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Encyclopædia

of

Religion and Ethics

Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

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VOLUME II

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PREFACE

BESIDES general books of reference, every one must now possess a work of reference covering the whole field of his own special studies with sufficient fullness. This Encyclopædia will cover the field of Religion and Ethics, the most widely interesting and the most important of all departments of thought.

1. The articles are written by those who have made a special study of their subject, and are recognized as most competent to write upon it. Attention is given to grace of style, so that the articles may be read with pleasure as well as relied upon for accuracy and insight.

2. The articles are full enough to give the reader a good working acquaintance with their subject; and to each article is added a select bibliography for the use of those who wish to pursue the subject further.

3. The range of the Encyclopædia is well defined. Religion and Ethics can no longer be studied separately with any profit. They are accordingly dealt with together; but each topic, whether religious or ethical, or both, will be found under its own appropriate title. The Encyclopædia will contain an account of all beliefs and customs which belong to Religion or Ethics throughout the world. It will also contain articles on the religions themselves, or on the nations professing them. And when a belief or custom belongs to more religions than one, or is found in more than one place, it will often be described in a series of articles, each article being written by a scholar of the particular religion or country.

4. Much attention is given to social topics which have an ethical or religious aspect.

5. The Encyclopædia includes some account of such persons and places as are important in the history of Religion and Ethics.

In issuing the second volume of the Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, the Editor desires to acknowledge with thankfulness the generous reception that has been given to the first volume.

The difficulties of the task have been recognized, but it has been acknowledged, and that most handsomely in the reviews of greatest weight, that these difficulties have been successfully overcome, and that (in the words of the Harvard Review) 'the Encyclopædia will be indispensable to the student of any part of its wide field.'

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Binding and Loosing.

MURRAY (JOHN CLARK), LL.D. (Glas.), F.R.S.C.
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy in McGill University, Montreal.
Bigotry.

MURRAY (ROBERT HENRY), M.A. Litt.D.
Assistant Chaplain of the Royal Hibernian Military School, Dublin; Lecturer in History at Alexandra College, Dublin; author of *Revolutionary Ireland and its Settlement.*
Blackmail.

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Professor at Maulbronn; author of *Syriac Grammar, Septuagintastudien, Philologica Sacra, Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the Greek New Testament*; editor of the *New Testament in Greek, German, and Latin*; contributor to *The Expository Times.*
Azazel.

NICHOLSON (REYNOLD ALLEYNE), M.A., Litt.D.
Lecturer in Persian in the University of Cambridge; sometime Fellow of Trinity College.
Asceticism (Muslim).

NICOL (THOMAS), D.D.
Professor of Biblical Criticism in the University of Aberdeen; Croall Lecturer, 1898; Baird Lecturer, 1907.
Baxter.

OESTERLEY (Rev. W. O. E.), D.D. (Cantab.).
Lecturer to the Palestine Exploration Fund; Examiner in Hebrew and Greek in the University of London; joint-author of *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue.*
Badges, Banners.

OMAN (JOHN), D.Phil. (Edin.).
Professor of Systematic Theology in Westminster College, Cambridge.
Boasting.

PARKER (EDWARD HARPER), M.A.
Professor of Chinese at the Victoria University, Manchester; formerly H.M. Consul at Kiungchow.
Blessedness (Chinese).

PATON (Rev. LEWIS BAYLES), Ph.D., D.D.
Nettleton Professor of Old Testament Exegesis and Criticism, and Instructor in Assyrian, in the Hartford Theological Seminary; late Director of the American School of Archæology in Jerusalem; author of *The Early History of Syria and Palestine, Jerusalem in Bible Times,* 'Esther' in the *International Critical Commentary.*
Ashtart, Atargatis, Ate, Baal.

PEAKE (ARTHUR SAMUEL), M.A., D.D.
Professor of Biblical Exegesis in the University of Manchester; Tutor in the Primitive Methodist College, Manchester, and Lecturer in Lancashire Independent College; sometime Fellow of Merton College, and Lecturer in Mansfield College, Oxford.
Basilides.

PEARSON (A. C.), M.A.
Late Scholar of Christ's College, Cambridge.
Atheism (Greek and Roman).

PILOT (WILLIAM), D.D., D.C.L.
Canon of St. John's Cathedral, Newfoundland; Examining Chaplain and Bishop's Commissary.
Beothuks.

PINCHES (THEOPHILUS GOLDRIDGE), LL.D. (Glas.), M.R.A.S.
Lecturer in Assyrian at University College, London, and at the Institute of Archæology, Liverpool; Hon. Member of the Société Asiatique.
Birth (Assyro-Babylonian).

POUSSIN (LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE), Docteur en philosophie et lettres (Liège), en langues orientales (Louvain).
Professeur de sanscrit à l'université de Gand; Co-directeur du Muséon; Membre de la R.A.S. et de la Société Asiatique.
Atheism (Buddhist), **Avalokitesvara, Blest, Abode of the** (Buddhist), **Bodhisattva.**

POWICKE (FREDERICK JAMES), M.A., Phil.D. (Rostock).
Hatherlow Parsonage, Cheshire; author of *John Norris of Bemerton; Henry Barrow, Separatist.*
Bogomils, Brownism.

POYNTING (JOHN HENRY), Sc.D., F.R.S.
Mason Professor of Physics, and Dean of the Faculty of Science, in the University of Birmingham.
Atomic Theory (Modern).

REID (JAMES SMITH), M.A., LL.D., Litt.D.
Fellow and Tutor of Gonville and Caius College, and Professor of Ancient History in the University of Cambridge.
Asceticism (Roman).

REVON (MICHEL), LL.D., D.Lit.
Late Professor of Law in the Imperial University of Tokyo and Legal Adviser to the Japanese Government; Professor of History of the Civilization of the Far East in the University of Paris; author of *Le Shinntoisme.*
Asceticism (Japanese).

ROBINSON (HENRY WHEELER), M.A. (Oxon. and Edin.).
Professor of Church History and of the Philosophy of Theism in Rawdon (Baptist) College; author of 'Hebrew Psychology in relation to Pauline Anthropology' in *Mansfield College Essays.*
Blood, Body, Bones.

ROSS (JOHN M. E.), M.A.
Minister of St. Paul's Presbyterian Church, Redhill; author of *The Self-Portraiture of Jesus.*
Bunyan.

ROUSE (WILLIAM HENRY DENHAM), M.A., Litt.D.
Headmaster of the Perse Grammar School, Cambridge; University Teacher of Sanskrit; President of the Folklore Society, 1904–6.
Axe.

ROYCE (JOSIAH), Ph.D., LL.D.
Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University; Gifford Lecturer at the University of Aberdeen, 1898–1900.
Axiom.

SANDAY (WILLIAM), D.D., Hon. D.D. (Edin., Durham, and Göttingen), Hon. LL.D. (Dublin), Hon. Litt.D. (Camb.).
Lady Margaret Professor and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; Chaplain in Ordinary to H.M. the King; Fellow of the British Academy.
Bible.

SAYCE (ARCHIBALD HENRY), Hon. D.Litt. (Oxon.), LL.D. (Dublin), Hon. D.D. (Edin. and Aberd.).
Fellow of Queen's College and Professor of Assyriology in the University of Oxford; President of the Society of Biblical Archæology.
Bull (Semitic).

SCHILLER (FERDINAND CANNING SCOTT), M.A., D.Sc. (Oxon.).
Fellow and Senior Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; author of *Studies in Humanism* (1907), *Plato or Protagoras* (1908).
Automatism.

SCHRADER (Dr. OTTO).
Ordentlicher Professor für vergleichende Sprachforschung an der Universität zu Breslau; author of *Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan Peoples.*
Aryan Religion, Blood-Feud (Aryan, Slavonic).

SCOTT (DAVID RUSSELL), M.A. (Edin.), B.A. (Oxon.).
Congregational Minister at Montrose; late Pusey and Ellerton Scholar in the University of Oxford, and Assistant Lecturer in New Testament Greek at Mansfield College.
Boldness.

SHAW (CHARLES GRAY), Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy in the University of New York; author of *Christianity and Modern Culture, The Precinct of Religion.*
Being.

SHOWERMAN (GRANT), Ph.D.
Professor of Latin in the University of Wisconsin; Fellow in the American School of Classical Studies at Rome, 1898–1900; Acting Secretary of the Wisconsin Branch of the Archæological Institute of America.
Attis.

SIEG (EMIL), Dr.Phil.
Ordentlicher Professor des Sanskrit und der vergleichenden indogermanischen Sprachwissenschaft in Kiel.
Bhrigu.

SIMPSON (JAMES YOUNG), M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S.E.
Professor of Natural Science in New College, Edinburgh.
Biology.

SMITH (GEORGE ARMITAGE), M.A., D.Lit.
Principal of Birkbeck College, London; formerly Dean of the Faculty of Economics in the University of London.
Barter.

SMITH (VINCENT ARTHUR), M.A.
Of the Indian Civil Service (retired); author of *Asoka* in 'Rulers of India,' *Early History of India.*
Asoka, Benares.

SÖDERBLOM (NATHAN), D.D. (Paris and Geneva).
Élève diplômé de l'École des Hautes Études; Professor of the University of Upsala; Member of the Chapter of Upsala; Prebendary of Holy Trinity in Upsala.
Asceticism (Persian).

SPENCE (LEWIS).
London; author of *Mythologies of Ancient Mexico and Peru, The Popol Vuh.*
Brazil.

STARBUCK (EDWIN DILLER), Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy in the State University of Iowa; author of *The Psychology of Religion.*
Backsliding.

STEWART (HUGH FRASER), B.D.
Fellow, Dean, and Lecturer, St. John's College, Cambridge.
Baptism by Blood.

STONE (DARWELL), M.A.
Pusey Librarian, Oxford; author of *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist.*
Berengar.

SUFFRIN (A. E.), M.A. (Oxon.).
Vicar of Waterlooville, Hants.
Asceticism (Jewish).

SUTHERLAND (Major W. D.).
Akola, Berar.
Birth (Hindu, popular).

TEMPLETON (THOMAS), M.A. (Edin.).
Minister of Panmure Street Congregational Church, Dundee.
Boys' Brigades.

THOMAS (NORTHCOTE WHITRIDGE).
Élève diplômé de l'École pratique des Hautes Études; Corresponding Member of the Société d'Anthropologie de Paris; Member of Council of the Folklore Society; author of *Thought Transference, Kinship Organization and Group Marriage in Australia.*
Australia.

THOMSON (J. ARTHUR), M.A.
Regius Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen; author of *The Study of Animal Life, The Science of Life, Outlines of Zoology, Heredity, The Bible of Nature.*
Atavism, Biogenesis.

THURSTON (HERBERT), B.A., S.J.
Joint-Editor of the Westminster Library for Priests and Students; author of the *Life of St. Hugh of Lincoln, The Holy Year of Jubilee, The Stations of the Cross.*
Bulls and Briefs.

TOD (DAVID MACRAE), M.A., B.D. (Edin.).
Minister of St. James' Presbyterian Church, Huddersfield; formerly Cunningham Fellow, New College, Edinburgh.
Avarice.

UPTON (CHARLES BARNES), B.A., B.Sc. (Lond.).
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy in Manchester College, Oxford; author of Hibbert Lectures on *The Bases of Religious Belief*, and of the philosophical portion of *Life and Letters of James Martineau.*
Atheism and Anti-theistic Theories.

WADDELL (L. AUSTINE), C.B., C.I.E., LL.D., F.L.S., F.R.A.I., Lt.-Colonel, I.M.S.
Professor of Tibetan in University College, London; author of *The Buddhism of Tibet, Lhasa and its Mysteries.*
Atisa, Bhutan (Buddhism in).

WALSHE (W. GILBERT), M.A.
Secretary of the Christian Literature Society for China
Birth (Chinese).

WARFIELD (BENJAMIN BRECKINRIDGE), D.D., LL.D.
Professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology in the Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. at Princeton, New Jersey.
Augustine.

WEBSTER (WENTWORTH), M.A.
Late of Sare, par St. Jean de Luz, Basses-Pyrénées.
Basques.

WESTERMARCK (EDWARD ALEXANDER), Ph.D.
Martin White Professor of Sociology in the University of London; Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Helsingfors, Finland; author of *The History of Human Marriage, The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas.*
Asylums.

WHITEHEAD (BENJAMIN), B.A.
Barrister-at-law; author of *Church Law.*
Brawling.

WILSON (GEORGE R.), M.D., M.R.C.P. (Edin.).
Late Medical Superintendent of Allanton House; author of *Drunkenness, Vice, and Insanity.*
Athletics.

WOOD (HERBERT G.), M.A.
Fellow, and Lecturer in History, of Jesus College, Cambridge.
Baptism (Later Christian).

WOODHOUSE (WILLIAM J.), M.A.
Professor of Greek in the University of Sydney, New South Wales.
Atimia.

WORKMAN (HERBERT B.), M.A., D.Lit.
Principal of Westminster Training College; Member of the Board of Studies in the Faculty of Theology, London University; author of *The Dawn of the Reformation, The Letters of John Hus, Persecution in the Early Church.*
Bernard of Clairvaux.

ZIMMERN (HEINRICH), Ph.D.
Professor of Oriental Languages in the University of Leipzig; author of *Grammatik der Semitischen Sprachen*; joint-editor of *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*, and of *Hebraisches und Aramaisches Worterbuch uber das Alte Testament.*
Babylonians and Assyrians.

ZÖCKLER (OTTO), Ph.D, Th.D
Late Professor of Church History and Apologetics in the University of Greifswald; author of *Kritische Geschichte der Askese.*
Asceticism (Christian).

CROSS-REFERENCES

In addition to the cross-references throughout the volume, the following list of minor references may be useful:

Topic.	Probable Title of Article
Artemis	Greek Religion.
Artemonites	Sects (Chr.).
Articles	Creeds.
Artotyrites	Sects (Chr.).
Aryaman	Vedic Religion.
Asana	Yoga.
Asananda	Ramanandis.
Ascension Day	Calendar (Chr.).
Ascitæ	Sects (Chr.).
Aseity	Solity.
Ash	Trees.
Ashanti Tribes	Bantu.
Asherah	Poles.
Ash-Wednesday	Calendar (Chr.).
Asiatic Brethren	Sects (Chr.).
Asmodæus	Spirits.
Ass	Animals.
Assassination	Crimes.
Assault	Crimes.
Assent	Inference, Judgment.
Assertiveness	Self-assertion.
Associate Church	Presbyterianism
Assyrian Christians	Nestorians.
Astarte	Ashtart, Ishtar.
Astodans	Death (Parsi).
Asturians	Sects (Chr.).
Asuras	Vedic Religion.
Aśvins	Vedic Religion.
Asylums (Lunatic)	Insanity.
,, (Inebriate)	Intemperance.
Atash-gah	Temple (Parsi).
Atharvaveda	Magic (Ved.), Vedas, Vedic Religion.
Athene	Greek Religion.
Attys, Atys	Attis.
Audæans	Sects (Chr.).
Audhūts	Atits.
Augustinian Monks	Monasticism.
Aurora Society	Communistic Societies.
Auto-da-Fé	Inquisition.
Avadhuts	Atits.
Avatara	Incarnation, Vedic Religion.
Aversion	Prophylactic Rites.
Avidya	Hinduism, Vedānta.
Avoidance	Prophylactic Rites.
Awakening	Orphism, Revival.
Awemba	Bantu, Nyanja Tribes.
Axinomancy	Divination.
Ayana	Abyssinia.
Ayodhya	Oudh.
Azarbaijan	Zoroaster.
Aztecs	Mexico.
Azymites	Sects (Chr.).
Babines	Carrier Indians.
Bacchanalia	Festivals (Rom.).
Bacchantes	Mænads.
Bacchus	Roman Religion.
Backbiting	Abuse.
Badagas	Todas.
Bætyls	Pillars.
Bagandas	Africa, Bantu.
Bagnolenses	Sects (Chr.).
Bahram Fire	Fire (Parsi)
Bahya	Ethics (Jew.).
Baj	Commemoration of the Dead (Parsi).
Balaamites	Nicolaitans.
Bali	Java, Bali, and Sumatra
Ballads	Poetry.
Band of Hope	Temperance.
Banns	Marriage.
Bardaisan	Gnosticism.
Barlaamites	Sects (Chr.).
Barotse	Bantu.
Basilisk	Animals.
Basutos	Bantu.
Bat	Animals.
Bear	Animals.
Bechuanas	Bantu.
Bedawīn	Arabs.
Bee	Animals.
Beel	Baal.
Beetle	Animals.
Beghards, Beguines	Religious Orders.
Behaism	Bāb.
Belgic Confession	Confessions.
Belit	Baal.
Belomancy	Divination.
Beltane	Festivals (Celtic).
Beltis	Baal.
Benedictines	Religious Orders.
Benediction	Cursing and Blessing.
Bethel	Stones (Sem.), Communistic Societies.
Bhikshu	Monasticism (Bud.).
Bhumij	Munda.
Bhuts	Spirits.
Bibliomancy	Divination.
Binitarian Monotheism	Monotheism.
Bird-Women	Sirens.
Bison	Animals.
Black Art	Magic.
Black Friars	Monasticism.
Blood-relationship	Consanguinity.
Blood-revenge	Blood-Feud
Bodh-gaya	Mahābōdhi.
Book of Common Prayer	Prayer (Chr.).
Book of Covenants	Mormonism.
Book of the Dead	Egyptian Religion.
Botocudos	Brazil.
Bo-tree	Trees.
Boy-Bishop	Abbot of Unreason.
Brahma Sampradayis	Madhavacharis
Broad Church	Church of England.
Buceros	Animals.
Buchanites	Sects (Chr.).
Buffalo	Animals.

SCHEME OF TRANSLITERATION

I. HEBREW

CONSONANTS

'	א	l	ל
b, bh	ב	m	מ
g, gh	ג	n	נ
d, dh	ד	s	ס
h	ה	'	ע
v, w	ו	p, ph	פ
z	ז	ṣ	צ
ḥ or ch	ח	q or ḳ	ק
ṭ	ט	r	ר
y or j	י	ś, sh	שׂ שׁ
k, kh	כ	t, th	ת

VOWELS

Short.		Long and Diphthongal.		Shᵉvas.		
a	ַ	ā	ָ	ă	ֲ	Composite shᵉvas.
e	ֶ	ē, ê	ֵ, ֵי	ĕ	ֱ	
i	ִ	î	ִי, ִי	ŏ	ֳ	
o	ָ	ō, ô	ֹ, וֹ	ᵉ	ְ	(simple shᵉva).
u	ֻ	û	וּ			

II. ARABIC

CONSONANTS

'	أ	d	ض
b	ب	ṭ	ط
t	ت	ẓ	ظ
th	ث	'	ع
j	ج	gh	غ
ḥ	ح	f	ف
ḫ	خ	q	ق
d	د	k	ك
dh	ذ	l	ل
r	ر	m	م
z	ز	n	ن
s	س	h	ه
sh	ش	v, w	و
ṣ	ص	y	ي

II. ARABIC—*continued*

VOWELS

Short.		Long.		Diphthong.	
a	ـَ	ā	ا ـَ	ai	ـَ ی
i	ـِ	ī	ی ـِ	au	ـَ و
u	ـُ	ū	و ـُ		

III. PERSIAN AND HINDUSTANI[1]

The following in addition to the Arabic transliteration above

p	پ	ẓ	ذ
ṭ	ٹ	r	ڑ
s	ث	zh	ژ
ch	چ	ż	ض
ḍ	ڈ	g	گ

[1] The diacritical marks in this scheme are sometimes omitted in transliteration when absolute accuracy is not required, the pronunciation of ṣ being the same as that of s, while z, ẓ, ż, are all pronounced alike

IV. SANSKRIT

CONSONANTS

Gutturals—k, kh; g, gh; ṅ (=ng in finger).
Palatals—ch (=ch in church), chh; j, jh; ñ (=n in onion).
Cerebrals—ṭ, th; ḍ, ḍh; ṇ (a sound peculiar to India).
Dentals—t, th; d, dh; n (=n in not).
Labials—p, ph; b, bh; m.
Semi-vowels—y; r; l; v.
Sibilants—ś or sh; ṣ or sh; s
Aspirate—h

anunāsika (ँ); anusvāra, ṁ; visarga, ḥ; avagraha (').

VOWELS

Simple.				Diphthongal.	
a	ā	or	â	e	āi
i	ī	or	î	o	āu
u	ū	or	û		
ṛ	ṝ				
ḷ					

LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

I. General

A.H. = Anno Hijrae (A.D. 622).
Ak. = Akkadian.
Alex. = Alexandrian.
Amer. = American.
Apoc. = Apocalypse, Apocalyptic.
Apocr. = Apocrypha.
Aq. = Aquila.
Arab. = Arabic.
Aram. = Aramaic.
Arm. = Armenian.
Ary. = Aryan.
As. = Asiatic.
Assyr. = Assyrian.
AT = Altes Testament.
AV = Authorized Version.
AVm = Authorized Version margin.
A.Y. = Anno Yazdigird (A.D. 639).
Bab. = Babylonian.
c. = *circa*, about.
Can. = Canaanite.
cf. = compare.
ct. = contrast.
D = Deuteronomist.
E = Elohist.
edd. = editions or editors.
Egyp. = Egyptian.
Eng. = English.
Eth. = Ethiopic.
EV = English Version.
f. = and following verse or page: as Ac 10^{34}f
ff. = and following verses or pages: as Mt 11^{28}ff.
Fr. = French.
Germ = German.
Gr. = Greek.
H = Law of Holiness.
Heb. = Hebrew.
Hel. = Hellenistic.
Hex. = Hexateuch.
Himy = Himyaritic.
Ir. = Irish.
Iran. = Iranian.
Isr. = Israelite.
J = Jahwist.
J″ = Jehovah.
Jerus. = Jerusalem.
Jos. = Josephus.
LXX = Septuagint.
Min. = Minæan.
MSS = Manuscripts.
MT = Massoretic Text.
n. = note
NT = New Testament.
Onk. = Onkelos.
OT = Old Testament.
P = Priestly Narrative
Pal. = Palestine, Palestinian.
Pent. = Pentateuch.
Pers. = Persian.
Phil. = Philistine.
Phœn. = Phœnician.
Pr. Bk = Prayer Book.
R = Redactor.
Rom = Roman.
RV = Revised Version.
RVm = Revised Version margin.
Sab. = Sabæan.
Sam. = Samaritan.
Sem. = Semitic
Sept. = Septuagint
Sin. = Sinaitic
Skr. = Sanskrit
Symm. = Symmachus.
Syr. = Syriac.
t. (following a number) = times.
Talm = Talmud
Targ. = Targum.
Theod = Theodotion.
TR = Textus Receptus.
tr = translated or translation.
VSS = Versions
Vulg. = Vulgate.
WH = Westcott and Hort's text.

II. Books of the Bible

Old Testament.

Gn = Genesis.
Ex = Exodus.
Lv = Leviticus.
Nu = Numbers.
Dt = Deuteronomy.
Jos = Joshua.
Jg = Judges.
Ru = Ruth.
1 S, 2 S = 1 and 2 Samuel.
1 K, 2 K = 1 and 2 Kings.
1 Ch, 2 Ch = 1 and 2 Chronicles.
Ezr = Ezra.
Neh = Nehemiah.
Est = Esther.
Job.
Ps = Psalms.
Pr = Proverbs.
Ec = Ecclesiastes.
Ca = Canticles.
Is = Isaiah.
Jer = Jeremiah.
La = Lamentations.
Ezk = Ezekiel.
Dn = Daniel.
Hos = Hosea.
Jl = Joel.
Am = Amos.
Ob = Obadiah.
Jon = Jonah.
Mic = Micah.
Nah = Nahum.
Hab = Habakkuk.
Zeph = Zephaniah.
Hag = Haggai.
Zec = Zechariah.
Mal = Malachi.

Apocrypha.

1 Es, 2 Es = 1 and 2 Esdras.
To = Tobit.
Jth = Judith.
Ad. Est = Additions to Esther.
Wis = Wisdom.
Sir = Sirach or Ecclesiasticus.
Bar = Baruch
Three = Song of the Three Children.
Sus = Susanna.
Bel = Bel and the Dragon.
Pr. Man = Prayer of Manasses.
1 Mac, 2 Mac = 1 and 2 Maccabees.

New Testament.

Mt = Matthew.
Mk = Mark.
Lk = Luke.
Jn = John.
Ac = Acts.
Ro = Romans
1 Co, 2 Co = 1 and 2 Corinthians.
Gal = Galatians.
Eph = Ephesians
Ph = Philippians.
Col = Colossians.
1 Th, 2 Th = 1 and 2 Thessalonians.
1 Ti, 2 Ti = 1 and 2 Timothy.
Tit = Titus.
Philem = Philemon.
He = Hebrews.
Ja = James
1 P, 2 P = 1 and 2 Peter.
1 Jn, 2 Jn, 3 Jn = 1, 2, and 3 John.
Jude.
Rev = Revelation.

III. For the Literature

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

Baethgen = *Beiträge zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, 1888.
Baldwin = *Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology*, 3 vols. 1901–1905.
Barth = *Nominalbildung in den sem. Sprachen*, 2 vols. 1889, 1891 (2nd ed. 1894).
Benzinger = *Heb. Archaologie*, 1894.
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Doughty = *Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols. 1888.
Grimm = *Deutsche Mythologie*[4], 3 vols. 1875–1878, Eng. tr. *Teutonic Mythology*, 4 vols. 1882–1888.
Hamburger = *Realencyclopadie fur Bibel u. Talmud*, i. 1870 ([2]1892), ii. 1883, suppl. 1886, 1891 f., 1897.
Holder = *Altceltischer Sprachschatz*, 1891 ff.
Holtzmann-Zopffel = *Lexicon f. Theol. u. Kirchenwesen*[2], 1895.
Howitt = *Native Tribes of S. E. Australia*, 1904.
Jastrow = *Die Religion Bab. u. Assyriens*, 2 vols. 1905–
Jubainville = *Cours de Litt. Celtique*, i.–xii., 1883 ff.
Lagrange = *Études sur les religions Sémitiques*[2], 1904.
Lane = *An Arabic English Dictionary*, 1863 ff.
Lang = *Myth, Ritual and Religion*[2], 2 vols. 1899.
Lepsius = *Denkmäler aus Ægypten u. Æthiopien*, 1849–1860.
Lichtenberger = *Encyc. des sciences religieuses*, 1876.
Lidzbarski = *Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik et Ephemeris*, 1898.
McCurdy = *History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, 2 vols. 1894–1896.
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Nowack = *Lehrbuch d. Heb. Archäologie*, 2 vols. 1894.
Pauly-Wissowa = *Realencyc. der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 1894.
Perrot-Chipiez = *Hist. de l'Art dans l'Antiquité*, 1881 ff.
Preller = *Romische Mythologie*, 1858.
Réville = *Religion des peuples non-civilisés*, 1883.
Riehm = *Handworterbuch d. bibl. Altertums*[2], 1893–1894.
Robinson = *Biblical Researches in Palestine*[2], 1856.
Roscher = *Lex. d. Gr. u. Röm. Mythologie*, 1884.
Schenkel = *Bibel-Lexicon*, 5 vols. 1869–1875.
Schürer = *GJV*[3], 3 vols. 1898–1901 [*HJP*, 5 vols. 1890 ff.].
Schwally = *Leben nach dem Tode*, 1892.
Siegfried-Stade = *Heb. Worterbuch zum AT*, 1893.
Smend = *Lehrbuch der alttest. Religionsgesch.*[2], 1899.
Smith (G. A.) = *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*[4], 1896.
Smith (W. R.) = *Religion of the Semites*[2], 1894.
Spencer (H.) = *Principles of Sociology*[3], 1885–1896.
Spencer-Gillen[a] = *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899.
Spencer-Gillen[b] = *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 1904.
Swete = *The OT in Greek*, 3 vols. 1893 ff.
Tylor (E. B.) = *Primitive Culture*[3], 1891 [[4]1903].
Ueberweg = *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols. 1872–1874.
Weber = *Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud u. verwandten Schriften*[2], 1897.
Wiedemann = *Die Religion der alten Ægypter*, 1890 [Eng. tr., revised, 'Religion of the Egyptians,' 1897].
Wilkinson = *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, 3 vols. 1878.
Zunz = *Die gottesdienstlichen Vortrage der Juden*[2], 1892.

2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopædias, and other standard works frequently cited.

AA = Archiv für Anthropologie.
AAOJ = American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.
ABAW = Abhandlungen d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
AE = Archiv für Ethnographie.
AEGL = Assyr. and Eng. Glossary (Johns Hopkins University).
AGG = Abhandlungen d. Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
AGPh = Archiv f. Geschichte der Philosophie.
AHR = American Historical Review.
AHT = Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).
AJPh = American Journal of Philosophy.
AJPs = American Journal of Psychology.
AJRPE = American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.
AJSL = American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
AJTh = American Journal of Theology.
AMG = Annales du Musée Guimet.
APES = American Palestine Exploration Society.
APF = Archiv f. Papyrusforschung.
AR = Anthropological Review.
ARW = Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.
AS = Acta Sanctorum (Bollandus).
ASG = Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
ASoc = L'Année Sociologique.
ASWI = Archæological Survey of W. India.
AZ = Allgemeine Zeitung.
BAG = Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.
BASS = Beiträge zur Assyriologie u. sem. Sprachwissenschaft (edd. Delitzsch and Haupt).
BCH = Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.
BE = Bureau of Ethnology.
BG = Bombay Gazetteer.
BJ = Bellum Judaicum (Josephus).
BL = Bampton Lectures.
BLE = Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique.
BOR = Bab. and Oriental Record.
BS = Bibliotheca Sacra.
BSA = Annual of the British School at Athens.
BSAA = Bulletin de la Société archéologique à Alexandrie.
BSAL = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie de Lyon.
BSAP = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie, etc., Paris.
BSG = Bulletin de la Soc. de Géographie.
BTS = Buddhist Text Society.
BW = Biblical World.
BZ = Biblische Zeitschrift.
CAIBL = Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
CBTS = Calcutta Buddhist Text Society.
CF = Childhood of Fiction (MacCulloch).
CGS = Cults of the Greek States (Farnell).

CI = Census of India.
CIA = Corpus Inscrip. Atticarum.
CIG = Corpus Inscrip. Græcarum.
CIL = Corpus Inscrip. Latinarum.
CIS = Corpus Inscrip. Semiticarum.
COT = Cuneiform Inscriptions and the OT [Eng. tr. of *KAT*²; see below].
CR = Contemporary Review.
CeR = Celtic Review.
ClR = Classical Review.
CQR = Church Quarterly Review.
CSEL = Corpus Script. Eccles. Latinorum.
DACL = Dict. d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie (Cabrol).
DB = Dictionary of the Bible.
DCA = Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith-Cheetham).
DCB = Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith-Wace).
DCG = Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels.
DI = Dict. of Islam (Hughes).
DNB = Dictionary of National Biography.
DPhP = Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.
DWAW = Denkschriften der Wiener Akad. der Wissenschaften.
EBi = Encyclopædia Biblica.
EBr = Encyclopædia Britannica.
EEFM = Egyp. Explor. Fund Memoirs.
ERE = The present work.
Exp = Expositor.
ExpT = Expository Times.
FHG = Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum, coll. C. Müller (Paris, 1885).
FL = Folklore.
FLJ = Folklore Journal.
FLR = Folklore Record.
GA = Gazette Archéologique.
*GB*² = Golden Bough ² (Frazer).
GGA = Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.
GGN = Göttingische Gelehrte Nachrichten (Nachrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen).
GIAP = Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie.
GIrP = Grundriss d. Iranischen Philologie.
GJV = Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes.
GVI = Geschichte des Volkes Israel.
HDB = Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible.
HE = Historia Ecclesiastica.
HGHL = Historical Geography of the Holy Land (G. A. Smith).
HI = History of Israel.
HJ = Hibbert Journal.
HJP = History of the Jewish People.
HN = Historia Naturalis (Pliny).
HWB = Handwörterbuch.
IA = Indian Antiquary.
ICC = International Critical Commentary.
ICO = International Congress of Orientalists.
ICR = Indian Census Report (1901).
IGA = Inscrip. Græcæ Antiquissimæ.
IGI = Imperial Gazetteer of India ² (1885); new edition (1908-1909).
IJE = International Journal of Ethics.
ITL = International Theological Library.
JA = Journal Asiatique.
JAFL = Journal of American Folklore.
JAI = Journal of the Anthropological Institute.
JAOS = Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB = Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.
JBL = Journal of Biblical Literature.
JBTS = Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JD = Journal des Débats.
JDTh = Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie.
JE = Jewish Encyclopedia.
JGOS = Journal of the German Oriental Society.
JHC = Johns Hopkins University Circulars.
JHS = Journal of Hellenic Studies.
JLZ = Jenaer Litteraturzeitung.
JPh = Journal of Philology.
JPTh = Jahrbücher f. protest. Theologie.
JPTS = Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JQR = Jewish Quarterly Review.
JRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JRASBe = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bengal branch.
JRASBo = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay branch.
JRASJ = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Soc., Japan.
JRGS = Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
JThSt = Journal of Theological Studies.
*KAT*² = Die Keilinschriften und das AT (Schrader), 1883.
*KAT*³ = Zimmern-Winckler's ed. of the preceding [really a totally distinct work], 1903.
KB or *KIB* = Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek (Schrader), 1889 ff.
KGF = Keilinschriften und die Geschichtsforschung, 1878.
LCBl = Literarisches Centralblatt.
LOPh = Literaturblatt f. Oriental. Philologie.
LOT = Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).
LP = Legend of Perseus (Hartland).
LSSt = Leipziger sem. Studien.
M = Mélusine.
MAIBL = Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
MBAW = Monatsbericht d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
MGH = Monumenta Germaniæ Historica (Pertz).
MGJV = Mittheilungun der Gesellschaft für jüdische Volkskunde.
MGWJ = Monatsbericht f. Geschichte u. Wissenschaft des Judentums.
MI = Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (Westermarck).
MNDPV = Mittheilungen u. Nachrichten des deutschen Palastina-Vereins.
MR = Methodist Review.
MVG = Mittheilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft.
MWJ = Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.
NBAC = Nuovo Bulletino di Archeologia Cristiana.
NC = Nineteenth Century.
NHWB = Neuhebraisches Wörterbuch.
NINQ = North Indian Notes and Queries.
NKZ = Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.
NQ = Notes and Queries.
NR = Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).
NTZG = Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte.
OED = Oxford English Dictionary (Murray).
OLZ = Orientalische Litteraturzeitung.
OS = Onomastica Sacra.
OTJC = Old Testament in the Jewish Church.
OTP = Oriental Translation Fund Publications.
PAOS = Proceedings of American Oriental Society.
PASB = Proceedings of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.
PB = Polychrome Bible (English).
PBE = Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology.
PEFM = Palestine Exploration Fund Memoirs.
PEFSt = Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement.
PG = Patrologia Græca (Migne).
PJB = Preussische Jahrbucher.
PL = Patrologia Latina (Migne).
PNQ = Punjab Notes and Queries.
PR = Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).
*PRE*³ = Prot. Realencyclopädie (Herzog-Hauck).
PRR = Presbyterian and Reformed Review.
PRS = Proceedings of the Royal Society.
PRSE = Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
PSBA = Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology.
PTS = Pāli Text Society.

RA = Revue Archéologique
RAnth = Revue d'Anthropologie
RAS = Royal Asiatic Society.
RAssyr = Revue d'Assyriologie.
RB = Revue Biblique.
RBEW = Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington)
RC = Revue Critique.
RCel = Revue Celtique.
RCh = Revue Chrétienne.
RDM = Revue des Deux-Mondes.
RE = Realencyclopädie.
REg = Revue Égyptologique.
REJ = Revue des Études Juives.
REth = Revue d'Ethnographie.
RHLR = Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses.
RHR = Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.
RN = Revue Numismatique.
RP = Records of the Past.
RPh = Revue Philosophique.
RQ = Romische Quartalschrift.
RS = Revue sémitique d'Epigraphie et d'Hist. ancienne.
RSA = Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.
RSI = Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.
RTAP = Recueil de Travaux rélatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.
RTP = Revue des traditions populaires.
RThPh = Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.
RTr = Recueil de Travaux.
RWB = Realworterbuch.
SBAW = Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
SBE = Sacred Books of the East.
SBOT = Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew)
SDB = Single-vol Dictionary of the Bible (Hastings).
SK = Studien u Kritiken.
SMA = Sitzungsberichte der Munchener Akademie.
SSGW = Sitzungsberichte d. Kgl. Sachs. Gesellsch d. Wissenschaften.
SWAW = Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akad. d. Wissenschaften
TAPA = Transactions of American Philological Association.
TASJ = Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan.
TES = Transactions of Ethnological Society.
ThLZ = Theologische Litteraturzeitung.
ThT = Theol. Tijdschrift.
TRHS = Transactions of Royal Historical Society.
TRSE = Transactions of Royal Society of Edinburgh.
TS = Texts and Studies.
TSBA = Transactions of the Society of Biblical Archæology.
TU = Texte u. Untersuchungen.
WAI = Western Asiatic Inscriptions.
WZKM = Wiener Zeitschrift f. Kunde des Morgenlandes.
ZA = Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.
ZA = Zeitschrift für ägyp. Sprache u. Altertumswissenschaft.
ZATW = Zeitschrift fur die alttest. Wissenschaft.
ZCK = Zeitschrift fur christliche Kunst.
ZCP = Zeitschrift fur celtische Philologie.
ZDA = Zeitschrift fur deutsches Altertum.
ZDMG = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlandischen Gesellschaft.
ZDPV = Zeitschrift des deutschen Palastina-Vereins.
ZE = Zeitschrift fur Ethnologie.
ZKF = Zeitschrift fur Keilschriftforschung.
ZKT = Zeitschrift fur kathol. Theologie.
ZKWL = Zeitschrift fur kirchl. Wissenschaft u. kirchl. Leben.
ZM = Zeitschrift fur die Mythologie.
ZNTW = Zeitschrift fur die neutest. Wissenschaft.
ZPhP = Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Padagogik.
ZTK = Zeitschrift fur Theologie u. Kirche.
ZVK = Zeitschrift fur Volkskunde.
ZVRW = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
ZWT = Zeitschrift fur wissenschaftliche Theologie

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as *KAT*^{2}, *LOT*^{6}, etc.]

ENCYCLOPÆDIA

OF

RELIGION AND ETHICS

ARTHUR, ARTHURIAN CYCLE.—The Arthurian cycle is a body of legend that has grown up around the name of the British hero, Arthur. There appears to be no reason for doubting that Arthur was one of the leaders of the Britons against the English in the 6th cent. A.D., but nothing further concerning him can be stated with certainty. Among the Britons themselves legends appear to have readily attached themselves to his name, as they did to the names of other British heroes, while to the original Arthurian legend itself legends of other heroes became appended, so that in the Middle Ages the Arthurian cycle of romance had attained an extraordinary development. In France, especially, the cycle was the successor in popularity to that of Charlemagne, and, like other legends, either in France or in Britain, it was combined with certain legendary narratives of the Church to form the story of the finding of the Holy Grail, the Cup from which Christ drank at the Last Supper.

The name Arthur is Brythonic (the Celtic tongue of the Britons), a language which came later to be differentiated into Welsh, Breton, and Cornish. Though Brythonic in form, the name Arthur is probably borrowed from Latin, like many other Brythonic names, such as Urien (Urbigena), Owein (Eugenius), Geraint (Gerontius), Padarn (Paternus), Emrys (Ambrosius), Custennin (Constantinus), Rhufawn (Romanus), Anarawd (Honoratus), Rhystud (Restitutus).* The Latin original of Arthur is Artorius, a name found in Greek letters in Clement of Alexandria, and at Khamisa in an inscription dedicated to the goddess Noreia by G. Artorius Tertullus. Another form of it is probably Artūrius, found in Juvenal (*Sat.* iii. 29). The later Latinized form Arturus or Arthurus and the Irish Artur are based on the British form, and of this the French form Artus and the Italian Artù are also corruptions. In Wales the name Arthur does not appear to have been common, but there is an example of it in the *Book of Llan Dâv* (Oxf. 1893, pp. 77 and 133) and also in one of the pedigrees, as that of Arthur, father of Noe or Nouy (also written Nougoy), a member of the royal line of Dyfed (Demetia). In the Osney Charter of 1129 the name Gaufridus Arturus (probably Geoffrey of Monmouth) occurs as that of one of the witnesses. The fact that the name Arthur is a genuine phonetic derivative of a real, though rare, Latin name is strong evidence of its authenticity, and the probability is that it was preserved, like other Welsh names of the Saxon period, in some genealogy or rudimentary chronicle, such as the nucleus of Nennius, which Prof. Zimmer (in his *Nennius Vindicatus*) thinks was composed at Dumbarton or Carlisle.

Attempts have been made from the evidence of Arthurian place names to determine the region of Britain with which Arthur was most closely associated; but, in spite of the researches of Mr. Stuart-Glennie (author of *Arthurian Localities*) and others, it cannot be said that these attempts have been successful, inasmuch as the later popularity of Arthur led to the naming of many places after him. The oldest indications make it probable that, like other prominent post-Roman Britons, he came from the zone of the North. Certain ruling families of Wales, such as those of Coel, Cunedda Wledig, and Cynfarch, maintained even into mediæval times the tradition (supported by Nennius) that they were settlers in Wales from the North, and styled themselves in their pedigrees 'The Men of the North' (for the northern associations of the Arthurian and kindred legends see the writer's articles in the *Celtic Review* for Oct. 1907 and Jan. 1908 on 'Wales and the Ancient Britons of the North'). The northern zones in question appear to be two: (1) that of Caer Alclud (Dumbarton), and (2) that of Dineiddin (Edinburgh). In an early stratum of Arthurian legend Arthur seems to be closely associated with Caw o Brydyn (Caw of Pictland), the father of Gildas and Aneirin (a Welsh poet), and of many of the saints of Anglesey. In the 12th cent. *Life of Gildas*, Arthur is represented as making war against Hueil, king of Scotland, one of the sons of this Caw. How early the name of Arthur came to be associated with the local legends of Wales it is hard to say, but it is significant that the name of one of Arthur's closest companions, from the very first appearance of the legend in the Welsh literature, is that of Cai (the Sir Kay of the Romances), whose name is found in that of Caer Gai, near Bala in North Wales, a place also known as Caer Gynyr, after the name of Cai's father Cynyr. An old Welsh poem which survives in the *Red Book of Hergest* mentions a *Ffynnon Vedwyr* ('the Spring of Bedivere'), but its locality is unknown. Through its entry into local legend in Wales and in other parts of the Brythonic world, the name of Arthur became attached to the characteristic stories of Celtic folklore, of which numerous examples are given by Professor Sir John Rhys in his *Celtic Folklore, Welsh and Manx* (1901), notably to those of the Other World, a type in which the folklore of Celtic countries abounds. It is not necessary to suppose that the names which that

* In this art. the spelling of Celtic names follows that now generally adopted by Celtic scholars, except in a few cases, where the actual spelling of the mediæval documents has been retained.

of Arthur may have supplanted in such stories bore any resemblance to it in sound or derivation.

In dealing with the Arthurian cycle, it will be convenient to give its place, first, in the tradition found in Cymric literature; secondly, in the Chronicles; and, thirdly, in the Romances.

1. **Arthur in Cymric tradition.**—The chief MSS in which fragments of this tradition are to be found are: (1) *The Black Book of Carmarthen* (verse, 12th cent.), (2) *The Book of Aneirin* (verse, 13th cent.), (3) *The Book of Taliessin* (verse, early 14th cent.), (4) *The White Book of Rhydderch* (prose, 14th cent.), and (5) *The Red Book of Hergest* (prose and verse, late 14th and 15th cents.). *The Triads of Arthur and his Men*, which are found in a Hengwrt MS of the 13th cent., are also important, as showing with what other legendary cycles that of Arthur was then, and probably earlier, associated in Wales. A considerable amount of the matter contained in the MSS, especially in the case of the oldest poetry, is older than the period of the MSS themselves. The Cymric tradition has many affinities with that of Geoffrey of Monmouth, but it has many features which are quite independent of Geoffrey, and which show that, while Geoffrey in some points borrowed from it, he either neglected or was ignorant of certain other important portions of it.

Of those above named, the MS which gives the clearest indication of containing pre-Norman matter is the *Book of Aneirin* (now in the Cardiff Free Library), since in one of its poems the scribe, in the course of copying a poem called *Gorchan Maeldderw*, departed from his usual practice of changing the orthography into that of his own time, and copied that of his archetype practically unmodified, thus showing that this archetype was written in a style of spelling in many points identical with that of the pre-Norman glosses of Wales. In this clearly pre-Norman poem the name of Arthur occurs in the words 'bei ef arthur' ('even if he were Arthur'). The poem in question is practically identical in many of its lines with the *Gododin*, which forms the main portion of the MS, and thus suggests that the name of Arthur was held in high respect in the zone of poetry to which the *Gododin* belongs. This zone is essentially one composed in praise of the family of Cynfarch, to which Cynon ab Clydno Eiddin, the chief hero of the *Gododin*, belonged, and also Urien Rheged, whose son Owein is the original of Chrétien de Troyes's *Yvain*. With this family was associated the poet Llywarch Hen, and Elphin, the friend of Taliessin, and other heroes, whose names with brief records of their memory are given in the *Gododin* in connexion with the battle of Cattraeth (one of the famous battles of Welsh bardic tradition), in which they were said to have taken part. From all indications, the historical stock-in-trade of the Welsh bards seems to have contained short lists of famous battles, such as Cattraeth, Gwenystrad, Argoed Llwyfain, Badon, and Camlan. The two last were among the chief battles of the Arthurian tradition. In Welsh, as in other legend, the prominent heroes of one period tended to sink into the background of action in that of a later date, or else to survive as vaguely imposing figures, present, as it were, behind the scenes. Cynon ab Clydno Eiddin, Caw of Pictland, and Brychan Brycheiniog are names of this type in Welsh mediæval literature, while in the Cymric Arthurian tradition Arthur's warriors undoubtedly play a much more active part in the story than he does himself. This fact has often been wrongly interpreted as implying that the legend of Arthur himself was not in any way developed in Wales (a view which, in face of the significant allusions to Arthur in Welsh literature, is quite untenable), while the truth seems to be that it was so long established in Wales that to it were attached other legends, whose heroes came to loom more largely in action than Arthur, their sovereign chief. In the stock-in-trade of the bards and story-tellers of Wales, from whom the remnants of old Welsh poetry and narrative have come down, Arthur appears to have held distinctly a place of honour, and the various portions in which this stock-in-trade of legend reveals itself bear witness to the same tale. This stock-in-trade, though the stories composing it were heterogeneous in origin and in local association, yet preserved a certain unity from its professional character, and portions of it can easily be detected in various parts of old Welsh literature. In the *Triads*, in the account of Arthur's Court found in *Kulhwch and Olwen*, in the *Book of Aneirin*, in a group of Arthurian poems in the *Black Book of Carmarthen*, in the *Stanzas of the Graves*, in the poetry of the *Book of Taliessin*, in the Llywarch Hen poems of the *Black Book of Carmarthen* and the *Red Book of Hergest*, certain associated groups of names come to view which show clearly the body of legend to which they belong. It is significant that in all these legendary clusters the name of Arthur appears. It is true that he is not once mentioned in the *Four Branches of the Mabinogi*, in the *Dream of Maxen*, or in *Lludd and Llevelys*; but the reason is that, in the *Mabinogion* in their present re-cast form, a certain chronological arrangement is implied which would make any reference to Arthur anachronistic in a story that was meant to be pre-Saxon. In the *Book of Taliessin* and in the lists of Arthur's men in *Kulhwch and Olwen*—the least altered of the *Mabinogion* stories—no such regard for chronology is shown, and in the latter Arthur is said to have been related to the 'Men of Caer Dathyl' on his mother's side. It is significant that, even in Chrétien and the later romances, many of the names of those who are associated with Arthur are those of well-known heroes of the Cymric tradition. If this tradition was carried into Cornwall or Brittany, the extreme scantiness of the heroic literature of these provinces in mediæval times makes it exceedingly difficult to judge of the extent of the transference, and it may well be that it was only fractional in character, though Arthur himself may have attained a high degree of legendary popularity, as Alanus ab Insulis suggests when he says in the second half of the 12th cent. that in Brittany any one who should deny Arthur's return would arouse the deep hatred of his hearers.

In the *Stanzas of the Graves* (given in the *Black Book of Carmarthen*), a series of verses kindred to the elegies of Llywarch Hen, the various heroes of the Cymric cycle are commemorated, and among them in one stanza are named March (the King Mark of the Tristan legend), Gwythur (the rival of the fairy king Gwyn, son of Nudd), Gugaun of the Red Sword, and Arthur. Each of the first three heroes is said to have a grave, but the grave of Arthur is said to be 'anoeth bid' ('the object for which the world searches'). The word 'anoeth' meant 'difficult,' as it still does in the Dimetian dialect of Welsh, and was used for the object of a difficult search, as in the Arthurian story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*. In the *Black Book of Carmarthen*, where these stanzas occur, there are other poems that contain direct or indirect allusions to Arthur. For example, in an elegy upon Geraint, son of Erbin (the Erec of Chrétien de Troyes), Arthur, for whom Geraint is said to have fought at the battle of Llongborth, is called 'the emperor, the ruler of the toil.' The significance of an allusion such as this, as indicating the place of Arthur in Welsh story, is clear. The site of Llongborth is unknown, but the men of Geraint are

said to have come from the region of Dyfneint (the Dumnonii). Poem xxxi. in the same MS is clearly Arthurian; but it is important to observe that it is one of a group in which the story of Arthur is associated with a cluster of names from the bardic tradition. Poem xxx., for example, though it does not name Arthur, yet mentions his horse Cavall, the Cabal of Nennius, the mark of whose hoof, according to that chronicler, was left on a mountain near Builth when Arthur was hunting the Porcus Troit (y Twrch Trwyth). In *Kulhwch and Olwen*, Cavall is erroneously given as the name of Arthur's dog. In the same poem, too, is mentioned Owein Reged, the Yvain of Chrétien. In the obviously Arthurian poem (No. xxxi.) there is a picture of Arthur and his men that is entirely distinct from those of Geoffrey and the Romances, and much more akin to that of the story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*. Arthur and his men arrive at a fortress (for what purpose is not stated, but it may have been for the rescue of one of their lost companions). Among his men are Cei Wyn (Kei the Blessed); Bedwyr (Bedivere); Mabon, son of Modron (an old deity, Mapŏnos, son of Matrŏna); Mabon, son of Mellt (Lightning); Manawyddan, son of Llyr (Manannan mac Lir of Irish legend, a hero of the *Four Branches*); Llacheu, Arthur's son (who is unknown to Geoffrey); and others. Some of the topographical allusions, such as those to Traetheu Trywruid (probably the Solway Firth) and Mynydd Eiddin (the mountain of Edinburgh, possibly Arthur's Seat), are to the North. As in *Kulhwch and Olwen*, expeditions to the wild country of the North, *gwrthtir uffern* ('the wild land of Hades'), as it is called, appear to have been a favourite theme of the Welsh Cymric Arthurian tradition; and for the men of North Wales, North Britain appears to have been the natural way of getting into the Other World by land, while the men of South Wales may have had their corresponding entrance into it in Cornwall. The poem in question, too, like the story of *Kulhwch and Olwen* and portions of the lives of the Welsh saints, describes Arthur and his men as being in conflict with certain pests, both animal and human, and, among the latter, with certain militant hags or witches (Welsh, *gwiddonod*). Even in the Welsh story of Peredur (the Percival of the Romances) there is an account of a conflict with the Witches of Gloucester (*Gwidonot Caerloyw*). One of the monsters mentioned in poem xxxi. is the 'Paluc cat' (*Cath Paluc*), also mentioned in one of the *Triads*. Poem xxxiii., though not referring to any exploits of Arthur, mentions his son Llacheu, 'the marvellous in song,' in words put into the mouth of a speaker who refers to certain other of the stock characters of the Welsh bardic tradition, such as Gwyn, son of Nudd; Creurdilad, daughter of Lludd (the Cordelia of Geoffrey); Guendoleu, son of Keidaw (the Gwenddoleu of the Myrddin legend); Bran, son of Iwerydd (the latter possibly his mother's name); and Gwyddneu Garanhir (a prominent character in a legend of inundation). With this poem is closely linked poem xxxv., which mentions Taliessin, while it also alludes to two of the chief characters of Math ab Mathonwy (Lleu and Gwydion), whose names and legends were associated with the places Nant Lleu (now Nantlle), Din Lleu (now Dinlle), and Bryn Gwydion in Carnarvonshire, and Moel Gwydion near Trawsfynydd in Merionethshire.

From this stock of narrative certain historical names other than that of Arthur, such as that of Maelgwn Gwynedd (the Maglocŭnos of Gildas), were far from being excluded, and that of Maelgwn occurs in this poem. As suggestive of the association of the Arthurian legend with Monmouthshire as well as with the North Wales zones in question, it may be mentioned that the *Liber Landavensis* (early 12th cent.) alludes to two streams whose names are identical with those of Arthur's sons (Llecheu or Llacheu and Amhir) in the forms Lechou and Amir. How persistent was the Welsh Arthurian tradition which mentioned Llacheu may be seen from the fact that he is given as a son of Arthur even in the late Powys story of *The Dream of Rhonabwy*, found in the Red Book text of the *Mabinogion*.

Again, the evidence from the *Book of Taliessin* points in the same direction. In this curious book there are scraps of Welsh legend interspersed with ideas derived from the current cosmology of the Middle Ages. In one passage, *Annwfn* (the Celtic 'Other World') is definitely located beneath the earth. Other poems imply that it contains a cluster of island fortresses, accessible from the sea. With the latter conception the Cymric Arthurian tradition has been linked in one of these poems, and the place of fortresses in this tradition is worthy of notice. No effort was apparently made to reconcile this belief in *Annwfn* with Christian teaching. It was simply conceived as a kind of counterpart of this world; for example, in the story of Pwyll, prince of Dyfed, it is a land divided into kingdoms. The view of it, reflected in *Kulhwch and Olwen*, as being accessible by land through Scotland, appears to be associated with the idea, found in the Welsh poetry of the 12th and 13th cents., that the ghosts of the dead wandered in *Coed Celyddon* ('the Caledonian forest'); and this was pictured as the scene also of the wanderings, accompanied by ghosts, of Merlinus Silvestris.

In one of the poems of the *Book of Taliessin*, Arthur and his men are represented as making expeditions to the island fortresses of *Annwfn* in Arthur's ship *Prydwen*. These expeditions were for various purposes, such as the releasing of one of his men, Gweir, from prison, and the carrying away of the cauldron of the Head of Hades (*pen Annwfn*): the latter would not boil the food of a coward, and was heated by a fire kindled by the breath of nine maidens. As further evidence of the Arthurian legend in Monmouthshire in at least the 12th cent., it may be stated that one of the place names mentioned in one of the boundaries (*Lib. Land.*, Oxf. ed. p. 207) is *Mesur Pritguenn* ('the Measure of Prydwen'). The poem has an obscure allusion which connects the story of Arthur with that of Pwyll and Pryderi, just as the *Black Book of Carmarthen* poem associated Arthur with Pryderi's friend Manawyddan. One of the island fortresses referred to in this poem, Caer Vandwy, is mentioned also in the *Black Book of Carmarthen*, while another bears the remarkable name Caer Wydyr ('the Fortress of Glass'). Of Arthur the first line of this poem says: 'Who has extended his rule beyond the bounds of the Universe?' That Arthur's name was proverbial within the zone of this poetry is shown by a passing allusion to 'the valour of Arthur' in poem xlviii. of the same MS.

This undoubted feature of the connexion of Arthur and his men with the Other World in the Welsh tradition suggests that the name of Arthur's wife, Gwenhwyfar ('the White Spectre'), is part of the same circle of ideas, and that the introduction of this conception made possible a number of congenial plots, such as the loss and rescue of one of Arthur's warriors, the loves of Arthur's warriors with ladies from *Annwfn*, the introduction into literature of the dwarfs with whom *Annwfn* was peopled, the machinery of magic and the supernatural, with which Celtic folklore especially associated the fairies, the possibility of being rendered invisible (another fairy privilege), and other commonplaces of Celtic legend, such as are found in Welsh and Irish story as well as in the living folklore not only of Celtic but of other imaginative countries.

As illustrating the place of the idea of imprisonment and release in the Welsh Arthurian tradition, it may be stated that one of the *Triads* contains a supplementary statement referring to a fabulous imprisonment of Arthur himself. The triad reads: 'The three noble prisoners of the Isle of Britain, Llyr of imperfect speech, who was with Euroswydd in prison, and the second, Mabon, son of Modron, and the third, Gweir, son of Gweiryoed, and one who was nobler than all three was for three nights in the prison of Oeth and Anoeth, and was for three nights in prison with Gwenn Benn Dragon, and was for three nights in the prison of magic (or fairyland) under the slab of Echymeint, and that noble prisoner was Arthur, and the same youth released him from those three prisons, and that youth was Goreu, son of Custennin (Constantine), his cousin.'

This story certainly appears to reflect a phase of Arthurian legend coloured by the characteristic ideas of Celtic folklore. These ideas show

themselves, too, in the Welsh Arthurian story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*, where Arthur and his warriors are represented as hunting the Twrch Trwyth (the Orc or Torc Tréith of Irish legend), a fabulous boar, to which there are obscure references in Old Welsh poetry and in Nennius. Though this story refers to Arthur's expedition to *Annwfn* and to other pieces of legend connected with that sphere, yet, like the *Four Branches of the Mabinogi*, it is characterized by the minute localization of its topography, an indication of the close relation of the Arthurian legend to certain Welsh districts. In *Kulhwch and Olwen* the narrative bears signs of having been connected originally with the North, but in its present form it is chiefly connected with Pembrokeshire, Carmarthenshire, Cardiganshire, and Breconshire. It is pre-eminently a story that has grown by accretion. The Court of Arthur, as is usual in the Welsh tradition, is located at Gelliwig in Cornwall (Cernyw). It is possible, however, that Cernyw is a later substitute for some Welsh locality. There is in the peninsula of Lleyn in Carnarvonshire a mansion called Gelliwig, but the writer has been unable to discover how old the name is.

It is, perhaps, not irrelevant to mention that in this peninsula there are certain names which provide links with the Welsh Arthurian legend, such as Bodarnahwy (for Bod Gwernahwy), Dynfra (for Rhedynfre), Coetan Arthur ('Arthur's Quoit'), a fine cromlech near Sarn Feilteyrn, and Ffynnon Wenhwyfar ('Guinevere's Well'). In the same district, too, is Castellmarch ('Mark's Castle'); nor is the zone of Nant Gwrtheyrn ('Vortigern's valley'), Dinas Emrys ('the fortress of Ambrosius'), and Abererch, where Rhydderch Hael was said to have been buried, far off.

Of the Welsh tradition there are certain indications, too, in the historical poets of Wales which suggest that it differed in some forms of it from Geoffrey's version. For example, in elegies and eulogies men are compared in compliment to Medrod (Modred). Meilir, for instance, says of Gruffydd ab Cynan, who died in 1137, that he 'thrusted in the fore-front of battle like Medrod'; and Gwalchmai, Meilir's son, in praising Madog ab Maredudd, prince of Powys, says that he had the strength of Arthur and the gentleness of Medrod. Gwynfardd Brycheiniog, too, calls the Lord Rhys of South Wales the twin-brother of Medrod, prophesied by Myrddin (Merlin). One triad (Foerster, *Myv. Arch.*[2] p. 393*a*), which shows, it is true, signs of later modification, states that there were in Arthur's Court three royal knights, Nasiens, king of Denmark; Medrod, son of Llew, son of Cynfarch; and Hywel, son of Emyr Llydaw. They were, the triad says, men of such gentle, kindly, and fair words, that any one would be sorry to refuse them any request. Where the feud between Arthur and Medrod is mentioned, it is represented sometimes in a different light from the account of Geoffrey; nor is the sympathy of the tradition always with Arthur. For example, a blow given by Arthur to Medrod is called 'an evil blow,' like that given by Matholwch to Branwen.

In a triad referring to the three costly campaigns of the Isle of Britain, Medrod is said to have gone to Gelliwig in Cornwall, to have left in the Court no food or drink unconsumed, and to have dragged Gwenhwyfar from her queenly throne. Arthur in revenge is said to have gone to the Court of Medrod, and to have similarly consumed all the food and drink, and, further, to have left neither man nor beast alive in the Hundred. The story of the battle of Camlan, too, appears to have been differently treated in different forms of the Welsh tradition. One form ascribes it to a blow given by Gwenhwyfar to Gwenhwyfach—a blow which is called in a triad one of the evil blows of the Isle of Britain. Another triad speaks of this as one of the vain battles of the Isle of Britain, and attributes it to the rivalry of Gwenhwyfar and Gwenhwyfach. According to the story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*, Gwenhwyfach was Gwenhwyfar's sister. In the story of *The Dream of Rhonabwy*, the battle of Camlan is said to have been caused by the mischief wrought by Idawc Cord Prydein in the negotiations between Arthur and his nephew Medrod. The fact that one of the triads says that there were three Gwenhwyfars suggests that there were in Wales not one but several Arthurian traditions. Though the Welsh 14th-cent. poet Dafydd ab Gwilym mentions Melwas (as in the *Life of Gildas*) apparently as the abductor of Gwenhwyfar, it cannot be stated with certainty that he was so known to the Welsh tradition. The name Melwas, however, was not unknown to S.E. Wales, as we see from references to persons of that name (written Melguas) in the *Liber Landavensis*.

Possibly, in one form of the Welsh tradition Arthur and Medrod fought on the same side at Camlan, for one of the triads says that one of the evil counsels of the Isle of Britain was Arthur's decision to divide his men three times with Medrod at Camlan. It is not impossible that this was the view of the writer of the *Annales Cambriæ* (under the year 537), who gives Camlan as the battle in which Arthur and Medrod fell together (*corruere*).

As illustrating further the Welsh tradition, it may be stated that Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr, a leading poet of the 12th cent., locates Arthur's Court at Celliwig, and that he has allusions to Gwalchmai, Dullus, son of Eurei, Cai and his father Cynyr, Myrddin, Elifer, Llacheu, the bards of Manddwy, Gwyndoleu, the family of Cynvarch, the Twrch Trwyd, and the battles of Baddon and Camlan. Another poet, Bleddyn Fardd, refers to Arthur as the slayer of a certain Erthyst, and to the valour of Gwalhaved as proverbial. All these allusions, though only of a passing character, suggest undoubted acquaintance with the legend, and the independence of the Welsh tradition from Geoffrey.

2. Arthur in the Chronicles.—Under this head reference may be made first to the lives of certain Welsh saints, and then to the *Chronicles* proper. The *Life of St. Gildas*, written in 1160, according to one of the most distinguished of Arthurian scholars, M. Ferdinand Lot, represents Arthur as being in conflict with Hueil, king of Scotland, the son of Caw of Pictland, and brother of Gildas. The association of Arthur with the family of Caw suggests a stratum of legend of an early type, not unrepresented in the story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*. The same *Life* also represents Melwas, a petty king of Somerset, as having carried Gwenhwyfar away from Arthur. In the *Life of St. Cadoc*, Arthur and his companions, Cai and Bedwir, are represented as haunting the borders of Breconshire and Monmouthshire.

In this connexion it may be mentioned that the highest point of the Breconshire beacons was called in the time of Giraldus Cambrensis (12th cent.), 'Arthur's Throne.' The association of Arthur in Nennius with Builth, in the same county, has already been mentioned, and there are similar associations in the story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*. Again, in the *Life of St. Carannog* (the saint of Llangrannog in Cardiganshire), there is a reference to Arthur as hunting a very powerful, huge, and terrible serpent, which had laid waste twelve parts of the land of Carrum—a description of Arthur's activities which is in thorough keeping with the Welsh tradition.

The *Life of St. Illtud* speaks of Arthur as the saint's cousin, to whom Illtud becomes a soldier, but the site of Arthur's Court is not mentioned. Further, in the *Life of St. Padarn* there is a curious story told of Arthur, who is called a *tyrannus*, in which, owing to his cupidity, he is cursed by the saint and swallowed in the earth up to his chin. This story is probably connected with the place name Llys Arthur ('Arthur's Court'), in the parish of Llanbadarnfawr in North Cardiganshire. In the *Chronicles* proper Arthur first comes to view by name in Nennius (a composite work completed before the 9th cent.), the nucleus of which was a *Chronicle of North Britain*, written probably at Dumbarton or Carlisle. Gildas, though he does not name Arthur, mentions a battle of Badon (fought, according to the *Annales Cambriæ*, in 516), which Nennius gives by name as one of the battles of Arthur. This battle is frequently mentioned by Welsh poets as Gweith Fadon ('the action of Badon'). In Nennius, Arthur is called *Dux bellorum* in the account of his battles, and *miles* elsewhere. The names are given of twelve of his battles, one of which was fought in 'the wood of Celidon' (Caledonia). Some of the other battles were also probably in the North. In the Chronicle called *Annales Cambriæ*, there is a reference under A.D. 516 to Arthur's leadership of the Britons at the battle of Badon by carrying the cross on his shoulders for three nights. In Nennius's account of

one of the battles, it is said that Arthur bore the image of the Virgin on his shoulders. Geoffrey of Monmouth says that Arthur fastened on his shoulders his shield Pridwen (in the Welsh tradition Pridwen was his ship), on which was the image of the Virgin Mary. Possibly the discrepancy between Geoffrey's account and the others is due to the resemblance between the old Welsh pre-Norman for 'shoulder' (*iscuid*) and 'shield' (*iscuit*). The Cambridge MS of the 13th cent. explains this passage of Nennius by saying that Arthur went to Jerusalem, and made a cross of the size of the true cross. These passages are interesting as demonstrating the Welsh tendency, shown in the case of Bran, son of Llyr, and Lles ap Coel, to make Arthur into a Christian hero—a tendency which reached its full development in the story of the Grail. Another Chronicle of the same type as the *Annales Cambriæ*, the *Chronicle of St. Michael's Mount*, composed by a Breton possibly in the 11th cent., says, under the year 421: 'St. Gildas was born. In these days was Artus (Arthur) king of the Britons, brave and witty' (*fortis et facetus*).

That there was a flourishing Arthurian legend in Brittany in the second half of the 12th cent. is suggested by the statement of Alanus ab Insulis already quoted, and that in the 12th cent. the Arthurian legend flourished in Britain also is attested by William of Malmesbury (born about 1095), who says of 'the warlike Arthur': 'This is Arthur of whom the idle tales of the Britons rave wildly even to-day—a man certainly worthy of celebration, not in the foolish dreams of deceitful fables, but in truthful histories; since for a long time he sustained the declining fortunes of his native land and incited the uncrushed courage of his people to war.' It is not improbable that there was at this time a flourishing Arthurian tradition in Glastonbury itself, in which place this historian was specially interested, and it is not out of place to mention that Glastonbury owned land in the beginning of the 12th cent. in the neighbourhood of Caerleon (see Adam de Domerham, *Charters of Glastonbury Abbey*). The popular view of Arthur may be reflected in Henry of Huntingdon's designation of him as 'leader of the soldiers and kings of Britain.' It was Geoffrey of Monmouth, however, who, in his *Historia Regum Britanniæ*, expanded and dignified the meagre annals of the Britons as given in Nennius by incorporating in them a number of stories (largely ætiological), together with matter based on the Welsh genealogies and on floating local legend, and by making the story of Arthur, as an Imperial figure, the culmination of these legends for the glory of Britain and his native county of Monmouth, wherein Caerleon, the seat in Geoffrey of Arthur's Court, was situated.

In this narrative Arthur is represented as the son of Uther-pendragon and Igerna (in Welsh *Eygr*). He becomes king at the age of fifteen, and his subsequent career is a succession of conquests, which culminate in an attempt to conquer Rome itself. In the very zenith of his power, and when within reach of the Imperial dignity, he is recalled to Britain owing to the usurpation of his throne by Modred (the Welsh *Medrod*), his nephew, and the latter's marriage to Ganhumara (Gwenhwyfar). In a great battle in Cornwall, Modred is killed, and Arthur is mortally wounded and carried to the Isle of Avallon (Glastonbury) to be healed. The note of tragedy in the story of Arthur is in keeping with other stories in Welsh literature, such as those of Pryderi, Bran, and Llew Llaw Gyffes in the *Four Branches of the Mabinogi*.

Geoffrey's form of the Arthurian legend (apart from his own pseudo-historical amplifications) was probably derived from the South Wales border and South-West Britain. It is needless to say that it is largely coloured by the ideas of the 12th cent., and traces of the spirit of chivalry and knight-errantry are already present. This book became exceedingly popular, and Henry of Huntingdon (some time after 1139) made an abridgment of it in his letter to Warinus. Benedict of Gloucester, too, gave a sketch of the Arthurian period in his *Life of St. Dubricius*. Afterwards came Thomas de Loches (about 1147) with a similar narrative in his *Gesta Comitum Andegavensium*. The chief successors of Geoffrey, however, were Geoffrey Gaimar (probably a little before 1150), whose *History of the Britons* unfortunately has been lost, Wace (in poetry), the author of the Anglo-Norman *Brut*, and Layamon, the author of a *Brut* in English verse. Wace's *Brut* is in the main a free paraphrase of Geoffrey's *History*, but in style it is often more romantic. His descriptions of love, for example, are not unlike those given by the Arthurian poet Chrétien de Troyes. Wace shows more of the spirit of chivalry than Geoffrey, and he appears to know many more stories about Arthur than he narrates. It is he who first introduced into literature the story of Arthur's Round Table, about which, he says, the Britons tell many a fable. Layamon came from Arley Regis in North Worcestershire, on the banks of the Severn, and may have been familiar with living Arthurian tradition. His narrative is based on that of Wace, which he treats even more freely than Wace treats that of Geoffrey. It may be noted that Layamon goes further than Geoffrey or Wace in naming the exact place of Arthur's final defeat, which he locates at Camelford in Cornwall, doubtless having in mind the Welsh *Camlan*. Of Latin metrical versions of Geoffrey, the chief were the *Gesta Regum Britanniæ* and the *Epitome Historiæ Britannicæ*. In spite of its popularity, Geoffrey's *History* was not allowed to escape criticism; it was violently denounced by William of Newburgh, and also by Giraldus Cambrensis, who accepts, however, important sections of the Arthurian story. A similar attitude was adopted in the middle of the 14th cent. by Ralph Higden. The longest account of the supposed discovery of Arthur's tomb at Glastonbury is given by Giraldus Cambrensis in his *de Principis instructione* (written about 1194). Of the later writers who followed Geoffrey, the most important is Holinshed (1577), from whose work the substance of Geoffrey became known to Shakespeare and other English poets.

3. The Arthurian cycle in the Romances.—The chief development of the Arthurian cycle combined with other cycles, both British and foreign, is found in the *Romances*, and the centre of this type of literary development was France. This development was undoubtedly stimulated largely by Geoffrey's *History* and the paraphrases of his successors, but the romances contain features of the Arthurian legend which are clearly independent of the *Chronicles*. In France, the chief poetic exponents of the Arthurian legend were Marie de France, Chrétien de Troyes, and Robert de Borron. In Chrétien de Troyes, especially, there are so many proper names—as Uriiens (Urien), Yvain (Ywein), Erec (Gereint), Keus (Kei), Bedivere (Bedwyr), Gauvain (Gwalchmai), Ider fil Nut (Edern, son of Nudd), Brons (Bran), Carados Briébraz (Caradog Freichfras), Ganievre (Gwenhwyfar), Tristans (Trystan), Melianz (Melwas), Maheloas (Maelwas), Bilis (Beli), Brangiens (Branwen), not to speak of others which are less obvious,—which are so clearly identical with well-known names of the Welsh tradition, that the existence of some relation to this tradition, whether direct or indirect, is obvious. Though the legend of Arthur himself flourished in Brittany, it is very doubtful whether the heterogeneous yet professedly connected mass of legends which the above names imply existed in Brittany, as it undoubtedly did in Wales. In spite of the opinion of Prof. Zimmer, it is perhaps simplest to accept the view that the Arthurian and other legends of the Welsh

tradition made their way into French literature through the contact of the Normans in the 11th cent. with the men of Breconshire, Glamorgan, and Monmouth. These districts were rapidly Normanized, and intermarriages of Normans and Welshwomen were frequent. This zone, too, was in close touch with Glastonbury and with other important monasteries, and monasteries such as this and Fécamp played no small part in the dissemination and development of the Arthurian and other legends. As for the lays of Marie de France, on the other hand, certain terms, such as 'Laustic' (=*l'eostik*, 'the nightingale'), as Prof. Zimmer points out, suggest Brittany as the source of their Arthurian matter. The degree of Chrétien's indebtedness not only for some of his proper names, but also for his materials, to Celtic sources has been a subject of great controversy, Prof. Foerster, the chief editor of his works, going so far as to deny that Chrétien derived any of his materials from such sources. But it is hardly conceivable that he should have borrowed from these sources only a bare list of personal names without a scrap of the legends connected with them. The task of discovering definite Celtic matter in his writings is, however, far from easy, owing to the elaborate transformation which such matter would have undergone when adapted to the courtly love-poetry of Chrétien and to his romantic conceptions generally. Still, it should be borne in mind that Welsh literature itself, as we see from the *Four Branches of the Mabinogi*, had already been developing on lines which reflected some of the conceptions of the feudal period, and which further showed skill in the delineation of female character, especially under conditions of unjust suffering.

The problem of Chrétien's origins has been further complicated by the existence in Welsh of three Arthurian romances corresponding to three by Chrétien, namely, *The Lady of the Fountain* (to *Yvain*), *Peredur* (to the *Conte del Graal*), and *Geraint and Enid* (to *Erec et Enide*). Count Hersart de Villemarqué thought that these were Chrétien's originals; but this is certainly not the case, as the traces of foreign influence on them show. At the same time, the Welsh tales, though in their present form based either on Chrétien himself (as Foerster thinks) or on his originals, have, in several points of topography and narrative, been shaped into conformity with a living Welsh Arthurian legend in a manner which adds considerably to their value and interest. The search for Celtic materials in Chrétien has been carried out with great diligence by Sir John Rhys, Mr. Alfred Nutt, M. Loth, Miss J. L. Weston, and a distinguished mediævalist, M. Ferdinand Lot. The task of reducing the narratives of Chrétien to their simplest elements, and comparing them with the narrative types of Welsh and Irish legend is one of great delicacy and difficulty, and some Celtic scholars, in their zeal for instituting such comparisons, have attempted to prove too much, without making sufficient allowance for the various literary influences to which Chrétien was accessible, or for his own imaginative power. The most fruitful line of investigation is the study of that Welsh group of legends from which Chrétien undoubtedly derived many of his proper names, and the classification of them into narrative types. Especially promising are the narratives that imply the wandering and return of Arthur's warriors, and in some cases their rescue from prison by him and his men. Narratives of the relations, pacific and hostile, between Arthur and his men and the fairy dwellers in *Annwfn* are a promising field of investigation, but Sun-myth theories of the Arthurian legend are now entirely abandoned.

Chrétien de Troyes was imitated in Germany by Hartmann von Aue, who wrote his *Erec* before 1197 and his *Iwein* before 1204; and also by Wolfram von Eschenbach, who composed his *Parzival* between 1205 and 1215. The latter mentions, in addition to Chrétien, a certain Kiot as his authority. The chief romantic accretions to the Arthurian cycle were the sagas of *Merlin*, the *Holy Grail*, *Tristan and Iseult*, and *Lancelot and Galahad*. The story of *Merlin* occurs in two forms, the ordinary *Merlin* and the *Suite de Merlin* (see MERLIN). The story of Tristan and Iseult is one of the most beautiful and tragic in the whole of literature, and, except perhaps as an element in the Welsh bardic tradition, was originally quite distinct from the Arthurian legend. The story of Lancelot is of uncertain origin, and that of Galahad, apart from the mere name (the Gwalchaved of the Welsh tradition), has no evident counterpart in Celtic legend. The story of Tristan was turned into German verse by Gottfried von Strassburg about 1210, who left it unfinished. But it was continued by Ulrich von Türheim (about 1236) and Heinrich von Freiberg (about 1270). In England the great collection of Arthurian romances was that of Sir Thomas Malory, printed by Caxton.

Within the limits of this article it is impossible to deal with all the problems which the various interrelations of these romances have raised, especially in the story of the Holy Grail. This story is essentially one where the legend of Arthur has been brought into connexion with the legends of the Church, notably such as were read from the Apocryphal Gospels at Easter. The stories of Helen, the mother of Constantine, and of Charlemagne had been similarly enlisted. One of the most distinguished authorities on the Grail legends, Mr. Alfred Nutt, conveniently divides them into two types, which he calls the 'Quest' and the 'Early History' versions respectively. These he enumerates as follows: Class I. (*a*) *Conte del Graal*, by Chrétien de Troyes; (*b*) *Conte del Graal*, by the continuators of Chrétien—Gautier, Manessier, and Gerbert; (*c*) the *Parzival* of Wolfram von Eschenbach; (*d*) *Percdur the son of Evrawc*, the Welsh version of Perceval; (*e*) *Sir Percyvelle*, an English metrical romance found in the Thornton MS, written shortly before the middle of the 15th century. Class II. (*a*) Robert de Borron, *Joseph of Arimathea*, and *Merlin*; (*b*) *The Grand St. Graal*; (*c*) *Quête del St. Graal*; (*d*) *The Didot Perceval*; (*e*) *Perceval le Gallois*, translated into English by Dr. Sebastian Evans under the title *The High History of the Holy Graal*. There is a Welsh mediæval translation of the story of the Holy Grail entitled *Y Seint Greal* which has been published with an English translation in the Hengwrt MSS. In modern times the Arthurian legend is most familiar through Tennyson's *Idylls of the King* and through Wagner's *Parsifal* and *Tristan*. Even into Dutch, Flemish, and Scandinavian literature portions of the Arthurian cycle penetrated.

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E. ANWYL.

ARVAL BROTHERS.—The study of the Arval Brothers is peculiarly valuable to the historian of religion, because it gives a unique insight into the details of the activity of a Roman priesthood. It also illustrates in a pre-eminent degree the accidental character of our knowledge of ancient Roman religion. Further, it emphasizes the activity of Augustus as a restorer of forms of ancient religion. And, lastly, it affords us additional proof of the supreme value of inscriptions.

In the matter of the appointment of priesthoods the Romans were extremely conservative. During the whole period of the Republic only two new priesthoods were formed—the *Duoviri* (later *Decemviri*, later *Quindecimviri, sacris faciundis*), in charge of the cults introduced by the Sibylline books; and the *Tresviri* (later *Septemviri*) *epulones*, merely assistants to the *pontifices* in arranging the banquets. On the contrary, many of the older priesthoods declined, and were, if not entirely forgotten, so neglected that they are very seldom mentioned in the literature. Thus during the Republic we hear of a certain priesthood, the *Sodales Titii*, only incidentally (Varro, *Lingua Latina*, v. 85); and even the Augustan reform and the Emperor's personal association with the priesthood (*Monumentum Ancyranum*, i. 46) result merely in our possessing eight or nine inscriptions in which individuals are referred to as *Sodales Titienses*.

Except that the etymology of the words *Fratres Arvales* is easier to understand than that of *Sodales Titii*, we should know scarcely more concerning them than concerning the *Sodales Titii*, were it not for the remarkable discovery of inscriptions. It will be well, however, to examine first what we know of the Fratres Arvales apart from these inscriptions.

1. Literary sources.—The one and only reference to the Fratres Arvales in the literature of the Republic is in Varro's *Lingua Latina* (v. 85), and reads as follows: 'They are called Fratres Arvales who make public sacrifices to the end that the fields (*arva*) may bear (*ferant*) crops. They are called Fratres Arvales from *ferre* and *arva*. Some people derive the name (*fratres*) from *fratria*; *fratria* is a Greek word designating a section of the people, as it is even now used at Naples.' In other words, Varro's interest is merely etymological, and his whole manner of treating the subject shows that the priesthood, though possibly still in existence, was practically unknown.

Borghesi, *Œuvres*, i. 376, thinks that the crown of corn-ears seen on the coins of D. Postumius Albinus Bruti f. and of L. Musidius Longus (Babelon, ii. 241 ff., and 385) relates to the Arval Brothers; but this is by no means certain (cf. Wissowa in Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Arvales,' ii. 1463).

Had not Augustus included the priesthood of the Arvals among his religious reforms, this might well have been our only reference to them. As it is, however, apart from the inscriptions, of which we shall speak in a moment, and which are themselves due to Augustus's influence, we have such a revival of interest that a faint reflexion of it is seen even in the literature.

A famous jurist of Tiberius's reign, Massurius Sabinus, seems to have dealt with the problem of the origin and the number of the Arvals. We read in Gellius (vii. 7. 8): 'But Massurius Sabinus in the first book of his *Memorialia* tells us on the authority of certain historians, that Acca Larentia was Romulus's nurse. This woman, he says, lost one of her twelve sons by death. In his stead Romulus became a son to her, and called himself and her other sons the Arval Brothers. From this time the college of the Arval Brothers was twelve in number. The insignia of this priesthood were the crown of corn-ears and the white fillets.'

A similar story is told in Pliny, *HN* xviii. 6, and again in Fulgentius, *Sermones Antiqui*, p. 114 (ed. Helm). This absurd theory of Massurius Sabinus was in some unaccountable way taken as genuine legendary tradition by Em. Hoffmann, *Die Arvalbruder*, Breslau, 1858 (original and more condensed form in the *Verhandlungen der Breslauer Philol. Versammlung*, 1857, 67 ff.). A similar idea governs E. Baehrens in his article in the *Jahrb. fur Philologie*, cxxxi. (1885) 785 ff. Wissowa (in Pauly-Wissowa, ii. 1464) has pointed out that this legend of Romulus and the Arvals arose at the beginning of the Empire, when the Emperor, as a new Romulus, himself belonged to the priesthood.

One additional piece of information is given by Festus (ed. Muller, p. 5): '*Ambarvales hostiæ* are sacrificial animals (*hostiæ*) which were wont to be sacrificed on behalf of the fields by the twelve (*duodecim*, so Augustinus; *duobus*, MSS) brothers.' These are evidently the Arvals (cf. Macrobius, *Sat. Conv.* iii. 5. 7).

With such a scanty beginning it might well seem foolish to expect that the discoveries of modern times would put us in the position of knowing more about the Arvals than about any other Roman priesthood. Yet such is the case, and it is entirely owing to the discovery of inscriptions.

2. Inscriptions.—These discoveries began in 1570 (on the date cf. especially Aldus Manutius in *Cod. Vatican.* 5237, f. 158). In that year, while workmen were digging in a field five miles outside the Porta Portese on the Via Campana, near the Papal villa La Magliana, in the region which then as now was known as *Affoga l'asino* ('Drown the donkey'), more precisely, in a vineyard then called Vigna Galletti (later Vigna Ceccarelli, now Vigna Vignoli), the remains of a building were discovered. In the apse of this building were found nine (according to other authorities seven) statues of Emperors who had been members of the Arval priesthood. In each case the base with the inscription was preserved.

Flaminio Vacca (*Memorie*, ed. Nibby, *Roma Antica*, iv., No. 98; ed. Schreiber, *Berichte Sachs Gesell. d. Wiss.* 1881, p. 82, No. 99) says: 'A good two miles outside the above-mentioned gate (Porta Portese), in a place which is called "Drown the donkey," towards the Tiber, in a thicket, were found in the time of Gregory xiii. (1572–1576; 1570 seems correct) many consuls in marble, and each one had his pedestal with an inscription; and also columns of fair marble, thirty palms in length. The columns were sawn up and used for the Cappella Gregoriana at St. Peter's. The consuls were scattered throughout Rome. They were, however, of only fairly good workmanship.' Baldassare Peruzzi's son, Silvestro or Sallustio, made a sketch giving the ground-plan of this building, and an attempted restoration. These are preserved in Florence (*Disegni di Architettura*, No. 664), and are reproduced by Huelsen, *Eph. Epigr.* viii. Tab. ii.

The statues have entirely disappeared, and all the inscriptions except one (*CIL* vi. 1012: to Marcus Aurelius, preserved in the Vatican, Giardino della Pigna; cf. Amelung, *Sculpturen des vatikanischen Museums*, Part i., Taf. 89), but six others have been preserved in copies (*CIL* vi. 968, 1021, 1053, 1093). The seven Emperors are: Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, Lucius Verus, Septimus Severus, Caracalla, and Gordian.

At the same time were found fragments of inscriptions containing the minutes of the meetings of the priesthood (first published by Fulvius Ursinus, *Notæ ad M. Catonem*, etc., Rome, 1587). Somewhat more than a century later, in 1699, a second great find of two large inscriptions was made on the same spot. Then came a constant series of finds, which have continued down to the present time. The most curious feature of these discoveries is their wide distribution. Fragments have been found on the Esquiline, on the Aventine, in excavating for the foundations of the choir of St. Peter's, at St. Paolo fuori le Mura, at St. Lorenzo, near the Lateran, and in the catacombs of Calixtus. The finds accumulated, so that in 1795 G. Marini was able to collect and publish 47 pieces (*Gli atti e monumenti dei Fratelli Arvali*, Rome, 1795). Further progress was made in 1858, when de Rossi proved the real site of the grove (*Annali dell' Instituto*, 1858, p. 54 ff.). The delay in ascertaining accurately the location of the grove was due to an error of Filippo della Torre (*Monumenta veteris Antii*, pp. 94, 384), who asserted that the stones found in 1699 had been discovered at the fourth milestone of the Via Ostiensis instead of Campana or Portuensis. In this he had been followed by Marini. This discovery was followed in 1866 by another important find in the grove itself. From 1867 until 1871 excavations were conducted by the German Archæological Institute.

The results of these excavations were summed up in Henzen's book *Acta Fratrum Arvalium quæ supersunt* (Berlin, 1874), with an admirable commentary. Henzen had written previous to this a preliminary report, *Scavi nel bosco sacro dei Fratelli Arvali* (Rome, 1868). The first definitive publication occurred in *CIL* vi. (city of Rome) Part i., 1876, and again in Part iv., 1902. The originals have been collected as far as possible and arranged by D. Vaglieri, and are exhibited in the small rooms off the cloister of the Museo Nazionale della Terme in Rome.

The body of inscriptions thus obtained presents a record, naturally with many breaks, of the minutes of the Arval Brothers' meetings from the first year of Tiberius's reign down into the reign of Gordian (A.D. 241). As regards the original situation and disposition of these marble tablets, Lanciani (in Henzen's *Relazione*, p. 105 ff., Tab. iv. and v.) thought they were placed on the outside of a round temple, that of the Dea Dia. But this is impossible, since the *acta* themselves indicate that the tablets were inside the temple, for they were engraved *in situ*, which necessitated the introduction of iron (the graving tool) into the grove—an offence against the deity for which a special expiatory ceremony had to be performed. The full formula for this begins: 'On account of the iron which had been brought into the temple for the sake of engraving,' etc. Further, a careful examination of the fragments has shown that they were not attached to a curved surface, either inside or outside of a building. The conclusion from these investigations (cf. Huelsen, *Eph. Epigr.* viii. 316-350, and Bormann, *Arch. Epigr. Mitt.* xvii. 1894) is that the tablets were attached to the flat walls on the inside of a building.

3. History of the cult. — With the knowledge gained from these inscriptions, supplemented by that gained from the literature and from the general history of religion, let us attempt to sketch the history of the priesthood.

Though the legend of the foundation of the priesthood by Romulus is of late date, the priesthood itself belongs to the very earliest period. Proofs of this are found at several points. First, the prohibition of iron in the grove and in the temple indicates that the worship preceded the discovery and use of iron. We may compare with this the custom referred to in Macrobius (*Sat. Conv.* v. 19. 13): 'The Etruscans used a bronze plough when they founded cities . . . among the Sabines the priests' hair was cut with a bronze shears' (cf. also Servius, *Aen.* i. 448; Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 230; Lydus, *de Mensibus*, i. 31). Similarly no iron was used in the construction of the Pons Sublicius (Plin. *HN* xxxvi. 15. 100; Dion. Hal. iii. 45). Finally, we may compare the express permission to use iron in making repairs in the temple of Juppiter Liber at Furfo (*CIL* i. 603 = ix. 3513). A second proof of the age of the worship may be found in the adoration of the *ollæ*, very primitive earthenware vessels, preceding the discovery of the potter's wheel. Remains of these *ollæ* were discovered in the sacred grove (cf. de Rossi, *Giornale Arcadico*, lviii., 1868, p. 136, Tab. iv.). A third proof of age is the sacred song which they sang, the words of which have been preserved to us in the minutes of the year 218 (*CIL* vi. 28 = vi. 2104 = Buecheler, *Carmina Epigraphica*, No. 1 = Schneider, *Exempla*, No. 392, where other literature may be found). This chant was probably not understood by the people of the Augustan age.

The fact that the great festival of the Arvals, their celebration in May in honour of the Dea Dia, is missing in the list of old festivals in the so-called calendar of Numa is no proof against its very great age. It was a movable feast, and hence could not be engraved on a permanent stone calendar. We cannot tell the exact nature of the Arvals' worship in this early period. In Augustus's restoration certain of the older features were retained, but it is difficult to distinguish exactly what is old and what is new in his scheme. Hence it is better to leave the discussion of details until the Augustan age. In general, however, we can think of the Arvals during the Kingdom and the early centuries of the Republic as performing their sacrifices to Mars and the Dea Dia, one of those numerous agricultural ceremonials of which the ritual of early Rome was so full. As we have seen above, the history of the priesthood during the Republic is absolutely unknown to us, but we are probably justified in supposing that it continued down through the period of the Second Punic War. At the close of that war, in the religious reaction which set in during the last two centuries of the Republic, this priesthood very probably declined along with the rest.

Our first definite reference to the new life into which the Arvals entered with the coming of the Empire is found in the *Monumentum Ancyranum* (iv. 7), where Augustus, in recounting the priesthoods to which he belongs, mentions that of the Fratres Arvales. This record, written at the close of Augustus's life, is therefore contemporaneous with what has hitherto been supposed to be the earliest datable fragment of the Arval inscriptions, that from A.D. 14, the year which saw Augustus's reign end and that of Tiberius begin. On the other hand, together with the Arval inscriptions were found fragments of a list of consuls (*Fasti Consulares*, cf. *CIL* i.^{2} 70 ff.). The fragments cover the years B.C. 2 to A.D. 37. It has been supposed, accordingly, that the restoration of the Arval priesthood must have been undertaken by Augustus in or before the year B.C. 2, and probably not earlier than B.C. 12, when on the death of Lepidus he became Pontifex Maximus. This office would unquestionably be the best strategic point for a revision of the priesthoods. But it has been shown (by Hula in *Arch. Epigr. Mitt.* xv., 1892, p. 23 ff.; for counter-arguments, which, however,

are not convincing, cf. Mommsen, *Eph. Epigr.* viii. 303 ff.) that one fragment at least (*CIL* vi. 32338) dates from the year B.C. 20. Accordingly, Augustus's reforms must have occurred before he became Pontifex Maximus. We have, however, other indications of Augustus's interest in religious restoration at the very beginning of his reign, notably the *augurium salutis* of B.C. 29 (aptly compared by Wissowa in Pauly-Wissowa, ii. 1468; cf. Dio Cassius, li. 20 and Suet. *Octav.* 31), and the rebuilding of temples in B.C. 28 (proofs for this date especially Dio Cass. liii. 2, and Hor. *Carm.* iii. 6, collected by Mommsen, *Res Gestæ*[2], p. 86).

The college as re-organized seems to have contained twelve members. Probably this was also the ancient number. That it was the number as restored by Augustus is clear not only from the legendary account of its foundation given by Massurius Sabinus (which on this point agrees with the facts), but also from the negative testimony of the inscriptions themselves, where, when the names of those present at each ceremonial are given, the number twelve is never exceeded. The fact that on the only occasion when as high a number as twelve is reached (at a session in the year 57, *CIL* vi. 2039, 1 ff.) the name of the Emperor Nero is not mentioned, although he was certainly a member of the college, is no argument in favour of the number being greater than twelve, because the Emperor and the members of the Imperial household would be *supra numerum*.

The members were elected by co-optation, that is, the college filled its own vacancies. Originally this co-optation was entirely untrammelled, the Emperor possessing merely his own vote, which he, like any other member, might send in writing in case he was not able to be present in person. But by degrees the influence of the Emperor began to prevail, until, from the time of Caligula onwards, the election was usually reduced to a mere formality, which is best described in the words of the minutes of the year 120 (*CIL* vi. 2080, 22 ff.):

'Under the same consuls on the seventh day before the Ides of February, in the vestibule of the temple of Concordia, when prayers had been said by C. Vitorius Hosidius Geta, the magister, they filled the place of Q. Bittius Proculus, and in accordance with a letter of the Emperor Hadrian Augustus (here follow the Emperor's other titles) elected Publius Manlius Carbo and invited him to the sacrifices. And the letter was opened, which was sealed with a seal representing the Emperor, and in the letter was written "The Emperor Trajan Hadrian Augustus to the Arval Brothers, his colleagues, greeting. In the place of Q. Bittius Proculus, for my part I vote as our colleague the name of Publius Manlius Carbo." There were present, etc. . . .'

Partaking, as such priesthoods did, of the nature of an exclusive social club, the membership was naturally restricted to men of high rank and great wealth (though not, as Marini thought, entirely confined to patricians; cf. Mommsen, *Rom. Forsch.* i. 79).

The college possessed two officers, a *magister* and a *flamen*, who were elected annually out of the members of the college on the second day of the great May festival (see below). These officers served one full year, one Arval year, which began and ended at the Saturnalia (December 17). The year received its name from that of the magister, though, fortunately for us, always subordinate to the names of the regular consuls of the year which always precede it. In case either the magister or the flamen was prevented from attending a meeting, he appointed a substitute (*promagister* or *proflamen*), who, however, served only for that occasion, and as the personal substitute of the man in question. A regular vacancy was filled by a new election.

Connected with the college and present at the May festival were four boys, the sons of senators (in many cases the senators in question were the Arval Brothers themselves). These boys, whose father and mother must both be living (hence called *patrimi, matrimi*), took part as assistants in certain of the ceremonies.

They were regularly employed along with the *servi publici* to carry the libations to the altar on the first day of the great May festival. They were present also at the banquet in the afternoon of the first day, seated in chairs, while the Arval Brothers reclined on dining couches. At the supper in Rome in the evening they waited at table. They did not officiate at the sacrifices of expiation, where only the *servi publici* assisted the magister and the *calator*. The attempt has been made to separate them from the *camilli*, with whom we are elsewhere familiar (cf. Henzen, *Acta*, p. vii, and Wissowa in Pauly-Wissowa, ii. 1471); but this is probably wrong (cf. Wissowa, *Rom. Relig.* 426, Anm. 2). Their sitting with the Arvals at meat is probably a reminiscence of the old custom that young boys should accompany their elders to dinner (cf. Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 16; Suet. *Claud.* 32).

Apart from their own elective officers and these lads of noble families, the Arvals were assisted in their work by a number of slaves and freedmen. Some of these, the regular *servi publici*, were assigned to them by the Emperor. Besides these, each brother had his own servant (*calator*), whom he chose from among his own freedmen. Each *calator* had to pay an initiation fee into the treasury of the college (this is proved by the interesting case decided by the Brothers on May 29, A.D. 120; cf. *CIL* vi. 2080, l. 45 ff.). There is also one mention of a sacristan (*ædituus; CIL* vi. 2068, ii. 27), who was probably a private slave owned by the college as a whole.

A list of the Arval Brothers, so far as they are known, is found in Gatti's article 'Arvales' in de Ruggiero's *Dizionario Epigrafico*, i. 683 ff.

4. **Activity of the Arvals.**—We have seen above that it is not possible for us to ascertain whether, at the close of the Republic, the priesthood of the Arvals had entirely ceased or whether it was still in existence, though neglected and forgotten. In any case, however, Augustus's re-organization of it, like all his work, was an attempt to restore the old forms of Roman religion in their purity and simplicity, though it was at the same time inevitable that he should consciously or unconsciously adapt them to the new conditions inherent in the Empire. His successors were less interested in the old ritual, and more concerned with the adaptation of the priesthood to the purposes of the moment. All these new adaptations, including the beginnings made by Augustus, were attempts to connect the priesthood of the Arvals with what was becoming more and more the one universal religion of the Empire, namely, Emperor-worship. Thus the greater number of the ceremonies performed by the Arvals were in the interest of the Emperor and of the Imperial household.

The cult acts of the Arvals fall therefore into two categories: (1) those acts which go back to the old forms of the religion of the Kingdom and of the early Republic, and (2) those acts which are connected with the Emperor.

(1) Let us discuss, first, those acts which go back to the old cult. We have seen above, in our discussion of the early history of the cult, that it was originally one of the many agricultural worships characteristic of early Rome. We have left until now the discussion of details.

So much did the Emperor and his household monopolize the attention of the Arval Brothers, that during the early part of the Empire, when the minutes are in general more concise, we have relatively few references to any of the really ancient ceremonies. As the minutes become more diffuse, however, the descriptions of the older rites are more detailed, until eventually under Elagabalus we have a full account of at least the May festival. Thanks to the conservative tendency of ritual performance, we are justified in considering that what we know of the ceremonies as conducted in the year 218 corresponds almost exactly with the ceremony as restored by Augustus. In

describing these ceremonies, therefore, we are at liberty to use them as though they were contemporaneous inscriptions covering more than two centuries.

The ancient ceremonies of which we find traces in the acts of the Arvals may be roughly divided into two classes: (*a*) those which relate to the great festival in May, and (*b*) certain *piacula*, or propitiatory ceremonies, carried out under special circumstances.

(*a*) *The Festival in May.*—As has been said above, the May festival belonged to the category of movable feasts, the so-called *Feriæ Indictivæ*. The days on which it was to be celebrated had to be formally announced at the beginning of the year. This process was known as the *Indictio*. It must in the nature of things go back to the earliest days of the priesthood, and may well have been mentioned in all the minutes from the time of Augustus. The first *indictio* actually preserved is of the year A.D. 21 (*CIL* vi. 32340). As an illustration of the process may be quoted the *acta* of the year 105 (*CIL* vi. 2075, i. line 11):

'Under the same consuls on the seventh day before the Ides of January, in the vestibule of the temple of Concord, the Arval Brothers set the date for the festival of the Dea Dia. And Marcus Valerius Trebicius Decianus, the magister, having washed his hands, and having covered his face, standing in the open air and facing the east, together with his colleagues set the date for the festival of the Dea Dia, thus for this year: So may it be good, favourable, happy, and fortunate for the Emperor, Cæsar Nerva Trajan Augustus Germanicus Dacicus, and for his whole household, for the Roman people, for the Quirites, and for the Arval Brothers, the festival of the Dea Dia shall take place this year on the sixteenth day before the Kalends of June (May 17) at home, and on the fourteenth day before the Kalends of June (May 19) in the grove and at home, and on the thirteenth day before the Kalends of June (May 20) at home. There were present,' etc. (the list of names follows).

Though the festival was indicted every year, there arose by degrees a certain regularity in the dates chosen. For the earlier period before Vespasian more or less irregularity prevails, but from Vespasian onward, with the exception of the year 90, the dates chosen are the 17th, 19th, and 20th of May (in the years of the city which were even in number according to Varro's reckoning), and the 27th, 29th, and 30th of May (in the years of the city which were uneven in number according to Varro's reckoning).

The festival itself accordingly occupied three days, but extended over a period of four days, because the first and second day were separated by an interval of a day, the familiar *dies postriduanus*. Of these three days the second was the most important. On it, in the morning, the ceremonies were held in the grove, whereas on the entire first and third days the celebration was held in Rome.

Regarding the localities in which these ceremonies took place, the following seems to have been the state of affairs:—In Rome itself the Arvals had no official meeting-place of their own. In the minutes of the earlier years we find them meeting in the year 14 in the Regia, in 38 in the temple of Juppiter Stator, in 59 in the Pantheon, in 63 in the temple of Concord, and from 69 onwards regularly in the temple of Concord, though naturally, when ceremonies were held in honour of the various deified Emperors, they met in the temple of the particular Emperor. In the grove itself there seem to have been at least four structures. First, there was the temple of the Dea Dia, which was on or near the top of the hill. No traces of this temple are left, nor do any of the Renaissance sketches seem to represent it. Probably in this temple the marble tablets containing the *acta* were exposed. As we have seen above, the temple was not round. Second, at the foot of the hill was a building referred to as the Tetrastylum. As its name implies, it was rectangular, and it is therefore probably identical with the building discovered in 1570, of which we have the sketch by Silvio Peruzzi (see above, p. 7b). Third, also at the foot of the hill was a building referred to as the Cæsareum. Probably this is the round building, represented in a sketch by Ligorio (in the Turin codex), the remains of which are still to be seen on the spot (cf. Altmann, *Italische Rundbauten*, p. 63 ff.). Lastly, there was the circus, of which we have no traces.

The fullest account of the festival is found in the *acta* of the year 218 (Elagabalus, *CIL* vi. 2104). It reads as follows (filling out the *lacunæ*, a process which can be accomplished with a high degree of certainty on account of the various other descriptions in other years of the minutes):

'Under the same consuls on the sixth day before the Kalends of June (May 27), on the Palatine in the temple of the Divi, Alfenius Avitianus, the vice-magister, officiating, the Arval Brothers made sacrifice at dawn with incense and wine, and took into their hands the dried grain-stalks and the fresh grain-stalks, and also the bread crowned with laurel, and they anointed the Dea Dia with oil, and the Arval Brothers put on the toga prætexta and sat in chairs, and thereafter they laid aside the toga prætexta. There were present the following (a list of names follows). Thereupon after midday, having bathed, they sat in their chairs, and then, when they had washed their hands, they put on the white garments for supper and reclined on dining couches and banqueted. Then boys clad in the toga prætexta, the father and mother of each of whom were living, sons of senators, four in number, sat in the chairs and banqueted. And after the banquet (*i.e.* the first course) the Arval Brothers reclined on couches ornamented with fluted valences, and made sacrifice with incense and wine; and the sacrifice was carried to the altar by the boys in the prætexta, the sons of senators, and by the slaves of the State; and the priests received the perfumes and garlands, and they consecrated the perfumes and wrapped them in the napkins (to take home). Likewise the second course, the dessert, was served, and *sportulæ* were given both to the priests of the Emperor and to the other priests whose names are written above. Then, having distributed the roses, they gave the usual salutations of farewell.'

Thereupon follows immediately the account of the second day:—'Likewise on the fourth day before the Kalends of June (May 29), in the grove of the Dea Dia, Alfenius Avitianus, the vice-magister, sacrificed at the altar two young sows, an offering of expiation for the cutting of the grove and the work thus done, and then he sacrificed a heifer in honour of the Dea Dia, and going to the Tetrastylum he sat in his chair. Then returning to the altar, he offered the *exta* of the young sows, and then in the circus, in a silver brazier ornamented with a piece of turf, he offered the *exta* of the heifer, and then he returned to the Tetrastylum and entered in the book (that he had performed the sacrifice), and thereupon he took off his prætexta and returned to his tent. Moreover, in the afternoon the Arval Brothers put the prætexta on again, and assembled in the Tetrastylum and sat on the benches and entered in the official records that they had come together and performed the sacrifice, and they feasted upon the young sows which had been sacrificed for expiation, and afterwards consumed the blood. Then wearing the prætexta, with covered heads and crowned with ears of wheat, they went up into the grove, and Alfenius Avitianus, the vice-magister, officiating, they sacrificed a fattened lamb, and examined the victim to see the success of the sacrifice; and when the sacrifice had been completed, they all made offering of incense and wine. Then they went back into the temple, and at the table made sacrifice to the wine-jars, and in front of the temple on the turf the vice-magister and the flamen made sacrifice. Then going out again to the altar, they all made an offering of money. Thereupon the flamen and the vice-magister, carrying silver cups with bowls filled with wine, and also incense boxes, made sacrifice before the door with incense and wine, and the priests took their stand before the door, and two (of their number), together with the slaves of the State, went to fetch the grain, and they gave it with the right hand and received it with the left hand, and they passed it thus one to another, and finally gave it back to the slaves. Then they entered into the temple and prayed to the wine-jars, and when the doors had been opened they threw the jars down the hill. Then they sat on the marble benches, and bread crowned with laurel was distributed by the slaves. Then they all took *lumemulia* (?) with radishes, and anointed the statues of the goddesses, and all (except the priests) went out of doors and the temple was shut. Then the priests shut up in the temple, girding up their togas, took the song-books, and marking the time, danced the three step, singing thus: "Enos Lases iuvate, enos Lases iuvate, enos Lases iuvate! neve luerve Marmar sins incurrere in pleores, neve luerve Marmar sins incurrere in pleores, neve luerve Marmar sins incurrere in pleores! satur fu, fere Mars! limen sali, sta berber! satur fu, fere Mars! limen sali, sta berber! satur fu, fere Mars! limen sali, sta berber! semunis alterne advocapit conctos, semunis alterne advocapit conctos, semunis alterne advocapit conctos! enos Marmor iuvato, enos Marmor iuvato, enos Marmor iuvato! Triumpe, triumpe, triumpe, triumpe, triumpe!" And after the three step, at a given signal, the slaves entered and took the song-books. And they stood before the door of the temple of the Dea Dia, and with their servants carrying the wreaths intended for each of them, they laid hold of the altar; and the images of the goddesses were crowned, and they elected Publius Ælius Secundinus as magister to serve from the next Saturnalia (for one year to the Saturnalia following), and they named Marcus Flavius Alpinus a flamen . . . and then they wished the customary good wishes, and went down out of the grove; and, taking off their prætextas, they put on white dining garments and banqueted in the Tetrastylum. And the platters with the Campanian earthenware and the wine-jugs of each of the priests were carried into the Tetrastylum like a solemn circus procession. And after the banquet each of those present received the *sportula* (100 *denarii*) and the roses. Then Lucius Alfenius Avitianus, the vice-magister, put on a tunic with a broad border and the purple mantle, and upon his head a wreath of roses, and he took his place above the Carceres and

gave the signal to the four-horse chariots and to the two-horse chariots, and to the vaulters . . . and when the circus performance was finished, they returned to Rome into the house of the magister, and put on white dining garments, and, reclining upon couches with fluted valences, they made sacrifice with incense and wine; and there ministered unto them the sons of senators, the boys above mentioned, whose fathers and mothers were still alive. And when the sacrifice was finished, they received perfumes and wreaths, and again they consecrated perfumes and wrapped them in napkins, and each one received a *sportula* (100 *denarii*). Then they divided the second course, the dessert, and then they took the roses and wished the customary good wishes.'

Lastly comes the account of the third day:—'On the third day before the Kalends of June (May 30), in the house of the magister, the Arval Brothers assembled to complete the sacrifice to the Dea Dia. At the supper there were present (a list of names follows), and reclining upon couches with fluted valences they made sacrifice with wine and incense, and there ministered to them those same sons of senators above mentioned, those boys whose fathers and mothers were still alive; and these boys, aided by the servants and the slaves of the State, carried the sacrificial grain-stalks to the altar. Then, lighting the lamps, they took the Tuscan wine-jars and sent them home by their private servants. Then they divided the second course, the dessert, and received wreaths and perfumes and *sportulæ* (each 100 *denarii*). In this year they feasted for a hundred *denarii* each day on the sixth, the fourth, and the third day before the Kalends of June, and there feasted also the boys, the sons of senators, four in number, and they (too) received each day a *sportula*. And they wished the customary good wishes.'

In spite of the detailed character of our information, the question still remains open as to the real meaning of these ceremonies. The one thing which binds the three days together is the presence of the grain-stalks, which the Brothers handled at dawn on the first day, which were passed from hand to hand at the solemn sacrifice of the second day, and appear again and are solemnly carried to the altar on the third day. The presence of these grain-stalks, the very name itself (*Arval*='land-brother'), the crowns of ears of wheat, their religious year from Saturnalia ('seed-festival') to Saturnalia, and the time of the festival in May at the close of the long series of agricultural festivals—all proclaim the character of their worship as intimately connected with agriculture.

Riddles in abundance remain, however. One is the identity of the chief goddess, the Dea Dia. This is, of course, not a proper name, but is merely one of those adjectival descriptions so common in early times (cf. Bona Dea, Di Manes, Dea Tacita), which were employed because of the reverent fear of mentioning the real name (that this fear was especially felt regarding agricultural deities is clear from Pliny, *HN* xviii. 8, and Macrob. *Sat. Conv.* i. 16. 8). This goddess can scarcely be other than Tellus or the old Italic Ceres. Another difficulty is the relation of this May festival to the Ambarvalia. This has been the subject of a long discussion (full literature on both sides is given by Wissowa in Pauly-Wissowa, ii. 1478 ff.). The truth seems to be that the Arval festival, while not identical with the Ambarvalia as a whole, was closely connected with it. That this connexion was very clear in the minds of later Roman writers is evident from Festus, p. 5 (quoted above, p. 7[b]).

(*b*) *Expiatory ceremonies.*—Apart from this great annual festival in May, the only traces of ancient ritual which remain are those of certain expiatory ceremonies (*piacula*). Two of these ceremonies—that connected with bringing instruments of iron into the grove, and that connected with taking them out again—have already been referred to. Other ceremonies are connected with the trees in the grove. We have a series of minor expiatory acts on account of broken branches or trees destroyed by old age or snow-storms. There are also certain major expiatory acts on account of more serious portents—for example, the growing of a fig tree on the roof of the temple, or a tree in the grove being struck by lightning. An event of the latter character occurred in the year B.C. 224, and on that occasion temporary altars were erected and many victims were sacrificed to various deities: to Dea Dia, to Janus, to Juppiter, to Mars, to the Juno of the Dea Dia, to the Virgines Divæ, to the Famulæ Divæ, to the Lares, to the mother of the Lares, to Fons, to Flora, to Summanus, to Mother Vesta, to the Vesta of the gods and goddesses, to Adolenda and Coinquenda, to the Genius of the emperor, and to the XX Divi.

(2) The other and more frequently recurring function of the Arvals was their activity in connexion with the Imperial household. They made sacrifices on birthdays, anniversaries of consecrations, on the occasion of accession to the throne, and on the giving of the title of *pater patriæ* or of the office of *pontifex maximus*, etc. Extraordinary sacrifices were made also on special occasions in the life of the Emperor—for example, when conspiracy was overthrown, when great military victories were won, when an Emperor was saved from shipwreck, etc. Another feature of their work was the making of regular annual vows (*vota*) on behalf of the safety of the Emperor and of the members of the Imperial household.

We have seen that the inscriptions begin with Augustus and continue down into the reign of Gordian. During this time the priesthood was in the main prosperous. There is, however, a slight indication that even before the close of this period the tide of prosperity had turned. It lies in the fact that the latest datable inscription (that of the year 241) gives the *sportula* as twenty-five *denarii* instead of the one hundred *denarii* always mentioned previously. The financial support of the State was therefore being reduced. We may suppose that this reduction was at least continued, if not increased, during the subsequent reign of Philip, who showed decided tendencies towards Christianity (de Rossi, *Ann. d. Inst.* 1858, 72 ff.). Under Gratian (382, cf. *Cod. Theod.* xvi. 10. 20) the Arvals' wealth went into the public treasury, but the geographical location of the temple and the grove outside the city of Rome, and possibly also the connexion with a circus for public amusement, would tend to preserve it (*Cod. Theod.* xvi. 10. 3). In any case it was preserved as a matter of fact. The proofs for this are sufficient, though in the main negative. Before the time of Constantine the catacombs of St. Generosa were built in the immediate neighbourhood of the Arval grove, but no materials from the grove were used (cf. de Rossi, *Roma Sotterranea*, iii. 689 ff.). The same respect for the grove was shown when Pope Damasus (366–384) built the oratory of the Martyrs Simplicius Faustinus and Viatrix. The first desecration of the marble plates occurred in the building of a Christian cemetery in the 5th or 6th century (Henzen, *Acta*, p. xxv).

LITERATURE.—The best general discussion: G. Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Arvales' in Paulv-Wissowa, ii. (Stuttgart, 1896) 1463–1486. The inscriptions themselves are available in *CIL* vi. parts 1 and 4. With these inscriptions may profitably be read Henzen's splendid Commentary, *Acta Fratrum Arvalium quæ supersunt*, Berlin, 1874; and Huelsen's Commentary in *Ephemeris Epigraphica*, viii. G. Gatti's article 'Arvales' in de Ruggiero's *Dizionario Epigrafico*, i. 682–710, may also be compared.

JESSE BENEDICT CARTER.

ARYAN RELIGION.

[O. SCHRADER].

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- Method.
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Conclusion.

INTRODUCTION.—*History.*—When A. Kuhn in the year 1845 published his famous treatise *Zur ältesten Gesch. der indogerm. Volker*, by which he gave the first impulse towards an Aryan* (Indo-Germanic) archæology, he held out at the close of it the prospect of further investigations:

'There is still abundance of material available for comparison, for there is *the whole province of religion*, which promises abundant results, and gives at the same time, from the intellectual side, the necessary complement of the picture we have sketched. If we have had occasion more than once in these pages to reach conclusions by means of the language of the Vedas, this will happen still more frequently when we are considering the myths and religion of these writings in relation to those of other races.'

A. Kuhn's scientific work during the remainder of his life was almost exclusively devoted to proving the truth of these words. Along with him we find Max Müller, with the same goal in view, and setting out from the same starting-point, the Rigveda, on which he was one of the best authorities.

These two scholars may be called the real founders of a comparative Aryan mythology, in which the notion of 'Aryan religion' had for a long time been taking shape. The common point of view which they hold lies in the conviction, already aroused by the brothers Grimm, that mythology as well as language is rooted deep in the heart of the people, and that it is not the creation of the higher ranks, such as the priestly or the poetic order—a theory which Fr. Creuzer had tried to prove at the beginning of the century in his *Symbolik*. Its explanation is to be sought exclusively in nature and its phenomena, especially in the idea of a struggle, such as the spectacle of a thunderstorm or the alternation of day and night presents to us. This naturalistic view of mythology is exhibited most clearly in the poems of the Rigveda—from which we can easily understand how the myths of the allied peoples were formed, and by means of which we are enabled to discover old Aryan myth-cycles. This A. Kuhn has attempted to do in his articles on 'Gandharven und Kentauren' (Kuhn's *Ztschr.* i.), "Ερινύς, Saranyû" (*ib.*), 'Manus, Μίνως, Mannus' (*ib.* iv.), "Ερμῆς, Saramâ, Sârameya, Wuotan' (*ZDA* vi.), and especially in his great work *Über die Herabkunft des Feuers und des Gottertranks* (Berlin, 1859). Max Müller—whose *Contributions to the Science of Comparative Mythology* (collected in 2 vols., 1897), *Lectures on the Science of Language* (1861–64), along with the 'Essays,' *Chips from a German Workshop* (1867–75), *Origin and Growth of Religion* (1878), *Biographies of Words* (1888), etc., are well known throughout the whole learned world—went even further than A. Kuhn in the naturalistic explanation of mythical names. As specially characteristic of the views of both scholars, the fact may be mentioned that they were not content with discovering old Aryan myths, but tried also to deduce their origin from the character of human speech, its capacity for poetic interpretation, its polyonymy and homonymy, etc. Such is, in a very condensed form, the conception of mythology and religion held by Kuhn and Müller, for the full characterization of which we should have to note also the meagre attention given in the works of both scholars to the important sphere of religious ceremonies or worship. This conception continued to be the prevailing one down to the eighties of last century, although from an early period currents were perceptible which, issuing from various departments of science, seemed to threaten the foundations of the Kuhn-Müller theory.

While this theory, in its re-construction of the Aryan religion, started mainly from the oldest literary remains of the Aryan races, first of all the Veda, and then the Avesta, Homer, and the Edda, on the other hand, the science which has become known under the title of 'Folklore,' and which has as its aim the collecting of the legends, fairy-tales, customs, and habits still prevalent among the people, directed attention to the forms of the so-called lower mythology, and sought to prove that the very oldest material is to be found in analogies, such as those of the Greek Dryads with the German moss- and wood-maidens, of the Cyclops and centaurs with the wild men, etc. It was held to be demonstrable that many exalted divine and heroic figures originated in these circles. The most successful representative of this view was W. Mannhardt, in his two chief works, *Der Baumkultus der Germanen und ihrer Nachbarstamme* (Berlin, 1875, 2nd ed. 1904) and *Antike Wald- und Feldkulte, aus nordeuropäischer Überlieferung erlautert* (Berlin, 1877, 2nd ed. 1905). Then, in addition to this, the study of ethnology, and in its train the *universal comparative history of religion*, pointed to a series of apparently primitive universal religious ideas among mankind, of which at least traces were found also among the Aryan races, and which did not seem to fit well into the system conceived by Kuhn and Müller. The *ancestor theory* especially, according to which all religions spring from the worship of the dead, was placed in the foreground from the anthropological side, and was applied to the Aryan races by J. Lippert in *Die Religionen der europäischen Kulturvolker, der Litauer, Slaven, Germanen, Griechen und Romer in ihrem geschichtlichen Ursprung* (Berlin, 1881); and in England, by H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology* (1876–96), followed by Grant Allen, *Evolution of the Idea of God* (1897). Similarly Elard Hugo Meyer, in his *Indogermanische Mythen* (Berlin, 1883, 1887), distinguished three chief periods in the formation of myths: belief in souls, in spirits, and in gods, the first of which he designated pre-Aryan, the second Aryan, and the third post-Aryan.

Moreover, even the opinion that the poems of the Rigveda (from which, as we saw, the adherents of the Kuhn-Müller theory started, especially with regard to their interpretation of myths) introduce us directly to the domain of naïve nature-poetry began to waver, and there were many acute interpreters who claimed to discover, in the very

* The terms 'Aryan' and 'the Aryans' are used in this article for that group of languages and peoples which is generally called, among students of philology, 'Indo-Germanic.' The term 'Teutonic' is used as a general term, including all branches of the Germanic race; cf. art. TEUTONS.

oldest parts of the Veda, traces of decay and of priestly refinement. This objection to the Kuhn-Müller explanation of myths has been urged with special force by O. Gruppe in his book, *Die griech. Kulte und Mythen in ihren Beziehungen zu den orient. Religionen*, i. (Leipzig, 1887); and in England by A. Lang, *Custom and Myth* (1884), *Myth, Ritual, and Religion* (1899), and *Modern Mythology* (1897). Gruppe points out that a great many of the mythical figures of the Rigveda are explicable not by natural phenomena and occurrences, but by certain priestly manipulations of the cultus. He himself believes the Aryans of primitive times to have been completely devoid of religion, and ascribes the uniformity of their myths and worship, almost in the same way as Creuzer, to the enormous number of religious forms that they borrowed from Western Asia and Egypt and transferred to Greece, India, and Middle and North Europe.

Finally, at the end of the seventies, Comparative Philology, whose daughter the comparative mythology of the Aryan people might well be claimed to be, had also entered upon a new phase of its development, inasmuch as from that time onwards the demand for a *regular* system in the correspondence of sounds as the result of etymological comparisons of words and forms was more emphatically insisted on. Naturally, this claim was made also in the sphere of the identifications proposed by students of the history of religions; and it became evident that the great majority of these identifications, and among them many which had hitherto been regarded as the most reliable supports of mythico-historical hypotheses, were phonetically untenable: *e.g.* Skr. *gandharvá* = Gr. κένταυρος ('Gandharven und Kentauren'); Skr. *marútas*, 'the Maruts' = Lat. Mars; Skr. *Váruṇa* = Gr. Οὐρανός; Skr. *Mánu* = Gr. Μίνως; and many others (see A. A. Macdonell, 'Vedic Mythology' in Buhler's *Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie und Alterthumskunde*, 1897).

Under these circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that doubt of the correctness of the Kuhn-Müller interpretation of mythology increased from year to year, and that finally people actually arrived at such a degree of scepticism as to affirm that it was impossible to ascertain with certainty anything whatever about the oldest religious ideas and customs of the Aryans (cf. *e.g.* E. Zupitza, in the *Ztschr. des Vereins fur Volkskunde*, 1901, p. 343 ff.). It is only quite lately (cf. *e.g.* M. Winternitz, in a series of admirable articles on 'Was wissen wir von den Indogermanen?' in *Beilage zur Münchner AZ*, 1903, Oct. and Nov.) that people are beginning again to ask if it is necessary and just to pronounce the life-work of such distinguished investigators as A. Kuhn and Max Müller absolutely null and void, and are attempting to rescue at least some of their results. All this enables us to see how hard it is at the present moment to give a summary of our knowledge of the Aryan religion; and before we even begin this difficult undertaking it will be necessary, first of all, to touch on the most important points regarding the method which we are to follow in the subsequent discussion.

Method.—In a thoughtful address, entitled *Die Aufgabe der theologischen Fakultaten und die allgemeine Religionsgeschichte* (Berlin, 1901), A. Harnack says:

'In the first place, it needs but little consideration to recognize that the study of each single religion ought by no means to be separated from the study of the *history* of the people concerned. . . . To try to study the religion alone is a more childish undertaking than to examine only the roots or the blossom instead of the whole plant.'

On account of this indissoluble connexion between the history, or, more accurately, the *history of the culture*, of a race and its religion, which will often meet us in the following discussion, it goes without saying that the materials which furnish us with a knowledge of the culture of the primitive Aryans are in reality the same as those which make possible for us an acquaintance with their *religion*. As the present writer has recently treated the former in detail in the preface to his *Reallex. der indogerm. Altertumskunde* (Strassburg, 1901) and in the 3rd ed. of his work *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte* (I. Teil: 'Geschichte und Methode der linguistisch-historischen Forschung,' Jena, 1906), it only remains for him to characterize it shortly here in its special application to the history of religion.

The materials which are at our disposal for the investigation of pre-historic periods of culture are derived partly from *language*, partly from *things*. With regard to the former, we must first of all, with very strict regard to phonetic laws, compare the pre-historic equivalents discovered in the history of religion. For example, there exists beyond all doubt an equivalence of this kind in the group of words: Skr. *devá* = Lat. *deus*, Lith. *dìẽwas*, Ir. *dia*, Old Norse *tivar*, 'God'; and Max Muller is certainly right when, at different times, he has reckoned the establishment of an etymology of this kind among the most important achievements in the mental history of mankind. In this search for the primitive vocabulary, we must, of course, exclude equivalents that are confined to particular languages of the Aryan group, which, we know, were united to each other more closely than to the other languages. This holds, *e.g.*, of a very considerable number of Indo-Iranian word-correspondences like Skr. *sóma* = Avesta *haoma* for the soma plant, which played so important a rôle in the cultus of both peoples; Skr. *mitrá* = Avesta *mithra* for the sun-god Mitra; Skr. *hótar* = Avesta *zaotar* for a certain class of priests, etc. We cannot utilize equivalents like these for determining the character of the Aryan religion; on the contrary, they simply demonstrate that the Indians completed the development of their religious history along with the Iranians, or perhaps only with the Eastern branch of them, the consideration of which falls outside the scope of this article (cf., on this point, Spiegel, *Die arische Periode*, Leipzig, 1887; and numerous sections in Oldenberg's book, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894). *Negative conclusions* from the vocabulary of primitive times, *i.e.* conclusions from the non-existence of an expression for a certain idea to the non-existence of that idea itself, are, on the whole, dangerous, as all negative deductions are. But it is otherwise when primitively related expressions are wanting for a *whole class of ideas*. When, *e.g.*, all attempts have failed to prove that real god-names existed in the earliest times, or when there is no etymological agreement to be found between two languages for the idea of the temple, these facts will require due consideration in deciding the question whether there really were god-names and temples in the primitive Aryan period.

But it would be a great mistake to suppose that the only way in which philology can be of service to the history of religion is by placing at its disposal the primitive etymological equivalents in the sphere of religion. Harnack (*op. cit.*) is right in saying that the history of religion is reflected in the history of language, and that only he who knows the latter is in a position to seek to decipher the former. In fact, the whole formation of religious ideas can be understood only with the help of philology. Whence came the god-names of the separate Aryan races, if, as we have just seen, they cannot be recognized in the vocabulary of the primitive language? What religious thought called them

into being in each separate case; and how did this, their fundamental idea, afterwards grow deeper and wider? But even if it must, unfortunately, be admitted that our knowledge in this department is still very limited, the fact that at present we know nothing certain about the etymological explanation of many, indeed of most, Aryan god-names (an Indian *Varuṇa* and *Mitra*, a Greek *Ares* and *Poseidon*, a Roman *Mars* and *Liber*, the Teutonic *Tanfana* and *Nerthus*, a Lithuanian *Occopirnus* and *Autrimpus*, etc.) does not justify the conclusion that this must remain so in the future. In this connexion, H. Usener's *Götternamen, Versuch einer Lehre von der religiösen Begriffsbildung* (Bonn, 1896), a book which to some extent forms the basis of the present article, shows a marked advance, although the present writer recognizes this advance more in the fundamental idea of the work than in its details, which are often linguistically assailable. Moreover, what we really lack most, in the sphere of Aryan archæology as in others, is a collection of linguistic material. Once we have before us, collected and sifted, the terminology of sacrifice and prayer, of priests and temples, of lots and consulting of oracles, of legal and moral ideas from all the Aryan languages, various stages of historical development emerge of their own accord, and each new etymological discovery implies a new discovery in the history of religion.

We have so far been treating of expressions which either belong to the common pre-historic vocabulary or are autochthonous in the separate languages. Now we have to refer to another important source for the understanding of religious history. This is the *foreign word*, or borrowing. Thus the Gr. Κάδμος taken from Heb. *qedem*, 'the East,' the Lat. *Apollo* and *Proserpina* from Gr. Ἀπέλλων and Περσεφόνη, and the Russ. *bogŭ*, 'God,' from Avesta *baγa*, show the directions from which new religious thoughts and suggestions came to the separate Aryan races.

Now, even although the aid which is given to religious history by philology is great and many-sided, yet it is a great mistake to believe, as was formerly done, that the religion of the primitive Aryans, like their culture generally, could be deduced simply from etymological comparisons. It is true that the above-mentioned equation, Skr. *devá* = Lat. *deus*, shows us clearly that there were divine beings even in primitive times; but we cannot expect from philology any information regarding the intrinsic value, or import and scope, of this term. In this, as in all other questions, therefore, the comparison of *things* and the investigation of *things* must accompany the comparison of *words*.

This brings us, in the first place, to *Pre-history* or *Pre-historic Archæology*, a science which, in general, is based in no small degree on certain religious conceptions and customs of prehistoric man. For we owe the majority of pre-historic relics, as is well known, to the ancient wide-spread practice of the worship of the dead; and the questions, how and where the dead were buried, what was placed beside them in the way of food and drink, what weapons and implements were laid in the grave or on the funeral pyre, and why the corpse was buried in this or that position, turned in this or that direction, are naturally connected most closely with problems of the history of religion. But discoveries of another kind—such as sacrifice-stones, idols, amulets, bronze kettles, bronze chariots, no doubt serving a religious purpose (one was found near Trundholm as recently as 1902; cf. S. Müller, *Urgeschichte Europas*, Strassburg, 1904, p. 116), and many others—possess great significance in religious history, even if at first they raise more problems than they enable us to solve.

But the chief task in this field of investigation must always be *the comparison of the religions historically attested in the various Aryan races*, and the attempt to select from the crowd of their heterogeneous phenomena what is common and original. And there can be no doubt concerning the path to be pursued, provided that the analogy emphasized above between the history of Aryan culture in general and the history of Aryan religion in particular is correct.

It is the great merit of V. Hehn to have shown, especially in his book *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere in ihrem Übergang aus Asien nach Europa*[7] (ed. O. Schrader, Berlin, 1902), that the conditions of civilization in primitive Aryan times have persisted, often with great faithfulness, among the N. European races, particularly the Lithuanians and the Slavs, among whom they not infrequently show themselves at the present day. It is from the study of these races that the higher forms of life, as they are presented to us in Indian, Greek, and Roman antiquity, have for the first time been fully understood. There was really nothing further needed than the transference of this simple thought to the history of religion. In very much the same way, men like W. R. Smith (*Religion of the Semites*[2], 1894 [Germ. tr. Freiburg, 1899]) and S. I. Curtiss (*Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, 1902 [Germ. ed. Leipzig, 1904]) have recently attempted to deduce the oldest Semitic religious conditions, not so much from Babylonian, Phœnician, and Hebrew antiquity as from their *modern* remains, especially among Arab tribes. Similarly our task is to look at the higher forms of religion of the Indians, Greeks, and Romans from the standpoint of the lower stages of N. European paganism, and to find the latter again in the former. Unfortunately, this methodical plan is more easily stated than carried out. The reason for this is that our knowledge of N. European religions is, in many ways, still shadowy and incomplete; for—and this more nearly concerns the *Teutons*—it cannot be doubted that the work of J. Grimm (*Deutsche Mythologie*[4], 1875–78), however worthy of admiration it is even yet, suffers from two defects which have not been removed even by later investigation. The first of these is that the religious-historical information with regard to the Continental Teutons is too much amalgamated with what we know about the *Northern* mythology, which requires special critical examination. The second defect is that the whole re-construction of the old Teutonic faith in the hands of Grimm and his followers is dominated by the same spirit of over-estimation of its contents as Tacitus exhibits in his *Germania*. Our knowledge of Slavonic paganism is still more uncertain. In G. Krek's *Einleit. in die slav. Literaturgeschichte*[2] (Graz, 1887), we find, indeed, a comparatively matter-of-fact presentation of ancient Slavonic religion (pp. 377–439); but the incisive criticism by A. Brückner (*Archiv für slav. Philol.* xiv. 161 ff.) has shown how careful an investigation we still need of the sources, which are far too full of the most incredible misunderstandings and faulty emendations (examples of these in *Archiv*, iv. 423 or xiv. 164), before we can obtain from them any grains of real gold. In particular, we know absolutely nothing about common Slavonic god-names, for even the agreement of *Zuarasici* (certified by Thietmar, vi. 7) with the Russ. *Svarog* does not prove any such thing with certainty (cf. Jagič, *Archiv*, iv. 412 ff.). This is perhaps due to the simple reason that, as yet, there were no Slavonic god-names at all. If the historical information about Slavonic paganism is thus of a doubtful nature, we are compensated for it in some measure by the fact that on Slavonic soil many

heathen manners and customs, even under the gloss of Christianity, make themselves widely felt even at the present time. We possess excellent data about these; and we hope, especially with regard to the cult of the dead, to obtain new and valuable information by means of them.

It fortunately happens, too, that we are very well supplied with information about the primitive paganism of the Baltic brother-races of the Slavs, the Prussians, Lithuanians, and Letts. Among these peoples, originally at least equally far removed from the influences of both Roman and Byzantine culture, a particularly primitive religious system survived down to the 15th and 16th cents., and even longer; so that we see the remarkable spectacle of adherents of the Lutheran doctrine like Jan Malecki (Meletius, Menecius) about 1550, or Matthæus Prætorius (born about 1635) being able to report in detail regarding the paganism existing in their communities. F. Solmsen has enumerated and briefly explained these sources of the Prusso-Lithuanian religion, in Usener's *Götternamen* (p. 79 ff.) We shall return to some of them in the course of this article. In general, however, we may express the hope that the Lithuanian religion will render services to the history of Aryan religion similar to those rendered by the Arabs to Semitic study.

Idea of God.—If we undertake to examine and arrange, in accordance with the method described above, the stock of religious ideas and customs prevalent among the primitive Aryan races, what could be a better starting-point than that conception to the evolution of which all those efforts are in the last resort directed—the conception of 'God'? We shall make the three words Gr. *θεός*, Lat. *deus*, and the common Teutonic O.H.G. *got* the pivot of this preliminary investigation.

For a long time the Greek word was erroneously connected with the Lat. *deus*. Nowadays this theory may be regarded as finally abandoned. On the other hand, nearly all later etymologists agree* that the Gr. *θεός* is derived from **θFεσο-ς* (cf. *θέσφατος* 'spoken by God') and belongs to the following word-group: Lith. *dwesiù*, *dwėsti* 'to breathe,' *dwãsė* 'breath,' 'spirit,' *dùsas* 'vapour,' Old Slav. *duchŭ* 'breath,' 'spirit,' *duša* 'soul,' M.H.G. *getwâs* 'ghost,' Old Gall. *dusii* 'nightmare' (cf. Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, xv. 23: 'Quosdam dæmones, quos *Dusios* Galli nuncupant, hanc assidue immunditiam et tentare et efficere plures talesque asseverant'; Isid. *Or.* 8, 11, 103: 'Sæpe improbi existunt etiam mulieribus, et earum peragunt concubitum, quos dæmones Galli *dusios* nuncupant, quia assidue hanc peragunt immunditiam'), Lat. *Fêrâlia* (**dhvêsâlia*) 'a festival in honour of the dead' (also probably *fêriæ* from **dhvêsiæ*, and *festus*). As the development of the meaning of the Gr. *θεός* we get therefore 'breath,' 'soul,' 'soul of the dead,' '*god*.'

A *second* series of words presents a quite analogous appearance. Jordanis (ch. 13) remarks of the Goths: 'Jam proceres suos, quorum quasi fortuna vincebant, non puros homines sed semideos, id est, *anses* vocaverunt.' Now the word *anses* which is here made use of, and which in the passage quoted denotes the souls of ancestors worshipped as gods, rose on the one hand to be the title of the highest old Norse gods, the Asen (Old Nor. *æsir*), and on the other hand exists still in Anglo-Saxon (*ése*) in the sense of lower spiritual beings, the elves: *ésa gescot* is like *ylfa gescot* = N.H.G. *Hexenschuss*, lit. *witches' shot*, *i.e.* lumbago. It is not improbable that there is, further, a connexion between the same word and Skr. *ásu* 'the breath of life in men and animals,' *anima* (cf., in phonetic connexion, Skr. *asi* = Lat. *ensis* 'sword'), and once more with Skr. *ásura*, Avesta *ahura* (Ahura-mazda) = 'god,' 'lord.'

The facts referred to find their explanation in a series of other related phenomena. As is the case among other races, the *soul* is thought of in the Aryan languages as breath, wind, vapour or smoke. A primitive Aryan expression for this survives in the equation Skr. *âtmán* = O.H.G. *âtum* 'breath,' 'soul' (Ir. *athach* 'breath'), while the closely related equation of Skr. *mánas* = Gr. *μένος* (cf. also Lat. *Minerva* from **Menesova*) seems to mean not so much the physical substratum of the soul as its spiritual power (cf. Gr. *μέμονα*, 'I strive'). The heart of man appears to be regarded as the real seat of the soul, a fact which seems to follow, on the one hand, from the Gr. *κῆρες*, primitive spiritual beings (cf. below, pp. 27, 52), and their identity with *κῆρ* 'heart,' and, on the other hand, from the circumstance that the Indian *mánas* also has its abode in the heart, as a being the size of the thumb (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 526). The heart is also viewed as the starting-point of numerous spiritual functions and emotions: Lat. *vêcors* 'mad,' *recordari* 'to remember,' Old Slav. *srŭditi sę* 'to be angry,' Bulg. *srŭčeliv* 'courageous' (Lat. *cor*, Old Slav. *srŭdĭce* 'heart'), etc. From the separate languages we may mention further, for the notion of the soul: Lat. *animus* 'soul,' *anima* 'breath': Gr. *ἄνεμος* 'wind' (Skr. *ániti* 'he breathes'); Gr. *ψυχή*: *ψύχω* 'breathe'; Gr. *θυμός* (*Il.* vii. 131 identical with *ψυχή*): Skr. *dhûmá*, Lat. *fûmus* 'smoke,' etc. This breath or smoke soul, then, is enclosed in the body of man, which, however, it leaves on the advent of death, also temporarily in the phenomena of sleep and dreams, in order to lead an independent existence. From the spiritual beings formed in this way there have now sprung a large host of spirits conceived as partly harmful and partly helpful, for which there exist in the Aryan languages a vast number of cognate expressions.

Some of these are: Skr. *drúh*, Avesta *druj* = Old Nor. *draugr*, Old Saxon *gidrog*, O.H.G. *gitroc* (cf. also A.S. *dredg* 'larva mortui,' and perhaps Old Nor. *dvergr*, M.H.G. *twerc* 'dwarf') 'goblin,' 'ghost': Skr. *druh* 'to injure'; Skr. *ṛbhú*, Vedic expression for three clever elfish beings (Kuhn's *Ztschr.* iv. 102 ff.) = Old Nor. *álfr*, A.S. *ælf*, M.H.G. *alp*, 'fairy,' 'ghostly being,' 'demon,' 'nightmare' (cf. W. Grimm, *Kleinere Schriften*, i. 405 ff., and also Schrader, *Reallexicon*, art. 'Zwerge und Riesen'); common Teutonic M.H.G. *mar* m.f., Old Nor. *mara*, A.S. *mære*, *mare*, O.H.G. *mara* f. 'demon' (*mare* in 'nightmare') = Old Sl. *mora* 'witch,' 'demon,' 'goblin,' Ir. *mor-[r]ígain*, Gl. *lamia* 'goblin-queen'; Old Nor. *valr*, A.S. *wæl* 'the dead' (esp. on the battlefield) = Lith. *vėlės* 'ghostly forms of dead people, ghostly beings in general'; Goth. *hugs* 'νοῦς,' Old Nor. *hugr* 'soul' (*mannahugir* 'human souls which appear in many forms') perhaps = Lith. *kaũkas* 'dwarf-spirit,' 'hobgoblin,' etc.

To this class of beings, which will engage our attention, in the discussion of the conception of fate (below, p. 52[a]), belong originally the two series of words which were discussed above, namely, Gr. *θεός* and Goth. *anses*; but these words took on a higher meaning under the influence of the worship devoted to the souls of the dead, and ultimately became associated with those divine beings for whom the Lat. *deus* is the characteristic term.

The word *deus*, as we have shown above, corresponds to the Skr. *devá*, Ir. *dia*, Lith. *dĩewas*, Old Nor. *tívar*, and along with these goes back to an Aryan root **deivo-s*, which, in consequence of its close connexion with Aryan **dyêu-s* = Skr. *dyáús* 'sky,' Gr. *Ζεύς*, Lat. *Juppiter*, must have had some such meaning as 'the heavenly.' Now, since the Aryan **dyêus*, as the use not only of the Indian *dyáús*, but also of the Gr. *Ζεύς* and Lat. *Juppiter* proves, originally denoted merely the visible sky worshipped as a god, **deivos* derived in primitive times* from **dyêus*, must have signified

* Bechtel forms an exception to this, in Bezzenberger's *Beitrage*, xxx. 207 ff. [*N.B.*—A star *before* a word (as in the next line) signifies that the form does not occur but is inferred.]

* A later formation from Skr. *dyáús*, *divás* = Gr. *Ζεύς*, *Δι-ός* is Skr. *divyá* = Gr. *δῖος* from **δι-Fο-ς* 'heavenly.'

originally only the powers of nature visible in the sky, *e.g.* sun, moon, dawn, thunder, winds, etc. In them, therefore, we must see the 'heavenly ones.' The common Teutonic root Goth. *guþ*, Old Nor. *goð*, A.S. *god*, O.H.G. *got*, seems to the present writer to be largely characteristic of the oldest conception of the divine element thought of as active in these 'heavenly ones.' The most significant thing about it is that it leads back to a *neuter conception*, to an original **ghutóm* which (cf. on this point Osthoff in Bezzenberger's *Beitrage z. Kunde d. idg. Spr.* xxiv. 177), as is shown by the comparison with Skr. *hávate* 'he calls' (*hutá* 'called'), Avesta *zavaiti* 'he curses,' Lith. *žavėti* 'to charm,' most probably denoted originally 'the divine element called forth by a charm from the deified phenomenon.' We shall return to this later. But meanwhile the discussion of the Gr. *θεός* and the Lat. *deus* has led us to the necessity of dividing the material at our disposal into *two* parts, which we may distinguish as worship of the dead and worship of the 'heavenly ones.' In a *third* division we shall discuss what, indeed, in many ways comes into contact with the worship of the dead and the 'heavenly ones,' but yet is on the whole independent of it, viz. the prevailing ideas of Fate and the means of their investigation.

I. *THE WORSHIP OF THE DEAD.*—As far back as we can trace the Aryan races by means of tradition or excavations, they honoured their dead by a long series of customs which shed a surprising light on the ideas of man concerning a life after death. We shall get the best view of these by treating of (1) the different forms of disposal of the dead which we encounter among the Aryan races, especially burial and cremation; (2) the attentions paid to the dead at the time of the disposal of the corpse, especially the gifts to the dead; (3) the attentions paid to them after the funeral rites (ancestor-worship). Then we must speak (4) about the beliefs in fixed common abodes of the dead (realms of the dead)—beliefs which, in the course of time, made their appearance in several parts of the Aryan world.

1. **Burial and burning of the corpse.**—The fact that in all countries occupied by Aryans these two forms of disposing of the dead are found contending for the mastery, even in very primitive times, suggests to us the question, To which of the two are we to assign the greater antiquity? If we turn for an answer first to *Asia*, we find that cremation may be regarded as the regular means of disposing of the body among the *Indians* even in Vedic times, and is the only one mentioned in the ritual texts; but alongside of it there are also evidences of the burial of the unburned body. Thus in the *Rigveda* (x. xv. 14) the pious ancestors who dwell in the joy of Heaven are divided into 'those who have been burned by fire and those who have not been burned by fire'; and so too in the *Atharvaveda* (xviii. ii. 34) buried bodies and cremated ones are distinguished among the 'fathers,' whom Agni is to bring forward. A glance at the *Iranian* brother-race of the Indians shows us that in these latter quotations we have before us the traces of an earlier state of affairs. Among the kings of the Scythians, who ethnographically seem to represent a part of the primitive Iranian race, left behind or scattered westwards, and who remained in more primitive conditions of culture, Herodotus (iv. 71 f.), who describes their obsequies in great detail, presupposes burial as the only form; and the bodies of the ancient Persian kings also were entombed unburned, as their graves show. Herodotus (i. 140) states the same thing of the Persians in general, while he gives in addition an account of a protective envelopment of the body in wax (*κατακηρώσαντες δὴ ὧν τὸν νέκυν Πέρσαι γῇ κρύπτουσι*). When, on the other hand, cremation is proved by the Avesta as existing among non-Zoroastrian tribes, or when the followers of Zarathushtra, as well as the Persian Magi, previous to burying their dead, exposed them to be devoured by dogs, birds and beasts of prey, we must in both cases undoubtedly detect the introduction of foreign customs, the last-mentioned of which seems to have originated among the wild mountain tribes of the Oreitæ in Baluchistan (cf. Diodorus Siculus, xvii. 105: *τῶν γὰρ τελευτησάντων παρ' αὐτοῖς τὰ σώματα φέρουσιν οἱ συγγενεῖς γυμνοί, λόγχας ἔχοντες. εἰς δὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας δρυμοὺς θέντες τὸ σῶμα, τὸν μὲν περικείμενον τῷ νεκρῷ κόσμον περιαιροῦνται, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ τετελευτηκότος καταλείπουσι βορὰν τοῖς θηρίοις*).

Similar conditions confront us among the *European* Aryans, especially among the *Greeks*. In the shaft-graves, and in the bee-hive and chamber tombs of the Mycenæan period, the dead were entombed unburned in a partly mummified state (cf. Tsountas-Manatt, *The Mycenæan Age*, chs. v. vi.). And even if, in the face of these discoveries, we must take account of the possibility of a non-Grecian population in Mycenæan Greece, the case is different with the great Athenian cemetery which has been open to view in the N.W. of the town since the year 1891 (cf. A. Bruckner and E. Pernice, 'Ein attischer Friedhof' in *Mitteil. d. kais. deutschen archaeol. Instituts*, Athen. Abt. xviii.). Among the nineteen 'dipylon-graves' (graves of the geometric period) in this burying-place, only one contained an urn with burnt bones, 'and this state of affairs agrees with the assurances of Greek local antiquaries, who claim to have seen no *προιστορικὸς τάφος* with a burnt body.' So, when burying and burning are met with in the Greece of history alongside of each other, there can be no doubt that the former custom must be regarded as the more primitive, and that the Homeric world with its practice of body-burning represents an innovation contrary to the primitive Greek custom of burial which is preserved in the mother-country.

The *Roman* tradition corresponds to the conditions actually found among the Greeks. According to Pliny, burial preceded cremation in Rome also (cf. *Hist. Nat.* vii. 187):

'Ipsum cremare apud Romanos non fuit veteris instituti; terra condebantur . . . et tamen multæ familiæ priscos servavere ritus, sicut in Cornelia nemo ante Sullam dictatorem traditur crematus.'

An old royal enactment referring to the so-called 'Cæsarian operation' (cf. M. Voigt, 'Über die leges regiæ' in *ASG*, vii.: 'negat lex regia mulierem, quæ prægnans mortua sit, *humari*, antequam partus ei excidatur') appears to be acquainted with burial only, but the legislation of the Twelve Tables already sanctions both methods of disposal of the dead.

Cf. Tab. x. (ed. Schoell) 1: 'hominem mortuum in urbe *ne sepelito neve urito*'; 8, 9: 'neve aurum addito cui auro dentes iuncti escunt, aut im cum *illo sepeliet uretve*, se fraude esto.'

The excavations also indicate that burial was succeeded by cremation on ancient Latin soil. The lowest layer of the burying-ground laid bare near the Porta Esquilina contains rock-hewn burial chambers with unburned bodies; while in the second layer of soil in this cemetery, as well as in the necropolis of Alba Longa and among the most recent excavations of Professor Boni in the Forum Romanum, urns of ashes have been brought to light which point, no doubt, to a higher antiquity for cremation in Rome than might be expected from the historical tradition quoted. We have to rely solely on excavations with regard to the northern part of Italy. Here, in the famous burying-places belonging to the older Iron Age, of Bologna, Villanova, and Marzobotto, the graves of bodies buried and burned almost contemporaneously lie close together. The latter class are assigned by Mon-

telius (*La Civilisation primitive en Italie depuis l'introduction des métaux*, Stockholm, 1895) to the Umbrians, *i.e.* to the near relatives of the Latins, and the former to the non-Aryan Etruscans. But the observations of the present writer, on the spot and in the Museum of Bologna, failed to convince him of the possibility of carrying through this ethnographic division.

When we pass to the East and North of our territory, we find both methods of disposing of the dead mentioned by Herodotus (v. 8) among the *Thracians*: ταφαὶ δὲ τοῖσι εὐδαίμοσι αὐτῶν [the present reference is thus only to the rich] εἰσὶ αἵδε· τρεῖς μὲν ἡμέρας προτιθέασι τὸν νεκρὸν, καὶ παντοῖα σφάξαντες ἱρήια εὐωχέονται, προκλαύσαντες πρῶτον· ἔπειτα δὲ θάπτουσι **κατακαύσαντες ἢ ἄλλως γῇ κρύψαντες.*** The same thing holds of the pagan *Prussians* and *Lithuanians*, regarding whom a treaty with the Teutonic Order in the year 1249 (cf. Dreger, *Cod. Pomeran. diplom.* No. 191) certifies the following: 'promiserunt quod ipsi et heredes eorum in mortuis *comburendis vel subterrandis* . . . vel etiam in aliis quibuscunque ritus gentilium de cetero non servabunt.' Elaborate descriptions of the disposal of the bodies of people of rank by cremation among the races mentioned are given us by different authorities, such as Peter of Dusburg or the canon Stryikowski; while others like the clerical Jan Malecki (Meletius, Menecius), who will often be referred to, in their accounts of the ancient Prussian funeral customs, start with burial as a self-evident institution. The older information among the Slavonic races is somewhat more uniform, and is in favour of cremation. It is certified by Boniface (Jaffé, *Monumenta Moguntina*, p. 172) as existing among the *Winedi*; by Thietmar of Merseburg (*Chron.* viii. 2) among the Poles, and by the Arabs Ibn Dūstah, Ibn Fosslan, Mas'ūdi, etc., among the Eastern and the Danube Slavs. Alongside of this, however, Ibn Dūstah tells of a custom according to which, if a man of noble rank died, a grave was made for him in the form of a large house, in which he was laid unburned. But, as the followers of this custom are expressly called Rhos (Russians), not Slavonians, it is natural to conjecture that, as we must understand by the Rhos the Norse conquerors of Russia, we have here to do with a Scandinavian custom; for we read of stately rooms in Norway belonging to the oldest Iron Age—rooms hewn in wood, in which some corpses lay on stuffed cushions, and some sat on chairs (cf. O. Montelius, *Die Kultur Schwedens*[2], p. 193). It may also be considered a foreign custom when, in the account given by Ibn Fosslan of the interment of a Russian merchant (see below, p. 30), the corpse was put in a ship and burned along with it, in exactly the same way as was customary in Northern Scandinavia. On the other hand, the simultaneous existence of different burial customs among the old Slavonic races—cremation among the Radimičes, Sěverjanes, and Kriviče, burial among the Poljanes and Drevljanes—may be inferred from the information of the old Russian *Chronicle* of Nestor, and Christianity at its introduction seems to have found both methods of disposing of the bodies followed to practically the same extent (cf. Kotljarevskij, 'On the Burial Customs of the Pagan Slavs,' in *Trans. of the Department for the Russian Lang. and Lit. of the St. Petersburg Acad.* [Russ.] xlix. p. 240 ff.).

The *Teutons* and *Celts* still remain to be considered. Among these the Roman authors are acquainted with cremation only.

Cf., for the Teutons, Tacitus, *Germ.* 27: 'funerum nulla ambitio: id solum observatur, ut corpora clarorum virorum certis lignis crementur, strucm rogi nec vestibus nec odoribus cumulant: sua cuique arma, quorundam igni et equus adicitur, sepulcrum cæspes erigit.' As late as the year 785 (*MGH* iii. 49) Charlemagne decreed against the Saxons: 'si quis corpus defuncti hominis secundum ritum Paganorum flamma consumi fecerit, et ossa eius ad cinerem redegerit, capite punietur'; and again, 'iubemus ut corpora Christianorum Saxonum ad cimeteria ecclesiæ deferantur et non ad tumulos Paganorum.' The native testimonies to cremations on a large scale are too well known from the *Beowulf* and the songs of the Edda to require to be detailed here. With reference to the Gauls, Cæsar states (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 19): 'funera sunt pro cultu Gallorum magnifica et sumptuosa; omniaque quæ vivis cordi fuisse arbitrantur, in ignem inferunt, etiam animalia, ac paulo supra hanc memoriam servi et clientes, quos ab iis dilectos esse constabat, iustis funeribus confectis una cremabantur.' The same thing appears from Pomponius Mela (iii. 2, 3) and from Diodorus Siculus (v. 28).

The question simply is, *At what time* did the Teutons and Celts begin to cremate their dead? The final answer to this can be given only by prehistoric archæology, for want of older written evidences. This shows that in the lands occupied by the Celts and Teutons during the Neolithic Age, the corpses were interred unburned in dolmens, upright graves, and stone chests, and that it was only after the use of bronze had become more firmly established in Europe that cremation gradually came in. It further encourages more and more the opinion (cf. Montelius, *AA* xvii. 151 ff.) that the change of custom went on in the countries mentioned, without any real change in the population, so that in this way we should have to conclude that, for both Celts and Teutons, burial and not cremation was the oldest method of disposing of the dead, although history gives evidence only of the latter. It is worthy of notice that in Sweden and Norway burial once more appears decisively during the younger Iron Age alongside of cremation, and we may doubt whether the former mode of disposing of the dead was at any time quite extinct.

No one who considers the facts and conditions here described (cf. for details J. Grimm, 'Über das Verbrennen der Leichen' in *Kleinere Schriften*, ii. 211, and Ridgeway, *The Early Age of Greece*, i. ch. vii. 'Inhumation, Cremation, and the Soul') will doubt that, so far as the Aryan races are concerned, there is a not inconsiderable probability for the priority of burial over cremation. This view is confirmed by a *consideration of the language*.

If it really happened, as J. Grimm (*op. cit.*) assumed, that cremation existed before burial, we should naturally expect this fact to be indicated somehow in the Aryan funeral terminology; that, *e.g.*, expressions for 'to dispose of the dead' should exhibit an original sense='to burn.' But this is not at all the case; and even the Gr. *θάπτω*, which means in historical usage 'to bury' and 'to burn,' can by no means, in spite of J. Grimm's contention, be connected with Skr. *tap*, Lat. *tepeo*, Gr. *τέφρα*, 'ashes,' but must very likely be connected with O.H.G. *tunc*, 'pit,' or with Armen. *damban* 'grave.' On the other hand, there is a wide-spread prehistoric designation of burial in the series: Old Pr. *kopts, enkopts*, 'to bury,' Lith. *kāpas*, 'cairn,' Lett. *kapu mâte*, 'grave-goddess,' Gr. *κάπετος*, 'grave,' 'pit,' Lat. *capulus*, 'coffin': Lith. *kapóti*, Old Slav. *kopati*, 'to hew,' and the same change of meaning recurs in the equally primitive equation: O.H.G. *grab*=Old Slav. *grobŭ*, 'grave,' 'coffin' (Goth. *graban*, 'to dig'). There is a pre-historic designation of the grave also in the probable equation, Lat. *orcus* (**urcus*), 'under world'=Goth. *aúrahi*, 'sepulchral cave' (cf. Bezzenberger, *Beitrage*, xxvi. 166); while the Lat. *sepelio*, the oldest meaning of which was undoubtedly 'to bury,' as follows from the passages of the Twelve Tables quoted above, through its connexion with the Skr. *sapary*, 'to serve,' 'do homage,' 'honour,' plainly expresses the ancient *ritual significance* of this mode of disposal of the dead (cf. also W. Schulze, in Kuhn's *Zeitschr.* xli. 335).

* Cf. also Kretschmer, *Einleit. in die Gesch. der griech. Sprache*, p. 178.

We are thus justified in assuming that the Aryans, alike in the land of their origin and after their arrival in what afterwards became their home, interred their dead unburned in carefully prepared graves. The thought that prompted this kind of burial must have been simply the desire to protect the body of the deceased, whether with the pious intention of warding off enemies and wild animals from it, or because, believing that the soul of the dead hovers around the corpse and is bound to its existence, they thought to secure the interests of the deceased by procuring for him the longest possible existence, and at the same time to serve the interests of the survivors—for they were afraid of ghosts—by confining the spirits of the dead rigidly to the grave. Or it may be that all these reasons worked together.

This intention of guarding the body of the dead person is exhibited on the grandest scale in those colossal tombs, known as dolmens, vaults, cairns, etc., which are scattered over Europe in the North, West, and South, and which also recur in North Africa, Palestine, and India; but the questions to which these buildings give rise from the side of the history of culture and ethnography (cf. S. Müller, *Nord. Altertumskunde*, i. 68; Hoernes, *Urgesch. der bildenden Kunst*, p. 241; Zinck, *Det nordevrop. dysseterritor. stengrave og dysserne udbredelse i Europa*; M. Much, *Heimat der Indogermanen*, Abschnitt v., 'Die grossen Steingräber') are as yet so far from being settled that we cannot enter upon them here. At bottom, however, the same endeavour to protect and preserve the human corpse is expressed in the later but still pagan invention of the coffin. It is unknown during the whole of the Stone Age, and in Greece also during the Mycenæan period of the Bronze Age. In Sparta, as late as the time of Lycurgus, the dead were, without any such covering, laid upon palm branches and leaves of the olive tree. Afterwards, as in the old Athenian cemetery (cf. above, p. 16), the bodies were enclosed in large vessels (*πίθοι*), and then the clay and wooden coffin and the stone sarcophagus gradually found their way into the South, borrowed perhaps from foreign countries. In the forest land of N. Europe there appeared for the first time, in the earlier Bronze Age, the so-called 'tree of the dead,' *i.e.* a hollowed-out trunk, especially of the oak, which was used for the protection of the body. Any one who desires to convince himself of the preserving power of this manner of interment has only to examine, in the Copenhagen National Museum, the tree-coffins with their contents taken from the Danish cairns. In Ancient Russia, and in dialects even at the present day, the coffin bears the very name *klada*, *koloda*, *i.e.* 'tree-trunk' (cf. N. Germ. *Dodenstock*). The Slavonians, even at the beginning of last century, felled a hollow tree for the purposes of burial, shaped it, and pushed the dead body inside. The sectaries of the province of Czernigovski are still said invariably to manufacture their coffins out of a complete tree-trunk. Moreover, corpses have been found in Russia which were enveloped only in bark (cf. Kotljarevskij, *op. cit.* p. 222 f.). This northern 'tree of the dead,' whose wide-spread use is a proof of the fact that the burial of the dead had never quite been given up, was afterwards superseded by the Christian coffin *constructed* from boards, which spread over Europe along with the diffusion of the new beliefs.

Eloquent witness is borne to this by numerous names of the coffin in the Teutonic languages—names which were borrowed from the Latin (O.H.G. *saruh*, *sarh*, from **sarcus*=*sarcophagus*, A.S. *cest*, *cist*, 'coffin,' *cistian*, 'to coffin,' Old Nor. *lik-kista* from Lat. *cista*, M.H.G. *arke* from Lat *arca*, O.H.G. *sarh-scrin* from Lat. *scrinium*).

Thus all along, from the earliest to the most recent times, we see connected with the disposal of the dead by burial the endeavour to protect and preserve the corpse.

Now, in the most direct opposition to this series of ideas connected with the burial of the dead, is the custom of *cremation*, which, as we have seen, emerges in pre-historic times among all the Aryan races, and subsists, alongside of burial, down even to the introduction of Christianity. While those who bury a body aim at *protecting* it by durable grave-constructions or by coffining, we now find men resorting to fire as the most drastic means of *destroying* it. It is in reality a revolution which can be explained only by a complete change in the ideas about life after death, and which in recent years several famous scholars have made the subject of research. The first place here is due to Erwin Rohde and his book *Psyche*[2] (i. 27 ff.). According to his view, cremation is meant to effect the speedy and complete separation of the soul from the body, and this from an affectionate as well as a selfish motive. As long as the body lasts, the soul is bound to it; it enjoys no rest itself and allows none to the survivors, whom it terrifies by manifold appearances.

'Nothing can destroy the visible counterpart of the soul more quickly than fire; if a fire is kindled, and the most precious belongings of the dead man are consumed in it, no bond can detain the soul any longer in this world. Thus, by burning the body, they serve the interests of the dead, who no longer roam about restlessly, and still more those of the living, whom the souls banished to the depths of the earth can never meet again.

In essential agreement with Rohde, but independently of him, S. Müller, in his *Nord. Altertumskunde* (i. 363 ff.), is convinced that the true purpose of cremation is the release of the soul in order that it may find peace in the other life, while R. Much, in a comprehensive discussion of Müller's book (*Anzeiger fur deutsches Altertum*, xlviii. 315 ff.), lays greater emphasis on the release of the survivors of the dead person from the fear of him than on the release of his soul.

'The thought of the dead person, if it was a case of burial, would involve the idea of the preserved but disfigured body, decomposed or already changed to a skeleton. . . . But if the dead person had been burned, what was left of him afforded no new food for the imagination. . . . The part which the dead under such circumstances played in the dreams, hallucinations, and imaginations of the survivors was undoubtedly a smaller and also a more friendly one; in other words, his soul entered more easily into the peace of a home of souls, or else followed its destined way at liberty within living and active nature.'

In confirmation of his view, Much appeals to the custom, which long persisted, of burning what were supposed to be vampires, witches, sorcerers, and the like, for no other reason than to prevent their return.

In opposition to the opinion (which, by the way, is generally prevalent) of these three scholars, that the 'dogma' of cremation spread into Europe and Asia by passing from race to race, W. Ridgeway, in his work mentioned above, *The Early Age of Greece*, defends the view that cremation was brought by the *conquering expeditions* of a N. European Celtic race to Italy and Greece as well as to Iran and India. He holds that, at the same time and in the same way as the custom of burning the body, the belief had spread that an entrance into a world of the blest was secured only by those who were burned by fire, but that cremation itself is rooted, in the last resort, in the conviction that it is only by fire that man can be freed from the pollution which death brings with it.

Setting aside this attempt of Ridgeway (which appears to have little foundation) to explain the spread of cremation among the Aryan races by migration of races instead of by 'waves of culture,' the present writer believes that in the discussions of all four scholars important points of view have been suggested for the under-

standing of the question with which we are here engaged, although naturally it will never be possible to get beyond more or less credible conjectures on the subject. There is no doubt that the thought which in stages of primitive culture is expressed most frequently and plainly, as we shall see in the section on 'Realms of the Dead' (p. 29), is that cremation opens for the dead person the entrance into a paradise beyond. But it cannot yet be decided whether cremation first originated from an Aryan race and spread 'wave-like' in different directions, or took rise outside the circle of Aryan linguistic and racial kinship—perhaps among the primitive Sumerian population of Babylon, where, in the year 1887, huge burying-grounds of burned bodies were brought to light in the two ruined sites of Surghul and El Hibba (cf. R. Koldewey, in *ZA* ii. 403 ff.).

2. Attentions paid to the dead at the time of the disposal of the corpse, especially the gifts to the dead.—Whether, in primitive times, the body of the dead was buried or burned, the disposal of it must have been accompanied even then by a long series of solemn customs, which can still be ascertained by a careful comparison of the burial-rites handed down from the separate Aryan races. Unfortunately, such a comparison has not as yet been undertaken, and cannot be attempted in an exhaustive way here. To show, however, how far-reaching the analogies in this connexion are, two at least of the chief Aryan races, namely, the *Greeks* and the *Lithuanian Slavs* will be compared.

For the former we shall start from the description of the Greek burial-customs in Rohde's *Psyche*[2] (denoted by R.), i. 218 ff.; for the latter we shall take special account of the above-mentioned (p. 17[a]) work of Kotljarevskij (=K.); cf also Joannes Menecius (=M.), 'de Sacrificiis et Idolatria veterum Borussorum, Livonum, aliarumque vicinarum gentium' (*Scriptores Rerum Livonicarum*, ii. 389 ff.); and P. V. Šejn (=Š.[1]), 'Materials for a Knowledge of the Life and Language of the Russian Population of the North-West' (White Russia), i. 2, 2nd pt: 'Burial and Memorial Customs, Wailings over the Corpse, and Lamentations for the Dead,' in *Trans. of the Department for the Russian Lang. and Lit. of the St Petersburg Acad.* [Russ.] 51, No. 3, St. Petersburg, 1890, and the same author's work (=Š.[2]), *The Great Russian in his Songs, Usages, Customs, Superstitions, Tales, Legends*, etc. [Russ.], St. Petersburg, 1898, 1900, 2nd pt. p. 777 ff. Thereafter the important subject of gifts to the dead will be discussed with regard to all the Aryan races.

(*a*) ANCIENT GREEK AND LITU-SLAVIC BURIAL-CUSTOMS.—(*a*) *The lying in state of the corpse* (*πρόθεσις*).—'After the eyes and the mouth have been closed by the hand of the nearest relative, the corpse is washed and anointed by the women of the family, clothed in clean garments, and laid on the bed in the house for solemn lying in state' (R.).

'In funeribus hic servatur ritus a rusticanis. Defunctorum cadavera vestibus et calceis induuntur, et erecta locantur super sellam, cui assidentes illorum propinqui perpotant ac helluantur' (M. p. 391). 'On the appearance of the master of the house, the wife, and the persons intimately connected with the dead man, the lying in state takes place in the "corner" (*kutŭ*), which in this case does not mean the corner under the sacred images, but the bench opposite the entrance door.* Among other wishes connected with a "decent" death, as, *e.g.*, that in the hour of death all the relatives may be present, that the son may close the eyes, the daughter sing the song of woe, etc., the White Russian peasant wishes to lie on his own "bench" after his death; he has not died "decently" if he has lain in the "corner" in a stranger's house.' 'They clothe every corpse in a clean white garment, prepared in the house, and in new bast shoes, which are replaced by boots only in wealthy families.' 'It is the bounden duty of the dead man's nearest relatives to close his eyes, and in doing so they are required to avoid most strictly any possible injury to his body; and they make haste to wash the body, before it has grown cold.' 'They clothe the dead man in a complete summer dress, *i.e.* in a summer tunic and girdle over the under-garment, and they usually put a hat on his head' (Š.[1] pp. 512, 518).

A difference from the Greek custom is shown in the fact that among the Slavs the washing of the dead body, which, moreover, is regarded as a religious ceremony accompanied by prayers, is not usually performed by relatives, but by strangers; in the case of men it is done by men, in the case of women by women, or sometimes in the case of both by old women.

(*β*) *The lamentation for the dead* (*θρῆνος*).—'The lamentation for the dead took place over the corpse lying on its bier, and the purpose of the lying in state was to give opportunity for this' (R.). The spontaneous passionateness of this lamentation in the earliest times is attested not only in the description of Homer,* but also by the endeavours of the lawgivers, especially Solon (Plutarch, *Solon*, 21), which were directed towards putting a check upon it. Solon will have only the women nearest of kin (cf. below, 3 *e*) to take part in the lamentation; all violent outbursts of grief, scratching of the cheeks, and beating of the breast and the head are forbidden, as well as the singing of set forms (*θρηνεῖν πεποιημένα*). Homer (*Il.* xxiv. 707 ff.) gives a graphic account of what once prevailed: Priam carries the body of Hector to Troy. The whole town is assembled before the gates; with weeping and lamentations the people surround Priam's chariot; wife and mother tear their hair at the sight of their beloved dead one. Priam now exhorts them: 'Give me place for the mules to pass through; hereafter ye shall have your fill of wailing when I have brought him unto his home.' There the body of Hector is laid on a splendid couch, professional singers strike up a melancholy air, accompanied by the woeful cries of the women; then Andromache, Hecuba, and Helen step forward to the dead body to utter those mourning songs which are doubtless meant by the *θρηνεῖν πεποιημένα* of Solon's edict.

We meet with all these customs in everyday use in the Litu-Slavic world, sometimes even at the very threshold of the present day. From the laying of the dead body on the 'bench,' from the very moment of death, indeed, the lamentations of female relatives or neighbours continue through all the phases of the burial—often it is impossible to say whether more as a conventional necessity or as an expression of deep anguish. Moreover, they are repeated at the anniversary festivals of the dead, which will be spoken of below. The Arab Ibn Dūstah (K. p. 217) was acquainted with the fierceness of these outbursts of grief when he relates that the women lacerated † their hands and faces with knives when a member of the family died. And Šejn states of the White Russians of the present day (Š.[1] p. 535):

'The room of the peasant's house, in which the dead body lies, re-echoes with the weeping and mourning of relatives, neighbours, and acquaintances. In such a case the women naturally distinguish themselves by special ecstasies of feeling, their wailing and moaning and their despair at times reaching such a pitch that, on looking at them, one involuntarily begins to be apprehensive not only for the health, but even for the life of some of them.' Again, referring to the *Great Russians*, he says

* Cf. also Š.[1] p. 531: 'They lay the dead body on a long broad bench, or on a frame specially prepared for it in the middle of the room, with the head towards the sacred images (*krasny ugolŭ*)'; and Š.[1] p. 551: 'They lay the dead body in the middle of the room, with the feet towards the door.' So in Homer (*Il.* xix. 212) the dead person rests *ἀνὰ πρόθυρον τετραμμενος*.

* Cf. *e.g. Il.* xviii. 22 ff. (the son of Nestor announces the death of Patroclus to Achilles):

ὡς φάτο, τὸν (Achilles) *δ' ἄχεος νεφέλη ἐκάλυψε μελαινα*
ἀμφοτερῃσι δὲ χερσὶν ἐὼν κόνιν αἰθαλόεσσαν
χευατο κὰκ κεφαλῆς, χαριεν δ' ἤσχυνε πρόσωπον·
νεκταρεῳ δὲ χιτῶνι μελαιν' ἀμφίζανε τεφρη
αὐτὸς δ' ἐν κονίῃσι μέγας μεγαλωστὶ ταυυσθεὶς
κεῖτο, φίλῃσι δὲ χερσὶ κόμην ἤσχυνε δαίζων.
δμωαὶ δ', ἃς Ἀχιλεὺς λήίσσατο Πάτροκλός τε,
θυμὸν ἀκηχεμέναι μεγάλ' ἴαχον, ἐκ δὲ θυραζε
ἔδραμον ἀμφ' Ἀχιλῆα δαίφρονα, χερσι δὲ πᾶσαι
στήθεα πεπλήγοντο, λυθεν δ' ὑπο γυία ἑκάστης.

† Cf. *Il.* xix. 282 ff.:

Βρισηὶς δ' ἄρ' ἔπειτ', ἰκέλη χρυσέῃ Ἀφροδίτῃ,
ὡς ἴδε Πάτροκλον δεδαιγμενον ὀξει χαλκῷ,
ἀμφ' αὐτῷ χυμένη λίγ' ἐκώκυε, χερσι δ' ἀμυσσεν
στηθεά τ' ἠδ' ἀπαλὴν δειρην ἰδὲ καλὰ πρόσωπα.

(Š.[2] p. 779): 'When the women strike up their mourning songs at the graves, the weeping widow often swoons in consequence of her great grief, i.e. she falls on the grave of her husband, and lies there perfectly motionless. Then the women who are present shake her and bring her to her senses; and she falls down on the grave again, and continues her song of lamentation. Swoons like these occur several times in succession. Often they are only pretended, as it does honour to the bereaved one, and they praise her for "knowing how to weep."'

It is worthy of note that these Russian lamentations often assume an epic, and even a dramatic, character—*epic* in so far as occasionally a complete sketch of the life of the deceased is given in them (cf. Š.[1] p. 546), *dramatic* in so far as the mourners are in the habit of turning to the dead person with questions as if he were alive.

Cf. Menecius, *op. cit.* p. 391: 'Epota cerevisia (see above) fit lamentatio funebris, quæ in lingua Rutenica sic sonat: . . . id est, hei mihi quare mortuus es? Num tibi deerat esca aut potus? Hoc modo lamentantes enumerant ordine omnia externa illius bona, cuius mortem deplorant; nempe, uxorem, liberos, oves, boves, equos, anseres, gallinas, etc. Ad quæ singula respondentes occinunt hanc naniam: cur ergo mortuus es qui hæc habebas?' and Š.[1] p. 520: 'Those who visit the dead man take pains to express their genuine grief, and in doing so they recall different circumstances in their lives which have such and such a connexion with his life. The women express this in a mournful, tearful song, but the men in a long address, during which the speaker often turns to the dead man with questions, just as if he were still alive, and several times during the course of the speech he repeats that the dead man, although no longer alive, can nevertheless hear and understand quite well, only he is unable to express his thoughts and feelings.'

These speeches of the men are not really dirges, since only the women can take part in funeral dirges. Copious collections of these dirges, arranged according to the relationship of the mourner (widow, mother, sister, daughter, daughter-in-law, etc.), are to be found in both of Šejn's works. While on the whole marked by great monotony, these songs not infrequently exhibit in details genuine poetic feeling, and quite recall the mourning songs which the Trojan women poured forth over the body of Hector.

Thus a White Russian widow laments (Š.[1] p. 638): 'O, my brave partner, how am I to live now with my dear little children? Who will be their supporter and father? Whence can warm winds blow down upon them? No warm winds will blow upon them,' etc. Cf. Andromache's words at the bier of her husband (*Il.* xxiv. 725 ff.): 'Husband, thou art gone young from life, and leavest me a widow in thy halls. And the child is yet but a little one, the child of ill-fated parents, thee and me; nor methinks shall he grow up to manhood,' etc.

In Russia there are also paid female mourners, who often achieve great fame by their art (cf. Mělnikow, *In the Forests*, ii. 307, Russ. ed.).

(γ) *The funeral procession* (ἐκφορά).—'The lying in state seems to have lasted, as a rule, only one day. Early on the morning of the third day after death, the body was carried out of the house along with the couch on which it had lain. . . . The solemn and magnificent forms which this part of the cult of the dead assumed, in the time of the ancient aristocracy, may be seen from the portrayal (if it corresponds at all to the reality) of a funeral procession on one of the very ancient "dipylon-vases." Here the body lies on an elevated bier in a carriage drawn by two horses; there are men with swords at the side, and a whole crowd of women following, wailing and beating their heads' (R.).

'Cum ad sepulturam effertur cadaver, plerique in equis funus prosequuntur, et currum obequitant, quo cadaver vehitur; eductisque gladiis verberant auras, vociferantes: . . . id est, aufugite vos dæmones' (M. p. 391). 'They always drive the dead body to the cemetery, and that on sledges even in summer; it is not customary to carry the dead body with the hands'* (Š.[2] p. 778). 'In old Russian the phrase "to sit on the sledge" means the same as "to approach the grave" (cf. Anučin, 'Sledge, Boat, and Horse as Requisites of Burial Ritual' (Russ.) in the *Moskauer Drevnosti*, xvi.). 'It is also worthy of notice that, as a rule, they yoke the dead man's favourite horse to his carriage.' 'In my parish they convey the dead to the cemetery in no other way than on a waggon drawn by a pair of oxen.' 'The burial takes place on the third day after the death of the invalid, and often on the second' (Š.[2] pp. 522, 541, 530).

The obsequies themselves naturally took a different form according as it was burial or cremation that was practised; both methods, as we have seen, can be proved to have existed in pre-Christian times, both on Litu-Slavic and on Greek soil. Winternitz, in his articles, 'Was wissen wir von den Indogermanen?' (*Beilage zur Munchner AZ*, 1903, No. 258, p. 293), thinks it is possible to recognize a primitive Aryan custom, connected with burial as well as cremation, in the frequently recurring practice of the mourners walking three times round the grave or the funeral pyre; but the present writer has not as yet been able to trace such a habit on strictly Slavonic soil. The most important part, however, of the obsequies proper was undoubtedly the *depositing of the funeral gifts* on the grave or on the funeral pyre of the deceased—a point which will be treated in greater detail below. We shall therefore pass on to the fourth and last chief act of the ancient Greek burial ceremonial on the one hand, and the Litu-Slavic on the other, viz. the funeral feast.

(δ) *The funeral feast* (περιδεῖπνον).—'Having returned from the disposal of the body, the members of the family undergo a religious purification, and then, crowned with wreaths, attend the funeral feast. This was also a part of the cult of souls. The soul of the dead man was believed to be present, as their host; it was dread of the invisible companion that gave rise to the custom of alluding to him only eulogistically during the feast. The funeral feast was a repast for the living relatives, given at the house of the dead person' (R.).

'All the rest of the company return (after the burial) to the peasant's house, with the priest at their head, in order to "celebrate the funeral feast" (*pravitĭ stolŭ*; cf. Homeric τάφον δαινύναι). By this is meant a commemoration meal for the dead person, which lasts from two to four hours.' 'After they have buried the corpse, the priest goes home, but often they invite him to the house of the dead person. All the others who attended the burial immediately betake themselves to the house of the deceased "to the feast of cakes" (*na klecki*). After they have washed their hands, they pray here first of all to God, sometimes inaudibly, sometimes, if there is a reader among them, aloud; then they sit down to table. The reader and those who dug the grave sit in the places of honour. The men sit at one table a little higher ("in the corner," *na kutě*), the women at another' (Š.[1] pp. 513, 554). 'But each one, before eating [at the funeral feast], must wash himself. This must have been a very ancient custom, and it has not been given up yet among the Nadravians; for, when the people come from the burial, a tub of water is placed before the door, as those who attended the funeral must wash* themselves, even although none of them touched either the earth or the corpse' (cf. Matthæus Prætorius, *Deliciæ Prussicæ oder Preussische Schaubuhne*, ed. W. Pierson, Berlin, 1871, p. 99). 'To this day I cherish the greatest respect for this burial feast (*žalobny stolŭ*), at which rude speaking, slander, dispute, disagreement, strife, wanton jests, and everything else that usually accompanies gatherings of peasants, had no place. The large gathering spoke with restraint, not raising their voices, and the conversation, whether of individuals or of the whole company, confined itself to the deceased, his actions, and the most trivial details of his life. They recalled the talk and instructions of the dead man, especially those in which the goodness of his heart shone forth' (Š.[1] p. 514).

We shall learn more about the funeral feasts of the Greeks and the Litu-Slavs when we come to speak of their 'commemoration feasts for the dead' (3 *d*); the latter cannot always be sharply separated from the former.

(*b*) THE GIFTS TO THE DEAD.—The remote antiquity of the Lithuanian, White Russian, and Great Russian ideas and usages connected with the disposal of the dead is shown not least in the custom, which even yet is in part wide-spread, of laying in the grave along with the dead person the favourite objects of his past life. The following is a selection from the great mass of testimonies:

'Post lamentationem dantur cadaveri munuscula, nempe mulieri fila cum acu: viro linteolum, idque eius collo implicatur. . . . Qui funus mortuis faciunt, nummos proiciunt in sepulcrum tanquam viatico mortuum prosequentes. Collocant quoque panem, et lagenam cerevisiæ plenam ad caput cadaveris in sepulcrum illati, ne anima vel sitiat vel esuriat' (M. *l.c.*). 'I

* The custom is different on the other side of the Volga, among the Raskolnikans (cf. Melnikow, *In the Forests*, ii. 309, Russ. ed.).

* The Scythians also, as Herodotus (iv. 73 ff.) describes in detail, had to purify themselves after the burial, which they did by means of a vapour-bath from hemp-seed.

was assured that they put into the pockets of the linen shirt (*nasovü*), which is put on the dead man, pipe and tobacco-pouch, flint and steel if he smoked during his life, and a snuff-box if he snuffed. To the man's girdle above the shirt they hung a small bag containing smooth copper buttons, as well as a small knife in a leather sheath—articles with which the peasant never parts during his daily life. In the case of both men and women they placed in the front folds of the linen shirt a clean linen handkerchief (*nosovička*), so that the dead person might, if necessary, wipe his eyes, his nose, and his mouth.' 'I have heard it frequently asserted that on opening a burial-mound the grave-diggers sometimes used to find a bottle of spirits which had been previously laid in the dead man's coffin. The men, so far from despising such a find, consumed it on the spot with great pleasure.' 'They place a towel in the dead man's hand, and some coppers in his pocket, with which he buys a place for himself "in yonder world."' 'After the burial-service they lower the deceased into the grave, along with objects which were specially treasured by him and were specially dear to him during his lifetime. If, *e.g.*, he was by trade a shoemaker, they invariably placed beside him an unfinished bast shoe (*sü pičkomü i spicami*, implements of his trade?); if he was a carpenter, or some other tradesman, they gave him an axe, a chisel, a plane, a file, etc. Besides these things they put into every dead man's grave bread, salt, eggs for an omelet, nuts, beer and spirits in a bottle, and also a short pipe with tobacco and tinder-box, or a snuff-box with snuff' (S.[1] pp. 512, 517, 531, 534).

Similar customs may still be shown to exist among the Teutonic races of the present day, although they have to a large extent disappeared (cf. E. Mogk, 'Mythologie' in Paul's *Grundriss d. germ. Phil.*[2] iii. 252).

The result of these investigations is that even to-day, under the complete domination of Christianity, we find the remains of a custom which can be traced back, by means of excavations and traditions, to the epoch when people generally began to bestow care upon the disposal of the dead, viz. the Neolithic Age; and this custom consisted in giving to the dead man gifts of meat and drink, weapons, household furniture of all kinds, ornaments, domestic animals, and even servants and wives. In fact, in the time of the Vikings, they even deposited the dead man's ship along with him at the burial mound, as the well-known discoveries of Tune and Gokstad show. And among those Aryan races which, at the time of the oldest historical tradition, seem to be no longer acquainted with the custom of gifts to the dead, unmistakable traces point to its existence at an earlier date. For instance, gifts to the dead appear to be unknown to *Vedic* antiquity, but such facts as the following must be taken into account. According to a famous hymn of the Rigveda (x. 18), they give the dead warrior on the funeral-pyre his bow, and then take it out of his hands again; or they make the wife lie on the funeral-pyre beside her husband, and afterwards command her to 'rise once more to the world of the living.' This shows that here also it used to be the custom for weapons and wife to be burnt along with the dead man (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 575). The same holds good of the Homeric Greeks. With them also the ashes of the dead were interred generally without gifts to the dead; but the funeral ceremony which Achilles prepared for his friend Patroclus (*Il.* xxiii. 164 ff.), and the funeral-pyre on which he placed pitchers with honey and oil, and at which he slaughtered sheep, oxen, horses, dogs, and twelve noble Trojans, show that there reached even into the Homeric epoch the memory of a time when people honoured the dead with sacrifices and gifts.

The method in which these gifts were offered to the dead man varied. Where the rite of *burial* was prevalent, they were lowered with the corpse into the grave; where *cremation* was customary, they were either placed beside the ashes of the dead man or burned with him on the funeral-pyre—which seems to be the later custom. But it is difficult to carry through a sharp distinction as to the character of the gifts according as it was a case of burial or of cremation. It is true that S. Müller, in his *Nordische Altertumskunde*, has ventured to suggest, for the geographically limited district of this northern world, a complete history of the development of gifts to the dead in harmony with the development he assumes to have taken place in the ideas of the people of this region concerning a future life. Thus (according to S. Muller), at an earlier period of the Neolithic Age it was believed that the dead person really continued to live in the seclusion of the tomb, and so he was provided in great abundance with weapons and implements, with vessels containing meat and drink, with amber beads, etc. Then came the close of the Stone Age and the earliest Bronze Age, in which 'the earlier belief in the continuance of the life of the soul appears to have been given up without having anything to put in its place.' The consequence was that importance was no longer attached to the proper equipment of the dead, which 'was confined to a fixed collection of *weapons* and *ornaments*—one might say, to the things belonging to the daily outfit.' But what was the use of these then? And does it not seem a simpler assumption that in graves like these we have to do with those of warriors, who had no need of implements? Finally, we are told, cremation came in, which completely freed the soul from the body and carried it off to airy regions. From that time, according to S. Müller, the graves contain only 'petty wares, such as objects for the toilet, smaller pieces of furniture, or simple articles of dress.' But what would the soul, released from the body, want, *e.g.*, with a razor? Thus, however interesting it is to hear the opinions of an investigator of the standing of S. Muller, it is, nevertheless, very doubtful whether his views can be maintained even so far as the northern part, and especially the rest, of Europe is concerned. What meaning are we to put, *e.g.*, on the fact that, in the famous cemetery of Hallstatt, 525 graves of skeletons lie alongside of and among 455 graves of ashes, and that both kinds of graves exhibit essentially the same kinds of gifts deposited: weapons, utensils, ornaments, clay vessels, etc.? Or how are we to judge the fact that the Russian peasant of to-day who puts a handkerchief in the dead man's coffin (see above) gives as his reason the grossly material notion (which, according to S. Muller, really occurs only in the earliest Neolithic periods) that he does it in order that the dead man may be able to blow his nose?

The fundamental idea of all these gifts to the dead, from the most primitive times down to the present day, must always have been simply the wish to give the dead man something with him that might be useful or agreeable to him after death. In this connexion it must be emphatically observed that, *in depositing these things, the mourners were actuated not so much by definite conceptions of the future life, as by a custom inherited from their fathers.* This much we may say, that at different places and at different times the fundamental idea underwent a process of sublimation, in so far as the gifts to the dead, once seriously meant, showed a tendency to change into symbols of love and remembrance. We can recognize this very beautifully in the graves of the Athenian burying-ground already mentioned (cf. p. 16[b]), which was in use from pre-historic times down to the 4th cent. B.C. In the graves of the 'dipylon epoch,' which, as we have seen, contain skeletons almost exclusively, the abundant gifts (weapons, pottery of all kinds, pots with meat and drink, and bones from bull-offerings) deposited in the graves were doubtless meant seriously, and intended for the actual use of the dead man. It is quite different with the later graves—cremation as well as burial graves—between which no distinction can be made here in this

respect. The men generally get nothing more than a few worthless vessels. But beside the women are laid their ornaments, beside the children their toys (cf. Brückner-Pernice, *op. cit.* p. 189 f.).

We have said that we must regard as the fundamental idea of all gifts to the dead the wish of the surviving relatives to provide for the dead man in a future life, whatever they might imagine it to be. We cannot here enter fully into the much-disputed question as to whether this wish was called forth by fear of or love for the dead man. It may be that there was a time when fear of the soul of the dead, and the intention of keeping it securely in the grave by means of these gifts, were the only ideas in view. On the other hand, we must imagine the family ties so well knit, even in the times of the early Aryans, that they cannot be thought of as lacking a feeling of love (however rude the manner of expressing it), which was naturally extended also to the dead. So we can only say that a feeling of *timid* reverence for the dead, of fear mingled with love, was the foundation of the Aryan worship of the dead; and this notion is reflected in numerous testimonies (see below).

On the other hand, we must notice briefly another motive frequently supposed to underlie these gifts to the dead, viz. the assumption that men did not venture to deprive the dead of the property belonging to them in the eyes of God and of justice. It is all the more necessary to examine this view, because it best explains a number of facts which it is otherwise impossible or hard to understand. Thus, in the first place, the idea was widely current in Teutonic law of 'the portion of the dead,' *i.e.* 'a share which belongs by right to the dead for his own legacy,' and which H. Brunner (*Z. der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgesch.* xix. Germanistische Abt. p. 107 ff.) has shown 'originally consisted of the movables which were burned or buried with the dead man.' If, therefore, the oldest usage affecting the rights of souls was that the dead should receive his entire possessions, the further inference is drawn (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 30 f. footnote 3) that in later times the idea must naturally have arisen of commuting this right by means of a small symbolical gift. Thus is to be explained the coin, the *obolus*, which in classical antiquity was squeezed between the teeth of the dead man, and which we have also frequently met with among the Litu-Slavic races as a gift to the dead. In the former instance it appears as 'Charon's penny,' *i.e.* as payment for the ferryman of the dead, in the latter (cf. above, p. 21[a]) it is transformed into money to buy a place in the next world. Generally, at the transference of an inheritance, many customs appear which indicate the notion that goods and chattels, from the point of view of God and justice, must follow the owner to the grave. In White Russia (Š.[1] p. 522) when the coffin has been lifted to the waggon drawn by a horse, the relatives take leave of the dead man by kissing his forehead, but the new head of the house kisses the hoofs of the funeral horse, as well as those of the other horses, and sometimes those of all the cattle.

'The dead man,' writes Kotljarevskij (*op. cit.* p. 211), 'could take all his belongings with him into the grave; so among the inhabitants of Mazovia, the new head of the house, as soon as the old one dies, goes to the house, to the buildings connected with the house, to the trees, and to the domestic animals, and tells them of the death of their former master, and of the entrance into power of the new one, with the words: "Your former master is dead; I am now your new lord."' The same thing is stated by Carl Cappeller, *Kaip seneji Lėtuvininkai gyveno, Aufzeichnungen aus dem Kreise Stallupönen*, Heidelberg, 1904, p. 36: 'Thus it was a pagan custom,' the account concludes

Similar customs are also reported from Germany. In Michelbach, near Marburg, when the head of the house dies, the new master goes to the cattle in the stable and to the bee-houses, and announces the 'Lād' and his taking over of the charge with the words: 'The master is dead; I am the master' (in letters of R. Heldmann). Hessler (*Hessische Landes- und Volkskunde*, ii. [Marburg, 1904] p. 152) tells of a similar undertaking of command on the part of the mistress.

Nevertheless, the present writer does not believe that the custom of gifts to the dead is made altogether clear by the series of ideas described above, however old they may be. In order to show this, he will in closing this section refer to one more point from which it will appear that on Aryan soil, even in pre-historic times, people had not only thought about providing the dead man with such things as had been, or might have been, his property during his life—his axe, his sword, his apparel, etc.—but made provision beyond this for his well-being in the world to come. For our purpose, we may start from the custom, already touched on above, of giving the dead man his wife, or, if he had several wives, one of them, as a companion in the grave or on the funeral-pyre.

According to the evidence in Europe collected by V. Hehn (*Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*[7], p. 535) and H. Zimmer (*Altindisches Leben*, p. 329), the same thing is clearly demonstrable among Scythians, Thracians, Lithuanians, Slavs, and Teutons, and undoubtedly goes back to primitive Aryan times. For India, it cannot be proved from Vedic antiquity. Nevertheless, Indologists do not doubt that, when the burning of widows makes its appearance, from about the 5th cent. B.C., we have to do not with an innovation, but with the revival of a very old custom preserved locally even in Vedic times (cf. R. Garbe, *Beiträge zur indischen Kulturgeschichte*, Berlin, 1903, p. 141 ff., 'Witwenverbrennung'; Risley, *Report Census of India*, 1901).

All these testimonies are concerned with provision for the *married* dead. What happened in the case of the single man? The present writer has tried to answer this question in a little monograph on *Totenhochzeit* (Jena, 1904). In this he starts from the custom, attested in Attica, of placing on the grave of those who died unmarried a λουτροφόρος, *i.e.* a certain kind of water-pitcher, which at the same time played an important part in marriage-ceremonies, as the water intended for the bridal bath of the young couple was brought in it. It is only by comparing the Greek customs with those of other Aryan peoples that we can discover the meaning of this custom. We then find that the placing of the bridal λουτροφόρος on the grave of unmarried people represents the symbolical preservation of a custom which is still very wide-spread among the Slavonic races, in terms of which a ceremonial imitation-marriage was celebrated at the graves of unmarried men and maidens, during which a bride or a bridegroom was there and then assigned to the dead person.* The third and last stage of the custom under discussion is presented to us in the accounts of the Arabs regarding the oldest Slavonic and Russian conditions of life. According to them, not only, as has been mentioned, was the wife of the dead *married man* given to him as a companion in death, but the *single man* too was, after his death, married *in regular fashion* to a young girl, who also was therefore doomed to die (cf. Mas'ūdī, *Les Prairies d'or*, ed. Barbier de Meynard, Paris, 1861–1865, ii. p. 9, n. 7). One of these 'death-weddings' is described in detail by the Arab Ibn Fosslan (text and translation ed. by C. E. Frähn, St. Petersburg, 1823). But it follows from isolated traces that the custom of the wife dying along with her husband was prevalent also in Greece in pre-historic times (cf. Pausanias, ii. 21. 7), and in the story of the Trojan maiden Polyxene, sacrificed at the grave of Achilles, there exists also on classical soil a case of the barbarian custom of 'death-

* Remains of this custom are found also in Germany; for in Hesse the coffins of single men who have died must be accompanied by 'wreathed girls,' who must wear mourning for four weeks, etc. (cf. Hessler, *op. cit.*).

marriage.' If these statements (for a fuller account of which reference may be made to the booklet mentioned above) are right,* we are undoubtedly concerned with a case in which the funeral gifts cannot signify making the dead take with him property possessed before, but were clearly due to a concern on the part of the survivors for the fortunes of the deceased in the next world. This concern was based on the conviction, firmly rooted in primitive Aryan times, that marriage is an absolute necessity and bachelorhood a pitiable condition (cf. the present author's book, *Die Schwiegermutter und der Hagestolz*, Brunswick, 1904, p. 26 ff.).†

3. Attentions paid to the dead after the funeral rites (Ancestor-worship).—After the dead body had been consigned to the grave or the funeral-pyre, in the way described above, the person remained in connexion with his relatives by means of a rigidly appointed service of the dead. Survivals of this service are to be met with more or less distinctly among all Aryan races. They can, however, now be studied in detail and as a whole only in two branches of the Aryan linguistic group, widely separated from each other in time and place, the Indians and the Litu-Slavs. With regard to the latter we must refer to the works of Šejn and Kotljarevskij, already quoted (pp. 17[a], 19). So far as the Indians are concerned, their ancestors were worshipped by two kinds of religious ceremonies, the *Pindapitṛyajña* and the *Śrâddha*. The first of these is a sacrifice in which balls of rice (*pinḍa*) are offered only to 'the fathers' on the afternoon of the day on which the new moon sacrifice takes place. The *Śrâddha*, however, *i.e.* 'that which is offered from a sense of trust (*śraddhâ*, viz. in the Brâhmans),' is a celebration in which the ancestors are honoured with water, cakes, ointment, clothes, and again with water, —but in addition, in order to please one or more of the departed, the worshipper provides food for Brâhmans. For the former ceremony compare O. Donner, *Das Pindapitṛyajña oder Manenopfer mit Klossen*, Berlin, 1870, and, for the latter, especially W. Caland, *Über Totenverehrung bei einigen der indogermanischen Volker*, Amsterdam, 1888, and *Altindischer Ahnencult*, Leyden, 1893 (cf. also the same author's 'Die altindischen Todten- und Bestattungsgebrauche' in *Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wettenschappen*, Amsterdam, 1896). Although the fundamental features of this old Indian ancestor-worship must be regarded as belonging to the Vedic period, still one cannot fail to recognize that its forms in most of the sources show that the ruling priesthood exerted a strong influence on them, and to a large extent transformed them. Fortunately, too, in India itself there is no lack of statements, as, *e.g.*, in the *Grhyasutra* of Gobhila, pointing to an essentially lower stage of ancestor-worship, features of which recur with surprising exactness in the Litu-Slavic ceremonial. We can almost say that the veil which Christianity has drawn across this ancient layer of religious worship is more transparent than the one which Brâhmanism has spread over it. In any case, it will be advisable in the re-construction of the old Aryan cult of the dead, to which we now pass, to take as our starting-point the Litu-Slavic and not the Indian conditions. Here we shall deal with (*a*) the designation and the manner of conceiving of the worshipped ancestors, (*b*) the times, (*c*) the places, (*d*) the ritual of the worship of the dead, (*e*) the general significance, for the history of culture, of the worship of the dead in early times.

(*a*) DESIGNATION AND MANNER OF CONCEIVING OF THE WORSHIPPED ANCESTORS (ADMISSION INTO THEIR NUMBER). —The White Russian peasants designate those to whom worship of the dead is offered as *dzjady* (Russ. *dědŭ*), 'grandfather,' while the Great Russians use the term *roditeli*, lit. 'parents.' Both expressions, but especially the Russian *roditelĭ*, *roditeli*, have now assumed such a general meaning that they can be applied to any deceased person, even to children of both sexes (cf. Š.[1] p. 594, footnote 1). The Gr. γονεῖς and the Lat. *parentes* (cf. *parentalia*, *parentatio*) correspond to the Great Russian expression, while the technical designation of the worshipped ancestors in Sanskrit, *pitáras*, literally means 'fathers.' A still further stage in the upward direction than the White Russian *dzjady* is represented by the Gr. τριτοπάτορες, 'great-grandfathers.' These are the ancestors to whom the inhabitants of Attica, at the celebration of a marriage, pray for the blessing of children (cf. E. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 247). Thus we get the designations 'fathers' ('parents'), 'grandfathers' and 'great-grandfathers,' and it is not a matter of chance that in the Indian ritual the offering of cakes and water is dedicated to these three:

'To three (ancestors) is the water offered, to three is the *pinḍa* given, the fourth (viz. the descendant) offers it (viz. *pinḍa*) to the three; the fifth has nothing to do with it' (Manu, ix. 186). In the same way this 'threefold circle of fathers' is embraced by the Gr. γονεῖς and the Lat. *parentes*; cf. Isæus, viii. 32 γονεῖς εἰσὶ μήτηρ καὶ πατηρ καὶ πάππος καὶ τηθη καὶ τούτων μήτηρ καὶ πατήρ· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ γενους εισιν, and Festus, p. 221 *parens vulgo pater et mater appellatur, sed iuris prudentes avos et proavos, avias et proavias parentum nomine appellari dicunt* (cf. A. Kaegi, *Die Neunzahl bei den Ostariern*, p. 6).

These ancestors are everywhere considered as real and powerful beings, watching especially over the welfare of the family, as may be seen from the designations applied to them, such as θεοὶ πατρῷοι, *Di parentes*, *Divi manes*, White Russ. *scjaty dzjady*, 'the sacred grandfathers,' etc., as well as from the wording of the prayers which are addressed to them. The following, *e.g.*, is a very characteristic report with regard to White Russia (Š.[1] p. 593):

'On every possible occasion the peasant expresses his worshipful remembrance of his "grandfathers." He does so in his daily prayer, in conversation in the family and in company, as well as on the different festive occasions. There are, too, weighty considerations which compel him to regard this as his duty. He is persuaded that all good fortune in the farm and in life was produced by the continuous exertions of his ancestors, and is sustained by means of their blessings and their prayers to the Supreme Being (the latter is a modern idea). It was they who laid out the present settlement and erected the buildings which until now have remained intact. There the grandfather dug a canal, there he broke up the land and made the fields arable. The grandson splits wood with the grandfather's axe, the granddaughter reaps with her grandmother's sickle. In the dowry of the daughter there are the "sarafan," the necklace, and even the wooden shoes of the grandmother; the spirited black horse is descended from the grandfather's mare. In a word, just as these individual objects speak of the ancestors, so the whole construction of life, which has changed little since their time, calls them daily and even hourly to remembrance.'

It is to them, therefore, that the peasant turns in all the necessities of daily life. Thus the following is a prayer used in India at the *Pinḍapitṛyajña*:

'Honour, Pitaras, for your comfort, honour for your living sap, honour for your living power, honour for your gentleness, honour for your life, honour for your vigour, *Svâhâ* to you, honour to you, Pitaras, honour, this (viz. water) is yours, Pitaras, this is our and your life-bringing element; may we who are here be quickened.' Thereupon the husband gives

* Several objections to these views raised by Paul Stengel in the *Wochenschrift fur klass. Phil.*, 1905, No. 18, and by F. Kauffmann in the *Zeitschrift fur deutsche Philologie*, 1907, vol. i., have been answered by the present writer in his *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*[3], i. (Jena, 1906), p. 220, note 1, and ii. (Jena, 1907), p. 335, note 3, p. 532.

† For examples of marriage of the living to the dead in modern India, see Nelson, *Manual of the Madura District*, ii. 40; Logan, *Manual of the Malabar District*, i. 128; Francis, *Report on Census of Madras*, 1901, i. 56. It was noticed also among the Tatars by Marco Polo (1st ed. i. 234, ed. Yule), who gives other examples; see also J. J. M. de Groot, *Religious System of China*, ii. 802 f.

the *pinda*, which lies in the middle, to his wife to eat, with the words: 'Give me a male child, ye Pitaras,' while the wife replies, 'Insert fruit in me, ye Pitaras, a lotus-wreathed boy, that he may be uninjured.'

In accordance with this signification of the help of the ancestors in producing children, we can understand why the Attic maiden, before her departure from her parents' home on the occasion of her marriage, was bound to offer a sacrifice to the souls of her ancestors (cf. E. Samter, *Familienfeste der Griechen und Romer*, Berlin, 1901, p. 96).

Frequently these spirits of ancestors are designated as the 'good' and 'helpful,' especially in the Lat. *mânes*: Old Lat. *mânus*, 'good.' This may, however, have been intended more in a euphemistic sense, in the same way as, *e.g.*, the avenging goddesses are called the 'Eumenides,' in order that they might be good and gracious; for, in general, the souls of ancestors are regarded as very stern and easily roused to anger.

The inhabitants of White Russia are filled with dread (Š.[1] p. 588) 'lest at the commemoration festival any mistake should be made. Then, to speak in the language of the peasants, the feast would be no feast. It would mean that they did not respect the memory of the person in whose honour the feast was instituted. As a punishment for disrespect to the dead there would follow at once family discord, death of cattle, failure of crops; in short, mountains and hills would fall upon the living.'

Woe betide those who do not really slaughter the cattle they have appointed for the commemoration feast, or who do not first taste the food which is served. In all these ways can the wrath of the worshipped ancestors be only too easily roused. The same ideas are to be found in India: 'Do us no harm, ye fathers, if in accordance with the way of mankind we have committed any fault against you' (*Rigveda*, X. xv. 6); and in the *Śrâddha*, too, the offerer, immediately after the offering of the cakes, pronounces the words: 'May the fathers not be hard' (see further in Caland, *Ahnencult*, p. 176 ff.). It was exactly the same thing that was meant in Greece by the saying, that the ἥρωες ('the spirits of the dead') were δυσόργητοι ('prone to anger') and χαλεποὶ τοῖς ἐμπελάζουσι (cf. E. Rohde, (*Psyche*[2], i. 246). In Italy, however, according to Festus (p. 237), they hung up to the Lares* at the *Compitalia* dolls resembling human beings, *ut viris parcant, pilis et simulacris contenti.*

The dead man does not, immediately after his death and without more ado, join the number of these ancestors who are worshipped with such anxious dread; on the contrary, fixed ceremonies are necessary to elevate him to the rank of the ancestors who are worshipped as divine.

In White Russia (Š.[1] p. 534), after the mourners have returned from the burying-ground, 'one of the old women takes a piece of bread, turns towards the door, and, fixing a copper coin on it, speaks the following words, *with which she introduces the dead man into the general list of her departed relatives*: "Grandfathers and grandmothers, fathers and mothers, uncles and aunts, take our dead father to yourselves, live there with him in friendship, do not quarrel, etc."' In addition to that, it is a wide-spread idea that for 40 days after his death the deceased has no rest in his grave, but 'visits his own house as well as those of strangers, and is able to inflict all kinds of damage on those among the living with whom he stood in hostile relations during his life; and, in fact, he can do this all the more easily as the latter are deprived of the power to take vengeance on their adversary, since he, owing to his immateriality, is invisible or comes forward in the form of different animals—which gives him ample scope to inflict all sorts of injury on his enemies' (Š.[1] p. 519). 'The peasants also believe that for six weeks the soul of the dead, every 24 hours and generally by night, flies into the peasant's hut and drinks water from a vessel, which is set out for the purpose and filled to overflowing' (Š.[1] p. 559).

A corresponding idea is prevalent in India, namely, that the soul of the deceased does not enter at once into the world of the Pitaras, but rather wanders to and fro as a 'spirit' or 'ghost' (Skr. *preta*, lit. 'the departed'). The spirits have also the inclination to return to the dwellings of the relatives, where in the same way 'food with a jug of water' must be given to them. In order to deliver the departed from this condition and to adopt them among the Pitaras, definite ceremonies were necessary, the most important of which was the *Sapiṇḍîkaraṇa* ('Sapinda-making'), which took place usually on the day after the first anniversary of the death, but often earlier (for particulars, see Caland, *Totenverehrung*, p. 22 ff., and Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 554 f.). See ANCESTOR-WORSHIP (Indian).

We shall have to speak afterwards (3*c* and 4) of the places where the spirits of the ancestors in the earliest times were supposed to live, and of the later transformation of the views on this subject. We have still to mention here that these spirits of ancestors show a tendency in different territories, usually in connexion with the cult of the hearth-fire, which came more and more to the front (cf. below, II. 1), to develop into tutelary house deities, localized in the home.

The same is true of the Gr. ἀγαθὸς δαίμων (Rohde[2], i. 255), of the Lat. *di penates* ('those within,' cf. *penitus*, *penetrare*), and *lar familiaris*, of the Germ. 'kobold' (**kubu-walda*, 'the one who rules the house'; cf. Old Nor. *kofi*, 'hut,' A.S. *cofa*, 'room,' M.H.G. *kobe*, 'shed, hovel' = Gr. γύπα, 'underground dwelling'; A.S. *cofgodu*, *cofgodas*, '*penates*, *lares*'), of Russ. *domovój* ('the one in the house'); and of many similar names.

In this connexion the worship of the *house-snake*, found among several of the Aryan peoples, can be explained. Nothing is more frequent in Greece than to imagine the soul of the deceased in the form of a snake (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. *passim*, and artt. on SOUL and SPIRIT), which seemed especially suitable for this on account of its winding motions, partly on the surface of the earth and partly underneath it. Based upon this idea, a strongly marked domestic snake-worship has been developed among the Lithuanians, regarding which Menecius (see above) gives the most detailed account:

'Præterea Lituani et Samagitæ in domibus sub fornace, vel in angulo vaporarii, ubi mensa stat, serpentes fovent, quos numinis instar colentes, certo anni tempore precibus sacrificuli evocant ad mensam. Hi vero exeuntes, per mundum linteolum conscendunt, et supra mensam assident: ubi postquam singula fercula delibarunt, rursus discedunt, seque abdunt in cavernis. Serpentibus digressis, homines læti fercula illa prægustata comedunt ac sperant illo anno omnia prospere sibi eventura. Quodsi ad preces sacrificuli non exierant serpentes, aut fercula super mensam posita non delibaverint, tum credunt se anno illo subituros magnam calamitatem.' Cf. also Lasicius, *de Dis Samagitarum*, p. 51: 'Nutriunt etiam quasi deos penates nigri coloris, obesos et quadrupedes quosdam serpentes, Giuoitos (Lith. *gywâtė*, "serpent") vocatos;' and Æneas Silvius in Usener-Solmsen, *Götternamen*, p. 91: 'Serpentes colebant; paterfamilias suum quisque in angulo domus serpentem habuit, cui cibum dedit et sacrificium fecit in fœno iacenti.'

At the same stage as the Lithuanian snake-worship stands among the ancient Romans (cf. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus*, p. 155), the worship of the house-snake, which is consecrated to the genius of the house, and which by its sudden appearance foretells the coming destiny of the house. This genius itself, lit. 'the generator' (*gigno*), can originally have been none other than the ancestral head of the family, who then came to be regarded as its tutelary spirit, under whose protection stands, as we might naturally expect from these family gods, especially the *lectus genialis*, the marriage-bed, the place of the generation of children. As the *paterfamilias* in Rome was considered the representative of the whole family and possessor of the family estate, it was natural that this genius should become spiritual-

* *Lăses* (nom. sing. *lăs*, gen. *lăsĭum*) are undoubtedly, from the first, spirits of the dead, as is proved by the certain etymological connexion of the word with *larva* from *lăsŭa*, and with the festival of the dead, *Lărentalia*. The change from *ă* to *ā* must be considered exactly the same as in *ăcer*: *ācuo*, *ambāges*. *ăgo*, *fāma*: *fāteri*, *stāre*: *stātus*, etc. Wissowa, in Roscher's *Ausf. Lexicon der griech. und rom. Mythologie*, art. 'Lares' (cf. also *Religion und Kultus der Romer*, p. 148 ff., and *ARW* vii. 51), fails to recognize this connexion, and consequently comes to a false conception of the Lares as 'spirits of the fields.' The correct view is given by Samter, *Familienfeste*, p. 115; cf. also Walde, *Lat. etymol. Worterbuch*, artt. 'Lar' and 'Larva.'

ized into the tutelary spirit of the master of the house.*

(*b*) THE TIMES OF THE WORSHIP OF THE DEAD.—Apart from the funeral feast already mentioned (p. 20[b]), which followed immediately after the disposal of the corpse, the feasts in commemoration of the dead in White Russia may be divided into two main classes, *special* and *general*:

'The former are celebrated in the circle of the family and near relatives, for each individual who has died in the course of the year, and they take place at stated intervals, though not on the same days or in the same months, but on the 3rd, 6th, 9th, 20th, and 40th days, reckoning from the day of the burial, during a period of six months, and periodically thereafter in the course of the year till the date of the death (*godovščina*, "anniversary"). These commemoration feasts take place without the co-operation or blessing of the Church. They are a relic of primitive, pre-Christian customs. The second class, or the general commemoration festivals, are held by all on the same days, which have been fixed from the remotest times by the Orthodox Church, and are never engaged in without her consecration. They are held from four to six times in the year, and for all relatives at one and the same time, no matter whether they have been dead for a longer or a shorter period. In the whole of Russia these commemoration festivals are held on Saturdays, and called in White Russia *dzyady* [the same name as that of the worshipped ancestors themselves], in Great Russia "parents' Saturdays" (*roditel'skya subboty*). But the *radunica* is for the most part celebrated on the Tuesday of the week following the first Sunday after Easter, and this feast is not everywhere called *dzyady*. . . . These commemoration feasts admit of being classified, according to the seasons of the year, into those of spring, summer, autumn, and winter' (S.[1] p. 582 f.).

These Christian institutions correspond to the old Lithuanian heathen conditions. Menecius has the special commemoration festivals in view when he writes: 'Cæterum cognati celebrant convivia die a funere tertio, sexto, nono et quadragessimo.' A general feast to the dead is described by Laskovskij in Lasicius, *de Diis Samagitarum*, p. 50:

'Isdem ferus (the beginning of November, at the festival of the flax-god Waizgauthos) mortuos e tumulis ad balneum et epulas invitant: totidemque sedilia, mantilia, indusia, quot invitati fuerint, in tugurio eam ad rem præparato ponunt; mensam cibo, potu onerant. Dehinc in sua mapalia reversi triduum compotant; quo exacto, illa omnia in sepulchris, potu perfusis relinquunt; tandem etiam manibus valedicunt.'

Another general celebration of this kind is mentioned in Lasicius, p. 51: 'Skierstuvves festum est farciminum, ad quod deum Ezagulis ita vocant: Veni cum mortuis farcimina nobiscum manducaturus.' Cf. also p. 48: 'Vielona Deus animarum, cui tum oblatio offertur, cum mortui pascuntur, dari autem illi solent frixæ placentulæ, quatuor locis sibi oppositis paullulum discissæ. Eo sikies Vielonia pemixlos ("wafers of which V. is very fond") nominantur.'

From the starting-point supplied by these data let us examine the times appointed for the worship of the dead among the other Aryan races. Among them all, *special* and *general* festivals in honour of the dead are frequently mentioned. With regard to the former, the Greeks in the south of Europe present us with exact parallels. In their case we meet with the τρίτα καὶ ἔνατα (the latter recurs also in the Roman *novendial*), *i.e.* meals which were offered to the dead at the grave on the third and ninth days after interment. In Athens we have likewise the τριακάδες (which was also at times repeated), a commemoration meal on the thirtieth day, a date which appears again among the Lithuanians, at least in so far as the widow must mourn for thirty days at the grave of her husband.

(Menecius: 'Uxor vero tam oriente quam occidente sole super extincti coniugis sepulcrum sedens vel iacens lamentatur diebus triginta').

Then both in Greece and Rome, in addition to the *parentalia* on the day of the death or the burial (White Russ. *godovščina*), an innovation appears in appointing the birthday of the deceased (γενέσια) as a regular commemoration festival in his honour.

Among the *general* festivals in honour of the dead, the most important, so far as Greece is concerned, is the close of the Anthesteria festival in the spring, while in Rome we have the nine *dies parentales* from the 13th to the 21st of February, the last of which is called Feralia, on the 23rd of December the great State festival of the Larentalia, and on the 9th, 11th, and 13th of May the Lemuria, all three named directly from the spirits of the dead (Feralia from **dhvĉsâlia*, cf. above, p. 15; Larentalia: *lâr laris*, cf. above, p. 24, footnote; and Lemuria: *lemures*, 'larvæ'). A later general festival in honour of the dead, though not a public State feast, was the *Rosalia*, festival of roses, which in Christian times acquired a significance far beyond the land of its origin, and among the great majority of Slavs has led to their designation of the Whitsuntide festival (*rusalija*, Lat. *pascha rosata*). See Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, London, 1899.

With regard to the ancient Teutons we have not much reliable information. It seems that they held commemoration festivals for the dead on the 3rd, 7th, and 30th days, and on the anniversary of the death. It is also not improbable that at Yuletide a general feast for the dead took place (cf. R. Kögel, *Gesch. der deutschen Liter.*, i. 1, 55, and E. Mogk, in Paul's *Grundriss der germanischen Philologie*[2], iii. 391).

Lastly, regarding the Indian times for the worship of the dead, we are supplied with the same detailed information as we have about those of the Litu-Slavs. The time of the uncleanness of the relatives after a death lasts from three to ten days. During this period libations of water with grains of sesame must be offered to the departed either daily or on the 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 9th days. Then on the 11th day the first sacrifice (*śrâddha*, see above, p. 23[a]) is offered to the dead, and thereafter every month (thus every 30 days) on the day of the death and on the anniversary of the death itself sacrifices are offered to the ancestors (though the conditions are more complicated than they appear from this short summary). There were also in India real All Souls' feasts, among which the *Aṣṭaka*-festival may be specially mentioned (cf., for details, below, II. 4 *d*).

If we glance at the details before us, we see what a significant part *odd* numbers play in the fixing of these dates for the festivals in honour of the dead; and, in fact, it is frankly avowed in India that the odd numbers are sacred to the worshipped ancestors. The same thought, however, permeates the White Russian ritual, in consequence of which, *e.g.*, the number of foods offered at the commemoration festivals must invariably be odd (cf. Caland, *Totenverehrung*, p. 23, and Šejn[1], pp. 590, 611, etc.). Then among these odd numbers, the number *nine* comes very prominently to the front, which seems to represent the three days' period between death and interment (funeral feast) taken three times. Perhaps the 10 days' period of uncleanness or of mourning of the Indians may be conceived of as a nine decadally rounded off. The number 30, which also occurs frequently, would then be a triad of such decadally rounded nines (cf. A. Kaegi, 'Die Neunzahl bei den Ostariern' in the *Philologische Abhandlungen fur H. Schweizer-Sidler*). It is, moreover, worthy of note that the farther back we go and the more primitive the state of culture, the greater is the number of these memorial feasts. A White Russian peasant can thus, according to the details given above, make the number of special and general festivals for the dead mount up to several dozens in the year.

* Cf. for a full account of snake-worship, F. S. Krauss, *Sreča, Glück und Schicksal im Volksglauben der Südslaven*, Vienna, 1886. It is especially interesting, in connexion with the Roman beliefs, that among the Wends in the Spreewald two snakes were worshipped in each house, one of which was called *góspodaŕ*, 'lord of the house,' the other *góspoza*, 'lady of the house.' Each dies at the same time as the master of the house, or the mistress, as the case may be.

(*c*) THE PLACES OF THE WORSHIP OF THE DEAD.—The nearest and, so to speak, most natural place for the friends to serve up the dead man's feast for him, and to eat and drink together with him, is the neighbourhood of the grave where the body has been laid. This is still the custom in great parts of Russia.

'After the close of the banquet (in the house) they all repair to the burying-ground, taking with them vodka, "bliny," and barley. There each family prays at the graves of their relatives for the peace of their souls. Then they eat and drink, pouring out a little vodka on the grave and throwing some morsels from each dish on it' (S.[1] p. 605). At the spring-*dzjady*, 'after the public worship of the church, they invite the priest, in whose company men and women betake themselves to the churchyard, partaking together of brandy and food on the way. After they have reached their destination they all seat themselves on the burial mound of those of the departed who during the year have completed the laborious days of their life's journey. Here they repeat fixed prayers for the blessed peace of their souls, as "Anelŭ Panĭski" ("Angel of the Lord"), then they begin to weep and lament, and end with a small debauch in honour of the dead. . . . The first mouthfuls of each dish are in every case laid on the grave for the soul of the dead. After the glasses of brandy have gone round the circle several times, the mournful mood of the assembly gradually changes into a joyous one. While some of those present sob aloud, others laugh and joke. Some bow their heads over the grave of their beloved dead, and sing in a sustained tone melancholy laments. . . . In order to calm their sorrow, those taking part in the celebration have frequent recourse to their comforter—the brandy. Ultimately these memorial feasts end in the laments turning imperceptibly into songs of joy' (S.[1] p. 616 f.).

The doings at the Greek τρίτα καὶ ἔνατα, which were likewise celebrated at the grave (see above, p. 25[a]), and at the Roman *solemnia mortis* (cf. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung*, iii. 298 ff.), which were accompanied by feasts at the grave, as well as at those old German *oblationes*, 'quæ in quibusdam locis ad sepulcra mortuorum fiunt,' against which Burchard of Worms, as late as A.D. 1000, protested, were no doubt *mutatis mutandis* identical with those just described. It is not improbable that the funeral banquet also (see above, p. 20[b]) took place originally not in the house of the deceased, but at the grave itself.

Thus Jordanis relates the following with regard to the funeral obsequies of Attila (ch. 49): 'Postquam talibus lamentis est defletus, *stravam* (probably a Slavic word, which signifies in Russian, Polish, and Bohemian "food," "meal," and in Old Bohemian also means "funeral banquet"; cf. Miklosich, *Etymol. Worterbuch der slav. Sprachen*, Vienna, 1886, *s.v.* "Strava") *super tumulum eius*, quam appellant ipsi, ingenti commissatione concelebrant'; and the Greek expression περίδειπνον, 'funeral banquet,' could be most easily explained if the δεῖπνον took place, as among the White Russians, *round about the burial mound* of the deceased. The old Russian expression for the commemoration festival was *trizna*, which has not yet been etymologically explained.

Further, the *trench*, in which the meals are frequently offered to the dead, may be regarded as a symbolical indication of the grave. This is what we have in ancient India, according to the description of Gobhila: 'Then three trenches are dug out, one span long, four fingerbreadths wide, and the same depth. Thereupon *darbha* grass is scattered on them.' On this *darbha* grass, then, with many varied ceremonial actions, the cakes are laid down for the three ancestors, father, grandfather, and great-grandfather (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 549 f.). The same significance belonged in Rome to the *mundus*, a trench situated at the centre of the town, and opened on certain days for the purpose of receiving sacrifices for the dead. This trench played the same rôle in the worship of the *inferi* as the altar played in the cult of the *superi*. Such a *mundus* was probably also the 'grave' of the Larenta, in which at the Larentalia a sacrifice to the dead was offered (cf. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 187 ff.; Samter, *Familienfeste*, p. 12 f.). Ulysses, too, as is well known, when in the lower world, offers his libations in a trench.

A third place at which the dead were often honoured with food, drink, and all kinds of festive celebrations was the *cross-road*. Among the Slavs, Cosmas of Prague bears witness that, about the year 1092, Prince Brětislav II. issued the following prohibition:

'Item sepulturas, quæ fiebant in silvis et in campis, atque cenas (or scenas? cf. Kotljarevskij, *op. cit.* p. 102 ff.), quas ex gentili ritu faciebant in *bivis* et in *triviis*, quasi ob animarum pausationem, item et iocos profanos, quos super mortuos suos manes cientes manes ac induti faciem larvis bachando exercebant.'

A feast similar to that here described was the Roman Compitalia, which was held once a year with debauchery and merry-making (*ludi*) in honour of the Lares at the cross-roads (more fully explained in Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 148 f.); but in Greece also it was customary to throw down at the same places offerings to the souls and to Hecate, their mistress (cf. Samter, *op. cit.* p. 120). In India, in the same way, the belief is widely held, and of extreme antiquity, that cross-roads and dwelling-places of spirits are identical (cf. Oldenberg, *op. cit.* pp. 268[1], 562[3]; and Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India*, London, 1896, i. 77 f., 165, 290). The reason for this idea has been sought in the fact, which has been expressly attested at least in the case of India (cf. Oldenberg, p. 562[3]), that the crossing of great main roads was a favourite place for burying the dead. In this way the worship of the dead at the grave, at the trench, and at the cross-roads really amounts to the same thing. In opposition to this, however, we have the remembrance of the dead, with gifts of food and drink, in the *dwellings* of the surviving relatives, which will be dealt with in the next section.

(*d*) THE RITUAL OF THE WORSHIP OF THE DEAD.—It will here be advisable to pass over a considerable number of individual peculiarities, and to confine ourselves to the most important features.

(*a*) *The summoning and dismissing of the ancestors.*—It is a prevailing custom to call solemnly on the ancestors at the beginning of the commemoration feast, and to dismiss them as solemnly at its close. We are again informed most accurately with regard to White Russia:

'All seat themselves at the table, which is set with articles of food, among which beer and spirits are to be found, and the one who reads the prayer utters the following words:

"Ye sacred grandfathers, we call you,
Ye sacred grandfathers, come to us!
Here is all that God has given.
. . . . . .
Ye sacred grandfathers, we implore you,
Come, fly to us!"

At the end of the meal they rise from the table and disperse, after having taken leave of the heavenly inhabitants in the following way:

"Ye sacred grandfathers! ye have flown hither,
Ye have eaten and drunk,
Now fly away home again!
Tell us, do you wish anything more?
But better is it, that ye fly heavenwards.
Akyšŭ, akyšŭ!"

(a sound which they make to scare away hens and crows).' *Cf.* S.[1] p. 596 ff.

The summoning as well as the dismissing of the ancestors is accompanied by extraordinary customs. For the purposes of the former they place a cooked pig's, sheep's, or fowl's head on the table.

'After the master of the house has got the guests seated at the commemoration table, he takes in the one hand a candle rolled up in a pancake, in the other a loaf of bread, and carries these three times round the animal's head which has been placed on the table, calling aloud by name not only all his dead relatives and acquaintances, but also all who have ever lived on the piece of ground belonging to him as master of the house, and invites them with the words, "Come to this banquet"' (S.[1] p. 602 f.).

At the end of the feast the ancestors are scared away.

'The master or the mistress of the house removes the table away from the seats, and sprinkles the whole floor of the room to the door with water, saying at the same time, "If you have not eaten or drunk enough, go to the priest's court." With these words the souls of the dead are turned out' (S.[1] p. 614).

A custom very like this is described by Menecius, who is also acquainted with the solemn invitation to the dead ('ad quæ convivia animam defuncti invitant precantes ante ianuam') among the pagan Lithuanians:

'Peracto prandio sacrificulus surgit de mensa, ac scopis domum purgat: animasque mortuorum cum pulvere eicit, tanquam pulices, atque his precatur verbis, ut e domo recedant; edictis ac bibistis animæ dilectæ, ite foras, ite foras.'

The same invitation and leave-taking of ancestors are attested with regard to the Indian *Piṇḍapitṛyajña*:

'After depositing the *piṇḍa*, he (the offerer) utters the words, "Ye Pitaras, may this be savoury to your taste, may each one enjoy his share." Afterwards he dismisses the Pitaras with the words: "Depart, ye lovely Pitaras, to your old mysterious ways, give us riches and good fortune, grant us abundant possession in men"' (cf. Caland, *Totenverehrung*, p. 5 f.).

In Italy and Greece, on the other hand, there are to be found survivals only of the final *expulsion* of the souls. In the latter there existed the saying, which is at once proved to have been very ancient by the use of the word *κῆρες* for *ψυχαί* (cf. above, p. 15): *Θύραζε, κῆρες, οὐκ ἔτ' Ἀνθεστήρια*—'Away, ye souls, the feast of the dead is over' (see J. E. Harrison, *Proleg. to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903, pp. 35, 165, 632). In Italy, at the Lemuria, the spirits of the fathers were driven away with the words, 'Manes exite paterni' (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 239[1]).

(β) *The feeding of the summoned ancestors.*—Concerning the *forms* in which the 'grandfathers' were entertained by the White Russian peasants, we are also provided with full information from Šejn's materials:

'At the table, which is laid with Lenten food, all the guests sit down along with the family of the deceased. Before the meal the *kanunŭ* (from Gr. *κανών*, the real food of the dead) is given out, from which each of the guests takes four spoonfuls: one of these he pours out on the table beside him, the other three he sups, in accordance with the demand of custom to eat them all and leave nothing behind. The guests must leave over a part of each dish (of which there are not few) to appease the deceased, that he may not rob his relatives of their earthly goods' (Š.[1] p. 585).

'The supper begins with porridge, the first spoonful of which each member of the family lays on the table, directly on the table cloth, and these remain the whole night on the table, along with all the other eatables which have been left over from the supper. This is done, the peasants say, on account of the fact that the deceased comes during the night and devours all that is left there' (Š.[1] p. 592).

'The master of the house commences the feast. He takes a spoon with *kanunŭ* and a small piece of bread and pours it out on the table, and then he eats three spoonfuls from this dish. This is repeated in turn by all the members of the family who are present. Then the *kanunŭ* is removed from the table. From the other courses each guest takes as much as he pleases, provided that he first of all sets aside a small piece of each dish for the table—for "the grandfathers." From these little bits a considerable heap of all kinds of mishmash is, by the end of the supper, formed on the table' (Š.[1] p. 613).

'If at the time of the banquet any part of the food falls on the seat or on the floor, they dare not lift it up. "That," they say, "some one will eat"' (Š.[1] p. 611). Cf. also Menecius: 'Si quid forte decidat in terram de mensa, id non tollunt, sed desertis, ut ipsi loquuntur, animis, quæ nullos habent vel cognatos vel amicos vivos, a quibus excipiantur convivio, relinquunt manducandum.' 'After they have prayed at the grave, they all separate and go to their homes, where they seat themselves once more at the table, on which the wives place pancakes and mead. They throw morsels of the pancakes into the mead. Each member of the family (with the exception of the children) must invariably sup three spoonfuls of this dish. Some of this mixture they leave intentionally in a soup-bowl for the "grandfathers." After the pancakes they eat the other prepared courses. When they have supped and prayed to God, they lie down to sleep, placing the remains of the mixture on the window sills. The remains of the other foods they divide out into small dishes, which in the same way are placed here and there beside the window. Bread and spoons are left on the table the whole night. The doors in the peasant's room are not locked during this night, but are left a little ajar, so that the dead may come in' (Š.[1] p. 605).

From these statements three points are clear: (1) Food and drink are shaken out on the table for the 'grandfathers' during the meal itself; (2) That which falls under the table belongs to the dead who have no family or friends; (3) The remains of the food and drink are placed after the meal in vessels, which are set near the windows or on the tables to be partaken of by the 'grandfathers.'

All this can be proved in classical tradition, although only in fragments. Certainly the barbarian custom of preparing the meal for the dead on the table itself (as at the grave) has fallen into abeyance. Among the Greeks, points (1) and (2) are combined into one, in such a way that they believe that whatever falls under the table during the meal belongs to the dead in general.

Cf. Laert. Diog. viii. 34: *Ἀριστοφάνης τῶν ἡρώων φησὶν εἶναι τὰ πίπτοντα λέγων ἐν τοῖς Ἥρωσι μηδὲ γένεσθ' ἅττ' ἂν ἐντὸς τῆς τραπέζης καταπέσῃ*, and Athenæus x. 427e: *τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι τῶν φίλων ἀπένεμον τὰ πίπτοντα τῆς τροφῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τραπεζῶν* (cf. also Samter, *Familienfeste der Griechen und Romer*, p. 109).

The third point finds its analogy again among the Greeks, in the fact that on the last day of the Anthesteria festival it was customary to place cooked fruits and seeds for the dead in pots—*χύτραι*, after which the day was named (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 238).

(γ) *The food of the dead.*—Like all the details of the ritual connected with the dead, the kinds of food and even the courses which must be placed before the dead are fixed in detail. With regard to the first of these, the cakes (cf. above, Lith. *sikies Vielonia pemixlos*, 'the wafers which Vielona likes'; and also White Russ. *klecki*, the latter taken over from German through Polish) play an important part among the Lithuanians.

'The courses at the commemoration meal were as a rule as follows: *kutyá* (wheat or barley grains) prepared with ordinary or lenten butter, if honey could not be got, *klecki*, "cakes" (in most cases made of barley with a piece of lard in the inside), pancakes, and porridge' (Š.[1] p. 514). 'All the others who attend the funeral at once betake themselves to the house of the deceased *na klecki*, "to eat cakes"' (Š.[1] p. 554). 'At this meal *galuški* or *klecki* must without fail be among the dishes. There are even proverbial expressions referring to them to be found among the population of this place, such as "he was *na kleckachŭ*" (he was at a funeral- or commemoration-feast); or if a person is dangerously ill and there is no hope of his recovery, they say: *ni kleckı jemu! i.e.*, "he will very soon have to enjoy cakes"' (cf. Š.[1] p. 576).

It is hardly necessary to emphasize how closely this corresponds to the Indian *piṇḍa*, which is so characteristic of the Indian worship of the dead, that *sapiṇḍa*, 'cake companion,' has come to be the technical expression for the circle of relatives whose duty it is to offer to the three ancestors (father, grandfather, and great-grandfather).

The question, what dishes were in the earliest times served up to the dead, would require a special inquiry, which would also have a general interest for the history of culture by helping to determine the most primitive food of the living. In the meantime we can refer only to two undoubtedly very ancient foods of the dead, viz. *honey* and *beans*.

The former is the most important ingredient of the White Russian *kanunŭ* (see above): 'This is usually cooked with bruised grains of peeled barley or wheat, which are afterwards stirred in *sytá*, "honey-water"' (Š.[1] p. 555). Thus it happens that the *kanunŭ* (a Gr. foreign word, as we saw) is called by its vernacular name *syta* (p. 613), and on comparing this with the Skr. *sutá*, 'soma-juice, soma-offering' (*lit.* 'pressed,' root *su*), we may venture to recognize in it a word derived from the primitive Aryan vocabulary, just as in the more frequent expression for honey and mead, Skr. *madhu*, Gr. *μέθυ*, O.H.G. *meto*, O. Slav. *medŭ*, etc. The Indian food for the dead, which was offered at the *śrâddhas*, rice-soup and honey, corresponds exactly to the White Russian *kanunŭ*.

'Thus speak the Pitaras: "May the person be born in our family who will offer to us on the 13th day rice-soup mixed with honey and *ghī!*"' 'Tormented with hunger and making known their own sins, they demand rice-soup mixed with honey from their sons and grandsons' (cf. Caland, *Totenverehrung*, p. 41 f.).

But in the Greek and Roman cult of the dead also, honey is a favourite food devoted to the powers of the under world (cf., for details on this, Samter, *op. cit.* p. 84 ff., and Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung*, iii. 299).

With regard to the *beans*, we may refer to an exhaustive article by L. von Schroder, 'Das Bohnenverbot bei Pythagoras und im Veda,' in *WZKM*, xv.

187 ff., in which convincing proof is brought forward that the above-mentioned pod, whose Aryan name appears in the Lat. *faba* = O. Slav. *bobŭ*, Alb. *baθë*, was used even in primitive Aryan times as an offering to the departed souls (see J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, iv. 240 f.).

It is also to be noticed that in the Polish-Russian province of Pintschov (cf. Kotljarevskij, *op. cit.* p. 255) the combination of these two foods of the dead, honey and beans, is attested: 'The foods at the commemoration feasts consist of beans and peas which are cooked in honey-water.'

(δ) *The frame of mind of the worshippers (joy and grief).*—According to Menecius, the funeral and commemoration meals were celebrated among the ancient Lithuanians in perfect silence: 'in his conviviis quibus mortuo parentant, tacite assident mensæ tanquam muti'; and also in India we are told: 'As long as the Brāhmans eat in silence, so long do the manes enjoy the meal' (cf. Winternitz, 'Was wissen wir von den Indogermanen?' in *Beilage zur Munchner AZ*, 1903, No. 259, p. 300). On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the Lat. *silicernium* denotes the 'meal taken in silence' or the 'meal of the silent ones' (*i.e.* the dead) (cf. Osthoff, *Etymologische Parerga*, Leipzig, 1901, 66 ff.).

In any case the meal, or at least the chief part of it, was passed in a restrained and anxious mood, as is most vividly described by Šejn ([1] p. 596 ff.) with regard to the White Russians:

'One can perceive that some anxiety fills the hearts of the whole assembly. The aged, who already stand, so to speak, with one foot in the grave, are at this time sadder and more thoughtful than the others. Not infrequently, when they have just raised the glass of spirits to their lips, they stop suddenly and do not drink, but listen to some unexpected noise, the moaning of the wind, or the rustling of a neighbouring tree which is casting off its last leaves. If the gate creaks, or the door moves, or the door-latch gets unfastened, or a half-broken pane in the window rattles—whatever the cause may be—if, attracted by the light, a belated moth or some similar insect should approach, all these things are regarded as undoubted signs of the visit of their dead grandfathers. Conversation comes to a standstill and consists only of single remarks, either concerning the certain presence of the dead and their share in the entertainment, or about their former life,' etc.

It is this frame of mind—this firm conviction that the deceased person is present at the meal—that led to the custom among the White Russians (cf. above, p. 20[b]), as well as in Greek and Roman antiquity, of remembering the dead at the meal only in a friendly way: εἰώθεσαν οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐν τοῖς περιδείπνοις τὸν τετελευτηκότα ἐπαινεῖν καὶ εἰ φαῦλος ἦν (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 232, footnote 1).

If thus the first and fundamental sentiment of the funeral and commemoration feasts is naturally a sad one, it is, nevertheless, quite as characteristic of these celebrations to show a tendency, before they are finished, to pass over to the opposite extreme—joy and mirth. The reason of this is, of course, to be sought, in the first place, in the fact that the mourners in an excessive degree turn for comfort to spirituous liquors, which very soon take effect, while, in the second place, the conviction is widely prevalent that too many tears and too passionate grief disturb the peace of the dead in the grave (cf. for details, Winternitz, *op. cit.*). In any case, it is a fact that, among all the Aryan peoples, the festivals in honour of the dead are wont to be brought to a close by games and dancing, trials of strength, masquerades, and music (cf. Winternitz, *op. cit.*). All these elements of rejoicing are contained in the following description from White Russia (Š.[1] p. 588):

'After the close of the entertainment, the mistress of the house produces a sieve with cabbage-heads and places it on the table. Every one has cabbage-stocks in his pockets. The person standing at the head of the table now takes a head of cabbage and pitches it at the master of the house, whereupon all begin to fight with cabbage-heads and cabbage-stocks. When these are exhausted they begin to throw at one another whatever comes to their hands. . . . It seldom happens that commemoration festivals pass without brawls. The ceremony of throwing or beating with cabbage-heads is accompanied by songs, masquerades, music, and dancing (after grief and anxiety come joy and consolation). That is how the White Russian commemoration festivals (*chavtury*) are celebrated.'

For the student of comparative culture, however, this rustic play with cabbage-heads is fundamentally the same as the *spectaculum admirandum* which took place at the funeral of Attila, or the games at the pyre of Patroclus.

(ε) *The feeding of beggars.*—In conclusion, we may mention the wide-spread custom, in the White Russian service of the dead, of showing kindness to *beggars* on this occasion.

'Without them no single funeral or commemoration festival takes place. They take the place of the priest on this occasion. Their songs, prayers, and religious poems are regarded as a sufficient equivalent, and one very advantageous to their pockets.' 'The beggars, knowing that at burials they are treated to food and drink, and receive bountiful gifts, stream together to them in crowds from all directions' (Š.[1] pp. 507, 527).

The reason for this is perhaps to be found in the fact that beggars, *i.e.* cripples, the blind, the lame, and especially the weak-minded and idiots, being exceptions to the normal course of nature, have in the thought of primitive man something supernatural, and thus 'sacred,' about them, on account of which they can be regarded as representatives of the summoned souls of the dead ancestors. It may also be owing to this idea that on Slavonic soil (cf. A. Brückner, 'Polnisch-lateinische Predigten des XV Jahrhunderts,' *Archiv fur slav. Phil.* xiv. 183 ff.) the spirits of the dead are often thought of as *ubože* (O. Slav. *ubožije*), *i.e.* 'poor little men' ('dæmonibus sacrificia offerunt, quæ dicuntur *vbosthye*, remantes seu derelinquentes eis residuitates ciborum quinta feria post cenam'). We are therefore inclined to believe that in this feeding of beggars at the White Russian festivals a primitive custom is preserved which in India, as we have already seen, the clergy had turned to their own account, by actually making it a rule that the pious should feed and clothe whole bands of Brāhmans at the *śrāddhas*. The service which is rendered to the Brāhmans is really rendered to the ancestors.

(*e*) THE GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE, FOR THE HISTORY OF CULTURE, OF THE WORSHIP OF THE DEAD IN PRIMITIVE TIMES.—It is not asserting too much to say that the entire social organization of primitive times rests in the last resort on *ancestor-worship*. Its practice falls, in the first place, on the sons, and then on the more distant relatives of the deceased. In this connexion we find, among some of the individual peoples, definite circles of relatives: among the Indians the *sapiṇḍa*, or 'cake-companions'; among the Greeks, the ἀγχιστεῖς, or 'nearest'; among the Romans, the *propinqui sobrino tenus*, 'the relatives as far as the *sobrinus*'; and it is not improbable that even in primitive times there existed a notion of such a close kinship, the members of which were, in the first instance, under an obligation to present the sacrifice of the dead to their common ancestors. In his *Reallex. der indogerm. Altertumskunde* (see art. 'Erbschaft') the present writer has sought to prove that these 'next of kin' in primitive times were covered by the conception of the Indian *sapiṇḍa*-relationship, and included those persons who had in common father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, or one of these ancestors, while in the case of the Gr. ἀγχιστεῖς and the Lat. *propinqui sobrino tenus* the purely *agnate* relatives mentioned above were, in the performance of the duties of mourning, early joined by *cognati* and even *affines*. But in any case they must have been originally the same persons to whom belonged, besides the offering of the sacrifice to the dead, the right of *inheritance* and the obligation of *blood revenge*. Thus worship of the dead and inheritance appear everywhere in

closest connexion with each other. In India, such expressions as 'to be one's heir' and 'to give the funeral feast to somebody' (Skr. *dâyâdâ*, 'sharer,' 'heir,' and *sapiṇḍa*, 'sharer in the sacrificial cake') are often synonymous. The same holds in Greece, where, as late as his own time, the orator Isæus (vi. 51) could say: 'Which of the two alternatives is law, that the son of this woman, or this son of the sister of Philoctemon, whom he has adopted, εἶναι κληρονόμον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ μνήματα ἰέναι χεόμενον καὶ ἐναγιοῦντα?' In Rome the principle of the jus pontificum is accepted, *nulla hereditas sine sacris*, but among the old Teutons also the idea must have prevailed that worship of the dead and inheritance were identical conceptions.

Linguistic proofs of this are supplied by the Old Norse expressions: *erfa*, (1) 'to honour with a funeral feast,' (2) 'to inherit'; *erfi*, 'inheritance'; *erfi-oldr*, 'a funeral feast'; *erfi*, 'a wake,' 'funeral feast'; *erfingi*, *erfi-vordr* (A.S. *erfeweard*), 'an heir'; *erfi-ol*, 'a wake,' 'funeral feast'

This alliance of worship and property was, at the same time, the real defensive and offensive alliance of primitive times, inasmuch as on it, in the first resort, the duty of *blood revenge* (cf. Schrader, *Reallex.*, art. 'Blutrache') for a murdered or wounded companion devolved; and since in those ancient times, in which as yet there was no State, but only families, clans, and tribes, it was simply this institution of *blood revenge* that afforded mankind that protection which in historical times the laws and institutions of the State guarantee, the extraordinary significance of ancestor-worship and the circle of relations based upon it again becomes, from this point of view, quite apparent.

But whether it was a question of offering the *sacrifice to the dead*, the entrance of the *heir* into possession, or the performance of the duties of *blood revenge*, it was always on the sons, in the first instance, that the man based his hope. This explains the ardent desire for sons which appears undisguised in the prayers to the gods, and especially to those ancestor-spirits who had charge of the welfare of the family (cf. O. Schrader, *Reallex.*, art. 'Kinderreichtum'). There was no special desire for daughters, who were unfitted to offer sacrifice to the dead, and were employed only in the lamentation services (see above, p. 19 f.). But sons who are to be fitted to perform these religious and social duties cannot even in primitive times be begotten of any woman indiscriminately; they must, on the contrary, be born of a wife who has been solemnly brought into the husband's house in compliance with the sacred customs (cf. *Reallex.*, art. 'Heirat'). It follows further from this, that in primitive times marriage was regarded as an unavoidable necessity, and bachelorhood as an almost unthinkable self-contradiction. So intense was this feeling, that, as we have already seen, the unmarried dead man was even after his death married to a wife for the life to come, with the observance of the full marriage ritual (cf. on this O. Schrader, *Die Schwiegermutter und der Hagestolz*, Brunswick, 1904, and *Totenhochzeit*, Jena, 1904).

4. The realms of the dead.—As the primitive Aryans lived together in families and clans (cf. *Reallex.*, artt. 'Familie' and 'Sippe'), we may assume that they buried their dead in families and clans. In Rome each *gens* had the use of a common *sepulcrum*, and also in Greece the individual groups of related οἶκοι were bound together by common places of interment (κοινὸν μνῆμα) (cf. Marquardt, *Privatleben der Romer*, 1879–82, p. 353; and Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 229, note 3). In the North, expressions like O. Nor. *œtthaugar*, 'hill of the tribe' (*œtt*, 'family,' 'tribe') and Russ. dial. *roditeliskoje mĕsto*, 'cemetery,' properly 'place of the ancestors' (on Russ. *roditeli*, 'ancestors,' see above, p. 23), point to the same custom, which is also confirmed by many facts of early historical research (cf. *Reallex.*, art. 'Friedhof,' and M. Much, *Mitteilungen der anthrop. Gesell. in Wien*, xxxvi. 90).

Public roads and paths were places at which these tribal graves were by preference wont to be laid out, perhaps because they were in this way most visible to the eye, or perhaps because in ancient times roads and paths were regarded at the same time as boundary lines between the separate districts, which were in this way both made obvious and protected by the sacred remains of the ancestors. The custom is especially well attested in Rome and Greece (cf. Marquardt, p. 351, and I. Muller, *Die griechischen Privatalterthümer*[2], 1893, p. 221) as well as in India (cf. p. 26); but according to Nestor's *Chronicle* (ed. Miklosich, p. 7) the old Slavonic Radimiči, Vjatiči, and Sĕverjanes laid the ashes of their dead in a small vessel and placed this *na stolpĕ* ('upon a pillar') beside the roads (cf. Kotljarevskij, *op. cit.* p. 123, who also refers to the fact that the Czech *hranice* has, in addition to the meaning 'boundary,' the significations of 'burial-mound' and 'funeral-pyre').

At these tribal cemeteries, situated at the sides of roads and paths, the souls of the dead were supposed in primitive times to dwell in the depth of the earth and in the neighbourhood of their graves. But as in the course of historical development (cf. *Reallex.*, artt. 'Stamm' and 'Staat') the families and clans of primitive times gradually increased to larger political unities, ruled over by kings, the idea became more and more natural of localizing the deceased in real realms of the dead, situated usually at a great distance, either in the heavens or on the earth, and governed by powerful rulers. Then, as the distinction between good and evil was more clearly recognized and, owing to the authority of influential priestly castes, obtained a religious significance (cf. on this below, II. 5), it became usual to distinguish in these newly created realms of the dead places of enjoyment for the 'good' and places of punishment for the 'wicked.'

Among the Aryans the following are the most important of these realms of the dead. The Indians, leaving the older primitive ideas (above, p. 23) out of account, thought of the kingdom of the blessed as in the heavens under the sovereignty of the first human pair, Yama and Yamî, whose names recur in an almost identical form in the Iranian Yima, proving this twin pair to be a common Indo-Iranian idea. It is a contested question whether, along with this heaven, there was also in Vedic times the conception of a 'hell' (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 530 ff.; Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 169 f.). Among the Greeks, there stands as the central point of their belief in immortality the dark, because underground, world of Ἀιδης. Its entrance is reached by a long voyage over the ocean to the land of the Cimmerians, and the grove of Persephone (details in Rohde[2], i. 53 ff.). Deep down beneath it lies Τάρταρος (*Il.* viii. 13), a place of punishment for the wicked (*Od.* xi. 576). For a few elect Ἠλύσιον (*Od.* iv. 561 ff.) is appointed—a plain at the Western border of the world, where everlasting spring reigns. The only thing the Romans had to place over against these poetical pictures, which at a later date passed also into Italy, was their Orcus, which is lacking in every characteristic trait.

'The Romans did not possess a conception of the continuance of life and of retribution after death, or of the form of existence in the realm of the shades which was invested with any lively imagination' (Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Romer*, p. 192).

If we turn northwards, we find, in the first place, among the Γέται ἀθανατίζοντες, 'the *Getes* who regard themselves as immortal' (Herod. iv. 93),

a kingdom of the dead belonging to the god Ζάλμοξις or Γεβελέιζις, to whom it was customary to send a messenger every five years, by throwing a man upwards and then receiving him on lances and so piercing him to death. We have already (above, p. 25[a]) made the acquaintance of the Lithuanian god of the dead *Vielona*, beside whom there existed a Lettic *Wella mâte*. In all the Teutonic languages there is, as an ancient designation of the realm of the dead, the common expression Goth. *halja*, Old Nor. *hel*, A.S. *hell*, O.H.G. *hella*, which only in the Old Norse (*Hel*) developed into a name for the goddess of the dead. The idea of *Valholl* is also confined to the north. Among the common people it was in all probability only a name for a home of the dead, but by means of the poetry of the Scalds it became a paradise of warriors under the rule of Odin. In Anglo-Saxon we find for Paradise the unusual expression *neorxna-wong*. It remains for us to mention the expression *raj* (Lith. *rojus*, Lett. *raja*) common to all Slavonic languages, which even in pagan times must have denoted some paradise-like dwelling of the dead. But it is impossible to prove the existence of a pagan word, such as Old Slav. *pĭklŭ*, for the idea of 'hell.'

If we glance over these expressions for realms of the dead and their rulers, we see that they are formations of the separate languages, and etymologically tolerably clear. The Gr. Ἀιδης must be derived from an original *ἀ-Fιδᾱ, 'place of invisibility' (Lat. *videre*, Gr. Fιδεῖν), and then, by being made masculine (cf. νεανίας, 'young man': *νεανία, 'youth'), came to denote the ruler of the under world. The case is similar with the Goth. *halja*, etc. (=Lat. *celare*), 'place of concealment,' originally, in all probability, simply the grave (cf. A.S. *byrgan*, 'to bury,' *byrgels*, O.L.G. *burgisli*, 'tomb'); as also the Lat. *orcus* (cf. above, p. 17[b]) should most likely be compared with the Goth. *aúrahi*, 'sepulchral cave.' A.S. *neorxna-wong* has lately been interpreted by A. Leitzmann (*Beitrage z. Gesch. d. deutschen Sprache u. Lit.* xxxii. 1) as 'meadow of the powers of the under world' (**neorsena*, **nerþ-iska*, *Nerthus*, 'terra mater,' Gr. νέρτεροι, 'the powers of the under world'; otherwise F. Kluge, *Zeitschr. fur deutsche Wortforschung*, viii. 144; Uhlenbeck, *Beitrage*, xxxii. 1). Perhaps we may also venture an explanation of the Getic god of the dead, Γεβελέιζις. There was an Old Slavic root *gyb*, *gib*, 'ἀπόλλυμαι' (Old Russ., *e.g.*, *gybelĭ*; Russ. *gibelĭ*, 'destruction,' 'loss'). Thus the language would point to a meaning for Γεβελέιζις such as δαίμων τῶν ἀπολλυμένων (Herodot. iv. 94: οὔτε ἀποθνήσκειν ἑωυτοὺς νομίζουσι, ἰέναι τε τὸν ἀπολλύμενον παρὰ Ζάλμοξιν δαίμονα. οἱ δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον νομίζουσι Γεβελέιζιν). However, the group Lith. *Vielona* (**Vėlōnis*), Old Nor. *Valholl*, and Gr. Ἠλύσιον (*Fηλύσιον) may possibly rest on a prehistoric connexion. The first part of both of the first two words is undoubtedly the Lith. *wēlės*, 'spirits of the dead,' Old Nor. *valr*, A.S. *wæl*, 'the dead on the battlefield,' O.H.G. *wal*, *wuol*, 'strages,' 'clades,' so that *Vielona* is the '*deus animarum*,' as is also explained in the Lithuanian tradition, while *Valholl* signifies 'the hall of the dead.' As regards the Gr. Ἠλύσιον (πεδίον), it is usually derived—even by E. Rohde (*Psyche*[2], i. 76, footnote 1)—from ἐλευσις, ἐλεύσομαι, etc., and interpreted as 'the land of the departed.' But in this etymology the fact is overlooked that the root ἐλευθ in Greek signifies 'to arrive' rather than 'to depart'; and as a 'land of those who have arrived' obviously gives no satisfactory explanation of Ἠλύσιον, the connexion of the Greek word with the Lith. *wēlės*, 'spirits of the dead,' suggested by A. N. Veselovskij (*Trans. of the Department for the Russ. Lang. and Lit. of the St. Petersburg Acad.* [Russ.], xlvi. p. 287 ff.), seems worthy of consideration. But, of course, we have before us in the case of *Vielona*, *Valholl*, and Ἠλύσιον, independent formations of the individual languages, so that all that follows from the series quoted is, in the end, no more than the existence of an Aryan root **vel-*, **vol-*, **vĕl-* in the sense of 'souls of the departed.' Thus there is a total want of points of connexion to justify the assumption that even in the primitive Aryan times realms of the dead, like those mentioned above, were believed to exist. All the linguistic comparisons from which people were wont at an earlier date to draw conclusions as to the existence of such primitive ideas—as, *e.g.*, Gr. Κέρβερος=Skr. *śarvara*, *śabala* (a name of an Indian dog of the dead); Gr. Τάρταρος=Skr. *talâtala* (at a later date the name of a definite hell); Gr. Ἑρμείας (as leader of the dead)=Skr. *sârameyu* (used of the dogs in the Indian world of the dead); Gr. Μίνως (as ruler of the dead)=Skr. *mánu*, and other similar comparisons—belong to the realm of beliefs that have long ago been given up by modern philology, as has been shown above (p. 13). Even the alleged agreements as to the matter in this sphere—as, *e.g.*, that a certain resemblance is to be found between the Gr. Κέρβερος and the two 'four-eyed and spotted dogs of Yama who guard the path'—do not turn out to be capable of convincing proof (cf. O. Gruppe, *Die griechischen Kulte und Mythen*, i. 113; E. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 304, footnote 2; Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 538).

Thus we believe that the idea of actual realms of the dead, situated at a great distance from the graves of the deceased, belongs to the individual development of the separate Aryan races, although this development may have taken place in prehistoric epochs. In the same way, it seems to us that it was also in the separate development of the individual peoples that the custom originated of burning the corpse and sending away the soul (which was thought of as 'smoke') to a distant land by means of the smoke of the funeral-pyre—a custom which, as we have shown above, stands in intimate connexion with this idea of a distant realm of the dead. If the first practice of cremation arose from still more primitive ideas—as, *e.g.*, from the wish to free the living from the pollution which was threatened by the dead, or to keep back, by means of fire, evil spirits from the body of the beloved dead—still it cannot be disputed that the conception of the flame as a female guide of the soul into a distant realm of the dead was one which, in the course of time, rose more and more clearly into prominence. This is most unmistakably the case in India, where, in an extremely realistic manner, the assurance is added, in the way of comfort, that at the cremation the male organ does not burn, and that there are many women-folk in the heavenly world (Oldenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 544, 536). In Homer the only way to Hades is over the funeral-pyre, but the elect are 'translated' into Elysium, even when still alive. Among the Gauls (Diodorus Siculus, v. 28) it was usual at a cremation to lay letters on the funeral-pyre, addressed to the departed relatives. These were supposed to be carried along with the soul of the cremated dead into the realm of the shades. But a Russian expresses himself most unreservedly as to the real purpose of cremation in the case of the funeral of a Russian merchant described by Ibn Fosslan (see above, pp. 17, 22):

'Ye Arabs are indeed a stupid people: ye take him who is the best beloved and most highly honoured of men and cast him into the earth, where the creeping beasts and worms feed on him. We, on the other hand, burn him in an instant, so that he goes directly, without delay, into Paradise.'

The oldest abode, therefore, in which the spirits of the ancestors dwell is the earth, the same earth

to whose bosom the farmer commits the seed; and accordingly we are not surprised if the gods of the earth who gradually emerge among the different peoples rule over the souls of the dead that are laid *in* the earth as well as over the seed which springs up *out of* the earth. This is true, in the first place, of the Mother Earth herself, of the Greek Γαῖα (Rohde, i. 208), and of the Latin *Tellus* (Wissowa, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, vii. 47), while among the Lithuanians *Žemyna* (cf. Lett. *Semmes mâte*, Lith. *žẽmė* 'earth,' Thrac. Σεμέλη 'earth-goddess') is on the one hand a goddess of blessing for field and house, and on the other hand sacrifices are offered to her at the festival of the dead. In this connexion the attempt has been made by the writer of the present article (*Reallex.* p. 870) to interpret the Greek *Persephoneia* as the 'killing of the seed,'* and the Latin *Feronia* as the 'bringing of the seed.'

II. *WORSHIP OF THE SKY AND OTHER NATURAL PHENOMENA — 'THE HEAVENLY ONES.' — Introduction.*—If we have so far succeeded in presenting the fundamental features of the Aryan worship of the dead, sometimes even to very trifling details in its development, we have owed this above all else to the Litu-Slavic tradition, by means of which we were enabled fully to understand the conditions prevalent among other Aryan races, which were both incompletely attested and (as *e.g.* among the Indians) transformed by priestly refinements. It is natural, therefore, to ask whether it will not be possible in the same way to understand the fundamental character of the Aryan religion as a whole. For this task it will unfortunately be necessary, owing to the facts noticed above (p. 14), to leave almost entirely out of account in the meantime the history of the religion of the pagan Slavs, and to confine ourselves to a consideration of the conditions prevalent among the *Lithuanian Prussians*, regarding which, fortunately, we have much fuller information. We may begin the subject with some general descriptions, supplied by trustworthy authorities, of the pagan beliefs about God obtaining among these peoples. First of all we may mention Peter of Dusburg, the editor of the first *Prussian Chronicle* (1326).

'Pruthenі noticiam dei non habuerunt. Quia simplices fuerunt, eum ratione comprehendere non potuerunt, et quia literas non habuerunt, immo in scripturis ipsum speculari non poterant. . . . Et quia sic deum non cognoverunt, ideo contigit, quod errando omnem creaturam pro deo coluerunt, scilicet solem, lunam et stellas, tonitrua, volatilia, quadrupedia etiam, usque ad bufonem. Habuerunt etiam lucos, campos et aquas sacras, sic quod secare aut agros colere vel piscari ausi non fuerant in eisdem' (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, i. 53).

We may compare with Peter of Dusburg's statement the following passage from the *Chron. ord. Theut.* of Blumenau (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, i. 53, note 1):

'Horum (the Prussians) ritus sicut a Christiana religione alienus, ita ab omni humanitate remotus fuit. Ipsi namque prisco gentilitatis errore imbuti omnem ornatum cæli atque terræ adorantes nonnullas silvas adeo sacras esse arbitrabantur ut nec ligna incidere nec vetustate quidem delectas arbores inibi abducere permittebant.'

Later but still more characteristic testimonies regarding the Litu-Prussian conditions are supplied by the report of a Jesuit missionary who at the beginning of the 17th cent. travelled all through Polish Livonia:

'Hi varios deos habent, alium cæli, alium terræ, quibus alii subsunt, ut dii piscium, agrorum, frumentorum, hortorum, pecorum, equorum, vaccarum ac singularium necessitatum proprios' (cf. Usener, *Götternamen*, p. 109). Cf. *Helmoldi Chronica Slavorum*, i. p. 163, ed. Pertz: 'Inter multiformia deorum numina, quibus arva silvas tristitias atque voluptates attribuunt, non difficultur unum in cælis ceteris imperitantem.'

With these general characteristics of the Litu-Prussian religion the gods and god-names of the Lithuanians and Prussians themselves correspond well. We have information about these from men like Jan Menecius (Meletius, Malecki, see above, pp. 17, 19), Math. Stryikowski (*Kronika Polska, Litewska, Pruska, Moskowitewska, Tatarska*, Rgbg. bei Osterberg, 1582), Jakob Laskowski (in Lasicius,* *de Diis Samagitarum*, Basel, 1615), Matthæus Prætorius (*Deliciæ Prussicæ oder Preussische Schaubühne*, completed about 1698, edited, with verbatim extracts from the MS, by Wilhelm Pierson, Berlin, 1871).

If we attempt to emphasize what is really characteristic in these Prusso-Lithuanian conceptions of the gods, it is evidently to be found in the fact that, for all phenomena of nature and life, for all undertakings and conditions of mankind, in fact even for every section or act of these which was at all prominent, individual gods (*Sondergötter*, 'special gods,' as H. Usener has aptly named them) were created, who, at least as a general rule, may be said to remain within the limits of the conception to which they owe their origin.

If, in order to demonstrate this by an example, we single out a particular province of culture, as, *e.g.*, cattle-breeding, which evidently occupied a prominent place in the life of the Litu-Prussians, we have, to begin with, a god who looks after cattle in general (*Sutvaras*), then a goddess who looks after their propagation (*Gotha*), a god who attends to the feeding (*Szeriezius*), another taking care of the pasture lands (*Ganýklos dëvas*). In addition to these, there are 'special gods' concerned with the oxen (*Baubis*), the horses (*Ratainicza*), the sheep (*Eratinis*), the swine (*Krukis* and *Kiemata*), the poultry (*Swieczpuńcscyunnis dëvos*), the bees (*Bicziu barbullis, Austheia, Prokorimos*), the calves (*Karvaitis*), the young pigs (*Priparszas*), and there is even a divinity that reveals itself in one of the most horrible plagues of the farmer, the fly pest (*Musiu barbiks*). We should meet with the same phenomenon if we examined closely the realms of nature or other spheres of civilization, agriculture, the home, family life, etc.

Long ago it was observed that this fundamental feature of the Litu-Prussian conception of the gods recurs on Aryan soil with amazing accuracy in the *Old Roman* religion. This comes before our notice most obviously in the list of gods which appears in the so-called *Indigitamenta*, *i.e.* priestly collections of forms of prayer to be used on the most varied occasions, which are known to us in the main from the attacks of the Church Fathers on the *Antiquitates rerum divinarum* of Varro, who drew his materials from these *Indigitamenta*. Now, although the fixing of these names of gods in definite classes (*di nuptiales, di agrestes*, etc.) † may have been already undertaken by the Pontifices, or for the first time by Varro, and although many of these names of deities may at first have been placed in that particular class owing to the interpretation of Varro, which was doubtless often wrong, still it is quite certain that in these *Indigitamenta*, and therefore in the Roman cult, there must have been a great number of individual gods exactly resembling in their nature the Litu-Prussian deities:

'Sed et alii sunt præterea (*i.e.* besides the great gods of the cult, whose names also stand in the *Indigitamenta*) dei complures hominum vitam pro sua quisque portione adminiculantes, quos volentem cognoscere indigitamentorum libri satis edocebunt' (Censorinus).

* Φερσεφόνη, etc.; *φῆρον· ἡ τῶν ἀρχαίων θεῶν τροφή*, Hes; *φηρίς· ἡ τροφὴ θεῶν*, Arcadius, and *φόνος* (cf. also Hoops, *Waldbäume und Kulturpflanzen*, Strassburg, 1905, p. 360); *Fêronia, Fârônia, Fêrônia*, acc. to W. Mannhardt, *Wald- und Feldkulte*, Berlin, 1875–7, ii. 328: *far* (=*φῆρον*, **bhers-*), 'spelt'; for another view of *Feronia* cf. W. Schulze, *Eigennamen*, Berlin, 1904, p. 165.

* Cf. *Joh Lasicii Poloni de Diis Samagitarum libellus*, ed. by W. Mannhardt, with additions by A. Bielenstein, Riga, 1868; 'Die Baltica des Libellus Lasicki: Untersuchungen zur litauischen Mythologie,' by Theodor R. von Grienberger in *Archiv für slavische Philologie*, xviii. 1 ff., and A. Brückner, 'Litauische Götternamen,' *ib.* xxii 569 ff. The last-mentioned scholar raises doubts as to the trustworthiness of Laskowski, the main source of Lasicki. He holds, among other things, that the Lithuanian deities Gabie, Polengabia, and Matergabia mentioned by Laskowski to Lasicki are simply mutilations of the Christian saint Agatha, the patroness of fire (*Polengabia*, 'the Agatha of the hearth'; cf. Lith. *pelënė*, 'fire-place,' *Matergabia*, 'Mother Agatha'). All this may be quite right in itself, but we are not justified on that account in doubting the good faith of Laskowski. What must be regarded as primitive among the Lithuanians, as we shall see more fully below, is the attempt and the ability to form separate gods, but not all the separate names and forms of these gods themselves. Why should not a Christian saint in earlier times have strayed into their midst? However, in the following discussion names of gods mentioned *only* by Laskowski-Lasicius will be noted as such.

† Cf. Wissowa, 'Echte und falsche "Sondergötter" in der römischen Religion' in *Ges. Abh. zur römischen Religions- und Staatsgeschichte*, Munich, 1904, p. 304 ff.

The important thing, however, is that these great gods of the cult themselves, as we know them particularly from the fixed or movable festivals which were devoted to them, are essentially, even in the earliest historical times, or at least in the earliest period we can read with certainty, nothing else than 'special gods.' If we take, *e.g.*, the sphere of agriculture, which lay at the foundations of old Roman culture, sowing is represented by *Saturnus*, harvest by *Consus* and *Ops*, growth by *Ceres*, blossom by *Flora*, fruit by *Pomona*, failure of crops by *Robigus*—all of them deities who, according to the information supplied by the stone-calendar, had special feasts, or special priests and feasts, at their disposal (cf. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus*, p. 21). If we may judge from pictures in the circus, there were worshipped along with Consus, the god of harvest, the three goddesses *Seia*, *Segetia*, and *Tutilina*, who had power over the seeds beneath and above the ground (Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 195).

In addition to these, there are the twelve gods who were invoked by the flamen at the *sacrum Cereale*: *Vervactor* (for the fallow ploughing), *Reparator* (for the second ploughing), *Imporcitor* (for the drawing of the furrow), *Insitor* (for the sowing), *Obarator* (for the grubbing), *Occator* (for the harrowing), *Sarritor* (for the hoeing), *Subruncinator* (for the weeding), *Messor* (for the mowing), *Conuector* (for the gathering), *Conditor* (for the storing), and *Promitor* (for the delivery of the grain), while from the report of Varro could be added a god of manuring (*Sterculinus*), and several more (cf. especially Peter, 'Indigitamenta' in Roscher).

A remarkable fact regarding these old Roman names of gods is that sometimes there seem to appear in them chronologically different strata of one and the same idea. Thus *Insitor* (and at the same time *Sator*) is at the *sacrum Cereale* the 'sower'; *Conditor* is the 'storer.' The same meaning is in all probability in the names of the old gods of the cult *Saturnus* (Sæturnus) and *Consus*, which are probably connected etymologically with *serere* and *condere* (Wissowa, pp. 169, 166). In the same way, *Janus* (Wissowa, p. 96) originally was simply the god of the doors (*ianua*), just as in the Lithuanian religion there was a god of the well, *Szullinnis* (Lith. *szulinỹs*, 'the well'), or a god of the bath-broom, *Szlotrazys* (Lith. *szlúträžis*, 'broom-stump'). After higher ideas, such as the concept of the deity as a god of the beginning (entrance), were blended with the idea of Janus, a renewal of this idea took place. This renewal we find in the gods of the *Indigitamenta*: *Forulus*, 'god of the doors,' and *Cardea*, 'goddess of the hinges.'

If in the preceding account we have placed the Litu-Prussian and the old Roman gods on the same stage of development in the history of religion, we do not mean to say that the figures which belong to these two groups represent common pre-historic formations, even in cases where these figures exactly correspond to each other in their nature, as is the case, *e.g.*, with the Lith. *Gabjaujis*, 'god of the barns'=Lat. *Consus*; Lith. *Tartois kibirksztů*, 'god of fire'=Lat. *Stata mater* (Wissowa, p. 185); Lith. *Perdoytus*, 'god of merchants'=Lat. *Mercurius*; Lith. *Pizius* (Lasicius), 'god of sexual intercourse'=Lat. *Mutunus Tutunus* (Wissowa, p. 195), etc. What can be proved to be pre-historic is rather the mere capacity and the tendency to form into a divinity every conception in nature or in culture which was of significance for primitive man, and to maintain the gods who were thus created for a longer or shorter period in their original sphere.

The greater part of H. Usener's standard work (*Götternamen*) is devoted to proving that the same tendency was operative in the formation of the Greek gods, that here too the great personal gods were evolved from special gods resembling those of the Romans and Lithuanians. This book also shows (cf. p. 116 ff.) how, even under the rule of the Christian Church, the same primitive and deeply-rooted longing for separate gods lived on in the worship of the *saints*, who, just like the gods of the *Indigitamenta*, could be rightly designated as 'dei hominum vitam *pro sua quisque portione* adminiculantes.' But how do matters stand in this connexion with the religion of the ancient Teutons? 'It is impossible,' says F. Kauffmann in his *Deutsche Mythologie*[2] (Stuttgart, 1893), p. 40, Eng. tr. *Northern Mythology*, London, 1903, p. 31, 'to prove in the oldest Teutonic religion the existence of more than three male divinities; and a triad of gods is usually ascribed to the Teutons by the historiographers of later times. The names given are Mercury, Juppiter, and Mars, names which really denote the Teutonic gods Wodan, Donar, and Ziu. With them is associated a goddess originally the great all-mother Earth, the beloved of the gods, and as such called by the name of Freia.' Certainly, if this statement is correct, and it expresses the opinion current among the German mythologists, there would hardly be room for 'special gods' in the religion of the ancient Teutons. But how then is it to be explained that even Procopius found among the Herulians a *πολὺς θεῶν ὄμιλος*; and when Jordanis (ch. xi.) relates of the Goth Dicenus: 'elegit ex eis tunc nobilissimos prudentioresque viros, quos theologiam instruens *numina quædam et sacella venerari iussit*,' what else can be meant than that that ruler was the first to choose some few State-gods out of the crowd of existing deities? Or is it possible to regard the numerous gods, and especially goddesses, which the Roman inscriptions exhibit—a Thingsus, Requalivahanus, Halamardus, Magusanus, Saxanus, etc., or a Tanfana, Nerthus, Baduhenna, Nehalennia, Hludana, Garmangabis, Haiva, Vagdavercustis, Harimella, etc.—as all being different forms of the names and ideas of those chief gods or goddesses? When only the Roman gods Juppiter, Mars, Mercury, and Hercules appear as Roman equivalents of the Teutonic world of gods, is it not natural to suppose the reason of this to lie in the fact that the people who first brought news about the Teutonic gods to Rome were soldiers and merchants? The former of these classes—in addition to *Juppiter Optimus Maximus*, who was worshipped by all in common—honoured especially the god Mars, the latter Mercury and Hercules (as the guardian of measure and weight; cf. Wissowa, p. 227, 231), and accordingly these classes sought with special fondness their favourite guardian gods on the barbarian Olympus—and found them too. But none of these questions can be disposed of briefly, and accordingly we cannot settle them here. In any case, however, no substantial objection from the standpoint of Teutonic religion* can be raised against the view that the craving, which is strikingly prominent in the Litu-Prussian and ancient Roman religion, for an endless variety of 'special gods' representing all sides of the life of nature and culture is to be regarded as a primitive Aryan characteristic. What confronts us here, however, as the oldest of the old is in reality nothing else than the phenomenon which anthropologists have called 'animism,' *i.e.* 'the investing with life and the deifying of the inanimate.' The extraordinary world-wide importance of this mode of thought for religious life has long been recognized (cf. especially Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], London, 1891). In close connexion with this animism we see fur-

* The same is true of the old Indian religion. Here, from primitive Indo-Iranian times onwards, the ever-growing tendency to form gods was kept in check by influential priests and priestly classes, who everywhere exercised the strongest influence on the development of great personal gods (cf. below, 4 *b*).

ther how, in the Aryan religions as well as everywhere else, traces of a pronounced 'fetishism' remain. It cannot be doubted that the Aryans, like other races, once worshipped and prayed to trees and stumps, stones and animals, not only as symbols of divinity, but as real embodiments of a divine *anima*. In the meantime it may be advisable to leave the proofs of this to be discussed in those sections which deal with the outward appearance and the oldest dwelling-place of the deity (below, 3 and 4*c*).

In this way it may be said that in the Aryan world animism and fetishism form the first and the oldest stage in the evolution of the history of religion. They are also to be traced in historical times, and are still to be detected at the present day. But it is likewise certain that even in primitive Aryan times the beginnings of a higher form of religion made their appearance.

For although the countless numbers of 'special gods' presupposed as original are not at first to be regarded as differing qualitatively among themselves, still it is natural to suppose that, just as the individual objects and conceptions which excited religious emotions were of different significance for mankind, so also the significance of the deities arising out of them would from the beginning be different, or would soon become so. And, in fact, we see how at a time when the Aryan peoples were still together, or were for the most part very close to each other, a class of beings became separated from the motley crowd of divinities, and appeared distinct from the other 'special gods.' These were designated by the list of primitive Aryan words already known to us: Skr. *devá*, Lat. *deus*, Lith. *dìẽwas*, Ir. *día*, Old Nor. *tívar*, nom. pl. *i.e.* the 'heavenly ones.'

These 'heavenly ones' will accordingly have to occupy the chief place in the following discussion, which will consist of five sections: (1) evidences of the significance of the 'heavenly ones' in the old Aryan religion, (2) their names, (3) their forms of manifestation, and the interpretation of them in riddle and myth, (4) their worship, and (5) their relation to the morality of mankind.

1. **Evidences of the significance of the 'heavenly ones' in the old Aryan religion.**—It is emphasized in the most unmistakable fashion, by unbiased authorities, with regard to the most diverse sections of the old Aryan racial territory, that the worship of the *sky* and the powers of nature connected with it formed the real kernel of the primitive Aryan religions.

This we have already seen in the reports regarding the Prussian Lithuanians* quoted above (pro deo coluerunt, scilicet solem, lunam et stellas, tonitrua—omnem ornatum cæli atque terræ adorantes—varios deos habent, alium cæli, alium terræ, *quibus alii subsunt*).

This is still more clearly proved by Herodotus (i. 131) with regard to the Persians: ἀγάλματα μὲν καὶ νηοὺς καὶ βωμοὺς οὐκ ἐν νόμῳ ποιευμένους ἱδρυεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ποιεῦσι μωρίην ἐπιφέρουσι, ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκέει, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρωποφυέας ἐνόμισαν τοὺς θεοὺς κατάπερ οἱ Ἕλληνες εἶναι. οἱ δὲ νομίζουσι Διὶ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ὑψηλότατα τῶν οὐρεων ἀναβαίνοντες θυσίας ἔρδειν, τὸν κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλέοντες· θύουσι δὲ ἡλίῳ τε καὶ σελήνῃ καὶ γῇ καὶ πυρὶ καὶ ὕδατι καὶ ἀνέμοισι· τούτοισι μὲν δὴ μούνοισι θύουσι ἀρχῆθεν, and the Scythians (iv. 59): θεοὺς μὲν μούνους τούσδε ἱλάσκονται, Ἱστίην μὲν μάλιστα, ἐπὶ δὲ Δία τε καὶ Γῆν νομίζοντες τὴν Γῆν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι γυναῖκα. Cæsar reports regarding the Teutons: 'Germani multum ab hac (Gallorum) consuetudine differunt, nam neque druides habent, qui rebus divinis præsint, neque sacrificiis student, deorum numero eos solos ducunt, quos cernunt et quorum aperte opibus iuvantur: *Solem et Vulcanum et Lunam*, reliquos ne fama quidem acceperunt' (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 21).

At the head of this worship stands the sky itself: Skr. *Dyâús*=Gr. Ζεύς, Lat. *Diespiter, Juppiter* (*Jû-piter*=Ζεῦ πάτερ, an ancient vocative), Old Nor. *Týr*, O.H.G. *Ziu*.* The fundamental meaning of the term 'sky' is most clearly preserved in the Vedic *Dyâús*, while the Gr. Ζεύς and Lat. *Juppiter* on the one hand, and the Old Norse *Týr* and O.H.G. *Ziu* on the other, have developed into gods, conceived of as purely personal, the classical words denoting the greatest god of the sky, and the Teutonic the greatest god of war. The root from which the whole class of words is derived is Skr. *div* 'to radiate,' so that Aryan **dyêus* (=Lat. *dies*, 'day') indicated in the first place the sky as the bearer of the light of day, and thus one of the first of the more elevated religious ideas of the Aryans was connected with the light of day.

The most violent natural phenomenon seen in the sky is the thunderstorm. From what has just been said regarding the fundamental signification of the Aryan **dyêus*, as well as from what has been indicated above regarding the fundamental feature of the Aryan religions—the formation of 'special gods'—it follows that the primitive condition of things has been preserved by those Aryan languages which have formed special deities for the phenomenon of the thunderstorm and its accompanying manifestation, the thundercrash, which agitates most powerfully the feelings of mankind. This is the case particularly over the whole of Northern Europe. Thus the universal Teutonic name of the thunder-god, O.H.G. *Donar*, O.L.G. *Thunar*, O. Nor. *Thórr*, is nothing else than the term for thunder (Skr. *stanáyati*, 'it thunders,' Lat. *tonat*, *tonitrus*, A.S. *þunian*, *þunor*, O.H.G. *donar*). The common Celtic expression for this natural power **torannos* (Irish *torann*, Welsh *tarann*, Cornish *taran*, 'thunder') is derived by metathesis from the same root. These Celtic forms led to the god (or goddess?) *Taranis* attested by Lucan (*Phars.* i. 445) and to forms which are found on inscriptions, such as Ταρανδου (Dat.), *Taranucus*, *Taranuenus*. Along with these we have a form exactly corresponding to the Teutonic *Donar*, viz. *Tanaros* (cf. R. Much, 'Der germanische Himmelsgott' in *Festschrift fur Heinzel*, p. 227). The names of the Lithuanian god of thunder, *Perkúnas* (according to Menecius '*deus tonitruum ac tempestatum*'), and of the Slavonic *Perun*, who was especially worshipped in Kiev, are obviously related to each other, but the exact nature of this relationship has not yet been determined. Both of them are used in their own languages as appellative terms for 'thunderstorm,' 'thundercrash.' The first of these two names has been connected (cf. H. Hirt, *Indog. Forsch.* i. p. 479) with the Old Norse *Fjorgyn*, the name of the mother of Thor, and with *Parjánya*, the rain- and thunder-god of the Vedas. All these words have again been connected with the Lat. *quercus*, O.H.G. *forha* 'oak,' 'fir' (**perku*), so that the meaning 'he of the oak' would result for *Perkúnas* (cf. in Menecius: *Putscætus*, 'deus qui sacros lucos tuetur,' Lith. *Puszatis* [from *puszis*, 'pine tree'], 'he of the pine tree'; cf. J. G. Frazer, *Early History of the Kingship*, 210). But the Skr. *Parjánya* must for phonetic reasons be excluded from this series (Skr. *j* is not=Lith. *k*), and after all it may be better (especially in consideration of the clear and evident changes of meaning which occur in the Celtic *Taranis* and the Teutonic *Donar*), in the case of *Perkúnas* and *Perun* to start from their appellative signification.† Just as in the North of Europe, so also in

* Cf., in addition, Erasmus Stella, 'de Borussiæ Antiquitatibus' ii., in Grynæus, *Novus Orbis*, Basel, 1537, p. 582: 'Solem et Lunam deos omnium primos crediderunt, tonitrua fulgetrasque ex consensu gentium adorabant, tempestates advertendas citandasque precationibus dixerunt.'

* Bremer (*Indogerm. Forschungen*, iii. 301) has lately, on insufficient grounds, the present writer thinks, separated the Teutonic words from **dyêus*=Ζεύς and connected them with **deivos*=*deus*.

† E. Lidén (*Armenische Studien*, Goteborg, 1906, p. 88) has recently discussed all these words. With us he derives the Slav. *perunŭ* and Lith. *perkunas* from the appellative signification 'thunder,' and places both words beside Old Slav. *pery*, *pirati* and Armen. *hark-anem*, aor. *hari* (cf. also Armen. *orot*

the Vedas, *Dyâús*, the god of heaven, and *Indra*, the god of the thunderstorm (along with *Parjânya*) are carefully kept separate. In contrast to that, the Greek Zeus is god of the clear sky and thunder-god at the same time:

Ζεὺς δ' ἔλαχ' οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσι (*Il.* xv. 192).

In fact, titles of the god referring to the latter quality, such as νεφεληγερέτα, τερπικέραυνος, στεροπηγερέτα, κελαινεφής, ἐριγδουπος, ἐριβρεμέτης, ἀστεροπητής, ἀργικέραυνος, etc., exist in large numbers. On the other hand, the epithet of Zeus, the old neuter plural εὐρύοπα, 'wide-eye' (cf. above, τὸν κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλέοντες), which is by far the most ancient of his titles, and takes us back to a long-forgotten epoch of the language, points to the god as the bearer of the light of day (cf. J. Schmidt, *Pluralbildungen der indoger. Neutra*, Weimar, 1889, p. 400). The same thing is to be found in the case of the Latin Juppiter as in the case of the Greek Zeus. In both instances, therefore, secondary developments and approximations are evidently present.

Further, the sun and the moon are unanimously mentioned, in the reports given above, as objects of worship among the tribes on the shores of the Baltic, the Persians, and the Teutons.

The Aryan names of these are:

The Sun: Skr. *sûvar* (*sûrya* and *svàr*, Av. *hvar*), Gr. ἀβέλιος (Cret. Hes.), ἠέλιος, ἥλιος, Lat. *sol*, Goth. *sauil*, neut. (beside *sunnô*, fem.), Welsh *heul*, Old Pruss. *saule*, Lith. *saulė*.

The Dawn: Skr. *ushás* and *usrâ*, Av. *ušah*, Gr. ἠώς, Æol. αὔως, Lat. *aurora*, Lith. *auszrà*.

The Moon: Skr. *más*, Av. *mah*, Gr. μήνη, Goth. *mêna*, Lith. *ménů* (in addition O. Lat. *losna*, Lat. *lûna*, Armen. *lusin*; cf. Old Pruss. *lauxnos*, 'constellations').

All these and the related phenomena of the sky connected with light—*Saulėlė* 'the sun,' *Mėnů* or *Mėnesėlis* 'the moon,' *Auszrinė* 'the morning star,' *Wakarinė* (also called *Żevoruna*) 'the evening star,' the stars (Lith. *Żwaigždė*) as a whole, over which *Suaixtix* rules, *Auszrà* 'the dawn' (cf., in Lasicius, 'Ausca [for *Auszrà*] dea est radiorum solis [vel occumbentis vel] supra horizontem ascendentis'), etc.—play, as will be seen further on, an exceptionally important part in the Prusso-Lithuanian religion and mythology. But even in the case of the neighbouring Teutons evidences of the prevalence of the worship of the sun and moon are by no means confined to the report of Cæsar quoted above. Thus Tacitus (*Ann.* xiii. 55) mentions a Teuton of the name of Boiocalus, of whom he says: 'Solem deinde suspiciens et cetera sidera vocans, quasi coram interrogabat,' and even as late as the 7th cent. the saintly Eligius preaches among the Franks: 'Nullus dominos solem et lunam vocet neque per eos iuret.' A deified sun is mentioned in the O.N. *Sól* and in the second Merseburg magic formula: *Sinthgunt Sunna era suister*. The history of the Teutonic names of the days of the week points to the same fact. If the analogy of the days of *Ziu*, *Wodan*, *Donar*, and *Freia* (A.S. *tîwesdæg*, *wôdnesdæg*, *þunresdæg*, *frîgedæg*) in itself as well as O.H.G. *sunnûntag* and *mânatag* (=Lat. *dies Solis* and *dies Lunæ*, where Sol and Luna were regarded as highly sacred divinities, at least by the Romans, who brought these days of the week to Germany) makes probable the existence of Teutonic gods and goddesses, in the same way the hypothesis of the worship of a heathen goddess *Sunna* is strengthened by the general West Teutonic formation A.S. *sunnanæfen*= O.H.G. *sunnûn-âband*. For as this combination, whose original meaning (as in A.S.) was 'evening before Sunday,' must without doubt have been formed in pagan times, the conclusion may in all probability be drawn that there was a feast in honour of a heathen goddess *Sunna*, the eve of which was called *sunnûn-âband* (but cf. R. Much, in *Mitteilungen der anthrop. Gesellschaft in Wien*, xxxviii. p. 16). The name of *the dawn*, too, developed on Teutonic soil into an important goddess *Ôstara* (to be found in the O.H.G. *Ôstarûn*, *Ôstarmânod*), A.S. *Eostre* (*Eastormonaþ*, cf. Bede, *de Temporum ratione*, c. 13)=Skr. *usrâ*, Lith. *auszrà*, only with the difference that here the original goddess of the morning has become a goddess of Spring (but cf. A.S. *ëarendel*, 'morning-star,' 'morning-dawn'). The reason of this change is to be found in the fact that in pre-historic times special worship was paid to the goddess of the dawn at the beginning of the year (the spring), as is made probable by the ritual of the Indian *Ushas* (cf. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, Bonn, 1891–1902, ii. 26 ff. and L. v. Schröder, 'Lihgo' in the *Mitteilungen der anthrop. Gesell. in Wien*, xxxii.). On Italian soil the Sabine *ausel*, 'sol' (Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* v. 68 acc. to emendation), must be mentioned as derived from the root **aus-* which has just been referred to, whose priests were called *Auselii* (*Aurelia familia*; cf. also the form found on Etruscan mirrors, *Usil Sol et Eos*). With regard to the divinities *Sol* and *Luna* themselves, it is doubtful whether or not they belonged to the oldest components of the pantheon (cf. Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 261). Tradition decides in favour of the former view, although there are no traces of their worship either in the calendar of feasts or in the priestly regulations. But the same is also the case with other Roman divinities, *e.g. Minerva*, whose name (**Menes-va*) is derived from a root (Gr. *μένος*, **μενεσ-os*) which is entirely extinct in the Italian languages, and therefore must be very old. *Mêna* in the *Indigitamenta* is the special goddess of menstruation. In Greece the related divinities are Ἥλιος and Ἠώς, Μήνη and Σελήνη, although they continue for the most part to play a rôle in the mythology subordinate to that of the chief gods. Finally, the Rigveda also knows a sun-god (*Sûrya*) and a moon-god (*Mâs*), who, however, in the same way withdraw into the background before other gods who are probably not creations of the Indian soil, as *e.g. Mitra* (Avestan and Old Pers. *Miθra*, New Pers. *mihr*, 'the sun'), *Varuna*, and the *Âdityas*, or they have been repressed by these (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, pp. 185 ff., 194). The position of the female personification of the sun *Sûryâ* is more important, owing to her relation to the *Aśvins* and her marriage with *Soma*, the moon-god of a later date, which we shall discuss further on. The same is true of the *Ushas*, so often celebrated in song (cf. above). For a Μήν (moon-god?) of Asia Minor, see Kretschmer, *Einleitung*, p. 197 ff.

Along with sun and moon, we find in Herodotus and Cæsar fire (Skr. *agni*=Lat. *ignis*, Lith. *ugnìs*, Old Slav. *ognĭ*) mentioned as an object of worship. According to primitive ideas it is born in heaven (cf. A. Kuhn, *Herabkunft des Feuers*, Berlin, 1859), and is carried to earth in the lightning-flash, which is accordingly called 'fire' in the most ancient times (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, art. 'Feuer'). On Prusso-Lithuanian soil it was the object of a sumptuous worship. Here Jerome of Prague found 'gentem quæ sacrum colebat ignem eumque perpetuum appellabat; sacerdotes templi materiam ne deficeret ministrabant.' The people called it *Ugnìs szwentà*, 'holy fire,' or *szwentà ponyke*, 'holy mistress.' On leaving the house of her parents (Prætorius, p. 82), the young wife said, 'Thou holy fire, who will guard thee?' There was also a goddess of the hearth, *Aspelenie*, 'the one behind the hearth' (Lith. *pelėnė*), etc. We thus find in

'thunder'), both of which mean 'to beat.' He also seeks to connect with this the Skr. *parjânya*. If this is correct, then, there would lie in the Skr. *parjânya*, Slav. *perunŭ*, Lith. *perkûnas*, a primitive Aryan word for thunder with the fundamental significance of 'the beating one.'

the North the same perennial fire, fed by priests, as recurs in the South in the cult of the Roman *Vesta*, Greek *ἑστίη*, Arcadian *Fιστία*, 'hearth,' 'hearth-fire.' There is absolutely no reason for deriving this Roman cult of Vesta from Greece, as Kretschmer has lately attempted to do in his *Einleitung* (p. 162 ff.). On the contrary, everything we know of this cult and its usages, as, *e.g.*, its place in the oldest calendars of feasts, the existence of appointed priestesses, the re-kindling of the extinguished flame by means of the rubbing together of pieces of wood, the carrying of the fire in a brazen instead of an iron sieve, the beating to death of the unchaste Vestal, the circular form of the temple of Vesta, etc. (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, art. 'Herd'; Frazer, *Early History of the Kingship*, 209 f.; and Wissowa, *op. cit.*, p. 141 ff.), points to the remotest antiquity. If we add to this the fact that, according to Herodotus (iv. 59), among the Scythians Ἱστίη (Scyth. *Ταβιτί*, *i.e.* 'the warming one,' or 'heat'; Avesta *tap*, Skr. *tápati*, *tâpáyati*, *taptá*; New Pers. *tâbad*, *tafsad*; Lat. *tepesco*) was a most sacred, in fact the most highly honoured, goddess, it is beyond doubt that the worship of the single hearth-fire, as well as of the common perennial fire, belongs to the most ancient religious ideas and cults of the Aryans. The most exalted, however, of all the divinities which spring from the element of fire is the Vedic *Agni* (Lith. *ugnìs*), the wise and great priest of mankind. The Greek Ἥφαιστος (probably derived from the kindling of the flame, cf. *ἀφαί*, 'kindling'), and the Latin *Volcanus*, in pre-historic times apparently the god of the fearful and devastating might of fire (from **volkâ*, 'fire' = Skr. *ulkâ*, 'firebrand'; cf. Kretschmer, p. 133), are more narrowly confined to their original sphere than the Vedic *Agni*. The beginning of a formation of a Teutonic god of fire may probably be found in the figure of the Old Norse *Vǫlundr*, whose name, however, has not yet been sufficiently explained.

As the last of the great powers of the sky and of nature we have to mention *wind* and *water*. The former appears as a god in the Litu-Prussian *Wêjo-patis*,* 'lord of the wind' (also *Wejpons* and *Wejdiews*) from the Lith. *wéjis*, *wéjas*, 'wind.' The last of these words corresponds to the Vedic *Vâyu*, 'wind,' and 'god of the wind,' and to the Greek Αἴολος (**Fη-ιο-λο-ς*). The name *Vâta*, which is found in the Vedas together with *Vâyu* and also means 'wind,' 'wind-god,' is generally compared with the Teutonic *Wôdan-Ôðinn*; but the etymological connexion in this view is not free from difficulty. The worship of *water*, too, in the form of springs and rivers, is reported from all Aryan lands (for the Persians, see Herodotus i. 138: *σέβονται ποταμοὺς μάλιστα*; for the Germans, Agathias 28, 4: *Ἱλάσκονται καὶ ῥεῖθρα ποταμῶν . . . καὶ τούτοις ὥσπερ ὅσια δρῶντες*). The same is true of the Greeks (cf. Preller, *Griech. Myth.* iv.[4], 146 ff.), among whom the rivers were called *διοτρεφεῖς* and *διιπετεῖς*, 'fed from heaven' and 'heaven-born.' Gods having their name from the watery element are the Latin *Neptûnus* (Umbr. *nepitu* '*inundatio*,' according to Bucheler, *Lex. Italicum*, Bonn, 1881, xvii., Av. *napta*, 'moist,' Νάπας, a Persian spring, Νάπαρις, a Scythian river); the Greek Νηρεύς: *ναρός*, 'flowing,' 'moist'; the Indian *Apsaras*: *ap-* 'water' (*apâm nápât*, 'the water-child'), etc.

These powers of nature which we have now enumerated, *i.e.* the sky (**dyêus*), together with the phenomena appearing in it or coming from it, 'the heavenly ones' (**deivôs*), must accordingly be designated as the *real kernel of the old Aryan religions*. The way in which around this original kernel new layers of divine beings were ever added among the separate peoples will be indicated, at least in broad outline, at the close of the next section, although, strictly speaking, it does not belong to this discussion.

2. The oldest names of the 'heavenly ones.'—Aryan archæology, in the course of its historical development, has been gradually coming to the conclusion that, in the vocabulary of the original Aryan language, real names of gods cannot be proved. The only thing that can be proved, as follows clearly from the indications given above, is that there were appellative but perfectly transparent designations of the sky and the natural phenomena proceeding from it. The fact that they were worshipped in primeval times follows from their being all united in the word **deivos*, and from the numerous historical divinities which have grown out of them. The reason for this phenomenon lies in the simple fact that in primitive Aryan times there were as yet no real gods in the later sense of the term, viz., no personal gods whose names could have been inherited. In *dyâus*—*Ζεύς*—*Juppiter*—*Ziu*, in *agni*—*ignis*—*ugnìs*—*ognĭ*, in *donar*—*torann*, etc., people worshipped in primitive times the mysterious power, the part of the infinite, the divine *anima*, which manifested itself to mankind in the phenomena of the sky, of fire, thunder, etc., but not as yet a god who was regarded as a person or who exerted influence outside of his own sphere. They were 'special gods' set, so to say, on a high pedestal of worship. That this was the oldest belief of the Aryans regarding their gods has already been clearly emphasized by the present writer in his book, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*[2], p. 600 (1890). It is the merit of H. Usener, in his frequently mentioned book *Götternamen* (p. 277), to have recognized that such a worship of gods is *actually* borne witness to in extensive parts of Europe.

Thus Herodotus reports (ii. 52) of the Pelasgi, 'the ancients,' a name which, as the present writer believes, included all that was known or supposed to be known regarding the pre-historic inhabitants of Greece: *ἔθνον δὲ πάντα πρότερον οἱ Πελασγοὶ θεοῖσι ἐπευχόμενοι ὡς ἐγὼ ἐν Δωδώνῃ* (the oldest place of worship in Greece) *οἶδα ἀκούσας, ἐπωνυμίην δὲ οὐδ' οὔνομα ἐποιεῦντο οὐδενὶ αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἀκηκόεσάν κω.*

Thus they possessed gods and worshipped them, but as yet had given them no epithets and no names. The ancients, too, had obviously meant the same thing when they designated certain peoples as *ἄθεοι*, 'without gods.'

Theophrastus knew such a people in the Thracian Thoi of Mt. Athos, and in the same sense Strabo, iii. p. 164, reports: *ἔνιοι δὲ τοὺς Καλλαικοὺς ἀθεους φασί, τοὺς δὲ Κελτιβηρας καὶ τοὺς προσβόρρους τῶν ὁμόρων αὐτοὶς ἀνωνύμῳ τινὶ θεῷ [θυειν] ταῖς πανσελήνοις νυκτωρ πρὸ τῶν πυλῶν, πανοικιους τε χορεύειν καὶ πανννχιζειν.*

The gods of the Aryans were also 'nameless.' They sacrificed to the sky, the sun, the moon, the dawn, fire, wind, and water; but the names indicating these powers still coincided perfectly with the respective designations. A Greek who had listened to their worship would, under the impression of the lively figures in his Olympus, have called them also *ἄθεοι*.

The further development in the formation of gods among the Aryans was now mainly directed towards the *creation of personal gods* and *true proper names* for them. This process was called forth almost spontaneously in the course of the history of culture. History produces personalities, and, as happens on the earth, separate individuals come to the front as kings or nobles and grasp power and riches for themselves, in the same way an attempt was made to invest some of the gods with an individual and personal character. All the 'special

* The Lithuanian names of gods ending in *-patis* (cf. also *Dimstipatis*: *dimstis*, 'house,' 'court,' *Laukpatis* 'lord of the fields,' *Raugupatis*, 'lord of the leaven') are regarded by the author of the present article, in opposition to Usener-Solmsen, p. 115, as very old, seeing that the Lith. *pats*, 'husband,' has preserved the old meaning 'lord,' 'master,' only in one case besides these names of gods, viz., in the old compound word *wiẽszpatis*, 'God,' lit. 'lord of the tribe.'

gods' had the capacity of annexing the sphere of activity of others. In the case of some deities the powers of various other gods were united. Then we have the additional fact that hundreds of new aspects and tasks of material culture, as of law and custom, require a new heavenly lord and protector, while the significance of the natural powers begins to pale, the more mankind gets raised above them.

In addition to this, there is no Aryan territory where *influences from without* have not made themselves felt. As far as India is concerned, Oldenberg (*Die Religion des Veda*, p. 194) is convinced that the great figures connected with light, which are sharply distinguished from the rest of the Vedic pantheon, *Mitra*, *Varuṇa*, and the *Âdityas* (according to him, sun, moon, and planets), had been borrowed, as early as the Indo-Iranian period, from the Semites or the Sumerians, or that they had received their astronomical character from them. Herodotus himself relates, in the passage referred to above, that the Pelasgi received the names of their originally nameless gods from the Egyptians, and that they afterwards handed on these names to the Hellenes. In any case there cannot be the slightest doubt that the personal characterization of the Greek deities followed the Oriental pattern to a large extent. The Persians, too, according to Herodotus (i. 131), had learned from the Assyrians and the Arabs to sacrifice to a personal deity, Οὐρανίη, along with their old nameless gods. Nor can we fail to recognize how the colourless forms of the old Roman gods were, during the course of Hellenic influence, clothed with Greek flesh and blood. The relation of the ancient Teutons to the Romans must be regarded in the same way. If we take the deities mentioned by Cæsar (obviously only as instances), sun, moon, and fire, and add to these the thunder (*Donar*), the sky (*Ziu*), and the wind (*Wodan* [?]), these being then regarded in their originally purely appellative meaning, we can find absolutely nothing in this list of old Teutonic gods which is in the least striking or unusual. Tacitus, 150 years later, mentions (*Germania*, ch. 9) as Teutonic gods Hercules, Mars, and Mercury; and these possess, at least according to his report, personal characteristics. But these 150 years were at the same time an epoch of intimate contact between Teutonic barbarism and Græco-Roman culture; and its definitely stamped divine figures, in the form which would be mediated to the north by traders and soldiers, must have tended to re-mould the conceptions of the special gods of the Teutonic nature-worship. If then, in addition to all this, we call up before our minds how the ever-increasing influence exerted by the priestly castes (cf. below, 4 *b*) and the beginnings of poetry and plastic art vied with each other in selecting individual deities from the ὅμιλος τῶν θεῶν, and in working up and embellishing the forms of their favourites, we shall have pretty well exhausted the conditions which brought about the gradual development of personal gods.

But however clear this development seems to be when we consider it in broad outline, it is nevertheless extremely difficult to fix beyond question the actual process of growth of the separate gods. For, at the point where the written records among the various Aryan tribes begin, these gods stand for the most part completed and finished before us, and in order to determine the point of departure in their development we are thus *almost exclusively dependent on the interpretation of their names*. It must, however, be said that the etymological explanation of the Aryan names of the gods unfortunately forms one of the most obscure chapters of comparative philology, and the only great step of progress that has been made here lies in the recognition of the fact that we know only a very little for certain. But even if we were successful in fixing the origin of a name of a god, and with it the first sphere of his activity, the 'cell of his nature,' still only more or less credible conjectures would be possible as to the lengthy and intricate pathway which led from this point to the personality of the god that we find in history. The phenomena of the sky, of which we have spoken above, are the most natural sources for personal gods. As soon as Ζεύς (**dyêus*) began on Grecian soil to denote not only the brilliant sky of day, but also the cloud-girt sky of the thunderstorm, with reference to the divine *anima* which was thought of as in both, from that moment the point of commencement was given for the formation of a personal god, which now led in continuous development, through the assumption of ever new elements in the life of nature and of man, to the immortal figure of the father of gods and men which we find in Homer. But it is worthy of note that in the Epic the number of epithets describing the relations of the god to the order of the world and of mankind (*e.g.* μητιετα, ξένιος in the *Iliad*) is extremely small compared with the crowd of attributes referring to natural phenomena (cf. above, p. 34). Corresponding to this, *Agni* in India is originally nothing else than the divine *anima* of fire. But it enters into the realm of personal gods as soon as man requires it, not only to give light and warmth or to dispel evil spirits by its heat, but also, as is already done in the Rigveda, to supply the blessing of children and to promote domestic prosperity.

The Greek Zeus and the Indian Agni are thus real 'heavenly ones,' true *dii*. Then there are joined to these, from the most varied spheres of nature and culture, countless other special gods, who raise themselves in ways similar to these to the position and dignity of personal deities. We shall illustrate this by a few examples from the history of the Greek, Roman, and Teutonic religions.

From the first of these let us take the figures of *Apollo* and *Hermes*. Among the very numerous interpretations that have been proposed for these divine names there are two which, without forcing, satisfy all the demands of phonetics and the science of word-formation; both of them originate from Carl Robert, the editor of Preller's *Mythologie*. According to them, Ἀπόλλων, Ἀπέλλων (ἀπέλλα, 'fold') is 'he of the fold' (cf. *e.g.* κίβδων, 'miner': κίβδη, 'dross'; Ἀγάθων : ἀγαθός; Φίλων : φίλος, K. Brugmann, *Grundriss der vergl. Gram.* ii.[2] 1, Strassburg, 1906, 300); and Ἑρμείας, Ἑρμῆς (ἕρμα, ἕρμακες, 'stone,' 'stone-heaps'), is 'he of the stone-heap.'

Divine names which designate the god appellatively as standing in a characteristic relation to a definite conception are exceedingly numerous in all Aryan languages, as is seen. *e.g.*, in Lith. *Medeinis*, 'he of the wood' (Lith. *mẽdis*); *Puszaitis*, 'he of the pine tree' (Lith. *puszis*); *Eratinis*, 'he that belongs to the lambs' (Lith. *éras*), Lat. *Silvanus*, *Pomona*, *Mellona*, *Bubona*, *Minerva* from **Menesova* ('she who has to do with the **menos* = Gr. *μένος*'), Old Gall. *Braciaca* (*brace*), 'he of the malt'; Phryg. *Sabazios* = Dionysus (Illyr. *sabaia*, 'beer'), 'he of the beer' (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, p. 89); and in numerous other instances. In the Teutonic languages the numerous formations in *-ana*—*Tanfana*, *Hludana*, *Saxanus*, *Magusanus*, etc. — may belong to this class. Ἀπέλλων is accordingly, in the first instance, a 'special god' of the cattle-pen,* then a god of cattle-rearing in general, in which character, as is well known, he already appears in Homer (*Il.* ii. 766, xxi. 448 ff.), and which is clearly referred to in the ancient epithets Λύκιος, 'he who frightens away the wolves from the folds,' Καρνεῖος: κάρνος, 'flock' (cf. Lith. *Eratinis*), and Νόμιος: νόμος, 'pasture' (cf. Lith. *Ganyklos dewas*: *ganyklà*, 'pasture'), which had all, without doubt, originally designated independent gods. The figure of Hermes, however, takes us back to the primitive epoch of an ancient stone-worship (cf. below, 4 *c*). As late as the year 1583 the Jesuit Rostowski was able to report the following from Lithuania (cf. A. Bruckner, *Archiv für slav. Phil.* ix. 33): 'Antiquæ colonis superstitiones . . . alibi Akmo (Lith. *aszmũ*, 'stone'), saxum grandius'; and further: 'Saxa pro diis culta (quæ illi lingua

* The Lithuanian god *Sutvaras* (cf. above, p. 31), 'the god of cattle,' would exactly correspond, if it is correct to connect his name with the Lith. *tvorà*, 'fence.'

patria Atmeschenes Viete, adiectorum scilicet loca [really adiciendi locus; Lett. *atmeschanas wieta*], in quæ ciborum analecta pro libamine coniectabant; quibus cæsorum animantium cruorem aspergebant quæque contingere ipsis fas esset victimariis), sex inquam eiusmodi aræ circum oppida, in primis Rositenum, Dunebungum, Russonum, eversæ coctusque sacrificantium dissipati.' Prætorius too relates (p. 21): 'There was, several years ago, a somewhat higher stone not far from Gumbinnen or Bisserkeim, in a pine grove, which was regarded as sacred, and on which the surrounding people offered money, clothes, and the like.' Similar phenomena occur in Greece. Even in the *Odyssey*, xvi. 471, we find the place name Ἑρμαιος λόφος:

τὸ γὰρ ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσιν.
ἤδη ὑπὲρ πόλιος ὄθι θ' Ἑρμαιος λόφος ἐστιν,

and the scholast remarks on this passage: 'The heap of stones on the roadside is called ἑρμαῖον. Hermes first cleared the roads, and where he had cleared them he set a stone for a mark on the roadside. Ἑρμαιος λόφος, however, is the same as finger-post, for the Roman milestones were called Ἑρμαιοι λόφοι. Hence it is the custom of people to erect cairns of stones in honour of Hermes, because he is the guide and protector of travellers, and to throw ever more stones on these cairns, which they call Ἑρμαιοι λόφοι.' Cf. also ἕρμακας λίθους σεσωρευμένους εἰς τιμὴν τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ (Schol. *Nik. Ther.* 150). Eatables, too, such as dried figs, etc., were laid down on these cairns of Hermes (ἕρμαιον), professedly for the passing travellers, but in reality as a sacrifice to the god. In both racial territories we therefore find divinely worshipped stones or cairns, which were added to by the passers-by. The divine *anima*, which exercised sway in them, was called among the Greeks, 'he of the cairn of stones,' Ἑρμείας.

How these primitive gods, 'he of the cattle-pen' and 'he of the cairn of stones,' gradually grew into the powerful and many-sided personalities of the Greek Olympus will never, as has been mentioned above, be completely ascertained in detail. Before all else his early combination with Φοῖβος, 'the shining one,' a sun-deity, may have been of significance for Apollo. The sun-god Phœbus opened the ἀπέλλαι, 'the cattle-pens,' in the morning and drove the cattle to the pasture. Hermes was raised from insignificance by the circumstance that these cairns of stones were more and more transformed into 'direction posts,' and the god with artistically formed head and extended penis became the protector of the ever growing traffic, and the messenger of gods and men. In any case, at the end of their development both of them attained to the same elevation as Zeus, and were regarded as his sons.

On Roman soil let us recall once more the figure of *Janus*, which is remarkable in many ways. As *Terminus* was the 'god of the boundary stone,' *Fons* the 'god of the spring,' *Vesta* the 'goddess of the hearth,' and Lith. *Szullinnis* (*szulinỹs*) the 'god of the well,' in the same way the Latin *Janus* was originally nothing else than the 'god of the doors' (so also Kretschmer, *op. cit.* p. 161), however difficult it may be for the modern mind to conceive what religious emotion could be aroused by looking at doors and gates. Probably it was the thought of the two-sidedness of the door, the fact that it looked inwards and outwards at the same time (*Janus Geminus*, *Janus bifrons*), and that it both shut and opened (*Clusius*, *Patulcius* in the *Carmen Saliorum*), that gave occasion to the first conception of the god. But even in Rome of the earliest date the god had his own priest (*Rex sacrorum*) and his own festival (*Agonalia*), and higher thoughts, chiefly the idea that he was the beginning of everything—especially of the year (Januarius)—must have become connected with his worship and have made him into the *divom deus* or the *principium deorum* (cf. Wissowa, p. 91 ff.). In the same way as a material and originally highly prosaic conception was here elevated to the rank of the *dii*, we find in Rome a great fondness, corresponding to the abstract-thinking spirit of the Romans, for raising even abstract ideas into deities. This is seen, *e.g.*, in *Ceres* (**Keros*, 'growth': *cresco* (cf. Osthoff, *Parerga*, i. 1), *Venus** (**venos* = Skr. *vánas* 'desire,' 'pleasantness'), *Sēia* ('sowing' = Lith. *sėjà*, 'seed-time'), *Robigus* ('failure of crops'), etc.

* In Oscan and Pælignian the goddess *Herentas* corresponds to her. The name is connected with Osc.-Umbr. *her-*, *herí-βούλεσθαι*, Goth. *gairnjan*, 'to desire,' etc., and accordingly means 'desire.'

In the same way among the Teutons all sorts of 'special gods' were added from all sides to the ancient *tívar* = *dii* (*Sol*, *Luna*, *Volcanus*, *Donar*, *Ziu*, *Wôdan*). As examples we may take the gods *Saxnôt* and *Requalivahanus*, which can be interpreted with comparative certainty. When bronze swords were introduced from the south-east into Europe, and thereby a new and formidable weapon was put into men's hands, they could not help seeing in this the activity of a god. As a matter of fact, evidences of such a *sword-cult* can be produced from extensive parts of Europe, from the Scythians, Alans, Quads, and other peoples (cf. J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[3], i. 185). This god who was present in the sword was called by the Saxons *Saxnôt*, *i.e.* 'sword-bearer,' 'companion of the sword,' and we can easily understand how he could, among a warlike people, acquire so great importance that in the baptismal vow he was placed on an equal footing with *Thunar* and *Wôdan* (Braune, *Althochdeutsches Lesebuch*[3], Halle, 1888, p. 159). We have seen above how a Celtic tribe, which had remained behind, worshipped a 'nameless god' by dancing in families before the gates on the nights of the full moon (above, p. 35[b]). May we not presuppose a similar custom among the neighbouring Teutons as well, and is it not likely that the god, when any one wished to indicate him in any way, was called 'he of the darkness' (Goth. *riqis* = Gr. ἔρεβος)—an interpretation of the *Requalivahanus* mentioned by the Romans, which the Germanists, by way of exception, unanimously accept? Besides, he was undoubtedly an important deity at the time when, according to a Roman inscription, Qu. Aprianus offered sacrifices and made vows to him on the banks of the Rhine.

3. The forms of manifestation of the 'heavenly ones,' and their interpretation in riddle and myth.—It is a characteristic quality of most primitive religions that in them the distinction between man and animal is entirely disregarded. 'The sense of an absolute psychical distinction between man and beast, so prevalent in the civilized world, is hardly to be found among the lower races. Men, to whom the cries of beasts and birds seem like human language, and their actions guided as it were by human thought, logically enough allow the existence of souls to beasts, birds, and reptiles, as to men. The lower psychology cannot but recognize in beasts the very characteristics which it attributes to the human soul, namely, the phenomena of life and death, will and judgment, and the phantom seen in vision or in dream' (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], i. 469). There may also have been such an epoch in the Aryan religions, in which it seemed quite natural to think of the flame racing over the fields as a horse, or the thunder in the storm-cloud as a bellowing steer, and numerous direct and indirect evidences point to a time in which the gods were actually conceived of as animals, or at least as beings partaking partly of human partly of merely animal qualities. Even as late as the Vedas (cf. Oldenberg, *op. cit.* p. 68 ff.) the lower deities at least are by preference thought of as being in the form of animals. But the higher gods also are repeatedly characterized as the children of animals, *e.g.* the *Aśvins* as children of the mare. The different animals, too, which were sacred to the gods, such as the eagle of Indra, or the animals under whose figure and name the gods were honoured, the horse of Agni, the steer of Indra, etc., are unmistakable signs of these once prevalent ideas. The oldest condition of affairs in Greece is summarized by E. Meyer (*Geschichte des Altertums*, ii. 98) in the following way: 'The view is almost still more wide-spread that the gods reveal themselves in the form of animals.' All through Greece a wolf-god was worshipped, which

in the Peloponnesus has become Zeus, while the wolf is otherwise regarded as a manifestation of Apollo (but cf. above, p. 36). Artemis, in Attica and Arcadia, where she was honoured as the mother of the tribe, is regarded as a she-bear; in other cases she was thought of as a hind (cf. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, ii. 435). In Argos, Hera βοῶπις was worshipped as a cow that was fertilized by Zeus in the form of a bull. In the countless rough figures of stone and clay, in human and animal form, which are found in all the layers of the Trojan and Ægean civilization, we may in all probability recognize the representations of the gods belonging to this epoch of Greece; not a few of them may have been house fetishes. In Italy, too, sacred animals (woodpecker, wolf, and ploughing ox) were assigned to different gods, particularly Mars. But the fact that the gods were here, too, conceived of as animals is very strongly supported by the tradition that there was carried in front of the divisions of the army, marching into the field, not only the eagle, as at a later date, but other figures of animals as well, wolves, minotaurs, horses, and boars (Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* x. 16: 'Romanis eam aquilam legionibus C. Marius in secundo consulatu suo proprie dicavit. Erat et antea prima cum quattuor aliis: *lupi, minotauri, equi aprique* singulos ordines anteibant'). It is the same custom to which Tacitus bears witness among the Teutons (*Germania*, ch. 7): 'Effigiesque et signa quaedam detracta lucis in prœlium ferunt,' since it cannot be doubted that, among the *effigies*, the sacred animals of the gods, the snake and wolf of Wodan, the bear and he-goat of Donar, the ram of Ziu, and the boar (cf. A.S. *eoforcumbol*, 'sign of the boar') of Freyr are to be understood (cf. Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 22: 'inde depromptæ silvis lucisque *ferarum imagines*'). Thus the oldest banners are seen to be animal fetishes, under whose visible protection the army marched into battle.

Along with the conception of the gods as animals, there is to be found, from the very beginning, the conception of them as existing in human form. In course of time this latter idea came more and more into prominence. It may seem that this is a contradiction of our earlier assertions, according to which the appearance of personal gods among the Aryan peoples is comparatively late. This is, however, not the case. We must not consider personification and the formation of personal gods as identical, no matter how much the latter presupposes the former. The characteristic mark of a *personal god* is that he is regarded as exercising influence outside of the sphere to which he owes his conceptual origin and his name. *Personification*, however, means, at first, simply the substitution of a human figure for the divine *anima* present in the phenomenon. This need for personification is all the greater the lower down we go in the stages of civilization. If the White Russian peasant be asked even to-day about his *Perunŭ*, whose fundamental appellative meaning is still quite clear to him (cf. above, p. 33), he says: 'He is a tall, broad-shouldered fellow, with black hair, black eyes, and a yellow beard. In his right hand he has a bow, in the left a quiver with arrows. He drives on the heavens in a chariot and discharges fiery arrows' (cf. Dahl, *Erklarendes Wörterbuch der lebenden grossrussischen Sprache*[2], St. Petersburg, 1880–82, iii. 104). Even quite impersonal conceptions of Greek and Roman civilization are, on their passing over into the Slavonic world, taken possession of by this primitive passion for personification. Thus the Lat. *calendæ* (καλάνδαι), 'New Year,' has led on Russian soil to a divine being, personifying the whole time between Christmas and Epiphany. In the neighbourhood of Moscow, even at the present day it is customary on Christmas eve to lead a maiden called *Koljada*, dressed in white, through the streets, and to sing, 'On Christmas eve was Koljada born, beyond the rapid river,' etc. In the same song, in close connexion with the worship of this Koljada, a pagan sacrifice of a kid is mentioned (cf. Glazunov, *Russian Folksongs* [Russ.], St. Petersburg, 1894, p. 1). We may also call to mind the supernatural *rusalki*, from Lat. *rosalia* (ῥουσάλια), 'festival of roses,' already mentioned above (p. 25).

Thus we may assume that there was, even in primitive times, an active tendency to conceive the divine in human form; and if Indra in the Rigveda and Thor in Northern mythology are described as giants with tawny or red beards, there is nothing against discovering there a primitive Aryan idea common to the Indians and the Teutons. This tendency, too, suggests an explanation of the fact that in certain branches of the Indo-Germanic language the attribute 'father' must have been, even in pre-historic times, added to the primitive Aryan **dyĕus*, 'sky' (Skr. *Dyâus pitâ*, Gr. Ζεὺς πατήρ; cf. also in Hesych. Δεισάτυρος· θεὸς παρὰ Τυμφαίοις, Lat. *Juppiter*), as there were also a Scythian Ζεὺς Πατταῖος and a Bithynian Ζεὺς Πάπας, Παππῶος (Kretschmer, *op. cit.* p. 241 f.). It is doubtful, however, whether the word 'father' indicates a position of honour of **dyĕus* compared to the other 'heavenly ones,' as seems more likely to the present writer, or expresses the relation of the god to the community worshipping him, as is the case in Italy, where *pater* (or *mater*) is applied to almost all the gods (or goddesses) of the oldest group.

A further consequence of this personification of the deity is to be found in the circumstance that the god was supplied with a wife, whose designation was most simply and originally obtained by forming the feminine of the male deity (Skr. *Agnâyî*: *Agni*; Gr. ΔιϜώνη: Ζεύς, Διός; Lat. *Juno*, **Jovino*: *Juppiter*, *Jovis*). The idea, too, that the heaven and the earth constitute a pair united in marriage is very old. In the Rigveda the 'mother,' *Pṛthivî* (=A.S. *folde*, 'earth'), appears along with the 'father,' *Dyâus*. The report of Herodotus regarding the Scythians (*νομίζοντες τὴν Γῆν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι γυναῖκα*) has already been mentioned. Among the Thracians the lordly Διόνυσος (probably a Thracian word) is sprung from the marriage of the god of heaven with the earth-goddess Σεμέλη (cf. the Lithuanian *Zémyna*: Lith. *žẽmė*, Old Slav. *zemlja*, 'earth'). Deeply rooted in the mind of the Russian peasantry is the belief in the love of Jarilo, the god of light, to the *matĭ syra zemlja*, 'the cold Mother Earth,' just as we find in an Anglo-Saxon rural verse: '*Hal wes þū, folde, fira modor, beo þu growende on godes fæþme*,' 'Hail to thee, O Earth, Mother of men! Be thou fruitful in God's embrace.'* It is doubtful, however, if the ἱερὸς γάμος of Zeus with Ἥρη, who can scarcely be shown to be a goddess of the earth, is related to the same circle of ideas (cf. Kretschmer, *Einleitung*, p. 90 f.; on the other side, Frazer, *GB*[2] i. 228, and Farnell, *Cults of the Gr. States*, i. 180 ff.). Finally, we have to mention that the distinction of grammatical gender, which was already perfected in the primitive language, formed the basis on which, on the one hand, male (*e.g. Dyâus* and *Agni*) and, on the other hand, female deities (*e.g. Ushas, Eostra*) could be developed. In short, in many places there are to be found, even in primitive times, the first beginnings of the formation of those divine families whose real evolution belongs entirely to the province of the respective separate peoples.

The conception of the oldest gods now as animals, now as men, which we have so far discussed, is,

* We may look upon the rôle played by *Tellus* at Roman marriages as a reminiscence of the same ideas. Cf. Servius, iv. 166: 'Quidam sane etiam Tellurem præesse nuptiis tradunt; nam et in auspiciis nuptiarum invocatur; cui etiam virgines, vel cum ire ad domum mariti coperint, vel iam ibi positæ, diversis nominibus vel ritu sacrificant.'

however, in reality only the outcome of a general longing, immanent in mankind, to know and understand the world, a longing which in primitive stages of culture expresses itself in two other phenomena as well—in *riddle* and in *myth*. In discussing these we may commence, as we have done so frequently, with the Litu-Slavic conditions, where both ideas appear with special purity and originality. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the riddle in the literature of the Slavonic peoples (cf. Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literatur gesch.*[2], p. 810 ff.; and, for the value of riddles in the interpretation of myths, Max Müller, *Contributions to the Science of Mythology*, 1897, i. 80 ff., and art. RIDDLE). They are in the real sense of the word *Weltratsel* ('riddles of the universe'), for their subject is, if not exclusively, at least in great measure, the universe, with its thousand-and-one phenomena, their meaning and illustration.

'Peas are scattered on a hundred paths; no one will gather them up—*ni cari, ni carica, ni krúsnaja dévica*' (*the stars*). 'The black cow has gored all men to death; the white cow has brought them to life again' (*day and night*). 'Without hands, without feet, he creeps on the mountains' (*the wind*). 'In Spring he makes glad; in Summer, cool; in Autumn, satisfied; in Winter, warm' (*the tree*). 'There stands an oak. On the oak there are 12 nests; in each nest there are 4 blue-bonnets, each blue-bonnet has 14 eggs—7 white and 7 black' (*the year, the month, weeks, days and nights*).

It is the same fundamental trait as appears in these few Russian examples (cf. Sadovnikow, *The Riddles of the Russian People* [Russ], Petersburg, 1875), viz. the tendency to explain the great cosmic processes, the course of the sun, the division of the year, etc., that comes most clearly to the front in the riddle-making of related peoples.

Thus in ancient India (cf. Haug, 'Vedische Ratselfragen und Ratselspruche,' in *Sitzungsberichte der Munchner Ak. d. W.*, phil.-hist. Kl. 1875, p. 457 ff.) the priests even in Vedic times, on occasions of great sacrificial gatherings, proposed for each other and for the officer riddles of the following kind. The Hotar asks, *e.g.*, 'Who travels alone?' 'Who will be born again?' 'What is the preventive against snow?' 'What is the great scattering?' and the Adhvaryu answers: 'The sun travels alone,' 'The moon will be born again,' 'Fire is the preventive against snow,' 'The earth is the great scattering.' Quite similar series of riddles occur on Teutonic soil (cf. Wilmanns' *ZDA* xx. 252) in the Edda and the poem of Traugemund ('What is whiter than snow? What is fleeter than the roe? What is higher than the mountain? What is darker than the night?'). In Greece one need only refer to the very ancient riddle of the fire that swallows up the father and mother, occurring in the *Marriage of Keyx*, ascribed to Hesiod. It makes quite a Vedic impression, seeing that it is a prevalent idea in the Rigveda that Agni, the son of the two pieces of wood by the rubbing of which he is produced, swallows up his father and mother at once after his birth.

The *myth* is devoted to the satisfaction of the same primitive longing as the riddle. It is quite incorrect (cf. above, p. 12) to suppose that it is the exclusive possession of higher social classes or the product of priestly acuteness, however much these may have influenced its forms as presented to us in history. In its origin it is undoubtedly nothing else than the naive and popular expression of the wish to understand and comprehend the universe, as can with especial clearness be recognized on Aryan soil in the rich but simple and transparent mythical formations of the Lithuanian and Lettic peoples. These, in any case, prove that, even at the most primitive stage of religious ideas, a myth can be developed to explain processes of nature puzzling to the people. In the first place, this formation of myths is concerned with the phenomena of the sun, moon, and stars (cf. Mannhardt, 'Die lettischen Sonnenmythen' in *ZE* vii. 73, 209, 281, and Usener-Solmsen, *Gotternamen*, p. 85 ff.).

Teljawelik is the smith that forged the sun. The people worship the sun and an iron hammer of special size. Once upon a time the sun was invisible for several months, because a very mighty king had closed him up in a strong tower. Then the figures of the Zodiac brought him help with the iron hammer. The tired and dusty sun is placed in a bath by the mother of Perkúnas, and then is dismissed on the following day washed and shining. Sun and moon are described in various *Daina* as husband and wife, and, indeed, as unfaithful in that relation. The moon separates herself from the sun, falls in love with the morning star (*Auszrinė*), and is cut in two by the sword of Perkúnas. The stars are considered as daughters of the sun, and so on.

Such stories as these regarding the heavenly beings, their deeds, and their relations to one another, were without doubt related even in primitive Aryan times; and it is to-day, in spite of all opposing scepticism, the right and the task of comparative mythology to discover cycles of myths which go back to such pre-historic interpretations of nature, as has been done by A. Kuhn and Max Müller. Three of these cycles of myths seem to the present writer to have been fixed beyond question.* These refer (1) to the relation of sun, moon, morning and evening stars, (2) to the origin of the thunderstorm, and (3) to the source of fire. It must suffice at this point to characterize them in the briefest possible way.

(1) Sun and moon have concluded a marriage with each other, as is related in the Lithuanian and Lettic poems, and more fully in a celebrated hymn of the Rigveda (x. 85). The morning and evening stars stand to these two heavenly bodies in a relation described in different ways. In a Lithuanian poem, as we saw above, the moon separates itself from the sun in order to run after the morning star. In the Lettic poems the most usual conception is that the 'sons of the god' (*dēwa dēli, dēwo sunelei*), among whom the two stars already mentioned are undoubtedly to be understood, are described as suitors for the favour of 'the daughter of the sun,' *i.e.* most likely the sun itself, just as in India the two *Aśvins*, 'the lords of the horses' (cf. Skr. *aśva*, 'horse'), are regarded as the lovers of *Surya* or *Súryasya Duhitá*, 'the daughter of the sun.' A pre-ethnic connexion of the Indian *Aśvins* with the Lettic 'sons of the god' seems, therefore, beyond the range of doubt (the view of Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 212), particularly when we remember that in the Lettic poems the morning and evening stars are also called the 'ponies' of the moon and the 'sons of the god' are thought of as riders on grey horses. Further, the equestrian Greek Διόσκουροι (Castor and Pollux), the brothers of Helena (Ἑλένη : *σέλα*, * *svelā*, 'heat of the sun') correspond to the Lettic *dēwa dēli*, 'sons of the god.' Finally, the Lettic 'sons of the god' are very often described as servants and workmen of the sun and the moon. Seeing now that we know from Lasicius, *de Dits Samagitarum*, p. 47, about a Lithuanian god *Algis*, '*angelus summorum deorum*,' whose name (cf. Lith. *algà*, 'reward') literally means 'hired labourer,' and this Lith. *Algis* is etymologically the same as the name of the Teutonic deity *Alcis* who corresponded to Castor and Pollux (Tacitus, *Germania*, ch. 43: Apud Nahanarvalos antiquæ religionis lucus ostenditur; præsidet sacerdos muliebri ornatu, sed deos interpretatione Romana Castorem Pollucemque memorant; ea vis numini, nomen *Alcis* [**Alkī*, dual ?]; nulla simulacra, nullum peregrinæ superstitionis vestigium; ut fratres tamen, ut iuvenes venerantur)—since this is so, it is impossible to deny that these forms also belong to the cycle of the Lettic 'sons of the god,' the Indian *Aśvins*, and the Greek Dioscuri.†

(2) The second cycle of primitive Aryan myths referred to above, dealing with the explanation of the thunder and the thunder-shower, is presented in two different settings. According to the one, a heavenly being slays the dragon concealed in the cloud, whose water now flows over the earth (fight of *Indra* with *Vṛtra*, of *Tištrya* with *Apaoša* in the Avesta, of Donar with the wolf Fenris, of Apollo with the Python), according to the other, a god delivers from a monster the cows of the clouds, who are imprisoned in a mountain gorge (*Indra* and *Viśvarūpa*, Herakles and Geryones, Hercules and Cacus).

(3) Lastly, the myths dealing with the origin of fire are connected with the custom, preserved among the Indians, Greeks, Romans, Slavs, and Teutons, and partially among the Lithuanians (cf. Usener, *op. cit.* p. 87), of obtaining fire for sacred purposes by taking a stick of hard wood (oak), boring it into a plank or board of softer wood (lime tree), and turning it round and round till fire is produced by the friction. In this way, which may be compared with animal generation, fire is also produced in the cloud, whence it is brought to earth by a bird or a daring human being (Prometheus). A similar origin is enjoyed by the earthly fire-drink, the honey-mead (Skr. *mádhu* = Gr. *μέθυ*, etc.) which, when drunk by mortals, bestows upon

* In this connexion the present writer agrees with Winternitz, 'Was wissen wir von den Indogermanen?' (*Beilage zur Munchner AZ*, 1903, No. 258, p. 292). Only in one point does Winternitz seem to make a mistake, viz. in deducing from these myths the existence of personal gods, a view which rests on the confusion emphasized above (p 38[a]) between personified natural phenomena and natural phenomena that have become personal gods.

† A. Bruckner (*Archiv fur slavische Philologie*, xxiii.) is wrong in finding in the author's contention that Lith. *Algis* = Ger. *Alcis* (*Reallexicon*, p. 673), a contradiction of his opinion, of which Bruckner himself approves, that as yet there were no Aryan names for the gods; for these names represent, not an Aryan god-name, but an Aryan appellative ('hired labourer') preserved by chance in the myth.

them immortality (Skr. *amṛta*, 'immortality,' 'draught of immortality' = Gr. *ἀμβροσία*, lit. 'immortality') as it is possessed by the heavenly beings (A. Kuhn, *Die Herabkunft des Feuers und des Gottertranks*, Berlin, 1859). The thought that the universe is a well-ordered whole, resting on fixed laws, is a long way in advance of these explanations, and where this thought meets us in earlier epochs, as in the Indo-Iranian conception of Skr. *ṛtá* = Av. *aša*, it points to foreign non-Aryan influences (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, pp. 49, 195).

4. The worship.—In the foregoing sections we have dealt with the ideas of the Aryans regarding their gods and with their beliefs. We now go on to the consideration of the services which they devoted to them, *i.e.* their worship. This point, which has often been neglected by investigators, is also of the greatest importance for the development of the gods, for naturally it must have been along with and by means of the form of worship assigned to them that the fluid and indefinite figures came to assume more fixed and individual forms. We shall in this discussion have to deal with four phenomena connected with worship which we find in historic times: (*a*) sacrifice and prayer, (*b*) the priests, (*c*) the temples, (*d*) the feasts. We shall have to ask whether and how far these institutions go back into the primitive history of the Aryan peoples.

(*a*) SACRIFICE AND PRAYER.—There was among the Aryans, just as among all other peoples, a more ancient way of bringing the supernatural within reach of the natural than sacrifice and prayer, namely, *magic*. Its forms appear so closely connected, even in historic times, with those of the cult, that it is often difficult, if not impossible, to draw a sharp line of distinction between the two conceptions. We may say, however, that magic is present in all those cases in which man imagines that he is able, by word or by deed, to make a spirit *directly* and immediately serviceable to himself. On the other hand, we can speak of an act of worship only where, by a sacrifice or a prayer, the otherwise free will of a deity is supposed to be more indirectly influenced and made favourable to mortal man. It thus depends on the *way of influencing* the deity, not on the intention connected with it, which is in both cases the same. He who lights a fire early in the morning in order thereby to facilitate the rising of the sun, or he who banishes with a text a demon of sickness into a stone or a plant, performs a *magical* act. He, however, who appeals to the heavenly powers by means of sacrifices and prayers in order that they may cause the sun to shine or make him well, engages in an *act of worship*.

Magic may be practised either by *an action* or by *words*, as can be clearly gathered from its terminology. The following series of terms is characteristic of the former method: Skr. *kṛtyā* 'action,' 'bewitching,' 'magic,' 'witch,' Lith. *kerus* 'magic,' *kerėti* 'to bewitch some one by the eye, etc.,' Old Slav. *čarŭ* 'magic'; Skr. *kṛṇóti* from *kar* 'he makes,' from which also Skr. *kárman* 'the sacrifice' is derived. In both cases, *i.e.* in magic and in sacrifice, a 'doing' *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, a ceremonial action is intended.

In by far the greatest number of cases, however, 'to charm' is the same as to 'speak' or 'sing,' as is seen in the Greek *ἐπῳδός* 'magician,' 'charmer,' *ἐπῳδή* 'magic formula': *ἐπάδω* 'I sing to it'; O.H.G. *galstar* 'magic song,' *galâri*, *galstarâri*, 'magician': *galan*, *bigalan*; Old Slav. *bajati* 'fabulari,' 'incantare,' 'mederi,' Serv. *bajati* 'to charm,' Old Slav. *balija* 'magician': Gr. *φημί*, Lat. *fâri*; Lith. *vaĩdyti* 'to conjure,' 'charm': *vaĩdas* 'name,' and in many other examples (cf. Osthoff, 'Allerhand Zauber etymologisch beleuchtet,' in Bezzenberger's *Beitrage zur Kunde der indogerm. Sprachen*, xxiv. 109; and Schrader, *Reallexicon*, art. 'Zauber und Aberglaube'). Here also we have to do with a 'speaking' *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, a ceremonial, rhythmical speaking, in which *a priori* a definite magic power is latent.

Such magic acts or words occur frequently on the soil of the separate Aryan peoples, along with and mixed up with actions of worship in the proper sense of the term. In India he who wishes to possess deadly weapons sacrifices iron nails (cf. Oldenberg, *op. cit.* p. 369); in Greece he who wishes to conjure up an actual thunderstorm produces by the rolling of a waggon a noise similar to thunder (cf. O. Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol.* i. p. 820). Burchard of Worms tells of a custom prevalent in Germany (cf. J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythol.*[3] i. 560), according to which he who wishes rain causes a naked girl to be led to the river and there sprinkled with water. In Lithuania, if the people wish rainy weather, they turn towards the sun and sprinkle themselves with water at the time of the morning prayer (cf. Prætorius, p. 33), etc. We may call special attention to another rain-charm of this kind, which by comparison with the Indian and the Greek usage is seen to be primitive. In Greece the phrase *Ζεὺς ὕει* is used for 'it rains,' which, when traced back to an older stage of the language, can only mean 'The father (heaven) presses grapes' (Skr. *sunṓmi* 'I press,' *sóma* 'the pressed,' 'the soma drink'). It is also customary to charm the rain by an offering of honey, where the rain which drops on the trees and branches is likened to honey. Exactly corresponding to these ideas we find in India the belief that by letting the soma, which itself is called a son of the rain-god Parjanya, drip through the strainer, rain is enticed to fall. Thus the very fact that the man 'presses' the juice on the earth, incites or rather compels the god in heaven to 'press,' *i.e.* to cause the rain to fall (cf. Windisch, *Festgruss an Roth*, p. 140; Oldenberg, *op. cit.* p. 459; O. Gruppe, *op. cit.* p. 819). The *magic formula* plays a still more important part in the religious conceptions of the ancient Aryans, and at the lower stage everything is secured by its means, for which at a higher stage man turns to the gods with prayers and sacrifices. By its means wounds and sicknesses are healed, by its means women in labour are delivered of the fruit of their body (cf. *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Arzt' and 'Hebamme'), by its means the heavenly powers are enticed to partake of the food offered to them (see below, p. 41), by its means a man curses himself in case of perjury (see below, II. 5), by its means the darkness of the future is penetrated (cf. below, III. 1), and so on.

But it cannot be doubted that from the wilderness of these primeval beliefs, which from the standpoint of a higher conception are called 'superstition,' *superstitio* (survival[?]), but which were originally 'faith' itself, a higher form of divine worship was developed among the Aryans even in pre-historic times, in which real, if exceedingly primitive, sacrificial rites were employed.

The history of the language points at once to this, for the expressions for 'sacrifice,' 'to sacrifice,' 'sacrificial animal,' in the separate Aryan languages, extend for the greater part beyond the realm of magic, and belong to a higher class of words, whose fundamental meaning we are wont to express in our language by the term 'holy.'

Cf. Gr. *ἅγος* 'worship,' 'sacrifice' = Skr. *yájas* 'worship': Skr. *yaj*, Av. *yaz* 'to sacrifice,' 'to worship by sacrifice' (*ἄζομαι* 'to worship with religious fear'); Goth. *hunsl*, Old Nor., A.S. *hûsl* 'sacrifice' = Lith. *szwenta*s, Old Slav. *svętŭ*, Av. *spenta* 'holy'; Volsc. *esaristrom*, Umb. *esunu* 'sacrifice' = Gr. *ἱερός* 'holy'; Lat. *victima* 'sacrificial victim' = Goth. *weihs* 'holy,' *weiha* 'priest,' *weihan* 'to sanctify'; O.H.G. *zebar*, A.S. *tîfr*, Old Nor. *tafn* 'sacrificial victim' = Lat. *dapes* 'sacrificial meal,' etc.

We have the additional fact that, among all the Aryan peoples, Slavs and Lithuanians as well as Greeks and Indians, the existence of real sacrificial rites can be proved. It will be our task in the following section to give an account of these.

Among the Indians, Greeks, and Romans of historical times, when sacrifices were offered to the immortals, fire had to be kindled on the altar in order that the gifts might by its means reach the gods. Thus 'to sacrifice' in Greek (*θύω*, *θυσία*,

etc.; Lat. *fūmus* 'smoke') implies 'to cause to go up in smoke.' Quite another picture is offered, however, by the other Aryan peoples. To begin with, Herodotus (i. 132) tells of a much more simple and primitive kind of sacrifice in the case of the Persians, who, as we saw above, preserved with great faithfulness the original ideas with regard to the gods:

θυσίη δὲ τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι περὶ τοὺς εἰρημένους θεοὺς (sun, moon, sky, earth, fire, wind, water) ἥδε κατέστηκε. οὔτε βωμοὺς ποιεῦνται οὔτε πῦρ ἀνακαίουσι μέλλοντες θύειν. οὐ σπονδῇ χρέονται, οὐκὶ αὐλῷ, οὐ στέμμασι, οὐκὶ οὐλῇσι. τῶν δὲ ὡς ἑκάστῳ θύειν θέλει, ἐς χῶρον καθαρὸν ἀγαγὼν τὸ κτῆνος καλέει τὸν θεὸν ἐστεφανωμένος τὸν τιήρην μυρσίνῃ μάλιστα . . . ἐπεὰν δὲ διαμιστύλας κατὰ μέρεα τὸ ἱρήιον ἑψήσῃ τὰ κρέα, ὑποπάσας ποίην ὡς ἁπαλωτάτην, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ τρίφυλλον, ἐπὶ ταύτης ἔθηκε ὧν πάντα τὰ κρέα. διαθέντος δὲ αὐτοῦ μάγος ἀνὴρ παρεστεὼς ἐπαείδει θεογονίην, οἵην δὴ ἐκεῖνοι λέγουσι εἶναι τὴν ἐπαοιδήν. ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ μάγου οὐ σφι νόμος ἐστὶ θυσίας ποιέεσθαι. ἐπισχὼν δὲ ὀλίγον χρόνον ἀποφέρεται ὁ θύσας τὰ κρέα καὶ χρᾶται ὅτι μιν ὁ λόγος αἱρέει.

Thus this old Persian sacrificial custom did not know the use of fire in bearing the food to the gods. The flesh was laid on a specially prepared sacrificial litter, on which the gods were supposed to descend (Skr. *barhís*, Av. *baresman* 'sacrificial litter' = Old Pruss. *balsinis* 'cushion,' *pobalso* 'pillow,' Serv. *blazma* 'cushion,' Old Nor. *bolstr*, O. H. G. *bolstar* 'pillow'), and the god was allured, by means of an exorcism, to partake of the food. Herodotus (iv. 60) tells of a similar practice prevalent among the Scythians. The sacrificer threw the animal to the ground by means of a noose, and strangled it after calling on the god, οὔτε πῦρ ἀνακαύσας οὔτε καταρξάμενος οὔτ' ἐπισπείσας. The flesh of the strangled animal was boiled, just as was customary among the Persians. In this connexion the two Litu-Prussian sacrifices, which are described in Lasicius' book, *de Dus Samagitarum* (pp. 49 and 54), are of great interest. Both are harvest-offerings. At the first (related by A. Guagnini from the *Kronika Polska*, etc., of Math. Stryikowski, mentioned above), which took place at the end of October, the sacrificial animals were battered to death with cudgels by the priests and other worshippers, who all the time called on the god Zemiennik. Before the worshippers sat down to the feast, portions of each kind of food were thrown into every corner of the house with the words: '*Accipe o Zemiennik grato animo sacrificium atque lætus comede.*' The second (related by Menecius) was the sacrifice of a goat. The faithful were assembled in a barn. A he-goat was led in. The sacrificing priest, or 'wurschaite,' laid both hands on it, and called on all the gods in succession. Then, while a hymn was being sung, the goat was raised into the air and held there till the song was finished. Thereupon the priest slew the animal, sprinkled the blood, which had been caught in a dish, round about, and gave the flesh to the women to boil. Here, again, there is no trace of a burning of the victim. Finally, in the case of the Teutons also, regarding whose sacrificial customs we have, unfortunately, very scanty information, sacrificial fire seems to all appearance to have been unknown. The bodies of the victims or their heads (cf. Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 61) were in this case hung on sacred trees, a custom which, according to the report of the Arab Ibn Dūstah, prevailed among the heathen Russians of northern origin:

'The soothsayer takes the man or the animal, puts a noose round the neck, hangs the victim up on a tree, waits till it expires, and then says: "This is a sacrifice for the god"' (cf. Thomsen, *Der Ursprung des russischen Staates*, Gotha, 1879, p 27)

The flesh of the victim is boiled here too, as is seen from the Goth. *saujs*, 'sacrifice,' O.H.G. *siodan*, 'to boil.'

Moreover, as there is in the Veda no lack of evidence that 'in the sacrificial fire an innovation of an advanced sacrificial technique' was present (cf. Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda*, p. 343 ff.), we have good reasons for assuming that the thought that the gifts assigned to the god could be borne to him by means of the flame or the smoke was one which was as yet foreign to primitive Aryan times. In the earliest times the gifts were, on the contrary, spread out on the place of sacrifice itself, raised into the air or hung on trees, and the god *must come himself and partake of them on the spot.*

The worshipper refreshes his gods with the *food* and *drink* of which he himself partakes, in order thereby to make them strong and willing to carry out his ends. That this was the original sacrificial idea of the Aryan peoples follows most distinctly from the complete correspondence between ancient Aryan sacrifice and ancient Aryan food. The further back we penetrate into the past of the Aryan peoples, the more do we find that cattle-rearing predominated over agriculture, and that in consequence flesh foods and animal products outweighed vegetable foods (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Ackerbau,' 'Viehzucht,' and 'Nahrung'). The same thing is true of the sacrifices. In the reports quoted above we find only animal sacrifices referred to In the same way Tacitus (*Germania*, ch. IX.) mentions only *concessa animalia*. In reference to the Slavs, cf. Procopius, *de Bell. Got.* iii. 14: θεὸν μὲν γὰρ ἕνα τὸν τῆς ἀστραπῆς δημιουργὸν (*Perunŭ*) ἁπάντων κύριον μόνον αὐτὸν νομίζουσι εἶναι, καὶ **θύουσι αὐτῷ βόας τε καὶ ἱερεῖα ἅπαντα**, and also Helmold, *Chron. Slav.* i. 52: 'Conveniuntque viri et mulieres cum parvulis, *mactantque diis suis hostias de bobus et ovibus.*' Among the Lithuanians, as late as the beginning of the 16th cent., sacrifices of oxen and swine were offered. The very early acquaintance of the Aryan peoples with animal sacrifice is significantly witnessed to by the existence in their primitive vocabulary of exact designations of the outer and inner parts of the animal carcass, which could be obtained only in the course of sacrificial rites (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, art. 'Körperteile').

In the earliest times it was customary to sacrifice and eat, or eat and sacrifice, the flesh of the ox, the sheep, the goat, and, in Europe, the pig, *i.e.* the most ancient domestic animals of the Aryans. The sacrifice of the horse seems to have occupied a special place. As the horse did not belong to the oldest stock of Aryan domestic animals (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, art. 'Pferd'), perhaps other sacrificial ideas may have been influential in introducing this sacrifice, such as the wish to incorporate the qualities of the animal in the worshipper, or to render a special service to the god who was thought of in the form of a horse (cf. J. v. Negelein, *Das Pferd im arischen Altertum*, Königsberg, 1903). Fowl, game, and fish were excluded from the stated sacrifices, because they did not originally serve as food (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Viehzucht,' 'Jagd,' and 'Fisch, Fischfang'). In the oldest times, too, the use of salt was avoided, again for the simple reason that for purely animal food it was unnecessary (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Salz').

The sacrificial drink of primitive times was mead, the place of which was gradually taken in the north by beer, and in the south by wine. The customs connected with these drink-offerings in barbaric conditions, such as we must presuppose for primitive times, are again vividly portrayed by Menecius (Lasicius, c. 53) with regard to Lithuania:

'Die Georgii sacrificium faciunt *Pergrubrio*, qui florum, plantarum omniumque germinum deus creditur. Sacrificulus enim, quem Vurschaiten appellant, tenet dextra obbam cervisiæ plenam invocatoque demonii nomine decantat illius laudes. Tu, inquit, abigis hiemem, tu reduces amœnitatem veris, per te nemora et silvæ florent. Hac cantilena finita dentibus apprehendens obbam, ebibit cervisiam nulla adhibita manu ipsamque obbam ita mordicus epotam retro supra caput iacit. Quæ cum e terra sublata, iterum impleta est; omnes quotquot adsunt, ex ea bibunt ordine atque in laudem Pergrubrii hymnum canunt. Postea epulantur tota die et choreas ducunt.'

If, then, 'to sacrifice' means simply to refresh the gods with earthly food and drink, and if, as we have seen, these gifts were originally offered to the heavenly beings to be partaken of by the summoned recipients on the place of sacrifice without the use of fire, we cannot fail to see how closely this sacrificial rite resembles the entertaining of the dead described above, when food and drink were shaken or poured out into furrows or trenches (see above, p. 26). The explanation is thus by no means far-fetched that the feeding of the beings which were thought to be in the natural phenomena, the thunder, the storm, the fire, etc., is to be understood as a kind of deduction or transference from the cult of the dead, where the offering of food and drink is intelligible without any difficulty from the prevailing ideas regarding the further existence of the soul after death. In that case we should conceive of the course of development in the following way. There was a time when only the dead were supplied with food and drink, and when man sought to obtain influence over the powers of nature only by means of magic, as described above. But the more the thought of personification gained precedence over magic, the more did people begin to transfer the sacrificial customs usual in the service of the dead to the worship of the heavenly powers, and then the further change arose naturally from this state of affairs, viz. that the sacrificial gifts were spread *on* the ground instead of being buried *in* it.

Returning to the sacrifice itself, we reach one form of it which has not yet been considered—a form which with its gloomy aspect persists from primitive into historic times, viz. *human sacrifice* (cf., for the Greeks and Romans, E. V. Lasaulx, *Das Sühnopfer*, Würzburg, 1841; for the Celts, Teutons, Slavs, Lithuanians, J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[3], i. 38, V. Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen*[7], p. 531, Golther, *Germanische Mythologie*, p. 516, Mullenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, iv. 214 ff.; for the Indians, A. Weber, *Indische Streifen*, i. 54–89, and Oldenberg, *op. cit.* p. 363). This human sacrifice is to be found in various forms. Thus in the north of Europe we have the *sacrifice of victory*, *i.e.* the previously promised slaughter of prisoners at the altars of the gods. In the south and among the Gauls we have the *sacrifice of expiation*, *i.e.* the giving up of a human life for other lives that are forfeited or in danger. We find everywhere the *building sacrifice*, *i.e.* the conviction that the durability of a new building could be purchased only by a human life (cf. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, p. 284 ff. 'Die vergrabenen Menschen,' also *Germ.* xxxv. 211). It is difficult to discover the really fundamental idea in this sacrifice. To carry out the idea of the meat-offering, we might start with the supposition that cannibalism was once wide-spread among Aryan peoples, which undoubtedly is very fully attested for numerous non-Aryan peoples of Europe (cf. R. Andree, *Die Anthropophagie*, Leipzig, 1887, p. 2). In milder times a change in this sacrificial idea had taken place, in the sense that a human being was regarded as the best sacrifice that could be brought to the gods (cf. Procopius, *de Bell. Got.* ii. 15: *τῶν δὲ ἱερείων σφίσι τὸ κάλλιστον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὅπερ ἂν δοριάλωτον ποιήσαιντο πρῶτον*). Or we could think of a transference from the worship of the dead, in which, as we saw above (p. 21), it was usual to give men to the dead as servants and companions in death. From this, too (cf. below, II. 5), the *penal-sacrifice* (execution), which has not been mentioned above, may have taken its rise. Ideas connected with magic may also have been operative in the *building sacrifice*, as, *e.g.*, the wish to transfer human potencies into the building. Whatever the real explanation may have been, we must in any case regard human sacrifice as a primitive institution in the history of Aryan religion, and not a comparatively late innovation originating from the East, as is done by O. Gruppe (*Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumsw.* lxxxv. 10).

We have already become acquainted with the incantation or magic formula which entices the gods to the feast, and seen it to be a necessary accompaniment of sacrifice. This is perhaps the oldest form of prayer. In any case the different terms for prayer point to a close connexion with sacrifice (cf. Gr. *εὔχομαι* = Lat. *vovco*; Gr. *λιτή*, *λίσσομαι* = Lat. *litare*; Lith. *maldà* 'prayer' = Goth. *blôtan* 'to sacrifice,' from **mlâd* [the last according to R. Much]). 'To pray' is to request a benefit while promising or offering a sacrifice: *do ut des*. The idea of *thanks* appears in the Aryan languages at a late date compared with the idea of petition (cf. *Reallexicon*, pp. 598, 605), and thank-offerings are almost entirely unknown both in the Vedic worship and in the Homeric poems. Those divinities, however, who were called up by means of those ancient incantations and prayers must at a very primitive stage of development have been designated simply as 'the called.' This we learned above (p. 16) to have been the real signification of the Teutonic 'God,' which then, as is easily enough understood, passed over into the masculine gender under the influence of expressions which were more personally conceived.

(*b*) THE PRIESTS.—If the practice of magic and the incantation preceded sacrifice and prayer, the magician must have been the forerunner of the priest. This development is clearly presented to us in the history of the language. The most important designation of the priest in the language of ancient India is *brahmán* (masc.), while *bráhman* (neut.) means 'devotion.' The opinion used to be generally held that the fundamental signification of this class of words was to be found in the sphere of religion (according to Bohtlingk-Roth, *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*, v. 135, 'the devotion which appears as intensity and depth of feeling, and aspires towards the gods'), but in recent times it has become more and more recognized that *bráhman* originally means 'the incantation,' and *brahmán* in consequence 'he who knows incantations' (cf. M. Haug, 'Über die ursprungliche Bedeutung des Wortes brahma,' in *Sitzungsb. d. kgl. bayer. Ak. d. W. zu Munchen*, 1868, ii. p. 80 ff.; R. Pischel, *GGA*, 1894, p. 420; H. Osthoff, in Bezzenberger's *Beitrage*, xxiv. 113 ff.). Now, in the view of the present writer and of the majority of investigators, the Lat. *flâmen*, whose formation (cf. *carmen*, *agmen*) points with certainty to an originally neuter idea (priesthood), corresponds exactly to the Skr. *bráhma*, so that for this word also there follows a similar evolution of meanings, 'incantation,' 'community of those who know incantations,' 'individuals acquainted with incantations' (= priests).*

It is accordingly not to be wondered at that from the Aryan root *vid*—*void*—'to know,' frequent designations of the magician and the priest are derived, since both are regarded as the 'knowers' (viz. of all kinds of magic) *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. Here must be mentioned, on the one hand, the O.H.G. *wizzago*, A.S. *witega* 'prophet,' O.N. *vitki* 'magician,' *vitka* 'witchery,' O.H.G. *wizzôn* 'prophecy,' and Old Russian *vĕdunŭ* 'magician,' *vĕdĭ* 'witchcraft,' *vĕdĭma* 'witch,' *vĕdĭstvo* 'witchery'; but, on the other hand, there is also to be placed alongside of these the designation of the ancient Gallic priestly caste of druids, Ir. *dráu*,

* Even those scholars who do not believe in the etymological relationship of *brâhman* and *flamen* (cf. *e.g.* Walde, *Lat. etymol. Worterbuch*) admit the two facts which are of importance for the history of religion, viz. (1) that *brâhman* originally signified 'magic formula,' and (2) that *flâmen* was originally a neuter conception.

which, being derived from **dru-vids* (according to Thurneysen, in Holder, *Altkeltischer Sprachschatz*), means exactly 'the very knowing ones.' But the personalities which in this connexion are most important for the history of Aryan religion are those that are frequently mentioned in the Litu-Prussian sources, and designated with all kinds of variations of their name* as *waidewut*, *waidelotte*, *waideler*, *waidler* (Old Prus. *waist* 'to know,' *waidimai* 'we know,' *waidleimai* 'we perform pagan religious rites').

They were also named *žynỹs*: Lith. *žinoti* 'to know' (*žýnauti* 'to charm'), or the *monininks*: Lith. *moniu* 'I understand,' or the *maldininks*: Lith. *maldà*, 'prayer' (cf. especially Matth. Prætorius, *Deliciæ Prussicæ oder Preussische Schaubühne*, p. 41 ff.). These 'waidlers' may be described both as magicians and as priests. They were servants of the chief-priest, who was called in Old Prussian *kriwe*, of whom we shall speak further below. The separate gods seem each to have had special 'waidlers': *naruttes* (cf. Gr. Νηρεύς above, p. 35) was the name given to the waidler of the water-god; *szweronei* (Old Pruss. *swîrins*, Lith. *žvierìs* 'wild animal') were 'the waidlers who worshipped and protected the sacred animals in the woods, especially elks, owls,' etc.; and *medzwarei* (Old Pruss. *median* 'forest,' Lith. *mẽdis* 'tree') were 'the servants of the sacred woods.' Every imaginable charm to divine the future (cf. below, III. 2) was in their hands. Now they are for the most part beggars and shepherds, although 'there are still well-to-do farmers who practise these arts of the waidler.' Prætorius (p. 48) mentions a fact regarding these waidlers which is especially important for the history of the priesthood:

'An old peasant of Strigkeim said to me that, many hundred years before, one of his race had been a chief-priest here in Prussia. He was called *Kryue Kriwulô*, and was believed to possess all the gifts which we find singly among the waidlers now called *Maldininks* (see above). *The gifts of the waidler are, they say, hereditary; if the gift ceases in one family, it becomes extinct*'

This *hereditary transmission*, in certain families or clans, of the existing magic formulas, sacrifices, and prayers, which we have here attested, may be regarded by us *as a common feature of the gradually evolving priesthood among the Aryan peoples.*

Sacred clans like the *Vasiṣṭhas*, the *Viśvamitras*, the *Bharadvâjas*, and others are well known to us from the Rigveda as the forerunners of the later priestly castes, and there is no lack of traces that these priestly families, who, according to the tradition, represent essentially the same cult, had in earlier times possessed *special cults* and *special rites* (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 373). In Greece, too, we find numerous sacred clans with special cults, the Εὐμολπίδαι, the Ἐτεοβουτάδαι, the Ἠσυχίδαι, the Κηρυκίδαι, Κροντίδαι, Κηρίδαι, Ποιμενίδαι, etc. The priesthood was a joint-possession in these families, and descended from the father to the son and grandson (cf. P. Stengel, *Die griechischen Kultusaltertümer*). By the institution of a sanctuary (which does not occur in Vedic India) such a priesthood becomes *local*, and in this way forms the *ἱερόν*, to which in Homer the existence of the *ἱερεύς* is united. Most nearly akin to the Homeric priest was the Norwegian 'gode' (Old Nor. *goði*, Goth. *gudja* 'priest'; cf. Goth. *Guþ*, 'God,' and see above, pp. 16, 42). They could break up the temple belonging to them and migrate elsewhere. Among them, too, the priestly office was inherited through several generations (cf. Golther, *Germanische Mythologie*, p. 615; and J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[3], i. 83). Finally, in *Rome* also there are indications of a condition in which not State colleges but particular families attended to the performance of special cults. This comes out most unambiguously in the case of the *fratres arvales* (see art. ARVAL BROTHERS), for at the time when this designation was coined *frater* can have indicated nothing else than the actual degree of relationship. The legend, too, explanatory of the name, reports that Acca Larentia, the wife of Faustulus, had twelve sons, along with whom she sacrificed once every year for the fruitfulness of the fields. We have, therefore, a real brotherhood (Gr. *φρήτρη*, Slav. *bratstvo*; cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Sippe') before us. Their peculiar hereditary magic poem was that song, luckily still extant, which was united to a dance, and by the combined invocation of the spirits of the dead (*Enos lases iuvate*) and a real god (*Enos Marmor iuvato*) bears the stamp of remote antiquity. The designation, too, of the Luperci, the priests of Faunus, as *Quinctiales* and *Fabiani* points to their tribal origin (cf. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 340, note 3, p. 411). The Salii, or 'leapers,' were without doubt a sacred family of this kind. Their magical secret was the leaping procession which accompanied their obscure songs, for both dance and solemn procession (O.H.G. *pigang*—even in modern German we have the phrase 'ein Fest begehen') belong to the oldest form of divine worship among the Aryan peoples (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Tanz').

On the ground of the facts which have been mentioned, we may assume that the 'learned in magic formulas,' whose existence in primitive times is attested by the equation, Skr. *brâhman* = Lat. *flâmen*, were primarily to be found in special families which were hereditarily distinguished by the gift of witchcraft. Further, seeing that it follows from the oldest sacrificial customs described above (p. 41) that at their celebration, in the majority of cases, persons designated as magicians, priests, or soothsayers assisted, we may consider it not unlikely that even in primitive times members of such sacred families were called upon by other families, and in particular by the head of the clan, to assist at sacrifices for the clan. In the case of sacrifices of the most ancient worship, we must sharply distinguish between the offerings dedicated to the souls of ancestors and those on behalf of the 'heavenly ones.' The former could, of course, be offered only by relatives (cf. above, p. 28 f.); in the case of the latter there was nothing against the assistance of a stranger who was particularly well acquainted with the incantations that would entice the gods. Here we have one of the deepest roots of the Aryan priesthood.

In the later history of the priesthood we shall call attention to only one more point, viz. the ever increasing closeness of the *union of law and religion* (cf. below, II. 5). This lent to the priestly dignity, here to a greater and there to a less extent, a new, and in part extraordinary, significance; and it may well be said that this is what really made the magician a priest. The more clearly the thought came to consciousness that the gods were the protectors of the moral and social principles attained in the long struggle of civilization, the greater must the influence of the authentic interpreters of the divine will have become.

In *India*, even before Vedic times, the hereditary dignity of the Brahmans had been developed from those families of primitive times that were expert in magic. From their midst there arose the domestic priest (*purohita*), who was indispensable to the king for preparing sacrifices, for 'the gods do not eat the food of a king who has no purohita' (*Aitarcya Brâhmana*, viii. 24). Under their supervision, too, the royal *administration of justice* was carried on, and in their conception of *dharma*, 'the

* It may be conjectured that the form *waidewut*, **waidwut* = Gr. εἰδώς **Fεϝδϝως*, *Fεϝδότος*, 'the knowing one,' is the original one.

fixed' (=Lat. *firmus*) law, custom, and religion lie together as yet undifferentiated. In *Rome*, in like manner, the *Pontifices*, 'the bridge-builders' (also without doubt originally a sacred family like the *fratres arvales*, perhaps endowed with a special magic charm for providing bridges and roads), were at the same time the guardians both of the *ius civile* and of the *ius sacrum* (*pontifex* according to Bezzenberger, in Kuhn's *Zeitschr.* xlii., from Umbr. *punti*, 'piatio, lustratio' from **kvento*=Av. *spenta*, Old Slav. *svętŭ*, Lith. *szweñtas* 'sacred'). The former of these had, after a long process of evolution and not without leaving clear traces of its original condition (cf. Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 324 ff.), separated itself from the latter. In *Gaul* also we find the administration of justice entirely in the hands of the Druids, who, however, in the time of Cæsar were not a real caste, or no longer a caste, but increased their numbers by securing and training novices:

'Fere de omnibus controversiis publicis privatisque constituunt, et si quod est admissum facinus, si cædes facta, si de hereditate, de finibus controversia est, idem decernunt, præmia pœnasque constituunt; si qui aut privatus aut populus eorum decreto non stetit, sacrificiis interdicunt. Hæc pœna apud eos est gravissima' (vi. 13).

In conscious contrast to these conditions, Cæsar (vi. 21) relates of the *Teutons*: 'Neque druides habent, qui rebus divinis præsint, neque sacrificiis student.' 'They have no Druids to preside over divine worship, nor do they lay any special stress on sacrifice' (cf. 'agriculturæ non student,' vi. 22, which cannot mean 'they do *not* engage in agriculture,' seeing that Cæsar himself attests that it was practised in a primitive form). The conclusion is that a distinctly marked priestly office which would attract the attention of a foreigner cannot at that time have been present among the Teutons. This, of course, does not exclude the existence of separate families expert in magic, as, according to our assumption above, was the case in primitive times. On the other hand, we find in the report of Tacitus a strong and influential priesthood already existing, particularly developed on the legal side (cf. also O.H.G. Old Sax. Fries. *êwart* and *êsago* 'priest,' lit. 'keeper or guardian of the law' and 'proclaimer of laws').

The priest is the man who calls for silence in the popular assembly (Tac. *Germ.*, ch. 11: 'silentium per sacerdotes, quibus tum et coercendi ius est, imperatur'); and while even Cæsar, vi. 23, reports: 'Cum bellum civitas aut illatum defendit aut infert, magistratus, qui ei bello præsint, ut vitæ necisque habeant potestatem deliguntur,' so that thus all power of punishment might be assigned to the *civil* authorities, we are told in Tacitus, ch. 7: 'Ceterum neque animadvertere neque vincire, ne verberare quidem *nisi sacerdotibus* permissum, non quasi in pœnam nec ducis iussu, sed velut deo imperante, quem adesse bellantibus credunt.' In addition, the priest carries the war standards out of the sacred groves (ch. 7), interprets the lot on public occasions, and accompanies, together with the king or prince, the sacred car in which horses are yoked (ch. 10). The priest of Nerthus (ch. 40) and the priest in the grove of Alcis among the Nahanarvali (ch. 43) seem to have presided at local sanctuaries.

The same extreme expansion of priestly power as is found in the west among the Druids of Gaul is to be met with again in the extreme east of Europe among the ancient Prussians.

Even Peter of Dusburg (*Script. rerum Pruss.* i. 53) was able to report: 'Fuit autem in medio nationis huius perversæ, scilicet in Nadrowia, locus quidam dictus Romow, trahens nomen suum a Roma (!), in quo habitabat quidam dictus *Criwe* [perhaps Lith. *keras* 'magic,' *kerĕti* 'to charm'; a connexion with Lith. *kriwas* 'crooked,' from which we have *kriwûle* 'the sign of the dignity of the Criwe,' seems semasiologically impossible], quem colebant pro papa, quia sicut dominus papa regit universalem ecclesiam fidelium, ita ad istius nutum seu mandatum non solum gentes prædictæ sed et Lethowini et aliæ nationes Lyvoniæ terræ regebantur. Tantæ fuit auctoritatis, quod non solum ipse vel aliquis de sanguine suo, verum etiam nuntius cum baculo suo vel alio signo noto transiens terminos infidelium prædictorum a regibus [by these are meant the small heads of clans who were to be found even in primitive Aryan times, cf. *Reallexicon*, art. "König"] et nobilibus et communi populo in magna reverentia haberetur. *Fovebat etiam prout in lege veteri iugem ignem*' (cf. also the passage quoted above, p. 34, from Jerome of Prague, and the more detailed information given by Matth. Prætorius, *op. cit.* p. 38 ff.).

What we have here, then, is another of those families expert in magic (according to Prætorius, *op. cit.* p. 40, the blood relations of the Criwe were called *Krywaitcn*), whose special service was devoted to a perennial fire, and whose chief on account of this cult—according to Jerome, magic oracles were practised by means of fire in the case of sickness—had attained to the position of influence described above.

(*c*) THE TEMPLES.—In primitive religions all over the world it is a recognized phenomenon that all objects which rise above the surface of the ground, in particular, *stones*, *stumps*, and *trees*, are regarded as possessing a divine *anima*, and are made the objects of a fetish worship (cf. E. B. Tylor, ii. 161 ff., 215 ff.). Among the Aryan peoples also this low stage of religious life can be proved. The most important testimonies for it will be brought together, without as yet asking the question whether the objects of worship of which they treat were really conceived of everywhere as real *incorporations* of the deity, or only as *representations* of it.

(*a*) *Stone-worship.*—With regard to ancient Greece in general, we have the following report of Pausanias, vii. 22. 4:

ἑστήκασι δὲ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ ἀγάλματος τετράγωνοι λίθοι τριάκοντα μάλιστα τὸν ἀριθμόν· τούτους σέβουσιν οἱ Φαρεῖς (Pharæ, a town of Achaia), ἑκάστῳ θεοῦ τινος ὄνομα ἐπιλέγοντες, τὰ δὲ ἔτι παλαιότερα καὶ τοῖσι πᾶσι Ἕλλησι τιμὰς θεῶν ἀντὶ ἀγαλμάτων ἄργοι λίθοι.

The same author mentions, in detail, unhewn stones in place of the figure of the god in the fane of Herakles at Ilyettus, and in that of Eros at Thespiæ; but with regard to the cult of the Graces at Orchomenos, it is said (ix. 38. 1): τὰς μὲν δὴ πέτρας σέβουσί τε μάλιστα καὶ τῷ Ἐτεοκλεῖ αὐτὰς πεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φασίν. Thus the worship of rough stones was not confined to the oldest periods of Greek history, but continued through the whole time of paganism. For Socrates, in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, knows:

τοὺς μὲν οὐθ' ἱερὸν οὔτε βωμὸν οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν θείων οὐδὲν τιμᾶν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ λίθους καὶ ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα καὶ θηρία σέβεσθαι (*i.e.* they were atheists and fetish-worshippers). Cf., further, Overbeck, 'Das Kultusobjekt bei den Griechen in seinen ältesten Gestaltungen' in *Berichte d. kgl. sächs. Ges. d. Wissenschaften zu Leipzig*, phil.-hist. Kl., 1864, ii. p. 121 ff.; and also the account above, p. 37, of the oldest cult of Hermes.

On *Italian* soil, perhaps the cult of Juppiter Feretrius or Lapis may be mentioned in this connexion. He was worshipped, in a chapel founded for him by Romulus, under the symbol of a fire-stone (*silex*), although in this case other explanations are still possible. In *Germany*, Burchard of Worms demands: '*Lapides* quoque quos in ruinosis locis et silvestribus, dæmonum ludificationibus decepti, venerantur, ubi et vota vovent et deferunt, funditus effodiantur, atque in tali loco proiciantur, ubi nunquam a cultoribus suis venerari possint,' and among the *Lithuanians*, as we have already seen above, the Jesuit Rostowski found the worship of a massive stone Akmo (Lith. *akmů* 'stone') as late as the 18th century.

(*β*) *Worship of stumps.*—More frequently than unhewn stones, however, we find in ancient *Greece* shapeless piles, boards, lumps of wood, and posts (ξύλον οὐκ εἰργασμένον, ἄγαλμα ξύλινον ἄμορφον, πρέμνον αὐτοφυές, δόρυ, σανίς) mentioned as objects of worship. The testimonies for this also have been fully gathered by Overbeck* (*op. cit.*). The *Italian* history of religion offers as proof of the primitive worship of stumps the Lat. *delubrum*, 'sanctuary,' lit. *delubrum lignum*, 'a piece of wood freed from the bark' (*liber*, **luber*, Russ. *lubŭ*). Regarding it, Festus (ed. O. Müller, p. 73) reports: 'delubrum dicebant fustem delibratum, hoc est decorticatum,

* The author has been unable to examine the work of M. W. de Visser, *Die nicht menschengestalt. Götter der Griechen* (Leyden, 1903).

quem venerebantur pro deo' (cf. also Bötticher, *Baumkultus der Hellenen*, and Overbeck, p. 149. Wissowa [*op. cit.* p. 400], on the other hand, gives another etymology, which was also wide-spread in antiquity, viz. *delubrum*, from *deluere* 'to wash away'; hence, 'place of washing away'). Among the *Teutons* also the Old Saxon 'Irmensul' was simply an upright tree-stump, regarding which we have in *Transl. S. Alexandri* (Pertz, *Mon. Germ.* ii. 676) the following account: 'Frondosis arboribus fontibusque venerationem exhibebant: *truncumque quoque ligni non parvæ magnitudinis* in altum erectum sub divo colebant, patria eum lingua *Irminsul* appellantes, quod Latine dicitur universalis columna' (cf. also W. Mannhardt, *Wald- und Feldkulte*, i. 304). The Scandinavian-Russian 'Waragers' are described by the Arab Ibn Fosslan (ed. Frahn). He tells how the people offered their reverence and sacrifices before a huge upright block of wood, which in this case had something resembling a human face. In the *Slavonic* languages the most frequent expressions for idols or idol-temples go back almost entirely to fundamental meanings, such as 'stump,' 'post,' 'picture,' 'statue' (cf. Miklosich, 'Die christliche Terminologie der slav. Sprachen,' *Denkschrift der Wiener Ak. d. W.* xxiv. 36 ff.). Is it not also possible that the Russian expressions for 'magician' and 'to charm,' *koldúnŭ*, *koldováti*, are connected with Russ. *kolóda*, 'tree-stump'?* With regard to *India*, it is natural to mention in this connexion the so-called 'sacrificial post' (*yûpa*) to which the sacrificial animal was bound, but which was also made an object of worship, seeing that it was addressed as 'Lord of the wood' (*vánaspati*), smeared with oil, and bound with plaited bands of grass (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 256). It is also worthy of note that the conception *post* or *stake* (cf. Skr. *sthûṇâ*, Avesta *stûna* =Gr. στήλη, O.H.G. *stollo* from **st(h)el-nâ*, and Skr. *svâru*, 'sacrificial post'=A.S. *swer*, 'stake') can be proved by means of two equivalents to be Aryan.

(γ) *Tree-worship.*—Of the exceedingly numerous evidences of tree-worship prevalent among the European branches of the Aryan race, only a few characteristic examples can be brought forward here. Further details will appear later in our investigation. In *Greece* we must, in the first place, mention the cult of Ζεὺς φηγωναῖος in the storm-moved Dodona, from whose sacred oak (ἐκ δρυὸς ὑψικόμοιο) the voice of the god rang forth proclaiming oracles, and who was served by a special priestly caste, the Σελλοί (=Lat. *Salii*), who slept on the ground with unwashed feet (*Il.* xvi. 234 ff.). In Mycenæan Greece also the worship of trees and stone-pillars was wide-spread (cf., regarding it, A. J. Evans, 'Mycenean Tree and Pillar Cult,' *JHS* xxi. 99 ff.), without making it necessary to think of influences from Oriental religions. The Phrygians, too, who migrated from Europe to Asia, worshipped a Βαγαῖος (probably=φηγωναῖος, cf. Kretschmer, p. 198). In Rome there stood on the Capitoline an oak sacred to the herdsmen.

Cf. Livy, i. 10: 'Spolia ducis hostium cæsi suspensa . . . ferculo gerens (Romulus) in Capitolium ascendit, ibique ea cum ad *quercum pastoribus sacram* deposuisset, simul cum dono designavit Jovis fines . . . hæc templi est origo, quod primum omnium Romæ sacratum est.' In addition, Festus (ed. O. Muller, p. 87) states: 'Fagutal sacellum Jovis, in quo fuit fagus arbor, quæ Jovis sacra habebatur.'

We know also of numerous sacred groves in Greece as well as in Italy. In the latter country it was 'the deities of ancient origin,' such as *Robigus*, *Anna Perenna*, *Camenæ*, etc., that were worshipped in them (cf. Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 401). The traces of tree-worship continue even more significantly in the richly wooded northern parts of the continent from the Amber coast to the Atlantic Ocean. With regard to the Lithuanians, we may refer to a few sentences of the report which a monk Jerome, who in the years 1409-1418 was active as a missionary in Lower Lithuania, sent to the papal secretary, Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini, and which is to be found in the work of the latter, entitled *Europa* (*S. Æneæ Sylvii Europa*), c. xxvi.:

'Postremo alios populos adiit (Jerome), qui silvas dæmonibus consecratas venerabantur et inter alias unam cultu digniorem putavere. . . . Ventum erat ad medium nemoris, ubi quercum vetustissimam et ante omnes arbores religione sacram et quam potissime sedem esse putabant percutere aliquamdiu nullus præsumpsit. . . . Erant in ea regione plures silvæ pari religione sacræ. Ad quas dum Hieronymus amputandas pergit, mulierum ingens numerus plorans atque eiulans Vitoldum (a Lithuanian duke) adit, sacrum lucum successum queritur et domum dei ademptam in qua divinam opem petere consuessent; inde pluvias, inde soles obtinuisse; nescire iam quo in loco deum quærant, cui domicilium abstulerint. Esse aliquos minores lucos, in quels du coli soleant, eos quoque delere Hieronymum velle.'

An altogether special worship was assigned to the sacred oak of Perkúnas, in whose rustling the worshipper believed himself to hear, as at Dodona, the voice of the god announcing the future (cf. below, III. 2). Other sacred trees were the birch (*biržùlis*), the hazel (*lazdona*), the cherry tree (*kirnis*), the maple (*klewẽlis*), and the mountain ash (*szermuksznis*). An especial reverence was assigned to trees that had grown together, *rumbuta*, *romove*, from which the centre of the Criwe mentioned above had its name. Undoubtedly the Teutons of the first Christian centuries stood at this stage of development, in spite of the idealistic interpretation which Tacitus (*Germania*, ch. 9) gives to their tree-cult:

'Ceterum nec cohibere parietibus deos, neque in ullam humani oris speciem adsimulare ex magnitudine cælestium arbitrantur: lucos ac nemora consecrant, deorumque nominibus adpellant secretum illud, quod sola reverentia vident.'

Of particular sacred trees, oaks before all others are mentioned, one of which Boniface felled near Geismar. The worship of a pear tree in Auxerre in heathen times is also well attested (J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythol.*[3] i. 6 f.), although this report leads us to *Celtic* territory; for here, too, the tree-cult was fully developed. There was nothing more sacred to the Druid than the oak and the mistletoe that grew on it (Pliny, *HN* xvi. 249), and we hear of sacred groves in Gaul as well as in Britain (cf. on them H. Munro Chadwick, 'The Oak and the Thunder-god,' *JAI* xxx. 22 ff.).

In glancing over the evidences of Aryan stone-, stump- and tree-worship collected here, we could make no greater mistake than to suppose that the religious ideas which find expression in this worship are all to be placed at the same historical stage. It cannot be doubted that in many, in fact even in the majority of cases, the object of worship is merely the symbol under which a deity was worshipped that existed outside of the object, and was only occasionally present in it. But, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that the traces are clearly to be perceived of a time when people actually worshipped, as is the case among the rudest savages, the very stone, post, or tree, as a god, since they looked on it as the body of a divine *anima*. This becomes very evident in the remains of the Greek stone-cult and in the Lithuanian tree-worship. When Theophrastus (*Charact.* c. 17), in his day, tells us of people who, when passing stones smeared with oil at the crossways, did not fail to pour oil on them out of their oil-phials, to fall on their knees, and to present the most solemn salutations, this proceeding is to be judged in the same way as when 'in the Society Islands, rude logs or fragments of basalt

* At the present day this primitive stump-worship is perhaps to be seen on Teutonic and Slavonic soil in the remarkable 'Yule or Christmas log,' regarding which see R. Meringer, *Indogermanische Forschungen*, xvi. 151 ff., xviii. 277, xix. 444. Cf. here also on Lat. *delubrum*.

columns, clothed in native cloth and anointed with oil, received adoration and sacrifice as divinely powerful by virtue of the "Atua" or deity which had filled them' (Tylor, ii. 162).

In Lithuania the oak was, it is true, sacred to Perkúnas; but evidently, like the other sacred trees mentioned above, it enjoyed independent worship, as follows from the report of Rostowski: 'Arbores item evulsæ stirpitus, tum quercus, quibus mares tum tiliæ quibus feminæ pullastra pro frugibus et incolumitate rei domesticæ quasi diis faciebant' (Bruckner, *Archiv für slav. Phil.* ix. 35), and other reports, according to which sick persons, observing remarkable customs, clamber up into the boughs of a sacred oak. 'Thereafter they bind each his offering on the branch of the tree, and seriously believe that they will be healed thereby. Often it happens that such a branch is quite full of garters, Lithuanian women's veils, girdles, knives, and such-like articles, which are tied to it from top to bottom. Several sacrifice money also, which they lay upon the ground before the tree' (cf. Usener-Solmsen, *Gotternamen*, p. 87).

Accordingly, we may (like Frazer, *GB*[2]) conceive of the process of evolution of these ideas in the following way. There was among the Aryan peoples a distant period in which stones, stumps, and trees were worshipped as actual fetishes. When within the limits of this racial division—and certainly as early as primitive Aryan times (a point where the present writer differs from Frazer)—the cult of the 'heavenly ones' came more and more to the front, connexions began to be thought of between these 'heavenly ones' and the objects of worship just mentioned, especially with the sacred tree and its shoot, the stump or post, which were now regarded only as symbols and occasional dwelling-places of the 'heavenly ones.' Along with these ideas the old conceptions continued to operate further among the lower classes.

This connexion is most clearly exemplified in the relationship of the *thunder-god* to the *oak*. Zeus and the oak of Dodona, Juppiter Feretrius and the oak worshipped by the herdsmen on the Capitoline, Perkúnas and *Aužúlas* ('oak'), we have already noted; but we are also told of the Celts by Maximus Tyrius: Κελτοὶ σέβουσι Δία, ἀγαλμα δὲ Διὸς Κελτικὸν ὑψηλὴ δρῦς. Nothing can be more easily understood than this connexion, when we call to mind how the lightning flashes of the thunder-god come down with an especial fondness on the king of the forest; and it is difficult to conceive why H. Munro Chadwick, in his otherwise excellent essay, 'The Oak and the Thunder-god,' mentioned above, deduces such a far-fetched reason for this phenomenon as a supposed dwelling of primitive man below the oak. But the other gods are also preferably thought of as dwelling in trees and forests. In Greece we have, besides a Ζεὺς ἐνδενδρος, a Διόνυσος ἐνδενδρος, an Ἑλένη δενδρῖτις, an Ἄρτεμις κεδρεάτις, etc. Among the Teutons were found, as well as a *silva Herculis* (=Donar) *sacra* (*Ann.* ii. 12), a *castum nemus* of Nerthus (*Germania*, c. 40), and a *lucus Baduhennæ* (*Ann.* iv. 73). Among the Lithuanians, as we have seen above, the rain- and sun-gods were worshipped in sacred groves.

In this assimilation of the cult of the 'heavenly ones' and a primitive stone-, stump- and tree-fetishism we have secured, once for all, the foundation for the explanation of the two most outstanding objects of heathen worship in historical times—the *temple* and the *image*. The tree or grove in which the deity is worshipped develops into the stone temple; the stone or wooden stump, which serves as a symbol of the deity, assumes human features and becomes the image of the god.

This process can be very well followed in the Greek word for 'temple,' Lesb. ναῦος, Dor. νᾶός, Ion. νηός, Att. νεώς (*ναϝο-), which originally indicated not the *whole* temple, but only the inmost room, where the figure of the god stood (τὸ ἄδυτον, σηκός). This primitive Greek **nāvo-* is, in the conviction of the present writer, identical with the root found beside it, **nāvo-*, **nāu* (Skr. *nāva*, *nāvā́*, *nāú* = Gr. ναῦς), 'ship,' 'tree,' so that both words come together in the meaning 'tree-trunk' (cf. *e.g.* Skr. *dāru* 'wood' and 'boat,' Old Saxon *stamm*, 'tree-trunk' and 'ship,' and many other similar changes of meaning).

This probable combination is, the present writer thinks, raised to a certainty when we consider that in Greece, in the most ancient times, the figures of the gods were actually placed *in*, *below*, or *on* trees (πρέμνῳ ἐνὶ πτελέης, φηγοῦ ὑπὸ πρέμνῳ, ἐν κέδρῳ μεγάλῃ); and the name of Juppiter of Dodona in the primitive cult, Ζεὺς Νάως (*nāvio-s*), finds its natural interpretation if we conceive him as 'the one in the tree-trunk.'* The ἀργὸς λίθος and the ξόανον οὐκ εἰργασμένον gradually change into the βρέτας (= Skr. *mūrta* 'figure'?), the image or figure of the god. It is not far-fetched to find in the images of Hermes, in which only the face and the extended penis of the god are represented, a stage on this path of development.

The words of J. Grimm (*Deutsche Mythol.*[3] i. 59) are true of the Teutons. 'Temple is also at the same time wood. What we think of as a walled and built house, dissolves, the farther back we go, into the conception of a sacred place which has not been touched by human hand, but is hedged in and made peaceful by trees that have grown up of their own accord.' The conceptions *grove* and *temple* accordingly run to a large extent together in the Teutonic languages.

This is true of the series Goth. *alhs*, A.S. *ealh*, Old Saxon *alah* 'temple,' which corresponds to the Old Lith. *elkas* 'grove,' Lett. *elks* 'idol,' perhaps also to the Gr. ἄλσος (**alkjos*?) 'grove,' 'sacred grove,' which, however, is compared by others with Old Slav. *lěsŭ* 'forest.' The same also holds of O.H.G. *haruc*, A.S. *hearh*, *hearg* (O.H.G. *harugâri* 'priest'), which are explained in glosses by *lucus*, *nemus*, and also by *sacellum*, *simulacrum*, *fanum*, as well as of the A.S. *bearu*, 'grove' (O.H.G. *parawâri* 'priest'), which belongs to the common Slavonic root *borŭ*, 'pine,' 'pine-forest' (cf. *Zutibure*, i.e. *sventi borŭ* 'sacred pine forest' in the lands of Merseburg according to Thietmar: *lucus Z. dictus ab accolis ut Deus ab omnibus honoratus*). To this class of expressions are added—for the later temples built of wood or stone, whose first traces are to be found probably in the *templum* of the *Tanfana*, which, according to Tacitus (*Ann.* i. 51), was level with the ground—new designations borrowed from the human dwelling-house, such as O.H.G. *hof*, *halla*, *sal*, *petapûr*, *petahûs*, *plôzhûs*, *plôstarhûs*, Goth. *gudhûs*, etc. Figures of the gods, too, which are designated as ξόανα, 'carved works,' but regarding whose more definite nature we unfortunately can discover nothing, are repeatedly mentioned from the 4th century (cf. Golther, *Germ. Myth.* p. 604).

At the same time in which we have among the Teutons *only* sacred trees and groves as places for the worship of the gods, the common Celtic name for 'sanctuary,' *nemeton* (δρυνέμετον, *Medionemeton*, *Tasinimeton*, *Vernemeton*: Skr. *nāmas* 'worship') without doubt indicates the stone temple built by human hands. Here too, however, the original meaning is seen from the Old Saxon *Indiculus superstitionum*, in which mention is made 'de sacris silvarum, quæ nimidas (=Gall. *nemeton*) vocant.' On the other hand, the neighbours of the Teutons on the North-East, the Prussians and the Lithuanians, may be regarded as having continued in their templeless condition up to the date of their conversion to Christianity. At the same time we hear incidentally of idols, which they carved for themselves. Thus a heathen fisher (cf. Prætorius, *op. cit.* p. 27) had made a wind-god (*Wējopatis*) out of bark, which had two faces on the head, one in front and one behind, both of them with gaping mouths. The same state of affairs is found among the *Eastern* Slavs, and Miklosich (*Die Christliche Terminologie*, p. 67) rightly remarks that there is no ground whatever for the assumption that the first preachers of Christianity found here buildings devoted to religious service (for Russian idols, cf. above, p. 45). The *Western* Slavs, on the other hand, were acquainted with

* The usual explanation of the Greek νεώς, 'temple,' derives this word from ναίω, 'I dwell,' and means the same as 'dwelling-place.' Against this view the chief objection is that designations of the temple according to the analogy of the human dwelling-place are all of a late date, and Gr. νεώς in the sense 'human dwelling-place' never occurs. Meringer (*Indogermanische Forschungen*, xviii. 277) now agrees with the explanation given by the present writer.

real temples, with statues of the gods, and with idols, *e.g.* the three-headed Triglav ('Three-heads'), as we learn from the descriptions of Thietmar of Merseburg (*Monum. Germ.* v. 812) and Otto of Bamberg (*M. G. Script.*, ed. Pertz, iii. 32). Here too, however, we see how deeply the ancient tree-worship was rooted in the affections of the people from the fact, related by Otto of Bamberg, that they calmly allowed four temples to be torn down, and even helped in the work, but raised objections when an attack was made on the large wide-spreading oak standing near, 'quam plebs simplex numinis alicuius inhabitatione sacram æstimans magna veneratione colebat.'

But the places of old Aryan worship are not yet exhausted in the foregoing discussion. While in the case of tree-worship it is to a certain extent supposed that the 'heavenly ones' descend from their airy abodes to the earth, an attempt was made by mankind in another direction to raise themselves to heaven. The *Persians*, we saw above (p. 33), climbed to the top of the highest mountain when they wished to offer a sacrifice to Heaven. The same was the case in Greece. Pausanias mentions the tops of mountains as the seats of famous cults in many localities. Especially sacred, however, was the territory of the Lycæan Zeus on the highest peak of Arcadia, where tree-cult and highplace-cult were combined. In *Italy*, too, the worship of the god of the sky was particularly connected with the high places; and with regard to most Roman hills the existence of ancient cults of Juppiter can be proved (Wissowa, p. 102). Of the Teutons, Agathias, 28. 4, reports: ἱλάσκονται καὶ . . . λόφους καὶ φάραγγας, καὶ τούτοις ὥσπερ θσια δρῶντες.

(*d*) THE FEASTS.—In the equation, Gr. ἑορτή, Ion. ὁρτή 'feast' = Skr. *vratá* 'decree,' 'divine service' (cf. *e.g.* *mahâvrata*, like M.H.G. *hôchzît*, lit. 'great feast'), there is to be found an originally related designation for the conception 'feast,' whose fundamental meaning was something like 'appointed time.' It is rather difficult to decide what these *certi dies* may have been among the Aryans, and without doubt a considerable time will have to pass before the comparative heortology of the Aryan peoples, the problems of which have hardly been taken in hand yet, will be in a position to give a decisive answer to this question. We saw above (I. 3 *b*) that the life of the Aryans even in primitive times was interwoven with a considerable number of special and general feasts for the dead; and in particular, in the wintry half of the year, the observance of a great festival of the dead, agreeing in many details, can be proved among almost all the Aryan peoples. Thus in India the third of the three annual festivals, which took place in the colder season of the year, was connected with a great sacrifice for the dead. Among the Lithuanians we discovered a general feast for the dead in the beginning of November. In Rome the *Larentalia* were held on the 23rd of December, the *Ferâlia* in February. Among the Teutons the dead seem to have been remembered with many varied customs at 'Yuletide' (cf. E. Mogk in Paul's *Grundriss*[2], iii. 391), a name which itself may be connected with the darkness of the realms of the dead, seeing that 'Yule' (A.S. *géol, geohhol*) probably goes back to a primitive Teutonic word **jeqa* or **jeqha* = Gr. **ζέφος* in *ζέφυρος, ζόφος*, 'west,' 'darkness,' 'under world.' Most remarkable in this connexion, too, is a wide-spread Slavonic name for the Christmas festival (Russ. *koročunŭ* 'Christ-evening,' Bulg. *kračun*, etc. 'Christmas'), which in White Russian signifies 'unexpected premature death in early years,' and 'an evil spirit that shortens life.' In regard to this development in meaning, Miklosich (*Etymol. Wörterbuch der slav. Sprachen*, p. 130) correctly remarks, 'perhaps *Kračun* was a feast of the dead.'*

The significance of these feasts of the dead, which in White Russia serve even to-day among the people as the basis for the reckoning of dates, is especially made manifest on Italian soil, as can be seen even in the language. Here it is impossible to separate the Lat. *fêriæ, fêsiæ* 'feast,' 'festival,' from the above-mentioned *fêrâlia* from **dhvês-âlia*, 'feast of the dead,' so that *fêsiæ* from **dhvêsiæ*, at first 'feast of the dead,' had come to mean 'feast' in general; and correspondingly *festus* from **dhvestus* and *fesnus* (in Umb. and Osc. *fesna, sc. domus*, 'temple') from **dhves-nus*, at first denoted 'applied to souls,' then 'sacred,' 'holy.'

But were there even in primitive times regular festivals in honour of the 'heavenly ones,' and is there a possibility of extracting a common primitive kernel from the endless mass of names and dates referring to the worship of the gods among the separate peoples? It has long been customary to find this in the festivals of the so-called four points of the year; and in particular the winter and the summer solstice were regarded as the most ancient feast dates of the Aryan peoples. We shall do well briefly to call to mind what we know regarding the oldest divisions of time among the Aryans, in order to make a judgment on these views possible. The *moon* was the oldest measurer of time for the Aryan peoples. According to its course natural months were distinguished. A division of the yearly course of the sun into these had not yet taken place, for which reason there were no names for the separate months in the vocabulary of the primitive Aryan language. Of course, some have sought to find a pre-historic attempt to equalize the moon-year with the sun-year in the apparent coincidence of our 'twelfth,' the time from Dec. 25 to Jan. 6, with the twelve sacred nights of the Brâhmana-literature (354 days of the moon-year + 12 days = 366 of the civil sun-year) (cf. regarding it especially A. Weber, *Indische Streifen*, xvii. 224, and *SBAW*, phil.-hist. Kl. 1898, xxxvii. 2 ff.). The present writer, however, believes that it has been made very probable by A. Tille (*Yule and Christmas, their place in the Germanic Year*, London, 1899) that these twelfths, famed in legend among the Teutonic peoples, do not go back to the remotest heathendom, but are only a copy of the Christian Dodecameron, the sacred time between Christmas and Epiphany, the new and the old day for calling to mind the Divinity of Christ. Along with these purely unattached lunar months a distinction of seasons of the year was made in primitive times, originally only winter (Skr. *hêmantá* = Gr. χειμών, Lat. *hiems*, etc.) and summer (Avesta *ham* = O.H.G. *sumar*, etc.), then besides these, at an early date, a short transition period of spring (Skr. *vasantá* = Gr. ἔαρ, Lat. *ver*, etc.). Their combination was called a 'past' (**vetos* : Skr. *vatsara*, Gr. ἔτος, Lat. *vetus*, etc.); but in reckoning it was customary to calculate according to single periods of the year, especially according to winters. The Aryan year was thus a purely natural year (cf. *Reallexikon*, artt. 'Jahr,' 'Jahreszeiten,' and 'Zeitteilung'). All more exact methods of dividing the time, based on a knowledge of the course of the sun, were derived by the Indians as well as by the Aryan peoples of Europe from *Babylon*. Here, too, the distinction between the four points of the year must have arisen at a very early date, and in a long migratory progress have passed over to the Greeks (cf. Herodotus, ii. 109) and Romans, and from them to the north

* A Russian name for the whole period of Christmas is *kudesd*, lit. 'magic,' which shows with what sort of heathen ideas this time of the year was associated.

of Europe. The designations of the equinoxes in the Teutonic languages (O.H.G. *ëbennaht*, A.S. *efennight*, Old Nor. *jafndœgri*) are undoubtedly only translations of the Lat. *æquinoctium* (Gr. *ἰσημερίαι*); and for the idea of the solstice separate expressions have been formed among the different Teutonic peoples (O.H.G. *sunwende*, *sungiht*, *sunstede*, *sommertag*, A.S. *sunnstede*, Old Nor. *sólhvarf*) which proclaim their dependence on the Lat. *solstitium* by the fact that they, like it, are used only for the *summer solstice*; but for the *winter solstice* (Lat. *brûma*, i.e. *brevissima*; perhaps its festival was *Angerona*, cf. Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 194) *absolutely no old Teutonic expressions are to be found.* Finally, it is impossible to understand what significance the fixing of the longest or the shortest day could have had, presupposing that it was at all possible in primitive conditions of culture*; for Procopius (*de Bell. Got.* ii. 15) relates of the inhabitants of Thule that, after they had been 35 days without the light of the sun, they sent messengers to the highest peaks of the mountains to spy out if the sun would not soon return, and then, when they had announced its speedy return, they celebrated the greatest of their festivals. Such a narrative is easily enough understood of the most northerly stretches, but would be utterly unintelligible among men who had the sun always before their eyes (cf. A. Tille, *Yule and Christmas*, 'Solstices and Equinoxes').

But although these solstice festivals, as such, among the Aryan peoples, seem to be by no means very primitive, it cannot be said that the manifest agreement of the customs and usages relating to them rests entirely on later transference and migration. If we turn our attention to the rites connected with the summer solstice or St. John's day (St. Ivan's day among the Slavs), we see that a characteristic feature of them is the intimate connexion in which the two elements of *fire* and *water* occur. It is everywhere customary to kindle bonfires, to dance round them, or to leap over them, generally in pairs. Almost everywhere we find water in some form or other along with the fire. It may be that the festive company bathe either before or after the kindling of the fire, it may be that fire-wheels are cast into the stream and there extinguished, or it may be in some other way.† In this connexion it seems most easy to understand an old Indian solstice custom which took place at the *Mahâvrata* festival, *i.e.* (according to Hillebrandt, *Romanische Forschungen*, v. 299) at the festival of the summer solstice (at a later date Mahâvrata is the winter solstice). Accompanied by the beating of drums, women carrying jars filled with water march in procession three times round a fire from right to left and then again from left to right, singing a song, which closes with the refrain, 'That is mead.' After going round the fire for the last time, they pour the water into the fire and thus extinguish it.

This remarkable combination of the two elements so highly honoured by the Aryans, fire and water, is entirely inexplicable when we start from an original solstice festival. On the other hand, it can be very easily interpreted if, in the usage of the Mahâvrata festival, which, moreover, was held in honour not of a sun-god but of Indra, the giver of refreshing rain, we see with Hillebrandt (*op. cit.*) and Oldenberg (*Die Religion des Veda*, pp. 448, 507) an ancient *rain-charm*, *i.e.* a magical device for procuring rain (cf. above, p. 40). Then the conjecture is inevitable, that in the rites described as existing mainly among Indians, Slavs, and Teutons, we have to recognize the vestiges of an ancient Aryan festival dedicated to fire and water, and held in summer, in which, by means of extinguishing the fire on the earth, the worshipper sought to cause the heavens to send down streams of fertilizing moisture on the meadows and fields. We have the additional fact that among all the Aryan peoples inhabiting Middle Europe the time near the Feast of St. John constitutes a kind of dividing period in the rainfall, *i.e.* the rain that fell *before* St. John's Day was believed to be especially valuable, and was prayed for from heaven by priest and congregation, while, on the other hand, the rain that fell *after* St. John's Day was useless, and even brought harm. Regarding St. John's Day itself, different opinions prevail. The peasants of the Russian province of Archangel say, 'The rain on St. John's Day is better than a mountain of gold'; other peoples hold an exactly opposite view (cf., for details on the subject, Alexis Yermoloff, *Der landwirtschaftliche Volkskalender*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 296 ff.). Thus from this side also we seem to obtain confirmation of our conjecture that in the customs described above we have traces of a midsummer feast which was celebrated without special regard to the longest day. Among other things, it may have belonged to the solemn rites of such a festival to seek, for the last time in the summer, to obtain moisture for the meadows and fields by means of a rain-charm. This view, which we have adopted with regard to the original significance of fire and water, does not in any way militate against the idea expressed by Mannhardt (*Der Baumkultus*, pp. 497, 516, 521). He regards the midsummer fires as sun-charms, since fire is supposed to represent the light and heat of the summer sun, to which the growing vegetation must be exposed.

Remains of a second Aryan festival, *a spring-feast*, are perhaps to be found in the worship of the Teutonic *Ôstara* and the Indian *Ushas*, which had its special place in the ritual at the beginning of the year at the *Prâtaranuvâka* of the *Agnishtoma* sacrifice, which was observed with great solemnity in spring (cf. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, ii. 26 ff.). It seems that this festival is chiefly in view in the idea, proved to be Aryan by L. v. Schröder ('Lihgo, Refrain der lettischen Sonnwendlieder,' in the *Mitteil. d. anthrop. Gesell. in Wien*, xxxii.), that the sun at its rising, particularly on certain days, dances, jumps, shakes itself, and plays.

From such indications as these we must seek further information concerning the times of the old Aryan festivals. Since the moon, as we have already noticed, was the measurer of time in primitive times, the Aryan *certi dies* must have been connected with the chief phases of the moon, new moon and full moon. In fact, in India the sacrifices of the new and the full moon belong to the regular and most ancient offerings to the gods (cf. Oldenberg, *op. cit.* p. 441 ff., and A. Hillebrandt, *Das altindische Neu- und Vollmondsopfer*, Jena,

* Even in civilized Greece it seems to have been difficult. Cf. Eustath. on *Od.* xv. 402: ἕτεροι δέ φασι σπήλαιον εἶναι ἐκεῖ, δι' οὗ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου ὡς εἰκὸς ἐσημειοῦντο τροπάς, δι' ὃ καὶ ἡλίου διὰ τοῦτο σπήλαιον ἔλεγον, καὶ τοῦτο δηλοῦσθαι ἐν τῷ ὕθι τροπαὶ ἡλίου. Cf. also Lebègue, *Recherches sur Délos*, Paris, 1876, p. 876: 'Le matin vers le mot d'avril un rayon de soleil glissant contre la montagne pénètre dans la caverne et la remplit un instant tout entière,' etc. (Communication of C. Weniger in Weimar).

† Cf. the following description from the south of Russia in Glazunov, *Russian Folksongs* (Russ.), St. Petersburg, 1894, p. 81: 'In particular, young men and women bathe themselves, then they put on wreaths of field-maple with fragrant herbs, gird themselves with artemisia, and gather before sunset on an elevated place, always overlooking a river. They set up two figures: one a human-like image, the other a piece of wood covered with female attire, ribbons, and garlands. The wood is generally maple. Then they kindle heaps of straw, walk in a circle round it, sing songs and, taking the figures in their hands, spring in pairs (every lad with his lass) through the fire. When they have all sprung through, then they throw the figures, of which the male is called *Kupalo* (*kupâla* "St. John's day," cf. *kupatî* "to bathe"), the female *Marena* ("maddei"), into the water. Afterwards they also throw their wreaths into the stream.'

1880). But in Greece also the feast-days were connected with definite phases of the moon, particularly the full moon (cf. A. Mommsen, *Heortologie*, p. 2); and among the Teutons the 'certi dies, cum aut inchoatur luna aut impletur' (Tac. *Germania*, ch. 11), on which the popular assemblies took place, and which were regarded as the 'agendis rebus auspicatissimum initium,' were certainly identical with the 'certi dies' (ch. 9) on which the people, *e.g.*, 'Mercurio humanis quoque hostiis litare fas habent.' In Rome all the Ides (*idus* = Ir. *ésce* 'luna') were regarded as feast-days.

Religious ceremonies must in primitive times have accompanied the ordinary family feasts as well. These come most directly to the front in the Aryan *marriage ceremonial*, in which again fire and water enjoy common worship. In India the bridegroom, after taking the bride by the hand, leads her three times round the fire on the hearth, on which a sacrifice of roasted corn is offered. Previously a new jug filled with water is placed on the floor, and it must remain on the right side of the bridal pair as they march round the fire. But liberal use is also made at other times of water, which is solemnly brought from the spring. The bride is bathed in it, or the young pair are sprinkled with it. In Rome, marriage is even designated a union 'aqua et igni.'

Romulus married the captured Sabine women, κατὰ τοὺς πατρίους ἑκάστης ἐθισμοὺς ἐπὶ κοινωνίᾳ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος ἐγγυῶν τοὺς γάμους (Dion. ii. 30), and Varro (Serv. *ad Æn.* iv. 167) reports: '*Aqua et igni* mariti uxores accipiebant. Unde hodieque et faces prælucent et aqua petita de puro fonte per felicissimum puerum aliquem aut puellam interest nuptiis, de qua nubentibus solebant pedes lavari.'

Here, too, a solemn procession round the altar from left to right took place, at which a boy carried the marriage-torch and the marriage-water, drawn from a pure spring; then in the house of the bride's father a *far*-loaf (hence *confarreatio*) was sacrificed in the fire (on the Greek λουτροφόρος, cf. above, p. 22). The same customs which we find in the east and south of the Aryan world exist also in the north of Europe.

Thus Menecius reports of the Lithuanians: 'Cum nuptiæ celebrantur, sponsa *ter ducitur circa focum*, deinde ibidem in sella collocatur, super quam sedenti *pedes lavantur aqua* qua lectus nuptialis, tota supellex domestica et invitati ad nuptias hospites consperguntur.'

Also among the Slavs, just as on St. Ivan's day, baths and dancing through or over a fire belong to the fixed marriage rites, and finally, in ancient Germany the bride was led three times round the hearth in the house of the bridegroom after she had stepped over a vessel of water (cf. the proofs of this fact in *Reallexicon*, art. 'Heirat,' p. 356 ff.). Perhaps in this case the union of fire and water (heat and moisture) may be regarded as the symbol under which husband and wife were united to each other for the purpose of producing a numerous progeny.

For further details regarding the common religious customs connected with the naming of the child, the first cutting of his hair, the feast of puberty, etc., see Winternitz, 'Was wissen wir von den Indogermanen?' (*Beilage zur Munchner AZ*, 1903, No. 258, p. 293), and E. Samter, *Familienfeste der Griechen und Romer*, Berlin, 1901.

5. The relation of the 'heavenly ones' to the morality of mankind.—In all the higher stages of heathen religion we find the gods represented as the guardians of all written and unwritten law, and as the strict avengers of all human transgressions of the same. Here we shall seek to discuss the question how far back in the history of the Aryan peoples this conception goes. It is obvious that legal or moral ordinances could be thought of as under the protection of some higher being only after these ordinances had been evolved and come to consciousness in the human society itself. Accordingly, it will be necessary in entering upon this discussion to direct our attention to the law and custom of primitive Aryan times as they are shown to us by the science of Aryan antiquities. What we at the present day designate as 'punishment' and 'crime' resolve themselves, the further back we go into the past of the Aryan peoples, in a great number of cases into the conceptions of 'fine' and 'act liable to a fine.' The Lat. *pœna* is the judicial penalty prescribed as a corrective provision against the transgression of the law, but the Gr. ποινή, from which *pœna* is borrowed, is, as we shall see below, the old Aryan expression for 'fine.' In the same way the Lat. *condemnare* is used of every legal condemnation, but the root-word *damnum* originally signifies nothing else than 'that which is given (as a fine)' (**da-mno-m*; *dare*). The German word *Schuld*, which in all the Teutonic languages in which it occurs designates the guilt of the accused in a law-court as well as guilt before the gods, as is evident from its being derived from Goth. *skal*, *skulun*, *skula*, *skulds*, meant nothing else than *Du sollst*, sc. *bezahlen* ('Thou shalt pay'). The Lat. *flāgitium*, 'crime,' 'infamous deed,' which is derived from **flageto*, (cf. *flagito*, 'I demand') probably = Ir. *dligeð* (**dligeto-*), 'duty,' 'law,' 'right,' Ir. *dligim*, 'I have a claim to something,' Welsh *dleu*, etc., 'to be guilty,' Bret. *dle*, Goth. *dulgs*, Old Slav. *dlŭgŭ*, 'guilt,' undoubtedly goes back in the same way to a fundamental meaning 'liability,' *i.e.* to a fine, and so on. The reason of this phenomenon lies in the fact that in primitive Aryan times a great number of actions which we regard as crimes at the present day, and which are punishable by the State—murder and manslaughter, theft and robbery, rape and adultery, etc.—were not punished in any way by the community, *i.e.* in primitive relations, *by the tribe and its chief* (Skr. *rāj* = Lat. *rex*, Ir. *rí*), but the avenging of them was left to the self-help of the individual families which were united in the tribe. The exercise of this self-help took the form of *blood-revenge* (cf. above, p. 28), which even in the earliest times could be expiated by a fine of cattle. The Aryan expression for blood-revenge itself and its compensation by means of the money payment is contained in the equivalents: Avesta *kaēnā* = Gr. ποινή: Skr. *chi*, Gr. τίνομαι = 'to punish,' 'to avenge,' 'to submit to pay a fine.' When at a later date the power of the State to inflict punishment deprived the families of the self-help and the exacting of the fine, the latter idea was changed into the conception of the penalty imposed by the State, and the action which incurred payment of a fine became a crime against the laws of the State (cf. *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Blutrache,' 'Strafe,' and 'Verbrechen').

Now such actions as were to be followed by blood-revenge or to be expiated by a fine were not in primitive times regarded as transgressions of the decrees of any supernatural beings whatsoever. This is seen to be the case from the fact that, in the earliest historical times, *e.g.* in the ethics of the Homeric poets, those very crimes which according to our ideas are most heinous, murder and robbery, were neither regarded as defiling mankind nor condemned by the moral consciousness of the people. For what other explanation can be given of the fact that Theoclymenus (*Od.* xv. 256 ff.), who had slain a man in Argos and had taken flight, was received by Telemachus without any purification being regarded as necessary, as was usual at a later date; or that Ulysses himself (*Od.* xiii. 256 ff.) was not afraid of the abhorrence of his listener, when, although in an imaginary story, he represented himself as a man who treacherously lay in ambush and killed a fellow-countryman in Crete? Just as little did Telemachus (*Od.* iii. 70 ff.) take

offence when he was asked on his arrival if he was perhaps a robber who was roving over the sea and at hazard of his own life bringing woe on alien men (cf., further, in *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Mord' and 'Raub'). Thus, it seems that actions such as those mentioned above had nothing in them offensive to the conscience of the people if they were carried out openly or with violence. On the other hand, theft and adultery may have been regarded at an earlier date as morally reprehensible merely on account of their secrecy—a view which finds expression in the fact that, so far as we can see, the killing of the adulterer or the thief, caught in the act, did not as a rule call forth the blood-revenge of his family, *i.e.* to use the form of expression of a later date, remained unpunished (cf. *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Diebstahl' and 'Ehebruch').

Under the circumstances described above, it may seem remarkable that in the vocabulary of the original language there was nevertheless *one* expression for the notion of sin and crime, in which the idea of a shortcoming before gods and men seems to have been operative from the beginning: Skr. *á'gas* = Gr. ἄγος (*ἀνάγας* = *ἀναγής*, *i.e.* 'without *á'gas*'—ἄγος). But we shall see that the circumstances connected with this expression are very peculiar. If we examine the oldest use of the Greek word (with regard to that of the Indian one, we can unfortunately deduce very little), we find that it is used by the tragedians (cf. *Reallexicon*, p. 905) with reference to *four* different actions, namely, high treason, regicide, parricide, and carelessness with regard to the duty of interment of a relative. An ἄγος, then, which is best translated by 'abomination,' was committed on the one hand by the man who was guilty of a hostile act against the tribe and against its chief, the king, and on the other hand by the man who violated the duties resting upon him in virtue of his family or tribal connexion. Here, too, there can be no doubt as to who the deities were that were insulted thereby. In Æschylus (*Septem contra Thebas*, 1017) we are told of Polynices: ἄγος δὲ καὶ θανὼν κεκτήσεται | θεῶν πατρῴων οὓς ἀτιμάσας ὅδε | στράτευμ' ἐπακτὸν ἐμβαλὼν ἥρει πόλιν, *i.e.* he who led the army against the city was in life an abomination to the θεοὶ πατρῷοι, and—as unburied—would be the same in death. But these θεοὶ πατρῷοι (cf. the discussion of the name in Caland, *Totenverehrung*, p. 69 f.) were—at least originally—*not* the 'heavenly ones' or the gods related to them, therefore not Zeus, Apollo, Athene, etc., but rather the *souls of the ancestors honoured as divine*, the heroes of the tribe or the family, to whom on the mainland of Greece even in later times a rich worship was assigned (cf. E. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 167 ff.). We saw (above, p. 28) that the foundation pillars of the social organization in primitive Aryan times rested on *ancestor-worship*, and it is an almost obvious conclusion that the souls of the worshipped ancestors were thought of as watching with jealous exactness over the keeping of the old institutions in the family and in the tribe (cf. above, p. 23). All those actions which merited praise rather than blame, when committed against one who did not belong to the clan, were regarded when perpetrated against a member of the family as ἄγος, which challenged the vengeance of the spirits of the progenitors who presided over the family. The old Roman conditions speak very plainly in this connexion: 'In regis Romuli et Tatii legibus hæc est: "si parentem puer verberit, ast olle plorassit parens, puer divis parentum sacer estod" id est clamarit. adicitur: "si nurus [sc. verberit parentem], sacra divis parentum estod" in Servi Tulli' (acc. to Th. Mommsen in C. G. Bruns, *Fontes iuris Romani antiqui*[6], Freiburg, 1883, p. 8). Thus, then, if a son beats his father or a daughter-in-law her father-in-law, they are said to be doomed to the *divis parentum*, the θεοῖς πατρῴοις, the souls of the ancestors, *i.e.* to death. How much more must this have been the case with the *paricida*, the 'kin-murderer' (**pâro-* from **pâso-* = Gr. πηός), *i.e.* the man who had killed a member of the clan; and Brunnenmeister (*Das Tötungsverbrechen im altrömischen Recht* p. 171) has undoubtedly good ground for describing the *deo* (or better still the *divis parentum*) *necari* as the legal consequence of the *paricidium*. These conditions doubtless also gave rise to the Latin expression *supplicium*, 'capital punishment,' really, however, the 'appeasing' (*sub-placare*), sc. *divorum parentum*. As the spirits of the ancestors had power over the family, so in the same way would they also have controlled the tribe even in primitive times, and their wrath would have been aroused by everything which was directed against the tribe and its leader, the king. Punishment by death, then, by means of stoning, the only punishment of primitive times (cf. above, p. 42), which was decreed and immediately executed by the popular assembly, which represented the tribe, can best be conceived of as a *supplicium*, *i.e.* an act of expiation of the spirits who rule over the tribe (cf. *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Opfer,' 'Verbrechen,' 'Strafe,' and 'Volksversammlung').

It is therefore evident that the oldest combination of law, custom, and religion is to be found in the *worship of the dead*, who from the remotest antiquity were looked upon as the guardians of the order prevailing in the family and the tribe (Skr. *svadhâ* 'propriety,' 'customary condition' = Gr. ἔθος, 'habit,' 'custom,' 'usage,' ἦθος, 'use and wont,' 'habitual stopping-place,' and (perhaps) Goth. *sidus*, O. H. G. *situ*, 'custom'). The 'heavenly ones' have originally nothing whatever to do with this conception; they are entirely beyond the realm of good or ill ('jenseits von Gut und Böse'). For if what is stated in detail above is correct, that the deities designated by the equivalents Skr. *devá*, Lat. *deus*, etc., were nothing else than 'special gods' of the sky and the natural phenomena connected with it, who exerted an influence only within the spheres to which they owed their conceptual origin, it is obvious that mankind could have recourse to them only in matters which lay within these special spheres. In this way a man may have sacrificed to the thunder that it might spare his own head and strike the head of the enemy, or he may have prayed to the fire to light up and to scare away the night-monsters and destroy the fields of the enemy, but nothing more. It is no accident that, even in the hymns of the Rigveda, the gods are much more frequently represented as strong, large, and powerful than as endowed with any moral qualities (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 284). But the more the 'heavenly ones' and the gods connected with them developed into distinctive and many-sided *personalities*, the more were they also invested with a moral life, seeing that, on the one hand, with the evolution of the family and the tribe into the city and the State, they took over the rôle of guardian from the souls of the ancestors, and, on the other hand, appeared as the bearers and protectors of *new* moral ideas, which were gradually coming to the front in human society. Thus the past belongs to the spirits of the ancestors, and the future to the 'heavenly ones.' It will be of advantage to seek to apprehend this important process of evolution in the history of *two* moral duties which received comparatively late recognition—the duty of truth and the duty of hospitality.

(1) *Truth.*—The Aryan name for this idea is contained in the two originally connected equivalents, Skr. *satyá* = Goth. *sunjis*, and Lat. *vērus* = O. H. G. *wâr*, Old Ir. *fír*, both roots signifying the 'actually existing' (*satyá*: *sán*, 'existing,' Lat. *verus* from **ves-ro-s*: Goth. *visan*, 'to be,' 'to exist'). The oath serves the purpose of strengthening this 'actually existing'; and

the farther back we go in point of time, the more important is the part played by the oath; just as, even at the present day, the uneducated more frequently than the educated regard it as necessary to strengthen their words by means of an oath. The existence of the oath in primitive Aryan times is placed beyond the reach of doubt by the series of words: Skr. *am*, Gr. ὄμνυμι, Ital. *omn.* (cf. Aufrecht, *Rhein. Museum*, xl. 160, and Bucheler, *Lex Ital.* p. 18; cf. also the words, Old Slav. *rota* 'oath,' = Armen. *erdnum* 'swear,' and Irish *óeth* = Goth. *aiþ*). The most ancient oath on Aryan soil (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Eid') was simply a *curse*, which a man declared against himself in case of false swearing (thus Skr. *śapátha*, 'curse,' 'oath', Old Slav. *klęti sę*, lit. 'to curse oneself' = 'to swear,' Germ. *schwören*). In swearing, a man touched himself or some other object (thus Ir. *tong*, 'swear,' = Lat. *tango*, 'I touch,' and Old Slav. *prisęga*, 'oath,' lit. 'touching'), with the idea that the object touched would bring destruction or be exposed to destruction if he swore falsely. In contrast to this, the oaths of the Greeks and Romans manifest, even in the oldest historical times, a more elevated character; for among both these peoples, leaving out of account a few survivals of the oldest state of affairs, the gods, and in particular Zeus-Juppiter, were invoked both in order to be present as witnesses of the curse pronounced, and to carry it out in the case of perjury. Thus we are brought from the realm of magic to the sway of religion; the 'heavenly ones'—particularly Zeus, the god of the bright, all-seeing sky of day—have become the bearers and the guardians of the concept of truth.

(2) *Hospitality.*—The primitive Aryans, like all other primitive races, regarded the stranger as a man without rights, who could be killed or robbed with impunity. In apparently irreconcilable contradiction to this idea, which in its last ramifications was finally vanquished only by the new conception of life brought in by Christianity, there stands the custom of *hospitality*, which can be proved to have existed among all the Aryan peoples, even among Teutons, Slavs, and Lithuanians, as early as the beginning of historical tradition (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Gastfreundschaft'); and the present writer, in opposition to his previous opinion, thinks it may be regarded as belonging to the primitive Aryans. How is it possible to regard a person as an outlaw, and yet at the same time give him a cordial reception at one's own fireside? In answer to this question, R. v. Ihering, in an essay, 'Die Gastfreundschaft im Altertum' (*Deutsche Rundschau*, 1886–87, vol. iii. April–June, 1887), and the present writer in his book, *Handelsgeschichte und Warenkunde*, i., Jena, 1886, p. 4 ff., have simultaneously, and independently of each other, pointed to the *exchange of gifts*, which is everywhere inseparably connected with the custom of hospitality, and expressed the view that in it is to be found the origin of hospitality, without which, in these primitive conditions, commercial intercourse would have been impossible. This opinion is everywhere confirmed by the facts of ethnology, which show that among many uncivilized peoples trade is nothing else than an exchange of gifts, and a hospitable reception is extended to the trader in spite of the bloodthirsty hatred of strangers 'The Angami-Nagas, in the mountainous regions of Assam, are divided into numerous communities, who live in constant feud; they are zealous head-hunters. But, none the less, the Angami trader of any village whatsoever finds in every other at least *one* house where he receives food and shelter, and is in safety from sudden murderous desires' (Ratzel, *Volkerkunde*[2], i. 570 ff.). G. Klemm (*Kulturgeschichte*, iv. 310) also reports as follows of the South Sea Islanders: 'As we saw above, besides the salutation a special gift is also essential to the sign of hospitality. This gift is regarded, when it is received, as being, in a kind of way, a continuation and a confirmation of the salutation. It consists of fruits, mats, and such-like articles, and forms to some extent the foundation of intercourse on the basis of barter and trade.' Similar conditions may also be assumed for primitive Aryan times, in which the existence of a primitive trade by barter can be etymologically demonstrated (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Handel'); and in the series of words, Lat. *hostis*, Goth. *gasts*, Old Slav. *gostĭ*, this twofold conception of enemy and guest lies clearly before us (cf. Winternitz, *op. cit.* p. 339). But, in order to become a 'guest,' the stranger must be formally received into a native family group. He thereby becomes himself a relative, as is expressed, *e.g.*, in the Lith. *svẽczias*, 'guest,' from **svetjas* = Gr. ἕτης from **svetâ*, 'relative'; the father of the family, on the other hand, into which he enters, becomes the *hospes*, *i.e.* **hosti-pets* 'lord and protector of the stranger,' and thereby at the same time takes over the responsibility for the personal safety of the stranger. This relation is still clearly described in the Anglo-Saxon legislation (cf. Roeder, 'Die Familie bei d. Angelsachsen,' *Studien zur eng. Philol.* iv. 83, note 1); and that is what is meant when Mauricius, *Strateg.* xi. 5, reports of the Slavs: εἰσὶ δὲ τοῖς ἐπιξενουμένοις αὐτοῖς ἥπιοι, καὶ φιλοφρονούμενοι αὐτοὺς διασώζουσιν ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, οὗ ἂν δέωνται, ὡς εἴγε δι' ἀμέλειαν τοῦ ὑποδεχομένου συμβῇ τὸν ξένον βλαβῆναι, πόλεμον κινεῖ κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τοῦτον παραβέμενος, σέβας ἡγούμενος τὴν τοῦ ξένου ἐκδίκησιν, *i.e.* he feels himself bound to take blood-revenge, just as if he were a relative. Thus the 'guest,' by means of the protection of a family and the θεοὶ πατρῷοι which guard it, is rendered inviolable. Now, the more the intercourse between tribes is extended, and the more they all learn to look up to Zeus, the great father of gods and men, the more does he also take over the task of protecting the stranger who is already, in a certain sense, sacred, and so Ζεὺς ξένιος takes his rise. That this is a comparatively late process is expressed by this very epithet, which appears very seldom in the Homeric language, in comparison with the countless number of attributes referring to the physical or natural powers of the god (cf. above, p. 84).

Not only did the 'heavenly ones' become the guardians of moral ordinances which were present in human society from the earliest times or had arisen at a later date, but there were evolved from their cult moral ideas previously unknown. This side of the relation between the gods and morality can be illustrated from the history of the idea of chastity.

That there was anything of the nature of this idea in primitive Aryan times must, in view of ascertained facts, be regarded as well-nigh impossible. Unlimited sexual intercourse with concubines and slaves besides his wife was allowed to the husband. The wife was, it is true, bound to conjugal faithfulness on pain of death; but the circumstance that the husband, in case of his own sexual impotence, could hand her over to a 'helper in generation' or could place her at the disposal of an honoured guest, shows that less value was laid on her sexual chastity than on the unlimited possession of her, which could occasionally be surrendered. As far as the condition *before* marriage was concerned, it is to be feared that Herodotus with his description of the Thracians: τὰς δὲ παρθένους οὐ φυλάσσουσι, ἀλλ' ἐῶσι οἱσι αὐταὶ βούλονται ἀνδράσι μίσγεσθαι (v. 6) comes nearer the true state of affairs in antiquity than Tacitus with his well-known glorification of ancient Teutonic chastity (cf. *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Ehebruch,' 'Keuschheit,' 'Zeugungshelfer,' 'Gastfreundschaft'). In addition, what a mass of indecent customs, or which at least seem to us indecent, are to be found in primitive times! In Rome a god *Mutunus Tutunus* (cf. above, p. 32) was worshipped, whose name was derived from the male and female sexual organs (*mutto* and *titus*). The newly married bride was placed on his *fascinum*. The amulet was called *muttonium* (from *mutto*). The Lithuanian youth sacrificed to a god *Pizius* (from Lith. *pisti*, 'coire') when they brought the bride to the bridegroom. Even the 'chaste' Teutons too, according to the report of Adam of Bremen, worshipped at their marriage festivals their god *Fricco* under the symbol of an immense *priapus*.

If, in contrast to this undisguised and brutally emphasized idea of sex, we examine the terminology of the conception 'chaste' in the separate Aryan languages, viz. Gr. ἁγνός (cf. ἅγιος 'holy,' ἄζομαι 'I fear'), Lat. *castus* (cf. *castum*, 'the sacred festive season of a deity, during which much restraint was enjoined,' *castimonia*, 'bodily purity which is demanded for religious ceremonies, the restraint from sensual enjoyments'), Goth. *swikns* (ἁγνός, ὅσιος, ἀθῷος), O. H. G. *chûski*, *scûski* (perhaps *sciuhen* 'to fear'), we find as a result that this conception in all probability has *its root in sacred soil*. In the worship of the 'heavenly ones,' the idea must first have occurred that it was fitting at definite periods, in order to draw near to the gods 'in purity,' to abstain from cohabitation* and other pleasures of the senses. An interesting pamphlet in this connexion is Eugen Fehrle, *Die kultische Keuschheit im Altertum*, i., Naumburg, 1908. It is, however, not unlikely that the whole teaching on religious purity, of which sexual purity forms only a single branch, is not native to Aryan soil (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Reinheit und Unreinheit').

The connexion of the 'heavenly ones' with law and morality, thus briefly described, was, as we saw above, considerably promoted by the priests and priestly bodies that were always coming more clearly to the front among the individual peoples. For they believed that in representing all the rules of law and morality prevalent on earth as the outcome of heavenly ordinances, and themselves as the appointed interpreters of the same, they were most effectively serving the interests of the 'heavenly ones,' of mankind, and of themselves.

If in this way we are correct in our contention that in primitive Aryan times the bond of connexion between the 'heavenly ones' and the morality of mankind was very weak, we must not omit, at the close of our discussion of this topic, to call attention to the theory recently propounded by Leopold v. Schroder (cf. *Verhandlungen des II. internationalen Kongresses fur allgemeine Religionsgeschichte in Basel*, 1905, p. 89). He holds that, like other primitive peoples, the primitive Aryans not only cherished animism and ancestor-worship, but already possessed the belief in one supreme benign being. This

* This does not exclude the possibility that certain rules of continence, as, *e g*, the demand occurring among the Indians and Teutons to preserve continence some time after marriage, had as their object the turning aside of magic influences, such as the entrance of evil spirits into the body of the woman at the consummation of the nuptials (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 271, and L. v. Schroder, *Die Hochzeitsbräuche der Esten*, etc., Berlin, 1888, p. 193).

being came in the course of pre-historic times to be combined with the primitive god of the sky, Dyaus, Ζεύς, etc. (cf. above, p. 33). We shall wait with interest to see what grounds L. v. Schröder is able to bring forward in support of this contention, which, to us at least, seems very daring.

III. *Fate.*—More even than by questions concerning the origin and relation of life and death, or by reflexion on the nature and descent of the heavenly gods, has the mind of man from remotest antiquity been exercised by the gloomy power which mysteriously surrounds him from the cradle to the grave, and which we call 'fate.' The souls of ancestors or the spirits that reveal themselves in the powers of nature can be reconciled and made serviceable to man. But inaccessible and incomprehensible seems to be that unknown power which appears ever to lavish its smiles on one and to bear an everlasting grudge against another, and which without distinction overwhelms with weal or woe 'now the curly-headed boy in the innocence of youth, now the grey-haired sinner in the guilt of old age.' Only rarely, and at certain late stages of its development, do we find in paganism the thought in which the Christian finds peace of soul—the thought, namely, that in reality God and fate are one and the same. Before that, however, mankind had proposed other solutions of the dark problem. What are these? Again the Christian, in his confidence in the unity of God and fate, and in the certainty that all that befalls him, as being sent from God, must be for his best here and hereafter, declines the attempt to probe the unsearchable will of God by human means. On the other hand, there runs through the whole of heathenism an irrepressible longing, appearing in a more intense degree the further back we go in point of time, to penetrate with inquisitive and premature vision into the dark land of the future, to tear the covering from the veiled picture. In what ways was this attempted?

Thus there are *two* questions which we have here to consider in reference to primitive Aryan times: 'What idea did they entertain of fate?' and 'How did they seek to divine the future?'

1. **The conception of fate.**—In this discussion we shall start from a famous passage in the *Iliad* (xxii. 208 ff.). Achilles has pursued Hector three times round the walls of Troy:

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον ἐπὶ κρουνοὺς ἀφίκοντο,
καὶ τότε δὴ χρύσεια πατὴρ ἐτίταινε τάλαντα,
ἐν δ' ἐτίθει δύο κῆρε τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο,
τὴν μὲν Ἀχιλλῆος, τὴν δ' Ἕκτορος ἱπποδάμοιο,
ἕλκε δὲ μέσσα λαβὼν· ῥέπε δ' Ἕκτορος αἴσιμον ἦμαρ.

The expressions that are of interest to us here are, first of all, the κῆρε, which are laid by Zeus on the balance of fate, and, secondly, the αἶσα involved in the αἴσιμον ἦμαρ. A synonym of αἶσα is μοῖρα, which is not mentioned here, but which is identical with it, representing the power that moves the balance of fate. As far as the word κήρ is concerned, we have seen its exact meaning at an earlier stage (cf. above, pp. 15, 27), where we were speaking of the driving away of the spirits designated as κῆρες on the occasion of the Anthesteria festival in Athens. κήρ is, accordingly, the soul, or better, *a* soul of man, for Tylor (i. 427 f.) has shown us that belief in the existence of several souls in the human body is widely prevalent. The soul designated by the term κήρ is specially regarded as the bearer of the fate of death to men, whether that death be peaceful or fraught with violence (cf. *Il.* ix. 411). Every man is invested at birth with such a κήρ, in consequence of which there are μυρίαι κῆρες (*Il.* xii. 326 f.). But every people as well, in so far as it is thought of as an individual, *e.g.* the Trojans or the Achæans (*Il.* viii. 69 ff.), possesses such a κήρ; and the word is finally used, and that, too, very frequently, as a personification of the goddess of death, Κήρ, the daughter of the night, whose brethren are Μόρος, Θάνατος, Ὕπνος, and the φῦλον Ὀνείρων, 'the people of dreams' (cf. Hesiod, *Theog.* 211 ff.). A series of ideas from the north of Europe comes more or less near to this Old Greek conception of κήρ. In the first place, the Old Norse figures of *fylgja* must be mentioned. Their identity with the human soul follows at once from the circumstance that the expression is interchangeable with the above-mentioned Old Norse *hugr*, 'soul' (cf. p. 15, and also W. Henzen, *Über die Traume in der altnordischen Sagalitteratur*, Leipzig, 1890, p. 36). They are called 'followers,' because the soul, like the ψυχή in Greece, follows the man as his second 'self,' his εἴδωλον. They often appear to the dreamer as animals (birds, horses, fishes, wolves, lions, white bears, boars, hares, oxen, goats); and if they appear, they announce certain ruin. As there was a κήρ of the Trojans and the Achæans, so among the old Norsemen there was a *kyn-* or *ættarfylgja*, i.e. a *fylgja* of the tribe; and, as was the case with the κῆρες (cf. *Il.* ix. 411), a man could have several *fylgjur*. On the other hand, the latter word has a wider signification in so far as it designates the guardian spirit of the man generally. The latter is also the meaning of the Old Norse *hamingja*, 'the many-formed' (Old Nor. *hamr*, 'form'), in like manner a designation of the human soul taken from its capacity of transforming itself, for the *hamingja* appear frequently as animals or as women. Especially characteristic is their hereditary transmission in the family, passing over from father to son, and so on. They appear first as giant women, offspring of the Norns, who are the *hamingja* of the world (cf. Vigfusson, *Icelandic-Eng. Dictionary*, Oxf., 1874–76, p. 236). Finally, we may mention the characteristic features of the southern Slavonic *vjedogonya*, who are conceived of partly as spirits of the house and partly as guardian spirits dwelling in each man. Probably their name (Slovenian *vjetrogonja*) is connected with Old Slav. *větrŭ*, 'wind,' in which case the wind-like nature of the soul would be indicated (cf. F. S. Krauss, *Sreća, Gluck und Schicksal im Volksglauben der Sudslaven*, Vienna, 1886, p. 19 ff.).

We have thus made acquaintance with a series of souls of fate and souls of fortune, a knowledge of which will assist us in the following consideration of αἶσα and μοῖρα.

Both of these words signify not only etymologically (αἶσα from **αιρτια*: Lat. *æquus*; μοῖρα: μέρος, μείρομαι, εἵμαρται), but also in actual usage, nothing more in the first instance than 'share' without any reference to fate, and then the share assigned by fate to every individual man at his birth (ὅτε μιν τέκε μήτηρ) (*Il.* xx. 128; *Od.* vii. 198). Thus they correspond exactly to the Slavonic expressions, Russ. *častĭ*, 'part,' 'lot,' 'fate,' *sčastĭe*, 'fortune,' *nesčastĭe*, 'misfortune' (**čensti*: Gr. σχίζω, Lat. *scindo*, lit. 'the part split off,' 'the share'), and *dolja*, 'part,' 'portion,' *nedolja*, 'misfortune' (Old Slav. *dola*, *dělŭ*, 'part,' Goth. *dails*).

This 'share' is, according to the popular Slavonic idea, innate, and it is natural to make the mother responsible for it if one is dissatisfied with his 'share' (cf. A. N. Veselovskij, 'Fate in the popular thought of the Slavs,' in *Trans. of the Imperial Academy of Science in St. Petersburg* [Russ.], xlvi. 173 ff.). There is thus a slight distinction between μοῖρα (αἶσα) and *dolja* (*častĭ*), in that the former is received *at* birth, the latter *by* birth. The latter idea, however, is proved to be the more ancient from the circumstance that among many Aryan peoples, in connexion with the assignation of fate to the separate individuals, there are deities who

are designated as 'mothers' or 'child-bearers.' On Slavonic soil this is true of the Old Slav. *rožd'anicy* (*roditi, ražd'ati* 'parere,' *rožd'enije,* 'generatio,' *rožd'enica,* 'nativitas,' 'obstetrix,' 'matrix,' 'mater,' 'generatio'), deities to whom, just as to the Perun and the Rodŭ, *i.e.* the personifications of the clan, sacrificial offerings of bread, cheese, and honey were offered. At the present day among the Bulgarians of the Rhodope mountains the woman in child-bed is called *rožd'enica,* but among the Slovenians and the Horvatians the women of fate are called *rodjenice* or *rojenice* (cf. Krauss, *op. cit.* p. 118 f.). Among the Greeks, the Εἰλείθυιαι, the goddesses of travail, are to be mentioned in this connexion. They occur in intimate alliance with the Μοῖραι (cf. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*[4], i. 512). Among the Romans, we must note the *Parcæ,* whose name (*Par-ca: pario,* cf. similar formations in Brugmann, *Grundriss*[2], ii. 1, p. 476 f.) stamps them as 'child-bearers' (so also Wissowa, p. 213). Would it not be possible also to find in this way a better explanation of the puzzling Celto-Teutonic cult of the 'mothers' (*matronæ, matres, matræ*) than has as yet been suggested? Thus the mothers originally bring forth his fate to man, or, having become goddesses of fate or even fate itself (Old Slav. *rožd'enica,** 'εἱμαρμένη,' cf. also *Archiv f. slav. Phil.* xiv. 137 ff.), they 'impart' it to him at birth, for which reason they are not infrequently called 'imparters.' Such designations are the Bulgarian *urisnicy* (from Gr. ὁρίζειν), the North Russian *udělinicy* (from *uděljati,* 'to impart'), which—an important fact for the subsequent consideration—have developed into spiteful spirits of nightmare, who torment women in labour, drag the children prematurely out of the womb, cause convulsions, etc. The Gr. Νεμέσεις (from νέμομαι 'impart') have also, in all probability, a similar origin, although at an early date they, along with the Erinyes, came to be known as avenging and punishing goddesses of fate. What these women of fate allotted to the newborn child in the decisive hour is designated not only as the 'share' (cf. above, p. 52), but also in three other ways: (1) as that which is 'spoken' by them (Lat. *fâtum*† [from *fâri*], Russ. etc. *rokŭ*: O. Slav. *rekǫ,* 'I say'); (2) as that which is 'spun' by them (Old Nor. *urþr,* A. S. *wyrd,* O. H. G. *wurt*; cf. O. H. G. *wirt, wirtel,* 'spindle'); for next to bearing children it is fitting for the Aryan woman and the women of fate (cf. Gr. κλῶθες) to engage in spinning (cf. on this Veselovskij, *op. cit.* p. 210; otherwise R. Much, *Mitteilungen der anthrop. Gesellschaft in Wien,* xxxviii. p. 16); and (3) as that which is 'decreed' by them (Old Nor. *ørlǫg,* A. S. *orlæg,* O. H. G. *urlag,* Russ. *sudĭba,* 'judgment').

We have up to this point become acquainted with the women of fate as 'mothers' and as 'imparters.' This, however, does not by any means exhaust the enormously rich terminology belonging to them in the Aryan languages. In the Scandinavian North they are also called *nornir* and *dísir.* The etymology of the former expression has not yet been explained. The latter, however (cf. Goth. *filu-deisei* 'cleverness'), is equivalent to 'wise women,' undoubtedly in the same sense as French *sage-femme,* since their help is called for by those in labour (cf. 'The Song of Sigrdrifa,' 9). Thus here, too, the women of fate stand in the most intimate relation to the birth of man. From the Slavonic region we may also mention the Bulgarian *narąčnici* and the Servian *sudnice, sugjenice,* both so called from the *rokŭ* and *sudŭ* = *sudĭba* (see above) which they announce. From Lithuania the *laumẽ* (of unknown derivation) must also be mentioned. The most important phenomenon for us, however, is to be found in the fact that in many regions the conceptions of division, fate, fortune, etc., at first abstract, show a strong tendency to become transformed into beings regarded as persons. This is true in particular in Polish and Little Russian of the *dolja* mentioned above, in Servian of the *sreća* (cf. Krauss, *op. cit.*), a word which literally means 'coming-together,' 'meeting' (*sŭ* + √*rêt*). In Latin, from the *fâtum,* as we saw above, the 'word spoken' (by the Parcæ), we have evolved, particularly on Celtic soil, the demons of fate designated by the name *fati* and *fatæ,* the latter of which became Old French *feie,* M. H. G. *feie,* German *Fee* ('fairy'). The same process went on also with regard to the Greek αἶσα and μοῖρα 'portion of fate,' to the consideration of which we now return. It is well enough known how both have evolved into personal powers of fate, Aisa being thought of only in the singular, Moira being also used in the plural (cf. Preller, *Griech. Myth.*[4] i. 530). The Moiræ, as is well known, play a specially important part in the life of the common people of Greece even at the present day, and it is not unlikely that primitive features of ancient Greek life are here preserved (cf. B. Schmidt, *Das Volksleben der Neugriechen,* i. 210 ff.). Besides the form μοῖρα, there is also a masculine form μόρος, Μόρος 'fate,' especially 'misfortune,' to be mentioned. Now all these forms lead back to an Aryan **moro*— **moria* (perhaps on account of εἵμαρται, εἱμαρμένη there was a form in the primitive language equivalent to this, viz. **smoro*— **smoria*), which corresponds phonetically to the primitive Teutonic names of the demons of the nightmare, O. H. G. *mar, mara,* Old Nor. *mara,* A. S. *mære* (=**moria,* μοῖρα); the terms most nearly connected with these in the North of Europe we have already discovered (p. 15, above). Since then, on the one hand, we have just seen, in the Russian *udělinicy,* spirits of fate becoming spirits of the nightmare, and, on the other hand, Laistner (*Rätsel der Sphinx,* ii. 342 ff.) has shown in detail how many spirits of fate and fortune have their origin in demons of dreams and nightmares—which is easily understood from the close connexion between the spirits of the departed and those of fate on the one hand, and the phenomena of the departed soul and those of dreams (nightmares) on the other—we need not hesitate to assume in the Gr. μοῖρα (=A. S. *mære*) the existence of a group of primitive Aryan words bearing the meaning of the share allotted to man by fate, which was either innate or bestowed at birth. From this group beings were evolved who in Greece became spirits of fate, while in Teutonic countries they were rather spirits of oppression, although, even in the latter case, their connexion with fate could not be concealed.

The details given above prove that *the faith of the Aryan peoples was permeated by a deeply fatalistic trend of thought.* The fate of each individual is born with him, transmitted by his mother, or is bestowed upon him at the hour of birth by spirits who at first have nothing to do with the heavenly gods, but much with the realm of departed souls. It was only gradually that the more advanced idea came to the front which united fate to the immortal gods; and where this idea appears, it is still in conflict with the older conceptions. This is the case in Homer. Now Zeus is subject to Moira, and again he takes her place as

* The report of Procopius (*de Bell. Goth.* iii. 14), that the Slavs did not know the εἱμαρμένη, must, with Veselovskij (*op. cit.* p. 174), be understood to mean that *at that time* they had still no abstract *Fatum,* but knew only beings or deities of fate.

† According to Wissowa (p. 213), Lat. *fâtum* was only a 'translation and interpretation' of the Greek αἶσα, which, however, cannot be correct, seeing that *fâtum* means 'that which is spoken' and αἶσα 'share,' as we saw above. *Fâtum,* like *Parca,* must have been a living religious conception among the people.

he 'spins out' to men their fortune (*Od.* iv. 208). That this latter idea could only at a later date have been transferred to Zeus, follows at once from the metaphor of 'spinning' (above, p. 53). This figure is exceedingly far removed from the activity of the highest god of the heavens, and it finds a satisfactory explanation only in the primitive cycle of ideas regarding mothers and women of fate. Thus we may hold that the belief which finds expression in the oracular responses, in Herodotus, and—at least very often—in the tragedians, the belief, namely, in a supreme law of the universe, the Moira, which rules over gods and men and from which none can escape, represents the ancient condition of popular thought from which the Homeric world had begun to raise itself, just as it did in other religious matters, *e.g.* burning of corpses instead of burial, disappearance of gifts to the dead and of a real ancestor-worship, realms of the dead, Hades and Elysium, etc. (cf. above, I. 4). In this way it was possible for demons of fate to become immortal gods. An instance of this evolution is afforded by the Greek δαίμων. The word, probably connected with δαίομαι 'I divide,' signifies the 'divider,'* and as it is used by the oldest tragedians (*e.g.* Æschylus, *Persæ*, 620) to indicate the soul or the shade of some dead person, and by Hesiod (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 146) in the sense of glorified human souls, we see that δαίμων is originally one of the many spiritual beings that determine the fate of individual human beings *in bonam* and especially *in malam partem*. These ideas prevail also in Homer; but in addition δαίμων is a common name of the immortal gods, because, according to the belief which gradually came into favour, they were responsible for the decrees of fate. This fatalistic trait of the Aryan religions has in Europe been most faithfully preserved by the Slavs (cf. Krauss, *op. cit.* p. 89 ff. 'Gott und das Schicksal'). Nor is this merely a matter of accident. Of all the Aryans, the Slavs are the race that remained nearest the original home, and are thus the last to enter into history. Nothing, however, frees the soul so certainly from the dull depression of fatalistic ideas as the great deeds of historical life.

2. The divining of the future.—A primitive Aryan expression for this important idea is to be found in the series of terms: Lith. *saitas*, 'interpretation of signs,' *scitones*, 'interpreters of signs,' Old Nor. *seiðr*, 'a particular kind of magic for investigating the future,' Middle Welsh *hut*, New Welsh *hûd*, 'præstigiæ,' Old Corn. *hudol*, gloss. *magus* = Gr. *οἶτος* (Ionic for **οἶτος*), 'fate' or 'misfortune.' A complete account of all the means used by the Aryan peoples to divine the future cannot be given here; still, we shall prove that among the Lithuanians and Prussians, from whom we have so often started in this discussion, the great majority of all kinds of divination practised among all the separate Aryan peoples is also to be found. The Baltic tribes, of whom Peter of Dusburg reported: 'Prutheni raro aliquod factum notabile inchoabant, nisi prius missa sorte secundum ritum ipsorum a diis suis, utrum bene vel male debeat eis succedere, sciscitentur' (*Script. rer. Pruss.* i. 54), come once more (cf. above, p. 31 f.) nearest to the Romans, of whom Cicero reports in almost identical terms: 'Nihil fere quondam maioris rei nisi auspicato ne privatim quidem gerebatur' (*de Div.* i. 28). For the most detailed account of this topic we are indebted to the repeatedly mentioned work of Matthæus Prætorius, *Deliciæ Prussicæ, oder Preussische Schaubühne* (ed. by W. Pierson, Berlin, 1871), in which the 'waidlers' (cf., p. 43, above) of the ancient Prussians, experienced in divination, are enumerated, and upon which we shall base the following discussion.

(*a*) *The flight and the cries of birds.*—'*Lekkutones* (cf. Lith. *lekiù* 'I fly') were the persons who observed the cries and the flight of birds and predicted future events from them, also called *Paukszt̃ičici* (cf. Lith. *paũkszt̃is*, 'bird'). Eagles, ravens, hawks were regarded by them as birds of strife; the kite as well as swallows, owls, and bees brought harm and fire. On the other hand, storks, herons, woodpeckers, nightingales, and pigeons were omens of good fortune' (Prætorius, p. 43). 'A *lekkutons*, or bird-diviner, when he is to prophesy, dresses in white, takes a sacred *krywule*, *i.e.* a crooked staff, in his hand, goes to a *pillukztis*, *i.e.* a mound of earth, prays with his face to the east, and waits till a bird comes' (Prætorius, p. 48). It is in accordance with this custom that in almost all the Aryan languages the words for 'bird' mean at the same time bird-omen and omen generally; cf. Skr. *śákuna* (*śákuna* 'the science of interpreting the flight of birds'), Gr. *οἰωνός* and *ὄρνις*, Lat. *auspicium* from **avi-spicium*, and probably also *augur* from **avi-gur* (the second part of the word is still obscure), O. H. G. *fogalôn* 'auspicari'; *fogal*, *fogalrarta* 'auspicium,' 'augurium' lit. 'bird's-cry' (Goth. *razda*, 'cry'), Old Slav. *kobĭ*, 'augurium'; Czech *koba*, 'raven' (for a more detailed list see *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Orakel' and 'Rechts und links'). We see how closely the Litu-Prussian *lekkutons*, even in details, corresponds to the Roman *augur*, who in the same way, armed with a crooked staff (*lituus*), mounted the citadel, and, generally with his face turned to the east, observed the sky. It is noteworthy that the dove, among the Prussians, was a bird of good omen, although it generally announced death and misfortune.

(*b*) *The appearance of the sky and natural phenomena.*—'*Szweigdżurinis* (cf. Lith. *žwaigždė*, 'star') was a star-gazer' (Prætorius, p. 42). '*Orones* (cf. Lith. *óras*, 'air,' 'weather') observed the sky and predicted its changes' (Prætorius, p. 43). '*Wejones* (cf. Lith. *vẽjas* 'wind') watch the winds, change the weather, and are still to be met with in Nadravia' (Prætorius, p. 44). '*Wanduolutti*, *item Udones* (cf. Lith. *vandů*, Skr. *udán*, 'water') are water-diviners, who divine from the foam, waves, etc. Of these there are different classes' (Prætorius, p. 45). It is enough to refer to the *de cælo servare* of the Roman magistracy, the *cœlestia auguria*, as well as the report of Plutarch (*Cæsar*, c. 19) regarding the Teutonic sacred women: *αἱ ποταμῶν δίναις προσβλέπουσαι καὶ ῥευμάτων ἐλιγμοῖς καὶ ψόφοις τεκμαιρόμεναι προεθέσπιζον.*

(*c*) *Sacrifice, entrails, and blood.*—'*Widdurones* (cf. Lith. *viduriaĩ*, 'entrails') were soothsayers who could predict the future from the entrails of the animal sacrificed to the gods. At the present time several of the inhabitants of Nadravia, on examining the spleen, liver, etc., of a pig, are able to say what kind of a winter it will be, what kind of a crop, whether the early or the late seed will thrive. *Kraujutter* (cf. Lith *kraũjas*, 'blood'), who could predict good or evil fortune from the blood of men and cattle, from the way it flowed, from its colour and changes, and who prophesied also from the menstrual blood of women, were the *medici* of the ancient Prussians. At the present date, in Nadravia we find *kraujutten* who let blood from the veins, suck it by means of a small horn, and tell from the taste whether the person will remain in good health or not. Before they suck, they murmur a few words indistinctly' (Prætorius, p. 43 f.).

In the south, the Greek *ἱεροσκοπεία* and the Roman *haruspices* correspond to these. It is generally believed that in these phenomena we have to deal with an oracular custom which was introduced at a comparatively late date from foreign sources (into Italy from Etruria), but it is not in accordance with this view that the Latin word *haruspex* with *hariolus*, *fariolus*, has been formed from a primitive root no longer extant in any Italian language (**haru-* 'entrails,' Old Nor. *gorn*, pl. *garnar* 'bowel,' 'bowels,' 'entrails,' Skr. *hirá*, 'bowel'). It is also worthy of mention that in the Prussian reports the *liver* is emphasized as especially significant for oracular purposes, while in Greece it is regarded particularly as the seat of soothsaying (cf. K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der gottesdienstlichen Altertümer der Griechen*[2], p. 242). In the same way among all Aryan tribes the blood of men and animals was regarded as a means of foretelling the future. Who does not remember the white-haired priestesses of the Cimri, who, according to Strabo (vii. p. 294), prophesied over a kettle of the blood of slaughtered prisoners of war? Cf. also Old Nor. *hlaut* 'sacrificial blood' = Goth. *hlauts* 'lot.'

(*d*) *Ominous meetings.*—'*Szweruttei* (cf. Lith. *žwiẽris*, 'game') prophesy from game. If a hare, wolf, ass, toad, lizard, or locust appears, it signifies misfortune' (Prætorius, p. 48). Cf. also the Galician-Volhynian chronicle of the Hipatios manuscript (A. Bruckner, *Archiv für slav. Phil.* ix. 3): 'Still his conversion (*i.e.* of Mendowej) was not genuine; he was wont to sacrifice secretly to his gods, to *Nũnadẽj*, *Teljawel*, *Diwerix*, and the hare-god *Mẽjdẽjn*; if when he rode out in the fields a hare rose, he would not enter into the thicket or dare to break off a twig, and he sacrificed to his gods, burned the corpses of the dead, and openly practised his paganism.' 'To meet a snake is still a good omen to the old Prussians and the Lithuanians' (Prætorius, p. 37). As far as the other Aryan peoples are concerned, it must suffice to call attention to the monograph of P. Schwarz, *Mensch und Tier im Aberglauben*, Celle, 1888. But we must specially bear in mind in Roman territory the information contained in Festus (ed. Muller, p. 244) on 'Pedestria': 'a vulpe, lupo, serpente,* equo, ceterisque animantibus quadrupedibus fiunt

* This explanation seems more likely than the one previously given by the author in his *Reallexicon*, p. 29 f.

* Also by Joh. Lasicius (*de Diis Samagitarum*, p. 51: 'nutriunt etiam quasi deos penates nigri coloris obesos et quadrupedes

(auspicia),' and p. 260 on 'Quinque': 'signa quæ augures observant ex quadrupedibus.'

(*e*) *The rustling of the oak.*—'Præexcellentes arbores, ut robora, quercus, deos inhabitare dixerunt, ex quibus sciscitantibus responsa reddi audiebantur, ob id nec huiuscemodi arbores cædebant, sed religiose ut numinum deos colebant' (Erasmus Stella, 'de Borussiæ Antiquitatibus,' ii., in Grynæus, *Novus Orbis*, Basel, 1537, p. 581). Cf. *Od.* xiv. 327 f.:

τὸν δ' ἐς Δωδώνην φάτο βήμεναι, ὄφρα θεοῖο
ἐκ δρυὸς ὑψικόμοιο Διὸς βουλὴν ἐπακούσῃ,

and Æschylus, *Prom.* 830 ff.:

ἀμφὶ Δωδώνην, ἵνα
μαντεῖα θᾶκός τ' ἐστὶ Θεσπρωτοῦ Διός,
τέρας τ' ἄπιστον, αἱ προσήγοροι δρύες.

(*f*) *Fire and smoke.*—'*Szwakones*, those who observe the signs of a burning light and its smoke, from *szwake*, "a burning light," are called *Dumones*, from *dumai*, "smoke"' (Prætorius, p. 43). 'Illi (the fire-priests, cf. above, p. 44) noctu ad ignem accedebant, mane vero consulentibus responsa dantes umbram ægroti (the question is about predicting the future in the case of illness) apud ignem sacrum se vidisse aiebant, quæ cum se calefaceret, signa vel mortis vel vitæ ostentasset: victurum ægrotum facies ostensa igni, contra si dorsum ostentasset morturum portendit' (Jerome of Prague). Cf. the Greek μαντικὴ ἐξ ἱερῶν or ἐμπύρων (K. F. Hermann, *op. cit.* p. 241). Thus, *e.g.*, Prometheus boasts in Æschylus, *Prom.* 498: καὶ φλογωπὰ σήματα ἐξωμμάτωσα, πρόσθεν ὄντ' ἐπάργεμα. But here we have to deal with prophetic utterances from the *sacrificial fire*, a custom which, as we saw above (p. 41) was unknown to the Prussians and Lithuanians.

(*g*) *Dreams.*—'*Sapnonei*, *i.e.* dreamers, from *sapnas* (*sâpnas*), "a dream": interpreters of dreams are to be found especially among the women' (Prætorius, p. 47). Cf. Gr. ὀνειροπόλος, 'interpreter of dreams' (see K. F. Hermann, *op. cit.* p. 330).

(*h*) *Prophetic utterances at marriages.*—'*Szwalgones* are bride-examiners, 'waidlers,' who attend at the betrothal and prophesy. They also arrange the *szwalgus* (Lith. *žwalgaĩ*, 'bride-inspection'), *i.e.* the betrothals. *Swalgauti* signifies literally 'to behold.' They interpret from all kinds of things, *e.g.* from the pouring, as either the bridegroom or the bride pours beer into the other's eyes. Such customs are still to be found' (Prætorius, p. 46) Cf. Servius, i. 346: 'secundum Romanos locutus est, qui nihil nisi captatis faciebant auguriis et præcipue nuptias'; iv. 45: 'nuptiæ enim captatis fiebant auguriis . . .'; iv. 166: '. . . ideoque auspices deliguntur ad nuptias.'

But, with all these the number of the Prussian 'waidlers' engaged in separate branches of divination is far from being exhausted. There was also a *Waszkonis* (*wâszkas*, 'wax'), *i.e.* a diviner who studied wax moulds; further, there were *Szwinnutzei* (*szwinas* 'lead'), or lead-moulders; *Puttones* (*putà*, 'foam'), 'those who observed signs in the foam of the beer'; *Sietones* (see above, p. 54), who prophesied life or death from charms bound round the necks of men or animals; *Sietones* (*siẽtas*, 'sieve'), 'those who acquired information from the turning of a sieve'; *Stiklorei* (*stiklas*, 'glass'), *Zerkoluttei* (*zerkolas*, 'mirror'), and *Zolinininkei* (*žolẽ*, 'plant'), who predicted the future from glass, mirrors, plants, etc. It would not be difficult to find parallels to these kinds of divination among the other Aryan peoples. On the other hand, there were several kinds of oracles attested among other peoples which have not yet been discovered in the Prusso-Lithuanian sources. Such are the *tree-oracle*, or oracle of the tree-lots (cf *Real-lexicon*, art. 'Los'), which is found among Scythians, Teutons, and Celts, and also in indistinct traces among the Greeks and Romans; the significance of monsters as foretelling misfortune (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Orakel'); the *horse-oracle*, found among Iranians and Western Slavs (cf. V. Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen*, p. 44); and also the peculiarly Roman '*signa ex tripudiis*.' Still, the horse was also looked on as sacred among the Lithuanians (Peter of Dusburg: 'aliqui equos nigros, quidam albos vel alterius coloris propter deos suos non audebant aliqualiter equitare'); and also hens, which were regarded as inviolable, were attended to in the houses, and their chickens under certain circumstances were understood to foretell misfortune (Lasicius, p. 48: 'nato cuiusvis generis vel cocco vel debili pullo actutum sedes mutantur').

The facts respecting divination here set forth can be regarded only as characterizing, and can in no way be supposed to exhaust, the enormous number of customs of this class. And they will arouse deeper interest if we can only succeed in discovering the *motives* by which this proceeding, viz. divining the future, which seems so absurd to us, is to be explained. Ihering (*Vorgeschichte der Indoeuropaer*, Leipzig, 1894, p. 441 ff.) is, so far as the present writer is aware, the only one who, although confining himself to the practice of taking the auspices among the Romans, has dealt with this fundamental and central question in detail. He begins with the undoubtedly correct idea that the supposition that auspices of this kind revealed the will of the heavenly gods is secondary and transmitted, and that every attempt to connect divination with higher religious ideas is quite valueless. He himself, accordingly, seeks to deduce the origin of oracular divination from purely practical grounds. Thus, according to his opinion, the oracle from birds (*signa ex avibus*) takes its rise from the observation of the birds of passage which showed the Aryans in their migrations the passes of the mountains, the courses of the streams, and the islands in the ocean which invited them to rest. The inspection of the entrails (*signa ex extis*) is explained from an examination which was made of animals of an unknown region to see if their entrails were healthy, and consequently whether the fodder of the land was satisfactory, etc. Thus we should obtain the remarkable result that this divination becomes the more sensible the further back we go in primitive times. No one will hesitate to conclude that the solution proposed by Ihering cannot be the correct one, no matter how difficult it may be to show it to be impossible in detail. No one, however, who considers with unprejudiced mind the material presented will fail to observe that the whole conception of divination does not rest on a basis of rational consideration, but has its roots in the childlike, dream-encircled, and imaginative mental condition of primitive man. Τὸ γὰρ εἰωθὸς οὐ τέρας, says Theophrastus (*de Plantis*, v. 3); and in this short sentence we have the key, or at least one key, to the understanding of oracular divination. For primitive man only the smallest part of his inner and outer life is εἰωθός. Everywhere wonders and signs terrify him. The phantoms of his dreams, and especially those of the horrible nightmare* which, in the rooms of primitive times, filled with noxious charcoal fumes, must have been very frequent (cf. Hofler, *Centralblatt fur Anthropologie*, vi. 1), are realities to him. In the plants and animals, in the stones and stars, there live, as in men's own bodies, souls to which, as we saw above, fate is united. Can we be surprised, then, that in the world of dreams, in the rustling of the trees, and in the flight of birds, the shadows of the future were supposed to hover mysteriously round the life of man? This anxious, timid, and nervous condition of primitive mental life called to its aid the art of priestly diviners, who—deceived deceivers—were always devising new means of obtaining some mysterious message with regard to the future. Their profession, however, always rests in the end on one fundamental thought, namely, on making the probability or improbability of a future event dependent on the incidence of another occurrence which was independent of human volition, such as the approach of a four-footed animal or a bird, a flash of lightning, hearing the sound of animals or the human voice. All this had, originally, nothing to do with the heavenly gods, and it is only at the close of a long process of evolution that we find the Roman *auspices* announcing the will of Juppiter or Pythia, and prophesying in the name of Apollo.

CONCLUSION.—It has been our aim—and nothing else was possible—to present, in this discussion regarding the religion of the Aryans, not the opinions and the usages of a perfectly definite and distinct period of antiquity, but rather a *series of developments* in the history of religion taking place on the soil of primitive Aryan peoples. These developments depend on more or less deeply-rooted pre-historic connexions,

quosdam serpentes') snakes are considered as quadrupeds. This settles the doubt expressed by R. v. Ihering (*Vorgeschichte der Indoeuropaer*, p. 444 f.) with regard to the passage of Festus quoted above.

* Cf. L. Laistner, *Das Rätsel der Sphinx, Grundzüge einer Mythengeschichte*, Berlin, 1889, and H. Roscher, 'Ephialtes, eine pathologisch-mythologische Abhandlung uber die Alptraume und Alpdamonen des klassischen Altertums,' *Abh. d. kgl. sach sischen Ges. d. W.*, phil.-hist. Kl. xx., 1900.

and lead to more or less distant epochs of primitive antiquity. Thus there have appeared different strata, lower and higher, overlapping each other in the historic development of the religion.

If at times we have assumed that these higher and lower strata of religion were to be found side by side at the same time and among the same people, such a supposition will not astonish any one who remembers that even among our own countrymen the purest religion and the darkest superstition are to be found existing side by side.

This series of developments has been obtained by a comparison of words and customs confined to the Aryan languages and peoples. Our intention has been to give the features of a comparative history of Aryan religions, not a comparative history of religions generally. At the same time, we by no means wish to underestimate the advantages of the latter discipline. On the contrary, we are indebted to it for a series of general stages in the evolution of the religious consciousness, which are also of great importance in the special history of Aryan religion. But at the same time it cannot be denied that a real history of religion can be written only on a historically coherent foundation, such as is offered by the Semitic and Aryan races, and only in the closest connexion with the history of language and culture, which can as yet be sufficiently examined only in the case of the two races mentioned. Even with this limitation, it must be confessed that comparative investigations such as ours, which are compelled to deal not only with the facts themselves but also with conclusions drawn from them, cannot possess the same degree of certainty as is to be found in the discussions of those who are content to supply a description of the historically attested religion of a single Aryan or Semitic people, the Indians or the Romans, the Hebrews or the Babylonians. It must, none the less, be emphasized that he who undertakes to give such a special description without reference to the comparative religion of related peoples deliberately closes his eyes to the light which, in judicious research, is cast by pre-historic upon historic times.

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ĀRYA SAMĀJ.—1. Founder.—Swāmī Dayānand Sarasvatī was born in the year 1824 in a village belonging to the Rājā of Morvī in Kāthiāwār, India. During his lifetime he refused to make known either his own name or his birthplace, lest his relatives should hinder him in his work or after his demise try to provide a successor as head of the sect. After his death, however, in 1883, it came out that his real name was *Mūl Śaṅkar*, son of Ambā Śaṅkar. His father was a well-to-do man, by occupation a banker, by descent a Brāhman, and in religion a stern and puritanical worshipper of Śiva. The life of Mūl Śaṅkar, *alias* Swāmī Dayānand Sarasvatī, falls into three nearly equal portions, namely, his life at home (1824–1845), his wanderings and studies (1845–1863), and his public ministry (1863–1883). For an account of the first two periods of the life of Swāmī Dayānand we are indebted to his *Autobiography*, which was dictated by him to the editor of the *Theosophist*, and published in English in that magazine.

There are three moments of religious interest in the home-life of the founder of the Ārya Samāj: first, his revolt from idolatry at the age of fourteen, on the night of his initiation into the mysteries of the Śaiva cult, when he saw mice running over the image of Śiva and defiling it; second, his resolve to abandon the world and seek salvation, the fruit of his profound grief on account of the death of his sister; and third, his flight from home at the age of twenty-one, in order to avoid the entanglement of marriage, into which his parents were determined he should enter. The history of the first twenty-one years of the life of the future Swāmī is thus summed up—(1) in the negative determination to eschew idolatry, (2) in the positive determination to seek salvation, and (3) in the further resolve to allow no such entanglement as marriage to interfere with his supreme purpose. There is no reason for questioning the essential truthfulness of the account of these early experiences. The sincerity of his revolt from idolatry, however it came about, is proved by the magnificent courage and vigour with which he afterwards attacked it in its chief centres, such as Hardwār and Benares. And the reality of his abandonment of the ties of home and kindred is proved by the fact that after his escape from his relatives he never again looked upon their faces.

After his flight from home he spent about eighteen years as a *Sannyāsī*, or religious mendicant, wandering from place to place and learning from a great variety of teachers. He first came under Vedantic influences, and for a time was convinced of the identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. He was initiated into the *Brahmācharya* order and given a new name, *Śuddha Chaitanya*. Later, he was initiated into the fourth order of *Sannyāsis*, and was given the name by which he always has been known, namely, **Dayānand Sarasvatī.** He retained little or nothing, however, that came to him from his Vedāntic teachers except this name, for he soon deserted the standpoint of the *Vedānta* for that of the *Yoga*. The crowning religious influence on the life of Dayānand Sarasvatī was exerted by the blind Vedic scholar, Swāmī Virajānand of Mathurā, an enemy of modern Sanskrit literature, who, as a condition of teaching him, demanded that he should throw away all his modern Sanskrit books. This condition being fulfilled, the blind Swāmī taught Dayānand the Vedas, and dismissed him with the words: 'I want thee to go forth into the world and spread enlightenment among mankind.' Thus ends the second period in the life of Swāmī Dayānand Sarasvatī (1845–1863).

His religious development may be briefly summed up. It was a movement from Paurānic Hinduism through philosophical Hinduism to Vedic Hinduism. He successively deserted Śaivism and Vedāntism, but clung to the end to the *Sānkhya-Yoga* as the philosophical point of view from which, in his opinion, the Vedas ought to be interpreted. The last twenty years of the life of Swāmī Dayānand Sarasvatī is the period of his public ministry (1863–1883). It is a history of preaching tours throughout the length and breadth of India, from Bombay and Poona on the South to Calcutta and Lahore on the North; of public discussions with pandits, maulvies, and missionaries; and of literary work. After his first preaching tour of four years, he went into retreat on the banks of the Ganges 'for further contemplation and perfection of character.' Happily, we have a picture, from the pen of a European, of Swamī Dayānand as he appeared in 1868, during this time of partial retreat:

'In the afternoon I visited a fakeer down on the sand, by the water's edge, of whose learning and sanctity I had heard in the crowds of the bazaar. I found him sitting in a little straw booth; and a splendid looking fellow he was, with his herculean frame and massive limbs, fine oval cranium, and really benevolent face. He was sitting almost entirely naked, and entered at once into pleasant conversation. I found him to belong to a class of mendicants who profess to have entirely abandoned the world, and are living in complete contemplation of the Deity. The conversation revealed in him a fine mind, and well

versed in the ancient lore of the Hindus. He talked only Sanskrit, and our conversation was conducted through an interpreter' (T. J. Scott, *Missionary Life among the Villages of India*, p. 102).

After about two and a half years, Swāmī Dayānand emerged from his 'retreat' and plunged at once into public discussion and controversy. In the great centres of idolatry his usual theme was, 'Is there idolatry in the Vedas?' Against this practice he thundered with all the force of his strong will, impressive personality, and unusual eloquence, and, according to his biographers, uniformly carried the day.

It was at Bombay, on the 10th of April 1875, that Swāmī Dayānand founded the Ārya Samāj. He visited Delhi in 1877 at the time of the grand *Darbar*, where he met certain gentlemen from the Panjāb, who invited him to visit their province. This was the occasion of his first visit to the Panjāb, the scene of the future triumphs of his Society. From 1878 to 1881 there was the curious episode of a partnership between the Ārya Samāj and the Theosophical Society. Both parties were disappointed, for a split soon took place on the question of the personality of God. For the history of this strange union, see, as representing the Ārya point of view, the various biographies of Swāmī Dayānand; and for the point of view of the Theosophical Society, Col. Olcott's chapter on 'Swāmī Dayānand' in *Old Diary Leaves*.

Swāmī Dayānand came into contact with many different leaders of religious thought in India, *e.g.* Dabendra Nath Tagore and Keshab Chandra Sen of the Brahmo Samāj, Madame Blavatsky and Col. Olcott of the Theosophical Society, Bholānāth Sārābhāi of the Prārthnā Samāj, Sir Saiyid Ahmad of Reformed Islām, and Dr. T. J. Scott and Rev. J. Gray representing Christianity. There is evidence that Swāmī Dayānand made overtures to the leaders of both the Prārthnā Samāj (see Krishnarāo Bholānāth, *Life of Bholānāth Sārābhāi*, p. 7 f.) and the Brahmo Samāj, with a view to organic union, the amalgamated body to be called 'The Ārya Samāj.' But no union with any other organization was even temporarily effected except with the Theosophical Society.

In 1882–1883 the Swāmī visited Rājputāna, and while there became the friend and counsellor of princes. According to his biographers, he acted the part of a modern John the Baptist in rebuking the Mahārājā of Jodhpur for being under the influence of a courtesan. A few days later the Swāmī fell ill. Some think that a slow poison had been given him in his food. At any rate, the illness was fatal. He died at Ajmēr on the 30th of October, 1883, in the fifty-ninth year of his age.

Swāmī Dayānand was, from all accounts, a man of splendid physique, impressive personality, and great strength of will. T. J. Scott speaks of his 'magnificent presence' and 'imperious zeal,' and tells how 'he would crush an ordinary opponent with a sledge-hammer style.' The epithet *mahā-mūrkh* ('great fool') was often on his lips when debating with the defenders of idolatry. Olcott speaks of him as 'tall, dignified in carriage, and gracious in manner,' and gives a general estimate of him in these words: 'The Swāmī was undoubtedly a great man, a learned Sanskrit Pandit, with immense pluck, force of will, and self-reliance—a leader of men' (*Old Diary Leaves*, p. 406).

2. Doctrine. — The official creed of the Ārya Samāj is in the form of a Decalogue, and it reads as follows:—

i. God is the primary cause of all true knowledge, and of everything known by its name.

ii. God is All-Truth, All-Knowledge, All-Beatitude, Incorporeal, Almighty, Just, Merciful, Unbegotten, Infinite, Unchangeable, without a beginning, Incomparable, the Support and the Lord of All, All-pervading, Omniscient, Imperishable, Immortal, Exempt from fear, Eternal, Holy, and the Cause of the Universe. *To Him alone worship is due.*

iii. The Vedas are the books of true knowledge, and it is the paramount duty of every Ārya to read or hear them read, to teach and preach them to others.

iv. One should always be ready to accept truth and renounce untruth.

v. All actions ought to be done conformably to virtue, *i.e.* after a thorough consideration of right or wrong.

vi. The primary object of the Samāj is to do good to the world by improving the physical, spiritual, and social condition of mankind.

vii. All ought to be treated with love, justice, and due regard to their merits.

viii. Ignorance ought to be dispelled and knowledge diffused.

ix. No one ought to be contented with his own good alone, but every one ought to regard his prosperity as included in that of others.

x. In matters which affect the general social well-being of the whole society, one ought to discard all differences and not allow one's individuality to interfere, but in strictly personal matters every one may act with freedom (*Handbook of the Ārya Samāj*, 1906).

It will be noticed that of the 'Ten Principles' given above, the first three, which deal with the existence and nature of God and with the doctrine of Vedic Scripture, are theologically the most important. The last seven are ethical principles. The Creed of the Ārya Samāj, it will be observed, is a *short* Creed. It is published with considerable variations in the phraseology, there being no insistence upon the same form of words.

In the *Handbook of the Ārya Samāj* we are told that 'the theology of the Ārya Samāj may be summed up in one word, viz. *the Vedas*' (p. 21). Combining principles i. and iii. of the Creed, namely, 'God is the primary cause of all true knowledge,' and 'The Vedas are the books of true knowledge,' we have the doctrine of the *Divine Origin of the Vedas*, which will now be considered.

In approaching this doctrine, let us first notice the problem of the regeneration of India, religious, political, and scientific, as it presented itself to the mind of the founder of the Ārya Samāj. He found himself confronted by a variety of faiths both indigenous and foreign. Of religions of foreign origin there were Islām, introduced in the 10th cent., and Christianity, a comparatively recent importation from the West. The indigenous religion of India, namely, Hinduism, presented itself as a vast congeries of faiths, ranging all the way from the strict *advaita* doctrine of Śaṅkarāchārya to the crudest and grossest superstitions embodied in the Tantras, the whole being held together in a kind of external unity by the vast hierarchical organization of caste. Such was the religious environment of Swāmī Dayānand. There was also a political environment furnished by the vast and impressive administration of the British Government in India, and a scientific environment consisting of the spectacle on all sides of railways, canals, telegraph wires, steam-engines, etc. Thus, as Swāmī Dayānand wandered up and down over India, he studied not only the past but also the present, not only the thought of India as embodied in *Veda* and *Upaniṣad*, *Sūtra* and *Epic*, but also the thought of Europe as embodied especially in the inventions of modern science, everywhere manifest in India.

The problem which confronted him was how to reform Indian religion, how to effect a synthesis of the old and the new, of the East and the West, in such a way as to guarantee the intellectual and spiritual supremacy of the Indian people, do full justice to the attainments of other nations, and provide a universalistic programme of religion. The solution of this problem was found by Swāmī Dayānand in the doctrine of the Vedas as the revealed Word of God.

There are many points of contact between Dayānand Sarasvatī and Martin Luther. As Luther the German monk was a child of the European

Renaissance, so Dayānand the Gujrātī monk was a child of the Indian Renaissance. Both alike felt the tug of the 'Zeitgeist'. Both in their different ways became exponents of the new spirit. Luther attacked indulgences, while Dayānand attacked idolatry. Luther appealed from the Roman Church and the authority of tradition to the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. Swāmī Dayānand appealed from the Brāhmanical church and the authority of *smṛti* to the earliest and most sacred of Indian Scriptures. The watchword of Luther was 'Back to the Bible'; the watchword of Dayānand was 'Back to the Vedas.'

Swāmī Dayānand's theory of the Vedas may be outlined as follows:—The word *Veda* means 'knowledge.' It is God's knowledge, and therefore pure and perfect. This transcendent and heavenly knowledge embraces the fundamental principles of all the sciences. These principles God revealed in two ways: (1) in the form of the four Vedas, which were taught to four *Ṛṣis*, Agni, Vāyu, Sūraj, and Aṅgira, at the beginning of Creation over one hundred billion years ago; and (2) in the form of the world of nature, which was created according to the principles laid down in the Vedas, somewhat as the Tabernacle is said to have been built according to the pattern shown in the mount (Ex 25^{40}). Mark the doctrine of correspondence involved. The book of Vedic Scripture agrees with the book of nature, so that the latter confirms the truth of the former. As Swāmī Dayānand says: 'I regard the Vedas as self-evident truth, admitting of no doubt and depending on the authority of no other book, *being represented in nature, the Kingdom of God*' (*Handbook of the Ārya Samāj*, p. 35).

Note the ambiguity in the meaning assigned to the word *Veda*. It is (1) God's knowledge, the content of the Divine Omniscience, *which is one thing*; and (2) it is the collection of Aryan literature known as the 'Four Vedas,' which is *quite a different thing*. One may believe in the Veda in the first sense, without accepting it in the second sense. The Vedas, then, being regarded as 'the Scripture of true knowledge,' the perfect counterpart of God's knowledge so far as 'basic principles' are concerned, and the 'pattern' according to which Creation proceeded, it follows that the fundamental principle of Vedic exegesis will be the interpretation of the Vedas in such a way as to find in them the results of scientific investigation. As E. D. Maclagan remarks: 'The bases of the Aryan faith are the revelation of God in the Vedas and the revelation of God in nature, and the first practical element in this belief is the interpretation of the Vedas in conformity with the proved results of natural science' (*Census of India*, 1891, xix. 175). In other words, there is involved the assumption that the Vedas as 'the books of true knowledge' must contain 'the basic principles of all the sciences,' and accordingly that every scientific discovery and invention of modern times must be found expressed, germinally at least, in the Vedas. The science of the West, then, is but the realization of the scientific programme anticipated by the seers of the East, over one hundred billion years ago. To the ancient East belonged the faculty of *seeing*: to the modern West belongs the faculty of *doing*. The programme comes from the East; the realization, from the West. In this way Swāmī Dayānand sought to render to the East the things which belong to the East, and to the West the things which belong to the West. Thus the West, in realizing the principles laid down in the Vedas, is unconsciously following the Vedic religion.

The principle that all the sciences have their revealed source in the Vedas is enlarged by the further principle that all religions have their original and inspired source in the same early literature. The doctrine of the Vedas as a primitive revelation given once for all to mankind, and so 'the fountain-head of religion,' reminds one of the similar doctrine of 'primitive revelation' held by some Christians. Diversities in religion are explained as due to the influence of different environments, in the one theory, upon the primitive Biblical revelation, in the other theory, upon the primitive Vedic revelation.

The Ārya doctrine of Vedic Scripture may now be summed up: (1) The Vedas are a revelation from God, as is proved by their correspondence with nature. (2) They are the sole revelation from God, since no other books show this correspondence. (3) They are accordingly the fountain-head of the science and the religion of all mankind. Such is the doctrinal basis of the two great duties of the Ārya Samāj, namely, (*a*) to recall India to the forsaken Vedic paths, and (*b*) to preach the Vedic gospel throughout the whole world.

It is evident from all this that Pandit Dayānand Sarasvatī was a man of large views. He was a dreamer of splendid dreams. He had a vision of India purged of her superstitions, filled with the fruits of science, worshipping one God, fitted for self-rule, and honoured as the primeval source of the world's science and religion.

All will admit that the vision of a regenerated India as seen by the prophet and founder of the Ārya Samāj is a splendid and inspiring one. But what about the means to be employed for the realization of this vision? As above stated, it is a return to the Vedas, but, be it noted, to the Vedas as interpreted, not by the traditional scholarship of Indian orthodoxy or by the critical scholarship of the West, but by the scholarship of the Ārya Samāj alone. The Scripture basis of the Ārya Samāj then, while formally the Vedas, is in reality a certain interpretation of the Vedas, which is not recognized as legitimate by a single Sanskrit scholar, either Indian or European, outside of the Ārya Samāj. This interpretation must be characterized as highly subjective and fanciful, different meanings being applied to the same word according to the caprice of the interpreter. One can readily imagine what kind of interpretation is involved in the attempt to find in the Vedas the programme of modern scientific inventions. Thus Swāmī Dayānand's interpretation of the Vedas is marked by (1) great emphasis on the etymology and neglect of actual Vedic usage, and (2) assumption of irregularity in the Vedic moods, tenses, persons, and cases. For the proof of these statements it is sufficient to consult Swāmī Dayānand's *Commentary on the Rig Veda*. The pamphlets on Pandit Dayānand's interpretation of the Vedas, written by T. Williams of Rewāri (1893–1894), and a pamphlet entitled *The Dayānandī Interpretation of the word Deva in the Rig Veda* (1897) may also be consulted. In this connexion the opinion of Max Müller is worth quoting: '*By the most incredible interpretations* Swāmī Dayānand succeeded in persuading himself and others that everything worth knowing, even the most recent inventions of modern Science, were alluded to in the Vedas. Steam-engines, railways, and steamboats, all were shown to have been known, at least in their germs, to the poets of the Vedas; for Veda, he argued, means knowledge, and how could anything have been hid from that?' (Max Müller, *Biographical Essays*, ii. 170). In a word, the Vedic interpretation of Swāmī Dayānand is interpretation in the interests of a theory—the theory, namely, that the Vedas teach a pure and exalted monotheism, and contain 'the basic principles of all the sciences.' It is as if one should attempt to

find a pure monotheism and a complete programme of scientific inventions in Homer's *Iliad* or Virgil's *Æneid*. Every historical allusion in the Vedas is carefully explained away, on the ground that 'the Vedas, being divine revelation, expound the laws of existence in its various departments, which precludes the mention of persons and places' (*Ārya Patrikā*, Lahore, Oct. 19, 1901). Thus *a priorism* reigns supreme. Induction has no place. Enough has been said to show that the doctrines of the Ārya Samāj are based not on the Vedas themselves but upon an *uncritical* and *unscientific* interpretation thereof.

On the other hand, it is only fair to say that Swāmī Dayānand has shown a sound instinct in rejecting the manifold absurdities found in *smṛti*, or tradition, and in seeking a basis in the early literature for a purer and more rational faith. That in his ignorance of historical and critical methods he set up a method of interpreting the Vedas which must constantly remain the target of the critical spirit, may in charity be regarded as his misfortune rather than his fault. Nor is this all that can be said. For, as in the case of those who are determined to regard Śrī Kṛṣṇa as an incarnation of deity, it is healthier and more ethical to allegorize his adventures with the *Gopis* than to take them literally, although by so doing a sin is committed against the critical conscience; even so we may say that for those who are bound to regard the Vedas as the Eternal Word of God, it is better that they should, by peculiar tricks of interpretation, read into the text a fairly consistent theism, than on the basis of a rigidly scientific interpretation find therein only a vague Henotheism or Pantheism. So much for the Ārya doctrine of the Vedas, which from its importance has been treated at length. The other doctrines of the Ārya Samāj may be dismissed with a word.

The *theology* of the Ārya Samāj is the religious philosophy of the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*. The fundamental principle of the *Sāṅkhya* is the dualism of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, 'matter' and 'soul.' The *Yoga*, or theistic *Sāṅkhya*, takes one of the innumerable souls recognized by the non-theistic *Sāṅkhya* and makes it the Supreme Soul. The result is a kind of trinity consisting of God, soul (or souls), and matter, each category of being having independent self-existence. God is eternal; so also is each soul; so also is matter. Pandit Ralla Rām refers to this as 'the universal trinity recognized by science and religion alike,' and as 'the most important of the doctrines of the Ārya Samāj' (*Ārya Patrikā*, Dec. 14, 1901).

As regards the *soteriology* of the Ārya Samāj, the great means of salvation is the effort of the individual, and for this a sufficient sphere is allowed through the doctrine of Transmigration, or repeated births. Salvation is conceived as virtually an eternal process. There is no remission of sins. *Karma* is inexorable. As regards the freedom of the will, the Ārya Samāj holds that 'we are not free to will an act, if we were created by some one else. . . . In order to be free, we must be believed to be eternally acting as we thought best, or as our previous *karmas* determined the course for us, receiving, according to God's eternal laws, the fruits of our good or bad deeds, and shaping in accordance therewith, and with our own hands, as it were, our future destiny' (*Ārya Patrikā*, Dec. 14, 1901).

It is evident from all this that the God of the Ārya Samāj is conceived as a great Cosmic Executive, whose business it is to preside over the inexorable processes of transmigration and *karma*. He is, as it were, a constitutional monarch, whose power is limited and defined by the eternal existence of two other 'estates,' namely, *soul* and *matter*. Thus 'absolutism is denied even to God.'

In the Ārya system of theology there is an attempt to settle the age-long conflict between science and religion. The doctrine of correspondence between the book of Vedic Revelation and the book of Nature is used for this purpose. Miracle is rejected.

Ethically, there is one doctrine of the Ārya Samāj which is most objectionable. This is the doctrine of *Niyoga*, which may be described as a virtual recognition of the principle of free love, sanctified by a temporary arrangement. Thus, in the English translation of the *Satyārth Prakāś* (ch. iv. p. 150), we read: 'A man may also contract *Niyoga* with eleven women (one after the other), just as a woman may enter into the relation of *Niyoga* with eleven men (one after the other).' Swāmī Dayānand's doctrine of *Niyoga* has been correctly summarized as follows by Lālā Ruchi Rām in the *Niyoga Doctrine of the Ārya Samāj* (p. 34):

'The Ārya Samāj allows even married men and married women to enter into the *Niyoga* connexion with one another or with widows and widowers under the following distinctly specified circumstances:

(1) When the husband or wife is incapable of producing issue through disease, etc.

(2) When the husband has been absent from home longer than a given period of time, for the sake of religion, for the acquisition of knowledge, or for earning a livelihood.

(3) When he or she is troublesome or in the habit of saying unkind words.

(4) When the wife is sterile, that is, if she has not been able to produce issue within eight years after the marriage.

(5) When the children born of her do not live long.

(6) If she begets girls only.

(7) If the wife be pregnant or constantly sick, or if the husband be always in bad health, and the other party be in the prime of youth and unable to control his or her passions.'

The motives which underlie this concession are twofold: (1) the duty of perpetuating the male line of a family, and (2) the desirability of legitimizing an errant passion and so 'preventing adultery and illicit intimacies.' '*Niyoga* is solemnized publicly even as marriage is' (*Satyārth Prakāś*, p. 147), and thus differs from prostitution. It is evident from all this that Swāmī Dayānand, like Plato, held strange views as to the proper relations between the sexes. In this respect both alike seem to have been theorizers. The members of the Ārya Samāj have not been courageous in practising *Niyoga* in the manner prescribed. Says the editor of the *Ārya Patrikā* (Sept. 27, 1902): 'We have to confess with regret that even the Āryas have not been able to set a single example of *the higher kind of Niyoga*.'

Before leaving the doctrines of the Ārya Samāj, it is proper to sum up the things also which are commendable in the doctrines and practices of this Society. Briefly stated, they are: (1) *negatively*, the rejection of pantheism and of some of the doctrines included therein, such as illusion and absorption, the casting over of the Paurāṇic superstitions together with idolatry, and a more or less vigorous fight against certain hurtful social customs such as caste, child-marriage, and intemperance; and (2) *positively*, the promulgation of a fairly consistent theism, the doctrine of the eternal identity of the soul, belief in prayer and in the need of the social worship of God, and a certain enthusiasm for education and for social and political reform.

3. The Society.—The organization which Swāmī Dayānand founded for the purpose of realizing his doctrine, propagating his faith, and regenerating India and the world, is known as the Ārya Samāj. *Samāj* means 'society' or 'assembly,' and *Ārya* is an ancient Indian epithet meaning 'noble.' *Ārya Samāj*, then, means 'society of the noble.' The name 'Ārya' is a patriotic and religious name, freighted with memories of ancient India, and

applied to the members of the three 'twice-born' castes. As such it was fitted to awaken patriotic sentiments. It is a social and political more than a religious name. In this respect it differs from the names of the other theistic and reforming movements of modern India, as, *e.g.*, the *Brahmo Samāj*, or 'Society of *Brahma* (God),' and the *Prārthnā Samāj*, or 'Society of Prayer.'

Some account will now be given of the history, organization, government, worship, methods of work, statistics, and future prospects of the Ārya Samāj.

(1) *History.*—The chief event of the period reaching from the death of Swāmī Dayānand (1883) to the present time is the division of the Ārya Samāj into two sections. The ostensible grounds of this split are twofold: (*a*) differences of practice in regard to the use of flesh for food, and (*b*) differences in theory concerning the proper policy to be pursued in higher education. From the point of view of the first difference, the two sections are called respectively the 'meat-eating' party and the 'vegetarian' party; and from the point of view of the second, the 'College' party and the '*Mahātmā*,' or old-fashioned party. Both differences run back into a still more fundamental difference of opinion, namely, concerning the degree of authority to be ascribed to the teachings of Swāmī Dayānand. In this matter, the position of the College party, as the party of light and culture, is liberal, while the attitude of the *Mahātmā* party is conservative. The educational work of each section is carried on in harmony with its special theory. The 'Cultured' party has a College at Lahore, the *Dayānand Anglo-Vedic College*, which it administers on modern lines and with a considerable degree of efficiency. The *Mahātmā* party, on the other hand, has an institution at Hardwār known as the *Gurukula*, in which ancient ideals of education receive the emphasis.

(2) *Organization and government.*—The organization of the Ārya Samāj provides for the local Samāj or congregation, the provincial assembly, and a general assembly for all India. The conditions of membership in a local Samāj are (*a*) implicit faith in the Ārya 'Decalogue,' or Ten Principles; and (*b*) belief in the canons of Vedic interpretation laid down by Swāmī Dayānand. The minimum age for membership is eighteen. There is no special ceremony of initiation for members of the 'twice-born' castes, but outsiders, such as Christians and Muhammadans, must undergo a ceremony of purification. The members of a local Samāj are of two kinds, probationers, or non-voting, and approved, or voting, members. The period of probation is one year. Sympathizers are also mentioned as a separate class. The officers of a local Samāj consist of a President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, and Librarian, elected by the voting members. The officers, it will be observed, are those of an ordinary secular association. The provincial assembly is a representative body composed of delegates appointed by the local congregations. Each affiliated Samāj has the right to send one delegate for every twenty members. Thus the form of government of the Ārya Samāj is clearly representative.

(3) *Worship.*—The weekly religious service of the Ārya Samāj is held on Sunday morning, since the Government offices are closed on that day. It is a long service, lasting three or four hours. Directly in front of the speaker's platform in the place of worship is the Vedic Fire Altar, which occupies the same relative position as the Communion Table in many Christian churches. Religious worship begins with the burning of incense (the *homa*, 'sacrifice'), accompanied by the chanting of Vedic verses. This is followed by prayers, exposition of the writings of Swāmī Dayānand, hymns, sermon, and lecture, the whole ending with the recitation of the Creed. With the exception of the use of incense, the constituents of worship are those of an ordinary Protestant service. The service is Puritan in its simplicity. There is no official priesthood. Members who are qualified take their turn in conducting public worship. The prayers are mostly extempore, and the sermon is long. For a very graphic account of the devotional services of the Ārya Samāj, see J. C. Oman, *Cults, Customs, and Superstitions of India*, pp. 152–166.

(4) *Methods of work.*—In its methods of work the Ārya Samāj follows in general the methods current among the various Missionary Societies working in India. It uses preaching, education, tract distribution, newspapers, etc. There are two classes of preachers, honorary and paid. The honorary preachers are local, the paid are itinerant. The first class consists of men in regular employment as clerks, pleaders, teachers, physicians, and other business men, mostly English-educated, and many of them College-bred. The paid preachers, on the other hand, give all their time to the work of preaching, and are, as a rule, educated only in the vernacular. The 'Cultured' party, it is interesting to observe, emphasizes *education*, while the *Mahātmā* party emphasizes *preaching*. Each section of the Ārya Samāj maintains a number of high-schools and orphanages, and also several newspapers and reviews.

(5) *Statistics and future prospects.*—According to the *Imperial Gazetteer of India* (1907), i. 474, the Ārya Samāj in 1901 had 'over 92,000 professed adherents.' It 'showed an increase of 131 per cent. in the decade preceding the last census' (*ib.*). The Ārya Samāj probably has by this time a membership of considerably over 100,000. The largest number of members is found in the Panjāb and the United Provinces, nearly 98 per cent., according to the census of 1901. Thus the Ārya Samāj is essentially a North India religious movement. There are a few branches in Burma and in British East Africa, the fruit of work among Indians who have emigrated to those regions. Lahore is the religious centre and capital of the Ārya Samāj, although Ajmēr, as the scene of the death of Swāmī Dayānand and the seat of the Vedic press, is a close rival.

As regards the future of the Ārya Samāj, it is difficult to play the prophet. It is undoubtedly the most popular among the indigenous reforming movements in North India to-day. In the matter of female education, temperance, and other reforms, it is in the line of progress. It also ministers to the patriotic spirit through its claim that the Vedas are the original source of all the religion and science of the world. It contains many earnest and good men who sincerely desire the welfare of their country. By its emphasis on education and social reform it is playing no unimportant part in the regeneration of India. It keeps in close touch with orthodox Hinduism through the fact that comparatively few members of the Ārya Samāj have broken caste. Will it ultimately be re-absorbed into the abyss of Hinduism, as some think probable, or will it advance to a still more rational and enlightened position?

LITERATURE.—I. *BIOGRAPHICAL*.—'The Autobiography of Dayānand Sarasvatī Swāmī' in the *Theosophist*, Oct and Dec. 1879 and Nov. 1880; Max Müller, 'Dayānand Sarasvatī,' in *Biographical Essays*, 1884; J. C. Oman, *Cults, Customs, and Superstitions of India*, 1908, ch. vii. 'The Ārya Samāj and its Founder'; Pandit Lekh Rām and Lālā Ātmā Rām, *Maharṣi Swāmī Dayānand Sarasvati Ji Maharaj ka Jivan Charitra*, 1897 (the standard biography of the Swāmī); Bāwā Arjan Singh, *Dayānand Sarasvati, Founder of the Ārya Samāj*, 1901; Bāwā Chhajju Singh, *The Life and Teachings of Swāmi Dayānand Sarasvati*, 1903.

II. *DOCTRINAL.*—*Rigvedabhāṣya* (*i.e.* the Rigveda translated into Hindi and explained); *Rigvedādibhāṣya Bhūmikā* (introduction in Hindi to the above-mentioned *Commentary on the Vedas*); *Satyārth Prakāś*, 'Light of Truth,' Eng. tr., Chiranjiva Bharadwāja, 1906. The three works just mentioned are all from the pen of Swāmi Dayānand Sarasvatī, and constitute the authoritative literature of the Ārya Samāj.

III. *CRITICAL.*—Pandit Kharak Singh and H. Martyn Clark, *The Principles and Teaching of the Ārya Samāj*, 1887; Henry Forman, *The Ārya Samāj, its Teachings, and an Estimate of it*, 1890; Lālā Ruchi Rām Sahni, *The Niyoga Doctrine of the Ārya Samāj*, Lahore, 1897; Pandit S. N. Agnihotri (of the Deva Samāj), *Pandit Dayānand Unveiled*; B. A. Nag, 'The Ārya Samāj, its History, Progress, and Methods,' in *Indian Evangelical Review*, Oct. 1901; H. D. Griswold, 'The Ārya Samāj,' in *Transactions of the Victoria Institute*, xxxv., 1903; Iswar Saran, 'The Ārya Samāj, its Present Position,' in the *Hindustan Review*, Allahabad, Dec. 1907; *A Hand-Book of the Ārya Samāj*, Benares, 1906; *The Vedic Magazine and Gurukula Samāchār*, vol. i., 1907–1908. H. D. GRISWOLD.

ASAṄGA.—The sources of our knowledge about Asaṅga's life are the records left by Paramārtha (6th cent.), Yuan Chwang [Hiuen Tsiang] (7th cent.), I-Tsing (do.), and Tāranātha (16th cent.). From these we can gather the following data. He was born of the Kāuśika family in Puruṣapura in the north of India. He was the eldest of three brothers, of whom the youngest, known as Vasubandhu (*q.v.*), was intimately associated with him in religious and literary activities. The school in which Asaṅga was ordained as a monk was the Mahīśāsaka, a branch of the most ancient form of Buddhism; but he was afterwards (we do not know how or when) converted to a more idealistic phase of Buddhist philosophy, which is now known as Asaṅga's idealism. Still we see that his idealism is much influenced by his former faith.

According to Yuan Chwang, Ayodhyā (the modern Oudh) was the chief scene of his activity. Here it was that he taught publicly and wrote books, etc.; and here probably in Ayodhyā, on the bank of the Sarayū, he converted his brother Vasubandhu to the idealistic Mahāyāna, though, according to Paramārtha, this took place in Puruṣapura, their native town. In any case it is clear that both Asaṅga and his brother were closely connected with the court of Ayodhyā, and that they were contemporaries of King Bālāditya and his father Vikramāditya. If we identify this Vikramāditya with Chandragupta II. of the Gupta dynasty, his date can be fixed in the first half of the 5th cent. A.D.; if with Skandagupta, in the second half. This is confirmed from another source. Yuan Chwang tells us that his master Śīlabhadra was 107 years old when he saw him in 633 A.D. Śīlabhadra's master, Dharmapāla, was a great systematizer of Asaṅga's teaching, but he was not his immediate disciple. Thus we have sufficient grounds for fixing Asaṅga's date in the 5th cent. of our era.

Many writings (*śāstras*) ascribed to Asaṅga are enumerated by Yuan Chwang. They are all handed down to us in Chinese translations. Although not one of the originals has yet been discovered, and there can, therefore, be no question of any strict criticism, nevertheless the authenticity of their tradition is assured by the fact that most of them were brought to China by Yuan Chwang himself, who was the greatest apostle of Asaṅga's philosophy in the East. The most important are the following:—

(1) Yogāchārya-bhūmi (Nanjio, No. 1170). This contains descriptions of the practice of Yoga, and of the stages one successively attains through it. The work is ascribed to the revelation of Maitreya. (2) Mahāyāna-samparigraha (Nanjio, No. 1247), a condensed treatise on the whole system of Asaṅga's psychology. (3) Prakaraṇa-āryavāchā (Nanjio, Nos. 1177 and 1202), an exposition of the moral and practical aspects of the system.

We learn from these sources that Asaṅga's system, in contrast to the Mādhyamika of Nāgārjuna, is decidedly realistic. Though it bears the name of Vijñāti-mātratā, *i.e.* idealism, and though Buddhist enlightenment consists, according to Asaṅga, in release from attachment to the objective world, his philosophy postulates the reality of each man's personality and also of the external world. In this respect his system is very near to the Sāṅkhya.

Asaṅga terms mind the *ālaya*, *i.e.* abode or *nidus* where all things, both subjective and objective, are latent, and whence they are projected and manifested. This *nidus* produces from and by itself intelligence or will (*manas*, otherwise *kliṣṭa-manas*), reason (*buddhi*, or *manas*), and five senses (*vijñānāni*) in succession. It is, therefore, called the eighth (*aṣṭama*), just like the Sāṅkhyan *puruṣa*. Each of the sense-organs projects or manifests its own objects, both fine and gross, by virtue of the seed (*bīja*) stored up in the *ālaya*; and the world thus manifested or objectified reacts upon the eighth (the *ālaya*) through the seven subordinate mind-organs, by 'perfuming' them. The *nidus*, or source of the world, the *ālaya*, acts, in this way, as that which *takes on* the impressions received from the objective world, *i.e.* as the *ādhāna*. Illusion in human life thus consists in regarding the objectification of one's own mind as a world independent of that mind which is really its source. To get rid of this fundamental illusion, we must study the true nature of our mind and its objectifications. Right knowledge of its true nature, the *dharma-lakṣaṇa*, leads us to the full development of the 'seeds of enlightenment,' and, as a consequence, to the absorption of the whole world into one's own self. Following, therefore, on right knowledge, this absorption, first of thought and then of objective phenomena into the inner self, *i.e.* the *yoga-āchāra*, is the necessary step to the attainment of Buddhahood (see BODHISATTVA).

Asaṅga teaches seventeen grades (*bhūmi*) of this attainment, and also the three personalities or bodies (*trikāya*, see ADIBUDDHA, i. 97ᵇ, and *JRAS*, 1906, p. 943 ff.) of the Buddha (see TRIADS [Bud.]); but neither of these doctrines was originated by him. The characteristic feature of his system is the elaborate and scholastic systematization of a theory of mind and of the seeds contained in it. On this account the Buddhist sect founded upon his system is called the *Dharma-lakṣaṇa*, *i.e.* the wisdom which shows us the true nature of all phenomena. It is, therefore, a philosophy rather than a religion; and such religious traits as may be found in it are but loosely connected with the system.

In Asaṅga's Buddhism, faith in Gautama Buddha had declined, being gradually superseded by the worship of Maitreya, the future Buddha. This worship maintained its ground for a long time in India and the East, but it was at last overwhelmed by another feature of popular Buddhism, the worship of Amitāyus (*q.v.*), lord of the Sukhāvatī in the West. In this way Asaṅga's Buddhism lost its hold on India and China, and is now preserved simply as a branch of learning among the Japanese Buddhists.

LITERATURE.—*Life of Vasubandhu* (Nanjio, No. 1463); cf. Wassilieff, *Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Gesch. und Liter.... aus Russischen übersetzt*, Leipzig, 1860, pp. 235–243; *Vie de Yuan Chwang*, pp. 83, 114, 118; J. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion by I-Tsing*, Oxford, 1896, p. 186; Schiefner, *Tāranātha*, pp. 107–118; J. Takakusu, 'Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu' in *JRAS*, 1905, pp. 33–53; Nanjio, *Catalogue*, Appendix i. No. 5, also *Twelve Japanese Buddhist Sects*, Tōkyō, 1886; Fujishima, *Le Bouddhisme Japonais*, Paris, 1889, ch. iv.; H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896, 128 f., and the references there given; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet, or Lamaism*, London, 1895, p. 141 f.

M. ANESAKI.

ASCENSION.—See ASSUMPTION AND ASCENSION.

ASCETICISM.

Introduction (T. C. HALL), p. 63.
Buddhist (C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS), p. 69.
Celtic (E. ANWYL), p. 71.
Christian (O. ZÖCKLER), p. 73.
Egyptian.—See Semitic.
Greek (W. CAPELLE), p. 80.
Hindu (A. S. GEDEN), p. 87.
Japanese (M. REVON), p. 96.
Jewish (A. E. SUFFRIN), p. 97.
Muhammadan (R. A. NICHOLSON), p. 99.
Persian (N. SÖDERBLOM), p. 105.
Roman (J. S. REID), p. 106.
Semitic and Egyptian (G. A. BARTON), p. 110.
Vedic.—See VEDIC RELIGION.

I. INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION AND DEFINITION.—'Asceticism' is derived from the Gr. word ἄσκησις = 'training.' The 'athlete' was one trained, and one might be an 'athlete' in virtue (πάσης ἀρετῆς ἀθλητής, Diod. *Excerp.* 551). So very early the ascetic became the spiritual athlete of Church History. Two quite different conceptions mingle in the history of asceticism. One of these preserves the original meaning of discipline of the body for some ultimate purpose, as when William James urges sacrifice to God and duty as a means of training the will (*Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 322, cf. also pp. 579–592). The other conception distrusts the body altogether. Asceticism has then as its function not the training but the destroying of the body or the negation of its importance.

1. Pathological elements in asceticism.—From the beginning we have to bear in mind that in the history of asceticism we are often dealing with phenomena distinctly *pathological*. The fact that this has only recently been fully recognized makes a critical investigation of all the phenomena exceedingly desirable. Whether we deal with the 'flagellantes' or with instances of *perversio vitæ sexualis*, we must recognize a distinctly psycho-pathological element in much of the self-torture and self-abnegation that goes by the name of asceticism. The close connexion between the excited emotions in the regions of love and religion has often been pointed out and variously explained (Neumann, *Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie*, p. 80; Krafft-Ebing, *Psychopathia Sexualis*, pp. 9–11); and in diseased conditions insane impulses to inflict pain and to suffer pain mark the mind controlled either by religious or by sexual emotions. It is not now difficult for the modern psychiatrist to recognize in the standard saints' stories of the Middle Ages many impulses familiar to him from his experience in the Insane Hospital, but which were, of course, at that time regarded only as evidence of piety and distinguished fellowship with God (Friedreich, *Gerichtliche Psychologie*, p. 389). Perversions of the natural impulses to protect the body from pain and destruction may range from slight and occasional contradictions to the madness of suicide. Thus no history of asceticism is complete that does not take into account the epidemics of hysteria in which all kinds of excesses against the body are committed. These outbreaks are common in Persia as well as in India, and marked the north of Italy from the 10th cent. until the 13th. At every step of a rational inquiry into asceticism in its most pronounced phases we must ask ourselves, How far are we dealing with distinctly morbid and neuropathic phenomena?

LITERATURE.—Maudsley, *Pathology of the Mind*, London, 1879; Krafft-Ebing, *Psychopathia Sexualis*, Stuttgart, 1887, *Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie*, 1879; Friedreich, *Diagnostik der psyc. Krankheiten*[2], Wurzburg, 1832, and *System der gerichtl. Psychologie*, Regensburg, 1842; Cramer, *Gerichtl. Psychiatrie*[4], 1908; H. Neumann, *Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie*, Erlangen, 1859.

2. Survival forms in seeming asceticism.—We must also deal with *survival forms* which are falsely classed as ascetic. Customs are classed as ascetic even by so critical an historian as Zöckler (*Askese und Monchtum*[2], 1897) which may more correctly be connected with the survival of older moralities. Thus the Essenes saw the hope of Israel in desert life and in return to a seminomad communism. How far this was ascetic, however, it is impossible to say. To be ascetic this type of communism must be shown to be connected either (*a*) with a disciplinary process for the attainment of righteousness, or (*b*) with a complete negation of the body by its mortification. Even granting that the Essenes were ascetics (cf., however, art. 'Essenes' in Hastings' *DB*, in which this is not emphasized), all their peculiarities are not to be connected with their asceticism. Professional men in our age wear black coats, not from motives of asceticism, but as survivals of past fashions. The robes of the monks, the communism of various sects, the treating of vegetable diet as superior to meat diet, may all be connected with ascetic modes of life, but they may also be mere survivals of past customs, or a recrudescence of old ideals. In new social and economic situations past moralities see much to blame, and can find hope only in reverting to the outward simpler life of the past and its forms. Such reversion is, however, only in a secondary sense ascetic. It is, nevertheless, true that the ascetic finds a ready discipline in such reversions; and cave-dwellings, communism, vegetarianism, primitive dress, etc., all play their part in the history of asceticism, but must be always examined carefully when they occur, for they may appear, where no ascetic motive proper can be shown, simply as survivals.

LITERATURE.—Ritschl, *Entstehung d. altkatholischen Kirche*, Bonn, 1857, pp. 179–203, for discussion of Essenes as ascetics; see also *Naturforscherversammlung*, viii. 184, Hamburg, 1893; Bousset, *Rel. des Judentums*[2], Berlin, 1906, pp. 484–496; Lucius, *Der Essenismus in seinem Verhältniss zum Judentum*, Strassburg, 1881; Schurer, *HJP* II. ii. 188 ff.; art. 'Essenes' in Hastings' *DB* by Conybeare, in *DCG* by C. A. Scott, in *EBi* by Julicher, in *PRE*[3] by Uhlhorn; *JQR* vii. 558, viii. 155.

3. Symbolic forms mistaken for asceticism.—Some customs are not ascetic, but are *symbolic forms*. Primarily asceticism consists in the contradiction of natural desires under the mandate of some higher, or supposed higher, ideal set by the will before the life. Such contradiction involves pain and discomfort for the person, that the body may be disciplined into subjection or removed as a hindrance to the soul's development. Soon, however, such contradictions are symbolized, and the symbols become conventional, the original significance being sometimes lost. Thus the tonsure, shaving the head, peculiar clothing, taking the last place in the procession, etc., may become mere symbols of what was once the expression of an attempt at self-mortification. Here again the student must be careful to mark customs that have become binding through usage or enactment, and that may seem ascetic, as the wearing of phylacteries, or broadened borders to garments (Mt 23[5]), but which in truth may have an entirely different motive, this motive being either sanitary or æsthetic, or based on racial distinction, on misinterpreted phrases from religious authority, or the like. Sometimes a symbol with such past significance becomes a sign of self-mortification. The wearing of sandals had no ascetic significance as it arose in a hot country, but, transferred to the north of Europe, it became a familiar symbol of self-denial among the monastic orders.

4. Disciplinary asceticism.—Every system of morals enforces the discipline of the will, and all systems of developed casuistry suggest methods of such discipline (cf. Paulsen, *System d. Ethik*[5], vol. ii. pp. 10–29, ed. 1900; and the 'Spiritual Exercises' of the Roman Communion). In this definition might be included, therefore, all exercises undertaken as training of the moral life, and carried through not for the sake of the exercise but for the effect produced upon the person using it. Thus also spiritual exercises may have a mingled motive, on the one side the pleasure of actual participation, and on the other obedience to the impulse to overcome habitual sloth by doing what is at the moment unpleasant or even painful. So fundamental has regularity been to life's development (cf. Wundt's *Ethik*, ed. 1886, p. 120), that religion has ever insisted upon recurrent periods of religious exercise in festivals, Sundays, hours of sacrifice and prayer, etc. And the ethical value of enforced regularity has been so apparent that in all developed religious systems disciplinary asceticism has had a more or less pronounced place. In evangelical Protestantism, tithes, church-going, grace before meat, family devotions are felt to have this disciplinary value, apart from the spiritual mood of the moment, and sometimes in spite of felt unreality on the devotional side. The substitution of the rational and significant for the arbitrary and mysterious in religious acts has gone far in Protestantism, but perhaps at some loss to the disciplinary effectiveness of these acts. In the Roman Communion, the division of the year, the month, and even the day, is minutely undertaken; and, viewed as a means of ascetic discipline of the life, such divisions have untold influence. Asceticism in this sense has the commendation of all great Protestant writers (cf. Luther's Sermon 'Von den guten Werken,' 1520). Acts that have no value *per se* may become disciplinary measures of great usefulness as means to gain self-control, regularity of life, proper self-appreciation, etc. It may be necessary for the moral man to exercise himself spiritually, as a man of thought trains his thinking capacity and subjects it to severe tests, or as the physical athlete engages in increasingly severe bodily exercise for the development of his muscle. The NT writers, and especially St. Paul, abound in directions along this line (Ro 8^{1-14}, 1 Co 9^{24-27}, Ja 3^{1-12}). The temptation to attribute to such exercises a special merit *per se*, and to harden them into a legal bondage, is so great that it has made Protestantism fearful in developing the ascetic life, perhaps even along legitimate lines. In the study of asceticism, however, the student must carefully keep present to his mind this legitimate element amid the legalistic and dualistic distortions.

LITERATURE.—Paulsen, *System d. Ethik*[5], Berlin, 1900, ii. 10–29; Wundt, *Ethik*, Stuttgart, 1886, p. 120; Black, *Culture and Restraint*, London, 1901, p. 187; Harnack, *What is Christianity?* Eng. tr. 1904, p. 81.

5. Dualistic asceticism.—The popular conceptions of asceticism have grown up in connexion with the experience of it linked with a distinct attitude towards life. In this thought the material body is inherently evil, and the spiritual element is alone good. (For the history of this, see the §§ 'Indian Asceticism' and 'Greek Asceticism,' p. 65). The object of ascetic exercise is not the *training* of the body, but its ultimate *extinction*, that the soul may be free (cf. Plato's *Timæus*, 69–71). This is a metaphysical dualism which separates soul and body, God and the world, material and spiritual, into sharply contrasted realities, and life is looked at more or less as the struggle for supremacy and the ultimate victory of spirit by the extinction of the material and lower elements. There are all degrees of this metaphysical dualism, from the sharp emphasis upon the negative work of destroying the body, that the soul may be free from its desires and itself cease (cf. Max Müller on 'Nirvāna' in *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. i. pp. 276–287), to the positive emphasis upon union with God on the part of the soul by abstraction, contemplation, and faith, as in modern Pietism (cf. A. Ritschl's *Geschichte des Pietismus*, vol. i. pp. 1–60). In all shades of this thinking, asceticism plays its part. World-flight in various degrees becomes the standard of holiness. It may be only abstention from certain forms of amusement, or it may be the life of Trappist silence, but what determines the conduct is not loving expediency within the realms of a Christian freedom (Gal 5^{1}), using the world but not abusing it (cf. Augustine, *de vera Religione*, §§ 21 and 36), but world-flight, as from that which is inherently antagonistic to spiritual perfection (cf. A. Ritschl, *Die christliche Vollkommenheit*, 1902). This dualistic asceticism always results in establishing a double standard of holiness. The exigencies of social organization enable only a few actually to realize world-flight to any extent; for the average man some symbolic or sacramental substitute must be found. Hence the whole doctrine of merit grows up with dualistic asceticism, as thus enabling a chosen few to flee from the world and impart of their holiness to less fortunate or less gifted followers. In the history of asceticism, upon which we now enter, we shall find many elements mingling, and it is often impossible and always difficult exactly to determine with which special conception we have to do.

LITERATURE.—Max Müller, *Chips from a German Workshop*, i. 276–287; Ritschl, *Gesch. der Pietismus*, 1886, i. 1–60, and *Die christliche Vollkommenheit*, 1902.

II. *HISTORY OF ASCETICISM.*—**1. Ancient ascetic customs.**—Almost all primitive life is marked by certain trials of courage to which the boy reaching manhood must submit. The customs sometimes assume a time of preparation, and priestly or religious direction was only a natural development (cf. Tylor, ii. 362–442; Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, 1871). So also marriage has its rites, some of which have, no doubt, a sanitary origin, some are memories of past culture, while all of them may become in course of time ascetic, in the sense that they are regarded as a necessary training for the communal life. Thus circumcision became a religious rite, and in a sense may even be regarded as ascetic (cf. Wellhausen, *Prolegomena zur Gesch. Isr.* 1883, p. 360). But in a strict sense, as a discipline for the *spiritual* life, it cannot be classed as ascetic. And the classes of customs gathered by Zöckler (*Askese und Mönchtum*[2], 1897, pp. 78–97) are almost without exception symbolic substitutes for outgrown customs, or they have social and legal significance apart from any true ascetic motive. Training for war and preparation for life's simpler duties produced customs which later on became the forms of ascetic practice; but in general it may be said that any developed asceticism belongs only to a high and elaborate economic stage. Asceticism proper belongs to an age of reflexion. Men in the process of moralization, looking out on life, revert to simple habits in the hope of restoring a morality that seems to them endangered. Thus the *forms* of asceticism have their history in customs that were in no sense ascetic. We have here to do with that variation of purpose of which Wundt rightly makes so much (*Ethik*, pp. 97–105, ed. 1886). A famine was viewed by primitive man as a direct infliction of the demons. To ward it off, self-inflicted periods of hunger, *i.e.* fasting, were the natural remedy. The punishment was thus anticipated and the demons were conciliated. There was no ascetic

motive until spiritual man sought in this form of religious custom a means for self-discipline. To the semi-nomad Amos the luxury of a commercial capital was immoral, and his only hope was a return to the nomad morality and semi-nomad customs and habits. The artificial music, ivory beds, etc. (Am 6^{4-6}), were hateful to him because connected with the luxury of a commercial development whose moral strains his people were standing but badly. The motive in his denunciation was, however, not ascetic, but patriotic and primitive. A tribe sees itself threatened with extinction, and to appease the wrath of gods or demons offers one of its members in human sacrifice (Iphigenia, Curtius, etc.). Later a *surrogatum* was found in animal sacrifice, or the devotion of that which was most precious to the worshipper (the Judæan-Prophetic story of Abraham, Gn 22^{1-19}). So at last the painful parting with possessions becomes by a process of reflexion a means of spiritual discipline in vows of poverty. At the same time the ascetic motive must be sought in the latest development. Hence the student must watch with care the uncritical collections of evidence for asceticism in primitive history. It is, to say the least, doubtful if, outside of the highest civilization, asceticism in the strict sense of either discipline or negation of the bodily desires can be shown anywhere (cf., however, Zockler, *op. cit.*).

LITERATURE.—Waitz, *Anthrop. der Naturvolker*, 1871; Wellhausen, *Proleg. zur Gesch. Isr.* 1883, p. 360; Zockler, *Askese und Monchtum*[2], 1897, pp. 78–97; Wundt, *Ethik*, 1886, pp. 97–105.

2. Persian and Indian asceticism.—Geographical and racial factors in the development have exposed the populations of Persia, India, and Egypt to a long succession of oppressive tyrannies by physically superior, but often mentally and spiritually inferior, races (Mongol, Muhammadan, English). The Orient has hence become the breeding-ground for religions of despondency or even despair (cf. Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*[3], ii. 701–703). Although in the Avesta fasting and mortification are forbidden (Spiegel, *Avesta*, ii. lviii.; cf. especially *Vendîdâd*, iv. 47–49), and a great many of the alleged evidences for a primitive asceticism in Persia will not stand a critical investigation, yet Mani and the very prohibitions of asceticism are evidences that in Persia as well as in India and Egypt spiritual suffering gave rise to a pantheistic world-view, with despair and asceticism as characteristic features. The forms of this asceticism are those of world-flight, the hermit life, the mortification of the body by unnatural inhibitions of all its desires. The most imperative of these was the sexual impulse, and hence, as it was also linked with the continuance of a hated existence, the mortification of this impulse became primary. As Indian religion became fully self-conscious in Buddhism and Jainism, it deliberately opposed the ascetic to the legal, and the life of contemplation to rituals and sacrifice, and democracy to caste-aristocracy (cf. Max Muller, *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. i. art. 'Buddhism'). The asceticism of Brâhmanism aimed at absorption into God. It was a training for spiritual vision. The asceticism of Brâhmanism, as awakened to full self-consciousness in the Buddhist reformation, was a negation of all life, the denial of the will to live (cf. Max Müller, *op. cit.*, art. 'Nirvâṇa'). This is the logical outcome of dualistic asceticisms, the perfection of world-flight. Even the monastic system is a compromise; and although it sprang up in India in response to the imperative social instinct, the hermit and the faqir are the real types (cf. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, London, 1878). The relatively mild asceticism of Buddhism seems due rather to the good sense of Gautama Buddha than to the logic of his teaching, and the result has been that ever increasing sects have pushed the logic of asceticism to its limits.

LITERATURE.—Besides works quoted, cf. Kuenen, *Hibbert Lectures*, 'National and Universal Religions,' London, 1882, Monier Williams, *Buddhism in its connection with Brahmanism and Hinduism*, London, 1889; Silbernagl, *Der Buddhismus nach seiner Entstehung, Fortbildung und Verbreitung*, Munich, 1891; H. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, Eng. tr. 1882, p. 61, T. E. Slater, *The Higher Hinduism in relation to Christianity*, 1903, p. 253. See also special artt. ('Hindu' and 'Persian') below.

3. Greek asceticism.—The æsthetic inhibitions prevented in Greece the disagreeable and morbid developments of asceticism found in India. Moreover, the evolution period was shorter. Yet the waning freedom of Greece and the high intelligence of her population began even in Plato's day to produce a despondent and ascetic as well as a pantheistic type of religious thought. It is immaterial whether this arose on the soil of Greece independently of the Orient (so Zeller, *Philosophie d. Griechen*[3], iii. pp. 70, 420 ff.; but cf. Roth, *Geschichte uns. abendlandischen Philosophie*, 2 vols.), or was an introduction from without. It rapidly developed from the teachings of Plato (cf. *Philebus*, 41; *Phædo*, 66–67, 82–83; *Apology*, 40), whose dialogues contain all the germs of the future Neo-Platonic development (consult treatment by Zeller, Weber, and Ueberweg-Heinze in their Histories of Philosophy). The cosmological speculations had their real religious interest in the assertion of the increasing badness of the phenomenal world as it fell below the spiritual reality. Nor is it essential whether the final belief was in a permanent separation of the two elements or an ultimate extinction of the lower element; the groundwork of an ascetic development is the hopeless surrender of the phenomenal as the sphere only of evil. The character of Greek asceticism was again controlled by the philosophic interest. The elimination of the phenomenal was by contemplation rather than by mortification. The way of salvation was escape from the body by pure thought. Even for Aristotle the higher life is open only to the man of pure speculative activity. In Neo-Platonism the Oriental mysticism was united definitely with Greek metaphysics (cf. Ueberweg, i. § 64, pp. 312–359). The Hellenistic-Judaic and the Neo-Pythagorean schools found their final expression along ascetic and mystical lines in Plotinus and Porphyry. God and the world were definitely separated. God as pure being was abstracted from all phenomenal manifestation. Salvation was in the beatific vision. Asceticism was the way of freedom from the fleshly. Between God and man angels and spirits became mediators, and revelation was in philosophy and ecstasy. Thus the waning faith of a homeless Greek culture found refuge, just where India found it, in ascetic despondency and theosophic speculation.

LITERATURE.—Besides the philosophical handbooks of Ueberweg-Heinze, Windelband, Weber, and Zeller, cf. E. W. Moller, *Geschichte der Kosmologie in der griechischen Kirche bis auf Origenes*, Halle, 1860; Leopold Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, 2 vols, Berlin, 1882, Roth, *Geschichte uns. abendlandischen Philosophie*[2], Mannheim, 1862; J. Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, 1908, p. 375; Rohde, *Psyche*[2], Tubingen, 1898. See also separate art. ('Greek') below.

4. Asceticism and Judaism.—(*a*) *Canonical Judaism.*—All early religions resort to various forms of self-inflicted privation or suffering to appease the assumed wrath of gods or demons. Famine is anticipated by fasting (cf. above), and wounding the body becomes a *surrogatum* for the punishment the offended powers would otherwise inflict with more fatal results. The motive in these cases is, however, not strictly speaking ascetic. The spiritual life is not being trained, nor is the body being destroyed as a thing evil in itself. Distinguishing, as we must in the interests of clear thinking, asceticism proper from such survivals of ancient thought, Judaism is seen to be a distinctly

non-ascetic religion. The fasts and the days of humiliation ('afflict your souls'), as in Lv 23^{26-32}, are no more ascetic in the strict sense than a day of prayer in a Protestant community. Some of the directions about the relations of sex may seem at first sight ascetic (Ex 19^{15}, Lv 15^{16-18} etc.), but a close examination shows that the motive was not ascetic, but had to do with the conception of a physical uncleanness (perhaps sanitary in origin) before Jahweh. This magical conception of impurity led to washings, lustrations, certain sexual inhibitions, but we find no trace of asceticism proper in the gradual evolution of the Jewish ritual. The dualistic asceticism of the Orient seems to leave no trace upon the canonical books. The fundamental conception of God, indeed, excludes it. Nor does it obtrude itself even as a foreign element, as it does in Muhammadanism. In spite of national disaster, the eschatological hopes of the Jews (cf. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums*[2], Berl. 1906, pp. 245–346) continually counterbalanced any beginnings of despair, such as we may notice in Job, Ecclesiastes, and Lamentations. For spiritual discipline the Jew turned to the study of the Torah (Ps 119), or submitted with great ease to the burden of a legal system. In all ages, however, the mystic world-view that lends itself to asceticism is sooner or later at war with any developed legalism, and likewise a developed legalism works inevitably against the mystic-ascetic type of religious thought. The evidences cited by Zöckler for an undeveloped asceticism (*Askese und Monchtum*[2], pp. 113–120) will not bear critical examination. The Nazirite vows have no real marks of strict asceticism (cf. art. 'Nazirite' in Hastings' *DB*). They were vows of special consecration to Jahweh for a longer or shorter period, and represent survivals of primitive Semitic religious customs; but spiritual or ethical *training* was wholly lacking (cf. the story of Samson), and they had no marks of any desire to destroy the body. The abstinence from wine is a survival of nomad morality protesting against the agricultural stage (Hermann Schultz, *Alttest. Theologie*[5], 1896, § 111). The priestly regulation of the Nazirite vow has so destroyed its primitive character, that we must completely re-construct it in the light of the stories of Samson and Samuel and the allusions to the Rechabites (cf. art. 'Rechabites' in Hastings' *DB*). Jahweh as the storm-god of the desert had those who even in the midst of an agricultural economic stage were His earnest champions and the maintainers of more primitive types of conduct. Thus the forms were given in which asceticism might begin to develop, as perhaps in John the Baptist, although even here again we deal with other spiritual phenomena (cf. next col.); and only when the influence of the Orient and Greece can be historically traced in Judaism do we find undoubted evidences of the ascetic ideal. The story of Jephthah's daughter has no real bearing on the question (cf. Hastings' *DB*, art. 'Jephthah,' and the Comm. of Budde and Moore, *ICC*). The fasts, feasts, and ceremonial regulations of Jewish religion proceeded upon a supposition which excludes Oriental asceticism, for the nation is holy to Jahweh, and the body can and must be kept ceremonially holy. This is binding on all; but priests and Nazirites, who come into closest contact with Jahweh, must be especially holy, *i.e.* ritually clean. The religions of the Orient centre in the negation of the body; Judaism insists upon its physical and ceremonial cleanness. This gives an entirely different character to the thought of the relation of the physical to the spiritual. So that we may put even more strongly than Zockler his closing words: 'Only the closing period of the pre-Christian Jewish history gives us real historical parallels and anticipations of monasticism,' and add that only in this period does ascetic practice proper have any place at all.

LITERATURE.—Out of a vast literature may be mentioned especially: H. Schultz, *Alttest. Theol.*[5] 1896 (Eng. tr. by Paterson, Edin. 1892); Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums*[2], Berlin, 1906; Schürer, *Gesch. des jud. Volkes*[3], Leipz. 1898–1902; Weber, *Jud. Theol.*[2] 1897; H. P. Smith, *OT History*, Edin 1903. See also separate art. ('Jewish') below.

(*b*) *Hellenistic Judaism.*—The distinction between fasts that have as their object the training of the spiritual life and those intended to propitiate an offended God must be constantly borne in mind. The first type is ascetic, the second has no necessary ascetic motive underlying it. The national fasts of Judaism, connected also as they generally were with times of special rejoicing, were intended to ward off the displeasure of the worshipped God. The non-ethical quality of these very fasts led to their entire rejection by the ethical prophets (Hos 6^{6}, Am 5^{25}). As custom hardened into a formulated legalism, neither world-flight nor spiritual discipline can be recognized as a formative motive. The mingling, however, of Oriental and Greek elements with Judaism began early (cf. Schürer, *Gesch. des jud. Volkes*[3], i. 187–190, ii. 21–67). The influence was probably wide-spread, but it reached its climax in the work of Philo at Alexandria. Here we find all the familiar marks of the Neo-Platonic teaching of a later day (Grätz, *Gesch. der Juden*, iii. [1856] 298, Eng. tr. ii. [1891] 211; Schultz, *Die jud. Religionsphil. bis zur Zerstorung Jerusalems*, 1864; Lucius, *Der Essenismus in seinem Verhaltniss zum Judentum*, Strassburg, 1881). God is not dragged down by the material; the highest life is that of contemplation; and abstraction from the body is the essential thing in religion. Holiness is also a negative thing. The dualism between God and nature is spanned by the Logos. The dualism between the flesh and the spirit is resolved in the contemplative life, where the spirit frees itself from the flesh and rises to the vision of God. The Essenes (cf. art. by Conybeare in Hastings' *DB*) are, as we have seen, doubtfully to be considered as an ascetic development. The communism is the simple agricultural communism that marked all Israelitish life in early times. The marriage customs are hidden in evidently inaccurate estimates of them, and the asceticism reported by Philo may well be imported from his preconceptions into their practice. It is difficult to believe that a sect that in so many ways suggests a recurrence to primitive type should become a medium for carrying a Greek culture (cf., however, Zöckler, *Askese und Monchtum*[2], pp. 125–127). The reports of Philo and Josephus are always open to suspicion when they see in Jewish customs bonds between the Greek world-view and Judaism. The food and clothing of John the Baptist (Mt 3^{1-17}, Mk 1^{4-8}) no more have asceticism as their motive than the poke bonnets and grey colour of the Quaker costume; both were inspired by the desire to revert to a primitive simplicity. John the Baptist is the reversion to the semi-nomad prophetic type. He proclaims no asceticism, but faithfulness to everyday duty (Lk 3^{7-14}). Only when Plotinus and Porphyry and Iamblichus leave the assumptions of the OT, and by symbolic interpretation read Greek and Oriental thought into Judaism, do we get a system of contemplative asceticism well developed. This asceticism is not a Jewish product and has left little trace upon Jewish life, but it has profoundly influenced the Christian development.*

* Muhammadanism has borrowed from old Christian sources an asceticism which, however, often resembles far more the nomadic excesses of the wilderness than either spiritual discipline or world-flight. Indeed, this latter is wholly strange to the Qur'ān, although in Persia it may be noted (cf. sep. art. 'Muslim' below).

LITERATURE.—Schürer, *op. cit.*; Bousset, *Die Rel. des Judentums*[2], Berlin, 1906; H. P. Smith, *The Bible and Islam*, Lond. 1897.

5. The Christian Church and Asceticism.—(*a*) *The Early Church and Asceticism.*—Very early in its history the transformation of Christianity from a life to a philosophy of life began (cf. Wernle, *Anfange unserer Rel.*[2], Tüb. 1904, 322–346). The marks of this change are already upon several of the NT books, notably the Ep. to the Heb., where the influence of Philo and Alexandrian Judaism is marked (cf. Siegfried, *Philo von Alex.*, Jena, 1875, p. 321 ff.; Pfleiderer, *Das Urchristentum*, Berl. 1887, p. 629 ff.; McGiffert, *Apost. Age*, Edin. 1897, pp. 477–482). Thus the Judaism with which the Christian Church found herself dealing was often not that of the OT, but a Hellenistic Judaism whose thought was based no longer on the ethical monotheism of 8th cent. prophecy, but on Greek dualism (cf. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* [ed. 1883], vol. i. § 7, pp. 93–101). This distorted the whole conception of the relation of the body to the purpose of the Kingdom; but the distortion was not realized because the faith in a catastrophic introduction of a new age seemed in itself to minimize the importance of the existing world. Upon this distortion grew up the conception of world-flight, and asceticism of the purest Oriental character was linked with the life of the Church. The exact history of the rise of monastic asceticism is obscured by the controversy over the genuine character of the alleged work of Philo, *de Vita Contemplativa*. This document has been pronounced by P. E. Lucius (*Die Therapeuten*, Strassburg, 1879) and others to be a forgery, while it has been defended by Conybeare (*Philo: about the Contemplative Life*, Oxf. 1895) and P. Wendland (*Die Therapeuten und die philonische Schrift vom beschaulichen Leben*, Leipz. 1896). It is certainly impossible to use it with confidence as a source for studying the history of monasticism. The so-called Therapeutæ, described as a Jewish monastic order, probably never existed, but the invention reflects the ideals of the highest holiness of certain circles profoundly influenced by Hellenized Christianity. As might be expected, it was in the Oriental Churches that the most negative type of asceticism flourished. Egypt became the home of men and women fleeing from the world to find in ascetic solitude the holiness they longed for (cf. the interesting pen picture in Anatole France, *Thaïs*[3], 1891). The attitude of St. Paul to marriage had nothing fundamentally ascetic in the Oriental sense. Abstinence was a matter of expediency, for the stress was great and the time was short (1 Co 7^{1-40}), and marriage brought cares which hindered the Christian in his main business of proclaiming the coming of Christ. At the same time, the vileness and licence of the period made continency, even to the denial of marriage, a very distinguishing mark of superior enthusiasm. In opposition to Marcion, however, Tertullian protests (*adv. Marcion.* i. 20), and he was not the only one to do so, against the rising tide of ascetic denial of marriage, urging that Christian liberty must be preserved (Clem. Alex. *Strom.* ii. 23, iii. 12; Euseb. *HE* iv. 29). Moreover, self-denial gave a stamp of sincerity to much religious life whose basis was really not Christian at all, as in Manichæism, and this religious life compelled the Christian communities to rival its earnestness by denials as dramatic; so that Tertullian, who himself distinctly repudiates asceticism in principle (*Apology*, 42), is nevertheless proud of the self-denials he is able to set over against the claims of the ascetic Marcionites (*op. cit.*). Thus, in Egypt and Africa world-flight and ascetic fasting and an un-Christian and un-Pauline celibacy came more and more to mark the ecclesiastical development. It culminated in the world-flight of Paul of Thebes, whose retreat to the desert was, however, only the logic of the transposition of Christian values effected by Cyprian and Origen. Manichæism and Gnosticism had really conquered, and, opposed with true instinct by the Church, had yet forced upon the Church the dualistic Oriental conception of life (cf. Hatch, *Organization of the Early Chr. Churches*, Lond. 1881, Lect. vi. pp. 152–164, for a slight modification of this view). And logic went to the fullest extent in the hermit seclusion and the absolute isolation of the individual, as in the case of Antony and Simeon Stylites. The grouping of the priests of the worship of Serapis is sometimes regarded (but see O. Zockler's art. below, p. 75[a]) as the model for what now sprang up as a modification of this hermit isolation. The monastery was at first a mere group of hermits gathered about some conspicuous example, or banded together for mutual protection. To such groups Pachomius (285–345) gave a set of rules (F. E. König, 'Die Regel des heiligen Pachomius' in *SK*, 1878; Grutzmacher, *Pachomius und das alteste Klosterleben*, Freib. i. B. 1896), and monastic asceticism was formally foisted upon the early Catholic Church. Then, as persecution began to lessen, and martyrdom became rarer and rarer, the enthusiasm that found vent in this last evidence of zeal and sincerity began to express itself in ascetic practices. The spiritual athlete proved his constancy by self-inflicted deprivations.

LITERATURE.—See ASCETICISM (Christian).

(*b*) *The Oriental and Greek Communions and Asceticism.*—In general it may be said that the negative, contemplative, mystic type of asceticism had its largest development in the Oriental Greek Church. From the time of Pachomius and Antony the contemplative withdrawal from life into the desert was indeed bound up with extraordinary limitations of diet, etc., but the life of contemplation was the end sought by these fastings. The bodily exercises remain in the late conception of Greek asceticism a means to the contemplative self-abstraction. This is seen clearly in the rules of Pachomius and their subsequent development (cf. Zockler, *Askese und Monchtum*[2], pp. 201–233). The influence of Origen and of the Neo-Platonic conceptions on the Oriental Church, as it ceased to be intellectually quick, was to emphasize dogma and details of ritual on the basis of an extreme literalism in the use of Scripture (cf. K. Muller, *Kirchengeschichte*, i. 209). The ritual development was excessive, and the monastery reflected the most primitive type, an aggregate of hermit cells. It was only when, in 988, the Russian organization and education called out the best that was in the monastic development that it exhibited any signs of life and growth. Cyril and Methodius, the two monks from Constantinople who gave Russia to the Greek Church, represented the spirit of missionary service (cf. J. M. Neale, *History of the Holy Eastern Church*, 1873). Yet asceticism in the true sense of the term was overlaid by formalism and ritual. The negative conception of holiness was even forgotten amidst the mass of superstitious externalism. The monastery as seen at Mount Athos or Mount Lebanon (cf. articles *ad hoc* in Brockhaus, *Konversationslexikon*) reflects the older type of com-

The prohibition of wine is not ascetic, but a return to primitive morality on national and economic grounds. Nor is the fasting of Muhammadanism in the strict sense ascetic any more than the regular hours of prayer can be so called. Pilgrimages, however (cf. art. 'Mecca' in *EBr*[9]), and various wild dances, do partake of the mystic negative view of holiness which sees in abstraction from the body the possibility of the Divine vision. But, on the whole, asceticism is as foreign to the real spirit of Muhammadanism as it is to the Jewish religious development.

munal life; but the asceticism, save in the absolute banishment of women from all participation in the life, is not extreme. Nor has asceticism proper experienced any new development in the Russian branch of the Greek Church. Sects have arisen with extreme and fanatical views based upon a bald literalism, as the sect of the *Skoptzy*, who interpret Mt 19[12] literally, and of whom 176 were in the years 1839–71 sent to Siberia for obedience to this supposed command (cf. Loofs, *Symbolik*, i. 181 [1902]). Yet in such cases the pathological and the superstitious overshadow the ascetic motives; and, indeed, of genuine ascetic development in the various branches of the Orthodox Greek Church there is almost no trace since the 17th century.

LITERATURE.—J. M. Neale, *History of the Holy Eastern Church*, 5 vols, London, 1850–73; I. Silbernagl, *Verfassung und gegenwärtiger Bestand sämmtlicher Kirchen des Orients*, Landshut, 1865; W. Gass, *Symbolik der griech. Kirche*, Berlin, 1872; Stanley, *Hist. of the East. Church*, new ed., London, 1884.

(*c*) *The Roman Church and Asceticism.*—The primary interest of the Christian Church as an Imperial organization was neither in dogma nor in the negative conception of holiness fundamental in ascetic monasticism (cf. A. Harnack, *Das Mönchtum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte*[5], 1901, p. 30 f.). Her interest was in the re-organization of the Empire in the service of an Imperial ecclesiasticism. At the same time, in the creeds and literature which the Western Church took over for her Imperial purpose, there were both dogmatic elements which she had to formulate and defend and ascetic ideals which she had to use and regulate. Under the leadership of Rome, asceticism became a handmaid of inestimable value. It was the great monk-pope Gregory VII. who forced on the whole of the clergy the ascetic celibate as an ideal (Synods of Erfurt and Passau, 1074), and in him were united the two contradictory ideals, the ruling of the world by an institution whose ideal was world-flight. The missionary activity of the monastery in Northern Europe had changed its character, and while bringing a mass of evils connected with the holding of property (cf. K. Müller, *Kirchengeschichte*, i. 353–358 [Freib. i. B. 1892]), it was at the same time the bearer of order and culture, and even of literature, to the relatively barbarous North. It had, however, of necessity drifted away from the ideals of Oriental asceticism. To the task of re-introducing those ideals the reform movements of the period from Otto I. (936–973) to Gregory VII. (1073–1085) were directed. The monastery of the Western Church was up to this period largely dependent on the great land-holders, and vows were not made for life. Only in the 7th century was the retirement from a cloister visited by penalty, and only under the vigorous reforms of Bernard of Cluny and the Abbot Hugo were the monasteries compelled to conform to the ascetic ideals of the past (cf. K. Müller, *op. cit.* i. 317 f., and 431–435). The new reformed monastic orders looked with suspicion on the agricultural and literary work which marked the less ascetic monastic institutions, and exalted more and more the life of contemplation and ascetic negation (cf. H. Reuter, *Gesch. der relig. Aufklär.* II. vi. 24–28, Berlin, 1877). From this period onwards extreme forms of ascetic life—scourging, wearing of chains and haircloth garments, no longer as survivals of primitive life, but planned to inflict pain and discomfort—as well as extreme seclusion, became the accepted means for the attainment of perfection; and the ideal of perfection was world-flight, and the negation of desire. At the same time, the linking of these ideals with Churchly ambitions gave peculiar form to the ascetic conception. Everywhere the monastic reform set before itself the same ends:

'The revival of monastic institutions, the recovery of lost lands, and the acquirement of new possessions, the establishment of old ecclesiastical laws, the acquirement of a better class of novitiate, introduction of stricter discipline and cultivation of piety, as described in the older stories of monastery life, and especially in the writings of Gregory the Great (590–604), penance and self-inflicted pain of all kinds, contemplation in solitude, humility to the point of self-renunciation, constant employment of confession and the sacrament, homage of the saints and relics, pilgrimages, search for the miraculous, pessimistic judgment of the world, longings for death, and generally an abnormal raising of the emotional life, increased sensitiveness, and, above all, a high estimate of the "grace of tears"' (K. Müller, *Kirchengesch.* pp. 385–386).

Each new attempt at monastic reform of necessity but revived this negative idea of holiness, and hence it is no accident that the circumstances which originally produced the pessimistic world-flight religious type in the Orient should generally mark its revival in the Western Church. The times of revived asceticism are periods of national disorder and social disruption. Gentle and thoughtful souls found world-flight the only seeming refuge amidst the wrecks of all that makes life really attractive, and in the extreme symbolic self-renunciation of self-torture the only hope for the devoted lives of those who saw the evil. It is impossible for any religious development to be wholly without the note of service and self-sacrifice for others, yet this sinks more and more into the background the more self-consistent the pursuit of the ascetic ideal becomes. To save one's own soul by retirement from the dangers of life is the chief goal, and the selfishness of this goal is only partly hidden by the fact that service on behalf of others may become a means to this end. Even the asceticism that marked the great monastic revival under St. Francis of Assisi (1182–1226) made the great services rendered by the order often a source of real corruption (cf. *Life of St. Francis*, by Thomas de Celano, 1229, by Bonaventura, 1261, and recently by Hase, 1856, and Sabatier [Eng. tr.], 1894). The complete impossibility of making the negative monastic asceticism a universal demand upon all Christians, while still maintaining Imperial world ambitions, has always led in the Western Church to compromises with the 'lay' world. Hence each revival of the extreme emphasis has also led to 'lay-brotherhoods,' to modified vows for those who cannot altogether flee the world, and to an extension of ascetic symbolism. This ascetic symbolism plays, therefore, a larger and larger part in penance, fasts, prayers, vigils, etc., in which the element of pain and bodily deprivation is reduced to a minimum, and the ascetic element is represented by symbols, 'half-fasts,' fish and eggs instead of meat, beads told, and masses said by proxy, etc. Against these compromises protests were constantly being raised by those who seriously held the monastic ascetic type of Christian ideal (Bernard of Cluny); but more and more as the Imperial organizing force of a centralized Vatican made its way, these compromises received the sanction of the Church. From the time of the Reformation onwards the Roman Church has been on the defensive, and the militant character of her great organizing force, inherited from Rome, has driven the negative and ascetic conception of holiness into a secondary place. In the Jesuit development, asceticism has a distinctly different place from that occupied in the older orders. It is a training for service under the ecclesiastical Imperialism of Rome (cf. Döllinger and Reusch, *Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten in der römisch-katholischen Kirche* [1889], particularly the 'Einleitung'). The goal the Jesuit order set before itself was world-conquest rather than world-flight, and thus again is clearly seen the old struggle between two distinct ideals of holiness, while both are maintained within the great historic communion of the Roman Church. The

triumphs of the Jesuit policies since the great Jansenist controversy have therefore steadily relegated asceticism to a secondary and disciplinary place, and its recent history shows no new development within the Roman communion, while it still maintains its place as one of historic legitimacy.

LITERATURE.—Out of a vast literature may be specially mentioned: Zockler, *Askese und Monchtum*[2], Frankf. a. M. 1897; Lea, *Hist. of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, 3 vols., Lond. 1888; Jessopp, *Coming of the Friars*[3], Lond. 1905; Montalembert, *Monks of the West from St. Benedict to St. Bernard*, 7 vols., Edin. 1861–1879; Taylor, *Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*, Lond. 1901; Harnack, *Das Monchtum* [Eng. tr. *Monasticism*, Lond. 1881]; and the Standard Histories of the Church in the Middle Ages, *e.g.* those of Neander, K. Muller, etc.; also Gothein, *Ignatius von Loyola und die Gegenreformation*, Halle, 1895; Ranke, *Die romischen Papste*, Leipz. 1878; Reuter, *Gesch. der religiosen Aufklarung*, Berlin, 1877.

(*d*) *Protestantism and Asceticism.*—In a true Protestantism there is no room for Oriental asceticism based upon world-flight (cf. Luther, *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen*, 1520). The only place asceticism can properly have is as a training for the life of service, and it is only a matter of loving expediency whether the Protestant shall prepare himself for service by fasting, deprivation and negation of legitimate desires, or by the simple and faithful discharge of daily duty. In the Matthew tradition (Mt 6[16]) Jesus certainly anticipated fasting; but in actual fact His disciples did not emphasize it during His lifetime (Mt 9[14]), as is seen also in the Mark tradition (Mk 2[18], Lk 5[33ff.]); and St. Paul's doctrine of Christian freedom (Gal 5[1] and argument of whole letter), permitting, indeed, any act that may prove for spiritual edification, excludes any emphasis upon such practice as necessary. Hence the Reformers admit fasts. 'Fasten und leiblich sich bereiten ist eine feine gute Zucht,' says Luther in his Smaller Catechism, and he urged it as a pious and useful exercise; as did also Calvin, with, however, the old primitive motive appearing, for the Church was to fast 'to appease the wrath of God' (cf. Zockler, *op. cit.* p. 565). All the ascetic practices have dropped away, or been actually condemned by both Lutheran and Reformed Churches (Augsburg Confess., Art. 27; 1 Helvet. Confess., Art. 28). In the form of world-flight Protestantism has overcome asceticism. Only in the forms of a legalism can we trace remains of the Catholic conception of a negative holiness (cf. A. Ritschl, *Gesch. d. Pietismus*, i. 36–80, Bonn, 1880), and even the legalism that forbids dancing, theatre-going, wine-drinking, and card-playing does so now on the basis of the expediency of the Christian life, or on the ground of inherent immorality in the practices, thus removing the discussion of them from the sphere of asceticism. It is therefore a source of confusion to confound these two separate motives. With Protestantism, therefore, Oriental asceticism may be said to have been theoretically overcome.

LITERATURE.—The best histories are those of Zöckler, *Askese und Monchtum*[2], Frankf. a. M. 1897, a new edition of his *Kritische Geschichte der Askese*, 1863; and J. Mayer, *Die christliche Askese, ihr Wesen und ihre historische Entfaltung*, Freiburg i. B. 1894; see also article 'Askese' in *PRE*[3]. Interesting material may be found in Palladius, *Historia Lausiaca* (*PL*, vol. xxxiv.), and in Rufinus, *Historia Monachorum* (*PL*, vol. xxi.). There is curious material in Stadler and Heim, *Vollstandiges Heiligen-Lexicon*, 1858. For the history of Monasticism consult the catalogue given in *Dictionnaire des Ordres Religieux*, 4 vols., Paris, 1860; and Montalembert, *Moines d'Occident*, 7 vols., 1860-1877 (in part translated). For accounts of Buddhism see Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, 1850, *Manual of Budhism*[2], 1880, and *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, 1866. For the attitude of the Reformation see Luther, *An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation*, 1520, and *de Libertate Christiana*; Melanchthon, *Loci Communes*, particularly 'de crucis afflictionibus,' 1521; Calvin, *Institutes*, iii. 6–10, iv. 12 ff.; also Luthardt, *Die Ethik Luthers in ihren Grundzügen*[2], 1875; P. Lobstein, *Die Ethik Calvins*, 1877. For the best expositions in the Ethical handbooks of the Protestant attitude, consult H. Schultz, *Grundriss der evangelischen Ethik*, 1891, p. 40 ff.; and Newman Smith, *Christian Ethics*, 1891. A very full bibliography is also given by Zockler, *op. cit.* pp. 21–29.

See also art. AUSTERITIES.

T. C. HALL.

ASCETICISM (Buddhist). — Judged by its literature, India has revealed to us human intelligence at its widest, intensest range of reaction to sensuous and emotional stimuli. European writers have described the mild, passive, dreamy, quiescent Hindu. But they have ignored the fact that these qualities were the natural antithesis to, and rebound from, the preponderant disposition. That appears to have been of a nervous, eager, high-strung, emotional character, passionate and pleasure-seeking, keenly susceptible, exuberant in expression, impulsive and strenuous in effort to satisfy desire. The notes of the *vīnā* (a kind of lute), the singing of the *Karavīka* bird from the Himālayas, are described as rendering languid and maddened those that heard it, no magic agency being imputed (*Saṁyutta*, iv. 197; *Sumaṅgala*, *ap. Dīgha*, xiv. 35). Where the heart's desire is cut off, the subject promptly lies down to die (*Majjhima*, ii. 57; Com. on *Therīgāthā*, p. 221). The ordinary man is described as indulging in extravagant expression and depression at a transition from happiness to grief (*SBE* xi. 102, 127; *Majjh.* i. 238, 239). Where sense and emotion sway so forcibly, we should expect to find a corresponding excess in attempts to cope with that exuberance. Nowhere, indeed, has asceticism been so highly elaborated as in India. Nowhere have sense impressions and sense gratification been suppressed more nearly to the utmost limits consistent with life. Nowhere has the art of pain been more studied. Every act and posture of common life was engrossed by the self-persecuting zeal of the ascetic. And the lay world that maintained him in the intervals of his weird warfare expected of him a rigid persistence in his efforts, in exchange for its alms, as much as the votaries expected it from each other, if the reputation for sincerity and sanctity of each was not to be lost (*Vinaya Texts*, iii. p. 66 ff., i. pp. 90, 93).

The English reader of translations from Pāli and Sanskrit will find the word 'ascetic' used to denote any person who from religious motives has 'renounced the world' (cf. *e.g. Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 213, n. 2; *The Jataka*, vi., Cambridge, 1907, Index, *s.v.* 'Ascetic'). This is due to the English poverty for such terms as *religieux* and its synonyms. It does *not*, however, follow that, beyond renouncing home, property, and marriage, the so-called 'ascetic' is to be understood as engaged in systematic penance or self-mortification.

Ascetic practices were spoken of collectively as *tapas* (Pāli *tapo*), *i.e.* 'burning,' 'glow.' Parallel with, but usually independent of, sacrificial rites, they constituted, no less than the latter, a systematic line of action pursued to gain a distinctive end. That end, when Buddhism arose, was chiefly the guarantee of re-birth under relatively happier conditions than the present life could afford.

For instance, in the parable of the log drifting down the Ganges, the Buddha, discussing the chances of its arriving in due course at the open sea, and enumerating the various obstacles, said that it might be seized by human or by non-human agencies. By this he illustrated the fate of a religious brother, drawn back again into the world, or captured by longings after some abode of the gods and conforming to some discipline (*brahmachariya*) with the notion: 'By this rule, or ritual, or askēsis (*tapena*), or discipline I shall become a god, or god-like being' (*Saṁy.* iv. 179 ff., but cf. also *Majjh.* ii. p. 36, l. 2).

Of the more usual object of *tapas*, according to the Vedas—the attainment of magical powers—but slight traces remain. The Buddha, for instance, tells, as an ancient legend, of the failure of certain *Ṛṣis* to blast by curses a seer who exclaimed that their *tapas* was proved futile and their discipline fruitless (*Majjhima*, ii. 155).

The way in which *tapas* was held to guarantee the end sought after was not, as in sacrificial rites, by the propitiation of a god or gods, but by satisfying, as a system of acts and abstinences, the law of *karma* conceived as impersonal, eternal, moral energy. Painful experience and the absence of pleasant experience were to work as a set-off, in the balance of fate, against the weight of pleasant

self-indulgences in the past, and of possible pleasant experience in the near future, respectively.

'There are, brethren,' the Buddha's discourse runs, 'certain recluses (Achelakas, Ājivikas, Nigaṇṭhas, etc.) who thus preach and believe: Whatsoever an individual experiences, whether it be happy, or painful, or neutral feeling, all has been caused by previous actions. And thus, from the cancelling of old actions by *tapas*, and by abstaining from doing new actions, there is no influx into future life; by this non-influx *karma* is destroyed, and so ill is destroyed, and so feeling is destroyed, and so all pain will become worn away. This, brethren, is what the Nigaṇṭhas (Jains) say. . . . Is it true, I asked them, that you believe and declare this? . . . They replied . . . Our leader, Nāṭaputta, is all-wise . . . out of the depths of his knowledge he tells us: Ye have done evil in the past. This ye do wear away by this hard and painful course of action. And the discipline that here and now, by thought, word, and deed, is wrought, is a minus quantity of bad *karma* in future life . . . thus all *karma* will eventually be worn away, and all pain. To this we assent' (*Majjhima*, ii. 214 ff.; cf. i. 238).

The recorded interviews between the Buddhists and the Brahmans yield no such efforts to master and forestall destiny. But one young Brahman names *tapas* as one of five conditions declared by the priestly class to be requisite for the achievement of 'merit' (*Majjhima*, ii. 199). And current verses commending *tapas* are here and there gathered into the Buddhist canonical anthologies (*Saṁyutta*, i. 38, 43, 172 = *Sutta Nipāta*, verse 77; *Aṅguttara*, iii. 346).

Now Buddhism was frankly eudæmonistic in its ethics. It hastened to reduce the evil of the world to its ultimate term—*dukkha*, 'pain,' 'sorrow,' 'misery,' 'ill.' It spoke of *nirvaṇa* as absolute happiness. Its cardinal tenets were to be an organon for the extirpation of ill. Affectionate and moral conduct, 'noble' (Aryan) views, are commended as securing *phāsuvihāra*, that is, easeful, serene living (*Aṅguttara*, iii. 132). Consequently it could not well sanction any deliberate infliction of pain, or *dis*-ease, as such, on one's self or on others. One of those categories into which the canonical books delight to divide humanity classes men as self-tormentors, or self-burners (*attantapo*), tormentors of others, tormentors of both self and others, tormentors neither of self nor of others (*Majjhima*, i. 341, 411, ii. 159; *Aṅguttara*, ii. 205; *Puggala*, 55). Under the first head come the votaries of *tapas*; under the second, butchers, fowlers, hunters, fishermen, thieves, executioners, gaolers, and all doers of acts of cruelty; under the third, great functionaries who, when holding sacrificial ceremonies, perform rites involving some personal discomfort, and also have herds of animals slaughtered, and keep their slaves in fear of punishment. Under the fourth head come those who have left the world and the home for the career of a recluse. These are, or should be, filled with charity and compassion for all living beings; they own no property in animals or in personal service. They harm no one, molest no one, and have thrown off the cares and ties that torment the world. And, as it were in antithesis to the word 'burning,' they are said to have 'become cool' (*sītibhūto*).

The latter term, *sītibhūto*, would seem to imply renunciation of *tapas*, as well as of those professions and practices through which a man would become, as it were, a cause of burning or torment to others. He has, of course, still to cultivate, even if he be a *bhikkhu* frequenting forest seclusion (*Majjhima*, i. 469), the virtue of *hiri-ottappa*, conscientiousness and fear of blame. These will often entail, ere he graduates in saintliness, states of mind called 'burning-producing' (*tapanīyā dhammā*), to wit, 'I have left undone those things that I ought to have done, and I have done those things that I ought not to have done' (*Aṅguttara*, i. 49; *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, §§ 38, 1300, 1323). Nor was he to be 'cool' in pressing forward to complete emancipation and self-conquest; but, on the contrary, abundance of 'ardour' (*ātāpī*) was expected of him. Only the *arahat* is described as wholly *sītibhūto*, as one resting on a summit, or by clear waters beyond the jungle (see art. ARHAT).

Buddhism, again, claimed at its very inception, in the Buddha's first sermon, to be a Middle Path, opposed equally to the extremes of sensuous and worldly indulgence on the one hand, and of self-mortification on the other. Both are denounced as ignoble (un-Aryan) and unprofitable, the latter, also, as *dukkha* (*SBE* xi. 146, *Majjh.* iii. 230). Contrasted in another passage, in a jungle simile, as the thick-set path and the fired-out path, they are opposed to the middle course of the brother who (in the practice of the 'Four Inceptions of Mindfulness') 'ardently' surveys body, impressions, thoughts, and feelings, that he may subdue all grief arising from coveting the things of the world (*Aṅguttara*, i. 295).

The Buddha's twofold objection to the practice of asceticism is really one: *dukkha* is evil and must be removed. Excess is *dukkha*. *Tapas* is a form of excess, and multiplies *dukkha*. It does not even lead through suffering to any gain; it is unprofitable. This futility of *tapas*, and not any shrinking from pain, was the moral of his own strenuous essay in austerities. This he is said, in the canonical books, to have related to a rāja's son, who maintained that happiness was to be won only through suffering (*Majjhima*, ii. 93); also to a young Brahman, who questioned him on the originality of the system he put forward (*Majjhima*, ii. 212); and again to a young Jain, who doubted whether the Buddha's disciples studied bodily as well as mental control (*Majjhima*, i. 237). When almost worn out by his austerities, he came, he said, to the conclusion: 'Not by this bitter course of painful hardship shall I arrive at that separate and supreme vision of all-sufficing, noble (Aryan) knowledge, passing human ken. Might there not be another path to Enlightenment?' Whereupon he once more took reasonable care of the body, (whereby his fellow-ascetics, who had expected great results, lost faith in him), and chose, for the meditations that brought the light, a spot where the natural environment was of a kind to soothe and brace the spirit.

A little poem in the *Saṁyutta Nikāya* (i. 103) represents him, at this stage, as happy in the release from all self-mortification and from faith therein. Before his complete enlightenment he sat by the river Nerañjarā, at the foot of the Goatherd's Banyan tree, musing: 'Oh! but I am freed from all that difficult toil! Oh! but well freed am I from that useless course of difficult toil! Wholly steadfast and mindful now draw I near to *bodhi* (enlightenment).' Māra, the evil one, tried to shake his serenity: '*Tapas* and sacrifice hast thou abandoned, whereby the Brahman youths are purified? The impure may deem himself pure, when he hath missed the path of purity.' And Gautama replies: 'I who have discerned the uselessness of [my] *tapas* and of all *tapas* whatsoever—bearing along with it, as it does, all that is useless, even as punting-pole and steering-pole may bring along a water-snake—I, practising the path to *bodhi*—moral conduct, meditation and insight—have won the Purity supreme.'

The foregoing allusions define the attitude of Buddhism to asceticism when the term applies to a course of painful penance, privation, injury, toil, or tedium inflicted upon the person. But in the sense of the Greek *askēsis*, or way of life, in which some channels of activity are barred and others developed by special training, Buddhism was thoroughly ascetic. 'The Greek has his asceticism, but it is no mortification of the senses. It is just the power to refuse a lesser good for the sake of the greater. Such asceticism, an alert and constant effort after betterness, is a tonic, a strengthening of fibre, an added increment to life.' Dr. Jane Harrison's words (*Albany Review*, Jan. 1908) apply no less to the Buddhist. Of the lay-disciple a less high standard of training was expected. His whole duty may be said to be laid down in the *Sigālovāda Suttanta* of the *Dīgha*. But any deeply serious movement must always concentrate its energies and its care at first on a nucleus of whole-hearted devotees, who alone will tide it over initial difficulties, and propagate it. These can no more live like the rest of the world than an army when mobilized can afford to do. With the end it had in view, the Buddhist *askēsis* is in some respects in affinity with the Christian, in some, again, with the Greek. For the earnest student (*sekha*) the body was something to be analytically studied and kept in cleanliness and good health. Clothing for it, regular and frequent baths, massage, shelter, regular food, rest, and medicines were prescribed. But it remained, religiously considered, a foul thing (*pūtikāyo*); and the senses

were so many opportunities and channels of malefic impressions and impulses. Susceptibility to beauty of person required to be corrected by the contemplation or imagination of bodily transience, decay, and putrescence. The bodily culture of the Order amounted very much to what would now be called 'the simple life.' Needs (which would else provoke pain) were to be satisfied without arousing new and unnecessary wants. The recurring explanation of 'moderation in diet' is typical:—

'When any one takes food with reflexion and judgment, not for purposes of sport, excess, personal charm and attraction, but so as to suffice for the sustenance and preservation of the body, for allaying hunger and *for aiding the practice of the religious life*; and thinking, "While I shall subdue that which I have been feeling, and shall cause no new feeling to arise, and maintenance shall be mine, blamelessness also and comfort"—this content, temperance, judgment in diet, is what is called "moderation in diet"' (*Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, 1348).

Compared with the ascetic excesses, as well as with the imaginative and speculative obsessions, of the age, the Buddhist standpoint was markedly hygienic. As the Buddha is recorded to have said (*Majjhima*, i. 509), to consider that health means merely that nothing ails the body is to lack all noble (Aryan) vision. On the other hand, a healthy and efficient condition of body was not only indispensable to a healthy and efficient condition of mind, but was an integral part of sound training (*Majjhima*, i. 239, 473 ff., 425; *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, §§ 40–51). There does not appear, in the canonical books, any glorification of the intellectual or spiritual at the expense of the corporeal. The constituents of individuality were ranked on a level, as being each and all impermanent, channels of suffering, and void of Ātman. But then this body-and-mind individuality, 'poor thing' though it might be, was potentially the vehicle of *nirvāṇa*, of *arahat*-ship. And hence the training of it was of the first importance—training by no means of a negative, paralyzing character. The pupil of a great Brahman ascetic school is asked by the Buddha whether, and how, Pārāsariya teaches the cultivation of the bodily faculties. The answer is, 'Yes; with the eye he sees no object, with the ear he hears no sound.' 'On that system,' is the rejoinder, 'the blind and the deaf have their senses best cultivated.' And 'the supreme faculty-culture (*indriya-bhāvanā*) of the noble (Aryan) discipline' is then described (*Majjhima*, iii. 298 ff.). The training, moreover, is often represented as gradual, just the 'bit placed in the colt's mouth' to begin with (*Majjhima*, iii. 2): 'Come thou, brother, keep the *sīla* and the precepts and acquire the range of moral conduct, . . . see that the gates of sense are well guarded, that no influx of impressions bear thee off thy feet, be moderate in diet, keep vigils, be mindful and heedful, cultivate self-collectedness in solitude, purging the heart of the five hindrances and practising the meditation raptures'—these are given as seven successive grades. But in proportion to the distance from graduation, that is, from 'emancipation,' was the training to be strict and unintermittent. Certain brethren, who asserted that a number of daily meals kept them in better health than the one midday meal of the Master, were gently reminded that they were too far from 'attaining' to emancipation to let themselves go (*Majjhima*, i. 473 ff.). To one who had attained, such questions sank into insignificance. 'You say,' the Buddha asks an appreciative friar, 'that my disciples hold me in reverence. Why do they?' 'For five qualities: your frugal diet, contentment with whatever raiment, food, and lodging you have, and your love of solitude.' 'That can hardly be,' is the answer, 'for while some of my disciples in one or other of these things practise austerities, I some days make a fuller meal, or wear lay robes, or accept invitations to dine, or dwell indoors, or among my fellows.' And he goes on to reveal the deeper basis of their trust in him (*Majjh.* ii. 5 ff.).

It was not to be expected that the Buddha's followers, even when they were advanced in training, would all appreciate the *quasi*-Pauline 'liberty' of his own high standpoint. In Dr. Neumann's words, 'ascetic simplicity is a characteristic of humanity and ineradicable' (*Lieder der Monche und Nonnen* [Berlin, 1899], p. viii). The austerities alluded to in the Order became elaborated into a scheme of thirteen extra vows or burdens (*dhutaṅga*), more discussed, perhaps, than carried out (*SBE* xxxvi. 267–269). But they were at variance with the spirit of early Buddhism, which, in reducing life to a healthful simplicity for those who had set their faces toward the Highest, sought, in its own metaphor, to give them the liberty of the bird, which in flying 'bears with it but the power to fly' (*Dīgha*, i. 71).

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C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

ASCETICISM (Celtic).—**1.** It has been suggested (Fisher and Baring-Gould, *Lives of the British Saints*) that the monastic system of Ireland and Wales was a continuation of pre-Christian ascetic practices; but this statement is unsupported by evidence. Herodian (A.D. 197) mentions the hardiness and scantiness of clothing of the Britanni; but this had no ascetic significance. On the other hand, Strabo (vi. 196) states that the Celts were pleasure-loving (ἡδονικοί), and Diodorus (xxvi. 3) says of the Galatæ that they were fond of wine. At the same time, it has to be admitted that our information as to the Celts in antiquity is very meagre, and especially insufficient for the relatively barren Celtic lands where Christian cœnobitism and asceticism afterwards flourished.

2. The Christian asceticism of Celtic countries in the 5th and 6th cents. undoubtedly owes its origin to transmission from Egypt through Massilia (Marseilles), a port which under the Empire had a vigorous Egyptian trade. Massilia and Lérins (Lerina) in the South and Tours further North became active centres for the dissemination of the cœnobitic ideal in Gaul and beyond. In the Life of the Scottish St. Ninian it is said that the saint had met St. Martin of Tours, and held him in such respect that, when he heard of his death, he dedicated to him the church called *Candida Casa* at Whithorn, which he was then building. With the monastic system of Southern Gaul, John Cassian was closely associated, and it has been held by Professor H. Williams (in *Trans. Cymmr. Soc.* 1893–4) that the monastic system of Britain and Ireland was more akin to that of Southern than that of Northern Gaul. In the latter district monasticism made marked progress after the death of St. Martin of Tours (A.D. 400), and it may even have spread from this source to Britain, as is suggested by the story of St. Ninian; but the main impetus to the growth of the monastic movement in these islands undoubtedly came through the anti-Pelagian mission of Lupus and Germanus (429). At Lérins a church and cloister were built by Honoratus, and it was here that Lupus, bishop of Troyes, became a monk after giving up his see and his family life. There was probably some rivalry between the Northern and the Southern monastic systems of Gaul, for Sulpicius Severus (*Life of St. Martin*, cxvii.) says that the institutions of St. Martin were

in some respects on a higher plane than the Egyptian institutions of John Cassian, the founder of the monastery of Marseilles. That there were links between Lérins and Britain is suggested by the fact (attested by Sidonius Apollinaris) that Riocatus, whose name is undoubtedly Celtic, visited that monastery twice in A.D. 450. The probability is that both of the Gaulish movements made contributions to British and Irish monasticism.

3. Celtic asceticism, however, in spite of its relation to the general movement in Christendom, had certain well-marked features of its own, which were mainly conditioned by the tribal organization in which it took root (Willis-Bund, *Celtic Church in Wales*; Fisher and Baring-Gould, *op. cit.*). The heads of the cœnobitic communities of Celtic countries were members of ruling tribal families, and the headship of these communities and participation in their property and privileges continued (in some cases even to the 12th cent.) to be limited to those who, by means of their valid pedigrees, could show kinship with the founder. The formation of cœnobitic communities in Wales and Ireland was probably directed not only by religious but also by economic considerations, owing to the pressure of population and the insufficiency of cultivable soil. The monasteries were largely centres of co-operative industrial activity in agriculture and other arts, while the pursuit of learning and other amenities of civilized life were thus rendered possible. Lay interests probably had a larger place in the life of these communities than the later Lives of Celtic saints, written under Benedictine influences, might lead us to suppose, and it was natural enough accordingly that these communities, as such, should take no account of clerical orders (Willis-Bund, *op. cit.*).

Prof. Hugh Williams (*loc. cit.*) gives the following as the four stages of development of monasticism in Wales, and the development in Ireland was in the main parallel: (1) A *life of seclusion*, self-denial, prayer, and meditation (and it may be added, industry, to a large extent manual), in a common life of obedience to a superior, the abbot. There were similar institutions for women, and a Celtic monastery was sometimes double. The life of this stage appears to have been modelled on the teaching of Cassian in his *de Institutis Cœnobiorum* and *Conlationes Patrum*. (2) A stage when the monastery was pre-eminently a *school*, as exemplified in the case of the Welsh saint Illtud. When children were sent to a monastery of this kind, they were regarded as the foster-children of the Church, and a fee had to be paid not only for their fosterage but at their removal. (3) That of the *Eremites*, or *Anchorites*. In Egypt this stage came first, but in Celtic countries it grew out of cœnobitism. In 595, when Columbanus wrote to Gregory the Great, this movement was at its height in Ireland, and was also characteristic of Gaul and Britain. It was doubtless largely due to economic pressure upon the monasteries. The settlements of those who left the monasteries were often named after the saint who was head of the monastic community that they left. In all Celtic countries the hermits of this stage showed a marked predilection for islands, at first in lakes and streams, then in the sea. (4) The stage of *monastic pilgrims* or *missionaries*. These combined the work of itinerant preaching with that of tilling the soil in the districts where for the time being they settled. Among the fruits of these missions were the monasteries established by Welsh and Irish saints in Brittany, and notably the following important communities: (*a*) that of Iona, founded by St. Columba in 563; (*b*) those of Anegray, Luxeuil, and Fontaine in the Vosges, founded by St. Columbanus in the end of the 6th cent.; (*c*) that of Bobbio in Italy, founded by the same saint in the beginning of the 7th cent.; (*d*) that of St. Gall, founded by a disciple of St. Columbanus. Other Irish monasteries on the Continent were Lagny, Péronne, Fosse-la-Ville (near Liège), Lure, Beaulieu (in Argonne), Würzburg, and Säckingen. These and other Celtic monasteries were important centres of learning in the Dark Ages, and the Irish monks especially were distinguished for their skill in copying and illuminating MSS (cf. *ERE* i. 843, 860).

4. The regulation of life in the monastic communities gave rise to the formation of Penitentials and Rules. Some of the former, as, for instance, that of Gildas (see Hugh Williams, *Gildas*), show that drunkenness and worse vices had to be kept in check, and the Lives of the saints themselves sometimes give similar indications. The rule of Columbanus was in some respects severer even than that of St. Benedict (Warren, *Liturgy and Ritual of the Celtic Church*). So far as the celibacy of the clergy, however, was concerned, it is probable, as Warren points out, that a married priesthood was not unknown in certain places and at certain times. St. Patrick appears to have been the son of a deacon and grandson of a priest, and one Irish canon speaks of a cleric and his wife ('uxor ejus'). Gildas in his *Increpatio in sacerdotes* seems to imply a married priesthood. The efforts to promote clerical celibacy in Wales in the 10th cent. met with considerable opposition, which continued into the two following centuries. Gildas (*Epist.* xxii. 21) speaks with approval of the celibate life, and quotes Elijah, Elisha, and Jeremiah as examples of it ('Virgo Elias, Elisæus virgo, virgines multi filii prophetarum'); in *de Excid.* 80 he says, 'Hieremias quoque virgo prophetaque'; but this was probably in opposition to the current ecclesiastical practice of Wales in his time.

The lives of the Celtic saints sometimes describe their ascetic practices in terms not unlike those of Indian *yogis* or *faqirs*, and it has been suggested that the principle underlying this self-torture was analogous to the Celtic legal remedy of 'fasting against a person,' a practice whereby the person 'fasting against' another, to whom he had preferred a request, could bring his blood upon the other person's head, if the fasting led to the faster's death through persistence in refusing the request (Fisher and Baring-Gould, *British Saints*, Introduction).

Some of the austerities recorded of Irish saints are as follows:—St. Finnchua is said to have spent seven years suspended by iron shackles under his armpits, 'so that he might get a place in heaven,' in lieu of one which he had given away. Both he and St. Ite are said to have caused their bodies to be eaten into by chafers or stag-beetles. St. Findian is said to have worn a girdle of iron that cut to the bone. Of St. Ciaran we are told that he mixed his bread with sand, and of him and St. Columba that they slept on the ground with a stone for a bolster. Of St. Mochua it is said that he lived as an *inclusus* in a prison of stone, and that he had only a little aperture left for letting food down to him. Of the Welsh saint Brynach we are told that he lessened his need for the luxury of clothing by dipping his body daily in the coldest water, and St. Cadoc is also said to have been wasted with fastings. Further, of the Irish saint Kevin it is said that he remained for seven years in a standing posture without sleep, with his arm held up in the same position, and that a blackbird laid and hatched her eggs in his palm. Some of these tales are obviously exaggerations, but doubtless the Celtic monks underwent not a few austerities both necessary and voluntary. An ascetic attitude towards women appears to be reflected in some ritual observances of the Celtic Church, as for instance in the rule (embodied in the *Penitential* of Cuminius) that women were to be veiled at the reception of the Eucharist. In the *Leabhar Breac*, too (f. 248, col. 1.), there is mentioned an Irish church where women were prohibited from going near the altar or taking the chalice into their hands. The Irish *Liber Hymnorum*, in its praise of the celibate lives of St. Patrick and St. Brigit, shows that the ascetic ideal had an honoured place in Celtic monasticism; and St. Patrick says of himself in his *Confessio* that he prayed as many as a hundred prayers a day, and the same number at night. Neither snow, frost, nor rain could prevent him from going before daylight to his wonted place of prayer. In spite of its tribal and other features, it cannot be doubted that Celtic asceticism was essentially part of the same movement as that which showed itself in

Christendom generally, and was governed in the main by similar ideals.

5. One of the best known names connected with Celtic asceticism is that of the Culdees (Ir. *Céli Dé*, 'the companions of God'). This term was sometimes Latinized into *Colidei* ('God-worshippers'). It is probable, according to the view taken by Reeves and Zimmer, that this term, as used from the 9th to the 12th cent., did not denote the regular successors of the Irish monasticism of the 6th, 7th, or 8th cents., but the followers of a new movement, which dated from the 8th century. Zimmer suggests that it was probably due to the influence of monks who had returned to Ireland after living at Metz under the rule of Chrodegang (A.D. 749). It was not in Ireland, however, but in North Britain that the Culdee movement attained its most important development.

Many of the terms of Celtic monastic nomenclature were derived from Latin, but a few were of native origin. The following are the chief terms of Irish: *abb* ('the abbot'); *secnabb* (i.e. *secundus abbas*, 'the prior'); *fer légind* ('the lector'); *mac légind* ('the lector's pupil'); *coimétaide* ('the warden'); *manach* ('a monk'); *mac clérech* ('a young monk'); *banairchinnech* ('the prioress'); *caillech* ('a nun'); *mac-caillech* ('a young nun'); *berrad manaig* ('the tonsure,' in Celtic countries over the front of the head from ear to ear); *cathair, congbail* or *mainster* ('a monastery'); *anchara* ('an anchorite'); *anmchara* ('a soul-friend,' 'confessor'); *cilic* ('cilicium'); *clausúd* ('clausula'); *cripta* (Lat. *crypta*), *disert* (Lat. *desertum*, 'an anchorite's cell'). In Welsh the following are some of the terms employed: *abad* ('an abbot'); *mynach* ('a monk'), *abades* ('an abbess'); *mynaches, lleian* ('a nun'); *mynachlog* ('monachi locus'); *mynachdy* ('a monastery'); *cwfeint* ('a convent'); *didryfwr* (lit. 'a homeless man,' 'a hermit'); *ancr* ('an anchorite'); *meudwy* (lit. 'a servant of God,' 'a hermit'); *cufygl* ('cubiculum,' 'a hermit's cell'). The Breton and Cornish terms are practically identical with those of Welsh. The place name Dyserth in Flintshire is probably identical in meaning with the Irish *disert*. The derivative of *cella* was in Irish *cille*, in Welsh *cell*. *Cil* in Welsh place names means 'a retreat,' and *llan*, 'an enclosure,' a term applied to the precincts of a monastic settlement. Generally it is followed by the name of a saint, but sometimes by some other word, such as a river name: *e.g.* Llanelwy, Llandaf, Llangefni, Llanarth, Llanllyfni. The Welsh term *Plwyf*, Breton *Plou* (from Latin *plebes*), which now means 'a parish,' meant in mediæval Welsh 'a congregation.'

6. The general fusion of Celtic Christianity with that of Rome led to the assimilation of the monastic institutions also, and the foundation of new monasteries and nunneries by the leading orders of the Continent. In Wales some of the mediæval abbeys, such as Neath, Margam, Strata Florida, Strata Marcella, Aberconwy, and Valle Crucis, aided and patronized Welsh literature; but from the 14th cent. onwards Welsh poetry, largely under the influence of the love-poet Dafydd ab Gwilym, shows an anti-ascetic tendency. Unlike Ireland and Brittany, Wales has become thoroughly Protestant in spirit, and not only Protestant but Nonconformist. So far as the Nonconformity of Wales may be said to have an ascetic bias, it is in the direction of temperance and total abstinence from the consumption of alcohol; and this tendency has left its trace in legislation in the 'Welsh Sunday Closing Act.' The Calvinistic Methodist Church, especially, views the sale and use of alcohol by its officers and members with marked disfavour; and its regulations are strongly hostile to all forms of card-playing, dancing, and the drama, but the spirit of Welsh Nonconformity in general is practically identical in these matters with that of this denomination.

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ASCETICISM (Christian).—

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I. *INTRODUCTION: ASCETICISM IN ITS RELATION TO BIBLICAL REVELATION.*—The word 'asceticism' (Gr. ἄσκησις, from ἀσκεῖν = 'to exercise *or* practise'), when used in the sphere of religion and ethics, denotes self-preparation for a virtuous course of conduct, the zealous practice of acts of devotion and morality. This practice of virtue in the narrower and stricter sense, or what may be called moral gymnastic, may consist in exercises of an inward kind (prayer offered in the heart, examination of conscience, and the like), or in acts of self-discipline passing over into the outward life (self-mortification by fasting, voluntary poverty, sexual continence, etc.). Both forms of asceticism, that pertaining to the spiritual sphere and that of a physical and external character, were already known to classical antiquity, especially in the traditional teaching of its philosophers from Pythagoras and Socrates downwards (cf. ἄσκησις in Plato, for instance *Rep.* vii. 536; and in Aristotle, for instance *Eth. Nicom.* ix. 9; as well as the mention of πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ ἀσκήσεις ὀσιότητος in Isocrates, p. 226 C, etc.). A specially high value was set upon the ascetic habit of life in the schools of the Stoics (cf. especially Epictetus, Περὶ ἀσκήσεως, Diss. II. xiii. 6), the Cynics (cf. κυνικὴ ἄσκησις in Jos. *Ant.* VI. xiii. 6), and the later Platonists beginning with Plutarch (cf. the latter's *Moral.* p. 668 E). Owing to the great and widespread influence of these schools during the Roman Imperial period, 'philosophy' and 'asceticism' (τὸ ἀσκητικόν, Epictetus, Diss. II. xii. 6) were employed almost as synonymous terms. Abundant evidence of the essential identity of the connotation of the terms 'ascetic' and 'philosopher' is furnished especially by the writings of Philo Judæus, as well as by those of numerous Christian Fathers from the time of Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria onwards. When Philo hails the Jewish religion, and the Fathers hail Christianity, as the true philosophy, both have in view a certain ascetic element in their respective religions. The moral strictness and earnest demand for virtue found in both, when looked at from the view-point of asceticism, formed the connecting link which rendered possible such a combination of the Jewish or Christian ideal of life with the 'wisdom' of the Græco-Roman philosophers.

As a matter of fact, there does appear to be inherent in both the OT and the NT stages of revelation an element of asceticism. This consists in the urgent demand for an earnest combating of sin and a complete resignation to the holy will of God. In its ritual legislation the Old Testament also prescribes fasting—sometimes strictly obligatory and universal (especially on the Great Day of Atonement, Lv 16^{29} 23^{27}), at other times optional and limited by temporary or personal conditions (*e.g.* Jl 1^{14} 2^{12}, Jer 36^{9}, 1 S 7^{6}, 2 S $12^{16ff.}$, Ezr 8^{23});

in particular, it imposes upon the priestly order certain temporary forms of abstinence; and is acquainted with a form of vow in virtue of which certain persons abstain all their lives from the use of wine (Nu $6^{2ff.}$, Jg 13^{4}, 1 S $1^{10ff.}$, Jer 35). And the New Testament religion not only takes cognizance of these and similar ordinances of the Old Covenant, but even itself leaves scope for a corresponding ascetic course of conduct. While not prescribing fasting as a matter of obligation, the NT clearly assumes that this practice will occasionally be followed by members of the Christian community (Mt 6^{16} 9^{15}, Ac 13^{2} 14^{23}, 2 Co 11^{27} etc.); it exhibits a similar attitude in the matter of sexual continence (Mt 19^{12}, 1 Co 7^{25}), or of the renunciation of earthly possessions (Mt 19^{21}, Ac 2^{44} 4^{32} 5^{4}), or of temporary submission to a vow (Ac 21^{24ff}), and the like. In short, acts of ascetic discipline and training in virtue are contemplated in the NT as allowable, nay, even as necessary, according to time and circumstances, in the sphere of Christianity. In the interests of the kingdom of Christ, the Apostle Paul submits himself to fastings, watchings, cold, nakedness, etc. (2 Co 6^{5} $11^{26f.}$); and 'bruises' and 'subdues' his body after the manner of athletes (1 Co 9^{27}). And he looks for similar action on the part of other seriously-minded followers of Christ (Gal 5^{24}, Ro 13^{14}, Col 3^{5}).

In view of the above and many other Biblical expressions, it cannot surely be maintained that ascetic practices are *excluded* by the religion of revelation. But, on the other hand, they cannot be regarded as a *primarily* important or *fundamentally* significant element of that religion. That they play only a secondary or accessory rôle in the sphere of revealed truth is plain even at the OT stage of religion, both from the relatively small number and the moderate strictness of the commands regarding fasting and other forms of abstinence, and from the sharp polemic of the Law and the Prophets against the excessive bodily and external mortification which prevailed widely in the religions of Israel's heathen neighbours (cf. the prohibitions of self-mutilation in Lv 19 and Dt 23, and Elijah's attitude towards the frantic wounding of themselves by the priests of Baal, 1 K $18^{28ff.}$). There is also proof of this in the absence of all trace of a partiality or a preference for the unmarried life in the social and ethical practice of life in Israel. To marry and to have children remain national fundamental virtues in Israel through all periods of its history; even as late as the Roman era, the Pharisees, who were pre-eminently the party of strict law, and who showed in many other points a disposition towards rigorous legalism in the matter of ascetic practice, maintained a decidedly unfavourable attitude towards celibacy. The opposite attitude of the Essenes cannot count for much, in view of the notoriously small number of this party and the extent to which they were probably influenced by foreign customs, particularly, it may be assumed, by the example of the Pythagoreans; and even in this sect there was a minority which (according to Jos. *BJ* II. viii. 13) did not renounce marriage.

That Christ and the primitive Christians deviated in any of the points here mentioned from the traditions that prevailed among the Covenant People of the OT is a theory that could be maintained only by a NT exegesis controlled by ascetic prejudices. Neither as regards the individual nor as regards society do the ethical teachings and prescriptions of the NT go further than *permit*. It is intended not as a rigorous statute, but as a command of love, when the Lord calls His disciples (Mt 10^{38} 16^{24}, Jn $13^{36f.}$) to follow after Him in the way of the cross and of humility; and the Apostles adopted precisely the same free and mild attitude towards the problems of controlling the appetites and mortifying the flesh. In regard to these problems, St. Paul appears in some measure to have made stricter demands (cf. the above-cited passages in 1 and 2 Cor. as well as the Epistle to the Galatians, etc.) than even the stern legalist St. James; but an injustice is done him when the attempt is made to read into his Epistles anything like a commendation of monastic withdrawal from the world or of fanatical maintenance of virginity. He was and continues to be the preacher of true evangelical freedom, even in all those instances where he deals with questions of individual or of social asceticism (cf. 1 Co 6^{12} $9^{4ff.}$ 10^{23}, Gal 5^{1}, Ro $14^{21f.}$); in the demands he makes for cross-bearing he nowhere goes beyond the standard set up by Jesus Himself. He who would 'walk by the Spirit' (cf. Gal $5^{16ff.}$) must, indeed, turn away from all works of the flesh; but there is no hint in this of an *ἀφειδία σώματος* or false angel-like spirituality (Col $2^{16ff.}$), no 'hating of one's own flesh' in the sense of Neo-Platonic or Oriental dualistic teachings (Eph $5^{28f.}$), no one-sided bodily exercise and mortification; for far higher than such *σωματικὴ γυμνασία* stands in his estimation the *γυμνάζειν ἑαυτὸν πρὸς εὐσέβειαν* (1 Ti $4^{7f.}$). Even in the solitary passage in which he uses the word *ἀσκεῖν* of religious and moral conduct (in his speech before Felix at Cæsarea, Ac 24^{16} *ἀσκῶ ἀπρόσκοπον συνείδησιν ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, κ.τ.λ.*), the practice of virtue he has in view is that which he champions everywhere else, a practice marked by the characteristic freedom of the Gospel, and as far removed from Pharisaic narrow-mindedness and legal bondage as it is from unnatural self-torture after the fashion of Indian *fuqîrs* or heathen Syrian priests of Asia Minor.

II. *THE ATTITUDE OF THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH TO ASCETICISM.*—In spite of the condition of things described above, which forbids us to regard asceticism as an element of the religious and moral life belonging exclusively to the essence of Christianity, or prescribed in its original body of doctrine as necessary to salvation, the ascetic principle early made way for itself in the development of the Christian Church. Nay, in the course of this development, asceticism soared to heights and produced phenomena in the life of the Church which for greatness and far-reaching influence on the whole cultured life of humanity fall in no way behind what the history of non-Christian religions has to show of an analogous kind. Christian asceticism is one of the phenomena produced by the union of pre-Christian factors of civilization with the spirit of Christianity, phenomena which —like Christian art, poetry, jurisprudence, etc.— have everywhere made contributions of inestimable value and of abiding significance for the furtherance and elevation of the mental life of mankind. And the source from which the Christian spirit derived this element of culture—so far as it did not lie in the religious and cultured life of the OT —can have been none other than that from which formative influences and impulses mainly flowed in the departments of art, poetry, politics, and law. The beginnings of asceticism in the Christian Church, especially as organized in the form of communities—monasticism—constitute another chapter in the history of that process which is usually spoken of as the 'Hellenizing of Christianity.' No other place can be assigned to them than within the sphere of this process, which embraces the history of the Church from the 2nd to the 5th century. For the stage upon which the phenomena of a fully developed and socially organized Christian asceticism first make their appearance is found in those lands which constituted the world of Græco-Roman civilization; and the religious and philosophical traditions of this same cultured

world form the point to which the asceticism of the Church, with its ideals and efforts, primarily and mainly attaches itself.

Per se another supposition might appear possible, namely, that a fruitful influence upon the ascetic and monastic tendencies of the ancient Eastern Church proceeded from a religious civilization which in the matter of asceticism was so richly developed as that of *India* (with ascetic systems like Jainism and Buddhism, which date back to a time considerably earlier than the Christian era). Or an attempt might be made to trace the earliest ascetic and monastic movements in Christianity to kindred phenomena in the religions of *Babylonia* (and Syrophœnicia) or of *Egypt*. But when the various pre-Christian religious civilizations are pitted against one another and their share in the result before us examined, none can dispute the palm with *Greece*. India is far too distant, and was always much too widely separated from the mental life of the peoples of Western Asia, to be seriously taken into account. Towards the religious usages of Babylonia and Syria, which might certainly be considered with a view to the solution of the problem, the people of God in OT times—and primitive Christianity in like manner—consistently assumed an attitude only of disapproval and sharp opposition (cf. the remark already made on 1 K 18^{28}). Again, the analogies with early Christian asceticism, which have been sought in the religious system of the Egyptians, prove, upon closer critical examination, to be merely apparent. This remark applies especially to those alleged ascetics or priestly monks of the temple of Serapis whom H. Weingarten (art. 'Mönchtum' in *PRE*^{2}, 1882; and previously in *Der Ursprung des Monchtums im nachkonstantin. Zeitalter*, Gotha, 1877) sought to represent as the real models and teachers of the earliest Christian monks—a false theory which has been completely shattered by more recent investigation (see É. Preuschen's monograph, *Monchtum und Serapiskult*, Darmstadt, 1899 [2nd ed. 1903], in which the existence of Serapis priests of a monkish type is disproved, and therewith the utter impossibility of Weingarten's hypothesis demonstrated). Thus we must abide by the view that the beginnings of early Christian asceticism and monasticism go back to essentially Greek influences, or, to put it more exactly, to the influence of the late Greek and Judæo-Hellenic schools of philosophy, to which we have already referred in this connexion. The religions of the Ancient East can at most be credited with only an indirect share (the result of the syncretism of the Alexandrian epoch) in the formative process we are considering. [Cf., on the one side, Edwin Hatch, *Influence of Gr. Ideas and Usages upon the Chr. Church* (Germ. tr., Preuschen, *Griechentum und Christentum*, Freib. i. B. 1892, p. 101 ff.), and A. Harnack, *Das Monchtum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte*^{4}, Giessen, 1895, esp. p. 18 ff.; and, on the other side, the literature (No. II.) cited at the end of the present article, dealing with the history of asceticism prior to and outside Christianity.]

Long before the rise of monastic organizations, by which asceticism was elevated to the rank of the ideal of life for the social ethics of Christianity, many forms of ascetic practice and endeavour had made their appearance within the sphere of individual ethics. Some of these had their model in Jewish customs. This was the case in particular with the habit of fasting twice a week and observing fixed daily hours of prayer. For both of these practices, the so-called 'station' fasts on Wednesday and Friday, and the habit of praying at least three times a day (the germ from which the later conventual institution of 'hours' developed), there is evidence in writings as early as the 2nd cent. (*Didache*, VIII. i. 3; Hermas, *Sim.* v. 1, 3; Aristides, *Apol.* 15; Tertull. *de Jejun.* i. 10, *de Orat.* i. 19; Clem. Alex., etc.). And at the root of both there is not only the Pharisaic Jewish model, but also an underlying allusion, dating probably even from Apostolic times, to the principal features of the Passion of our Lord. The phenomena of pre-monastic early Christian asceticism may be assumed to have found their models and motives mainly in pagan Hellenism. So with the custom (to be attributed to the influence of Montanism) of partial fasting for several weeks before Easter (the *Xerophagy*, or Fast of the Passion); the disposition (attributable to the same source) to increase the severity of Church discipline and to place additional obstacles in the way of contracting a second marriage (cf. especially Tertull. *de Pœnit.*, *de Pudic.*, *ad Uxor.*, *de Monogam.*, etc.); as well as the high or exaggerated value (to be explained partly from Montanist and partly from Gnostic influences) set upon voluntary virginity (*παρθενία*, *ἐγκράτεια*) as an ideal.

We see the *coryphæi* of all the leading schools of theology, Greeks and Latins, Alexandrians and non-Alexandrians (cf., in regard to these last, not only the already oft-cited Tertullian, but also especially Cyprian, *de Hab. Virg.* and *de Orat. Domin.*; Lactantius, *Inst. Div.* vi. 23; and Methodius, *Conviv.* vii. 3, viii. 1), participating in the endeavour to commend such ascetic practices. The ascetic element was most prominent, to be sure, in the theology of that school which, as the founder of an ecclesiastically orthodox gnosis in opposition to that of the heretical Gnostics, ventured to draw most boldly and most deeply from the treasury of the traditions of Greek philosophy—the *Alexandrian*, which far surpassed all other theological schools of the early Church in the matter of establishing and developing Christian asceticism. Even Clement, although he defends the right to hold earthly possessions (*Quis div. salv.*), and upholds the sanctity of the married condition (*Pæd.* ii. 10; *Strom.* ii. 23, iii. 12), gives expression to very rigorous views regarding the Christian attitude to fine clothes and various worldly pleasures and enjoyments (*Pæd.* ii. 1 ff., iii. 2 f., 7 f.), and even pleads at times in favour of an almost Stoically conceived ideal of apathy (*Strom.* iv. 22, cf. iii. 7 and vii. 12). Origen, even after he had learned to repent of the hyper-ascetic excesses of his youth, in particular his self-emasculation (Euseb. *HE* vi. 8), still remained an enthusiastic panegyrist of all forms of world-renunciation and mortifying of the flesh. He went still further in the matter of fasting and other forms of abstinence (see *Hom. in* Lv $^{10.\ 11}$, *Exhort. ad Martyr.* etc.), and especially in recommending virginity (on this last point, besides passages like *c. Cels.* i. 26, vii. 48, viii. 55, see especially his Com. on Ro 12^1, where he commends three kinds of 'living, holy, God-pleasing sacrifice,' namely a martyr death, voluntary celibacy, and abstinence from sexual intercourse on the part of married persons; similarly *Hom.* 23 *in Num.*).

It is not surprising that, when an advance took place from the practice of asceticism by individuals to its practice by bodies of people, the earliest signs of the movement took place where this Christian-Gnostic theology made its influence first and most powerfully felt. Egypt, the home of the Alexandrian theology, became also the mother-land of early Christian *monasticism*, or, to designate it more exactly and correctly, *cœnobitism* (for *μοναχός* or *μονάζων* is properly 'a hermit,' 'one living alone'; it is the living together in *κοινόβια* that stamps the ascetics as monks in the modern sense of the word). It was in those circles in Egypt in which theology and church stood in the closest connexion with Origen that the impulse towards more intimate

association, with a view to a common ascetic life, appears to have set in earliest. The adherents of the Origenist Hierakas, whom Epiphanius in No. 67 of his Catalogue of Heretics describes as a sect under the name Ἱερακῖται, may in many respects be regarded as one of the earliest societies of ascetics. But in their case, as previously in that of the Encratite party of Tatian, the element of theoretical traditional teaching or mystico-Gnostic speculation probably predominated to such an extent that the name 'school' or 'sect' fits them better than such designations as 'Mönchverein' or 'Klosterbrüderschaft' (cf. art. 'Hierakas' in *PRE*[3] viii. 38 f. by A. Harnack, who does not take sufficient account of the peculiarity which distinguishes them from the cœnobite societies of the following period). Like these Hierakites, who may have belonged entirely to the 3rd cent., the 'solitaries' (μοναχοί, also μονότροποι, μονῆρεις), described by Eusebius in two passages of his Commentary on the Psalms (on Pss 67 and 83), were also still without the closer social organization. The latter may yet have been wanting also to those 'bond brothers' or 'sons of the bond' (Syr. *bənai qyâmâ*), of whom mention is made by a Syrian contemporary of Eusebius, namely, Aphraates of Edessa, in Nos. 6 and 18 of his *Homilies*. To the category of ascetics who received their impulse from the Alexandrian theology we must assign also those representatives of the ascetic habit of life who belong to the first decades of the 4th cent., and whose dwelling-places should probably be sought in Palestine and Syria rather than in Egypt. What here again forbids our identifying them with monks proper or cœnobites is the lack of more definite information as to principles of organization or rules that may have belonged to them.

This characteristic of being bound together by a fixed principle or rule of life is not wanting, however, in those societies of Middle Egypt which from the early part of the 4th cent. began to make their appearance in the Eastern Church, and as the founders of which St. Antony and St. Pachomius have gained superlative fame. The former (born 251, died 356) lived for some decades (from about 270) as a hermit in the mountain wastes of northern Middle Egypt, on the right bank of the Nile, opposite Arsinoë and Heracleopolis. Then, shortly after the year 300, a number of bodies of associates in his ascetic mode of life, who had taken up their abode in the same region, were trained by him to work and to practise devotional exercises in common, and thus—though for a time without written rules—a kind of monastic life was established. The sites of two of the κοινόβια, or colonies of monks, established and directed by St. Anthony down to his death (*i.e.* for a full half century) can be fixed with tolerable certainty: Pispir, or the 'outer mount of Antonius,' lying close to the right bank of the Nile, and the 'inner mount of Antonius,' lying farther to the east, near the Red Sea. While this older patriarch of Egyptian monasticism still refrained from committing his rules to writing, his younger contemporary Pachomius (born *c.* 290, died 345 or 346) provided the hosts of ascetics who gathered round him in southern Middle Egypt, between Akhmîm [Panopolis] and Denderah, with a rule of life which regulated in detail their devotional exercises and their work. This body of rules was, no doubt, reduced to writing by himself or by some of his immediate associates. By the authors of the earliest accounts of his life and work it was regarded as a product of Divine inspiration, having, it was alleged, been given to him, written on a tablet of brass, by an angel while he sojourned in a cave. Its prescriptions regulate in the most minute detail not only the daily round of work and prayer, but also everything relating to the food, the clothes, the sleep, and the dwellings of the monks. They comprise much that is original and characteristic of the national Egyptian monastic usage, but also some things which the later tradition did not accept at all (so, especially, the division of the inmates of each establishment into 24 τάγματα classified according to age), or accepted only with considerable modifications (for instance, the prescription of 3 × 12 daily acts of prayer).

Partly independent of the models offered by the creations of these two great monastic fathers, and partly with more or less close attachment to them, there arose even during their lifetime various large and afterwards influential settlements of associated bands of ascetics. Thus we find (1) in Lower Egypt, the monasteries, or, to be more correct, the hermit-villages of the Nitrian mountain, founded somewhere about the year 320 by Amun or Ammonius, as well as those of the desert of Skete to the north of this hill country, founded about 330 by Macarius 'the Great' or 'the Egyptian' (died 390); (2) the South Palestinian hermitages and monasteries of St. Hilarion, a pupil of St. Anthony (*c.* 320–360); (3) the N. Syrian and Mesopotamian monasteries called into being about 325 in Nisibis and its environs by the Egyptian Awgîn (a monkish saint who received his training at Tabennisi, the principal monastery of Pachomius); (4) the monastic societies established about 330 still farther north, in Armenia, Pontus, and Cappadocia, by Eustathius of Sebaste. Only a little later are the phenomena which mark the laying of the foundation of a joint practice of asceticism in the West, especially the essentially monastic activity of St. Martin (*c.* 370–400) in Western Gaul. Regarding the majority of these fathers of the monastic system we have more or less detailed and in the main reliable historical information. In his *Historia Lausiaca* (written in the beginning of the 5th cent.), Palladius has collected sketches of the lives of some 70 notable ascetics and founders of monasteries. These sketches, while not devoid of certain features of embellishment, are never pure fictions, but rather embody reports by eye- and ear-witnesses of the persons and events in question. The same remark applies to the historical value of the still older *Historia Monachorum* by Rufinus, and to Athanasius's *Vita Antonii*. Here, again, this last-named biography of the most famous of all the Oriental fathers of monasticism has handed down to us information which, while it is enriched with not a few legendary additions, represents in the main the authentic testimony of contemporaries. [Against the attacks of modern hyper-critics (esp. the above-named Weingarten) on these and other sources for the history of asceticism and monasticism during the era of Constantine and the following period, see, in general, the discussions by C. Butler and the author of the present article in the works cited below (esp. Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*, pp. 188 ff., 200 ff., 212 ff.)].

III. *DEVELOPMENT OF ASCETICISM IN THE MIDDLE AGES.* — The Church of the Middle Ages added scarcely anything that was essentially new to the forms of ascetic effort and action that had become usual in the Early Church period; but in the matter of establishing fixed rules and systematizing these forms it went far beyond what had been done by the Ancient Church. The development in question was accomplished in the course of the following four periods:

1. *The transition period from the Early Church to the Middle Ages proper* (*c.* 360–800).—During this period the labours of a number of *monastic legislators* in East and West gave permanent form

and binding force to the traditions of the era of Constantine with reference to the living together of ascetics in monastic establishments. Basil the Great of Cæsarea (died 379) drew up a set of rules, which proved of fundamental importance and attained to permanent influence, for the monastic system of the Eastern Roman Empire and partly also of Lower Italy and Sicily. Suppression of the hermit or anchorite form of monastic life (which was still frequently preferred by the earliest Oriental ascetics) by cœnobite arrangements, transfer of monastic settlements from remote deserts to the neighbourhood of cities, rejection of hyper-ascetic excesses (*e.g.* in such matters as fasting and the number of daily times of prayer, which were restricted to seven or eight), and generally an increasing mildness of disposition, directed to the discouraging of excessive ascetic enthusiasm—such are, upon the whole, the characteristic features of this organization which derived its origin and its name from Basil. In the Latin edition of the Rules of Basil, which Rufinus prepared to serve as a constitution for the lower Italian and Sicilian branches of this monastic family, provision is made even for the establishment of double religious houses, *i.e.* the erection close to one another of monasteries under an abbot and of nunneries under a 'mother.' The foundation of these double houses indicates a shrinking from the vehemence of the older sexual asceticism. A similar custom prevailed frequently in the West, even independently of the influence of Basil and Rufinus. Such houses were founded, for instance, in Spain by Fructuosus (died 670); in the British Isles we have examples in the Iro-Scottish religious houses founded by St. Patrick and St. Columba; and still later in the orders of Robert of Arbrissel (died 1117), Gilbert of Sempringham (died 1189), and Birgitta of Sweden (died 1373); cf. Zockler, *l.c.* pp. 290, 379 ff., 419 ff., 541 f. More or less important developments continued to be undergone by Basil's monastic legislation in the Byzantine East till towards the middle of the 11th century. These concerned especially such matters as the placing of the religious houses under the bishop's superintendence, increased severity of discipline within convents, an organic union whereby anchorites (κελλιῶται, 'inmates of cells') lived with cœnobites within the same cloistral district, and the distinguishing of the monks' right of penitential discipline from the pastoral charge exercised by the secular clergy. Most effective for this development were the ecclesiastical prescriptions of Justinian's civil code; the canons of certain synods of the 7th and 8th cents., especially the Trullan Council, ii. 692; the influence of the patriarch Germanus of Constantinople (died 703), of the abbot Theodorus Studita (died 826), of Athanasius of Trapezus (*c.* 960 ff.) who founded the oldest principal religious house of the monastic republic on Mt. Athos, and of the Constantinopolitan monastic prefect, Simeon the younger (*c.* 1040; cf. Zöckler, *l.c.* p. 290 ff.; and, in regard to the last named, K. Holl, *Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt beim griechischen Monchtum*, Leipzig, 1898).

Turning to the monastic system and asceticism of the West, we discover the most influential legislator and most famous founder of orders in the person of Benedict the Great of Nursia (died 543), the founder of Monte Casino. A number of his predecessors in the West (in particular Joh. Cassianus [died 435] and Cæsarius of Arles [died 542], the former the composer of rules for monks, the latter the author of a system for nuns) had sought to adapt the ascetic traditions of the East as represented by Egypt and Syria to the needs of the inmates of Western religious houses. In relation to these attempts it is to be noted that the course followed by the *Regula Benedicti*, which became the fundamental code of the greatest of all the orders of monks, is partly to summarize and partly to condense and simplify previous results. The *Regula* in its present form is divided into 73 chapters, and though perhaps not free from some later additions, may be regarded, certainly up to ch. 66, as genuine. It exhibits no small degree of legislative wisdom in its enactments, which are marked on the one hand by strictness and on the other by humanity and mildness. It wears the aspect of strictness in its insistence upon the maintenance of the *votum stabilitatis*, and in its measures for ensuring a strict *clausura* in opposition to all undutifulness and disposition on the part of the monks to wander about without restraint; so also in its demand that there shall be no holding of private property by any inmate of a religious house; in short, in its enforcing of the three fundamental monastic duties: *castitas*, *obedientia*, *paupertas*. But, on the other hand, it evinces relative mildness in its dietary prescriptions (the eating of flesh food being prohibited, but a moderate quantity of wine allowed), its regulation of dress, its enjoining of silence (*taciturnitas*) at fixed times, and its directions as to devotions, eight daily 'hours' being indeed prescribed, but excessive length being avoided by reducing the number of Psalms to be sung in each 'hour' to three. The *Regula* of the patriarch of Monte Casino knows as yet nothing of the more violent methods of penance and discipline, such as self-flagellation, wearing the hair shirt, temporary *inclusio*, or confinement of monks in their cells, etc. It was reserved for later epochs in the Middle Ages to give birth increasingly to such aggravations of ascetic practice until an unnatural degree was reached.

2. *The period from the beginning of the 9th till towards the end of the 11th century* (from Charlemagne to Hildebrand).—This period is characterized, on the one hand, by the beginnings of that rigorous reaction, within the bosom of the Benedictine order of monks, against the frequent laxity or disuse of monastic discipline, such a reaction as is exhibited in the reforms of the younger Benedict (of Aniane, died 821) and the 'congregation' of Cluny (especially from the time of its second abbot, Odo [died 942]); and, on the other hand, by the constant effort of the Church, through the instrumentality of penance, to carry over ascetic principles and habits of life to the lay world. Amongst the literature serving this purpose (the *Libri Pœnitentiales*), one of the earliest and most prominent places should be assigned to the works of Columbanus of Luxeuil (died 615), who composed not only a book of penance for laymen, but a rule for religious houses (*regula cœnobialis*) which contained a severe penal code. In this class of literature we find prescribed not only a number of the ordinary forms of penance for sins that have been confessed (money fines, almsgiving, pilgrimages to distant shrines, intensified fastings, etc.), but with special frequency also the penalty of flagellation. In connexion with the rigorous movement emanating from Cluny, there were many monasteries in which, from the commencement of the 11th cent., this flagellation was practised in a specially severe form, and with all sorts of refinements added to intensify it. Thus arose the practice of self-flagellation, first introduced in certain religious houses of Central Italy (Clusium, Pomposia, perhaps also at Camaldoli near Arezzo, the original seat of the Camaldulensian 'congregation' founded by Romuald [died 1027]), and reduced to a fine art in Peter Damiani's establishment, Fonte Avellana, by Dominicus, surnamed

Loricatus (*c.* 1050), who added to the self-inflicted flagellation yet other methods of mortifying the flesh, notably the performance of numerous genuflexions (*metanœæ*) during the singing of Psalms in Divine worship, and so became a much admired hero of the self-torturing hyper-ascetic discipline (see the literature cited below).

A more harmless form of the joint practice of asceticism, likewise developed first in the religious houses that were influenced by the reforming movement of Cluny, and showing itself almost simultaneously in Central Italy and in South Germany, consisted in the institution of lay-brothers or 'outside brothers' (*fratres exteriores* or *conversi* or even *barbati*). These were a kind of half-monks, who, because they were subject to only part of Benedict's *Regula* and were not bound to wear the monastic habit, did much to diffuse the spirit of monastic piety even in lay circles, and at the same time to extend the political influence of the monastery. Starting from Gualbert's 'congregation' of Vallombrosa near Florence (*c.* 1038), and from Hirschau, the monastery of abbot William the Holy (died 1091), this institution of lay-brothers gradually established itself in other 'congregations' as well. It became the model for those brotherhoods of Penitents or Tertiaries which were afterwards (from the end of the 13th cent.) affiliated with the mendicant orders of St. Dominic and St. Francis, and from whose activity results of great significance followed.

3. *The period of the Crusades and of the last two centuries of the Middle Ages* (*c.* 1100–1517).—The characteristics of this period are an ever-growing effort on the part of the religious orders to extend their manner of cultivating piety to the Church as a whole, and an increasing tendency to multiply ascetic practices and forms. Even during the 12th cent. the monasticizing of the secular clergy by the imposition of celibacy—a movement which had the fashion set to it in Rome from the time of Gregory VII.—had been accomplished in almost all the countries of the West, both the great rival 'congregations' of the Benedictine order, that of Cluny and that of the Cistercians, lending their services to the Curia for this end. Still greater results were reached by the above-mentioned mendicant orders, which from the 13th cent. began to take up the work of both these bodies and in general of the older religious orders. Partly through the stringency with which they enforced the rule of poverty, partly through the institution of Tertiaries above referred to, and, in addition to all this, owing to their preaching in the language of the people, and to the self-sacrificing character of their pastoral activity, especially in times of severe national calamities, they gained for themselves a degree of popularity which threw all their predecessors into the shade. Many phenomena of asceticism as well as hyper-asceticism still prevailed side by side with the influences emanating from these regularly constituted chief representatives of monastic piety. Such, for instance, was the practice, much resorted to by both sexes, of *inclusio*, or allowing themselves to be shut up in narrow cells, caves, or huts, sometimes in remote districts, sometimes in the vicinity of much frequented churches or religious houses. So with pilgrimages to places of devotion and miracle-working shrines, the latter increasing in number towards the end of the Middle Ages. To the same category belong the processions of flagellants, which after the year 1349 repeatedly poured over great tracts of country, and whose practices about the beginning of the 15th cent. were brought to the highest degree of perfection under the guidance of the Spanish Dominican saint Vincentius Ferrer (1401–1417). Another phenomenon was the appearance in particular localities of groups of people who were seized with a sudden religious (or semi-religious) mania, *e.g.* the 'dancers' of the Lower Rhine and Holland (1374) and Strassburg (1418). Finally must be mentioned the numerous instances, amounting almost to a general epidemic of asceticism, in which, from the time of the 'stigmatization' miracle connected with St. Francis (1224), visible copies of the wounds of Christ were, it was alleged, miraculously produced on persons of both sexes, sometimes within the pale of the two rival orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic, sometimes outside it.

The above and kindred phenomena betray a religious degeneration, hand in hand with which went numerous symptoms of moral decay, particularly in the discipline of most of the religious orders, old and new alike. An attempt was made to counteract this degeneration by the mystical and inward tendency which marked some ascetic groups, esp. the 'Brothers of the Common Life' (*q.v.*), who spread from the Netherlands over North and Central Germany; but this effort to lead men to spiritual religious exercises and to a spiritual following of Christ failed to make any deep and lasting impression upon any large number of people.

IV. *ASCETICISM IN MODERN TIMES.*—The Reformation of the sixteenth century led to a return, on the part of all that portion of Western Christendom which adhered to it, to that limited measure of ascetic practice and aim which was the norm for primitive Christianity, with its freedom from the Law. In other words, an attitude of disapproval was adopted not only towards the hyper-asceticism of the Middle Ages, but also towards those intensifications of the ascetic-monastic principle which had made their appearance in the Early Church. On the other hand, in both the Churches of Catholic tradition, the Roman and the Greek, this critical attitude, derived from the Protestant doctrine of justification, towards the development of previous centuries was condemned as unbridled antinomianism. Hence the attempt was made to conserve not only the ascetic but partly also the hyper-ascetic acquisitions of the Church's past. Accordingly a wide severance between the principal Churches in the matter of their ascetic practice now set in.

1. *The Græco-Russian Church.*—This Church, which had been more or less untouched by the exaggerations of asceticism that had shown themselves during the mediæval development of the Western Church, continues to abide in all essentials by the forms and conditions with which the period of primitive Christianity had ended. Hence for it an enduring validity belongs to Canon 13 of the Second Trullan Council, which frees the priests and the lower clergy in general from the obligation to celibacy; as well as to the 12th Canon of the same Council, which strictly binds the higher grades of the hierarchy, from bishops upwards, to an unmarried life. Accordingly, the higher church offices can, as a rule, be held only by men chosen from the ranks of the monastic clergy—a principle far-reaching in its bearing upon the whole ecclesiastical and civil life, and serving to erect a great wall of partition against Western Catholicism.

2. *The Roman Catholic Church.*—Along with the celibacy of the clergy, this Church retains almost all the other intensifications of the ascetic principle which the mediæval development added to the Early Church traditions. Nay, in the interests of its contra-reforming aims it has in not a few points gone beyond the Middle Ages. New forms of ascetic discipline and self-torture could indeed

no longer be invented, but all that was possible was done in order to give more effective form and more refined manner to the creations of earlier days. This will be seen if, for instance, Loyola's *Exercitia spiritualia* be compared with their embryonic types in the monastic mysticism of the Brothers of the Common Life, or if the Jesuitical school comedies and the performance of oratorios in the order of Neri be compared with the crudities of the clerical plays of the closing pre-Reformation period. Of the unnatural extravagances of the later mediæval asceticism, some, such as flagellantism, *inclusio*, the wearing of the penitential shirt, etc., were, if not wholly suppressed, at least somewhat mitigated and more discreetly ordered. The tendency to multiply the forms of joint practice of asceticism was still maintained. And especially in the frequent formation of new religious brotherhoods and sisterhoods outside the orders proper the more recent Catholicism exhibits an inventive genius and a productive power which have been able to defy all counter-forces, including even the revolutionary storm at the transition from the 18th to the 19th cent., and which at the beginning of the present century continue to exhibit the same capacity as during the first decades of the counter-Reformation. The Society of Jesus forms the chief centre. Within its bosom is constantly produced that inexhaustible supply of ascetic vital energy which is diffused in all directions with triumphant effect. The uniqueness of this most important and original of all Catholic orders consists neither in unexampled severity of self-mortification nor in unusual zeal in performing deeds of loving self-sacrifice, nor yet in a superlative degree of scientific industry. In none of these points, least of all in the last-named, is the order of Loyola content to hold a secondary place; but it seeks its chief glory in an intensifying of the monastic virtue of obedience, whereby it far surpasses all that has been achieved in this matter by earlier ascetic societies. The secret of its greatness lies in the blindly obedient devotion on the part both of its individual members and of its superiors to the command of the Pope, and all with a view to extirpating Protestant heresy. To the vow of obedience it has imparted, especially by that sacrifice of intellect to which it trains its pupils, a military precision which secures for it an incomparable superiority over all the other militant orders of the Papal Church. And, owing to this essentially military character and organization, while it has not indeed reached its goal in the extirpation of Protestantism, it has gained other successes of the utmost importance. Instead of the Churches of Protestantism, it has completely conquered its own Church, and secured for itself within it a position of influence which, to all appearance, is destined to continue for decades if not for centuries.

3. *The Protestant Churches.* — These reject, as their reforming instruments and Confessions declare with practical unanimity (cf. *Conf. Aug.* artt. 26, 27; *XXXIX Artt.*, xxxii., xxxiv.; *Conf. Helvet.* ii. 18, 24, 29; *Scotch Conf.* i. 14, 15, and ii.), the Roman demand for the celibacy of the clergy, just as they oppose the claiming of special merit for ascetic displays of virtue. A certain number of wonted ascetic observances, especially in the matter of keeping weekly and yearly fasts, passed over into the practice of Lutherans, Anglicans, and some of the other Reformed Churches in the times immediately following the Reformation, but have survived in only a very limited measure down to the present day. A return to the principles and practices of strict asceticism in the matter both of fasting and of abstinence from worldly pleasures and enjoyments, evincing in general a tendency to withdrawal from the world, was aimed at and in some measure achieved by the Continental Pietism of the 17th and 18th cents., as well as in England and her colonies by Methodism and some of the Methodist and Baptist sects (especially the Tunkers [from *c.* 1724] and the Shakers [from 1774], both of which favoured the principles of celibacy and complete community of property). But even these attempts led for the most part to no permanent results. The Pietistic bodies in Germany, in so far as they survived the Spener-Francke and Zinzendorf times, introduced important modifications in their opposition to a more secular form of Christianity. A more enduring character belongs to the ascetic efforts of many branches of British and American Methodism. Particularly in the sphere of the crusade against alcohol not a little success has already been achieved, whose salutary influence extends to the life of other denominations as well, and from which still more may be looked for in the future. A similar remark applies to the work of the Salvation Army. Its 'Self-Denial Efforts,' *i.e.* abstinence from a number of the pleasures of life with a view to being able to give all the more for the benefit of others, may be classed with those forms of ascetic action whose survival and wider diffusion within the pale of Protestant Christianity are in general to be wished and prayed for. Similar in character and aim are the 'Weeks of Self-Denial' that have recently become common among the Presbyterians of North America, of which an account is given by R. E. Thompson, the historian of that denomination, in *American Church History* series, vi. 189.

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III. *HISTORY OF EARLY CHRISTIAN ASCETICISM*: I. Gregory Smith, *Christian Monasticism from the Fourth to the Ninth Century of the Christian Era*, London, 1892, P. Ladeuze, *Étude sur le cénobitisme pakhomien pendant le ive et ve siècle*, Louvain and Paris, 1898; James O. Hannay, *The Spirit and Origin of Christian Monasticism*, London, 1903; Cuthbert Butler, *The Lausiac History of Palladius*, 2 vols, Cambridge, 1898–1904; Stephan Schiwietz, *Das morgenlandische Monchtum*, Mainz, 1904; cf. also the monographs (cited in the text above) of Weingarten, Preuschen, Harnack, etc., and, in general, Zöckler *Askese und Monchtum*, pp. 149–285.

IV. *EASTERN ASCETICISM IN THE CHURCH OF THE MIDDLE AGES*: F. Kattenbusch, *Vergleichende Confessionskunde*, i. (Freiburg, 1892), pp. 522-542, Phil. Meyer, 'Die Athoskloster' in *Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte*, 1890, and the same author's *Die Haupturkunden fur die Geschichte der Athoskloster*, Leipzig, 1893; Kosmas Blachos, Ἡ χερσόνησος τοῦ Ἁγίου Ὄρους Ἄθω καὶ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ μόναι καὶ οἱ μοναχοί, πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν, Volo, 1903; G. A. Schneider, *Der heilige Theodor von Studion*, Munster, 1900; K. Holl, *Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt beim griechischen Monchtum*, Leipzig, 1898; cf. Zockler, *Askese und Monchtum*, pp. 285 ff., 620 ff.

V. *WESTERN CATHOLIC ASCETICISM*: Max Heimbucher, *Die Orden und Congregationen der kathol. Kirche*[2], 3 vols., Paderborn, 1907; E. Spreitzenhofer, O S B., *Die Entwicklung des alten Monchtums in Italien bis zum Auftreten des heiligen Benedikt*, Vienna, 1894; G. Grützmacher, *Die Bedeutung Benedicts von Nursia und seiner Regel in der Geschichte des Monchtums*, Berlin, 1892; Seebass and Zockler, art 'Benedikterorden,' in *PRE*[3] ii. 577 ff.; E. Sackur, *Die Cluniacenser in ihrer kirchlichen Wirksamkeit bis zur Mitte des zweiten Jahrhunderts*, 2 vols., Halle, 1891–1894; cf., in general, Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands*, Leipzig, 1900–1906, vols. ii. iii. iv., and Zöckler, *op. cit.* pp. 323–557.

VI. *History of Asceticism in Modern Times*: On Greek and Roman Catholic asceticism see **Kattenbusch** and **Heimbucher**, *opp. citt.*; and cf., for the different modern orders, artt. Capuchins, Jesuits, Liguorians, etc. On asceticism in the Protestant Churches see **H. Josephson**, *Die evangel. Askese*, Leipzig, 1890; **Jul. Kaftan**, *Die Askese im Leben des evangel. Christentums*, Potsdam, 1904; cf. also the artt. Methodism and Pietism, and, in general, **Zockler**, *op. cit.* pp. 558-631.

O. Zöckler.

ASCETICISM (Greek). — We find asceticism even in ancient Greek life, and there, in fact, its unseen beginnings go back to the 7th cent. B.C. Sundry anticipations of the practice are traceable in various religious cults, as, *e.g.*, the rigorous fasting enjoined by the Eleusinian Mysteries, the fast-day in the sacred calendar of the Attic *Thesmophoria*, the fasting preparatory to incubation in the chthonian cults, etc.* But none of these ever got beyond the embryonic stage, as they did not emanate from any systematic religious conception of the world. Ascetic movements of real significance make their first appearance among the ecstatic seers and purifiers of the 7th and 6th centuries B.C. Thus Abaris, whom Pindar (frag. 270 B) names as a contemporary of Cræsus, is said to have carried the golden arrow of Apollo over the whole earth without taking food.† In Strabo, vii. 301, he appears as the pattern εὐκολίας καὶ λιτότητος καὶ δικαιοσύνης—a description, of course, merely legendary and idealizing. The famous seer and purifier, Epimenides of Crete, is also extolled by ancient authorities for his rigorous fasting and his ascetic mode of life in general.‡ While it may be the case that these reports all proceed from the *Pseudepimenidea* of Onomacritus, we have nevertheless no reason to doubt the ascetic tendencies of the persons named, or of kindred spirits. This is, in fact, confirmed by the account given in Hippocrates, *de Morb. Sacr.* c. 1 (Littré, ii. 354 ff.), of the rules of abstinence prescribed by such purifiers.§ The purpose of these regulations and ceremonies was to purify men from the contaminating touch of demons. And, indeed, the practice of cathartics in general arose mainly from the dread of demonic powers, with their standing menace of pollution. Such ideas had not yet taken shape in the Homeric age.

These germinal notions, however, could not develop into a genuine asceticism until men had become conscious of an opposition between body and soul. No doubt the idea that the soul may pursue an independent existence apart from the body belongs to the remote past, the phenomena of dreams, the trance of 'possession,' as also the frequently abrupt transition from life to death, all having tended to suggest such a thought to primitive man. But the feeling of an *opposition*, the surmise that the soul is in its nature divine, while the body is merely its prison-house, makes its first appearance in Greece as a result of the experiences of men in a state of *ecstasy*, notably in connexion with the Dionysan cult. It was, in fact, the triumphal advance of the Dionysan religion which first gave currency to the conviction that the soul acquires hitherto unsuspected powers once it is free from the trammels of the body—a conviction presently appropriated by the adherents of Orphism. 'Of small account, as contrasted with the soul, ever striving after freedom, must appear the body, as that which obstructs, which fetters, and which must be cast off.' . . . 'It was all but inevitable that one who had become familiar with the idea of the antagonism between body and soul, especially if he moved in the circle of cathartic ideas and practices, should hit upon the thought that the soul itself must be "purified" from the body as a defiling encumbrance (Rohde, *Psyche*[2], ii. 101).'

This feeling of the rigid *opposition between soul and body*, as also of their vital and radical *difference in value*, forms the one main source of asceticism. The other is to be looked for in the nascent *consciousness of sin*, and the consequent *yearning for redemption*, in troubled souls.* Before the age of (let us say) Hesiod, such feelings had no place whatever in Greek life. They sprang from a pessimistic outlook upon earthly existence (cf. art. Pessimism), the proximate causes of which probably lay in the social and political conditions as well as in the revolutionary changes of the 7th and 6th centuries B.C. Asceticism was regarded as a means of liberating the soul from the bondage of the flesh and of the world of sense in general (that the body is the prison of the soul was one of the leading ideas of Orphism†): by the practice of asceticism, in fact, the soul, divine in origin, but meanwhile immured in the body by reason of its guilt, might free itself from every corporeal bond, as from the whole 'cycle of becoming,' and, venturing forth upon its flight to the Deity, at length become one therewith.‡ Here we come upon the conjunction of asceticism and mysticism.

1. **Orphism.**—Views of this character make their first appearance in the communities named after the Thracian bard Orpheus, which can be traced to about the middle of the 6th cent. B.C. The Orphic sect, which in the 6th cent. appears to have had its main centre in Athens,—witness the fact that Onomacritus flourished at the Court of the Pisistratidæ,—seems, towards the end of the same century, to have found a particularly congenial soil in lower Italy and Sicily.§ Fresh and surprising evidence of this has been furnished by the gold leaves found in tombs of the 4th and 3rd cents. B.C. at Petilia, near Thurii. An inscription of like import, moreover, dating from the 2nd cent. B.C., has been discovered at Eleutherna in Crete. While Orphism was never assimilated by the civic religion,‖ and while the various Orphic cults from the 4th cent. onwards degenerated more and more into esoteric mysteries and nonconforming communities, they nevertheless continued to exist till the close of the ancient era, and still exercised a profound influence upon Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism, as well as upon early Christian ideas regarding the other world and the experiences of the soul after death. The central feature of the Orphic faith was constituted by the fortunes of the god Dionysus-Zagreus, who as a child was torn in pieces and devoured by the Titans, Athene being able to recover his heart only; this she carried to Zeus, who, having swallowed it, presently, with Semele, begot the 'new Dionysus,' and destroyed the Titans with a thunderbolt. From their ashes afterwards arose the human race, and, accordingly, there are in man two constituent elements—a Dionysan and a Titanic. It is the Dionysan constituent that generates the human soul, and man must free himself as far as possible from the Titanic element in order to return once more to the deity whose essence he likewise shares.

The outstanding feature of early Orphic asceticism was the *prohibition of animal food* (cf. Euripides, *Hippolyt.* 952 = Diels, *Frag.*[2] 471, No. 8).

* Not only in the Demeter cult, but also in the worship of deities of foreign extraction: Cybele, or, later, Isis, or, finally, Mithras.

† Herodot. iv. 36; Plato, *Charmides*, 158 B; Lycurg. frag. 86; Iamblich. *Vit. Pythag.* 141.

‡ Diog. Laert. i. 114 = Diels, *Frag.*[2] ii. 490, l. 16 ff.; Plato, *Laws*, iii. 677 D (reference to Hesiod, *Op.* 40 *f.*); Plutarch, *Sept. Sap. Conviv.* 157 D = Diels, *Frag.*[2] 492, 27 n.; Theophrast. *Hist. Plant.* vii. 12. 1, *Char.* 16 = *Frag.*[2] 493, No. 6.

§ With Hippocrates' sketch cf. the Pythagorean regulations in Diog. Laert. viii. 33.

* *Orphica*, frag. 226.

† Cf. especially Plato, *Cratyl.* 400 C; *Phædo*, 62*b* = *Orphica*, frag. 221 (Abel).

‡ Cf. *e.g. Orphica*, frag. 226.

§ The earliest specific mention of the sect is in Herod. ii. 81.

‖ E. Maass is of a different opinion.

In Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 1032, Æschylus (who had probably been initiated into the Orphic mysteries) says:

'Ορφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ' ἡμῖν κατέδειξε φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι.

Cf. Euripides, frag. 475 N², v. 16 ff.:

Πάλλευκα δ' ἔχων εἵματα φεύγω
γένεσιν τε βροτῶν καὶ νεκροθήκης
οὐ χριμπτόμενος τήν τ' ἐμψύχων
βρῶσιν ἐδεστῶν πεφύλαγμαι.*

See also Plato, *Laws*, vi. 782 C: οὐδὲ βοὸς ἐτόλμων μὲν γεύεσθαι θύματά τε οὐκ ἦν τοῖς θεοῖς ζῷα, πέλανοι δὲ καὶ μέλιτι καρποὶ δεδευμένοι καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα ἁγνὰ θύματα, σαρκῶν δ' ἀπείχοντο ὡς οὐχ ὅσιον ὂν ἐσθίειν οὐδὲ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν βωμοὺς αἵματι μιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ 'Ορφικοί τινες λεγόμενοι βίοι ἐγίγνοντο ἡμῶν τοῖς τότε, ἀψύχων μὲν ἐχόμενοι πάντων, ἐμψύχων δὲ τοὐναντίον πάντων ἀπεχόμενοι.† The prohibition not only applied to the eating of flesh, but covered all food-stuffs of animal origin, even eggs (frag. 42, Abel); and, amongst vegetables, beans: cf. Diels, *Frag.*² 214, 28: φέρεται δὲ καὶ 'Ορφέως τάδε ἔπη, Δειλοί, πανδειλοί, κυάμων ἀπὸ χεῖρας ἔχεσθαι καὶ 'Ισόν τοι κνάμους τε φαγεῖν κεφαλάς τε τοκήων.

The reason of these prohibitions was that the things referred to were used by the χθόνιοι in their sacrifices to the dead and as food;‡ in the case of eggs, a further consideration was perhaps the fact that these contained the germ of life (cf. frag. 42, Abel). The practice of *fasting* (νηστεία) seems also to have had a place in Orphic asceticism.§

'As a matter of fact, the things and conditions from which they really kept themselves unspotted were those which represented in the symbolism of religion, rather than involved in actual practice, a dependence upon the world of death and impermanence' (Rohde, *op. cit.* ii. 126).

The Orphic asceticism, however, like the 'Ορφικὸς βίος in general, probably had, even in its early stages, an ethical import as well. This is certainly not the opinion of Erwin Rohde, who, speaking of this asceticism, says: 'It does not enjoin the practice of the civic virtues, nor is discipline or transformation of character required by it; the sum-total of its morality is to bend one's course towards the deity, and turn away, not from the moral lapses and aberrations of earthly life, but from earthly existence itself' (*op. cit.* ii. 125, cf. ii. 102). On the other hand, Gomperz writes: 'What distinguishes the Orphic branch of the Greek religion from the other Mysteries is the extraordinary emphasis it laid upon morality, an approximation to which is found only in the Apollinarian cult centralized at Delphi. This deepening of the moral consciousness may well be regarded as the true source of the most important and most characteristic element in the Orphic teachings about the soul' (*Griech. Denker*², i. 107, cf. 434).‖ It would certainly seem that the view of Gomperz, as compared with that of Rohde, is so far the right one, though the former has possibly somewhat exaggerated the moral factor.

2. Pythagoreanism.—Orphic ideas exercised a vast influence upon the succeeding period. In the first place, cognate views and practices are found among the early Pythagoreans. It is, of course, impossible to determine precisely how far such ideas are traceable to Pythagoras himself, as the oral traditions of the school are all we have to go upon till the time of Philolaus, *i.e.* the middle of the 5th cent. B.C.;¶ but general considerations seem to favour the theory of their being so derived. With regard to Pythagoras, indeed, we are certain of only two of his cardinal tenets, viz. the immortality of the soul, and the transmigration of souls.** But when we bear in mind how intimately these two tenets are connected with asceticism among the adherents of Orphism, with whose Mysteries Pythagoras was undoubtedly acquainted, and when we find unmistakable traces of the ascetic mode of life even among the oldest Pythagoreans, we need hardly hesitate to infer that the founder of the school was himself an ascetic. Even Herodotus (ii. 81) speaks of the prohibition of burying the dead in woollen clothes as being not only an Orphic, but also a Pythagorean, ordinance; while, again, the doctrine of the ἀποχὴ ἐμψύχων was attributed to Pythagoras by the geographer Eudoxus (*c.* 280 B.C.).* The contrary opinion expressed by Aristoxenus† is really meant to apply only to contemporary Pythagorean scholars with whom he was intimate.‡ The interdict against the use of beans seems likewise to belong to the early school.§ It cannot be doubted that the early Pythagoreans were distinguished by their *simple life*.‖ A peculiar feature in their asceticism, from the 4th cent. at least, seems to have been *silence*, originally resorted to, no doubt, as a means of avoiding sacrilegious or ill-omened language in their religious practices; compare what is said by Isocrates (*Busiris*, 28) regarding the Pythagoreans of his own time.¶ It should also be noted that anticipations of *sexual* asceticism, or continence, are apparently found in connexion with the primitive school.**

Meagre as these notices are, they are sufficient to show us that purity (ἁγνεία, ἁγιστεία) in the ceremonial religious sense was the ideal of the 'Italic' philosophers no less than of the Orphic cults. Moreover, when we compare with them the teaching of Pythagoras regarding the immortality and the transmigration of the soul, and that of Philolaus regarding the human body as a house of detention wherein the soul expiates its guilt (frag. 14D), it would appear that early Pythagorean asceticism sprang from the same fundamental causes, and had the same objects in view, as that of Orphism, the influence of which upon the former is unmistakable. Pythagoreanism, further, had also an ethical tendency; thus one of its characteristic virtues was σωφροσύνη, which was supposed to be promoted by asceticism, and which unquestionably had a place in the system before the days of Aristoxenus.††

3. Empedocles.—While we may thus deduce from a tradition, fragmentary at best and overgrown with later traditions, the fairly definite fact that among the ancient Pythagoreans asceticism was intimately associated with mystical theories about the soul, the same conjunction of ideas is brought out in strong relief in the case of the last great purifier of ancient Greece, viz. Empedocles of Acragas, who likewise belonged to the West. Further, the moral and religious views of Empedocles resemble those of the Pythagoreans in the circumstance of their having no organic connexion with his philosophical or scientific

* Diels, *op. cit.* 492, 27 n., where for frag. 472 read frag. 475.

† Cf. also Plut. *Sept. Sap. Conviv.* 159 C; further, the late Orphic *Lithika*, 368 (proscription of animal food), 699 f. (proscription of animal sacrifice).

‡ The prohibition of burying the dead in woollen clothes is already noted by Herodotus, ii. 81; cf. Rohde, ii. 126, 1.

§ Diels, *Frag.*² p. 482, 4 ff. On this see Diels, *Orphischer Demeterhymnus*, 6 ff.

‖ Endorsed by Ernst Maass, *Orpheus*, 167 f.

¶ Diels, *Frag.*² i. 22.

** Herod. ii. 123 = Diels, *Frag.*² i. 22, No. 1; Xenophanes, frag. 7 D; cf. Empedocles, frag. 129.

* Porphyr. *Vit. Pyth.* 7 = Diels, *Frag.*² i. 24, 39 ff. See also Strabo, xv. 716, from Onesicritus (*c.* 320 B.C.), frag. 10 M = Diels, *Frag.*² i. 24, 42 f.; Diog. Laert. viii. 20; Callimachus, frag. 83A = Diels, *Frag.*² i. 270, 27 f.; also Diog. Laert. viii. 33, from Alexander Polyhistor; for the later period, passages from the Middle Comedy, in which the 'Pythagorists' are ridiculed; Diels, *Frag.*² i. 291, 41 ff.; 292, 1 ff., 47 f.

† Diog. Laert. viii. 20; Gellius, iv. 11. 1 = Diels, *Frag.*² 24, 47 ff.

‡ Rohde (ii. 164, 1; 162, 6) seems to have grasped the point better than Zeller, i. 317, notes 3, 4, 5; 318, 5.

§ Diels, *Frag.*² i. 279, 31 ff. = Aristotle, frag. 195 (Rose). Cf. also Diels², i. 214, 19 ff. Of course the explanations of Aristotle, as well as those given by Gellius, are quite inept. Cf. also Schroeder in *WZKM* xv. 187–212.

‖ Diels, *Frag.*² i. 268, No. 3; 284, 2 ff.; 288, 23 ff.; 289, 4 ff.; from the Middle Comedy, Diels², i. 291, 31 ff.; 292, 10 ff., 30 ff.; 293. 9 ff.—caricatures, of course.

¶ Diels, *Frag.*² i. 23, 2; cf. 288, 4 f.; 285, 8 ff.; from the Middle Comedy, *op. cit.* 292, 27.

** Diels², i. 28, 36 ff.; 29, 1 ff.; cf. especially Ikkos (Diels, *Frag.*² i. 105, No. 2), further, the statement of Cleinias, *ib.* 267, No. 5; cf. also 289, 8 ff.; 290, 20 ff., Diog. Laert. viii. 33, καθαρεύειν ἀπὸ λέχους.

†† Cf. especially Diels, *Frag.*² 287, 33 ff.; 288, 10 ff.; 289, 46 ff.

theories. In his poem called Καθαρμοί, abstinence from animal food, and, in fact, avoidance of blood-shedding in general, are very specially inculcated, and are based upon the theory of transmigration and that of the close affinity of man and animal—a concatenation of thought which we may perhaps suppose, though we cannot prove, to have obtained among the ancient Orphics and Pythagoreans.

So Hippolytus, *Refutationes*, viii. 29, 249 = Diels, *Frag.*[2] i. 206, 29 ff.: διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην οὖν τοῦ ὀλεθρίου Νείκους διακόσμησιν τοῦδε τοῦ μεμερισμένου κόσμου πάντων ἐμψύχων ὁ Ἐ. τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ μαθητὰς ἀπέχεσθαι παρακαλεῖ· εἶναι γάρ φησι τὰ σώματα τῶν ζῴων τὰ ἐσθιόμενα ψυχῶν κεκολασμένων οἰκητήρια.*

Frag. 140 is also worthy of note, as enunciating the inviolability of the laurel (on this cf. Rohde, ii. 181, 2). In strict consistency, of course, Empedocles ought to have affirmed the inviolable nature of trees in general (as is justly observed by Plutarch, *Quæst. Conviv.* iii. 1, 2, 646 D, in reference to the passage cited), since souls migrate also into trees and plants.† On the other hand, the interdict against beans,‡ which Empedocles has in common with the Orphics and the Pythagoreans, probably sprang from the same motive in his case as in theirs.§

The deeper significance of these ascetic injunctions, to which Empedocles manifestly attaches enormous importance for the soul's welfare, and their close connexion with his mystical standpoint, are fully disclosed in the still extant fragments of his Καθαρμοί. For him, too, the divine nature of the soul is an indefeasible fact,‖ and he likewise accepts the doctrine of the soul's fall from its original divine condition into the corporeal state, in which it must expiate its guilt by a long pilgrimage through the bodies of men, animals, and plants.¶ Empedocles also shares the view that the human body is the disparate integument of the soul (frag. 126). He regards asceticism as one of the most effective means of delivering the soul from the world of sense. 'Who ever exerteth himself with toil, him can we release'; the soul at length returns to its divine habitat, and indeed the wise men who practise such holy living—the asceticism of Empedocles having a strong ethical tendency **—eventually become gods while yet upon the earth (frag. 146), so that the poet even speaks of himself as a god (frag. 112, 4 ff., and frag. 113).

It is certainly the case that Empedocles was strongly influenced by the teachings of Orphism, as has, in fact, been made out, with reference to certain particular points, by Otto Kern.†† While this is so, it would nevertheless be wrong, the present writer thinks, to deny the influence of the ancient Pythagorean Mysteries and asceticism.‡‡

* Cf. the passages given in Diels at frag. 135 (p. 213, 1 ff.), especially Cicero, *de Republ.* iii. 11, 19, and Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 108, and frag. 135 D; further, cf. especially frag. 136 (Empedocles): οὐ παύσεσθε φόνοιο δυσήλεος; οὐκ ἐσορᾶτε | ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδείῃσι νόοιο; with this cf. Sextus, *adv. Math.* ix. 127 (from Posidonius) in Diels, *Frag.*[2] i. 213, 19 ff., also frag. 137 D, and passages there; Porphyr. *de Abstin.* ii. 21 = Diels, i. 210, 22 ff., also frag. 139; and Porphyr. ii. 31 = Diels, p. 214, 9 ff.

† Frag. 117. Cf. Zeller[5], i. 808 ff., 824, 837.

‡ Frag. 141. See the relevant passages in Diels, i. 214, 19 ff.; Diog. Laert. viii. 34 = Diels, 279, 31 ff.; Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, i. 254.

§ Special attention is due to the passage, Hippolytus, *Refutationes*, viii. 29, 249 = Diels, *Frag.* 206, 32 ff., where the injunction καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς εἶναι . . . τῆς πρὸς γυναῖκα ὁμιλίας, κ.τ.λ., is attributed to Empedocles.

‖ Diels, *Frag.* i. 159, 8 f.: καὶ θείας μὲν οἴεται τὰς ψυχάς, θείους δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας αὐτῶν καθαροὺς καθαρῶς. Cf. *Frag.* i. 173, 1, and note by Rohde, ii. 185, 1.

¶ See especially the magnificent fragment, 115, and the passages cited in connexion therewith by Diels, who also refers to the famous passage in Plato, *Phædrus*, 248 C, as an imitation. Cf. also Diels, i. 219, 17 ff.; frag. 119, and relevant passages in Diels; frag. 121 (Rohde, ii. 178, 1).

** Frag. 112, 9 f.; 144, 145.

†† We do not agree with Kern, however, in regard to every point.

‡‡ Cf. Empedocles, frag. 129, and the passages given there.

To say nothing of the affinity between the views of Empedocles and those of the Pythagoreans,* it is impossible that one who lived at so short a distance from Magna Græcia could remain ignorant of Pythagorean doctrine, or that one of his cast of mind should not be deeply influenced thereby.

4. Plato.—This whole process of development, beginning with the ecstatic seers and purifiers of the 7th cent., may be said in one sense to reach its end, but in another to arrive at its culminating point, in the Platonic philosophy. In Plato, the founder of the idealistic view of the world, philosophical thought and theological thought merge and combine with one another in a wonderful way. The Divine origin of the soul, its pre-existence, its fall into corporeality, its judgment after death, its expiatory wanderings through the bodies of animals or men, according to its character, its final redemption from the cycle of re-births, and its return to God—all these various doctrines, in their main features at least, were borrowed by Plato directly from the 'theologians,' *i.e.*, in a special sense, the Orphics. The manner in which he amalgamates them with the results of his philosophical speculation is, however, all his own.

In the early stages of Plato's thought the two worlds of becoming and being stand in the relation of sheer opposition: here, the world of sense, with its unresting flux of ever-changing phenomena; there, the supersensuous world of eternally self-identical and absolutely unchangeable realities, of the 'Ideas,' of what alone truly exists. The human soul, however, occupies a peculiar position between the two; it is of Divine origin, and while not itself an Idea, it is 'most like' one, and partakes of the Idea of life. In its state of pre-existence in the supramundane sphere it has gazed upon the Ideas, but, having fallen into the state of corporeality, it has forgotten them; and only by its recollection thereof (ἀνάμνησις) can it possibly attain to true knowledge. Such leading principles must of necessity result in a pessimistic attitude to the world and its supposed goods,† that is, in a world-renouncing morality. Withdrawal from the life of the body, which only impedes and constrains the soul; the utmost detachment of the soul from its prison-house in the flesh (the philosophic 'dying' so impressively depicted by Socrates in *Phædo* [especially p. 64 ff.]); disengagement from the world of sense in general, with its phantasmagoria of delusive appearances—these things go to form the end which the friend of wisdom must keep in view.

In the *Theæt.* 176 A we read: διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε (from this world) ἐκεῖσε (to the gods) φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. Similarly, philosophy becomes κάθαρσις; *Phædo*, 67 A: ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν οὕτως ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς.‡ καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές· μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦ κ.τ.λ.; § 67 C: κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο ξυμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνην καθ' αὑτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; ‖

* Cf. also Cicero, *de Republ.* iii. 11, 19; Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 108 = Diels, *Frag.* 213, 5 ff.; Sextus, *adv. Math.* ix. 127, quoted by Diels at frag. 136. The passages Diog. Laert. viii. 53, cf. 51 = Diels, 150, 22 f., cf. 154, 44 ff., refer to the grandfather of Empedocles, who bore the same name, and who, according to the latter passage (Athenæus, i. 5), had been a Pythagorean.

† Cf. *e.g. Gorg.* 519 A, *Repub.* vii. 515 D, *Laws*, vii. 803 B; and Rohde, ii. 291.

‡ Both the Orphic and the Platonic teaching make suicide a crime; the period of one's earthly existence is to be determined by the Deity alone.

§ Cf. 82 C ff., *Rep.* vii. 514 ff., *Phædo*, 62 B, 66 B, *Cratyl.* 400 B.

‖ Cf., further, 69 C, *Cratyl.* 403 E; Rohde, ii. 281, 4; 282, 1; 285, 2.

The philosopher also will therefore stand aloof from the enterprises and pursuits of his fellow-citizens, and, as one withdrawn from the community at large, will give himself entirely to the task of becoming holy.

On its positive side, however, this *katharsis* from all that is earthly implies a turning towards God. By renouncing the present world the soul becomes free to follow its true vocation—the knowledge of the ὄντως ὄν, the vision of the Ideas, and especially the Idea of the Good, the highest of them all. But the Ideas constitute the realm of divine realities. Thus the soul which, though of heavenly origin, had been cramped and defiled through its fall, becomes God-like by the possession of that highest *knowledge* which is identical with virtue.

Cf. *Theæt.* 176 B—in connexion with the passages given above: φυγὴ (from the corporeal) δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. 176 C: θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότατος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος. 'To know God is to become divine' (Rohde). The philosopher, therefore, lives entirely in the ἐπιστήμη of the truly existent, this being rendered possible only by complete renunciation of the world.

Such is Plato's standpoint in the *Phædo*, as, indeed, also in the *Theætetus* and the *Gorgias*, a standpoint which, were it consistently applied, would put an end to all life and all progress upon the earth. As has been aptly observed by Eucken, however, 'in this relinquishment of the world we have the real Plato and the consistent Plato, but by no means the complete Plato.' In his later elucidation of the Ideal theory, Plato admits the possibility of mediation between the two worlds. Conceiving now of the Ideas as the final causes of phenomena, he sees the Divine realities looming through the world of sense, and he is thus able to regard the realization of the Ideas in practical life as the true task of mankind. Besides the all-pervading religious factor in Plato's thought, the æsthetic and the social factors are also active. Thus, to quote Eucken again:

'That ascetic tendency [in Plato] underwent considerable modification, and even some reaction, as has been the case with all its adherents who did not forget humanity at large in the individual. But that which upon Indian, and often also upon Christian, soil won at best a grudging recognition, found in Plato a native propensity in its favour; alike as a Greek and as the friend, nay, the discoverer of the Beautiful, he was bound with a thousand ties to the actual world.'

But nevertheless the opposition between the two spheres—between renunciation of the world and its transfiguration, between philosophical and theological thought—was never completely adjusted, and it shows itself unmistakably in Plato himself.

'In Plato's own nature the phlegmatic blood of the thinker co-existed with the lively heart-beat of the artist; there was a cleavage in the inner man; for, while his philosophy allured him into the realm of immaterial forms, yet the whole magic of Hellenic beauty was at work within him' (Windelband, *Gesch. der Philosophie*[3], p. 100).*

And, we may venture to add, he was thrilled with the desire to intervene in the moral, social, and political conditions of the world, with a view to succour, to ameliorate, to reform, as is well shown in the *Republic* and the *Laws*.

Plato was the discoverer of the supersensual world. The kingdom for which his lofty soul yearned was 'not of this world.' He purified the beliefs and ideas of the Orphic cult; he spiritualized and glorified them,† thereby becoming a religious reformer—probably the greatest, after Jesus Christ, our race has known.

5. Cynicism.—The asceticism thus far dealt with—*religious* asceticism, as it might be called—rests upon a twofold dualism; body and soul, Earth and the Beyond, being sharply and almost irreconcilably opposed to one another. But while among the earlier adherents of the older Academy, as, *e.g.*, Philippus of Opus, Heraclides Ponticus, probably Xenocrates too, and even in the youthful Aristotle (Rohde, ii. 297), a negative and ascetic attitude towards the world is still discernible (Polemon and Crantor being the first to secede therefrom), an entirely different congeries of ideas had given birth to a kind of asceticism which, in contrast to the religious, may be called the *rationalistic and ethical*, or more precisely the *volitional* asceticism. Its roots are to be found in the Socratic teaching. It is, of course, true that the ascetic aspect of the figure of Socrates portrayed by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* and the *Symposium* belongs not to the historical but to the Antisthenic Socrates. (Xen. *Symp.* iv. 38 may serve as a striking illustration of this; on the whole question, cf. Joel's great work.) Further, the much-lauded temperance of Socrates, as has been appositely observed by Zeller (II. i.[4] 68), has nothing ascetic about it. His temperance, in fact, was not calculated abstinence from enjoyment, but only an expression of spiritual freedom; he would not be dependent upon enjoyment, nor would he sacrifice to it his self-command (Zeller, II. i. 57, 66, 68, 155 ff., 162 ff.).

But, as has been admirably said by Theodor Gomperz (*op. cit.* ii. 113) in reference to the views of life held by Socrates:

'In certain particulars he had certainly abandoned the view of life current amongst his people and his fellow-citizens; thus, in regard to one leading feature of that view, viz. its appreciation of external goods, including life itself, he ranks the health of the soul and inner peace of mind as incomparably higher than all.'

Here we have the germ of the ascetic strain in the *Cynic* ethics. Nevertheless, man's inner happiness, his εὐδαιμονία, was a matter upon which even Antisthenes, the founder of the school, laid the strongest emphasis, and in his view it could be won only by means of ἀρετή, 'moral excellence.' This moral excellence alone, therefore, as was argued by the uncompromising spirit of Antisthenes, is to count as a good; everything else in the world, as making no contribution to man's εὐδαιμονία, is simply indifferent, an ἀδιάφορον. The conviction of the utter worthlessness of earthly goods, moreover, brought the Cynics—even Antisthenes, and still more his pupil Diogenes, and subsequently Crates and others—quite consistently to the standpoint of *world-renunciation*.

Virtue, according to the Cynics, consists in right knowledge (φρόνησις) coupled with moral volition.* Their ethic, as formulated by Antisthenes, was above all a volitional ethic. Moral volition, however, as they held, was steeled by πόνος, by ἄσκησις. The latter word properly means the *exercise* or *practice* which was pre-eminently demanded by the Cynic conception of virtue,† since virtue, in the opinion of Antisthenes, was not simply theoretical knowledge regarding good and evil, but rather practical moral excellence, strength of character asserting itself against all περιστάσεις.‡ By virtue alone, he taught, does man attain to felicity. In what, then, does felicity consist? In that genuine freedom which is based upon independence of all external things—αὐτάρκεια—and in freedom from all desires and affections—ἀπάθεια. In order to

* See specially the *Symposium* and the *Phædrus*.

† Cf. Windelband, *Platon*, 141: 'He implements the Orphic doctrine of the destiny of the soul, throughout its entire range, with the principle of moral responsibility and retribution.'

* Diog. Laert. vi. 11 (teaching of Antisthenes): Αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος. Cf. also the Cynic ἐγκράτεια.

† The word certainly goes back to Antisthenes himself; cf. Xenophon, *Sympos.* viii. 27, *Memorab.* ii. 6 20, where Socrates speaks of the ἀσκεῖν of ἀρετή. Cf. also *Memorab.* i. 2. 20 and 23, i. 2. 10, where Xenophon has even ἀσκεῖν φρόνησιν, as Isocrates, *Busir.* § 22, has φιλοσοφίας ἄσκησιν; both writers undoubtedly follow the example of Antisthenes. For the latter φρόνησις is inseparably connected with ἀρετή, and his whole philosophy is the practice of virtue based upon intelligence.

‡ On Heracles as an ascetic for the purpose of acquiring virtue, see Dio, *Orat.* lx., especially p. 310; on Diogenes' struggle against πόνοι, see Dio, viii. 12 ff., especially § 15; Marcus Aurelius, ii. 17.

render himself as independent of the external as possible, the Cynic endeavours to reduce his wants to a minimum; and in order to win his inner freedom (*ἀπάθεια*), he exercises himself in combating and overcoming the affections (so Diogenes, cf. Dio, ix. 12), more especially in fighting against *ἡδονή* (Diogenes, as in Dio, viii. 20 ff., ix. 12; cf. Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 8; Teles, frag. v. H).

This world-abjuring tendency in Cynic ethics found its chief expression in a negative attitude towards the family, the State, and the idea of nationality, and towards the great traditions of Greek history, even those of the Persian war; and in the position the Cynics assumed towards Greek religion, art, and science. This is to be explained in part by the fact that Antisthenes was but half Greek by blood, and that Diogenes sprang from the lower classes. Even in their boasted cosmopolitanism the Cynics were in earnest only with the negative constituent, viz. their detachment from State and nationality.

The real asceticism of the Cynics showed itself, above all, in their mode of life, which they reduced to the simplest conceivable form: thus their food consisted chiefly of lupines, dried figs, peeled barley and water; their clothing was practically limited to the *τρίβων*, their feet being *ἀνυπόδητοι*; while their place of abode, *i.e.* their lodging by night, was in the open air or among the pillars of the temple in summer, and in the bathing-houses in winter. By inuring the body to the extreme of rigour, they—more especially Diogenes—sought to strengthen their power of will (Diog. Laert. vi. 23, 34).

The significance attached to asceticism by Diogenes, who had already distinguished two kinds of *ἄσκησις*—one purely physical, the other both physical and psychical (Diog. Laert. vi. 70 f.)—is shown by his apothegm: *Οὐδέν γε τὸ παράπαν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χωρὶς ἀσκήσεως κατορθοῦσθαι, δυνατὴν δὲ ταύτην πᾶν ἐκνικῆσαι.* A significant, and characteristically Hellenic, feature of Cynic ethics, however, was its attitude towards the sexual impulse. To the Cynics this appeared to be no less natural than hunger itself, and therefore likewise to require satisfaction—though in the simplest and least expensive way. Thus Diogenes is in no way scandalized at either masturbation or illicit intercourse (marriage had, of course, no meaning for him); in fact, as the gratification of sexual desire was reckoned *κατὰ φύσιν* by the Cynics, many of them, such as Diogenes and Crates (with Hipparchia), had no scruples about indulging even in the presence of others, thus showing a gross lack of modesty, to say nothing of good taste. Nevertheless, those who indulged beyond the requirements of nature were looked upon as the slaves of pleasure (*ἡδονή*), and this they reckoned the worst of evils.*

Antisthenes did not himself lay so much stress on the external aspects of the Cynic mode of life; what he did was rather, it would seem, to make a virtue of necessity. Very much more did externals weigh with his gifted pupil Diogenes, as also with Crates, his wife Hipparchia, her brother Metrocles, and others.† The asceticism of the Neo-Cynics during the Roman Imperial period will be dealt with in connexion with the later Stoics.

Primitive Cynicism reprobated even innocent enjoyment. Further, from the time of Diogenes at least, the Cynics tended to make too much of the external aspect of their mode of life. But an asceticism which sprang from an ethical standpoint so grossly individualistic could be of no permanent value to human society. Still, in putting to the test of actual practice the dictum that man's true happiness does not depend upon his circumstances, the Cynics made a valuable contribution to human progress; while, from another side, their belief that moral volition is an essential constituent of virtue was pregnant with significance for the future.

6. **Stoicism.**—Of the leading principles of the early Cynic *ἄσκησις** only one was of exceptional importance, viz. the idea that virtue can be acquired only by unremitting practice. In this particular point, which involved an emphasizing of the volitional factor in virtue, the Cynics made an advance upon Socrates; it was, in fact, a thought destined to be fruitful for all time, and in the further development thereof special credit is due to the Stoics. We must not forget, indeed, that the Stoa was preceded by Aristotle, who in his *Ethics* had already distinguished two orders of virtues, viz. the ethical and the dianoetic (*e.g. Eth. Nicom.* ii. 1. 1103 A, 14 ff., i. 13. 1102 B, 33 ff.). Ethical virtue (*αὕτη ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις* [*Eth. Nicom.* ii. 6. 1106 B]) *ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται* (ii. 1. 1103 A, 17). Since the irrational impulse, with its resultant desire, is often stronger than the volition which springs from *φρόνησις*, it is only by means of exercise that the individual can acquire that *ἐγκράτεια* which enables him, even in opposition to the stronger desire, to do what he recognizes as right. Now, *ἐγκράτεια* is a sub-species of *σωφροσύνη*, which, again, is one of the 'ethical' virtues. But the idea of a psychological independence of the will—apart from the intellect—was foreign to Aristotle.

It must certainly be admitted that among the early Stoics, so closely related to the Cynics in many other things, the volitional moment in virtue does not stand out very prominently, though this may be due partly, of course, to the fragmentary character of our available sources. Unmistakable traces of the idea, nevertheless, are still extant, and yeoman service has been rendered by Adolf Dyroff in bringing these to light. The personal ideal of the Stoic doctrine of virtue—the wise man—has, of course, no further need of practice; but all the more is practice necessary for the neophytes, the *προκόπτοντες* (cf. Zeno, frag. 234 A). The founder of the school valued practical example more highly than arguments against pleasure (frag. 241); witness also his significant utterance: *οὐδενὸς ἡμᾶς οὕτω πένεσθαι ὡς χρόνου. βραχὺς γὰρ ὄντως ὁ βίος, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρή, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς νόσους ἰᾶσθαι δυναμένη* (frag. 323). His successor Cleanthes likewise places moral conduct higher than theory, and that he recognizes the element of volition in virtue is shown by frag. 563. It is accordingly easy to understand why Cleanthes, like Antisthenes before him, regarded the *πόνος* as *ἀγαθόν* (frag. 611), while frag. 129 (Gercke) furnishes special evidence of the fact that Chrysippus, 'the second founder of the Stoa,' appreciated the value of practice and habit in the attainment of virtue. The task of becoming virtuous, or—since only a few finally attain that end—that of coming as near to perfect virtue as possible, belongs

* **Antisthenes, frag. xi. 1,** Winkelmann, p. 29 (Clemens Alex. *Strom.* ii. 20, p. 485, Potter); Diog. Laert. vi. 3: *μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην.*

† Cf. *e.g.* Diog. Laert. vi. 23, 84, 48, 70 f. Concerning Crates, see Diog. Laert. vi. 87 (Diels, *Poetæ Philosoph. Gr.* 207). Further, Teles, frag., *πόνος αὐταρκείας* and *πόνος πενίας καὶ πλούτου*, 30, 10 ff., 31, 2 ff.; Crates, frag. 4, 7, 12, 18 (Diels). Main sources for ancient Cynicism: Diog. Laert. vi.; Xenophon, *Memorab.* and *Sympos.*; Teles, ed. O. Hense, fr. v.–vii.; also Dio, especially *Orat.* 6, 8, 9, 10.

* No doubt, the doctrine of the absolute worthlessness of earthly goods was taken over by the Stoics, but it was subsequently modified by Zeno in his differentiation of three grades of *ἀδιάφορα*, viz., *προηγμένα*, *μέσα*, and *ἀποπροηγμένα*, whereby at least a certain relative value was assigned to sundry material goods. On the other hand, the *αὐτάρκεια* of the Cynics was spiritualized by the Stoics, who put no special value on the ascetic mode of life. Only in the case of certain adherents of the later Stoa, such as Musonius, and, in some degree, also Epictetus, did a change in this respect take place.

to the will, and cannot be performed without practice (cf. also frag. 214, 278 A). Chrysippus gave full recognition to the value of personal effort in the work of attaining perfection. True insight is shown also by Aristo of Chios in his remark that 'much practice and much fighting' is demanded by the struggle both against pleasure and against the affections (frag. 370 A). It is matter for regret that nothing now remains of the work of Herillus, who, like Dionysius Metathemenus, wrote *περὶ ἀσκήσεως* (Diog. Laert. vii. 166 f. [Diels, 410 f. A]), especially as he deemed *ἐπιστήμη* to be the supreme good. A further proof of the fact that the value of 'practice' in the sphere of virtue was ever more and more highly appraised by the Stoics, appears in their doctrine that many (apparent) evils are allotted to man for the purpose of calling his moral energies into exercise, and may therefore be utilized for his welfare in whatsoever degree he may choose. This idea was already mooted by Chrysippus, but it was especially in the later (though probably also in the middle) period of Stoicism that it became fruitful.

The early Stoics undoubtedly felt that the will has an important place in the acquirement of virtue, but they gave the thought neither clear articulation nor adequate recognition. An advance in this respect was made during the middle period. Thus Panætius, whose ethical teaching was unquestionably influenced by Aristotle, draws a distinction between a 'theoretical' and a 'practical' virtue, and holds that the latter, requiring, as it does, a correlative action, is attainable only by practice.* Discipline of the body is also necessary (Cicero, *de Offic.* i. 23, 79). The practical virtue, which concerns the individual, is *σωφροσύνη*, consisting in the unconstrained submission of the lower faculties to the reason. The most important of the four categories of *σωφροσύνη* is *ἐγκράτεια*, the virtue whose significance was first fully realized by Antisthenes, and afterwards very specially by Aristotle. Posidonius likewise distinguishes the two aspects of virtue. Inasmuch as practical virtue consists in the subordination of the irrational to the rational part of the soul, especially in the repression of the bodily impulses and passions, it is to be acquired, Posidonius believes, only by means of practice and habit, which must carry out the process of subjugating impulse begun by education. But this point of view, which at first sight is hardly distinguishable from that of Panætius, or even that of Aristotle, is in the case of Posidonius most intimately related to a mystical Platonic conception of the nature and destiny of the human soul: the soul is a part of the Divine *πνεῦμα*, and, coming down from the heavenly to the earthly sphere, enters the body which is its prison, and which seduces and defiles it with desires. To preserve this divinely begotten soul, this *δαίμων*, from earthly guilt and defilement, and by means of a virtuous life to effect its return to its celestial home, the Æther, where alone full knowledge can be its portion—such is the aim of all truly wise and great men. The influence of Plato is here quite unmistakable, though Posidonius was doubtless congenitally inclined to the idealistic point of view.

It was in later Stoicism, however, that the importance of practice in virtue, as in moral life and endeavour generally, first gained full and adequate recognition. Seneca, it is true, emphasizes this particular aspect in an incidental way at best, but this was due not so much to any lack of insight on his part, as to the defects and the weaknesses of his own character. He nevertheless makes many most apposite observations on the point in question.* Moreover, influenced as he was by the strong Platonizing bent of Posidonius, Seneca also manifests an ascetic mystical tendency which in the main takes the form of contempt for the body, the body being regarded as but a fetter upon the Divine soul, which amid her sombre, insecure, changeful, earthly existence longs for her Divine home, where every mystery of heaven and of nature shall be made plain.†

The idea of moral *ἄσκησις* assumes a new character in the hands of the two representatives of later Stoicism who deal seriously with moral problems and the improvement of their fellow-men, viz. Musonius and Epictetus. Of the dissertation *περὶ ἀσκήσεως* of Musonius a fairly large fragment has been preserved (frag. vi. H). He follows Panætius in drawing a distinction between theoretical and practical virtue. The practical, which he regards as the more important (p. 23, 14 ff. H), is to be attained only by practice of a twofold kind: one, as applied to body and mind together, the other, as applied to mind alone (p. 25, 4 ff.)—a distinction already made by the Cynic Diogenes. Exercise directed upon both body and mind produces *ἀνδρεία* and *σωφροσύνη*, whereas the purely mental exercise consists in those 'thought-actions' (*Denkhandlungen*, as Eucken calls them) which determine both our mental attitude and our conduct (cf. especially p. 25, 4 ff., Hense).

Frag. v., the thesis of which is *ὅτι ἰσχυρότερον ἔθος ἢ λόγος*, and frag. vii., *ὅτι πόνου καταφρονητέον*, are also significant passages; cf. also p. 7, 20 ff.; p. 10, 18; p. 11, 17; p. 29, 7 f. The ascetic views of Musonius in regard to sexual relations, as set forth in frag. xii., *περὶ ἀφροδισίων*, are likewise worthy of note, see, *e.g.*, p. 64, 1 ff.: *μόνᾳ μὲν ἀφροδίσια νομίζειν δίκαια τὰ ἐν γάμῳ καὶ ἐπὶ γενέσει παίδων συντελούμενα, ὅτι καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν· τὰ δέ γε ἡδονὴν θηρώμενα ψιλὴν ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα, κἂν ἐν γάμῳ ᾖ.* The student is recommended to read the whole fragment.

The moment of ethical *ἄσκησις*, however, reached its highest development in the Phrygian freedman Epictetus, in whose hands the idea of 'asceticism' became fully spiritualized, representing, in fact, *the unremitting endeavour of the individual soul towards its own moral perfection.* Of a multitude of relevant passages we note only the more important.‡

That which was openly taught and practised by Epictetus was put to the proof in private by Marcus Aurelius, the last Roman who sat upon the throne of the Cæsars.§ Amid the tumult of the world's capital, or by night in his lonely tent at Carnuntum, Aurelius laboured ceaselessly in the depths of his heart towards the purifying and perfecting of his soul. He is never able to satisfy himself, but never falters in his effort to come nearer and nearer to the ideal (pp. 127, 14 ff.; 131, 18 ff.), and throws himself bravely into the conflict between soul and sense (pp. 59, 13 ff.; 91, 9 ff.; 131, 12 ff.; 162, 4 ff.). But apart from other profound differences between Aurelius and Epictetus, though both were Stoics, they were fundamentally unlike in their spiritual outlook. Thus, while Epictetus, alike in thought and action, is wholly concerned with the present world—in the best sense, certainly—the mind of the Emperor tends rather to brood darkly upon the shortness of life and the transitoriness of earthly things (*e.g.* ii. 17, vii. 3). He despises the goods of this world (iv. 48), even fame, and often all but grows weary of life itself (p. 115, 9 ff.). His aphoristic utterances seem to be haunted by the pathos of life and the yearn-

* Cicero, *de Offic.* i. 18, 60; Schmekel, *Phil. d. mitt. Stoa*, 216 ff.

* e.g. *Epp.* 16, 1 ff.; 18, 5 ff.; 75, 7 ff; 82, 16; 90, 46; 94, 47; 95, 45 and 57. In *Ep.* 5, 4 he deprecates the extravagances of Cynic asceticism.

† *Quæst. Nat.* proleg. § 3 f.; *ad Marciam*, 23, 1 f.; 24, 5. 25; *Epp.* 65, 16 ff.; 102, 23 ff.

‡ e.g. *Dissert.* ii. 9, 13 f., ii. 18, iii. 3, iii. 12, iv. 1, 111; cf. also i. 2, 30–32. With regard to the attitude of Epictetus towards corporeal asceticism, see iii. 12, 16 f.

§ Cf. *e.g.* *εἰς ἑαυτόν*, ii. 1; also i. 9, p. 4, 5 ff., ed. Stich, i. 15 (p. 5, 21 ff.), i. 16 (p. 9, 6 ff.).

ing for death.* He certainly has no belief in a future life, but his eye turns away from earth and from human effort, and is directed toward the All and the Eternal.† Though he is an adherent of the monistic philosophy characteristic of the Stoa—a philosophy, however, not consistently maintained by Aurelius, any more than by Seneca and Epictetus—yet the fundamental qualities of his great soul have an admixture of the spirit of renunciation and mysticism. Leaving his anthropology out of account, we see this most unmistakably in his conception of the Deity.

7. Neo-Cynicism. — Of an entirely different nature from the view of life entertained by Aurelius, is that of the Neo-Cynics, for whose teachings there was a lively interest, and even a certain sympathy, among the later Stoics, such as Musonius, Seneca, and Epictetus. The representatives of this Neo-Cynic tendency revive the asceticism of Diogenes and Crates, and, while laying the main emphasis upon the actual practice of asceticism, they contribute nothing whatever in the way of fresh thought. For fuller information see art. NEO-CYNICISM.

8. Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism. —The tendency towards renunciation of the world, which forms the basal element in the temperament of Marcus Aurelius, was not due to the spirit of Stoicism, but was rather a product of the time, and, one may well suppose, of his own experiences and fortunes. It was, however, organically related to the philosophy of the Neo-Pythagoreans—that singular group which emerged in the earlier half of the first cent. B.C., perhaps in Alexandria. No doubt the greater part of the literature of this school is pseudepigraphic, and we know by name only a few of its adherents. Apart from P. Nigidius Figulus and Vatinius, contemporaries of Cicero, and Sotion the friend of the Sextians, the most important representatives known to us are Apollonius of Tyana and Moderatus of Gades (1st cent. A.D.), Nicomachus and Numenius (2nd cent. A.D.), and Philostratus (3rd cent. A.D.).

The moral and religious view of life promulgated by the Neo-Pythagoreans is in part traceable to the Mysteries of the ancient school, but in a still greater degree to Platonism, especially to that form of Platonism set forth by Posidonius in his commentary to the *Timæus*. The characteristic of the sect is absolute dualism: God and the world, soul and body. Spirit is the principle of good (the Deity being conceived as pure Spirit, and regarded as utterly transcendent), while the body, like matter in general, is the principle of evil. Between the two stands the Demiurge, or world-former, and the demons, whose kingdom lies in the sphere between the earth and the moon. The soul, which is formed of the Divine essence, is meanwhile confined within the body as in a prison, and her deliverance from the body and its impulses, in order that she may become worthy of communion with the Deity, is the most urgent task of mankind—a task which finds its positive side in a holy and devout life, since the Supreme can be worshipped in a truly spiritual manner only with purity of thought and piety of conduct (cf. the fragment of Apollonius in Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* iv. 13). Mankind is exposed on all sides, however, to contamination by demons, and the means employed to cleanse from this defilement is asceticism. The most effective forms of asceticism are certain specific ablutions and expiatory ceremonies, abstinence from certain kinds of food, more particularly from flesh and wine (among the later Neo-Pythagoreans), sexual temperance, or even abstinence (as is said to have been counselled by Apollonius), silence on the part of neophytes, etc.

* Pp. 24, 19 ff.; 54, 6 ff.; 62, 5; 91, 19 ff.; 115, 4 ff.
† Pp. 21, 17 ff.; 60, 19 ff.; 155, 3 ff.

But as man is of himself unable to realize this end, and since between him and the supramundane Godhead there yawns a great gulf which requires to be bridged, the Deity reveals His will through the agency of specially gifted individuals, such as Pythagoras formerly, and now Apollonius, as also in the art of divination, in order that man may be helped in his dark endeavour to reach his heavenly home and the deification of his being.

Sources for our knowledge of Neo-Pythagoreanism are the account of Alexander Polyhistor in Diog. Laert. viii. 22 ff., the large fragments of pseudonymous literature written under the name of the old Pythagoreans (particulars in Zeller), the fragments of Numenius, Philostratus's *Vita Apollonii*, and the *Lives* of Pythagoras by Porphyry and Iamblichus.

In Neo-Pythagoreanism the mysteries of the older school are resuscitated in a spiritualized and morally nobler form. The real significance of the later development, however, lies in the fact that, in conjunction with Philo, it prepares the way for the last great system of ancient philosophy, viz. the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus. It was the aim of Plotinus to get beyond the dualism of Neo-Pythagoreanism on both metaphysical and ethical principles. In his nobly planned and profoundly excogitated system the whole world stands forth as an emanation from the Deity, who is supersensual, supramundane, and exalted above oppositions, even that between spirit and body. He is Pure Being, the Absolute, and from Him issues the world in a series of gradations, returning again to Him in a similar way. The principal stages of this emanation are three in number, viz., Spirit, Soul, and Matter. Just as light eventually fatigues the eye, and its radiance is changed to darkness, so does the final irradiation of the ineffable and inscrutable Essence, having traversed the intermediate stages of Spirit and Soul, become Matter (*Enneads*, iv. 3, 9), which, however, never attains the metaphysical independence that belongs to the Absolute. Matter is the *μὴ ὄν*, and, as the *ἀπουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, the *πρῶτον κακόν*. Man, too, is an effluence from the Absolute, and in the human soul are distinguished a supersensual or Divine, and a lower or sensual part. Just as pure spirit in its final expression becomes matter, so the human soul with equal necessity is metamorphosed into body. The supersensual part, which was pre-existent (iv. 3. 12, vi. 4. 14) and in union with God, has suffered disaster from having entered the body (iv. 3. 15 ff., v. 1. 1). From the union of soul and body springs all the irrationality and depravity of the soul. Our great task, therefore, is the 'extinction of everything that binds us to sensuous existence,' the complete withdrawal of the soul from the outer world to its own inner life. Hence, virtue is neither more nor less than the work of 'purifying' the supersensual soul from all its relations with the world of sense (especially i. 2. 3, i. 6. 6, v. 3. 9). It accords with all this that Plotinus should set no value upon taking part in earthly affairs, either of a scientific or a politico-ethical nature. This complete detachment of the soul from all ties with the external world, however, appears on the positive side as its surrender to the Supersensual, to the Deity, the yearning for whom becomes ever more intense as the bonds of sense are more and more transcended. So far as union with the Divine is concerned, the external mode of life is of no importance. What counts is, in the opinion of Plotinus, not action, but feeling; and accordingly he attributes no value to asceticism of the common sort, however it may have consorted with his own inclinations (Zeller, iii. 522 f.). Of greater importance is the thinking consideration of life, and, still more, pure intuition; but the full and blessed union is vouchsafed only to

the elect in the form of *ecstasy*, which is not to be won by force, but must be calmly waited for, if haply it may come over us. In the state of ecstasy, however, man not only forgets all his earthly limitations, but loses self-consciousness altogether, and all that remains is the blessed feeling of union with the Divine.

This withdrawal from the world of sense, however, is not without its positive complement. In the beauty of the external world and in all its varied phenomena, Plotinus, like Plato, discerns the shimmering of the eternal ideas. In man sensuous beauty awakes ἔρως, the love of the Good (cf. esp. i. 6) arouses the desire of the supersensual soul for its source. For the Absolute is likewise the absolutely Good.

This sketch lets us see that the ascetic tendency in the life of ancient Greece is of much more importance than is usually supposed. We are now in a position to distinguish two different kinds of asceticism: (1) the Orphic-Pythagorean-Platonic, or the religio-mystical; and (2) the Cynic-Stoic, or ethico-volitional. It is true, indeed, that the ascetic view of life, in the sense which we attach to the term, was always confined to narrow circles in the Greek world; nevertheless, as a consequence of its being embraced, deepened, and spiritualized by two of the greatest thinkers of Greece, Plato and Plotinus, its influence has been enormous. Of no less importance, however, than the asceticism of the religio-mystical type has been what we have called the ethico-volitional, which discovered, and to some extent developed, the significance of the will in morals. Both of these tendencies, which, moreover, were in some degree combined in Posidonius, exercised a profound influence upon early Christian thought.

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The present writer has in preparation [1908] a monograph, *Die Askese im griechischen Altertum*, which will also take account of the Sextians, the Essenes, Philo, and, in particular, early Christianity.

W. CAPELLE.

ASCETICISM (Hindu).—In India ascetic practices have been very widely prevalent from the earliest times. The mortification of the body, and the self-inflicted penances associated therewith, have been habitually carried to lengths beyond anything familiar to other peoples. Tradition and legend have united to glorify the ascetic, whether human or Divine; religion, as elsewhere, has sanctioned and encouraged his devotion; and the highest rewards of place and power have been within his reach, if only his austerities have taken a form sufficiently protracted and severe. Eastern patience, self-abnegation, and resolution are seen in their strangest guise, in submission to extreme conditions of self-torture and distress. The profession of the ascetic has always been held in the highest esteem, and his claim to support at the public charge by gifts and alms universally allowed. If it is his merit to practise, it is the merit of others to give to him, that his simple wants may never lack supply. And thus on both sides asceticism ministered to spiritual profit, to the actual and personal gain of the ascetic himself, both present and prospective, and to the store of credit which by his generosity the householder trusted to accumulate for himself, so as to win a higher position and birth in the next existence. Part of the secret of the hold which the ascetic ideal has maintained on the Indian mind lies in the fact that, according to the teaching of their sacred books, benefit accrues also to the donor who forwards the holy man on his way with gifts of money or food, or ministers in any way to his personal needs.

The thought that essentially underlies the Indian conception of asceticism, and prompts the adoption of the ascetic life, is the desire to escape from the *saṁsāra*, the never-ending cycle or round of successive existences, in which all created beings are involved, and which brings in its train the suffering and misery to which all such beings are subject. Asceticism offers a means of escape from an otherwise hopeless procession, without beginning and without end. And there is therefore little marvel if to a people whose theory of life was essentially pessimistic present hardship and suffering voluntarily endured were welcome when they brought with them the promise of future deliverance.

1. **Meaning and history of the Indian term 'tapas.'**—The Hindu and Sanskrit term is *tapas*, from the root *tap*, 'to be hot,' 'to burn' (cf. Lat. *tep*-eo, *tep*-or, Gr. *τέφ-ρη*, 'ashes' [*Iliad*, xviii. 25, xxiii. 251], Old Germ. *damf*). *Tapas* signifies therefore in the first instance 'warmth,' or 'heat'; then the feelings or sensations, usually painful, experienced in consequence of heat; and thus pain or suffering in general, especially the pain which is voluntary and self-inflicted from a religious motive. The term therefore came to be applied in particular to religious penance, austerity, devotion, and to connote the merit which such devotion was supposed to assure. This was the paramount and ordinary significance of the word. But it was also used, by analogy, for the special duty or 'merit' of each of the four castes of Manu,* or again, in a limited and

* Manu, xi. 235 f.: 'All the bliss of gods and men is declared by the sages to whom the Veda was revealed to have *tapas* for its root, *tapas* for its centre, *tapas* for its end. Knowledge is the *tapas* of a Brâhmana, protection the *tapas* of a Kshatriya, his daily business the *tapas* of a Vaiśya, service the *tapas* of a Śûdra.'

technical sense, of the special season of the year (the month *Māgha*, Jan.-Feb.) to which the practice of religious austerities was more peculiarly appropriate. Other terms of less frequent occurrence were *tapasyam* and *tapasyā*.

The Greek writers, in their references to ancient India, make frequent mention of philosophers or ascetics, whose characteristic practices repeat themselves in every part of the country at the present day. Strabo, for example (bk. xv. ch. i.), quoting from Megasthenes, describes two sects of the philosophers whom he calls Brāhmans and Garmans,* who abstain from meat and from sexual indulgence, and live in groves without the city.† It is not always easy to determine whether he is referring to Hindu or to Buddhist mendicants; probably there was little difference at that period in the habits or dress of the monks and ascetics of either faith, and to a Greek eye they were indistinguishable. Elsewhere he writes of the Garmans (Sarmans) that the most honourable of them were known as Hylobioi,‡ who lived on wild fruits and leaves, clothed themselves in garments made of bark, and abstained from wine and sexual indulgence.§ Two of the Brāhman *σοφισταί* were seen in Taxila, of whom the elder was clean-shaven, while the other wore his hair long, and both were attended by disciples; they were provided with food without cost, and exhibited their powers of endurance by standing for a whole day on one leg, or lying on the ground exposed to the vicissitudes of the weather.‖ Others were seen standing immovable in one position during the day, naked and exposed to the almost intolerable heat of the sun. The elder of the two ascetics above referred to accompanied Alexander to Persis, and there abandoned his ascetic practices, giving as his reason that he had completed the forty years' term which he had prescribed for himself. Another, who followed in the train of the king, was named Kalanus. He perished by a voluntary death by fire at Pasargadæ, at the age of seventy-three; with reference to this act Megasthenes is quoted to the effect that self-destruction was not a rule with the Indian philosophers, and that those who thus acted were regarded as rash and headstrong (*νεανισκοί*, *ib.* xv. 68).

Other philosophers bore the name 'Pramnai' (Πράμναι, probably a corruption again of *śramaṇa*, *samana*), and were opposed to the Brāhmans. These the author distinguishes, some as living on the hills or plains, others as frequenting the cities Others, again, were known as Γυμνῆται, and were therefore probably Jains, of the Digambara sect; they lived mostly under the open sky, and practised austerities for thirty-seven years.¶ Reference is made later to the Indian embassy to Augustus, and the Brāhman or perhaps Buddhist ascetic who accompanied it, and burned himself on the funeral pyre at Athens in the presence of the Emperor and the people. His name is said to have been inscribed on his tomb: 'Zarmanochegas, an Indian from Bargosa . . . lies here.'** Elsewhere the name appears as Zarmanus.††

2. **'Tapas' in Indian literature.**—(1) *Rigveda.*—In the earliest Sanskrit literature, the Hymns of the *Rigveda*, neither the word *tapas* nor the conception and thought that underlies it is of frequent occurrence. It would not, however, be a legitimate inference from this fact that ascetic habits were unknown to the primitive Aryan communities. Nevertheless, the absence or rarity of reference does suggest that, together with much else which belonged to the lower side of the religious life, the practice of *tapas* also was, in great part at least, adopted from the aboriginal or other tribes among whom the new-comers settled. Theirs was the darker, gloomier view of religion and of life, to which austerity was congenial. To the bright, joyous spirit of the Aryans—the spirit that finds expression in the Hymns—the sad and despairing outlook which is the motive-power and inspiration of ascetic practice was repugnant. To them the gods were open-handed, and did not need to be forced or cajoled by human suffering; and life was not yet clouded by the pessimistic tendencies of a later age. It is noticeable that all the instances quoted from the *Rigveda* of the use of *tapas* in its technical sense are taken from the late tenth book, where the word is found both in the literal meaning of 'warmth,' 'glow' (*e.g.* x. 16. 4), and metaphorically of the glow of feeling, passion (*e.g.* x. 83. 2). *Tapas*, however, is also pain, suffering, voluntarily endured (*ib.* 109. 4, 154. 2, 167. 1). So also the root *tap*, which is met with in the earlier books with the significance of 'burn' (viii. 102. 16), or transitively to 'heat,' 'make hot' (iii. 53. 14, iv. 2. 6), to 'consume by fire,' 'destroy' (iii. 18. 2), assumes in the tenth book the connotation of remorse, the heat or pain which is within, self-originated in the heart (*tatāpa*, impers. x. 34. 11, cf. *ib.* 34. 10, 95. 17). Similarly, also in the same book, we find *tapasvat*, 'practising asceticism' (154. 4); *tapoja*, 'born through penance' (154. 5).*

The purpose and subject-matter of the *Sāmaveda* and *Yajurveda* almost preclude a reference to *tapas*; and the nature of the magical devices and charms, the incantations of the *Atharvaveda*, aims rather at inflicting harm upon another, or securing personal immunity, than at exhibiting endurance or attaining the desired end by actual self-inflicted tortures.†

Of the *Brāhmaṇa* literature the same is true as of the later mantra and ritual writings, that there was little occasion for reference to *tapas*. Such literature is concerned almost entirely with the order and interpretation of the sacrifice, with mythology, cosmology, and so forth. The practice of *tapas*, however, is recognized, and is enjoined, *e.g. Śatap. Brāhm.* x. 4. 4. 4: 'let him who knows this by all means practise austerities; for, indeed, when he who knows this practises austerities, . . . every part of him will share in the world of heaven.'‡ The world is conquered by *tapas* (iii. 4. 4. 27; cf. xiii. 7. 1. 1).§

(2) *Upaniṣads.*—In the *Upaniṣads*, on the contrary, the theory and the duty of *tapas* are completely assumed; and even where its efficacy is denied, or only partially and grudgingly conceded, the existence and wide-spread influence of ascetic ideals are taken for granted, though the writers claim that there is a better way by which to reach the supreme goal. In the oldest strata of the *Upaniṣad* literature the ascetic calling is an obligation to be undertaken at a special stage or period of life; and their greatest teacher, Yājñavalkya, proposes thus to abandon home and possessions, and, retiring to the forest, in the practice of austerities to sever actually and ideally every tie that binds to earthly existence. In complete harmony, however, with the spirit of these writings, *tapas* is depreciated in comparison with knowledge as an inferior, secondary way to the highest bliss, to *Brahman*.

* Βραχμᾶνες and Γαρμᾶνες, the latter name probably a textual error for Σαρμᾶνες, the Pāli and Buddhist *samana*, Skr. *śramaṇa*, *śrāmaṇera*, 'hearer,' 'disciple.'

† διατρίβειν . . . ἐν ἄλσει πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὑπὸ περιβόλῳ συμμέτρῳ, λιτῶς ζῶντας ἐν στιβάσι καὶ δοραῖς, ἀπεχομένους ἐμψύχων καὶ ἀφροδισίων (Strabo, xv. 59).

‡ ὑλόβιοι, 'dwellers in the forest,' *i.e.* Skr. *vānaprastha*.

§ ζῶντας ἐν ταῖς ὕλαις ἀπὸ φύλλων καὶ καρπῶν ἀγρίων, ἐσθῆτας δὲ ἔχειν ἀπὸ φλοιῶν δενδρίων, ἀφροδισίων χωρὶς καὶ οἴνου (*ib.* xv. 60).

‖ τὸν μὲν πρεσβύτερον ἐξυρημένον, τὸν δὲ νεώτερον κομήτην, ἀμφοτέροις δὲ ἀκολουθεῖν μαθητάς· τὸν μὲν οὖν ἄλλον χρόνον κατ' ἀγορὰν διατρίβειν, τιμωμένους ἀντὶ συμβούλων, ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντας, ὅτι ἂν βούλωνται τῶν ὠνίων φέρεσθαι δωρεάν . . . τοῦ τε μέλιτος πολλοῦ προκειμένου καὶ τοῦ σησάμου μάζας ποιουμένους τρέφεσθαι δωρεάν . . . τὸν μὲν πρεσβύτερον, πεσόντα ὕπτιον, ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν ἡλίων καὶ τῶν ὄμβρων· ἤδη γὰρ ὕειν ἀρχομένου τοῦ ἔαρος· Τὸν δὲ ἑστάναι μονοσκελῆ, ξύλον ἐπῃρμένον ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς χερσὶν, ὅσον τρίπηχυ· κάμνοντος δὲ τοῦ σκέλους, ἐπὶ θάτερον μεταφέρειν τὴν βάσιν, καὶ διατελεῖν οὕτως τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην· φανῆναι δὲ ἐγκρατέστερον μακρῷ τὸν νεώτερον (*ib.* xv. 61).

¶ τοὺς δὲ Γυμνήτας κατὰ τοὔνομα γυμνοὺς διαζῆν, ὑπαιθρίους τὸ πλέον, καρτερίαν ἀσκοῦντας, ἣν ἔφαμεν πρότερον μεχρὶ ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα (*ib.* xv. 70).

** Ζαρμανοχῆγας Ἰνδὸς ἀπὸ Βαργοσῆς κατὰ τὰ πάτρια Ἰνδῶν ἔθη ἑαυτὸν ἀπαθανατίσας κεῖται. Zarmanochegas is probably the Sanskrit *śramaṇāchārya*, a mendicant teacher, and Bargosa is Bharūch, or Broach, at the mouth of the Narbada river.

†† The passages from the ancient classical authors referring to the Indian ascetics, and especially to the examples quoted of self-immolation, are translated in J. W. M'Crindle, *Invasion of India by Alexander the Great*, 1896, pp. 386-392; and in the same writer's *Ancient India as described in Classical Literature*, 1901, pp. 65 ff., 73 ff., 113, 167 ff., 176, 181 ff., 212 f.

* In one Hymn, x. 83. 2, *tapas* is invoked, together with *manyu*, to protect the worshipper and overthrow his foes.

† A confirmation of the view that the conception of *tapas* was strange to the earliest Aryan thought, and was adopted from without and became familiar only at a later period, is perhaps afforded by *Rigveda*, vii. 59. 8: 'kill him with your hottest bolt,' *tapiṣṭhena hanmanā*, where *Atharvaveda*, vii. 77. 2, and *Taitt. Saṁh.* iv. 3. 13. 3, substitute for the last word *tapasā*, 'with your hottest penance,' an expression quite in harmony with the later thought of the overwhelming magical power of *tapas*.

‡ *SBE* xliii. 362. § *SBE* xxvi. 111.

The representation, however, as might be expected, is not always consistent. In addition to the view most usually adopted, which sees in *tapas* a real, though less commendable and direct, means to the attainment of a knowledge of *Brahman*, the two extremes are met with of those who declare the practice of austerities indispensable to such knowledge, and those who refuse to acknowledge in asceticism any virtue or efficacy whatsoever, and maintain that only in the way of knowledge and by no other means may the final end be reached. Elsewhere asceticism and the study of the *Veda* are placed side by side as the essential conditions of a true insight; and those who in the right spirit with faith practise asceticism in the forest ascend on the way of the gods.

Tapas also is indefinitely associated in the *Upaniṣads* with the third *āśrama* (*q.v.*), and the life of the anchorite in the forest (*vānaprastha*). On him the practice of asceticism is especially obligatory, but even he must add to it faith, or the mere outward observance and self-mortification will be in vain. Only gradually, and not quite clearly or definitely, within the *Upanisad* period was a distinction drawn between the third and a fourth higher stage, the essential note of which was not mere bodily self-mortification, but the voluntary and entire surrender of all worldly possessions, and the concentration of thought and affection on the Supreme. This last stage is identified with a real knowledge of *Brahman*. He who 'knows' has passed beyond the (three) *āśramas* (*atyāśramin*, *Śvet.* vi. 21), and *tapas* is no longer in the least degree necessary or profitable to him, for that which the ascetic painfully strives to win he has already attained. Thus the theory of the *āśramas*, and with it the doctrine of *tapas*, takes on in the *Upaniṣad* literature a distinctly ethical colouring. It is only, however, in the later treatises that the separation between the two last stages, the *vānaprastha* and the *sannyāsin*, is completely carried out, and the duties and obligations of each clearly defined.

(3) *Manu and the Law-Books.*—It is in the *Law-Book of Manu*, ch. vi., that the formal conditions and rules of the ascetic life are set forth; and these are in large part repeated, quoted, or amplified in the later *Dharmasūtras*. How far some of the more strict and exacting of these regulations ever became matters of literal observance, or how far they represented merely abstract or conventional ideals, must, of course, remain uncertain. But, in view of the capacity which Indian ascetics have always exhibited for almost heroic endurance of self-mortification, it would seem by no means impossible, or even improbable, that in some instances at least the utmost extremes of bodily torture were submitted to, and the rules of the books carried out in fullest detail. It will be noticed that Manu confines the rights and privileges of an ascetic life to the twice-born.

'A twice-born Snātaka, who has thus lived according to the law in the order of householders, may . . . go forth from the village into the forest and reside there, duly controlling his senses. Let him offer those five great sacrifices according to the rule, with various kinds of pure food fit for ascetics, or with herbs, roots, and fruit. Let him wear a skin or a tattered garment; let him bathe in the evening or in the morning; and let him always wear (his hair in) braids, the hair on his body, his beard, and his nails (being unclipped). . . . Let him be always industrious in privately reciting the Veda; let him be patient of hardships . . . ever liberal . . . and compassionate towards all living creatures.' *

Then follow directions with regard to the sacrifices the ascetic must offer, and the kind and quantity of food he may eat.

'In summer let him expose himself to the heat of five fires, during the rainy season live under the open sky, and in winter be dressed in wet clothes, gradually increasing his austerities. When he bathes at the three Savanas (sunrise, noon, and sunset) let him offer libations of water to the manes and the gods, and, practising harsher and harsher austerities, let him dry up his bodily frame . . . let him live without a fire, without a house, wholly silent, subsisting on roots and fruit . . . chaste, sleeping on the bare ground, dwelling at the roots of trees.' * 'Having thus passed the third part of life in the forest, he may live as an ascetic during the fourth part of his existence, after abandoning all attachment to worldly objects . . . after offering sacrifices and subduing his senses . . . an ascetic gains bliss after death.' † 'Departing from his house . . . let him wander about absolutely silent, and caring nothing for enjoyments that may be offered. Let him always wander alone without any companion, in order to attain (final liberation) . . . He shall neither possess a fire nor a dwelling, he may go to a village for his food, indifferent to everything, firm of purpose, meditating and concentrating his mind on *Brahman*. A potsherd (for an almsbowl), the roots of trees (for a dwelling), coarse worn-out garments, life in solitude and indifference towards everything, are the marks of one who has attained liberation. Let him not desire to die, let him not desire to live, let him wait for his time, as a servant for the payment of his wages . . . let him patiently bear hard words, let him not insult anybody, let him not become anybody's enemy for the sake of this body . . . entirely abstaining from sensual enjoyments, with himself for his only companion, he shall live in this world, desiring the bliss (of final emancipation)'.‡ 'Carrying an almsbowl, a staff, and a water-pot, let him continually wander about, controlling himself and not hurting any creature. . . . A gourd, a wooden bowl, an earthen dish or one made of split cane, Manu, the son of Svayambhu, has declared to be vessels (suitable) for an ascetic' §

Rules are then given for begging and the manner of eating, subjects of meditation, etc. The ascetic is to beg only once in the day, and when he goes to any house for that purpose it must be after the ordinary meal of the household has been concluded (cf. *Baudh.* ii. 22; *Vas.* x. 7, 8).

'Three suppressions of the breath even, performed according to the rule, and accompanied with the (recitation of the) *Vyāhṛtis* ‖ and of the syllable "Om," one must know to be the highest austerity for every Brāhmaṇa.' ¶ 'When by the disposition (of his heart) he becomes indifferent to all objects, he obtains eternal happiness both in this world and after death. He who has in this manner gradually given up all attachments, and is freed from all the pairs (of opposites), reposes in *Brahman* alone . . . a twice-born man who becomes an ascetic . . . shakes off sin here below, and reaches the highest *Brahman*.' **

Elsewhere in the *sūtras* of Manu, in the other books, there are incidental references to the ascetics, which lay down further rules for their conduct and life.

Ascetics and students are to receive alms from the Brāhman householder after the performance of the Bali offering (iii 94; cf. vi. 7; and *Baudh.* ii. 5 11; *Vas.* xi 5; *Āpast.* ii. 4. 10, 11).

The purification ordained . . . shall be 'double for students, treble for hermits, but quadruple for ascetics' (v. 137; cf. *Viṣṇu*, lx. 26; *Vas.* vi. 19).

The ascetic is not admissible as a witness in the law-courts (viii. 65; cf. *Baudh.* i. 19. 13; *Viṣṇu*, viii. 2).

For secret converse with female ascetics a small fine is payable (viii. 363; cf. *Viṣṇu*, xxxvi. 7, and the statement [*ib.* xcix. 14] that the deity himself resides 'in the frame of gods, ascetics, and officiating priests').

'An ascetic, a hermit in the forest, and Brāhmaṇas who are students of the Veda shall not be made to pay toll at a ferry' (viii. 407; cf. *Viṣṇu*, v. 132).

'Hermits (*tāpasāh*, *i.e.* those who practise *tapas*), ascetics (*yatis*, those whose passions are under control), Brāhmaṇas, the crowds of the Vaimānika deities, the lunar mansions, and the Daityas are the first (*i.e.* lowest) order of existence caused by Goodness' (*sattva*, xii. 48).

Additional details in the *Law-Books* are to the effect that a householder must turn back if he meets an ascetic (*Viṣṇu*, lxiii. 36). 'An apostate from religious mendicity shall become the king's slave' (*ib.* v. 152). Cf. *Gautama*, iii. (*SBE* ii.² 192–196); *Baudhāyana*, ii. 11. 14–26, 17. 16, 17, iii. 3; 'eight mouthfuls are the meal of an ascetic, sixteen that of a hermit in the woods, thirty-two that of a householder, and an unlimited (quantity) that of a student' (*Baudh.* ii. 13. 7; cf. *Vas.* vi. 20); 'let him (the hermit) not injure even gadflies or gnats, let him bear cold and perform austerities, let him con-

* Manu, vi. 1–8 (*SBE* xxv. 198 ff.).

* Manu, vi. 23–26; cf. *Viṣṇu*, xcv. 1–4. Chs. xcv.–xcvii. of the *Institutes of Viṣṇu* are devoted to the exposition of the method of life and the duties of the ascetic, and the subjects of his meditation; the whole is closely related to the corresponding passages of Manu.

† Manu, vi. 33, 34. ‡ *Ib.* 41–49. § *Ib.* 52–54.

‖ *i.e.* the three mystic syllables *bhūr*, *bhuvaḥ*, *svar* (cf. ii. 76, 78, 81); the virtue of their recitation, with suppressions of the breath is so great that it frees from the guilt of the murder of a Brāhmaṇa (xi. 249).

¶ Manu, vi. 70. ** *Ib.* 80–85.

stantly reside in the forest, be contented, and delight in (dresses made of) bark and skins (and in carrying) water (in his pot)' (*Baudh.* iii. 3. 19; *Vas.* ix. x. [*SBE* xiv. 45–49]). 'The qualities by which a (true) Brāhmana may be recognized are the concentration of the mind, austerities, the subjugation of the senses, liberality, truthfulness, purity, sacred learning, compassion, worldly learning, intelligence, and faith' (*Vas.* vi. 23); 'he is worthy to receive gifts who . . . reduces himself by austerities' (vi. 30); 'to suppress the breath is the highest austerity' (x. 5; cf. *Āpastamba*, ii. 21. 7–21, 22, 23. 1, 2).

(4) *Bhagavad Gītā.*—The 'Song of the Blessed' represents, as is well known, a syncretism between the two views of an idealistic pantheism and the practical devotion demanded by a theistic creed, salvation by conviction and knowledge alone, or salvation through faith and works. It is a subject of dispute which of these views is the earlier in the poem, and forms the original kernel, and which has been superimposed upon the other.* In either case *tapas*, in the form of renunciation, self-devotion, is the highest form which 'action' can take; and in the thought and teaching of the writer the essence of ascetic practices is not painful mortification of the body, but the abnegation of selfish desires and the sacrifice of selfish inclination and love of ease in the cause of right and devotion to the Supreme God. Passages which enforce renunciation and the duty of earnest and purposeful action belong to the practical theistic strata of the poem. Attempts, however, to reconcile conflicting views, or at least to recognize what is good in both, are not wanting.

'There is a twofold path, that of the Sāṅkhyas by devotion in the shape of knowledge, and that of the Yogins by devotion in the shape of action. A man does not attain freedom from action merely by not engaging in action; nor does he attain perfection by mere renunciation' (*Bhag. Gītā*, iii. 3 f.).

The 'ascetic' is one 'who has no aversion and no desire. . . . Children, not wise men, talk of *sāṅkhya* and *yoga* as distinct. One who pursues either well obtains the fruit of both. . . . He who, casting off attachment, performs actions dedicating them to *Brahman*, is not tainted by sin' (*ib.* v. 3 ff.).

'Some by concentration see the self in the self by the self; others by the *Sāṅkhya-yoga*; and others still by the *Karma-yoga*; others yet, not knowing this, practise concentration after hearing from others. They too, being devoted to hearing (instruction), cross beyond death' (xiii. 24 f.).

'Renunciation is devotion (*yoga*); for no one becomes a devotee (*yogin*) who has not renounced (all) fancies. . . . The devotee whose self is contented with knowledge and experience, who is unmoved, who has restrained his senses, and to whom a sod, a stone, and gold are alike, is said to be devoted. . . . He should restrain his mind, and concentrate it on me, and sit down engaged in devotion, regarding me as his final goal. Thus, constantly devoting his self to abstraction, a devotee whose mind is restrained attains that tranquillity which culminates in final emancipation and assimilation with me. . . . When his mind well-restrained becomes steady upon the self alone, then he, being indifferent to all objects of desire, is said to be devoted. As a light standing in a windless (place) flickers not, that is declared to be the parallel for a devotee, whose mind is restrained, and who devotes himself to abstraction' (vi. 2 ff.).

The indestructible seat . . . 'is entered by ascetics from whom all desires have departed' (viii. 11).

'Whatever you do . . . whatever you eat, whatever sacrifice you make, whatever you give, whatever penance you perform, do that as offered to me' (ix. 27).

'This threefold penance (*i.e.* bodily, vocal, and mental) practised with perfect faith . . . is called good (*sāttvikam*). . . . Whatever oblation is offered, whatever is given, whatever penance is performed, and whatever is done without faith, that . . . is called *asat* (not good), and that is nought both after death and here' (xvii. 7, 28).

'One who is self-restrained, whose understanding is unattached everywhere, from whom affections have departed, obtains the supreme perfection of freedom from action by renunciation' (xviii. 49).

'Those who, restraining the group of the senses . . . meditate on the indescribable, indestructible, unperceived . . . they, intent on the good of all beings, necessarily attain to me. . . . He who is alike to friend and foe, as also in honour and dishonour, who is alike in cold and heat, pleasure and pain, who is free from attachments, to whom praise and blame are alike . . . who is homeless, and of a steady mind and full of devotion, that man is dear to me' (xii. 3 f., 18 f.).

Similar quotations might easily be multiplied. In the *Bhagavad Gītā* the philosophic theory of asceticism, as it presented itself to the Indian mind, appears in its loftiest and purest form. To the earnest-minded *sādhu* this book is his Bible; and the nobility of its thought, and the charity and breadth of its outlook, render it not undeserving of the name.*

(5) *Epic poetry.*—The Epic poems add little to the general conception of *tapas*, although they offer many examples of its practice, and contain narratives more or less marvellous of ascetics who proved in their own experience its virtue and power (see below, p. 91[a]). Rāma in his hermitage on the banks of the Godāvarī is the type of the peaceful, gentle hermit who has renounced the world, and lives retired from its strife and care, 'true to duty, true to virtue.' In the *Mahābhārata* descriptions of the hermit (*vānaprastha*) and of the ascetic (*sannyāsin*) are found, which agree almost verbally with those of Manu (*Mahābh.* xii. 191 f., 243 ff.; cf. above, p. 89). And in the same book, true and false *tapas* are distinguished from one another: 'Fasting though for a fortnight, which ordinary men count for *tapas*, is merely a castigation of the body, and is not regarded as *tapas* by the good; renunciation and humility, these are the noblest *tapas*; he who practises these virtues fasts unceasingly, and his virtue is never found wanting.' 'Study of the Veda and avoiding injury to any living being, men call bodily asceticism; the true spiritual asceticism is control of speech and thought.'†

In the *Purāṇas* and later literature the extravagances of ascetic practice are more prominent than its virtues. The underlying conceptions remain the same; renunciation of worldly possessions and the voluntary endurance of bodily pain are means to an end, viz. deliverance from the *saṁsāra* and the acquisition of supernatural powers. The essential principles, however, are overlaid with a mass of extravagant fancy and repellent detail; and the stories of the lives of the ascetics, and the descriptions of their self-inflicted tortures, present few features of attractiveness or interest.

3. Asceticism in modern practice.—The most general term for a Hindu ascetic is *sādhu*, a 'good' or 'pious' man, a saint, or sage, of which the feminine *sādhvī* denotes a woman who has taken ascetic vows. *Sannyāsin*, one who has 'cast off,' *i.e.* home and possessions, is also frequently used of any mendicant, though the title is more properly restricted to a particular sect (see below, p. 93 f.). *Faqīr* is a Muhammadan term, expressive of poverty of spirit, but is sometimes, though incorrectly, applied to a Hindu beggar or ascetic. India has always been the home of asceticism, and from the very earliest times this feature of Indian life has attracted attention. *Sādhus* have formed the shifting itinerant element in a population for the most part stationary and rooted to the soil. In spite also of their general aloofness, by their numbers and by the respect paid to them they have always exercised a considerable influence in the land, and, in the absence of more direct methods of conveying intelligence, have formed a fairly constant though uncertain means of communication between the different parts of the country. Present everywhere, although rarely making a prolonged

* See esp. R. Garbe, *Bhagavad-Gītā*, Leipzig, 1905, Einleitung; *SBE*, vol. viii.[2], Oxford, 1898, Introduction; and art. BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ.

* Cf. the interesting account which Dr. T. L. Pennell gives of the *sādhu* whom he overtook on the road from Ludhiāna, and who recounted to him his experiences and manner of life: 'When my heart is lonely I read in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, and get consolation, and I like that better than any other book because it makes my heart glad' (*Church Missionary Intelligencer*, 1905, p. 516).

† *Mahābh.* xii. 217, 221; cf. Deussen, *Allg. Gesch. der Philosophie*, i. 3. p. 89 ff.

stay in one place, they brought to the settled inhabitants the consciousness of an outside world, and wrought effectively, though probably unintentionally, against the narrowness of a merely local and parochial spirit. Whether the *sādhus* were more numerous in ancient times than at the present day it is difficult to determine. They occupy a larger place in the ancient than in the modern literature of India; and the same is true also in all probability of the thought of the people. They still form, however, an appreciable though small percentage of the population. At the census of 1901 the total number of beggars and religious mendicants was returned at 4,914,000, or nearly five millions, a decrease of about 6½ % during the decade preceding. The decrease, however, is attributed to the heavy mortality of the famine years, and not to any lessened attraction in the profession of sādhuism. Probably by far the greater number of these, if not all, were true ascetics, bound by vows to a life of self-renunciation and poverty.

More, also, perhaps than in any other country asceticism in India has been under the definite and strong sanction of religion. That sanction was given to the practice of *tapas* in the first instance by the example of the greatest saints and heroes of old, and of the gods themselves, who are represented as enduring self-inflicted tortures for thousands of years in order to attain supernatural or enhanced power. The *ṛṣis* of old, the demigods of legend and story, the dwellers in heaven as well as on earth, engaged in the practice of *tapas* to secure dominion for themselves, or to confound their foes. The Supreme Being himself endured age-long austerities in order to create. And Śiva, in the character of an austere naked *sannyāsin* practising austerities of almost unimaginable severity for thousands of years, is the type and patron of the ascetic, who by the grace of Śiva and by the virtue of *tapas* hopes to attain all his desires. There was no limit to the power of self-mortification; all things were possible to *tapas*. The classical example and the most convincing to Hindu thought was found in the story of the rivalry and hostile encounters of Vaśiṣṭha and Viśvāmitra. The latter, a Kṣatriya and a most powerful and wealthy king, was overthrown and put to confusion at every point by the might of the Brāhman's incantations and magical devices. Humbled and beyond measure enraged, Viśvāmitra had recourse to *tapas*, and by the most severe and protracted austerities compelled the gods to grant him the birth and rights of a Brāhman, thus placing him on a level with his Brāhman adversary. The story undoubtedly represents the rivalry of the two great orders or castes, the priestly and the warrior; but it also expresses the conception of the omnipotent strength of *tapas*, which could bridge the gulf, and lift the Kṣatriya, inferior though a king, to the level of the proud and domineering Brāhman.*

On the power of *tapas* see also Manu, xi. 239 ff.: 'Whatever is hard to be traversed, whatever is hard to be attained, whatever is hard to be reached, whatever is hard to be performed, all may be accomplished by austerities; for austerity (possesses a power) which it is difficult to surpass. Both those who have committed mortal sin and all other offenders are severally freed from their guilt by means of well-performed austerities. Insects, snakes, moths, bees, birds, and beings bereft of motion reach heaven by the power of austerities. Whatever sin men commit by thoughts, words, or deeds, that they speedily burn away by penance, if they keep penance as their only riches. The gods accept the offerings of that Brāhmaṇa alone who has purified himself by austerities, and grant to him all he desires. . . . The gods, discerning that the holy origin of this whole (world) is from austerity, have thus proclaimed the incomparable power of austerity' (*SBE* xxv. 478 f.); cf. iv. 148, where *tapas* is one of the means for remembering former births, and xii. 83, where *tapas* leads to the attainment of supreme bliss; cf. also *Rigveda*, x. i. 36, where the long-haired ascetic with semi-divine powers is able to move on the path of the Apsarases and Gandharvas (A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 134).

Hindu asceticism represented, further, a revolt from, or at least a protest against, the tyranny of caste. In its origin probably remote from Brāhmanism, and conveying the ordinary idea that bodily pain was profitable for the advancement and purification of the spirit, the ascetic life became, in association with Hinduism and under the prescriptive sanction of Hindu law itself, a refuge from the burden of caste rules and ostracisms. By the ascetic, caste, like every other institution of the mundane life, has been surpassed, and left behind. He is casteless not because he is below but because he is above caste. And this freedom from the bondage and artificial restrictions of a society elaborately fenced off and partitioned by innumerable barriers which the ordinary man might not transgress presented no inconsiderable attraction, and has been one of the secrets of the abiding popularity of the ascetic ideal and manner of life in India. The subdual of the bodily passions by mortification of the flesh, which in other countries was itself the end of asceticism, was in India only the means; the end was primarily and avowedly the attainment of magical powers, but also, perhaps in many instances only half consciously, escape from the burdens of a social life, the petty restraints and prohibitions of which had begun to be a weariness to the spirit. Over this tendency, with that wonderful compliance and dexterity of which it is so great a master, Brāhmanism threw its shield, and legalized what it could not prevent. In the doctrine of the four *āśramas* (*q.v.*) asceticism was made an integral part of the orthodox Hindu life, and it became the duty of every Hindu, as advanced age overtook him, homeless and a wanderer to chasten himself with austerities. Formally this was to be done for the sake of detaching himself from earthly ties, and of realizing union with *Brahman* (see art. YOGA). And a religious motive was thus supplied for that which in itself was a welcome release from responsibility, care, and the minute requirements of an elaborate social code.

In the first instance apparently, the right and privilege of asceticism, according to Hindu custom or law, belonged to Brāhmans alone; it was then extended to all the twice-born, and finally all restrictions were removed, and admission into the ranks of the ascetics was accorded to men of every position and degree.

Cf. Rāmāyaṇa, *Uttara Kāṇḍa*, 74. 9 ff., quoted in Muir, *Orig. Sanskr. Texts*[3], i. 119 f.: 'Formerly in the *kṛta* age Brāhmans alone practised *tapas*; none who was not a Brāhman did so in that enlightened age . . . then came the *tretā* age, . . . in which the Kṣatriyas were born, distinguished still by their former *tapas* . . . Those Brāhmans and Kṣatriyas who lived in the *tretā* practised *tapas*, and the rest of mankind obedience. . . . In the *dvāpara* age *tapas* entered into the Vaiśyas. Thus in the course of three ages it entered into three castes; and in the three ages righteousness (*dharma*) was established in three castes. But the Śudra does not attain to righteousness through the (three) ages . . . such observance will belong to the future race of Śūdras in the *kali* age, but is unrighteous in the extreme if practised by that caste in the *dvāpara*.' Cf. Manu, i 86: 'In the *kṛta* age the chief [virtue] is declared to be *tapas*'

It is evident, however, with what reluctance the privileges and powers of the ascetic life were extended to Śūdras and low-caste men. At the present time there is no distinction or barrier; any one may become an ascetic, and the vows are not necessarily lifelong. Some sects, however, still restrict membership to Brahmans, or at least to men of the three higher castes.

Moreover, the distinction between the last two *āśramas*, that of the *vānaprastha*, the anchorite in the forest, corresponding to the class of the ὑλόβιοι

* See J. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*[3], i. 388 ff., who quotes the story in a twofold form from the *Mahābhārata* (*Ādiparvan*, 6638 ff.), and from the *Rāmāyaṇa* (*Bālakāṇḍa*, 51–65); cf. the narrative of Nahuṣa, who by *tapas* won for himself the rank of Indra (*Mahābh.*, *Ādip.* 3151; Muir, *op. cit.* p. 307 ff.).

of Megasthenes (see above, p. 88a), and that of the true *sannyāsin*, the homeless wanderer, was never very clearly drawn even in theory, and was in practice entirely disregarded. Ascetic habits at least were common to both; and the dweller in the forest-hermitage, no less than the man who had 'cast off' possessions and earthly ties in favour of a vagrant life through the cities and country, endeavoured by means of *tapas* to break the fetters which bound him to an earthly existence, and to secure final rest and bliss.

(1) *Clothing and habits.*—Numerous also as were, and are, the sects of ascetics, varying in the details of costume and habit, they all possess certain broad characteristic features in common, and to the eye of the comparative stranger present a similar and specific appearance by which their profession may be recognized. All *sādhus* carry a begging-bowl, which in its simplest form consists of a hollowed-out coconut or gourd, but is sometimes of brass, figured or otherwise ornamented, and furnished with a lid or handle; a water-pot also, and usually a staff. Theoretically, and as individuals, they are without worldly possessions, but the monasteries in which many of them take up their abode during the rainy season, and for longer or shorter intervals, are often richly endowed. Such monasteries, which are very numerous all over India, owe their existence to the liberality of pious founders, and have at different times been the recipients of gifts of money or land, whereby merit has accrued to the donors, and the religious houses have in many instances become endowed with great revenues. They are not, however, in most cases, places of permanent residence, but their inmates wander through the country as *sādhus*, or ascetics, living on the alms of the people. The robes of the ascetic are ordinarily salmon-coloured, but sometimes other colours are met with, according to the sect or order to which they belong; many also go practically naked. On their bodies they rub ashes—a practice which is supposed to have been originally intended to protect the skin against the insect plagues of India, or as a defence against the hosts of the demons.* The forehead is marked with the *tilaka*, the variously shaped sign or symbol, made with coloured earths, indicating their sect or the god to whose service they have consecrated themselves; and the hair hangs down from the head, long and matted, but in other cases is formed into a rough coil at the top, or is entirely shaved off, the head being left bald. They sleep on the ground, and once or twice in the day go round to collect food and alms, for which they must not ask, but contentedly receive what is given. According to the stated rule, they must not approach a house to beg until the regular meal-time is past; what remains over is the portion of the mendicant.

Other objects usually found in the possession of a *sādhu* are a rosary, the material of which and the number of the beads vary with the different sects. Śaivite rosaries are composed of the berries of the *rudrāksha* tree (*Eleocarpus ganitrus*), thirty-two or sixty-four in number; sometimes, however, such ascetics wear strings of human teeth (*dantamālā*) or the skin of a snake round their neck. Vaiṣṇavite ascetics carry a rosary of a hundred and eight beads of *tulasī* wood, the holy basil (*Ocymum sanctum*), or occasionally, though it is said rarely, of the seeds of the sacred lotus. The purpose of the rosary is for use in the recitation of prayers, or to enable the devotee to repeat the name of his god a definite number of times without error.† In all probability the Christian use of the rosary was derived ultimately from India. Many *sādhus* will also be found with fire-tongs, the iron of which is supposed to be a protection against evil spirits, and, as they are inveterate smokers of bhang, with a pestle and mortar, and a pipe, which are brought into constant use. Many of them carry on their person small idols, or sacred objects, or talismans as the *liṅgam* or *śālagrāma*, relics also from the places of pilgrimage they have visited, and seals or certificates issued by the priests in charge. They are supposed to spend their lives in meditation, withdrawn from the thoughts and interests of the world. For a similar reason, because he is believed to be in *samādhi*, 'profound trance,' a state of intimate and untroubled communion with the Divine, the body of a *sannyāsin* is under ordinary circumstances buried, not burned; he is in reality not dead, and may revive at pleasure to a consciousness of external things.

(2) *Mortifications.*—The distresses and self-mortifications to which the Hindu ascetic submits himself would be almost incredible if they were not certified by the accounts of many eye-witnesses from the earliest times to the present day, and by the well-known capacity of the Eastern to endure with stoicism hardship and pain that would be intolerable or fatal to a European. Fully to enumerate and describe the various kinds of self-torture invented and practised by *sādhus* would be impracticable. Among the more usual and prominent which attract attention is the so-called 'arrow' or 'spike-bed' (*śaraśayyā, kaṇṭakaśayyā*), a flat board studded with iron nails or spikes, on which the ascetic sits or lies at full length, and which he is supposed never to leave night or day. The practice is in imitation of the sufferings of Bhīṣma, the leader of the Kurus and chief antagonist of Arjuna in the *Mahābhārata*. His body was pierced in the fight by Arjuna with so many arrows that, falling, it did not touch the ground, and Bhīṣma lay thus supported for forty-eight days and nights before his death, during which time he discoursed on high topics before the assembled armies.* A Brāhman ascetic at Benares is said to have used one of these couches, on which he lay naked, for thirty-five years.† Another common form of self-torture is to raise one or both arms above the head, and to hold them there until stiff and atrophied, when they cannot be drawn down again (*ūrdhvabāhu*). A man who has both arms thus extended is unable even to feed himself, and is dependent in everything on the help of others. As a further penance the hand is sometimes held closed till the nails grow through the palm. The *pañcha-tapāṁsi* penance consists in enduring the heat of four fires lighted around, with the sun overhead as a fifth; sometimes five artificial fires are employed. Difficult and distressing postures of various kinds are frequent modes of self-mortification, which are supposed to distract the thoughts from external objects (see art. YOGA), for example, standing on one foot for protracted periods (*eka-pāda*), measuring the length on the ground (*aṣṭāṅga*), and thus making slow and painful progress from one place of pilgrimage to another, or round a sacred shrine. Most *sādhus* undertake long and toilsome journeys to visit the holy places of their religion, as Badarīnāth in Garhwāl, or the sacred mountain Kailāsa;‡ and on the way, or at the temples themselves, suffer the greatest hardships from want and cold. Many perish by the way from these causes and from the attacks of wild beasts. Other *sādhus* undertake prolonged fastings, or place themselves under vows

a The number of the beads is said to vary, or not to be very strictly observed; see J. C. Oman, *Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, 1903, p. 39 f. and note.

* W. Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India*, i. 29 f.

† Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], p. 67 f.

* *Mahābh.* bk. viii.

† Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], p. 560 ff.

‡ See E. S. Oakley, *Holy Himálaya*, Edin. and London, 1905.

of silence for years. Some display their powers by chewing live coals, or their endurance by thrusting knives or skewers into their flesh, treading on beds of glowing ashes, sitting immersed to the neck in water, allowing themselves to be buried alive, or hung with the head downwards (*ūrdhvamukhi*). Tricks of self-hypnotism of a most remarkable character have been without doubt known to and practised by Indian ascetics for centuries.*

(3) *Ascetic sects.*—Hindu *sādhus* are of various types and sects, between which to the unaccustomed eye there appears to be little difference. The greater number are Śaivites, but some belong to Vaiṣṇavite forms of Hinduism. Śiva, the narrative of whose austerities is found chiefly in the *Śiva*, *Skanda*, and *Liṅga Purāṇas*, is the chief patron god of ascetics. In this character he is represented as *digambara*, 'sky-clad,' with hair unkempt and his body smeared with ashes, sometimes sitting under a snake canopy. While practising austerities his home was in the remote fastnesses of the Himālaya range, where accordingly some of the most sacred places of Śaivite pilgrimage are to be found. Most of the great teachers or reformers of Hinduism founded mendicant orders, and established monasteries, which are centres and homes of ascetic life. There are sects that trace their origin to Śaṅkarāchārya, Kabīr, Rāmānuja, Rāmānanda, etc. The number of them is great, and only a few of the more prominent and important can here find mention.†

There are seven chief sects of Śaivite ascetics as follows:—(1) *Daṇḍin*, (2) *Sannyāsin*, (3) *Brahmachārin*, (4) *Paramahaṁsa*, (5) *Lingait* or *Liṅgayat*, (6) *Aghorin*, (7) *Yogin*. The first four are mendicant orders founded by Śaṅkarāchārya, the great Brāhman teacher and expositor of the 7th or 8th cent. of our era. The *Liṅgaits*, or *Liṅgayats*, are properly Śāktas, who worship the *liṅgam*, or phallus, and whose founder is said to have been a Brāhman named Basava, or Basappa, of Kalyāna, and to have lived in the Deccan about the beginning of the 12th century. Their itinerant monks (*jaṅgamas*) are to be found all over India (see art. LIṄGAYAT).

The subdivisions of the *Daṇḍins* and *Sannyāsins* appear to be uncertain in their limits,‡ and perhaps some of the sub-orders coincide, and are practically the same. There are said, however, to be ten classes of *Daṇḍins*, whence they are known as *Daśnāmī* ('ten-named') *Daṇḍins*, which derive their titles from ten disciples of Śaṅkara. The general name has been given to them from the *daṇḍa*, or staff, which every *Daṇḍin* carries, and which they are said to worship; the various sub-orders have different kinds of staves. Membership of the sect is confined to Brāhmans, and they are especially numerous in Benares. They wear salmon-coloured clothes, and beg only from the houses of Brāhmans. Initiation into the order is accompanied by a kind of baptism, with fasting; the sacred thread is also taken off at this time and burned, and together with the communication of the sacred *mantram*, and the new name of the sub-order to which the candidate is to belong, there is enforced upon him the observance of chastity and poverty. *Daṇḍins* avoid the use of fire, and bury their dead or cast them into a sacred stream § (see art. DAṆḌIN). Seven classes of *Sannyāsins* are enumerated by Oman, together with three which are said to belong more properly to the *Daṇḍin* orders. The list is as follows:—Giri, Puri, Bhārti, Ban, Auran (Aranya), Parvat, Sagar; Tirath, Ashram, Sarasvatī. Membership of the sect is open to all, without distinction of caste; twice-born men lay aside the thread, and all join at meals. They usually wear a necklace of *rudrāksha* berries, and some, in place of the ordinary salmon-coloured robes, carry the skin of a tiger. In their food, which they accept from any Hindu, they avoid meat and do not drink spirits, but are great smokers of *ganja* (*guñjā*), or hemp. At initiation the *guru* communicates to the novice his new name and the *mantram* of his order, and he is then expected to serve the *guru* for a time, receiving instruction from him. He has to bathe daily, and to perform daily worship with contemplation of the image of Śiva; he must not sleep on a couch or during the day-time, or converse with women, and must always go on foot, etc. At death the body is buried in a sitting posture, facing east or north-east, and no *śrāddha* ceremonies are performed, since he is supposed to have quitted this life when he entered the order* (see art. SANNYĀSIN).

The remaining sects are of less importance. *Brahmachārin*, the name given in the old literature to a student of the Veda during his period of pupilage in the first *āśrama*, has been appropriated to a subordinate class of ascetics, who are said usually to act as servants to *Sannyāsins* or *Paramahaṁsas* (see art. ĀŚRAMA). The *Paramahaṁsas* are the highest order, and have an *Upaniṣad* of their own, the *Paramahaṁsopaniṣad*. They lay claim to greater sanctity, and profess to observe stricter rules of conduct than others. Before admission to the rank of *Paramahaṁsa*, a probation of some years, usually not less than twelve, must be undergone. In token of absolute renunciation of the world, some observe a strict vow of silence, profess to abstain entirely from food, or dispense with all clothing. Some are unquestionably men of sincere piety, and devote themselves to study and good works. The *Paramahaṁsa* believes that he has already attained to union with the Divine, or rather has learned to know himself as identical with *Brahman*—a creed not conducive to humility or modesty. The title is said to be derived from a mythical bird, which possesses the faculty of separating water from milk; hence in a metaphorical sense is able to distinguish falsehood from truth. The word *haṁsa* ordinarily signifies a goose; so that the title was perhaps originally given to members of the sect in derision.†

The *Aghorins* or *Aghorapanthins* are *sādhus* who have acquired a strange and repulsive appetite for the flesh of corpses, and are said to steal dead bodies from the graveyards, and drag them from the rivers for purposes of food. There are probably few, if any, of these ascetics now left in India, but in times past they were more numerous, and their habits have been noted from a very early date. The home of the chief of the sect is said to be at Siddhapur, in North Kanara (see art. AGHORI).

Yogin is a general term for an ascetic who is endeavouring by restraint and discipline of the body to secure the union of the soul with the Supreme (see art. YOGA). Such ascetics are usually mystics and self-hypnotists, who claim to be possessed of miraculous powers, and in some instances undoubtedly perform marvellous feats. As a sect they trace their origin to Gorakhnāth, a

* J. C. Oman, *op. cit.* chs. iii. iv. and vi.; Monier Williams, *Indian Wisdom*[2], p. 104 ff.

† The list and details that follow are derived in the main from J. C. Oman's important work; see also separate articles. There are, of course, in India many men who live ascetic lives, but who are not Hindus, such as the Muhammadan faqirs in the north, and the wandering Jain monks (see artt. MUHAMMADANISM and JAINISM).

‡ See Oman, *op. cit.* p. 153.

§ Monier Williams, *op. cit.* p. 87.

* See J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], Eng. tr., Oxford, 1906, ch. xxxvi. p. 538 ff., and for an account of the initiation of a *sannyāsin*, *ib.* p. 523 ff.

† Monier Williams, *op. cit.* p. 87; Max Muller, *Ramakrishna*, London, 1905.

disciple of Mahendranāth, of whom little or nothing is known, even the period at which he lived being uncertain. *Yogins* worship Śiva, especially in the form of Bhairon or Bhairava (*q.v.*), the village god identified with Śiva, whose sacred animal is the dog; and they pay especial veneration to the nāths (*nātha*), or guardian spirits of the Himālayan peaks, and to the eighty-four *Siddhas*, or 'perfect' ones, whose practice of the *yoga* has reached perfection, some of whom are believed to be still living. They disregard caste, wear sacred rosaries of *rudrāksha* berries, and allow themselves the utmost freedom in the matter of food and drink. There are several sub-orders, as Kanphatas, Augars, distinguished by peculiarities of dress or ornamentation.*

The ascetic sects of the Vaiṣṇavites have perhaps hardly so much right to the name of ascetics. They are rather wandering monks, whose abstinence is displayed almost entirely in the matter of food and drink. Some of them practise the rules of *yoga*, and with few exceptions all refrain from partaking of flesh or spirits. Viṣṇu is worshipped by them under the form either of Rāma or of Kṛṣṇa, with whom they usually associate their wives Sītā or Rādhā. The list of the sects is as follows, omitting the adherents of Vallabhāchārya, whose principles are the reverse of ascetic:—

NAME.	REPUTED FOUNDER.
Śrī Vaiṣṇava.	Rāmānuja.
Rāmānandin.	Rāmānanda.
Mādhava.	Mādhavāchārya.
Chaitanyite.	Chaitanya.
Kabīr Panthin.	Kabīr.†

The *Śrī Vaiṣṇavas*, so called because they unite the worship of Śrī or Lakṣmī, the wife of Viṣnu, with that of Viṣnu himself, retain the sacred thread, wear reddish-coloured robes, and carry strings of *tulasī* beads or of the seeds of the lotus. In addition to the *tilaka*, or sect-mark, on the forehead, they are often stamped or branded on the body with sacred marks emblematic of the god or his wife. They are found chiefly in the south of India, where the great monasteries of the sect are established.‡

The *Rāmānandins* are followers of Rāmānanda, the disciple of Rāmānuja. His work lay rather in the north of India, and the various types of ascetics who belong to this order are numerous in most of the northern districts of the peninsula. The chief subdivision is that of the *Bairāgins* (*q.v.*) or *Vairāgins*—a title which indicates one who is free from worldly passion or desire, and is often applied generally to any Vaiṣṇavite mendicant or devotee. The *Vairāgins* proper disregard caste distinctions, though they wear the thread, eschew meat and spirits, and worship Hanuman, the monkey-god, as well as Rāma and his brothers, and Sītā, and they go through an elaborate daily routine of bathing, etc., including the practice of *yoga*; frequently also they are branded upon the arm with the sacred symbols of Viṣnu.§ Other sub-sects of Rāmānandins are Acharins, Khakins, Sannyāsins, the last-named being distinguishable from the Saivite ascetics of the name by the use of the sacred thread. They wear robes of different colours, and the Khakins at least usually dispense altogether with clothing. All Rāmānandins are pledged to vows of celibacy (see art. RAMANANDA, RĀMĀNANDIN).

The *Mādhavas*, or *Mādhvas*, are almost entirely confined to the south of India. They live celibate lives, and admit all castes to the order. Their one garment is orange-coloured, and on breast and arms they bear the marks of Viṣnu, and shave the head, in this last respect being distinguished from the true Vairāgins, who leave a small tuft of hair on the crown (see art. MĀDHVAS).

The *Chaitanyites* are in some respects the most liberal in thought, and in mode of life most free and unrestrained of all Vaiṣnavite ascetics. They admit into the order men and women from all, even the lowest, castes, and with few exceptions do not profess or practise celibacy. The sect is most widely spread in Bengal, of which district the founder was a native. They wear white, or sometimes yellow garments, abstain from meat and spirits, and carry the usual *tulasī* rosary and necklace. There are several subdivisions, the moral reputation of some of which does not stand high (see artt. BENGAL, CHAITANYA).

The *Kabīr Panthins* can hardly be said to affect asceticism in any real sense of the term. They wear no distinctive dress, carry the usual necklace and beads, and on their foreheads the distinctive mark of Viṣnu. The wandering monks of the order are numerous in northern and central India, and bear a high character for simplicity and purity of life.*

The remaining orders of *sādhus* have originated among the Sikhs. The three most important are known as *Akālin*, *Nirmālin*, and *Udāsin*. There are others less numerous and distinctive. In general the dress of the Sikh *sādhu* is more complete than that of the ascetics of other, or at least of Śaivite orders; and he bears less prominent and obtrusive marks of his ascetic profession. The *Akālins*, or *Nihangs*, are the militant monks of the Sikh faith. They dress in blue garments, and travel over the country fully armed, on horseback or riding on camels, and their requests for alms are said to be preferred with a tone and manner that secures instant compliance (see art. AKĀLIS). The *Nirmālins* are for the most part quiet and inoffensive students of the sacred books, whose only outward marks of their *sādhu* profession are their reddish-yellow garments and long hair (see art. NIRMĀLIN). The *Udāsins* dress in salmon-coloured robes, with a peculiar pointed cap, and a black cord round the neck; and, in addition to the water-pot, usually a gourd, carry a bag over the shoulder, and a small black mat or carpet, which they spread on the ground when they rest. Some Udāsins shave the head, while others allow the hair to grow; all avoid the use of meat or spirits, and do not smoke, and are pledged to poverty and continence† (see art. UDĀSIN).

There have also been at all times a few *sādhvīs*, or female ascetics, in India, who have emulated their more numerous male companions in their devotion and the rigour of their ascetic practices. The publicity, however, which the profession of sādhuism entails is an obstacle to its frequent adoption by Indian women, and any general observance by them of ascetic habits or vows would be opposed to the sentiments and prejudices of the Hindus themselves. *Sādhvīs* are usually widows, who have less to lose in the adoption of a roving life; and in most instances, though not always, are of low caste. It would seem also that generally, although again not without exceptions, the *sādhvī* is moved to enter upon this manner of life by the desire to cast in her lot with father or other male relative or friend; and solitude therefore rarely forms part of the voluntary penance which she undergoes. The case is recorded,

* Oman, *op. cit.* p. 184 ff. † *Ib.* p. 152.
‡ See G. A. Grierson in *JRAS*, 1903, p. 448 f., 1907, p. 317 ff., and art. RĀMĀNUJA.
§ Oman, *op. cit.* p. 188 ff.

* See G. A. Westcott, *Kabir and the Kabir Panth*, Cawnpore, 1907; G. A. Grierson, in *Bible in the World*, 1908, pp. 247 ff., 269 ff.; and art. KABĪR PANTHI.
† See Oman, *op. cit.* ch. viii.

however, of a Hindu widow of good family, who lived as a solitary recluse in an underground cell near Benares for thirty-eight years, devoting herself to study and the practice of *yoga*, reverenced by all the people, and receiving visitors from the great distances to which her fame had spread.*

Asceticism, and the habits and practices associated with it, have been adopted in several instances in India by Christian missionaries, with the purpose and hope of thereby commending their teaching to the people among whom their lives were spent. It is doubtful how far the attempt has ever been really successful. With the spirit that counselled and animated such resolutions, moving men to self-renunciation and the abandonment of all for the sake of duty, and to promote the unselfish end which they had in view, all will feel sympathy. In the regard of every Hindu also the ascetic ideal is a noble one, and the man who endeavours to put it into practice is worthy of all honour. It would seem, however, that the utmost sacrifice which it is in the power of a European, either by constitution or circumstances, to make cannot approach the abnegation or extreme rigour of self-mortification of the ordinary Indian *sādhu*; and therefore to the Indian his mode of living will probably appear to be a pale imitation, not wholly sincere, and immeasurably below the true ideal. It will excite his wonder, but in no degree move him to respect, while the motive that prompts the adoption of such a life will be entirely beyond his comprehension. There have been native Indians also, Christian *sādhus*, who have wandered through the country in ascetic garb, and followed the ascetic rule of preaching and teaching by the way. Their action, so far as it is possible to ascertain, has greatly increased and widened their influence for good, and has appeared entirely commendable to their fellow-countrymen.†

4. Religious and ethical value of 'tapas.'—There is probably no country in which asceticism has been so widely and constantly practised, or in which its ideals have been held in such high regard, as India. The injunctions of their sacred books, and the examples of their sages, have kept before the mind of the people the thought that renunciation of the world, with rejection of its pleasures and pursuits, is the supreme good. And although the motive of the abnegation and bodily self-mortification of the Indian *sādhu* was undoubtedly in the ultimate analysis selfish ‡—he abandoned the world that he might gain something better for himself—yet his life and action were an ever-present reminder to the people that the good of this world is not the good which is most worth having; and his example revived in them the longing, which the pressure of worldly cares and ambitions might well have deadened or crushed, for a higher experience of life than was suggested by the hard material facts of the present. The hand that pointed upwards and onwards might indeed be prompted by no generous or altruistic spirit. Nevertheless it did suggest and invite to upward striving. And there can hardly be any doubt that, in spite of its obvious drawbacks and limitations, sādhuism has been on the whole a good to India, and a force that has made for righteousness in the broadest use of the word.

That ideal commanded the assent and enthusiastic goodwill of the people at large. They were not blind to the defects and dangers of an ascetic life, the opportunities it afforded for imposture, the habits of idleness and the love of ease which it promoted. While, however, they jested at the *sādhu*, they respected his profession and wished themselves to be like him. It was his better qualities that they revered, and the ideal which he represented. His ignorances and littlenesses they tolerated or laughed at, while they allowed his claim to a holiness greater than any to which they, pre-occupied with mundane affairs, could aspire. That there were pretenders and impostors among the ever-moving crowd of ascetics, men to whom godliness was a way of gain, the keen instinct of the people always recognized. These, however, were not true *sādhus*, but were masquerading in a borrowed garb to which they had no right; and their presence hardly lessened the respect in which the profession was held, or weakened the influence which its better members wielded. It was and remained good that an ideal of purity, self-restraint, and indifference to pleasure and wealth should be constantly exhibited in concrete form before the eyes of the people.

On the other hand, the existence of so large a number of able-bodied men, living in idleness, cannot have been other, to our Western modes of thinking at least, than a burden to the commonwealth. No *sādhu* ever did any work. He passed his time in the most complete and absolute idleness, as far as the labour of the hands was concerned; and from a social or communistic point of view, his life was entirely unproductive. It must be remembered, however, that the burden was very widely distributed, from Cape Comorin to the utmost Himālayas; and that in any given case the demand made by the individual *sādhu* upon the people among whom he sojourned was very slight. The burden was probably little felt, much less than would have been the case in the more artificial and closer-knit States of the West. It is true, nevertheless, that, on the premisses of Western logic and argument, the loss of the remunerative labour of so great an army of potential workers cannot have been other than hurtful to the general prosperity of the land.

Sādhuism also, both by its principles and by its practice, struck a heavy blow at the spirit of caste. To the true *sādhu* all things were indifferent, and therefore the distinctions and jealousies of caste were nothing to him. Most of the orders acted up to this belief, although a few refused admission to membership to any but Brāhmans, and declined to receive food from men of a lower caste. Their influence, therefore, on the whole was democratic and levelling; they stood for brotherhood and equality as against caste assumption and pride. And mingling with the people as they did on their incessant journeyings, the conceptions and theories which they thus represented, though they never availed to break the Brāhman yoke, must have struck deep root, and given rise to many searchings of heart.

There is, however, at the present day a new spirit brooding over the land, inimical to sādhuism and the ideals which it represents and fosters. Western activities, and the conceptions of duty and aim which the West has introduced, and which are acting as a strong ferment in the life and society of India, must in the long run be fatal to the ascetic, to the world-renouncing spirit. English education, if there were nothing else, and the strenuous life which it inculcates, will render impossible the meditative existence of the *sādhu*—the man who in the world is not of it. The end is not yet; for perhaps a considerable time to come the professed ascetic in India will perform his pilgrimages by rail, will utilize the electric light and the other appliances and conveniences of

* Oman, *op. cit.* p. 244 ff.

† For a recent example of Indian Christian *sādhus*, see *Harvest Field*, 1906, p. 300 *f.*

‡ Cf. Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 364 *f.*; the worth of *tapas* to the Indian was primarily its worth to himself; the external results, its worth for others, were of comparatively little account.

civilization, and will remain what he is, unmoved and unchanged. Eventually, however, and inevitably the forces of the new era will be too strong for him. It is hardly possible that the *sādhu* should accommodate himself to an age that prizes merchandise and gold above all. He must vanish before the pressure of modern forces and strange ideas. But with him will go one of the most picturesque if not the most lovable figures that Indian history or life has to show. And it is permissible to doubt whether the new spirit and influence that is driving him from the world's stage will be on the whole more conducive to India's real welfare and happiness than his has been throughout the long centuries.

LITERATURE.—The more important works have been quoted in the course of the article. The most complete description in English of ascetics and their manner of life is to be found in J. C. Oman, *Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, Lond. 1903, and the same author's *Cults, Customs, and Superstitions of India*[2], Lond. 1908, pt. i. ch. 1, and pt. iii. ch. 4. E. S. Oakley, *Holy Himālaya*, Lond. 1905, describes the sacred places of pilgrimage in Kumāun and Garhwāl; and an interesting description of a visit to the *sādhus* of Rishi Kesh is given by T. L. Pennell in *Church Miss. Intelligencer*, 1905, p. 597 ff. Add F. Max Müller, *Rāmakrishna, His Life and Sayings*, new impression, Lond. 1905; Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], Lond. 1891, with a portrait and description of a high-caste Brāhman *sannyāsin*, formerly prime minister of Bhaunagar, and a C.S.I.; W. Crooke, *PR*, Lond. 1896; J. Jolly, 'Recht und Sitte' in *GIAP*, Strassburg, 1896, p. 150 f.; P. Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Eng. tr., Edin. 1906, pp. 65 ff., 378 ff., *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, i. 3, Leipzig, 1908, and *Das Yogasystem*, p. 543 ff., cf. pp. 94 f., 98 f.; artt. ĀŚRAMA, YOGA.

A. S. GEDEN.

ASCETICISM (Japanese). — The asceticism found in Japan after the introduction of Buddhism is only a foreign importation with which we are not concerned here (see ASCETICISM [Buddhist]). What we must give our attention to is the only original form of Japanese asceticism, that is to say, the asceticism of primitive Shinto as it is met with in the most ancient documents.

A Chinese traveller, describing the Japanese of the early centuries of our era, mentions this interesting custom: 'They appoint a man whom they call an "abstainer." He is not allowed to comb his hair, to wash, to eat flesh, or to approach women. When they are fortunate, they make him presents; but if they are ill or meet with disaster, they set it down to the abstainer's failure to keep his vows, and unite to put him to death' (W. G. Aston, 'Early Japanese History,' in the *TASJ* vol. xvi. pt. 1, p. 55). All the features of this description—carelessness with regard to the cleanliness of the hair and the body, abstinence from certain foods, and continence—correspond exactly with what we know of the usual condition of the 'god-men' who are found among so many primitive peoples, and who, when illness or any other calamity occurs, are held to be responsible, and are deposed, punished, or killed (see J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], *passim*). Analogous conceptions are also known to exist in China, where the Emperor is held responsible for drought; and in Korea, where, in the event of a bad harvest, the ancient kings were deposed or put to death.

If we turn now to the most ancient Japanese book, the *Kojiki* (A.D. 712), we shall not find this primitive custom mentioned; but we may see there at least an idea of abstinence which appears to be the continuation of it. This idea is expressed by the word *imi*, the root of the verb *imu*, which, in its original meaning, signifies 'to shun.' In one passage the reference is to a sacred weaving-hall (*imi-hataya*), where the Sun-goddess presides at the making of the garments of the gods. Here *imi* has only the secondary sense of 'sacred,' which, however, is closely related to its original meaning. In another passage we have an account of the mythical origin of the *Imibe no obito*, that is to say, the chiefs of the *Imibe* (or *Imbe*), a hereditary corporation of abstaining priests, who claimed descent from the god Futo-dama ('Great Jewel' or, rather, 'Great Gift,' 'Great Offering'). Again, in a third passage, relative to the troubles which followed the death of the first legendary Emperor, Jimmu, we are told that one of his sons, renouncing his claim to the succession, became an 'abstainer' (see *Kojiki*, ed. with notes by Motoöri, 1789–1822, vols. 8, 15, 20; or the Eng. tr. by B. H. Chamberlain, sec. 15, 33, 53, pp. 62, 134, 186 of the re-issue of 1906).

The *Nihongi*, which appeared only eight years later, that is, in A.D. 720, contains passages corresponding to the first two passages of the *Kojiki*; but, under the influence of Chinese ideas, it substitutes for the 'abstainer' of the third passage a single priest 'of the gods of Heaven and Earth' (*Nihongi*, ed. Shukai, vols. 1 and 4, or the Eng. tr. by W. G. Aston, 1896, pp. 41, 42–47, 140).

We shall now examine the documents relating to worship, especially the old rituals in which the *Imibe* appear (*Engishiki*, A.D. 927, ed. Dehabon, vol. 8, *norito* 1, 8, 14), to see more clearly what their 'abstinence' consisted in. The special function of the *Imibe* was to prepare the offerings for the gods, 'avoiding' all impurity in doing so. This is what is given in exact terms in the last lines of the first ritual, relating to the *Toshigohi no matsuri*, or 'Festival for the Harvest,' celebrated at the time of sowing, and also at the end of the fourteenth ritual, recited at the *Ohonihe no matsuri*, or 'Festival of the Great Offering of Food,' which was a festival of first-fruits (*Nihi-name*, 'New-tasting'), more solemn, and celebrated only at the accession of the Emperors. On the other hand, in the eighth ritual, concerning the festival of the *Ohotono Hogahi*, or 'Luck-wishing of the Great Palace,' we are told that it was the *Imibe* who, with a sacred (*imi*) axe, set to work on the wood destined for the construction of this palace, and who, with a sacred (*imi*) mattock, dug out its foundations. On this occasion they also prepared the offerings, brought the Imperial insignia into the great hall, hung up the magic stones in various places (the audience-hall, the Emperor's bathroom and privy), and in conclusion pronounced the ritual. The recitation of the ritual (No. 9) for the *Mikado matsuri*, or 'Festival of the Sublime Gates,' was also entrusted to them. In short, the main idea underlying these various functions is that of material purity, which the *Imibe* had to ensure by avoiding with great care everything that might cause defilement.

Apart from the *Imibe*, abstinence was practised also by certain people and on certain occasions. As a general custom, to prepare himself for a religious festival, the officiating priest had to remain indoors (*i-gomori*), to avoid speaking and making a noise, to eat no food except that cooked on a pure fire (*imu-bi*), in short, to contrive to escape every possible cause of uncleanness. The duration of this abstinence varied, too, with the importance of the festivals: a month for festivals of the first class, three days for festivals of the second class, and one day for festivals of the third class. During the month preceding the *Ohonihe*, the most important festival of ancient Shinto, a lesser abstinence (*ara-imi*) was observed, and during the last three days a greater abstinence (*ma-imi*). The Emperor himself, having to take part personally in the ceremony, had to conform to this rule. When the Emperor Yuriaku desired to see the god of Mount Mimoro without having practised abstinence previous to presenting himself before him, he was confronted by the apparition of a dreadful serpent, which made him rush, terror-stricken, into the interior of his palace for

safety (*Nihongi*, which assigns the event to A.D. 463). Certain categories of priests had to observe special forms of abstinence. Some lower priests, the *Negi* (from *negafu*, 'to pray'), were called *imi-bi* in some old provinces, because of the particular care which they had to take to avoid all uncleanness with respect to fire. Similarly, the priestesses had to be virgins. This rule of continence was limited, however, to the time of their priesthood, and did not prevent their marrying afterwards. The *Saiwō*, a princess of the Imperial blood consecrated to the worship of the Sun-goddess, prepared herself for this office for a long time before. For three years, on the first day of each month, she had to repair to a sacred hall (*imi-dono*), where she worshipped towards the great temple of Ise. This was the 'three years' abstinence' (*mi-tose no mono-imi*). The *Kamu no Ko*, or 'god-children,' young daughters of the nobility attached to the principal temples to perform there the sacred dance (*kagura*), and to cook the food for the offerings, were called also *mono-imi*, that is to say, 'abstainers from things' ('impure' being understood). Lastly, from a passage of the *Hitachi Fudoki* we gather that a domestic *Nihiname* existed apart from the official festival, and that on this occasion abstinence was observed by all the family. But in every case abstinence was associated with the idea of ritual purity. The important thing was to avoid impurities (*tsumi*) of every kind, that is to say, everything that might be displeasing to the gods, *e.g.* uncleanness (to begin with personal cleanliness: no one could take part in a religious ceremony without first having washed and put on clean clothes), crimes condemned from the ritualistic point of view (*e.g.* incest), and lastly, calamities (such as the bite of serpents), because these were then regarded as a Divine punishment for some unknown offence. But, on the other hand, certain things forbidden to the ascetics of the primitive period, such as eating meat, were not considered to be contrary to this Shinto conception of abstinence.

The psychological evolution of Japanese asceticism can be clearly followed in this series of documents taken in their chronological order. In the first centuries of the Christian era we have the asceticism of primitive peoples, characterized chiefly by its strict abstinence and continence, and by carelessness with regard to personal cleanliness. In the 8th cent. we can scarcely discover any trace of an ascetic properly so called (cf. the passage from *Kojiki* which the *Nihongi* thought it necessary to correct). On the other hand, there is mentioned as a hereditary priesthood, already well established, this corporate body of the *Imibe* which we see afterwards in operation in the *Engishiki* in the 10th cent., and which represents the most typical case of the abstinence practised also by many other people in all circumstances connected with religious rites. But, under this new form which so quickly succeeded the preceding one, Japanese asceticism no longer demanded abstinence properly so called, or even continence, except as an immediate preparation for certain festivals or as a temporary condition for certain functions; and, above all, far from regarding filth as a virtue, it required absolute cleanliness. Thus the idea of religious purity had undergone a complete transformation; and, in conformity with this instinct for cleanness which already manifested itself as one of the distinctive features of the national character, physical cleanliness became itself the condition of moral and ritualistic purity.

MICHEL REVON.

ASCETICISM (Jewish).—1. Pre-exilic customs.—Jewish piety, consisting originally of faith and trust in a covenant God, found no room for asceticism as a self-imposed discipline of the soul. Indeed, the terms of the bi-lateral covenant between Jahweh and Israel rendered asceticism impossible. For, according to the solemn transaction on Sinai, Israel became Jahweh's own people in a special manner, pledged henceforth to acknowledge Jahweh as their only God, and to obey His will as revealed to them by Divinely-inspired legislators and prophets. Jahweh in return solemnly promised to remain Israel's God. Moderate prosperity was therefore regarded as His smile on His land and people. In the midst of opulence it was possible 'to walk with Jahweh.' No mortification of the flesh or renunciation of the world was necessary to arrive at the highest stage of Jahweh-pleasing holiness. And so we find that pre-exilic customs and laws were adverse to asceticism, *e.g.* mutilation of the body was forbidden (Lv 19^{28}, Dt 14^{1} 23^{1}), fasting was only an accompaniment of prayer and confession of sin, and was therefore an act of humiliation before God, and not a self-inflicted chastisement, and, except on the Day of Atonement, was left to the free will of the faithful (1 S 7^{6}, Ps 35^{13}, Dn 9^{3}, Ezr 8^{23}, Jer 36^{9}).

2. Post-exilic legalism.—The re-organization of the community after the Exile laid the foundation of that rigid, torpid legalism from which Judaism has not yet recovered. The leaders of the nation, in their efforts to re-establish the theocracy and to guard it against internal and external foes, had recourse to the rigour of the Mosaic Law. They had already learned in Babylon that by attachment to ancestral customs they could remain the people of Jahweh outside Palestine and without a sacrificial cult. On their return, the miserable condition of the nation and the scanty materials at their disposal for re-building the State rendered adherence to the Law their only weapon in the struggle for self-preservation. The theocracy was gradually being converted into a nomocracy. 'Let it be done according to the law' (Ezr 10^{3}) became henceforth the norm of Judaism. No longer the prophet with fresh messages from Jahweh, but the expounder of the Law became the spiritual guide. Fresh cases for which the Law had made no provision were decided by an artificial deduction from the written, or by an appeal to the traditions or unwritten Law. If the name 'Pharisee' as the designation of a party sprang up after the Maccabæan rising, the spirit of Pharisaism or Nomism came with the exiles from Babylon. 'The law was forgotten in Israel, and Ezra restored it' (*Sukka*, 20*a*). Even five centuries later, Hillel, the great doctor of the Law, was called 'disciple of Ezra' (*Tos. Sot.* 13). Thus the State became a Church, and religion equivalent to legalism, according to which a man's acceptance with God depended on a considerable balance of good works over his failings. 'Know also,' says *Pirqe Aboth* (iv. 29), 'that everything is according to reckoning.' 'Weigh thou therefore our wickedness now in the balance, and theirs also that dwell in the world, and so shall thy name no where be found but in Israel' (2 Es 3^{34}; cf. also *Siphrā* to Lv 26^{9}). Piety was equivalent to a life of righteousness, but such righteousness as God acknowledged and demanded in the Law.

3. Ḥasidism.—The early enthusiasts of Nomism and forerunners of the Pharisees were the Ḥasidim. They were neither a sect nor a political party, as might appear from 1 Mac 2^{42}, but only the pious in the land, of whom frequent mention is made in the Psalms (cf. *JE* vi. 250 f.). They were the successors of those coadjutors of Ezra who endeavoured to fulfil the Law in all its bearings. With that they combined austerity of life and a contempt for earthly possessions (cf. Enoch $108^{8f.}$). They were expected to be more self-denying than God-fearing

men (*Shab.* 120*a*). Theirs was the highest degree of piety (*Rosh hash.* 17). 'Zeal leads to innocence, innocence to purity, purity to Pharisaism, Pharisaism to holiness, holiness to humility, humility to sin-fearing, sin-fearing to Ḥasidism, Ḥasidism to the gift of the Holy Spirit,' etc. (*Soṭa* ix. 15). Their excess of piety was so great that their practice could not be quoted to prove a doubtful halakha (*Men.* 41*a*). Only those were admitted into their circle who were learned (*Pirqe Aboth* ii. 6), and whose youth had never been defiled by sin (*Suk.* 53*a*; see also *B. ḳama*, 103*b*). Most praiseworthy was their cultivation of an even temperament, a forgiving spirit, generosity in money transactions, and almsgiving (*Pirqe Aboth* v. 10, 11, 14). Their devotions were preceded and succeeded by an hour's meditation, and accordingly they spent nine hours a day in spiritual exercises (*Bᵉrākh.* 32*b*). In order to sacrifice the more, they occasionally took the Nazirite vow (*Ned.* 10*a*). It was probably due to their excessive fasting that they mostly died of enteric diseases, from which they suffered ten or twenty days before their death (*Sᵉmāḥ.* iii. 9; *Gen. Rab.* 62).

Since, however, the object of the Ḥasidim was not mortification of the flesh but nomism, their asceticism did not exclude such indulgences as were permitted by the Law. Hence they never eschewed marriage, although even in the married state they imposed restrictions on themselves (*Nid.* 38*a*). Unlike the Essenes, they did not live in separate communities, and therefore it is incorrect to describe them as an *ecclesiola in ecclesia*. Ḥasidism merged not into Essenism but into Pharisaism and Rabbinism. Pharisees are mentioned first in the time of Jonathan (Jos. *Ant.* XIII. v. 9). Henceforth a Ḥasid was only an exaggerated Pharisee. Most of the Rabbis who were eminent for piety bore the title Ḥasid.

4. Pharisaism and Rabbinism.—Although the Pharisees were as rigorous in their opposition to Greek hedonism as were the Ḥasidim, in their life and teaching they modified the austere views of the latter, and showed less tendency to asceticism. Starting from the principle that right and wrong were defined by the Law, and that the choice of either was in one's own power (cf., besides Josephus, *Pirqe Aboth* iii. 19), they had no inducement to inquire further into the origin of evil, or to trace any connexion between cosmic and individual evil. God created the evil inclination (יצר הרע), and God created the Law as antidote (*Ḳid.* 30ᵇ). As long as the faithful were occupied with the study of the Law and with the performance of works of mercy, they had the power over their own evil inclination (*'Abōdā zārā*, 5*b*). Perfection could be aimed at by a punctilious attendance to the positive and negative precepts of the Law, without the suppression of the natural feelings. A legalist could therefore indulge in all those pleasures of life of which the Law took no cognizance, provided that indulgence did not interfere with Israel's separation (cf. also *Jeb.* 20*a*, 'Hallow thyself also in lawful matters'). The body was accordingly considered sacred, having been created in God's image (*Lev. R.* 34). Self-inflicted injuries were forbidden (*B. ḳam.* 91*b*).

No scribe might live in a town which did not possess, among other sanitary requisites, a bath, a barber, and a physician (*Sanh.* 17*b*). When health required, one might sell one's shoes for food; and he who stinted himself was threatened with retribution by Providence (*Shab.* 129*a*). To save life, even the life of a newborn infant, all laws except those relating to idolatry, incest, and murder might be suspended (*Joma*, 82*a*) and the Sabbath profaned (*Shab.* 128*b*; cf. also Mekh. *Ki This*, 1, 'The Sabbath is delivered unto you, not you unto the Sabbath'). A hungry invalid might be dieted on ceremonially unclean food. The wine-cup hallowed the Sabbath and great festivals, and was not missing from the social board. 'He who abstains from wine is a sinner' (*Ta'an.* 11*a*). Rab went so far as to say that in the great Judgment Day man would have to give an account for every lawful pleasure he refused (Jer. *Ḳid.* iv.). The same Rabbi on another occasion said, '*Beati possidentes* אם יש לך הימב לך, for there are no pleasures in Sheol, and death knows no delay' (*Erub.* 54*a*).

Nevertheless, moderation and contentment were among the cardinal virtues of Judaism. 'A rich man is he who is contented with his lot' (*Ab.* iv. 1). 'Man must be taught not to be a glutton' (*B. mez.* vii. 5). From Dt 14^{26} the Rabbis curiously deduce that one may not eat meat unless he has a special appetite for it (*Ḥul.* 84*a*). 'Abstain from evil, and from every appearance of evil' (*Ḥul.* 44*b*). Marriage was raised by the Rabbis to a positive precept, based on Gn I and Is 45^{18}. There are a few isolated passages in pre-Talmudic writings which seem to attach greater sanctity to the virgin and celibate state than to wedded life (see 2 Es 16^{44}, Wis 3^{13}, Sibyll. ii. 48, Test. Issachar 2). Enoch (83^2) received his revelation before his marriage (cf. also To 8^7, Jth 8^4 $9^{4,9}$ 16^{23}, Lk 2^{36}, Mt 19^{12}). But this was not in accordance with the teaching and practice of the Rabbis, to whom marriage was both a legal duty and a safeguard against sin (*Jeb.* 63*b*, *Kᵉth.* 61*b*). Nowhere in the Rabbinic literature is abstinence from marriage recommended as a help to piety.

Great merit was attached to fasting. The fact that an official calendar, the *Mᵉgillath ta'anīth*, was published, which prohibits fasting on certain days, shows the prevalence of private fasting at the time of the Christian era. The bi-weekly fast, supposed to have been instituted by Ezra, which is mentioned in Lk 18^{12} and in the *Didachè*, is still observed in the East by extremely devout Jews. But the ethical value of public and private fasting consisted in its sacrificial nature and in its being the outward expression of penitence; it was not regarded as a stage on the path to perfection.

The destruction of Jerusalem by Titus led many Jews to adopt ascetic practices. Some abstained from meat and wine because of the cessation of sacrifices and libations. But Joshua b. Ḥananiah argued that for similar reasons they should abstain from bread, water, and fruits, for these also were elements offered on the altar (*Baba bathra*, 60*b*).

There are, indeed, instances of Rabbis who led ascetic lives. Thus R. Zadok is said to have fasted forty years to avert the destruction of the Temple, and he was so emaciated that, at the request of R. Jochanan, Vespasian allowed him to be treated by a physician (*Giṭ.* 56*b*, *Lam. R.* i. 5) His contemporary Ḥanina b. Dosa, the thaumaturgos, subsisted only on a kab of locust beans from week's end to week's end (*Bᵉrākh.* 18). Nor were R. Ze'era and Simeon b. Jochai, though abstinent, ascetics in the true sense of the word. Asceticism was not suited to the Jewish temper. Although trials and chastisements (יסורין) were regarded as Divinely ordered for expiatory reasons and with promises of compensation, they were not willingly sought after. Both R. Ḥiya bar Abba and R. Jochanan, when asked whether trials were welcome to them, are recorded to have replied, 'No, I will have neither them nor their reward' (*Bᵉrākh.* 5*b*). The principle of Rabbinism was, 'The disciples of Abraham our father enjoy this world, and are heirs of the world to come' (*Ab.* v. 22).

5. Alexandrianism.—While Palestinian Judaism was being developed into a forensic science, that of the Greek diaspora, notably in Alexandria, assumed the appearance of a philosophical system. There

were several agencies at work to produce this effect. The inability to fulfil every precept of the Mosaic Law on foreign soil must have been the first inducement to spiritualize the Law. The Stoa further supplied them with the allegoric method, and the Greek language with a metaphysical terminology. As early as pseudo-Aristeas the Jewish delegates to Ptolemy IV. are called philosophers (Kautzsch, *Apok.* ii. 21). According to the fragments of Aristobulus, the most prominent Greek philosophers and poets derived their knowledge from Moses, who was the inspiration and source of all philosophy. One of the fundamental principles of this religious philosophy was the pessimistic dichotomy of man which led to asceticism. 'The corruptible body,' says the Book of Wisdom, 'presseth down the soul, and the earthy tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things' (9[15]). But it is Philo who is the prophet of Alexandrianism. According to him, man's highest aim is a mystic union with the Deity, attained through asceticism and flight from the world, the former as a means of liberating the spirit from the trammels of the flesh, the latter as a safeguard against a relapse into the sensual (*de Præm. et Pœn.* ii. 411). The patriarchs were accordingly ascetics and hermits. Enoch was removed from sinful surroundings (*de Abr.* iii. 352). Abraham's call was accompanied with the command to depart from temptations of the flesh (*de Mig. Abr.* i. 437). Jacob was the true ascetic who wrestled until he obtained a vision of God (*de Som.* i. 643). But the greatest ascetic was Moses, whom self-discipline and continence qualified for the gift of prophecy, and raised to the nearest approach to God (*Vita Mos.* ii. 145 ff.). Alexandrianism left no impression on Palestinian Judaism, though some of the Philonic *Midrash* found its way into the Rabbinic *Haggada*. The *hokhmath Jevanith*, or Greek philosophy, had no attraction for the Rabbis. The works of Philo would have perished if they had not been preserved by Christians. The first Jew who mentions Philo is A. dei Rossi (1573).

6. Essenism.—The asceticism of the Essenes, as seen in the short accounts of them by Josephus, Philo, and Pliny, is so strange that we doubt whether the Essenes and their practices have any claim to be called Jewish. Even the origin of the sect is obscure. Since no satisfactory derivation of the name exists, we hazard the suggestion that Ἐσσαῖοι is an ethnic term=*Esauites*, or Idumæans, or at least a clan of Idumæa.* This would coincide with Pliny's account of their chief settlement on the western shores of the Dead Sea, and would also account for Herod's partiality for them, and for the presence of an Essene in his court. Their rejection of animal sacrifice removes them considerably from Palestinian Judaism, in which the sacrificial cult is everything. Their other tenets are so non-Jewish that the conviction is inevitable that the sect was of exotic origin, though on Jewish borderland; that in its gradual development it received accretions from Pythagoreanism, and finally from Alexandrianism; that to replenish its ranks it carried on a propaganda in Palestine and Syria where the soil was ripe for anti-hedonic movements; and that those Jews who joined the order, and among them chiefly Ḥasidim and Pharisees, would adopt only those practices of the Essenes which were not inconsistent with the State religion. Thus Onias ha-Meʿaggel, who is supposed to have been an Essene (*Taʿan.* 19 and *ib. Tos.* ii. 11), was a married man and offered sacrifices (*Taʿan.* 23). Josi b. Joezer the priest, another reputed Essene, was a wealthy man (*Baba bathra*, 133). The number of adherents, however, could not have been very considerable. The name 'Essene' is not mentioned in the NT. In the Talmud the allusions to them are scanty and doubtful, and under the appellations of *Vathikin* ('firm'), *Zenuim* ('modest'), *Ḥashaim* ('silent,' 'mysterious'), *Bannaim* ('builders'), and *Toblē Shaḥrith* ('morning bathers'). Perhaps the *Anshe Maʿaseh* ('men of work'), who are mentioned on a par with the Ḥasidim (*Sukka*, 51; *Soṭa* ix. 15), were Essene ascetics, *maʿaseh* being pure Hebrew for *ʿesek* (=ἄσκησις), 'work,' 'occupation.'

* For other etymologies cf. Kohler, *JE* v. 224.

7. Modern Judaism. — The teaching of the Talmud is codified in the *Ṭurim* and *Shulḥān ʿArukh*, which is still binding on Judaism. We look in vain for traces of asceticism in that code.

The Jewish devotional literature of the Middle Ages shows indeed a tendency to asceticism. Foremost among these is Baḥya's *Ḥoboth ha-Lebaboth* ('Duties of the Heart'), which is a Hebrew translation from the original Arabic made by Ibn Tibbon (1161–1180), and is as popular among orthodox Jews as Thomas à Kempis' *Imitation* among Christians. So are the *Shaʿare Teshubah* ('Gates of Repentance') and *Sepher ha-Yirah* ('the Book of Fear'), by Jonah Geronoli († 1263). But this is due mainly to the influence of Græco-Arabic philosophy (see Brüll, *Jahrb.* v. and vi. 71–93). Maimonides' views are more in accordance with the Jewish spirit. In his *Mishne Torah, Deʿoth* iii. 1 and vi. 1, he points out that asceticism is not only unnecessary but even sinful. Judah Halevi, another prominent philosopher, in the *Kuzari* (iii. 1 and 4), states: 'The prevalent custom among us is not to separate oneself from the world, nor to despise life . . . but to love the world and length of life.'

On the asceticism of the Kabbalists and Kabbalistic Ḥasidim see KABBALISM, ḤASIDISM, also ESSENES, KARAITES, PHARISEES, and SECTS (Jewish).

LITERATURE.—M. Lazarus, *Ethics of Judaism* (Eng. tr., Philadelphia, 1900), §§ 246–256; *JE* ii 165–169; Bousset, *Rel. d. Judent.*[2] 1906, pp. 470–539; Koeberle, *Sunde u. Gnade*, 1905, pp. 459–571; M. Friedlander, *Rel. Beweg.* 1905, pp. 237–264; Schurer, *GJV* (index). A. E. SUFFRIN.

ASCETICISM (Muslim).—The very copious materials which are available in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish literature for the study of Muslim asceticism have hitherto received little attention from European scholars, and much remains to be done before it will be possible to give an adequate survey of the subject. This article can only attempt to sketch the main lines of development, and to illustrate the salient features of each.

1. Introduction: the teaching of Muhammad.
2. Early Muslim and Ṣūfi asceticism.
3. Development of Ṣūfi asceticism in the Middle Ages.
   (*a*) Monastic institutions.
   (*b*) Ascetic systems.
4. Philosophical asceticism.
5. Conclusion: the Dervish orders.

1. Introduction: the teaching of Muhammad.—The religious ideas of the pagan Arabs were vague and scanty. Engrossed in the toils and pleasures of the present life, they seldom thought of the future, and the notion of preparing themselves for a shadowy existence beyond the grave never entered their minds. It was Christianity, not ecclesiastical, but of an irregular and unorthodox type, that sowed the first seeds of asceticism in Arabia before the advent of Muhammad, and continued to exert a dominating influence upon its development in the Muslim empire during the early centuries. In pre-Islāmic times Christianity was diffused among the tribes of North Arabia, and many Arabs had at least a superficial knowledge of its rites and doctrines (Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], 230 ff.). Allusions in the ancient poetry show that the Bedawin were impressed by the Christian monk (*rāhib*), whose lamp, burning in his lonely

cell, was a welcome sight to travellers in the darkness of the desert. These monks, together with occasional wandering hermits, offered to the heathen Arabs a model of ascetic life, and inspired certain individuals, known as *ḥanīfs*, to reject idolatry, profess monotheism, and even adopt ascetic practices, such as the wearing of sackcloth and the abstention from particular kinds of food. There can be little doubt that the *ḥanīfs* stimulated Muhammad, with whom most of them were contemporary; two, in fact, were connected with him by blood or marriage (cf. Sir Charles Lyall, 'The words "Ḥanīf" and "Muslim,"' in *JRAS*, 1903, p. 771 ff.). The influence of Christianity may serve to explain ascetic tendencies which appeared in the oldest form of Islām—*e.g.* Muhammad and his first converts used frequently to watch and pray through the night—but which were gradually mitigated (Wellhausen, *Reste*², 241). Asceticism is characteristic neither of Islām nor of its founder. The Prophet himself enjoyed all pleasures within his reach, and commanded his followers not to abstain from the good things which God allowed them (*Qur'ān*, v. 89). It is true that he imposed on them some restrictions and obligations of an ascetic nature—the fast during Ramaḍān, abstinence from intoxicating drinks, the five daily prayers, the pilgrimage to Mecca, etc.—but these only threw into stronger relief the social, active, and aggressive spirit of Islām as contrasted with monastic quietism and renunciation. Apart from general exhortations to recognize the vanity of earthly joys, and to put trust in good works rather than in the gifts of fortune, the Qur'ān contains few passages that can fairly be interpreted in a specifically ascetic sense. *Fasting* is enjoined as a penance for certain ritual and legal offences (*Qur.* ii. 192, 257, iv. 94, v. 91, lviii. 5); *penitence*, when accompanied by faith and pious works, turns evil into good (xxv. 70); *prayer* restrains a man from committing sin (xxix. 44); the doctrine of *self-purification*, especially by means of almsgiving (*zakāt*), is preached in Sūras of the Meccan period: 'He that purifies himself (*tazakkā*) hath attained felicity' (lxxxvii. 14; cf. Grimme, *Mohammed*, 1904, pt. ii. p. 113). The root ZHD ('to renounce'), from which is derived *zuhd*, the ordinary word for Muslim asceticism, occurs in the Qur'ān only once, and is applied reproachfully to those who sold Joseph for a low price (xii. 20); but an older term, *tabattul* ('detachment from the world'), is found (lxxiii. 8) among Divinely ordained acts of devotion. Another ancient epithet of ascetics is *sā'iḥūn*, fem. *sā'iḥāt* (literally, 'wanderers'); these are mentioned honourably (ix. 113, lxvi. 5). It need scarcely be said that Muhammadan writers on asceticism interpret the Qur'ān in the light of their own theories, and import a technical meaning into many words, *e.g. dhikr* and *tawakkul*, which the Prophet used in the obvious signification.

2. Early Muslim and Ṣūfī asceticism.—According to the Qur'ān (lvii. 27), monasticism (*rahbāniya*) was an innovation in Christianity itself, and Muhammad in a famous sentence declared that it was no part of Islām. Nevertheless, some instances of a tendency in this direction are recorded by early Muslim tradition (see Goldziher, 'De l'Ascétisme aux premiers temps de l'Islam,' in *RHR*, vol. xxxvii. p. 314 ff.), which invariably represents Muhammad as condemning such acts of penance and mortification, whereas at a later time, when asceticism was firmly established in Islām, and had to be reconciled with the Prophet's teaching, he is constantly cited as an authority for similar practices. Goldziher has collected several examples of persons contemporary with Muhammad, or nearly so, who did penance for their sins. Thus Bahlūl b. Dhu'aib retired into the mountains in the neighbourhood of Medīna, clad himself in haircloth, and tied his hands behind his back with iron chains, crying repeatedly: 'O my God and my Lord! see Bahlūl, bound and shackled, confessing his sins.' Abū Lubāba, in remorse for an act of treachery (Ibn Hishām, 686), fastened himself to a pillar in the mosque at Medīna, and remained in that position until he was assured that God had pardoned him. Other forms of penance were associated with the pilgrimage to Mecca. It was not unusual for pilgrims to go on foot and without shoes, or, while circumambulating the Ka'ba, to let themselves be led like a camel by means of a ring which was inserted in the nose (cf. Goldziher, in *Vienna Oriental Journal*, vol. xiii. p. 36, n. 3). We hear of pilgrims who had taken a vow of silence; this was denounced as a heathen custom by the khalīf Abū Bakr.

The first century of Islām was singularly favourable to the growth of asceticism. The long and bloody civil wars, the fierce fanaticism of the political sects, the rapidly increasing laxity of morals, the spectacle of a military despotism enforcing its will upon devout Muslims, and openly rejecting every principle of the ideal theocracy which they wished to restore—all these circumstances contributed to excite in men's minds a disgust of earthly affairs, and fix their thoughts on the world to come. Hence arose a powerful and wide-spread ascetic movement, originally orthodox in character, but gradually developing mystical tendencies, and passing almost imperceptibly into the oldest form of Sūfiism. During the Umayyad period (A.D. 661–750) this movement continued to bear a distinctly orthodox stamp, and derived its leaders, if not its chief strength, from the Pietists, including Qur'ān-reciters (*qurrā*), students of the *ḥadīth*, and learned divines. Its most prominent representative was the famous theologian Ḥasan of Baṣra (ob. 728 A.D.), who may be regarded as the founder of the Baṣrite school of ascetics and mystics (cf. *Qūt al-qulūb*, Cairo, 1310 A.H., i. 129 and 166). His sayings, and those of the early Muslims in general, leave no doubt that the mainsprings of their asceticism were (1) the intense terror produced by the vivid descriptions in the Qur'ān of the Day of Judgment and the tortures of Hell, and (2) a morbid consciousness of sin, which impelled them to spend their lives in penance and devotion. 'Only extreme fear,' said Sufyān ath-Thaurī (ob. 777–778 A.D.), 'enables any one to support the burden of devotion' (*Ḥilyat al-auliyā*, i. 74*a*). 'Suppose,' said Bishr b. Manṣūr to 'Aṭā as-Sulamī, 'that a blazing fire were kindled, and proclamation made that whoever entered it should be saved?' 'I should tremble,' Aṭā replied, 'lest my joy might cause me to expire before I reached it' (*ib.* i. 32*b*). Many stories are told of persons who died of fear on hearing a preacher describe the anguish that awaits the wicked after the Resurrection, or who wept so violently from terror and remorse that they swooned away. The slightest infraction of the religious law required a long and painful expiation. Kahmas b. al-Ḥasan is said to have wept for forty years because he once took a piece of clay from a neighbour's wall. There was a class of ascetics called 'the Weepers' (*al-Bakkā'ūn*), a term probably borrowed from Christian monasticism (Abu 'l-Maḥāsin, ed. Juynboll, i. 396, l. 5; cf. Thomas of Margâ, *The Book of the Governors*, ed. Budge, vol. i. p. cxlvii).

In this connexion the pervading influence of Christianity on the early period of Muslim asceticism should not be overlooked (see von Kremer, *Herrschende Ideen*, 52 ff., 57 ff.; Goldziher, *RHR*, vol. xxxvii. pp. 314–324, and 'Materialien zur Entwickelungsgesch. des Ṣūfismus,' in *Vienna*

Oriental Journal, vol. xiii. p. 35 ff.). Not only can the dress, vows of silence, and many other practices of Muslim ascetics be traced to this source, but in the oldest Ṣūfī biographies, besides numerous anecdotes of the Christian monk (*rāhib*), who from his cell or pillar gives instruction and advice to wandering Muslim devotees, we find unmistakable proof that the doctrines of the latter were, to a considerable extent, based on Jewish and Christian traditions. Quotations from the Pentateuch and the Gospels frequently occur among the sayings attributed to Muhammadan saints; and Biblical stories, related from the monastic point of view, were eagerly read, *e.g.* the popular collection entitled *al-Isrā'īlīyāt*, which is said to have been compiled by Wahb b. Munabbih (ob. 728 A.D.), and the still extant *Qiṣaṣ al-anbiyā* ('Tales of the Prophets'), by Tha'labī (ob. 1036 A.D.). While, as has been stated, many of the early Muslim ascetics belonged to the learned class, lived in towns, and did not exclude themselves from social intercourse and public life, the movement had its roots among the common folk, of whom a great number embraced with enthusiasm the ideal of unworldliness that was held up to them, and strove to attain it by abandoning all human society, seeking shelter in caves and cemeteries, or roaming in solitary places, deserts, mountains, and on the shore. Of such wanderers Ibrāhīm b. Adham (ob. 776 A.D.) is a type, although, unlike most of them, he was of noble birth. A prince of Balkh, he clad himself in garments of wool, left his kingdom, and roamed through Syria, earning a scanty livelihood by gardening and other kinds of manual labour. On being asked why he shunned the sight of men, he replied: 'I have clasped my religion to my bosom, and am fleeing with it from town to town and from peak to peak. All who see me think that I am a camel-driver (read *jammālī* for *ḥummā'ī*) or a madman. This I do, that perchance I may save my religion from Satan, and bring my faith safely forth through the gate of death' (*Tadh. al-auliyā*, ed. Nicholson, i. 95. 15 ff.). Others, again, sought refuge from worldly temptations in the Ṣūfī monasteries which began to be founded before the close of the 2nd cent. A.H. Women took an active part in the movement, especially on its mystical side (see SŪFIISM). It had no organization, no system of doctrine, but is characterized, as Goldziher has observed (*Vienna Orient. Journ.* vol. xiii. p. 37), by the one-sided elaboration of certain Qur'ānic ideas and doctrines, with a corresponding neglect of other elements equally important in the eyes of orthodox Muhammadans. In the early period, asceticism can hardly be separated from Ṣūfiism; and even when the distinction became sharp (in the 3rd cent. of Islām), many who called themselves Ṣūfīs were really little more than ascetics with a vein of mysticism. It will be convenient, therefore, to regard the early Ṣūfīs as in some degree belonging to the movement under consideration, leaving the monastic institutions and organized asceticism of a later period to be treated in the following section. We shall now deal with some practices and theories which illustrate the general character of ancient Muslim asceticism.

(*a*) *Dress.*—Garments of coarse wool (*ṣūf*) were a mark of asceticism in pre-Islāmic times: in this respect the Arabs copied the Christian hermits (Nöldeke, in *ZDMG*, vol. xlviii. p. 47). Similar garments were often worn by Muslim ascetics; hence the name 'Ṣūfī,' which came into use before 200 A.H. A synonymous epithet of rarer occurrence is *Musūḥī*, which is derived from the garments of hair-cloth called *miṣḥ*, plural *musūḥ* (cf. *Ḥilyat*, ii. 80[a]; *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, Calcutta, 1859, Nos. 89 and 90). Ascetics of both sexes are described as wearing a smock (*jubba* or *midra'a*) of wool; women sometimes added a head-covering and veil (*ḫimār*) of the same material. Sufyān ath-Thaurī (ob. 777–778 A.D.) condemned the wearing of wool as being an innovation (*bid'a*), others on the ground that it was borrowed from Christianity or savoured of ostentation (*Ḥilyat*, i. 90[a]; *'Iqd*, Cairo, 1293 A.H., iii. 348 f.; Sha'rānī, *Lawāqiḥ*, 1299 A.H., i. 45, penult.). Abū Sulaimān ad-Dārānī (ob. 830 A.D.) declared that a woollen garment might be worn for economy, or as a travelling dress, but not for religious purposes (*Ḥilyat*, ii. 171[b]). In another place (*ib.* ii. 167[a]) he allows the adept, whose heart is purged of all the passions, to wear an *'abā* (woollen mantle), 'which is one of the signs of asceticism,' but says that it is safer for him to wear 'two white garments' like ordinary people, so as not to excite remark. Garments of hair (*sha'r*) are often mentioned; they were sometimes worn under a rich dress, *e.g.* by Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq (*Lawāqiḥ*, i. 42. 20 ff.). Some pietists were recognized by their long cloaks (*burnus*, pl. *barānis*; cf. *'Iqd*, ii. 291. 7). 'Utba al-Ghulām (ob. *circa* 780 A.D.) wore two dust-coloured garments—one as a *ridā*, the other as an *izār*—so that he looked like a ploughman (*Ḥilyat*, i. 37[b]). Bishr al-Ḥāfī (ob. 841–842 A.D.), the well-known ascetic of Baghdād, went to market 'wearing a shabby fur (*farw*), a short boot (*ḫuff*), and a very fine *izār*' (*ib.* ii. 77[a]). All this shows that certain kinds of dress were peculiar to ascetics, but that ascetics were not invariably distinguished by a peculiar dress. Concerning the patched frocks (*muraqqa'āt*), which in course of time superseded the woollen garb of the Ṣūfīs, see art. ṢŪFIISM.

(*b*) *Food and fasting.*—Many ascetics attached great importance to eating only what was lawful (*ḥalāl*). Thus Ibrāhīm b. Adham said, 'Let your food be good (*ṭayyib*), and you need not pray by night or fast by day' (*Ḥilyat*, i. 199[a]); and he used to eat clay and earth when he could not get anything above suspicion. Sarī as-Saqaṭī (ob. 867 A.D.) was celebrated for the purity of his diet (*ib.* ii. 247[a]); he wished to eat no food that entailed either gratitude to man or chastisement from God, but confessed that he found this impossible (*ib.* ii. 244[a]). The legends of the Muslim saints furnish many instances of holy men who were miraculously guarded from eating 'dubious' viands, *e.g.* such as came from a wedding-feast or had passed through the hands of a government official. It is related of Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (ob. 857 A.D.) that whenever he stretched out his hand to take any food of this sort, he was warned by the twitching of a vein in the tip of one of his fingers (Qushairī, Cairo, 1318 A.H., p. 64, l. 21). Ibrāhīm b. Adham recommended warm bread with olive oil as the best food for ascetics (*Ḥilyat*, i. 199[a]); others favoured bread and salt, gruel made of barley-meal, etc. Some abstained from meat altogether, but this does not seem to have been usual; it was, however, eaten sparingly. Vows of abstinence from particular kinds of food, *e.g.* carrots or dates, were often made, and were supposed to confer a higher spiritual rank (*Lawāqiḥ*, i. 61. 17 ff.). Besides the obligatory fast of Ramaḍān, voluntary fasts of varying length and severity form an indispensable feature of Muslim asceticism. Their purpose was to mortify the flesh and illuminate the spirit, to procure wisdom and prevent sin. 'He who masters his belly,' said 'Abd al-Wāḥid b. Zaid (ob. 793 A.D.), 'masters his religion and masters all the virtues' (*Ḥilyat*, i. 16[a]). Bāyazīd al-Biṣṭāmī said that he attained to knowledge of God by means of a hungry belly and a naked body (Qushairī, 16. 10). Sahl b. 'Abdallāh at-Tustarī (ob. 896 A.D.) was famous for his fasts.

He held that food should be eaten only to preserve life and reason, not to give strength, and that incapacity to perform one's devotions through weakness arising from want of food was better than the performance of them by one who had eaten his fill (*Iḥyā*, Cairo, 1289 A.H., iii. 87 f.). He used to break his fast once in fifteen days (Qushairī, 78. 31), and his name is included by Ghazālī in a list of those who had fasted forty consecutive days (*Iḥyā*, iii. 89). Later, Ṣūfīs surpassed his achievements in this line, for, according to Abū 'Uthmān al-Maghribī (ob. 983–984 A.D.), the man who is Divinely aided (*ṣamadānī*) does not eat once in eighty days (Qushairī, 79. 16).

(*c*) *Prayer.*—The five canonical prayers incumbent on every Muslim, arduous and exacting as they were, did not satisfy the zealots of the new religion. Authority for an extension of the practice was found in several passages of the Qur'ān where *dhikr* ('praise of God') is mentioned: the faithful are enjoined to praise God frequently (*Qur.* xxxiii. 14). Starting from this command, which does not refer to any special act of ritual, the early ascetics developed a regular service of litanies and devotional exercises: reading of the Qur'ān, repetition of the names of God, reiteration of certain invocations and formulas, such as *Allāh! Allāh!* and *Lā ilāha illā 'llāh!* This *dhikr* the Ṣūfīs regarded as one of the main pillars, nay, the very corner-stone, of practical religion; without constantly performing it no one could attain to God (Qushairī, 119. penult.). Here they may have imitated the Christian Euchites, as Goldziher conjectures (*Vienna Orient. Journ.* vol. xiii. p. 39) in his valuable paper on the early development of Ṣūfiism, to which the writer of the present article is deeply indebted. Even those who granted that ordinary prayer (*ṣalāt*) was the most excellent act of devotion recognized the superiority of *dhikr*, in so far as the latter was not confined to any stated times, and might be continued hour after hour without interruption (Qushairī, 120. 5 from foot). In some cases it was accompanied by acts of penance. Ḥāzim al-Ḥanafī used to knock his head against the wall of his chamber until it bled (*Ḥilyat*, ii. 251); and Shiblī (ob. 945–946 A.D.) during his novitiate was accustomed to pray in a dark cellar, and flagellate himself with a bundle of rods whenever he felt that his faculties were not concentrated (Qushairī, 120. 4 ff.). Meetings for the purpose of *dhikr* were held in the Umayyad period—Ḥasan of Baṣra is said to have presided over them—and seem to have been attended by persons inclined to quietism, who disliked the crude declamations of the *quṣṣāṣ*, or popular preachers (cf. *Qūt al-qulūb*, i. 149). The dangers lurking in a perpetual lip-service soon became apparent to the Ṣūfīs themselves; it was discouraged by the Baghdād school, which flourished in the 3rd cent. A.H., because it led to hypocrisy (Goldziher, *loc. cit.*, p. 40). Qushairī (119. last line) insists that *dhikr* with the tongue is subordinate to *dhikr* with the heart, and should be regarded as an instrument whereby the higher and truly effectual *dhikr* is acquired; nevertheless, the latter is incomplete without the former—the adept combines both. See also art. ṢŪFIISM.

(*d*) *Renunciation and poverty.*—Qushairī, in his chapter on renunciation (*zuhd*), refers to the question whether *zuhd* consists in renouncing what is unlawful (*ḥarām*) or what is lawful (*ḥalāl*). The general opinion was that all Muslims were bound to renounce *ḥarām*, but that renunciation of *ḥalāl* was a merit; this view accords with many passages in the Qur'ān, *e.g.* 'Say, the goods of this world are little, and the next world is better for those who fear God' (*Qur.* iv. 79). At first, renunciation was understood almost exclusively in a material sense; the *zāhid* abstained from food, sleep, society, and all harmless pleasures. If a man possessed only one shirt, he might count on being admitted to paradise before his more deserving neighbour who had two (*Tadh. al-auliyā*, i. 47. last line and foll.). But since the ascetics naturally restricted *ḥalāl* to the narrowest possible limits, and condemned everything else as superfluous, it was but a short step to the view that 'nothing in the world is lawful, and therefore there is no true renunciation in renouncing the world' (Qushairī, 67. 11). The sayings of the early Ṣūfīs exhibit a strong bias towards a spiritual conception of *zuhd*. Not that they fasted less, kept fewer vigils, or relaxed their austerities, but they realized that such acts could have no value except as the expression of an inward feeling. Renunciation exists only in the heart (*Ḥilyat*, ii. 170[8]); it is the abandonment of all that diverts one from God (Qushairī, 67. 4), and especially the abandonment of 'self.' Self-abnegation, in its practical aspects, which alone concern us here, may be described as trust in God (*tawakkul*) or quietism (*ridā*), and is closely connected with the doctrine of 'poverty' (*faqr*).

Most Muhammadan treatises on Ṣūfiism allude to the controversy which arose at an early period as to the superiority of poverty or riches (see, *e.g.*, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, Lahore ed. p. 15, l. 18 ff.; *Ḥayāt al-qulūb*, printed on the margins of *Qūt al-qulūb*, ii. 161. 15 ff.). It was debated whether the rich man who was blessed with wealth and who rendered thanks to God for it did not represent a higher ideal than the poor man who endured want uncomplainingly. Some argued that wealth (*ghanā*), being an attribute of God, should be preferred to poverty, which is an attribute of man, and cited the Prophet's saying: 'The upper hand is better than the lower,' *i.e.* 'to give is better than to receive.' The leading Ṣūfīs, however, with a few exceptions, declared in favour of poverty, quoting such traditions as these: 'O God, let me live poor, and die poor, and rise from the dead amongst the poor'; 'the poor of my people will enter Paradise five hundred years before the rich'; 'poverty is my pride' (*al-faqru faḫrī*). What poverty meant may be gathered from a saying of Sarī as-Saqaṭī (ob. 867 A.D.): 'Do not take any thing from any one, nor ask any thing of any one, nor have with you any thing that you can give to any one' (*Ḥilyat*, ii. 244[b]). This counsel of perfection was based on the theory of *tawakkul* ('trust in God'), which the early Ṣūfīs carried to extreme lengths (see Goldziher's investigation of the subject in the *Vienna Orient. Journ.* vol. xiii. pp. 41–56). They define *tawakkul* as renunciation of personal initiative and volition, leaving all to God, being entirely passive, like a corpse in the hands of the washer who prepares it for burial. Applying this doctrine to matters of practical life, the true *mutawakkil* could not make any effort, direct or indirect, to obtain the means of subsistence, or admit any thought of providing for the morrow. He could not beg, work for hire, or ply any trade or handicraft, but had to depend for his daily bread on what God, 'to whom belong the treasures of earth and heaven,' sent to him as a gift from Himself, or delivered to him by the hands of his fellow-creatures. He was then said to gain his livelihood *mina 'l-futūḥ*, *i.e.* through an 'opening' which God made for him. The ancient Ṣūfīs, who commonly adhered to these principles and hence are often called *al-mutawakkilūn*, seem to have been influenced by Christian teaching (Mt 6^{25-34}, Lk 12^{22-30}; see Goldziher, *loc. cit.* p. 45). In later times, when the theory had broken down, the same term was still used to denote a class of Ṣūfīs who wandered to and fro, living 'on trust' (*alā 't-tawakkul*). It

was customary for such men to make the pilgrimage to Mecca 'without provision' (*bilā zād*), and in some cases they considered their vow of *tawakkul* to have been violated if they extracted a thorn from their feet or cried out for help on falling into a well. But, of course, the facts of nature were too strong for the doctrinaires. Living 'on trust,' if strictly interpreted, involved a serious risk of death by starvation. That some *mutawakkilūn* perished in this way is likely enough, and may possibly have evoked the assertion, which is ascribed to Sufyān ath-Thaurī (*Ḥilyat*, i. 81[a]), that those who refuse to beg, and die of hunger in consequence, go to Hell. Gradually the Ṣūfīs themselves came round to the opinion that *tawakkul* was not invalidated by seeking a livelihood (*takassub*). A similar conclusion was reached as regards the question whether a *mutawakkil* might take medicine or not; but there were always individuals who refused to compromise with their conscience. Goldziher (*loc. cit.* p. 53) mentions the existence in Persia, in the 4th cent. A.H., of a numerous sect who rejected medical aid. Their leader, Abu 'l-Ḥair b. Bābā, was a Christian physician, and, like modern Christian Scientists, he recommended his patients to trust in God. It is curious that a theory which forbade beggary, or allowed it only as a last resource, should actually have produced swarms of able-bodied mendicants who made their *tawakkul* an excuse for living on charity.

3. Development of Ṣūfī asceticism in the Middle Ages.—(*a*) *Monastic institutions.*—The Prophet's saying, 'There is no monasticism in Islām,' was not falsified, on any large scale at least, until several centuries had elapsed. Most of the early Ṣūfīs led secluded lives with a few friends and companions of the same way of thinking. Many of them were married, and some had the full legal complement of wives, like Ḥātim al-Aṣamm of Balkh, who died in A.D. 851 (*Ḥilyat*, i. 213[b]). Bishr al-Ḥāfī, although himself unmarried, is said to have acknowledged that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, who had followed the *sunna* approving matrimony, was his superior in this respect (*Qūt al-qulūb*, ii. 241) Nevertheless, the advocates of celibacy—for they did not always practise what they preached—soon began to make themselves heard. Ḥasan of Baṣra said that, when God wills the welfare of a man in this world, He does not occupy him with wife and child (*Lawāqiḥ*, i. 38. 10). According to Ribāḥ b. 'Amr al-Qaisī, no one attains the rank of the elect (*ṣiddīqūn*) until he leaves his wife a widow and his children fatherless (*ib.* i. 61. 4). Abū Sulaimān ad-Dārānī spoke of marriage as a backsliding and a concession to worldliness; it might be the better state for those who could endure its cares, but only the single man (*waḥīd*) tasted the full sweetness of devotion, and was able to give his whole heart to God (*Qūt al-qulūb*, ii. 247). These views, conflicting with the ancient Muslim doctrine that a man's duties towards his family are quite as important as those which concern his faith, never gained universal acceptance. Celibacy is seldom demanded by Muhammadan religious orders as a condition of membership.

We have but little information as to the origin and growth of monasticism in the early period of Islām. The first monastery (*ḥānaqāh*) for Ṣūfīs is said to have been founded at Ramla in Palestine by a Christian dignitary (*Nafaḥāt*, 34), apparently before A.D. 800. Sitting in a *ḥānaqāh* was condemned, as equivalent to begging, by Abū Turāb an-Nakhshabī, who died in A.D. 859 (*Ḥilyat*, ii. 222[b]). The year 200 A.H. (=A.D. 815) is named in two fictitious traditions (*Qūt al-qulūb*, ii. 239) as the date after which celibacy would be permissible to all Muslims, and would be adopted by the best men amongst them; and this prophecy after the event seems to mark the beginning of Muslim monasticism with approximate correctness. It is probable, however, that the development of organized monastic institutions throughout the Muhammadan empire belongs to a much later period. In reading the older works on Ṣūfīism, *e.g.* the *Qūt al-qulūb*, the *Ḥilyat al-auliyā*, and the *Risāla* of Qushairī (all of which were written before A.D. 1050), one is struck by the rarity of any reference to monasteries; yet the celebrated Ṣūfīs of the 3rd and 4th cents. A.H. generally gathered round them a circle of disciples, who would naturally have dwelt in religious houses, if such had been available. Maqrīzī (*Ḥiṭaṭ*, ii. 414. 3) says that *ḥānaqāhs* were introduced into Islām during the 5th cent. A.H., which corresponds to the 11th cent. of the Christian era. We may accept this statement in the sense that Ṣūfī monasteries, the members of which lived together for ascetic purposes under the direction of an abbot, or *shaikh*, first became numerous and widely spread during the above-mentioned epoch. Maqrīzī's observation agrees with a passage in Qazwīnī (*Āthār al-bilād*, ed. Wustenfeld, 241. 3 from foot), where Abū Sa'īd b. Abi 'l-Ḥair, who died in A.D. 1049 (not about A.D. 815, as was erroneously asserted by De Sacy in *Journal des Savants*, 1821, p. 725, and after him by Dozy and von Kremer), is described as the founder of Ṣūfī monasticism and rules of discipline. During the next two hundred years (A.D. 1050–1250) the system was further organized and extended by the various Dervish orders—'Adawīs, Qādirīs, Rifā'īs, Mevlevīs, etc.—which arose in rapid succession.

The well-known treatise on Ṣūfīism, entitled *'Awārif al-Ma'ārif*, by Shihāb ad-Dīn 'Umar as-Suhrawardī (ob. 1234 A.D.), supplies many interesting details concerning Muslim monastic life (see especially chapters 12–18 and 48–52). Speaking of the relation between the Shaikh and the disciple (*murīd*), Suhrawardī asserts that the latter becomes part of the Shaikh, just as in natural generation the son is part of the father. 'This,' he says, 'is a spiritual birth, according to the words of Jesus: "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God"' (Jn 3[3]). The disciple was usually invested by the Shaikh with a patched frock (*ḫirqa*) as a sign that he submitted absolutely to the Shaikh's authority; in this ceremony the hand of the Shaikh was considered to represent the hand of the Prophet. While the disciple remained in constant association with the Shaikh and under his care, he passed through the time of 'sucking' (*irtiḍā'*), and it behoved him not to depart without leave, but to wait until the Shaikh decided that the moment of 'weaning' (*fiṭām*) had arrived. 'The ascetics of old,' Suhrawardī continues, 'desired solitude on account of the dangers to which society exposed them, but Ṣūfīs who live in convents overcome these dangers by the strength of their devotion and the soundness of their spiritual state. They are as one body animated by the single aim of dwelling together in complete accord both outwardly and inwardly; this is a unique characteristic which distinguishes them from every other sect in Islām.' The convent (*ribāt*) comprised men of all ages, and consisted of private cells (*zāwiya*) as well as an assembly-room (*bait al-jamā'a*). The old men, Suhrawardī thinks, should be allowed to stay in their cells, where they can sleep and rest and do as they please; but, for disciplinary reasons, it is advisable that the young should sit in the assembly-room, holding their breath and keeping their senses under control; if, however, a novice is disturbed by talking and noise, he should be sent to the Shaikh's private apartment, that his attention may not be distracted, while the Shaikh himself maintains order in the assembly-room. Novices should be em-

ployed in 'service' (*ḫidma*) and sent to help their brethren who are engaged in devotion and contemplation, and who alone are excused from menial tasks. Service is a pious work, but the Ṣūfīs do not approve of asking any one who is not a Ṣūfī to serve them; for 'they are men, and things proceed from them, in the course of human nature, which are objectionable to a stranger ignorant of their aims.' Their refusal to associate with such a person is due to respect for his feelings, not because they deem themselves superior to any Muslim. The food of the monks was either provided by endowment or procured by begging. Only those were entitled to partake of it who were so occupied with God as not to be capable of earning their livelihood, or who were excused on the score of age, or who were authorized by the Shaikh to receive it in return for their labour. Unless the terms of the endowment necessitated a certain indulgence, it was a universal rule in Ṣūfī asceticism that no idler should eat the food of the convent. Suhrawardī recommends a forty days' seclusion (*arba'īnīya*) for prayer and fasting once a year. Solitude, he insists, has for its object a moral purification: it must not be sought on account of the visions and ecstasies which sometimes result from it. The disciple who goes into retirement (*ḫalwa*) should strip himself of the world and discard all that he possesses, and, after seeing that his clothes and his prayer-mat are clean, he should pray two *rak'as* and repent of his sins with weeping and humility. He ought not to leave his cell except for the public and Friday prayers (*ṣalāt al-jamā'a wa-ṣalāt al-jum'a*); on these occasions he should continue his *dhikr* and pay as little attention as possible to what he hears and sees, in order that he may not fall into temptation. During his retirement, he should perform ablutions regularly, and sleep only when overpowered by fatigue, and never cease from repeating his *dhikr* until he grows weary; then he must con it over in his heart, without any movement of his tongue (see *'Awārif*, chs. 26–28).

(*b*) *Ascetic systems.*—European writers on Ṣūfīism are often inclined to identify it with pantheism and to lay undue stress on its transcendental flights, while they ignore its ascetic and ethical foundation. This is the 'path' (*ṭarīqa*) which every Ṣūfī must traverse before he can hope to reach the goal of his journey, and which is expounded at great length in the *Qūt al-qulūb* by Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (ob. 996 A.D.) and other manuals written with a didactic purpose. In such works the different 'stations' (*maqāmāt*) of the 'path' are carefully mapped out, and the doctrines pertaining to each are explained and illustrated by means of Qur'ānic texts, traditions of the Prophet, and sayings or anecdotes of famous saints. All systems of Ṣūfī asceticism are based on the same materials; hence it is not surprising that one is very like another externally, however much they may diverge in spirit according to the author's individual point of view. It is not possible to describe any of them in detail here, but their broad outlines can be exhibited if we briefly examine the systematic treatment of the subject by Ghazālī (ob. 1111 A.D.) in his *Iḥyā*, which is a classical text-book of orthodox Ṣūfīism. Ghazālī does not address himself to Ṣūfīs alone; his aim is the revivification (*iḥyā*) of the Muhammadan religion, and he has no desire to make every Muslim a monk. Consequently, in the first half of the work he deals with the ordinary religious duties of purification, prayer, almsgiving, fasting, and pilgrimage; then with supererogatory acts of devotion, such as recitation of the Qur'ān, praise of God (*dhikr*), supplication (*du'ā*), and vigils; and discusses exhaustively the relation of religion to social life. Many of these topics, though bearing a wider application, belong to the preliminary stage—the 'law' (*sharī'a*), as it is technically named—of Ṣūfī asceticism, but in the third and fourth volumes of the *Iḥyā* Ghazālī unfolds the method adopted by the Ṣūfīs for attaining spiritual perfection. This method falls into two parts, which may be called *purgative* and *unitive*, inasmuch as the former purifies the heart by subduing the passions, while the latter leads to union with God by the acquisition of virtues and faculties. The principles of the *purgative* way are summarized as follows (*Iḥyā*, iii. 74. 15 ff.):—Before entering on his novitiate, the aspirant must renounce four things: wealth, reputation, mechanical conformity (*taqlīd*), and sin. He will then need a Shaikh to direct him. The Shaikh, to whom he must cling 'like a blind man on the bank of a river to his guide,' will provide him with four weapons against the assaults of Satan, viz. solitude, silence, fasting, and sleeplessness. Now begins what is generally a long inward struggle with the lusts and passions. When these have been vanquished, the novice should retire to his cell and perform only the obligatory acts of devotion, and continually repeat some *dhikr*, such as *Allāh! Allāh!* or *Subḥāna'llāh!* ('Glory to God!'), until the essential meaning of it has filled his heart. He must strive to banish every thought that is not of God, and to repel the evil suggestions with which Satan plies him. Whatever passes in his mind he should communicate to the Shaikh. Then, if the Shaikh knows that his pupil is intelligent and can be trusted rightly to apprehend the Divine reality (*ḥaqīqat*), he will bid him meditate assiduously, in order that illumination may enter his heart. Herein it behoves the Shaikh to exercise the greatest possible care, for this is a perilous matter, in which many novices, going beyond their depth, are utterly lost. The weak should be confined to what they are capable of understanding, *e.g.* simple faith and practical devotion. Those who occupy themselves with meditation have to beware of many pitfalls, such as vainglory, hypocrisy, delight in visions and miracles. After this *résumé* of the *purgative* way, Ghazālī treats in ample detail of the various passions and vices, from lust and gluttony to spiritual pride, their nature, symptoms, diagnosis, and the remedies which are most effectual in each case (*Iḥyā*, iii. 78–392). Finally, in the fourth volume of his work, he expounds the *unitive* way under the following heads: (1) repentance, (2) patience and thanksgiving, (3) fear and hope, (4) poverty and renunciation, (5) unification (*tauḥīd*) and trust in God, (6) love, desire, intimacy, and acquiescence, (7) intention, sincerity, and truth, (8) contemplation (*murāqaba*) and self-examination (*muḥāsaba*), (9) reflexion (*tafakkur*), (10) meditation on death and what comes after it. Similar scales of ascent occur in every system of Ṣūfī theosophy (see ṢŪFIISM), and are possibly of Buddhistic origin (cf. Goldziher, in *JRAS*, 1904, p. 139 ff.). At any rate, Buddhism can be shown to have exerted a considerable influence on the practice and theory of mediæval Muslim asceticism; *e.g.* the use of rosaries and the custom of holding the breath were borrowed from Buddhist monks, whose example must also have powerfully affected the monastic ideals and institutions that reached a high degree of development in this period (cf. Goldziher, *loc. cit.* p. 125 ff.; von Kremer, *Culturgesch. Streifzuge*, p. 45 ff.).

4. Philosophical asceticism.—Suhrawardī (*'Awārif*, iii. 194 ff.) distinguishes the asceticism of the mystics, which illuminates the heart, from that practised by philosophers and materialists with the object of purifying the senses and thus facilitating the acquirement of the intellectual sciences: the latter, he says, leads to heresy. It assumes its

most interesting form in the so-called *zindīqs*, a name given by the Muslims to various kinds of heretics, particularly those who rejected positive religion and acknowledged only the moral law (for the derivation and meaning of *zindīq*, cf. E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, 1902, i. 159 ff.; Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs*, 1907, 372 ff.; and art. ATHEISM [Muh.]). Renunciation (*zuhd*) was characteristic of many on whom this epithet was bestowed. Some of them were undoubtedly influenced by Manichæan and Buddhistic ideas, but Muhammadan orthodoxy was apt to brand as 'free-thought' (*zandaqa*) any moral creed that was not built entirely on a dogmatic basis. Abu 'l-'Atāhiya (ob. 828 A.D.), though his poems are full of allusions to Paradise, Hell, and the Resurrection, was called a *zindīq* by his contemporaries, apparently because they suspected him of being a moralist in disguise; and they might have urged, with truth, that the prevailing tone of his poetry is ethical and reflective rather than religious. He sings the praises of asceticism, which he had adopted professionally in consequence, it is said, of a disappointment in love. 'The noblest of men,' he declares, 'is a king in the garb of a beggar,' *i.e.* an ascetic who is independent of the world and whose passions no longer enslave him; and again, 'those who are content with their lot are the truly free.' With much better reason the charge of heresy was brought against another celebrated Muslim poet, Abu 'l-'Alā al-Ma'arrī (see MA'ARRĪ). He too retired from a world where he had found only sorrow and failure. His asceticism, however, presents some peculiar features which it is possible, though hardly probable (cf. *JRAS*, 1902, p. 291), that he borrowed from the Indian Jains. He held that it was wrong to kill or injure any living creature, even a flea. His diet was strictly vegetarian; he abstained from fish and eggs as well as milk and honey. He wore a dress of undyed wool and wooden shoes, on the ground that no animal should be slaughtered to make leather of its skin. His celibacy was not monastic in character, but was the result of his belief that the best fate is non-existence, and that one ought to shrink from multiplying the misery of life. To pretend that such opinions and practices are typical of the moral philosophers of Islām would be unjust to Ma'arrī's eccentric and original genius. He resembled some of them in making asceticism an affair of the conscience and the understanding, an ingredient of the highest virtue instead of a stepping-stone to the Absolute. Others, like the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā, or 'Brothers of Purity,' inculcate obedience to the Divine world-law and love of God, which 'gains in this life serenity of soul, freedom of heart, and peace with the whole world, and in the life to come ascension to Eternal Light.'

5. Conclusion: the Dervish orders. — As was said at the outset, this article is limited in scope, and deals only with the origin and main developments of Muslim asceticism. Nearly every Muhammadan sect could contribute something to a detailed history of the subject, and there are abundant Oriental sources for such a work, but in the present state of our knowledge a certain sketchiness is unavoidable. European writers have confined their researches almost exclusively to the modern Dervish orders, in which Ṣūfī asceticism and mysticism are carried as far as human nature can go. Some were founded before the Mongol Invasion (A.D. 1258), but since the 14th cent. they have branched out in all directions from Senegal in the west to China in the east. While basing their doctrine on the principles of mediæval Ṣūfiism, they have evolved a complex organization, extended the old practices, and introduced new ones. In some cases, too, their spirit and aims have been altered by the influence of environment and political circumstances. As regards the ascetic training which they impose on their members, naturally each order has its own rules, but they generally agree in the following points: (1) an elaborate ceremony of initiation, which is sometimes preceded by a long and arduous apprenticeship; (2) the wearing of a peculiar costume; (3) for neophytes, a severe discipline of solitude, prayer, fasting, and other austerities; (4) the immoderate use of *dhikr*, with the help of music, dancing, and diverse physical stimulants, to excite ecstasy; (5) belief in extraordinary spiritual powers vouchsafed to adepts and ecstatic persons, which they display by chewing live coals, charming snakes, predicting future events, etc.; (6) veneration, approaching to deification, of the Shaikh, or head of the order. If it is true that in most of their practices and beliefs the modern Dervishes had already been anticipated by the Ṣūfīs of the Middle Ages, from whom they are lineally descended, it is no less true that they have vulgarized Ṣūfiism by surrounding it with a network of mechanical routine, by exalting its thaumaturgy at the expense of its theosophy, and by associating its deepest mysteries with the performance of an orgiastic exercise. See article DERVISH.

LITERATURE. — Besides the references given in the article, students may consult, for early Muslim asceticism: von Kremer, *Gesch. der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, 1868, p. 52 ff.; D. B. Macdonald, *Muslim Theology*, 1903, pp. 172–180; R. A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs*, 1907, pp. 224–235; for Sūfi asceticism in the Middle Ages: Miguel Asin Palacios, *Algazel, dogmática, moral, ascética*, 1901; for philosophical asceticism: Goldziher, 'Sâliḥ b. 'Abd al-Quddûs und das Zindîḳthum wahrend der Regierung des Chalifen al-Mahdî,' in *Transactions of the Ninth Congress of Orientalists*, 1893, vol. ii. p. 104 ff.; Dieterici, *Die Philosophie der Araber im X. Jahrhundert n. Chr.*, 1861-79; and for the asceticism of the Dervish orders: J. P. Brown, *The Dervishes or Oriental Spiritualism*, 1868; Depont and Coppolani, *Les Confréries religieuses musulmanes*, 1897.

REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON.

ASCETICISM (Persian).—An essential part of the meaning of the Zarathushtrian reform, viz. the care of cattle and pasture land, is given in 'The Complaint of the Soul of the Kine' in the *Ahunavaiti Gāthā*, *Yasna* xxix. This zeal for economics being inseparably connected with the new faith, the Prophet in his religion placed a distinct value on earthly goods and productive work, and introduced that strongly anti-ascetic tendency which separates the Avesta so widely from the higher Indian religion.

1. The Avesta moral code is not only negative ('Thou shalt not,' etc.), but also contains positive duties. In its origin it is the ethics of cattle-breeding. Zarathushtra himself was the first 'meadow-keeping cattle rearer' (*vāstryō-fšuyąs*, *Yasht* xiii. 89), as well as the first priest and the first warrior. The *Gāthās* do not know any but pasture land. By the time of the later Avesta agriculture has appeared. *Vendīdād* iii. mentions the five places which are the happiest on this earth: (1) where one of the faithful is worshipping; (2) where one of the faithful erects a house with a priest therein, with cattle, a wife, children, and good herds, and where all these treasures of life are prospering; (3) where most corn and fruit trees are cultivated, and where water is led into a poorly watered soil (a later glosser has added, 'and where dryness is brought to a watery soil,' ditching being later than artificial irrigation); (4) where flocks and herds increase most; and (5) where flocks and herds yield most urine. The life-long fight against the demons means cultivating the ground, sheltering the plants from drought and frost, spreading cultivation over land strenuously conquered from the wild. Activity has always been one of the first principles of Zarathushtrianism.

Among the later writings of the Parsis, *Sad Dar* lxxxi. 10 inculcates: 'Every good work which thou art able to do to-day do not postpone for to-morrow, and accomplish with thine own hand the counsel of thine own soul'; and in *Ganje-shāyagān* (§ 126) one-third of the day (and night) is given to religious duties, one-third to the cultivation of the ground (the eight hours' working day !), and one-third to eating and sleeping.

2. The following objections are raised against ascetic principles:—

(1) Wife and children make a man superior to him who is not married (*Vend.* iv. 47). A young woman without children needs a husband, just as uncultivated ground needs cultivation. The good husband receives fruit from both (*Vend.* iii. 24–25).

Zarathushtra is of Divine origin—the heavenly glory (see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Zoroastrian], vol. i. p. 205 f.) entered his grandmother (*Dīnkarṭ* VII. ii. 2 ff., 14; VIII. xiv. 1). But nowhere is an attempt made to eliminate his father in the flesh. Such an idea would be opposed to the Mazdayasnian ideal of holiness. The psychological relation of the union of Zarathushtra's parents in *Dīnkarṭ* VII. ii. 48–52 may be a criterion:

'Both have embraced the first time with desire for a son, and the demons shouted out unto them, in the villainous speech of sinfulness, thus: "Why shouldst thou act like this, vile Pōrūshāspō?," whereupon they started up like people who were ashamed.' The same experience was repeated a second and a third time. 'And they spoke with one another about it, and continued at this duty, and accomplished it, saying. "We will not so stop without accomplishing something, not even though both Rāk and Nōdar should arrive here together." Then that manchild, who was the righteous Zarathūsht, became complete . . . in the womb of his mother.'

The Mazdayasnian has to recite the *Ahuna-Vairya* (*q.v.*) and the *Ashem* when he goes in to his wife (*Dīnkarṭ* IX. xix. 8).

(2) The man who owns a house is superior to him who does not (*Vend.* iv. 47).

(3) Fasting is a sin. Without eating no one has strength for a vigorous piety, for cultivating the ground, for begetting strong children (*Vend.* iii. 33). The man who nourishes and develops his body through the eating of meat takes in more of *vohūman* ('good thought') than he who does not (*Vend.* iv. 48). The man who teaches or practises fasting is an *ashemaogha*, a destroyer of piety and of the holy law, and deserves punishment (*Vend.* iv. 49).

A well-known passage of the Parsi treatise *Sad Dar* lxxxiii. forbids fasting: 'In our religion it is a sin to pass a day without eating. To us fasting means to fast from sin with the eye, with the tongue, with the ear, with the hand, with the foot.'

According to al-Bīrūnī, the person who fasted was considered by the Zarathushtrians as a sinner, and had to feed a certain number of men as an expiation (*Chronology*, tr. Sachau, p. 217).

(4) All practices of mortification are prohibited. The Pahlavi paraphrase of the *Varshtmānsar Nask* of the Sasanian Avesta attributes the self-tortures prescribed by Mani to the Evil One (*Dīnkarṭ* ix. 39).

The ascetics whose doctrines are opposed in the Pahlavi writings can be identified, even if they are not expressly mentioned, as Mani in the Pahlavi *Varshtmānsar Nask* and Mazdak in the Pahlavi commentary to *Vend.* iv. 49 ('Mazdak, son of Bāmdāt'). The chief form of asceticism opposed besides Manichæism was Christianity. During the persecutions of the Sasanians, marriage was not infrequently offered as an alternative to death.

The ascetics referred to in the *Vendīdād* may have been Christians (Darmesteter) or Manichæans (Spiegel). But it seems equally probable that ascetic doctrines were well known and practised in Iran before them. The Babylonian religion had unmarried brides of gods. In India the great ascetic methods of salvation were ancient.

3. Penalties, imposed for offences against the Avesta law, often illustrate the anti-ascetic tendency, inasmuch as those punishments themselves do not consist in sufferings, but in positive useful work. The requirements of penance and agriculture are fulfilled at the same time. In some Avesta fragments of the manuscript *Tahmuras* and in some of the book of ritual ceremonies, *Nīrangistān*, the degree of penalty incurred partly by omissions or smaller inadvertencies in the ritual, and appointed to be three cuts with the lash (*sraosho-karana*, 'the instrument of obedience'), is commuted into a day's work in the fields (Fragments of *Tahmuras*, xii. 11, 12; Fragments of *Nīrangistān*, 42, 43, 69, 83, 109; *AMG* xxiv. 55 f., 105 ff.). If the penance inflicted by *Vendīdād* xiv. upon the man who has killed an otter belongs to the ideals never realized, it is nevertheless very characteristic. He must, among other penalties, kill thousands of snakes, lizards, frogs, ants, worms, and flies. He must give to good men the instruments of a priest, of a warrior, and of a farmer. He must make ditches for irrigation, and make a gift to good men of cultivated ground, a byre, and a beautiful bedstead. He must give a young virgin as wife to a good man. He must make a gift of small cattle. He has to bring up twice seven puppies, and make twice seven bridges over ditches. He must cleanse twice nine dogs from vermin, and let twice nine Mazdayasnians get a good square meal of meat, bread, strong drink, and wine (cf. quotation from al-Bīrūnī under 2 (3) above, and *Vend.* xviii. 73–74, where the killing of snakes, frogs, and ants, and the building of bridges over water belong to the punishment for sexual intercourse at forbidden times). All animals considered as bad and noxious are called *khrafstra*, and it is a most meritorious work to kill them. This is very different from the view of Lao-tse, from Indian, and from mediæval Ṣūfī and Christian asceticism and mysticism.

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NATHAN SÖDERBLOM.

ASCETICISM (Roman).—**1.** For the purposes of this article 'asceticism' may be taken roughly to mean self-discipline, prompted either by the authority of religion or by philosophic reflexion upon life, or by a combination of both these forces. The early Roman religion, so far as we can trace its features, was not to any appreciable extent swayed by the yearnings which in the Orient gave rise to asceticism at a time immemorially remote. The primitive Romans deemed that their shadowy and impalpable divinities were under compact with the community whose exclusive property they were. They asked of their worshippers no burdensome price for the favour which they accorded. The sacrifices required by them were trifling, though the ritual of circumstance and language connected with them was complicated, and needed to be carried out with the utmost precision. The idea of a taint or impurity, displeasing to the gods, and attaching to individuals, to masses of men, or to places, and to be cleansed away only by purificatory ceremony, is old enough in Roman religion. But the expiation was easy, and called for little in the nature of self-suppression. Some of the primitive servants of the gods, particularly the Flamen of Juppiter and the Vestal Virgins, were subjected to strong ceremonial restrictions in their lives. But these resembled the religious tabus prevalent among backward races, rather than any genuine

ascetic discipline. The Roman *feriæ*, or public religious celebrations, though requiring a cessation of labour and ordinary occupations, were, for the most part, joyous in character. Even the services to appease the dead and the powers of the nether world, or to avert the wrath of heaven as declared by prodigies, were not accompanied by practices of an ascetic character.

2. It is probable that the idea of self-sacrifice as an element in religion was first made conspicuous to the Romans by some of the forms of worship which were imported from without into the Roman State. The rare traces of human sacrifice at Rome in obedience to superstition or religion may safely be referred to a foreign origin. Such an elementary ascetic form as the *fast* was not regarded by Varro as belonging to the real Roman ritual, but as a feature of the *Græcus ritus*. The earliest mention of it is in a fragment of the *Bellum Punicum* of Nævius (quoted by Nonius Marcellus, p. 197 M: 'res divas edicit, prædicit castus'). The special name for a fast, *castus* (a noun), is of doubtful derivation. The adjective *castus* implied originally purity achieved not by self-discipline but by ceremonial observance of no very exacting nature.

3. Such discipline as the early Roman underwent was not self-imposed or required by religion, but was laid upon him by his country. There was no limit to the sacrifices which she might demand of him; but only in rare cases had these a religious significance. This was particularly true of the ceremony called *devotio*, by which a commander in the field, using a solemn formula, vowed himself to death, thereby binding the gods to bestow the victory on his army (Livy, viii. 6–10). But even in such circumstances, if the enemy failed to kill the willing victim, it was possible, in true Roman fashion, to cheat the gods by burying a human image and raising a mound over it.

4. We must look, therefore, for traces of asceticism to those cults which Rome and the West adopted from Greece and the East. The fast (*castus* or *jejunium*) enjoined upon a deity's worshippers first appears in connexion with Ceres. Although her name is Latin, all her ritual in historic times was Greek, and her station in the official religion was first assigned to her in the earliest days of the Republic by the custodians of the Sibylline books, who controlled the immigration of alien divinities. Her priestesses were Greeks brought from the towns of lower Italy (Cicero, *pro Balbo*, 55). As she became a chief patroness of the plebeians and the poor, her cult grew in popularity, and new services were grafted on the old. In B.C. 191 a fast in imitation of a Greek νηστεία was instituted in her honour, and was celebrated annually on Oct. 4. By a paradox not uncommon in the history of religion, Ceres, who bestowed the boon of bread, was honoured by abstinence from bread (Fest. p. 154; Arnob. v. 16). The fast may also have indicated a participation in the sorrow of the mother (Ceres-Demeter) for the loss of her child (Libera-Persephone). Also in August a vigil was maintained during nine nights by women worshippers, and was accompanied by a strict rule of chastity. This led to Ceres being regarded as a divinity who presided over divorce, though she was commonly reckoned as one of the patronesses of wedlock. An inscription found at Bologna, and of at least as early a date as 200 B.C., seems to point to a *castus* by which Juno Lucina and Juppiter were propitiated (Ritschl, *Prisc. Lat. Monumenta*, Suppl. 11, 12).

5. A few years before the time at which the *jejunium Cereris* was introduced, the Magna Mater, the Great Mother of the gods, who dwelt especially on Mount Ida, was officially welcomed at Rome. This was due to the superstition which was generated in the minds of the people by the disasters of the Second Punic War, when the Roman gods seemed insufficient to sustain the Roman power, and a yearning arose for aid from the gods of other lands. The formless stone, which in the temple of the Great Mother at Pessinus in Galatia was venerated as her type, was brought to Rome and enshrined on the Palatine. The ritual of the goddess was frenzied and orgiastic. For the first time self-mutilation was accepted by authority at Rome as pleasing to Heaven. The favourite of the Great Mother, commemorated in her ceremonies, was the mythical Attis, who gave his name to the weird poem of Catullus. At first the priests of the goddess were imported from her original home, as their name (*Galli*) indicated, and Romans were forbidden to take office under her. But as early as B.C. 77 a breach of the rule took place, and during the Imperial period the priests and priestesses were all Roman. The worship became more and more elaborated as time went on, and it grew in popularity till it spread far and wide in the West.

6. Closely connected with the Magna Mater was the great rite of the *Taurobolium*, with its minor form, the *Criobolium* (*qq.vv.*). Its history and nature are in several respects obscure, but its essence was that the adherent of the goddess should be penetrated with a sense of impurity, of which he is rid by being drenched with the blood of a slain bull or ram. A famous inscription (*CIL* vi. 510) relates how, after undergoing the *taurobolium* and *criobolium*, a worshipper 'was born again for eternal life' (*renatus in æternum*). This ritual sprang up in the 2nd cent. A.D., and its earliest traceable home was the Vatican mount, where St. Peter's now stands. The fame of this ceremonial is significant of that great change which passed over the Western world during and after the 1st cent. A.D., when the passage was made from general scepticism to general belief and superstition, and a curious sense of guilt in the face of heaven became prevalent, with a longing to find means for purging it away. Renunciation and the repression of desire were to some extent demanded by all the worships of the East which encountered this changed spirit and endeavoured to satisfy it. The satisfaction offered was, of course, to a large extent ceremonial and magical, and sometimes, to our ideas, flagrantly unethical. But the Eastern cults in their westward march dropped most of their baser features, and, on the whole, introduced new and better conceptions of Divine power. It was possible for speculating Romans to identify the Magna Mater and also Bellona,* whose respectability in Asia Minor was not beyond question, with the divinized idea of Virtue.

7. As is well known, the soldiers who served Rome, whether Romans or aliens, and passed from land to land, were greatly instrumental in carrying westward the Eastern cults. Some of these failed for a time to obtain authoritative recognition, and were merely tolerated by Government (with occasional suppression), because of their acceptability to the people at large. But by the 3rd cent. the Roman Emperors practically abandoned the attempt to hurl back the Oriental deities who were invading Italy and the capital of the empire. A cult which long remained unofficially popular was that of the Cappadocian divinity Mâ, a form of the Great Mother, whose acquaintance the Roman soldiers made when Sulla penetrated into the country of the goddess. We have in Strabo (p. 535) a reference to her temple at Comana, with 6000 servants attached, whose forms of veneration were often far

* A Cappadocian goddess who must not be confused with the Roman deity of the same name (cf. Cumont, *Les Religions orientales*, Paris, 1907, p. 66 f.).

from reputable. She was identified by the Romans with the old Italian goddess Bellona. The populace of the West became familiar with the spectacle of hierophants in procession with strange garb, who cut themselves with the double axe and sprinkled the mob with their blood, while they uttered frantic prophecies. The priests wandered about making collections, like the begging friars of the Middle Ages.

8. Egyptian divinities, especially Isis, early made their way into the Greek districts of Italy and into Etruria. The cult of Isis ultimately had extraordinary ramifications all over the Empire, but particularly in the West, and it exercised an especial fascination over women. Stringent bodily abstinence and a sort of penance were marked features of her worship, which took upon it manifold forms. Its elaborated ritual, its perpetual services carried on (as few were) day by day, its mystical character, its discipline preceding initiation in ascending grades, the duties which its ceremonies provided for the multitude, as well as for the priests, and the brotherhoods in which the worshippers were united and in some sort fenced off from the outer world—all these characteristics proved strongly attractive to the lower classes, so that Christians of the earlier centuries saw in Isis a formidable enemy of Christ. And she contributed, indeed, to Western culture elements which penetrated into the texture of the Church. Her worship was at first regarded with disfavour by the Government, but it advanced irrepressibly, as the literature of the Augustan age and later abundantly proves.

9. There was also an influx of deities from Syria. The *Dea Syria* had close affinities with the Magna Mater and Bellona, and the priests and worshippers of these three heavenly beings were often seen in company, particularly in the last age of Paganism, when a dim consciousness of one great God beyond and above the separate divinities became prevalent. Another immigrant from Syria was the Sun-god, who played a great part in the reign of Elagabulus and later. But more important than these was the mighty Persian deity Mithra, often identified with the Sun-god. The strongly developed discipline, the advancement of the worshipper in mystic fellowship from grade to grade, and the community of the sacred brotherhoods rendered this cult highly fascinating to the West. Even in barbaric regions never wholly Romanized, numerous altars dedicated to Mithra and other traces of his worship have been found (see article MITHRAISM).

10. These new forms of worship supplied to the Italic peoples elements which were wanting in the indigenous religions—the satisfaction which comes of self-sacrifice for heaven's sake, the sensation of mystical awe and an elevation of soul born of intercommunion with the deity, also oftentimes a hope of life in a world beyond the grave. In the hard primitive life of the early Italian farmer the lack of these elements was not felt, but the expanded life of later times welcomed their advent. Mysteries of a Greek type, with symbolic ceremonies partly reminiscent of religion, partly embodying ideas that originated in the philosophic schools, seem to have begun to spread to the Italic races as early as the days of the Punic Wars. To these mysteries ascetic practices were often attached. How ready the soil was to receive and develop the seeds of these new devotions was shown by the rapid spread of the movement called by the Roman Government the 'Bacchanalian conspiracy,' which was violently suppressed in B.C. 186. The Bacchic mysteries, taking root in the Greek districts of Italy, drew into connexion with them multitudes of Italic race and large numbers of Roman citizens. Many thousands were executed by authority of the senate, after inquiry which recalls the drumhead court-martial, in defiance of the laws which guaranteed fair trial to the Roman burgess. The criminal nature of the 'conspiracy' was assumed, but never proved. The secrecy of the worship, then a strange and unfamiliar feature, produced an atmosphere of panic, generating visions of crime such as arose in the Gentile world from the mysterious nature of the early Christian observances. In later centuries, 'mysteries,' connected with some mythical or semi-mythical founder such as Orpheus or Pythagoras, or with some definite divinity, were popular in the West, but the information which has come down to us concerning them is defective.

11. The prevalence of the rites and practices to which reference has been made must have greatly changed, in the course of centuries, the primitive Roman and Italian sense of the relation between the Divine powers and man. The claims of the gods upon man were felt to be more exacting than had been imagined in early days, requiring a toll of human suffering, sometimes physical, sometimes consisting in a sharp repression of many of the desires and ambitions of the average human being. The object of the discipline was in some way to cleanse the worshipper from a taint of impurity which he conceived to stand between himself and his divinity. The sense of sin often had a merely superstitious, ceremonial, or mechanical origin, but more and more of a moral and truly religious leaven mingled with it as time went on. Rome contained a large Oriental population, mostly descendants of slaves brought from the East; these contributed to the gradual transformation of ideas which proceeded through the centuries. Juvenal (*Sat.* iii. 62–65), it will be remembered, declared that the Syrian Orontes had long since debouched into the Tiber, and many other Eastern races besides the Syrian were abundantly represented at Rome. In the orientalizing of religious sentiment, the Jews played a certain part. The populace of the capital were as familiar with Jewish ideas as the rulers of the Empire were ostentatiously ignorant of them. The action of the Christian element on the pagan cults of the West, though important, is hard to measure, and has often been over-estimated.

12. But another potent influence mingled with that of religion, and promoted a change in the moral atmosphere—the influence of philosophy. The first conspicuous example of asceticism within the bounds of Italy is seen in the extension among the Greek towns of the brotherhood founded by Pythagoras. The Roman antiquarians of the late Republic believed that early Rome itself had been influenced by the great philosopher, whose personality had already been dissolved away by legend. Down to the latest Imperial times there never ceased to exist in Italy men who called themselves his followers. The name 'Pythagorean' came to stand for simplicity of life, and for quiet of mind secured by self-suppression, self-discipline, and abstinence. Doctrines and ideas connected with the mythical name of Pythagoras entered into many of the late forms of religion and philosophy in the West. Apollonius of Tyana (*q.v.*), who was at Rome in the time of the Flavians, was supposed to be the great exponent of Pythagoreanism on its moral and religious side. This figure, like that of Pythagoras, was soon encrusted by myth. The romantic biography written by Philostratus during the reign of Septimius Severus is charged with 'Pythagorean' ideas, and is deeply coloured by asceticism.

13. But the vogue of the Pythagorean school never extended very far. The force of Stoicism in the Western world was vastly greater and more

pervading. The educated class at Rome began to be affected by it in the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C.; and the influence continued and grew until the Imperial system was submerged. The Roman character, as formed in the hard school of early military service, and of that subjection to authority in which Rome had found the secret of conquest, responded more readily to the call of Stoicism than to any other creed framed in the philosophic schools of Hellas. When the days of luxury and corruption came, the ideal Roman heroes were such men as Cincinnatus, summoned from the plough to command the State; Curius Dentatus, receiving the envoys of the Samnites while he cooked his herbs over the fire; Decius and Regulus, self-devoted to death for their country's sake. In the Augustan age, the Stoic and the ideal Roman were felt to be closely akin. There is a Stoic breath in the pessimism of Livy and Vergil, and the hope of their times for a new Golden Age and a great moral reform was often tinged by Stoic influence. It was not unnatural that many of the national heroes of later creation should be Stoics: Rutilius, 'the Roman Socrates,' who suffered on a false charge of the very crimes which he had repressed, Cato of Utica, Paetus Thrasea, and Helvidius Priscus. Even the Stoics who had opposed his predecessors on the throne, were heroes and martyrs in the eyes of Marcus Aurelius.

14. Like all the other Greek philosophies of the later time, late Stoicism laid peculiar stress on conduct, and paid comparatively little heed to old theological and cosmological speculation. It carried to a higher pitch than other schemes the enthusiasm for morality, which it raised almost to the level of a religion. A school which proclaimed the worthlessness of all ambitions except the ambition to achieve pure virtue within the soul, which regarded 'Nature' as the teacher of all simplicity, which deemed that man most god-like who had the smallest wants and the most perfect control over his desires, which enjoined absolute submission to a Divine order, and aimed at complete harmony between the individual and the Divine will, could claim affinity with what the best Romans regarded as the true Roman spirit. The Stoic made higher moral claims than other teachers; he was therefore more severely judged by the outside world. It has been easy for the detractor in ancient and modern times to contrast the professions of many Roman Stoics with their practice, and so to exhibit their school as worthless. In equally easy fashion has the worthlessness of Christianity often been alleged. It is certain that for the Romans, and for Western society generally, during many generations Stoicism was a leaven which worked powerfully for good, transforming the noblest natures most, but more subtly affecting the tone of life over a wide area. Profoundly influencing Roman law, and creating an atmosphere which the early Church inhaled, the ideal pursued by the Roman Stoics has transmitted much to the culture of the modern world. In particular, the growth of asceticism within the early Church was made easier because society was permeated with Stoic ideas and ideas akin to them.

15. The Cynic School, which was well represented in the Imperial age, exaggerated all the ascetic elements in Stoicism. Some of the Stoics even pronounced Cynicism 'a short road to wisdom.' Cynicism was indeed Stoicism 'heated seven times more than it was wont to be heated.' Epictetus draws a striking picture of the true Cynic (*Diss.* iii. 22). He has thoroughly accepted the old Greek doctrine, which left its traces in many systems, that the body is the tomb of the spirit. The soul must turn to God for release, and liken itself to Him, so far as human strength will go, and must regard all material conditions as hampering and evil. But ascetic features were not wanting to many other sects besides the Cynics and the Stoics. They were conspicuous even in the much maligned Epicurean School. Although the motive power in human action was differently viewed by Stoics and Epicureans, yet the practical road to happiness laid down by both was much the same. The would-be happy man must learn to control, to limit, and to repress his desires, and to make himself independent of all that lies beyond his own power. Epicurus could rival Zeus in happiness on a diet of bread and water; and it was a maxim among Epicureans that the man of perfect wisdom would not cease to be happy if he were stretched upon the rack. Human misery was held to spring in large part from the mistaken value set on things external to the soul—the rest of it being due to superstition. Like other moral and all religious schemes, Epicureanism could be distorted and travestied, and could stray far away from the lines laid down for it by its founders and leaders. But true Epicureanism and true Stoicism were two trees which bore much the same moral fruit, however unlike they might be at the roots. Many of the most ascetic lessons in morality which are laid down by Seneca were drawn from the writings of the Epicurean brotherhood.

16. Platonism was early influenced by Stoicism, and the Neo-Platonic movement of the third and later centuries resumed and enforced the ascetic elements in the earlier systems. Philosophic sects and cliques other than those which have been named also existed; and nearly all showed some drift towards asceticism. But the most important movement of all was that great missionary movement which began early in the period of the Empire. Philosophers, often Cynics, but often also calling themselves by other names, left their studies and went forth into the streets of the great cities and preached to the people, urging them to change their lives and to follow after purity and abstinence, and to listen to the Divine call. The bearded preachers, wandering from city to city in coarse attire, have often reminded the modern student of the poor friars of the Middle Ages, who might have used without change many of the phrases uttered by their Stoic, Cynic, or Epicurean predecessors. Indeed, some of their utterances ring very like those of the 'revivalist' of modern days. Refined triflers like Lucian ridiculed and vilified these enthusiasts, but the common people heard them gladly, and thronged to drink in their lessons. Doubtless some impostors traded on this demand for instruction; but when every deduction has been made on account of the sounder ancient criticism, such as that by Epictetus, it would be unreasonable to doubt that these teachers did stir among the lower grades of society some yearnings after a better life. We cannot measure their influence with precision, but they must have contributed to swell the tide which bore Christianity on to its assured triumph. That the philosophic influences in the late Empire were far from worthless is seen by the example of Boethius, who, Christian as he was, found his chief consolation in philosophy.

LITERATURE.—Information bearing on this subject is to be sought in the great modern works bearing on Roman religion and on late ancient philosophy. Among them may be mentioned: **Wissowa**, *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (Munich, 1902); **Réville**, *La Religion romaine sous les Sévères* (Paris, 1886); **G. Boissier**, *La Fin du paganisme* (Paris, 1894); **F. Cumont**, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra* (2 vols., Brussels, 1895-99), and *The Mysteries of Mithra* (Eng. tr. from 2nd Fr. ed., Chicago, 1903); **Zeller**, *History of Greek Philosophy* (2 vols., London, 1881); **Dill**, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London, 1904); and **A. Gasquet**, *Le Culte et les mystères de Mithra* (Paris, 1899)

J. S. REID.

ASCETICISM (Semitic and Egyptian).—Asceticism, if it means the habitual renunciation of the things of the flesh as a self-discipline for the purpose of cultivating the things of the spirit, was unknown among the old heathen Semites and Egyptians. Asceticism is fundamentally based on a dualistic conception of the universe. It is justified only by the belief that matter is inherently corrupt—that it is the work, in whole or in part, of a being other than the Creator of the soul. Such a conception had no existence among either Semites or Egyptians. To the Semites in the earliest times the soul was simply the physical breath. It sometimes in later periods designated the inner nature of man, and thus was often used for the self, but it was always closely connected with the body, and was never conceived as of such a different order of existence that it could be benefited by the destruction of the body. That God who had made the body breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul (Gn 2^{7}), is the general Semitic conception. The soul was no holier than the body, for both were the work of the same deity. So dependent was the soul on the body, that after death the soul's existence was confined to the under world where the body had been placed—a dark and gloomy region, where it led a miserable and half-animate existence (see 'Ishtar's Descent,' *KB* vi. 80-91; Dhorme, *Choix de textes*, 326-341; or *Bab. and Assyr. Literature*, Aldine ed., 408-413; also Is $14^{9ff.}$ and Ezk 32^{18-32}). So closely was the soul associated with the body, that later, when Semites came to believe in a resurrection, they necessarily held to the resurrection of the physical body. Indeed, the early Semitic conception of the manifestation of divinity through the processes of procreation (see Barton, *Semitic Origins*, ch. iii.) shows that their conceptions were removed as far as possible from asceticism.

The Egyptian conception of the soul was different. They held it to be a concrete entity, impalpable during life, which had its residence in the body, but left it at the moment of death. Another entity was the *ka*—an impalpable something connected with every man. Whether it was his double, or his guardian spirit or genius, is not clear (see Steindorff, *Rel. of the Anc. Egyptians*, 121 f.). These were not, however, considered holier than the body, nor were their interests promoted by its destruction. On the contrary, the body had to be preserved for their use, and so preserved that each soul could recognize its own body; hence the great efforts made in Egypt to mummify the bodies of the dead.

It is clear, therefore, that among the peoples of whom we are speaking the fundamental thought-basis of asceticism did not exist. There are some phenomena, nevertheless, in the religions of these peoples which might to a superficial thinker seem to contradict this view. These must be briefly considered.

1. *Fasting* was practised by the Egyptians (Herod. ii. 40), by the Babylonians and Assyrians as is shown by their penitential hymns (cf. Zimmern, *Babylonische Busspsalmen*, 34; and *Bab. and Assyr. Lit.*, Aldine ed., pp. 434, 437), by the Hebrews (cf. 1 K $21^{9.\ 12}$, Lv $16^{29.\ 31}$ 23^{27-32} etc.), and by the Arabs, as is shown by the great fast of the month Ramaḍān, which has been taken over into Islām. A careful study of Semitic and Egyptian fasting makes it clear that it was not an ascetic practice. W. R. Smith (*Rel. of Sem.*[2] 434 ff.) held that in the beginning Semitic fasting was a preparation of the body for the reception of holy food—a view which Benzinger shares ('Fasting,' in *EBi*). This is evidently the conception of it which the Egyptians entertained, if Herodotus may be trusted, for he says the fasting was immediately followed by a sacrifice and a banquet. In the later development of Semitic thought among the Babylonians and Hebrews, fasting was undoubtedly regarded as a means of expressing penitence for sin, and of exciting the pity of the offended deity. This is the view which is expressed in the penitential psalms. It is based, however, on their conception of sin, and, as is shown below, that had nothing to do with asceticism.

2. Another practice which might be interpreted by some to indicate the presence of asceticism was the *abstinence from sexual intercourse* under certain conditions. Thus 'to lie with a woman having her sickness' was tabu (Lv 20^{18}). This was not, however, a manifestation of asceticism, but the tabu arose from the belief that menstruation was a manifestation of Divine power with which it was dangerous to come into contact. Herodotus tells us that among the Babylonians and Arabs all sexual intercourse was followed by purification (i. 198), which means simply that it was regarded as an especially Divine process (cf. W. R. Smith, 425 ff., 446 ff.). Sexual intercourse was also tabu among both Egyptians and Semites within the holy precincts of a sanctuary (cf. Herod. ii. 64, and W. R. Smith, 45 ff. and 481 ff.). This was the case even when sacred prostitutes were connected with the temples, for these were careful to take their partners outside the sacred precincts (cf. Herod. i. 199). It was also prohibited to warriors—war being to the ancients a holy function—and often to people under a vow. While the origin of these tabus is not altogether clear, they had nothing to do with asceticism. The tabu relating to holy places does not apparently belong to the earliest stratum of Semitic religious thought, for in the earliest period sexual licence appears to have formed a part of the religious feasts (cf. Barton, *Sem. Or.* 110). Probably at first sexual pleasures were tabued to those on pilgrimage for a reason similar to that which prescribed fasting, viz. that the body might be the better prepared for the holy function at the festival. The tabu may afterwards have been applied to the holy place as an extension of this, or may have existed from the first lest the exercise of such a holy function in a sacred spot would make it too dangerous for one afterwards to mingle with his fellows. The application of the tabu to warriors is an extension of the tabu attaching to the holy place. Sexual intercourse was also renounced by those under a vow, perhaps for the same reason that food was sometimes renounced, *i.e.* as a motive for the early performance of the vow (cf. Ac 23^{14}). In any case these tabus do not spring from ascetic principles.

3. The conception of *sin* which is found in the OT, the Babylonian penitential psalms, and in lesser degree in the Qur'ān (cf. Toy, *Judaism and Christianity*, 183 ff.; Morgenstern, *The Doctrine of Sin in the Babylonian Religion*, 1905; and Qur'ān, iv. 35), has no ascetic foundation. This consciousness of sin arose from the want of harmony between environment and life, or the disparity between prosperity and merit, and had nothing to do with ascetic conceptions.

There were two apparent exceptions in ancient Semitic life to the statements made above: the Essenes (*q.v.*) in Judæa, and the *rāhibs*, *sā'ihs*, and *ḥanīfs*, who existed in Arabia at the beginning of Muhammad's career (see ASCETICISM [Muslim]). These were, however, not real exceptions, as in each case the impulse to ascetic practices came from non-Semitic sources.

The fullest contemporary description of the *Essenes* is in Josephus, *BJ* ii. 8. It appears that sunrise was a sacred time to them, though

Josephus does not, like Appian, imply that they worshipped the rising sun. The other ascetic traits connected with them were that they lived in brotherhoods, avoided trade, paid great attention to ceremonial purity, and some of them renounced marriage. Some regard this last as a natural heightening of Levitical purity, because priests had to be purified from sexual contact before performing priestly functions; others look upon it as a practice which could spring only from a dualistic conception of the universe, such as we find in Zoroastrianism. The reverence for the rising sun also points in the direction of Persian influence. Josephus makes it clear that the Essenes were confined to no locality, but were a brotherhood, about 4000 in number, scattered through the cities of Palestine. How the Persian influence reached them may be variously explained, but from the time of Cyrus the channels through which it might come were open.

Among the Arabs, the *rāhibs*, or monks, the *sā'iḥs*, or wanderers, and the *ḥanīfs*, who were regarded as a kind of monk, were probably imitations of Christian monks. We learn from the pre-Islāmic Arabian poetry in what high regard the Christian monks were held during that period. In the break-up of Arabian heathenism it was no wonder that men endeavoured to find satisfaction in the way of life which was followed by these monks and anchorites. Monasticism (*q.v.*) entered Christianity from non-Semitic sources, and in a mild form was transmitted by Christianity to Arabia. The same is true of Egypt, though monasticism in Egypt was Christian, and became much more intense than in Arabia. It was grafted on to Egyptian life, however, from a foreign source.

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AL-ASH'ARĪ.—Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Ismā'īl al-Ash'arī was born at Baṣra in A.H. 260 (A.D. 873), of a noble and ancient Arab family; several of his ancestors held high offices in the State, and it was one of them, Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī, Governor of Kūfa, who after the battle of Ṣiffīn represented the cause of 'Alī in the arbitration that resulted in the proclamation of Mu'āwiya as Khalīf (A.D. 658). Of his father little is known except that he was an orthodox Muslim, a student of the Traditions, and a friend of the Shāfi'ite legist Zakarīyā ibn Yaḥyā al-Sājī. Baṣra had long been a centre of active religious controversy, and had been the home of some of the most famous teachers of the Mu'tazilite school, such as Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā, Abū al-Hudhayl, and others, and at this period—the end of the 3rd cent. of the Hijra—Abū 'Alī Muḥammad al-Jubbā'ī was famous there as the greatest living exponent of the Mu'tazilite doctrines. Al-Ash'arī seems soon to have broken away from the orthodox influences of his home and to have become a zealous Mu'tazilite as the pupil of al-Jubbā'ī. Until his 40th year, he attended al-Jubbā'ī's lectures and took an active part in the disputations of his school; having a ready wit and an engaging delivery, he was not infrequently called upon by his master to take his place, whenever al-Jubbā'ī was not prepared to lead the discussion. We have no certain information as to the mental processes through which al-Ash'arī passed before he abandoned the Mu'tazilite position, at the age of 40, and went over to the orthodox party. His biographer gives the following dramatic account of the manner in which he publicly announced his conversion: 'He shut himself up in his house for fifteen days and refused to see any one; then making his way to the great mosque of Baṣra, he went up into the pulpit and cried out, "O assembly, I have absented myself from among you so long only because I have been absorbed in meditation, for the opposing doctrines seemed to me to be equally balanced, and the true did not outweigh the false nor the false the true; so I prayed unto God for guidance, and He has led me into the true faith, such as I have written down in these books of mine. I strip myself of all my former beliefs, just as I strip myself of this my garment." So saying, he took off the robe he was wearing and cast it from him, and distributed his books among the people' (Mehren, p. 252). The conversion of so eminent a thinker and so ardent a controversialist created a great stir, and the ability with which he now began to champion the orthodox position attracted to him a large number of disciples, so that he soon became one of the most celebrated teachers of his age, and theological problems were sent to him for solution from all parts of the Muslim world. He held several controversies with his old teacher, al-Jubbā'ī, who survived the defection of his pupil only three years. We have an indication of the character of such disputations in a story which several authorities tell in slightly different forms; but in spite of its doubtful authenticity and uncertain date (*e.g.* whether it belongs to the period after or immediately before his breach with the Mu'tazilites), it is undoubtedly characteristic of the theological controversies of this period. The story, as told by Ibn Ḫallikan, (No. 618, ed. Wustenfeld), is that al-Ash'arī proposed the case of three brothers, one of whom was a true believer, virtuous and pious; the second an infidel, a debauchee, and a reprobate; and the third an infant. They all died. What was the state of each one of them? Al-Jubbā'ī answered: 'The virtuous brother occupies a high place in heaven; the infidel is in the depths of hell; and the child is among those who have obtained safety.' 'Suppose,' asked al-Ash'arī, 'that the child should wish to ascend to the place occupied by his virtuous brother, would he be allowed to do so?' 'No,' replied al-Jubbā'ī, 'it would be said to him: "Thy brother attained to this place through his numerous works of obedience (to God), but thou hast no such works to show."' 'But suppose,' said al-Ash'arī, 'that this child said, "That is not my fault; Thou didst not let me live long enough, neither didst Thou give me the means of proving my obedience."' 'In that case,' replied al-Jubbā'ī, 'God would say, "I knew that, if I had allowed thee to live, thou wouldst have been disobedient and deserved the grievous punishment (of hell); I thus considered what was for thy advantage."' 'But suppose the infidel brother were then to say, "O God of the universe! since Thou knewest what his state would be, Thou must have known what mine would be; then why didst Thou consider what was for his advantage and not for mine?"' Then al-Jubbā'ī was put to silence (Spitta, p. 42). Indeed, al-Ash'arī seems to have become rather a thorn in the side of his old teacher, who at last declined further discussion with him; whereupon al-Ash'arī is said once to have concealed himself in a part of the lecture-hall where al-Jubbā'ī could not see him, and to have prompted a woman sitting near him with question after question to which al-Jubbā'ī was unable to give satisfactory answers, until at last he guessed the trick that was being played upon him. Of the rest of al-Ash'arī's life few details are recorded.

We know that he ended his days in Baghdad, but have no information as to why he left Baṣra, the scene of his earlier triumphs. He died in A.H. 324 (A.D. 935–6) in the arms of one of his pupils, with a curse on the Mu'tazilites upon his lips.

Al-Ash'arī was a voluminous writer, and a list of upwards of a hundred of his works has come down to us; some are theological, dealing with the exegesis of the Qur'ān or with the Traditions, others philosophical; but the greater part of them are of a controversial character—polemics against heretics and unbelievers of all kinds, and attacks upon individual thinkers, such as al-Jubbā'ī, al-Balḫī, and others of his contemporaries (Spitta, pp. 63–81). This list of his works also includes a number of pamphlets written by him in response to queries relating to difficult problems in theology and philosophy, and those authorities who give 200, or even 380, as the number of his writings must have reckoned up each one of these letters as a separate work. Out of this immense literary activity, only five treatises are known to have survived, and these exist in manuscript only.

The importance of al-Ash'arī in the history of Muhammadan theology lies mainly in the fact that he was one of the first to employ in the defence of orthodox doctrines the dialectic method, and those processes of reasoning and of proof of which the rationalists had made so effective a use. Orthodoxy thus learned to fight its opponents with their own weapons, instead of merely doggedly repeating texts and traditions in answer to all arguments and questions. Al-Ash'arī is in this respect typical of an intellectual need that was being felt by the orthodox party of his time for a rational statement and defence of their position; the same tendency manifested itself among his contemporaries in other parts of the Muhammadan world, such as al-Ṭaḥāwī in Egypt and al-Mātarīdī in Samarcand. Further, in stating his theological position, al-Ash'arī held a mean between the gross anthropomorphism of some of the traditionists and the philosophical speculations of the rationalists. Thus, while devoutly accepting the statements of the Qur'ān about the face, the hands, the eyes of God, and His sitting on His throne, as articles of faith, not to be interpreted as metaphorical expressions for the knowledge and power, etc., of God, he does not take them to imply a corporeal existence analogous to that of man, but explains them as being His qualities and free from all limitations of space. In his later writings, however, when apparently he had come under the influence of the Ḥanbalite school, he gave up all such attempts to explain these anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur'ān, and maintained that they must be accepted 'without asking how and without drawing any comparison,' *i.e.* with human qualities. Similarly, he took up a middle position between the fatalistic and the libertarian schools, which has been stated by Professor Macdonald as follows: 'Man cannot create anything; God is the only creator. Nor does man's power produce any effect on his actions at all. God creates in His creature power and choice. Then He creates in him his action corresponding to the power and choice thus created. So the action of the creature is created by God as to initiative and as to production; but it is *acquired* by the creature. By acquisition (*kasb*) is meant that it corresponds to the creature's power and choice, previously created in him, without his having had the slightest effect on the action. He was only the *locus* or subject of the action' (*Muslim Theology*, p. 192). As one of the most famous theologians of this school, Abū al-Ma'ālī Imām al-Ḥaramain (A.H. 419–478), puts it, al-Ash'arī holds that man has no power over the production of his actions, but has power over the acquisition of them, whereas the Mu'tazilites maintained that he has power over both, and the Fatalists that he has power over neither (Spitta, p. 141). In similar fashion, al-Ash'arī dealt with the great controversy on the nature of the Qur'ān, which had stirred the Muslim world to its depths, and had been made the subject-matter of decrees by successive Khalifs—al-Ma'mūn (in A.H. 202 and 218) giving official sanction to the Mu'tazilite doctrine that the Qur'ān is created, and al-Mutawakkil (in A.H. 234) as authoritatively establishing as the orthodox doctrine the belief that it is uncreated. While allying himself with the orthodox party in maintaining that the Qur'ān is the eternal, uncreated Word of God, al-Ash'arī rejected their extravagances about the letters and the ink and the sounds employed in reciting it being equally uncreated and eternal. The above examples are sufficient to indicate how far al-Ash'arī was willing to allow dialectic reasoning to be applied to theological questions, thereby avoiding the gross literalism of the anthropomorphic exponents of the orthodox position, and attempting to explain where hitherto any such attempt had been branded as heretical. But such concessions to a rationalistic method were made by him mainly in dealing with matters connected with the doctrine of *tauḥīd* ('unity'), such as the Attributes of God and the Word of God. In other matters he frankly accepted the orthodox position unmodified, *e.g.* the intercession of the Prophet, his journey to heaven (*mi'rāj*), the miracles of the saints, the evil suggestions of Satan, the coming of Antichrist, etc.

Al-Ash'arī was the founder of a theological movement that gradually won for itself a preponderating influence among Muhammadan sects, gaining a foothold first in 'Irāq, and later spreading eastward into Persia and westward into Syria and Egypt; introduced into the Maghrib by Ibn Tūmart (*q.v.*) in the 6th cent. of the Hijra, it became in a modified form the official doctrine of the Muwaḥḥids. The sect produced a number of remarkable thinkers, who by their independent speculations further contributed to the development of the system; among them the most distinguished were Abū Bakr al-Bāqilānī (ob. 403 A.H.) (*q.v.*), Abū Ja'far al-Sumnānī (ob. 444 A.H.), Abū al-Ma'ālī Imām al-Ḥaramain (ob. 478 A.H.) and al-Ghazālī (ob. 505 A.H.) (*q.v.*), who systematized the tenets of the sect into a body of doctrine that is accepted throughout the greater part of the Muslim world to the present day.

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T. W. ARNOLD.

ASHES.—The dust which remains after the burning of plants, animals, and human beings, has been used from the most remote times for various religious and semi-religious purposes. It is natural to think that, when once the use of fire was discovered, it would not be long before the ashes would be found to be valuable and be turned to some account.

1. In places where water is scarce, we know that sand has been used for *ablutions*. Where sand is scarce, ashes would provide an excellent substitute. And since, from the first, fire was regarded with awe and wonder, it is likely that the ashes were often thought to share its mysterious nature. At any rate, we know of the use of ashes in ablutions. Amongst the preparations which the Brāhmans made for any act of religion was an ablution called

'a bath sacred to fire,' the body being rubbed with ashes (Colebrooke, ii. 154).* Amongst the New Mexicans it was found that a newborn child was washed and then covered with ashes (Bancroft, i. 566). In this case, however, the ashes may have been used, not as part of the cleansing process, but for drying, or possibly for both purposes. People belonging to the Nahua nations were found by Bancroft to have a practice of rubbing an infant's joints, especially the knees, with ashes in order to strengthen them (Bancroft, ii. 277). This practice may have arisen from the other.

2. When ashes were used for ablutions, it would soon be noticed that the friction produced a healthy effect, or, as we should say, promoted the circulation.† In any case, it has been found that primitive folk also use ashes for *medical purposes*. Hot ashes would serve as a substitute for hot water. Thus the Nutkas apply them in order to cure headache, colic, or rheumatism; the Miwoks use a plaster of hot ashes for stomachic affections and cases of severe travail (Bancroft, i. 204, 396).‡ Vapour-baths are also produced by means of hot ashes. In parts of England the ashes of a consecrated box-tree, mixed with holy water, used to be thought an effective remedy for cold fever.§ Similar powers are attributed to the ashes of the Muhammadan sacred fire at Gorakhpur and to those of the Hindu Holi-fire; and in Ireland ashes from the bonfire on St. John's Day (June 24) are believed to aid the fertility of the fields (Crooke, ii. 197, 318). The Parsis of India dip their fingers in ashes, while the ancient Armenians venerated the ashes of the sacred fire, and scattered them in streams also considered holy. Among the modern Armenians, in like fashion, the ashes of the sacred fire kindled on Feb. 13 are held to protect men and cattle from sickness, and are carefully preserved or scattered on the four corners of the roofs, or in the stalls, the gardens, and the meadows (Abeghian, p. 73).

3. A more familiar use of ashes, however, is that associated with *mourning customs*. The Greeks showed their sorrow at bereavement by strewing themselves with ashes (Homer, *Il.* xviii. 22, *Odyss.* xxiv. 315; Plut. *de Superstit.* ch. 3; cf. Herod. ii. 85; Vergil, *Æn.* x. 844; Ovid, *Metam.* viii. 528), or by sitting in them (*Odyss.* vii. 153; cf. *Il.* xviii. 26); and the practice of sprinkling ashes over the head as a sign of affliction is wide-spread. But this simpler practice always seems to be an abridgment of the more elaborate ceremony. In course of time a mere sprinkling suffices instead of an actual sitting or lying in dust or ashes. It becomes a sign or simple expression of what was originally a stricter form of submission or humiliation, practised first before visible persons, and then before invisible beings as well. Herbert Spencer gives some interesting instances in support of this explanation of the custom. Thus, in the Congo regions of Africa, it was found that the person who would do homage to a *banza*, or village chief, prostrated himself, kissed the earth, and strewed dust over the forehead and arms. When the Dahoman made a salutation, he prostrated himself, and poured sand or earth upon his head. It was found that the Kakanda and Balonda people used the same ceremony; and we are told of the latter, that 'when they wish to be excessively polite they bring a quantity of ashes or pipeclay in a piece of skin, and, taking up handfuls, rub it on the chest and upper front part of each arm.' To what extent this ceremony underwent abridgment we see, when, instead of sprinkling dust on the head, people made salutations by pretending to do so (Spencer, ii. 124 f.). But originally the practice seems to have been one of humiliation. At the same time, even among primitive folk, other customs have been observed in which the ashes seem to be a mere badge of mourning. Thus it was found that some of the Californians mixed the ashes of a dead person with grease, and smeared their faces with the mixture. The dirt was allowed to remain until the action of the weather wore it off (Bancroft, i. 397). In the Arunta tribe of Central Australia, it was found that the widow of a deceased man smeared her hair, face, and breast with white pipeclay; hence she received the name *inpirta*, 'the whitened one.' Sometimes she smeared ashes from a fire over the pipeclay, and was then called *ura-inpirta*, *ura* meaning 'fire' (Spencer-Gillen, p. 500). Amongst the Athapascan Tacullies it was found that after a deceased man had been burned, the ashes were collected and put into sacks. Each wife then received one, and had to carry it on her person for two years, during which she was clothed in rags, kept in a kind of slavery, and not allowed to marry. At the end of this period of mourning, structures were erected, and the bags or boxes of ashes deposited in them (Bancroft, i. 126). Here again the bag of ashes seems to be a badge of mourning.

4. When bodies have been burned, instead of buried at once, the ashes have naturally been *regarded as sacred*. They are either buried afterwards, or left on the altar and the whole covered with earth, or thrown into a river to be carried out to sea, or carefully preserved in urns. In India, when cremation first took the place of ordinary burial, they were buried; at a later date they were thrown into a sacred river. Among the Nahua nations it was found that the ashes of the common people were placed in the yards of their houses, in the temple courts, in the mountains, or in the field. In time of war, even in the case of people who have not altogether adopted the practice of cremation in their native land, it has been the practice to burn the bodies of the slain, partly to prevent the enemy from mutilating them, partly that the warriors' ashes might be carried back to their native place. This explains the fact that in the Homeric poems only the burning of corpses is mentioned.* Sometimes the ashes are gathered with a good deal of ceremony. When the Brāhmans burn a corpse, the fire has to be so arranged that some of the bones may remain for the elaborate ceremony of gathering the ashes, which is performed by the nearest kinsman on the last day of mourning (Colebrooke, ii. 175 ff.). But it has not always been thought necessary to preserve all the ashes, or at least not all in the same place. Among the Nahua nations, it was found that, when a human victim was sacrificed, his heart, after being offered to the sun, was burned, and the ashes preserved with great care and veneration (Bancroft, ii. 307). Buddha gave directions that his body should be cremated, and a *dagoba* or *stūpa* ('reliquary monument') erected over the ashes. When the body had been burned, messengers came from the chiefs or kings of the tribes around and claimed the relics. To avoid dispute, these were divided amongst them, and placed in *stūpas* built for the purpose.† When

* Works are cited simply by their authors' names. The titles of the works will be found in the bibliography.

† In this particular instance, however, we possibly have a use of ashes which were supposed to possess special qualities.

‡ Some of the Californians took an internal dose of ashes for snake-bites. This, of course, is a different kind of treatment. We need hardly remind the reader that amongst primitive folk medicine is a part of religion. See MEDICINE-MEN.

§ It should be added here (cf. 5 below) that, according to Bede, the dust of Oswald, king of Northumbria, was preserved as a cure for sickness (see Brand, *Popular Antiquities of Great Britain*, ed. W. C. Hazlitt, i. 320).

* See H. Blumner, *Leben und Sitten der Griechen*, ii. 80 (Leipzig, 1887).

† See Hermann Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 428 (Berlin, 1897); and William Simpson, 'The Worship of Death,' in the *Transactions of the Lodge Quatuor Coronati*, No. 2070, p. 28.

Mr. William Simpson was in Jelalabad during the Afghan War, he excavated the remains of a Buddhist tope, called the Ahin Posh Tope, and was fortunate enough to come upon the relic-cell, where he found some brown dust which he supposed to be the ashes of the holy individual to whose sanctity the tope had been erected. Among the ashes was a golden relic-holder. The same writer tells us that amongst the Lāmas of Tibet also, when a holy man dies, a *stūpa* is made for his ashes. But he found another practice amongst them. The ashes are mixed with mud or clay, and small figures of Buddha are made of the mixture. These are then placed in the shrines where devotions are performed. But if the ashes of one person have sometimes been distributed, the ashes of two or more persons have sometimes been mingled. In this way Domitian and Julia, Achilles and Patroclus, were united in death. In other cases, family urns gathered up the ashes of kinsmen and friends.* It should be added that a king has been known to lie in state even when reduced to ashes. Thus it was found that among the Nahua nations they gathered the ashes and valuables of a Tarascan king, made them into a figure, dressed it in royal robes, and put a mask for its face, a golden shield on its back, and bows and arrows by its side (Bancroft, ii. 621).

5. Ashes have not only been regarded as sacred, but have sometimes been *thought to possess special virtues*. We hear of migrating tribes among the Nahua nations carrying the ashes of honoured chiefs with them to serve as talismanic relics (Bancroft, ii. 348), and of other savages inoculating themselves with ashes which represent and are supposed to impart moral and other virtues. Thus, as a protection against disease, a slight incision is made in a person's temple, and some powder made of the ashes of certain plants or animals rubbed into the wound, those plants or animals being chosen which denote certain special qualities (*e.g.* the claws of a lion might be used to impart bravery). In this way the fighting-men among some tribes of South-East Africa are inoculated with strength and courage in time of war (Frazer, ii. 361 f.).† Of a similar character is a practice found among the Tarianas and Tucanos and some other tribes. They disinter a corpse about a month after burial, reduce it by burning and pounding to a fine powder, mix this in large conchs of caxiri, and drink it, in the belief that by so doing they will imbibe the virtues of the dead man (Spencer-Gillen, p. 535 f.). The Cobeus were found to drink the ashes of the dead in the same way. It was a similar kind of belief in the virtues of human ashes that led the Romans to scatter in the city the bones of a general who had celebrated a triumph.‡ In Bavaria it has been customary to sprinkle ashes from the Easter fire on the land as a protection against hail-storms, and in Bombay caste is restored by swallowing ashes given by the *guru* (Crooke, i. 293). Ashes from the burning ground in India are used in 'black' magic (*ib.* p. 261).

6. A different use of ashes from any we have mentioned is found *in connexion with the belief in ghosts*. It has been a not uncommon practice to strew ashes on the ground in order to detect by the footprints the visits of ghosts or demons. The practice has been noticed amongst the Philippine islanders; and the Peruvians, instead of ashes, scattered flour of maize or quinua about the dwelling, to see 'by the footsteps whether the deceased has been moving about' (Spencer, i. 171). Amongst the funeral customs of the Hos of N.E. India, quite an elaborate rite has been observed, in which ashes are used to detect the return of a dead person's spirit; and similar customs exist in Mirzapur (Crooke, i. 176, ii. 72–74). Another practice has been noticed in Yucatan. A child is left alone at night in a place strewn with ashes, and the animal whose footprint is found on the spot in the morning is regarded as its guardian deity. With this may be compared the old superstition that the first bird or beast which appears after the birth of a child is its spiritual protector. In German folklore we hear of the little 'earth-men' leaving footprints in strewn ashes; and in England there was once a superstitious belief that, if on St. Mark's Eve ashes were sifted over the hearth, the footprints would be noticed of any one who was destined to die within the year (Tylor, ii. 197).

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MAURICE A. CANNEY.

ASH-MOUNDS (in Persia).—The ash-mounds of Persia are a series of elevations in the Province of Azarbaijan in north-western Persia, composed largely of ashes mixed with earth, and called 'Hills of the Fire-worshippers' by the modern inhabitants, who assign their origin to the fire-cult of the ancient Zoroastrians. Scores of these hillocks are scattered over the great plain around Lake Urumiah and the city of that name, which is associated traditionally with events in Zoroaster's life in Azarbaijan. The mounds are usually constructed of clay mingled with immense deposits of ashes that are saturated with nitrous salts of organic composition; and in many instances these elevations surmount a small natural eminence. It is generally conceded that there is nothing of a volcanic nature in their composition; and although we may not agree in all respects with the natives, who unanimously ascribe the origin of the mounds to the accumulation of ashes from fire-temples, century after century, we may assume that at least some of the hillocks were surmounted, in ages past, by sanctuaries dedicated to the worship of fire.

Many of these hills have been excavated in recent years by the neighbouring peasants, who have discovered the value of the alkaline quality of the ashes for fertilizing purposes and for the manufacture of saltpetre. Their casual diggings have revealed in one or two instances remnants of ancient walls, and have brought to light ancient pieces of pottery, terra-cotta figurines, and other relics of antiquity, like the small bas-relief cylinder of alabaster found at Geog Tapah, near Urumiah, and now preserved in the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York city. The design of the cylinder is archaic Babylonian in style, and among the figures carved upon it are the sun-god Shamash and the demi-god Ea-bani, as described by Dr. W. H. Ward in *American Journal of Archæology*, vi. 286–301. The Mission museum at Urumiah contains similar relics. No systematic excavations, however, have been carried on to determine the possible

* See Sir Thomas Browne, 'Hydriotaphia,' ch. iii (*Works*, ed. Sayle, Edin. 1907, vol. iii. p. 113).

† Modern psychology teaches that such a practice, however superstitious the original idea in it, might—and no doubt often did—have the desired effect. It would serve to remind the inoculated person of certain qualities, to concentrate the mind upon them, and so to produce them. This would be an instance of primitive folk having been led to adopt a custom for a reason of their own, which for another and a better reason has proved to be one of the factors in civilization.

‡ See F. Granger, *The Worship of the Romans*, 1895, p. 61 f.

value of the ash-hills as contributing to archæological knowledge or to a better understanding of the early religion of Irân. The study of the ash-mounds should furthermore be brought into connexion with the entire subject of kitchen-middens, cromlechs, and cairns.

LITERATURE.—For bibliographical references and a description and photographic illustrations of the Urumiah hillocks, see Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York and London, 1906, pp. 90–97. A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

ASHTART (ASHTORETH), ASTARTE.—*'Ashtart* (עשתרת) was a goddess worshipped by the Canaanites, Hebrews, Phœnicians, and in Phœn. colonies. This vocalization of the name is attested not only by *'Athtar*, *'Attar*, etc. in the cognate languages, but by the earliest documentary evidence. In the Amarna Letters (Winckler, 142. 10, 237. 21) it appears as *Ash-tar-tu*. In a Bab. tablet (*PSBA*, Mar. 1889, p. 174 ff.) *Ash-tar-tu* is given as the Pal. equivalent of Ishtar, and in the treaty between Esarhaddon and Ba'al of Tyre *As-tar-tu* is named as one of the chief gods of Tyre (Bezold, *Catalogue*, 539). The Gr. transliteration is Ἀστάρτη, which appears even in the LXX along with Ἀσταρώθ. Augustine (*Quæst. in Jud.* 16) gives *Estart* or *Astart*. The pronunciation עשתרת, *'Ashtōreth*, of MT is probably due to the substitution of the vowels of *bōsheth*, 'shameful thing,' as in 'Molech' for 'Melech' (Nöldeke, *GGA*, 1884, p. 1022).

1. **Origin.**—As to the origin of 'Ashtart, opinions differ. Hommel (*Zwei Jagdinschr.* 22), Delitzsch (*Assyr. Lesestucke*[4], *s.v.*), Driver (Hastings' *DB* i. 168), Zimmern (*KAT*[3] 420 f.), Jastrow (*Die Rel. Bab.* 81, 207 f.) hold that she is derived from the Babylonian goddess Ishtar. In favour of this view are the facts that Ishtar is mentioned in Bab. inscriptions long before the earliest mention of 'Ashtart, that Palestine was profoundly influenced by Bab. religion during the third millennium B.C., and that Ishtar is called *âshirat ilâni*, 'musterer of the gods,' which suggests a derivation of her name from Bab. *ashâru*, the same root from which *Ashshur* and *Asherah* may come (cf. Jensen, *KIB* vi. 409 f.).

There are, however, a number of difficulties in the way of this theory:—(1) This deity is found not merely in Babylonia and Assyria, but also in Canaan and among all the other Semites. In Syria she appears as *'Attar* or *'Atar* (see art. ATARGATIS); in Moab, as *'Ashtar* (see art. MOABITES); in South Arabia, as *'Athtar* (see art. SABÆANS); and in Abyssinia, as *'Astar* (Muller, *Epigr. Denkm. aus Abessinien*, 37 f.). In classical Arabic her name does not occur, though she herself is known under such epithets as *al-Lāt* and *al-'Uzza* (cf. Herod. iii. 8, where *al-Lāt* is identified with Urania = Astarte). It is hard to believe that the cult of Ishtar spread to all these races, since no other Bab. deity found such wide acceptance. It is more natural to suppose that 'Ashtar was a primitive Semitic goddess. (2) The phonetic changes that this name undergoes in passing from one dialect to another indicate that it is primitive Semitic. In Bab. א and ע are not distinguished. If Ishtar had been the original form, the appearance of the initial ע with the vowel *a* in all the cognates would have been impossible, and the second consonant would not have undergone the regular mutation Heb. ש = Arab. ث = Aram. ת. (3) The addition of the fem. ending *t* in 'Ashtar(t) is adverse to the theory of a direct borrowing of the Bab. Ishtar. (4) The absence of the fem. ending in 'Ashtar, Ishtar, favours the theory of a primitive Semitic rather than a Bab. origin of the name. Before the Semitic languages diverged from one another, the fem. ending was already developed, but a number of primitive words found in all the dialects, such as אם, רחל, are fem. without fem. ending. To this class Ishtar-'Attar appears to belong. If the Babylonians had coined this name after their separation from the parent stock, they would have appended the fem. ending. (5) The different genders of the name in the dialects witness to its primitive character. In South Arabia 'Athtar is masc., in Moab also apparently in the compound 'Ashtar-Chemosh. If these cults had been derived from Babylonia, where Ishtar was fem., the change of sex would have been impossible. If, on the other hand, 'Ashtar was a primitive Semitic name of some physical object, this might have been regarded as fem. by one tribe and masc. by another, just as in South Arabia *shams*, 'the sun,' was fem., while elsewhere it was usually masculine. (6) One of the most marked characteristics of the Babylonian Ishtar is her connexion with the planet Venus. There is no trace of this in other early Semitic religions, and this makes it improbable that she is the prototype of 'Ashtar, 'Athtar, etc. (7) The use of the plural *'ashtārōth* in the sense of 'offspring' (Dt 7^{13} $28^{4.\ 18.\ 51}$) cannot be explained from the goddess Ishtar, but points to a primitive Semitic root עשר. The Bab. association of Ishtar with אשר, accordingly, is to be regarded as merely one of the punning combinations of which there are so many instances in Bab. literature.

2. **Original sex and character.**—If 'Ashtar-'Athtar was a primitive Semitic name, the question then arises as to its original gender: Was it masculine, as in South Arabia and Abyssinia (*CIS* IV. i. 40. 4, 41. 2 f., 46. 5; Hommel, *Aufs. u. Abh.* 34; Mordtmann, *Him. Ins.* 862, 886[2]; Müller, *ZDMG* xxxvii. 4. 326; Barton, *Hebraica*, x. 52–59, 202–205), and apparently in Moab (*Mesha Ins.* 17; Barton, *Sem. Origins*, 141); or feminine, as in Babylonia, Assyria, Syria, Canaan, Israel, Phœnicia, and the Phœnician colonies? Zimmern (*KAT*[3] 420) holds that it was originally masc., on account of the absence of the fem. ending, but this proves nothing if the word belongs to the earliest period of Semitic language. Baudissin (*PRE*[3] 152) suggests that there were originally both a male and a female 'Ashtar, just as there were *ilu* and *ilat*, *Ba'al* and *Ba'alat*; but no other case exists where the fem. is expressed by the same word as the masculine. The most likely view is that 'Ashtar was originally feminine. This is the gender in all the Semitic languages except South Arabic and Moabite, and therefore is probably primitive. It corresponds also with early Semitic social organization. There is a large body of evidence to show that the Semites before their separation passed through a matriarchal stage of society (see W. R. Smith, *Kinship*, 131 ff.; Barton, *Sem. Origins*, 30 ff.). The tribe was a group of people inhabiting a particular oasis in the Arabian desert. It was made up of mothers and their brothers and children. The fathers were men of other tribes, dwelling in other oases, who contracted only temporary unions with the mothers. Descent was traced through the mother, and she was the head of the clan in peace and in war. In such a society the chief deity of the tribe must have been conceived as a counterpart of the human matriarch. Male divinities might exist and be known as חל, 'maternal uncle' (cf. חלכרב, חלאסר), but they would not be called 'father,' and would play so unimportant a part that they would survive only sporadically in later religion. This view is confirmed by the fact that all those traits which are oldest and most permanent in the character of 'Ashtart-Ishtar are those which for other reasons we must predicate of the ancient Semitic tribal mother.

(1) She is the goddess of *untrammelled sexual*

love. In the Ea-bani episode of the Gilgamesh Epic, one of the earliest monuments of Bab. literature (*KIB* vi. 166–171), she is represented as forming numerous unions which bring mischief to her suitors. In the Descent to Hades (*KIB* vi. 86 f.), sexual relations among men and animals cease the moment that she enters the under world. Prostitution as a religious rite in her service is widely attested: in Babylonia, by the Gilgamesh Epic (*KIB* vi. 122–129), Herodotus (i. 199), Strabo (xvi. 1. 20), Ep. Jer 43 (=Bar 6[43]); in Syria, by Lucian (*Dea Syr.* 22, 43); in Arabia, by Theodoret (*Hist. Relig.*, ed. Sirmond, iii. 883; cf. Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], 44); in the Phœnician colonies at Carthage, Cyprus, and Sicily, by Augustine (*Civ. Dei*, ii. 4), Herodotus (i. 199), *CIS* I. i. 86, Clement of Alexandria (*Protreptikos*, 12 f.), Arnobius (*adv. Gent.* v. 19), Justin (xviii. 5), Strabo (vi. 2. 5). Among the Hebrews and Phœnicians, *q'dēshôth*, or 'temple harlots,' are often mentioned, but they are not expressly connected with the cult of 'Ashtart (yet cf. Herod. i. 105). If, however, they belonged to her in the colonies, they doubtless belonged to her also in the home country. *Ba'alat*, 'mistress,' the goddess of Gebal (Byblus) is only a title of 'Ashtart, and prostitution in her service is described by Lucian (*Dea Syr.* 6 ff.). The identification of 'Ashtart with Aphrodite by both the Greeks and the Phœnicians is also evidence of her sexual character. In this aspect she is clearly a counterpart of the ancient Semitic woman, who bestowed her love as she pleased upon men of other and often hostile tribes, who was courted at the risk of life (cf. *Mu'allaqāt of Labîd* 16–19, *of 'Antarah* 5–22, *of Ḥârith* 1–9), and who had frequent occasion to bewail the death of some Adonis.

(2) 'Ashtart-Ishtar is a goddess of *maternity and fertility*. With her is associated her son Tammuz (see art. TAMMUZ). Under the title *bêlit ilê*, 'mistress of the gods,' she is represented in Assyr.-Bab. art bearing on her left arm a child, which she suckles at her breast, while with her right hand she caresses or blesses it (Bezold, *ZA* ix. 121, line 5). She is called *bânat-ilâni*, 'creatrix of the gods' (Haupt, *Akkadische und sumerische Keilschrifttexte*, 116 f. obv. 6). She is often designated the 'mother' or 'creatrix' of men (cf. Zimmern, *KAT*[3] 428 f.). In the Deluge Story (*KIB* vi. 238 f.) men are described as her offspring. In Babylon she was known as *Mu'allidtu* or *Mulittu* (מוּלִדְתּ), 'she who causes to bear,' from which is derived the name *Mylitta* in Herodotus, i. 131, 199 (Jensen, *Kosmologie*, 294, 515). In a Sabæan inscription (*JA*, 8 sér. ii. 256 ff.) 'Athtar, who is commonly male, is called 'the mistress, mother-'Athtar,' and is described as the giver of children. In Arabia the goddess was comparable to the Virgin Mary with the child Jesus (Epiphanius, *Panarion*, li.). The existence of the same conception in the West is attested by the Carthaginian proper name אסעשרת, 'Ashtart is a mother' (*CIS* 263), by the title 'mother' applied to the Paphian goddess, and by numerous myths of the sons of 'Ashtart (Aphrodite, Venus). In this aspect also she is the counterpart of the ancient Semitic woman, the fruitful mother of the children of the tribe.

(3) 'Ashtart-Ishtar is *a war-goddess*. She appears to Ashurbanipal robed in flames, with quivers on the right hand and on the left, a bow in her left hand, while with her right she draws a sword out of its sheath (*KIB* ii. 227, 251). In Babylonian art she is often depicted fully armed, standing on a leopard or a lion. In one hymn (Reisner, 108[44]) she says of herself, 'Into battle I fly like a swallow.' In like manner the Canaanite 'Ashtart was regarded by the Egyptians as a war-goddess (*ZÄ* ix. [1871] 119), and was depicted standing on a lion (Müller, *Asien*, 313 f.). The armour of Saul was placed as a trophy in the temple of the Philistine 'Ashtart (1 S 31[10]). Her statue at Cythera, a Phœnician colony, was in full armour (Pausan. iii. 23. 1), and there is little doubt that the armed Aphrodite and armed Venus of Gr.-Rom. art were perpetuations of Phœnician types. 'Attar at Hierapolis rode on a lion (Macrobius, *Sat.* i. 23. 18 f.). This warlike character of 'Ashtart stands in marked contrast to her maternal character, and is the basis of an antithesis often found in Gr. and Lat. poets. It finds a natural explanation in the analogy of the ancient Semitic matriarch, who was not only the mother of her tribe, but, like Deborah (Jg 5[7-15]) and Samsi queen of Aribi (*KIB* ii. 54 f.), its leader in battle.

Other traits of 'Ashtart-Ishtar are local or late, so that they cannot have belonged to the primitive conception of this deity. In Babylonia she is identified with the planet Venus (also with Sirius and Virgo), but this does not appear elsewhere, except in late writers who have been influenced by Babylonian theology (*e.g.* Suidas and Zonaras, *Lex. s.v.*; Lydus, *de Mens.* iv. 44; Athenæus, ix. 392 D; *Myth. Vatic.* i. 17, ii. 37, iii. 8; Philo Bybl. in Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum*, iii. 569. 24). The identification of 'Ashtart with the moon by Lucian (*Dea Syr.* 4) and Herodian (v. 6. 4) is unconfirmed by ancient evidence, and is due to theological speculation. The horns with which goddesses are depicted in Phœnician art are not those of the crescent moon but of a cow, and are probably derived from the Egyptian Hathor, with whom 'Ashtart was early identified (Müller, *Asien*, 314). On 'Ashtaroth Qarnaim, ''Ashtart of the two horns,' see Moore, *JBL* xvi. 155 ff.

In the light of the foregoing facts, the original conception of 'Ashtar(t) as a divine counterpart of the human matriarch seems to be established. When society changed from a matriarchate to a patriarchate, either a male deity was exalted to the chief place, and 'Ashtar(t) became his consort, as in Canaan, or her sex was changed, as in South Arabia and Moab. This could be done the more readily since her name had originally no feminine ending.

3. **Etymology of name.**—The original character of 'Ashtar(t) must guide us in the effort to find an etymology and a meaning for her name. If it is primitive Semitic, it must be derived from the root *'ashar*, Heb. עשר, Arab. عثر, Aram. ܥܬܪ. The *t* is infixed after the analogy of the Arab. VIII. stem *iqtatala* and Assyr. *kitshudu*, and is transposed with the sibilant after the analogy of Heb. *hishtaḥăwah* and Assyr. *qashdu* for *qadshu*. In Heb. and Aram. עשר means 'to be rich,' which represents Arab. غثر rather than عثر, and therefore throws no light on the primitive meaning of عثر.

In Arab. the common meaning for *'athara* is 'stumble,' but *'athr* and *'athart*, or *'aththa'i*, are used of palm-trees or seed-produce which are watered naturally; and *'athûr* means 'a channel to irrigate a palm tree such as is termed *ba'l*' (Lane, *Lex. s.v.*). If these words are primitive and not loan-words, the root may mean 'to be watered.' The parallelism in Ps 65[10] suggests the possibility of a similar meaning for עשר. If so, *'ashtar* in a reflexive sense may mean 'the self-watering,' *i.e.* 'the spring,' and in a passive sense 'the watered' or 'fertilized,' as in the Heb. *'ashtārôth*='offspring' or 'lambs.' All this, however, is very uncertain.

It does not seem unnatural that the primitive Semites should have regarded the numen of a spring as a divine matriarch, such as we have seen 'Ashtar(t) to be. To the spring, man and beast owed their lives in the arid desert. It formed the oasis about which as a centre the tribe rallied. It nourished the date palm, which furnished food, and which emphasized sex by its distinction of male and female trees, and its need of artificial cross-pollination. Everywhere throughout the Semitic world springs were holy (cf. Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 148–184), and the same is true even in modern Arabia and Syria (Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel.*, 94–96, 113–115). In the Sabæan inscriptions 'Athtar is entitled 'Lord of the water-supply' (*CIS* IV. i. 41; *ZDMG* liv. 245), and is described as the giver of harvests (*CIS* IV. ii. 104, 105). *Al-'Uzzā*, 'the mighty,' a title of the fem. 'Athtar, was connected with the sacred spring Zemzem at Mecca (Wellhausen, *Reste*[2],

34–45, 103). In a Bab. hymn (Haupt, *Akkadische und sumerische Keilschrifttexte*, 116 f.) Ishtar is described as 'the one who causes verdure to spring forth, . . . creatrix of everything.' Of Atargatis, Plutarch says, 'She is the divinity who out of moisture produces the seeds of all things.' Her chief sanctuary Hierapolis bore the native name of *Mabbog* (Bambyce; *i.e.* מַבּוּעַ 'spring'), and had a lake full of sacred fishes. At Askalon also she had a lake and sacred fishes, and was represented as a mermaid with a fish's tail (see art. ATARGATIS). One of the chief sanctuaries of the Phœn. 'Ashtart was at Aphaka (= אֲפִיק 'water-course'), at the point where the Adonis River bursts out of a cave in the side of Mt. Lebanon. Many nymphs of fountains and streams in Phœn. settlements may be only variant forms of 'Ashtart. On the whole, therefore, the etymology which connects 'Ashtart with a root meaning 'to be watered,' and interprets it as the numen of a spring, cannot be regarded as unreasonable (see W. R. Smith, *Semites*[2], 100; Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], 146; Lagarde, *Ges. Abh.* 14; Halevy, *REJ* ix. 182 *f.*; Hoffmann, *Phœn. Ins.* 21 *f.*; Baudissin, *Jahve et Moloch*, 23 *f.*; Schlottmann, *ZDMG* xxiv. 657 ff.; Noldeke, *ZDMG* xl. 742; Barton, *Sem. Origins*, 102 *f.*; Haupt, *ZDMG* xxxiv. 758).

4. Primitive worship.—As to the manner in which 'Ashtar(t) was worshipped in primitive times, we can only conjecture that those rites which are most ancient and most prevalent among the Semites were originally consecrated to her. Some offerings were cast into the sacred spring, as in Arabia (Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], 76), and in modern Syria (Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel.* 114, 270); but in other cases, such as bloody sacrifices, this was impracticable, and another point of contact with the goddess was needed. This was found in the *maṣṣēbāh*, or 'standing stone,' which was erected as a *beth-el*, or 'abode of deity,' near the spring. On this victims might be slain and offerings might be poured without contaminating the sacred waters. This was the form of the goddess at Petra (Epiphanius, *Panarion*, li.). Down to the latest times the 'Ashtart-Aphrodite of Paphos was identified with such a stone (Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 3; Serv. *Aen.* i. 720; Head, *Hist. Num.* 628). The *Ba'alat* of Gebal was similarly represented, to judge from a coin of this city (Pietschmann, *Phönizier*, 200). In Canaanite temples in general *maṣṣēbôth* rather than images seem to have embodied the mother-goddess. This is alluded to apparently in Jer 2[27] 'who say to the stone, Thou hast brought me forth' (see art. MASSEBAH). The sacred precinct around the *maṣṣēbāh* was enclosed with *'ăshērîm*, or 'totem posts,' which also received religious reverence and were early identified with 'Ashtar(t) (see art. POLES). Offerings were made of the fruits of the earth and of the increase of the flocks and herds. The first-born of animals were sacred. Circumcision was practised as a consecration of the reproductive powers, and the first-born child was sacrificed in order to secure increased fertility. In Gezer, where the cult of the mother-goddess is everywhere in evidence, the remains of hundreds of new-born infants have been discovered around the standing stones of the high place (for the existence of this custom among the Arabs, see Isaac of Antioch, ed. Bickell, 220). A spring feast was celebrated at the time when the lambs were born, and an autumnal festival at the time of the gathering of the date harvest. These occasions were marked by great sexual licence (see W. R. Smith, *Semites*[2], 469 ff.; Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], 94–101; Barton, *Sem. Origins*, 108–115; and art. SEMITES).

5. History of cult.—If 'Ashtart was a primitive Semitic deity, she must have been brought into Canaan by the first Semitic settlers. Her name first appears in the annals of Thothmes III. (B.C. 1478) in the name of the city *'A-s-ti-ra-tu* (Müller, *Asien*, 162, 313). In the Amarna Letters (*c.* B.C. 1400) this city is mentioned (*KIB* v., Let. 142. 10 237. 21). In the treaty of peace between Rameses II. and Khetasar (*c.* B.C. 1270) the 'Ashtart of the land of the Hittites is named (Breasted, *Egyp. Records*, iii. 172). Evidently the Canaanite mother-deity was so well known to the Egyptians that her name served as a general designation for foreign goddesses (Muller, *Asien*, 313 f.). In the mound of Gezer a large number of plaques have been discovered in pre-Israelite levels, representing a nude deity who is doubtless 'Ashtart. No other images, except of Egyptian origin, are found in these levels, and this indicates that 'Ashtart remained the principal, if not the exclusive, deity of the ancient Canaanites as of the primitive Semites (see art. CANAANITES).

In the OT 'Ashtart appears as a survival in the city-name *'Ashtārôth* (Dt 1[4], Jos 9[10] 12[4] 13[12. 31], 1 Ch 6[56(71)]). In Jos 21[27] = 1 Ch 6[56(71)] this is called Be'eshtera, i.e. *Beth-'Ashtart*, 'house of 'Ashtart.' The plural vocalization is not confirmed by the spelling in the Amarna Letters, and can hardly be due to the fact that several 'Ashtarts were worshipped at this shrine. It may perhaps be a plural of majesty like *'Elohim*. 'Ashtaroth-Qarnaim (Gn 14[5], 1 Mac 5[26], 2 Mac 12[21]) is perhaps to be distinguished from 'Ashtaroth. In Jg 2[13] 10[6], 1 S 7[3f.] 12[10]—all from a late Elohistic or Deuteronomic hand—it is stated that the Israelites in the period of the Judges worshipped the Ba'alim and the 'Ashtaroth of the land of Canaan. Here *'Ashtaroth* means no more than 'goddesses,' as in the Bab.-Assyr. formula *ilāni u-ishtarāti*, 'gods and goddesses'—a usage that occurs as early as the time of Ḥammurabi (L. W. King, *Ḥammurabi*, ii. 34). Since 'Ashtart was known to the Canaanites, and also probably to the pre-Mosaic Hebrews, there is no reason to doubt that she was worshipped by Israel after the conquest of Canaan. According to 1 S 31[10], the Philistines, who also were newcomers in Palestine, had adopted the cult of the Semitic mother-goddess (read the sing. with LXX τὸ Ἀσταρτεῖον). In 1 K 11[5. 33], 2 K 23[13] 'Ashtart is called the 'goddess' (or 'loathsome object') of the Sidonians, and her worship is said to have been favoured by Solomon. In the latter passages *'Ashtart* is construed as a proper name without the article. The same is true in the Phœn. inscriptions. We do not read of the 'Ashtart of Tyre and the 'Ashtart of Sidon, as of the Ba'al of Tyre and the Ba'al of Sidon. In עשתרת ארך of *CIS* 135, ארך is probably an epithet and not the name of the city Eryx. In spite of this, different 'Ashtarts were worshipped in different cities, and the plural, as noted above, could have the general sense of 'goddesses.' The use as a proper name, accordingly, is due, as in the case of *'Anm*, *'Ammi* (*q.v.*) to loss of the primitive meaning.

The worship of 'Ashtart in Phœnicia and the Phœn. colonies is well attested by inscriptions and statements in classical writers: at Sidon, by *Tabnith Ins.* 1, 2, 6; *CIS* I. i. 3. 15, 16, 18; 4. 5; Lucian, *Dea Syr.* 4; Achil. Tat. i. 1; Lydus, *de Mens.* iv. 44; Malalas, *Chron.* ed. Dind. p. 31; at Tyre, by Sanchoniathon (Philo Bybl. in Müller, *Fragmenta Hist. Græc.* iii. 569, fr. 24), Menander (in Josephus, *Ant.* VIII. v. 3, *c. Ap.* i. 18); at Um el-'Awamîd near Tyre, by *CIS* 8; at Ma'ṣûb, by the *Ma'ṣûb Ins.* 4; in Cyprus, by *CIS* 11. 3; 86A. 4 (cf. 46, 72), *CIA* ii. 168; at Gul near Malta, by *CIS* 132. 3; at Eryx in Sicily, by *CIS* 135; 140. 1; at Carthage, by *CIS* 255. 4 f.; 263. 4, *C. R. Acad. Ins.* 7, Dec. 1894, Augustine, *Quæst. in Jud.* 16, *Heptat.* vii. 16 (Migne, iii. 797). It is probable that Ba'alat, 'mistress,' the goddess of Gebal and other Phœn. towns (*CIS* 1. 2 ff.; 177; Philo Byb. in Müller, *Fragmenta Hist. Græc.* iii. 569; Melito in Cureton, *Spic.* 44), is only a title of 'Ashtart. Her cult was the same as that of 'Ashtart, and she is identified with Astarte by Plutarch, *de Iside et Osiride*, 15 (cf. Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* iii. 59). Tanith also and other Phœn. goddesses may be only local forms of 'Ashtart (see PHŒNICIANS). In Phœnicia, Cyprus, and most of the islands of the Ægean, statuettes have been found representing a nude female holding a dove. These are similar

in type to the plaques discovered at Gezer, and are generally believed to represent the Phœn. goddess (see Perrot and Chipiez, fig. 381 f.). On Phœn. coins she is represented standing on the prow of a galley with a mural crown on her head or in her hand.

Into Syria proper the cult of 'Ashtart seems never to have spread, on account of the strength of the native goddess Atargatis. Although 'Attar was originally the same as 'Ashtar, the two goddesses had diverged so far that they were never identified. Lucian (*Dea Syr.*) carefully distinguishes them. There was even a temple of Atargatis at Askalon alongside of that of Astarte, and Atargatis elsewhere invaded the territory of 'Ashtart. Accordingly, when Tertullian (*Apol.* 24), Artemidorus (*Oncirocrit.* i. 8), and Lydus (*de Mens.* iii. 35, iv. 44) call Astarte the goddess of Syria, this only shows a loose usage of the name Syria.

From the Phœnicians the cult of 'Ashtart spread to the Greeks and to the Romans. One inscription (*CIG* 6807) shows that her worship was carried, probably by Roman soldiers, as far as Corbridge in England. Hommel (*Neue Jahrb. f. Phil.* cxxv. [1882] 176; *Aufs. u. Abh.* 34) attempts to show that Aphrodite is etymologically the same as 'Ashtart; but this is doubtful. It is certain, however, that the Greeks identified 'Ashtart with Aphrodite (cf. the inscription from Delos in *Bulletin de Corresp. Hellénique*, vi. 1882, p. 473). Aphrodite often bears the title of *Urania* or *Cœlestis*, but this is also a title of 'Ashtart (Jer 7^{18} $44^{17f.\ 25}$; Sanchoniathon in Muller, *Fragmenta Hist. Græc.* iii. 569). Many of the seats of Aphrodite worship were originally old Phœn. sanctuaries. The temple of Urania Aphrodite at Askalon (Herod. i. 105) must be the same as the 'house of 'Ashtart' (1 S 31^{10}). The Aphrodite whose rites at Aphaka are described by Lucian (*Dea Syr.* 6) and Eusebius (*Vit. Const.* iii. 55), and whom Sozomen (*HE* ii. 5) calls *Urania*, can have been no other than the Ba'alat of Gebal whose identity with 'Ashtart has already been discussed. The shrines of Aphrodite in Cyprus also were certainly Phœn. foundations, and when Homer calls her Κύπρις and Κυθέρεια (*Il.* v. 330; *Od.* viii. 283, xviii. 193), he shows that she was derived by the Greeks from the Phœnicians. In like manner Venus Erycina of the Romans is identical with the old Phœn. 'Ashtart of Eryx, and Cicero says expressly (*de Nat. Deor.* iii. 59; cf. Lydus, *de Mens.* iv. 44) that there are four Venuses, one originating in Syria and Cyprus, who is called Astarte and is recorded to have wedded Adonis. Compare also what Lucretius says of 'Æneadum genetrix' in the opening lines of *de Rerum Natura*. It is clear, accordingly, that much information in regard to the cult of 'Ashtart may be gained from a careful sifting of the statements of classical authors concerning Aphrodite and Venus (see art. GREEK RELIGION). It is even possible that Rhea, Cybele, and other mother-goddesses of the ancient world may be ultimately derived from the Semitic 'Ashtart, or at least may be modified by her influence (see ATARGATIS, ISHTAR).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the discussions mentioned above, see **E. Meyer**, art. 'Astarte' in Roscher (1884); **Cumont**, art. 'Astarte' in Pauly-Wissowa (1896); **Baudissin**, 'Astarte und Aschera' (with full bibliography of earlier writers) in *PRE*[3] (1896); **Driver**, 'Ashtoreth' in Hastings' *DB* (1898); **Farnell**, *CGS*, chs. xxi.-xxiii. (vol. ii. 1896); **Moore**, 'Ashtoreth' in *EBi* (1899); **Barton**, 'Ashtoreth and her Influence in the OT,' *JBL* x. 73 ff., 'The Semitic Ishtar Cult' in *Hebraica*, ix. (1893) 133-165, x. (1894) 1-74, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins* (1902); **Haupt**, 'The Name Istar,' in *JAOS* xxviii. (1907) 112-119; **Lewy**, *Sem. Fremdw. im Griech.* 148, 186 f. See also the literature under ATARGATIS, ISHTAR.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON.

ASIA (Ethnology, Religions, and Ethics).—The distinctive title of *officina gentium*, formerly awarded to Asia by common consent, was based mainly on her vast population, which greatly exceeded that of all the rest of the known world. Now it may be taken in a more literal sense, as indicating that this continent is really the *officina*, the true cradle of the human species. In art. ETHNOLOGY it is shown that man was specialized most probably in Malaysia during Pliocene times, that is, while that insular region still formed part of the Asiatic mainland.

From this centre of origin and dispersion the first migratory routes, still in the late Pliocene or early Pleistocene Age, may now be followed almost step by step through the Malay Peninsula, Indo-China, and India to the Tibetan plateau, which was not yet so sharply cut off from those lands as it afterwards was by the continuous upheaval of the Himalayan system. Recently a very old station on this route was revealed in the P'ahang district, north of Johore (Malay Peninsula), where a rudely worked stone implement was found resting on limestone rock 45 feet below the surface, among some river gravel, above which was a bed of clay 43 feet thick, derived from the decomposition of the greenstone hills skirting the Tui river valley. These hills had been overlaid by the limestone deposit, and it was only when the limestone had been sufficiently denuded to allow the greenstone to emerge that the latter rock began to yield its clay. 'The amount of denudation since this emergence has been at least 300 feet' (*Straits Times*, 14th Feb. 1902). Farther north, Dr. Noetling discovered (1894) another palæolithic station in the Yenangyaung district, Upper Burma, where some chipped flints were found *in situ* in a Pliocene bed associated with *Hipparion antelopinum* and other long extinct fauna (*Natural Science*, April, 1897). In India, palæoliths are yielded, often in great abundance, by the Pleistocene beds and drift gravels of the Mirzāpur, Arcot, Orissa, Hyderābād, Narbadā, Gangetic, and other districts. Many of the objects are of the same type as those of the European Drift, and are certainly contemporaneous or even of earlier date (*JAI* xvii. 57 f.).

These primitive Indo-Malayan wanderers may thus easily have converged both from India and Indo-China on the Tibetan tableland, which, under conditions far more favourable than at present, would almost inevitably have become a new centre of specialization and dispersion for the human, as it has for so many other mammalian, species. Here was ample space, such as seems needed for the evolution of all new varieties; a different and cooler climate than that of the Torrid Zone, though, owing to its then lower altitude, more genial than at present; boundless plains intersected by ranges of moderate height, and diversified by a lacustrine and fluvial system far more extensive than that revealed by modern exploration. Here, therefore, the Indo-Malayan Pleistocene precursor must necessarily have become modified in the process of adaptation to his changed environment, and thus gradually have acquired the physical features characteristic of the Mongol division of mankind. Neither colour of the skin, texture of the hair, nor stature could present any difficulty, since in all these respects the Mongol type stands actually nearer than does the Negro to that of the generalized Quaternary ancestor (de Quatrefages). Taken as a whole, the Mongol archetype differs from the other divisions—black, white, red—mainly in the general yellowish complexion, the broad flat features, with prominent cheek-bones, small mesorrhine nose, mesognathous jaws, brachycephalous (short) head, somewhat sunken eyes, with a narrow almond-shaped aperture between the lids, a vertical fold of skin over the inner canthus, and the outer angle slightly raised; lastly, the highly

characteristic dark blue spot in the lower sacral region peculiar to all true-born Mongols, but disappearing in infancy, and said to be common also to the Simian young (Dr. Balz, quoted by Dr. O. Nachod, *Gesch. von Japan*, 1906, p. 35). The oblique eye with its fold is also a distinct racial mark, whereas the black, lank, and rather coarse hair, round in transverse section, though constant is not exclusive, being common also to the American aborigines, and forming the most marked somatic link between the Mongol and American Indian divisions.

From the central Tibetan plateau this *Homo asiaticus fuscus*, as he has been named by Linné, radiated during the Stone Ages over the greater part of the continent, northwards to Mongolia, Siberia, and the Amur basin, eastwards to China and Indo-China, westwards to the Tarim basin, the Aralo-Caspian depression, and Mesopotamia, southwards to India as far as the Vindhyan uplands. Most of the Asiatic mainland was thus first occupied by peoples of proto-Mongol stock, who in their several new environments developed a number of sub-groups distinguished by more or less marked physical, mental, and linguistic characters. Such are the so-called *Hyperboreans*, comprising the now nearly extinct Yukaghirs, Chukchis, Koryaks, and Kamchadales of the Arctic region east of the Lena basin; the wide-spread *Mongolo-Turki* family, whose chief branches are the Mongols proper, the Tunguses with the Manchus, Koreans, Japanese, and Liu-Kiu Islanders, in the east, the Turks or Tatars, the Yakuts, Kirghizes, Samoyeds, and Ugro-Finns, in the north and west, ranging from the Lena basin to Lapland and Hungary, and loosely connected by their common agglutinating Ural-Altaic speech, of which Korean and Japanese appear to be aberrant members; the *Tibeto-Chinese* section, including the Tibetans, the Chinese, the Indo-Chinese, and several south Himalayan groups, all of more or less monosyllabic isolating speech; the extinct or absorbed *Akkado-Sumerians* of Babylonia, whose highly agglutinating pre-Semitic language is by many affiliated to the Ural-Altaic family (details in art. ETHNOLOGY, 'Conspectus).'

This first Mongol settlement of Asia left free the southern and south-western regions—a great part of India, Irania, Caucasia, Asia Minor, Syria, Canaan, and Arabia, *i.e.*, about one-fourth of the whole continent. During the early Stone Ages, most of the south-western section was occupied by various branches of the Caucasic division, ranging eastwards from North Africa, where that division appears to have been specialized (see art. AFRICA). Amongst the first arrivals were the *Semites*, who ramified from the common Hamito-Semitic stock, and occupied the Arabian Peninsula, of which they have always held exclusive possession, and whence they migrated later into Mesopotamia, Syria, and Asia Minor, becoming differentiated in their new homes as Himyarites, Arabs, Phœnicians, Canaanites (Israelites, Amorites, and others), Aramæans (Syro-Chaldæans), Assyrians, and perhaps Hittites. Other early streams of migration from Africa are now represented by the *Georgians*, *Circassians*, *Lesghians*, and others of the Caucasus, where they are distinguished by a surprising diversity of speech (whence the expression 'mountain of languages' of the mediæval Arab writers), and often by an almost ideally perfect physical type, owing to which 'Caucasic' was adopted by Blumenbach as a suitable conventional name of the white division, that is, of Linné's *Homo europæus albus*. Then came the Caucasians of Aryan speech, commonly called *Aryans* or *Indo-Europeans*, whose provenance and centres of dispersion are still moot questions, but whose various Asiatic branches are found at the dawn of history already settled in Asia Minor (Hellenes, Phrygians, Lydians, Armenians, and others), in Irania (Medes, Persians, Kurds, Afghans, Baluchi, and others), in the Hindu-Kush, Pamirs, and North India (Siah-Posh, Dards, Galchas, Vedic Aryans).

In India these Aryans were probably preceded by a now submerged *Negrito* element from Malaysia, by the *Kolarians* of the Vindhyan uplands, and by the *Dravidians* of the Deccan and Ceylon. There is no certain clue to the origin of the last two, who present mixed physical characters and speak two radically distinct agglutinating languages, Kolarian especially being of an extreme type. In its morphology it remotely resembles the Finno-Turki branch of the Ural-Altaic family, but, like Dravidian, in other respects differs profoundly from all other known forms of speech. But it is generally, and perhaps rightly, assumed that the Kolarians entered India from the north or north-east, and the Dravidians from the north-west, and that both may have been offshoots of the Mongol stock afterwards greatly modified in their new tropical homes.

This first occupation of Asia mainly by the Mongols, but also largely by the Caucasians, has undergone great changes and shiftings, brought about by the ceaseless migratory movements and racial struggles which, beginning in remote prehistoric times, were continued throughout the historic period, and are still in progress. Evidence is now available to show that the Mongol domain was encroached upon and traversed north and south by neolithic whites penetrating from Europe across Siberia and Mongolia to Manchuria, Korea, and Japan, and apparently from Africa through Syria, Caucasia, Irania, and north India to Indo-China and Malaysia. The strain of white blood is very marked amongst the Manchus and Koreans, while the Ainus, the true aborigines of Japan, are now definitely declared by Nachod to be neolithic Caucasians (*Gesch. von Japan*, 1906, I. 1.). The route followed seems indicated by the station near Tomsk, West Siberia, where, in 1896, numerous worked flints and some human remains were found by Prof. Kashchenko in association with those of a mammoth. Farther east, A. P. Mositz explored (1895) five pre-historic stations in Transbaikalia, in one of which he found two highly dolichocephalic pre-Mongol skulls of the early European type (*L'Anthropologie*, 1896, p. 82). In Korea, where the evidence accumulates, H. S. Saunderson remarks on 'the frequency with which features almost European in refinement and Caucasian in cast are met with.' Here the numerous flint implements and dolmens, like those of Britain and North Africa, must be accredited to the San-San aborigines who occupied the peninsula long before its conquest by the Mongoloid Sien-pi from Manchuria.

The southern highway may similarly be traced from Africa through Syria, where Prof. Zumoffen describes seven stations of the early and later Stone Ages (*L'Anthropologie*, 1897, pp. 272, 426), and thence through Caucasia, India, and the Khāsi Hills to Indo-China, where the evidence again abounds. Here are numerous Caucasic groups intermingled or associated with the Mongol substratum, and conspicuous especially amongst the Kahyens of North Burma, the Cambodians of the Lower Mekhong, the Mosso, Lolo, Man-tse, and many other hillmen all along the Chinese borderlands from Assam to Annam. Mrs. Bishop (Miss Bird) describes the white Man-tse, visited by her in 1896, as 'quite Caucasian, both men and women being very handsome.' Prince Henri d'Orléans was reminded by the Kiu-tse (Khanungs, Lu-tsé) of some of his European acquaintances. Dr. Billet met some Nong people 'with light and even

red hair'; and M. R. Verneau tells us that the Mans and T'hai 'differ altogether from the Mongol group represented by the Chinese and Annamese. The Mans especially show striking affinities with the Aryan type' (*L'Anthropologie*, 1896, p. 602).

In the extreme west the racial movements resulted in Mesopotamia in the extinction of the Akkado-Sumerian Mongols by the Caucasic Semites over 4000 years ago. After the rise of Islām these and most other Semites became Arabized in speech and religion, while in Asia Minor nearly all the early Caucasic peoples were displaced by the Muhammadan Turki hordes from Central Asia. Anatolia has thus become by conquest a part of the Mongol domain, which has also encroached on a considerable section of North Irania, that is, the hilly district between Herāt and Kābul, now occupied by numerous Aimak and Hazara tribes, who are ethnically Mongolo-Turks, Muhammadans in religion, and now of Aryan (Persian) speech.

In Irania and the Aralo-Caspian steppe, that is, the *Irān*, or 'land of light,' and *Turān*, the 'land of night,' of the Persian poet-chroniclers, a perpetual struggle for the ascendancy has been maintained throughout the historic period between the nomad predatory hordes of the northern wastes and the cultured agricultural populations of the fertile southern lands. These southern Aryans were dominant under the old Persian empire of the Achæmenians, which extended from the Ægean to the Oxus and Indus, and fostered the growth of flourishing settled communities throughout Central Asia. Thus it was that Irān interpenetrated Turān, expanded its higher culture by the very enlargement of its own borders, and, when further stimulated by Hellenic influences, invaded the wilderness itself. In the Tarim basin, at that time a fertile well-watered region, there arose a great centre of Iranian and Græco-Bactrian civilization, the remains of which, after lying buried for some two thousand years under the advancing sands of the Takla-Makan Desert, have again been brought to light by the Sven Hedin expeditions of 1895 and 1900, and more fully explored by Dr. M. A. Stein, who in 1901 recovered great quantities of hidden treasures, now deposited in the British Museum (*Sand-buried Ruins of Khotan*, 1903).

Later, the Caucasian ascendancy in Central Asia disappeared before the repeated invasions of Huns, Finns, Turks, and other Mongol hordes, but has been again restored, at least politically, by the spread of the Russian power over the trans-Caspian region in recent times. To these incessant ethnical movements, dislocations, and interminglings are due those intermediate Mongolo-Caucasic populations, such as the Ugrians and other Finns, the Uzbegs, Turkomans, Hazaras, and other Turki groups, who in their physical characteristics present every shade of transition between the typical white and yellow races.

In many places the cultures and social and religious institutions are similarly intermingled, although in Asia the dominant religions are in great measure distributed according to race. Thus the Tunguses and most other Siberian aborigines are pronounced shamanists; the Hindus extreme polytheists; the Tibetans, Sinhalese, Indo-Chinese, Chinese, Japanese, and Mongols proper all nominal Buddhists; the Arabs, Kurds, Afghans, Turkomans, Uzbegs, Kirghizes, and Turks generally Sunnites ('orthodox' Muhammadans); the Persians, the Moors of Ceylon, and the Hazaras mostly Shī'ites ('separatist' Muhammadans). Thus is seen the curious spectacle of a nomad Turki group (Kirghizes) and a nomad Mongol group (Kalmuks) encamped side by side on the Lower Volga plains, both intruders from Asia, but the former strict Sunnites, the latter Buddhists like all their Eastern kindred. This distribution, however, is purely superficial, since below the outward forms, often merely official, as in Tibet, Siam, Annam, and China, the old primitive beliefs still everywhere survive in their full vigour. In Asia these beliefs represent all the earliest developments of the religious sentiment—pure animism, personification of the powers of nature, and ancestor-worship (art. ETHNOLOGY, § 9)—not merely in juxtaposition, but often in the closest possible association. Thus ancestor-worship, characteristic of Africa, and animal-cult, dominant in America, are both prevalent in China, jointly with the belief in good and bad aerial and water spirits, and an outward adherence to the three recognized national religions—the three 'State Churches,' as they have been called—*fo-kiao* (Buddhism), *tao-kiao* (Taoism), and *ju-kiao* (Confucianism).

'In every district are practised diverse forms of worship between which no clear dividing line can be drawn, and, as in Annam, the same persons may be at once followers of Confucius, Lao-tse, and Buddha. In fact, such is the position of the emperor, who belongs *ex officio* to all three of these State religions, and scrupulously takes part in their various observances. There is even some truth in the Chinese view that "all three make but one religion," the first appealing to man's moral nature, the second to the instinct of self-preservation, the third to the higher sphere of thought and contemplation. But behind, one might say above, it all, the old animism still prevails, manifested in a multitude of superstitious practices, whose purport is to appease the evil and secure the favour of the good spirits, the *Feng-shui*, or *Fung-shui*, air and water genii who have to be reckoned with in all the weightiest as well as the most trivial occurrences of daily life. These, with the ghosts of their ancestors, by whom the whole land is haunted, are the bane of the Chinaman's existence. Everything depends on maintaining a perfect balance between the two principles represented by the 'White Tiger' and the 'Azure Dragon,' who guard the approaches of every dwelling, and whose opposing influences have to be nicely adjusted by the well-paid professors of the magic arts' (Keane, *Man Past and Present*, p. 223).

The 'professors' here referred to correspond in China to the *shamans* who control the religious world in Siberia. Shamanism will be separately dealt with, and here it may suffice to say that it is not a particular system of belief, but rather a peculiar phase of thought, which is widely distributed, and appears to be a necessary stage in the progress of all religious development. Thus the shaman belongs to no special form of belief, but holds a position somewhat intermediate between the medicine-man and wizard of the lower, and the marabout and true priest of the higher, religious systems. Although in its more advanced state the office tends to become hereditary and thus to crystallize into a regular hierarchy, in Siberia any one may become a shaman who has sufficient will-power to enforce belief in his claim to supernatural virtues, and to exercise them as intercessor between the invisible and otherwise inaccessible deities and their votaries. Hence in Siberia beneath the general shaman-craft there are all kinds of animistic beliefs, practices, and superstitions, in which animal-cult, as in North America, plays a much larger part than ancestor- or nature-worship. Wer-wolf notions are wide-spread, and the *Tatars* of the Minusinsk district about the Abakan affluent of the Yenisei, although baptized Christians, are still under the influence of the shamans, and credit the *Ainas*, that is, the invisible spirits of evil, with the power of assuming the form of dogs, foxes, birds, snakes, and other animals. These Ainas dwell in the underground regions, and are ruled by the *Irle-Khan*, who is also the familiar spirit and patron of the shamans.

So also the *Yakuts* of the Lena basin have a subordinate deity, the *Vekhsyt*, or 'Advocate,' who from time to time visits the abodes of mortals in the form of a white horse, an eagle, a cuckoo, or some other bird, and carries messages to and fro between them and the 'Merciful Chief,' creator of the world, who with his wife, 'Shining in Glory,'

is all-powerful. These are beneficent beings, but nearly all the rest appear to be devils, and amongst the Yakuts demonolatry is certainly carried to its extreme limits. The malevolent aerial spirits form twenty-seven tribes ruled by a kind of Satan, who with his wife has a numerous progeny, all hostile to man. *Sugai-toyon*, the Yakut *Juppiter Tonans*, is the instrument of his vengeance, while in the underground *Mung-tar*, abode of 'Everlasting Woe,' there dwell eight other hosts of demons under *Asharay-bioho*, the 'Mighty,' supreme in Hades. These hosts have all their female consorts, and are joined by the shamans after death. Another potent divinity is *Enakhsys*, the 'Cow-herdess,' who is much dreaded because of her power to harm their cattle, strike them with murrain, and destroy the calves; hence her wrath has to be turned aside by many costly offerings (Ovarovsky).

Despite their veneer of Russian Orthodoxy, the neighbouring *Samoyeds* still cling tenaciously to their old pagan beliefs. 'As long as things go well with him [the Samoyed], he is a Christian; but should his reindeer die, or other catastrophe happen, he immediately returns to his old god *Num* or *Chaddi*. . . . He conducts his heathen services by night and in secret, and carefully screens from sight any image of Chaddi' (F. G. Jackson, *The Great Frozen Land*, 1895, p. 84). Several instances are here mentioned of this compromise between the old and the new—a subject more fully dealt with in art. ABORIGINES. Thus on the Samoyed graves the wooden cross is supplemented by an inverted sledge, which is intended to convey the dead safely over the snows of the under world. They also hold in awe the rings of stones within which human sacrifices appear to have been formerly offered to propitiate Chaddi; and although these practices have ceased, 'it is only a few years ago that a Samoyed living on Novaia Zemlia sacrificed a young girl' (*ib.*). Many of these aborigines hold that death is the end of everything, that good and evil deeds receive their deserts in this life, and that immortality is reserved only for the *tatibé*, that is, the Samoyed magicians or shamans, who either remain quietly in their graves or else wander about at night seeking an opportunity to benefit their friends or harm their enemies. Despite this limited measure of immortality, in the graves are deposited all kinds of useful objects, such as clothing, cooking-pots, knives, horns filled with tobacco, guns, bows and arrows for the men, needles, thread, or sinews for sewing, and scraping-knives for the women, everything being damaged to prevent it from being stolen. The explanation of this seeming inconsistency is that the departed do not die at once, but survive for some time in the grave, where they will require the same objects that they needed in this life.

The above-mentioned Num is an aerial god who dwells in the sky, where he generates thunder and lightning, sends down rain and snow, and rules the winds and storms. The sky itself, also called Num (cf. *Diespiter*), is his visible embodiment, and to his essence also belong the moon and stars through which he manifests himself at night, the rainbow (*munbano*) which forms the hem of his mantle, and the sun in which he is chiefly personified, and which is greeted at its rising and setting with suitable invocations. Some even hold that the earth, the sea, and all visible nature form part of the same divine system, thus anticipating the monistic and pantheistic concepts of more advanced theosophies. Num knows and sees all that happens upon earth; if men are good and benevolent, he prospers all their doings, increases their reindeer herds (one of his epithets is *Jilibeam-baertie*, 'cattle-ward'), blesses their hunting expeditions, and endows them with many days. But if they lead wicked lives, they fall into poverty and misery, and die prematurely. There is even a sort of moral code containing the precepts by which all should be guided who wish to stand well with Num: 'Believe in Num. Believe in the spirit of evil, and that he can be appeased by sacrifices, that no misfortune befall thee, or thy family, or thy herds, that he may save thee from sickness and assist thee in thy labours. Believe in the spirits that they may do thee no evil. Do not jump over the sledge in which the gods are placed; honour thy parents; reverence thy elders; kill not, quarrel not, speak no evil, tend the herds, help the poor, and Num will reward thee. Speak not of what thou hast seen, that no one may know from thee what has happened.'

Yet beneath this outward display of lofty religious and ethical notions, most of the Samoyeds are still mainly nature-worshippers and animists. They show great respect especially for the bear, which with the wolf is held in the highest veneration in Siberia. Nevertheless the Samoyeds, like the Ainus and other Eastern peoples, will capture and kill it whenever they can. When it is dead, the claws of its forepaws are usually amputated, the object being, by a strange confusion of ideas, to protect themselves from harm when next they venture to attack one of the species.

Like the Samoyeds, the *Ostyaks* of the Yenisei region have a god of the sky, *Turm* or *Urt*, who sends thunder and storms, but is also credited with a high sense of honour and rectitude. He mingles amongst mortals, accompanying them wherever they go, and judging them according to their deserts, for no act, good or evil, can escape his notice. He is inaccessible even to the shamans; no appeals can bend his will; and he controls human destinies and the course of events according to the eternal laws of justice. No sacrifices can secure his favour, since he looks only to merit in the disposal of his gifts, without the least regard to prayers or offerings. Hence in times of distress and trouble it is useless to seek his aid. It is the lesser deities and the demons alone that can be swayed by the mediation of the shamans, and, as amongst the Ugrian Finns, they are generally represented by rude stone or wooden effigies, often of extremely fantastic form. Thus Ortik, the patron of the hunt, is figured as a legless horse stuffed with hair and skins, with two linen sleeves for arms, a linen skirt, and a face made of a hammered metal plate nailed to a block of wood. A log arrayed in beaver skins stands for Meig, a peculiarly malignant goblin, who plays mischievous pranks with people, leading them astray in the woods, and overwhelming them in snowstorms. In this strange pantheon a place is also found for both the wolf and the bear, and when one of these animals is bagged in the hunt it is regarded as a stroke of luck celebrated with much feasting and revelry.

'The skin is stuffed with hay, and the people collect from all quarters to jeer, mock, and spit upon the helpless enemy. They sing songs of triumph expressed in words of insult and defiance. After their spirit of merriment is exhausted, they set up on its hind legs in the corner of the hut the now harmless effigy of the ferocious beast, and bestow upon it, for a considerable time, the veneration of a tutelar god' (A. Featherman, *Races of Mankind*, 1891, iv. 564).

But it is in the extreme east, amongst the *Gilyaks* and *Ainus*, that this animal-cult has acquired its highest development. The *kohr* (bear), who represents the *Kur*, or Lord of the heavens, is one of the chief Gilyak divinities, although under certain circumstances he is occasionally captured and eaten. When taken in his lair while hibernating in winter, he is secured by a leathern noose and dragged along with shouts and cries intended to stupefy the still half-dozing victim. He is then kept in confinement, fed and fattened on fish, and at last slain on his feast-day, after a fight in which the villagers are required to attack him without arms. Similar strange practices prevail amongst the Ainus of Yezo, North Japan, as described by the late Mrs. Bishop:

'The peculiarity which distinguishes this rude mythology is the "worship" of the bear, the Yezo bear being one of the finest of his species. But it is impossible to understand the feelings by which it is prompted, for they worship it after their fashion, and set up its head in their villages, yet they trap it, kill it, eat it, and sell its skin. There is no doubt that this wild beast inspires more of the feeling which prompts worship than the inanimate forces of nature, and the Ainus may be distinguished as bear-worshippers, and their greatest religious festival, or Saturnalia, as the Festival of the Bear. Gentle and peaceable as they are, they have a great admiration for fierceness and courage; and the bear, which is the strongest, fiercest, and most courageous animal known to them, has probably in all

ages inspired them with veneration. Some of their rude chants are in praise of the bear, and their highest eulogy on a man is to compare him to a bear' (*Unbeaten Tracks in Japan*[4], 1885, ii. 73). For further details and a possible explanation of this strange cult, see the art. AINUS in vol. i. p. 249[a], and art. ANIMALS, *ib* p. 502[b].

In Mongolia the never-dying superstitions associated with nature-worship, animism, demonolatry, and witchcraft still survive beneath the outward show of official lamaism. Indeed, the whole system of Buddhism is everywhere coloured and modified, as in most other Buddhist lands, by the old local beliefs. The magicians are still appealed to when the flocks are smitten by disease; when 'fine weather,' which there means rain, is needed; when sickness troubles the household; or when some healthy but unfriendly neighbour is to be stricken by a mortal illness or fatal accident. The very inmates of the huge lamaseries bear the name of 'Samaneans,' perhaps a corrupt form of the Tungus word *shaman*, as if the Buddhist monks were merely the spiritual successors of the old medicine-men. Every possible transition is thus observed between the former nature- and spirit-worship and the peculiar form of lamaism introduced from Tibet after the death of Jenghiz Khan.

In Tibet itself much the same relations prevail between the 'State Church' and the pre-Buddhist *Bonbo* or *Boa-ho* religion, which persists, especially in the central and eastern provinces, side by side with the national creed. From the colour of the robes usually worn by its priests, it is known as the sect of the 'Blacks,' in contradistinction to the orthodox 'Yellow' and dissenting 'Red' lamaists; and, as now constituted, its origin is attributed to Shen-rab (Gsen-rabs), who flourished about the 5th cent. before the new era, and is venerated as the equal of Buddha himself. His followers, who were powerful enough to drive Buddhism from Tibet in the 10th cent., worship eighteen chief deities, the most popular being the red and black demons, the snake devil, and especially the fiery tiger-god, father of all the subordinate members of this truly diabolical pantheon. The sacred symbol of the Bonbo sect is the ubiquitous *swastika* with the hooks of the cross reversed,  instead of , a change said to be due to the practice of turning the prayer-wheel from right to left as the Red lamas do, instead of from left to right as is the orthodox way. The common Buddhist formula of six syllables—*om-ma-ni-pad-me-hum*—is also replaced by one of seven syllables—*ma-tri-mon-tre-sa-la-dzun* (Sarat Chandra Das, in *JRASBe*, 1881–1882).

In the upland regions skirting the Brahmaputra, between Tibet and Upper Burma, there are a multitude of primitive Mongoloid peoples—Abors, Mishmis, Garos, Khāsis, Kocchis, Bodos, Kacharis, Lushais, Nagas, Kukis, Chins, Kahyens, Karens, and many others—who have been little or not at all affected either by Buddhist or Hindu influences, and whose religions or mythologies consequently present features often of exceptional interest. Thus the gods of the *Garos* are mostly vague mythical entities, dwelling in the hills or in the sky, but possessing no definite attributes or powers, and associated with many wonderful cosmical myths. Salgong, the chief deity, marries Apongma, a divine princess who descends on earth and gives birth to Kengra Barsa, father of fire and of all the heavenly bodies, and also to a daughter, Mining Mija, who marries the son of Donjogma, mother of mankind. From a granddaughter of Salgong spring the mothers of the Tibetan Bhotiyas, of the Garos, and of the Feringies (English), and so on. But beneath these fanciful legends, many of them obviously later inventions, there persists the old nature-worship, as seen in the personification of the sun, moon, and stars, of the hills, streams, and forests, with their indwelling genii, to whom are attributed divine powers as rulers of the universe, and controllers of human destinies and of all natural phenomena.

'According to the *Kuki* creation myth, the face of the earth was originally covered with one vast sheet of water inhabited by a huge worm. One day the Creator, passing over this worm, dropped a small piece of clay, saying, "Of this I mean to make a land and people it." "Nonsense," said the worm; "look here, I can swallow it." But the lump passing out of his body grew and grew until it became the world we now see. Then man sprang out of the ground by the will of the three gods, Lambra the Creator, without whose consent nothing can be done, Golarai, god of death, and the beneficent Dudukal, who operates through his wife Fapitó' (C. A. Soppitt, *Kuki-Lushai Tribes*, 1887).

The *Tawyans*, a branch of the numerous Chin family, have a tradition that they were formerly very powerful, but were ruined by their insane efforts to capture the sun. With a sort of Jacob's ladder they mounted higher and higher, but, growing tired, began to quarrel among themselves, until one day, while half of them were clambering up the pole, the other half below cut it down just as they were about to seize the sun.

Although often described as devil-worshippers, the *Chins* appear to worship neither god nor devil. The northern groups believe there is no *Ens Supremum*; and although the southerners have a Kozin, or head god, they pay him no homage, and never look to him for any favours, except perhaps exemption from such troubles as he might be disposed to inflict on those who offend him in this world. There are also the countless *nats*, or spirits of the air, the streams, the jungle, the hills, and there are those that swarm in the house and in the fields. None of these can do any good, though all may do harm unless soothed by gifts. *Mithikwa*, the 'Village of the Dead,' is divided into two wards, the *Pwethikwa*, abode of the happy, and the *Sathikwa*, reserved for the wretches who die *unavenged*, and must there bide till their murder is wiped out in blood. Thus the vendetta receives divine sanction, strengthened by the belief that the slain becomes the slave of the slayer in Pwethikwa.

'Should the slayer himself be slain, then the first slain is the slave of the second slain, who in turn is the slave of the man who killed him. Whether a man has been honest or dishonest in this world is of no consequence in the next existence; but if he has killed many people in this world, he has many slaves to serve him in his future existence; if he has killed many wild animals, then he will start well supplied with food, for all that he kills on earth are his in the future existence. In the next existence hunting and drinking will certainly be practised, but whether fighting and raiding will be indulged in is unknown' (Carey and Tuck, *The Chin Hills*, 1896, i. 196).

Before the advent of the Vedic Aryans, the chthonic gods were probably supreme throughout India, and, despite the wide diffusion of Hinduism, they are still supreme amongst most of the Dravidian, Kolarian, and mixed Aryo-Dravidian aborigines. But these gods themselves are nearly all hostile to man, and consequently not easily distinguishable from devils. Hence it is that we have now official assurance that the Pahārias and other low castes, and even some of the high castes, are for the most part demon-worshippers; and this is specially true of the aborigines of Southern India. In the Cochin *Census Report for 1901*, M. Sankara Menon writes:

'Nowhere perhaps has the belief in demons a stronger hold on the popular mind than in this part of India. The existence of numerous exorcists amongst the various sections of the Hindu population, from the highest Nambudri to the lowest Paraiyan, bears ample testimony to this fact. There is a separate caste, the *Panans*, amongst whom exorcisms, sorcery, and witchcraft are hereditary occupations. The Panan is quite as indispensable a factor in the social organism of the village as the barber and the washerman. There are again certain families who have special control over particular classes of demons.' The priests attached to many families have their special family deities 'by whose aid they profess to control the action of demons and spirits. It may sound strange, but it is none the less true, that there are exorcists amongst native Christians and Musalmāns

as well. One interesting fact is that high-class Hindus exercise their magical influence by propitiating only the more refined and sublime manifestations of the gods of the pantheon, whereas the low-caste Hindus do the same by propitiating Kali in her more terrible and bloodthirsty aspects.' Some of the more evil-minded demons are 'supposed to be wandering about in mid-air, or haunting houses, trees, wells, or tanks, ever bent upon doing evil to those that come in their way. They are supposed to live upon the offerings made to them by their votaries, who are continually tormented for the purpose. Illness, accidents, and other misfortunes are often attributed to the evil influence of demons or spirits. At the sick-bed of a person, the astrologer, the exorcist, and the physician are all in attendance. The astrologer divines the causes, and prescribes propitiatory remedies. The exorcist then comes in, and goes through a more or less elaborate ceremony to drive out the demons or spirits. The physician steps in last to treat the patient, for the common belief is that so long as the patient is possessed, medicine can have no effect. The demons of smallpox and cholera, and myriads of others, have all to be coaxed into good humour to desist from doing evil. Ghosts or demons often appear in terrible form before they enter into human bodies, and with the sudden disappearance of the phantoms or apparitions a person believes himself to be possessed, and falls ill' (*ib.*).

In some places snake-worship ranks next to demonology even amongst the high castes. In Malabar nearly all the compounds have their serpent-groves, with effigies of the reptiles carved on blocks of stone; and here no orthodox Hindu will ever kill a snake, even if bitten, since an injury done to any of them would be sure to bring on leprosy, ophthalmia, or other ailments. Serpents are treated as members of the family, and served with milk, fruits, and all kinds of dainties. None but a Brāhman would dare to pluck even a flower or a twig from the trees growing in the snake-grove, where songs are chanted and religious rites observed in honour of these reptiles, which are, in fact, worshipped as gods or demons.

In the direction of the north the native superstitions seem to touch even a lower level, and among the *Kolarians* of the Vindhya uplands they were till recently associated with human sacrifices of a peculiarly barbarous character. In order to secure good harvests, the victim, often a child captured or bought from a neighbouring tribe, was put to a lingering death, by being slowly hacked to pieces with an axe, the supposition being that the greater the suffering the better pleased would be the god, and the heavier the crops of cereals. Of the *Mundas*, one of the largest Kolarian tribes, the chief social feature is their highly developed totemic system. The number of totems almost passes belief, and includes such remarkable objects as rice-weevils, cocoons, mice, leeches, mushrooms, ants, frogs, eels, worms, or even moonlight, red earth, umbrellas, ghī (clarified butter), or walking-sticks. These are all animated by indwelling spirits, so that we have here the lowest conceivable form of the animism that lies at the foundation of all natural religions.

Still more debased than the full-blood Kolarian and Dravidian aborigines are the *Aryo-Dravidian* half-breeds, who are interspersed over the northern provinces, and to their own crude religious dawnings often superadd the revolting ideas and practices of the later corrupt Hinduism. Here the blending of the higher and lower races, of the 'twice-born' Aryas ('Nobles'), and the scarcely human Nāgas, 'kindred of the dragon,' dates back to the earliest recorded times, and is typified in the mythical marriage of Arjuna, one of the high-born Pāṇḍavas, with Ulūpi, daughter of the Nāga king Vāsuki. The union took place in the still sacred city of Hardwār on the upper Ganges, which is described as inhabited by 2000 crores (a crore = ten millions) of snake-people, whose wives were of peerless beauty; and here was also a lake which contained the waters of life, wherein all those snake-people were wont to bathe. During their later migrations the already mixed Aryas encountered the vile Dasyus, proto-Kolarians of the south Gangetic woodlands, for whom no terms of abuse are too strong, yet with multitudes of whom a fusion was eventually effected. Thus it was that 'from the union of the white, the yellow, and the black men arose the modern people of northern India' (W. Crooke). That the union was not merely ethnical, but also social and religious, is seen in the *baigā*, or devil-hunting priest of the jungle tribes, who in the Hindu system became a Brāhman *Ojha*, or exorcizer of evil spirits; and we know that in later times whole sections of the lower races were raised to priestly rank. But this tendency towards complete fusion of all the racial elements was arrested by the institution of caste, which, though at present occupational, had originally an ethnical basis (see art. CASTE).

A clear insight into these obscure relations is necessary to a right understanding of the strange intermingling of primitive and Hindu social and religious notions prevalent amongst these mixed northern groups. But even so, great difficulties remain, and Mr. W. Crooke, himself a most diligent and shrewd observer, finds it

'all but impossible to frame a working definition of a Hindu; Musalmāns of the lower class cling to many of the beliefs of the faith from which they were originally drawn; everywhere in the lower strata the forms of faith known as Brāhmanical or Animistic constantly overlap. . . . The natural cleavage line is between Brāhmanism and Animism, and it has been found possible on this basis to define the religious beliefs of eastern and southern India, but in northern India this distinction is unworkable. Most of the menial and hill tribes profess theoretically a belief in the Brāhmanical pantheon; at the same time even the higher classes are more or less influenced by the Animistic beliefs of the lower races' (*The N.W. Provs. of India*, 1897, ch. v.). And elsewhere: 'It is little use defining a man as a Vaishnava if we know that on occasion he will worship other gods as well—will reverence the cow or the pipal tree, Mother Ganges, or the goddess of smallpox' (p. 242).

As pointed out by Mr. E. A. Gait (*General Report of the Census of India*, 1901, p. 358), the animism here in question—a belief in and dread of impersonal powers to be coerced by magic—appears to have passed into the Hindu system from two different sources. Some of its elements 'are derived from the Vedic Aryans themselves, others from the Dravidian [and Kolarian] races who have been absorbed into Hinduism.' But 'it would be fruitless to attempt to distinguish the two streams of magical usage—the Vedic and the Animistic. They are of mixed parentage, like the people who observe them, partly Indo-Aryan and partly Dravidian.' It now becomes possible to understand the picture of chaotic religious notions—some utterly revolting and immoral, others betraying some glimmering of a moral sense, but the great majority degrading—by which these mixed populations are animated. Thus some of the widespread *Doms*, most probably the parent-stock of the European Gipsies (Dom = Rom, *r* and *d* interchangeable), hold that raiding and robbery have divine sanction. Before starting on a nocturnal expedition they sacrifice to Sansāri Māi, the chthonic goddess patroness of thieves, and pray in a low voice that a dark night may cloak their designs and the gang escape detection, just as the *furum dea*, Laverna, was silently invoked by the Roman *latro:*

> 'Labra movet metuens audīri, Pulchra Laverna,
> Da mihi fallere; da justo sanctoque videri;
> Noctem peccatis, et fraudibus objice nubem.'
> (Hor. *Epist.* I. xvi. 60–62).

Yet these Doms, scavengers in the towns, vagrants or wandering tinkers in the country, are not quite irreclaimable, and the recent efforts to civilize them have met with a measure of success in some districts. They have even a family priest, always the sister's son, which points to matriarchal times when kinship was reckoned through the female line.

The *Agariās* of Mirzapur, all smelters and forgers, call themselves Hindus, yet worship the tribal deity Lohāsur Devi, goddess of iron (*lohā* =

'iron'), and also employ the *baigā* (see above) to worship the old local godlings. The black goat offered to Lohāsur Devi is worshipped before being sacrificed, and goats and fowls are also offered to the ghosts of the dead who appear to them in dreams. At the end of the difficult road to the heaven of Parameshvar (Vishnu) is a great gate guarded by terrible demons, who allow no woman to pass unless tatued. There are twenty-four forms of tatus, and the women who can show no mark of some god on their bodies are tormented by the gate-keepers, who brand them with a hot iron, roll them in thorns, and fling them down from the top of the gate. Tatuing has thus become a religious obligation, and although perhaps totemistic in origin, the forms—Ganeśa, Śiva, Krishna as flute-player, the moon, the peacock, and many others—are now merely charms to ward off evils and gain access to the abode of Vishnu. The whole religious world of the Agariās is an inextricably interwoven system of primitive and Hindu notions.

Similarly the *Agarwālas* of the Upper Ganges, although reckoned as Vaishnavas, call themselves, and are, *Nāga Upāsaki*, 'Snake-worshippers,' doing homage to *Astika Muni*, who sprang from the sister of the great serpent Vāsuki. But there is also a deity Ohur, who saves women from widowhood, besides the tribal deity *Lakshmi* and several trees—pipal, kadam, sami, babul—which are held in special honour. Socially the Agarwālas are landowners, bankers, and money-lenders, but for them animal food, as well as onions, garlic, carrots, and turnips, is tabu, and a good illustration of the countless hair-splitting caste distinctions is the refusal of the women to eat the food prepared by their daughters-in-law.

One might almost suppose that the Hindu snake-cult had passed into Irania, so general is the respect in which these reptiles are held even by the Persian Shī'ites. No Persian will willingly kill a house-snake, partly because he thinks it harmless, but chiefly because he supposes it to be tenanted by the spirit of the late owner of the house. When one was shot by Dr. C. J. Wills, the whole household 'sulked and looked black for a week,' although the landlord, being an educated man, was glad, 'the clock-winding snake' having plagued him for years. Equally prevalent are the superstitions associated with omens, the evil eye, and astrology. Nothing serious is done in Persia without the taking of an omen, the casting of lots, or the consulting of an astrologer. A favourite place for taking omens is the tomb of the Shirazi poet and mystic, Hafiz, to whom are paid almost divine honours. Recourse is had to the *munajjim*, 'astrologer,' on all occasions; every village has its professional diviner, every town several, whose chief business it is to predict lucky hours or days, to read the future, and to discover stolen property, and in this they are often successful by laying pitfalls into which the thieves unwittingly stumble.

Apart from the fanatical Bābīs (*q.v.*), and the periodical outbursts of religious frenzy connected with the anniversary of the martyrs Husain and Hasan, the Persian Shī'ites are not particularly zealous Muhammadans. Many, indeed, of the educated classes prefer the writings of Hafiz and Sadi to the Qur'ān, are theists and even advanced freethinkers, while scepticism is wide-spread amongst the higher military and official classes. 'These say no prayers, keep no fasts, have no belief, and are utterly dead to everything but what they believe to be their own interests. Many openly boast their disbelief in anything, and this is done with impunity' (Wills, *The Land of the Lion and the Sun*, 1883, p. 339). One thing is clear. There is no danger that the monotheism which has supplanted the old Zoroastrian dualism in Persia will ever sink, like the Vedic system, to the low level of the primitive chthonic beliefs. It will rather be dissipated, like the Western creeds, in the atmosphere of philosophic unbelief.

On the other hand, these primitive beliefs are still rife in Arabia, the very cradle of Muhammadan monotheism. Muhammad enthroned Allāh, but failed to abolish the *jinns*, the *afrīts*, and *shaitans* that still haunt the sandy wastes, and swarm in every wady, cave, well, and hillside of the peninsula. But it has to be remembered that the Persians are Iranians, that is, one of the noblest branches of the Aryan family, while the Arabs are Semites whose primeval 'monotheism' is probably a delusion, and whose early beliefs were 'of the earth earthy,' originally associated with the Asherahs, the Astarte and Tammuz myths, the abominations of the Baals and Molechs, and all that is implied in the primitive phallus-worship.

For the higher religions, all of which took their rise in Asia, see special articles CHRISTIANITY, JUDAISM, MUHAMMADANISM, ZOROASTRIANISM, BRAHMANISM, BUDDHISM, SHINTOISM.

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AŚOKA.—Aśoka, emperor of India (B.C. 273–231), was the grandson of Chandragupta Maurya (*q.v.*), and son of Bindusāra, whom he succeeded on the throne in B.C. 273 or 272, although his formal coronation did not take place until B.C. 269, having perhaps been delayed by a disputed succession. According to tradition, Aśoka in his youth represented his father as viceroy at Taxila in the Panjāb, and also at Ujjain in Mālwā. Silly legends represent him as having attained power by the massacre of ninety-nine brothers, and as having been a monster of cruelty in the early years of his reign; but these are mere fables. In B.C. 261 he rounded off his vast inherited dominions by the annexation of the kingdom of Kalingā on the coast of the Bay of Bengal, corresponding with the 'Northern Circars' and part of Orissa. This was the only aggressive war of the reign. The suffering inflicted upon the conquered people made a profound impression on the conscience of Aśoka, who at about this time came under the influence of Buddhist teachers, to whom war was abhorrent. Four years later, the emperor solemnly recorded in inscriptions engraved upon the rocks his 'profound sorrow and regret' for the misery caused by his ambition, and declared that 'the loss of even the hundredth or thousandth part of the persons who were then slain, carried away captive, or done to death in Kalingā, would now be a matter of deep regret to His Majesty. Although a man should do him an injury, His Majesty holds that it must be patiently borne, so far as it can possibly be borne.'

Aśoka acted on the principle thus publicly professed and indelibly recorded, and henceforward was a man of peace, devoted to the inculcation and propagation of the Law of Piety (*dharma*), as conceived by him in accordance with the teaching of the Buddha. At a date not exactly known he

qualified himself for the highest rewards of a Buddhist saint, by accepting ordination as a monk, and donning the yellow robe of the Order, but did not then abdicate his royal power, although it is possible that in the last year of his life he withdrew from all worldly affairs. He passed away in B.C. 232 or 231 after a reign of fully forty years. The scene of his death may have been a monastery on the Golden Hill (Suvarṇagiri) at Rājāgrihā, the capital of the early kings of Magadha (S. Bihār).

The empire which Aśoka ruled comprised, in modern terminology, Afghanistan south of the Hindū Kush, Balūchistān, Sind, the valley of Kashmīr, Nepāl, the lower Himālaya, and the whole of India proper, except the southern extremity below the latitude of Madras. The central regions seem to have been governed directly from Pāṭaliputra, the modern Pātna, then on the north bank of the Sōn, the great city which continued for centuries to be the capital of India. The outlying provinces were controlled by at least four viceroys, who were often members of the Imperial family; and the orders of these high officers were executed by a regularly organized departmental service of officials. The capital was administered by a municipal commission divided into six boards, and similar arrangements probably existed in the other principal cities. A standing army of all arms —cavalry, infantry, chariots, and war elephants —was maintained in great force, and public order was well preserved.

When Aśoka became a devoted disciple of Buddha, the whole machinery of government was utilized by him for the teaching and dissemination of his Master's doctrine, and produced commensurate effects.

Gautama the Buddha, the founder of the Buddhist system as known to history, had confined his ministry to a region of moderate extent in the Gangetic valley, which may be roughly defined as lying between Gayā, Prayāg or Allāhābād, and the Himālayas. When he died in B.C. 487 or 486, his followers formed but one of many rival sects in that region, and the society of ordained monks organized by him had only limited and local influence. There is no reason to believe that the vogue of the Buddhist sect had increased very greatly during the two centuries and a quarter which intervened between its founder's death and the conversion of Aśoka. The latter event made the fortune of Buddhism, and transformed an obscure local sect in the basin of the Ganges into a dominant world-religion—perhaps the greatest of all, if measured by the number of its adherents.

Aśoka's progress in the faith was gradual. According to tradition, he was in early life an orthodox Hindu, of the Śaiva sect (see SAIVISM); and it is certain that he then approved of sacrifices, and sanctioned the slaughter of animals on a large scale for the purposes of food, sacrifice, and sport. Regard for the sanctity of animal life being the cardinal principle of Buddhist ethics, he began the reformation of his habits by reducing the butcher's bill for the Imperial table to the modest amount of two peacocks and one antelope daily. The institution of the royal hunt was abolished in B.C. 259, and two years later destruction of life for the service of the royal kitchens was absolutely forbidden. In B.C. 243 detailed regulations concerning the slaughter or mutilation of animals applicable to the whole empire were published, which prohibited unconditionally the killing of many large classes of living creatures, and imposed stringent restrictions on the entire population in respect of their dealings with animals.

In the next year the emperor placed on record a solemn review of all the measures which he had taken for the propagation of the *dharma*, or Law of Piety, and reminded his subjects how he had striven to lead them in the right way by his personal example, by exhortations, expressed in oral sermons as well as in inscriptions on rocks and pillars, by suitable official arrangements for the supervision of morals and the royal alms, by detailed pious regulations, and by benevolent provision for the cure and comfort of man and beast. But Aśoka, while utilizing to the full all this machinery for the moral regeneration of his people, recognized frankly that permanent improvement must be based on a change of heart, and could not be secured by merely administrative measures; because 'pious acts and the practice of piety depend on the growth among men of compassion, liberality, truth, purity, gentleness, and saintliness.' The growth of piety, he goes on to observe, 'has been effected by two-fold means, to wit, pious regulations and meditation. Of these two means pious regulations are of small account, whereas meditation is superior. Nevertheless, I have issued pious regulations forbidding the slaughter of such and such animals, and other regulations of the sort. But the superior effect of meditation is seen in the growth of piety among men, and the more complete abstention from injury to animate beings and from slaughter of living creatures.'

The substance of Aśoka's practical ethical teaching is tersely summed up in a short edict, perhaps one of the latest:

'Thus saith His Majesty: "Father and mother must be hearkened to, similarly, respect for living creatures must be firmly established; truth must be spoken. These are the virtues of the Law of Piety which must be practised. Similarly, the teacher must be reverenced by the pupil, and proper courtesy must be shown to relations." This is the ancient nature of piety —this leads to length of days, and according to this men must act.'

The three primary duties prescribed by the Aśokan code were (1) respect for the absolute, unconditional right of the meanest animal to retain the breath of life until the latest moment permitted by nature; (2) reverence to parents, elders, and preceptors—the superiors so honoured being required, in their turn, to treat their inferiors, including servants, slaves, and all living creatures, with kindness and consideration; and (3) truthfulness. Among secondary duties, a high place was given to that of showing toleration for, and sympathy with, the beliefs and practices of others, and all extravagance or violence of language was earnestly deprecated.

The ethical teaching outlined in the above propositions, which is in agreement with the doctrine of the *Dhammapada* and other scriptures of primitive Buddhism, was developed by Aśoka in a series of edicts, probably drafted by himself. The 'Fourteen Rock Edicts,' published in B.C. 256, were incised upon rocks at seven localities in the remoter provinces, namely: (1) Shāhbāzgarhī, in the Yūsuzai country, forty miles N.E. of Peshāwar; (2) Mānsāhra, in the Hazāra District, Panjāb; (3) Kālsī, in the lower Himālayas, fifteen miles west from Mussoorie; (4) Sopāra, in the Thānā District, near Bombay; (5) the Girnār hill, near Jūnāgarh, the ancient capital of Kāṭhiāwār; (6) near Dhauli, to the south of Bhuvanēsvar, in the Purī District, Orissa; and (7) at Jaugada, in the Ganjām District, Madras.

Some of these versions, which vary in script, in dialect, and to some extent in substance, are preserved practically complete, while others are mere fragments.

The second great series is that of the 'Seven Pillar Inscriptions,' six of which exist in six copies, engraved on monolithic sandstone pillars erected at various localities in the home provinces. The seventh and most important edict is found on one

pillar only. The remaining records, particulars of which will be found in the works cited at the end of this article, are the two 'Kalingā Edicts' in two recensions, three 'Cave Inscriptions,' two 'Tarāi Pillar Inscriptions,' four 'Minor Pillar Edicts,' two 'Minor Rock Edicts' in several recensions, and the 'Bhābra Edict.' The number of distinct documents known may be reckoned as thirty-five, forming a group of inscriptions which may be regarded with justice as among the most interesting and remarkable in the world.

A large body of tradition affirms that a Buddhist church council was held at the capital by the command and under the patronage of Aśoka, in order to settle the canon of scripture and reform abuses in monastic discipline. Although the traditional details of the constitution and proceedings of the council are clearly unhistorical, the fact of its assembly may be accepted without hesitation. If it had met before the thirty-second year of the reign, in which the emperor published the 'Seven Pillar Edicts,' recording his retrospect of the measures taken for the promotion of piety, the council assuredly would have been mentioned in those documents. But they are silent on the subject, and the fair inference is that the council was held at a date subsequent to their publication, that is to say, between B.C. 242 and 231.

The Imperial arrangements for diffusing the knowledge of Buddhist doctrine, and for enforcing the moral practices recommended by the teachers of the church, were designed on a grand scale, so as to cover not only the whole Indian empire, but also distant countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The officials of the Government in their various grades were required, in addition to their ordinary duties, to give instruction in morals to the lieges. From the year B.C. 256 the efforts of the official lay preachers were supplemented by the more systematic labours of special functionaries, designated as Censors of the Law of Piety (*dharma-mahāmātrāḥ*), who were enjoined to occupy themselves in promoting the establishment and progress of piety among the people of all sects, Buddhist or others, and were further charged with the delicate duty of superintending the female establishments of the members of the royal family. These officers were vested with special powers for the prevention of wrongful imprisonment or corporal punishment, and were directed to investigate cases in which peculiar circumstances caused the ordinary law to press hard upon individuals. The general superintendence of female morals was entrusted to another set of officers called the 'Censors of Women.' The regulations for guarding the sanctity of animal life presumably were enforced with strictness by the Censors; and if we may judge by what is known of the procedure adopted in later ages by pious Indian kings, the penalties of disobedience must have been extremely severe, extending even to the death of the offender.

The activity of the Censors was not confined to the provinces directly controlled by the Imperial officers, but embraced all the bordering tribes and nations in the Indian hills and forests, who lived under the rule of their own chiefs, subject to the suzerainty of the paramount power.

Aśoka's zeal carried his propaganda far beyond the limits of his empire, and induced him to organize a system of foreign missions, which permanently determined the direction of the religious history of a large portion of the world. A band of enthusiastic missionaries, headed by Mahendra (Mahiṁda), younger brother of the emperor (or, according to another account, his son), evangelized Ceylon with such success that the island has been essentially a Buddhist country ever since, and the religion of the Sinhalese monks to-day is practically the same as that of Aśoka. The Sinhalese chronicles aver that a mission was dispatched at the same time across the Bay of Bengal to Pegu, but strong reasons exist for believing that Buddhism was not introduced into the Burmese countries until several centuries later. The existing form of Buddhism in Burma, which undoubtedly was derived from Ceylon, and thus is indirectly a result of Aśoka's labours, dates only from the reformation effected by king Dhammachēti in the 15th cent., the history of which is related in the Kalyānī inscriptions (*Ind. Ant.* vol. xxii., 1893). The Siamese church also is a daughter of that founded in Ceylon by Mahendra.

From the time of Megasthenes, who was sent as ambassador by Seleukos Nikator to the court of Chandragupta Maurya in the year B.C. 303, regular intercourse, both commercial and diplomatic, had been maintained between the Indian empire and the Hellenistic kingdoms founded by the generals of Alexander. Aśoka made use of the channels of communication thus opened, in order to convey the treasures of Buddhist wisdom to the nations of the West. His missionaries traversed the wide realms of Antiochos Theos, king of Syria and Western Asia, and penetrated the dominions of Ptolemy Philadelphos, king of Egypt, those of his neighbour king Magas of Cyrene, and even those of the European monarchs Alexander of Epirus and Antigonos Gonatas of Macedonia.

Although missionary effort did not succeed in planting branches of the Buddhist church in the foreign countries named, except perhaps in some portions of the territory of Antiochos, its effects may be traced obscurely both in the history of the Gnostic and Manichæan sects of Christianity (Kennedy, 'Buddhist Gnosticism,' in *JRAS*, 1902, pp. 377–415) and in the reflex action on India which helped to develop the Mahāyāna form of Buddhism about the beginning of the Christian era. Ceylon, as already observed, was won permanently to Buddhism, which became the dominant religion in India and the bordering countries. Of course the other forms of Indian religion were not destroyed—they were merely overshadowed for a time, and in due course recovered their ancient vigour. In India, Buddhism is practically extinct at the present day, and is hardly traceable later than 1200 A.D. But for many centuries the impulse given by Aśoka's systematic missionary propaganda made Buddhist institutions a prominent feature of Indian life; and as late as the 7th cent. A.D., Buddhism, although then slowly decaying, was still a power in almost all parts of India. The extension of the Buddhist faith to Tibet, China, and Japan, through the agency of Indian missionaries at various dates, was an indirect consequence of the Aśokan propaganda.

Aśoka, while determined to enforce with all his authority Buddhist ethics as a practical system of morals, was avowedly tolerant of other creeds, and devoted a special edict to the subject of toleration:

'His Majesty does reverence to men of all sects, whether ascetics or householders, by gifts and various modes of reverence.

'His Majesty, however, cares not so much for gifts or external reverence as that there should be a growth of the essence of the matter in all sects. The growth of the essence of the matter assumes various forms, but the root of it is restraint of speech, to wit, a man must not do reverence to his own sect by disparaging that of another man without reason. Depreciation should be for specific reasons only, because the sects of other people deserve reverence for one reason or another. . . . Self-control, therefore, is meritorious, to wit, hearkening to the law of others, and hearkening willingly.

'For this is His Majesty's desire, that adherents of all sects should hear much teaching and hold sound doctrine.'

In another passage the royal preacher repeats his profession of reverence for all sects, and adds that 'nevertheless, personal adherence to one's own creed seems to me to be the chief thing.'

Extant dedicatory inscriptions prove that Aśoka gave practical effect to these liberal principles, by hewing cave-dwellings from the rock at enormous cost, and bestowing them on ascetics of a non-Buddhist sect; while, of course, hundreds of his benefactions must have passed unrecorded.

He realized the truth that his subjects could not be expected to take his preaching to heart unless he proved by acts of material beneficence that he was really, as he had claimed to be, the father of his people. Accordingly, he organized elaborate arrangements, both in his own dominions and in those of friendly powers, for the cure of man and beast, which doubtless involved the establishment and endowment of hospitals. We are expressly informed that healing herbs, medicinal for both human beings and animals, wherever they were lacking, were imported and distributed. In pursuance of the same policy, banyan-trees were planted to provide ample shade, groves of mango-trees were laid out to supply fruit, wells were dug at every mile on the highroads, and numerous rest-houses and watering-places were constructed, for the enjoyment of man and beast. But His Majesty is careful to explain his motive by the remark that 'such so-called enjoyment is a small matter. With various blessings have former kings blessed the world even as I have done, but in my case it has been done solely with the intent that men may conform to the Law of Piety.'

Aśoka's buildings were designed and constructed on a scale of such magnificence that they were regarded by the men of later ages as the work of demons obedient to his command. Although comparatively little of his architectural masterpieces has survived, the great *stūpas*, or brick cupolas, at Sānchi, and numerous monolithic pillars, inscribed and uninscribed, which are still standing, suffice to justify his fame as a builder. The monoliths, some of which are fifty feet high and weigh fifty tons, exhibit the stone-cutter's art in perfection, and have been polished and engraved with the utmost nicety.

It is clear that Aśoka was no merely fanatic devotee, but that he succeeded in combining the piety of a saint with the practical qualities of an able king. As a king he disputes with Akbar (*q.v.*) the right to the highest place of honour among the sovereigns of India; and, in the history of Buddhism, his importance is second only to that of the founder of the system.

Aśoka seems to have been followed on the throne by his grandson Daśaratha; but hardly anything is known about his successors, in whose feeble grasp the great empire founded by Chandragupta, and maintained for three generations, quickly crumbled to pieces. See BUDDHISM, CHANDRAGUPTA.

LITERATURE.—Edmund Hardy, *Konig Asoka* (Mainz, 1902); Vincent A. Smith, *Asoka, the Buddhist Emperor of India* (Oxford, 1901), containing complete translations of the inscriptions known up to 1901 (an inscription on a pillar at Sārnāth has been discovered since then; *Epigr. Ind.* viii. 166; *Comptes rendus Acad. des Inscr.*, 1907, p. 25; *JASB* iii., new ser., 1907), and *The Early History of India*[2] (Oxford, 1908). All the original authorities are cited fully in those works. *Buddhist India* (1903), by T. W. Rhys Davids, may also be consulted.

VINCENT A. SMITH.

ASPIRATION may be defined generally as ardent longing. The word is sometimes used to denote worldly ambition or desire, but its proper application, as the etymology may suggest, is to desire directed upon spiritual objects, and so it finds its distinctive exercise in the spheres of ethics and religion. In each of these spheres it is a power inciting to spiritual progress, an inward impulse by which men are urged to the development of their highest nature and true ends as spiritual beings.

1. In ethics, aspiration appears as a longing for the realization of ideals. Whatever theories may be held as to the origin of moral ideas and of the moral faculty, there is no ethical system worthy of the name that is not based on some moral ideal or conception of the highest good; and aspiration is the longing that impels to the pursuit of the ideal and of all the qualities that belong to it or tend to further it. Aspirations and ideals go together, and have a reactive influence upon each other. On the one hand, aspirations are kindled by ideals; on the other, ideals are shaped and fostered by aspiration. The moral feelings depend for their strength and purity upon the clearness and immediacy of the moral vision; while the moral vision owes much of its quick discernment to the cultivation of the moral feelings. Both vision and aspiration, again, are qualified by obedience. The gleaming vision must be pursued, the sighing of the human spirit after the attainment of its ideals must not be ignored or suppressed, else moral blindness and moral apathy will inevitably follow. But when men turn away from wrong and do what they know to be right, and keep hungering and thirsting after righteousness, moral progress is the assured result.

The particular function of aspiration in the moral sphere is to mediate between vision and obedience. It is a mighty motive power by which our spiritual knowledge is utilized for the purposes of our moral activity. Without the uplifting and impelling force of aspiration, ideals would never be transformed into realities; and so it is a necessity of the moral life that men should cherish their spiritual aspirations. The voice of duty is an imperative voice, but before its high behests can be carried out there must come some urging from the heart's desire. It is faith and hope, admiration and love—and these may all be summed up in aspiration—which enable us as moral beings to walk without fainting, to run without weariness, and even at times to mount up on eagles' wings. 'Let us learn to have noble desires,' said Schiller, 'and we shall have no need for sublime resolutions.' And what is moral aspiration but an impulse of noble desire which bears the soul irresistibly forward, as on the bosom of a swelling tide, towards the realization of the highest moral ends?

2. But it is in religion still more than in ethics that aspiration finds its especial home and sphere, for aspiration is the outgoing of the soul in search of complete spiritual satisfaction, and ethical ideals, even could they be perfectly realized, would not avail to satisfy it. 'Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it repose in Thee' (Augustine, *Conf.* i. 1). Nothing but personal communion with the Divine Spirit will meet the wants of the aspiring human spirit. It is to the experience of aspiration as a psychological fact that the origin of religion may be traced. In the visible world men saw around them on every side the tokens of change and decay, of transience and evanescence. But this sense of the perishableness and unreality of all earthly things brought to light their own possession of the idea of something or some one real and permanent; and instinctively their hearts went out in dumb longing to seek the Unknown God. And as self-consciousness grew clearer in the course of man's ascent, the contradiction between the inner life of feeling and desire, of hope and endeavour, and the hostile powers of nature by which he was encompassed and opposed, would fill his soul with a still deeper longing for communion with that higher Power akin to himself by whose help he might gain the victory over the world.

The aspirations of the religious soul naturally express themselves in forms of worship. And if at first the forms in which men embodied their religious desires were crude, material, grotesque, and even repulsive, they testified none the less to a sincere longing after God. The blood of the sacrifice was the blood of a covenant between man and his deity; the sacrificial smoke, as it rose into the air, was a symbol of the spirit's desire

to rise heavenward; the sacrificial meal was a sacrament of fellowship between the god and his people. Moreover, as men grew in the power of spiritual conception and apprehension, their aspirations became purer, and began to find expression in forms more spiritual and refined. And when the inspiring Spirit from above stoops down to raise and inform the aspiring spirit from below, there comes the utterance of the purest spiritual desire: 'As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God.'

There is a wide difference between the aspirations of morality and those of religion. Not only is the ethical ideal an abstraction, it is an elusive abstraction. As we pursue it, it recedes before us. The horizon moves onward as we advance, and the actual and the ideal never meet. Religious aspiration, on the other hand, being a longing of the human spirit for personal communion with the Divine Spirit, is able to enjoy an immediate fruition of its object. With the dawn of religion in the soul, the restless heart of man finds rest in God. Not that there is no room in the religious life for further progress and fuller aspiration; the room for progress is infinite, and the call to it is never hushed. But progress here 'is not *towards*, but *within* the sphere of the infinite. It is not the vain attempt, by endless finite additions or increments, to become possessed of infinite wealth, but it is the endeavour, by the constant exercise of spiritual activity, to appropriate that infinite inheritance of which we are already in possession' (J. Caird, *Phil. of Rel.* 284). Hence the life of Christian faith, in which the experience of communion with God is most fully realized, is a life of aspiration satisfied yet never sated, resting joyfully in its object and yet longing to apprehend it more fully.

LITERATURE.—Augustine, *Confessions*; Green, *Prolog. to Ethics*, 1883, bk III ch. IX.; Jevons, *Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, 1896, ch XXVI.; J. Caird, *Phil. of Religion*, 1880, ch. IX.

J. C. LAMBERT.

ĀŚRAMA.—1. General survey.—*Āśrama*, from the root *śram*, 'to exert oneself,' means (1) a place where austerities are performed, a hermitage, and (2) the action of performing such austerities. It may be doubted which of the two meanings is the original. Without dwelling on this question, we limit ourselves to the second meaning, which in the development it has taken in India reveals a very striking feature of ancient Indian life. At the time when the Indians lived in the Panjāb there was no question either of a brāhmanical order of life or of castes and *āśramas*. The castes occur only in one hymn of later date (*Rigv.* 10. 90), and the word *āśrama* is not found at all in the *Rigveda*.

Very different from this oldest period of Indian antiquity is the time after the conquest of Hindustan by the Āryans. The danger of mixing with the indigenous tribes led to the establishment of a very sharp distinction between the victorious tribes of the Āryans and the remnants of the aborigines, who later on were included under the collective name of the *Śūdras*, and were excluded from all community of life, and especially of religion, with the Āryans. This principle of setting up boundary lines between the different classes of the population was carried out to a certain degree among the conquering Āryans themselves. The great mass of the Āryans were called *Vaiśyas*, 'colonists,' and devoted themselves to agriculture, handicraft, and trade. They were ruled and taxed by the *Kṣatriyas*, the kings, and those who with them had carried out the conquest of the country. But another class claimed and obtained a preponderance over both the Vaiśyas and the Kṣatriyas. These were the *Brāhmaṇas*, the descendants of the old Vedic *Ṛṣis*, who in their families kept as an inestimable treasure the ancient Vedic hymns, without which no religious ceremony could be performed, and no higher education was possible in an age wholly without secular literature. Indeed, the Brāhmaṇas succeeded in getting into their hands not only the religious cult, but also the education of the Āryan youth. It became a custom and more and more a law that every young Āryan, whether of the Brahmaṇa, Kṣatriya, or Vaiśya caste, should spend a series of years as a *brahmachārin* in the house of a *guru*, or brāhmanical teacher.

In the early period the father himself acted as *guru*, and instructed his son as well as he could in the sacred science in so far as it was in the possession of his family. Very often, however, the father was not able to satisfy the curiosity of his son. Not only metaphysical questions embarrassed him; the understanding of the old texts became more and more difficult, the ritual more complicated, the field of study ever broader. Thus it became necessary to apply to celebrated authorities in order to learn some special theory (*vidyā*). Wandering students (*charaka*) travelled far and wide (*Brih. up.* 3. 3. 1); renowned teachers itinerated from place to place (*Kauṣ. up.* 4. 1); and there were masters to whom disciples streamed 'like waters to the deep' (*Taitt. up.* 1. 4. 3).

Later it became customary for every *Āryan* to spend a series of years (at least twelve, according to Āpastamba, *Dharmasūtra*, 1. 1. 2, 16) in the house of a brāhmanical teacher. It was the latter's duty to prepare his brāhmanical pupils for their future vocation, and to teach those of the Kṣatriya and Vaiśya castes in order to inculcate in their minds the necessary directions for all their future life. We must assume (cf. Manu, 2. 241; Śaṅk. on *Brih. up.* p. 345, 13) that it became in course of time an exclusive privilege of the brāhmanical caste to give this instruction, and only thus can we understand the incomparable influence which the Brāhmaṇas gained and maintained over the Indian people.

It would seem that not only the outward apparel, but also the method of instruction, was different for the three castes; thus in *Ait. Ār.* 3. 2. 6, 9 the rule is laid down to communicate a certain theory *na apravaktre*, 'not to any one who will not himself become a teacher.' In return for this instruction the pupils had to work for the teacher in house and field; they attended to the sacred fires (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 10. 1), they looked after the cattle of the teacher (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 4. 5), collected for him in the village the usual gifts of charity, and bestowed a present upon him at the conclusion of their studies in his home. In the leisure time left from the duties to be performed for the *guru*, the Veda was studied; the teacher recited it verse by verse, and the pupils had to repeat it until the whole was learned by heart. It was perhaps not so much a time of learning as a time of vigorous training, as the word *āśrama* implies. The principal rule was strict obedience to the orders of the teacher (of which we read extravagant examples in *Mahābh.* i. 684 f.). It was a period devoted to practice in self-denial and mortification. But the brāhmanical system of life had the tendency to extend this *āśrama*, or self-mortification, over the whole life of the Brāhmaṇas, and as far as possible of all the Āryans. Not all, after having finished this course of study, founded families as *grihasthas*, 'householders'; some preferred to stay in the house of their teacher as *naiṣṭhikas* to the end of their life. Others again, as *vānaprasthas*, retired to the jungle and gave themselves up to privations and austerities. Some scorned even this form of a regular existence, and roamed about as beggars. These last were known as *sannyāsins*, 'throwing away everything,' or *parivrājakas*, 'vagabonds,' or simply *bhikṣus*, 'beggars.' It was only later that these various kinds of *āśramas*, 'religious mortifications,' were developed into a system embracing the whole life, the aim of which was to obtain methodi-

cally and by gradual progress that which appears as an abrupt demand in *Matth.* 19. 21.

According to this later system, the life of every Brāhmaṇa (and not only of these, for the rules given in Manu, vi., seem to extend also to Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas) had to pass through four *āśramas*, or ascetic stages. Every Ārya had to be (1) a *brahmachārin* in the house of a teacher; (2) a *grihastha*, performing the duty of founding a family; (3) a *vānaprastha*, a hermit in the woods, devoting himself to gradually increasing austerities; and (4) towards the end of his life a *sannyāsin*, *bhikṣu*, *parivrājaka*, roving about without home or property, living merely on alms, free from all earthly ties, and awaiting his end, delivered even before it from all earthly attachments. How far the practice corresponded to this theory, given in Manu and other Law-books, we do not know; but we are free to confess that in our opinion the whole history of mankind has not much that equals the grandeur of this thought.

After this general survey let us proceed to consider the history of the *āśramas* in the Vedic and the post-Vedic age.

2. The Āśramas in the Veda.—In the older Upaniṣads the theory of the four *āśramas* is seen in course of formation. *Chhānd. up.* 8. 15 mentions only the Brahman-student and householder, and promises to these, in reward for study, the begetting of children, the practices of *yoga*, abstinence from doing injury, and sacrifice, a departure hence without return. *Chhānd. up.* 2. 23. 1 names the *tapas* (of the anchorite) side by side with these as a third 'branch of duty.' There is still no progressive series. Rather, according to this passage, the Brahman-students, in so far as they do not elect to remain permanently in the house of the teacher, appear to have devoted themselves partly to the householder's state, partly to the life in the forest. It is in harmony with this that in *Chhānd. up.* 5. 10 among the dying the anchorite in the forest and the sacrificer in the village appear side by side. *Chhānd. up.* 2. 23. 1 contrasts all three branches of duty with the position of the man who 'stands fast in Brahman.' So too, in *Brih. up.* 4. 4. 22, those who practise (1) the study of the Veda, (2) sacrifice and almsgiving, (3) penance and fasting, are contrasted with the man who has learned to know the *ātman*, and in consequence becomes a *muni* and *pravrājin* ('pilgrim'). Both have attained the knowledge of the *ātman*, and therefore the supreme goal. In the cognate passage *Brih. up.* 3. 5, on the contrary, the *brāhmaṇa* is still distinguished from the *muni* as a higher grade. In *Brih. up.* 3. 8. 10 also, the knowledge of the *ātman* as the highest aim is differentiated both from the sacrifices and benefactions (of the householder) and from the practices of *tapas* (of the anchorite).

All these passages assume only the three stages of Brahman-student, householder, and anchorite, and contrast with them the men who know the *ātman*. The last were originally 'exalted above the (three) *āśramas*' (*atyāśramin*, as it is said in *Śvet. up.* 6. 21, *Kaivalya up.* 24). This very position, however, of exaltation above the *āśramas* became in course of time a fourth and highest *āśrama*, which was naturally assigned to the end of life, so that studentship, and the positions of householder and anchorite (which stood side by side), preceded it as temporary grades in this successive order. Until the post-Vedic age, however, the separation between the third and fourth *āśramas*, between the *vānaprastha* practising *tapas* and the *sannyāsin* who has succeeded in attaining *nyāsa*, was not strictly carried out. An intimation of the fourfold number of the *āśramas* is perhaps already afforded by the words of *Muṇḍ. up.* 2. 1. 7: 'Mortification, truth, the life of a Brāhman, instruction.' Otherwise the oldest passage which names all four *āśramas* in the correct order would be *Jābāla up.* 4: 'When the period of Brahman-studentship is ended, a man becomes a householder; after he has been a householder, he becomes an anchorite; after he has been an anchorite, let him travel about on pilgrimage.'

(1) *The Brahmachārin.*—'Śvetaketu was the son of (Uddālaka) Āruṇi. To him said his father, "Śvetaketu, go forth to study the Brahman, for none of our family, my dear son, is wont to remain unlearned, and a (mere) hanger-on of the Brahman order"' (*Chhānd. up.* 6. 1. 1). From this remark it seems to follow that at that time entrance upon the life of a Brahman-student, while it was a commendable custom, was not yet universally enjoined upon Brāhmans. The entrance also of Satyakāma upon studentship appears to be his voluntary determination (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 4. 1). It was possible for a man to receive instruction from his father, as Śvetaketu (*Chhānd. up.* 5. 3. 1; *Brih. up.* 6. 2. 1; *Kauṣ. up.* 1. 1), or at the hands of other teachers, as the same Śvetaketu in *Chhānd. up.* 6. 1. 1 (contradictory to the passages just quoted). The request to be received must follow duly (*tīrthena*, cf. *vidhivat*, *Muṇḍ. up.* 1. 1. 3), *i.e.* according to *Brih. up.* 6. 2. 7, with the words *upaimi aham bhavantam*. The student takes the fuel in his hand as a token that he is willing to serve the teacher, and especially to maintain the sacred fires (*Kauṣ. up.* 4. 19; *Chhānd. up.* 4. 4. 5, 5. 13. 7, 8. 7. 2, 8. 10. 3, 8. 11. 2; *Muṇḍ. up.* 1. 2. 12; *Praśna up.* 1. 1). Before receiving him, the teacher makes inquiry into his birth and family (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 4. 4), but yet, as this example shows, in a very indulgent manner. Sometimes instruction is given even without formal reception (*Anupanīya*, *Chhānd. up.* 5. 11. 7). The duration of the period of instruction is twelve years (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 10. 1), or 'a series of years' (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 4. 5). Śvetaketu also begins to receive instruction at the age of twelve (*Chhānd. up.* 6. 1. 2), and continues his study for twelve years. During this time he has 'thoroughly studied all the Vedas' (*Chhānd. up.* 6. 1. 2), namely, the verses of the *Rigveda*, the formulas of the sacrifice, and the hymns of the *Sāmaveda* (*Chhānd. up.* 6. 7. 2), apparently therefore only the *saṃhitās*. In other instances there appears to have been at first no mention of study. In one example Upakosala has tended the sacred fires for twelve years, and yet the teacher can never make up his mind to impart to him 'the knowledge' (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 10. 1-2). Satyakāma is sent at first with the teacher's herds of cattle into a distant country, where he remains for a succession of years (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 4. 5). A further act of service on the part of the *brahmachārin* consists in his going to beg for the teacher (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 3. 5). On festival occasions also we find him in the train of the teacher and awaiting his commands (*Brih. up.* 3. 1. 2). Together with and after these acts of service, 'in the time remaining over from work for the teacher' (*guroḥ karma-atiśeṣeṇa*, *Chhānd. up.* 8. 15) the study of the Veda is prosecuted. The consequence was sometimes self-conceit rather than real enlightenment (*Chhānd. up.* 6. 1. 2). We further find the students wandering from place to place; they hastened, as stated above, from all sides to famous teachers 'like waters to the deep' (*Taitt. up.* 1. 4. 3); they roamed as far as the land of the Madras (on the Hyphasis) 'in order to learn the sacrifice' (*Brih. up.* 3. 7. 1, 3. 3. 1). As a rule, however, they lived as *antevāsins* in the house of the teacher, and not a few found this manner of life so congenial that they

'settled permanently in the teacher's house' (*Chhānd. up.* 2. 23. 1). The others were dismissed at the close of the period of studentship with advice (*Brih. up.* 6. 4) or admonitions. 'After he has studied the Veda with him, the teacher admonishes his pupil: "Speak the truth, do your duty, forsake not the study of the Veda; after you have presented the appropriate gifts to the teacher, take care that the thread of your race be not broken"' (*Taitt. up.* 1. 11). Further admonitions follow, not to neglect health and possessions, to honour father, mother, teacher, and guests, to be blameless in works and life, to honour superiors, to bestow alms in the appropriate manner, and in all doubtful cases to order one's conduct according to the judgment of approved authorities.

(2) *The Grihastha.*—'He who returns home from the family of the teacher, after the prescribed study of the Veda in the time remaining over from work for the teacher, and pursues the private study of the Veda in (his own) household in a pure neighbourhood (where Brāhmans are permitted to live), trains up pious (sons and pupils), subdues all his organs in the *ātman*, and, besides, injures no living thing except on sacred ground (at the sacrifice), he indeed, if he maintains this manner of life all his days, enters into the world of Brahman and does not return again' (*Chhānd. up.* 8. 15). According to this passage, the householder may remain in that state all his life long without doing injury to his soul. According to *Chhānd. up.* 5. 10, on the contrary, for those 'who in the village worship with the words "Sacrifice and pious works are our tribute,"' for those, in other words, who continue in the householder's state to the end of life, the transient reward in the moon and a return to a new earthly existence are appointed.

The most imperative duty of the householder is to establish a family and to beget a son to continue his father's works. To beget a son is considered a religious duty. In *Taitt. up.* 1. 9 it is enjoined side by side with studying and teaching the Veda. Frequently (*Chhānd. up.* 3. 17. 5, 5. 8–9; *Brih. up.* 6. 2. 13, 6. 4. 3) it is allegorically described as an act of sacrifice. In *Taitt. up.* 1. 11 the pupil, among other admonitions, is charged to take care 'that the thread of his race be not broken.' In *Mahān. up.* 63. 8 it is said: 'He who in his lifetime rightly continues to spin the thread of posterity, thereby pays the debt which he owes to the fathers; for it (begetting) is the payment of his debts.' His continued life in the world of men is assured by the son (*Brih. up.* 1. 5. 16), who stands in the place of the father in order to accomplish for him the religious works (*Ait.* 2. 4), 'and if anything whatever has been committed previously by him, his son will expiate it, therefore is his name "son" (*putra*, because he *pūraṇena trāyati pitaram*, Śaṅk.); for by the son he continues to exist in this world' (*Brih. up.* 1. 5. 17). Particular directions are given in *Brih. up.* 6. 4 how to proceed in order to beget a son or daughter of a certain quality. This chapter forms the conclusion of the Upaniṣad, and therefore probably the close of the religious instruction imparted to the student at the end of his student life. Several wives are permitted, as, in fact, Yājñavalkya himself had two (*Brih. up.* 2. 4, 4. 5). As further duties of the *grihastha* are named sacrifice, study of the Veda, and almsgiving (*Chhānd. up.* 2. 23. 1, 8. 5. 1–2; *Brih. up.* 4. 4. 22, 3. 8. 10).

(3) The *Vānaprastha* and (4) the *Sannyāsin.*—A distinction between these two periods of life was only gradually established. Originally the solitary life in the forest existed as a special branch of vocation (*dharmaskandha*) side by side with the position of householder (*Chhānd. up.* 2. 23. 1, 5. 10. 1–3). Later it may have become usual to retire into the solitude of the forest only on the approach of old age, after the obligations of the householder had been fulfilled. Yājñavalkya is an example, when he addresses his wife Maitreyī (*Brih. up.* 2. 4. 1 [4. 5. 1–2]): 'I will now abandon this state (of householder), and will therefore make a division between thee and Kātyāyanī.' In doing so, Yājñavalkya puts into practice what he teaches in *Brih. up.* 3. 5. 1: 'In truth, after that Brāhmans have gained the knowledge of this soul, they abstain from desire for children and desire for possessions and desire for the world, and wander about as beggars.' Here the third and fourth stages are not yet distinguished. The case is otherwise with the king Brihadratha, who (*Maitr. up.* 1. 2) surrenders his kingdom, retires to the forest, and gives himself up to the most painful mortifications, gazing fixedly at the sun, and standing with arms erect, and yet is obliged to confess: 'I am not acquainted with the *ātman.*' Here the anchorite, who devotes himself to ascetic practices with meditation (*Chānd up.* 2. 23. 1), has not yet attained the highest goal; he who without knowing the *ātman* 'practises austerities for many thousand years earns only a finite reward' (*Brih. up.* 3. 8. 10). Asceticism leads only to *pitṛyāna*, 'way of the fathers' (*Brih. up.* 6. 2. 16), and the case is different only with those who can say: 'Faith is our asceticism' (*Chānd. up.* 5. 10. 1). Penance and fasting are only the means by which Brāhmans 'seek to know' the *ātman* (*vividiṣanti, Brih. up.* 4. 4. 22). According to some, *tapas* is indispensable as a means to the knowledge of the *ātman* (*Maitr. up.* 4. 3, *na atapaskasya ātmajñāne 'dhigamaḥ*), according to others (*Jābāla up.* 4), it is superfluous; and this view is more in accordance with the whole system. For as long as the goal was a transcendental one, the hope might be cherished of approaching near to it by severing by means of asceticism the tie that binds to this life. If, however, emancipation is the discovery of one's self as the *ātman*, and therefore something that only needs to be recognized as already existing, not to be brought about as though it were future, the asceticism of the *vānaprastha* becomes as superfluous as the *grihastha's* sacrifice and study of the Veda (*Brih. up.* 3. 5, 4. 4. 21). He who knows the *ātman* is *atyāśramin*, 'exalted above the (three) *āśramas*' (*Śvet. up.* 6. 21). He has attained that which the ascetic only strives after, complete release from his individuality and from all that pertains to it, as family, possessions, and the world (*Brih. up.* 3. 5, 4. 4. 22). He is called *sannyāsin*, because he 'casts off everything from himself' (*sam-ni-as*); *parivrāj, parivrājaka*, because he 'wanders about' homeless; and *bhikṣu*, because without possessions he lives only as a 'beggar.'

(4) *The Sannyāsin* (*parivrājaka, bhikṣu*).—The *sannyāsa*, which is originally only the 'abandonment' of the entire brāhmanical mode of life in the three *āśramas*, assumed in course of time the position of a fourth and highest *āśrama*, which, as a rule, though not necessarily, would first be entered upon towards the close of life after passing through the stages of *brahmachārin, grihastha*, and *vānaprastha*. It thus, however, gained a further meaning. If it was originally a natural consequence of the knowledge of the *ātman*, it now became a final and most efficacious means by which it was hoped to attain that knowledge. The *sannyāsa*, accordingly, is represented as such a means to the knowledge of the *ātman* and to emancipation in a series of later *Upaniṣads*, of which the most important are *Brahma, Sannyāsa, Āruṇeya, Kaṇṭhaśruti, Paramahaṁsa, Jābāla,*

Āśrama. We find in them a full account, with numerous contradictions in details, of the preliminary conditions imposed upon the *sannyāsin*, of his departure from life, of his dress and equipment, of his food, place of abode, and occupations.*

3. **The Āśramas in post-Vedic time.**—Although the Upaniṣads teach that every man, Śūdra as well as Ārya, is an incarnation of the *ātman*, the knowledge of which, whether originating in an Ārya or a Śūdra, would lead to emancipation, yet the Brāhmans were too much under the influence of old traditions to put this doctrine into practice, and thus the Śūdras were, and remained, excluded from all religious community with the Āryas. So much the greater was their care for the spiritual welfare of the three superior castes, and the four *āśramas* became the *via salutis* through which every twice-born man (*dvija*) had to pass, *i.e.* every Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, and Vaiśya, in order to reach the highest goal. As in Vedic times, so also in the later period of Indian life, it was the rule that every twice-born man had to become first a *brahmachārin*. In this stage he lived in the house of a teacher, persisted in the fulfilment of his duties of temperance and chastity, and received, through the study of the Veda, the intellectual stamp for all his future life. He then, as *grihastha*, had to marry, to beget offspring, and to fulfil the six duties of teaching and learning, sacrificing in person and through the agency of others, giving alms and receiving presents; besides this there were five daily observances incumbent upon him: to satisfy the gods by sacrificing, the Ṛṣis by studying the Veda, the fathers by offering funeral oblations, men by almsgiving, and animals by feeding birds, antelopes, and other denizens of the forest. Afterwards he passed to the state of *vānaprastha* as it is described in Manu, 6. 2, and *Mahābh.* xii. 245. 4: 'When the householder sees his skin wrinkled and his hair white and the sons of his sons, then he has to retire to the forest,' in order to extinguish in himself, by austerities gradually augmented, all the remnants of worldly attachments. 'In summer let him expose himself to the heat of five fires, during the rainy season live under the open sky, and in winter be dressed in wet clothes, thus gradually increasing the rigour of his austerities' (Manu, 6. 23). Further, 'after having purified himself in the three social stages from all stain of sin, let him wander towards the highest goal with undaunted perseverance' (*Mahābh.* xii. 246. 3).

In this stage of *sannyāsin*, 'one who has abandoned everything,' he roamed about without home (*parivrājaka*), and lived merely on alms (*bhikṣu*). At a period of life when, according to our thought, aid from others is more than ever needed, the aged man was left to himself without any care or attendance; 'let him flee from society as from a serpent, from comfort as from a hell, and from women as from a corpse' (*Mahābh.* xii. 246. 13); 'let him not look forward to death, let him not look forward to life, let him await his time as the servant awaits a command' (*nideśam*, which is the better reading both in *Mahābh.* xii. 246. 15, and in Manu, vi. 45).

We subjoin a few more verses on the state of the *sannyāsin* from the sixth book of Manu. 'Let him put down his foot purified by his sight, let him drink water purified by (straining with) a cloth, let him utter speech purified by truth, let him keep his heart pure' (46). 'Let him patiently bear hard words, let him not insult anybody, and let him not become anybody's enemy for the sake of this (perishable) body' (47). 'Against an angry man let him not in return show anger, let him bless when he is cursed, let him not utter speech, devoid of truth, scattered at the seven gates (of the neighbours)' (48). 'Neither by (explaining) prodigies and omens, nor by skill in astrology and palmistry, nor by giving advice and by the exposition (of the Śāstras), let him ever seek to obtain alms' (50). 'Let him not (in order to beg) approach a house thronged with hermits, Brāhmaṇas, birds, dogs, or other mendicants' (51). 'His hair, nails, and beard being clipped, carrying an alms-bowl, a staff, and a water-pot, let him continually wander about, controlling himself and not hurting any creature' (52). 'Let him go to beg once (a day), let him not be eager to obtain a large quantity (of alms); for an ascetic who eagerly seeks alms, attaches himself also to sensual enjoyments' (55). 'When no smoke ascends from (the kitchen), when the pestle lies motionless, when the embers have been extinguished, when the people have finished their meal, when the remnants in the dishes have been removed, let the ascetic always go to beg' (56). 'Let him not be sorry when he obtains nothing, nor rejoice when he obtains (something), let him (accept) so much only as will sustain life, free from attachment to material things' (57). 'By eating little, and by standing and sitting in solitude, let him restrain his senses, if they are attracted by sensual objects' (59). 'By the restraint of his senses, by the destruction of love and hatred, and by the abstention from injuring the creatures, he becomes fit for immortality' (60). 'In order to preserve living creatures, let him always by day and by night, even with pain to his body, walk, carefully scanning the ground' (68). 'When by the disposition (of his heart) he becomes indifferent to all objects, he obtains eternal happiness both in this world and after death' (80).*

For further information about the four *āśramas* we must refer the reader to the detailed treatment of them in Manu, bks. ii.–vi., and to the parallel passages in the *Mahābhārata*, chiefly bk. xii. 243–246. Of special interest also is the short description, *Mahābh.* xii. 191–192, which, being in prose, may have been inserted from an old *Dharmasūtra*.†

If it is true that the highest aim of mankind is not to be found in this worldly existence, but in the realm beyond, however closed to our knowledge this may be, it is none the less true that the attempt, as we have it in the four *āśramas*, to transform the whole earthly existence into a preparatory school for eternity, merits recognition and admiration even from those who have reached the highest degree of civilization. The Indian system does not demand what is impossible; it does not tear men away roughly and abruptly from that attachment to the world which is innate in them. It offers the opportunity in the stage of *grihastha* to enjoy life, and by enjoying it to convince oneself of its futility. It then, in an advanced age, in the stage of *vānaprastha*, tends to a systematic mortification of sensuality, and it describes in the *sannyāsin* a man who, approaching the end of his days, has become free from all worldly fetters, and is best prepared for departure. What we say of so many precepts of the Gospels we may say also of the four *āśramas*: although they are by no means suitable for literal and blind imitation, yet they may serve in a certain sense as a pattern, since the way of thinking manifested in them may in other forms and modifications be precious for every age.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the article. See also ASCETICISM (Hindu), UPANIṢADS.

P. DEUSSEN.

ASSAM.—1. Religious history.—There is no part of India which is more interesting in some respects to the student of Hinduism than the Assam valley. As everyone knows, Hinduism professes to be a race religion, the religion of the inhabitants of Bhārat-varṣa, of the Hindu people. Yet, since the origin of the Hindu religion is Vedic, and the Vedas were the collected hymns of the so-called 'Aryan' immigrants, the two hundred millions of people now calling themselves Hindus must, in part at least, and probably in large part, be the descendants of races who were converted to, or more properly adopted into, Hinduism. Indeed, the later developments that have sprung from Vedic worship must have been due in great measure to the influence of aboriginal

* These will be found described in P. Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, ii. pp. 335–343; *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 374–382.

* *SBE* xxv. 207–213

† See Deussen, *Allgemeine Gesch. d. Philosophie*, i. 3, pp. 90–93.

beliefs on the simple nature-worship of the Aryan invaders. That was essentially democratic in its nature, whereas the hierarchy of Brāhmanism and the intellectual aristocracy of priests, philosophers, and the highly cultivated warrior chiefs who played so important a part in the development of Hinduism, must have been due to conquest, at once physical and moral, of lower by higher races. Yet in most parts of India the transition and the struggle are so distant that all memory of them is lost. The Dravidian of the South and the Bengali of the East alike believe that they were always Hindu. The higher castes and classes, it is true, have dim traditions of a time when their ancestors, fairer and slighter in figure than the aborigines, migrated from North-Western India. But the lower castes have no such traditions, and no curiosity as to how their distant ancestors came to be accepted into the Hindu community. There are, of course, notable exceptions to this rule. On the whole, however, it is only the ethnologist who can conjecture from the physical aspect of the various races of India that they were once non-Hindus and spoke some non-Aryan language. But in the Assam valley, owing to geographical and historical causes, which will presently be stated as briefly as possible, the process by which aboriginal tribes are accepted into the Hindu fraternity is seen in actual operation at the present time, and, by analogy and in some cases by actual historical indications, the process can be traced back for some two thousand years. In the Assam valley we are on the border-land of the Hindu faith, and see the most tolerant and receptive of creeds in contact with the beliefs of Indo-Chinese races. It is singularly interesting to note how alien blood and alien civilizations are quietly assimilated by the slow, gentle, and irresistible force of Hindu ideas.

In the earliest times of which we have any knowledge, what we now call the Assam valley was the nucleus and centre of the great independent kingdom of *Kāmarūpa* (*q.v.*), a name which still survives as that of the modern District of Kāmrūp, whose capital, now Gauhati (or Guāhāti), was then famous all over India as Prāgjyotishpur, the 'City of Eastern astrology.' This kingdom appears to have included, some 1500 years ago, not only the valley of the Brahmaputra river, but also the whole of Eastern Bengal down to the sea, and in addition (a thing even more difficult of belief for the modern traveller) the rugged and now almost inaccessible mountains of Bhutān. It was apparently in the Bhutanese hills that the kings of Kāmarūpa obtained their store of mineral wealth, and especially of copper. They were powerful monarchs, cultivated, warlike, and enterprising. Each dynasty, as it arose into power, attracted the attention of the Brāhmans, and, by one or other of the fictions common to early law and early religion in all countries, was adopted into Hinduism. It was, indeed, by common consent, at Prāgjyotishpur that there came into being the Tantrik form of Hinduism, that form which gives especial prominence to the female energy of the deity, his active nature being personified in his *śakti*, or 'wife.' Devī, as the *śakti* of Śiva, is the energy chiefly identified with the mystery of sex and magical powers, which are the leading topics of the *Tantras*, the scriptures (though, of course, not the sole scriptures) of this form of Hinduism. On the Nilāchal hill, a beautiful wooded eminence near the town of Gauhati, still stands the temple of Kāmākṣā Devī, one of the forms of the *śakti* of Śiva. The legend that explains the ancient sanctity of Kāmarūpa and of Kāmagiri (the religious name of the Nilāchal hill) is as follows:

Satī, the first wife of the god Śiva, died of sorrow at the discourtesy shown to her husband by her father Dakṣa, who was incensed by the interruption of his famous sacrifice of burnt-offering. (It may be worth mentioning, as a picturesque circumstance, that when the woods on the southern slopes of the Bhutān and Ākā hills catch fire in the dry winter season, and can be seen glowing or blazing from great distances, the people to this day assert that the far-off glare against the sky is caused by the reviving ashes of Dakṣa's interrupted sacrifice.) Śiva, overcome by grief and remorse, wandered about the world, carrying, as a penance, his dead wife's body on his head. In order to arrest this penance and to prevent Śiva from obtaining excessive power, Viṣṇu pursued him, and, by successive blows of his discus, lopped the body piecemeal, so that it fell to earth in fifty-one pieces. Wherever any piece fell, the place became a *pīṭha-sthāna*, sacred and a fit resort for pilgrims. But the most sacred of all was the Kāmagiri hill, for this became identified with the generative powers of Satī, and, probably by some subsequent extension of the idea, with those of *Prithivī*, 'the Broad Earth,' regarded as the mother of living beings. But Śiva continued his penance, and Kāma-deva, the god of Love, was dispatched to beguile the mourner from his austerities. He succeeded. Śiva was so indignant that he burnt the Indian Cupid to ashes by a single glance from the eye in the midst of his forehead. But Love was not destined to die eternally, and the land where he recovered life to inveigle men from contemplation and austerity was the beautiful valley ever since known as Kāmarūpa, the 'Shape of Love.'

As the legend sufficiently indicates, the princes and upper classes of the kingdom of Kāmarūpa were Hindus, probably spoke some Indo-European dialect derived from Sanskrit, and were accepted as of Indian race. But the bulk of the people were not then, and many of them are not even now, Hindus. It is interesting, and not without more than ethnological interest, to indicate briefly what they were.

In the greater part of India, except in the extreme North-West, the people have a strong infusion of Dravidian blood. In the South they speak what are known as Dravidian languages, and the Southern races are of the dusky Negrito strain, and apparently akin to African peoples. In the North-East the Dravidian blood is mingled with other, and especially Indo-Chinese, infusions. In the Assam valley the Brāhmans (priests and astrologers) resemble their Bengali neighbours, and the Doms, a large fisherman caste, are plainly of Western origin. But the bulk of the people are evidently of partly Indo-Chinese blood, and their physical appearance is of the 'Mongolian' type, bearing, more or less, the characteristic aspect of the yellow races. They have themselves (with the exception of the Āhoms) no record, historical or traditional, of their advent into Assam. But the languages they speak are some clue to the successive invasions of Indo-Chinese folk from the north-east and the south-east of the valley. The oldest Indo-Chinese language spoken in Assam belongs to the Mon-Khmer sub-family, which has recently been named by Schmidt of Vienna the 'Austric' family of languages. Schmidt claims that it extends from Assam across Further India to Cambodia, and thence through Polynesia and Micronesia to Easter Island, on the coast of South America. It is worth noting, in passing, that Hindu dynasties seem once to have reigned over peoples of this race in the Far East as well as in Assam. E. A. Gait, in his *History of Assam*, quotes the case of an Indian king, Samuda, who was ruling in Upper Burma in A.D. 105, and also that of Hindus who led the Tchampas or Shans in their conquests of the mouths of the Mekong in A.D. 280. These Hindus, as Gait says, must have passed through Assam, as, probably, did the Hindus from Kām-bōd, in N.W. India, who founded and gave its name to the Cambodian kingdom in Indo-China. It is possible that Mon-Khmer peoples invaded and gave their language temporarily to much of North-Eastern India, as well as to parts of Burma. But the only Mon-Khmer tongue surviving in Assam is that of the Khāsis, now inhabiting and giving their name to the mountains between Kāmrūp and Sylhet. These interesting people remained independent until they came under British rule, and have not even now come under Hindu influences. They are a curious counterpart of the Basques in the Pyrenees. Elsewhere the Mon-Khmer element, whether in blood or speech, has become completely assimilated, and can no longer be distinguished.

The next wave of Indo-Chinese invasion is represented by the various peoples speaking the Tibeto-Burmese tongues. These have three main groups of dialects. The first of them is Nāgā, spoken in and to the east of the Nāgā hills. The second is Kuki-Chin, spoken in Manipur, Cāchār, the Lushai hills, and by the interesting race known as the Mikirs, who now inhabit an outlying bastion of the Khāsi hills jutting into the Assam plain. The people speaking these two groups of dialects have as yet hardly at all come into contact with Hinduism, and retain their own primitive animistic superstitions. The third and most important group is that now known (since Brian Hodgson's celebrated investigations into their language and ethnology) as 'Bodos.' They comprise the Meches of Northern Bengal; the Kacharis of Northern Assam; the Dimāsās, who live in the hills between Nowgong and Cāchār; the Gāros and Tipperas, inhabiting the mountains called after them; scattered plains-folk known as Lālungs and Rābhās; and (if they really

belong to the Bodo race) the Chutiyas of Lakhimpur and the great Mājuli island in the Brahmaputra. It is not to be supposed that the people who now speak Bodo languages were all of common origin. But the wide-spread survival of this group of tongues presupposes an invasion of sufficient force to impose them upon subject and assimilated races. Moreover, since the acquisition of the Bodo speech was not, as in the case of the incursion of Indo-European tongues, accompanied by the imposition of any caste restrictions, the assimilation of race was complete. It is impossible to find any ethnological difference between the various tribes now speaking the Bodo languages, except in so far as those who live in the plains among Hindus have acquired a tincture of Dravidian and, in a very slight degree, of 'Aryan' blood. The Koch race in Northern Bengal has become completely Hinduized, has adopted the Bengali language, and is practically a Hindu caste, to which modern converts from other Bodo races are still admitted. The Khyens, once a Bodo ruling race in Northern Bengal, are now wholly absorbed, and can no longer be identified. But the Meches and the Kacharis, though they live among Hindus, are still physically, linguistically, and in matters of belief, distinct races, as, to some extent, are the Chutiyas also. The Garos, Tipperas, and Dimāsās, being isolated highlanders, remain totally unaffected by Hindu influences, whether in language or religion. On the other hand, the race most properly described as Bodos (see art. Bodos) are rapidly losing their native speech, and are being adopted into Hinduism.

What the Hinduism of the great kingdom of Kāmarūpa was, it is impossible to say now with any certainty. But it was evidently the aristocratic religion of kings and nobles only, and from the fact that its centre was the hill shrine of Kāmākṣā Devī, it was no doubt of the Tantrik type identified with Western Assam and Eastern and Northern Bengal—a religion of propitiation of awful and uncomprehended natural forces by bloody sacrifices, often by the slaughter of human victims. Kāmarūpa, with its shrines, priests, kings, and heroes, figures largely in Sanskrit literature from the *Mahābhārata* downwards, and especially in certain *Purāṇas* which deal chiefly with the worship of Śiva and his *śakti*, such as the *Kālikā Purāṇa*. On the other hand, Kṛṣṇa makes a frequent appearance in the stories told in connexion with various places in the Assam valley. Many of these tales seem to imply ancient contests between the cult of Kṛṣṇa and that of Śiva.

For instance, in and round the little town of Tezpur, now the headquarters of the British District of Darrang, are the scattered remains of what seem to have been temples—stone pillars and slabs elaborately carved and ornamented. These are said to have been the palace of one Bāna Asura (the word Asura implies that the king was a non-Hindu by origin), who was the son of Bali Asura. Bāna had many sons and one lovely daughter named Ushā (perhaps after Ushas, the fair goddess of dawn). Ushā dreamt one night of a beautiful youth, and vowed that she would marry no other than the prince of her dream. Her attendant Chitra-lekhā (literally, the 'draughts-woman') had magic skill in drawing portraits, and she drew in turn the features of all the princes in India. Finally, trembling and with hesitation, she ventured to depict Aniruddha, the grandson of Kṛṣṇa himself, and this picture Ushā recognized as the vision that visited her sleep. Aniruddha was attracted by magic arts to Ushā's bower, and 'married her according to the Gandharva ceremony.' The young lovers were surprised by the princess's father, who, in high wrath, being a fervent follower of Śiva, cast the prince into prison, and confined him 'in serpent bonds.' Kṛṣṇa came to his grandson's rescue with a great fleet and army, and carried him and his bride away to distant Dwārika in Western India, but not until a great battle was fought, in which so much blood was shed that the town is called Sonitpur or Tezpur ('the city of blood') to this day, while the little river which runs near it is known as the Bharali, or 'river of fear.' The low range of hills which here skirts the Brahmaputra bank is said to be the extinct remains of a series of fiery volcanoes cast up by the god Śiva as a bulwark for his ally, the angry father Bāna.

There is one circumstance in connexion with this tale which has a certain ethnological interest. The ruins are visited in the dry season by the Daphlas, a wild tribe who live in the Northern hills. They declare that certain mysterious marks on the carved stones are 'Daphla writing,' and that the buildings were the work of their ancestors. It is possible that the Daphlas once lived in the plains of Assam, and were driven into forest fastnesses by some forgotten incursion of Indo-Chinese invaders. Their national costume, curiously enough, resembles the traditional dress of the god Śiva, and the lower caste Hindus believe them to be of the race of that god, who is described in the books as a Kirāti, 'dweller in the hills.' It was indeed somewhere in these north-eastern hills that the Epic hero Arjuna received lessons in archery and other arts of war from Śiva. In any case, the Daphlas have only to adopt Hindu rules of eating, marriage, etc., to be readily accepted into the Hindu fraternity. Again, it is said that Bhāluka, the grandson of Bāna, built a fort, ruins of which are still visible, not far from Bālipārā at the foot of the Ākā hills. The Ākās, whose chiefs now, on occasions of state, wear costumes evidently borrowed from Tibetan Buddhists, are said to claim descent from Bhāluka. It is possible that they too are descendants of a race that was driven into the hills, was once more or less Hinduized, and may yet be accepted into the Hindu fold.

But there are many such legends, all, or nearly all, relating to powerful Asura monarchs. One of the most famous of these was Naraka Asura, son of the Earth, who is said, in the *Mahābhārata* and *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, to have carried off the car-rings of Aditi (the mother and daughter of Dakṣa, above described) to his impregnable castle of Prāgjyotishpur, where Kṛṣṇa, at the request of the gods, went and killed him and recovered the jewels. In the *Harivaṁśa* the same story is told in a slightly different form. Narak's son and successor was Bhagadatta, who is frequently mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*. In the *Sabhā Parvan* of the Epic, the tale is told of how Arjuna attacked Bhagadatta and compelled him to pay tribute. Subsequently, it is related that Bhagadatta went with a great army to the assistance of Duryodhan in the final struggle between the Kauravas and Pāndavas in Western India.

Those who are interested in the legendary period of Assamese history will find a full account of it in Gait's *History of Assam*. In the first half of the 7th cent. we at last get a glimpse of authentic history from the famous Chinese traveller Hiuen Tsiang, who visited Kumar Bhāskara Varmana, then king of Kāmarūpa. Assam was not then, or apparently at any time, a Buddhist country. The king and the upper classes were Tantrik Hindus, the humbler folk were not yet recognized as Hindus at all. This, in the end, was perhaps an advantage, as we shall see when we come to more modern developments of Assamese Hinduism. From the 7th to the 12th cent. our sole knowledge of the country is derived from inscriptions on copper plates, most of them discovered by Gait, which were records of grants of land made to Āyurvedic Brāhmans by Hindu monarchs. These documents contain lists of kings, and enable the historian to settle a few dates at rare intervals. When the Āhoms entered the Brahmaputra valley in 1282, the old kingdom of Kāmarūpa had been shorn of much of its pristine glory, and the history of Assam proper may be said to begin. The Āhoms were Shāns who descended into the valley over the Pātkai pass from Upper Burma. M. Terrien de Lacouperie, the eminent authority on this subject, says that the Shāns are the outcome of an intermingling of Mons, Negritos, and Chinese. They were a manly and hardy race, and (an unusual thing in the East) possessed the historic instinct very strongly. Their *bu-ran-jis* (the word is one of the very few Shān words in the Assamese language) are chronicles comparable for accuracy of detail and picturesqueness of narration with those of any country, and from this time on we have a systematic account of the rise, decay, and fall of the Ahom rule, which resulted finally in British supremacy in Assam. The name Assam itself is probably derived from the word Āhom. The religious history of the Āhoms (*q.v.*) closely resembles that of previous rulers of the country. They, like their predecessors, finally established themselves at Pragjyotishpur (which gradually came to be called Gauhāti) after having founded Sibsāgar and other towns and palaces in Upper Assam. The kings and their Āhom subjects intermarried with their predecessors in the country,

and became, as zealous Hindus, defenders of the famous shrine of the Tantrik goddess Kāmākṣā. But the bulk of the quiet, innocent, and cheerful Hindus of Assam are not Tantriks at all. They are, like the followers of Chaitanya in Bengal, Vaiṣṇavas, and hold a creed which is manifestly tinged by Buddhistic influences. Their faith is that of the *Bhāgavatas*, enthusiastic worshippers of a monotheistic personal god, who is regarded as the Father of his creatures, as accessible to prayer, as having been incarnate in human form, and as one who loves humanity. The soul is regarded as eternal, and extinction or absorption is not considered as possible or desirable. Rather is it the object of the Vaiṣṇava worshipper to obtain by *bhakti*, or 'devotion,' and prayer, fellowship with and ultimate approach to the presence of the divinity (see BHAKTI-MĀRGA).

2. Śāktism.—(*a*) *Historical aspect.*—This new religion, to which the majority of the converts to Hinduism from the humbler races and classes now belong, came into being at a time when the Assam valley was divided between the Koch kings of the West and the Āhom kings who were establishing their dominion in the East. One of the greatest of the Koch rulers was Nara Nārāyaṇa, who died in 1584 after a rule of nearly fifty years. In his time the Koch power reached its zenith, chiefly owing to the warlike ability and energy of his brother, the celebrated commander Silārai. Nara Nārāyaṇa himself is described as a man of mild and studious disposition, who greatly encouraged the spread of the Hindu religion. Like all the rulers of Assam, he was himself a Śākta (a worshipper of the *śākti* of Śiva), and he re-built the temple of Kāmākṣā Devī, which had been destroyed by Musalmān invaders. He imported Brāhmans from Bengal to conduct the religious ceremonies at the temple, and, to this day, the *parvatia gusain* ('mountain priest') who is the chief priest at Kāmakṣā, is a Bengali from the great seat of Bengal religion and culture at Nuddea. The temple contains two stone figures which are said to represent Nara Nārāyaṇa himself and his warrior brother Silārai (or Sukladhvaj). What Śāktism then was (and what it still is in principle) may be judged from the ceremonies conducted at the opening of the restored temple. Here we cannot do better than quote from Gait's *History*.

'At this time Śāktism was the predominant form of Hinduism in this part of India Its adherents base their observances on the Tantras, a series of religious works in which the various ceremonies, prayers, and incantations are prescribed in a dialogue between Śiva and his wife Párvatī The fundamental idea is the worship of the female principle, the procreative power of nature as manifested by personified desire. It is a religion of bloody sacrifices from which even human beings were not exempt. In the *Kālikā Purāṇa* it is stated that a man without blemish is the most acceptable sacrifice that can be offered, and the manner in which the victim is to be dealt with is laid down in great detail. When the new temple of Kāmākṣā was opened, the occasion was celebrated by the immolation of no less than a hundred and forty men, whose heads were offered to the goddess on salvers made of copper. According to the *Haft Iqlim*, there was in Kāmarūpa a class of persons called *Bhogis*, who were voluntary victims. From the time when they announced that the goddess had called them, they were treated as privileged persons; they were allowed to do whatever they liked, and every woman was at their command; but when the annual festival came round, they were killed. Magic also held an important place in the estimation of this sect, and in the *Ain-i-Akbari* the people were accused, among other practices, of divination by the examination of a child cut out of the body of "a pregnant woman who has gone her full term of months." The religious ceremonies of the sect were equally abominable, and they were often associated with licentious orgies too disgusting to be even hinted at' (p. 56).

It may be noticed as a historical fact, that the Śāktism of Kāmākṣā was the religion in turn of dynasty after dynasty of decadent monarchs, each promoted from a state of semi-savagery by adoption into Hinduism. It may be, on the one hand, that something of savage brutality and lust were imported into the cult by association with primitive beliefs. Certain it is that all the royal families, whether of the Brahmaputra valley or of the adjacent Surmā valley, seem to have been addicted to human sacrifice and to all the excesses and abuses that go with panic-stricken cruelty. It is a fact, too, that life in the soft, enervating, and malarious climate of Assam invariably produced physical and moral decay in the fine and manly Indo-Chinese races that invaded the country. When the British took possession of Assam, the Burmese were in occupation of the valley, and were belying their Buddhist creed by cruelties probably unequalled in savagery in any part of the world. Had they established themselves on the ruins of the Āhom monarchy, there can be little doubt that they, too, would have come under the influence of environment, and that their race would have become emasculated by commixture with the degenerate plains-people. Certainly the Tantrik religion of Kāmākṣā was one of inconceivable cruelty and degradation. Before going on to describe how in the 16th cent. a reformation of the utmost importance and interest altered the whole aspect and application of Hinduism in Assam, it may be well to state briefly what the present state of Śākti-worship in the Brahmaputra valley is known to be.

(*b*) *Śāktism at the present time.*—The modern manifestations of the cult of the generative and reproductive forces of Nature are undoubtedly less sensual, less devilishly cruel, than in mediæval times, and this for a variety of tolerably obvious reasons: (1) the reaction from Burmese oppression helped the natural tendency of the Assamese temperament towards placid acquiescence and tolerance; (2) the example of the reformed and infinitely milder and purer religion of the Bhakats had a similar influence; (3) British rule, again, has made open cruelty and obscenity impossible, and even the secret performance of illegal rites dangerous; (4) above all, perhaps, the spread of education, the improvement of communication, and the fact that Assam has now probably a larger foreign population in proportion to its total numbers than any other Indian province, have effected a real change in the tenets, perhaps, and certainly in the manners of Śāktas. Śāktism remains, and must remain while the Tantras are the scriptures of the sect, a religion of blind terror, of uncomprehended forces, of the terrible mystery of birth and death. The root-idea seems to be that Nature creates only to destroy; that she creates only *because* she destroys; that life is begotten only because it is foredoomed to early destruction. The Śāktist can indeed say of his Kāmākṣā, or of some other form of the generative powers of boon nature, that, like the Lucretian Venus,

> 'per te quoniam genus omne animantum
> Concipitur, visitque exortum lumina solis.'

He can, indeed, take pleasure in the recurring marvel of love. But behind seems to lurk a morbid sense that life and death go hand in hand, or rather that one is the shadow of the other. Since the Venus of the Nilāchal hill is Mistress of Life, and Love, and Death, it is inferred that weak mortals, her children, can do her service by loving, by begetting, by slaying. This sentiment is very widely, if obscurely, present in the minds of Hindus of even the highest intelligence and culture. In *Bhānumati* (Calcutta, 1900), a novel by the poet Navin Chandra Sen, the most eminent of living Bengali men of letters, the sense of the mingled horror and rapture of Śākti-worship is expressed in a way that no mere description by a foreigner could convey. The novel contains, incidentally, a graphic account of the appalling cyclone and tidal wave which swept over the district of Chittagong in

October 1897. The whole description is a vivid reminder of the fact that this remote corner of Eastern Bengal was once part of the vanished kingdom of Kāmarūpa, and still preserves its ancient attitude towards the inscrutable mysteries of our common existence.

The tale opens with a singularly beautiful and poetic description of the smiling aspect of the Chittagong coast in late autumn, of the blue sea flecked with foam as the water of a lake is studded with swaying lilies, of the pale azure of the sky overhead, of the yellow sands shining in the happy brightness of morning sunshine, and behind them the rich gold of ripening crops, varied by the dense green foliage, in which the brown-roofed cottages of the peasants nestle. To the north soars the sacred peak of Chandra-sekhar, crowned with the gleam of the white temple of the goddess, and to the south lies the rocky island shrine of the local Venus at Māskhal, an Indian Cyprus on a small scale. It is the eve of the annual festival at which, in old time, human sacrifices were offered to the goddess of Life and Death. The people are happy in the expectation of a plentiful harvest. They are preparing the simple presents with which they rejoice the hearts of their relatives and children; their minds are filled with gratitude for safety, and prosperity, and sufficient food. But the goddess is bent on warning her creatures that death is her function as well as life, and love, and happiness. On the fated night of the cyclone, when the rough and simple peasant folk are quietly sleeping, the great wind blows suddenly without visible warning, and, catching up the rising tide, pours it in a torrent of impartial destruction over the sleeping coast, involving all—happy homes, men, women, and children, ripening crops, prowling beasts of prey, and harmless domestic animals, even the birds of the air—in one common hecatomb. The goddess has exacted her own sacrifice, since men no longer offer victims at her altar. The chapter is significantly headed '*Raṇa-Kṣettra*,' the 'Field of Battle.'

And this, be it noticed, is not a description written by a fanatic priest. Navin Chandra Sen is an English scholar, and an administrator who rose high in the British service. He has been an ardent student of English literature, and, as his poetical works show, is deeply interested in the study of religion. But the warp and woof of the devotional texture of his mind is made up of the ancient conceptions which gave the Brāhmans of Prāgjyotishpur their supremacy through Eastern India, and the kingdom of Kāmarūpa its old reputation for magic, sorcery, and divination. It is still a land of spells and charms; and mystic formulas, rightly used, still have power to bless and curse, to draw on fellow-mortals the smile or frown of the inscrutable goddess in whose hands are the gifts of birth, love, and death alike.

The temple at Nilāchal is open to the visits of foreigners; but its rites are not, even now, very accurately known to the uninitiated. During the Amābasyā week the shrine is closed to all, because, by a quaint fancy, that is the period during which Mother Earth, obscurely identified with the goddess, is unclean. Conversely, the great river Brahmaputra, which flows under the shrine, is, for reasons mythological and other, ceremonially impure throughout the year, except on the annual bathing-festival of the Aśokāṣṭamī, when ablution in his waters becomes as cleansing as bathing in Mother Ganges herself.

In the *Report on the Census of Assam*, taken in 1891, Gait writes as follows:

'Their religious ceremonies [*i.e.* those of the Śāktas of Eastern Bengal and Assam] have frequently been the subject of adverse criticism. Robinson says* that some of the formulas used at the festival in honour of Kāmākṣā relate to things that can never become the subject of description, and that "the most abominable rites are practised and licentious scenes exhibited, which it is scarcely possible to suppose the human mind could be capable of devising." I am not aware on what authority he framed this extremely strong denunciation, but his statements are supported by other writers, and have not, so far as I know, been contradicted. It is well known that dancing girls are maintained at all the principal temples, and it seems certain that a great deal of licentiousness is permitted under the guise of religion.' Here Gait refers his readers to the account of Śāktism given by Monier Williams in his *Religious Life and Thought in India*.

The five essentials for worship are the five *Makāras*, or 'five *M's*,' namely, *Madya*, 'wine'; *Māṁsa*, 'flesh'; *Matsya*, 'fish'; *Mudrā*, 'parched grain and mystic gesticulation'; and *Maithuna*, 'the indulgence of sex.' B. C. Allen has a similar account of modern Śāktism in the *Assam Census Report* for 1901.

* *Descriptive Account of Assam*, p. 258.

Before quitting the subject of Tantrik worship in Assam, it is only right to warn the reader that descriptions based on the excesses of possibly a few enthusiasts must not be accepted as a fair account of either the religious beliefs or the ethics of the great bulk of Assamese Śāktas. Like most Eastern Indians, and especially those who have an infusion of Indo-Chinese blood, they are a mild, contented, and smiling race, little given to excesses of any kind, good sons, husbands, and fathers, and, so far as the long experience of those Europeans who have lived among them shows, not more addicted to grossly superstitious practices than the bulk of humanity. Religion with them, as with most races, is left in its more esoteric forms to priests, experts, devotees, and enthusiasts. There are a few dancing girls at the Kāmākṣā temple, it is true, and it is to be feared that these are devoted to the perversely logical extremes of a creed of panic terror, and morbid exaggeration of the facts of sense. But there is no part of India where womanly virtue and modesty are more valued and more consistently practised than in Assam, which in this respect compares very favourably with neighbouring Bengal, where prostitution is rife. In truth, the Śākti-worship of Kāmākṣā can hardly be considered as belonging to Assam in any proper sense. It is the creed, so far as it is Assamese at all, of the upper classes, all of whom claim to be of foreign origin; and there can be no doubt that, except at the temple itself, it has been purified by contact with the true national religion of the country, the reformed Vaiṣṇavism, to which it is a pleasure and a relief to turn.

3. **The Vaiṣṇavism of Assam.**—(*a*) *The historical aspect of Assamese Viṣṇu-worship.*—When the Koch king Nara Nārāyaṇa (1528–1584) ruled in Western Assam, and the Āhom king Chuhumung, whose Hindu name was Swarga Nārāyana (1497–1593), ruled over the eastern part of the Brahmaputra valley, the great social and religious reform initiated in Bengal by Chaitanya spread to Assam, and became the foundation of what is still the popular and prevalent form of Hinduism in the country.

In still earlier times, when the Āhoms entered the Brahmaputra valley, there were twelve subordinate rulers or chiefs, who were known as the Bāra Bhuiyā, and these claimed to be descendants of Samudra, the minister of an ancient and still famous ruler called Arimatta. Samudra, it is said, seized the throne on the expulsion of Arimatta's son Ratna Singh. Samudra was succeeded by his son Manohar, and Manohar's daughter Lakṣmī became the bride of the sun-god, to whom she bore two sons, Santanu and Sāmanta. Santanu became a follower of Viṣṇu, and Sāmanta a Sākta and worshipper of the rival deity Śiva—another reminder of the never-ending contest between the two great Hindu schools of divinity. The brothers separated, Santanu and his sons going to Rāmpur in Nowgong, while Sāmanta remained in Eastern Assam, at Lakṣmipur, the village from which the British District of Lakhimpur takes its name. He and his descendants seem to have exercised a gradually diminishing political power, and for a long time maintained their independence against the Kachāri or Bodo king who then ruled in Central Assam, and the powerful Chutiya monarch whose capital was at Sadiyā, near the north-eastern frontier. Ultimately, however, they fell victims to the usual law of decay to which all Assamese dynasties have been subject, and were subdued by the rising Āhom power. As in so many other cases, this semi-royal family became reconciled to the common lot of Assamese humanity, and, save for some lingering pride of race and some intellectual aspirations, were merged in the landholding class. One of Santanu's descendants, named Rājdhar, settled at Bardowa in Central Assam, and his son Kusambar was the father of the great religious reformer Śankara Deva.

This is one of two versions given by Gait of the origin of the first of the reformers of Assam. The other story does not differ in material points from that which has been summarized above. It,

too, describes Śankara Deva as the descendant of famous chiefs, but speaks of these as the wardens of the northern marches.

It is said of Śankara that he early recognized the crude and cruel features of the cult of the goddess of Life and Death, and was puzzled by the anomalies of the Śākta religion, obvious enough to modern minds, if they presented few difficulties to simple races surrounded not only by human foes, but by the frequently hostile and always terrible and incomprehensible forces of a land of fierce sunshine, and one much subject to earthquake and storm. Śankara's fate was cast in a happier and more peaceful time, when there was an equilibrium of forces between the two great powers of the Koch and the Ahom, and when men had leisure to think of the possibility that human beings might conceivably live at peace together, and that Nature herself might not be so hostile after all. He spent twelve years in Bengal, chiefly, it is supposed, at Nuddea, where he learnt the religious ideas of a greater than himself, the famous reformer Chaitanya. Like his master, he made the *Bhāgavad Gītā* his scripture, and Kṛṣṇa, the heroic incarnation of Viṣṇu, the god of his worship. He was one of the most eminent of the many teachers, both before and after Chaitanya, of the *Bhāgavata* religion, which in some of its forms so closely resembles the teachings of Christianity that it has been supposed by some that the doctrine of *bhakti*, or personal adoration of a divine Father, was borrowed from the Thomasine Christians of Southern India (see BHAKTI-MĀRGA). Śankara, at all events, abjured priests, idols, and castes, and taught that all men are alike the sons of Viṣṇu, possessed of immortal souls, and capable of being freed from sin and sorrow by addressing their prayers to their loving Father. He at first strove to propagate his ideas—and his earnest desire to find converts affords another parallel with Christianity — in the Ahom dominions But the Ahom kings were under the domination of Śākta priests, who denounced the innovator as a heretic. Śankara was compelled to take refuge at Barpetā, in the kingdom of the mild and enlightened Koch king Nara Nārāyaṇa. It is said that the king had many interviews with the reformer, and even proposed to become his disciple. But Śankara, with characteristic modesty, refused the honour.

This story may merely record in a concise and picturesque form the fact that the Vaiṣnavas of Assam never tried, as their Brāhman predecessors had done, to win over the ruling classes. Their 'kingdom,' if the expression may be used without irreverence, 'was not of this world,' and they were content to make converts among the humblest races and classes, those which orthodox Hinduism had, with some vague memory of the old 'Aryan' exclusiveness, regarded as Mlecchas and barbarian. It is said by modern followers of Śankara that he had studied the *Bhāgavad Gītā*, before he proceeded to Bengal, with Hari Deva and Dāmodar Deva, subsequently to be themselves founders of minor Vaiṣnava sects. It is possible that there was at this period a widely spread wave of religious inquiry and a silent revolution against the physical and spiritual tyranny of Śākta priests. It is at least a curious coincidence that, when Luther and other reformers were rebelling against the abuses of Roman doctrine and discipline, a precisely similar movement should have produced Hari Vyāsa in Nepāl, Rāmānanda in Orissa, Chaitanya in Bengal, and Śankara in Assam.

Śankara is said to have lived to great old age, and to have died in the year 1569. He was succeeded by his favourite disciple Mādhava, a Kāyastha like himself. Among those who still follow the teaching of Śankara, Mādhava is regarded with even greater reverence than Śankara himself, and the sect is commonly known as the Mahāpuruṣiyas, the followers of the 'Great Man' or Teacher, *i.e.* Mādhava. But there were some who, on the death of their original teacher, were still under the influence of old-time ideas, and resented the founding of a hierarchy of Kāyasthas as religious guides. Several Brāhman disciples seceded and founded sects of their own. The most important of these Brāhman dissidents were Dāmodar Deva, Hari Deva, and Gopāl Deva, who founded numerous *chattras*, or centres of religious instruction. The most important and interesting of these are the institutions, not wholly unlike Buddhist monasteries, at Auniāti, Dakṣinpāt, Garamur, and Kurubāhi — all in the remarkable Mājuli island, perhaps the longest river-island in the world, which lies in the Brahmaputra, between the modern Districts of Sibsagar and Lakhimpur. There is little Śāktism now except in Kāmrūp Laur; and that of the Vaiṣnavas in Lower Assam is mainly Mahāpuruṣiya, while Upper Siam, including Nowgong, east of the Kalang, is inhabited mainly by followers of the Bāmumya *guṣains*.

But even in Upper Assam the Brāhmans did not in early times exercise an unquestioned sway. There was one Aniruddha, a Kolitā or writer by caste, who quarrelled with Śankara Deva and founded the Moāmāriā sect, which played an important part in subsequent political events, and is known to all students of Assamese history as the origin of the famous Moāmāriā rebellion. It is said that the word 'Moāmāriā' is a nickname, contemptuously given by the Brāhmans to the low-caste followers of Aniruddha, who lived by a fresh-water lagoon which abounded in the coarse fish known as *moā*. His disciples were known as 'killers of moā-fish.' They became 'fishers of men' to considerable purpose in later times, and furnished a hard nut for the Ahom rulers of Assam to crack.

For a time the Mahāpuruṣiyas and Bāmuniyas between them practically ousted Śāktism from Assam. Its restoration was due to the royal pride of the famous Ahom king Sukhrungphā, better known by his Hindu name of Rudra Singh (1696–1714). He wished to adopt Hinduism, and was too proud to accept the *saran*, the oath and formula of orthodoxy, from a subject. He imported one Kṛṣnarām Bhattāchariya from Nuddea, and made him *parvatia gusain*, the high priest of the mountain-temple of Kāmākṣā. Kṛṣnaram was a Śākta, and the Court and its dependants adopted his form of Hinduism. The new guṣain's priestly arrogance was aptly shown when Rudra Singh died and was succeeded by his son, Sunyeophā or Lakśmī Singh. Kṛṣnarām refused to recognize the young king, on the ground of illegitimacy. Lakśmi Singh accordingly imported another Śākta priest from Bengal, who was the founder of the family of the Na Guṣain, the 'New Priests,' as the Parvatia Guṣains are the heads of the Nāti Guṣains, who together with them form the nucleus of Śāktism in Assam. There are, however, a few representatives still of the old indigenous Śāktism of the Assam valley, who, from their habit of going about un-turbaned, are known by the title of *Muṛkali Muṛa*, the 'Bare-heads.' Gait believes that Śāktism has more vital force than Vaiṣnavism. 'Many Vaiṣnavas,' he says, 'are attracted by the more realistic worship of the Śāktas, and offer sacrifices at Kāmākṣā despite the remonstrances of their spiritual guides.' In truth, Vaiṣnavism, as practised by its humbler converts, is but a stage removed from the animistic creed of the aboriginal races of Assam. It involves chiefly the giving up of good roast pork and rice-beer—luxuries to which the castes that have Indo-Chinese blood in their veins are much addicted. Śaktism, on the other hand, puts little check on sensual gratification, since it is always possible for enthusiasts of either sex to regard themselves as incarnations of the male or female form of the deity, and so to please divinity by pleasing themselves.

(*b*) *Vaiṣnavism at the present time.*—It remains to say a word as to the Vaiṣnavas as they now are. Laymen are under the supervision of the *gusains* of one *chattra* or another, to whom they have taken the vow of obedience. They are visited from time to time by *bhakats*, or disciples of the *chattra*, who exact the doles or fines by which the community is maintained. They are mostly simple and innocent enough folk, not much given to religious or ethical speculation. Their

rustic existence is so uneventful and unchequered that a very plain and uncomplex theory of moral and material existence suffices them. The Mahāpuruṣiyas now regard Śankara and Mādhava as *avatārs*, or incarnations of Viṣṇu, though neither of them claimed this promotion in his lifetime, and would, indeed, have regarded such an assumption of divine honours with horror. The way to salvation lies through the performance of good deeds and the devout pronouncing of the name of Hari. Worship is carried out by the performances of *sankirtan*, the enthusiastic singing of hymns accompanied by much beating of drums (*dhol*) and clashing of cymbals (*kartāl*). The ten incarnations, or *Daś Avatār*, of Viṣṇu are believed in. Caste prejudices, though theoretically opposed to the tenets of the sect, were not wholly destroyed by Mādhava himself, and are slowly but surely reasserting themselves, perhaps under the influence of the adjacent Śāktism. The Mahāpuruṣiyas do not, however, recognize caste so fully as the sects that have Brahman leaders. The *Kaulia Bhakats*, the monks or recluses who live in the precincts of the *chattras*, are celibates, ascetics, and wholly ignore caste, as being of the nature of worldly distinctions. In each *chattra* there is an image of Viṣṇu, but this is said by the Kaulias to be a mere concession to the idolatrous weaknesses of the common people. They themselves do not pay any reverence to the idol, and are pure monotheists after the teaching of the *Bhāgavad Gītā*, with, no doubt, in the case of the better read among them, a leaning towards pantheism.

The Mahāpuruṣiyas eat the flesh of wild animals, such as deer, and also all feathered game. They do not eat domesticated animals or fowls. (It may be worth mentioning that the Assamese word for 'deer' is *pahu*, the local pronunciation of the Sanskrit *paśu*. The deer is, in fact, '*the* animal.') The Mahāpuruṣiyas do not kill with the knife or poleaxe, as most Indians do, but cudgel animals to death. Their principal scriptures are a *Kirtan* and *Daśam* attributed to Sankar Deva, and a *Nāmghoṣa* and *Ratnāvali* said to have been composed by Mādhava. The *Kirtan* and *Nāmghoṣa* are anthologies from different *purāṇas*. The *Daśam* and the *Ratnāvali* are extracts from the *Bhāgavad Gītā*. The Mahāpuruṣiyas refuse to eat with the Dāmodariyas, but, curiously enough, intermarriage with them is not unknown.

The Dāmodariyas worship the idol of Kṛṣṇa, and they regard their founder Damodar Deva as an incarnation of that god. Refusing the spiritual leadership of Śūdras, they refuse, necessarily, to recognize the claims to homage of Sankar and Madhava. In other respects there is little difference between their tenets and habits and those of the Mahāpuruṣiyas. Though they are careful for Brāhmanical supremacy, they are, strange to say, less strict in diet than the Mahāpuruṣiyas, and eat the flesh of goats, pigeons, ducks, etc., following in that respect the example of their Brāhman teachers. Nor are they so particular as the Śūdra caste in matters of personal cleanliness.

The followers of Hari Deva regard their leader as an emanation of Kṛṣṇa, but do not on that account deny that Sankar was also an incarnation of Viṣnu. Among them prevails the practice of the *bhakat-seva*, which permits their Brāhman leaders to accept indiscriminately all offerings made to them by their *jajmānas*, or disciples. Hari Deva was himself an enthusiastic admirer of Sankara and Mādhava, but in modern times the tendency is for the followers of this reformer to identify themselves with the Dāmodariyas.

Finally, a few words must be said as to the followers of Gopāl Deva. Gopāl was a disciple of Sankara, who quarrelled with his leader, and started a *chattra* of his own. But it is said that the misunderstanding did not wholly destroy their liking and respect for one another, and it is difficult at the present day to see much difference between the beliefs and practices of the followers of Gopāl Deva and the Mahāpuruṣiyas. The former hold an annual festival in honour of their founder, but in other respects are much the same as members of the rival sect.

4. Methods of conversion.—The most important method of conversion to Hinduism in Assam, but one always reserved for ruling princes and powerful tribes, and now obsolete, was that described by Gait as 'conversion by fiction.' As he says (*Census of Assam*, 1891, p. 83):

'The Brāhmans ingratiate themselves with the head of the tribe, discover that he is a Hindu of unexceptionable antecedents, whose ancestors have for some reason thought fit to conceal their identity, and present him with a brand new genealogy, in which his descent is traced back to some god in the Hindu pantheon or some potentate in Hindu mythology. Thus the Koch kings are said to be descended from Śiva, who, assuming the form of Haria Mandal, had intercourse with his wife, who was no other than an incarnation of Pārvatī. While a divine origin for the king was thus furnished, the rest of the tribe were not forgotten. It was explained to them that they were Kṣatriyas who fled eastwards to escape the wrath of Paraśurāma, and had remained there ever since, disguised as Meches and Koches. The Kachāri kings of Hiramba were similarly converted, and, after their ancestry had been satisfactorily traced back to Bhīma, the two chiefs, Kṛṣṇa and Govinda Chandra, were placed (about 1790 A.D.) in the body of a large copper image of a cow, and were thence produced to an admiring people as newly born Hindus. The whole of the Kachāris of that part of the country were also admitted to be of Kṣatriya origin, and were allowed to assume the sacred thread on declaring their adherence to the orthodox faith. The conversion of the Manipuris (or Meithei, the Kuki-Chin race inhabiting the Imphāl valley) happened in precisely the same way. Arjuna was alleged to have been the founder of the royal family, while the masses of the people, like the Kacharis, were admitted to be "concealed Kṣatriyas." To this day a Nāga or Kuki on conversion is at liberty to describe himself accordingly and to assume the sacred thread. For the Āhoms, Indra was selected as the mythical progenitor of the kings, but no special origin seems to have been assigned to the common people, so that an Āhom on conversion takes as low a place in the Hindu caste system, in his own estimation, as he does in that of orthodox Hindus.'

Here Gait adds an interesting note to the effect that Indra also enters into the traditions of the Mon-Annam races of Burma and the Far East. Indra alone of the Vedic gods, Forbes tells us, has been admitted into Buddhist mythology (*Languages of Further India*, p. 41). It is just possible that the Āhom kings brought the tradition of their heavenly descent with them from Burma, and did not obtain it from their priestly attendants.

The fictional system of conversion had its advantages. It admitted whole races at a time into Hinduism. But it involved important concessions, which the Brāhmans were not likely to make unless they could receive some equivalent in return. Converts who belong to tribes for which a high ancestry has already been invented, continue to claim admittance to their reputed caste—generally, of course, a high one. But nowadays conversion is sporadic and confined to humble folk, and such people are kept on a much lower footing than the kings, warriors, and invading races of old time. Sometimes they change their tribal name and enter a caste specially reserved for them. Sometimes they even become Hindu without changing the title of their race.

In the Assam valley the Koch caste is usually allotted to converts - a circumstance not without interest when it is considered that Koch was originally the name of a race whose members, in Northern and Eastern Bengal, changed their name to Rājbaṁsi, or 'royal-born,' when they adopted Hinduism. The true Bodos of the Kachāri Dwars usually enter this caste, while their highland

cousins, the Di-mā-lisa, as already related, have been raised to Kṣatriya rank. But even the name of Koch cannot be assumed all at once. A Kachāri, for instance, begins by placing himself under the protection of a *guṣain* and taking the oath of obedience, or *saran*. He is then called a Saraniya. At this stage he still eats pigs and fowls, and continues to drink beer and, less frequently, distilled spirits. Next he (or rather his descendants) becomes a Modāhi, which implies the renunciation of alcohol. By slow degrees the ancestral yearning for unholy food and drink diminishes or disappears, and, having become a ceremonially pure Hindu, the aforetime Kachāri is accepted as a Kāmtāli or Bar Koch. Even then, however, he is subject to relapses, especially in the matter of pork, as the presence of pigs in Koch villages sufficiently testifies.

In the eastern part of the Brahmaputra valley, where caste feeling is even now weaker than on the confines of Bengal, a change of name is unnecessary, and a Kachāri or Āhom retains his tribal appellation. In the Surma valley the only Indo-Chinese tribes who are now converted are Manipuris and Kachāris; and these, as explained above, are entitled to be received as Kṣatriyas though the Kṣatriya caste no longer exists among the Bengalis. There are a few Tipperas (Bodo folk from the Tippera hills) who are received into Hinduism. These obtain the as yet unexplained caste name of Rārh.

It may be mentioned in passing that instances have been known in which members of hill tribes have undergone a stage of Christianity on their way to Hinduism.

For instance, there is a well-authenticated case of a young Kachāri in Darrang who was brought up in a mission school, was baptized, and obtained a somewhat lucrative post. To a man of his race it seemed natural that he should invest his savings in a polygamous union, and he was at some pains to convince his missionary that he could find nothing in the New Testament to prevent a layman from being the husband of two wives. It was, of course, impossible for his pastor to accept his view of the case, but he married a Koch girl *en secondes noces*, and himself in due course became a Hindu Koch.

At the present time the ferment of political agitation which is stirring in Bengal has spread, to some extent, to the educated classes in the Assam valley. The movement is largely a Hindu movement, and implies the fervent adoration of a Mātā, or mother, to whom the *Bande Mātāram* hymn is addressed. This hymn is usually interpreted as an invocation of the mother-land; and, in one sense, it undoubtedly has this meaning. But no one who will take the trouble to read the context in the well-known novel of *Ānanda Maṭh*, from which the hymn is taken, will have any difficulty in convincing himself that the invocation has also an esoteric sense, and implies the adoration of a female divinity, who is, more or less disguised, the Śākti of the old cult of the vanished kingdom of Prāgjyotishpur. The neo-Śāktists who, in Bengal and Assam at least, head the new 'national' movement towards autonomy and independence of British rule, boldly claim, on the strength of their education and intellectual ability, an equality with European races, and, of late, have exhibited a marked desire to be admitted to the amenities of European society. They themselves confess that the social and political progress of Japan has given the hint for this new ambition. It will be a matter of much interest to see whether followers of the more esoteric and, according to European ideas, less pure and elevating form of Hindu belief will be able so to transmute their social system and ideals as to obtain admittance into even the comparatively tolerant society of modern Europe. Of the intellectual ability of the Aryo-Dravidian upper classes of Bengal and Assam, the heirs of the ancient civilization of Kāmarūpa, there can be no doubt. That most of them are good citizens and excellent in their dealings with one another is equally undoubted. It may be that Śāktism at its worst was no worse than the society depicted, for instance, in the tales of Apuleius—a society which nevertheless still retained something of the administrative instincts of Republican Rome. It would be unwise to dogmatize or prophesy in a matter whose solution must depend on many incalculable events. It would be unfair to remind the political reformers of Assam that the shrine of Venus Kāmākṣā still draws its throngs of worshippers and furnishes revenue to priests who are much as were the priests of old time, when the humble civil station of Gauhāti was the proud and famous capital of Prāgjyotishpur, an early English account of which may be read in the travels of Ralph Fitch, who visited the country of Couch, or Quichen, as he calls it, when Nara Nārāyana still ruled over the diminished remains of the old kingdom of Kāmarūpa.

See, further, separate artt. on ĀHOMS, BODOS, KHĀSIS, LUSHAIS, MANIPURIS, MIKIRS, NĀGAS. For an account of the Muhammadanism of Assam see ISLĀM (in Burma and Assam), and for the Buddhism see BUDDHISM (in Burma and Assam).

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ASSASSINS.—1. Names.—'Assassins' was a name given, mainly by European writers, to a community properly called Ta'līmites ('Instructionists') or Ḥasanites ('followers of Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ'), forming a branch of the Bāṭinites ('followers of the Inner Meaning'), Ismā'īlians ('adherents of Ismā'īl b. Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq'), or Sab'ites ('Heptadists'), and sometimes confused with the Bābakites or Ḫuramites and Qarmatians (*q.v.*). For the origin of the name Assassin (spelt in base-Latin documents *assasini*, *assessini*, *assisini*, *assassi*, *hassasuti*, *heissessin*, etc.) many improbable conjectures were offered till it was finally identified by de Sacy (*Mém. de l'Institut*, iv. 44) with the Arabic *ḥasshāshīn* or *ḥashīshiyya*, 'drinkers of *ḥashīsh*' (an extract of hemp possessing intoxicating properties, with which there is reason to believe that the members of the sect were at times drugged). The story, however, to that effect which is told by Marco Polo (3rd ed., Yule, i. 139), though parallel with some Eastern narratives (see von Hammer, *Mines de l'Orient*, iv. 355), can only be regarded as a romance. The name *ḥasshāshīn* with its synonym has as yet been found in very few Arabic authors,* applied to the Syrian branch of the sect; and seems to have been a term of abuse, given to it by its enemies, who associated deceit with the habit of drinking this liquor (*ZDMG* xx. 591).

2. Tenets.—The tenets of the community are very imperfectly known, partly owing to the rarity of MSS emanating from it, and partly because their doctrines were essentially esoteric, and communicated in their entirety to very few persons. It is, however, certain that the system of the Ismā'īlians was a conflation of philosophic pantheism, emanating from India, with the formulæ of Islām; and the doctrine whereby this process was facilitated, and which won them the name Bāṭinites, was that every text of the Qur'ān had a hidden meaning, which was to be followed

* To de Sacy's references we may add Mufīd al-'ulūm (Cairo, 1310, p. 50), where *ḥashīsh* is said to be the food of the *Mulḥids* (the name by which the sect is known to its enemies).

to the exclusion of the literal sense. The name Sab'ites is ordinarily interpreted as implying that they recognized only seven *imāms*, whereas most of the Shī'ites recognized twelve; the seventh being that Ismā'īl b. Ja'far, who was supposed to have died before his father (who therefore left the imāmate to another son Mūsā), but in the opinion of the Ismā'īlians either did not die but remained concealed, to re-appear at some time as Mahdī ('divinely-guided' leader), or retained his title to the imāmate and handed it on to his son Muḥammad, a real or pretended descendant of whom afterwards founded the Fāṭimid dynasty in Egypt. More probably the name Sab'ite refers to their belief in seven incarnations of the deity, called *nāṭiqs*, 'utterers,' whom they enumerate as Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Muḥammad, and Muḥammad b. Ismā'īl; for the last, as will be seen, the head of the community for the time being was apt to be substituted. Between every two of these *nāṭiqs* there came a series of seven *imāms*, or chiefs; and each imām was at the head of a heptad, of either followers or classes of followers, called respectively *ḥujja* ('argument'), *dhū maṣṣa* ('sucker,' *i.e.* imbiber of learning), *dā'ī akbar* ('greater missionary'), *dā'ī ma'dhūn* ('permitted missionary'), *mukallib* ('trainer') and *mu'min* ('believer'); the last class but one were not permitted to reveal the doctrines, but might shake the faith of ordinary Muslims. Similarly they had a system of seven operations required in the making of a convert, the first of which consisted in testing the capacity of a man for conversion, the second in winning confidence by flattering a man's particular taste (*e.g.* practising asceticism before an ascetic, debauchery before a loose liver), the third in suggesting doubts as to the truth of Islām; in the sixth a man had to abandon religious observances, and interpret 'washing' as obeying the imām, 'washing with sand' (permitted by the Islāmic code in the absence of water) as obeying the 'permitted missionary' when the imām was away, etc. Certain other examples of the 'inner meaning' assigned by them to Qur'ānic texts are given by Ch. Schefer (*Chrestomathie persane*, i. 178):

'When the Qur'ān says Jesus had no father, the meaning is that he received instruction from no trustworthy teacher: when it says that he raised the dead, it signifies that he brought knowledge to dead understandings.'

Rather more interesting is their gloss on the Qur'ānic passages in which Pharaoh and Haman are mentioned. These names they supposed to stand for the first two Khalīfs, Abū Bakr and 'Omar, who kept the first imām, 'Alī, out of his rights. With regard to the existence of God they maintained a sceptical attitude, so far at least as 'existence' might be regarded as an attribute; for their public symbol was at times 'we believe in the God of Muḥammad.' In their cosmogony the world of mind was said to have first come into existence; the world of soul followed, and then the rest of creation. A man's life is due to his being a receptacle of a partial soul which at death rejoins the universal soul.

3. History.—The tenets of this community seem to have attracted little attention till towards the end of the 5th cent. of Islām; for the work of Ibn Ḥazm on sects and creeds of the middle of that century contains but a casual allusion to them as one of many sects who vainly believed in a concealed imām. The importance of the branch known as Assassins began with Ḥasan b. 'Alī b. Ṣabāḥ the Ḥimyarite, ordinarily known as Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ, who in A.D. 1090 seized the fortress of Alamūt near Kazvīn; but it was greatly reduced when, in 1256, that fortress was taken by the Mongol Hūlāgū. On that occasion the conqueror gave his vizier 'Atā Malik Juwainī the right to inspect the library of the fortress before burning it, and the vizier thence extracted a brief history of the community, which he afterwards inserted in his chronicle called *Jahān-Kushāi*, tr. by Defrémery in *JA*, 1860.

This summary was afterwards embodied by the Persian chronicler Mirkhond (*ob.* 1498) in his *History*, together with some other matter bearing on the history of Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ and his successors (published with tr. by Jourdain in *Notices et Extraits*, ix. 143 ff.). An account in some respects more favourable to Ḥasan is given in the chronicle of Ḥamdallāh Mustaufī (*ob.* 1349 A.D.), translated by Defrémery in *JA*, 1848. Some of the matter given by Mirkhond is derived from a work by the celebrated Niẓām al-Mulk, vizier of the Seljūks, who was well acquainted with Ḥasan and finally perished by his machinations. The most elaborate account as yet discovered is that in the chronicle *Jāmi' at-tawārīḫ* (Brit. Mus. Or. 1684), which is told from the point of view of followers of the sect. The statements of this work, and others bearing on the same subject, have been submitted to searching criticism by E. G. Browne (*A Literary History of Persia*, ii. 190 ff.), who has disposed of certain familiar myths, which need not again be repeated. According to this, his father's home was Kūfah, but he had migrated to Qum, where Ḥasan was born; both originally belonged to the Shī'ite 'Sect of Twelve,' but the son was converted to the 'Sect of Seven' through the efforts of a missionary named Amīr Darrāb, and those of the famous poet and traveller Nāṣir-i-Khusrav. These missionaries, societies founded by whom had already honeycombed Persia, were agents of the so-called Fāṭimid Khalīfs of Egypt, at whose court ambition which had failed to find gratification at that of the Seljūks, now in control of Baghdad, naturally sought compensation. The myth to which reference has been made assigns Ḥasan a motive of this sort for joining the sect.

About the year 472 A.H. (A.D. 1079) Ḥasan went to the court of the Egyptian Khalīf Mustanṣīr, and studied the doctrines of the community which he had joined. But he did not stay more than two years in Egypt, having espoused the cause of the Khalīf's eldest son Nizār, who had been appointed by his father to succeed him, but was later displaced in favour of another son. Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ maintained that the expressed resolve of an imām was unalterable. He obtained, however, some sort of certificate as Ismā'īlian missionary, and introductions to those persons who were already playing that part in Persia, whither he returned in 1081; and a writer on religions in 1085 at the court of Ghazni already mentions Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ as a successful preacher of Bāṭinism in Khurāsān and 'Irāq (Schefer, *op. cit.*, i. 161).

According to Ibn Athīr (ed. Tornberg, vol. x. p. 213), the Ismā'īlian revival with which Ḥasan proceeded to associate himself had about this time begun at Sāwa, where eighteen men met to perform worship in the style peculiar to the sect. There, too, their first assassination took place, the victim being a *mu'adhdhin* ('caller to prayer'), whom they had vainly endeavoured to convert to their doctrines, and had murdered when they feared he might betray them to the local authorities. The vizier Niẓām al-Mulk ordered a carpenter who was suspected of the murder to be executed with great brutality, and thereby exposed himself to the vengeance of the sect. Since Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ's conduct is said to have been dictated by dissatisfied ambition and the desire to be avenged on Niẓām al-Mulk, this may have been the occasion for his conversion; but the order of events is not quite certain. What is clear is that the sect was highly unpopular with the orthodox, though the skill of the missionaries caused it to spread in secret; and that the sectarians quickly felt the need for strongholds in which they could be safe from persecution. The first fortress seized was one near Qā'in between Iṣfahān and Nīshāpūr (see C. E. Yates, *Khurasan and Seistan*, 1900, p. 62). That of Alamūt, which fell into the hands of Ḥasan, 'is 32 miles from Kazvīn; it is on a solitary rock, about 300 yards long from E. to W., very narrow, not 20 yards wide at the top; about 200 feet high everywhere save to the W., where it may be 100' (*JRGS* viii. 431; cf. iii. 15). Ḥasan

is said to have purchased it for 300 pieces of gold from an 'Alid who happened to be governor, and on whom Ḥasan imposed by professed asceticism and piety; and he probably obtained authority among the Ismā'ilians by professing to act as the deputy of the Egyptian Khalīf, whom they acknowledged as their chief. Ḥasan caused the land surrounding his fortress to be carefully cultivated, and this may have led to the legend which associated with it gardens of delight that could serve as a foretaste of the Islāmic Paradise.

Like other founders of dynasties in the East, Ḥasan was a preacher and controversialist. Works by him* or by his colleagues, embodying Bāṭinite doctrines, excited sufficient attention to evoke replies from the foremost theologian of the time, al-Ghazālī, who refuted their tenets in a work dedicated to the Khalīf Mustaẓhir (487–512 A.H.), whose reign coincided with Ḥasan's tenure of Alamūt. A second tract written by him in answer to the 'Instructionists,' called 'The Just Balance' (*al-Qusṭās al-Mustaqīm*), was published in Cairo, 1900. It is in the form of a dialogue between Ghazālī and a member of the sect. The latter maintains the doctrine of a hidden instructor, who can see all that is going on in the world, on the authority of his mother, 'and our master the lord of the fortress Alamūt,' as well as a comrade of Dāmghān Iṣfahānī, and the inhabitants of the fortresses. The treatise is occupied mainly with an account of the forms of the syllogism and the logical fallacies, and an attempt to show that there is no need for an infallible instructor. The book must have been written before 515 A.H., when its author died. The writings of Ḥasan were burned by one of his successors; but some of them were current in the time of Shahrastānī, who in his works on *Sects and Schools*, ed. Cureton, p. 150 (A.D. 1127 [521 A.H.]) gives excerpts from one of them, translated from Persian into Arabic. The purpose of this treatise appears to have been to decry the independent use of the reason, and prove that for knowledge of God (which with this sect was equivalent to salvation) recourse must be had to a divinely-authorized teacher, whence the sect are sometimes called *at-ta'līmiyya*, or 'Instructionists.' Undoubtedly his purpose was completely to enslave the mind of his disciples, who may even have been drugged for certain periods. Although assassination was from the commencement of Islām a common way of dealing with enemies, Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ appears to have systematized the process in a manner previously unknown. A doctrine which is ascribed to the Ismā'ilians by a late writer, but which may well have been taught also by Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ, was that the soul is imprisoned in the body for the purpose of executing in all points the orders of the *imām*. If the soul quits the body while fulfilling its duty of obedience, it is delivered and transported to the regions of the upper lights; whereas, if it disobeys, it falls into darkness (Quatremère, *Mines de l'Orient*, iv. 368).

One class of disciples, called *Fidā'īs*, were ready at all times to assassinate those whom the head of the order marked out for death; and in accordance with the doctrine described they would risk their own lives readily in making such attempts. Nevertheless these persons received a special training qualifying them for such missions; they were taught foreign languages and the ceremonies of foreign religions, and how to adopt and maintain a variety of disguises. Hence the assassins dispatched by the 'Old Man of the Mountain,' in order to win the confidence of their destined victims, would play a part for a series of months, or even years. The terrible certainty with which Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ could strike from his fortress soon enabled him to extend his possessions and make terms with various rulers. In the second year of his residence at Alamūt he struck down Niẓām al-Mulk, and, shortly after, the Sulṭān Malik Shāh. Emissaries of his made attempts on the lives of Malik Shāh's successor, Barqiyāruq, and the former's brother, Sinjār, installed by his nephew as governor of Khurāsān. During the war between Barqiyāruq and his brother Muḥammad, numerous fortresses were acquired by the chiefs of the sect, mainly in the region called Kuhistān. The knowledge of the existence of this society, and that many persons in high posts at the Seljūḳ courts were its secret adherents, caused terrible anxiety and disquietude. 'Whoever wished to ruin his adversary accused him of belonging to the Ismā'īlian sect; delations multiplied; suspicion hovered over every one' (D'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols*, iii. 159). The Sulṭān Barqiyāruq, son of Malik Shāh, was himself accused of favouring the Assassins, and was compelled to raid their country, without, however, achieving any important results.

Not long after the acquisition of Alamūt by Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ, the Assassins became strong in Syria also. Whether these Syrian Ismā'ilians at the first recognized the authority of the 'Old Man of the Mountain' is not certain; a detailed account of their history is given by Quatremère, to which something is added by Defrémery in *JA*, 1854, 1855. Ten years after the seizure of Alamūt, we hear of the Ismā'ilians establishing themselves at Aleppo; and for a time they enjoyed the almost unconcealed favour of the Seljūk prince of that place, Riḍwān, who is thought to have employed their services in getting rid of his enemy Janaḥ ad-Daula, prince of Emesa (A.D. 1100). The names of their leaders at Aleppo are given as al-Ḥakīm al-Munajjim and after him Abū Ṭāhir al-Ṣā'igh (Abū Ya'lā Ḥamzah, p. 149). Through the machinations of the latter, in 1106 they obtained possession of Apamea, whence, however, they were ere long driven by the Franks. Riḍwān's successor, Alp Arslān, the Dumb, urged on by the Persian Seljūḳs, organized a massacre of the Ismā'īlians in 1113; yet their numbers and power kept increasing, and in 1126, through the efforts of their agent Bihrām and his influence with Ẓahīr ad-Din Atābek, they got possession of Bāniās, whence, however, they were driven in 1129 owing to a massacre of their adherents in Damascus. In 1140 they acquired a highly important stronghold, Masyāt or Masyāf, and in the second half of the 12th cent. they were in possession of ten or eleven fortresses. Lists of the persons of eminence whom they killed have been made out by many writers. These were sometimes persecutors of the sect, but not infrequently the head of the community took pay from some foreign prince to strike down an enemy. In 1148 one of their number killed the Frankish count of Tripoli, in consequence of which the Templars invaded their territory and compelled them to pay tribute. On 29th April, 1192, an emissary of the 'Old Man of the Mountain' killed Conrad of Montferrat, signor of Tyre and titular king of Jerusalem; different accounts make the 'Old Man of the Mountain'—or rather Rāshid ad-Dīn, at this time independent head of the Syrian Assassins, resident in the fortress of Kahf—despatch the Assassins at the instigation of Saladin, and at that of our Richard I. The Assassins in this case were disguised as monks. The ability with which the Ismā'ilian chiefs could execute assassinations caused them to receive commissions for such acts from both Eastern and Western princes, including the Byzantine emperors. And many a crime of the sort was ascribed to them of which they were innocent.

* One of them is called by Muḥammad b. Malik Shāh 'the book filled with lies' (Abū Ya'lā Ḥamzah, ed. Amedroz, p. 153).

The throne founded by Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ was occupied by seven successors—Buzurg Umid (518–532 A.H.), his son Muḥammad (532–557), his son Ḥasan (557–561), his son Muḥammad (561–607), his son Ḥasan (607–618), his son 'Alā ad-Dīn (618–653), his son Rukn ad-Dīn (653–654), when Alamūt was taken by the Mongol leader Hūlāgū, and the fortresses of the Assassins in Persia were stormed one after another. This last date corresponds with A.D. 1256. In Syria the power of the Ismā'īlians continued somewhat longer, and as late as 1265 presents are said to have been sent them by various European monarchs; but the ruler of Egypt, which, after the fall of Baghdad, became the headquarters of Islām, gradually obtained possession of their fortresses, all of which were occupied by the Egyptian Sulṭān Baibars in 1273. Baibars, however, continued to favour the sect, and to make use of members of it when he required assassins; and a curious treaty is mentioned between his general Qalā'ūn and Margaret of Tyre, in which the Egyptian undertakes that no servants of his with the exception of Assassins shall molest her. At times they were able to regain possession of their fortresses, and in 1326 held as many as five. Many of the later Mamlūk Sulṭāns countenanced them, and occasionally employed their services against enemies; thus the long war between the Mamlūk Qā'itbai and the Turkomans was due to the employment by the Sulṭān's predecessor of an Assassin to remove a Turkoman prince.

Of the successors of Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ the third signalized himself by rejecting the claims of the contemporary Egyptian Khalīf to the imāmate on the ground that it had descended of right to Nizār, eldest son of Mustanṣir; and that he, Ḥasan, though supposed to be the son of the governor of Alamūt, was in reality the heir of this Nizār. In virtue of his divine right he formally absolved his subjects from many of the ordinances of Islām, including the Fast (*Ṣaum*), and made some changes in public worship. He is also charged with having given permission for various forms of immorality. The fifth successor, on the other hand, endeavoured to restore Muslim orthodoxy among his followers, and burned the books of the founder of the dynasty. He entered into friendly relations with the Sulṭāns of Baghdad, and was treated by them with distinction.

Of the members of the sect in Syria by far the most interesting is Rāshid ad-Dīn Sinan, of whose career a detailed account is given by S. Guyard in *JA*, 1877. About 555 A.H. (A.D. 1160) this person was sent by the ruler of Alamūt to take the place of Abū Muḥammad, governor of the fortress Kahf. He adopted the tactics with which Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ had previously succeeded, made himself interesting, and won respect in the neighbourhood of Kahf by religious exercises and philanthropic actions, and by an affectation of humility and asceticism. This secured him the notice of Abū Muhammad, who received him into the fortress and treated him with honour, learning only on his deathbed that he had been sent to supplant himself. Rāshid appears to have shaken off allegiance to Alamūt, claiming to be not only *imām*, but an impersonation of the deity —a claim which won large acceptance among the Ismā'īlians, though his lameness constituted a difficulty to some minds. In the fragments relating to the doctrine of the sect published by Guyard in *Notices et Extraits*, vol. xxii., some treatises ascribed to him are to be found; in these the title *nāṭiq* (which is also given to Moses) is claimed for him. In anecdotes told about him (collected by one Abū Firās, *JA*, 1877), he figures as a magician, or rather conjuror. He claimed to be able to answer letters that he had not read, and, anticipating modern conjuring tricks, held conversation with a trunkless head.

At the beginning of the 19th cent., Ismā'īlian communities still existed both in Persia and Syria; J. B. Fraser (*Journey into Khorasan*, 1825), describes his meeting with Khalīl Allāh, the then head of the Ḥasanites (as he calls the sect) at Yezd. This chief was treated by the community with almost divine honours, and many of his adherents were visitors from India. The same personage is mentioned by J. B. Rousseau ('Mémoire sur les Ismaelis et les Nosairis,' *Annales des Voyages*, xlii., 1818), who, however, places the residence of the chief at Kehk in the district of Qum, S.S.W. of Teheran. Rousseau also gives details concerning a Syrian community of Ismā'īlians, with headquarters at Masyāf, twelve leagues west of Ḥamāth. They were distributed over eighteen villages, and their *shaikh*, or governor, was appointed by the governor of Ḥamāth. They were subdivided into two sects, Ḥadrāwīs and Suwaidānīs, of whom the former held seventeen villages and the latter one only; and they still possessed one of their ancient fortresses called Qadamūs. In 1809 they had sustained a treacherous attack by their neighbours the Nosairites, which, though afterwards avenged, left the community in a wretched condition.

Recent explorers of Persia and Syria seem either to ignore the existence of Ismā'īlian communities, or to speak of them as extinct (but see art. QARMATIANS). On the other hand, the Assassins are still represented in India by a community called Khōjās, who trace their origin to the mission of an Assassin named Ṣadr ad-Dīn, who some centuries ago made converts among the Hindu trading classes in Upper Sind. Col. Yule in his edition of *Marco Polo* (3rd ed., i. 146) states that the sect multiplied considerably in Sind, Kachch, and Gujarāt, whence they spread to Bombay and Zanzibar. Their numbers in Western India were then probably not less than 50,000–60,000. Sir W. Hunter (*Gazetteer of India*, 1885, iii. 52) adds that they are especially numerous in the Peninsula of Kāthiāwār. They have also established trading colonies along the East coast of Africa. The leader of the main body of the Khōjā community was then the Persian prince Agha 'Alī Shāh, whose predecessor, the well-known Aghā Khān, was long a resident of Bombay after the troubles that drove him from Persia. About this person some further details are given by Yule in the passage quoted. Having raised a revolt in Kirmān, he fled from Persia to Sind in 1840. He had been installed as *imām* on the death of Khalīl Allāh (mentioned by Rousseau and Fraser) in a brawl at Yezd in 1818. In 1866 a schism in the Khōjā community, in which an attempt was made to exclude Aghā Khān from all rights over the sectarians and to transfer the property of the community to orthodox Muslims, led to a trial in the high court, which ended in favour of Aghā Khān. Further lawsuits have led to the appointment of a commission to inquire into the sect. According to Balfour (*Cyclopædia of India*, 1885), their sacred book is in ten chapters, of which the first nine treat of the incarnations of Vishnu, 'Alī being the subject of the tenth. This would imply that the conflation of Indian and Arabian ideas which characterized the sect from the first continues in its latest development.

LITERATURE —Denis Lebey de Batilly, *Traité de l'origine des anciens Assassins porte-couteaux*, 1603, Falconet, 'Dissertations sur les Assassins, peuple d'Asie' (*MAIBL* xvii., 1751); de Sacy, 'Sur l'origine du nom des Assassins' (*Mém. de l'Institut*, iv., 1809); Quatremère, 'Mémoire sur les Assassins' (*Mines de l'Orient*, iv., 1814); Defrémery, 'Recherches sur les Assassins' (*JA*, 1854, 1855); S. Guyard, 'Un grand Maître des Assassins' (*ib.* 1877); E. G. Browne, *Literary History of Persia*, ii. (1906).

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

ASSIMILATION (Psychological).—The term 'assimilation' in psychology represents a form of union or combination between presentations or presentational elements, but its precise application has been variously interpreted.

(1) In its general use it refers to a phase of the apperceptive process: a presentation is 'assimilated' when it is taken up into, and becomes an effective moment in, the total consciousness present at the time of its arrival. No new presentation is available either for memory or for knowledge or for practical application, until and unless it has been thus brought into connexion with other elements of consciousness, and with the general forms and tendencies of conscious movement which constitute for psychology the 'self.'

(2) Historically, the first usage of the term was the converse of the above: many of the Scholastics spoke of knowledge as taking place by the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, after the Greek principle (ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ): so Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Suarez, and others. A wide-reaching corollary of this principle was that (*a*) ideas are 'copies' or images of reality, and (*b*) memory-images are 'copies' or shadowy forms of sensations; to this reference is made below.

(3) In modern psychology, 'assimilation' is applied to a form of association (*q.v.*), namely, simultaneous partial association, the features of which are (*a*) that it takes place between elements or parts of presentations, not between individual or independent presentations, as in ordinary association by contiguity; (*b*) that the two (or more) elements which enter into the association are simultaneously given in consciousness, although one is usually a 'sensation' (*i.e.* peripherally excited), the other necessarily a 'representation' (*i.e.* centrally excited); (*c*) that they cannot be separated or distinguished by *direct* analysis, thus corresponding to the 'inseparable association' of English psychology. Instances are the union of colour and form in visual perceptions, of tone-quality and distance in the perceptions of sound, of tactual quality and 'hardness' or 'softness,' 'smoothness' or 'roughness,' in the perceptions of touch.

(4) More definitely, 'assimilation' is applied to the synthesis of similar elements or elements of similar quality, and is contrasted with 'complication,' a synthesis of presentations of diverse quality, etc. It may be either *intensive*, as in the musical *clang*, or the chord, where tones of different pitch combine to give a resultant which is more than their mere sum (it is a unity in which their individuality is absorbed); or *extensive*, as when a number of discrete touch-impressions or visual impressions combine to give a continuous presentation of surface or depth. This form of assimilation is sometimes made to replace the older conception of association by similarity, as when a perception (*e.g.* that of an orange) 'reproduces' an idea (*e.g.* that of the moon), which has some element in common with the perception in question. It has been argued (*a*) that this process is possible only by the assimilation of the given element to the former experiences of itself, which must therefore be somehow 'revived'; and (*b*) that the process is not one of association, since the new and the old experience have never formed parts of one and the same consciousness, as the doctrine of association requires; (*c*) that, so far from being an association of elements which through frequent repetition have become 'inseparable,' assimilation is a process prior to and presupposed in every association.

(5) On this view, of which Höffding and Ward are the chief exponents, an assimilative process is of the essence of perception. In its simplest form, perception is *recognition* (or direct cognition), *i.e.* the awareness of an impression, or group of impressions, as familiar, as already experienced, without any explicit idea or image of the previous presentation arising in the mind. The impression is not merely repeated, but has an added quality or colouring, by which it is distinguishable from a wholly new impression. This added character or mark Höffding calls the *Bekanntheitsqualitat*, 'the quality of known-ness.' It has been explained by Külpe through (*a*) the facility and power with which the known excites other ideas, and (*b*) the peculiar mood or feeling which the known arouses, as contrasted with the unknown or unfamiliar. Both of these features, however, are common to other forms of repeated consciousness; they illustrate the *law of practice*, according to which all function, and especially nervous function, 'is made easier by repetition and practice.' A more important feature in Höffding's theory is that recognition or perception involves an assimilation between two elements, namely, the new or incoming impression (A), and the reproduction or revival of the earlier impressions (a_1, a_2, etc.), the whole being symbolized by $\binom{a}{A}$; *a* is not, however, an explicit or free idea, but an '*implicate* (*gebundene*) *representation*'—a tied idea. But according to Ward there is no revival of earlier impressions: 'We have to do not with the retentiveness of a waxen tablet but with the plasticity of a growing structure. The inchoate beginning, so far from being reproduced, is obliterated and superseded by the supervening detail; and even when the acquisition is complete, the perfect identity of the new with the old forbids us to talk of memory of ideas.'*

Thus (i.) assimilation is the process underlying all *acquired* perception, as distinct from mere sensory impressions on the one hand, and the organized sensations, or perceptions, which seem to form the stimulus of instinctive behaviour on the other. (ii.) It is a product of mental activity (through interest, attention, action by way of trial and error, etc.) in which past experience is correlated with the present situation. But (iii.) this influence is not mediated by distinct images or free ideas, which are a later product. (iv.) It marks a distinct step in mental growth, and is correlated with a special development of the central nervous system (the cerebral hemispheres). (v.) Individual development, phylogeny (the evolution of the nervous system in animals, and *pari passu* of the forms of animal behaviour) and mental pathology (cortical or sensory, psychic or 'soul,' and verbal blindness, etc.), support the view that sensation, perception and assimilation, free ideas, and association are both distinct in their psychical nature and origin, and have as their 'basis' distinct physical functions and structures.

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J. LEWIS M'INTYRE.

ASSIMILATION (Religious).—All development, that is growth, must proceed by means of assimilation. That is to say, religion, if it is to grow, must assimilate 'whatever is good and true in general culture' (Tiele, *Elements*, i. 242), or, if that is too wide a statement, then we may say it

* *Mind*, N.S. iii 532.

must appropriate whatever conduces to its growth—'all that makes its creed clearer and deeper' (*ib.* 230); it must assimilate what it appropriates, and not merely 'imitate or adopt it' (*ib.* 237). What is thus appropriated will in the process be transformed to some extent, for it is 'assimilated' to religion or to the form of religion into which it is taken up. On the other hand, the form of religion which thus takes up from the environment something good and true, and assimilates it, will be affected by what it takes up; it will be brought into accord with the civilization from which it has appropriated the good or true idea; it will be different from what it was before; it will have developed or grown. But, in thus growing by means of assimilation, it must remain true to its type, it 'must form, maintain, and vindicate its *own* character' (*ib.* 242). It will also maintain and vindicate its own character by shedding dead leaves, throwing off waste tissue. And the matter thus thrown off is not matter which ought never to have been taken up, but matter which—useless and even dangerous as it now is, cumbering the ground on which it is found—was once, when first taken up, essential to the vitality and growth of religion. In now rejecting conceptions or formulæ which are dead, and being dead are injurious to continued growth and life, we are neither denying that they once were essential nor condemning the past generation with whom they originated. We are simply claiming the same right to grow which they enjoyed and exercised, the same right to grow in the same way as they—by shedding dead leaves and putting forth fresh ones.

Thus far we have illustrated the meaning of 'assimilation' by reference to ideas which religion appropriates from its cultural environment; and such ideas, though they may, at the time when they were taken up, have represented the highest scientific or philosophic knowledge of the day, may with the advance of knowledge cease to occupy that position; they may become dead leaves on the tree of knowledge, and if so, then religion, too, must shed them—or share decay with them. But a religion in the course of its history may—and if it is to grow, must—come into conflict with other religions and convert men from their old form of religion to the new. In such a case the converts cannot and do not empty their minds utterly of their old religious ideas. Some form of transaction or accommodation between the old and the new is inevitable; and no religion ever escapes from this consequence of contact. Some of the old ideas are taken up by the invading religion; but they are not simply adopted as they stand; they are assimilated. And, naturally and necessarily, they are assimilated to those elements in the new religion to which they are most akin; and they strengthen those elements. Thus, if the new religion recognizes the existence of evil spirits, whether as the cause of disease or of other ills, the gods of the old religion may appear as demons in the new. Or, if the new religion recognizes saints and angels, some of the old gods may persist by a corresponding metamorphosis. And in either case the metamorphosis immensely strengthens the element which it has reinforced. But though it strengthens the particular belief by this process of assimilation, it does not necessarily thereby make the religion which has absorbed it better as religion. On the contrary, the very belief which it strengthens may be one which religion, to live, must ultimately cast aside. 'Assimilation' is not necessarily and always beneficial to the organism. The healthiest organism may assimilate what is injurious to it.

On the other hand, what is assimilated from the old religion may be advantageous, in a greater or less degree, to the new. The habit of worshipping on stated occasions may exist in the old religion and be made usefully subservient to the purposes of the new. Yule and Easter testify by their names to the fact that they existed before Christianity, though they have been assimilated, and in the process of assimilation have been transformed, by the Church. What was thus taken up into Christianity and baptized into the name of Christ was not merely this or that outward form of worship: we have to recognize 'the selective assimilation and consequent consecration of many current customs and institutions and ideas' (Illingworth, *Doctrine of the Trinity*, p. 94). As an example of such ideas we may take the Logos doctrine. That idea was taken up—whether from Philo or from 'the general intellectual atmosphere of which he was a representative product' (*ib.* p. 88)—and baptized into Christianity by St. John. But it was not adopted just as it stood; 'the new faith fashioned a new thing' out of it (*ib.* p. 89), the new 'term was, so to speak, taken out of its old associations, to be employed thenceforward as a Christian symbol' (*ib.* p. 90).

At this point a divergence of opinion manifests itself as to what 'assimilation' means and implies. It may be maintained that assimilation never implies an addition to the original creed of Christianity—'never the imposition of a new article of faith' (Illingworth, p. 98), but simply the 'progressive formulation of doctrine' (*ib.*); the process is 'one of interpretation, and not of innovation'; it is 'the fuller explanation' of the meaning of the original teaching, 'an explanation of what was implicit, but never an addition to what was implicit in the teaching of Christ Himself' (*ib.* p. 101). This view may seem to imply that the formulation of doctrine is of necessity progressive; that the process is always one of interpretation, never of misinterpretation; that the result is always to bring out what was implicit in the teaching; and that those who hold this view have the means of knowing, and the power of declaring, infallibly, what was and what was not implicit in the teaching of Christ Himself. In the absence of such power, our confidence that the process in any given case is one of interpretation and not of innovation must vary with the particular circumstances of the case. Let us illustrate this by reference to the Logos doctrine. Every one will admit that out of the Philonian doctrine the new faith fashioned a new thing, viz. the Johannine doctrine. Was the new thing an innovation or was it not? It is evident that there was that in the new faith which was capable of being interpreted or explained by the terms and the conceptions of the Logos doctrine. But will it be maintained that, if the Philonian doctrine had been non-existent, the Logos doctrine would nevertheless have appeared, all the same, exactly as it actually does, in the Gospel according to St. John? No one can maintain that. Had the Johannine doctrine been non-existent, no one would or could maintain that it was implicit in the teaching of Christ Himself. And had the Philonian doctrine been unknown to St. John, the Logos doctrine would not have existed in the Fourth Gospel. But the Philonian doctrine did exist; it contained some truth; and that truth was recognized, appropriated, transformed—in a word, assimilated—by Christianity. To say, however, that Christian doctrine was not affected by what it assimilated, that it remained what it was, and that it is now exactly what it would have been had it never assimilated anything whatever from the spiritual and intellectual environment in which it developed, is a position which no one will undertake to maintain. Christian doctrine took over what was good and

true in the Philonian teaching; and it has grown consequently in a way in which it would not have grown otherwise. The Christian creed has grown clearer and deeper, because it had the power of appropriating and assimilating from its environment what there was good and true in that environment (*ib.* p. 144). But the power of assimilation, where it exists, is not always exercised; and, where exercised, is not always exercised wisely. We are not able to say either that Christianity left nothing good unassimilated or that everything it did assimilate was good. Neither, therefore, can we say that everything it did assimilate was implicit in the teaching of Christ Himself. We may believe—as members of the Church of Christ we must believe—that the growth and development of Christian doctrine, so far as it is the unfolding of what was implicit in Christ's teaching, is the work of the Holy Spirit, or of the Church following the guidance of the Holy Spirit. But it is simply not true that the Church has always, invariably, and in every respect, followed that guidance: 'our confidence that any given action is the result of that guidance . . . must vary with the particular circumstances of the case' (*ib.* p. 100). The fact that any given action is the action of the Church is a presumption, but no proof, that it was done under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. So far as the Church submitted to that guidance, 'it appropriated what was best and truest in the surrounding life and thought to its own purposes' (*ib.* p. 124). And that statement is as true of the present day as it is of the earliest days. But evil as well as good may be assimilated; has been, as a matter of history, assimilated; and, as a matter of fact, is being assimilated. The mere fact that a custom, institution, or idea has been assimilated constitutes no proof that it was implicit in Christ's teaching. The fact of assimilation is one to be 'constated' by scientific investigation. The value of the assimilation and of its consequences is a different question, and one which should be kept distinct.

If Christianity should come to be the dominant religion in Japan, it will inevitably, in becoming so, assimilate much from Buddhism; and it may be that the resulting form of Christianity will in some respects be higher than any hitherto taken by Christianity. That is a possibility which no one who believes in the infinite potentiality of Christianity will for one moment care to deny. But the higher form, in such case, will be a higher form of Christianity. The process will be one of assimilation; the result may be to reveal to the world that it is possible for men to make greater self-sacrifice, and to lead a more Christ-like life, than has hitherto been the case with any Christian people.

LITERATURE.—C. P. Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1897; J. R. Illingworth, *Doctrine of the Trinity*, Lond. 1907; P. Gardner, *Growth of Christianity*, Lond. 1907; P. Wendland, *Die Hellenistisch-Romische Kultur*, Tubingen, 1907.

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ASSOCIATION.—Association, or, the more frequently used phrase, **Association of Ideas**, denotes a doctrine of both philosophical and psychological import. In philosophy it is the explanatory principle of that theory of knowledge which would derive all knowledge from items of sensation. Psychologically considered, association is primarily the doctrine which deals with the reproduction of past experience by a present object of consciousness. The so-called 'Laws of Association' express the conditions under which reproduction takes place. Three such laws have been formulated and are still discussed in current English text-books of Psychology. (*a*) *Law of Contiguity*: a present object will recall to mind any object with which it was contiguous in space or time, *e.g.* the sight of a visitor from one's native place revives memories of that place. (*b*) *Law of Similarity*: a present object will recall one similar to itself, *e.g.* the sight of one person revives the memory of another whom he in some respect resembles. (*c*) *Law of Contrast*: a present object recalls an object contrasting with itself, *e.g.* a childless hearth revives the memory of a neighbour's merry crew of boys and girls. It is this particular psychological doctrine which is the foundation both of association as a philosophical principle and of association as a comprehensive psychological theory.

It has been claimed by Sir W. Hamilton * that **Aristotle** was the first to formulate the Laws of Association. The passage upon which the claim is based is from *de Memoria et Reminiscentia*, a translation of the latter part of which Hamilton gives in full, together with his own emendations in, and commentary on, the text, in the note in question. After dealing with memory (*μνήμη*), or what modern Psychology would term retention, Aristotle contrasts with it recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*).

'The occurrence of an act of recollection is due to the natural tendency of one particular change to follow another. If the sequence is necessary, it is clear that, on the former change occurring, the second will be summoned into activity; when, however, the connexion is not necessary, but due to custom, the occurrence of the second process will take place only in most cases. It so happens that some people receive a greater bent from a single experience than others in whom the sequence has frequently taken place, and hence, in some instances, after seeing the things once we remember them better than others who have seen them frequently. Thus, when we recollect, one of our previous psychic changes is stimulated which leads to the stimulation of that one after which the experience to be recollected is wont to occur. Consequently we hunt for the next in the series, starting our train of thought from what is now present, or from something else, and from something similar or contrary or contiguous to it.' †

Plato had already noticed the same striking cases of relationship between recollected idea and present object of consciousness (*Phædo*, 73 D). At the sight of his lyre the lover will recollect the beloved. The picture of Simmias is apt to remind one of Simmias. 'Recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike.' ‡ There had, however, been no formulation of the principles involved or any attempt at a scientific theory of recollection as such. All knowledge was recollection.

The fact of association was recognized in the teaching of the **Stoics** and **Epicureans**, but no new contribution was made towards the theory either by them or later by the **Schoolmen.**

The first important formulation of a theory is that of **Thomas Hobbes.** In *Human Nature* (1650), Hobbes distinguishes between the casual and incoherent flow of ideas in dreams and the orderly flow—

'when the former thought introduceth the later. . . . The cause of the coherence or consequence of one conception to another is their first coherence or consequence at that time when they were produced by sense: as, for example, from St. Andrew the mind runneth to St Peter, because their names are read together; from St. Peter to a stone, for the same cause; from stone to foundation, because we see them together; and for the same cause, from foundation to church, and from church to people, and from people to tumult: and, according to this example, the mind may run almost from anything to anything.' §

In addition to this form of the flow of ideas, which would be order in accordance with the Law of Contiguity, Hobbes notices another and different form which one might in general term 'appetitive,' on account of the cause assigned for it.

'The cause whereof is the appetite of them, who, having a conception of the end, have next unto it a conception of the next means to that end.' ‖

* *Works of Reid*, ed. Hamilton, note D**.

† *De Sensu* and *de Memoria*, ed. by R. T. Ross, Camb. Univ. Press. This translation, from the point of view of scholarship, seems preferable to that given by Sir W. Hamilton.

‡ Jowett's tr. of *Phædo*, 74 A.

§ *Human Nature*, ch. iv. §§ 1 and 2. ‖ *Ib.* ch. iv. § 2.

'To omit that kind of discursion by which we proceed from anything to anything, there are often other diverse sorts. as first in the senses there are certain coherences of conceptions which we may call ranging; examples whereof are: a man casteth his eye upon the ground, to look about for some small thing lost; the hounds casting about at a fault in hunting; and the ranging of spaniels: and herein we take a beginning arbitrary.

'Another sort of discursion is when the appetite giveth a man his beginning, . . . where honour to which a man hath appetite maketh him think upon the next means of obtaining it, and that again of the next, etc. And this the Latins call *sagacitas*, and we may call hunting or tracing. There is yet another kind of discursion beginning with the appetite to recovery of something lost, and proceeding from the present backward, from the thought of the place where we miss at, to the thought of the place whence we came last; and from the thought of that, to the thought of the place before, till we have in our mind some place wherein we had the thing we miss: and this is called Reminiscence.'*

The recognition of these appetitive associations might have led to new theories as to the origin of the association link, but Hobbes did not pursue the theme any further, and his successors do not appear to have noticed the group of associations which he here singles out.

For Hobbes the psychological doctrine of remembrance becomes also a philosophical one, the principle of his theory of knowledge, as it was thereafter the principle for the empirical school.

'All experience being . . . but remembrance, all knowledge is remembrance,'† for it is either sense knowledge and the remembrance of this, or is knowledge of the truth of propositions and how things are called, which latter again arises from experience—

'which is nothing else but the remembrance of what antecedents have been followed by what consequents.' ‡ 'When a man hath so often observed like antecedents to be followed by like consequents that, whensoever he seeth the antecedent, he looketh again for the consequent, or when he seeth the consequent, maketh account that there hath been the like antecedent; then he calleth both the antecedent and the consequent signs one of another, as clouds are signs of rain to come, and rain, of clouds past. This taking of signs by experience is that wherein men do ordinarily think.'§

It is the power of arbitrarily devising signs and so increasing associations that differentiates man, the rational being, from the brute beasts. Without such signs the coherent flow of ideas would be at the mercy of chance—

'for one conception followeth not another according to our election and the need we have of them, but as it chanceth us to hear or see such things as shall bring them to our mind. The experience we have hereof is in such brute beasts, which, having the providence to hide the remains and superfluity of their meat, do nevertheless want the remembrance of the place where they hide it, and thereby make no benefit thereof in their hunger: but man, who in this point beginneth to rank himself somewhat above the nature of beasts, hath observed and remembered the cause of this defect, and to amend the same, hath imagined or devised to set up a visible or other sensible mark, the which when he seeth it again, may bring to his mind the thought he had when he set it up. . . . In the number of these marks, are those human voices which we call names or appellations of things sensible by the ear, by which we recall into our mind some conceptions of the things to which we gave those names or appellations.'‖

To **John Locke** belongs the authorship of the phrase 'Association of Ideas'; yet Locke does not even mention association in his psychological account of memory.¶ The phrase for him denotes the connexion of ideas 'that in themselves are not at all akin,' as opposed to those which 'have a natural correspondence and connexion one with another.' 'This strong combination of ideas, not allied by nature, the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance, and hence it comes in different men to be very different according to their different inclinations, education, interests,' etc.** Association of Ideas is for Locke the explanation of error, prejudice, and intellectual habits, but it is not given any philosophical or general psychological significance.

* *Human Nature*, ch. iv. §§ 3, 4, 5; cf. *Leviathan*, pt. i. ch. iii.

† *Ib.* ch. vi. § 1. ‡ *Ib.* ch. iv. § 6.

§ *Ib.* ch. iv. §§ 9 and 10. ‖ *Ib.* ch. v. §§ 1 and 2.

¶ *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, bk. ii. ch. x.

** *Ib* bk. ii. ch. 33.

In **Hume's** philosophy, on the other hand, Association of Ideas plays an all-important part. In the *Treatise on Human Nature* (1739–40), he brings forward association as the principle of connexion, *not* for ideas of memory, wherein the connexion is 'inseparable' and is 'the original form in which its objects were presented,' but for ideas of imagination. We are to regard it as 'a gentle force which commonly prevails.' 'The qualities from which it arises, and by which the mind is after this manner convey'd from one idea to another, are three, viz. Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect.'*

From the *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, we learn that Hume regarded himself as being the first to enumerate or class the principles of association. In this later treatise he recognizes them as principles of connexion for memory and imagination alike.

After Locke, Hume analyzes knowledge into simple and complex ideas; but with Hume association becomes what it never was with Locke, the mechanism by which complex ideas — relations, modes, and substances — arise from simple ones. Cause and effect is classed as if it were a special form of association, yet, when analyzed, it is shown to be merely a case of contiguous association. The 'necessity' which characterizes this relationship is due to the inferential attitude of mind, which again is but the effect of custom. 'After the constant conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for instance, . . . we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other.'†

Although in his theory of knowledge Hume shows an advance upon Hobbes, both in the application of the principle of association to explain our conceptions and in his systematization of the whole doctrine, yet his psychology of association is inferior to that of the earlier writer. Beyond the classification of the principles there is little attempt at a theory of association. 'Its effects are everywhere conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain.'‡ Custom is the cause of the necessary associations of contiguity, and with 'this propensity' we must rest content 'as the ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions from experience.'§

It is in **Hartley's** *Observations on Man* (1749) that we first meet with association as a comprehensive psychological theory. Here for the first time there is a methodical array of the phenomena of mental life and a thoroughgoing attempt to show how the more complex mental phenomena are derived from the simpler by means of association, memory being but one particular case of this.

Here the passions and the phenomena of conduct are shown as products built up by the association of ideas (traces of sensation) with the simple sensations of pleasure and pain, and with automatic movements; just as similarly imagination and reasoning are but cases of the association of ideas with one another, and with words.

Hartley's psychological theory is closely bound up with his physiological one as to the nature of the processes which take place in the nervous system. The main outline of the general theory is best given by his own propositions, and from the psychological point of view some of these are important enough to warrant quotation *in extenso*.

'The white medullary substance of the brain is also the immediate instrument by which Ideas are presented to the mind: or, in other words, whatever changes are made in this sub-

* *Treatise on Human Nature*, pt. i. § iv., ed. Green.

† *Concerning Human Understanding*, pt. i. § v.

‡ *Treatise on Human Nature*, pt. i. § iv.

§ *Concerning Human Understanding*, pt. i. § v.

stance, corresponding changes are made in our ideas; and *vice versa*.

'External objects occasion, first in the nerves on which they are impressed, and then in the brain, vibrations of the small, and, as one may say, infinitesimal medullary particles.

'Sensations, by being often repeated, leave certain vestiges, types, or images of themselves, which may be called simple ideas of sensation.

'Sensory vibrations, by being often repeated, beget, in the medullary substance of the brain, a disposition to diminutive vibrations, which may also be called vibratiuncles and miniatures, corresponding to themselves respectively.

'Any sensations, A, B, C, etc., by being associated with one another a sufficient number of times, get such a power over the corresponding ideas, *a*, *b*, *c*, etc, that any one of the sensations, A, when impressed alone, shall be able to excite in the mind *b*, *c*, etc., the ideas of the rest.

'Any vibrations, A, B, C, etc., by being associated together a sufficient number of times, get such a power over *a*, *b*, *c*, etc, the corresponding miniature vibrations, that any of the vibrations, A, when impressed alone, shall be able to excite *b*, *c*, etc., the miniatures of the rest.

'Simple ideas will run into complex ones, by means of association.' *

Sensations are associated when their impressions are made at the same instant or in successive instants. Strength and frequency of impression are the determining conditions for the association. The whole theory is full of suggestions for the later psychology wherein association becomes the great explanatory principle. Even Herbart's mathematical treatment of the relations between ideas seems foreshadowed.

'The power of miniature vibrations to raise other miniatures may, perhaps, be made clearer to mathematicians, by hinting that the efficacy of any vibration to raise any other is not in the simple ratio of its vividness, but as some power less than unity; for thus *b* may raise *c*, a weaker vibration than *b*, *c* may raise *d*, etc., with more facility than if the efficacy was in the simple ratio of the vividness, and yet so that the series shall break off at last.' †

It was because of the physiological doctrines upon which the psychological theories were made to depend that Hartley's work did not meet with the attention it merited at the hands of his immediate successors In France, Locke had had many disciples; the analysis of all the complex ideas of knowledge into simple ideas derived from sensation had been pushed to extremes far removed from Locke's 'plain, historical method.' One might therefore expect to find in France a parallel for, if not an acceptance of, Hartley's psychological analysis of the phenomena of consciousness. But there is nothing which at all compares with it. We do find in **Condillac** an effort to derive all the so-called faculties of the mind from sensation. This faculty is said to comprehend all the others; analysis of it will reveal attention, imagination, judgment, etc. But an instance of such analysis will show how far removed such an effort after derivation was from the scientific method pursued by Hartley.

'To decompose the faculty of feeling, we need only observe in succession all the circumstances that happen in it, when we acquire any knowledge whatever. . . . My looking at an object is an action by which my eye tends towards the object to which it is directed: for this reason, I give it the name of attention. . . . The attention we pay to an object is therefore, as to the mind, nothing but the sensation which that object causes in us. . . . As we bestow our attention on one object, so we may on two at once, then instead of one exclusive sensation we experience two. . . . Comparison is therefore nothing else but a double attention—it consists in two sensations. . . . It is impossible for us to compare two objects and to experience side by side, as it were, the two sensations which they produce in us exclusively, without presently perceiving that they resemble each other or differ from each other. Now to perceive resemblances or differences is to judge. Judgment, therefore, is nothing still but sensation.' ‡

In a similar manner Condillac proceeds to derive 'desire,' 'will,' and 'the passions' from our sensations 'if we consider them as agreeable or disagreeable.'

In Scotland, **Thomas Brown**, although expressly disapproving of Hartley's theory of association with its physiological basis, gave an exposition of mental phenomena in which association, or, as Brown prefers to style it, suggestion, was used as the explanatory basis. In place of the varieties of powers or mental faculties given by Reid and others, Brown grouped all intellectual phenomena (other than those of sensation) under two generic capacities—simple and relative suggestion.

'Simple suggestion is the capacity by which conception after conception arises in the mind—precisely in the same manner, and in the same state, as each might have formed part of other trains, and in which the particular state of mind that arises by suggestion does not necessarily involve any consideration of the state of mind which preceded it.' *

The primary laws of simple suggestion are resemblance and contrast, while contiguity is treated as a secondary law. To simple suggestion belong conception, memory, imagination, habit.

Relative suggestion is 'the capacity for feeling resemblance, difference, proportion or relation in general, where two or more external objects or two or more feelings of the mind itself are conceived by us.' † To this capacity belong the so-called faculties of judgment, reasoning, and abstraction.

The true psychological descendant of Hartley is **James Mill**, in whose *Analysis of the Human Mind* (1829) we have association, freed from the effete mythology of vibratiuncles, used as the great explanatory principle of psychology. The phenomena of the human mind are analyzed into two classes—intellectual and active—and the psychology of these is a doctrine of elements and compounds. Sensations, including pleasurable and painful feelings, are the elements, the whole of the remaining furniture of mind being set forth as products, compounded out of these elements in accordance with the Laws of Association. Ideas are traces of sensation, and 'spring up or exist in the order in which the sensations existed of which they are copies.' ‡ This order is synchronous and successive order in time, and synchronous order in space. Contiguity is thus the fundamental Law of Association, resemblance and contrast being treated as special cases. 'Not only do simple ideas, by strong association, run together, and form complex ideas, but a complex idea, when the ideas which compose it have become consolidated so that it always appears as one, is capable of entering into combinations with other ideas, both simple and complex.' §

Conception, imagination, classification, abstraction, memory, belief, inference, are shown by analysis to involve nothing but our sensations and their ideas compounded by association. Similarly for the phenomena of conduct. Will is analyzed as a chain of associations. In all cases where a certain action is desired, it is associated as cause with pleasure as effect; the idea of the 'outward' appearance of the action excites by association the idea of the inward feelings which are the immediate antecedents of the action, and then the action takes place. There is no place here for a doctrine of Free Will. 'Whatever power we may possess over the action of our muscles, must be derived from our power over our associations; and this power over our associations, when fully analyzed, means nothing more than the power of certain interesting ideas, originating in interesting sensations, and formed into strength by association.' ‖ This strength, we are told, depends upon the vividness of the associated sensations and the frequency with which the association occurs.

As compounds formed in conformity with an exact law, mental phenomena admit of scientific treatment. Psychology need no longer stand without the pale of science; its method resembles that of the mechanical and physical sciences. The

* *Observations on Man*, Props. 2, 4, 8–12.
† *Ib* on Prop xi p. 39.
‡ Condillac, *Logique* (1805), tr. by Neef (1809), ch. vii.
* *Lectures on Philosophy of Human Mind*, Lect. 33.
† *Ib.*
‡ *Analysis of Human Mind*, vol. i. ch. iii.
§ *Ib.* vol. i. ch. iii. ‖ *Ib.* vol. ii. ch. xxiv.

service which the principle of association thus rendered to psychology was clearly recognized later by John Stuart Mill.

'A science of human nature may be said to exist in proportion as the approximate truths which compose a practical knowledge of mankind can be exhibited as corollaries from the universal laws of human nature on which they rest.' *

Given the fundamental laws of mind, the Law of Retentiveness, and the Laws of Association—

'it is a fair subject of scientific inquiry how far these laws can be made to go in explaining the actual phenomena. It is obvious that complex laws of thought and feeling not only may but must be generated from these simple laws.' †

J. S. Mill emphasizes the distinction between complex ideas which can be treated as resultant sums of the simple ideas which form them, *i.e.* are what he would term 'homogeneous effects,' and complex ideas which are 'generated by' but do not 'consist of' the simple ideas, *i.e.* are heteropathic effects. In so far as we have the former, the complex phenomena are mechanical products, but in so far as we have the latter, they are products of a mental chemistry. Our inability to find the elements in the generated compound is no disproof that a complex idea is due to an association of simple elements. Such is the case with the associations treated by Hartley and James Mill as inseparable.

But although inability to resolve the product into the elements is no obstacle to its having been generated from such elements, Mill saw clearly the weakness of attempting to prove that a particular complex idea had been generated from such and such simple ideas merely on the ground that these ideas were always present whenever mind was in possession of the complex idea. It is necessary to show, further, that if the complex idea be lacking, it will arise when the simple ideas in question are associated. And it is in the direction of a closer investigation of the mental phenomena themselves, both simple and complex, that Mill would advance psychology. He hoped that the rapid progress being made in physiology would throw light on the influence of organic on mental phenomena. By advocating a more scientific study of the phenomena of consciousness as distinguished from scientific treatment of data obtained uncritically, Mill in reality was giving an impetus to a new psychology wherein association became untenable as a comprehensive explanatory principle.

In his theory of knowledge, Mill is a thoroughgoing empiricist. All knowledge, other than that given by the senses, is inductive inference, 'generalization from experience.' *A priori* or necessary truths there are none. The truths so called are inductions. The forcibility which characterizes mathematical axioms is due to the familiarity of the ideas involved. The very criterion emphasized by the champions of *a priori* truths—inconceivability of the opposite—does but testify to the law of inseparable association between ideas. 'If one exists, the other exists along with it, in spite of whatever effort we make to disjoin them' (J. S. Mill's ed. of *Analysis of Human Mind*, vol. i. ch. iii.).

Mill, however, never treats even inseparable association as a *ground* for the logical connexion of ideas. 'Assuredly an association, however close, between two ideas is not a sufficient ground of belief; it is not *evidence* that the corresponding facts are united in external nature.' ‡ Thus the relationship of cause and effect as a mere instinctive association could lay no claim to objective truth; it must be shown to be an inference, a generalization from experience.

Herein lies the difference between Mill's theory of knowledge and that of his predecessor Hume. The psychological statement of genesis, even if accurate, is no longer accepted as a logical criterion of the validity of relationships. Consequently Mill attempts to find an independent justification for our belief in the uniformity of nature, belief in the relationship of cause and effect in particular; and in this attempt his theory of knowledge breaks down. Psychologically he regards belief as being primordial. It makes the difference between memory and expectation on the one hand and imagination on the other. 'What, in short, is the difference to our minds between thinking of a reality and representing to ourselves an imaginary picture? I confess I can perceive no escape from the opinion that the distinction is ultimate and primordial.' * It is present when certain associations of ideas are entertained, absent in the case of others. It is present in every inductive inference, and its logical justification is 'experience'; the inferred connexion of ideas conforms to fact. Yet even in the simplest inference, since the judgment must embrace 'unobserved' as well as 'observed' cases (for otherwise it would be no inference), this guarantee, conformity to fact, already implies logically our belief in the uniformity of nature, in the uniformity of the unobserved with the observed; that is to say, the logical guarantee of the belief present in inference itself involves belief. Thus the attempt to establish as an induction the uniformity which every process of inference presupposes is foredoomed to failure; † and Mill ends by confessing that inference is not *from* uniformity, but *according to* it. What is important philosophically is not this failure to establish inductively the Law of Causation, but the recognition which this abortive effort involves, viz. the recognition of association as an inadequate doctrine in the theory of knowledge. This point might be further illustrated from Mill's own subsequent writings on Utilitarianism, where he uses association for the purpose of removing psychological difficulties in the way of his main logical thesis rather than for positively supporting it.

Alexander Bain in his *Senses and Intellect* (first published in 1855) shows adherence to the Laws of Association as the principles which should dominate the presentation of his psychology. Thus he writes in the preface to the first edition:

'In treating of the Intellect, the subdivision into faculties is abandoned. The exposition proceeds entirely on the Laws of Association, which are exemplified with minute detail and followed out into a variety of applications.'

Movements, sensations, appetites, and instincts are treated as the raw material, the data to be worked up into the various forms of intellect: memory, judgment, abstraction, reason, imagination. The fundamental properties of intelligence are consciousness of difference, consciousness of sameness, and retentiveness, of which last reproduction is a higher form. The general condition under which retentiveness is manifested is contiguity. This is the basis of memory, habit, and the acquired powers in general. Consciousness of sameness gives rise to the reproductive principle of similarity, which is dominant in invention, reason, and abstraction.

Bain then proceeds to trace out in detail the operation of these two principles upon our movements, sensations, and instincts, and the acquisitions and forms of knowledge to which they separately, and in conjunction, lead. In the *Emotions and Will* (the first edition of which appeared three years later than the *Senses and Intellect*), the same general plan of treatment prevails. Emotions and the will are secondary products. Emotions are derived from muscular feelings and sensations, while will is derived from spontaneous movement.

* *Logic*, bk. vi. ch. iii. § 2; cf. Preface to J. S. Mill's ed. of *Analysis of Human Mind*.

† *Ib.* bk. vi. ch. iv. § 3.

‡ J. S. Mill's ed. of *Analysis of Human Mind*, ch. xi. note.

* *Analysis of Human Mind*, ch. xi. note.

† Cf. *Logic*, bk iii. ch. xxi.

'The modes of derivation or composition of the emotions are various; but the leading circumstance is contiguous growth or the associating process. Association operates in uniting together a number of separate feelings into one aggregate or whole. . . . It also operates largely in the transfer of feelings from their original cause to some connected object.' *

But although in general method of exposition Bain follows the lines of the association school, treating the higher mental phenomena as products built up by the mechanism of association, yet the spirit of treatment is different; the new psychology has begun. This is the more evident if one compares the later with the earlier editions of Bain's works. The compounds are not conceived as mechanical or even as chemical products, but as growths; and psychology is no longer treated on the analogy of physics, but as having its place among the biological sciences, as the science of mental life. Mental development is brought under the influence of the new theory which was transforming the biological sciences—evolution. Mental phenomena are viewed generically not as mere contents, ideas, but as processes. The complex phenomena, instead of being compounded from simple, are higher processes developed out of the lower by means of association.

Among advances in detail is the recognition of movements and instincts as data for intellect. It is from the rudiments of all the forms of mental life that association builds up the higher intellectual processes, which again in their turn aid in building up the emotions and the will. And the new conception of psychology becomes especially evident in the attempt made to give a natural history of the emotions, to describe them, trace their origin, and classify them, and by the reference made where possible to physiological facts.

With regard to the laws and conditions of association, we may notice the following points. In the later editions, Bain places Contrast on the same plane as Similarity; it is the form of reproduction derived from consciousness of difference, just as similarity is derived from consciousness of sameness. Contiguity is the all-pervasive mode in which retentiveness shows itself, and, in so far, would appear to be directly derived from this fundamental property of mind; but Bain, nevertheless, treats of special 'conditions' of association by contiguity. These are: repetition, concentration of mind, and the specific aptitude of the individual. Concentration of mind is regarded as very important.

'Properly speaking, attention or concentration is the employment of will in the sphere of intellect. It is the stimulating adjunct that renders the intellectual processes effective for their purpose, and, being itself dependent upon the feelings, it illustrates the necessity for the united action of all the forces of the mind in the sphere of intellectual production.' †

Bain is here going behind the Law of Contiguity. A and B are associated not merely because they are successive or simultaneous, but because they are attended to. In his note to the chapter on 'Association of Ideas' in James Mill's *Analysis of the Human Mind* (ed. J. S. Mill), he again emphasizes the need for analyzing the conditions of association. James Mill named repetition and vividness; the latter Bain criticizes as failing to bring out the distinction between the influence of the feelings and the influence of the will, which his own condition, 'concentration of mind,' is designed to do.

Spencer's first edition of the *Principles of Psychology* appeared in the same year as Bain's *Senses and Intellect*. Here biological conceptions are the foundation of the whole structure. The phenomena of body and of mind are identical in being forms of life, and from the conception of the general characteristics of life, the special characteristics of mental life or intelligence can be inferred. Life is briefly defined as 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations.' * It is 'correspondence.' In the intelligence, then, it will likewise be adjustment of internal relations to external—correspondence.

'The relation between two states of consciousness corresponds with the relation between the two things producing them.' 'The strength of the tendency which the antecedent of any psychical change has to call up its consequent is proportionate to the persistence of the union between the external things they symbolize.' †

Such is the law of intelligence in the abstract and the basis for Spencer's theory of knowledge. Perfect knowledge will mean perfect correspondence between subjective and objective. This correspondence is the 'universal postulate' behind which thought cannot go. The ultimate test by which thought tries a subjective relation with respect to its objective validity is 'inconceivability of the opposite.'

'To assert the inconceivableness of its negation is at the same time to assert the psychological necessity we are under of thinking it, and to give our logical justification for holding it to be unquestionable.' ‡

Of such certainty are the 'necessary' truths and ultimate premises of our knowledge. Thus with Spencer, as with the earlier writers of the association school, the theory of knowledge is 'psychological.' This gains some additional plausibility because it is the task of psychology to trace out the processes by which the correspondence between subjective and objective relations is evolved, and in its task it must, through the doctrine of heredity, draw upon the experience of the race as well as on that of the individual. The various faculties—memory, imagination, reason—are different stages in the evolution of intelligence.

Mental life has two constituents—feelings and the relations between feelings. Our sensations are peripherally initiated feelings, ideas are secondary or faint sensations, while emotions are centrally initiated feelings.

'The requisite to the existence of a relation is the occurrence of a change, the passage from one apparently uniform state to another apparently uniform state implying the momentary shock produced by commencement of a new state.' §

Relations arise between feelings that are like or between feelings that are unlike, and again, between feelings that are simultaneous or successive. Such are the constituents. The law for their association is the Law of Similarity. Each primary or vivid feeling 'is joined to and identified with faint feelings (secondary), which have resulted from similar vivid feelings.' ‖

'Knowing a relation as well as knowing a feeling is the assimilation of it to its past kindred; and knowing it completely is the assimilation of it to past kindred exactly like it. But since within each great class the relations pass one into another insensibly, there is always, in consequence of the imperfection of our perceptions, a certain range within which the classing is doubtful—a certain cluster of relations nearly like the one perceived, which become nascent in consciousness in the act of assimilation. Along with the perceived position in space or time, the contiguous positions arise in consciousness.

Hence results the so-called law of association by contiguity. When we analyze it, contiguity resolves itself into likeness of relation in time or in space or in both. . . . Thus, the fundamental law of association of feelings is that each, at the moment of presentation, aggregates with its like in past experience. The act of recognition and the act of association are two aspects of the same act. And the implication is that, besides this law of association, there is no other; but all further phenomena of association are incidental.' ¶

This somewhat lengthy quotation will serve to make clear what association meant to Spencer. It is now a general name for the essential characteristic which Spencer finds in all processes of knowing—assimilation. Since consciousness is dependent upon change, there is also, in every process of knowing, 'differentiation'; consciousness is continuous differentiation and continuous assimilation. The finer the degree of differentiation and assimilation, the higher the process of knowing.

* *Emotions and Will*[4], ch. iii.
† *Senses and Intellect*, 'The Intellect,' ch. i.
* *Principles of Psychology*, pt. iii. ch. i.
† *Ib.* pt. iv. ch. ii.
‡ *Ib.* pt. vii. ch. xi.
§ *Ib.* pt. ii. ch. ii.
‖ *Ib.* pt. ii. ch. ii.
¶ *Ib.* pt. ii. ch. viii.

This is the parallel of differentiation and integration in organic processes. In an organism increase in complexity of structure goes hand in hand with increase in function, and the establishment of closer connexion between part and part, with fuller organization of function.

'When we remember that the laws of structure and function must necessarily harmonize, and that the structure and function of the nervous system must conform to the laws of structure and function in general, we shall see that the parallelism here roughly indicated is such as might be expected. We shall see that the ultimate generalizations of psychology and physiology must be, as they here appear, different sides of the same primordial truth: both are expressions of the same fundamental process of life.'*

Viewed as a generic feature of knowing, association is not a mechanism for combining items of knowledge, but is the principle of growth whereby past progress is retained and further differentiation made possible. In the old doctrine the complex idea contained the elements out of which it was composed; here the higher process absorbs the lower, the new the old. So different is the doctrine, that one may be tempted to wonder why Spencer's psychology should be ranked with that of the association school. The reason is this: the conception of 'why' the higher is enabled to absorb the lower, the new the old, is taken unchanged from the theory of association.

Throughout the history of the school the advance in the theory of association as such is practically *nil*. There are efforts to distinguish some one form as more fundamental than the others, *e.g.* Mill selects Contiguity, Spencer Similarity, or to subsume them under some more comprehensive law, such as Hamilton's Law of Redintegration, but for all alike the theory of the process itself remains on the same level. Things are associated because they are alike, or because they are contiguous in space or time. A hint of an internal analysis of association is given, as we noticed, by Bain, and it is his study of the 'conditions' of association that marks the close of what is strictly to be called 'association psychology.'

Closer study of the 'how' and 'why' of mental development renders necessary broader conceptions than any which can be yielded by the three laws of association. Similarly, closer study of the memory processes brings a demand for a fuller statement of the conditions under which one fact of consciousness is able to suggest some fact of previous experience, and of the extent to which such a memory is 'a revival' (see MEMORY).

Although German psychologists stood outside the association school, it would be an omission not to refer to **Herbart**, in the general conception of whose psychology there is considerable likeness to that of Hartley and Mill. The first presentation of Herbart's psychological doctrine was the *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie* (1815). This was followed by the fuller and more reasoned exposition in *Psychologie als Wissenschaft neu gegrundet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik, und Mathematik* (1824–1825). Herbart rebelled against the dogmatism of 'faculty psychology.' He found Locke's treatment of mind as a storehouse of ideas at least truer to experience than the analysis of mind into faculties current in the school of Wolff. The faculties are set up as *genera* and treated as causes, when there has been, and can be, no study of the particulars from which alone such generic notions could be reached. Such psychology achieves nothing but hair-splitting distinctions between these faculties, and yet withal acknowledges an unknown unity in which these faculties are contained. The whole method of this psychology stands in need of reform. It is impossible to reach generic notions by study of particulars, *i.e.* it is impossible to use induction and analogy in psychology, because our knowledge of these particulars is unavoidably defective; consciousness is in perpetual change. The new method which Herbart introduces is elaboration (*Ergänzung*) or completion by means of constructive hypothesis. One is entitled to use such a method only if the existence of certain relationships can be demonstrated, viz. relationships wherein the positing of one member renders necessary the positing of the other.

The whole task of psychology will be to complete the known facts of inner experience, and to establish relationships by which these facts shall be connected, in accordance with general laws. Psychologists have failed to find conceptions appropriate for psychology, because they have not been mathematicians, and have thus not realized the special adaptability of mathematical notions to the ever-changing phenomena of consciousness. Further, it is, in Herbart's view, necessary for psychology to be based upon metaphysics. Psychology is brought face to face with the problem of the many in one, for behind all the varying mental conditions is the unity of mind. That is to say, psychology is brought face to face with the problem of 'substance.' And again, since consciousness is in perpetual change, psychology is brought face to face with the problem of change, transformation.

Herbart's psychology, therefore, is prefaced by speculative metaphysics. The first step is to arrive at a concept of the soul. This is defined as 'a simple substance, without parts, without any plurality whatever in its quality.' What this quality is we can never know. Like all other substances, the soul's activity consists in self-preservation. Each reality or substance conserves itself against other substances, and from these conservative activities arise relations, plurality. The efforts of the soul in opposition to other substances are its ideas. These ideas are not produced by any spontaneity of the soul, but arise only in its strife against other realities; they arise, then, from external conditions, and have their quality determined by these conditions. In so far as these ideas come into relation with one another they are forces, and in virtue of their opposition to one another have a quantitative character. Every idea is a tendency, and as such is never destroyed; it may be arrested, totally or partially, or pass from consciousness to subconsciousness, but it will ever strive to reinstate itself, and will do so should opposition be removed or reinforcement come through relations to some other idea. The subject-matter of psychology is not the soul, but these relations between ideas; hence the metaphysical speculations and the general consideration of mathematical relations are followed by a statics and mechanics of ideas.

It is in his reaction against 'faculty psychology,' and in his reduction of inner experience to simple events of a homogeneous character, from whose interplay arise all the diverse forms of consciousness — memory, imagination, feeling, will, etc.— that we see the resemblance between Herbart's conception of psychology and that of Hartley or James Mill. In the metaphysical bases of their thoughts and in their methods of exposition, the German and the English writers are poles apart.

In the more recent German psychology, and independently of Herbartianism, the influence of the association school can be seen, despite the fact that the errors of its doctrines are sometimes laid bare in a none too gracious manner. **Wundt** has treated psychology as a doctrine of elements and compounds; thus in his *Outlines of Psychology*, which represents his standpoint in general psychology better than the more specialized *Physiological Psychology* or the lectures on *Human*

* *Principles of Psychology*, pt. vi. ch. xxvii.

and Animal Psychology, we find the following division of topics: (1) psychical elements; (2) psychical compounds; (3) inter-connexion of compounds; (4) psychical developments; (5) principles and laws of psychical development. The elements, of course, are no longer the simple ideas of, say, Mill, since they are not simple items of knowledge, but abstractions, the ultimate factors into which the simplest experience can be analyzed by thought: elements of sensation, and elements of feeling. The compounds, too, do not correspond to complex ideas; they are the phases of experience which can be recognized as having a determinate character, *e.g.* an emotion, such as anger, or a simple perception; they are not, therefore, mere sums of the elements which enter into them. Moreover, such compounds are only components of experience; that is to say, in any given state of consciousness we have an inter-connexion of such compounds, *e.g.* the emotion in connexion with perception.

The connective processes, again, are not the old forms of association. Various processes are distinguished: for building up compounds, fusion and extensive union; for the inter-connexion of compounds, association (which, however, is not association of ideas, since no such phenomena as ideas in Mill's sense—copies of sensations—are recognized) and apperception. All save the last find their determining conditions in the nature of that which is connected; but the last, apperception, is a volitional process involving choice, the motives of which can be explained only from the whole previous development of the individual consciousness. As 'volitional' it is placed on a different level from the others.* This treatment of apperceptive connexion is peculiar to Wundt, and is connected with his ontological view that 'will' expresses the ultimate reality of the soul.

The same general ground-plan is followed by **Külpe** in his *Outlines of Psychology*. 'Psychology is defined as 'science of the facts of experience in their dependency upon experiencing individuals'† —a definition of the science which assigns a leading rôle to bodily processes, since 'individual' signifies corporeal individual. The connective processes, therefore, are viewed as dependent upon psychophysical conditions. The laws of reproduction are explained in relation to the conditions of centrally initiated sensations—the 'ideas' of English psychologists—and apperception is treated as being in principle capable of subsumption under the laws of reproduction.‡ For the essential conditions of the origin and maintenance of the feature which especially characterizes apperception, viz. attention, we are referred outside consciousness to the central nervous system.§

Widely different as the specific doctrines are from those held by the earlier English writers, yet, nevertheless, the scheme of classification adopted for the scientific exposition of psychological facts would seem to be derived from the writings of the association school.

As was stated above, current English psychology does not use association as an explanatory principle. Traces of the older method of exposition are, however, to be found in Prof. **Sully's** text-books, *Outlines of Psychology* and *The Human Mind*, although these embody the results of modern research and learning. The three aspects of mental life—intellection, the feelings, and conation or volition—are treated separately. Under each we have a serial order of phenomena; from elements of sensation, feeling, and conation, progressively higher products are built up by elaborative processes. These processes are: differentiation, assimilation, and association. The last is discussed in connexion with retentiveness and reproduction, and is conceived as the process 'which binds together presentative elements occurring together or in immediate succession,'* and as being a 'main factor in development, resulting in a progressive elaboration of what is relatively simple into more and more complex products.'† Attention is, however, treated as a determining condition for the elaborative processes, and this saves their operation from being purely mechanical.

The old method is entirely departed from in the psychology of Ward and Stout. **Ward's** conception of differentiation and integration, in the continuous advance of which processes mental development consists, shows an advance on that of Spencer.

'We shall find in the growth of a seed or an embryo far better illustrations of the unfolding of the contents of consciousness than in the building up of molecules: the process seems much more a segmentation of what is originally continuous than an aggregation of elements at first independent and distinct.'‡

Unity of consciousness is not something which psychological theory has to account for as a product or growth, but is that from which psychology takes its start.

'Working backward from this as we find it now, we are led alike by particular facts and general considerations to the conception of a *totum objectivum* or objective continuum which is gradually differentiated, thereby becoming what we call distinct presentations.'§

'The notion, which Kant has done much to encourage, that psychical life begins with a confused manifold of sensations not only without logical but without psychological unity, is one that becomes more inconceivable the more closely we consider it.'‖

Changes within the total field of consciousness, and persistence of the old alongside of the new (retentiveness), give the bases for differentiation, and subjective selection; that is to say, voluntary concentration of attention on 'this' or 'that' within the total field explains its further progress. The connexion of sensations with movements is the first phase of integration; the pleasure or pain which accompanies sensation causes change in the distribution of attention, and thus causes movement, the initiation of 'this,' the suppression of 'that.' First 'natural selection,' then 'subjective selection,' will bring about such syntheses, and thus 'presentations originally in no way connected tend to move in consciousness together.'¶ Association is a particular instance of this. Association by contiguity is as such inexplicable; for 'contiguity' Ward substitutes 'continuity.' A and X, which have no connexion one with another, occupy 'the focus of consciousness in immediate succession. This constitutes their integration.'** Through the movements of attention they are now parts of one whole, form what Ward terms a continuum, are continuous one with another. These movements of attention 'come in the end to depend mainly upon interest, but at first appear to be determined entirely by mere intensity.'†† The power of variously distributing attention is the one power which Ward desires to leave the subject of consciousness, and it is in virtue of this power that the subject plays the rôle of agent.

In **Stout's** psychology we have a similar view of the unity of consciousness and of the processes of differentiation and integration.

'The process of consciousness is a process of incessant change; the changes are partly due to the play of external impressions, and to other conditions extraneous to consciousness itself. But this is rarely, if ever, entirely so. The process is in part self-determining. The successive phases have by their very nature a tendency to pass into other phases.'‡‡

This tendency is conation, and it is conation which correlates and gives a special unity to 'other-

* Cf. § 17.
† § 5, tr. by E. B. Titchener.
‡ Cf. *ib.* § 77.
§ Cf. *ib.* § 76.
* *Human Mind*, i. 185.
† *Ib.* i. 169 f.
‡ 'Psychology' in *EBr*[9] xx. 45.
§ *Ib.* p. 45.
‖ *Ib.* p. 45.
¶ *Ib.* p. 52.
** *Ib.* p. 61.
†† *Ib.* p. 61.
‡‡ *A Manual of Psychology*, bk. i. ch. i. § 4.

wise disparate and disconnected processes.' For such unity the 'general condition is that the successive phases of a conscious process shall constitute a movement towards an end-state or terminus.'* There must be continuity of interest, and for this, retentiveness is essential; later phases of a conative process owe their meaning to the earlier. So in general, it is the 'dispositions' or 'traces' left by previous experience which make development possible.

Continuity of interest lies at the bottom of all association and reproduction. In association by contiguity the re-occurrence of any one of the members of a 'conative unity' re-excites the whole disposition, because of the direct continuity of all the members of such disposition. There is direct continuity between the suggesting and the suggested idea. In what is called 'association by similarity,' the suggesting factor re-excites a disposition having a member similar to, or partially identical with, itself, and does so only through the medium of this similar or partially identical member; there is thus no direct connexion between the suggesting factor and the members of the re-excited disposition. The continuity of interest is indirect.

With both Ward and Stout, therefore, association takes its place as a process depending upon the fundamental laws of psychical development, as explanandum, not explanation.

LITERATURE.—General: Ferri, *La Psychologie de l'association*, Paris, 1883; Janet and Séailles, *Hist. de la Philosophie*, Paris, 1887; G. Croom Robertson, 'Association,' in *EBr*[9]. Special authors have been sufficiently indicated in the article.

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ASSUMPTION and ASCENSION.—*Meaning and scope.*—The idea underlying these theological conceptions is the idea of communication between the natural and the spiritual order, and of a passage from the former to the latter. As the idea of 'Revelation' presupposes the possibility of movement from heaven earthward, so the idea of 'Ascension' presupposes the possibility of movement from earth heavenward. In some form or other both these conceptions have a place in every religious system; and in primitive religions they are set forth in terms of the geocentric philosophy of antiquity. The earth is the centre of the universe. Heaven, the abode of the gods, is above us in the distant sky; and the advent of heavenly messengers is represented as a physical descent, a 'coming down,' while their departure is a physical ascent, a 'going up.' So too the movement of human beings to the spiritual region is a 'going up,' an uplifting; and the language of devotion bears perpetual witness to this primitive conception. *Sursum corda* is the form which an exhortation to fix our thoughts on the realities of the spiritual world naturally takes. We speak of noble ideals as 'high' or 'lofty,' and of material ambitions as 'low'; and the abode of the Eternal is described as 'a high and holy place.' It was inevitable, while the Ptolemaic system of cosmography was accepted, that its fundamental conceptions should affect the language in which spiritual facts were described.

It is clear, however, that belief in the possibility of communication between man and God, between the natural and the spiritual, between earth and heaven, is not bound up with this geocentric philosophy which no one now accepts, although we are quite content to continue to use the language of devotion which it originally suggested, just as we are content still to speak of the 'rising' and 'setting' of the sun. Such language misleads no one in the sphere of science, and there is no reason why it should be a perplexity in the sphere of religion. That there is a region of 'spirit,' which encompasses us; that, although invisible, it is not inaccessible; that it is the dwelling-place—for we can get no better phrase—of the Divine; that it is the ultimate reality of the universe: these convictions are a sufficient background for the idea of 'Revelation,' and also for the idea of 'Ascension,' that is, the passage from the natural to the spiritual order.

This idea has appeared in several different forms, which it is necessary to distinguish. A characteristic feature of mysticism is the belief that in supreme moments the soul is translated to heavenly places, and granted a vision of the spiritual world. Thus in the Neo-Platonic philosophy of Plotinus, knowledge of Divine things is conveyed to the human spirit in a condition of exaltation, described as ἔκστασις, by which man comes into contact with God (*Ennead*s, vi. 9–11). The 'occult' philosophy of the East presupposes a similar means of approach to the highest truths. And the phenomena of clairvoyance and telepathy, as yet imperfectly understood, point to the possibility of free exercise of the cognitive powers, unrestrained by the limitations of the bodily senses. Here, however, there is no thought of a translation of the *body* to the unseen world; it is the *spirit* alone, temporarily divorced from the body, that is thus favoured. And, accordingly, we do not describe such an experience as an 'ascension' or an 'assumption,' these terms being reserved for the translation of the whole man, soul and body, to the region of spirit. In special cases, the vision of the spiritual order may be so clear that the man may be unable to determine, as he looks back upon it, whether he was 'in the body or out of the body.' Such was the case of St. Paul, who recalls (2 Co 12^{2-4}) how he had been 'caught up into Paradise, and heard unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a man to utter.' But it is only if the translation be of body as well as of soul that it comes within the scope of this article, which does not embrace an inquiry into 'visions,' or 'dreams,' or 'intuitions' of the Divine (see those articles).

I. *ASSUMPTIONS OF SAINTS.*—**1. Bodily translations to heaven, for purpose of revelations.**—The apocryphal and apocalyptic literature of Judaism and of Christianity furnishes (see BIBLE) some illustrations of bodily 'assumptions' into heaven, granted to individuals in order that they might be informed of spiritual truth. 'Assumptions' of this kind are temporary only; and, the vision ended, the man returns to earth. The language of Ezk 8^{3} was, perhaps, not intended to be literal, and (see 11^{24}) need not convey more than an involuntary rapture of the spirit; but the story of the transportation to Babylon of Habakkuk, who was lifted up 'by the hair of his head' (Bel [36]), implies a translation of his body. Granted a belief in the possibility of such earthly experiences (which underlies much Eastern folklore, as in the *Arabian Nights*), the step is easy to the belief in a translation of the body from earth to heaven.

(1) The most remarkable legend of this kind is that of *Enoch*, discussed below (**2, 1**). But there are other instances.

(2) *Abraham.*—In the *Testament of Abraham* (ed. M. R. James, 1892), Michael takes Abraham up in a cloud with angelic chariots, to show him the world of men from the standpoint of heaven. Abraham then is brought back to his house, where after an interval he dies.

(3) *Isaiah.*—In the *Ascension of Isaiah* (chs. 7, 8), Isaiah is raised to the seventh heaven, where he has a vision of the Beloved, after which experience he returns to earth (ch. 11).

(4) *Rabbinical seers.*—Rabbinical literature tells in like manner of four rabbis who entered Paradise and were granted revelations.

* *A Manual of Psychology*, bk. i. ch. ii. § 3.

(5) *Moses.*—The story of Moses in later literature has affinities with 'assumption' or 'ascension' legends of various forms. The two starting-points are the Biblical accounts of his discourse with God on the holy mountain, when the Law was revealed to him (Ex $24^{15ff.}$), and of his secret burial (Dt 34^{6}). The first of these led to the idea of an 'Apocalypse of Moses,' such as that edited from the Greek by Tischendorf; the second to the stories of his 'assumption' (cf. Jude ^{9}). Thus Josephus (*Ant.* IV. viii. 48) tells that, as Moses was discoursing with Eleazar and Joshua, a cloud suddenly enveloped him and he disappeared in a certain valley, although he wrote in Deuteronomy that he died, 'fearing lest because of his exceeding virtue men might venture to say that he had withdrawn to the Divine' (*πρὸς τὸ θεῖον αὐτὸν ἀναχωρῆσαι*). The phrase *πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀναχωρεῖν* is used by Josephus (*Ant.* I. iii. 4) of Enoch; and he evidently means to suggest that Moses' departure from the world was abnormal, although he will not say positively that, like Enoch, he escaped the passage of death. The legend of the 'Assumption of Moses,' as it is restored by Charles (*Assumption of Moses*, p. 106), described the living man carried up to heaven, while his corpse was hidden in the recesses of the mountains.

(6) *Muhammad.*—The journey of Muhammad to heaven affords a later instance. It has been interpreted, indeed, by some Muhammadan expositors as non-corporeal, and his experience has been described as that of a dream or a vision only. But the more popular version is that the prophet was transported by night from Mecca to Jerusalem, thence through the seven heavens to the presence of God, and then back to Mecca. Ch. xviii. of the Qu'ān claims to contain the revelation then vouchsafed to him.

2. Bodily translations to heaven, in lieu of death.—We have next to examine the legends which represent saints as being transported, without dying, to the world beyond the grave.*

In the Babylonian mythology, the apotheosis of Xisuthros, the hero of the Deluge, was of this character. In recognition of his piety, he was not subjected to death, but was assumed to heaven.† In Jewish literature, two figures stand out as having been granted this high privilege, Enoch and Elijah.

(1) *Enoch.*—The source of all the later traditions is Gn 5^{24} (Heb.): 'Enoch walked with God: and he was not; for God took him.' That he 'walked with God' or that he 'pleased God' (*εὐηρέστησε τῷ θεῷ*, LXX) does not necessarily signify more than that he spent his life in converse with the spiritual world, and that death was to him a withdrawal to God. But this simple statement, which might be made of every saint, was developed in two directions:—

(*a*) Gn 5^{24} suggested that Enoch was the recipient of supernatural revelations; and the *Book of Enoch* and the Slavonic *Secrets of Enoch* (see also the *Book of Jubilees*) were the outcome of this idea. In these books he is represented as having been 'assumed' to heaven that he might be instructed in heavenly things, which he subsequently described (*En.* lxx. 1, lxxxvii. 3; *Sl. En.* Introd.; *Jub.* iv. 21). According to the *Slavonic Enoch* (lxvii.), he lived on earth thirty days after this vision, and then 'the angels hasted and took Enoch and carried him into the highest heaven, where the Lord received him.'

(*b*) In the last quoted passage we have the idea of a translation to Paradise in lieu of dying, which is the most familiar form of the Enoch story. Thus the LXX of Gn 5^{24} has *οὐχ ηὑρίσκετο, διότι μετέθηκεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεός* (cf. *En.* lx. 8); and Sir 44^{16} says of him *μετετέθη* (cf. Sir 49^{14} *ἀνελήμφθη ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς*). Following this tradition, He 11^{5} has 'Ἐνὼχ *μετετέθη τοῦ μὴ ἰδεῖν θάνατον*; and the conception of Enoch's 'ascension' without dying is frequent in Christian literature. The same idea appears in Josephus (*Ant.* I. iii. 4), who says of Enoch, *ἀνεχώρησε πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, ὅθεν οὐδὲ τελευτὴν αὐτοῦ ἀναγεγράφασι.*

(2) *Elijah.*—The Elijah traditions, like those of Enoch, seem to have developed in two different directions. The *Apocalypse of Elijah* (ed. from the Coptic by Steindorff[1]) is a Christianized form of a Jewish apocalypse, and bears witness to the belief that Elijah received supernatural revelations (it was long supposed to be the source of 1 Co 2^{9}). But the best known form of the tradition is that which starts from 2 K 2^{11} 'Behold, a chariot of fire, and horses of fire, which parted them both asunder; and Elijah went up by a whirlwind into heaven' (*ἀνελήμφθη Ἠλειοὺ ἐν συσσεισμῷ ὡς εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν*). It re-appears in Sir 48^{9} (*ἀναληφθεὶς ἐν λαίλαπι πυρός*) and in 1 Mac 2^{58} ('Elias for being zealous and fervent for the law was taken up into heaven'). It will be observed that the instrument of his assumption, according to the original story, was a tempest, not a chariot, of fire, as artists have loved to represent it; and that 1 Mac 2^{58} explicitly points to the piety of Elijah as the cause of his 'assumption' without passing through the gates of death.*

(3) *Other Biblical personages.*—In Rabbinical legends, other persons are held to have escaped death by a privilege similar to that of Enoch and Elijah: *e.g.* Eliezer, Abraham's steward, for his faithful service; Ebed-melech (Jer $38^{7ff.}$); Hiram; Jabez (1 Ch 4^{10}); Serah, Asher's daughter (Gn (46^{17}); and Pharaoh's daughter. So Ezra was 'taken up' after his vision (2 Es 8^{19}), and Baruch had a like privilege (Apoc. Bar., *passim*).

3. Assumptions after death.—With such 'assumptions' as have just been described, we must not confound the 'assumptions' in which *after death* the body was removed from earth and caught up to heaven.

(1) *Hercules.*—A classical example is the legend of Hercules. Being poisoned by the arts of Dejanira, he erected a pyre on the summit of Mount Œta in Thessaly, and lay down to die. Zeus, applauding his career, surrounded the pyre with smoke, and after the mortal parts of Hercules had been consumed, he was carried up to heaven in a chariot drawn by four horses. Neither his bones nor his ashes could be found, the underlying idea of the legend being that earth was not a worthy resting-place for the remains of one so godlike.†

(2) *Virgin Mary.*—A Christian legend of the same kind is that of the 'Assumption of Mary,' according to which first the soul, and after that the dead body, of the Virgin were assumed to heaven (see the *Transitus Mariæ*, ed. Tischendorf). 'It was becoming'—so Newman expresses the conviction of the Roman Church—'that she should be taken up into heaven and not lie in the grave until Christ's Second Coming, who had passed

* The story of Ganymede, who was caught up to heaven by Zeus that he might be the cupbearer of the gods, is not strictly parallel, for there is no suggestion that this was due to the piety of Ganymede. Cf. also the Rape of Proserpine, transported to the infernal regions by Pluto in his chariot.

† Cf. Abydenus *apud* Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* ix. 12, of Xisuthros, *θεοί μιν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀφανίζουσιν*, and see Smith, *Chaldæan Genesis*[2], p. 38.

* According to early Christian belief, Enoch and Elijah were the 'two witnesses' of Rev 11^{3}, who were at last to be manifested in Jerusalem (11^{7}), and whose ascent into heaven (11^{12}) was to be followed by the Second Coming of Christ.

† The classical myth of the quest in Hades for his dead wife Eurydice by Orpheus, who afterwards returned to earth, is the prototype of many legends of visits to the under world, such as that in Virgil, *Æneid*, vi., or in Dante. But in these there is nothing strictly comparable with the idea of 'assumption' to heaven.

a life of sanctity and of miracle such as hers.' * And, accordingly, the Feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary has had a place in Church Calendars (Aug. 15) since the 7th century.

II. *ASCENSION OF CHRIST.*—The narrative of the Ascension of Christ (Ac 1^{9}) is not analogous to the Jewish legends of 'ascension' or 'assumption' in either of the forms which they have taken. Christ was not 'assumed' into the heavenly places in order to receive revelations of the spiritual order, as was reported of the seers of the Jewish apocalypses. Nor, again, was His Ascension an escape from the experience of death, as was believed by some to have been the privilege of Enoch and Elijah. It is represented consistently in the early Christian documents, canonical and extra-canonical, as a withdrawal into the spiritual world with the body which He had taken upon Himself and in which He had lived an earthly life, died, and risen victorious over death. After His Resurrection, His body is represented as spiritualized and as superior to earthly conditions, to a degree which is not asserted of it during the days of His ministry; but nevertheless, according to the Christian tradition, the body in which He ascended was the same body that had hung on the cross and had been buried in the sepulchre of Joseph. The 'assumption' of Moses was conceived of as consistent with the continuance of his corpse in a hidden grave (see above, p. 152[a]). But this is not parallel with the Ascension of Christ, which presupposed the empty tomb. Christ's Ascension was a 'resumption' of His pre-existent state, in His glorified humanity, rather than an 'assumption' to heaven, granted by the favour of the Most High. Its meaning will be considered more fully in a later section (§ 7); at this point, we note that, as described in the Christian tradition, it has no exact parallel in history or literature. This it is essential to keep in mind.

It is next to be observed that there was nothing in the Jewish beliefs about Messiah which would naturally suggest such a consummation of the visible ministry of the Christ. An Ascension, in lieu of death, might have been expected by those who accepted the current beliefs about Enoch and Elijah; but death, followed by a re-vivification and exaltation, was not within the purview of the first disciples. Looking back upon the Resurrection, they were able to find phrases in the OT which might be thought to point forward to it; and, in fact, that Christ rose again 'according to the scriptures' (1 Co 15^{4}) became a settled point of belief. But nothing of the kind was asserted consistently of the Ascension. Ps 110^{1} was, indeed, quoted, according to Ac 2^{34}, by St. Peter, and Ps 68^{18} was quoted by St. Paul (Eph $4^{8.\ 9}$), as applicable to the exaltation of the Christ; but that He ascended *according to the Scriptures* was never an article of the Creed. The Ascension of the Messiah had not been part of the Jewish expectation. Nor, so far as can now be discovered, did the disciples understand the allusions which, in the Fourth Gospel, Christ is reported to have made beforehand to this consummation of His visible Ministry on earth (Jn 3^{13} 6^{62} 20^{17}), any more than they understood His predictions of His Resurrection (Mk 8^{31} 9^{10} 10^{34}; cf. the Synoptic parallels, and see art. RESURRECTION). That after His visible Ministry amongst them had come to an end there would be an interval of waiting and of discipline before the final appearance of the Christ in triumph, the Apostles seem vaguely to have realized, and it had many times been put before them (Mk 2^{20} with ‖‖, Lk 17^{22}, the parables of the Absent Master [Lk $12^{36ff.}$] and of the Pounds [Lk $19^{11ff.}$], Jn 13^{36} 14^{19} 16^{7} etc.); but in their half-formulated expectations of a period of suspense followed by an Advent of Christ in victory and judgment, His Death, Resurrection, and Ascension had no place.

1. **The Ascension in Christian literature.**—In examining the belief of Christians as to the Ascension of Christ, it is important to distinguish between the *fact* of the Ascension and its *mode*, between the conviction of Christ's beneficent activities on behalf of mankind being continued after the withdrawal of His visible presence and the acceptance of the brief narrative which describes the manner of His departure. In every Christian age the former of these beliefs has been more conspicuous than the latter. In the language of theology, Christ's 'Session' at the right hand of the Father has always been more in the thoughts of those who call Him Master than His 'Ascension' to His Throne. For the belief that Christ is now in spiritual communication with His disciples, that He guards, forgives, and guides them, is essential to the Christian life. It is historically interesting, but it is not vital, to know how the beginning of this ministry was revealed to the early disciples by the Risen Master's final withdrawal from their sight. And, in fact, while the doctrine of the activities of the Ascended Christ has always been a principal part of Christian instruction, and a favourite topic of Christian contemplation, the Festival of the Ascension (see § 3 below) has throughout the Church's history been treated with comparative neglect.* It might have been anticipated *a priori* that this Feast would have rivalled Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost in its attraction for Christian believers; but it has never approached them in its popularity, not because there has been any doubt in the Church as to the event which it commemorates, but because it is the issues of that event, rather than the event itself, in which Christians have been mainly interested. A kindred phenomenon, which points the same way, is the poverty of the hymnology of the Ascension. The subject is one which might be expected to attract the imagination and inspire the poetry of the Church; but it has never done so to any considerable extent.†

In strict conformity with these tendencies of later Christian history, we find that, while the Pauline theology is full of the conception of an Exalted Christ in spiritual fellowship with those who are 'in Him,' references to the Ascension as an event are rare. It is always presupposed, as in the phrase 'The Lord himself shall descend from heaven' (1 Th 4^{16}), for *descent* implies a previous *ascent*. But this implication becomes explicit only in Eph 4^{10} 'He that descended (*sc.* into Hades) is the same also that ascended far above all the heavens,' where the reference to the *ἀνάβασις* of Christ is unmistakable. The only other allusion in the Pauline writings to the Ascension as an event is in the fragment of an early hymn quoted in 1 Ti 3^{16} (*ἀνελήμφθη ἐν δόξῃ*).

To these may be added, from the Epistles, He 4^{14}, (*ἀρχιερέα μέγαν διεληλυθότα τοὺς οὐρανούς*) and 1 P 3^{22} (*ὅς ἐστιν ἐν δεξιᾷ θεοῦ, πορευθεὶς εἰς οὐρανόν*), both of which carry a distinct reference to the act of Ascension. In like manner, the allusions in the Fourth Gospel are express: *οὐδεὶς ἀναβέβηκεν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν εἰ μὴ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς, κ.τ.λ.* (Jn 3^{13}), *ἐὰν οὖν θεωρῆτε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀναβαίνοντα ὅπου ἦν τὸ πρότερον;* (Jn 6^{62}), *οὔπω γὰρ ἀναβέβηκα πρὸς τὸν πατέρα μου . . . ἀναβαίνω πρὸς τὸν πατέρα μου, κ.τ.λ.* (Jn 20^{17}).‡ Whatever view be taken as

* *Discourses to Mixed Congregations*, No. xviii.

* This was noticed as early as the 4th century. *οἱ πολλοὶ ἀγνοοῦντες τὸ ταύτης μέγεθος ἧττον αὐτὴν νομίζουσι* are words at the beginning of a Homily on the Ascension printed among the works of Epiphanius (*PG* xlii. 477).

† Cf. Trench, *Sacred Latin Poetry*[2], 1874, p. 172.

‡ It is possible that the words ascribed to Christ in Jn 12^{32}, *ἐὰν ὑψωθῶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς πάντας ἑλκύσω πρὸς ἐμαυτόν*, involve

to the accuracy of the reports of Christ's words in John, it is certain from these passages that, at the date of the composition of the Fourth Gospel, the Ascension of Christ as an event in time was a definitely conceived part of the Christian tradition. It did not come within the purpose of the writer to give any direct account of it, just as it did not come within his purpose to describe the institution of the Eucharist; but his allusions indicate that his readers had knowledge of both.

(1) *The Gospels.*—The end of the Second Gospel is lost, and what it contained can only be matter of conjecture, more or less probable. It is likely that the writer of Mt 28 had it before him, and that he followed the main lines of the Marcan narrative here, as in other places. If this be so, Mark in its original form did not explicitly describe the Ascension. Mark, followed by Matthew, represents the Galilæan tradition of the Resurrection-appearances, and the Ascension narrative belongs more naturally to the Jerusalem tradition, as the scene of the Ascension was Olivet. That Matthew does not describe it is to be explained precisely as his omission to describe the Appearance of the Risen Christ to the Eleven in the upper room is to be explained. He is following the Galilæan narrative of Mark, the climax of which probably was the appearance of Christ *in Galilee* (cf. Mt 28^{16}), in accordance with His promise (Mk 14^{28}) and with the angelic announcement (Mk 16^{7}). The climax, on the other hand, of the Jerusalem narrative would be the Ascension, the last of the post-Resurrection manifestations in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, and accordingly we find it explicitly mentioned by the writer, who follows the Jerusalem tradition of the Resurrection throughout, *i.e.* by St. Luke (cf. 9^{51} *τὰς ἡμέρας τῆς ἀναλήμψεως αὐτοῦ*).

The statement, in the Third Gospel, of the events which followed the Resurrection is condensed to the point of obscurity, and the variants of the texts of the closing verses are puzzling. But when all this has been admitted, it does not seem (to the present writer at least) to be possible to regard it as silent on the subject of the Ascension, although this has been maintained by some critics. The passage is as follows: *ἐξήγαγε δὲ αὐτοὺς* [*ἔξω*] *ἕως εἰς* [*al.* *πρὸς*] *Βηθανίαν· καὶ ἐπάρας τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ εὐλόγησεν αὐτούς· καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ εὐλογεῖν αὐτὸν αὐτοὺς, διέστη ἀπ' αὐτῶν* [*καὶ ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν*]. *καὶ αὐτοὶ* [*προσκυνήσαντες αὐτὸν*] *ὑπέστρεψαν εἰς Ἰερουσαλὴμ μετὰ χαρᾶς μεγάλης· καὶ ἦσαν διὰ παντὸς ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ* [*αἰνοῦντες καὶ*] *εὐλογοῦντες τὸν θεόν* [*Ἀμήν*] (Lk $24^{50f.}$). The words in brackets are omitted in some (mainly Western) texts, and are marked as doubtful in WH. It is by no means certain that they did not form part of the original text; and if they did, *ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν* is an explicit description of the Ascension. But even if these words are left out of consideration, there remains the narrative of a solemn parting from the disciples in the act of benediction, subsequently to which they returned to Jerusalem with joy and continued in the Temple blessing God. Some special significance must have been attached to a departure of the Risen Master, so lately restored to them from death, which they would recall *with joy*, and for which they would fall to thanksgiving. Such a separation could hardly have been viewed as merely temporary; the language indicates that they regarded it as final, and the termination of the Gospel at this point shows that the evangelist conceived of it as the beginning of a new era for the followers of Christ. But a withdrawal of this nature into the spiritual region is the essence of the Ascension, to which, therefore, the conclusion of St. Luke's Gospel bears definite witness, even if it be supposed that *ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν* is a later gloss, explanatory, in the unscientific language of the age (see pp. 151, 156), of the manner of the disappearance of Christ into the spiritual world.

(2) *The Acts.*—In the later treatise by Luke, the Acts, this kind of descriptive language is used without hesitation when the story of the Ascension is being told: *βλεπόντων αὐτῶν ἐπήρθη, καὶ νεφέλη ὑπέλαβεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αὐτῶν. καὶ ὡς ἀτενίζοντες ἦσαν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν πορευομένου αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.* (Ac $1^{9f.}$). According to Acts, that is, the departing Christ was received in a cloud, His disciples following His passage 'upward' with straining eyes. Angelic messengers then informed them that, as was the manner of His Departure, so would be that of His Return, *i.e.* in a cloud, from the upper regions of the sky. There is no doubt as to the definiteness with which the Ascension of Christ is here narrated. The testimony of Acts is express. It remains, however, a legitimate problem, although one of no small difficulty, to determine how far the language in which it is described is to be regarded as literal, and how far it may be understood either as symbolical or as the natural, unstudied language employed in an unscientific age to describe a fact quite abnormal and unique in the experience of the narrators.

The Christian Church for many generations regarded the story as literally precise, *i.e.* it was believed that Christ went 'up' in a cloud into the higher regions of the atmosphere. It may have been so, just as the true interpretation of the words ascribed to Christ of His Second Coming 'in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory' (Mt 24^{30}; cf. Mk 14^{62} = Mt 26^{64}) may be the literal interpretation, which was adopted by St. Paul ('we shall be caught up *in the clouds* to meet the Lord in the air,' 1 Th 4^{17}). But it must not be forgotten that phraseology similar to the eschatological language used by Christ—or, at any rate, ascribed to Him by the Evangelists—is to be found in the Jewish apocalypses, which reflect the popular beliefs of the age. If the last things were to be spoken of intelligibly at all, they must be spoken of in the language of symbol and imagery familiar to His hearers. And no one doubts the verbal connexion of Mk 14^{62} and parallel passages with Dn $7^{13f.}$: 'There came with the clouds of heaven one like unto a son of man, and he came even to the ancient of days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all the peoples . . . should serve him.' It is to be remembered, then, that the Ascension in Ac 1 is described as a 'going into heaven,' conceived of as a process similar to that 'coming from heaven' of which Jewish apocalyptic and Christ Himself had spoken. The cloud and the upward movement are, indeed, explicitly recorded as having been observed, and they present no special difficulty. But it is right to note that they are the natural and almost inevitable accessories of any Jewish narrative which sought to describe the solemn and unique departure of the Christ, or to enrich with detail the brief statement *διέστη ἀπ' αὐτῶν* (Lk 24^{51}).

(3) *Sub-Apostolic literature.*—The *Appendix to St. Mark*, a document of the earliest sub-Apostolic age, gives no information as to the post-Resurrection appearances of Christ which is not found in the Lucan and Johannine narratives. It may have been based upon these, but in any case, like them, it follows the Jerusalem tradition. It describes

another reference to the Ascension, despite the fact that the Evangelist confines them to the Elevation on the cross. In Jn 8^{28} the latter meaning must be the true interpretation of *ὑψόω*; but the context of Jn 3^{14}, *καθὼς Μωυσῆς ὕψωσε τὸν ὄφιν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ, οὕτως ὑψωθῆναι δεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, seems to show that the *ὑψωσις* is the Ascension rather than the Crucifixion. The verb *ὑψόω* is used twice in Acts (2^{33} 5^{31}) of Christ's exaltation to heaven (cf. Ph 2^{9} *ὑπερύψωσε*). For a discussion of its meaning in John see Abbott, *Johannine Gram.*, 1906, 2642 *b*.

the Ascension in OT language: ὁ μὲν οὖν κύριος μετὰ τὸ λαλῆσαι αὐτοῖς ἀνελήμφθη εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν (the phrase used 2 K 2^{11} of the Assumption of Elijah) καὶ ἐκάθισεν ἐκ δεξιῶν τοῦ θεοῦ (cf. Ps 110^{1}).

Later writers, Barnabas (ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ φανερωθεὶς ἀνέβη εἰς οὐρανούς, c. 15), Aristides (εἰς οὐρανοὺς ἀνῆλθεν, § 15, ed. Robinson), Justin (ἀναβεβηκέναι εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, *Dial.* 38), and Irenæus (τὴν ἔνσαρκον εἰς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ἀνάληψιν, *Hær.* I. x. 1; cf. II. xxxii. 3, III. iv. 2), carry on explicit witness to the Christian tradition into the 2nd century. To these may be added the descriptions in the *Ascension of Isaiah, e.g.*: 'They will teach all the nations . . . of the Resurrection (ἀνάστασιν) of the Beloved, and those who believe in His Cross will be saved, and in His Ascension (ἀναβάσει) into the seventh heaven whence He came' (iii. 18, a passage which Charles treats as belonging to the earliest part of the treatise, and as probably of the 1st cent.); see also the description in xi. 22 ff. of the Ascension of the Beloved through the seven heavens (a passage which looks like an imaginative amplification of He 4^{14}).

2. The Ascension and the Resurrection.—Despite the definite language of passages such as those which have been cited, it has been suggested by some writers, *e.g.* by Harnack,* that in the earliest tradition the Resurrection and the Ascension were not clearly distinguished. But the considerations already adduced (p. 153[b]) sufficiently explain the omission on the part of some writers (*e.g.* Clement, Polycarp, and Ignatius [yet cf. *Magn.* 7]) to make explicit mention of the Ascension as an event in time. To the thought of the first Christians, the credentials of the Gospel were the appearances of Christ after His Resurrection; this historical fact was fundamental. But the *evidential* value of the Ascension was no greater than that of any other of the Epiphanies of the Risen Christ, and from this point of view it was not essential to make separate mention of it. So soon, however, as the Church began to formulate a Creed, the Ascension, as the event which terminated the visible ministry of Christ on earth and inaugurated His invisible ministry in heaven, was explicitly distinguished therein from the Resurrection, as it had already been distinguished in the Acts, in the Marcan Appendix, in Barnabas, and in the 2nd cent. writers. 'He ascended into heaven' is a separate article of the Creed in the earliest forms which we can trace.

Tradition, however, is not quite unanimous as to the interval between the first and last manifestations of the Risen Christ, between the 'Resurrection' and the 'Ascension.' Neither in the third Gospel nor in the Marcan Appendix is there any note of the time that elapsed; and as the story in both cases runs continuously, a hasty reader might conclude that these writers mean to place the Ascension on Easter Day. But it is evident that the Marcan Fragment is only a summary, and not a consecutive narrative. And, although not so evident in St. Luke's account, its summarized character is clear when ch. 24 is scrutinized closely. The Supper at Emmaus was in the evening (24^{29}); time must be found for the return to Jerusalem, seven miles away ($24^{13.\ 33}$); for the telling of the story to the Eleven (24^{35}); for the Meal in the upper room (24^{43}); for the Discourse there and the Commission (24^{44-49}); for the walk of 1½ miles to Olivet (24^{50}). No tradition represents the Ascension as taking place in the middle of the night; and yet this is what we must suppose St. Luke to state, if we take 24^{13-51} as describing the events of a single evening. The fact is that this narrative is not necessarily continuous, from 24^{43} to 24^{44} at any rate, and that therefore it does not contradict the statement of Ac 1^{3} (cf. Ac 13^{31}) that 'forty days' elapsed between the Resurrection and the Ascension.

3. Ascension Day.—'Forty' days is a round number; and although the Church since the 4th cent. has kept the Festival of the Ascension on the 40th day after Easter,* it is not certain that the author of Acts meant it to be taken quite literally. Barnabas speaks of the Resurrection and the Ascension as having both taken place on a Sunday† (διὸ καὶ ἄγομεν τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ὀγδόην εἰς εὐφροσύνην, ἐν ᾗ καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ φανερωθεὶς ἀνέβη εἰς οὐρανούς, c. 15); and it is possible that he preserves a true tradition about this.‡ It has been suggested by Dr. Swete (*op. cit.* p. 69) that Sunday the 43rd day after Easter would meet the statement of Barnabas, as well as the 'forty' days of Acts; and it may well be that this is the true interpretation of all the data.

4. Origin of belief in the Ascension.—The nature and details of the Church's tradition as to the Ascension of Christ have now been summarized. It is worthy of attention that, *a priori*, it would be difficult to account for the origin of such a belief were it not based on fact. Those who explain the belief in the post-Resurrection appearances of Christ as of *subjective* origin, and as due to the temper of strained expectancy which dominated the little company of the disciples of Jesus, may not unreasonably be asked to explain why these pious imaginings should suddenly have ceased. If the visions of the Risen Christ were evoked or created by the loving ardour of those who would fain realize the nearness of the presence of the Master whom they had lost from daily sight, why should they not have continued throughout the Apostolic Age? Granted a belief in the occasional appearances of Christ after His Resurrection, a belief in His subsequent Departure from sight and the complete withdrawal of His visible presence is a surprising phenomenon. Yet nothing is clearer in the records of the 1st and 2nd cents. than that the Church after Pentecost ceased to look for any manifestation of the Risen Lord other than His Second Coming in Judgment. Some event must have taken place which assured them that the period of the Resurrection visions was transitional, and that the consolations of the Church in the future were to be derived, not from such manifestations, but from the spiritual ministrations of a Master in heaven. There must have been, that is, some manifestation of the Risen Christ which they recognized with certainty as the last of the series, and which, therefore, in some respects was unlike those which preceded it. Such an experience was theirs, according to the Lucan narrative, in the vision of the Ascension; and those who do not admit that the narrative is based on a historical event are under the necessity of explaining how the disciples, whose only strength was in the conviction of the nearness of their Risen Master, should have been led to imagine that the gracious Epiphanies of His presence had suddenly come to an end.

5. Manner of the Ascension.—When it is sought more closely to determine the manner of the 'Ascension,' the data are found to be insufficient. For it is represented as an Ascension of the body, as well as of the spirit, of Christ; and yet of a body not subject to the ordinary physical conditions. Both in the Lucan (Lk $24^{51.\ 36-43}$) and in

* A careful and valuable examination of his argument will be found in Swete, *The Apostles' Creed*, p. 64 ff.

* Cf. *Const. Ap.* v. 19: ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κυριακῆς ἀριθμήσαντες τεσσαράκοντα ἡμέρας, ἀπὸ κυριακῆς ἄχρι πέμπτης ἑορτάζετε τὴν ἑορτὴν τῆς ἀναλήψεως.

† Swete (*op. cit.* p. 69) points out that the *Syriac Doctrine of the Apostles* identifies the Ascension with Pentecost, which, although quite inconsistent with Acts, again places the Ascension on a Sunday.

‡ A Gnostic fancy (Iren. I. xi. 2 and xxv. 14), which is also found in the *Ascension of Isaiah* (ix. 16), represented the interval between the Resurrection and the Ascension as 18 months.

the Johannine (Jn $20^{19.26}$) Resurrection narratives, the Risen Christ is represented as in a body over which His spirit has complete control. It is the same body which hung on the cross, but it has been spiritualized. To describe it we have to use St. Paul's phrase, and say that it is now a 'spiritual body' (*σῶμα πνευματικόν* [1 Co 15^{44}]), a body which is the fit organ and instrument of the spirit. We can understand that such a body would not be subject to the laws of space and time, although it is impossible for us to figure in the imagination its movements. And therefore a physical theory of the Ascension is out of our reach. We are subject to spatial and temporal conditions, and although we fully recognize that they are not binding in the spiritual order, they impose limitations upon the pictures of our imagination.

6. Philosophical rationale of the Ascension.—It is, however, possible to conceive the *fact*, although not to imagine the *manner*, of the Ascension, when we remember that it represents the passage from the physical to the spiritual order. Heaven is not a place up in the sky; it is the spiritual world which encompasses us, and which is nearer than can be indicated by physical proximity. It is like a fourth dimension of space, invisible, unimaginable, and yet quite as real and quite as near as the length, breadth, and depth of our bodily environment. To move into this fourth dimension from the earthly life may be the most natural of all movements for the spirit, or for the 'spiritual body' which is its envelope, while the process may be, must be, inscrutable for the spirit confined by the 'natural body.'

Of such a process the counterpart would be a movement from the spiritual order into the physical plane. 'Their eyes were opened, and they knew him; and he vanished out of their sight' (Lk 24^{31}): that is the heavenward movement—the passage *to* the spiritual order. 'Jesus cometh, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst' (Jn 20^{26}): that is the earthward movement—the passage *from* the spiritual order. In neither case is the movement perceptible; the result alone, in the one case *appearance*, in the other *disappearance*, is noted by the bodily senses. Once the reality of the spiritual order is recognized, such phenomena will not be declared impossible. The capacity thus to rise superior to the earthly conditions of space, and in the power of the spirit to move unseen to and from the world of spirit, has been claimed by masters of the spiritual life in many lands; notably it has been claimed by Buddhist mahātmas. We do not stay here to examine the justice of such claims, upon which the last word has probably not yet been said by psychological science. Nor is this the place to enter upon speculation as to the power of spirit over matter, and of mind over body, the limits of which cannot as yet be regarded as defined. But it is desirable to note that the incidents in the Resurrection narratives which have been subjected to the severest criticism as abnormal and incredible present no other difficulty than this, that they presuppose a passage from the physical to the spiritual order. And, in this aspect, the only distinction between the Ascension and the previous withdrawals from sight of the Risen Christ is that the Ascension was the last of a series, and that it was purposely so effected as to give the impression that it would be the last.

7. Implications of the Ascension from the Christian point of view.—This, however, would be a quite inadequate conception of the Ascension from the Christian point of view, for no account has been taken in the preceding section of the unique Personality of the Ascending Christ. We proceed, therefore, briefly to exhibit the significance of the Ascension—or, more strictly, of the Heavenly Session which is its sequel, and which it initiated—in its relation to the fact of the Incarnation, with which it is associated in the Creeds. In what follows, the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation (see INCARNATION) is assumed, and an attempt is made to indicate the doctrinal implications of the Ascension, as they have been recognized by the Church looking back upon the Revelation of God in Christ.

(1) *Exaltation of Christ's Manhood.*—The Christian gospel is that God became man, (*a*) to free man from the bonds of sin, and (*b*) to restore him to the dignity of fellowship with the Divine. (*a*) The beginning of the movement of Divine Love is *Christ Incarnate*, i.e. *Christ in the Humiliation of His Deity.* 'The Word became flesh.' And the Divine sacrifice of the Cross marks the consummation of the Redemption of humanity. But (*b*) the Divine purpose is not fulfilled until man is restored to his true estate. 'The Incarnation could only identify the Redeemer with the essential elements of humanity. It could not spiritualize that bodily organization which is no less a part of the true being of man than his intellectual and moral gifts. . . . The Resurrection and Ascension needed to follow, that the quickening Spirit of Jesus, thus set free, might enter into our spirits, and make us sharers of its victory.'* Thus the end of the movement of the Divine Love is *Christ Ascended*, i.e. *Christ in the Exaltation of His Manhood.* The Ascension was *ἐνσαρκος*, as Irenæus has it (see I. 3); it was not a mere *ἀνάλημψις*, or Assumption, of Christ's spirit; it was a true *ἀνάβασις*, an exaltation, of Christ as the Representative Man to the glory of the heavenly life. The doctrine of the Incarnation does not teach that Christ assumed human nature, body and spirit, only for the years of His visible ministry, and then abandoned it like a discarded cloak. In the light of the Ascension it means that He is still Man, and that as Man He is in communion with Deity. This is the significance of the Ascension when Christ resumed His heavenly condition, the same yet not the same, for He had become man, who thenceforth may dwell in Him, as He in man.

(2) *Completion of His ministry for mankind.*—The Ascension, therefore, marks the completion of the ministry of Christ in His relation to humanity; henceforth His Messianic offices of King, Prophet, and Priest are fulfilled in perfect measure and without the restraints to which He submitted Himself in the flesh. The service of man is always a service of *leadership*, of *counsel*, of *reconciliation*. These three functions exhaust the service which man can offer to his fellows; he may rule, he may teach, or he may by sacrifice of himself bring them nearer to each other and to God. And in the Ascended Christ as the Perfect Man these ideals are perfectly fulfilled.

(i.) *The Ascended Christ as King.*—It was under this image that the Hebrews most vividly conceived of the Messianic Deliverer who was to come. Their natural leader in war was their king, who not only directed the campaign from afar, but himself descended to the battle-field. So, too, under the conditions of Eastern autocracy, the king was the judge, who assigned reward and punishment by his own authority. And thus, when Christ spoke in parables of His future relation to mankind, the images most frequently used were the images of kingship and a kingdom: 'Henceforth ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power' (Mt 26^{64}); and it is 'the King' who is to dispense blessing and cursing at the Last Assize (Mt 25^{34}). The Apocalypse represents Him as a Warrior going forth to smite the nations, 'King of kings and Lord of lords' (Rev 19^{16}), whose victory at last shall be complete: 'the

* Milligan, *The Ascension of our Lord*, p. 30.

kingdom of the world is become the kingdom of our Lord, and of His Christ' (Rev 11[15]). In this there is an inner moral necessity, according to St. Paul: 'He *must* reign till he hath put all his enemies under his feet' (1 Co 15[25]). The rule of the Ascended Christ, seated in majesty at the right hand of power, is the rule of an absolute monarch; and the Ascension marks the Enthronement of the King. The Hebrew conception of a Messianic Prince merges in the larger conception of an invisible Master in heaven, who directs the history of the world, and holds the keys of the future.

(ii.) *The Ascended Christ as Prophet.*—That 'the Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified' (Jn 7[39]), is a principle frequently laid down in the Fourth Gospel. The thought of Christ as 'the Servant of Jahweh,' the Prophet who was to be raised up, was prominent in the earliest Christology (Ac 3[13. 22. 26] 7[37]). That He came to reveal the Father's will was His own claim from the beginning (cf. esp. Mt 11[27] || Lk 10[22]). Nevertheless, this prophetical office, although fulfilled by the Incarnate Christ in such measure as no prophet or seer before Him had reached, was not to be fulfilled in its perfection until after the Ascension, when it was to be exercised through the ministry of the Spirit: 'It is expedient . . . that I go away: for if I go not away, the Paraclete will not come. . . . I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he shall guide you into all the truth' (Jn 16[7. 12. 13]). *Accipe Spiritum Sanctum* is the final gift of Christ, who became a 'quickening spirit' after His Resurrection. The gift of the Spirit is the supreme grace and glory of the Church, and through this ministry the prophetical office of Christ is perpetuated and perfected for all time.

(iii.) *The Ascended Christ as Priest.*—Of the conception of Messiah as Priest there is but little in the OT literature. The idea emerges, in Ps 110[4], of His Eternal Priesthood, although not after the order of Aaron, but 'after the order of Melchizedek'; but the thought was not developed until the Epistle to the Hebrews expanded it. The consummation of the official service of the Jewish high priests was reached when, on the Day of Atonement, the sin-offering on behalf of the people having been sacrificed outside, the blood of the victim was brought within the Holy Place and sprinkled before the Mercy-seat (Lv 16[15]). So, it is argued (He 9[11. 12]), the consummation of the offering of the great High Priest is His Ascension to the heavenly Mercy-seat, where the efficacy of His sacrifice of blood is perpetually pleaded. It is the function of a priest *to offer sacrifice*, and this is perfectly fulfilled in the voluntary sacrifice of the Victim-Priest, which is efficacious to the cleansing from *sin* and not merely from ceremonial defilement (He 10[12]), and which, further, is unique and needs not to be repeated (He 7[27] 9[25. 26]). But the higher, and more spiritual, function of a priest is *to intercede*, and this is perfectly fulfilled in the perpetual intercession (He 7[25]) of the Priest who has 'passed into the heavens' (He 4[14]), 'made higher than the heavens' (He 7[26]), 'who sat down on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens' (He 8[1]), whose priesthood is 'unchangeable' (He 7[24]). It has been debated by theologians when the Priesthood of Christ began. Is He to be regarded as a Priest during any period of His visible ministry, or did He enter upon His Priesthood only in heaven?* The answer seemingly implied in Hebrews is that, while He was always Priest throughout His Ministry and Passion, and while the supreme sacrifice of His priestly ministration was the sacrifice of Himself on the Cross, yet the consummation of His priestly service is to be found in His perpetual intercession in heaven. Just as the Jewish priest did not reach the highest moment of his service until he had brought the blood of the victim within the Holy Place, so Christ did not fulfil His priesthood in perfect measure until He had ascended. The Ascension marks the complete fulfilment and consummation of His work as Priest no less than as King and as Prophet. For the Ascension no less than for the Passion, there was an inner moral necessity in the Divine counsels: οὐχὶ ταῦτα ἔδει παθεῖν τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ; (Lk 24[26]).

8. Practical issues of the dogma.—While the Ascension has thus always been viewed in Christian theology as the 'Glorification' of Christ and the entrance upon His reward, the practical issue of belief in it has always been the same as that which is recorded of its first witnesses: 'They continued in the Temple, blessing God' (Lk 24[53]). The vision of the Ascension is a call to worship: Let us draw near unto the throne (He 4[16]). That Christ 'ascended' is not only the pledge that His Ministry for mankind is perfect and final; it also conveys the assurance that heaven is near, and that the earthly order is encompassed by the spiritual. The practical theology of the Ascension is the idealism of the Christian life.

LITERATURE.—The articles *s.v.* 'Ascension' in Hastings' *DB* and *DCG* and in *JE*; **Charles**, *The Book of Enoch*, 1906, *The Slavonic Secrets of Enoch*, 1896, *The Book of Jubilees*, 1902, *The Apocalypse of Baruch*, 1896, *The Ascension of Isaiah*, 1900, *The Assumption of Moses*, 1897; **M. R. James**, 'Testament of Abraham,' *TS* ii. 2, 1892; [**E. A. Abbott**] *Flatland*, 1884 (an ingenious essay on the fourth dimension of space); **Swete**, *The Apostles' Creed*, 1894, ch. vi. (a valuable statement of the place of the Ascension in the earliest Christian tradition); **Martensen**, *Christian Dogmatics* (Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1866); **W. Milligan**, *The Ascension of our Lord*, Baird Lecture, 1891 (a full and careful examination of the doctrinal implications of the Ascension); **Westcott**, *Epistle to the Hebrews*, 1889, *passim*.

J. H. BERNARD.

ASSURANCE.—See CERTAINTY.

ASSYRIANS.—See BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS.

ASTROLOGY AND ASTRONOMY.—See STARS, also SUN, MOON.

ASURS.—The Asurs of the present day are a non-Aryan tribe of the Kolarians in Chota-Nagpur, Bengal. A people of the same name is mentioned in the religious books of the Hindus. According to the *Śatapatha Brāhmana*, they are the descendants of Prajāpati ('the Lord of the Creation'). How they became evil spirits or *A-sura* (='not-God') is not clear; the fact alone is stated that they fought against the Devatās 'for the possession of the earth,' and that they were overcome and finally succumbed. The historical grain of truth in this poetical story is apparent: the Aryans, in their invasion of what is now called India, were obstructed by that fierce and savage-like people whom they called *Asura*, or demons, and whom they expelled and partly annihilated.

Whether the Asurs living in Chota-Nagpur are the offspring of these opponents of the Aryans or are connected with the Asura builders of those ancient embankments still found in the Mirzāpur district, is, of course, an open question; yet there seems to be nothing to exclude such suppositions. This much is certain, that Chota-Nagpur was partly inhabited by Asurs before the Kolarian and Dravidian tribes entered it from the North-West, when they likewise had been expelled from their former seats by the stronger and more intelligent Aryans.

There are still traces of copper mines in Chota-

* For opposing views, see Milligan, *op. cit.* 77 ff., and Westcott, *Hebrews*, *passim*.

Nagpur, which seem to have been worked in ancient times, and tradition attributes these to the Asurs. The conclusion may readily be drawn that the Asurs, before leaving their former settlements, lived for some time as subjects of the conquering race (the Aryans), by whom they became to some extent civilized. At the present time their occupation consists in digging iron ore, melting iron, and making agricultural implements for their neighbours.

When the Kolarians were compelled by the Aryans to seek refuge in the hills and the dense forests of Chota-Nagpur, they met there the Asurs, and a severe fight ensued for the possession of the arable land, in which the Asurs were overcome, and again almost annihilated. The remnant fled to the plateaux of the Chota-Nagpur and Palamau hills, where we find them to-day. A few of them have emigrated to adjacent districts.

The spirits of the slain Asurs must ever have haunted the superstitious and demon-fearing Kols, and they, perhaps with the help of some Hindu hermit versed in the Purānas, invented the so-called *Asur legend*. In this legend may perhaps be found some traces of the tradition of the tower of Babel, and the supposition is allowable that such a legend was current among the Kolarians when the story of the destruction of the Asurs and the dispersion of their remnant was added and mixed up with it in later times. The legend as told at present by the aborigines in Chota-Nagpur amounts to the following story:—

There were twelve brethren (septs) of Asurs with their wives and children. They melted iron, they ate iron, and made such a big fire in the melting furnace that Singbongā, the sun-god, was annoyed. He first sent two birds with a message of warning, but the Asurs maltreated the divine messengers, sullied their colour, and plucked feathers from the tail of one of them until only two were left; these birds were the raven and the black starling. Seeing that the Asurs were bent on doing even more mischief, Singbonga at last sent his son in the form of a *Kasrā Kora*, or leprous youth. He sought and found shelter with an old Munḍa chief and his wife. The Asurs got hold of him and threw him into the furnace, but he came out of the ordeal cleansed of his leprosy, and bearing in his hands large lumps of gold. This roused the covetousness of the Asurs, and bidding their wives to tread the bellows well, they jumped into the fire, and perished one and all, leaving their wives and children widows and orphans. These surrounded the son of Singbonga, and did not let him return to heaven until he had assured them that they might occupy the high mountains, the forests, the rivers and desert places, where people would worship them, offering fowls and goats, and rice and liquor, to feed and satisfy them. Whereupon the old ladies dispersed and became the malicious spirits of the mountains, the Sāl-forest, the barren fields and the springs, where they receive the offerings of the people, and are content as long as they are appeased.

The Asurs in Chota-Nagpur number 4894, besides 4616 Brijiā and Agariā. They claim to be connected with the Brijiā or Binjhiā tribe, an agricultural and land-holding class in Chota-Nagpur, who within their own households speak Uriya. A subdivision of the Asurs are the Agariās, beggars wandering about with tamed monkeys, whose feats they exhibit. Another sub-tribe, following the vocation of blacksmith, call themselves 'Lohara-Asurs.' Others are called Pahārias or Hill-Asurs. Though few in number, the Asurs are divided into several totemistic septs, such as *Bāsrār* (=sprung from the bamboo), *Makrār* (=spider), *Ind* (=eel), *Hōrō* (=tortoise), etc. The totems of these septs do not appear to be tabu, though marrying within one of these sections is eschewed as far as practicable.

Customs.—Child marriages are unknown among the Asurs. A price for the bride is given, varying from 3 to 5 rupees. Polygamy is permitted, as well as re-marriage of widows. No priestly functions are required for the marriage ceremonies, which are very simple. Rice-beer is indulged in by both sexes, but smoking only by the men. The Asurs have no dancing places like the Kols, as they lead almost a nomadic life, leaving their own settlement when the iron ore or the land is exhausted; the latter they till only in the most primitive way, without manuring or ploughing. They have scarcely any musical instruments, and seldom sing or dance. The women, however, are notorious for their lax morality, and are easily enticed away into the towns and large villages of Chota-Nagpur, where they earn a living as dancing girls. As to food the Asurs are not very particular, eating almost anything, the flesh of the carcass of a cow not excluded.

Language.—The language of the Asurs, which they call *Dukma*, is a dialect of the Kolarian family of languages, and was most probably adopted from their conquerors, the Munḍās, with such alterations in the pronunciation as suited their nature. For example, almost all Munḍāri words found in *Dukma* that commence with *h* change this consonant into *v*; and wherever a vowel follows *n* in Munḍāri, the Asur inserts the semi-vowel *y* between the two. There are no traces of an original tongue in the Asur *Dukma* as spoken at the present day, for almost every word in its vocabulary can be traced to Kolarian or Dravidian sources. From the Dravidian languages the Asurs subsequently added to their vocabulary. Through contact with Aryans, they have adopted also a number of words derived from Sanskrit. What has been said about their language is not opposed to the assumption that the Asurs are essentially a Kolarian tribe. They may have separated from the rest of the Kolarian ancestors at a remote period, developing a language of their own, until they were conquered by the Kolarian tribe of the Munḍās, whose dialect they adopted to a great extent. The features and bodily appearance of the Asurs are distinctly and decidedly Kolarian.

Religion.—This is somewhat different from the animism of their Kolarian relatives. The Asurs are not demon-worshippers, and have no priestly institution. Where they are found sacrificing to the evil spirits of the forest, the mountain, or the field, this is due to their being members of a village community, consisting of Kolarian or Dravidian inhabitants, who worship those deities. Wherever they live by themselves, they do not worship any of the petty gods or demons of those tribes. The Asurs believe in a great benevolent spirit, the Creator and Preserver of the world. He does not require to be worshipped in any way. When they identify him with the sun, or rather believe him to be resident in the sun, they most likely follow therein the notions of the Munḍāri tribe. It is true that they also believe in evil spirits, and have to propitiate them by making bloody sacrifices, consisting of fowls. These evil spirits, however, with the Asurs, are exclusively the departed spirits of their forefathers, who must be provided with food, and propitiated whenever they become hungry and irritable. All the diseases and troubles of this life are ascribed to their anger; they must be appeased, therefore, with sacrifices of fowls, presented by the head of the family at the house-altar, the fire-hearth. In new-born children the Asurs see the re-born spirits of ancestors. Witches and the evil eye are therefore unknown within the tribe, but people from without may bewitch an Asur baby, or a foreigner may cast an evil eye upon him, and for this reason anklets of iron are required to protect the little Asur child.

The Asur has no moral code, all his obligations being confined to the one important matter of keeping the spirits of his ancestors at ease, or, when disturbed, of quieting them in the manner described above. Every departed parent becomes a spirit—a good one if he died a natural death, an

evil one if he died suddenly or by accident. In the former case it is essential to provide him with food for the journey beyond, and in the latter to present a sacrifice at the funeral. The Asurs burn their dead, and at the funeral some rice must be put on the funeral pile, and for eight days after cremation portions of the regular meals must be placed outside the door of the house in the name of the departed. After the time mentioned he will settle down in quiet. At the close of the eight days the nearest relatives and friends come for the funeral meal, when they partake freely of home-brewed rice-beer. After this, good spirits of the ancestors need no further attention, and may be trusted to help and protect their people on earth. It is only the unfortunate evil spirit which so frequently becomes irritable and ill-disposed. He is to be feared, and in time of sickness and calamity to be reconciled by offerings of rice and liquor, and by sacrifices. See art. AGARIĀ.

LITERATURE.—*Census of India*, 1901, vol. vi. pt. 1, Calcutta Bengal Secr. Press, 1903; W. W. Hunter, *Stat. Acc. of Bengal*, vol. xvii., London, 1877; H. H. Risley, *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1891; E. T. Dalton, *Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872; F. Hahn, 'A Primer of the Asur dukmā,' in *JRAS*, vol. xix. pt. 1. No 2, 1900, W. Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folk-lore of North India*[2], Westminster, 1896; *Linguistic Survey of India*, iv. 135–145, Calcutta, 1906; Sebastian, in *ZE* iv. 237; L. Nottrott, *Die Gossnersche Mission unter den Kols*[2], i. and ii., Halle, 1895; *Missionsberichte der Gossnerschen Mission.* FERD. HAHN.

AŚVAGHOṢA.—Aśvaghoṣa is well known as the author of the Buddha-charita, a poetical description of Buddha's life.* To him is ascribed the Alankāra, a collection of Buddhist stories with their respective moral teachings. The authenticity of these traditions is confirmed by the external evidence of I-Tsing's statement,† and the internal evidence does not contradict it.

We learn from the colophon to the Tibetan Buddha-charita,‡ and from a biography of Vasubandhu, that Aśvaghoṣa was a native of Sāketa. According to the latter authority, it was he who was summoned to Kābul by Kātyāyanīputra, the alleged composer of the 'Abhidharma in Eight Sections,' in order to help him in the compilation of the great commentary (Mahāvibhāṣā) on the text of that Abhidharma. As we learn from Yuan Chwang (Hiuen Tsiang), this compilation took place under the patronage of King Kaniṣka, who is now generally believed to have flourished in the 1st cent. A.D. That Aśvaghoṣa was contemporary with Kaniṣka is confirmed from another source,§ which describes Aśvaghoṣa's life in detail, and from which are derived the later legends concerning him.

We are told that Aśvaghoṣa was a learned but haughty man, who was at last converted to the Buddhist faith in the nonentity of the phenomenal world. The agent in his conversion was Pūrṇayaśas, a disciple of Pārśva,‖ who is said to have presided over the compilation of the above-mentioned great commentary. After his conversion Aśvaghoṣa worked eagerly for the propagation of Buddha's teaching in Kusumapura (the modern Patna), not only as a preacher, but also as a poet and musician. When that town was taken by the army of Chandana Kaniṣṭha, the king of the Yuechis, Aśvaghoṣa was carried away to their country in the north as a portion of the tribute paid to the conqueror by the Magadhans.

Another biography of Aśvaghoṣa tells essentially the same story. The indebtedness of Aśvaghoṣa to Pārśva and Pūrṇayaśas is confirmed by the expression of homage at the beginning of the Alankāra, while his connexion with King Kaniṣṭha is elsewhere asserted.*

Thus far the traditions about Aśvaghoṣa's life, which are the oldest sources of our knowledge about him, may be regarded as comparatively authentic. But when we take up many other writings which bear his name, we find ourselves in the dark as to the identity of the person.† And the matter is made no clearer by the Tibetan tradition, which applies many epithets to him. This tradition dates from the 16th cent., and itself seems to be the result of confusion.

According to it, Aśvaghoṣa was living under King Bindusāra, the son of Chandragupta, and was connected with Kanika, the king of Ṭīh and Malava in the west. Of six epithets given to him we mention: Mātṛcheta, Dhārmika-Subhūti, Śūra. Comparing these different traditions, we find little reason to see in this Aśvaghoṣa the author of the Buddha-charita, except the connexion of the name with King Kaniṣka or Kanika. The Tibetan author, it is true, states expressly that the Kanika mentioned there is not to be confused with Kaniṣka, yet there is reason enough to suspect his accuracy.

The following are the works attributed to a person or persons bearing the name of Aśvaghoṣa.

1. 'Hymn in one hundred and fifty stanzas.' This has been handed down to us in a Chinese and in a Tibetan version. The two agree fairly well with one another, and in both the author is known as Mātṛcheta. The colophon to the Tibetan version identifies this Mātṛcheta with Aśvaghoṣa. But I-Tsing, the translator of the hymn into Chinese, seems to regard him as different from the author of the Buddha-carita. On the other hand, there is in Tibetan an epistle sent from Matṛcheta to King Kanika of the Kuśa race.‡ King Kaniṣṭha is mentioned in Aśvaghoṣa's Alaṅkāra as of the Kuśa race. But there Aśvaghoṣa speaks of the king as of one who lived in the past. It remains quite uncertain whether Matṛcheta and Aśvaghoṣa, on the one hand, and Kanika, Kaniṣka, and Kaniṣṭha, on the other, are respectively to be identified or not.

2. The Vajra-sūchi,§ a refutation of the caste-system, bears the name of Aśvaghoṣa as its author, but the same text in the Chinese translation (Nanjio, No. 1303) is ascribed to Fa Hien, lit. 'law-fame.' This name is usually rendered as Dharmayaśas, but may be Dhārmika-Subhūti, lit. 'lawful-glory.'

3. Further, a work, in the Chinese translation, called 'The Distinctions of the Fruits of Works' (Nanjio, No 1349), is ascribed to a Bodhisattva 'Great Valour,' which is surely Mahāśura in Sanskrit. Another book, 'Transmigration in the Six Resorts,' agrees with the above in substance, and its authorship is ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa.

The two instances given above seem to be confirmatory of the Tibetan tradition, but they are not strong enough to establish the identity of these Aśvaghoṣas with the author of the Buddha-charita.

4. Another book ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa is 'A Nirgrantha's Inquiry into the principle of Non-ego.'‖ It expounds the contrast of phenomena and reality, just as in the sermon delivered by Pūrṇayaśas to Aśvaghosa which is preserved in the Records of the Patriarchs. Probably this Aśvaghoṣa is the same as the Aśvaghoṣa of those Records.

5. There is mention of the name Aśvaghoṣa in the memoirs of Yuan Chwang. This Aśvaghosa was a contemporary of Nagārjunana, of Deva, of Kumaralabdha, and of the man who detected a Brāhman possessed by a demon. Though Yuan Chwang calls this Aśvaghoṣa a Bodhisattva, we have no ground for identifying him with any of the Aśvaghosas mentioned above.

6. Finally, we have Aśvaghoṣa the author of *The Awakening of Faith.*¶

This last work represents a well-reasoned exposition of the doctrines of the final metaphysical principle and of the phenomenal world as contrasted with it. Everything phenomenal is unreal, because it is made up of constituents and is governed by the law of causality. Now reality transcends every distinction and qualification. It is the *ὄντως ὄν*, and cannot but be named *tathatā*, *i.e.* 'the

* Tr. in *SBE*, vol. xlix.

† *Record of the Buddhist Religion*, Oxf. 1896, pp. 153, 165 f.

‡ *IA*, 1903, p. 350.

§ *Records of the Patriarchs*, Nanjio, No. 1340, tr. by Kiṅkārya (Kiṅkāra of Suzuki and Kekaya of Takakusu) in 472; No. 1460 tr. by Kumārajīva about 405; see Wassilieff, p. 231.

‖ Possibly an epithet of Kātyāyanīputra.

* Nanjio, No. 1329, *Ratnapiṭaka*, tr. by Kiṅkārya. He gives the name as something like kaṃṭa (or, -ṭṭha); but a later translator, Sūryayaśas, gives Kaniṣṭha.

† T. Suzuki has made a very exhaustive collection of the materials respecting these works and legends in his introduction to Aśvaghoṣa's *Awakening of Faith*, Chicago, 1900. But he was too anxious to regard any Aśvaghoṣa as identical with the author of the book he translated.

‡ On the connexion of Mātṛcheta with King Kanika and the questions connected therewith, see F. W. Thomas, art. in *IA*, 1903, p. 345 f.

§ A. F. Weber, *Die Vajra-sūcī des Açvaghosha*, Berlin, 1860.

‖ Tr. by Sūryayaśas (11th cent.), but the work is not mentioned in Nanjio's *Catalogue*. See S Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, 2 vols., Boston, 1885; *Life of Buddha*, by Aśvaghoṣa Bodhisattva, *SBE* xix., Oxford, 1883, p. xxx ff.; L. A. Waddell, *Lamaism*, 1895, p. 10 f.

¶ Nanjio, No. 1249 f., translated by T. Suzuki; see above, note †.

Thatness.' The final aim of Buddhist enlightenment consists in the full realization of this absolute reality, which is the true and highest condition of Buddhahood. That is the eternal substance of the Truth revealed by Buddha, and is, therefore, the true doctrine and, at the same time, the true body or entity of Buddha, *i.e.* the *Dharma-kāya*. But the absolute, which is unique in its substance, does not remain without its manifestations. When it appears to us in its state of bliss, it is the Buddha in enjoyment (*saṁbhoga*). When it is manifested in this world in order to save us personally, it is the Buddha incarnate or in *kenosis* (*nirmāṇa*), as, for example, Śākyamuni. In order to attain the ideal of enlightenment, it is necessary for us to believe in any of these three aspects of Buddha's personality, and to be saved by his grace (*parigraha*, lit. 'grasping').

Thus we see in this work of Aśvaghoṣa a concise systematization of later Buddhist metaphysics in their consequences, and of Buddhist religious faith, expressed in the doctrines of the three personalities (bodies) of Buddha,* and of the relation between grace and faith.

Summing up these statements, we have not enough evidence either to affirm or to deny the identity of any of the Aśvaghoṣas enumerated under heads 1–6, except 4, with the author of the Buddha-charita. The same epithet may have been applied to many authors in different periods, because of their poetic talent or of their wisdom, which is said to have touched the heart even of a horse. The Tibetan tradition seems to have erroneously regarded these different persons as one with many names.

LITERATURE.—Nanjio, *Catalogue of the Chinese Buddhist Books*, 1883, No. 1460, 'Life of Aśvaghoṣa,' No. 1463; 'Life of Vasubandhu,' in *JRAS*, 1905, p. 33 ff., and Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, 1860, p. 239.

M. ANESAKI.

AŚVAMEDHA.—The *aśvamedha*, 'horse-sacrifice,' is one of the most imposing sacrifices in Indian ritual. It ranks as one of the great or solemn sacrificial ceremonies (*mahākratu* or *yajñakratu*). As early as the Rigveda itself two hymns are found composed for this particular occasion (i. 162 and 163). The sacrifice is described in detail in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa (xiii. 1–5) and Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa (iii. 8–9), as well as in the special treatises on ritual known as the Śrauta-sūtras, of Kātyāyaṇa (xx.), Āpastamba (xx.), Āśvalāyana (x. 6 f.), Śāṅkhāyana (xvi.), and others. In the Mahābhārata (xiv. 71. 14 ff.) the horse-sacrifice which King Yudhiṣṭhira celebrated after his victory over the Kurus, as a purification from all sins, is described with epic diffuseness. The *aśvamedha* was thus the royal sacrifice *par excellence*. The privilege of sacrificing the horse belonged only to a ruler whose sovereign power was undisputed. It was designed to secure for him continued success, the fulfilment of all his desires, increase of strength and extension of the empire. Consequently the sacrifice was made before an expedition for conquest (*digvijaya*), or after a campaign which had ended in victory. The Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa (viii. 21 f.) gives a list, adorned with antique verses, of the kings of olden times who, after ascending the throne, marched victoriously through the whole earth and then celebrated a horse-sacrifice. The *aśvamedha* thus became a great State function in the performance of which the people took part officially, and with which were associated customs of a secular and often very gross character, accompanied by oratorical displays. In the strictly regulated ritual these last were prescribed in detail; but in olden times, before the ritual had hardened into fixed rules, they were a matter of spontaneous improvization. These two features, its more secular character and its national colouring, distinguished the *aśvamedha* from most of the other sacrifices, which were exclusively priestly.

The sacrifice began in spring or summer, and, with the preparatory ceremonies, occupied more than a year. First, a suitable victim had to be carefully selected. The animal chosen must be of pure breed and valuable, distinguished by special marks. After it had been set apart for sacrifice by the symbolical act of tethering to the sacrificial post, and had been bathed, it was granted full freedom again. It was allowed to run loose for a whole year, and to sport freely in the company of a hundred old horses. A hundred royal princes, a hundred noblemen, a hundred sons of officials of higher, and a hundred of those of lower rank, all armed in accordance with their station, formed its escort and guarded it against danger or theft, without interfering with its freedom of movement. Conflicts or wars (cf. especially Mahābhārata, xiv.) often resulted from attempts to steal the horse during its wanderings. If it were lost, the ceremonial had to be partly repeated and another animal substituted.

While the horse thus roamed about at a distance, the people at home awaited the time of its return, and in the meantime took part in all kinds of festivities. Gifts were offered daily to the god Savitṛ; daily also at a festive gathering before the king and the court the *hotṛ* had to give a recital. Every eleven days this cycle of recitations was repeated. The recital concluded with an appropriate chapter from the Vedas, together with singing, lute-playing, and impromptu verses, composed by a noble bard in honour of the king, the giver of the sacrifice, in which he was compared with the pious rulers of olden times. The recital itself was enlivened by dramatic action. According to the class of persons who formed the subject-matter of the recitation, it was arranged that the audience and chorus to whom the reciter addressed himself should consist of old or young people, snake-charmers, robbers, usurers, fishermen, bird-catchers, or sages. When the year had expired and the horse had returned, the sacrifice began with consecration (*dīkṣā*) of the king.

The ceremony proper lasted three days, and was accompanied by numerous other animal-sacrifices, and by the pressing of the soma. On the second day, the sacrificial horse, decked with gold, was once more yoked with three other horses to a gilded car, driven round, and then bathed. On its return, it was anointed by the three chief wives of the king and decorated, while the *hotṛ* and the superintendent of the sacrifice (Brāhman) performed a *Brahmodya*, or theosophical enigma-play. The horse was then bound, together with a he-goat, to its sacrificial post, the other animals for sacrifice, to the number of several hundreds, being bound to similar posts; and, having been covered with cloth, it was suffocated. The chief wife of the king had to lie down by the corpse under a covering and submit to an obscene ceremony, while the sacrificial priests took part with the women and maidens in sportive questions and answers (*Vajasaneyi-Saṁhitā*, xxiii. 22 f.), not distinguished by delicacy. As soon as the chief wife had arisen, the horse was skilfully cut up. After another series of enigmatic questions in which all the chief priests and the sacrificer joined, the served portions of the horse were roasted on a spit and offered to Prajāpati. On the third day the whole festival closed with the bath of purification of the donor of the sacrifice and with gifts to the sacrificing priests. The honorarium (*dakṣiṇā*), which was measured with a very liberal hand, was derived from booty captured in the conquered land. Even

* See art. 'Triad' in *JRAS*, 1906, p. 943 ff.

wives of the king with their maids figure among the presents.

LITERATURE.—A. Hillebrandt, *Rituallitteratur* (Strassburg, 1897), p. 149; J. Eggeling, *SBE* xliv., Introd. p. xv f.

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ASYLUM.—Asylum (Lat. *asȳlum*, Gr. ἄσυλον, 'refuge,' 'sanctuary,' neut. of adj. ἄσῡλος, 'inviolable,' from ἀ priv. and σύλη, σῦλον, 'right of seizure') means a place of shelter and protection from which a refugee is not allowed to be forcibly removed.

1. Among many peoples at different stages of civilization sacred places are asylums. Thus among the Aruntas of Central Australia there is in each local totem centre a spot called *ertna-tulunga*, in the immediate neighbourhood of which everything is sacred and must on no account be hurt. The plants growing there are never interfered with in any way; animals which come there are safe from the spear of the hunter; and a man who is being pursued by others cannot be touched as long as he remains at this spot.[1] At Maiva, in the South-Eastern part of New Guinea, 'should a man be pursued by an enemy and take refuge in the *dubu* [or temple], he is perfectly safe inside. Any one smiting another inside the *dubu* would have his arms and legs shrivelled up, and he could do nothing but wish to die.'[2] In Upolu, one of the Samoan Islands, a certain god, Vave, had his residence in an old tree, which served as an asylum for murderers and other great offenders; if that tree was reached by the criminal, he was safe, and the avenger could pursue no farther, but had to wait for investigation and trial.[3] In the island of Hawaii there were two *puhonuas*, or cities of refuge, which afforded an inviolable sanctuary even to the vilest criminal who entered their precincts, and during war offered safe retreat to all the non-combatants of the neighbouring districts who flocked into them, as well as to the vanquished. As soon as the fugitive had entered, he repaired to the presence of the idol and made a short ejaculatory address, expressive of his obligations to him in reaching the place with security. The priests and their adherents would immediately put to death any one who should have the temerity to follow or molest those who were once within the pale of the *pahu tabu*, and, as they put it, under the shade or protection of the spirit of Keave, the tutelary deity of the place. After a short period, probably not more than two or three days, the refugee was permitted to return unmolested to his home, the divine protection being supposed still to abide with him.[4] In Tahiti the *morais*, or holy places, likewise gave shelter to criminals of every kind.[5]

2. In many North American tribes certain sacred places or whole villages served as asylums.[6] Thus the Arikaras of the Missouri had in the centre of their largest village a sacred lodge called the 'medicine-lodge,' where no blood was to be spilled, not even that of an enemy.[7] 'In almost every Indian nation,' says Adair, who wrote about the tribes of the South-Eastern States, 'there are several peaceable towns, which are called "old-beloved, ancient, holy, or white towns"; they seem to have been formerly "towns of refuge," for it is not in the memory of their oldest people that human blood was ever shed in them, although they often force persons from them, and put them to death elsewhere.'[1] Among the Acaghchemen Indians, however, in the valley and neighbourhood of San Juan Capistrano in California, a criminal who had fled to a *vanquech*, or place of worship, was secure not only as long as he remained there, but also after he had left the sanctuary. It was not lawful even to mention his crime; all that the avenger could do to him was to point at him and deride him, saying, 'Lo, a coward, who has been forced to flee to Chinigchinich!' Yet this flight turned the punishment from the head of the criminal upon that of one of his relatives.[2]

3. On the coast of Malabar a certain temple situated to the south-east of Calicut affords protection to thieves and adulterous women belonging to the Brāhman caste; but this privilege is reckoned among the sixty-four *anatcharams*, or abuses, which were introduced by Brāhmanism.[3] Among the Kafirs of the Hindu-Kush there are several 'cities of refuge,' the largest being the village of Mergrom, which is almost entirely peopled by *chiles*, or descendants of persons who have slain some fellow-tribesman.[4] In the Caucasus holy groves offer refuge to criminals, as also to animals, which cannot be shot there.[5]

The Barotse of South Central Africa have a city of refuge, where anybody who has incurred the king's wrath or committed a crime is safe; the man in charge of it is expected to plead for him before the chief, and the refugee can then return to his house in peace.[6] In Congo Français, according to Miss Kingsley, there are several sanctuaries. 'The great one in the Calabar district is at Omon. Thither mothers of twins, widows, thieves, and slaves flee, and if they reach it are safe.'[7] In Ashanti a slave who flees to a temple and dashes himself against the fetish cannot easily be brought back to his master.[8] Among the Negroes of Accra, criminals used to 'seat themselves upon the fetish,' that is, place themselves under its protection; but murderers who sought refuge with the fetish were always liable to be delivered up to their pursuers.[9]

4. In Morocco the tombs of saints and mosques offer shelter to refugees, especially in those parts of the country where the Sultan's government has no power; even the descendants of the saint or his manager (*mḳaddam*) can only by persuasion and by promising to mediate between the suppliant and his pursuer induce the former to leave the place.[10] In other Muhammadan countries there are, or have been, similar places of refuge.[11] In Persia the great number of such asylums proved so injurious to public safety, that about the middle of the 19th cent. only three mosques were left which were recognized by the government as affording protection to criminals of every description.[12]

Among the Hebrews the right of asylum originally belonged to all altars (Ex 21[13f.]; cf. W. R.

[1] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 133 ff.
[2] Chalmers and Gill, *Work and Adventures in New Guinea* (1885), p. 186.
[3] Turner, *Samoa* (1884), p. 64 f.
[4] Ellis, *Tour through Hawaii* (1827), p. 155 ff.; Jarves, *History of the Hawaiian Islands* (1872), p. 28 f.
[5] Turnbull, *Voyage round the World* (1813), p. 366; Wilson, *Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific Ocean* (1799), p. 351.
[6] Bourke, 'Medicine-Men of the Apache,' in *9 RBEW* (1892), p. 453; Kohl, *Kitschi-Gami* (1859), p. 271 (Chippewas).
[7] Bradbury, *Travels in the Interior of America* (1817), p. 165 f.

[1] Adair, *History of the American Indians* (1775), p. 159; see also pp. 158, 416.
[2] Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, iii. (1883) p. 167; Boscana, in Robinson, *Life in California* (1846), p. 262 f.
[3] Graul, *Reise nach Ostindien*, iii. (1854) pp. 332, 335.
[4] Scott Robertson, *Kafirs of the Hindu-Kush* (1896), p. 441.
[5] Hahn, *Kaukasische Reisen* (1896), p. 122.
[6] Arnot, *Garenganze* (1889), p. 77.
[7] Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa* (1897), p. 466.
[8] Bowdich, *Mission to Ashantee* (1819), p. 265.
[9] Monrad, *Skildring af Guinea-Kysten* (1822), p. 89.
[10] Westermarck, '*L-'ār*, or the Transference of Conditional Curses in Morocco,' in *Anthrop. Essays presented to E. B. Tylor* (1907), p. 372 f.
[11] Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, i. (1889) p. 237 f.; Quatremère, 'Mémoire sur les asiles chez les Arabes,' in *Mémoires de l'Institut de France, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, xv. pt. ii. (1842), p. 313 f.
[12] Polak, *Persien*, ii. (1865) p. 83 ff.; Brugsch, *Im Lande der Sonne* (1886), p. 246; Jackson, *Persia Past and Present* (1906), pp. 170, 267, 422.

Smith, *Rel. of Semites*[2], 1894, p. 148, n. 1); but on the abolition of the local altars it was limited to certain cities of refuge, three on either side of the Jordan (Dt $4^{41ff.}$ $19^{2ff.}$). Unintentional manslayers were sheltered in these cities; whereas, if a refugee was found guilty of murder, he had to be taken away from the asylum by the elders of his town and delivered to the next kinsman of the murdered person, to be put to death by him (Dt $19^{4ff.}$). According to the post-exilic law, the refugee could leave the place, after the high priest's death, without being exposed to the pursuit of the avenger of blood (Nu 35^{28}); but he was not permitted to purchase an earlier return to his possession with a money ransom (Nu 35^{32}). However, the restriction of the legal right of asylum to the case of involuntary homicide was undoubtedly a narrowing of the ancient custom. Many heathen sanctuaries of the Phœnicians and Syrians retained even in Roman times what seems to have been an unlimited right of asylum, and at certain Arabian shrines the god likewise gave shelter to all fugitives without distinction, and even stray or stolen cattle that reached the holy ground could not be reclaimed by their owners.[1]

5. In Greece many sanctuaries possessed the right of asylum down to the end of paganism, and any violation of this right was supposed to be severely punished by the deity.[2] According to an old tradition, Romulus established a sanctuary, dedicated to some unknown god or spirit, on the slope of the Capitoline Hill, proclaiming that all who resorted to it, whether bond or free, should be safe.[3] This tradition and also some other statements made by Latin writers[4] seem to indicate that from ancient times certain sacred places in Rome gave shelter to refugees; but it was only at a comparatively late period of Roman history that the right of sanctuary, under Greek influence, became a recognized institution of some importance.[5] This right was expressly conferred upon the temple which in the year 42 B.C. was built in honour of Cæsar;[6] and other imperial temples, as also the statues of emperors, laid claim to the same privilege.[7] When Christianity became the religion of the State, a similar claim was made by the Churches; but a legal right of asylum was first granted to them by Honorius in the West and Theodosius in the East.[8] Subsequently it was restricted by Justinian, who decreed that all manslayers, adulterers, and kidnappers of women who fled to a church should be taken out of it.[9]

6. The right of sanctuary existed among the pagan Slavs, or some of them,[10] and, as it seems, among the ancient Teutons.[11] After their conversion to Christianity the privilege of asylum within the church was recognized in most of their codes. In the Middle Ages and later, persons who fled to a church or to certain boundaries surrounding it were, for a time at least, safe from all prosecution, it being considered treason against God, an offence beyond compensation, to force even the most flagrant criminal from His altar. The ordinary of the sacred place, or his official, was the only one who could try to induce him to leave it; but if he failed, the utmost that could be done was to deny the refugee victuals, so that he might go forth voluntarily.[1] In the *Lex Baiuwariorum* (i. 7) it is asserted in the strongest terms that there is no crime which may not be pardoned from the fear of God and reverence for the saints. But the right of sanctuary was gradually subjected to various restrictions both by secular legislation and by the Church.[2] Innocent III. enjoined that refuge should not be given to a highway robber or to anybody who devastated cultivated fields at night,[3] and, according to Beaumanoir's *Coutumes du Beauvoisis* (xi. 15 ff.), dating from the 13th cent., it was also denied to persons guilty of sacrilege or arson. The Parliament of Scotland enacted that whoever sought the protection of the Church for homicide should be required to come out and undergo an assize, that it might be found whether it was committed of 'forethought felony' or in 'chaud-mellé'; and only in the latter case was he to be restored to the sanctuary, the sheriff being directed to give him security to that effect before requiring him to leave it.[4] In England a malefactor who took refuge in a consecrated church could not be removed from it; but it was the duty of the four neighbouring 'vills' to beset the holy place, prevent his escape, and send for a coroner, who then came and parleyed with the refugee. The latter had his choice between submitting to trial and abjuring the realm. If he chose to abjure the realm, he hurried, dressed in pilgrim's guise, to the port which was assigned to him, and left England, being bound by his oath never to return. His land was escheated, his chattels were forfeited, and if he came back his fate was that of an outlaw. But if the refugee would neither submit to trial nor abjure the realm, then the contention of the civil power was that, at all events after he had enjoyed the right of asylum for forty days, he was to be starved into submission; although the clergy resented this interference with the peace of Holy Church.[5] In the reign of Henry VIII. there were certain places which were allowed to be 'places of tuition and privilege'—in fact, cities of permanent refuge for persons who should, according to ancient usage, have abjured the realm, after having fled to a church. There was a governor in each of these privileged places, charged with the daily duty of mustering his men, who were not to exceed twenty in each town, and who had to wear a badge whenever they appeared out of doors. But when these regulations were made, the protection of sanctuary was taken away from persons guilty of murder, rape, burglary, highway robbery, or arson. The law of sanctuary was then left unchanged till the reign of James I., when, in theory, the privilege in question was altogether denied to criminals.[6]

[1] W. R. Smith, p. 148 *f.*

[2] Tac. *Ann.* iii 60 ff.; Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, i (1896) p. 73; Westcott, *Essays in the History of Religious Thought in the West* (1891), p. 115; Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, ii. (1882) p. 285; Bulmerincq, *Das Asylrecht* (1853), p. 35 ff.; Fuld, 'Das Asylrecht im Alterthum und Mittelalter' in *ZVRW* vii. (1887) p. 118 ff.; Barth, *de Græcorum asylis* (1888).

[3] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Antiquitates Romanæ*, ii. 15; Livy, i. 8. 5 *f.*; Plutarch, *Romulus*, ix 5; Strabo, v. 3 2, p 230.

[4] Valerius Maximus, *Facta dictaque memorabilia*, viii. 9. 1, Dionys. Hal. *Antiq. Rom.* vi. 45; Cicero, *de Lege Agraria oratio secunda*, 14 (36); see also Hartung, *Die Religion der Römer*, ii. (1836) p. 58 *f.*

[5] See Tac. *Ann.* iii. 36; Plautus, *Rudens*, 723; Dio Cassius, *Historia Romana*, xlvii. 19; Bulmerincq, *op. cit.* p. 58 ff.; Mommsen, *Römisches Strafrecht* (1899), p. 458 *f.*

[6] Dio Cassius, xlvii. 19.

[7] Tac. *Ann.* iv. 67; Suetonius, *Tiberius*, 53; Mommsen, *op. cit.* p. 460

[8] Mommsen, *op. cit.* p. 461 *f.*

[9] *Novellæ*, xvii. 7.

[10] Helmold, *Chronik der Slaven*, i. 83 (1852), p. 170.

[11] Wilda, *Das Strafrecht der Germanen* (1842), p. 248 *f.*; Stemann, *Den danske Retshistorie indtil Christian V.'s Lov* (1871), p. 578; Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, ii. (1892) p. 610, Fuld, *loc. cit.* p. 138 *f.*; Frauenstadt, *Blutrache und Todtschlagsühne im deutschen Mittelalter* (1881), p. 51.

[1] Milman, *History of Latin Christianity*, ii. (1867) p. 59; Bulmerincq, *op. cit.* p. 73 ff.; Fuld, *loc. cit.* p. 136 ff.; Bracton, *de Legibus et consuetudinibus Angliæ*, fol. 136*b*, vol. ii. (1879) p. 392 *f.*; Innes, *Scotland in the Middle Ages* (1860), p. 195 *f.*

[2] Brunner, *op. cit.* ii. 611 *f.*; Bulmerincq, *op. cit.* p. 91 ff.; Fuld, *loc. cit.* p. 140 *f.*

[3] Gregory IX., *Decretales*, iii. 49. 6.

[4] Innes, *op. cit.* p. 198.

[5] Pollock and Maitland, *History of English Law before the Time of Edward I.* ii. (1898) p. 590 *f.*, Réville, 'L'abjuratio regni,' in *Revue historique*, vol. i. (1892) p. 14 ff.

[6] Pike, *History of Crime in England*, ii. (1876) p. 253; Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, vol. iv. (1778) p. 333.

Yet, as a matter of fact, asylums continued to exist in England so late as the reign of George I., when that of St. Peter's at Westminster was abolished.[1] In the legislation of Sweden the last reference to the privilege of sanctuary is found in an enactment of 1528.[2] In France it was abolished by an *ordonnance* of 1539.[3] In Spain it existed even in the 19th century.[4] Not long ago the most important churches in Abyssinia,[5] the monastery of Affaf Woira in the same country,[6] and the quarter in Gondar where the head of the Abyssinian clergy has his residence,[7] were reported to be asylums for criminals. And the same was the case with the old Christian churches among the Suanetians of the Caucasus.[8]

Among the ancient Irish the right of sanctuary also existed. This was of two sorts: temporary within the precinct (*maigen*) of a person of rank, and permanent within the land of a hostel (*bruden*) or the glebe (*nemed, termann*) of a church. The *maigen* varied according to the status of the owner of the land, ranging from the radius of one spear-cast to the entire plain in which the palace of a provincial king, the king of Ireland, or the Archbishop of Armagh, stood. Within the *maigen* the fugitive, when duly certified of the character of the place and granted formal permission to enter, was safe, so long as he in no wise injured the *maigen* or its owner, for a time, but must sooner or later incur the penalty of his original misdeed. Within the *bruden*, on the other hand, a homicide was safe from the vengeance of his victim's friends until he could obtain a fair trial before a *brehon*, or judge. 'The right accorded to the maigen of a dwelling was for the protection of the owner against scenes of violence on his premises by outsiders—not primarily in the interest of the fugitive; and as it depended on the will—or caprice—of the owner, it was uncertain. It was indeed not an asylum at all in the proper sense of the word. But the sanctuary of a church or the asylum of a bruden was absolute and inviolable, depending on no conditions and on no man's will or caprice.'[9]

7. In many cases the tombs of dead or the houses of living persons serve as asylums. The Arab poet Ḥammâd found a safe refuge at the tomb of his enemy's father.[10] In the monarchical states of the Gallas, in Eastern Africa, homicides enjoy a legal right of asylum if they have succeeded in escaping to a hut near the burial-place of the king.[11] Among the Barotse[12] and Kafirs[13] the tombs of chiefs are places of refuge. Among the Ovambos in South-Western Africa the village of a great chief is abandoned at his death, except by the members of a certain family, who remain there to prevent it from falling into utter decay; and condemned criminals who contrive to escape to one of these deserted villages are safe, at least for a time.[14] Among various peoples the domicile of the chief or king is an asylum for criminals;[1] and in some places in West Africa the same is the case with the house of the high priest.[2] In Usambara, again, a murderer cannot be arrested at any of the four places where the great wizards of the country reside.[3] But even the house of an ordinary man may possess the right of asylum. Among the Bareas and Kunamas, in Eastern Africa, a murderer who finds time to flee into another person's dwelling cannot be seized, and it is considered a point of honour for the community to help him to escape abroad.[4] In the Pelew Islands 'no enemy may be killed in a house, especially not in the presence of the host.'[5] In Europe the privilege of asylum went hand in hand with the sanctity of the homestead;[6] and the reach of a man's peace was proportionate to his rank.[7]

8. The right of sanctuary has been ascribed to various causes. Obviously erroneous is the suggestion that places of refuge were established with a view to protecting unintentional offenders from punishment or revenge.[8] The restriction of the privilege of sanctuary to cases of accidental injuries is not at all general, and where it occurs it is undoubtedly an innovation due to moral or social considerations. Very frequently this privilege has been attributed to a desire to give time for the first heat of resentment to pass over before the injured party could seek redress.[9] But although such a desire may have helped to preserve the right of asylum where it has once come into existence, it could hardly account for the origin of this right. It should be remembered that the privilege of sanctuary not only affords temporary protection to the refugee, but in many cases altogether exempts him from punishment or retaliation, and that shelter is given even to animals which have fled to a sacred place. And if the theory referred to were correct, how could we explain the fact that the right of asylum is particularly attached to sanctuaries? It has been said that the right of sanctuary bears testimony to the power of certain places to transmit their virtues to those who entered them.[10] But it is doubtful whether we have any evidence that the fugitive is supposed to partake of the sanctity of the place which shelters him. In Morocco, persons who are permanently attached to mosques or the shrines of saints are generally regarded as more

[1] Jusserand, *English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages* (1892), p. 166.
[2] Nordstrom, *Bidrag till den svenska samhalls-forfattningens historia*, ii. (1840) p. 405.
[3] Du Boys, *Histoire du droit criminel des peuples modernes*, ii. (1858) p. 246.
[4] Du Boys, *Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne* (1870), p. 227 f.
[5] Hellwig, *Das Asylrecht der Naturvölker* (1903), p. 52.
[6] Harris, *Highlands of Æthiopia*, ii. (1844) p. 93.
[7] Ruppel, *Reise in Abyssinien*, ii. (1840) pp. 74, 81; von Heuglin, *Reise nach Abessinien* (1868), p. 213.
[8] von Haxthausen, *Transcaucasia* (1854), p. 160 n.
[9] Joyce, *Social Hist. of Ancient Ireland* (1903), i. 258 f., ii. 44 f., 173.
[10] Goldziher, *op. cit.* i. 236.
[11] Paulitschke, *Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas, Die geistige Cultur der Danâkil*, etc. (1896), p. 157.
[12] Decle, *Three Years in Savage Africa* (1898), p. 75.
[13] Rehme, 'Das Recht der Amaxosa' in *ZVRW* x. 51.
[14] Schinz, *Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika* (1891), 312.

[1] Harmon, *Voyages and Travels in the Interior of North America* (1820), p. 297 (Tacullies); Lewin, *Hill Tracts of Chittagong* (1869), p. 100 (Kukis); Junghuhn, *Die Battalander auf Sumatra*, ii. (1847) 329 (Macassars and Bugis of Celebes); Tromp, 'Uit de Salasila van Koetei,' in *Bydragen tot de taal-land- en volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie*, xxxvii. (1888) p. 84 (natives of Koetei, a district of Borneo); Jung, quoted by Kohler, 'Recht der Marschallinsulaner,' in *Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss.* xiv. 447 (natives of Nauru in the Marshall Group); Turner, *Nineteen Years in Polynesia* (1861), p. 334 (Samoans); Rautanen, in Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse*, p. 342 (Ondongas); Schinz, *op. cit.* p. 312 (Ovambos); Rehme, 'Das Recht der Amaxosa,' in *Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss.* x. 50; Merker, quoted by Kohler, 'Banturecht in Ostafrika,' *ib.* xv. 55 (Wadshagga); Merker, *Die Masai* (1904), p. 206. Among the Barotse the residences of the queen and the prime minister are places of refuge (Decle, *op. cit.* p. 75).
[2] Muller, *Die africanische Landschafft Fetu* (1673), p. 75, Wilson, *Western Africa* (1856), p. 129 (Krumen of the Gram Coast).
[3] Krapf, *Reisen in Ost-Afrika*, ii. (1858) p. 132.
[4] Munzinger, *Ostafrikanische Studien* (1864), p. 503.
[5] Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln in der Südsee,' in *Jour. d. Museum Godeffroy*, iv. (1873) p. 25.
[6] Wilda, *op. cit.* pp. 242, 243, 538, 543; Nordstrom, *op. cit.* ii. 435, Fuld, *loc. cit.* p. 152; Frauenstadt, *op. cit.* p. 63 ff.
[7] Pollock, 'The King's Peace,' in *Law Quarterly Review*, i. 40 f.
[8] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, § 117; Powell, 'Outlines of Sociology,' in *The Saturday Lectures delivered in the U.S. National Museum* (1882), p. 82.
[9] Meiners, *Geschichte der Menschheit* (1785), p. 189; Nordstrom, *op. cit.* ii. 401; Pardessus, *Loi salique* (1843), p. 656; Bulmerincq, *op. cit.* pp. 31, 47, Fuld, *loc. cit.* pp. 102, 118, 119, 294 ff.; Kohler, *Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz* (1883), p. 180, Quatremère, *op. cit.* p. 311.
[10] Granger, *Worship of the Romans* (1895), p. 223 f.

or less holy; but, so far as the present writer knows, this is never the case with casual visitors or suppliants, hence it is hardly from fear of the refugee that his pursuer refrains from laying hands on him. Prof. Robertson Smith has stated part of the truth in saying that 'the assertion of a man's undoubted rights as against a fugitive at the sanctuary is regarded as an encroachment on its holiness.'[1] There is an almost instinctive fear of disturbing the peace, and particularly of shedding blood,[2] in a holy place; and if it is improper to commit any act of violence in the house of another man, it is naturally considered equally offensive, and at the same time much more dangerous, to do so in the homestead of a supernatural being. But this is only one aspect of the matter; another, equally important, still calls for an explanation. Why should the gods or saints themselves be so anxious to protect criminals who have sought refuge in their sanctuaries? Why do they not deliver them up to justice through their earthly representatives?

The answer lies in certain ideas which refer to human as well as divine protectors of refugees. The god or saint is in exactly the same position as a man to whose dwelling a person has fled for shelter. According to Moorish ideas, the owner of the house or tent must, in his own interest, assist the fugitive; for, by being in close contact with him and his family and his belongings, the refugee is thought to be able to transfer to them curses and evil wishes. He is in the *'âr* of his host, and *l-'âr* denotes a compulsory relation between two persons, the constraining character of which is due to the belief in the transference of a conditional curse.[3] Ideas of this sort seem commonly to underlie the duty of assisting a suppliant;[4] and especially when the protector is so mighty a personage as a king or chief or high priest, his domicile then readily comes to be regarded as an inviolable place of refuge. Sometimes a criminal can, in a similar way, be a danger to the king even from a distance, or by meeting him, and must in consequence be pardoned. In Madagascar an offender escaped punishment if he could obtain sight of the sovereign, whether before or after conviction; hence criminals at work on the high road were ordered to withdraw when the sovereign was known to be coming by.[5] In Usambara even a murderer is safe as soon as he has touched the person of the king.[6] Among the Marutse and neighbouring tribes, a person who is accused of any crime receives pardon if he lays a *cupa*—the fossilized base of a conical shell, which is the most highly valued of all their instruments—at the feet of his chief; and a miscreant likewise escapes punishment if he reaches and throws himself on the king's drums.[7] On the Slave Coast, 'criminals who are doomed to death are always gagged, because if a man should speak to the king he must be pardoned.'[8] In Ashanti, if an offender should succeed in swearing on the king's life, he must be pardoned, because such an oath is believed to involve danger to the king; hence knives are driven through the cheeks from opposite sides, over the tongue, to prevent him from speaking.[9] So also among the Romans, according to an old Jewish writer, a person condemned to death was gagged to prevent him from cursing the king.[1] Fear of the curses pronounced by a dissatisfied refugee likewise, in all probability, underlay certain other customs which were prevalent in ancient Rome. A servant or slave who came and fell down at the feet of Juppiter's high priest, taking hold of his knees, was for that day freed from the whip; and if a prisoner with irons and bolts on his feet succeeded in approaching the high priest in his house, he was let loose and his fetters were thrown on to the road, not through the door, but from the roof.[2] Moreover, if a criminal who had been sentenced to death accidentally met a Vestal virgin, on his way to the place of execution, his life was saved.[3] So sensitive to imprecations were both Juppiter's high priest and the priestesses of Vesta, that the Prætor was never allowed to compel them to take an oath.[4] Among several peoples even ordinary women are regarded, in a way, as asylums, probably from fear of the magic power attributed to their sex. In various parts of Morocco, especially among the Berbers and Jbâla, or northern mountaineers, a person who takes refuge with a woman by touching her is safe from his pursuer. Among the Arabs of the plains this custom is dying out, owing to their subjection to the Sultan's government;[5] but among certain Asiatic Bedawîn, the tribe of Shammar, 'a woman can protect any number of persons, or even tents.'[6] Among the Circassians, 'a stranger who intrusts himself to the patronage of a woman, or is able to touch with his mouth the breast of a wife, is spared and protected as a relation of the blood, though he were the enemy, nay even the murderer, of a similar relative.'[7] The inhabitants of Barèges in Bigorre have, down to recent times, preserved the old custom of pardoning a criminal who has sought refuge with a woman.[8]

Now, as a refugee may by his curse force a king or a priest or any other human being with whom he establishes some kind of contact, to protect him, so he may in a similar manner constrain a god or saint as soon as he has entered his sanctuary. According to the Moorish expression, he is then in the *'âr* of the saint, and the saint is bound to protect him, just as a host is bound to protect his guest. It is not only men that have to fear the curses of dissatisfied refugees. Æschylus puts the following words into the mouth of Apollo, when he declares his intention to assist his suppliant, Orestes: 'Terrible both among men and gods is the wrath of a refugee, when one abandons him with intent.'[9]

LITERATURE.—**Bulmerincq**, *Das Asylrecht*, Dorpat, 1853; **R. Andree**, 'Die Asyle,' in *Globus* xxxviii., Brunswick, 1880; **Fuld**, 'Das Asylrecht im Alterthum und Mittelalter,' in *ZVRW* vii., Stuttgart, 1887; **Barth**, *de Græcorum asylis*, Strassburg, 1888; **J. G. Frazer**, 'The Origin of Totemism,' in *The Fortnightly Review*, N.S., lxv., London, 1899; **Hellwig**, *Das Asylrecht der Naturvolker*, Berlin, 1903; **Westermarck**, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, ii. (London, 1908) pp. 628-638.

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ATARGATIS.—Atargatis (Ἀτάργατις, Ἀταργάτη, Ἀτέργατις, Ἀταργάτειτις, Ἀττα[ρ]γάθη) is the Greek pronunciation of עתרעתה, a Syrian goddess often mentioned by classical writers. The Aram. name was shortened into תרעתה, the regular form in the Talmud, Syr. literature, and Armenian; and from this was derived Δερκετώ, **Derceto, a**

1 Quoted by Levias, 'Cursing,' in *JE* iv. 390 (cf. in general, for Biblical and Talmudic material, Toy and Ginzberg, *ib.* ii. 256-259).

2 Plutarch, *Questiones Romanæ*, 111; Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticæ*, x. 15 8, 10.

3 Plutarch, *Numa*, x. 5.

4 Aulus Gellius, x. 15 31.

5 Westermarck, *Origin and Develop. of the Moral Ideas*, i. 668.

6 Layard, *Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon* (1853), p. 318.

7 Pallas, *Travels through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire*, i. (1802) p. 404.

8 Fischer, *Bergreisen*, i. (1804) p. 60.

9 Æschylus, *Eumenides*, 232 ff.

1 *Rel. of Sem.*[2] p. 148.

2 Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, i. (1906) p. 380.

3 Westermarck, in *Anthrop. Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, p. 361 ff.

4 Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, i. 587 ff.

5 Ellis, *History of Madagascar*, i. (1838) p. 376.

6 Krapf, *op. cit.* ii. 132 n.*

7 Gibbons, *Exploration in Central Africa* (1898), p. 129.

8 Ellis, *Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast* (1890), p. 224.

9 *Ib.* p. 224.

common Gr. and Lat. form. The origin of this name was a matter of much speculation to earlier scholars. Selden (*de Dis Syris*, 178) explained it as a corruption of אַדִּיר־דָּג, 'great fish,' and connected it with Dagon; Sickler (*Die Hieroglyphen*, 74 f.) and Gesenius (*Com. ub. Is.* ii. 342) interpreted it as אַדַּר־גַּד, 'greatness of fortune'; Movers (*Phonizier*, i. 594) as Aram. תרעתא, 'cleft,' like Heb. נְקֵבָה, as a designation for 'female'; de Vogué (*Syrie Centrale, Insc. Sem.* 7 f.), followed by Baudissin (*Jahve et Moloch*, 25), as עַתַר־עֵת, 'fullness of favourable time.' All these etymologies were set aside by the discovery of inscriptions bearing the name עתרעתה, the original Aram. designation of the goddess (see below). Ewald (*Inschr. von Sidon*, 1856, p. 52) at once recognized that this was compounded out of עתר, 'Atar, and עתה, 'Ate, two well-known Syrian deities, and in this view he has been followed by Levy (*Phon. Stud.* ii. 39), Noldeke (*ZDMG* xxiv. 1870, pp. 92, 109), Baudissin (*Studien*, i. 238; *PRE*[3] ii. 172), Baethgen (*Beitrage*, 69 ff.), and nearly all recent scholars. Lagarde (*Mitt.* i. 1884, 77 f.) doubts the correctness of this view, and Jensen (*Hittiter und Armenier*, 1898, 157 f.) suggests that Atargatis is derived from a hypothetical Hittite goddess Tarkhu. Neither of these scholars has succeeded, however, in disproving the commonly accepted etymology.

'Atar, the first element in the compound, is the Aramaic form of the name that appears in Canaan as 'Ashtar(t), (Astarte); in Assyr. and Bab. as Ishtar; in South Arabia as 'Athtar; in Abyssinia as 'Astar; in Moab as 'Ashtar. Heb. ש and Arab. ث regularly correspond with Aram. ת, so that Heb. עשתרת becomes Aram. עתתר. *'Athtar* was soon assimilated into *'Attar*, and this was written עתר, the usual form in the inscriptions. The phonetic relation of these various forms shows that 'Athtar ('Ashtart, Astarte) was a primitive Semitic deity who must have been worshipped by the Aramæans from the earliest times. The first appearance of the name is in the Annals of Ashurbanipal (Rassam, viii. 112, 124 = *KIB* ii. 221 f.; Cyl. B, vii. 92 = *KIB* ii. 215, n. 4), where the form *Atar-samain*, 'heavenly Atar,' indicates the Aramaic origin of the divinity. It appears also in Syrian proper names such as Atar-bi'di, Atar-gabri, Atar-'idri, Atar-sûri (Johns, *Ass. Doomsday Book*, 17; Hilprecht, *Bab. Exp.* ix. 51, 76). A gem bears the inscription עתרעו, 'Atar is strong' (Levy, *Phon. Stud.* ii. 38; E. Meyer, *ZDMG* xxxi. 1877, 732, n. 1). From none of these early mentions does it appear whether 'Atar is masculine or feminine. In South Arabia, Abyssinia, and Moab it is masculine, in Assyria and Canaan it is feminine (cf. Barton, *Semitic Origins*, ch. iv.). Winckler (*Altorient. Forsch.* i. 528) has shown, however, that Ashurbanipal in two texts equates Atar-samain with the Assyrian Ishtar, which is always feminine (in spite of the absence of fem. ending). Strabo also (xvi. 785) says that Athara is the same as Atargatis, and Atargatis is always feminine. *Athara* seems clearly to be a variant form of *'Athtar*, *'Attar*, and Noldeke (*ZDMG* xxiv. 109) explains it on the analogy of Arab. *'Athur* for *'Aththur*, *'Ashshur*, 'Assyria.' Justin (*Hist. Phil.* xxxvi. 2) speaks of Arates (Arathis = Athares) as the wife of Damascus, for whom he built a temple. In the light of this evidence there can be no doubt that the Aramæan Atar was a goddess (see ASHTART).

'Ate or *'Athe*, the second element in the compound name Atargatis, appears in the forms עתה, עתא, and עת in Palmyrene proper names, *e.g.* עתנתן, עתעקב, Ἀθηακαβος, וברעתה, וברעתא, Σαβδααθης or Σαβδεαθης, נרעתה, עברעתה, עתה as the name of a man, and עתי as the name of a woman (de Vogüé, *Insc. Sem.* No. 30, 5, 19, 63, 74, 107, 143, 54; Mordtmann, 'Neue Beiträge z. Kunde Palmyra's,' *SMA* 1875, 47; Sachau, *ZDMG* xxxv. 1881, p. 740 f.). It appears also in Phœn. inscriptions from Cyprus in the names נרעת and עתרשף (*CIS*, No. 93, 79; cf. Noldeke, *ZDMG* xlii. 1888, p. 471; Halévy, *Mélanges de critique et d'histoire*, 1883, 146). In Gr. inscriptions and authors it assumes the forms Ἄθη, Ἄθης, Ἄθας, Ἔθαος. These forms and the masc. verbs in the Palmyrene proper names suggest that 'Ate is a male divinity, but there is so much looseness in Palmyrene in the agreement of the verb with the gender of its subject that this argument is not conclusive. Pseudo-Melito (in Otto's *Corp. Apol. Christ.* ix. 426, 505; Cureton, *Spicileg.* 44, 25 Syr.) describes ܥܬܝ, 'Ati, as worshipped at Hadyab (Adiabene), and uses the feminine in speaking of her, but this testimony also is far from decisive. As uncertain as the sex of 'Ate is his (or her) identity. De Vogué and Baudissin think that the name is ܥܬ, Heb. עת, in the sense of 'favourable season,' and that it was used originally merely to distinguish the 'Atar of Heliopolis from other 'Atars, but subsequently was separated from her as the name of an independent deity. This is very unlikely. Combinations of two deities into one are common in the Semitic world, but the separatiou of one into two is an unknown phenomenon. Levy (*Phon. Stud.* iv. 7) and Six (*Numism. Chron.* 1878, 108) hold that *'Ate* comes from *'Ante*, *'Anath*, but the Gr. equivalent Ἄθη makes this view difficult. Baethgen (*Beitr.* 71 ff.) identifies 'Ate with Attes (a Lydian deity), which appears in the proper names Sadyattes, Myattes, Alyattes, and he appeals to Lucian's story (*de Dea Syr.* 15) of the founding of the temple at Hierapolis by Attes the Lydian in honour of Rhea who had castrated him. In that case the phonetic relation of *Athes* to *Attes* is the same as that of *Athara* to *Attar* (see above). Hommel (*PSBA*, 1897, p. 81) thinks also that the original seat of the worship of 'Ate was in eastern Asia Minor (see ATE, ATTIS).

When so much doubt exists as to the character of 'Ate, it is difficult to determine what is the relation of 'Atar to this deity in the compound 'Atar-'Ate, or how the character of the primitive Semitic 'Atar is modified by this relationship. Meyer (*ZDMG* xxxi. 730) and Hommel (*l.c.*) regard 'Atar as the wife of 'Ate, but Hadad is always represented as her consort. Halévy (*l.c.* 224) suggests that 'Atar is the daughter of 'Ate, and compares 'Ishtar the daughter of Sin.' Baudissin (*PRE*[3] ii. 173) thinks that, if 'Ate is a real name and not a mere title of 'Atar, he is probably the son of 'Atar (cf. Ishtar and Tammuz and the legends given below of Atargatis and her son). Baethgen (*Beitr.* 71 ff.) thinks that the relationship is 'Atar = 'Ate, *i.e.* Attes has lost his identity in 'Atar; and he appeals to Lucian's story (see above). The philological method cannot throw much light on this problem, and we are compelled to turn to the allusions in the inscriptions and in classical writers in order to ascertain the character of Atargatis.

The earliest references to the worship of this goddess are found in fragments of Ctesias († *c.* B.C. 400) scattered through the writings of later classical authors (cf. Ctes. *Reliq.* ed. Bahr, 393–395; Muller, in Dindorf's *Herodotus*, 16 ff.). Strabo (xvi. 785) says that Ctesias calls Atargate *Derkêto*. Diodorus Siculus (ii. 4), in dependence upon Ctesias (cf. ii. 20), narrates that Aphrodite was angry with Derkêtô, and caused her to fall in love with a beautiful youth among those who sacrificed in the temple in Askalon. By him she became the mother of Semiramis. Filled with shame, she caused the youth to disappear, and placed the child in a desert, where she was fed by doves. She then

cast herself into a lake near Askalon and was changed into a fish, with the exception of her face. This is the origin of the half-human half-fish image of Derkĕtó. The same story is repeated by Athenagoras (*Legat. pro Christ.* 26) and by an anonymous author (Bahr, *op. cit.* 393 f.; Muller, *op. cit.* 18), who also calls Derkĕtó 'the Syrian goddess.' Eratosthenes (*Catast.* 38) cites Ctesias as his authority for the statement that Derkĕtó was saved by a fish at Bambyce (Hierapolis, the modern Membidj) in northern Syria. He also calls her the goddess of Syria. Hyginus (*Astron.* ii. 41) states, on the authority of Ctesias, that a fish rescued Isis (*i.e.* Derkĕtó) from the sea, and therefore the Syrians regard fishes as holy, abstain from eating them, and worship golden images of them. Xanthus the Lydian, a contemporary of Ctesias, cited by Mnaseas, according to Athenæus (viii. 37), states (if the citation be genuine) that Atargatis because of her pride was seized by the Lydian Mopsus and cast with her son Ichthus ('fish') into a lake near Askalon, where she was devoured by fishes. Hesychius (*s.v.* Ἀτταγάθη) says that she is called Ἀθάρη by Xanthus.

The earliest epigraphic evidence of the worship of Atargatis is found on a coin bearing on one side the inscription עבד הדד, 'Abd-Hadad, on the other עתרעתו, 'Atar'atu (de Luynes, *Essai sur la numismat. des Satrap.*, 1846, p. 39, pl. v.; Blau, *ZDMG* vi. 1852, pp. 473 f.). De Luynes supposed that this belonged to the Persian period, but it is probably to be assigned rather to the early Greek period. It comes perhaps from Hierapolis, and is interesting as confirming the statements of later writers that Hadad and Atargatis were the two great divinities of Syria. Other coins of 'Abd-Hadad show the more usual spelling עתרעתה, 'Atar'ateh (see Waddington, *RN* vi. 1861, p. 9 ff.; Six, *Numismatic Chronicle*, 1878, p. 105).

According to 2 Mac 12[26], Judas Maccabæus in the year B.C. 164 went forth against Carnion and the temple of Atergatis (τὸ Ἀτεργάτιον) and slew 25,000 people. In 1 Mac 5[43] this is described as τὸ τέμενος ἐν Καρναΐν. From this it appears that the cult of Atargatis flourished during the Greek period not only in Hierapolis and Askalon, but also in Bashan. An inscription of the same period from Kefr Hauwar, on the road between Damascus and Banias, bearing the word [Ἀ]ταργάτη indicates probably that there was a temple of Atargatis in this place (Waddington, No. 1890). Excavations in Delos have disclosed a number of votive inscriptions to Atargatis dating from a period shortly before the beginning of the Christian era. Here occur the forms Ἀταργάτη, Ἀτέργατις, Ἀταργάτειτις (*BCH* iii. 407), and Ἀτάργατις (*ib.* vi. 495 ff., vii. 477, viii. 132). These inscriptions combine Atargatis and Adados (Hadad) and identify Atargatis with Aphrodite. In one case she is called Ἀφροδίτη Ἀτάργατις, in another ἁγνὴ Ἀφροδίτη. Her priests are called 'Hierapolitans,' either because this was a colony that had come from Hierapolis, or because the cult was known to be derived from that city.

Ovid († A.D. 17) tells how Dercetis was changed into a fish in Palestine (*Metam.* iv. 44–46). Germanicus († A.D. 19) calls her 'the Syrian goddess,' Derceto, and Atargatis (*Scholia on Aratus*, ed. Breysig, pp. 65, 98 f., 125, 176), and adds the new information that she was changed into a fish at Bambyce (Hierapolis). Strabo († A.D. 24) says, 'Atargate (according to some MSS, Artagate) the Syrians call Athara, but Ctesias calls her Derkĕtó.' Here Atargatis is identified with 'Athar (=Athtar, Ashtart, Astarte) in the same manner in which she is identified with Aphrodite in the Delos inscriptions (cf xvi. 748, 785). Cornutus († A.D. 68) records (*de Nat. Deor.* 6) that fishes and doves were sacred to Atargatis, the goddess of the Syrians, and therefore were not eaten. Pliny († A.D. 79), in *HN* v. 13 (14), 69, says of Joppa, 'There is worshipped the fabulous Ceto.' Whether this is to be understood of the sea-monster (κῆτος), whose skeleton, according to Strabo and Pliny, was shown at Joppa, or whether it is to be regarded as a truncated form of Der-ceto, is uncertain (cf. Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 178). In v. 23 (19), 81, Pliny identifies Atargatis with Derceto, and says that she was worshipped at Hierapolis, or Bambyce, or Mabog. In xxxii. 2, (8) 17, he speaks of the pond of sacred fish at the temple of Hierapolis. Plutarch (*Crass.* 17) says of the goddess of Hierapolis that some call her Aphrodite, others Hera, while others regard her as the divinity who out of moisture produces the seeds of all things, and has shown men the way to all good things.

A Palmyrene bilingual of the year A.D. 140 (de Vogüé, *Inscr. Sem.* 3 = Waddington, 2588) mentions עתרעתה, or [Ἀταρ]γάτει, as one of the 'good' or one of the 'national' gods. On the strength of this inscription a broken Palmyrene text (*CIG* iii. 4480) is doubtless to be restored [Ἀταργ]άτει. Another inscription of the 2nd cent. from Astypalæa, near Crete, reads, Ἀταργατειτὶ ἀνέθηκαν (see Rayet, 'Dédicace à la déesse Atergatis,' *BCH* iii. 1879, pp. 406 ff.; cf. *CIG* iv. 7046; *ZDMG* xxxix. 43).

The fullest of all the accounts of the cult of Atargatis at Hierapolis is found in the treatise of Lucian († *c.* A.D. 200), *de Dea Syria*. Lucian was himself a Syrian, and speaks as an eye-witness. He never calls the goddess Atargatis, and refuses to identify her with Derkĕtó of Askalon, because the image in that place had a fish's tail, while the one in Hierapolis had perfect human form (14). He prefers to call her Hera (1, 16), although he admits that there is much to be said in favour of the view that she is Rhea (15). Nevertheless, there is no doubt that his 'Syrian goddess' is really Atargatis. His title Συρία θεός is one that is constantly applied to this divinity by other writers. Hierapolis is known to have been a chief centre of her cult. The priests of Atargatis at Delos entitle themselves Hierapolitans. In the temple was a pond of sacred fish, such as Pliny describes in the temple of Atargatis at Hierapolis; and Lucian himself narrates that the people said that the temple was built by Semiramis in honour of her mother Derkĕtó, and that they abstained from eating fish and doves, in the same manner as the people of Askalon (14).

The temple of Hierapolis is described by Lucian as the largest and richest in Syria. To it pilgrims came from all parts of Western Asia (10) It stood on a hill in the midst of the city, and was surrounded with two walls, one of which was very ancient. To the north of the sanctuary lay a court 100 cubits square. In this stood a row of huge stone *phalli*, one of which a man ascended twice a year, and remained on the top seven days offering prayers for the people, who placed gifts at the bottom. In the court there was also an altar of bronze, and round about it were a multitude of statues of gods, heroes, and kings, among them 'Semiramis.' Here also bullocks, horses, eagles, bears, and lions fed together (28–29, 39–41). In the inner temple, to which only certain priests were admitted, stood three golden images. The first was that of Hera (Atargatis), which had attributes not only of Hera but also of Athene, Aphrodite, Selene, Rhea, Artemis, Nemesis, and the Fates. In one hand she carried a sceptre, in the other a distaff. On her head, which was surrounded with rays, she wore a tower-crown, and she was encircled with a girdle like that of Urania She stood on lions, and had a drum like that of Rhea (32, cf. 15) The second image bore a general resemblance to Zeus, although it was called by a different name. It was, doubtless, Hadad, who was represented armed with a thunderbolt. Between these two stood a third image, the sex of which Lucian could not determine. It had no name, he says, but was called merely σημήιον, 'sign' [Baethgen (*Beitrage*, 73) is doubtless correct in regarding this statement as due to a mistake on Lucian's part of אתה for עתה. The third divinity was really 'Ate, whose name appears as the second element in עתרעתה, Atargatis.] As to the origin of the temple, some said it was built by Deucalion, others by Attes (= Ate?), others by Semiramis, and others by Stratonice Lucian preferred to believe that it was the work of Dionysus (12 29).

The priesthood of the temple was very numerous, and was divided into classes that exercised different functions. Conspicuous among these were the *Galli*, or eunuch-priests. On

festal occasions young men worked themselves into a frenzy through music and other religious exercises, and then castrated themselves. After this they wore women's dress, and travelled about the country carrying an image of the goddess, which they worshipped with wild orgies, flogging one another and cutting themselves with knives (50–53, cf. *Asin.* 35–44). Of this custom Lucian offers two explanations. One was that it was in honour of Attes ('Ate?), who was castrated by Rhea, and wandered through the world in female attire; the other was that it was in memory of Combabus, who mutilated himself in order to avoid compromising himself with Queen Stratonice. There were also female devotees in the temple (43), and licentious rites were practised as a part of religion (22).

One of the great annual ceremonies consisted in carrying the third image ('Ate?) to the sea-shore and bringing thence jars of sea water, which were poured into a hole in the temple precincts (13, 33, 48). Another ceremony in the spring consisted in piling up trees in the outer court of the temple, heaping upon them garments, treasures, and all sorts of animals, and then burning the whole in the presence of all the gods of Syria, who were brought by their devotees to witness the rite (49). Domestic animals, except the hog, were offered in sacrifice. These were presented in the temple, and were taken home to be slain, but sometimes they were killed by being cast down from the portico of the temple. Children also were occasionally offered in this way. Pilgrims always shaved their heads when coming to the sanctuary, and young men and women presented their hair in gold or silver boxes before marrying. Tatuing in honour of the goddess was a common practice (54–60).

Apuleius (*Metamorph.* viii. 170) speaks of the 'omnipotent and all-producing Syrian goddess.' Ælian (*Hist. Anim.* xii. 2) speaks of the reverence for fishes at Hierapolis or Bambyce. Athenæus (viii. 37) gives the goddess the name of Ἀτέργατις. Arcadius (*de Accent.* ed. Barker, 36. 18) calls her Ἀταργατῖς. The book *de Legibus*, ascribed to Bardesanes († A.D. 223) (in Cureton, *Spicileg. Syr.* 1855, 20, tr. 31), calls her *Tar'atha* (ܬܪܥܬܐ), and says that she is worshipped in Syria and Edessa (the Gr. translation speaks of Rhea as worshipped in Syria and Osroëne). He also mentions castration as practised in her worship. Tertullian (*ad. Nation.* ii. 8, cf. *Apol.* 24) calls Atargatis 'the goddess of the Syrians.' Macrobius (beginning of 5th cent.) says that among the Syrians the sun is called Hadad, the earth Adargatis. The latter is represented mounted upon a lion, with her head encircled by rays (*Sat.* i. 23, 18). Jacob of Sarug († A.D. 521), in the documents published by Martin (*ZDMG* xxix. 1875, 132), states that Tar'atha (ܬܪܥܬܐ) was worshipped at Harran. Simplicius (6th cent.) has the form Ἀταράτη (cf. Lagarde, *Ges. Abhl.* 1866, 238). The Talmud (*'Abōdā zārā*, 11*b*; tr. Ewald, 1868, p. 85) calls her *Tar'atha* (תרעתא), and says that she is worshipped at עדד, *i.e.* Mabog (Bambyce, Hierapolis). In Armenian writers the goddess appears as *Tharatha*. Moses of Chorene (ii. 27) says that Abgar built Edessa and brought into it his idols, Nabok, Bel, Bathnichal, and Tharatha. For other Armenian authorities see Lagarde, 'Armenische Studien' in *AGG* xxii. 1877, p. 58, § 846; Mordtmann, *ZDMG* xxxix. 43.

From these accounts it appears that Atargatis is merely a local form of the primitive Semitic goddess Ishtar-'Athtar. St abo and Hesychius both affirm her identity with Athara, and the Delos inscriptions call her Aphrodite. Like Astarte, she was a goddess of life-giving water and of fertility. The main seats of her cult, Askalon, Karnaim, and Delos, were places long devoted to the worship of Astarte. Doves were sacred to her as to Astarte, and, according to Artemidorus (*Onirocrit.* i. 8), fish were not eaten by the worshippers of Astarte any more than by the worshippers of Atargatis. The emphasis upon sex in the cult at Hierapolis, as described by Lucian, also favours the original identity of Atargatis with Astarte. At the same time it is doubtless true that, in the mind of the common people, the Astarte of Hierapolis was distinguished from the Astartes of other cities as a separate deity, just as Ishtar of Arbela was distinguished by the Assyrians from Ishtar of Nineveh. At Askalon there was a temple of Astarte as well as one of Derkĕtó, and there is no evidence that the Atargatis of Karnaim was regarded as the same as the old Ashtoreth of Karnaim. See ASHTART, ISHTAR.

Hierapolis was, doubtless, the starting point of her cult, because her name is Aramaic. Mabog, the native name of Hierapolis, is apparently עבד, 'spring,' and is derived from a sacred spring in the precincts of the goddess. From Mabbog or Manbog comes the Gr. *Bambyce*. From this centre the cult spread in every direction. We find it at Palmyra, in the Ḥauran, at Karnaim, at Askalon, and in the Greek islands. Into every place where the worship of Astarte had gone that of Atargatis seems to have followed. During the Hellenistic period she became well known in all ports of the Mediterranean, and by Greek and Latin writers she was commonly called 'the Syrian goddess.'

LITERATURE.—In addition to the special treatises referred to above, see the art. and full bibliography by Baudissin in *PRE*³ ii. (1897) p. 171; also artt. 'Atargatis' and 'Dea Syria' in Roscher (1884) and in Pauly-Wissowa (1894); Puchstein, *ZA* ix. (1892), 420; W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*² (1894), 172–175; White, art. 'Atargatis,' in Hastings' *DB* i (1899), 194; Cheyne, art. 'Atargatis,' in *EBi* (1899); Barton, *Semitic Origins* (1902), 238–243.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON.

ATAVISM.—This word is used in three senses. (1) It is used to denote the hereditary re-appearance of a character not seen in the parents, or even in the immediate ancestry, but found in an ancestral race or in one related thereto. Thus, markedly projecting canine teeth in man have been regarded as re-expressions of a Simian character, and supplementary mammæ on the breast of a woman have been regarded (probably quite erroneously) as atavistic re-appearances of a characteristic of the Lemuroids. (2) It is used to denote the hereditary re-appearance of a character not seen in the parents, but known to have occurred in a definite ancestor belonging to the stock. Thus, a child may have the peculiar hazel eyes or a peculiar lock of hair characteristic of a great-grandparent, and not expressed in the intervening lineage. To such cases the term 'reversion' is often restricted—'the full re-appearance in an individual of a character which is recorded to have occurred in a *definite* ancestor of the same race' (K. Pearson, *Gram. of Science*², 1900, p. 489), while 'atavism' is restricted to 'a return of an individual to a character not typical of the race at all, but found in allied races supposed to be related to the evolutionary ancestry of the given race' (*ib.*). This would be a useful distinction between atavism and reversion, but unfortunately some scientific writers have used the two terms in the very opposite way, applying 'reversion' to (1) and 'atavism' to (2). The distinction which Pearson makes seems quite clear, but we doubt if it is now practicable. (3) It remains justifiable to use 'atavism' and 'reversion' as synonyms denoting the hereditary re-appearance of characters which were latent in the parents at least, but which were expressed in definite—not problematical—ancestors near or remote. It need hardly be said that an atavism is not necessarily a deterioration; it may be a throw-back to a higher degree of differentiation. That depends on the direction in which the species or stock is evolving in relation to its ancestors.

Examples.—A dovecot with carefully bred pigeons was left to itself for some years, after which it was found to contain numerous blue pigeons, resembling in many ways the wild rock-dove (*Columba livia*), believed to be the ancestor of all the domestic breeds of pigeon. In exact experiment this reversion to the rock-dove type has been repeatedly observed. Cultivated flowers and vegetables, such as pansies and cabbages, sometimes produce forms hardly distinguishable from their wild progenitors. The nectarine, which is derived from a peach, may produce what is practically a peach again; the white flowering-currant, which is derived from the common red form, may have branches with red flowers. In a hornless breed of

cattle, derived originally from a horned breed, a horned individual may suddenly re-appear. A dark bantam hen, crossed with an Indian Game Dorking cock, produced amongst others a cockerel almost identical with a jungle fowl (*Gallus bankiva*) —*i.e.* with the original wild stock (Cossar Ewart). Similarly, in his horse-zebra hybridizations, Professor Cossar Ewart obtained forms whose stripings were at least plausibly interpreted as reversions to an extremely old type of horse, such as is suggested by the striped ponies of Tibet.

There is no doubt that organisms often show peculiarities which their parents did not possess, but which their ancestors possessed. Summing up such cases *descriptively*, we may say that they seem to illustrate atavism, but the use of the term *as an interpretation* is not justified unless we can give some reason for believing that the resemblance to an ancestor is due to the rehabilitation of latent items in the inheritance. To do this we have to try to eliminate other interpretations, and that is often difficult. (*a*) What looks like an ancient feature may be due to an arrest of development through lack of appropriate nutrition. (*b*) Similar conditions of life, *e.g.* of food and climate, may induce an acquired or modificational resemblance between the organism and its great-grandparent, but this would not be an atavism. (*c*) Many organisms normally have certain 'vestigial organs,' and these are often variable. A quantitative variation in a normally present vestigial organ is not what is meant by an atavism. (*d*) It is conceivable that an independent individual variation may happen to coincide with one that occurred generations before, but this is different from the re-awakening of a latent item in the inheritance. (*e*) Filial regression, or an approximation towards the mean of the stock, is of everyday occurrence in blended inheritance, and must be kept quite distinct from reversion or atavism. (*f*) The list of alleged atavisms must also be reduced by the subtraction of what are called Mendelian phenomena. In certain cases, such as peas and mice, the crossing of two sharply contrasted pure-bred parents results in hybrid offspring which are all like one of the two parents as regards the contrasted characters; when these hybrid offspring are inbred their progeny resemble in definite proportions the two grandparents.

The fact seems to be that many phenomena have been labelled atavisms which admit of other interpretations, and that genuine atavisms are rather rare. Let us repeat that an atavism is a harking back to a more or less remote ancestor, the harking back being due to the re-assertion or re-awakening of ancestral contributions which have lain for several generations latent or unexpressed.

It seems unnecessary to use the term 'atavism' for the common phenomenon of resemblance to a grandparent. There is every reason to believe that an individual inheritance is like a mosaic, built up of many contributions, through the two parents, from the grandparents, great-grandparents, and so on. It is a normal and frequent fact of inheritance that an offspring exhibits a peculiarity known to have occurred in one of the grandparents but not in either of the parents. There seems little utility in calling this very frequent 'skipping a generation' an atavism, though it is of the same general nature, and though it is obviously difficult to decide where to draw the line. For how long must a character have been absent or latent before its re-assertion or re-awakening is to be called an atavism? A drone-bee arises from an unfertilized egg; it has a mother and two grandparents, but no father. But it seems rather absurd to call its resemblance to its grandfather atavistic or reversionary. This is a *reductio ad absurdum*, for the drone-bee would resemble its father if it had one! The case may serve to show that it is undesirable to use the term 'atavism' unless the throw-back is to an ancestor more than two generations antecedent.

The exact study of atavistic phenomena must have regard to characters which can be definitely measured and registered, and only when this study has reached secure results will it be possible to discuss with precision what may be called psychical atavisms, re-awakenings, often more fitly termed recrudescences, of ancestral traits which have lain latent, it may be, for generations. The garden of a shepherd's cottage which was swallowed up in a deer forest, lost all trace of its previous cultivation, and became a weed-ground. After many years, under more humane conditions, it was re-delved, and there sprang up many different kinds of old-fashioned flowers whose seeds had lain dormant for several generations. So may ancient flowers and weeds now and again re-appear out of latency in that garden which we call our inheritance.

LITERATURE.—See artt HEREDITY, REVERSION, and the important works noted under these articles. See, in particular, Charles Darwin, *The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, 2 vols., London, 1868, Yves Delage, *L'Hérédité et les Grands Problèmes de la Biologie Générale*[2], Paris, 1903; J. Cossar Ewart, *The Penycuik Experiments*, London, 1899, also 'Experimental Contributions to the Theory of Heredity, Reversion and Telegony,' *Trans Highland and Agricultural Soc. of Scotland*, 1901; I. H. F. Kohlbrugge, *Der Atavismus*, Utrecht, 1897; Karl Pearson, 'On the Law of Reversion,' in *Proc. Roy. Soc.* London, lxvi. (1900) pp. 140–164, also *The Grammar of Science*[2], London, 1900, p. 486; J. Arthur Thomson, *Heredity*, London, 1908, see ch. v.

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'ATE.—A Semitic deity first mentioned in Assyrian proper names such as *Ata-idri*, *Ata-suri*, *Ate-iana* (cf. *KAT*[3] 435), then in Palmyrene inscriptions under the forms עתא, עת, Ἄθη, Ἄθης, Ἄθας, and in Gr. and Syr. writers. This divinity was associated with the old Semitic mother-goddess 'Attar-Ishtar-'Ashtart in the compound name עתרעתה 'Attar-'Ate, Atar-gatis (see ATARGATIS). The characteristics and even the sex are uncertain. It is possible that the Lydian god Attis is only another form of the name, in which case his myths may be used to supplement the meagre information in regard to 'Ate (see ATTIS).

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ATHANASIAN CREED.—See CREEDS.

ATHANASIUS.—1. Life.—There is no trustworthy record of the early years of Athanasius, but his writings show that his education was Greek (Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*[2], Camb. 1900, pp. 67–70). He is acquainted with Greek literature (Homer, Demosthenes, and Plato) and with the later Greek philosophy. In knowledge of the Greek Bible he is second to none of the Fathers.

He first passes into the light of history at the Council of Nicæa in A.D. 325, at which the Arian party was opposed by 'Athanasius, a deacon of the church of the Alexandrians, who was highly esteemed by Alexander the bishop' (Socrates, i. 8). The rest of the life of Athanasius coincides in the main with the history of the Arian controversy, in which he was the protagonist on the Catholic side. In A.D. 328 he succeeded Alexander as bishop (Cureton, *Festal Letters*, p. xxxvii f.), though it was asserted that he was 'too young' at the time* (p. xliv). It was further asserted that his election was secret (*Apologia*, § 6).

* Gwatkin (*Ar.* 67 [71], note) and Robertson (*Selected Works of Athan.* p. xiv, note) say that the assertion that A. was 'under age' (*nc*) at his consecration must have had some semblance of truth, and they draw the conclusion that he was about 30 in A.D. 328; but the argument is precarious. There is not sufficient evidence to show that a canon was accepted at this time at Alexandria prescribing 30 as the age qualification for the episcopate. The *Didascalia*, both Syriac (Lagarde, p. 10) and Ethiopic (Platt, p. 16), lay down the general rule that a bishop must not be less than 50 years of age, and the Apostolic Constitutions (Funk, p. 31) uphold the same limit. Canon xi. of the Council of Neocæsarea (A.D. 314 or later) prescribes 30 as the age for a presbyter, but does not touch the case of a bishop.

The objection to Athanasius on the score of his youth is instructive. He was, indeed, representative of the new age which began with the conversion of the Emperor Constantine. Eusebius of Cæsarea, the older contemporary of Athanasius, stood for the bygone order. He had been a confessor during the terrible Palestinian persecution, and so he feared heathenism chiefly as a persecuting power, and was lulled into security when Constantine adopted Christianity. But a new and more subtle danger was arising. Crowds of heathen followed the Emperor with a facile profession of his religion on their lips, and a traditional attachment to heathenism in their hearts. When, therefore, Arius represented the Son of God as a (heathen) demi-god, his teaching secured ready listeners. To the young Athanasius, the man of the new age, fell the task of detecting the working of the heathen leaven, and of meeting it with Christian medicine.

Athanasius succeeded Alexander in a troubled heritage. Not only were the (new) Arians to be reckoned with, but also the (old) Meletians. In 306, during the Galerian persecution, Meletius, bishop of Lycopolis, separated from Peter of Alexandria on the ground that Peter's treatment of the lapsed was too mild (E. Schwartz, in *GGN*, 1905, p. 164 ff.). The schism continued throughout the episcopate of Alexander. The Council of Nicæa endeavoured to heal the breach, but the election of Athanasius seems to have widened it; indeed, Gwatkin (*Ar.* 66, note) thinks it probable that the Meletians elected a candidate of their own, one Theonas.

Athanasius' career as bishop falls into three periods: (*a*) 328–345, the double contest, personal with the Meletians, doctrinal with the Arians; (*b*) 346–356, the steady growth of his influence over Egypt, and the decline of Arian power in that country; (*c*) 357–373, the contest with those who denied the Divinity of the Spirit, and the reconciliation of the old Conservatives of the East to Nicene orthodoxy.

(*a*) *First period* (A.D. 328–345). — During the first period the battle waged by Athanasius against Arianism was confused with personal issues. The Meletians worked for his deposition, because he was a strong man and not their own candidate; the Arians aided them, because he was known as an opponent of Arianism. His enemies declared his rule to be oppressive, and accused him of violence, and even of murder. At the Council of Tyre in 335, in which several Arian sympathizers took part, Athanasius was deposed. He appealed to Constantine, but the Emperor compromised the dispute by sending him into honourable banishment to distant Trèves. He returned at the accession of Constantius for a troubled period of sixteen months, but was expelled in Lent, 339, by the prefect Philagrius, his enemies asserting that the sentence pronounced at Tyre was still binding. Gregory, a Cappadocian and (according to *Epist. Encycl.* 4, 6) an Arian, became bishop. Athanasius fled to Julius, bishop of Rome, and after some negotiations was re-tried in 343 by a Council held at Sardica (Sofia, in Bulgaria), and was acquitted of the charges on which he had been condemned at Tyre. The Eastern bishops, however, seceded from the Council, and refused to receive Athanasius. The doctrinal question lay behind the personal. The result of the Council showed that the West was Nicene, while the East outside Egypt was in the main (though not Arian) certainly anti-Nicene. In 345 Gregory died, and Constantius conciliated Alexandria by allowing Athanasius to return to his see.

All through his period of exile Athanasius showed himself a true pastor to Egypt and Alexandria. His 'Festal Letters' (announcing the date of Easter each year and warning his flock to prepare for it) are preserved for many eventful years. They show the pastoral side of the bishop and the depth of his religious feeling. On the occasion of his expulsion by Philagrius, he wrote his *Epistula Encyclica*, a narrative of the acts of outrage with which the intrusion of Gregory was accompanied. The four *Orationes c. Arianos* were probably composed about the same time (so Loofs, in *PRE*[3]).

(*b*) *Second period* (346–356).—In the autumn of 346, Athanasius returned to Alexandria. The great welcome he then received and the ten prosperous years which followed are sufficient proof that the bishop had won the hearts of his people. During this decade he may be said to have completed his work of bringing Egypt round to the doctrine of the ὁμοούσιον. Indeed, his position became so strong that it excited the envy and alarm of the suspicious Constantius. For a while the political condition of the West stayed the Emperor's hand, but when Constantius became master of the whole Empire in 353, he marked out Athanasius for overthrow. The well-known affection of the Alexandrians for their bishop protected him for a year or two, but he was driven from his seat in 356. Syrianus, 'dux Ægypti,' with 5000 men broke into the church of Theonas in which Athanasius and his people were keeping vigil, and Athanasius was forced to flee for his life. For years he flitted from hiding-place to hiding-place in different parts of Egypt, encouraging his flock by letters and by secret visits. George, an Arian of Cappadocia, took the see of Alexandria, and ruled without gaining affection or success.

(*c*) *Third period* (357–373).—The ejection of Athanasius, however, greatly encouraged the various anti-Nicene parties of the East. It was followed in 357 by the issue of a manifesto by a few bishops gathered at Sirmium (Mitrovicz in Slavonia on the Save), which condemned the Nicene ὁμοούσιον and the 'Semi-Arian' ὁμοιούσιον, and stated without disguise the Arian doctrine of the Person of the Son. But this act roused the conservatives of the East, and compelled them to approach the theological position of Athanasius. While still hesitating to accept the word ὁμοούσιον, they began to adopt the language and arguments of the Nicenes. At the Council of Seleucia in 359 the majority signed the Lucianic Creed, a conservative confession, and deposed Eudoxius of Antioch, George of Alexandria, and some other leading Arians. Athanasius in exile heard the news. In his *de Synodis* he approaches the conservatives with a friendly appeal to them not to stumble at the *word* ὁμοούσιον, since (he says) they accepted the *doctrine* which it represents. This act was the beginning of a policy of conciliation which bore good fruit a few years later.

For the moment it failed. A new party, the Homœan, gained the Emperor's ear and the predominant voice in the Church. The Homœans, by their confession that the Son is *like* (ὅμοιος) the Father, stood opposed to the extreme Arianism which denied this likeness, but otherwise they represented colourless doctrine and a policy of toleration for all, including the Nicenes. (The Homœan supremacy, with the brief interruption of the reign of the pagan Julian [A.D. 361–363] and of Jovian [A.D. 363–364], lasted until the accession of Theodosius in A.D. 379.)

In 362 Athanasius returned from hiding and held a Council at Alexandria. The work of conciliation was continued. Arian clergy who came over to the Nicene side were allowed to retain their rank on accepting the Nicene Creed and anathematizing those who spoke of the Holy Spirit as a creature (κτίσμα, *ad Antioch.* 3). To the doctrine of the

Holy Spirit Athanasius had already devoted an important work, the Epistles *ad Serapionem* (356–361, Loofs). The subject remained with him to the end of his life, but he was unwilling to see any addition made to the bare clause as it stood in the Nicene Creed—καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον (*ad Afros*, 10, 11).

Athanasius retained his position (with one short interval) under the Homœan emperor Valens. It was during this last period of his life (364–373) that he was able to see the promise of the coming decisive victory of the Nicene Creed. In Cappadocia, the province which had produced many of the Arian leaders, there now grew up under the leadership of Basil of Cæsarea a party devoted to Nicæa. Basil's early connexions had been with the conservatives, but Athanasius accepted his overtures, and gave the support of his name to Basil's schemes for reconciling the conservatives with the Nicenes. Acacius, the Homœan of Cæsarea in Palestine, and Meletius the conservative of Antioch, and others like them, became willing at last to accept the Nicene Creed. Egypt and the West were already Nicene, and the work of Basil, blessed by Athanasius, made Orthodoxy victorious. In 373, eight years before the Council of Constantinople registered the victory, Athanasius, Confessor and Reconciler, departed this life.

2. **Theology.** — *Introduction.* — (1) Athanasius, though an Alexandrian, was not a speculative theologian, but (as his Festal Letters show*) a great Christian pastor. Bishop of Alexandria in name, he was, in fact, the effective spiritual father of the numerous Christian congregations of Upper and Lower Egypt and of Libya. The ascetic spirit of Egypt, in which he shared, deepened his religious life without impairing his vigour as a Christian ruler. Arianism was to his pastoral mind not heterodoxy, but impiety and soul-destroying (ἀσέβεια, ἀνθρωποκτόνος). Redemption was the centre of his teaching.

(2) As far as Athanasius' theology was systematic, it was a systematizing of Scripture. His knowledge of the text was wide; he compares Scripture with Scripture, and appeals to the sense rather than to the words. As regards the contents of the Canon, there is no reason to believe that his opinions ever changed in any important particular, but his list of the Canonical books belongs to the last years of his life (Festal Letter 39, written for Easter, 367). In the NT his list coincides with our own; in the OT Esther is reckoned with the 'other' (ἕτερα) books, and is placed between Sirach and Judith.

(3) In forming an idea of Athanasius' teaching, we have to use his works, even those given by the Benedictines as genuine (*PG* xxv., xxvi.), with discrimination. The *Exposit to Fidei*, *Oratio in. c. Arianos*, *Vita Antonii*, and *Sermo Maior de Fide*, though probably genuine, are not free from difficulty. Some phrases may be non-Athanasian. *Historia Arianorum ad Monachos* was written, perhaps with the help of Athanasius, but not by his hand. The *de Incarnatione et c. Arianos* is probably of mixed authorship. The two *Libri cont. Apollinarium* are doubtful according to Loofs and Bardenhewer, non-Athanasian according to Stulcken and others. The genuineness of *de Virginitate* (*PG* xxviii. 251–282) has recently been defended by von der Goltz, but the phrase Πατὴρ καὶ Υἱὸς καὶ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις is in any case not likely to have come from Athanasius.

Discussions of the genuineness of Athanasius' works are found in Loofs' 'Athanasius,' in *PRE*³; in Stulcken's 'Athanasiana,' in *TU*, new ser. iv. 4, and in O. Bardenhewer's *Patrology*, p. 253 ff., Eng. tr., 1908, see also von der Goltz, 'de Virginitate,' in *TU*, new ser. xiv 2*a*.

* See also the Letters *ad Dracontium* and *ad Amunem monachum* included among the 'ascetical works.'

i. *REDEMPTION.* — An account of Athanasius' theology begins naturally with his presentation of the doctrine of Redemption. Athanasius speaks of the death of a Divine Christ as 'the sum of our faith' (κεφάλαιον τῆς πίστεως, *Incarn.* 19; see, too, *Orat.* i. 34, where the same term is applied to the doctrine of the threefold name into which Christians are baptized).

'After showing the proofs of His Godhead from His works, He next offered up His sacrifice also on behalf of all, yielding His Temple (Jn 2²¹) to death in the stead of all, in order, firstly, to make men quit and free of their old trespass, and, further, to show Himself more powerful even than death, displaying His own body incorruptible, as firstfruits of the resurrection of all' (*Incarn.* 20).

In all references to Redemption, Athanasius gives an important place to the thought that Christ delivered mankind from physical extinction.

Adam and Eve were 'by nature corruptible, but destined by the grace which followed from partaking of the Word to have escaped their natural state, had they remained good' (*Incarn.* 5). They fell, however, and so corruption remained with them; the rational man made in God's image was disappearing (ἠφανίζετο, *Incarn.* 6) by a gradual course of deterioration. So the Word by whom man was made came into the world by the Incarnation in order to re-make man, that God's purpose in creation might not be disappointed. The mere coming of the Word in a human body availed in one aspect to save man. Human nature could not finally perish, seeing that the Word united Himself with it.

But a further work remained for the incarnate Word. Death, owing to God's sentence against Adam, had acquired a certain authority; this authority, however, was exhausted by the Passion of Christ (πληρωθείσης τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐν τῷ κυριακῷ σώματι, *Incarn.* 8). This annulling of Death was demonstrated by the Lord's resurrection with an incorruptible body, and those who believe in Christ know that they themselves have become incorruptible through the Resurrection (*Incarn.* 27).

In connexion with this annulling of the authority of death, the death of Christ is spoken of by Athanasius as a sacrifice or offering (θυσία, προσφορά, *Incarn.* 10); yet whether to God or to the Divine justice he does not say.

'By offering *unto death* (εἰς θάνατον) the body He Himself had taken, as an offering and sacrifice free from any stain, straightway He put away death from all His peers by the offering of an equivalent' (τὸν καταλλήλου, *Incarn.* 9).

In another passage Athanasius uses the forensic analogy, yet without definitely saying that Christ's death was a satisfaction of Divine justice by a substitution. His statement follows Scripture closely:

'Formerly the world as guilty was under judgment from the Law, but now the Word has taken on Himself the condemnation (τὸ κρίμα), and, having suffered in the body for all, has bestowed salvation upon all' (*Orat.* i. 60).

But these statements are general; so far (says Robertson, p. lxx) as Athanasius works out the doctrine of redemption in detail, it is

'under physical categories without doing full justice to the ideas of guilt and reconciliation, of the reunion of *will* between man and God.'

On the other hand, Athanasius loves to dwell on the spiritual illumination of mankind wrought through the Incarnation, and the restoration thereby to man of the lost Divine likeness (*Incarn.* 14, 15).

If Athanasius does not attain to the Scriptural fullness of the doctrine of Redemption, yet his own teaching as to the Incarnation and the Passion is Scriptural in its grandeur. He seeks to express what he finds in the Scriptures, and often sums up the teaching of many passages in one terse phrase of his own. Regarding the purpose of the Incarnation, his summary is: 'He was made man, that we might be made Divine' (ἵνα θεοποιηθῶμεν, *Incarn.* 54; cf. *Orat.* i. 39). Any other attempt to summarize the work of the Incarnate Word is renounced by Athanasius.

'In a word,' he writes, 'the achievements of the Saviour resulting from His becoming man are of such a kind and number that, if one should wish to enumerate them, he may be compared to men who gaze at the expanse of the sea and wish to count its waves' (*Incarn.* 54).

ii. *THE DIVINITY OF THE SON.*—Athanasius is best known for his defence of the Godhead of the Son. His older contemporary Arius challenged the whole Christian world by the answer which he gave to the question, In what sense is Jesus the Son of God? Arius wished to maintain the doctrine of the Divine unity, and at the same time the doctrine of the personality or separate existence of the Son. Lest he should confess two Gods, he treated the title 'Son of God' as honorific only. According to Arius, the Son was not God, or eternal, or omniscient, or immutable, but a creature (κτίσμα), yet unique among the creatures. The Son as Son was later than the Father, therefore not eternal, therefore not God but a creature. This bald logic involved Arius in a great contradiction. Beginning by basing his argument on the title 'Son of God,' he ended by emptying the title of all meaning. The Son was not a Son, but only a favoured creature of God.

The doctrine of Arius is easy to state, for it was only a theory of something conceived of as finite; but this is not the case with that of Athanasius. It is true, indeed, that Athanasius accepted from the first the Nicene Creed and defended it to the last. Negatively, in agreement with its anathematisms, he contradicted the favourite Arian formulæ, ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν—ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο—ἐξ ἑτέρας οὐσίας, etc. Positively, in loyalty to the terms of the Creed, he taught that the Son was born ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός, and that He is ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρί. But these two last watchwords of orthodoxy were not the invention of Athanasius; nor were they, in their orthodox sense, of Eastern origin. Neither Athanasius nor any other Eastern received them without allowing his thought to play round them and put them to the test.

When we turn from the acknowledged fact of Athanasius' acceptance of the Nicene Creed to study his own works, we are met by two important facts: (1) Athanasius does not restrict himself to the Nicene watchwords, but (2) on the contrary he uses a great variety of language in order to assert the true Deity of the Son. His language is, in fact, a maze through which we might perhaps make our way more easily, if we could be sure of the dating or at least of the order of his works. But much remains uncertain. The two apologetic works (*c. Gentes; de Incarnatione*) are usually assigned to a date before the outbreak of the Arian controversy; but, as Loofs points out, the same kind of evidence might be urged in favour of a similar dating of some of the Festal Letters. The important *Orationes c. Arianos* are assigned by the Benedictines to *c.* 358 A.D., but Loofs gives good grounds for *c.* 338 A.D. The short *Expositio Fidei* contains no certain indication of date, though it is important to know at what period Athanasius made use of the rather surprising language found in it. If, however, we may accept in general the Benedictine dates in addition to Loofs' early date for the Orations, we may say that in his later works Athanasius seems to hesitate less to use and defend the special term ὁμοούσιον than in the early work. To this extent there seems to have been a development in Athanasius' teaching.

In his early works, however, far from confining himself to the watchword ὁμοούσιον and to the language of the Nicene Creed in general, Athanasius allows himself great freedom, and not seldom seems to avoid ὁμοούσιον. Thus in *Expositio Fidei* (§ 1) he writes: Τὸν αὐτοτελῆ . . . τὴν ἀληθινὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ Πατρὸς ἰσότιμον καὶ ἰσόδοξον ('Very Son . . . true image of the Father, equal in honour and glory'), while later in the section he uses even ὅμοιος τῷ Πατρί ('like to the Father'), the formula adopted by the Homœans in A.D. 359–360 (*de Syn.* 30) for evading the issue. In *Orat.* i. 40, in arguing with his opponents he uses for the moment ὅμοιος κατὰ πάντα, the formula of the fourth Council of Sirmium (*de Syn.* 8), and in iii. 11 he similarly employs ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν, a variant of ὁμοιούσιος. These, no doubt, were intended to be only approximations to Athanasius' full meaning, but it is worthy of note that in i. 58, where he seems to aim at full and explicit statement, he gives not ὁμοούσιος but τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας ἴδιος καὶ ὁμοφυής. In *Orat.* iii. 1 he writes, in almost untranslatable phrase, πλήρωμα θεότητός ἐστιν ὁ Υἱός ('The Son is the completeness of Divinity,' *i.e.* is completely Divine).

Similarly Athanasius seems often to avoid the Nicene [γεννηθέντα] ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός. In the Orations (cf. *de Decr.* 26; *de Syn.* 35) he gives ἴδιον γέννημα τῆς οὐσίας τ. Π. ('proper offspring of the essence of the Father'). For οὐσία, 'essence,' 'substance,' Athanasius sometimes prefers φύσις, 'nature.' Thus he writes τὸν Μονογενῆ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν ἀχώριστον τῇ φύσει (*Omnia tradita*, § 3), and ἡ φύσις μία καὶ ἀδιαίρετος (§ 5). It is clear that Athanasius recognized that the terms οὐσία and ὁμοούσιος raised real difficulties. Οὐσία, 'substantia,' suggested to many thoughts of that which is material, while ὁμοούσιος suggested some previously existing οὐσία in which both Father and Son shared as brethren (cf. *de Syn.* 51). Consequently Athanasius received these two terms only in the sense in which they were used by the Nicene Council, and only for the purpose which the Council had in view. He contended so long not for the un-Scriptural word ὁμοούσιος, but for the official condemnation of Arianism which it registered.

'The Bishops,' he writes, 'were compelled (ἠναγκάσθησαν) to gather once more from Scripture the general sense (τὴν διανοιαν), and to write that the Son is of one substance (ὁμοούσιον) with the Father' (*de Decr.* 20; cf. *de Syn.* 36).

Athanasius' own doctrine is best described as a direct and complete repudiation of the teaching of Arius. He denies *seriatim* all Arius' propositions, holding that the Christ of Arius could not be the Saviour of the world. Athanasius maintained that the Son is Divine, because He is the true Son of God (ὡς ἐκ πηγῆς ζωὴ καὶ φωτὸς ἀπαύγασμα, *de Syn.* 42). But he shrank from attempting to tie this truth to set phrases.

'The more I desired to write,' he says, 'and endeavoured to force myself to understand the Divinity of the Word, so much the more did the knowledge thereof withdraw itself from me; and in proportion as I thought I apprehended it, in so much I perceived myself to fail of doing so. Moreover, also I was unable to express in writing even what I seemed myself to understand, and that which I wrote was unequal to the imperfect shadow of the truth which existed in my conception' (*Historia Arianorum. Epistola*, § 1).

Athanasius' argument for the Divinity of the Son may be stated under five heads. (1) He argues from the notion of a Trinity (τριάς) that it is folly to suppose that it is partly created and partly uncreate, in part eternal and in part not eternal (*Orat.* i. 18). (2) He identifies the Son with the Word (Λόγος, *Orat.* i. 28), and urges that the Son must be eternal, because the Father can never have been without His Word or Reason (ἄλογος, *Decr.* 15). (3) He appeals to the Divine works of the Son, namely, Creation (*Orat.* ii. 22) and Redemption (*Incarn.* 20). (4) By a copious use of Scripture, and particularly of the Fourth Gospel and the Epistle to the Hebrews, he shows how great is the difficulty of reconciling the Arian theory of the Person of Christ with the language of Scripture. (5) Similarly, he shows that the Christian consciousness demands a Divine Christ (Χριστιανοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν, ὦ Ἀρειανοί, Χριστιανοὶ ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς, *Orat.* iii. 28).

Defensively Athanasius meets the Arians with a

careful exegesis of the chief passages of Scripture which they quoted in defence of their views. The passages are collected and discussed in *Orat.* i. 37–iii. 58. They may be classified under various heads. Some of them seem to speak of the Son as a creature, *e.g.* Pr 8[22] (ἔκτισέν με, LXX), He 3[1, 2] (τῷ ποιήσαντι αὐτόν); others of His advancement from a lower state, *e.g.* Ph 2[9, 10], Ps 45[7]; others of His entire dependence on the Father, *e.g.* Mt 11[27], Jn 5[30]; others of His progress in knowledge or of His ignorance, *e.g.* Mk 13[32], Lk 2[52]; others of His prayers, *e.g.* Mt 27[46]. Others again seem to draw a line of separation between Him and the Father, *e.g.* Jn 17[3]. On the whole, it must be said that Athanasius shows a great grasp of Scripture, and that his interpretations are sounder than those of his opponents. Most of the passages cited above he understands of the human nature of Christ, telling the Arians that their objections are really objections to the Incarnation itself. The passages which refer to advancement he explains less convincingly as referring to the exaltation of human nature through union with the Word by the Incarnation.

iii. *CHRIST'S HUMAN NATURE.*—THE UNION OF THE TWO NATURES IN CHRIST.—Though Athanasius' language is not that of the Chalcedonian definition or of the *Quicumque vult*, he maintains in fact the true manhood and the true Godhead together with the true union of the two Natures in Christ. The apparently Nestorian language of such a passage as *Expositio Fidei*, § 1 (τὸν ἡμέτερον ἀνείληφεν ἄνθρωπον Χ. Ἰ. . . . ἐν ᾧ ἀνθρώπῳ σταυρωθεὶς . . . ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν), has to be judged in connexion with other statements of a different form.

'He became man; he did not merely enter into a man' (*Orat.* iii. 30). 'It behoved the Lord in putting on man's flesh to put it on in its completeness with its own passions' (μετα τῶν ἰδιων παθῶν αὐτῆς ὅλην, *Orat* iii 32). 'They [truly] confessed that the Saviour had not a body without a soul, nor without sense or intelligence; . . . nor was the Salvation effected in (through) the Word Himself a salvation of body only, but of soul also' (*Antioch.* 7). 'If the works of the Word's Godhead had not taken place through the body, man had not been deified, and again, if the things proper to the flesh had not been predicated of the Word, man would not have been completely delivered from them' (*Orat.* iii. 33, cf. 32)

iv. *DIVINITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.*—The Fathers of Nicæa contented themselves in their Creed with the brief clause, 'and in the Holy Ghost'; they added nothing regarding His Person or work. For thirty years after the Council met, Athanasius kept himself within the limits thus laid down. Though he was engaged in contending for the full Divinity of the Son, though in this contest he often uses the Trinitarian baptismal formula and the word 'Trinity' (τριάς), he does not attempt to complete formally his doctrine of the Trinity by extending or adapting to the Spirit the Nicene definitions which asserted the Divinity of the Son. Perhaps he realized that, when the doctrine of the Godhead of the Son was accepted, the acceptance of the Godhead of the Spirit must follow as a consequence.

In the Epistles *ad Serapionem*, written some time after A.D. 356, Athanasius begins to speak fully of the Divinity of the Holy Spirit. He learned that certain of the Arians were teaching that the Holy Ghost was a creature, one of the ministering spirits, superior to the angels only *in degree* (βαθμῷ, *Ser.* i. 1). It appears also that there were others who disagreed with the Arians as to the Deity of the Son, but were content to regard the Holy Spirit as a creature. To these last Athanasius utters the challenge: 'Is God a Trinity or a Duality?' (τριάς ἐστιν ἢ δυάς, *Ser.* i. 29).

Athanasius unfolds his doctrine of the Holy Spirit in his Epistles to Serapion, much as he develops his teaching on the Son in the Orations. (1) He maintains that the Trinity must be a real (eternal) Trinity, in which no creature is included (*Ser.* i. 9, 17, 20, 28; iii. 7). (2) He asserts that the work ascribed to the Spirit implies His Godhead. Thus he asks: 'Who shall unite (συνάψει) you to God, if ye have not the Spirit of God Himself, but the spirit of the creature?' (τῆς κτίσεως, i. 29; cf. i. 6). He carefully discusses passages which appear to speak of the Spirit as a creature (κτίσμα), and rejects the Arian interpretation of them (i. 3, 4, 10), pointing out that πνεῦμα anarthrous does not mean the Holy Spirit (i. 4, 9, in reference to Am 4[13] κτίζων πνεῦμα). He appeals to 2 Co 13[14], and expounds Eph 4[6] of the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit (i. 28). If his opponents point to passages (*e.g.* 1 Ti 5[21]) in which only two Persons of the Trinity are mentioned, he answers that the Trinity is indivisible (ἀδιαίρετος) and united within itself, so that, when one Person is mentioned, the other Persons are understood (i. 14). He accepts fully the doctrine of περιχώρησις, 'circumincessio,' based on Jn 14[10] 'I in the Father and the Father in me.'

'Therefore also,' he writes, 'when the Father gives grace and peace, the Son also gives it, as Paul signifies in every Epistle, writing, Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ' (*Orat.* iii. 11).

Athanasius avoids applying directly to the Holy Spirit the contested word ὁμοούσιον, except in a very few places (*e.g. Ser.* i. 27).

He writes: 'It is sufficient to know that the Spirit is not a creature' (i. 17). He describes the Spirit as 'united to the deity of the Father' (ἡνωμένον τῇ θεότητι τοῦ Πατρός, i. 12), and as immutable and unchangeable (ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, *Ser.* i. 26). Usually, however, he asserts the Deity of the Spirit *through His relation to the Son.*

'If the Son . . . because He is own offspring of the Father's essence is not a creature, but ὁμοούσιος τοῦ Πατρός, so neither would the Holy Spirit be a creature, because He is proper to the Son' (διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν ἰδιότητα, iii. 1; cf. i. 33).

v. *PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.*—Athanasius can hardly be said to have a doctrine of Procession. He approaches it in *Ser.* i. 15, where he represents his opponents as saying: 'If the Spirit is not a creature (*i.e.* as we hold), but proceedeth from (ἐκ) the Father (*i.e.* as ye hold).' Cf. i. 33, 'Who deny that the Spirit (αὐτό) is from (ἐκ) the Father in the Son.' But if this seems to attribute to Athanasius the doctrine of Procession from the Father alone, Athanasius himself (*Ser.* iv. 4) describes the Spirit as ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ Λόγου οὐσίας, 'proper to the essence of the Word,' so that the two passages taken together supply evidence that Athanasius approximated to the Western doctrine of Procession from the Father and the Son. The same might be said of *de Incarn. et c. Arianos*, 9: 'David (a reference to Ps 36[9]) knew that the Son, being with the Father (παρὰ τῷ Πατρὶ ὄντα), is the source (τὴν πηγήν) of the Holy Spirit,' but the genuineness of the passage is highly doubtful (Stulcken, p. 63 f.).

On this mysterious subject Athanasius does not forsake his custom of keeping as closely as possible to the language of Scripture. 'The Son is the Son of God,' he says, 'and the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit, and not the offspring (ἔκγονον) of the Father' (*Ser.* iv. 4). He doubtless prefers to speak of the Procession in Time: 'The Spirit who proceedeth from (παρά, Jn 15[26]) the Father, and, being proper to the Son, is given by Him to the disciples and to all that believe on Him' (*Ser.* i. 2).

vi. *THE TRINITY.*—Athanasius is clear and express in his teaching that the Trinity is one in nature and cannot be divided (*Orat.* iii. 15; *Ser.* i. 2), but he is less precise in his doctrine regarding the nature of the (personal) distinctions within the Godhead. He writes with severe restraint, keeping himself as far as possible to the words of the

Baptismal formula (Mt 28^{19}) and the Pauline benediction (2 Co 13^{14}). Indeed, 'Person' is not one of Athanasius' theological terms; the phrase *εἷς θεὸς ἐν τρισὶν ὑποστάσεσι* (*de Incarn. et c. Arianos*, 10), 'one God in three Persons' (or 'Subsistences'), belongs to a passage of highly doubtful authenticity. In *de Syn.* 36 he reckons the phrase *τρεῖς εἰσιν ὑποστάσεις* among the un-Scriptural phrases used by his opponents. It is true, indeed, that once (*Omnia tradita*, § 6) he uses the term much as Westerns use it:

'For the fact of those venerable living creatures (Is 6) offering their praises three times, saying, "Holy, Holy, Holy," proves that *the Three Subsistences* (*τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*, if the text be sound) are perfect, just as in saying, "Lord," they declare the One Essence (*τὴν μίαν οὐσίαν*).'

In the *Expositio Fidei*, however, he points out the danger which lurks in the term:

'Neither can we imagine three subsistences (Persons) separated (*μεμερισμένας*) from each other, as results in the case of men from their bodily nature, lest we hold a plurality of gods like the heathen' (§ 2).

Accordingly Athanasius never makes *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις* a test of orthodoxy, and in his later years he tells the Antiochenes (*Antioch.* 5, 6) that he received those who professed belief in *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις* (meaning three 'Persons') on condition that they in their turn received those who confessed *μία ὑπόστασις* (meaning one 'Substance'). Indeed *ὑπόστασις*, a synonym of *οὐσία* in the Nicene anathematism, could never become fixed for Athanasius himself to the meaning 'Person,' though he might tolerate the innovation in others. Sometimes Athanasius writes simply *ἄλλος ὁ Πατήρ, ἄλλος ὁ Υἱός* (cf. *Orat.* iii. 4), and similarly, 'The Father is Father, and the Son Son' (*Orat.* iv. 2).

Conclusion.—Looking at the teaching of Athanasius as a whole, we see that it was shaped with a practical aim, and that it was expressed as little as possible in set theological terms. The profound mind of Athanasius realized that Christian truths strain to the breaking point the formulas in which men strive to express them. He invented no theological terms himself, and if in his later writings (from *de Decretis* onward) he strenuously defended the *ὁμοούσιον* of the Nicene Council, this defence was justified by an experience of many years that this word, and this word only, was a 'bulwark' (*ἐπιτείχισμα*) against Arian error (*de Syn.* 45).

LITERATURE.—i. *ANCIENT.*—The works of Athanasius printed in Migne, *PG* xxv.-xxviii. (with these works are associated a number of contemporary documents of great value). To these must be added the *Festal Letters* (almost wholly lost in Greek, but edited in Syriac with an Introduction by **W. Cureton**, Lond. 1848). Though several doubtful or spurious works are included in Migne, yet enough remains which is certainly genuine to yield a full account both of his life and of his teaching. Athanasius' writings ('Pamphleten,' as E. Schwartz calls them) illustrate in a living way both the vicissitudes of his own life and the varying fortunes of the Arian controversy. (The later writers, Rufinus, Socrates, Sozomen, and others tell us little in addition that is trustworthy, and, moreover, misrepresent much which is given in Athanasius' own writings.)

Information with regard to the MSS of the works of Athanasius is to be found in *JThSt* iii. 97-110, 245-258, two articles by **F. Wallis**, supplemented by notes by **A. Robertson**, and **C. H Turner**; also in *JThSt* v. 108-114, notes by **Kirsopp Lake**; *JThSt* vii. 600-603, note by **C. H Turner**, calling attention to **G. Bertolotto's** art. in the *Atti della Societa Ligure di storia patria*, 1892, pp. 1-63. Bp. Wallis's work has been used and supplemented in the valuable account of MSS given by **E. von der Goltz** in his ed. of [Athanasii] *de Virginitate*, Leipzig, 1905 (=*TU*, new ser. xiv. 2*a*).

ii. *MODERN.*—Modern authorities have thrown much additional light on Arianism and on Athanasius. Full bibliographies are given in **Gwatkin**, *Arianism*, 1882 and 1900, and in **Bardenhewer** (see below). Gwatkin's book is itself almost a life of Athanasius. **A. Robertson**, *Selected Works of A. translated into English* (Oxford and N.Y. 1892), gives an important Introduction on the Life and Teaching of Athanasius. **W. Bright**, 'Athanasius,' in Smith-Wace's *DCB*, and **Loofs**, 'Athanasius,' in *PRE*^{3}, are both valuable. **E. Schwartz**, 'Zur Geschichte A.'s,' in *GGN*, 1904, 1905 (and 1908), throws light on some obscure points. **O. Bardenhewer**, *Patrology* (Eng. ed. by Shahan), Freiburg i. Breisg. 1908 (pp. 253-264), and **A. Stulcken**, 'Athanasiana,' *TU*, new ser. iv. 4 (on the genuineness of some disputed works), are both of value. Cf. **J. F. Bethune-Baker**, 'The Meaning of homoousios' (1901), in Cambridge *TS* vii. 1. Of general histories of doctrine it is sufficient to mention **Harnack**, *Hist. of Dogma* (Eng. tr. 1896-98), especially iii. 272 ff., 290 ff., iv. 1-163. Among general Historians of the Church, **L. Duchesne**, *Histoire ancienne de l'église*, ii. (1907), tells the story of Athanasius and the Arian struggle with much freshness.

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ATHAPASCANS.—See DÉNÉS and NAVAHOS.

ATHEISM.

Anti-theistic Theories (C. B. UPTON), p. 173.
Buddhist (L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN), p. 183.
Chinese.—See p. 176^a and art. CHINA.
Egyptian (F. LL. GRIFFITH), p. 184.
Greek and Roman (A. C. PEARSON), p. 184.
Indian, Ancient (R. GARBE), p. 185.
Indian, Modern (G. A. GRIERSON), p. 186.
Jain (H. JACOBI), p. 186.
Jewish (S. DAICHES), p. 187.
Muhammadan (D. S. MARGOLIOUTH), p. 188.

ATHEISM AND ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES.—*Introduction.*—Atheism is sometimes said to be equivalent to **pancosmism**, *i.e.* the doctrine that the universe consists of nothing but those physical and psychical existences which are perceptible by the senses or are cognizable by the imagination and finite understanding. Pancosmism, however, is a positive doctrine, while atheism, both by etymology and by usage, is essentially a negative conception, and exists only as an expression of dissent from positive theistic beliefs. **Theism** is the belief that all the entities in the cosmos, which are known to us through our senses, or are inferred by our imagination and reason, are dependent for their origination and for their continuance in existence upon the creative and causal action of an Infinite and Eternal Self-consciousness and Will; and in its higher stages it implies that this Self-existent Being progressively reveals His essence and His character in the ideas and ideals of His rational creatures, and thus stands in personal relationship with them. In its earlier stages theism conceives of God simply as the Cause and Ground of all finite and dependent existences; but as it develops, it realizes the idea of God as immanent and self-manifesting as well as creative and transcendent. Until it attains to this consciousness of felt personal communion with the immanent Cause and Ground of the universe, it is more appropriately described as **deism.**

As was said above, atheism presupposes the existence of theism. It can hardly be said to arise until the human mind has formed the conception of a Unitary Self-existing Cause on whom all things and persons depend, and to whom the sentiments of reverence and worship are directed. Anthropology shows that long before the idea of One Infinite Supreme Being is reached, uncivilized races, through the experience of dreams and supposed ghosts, as well as through the intuitive judgment that the energies in nature which resist human volitions are the manifestation of wills resembling their own, come to believe in the existence of superhuman beings who act for or against human welfare, and are thus the objects of worship or of fear. But along with this conception of a variety of finite superhuman personalities there dawns on the more advanced minds of savage peoples, through the intuitive idea of infinity, the felt Divine authority of conscience, and the gradual

intellectual perception of a pervading unity behind all the changing phenomena of nature, the conception of One Supreme Spiritual Reality who is the omnipresent Cause that originates and controls all the forces of nature, and in varying degrees manifests Himself within the human soul.

It is not till this theistic idea is to some extent present that real atheistic negation becomes possible. If a Hindu or a Greek came to disbelieve in one or all of the deities of his national pantheon, he would not necessarily be an atheist; for it often happened that this scepticism, which the vulgar called atheism, arose simply from a more or less clear apprehension of the One Supreme object of worship. Max Müller well says in his Gifford Lectures on *Natural Religion* (p. 228):

'We must remember that to doubt or deny the existence of Indra or of Juppiter is not Atheism, but should be distinguished by a separate name, namely, Adevism. The early Christians were called ἄθεοι, because they did not believe as the Greeks believed nor as the Jews believed. Spinoza was called an atheist, because his concept of God was wider than that of Jehovah; and the Reformers were called atheists, because they would not deify the mother of Christ or worship the Saints. This is not Atheism in the true sense of the word; and if an historical study of religion had taught us that one lesson only, that those who do not believe in our God are not therefore to be called Atheists, it would have done some real good, and extinguished the fires of many an *auto da fé*.'

Atheism, as we have seen, is not, like theism and pantheism, a positive belief the phases of which can be depicted in their relation to one unifying conception. It has no organic character. The history of it is little more than a collection of the instances in which doubt and negation in regard to some essential element in theism have arisen. And the occasion and cause of this atheistic frame of mind will generally be found in some new scientific or philosophical ideas, which have, for the time being at least, appeared to be incompatible with the current form of deistic or theistic belief.

The following lines of scientific and philosophical speculation have been especially influential in calling forth atheistic protests against theistic belief. First, *materialism*, or the theory that matter and physical forces constitute the ultimate reality of the universe, and that, through the aggregation of the elements of matter in various organic forms, life and the infinitely varied forms of consciousness have originated. Another line of speculation which has largely concurred with materialism in undermining religious belief is the doctrine of *sensationalism*, which originated early among Greek thinkers, and which the genius of our philosopher, John Locke, presented in so plausible a form that both in this country and in France it led to much atheistic negation. Locke himself was a devout theist; for though, according to his basal theory, all our ideas are derived from sensations or from reflexion on sensations, he still held that the human mind is compelled to postulate an adequate creative cause for all material and psychical existences. Had Locke, however, carried out his sensationalism to its logical results, it would have led him, as it led many sensationalists in France, to an atheistic conclusion. If all our ideas arose out of sensations, we could have no conception either of an infinite God, or of ultimate causation, or of that absolute moral imperative which has been to Kant and to several other thinkers the main foundation of theism. A third source of atheistic doubt, and one which has been strongly operative since Evolution became recognized as the method of nature, is *distrust of the argument from design*—an argument which, ever since the time of Anaxagoras, has been one of the chief supports of theism. This argument appears, however, to be recovering its former power even in the scientific world, for Huxley and other scientists have admitted that, when account is taken of the process of evolution as a whole, 'it is necessary to remember that there is a wider Teleology which is not touched by the doctrine of Evolution, but is actually based upon the fundamental proposition of Evolution' (Huxley, *Critiques and Addresses*, 1873, p. 305). See art. DESIGN.

Among the intellectual causes which have led, not indeed to atheism but to extreme agnosticism, is the doctrine of *the relativity of knowledge*, which, when carried to such length as it has been by the Greek sceptic Carneades, and by recent thinkers such as Mansel and H. Spencer, precludes all insight into the essential nature and character of the ultimate cause and ground of the universe. This complete agnosticism has been ably criticized by Calderwood in *The Philosophy of the Infinite*, and by Martineau in several of his philosophical Essays and Reviews.

1. Criticism of atheistic materialism.—Of the alleged reasons for rejecting theism, materialism has been, and still is, the most influential. It is the basis of much of the earliest atheism, and also of the recent atheism which appears in the writings of H. G. Atkinson, Bradlaugh, Büchner, and Haeckel. For this reason it seems desirable, before presenting a brief sketch of the chief historical instances of atheism, to state what appear to be the most potent answers given by theists to the arguments for materialistic atheism.

Idealists, as their name implies, make short work with materialism; for their basal assumption is that matter and force have no existence apart from the sensations and ideas in self-conscious minds. Most theistic writers, however, hold that the experience of resistance to our volitional efforts justifies the conviction that entities exerting energy exist independently of perceiving minds. But while the theist maintains that these entities depend for their origination, their continuance in existence, and their special properties on the creative activity of an Infinite and Eternal Self-consciousness and Will, the atheist contends that matter is itself the ultimate and self-existent reality, that in virtue of its modes of motion and the properties which intrinsically belong to it, it can, when its elements are aggregated in certain ways, manifest life and, in the case of the highest organisms, all the forms of personal consciousness and volition.

Perhaps the most conclusive reply to the atheism which asserts that out of uncreated matter and energy all that we know of life and consciousness has been evolved, is based on an appeal to the recognized philosophical principle that no effect can contain more than is contained in the ground and cause from which the effect has proceeded. The American writer Dr. M. J. Savage thus expresses himself on this point:

'If you can prove to me that "dead" matter, the matter we find in a brick or a piece of marble, under some mysterious transformation comes to have the power to live, to think, to feel, to love, to hope, to sacrifice itself for another, to aspire, to look onward towards an immortal life—if you can prove to me that matter can do that, you have simply changed your definition of matter, and made it coincide with what I call spirit' (*Belief in God*, Lond. 1881, p. 40).

Haeckel would probably reply to this by saying that in his view the elements of the ultimate and self-existent 'Substance,' out of which the universe arises, have their psychical as well as their physical side or aspect, and that it is owing to the former aspect that organic compounds of matter become capable of feeling, thinking, and volition. Does he, then, mean that all the higher attributes of mind are already implicit in the ultimate eternal 'Substance,' out of which, by condensation or otherwise, that which we call matter, energy, and life proceeds? Is the perfection of all human ideals already present, though invisible to the scientific gaze, in 'the Infinite and Eternal Energy,' which is H. Spencer's mode of describing Haeckel's ultimate 'Substance'? If so, the self-existent 'Substance' is nothing less than the theist's Eternal

God; and the molecular corpuscles are simply variously limited modes which the will of God imposes upon a portion of His own eternal life, or, as Lotze and Martineau would say, are differentiations or individuations of His own essential being, to which He delegates some measure of individuality or selfhood. In each of them the Ground and Cause of all created things and persons is immanent and active, and through His creative presence there is no limit to the possibilities of the development of the creatures whom He calls into existence. If it were true, as Tyndall said, that 'in matter are the promise and potency of all terrestrial life,' that could be the case only in the sense that in the ground and cause of each molecule there are already involved all the energy, all the intellectual, moral, and spiritual powers and ideals, which are gradually evolved in the course of the development of the cosmos. The fallacy in Haeckel's 'Weltanschauung' is that, though he gives to the separate molecular corpuscles out of which the universe proceeds a mental side, a germ of consciousness, there is nothing in his account of these elements of matter and energy which at all explains how it comes about that all these innumerable corpuscles conspire together to produce the present harmonious and intelligible cosmos, or how sentient organisms should at length become cognizant of those authoritative ideals which prompt them to subordinate their own personal aims to the general good, and which enable them in a measure both to see and to act from the point of view of the immanent God. It is for want of this recognition of the constant creative presence of the source of ideals throughout the course of evolution that Haeckel's theory, no less than the theories of coarser materialists, must be condemned as unsatisfactory. It fails to show that the 'Substance,' which he represents as the cause and ground of all things, contains within itself the power to produce the effects which we experience in ourselves, and which we discern in the cosmos.

Some eminent physicists and philosophers, including Sir Oliver Lodge, Professor J. H. Poynting, and Professor James Ward, have recently assailed materialism on the ground that the mechanical and chemical movements which matter exhibits in its inorganic condition appear to be quite different from the action of matter in the case of living organisms.

'Matter,' says Sir Oliver Lodge, 'possesses energy, in the form of persistent motion, and it is propelled by force; but neither matter nor energy possesses a power of automatic guidance and control. Energy has no directing power (this has been elaborated by Croll and others—see, for instance, *Nature*, vol. xlii. p. 434—thirteen years ago, under the heading 'Force and Determination') Inorganic matter is impelled solely by pressure from behind, it is not influenced by the future, nor does it follow a preconceived course nor seek a predetermined end. . . . The essence of mind is design and purpose. There are some who deny that there is any design or purpose in the universe at all; but how can that be maintained when humanity itself possesses these attributes? Is it not more reasonable to say that, just as we are conscious of the power of guidance in ourselves, so guidance and intelligent control may be an element running through the Universe, and may be incorporated even in material things?' (*Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1905, p. 327).

The celebrated astronomer Laplace maintained that a Perfect Calculator,

'who for a given instant should be acquainted with all the forces by which nature is animated and with the several positions of the beings composing it, if, further, his intellect were vast enough to submit these data to analysis, would include in one and the same formula the movements of the largest bodies in the universe and those of the lightest atom. Nothing would be uncertain for him; the future as well as the past would be present to his eyes' (see Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 41).

Professor Poynting pertinently asks whether this 'Perfect Calculator' would find all his predictions verified as his atoms (see ATOMISM) came in contact with living matter, and were themselves concerned with life.

'Suppose the man into whose brain the atoms entered were Laplace's friend and chief, Napoleon. If the calculator took into account every atom in Napoleon's frame, would he be able to calculate all the motions of Napoleon, all his actions on the similar surrounding groups of atoms which we call his generals? Could the calculator foretell the eclipse of Waterloo as surely as the astronomer foretells an eclipse of the sun? Is man, in fact, from the physical point of view a group of atoms, each of which behaves as it would with the same neighbours were it part of a non-living system?' (*HJ*, July 1903, p. 739).

After showing elaborately that there is contrast, rather than correspondence, between physical action and mental action, Professor Poynting concludes as follows, and his testimony to the real freedom of the will is specially interesting and important, as coming from a high authority in physical science:

'I hold that we are more certain of our power of choice and of responsibility than of any other fact, physical or psychical. . . . It appears to me equally certain that there is no correspondence yet made out between the power of choice and any physical action, and there does not seem any likelihood that a correspondence ever will be made out. . . . Holding this view, I am bound to repudiate the physical account of Nature when it claims to be a complete account. I am bound to deny that the Laplacean calculator can be successful when he takes man and the mind of man into his calculations' (*ib.* p. 743 f.).

While Sir Oliver Lodge holds that the mind or will thus controls the atomic movements of the brain, he yet maintains that this power of guiding energy does not involve any creation of energy whatsoever. 'Life,' he says, 'is not a form of energy, but guides energy.' On this secondary question he appears to differ from some contemporary thinkers, who agree with Sir John Herschel that in a volitional act the will does originate *some* force,

'though it may be no greater than is required to move a single material molecule through a space inconceivably minute.' 'It matters not,' continues Sir John, 'that we are ignorant of the mode in which this is performed. It suffices to bring the origination of dynamical power, to however small an extent, within the domain of acknowledged personality' (*Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects*, p. 468).

The difference between Sir Oliver Lodge and Sir John Herschel is of some importance in regard to the philosophy of religion; but it does not in any way affect the force of the argument against materialism. Both authorities agree that mind or will controls and guides the atoms of the brain, and that, therefore, will cannot possibly be a mere attribute or accompaniment of the cerebral structure.

In connexion with the criticism of materialistic atheism, reference has to be made to two lines of argument which have often been employed by theists in the past, but which are now falling, and probably justly, somewhat into disuse. One of these is the appeal to the inability of present science to prove the existence of any case of abiogenesis (*q.v.*), as if it afforded clear evidence of special Divine creation. But it is impossible to show that a natural passage from non-living to living matter has never taken place, or that it would not take place now if the fitting conditions for it could be reproduced. The argument from our ignorance is not conclusive; and probably most thinkers would agree with Sir Oliver Lodge that, 'though we do not know how to generate life without the action of antecedent life at present, that may be a discovery lying ready for us in the future' (art. 'Life,' in *Hibbert Journal*, Oct. 1905, p. 106). But if this discovery should one day be made, it would not at all destroy the force of the argument against materialism; for if under certain circumstances the elements of inorganic matter assume an organic form, and manifest psychical properties, that change can be accounted for only by assuming the presence in nature of a cause which guides the movements of the corpuscles, and is competent to confer on them, or to manifest in connexion with them, the germs of that self-conscious and self-directing principle of life which

no mechanical properties of matter could possibly generate. The creative power and directing influence of immanent intelligence and will are equally necessary to explain the emergence of organism and life out of the mechanism of the inorganic world, whether that emergence took place once only by a special creative act, or always takes place when the antecedent conditions are realized. As Professor Flint well says, 'Were spontaneous generation proved, materialism would remain as far from established as before' (*Anti-theistic Theories*, p. 164).

The other doubtful argument which has often been employed by theistic writers is that the universe must have come into existence at some point of past time. This again appears to be a question in regard to which dogmatism is out of place. Science assumes that matter and energy are indestructible; that the present arrangement of them results from a previous arrangement, and this in turn from one still earlier. Thus science affords no justification for the belief in a temporal origin of all things. When our present solar system is traced back to its earlier condition in a revolving fiery mist, it is not supposed that this discovery brings us at all nearer to the origin of the cosmos. Some theists have maintained, however, that an infinite regress of these secondary or scientific causes is inconceivable, and that we are compelled to assume that at some remote moment the great First Cause by a creative act started this series of entities and phenomena which science endeavours to understand. This alleged inconceivability is not admitted by some eminent theistic thinkers. Regarding the laws of nature as the method of God's creative action, they see no conclusive reason against the supposition that creation is perpetual, and that there never was a time when the universe did not exist as a visible garment and expression of God's eternal life. This appears to be the view of great scientists, such as St. George Mivart and Sir Oliver Lodge, and it is also the view of such theistic philosophers as Lotze and Martineau. It is at the heart of present physical and psychical reality, and not at some imagined beginning of things, that both science and philosophy most effectually find the immanent and living God. The universe, in all its particulars and throughout its entire history, depends for its existence upon the Eternal Cause, the methods of whose activity science gradually discovers, and whose essential character is progressively revealed in the authoritative ideals of truth, beauty, righteousness, and love, which constantly testify to their Divine and self-existent source at the centre of our dependent and created being (cf. Upton, *Bases of Rel. Belief* [Hibbert Lectures, 1894], p. 209 f.; and art. MATERIALISM).

2. Atheism in the East.—It is not till we reach the period of Greek civilization that we meet with atheistic arguments sufficiently explicit to call for detailed description and criticism. In the ancient civilization of China, materialistic atheism appears to have been rife; and in the 3rd cent. B.C. the eminent philosopher Mencius, the disciple of Confucius, speaks of it as a moral danger to the State. The Chinese appear to have been almost incapable of thinking of spirit as existing apart from matter. Dr. Legge, in his prolegomena to the edition of Mencius, translates an essay by a certain Yang Choo, which, as Dr. Flint says, is 'one of the oldest systems of ethical materialism and of materialistic ethics' (*op. cit.* p. 47). He advises men

'to care nothing for praise or blame, virtue or vice; to seek merely to make themselves as happy as they can while happiness is within their reach; to eat and drink, for to-morrow they die' (*ib.*).

Concerning recent materialistic and atheistic speculations in China, there does not appear to be at present much reliable information. See CHINA.

In regard to materialism and atheism there is a great contrast between China and India. The introspective and philosophic character of the Hindus led them to dwell especially on that Absolute Spirit or Self which they felt to underlie, and to reveal itself in, all finite personalities. In comparison with this infinite and eternal Being, the visible world appears to them as an illusory appearance. Hence in Hindu speculation materialistic atheism plays but a small and inconspicuous part. In a conspectus of philosophical systems written by Mādhavāchārya in the 14th cent. A.D. (recently translated into English by Cowell and Gough, and published in Trübner's 'Oriental Series,' 2nd ed., Lond. 1894), there is mentioned as one of sixteen schools, including the Buddhists and Jains, a school called the Materialists, who denied the existence of the soul and God, and rejected the whole theory of *karma* and transmigration.

'These were known under various designations, and in the 14th century A.D. their ideas were fathered on a mythical ogre in the Mahābhārata, named Chārvāka. Denying transmigration, they rejected the entire claims of the Brāhmans. Matter was the only reality, and sense-perception the only form of knowledge. The pedigree of their text-book was traced back ironically (Macdonell) to Brihaspati, preceptor of the gods, and bitter verses survive, declaring, "There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in any other world"' (J. E. Carpenter, 'Oriental Philosophy and Religion,' in *DPhR* ii. 234). See also ATHEISM (Indian).

Atheism among the Buddhists as well as among the Greeks and Romans will be dealt with in separate articles following, and may therefore be passed over here.

3. Modern atheism.—Soon after the time of Christ scepticism declined, and its place was taken by that eclectic blending of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Oriental ideas which flourished in Alexandria and exercised at times considerable influence over Christian thought. The influence of the Church, and the reverence for Aristotle's writings, as well as the absence of any vigorous interest in science, explain the fact that until the close of the Middle Ages atheistic speculation was to a great extent in abeyance. It was not till the *Renaissance*, when new scientific discoveries were made, and freer principles of Biblical criticism began to be applied, that atheism again raised its head; and here, as in similar cases in India and Greece, the reputed atheism was in some cases genuine, but was more frequently a name applied to the theism or pantheism which was intellectually in advance of the theological thought of the time.

(*a*) *Atheism in England and France.*—It was not till the fifteenth century that materialistic interpretations of the universe began to show themselves in modern times. F. A. Lange, in his *History of Materialism* (vol. i. p. 225), mentions one isolated case in the 14th century—that of Nicolaus de Autricuria, who at Paris in 1348 was compelled to make recantation of several doctrines, and among others this doctrine, that *in the processes of nature there is nothing to be found but the motion of the combination and separation of atoms.*

'Here,' says Lange, 'is a formal Atomist in the very heart of the dominion of the Aristotelian theory of nature. But the same bold spirit ventured also upon a general declaration that we should put Aristotle, and Averroes with him, on one side, and apply ourselves directly to things in themselves. Thus Atomism and Empiricism go hand in hand together! In reality the authority of Aristotle had first to be broken before men could attain to direct intercourse with things themselves.'

The speculations which followed the incoming of the Copernican conception of the universe, such as those of Bruno and Vanini, were pantheistic rather than atheistic in their character. It was not till the first half of the 17th cent. that the ripe fruits of the great emancipation of thought began clearly to present themselves. On the

materialistic side these fruits appeared in the writings of Bacon, Gassendi, and Hobbes, and, on the spiritualistic side, in the works of Descartes. The materialism of the former writers cannot be called atheistic, for the atoms as they conceived them were not self-existent. There were probably a good many professors of materialistic atheism in this early part of the 17th century.

Père Mersenne, a contemporary and friend of Descartes, makes the startling statement that there were in his time as many as 50,000 atheists in the city of Paris alone. It seems likely, however, that the majority of these were called atheists simply because they declined to accept any longer the authority of Aristotle. Descartes himself had been accused of atheism on this ground.

About this time there was much scepticism and speculation which came very near to atheism, but escaped it by an adhesion that was, no doubt, in some cases insincere, but in other cases genuine enough, to the national Church. Whether the attachment of Thomas Hobbes to the English Church was sincere has been questioned. His philosophy was thoroughly materialistic. He held that even human sensation is nothing but the motion of corporeal particles; but he sheltered himself from the charge of atheism by saying that, in regard to his view of the universe, he confined himself exclusively to the phenomena which are knowable, and can be explained by the law of causality. Everything of which we can know nothing he resigns to theologians. The way in which, in his *Leviathan*, he utilizes religion for State purposes appears to render the genuineness of his theism very doubtful.

'He lays down the following definition, "Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind or imagined from tales publicly allowed, *Religion*; not allowed, *Superstition*"' (Lange, *op. cit.*, vol. i p. 283).

While both Thomas Hobbes and the other great English thinker of the 17th cent., John Locke, were attached to Christianity, and the latter no doubt most sincerely so, their writings had no little effect in preparing the way for future manifestations of positive atheism. Both the materialism which formed the basis of Hobbes' philosophy, and his selfish system of morals, were quite uncongenial to theistic belief. And Locke's doctrine of the origin of all ideas in sensation, though its atheistic tendency was, as we have seen, neutralized in his own case by his inconsistent belief in the necessity of an adequate causal ground for the universe, and by his recognition of the validity of the teleological argument, yet really undermined the rational basis of theism, and when consistently carried out, it, in conjunction with Hobbes' materialism, was largely instrumental in bringing about the positive atheism which flourished in France towards the middle of the 18th century. What kept Locke and, indeed, most thoughtful persons in England from atheism during the 17th and 18th cents. was the indestructible principle thus enunciated by Locke:

'Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree; it necessarily follows that the first eternal being cannot be matter' (cf. Flint, *op. cit.* p. 142).

It should be added that, as Dr. Flint acutely remarks, the absence in England of much positive scepticism and professed atheism during these two centuries is partly to be accounted for by the strong tendency at that time, and also till far on in the 19th cent., to refer theological insight and philosophical knowledge to two quite distinct sources. In § 1 it has been argued that in the above principle lies the most conclusive refutation of materialism and atheism. But though Locke built his own theism mainly on this foundation, it is a principle which finds no justification in his own exposition of the origin of knowledge. It is a purely *a priori* conception and belief, such as are also the conceptions of moral authority and of infinity. Accordingly, when Locke's ideas were introduced into France in the 18th cent., his doctrine of the origin of all knowledge in sensation was consistently worked out, and led several thinkers to atheism. The belief in a separate and specially inspired source of theological truth had to a large extent passed away among French thinkers; and hence what was simply neutral materialism in London became often positive atheism in Paris. The physician La Mettrie, the author of *L'Homme Machine* (1748), was led, through observing in his own case the influence of the movements of the blood on the power of thought, to maintain that all thinking and willing have their origin in sensation. He admits that it is probable that a Supreme Being exists, but adds that, if so, it is a theoretical truth without any use in practice.

'For our peace of mind,' he says, 'it is indifferent to know whether there is a God or not, whether He created matter, or whether it is eternal.' But a little further on he appears to agree with a friend of his whom he represents as arguing that 'the world would never be happy unless it was atheistic' (Lange, *History of Materialism*, ii. 73).

Lange, who gives an excellent account of La Mettrie's writings, remarks that

'La Mettrie's friend has only forgotten that even religion itself, quite apart from any revelation, must be reckoned among the natural impulses of man, and if this impulse leads to all unhappiness, it is not easy to see how all the other impulses, since they have the same natural origin, are to lead to happiness' (*ib.*).

In his treatises on *Volupté* and *L'Art de Jouir*, La Mettrie seeks to justify the pursuit of sensual enjoyment in a manner which Ueberweg justly describes as 'still more artificially exaggerated than frivolous.'

About twenty years after the publication of La Mettrie's *L'Homme Machine*, appeared the work which is regarded as the *chef-d'œuvre* of French materialism. Its title is *Système de la nature ou des lois du monde physique et du monde moral* (1770). On its title-page it professes to be written by a M. de Mirabaud, who was a deceased secretary of the French Academy, but the real author was known to be Baron d'Holbach. Holbach's system, says Ueberweg, 'combines all three elements of the empirical doctrine, which till then had been cultivated separately rather than together, viz. materialism (La Mettrie's), sensationalism (Condillac's), and determinism (which Diderot had at length admitted).' In this elaborate treatise the atheism is most pronounced, so that when a translation of it was published in London by the secularists in 1859, it bore on its cover the title *The Atheist's Text-Book*. It directly attacks the existence of God, and traces the origin of religion to fear and ignorance. Holbach substitutes for God matter and motion. The work is highly rhetorical, and in parts quite eloquent. Its ethics resembles that of Epicurus. Like Epicurus, Holbach points to the pleasure and happiness which friendship and sympathy can impart, and reaches a code of morals which superficially seems somewhat exalted. In his concluding chapter he says:

'Be just, because equity is the support of human society. Be good, because goodness connects all hearts in adamantine bonds! Be thankful, because gratitude feeds benevolence, nourishes generosity! . . . Forgive injuries, because revenge perpetuates hatred! Do good to him that injureth thee in order to show thyself more noble than he is; and in order to make a friend of him who was once thine enemy. Be temperate in thine enjoyment, and chaste in thy pleasures, because voluptuousness begets weariness, intemperance engenders disease' (p. 513).

It is characteristic of this ethical theory, as of all sensational ethics, that the intrinsic grandeur

and worth of all these virtues are undermined and destroyed by the egoistic motives to which they are referred.

Several other French writers of this epoch show anti-theistic leanings, even when they repudiate atheism, such as Diderot, in his later life, Helvetius, Lalande, Maréchal, etc. (see Flint's *Anti-theistic Theories*, pp. 469–474). The great astronomer Laplace is sometimes classed among atheists, because, when reminded by Napoleon that in his treatise on *Mécanique Céleste* he had said nothing about God, he replied, 'Sire, I had no need of that hypothesis.' But it is quite possible that in this reply he meant simply that he could account for the celestial movement by the forces of which alone science takes cognizance, and he may not have implied that these second causes do not demand for their existence a self-existent 'Cause of causes' (see § 1, above; and cf. Fiske, *Through Nature to God*, p. 141). It is related of David Hume that, when dining once with a party of eighteen at the house of Baron d'Holbach, he expressed a doubt as to whether it was possible to find any person who would avow himself dogmatically an atheist. On which his host replied, 'My dear sir, you are at this moment sitting at table with seventeen such persons.'

The greatest French writer, however, of this time, Voltaire, felt no respect for these sceptical or atheistic reasonings. That powerful and original thinker (like Locke in the previous century) saw that only by a spiritual First Cause could living and self-conscious beings be produced; and in the universe he saw such clear evidence of beneficent purpose that more than once in his writings he dwells eloquently on that old argument from design to which from the time of Anaxagoras and Socrates theists have confidently appealed, and which, as we shall afterwards see, the facts of evolution have by no means invalidated.

The materialistic atheism which flourished in France before and during the Revolution gradually decayed, owing partly to Kantian and Hegelian influence, and partly to that spiritual philosophy which was developed in France itself by Maine de Biran and Victor Cousin

(*b*) *German anti-theistic theories.*—About a century after the advent of materialism and atheism in French thought, there arose in Germany, partly as a result of the extreme idealistic thinking, but to a still greater extent as a reaction against it, a succession of anti-theistic writers of whom the latest, Professor Ernst Haeckel, is still exercising great influence, both on the Continent and in Britain. The first of these in date, Ludwig Feuerbach, began his intellectual career as an idealist Along with the still more celebrated writer David Strauss, he came forth from the extreme left wing of the Hegelian school. Both of these thinkers found the supreme object of interest not in the Hegelian Absolute Spirit, but in human nature; and hence Feuerbach was a humanist like Auguste Comte rather than a materialist.

'In his view,' says R. H. Hutton, 'God is but the magnified image of man reflected back upon space by the mirror of human self-consciousness. As pilgrims to the Brocken often observe, during an autumn sunrise, shadows of their own figures enormously dilated confronting them from a great distance, bowing as they bow, kneeling as they kneel, mocking them in all their gestures, and finally disappearing as the sun rises higher in the sky, so the German Atheist maintains that in the early dawn of human intelligence, man has been deluded by such a Brocken-shadow of himself, which has been childishly worshipped as an independent being and named God, but which must vanish soon' ('The Atheistic Explanation of Religion,' in *Essays Theological and Literary*, vol. i. p. 25. This article is an admirable exposition and criticism of Feuerbach's position)

The translation of Feuerbach's chief work, *The Essence of Christianity* (*Das Wesen des Christenthums*, 1841), by Miss Marian Evans (George Eliot) in 1854, which was reviewed in the before-mentioned article by R. H. Hutton, attracted much attention in this country. The feature in his thought which has led to his being classed among materialists is his doctrine that only the sensible is real.

'The body,' he says, 'is part of my being; nay, the body is its totality, is my Ego.'

Consistently with this view, he emphatically rejected all belief in personal immortality.

Far more decisively materialistic than Feuerbach was Carl Vogt, who in his *Physiological Letters* (1845–1847) developed the ideas of the French author Cabanis (1798), and argued that 'thought stands in the same relation to the brain as the bile to the liver, or the urine to the kidneys.' In 1852 appeared Jacob Moleschott's famous work, *The Circulation of Life* (*Der Kreislauf des Lebens*), which maintains that all vital phenomena can be explained as a perpetual circulation of matter from the inorganic to the organic world, and then back again from the organic to the inorganic. This doctrine has recently been acutely criticized by Sir Oliver Lodge, who contends that the phenomena of organization and life find their only satisfactory explanation in the assumption that a higher principle, life, guides and controls the elements of matter and energy (see his article on 'Mind and Matter' in *HJ*, Jan. 1905). 'Without phosphorus,' says Moleschott, 'there is no thought'; and he concludes that thought is a movement of the matter of the brain.

The book which in this materialistic and atheistic movement of the 19th cent. had much the same position and influence as Holbach's *System of Nature* had in the century preceding, was Professor Ludwig Buchner's *Force and Matter* (*Kraft und Stoff*, 1855). Buchner was the first of those German materialists who afterwards came under the influence of Darwin's book on *The Origin of Species* (1859). He professed that he found in Darwinism the chief support of materialism, and in the later editions of his book he declared that the doctrine of Natural Selection had wholly destroyed the force of the teleological argument. His general inference is that—

'not God, but evolution of matter, is the cause of the order of the world, that life is a combination of matter which in favourable circumstances is spontaneously generated; that there is no vital principle, because all forces, non-vital and vital, are movements; that movement and evolution proceed from life to consciousness; . . . that there is no God, no final cause, no immortality, no freedom, no substance of the soul' (Case, 'Metahpysics,' in *EBr*[10], vol. xxx. p. 647).

Sometimes Buchner speaks of mind as an effect of matter, and sometimes as a movement of matter, and he uses these expressions indifferently. He defines psychical activity as 'nothing but a radiation through the cells of the grey substance of the brain of a motion set up by external stimuli.' Buchner argues that his 'philosophic system, since it puts at its head not matter as such, but the unity and indivisibility of force and matter, cannot be described as materialism' (*Last Words on Materialism*, p. 273). But, as Professor Case points out, if a philosophy makes force an attribute of matter, as Buchner's does, it will recognize nothing but matter possessing force, and will therefore be at once materialism and monism, *i.e.* materialistic monism.

The most recent anti-theistic work of importance in Germany is Professor Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe* (*Die Weltrathsel*), of which there is an English translation by J. McCabe (see § 1, above). The peculiar feature of Haeckel's theory is that, like the ancient Hylozoists, he represents the original substance as having a psychical as well as a physical side. Because of this he contends that his philosophy is not materialism. As, however, in his doctrine mind is always spoken of as an attribute of body, and cannot be conceived to exist dissociated from matter, it would appear that his system, like

Büchner's, is fitly described as materialistic monism. Haeckel derives everything from an eternal primitive substance, which by condensation passes first into imponderable ether, and then by further condensation into the elements of ponderable matter. This eternal substance is God. His system bears some resemblance to that of Leibniz in so far as his monads possess the germs of perception and appetition. The souls of animals and men have no origin separate from that of their bodies. Sensation is the property of all matter. In plants and the lowest animals he considers sensation and will to be present, but only in a rudimentary and unconscious form. As to the point in evolution at which consciousness first clearly presents itself, he is not explicit.

'However certain,' he says, 'we are of the fact of this natural evolution of consciousness, we are, unfortunately, not yet in a position to enter more deeply into the question' (Haeckel, *Riddle of the Universe*, p. 191).

On this Case makes the weighty remark:

'Thus in presence of the problem which is the crux of materialism, the origin of consciousness, he first propounds a gratuitous hypothesis that everything has mind, and then gives up the origin of conscious mind after all. He is certain, however, that the law of substance somehow proves that conscious soul is a mere function of brain, that soul is a function of all substances, and that God is the force or energy, or soul or spirit, of Nature.' (See Professor Case's admirable article on 'Metaphysics' in *EBr*[10] for a fuller account and criticism of the systems of Buchner and Haeckel.)

As was before remarked, Haeckel's philosophy affords no explanation of how it comes about that the corpuscles from the primitive substance conspire not only to form organisms, but to produce an orderly and teleologically arranged cosmos. What is needed for this is not only the psychical character which he assigns to each corpuscle, but an intelligence and will dominating the whole and co-ordinating all its separate parts. He calls his philosophy the monistic or mechanical philosophy, as contrasted with the teleological.

'There is everywhere,' he says, 'a necessary causal connexion of phenomena, and therefore the whole knowable universe is a harmonious unity, a *monon*' (*Evolution of Man*, ii. 356).

But Haeckel's 'Law of Substance' gives no explanation of the cause of this 'harmonious unity,' nor does it at all account for the origin of the ideas which he makes the very bases of religion—the ideas, namely, of the good, the true, and the beautiful. In his system, spirit and matter are inseparable, and therefore spirit can neither create nor control matter. This circumstance alone shows that there is an impassable gulf between his world-theory and any world-theory that can be rightly termed theistic.

Along with German anti-theistic theories must be classed a doctrine which, so far from being materialistic, is intensely idealistic, namely, the doctrine of 'ethical idealism,' which is propounded by F. A. Lange in the third volume of his very able *History of Materialism*. Lange, under the influence of the agnostic side of the Kantian philosophy, came to the conclusion that there exist in the universe no reality or realities corresponding to our ideal conceptions. But these ideal conceptions, he contends, are in themselves of incalculable value to the soul, and it is in this sphere of the poetic imagination alone that we must look for the satisfaction of our religious sentiments and aspirations. The intelligible world is, in his view, a world of poetry. The greatest poems, he argues, have immortal worth, though the heroes celebrated in them may have had no historical existence. To this illustration pastor Heinrich Lang of Zürich very pertinently replied:

'Poems hold their own when they æsthetically satisfy: religion decays so soon as it is seen that the objects of faith are imaginary and not real.' An admirable criticism of the school of religious thought of which Lange is one of the leaders will be found in Martineau's Address on 'Ideal Substitutes for God' in his *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses* (vol. iv. p. 269 ff.).

4. Positivism.—Positivism, both as a philosophy and as a religion, appears to have about as much influence in England as it has in the land of its birth. In Mr. Frederic Harrison and Dr. J. H. Bridges it has had remarkably able exponents and advocates in this country; and its monthly organ, *The Positivist Review*, often reaches a high level of philosophical and sociological thought. As a philosophy, Positivism professes to be an exclusively non-metaphysical system. It teaches that the phenomenal world is the only knowable world, and it deprecates as wholly without value or interest all speculations concerning the nature of the ground or cause beneath or behind the phenomena of the sensible universe. While Herbert Spencer holds that our very conception of the relative character of all our scientific knowledge compels us to believe in the existence of an Absolute Reality behind the world of phenomena, and that it is this Unknowable Reality which forms the object of religion, the Positivists, on the other hand, maintain that what is wholly unknowable is wholly without interest to mankind, and therefore can never excite or satisfy religious ideas or emotions. According to Comte's celebrated law of the three stages of religious insight, mankind begins by assigning the causation of cosmical phenomena to the supernatural volition of personal deities, and finally to one Supreme Deity, when the stage of monotheism is reached. Reason, Comte held, gradually overthrows this theological belief, and in place of a personal cause sets up metaphysical abstractions such as centrifugal force, elective affinity, or vitality as the causal principles behind phenomena. Science, however, at length concludes that these abstractions rest upon no real experience; and the third and final stage is that of Positivism. The Positive stage of conviction, towards which all culture is approaching, means, he says, the recognition of the truth that all ontological causes (whether metaphysical or theological) are wholly beyond the scope of man's intellectual insight. It has been shown by many critics of Positivism that these three ways of considering the universe are not necessarily successive, but constantly occur together in the history of philosophical and religious thought.

There is one true and valuable feature in Comte's philosophy which raises it far above the level of the 18th century materialism of La Mettrie, d'Holbach, etc. They carried up the materialistic and mechanical principles, by which they explained the inorganic world, into the sphere of life and consciousness, and thus arrived at the description of man as a machine (*L'Homme Machine*). This, said Comte, is materialism, and against it he strongly protested. He would never allow that the mechanical theory was rationally applicable beyond the limits of the physical world, and held it to be self-condemned so soon as it was pushed into the provinces of biology and human character (Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, i. 503).

Comte's religious conception appears to be atheistic, in so far as it rejects the view that nature and humanity are the products of a self-existent and self-conscious Eternal Cause. In the place of God, in the theistic sense, he substitutes the *Grand Être*—Humanity—as the supreme object in the universe. Some critics hold that the real object of the Positivist's adoration is the ideal of human perfection, which he practically hypostatizes and adores. Positivists, however, will not admit this, for this would be, in their view, equivalent to the worship of an abstraction. In the *International Journal of Ethics* for July 1900 (p. 425), Dr. Coit, the founder of the 'ethical culture' societies in England, says:

'So far as I am aware, the Positivists have never declared that Humanity is God But they have maintained that all the homage

and obedience which has been rendered to God should now be transferred to Humanity. They have worshipped Humanity, they have prayed to it, they have found consolation and strength in communion with it. Surely, then, it has become their God.'

In the next number of the *Positivist Review*, however, Mr. Frederic Harrison expresses strong dissent from this statement, and denies that Positivists have prayed to and worshipped Humanity.

The non-metaphysical character of the Positivists' religion provokes a comparison of it with Buddhism. There are, however, vital differences between the two. The religious sentiments of Positivists do not centre in a glorified personal being; nor has Positivism as a religion anything corresponding to the doctrines of *karma* and transmigration, which bring Buddhism into some affinity with theistic religion. Cf., further, art. POSITIVISM.

5. Anti-theistic theories in England in the nineteenth century.—It was not till the middle of the 19th cent. that anti-theistic writings had much influence in England. The *Essay on the Origin and Prospects of Man* (3 vols., 1831)—a posthumous work by Mr. Thomas Hope, the author of a brilliantly written novel, *Anastasius, or Memoirs of a Modern Greek*—is a confused medley of materialistic speculations respecting the origin of the inorganic and organic worlds from molecules, which are represented as proceeding by way of radiation or evolution from the substance of God, the inconceivable primary cause. On its appearance Thomas Carlyle characterized the book as 'a monstrous Anomaly, where all sciences are heaped and huddled together' (*Miscellaneous Essays*, iv. 31). Some illustrative passages are quoted from it in Flint's *Anti-theistic Theories* (pp. 476, 478).

A much more lucid materialistic treatise, and also more decidedly atheistic, appeared in 1851, in the form of *Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development*, from the pens of Mr. H. G. Atkinson and Miss Harriet Martineau. In this book Atkinson says:

'I am far from being an Atheist, as resting on second causes. As well might we, resting on the earth, deny that there is any depth beneath; or, living in time, deny eternity. I do not say, therefore, that there is no God, but that it is extravagant and irreverent to imagine that cause a Person; the fundamental cause is wholly beyond our conception' (p. 240).

As these writers, however, always speak of matter as if it were eternal, declare that 'the mind of man is the result of material development,' and assert that 'philosophy finds no God in nature, nor sees the want of any,' it is impossible to deny that their book is fundamentally atheistic. Like most atheistic treatises, it denies the freedom of the will and personal immortality, and declares that 'there is no more sin in a crooked disposition than in a crooked stick in the water, or in a hump-back or a squint.' At the time of its appearance the work was severely criticized by James Martineau in the *Prospective Review*, and there is another acute criticism of it in Professor J. S. Blackie's *Natural History of Atheism* (1877).

6. Secularism.—English Secularism appears to be almost entirely an indigenous growth. During the early portion of the 19th cent. there appeared several writings which, though by no means atheistic, yet prepared the way for the incoming of a non-religious and also of an anti-religious drift of thought. The phrenological writings of George Combe, though they were in his own case associated with theistic views, were calculated to encourage a materialistic view of mind. Thomas Paine and Richard Carlile were themselves Deists, but many of the admirers of their rationalism did not admit the validity of their deistic views. The philosophy of the philanthropic socialist, Robert Owen, exercised a strong anti-theistic influence. Owen held a doctrine somewhat resembling Haeckel's, in which God is conceived as permeating all the particles of the universe. At this time there was also an important circle of thinkers, of which Jeremy Bentham was the centre, and which was strongly antagonistic to positive religious beliefs. Professor Bain in his *Life of James Mill* says:

'That Mill's acquaintance with Bentham hastened his course towards infidelity it is impossible to doubt. Bentham never in so many words publicly avowed himself an atheist, but he was so in substance. His destructive criticisms of religious doctrine in *The Church of England Catechism Reviewed*, and still more his anonymous book on Natural Religion, left no residue that could be of any value. As a legislator he had to allow a place for Religion; but he made use of the Deity, as Napoleon wished to make use of the Pope, for sanctioning whatever he himself chose, in the name of Utility, to prescribe. John Austin followed on the same tack; but this course was too disingenuous to suit either of the Mills. It is quite certain, moreover, that the whole tone of conversation in Bentham's more select circle was atheistic' (cf. *Mind*, vol. ii. p. 527).

All these circumstances had probably some influence in bringing about that secularist movement in which George Jacob Holyoake and Charles Bradlaugh were the leading spirits. Bradlaugh in the *National Reformer*, and Holyoake in the *Reasoner*, appealed to a large number of readers, especially of the artizan class. The work thus begun has been continued down to the present time by a succession of lecturers and writers; but it has now to a large extent lost its positively atheistic character, and is merged in the larger movement of agnosticism, which the numerous cheap publications of the 'Rationalist Press Association' are doing much to advance. The name 'Secularist,' as distinguished from 'Atheist,' was originated by Holyoake in 1851. The latter word, to which Bradlaugh had no dislike, was objected to by Holyoake on the ground that it was often understood to mean 'one who is not only without God but also without morality.' The two leaders were of very dissimilar types of mind. Holyoake, like Robert Owen, of whom he had been a disciple, was of a constructive disposition; he would have liked to give to the word 'secularism' a meaning which would not have excluded theists. Bradlaugh, on the contrary, was naturally aggressive. He identified all theological ideas with superstition, and the work of undermining them he evidently found very congenial.

The chief logical ground on which they both rejected theism differed somewhat from that which was taken by earlier atheists of that century. These, as we have seen, asserted the existence of a First Cause, though they regarded its character as wholly unknowable. Holyoake and Bradlaugh, on the other hand, started with matter, maintaining that it needed no cause, being itself self-existent and eternal. Their contention was that the creation of matter by a self-existent Spirit is inconceivable. To this the theist replies that, though we have no experience of it, such creation would violate no necessary law of thought; and he further contends that the atheist's assertion that out of lifeless matter organization and life spontaneously arose is not only inconceivable, but actually violates the law of thought which compels us to believe that no cause for an effect can be admitted unless there is some element in it which can be conceived as capable of giving rise to the effect.

Another very prominent feature in both Bradlaugh's and Holyoake's attack on theism was their attempt to invalidate that argument from design in which so many thinkers, including Locke and Voltaire, have found a sure basis for theistic belief. Holyoake in his chief works, *Paley Refuted* and *The Trial of Theism*, dwells at great length on this question. Finding it impossible to explain the order and systematic organization of the cosmos on the materialistic hypothesis, he tries to overthrow the theist's explanation by contending that, if it were a real explanation, it would involve other necessary assumptions which experience shows to have no existence in fact. Admit,

he says, that there was a designer, then that designer must have been a person; and if a person, he could not have designed the universe unless he had possessed what all persons whom we know possess, namely, a cerebral organization, a brain; and, he concludes, there is no evidence of the existence of such a brain. This argument has also been employed by Professors W. K. Clifford and Du Bois-Reymond in the anti-theistic interest. It has been replied to by eminent thinkers, both scientific and philosophical. On the relations between mind and matter Sir Oliver Lodge says:

'Fundamentally they amount to this: that a complex piece of matter called the brain is the organ or instrument of mind and consciousness; that if it be stimulated mental activity results; that if it be injured or destroyed no manifestation of mental activity is possible. . . . Suppose we grant all this, what then? We have granted that brain is the means whereby mind is made manifest on this material plane, it is the instrument through which alone we know it, but we have not granted that mind is *limited* to its material manifestation; nor can we maintain that without matter the things we call mind, intelligence, consciousness, have no sort of existence. Mind may be incorporate or incarnate in matter, but it may also transcend it. Brain is truly the organ of mind and consciousness . . . but no one is at liberty to assert on the strength of that fact that the realities underlying our use of those terms have no existence apart from terrestrial brains' ('Mind and Matter,' *HJ*, Jan. 1905, p. 324 f.).

In § 1 reasons have been given for concluding that organization can be explained only by assuming that a higher principle guides the arrangement of the material particles. If this is the case, life is the cause of the structure of brain, while brain is posterior to life, and is the organ through which life and the material universe interact. Dr. James Martineau, in his article on 'Modern Materialism: its Attitude towards Theology,' very carefully discusses this question. He argues that, though a finite and created mind needs a cerebral organ for its communication with the physical world, it is highly probable that a self-existent and eternal Mind is not thus conditioned. 'Further,' he says,

'I would submit that in dealing with the problem of the Universal Mind this demand for organic centralization is strangely inappropriate. It is when mental power has to be localized, bounded, lent out to individual natures and assigned to a scene of definite relations, that a focus must be found for it and a molecular structure with determinate periphery be built for its lodgment. And were Du Bois-Reymond himself ever to alight on the portentous cerebrum which he imagines, I greatly doubt whether he would fulfil his promise and turn Theist at the sight; that he had found the Cause of causes would be the last inference it would occur to him to draw; rather would he look round for some monstrous *creature*, some cosmic megatherium, born to float and pasture on the fields of space' (*Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. p. 254).

If the objector still insists that the Eternal Mind must have some material organ, both Sir Oliver Lodge and Dr. Martineau point out that

'it has been surmised that just as the corpuscles and atoms of matter, in their intricate movements and relations, combine to form the brain cell of a human being, so the cosmic bodies, the planets and suns and other groupings of the ether, may perhaps combine to form something corresponding as it were to the brain cell of some transcendent mind. The thing is a mere guess, it is not an impossibility, and it cannot be excluded from a philosophic system by any negative statement based on scientific fact' (Sir Oliver Lodge, *loc. cit.*, p. 325; cf. Martineau, *op. cit.*, p. 255).

In addition to these two arguments for atheism, Bradlaugh appeals to some metaphysical obstacles which, in his opinion, bar the way to a theistic conclusion. The chief of these is that we are necessitated by the laws of thought to conceive of Substance as 'that which does not require the conception of anything else antecedent to it'; and therefore Substance cannot have been created or originated. To this Dr. Flint well replies:

'If he [Mr. Bradlaugh] can conceive substance *per se*, and not merely through its qualities, effects, and relationships to his own faculties, he is logically bound to abandon sensationalism and all its consequences, and betake himself to absolute idealism or to mysticism' (*op. cit.*, p. 517).

In a similar strain Bradlaugh contends that, if God were infinite, it would be impossible to conceive of any addition to Him, and that, therefore, an infinite God and a created universe are incompatible ideas. Such arguments as these, even if they were valid (which all theists would deny), would have little or no weight with secularists in general; for such arguments assume the existence of an *a priori* source of knowledge, and this very few atheists would grant.

Besides Holyoake and Bradlaugh, there have been other secularist lecturers and writers, such as Charles Watts, G. W. Foote, Mrs. Besant (who has since become a leader among the theosophists), W. S. Ross, etc. An account of the books, pamphlets, and periodicals which have been issued by this school of anti-theistic thought will be found in Dr. Flint's *Anti-theistic Theories* (pp. 509–519). See also art. SECULARISM.

7. Recent Agnosticism. — In connexion with this subject, brief reference needs to be made in conclusion to some recent distinguished writers, whose speculations, though often by no means atheistic, have unquestionably weakened theistic belief in the case of many of their readers. The most eminent among them are the scientific writers, G. J. Romanes, W. K. Clifford, John Tyndall, T. H. Huxley, and the philosopher, H. Spencer. In 1878 there was published anonymously a decidedly atheistic work, entitled *A Candid Examination of Theism*, by Physicus. Many years later, Romanes acknowledged the authorship, and stated at the same time that he had then come to see that his most important objections to theism were invalid. In the above work he says that he had at one time been convinced by Baden Powell's work on *The Order of Nature*, that this order necessitates the hypothesis of an eternal creative intelligence and will, but that, on the appearance of Spencer's *First Principles* and Charles Darwin's work on *Natural Selection*, his views had undergone a total change, and that at the time of writing the *Candid Examination* he felt assured that the appearances of design in the universe could be explained without the assumption of a creating mind. About the year 1889, however, he wrote three articles on the 'Influence of Science upon Religion,' and these, together with some other notes on theism from his pen, were published, after his death, under the title *Thoughts on Religion*, by Dr. Charles Gore, now the Bishop of Birmingham. In these articles Romanes declares his recovered faith in the validity of the teleological argument.

'I think it is perfectly clear,' he concludes, 'that if the argument from teleology is to be saved at all, it can only be so by shifting from the narrow basis of special adaptation, to the broad area of Nature as a whole. And here I confess that to my mind the argument does acquire a weight which, if long and attentively considered, deserves to be regarded as enormous. For although this and that particular adjustment in Nature may be seen to be proximately due to physical causes . . . the more ultimate question arises, How is it that all physical causes conspire, by their united action, to the production of a general order of Nature? It is against all analogy to suppose that such an end as this can be accomplished by such means as those, in the way of mere chance or "the fortuitous concourse of atoms." We are led by the most fundamental dictates of our reason to conclude that there must be some cause for *this co-operation of causes*' (*Thoughts on Religion*, p. 67 f.).

He then proceeds to show that this adequate cause can be nothing short of a Divine Mind, though that Infinite Mind may be, and indeed must be, beyond the comprehension of man's finite intelligence. For the views of Dr. Romanes on the 'character' of God, and on Christianity, the *Thoughts on Religion* must be consulted. Bishop Gore mentions that his friend, shortly before his death, expressed his belief that it is by 'intuition' we become acquainted with God, and added that he was in cordial agreement on this subject with Knight's *Aspects of Theism*.

Professor W. K. Clifford held a world-theory somewhat similar to that of Haeckel. Everything, both physical and psychical, was, he maintained, composed of elements of 'mind-stuff,' and

when these elements are compounded in a nervous system, they manifest the phenomena of consciousness. As to the cause which so arranges these elements as to form out of them the actual orderly universe of matter and mind, his writings furnish no explanation. With Holyoake and Du Bois-Reymond, he regards the existence of a self-existent personal cause as highly improbable, owing to the want of evidence for the existence of a corresponding brain. What has been previously said in reply to Holyoake's secularistic atheism applies equally to Clifford's reasons for denying the existence of God. Clifford's view of religion was akin to Positivism.

'In such a moment of utter sincerity,' he says, 'when a man has bared his own soul before the immensities and the eternities, a presence in which his own poor personality is shrivelled into nothingness arises within him, and says, as plainly as words can say, "I am with thee, and I am greater than thou." Many names of Gods, of many shapes, have men given to this presence, seeking by names and pictures to know more clearly the guide and the helper of men.'

These words appear to point to a theistic conclusion, but Clifford disappoints this expectation; for his final judgment is that, 'after all, such a helper of men, outside of humanity, the truth will not allow us to see' (*Lectures and Essays*[2], 386).

Professor John Tyndall's Address before the British Association at Belfast in 1874 excited much attention, and called forth many criticisms from the theistic side. Among these perhaps the most important was a paper in the *Contemporary Review* on 'Modern Materialism: its Attitude towards Theology,' by Dr. James Martineau, between whom and Professor Tyndall there had often been mental encounters at the meetings of the Metaphysical Society. (This paper, together with another on 'Religion as affected by Modern Materialism,' is reprinted in vol. iv. of Martineau's *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses.*)

Though in the 'Address' Tyndall says, 'I discern in matter the promise and potency of all terrestrial life,' he declined to be called a materialist. His view somewhat resembled Haeckel's, in that he maintained that sensation could not arise unless the elements of matter had a psychical as well as a physical side. He did not, however, regard sensation as a property of matter, but rather as a universal concomitant of matter. The passage from the physics of the brain to the facts of consciousness he admitted to be altogether inconceivable by the human mind. As to the cause of the atoms and of the processes of evolution, his position was not atheistic but agnostic. In an Address at Birmingham, a few months later than the one at Belfast, he says, in reply to the question whether there are not in nature manifestations of knowledge and skill higher than man's:

'My friends, the profession of that atheism with which I am sometimes so lightly charged would, in my case, be an impossible answer to this question.'

Like Lange, he confines religion to the sphere of idealism and emotion. In reference to Tyndall's statement that 'we must radically change our notions of "Matter" if we are to understand how it carries with it the promise and potency of all terrestrial life,' Martineau remarks (*op. cit.* iv. 175) that what Tyndall says simply amounts to this:

"'Charge the word [matter] with your *quæsita*, and I will promise to elicit them explicitly." It is easy travelling through the stages of such an hypothesis; you deposit at your bank a round sum ere you start; and, drawing on it piecemeal at every pause, complete your grand tour without a debt. Words, however, ere they can hold such richness of prerogative, will be found to have emerged from their physical meaning, and to be truly θεοφόρα ὀνόματα—terms that bear God in them, and thus dissolve the very theory which they represent. Such extremely clever Matter—matter that is up to everything, even to writing *Hamlet*, and finding out its own evolution, and substituting a molecular *plebiscite* for a divine monarchy of the world—may fairly be regarded as a little too modest in its disclaimer of the attributes of Mind.'

The views of Professor T. H. Huxley differ in one important respect from those of his great friend, Professor Tyndall. The former, through his study of Hume, was inclined to accept the principles of sensational idealism, whereas the latter sided with the agnostic realism of Herbert Spencer. Huxley, accordingly, seeks to rebut the charge of materialism, by declaring that he is utterly incapable of conceiving 'the existence of matter if there is no mind in which to picture that existence' (*Method and Results*, Lond. 1893, p. 245). But, while he thus makes the existence of matter dependent on mind, he at the same time holds the doctrine of 'human automatism,' *i.e.* that while states of consciousness depend upon the molecular movements of the cerebral substance, 'there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism' (*ib.* p. 214).

At a meeting of the Metaphysical Society, when Huxley had read a paper on the subject, 'Has the Frog a Soul?' one of the members present said: 'I was walking down Oxford Street this morning, intending to go straight to the Marble Arch; but, happening to glance at my boots, I saw that I needed a new pair, and I accordingly turned into Regent Street, where my bootmaker lives.' Then, addressing Huxley, he asked, 'Am I to understand that the coming into my mind of the idea about the boots had no causal connexion with the change in the direction of my walk?' 'Most certainly you are,' replied the professor.

It is clear, then, that though Huxley in words rejects materialism, and asserts that the body is only a group of mental symbols, he is virtually a decided materialist, for he represents mind as dependent for its existence on this group of mental symbols, and possessed of no power to act in any way upon the reality for which these symbols stand.

As Huxley maintained that nothing is knowable but phenomena, *i.e.* states of consciousness, he held that we can neither affirm nor deny the existence of God or of any metaphysical realities behind phenomena. To describe his attitude towards these metaphysical questions he coined the convenient word 'Agnostic.' The charge of atheism he emphatically repels, saying:

'The problem of the ultimate cause of existence . . . seems to me . . . hopelessly out of reach of my poor powers. Of all the senseless babble I have ever had occasion to read, the demonstrations of these philosophers who undertake to tell us all about the nature of God would be the worst, if they were not surpassed by the still greater absurdities of the philosophers who try to prove that there is no God' (*Method and Results*, p. 245ff.).

With regard to the relation of the Darwinian account of evolution to the argument from design, Huxley expresses himself as follows:

'No doubt, it is quite true that the doctrine of Evolution is the most formidable opponent of all the commoner and coarser forms of Teleology. . . . The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are not, however, of necessity mutually exclusive On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement, of which all the phenomena of the universe are the consequences, and the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe' (*Critiques and Addresses*, pp. 305–307).

It would seem that Huxley should here have asked himself the question whether this 'primordial arrangement,' from which a universe abounding in marks of adaptation has proceeded, does not by a necessity of human thought demand an adequate cause. Romanes, as we have seen, did put this question to himself, and the answer to it in which he finally found satisfaction was that it is only on the hypothesis of the creative action of an Eternal Mind that the facts of physical and mental evolution are at all satisfactorily accounted for. Huxley, however, never fairly faces the question of ultimate causation, but concludes his criticism of the teleological argument with the words:

'Why trouble oneself about matters which are out of reach, when the working of the mechanism itself, which is of infinite practical importance, affords scope for all our energies?' (*ib.* p. 307).

He forgot that the human mind has other aspirations and faculties besides those which lead

to scientific discovery; that it cannot content itself with the ascertainment of the order of phenomenal succession, but must perforce, for the satisfaction of its rational, its ethical, and its religious nature, ever seek after insight into the reality and the character of the *Causa causarum*.

Herbert Spencer's attitude towards theism was by no means so negative or neutral as was that of Tyndall and Huxley; and with good right he maintained that his philosophical system might be pantheistic, but could not justly be termed atheistic. His conception of the basal reality of the universe rested upon an assumed *a priori* principle.

In opposition to the doctrine of Mansel and Sir W. Hamilton, he maintains,

'Impossible though it is to give to this consciousness of the Absolute any qualitative or quantitative expression whatever, it is not the less certain that it remains with us as a positive and indestructible element of thought' (*First Principles*[6], p. 77; *cf. Nineteenth Century*, July 1884, pp. 5–7).

In his view it is the same ultimate reality which in the inorganic world manifests itself in the form of matter and motion, and in living beings in modes of consciousness. His philosophy, however, furnishes no explanation of how, from the modes of matter and motion which physical science discerns, organic structures can spontaneously arise. He states that the volumes in which he would have explained the passage from the inorganic to the organic had for want of time not been written. What these volumes would have contained we can only conjecture from other passages in Mr. Spencer's writings, where he maintains that, in his doctrine of an infinite and eternal energy out of which all phenomena, both psychical and physical, arise, he has reached a reality which satisfies the demands alike of science and of religion. In 1884, he declares that

'though the attributes of personality, as we know it, cannot be conceived by us as attributes of the Unknown Cause of things, yet duty requires us neither to affirm nor to deny personality, but to submit ourselves in all humility to the established limits of our intelligence, in the conviction that the choice is not between personality and something lower than personality, but between personality and something higher; and that the Ultimate Power is no more presentable in terms of human consciousness than human consciousness is representable in terms of a plant's functions' (*Nineteenth Century*, July 1884, p. 7).

Were it not for the last clause in this quotation, one might suppose that Spencer held a view akin to the theistic doctrine of Lotze, *i.e.* that personality under human limitations must needs be imperfect, and that it is only in God that perfect personality is realized. Lotze's doctrine is theistic, because it implies that, in conceiving of God after the fashion of the highest form of human personality, we have a real and positive, though imperfect, insight into the nature of God. The last clause of the above quotation, however, denies the possibility of any such insight, and thus entirely separates Spencer's doctrine from true theism. Further, Spencer's attempt to derive all moral ideals and all consciousness of moral authority from the experiences of pleasure and pain, makes it impossible for him to recognize in our ideals any insight into the *character* of God; and hence his Ultimate Reality cannot be regarded as an adequate object of religious faith and worship.

This article may conclude with the obvious remark, that at the present time atheism in the definite form which it has often assumed in the past has almost entirely disappeared, and an agnostic form of rationalism has taken its place. Benn's treatise on *The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, and Robertson's *Short History of Freethought*, will give a tolerably clear idea of the forms of negation with which the defenders of theism will probably have to deal during the present century.

LITERATURE.—**James Buchanan**, *Faith in God and Modern Atheism*, 2 vols., Edin. 1855; **Robert Flint**, *Anti-theistic Theories*, Edin. 1879; artt. 'Greek Philosophy' and 'Oriental Philosophy and Religion,' in *DPhP*, 3 vols., New York and Lond. 1901–5; **T. Case**, art. 'Metaphysics,' *EBr*[10]; **F. A. Lange**, *History of Materialism*, 3 vols., Lond. 1877–81; **J. Martineau**, *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. (Essays on 'Materialism,' in reply to Tyndall) Lond. 1891; **Paul Janet**, *Contemporary Materialism*, Lond. 1865; **J. S. Blackie**, *Natural History of Atheism*, Lond. 1877; **J. Iverach**, *Is God knowable?* Lond. 1887, and the same author's *Theism in the Light of Present Science and Philosophy*, Lond. 1900; **R. M. Wenley**, *Contemporary Theology and Theism*, Edin. 1897; **Charles B. Upton**, *The Bases of Religious Belief* (Hibbert Lecture), Lond. 1894; art. 'Atheism,' in Franck's *Dict. des Sciences Philosophiques*, Paris, 1875; **Goblet d'Alviella**, *The Contemporary Evolution of Religious Thought in England, America, and India*, Lond. 1885; **Alfred Caldecott**, *The Philosophy of Religion in England and America*, Lond. 1901; **Ralph Cudworth**, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* [tr. by John Harrison], 3 vols., Lond. 1845; **Rudolf Otto**, *Naturalism and Religion*, Lond. 1907.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

ATHEISM (Buddhist).—**1.** Buddhism, in so far as it is a philosophic system, is radically averse to the idea of a Supreme Being—of a God, in the Western sense of the word. It must be remembered that this atheism is not a characteristic peculiar to Buddhism alone. The 'Lord' (*Iśvara*) of the nominally theistic schools (*aiśvarikas*), when He is not conceived of as an Oriental despot, arbitrarily imputing sin or virtue and assigning hell or heaven to His creatures, is practically only an Organizer of the world, keeping account of the actions (*karma*) of creatures in order to ensure their due recompense, and, after each period of chaos, re-constructing the universe in order to set each creature in the place which befits it. All the Hindus believe, as a matter of fact, in endless transmigrations.

Another point worthy of remark is that, although the Buddhists maintain the uselessness of this 'Lord,' a mere delegate of the *karma* of creatures, they nevertheless personify the *karma*, or Law. 'Even if I hid my sin from every one, I should not hide it from the Law' (*cf. SBE* xxxv. 295). But, as a general rule, retribution for deeds is believed to operate automatically by reason of an energy called the 'indestructible' (the 'invisible' of the Brāhmanical treatises), and the system is therefore atheistic because it does away with the thought of a personal Being who would scrutinize the 'book of debts' of which their treatises sometimes speak. It must be acknowledged, however, that to believe in infallible and immutable justice is to recognize at least one of the thoughts which constitute the idea of God. The Buddhists know that good actions can mix with evil ones and counteract their unhappy consequences; they especially praise repentance, and by doing so raise themselves above the purely mechanical idea of *karma* (*q.v.*), which they view as an intelligent force.

It may be further remarked, that the contemplation of the Buddha plays in early Buddhism a rôle analogous to that which the *Sānkhya-Yoga* assigns to the contemplation of the 'Lord' (*Iśvara*).

2. It will be profitable to read the 2nd chapter of the *Brahmajālasutta* (Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Lond. 1899, p. 30), where the Buddha explains how the god Brahmā, being born at the commencement of the world-age in the midst of the heaven prepared for him by his *karma*, unconscious of his former existences, and witnessing the birth of the other gods whom he wished to have as companions, imagines that he is in truth 'the Supreme One, the Lord of all, the Creator, the Ancient of Days, the Father of all that are and are to be.' 'These other beings are of my creation. And why is that so? A while ago I thought, "Would that they might come!" And on my mental aspiration behold the beings came.'

The *Kevaddhasutta* (*ib.* p. 280) is also very instructive. It shows the reverence of the gods for the great Brahmā, and how Brahmā is inferior to the Buddha. A certain monk, in order to solve

a problem of cosmology, traverses the celestial regions, consulting the divinities. They refer him to Brahmā. 'He is more potent and more glorious than we. He will know it.' 'Where, then, is that great Brahmā now?' 'We know not where Brahmā is, nor why Brahmā is, nor whence. But when the signs of his coming appear, when the light ariseth and the glory shineth, then will He be manifest.' Soon after, Brahmā became manifest, and that monk drew near to him and asked, 'Where do the four great elements cease, leaving no trace behind?' Brahmā then took the monk by the arm and led him aside and said, 'These gods, my retinue, hold me to be such that there is nothing I cannot see, I have not realized. Therefore I gave no answer in their presence. But I do not know where the four elements cease. Therefore return to the Buddha, and accept the answer according as he shall make reply.'

3. In the later literature of Buddhism there are found formal proofs of the non-existence of a God who creates and organizes the world, for example in the *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, ch. ix. ver. 119 f.

'Theists say that God is too great for us to be able to comprehend Him; but then it follows that His qualities also surpass our range of thought, and that we can neither know Him nor attribute to Him the quality of a Creator. Theists further maintain that the nature of God is incomprehensible, and His work comprehensible. But (1) God has created neither souls nor elements which are eternal: He does not bring about the birth of knowledge in the mind [compare Malebranche], since knowledge is produced by its object; He does not allot pain and pleasure, which result from *karma*. Then (2) if God acts without desiring to act, it is because He is subject to another; if He acts because He desires to act, He is subject to desire; therefore He is not independent; and (3) if He is independent of others, why does He not accomplish at one and the same time the creation, preservation, and destruction of the universe? An eternal and immutable cause ought to produce all its effects at the same time. Thus everything is momentary.'

LITERATURE.—'Abhidharmakoça,' in Burnouf, Introduction, Paris, 1844, p. 572; *Buddhacharita* ix 53 (*SBE* xlix. 100); Nāgārjuna, 'Friendly Epistle,' in *JPTS*, 1886, p. 16; 'Bodhicharyāvatāra,' ed. with commentary, in *Bibl. Buddhica*, Fr. tr., *Introduction à la pratique des futurs Bouddhas*, Paris, 1907; Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Lond. 1899, 'Brahmajālasutta,' and also 'Tevijjasutta': 'that no Brahman has ever seen Brahmā'; Oldenberg, *Buddha*[5], 1906, p. 380, Edm Hardy, *Buddhismus*, Munster i. W. 1890, p. 130; St Clair-Tisdall, *The Noble Eightfold Path*, Lond. 1903, p 161 f. (ch. iv. 'Buddhism and Christianity').

LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

ATHEISM (Egyptian).—No trace has yet been found of any definite atheistic teaching in Egypt. The contradictory, wholly incompatible, doctrines current in Egypt regarding the future life must have caused every thinking man to wonder and doubt, and when such a man appeared to accept them all and act upon them, if his motive was not simply to conform with custom, or to satisfy the superstition of his women-folk, it must have been the hope that one of the alternatives might possibly be correct enough to help towards bliss. The Song of the Harper, engraved in banqueting scenes in the tombs of kings and priests, urges to present enjoyment because death comes to all, and no one has ever returned to tell what has become of the dead; the most learned scribes and philosophers pass away and become as though they had never been. 'Follow thy heart greatly; but give bread to him that hath no field—so shalt thou have a good name among all posterity.' Such is the teaching of the Song. This text dates from the Middle Kingdom, but was in vogue also later. Another, of late Ptolemaic age, when the Egyptian religion was indeed on the decline, is put into the mouth of a deceased lady. Inscribed upon her tombstone, it is addressed to her husband, the high priest of Ptah at Memphis, who was almost, if not quite, at the head of the Egyptian hierarchy. She counsels merrymaking and enjoyment in the years of life upon earth: the 'western' land of the dead is a land of wakeless sleep, of heavy darkness, of forgetfulness; and apparently implies that nothing could relieve the misery if the dead could feel it. It seems that these views belonged in some degree to the varied face of orthodoxy, which preached the Psychostasia, the reward in rich fields of Aalu and abundant food and happiness; or, again, the attainment by the dead of all Divine powers; or, again, the sad doctrine of a gloomy existence in the dark under world, relieved only by one hour of illumination each night while the sun passed between two of the clanging gates.

LITERATURE.—There is no literature on the subject. For translations of the Songs, see W. Max Müller, *Die Liebespoesie der alten Ägypter*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 29 ff.

F. LL. GRIFFITH.

ATHEISM (Greek and Roman).—As a dogmatic creed, consisting in the denial of every kind of supernatural power, atheism has not often been seriously maintained at any period of civilized thought, and Plato goes so far as to assert that, while other erroneous views about the gods might be permanent, no one, after embracing in his youth the doctrine of atheism, had ever continued in it up to old age (*Legg.* 10. 888 C). Thus, in dealing with the statements of Greek and Latin texts, it is necessary to distinguish those thinkers, such as Xenophanes (fr. 15, Diels, etc.), who rejected the gods of the popular religion, from those who repudiated the idea of God in its entirety. There are further difficulties arising from the fragmentary and often untrustworthy character of our authorities. A charge of atheism was a favourite controversial weapon, and how careful we should be in accepting isolated statements which impute it may be learnt from a consideration of the cases of Socrates (Plat. *Apol.* 26 C) and of the early Christians (Gibbon, *Roman Empire*, ii. 225). Moreover, the sceptic is always liable to be confounded with the atheist. Thus the attitude of Protagoras towards the problems of theology is sufficiently indicated by the sentence preserved by Diogenes Laertius (ix. 51), in which he declares himself unable to affirm of the gods either that they are or that they are not. Nevertheless, other authorities (Epiphanius, *adv. Hæres.* iii. 2. 9; Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 591, 1) testify to his absolute denial of the existence of God. These considerations will show the difficulty of appraising the statements which impute atheism to the physicist Hippo, a contemporary of Pericles (Plut. *Comm. Not.* 31, p. 1075 A, etc.), or to the more notorious Diagoras of Melos. The latter, familiar to us from the allusions of Aristophanes (*Nub.* 830; *Av.* 1072), is said to have turned to atheism because the gods failed to visit with punishment a flagrant wrong which had been committed against him (Sext. *Math.* ix. 53). We have more definite information about Theodorus of Cyrene, a follower of Aristippus, who lived in the latter years of the 4th cent. B.C. His atheism was absolutely uncompromising (Diog. Laert. ii. 97; Epiphan. *l.c.*; Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 591, 25), and formed a reasoned element in a philosophical system which was subversive of the foundations of customary morality.

Again, atheism is the logical result of the rationalizing system of Euhemerus; but the charge is made against him (Plut. *Is. et Osir.* 23, p. 360 A) on precisely the same grounds as against the Stoics (Plut. *Amat.* 13, p. 757 C), and cannot of itself be held to imply more than his opposition to received religion. The same is true of the earlier attempt of Prodicus, who held that Divine honours were in the first place bestowed upon such natural objects as the sun and moon and the fruits of the earth, and next in order upon the civilizing benefactors of the human race (Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1901, i. 430). To the same period belongs Critias, the leader of the Thirty Tyrants, who is ranked with the atheists by Sextus

(*Math.* ix. 54) on the strength of some remarkable verses, referred by other authorities, erroneously, as it would seem (Diels, *Doxogr.* proll. p. 59. 1), to the *Sisyphus* of Euripides. These lines are conceived in the spirit of a Callicles or a Thrasymachus, as we meet them in the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*. The argument is founded on the Sophistic distinction between nature and convention; and the belief in God, which is made subsequent to the rule of morality imposed by law, is attributed to the policy of a cunning legislator, who sought to check secret immorality by the fiction of an eternal, all-seeing, and all-wise power, and to procure obedience to its decrees by investing it with awe-inspiring attributes.

Though denounced as a fiction in the age of the Sophists, the universality of religious belief among the nations of the world was always one of the strongest weapons possessed by the advocates of theism (Plat. *Legg.* 10. 886 A; Sext. *Math.* ix. 60). The only exception which ancient tradition, as preserved by Theophrastus in his treatise on *Piety* (Bernays, *Theophr. ub. Frommigkeit*, p. 56), records was furnished by a doubtful story concerning the Thoës or Acrothoitæ. They are said to have been a tribe living on the borders of Thrace, who, like Hesiod's Silver Race (*Op.* 133 f.), neglected entirely to sacrifice to the gods, and were swallowed up by an earthquake as a punishment for their atheism (Porphyr. *de Abst.* ii. 7, 8; Simplic. *ad Epict. Enchir.* 31. p. 95, 34, Dubn). Thus, whether viewed in connexion with popular opinion or with scientific thought, atheism appears to have been regarded by the ancients as a mark of coarseness, depravity, or eccentricity.

LITERATURE.—See the commentators on Parmenides and Heraclitus, and L. Campbell, *Religion in Greek Literature*, Lond. 1898, p. 295. For the charges against astronomers, Plato, *Legg.* 12, 967 A. See also Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*[3], Oxford, 1892, index; Zeller, *Stoics*, etc., Eng. tr. new ed. 1880, p. 465; G. Boissier, *La Religion romaine*[4], Paris, 1892; and other reff. throughout the article. A. C. PEARSON.

ATHEISM (Indian, ancient).—The beginnings of Indian atheism can be traced back into the Vedic period. In the Rigveda the national god Indra is derided in several passages (iv. 24. 10, x. 119); and we read (ii. 12. 5, viii. 100. 3) of people who absolutely denied his existence even in those early days. We have here the first traces of that naive atheism which is so far from indulging in any philosophical reflexion that it simply refuses to believe what it cannot visualize, and which, in a later period, was known as the disbelief of the Lokāyata system; that is to say, of crass materialism (see art. LOKĀYATA).

It is different with the atheism which had grown into a conviction as the result of serious philosophical speculation; this, in distinction from the other naive form, we may describe briefly as *philosophic* atheism.

When the old Vedic religion developed into pantheism, the figures of the old gods faded and became transient creatures. But, as such, they still lived in the philosophic systems of India, even in the atheistic Sāṅkhya system (see SĀṄKHYA), and in the religions of Buddha and Mahāvīra, which found support in this system, and, like it, recognize no *real* God. Here these shadow-like gods afford an illustration of a fact which can be noted throughout the history of religion—that religious ideas belonging to earlier periods project themselves into a later and differently-conceived view of the world—one with which in essence they have ceased to have anything to do, but to which, nevertheless, they adapt themselves. In the Sāṅkhya system, in Buddhism, and in the religion of the Jains, we find the belief in the existence of gods, demi-gods, and demons, as well as in heavens and hells. But the gods are only more highly organized and happier beings than men; like the latter, they are within the *saṁsāra*, 'circle of life,' and, unless they gain the saving knowledge which enables them to withdraw from worldly existence, they are obliged to change their bodies again. Nor have they escaped the power of death; consequently they are lower than the man who has reached the highest goal. In India, recognition of these faded gods of the people has been fully reconciled with the atheistic view of the world. In the Sāṅkhya system, belief in gods who have risen to evanescent godhead (*janyeśvara*, *kāryeśvara*) has nothing whatever to do with the question of God Eternal (*nityeśvara*), as regards whom the theists assume that He made the world by His will. The use of a special term (*Iśvara*, 'the powerful') in Indian philosophy obviously arose out of the endeavour to distinguish this God even verbally from the shadow-like gods of the people (*deva*).

The positive way in which the existence of God is denied is one of the characteristic features of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, which on that account is also continually denoted as *nirīśvara* ('godless'). Again and again in the Sāṅkhyasūtras it is stated that the existence of God cannot be proved (i. 92–94, v. 2–12, 46, 126, 127, vi. 64, 65, with the respective commentaries). Having regard to the aphoristic conciseness of this work, it is clear from this frequent repetition what importance was attached by the adherents of the Sāṅkhya system to this point—the actual absence of any strict proof of the existence of God. The denial of God in the Sāṅkhya philosophy is in essence the result of the following ideas: (1) the doctrine that there is inherent in unconscious matter the force which operates with physical necessity to develop itself for the purely receptive souls; and (2) the general Indian conception of the after-effects of the actions of living beings, which instigate that natural force and guide its activity into definite channels. Other reasons seem to have contributed, especially the realization that the problem of misfortune cannot be solved by any of the speculations of theism. This idea is made use of by Vāchaspatimiśra (12th cent. A.D.) in the *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī* to *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 57, as one of the main supports of the atheistic explanation of the world. It will be useful here, we think, to give a translation of this passage, which is so important and so characteristic of Indian thought. It runs thus:

'Every conscious action is, without exception, determined either by an egoistic purpose or by kindness. Since these two motives are excluded in the case of the creation of the world, it becomes impossible to assume that the creation of the world was due to conscious action. For a God whose wishes are all fulfilled can have had no personal interest whatever in the creation of the world; the possibility of any egoistic purpose consequently disappears. But neither can God have undertaken the creation from kindness; since *before* the act of creation souls suffered no pain—senses, bodies, and objects not having come into existence yet—from what could the kindness of God wish to have souls released? If, on the other hand, we suppose that the kindness of God was shown later, when, after the act of creation, He saw His creatures full of pain, we can hardly escape the argument in a circle: creation was the result of kindness, and kindness the result of creation! Further, a God who is actuated by kindness would create only joyful creatures, but not creatures in different conditions. If to this some one objects that the difference results from the difference in that work for which individuals receive a reward from God, we reply that in that case the direction of the work on the part of that conscious, highest Being is entirely superfluous, for the effectiveness of the work performed by individuals (that is to say, the consequences of merit and guilt) fully explains itself without any supreme direction on the part of that God. . . . On the contrary, that operation of unintelligent matter which we assume has no egoistic purpose behind it, nor is kindness its motive; consequently it cannot be substantiated as against *our* theory that the stated grounds of refutation apply to it as well.'

This argument of Vāchaspatimiśra was repeated almost entirely by Mādhavāchārya (14th cent.

A.D.) in the Sāṅkhya chapter of his *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* (p. 228 of tr. by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough). These and similar reflexions had certainly already forced themselves upon Kapila, the originator of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, when he decided to take the bold step of publicly declaring for atheism. That no other doctrine in the Sāṅkhya system was so often and so fiercely attacked as this may be inferred even from the fact that Patañjali, the founder of the Yoga system (see art. YOGA), introduced the idea of a personal god in the hope that he would thus make the Sāṅkhya philosophy acceptable to his countrymen. The strict adherents of the Sāṅkhya doctrine, on the other hand, tried to derive from their own system new arguments by which to ward off the attacks made upon the denial of God. They placed first and foremost the sophistical alternative: Is God to be thought of as a free or as a fettered soul? Regarded as a *free* soul, that is to say, one not connected with a body or with any physical organ, God would be devoid of all qualities, and particularly of desire and will—the prerequisite of all creative activity; He would also be without any motive for directing the world. Regarded as a *fettered* soul, God would belong to the *saṃsāra*, and, like all other beings, would be deluded, and be hampered by human infirmities; in which case again He could not be creator and controller of the world, but only a nominal (*pāribhāṣika*) god who came into existence at the beginning of this world-period, and passes away with the end of it. If a theist raises against this argument the obvious objection that in that case God would belong neither to the free nor to the fettered souls, but must be assigned an exceptional place, he receives the answer, 'When a thing is defined as being unique in character, every basis upon which to argue is removed.'

This atheism of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, somewhat softened by the recognition of the gods of the people, was taken over, as we have already noted, into Buddhism and the religion of the Jains. But in all probability it also had an influence upon two schools of Brāhman philosophy—the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya (see the two articles). These two schools were originally atheistic, and did not go over to theism until after their amalgamation.

LITERATURE.—R Garbe, *Die Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1894; L. Suali, in *Muséon*, new ser. IX. 277-298; F. Max Muller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899; P. Deussen, *Philosophie der Upanishads*, Leipzig, 1899 (Eng tr., Edin. 1905, esp. pp. 238, 407). See also artt. SĀṄKHYA, YOGA.

R. GARBE.

ATHEISM (Indian, modern).—In modern India, philosophic atheism still survives in the religion of the Jains. (For Jain and Buddhist atheism see the special articles.) As regards the materialism professed by the ancient Lokāyatas, the modern predominance of a religious attitude founded on *bhakti*, or faith devoted to a personal Supreme Deity, has practically extinguished it. Sporadic attempts to revive it have been made by isolated teachers, with but small success. The best known of these was the composition of the *Sānisār*, or 'Essence of Emptiness,' by a religious mendicant named Bakhtāwar, the promulgator of the so-called *Śūnyavādī* doctrine. He flourished in the early part of the 19th cent. under the patronage of Dayā Rām, a Jāt Rājā of Hāthras in the central Gangetic Doab. Bakhtāwar's teaching went a step beyond simple materialism, and was an attempt to popularize it. According to him, nothing—God, or man, or any material object—exists. All is emptiness (*śūnyatā*). The one thing that exists is the Ego, and all conceptions are but reflexions of this Ego. 'It is an error,' he says, 'to think that the reflexion of my face in a glass is not my face, but is that of another. Similarly, whatever you see elsewhere is but yourself, and father and mother are non-entities. You are the infant and the old man, you are the wise man and the fool, the male and the female. It is you who are drowned in the stream, and it is you who pass over safely. You are the killer and the slain, the slayer and the eater, the king and the subject. You seize yourself and let go, you sleep and you wake; you dance for yourself and you sing for yourself. You are the sensualist and the ascetic, the sick man and the strong. In short, whatever you see, that is you, as bubbles, surf, and billows are all but water' (Wilson, *Rel. Sects*, 361).

It was not to be expected that such a dreary creed would retain many adherents, and it is doubtful if the few who were first attracted by it have left any representatives at the present day.

The atheism of the Sāṅkhya school is still professed by those learned men who follow that system of philosophy, and these and the Jains are the only real atheists of modern India.

LITERATURE.—Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus*, Lond. 1862, 359 ff.

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

ATHEISM (Jain).—Jainism is atheistical, if by atheism we understand the belief that there is no eternal Supreme God, Creator and Lord of all things; for the Jains flatly deny such a Supreme God. Nor need it surprise us that atheism should be essential to a religious system; for even the most orthodox Brāhmanical theologians, the Mīmāṁsakas of Kumārilabhatta's school, deny the existence of a Supreme God, though, of course, on other grounds than those of the Jains (see *Ślokavārtika*, sec. 16, Calcutta, 1907).

The Jains admit the existence of innumerable gods of many kinds and various degrees of perfection. But none of these gods is eternal; however long their life, it must come to an end when the merit of the god in question is exhausted. The longest life of a celestial being is that in the highest heaven Sarvārthasiddhi, which lasts between 32 and 33 *sāgaropamas* ('oceans of years'). Gods are embodied souls, just like men or animals, differing from them in degree, not in kind; for their greater power and perfection appertain to their divine body and organization, which is the reward for their good deeds in a former life, and which they lose on the exhaustion of their merit, to be born again in some other state of life. But those souls who are not born again, or, in other words, are liberated, go up to the top of the universe and remain there for ever in the state of absolute perfection; they have no longer any connexion with the world, and cannot, therefore, have any influence upon it. Accordingly the functions of a Supreme God, as Lord and Ruler of the world, cannot be attributed to liberated souls; and as the not yet liberated souls, *i.e.* the souls in the state of bondage, are subject to re-birth, none of them can be regarded as an eternal God. Therefore the Jains cannot acknowledge a Supreme God in our sense of the word.

Following up their theoretical views on this point, the Jains have strenuously combated, and denounced the fallacies of, the arguments by which the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers tried to prove the existence of an eternal and omniscient God as Creator and Ruler of all things, viz. the famous argument that all things, being products, presuppose a maker who has an intimate knowledge of their material cause. The refutation of this argument will be found in the *Syādvādamañjarī*, in the *Commentary on the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuchchaya*, and many similar works. The Jains also controvert the views of the Vedāntins and of the followers of the Yoga philosophy regarding Brahman or Īśvara as the Supreme God and Cause

of the world. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas seem to have been their most formidable opponents in this controversy about the existence of God.

Though the Jains are undoubtedly atheistical, as we understand the term, still they would probably object to being styled atheists. While admitting that the world is without beginning or end, and therefore not produced by a god, or ruled by one, they recognize a highest deity (*paramadevatā*) as the object of veneration, viz. the Jina, *i.e.* the teacher of the sacred Law, who, being absolutely free from all passions and delusion, and being possessed of omniscience, has reached absolute perfection after having annihilated all his *karma* (*Ṣaddarśanasamuchchaya*, 45 f., Calcutta, 1907). It must be remarked, however, that there are innumerable Jinas who, having proclaimed the sacred Law, have reached perfection, and have passed out of this world of change and woe. Prayers are addressed to them by the faithful, just as if they did or would bestow happiness and bliss on the devout adorer; but, of course, a Jina cannot show favour to anybody, as he is utterly indifferent to all that belongs to the world, and is entirely free from all emotions. He therefore does not reward the adorers or satisfy their wishes, but in his stead the gods who watch and control true Discipline (*śāsanādhiṣṭhāyikā devatās*) hear their prayers; for the practice of the discipline taught by the Jinas is the best mode of worshipping them. In the case of spiritual gifts vouchsafed to the worshipper, the explanation given comes to this: the adoration of the Jina purifies and sanctifies the soul of the worshipper through his meditating on the perfections of the Jinas. In this sense the Jinas are regarded as the highest deity (*paramadevatā*); temples are erected for their worship, and a kind of divine service is instituted in them on the model of that practised in Hindu temples.

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1. Atheism in ancient Israel.—Nevertheless there are passages to be found in the OT from which we can conclude that disbelief in the existence of God (or gods) was extant among the people in pre-exilic times, and that this disbelief was regarded by the prophets and psalmists as the source of the wickedness of the masses. It is also likely that the polytheism and idolatry against which the prophets contended were not the result of genuine superstition, but of real indifference towards all the gods served, whose worship was merely a pretext for indulgence in all kinds of licence and crime, and whose recognition was prompted mostly by political and social considerations. But the reason for this unbelief was always supposed to be thoughtlessness, indifference, ignorance, sensuality. There was no system of thought leading to the denial of God which the prophets deemed it necessary to combat. They merely wished to awake the people and to induce them to shake off their indifference. Jeremiah very often speaks in this tenor. The most outspoken passage is Jer 5^{12} 'They have denied the Lord, and said, He is not.' Here the prophet has in view the more intelligent members of his race, 'the great men' who ought to 'know the way of the Lord' (5^5). While pleading absolute ignorance and folly for the degraded masses with whom it would be useless to argue (5^4), he addresses himself to the leaders who are avowed atheists. The fact that they swear by the name of Jahweh (5^2) does not contradict the assumption that the prophet accuses the people of practical atheism. As their oaths are false, the perjurers only misuse the name of Jahweh without believing in His existence. Jeremiah employs the cosmological proof for the existence of God ($5^{20\text{-}25}$), in order to convince the people of their folly. But the confident use of the proof makes it quite clear that he merely intends to dispel the thoughtlessness of the people, and not to refute any antagonistic theories concerning the natural phenomena he refers to (cf. also Is 32^6, Pr $30^{1\text{-}4}$, Ps 12. 36. 58^{11} 74). Psalms 10 and 14 (53) contain passionate outbursts against the *nābhāl* ('impious,' 'fool') who denies the existence of God, and thus degenerates into a dangerous criminal. 'The impious says in his heart, There is no God' (Ps 14^1). 'The wicked in the haughtiness of his countenance saith, He will not require. All his thoughts are: There is no God' (Ps 10^4). The *nābhāl*, however, typifies the whole people. 'There is none that doeth good, no, not one.' It is not likely that Ps 14^1 refers to Edom or some other enemy of Israel (see Baethgen, *Psalmen*[3], p. 36, Delitzsch, and others; the reading of 'Gebal' by Cheyne seems quite unfounded). Here it is the reckless ignoring or denial of the omniscience of God or His very existence that is dwelt upon by the psalmist as the immediate cause of the moral decay of the Jewish people (which in the end must lead also to political ruin). Atheism and immorality are regarded as being inseparably connected with each other.

2. Post-exilic times.—In late post-exilic times we lose sight of any atheistic tendencies that may have existed among the Jews, for there were no more prophets to chronicle the sins of the people. Moreover, the contact with Babylonian culture had given rise to the mythical beliefs which from the days of Ezekiel became identified with Judaism, and which have found definite recognition in the Talmudic and Rabbinic literature. Again, the revival of the religious and national spirit under Ezra was destined to dispel that ignorance and thoughtlessness of which Jeremiah and the psalmists complained, and the second Temple could not very well accommodate arrogant and defiant unbelievers. The influence of Hellenism was no doubt responsible for the slackening of religious fervour and the loss of national self-consciousness during the period immediately preceding the time of the Maccabæans, but that influence never went so far as to cause the Jews to adopt the Greek Pantheon or to deny the existence of an invisible God. It was their unflinching faith in their only (invisible) God that later on prevented the Jews in Alexandria and elsewhere from joining their fellow-citizens in the worship of the local deities, and created the feelings of hatred which resulted in the curious charge of 'atheism' being made against the Jews—a charge which Josephus refuted with great vigour (Josephus, *c. Apionem*, ii. § 6).

3. Philo against Atheism.—Jewish thinkers, however, have never ignored atheism. Philo devotes two chapters in his *de Somnus* (§§ 43, 44) to a refutation of all atheistic doctrines from a Jewish standpoint. The wicked say that 'this Universe is the only thing which is perceptible to the outward senses, and visible, having never been created, and being destined never to be destroyed, but being

A.D.) in the Sāṅkhya chapter of his *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* (p. 228 of tr. by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough). These and similar reflexions had certainly already forced themselves upon Kapila, the originator of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, when he decided to take the bold step of publicly declaring for atheism. That no other doctrine in the Sāṅkhya system was so often and so fiercely attacked as this may be inferred even from the fact that Patañjali, the founder of the Yoga system (see art. YOGA), introduced the idea of a personal god in the hope that he would thus make the Sāṅkhya philosophy acceptable to his countrymen. The strict adherents of the Sāṅkhya doctrine, on the other hand, tried to derive from their own system new arguments by which to ward off the attacks made upon the denial of God. They placed first and foremost the sophistical alternative: Is God to be thought of as a free or as a fettered soul? Regarded as a *free* soul, that is to say, one not connected with a body or with any physical organ, God would be devoid of all qualities, and particularly of desire and will—the prerequisite of all creative activity; He would also be without any motive for directing the world. Regarded as a *fettered* soul, God would belong to the *saṁsāra*, and, like all other beings, would be deluded, and be hampered by human infirmities; in which case again He could not be creator and controller of the world, but only a nominal (*pāribhāṣika*) god who came into existence at the beginning of this world-period, and passes away with the end of it. If a theist raises against this argument the obvious objection that in that case God would belong neither to the free nor to the fettered souls, but must be assigned an exceptional place, he receives the answer, 'When a thing is defined as being unique in character, every basis upon which to argue is removed.'

This atheism of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, somewhat softened by the recognition of the gods of the people, was taken over, as we have already noted, into Buddhism and the religion of the Jains. But in all probability it also had an influence upon two schools of Brāhman philosophy—the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya (see the two articles). These two schools were originally atheistic, and did not go over to theism until after their amalgamation.

LITERATURE.—**R. Garbe**, *Die Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1894; **L. Suali**, in *Muséon*, new ser. ix. 277-298; **F. Max Muller**, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899; **P. Deussen**, *Philosophie der Upanishads*, Leipzig, 1899 (Eng. tr., Edin. 1905, esp. pp. 238, 407). See also artt. SAṄKHYA, YOGA.

R. GARBE.

ATHEISM (Indian, modern).—In modern India, philosophic atheism still survives in the religion of the Jains. (For Jain and Buddhist atheism see the special articles.) As regards the materialism professed by the ancient Lokāyatas, the modern predominance of a religious attitude founded on *bhakti*, or faith devoted to a personal Supreme Deity, has practically extinguished it. Sporadic attempts to revive it have been made by isolated teachers, with but small success. The best known of these was the composition of the *Sānīsār*, or 'Essence of Emptiness,' by a religious mendicant named Bakhtāwar, the promulgator of the so-called *Śūnyavādī* doctrine. He flourished in the early part of the 19th cent. under the patronage of Dayā Rām, a Jāt Rājā of Hāthras in the central Gangetic Doab. Bakhtāwar's teaching went a step beyond simple materialism, and was an attempt to popularize it. According to him, nothing—God, or man, or any material object—exists. All is emptiness (*śūnyatā*). The one thing that exists is the Ego, and all conceptions are but reflexions of this Ego. 'It is an error,' he says, 'to think that the reflexion of my face in a glass is not my face, but is that of another. Similarly, whatever you see elsewhere is but yourself, and father and mother are non-entities. You are the infant and the old man, you are the wise man and the fool, the male and the female. It is you who are drowned in the stream, and it is you who pass over safely. You are the killer and the slain, the slayer and the eater, the king and the subject. You seize yourself and let go, you sleep and you wake; you dance for yourself and you sing for yourself. You are the sensualist and the ascetic, the sick man and the strong. In short, whatever you see, that is you, as bubbles, surf, and billows are all but water' (Wilson, *Rel. Sects*, 361).

It was not to be expected that such a dreary creed would retain many adherents, and it is doubtful if the few who were first attracted by it have left any representatives at the present day.

The atheism of the Sāṅkhya school is still professed by those learned men who follow that system of philosophy, and these and the Jains are the only real atheists of modern India.

LITERATURE.—Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus*, Lond. 1862, 359 ff.

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

ATHEISM (Jain).—Jainism is atheistical, if by atheism we understand the belief that there is no eternal Supreme God, Creator and Lord of all things; for the Jains flatly deny such a Supreme God. Nor need it surprise us that atheism should be essential to a religious system; for even the most orthodox Brāhmanical theologians, the Mīmāṁsakas of Kumārilabhaṭṭa's school, deny the existence of a Supreme God, though, of course, on other grounds than those of the Jains (see *Ślokavārtika*, sec. 16, Calcutta, 1907).

The Jains admit the existence of innumerable gods of many kinds and various degrees of perfection. But none of these gods is eternal; however long their life, it must come to an end when the merit of the god in question is exhausted. The longest life of a celestial being is that in the highest heaven Sarvārthasiddhi, which lasts between 32 and 33 *sāgaropamas* ('oceans of years'). Gods are embodied souls, just like men or animals, differing from them in degree, not in kind; for their greater power and perfection appertain to their divine body and organization, which is the reward for their good deeds in a former life, and which they lose on the exhaustion of their merit, to be born again in some other state of life. But those souls who are not born again, or, in other words, are liberated, go up to the top of the universe and remain there for ever in the state of absolute perfection; they have no longer any connexion with the world, and cannot, therefore, have any influence upon it. Accordingly the functions of a Supreme God, as Lord and Ruler of the world, cannot be attributed to liberated souls; and as the not yet liberated souls, *i.e.* the souls in the state of bondage, are subject to re-birth, none of them can be regarded as an eternal God. Therefore the Jains cannot acknowledge a Supreme God in our sense of the word.

Following up their theoretical views on this point, the Jains have strenuously combated, and denounced the fallacies of, the arguments by which the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers tried to prove the existence of an eternal and omniscient God as Creator and Ruler of all things, viz. the famous argument that all things, being products, presuppose a maker who has an intimate knowledge of their material cause. The refutation of this argument will be found in the *Syādvādamañjarī*, in the *Commentary on the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuchchaya*, and many similar works. The Jains also controvert the views of the Vedāntins and of the followers of the Yoga philosophy regarding Brahman or Īśvara as the Supreme God and Cause

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uncreated and imperishable, not requiring any superintendence or care, or regulation, or management.' This view must lead to universal disorder and anarchy, that means to the ruin of mankind (*ib.* § 44). All that uphold this view are sure to meet with severe but well-deserved punishment, as all wicked people always do (§ 45). The world cannot exist without a ruler, as a house cannot exist without a master, or a country without a leader (*ib.*).

4. Atheism in Talmudic and Rabbinic literature.—The final ruin of the Jewish nation and its great humiliation by the Romans in the 1st cent. after Christ made reckless ignoring or denying of the existence of God impossible. The deepening of the religious sense and the attachment to the great literary products of the past caused by the downfall led to the development of the Talmudic and Rabbinic literature, which henceforth dominated Judaism and put an end to atheistic beliefs and practices. There is no reference in the Talmud to theoretical atheism, and no attempt is made to prove the existence of God. The *Min* or the *Apikoros* (Epicurean) is not necessarily an atheist, but one who denies one of the principles of the Jewish faith. Immortality, Resurrection, Divine origin of the Law, and several other tenets are of equal importance with the belief in God as regards the application of the above designations. The term that approaches most closely the meaning of the word 'atheist' is *kofer be' ikkar* (*i.e.* 'one who denies the first principle'), which occurs for the first time in Bab. *Shabbath*, 16*b*, and is frequently used in modern Rabbinic literature.

Among the Jewish thinkers and religious philosophers of the Middle Ages, there was none who denied the existence of God or could in any way be described as an atheist (although pantheistic ideas are frequently to be found in their works). The problem of reconciling Aristotle with the Bible necessitated the discussion of the question of creation, of the attributes of God, and of the eternity of matter (maintained by the Muhammadan atheists and adopted by Crescas), but the existence of a free, personal God had never been questioned by any Jewish philosopher down to Spinoza.

5. Spinoza.—Spinoza himself can scarcely be described as an atheist. To an atheist nature is possible without God, and matter is responsible to itself—not to mind—for its existence and development. Mind is altogether denied, for the assumption of mind is incompatible with the materialistic conception of the Universe which leads to atheism. Spinoza denies the existence of anything beyond God. Mind and matter are attributes of the same substance, of *deus* (*sive natura*). Certainly there is no free, personal God in existence according to Spinoza, and in a religious sense this amounts to atheism. But man himself is part of God, and is thus in no need of worshipping any Deity. It is the 'intellectual love of God' that makes man perfect—an idea which, although vague and capable of various interpretations, is incompatible with consistent atheism. The influence of the Jewish religious philosophy on Spinoza was too great to allow him to become anything but a pantheist.

6. Modern Jewry.—The philosophical views and ideas of modern Jews are so closely connected with the standard of culture and the ideas of the nations among whom they live, that they do not admit of separate treatment. Every school of thought has its Jewish followers, and Buchner, Darwin, and Haeckel are just as popular among free-thinking Jews as they are among free-thinking Christians. But the charge often made against modern Jews, that the proportion of atheists among them is greater than among their Christian neighbours, is unfounded. There is scarcely a Jewish thinker to be found who has included atheism in his system, while the great masses of the Jewish people all over the globe still faithfully believe in the God of their fathers, and twice daily proclaim their faith in the words of Moses: 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one.' In the last decade or two there has been a tendency growing among the Jewish proletariat of the East of Europe to combine doctrines of atheism and hatred of religion with their socialistic ideas. The well-educated leaders of the working classes succeeded in spreading those doctrines among the young Jewish workers, by providing them with the necessary literature in their own Yiddish language by translation from the European languages. But the rise of the Jewish national (Zionist) movement has in the last few years proved most effective in stopping the growth of those tendencies, and is now bringing the despairing, ill-treated, starving Jewish labourer back to the camp of Israel and to the God of his fathers. With the revival of the hope for better times, the belief in God's mercy and omnipotence has also been revived. A great truth is expressed in the saying of the Rabbins: 'Israel, and the Law, and the Holy One (blessed be He!) are one.' Israel cannot exist without a firm belief in his God, 'the one and only God, the Creator and Ruler of the Universe.'

LITERATURE.—**D. Neumark**, *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1907; **G. S. Spiegler**, *Geschichte der Philosophie des Judentums*, Leipzig, 1890; **T. K. Cheyne**, *The Book of Psalms*, London, 1888 (pp. 33–35); art. 'Atheism' in *JE*, and in Hamburger.

SALIS DAICHES.

ATHEISM (Muhammadan).—The Muslim world has at no time been a favourable soil for the growth or continuation of agnosticism, and in Arabic literature unorthodox tenets of all sorts are apt to be described by the word *zandaqah*, which, though of uncertain origin (being derived by some from the Syriac, by others from the Persian), is probably the correct term for such systems as deny the existence of a personal God and the moral government of the world. Another name for the holders of such opinions is derived from the word *dahr*, 'time,' and signifies 'believers in the eternity of the world,' *i.e.* in its having no beginning. The earliest persons credited with these doctrines are certain of Muhammad's Meccan opponents, including the leader of the long-continued opposition against him, Abū Sufyān b. Umayyah, who are all supposed to have learned their 'atheism' from the Christians of the Ḥarrah [? Ḥīrah] (Tha'ālibī, *Laṭā' if al-ma'ārif*, p. 64). The charge against Abū Sufyān is not borne out by history, and of the others we know too little to estimate its probability; but the supposition that such opinions would originate from Christians, and especially monks, seems to have been due to the cultivation by Oriental Christians of certain forms of Greek philosophy; whence, in the legend that tells us how the Khalīf Ma'mūn (ob. A.D. 833) acquired his library of Greek books, the Greek king is advised to send his library to the Muslim ruler on the ground that 'these sciences' have never been engrafted on a religious system without ruining it.

In early Arabic writers the system of the *Zindīqs* seems to be inextricably confused with that of Manes, whose followers were fiercely persecuted by the early Abbāsids. The *locus classicus* on the subject for the early Abbāsid period is in the *Zoology* (iv. 141–144) of Jāḥiẓ (ob. A.D. 869), where, however, a *Zindīq* is confuted by the Khalīf Ma'mūn by means of a puzzle which could only trouble one who believed in dualism. The verses which the author cites show, nevertheless, that the

persons with whom he is dealing held the leading tenets of the atheists: 'You have given presents,' says Ḥammād 'Ajarrad in a lampoon on 'Umārah b. Ḥarbiyyah, 'to one who asserts that the heavens made themselves, and that the earth was not laid out by its Creator.' On this the author makes the curious remark that no one asserts that the universe with its organization came of itself, and that Ḥammād's ascription of this doctrine to the persons whom he lampoons might count as a proof that he held them innocent; and that, in fact, the satirist was himself a colleague of the objects of his lampoon. Jāḥiẓ then proceeds to enumerate the persons who constituted this society of sceptics, and his list contains some names that are familiar from the *Kitāb al-Aghānī*, while others are more obscure: Ḥammād 'Ajarrad, Ḥammād the Reciter, Ḥammād b. al-Zibriqān, Yūnus b. Hārūn, 'Alī b. al-Khalīl, Yazīd b. al-Faid, 'Ubādah, Jamīl b. Maḥfūẓ, Qāsim, Muṭī', Wālibah b. al-Ḥabbāb, Abān b. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, 'Umārah b. Ḥarbiyyah. 'All these were in constant communication, and might be considered one person.' Of these, Yūnus addressed a pamphlet to the Byzantine emperor, showing up the vices of the Arabs and the defects of Islām. Abān figures in a satire by the well-known poet Abū Nuwās (ob. A.D. 810), partly as a follower of Manes, but partly as a rationalist:

'I sat one day with Abān (plague on him!), when the time for the first prayer came, and the call was duly uttered by a correct and clear-voiced speaker.

We all repeated the call to prayer to the end. Then said Aban: "How could you testify to that [*i.e.* the Muslim formula of faith] without ocular demonstration? So long as I live I shall never attest anything but what I see with my eyes." Then I said: "Glory to God"; he said: "Glory to Manes." I said: "Jesus was an Apostle"; he said: "Of Satan." I continued: "Moses was the interlocutor of the Gracious and Faithful One", he said: "Then your God must have a tongue and an eye. And did He create Himself, or who created Him?" So I held my tongue before this obstinate blasphemer.'

The poet then gives a list of sceptics, containing several of the names that have already been mentioned. In the tales told about them in the *Kitāb al-Aghānī* they are not distinguished from dualists, and 'their book,' which was said to be in the hands of the daughter of Muṭī' b. Iyās when arrested for *zandaqah*, was probably the work ascribed to Manes. In Ṭabarī, iii. 588 (A.D. 786), an account is given of their system which is clearly more positive than negative, enjoining washings, to which Jāḥiẓ (*loc. cit.*) adds respect for animal life and vagrancy.

'Vagrancy means with them that they may not abide two nights in the same dwelling; the vagrants among them always wander in pairs, and adopt four rules—saintliness, purity, veracity, and poverty.'

The author then tells a story about two of these *Zindīqs*, who suffered themselves to be beaten almost to death on suspicion of stealing jewels which they had seen an ostrich swallow, rather than let any harm happen to the ostrich. From these 'atheists' *par excellence* other free-thinkers were careful to distinguish themselves: *e.g.* the poet Basshār b. Burd (ob. A.D. 783), who himself had a reputation for unorthodoxy, and in one of his verses prayed to the Prophet Muhammad to join with him in an attack upon the Deity. Abū Nuwās himself was severely punished for being a 'dualist,' because he ridiculed the angels (Ṭabarī, iii. 964).

Although this sect was persecuted almost to extermination in the 2nd cent. of Islām, this fact did not prevent the rise of other systems branded by the orthodox as 'atheistic.'

The most famous founder of a system of the sort in the latter part of this and the first half of the 3rd Islāmic cent. was Abu'l-Ḥusain Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Rāwandī, reckoned by later historians as one of the three *Zindīqs* of Islām. A sect bearing the name Rāwandī is mentioned by Ṭabarī shortly after the accession of Manṣūr (A.H. 140 [A.D. 757–8]). They came from Rāwand in the country between Qashān and Iṣfahān, and held the strange opinion that Manṣūr was himself the Deity. Aḥmad al-Rāwandī was somewhat later, as he died in A.H. 245 or 250, but as early as A.H. 189 he recited his works in Baghdad. His followers were also called *abnā'u al-daulah*, 'sons of the Empire,' with reference to a book by him called 'The Empire,' in about 2000 leaves. He appears to have taught the eternity of matter, as a book was written in refutation of his opinion that 'a body could not be created out of nothing.'*

Besides sectarians, there were persons of importance notorious for holding liberal opinions at most periods of the Khalīfate. In the 2nd cent., atheistic verses, it is said, were composed by the Umayyad Khalīf Yazīd b. al-Walīd b. 'Abd al-Malik (ob. A.D. 744; *Aghānī* vi. 123), who also displayed great contempt for the ordinances of religion. In the 3rd cent. the poet Abū Tammām (ob. A.H. 231 [A.D. 846]) had this reputation, though his extant poems appear to show no trace of unorthodoxy. It was earned with apparently more justice by his successor as chief poet in the following century, Abu'l-Ṭayyib Aḥmad al-Mutanabbī (ob. A.H. 354 [A.D. 965]), whose brilliant odes are, in the opinion of Muslim critics, defaced by utterances which imply disrespect for prophets and revealed religion. His most offensive line in their opinion is one in which he tells his patron, an 'Alid, 'the greatest miracle of the man of Tihāmah (*i.e.* Muhammad) is that he is thy father'; in another he tells a patron that if his sword had hit the head of Lazarus on the battlefield, Jesus would not have been able to restore him to life; and that if the Red Sea had been like his hand, Moses could never have crossed it.

Somewhat later in the 4th cent. of Islām comes the second of the great *Zindīqs*, Abū Ḥayyān 'Alī al-Tauḥīdī (ob. A.H. *c.* 400 [A.D. 1009]), whose works are said to have been more dangerous than those of the others, because, while the others proclaimed their unbelief, he expressed his in innuendoes. Such of his works as are now accessible seem harmless and even pious. Still, in a story told by him in an apparently lost book, copied by Yāqūt in his *Dictionary of Learned Men* (ii. 45–51), he pours ridicule on a secretary of State who is advised by his friends to study Euclid, but finds heresy in the first two definitions, and so will proceed no further. And, indeed, the study of Greek philosophy, of which portions were translated or travestied in Arabic, and taught to aspirants after the medical profession, was generally thought to indicate atheism; and 'the naturalists and physicians,' with whom the astrologer is sometimes joined, are said to deny the resurrection of the body, and therewith the future life.

It is curious that the writer who brings this accusation is himself the third of the great *Zindīqs*, Abu' l-'Alā Aḥmad b. 'Abdallah of Ma'arrah (ob. 1057 A.D.), 'discovered' by Alfred von Kremer, who translated many of his verses. Three of his works in particular were supposed to be tainted with unbelief: the *Luzūmiyyāt*, 'Double Rhymes,' made familiar by von Kremer; the 'Divine Forgiveness,' epitomized by R. A. Nicholson in *JRAS*, 1902; and a volume of poems called 'I ask pardon, and do thou ask it,' of which the present writer has collected some fragments in his dissertation, 'Index operum Abu' l-'Alæ Ma'arrensis,' in the volume of studies in memory of Amari. The most considerable collection of heretical or atheistic

* One of his criticisms on the Qur'ān is quoted in the *Letters* of Hamadhānī (ob. A.H. 396 [A.D. 1005–6]), ed. Beyrut, p. 18. He asked the grammarian Ibn 'Arābī whether 'to make one taste the garment of hunger' (*Qur.* xvi. 113) was really an Arabic phrase.

epigrams composed by or attributed to this author is to be found in Yāqūt's *Dictionary of Learned Men* (i. 189-194); and, indeed, they seem to go in the direction of agnosticism as far as it is possible to go. All known religions are branded as error. Mankind consists of two classes—the wise who have no religion, and the fools who are religious. The real meaning of the assertion that there is a Creator outside space and time is that he who asserts it has no intellect.

'Do not suppose the statements of the Prophets to be true; they are all fabrications. Men lived comfortably till they came and spoiled life. The "sacred books" are only such a set of idle tales as any age could have and indeed did actually produce. What inconsistency that God should forbid the taking of life, and Himself send two angels to take each man's! And as for the promise of a second life—the soul could well have dispensed with both existences.'

It is remarkable that the author should also have preached vegetarianism in an extreme form, as apparently was done by the earlier *Zindīqs*; still more, that he should have devoted much of his time to the composition of sermons and other works of an edifying character.

In orthodox circles the possession of philosophical books long continued to be an indication of heretical tendencies, and the burning of such books by authority was not uncommon. The employment of Avicenna and similar students of Greek systems in government offices was unpopular, and is condemned by historians. In the 6th cent. of Islām there was a considerable development of pantheistic Ṣūfiism, which produced a series of works which, under pretence of orthodoxy and devoutness, in reality substituted for the personal God and the future life of Islām notions that were irreconcilable with either and were supported by an interpretation of the Qur'ān so far-fetched as to be ludicrous and irreverent. The most famous of these are the poem of Ibn al-Fāriḍ (556 632 A.H. [A.D. 1161-1235]), called from its rhyme *Tā'iyyah*, and the treatise of Ibn 'Arabī (550-638 A.H. [A.D. 1155-1240]) called *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, 'Gems of Maxims.' Both these works at different times brought their owners into danger, and were the cause of riots (see Ibn Iyās, *History of Egypt*, ii. 119 [875 A.H.] and 219 [888 A.H.], where the latter book is described as the work of a worse unbeliever than Jew, Christian, or Idolater). Of the comments on the Qur'ān which this work contains it is sufficient to cite that on the story of the Golden Calf; according to Ibn 'Arabī (or the Prophet, who revealed this work to him in a dream), Moses found fault with his brother for not approving of the worship of the Calf, since Aaron should have known that nothing but God could ever be worshipped, and therefore the Calf was (like everything else) God.

Refutation of the opinions of the 'atheists' was one of the purposes of the science called *kalām*, or metaphysical theology. They are divided by the theologian Ghazālī (ob. 505 A.H. [A.D. 1111]), in his treatise called *Al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, into three classes: the *duhrīs*, 'an ancient sect who denied the Creator, maintained the eternity of the world, and the eternity of generation,—these are the *zindīqs*'; the 'Naturalists,' who allow the existence of a Creator, but suppose the life and soul to be the result of the admixture of elements and humours in the body, and to cease at death; and the 'Deists,' viz. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and their followers.

A somewhat different division is given in the treatise on *Sects* by Ibn Ḥazm (ob. 456 A.H. [A.D. 1064]), where, after refutation of the Sophists, who make knowledge either non-existent or relative, the author deals with those who (1) say the world is eternal, without Creator or Governor; (2) say that the world is eternal, with a Creator and Governor; (3) say that, besides God, Time, Space, and the Soul are eternal. In addition to the other names that have been mentioned, this author gives the believers in these positions the name *mulḥid*, 'heretic,' and gives the name of one of the upholders of the first as 'Abdallah b. 'Abdallah b. Shunaif. It could not be expected that many names of the supporters of such unpopular opinions would be recorded.

LITERATURE.—There is no treatise, so far as we are aware, in any European language bearing on the subject. The original sources are given in the course of the article.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

ATHLETICS, ATHLETICISM. — Athleticism, notwithstanding the great and elaborate developments which have taken place in the last hundred years, is to be understood only as an expression of a very primitive instinct—the instinct to play. All the evolution of twentieth century sports and games—the elaboration of rules, the development of muscle and nerve—is a provision for the impulse, the same in lambkins and in babies, in savages and in civilized men and women, to stretch their limbs, to overcome elemental forces, to contend against self-imposed difficulties and against each other.

It is interesting, in an attempt to analyze athleticism or to review athletics, to note the various forms of amusement which have sprung from that instinct to gambol, and the various factors in modern sports which make them appeal to various people. It is impossible to treat the subject exhaustively; one could scarcely enumerate all the different kinds of sport, much less discuss them. There are, however, some points worthy of consideration as suggesting the different kinds of development in physique and in character, acquired by different forms of exercise. Walking, running, leaping, dancing, hill-climbing, and swimming are our simplest sports. In these a man pits himself against natural difficulties, for the most part fighting against the force of gravity, and develops muscle and nerve in comparatively gross combinations of movements. In other words, there is achieved by these primitive exercises the kind of development of muscle and nerve which all young animals achieve when they learn to disport themselves in air, on land, or in water. That is the elementary stage of athletics, very like what the savage attains to when he executes a war-dance. It represents the demand of the body to be allowed to grow to its full stature—and a little over. The surplus we call *play*. In these days the same kind of simple development is achieved by such exercises as are now in England associated with the name of Sandow. If one has not opportunity to climb hills or battle with waves, one may 'bring up' the muscles by daily contest with improvised forces of an elastic nature, when the strain and the stress are finely adjusted and each day's ambition is to increase both. At this level of athleticism there seem to be only two kinds of gain—the opportunity to get rid of surplus energy, and the function of the muscle substance and the skin in disposing of elements in the blood which clog the vital mechanism.

Another kind of effect is experienced when implements are introduced for outdoor sport. About the simplest of exercises at this level are stilt-walking and pole-vaulting, and here we begin to realize a development which can never be achieved by primitive exercises. The feeling one has in pole-vaulting, when, by his own effort, he raises himself on a pole over a nine-foot fence, is quite different from the effect in simple high leaping. So also is the effect of high stilt-walking. In both of these there is demanded also a skill in movement which, added to the pleasant sensation,

makes a nerve-muscle combination on a plane much higher than that of natural movements.

This brings us to the innumerable varieties of games in which a ball of some kind is used. Of these football is the most elementary, so far as the impedimenta of the game are concerned. There has always been a great difference of opinion as to whether the Rugby or the Association game is the better, but the discussion is idle, for the two games are not comparable. The feeling and the skill in a Rugby game when one plays with an oval ball and is allowed to use one's hands freely, are obviously quite different from those of an Association game, which is played with a round ball and in which the use of the hands is not allowed. The same sort of idle dispute is waged over the respective advantages of golf and cricket. The two games have little in common, except that, in both, one tries to strike a ball with an implement under conditions which usually make the stroke difficult, and in those who are skilful at such games the nerve-muscle development is of a very high order. The same, of course, is true of other games—lacrosse, hockey, tennis, racquets, lawn-tennis, croquet, and the rest. A most important change comes about when the athlete employs something to carry him—a boat to row in or to sail, a bicycle, motor, or horse. The game of polo is probably the most athletic of all games. It develops strength and endurance; it requires co-operation between man and beast which is always inspiriting; and to be able to strike a ball which may be moving with great rapidity, the striker himself riding at breakneck speed, while all the time one hand is engaged with the pony, betokens a development of eye and nerve and muscle of the highest order. One is naturally tempted to pass from polo to other forms of horseback exercise, but one may not dwell upon the glories of the chase.

1. The *hygienic* effect of athleticism is its first justification. The contribution to the health of the community derived from sports is incalculable. It consists chiefly in the development of the chest from full breathing of fresh air; in the increase in the circulation from the acceleration of the heart's action; in the quickening of appetite and the promotion of digestion; in the elimination of waste products achieved by muscular exercise, rapid breathing, and perspiration; and, perhaps most important of all, in the rest and change it affords to a tired and dull brain. When we hear any one ask what form of exercise would be best for him, our answer, especially in the case of adults, should almost invariably be—that which he most enjoys. Even exercises so mild as bowling and croquet promote nearly all the good results just enumerated if entered into with zest and keenly pursued. On the other hand, caution should be exercised lest excess of effort lead to injury. The most important ill effect and one not sufficiently considered and often entirely overlooked, is a dilatation or strain of the heart. This sometimes occurs in young people who are pressed to do too much. Boys at school may suffer irreparable injury from being made to play a strenuous game of football, or take a long cross-country run, when they are not toned up to the effort. More frequently heart-strain occurs in adults who are of a sporting nature—men who, perhaps on the occasion of their school sports, come ill-conditioned from the desk and try a quarter-mile race; or who tramp for eight hours on 'the Twelfth' without preparation; or who are carried away in the Christmas vacation, after weeks of muscular idleness, and ride to the finish on their first day with hounds. The next most important injury is perhaps apoplexy—a rupture of a blood-vessel. We read frequently of some one having suffered a paralytic shock when engaged in sport, and that means that he has neglected his exercises and allowed his blood-vessels to become hard, then has subjected them to an unwonted stress. It is doubtful if bones become brittle from want of exercise, though some authorities maintain that they do. It is certain that, without exercise, muscles become flabby and cannot meet unwonted demands of a severe kind. In wrestling, for example, which has become very popular of late (and deservedly so, for it calls into play more functions than any other game not implemented by tools), one is apt to ask the bones and muscles to do too much, and strain and laceration of muscle are very likely to follow. The lesson to be gathered is that one should keep oneself as fit as possible, take as much moderate exercise as may be, but never attempt anything severe without due preparation.

2. The good and the ill effects of athletics *in moulding character* are not to be so plainly set forth. It is certain, however, that sports have been and are of enormous importance in their effect upon a nation's mind and morals; and probably nowhere so much as on British soil. The kind of trite saying which echoes 'the Duke's' remark about our battles being won on the playgrounds of our schools, describes only a fraction of the influence exerted by athletics on a people's character. It would be unwise to be an unconditional advocate of sport, but it is useful to try to see what the effects of it are.

It may be well to dispose first of the evil effects often attributed to athletics. And, at the outset, let us observe that athletics never can give to man or boy, woman or girl, what they did not have at least potentially before. Athletics are a form of education, and can only elicit and develop the qualities, physical and mental, good or ill, already gifted by nature. Thus, for example, we are told that athletics tend to make men brutal, but that is true only of those who are already cruel. In any case, well-conducted sport, as, for example, modern football with its penalties for rough play, tends all the other way. In the present writer's opinion, the charge is most fairly laid at the door of those who conduct big 'shoots' in which there is wanton destruction of birds which may almost be described as domesticated fowl; and there are other so-called sports sometimes conducted so as to transgress the law of sport that every creature should be given a fair chance. But these are the exceptions. A good Master of Hounds is as humane as he is expert, as just as he is ingenious, in the pursuit of stag, fox, or otter. To a big-game hunter the temptation to kill for killing's sake, when, as often happens, no other white man is at hand to see, may be considerable. But even then self-restraint and humanity are part of the etiquette of the sport. Sometimes it is alleged of single-handed games, like golf, that they are selfish; that, when a man is playing for his own hand, he is doing something not so good as when he is playing for his side, as in cricket. The argument is superficial, as both results and theory show. It is safe to assert that the average cricketer plays as selfishly as the average golfer. In both cases the play itself makes wholly for self-forgetfulness. The man who, at the moment of the stroke, thinks what is going to happen to him because of it will thereby spoil his game. Both games, and all games, weed out those whose attention is not wholly upon the thing to be done at the moment. It will be found that most of the 'selfishness' in games crops up in the talk of the pavilion or club-house, when the salutary stimulus of the game is withdrawn. Other evils spoken of, and especially gambling, are quite accidental, and are no more part of athletics than weather or geography.

On the other hand, the advantages which ath-

letics confer cannot be gainsaid. First come the qualities which go to make up what we confusedly call physical courage—pluck, endurance, and indomitable resolve. But these are transferred in essence to a higher plane, and a sound athletic training teaches the adult, if he has it in him, not to be afraid, not to give in, and not to think too meanly of himself. Probably the most important, because the most constant contribution—and a very desirable one—is that which well-ordered games make to those qualities which are related to a sense of justice. It is questionable if it be possible to convey to a youthful mind a living meaning of fair play by any method so well as by the give-and-take of the playground. There also is to be learned a most wholesome discipline. First and foremost comes the training of the colt, to use a cricket phrase, reined and whipped to abide by the rules of the game, taught the obedience which he must give to the captain of his team, the unselfishness which he must show in sacrificing himself for the good of his side; and such discipline is invaluable. And in games, more easily perhaps than by any other means, a lad learns to take a just measure of himself, neither too high nor too low, to know what he can and what he cannot do, wherein he excels his fellows and wherein he falls short. Finally, we may repeat, one of the greatest advantages of sport, though not immediately recognized as of value, is that it offers an opportunity for sheer forgetfulness of the oppressive things in life, when in the zest of a mild game or the excitement of a dangerous contest, the sportsman is 'beside himself' for a brief spell, wholly removed from the sense of laboriousness and hardship and care. That way sanity lies. See also art. GAMES.

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G. R. WILSON.

ATIMIA.—An Athenian in full enjoyment of all civic rights was spoken of as *ἐπίτιμος* (*ἐπιτιμία* of the condition); the word *ἀτιμία* denotes, therefore, the various degrees of penal limitation of such rights (Lat. *capitis deminutio*).

How old such limitation of rights was in Athens is not known; it occurs as early as the legislation of Dracon (about B.C. 620), and by Solon's time (B.C. 594) apparently a large number of Athenians had incurred disfranchisement on various grounds. Solon restored their civic rights to such, with the exception of those who for treason or crimes of violence were in exile. From the wording of his law (Plut. *Sol.* 19) it would appear that we should distinguish two classes: (1) those who were living at Athens disfranchised, and (2) those who had gone into exile, which necessarily also involved loss of civic rights, and must in many cases have involved loss of property also; but it does not therefore follow that such perpetual exile should be regarded as forming part of the penalty of *ἀτιμία*, any more than that the confiscation of property, which in post-Solonian times is found sometimes conjoined with it, is so to be regarded. It is possible, indeed, that the Athenian law never attained a perfect clearness of conception in regard to this connexion.

The *locus classicus* upon this subject is a passage of Andocides (*de Myst.* 73 f.), in which he distinguishes the following three varieties of *ἀτιμία*: (1) deprivation of civic rights and confiscation of property, in which category he enumerates only public debtors; (2) loss of civic rights, without confiscation—inflicted upon thieves, those who received bribes, those guilty of breaches of military duty or thrice convicted of perjury, or children convicted of unfilial conduct; (3) a minor degree of disfranchisement (*κατὰ προστάξεις*), in which certain specific disabilities were inflicted for certain varieties of offence.

The distinction of three degrees of 'atimia,' made by Meier in his treatise *de Bonis Damnatorum* (Berl. 1819), which he entitles *infamia maxima, media*, and *minima*, upon the analogy of Roman law* and upon the basis of the above-cited passage of Andocides, does not seem to be substantiated by the evidence. For the passage of Andocides is clearly of the nature of a popular classification, which omits several well-established categories of offences, and is in general devoid of any logical principle of division. It would seem safer to adhere to the view enunciated by Caillemer, according to which 'atimia' *per se* was limited to the civic status of the subject; but we must also recognize that in practical effect it was a necessary concomitant of a sentence of exile (*ἀειφυγία*), and that, on the other hand, confiscation might in certain cases be conjoined with a sentence of *ἀτιμία*.

From this point of view 'atimia' must be distinguished simply as (1) total, and (2) partial.

1. **Total 'atimia'** meant the entire loss of civic personality (Lat. *caput*), so far as its active functions were concerned. The citizen who was pronounced totally *ἄτιμος* † was incapable of holding any civil or priestly office within the Athenian empire, or of acting as herald or ambassador; he might not appear in the Agora or attend meetings of the Senate or Assembly, or appear in any public sanctuary or public ceremonial; nor could he appear either as principal or witness in any court of law (see the enumeration of disabilities in Æschines, i. 21; Demos. *Meid.* 87: *οὔτε λαχεῖν ἀδικηθέντα*). Under the conditions of Athenian life the prohibition against taking part in the business of the public Assembly (*λέγειν καὶ γράφειν*) naturally covered most of the privileges here enumerated, and consequently this right is frequently spoken of as that which *par excellence* was forfeited by the *ἄτιμος* (Demos. *Steph.* i. 79: *τίνα τῆς πόλεως . . . καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ παρρησίας ἀπεστέρηκα*). In general, the condition of the *καθάπαξ ἄτιμος* was inferior to that of the alien (Demos. *Theocr.* 88: *μήδ' ἐλπίδα ἡμῖν εἶναι μηδεμίαν τοῦ μετασχεῖν τῆς καὶ τοῖς ξένοις διδομένης παρρησίας*), and is spoken of by Isocrates as worse than exile (Isocr. xvi. 47: *ἀτιμίας, ἣν ἐγὼ φυγῆς μείζω συμφορὰν νομίζω· πολὺ γὰρ ἀθλιώτερον παρὰ τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις ἠτιμωμένον οἰκεῖν ἢ παρ' ἑτέροις μετοικεῖν*).

The *ἄτιμος*, in fact, was in the State, but was not of it.‡ Precisely how far his disabilities extended is not known; our authorities do not furnish an answer to all questions which suggest themselves. It has been pointed out, for example (see art. ADOPTION [Greek]), that *ἀτιμία* on either side would be a practical bar to adoption; but whether in law it was so is uncertain, and the suggestion might be hazarded that, in order to prevent the extinction of a family, testamentary adoption, at any rate, may not have been denied. Again, the case of one holding an hereditary priesthood presents a difficulty. And we may ask what legal protection was given to the life and property and personal dignity of one who was *ἄτιμος*, and under what forms. The consequences of *ἀτιμία* in detail are not treated by modern writers, who content themselves with the above-given generalizations as to its significance; but even these cannot be taken quite *au pied de la lettre*. It may be conjectured that redress of personal wrongs in the case of an *ἄτιμος* was secured, if at all, by means of a public prosecution (*γραφή*) undertaken by a friend of the aggrieved (see Demos. *Meid.* 47). The free use of depositions, which obtained in Attic legal procedure, would obviate the difficulty in regard to evidence (cf. Demos. *Meid.* 95). If so, we must say that in point of law a sentence involving total

* *Dig.* iv. 5. 11: 'Capitis deminutionis tria sunt genera, maxima, media, minima; tria enim sunt quæ habemus, libertatem, civitatem, familiam. Igitur cum omnia hæc amittimus [*e.g.* by death or slavery], maximam esse capitis deminutionem; cum vero amittimus civitatem, libertatem retinemus, mediam esse,' etc.

† Cf. Demos. *Meid.* 87: *ἁπάντων ἀπεστέρηται τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ καθάπαξ ἄτιμος γέγονεν.*

‡ Cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* viii. 5: *ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν.*

ἀτιμία was equivalent to civil death, but stopped short of outlawry.* Attic law protected even the murderer who had fled beyond jurisdiction (*CIA* i. 61; Demos. *Aristocrat.* p. 631).

The crimes for which total disfranchisement was the penalty were the following:†

(1) *Treason* (προδοσία).—The penalty was death, confiscation of property, and a declaration of ἀτιμία, which became the unavoidable inheritance of the heirs of the disfranchised, falling also upon any who subsequently adopted them. To the same penalties those were liable who conspired to subvert the democracy (δήμου κατάλυσις).

(2) *Theft* (κλοπή) in its more serious forms; cf. Andoc. *l.c.*: ὁπόσοι κλοπῆς . . . ὤφλοιεν, τούτους ἔδει καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τούτων ἀτίμους εἶναι.

(3) *Corruption* (δῶρον or δωροδοκία of the recipient; δικασμός of him who bribed) on the part of public functionaries (Demos *Meid.* 113). For some forms at least of this offence the penalty was hereditary ἀτιμία and confiscation of goods.

(4) *Various offences in respect of military service by sea or land*—refusal to serve, desertion, cowardice in the field, etc (Andoc. *l.c.*: ὁπόσοι λίποιεν τὴν τάξιν ἢ ἀστρατείας ἢ δειλίας ἢ ἀναυμαχίας ὤφλοιεν ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα ὀποβάλοιεν). For all such offences disfranchisement was the penalty, and in some cases confiscation seems to have been conjoined.

(5) *Perjury* (ψευδομαρτυρία, with the particular variety ψευδοκλητεία, false assertion of service of writ). According to Andoc. *l.c.*, disfranchisement was incurred only after a third conviction, but other authorities seem to prove that a single conviction was sufficient (see Wyse on Isæus, v. 17 and art. PERJURY).

(6) *Unfilial conduct* (κάκωσις γονέων).—The law seems to have specified four varieties of the offence—actual ill-treatment, withholding food, expulsion from the house, and refusal of funeral ceremonial.

(7) *If a man gave in marriage to an Athenian citizen a foreign woman, falsely alleging her to be his daughter and a citizen of Athens*, he incurred loss of civic rights and confiscation of property.

(8) *Contempt of the sentence of a court or of the Council or Assembly.*—Disfranchisement fell upon a President of the Assembly (πρόεδρος) who put to the vote the illegal question of remitting a debt to the Treasury.

(9) *Unauthorized proclamations by the herald in the theatre.*

(10) 'Any one who *suffers injustice at the hands of the public Arbitrators* (διαιτηταί) may appeal to the whole Board of Arbitrators; and if they find the magistrate guilty, the law enacts that he shall lose his civil rights' (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 53: case in point, Demos. *Meid.* 87). A Heliastic court could confirm or reverse this verdict on appeal.

(11) *Offences against the dignity of a superior magistrate* (Demos. *Meid.* 32, Greenidge, *Rom. Publ. Life*, p. 190).

(12) Disfranchisement was the penalty for any *proposal to modify the old (Drakonian) law relating to homicide.*

(13) *Condonation of a wife's adultery*, if she were caught in the actual commission of the offence.

(14) A law attributed to Solon visited with loss of civil rights the man who *in time of party-strife* (στάσις) *did not take a side* (Plut *Sol.* 20; cf. Cic. *ad Att.* x. 1 2: 'ego vero Solonis, popularis tui, ut puto etiam mei, legem neglegam, qui capite sanxit, si qui in seditione non alterius utrius partis fuisset.' See on this Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, III 144; Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek History*, p. 87 n. The intention was that he should side with the established government, for armed assault upon it was itself a capital offence). This law was apparently obsolete by the end of the 5th cent. B.C.

(15) A law of Solon, traditionally derived from Egypt, but probably in existence in Drakon's time, made ἀτιμία the penalty on *a third conviction for incorrigible idleness* (ἀργία).

(16) Disfranchisement was the penalty for those who, having been guilty of *unchastity for hire* (ἑταίρησις), took office or spoke in the Council or Assembly, or who had *wasted their substance in riotous living.*

(17) Every citizen who, having reached the age of 59, at which he was competent to serve as *Public Arbitrator* (διαιτητής), *failed to do so*, became ἄτιμος (Arist. *Ath. Pol* 53).

2. Partial atimia signified that a man lost certain of his rights, retaining in respect of the remnant an equality with his fellows. Partial 'atimia' in its various forms was the penalty in the following cases:

(1) Generally, one who initiated a public prosecution (γραφή) and thereafter dropped it, or who in the event did not obtain a fifth part of the votes of the jury, was fined 1000 drachmas and lost the right to bring a similar suit in the future (Harpocr.: ἐάν τις γραψάμενος μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, ὀφλισκάνει χιλίας καὶ πρόσεστιν ἀτιμία τις. Andoc. *l.c.*: ἑτέροις οὐκ ἦν γράψασθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἐνδεῖξαι, which would seem to include all forms of γραφαί; others think that only the particular form in which the prosecutor failed was henceforth debarred to him. See Goodwin's Demos. *de Cor.* p. 331, n. 3).

(2) Any one who had been thrice convicted under a γραφὴ παρανόμων of submitting illegal or unconstitutional proposals was debarred in future from making any further proposals in the Senate or the Assembly.

(3) Certain disabilities attached to certain specified classes (these are cases of ἀτιμία κατὰ προστάξεις properly so called, although Andocides, *l.c.*, applies this term to all cases of what we have called 'partial atimia'). For example, those citizens who had remained in the city and constituted the military force of the Oligarchs in B.C. 411 were deprived of the right of sitting in the Senate or the Assembly. Andocides mentions other cases of deprivation of specific rights, but we know not on what grounds it was inflicted.*

3. Conditional atimia.—To these two degrees of disfranchisement, a third variety, which may be styled 'conditional atimia,' must be added. This form was not in consequence of a verdict of any court of law, but was in a way voluntarily assumed. The class concerned is that of all who were in any degree debtors to the Treasury. All such debtors as failed to meet their obligation by the date fixed by law became *ipso facto* ἄτιμοι in the full sense of the word until the debt was paid. The amount of the debt was immaterial. A list of such State-debtors was kept by the Praktores in the Acropolis. The ninth Prytany, or decimal part of the year, constituted the official limit of grace, on the expiry of which the Poletai sold the possessions of the debtor to double the amount owing; in the meantime the debtor remained disfranchised, and if the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the debt, he continued so until the balance was forthcoming. If the debtor died before the balance was paid, his heirs inherited his ἀτιμία until the claims of the State were finally satisfied. The moment the debt was discharged, full civil rights were *ipso facto* regained. In a general way, then, it rested with the man himself to retain or lose his citizen rights on this account. The institution of the Eranos, or Club, must have been of some importance in this regard.

If an ἄτιμος continued, nevertheless, to exercise any of the rights which he had lost, he was liable to the summary processes of arrest (ἀπαγωγή) or ἔνδειξις (information laid before a magistrate).† If transgression was proved, he might be punished, without further proceedings or appeal, with imprisonment or death. The above methods would be employed when there could be no dispute as to the existence of the disability, *i.e.* when the ἀτιμία was the consequence of conviction on some charge for which it was the penalty. It was possible, however, that a man might be notoriously or otherwise guilty of conduct (*e.g.* ill-treatment of parents, or unchastity—ἑταίρησις) which, if proved, involved disfranchisement, though he had never, owing to public apathy or his own influence, been charged before a court therewith. So long as he did not challenge public opinion by conspicuous exercise of his civil rights, he was safe; but the attempt to speak in the Assembly or to hold office rendered him liable to the process called ἐπαγγελία δοκιμασίας, or challenge to stand judicial inquiry into character before a jury court. If the jury

* Outlawry was indeed known and applied by the Greeks, but is not indicated by the single expression ἄτιμος without the addition of further explanatory terms and phrases (see art. OUTLAWRY).

† In order to keep the article within bounds, a general reference to the classical work of Meier and Schomann, *Der attische Process* (new ed. by Lipsius, 2 vols., 1883–1887), for the justificatory texts must here suffice.

* Seeing that a woman had no political rights, perhaps we may class here the 'atimia' which by a law of Solon fell upon a woman taken in adultery: she was forbidden to adorn herself or to enter the temples (Æsch. *Timarch.* 183: ἀτιμῶν τὴν τοιαύτην γυναῖκα καὶ τὸν βίον ἀβίωτον αὐτῇ παρασκευάζων).

† For a complete discussion of these processes, consult Meier-Schomann, *Der att. Proc.*² 270-294.

found a verdict of guilty, sentence of disfranchisement was formally pronounced. Whether from the moment of the challenge the right to ascend the Bema, etc., remained in abeyance until the issue of the trial is uncertain.

It is to be observed that a sentence of 'atimia,' once pronounced, was perpetual, and, moreover, was in certain cases an inheritance no more avoidable by a man's heirs than was his other estate (see art. INHERITANCE). Rehabilitation, at any rate, was so hedged round with conditions as to make it hopeless in the vast majority of cases. No citizen could propose a restoration of civic status to one disfranchised, without the protection of a preliminary Bill of Indemnity (ἄδεια), for the validity of which at least 6000 votes were requisite (Demos. *Timocr.* 46: ἄλλος οὗτος νόμος, οὐκ ἐὼν περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων οὐδὲ τῶν ὀφειλόντων λέγειν οὐδὲ χρηματίζειν περὶ ἀφέσεως τῶν ὀφλημάτων οὐδὲ τάξεως, ἂν μὴ τῆς ἀδείας δοθείσης, καὶ ταύτης μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ ἑξακισχιλίων ψηφισαμένων—by which we should probably understand 6000 votes in all, not 6000 affirmative votes). If the Bill of Indemnity were passed, the main proposal would be carried as a matter of course. But it is, in fact, easier to find examples of rehabilitation on a large scale than on a small, as, for example, the Act of Rehabilitation passed by Solon (Plut. *Sol.* 19). In times of national peril, above all, such wholesale enfranchisement was not infrequent (cf. Cic. *in Verr.* v. 6: 'perditæ civitates desperatis iam omnibus rebus hos solent exitus exitiales habere, ut damnati in integrum restituantur, vincti solvantur, exules reducantur, res iudicatæ rescindantur'). Examples from Athenian history are the decrees passed just before the battle of Salamis, and during the siege of Athens, and after the defeat at Chæroneia (see art. AMNESTY).

In the above account no notice has been taken of a species of ἀτιμία which, although a natural consequence of certain acts, was yet not part of their legal penalty. 'Atimia,' in this non-legal sense of the verdict of popular opinion, is alluded to by Demos. *Meid.* 72 (of the insult of a blow received in public), and by Aristotle (of the dishonour attaching to the suicide) * Similarly, and equally naturally, the sycophant, the disowned son, and the children of a man who had been executed, were all under this species of 'atimia' (cf. Demos *Arist.* i. 30).

'Atimia' in this non-legal sense in Athens is akin to 'atimia' as it presents itself at Sparta, where there was not the same development of legal ideas and procedure; but all the more strong there was the force of public opinion, which perhaps to a greater degree than elsewhere in Greece was identical with law. At Sparta such 'atimia' fell upon all departure from the customs of the community (Xen. *Resp. Lac.* x. 7, iii. 3). An example is the case of Aristodemos who survived the battle of Thermopylæ (Herod. vii. 231: ἀπονοστήσας ἐς Λακεδαίμονα εἶχε ὄνειδός τε καὶ ἀτιμίην; cf. Xen. *op. cit.* ix. 4; Plut. *Ages.* 30). Those who surrendered at Sphacteria, however, were treated more leniently (Thuc. v. 34: ἤδη καί ἀρχάς τινας ἔχοντας ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιάνδε ὥστε μήτε ἄρχειν μήτε πριαμένους τι ἢ πωλοῦντας κυρίους εἶναι—a penalty corresponding to 'partial atimia' at Athens). The number of those defeated at Leuctra made it impossible to carry out the law even to this extent. Spartans who remained unmarried were also subjected to a certain 'atimia,' being deprived of all claim of respect from their juniors, and excluded from certain festivals (Plut. *Lyc.* 15). Inability to provide the fixed contribution to the common mess excluded a Spartan *ipso facto* from the class of Peers (ὅμοιοι), which probably implied the loss of political rights, as distinguished from the civil rights, of citizenship (Arist. *Polit.* ii. 9; Xen. *Hell.* III. iii. 5). Apparently full rights were at once recoverable by conformity to the required conditions; even Aristodemos by his valiant conduct at Platæa recovered caste, though not, indeed, entirely (Herod. vii. 231 and ix. 71). It would hence appear that 'atimia' at Sparta was in general analogous to what we have called 'conditional atimia' at Athens.

The existence of 'atimia' as a penal measure is proved for other States of Greece (*e.g.* Chalcis and Eretria in Euboea, Chios, Lokris, Ephesos, etc.) by inscriptions ranging in date from the 5th to the 1st cent. B.C. In certain cases Athenian influence may have operated, as in Euboea (see Hicks, *Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions*[2], No. 40: ὀμόσαι δὲ Χαλκιδέων τοὺς ἡβῶντας ἅπαντας. ὃς δ' ἂμ μὴ ὀμόσῃ, ἄτιμον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια); and perhaps also at Delphi, where, in the 2nd cent. B.C., at any rate, State-debtors were ἄτιμοι (Dittenberger, *Sylloge*[2], No. 306). But, in general, it is probable that the penalty of 'atimia' was practically a universal method among the Greek States, and followed immediately from the Greek conception of the relationship between the State and the individual (on this subject see Newman's *Politics of Aristotle*, vol. i. p. 30 f.).

LITERATURE.—Besides the works above specified, see also P. van Lelyfeld, *De infamia iure Attico*, Amst. 1835; H. M. E Meier, *Historia iuris attici de bonis damnatorum*, Berl 1819; Thonissen, *Le Droit pénal de la république athénienne*, Brussels, 1875 Paul Usteri, *Achtung und Verbannung im griechischen Recht* (Berl. 1903), gives the most exhaustive treatment of the subject; following out the ideas of H. Swoboda (in *Arch-Epigr. Mitt. aus Österr.-Ung* XVI. [1893] p. 49 f.), he draws a sharp distinction between ἄτιμος in the sense of 'outlawed' and ἄτιμος='disfranchised,' but without apparently attaining any very significant result

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ATIṢA (or **Dīpaṅkara**).—A learned Indian Buddhist friar, who effected the most profound reformation of Lāmaism. Entering Tibet in A.D. 1038, and finding the prevalent Buddhism in the hands of an immoral priesthood and extremely debased by demonolatry, he founded a new Order, on a purer Buddhist model, which he called 'Bound by the Orders' (*Kah-dam*). This afterwards became the 'Yellow-cap' sect or 'the Virtue Practisers' (*Ge-luk*), now the dominant State Church. In his reform Atīṣa restored celibacy and purged the ritual of much of its grosser devil-worship. He wrote a great many doctrinal works, and translated into the Tibetan scriptures a large number of Indian Buddhist commentaries. The beneficial effects of his teaching also initiated other semi-reformed sects, the Saskya and Kargyu, which arose somewhat later. He died in A.D. 1052 at Ne-t'ang, near Lhāsa, where a large funereal mound, or *stūpa*, was erected over his grave and still exists.

LITERATURE.—C. F. Koppen, *Lamaische Hierarchie und Kirche* (Berlin, 1857-59), ii. 78, 117, 127, 285, L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet* (1895), pp. 35, 36, 54, 57, also *Lhasa* (1905), p. 320 f. L. A. WADDELL.

ATĪTS or, incorrectly, **Atiths**; **AVADHŪTS**, sometimes **Abdhūts, Audhūts, Avdhūts** (Skr. *atīta*, 'passed away [from worldly care]'; *avadhūta*, 'shaken off').—These two names can conveniently be taken together. They are generally applied in India to any religious mendicants, as indicating that they have 'passed away' from or become liberated from worldly cares, or have 'shaken off' all caste and personal distinction. *Avadhūt* is applied to both Vaiṣṇavas and Śaivas (*qq.v.*); but, so far as the present writer is aware, *Atīt* is applied only to the latter. Mr. Risley,* however, states that Vaiṣṇava Atīts exist in Bihār. In this technical

* Ar *Eth. Nic* v. 11: καί τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. This should not be taken, as is usually done, of a penal consequence. For upon whom should it fall?

* *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, s.v. 'Atit.'

sense, *avadhūta* often occurs in Sanskrit literature, but the technical use of *atīta* seems to be more modern, and to be confined to the vernaculars. *Atīt* is often confounded with the word *atith* (Skr. *atithi*), 'a guest,' which has more than once given rise to fanciful explanations. In addition to this customary general sense, both words are sometimes employed to indicate special classes of religious mendicants.

In this narrower sense *Atīt* is applied to six and a half of the Dasnāmī, or ten sections of Śaiva mendicants, who claim spiritual descent from the great reformer Śaṅkarāchārya (*q.v.*). Three and a half of these sections, who are called *Daṇḍīs* from their habit of carrying a *daṇḍa*, or staff, are considered to have retained Śaṅkarāchārya's doctrine in all its purity. The rest, viz. the Vanas, Araṇyas, Purīs, Giris, Pārvatas, Sāgaras, and half the Bhāratīs, are reputed to have fallen to some extent from orthodoxy, but are still looked upon as religious characters. These are the Atīts. Unlike the Daṇḍīs, they carry no staff. They differ from the latter also in their use of clothing, money, and ornaments, their methods of preparing food, and their admission of members from any order of Hindus. Some of them lead an ascetic life, while others mix freely in the world, carry on trade, and acquire property. Most of them are celibate, but some of them marry, and are then known as *saṁyōgī* ('married') or *gharbārī* ('householder') Atīts. They are often collected in *maths*, or monasteries, and some officiate as temple-priests. They wear ochre(*gērā*)-coloured garments, and carry a rosary of the *rudrākṣa* seeds sacred to Śiva. They do not eat flesh or drink spirits. They worship Śiva, usually under the name of Mahādeva or Bhairon, and also pay devotions to the monkey-god Hanumān or Mahāvīra. Their religious theories (when they have any) are based on the *advaita* Vedānta (*qq.v.*) of their founder Śaṅkarāchārya.

The Śaiva Avadhūts (when the word is employed in the narrower sense) are ascetics of a sterner mould. They wear as few clothes as possible, making up the deficiency with mud, and let their hair grow long and matted (technically called *jaṭa*). They practise silence, and live on alms. In the cold weather they may be seen cowering over a small fire. Their life is in every way an extremely hard one. Gorakhnāth (*q.v.*), the founder of the sect of *Kānphāṭā* Yogīs, is often referred to as a typical Avadhūt of this class.

As regards Vaiṣṇavas, the term *Avadhūt* has a special significance. When Rāmānanda made his great reformation amongst the followers of Rāmānuja, and abrogated the distinction of caste in religious orders, he gave this title to his followers, to signify that they had, so to speak, 'put off the old man.' They had 'shaken off' all personal distinction by adopting a religious life, and thus quitting the ties of nature and of society. For an account of the religious tenets and customs of these Avadhūts, see RĀMĀNANDIN and BHAKTI-MARGA.

LITERATURE.—These names can hardly be called the titles of distinctive religious sects, and hence little has been written about them. The above article has been compiled partly from the writer's private notes and partly from the following works: **H. H. Wilson**, *Essays on the Religion of the Hindūs* (ed. 1861), i. 204 ff. ('Atīt'), 55 ff. ('Vaiṣṇava Avadhūts'); **H. H. Risley**, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal* (1891), *s.v.* 'Atīt'; **W. Crooke**, *The Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh* (1896), *s.vv.* 'Atit,' 'Awadhût.'

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

ĀTMAN.—1. Etymology.—The origin of the word *ātman* is doubtful. It is usual to compare it with the Greek *ἀτμός*, *ἀϋτμήν*, *ἀϋτμή*, and the Teutonic *ātum*, *āðom*, *æðm*, and it is then derived either from *an*, 'breath' (*Petersburger Wörterbuch*), or *at*, 'go' (Weber), or *av* (=*vā*), 'blow' (Curtius, Grassmann, etc.). The development of meaning would therefore be—(1) breath, (2) soul, (3) self. However, *ātman* in the sense of breath (of the wind) occurs only in four passages of the Rigveda, mostly in hymns of younger date; and, what is more important, we find more frequently in the Rigveda the abridged form *tman* (in the case-forms *tmanam*, *tmanā*, *tmane*, *tmani*, *tman*), in the sense partly of a reflexive pronoun, partly of an adverb. It might then be that *ātman*, and perhaps also the Greek *αὐτός*, originate from two pronominal stems, *a* (in *a-kam*) and *ta* ('this'), and the meaning would be 'this ego,' 'this my own self.' However this may be, the word *ātman* came very early to signify 'the self in contrast with that which is not self,' and this meaning developed in four directions: (1) the own person, the own body, opposed to the outside world; (2) the trunk of the body as opposed to the limbs; (3) the soul as opposed to the body; (4) the essence as opposed to what is not essence. Examples of these various meanings are frequent in the Vedic texts.

2. Philosophical meaning.—It is evident from this that the idea of *ātman*, 'self,' is *relative*, pointing to something which is not the *ātman*, and *negative*, in so far as the positive sense is not in it, but in that which is to be excluded. Such relative-negative concepts are frequent in philosophy, and have been used with great advantage to signify the inner principle of the universe, excluding from it the whole content of the phenomenal world. Of this kind is the *ἀρχή* of Anaximander in contrast to all things which have antecedents; the *ὄν* of Parmenides in contrast to the *γένεσις* and *ὄλεθρος* which rule in the world of sense; the *ὄντως ὄν* of Plato in contrast to the *γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον*; the *substantia* of Spinoza in contrast to the *modi*, of which the whole world, corporeal as well as intellectual, consists; and the *Ding an sich* of Kant in contrast to the whole phenomenal world, which contains the things only in so far as they exist *for us*, *i.e.* for our intellect in its innate forms, viz. time, space and causality. All these concepts, *ἀρχή*, *ὄν*, *ὄντως ὄν*, *substantia*, *Ding an sich*, are *negative*, for they state only what the principle is not, and not what it is. They are therefore empty of content, and herein lies their great value for the science of metaphysics, which has to do with a subject eternally unknowable. Of this kind is also the concept *ātman*, which requires us to direct our attention towards the Self of our own person, the Self of everything else, the Self of the whole world, and to discard all that, strictly speaking, does not belong to this Self. It is the most abstract, and therefore the best name which philosophy has found for its sole and eternal theme. All those other names, *ἀρχή*, *ὄν*, *ὄντως ὄν*, *substantia*, *Ding an sich*, still smack of the phenomenal world, from which they originate. *Ātman* alone touches the precise point at which the inner, obscure, never-appearing essence of things reveals itself. Nor is it by accident that Indian thinkers, above all others, arrived at this most abstract, and therefore best, expression for the eternal subject of all metaphysics; for the Indian genius is animated by a restless desire to penetrate to the depths, a longing to be rid of all that is external and non-essential, as we shall see later on in some famous examples from the Upaniṣads.

3. Brahman and Ātman.—There are two words, *brahman* and *ātman*, which are often used in the Upaniṣads to signify the inner essence of the individual as well as of the whole world, and which cannot be considered separate from each other. *Brahman* means originally, and wherever it occurs in the Rigveda, 'prayer'; and it is very strange (and recalls the similar case of the Biblical *λόγος*)

how this word came to mean the essential principle of the world. In prayer the devotee felt himself elevated above his own individuality, above the phenomenal world, in union with the gods; in prayer he felt awaking within himself a power which was above all beings, above all worlds, and even above the gods. So it came about that to the question already raised in Rigveda, x. 81. 4, 'What was the wood, what was the tree, of which they have carved heaven and earth?' the following answer is given later on in a Brāhmaṇa (Taitt. Br. ii. 8, 9): '*Brahman* was the wood, *Brahman* was the tree, of which they have carved heaven and earth.' We cannot enter here into further details; let it suffice to say that we can follow in the Vedic literature step by step the path by which the word *brahman* from the original meaning 'prayer' came to signify the 'principle of the world.' It might be supposed that a similar development could be traced for the word *ātman*. And, indeed, there are some who believe that, side by side with the theological significance attached to the word *brahman*, there was a more philosophical tendency which circled round the word *ātman*, and that both views expanded more and more until they coalesced in the identification of *brahman* and *ātman* as it is found in the Upaniṣads. But this hypothesis is not confirmed by the facts. It is useless to attempt to gain in the hymns and Brāhmaṇas the necessary materials for a history of the word *ātman*, as we can for the word *brahman*. On the contrary, we see the word *ātman* emerging here and there, and quickly disappearing again, until the Indian thinkers, becoming aware of the advantage of this term, began to use it more and more frequently to express what they felt without being able to clothe it in words. In fact the word *brahman*, 'prayer,' originally expressed a subjective feeling; and it was only by intensifying this subjective, and at the same time metaphysical, character that they came to take hold of the word *ātman* as the most striking and happy expression for the inner essence of the individual, and for the inner essence of the whole world (see art. BRAHMAN). A few examples may serve to illustrate this process.

4. Examples from hymns and Brāhmaṇas.—Even as early as the Rigveda, in the profound and difficult hymn of Dīrghatamas (i. 164. 4), the poet asks: 'Who has seen how the firstborn, being the Bone-possessing (the shaped world), was born from the Boneless (the shapeless)? Where was the vital breath, the blood, the Self (*ātman*) of the world? Who went to ask him that knows it?' Here the poet, penetrating deeper and deeper, passes from the vital breath to the blood, from the blood to the *ātman*, or inmost Self. It may seem strange that the Indian philosophers ask earlier after the Self of the world than after the Self of the individual, but the mind is like the eye, which sees everything else before it sees itself.

Many other quotations of similar import will be found in the present writer's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, i. 1, especially p 331 ff. It is said, for example, of Prajāpati (a mythical personification of the creative power) in the Taittarīya Āraṇyaka, i. 23: 'In building the worlds and the beings he entered with his own Self (*ātmanā*) into his own Self (*ātmānam*)'; in Atharvav. x. 8. 44: 'He who knows him does no longer fear death, him the wise, undecaying, ever-young *ātman*'; in Taitt. Br. iii. 12. 9. 7: 'He through whom the sun shines, enflamed by glowing fire—only the knower of the Veda when departing this life understands him, the great omnipresent *ātman*. He, living in the Brahmans as their greatness, is not augmented or diminished by works; the Self is his pathfinder; one who knows him is no more stained by evil deed'; in Taitt. Ar. iii. 11 1: 'He who lives in us as our ruler, who is one, and yet appears in many forms, in whom the hundred lights of heaven are one, in whom the Vedas are one, the priests one—he is the intellectual Self (*mānasīna ātmā*) in man.'

These passages already approach the standpoint of the Upaniṣads, which is fully reached in the so-called 'Science of Śāṇḍilya' (Śatap. Br. x. 6. 3) and Chhānd. Up. iii. 14. 'Verily this world is *Brahman*. Let a man meditate upon it in silence as *Tajjalān* (origin, annihilation, and breath of the world). Mind is his stuff, life his body, light his shape, truth his thoughts, his Self the infinite. All-working is he, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting, all-embracing, silent, unconcerned; He is my soul (*ātman*) in the inner heart, smaller than a rice-corn or a mustard-corn, or a millet-corn, or a rice-corn's kernel; He is my soul (*ātman*) in the inner heart, greater than the earth, greater than the atmosphere, greater than the heaven, greater than all these worlds. The all-working, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting, all-embracing, silent, unconcerned, He is my ātman in the inner heart, He is the Brahman; to Him, when departing, I shall enter. Whoever obtains this, verily he does not doubt! Thus spake Śāṇḍilya, Śāṇḍilya.'

5. The Ātman in the Upaniṣads.—The words just quoted, 'He is my *ātman* in the inner heart, He is the *Brahman*,' contain the two words about which circle nearly all the thoughts of the Upaniṣads. Very often they are used without any distinction; but wherever, as in the quotation just given, a difference is observable, *Brahman* means the eternal principle as realized in the whole world, and *ātman* the same principle as realized in ourselves. Assuming this, the fundamental thought of all the Upaniṣads can be expressed by the simple equation:

Brahman = *ātman*,

meaning the identity of *Brahman* and *ātman*, or, as we should say, of God and the soul. It is thus expressed in the so-called 'great words': *tat tvam asi*, 'that art thou' (Chhānd. Up. vi. 8. 7), and *aham brahmā asmi*, 'I am Brahman' (Brih. Up. i. 4. 10). That means: *Brahman*, the power which creates all the worlds, supports them, and destroys them. This all-mighty, all-pervading, eternal power is identical with the *ātman*, with that which, rightly understanding, we have to consider as our soul, as our own unchanging, imperishable Self. The grandeur of this thought is manifest. We do not know what ways are reserved for philosophy in future ages, we do not know what discoveries may be made in times to come, but so much we know with certainty: if a solution of the riddle which this phenomenal world presents to us is possible in any way to mankind, the key to that riddle can be found only where Nature manifests herself not merely from the outside, but where she exceptionally reveals her secret to us, and allows an insight, however limited, into her abysmal depths, *i.e.* into our own inner Self, into our *ātman*. This way was trodden by the Indian philosophers in the Upaniṣads, and no future time will cease to learn from them. But what have we to consider as our Self, as our *ātman*? It was not without serious researches that the Indians came to a satisfactory answer to this question. *Ātman*, the Self, might be simply the body, it might be the vital principle, the individual soul (*jīva*) in us, it might be something higher than all this. It is wonderful to follow the Indian thinkers in their researches after the real essence of the *ātman*, as they lie open before us in the various Upaniṣads; here, however, we must limit ourselves to a few examples.

In the second *vallī* of the Taitt. Up. the philosopher takes man as he appears as a bodily existence. In so far he consists of food, he is *annarasamaya*, 'consisting of the essence of food'; but this body is only the sheath which envelops something else, the *prāṇamaya ātman*, 'the Self consisting of vital breath.' This, again, hides another being, the *manomaya ātman*, 'the Self consisting of will.' This, again, contains the *vijñānamaya ātman*, 'the Self consisting of consciousness'; and only by removing this, as an envelope, do we come to the inmost Self, the *ānandamaya ātman*, 'the Self consisting of bliss.' Having come to this, the text says: 'Verily this is the essence; for whoever obtains this essence is filled with bliss For who could breathe, who could live, were not this bliss in the ether of his heart? For it is he who creates bliss. For whoever in that Invisible, Incorporeal, Unspeakable, Unfathomable finds peace, finds rest, he really has come to peace. But whoever assumes in it a distinction, a separation between himself and this *ātman*, there is fear for him; it is the fear of the man who thinks himself wise' (Taitt. Up. ii. 7).

As in this passage five different *ātmans*, one within the other, are distinguished, so another

text speaks of three *ātmans*—the corporeal, the individual, and the highest *ātman*. In Chhānd. Up. viii. 7, Prajāpati said: 'The Self (*ātman*) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose wishes are true, whose counsels are true, that is to be investigated, that is to be understood; he obtains all worlds and all wishes, whoever has found that Self.' These words of Prajāpati were heard by the gods and by the demons; and in order to learn the true Self the gods sent Indra, the demons Virochana, to Prajāpati. He consented to teach them, and began his instruction with the words: 'Look at yourself in a vessel of water, and tell me what of your Self you do not see there.' They answered: 'We see, O venerable master, this our entire Self even to the hairs, even to the nails.' And he said: 'Well, that is the Self, that is the Immortal, the Fearless, that is the Brahman.' They went away with satisfied heart, but Prajāpati said: 'There they go away, without having perceived, without having found the Self.' Virochana, the messenger of the demons, remained content with the answer; but Indra, without returning to the gods, came back and said: 'O venerable master, just as this Self is well adorned when the body is well adorned, well dressed when the body is well dressed, well cleaned when the body is well cleaned, even so that Self will be blind when the body is blind, lame when the body is lame, crippled when the body is crippled, and, in fact, will perish as soon as the body perishes; therefore, I see no consolation in this doctrine.' Prajāpati then led him to a higher conception of the Self, saying: 'He who moves about happy in dreams, he is the Self, this is the Immortal, the Fearless, this is Brahman.' Indra departed, but, before reaching the gods, came back and said: 'Venerable master, it is true that the Self is not blind when the body is blind, not lame when it is lame, it is true that it is not affected by the infirmities of the body; it is not killed when the body is murdered, is not lamed when it is lamed, but it is as if it were killed, as if it were vexed, as if it suffered pain, as if it wept, —in this I see no consolation.' Prajāpati gave a new instruction: 'When a man, being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest, sees no dreams, this is the Self, this is the Immortal, the Fearless, this is Brahman.' Indra departed, and returned again: 'Venerable master, in that way he does not know himself, does not know "I am this," nor does he know anything that exists. He is gone to annihilation. I see no consolation in this.' And now Prajāpati, after having led his pupil from the bodily Self to the conscious individual Self in dreams, and from this to the unconscious individual Self in deep sleep, revealed the full truth about the Self: 'O mighty Indra,' said he, 'this body indeed is possessed by death. It is the abode of that immortal, incorporeal Self. Possessed is the incorporated Self by pleasure and pain; for, because it is incorporated, there is no escape from pleasure and pain. But the incorporeal Self is touched neither by pleasure nor by pain. Bodiless are winds, clouds, lightning, and thunder; and as these, being hidden in the heavenly ether, rise from it, and, approaching the highest light, appear in their own form, thus does that serene being, arising from this body, approaching the highest light (the knowledge of Self), appear in its own form. He then is the highest spirit. He obtains all worlds and all wishes who knows and understands this Self.'

6. Conclusion.—Even in the oldest texts of the Upaniṣads there is found a bold *idealism* which maintains the sole reality of the *Ātman*, and denies an existence beyond the *Ātman*. This standpoint, however, could not be maintained for any length of time, for the reality of the phenomenal world imposed itself upon the mind; and, therefore, the desire to satisfy both convictions, that of the sole existence of the *Ātman* and that of the reality of phenomena, led to a kind of *pantheism* (represented chiefly by the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad), whose thesis was the identity of the universe and the *Ātman*. But this identity, however often proclaimed, was and remained unintelligible. Substituting for it the more comprehensible concept of causality, the thinkers of the Upaniṣads came to what we would call *cosmogonism*, asserting that the *Atman* was the cause, and the world its effect. The *Ātman* creates this world, and, having created it, He incorporates Himself in it as individual soul.

Taitt. Up. ii. 6: 'He desired: "I will be manifold, I will propagate myself." He performed austerities. Having performed austerities, he created this whole world, whatever exists. Having created it, he entered into it.'

Even thus the *Ātman* remained what it was before, the Self in us. This Self creates the world, and enters into it as the individual soul. As early as the Kāṭhaka Upaniṣad this theory developed into a kind of *theism*, distinguishing between the highest *Ātman* who creates the world, and the individual *ātman* who lives in it. It is very remarkable that this theism then passed into the atheism proclaimed in the Sānkhya system. The highest *Ātman*, being distinguished from the individual *ātman*, in which it had its real certification, was no longer sufficiently certified, and was rejected by the thoroughgoing realism of the Sānkhya philosophy. There remained only material nature called *prakṛti*, and a multitude of individual *ātmans* called *puruṣas*. The last step in this process of degeneration was the *apsychism* of the Buddhists and the Chārvākas, who in part doubted, in part denied, the *ātman* altogether.

Thus the lofty idealism of the Upaniṣads was altered, and at last destroyed, by the realistic tendencies of a later age.

LITERATURE.—**Deussen**, *Allgemeine Gesch. der Philosophie* (2 vols., Leipzig, 1894-99), I. i. 282-336, ii. 78-90, 359-362.

P. DEUSSEN.

ATOMIC THEORY.

Greek (W. KROLL), p. 197.
Indian (H. JACOBI), p. 199.
Muhammadan (T. J. DE BOER), p. 202.
Mediæval and Modern (J. H. POYNTING), p. 203.

ATOMIC THEORY (Greek).—The originator of what is called the atomic theory was **Leucippus**, of whom even the ancients knew so little that Epicurus could entirely deny his existence—a conjecture which was revived in modern times, but may now be regarded as finally abandoned. Leucippus' native country was Ionia (Miletus ?), and he lived between the times of Parmenides and Democritus. We are acquainted with his teaching only in the form which it took in the mind of his disciple, **Democritus**. The latter was born at Abdera; but the ancient writers knew nothing about the period in which he lived except what he himself had stated in a written work. He was a young man, evidently, when Anaxagoras had attained a rather advanced age; this would imply that he was in his prime in the years B.C. 430–420 The logical consistency of his thought, the wide range of his knowledge of natural science, and the excellence of his composition, made the success of

his numerous writings very considerable. His views were thoroughly discussed and opposed by Aristotle and Theophrastus.

Leucippus was led to his theory by the reaction against the Eleatic School, whose views had been placed on a scientific basis by Parmenides. It had denied all motion and change, and declared them to be an illusion of the senses; the truth being, they maintained, that reason leads us to perceive that what exists is unchangeable. This assumption so entirely contradicts all experience that a more plausible explanation of the processes of nature had to be found; account had to be taken of Heraclitus' correct observation that a continual change is taking place in the world. But it was no longer permissible to explain—as was formerly done—this change as due to transformations of a primordial substance, for neither could the conversion of fire into water and earth, and *vice versa*, as Heraclitus claimed, be grounded on experience, nor could the Eleatic principle be ignored that anything that is permanent must be present in the change. While the Pythagoreans found this permanent element in number, and therefore entirely abandoned the explanation of materialism, Leucippus and Democritus recognized it in atoms—those particles of matter so minute that they cannot be further divided, and are not perceptible to the senses—of varying size and form, but all consisting of the same substance, or matter, which cannot be more narrowly defined. Particular things come into existence when these atoms combine, and disappear when they separate; but the atoms themselves are eternal and indestructible. The combination and separation of the atoms are not possible unless there be motion, nor this again, as the Eleatic School had already noted, unless there be empty space; but whereas the Eleatics had denied motion and empty space, the atomists held both to be real, indeed to be the only reality (Democr. *Fragm.* 125, Diels: *νόμῳ χροιῇ, νόμῳ γλυκύ, νόμῳ πικρόν, ἐτεῇ δ' ἄτομα καὶ κενόν*). For these principles Democritus also found support in special observations; *e.g.*, a body can grow only by the nutriment penetrating the open pores.

The atoms differ in form, composition, and condition; with the form is connected the size, and on this depends the weight. But these characteristics of bodies are primary, all other sense-qualities being secondary; *e.g.*, warmth was supposed to appertain to round atoms, whiteness to rough atoms, blackness to smooth atoms, sourness to small angular atoms, and sweetness to larger round atoms (there is some apt criticism by Theophrastus, *de Sens.* 68, in Diels[4], p. 376). Since it depends upon chance which kind of those different atoms that form a body makes most impression upon the senses, these secondary qualities are at the same time subjective (*νόμῳ*, see above). The other elements assumed by physicists are, of course, for Democritus composite bodies; but he made fire an exception by supposing it to consist of only one kind of atom, globular in form. On this point he was no doubt influenced by Heraclitus.

There are great difficulties in the question whence, in the ultimate analysis, the motion arises which causes combination and separation of atoms. It was clear to Democritus that all change is motion in space, though, at the same time, Epicurus was perhaps the first to say so expressly. The old atomists did not answer this question; on the contrary, they assumed an eternal, primordial motion of the atoms, and gave up the idea of specifying its first cause. Whether they thought of the motion as a falling movement like that of gravity or as an irregular whirl is not quite clear. Zeller takes the former view, Brieger and Liepmann the latter. In any case, they had no strict idea of gravitation or of the necessity of falling; and this makes the dispute very difficult to decide. In this motion the particles impinge upon one another, seemingly in consequence of their unequal weight, receive blows, break off other particles, and so produce a whirling motion, a kind of primordial dance in which several atoms combine, provided that their form renders them capable of adhering to one another (the modern theory has actually been led to make similar assumptions). Every such whirl may develop into a world; and this led the atomists to the assumption—to which Plato objected (*Tim.* 55 C)—that there were innumerable worlds, several of which had passed out of existence again through colliding with greater ones. The space between these worlds Epicurus called *μετακόσμια* (in Cicero, *intermundia*). Round the whirling mass of atoms a crust was formed out of hook-shaped particles. This crust, in the course of a long process of rotation, became thinner and thinner (the *flammantia mœnia mundi* of Lucretius, i. 73). The heavier atoms gathered in the middle and formed the earth, the lighter atoms remaining at the circumference. The crust holds fast those bodies which, coming from without, conglomerate at the edge of the world, and are aflame with the velocity of their motion: these are the stars. Worlds may perish by becoming feeble or old, but also by collision with other worlds.

In psychology also Democritus carried his views to their logical consequences. The human soul consists, in like manner, of atoms, and of the most mobile of these—that is to say, of fire-atoms, which are so distributed throughout all bodies that between every two body-atoms there is one soul-atom, and which produce both motion and thought. The preference here given to fire is again due to the influence of Heraclitus. Even the sensations are explained atomically; for instance, sight is produced by fine particles, which retain the form of bodies (*εἴδωλα, δείκελα*), detaching themselves from the surface of bodies and pressing upon the eye. Similarly sound is a material thing. But perception gives only a dull cognition; thought alone makes it clear (*γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ σκοτίης μὲν τάδε σύμπαντα, ὄψις, ἀκοὴ, ὀδμὴ, γεῦσις, ψαῦσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη, ἀποκεκριμένη δὲ ταύτης. Fragm.* 11 Diels).

To the school of Democritus belonged Nausiphanes of Teos (Diels, *Fragm. d. Vorsokr.*[2] i. 462), who became the teacher of Epicurus (*c.* 325 B.C.) and introduced him to the atomic theory. But while it had been the aim of Democritus to explain the world-phenomena in a uniform way, Epicurus merely wished to give his own views on human happiness a satisfactory basis in natural science (*Sent. Sel.* xii. *οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν*); he regarded the whole of natural science as superfluous except in so far as it served this purpose, and declined to recognize as final any solution of a question if it failed to rid us of fear (*Sent. Sel.* xi.). Consequently he accepted Democritus' theories without introducing much change into them (Cic. *de Fin.* i. 21: 'Quæ sequitur, sunt tota Democriti. Atomi, inane, imagines, quæ *εἴδωλα* nominant'). A number of the changes which he did make have been abortive, and, when carried to their logical conclusions, are such as to shake the foundation of the system. For instance, even the ancient writers had noticed that Democritus did not avail himself of chance as an explanation of certain phenomena (Eudem. *ap.* Simplic. in *Phys.* 330, 14). Epicurus, on the other hand, made frequent use of this expedient.

Again, the only existing things, according to him, are atoms and empty space, and he finds the former characterized by hardness (*ἀντιτυπία*), and the latter by pliability (*εἶξις*). The atoms, on

account of their minuteness, are not perceptible, and yet they are not infinitely small in a mathematical sense, but simply, by reason of their hardness, not further divisible. They fall downwards by their weight, like rain, and with equal rapidity, empty space yielding to them; here then, in opposition to Democritus, a characteristic primordial motion is ascribed to them. Since, however, in this way no contact could ever take place between them, Epicurus found himself forced to make the assumption—fundamentally monstrous, and derided even by the ancients—that certain atoms deviated very slightly ('nec plus quam minimum,' Lucr. ii. 244) from the perpendicular direction, thus colliding with others and producing all those processes which, from Democritus' point of view also, led to the formation of worlds. He made use of this deviation of atoms as an explanation even of the freedom of the will (Brieger, *Abhandl. fur Hertz*, Berlin, 1888). The idea that the motion of the atoms is permanent, and does not cease even in the interior of the bodies formed from them, also appears to be new. Even the soul Epicurus makes to consist of material atoms, though not now merely of fire-atoms, but of fire, air, *pneuma*, and an indefinable substance which was supposed to be the vehicle of feeling; thus he gave the soul a separate status in contradiction to the logic of materialism. Perception he explained in exactly the same way as his great predecessor, but he seems to have laid greater emphasis on the identity of perception and motion in the soul-particles, being here, as often, influenced by Aristotle. While Democritus had explained the sense-qualities as subjective, Epicurus ascribes reality to them, and denies that the senses can ever deceive. But since all kinds of atoms are intermingled, and one person perceives more of one kind and another more of another, the same things may affect different men differently (Fragm. 250, Us.). Epicurus' teaching about the mingling was more correct than that of Democritus. The latter had assumed that parts of the mingled matter lay side by side, but was met by Aristotle with the objection that in this way only a medley could arise, and not a real mingling. Consequently, Epicurus now made, not the particles of matter, but the particular atoms come to the side of one another, and thus approached very near to the views of modern chemistry.

The school of Epicurus held to the teaching of its founder with greater tenacity than any other, and consequently in ancient times atomism subsequently underwent no development. Thus Lucretius, although he is hardly indebted directly to Epicurus, but to later Epicureans, faithfully reproduces the views of the master. A little before him lived the physician Asclepiades of Bithynia, who grounded his theory of medicine on the basic ideas of the Epicurean doctrine of atoms (M. Wellmann, in Pauly-Wissowa, ii. 1632).

LITERATURE.—On Leucippus and Democritus: **E. Zeller**, *Philosophie der Griechen*[5], i., Leipzig, 1892, 837 ff.; **H. Diels**, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[2], Berlin, 1903, i. 342 ff.; **C. Baeumker**, *Das Problem der Materie*, Munster, 1890, p. 79 ff.; **A. Brieger**, *Die Urbewegung der Atome*, Halle, 1884; **H. C. Liepmann**, *Die Mechanik der Leukipp-Demokritischen Atome*, Leipzig, 1886 (cf. the notice by Lortzing in Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, cxvi. 135 ff.); **E. Wellmann**, in Pauly-Wissowa, v. 135. On Epicurus: *Epicurea*, ed. H. Usener, Leipzig, 1887; **Zeller**[3], iii. 1, p. 363 ff.; **Baeumker**, *op. cit.* 303 ff.; **A. Goedeckemeyer**, *Epikurs Verhältnis zu Demokrit*, Strassburg, 1897; **H. v. Arnim**, in Pauly-Wissowa, vi. 133. W. KROLL.

ATOMIC THEORY (Indian).—In the oldest philosophical speculations of the Brāhmans as preserved in the *Upaniṣads*, we find no trace of an atomic theory; and it is therefore controverted in the *Vedānta Sūtra*, which claims systematically to interpret the teachings of the *Upaniṣads*. Nor is it acknowledged in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies, which have the next claim to be considered orthodox, *i.e.* to be in keeping with the Vedas; for even the *Vedānta Sūtra* allows them the title of *Smṛtis*. But the atomic theory makes an integral part of the Vaiśeṣika, and it is acknowledged by the Nyāya, two Brāhmanical philosophies which have originated with, or at least been favoured by, secular scholars (*paṇḍits*), rather than by divines or religious men. Among the heterodox it has been adopted by the Jains, and, as is stated in the *Abhidharmakośa vyākhyā*,* also by the Ājīvikas. It seems to have been unknown to original Buddhism; for the well-known Pāli scholar, Professor Franke, states that no mention is made of it in the Pali canonical books. It is different, however, with the Northern Buddhists; for the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas were adherents of the atomic theory, while the Mādhyamikas and Yogāchāras opposed it, as they declared the external world not to be real.

The speculations of the sects and philosophical schools just mentioned may be arranged in three groups. The first is represented by the Jains; the second by the Vaiśesika and Nyāya *Sūtras* and the *Bhāṣya* on the latter by Vātsyāyana, and, on the other hand, by the Northern Buddhists; while the last phase of the theory is that which appears first in the *Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya*, the oldest systematic exposition of the Vaiśeṣika system, and has since been generally adopted by the combined Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas.

I. We place the Jains first, because they seem to have worked out their system from the most primitive notions about matter. These may be taken to be the following. Matter is an eternal substance, undetermined with regard to quantity and quality, *i.e.* it may increase or diminish in volume without addition or loss of particles, and it may assume any forms and develop any kind of qualities. Material substances may coalesce into one substance, and one substance may divide into many.

Now, the Jains maintain that everything in this world, except souls and mere space, is produced from matter (*pudgala*), and that all matter consists of atoms (*paramāṇu*). Each atom occupies one point (*pradeśa*) of space. Matter, however, may be either in the gross state (*sthūla*, *bādara*), or in the subtle (*sūksma*). When it is in the subtle state, innumerable atoms of it occupy the space of one gross atom. The atoms are eternal as regards their substance; each atom has one kind of taste, smell, and colour, and two kinds of touch. These qualities, however, are not permanent and fixed for the several atoms, but they may be changed and developed in them. Two or more atoms which differ in their degree of smoothness and roughness, may combine to form aggregates (*skandha*). The figures formed by the arrangement of the atoms into groups are manifold, and are precisely described in the *Bhagavatī*; every thing is believed to be formed of groups of one kind only. The atom may develop a motion of its own, and this motion may become so swift that by means of it an atom may traverse in one moment the whole universe from one end to the other.

It is evident, from what has been said, that there are not different kinds of atoms corresponding to the four elements, earth, water, fire, and wind; but though it is not explicitly stated, still we may assume that the atoms, by developing the characteristic qualities of the elements, become differentiated and thus form the four elements. For the latter are presupposed by the belief in elementary souls:

* The passage is quoted, *s.v.* 'Aṇu,' in a Buddhist dictionary now [1908] being printed in Calcutta, for the proofs of which the present writer is indebted to the courtesy of Prof. de la Vallée Poussin.

earth-souls, water-souls, fire-souls, and wind-souls, *i.e.* souls in various phases of development, which are embodied in particles of earth, etc. The elements must accordingly be regarded as the bodies, or even corpses, of particular living beings; at any rate they are not without beginning and end.

We must mention the opinion of the Jains concerning *karma*, *i.e.* merit and demerit, in its bearing on the atomic theory. *Karma* according to them is of material nature (*paudgalika*). The soul by its commerce with the outer world becomes literally penetrated with material particles of a very subtle kind. These become *karma* and build up a special body, the *kārmaṇaśarīra*, which never leaves the soul till its final emancipation. Thus the atoms of which the *karma*-matter is composed are believed to be invested with a peculiar faculty which brings about the effects of merit and demerit. The opponents of the Jains understood this theory to mean that *karma* is the property of atoms, and produces a motion in them so that they combine to form the body, and that the internal organ enters it.*

II. In our second group the conception of atoms has been combined with that of the four elements in the following way: There are four distinct kinds of atoms corresponding to the four elements, earth, water, fire, and wind; and the distinctive qualities of the latter are already found in the several atoms. Now, the belief that all material things are made up of four elements, singly or jointly, was current in India probably long before the philosophical systems of which we are speaking came into existence. We first meet it in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (vi. 2 ff.). There it is said that the *Ens absolutum* created fire, fire created water, and water created earth (*anna*), and that these three elements combining produce all existing things. In other places, wind (*vāyu*) is regarded as an element, and at last space (*ākāśa*) was reckoned as the fifth element; for it seemed proper that there should be five elements corresponding to the five organs of sense.† This theory of the five elements has been adopted in the Sāṅkhya philosophy, and there it has been further developed by distinguishing two sets of elements, subtle (*tanmātra*) and gross (*mahābhūta*). The elements in Sāṅkhya are, however, not atomic or eternal, but are developed from primeval matter (*prakṛti*) by a process which need not be detailed here. Of these traditional five elements, the fifth, *ākāśa*, has a peculiar character of its own, as it is not considered to enter into combination with the other elements, but to be a simple, *i.e.* an infinite and continuous, substance; nor did the Buddhists even reckon it among their elements (*mahābhūta*). And the Vaiśeṣikas also, who distinguished space (*diś*) from *ākāśa*, the substratum of sound, count the latter among the simple and infinite substances (*vibhu*), together with space, time, and the souls. Accordingly, both Brāhmanical and Buddhistic atomists admitted only four atomic substances, viz. earth, water, fire, and wind. But in other details their opinions vary.

As we have as yet but defective and second-hand information about the atomic theories of the Buddhists, we shall first describe that of their opponents, the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas.

1. Vaiśeṣika being chiefly concerned with physics, and Nyāya with metaphysics and dialectics, the physical side of the atomic theory was more the province of the former, and the metaphysical of the latter system. Hence it may be supposed that the atomic theory is more intimately connected with the Vaiśeṣika system, and indeed Bādarāyana regards it as their cardinal tenet.‡

The opinions of the Vaiśeṣikas on atoms and their qualities, as well as the arguments connected therewith, are epitomized in a few aphorisms of the 4th and 7th chapters of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* by Kaṇāda. They reasoned in the following way: Things that exist and are not produced from a cause are eternal; they may be inferred from (the fact that all known things are) products. Besides, as we call everything we perceive non-eternal, this idea of non-eternity presupposes eternity (IV. i. 1–4). And finally the fact that we do not perceive the ultimate, *i.e.* uncaused, causes of things, constitutes our ignorance, and thus we are forced to assume that these ultimate causes are eternal.

But there is another interpretation of the last sūtra (IV. i. 5), which consists only of one word, 'ignorance'; *i.e.*, as we can imagine no other cause of the destruction of a thing than the disjunction or destruction of its causes, it follows that the last causes must be eternal.

For the interpretation of the sūtras here given the writer relies not so much on the modern commentaries (for there is no old one in existence), as on their refutation by Śaṅkara, which shows us what was the meaning attached to them more than a thousand years ago. It is to be understood that these eternal things, the causes of the non-eternal ones, are the *atoms*; but they are not visible. For the sūtra goes on to declare that a great thing may be visible, if it has many constituent parts and possesses colour (IV. i. 6). The next sūtra (not in our text, but as quoted in the *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 233) states that the atom is invisible, because it is not composed of material parts. Now, a thing is great if it is composed of many constituent parts, or if the parts themselves are great, or if they are arranged in a peculiar way (VII. i. 9, not as in our text, but as quoted by Śaṅkara on *Ved. Sut.* II. ii. 11). The reverse of this holds good with the small *aṇu* (*i.e.* atom); that is to say, the atom is not composed of parts.

The discussion, carried on in the next sūtras (10–20), comes to this. The expressions 'great, small, long, short,' as used in common parlance, are relative terms, the same thing being called great with reference to one thing and small with reference to another. These expressions refer to great (or long) things only, since only such are visible, and therefore they are used in a secondary meaning. In their *primary* sense 'great' and 'small' are not relative terms, but denote distinct kinds or *genera* of dimension (just as red and blue are different kinds of colour). For otherwise we should speak of great or small greatness, *i.e.* we should attribute qualities (great or small) to a quality (greatness), which would be against the principle that qualities have no qualities. Greatness and smallness are non-eternal in non-eternal things; in eternal things they are eternal, *i.e.* absolute or infinite. The absolutely small is called globular (*parimaṇḍala*).

About the other properties of the atoms we have the following statements. The qualities of earthen and other things—colour, taste, smell, and touch—vanish on the destruction of the thing itself; accordingly they must be eternal in eternal things, *i.e.* in atoms. And so they are in the atoms of water, fire, and wind. In earth, however, as well as in atoms of earth, (some) qualities are *pākaja*, *i.e.* changeable by heat (VII. i. 1–6) Different atoms may come into conjunction (IV. ii. 4). In the beginning of creation the atoms are set in motion by *adṛṣṭa*, *i.e.* merit and demerit of creatures in the past period (V. ii. 13). The internal organ also is an atom (VII. i. 23).

This is all the information about atoms we can gather from the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*. But, short though it be, it is enough to show us the actual state of the atomic theory at the time of Kaṇāda and the arguments used by him in establishing that theory. Two things deserve to be noticed. Firstly, the word for 'atom' used in our text, and, it may be added, in the *Nyāya Sūtra* too, is *anu*; only in the sūtra quoted in the *Nyāya Vārtika* do we meet with *paramāṇu*, the usual form with all later authors; but this may be a mistake of the Vārtikakāra, who quoted from memory. Secondly, the argument for the existence of atoms, which is based on the impossibility of unlimited division of a thing, was not yet made use of by the author of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*.

2. In the *Nyāya Sūtra* by Gautama, and especially in the *Bhāṣya*, or old commentary on it, by

* *Vātsyāyana*, p. 191, and Vācaspati's remark in the footnote, and *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 448.

† This subject is treated at some length in Dr. Sukhthankar's dissertation, 'Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja,' in *Wiener Ztschr. f. d. Kunde d. Morgenl.* xxii.

‡ *Vedānta Sūtra*, II. ii. 11 ff., and Śaṅkara's remarks on II. ii. 11.

Vātsyāyana, who wrote in the 5th cent. A.D. or earlier, some aspects of the atomic theory are discussed, and objections raised to it by opponents are refuted. Gautama shared the opinions of the Vaiśeṣikas on the physical properties of the atoms described above. For, since he incidentally remarks (IV. i. 67) that the black colour (of earthen atoms) is not eternal (though existing from eternity), it follows that he considered the properties of water, fire, and wind to be eternal. The metaphysical questions, however, relating to atoms are fully discussed by Gautama, and further explained by Vātsyāyana. In the two places (II. i. 36 and IV. ii. 14 ff.) where they occur, they are brought in at the end of the discussion of the 'whole and its parts.' The Naiyāyikas maintain that the whole is something more than its parts; it is a different thing (*arthāntara*), not separated from its parts, but rather something in addition to them. We perceive the whole thing as such, *e.g.* a tree, though we see only the front parts, and not the middle and back ones; and thus we see a thing though we cannot see the atoms of which it consists. The question of atoms is then discussed in this way. A thing consisting of parts is called a whole, but each part must again be considered as a whole, and so the parts of a part, and so on *ad infinitum*. If we never could come to last parts, we could not conceive the idea of the whole, and so the whole would be dissolved into nothing. But the division reaches its limit in the atom, which cannot be divided any further, as we assume it to be absolutely small.

Another proof is the following. If the division into parts had no limit, the mote (*truṭi*) would not differ in size from the highest mountain, because both would have the same number of parts (IV. ii. 1 f.). The text then proceeds to refute objections raised against the notion of atoms as indivisible smallest things without parts. *Ākāśa* ('air'), as the Vaiśeṣikas assert, is a simple, all-pervading, and infinite substance: the question is put whether it penetrates the atoms or not. If it does, the atom must have parts; if not, *ākāśa* would not be all-pervading. The reply is that the atom has no exterior or interior, nor is it hollow inside, but it is a simple not a compound thing. It is further objected that, since the atom has a form, being globular, and since the form of a thing consists in the disposition of its parts, the atom must have parts. And again, when three atoms are in juxtaposition, that in the middle touches the one to the left with its right side, and that on the right with its left side; and when the atom is surrounded on all sides, we can distinguish six sides of the atom which must be considered its parts. And if the six sides were reduced to one (*i.e.* if the atom were a mere point), then the aggregate of the seven atoms would take up no more space than one atom, and consequently a jar could be reduced to the size of an atom, and hence become invisible. These arguments are met by the declaration that the division of the atom into parts is not real, but a mode of expression only.

The following are some opinions on atoms, which are mentioned in the *Nyāya Vārtika* (6th cent. A.D.), but the authors of which are not named. Some thought that the mote which is seen in a ray of the sun entering a window is an atom. Others believed that atoms do not occur singly (*asaṁhata*), but always in aggregates (p. 234). Some, apparently Buddhists, maintained that the atoms were not eternal, because they possess motion. The Naiyāyikas agree with the Vaiśeṣikas that the atoms are set into motion by *adṛṣṭa*, *i.e.* merit and demerit, but expressly state that God (*Iśvara*) directs the action of the atoms.*

3. The chief opponents of the Naiyāyikas, who held different views on atoms, were Buddhists of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools, as was said at the beginning. The Vaibhāṣikas maintained that external things can be directly perceived, the Sautrāntikas that they can only be inferred. Śaṅkara, who comprises both under the name of Sarvāstivādin, describes their opinions on atoms in his commentary on *Ved. Sut.* II. ii. 18 thus:

'These Buddhists acknowledge the four elements, earth, water, fire, and wind, with their properties and products, including the organs of sense; the four elements are atomic; the earth atoms have the quality of harshness, the water-atoms that of viscidity, the fire-atoms that of heat, and the wind-atoms that of motion; in combination these atoms form earthly things,' etc.

More details we learn from the work of the Tibetan *hjam yan bšad pa*, of which Wassiliefl has given an abstract,† from the *Abhidharmakośa vyākhyā*, a work of the idealistic school Yogāchāra (for a transcript of which the present writer is indebted to the courtesy of Prof. de la Vallée Poussin), and from Prajñākaramati's commentary on the *Bodhicharyāvatāra* (ix. 8 f., 95 f.).

The Vaibhāṣikas admitted that an atom had six sides, but they maintained that they made but one, or, what comes to the same, that the space within an atom could not be divided. Their opinion has been disputed by the Naiyāyikas in an old verse quoted in the *Nyāya Vārtika* (p. 521). They further asserted that atoms were amenable to sense-knowledge, though they were not visible apart, just as a dim-sighted man sees a mass of hair, though he cannot see a single hair. This view, too, was disputed by the Naiyāyikas, who maintained that the atom is transcendental (*atīndriya*), not perceptible to sense (*aindriyaka*).‡

The Sautrāntikas seem to have regarded the aggregate of seven atoms as the smallest compound (*aṇu*).§ Their opinion seems to have been that the (globular) atoms did not touch one another completely, but that there was an interval between them; but some held different views. All agreed that the atom is indivisible, though some admitted that it might be regarded as having parts, viz. eight sides. Both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas declare that atoms are not hollow, and cannot penetrate one another.

Most points in the Buddhistical opinions which we have related are also discussed in the *Nyāya Sūtra*, *Bhāṣya*, and *Vārtika*; all the speculations on atoms we have dealt with in this our second group (the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* perhaps excepted) must, therefore, be regarded as having been current in the same period, *i.e.* in the beginning of our era down to the 6th cent. and later.

III. The latest improvement of the atomic theory consists in the assumption of *dvyaṇukas*, etc. It was first taught by *Praśastapāda* (p. 28), and is plainly referred to by Udyotakara;§ it was received as a tenet in all later works of what may be called the combined Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The fusion of these two schools began early, and seems to have been complete at the time when the *Nyāya Vārtika* was written; for in this work the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* is several times quoted simply as the *Sūtra* or *Śāstra*, and once (p. 222) its author is called *Paramarṣi*, a title accorded only to the highest authority. From that time *dvyaṇukas* are quite familiar in Sanskrit writers. It is assumed that two atoms (*paramāṇu*) form one binary (*dvyaṇuka*), and that three or more‖ *dvyaṇukas* form one *tryaṇuka*, which is 'great' and perceptible by the eye. From *tryaṇukas* are produced all things. Modern writers further assume *chaturaṇukas*, formed of four *tryaṇukas*, etc. The reasoning that led to this highly artificial theory is the following.¶ The rule that the quality of the product is derived from the corresponding quality of the cause does not apply to *dvyaṇukas* and *tryaṇukas*. For in that case the 'small' *dvyaṇukas* would produce a 'small' *tryaṇuka*, not a 'great' one as required. And if the smallness of the *dvyaṇukas* were produced from the like quality of the *paramāṇus*, it would be of a higher degree, just as two great things produce one greater

* *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 401 ff.

* *Der Buddhismus*, pp. 298, 307 f., 337 of the Germ. tr.

† *Nyāya Sūtra*, II. i. 36, IV. ii. 14; cf. *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 232.

‡ Cf. Hiuen Tsiang, *Si-yu-ki*, i. 60. In Paurāṇic measures 8 *paramāṇus* = 1 *parasūkṣma* (Wilson, *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, i. 93 n.).

§ *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 418. ‖ *Śridhara*, p. 32.

¶ Athalye's note to *Tarka Saṅgraha*, Bombay Sanskrit Series, p 123.

thing; but the *paramāṇu* is that than which nothing smaller can be imagined. Therefore it is not the dimension of the cause, viz. of the parts, which produces the peculiar dimension of the *dvyaṇuka* and *tryaṇuka*, but another quality: *number*. The number of the *dvyaṇukas* in the *tryaṇuka* has the effect of producing, on the latter, greatness, a dimension which differs in kind from that of its parts. *Dvyaṇukas* have been assumed for the following reason. As great things are of two kinds, eternal (viz. the infinitely great ones, *e.g.* space) and non-eternal, so both kinds must be found in 'small' things. Eternal small things are, of course, the atoms. Non-eternal ones must therefore consist of atoms; they are the *dvyaṇukas*.* Now number is produced by the 'notion which refers to many unities' (*apekṣābuddhi*); and such a notion presupposes an intellect to form it; in our case it must be the intellect of one who perceives all the atoms and *dvyaṇukas*, and who therefore must be omniscient—that is, God. Without him in whose intellect the notion of duality in *dvyaṇukas* subsists, there would not be any *dvyaṇukas* or any *tryaṇukas*, and consequently there would not be anything whatever. This strange idea, found *in nuce* already in *Praśastapāda*, was brought forward by Udayana (12th cent.) as a proof of the existence of God.

Having passed in review all forms of the atomic theory which are known to us at present, we must now inquire into the origin of that theory. Two points appear to be of chief importance for our inquiry: firstly, that the name of atom is *aṇu*, 'small,' or *paramāṇu*, 'absolutely small'; and secondly, that 'small' was generally considered to differ, not in degree but in kind, from 'great.' In accordance with this notion which is shared by all, even by the opponents of the atomic theory, the small, or, as we had better call it, the infinitesimal, had to be assumed as existing, and needed no further proof. The idea of the infinitesimal in this sense seems to have already been current in the time of the *Upaniṣads*, where we frequently meet with the statement that *Brahman* is smaller than the small, and that the self (*ātman*) is small (*aṇu*). In order to arrive at the conception of the atom, the idea of the infinitesimal had not only to be applied to matter, but it had, at the same time, to be joined to the idea of its indestructibility. Reasoning from analogy apparently came in to help; as the absolutely great, *e.g.* space, is acknowledged by all to be eternal, so the absolutely small, the atom, must also be assumed to be eternal. At any rate, the notion of the infinitesimal led, by easy steps, to the conception of the atom. It was probably in this early stage of development that the Jains took up the idea of the atom and made use of it in their metaphysical speculations. But in India the inventors of a new theory have generally been forgotten, and the fame attached to it went to those who succeeded in defending the theory against all opponents and in thus putting it on a base of firm reasoning. This task seems to have been performed by the Vaiśeṣikas. For the atomic theory makes an integral part of their system, and in their *Sūtra* we find the outlines of the arguments used to establish it. Moreover, when the atomic theory is discussed in the *Vedānta Sūtra*, it is there ascribed to the Vaiśeṣikas, and at the same time treated as one of their cardinal tenets; we may therefore conclude that the author of the *Vedānta Sūtra* looked on the Vaiśeṣikas as the principal upholders, if not the authors, of the atomic theory.

When once firmly established, the atomic theory must have had much persuasive power with many philosophers; for it put in place of the primitive conception of matter as an eternal but quite undefined substance the more rational notions which offered an intelligible explanation of the perpetual change of things while still maintaining the eternity of matter. The Northern Buddhists adopted it, though they had to deny the eternity of atoms, according to the fundamental tenet of Buddhism that there are no eternal things. Even some adherents of Yoga admitted *paramāṇus*, defining them as the smallest particles in which the three *guṇas* are present.* The Mīmāṁsakas are said by Prajñākaramati to have acknowledged eternal atoms;† and the same holds good with the Ājīvikas, as stated above.

It must, however, be mentioned that Dr. W. Handt‡ has maintained the Buddhist origin of the atomic theory. 'Starting,' he says, 'from the fundamental view of original Buddhism, which looked on the *saṁsāra* as continual springing into existence and perishing, they regarded the whole material world as an aggregate of non-eternal atoms, just as the spiritual one was produced by the aggregate of the five *skandhas*.' But non-eternity seems to reverse the idea of the atom as it is generally understood. And if, as Handt asserts, the Buddhists, in order to explain the perpetual flow of existence, 'naturally hit on the assumption of non-eternal atoms which are divided into four classes according to the four elements,' still it would seem not to have sufficed them even for that purpose. For the Sautrāntikas have brought forward their famous theory of the momentariness of all things (*kṣaṇikavāda*). Every thing, according to this theory, exists but for a moment, and is in the next moment replaced by a facsimile of itself, very much as in a kinematoscopic view. The thing is nothing but a series (*santāna*) of such momentary existences (*kṣaṇa*). Here time is, as it were, resolved into atoms. This theory explains perfectly well the perpetual change of things, and apparently was invented for that purpose. Still, the Sautrāntikas retained the atomic theory alleged by Dr. Handt to have been invented by the Buddhists for the same purpose. We shall therefore not err in supposing that the Buddhists did not invent the atomic theory as a prop for their fundamental dogma, but advocated it because it belonged to the stock of physical and metaphysical ideas which passed current during the early centuries of the Christian era in Northern India.

LITERATURE — Handt, *Die atomistische Grundlage der Vaiśeṣikaphilosophie*, Rostock, 1900. A full discussion of the Atomic Theories is lacking. The original works are:—I. *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, by Umāsvāti, translated in *Zeitschrift d. deutsch. morgenl. Ges.* vol. lx. p. 512 ff. II. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* and *Praśastapada Bhāṣya*, *Nyāya Sūtra* with *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika*, at the places quoted in the article. III. See above, p 201.

H. JACOBI.

ATOMIC THEORY (Muhammadan). — The genesis of atomic theories among Muslim thinkers is shrouded in obscurity. It is probable that such theories found their way into Islām through the medium of the Aristotelian physics and the Neo-Platonic commentaries dealing therewith. As far back, at all events, as we can follow the growth of atomism in this field, we find it imbued with the conceptions of Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic thought.

We can trace the presence of such atomistic doctrine as early as the 9th century. Al-Naẓẓām († A.D. 845) is mentioned as having been an opponent thereof, while al-Kindī († A.D. *c.* 870) wrote a treatise against its adherents.

The first recognizable form of the doctrine is that which it assumed in the hands of Abū Hāshim of Baṣra († *c.* 933 A.D.). His theory, which is practically

* *Praśastapāda*, p. 131, and *Śrīdhara*, p. 133.

* *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 251 f., and *Yoga Sūtra*, i. 40.

† Com. on *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, ix. 127.

‡ *Die atomistische Grundlage der Vaiśeṣikaphilosophie*, Rostock, 1900.

that of the Basrensian Mu'tazilites of the 10th cent., is found in the *Kitābu 'l-masā'il* of Abū Rashīd Sa'id b. Muḥammad b. Sa'id al-Naisābūrī, whose lifetime falls between A.D. 932 and 1068. We give here a concise summary of his views.

The atom (*al-juz' alladhi lā yutajazzu'*), or, as it is commonly called, the substance (*al-jauhar*), possesses in itself (*jauhar fard*), as the attribute involved in its very essence, the capacity of filling space (*taḥayyuz*). The 'substances' are of cubical form, and they are all of the same sort. Hence the only real difference amongst them lies in the fact that each occupies a definite portion of space (*ḥayyiz*). Besides existence and spatiality, each has likewise a certain range (*jiha*), or spatial persistence, by means of which others are prevented from usurping its position. Finally, the substances have the property of assuming accidents, in virtue of which they are qualitatively determined.

These substances move in empty spaces, and interact by pressure and impact. The proof of this is sought not merely on deductive lines, but by way of simple experiments. According to the older form of atomism, as set forth by Democritus, Nothing is no less a fact than Something (*μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν ἢ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι*), and by 'nothing' in this case was meant simply empty space. As a result of the infusion of later theories, however, this idea is wholly discarded in Islām, and the states of being and not-being are distinguished as existing in the substance itself; or, in other words, even the non-existent, as something known, *i.e.* distinguished from something else, is possessed of substantiality.

The essence of the atom, or substance, is independent of its existence—a statement which probably means that such essence might form the content or object of the Divine thought or of human knowledge. The substances are not created by God: He simply brings them into existence, or lets them come forth. When they have attained the status of actual being, they have certain necessary modes of existence (*'akwān*), such as motion and rest, union and separation. Other accidents again are contingent, *i.e.* each several substance may assume an indefinite number and variety of accidents, so long as these are not mutually antagonistic.

The substances and the bodies they go to constitute are endowed with duration in time. Their annihilation—the cessation of their existence—is possible, but only in their totality, *i.e.* only if the whole world were to pass away at once.

Such, apart from insignificant differences of view, was the theory of the Basrensian thinkers. From these the scholars of Baghdad differed in many ways. The teaching of the latter school is known to us most fully in the form subsequently given to it—first of all, probably, by Abū Bakr al-Bāqilānī († *c.* 1012)—in the Ash'arite or orthodox *Kalām*. A most comprehensive account of this doctrine is given by Maimonides (1135–1204), and it is largely upon his description that the following outline is based.

The entire world, of which God is the absolutely free Creator, consists of indivisible substances or atoms, and their accidents. These substances, taken separately, are mere points; they have no magnitude or extension, and are thus imperceptible to sense. They have their *ḥayyiz*, or natural position, which, however, in contradistinction to *makān*, does not involve quantity or spatial magnitude. Only by aggregation do the infinitesimal substances become spatially extended bodies occupying the tri-dimensional *makān*. By union or separation of substances—which are all of the same kind—bodies are produced or dissolved. What is true of space holds good also of time. The latter is generated by the combination of points of time or moments (*'ānāt*). Motion also, like space and time, is discontinuous.

Every individual substance possesses at all times a large number of accidents. Some thinkers even hold that it possesses all possible positive accidents or their opposites. Negative states, or privations, in fact, are just as truly accidents as positive states: death as well as life, ignorance no less than knowledge, etc. Life, feeling, thought—in a word, the soul—are quite consistently classed amongst the accidents. Some writers regard the soul as belonging to all the atoms of the body, while others are of opinion that it is composed of finer atoms, or again, that the soul and the mind appertain to only one particular atom in the body.

No accident can subsist for more than an instant, and as the substance is inseparably united with its accidents, the measure of its persistence likewise shrinks to a moment of time. Now, since the entire aggregate of spatial points which constitutes the world can maintain itself only for a moment, it must follow that the world is created anew by God every instant. There is no such thing as causal connexion or natural law, nothing save the arbitrary act of an omnipotent Creator, to whom being and not-being are alike. God creates as many worlds one after another as He chooses, and when He ceases to create any more, what He then really creates is Nothing.

Here, then, is the religious purpose of this atomistic doctrine achieved. The theory is meant to be, not an explanation, but a subversion, of nature. All natural causes whatever are sacrificed to the arbitrary fiat of Allāh. Anything is possible; whatsoever is capable of being figured in thought or imagination may come to pass. Of everything that happens the opposite might quite as well happen, if Allāh but willed it so.

This atomistic teaching seems almost an anticipation of Occasionalism, especially as applied, not to the course of nature merely, but also to human action. The classical illustration is that of a man engaged in writing. It was maintained that Allāh creates within him, and, indeed, creates anew every instant, first the will, and then the capacity, to write; next, the movement of the hand, and, finally, the motion of the pen, concurrent therewith, etc. Every factor in the transaction is independent of every other, all the several stages of the process emanating from God alone. It is only in appearance that we have a coherent action; only in appearance is there a self-consistent and harmoniously-working world in space and time. That the world and human life appear to be pervaded by a causal nexus is due simply to the fact that meanwhile, and as a rule, Allāh does not choose to interrupt the continuity of events by a miracle. It is possible, however, that He might so intervene at any moment.

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ATOMIC THEORY (Mediæval and Modern).—**I. History.**—If we seek for an explanation of the phenomena of expansion, contraction, solution, and precipitation, we are inevitably led to adopt the hypothesis that matter is, in its minute structure, formed of particles with interspaces. If matter is a continuum, these phenomena are ultimate facts,

not to be likened to, and not to be explained by, any other facts. We may conceive the possibility of expansion and contraction of a continuum, but we cannot explain it. If, however, we assume that matter consists of discrete particles, a crowd of particles is like a crowd of people. Expansion is a widening out, contraction is a drawing in, of the crowd. Solution is the thorough mixture of two crowds, precipitation is the expulsion or segregation of certain members of the crowd. Other phenomena, too, find an easy explanation. Thus, evaporation is the passing away of members of the crowd from its boundary. It is no necessary part of the hypothesis that the space between the particles is a vacuum. We know that there is air between the members of a crowd of people. So there may be some kind of material between the particles of matter, displaced when other particles squeeze their way in.

When we trace the history of the speculations about the constitution of matter from mediæval into modern times, we find that the atomic doctrine of Greek philosophers—the doctrine that the minute particles are indivisible—has fallen into disfavour (see ATOMIC THEORY [Greek]). The mediæval philosophers no doubt thought of matter as composed of minute parts, and they followed the ancient philosophers in regarding the parts as of four kinds, four elements—fire, air, earth, and water. Ordinary bodies were 'mixed bodies,' mixtures of these four, in different proportions in different bodies. But the elements were not always elements in the modern sense. It was sometimes thought that they could be transformed one into another. **Roger Bacon**, for instance, in the 13th cent. held that the four elements were made of *hyle* (ὕλη), that each could be converted into the nature of another, and everything into anything else. Wheat is a possible man, and man is possible wheat (*de Arte Chymiæ*).

These four elements were still dominant when modern science began; and long thereafter they hindered progress, not disappearing indeed till the 18th century. At the beginning of the modern period, matter was regarded as consisting of particles, but the particles were not atomic. Thus **Francis Bacon** in the *Novum Organum* (1620) in several passages mentions the 'atoms' of Leucippus and Democritus only to discard them, and in one passage he says:

'Nor by this are we brought to the (Epicurean) Atom, which presupposes a vacuum, and matter immutable (both of which are false), but to true Particles, as they are found to be' (*Nov Org.* bk. II. § 8, Kitchin's tr.).

Bacon made an important contribution to the theory of matter by his clear statement of the doctrine that heat is a mode of motion of the particles:

'Heat is motion, not expansive uniformly in the whole, but expansive through the lesser particles of the body; and at the same time restrained, repelled, and reflected; so that it obtains an alternative motion, ever hurrying, striving, struggling, and irritated by repercussion; whence the fury of fire and heat has its origin' (*ib.* bk. ii. § 20, iii.). 'Heat is motion, expansive, restrained, and struggling through the lesser parts of (a body)' (*ib.* iv.)

These passages clearly imply a crowd of separate particles knocking each other further apart when heated, that is, when thrown into more violent motion. Between the particles Bacon appears to have supposed that there was an intangible, weightless, continuous material which he called 'spirit.' Had he lived later, probably he would have called it 'ether.' He speaks of

'the action and motion of spirit enclosed in tangible bodies. For everything tangible that we know contains an invisible and intangible spirit, and covers and seems to clothe it. Hence that powerful triple source (of effects) and wondrous *process* of spirit in a tangible body. For spirit in a tangible thing, (1) if emitted, contracts and dries up bodies; (2) if retained, softens and melts them; (3) if neither entirely emitted nor entirely retained, models them, gives them limbs, assimilates, carries them out, organizes them,' etc. 'Spirit has no weight' (*op. cit.* bk. ii. § 40).

It may be worthy of note that Bacon held that the totality of matter is constant.

The first attempt at a detailed theory of the constitution of matter was made by **Descartes** in his *Principia Philosophiæ* (1644). He held that whatever we can clearly perceive is true, clear perception being of that which is present and manifest to the mind giving attention to it (pt. i. xxx., xlv.). Applying this doctrine to the parts of matter, he is led to the rejection of indivisible atoms. For however small we suppose the parts, we are always able in thought to divide any one of them into two or more smaller parts, and may accordingly admit their divisibility. Again, he holds that a vacuum or space in which there is absolutely no body is repugnant to reason. Extension in space is extension in substance. All space, then, is filled with matter. Sensible bodies are composed of insensible particles (pt. iv. cci.). These insensible particles are of three elementary forms (pt. iii. lii.), though constituted out of the same kind of material. The first element consists of very minute bits, of irregular shape and capable of very rapid motion; chips off the particles forming the second element, and entirely filling the spaces between them. The particles of the second form have become spheres by attrition. They are very minute, and beyond the range of vision. The third form is larger and slower in motion. The sun and stars are composed of the first element, the sky of the second, and the earth and planets of the third. The second and third elements appear to have vortices of the first element round them, and these vortices account for the forces which the particles exert upon each other. They are like the vortices which Descartes supposed to exist round the sun and planets to account for orbital motion.

This theory of the three elemental forms of matter, fanciful in its beginning, becomes more fanciful as he builds it up. It does not appear to have served, except in the mind of Descartes, to co-ordinate facts or to stimulate investigation. But it is important historically, as the first suggestion that it might be possible to consider in detail the ultimate structure of matter and to explain phenomena by this structure. It is important, too, in that it is purely mechanical, that all phenomena are to be explained by configuration and motion of the ultimate particles. Descartes insisted that the sensations are excited by the *motion* of matter only.

'Our mind is of such a nature that the motions of body alone are sufficient to excite in it all sorts of thoughts, without its being necessary that these should in any way resemble the motions which give rise to them, and especially that these motions can excite in it those confused thoughts called sensations' (pt. iv. excvii., Veitch's tr.). We perceive nothing outside ourselves 'except light, colours, smells, tastes, sounds, and the tactile qualities; and these I have recently shown to be nothing more, at least so far as they are known to us, than certain dispositions of the objects, consisting in magnitude, figure, and motion' (pt. iv. excix.).

That is, there is not a separate light principle or substance, smell principle, sound principle. These are in our minds. All the different senses are excited by the size, shape, and motion of the small particles of which matter consists.

Like Bacon, Descartes held that heat is a mode of motion of the particles (pt. iv. xxix.).

The most influential writer on the structure of matter in the generation succeeding that of Descartes is **Robert Boyle**, who in the *Sceptical Chymist* (1661), *Origin of Forms and Qualities* (1666), and other works, laid the foundation of modern chemical theory. He was probably an atomist.

'We may consider,' he says, '(1) that there are in the world great store of Particles of matter, each of which is too small to be, whilst single, sensible; and, being entire, or undivided, must needs both have its determinate shape, and be very Solid. Insomuch that though it be *mentally*, and by Divine Omni-

potence divisible, yet by reason of its Smallness and Solidity, Nature doth scarce ever actually divide it; and these may in this sense be called *Minima* or *Prima Naturalia*. (2) That there are also multitudes of corpuscles, which are made up of the coalition of several of the former *Minima Naturalia*, and whose bulk is so small, and their Adhesion so close and strict, that each of these little Primitive Concretions or Clusters (if I may so call them) of Particles is singly below the discernment of Sense, and though not absolutely indivisible by Nature into the *Prima Naturalia* that composed it, or perhaps into other little fragments, yet, for the reasons freshly intimated, they very rarely happen to be actually dissolved or broken, but remain entire in great variety of sensible Bodies, and under various forms or disguises' (*Forms and Qualities*, p. 71).

Yet in the prefatory address to the reader in the same work, he says that he has forborne to use arguments that are grounded on or suppose indivisible corpuscles called atoms. Though not a Cartesian he followed Descartes, as indeed all the world has followed him, in ascribing the qualities of natural bodies to the 'Catholick and fertile Principle *Motion*, *Bulk*, *Shape*, and *Texture* of the minute parts of Matter' (*Forms and Qualities*, last page). He, too, regarded heat as a vehement agitation of the parts of the body tending all manner of ways ('Heat and Cold,' *Works*, Shaw's ed. i. 560). Fire, however, is the violent agitation of the particles of a subtle matter. But it is for his clear idea of the nature of chemical combination that we are chiefly indebted to Boyle. In the *Sceptical Chymist* he discards the old elements, air, earth, and water, and says that these three are to be regarded as made up of mixed bodies rather than mixed bodies as made up of them; and by mixed bodies he means ordinary bodies which had been regarded as mixtures of air, earth, and water, and had so come to be called mixed bodies. He dwells on the idea that an enormous number of compounds may be made by various arrangements of corpuscles, and that they differ from each other in nothing but the various textures resulting from the magnitude, shape, motion, and arrangement of the small parts.

'One and the same parcel of universal matter may by various alterations and contextures be brought to deserve the name sometimes of a sulphureous, and sometimes of a terrestrial or aqueous body' (Shaw's ed. iii. 282).

Boyle agreed, then, with Descartes in thinking of matter as one in kind, the differences being due solely to shape, size, and motion of the parts.

Newton does not appear to have concerned himself very much with speculations about the ultimate structure of matter. He was, above all, an experimental philosopher, determining laws by experiment and observation, using mathematics to deduce their consequences, and comparing these consequences with further experiment and observation, thereby verifying or correcting the laws. The framing of atomic hypotheses did not come into this programme. In the *Principia* he hardly uses the hypothetical structure of matter at all. There is a suggestion of it in the determination of the velocity of sound, but a mere suggestion. In the series of queries at the end of the *Optics* (2nd and 3rd editions) he gave himself free play, and among a number of speculations he declared himself an atomist. 'It seems probable to me that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, movable Particles' (3rd ed. p. 375). In the history of the subject Newton is mentioned only as in all probability deflecting attention from it. His immediate successors were occupied so much in following out his methods that theories of matter were apparently little studied or considered by leaders in physical thought.

But the atomic doctrine was probably making way. One very notable contribution to the particle theory was made by **D. Bernouilli** in his *Hydrodynamica* (1738), § x.. He suggested that a gas consists of very minute corpuscles moving with very great velocities in all directions, and that the pressure of a gas against the walls of a containing vessel is due to the bombardment by these corpuscles. He showed that with this constitution the pressure would be inversely as the volume if the volume were changed, which is 'Boyle's Law'; and that if the temperature were raised by increase in the velocity of the corpuscles, the pressure would be proportioned to the square of the velocity. His reasoning is somewhat obscure and unconvincing, and, perhaps on that account, his theory remained almost unnoticed for more than a century, when it was re-discovered and was developed on better lines.

In 1758, **Boscovich** published his *Theoria Philosophiæ Naturalis*. In this work he begins with his celebrated hypothesis of the nature of an atom, and then seeks to show how physical phenomena, such as collision, cohesion, fluid pressure, viscosity, and elasticity may be accounted for if matter is composed of atoms such as he imagines. According to his hypothesis, an atom is a central point to which mass or inertia is assigned, a mass-point let us say, and towards this point force is acting so that another mass-point is urged towards it with an acceleration proportional to the mass of the first point, and varying with the distance in such a way that at a great distance the attraction is inversely as the square of the distance. But when the distance becomes very small the force undergoes one or more alternations of repulsion and attraction, finally ending with a repulsion which is infinitely great when the two points are infinitely near each other. Two central mass-points can therefore never actually coincide. Boscovich did not assign any formula for the force, probably considering that future experiment alone could determine the law, but it is easy to devise expressions which satisfy his general conditions.

For instance, if a mass-point is distant r from a mass-point m, and if its acceleration to m is expressed by $m\,(r-a)\,(r-2a)\,(r-3a)/r^5$, the force is attractive, and inversely as the square of the distance if r is very great, it increases as r diminishes to a certain point, and then diminishes to zero when $r=3a$. Between $r=3a$ and $r=2a$ it is a repulsion, again vanishing at $r=2a$. Between $r=2a$ and $r=a$ it is an attraction changing again to a repulsion when r is less than a, a repulsion becoming infinite when r is infinitely small. Whatever the velocity of approach, that velocity will be destroyed before the two points coincide, *i.e.* they never will coincide.

Perhaps we can form an idea of the way in which Boscovich's atoms would act, by imagining that two solid surfaces are brought together. At great distances apart there is merely the inverse square law of gravitative attraction. When, however, they come very near, there is mutual pressure, which we may represent by supposing that the surface atoms have come into each other's first sphere of repulsion, and outside pressure is required to overcome this repulsion. If the outside pressure is made very great, we may force the atoms through this sphere of repulsion into the second sphere of attraction, and we may have equilibrium at the point where the attraction again changes into repulsion. If we can reach this point, the surfaces will adhere even when the outside pressure is removed. Thus the hypothesis explains the adhesion of bodies pressed very closely together.

Boscovich's predecessors had, like Newton, imagined a little hard nucleus round the centre of the atom; Boscovich showed that the nucleus was unnecessary. Its place was efficiently taken by the repulsive force rapidly increasing as the centre was approached. The nucleus had no part to play, and might be discarded.

The hypothesis at once excited attention. It was adopted, for instance, by **Priestley** (*Vision*, 1772, and *Matter and Spirit*, 1777). In the next century it attracted **Faraday**, who definitely adopted it (see two letters to R. Phillips, *Researches in Electricity*, 1844–55, ii. 284, iii. 447). Faraday laid stress on the uselessness of the little hard nucleus of finite size

—an idea which had again gained ground in the form of the atomic hypothesis of Dalton. He urged that the powers of matter, the forces which it exerts, are all that we know about it. These powers or forces *are* the matter, and where they extend the matter also extends. Each atom, then, extends through all space. Faraday symbolized the forces by straight lines extending out on all sides from the atomic centres, and thought of light as tremors or minute jerks carried along these lines—an idea which has been revived and made precise by Sir J. J. Thomson.

In recent years, **Lord Kelvin** took up 'the inevitable theory of Boscovich,' and sought to show how the grouping of Boscovichian atoms could account for crystalline arrangement and for the phenomena of light.

For purposes of calculation, the Boscovichian atom is indeed inevitable, in some form or other, in any atomic theory in which the forces depend solely on the distance. Mathematically, there is no difficulty in thinking of one point, B, moving towards another point, A, with an acceleration expressed by $mf(r)$. We then define m as the mass of A. If A moves towards B with an acceleration $m^1f(r)$, we call m^1 the mass of B, and we say that the force is $mm^1f(r)$. But, physically, there is some difficulty in reducing all to force. We think of force as effort, symbolized by muscular effort; and if we have force alone, it is difficult to assign meaning to effort acting on effort. We must have a duality, at least in thought. If we think of force, we think also of that which the force moves, or perhaps more fundamentally that which resists the force, and we call this matter. If with Boscovich and Faraday we identify the moved with the mover, and say that the matter is but force, then we have a dual aspect of force. In one aspect it acts, in the other it suffers action. One is the symbol of will, the other of sensation. Whatever may be the ultimate fate of Boscovich's atom in physical theory, the conception of the unity of matter and force, and unity as force rather than as matter, is a permanent contribution to philosophical ideas.

We have now come to the time when chemistry began to influence atomic speculation. Up to the latter half of the 18th cent. it was a hindrance rather than a help. Of course, chemical knowledge was continually increasing, so far as concerned the extraction of the metals from ores and the preparation of definite substances. But progress in chemical theory was hopeless while the doctrine of the four elements, fire, air, earth, and water, held sway. About 1700 the phlogiston theory of **Stahl** came into vogue, and added to the confusion of thought. This theory held that the metals contained a something called 'phlogiston' which they gave off on combining with air, that oxygen was air deprived of phlogiston, that nitrogen was air containing phlogiston, and some chemists even supposed that hydrogen was phlogiston itself. There must have been some expression or symbolization of fact in a theory which was accepted by discoverers so great as Black, Cavendish, and Priestley. But it is difficult now, so entirely is our point of view changed, to see what facts it expressed. It is obvious only that any advantage in its adoption was far outweighed by the confusion of thought which attended it. Towards the end of the 18th cent. the fog in which chemical theory was enveloped began to lift. The atomic theory had been making way, though in a vague form, and in many minds Boyle's idea that chemical compounds consisted of definite groups of atoms had taken root. The word 'molecule,' originally used as equivalent to particle, was now adopted for atomic groups. The four elements, fire, air, earth, and water, were being gradually disestablished from their supreme position. A number of gases were discovered with definite properties, and obviously not mere modifications of air. Air itself was found to consist almost entirely of two gases which we now call nitrogen and oxygen, and so air ceased to be regarded as an element. Cavendish's discovery that water was a compound of hydrogen and oxygen removed it, too, from the list. Earth was resolved into at least several different earths, and the discovery by Lavoisier of the part played by oxygen in ordinary combustion killed phlogiston. Fire and flame, however, still remained as substances; for the idea that heat was a form of motion, or, as we should now say, of molecular energy, so often put forth in the 17th cent., had fallen into abeyance, and heat was regarded as a subtle substance. The way was being prepared for the atomic theory of Dalton, and there were several foreshadowings of it, the most notable by **William Higgins**, who in 1789 published *A Comparative View of the Phlogistic and Antiphlogistic Theories*, in which he says that 'we may justly conclude that water is composed of molecules formed by the union of a single ultimate particle of dephlogisticated air [oxygen] to an ultimate particle of light inflammable air [hydrogen], and that they are incapable of uniting to a third particle of either principle.' But it is doubtful whether he considered this as an example of a general principle, and he does not appear to have considered the 'ultimate particles' of an element as all alike.

In 1804 the modern doctrine of chemical combination was definitely formulated by **Dalton**, and communicated to his friends. In 1808 he first published it in his *New System of Chemical Philosophy*. According to Dalton, the particles or atoms—he uses the terms indifferently—in a simple body are all exactly alike, and in a finite space enormous in number.

'Chemical analysis and synthesis go no farther than to the separation of particles from one another and to their reunion. No new creation or destruction of matter is within the reach of chemical agency. We might as well attempt to introduce a new planet into the solar system, or to annihilate one already in existence, as to create or destroy a particle of hydrogen. All the changes we can produce consist in separating particles that are in a state of cohesion or combination, and joining those that were previously at a distance' Compounds are definite groupings of definite atoms. Thus 1 atom of A + 1 atom of B may form 1 atom of C, binary; or 1 atom of A + 2 atoms of B may form 1 atom of D, ternary, and so on

Here he uses 'atom' for C and D where we now use 'molecule'; and it is evident that he does not think of an atom as an indivisible particle, but as the smallest particle of a body which has the properties of the body. If this particle is divided, the substance is resolved into different substances. Dalton goes on to show that the relative weights of two elements entering into, say, a binary compound are proportional to the weights of the atoms themselves, and he gives the first table of atomic weights of the elements, taking the hydrogen atom, the lightest, as having weight 1.

Dalton's great advance appears to consist in the clearness of his conception of an element as consisting of particles all alike, and whether truly atomic or not, yet indivisible by ordinary chemical agency, and in his supposition that compounds consisted in general of small groups of these elementary particles or atoms. This gave an easily pictured hypothesis to account for the chemical fact, by this time established, that the elements combine in definite proportions, which are always integral multiples of the smallest proportions in which they enter into combination. From this time forward, chemists, freed from the burden of the four elements, sought for bodies which were not to be decomposed by ordinary chemical and physical agency. These they termed 'elements,' and they investigated the

proportions in which the elements entered into compounds.

Soon after the publication of Dalton's theory, **Avogadro** put forward the hypothesis that in gases at the same temperature and pressure equal volumes contain equal numbers of molecules—a hypothesis then supported by experiments on the combination of gases, and since shown to be in accord with the kinetic theory of gases.

We have seen that with Dalton the atom was not necessarily indivisible, but merely undivided, and in modern times probably no one has held the indivisibility. Indeed, quite early in the development of the atomic theory by chemists, the old idea was revived, that the atoms of the different elements were really made of one kind of material, differing only in the quantity or arrangement of that material. **Prout** held that all the atomic weights were exact multiples of the atomic weight of hydrogen, a supposition which seems to imply that other elements were really groups of hydrogen atoms not to be divided by known agency. Later, it was suggested that discrepancies with this theory might be accounted for by taking one half or one quarter of the hydrogen atom as the unit out of which other atoms were built. But subsequent research on atomic weights has not supported these suggestions. There were, however, other reasons for supposing some community of plan in atomic structure. If weights of different metals be taken, containing, on the atomic hypothesis, equal numbers of atoms, nearly equal quantities of heat are required in many cases to raise these weights through one degree of temperature. In electrolysis, equal quantities of electricity are required to turn equal numbers of atoms out of combination. If the atoms of different elements had, as their only common property, weight or gravitation, and in other qualities were entirely different, we should hardly expect these quantitative relations.

The chemical atomic theory, as set forth by Dalton, is a statical theory. For chemical purposes the atoms may, up to a certain point, be considered as little bodies somehow held together in compounds by forces which need not be specified; and their motion and the motion of the molecules need not be regarded.

By the middle of the 19th cent. the researches of **Joule** and others had led every one to reject the doctrine of heat as a substance, and had brought to the front the old idea that heat was the energy of motion and of separation of the atoms and molecules. The dynamic aspect of the atomic and molecular theory now began to be seriously studied. We have seen that D. Bernouilli made an early but fruitless attempt to show that gas pressure could be accounted for by molecular motion. Other attempts were made by **Herapath** in 1821, by **Waterston** in 1846 (published only in 1892, when Lord Rayleigh disinterred the paper from the archives of the Royal Society), and by Joule.

Joule, in 1848 (*Scientific Papers*, i. 290), was the first to publish a calculation of the velocity with which the molecules are flying about. But the general acceptance of the dynamical, or, as it is now termed, the kinetic, theory began with the work of Kronig, Clausius, and Maxwell about 1856, and from that time onwards the theory has been developed in a series of memoirs by various authors, especially by **Clausius, Maxwell,** and **Boltzmann.**

2. Kinetic Theory.— The kinetic theory has been studied chiefly with regard to gases. It supposes that a gas consists of an enormous number of molecules, all exactly alike in a given gas, but so small that their average distance apart is very great compared with the size of any one molecule. These molecules are flying about in all directions with very great velocities, continually colliding with each other and with the walls of any containing vessel. The collisions are of such a kind that on the whole the energy of motion remains the same so long as the temperature is constant. The molecules are so far apart that they do not act upon each other except just during the moment of collision. Between collisions, then, they move in straight lines, and the average length of path between two collisions is called the 'Mean Free Path.' The velocities of the molecules are not all equal, but are grouped about a mean value which remains constant, and when the gas is in a constant or steady condition the grouping about this mean value is constant. It can be shown from simple mechanical considerations that if $\bar{v}^2$ is the average of the squares of the velocities, if p is the pressure, and if ρ is the density, then $\bar{v}^2 = 3\,p/\rho$. If we suppose that $\bar{v}^2$ remains constant so long as the temperature is constant, when the density is changed by changing the pressure, p/ρ is constant. This gives 'Boyle's Law.' The mean velocity is not quite the same as $\bar{v}$ (the square root of the mean of the squares), but the difference is only small. For hydrogen at 0° C. $\bar{v}$ is about 1800 metres per second—over a mile per second. For oxygen and nitrogen it is about a quarter of a mile per second. It can be shown that in a mixture of gases it is necessary that the average kinetic energy of each kind of molecule be the same in order that the collisions shall not affect the general condition; hence it can be further shown that the number of molecules in equal volumes of two gases at the same temperature and pressure is equal. This is 'Avogadro's Law.' Experiment shows that the pressure of a gas in a closed vessel increases by equal amounts with equal rises of temperature, and is, in fact, proportional to the temperature reckoned from −273° C. as zero. Then $\bar{v}^2$ is also proportional to this temperature. Or the mean kinetic energy of the particles is proportional to the temperature reckoned from −273° C. On this scale of temperature the sun's surface is probably about twenty times as hot as the earth's surface, so that the molecules of hydrogen there have about twenty times as great a $\bar{v}^2$ as they have here. Their velocity is thus about 4½ times as great, say, some 5 or 6 miles per second.

So far it is not necessary to enter into the structure of the molecules; but for further developments with regard to the specific heats of gases, structure has to be taken into account, and difficulties arise into which we need not enter.

The mean free path, or the average distance travelled in a straight line between two collisions, plays a very important part in the theory. It is evident that the rate of diffusion of one gas into another, or the diffusion of one part of the same gas into another part, will depend partly on the mean free path, partly on the velocity; and from certain phenomena depending on the rate of diffusion, most simply from the resistance to the travelling of one layer of gas over another, the mean free path can be calculated. For hydrogen at atmospheric pressure it is about 0·00002 cm., or, say, a little less than a hundred thousandth of an inch. For air it is almost half as much. This implies that the hydrogen molecule is effectively less than the air molecule, since it can thread its way farther through its neighbours without collision.

The greatest triumph of the kinetic theory consists in its determination of the size of the molecules and of the number in a given space. By the size of the molecules we are not to suppose some definite solid shape. Imagine two molecules approaching so closely that they just begin to deflect each other, *i.e.* just begin to collide. Draw equal

spheres round each, just touching. Then the radius of either sphere is termed the radius of molecular action, and the sphere round each molecule is taken to be the size of the molecule, even though the atomic centres may be far within the surface of the sphere. It is evident that the mean free path of a molecule depends partly on the number of molecules in a given space, and partly on their size, just as the distance a man can walk straight on in a street without touching another passenger will depend partly on the number of people, partly on their breadth from shoulder to shoulder. A relation can be found connecting the mean free path, the molecular size, and the number present in unit volume; and since we know the mean free path, this gives a relation between size and number. Another relation can be obtained from the supposition that when the gas is condensed to a liquid the contraction is due to all the molecular spheres coming into contact. We may illustrate this by thinking of a cloud of equal water drops in a vessel as representing the molecules. When the cloud sinks to the bottom of the vessel, the volume of water at the bottom will be equal to the volume of each drop multiplied by the number of drops. So the observed volume of liquid into which a given volume of gas condenses may be taken as equal to the volume of each molecule multiplied by the number of molecules. At least it may be taken as nearly equal. We cannot say how closely the molecules are packed in a liquid, and thus some uncertainty is introduced into the results obtained. Thus we have two relations between number and size, and from these two we can calculate approximately both number and size. The result obtained is that the number of molecules in a cubic centimetre of a gas at 0° C. and atmospheric pressure is about 6×10^{19}. The mass of a molecule of hydrogen, which we must suppose to consist of two atoms, is a little less than 10^{-24} of a gramme. The radius of molecular action, differing somewhat for different gases, lies between 10^{-7} and 10^{-8} of a centimetre. The number of molecules in a cubic centimetre of water is about 10^{23}, and the distance from centre to centre about 10^{-8} cm. (These results can be translated into inches if it is remembered that 1 inch = 2·5 cm.) The number of molecules of gas per cubic centimetre has been calculated in other ways, most notably from certain experiments on electric discharge, and the results obtained are in fair accordance with those given above. Unless, then, we reject the theory altogether, we may assume that we know with fair accuracy both the 'size' and the average distance apart of the molecules in a body.

The kinetic theory, when applied to account for the properties of solids and liquids, has made very little progress. In the gaseous condition the molecules, according to the theory, spend most of their time in moving in straight lines, and when the collisions do occur there is no need to consider the forces acting. It is enough to assume that, on the whole, collisions do not alter the general condition. Many properties can then be accounted for. But when we come to solids and liquids, the molecules are supposed to be so closely packed as to be always entangled with each other, and there is no mean free path. Hence we cannot go far without knowing the forces between the molecules; and even if we could specify the forces, the calculations of their effects in such complex systems would probably be exceedingly difficult. In the solid condition, we must suppose that the molecules do not move far from a mean position. Each is held by its neighbours, so that though it may be violently agitated it keeps slackly anchored, as it were, to one spot. In a liquid, the molecules are still entangled with each other, but they possess more energy, and are able to break away every now and then from their anchorage and get into new surroundings. A liquid may probably be regarded as a cross between a solid and a gas—solid-like if time be reckoned by millionths or billionths of a second, gas-like if it be reckoned by seconds.

3. Atomic and molecular structure.—Since the kinetic theory of matter arose, several attempts have been made to imagine atomic structures which should serve to give some account of phenomena. **Rankine** (Nichol's *Encyclopædia*, *s.v.* 'Heat,' p. 353) assumed that the atoms were little nuclei surrounded by atmospheres whirling round them in vortices—a revival of Descartes's idea. Though Rankine made use of the theory himself, it is obscure in detail, and has not been used by others.

The vortex atom of Lord Kelvin (*PRSE*, Feb. 1867) is a much more celebrated hypothesis. This atom is founded on Helmholtz's investigations on fluid motion. We are to suppose that space is full of a frictionless incompressible fluid of uniform density throughout. An atom is a vortex ring in this fluid, a ring-shaped portion of the fluid distinguished from the rest solely by its peculiar whirling motion. The whirling motion may be understood by running an india-rubber umbrella-ring along its stick. The friction makes it move round and round as it travels. The rings which an expert smoker makes are vortex rings. A spoon drawn sharply across a cup of tea makes half a vortex ring of which the two cut ends, as it were, appear as little whirlpools, the half ring being below the surface. We can make rings in real fluids, because they possess viscosity or friction. But in a frictionless fluid, the creation and equally the destruction of a ring would require forces to act which the fluid itself does not possess; so that a ring if in existence must have existed in all past time, and will persist in all future time, the same portion of fluid always existing in it. We thus have a suggestion for an indivisible and eternal atom. The difficulty of the mathematical investigation of the mutual actions of vortex rings is so great, that little progress has been made in the theory. But it possesses value in suggesting the possibility that all energy is of one kind, energy of motion either of the rings themselves or of the fluid outside the rings. In accounting for the eternity of the atom it perhaps goes too far. In recent years the theory has dropped into the background.

Another hypothesis, due to **Larmor** (*PRS* lxi. [1897] p. 275), supposes that space is filled with an elastic solid, or jelly, capable of vibrating and carrying waves. An atom is the centre of a strain or twist in the jelly. The strain is persistent, but it can move from point to point in the jelly, using new parts as it travels along. It is the form of strain which is the persistent atom. The atom may be likened to a kink on a rope which travels along the rope, new material continually passing into the kink to take the place of the material which passes out of it.

Larmor has developed this hypothesis in several memoirs, showing how electrical and optical phenomena are to be interpreted in terms of it.

The latest atomic hypothesis is one which assigns an electrical structure to the atom. Here we can only give a sketch of the subject. Fuller details will be found in *Electricity and Matter* and *The Corpuscular Theory of Matter*, by Sir J. J. Thomson, on whose researches the hypothesis is chiefly based, and in *Electrons*, by Sir Oliver Lodge.

The idea that the forces keeping the atoms together in the molecule are electrical in nature is

as old as **Davy.** It is rendered probable by the fact that electric charges put into a liquid will decompose it, and by the fact that one of the chief sources of electricity is the voltaic cell in which chemical combination occurs and charges are given out. We may suppose that, if a molecule contains two constituent atoms or groups of atoms, one of these is positively electrified and the other negatively electrified, and that it is the attraction between the two charges which binds the atoms together to form the molecules.

Faraday discovered that, when a liquid is decomposed by an electric current, a definite charge of electricity of each kind is required to disengage a definite amount of an element from a compound, and that, if we accept the atomic theory, the charge is proportional to the number of atoms disengaged. The hydrogen atom always requires the same charge. Other atoms require either the same charge as the hydrogen atom or twice the charge or a small multiple of it. There is no evidence for the existence of a smaller charge than that on the hydrogen atom, and apparently all other charges are exact multiples of it. Thus electricity appears to be, as it were, atomic. Any quantity of it consists of multiples of the hydrogen atom charge, which is an undivided unit. We have to suppose that, when we decompose a molecule, each constituent has a charge, one positive the other negative, and we have to put in equal neutralizing charges to render the products of decomposition neutral. This interpretation of Faraday's discovery may be regarded as the foundation of the theory of the electrical atom.

The superstructure began with a discovery made by **Crookes,** when investigating electric discharge in highly rarefied gases. If the discharge takes place between two metal plates in a space sufficiently rarefied, Crookes found that a stream of negatively electrified matter shoots straight out from the plate to which negative electricity is supplied. This stream of matter can be deflected by a magnet. Sir J. J. Thomson found that it can be deflected also by electric force. In a series of brilliant experiments on the deflections by known magnetic and electric forces, he made the immensely important discoveries that the mass carrying a given charge is the same whatever the gas used, and that it is $\frac{1}{1700}$ part of the mass of hydrogen which would carry the same charge. By further experiments he showed that each particle in the stream carried a charge equal to that of the hydrogen atom, so that the mass of each particle is $\frac{1}{1700}$ part of the mass of the hydrogen atom. These minute carriers of negative electricity he termed 'corpuscles.' They are usually now called 'electrons.' We must suppose that the electric forces during the discharge tear away the negatively electrified portions of the atoms at the negative plates, that these are alike for all atoms, and that their mass is but $\frac{1}{1700}$ part of the mass of the hydrogen atom. If the atom was neutral before the corpuscle was torn from it, an equal positive charge remains behind upon what is left.

In building up the electric atom we must bear in mind that all experiment shows that there are equal quantities of the two opposite charges. We do not know of such a thing as a charge of one kind alone. One kind of charge is always accompanied by the other kind of charge—either united to it as in a so-called neutral atom, or separated from it by a greater or less distance, yet connected to it by forces. We imagine, then, that an atom consists electrically of a charge of positive electricity and a greater or less number of electrons, and there are reasons for supposing that the number of electrons is proportional to the atomic weight. The oxygen atom will possess, for instance, 16 times as many electrons as the hydrogen atom. The positive charge is equal to the sum of all the negative charges on the electrons. This positive charge is supposed to be spherical, and to be distributed uniformly within the sphere. In some way it coheres and occupies a definite volume of the order of the atomic volume, say, 10^{-8} cm. radius. The spherical supposition is made for simplicity of treatment. The electrons are moving about inside the globe, and can move without resistance through the positive. With these suppositions, it can be shown that, if there were a single electron moving within the globe of positive, it would have a definite period of revolution round the centre of the globe, the same whatever its distance from the centre. With a number of electrons moving in orbits round the centre, each would affect the time of revolution of the others, but certain arrangements of orbits would persist. Other arrangements might be unstable, and then electrons might be thrown out of the atom. As the electrons circulate in their orbits, they radiate out energy in the form of waves, one wave for each revolution, and the hypothesis thus seeks to account for light and other radiation of like kind. If two such atoms approach each other, one may be so nearly unstable that it parts with one electron, giving it to the other, which may absorb it into its own system. One atom, then, gains a small balance of positive, while the other has acquired an equal small balance of negative, and, these opposite charges attracting each other, the atoms keep together and form a molecule.

The atom possesses an enormous store of energy in the motion of the negative electrons. It may become unstable through mutual action of these in their orbits, and some part may fly off to form a new atom. Thus the hypothesis seeks to account for the breaking down of the atoms which appears to occur in radium and other radio-active bodies.

We have seen that the mass of each electron is $\frac{1}{1700}$ part of that of the hydrogen atom. The hypothesis gives an account of this mass which we owe to J. J. Thomson. If a body with an electric charge upon it is moving, it acts like a short length of electric current, and it is surrounded by a field of magnetic force; that is, there is magnetic energy in the space around as well as electric energy. If the moving body is a sphere with the charge upon its surface, the quantity of magnetic energy is directly proportional to the square of its velocity, and is inversely as its radius. Now, the mass of a body may be measured by the energy required to get up in it a given velocity v, for that energy is $mv^2/2$. If the sphere has mass m and no charge, its energy when moving with v is $mv^2/2$. If it has a charge, then there is in addition the magnetic energy also proportional to v^2, say, $m^1v^2/2$, or the total will be $(m+m^1)\,v^2/2$. Suppose that when without charge the sphere has no mass, m will be 0. When it has a charge, there will still be mass m^1, or rather the sphere will behave just as if it had this mass. It is possible, then, that the mass of the electron is entirely due to its charge. Calculation shows that a massless sphere carrying a surface charge equal to that of the hydrogen atom, and about 10^{-13} cm. in radius, would behave as if it had mass $\frac{1}{1700}$ of the hydrogen atom.

If we could suppose that the hydrogen atom contains 1700 electrons, we could thus account for its whole mass. But it appears much more probable that that atom contains but one or a few electrons, so that if we are still to give an electrical account of mass, we must break up the positive globe into very small spheres enormous in number, and each containing a very small charge, far smaller than

that on the electron, these being scattered through the globe. But for this supposition there does not as yet appear to be any justification, i.e. it does not account for any observed phenomena.

Certain experiments do seem to show that the mass of the electrons is fully accounted for by the magnetic energy of their charges when in motion; but even if we accept this account it is very doubtful if we have 'explained' mass. Certainly all our measurements of energy involve the idea of mass, and it may perhaps be maintained that the magnetic energy in the space round the moving electron implies the existence of mass in that space to serve as a seat for the energy. If so, the electric theory of mass only takes the mass from the inside of the moving sphere and spreads it through the outside space. Again, we come to the Boscovich-Faraday conception, that an atom is wherever its force acts—not at the centre alone, but spread through all space.

Summary.—Present position of the atomic theory.—The belief that matter is granular in structure, that it consists of exceedingly minute discrete particles, is irresistible. The particle structure accounts for a vast host of observed facts, for which no other explanation has been suggested. We must accept it, unless we abandon all explanation by means of hypothesis, and are willing to content ourselves with mere description of phenomena—a frame of mind which is non-existent. When we pursue the particle structure into detail, we find an excellent explanation for the facts of chemistry in the hypothesis that, in a definite chemical compound, the particles are molecules, all alike, and that each molecule consists of a group of still smaller particles, which, without prejudice to their divisibility, we call atoms. The chemist finds that the compound can be resolved into bodies, each of which is incapable of further resolution by ordinary chemical agency, and which he terms 'elementary.' An element is supposed to consist of atoms all alike in each one kind. No explanation other than this has been devised for chemical phenomena, and it works so well that it has been universally accepted. So far, we cannot even conceive of any other hypothesis. The hypothesis that in a gas the molecules are, on the average, far apart and rushing about leads to a simple explanation of many gas properties, and has suggested properties hitherto unknown which investigation has shown to exist. Again, no alternative hypothesis has been offered; and if we accept this, we are bound to accept the determinations of number and size, determinations arrived at also from other starting-points.

So far, no special assumptions need be made as to atomic or molecular structure. But if we seek an explanation, on the atomic hypothesis, of certain electrical phenomena, we must imagine some definite structure for the atom. The electrical atom, in some such form as that described, is the only atom yet imagined which has any value for the purpose. It has served to explain many of the phenomena, and it has suggested researches which have led to new and important discoveries. It is easy to criticize it, to point out the large assumptions on which it is founded. There is, for instance, the coherent globe of positive electricity held together by unknown agency and allowing the negative electrons to move about freely in it. For this we require properties unlike the properties of any known electrical system. But the chief value of such a hypothesis lies, not in its objective truth, but in its success in accounting for, in co-ordinating, what we actually observe, and in predicting results which are afterwards verified. It is to be regarded as a 'working model' which gives the same results as the actual atom, though, it may be, by quite different machinery. From this point of view the electrical atom is a brilliant success.

We observe phenomena due to matter in large masses. Our senses tell us nothing of ultra-microscopic structure, and perhaps the sparkling of zinc sulphide when exposed to radium is the only phenomenon which can fairly be ascribed to single atoms, each sparkle being assigned to the impact of one atom. When we go behind observed phenomena and assume a minute structure to account for them—a structure far beyond the range of our senses in minuteness, and probably utterly beyond direct verification — it is possible to imagine many types of structure which will account for what we observe; just as when we stand in front of a clock which we cannot open, we can imagine many different trains of wheel-work which will account for the motion of the hands. We must, therefore, accept only provisionally any one type of atomic structure which may be offered. It is, on the highest valuation, only one possible solution of the problem. We must be prepared for alteration, for addition, for re-construction, as new phenomena are observed and need to be accounted for. We must be prepared even to abandon it altogether if some better 'working model' is devised. The hypotheses of science are continually changing. Old hypotheses break down and new ones take their place. But the classification of known phenomena which a hypothesis has suggested, and the new discoveries of phenomena to which it has led, remain as positive and permanent additions to natural knowledge when the hypothesis itself has vanished from thought.

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J. H. POYNTING.

ATONEMENT.—See EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT.

ATROPHY.—This term in its simplest meaning signifies lack of nourishment, but in its strictest use is applied to the diminution and enfeeblement of the limbs and organs, or parts of organs, of complex animals and vegetables as a result of disuse. The rapid decrease in weight of an animal as a result of starvation, or the wasting (emaciation) so commonly seen as a consequence of prolonged fever or malignant disease, does not even in the medical sense come under the heading 'atrophy'; this term is used to express such changes as the wasting of a muscle when its nerve supply is cut. Muscles are in reality the specialized end-organs of motor nerves, and without the necessary stimulus from the nerve-centres the muscle is useless. The atrophy of a muscle is brought about not only by dividing its dominant nerve, but also by destroying the nerve-centre in the spinal cord or brain from which its impulses to contract are derived. Examples of atrophied muscles from these causes may be found in every Poor Law infirmary in Great Britain. Similar results may be studied in other special sense-organs like the

eye; when the optic nerve is divided, or the visual centre in the brain destroyed, the retina, the delicate structure in the eyeball which is the recipient of light rays, quickly atrophies. It is likewise a matter of importance for the preservation of highly organized structures that they be kept in moderate use. It is common knowledge that living animals kept in dark places lose their acuteness of vision, and in fish, crustaceans, and burrowing forms of animal life the sense of vision is not only diminished but is actually lost, and the eyeballs diminish to inconspicuous dots.

The most interesting examples of atrophy and suppression of parts are those which come under the observation of naturalists and morphologists. These observers are especially interested in the effects produced by disuse of organs of animals and plants caused by changed habits of life, or by the increasing importance of other organs. This is illustrated by tadpoles. When the frog embryo emerges from the egg, it has a long tail and external gills; in the course of its metamorphosis limbs appear, and the tadpole assumes more and more the form of a frog; the gills and tail do not drop off, but are slowly absorbed and disappear, and the aquatic tadpole is changed to the amphibious frog. The disappearance and modification of the cartilaginous arches which supported its gills, and some correlated changes in the framework of the skull, are as remarkable, though not so obvious, as the atrophy of the tail. Similar atrophy of organs may be studied in many animal forms which in their early life enjoy a free existence, but later become fixed forms, such as ascidians. Many remarkable instances of the atrophy and disappearance of larval organs may be studied among invertebrates, especially sea-urchins and star-fishes. Whilst wondering at these remarkable things, we should not overlook the fact that many instances of this suppression of parts occur in the highest mammals, even in man. The fall of the milk-teeth is due to a process similar to that which causes the loss of the tail in tadpoles and ascidians. Puppies are born blind, owing to the existence of a vascular membrane occupying the space known as the pupil of the eye; this membrane atrophies, and the pups become sensible to light. In the human embryo this membrane is also present, but it disappears shortly before birth.

The bodies of all mammalia contain many remnants of organs which in the early stage of their development were of first-rate importance in their economy; but when the animals are born and become lung-breathers, the alteration in the manner of respiration leads to very great changes in a few of the larger blood-vessels, causing them to atrophy; but they remain throughout life detectable by the eye and scalpel of the anatomist. Even more remarkable are the great number of vestiges of parts which may be discovered in every special organ of the body; and the more specialized the organ has become, the greater the number of atrophied parts it contains. The brain abounds in such remnants, and contains rudiments of a third eye. The organ of hearing, and even the external ear, or auricle, contain many atrophied parts. This is true of the eyeball and its protecting lids. A child can verify for himself that a horse or a dog has three eyelids, merely by holding the paired eyelids apart; and if he examines the nasal side of his own orbit he will see the little pink cone representing the third eyelid (nictitating membrane) of the horse, dog, and owl, and with a magnifying glass may distinguish the delicate hairs upon it. The larynx, the heart, the liver, the intestines, and even the limbs abound in vestiges. In those remarkably modified mammals the whales, the hind limbs are represented by mere rudiments concealed in blubber.

Probably the result of atrophy in producing profound modification of outward form and structure and yet leaving traces of its steps in the form of atrophied organs is nowhere so convincing as, or more easily studied than, in those interesting flowers known as orchids. The present writer believes that it is hardly an exaggeration to urge that orchids hold the same relation in the floral world in regard to modification of form through atrophy and suppression of parts—the results of a changed environment—that whales hold for the same reasons among mammals.

Not the least important aspect of atrophy is its relation to sexual organs. It is well known that flowers represent the reproductive organs of phanerogamous plants, and that in many of them a single flower contains male and female parts. In some plants the sexes of the flowers are separate, some being male and others female. A careful investigation of the development of certain flowers which, when fully blown, are of single sex, shows that they possess the germs of organs belonging to both sexes, and that in the course of growth the organs of one sex develop and attain maturity, whilst those of the opposite sex remain rudimentary or completely atrophy. It happens, and not infrequently, that in a flower of a plant normally unisexual the male and female parts develop equally: such are called hermaphrodite. Exactly similar conditions have been detected throughout the animal kingdom, even to its summit—man. In the higher mammals, hermaphrodite forms are always sterile, and regarded as malformations. In addition to suppressed or atrophied parts resuming a former higher grade of development, they may even in their degenerate condition, like idlers in a community, be a source of much trouble. Very many curious and often dangerous conditions, known to surgeons as cysts and tumours, arise in the remnants of belated organs. Many occur in the neighbourhood of the mouth, tongue, and neck. Probably the two most persistently fatal are the vermiform appendix, and the remnant of the representative of the yolk-sac, known as Meckel's *diverticulum*, a fertile source of intestinal obstruction as well as a cause of malformation in that part of the alimentary canal known as the *ileum*.

When an organ, or part of an organ, which is usually suppressed, or represented by an atrophied rudiment in the adult, appears as a fairly formed part in an animal, it is regarded as a malformation. For example, men and women normally possess twelve pairs of ribs, but the vertebral segments in the neck, and some of those in the loin, possess minute undifferentiated ribs. In many vertebrates the corresponding cervical and lumbar vertebræ bear well-developed ribs, but, as they are always present, it is usual to speak of them as normal. Occasionally in man the rudimentary ribs in the neck and loin appear as well-developed elements in the skeleton. Thus a skeleton with thirteen pairs of ribs is described as being abnormal. The condition has a deeper meaning. The interpretation which the morphologist places on the matter is this: Man is descended from an ancestor who normally possessed more than twelve pairs of ribs; the cervical and lumbar ribs have undergone suppression, and are represented by rudiments or vestiges. When a vestige of this character reappears in a functional form, it is described as an example of atavism (*q.v.*) or reversion.

Atavistic phenomena are easily studied in plants. This has been a subject of great fascination since Goethe drew the attention of botanists to the fact that the various parts of a flower may be regarded as modified leaves. This does not mean that each

part of a flower is a metamorphosed leaf, but that we are able to trace every structural gradation, from leaves to bracts, from bracts to sepals; and not infrequently sepals will be replaced by or become converted into true leaves. The changes from sepals to petals, and from petals to stamens, are as gradual as from bracts to sepals; and the homology is often declared by the stamens becoming petals, and petals appearing as leaves. Even stamens occasionally revert in this way, and constitute abnormalities or monstrosities.

Atavistic conditions of this kind are met with in animals, especially in connexion with the appendages of crustaceans; and it is astounding to see a lobster with an antenna surmounting its eye-stalk and replacing the whole or part of its eye. Yet parallel malformations occur in sheep, dogs, and children, when the conjunctival covering of the eyeball reverts to skin and produces hair. Although men offer explanations of these curious phenomena, and call them reversions to ancestral types or adaptations to environment, or seek to solve them by the phrase 'natural selection,' it must be admitted that the cause still remains veiled in impenetrable mystery. It is also certain that, if we knew the cause of the shedding of the milk-teeth in children, we should be able to explain the origin of species, and the cause of the great division of plants and animals into males and females. See also DEGENERATION, DISEASE.

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J. BLAND-SUTTON.

ATTACHMENT.—Attachment may be considered in three relations: (1) attachment to the things of sense; (2) to objects of affection; (3) to the fruits of action.

1. *Attachment to the things of sense.*—This is the uncontrollable attraction that the physical and emotional environment has for the lower consciousness in man. Now it is obvious that attachment in this sense is perfectly natural, and is quite necessary for long stages of evolution during which the ego in man is gaining experience and learning the necessity for self-control, while the various faculties of the mind are developed through the activities induced by the struggle for life and goods. The characteristic of this form of attachment is that it centres in the personal self, and is essentially selfish, and so cannot be an abiding condition in the life of humanity. A time comes in the evolution of each individual soul when that attachment is weakened and a new centre formed; and it is religion that then begins to draw in opposition to that downward absorption in worldly affairs which claims so strongly the energies of man. There may indeed be long periods during which the attraction towards a spiritual life may seem almost inoperative, but sooner or later must come the conversion to a new course of life, when the old way will be forsaken and an upward path adopted.

2. *Objects of affection.*—Though attachment here, in the more primitive phases, is strongly permeated with selfishness, yet there is always and in all cases a centre of attraction formed outside the self, and this change, implying new motives, at once begins to humanize and improve the entire nature. From sex and family affections—extended gradually to comrades and friends—there eventually arises a wide love of mankind, losing all the elements of attachment as it grows in unselfishness and approaches union with the Divine.

3. *The fruits of action.*—Man seeks advantageous results; he sets his mind on success, and is proportionally elated or depressed as events turn out in accordance with his wishes or against them. He is attached to the outcome of his efforts, and is not content solely with doing his duty, or his best, and leaving the result to God. It is on this kind of attachment that the *Bhagavad Gītā* (ch. 5) has so much to say: 'The man who is devoted and not attached to the fruit of his actions obtains tranquillity; whilst he who through desire has attachment for the fruit of action is bound down thereby.' Man acts less and less selfishly as he rises towards perfection, and he remains undismayed and patient when the results appear adverse. When he has rid himself of all the lower attachments, he is no longer a slave to the lower desires, and has become ready to enter the abode of bliss, or the Kingdom of Heaven, for he has conquered self and obtained freedom.

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G. A. GASKELL.

ATTENTION.—

'Strange to say, so patent a fact as the perpetual presence of selective attention has received hardly any notice from psychologists of the English empiricist school. The Germans have explicitly treated of it, either as a faculty or as a resultant; but in the pages of such writers as Locke, Hume, Hartley, the Mills, and Spencer, the word scarcely occurs, or if it does so, it is parenthetically and as if by inadvertence. The motive of this ignoring of the phenomenon is obvious enough. These writers are bent on showing how the higher faculties of the mind are pure products of "experience"; and experience is supposed to be of something simply given. Attention, implying a degree of reactive spontaneity, would seem to break through the circle of pure receptivity which constitutes "experience," and hence must not be spoken of under penalty of interfering with the smoothness of the tale' (James, *Principles of Psychology*, i. 402).

This is the opening paragraph of James's chapter on Attention, which introduced into English-speaking countries a new and better way of treating the subject. Other writers on Psychology have written luminously on the subject, and readers of the works of Ward, Baldwin, Stout and others, may now have an adequate conception of the function of attention in the evolution of mental life, and of its significance in mental work.

While the empiricists have, for the reason stated by Professor James, thrust attention into the background, and have neglected the whole function of mental activity in experience, other schools also have conspired towards the neglect of this form of mental action. Idealism in all its forms finds scarcely any place for it and its function. As the empiricist, in the interest of a view which regarded experience as given and determined by the pressure of the external order on the mind, insisted that all experience is implicit in sense impressions, so the idealist regarded experience as determined by the evolution of the Idea. Will is, for some of them, especially for Mr. Bradley, the self-realization of the Idea. But in the evolution of the Idea there is no room for selective attention; there is scarcely room for any activity of the subject at all. It is curious that both idealists and empiricists come to practically the same result. Empiricists ignore selective attention, because they wish to account for all the products of experience by laws of association which cluster things together independently of the activity of the subject; and idealists, in the interests of the ideal order, regard experience as dictated by the objective selection of pure thought.

In truth, the question of attention and its significance involves the whole question of the possibility of spontaneity in life, and of whether the movement of life is wholly determined from without, or whether the organic being has the power of selecting, out of various possibilities, what it can be and do. Is there such a thing as subjective selection, as Dr. Ward calls it, or organic selec-

tion, as Professor Baldwin calls it? Or is the life of an organism determined for it by factors in which it has no function? Is there subjective selection, or is all determined by what is called Natural Selection? The question is too large to be argued here, but it is named because the same fundamental issue is raised by writers on attention. It may be well, then, simply to state the issue as it appears from the view of Biology before we discuss it from the narrower view of Psychology and Ethics.

The question may be broadly stated thus: Is there an autonomy of life? Is the proper activity of the organism a real factor in biology? And are there new concepts required to describe the functions of life, in addition to those which are required for an adequate account of the phenomena of the inorganic world? A quarter of a century ago, it was strongly affirmed that a true and adequate scientific account of vital behaviour could be reached only when the behaviour of life could be expressed in terms of physics and chemistry. Vital phenomena were only transformed physical and chemical processes. They were altogether determined by the pressure of physical and chemical activities. Let one read the writings of Huxley, or the art. 'Zoology' in *EBr*[9], and it will be seen that the physical and chemical explanation held the field. It holds the field no longer. There are now many who do not fear to speak of the autonomy of life, and who do not hesitate to affirm that the chief factor in biological science is the proper activity of the organism. It is questioned now whether any organic feature can be explained, even in the most general way, by the action of physical forces.

'What at first seems to be the result of mechanical pressure may afterwards be found to be an active process of growth, and what at first seems to be a full effect of capillarity among homogeneous elements may afterwards be shown to depend on specialized metabolic conditions of the surfaces as its principal *cause*' (Driesch, *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, i. p. 93).

As Driesch further shows, these processes do not constitute life, 'they are used by life.' In this sentence the issue is stated with clearness and precision. Life uses for its own purpose the physical and chemical processes, and account must be taken of the activity of life, if we are to understand the problem of vital behaviour.

Life, then, uses the physical and chemical processes, and by its own activity disposes of them for its own purpose, and puts them to uses not forthcoming in the inorganic world. Alien matter is taken up, transformed, raised to a higher level, and used for the weal of the organism. Life selects out of the environment what is needed for itself. There is selective activity on the part of life; it takes what it needs and neglects what it does not need.

'Turn a miscellaneous lot of birds into a garden: a flycatcher will at once be intent on the gnats, a bullfinch on the pease, a thrush on the worms and snails. Scatter a mixture of seeds evenly over a diversified piece of country: heath and cistus will spring up in the dry, flags and rushes in the marshy, ground; violets and ferns in the shady hollows, gorse and broom on the hilltops. . . . By the principle of subjective selection special environments are singled out by different individuals from the general environment common to all, and so far there is not necessarily any competition. Two artists or two anglers may be in each other's way, but an artist and an angler will hardly incommode each other. A garden would still interest a flycatcher if there were neither pease nor cherries in it, provided the insects remained, whereas the bullfinch would at once forsake it. Natural selection, as distinct from subjective selection, comes into play only when two anglers contend for the same fish, two artists compete for the same prizes, when the early bird gets the worm that the later one must go without' (Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*[2], i. 295 f.).

For a complete explanation of biological phenomena, account must be taken, no doubt, of the two comprehensive factors summed up under the names of 'natural selection' and 'subjective selection.' This is not the place to deal with them in any comprehensive manner (see art. ACTIVITY and other related articles). Here it is sufficient to say that natural selection (comprehending under that name all external conditions, and all that Darwin sets forth under the comprehensive title of Natural Selection) is not sufficient to describe the behaviour of life, or to account for its manifold activities. Life itself counts for something in the final result. Growth, assimilation, and reproduction attest the activity of life. These show that life so far selects its environment, and that, if there are a thousand species in a square mile of ground, each selects its own environment, and each uses it in its own way, and for its own purposes.

The wider problem set to biology by the activity of the organism, and by subjective selection in relation to natural selection, is parallel to the problem set to the psychologist and the moralist by the relation of attention to the general conditions imposed on conscious individual life by the fact that there are logical laws, laws of association, psychological conditions of thought, action, and feeling, and other conditions which seem to determine the limits within which attention is to be exercised. As in biology we ask the question, Does natural selection account for vital experience without the postulate of the activity of the organism? so here we ask the question, Do the logical, psychological, and other laws and conditions of mental life account for mental behaviour without the postulate of the conscious activity of the individual subject?

As regards life in general, it is to be observed that its first work is concerned with those movements which are indispensable to vital functions and to its existence as a living body. As a primary condition of existence an organism must adapt itself to its surroundings, and a series of actions must proceed in order that such an end may be accomplished. These activities relate themselves to the general ends of self-preservation and the preservation of the species. A full account of the phenomena connected with this problem would lead us into the region of the relation of organ and function, the relation of appetite and desire to their objects, and also the relation of feeling generally towards physiological processes on the one hand and mental processes on the other. Without entering into these, we shall merely notice here that life can be described only as a series of actions having reference to an end. That end is the preservation of the individual or the preservation of the species. It is a question whether those activities which are said to be instinctive in the individual are really so; that is, whether they are the outcome of activities which at the outset were acts of choice, these being by repetition consolidated into habit; or whether they were automatic from the beginning. Some contend that actions at present instinctive were originally the outcome of choice, and that these actions, stimulated by a feeling of pleasure, which usually accompanies the exercise of vital functions, have been translated into habit, and have passed into the region of reflex action. Habit is 'lapsed intelligence,' *i.e.* voluntary action may become instinctive, or impulsive, and in the evolution of life may become habitual or reflex action.

But, if we take any organism as it stands, leaving undecided the question as to the forces which have operated to make it what it is, there is no doubt that every organism has to adjust itself to its environment. Whether it has been made by the slow processes of what is called natural selection, or whether it has had something to do with the making of itself, yet, as it is there in its circumstances and conditions, it has to strive,

to work, to adapt itself to varying conditions; and if it is to survive, it must select the most advantageous course of action. In the case of life generally this is comparatively simple. The individual organism adapts itself to its environment by a series of actions directed to the main ends of self-preservation or the preservation of the species.

'All acts of willing, whether external or internal, are divided into two great classes, the first comprising simple or impulsive acts, the second, complex acts, which imply freedom of choice. Simple or impulsive acts are determined by a single motive, whereas complex acts, though they may be determined by a single motive, imply a choice between several. An impulsive action, whether internal or external, is therefore quicker than an act of choice, which is preceded by a feeling of doubt and hesitation. The latter is also termed a free act, or an act of "free-will," because it expresses more clearly than any other the freedom, spontaneity, and independence of the individual with regard to external stimuli. Impulsive acts are also acts of volition, though in a lesser degree than acts of free-will, and possess the character of spontaneous consciousness, which distinguishes all manifestations of the will' (Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, p. 213).

In an ordinary organism, up to the appearance of reflective consciousness, action is directed to its ends mainly by what Villa calls 'a single motive.' Driven by the impulse of hunger or of love, the action of the organism goes straight to its object. Whether this is the outcome of natural selection, or whether it is acquired by the organism itself as the result of a process of education, it is not necessary here to decide. For in either case the adaptation is there, and the action of the organism is the result of subjective need finding its satisfaction in an appropriate object. In any event, the action and its motive are simple, direct, and imperative.

In a life which is merely organic, the need of the organism may be regarded as in direct and simple relation to its external objects, and proceeds straight to the appropriation of them; in conscious life, or in the life which is on the way towards self-consciousness, other factors enter in, and the situation becomes more complex. Yet the more complex situation rises naturally out of the simpler. There is no abrupt break in the evolution of mental life, and we can scarcely say when what we call attention begins to be properly exercised. In every organism there is a centre, to which all movements are referred. The organism is aware of its own needs, and of the objects which are to satisfy those needs. With the growth of consciousness, the awareness becomes intensified, until, in the fully-developed self-conscious life, consciousness is aware of itself and of all its needs and aims. But consciousness in general is just this awareness, and this awareness involves that mental activity which we call attention. More fully described in the words of Dr. Ladd, attention is 'a purposeful volition, suffused with peculiar feelings of effort or strain, and accompanied by a changed condition of the field of discriminative consciousness, as respects intensity, content, and clearness' (*Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 61). While the description just given seems to apply in its fullness only to a mental life completely developed, it is in a measure applicable to all conscious life. It will be observed that in the definition given above there is no attempt to limit attention to the exclusive operation of any particular activity of the mind. It is, on the contrary, the synthesis of all the activities of the mind, whether of feeling, willing, or thinking. Attention is thus elementary and universal; it belongs to every state of consciousness, and is present in every field of consciousness, or, as is said by Dr. Ward:

'As to the subjective relation of objects, the relation of presentation itself, we have merely to note that on the side of the subject it implies what, for want of a better word, may be called *attention*, extending the denotation of this term so as to include even what we ordinarily call inattention. Attention so used will thus cover part of what is meant by consciousness—so much of it, that is, as answers to being mentally active, active enough at least to "*receive* impressions." Attention on the side of the subject implies intensity on the side of the object: we might indeed almost call intensity the matter of a presentation, without which it is a nonentity' (*EB*[10], art. 'Psychology,' p. 41[b]).

Awareness of the stream of consciousness, as it passes on, becomes attention in the stricter sense as elements in experience become more or less intense. It is impossible here to enumerate all the elements which enter into consciousness, nor is it necessary. For the reaction of the mind against its presentations, whatever these may be, gives us at once the elementary condition of attention. At the outset, before mind has come to the possession of itself, it is possible that attention is without purpose, that it is aroused by change in mental experience—by pleasure or pain, or by the over-stimulation of sense or faculty—and that it is exercised in an unthinking, involuntary way. But such rudimentary forms of conscious activity are the foundations on which voluntary, deliberate, and sustained attention are built up. Some, indeed, limit the term 'attention' to its more developed form, and refuse to recognize the more rudimentary forms as worthy of the name. But without the rudimentary forms there would be no possibility of the development of mental life, and no possibility of the deliberate sustained attention which fashions for itself a scheme of living, and shapes means for realizing it. Mental activity in accepting the given, in being interested in it, finds that it can enhance the intensity of some elements, may hasten or retard the flow of the stream of consciousness, may also discriminate between desirable and undesirable elements, and thus the value of attention is recognized. For mental life cannot grow without proper mental activity, and the proper name of such activity is simply 'attention.'

Usually the conditions of attention are just the conditions of consciousness in general. We have seen from Dr. Ward that a large part of the stream of consciousness is properly included under the phenomena of attention. It so happens that many writers on this topic so describe the conditions of attention as to leave out of sight any proper activity on the part of the subject. It is possible so to describe the effects of attention as to leave out all reference to the selective activity of the individual. One may say, with Professor Pillsbury, that 'the essence of attention as a conscious process is an increase in the clearness of one idea or group of ideas at the expense of others' (*Attention*, p. 11). This is quite true, only it leaves out the essential element of how attention was directed so as to produce that result. In fact, in the able work cited so much stress is laid on processes and conditions of attention that attention itself scarcely ever appears. Thus there are many valuable descriptions of the motor concomitants of attention, of its conditions, of the effects of attention on consciousness, and so on, and yet the proper character of mental activity receives hardly any recognition. We may quote from the summaries, usefully appended to each chapter. The summaries of the chapter on 'The Conditions of Attention' are these:

'The conditions of any act of attention are to be found in the present environment (objective conditions) and in the past experience of the individual (subjective conditions). The main objective conditions are the intensity, extent, and duration of the stimulus. The subjective conditions are to be found in the idea in mind at the time, in the mood of the moment, the education, previous social environment, and heredity of the individual' (p. 52)

Professor James has said:

'My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I notice shape my mind; without selective interest experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground—intelligible perspective, in a word. It varies in every creature, but without it the consciousness of every creature would be a grey,

chaotic indiscriminativeness, impossible for us even to conceive' (*Psychology*, i. 402 f.).

But Professor Pillsbury in his summary of the chapter on 'Interest and Feeling of Activity as Conditions of Attention' speaks thus:

'Neither interest nor "mental activity" can be regarded as a condition of attention. Interest is either a general name for the subjective conditions of attention when ascribed to the object, or it is used to designate a mood which accompanies all attending. Mental activity is really bodily activity—a mass of sensations that comes from the contraction of muscles in different parts of the body. The contractions result from motor innervations which accompany attention' (p. 68).

According to Professor James, we attend to things because they are interesting. Professor Pillsbury is of opinion that 'things are interesting because we attend to them, or because we are likely to attend to them: we do not attend to them because they are interesting' (p. 55). The cart and the horse are somehow united, but we are left in doubt as to which comes first. To us it appears that in the solution of Professor Pillsbury the cart is before the horse. His book is the largest and most elaborate of any work we know on 'Attention.' It contains many things which are of the highest value. But it does not seem to cast much light on its main theme. Attention in its proper meaning seems to be conspicuous by its absence. We quote from the chapter called 'General Conclusions':

'Using attention as a type, it is possible to bring many of the other mental processes under that head and to make it serve as a basis for the classification of states of mind. We have seen, for example, that attention influences recalled impressions in practically the same way that it influences their original entrance. When a memory image is once given in consciousness, it will be retained very much as a perception received immediately from the external world. Furthermore, attention largely determines which of the many possible associates of any impression shall become actual. In this sense it selects the memories offered by association just as it selects the objects of sense that shall be permitted to enter. By attention in this sense we mean again from the side of the conditions the effect of the sum-total of previous conscious states, as united in the purpose of the moment, the general trend of the preceding thought, the character of the man, his profession, and further back the complete series of earlier experiences and inherited tendencies which make him what he is. His thought about any subject, no matter what the starting-point, is an expression of himself in the fullest meaning of the term' (p. 313 f.).

When Pillsbury in the passage quoted describes attention as 'the effect of the sum-total of previous conscious states,' etc., has he not left out the most essential element in attention? When he speaks of the complete series of earlier experiences and inherited tendencies which have made 'him what he is,' has he not neglected the most potent factor, namely, the share which the man has in the making of himself? Take members of the same family, descended from the same parents, subject to the same kind of earlier experiences, the same inherited tendencies, responsive to the same environment in family, school, and neighbourhood, and how on his principles does he account for the manifold differences between them? It seems to the present writer that Professor Pillsbury, in his earnest desire to lay stress on the general conditions, has forgotten the personal equation of each individual. He has imitated the procedure of the biologist, who lays the whole stress on natural selection, and neglects the part played by the subjective in the evolution of life. General laws can never account for particular effects. It is a useful study to seek to find out the general conditions which have helped to make a man what he is; but that has to be supplemented by a particular study of the man in his habit as he lives. It does not help us much to say that Shakespeare was an Englishman, and that Burns was a Scotsman; for we have still to learn what were the topics which interested these great men, and what was the interest which directed their attention to this or to that line of thought and action. It is possible that we may never be able to give a scientific explanation of the individual in this relation or in any other; for the individual, as such, is outside of general rules, and must be accepted in all his concreteness as a subject of study by himself.

It is pointed out by Höffding (*Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 108–112) that, in immediate sensations and in the flow of them, interest and the attention determined by the interest play an essential part. He points out (p. 120) that we are not given over in a purely passive way to the impressions of the external world. Excitations from without call forth movements which serve to retain or pursue them. An involuntary search and accommodation help to determine the character of the sensation.

'If a sensation takes complete possession and almost succeeds in driving all else out of consciousness, it then arrests our activity also. An exclusive sensation therefore presupposes attention, but is not one with it. Besides, how does a sensation become exclusive? Excitations can flow in upon us simultaneously from several sides. The eye, *e.g.*, receives simultaneous excitations from several points of light. Several senses, moreover, may be in operation together. If purely passive, sensuous perception would afford at every instant a chaos of diverse sensations. But from the multitude of these diverse sensations, in every instant, one is selected which becomes the centre. Reflexly and instinctively the attention moves from one excitation to another . . . The motive which decides the attention to leave one excitation and turn to another is to be looked for in a sense of fatigue or in a feeling of dullness, which makes it a necessity or a recreation to turn to a new excitation, especially to one which is a natural counterpart or supplement of a preceding excitation. In every such transition an elementary choice takes place' (p. 120 f.).

Referring to the whole discussion for further elucidation, we may now say that even in sensations and in the flow of them choice has a part, and attention may determine what sensations may occupy the centre of consciousness, what may be thrust into the background, and what may be thrust altogether outside the threshold of consciousness.

But such attention may be involuntary, or may have the character of reflex movement. Yet this elementary choice is the necessary condition of such new arrangement of sensations as will be transformed into those results of human effort which we recognize in the contents of science, art, philosophy, and in all other results of human effort. Out of elementary choice and out of almost unconscious attention come the magnificent results which we have already named. We may attend to things because we cannot do otherwise. But when we have an express volition to attend to this or to that, we call it voluntary attention. All other attention is called non-voluntary or spontaneous. The relations between spontaneous and voluntary attention are manifold. They may be antagonistic to one another, or they may act in such a way that the one passes into the other. Thus voluntary attention to an uninteresting object may invest it with such interest as to make attention to it a spontaneous matter. For example, when we are occupied with any matter, as when a great misfortune has befallen us, or when we pass in review a certain course of conduct in order to find the cause of failure, it may take possession of our minds to such a degree that no effort of will can make us cease from brooding over it. An article has to be written, or a book is in process of preparation; the work is carried on to the loss of sleep, and we are unable to tear ourselves away from it; the attention which began voluntarily has become an obsession.

On the other hand, experience shows that, by the constant and ever-renewed effort of attention, a subject which at the outset was dry and uninteresting may become full of interest as we master it, and learn its meaning and its issues. The power of concentrating our attention on the subject may become stronger, the intervals of con-

centration may become more prolonged, until no effort is needed to attend to the subject. Voluntary attention has become spontaneous (see Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, vol. i. p. 241 f.).

It would be tedious and would not be profitable to enumerate the various kinds of involuntary attention. Reference may be made generally to systematic treatises on Psychology, in which the various kinds are described. Vital needs, the calls of love or hunger, pleasure and pain, every relation between the organic being and his environment, may give rise to that exaltation of consciousness which calls forth the reactive energy which we name 'attention.' It is possible, however, to classify all of these under two great divisions, and to speak of them under the general heads of 'external' and 'internal.' The external are the presentations with the accompanying emotions which precede action. These are usually simple and single in their procedure. The internal are those which, as already indicated, consist in a variation of the current of presentations and feelings. In these we have emphatically the presence of choice, of the selection of one motive out of many, with the increase of intensity and urgency resulting from the concentration of the mind on it.

In the description of these external and internal movements an attempt has been made to introduce greater precision into psychological phraseology. Instead of the phrases 'involuntary' and 'voluntary,' which many still use as adequate, some psychologists have introduced the terms 'perception' and 'apperception' (*q v.*). By 'perception' they mean a content of which we are conscious. When we concentrate ourselves on a content of consciousness so that it stands out distinctly or as distinctly as possible, we say that it is 'apperceived.' In the art. APPERCEPTION will be found the history and meaning of this term; it is sufficient to say here that those psychologists who use attention in this sense define it as that peculiar state, characterized by certain special feelings, which accompanies apperception. Spatial illustrations are used to describe the state of apperception. Consciousness is figured as a circle, the centre of which represents the focus or point of apperception. The circumference of the circle represents the threshold of consciousness; and of the various stimuli some pass along chords of the circle, while others pass along a diameter, and so through the centre. Or it might be represented by a reference to the great circles of navigation. These pass through the centre of the earth. Apperceived mental contents correspond to great circles, which pass through the centre of consciousness. These spatial illustrations do not add much to our knowledge, yet the distinction between perception and apperception might be very helpful, if writers on Psychology were to use the terms in precisely the same sense.

With regard both to our perceptions and to our apperceptions we are never wholly passive. We have seen that even in the immediate sensations, as well as in the flow of them, the attention is determined by interest, and the interest has a determining influence on sensations selected for closer examination. So it is in the flow of ideas Here, too, interest has a determining influence. We can never account for the association of ideas, or for the ways in which ideas are clustered together in the mind, by a mere regard to the laws of association, or to any other laws of a general kind. There are laws of association, as there are laws of science, of logic, of psychology, but these do not act as if they aggregated themselves together merely by their own action. Like other general laws, they are used by life, and as regards mental laws they are used by the mind. The determining influence is in the conscious mind itself, which guides its action by its own law of action, so that each experience is essentially a unique experience. To determine accurately the practical problem of attention for any individual would be to determine the real character of personality. But that is beyond the scope of science, which deals with the general, and with the super-personal, or the infra-personal.

The characteristic difference between perception and apperception, or between involuntary and voluntary attention, is that in the one case the strain follows directly on the presentation of the stimulus, and in the other case the strain, or the turning of the mind in a certain direction towards a certain object, is present before the stimulus.

'The fusion of the sensation with the corresponding idea, whence perception arises, thus takes place in inverse order in voluntary and involuntary attention. We see in great measure what we wish to see, and as a general rule are able to see only what we wish. Hence the possibility of strokes of genius and prophecies, as also of illusory interpretations of facts. The originally sanguine tendency of human nature anticipates experience, and only gradually accepts correction from it. Fortunately experience has the power to open our eyes and force us to see. But the activity of the will is always an essential condition' (Höffding, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 315).

The relation of attention to the general laws of the system in which we live is too large a subject to be discussed here. Generally it is analogous to the relation of life to the system of which life forms a part. The conscious subject lives in relation to an environment. In interaction with it, it realizes itself. But the process of self-realization is an active process. It reacts against the environment, it selects out of it what it can use, and what it needs and wants, and it makes out of it something new. Merely organic life modifies itself in order to adapt itself to its surroundings. Conscious life modifies its environment so as to make it in a measure accomplish its ends. It impresses itself on the environment, and modifies the earth so as to command its resources in the shape of food, clothing, and houses. Homes are built, cities are founded, facilities of travel are made to abound. We need not enumerate the resources of civilization. The forces of nature are at the service of man, just because man has modified nature to accomplish his ends. But these are the outcome of attentive activity, and cast light on the nature of attention, and on the relation of attention to the laws of the system. Attention of the intellectual kind may be set forth as the activity arising out of the desire to know what are really the laws of the system in which we live. No doubt this is the characteristic of the highest form of intellectual life. But it exists, and ought to be recognized. Into this also choice enters, for it is allowable for a man to think twice, or more than twice, in order that his thoughts in their flow may correspond with reality. Thus into the most abstract and intellectual of our pursuits voluntary activity may enter.

Truth has thus a value of its own, and the greatest determinant of attention is just the scale of values which human judgment has set up for itself. It is this scale of values that determines our interest, and our interest dominates our attention. Referring to the art. VALUE for the full account of the doctrine of values, we state briefly here that it is the characteristic quality of highly-evolved, conscious, moral, spiritual life to transform the given world into a world which will correspond with its highest ideal, and be the image of its deepest thought. What forms these may take, and what strivings may issue from the attempt to make a world in which our values may be realized, cannot be described here. But whatever value may be striven

after by this people or by that, or by this man or by that, it can be realized only by thinking about it, attending to it, working at it, till airy nothing obtains a local habitation and a name. Thus, for the man of science, truth may have the highest value, and he may concentrate his attention on the effort to see the flow of things as it is; for philosophy, everything else may be neglected in the desire to know reality, and to see it in its wholeness; while for the artist a thing of beauty is a joy for ever, and the beautiful is the value that is highest. On the other hand, for some the highest of the values is the good, and so on, around the whole circle of human activity. In whatever direction we look, we find that it is the scale of values that determines the interest of man, and sets him to work for its realization. Values—artistic, scientific, ethical, spiritual—are the dominating interests of conscious life, and these are the ends which all men seek to realize.

For the conscious spirit, then, the given world is plastic, something to be formed into a world of specific value in which it may find its appropriate home. The machinery of the world, its laws, whether mental or material, may submit to new directions, take on new meanings, and issue in results not to be accounted for apart from the activity of the conscious spirit. Material laws may find a new expression in the *Principia* of Newton, which, after all, is as much poetry as science. It is nature as transformed in the mind of Newton. The philosophy of Hegel, *e.g.*, or of other great masters in philosophy, is a revelation of personality, as much as, or even more than, it is a transcript of the meaning of reality. For each mind in the world has to make a world for itself, and it will be the centre of its own world How each world so made corresponds to the world which is common to all, how the general is related to the individual world, is another question. What concerns us here is that the phenomenon which we call voluntary attention is the chief means by which the world of values is made; and without its working no world is possible for man.

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ATTIS.—Attis was a male Asiatic deity whose relation to Cybele, the Great Mother, was analogous to that borne by Adonis to Aphrodite, Baal to Astarte, Osiris to Isis, etc. Of Semitic origin, or at least greatly influenced by Semitic religion, his worship, always in dual connexion with that of the Great Mother, and never independent of it, became strongly centralized in Phrygia and Lydia, spread to the adjacent countries, was introduced into Greece, and finally became known throughout the Roman Empire. According to the legend given by Pausanias (vii. 17) as current among the Phrygians, the seed of Zeus, discharged in sleep upon the earth, begot the hermaphroditic monster Agdistis, who was afterwards deprived of male organs by the gods. An almond tree having sprung from these, the daughter of the river Sangarius ate of its fruit and bore Attis, who, after having been exposed, was reared by a he-goat, became very beautiful, and inspired passion in Agdistis. Being about to wed the king's daughter, Attis was struck with madness by Agdistis (who suddenly appeared during the nuptial hymn), and emasculated himself. Agdistis in repentance prevailed upon Zeus to preserve the body of Attis from wasting away or decaying. In Arnobius (*adv. Nationes*, v. 5–8) the fruit is the pomegranate, the daughter of the river-god is named Nana, and the king and his daughter are Midas and Ia. The Great Mother, created by Deucalion and Pyrrha on Mount Agdus, also loves Attis, and plans the marriage in order to rescue him from the shameless love of Agdistis, who strikes the entire company with madness. Attis mutilates himself under a pine tree, and Ia, after wrapping Attis in wool and mourning over him, kills herself. The fatal pine is borne by the Mother into her cave, where she and Agdistis wildly lament Attis. Zeus allows the body of the youth to remain undecayed, his hair to grow, and his little finger to move. Agdistis has the body of the youth consecrated at Pessinus, a city in Galatia near the borders of Phrygia, and also institutes annual ceremonies in his honour. The little finger (*digitus*, δάκτυλος) is interpreted as the phallus by Georg Kaibel (*GGN*, 1901, p. 513). In Diodorus Siculus (iii. 58, 59), Attis is a stripling whom Meion, the king of Phrygia and Lydia, slays because of an intrigue between him and the king's daughter Cybele. As a consequence of plague and famine, worship of both is instituted by the Phrygians. In Ovid's version of the legend (*Fast.* iv. 223 ff.), Attis breaks his pledge of chastity to Cybele; Sagaritis, the nymph who has sinned with him, is destroyed by the goddess; while the youth himself mutilates his own person in a frenzy on Mount Dindymon. In the version of Arnobius the blending of two forms of the Attis legend is apparent—one accounting for the birth of Attis, the other for his relation to Cybele—and the latter and Agdistis are really identical. A Lydian form of the legend, in which the youth is killed by a boar, is found (Paus. vii. 17).

There is no evidence of an Attis cult in Asia Minor until the 4th cent. B.C., though it must have existed long before that time. It never attained to great prominence in Greece, because of the strange and un-Hellenic nature of its rites. The same is true of it in Italy up to the Empire. There is no direct evidence of the existence of the worship of Attis at Rome under the Republic, and the general probability of its existence is rendered very slight by the lack of monumental and literary evidence where such evidence might be expected (Showerman, 'Was Attis at Rome under the Republic?' in *TAPA* xxi., 1900, pp. 46–59). Under the Empire, however, from the time of Claudius onward, it rapidly increased in importance, Attis being worshipped side by side with the Great Mother, and frequently appearing in literature and on the monuments with her. His prominence in the cult is indicated by his part in the annual season of festivals in honour of the Great Mother which covered the period March 15–27 (Hepding, *Attis, seine Mythen und sein Kult*, Giessen, 1903, pp. 123–176). On March 15 the college of *Cannophori*, or reed-bearers, took part in the ceremonies of the day by carrying reeds in procession—a custom explained as a commemoration of the finding of Attis by the Great Mother on the reedy banks of the river Gallus, but more likely a reminiscence of a primitive phallic procession (see Showerman, 'Canna intrat and the Cannophori,' in the *Classical Journal*, ii. 28–31). Sexual abstinence and fasting were prescribed for the day. On March 22 the sacred pine, the emblem of the self-mutilation of Attis, was borne in procession by the *Dendrophori* to the temple of the Mother on the Palatine, its trunk wound with fillets of wool and its branches hung with garlands of violets, the whole being regarded as a commemoration of the wrapping of Attis's body in wool by Ia and the decking of the original tree by the

Mother with the violets which sprang from Attis's blood. On March 24, *Dies Sanguinis*, fasting and mourning symbolized the grief of the Mother at the death of Attis. The special feature was the orgiastic dance and song of the priests, culminating in self-laceration, and even self-emasculation (not attested at Rome), in commemoration of the final deed of Attis. At night the mystics partook of a sacrament, and perhaps underwent the baptism of blood in the *taurobolium* (wh. see). March 25 was the day of rejoicing (*Hilaria*) at the resurrection of Attis. On March 27, after a day of rest known as *Requietio*, occurred the *Lavatio*, a ceremonial bathing of the goddess in the Almo, a stream a short distance south of Rome, followed by universal rejoicing, a feature of which was dramatic representation of the story of the Mother and Attis. The *criobolium* (wh. see), or sacrifice of a ram, involving the blood-baptism, and consequent purification and regeneration, of the person who performed it, was a ceremony created on the analogy of the *taurobolium*, a similar sacrifice to the Great Mother, for the purpose of giving full recognition to Attis in the dual worship. The high priest of the cult bore the traditional title of Attis. The Attis in Catullus lxiii. is intended to represent a type of the priesthood.

The Cybele-Attis myth, according to the philosophers, symbolized the relations of Mother Earth and her fruitage. Attis is the plant kingdom beloved by her; his emasculation is the cutting of her fruits; his death, his burial, and his preservation by the mourning Mother symbolize the death and preservation of plant life through the cold and gloom of winter; his resurrection is the return of the warmth of spring. The festival of the *Hilaria* occurred on March 25, the first day of the ascent of the sun, while the *Dies Sanguinis*—the day of lamentation and self-scourging—was the last day of winter. In the 4th cent. A.D., under the influence of syncretism, Attis came to be regarded as a symbol of the sun. He and the Great Mother were also sometimes thought of as a parallel to Christ and the Virgin (Isidor. *Ep.* iv. 31. 28).

In art, Attis appears only under the Empire, and for the most part in connexion with the Mother. He is usually standing or leaning against the pine, wears the Phrygian cap, and carries the pedum or syrinx. The most important statue of him is the Lateran Attis, discovered at Ostia, representing him as the shepherd-lover of the Mother, the symbol of the fruits of the earth and of the sun. Half nude, with a long mantle fastened over his breast, he reclines on a rock representing Mount Ida, his left elbow on the head of Idæan Zeus. In the left hand is the pedum, in the right fruit, flowers, and three spears of grain, on the head a pine garland with fruits, and a tiara with five rays, a half moon, and two spears of grain. The half moon indicates his identity with the Phrygian moon-god, Men.

LITERATURE.—Hugo Hepding, *Attis, seine Mythen und sein Kult*, Giessen, 1903; Grant Showerman, 'Was Attis at Rome under the Republic?' in *TAPA* xxi (1900) pp. 46-59, and 'The Great Mother of the Gods' in *Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin*, No. xlm., Madison, 1901. See also artt. CYBELE and GREAT MOTHER.

GRANT SHOWERMAN.

ATTRACTION and REPULSION.—'Attraction' is the name given to those forces exerted between bodies which tend to draw the bodies together or to resist their separation. 'Repulsion' is the name given to forces that have the opposite effect. Both forces are to be seen exerted in the following familiar phenomena: in gravitating bodies, in various magnetic and electric phenomena, in chemical affinity, in the cohesion of the parts of a body, and in the adhesion of one body to another.

If we adopt the analysis given by Kant (*Monadologia physica*, 1756, and *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, 1786), we may even add: the very existence of a space-filling body presupposes these two forces or tendencies. A body must resist compression (repulsion), or it would become a mere mathematical point; and, again, it must resist expansion, or it would be scattered indefinitely through space.

Attraction and repulsion are to be differentiated from two other similar forces, tension and pressure, in that they act from a distance; and this characteristic has made them especially the subject of philosophical discussion. Can a body exert a force where it is not? The day has gone by when the metaphysician had the temerity to give an *a priori* answer to the question thus simply put; but in the 17th and 18th cents. the correct answer was a frequent matter of debate. The followers of Descartes, including Leibniz, were strongly opposed to the affirmative answer; for it seemed contrary to 'natural light' that a body can act where it is not (cf. Leibniz, Erdmann's ed. p. 767). For us of to-day the question is more complicated; but it still involves a truly metaphysical or *a priori* problem. On the one hand, empirical evidence leads us to believe that we do not know of any instance in nature of absolute contiguity between bodies. Moreover, mathematical intuition would add that the only true contiguity is where bodies have one point in common, and this, in turn, would involve complete coincidence of the two bodies; for the same problem of contiguity must be raised regarding all the points in each body. On the other hand, there is much prejudice, well or ill grounded, against the doctrine that a body acts at a distance. Faraday, it seems, had this prejudice; and his discovery of a medium between two bodies acted upon by magnetic forces, along with evidence of tension and pressure within this medium, justified his point of view. Again, there have been repeated attempts to reduce the forces operating in the phenomena of gravitation to pressure (cf. the theory of Le Sage, and Clerk Maxwell's article 'Attraction' in *EBr*[9]). Possibly this prejudice has its origin in the fact that our bodies must come in contact with objects to move them or to exert a force upon them, and, in turn, that when we are moved we feel the pressure of the outside body, or medium, upon the surface of our body. Such an explanation of this prejudice does not, however, do it full justice.

Here, then, the metaphysical problem arises: Is there an ultimate presupposition actually present in man's attempt to explain nature, forbidding him to rest satisfied with an explanation that involves the action of one body upon another from a distance? Whenever we are forced to adopt as an explanation such a force as gravity, ought we not simply to regard it, not as a final solution, but as a confession of ignorance? Does there not remain in all such cases an unsolved problem bidding us seek for a medium between the two bodies? Faraday sought a medium in one set of cases, and found it. Ought not science to seek it in all cases? Hence, is not this prejudice a fundamental methodological attitude? If so, we can call it an axiom, meaning by an axiom an assumption that seemingly we have to make, but have no hope of either proving or disproving. We cannot prove that bodies do not act upon one another from a distance, nor can we prove that they do; for these latter cases mean, at the most, that we have not as yet been able to find any known medium.

Moreover, the mathematical statement that in a continuous space all particles of matter must be separated, and therefore cannot be in absolute

contiguity, does not contradict this axiom. It simply introduces the larger metaphysical question: Is not nature a continuum, and therefore an inexhaustible source of problems; that is, does not all scientific explanation leave residual problems which arise the moment we think of any given system analyzed into yet minuter entities than those which we are considering, and so on *ad infinitum*? In short, our axiom means contiguity relative to the type of spatial objects involved in the problem at hand, not absolute or mathematical contiguity. Cf. artt. ATOMIC THEORY.

LITERATURE.—**Clerk Maxwell**, art. 'Attraction,' *EBr*[9] iii. 63; **Mach**, *The Science of Mechanics*, Eng. tr., 3rd ed., Chicago and London, 1907, p. 245 ff.; **Ostwald**, *Naturphilosophie*[2], Leipzig, 1902, 'Das energetische Weltbild'; **Pearson**, *Grammar of Science*[2], London, 1900, p. 272 ff.: **Berkeley**, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1710, sect. 103 ff.; **Leibniz**, Erdmann's ed., p. 767; **Kant**, *Monadologia physica*, 1756, and *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, 1786; **Lotze**, *Metaphysics*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1887, bk. II., chs. v. and vii. For attraction in the sense of the influence of one person upon another, see **A. W. Small**, *General Sociology*, Chicago and London, 1905, p. 564 ff.; **Harless**, *System of Christian Ethics*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1868, p. 433; and art. LOVE

W. T. MARVIN.

AUGSBURG CONFESSION.—See CONFESSIONS.

AUGURY.—See DIVINATION.

AUGUSTINE.—1. Life.—Aurelius Augustine (the prænomen 'Aurelius' is attested by contemporaries but does not occur in his own works or in his correspondence) was born of mixed heathen and Christian parentage, 13 Nov., A.D. 354, at Tagaste, a small municipality in proconsular Numidia. He was taught in his childhood the principles of Christianity, and great sacrifices were made to give him a liberal education. From his youth he was consumed by an insatiable thirst for knowledge, and was so inflamed by the reading of Cicero's *Hortensius* in his nineteenth year that he thenceforth devoted his life to the pursuit of truth. The profession to which he was bred was that of rhetorician, and this profession he practised first at Tagaste, and then successively at Carthage, Rome, and Milan up to the great crisis of his life (386). In his early manhood he had fallen away from his Christian training to the Manichæans, who were the rationalists of the age (373); and subsequently (383) had lapsed into a general scepticism; but he had already fought his way out of this, under the influence of the Neo-Platonists, before his conversion to Catholic Christianity took place at Milan in the late summer of 386. He spent the interval between this crisis and his baptism (Easter, 387) in philosophical retirement at Cassiciacum, and then, after a short sojourn at Rome, returned to Africa (autumn, 388) and established at his native town a sort of religio-philosophical retreat for himself and his friends. Early in 391 he was almost forcibly ordained presbyter at Hippo Regius, and nearly five years later (shortly before Christmas, 395) was raised to the rank of coadjutor-bishop. From the first he sustained practically the entire burden of the administration, and, soon succeeding to its sole responsibility, continued bishop of that second-rate diocese until his death, 28 August 430.

In this simple framework was lived out the life of one who has been strikingly called incomparably the greatest man whom, 'between Paul the Apostle and Luther the Reformer, the Christian Church has possessed.'* We cannot date from him, it is true, an epoch in the external fortunes of the Church in the same sense in which we may from, say, Gregory the Great or Hildebrand. He was not, indeed, without ecclesiastico-political significance. He did much to heal the schisms which tore the African Church. He regenerated the clergy of Africa by his monastic training school. And it must not be forgotten that the two great Gregorys stood upon his shoulders. But his direct work as a reformer of Church life was done in a corner, and its results were immediately swept away by the flood of the Vandal invasion.

2. Writings.—It was through his voluminous writings, by which his wider influence was exerted, that he entered both the Church and the world as a revolutionary force, and not merely created an epoch in the history of the Church, but has determined the course of its history in the West up to the present day. He was already an author when he became a Christian, having published (about 380) an æsthetical study (now lost), on *De pulchro et apto*. But his amazing literary productivity began with his conversion. His first Christian writings were a series of religio-philosophical treatises, in which he sought to lay the foundations of a specifically Christian philosophy. These were followed by a great number of controversial works against the Manichæans, Donatists, Pelagians, interspersed with Biblical expositions and dogmatic and ethical studies. The whole was crowned by four or five great books in which his genius finds perhaps its fullest expression. These are his *Confessiones* (397–400), in which he gives an analysis of his religious experience and creates a new *genre* in literary form; the *de Doctrina Christiana* (397–426), in which the principles of his Biblical exposition are expounded; the *Enchiridion ad Laurentium* on Faith, Hope, and Charity (421), which contains his most serious attempt to systematize his thought; the *de Trinitate* (395–420), in which its final formulation was given to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity; and the *de Civitate Dei* (413–426), in which are laid the foundations of a rational philosophy of history.

He seems to have been himself aware of the significance of the writings into which he had so unstintedly poured himself, and he devoted some of his last years to a careful survey and revision of them in his unique *Retractationes* (426–428), in which he seeks to compact them into an ultimate whole. The influence which they exerted from the beginning is attested no less by the spiteful comments on their volume which escaped from those less well affected to them (*e.g.* the interpolators of Gennadius), than by the wondering admiration of the better disposed (already, Possidius, *Vita*, ch. vii.). In point of fact they entered the Church as a leaven which has ever since wrought powerfully towards leavening the whole mass.

3. Influence.—(*a*) *Its extent.*—The greatness of the influence exerted by Augustine is fairly intimated by the suggestion that the division between the Eastern and Western Churches may properly be represented as having been 'prepared' by him.* No doubt, according to Renan's saying, the building of Constantinople contained in it the prophecy of the division of the Empire, and the division of the Empire the prophecy of the division of the Church. But it was Augustine who imprinted upon the Western section of the Church a character so specific as naturally to bring the separation of the Churches in its train. It must not be inferred, however, that his influence was felt only in the West. The prevailing impression to this effect implies some failure to appreciate not only the extent of the intercourse between the East and the West in Augustine's day, but also the indebtedness of the East to the West for its theological constructions. The interest of the Antiochenes in Western Christo-

* Harnack, *Monasticism and the Confessions of Augustine*, p. 123.

* Reuter, *Augustinische Studien*, vii. 499.

logical thought, as illustrated, for instance, in the *Eranistes* and the correspondence of Theodoret, is only one example of a much wider fact; and in any event, the great doctrines of the Trinity and the Person of Christ, which form almost the entirety of 'dogma' in the East, so far from being a gift from the East to the West, as often represented, had their origin in the West, and were thence communicated to the East—the former through the intermediation of 'the great Hosius,' and the latter through that of Leo the Great. Augustine, through whom—working, no doubt, in full knowledge of what had been done by the Greeks, but in entire independence of them—the doctrine of the Trinity received its completed statement, came too late to affect the Greek construction of this doctrine, and accordingly gave form on this great topic only to the thought of the West. But his Christological conceptions underlay the formulations of Leo, as those of Ambrose underlay his, and through Leo determined the Christological definitions of the East as well as of the West. Accordingly, while the doctrines of the East and the West on the Person of Christ have remained identical, in their doctrines of the Trinity the two sections draw somewhat apart, not only with respect to that perennial bone of contention, the *filioque* clause in the definition of the procession of the Spirit, but in what underlies this difference—their general conception of the relations of the Trinitarian Persons. This in the East is ruled by subtle subordinational inheritances (embedded in the Nicene formulary in the phrase θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ and its equivalents), while in the West it is dominated by that principle of equalization which found its sharpest assertion in the ascription of αὐτοθεότης to Christ by Calvin, whose construction marks the only new (subordinate) epoch in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity after Augustine. This complete determination of Western thought on the fundamental Christian doctrine of the Trinity fairly illustrates at once the place of Augustine in Western Christian thought, and the effect of his supreme influence there in creating a specifically Western type of Christianity.

It is worth while, no doubt, to distinguish between the actual influence exerted by Augustine in the West, and what may perhaps, in a more external sense, be called the authority enjoyed by his name in the Latin Church. To no other doctor of the Church has anything like the same authority been accorded, and it seemed for long as if his doctrine of grace at least was to be treated as a definitely defined dogma, *de fide* in the Church. Already in 431 Celestine sharply reproved the bishops of Gaul for permitting Augustine's authority to be questioned in their dioceses; and soon afterwards, Gelasius (493) addressed to the bishop of Picenum a similar letter of rebuke for the like carelessness. Subsequent deliverances of Hormisdas (520), and Boniface II. (530–531), and John II. (534) confirmed the authority thus assigned him; and their encomiums were repeated by many later Roman bishops. It very naturally became, therefore, the custom of the 'Augustinians' in the Church of Rome—like Diego Alvarez, Jansen, Noris—to ascribe 'irrefragable authority' to his teaching; and the question was gravely debated among the theologians whether a truly plenary authority were really to be attributed to him, or whether he were only to rank as the first of the Church's authorized teachers. The result was very naturally that every tendency of thought in the Church was eager to claim for itself the support of his name; and the extraordinary richness of his mind, and the remarkable variety of, so to say, the facets of his teaching, lent him more than ordinarily to the appeal of numerous and even divergent points of view. The possibility of this was increased by the long period of time covered by his literary activity, and the only gradual crystallization of his thought around his really formative ideas. The Augustine of Cassiciacum or even of the presbyterate was a somewhat different Augustine from the Augustine of the episcopate; and not even at his death had perfect consistency been attained in his teaching. Accordingly the most amazing variety of doctrine, on almost every conceivable subject, throughout the Middle Ages, and later in the Church of Rome, has sought support for itself in some saying or other of his; and both sides of almost every controversy have appealed with confidence to his teaching. Schools of thought which had drifted entirely away from his most fundamental postulates still regarded and represented themselves as 'Augustinian'; and the Church of Rome itself, whose whole history since the second Council of Orange (529) has been marked by the progressive elimination of Augustinianism from its teaching, is still able to look upon him as the chief doctor of the Church, upon whom its fabric is especially built. Confusion became so confounded that the Confession of Faith which Pelagius presented to Innocent was inserted quite innocently into the *Libri Carolini*, and was even produced by the Sorbonne in 1521 against Luther as Augustine's own.

Obviously this universal deference to the name of Augustine furnishes no accurate measure of his real influence. It supplies, however, a fair general reflexion of its extent. In point of fact the whole development of Western life, in all its phases, was powerfully affected by his teaching. Thus, his unique ascendancy in the direction of the thought and life of the West, is due in part to the particular period in history in which his work was done, in part to the richness and depth of his mind and the force of his individuality, and in part to the special circumstances of his conversion to Christianity. He stood on the watershed of two worlds. The old world was passing away; the new world was entering upon its heritage; and it fell to him to mediate the transference of the culture of the one to the other. It has been strikingly remarked that the miserable existence of the Roman Empire in the West almost seems to have been prolonged for the express purpose of affording an opportunity for the influence of Augustine to be exerted on universal history.* He was fortunate even in the place of his birth and formative years; although on the very eve of its destruction, Africa was at this precise moment, in the midst of the universal decadence, the scene of intense intellectual activity—into which he entered with all the force of his ardent nature. He gathered up into himself all that the old world had to offer, and re-coining it sent it forth again bearing the stamp of his profound character. It belonged to the peculiarity of his genius that he embraced all that he took up into himself 'with all the fibres of his soul'; not, as has been said, 'with his heart alone, for the heart does not think, nor with the mind only; he never grasps truth in the abstract, and as if it were dead,'† but with his whole being, giving himself to it and sending it forth from himself as living truth, driven on by all the force of his great and inspiring personality. Accordingly, when, having tested everything that the old world had to offer and found it wanting, he gave himself at last to Catholic Christianity, it was with no reserves. Catholicism, frankly accepted as such, became his

* Harnack, *Grundriss d. Dogmengeschichte*, Eng. tr. p. 335.
† Portalié, in Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de la Théologie Catholique*, i. 2153.

passion, and into the enthusiastic maintenance of it he threw all his forces. It was primarily as a Catholic Christian, therefore, that he thought, and worked, and lived. But the man who threw himself with such zeal into the service of Catholic Christianity was a man who had already lived through many experiences and had gathered much spoil in the process. He had sounded the depths of heresy in its most attractive form, and had drunk the waters of philosophy in its culminating development; life in the conventicles of the sects and in the circle of cultured heathenism was alike familiar to him. But, above all the spoil he brought from without, he brought with him himself. He was a man of the highest and most individual genius—intellectual, but far beyond that, religious—who had his own personal contribution to make to thought and life. If we cannot quite allow that there were in very truth many Augustines, we must at least recognize that within the one Augustine there were very various and not always consistent currents flowing, each of which had its part to play in the future. Within the Catholic Christian a philosopher of the first rank was restlessly active; and within both a religious genius of the highest order was working; while for the expression of the resulting complex of feelings and ideas a literary talent was available second to none in the annals of the Church.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the Western Church has felt the force of his influence in all the main lines of its development, and in no one of its prominent characteristics could it have been without him what it has become. In him are found at once the seed out of which the tree that we know as the Roman Catholic Church has grown; the spring or strength of all the leading anti-hierarchical and mystical movements which succeeded one another through the Middle Ages; at least the promise and pre-formation of the great types of Western philosophical thought; and, above all, the potent leaven of vital religion. Beginning in the first force of its fresh promulgation by overcoming the ingrained rationalism of the popular Christianity expressed in Pelagianism and its daughter movements, it refused to be bound by the compromises of the Council of Orange, compacted though they were into a system by the genius of a Thomas, and given irrefragable authority in the Church of Rome by the decrees of Trent, but manifested its power by outbreak after outbreak, from Gottschalk in the 9th to Jansen in the 17th cent.; and then burst all bonds and issued in the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century.

(*b*) *Augustine as a Church-teacher.*—No doubt it is pre-eminently as the great Catholic doctor that Augustine stands out on the page of history. To his own consciousness he was just a Catholic Christian; and the whole mass of his teaching was conceived by him as simply the body of Catholic doctrine. It is, accordingly, interesting to observe that it is precisely as the Catholic doctor that he has lived in the hearts of the people. The legends which have gathered around his name picture him pre-eminently as the expounder of the *principia* of the Christian faith, particularly of the mysteries of the Godhead, who abode continually *in excelsis disputans de gloria excellentissimæ Trinitatis*, and communicated to the Church the results of his high meditations 'as he was able'—a note of humility caught from his own habitual tone when speaking of himself.* The task to which he consciously gave himself was to apprehend, so far as it was given to him to apprehend, to proclaim, maintain, and defend the Catholic truth; and from this task he never swerved. It was no empty formula with him when he declared, as he repeatedly declared, 'This is the Catholic faith, and it is therefore also my faith'; and he was altogether in earnest when he exhorted his readers not to love him more than the Catholic faith, and his critics not to love themselves more than the Catholic truth.* The body of Catholic doctrine constitutes thus the traditional element in Augustine's teaching. But, of course, it by no means left his hands precisely as it entered them. Nor did he contribute to it merely intellectual precision and logical completeness; he impressed on it the stamp of his religious fervour, and transmuted its elements into religious entities.

It was particularly in the doctrine of the Church, which he thus took up and transfigured, that he became in a true sense the founder of Roman Catholicism, and thus called into being a new type of Christianity, in which 'the idea of the Church became the central power in the religious feeling' and 'in ecclesiastical activity,' 'in a fashion which has remained unknown to the East.'† This idea of the Church was, to be sure, so little the creation of Augustine that he took it over whole from his predecessors, and in his innermost thought, indeed, never thoroughly homologated it. It was Cyprian, not Augustine, who identified the Church with the Episcopate, and to whom the Church outside which there is no salvation was fundamentally the hierarchical institution. It was Gregory the Great who first spoke of the organized Church as the Divine *civitas*. To Augustine the Church was fundamentally the *congregatio sanctorum*, the Body of Christ, and it is this Church which he has in mind when he calls it the *Civitas Dei*, or the Kingdom of God on earth. He is, however, not carefully observant of the distinction between the empirical and the ideal Church, and repeatedly—often apparently quite unconsciously—carries over to the one the predicates which, in his fundamental thought, belonged properly to the other. Thus the hierarchically organized Church tends ever with him to take the place of the *congregatio sanctorum*, even when he is speaking of it as the Kingdom or City of God in which alone any communion with God is possible here, and through which alone eternal blessedness with God is attainable hereafter.

In the Donatist controversy, although the distinction between *habere* and *utiliter* or *salubriter habere* is made to do yeoman service, the conception of the Church as the sole sphere of salvation, passing into the conception of the Church as the sole mediatrix of grace, and therefore the sole distributor of salvation, was necessarily thrown into high emphasis; and the logic of the situation too directly and too powerfully identified this Church with the empirical Church for the deeper-lying conception of the *congregatio sanctorum* to remain in sight. Thus Augustine, almost against his will, became the stay of that doctrine of the Church as the sole instrument at once of true knowledge of the Divine revelation and of saving grace which provides the two *foci* about which the ellipse of Roman Catholic doctrine revolves. What before him was matter of assertion became in his hands a religion, and went forth to conquer the world. His profounder conception of the Church as the *congregatio sanctorum*, and the consequent distinction between the empirical and the ideal Church, with all its implications with respect to the action of the sacraments and the effect of ecclesiastical decrees, and even of excommunication, did not indeed remain unobserved or unutilized when occasion demanded. Thus, for example, they came forward in their completeness

* Cf. Stilling, *Acta Sanctorum*, Aug. vi.

* *De Trinitate*, I. iv. 7; iii. *præf.* 2.

† Reuter, *op. cit.* p. 499

in the arguments of the Imperialists in the great controversies of the later 11th century.* These also, and in a truer sense than the Papalists in that debate, were 'Augustinians.' But the main stream of Augustine's influence flowed meanwhile in the traditionalist channel, and gave the world the Church as the authoritative organ of Divine truth and the miraculous vehicle of saving grace, through which alone the assured knowledge of the revelation of God could be attained, or the effective operations of His redeeming love experienced. Many of the subsidiary conceptions which fill out the system of Roman Catholic doctrine also find their direct prop in his teaching—its doctrine of merit, the distinctions between precepts and counsels, mortal and venial sins, and particularly the elaborate sacramental system, with its distinction between matter and form, its assertion of *ex opere operato* action, and of the indelible character of baptism and ordination, and even the doctrine of intention. On this side of his teaching the Roman Catholic Church may well be accounted Augustine's monument.

(*c*) *As a thinker.*—But beneath Augustine the traditionalist lay Augustine the thinker, and as a thinker he gave law not only to the Church but to the world. From the moment of his conversion, to be sure, religion became paramount with him. But this did not quench his philosophical impulse; it only made his specifically a religious philosophy, and himself, to adopt Rudolph Eucken's more precise definition,† 'the single great philosopher on the basis of Christianity proper the world has had'—in the richness of his thought and poetry of his expression alike, not unworthy of comparison even with his great master Plato.‡ He brought with him into Catholic Christianity not only a sufficient equipment of philosophical knowledge, but a powerful and trained intelligence, and an intellectual instinct which had to find scope. It was in the rôle of Christian philosopher, seeking to give form and substance to fundamental verities from the Christian standpoint, that he first came forward in the service of faith; and though later the religious teacher and defender of the faith seemed likely to swallow up the philosophical inquirer, they never really did so, but his rich and active mind kept continually at work sounding all depths. Thus not only was there imparted to all his teaching an unwonted vitality, originality, and profundity, but 'the activities set in motion were not confined to the narrow circle of theological science, but extended, directly or indirectly, to all forms of human life.'§ In every department of philosophical inquiry he became normative for the succeeding centuries; and until the rise of Aristotelianism in the 12th cent. and its establishment in influence by the advocacy of such teachers as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, Augustinianism reigned supreme. Throughout the remainder of the Middle Ages it contended masterfully with its great rival, forming many compromises with it, and tending to off-set the rationalism into which Aristotelianism was ever degenerating by itself falling into mysticism. It thus became the support of the tendency towards Mysticism which prevailed through the Middle Ages, or rather its protection from the pantheism into which, when drawing more directly from Neo-Platonic sources, it was ever liable to deteriorate. From it every Catholic Reformer drew his strength, and to it the whole body of Reformers before the Reformation made their appeal. From its partial obscuration it emerged at the Renaissance, and burst again into full view in the 17th cent. to lay the foundations of modern thought. Siebeck accordingly bids us see in Augustine 'the first modern man'; * and, if Eucken questions the exactness of the designation, he is free to allow that the modern world finds in Augustine many points of contact, and, not only in questions of religious philosophy may wisely take its start from him rather than from Luther or Thomas, Schleiermacher or Kant, but in purely philosophical matters will find him in many respects more modern than Hegel or Schleiermacher.†

It was in the spheres of psychology and metaphysics that the dominion of Augustine was most complete. He aspired to know nothing, he tells us, but God and the soul; but these he strove with all his might to know altogether. His characteristic mark as a thinker was the inward gaze; the realities of consciousness were the primary objects of his contemplation; and from them he took his starting-point for reflexion on the world. Antiquity supplies no second to him in the breadth and acuteness of his psychological observation. And in his establishment of 'self-assured subjectivity,' as Windelband calls it,‡ in 'the controlling central position of philosophical thought' he transcended his times, and became 'one of the founders of modern thought.' If he may truly be said to have derived from Plato and Plotinus, in a far truer sense he stood above his Neo-Platonic teachers, and of his lineage have come Descartes and Malebranche and all that has proceeded from the movements of thought inaugurated by them. Even the famous ontological argument for the being of God, and, indeed, the very *cogito, ergo sum* of Descartes, have not merely their material but their formal pre-formation in him. It was not, however, in abstract thought alone, or chiefly, that he made his mark on the ages; his own thinking was markedly concrete, and nothing characterized it more strongly than the firmness of its grasp upon the realities of life, to the understanding and direction of which it was held strictly ancillary.

His impact upon the world might accordingly not unfairly be summed up, from one point of view, in the ethical revolution which he wrought. 'In essence,' remarks Harnack,§ 'Augustine's importance in the history of the Church and dogma lies in his giving to the West in the place of the Stoic-Christian popular morals, as that was recapitulated in Pelagianism, a religious, specifically Christian ethics, and so strongly impressing this on the Church that at least its formulas maintain up to to-day their supremacy in the whole extent of Western Christianity.' Indeed, we might do worse, in seeking an index of his influence as a thinker, than fix upon the place he has occupied in political theory and practice. The entire political development of the Middle Ages was dominated by him; and he was in a true sense the creator of the Holy Roman Empire. It was no accident that the *de Civitate Dei* was the favourite reading of Charlemagne: 'he delighted,' Einhard tells us (*Vita Caroli*, 24), 'in the books of St. Augustine, and especially in those that bear the title *Of the City of God*.' And in the great struggle between the Empire and the Papacy in the later 11th cent. it was expressly to him that the controversialists on both sides made their appeal. No Father is quoted by them as often as he, except, perhaps, Gregory the Great; and no series of documents is cited more frequently than his writings, except, perhaps, the pseudo-

* Mirbt, *Die Stellung Augustins in der Publicistik*, etc., p. 80.

† Eucken, *Die Lebensanschauungen*, etc.[2], p. 216.

‡ Cf. E. Norden, in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, i. 8, 1905, p. 394: 'Augustine was the great poet of the ancient Church, though just as little as Plato did he write in verse. These two go together as the great poet-philosophers of all time.'

§ Mirbt, *op. cit.* p. 1

* *ZPhP*, 1888, p. 190. † Eucken, *op. cit.* p. 249.

‡ *A History of Philosophy*, pp. 264, 270, 276.

§ *Dogmengesch.* (Eng. tr. v. 30); cf. on Augustine's place in the history of ethics, Joseph Mausbach, in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, i. 4, 1906, p. 526.

Isidorian decretals.* Not only do writers like Walram of Naumburg and Wido of Ferrara reflect accurately his conception of the Church, with its emphasis on unity and its vacillation between the ideas of the *congregatio sanctorum* and a hierarchical organization—echoes of which still sound in William of Occam's *Defensor Pacis* and the discussions of the conciliatory party in the Roman Church whose ornament was Gerson—but they made their appeal to Augustine in their endeavours to give validity to their defence 'of the State as a Divine institution, of the moral significance and relative independence of the earthly sovereignty, of the necessary concordance of the *Sacerdotium* and *Imperium*,' and the like.†

On the theoretical side he must be accredited, in this aspect of his thought, with the creation of the science of the Philosophy of History. For the primary significance of the *City of God* lies in the fact that 'in it for the first time an ideal consideration, a comprehensive survey of human history found its expression.'‡ No doubt his external position at the division of the ages, when the old world was dying and the new world, under the dominion of Christianity, was struggling into its place, supplied him with incitement for the creation of this new science; and the demands which the times, in the crash of the secular order, made for an apology for Christianity, powerfully determined him to a general historical philosophy. But it was Christianity itself, as the entrance into the world of a renovating force, and his own particular conception of Christianity (leading him to conceive the history of human society no less than the course of the individual life, as the continuous evolution of the Divine purpose, and impelling him to interpret all the forces of time as working harmoniously onward towards that far-off Divine event to which all creation moves) that gave him not only the impulse to work out a philosophy of history, but the elements of the particular philosophy of history which he actually presents in his epoch-making treatise, which, incomplete and perhaps one-sided as it is, still retains full validity in its fundamental traits.

(*d*) *As a religious genius.*—Not even, however, in Augustine the philosopher do we find the Augustine whose influence has wrought most powerfully in the world. The crisis through which he passed at his conversion was a profound religious revolution; and if he gave himself at once to the task of constructing a philosophy, it was distinctively a Christian philosophy he sought to construct, built though it was largely out of Platonic materials: the authority of Christ, he tells us in the earliest of the writings in which this task was prosecuted, ranked with him even above that of reason. And if he devoted all his powers to the exposition and defence of the Catholic faith, it was because he saw in the Catholic faith the pure expression of religion, and poured into the Catholic faith all the fullness of his religious emotion. It is not Augustine the traditionalist, or Augustine the thinker, but Augustine the religious genius, who has most profoundly influenced the world. The most significant fact about him is that he, first among Church teachers, gave adequate expression to that type of religion which has since attached to itself the name of 'evangelical'; the religion, that is to say, of faith, as distinct from the religion of works; the religion which, despairing of self, casts all its hope on God, as opposed to the religion which, in a greater or less degree, trusts in itself; in a word —since religion in its very nature is dependence on God—religion in the purity of its conception, as over against a *quasi*-religious moralism. What requires particularly to be noted is that he gave full expression to this type of religion both in its vital and in its thetical aspects—the former most adequately in that unique book in which he reveals his soul, and admits us as spectators to the struggles of his great heart as it seeks to cleanse itself of all trust in itself and to lay hold with the grasp, first, of despair, next of discerning trust, and then of grateful love, on the God who was its salvation; and the latter most adequately in that long series of writings in which he expounds, defends, and enforces with logical argument and moving exhortation the fundamental elements of the theology of grace, as against the most direct assailants which that theology has been called upon to meet in the whole history of Christian thought. The great contribution which Augustine has made to the world's life and thought is embodied in the theology of grace, which he has presented with remarkable clearness and force, vitally in his *Confessions*, and thetically in his anti-Pelagian treatises.

It would be altogether a mistake to suppose that Augustine consciously discriminated between the theology of grace which was his personal contribution to Christian thought, and the traditional Catholicism which he gave his life to defend and propagate. In his own consciousness, the two were one: in his theology of grace he was in his own apprehension only giving voice to the Catholic faith in its purity. Nevertheless, however unconsciously, he worked with it a revolution both in Christian teaching and in Christian life, second in its depth and its far-reaching results to no revolution which has been wrought in Christian feeling and thought in the whole course of its history. A new Christian piety dates from him, in which, in place of the alternations of hope and fear which vex the lives of those who, in whatever degree, hang their hopes on their own merits, a mood of assured trust in the mercy of a gracious God is substituted as the spring of Christian life. And a new theology corresponding to this new type of piety dates from him; a theology which, recalling man from all dependence on his own powers or merits, casts him decisively on the grace of God alone for his salvation. Of course, this doctrine was not new in the sense that it was Augustine's invention; it was the doctrine of Paul, for example, before it was the doctrine of Augustine, and was only recovered for the Church by Augustine, though in that age, dominated in all its thinking by the dregs of Stoic rationalism, it came with all the force of a new discovery. And, of course, Augustine did not discover it all at once. Because his conversion was a vital religious experience, in which the religious relation was realized in thought and life in unwonted purity and power, the fundamental elements of his religious revolution were from the first present in his mind and heart; in his earliest Christian writings he already gives expression to both the formal and the material principles, as we may term them, of the theology of grace. The authority of the Divine revelation in and through Christ, embodied in the Scriptures, and the utter dependence of man on God for all good (*potestas nostra Ipse est, da fidem*), are already the most intimate expression of his thought and life. But just because the religious system to which he gave himself on his conversion was taken over by him as a whole, time was requisite for the transfusion of the whole mass by the consistent explication and conscious exposition of the 'Augustinianism' implicitly summed up in such maxims. The adjustment went on slowly, although it went on unbrokenly. It required ten years before the revived Paulinism attained even a fully consistent positive enunciation (first in the work, *De diversis quæstioni-*

* Mirbt, *op. cit.* p. 75. † Reuter, *op. cit.* p. 508.
‡ Seyrich, *Die Geschichtsphilosophie Augustins*, 1891, p. 68.

bus ad Simplicianum, 396); and, though the leaven worked steadily thereafter more and more deeply and widely into his thought, death intervened before all the elements of his thinking were completely leavened. That is the reason why Augustine was both the founder of Roman Catholicism and the author of that doctrine of grace which it has been the constantly pursued effort of Roman Catholicism to neutralize, and which in very fact either must be neutralized by, or will neutralize, Roman Catholicism. Two children were struggling in the womb of his mind. There can be no doubt which was the child of his heart. His doctrine of the Church he had received whole from his predecessors, and he gave it merely the precision and vitality which ensured its persistence. His doctrine of grace was all his own: it represented the very core of his being; and his whole progress in Christian thinking consists in the growing completeness with which its fundamental principles applied themselves in his mind to every department of life and thought. In this gradual subjection to them of every element of his inherited teaching, it was inevitable, had time been allowed, that his inherited doctrine of the Church, too, with all its implications, would have gone down before it, and Augustine would have bequeathed to the Church, not 'problems,' but a thoroughly worked out system of evangelical religion.

(*e*) *Augustine and Protestantism.*—The problem which Augustine bequeathed to the Church for solution, the Church required a thousand years to solve. But even so, it is Augustine who gave us the Reformation. For the Reformation, inwardly considered, was just the ultimate triumph of Augustine's doctrine of grace over Augustine's doctrine of the Church. This doctrine of grace came from Augustine's hands in its positive outline completely formulated: sinful man depends, for his recovery to good and to God, entirely on the free grace of God; this grace is therefore indispensable, prevenient, irresistible, indefectible; and, being thus the free grace of God, must have lain, in all the details of its conference and working, in the intention of God from all eternity. But, however clearly announced and forcefully commended by him, it required to make its way against great obstacles in the Church. As over against the Pelagians, the indispensableness of grace was quickly established; as over against the Semi-Pelagians, its prevenience was with almost equal rapidity made good. But there advance paused. If the necessity of prevenient grace was thereafter (after the second Council of Orange, 529) the established doctrine of the Church, the irresistibility of this prevenient grace was put under the ban, and there remained no place for a complete 'Augustinianism' within the Church, as Gottschalk and Jansen were fully to discover. Therefore, when the great revival of religion which we call the Reformation came, seeing that it was, on its theological side, a revival of 'Augustinianism,' as all great revivals of religion must be (for 'Augustinianism' is but the thetical expression of religion in its purity), there was nothing for it but the rending of the Church. And therefore also the greatest peril to the Reformation was and remains the diffused anti-'Augustinianism' in the world; and, by a curious combination of circumstances, this, its greatest enemy, showed itself most dangerous in the hands of what we must otherwise look upon as the chief ally of the Reformation—that is to say, Humanism. Humanism was the ally of the Reformation in so far as it too worked for the emancipation of the human spirit; and, wherever it was religious, it became the seed-plot of the Reformation. But there was a strong anti-'Augustinian' party among the Humanists, and from it emanated the gravest danger which threatened the Reformation. Where this tone of thought was dominant the Reformation failed, because religious depth was wanting. What Spain, for example, lacked, says R. Saint-Hilaire justly, was not freedom of thought, but the gospel.* In the first stages of the Reformation movement in the North, this anti-'Augustinianism' may be looked upon as summed up in Erasmus; and Erasmus, on this very ground, held himself aloof from the Reformation movement, and that movement held itself aloof from him. 'I am at present reading our Erasmus,' wrote Luther six months before he nailed his theses on the door of the Schloss-Kirche at Wittenberg, 'but my heart recoils more and more from him. . . . Those who ascribe something to man's freedom of will regard these things differently from those who know only God's free grace.' Do we realize how much we owe to Erasmus and his friends that they remained Roman Catholics, and thus permitted the 'Augustinianism' of the Reformation to plant its seed and to bear its fruit?

LITERATURE.—The literature upon Augustine is immense. An excellent selection from it is given by Loofs at the head of the art. 'Augustinus' in *PRE*[3], with which should be compared that given by Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, v. 61 f. The following deal directly with the influence of Augustine: Feuerlein, 'Ueber die Stellung Augustins in der Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte,' in von Sybel's *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1869, xxii. 270-313; Reuter, *Augustinische Studien*, Gotha, 1887, vii. 479–516; Cunningham, *S. Austin and his place in the History of Christian Thought* (Hulsean Lectures for 1885), London, 1886; Schaff, *History of the Christian Church*, iii., New York, 1884, § 180, pp. 1116–1128; Eucken, *Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*, Leipzig, 1890 (2nd ed. 1896, pp. 216–250; 4th ed. 1902, p. 211, etc.); Nourrisson, *La Philosophie de Saint Augustin*, Paris, 1886, ii. 147–276; Werner, *Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters*, iii., Vienna, 1883, and 'Die Augustinische Psychologie in ihrer mittelalterlich-scholastischen Einkleidung und Gestaltung,' *SWAW*, Vienna, 1882, pp. 435–494; Siebeck, 'Die Anfänge der neueren Psychologie,' in *ZPhP*, 1888, p. 161 f., cf. his *Geschichte d. Psychologie*; Ehrle, 'Der Augustinismus und der Aristotelismus in der Scholastik gegen Ende des xiii. Jahrhundert,' *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, 1889, v. 603–635, cf. also *ZKT*, Innsbruck, 1889, xiii. 172–193; Mirbt, *Die Stellung Augustins in der Publicistik des gregorianischen Kirchenstreits*, Leipzig, 1888; Koch, *Der heilige Faustus Bischof von Riez*, Stuttgart, 1895, pp. 129–191; Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*[2], 1908, ii. 179: Portalié, 'Augustine,' in *Catholic Encyclopædia*, ii. 84–104, New York, 1908. The text of Augustine is most generally accessible in *PL* xxxii.–xlvii.; and his chief writings are translated in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 1st ser. i.–viii., Oxf. and N. Y., 1886–88.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

AURANGZĪB. — Aurangzīb (Abū-l-Muẓaffar Muḥyī-ad-dīn Muḥammad Aurangzīb 'Ālamgīr Pādishāh Ghāzī), sixth of the so-called Mughal emperors of India, and third son of Shāh-Jahān, was born at Duhad, on the borders of Mālwa, on Nov. 4th, 1618. Nothing is recorded of his early years, except that he was held by his grandfather Jahāngīr as a hostage for his father's loyalty, and was educated in the conventional manner of Ḥanafī Muhammadanism. In 1636 he was appointed nominal governor of the Deccan, but his religious exaltation led him seven years later to renounce the world, and to adopt the rigorous rules of a *faqīr*. For a year he practised self-mortification in his retreat in the Western Ghāts, to the indignation of his father and the ridicule of his family. His active spirit, however, was not satisfied with the life of contemplation; he resumed public duties as governor of Gujarāt, and in 1647 was ordered to command the recently annexed provinces of Balḥ and Badakhshān beyond the Hindū Kūsh. A brief experience convinced him of the uselessness of attempting to hold these distant provinces against the resistance of the Uzbegs, and he retired with heavy loss. He was equally unsuccessful in his next command, when he was sent in 1649 to relieve Kandahār, then besieged and soon captured by the Persians; nor was a second attempt in 1652 more fortunate. These campaigns, however fruitless to the empire,

* *RCh*, 1857, p. 146.

taught Aurangzīb the lessons of strategy, and taught his followers to respect their commander's courage. They laid the foundations of his future dominating influence. He was again governor of the Deccan in 1655–57, when the illness of his father brought about a fratricidal struggle for the throne. Allying himself with his youngest brother, Murād Bahsh, Aurangzīb defeated the Imperial army under Jaswant Singh at Dharmātpūr on April 25th, 1658, and again at Samūgarh on June 2nd, when his eldest brother Dārā was forced to fly. Agra fell into the hands of the victors; Shāh-Jahān was held a prisoner till his death seven years later; the other brothers were ruthlessly killed; and Aurangzīb, who had already been proclaimed Emperor at Delhi in July, 1658, formally ascended the throne on May 26th, 1659, with the title of '*Ālamgīr*, 'World-grasper.'

Though he had won the throne by treachery and by the murder of his brothers, Aurangzīb was humane by nature, and no subsequent act of barbarity has been proved against him during his reign of half a century. The keynote of his character was a rigid Muslim's puritanism. It is impossible to doubt his sincerity, for he had nothing earthly to gain and everything to lose by his stern adherence to every tittle of the law of Islām. He might have cast Muhammad's precepts to the winds, as his father and grandfather had done, and only strengthened his hold of his Hindu empire.

'There was nothing but his own conscience to prevent Aurangzīb from adopting the eclectic philosophy of Akbar, the luxurious profligacy of Jahāngīr, or the splendid ease of Shāh-Jahān. The Hindus would have preferred anything to a Muhammadan bigot. The Rājput princes only wanted to be let alone. The Deccan would never have troubled Hindūstān if Hindūstān had not invaded it. Probably any other Mughal prince would have followed in the steps of the kings and his forefathers, and emulated the indolence and vice of the court in which he had received his earliest impressions. Aurangzīb did none of these things. For the first time in their history the Mughals beheld a rigid Muslim in their Emperor, a Muslim as sternly repressive of himself as of the people around him, a king who was prepared to stake his throne for the sake of the faith' (Lane-Poole, *Aurangzīb*, p. 69).

In his daily life Aurangzīb observed not only the minute details of the Muslim ritual, but an extreme austerity. He ate no meat, drank only water, kept all the fasts and vigils, passed whole nights in prayer and reading the Qur'ān in the mosque, gave alms profusely, and used the utmost simplicity in his dress and manners. In accordance with the Prophet's precept that every Muslim should practise a trade, he made skull-caps; he was also a fine calligraphist, and twice copied the whole Qur'ān, which he knew by heart. Laxity of morals, lewd conversation, the dancing of the Nāch girls, even music, were his detestation. Since to the fanatical puritanism of a strict Muslim were added an indomitable will and a courage so cool that he would dismount and recite the ordained prayers at the customary hour in the very thick of a battle, it is clear that far-reaching changes were in store for the mixed populations and religions of India. The storm began to gather in 1669, when the temple of Viṣṇu at Benares was destroyed by his order, and the idols buried under the feet of good Muslims at the mosque at Agra. Three years later came a rebellion of the Hindu devotees called Satnāmīs at Nārnaul, which was sternly suppressed. Soon afterwards Aurangzīb imposed the intolerable *jizya*, or poll-tax, upon all non-Muslims, and turned the whole Hindu population against him. An interference with the infant princes of Mārwār led to a revolt of the Rājputs, and though this was more or less extinguished in 1681, Aurangzīb lost thereby the support of the finest fighting force in Hindūstān.

The loss of Rājput loyalty was felt as soon as the Emperor undertook the reduction of the Deccan, which he regarded as 'infidels' land,' *Dār el-ḥarb*, and resolved to make *Dār el-Islām*. He had nearly conquered Gulkanda when he was called away to fight for the throne in 1657, but since then a new Hindu power, more formidable than the Muhammadan kingdoms of Bījāpūr and Gulkanda, had arisen by the energy of Sivājī the Marātha freebooter, who had gradually established an era of brigandage on an heroic scale, built up a kingdom in the Western Ghāts, and widened his authority to the extent of levying blackmail over a great part of the Deccan. His death in 1680 did not end the revolt, and Aurangzīb found that he had to deal with an indomitable nation of freebooters, whose strength and skill in guerrilla warfare he was never able to break. The Mughal generals had been too often repulsed, and the Emperor took the field in person in 1681. He first attacked the old Deccan kingdoms which appeared to shelter the Marāthas: Bījāpūr fell in 1686, and Gulkanda in the following year. Their extinction, however, only strengthened the Marāthas, whose disbanded armies swelled the forces of rebellion. The effeminate Mughal troops, deprived of the Rājput 'stiffening,' grew more and more demoralized by year after year of guerrilla fighting; and, whilst Aurangzīb effected a kind of military occupation of the whole Deccan, except the Portuguese possessions and the extreme point south of Trichinopoly, his hold of the country was illusory; and the moment the Mughals turned their backs the hardy Marāthas emerged from their mountain fastnesses and recovered the territory lately occupied by their enemy. The country, devastated by the horde of invaders, welcomed the mountaineers as deliverers from a hateful foreign yoke. Aurangzīb was engaged in a hopeless struggle, yet he never lost heart. For twenty years he fought his evasive foe, planned every campaign himself, issued all general orders and controlled every detail, conducted sieges in person, and in extreme age was barely withheld from leading the assault. It was all in vain; Hindūstān itself was full of revolt in the prolonged absence of its Emperor; the Deccan was a desert; the army was enfeebled and clamouring for its pay; and the Marathas ever hung about its skirts and insolently defied it. Finally Aurangzīb died, alone as alone he had lived, with all the puritan's sense of sin and unworthiness and dread of death, and full of the dejection of a colossal failure, on March 4th, 1707, in the 49th year of his reign, and the 89th of his age. With him the orthodox Muhammadan revival in India died also.

LITERATURE.—The native annalists are quoted in substance in Elliot and Dowson's *History of India as told by its own Historians*, vol. vii (London, 1876). European contemporary observers are Bernier, *Travels*, ed Constable (London, 1891), Manucci, *Storia do Mogor*, ed. W. Irvine (4 vols., London, 1907–8); Gemelli Careri, in Churchill's *Voyages*, vol. iv. (London, 1745); Tavernier, *Travels*, tr. V. Ball (2 vols., London, 1889) Fryer's *New Account of India* (London, 1698); and Hedges' *Diary*, ed. Sir H. Yule (3 vols., London, Hakluyt Society, 1887–9), may be consulted. The present writer contributed a biography of Aurangzīb to the 'Rulers of India' series (Oxford, 1893).

STANLEY LANE-POOLE.

AURELIUS.—See MARCUS AURELIUS.

AUSTERITIES.—**1. Introduction.**—Asceticism, strictly so called, is not found among peoples of lower grades of culture, but the practice of various kinds of austerities is very common. These take the place in the social, moral, magical, and religious life of savages which asceticism holds in that of more advanced peoples, but it is also noticeable that in certain instances, as where these austerities have the form of a self-discipline or are performed as part of the service of the gods, they approach very near to some aspects of asceticism. In savage life the precarious nature of existence, exposure, the struggle for food, the constant state

of warfare between different peoples, the ravages of diseases whose nature and cause are misunderstood, and many other things, are productive of much suffering and call for great endurance on the part of those whom they affect. More particularly women must undergo many austerities, whether as mothers, or as workers, or as suppliers of food; yet many of these are cheerfully undergone. Thus in carrying her child for miles on long journeys in great heat and often with little food, and in relieving its wants at the expense of her own comfort, the savage mother, in thus fulfilling her functions of motherhood, will willingly bear pain and discomfort. Nor are similar forms of austerity lacking, especially among the poor, even in our highest forms of civilization, where want, toil, and suffering must be undergone to satisfy the conditions of existence. The savage methods of punishment, the various forms of the ordeal, of revenge or recrimination, are usually of the most cruel and painful kind. But all such forms of austerity do not concern us here. Those alone are dealt with which are self-inflicted or which are willingly borne, for definite purposes, subserving now magical, now religious, now ethical ends.

Unwilling as the savage is to suffer pain, his theory of the universe constrains him to undergo it on many occasions in order to fit him better for the ends of life, or to make life more tolerable, or to please the gods or spirits by whom he believes himself to be surrounded. Such austerities, undergone at one time for magical purposes, frequently change their nature. Thus they may come to be regarded as possessing a disciplinary character, in which case they are hardly to be differentiated outwardly from the disciplinary exercises, often of the same kind, of a higher asceticism, though they may not possess the same ethical or religious content. Others, again, as time goes on, may assume a more or less symbolic character, their excessive severity being then much lessened. On the other hand, even where such earlier forms of austerity survive in higher forms of religion, their severity is often by no means decreased, although the motive may have become a nobler one. Examples of this will be found in the various forms of austerity discussed here. These are mainly austerities connected with a variety of initiatory ceremonies, flagellation, fasting, mutilations of the body, tatuing, and medical rites, while some notice must be taken of self-restraint among savage races.

Before passing on to these, we may notice that the universal custom of sacrifice, involving a greater or less renunciation of property and possessions, of food-stuffs, and not infrequently life itself, or, as a substitute for that, of some part of the body, is a marked form of austerity; and its equivalent in the higher ascetic life—the devotion to poverty, the willing renunciation of comfort and luxury for the sake of love to God—has surely received a considerable impulse from this wide-spread custom of ethnic religion, though by no means wholly derived from it. In other cases, which need not be more fully detailed here, life itself is sacrificed in suicide, often through pride or shame or a sense of duty (see A. Sutherland, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, London, 1898, ii. 35). Or, where it is thought that one ought to pass into the other world before the body and mind have become frail, decrepit, and worn out, life is often freely yielded up by the aged or the sick (see ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE). Though the custom may appear cruel and frequently is accomplished by cruel means, it is mostly a willing self-surrender of life that a higher life may be attained beyond the grave (see Letourneau, *Sociology*, London, 1893, 154 ff.; Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. i., London, 1906, p. 383 ff.).

2. Adolescence initiation ceremonies.—Among savage tribes the passing of a boy or girl to manhood or womanhood is usually accompanied by a number of ceremonies, several of which are most severe and painful, but must be undergone willingly in order to preserve their effect. This stage of life, being a highly critical one, the beginning of sexual existence properly so called, demands many safeguards, and, taken as a whole, the various ceremonies are intended to ward off or neutralize the evil influences incident to that period. Where a youth is concerned, there is the beginning of a new life which requires ceremonies of a purificatory kind, besides preparation for entrance upon a stage of new relations with the other sex. Hence there must be seclusion for a time, while the youth is usually debarred from intercourse of any kind with the other sex, and silence is frequently imposed. Fasting is also made use of, either in the sense of complete abstinence from food for a longer or shorter period, or abstinence from certain foods which are tabu at such a stage. This is intended to prevent the entrance of evil influences to the body with such foods, or to prepare the way for receiving them later on. Other ceremonies have the purpose of strengthening the youth for manhood; these are often of a severe character, and, joined with others which are intended to purify from the contagion of evil, easily pass over into tests of endurance. Some form of mutilation, more or less severe—the more severe forms being circumcision, loss of a tooth, or cutting of the flesh,—is frequent. In this case, perhaps, the primary intention is, by losing some part of the body, to secure the rest from evil influences; but it easily passes over into the idea of sacrifice, or some purificatory ceremony, or simply a test of endurance. Again, the youth at this period sometimes obtains a guardian spirit, whose nature is revealed to him in most cases by fasting in solitude, exposed to all the terrors which imagination and the sense of mystery may conjure up. This sense of mystery exciting fear is usually present at all these initiatory ceremonies, for now the youth is instructed not only in sexual matters but in such tribal lore—magical, religious, moral, or otherwise—as is confined to the men. Thus, though in different places the nature of the rites may vary, or their severity be greater or less, they call for the endurance of great austerities on the part of the youth. See art. INITIATION.

A few examples chosen from different localities will show the nature of the austerities undergone at this period. Among the northern tribes of Central Australia the long and complicated ceremonies of initiation to manhood include beating, which must not be resented, circumcision, sub-incision or cutting open the urethra, and biting the youth's scalp; while, as a rule, though fasting is not carried to an extreme, several foods are tabu. During the painful rites of circumcision and sub-incision the youth's mouth is gagged with 'fur-string' to prevent his crying out, while no attempt is made to spare him pain when his scalp is bitten, the object being to cause a plentiful growth of hair. With some of the tribes knocking out a tooth is part of the ceremony, with others it has no connexion with it (Spencer-Gillen[b], ch. i.). Among the Macquarrie tribes any exhibition of shrinking when the tooth is knocked out or the body scarified makes the youth unfit for manhood (Angas, *Savage Life*, London, 1847, ii. 224). With other tribes scourging is practised, and the young men must endure it silently (Ridley, *Kamilaroi and other Aust. Lang.*, Sydney, 1877, 154). With the Andamanese the initiatory period—for both youths and girls a period of fasting from several tabued foods—begins from the 11th to the 13th year, and lasts from one to five years, though sometimes a youth will extend the period in order to boast of his powers of endurance afterwards. It is said to be intended as a test of endurance or self-denial, but as various complicated ceremonies mark the first partaking of these foods at the time when tabu is raised from each, the intention probably goes further than this (Man, *JAI*, 1882, xii. 94, 129). In New Guinea the initiation of boys to the Malu cult is attended with great mystery and severity. They are not allowed to cut or dress the hair, to dance, feast, smoke, or behave in an unseemly way; they are beaten with clubs and severely wounded. These rites are said to have had a strong educative effect. Boys among the Cape York natives were secluded for a year, at the

end of this time a tooth was knocked out, and a year later a further test of endurance was applied (Haddon, *Head Hunters*, London, 1901, 50 ff., 191). Similarly in Mabuaig lads were tortured and chastised, and the tests increased with a refractory boy, who was speared, scraped, or beaten with the nests of green ants which stung him furiously (*ib.* 140). In many parts of Africa similar rites are found. Thus among the natives of the Bondei region the *galo* ceremonies include passing the boy through a narrow pit smeared with the juices of a plant which burn his skin, incision of tribal marks on the arm, and the performance of secret ceremonials in some of which he is severely handled, death occasionally resulting (Dale, *JAI*, 1895, xxv. 189 ff.).

But it was among the tribes of North America that such austerities at initiation were most severe, especially where they were connected with the choice of a *manitou*. Thus among the Californian tribes abstinence and indifference to hardship and privations were insisted upon, and before the youth could rank as a warrior his naked body was stung with nettles till he could not move, after which he was laid on the nest of a virulent species of ant, which, swarming over his body and stinging it, caused him fearful agony. To discover his *manitou* he was made to fast for three or four days, and was intoxicated and harassed until he confessed to seeing it. A figure of the *manitou* was then moulded and placed on his breast, where it was ignited so that the figure might be indelibly marked on the flesh (Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, London, 1875, i. 413 ff.). Among the New Mexicans the ordeal consisted in scarifying the skin till the blood ran, the candidate being expected to show no sign of pain (*ib.* i. 580). With the tribes of British Columbia boys were secluded at puberty and made to eat and drink very sparingly; in other cases they were made to bathe in all weathers, their naked bodies were whipped daily, they had to gash themselves with knives in the sweat-house, or lie out exposed to the elements all night. Prolonged fasts, bathings, forced vomitings, and other exhausting exercises for a longer or shorter period were among the means employed in solitude for obtaining mystic dreams and a knowledge of the *manitou* (Hill Tout, *JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 32, 316; 1905, xxxv. 143-144). Rigorous fasting was compulsory on boys and girls among the Algonquin tribes, and the longer the period of abstinence the greater the merit which accrued. During these fasts, which were common to practically all the American Indian tribes, the greatest attention was paid to dreams, for it was mainly through these that the revelation of the *manitou* came (Tanner, *Narrative*, New York, 1830, 288; Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes*, Philadelphia, 1857-1860, *passim*; Beverley, *Hist. of Virginia*, London, 1722, 177 ff.).

Similar austerities are found among the South American tribes. Thus, in Guiana, before the youth can marry he must endure the infliction of flesh-wounds, or he is sewn up in a hammock full of fire-ants, or undergoes other hardships (Im Thurn, *Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, 221). Among the ancient Peruvians, at fifteen or sixteen years, boys had to practise rigorous fasts until they were worn out, to watch for twelve nights in succession, to fight with each other at the risk of wounds, or death, to undergo flogging, and many other privations, before receiving the signs of their new position as men (Garc. de la Vega, *Comm. Real.*, Madrid, 1609, vi 35). So in ancient Mexico, before being introduced to the aristocratic warrior class, the youth, covered with rags, was shut up in different temples in succession, offering his blood to the divinity, watching and fasting for periods of four days and four nights (Lopez de Gomara, *Hist.*, Madrid, 1852, ii. 78). See § 8 (3).

In the case of girls, the arrival of puberty, in accordance with the universal theory of menstruation as containing an element of danger to the girl herself, but more especially to others, and even to nature itself, is marked by several painful ordeals. Among these the most common is the absolute seclusion of the girl for a longer or shorter period, so that no man may see her and that the sun may not shine on her. Fasting, excision, cuttings, and other barbarities are also commonly found at this period.

Girls in New Guinea, on the first signs of puberty, are shut up for three months and permitted only vegetable food (Haddon, *op. cit.* 135). In New Ireland they are confined for several years in the dark in small cages, and this custom is general over Melanesia (*JAI*, 1888, xviii. 284). Seclusion is also found among most African tribes, as among the Kafirs (MacLean, *Kaffir Laws and Customs*, Mount Coke, 1858, 101) and in Loango (Ploss, *Das Kind*, Leipzig, 1884, ii. 439). With the Bondei people the rite for girls, corresponding to the *galo* of the boys, lasts for twelve days. On the last day the girl fasts. During this period she is taught the *vihili*, or secrets, and this teaching is accompanied by severe and painful ordeals (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 193). The custom of seclusion is common among the N. American tribes, varying from a few days to a year or longer. Girls among the Ahts are hidden behind mats in the house, where they can see neither sun nor fire, and are allowed no food for several days (Sproat, *Savage Life*, London, 1868, 93 ff.). Among Alaskan tribes the girl was shut up in a cage with a small air-hole, or in a hut, where she remained on hands and knees. This treatment lasted for a year, and no communication with others or exercise of any kind was allowed (*GB*² iii. 211). Bancroft cites many instances among the tribes of the Pacific coast. Thus among the Isthmian tribes the girl was closely confined, sometimes for a period of two years (*NR* i. 772, cf. 82, 110, 197, 278). Among the Californian tribes she was laid over a hole previously heated, and kept without food for some days. Or she was buried up to the neck and the ground about her beaten till she perspired profusely (*ib.* 411). Among the Salish tribes of British Columbia, seclusion in a cubicle for ten days was the rule, the girl being allowed little food or water. With other Salish tribes she was secluded outside the settlement for a month under many food restrictions (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 32, 319). In other tribes she had to squat for some days in a hole made in the hut, while her seclusion lasted for a much longer period. She fasted entirely for four days, and afterwards abstained from all fresh meats (*ib.* xxxv. 136). In S. America these customs also flourished among most of the tribes, as in Brazil, where the girl's back was cut with a sharp tooth, after which she was bound and hung in a hammock, in which she remained without food or drink for three days. New gashes were then inflicted upon her, and she remained in the hammock under less strict rules of abstinence until the third month (Lafitau, *Mœurs des Sauvages Amér.*, Paris, 1724, i. 290 ff.). The Uaupes of Brazil also seclude the girl for a month on an abstemious diet. When released she receives several severe scourgings at intervals, death sometimes ensuing as the result (Wallace, *Amazon*, London, 1895, 345). In Guiana the hammock seclusion lasted for a month, after which the girl's naked body was exposed to the bites of venomous ants (Labat, *Voy. en Guinée*, Amsterdam, 1731, iv. 365).

Similar instances might be cited, occurring among more advanced races, *e.g.* the Hindus, though with less severity. Here it may also be noted that, on account of similar beliefs regarding the danger and impurity of menstruation, women, among most savage tribes, must go into seclusion, often at some distance from the village, abstain from certain foods, or fast (see Stoll, *Geschlechtsleben in der Volkerpsychologie*, Leipzig, 1908, 835 ff.; *NR* i. 549; *JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 323, *GB*² iii. 222 ff.). This is also found at higher levels of civilization (cf. Lv 15[19ff.]; Avesta, *Vendîdâd*, xvi.) Similarly, women, being tabu among many peoples at pregnancy on account of the danger arising from this critical period of their life, have frequently to go into entire seclusion, or are in some way separated from others, and must abstain from certain kinds of food (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, 9, 167, 200, 417; *NR* i. 413, 734; *JAI*, 1882, xii. 354). See also §§ 6 (*b*), 8 (5).

3. **Admission to secret societies** or 'mysteries' at opening manhood or womanhood was, in many cases, also characterized by severe austerities, which, though no doubt intended as a preparation for the revelation of secret knowledge, myths, or ritual, can hardly be separated in their origin from the pains undergone at puberty, while in some cases they seem to have been intended also as puberty ceremonies. Yet, in so far as these and certain ordinary initiatory ceremonies pave the way for the communication of religious and, occasionally, moral teaching, we see such forms of austerity almost passing over to a kind of disciplinary asceticism, and certainly possessing the primitive meaning of ἄσκησις as 'training.' In Australian mysteries, for example, the advice given by the old men was intended to 'soften the heart,' and, as among the Kurnai, the stomachs of the boys were kneaded to drive out selfishness and greed (*JAI*, 1883, xiii. 296; 1884, xiv. 313), while unselfishness is taught in the Yao mysteries, a selfish person being called 'uninitiated' (Macdonald, *Africana*, London, 1882, i. 130; cf. the moral teaching given by headmen to boys at circumcision and initiation during the painful rites attendant thereon among the Mavendas of S. Africa, *JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 268). Further, in many of these mysteries, the initiation to which lasts for a long period of time, the candidate is supposed to die and come to life again as a new being. Although this idea may not have the intention of ascetic renunciation—*Stirb und werde*—yet in it and in the moral training for the attainment of 'selflessness,' so far as a savage can grasp the idea, we see a connexion with the later ascetic ideals.

In Africa, examples of such initiations are numerous. Among others may be cited those of the west coast, in which the youths are taken by their instructors into the depth of the forest, where they are subjected to a severe course of training during a year; they are naked and smeared with clay (M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, London, 1897, 531). In the Mwetyi society of the Shekani tribes—a woman's society—the initiation lasts for two weeks, and is accompanied by severe ordeals and fasting, while the girls must gaze at the sun until they fall back in a swoon. Most of the ordeals are intentionally hard, so that the wills of the candidates may be broken and secrecy ensured (Nassau,

Fetichism in W. Africa, London, 1904, 249). With candidates for the Malanda society among the Batangas the sun-gazing ordeal is applied to the lads; then, while everything is done to augment their sense of awe and mystery, they are confined in a hut for twenty days along with a corpse, and beaten severely with rods until they are submissive (*ib.* 322). In Melanesia entrance to such societies is possible only after a severe initiation, including hardships and tortures. In other cases the candidates are stung with leaves of the nettle-tree, made to fast and to take live embers in their hands, and are trodden upon, or, as in the Welu society, they are each placed in a hole in the ground and burning fronds of the coco-nut palm are thrown on their backs, yet they must not utter a cry (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, London, 1891, 82, 87, 88). In these and many similar initiation rites the youths are daubed with clay, charcoal, mud, or filth, which must not be washed off till the ordeal is at an end; this rite may signify the putting away of the old life, as it did in certain Greek mysteries (Lang, *Custom and Myth*, London, 1884, 40; *JAI*, 1889, xix. 261; Demosthenes, *de Corona*, 313). Here, too, may be noted the initiatory customs used in the Eleusinian and other Greek mysteries, in which, besides other tests, the candidates had to prepare themselves by fasting for several days; the similar fasting before initiation to the cult of Osiris and Isis in Egypt; and the various tests of endurance undergone by candidates for initiation to Mithraism (see artt. MYSTERIES, MITHRA, SECRET SOCIETIES, and Apul. *Metam.* xi.).

4. **Initiation to the priesthood.**—As in savage societies the priest, sorcerer, or medicine-man has a commanding station and exercises so much influence by virtue of his relation to the spiritual world, it is natural that those who seek to enter upon that profession should be subjected to a severe course of training, involving many austerities. And as the communications of the medicine-man with the other world are usually associated with a state of trance, or his revelations are given in some ecstatic condition, the candidate's course of training is intended to adapt him for the production of these states either by reducing him to an abnormal condition of body and mind, or by accustoming him to the use of such severe methods as will readily produce them. The phenomena of hysteria, epilepsy, catalepsy, and such-like diseases are believed by savages, and indeed by many peoples at a higher grade, to denote possession or inspiration by gods, spirits, or demons. Hence such persons as are subject to them are often deliberately chosen for the profession of medicine-man, while their abnormal states are only heightened by the austerities undergone. In other cases, in accordance with the prevailing theory of the nature of inspiration and of the state into which the inspired person is thrown, the production of such states at will is the object of the painful processes to which the candidate must submit. The course of training includes solitude, exposure to the elements, scarifying the body, castigation, fasting, and drinking various unwholesome beverages. By all these means the candidate soon arrives at a hysterical or abnormal state. He acquires the faculty of seeing visions, of producing a convulsionary state of body, or of falling into a trance. A few examples of the method of training will suffice to show its severity and the painful nature of the austerities undergone (see also artt. MEDICINE-MAN and PRIEST).

In Greenland the preparation for the profession of *angakok* begins at an early age, and includes retirement into solitary places and a severe course of fasting. By these methods trances are produced in which the novice obtains a *tornak*, or guardian spirit, or falls into fits in which his ravings are held to be communications from the spirits (Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, London, 1875, 58; Cranz, *Grönland*, Leipzig, 1770, 268). Among the American Indians similar methods are adopted: protracted fasts, severe bodily exercises, and solitary vigils all reduce the candidate to a hysterical state, in which he dreams or has revelations; and the greater his austerities the more vivid and copious are his visions, and hence the higher is the estimation in which he is held (*JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 26; Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes, passim*). Among the Isthmian tribes, youths are chosen for their natural aptitude to the office of *piaces*, or sorcerers, and are confined in a solitary place, subjected to a severe discipline for two years, fasting from all flesh meat and living only on a scanty diet of vegetables and water; while all sexual intercourse is prohibited (*NR* i. 777). In S. America we find similar methods employed. Among the Abipones the aspirants had to remain seated on the branches of a tree and to fast for several days. By this means they contracted 'a weakness of brain, a giddiness, and kind of delirium, which makes them imagine that they are gifted with superior wisdom, and give themselves out for magicians' (Dobrizhoffer, *Abipones*, London, 1822, ii. 68). Training for the office of *peaiman* in Guiana involves a painful and severe trial of endurance. The candidate fasts for protracted periods, wanders alone in the forest, and accustoms himself to drinking large draughts of tobacco-juice mixed with water. The terrors of solitude and the drinking of the nicotine produce intense delirium, in which he holds converse with spirits. Epileptic subjects are preferred for the office (Im Thurn, 334).

In Africa, among the Zulus, those who wish to become diviners have to acquire the power of intercourse with the spirits in states of coma or ecstasy by solitude, prolonged fastings, and flagellation, until they become a 'house of dreams' (Callaway, *Rel. of Amazulu*, London, 1884, 387; Grout, *Zulu-Land*, London, 1865, 158). Among the Bondeis the youth who aspires to be a doctor must submit to be scarified all over his body (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 213). The *manangs*, or medicine-men, among the Sea Dayaks must prove their call to the office by prolonged fasting, and by ecstatic states and trances in which they foam at the mouth (Ling Roth, *Natives of Sarawak*, London, 1896, i. 266). And among the Todas, the *palal*, or priest, at his initiation must remain naked for three days and two nights, whether the weather is hot or freezing, and eat only a little porridge at night (Reclus, *Primitive Folk*, London, 1891, 221).

For similar trials among American tribes before appointment to the office of chief, etc., including fasting, flagellation, stinging with ants, see Letourneau, *Sociology*, 473; Biet, *Voy. en l'Isle de Cayenne*, Paris, 1664, iii. 10.

In these and hundreds of similar cases the discipline may be more or less severe, and its period longer or shorter, but the intention in all is the same. Not only so, but in future the medicine-man, or shaman, previous to communicating with the spirits, giving oracles, healing, and the like, must produce the abnormal state by these painful processes, which will, of course, be more or less extensive according as he readily passes over into that state or not. Frequently it is spontaneously produced, either because the shaman is a hysterical subject or on account of the training he has undergone; but generally it is artificially produced by fasting, by wild dances and screams, by contortions of the body, by flagellation, by cutting the flesh, or by swallowing various narcotics and herbs (cf. Parish, *Hallucinations*, London, 1897, 40). The result is a trance, a nervous seizure, frenzied movements, foaming at the mouth, and raving utterances. Similar results followed the hysterical excitement which attacked whole communities in the Middle Ages, and which was often produced by such artificial means, especially convulsive movements and dancing. They are seen again in the American Indian ghost-dances, in which, following convulsive gyrations, trance and catalepsy are induced, or in the indifference to pain and wounds among Muhammadan dervishes in consequence of ecstasy produced by similar movements (Tuckey, *Psycho-Therapeutics*[3], London, 1891, 12; Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, London, 1902, ii. 161; Myers, *Human Personality*, London, 1903, ii. 190; and *Proc. Psych. Research Soc.* 1885, p. 31).

5. **Flagellation.** — As has been said above, scourging or beating is a frequent practice at the various forms of initiation. A wider view of this rite among savages and as a folk-survival leaves little doubt as to its original purpose. The scourging is intended to drive away the contagion of evil, and the malignant presence of demoniacal powers. The pain is inflicted less as a means of hurting the victim than of making these evil influences suffer, or of frightening them so that they will depart. This is especially noticeable where the scourging is done not with rods, but with branches or plants which are supposed to possess magical virtues; in such cases it is not always necessarily painful. It may, however, be made painful where the plant has poisonous juices or is of a stinging variety. But its original intention soon passes over into that of simply inflicting pain or undergoing voluntary suffering, either by way of hardening or as a means of self-discipline with a definitely religious or moral end. Here it becomes a true ascetic

austerity, but it may also be a pathological form of asceticism. Or, again, it may be used as an erotic stimulation, though here it assumes a pathological form as subserving genesic excitability. In other cases its religious disciplinary use is conjoined with some pathological erotic purpose, as in the case of Brother Cornelius and his penitents, or of Père Girard (Cooper, *Hist. of the Rod*, London, 1870, 122 ff.; Zockler, *Askese und Monchtum*[2], 609). The pain caused by flagellation, again, made it an obvious and well-nigh universal form of punishment. With this and its previous use we are not concerned here. Finally, it remains to notice how, while subserving its primitive purpose or used simply as a means of producing pain, it may be regarded as a form of sacrifice to gods who will that their worshippers should suffer, or it may pass as a substitute for an offering of the person himself as a human sacrifice. Most of these purposes are also served by using instead of a scourge some stinging plant or some substance causing pain to the tissues when applied to the body, as has been seen in several cases of initiation rites.

The primitive purpose of flagellation is seen in the fact that those animals or men on whom the evils of a community were laid (scape-goat), and who were driven away or slain, had probably in the first instance been regarded as representatives of a spirit of vegetation who was slain. They were frequently scourged, and the scourging had the effect of driving off 'any malignant influence by which at the supreme moment they might conceivably be beset' (*GB*[2] iii. 128). When they were regarded simply as scapegoats, the scourging became a means of causing pain. Instances of this use of flagellation to drive away evil are found in many places. When a king was installed in the Sandwich Islands, the priest struck him on the back with a sacred branch, in order to purify him from defilement (Ellis, *Polynes. Researches*, London, 1829, iii. 110). Brazilian Indians scourge themselves on the genital organs with a certain plant at the time of the new moon (Nery, *Folk-lore brésilien*, Paris, 1889, 253). Sometimes the scourging is done on a substitute, as in New Caledonia, where, when a chief is ill, a girl is severely whipped to drive away the evil (Featherman, *Soc. Hist. of Races of Mankind*, London, 1891, ii. 92). Or it may be mutually inflicted, as in Peru at an autumn festival, where the people beat each other with torches, saying, 'Let all harm go away' (Acosta, *Hist. of the Indies*, Hakl. Soc. 1880, ii. 375). Similar practices still survive in folk-custom (*GB*[2] iii. 131 ff.).

With the same object of driving out the demon of disease which has entered into a patient's body, in accordance with the universal primitive view of the cause of sickness, flagellation is resorted to in savage medicine, the patient often undergoing great suffering through this cure. Thus among the Californian Indians, in cases of paralysis, the affected parts are whipped with nettles (*NR* i. 419). Among the Ainus beating with herbs to drive out the demons of sickness is part of the healer's method (Batchelor, *Ainus and their Folklore*, London, 1901, 313). In Timor-Laut, if a smallpox *prao* should be stranded on the coast, the people are beaten with branches, which are then put on the *prao* before it is launched away again, and the demon of smallpox is besought to depart (*GB*[2] iii. 98, citing Riedel). Women suffering from demoniacal possession in Burma are thrashed with a stick, the demon alone being supposed to feel the blows (Bastian, *Östl. Asien*, Jena, 1866–71, ii. 152). These methods survived into later medicine, especially in the case of madness, though here the curative virtue was evidently supposed to lie in the rough treatment to which the patient was subjected (Cooper, *op. cit.* 204).

The magical value of flagellation is seen in the flogging of women with thongs cut from the skins of the sacrificial goats by the Luperci at the Lupercalia in Rome. This act, communicating to them magically the beneficent influence of divinity, was believed to render them prolific (Ovid, *Fasti*, ii. 267 ff.). Although the numerous cases of scourging or stinging at initiation frequently have the primitive purpose here discovered, they are sometimes expressly said to be done with the view of causing pain or testing endurance. Thus, among the Bavendas, after circumcision, the youths, stripped naked, are beaten and suffer other hardships by exposure to the intense night cold, in order to harden them (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 252). Among other Bechuana tribes, after circumcision the youths are scourged at intervals with great severity, and it is a point of honour that they should show absolute impassibility even though the blood spouts from their backs, and the whip leaves life-long scars. At the same time they are allowed no flesh meat but what they can themselves obtain, and are subjected to the endurance of cold and hunger (Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, London, 1857, 146 ff.; *JAI*, 1889, xix. 268 ff.).

The primitive view of scourging has here, as in other cases, been superseded by a later conception of it as a painful test of endurance. At this point the cruel flogging of youths at Sparta in connexion with the cult of Artemis—the blood from the wounds caused by the whip being shed on the altar—can scarcely be viewed in any other light than that of a survival of earlier rites of initiation, especially as the Spartan youths, like the Bechuanas, were allowed no food save what they could discover for themselves. The flogging was done in presence of their parents, who encouraged them to show no sign of suffering; and so severe was it that the youths sometimes died. Various mythical explanations of this flogging were current, but it was generally regarded as a substitute for human sacrifice ordained by Lycurgus (Paus. iii. 16; Lucian, *Anacharsis*). But in the light of similar customs elsewhere, the origin must be sought in old initiation rites of a savage past, remains of which, like the 'bull-roarer' (ῥόμβος) and daubing with mud, were also found in the Greek mysteries. Similar scourgings took place elsewhere in Greece (Potter, *Antiq. of Greece*, Edinburgh, 1824, i. 258); and among the Thracians, according to Artemidorus, flagellation in honour of their Artemis was also practised.

Such tests of endurance by flagellation enter sometimes into festival dances, as among the Arawaks, where the men armed with whips lashed each other alternately until they were covered with bleeding wounds, yet the pain was 'borne and inflicted with perfect good temper' (Im Thurn, 326; cf. a striking match, resulting often in death, among the Mosquito Indians, *NR* i. 735). Probably this is to be connected with a group of rites in which blows, effusion of blood, etc., are intended to promote fertility (see § 8 (*b*)). For the discipline of self-flagellation in the Christian Church, see artt. ASCETICISM, FLAGELLANTS; Zockler, *op. cit.* 458, 528 ff.; Cooper, *op. cit.* Beginning as an act of monastic asceticism in the 11th cent., it assumed a pathological form with the later orders of Flagellants (especially during the ravages of the Black Death), who regarded it as more efficacious than the sacraments.

Flagellation as a sacrifice or as a substitute for sacrifice has already appeared in the case of the Spartan youths. Perhaps the mutual flagellation of the Galli at the spring festival at Hierapolis, accompanied as it was by self-cuttings (Lucian,

de Dea Syria, 50), and the flagellation of the Egyptians at Busiris during the festival of Isis (Herod. ii. 61, 'for whom they beat themselves it would be impious for me to divulge'), also had this character. An analogous instance may be found in the custom of the Indians of Guiana who rub red pepper into their eyes when approaching any place haunted by spirits, in order that the latter may not see them. But it is probably in its intention a sacrificial act—the suffering endured being intended to placate the spirits (Im Thurn, 368). See art. FLAGELLANTS.

6. Fasting.—Fasting as a form of austerity enters largely into savage life. Hunger is one of the most pressing trials of the savage, although he can go for long periods with little food, like the Bushman observed to live for fifteen days on water and salt (Thompson, *Trav. in S. Africa*, London, 1827, 99). Sometimes, too, the savage will undergo fasting as a purely unselfish act, giving his food to his starving children or sharing his scanty supply with his fellows, who, when it is exhausted, starve to death with him (Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, London, 1893, 103, 115). Frequent periods of abstinence, especially in regions where the food supply is scarce, are forced upon him. We are here concerned, however, with voluntary fasts rather than with those imposed upon savage man. Although he regards fasting quite differently from the civilized ascetic, and probably has no strong wish to suffer the pangs of hunger, yet voluntary fasting is forced upon him for different reasons.

The origin of fasting is complex, but on the whole it seems to have been adopted at first for magical reasons. Man's experience of hunger in times of scarcity may have suggested to him that to fast voluntarily might guarantee him against scarcity, and also have the effect of increasing the food supply. Thus at the Intichiuma ceremonies of Central Australian tribes, which have for their purpose the increase of the totem food supply, fasting is a part of the rite (Spencer-Gillen[b], 290). On more purely religious grounds an analogy is found where the sacrifice of one person wards off danger menacing a whole group. Fasting is also intimately connected with the system of food tabus. In some cases these may arise from the selfishness of stronger members of a human group, who forbid others to touch certain foods sacred to themselves, or again from the wise practice of establishing a 'close' time when certain foods are likely to become scarce, as in Polynesia, where, if a bad harvest is feared, a tabu is placed on bananas, hens, etc., to establish a reserve (Letourneau, *Sociology*, 489). But they often arose out of man's peculiar views regarding the contagion of evil influences which might be warded off by, so to say, sacrificing a part in lieu of the whole. Food was eminently a vehicle for evil influences entering the body, hence by the tabuing of some particular food other foods would be rendered harmless. Tabu is also connected with totemism, where some particular animal or plant species is not eaten by those whose totem it is. But it also has a much wider range, and affects foods which may not be eaten at certain periods of life, *e.g.* before a youth is initiated, before marriage, during pregnancy, at the time of the couvade, during hunting or war. In this aspect fasting from the tabued food also acts as a kind of purification. Fasting in all such cases includes such varieties as abstinence from certain foods, or from meat, or from food with which women have had to do (sexual tabu), or from all food for a varying period. In certain cases kings or priests might not eat certain foods for tabu and other magical reasons, such as their being recognized as incarnate divinity, which often occurs. Frequently, too, women might not eat men's food, and *vice versa* (see Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 172, etc.; cf. an instance cited by Im Thurn, 256, where the Indians would have starved rather than resort to cooking some cassava roots, because cooking was woman's work).

Whatever be the reason for a food-tabu, it argues considerable self-restraint, akin to the restraint which desires to discipline the body through fasting among peoples of a higher culture. To break such a tabu is universally considered the greatest crime, to be visited by severe punishment or by automatic results—sickness or death. Many instances are known where a savage would rather starve to death than eat some tabued food though that alone was available, and though all risk of detection by fellow-clansmen was out of the question. Again, since during periods of fasting as the result of famine, morbid conditions of psychic life are induced, with dreams and visions, fasting is in turn resorted to in order to produce these, as has already been seen (§ 4). Finally, since it is believed that the gods are pleased with suffering, fasting becomes a painful service rendered to them, or, again, it is used as a penitential discipline. This occurs in many barbaric cults at a higher stage than mere savagery, and in the later usage fasting speedily becomes an ascetic exercise (see art. FASTING).

(*a*) Fasting before marriage has mainly a magical aspect, and is doubtless intended as one means out of many of lessening the dangers supposed to attend this critical stage of sexual life, while it avoids the possibility of evil influences entering the body through food. The following typical examples will suffice. Among the Macusis the man must abstain from meat for some time before marriage, and will rather go without food altogether upon occasion than break this tabu (Im Thurn, 222). The newly-married pair among the Wa-teetas are shut up for three days without food, and among the Bondeis they eat nothing and only wash out their mouths with water on the day of the wedding (Thompson, *Travels in S. Africa*, London, 1827, 343; *JAI*, 1895, xxv. 199). Similarly with the Thlinkets, bride and bridegroom must fast for two days, then eat a little food, and again fast for two days (*NR* i. 111).

(*b*) The custom of a woman's abstaining from certain foods or fasting before the birth of a child, in which abstinence the husband frequently joins her, is intimately associated with and has the same *rationale* as the husband's fasting during the period of the couvade in which he lies in instead of his wife. The reason for the practice of fasting here is the intimate connexion between parents and child which is emphasized at such a time, so that they must abstain from all such foods as might injure the child through eating them. Thus in the Andaman Islands the mother abstains from pork, turtle, honey, iguana, and paradoxurus, and after a time her husband avoids the two last, 'in the belief that the embryo would suffer were he to indulge in such food' (*JAI*, 1882, xii. 354). Among the Californian Indians the mother fasted for three days after the birth, drinking nothing but warm water. This formed part of a ceremony of purification, and for two moons she was allowed no meat (*NR* i. 413). Where the couvade is concerned, the husband usually abstains for some weeks from all flesh food and lives on a very abstemious diet, and such customs are widely prevalent among most savage peoples (see art. COUVADE, and Lubbock, *Origin of Civilization*, London, 1870, 16 ff.).

(*c*) In many cases where fasting occurs at initiation, we almost see it passing over from its magical intention of the avoidance of evil influences and of a preparation for the reception of new food to an act of religious preparation for the divine and ethical revelations about to be made to the lad. A similar transition to a more religious view of fasting is seen in other cases. Among many peoples when the harvest, whether of corn, yams, bananas, etc., has been gathered in, no one may eat of it until the first fruits have been offered to a divinity or partaken of by a priest, chief, or king, and in some cases a fast of several days' duration takes place. This, though it is primarily a preparation for the reception of new food, is also part of a group of purificatory rites, while it has also a religious element. Thus, among the Creek Indians, part of the elaborate ceremonies included a strict fast for two nights and one day, while a bitter decoction was drunk in order 'to purge their sinful bodies.' This was followed by a sacramental eating of the new crops (Adair, *Hist. of the Amer. Ind.*, London, 1775, 96 ff.). A similar solemn fast took place among the Natchez for three days along with the observance of silence at the Fire Festival, when the maize was offered on the altar of the Sun; and was also observed among the Cherokees by the warriors, who at the same time abstained from sexual intercourse (Chateaubriand, *Voyage en Amérique*, Paris, 1835, 130 ff.; Featherman, *op. cit.* iii. 157). The Comanches had yearly gatherings to light the sacred fires, when they took 'medicine' for purification and fasted for seven days. Those who could endure to keep the fast unbroken became sacred in the eyes of the others (Palmer,

Harper's Magazine, 1889, xvii. 451). Again, where foods are tabu, either through totem restrictions or for some other reason, abstinence from them is frequently regarded as an honour done to the totem animal or to a divinity who would resent any breach of the rule, or it has the nature of a sacrificial act of self-denial. Thus among the Samoans, Fijians, and others, certain animals, which were probably earlier totems, were believed to be incarnate gods or sacred to particular deities, and each man had some particular animal species, which he would under no circumstances eat (Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, 112; Williams, *Fiji*, Lond. 1858, i. 219). Or among the Andaman Islanders at certain seasons a number of foods are abstained from because the god Puluga requires them at those times (*JAI* xii. 154). Or, as among various West African tribes, certain prohibited foods, or *orunda*, which a man will not eat even when suffering from hunger, are 'literally a sacrifice ordained for the child by its parents and the magic doctor as a gift to the governing spirit of his life,' and to eat of it would be a sin at once punished by the spirit and requiring atonement by expensive ceremonies and gifts (Nassau, *op. cit.* 78; M. H. Kingsley, *Travels*, 456), or they are not eaten because they are dedicated by man to the use of his attendant spirit (Dennett, *Folk-lore of the Fjort*, London, 1898, xxix.). Abstinence in all such cases is a religious rather than a magical act.

(*d*) Fasting to induce visions in which the spirits or divinities reveal themselves has already been noticed, but a few further instances will serve to show the austere character of the act. The Algonquins would fast six or seven days, 'till both their bodies and their minds became free and light, which prepared them to dream' (Tylor, ii. 411–412). Chiefs among the Columbians in times of perplexity practise both fasting and laceration (*NR* i. 203). In general, the American Indian fasted before any undertaking in order to receive direction in his dreams. Among the Caribs a father fasted for a long period in order to see in a vision the destiny of his newly-born son (Muller, *Amer. Urrel.* Basel, 1855, 214). Similar fasts were customary in Greece among the priests and priestesses of oracular shrines, in order to obtain visions (Paus. i. 24); and in India fasting is a recognized mode of obtaining intercourse with the gods (Meiners, *Gesch. der Relig.*, Hanover, 1806–1807, ii. 147). The visions and revelations obtained by Christian saints and ascetics are in some degree due to similar austerities.

(*e*) From the use of abstinence and fasting as a general religious act to its use as a species of sacrifice by which the gods are appeased, or as a penitential discipline, the step is not a long one. Instances of such uses are found mainly among barbaric and civilized peoples, though not unknown among savages; while fasting, either as a means of purification, or as a penitential discipline, or as a preparation for mystical illumination, rapidly became part of the practice of the Christian Church. Penance, including fasting, self-torture, and confession of evil, is found among many tribes of the American Indian stock, but among the ancient Mexicans it had an especially prominent place. Some fasts of a rigorous kind lasted from three to five days; others, probably less rigorous, from twenty to 160 days. These were binding upon either individuals or the whole people, were intended both as purifications and as penances, and, in the latter form, were accompanied by other extreme forms of self-discipline for sins committed. Such were generally imposed by the priests (Clavigero, *Hist Mex.*, London, 1787, i. 353, 397 ff.). Fasts of a similar character and intention were also common in Peru. In Babylonia and Assyria fasting had also a systematic form, either for the whole people in times of danger (cf. Jon 3[5]), or for individuals as part of the penitential discipline with which men approached the gods seeking forgiveness, as is seen in the penitential psalms, *e.g.* 'Food I have not eaten, weeping is my nourishment' (Jastrow, *Rel. of Bab.*, Lond. 1898, 332; Sayce, *Rel. of Anc. Egypt and Bab.*, Edin. 1902, 418, 477). The more primitive savage custom of appealing to the gods through the pain borne by their worshippers is seen in a Fijian custom. A priest, after unsuccessfully supplicating his god for rain, slept for several successive nights exposed on the top of a rock without mat or pillow, hoping thus to move the obdurate deity to send a shower (Williams, i. 232).

In certain cases men fast until some act of revenge is performed, as in Fiji, where, to indicate sworn revenge, a man would deprive himself of favourite or necessary food (Williams, i. 129). Compare the curious Celtic custom of 'fasting against' a person (see ASCETICISM [Celtic]). This was a legal process in Ireland, by which any one who desired a stronger person to yield to his plaint sat fasting at his door until he yielded (*Ancient Laws of Ireland*, Dublin, 1869–79, i. 112 ff., ii. 46; Joyce, *Social Hist. of Ancient Ireland*, Lond. 1903, i. 204–207).

7. Mourning ceremonies.—Here again universally in savage and barbaric life the death of a relative or of some chief or great warrior, etc., involves the practice of many austerities, varying in degree, among the survivors. The motive of these is complex; and, though all may be regarded as different ways of showing grief, it seems certain that they did not all originate from that ground. Among mourning ceremonies of a simpler and less painful class may be enumerated wailing, wearing old or unusual clothes, the rejection of ornaments, rubbing charcoal, clay, and other substances on the body, shaving the hair or allowing it to grow unusually long, the discarding of pleasant food or of customary unguents, sleeping on the grave or in the open air (cf. Nassau, 10; Williams, *Fiji*, London, 1858, i. 4; M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, 483, 487; Haddon, *Head Hunters*, 206; *JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 417). But others of a much more severe character are also extremely common, *e.g.* gashing or cutting the body, amputating a finger, and fasting.

(1) The origin of gashing or cutting the body may be found simply in an ecstatic expression of grief, at first spontaneous, then reduced to a custom. The pain caused by such methods of wounding, though in the ecstasy and delirium of grief it may be less than we imagine (Beckworth says of the horrible gashings of the Crow Indians that 'they seemed to feel no pain,' *14 RBEW*, p. 898), is itself an expression of sorrow. But other meanings were perhaps given to these self-inflicted wounds. Thus there may have been some idea of union with the dead through the blood spilt on the grave, as in N. S. Wales, where the men stood over it and cut each other with their boomerangs, letting the blood trickle down into it (cf. W. R. Smith, 305). This bond of union with the dead implies 'on the one side submission, on the other friendliness' (Spencer, *Cerem. Inst.*, London, 1879, 70). Or, again, the blood may be an offering to the dead in order to refresh them (*ib.*; cf. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, i. 476). In either case the rite would have a propitiatory aspect. It is found among the Australians, Melanesians, Polynesians, in Africa and America, and it existed in ancient Israel (Lv 19[28]), among the Greeks, Turks, Huns, etc. (cf. Stoll, *op. cit.* 88 ff.; Spencer, *op. cit.* 70–71), and with some of these peoples assumed a ghastly form, while it was frequently proportionate to the rank of the dead person. The wounds included lacerating or cutting the arms, breasts, or legs, piercing them, slitting the ear lobes, wounding the head, etc. Thus the Crow Indians made two cuts down the length of the arm, tearing away the skin, or cut the flesh on the breast and shoulders (*BE*, *loc. cit.*); the Tongans cut and bruised themselves with shark's teeth, shells, axes, clubs, and knives (Mariner, *Tonga Islands*, London, 1817, i. 380, 403); the Spartans tore the flesh from their foreheads with pins and needles to gratify the ghosts of the dead (Potter, *op. cit.* ii. 204). The descriptions of mourning ceremonies among all savage tribes supply copious instances of the severity of these lacerations.

(2) The mutilation of some member of the body, usually a finger, occasionally an ear, is also found as a common sign of grief at mourning ceremonies. Spencer regards this as an act of sacrificial propitiation of the dead and a sign of submission (*op. cit.* 56), and it certainly has the significance of a propitiation of divinities or spirits, *e.g.* in cases of illness, etc. (see § 8, 2). In some cases it may be regarded as a substitute for human sacrifice, giving a part in place of the whole, as when a widow has her finger chopped off in the Nicobar Islands, evidently in place of being slain at her husband's grave (Tylor, ii. 363). But it might readily become a formal expression of grief, as in Fiji, where, on the death of a chief, orders were given that a hundred fingers should be cut off (Williams, i. 197). Yet even in Fiji a child's finger was cut off as a sign of affection for a dead father (*ib.* i. 177). Usually a joint or the whole of the little finger is cut off, though another finger may be removed later when this is lacking. This painful custom is found among some Australian tribes, in Tonga and Fiji, among various N. and S. American Indian tribes, among the Hottentots

when a widow re-marries, and occasionally with Chinese widows as a sign that they will not re-marry (Stoll, *op. cit.* 274 ff.; Spencer, *op. cit.* 55 ff.; Kolb, *Caput Bonæ Spei*, Nuremberg, 1719, 572; Giles, *China and the Chinese*, London, 1879, 202).

(3) The custom of fasting is here met with once more as a natural expression of mourning, often of a severe and prolonged character. The Fijians fasted for a dead chief for ten or twenty days (Williams, i. 197). Some of the Salish tribes of British Columbia fast for four days after a death, while a widow must not eat fresh meat for a year, a widower for a shorter period (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 138–9). The Andamanese must abstain from certain favourite foods, and here relations are often joined in this custom by other members of the tribe as a token of sympathy (*JAI*, 1882, xii. 142, 146). The Japanese partake only of a spare vegetable diet during the period of mourning, while in Korea the mourners drink rice water for some days, and then are allowed to partake of gruel for the rest of the time (*JAI* xii. 225, xxv. 359).

(4) Finally, though the custom of a wife's being slain at her husband's death may have become a mere customary rite, and though its origin may be sought in sacrificial ideas and in the belief that she must accompany him beyond the grave, it is frequently found as an extreme act of austere devotion, the wife devoting herself to death out of affection. Instances of this are found in Fiji (Williams, i. 189), where wives were frequently sacrificed at their own instance; in India, where a wife lit the pyre with her own hands; in China, where wives will take their own lives to follow their husbands into the next world (de Groot, *Rel System of China*, Leyden, 1894, ii. 1. 735 ff.); among the ancient Greeks, with whom historic instances of this suicidal devotion are recorded (Euripides, *Supp.* 1000 ff.; Paus. iv. 2. 7); and among the ancient Celts (Leahy, *Heroic Romances of Ireland*, London, 1905, i. 105; cf. Cæsar, vi. 19, slaves and clients beloved by the dead; Mela, iii. 2. 19; see artt. SATI and MOURNING).

8. Mutilations.—A great variety of ethnic mutilations involving a considerable degree of pain may be classed among austerities. Each one of these may have a different origin or intention, some may be mere customary or symbolic followings of archaic rites, but this makes no difference in the degree of suffering which is borne or in the stoical patience with which it is endured (see art. MUTILATIONS).

(1) The custom of *cutting the body* and using the blood for some specific purpose is widely extended, and has already been met with as a mourning ceremony.

(*a*) It is found as part of the ceremonies of initiation in various quarters. Thus in North Central Australia the final ceremony among several of the tribes consists of making a series of cuts on the back and one on the neck of the candidate. These are said to commemorate certain events in the *Alcheringa*, or mythical period (Spencer and Gillen[b], 335). A similar rite is found among S. Australian tribes (Schürmann, in *Nat. Tribes of S.A.*, Adelaide, 1879, 231 ff.). Scars are also made on the face and body at puberty among the Ba-Mbalas (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 402) and elsewhere in Africa (Burton, *Abeokuta*, London, 1863, i. 104; Denham, *Travels in Africa*, London, 1828, iii. 175: 'the process is said to be extremely painful on account of the heat and flies'). These appear to be of the nature of totem or tribal marks. Among the Abipones the marks were made with thorns, and ashes were rubbed into the wounds—a species of tatuing (Dobrizhofler, ii. 36 ff.).

(*b*) Cutting or gashing the body in order to obtain blood, usually for magical purposes or for use in various ceremonies, is found all over Australia. Thus among the Dieri two men are bled with a sharp flint, and the blood is allowed to flow on others of the tribe. The ceremony was intended to produce rain, the blood representing rain (Gason, in *Nat. Tribes of S. Aust.* 276). Among the Wiradthuri tribes, at initiation rites men wounded their gums or the flesh under their tongues with sharp pieces of bone, and allowed the blood to fall on the seat used in the ceremony; and among the Kamilaroi, at the *bora*, quantities of blood were collected from gashes made in men's arms with flint or shell (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 301, 325). Among the Central Australian tribes 'it is astonishing what an enormous amount of blood is used for decorative purposes by these savages, one of whom will think nothing of bleeding himself perhaps twice a day for a week or two in succession.' Here it is also drawn from gashes in the body for a variety of other purposes—to seal a covenant, to be administered as a strengthening potion, or applied to the body of the sick or aged (Spencer-Gillen[b], 596 ff.). Among the Basutos the hands of those who have carried a corpse to the grave are scratched with a knife, and magic stuff is put into the wounds to remove the contagion of death (*GB*[2] i. 302). Here, too, may be mentioned a group of customs already alluded to (§ 5), in which the inhabitants of a district divide into two parties and engage in a sham fight, in which, however, severe blows are given and received, blood is shed, limbs are broken, and sometimes life itself is taken, the fight lasting for some hours. This fight takes place at some given moment in the processes of agriculture, and has for its object the promotion of fertility. The *rationale* probably is that the blood shed fertilizes the earth, for among the Acobambans of Peru women caught the blood and sprinkled it on the fields (Bastian, *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*, Jena, 1860, iii. 73). Similar fights, more or less severe, have been observed among the Tongans, American Indians, African tribes, among the Khonds, in China; they occurred in the form of stone-throwing in Greece at certain festivals; and they still occur in modified form in European folk-custom (see Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 267).

(*c*) Incisions in the flesh and blood-letting are also customary before marriage in many places. Incisions which leave raised scars are made on the bodies of young men and women among the Kikuyus of E. Africa, the purpose being ornamental (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 255). Elsewhere the blood-letting, followed by each spouse drinking or swallowing the blood in food, has the purpose of uniting them, and shrinks in some cases to a mere symbol (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 385; see artt. BLOOD, BROTHERHOOD [artificial]). Or, again, the opening of a vein in both bride and bridegroom is a species of blood-offering, mainly among American Indian tribes (Zoekler, *op. cit.* 80).

(*d*) Frequently the making of scars and cicatrices, painful as the process is, seems to have mainly an ornamental purpose, as among the Australians (Spencer-Gillen[b], 56), Tasmanians and Melanesians (Letourneau, *Sociology*, 80), and N. American tribes, *e.g.* the Thlinkets (*NR* i. 97), though with most of these they are also made for other purposes. Among West Coast African tribes, with whom tatuing is rare, cicatrices are made by cutting the skin and then placing in the wound the fluff of the silk cotton tree (M. H. Kingsley, *op. cit.* 530). In New Guinea women make scars on the chest when a brother spears his first dugong (Haddon, 113).

(*e*) Finally, gashes are frequently used to draw blood as a propitiation of the gods. Thus, among

the Mosquito tribes of Central America, besides sacrifices to influence the gods before war or any important undertaking, blood was drawn from tongue, ears, or other parts of the body (*NR* i. 723, 740). Similar gashings were made by the priests of Baal (1 K 18^{28}, cf. Jer 41^{5}), the Aztecs at the feast of the Earth-goddess, and the Peruvians, both of whom drew blood from gashes in arms, legs, ears, nose, etc. (Garcilasso de la Vega, i. 52; Zockler, *op. cit.* 84). These are sometimes thought to be relics of earlier human sacrifice, like the commutation of a human victim among the Gauls, who made an incision in the victim's flesh (Pomp. Mela, iii. 2, 18). But possibly they may have been intended to promote union with the divinity through the vehicle of blood. Connected with this is the custom of self-castration seen in the Phrygian worship of Cybele and analogous cults in Syria, etc. In these the priests also wounded themselves in the arms and scourged each other (Tert. *Apol.* 25; Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 50). Similarly in the Roman cult of Bellona the priests made gashes in their shoulders and the blood was sprinkled on the image of the goddess and used in the sacrifices (Lactantius, i. 21; W. R. Smith, 304).

(2) *Amputation of fingers.*—This practice, already met with as a mourning ceremony, is also found sporadically as a sacrificial observance. In sickness Bushmen sacrifice a joint of their fingers (Farrer, *Prim. Manners and Customs*, London, 1879, 143). The Cochimis of California, when all other means had failed, cut off a finger from a daughter or sister of a sick man, in the belief that the blood would preserve him (Adelung, *Gesch. von Califor.*, Lemgo, 1769, i. 76). This was also done by the Tongans in cases of illness as a propitiatory offering to the gods, while a man would also cut off his own finger to avert their anger when danger threatened (Mariner, *Tonga Islands*, i. 454, ii. 210). During initiation the candidate among the Mandans held up his finger to the Great Spirit expressing his willingness to offer it, and then had it chopped off with a hatchet (Lewis and Clarke, *Travels*, London, 1817, 86). In India the practice is found in custom and myth. Mothers will cut off their own fingers as sacrifices for the preservation of their children, while Siva is said to have cut off his finger to appease the wrath of Kali (Tylor, ii. 401). Mothers in Bengal frequently draw blood from their chests, when a husband or son is ill, to propitiate the goddess Chandika (Rajendralāla Mitra, *Indo-Aryans*, London, 1881, i. 111). This may also have been a Celtic practice, since in one legend Ethne the Horrible is said to have cut off the ends of her children's little fingers to make them longer-lived (Windisch-Stokes, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1891–1897, iii. 363). We may compare with these rites the Chinese custom of cutting pieces of flesh from the thighs, while offering a prayer to Heaven to accept this as a species of self-immolation on behalf of a sick relative, who then was given the flesh to eat (de Groot, *op. cit.* iv. 2, 386).

(3) *Circumcision.*—This has already been found as one of the rites of initiation to manhood; and, in general, where it occurs it is performed at puberty, though sometimes, as with the Jews, it takes place in childhood. We are not concerned here with the various reasons assigned for it by the different peoples who practise it, or with its original intention, though this may have been, as already suggested in other cases, to ward off danger from the whole organ by removing a part, which part might also harbour dangerous influences. What concerns us here is the painful nature of the rite, and its wide-spread use. Practised by many peoples of antiquity, Egyptians and others (Herod. ii. 104), it is found among most African tribes, in N. and S. America, in Polynesia, Australia, and parts of Melanesia, and sporadically elsewhere. Among most of these peoples it is regarded as a disgrace not to have it done, or as rendering a man unclean. If the patient shrieks or cries, this is frequently considered unmanly, but occasionally he is in such a frenzied state as not to feel pain at the moment. But sometimes, besides the actual pain of the cutting, the youth has to undergo other ordeals. Thus, among the Bantu peoples of W. Africa cayenne pepper is squirted on the wound (Nassau, *op. cit.* 12), and among the Mavendas of S. Africa the candidates are subjected to exposure for some time in a nude condition and to treatment of a harsh nature (*JAI* xxxv. 268). See art. CIRCUMCISION, and Andree, *Ethnographische Parallelen*, Leipzig, 1889, 166 ff.; Ploss, *Das Kind*, Leipzig, 1884, i. 340 ff.; Stoll, *op. cit.* 499 ff.; Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, Edinburgh, 1885, 360; *L'Anthropologie*, Paris, 1896, vii. 653 ff.

(4) The practice of *sub-incision* or *mika* or *pura-arilthа-kuma* has already been referred to (§ 2). This terrible rite involves the slitting open of the under side of the urethra, and is found in Queensland, N. S. Wales, S. Australia, and among N. and W. Australian tribes (Spencer-Gillen[a], 212 ff.; *ib.*[b] 133, 328 ff.). Analogous to this is the custom of semi-castration, practised, according to Kolb, by the Hottentots (*op. cit.* 420 ff.), though it has been questioned by later observers; it is also found among the Ponapes in the Caroline Islands and in the Friendly Islands (Finsch, *ZE* xii. 316). For other mutilations of the sexual organs for different purposes among the Dayaks, Battas, ancient Romans, etc., see O. Hovorka, *Mitt. der Anthr. Gesell. in Wien*, 1894, xxiv. fasc. 3; *JAI*, 1892, xxii. 45; Stoll, *op. cit.* 496 ff., 921 ff.

(5) Girls at puberty among many separate peoples must also undergo the equally painful rite of excision, probably with the same original intention as circumcision, and like it frequently an initiation ceremony. It is found among various African peoples, in Nubia, Abyssinia, Galla and Masai Lands, on the west coast, and also in the south, while it is also met with among several S. American peoples, occasionally in N. America, and sporadically in Indonesia (Stoll, *op. cit.* 523; Ploss, *Das Kind*, i. 379 ff.; Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904, 60 ff.; Martius, *Zur Ethnog. Amerikas*, Leipzig, 1867, 445; *JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 133). With it may be classed the cutting or artificial rupture of the hymen, mainly among several Australian tribes, but occurring elsewhere also. With the Australians it is an initiatory rite, and also serves as an immediate preparation for marriage (Spencer-Gillen[a], 93; *ib.*[b] 133). Even more painful is the rite of 'infibulation' of marriageable girls, which is found mainly in the Nile region, the Sudan, Galla and Somali Lands, Nubia, Kordofan, and the Abyssinian highlands, and also in Pegu (Stoll, *op. cit.* 548 ff.).

(6) Among other forms of mutilation causing considerable suffering may be mentioned (*a*) knocking out one or more of the front teeth, usually as an initiation ceremony, though various interpretations of its purpose are current among those who practise it, and with some it is regarded as an ornament. Perhaps arising as a preparation for the reception of new food at puberty, it soon became a mark of acquired manhood, and sometimes, as with the Kavirondos, any one not undergoing it endangered his life in battle (Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, London, 1902, ii. 728). Among many Australian tribes it is found as a regular initiation ceremony performed only on youths, but among the central tribes it has ceased to be so, and is performed on both sexes indifferently (Spencer-Gillen[a], 588 ff.). The custom is found among most African tribes,

Bantu and Negro; in N. America, *e.g.* among the Seri Indians, who practise it on girls before marriage (*17 RBEW*, p. 169); in Formosa among the Pepos, who think it assists breathing (Ploss, *Das Kind*, ii. 424); while it was practised by the ancient Peruvians, who regarded it as a punishment ordained on their ancestors and binding upon themselves, or as a service rendered to the divinity (Garcilasso de la Vega, ix. 3; Herrera, *Historia general*, Madrid, 1730, v. 6, 1). It is also found as a mourning mutilation at the death of a chief in the Sandwich Islands (Ellis, *Tour through Hawaii*, London, 1826, 146).

(*b*) Filing the teeth, usually to sharp points, grinding them down, and breaking part of them, are found sporadically, sometimes as initiation ceremonies. Among the Malays the first method takes place soon after circumcision; the rite, though painful to behold, is borne with great patience (Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, 355). Elsewhere, as in Sumatra, Borneo, etc., the teeth are filed, broken, or pierced, and then ornamented with gold or blackened, the operation sometimes causing great pain (Marsden, *Sumatra*, London, 1811, 52; *Hist. gén. des voyages*, Hague, 1757, xv. 97; Ling Roth, *Natives of Sarawak*, ii. 78). But the custom is also supposed to preserve the teeth. Filing the teeth was also practised by the Mayas of Yucatan (Diego de Landa, *Relación*, Paris, 1864, 31), as it is still among some East African tribes (*JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 138), and peoples of the Congo region (Stoll, *op. cit.* 255); and, as among the Californian tribes, they were ground down to the gums (*NR* i. 333 f.; see also Frazer, *Totemism*, Edinburgh, 1887, 28; *ZE* xiv. 213).

(*c*) Making holes or slits in the nose, lips, cheek, or ears, in which are inserted various objects, is a world-wide practice, and, though regarded as a means of ornamentation, was probably in its origin of a magical character (the objects serving as amulets), while it was also and still is in many cases associated with initiation rites. Frequently the hole or slit is begun in childhood, but the permanent object is inserted only at puberty. Only the most extreme instances of this form of mutilation need be referred to here. Among the Thlinkets the under lip of female children is pierced and a small object inserted. As time goes on, a larger object is placed in the slit to extend the aperture, causing a painful and continuous strain, until, at the age of maturity, a grooved block of wood sometimes six inches long and half an inch thick can be inserted (*NR* i. 99). The Botocudos of S. America treat the under lip and the ear lobe in the same manner, gradually enlarging the apertures, until wooden plugs of a considerable size can be inserted, the ear lobe sometimes reaching to the shoulder (von Wied-Neuwied, *Reise nach Brasilien*, Frankfort, 1820, ii. 5). Every variety of these mutilations, either singly or together, is found over the American continent; lip-slitting occurs in Africa, ear-slitting and ear-extension in Fiji, Easter Island, and the Nicobar islands, while ear-piercing, with a religious significance, occurs all over India, Burma, and the Malay Peninsula (see Stoll, *op. cit.* 98 ff.; Hovorka, 'Verzierungen der Nase,' *Mitt. der anthr. Ges. in Wien*, xxv. pts. 4 and 5, 1875; *3 RBEW*, p. 76 ff.).

(*d*) The well-known and painful custom of deformation of the foot among Chinese women is regarded as the chief point of beauty and attractiveness, while it has apparently also some erotic character. The process is begun in early childhood by bandaging the feet firmly so that all growth is hindered, until they become little more than stumps, rendering walking a matter of difficulty (Brandt, *Sittenbilder aus China*, Stuttgart, 1895, 53 ff.; Ploss-Bartels, *Das Weib*, Leipzig, 1904, i. 173 ff.). A similar custom is found among the Kutchin Indians, where a child's feet are bandaged to prevent growth, small feet being there thought handsome (Richardson, *Arctic Searching Expedition*, London, 1851, 384).

9. Tatuing.—This custom is of world-wide extent; but while every variety of motive is ascribed to it, it frequently has a religious or magical significance, and it is commonly done as an initiation rite. Among the Eskimos the process usually consists in passing a needle and thread dipped in soot below the skin (Egede, *Besch. von Gronland*, Copenhagen, 1790, 153). More usually pricking the skin or cutting it, and then rubbing in some pigment, is resorted to. Or in some cases figures are cut or cauterized on the skin and the cicatrices painted, as in the Deccan and among the Mosquito Indians (Forster, *Voyage round the World*, London, 1777, 588; *NR* i. 716). Still, however done, the process involves much suffering, especially where great parts of the body are tatued; but to shrink from it or to show signs of suffering is held as evidence of cowardice. Mœrenhout says of the operation in Polynesia that it was the cause of such sufferings that sometimes the girl died under them. Yet in spite of this the operation, which is a tedious one, is seldom or never refused (Wilson, *Miss. Voyage*, London, 1799, 339). Nearly every observer of the actual carrying out of the process speaks of its extremely painful and even dangerous character. Hence it may be regarded, for whatever purpose it is undergone, as by no means the least serious of the many kinds of austerities practised by lower races. Thus, when it is undergone at puberty, it affords a test of the individual's capacity for enduring pain and showing courage (cf. *JAI*, 1882, xii. 331). Where it has a religious significance, as in Fiji, where it was held to have been appointed by the god Ndengei, it may be regarded as a kind of offering made to a divinity, while it also secured the entrance to, or the recognition of the individual in, the other world, un-tatued persons being there subjected to torture (Williams, *Fiji*, i. 160; cf. *FL*, 1894, v. 33, 318; Hall, *U.S. Explor. Exped.*, Philadelphia, 1846, 99, for other instances). The practice of making marks or designs on the body by cuts or scars, into which some pigment is often rubbed, is found among many peoples, especially those with darker skins (Australians, Tasmanians, Papuans, etc.), and must involve considerable suffering. See art. TATUING; Joest, *Tatowiren, Narbenzeichnen und Korperbemalen*, Berlin, 1887.

10. Medical austerities.—The methods of healing used by the medicine-man, or doctor, in savage societies are often of a drastic and acutely painful nature, though they are generally borne submissively by the patient. Resting mainly upon the theory that all disease is caused by evil spirits, the object of the treatment is to drive these away or to obtain possession of the object which they have placed in the body. Hence a great part of the treatment consists of yelling and singing, noises of all kinds, dances, and fumigations. But in addition the patient is subjected to a variety of vigorous remedies wrought upon his person. Among the most common of these are scarifying the flesh and bleeding. Thus among the Andamanese the flesh is cut with quartz or glass flakes (*JAI*, 1882, xii. 85), elsewhere, as among the Dinkas (*JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 156), with knives, and sometimes, as among the Bondeis, a very smarting medicine is rubbed in (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 215). Similar scarifications are used by many other peoples—Australians, Papuans, American Indians, both north and south. A primitive method of cupping is found in different parts of Africa, consisting of making an incision in the flesh, placing a horn above the incision, exhausting the air by

suction, and then closing the orifice. The horn is then gradually filled with blood (Nassau, *op. cit.* 183). Sucking the surface of the skin till it is blistered, or sucking blood from an incision in the flesh, is common, *e.g.* in N. America (Bancroft, *passim*; Pétitot, *Traditions indiennes*, Paris, 1886, 134). There, too, kneading and pounding the body violently, and pressing the fists into the pit of the stomach until the patient's strength is exhausted, are in great favour, and occasionally the medicine-man bites the patient with his teeth and shakes him (*NR* i. 246, 355; Kane, *Wanderings*, London, 1859, 225). Another remedy is to make the skin smart by applying pungent spices, or by stinging it with ants or whipping it with nettles (*GB*[3] i. 301, iii. 216). This, like flagellation in cases of madness, is intended to drive off the demon of disease. A favourite remedy for fever and other diseases among American Indians is the sweat-bath. This is a small hut which by various means is heated to suffocation. In it the patient is placed, and afterwards, dripping with perspiration, he rushes out and plunges into cold water. This treatment sometimes causes death, but it is also in use as a purificatory rite (*NR* i. 246, 285). A similar remedy for madness is found in Gabun (Nassau, *op. cit.* 273). It is to be noticed also that sometimes the relatives of the patient, or even of the medicine-man, fast, to assist the progress of the remedy (Ploss, *Das Kind*, i. 150; Dall, *3 RBEW*, p. 426). See Bartels, *Medecin der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1893.

11. Self-restraint. — A certain degree of self-restraint, especially in marital relations, though scarcely coming under the heading of 'Austerities' as do other forms of self-restraint, *e.g.* fasting, is found on particular occasions among lower races and may be taken notice of here, since it shows the power of current theories or beliefs or customs to strengthen the will even of a savage, and cause it to stifle bodily desires. Thus, though the ultimate purpose is no doubt different, such forms of self-restraint are yet akin to the self-discipline and continence of later forms of asceticism. Examples of continence are most marked during war or hunting, the intention probably being the avoidance of possible loss of strength and also of the potential dangers lurking in sexual relations generally. But in some cases the prohibition has assumed a religious sanction, especially among American Indian tribes. The Winnebagos observe continence in war because it was commanded by the Great Spirit; among other tribes it is said to be based on religious grounds, and the Dakotas thought that the violation of captives would be resented by the spirits of the dead (Drake, *Ind. Tribes*, Philadelphia, 1884, i. 188; Waitz-Gerland, *Anthrop.*, Leipzig, 1859–1871, iii. 158; Schoolcraft, *op. cit.* iv. 63).

A religious motive is also to be seen in those cases where such continence has become a binding form of tabu, as among the Maoris, with whom, not only during war, but on other important occasions, women are strictly tabu to men, who must not approach their wives until war is over (*JAI*, 1889, xix. 111; Waitz-Gerland, vi. 349). This is also found in parts of New Guinea, where the warriors are *helega*, or sacred, for some days before fighting, and must not even see a woman (Chalmers, *Pioneering in N. G.*, London, 1885, 65). But the original basis of such continence may be seen in the Seminole belief that connexion with women enervated men and unfitted them for their duties as warriors (Schoolcraft, v. 272); or, as in Halmahera, that they must practise continence during war else they will lose their strength (Riedel, *ZE* xvii. 69). This rule of continence is practically universal among savages, and applies to the period immediately preceding war or during the actual course of the war, while it also appears at higher levels of civilization (cf. Cæsar, vii. 66; 2 S 11[11]). The rule also applies frequently before or during a hunting or fishing expedition. Chastity is part of a seven days' tabu among the Malays when fishing (Skeat, *op. cit.* 315), but a similar rule prevails generally in such cases; while, as among the Aleuts, it is connected with religious beliefs, since during a whaling expedition unfaithfulness on the part of the men or their wives would be punished by the whale, an object of reverence to them (Reclus, *op. cit.* 53). In some cases, too, the rule of continence is accompanied by fasting, ceremonial preparations, and the infliction of pain. Thus, among the Nutkas, before war, some weeks are spent in preparation, which consists mainly of abstinence from women, bathing, scrubbing the skin with briers till it bleeds, and finally painting the whole body jet-black (*NR* i. 189). Among the Bondeis a man is scarified down the arms as a charm against sword-cuts (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 205); while, before hunting, the Indians of Guiana subject themselves to the stings of ants and the irritation caused by the hairs of certain caterpillars (Im Thurn, 229). Again, probably on the principle of sympathetic magic and the intimate connexion between a man and his wife, fasting and other forms of rigorous discipline are enjoined on women in many quarters while the men are absent on war or the chase, as in the Babar Islands, where women must fast and abstain from sexual intercourse (Riedel, *Selebes en Papua*, Hague, 1886, 341).

The rule of continence is also followed in various other circumstances. In Congo, when the *Chitomé* is on circuit, a fast of continence is proclaimed, the penalty for breaking it being death. By such continence 'they preserve the life of their common father' (Reade, *Savage Africa*, London, 1863, 362). Strict continence is also observed by men during the Cherokee new year's festival of purification already referred to (§ 6 (*c*)). It is also a common tabu after slaying a man or touching the dead, here probably connected with the contagion of death, which necessitates the avoidance of one's fellows till a certain time has elapsed or certain purifications have been performed. Fasting frequently accompanies continence on such occasions. Contact with women is forbidden for one month after the shedding of blood among the Kikuyus of E. Africa (*JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 264); and among the Natchez, after the first scalp-taking or securing a prisoner, the warrior had to abstain from seeing his wife or eating flesh for a month (Charlevoix, *Histoire de la Nouvelle France*, Paris, 1744, vi. 186; cf. Westermarck, *op. cit.* i. 375). In many places continence must be observed for a time after marriage and after a birth (Crawley, *op. cit.* 345 ff.; Lubbock, *op. cit.* 81).

Even among savages chastity on the part of the priesthood is sometimes a necessity. Thus Algonquin priests were ordained to a life of chastity, and could not eat food prepared by a woman (*NR* ii. 212), and in Yucatan the 'captain,' during his three years' tenure of office, had to observe the same rule (*ib.* ii. 741). This corresponds to the general rule of chastity found among higher priesthoods, while there, too, celibate orders are found, *e.g.* those in Mexico dedicated to the service of Quetzalcoatl, and the virgins of the sun in Peru, who, though regarded as the brides of the Inca, had otherwise, on pain of a cruel death, to live in chastity, in this exactly resembling the Vestal virgins in Rome (Zockler, *op. cit.* 85; Prescott, *Peru*, London, 1890, 53; cf. also the purity enjoined on the Roman Flamen Dialis and his household).

See also the articles on ASCETICISM.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the article.

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AUSTRALASIA (Ethnology, Religions, and Ethics).—*Australasia* is here taken in its widest sense, so as to cover the great insular world which comprises nearly the whole of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, and constitutes one of the five main divisions of the globe. The term is practically synonymous with *Oceania*, which is still favoured by most Continental geographers, but for which English writers now generally substitute *Australasia*, as harmonizing better with the other divisions, and at the same time serving to recall its essential characteristics—'firstly, that it is geographically a southern extension of Asia; and secondly, that the great island-continent of Australia forms its central and most important feature' (A. R. Wallace, *Australasia*, p. 2).

As thus understood, this Oceanic region comprises five main insular groups, which form the subjects of separate articles, but may here be summarily tabulated with their more important subdivisions:

I. AUSTRALIA with TASMANIA.
II. MALAYSIA, comprising the Malay Peninsula; the large Sunda Islands (Sumatra and Java), the Lesser Sunda Islands (Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Sumba, Allor or Ombay, Timor, Wetta, Serwatti); Borneo, Celebes; Jilolo or Halmahera; Ceram; the Moluccas; Sulu; the Philippines; Formosa, and the outlying Andaman and Nicobar groups.
III. PAPUASIA, with two sections:
1. *New Guinea*, with the D'Entrecasteaux, Louisiade, and other insular dependencies.
2. *Melanesia*, comprising the Bismarck Archipelago (New Britain, New Ireland, Duke of York); Solomon; Santa Cruz, Banks; Fiji; New Hebrides; New Caledonia; and Loyalty Archipelagoes.
IV. POLYNESIA, including New Zealand; Tonga (Friendly); Cook or Hervey (Mangaia, Rarotonga, etc.), Austral (Tubuai); Society (Tahiti), Low (Tuamotu); Marquesas (Nukahiva, Fatuhiva, etc), Navigator (Samoa); Union (Tokelau); Ellice (Funafuti), Savage (Niue), Sandwich (Hawaii) and Easter (Rapanui) groups.
V. MICRONESIA, comprising the Pelew (Palau); Ladrones (Marianne); Caroline; Marshall (Ralick, Radak); Gilbert (Kingsmill); Phœnix and Penrhyn (Manahiki) groups.

For Madagascar, which should properly be included in No II., see art. AFRICA. The Seychelles, Mascarenhas, and other scattered clusters in the Indian Ocean are excluded because uninhabited when discovered, and the same remark applies also to Norfolk, Kermadec, Pitcairn, and a few other South Sea islands. Note that South Sea is synonymous with Pacific Ocean.

All the lands in this table have been occupied by man since the remotest times, and it is argued in the art. ASIA that the cradle of the human family lay most probably in Malaysia (Java). From this central area of dispersion the first migratory movements ranged north to Asia, west to Africa, and east and south over the whole of the Oceanic world by land connexions which have since been greatly reduced by subsidence (see art. ETHNOLOGY, § 3). It would thus appear that the first inhabitants of Australasia must have been direct descendants of a Pleistocene precursor whose prototype is found in the Javanese *pithecanthropus erectus*, and who are themselves represented by the black elements still persisting in Malaysia (Malay Peninsula, Flores, Timor), in Papuasia, Australia, and even in Polynesia and Micronesia, though here mostly absorbed or assimilated by later intruders from Asia. As in Africa, there are two black elements in Oceania: (*a*) the dwarfish *Negritos* surviving in the Andamans, in the Malay Peninsula (Sakais, Semangs), in the Philippines (Aëtas), and in Java (the nearly extinct Kalangs); and (*b*) the medium-sized or even tall *Papuasians*, who form nearly the whole of the population in New Guinea (Papuans proper), and throughout Melanesia. For several reasons, such as their physical, linguistic, and religious differences, it is desirable to treat the Papuans proper and the Melanesians as two distinct though closely related sub-groups, while both may be conveniently comprised under the collective name of *Papuasians*. The Melanesians, for instance, are of Malayo-Polynesian speech, and worship no devils, whereas the Papuans speak numerous languages fundamentally distinct from any others, and are pronounced demonolaters. Dr. Hamy speaks of their origins as lost 'dans les profondeurs d'un insondable passé,' while W. Volz shows that in pre-Malay times they occupied all the Pacific Ocean (*AA*, Nov. 1894). Their westward extension to the large Sunda Islands, where no full-blood Papuans are now found, is also established by B. Hagen, who groups together the Battas, Gayos, and Alas of Sumatra, the Ulu-ayars of Borneo, the Semangs and Aetas of Malacca and the Philippines, the Torajas, and the Toalas recently discovered by Dr. Sarasin in Celebes, the Melanesians, Papuans, and Australians, 'as local varieties and remains of a great wide-spread primitive southern race,' which he calls 'the old pre-Malay ethnical element' in Oceania (*Globus*, 1904, 76, No. 2, p. 24 f.). These pre-Malayans therefore constitute the substratum, the true aborigines, everywhere in Australasia.

Their watery domain was later, but still in remote pre-historic times, encroached upon first by Caucasic and then by Mongoloid immigrants, both from the Asiatic mainland. It is shown in art. ASIA that during the Stone Ages two branches of the western Caucasians reached the uttermost confines of the continent, one probably from Europe through Mongolia to Korea and Japan, the other from North Africa through Irania to India and Indo-China. Some of the northern branch, all dolmen or megalithic builders, appear to have passed from Japan to Micronesia, where they may have joined hands with those of the southern branch who ranged from Indo-China southwards to Malaysia and thence eastwards to Polynesia. Thus are explained those astonishing *maraes* and other monolithic structures which are found scattered over the Pacific islands as far east as Rapanui (Easter Island), and culminating in the stupendous works of Ponapé (Eastern Carolinas) with cyclopean walls 10 to 18 feet thick, constructed of huge basaltic blocks, some measuring 25 ft. in length by 8 ft. in circumference (F. J. Moss, *Atolls and Islands, passim*). There is a trilithon at Maui (Tonga group) which looks like one of those 'Druidical-like shrines' seen by Mr. R. T. Turley in North Korea, where some of the people 'show Caucasian and not Mongolian features' (*Geograph. Jour.*, April 1904, pp. 478, 479). That the two Caucasic streams must have met and commingled in these North Pacific waters is shown, amongst other indications, by the fact that the Nukuor islanders near Mortlock (Central Carolinas) still speak a pure but archaic form of the Maori language away to the south (New Zealand).

In order to distinguish between the Mongoloid (Malayan) peoples and these primitive Caucasians who long sojourned in the Eastern Archipelago, and are there still represented, amongst others, by the Mentawi islanders (west coast Sumatra), Logan introduced the term *Indonesian*, which has now been extended to all the natives of European type throughout Australasia. They are found sporadically in Papuasia and Melanesia, and are in exclusive possession of Polynesia, so that all the South Sea Islanders east of a line running from New Zealand by Samoa to Hawaii may be called Indonesians, and the collective names *Mahori*, *Sawaiori*, and others formerly applied tentatively to them may now be discarded. Their claim to be regarded as an Oceanic section, not of the 'Aryans,' as is sometimes assumed, but of the pre-Aryan Hamitic and Iberian Caucasians, can no longer be seriously questioned, since by the unanimous testimony of all competent observers they are one of the very finest races on the globe, with physical characters connecting them anthropologically with

the western Caucasians. Of the Tonga natives Lord George Campbell writes:

'There are no people in the world who strike one at first so much as these Friendly Islanders. Their clear light copper-brown coloured skins, yellow and curly hair, handsome faces, their *tout ensemble*, formed a novel and splendid picture of the *genus homo*; and, as far as physique and appearance go, they gave one certainly an impression of being a superior race to ours' (*Log Letters from 'The Challenger'*; and see also Guillemard's *Australasia*, ch. 14).

But it was shown above that the whole Oceanic area was first peopled by the Papuasians, which explains the constant occurrence of a black strain, very marked in Micronesia, but also met with all over Polynesia. The natives of Niue (Savage Island) have a tradition that, when they occupied the island from Samoa, they found a black population with whom they intermixed. The same statement is made by the Hervey people, and is confirmed by their dark complexion and kinky hair, while in Mangaia the Melanesian features—frizzled hair, dark-brown skin, and full beard—predominate. Even the Tahitians and Maoris, both in other respects splendid Caucasians, here and there betray the dark element in their protruding lips, very dark-brown skins, curly hair, and slightly developed beard. In Malaysia the above-mentioned Mentawi islanders are the finest of all the surviving Indonesians, and of them Von Rosenberg writes that, 'as regards physical appearance, speech, customs, and usages, they stand almost quite apart. They bear such a decided stamp of a Polynesian race that one might far sooner compare them with an inhabitant of the South Sea Islands' (*Der malayische Archipel*. i. 189).

'It is somewhat difficult to say what the original type of the true Polynesian was; but it is probable that the handsome, tall, oval-faced, high-browed, lithe, active, light brown, black straight-haired, black or very dark brown-eyed, cheerful, dignified individual so frequently met with, is the nearest to the true original Polynesian' (Percy Smith, *Hawaiki*, p. 14).

As the western Indonesians moved eastwards to their present homes in the Pacific, their place was taken by the Asiatic Mongols, who are now represented in the Eastern Archipelago by the light- or olive-brown populations commonly called *Malays*. They form, in fact, the Oceanic section of the Mongol family, and as their right to be regarded as members of this family is no longer contested, the point need not here be laboured. Interminglings with the pre-Malayan dark and fair elements (Papuans and Indonesians) have caused considerable local modifications and given rise to some marked varieties, such as the Nias Islanders, the Bornean Dayaks and Kayans, the Bugis and Minahassas of Celebes, the Tagalogs and others of the Philippines, and the Formosan aborigines. But the dominant historical Malays, whose original home was in the Menangkabau district of Sumatra, and whose language has become the *lingua franca* of the Archipelago, are a true Mongoloid people, distinguished by their 'light yellowish and brownish skins, long lank and black hair, small stature, rather oblique eyes, and prominent cheek-bones' (Meyer, *Minahassa auf Celebes*, Berlin, 1876, p. 7). These Oceanic Mongols do not occupy the whole of the Archipelago, the eastern parts of which are still held by full-blood and half-caste Papuans, the ethnical parting line, as drawn by Wallace, running from east of the Philippines along the west side of Jilolo through Bouro, and curving round the west end of Flores, then bending back by Sandalwood so as to take in Rotti near Timor (Wallace, *Malay Archipelago*[5], p. 590).

Now comes a difficulty. All the Australasian peoples except the Papuans and Australians—Malayans, Malagasy, Philippine Islanders, Melanesians, Indonesians, and Micronesians—speak numerous idioms which differ greatly in their lexical and phonetic characters, and often even in their grammatical structure, but are none the less regarded as members of a common stock language which is usually called Malayo-Polynesian, and has a prodigious range—from Madagascar to Easter Island, within some 2000 miles of the South American coast, and from New Zealand across the Pacific to Hawaii. All are *polysyllabic* and *untoned*, whereas those of the south-eastern Mongols—Indo-Chinese and others—are *monosyllabic* and *toned*. But the Malayans belong to this connexion, hence should presumably speak toned languages like Burmese, for instance, or Siamese, or Annamese. The explanation seems to be that the Oceanic Mongols reached their present domain in remote times, before the Indo-Chinese tongues had become disintegrated—that is, before the development of monosyllabism by phonetic decay. Not only do such untoned languages still survive on the mainland, but they so closely resemble the Oceanic tongues that they may be called proto- or archaic-Malayan. Of the continental Malay mother tongue there are several varieties, such as Khmer (Cambodian), Redais, Bahnar, Samré, and Charay, which are all toneless, and have a great number of words in common with the Oceanic Malay, while 'the grammatical structure of both is absolutely identical' (C. Fontaine, quoted by H. Mouhot, in *Voyage dans les royaumes de Siam*, etc., Paris, 1868, p. 216). The organic kinship is seen especially in the characteristic infix system, which is everywhere precisely the same, as in the Khmer *sauk*, 'to corrupt,' *samnauk*, 'a bribe'; the Malagasy *tady*, 'twisted,' 'a rope,' *tomady*, 'strong'; the Javanese *hurub*, 'flame,' *humurub*, 'to flare up'; the Tagalog *kapatir*, 'brother,' *kinapatir*, 'brotherly'; the Malay *sipit*, 'to grasp,' *sinipit*, 'an anchor,' and so on (the infix elements always the same, *m*, *n*, and *mn*).

A harder problem is the extension of this *vrai groupe malay continental* (Dr. Hamy) not only to the Mongoloid Oceanic lands, but also to Melanesia, whose black inhabitants speak many more primitive varieties of Malayo-Polynesian than either the Polynesians or the Malayans, although they are neither Polynesians nor Malays themselves, but a branch of the primordial Oceanic Negroid race. Here Dr. Codrington, the leading authority on the subject, vouches for three essential points: (1) the substantial unity and homogeneous character of the Melanesian tongues, under considerable dialectic diversity, and apart from a number of Indonesian enclaves, such as Uea, Futuna, Fate, Mae, Tikopia, and Ongtong Java; (2) their fundamental kinship with the Malayo-Polynesian family; and (3) their archaic character as compared with all the other members of that family. 'As compared with Fiji [a Melanesian tongue], the languages of Tonga and Samoa [Indonesian] are late, simplified, and decayed' (Codrington, *Melanesian Languages*, Oxf. 1885, p. 26). The question therefore arises, How came these savage head-hunters and cannibals to lose their original forms of speech, such as still survive amongst the kindred black peoples of New Guinea and of Australia, and have but recently become extinct in Tasmania? And then, how did they everywhere, from the Bismarck to the Loyalty groups, acquire Malayo-Polynesian languages of primitive type? Early Indonesian or Malayan conquests, followed by miscegenation, naturally suggest themselves, but are excluded by the absence of those modified Negroid physical characters which must necessarily have resulted from such postulated interminglings. The Melanesians are quite as full-blood Negroes as the Papuans, and show even more marked Negro features than the somewhat modified Australian aborigines. Codrington, who gives a few instances of mutual assimilation and interchange of type and speech, especially in Fiji, remarks that—

'It is conceivable, on the supposition that the languages now spoken by Melanesians are not originally their own, that the original stock is not now represented anywhere, either in vocabulary or in grammar, that languages derived from without have entirely taken the place of some earlier [Papuasian?] speech; but it is difficult to allow it to be more than possible. . . . There is the great difficulty that the present Melanesian languages certainly have not been introduced by intruders speaking the present Malay or Polynesian languages.' He then suggests a tentative solution of the problem which 'would account for the Polynesians having a language allied both to the Malay and to the Melanesian' (p. 31).

It should be added that Malayo-Polynesian has not the remotest connexion either with the heterogeneous tongues of the New Guinea Papuans or with the homogeneous agglutinating languages of the Australian aborigines. As a rule the Negritos both of the Philippines and of Malacca have lost their original tongues, and now generally speak those of the surrounding Malayan peoples. On the other hand, the Andamanese may claim to have developed in their long secluded island homes perhaps the most remarkable form of speech known to philology. It has no kinship with any other, and its most striking feature is a superabundance of pronominal prefixes and formative postfixes, so that 'in adding their affixes they follow the principles of the ordinary agglutinative tongues; in adding their prefixes they follow the well-defined principles of the South African [Bantu] tongues. Hitherto, as far as I know, the two principles in full play have never been found together in any other language. In Andamanese both are fully developed, so much so as to interfere with each other's grammatical functions' (R. C. Temple, *Anthrop. Journ.* 1882, p. 123). Yet, like the Australians, these paradoxical 'Mincopies,' as they were formerly called, have an infantile arithmetic with no words for the numerals beyond *two*.

In the Oceanic area the various religious systems may be broadly described as consisting of diverse forms of the crudest and the most advanced animism, leading in some places to the purest psycholatry, in others to nature- and ancestor-worship, above which has been raised a luxuriant growth of myth and legend. With all this are combined some strange aspects of demonology and tabu, wide-spread over the Indo-Pacific domain, besides totemism, ordeals, omens, and fetishism, in forms which throw light on the origin of these practices. Less wide-spread are true idolatry, shamanism, priestcraft, animal and human sacrifices, lycanthropy, tree-cult, witchcraft, the evil eye, rain- and weather-doctoring, and the other superstitions usually associated with primitive religions. The ethical standards present enormous differences, although the Oceanic peoples may in a general way be spoken of rather as non-moral than immoral. In fact, the moral sense, as understood by more advanced races, must be regarded as still dormant amongst Polynesians, who indulge openly in unbridled licence; Melanesians and Borneans, who glory in the trophies acquired in their head-hunting expeditions; and Papuan marauders, who treat with fiendish cruelty the captives secured for their cannibal feasts. Nor are these atrocities confined to the lower races, as seen by the unspeakable horrors of the cage-prisons in the unprotected Malay States described by H. Clifford (*In Court and Kampong*, p. 161 f.).

In Sumatra also the Battas open hostilities by offering to their war-god a boy eight or ten years old, who is buried to his neck in the ground and then stuffed with a mixture of sliced ginger, red pepper, and salt. When he is nearly raving mad with thirst, he is induced by the offer of a little water to promise to plead the tribal cause in the next world. But, the promise made, molten lead instead of water is poured down his throat, and his head is cut off and buried in an earthenware pot under a large tree in the village. These Battas are idolatrous cannibals, who, before the fight begins, prepare a rudely carved wooden effigy with a square hole in the place of the navel. The pot is then dug up and the soft parts of the head are thrust into the hole, which is closed with a leaden plate. The idol thus becomes animated (*hat hierdurch seine Seele bekommen*), and is at once sent off to the enemy, from whom another is received in exchange, and the pot is put aside for future use (Von Rosenberg, *Die malayische Archipel*, i. 60). And thus we seem to get a hint of how crude animism may in some places have passed through the fetish stage of the indwelling soul up to true idolatry or image-worship. The *Panghulu-balang*, as the Battas call this wooden effigy, has already become a true anthropomorphic entity—'has received its soul'—and, like the war-gods of Olympus, can now champion their cause in this and the next world.

Amongst the Karo Battas the doctrine of soul receives its utmost development. Here the *tendi*, like the *kra* of the Gold Coast negroes (see art. ETHNOLOGY, § 9), is a second *ego*—a sort of 'double' dwelling in the body, which it may occasionally leave—and at death becomes a *begu* (spirit, properly 'shade') on earth, or a *dibatta* (god) of the middle spaces. Often there are as many as seven such *tendis*, which are partly generated as individualized activities or properties of man. Two are clearly distinguished, one more specialized which later becomes a *begu*, the other representing more generally the vital force, and after death resolved into breath, or becoming wind, and returning to the soul of the world (*Weltseele*). Not only men, but animals and even plants, are endowed with *tendis*, and the *Si Dayang*, as the rice *tendi* is called, is represented as a goddess who plays a great part in the creation myth. She is the maker of man, the creative and sustaining power of the universe, the All-life, the gracious mother of nature, these cosmic notions being no doubt due to later Hindu influences (J. H. Neumann, quoted by W. Foy, in *Centralblatt f. Anthrop.* 1904, v. 299).

In the neighbouring Nias archipelago the Malayan natives are both idol- and devil-worshippers, and also head-hunters in the southern districts. Having no idea of a pure bodiless spirit, they fabricate numerous stone and wooden statuettes as tutelar deities, protectors of the chief, of the village, of the weapon, or else guardians against sickness and other troubles. The chief god, however, is *Lubu-langi*, who dwells in the wind, which, although it is invisible, can still be felt. This god is conceived as a tree waving in the atmosphere and shedding fruits which become either spirits or men, forefathers of the present generation, according as they fall in space or on the ground. In fact, Lubu-langi is the origin of everything, and from him comes nothing but good. Their forefathers dwell in constant association with him, and that is why they are invoked for blessings and against all kinds of evils. Here we have a peculiar form of ancestor-cult, which is paid also to the subordinate chthonic god *Batubeana*, while appeal is likewise made to the other deities, amongst them some goddesses, all collectively called *Aju*. But more numerous appear to be the demons, of whom the most powerful and most dreaded is *Nadûiya*. Of them no images are made, since they dwell in the woods, the fields, the gardens, the houses, even in men and animals when they fall sick. Then they send for the *Eré* (wizard), who smells out the particular spook that is causing the mischief, and bribes him with the heart and blood of a fowl to leave the sick man and go away. If this and stronger measures fail, it is concluded that there are several devils about, and these are got rid of by stopping all the

doorways except one, through which they are driven off by cutting and slashing in all directions and making a tremendous uproar with much shouting, tom-tomming, and beating of pots and cans. The Nias people are not clear about an after-life, but say that the body came from and returns to nothing, while the soul joins the company of the ancestors with Lubu-langi, nothing being said about rewards or penalties. Earthquakes, the tides, eclipses, and other natural phenomena are due to sinister influences, even the rainbow being a net cast out by Nadáiya to ensnare mortals, while comets consist of an ordinary star with a long tail to which a devil clings, careering through space to strew the (Nias) world with woes.

Farther south the Indonesian Mentawi people are similarly plagued with demons, and here, strange to say, the natives of Pora Island migrate after death to an adjacent islet where all become devils, hence this is called 'Devil Island.' Hence also after the burial everybody makes off in all haste, fearing the return of the new-made demon. There are no idols or religious rites, but numerous oracles and omens and divinations by the inspection of birds' entrails, exactly as amongst the old Etruscan *haruspices*; and children are specially guarded against the evil eye of passing strangers. Much dancing accompanies all festive gatherings, which would appear to have a sacred character, since they wind up, if possible, with a human sacrifice, the victim being obtained by raiding a neighbouring island. The *sinétu* (fiends) are of course the root of all evil, and when they are appealed to in the woodlands which they infest, they are supposed to reply in the thin squeaking voice of an old man (Von Rosenberg, i. *passim*).

Most of the other Sumatrans, and all the Javanese, formerly Buddhists and Brāhmans, have been Muhammadans since about the close of the 15th cent.; but the new religion is merely lip service, a threadbare cloak thrown over the still fresh garb of Hinduism, which itself barely conceals the everlasting vesture of pagan times. Here, therefore, and especially in Java, we have three religious systems intermingled, or rather superimposed one on the other (cf. art. ABORIGINES, § 5). Hindu blood still flows in the veins of the Javanese nobility, such as the 'Emperor' of Solo (Surakarta), and the Prince of Jokjokarta, while the triumphs of Hindu architecture are still everywhere conspicuous, as on the Batta and Padang uplands of Sumatra, even in Bali and Sumbawa, and culminate in the stupendous temple of Boro-budur in Central Java. Hence it is not perhaps surprising that the early Indian religious and moral notions still survive and display a more vigorous growth than the arid teachings of Islām. The Qur'ānic texts may be daily read in the tasteless mosques, but in serious trouble Allāh and his Prophet are forgotten, and resort is had to the ancient shrines, where sacrifices and prayers are still offered to the old Hindu deities. Even the primeval tree-cult is kept alive, the chief objects of veneration being various species of the fig-tree, such as the pipal (*Ficus religiosa*) and *F. benjamina*. Beneath the shade of these wide-branching giants the natives often gather to worship the old earth-gods, for whose long-forgotten names those of the Hindu pantheon are substituted. Respect is also paid to the turtle-doves and to the monkeys (*Cercopithecus* and *Somnopithecus*) which have their homes in the branches of the sacred pipal-tree, and even to certain strangely shaped blocks and rocks, carrying the mind back to the stone-cult of primeval times (E. Carthaus, in *Kolnische Zeit.*, Aug. 26, 1906).

Hinduism still holds its ground in Bali and parts of Lombok, but is here also associated with many old superstitions, so that these islands present the strange spectacle of large Hindu communities professing every form of belief, from the grossest heathendom to pure pantheism. It is everywhere evident enough that 'just as Hinduism has only touched the outer surface of their religion, it has failed to penetrate into their social institutions, which, like their gods, originate from the time when Polynesian [Indonesian] heathendom was all-powerful' (W. Cool, *With the Dutch in the East*, p. 139).

A local myth relates how these gods established themselves in Bali after their expulsion from Java by the Muslim invaders in the 15th century. They had first to contend with the wicked Rakshasas, who fiercely resented the intrusion, but in the struggle were annihilated, all but the still worshipped Mraya Dewana. Then new thrones for the Olympians had to be erected as in Java; but there being no mountains at that time in Bali, the four nearest hills in East Java were brought over and set down in the east, west, north, and south, and assigned to the different gods according to their respective ranks.

Hinduism never made much progress in Borneo; nor has Islām anywhere penetrated much beyond the seaboard, so that the great bulk of the Dayaks, Kayans, and other aborigines are still pagans. Head-hunting, cannibalism, and human sacrifices, attended with shocking barbarities, are being slowly repressed by the British and Dutch authorities; but the Muslim and Christian propagandists appear to make little headway amongst the heathen tribes of the interior. All are still in the wild state, and the whole island has not inaptly been described as '300,000 square miles of savagery.' As in Africa, the human sacrifices, formerly universal, were the direct outcome of the prevalent ancestor-worship, the ostensible motive being to dispatch messages to dead relatives, or to honour them by these sanguinary rites. For this purpose a slave was tied up and bound round with cloths, and then, 'after some preliminary dancing and singing, one after another would stick a spear a little way—an inch or so—into his body, each one sending a message to his deceased friend as he did so' (W. B. Pryer, *JAI*, 1886, xvi. 234). The wicked, however, cannot receive their messages, since they are doomed, Sisyphus-like, to be everlastingly clambering up the rugged slopes of Kina Balu, the highest peak in Borneo (nearly 14,000 feet). The good, that is, those who have collected most human heads in this world for provision in the next, easily reach the top, whence they are ushered into heaven. But in other places, where the mountains are not so high, even the elect have to overcome many obstacles during their long wanderings up hill and down dale, across rivers, through fire and water, until 'at last they are safely landed in the heaven of their tribe' (C. Bock, *Headhunters of Borneo*, p. 223).

Dr. W. H. Furness describes the Borneans as 'savages of a high order,' without 'any definite forms of religious worship,' although they make 'wooden idols,' regarded apparently as mere 'scarecrows to frighten off evil spirits' (*Folklore in Borneo*, p. 4). They are 'saturated with superstitions; every pool, every tree, every rock is the home of an evil spirit, and all mysterious noises in the forest are ghostly whisperings. Everywhere are signs and omens to warn man of danger, or direct his course,' and the mountains are so infested with *antu* (demons) that 'the summits can be gained only at the risk of body, and, still worse, of soul' (*ib.* p. 6). Head-hunting 'is part of their religion; no house is blest which is not sanctified by a row of human skulls, and no man can hope to attain to the happy region of *Apo Leggan* unless he, or some relative of his, has added a head to the household collection' (p. 14). The practice is explained by the myth of the great chief *Tokong*, who when on a raid was told by *Kop*, the frog, to carry off the heads of the enemy. Having done so, the war party retreated quickly to the river

down which they had come. After they had again embarked, the current of the stream was, for their sakes, reversed, and like a flash they were carried up-stream to their homes. During their short absence the rice crop had ripened, the sick were all well again, the lame could walk and the blind see; so they ever afterwards observed the custom that Kop had taught them (p. 15). In the Kayan cosmogony there was at first nothing but sky and water, when a huge rock fell from the heavens, and rising above the surface was covered with soil by the action of the little *halang* worms. Then from the sun was dropped the wooden handle of a big sword, which, taking root in the soil, grew to a great tree, with branches spreading over all the new land, and this was followed by a rope-like vine from the moon, which also took root and twined round the tree. Now the vine became the husband of the tree, which gave birth to a male and a female, from whose union are sprung the Kayans and all the other Bornean tribes, and lastly Tokong, father of head-hunting. At first they were only half-human, with head, chest, and arms, but no legs, so that they had to crawl along the ground by their arms, an idea perhaps suggested by the octopus, which plays such a large part in the Oceanic mythologies (pp. 7–9). The Kayan Hades is not in the sky but underground, and, like the Greek Hades, has its Charon and its Styx, a deep wide ditch swarming with worms, and crossed, not by a ferry, but by a fallen tree-trunk which is guarded by the great demon *Maligang*. By him all comers are challenged, and if they have no record of bravery, no store of captured heads, the tree-trunk is shaken until they fall into the ditch, to be tortured for ever by the worm that dieth not. But there are 'many mansions,' as for those dying a violent death, or on the battlefield; for mothers dying in child-birth, or for suicides. In *Apo Leggan*, one of the chief divisions, dwell those dying of sickness or old age, and these 'have much the same lot as they had in this world; the poor remain poor, and the rich maintain their rich estate' (p. 16).

In Malacca the dominant Malays are all nominal Muhammadans; but here, as elsewhere in the Malay world, the cloak of religion is a very loose garment which covers a multitude of primeval rags and tatters. These were never touched or repaired by Brāhman or Buddhist, who appear to have got no farther than *Singapore*, the 'Lion City' over against the mainland. Hence Islām is here directly superimposed on the old heathendom, which it has barely penetrated a little below the surface. Raja Dris, himself a Musalmān, tells us that the people of Perak are still specially noted for many strange customs and superstitions 'utterly opposed to Muhammadan teaching, and savouring strongly of devil-worship. . . . An enormous belief in the supernatural is possibly a relic of the pre-Islām state' (*JAI*, 1886, xvi. 227). One is here reminded, however, that even the Arabs, if they do not worship the devil, still pelt him with stones at Muna near Mecca 'in the name of Allāh.' Referring to the Malays generally, Miss Bird (Mrs. Bishop) wishes that 'it were possible to know to what extent they are a *religious* people as Muslims. That they are bigots and have successfully resisted all attempts to convert them to Christianity there is no doubt, as well as that they are ignorant and grossly superstitious' (*Golden Chersonese*, Lond. 1883, p. 361). Elsewhere (p. 314) she tells us that 'buffaloes are sacrificed on religious occasions, and at the births, circumcisions, marriages, and shaving of the heads of the children of wealthy people. The buffalo sacrificed for religious purposes must be always without blemish. Its bones must not be broken after death, neither must its horns be used for common purposes. It is slain near the mosque with solemn sacrificial ceremonies, and one half is usually cooked and eaten on the spot by the "parishioners."'

But the most striking survival from pagan times is the universal belief in the wer-wolf superstition, which here of course takes the form of the wer-tiger. In Borneo there are wooden idols of tigers with indwelling souls (C. Bock, *op. cit.* p. 226). But in the Malay lands the tiger himself is worshipped, and the belief that men assume his form at night is inextinguishable. H. Clifford remarks that—

'In the Malay Peninsula we live in the Middle Ages. Magic and evil spirits, witchcraft and sorcery, spells and love-potions, charms and incantations are as real and as much a matter of everyday life as are the miracle of the growing rice and the mysteries of the reproduction of species. Tales of the marvellous and the supernatural excite interest and fear in the Malay, but they occasion no surprise. Every Malay knows that strange things have happened in the past, and are daily occurring to them and to their fellows. Thus the existence of the Malayan Loup Garou to the native mind is a fact and not a mere belief. The Malay *knows* that it is true' (*op. cit.* p. 65).

Then follows a wer-tiger story which for vividness and intense horror could scarcely be surpassed. For details, see art. LYCANTHROPY; and for prevalent religious notions in Minahassa and other parts of Celebes, see art. AIR.

Even magic, which becomes gradually divorced from the religions of more advanced peoples, is still interwoven with the beliefs and practices of the Malayan Muhammadans. In his *Malay Magic* (p. 60) W. Skeat tells us that one of the ways by which the Malays 'get magic' is to run against the ghost of a murdered man. As this is not easy, a mystic ceremony must be performed at the grave on a Tuesday at full moon, when the person needing help conjures the departed spirit and states his request. After a time an aged man appears, and to him the request is repeated, and is supposed to be ultimately granted. The magic here in question appears to be what is elsewhere called *mana* (Melanesians), *wakanda* (Dakotans), *orenda* (Iroquoians), *arungquiltha* (Aruntas), and by other names. It colours all primitive beliefs, from which it is inseparable, although by some recent theorists it has been regarded as something apart from religion.

A link between the Malayan and Papuan domains was discovered by Wallace in the island of Jilolo (Halmahera), whose 'Alfuro' inhabitants 'are radically distinct from all the Malay races. Their stature and their features, as well as their disposition and habits, are almost the same as those of the Papuans; their hair is semi-Papuan, neither straight, smooth and glossy, like all true Malays, nor so frizzly and woolly as the perfect Papuan type, but always crisp, waved, and rough, such as often occurs among the true Papuans, but never among the Malays' (*op. cit.* p. 316). The term *Alfuro* applied to these aborigines has no ethnical value, being the general Malay designation of the uncultured non-Muslim peoples in the eastern parts of Malaysia.

From them the transition is easy to New Guinea, the home of the true *Papuans*, on whose religious views much light has been thrown in recent years. In the western parts, subject to Holland as far as 140° E., prevalent features are pure demonolatry and the worship of ancestors represented by the so-called wooden *karwar* effigies of the dead, fashioned by the wizards. In the Sekar district, lately visited by J. S. A. van Dissel, scraps of food, tobacco, and sugar-cane are scattered about wherever goblins are suspected to be lurking. Here the arch-fiends are the so-called *Atitigi*, gigantic monsters of white colour, with an eye in front and another behind, six fingers on each hand, and the right index finger furnished with a very

long sharp nail. They dwell in underground caves, and hunt down mortals, whom they eat if the flesh is found to their taste. To test the quality, a piece of the flesh is first scooped out with the long finger-nail, and if palatable the victim is roasted and eaten, but otherwise is allowed to go free. These supernatural beings are vulnerable only in the eye-sockets. Here the tabu marks (*kèra-kèra*)—leaves, rags, shells, bast, and the like, with a painted male figure attached to a post sunk in the ground—are very effective, since their violation would bring on not only the vengeance of the owner, but also the wrath of the presiding deity, causing illness and death (W. Foy, *loc. cit.* p. 305).

Dr. A. B. Meyer has made a careful study of the above-mentioned *karwars*, which are met with among the *Mafors* (not *Nufors*) of the North-West Coast, and appear to be real idols, not merely ornaments or emblems, as is often asserted. He calls them *Ahnenbilder*, 'ancestral effigies.'

'After a burial a block of wood is brought from the forest, and first roughly hewn and then furnished with eyes, nose, ears, and mouth, usually by the village magician, all amid much feasting and dancing, which is kept up for several days. When the supplies, mostly sago and palm-wine, run out, more is sent for. Meanwhile the soul of the departed is still flitting about, and every effort is now made to entice him into the finished image. A tremendous uproar is raised with shouting, yelling, and drum-beating in all the houses and neighbouring hamlets, and this is continued for several evenings, a wizard all the time holding the block in his hands with much contortion of face until he falls down—a sign that the soul has entered its future abode, from which it can no longer escape and go about working mischief. Henceforth much homage is paid to the idol, which is carefully put away under the best mats in a corner of the house, and hidden from the eyes of any uninvited guests. It is consulted and invoked on all occasions by the near relatives, its intercession being sought by offerings of tobacco, by adorning it with shreds of bright cloth, and holding it in the hand till it moves, that is, till it answers. It accompanies travellers on long journeys to guard them from harm, until at last, having lost its virtue [its *mana* ?], it is thrown aside as so much lumber, or otherwise disposed of, for this point still remains obscure. But there is no doubt that 'the Mafors worship the departed spirits. This belief in the immortality of the soul is the main principle of their religion, and with it are associated many rites and usages' (*Glauben u. Sitten der Papúas*, etc., *passim*).

In recent times the upper reaches of the Fly River, about the Anglo-Dutch frontiers, have been depopulated by the incessant razzias of the ferocious west coast tribes, especially the *Tugare* or *Tugere* cannibals, whose extreme savagery and cruelty may be taken as representing the lowest state of human culture in New Guinea, if not in the whole world. Little is known about their religious views, if they have any; but we have now *official* information regarding the almost incredible horrors accompanying their slave-raiding expeditions. 'They are a cannibal tribe of pirates,' writes the Rev. S. MacFarlane, 'who make periodical raids upon the villages along the eastern coast. They break the arms and legs of the prisoners, so as to prevent their fighting or running away, and then keep them as fresh meat until required, cooking one or two bodies at a time' (*Cannibals of New Guinea*, London, 1888, p. 106). Or else the captives' palms are pierced, a string passed through the holes, and the arms tied together at the back. When the flotilla arrives they are thrown into the water, and fished out by those on the beach sticking barbed spears into the fleshy parts. Then they are put on mats, a rope secured to a tree is passed round their necks to make them sit up, and after much slow torture they are wrapped in dry cocoa-nut leaves, hoisted some six feet from the ground, and slowly roasted with fire-sticks. 'When the rope is burnt, and the body falls to the ground, the wildest and most savage scene takes place. The natives rush with knives in their hands, each slashing a piece of the body, which may be still alive, in the midst of diabolical noise and yells of rejoicing' (L. Loria, *Official Report*, 1895, Appendix S, p. 44 f.).

In British New Guinea, witchcraft causes much trouble, and everywhere presents the same general features. A sorcerer, paid for the purpose, prepares a parcel of rubbish containing a hair or something taken from the person to be operated upon. The parcel then acquires diabolical powers and frightens people, who sometimes sicken and die through fear. Thus the sorcerers cause great trouble, and 'the people generally would gladly see them put down, but fear keeps them from reporting their threats and swindles' (*Report* for 1892–4, p. 37).

Various forms of tabu are met everywhere, but in the British districts 'it has never been grounded on any deep religious sentiment, consequently has never taken deep root. So far as is known at present, it is used only in order to store up food for a coming feast. It is most frequently applied to coco-nut and betel-nut trees. In some places the prohibition is announced by a syren of wood on a string wielded by a fishing-rod. From the Fly River to the far east, branches, usually of sago, are tied on the prohibited trees. Sometimes strings are put round gardens; branches are tied into the door of a house that is not to be entered, or are laid across a road that is not to be traversed' (*ib.* p. 38). With the statement about storing up food should be compared the practice in New Caledonia at the other end of Papuasia. Here *tapu* has no religious significance, and is associated exclusively with the question of food—that is, the question which most interested primitive man. It is much the same in the Marshall Islands, where Mr. F. J. Moss tells us that recently the despotic king of Majuro speared a man for picking a green coco-nut 'when the tapu had been placed upon them' (*Through Atolls and Islands*, p. 126). The reservation and safeguarding of food, particularly in times of scarcity, would thus appear to be the original purpose of the institution, the religious sanction being a later development, as amongst the more advanced Indonesians of New Zealand, where 'tapu and its observances, in a sense, took the place of religion' (A. Hamilton, *Art Workmanship of N. Z. Maori Race*, 1898, p. 370).

Both in British and German New Guinea ancestor-worship is a prominent feature of the religious systems, and here the moral sense is scarcely yet awakened, so that little or no provision is made for saints and sinners in the after life. Thus in Murua (Woodlark Island), at the east end of New Guinea, 'all people, whether good or bad, when snatched away by death, go like the wind to the small island of Watum; there they enjoy the full pleasures of life, the women cultivating and cooking food for their lords and masters' (J. P. Thomson, *British New Guinea*, p. 184).

A far higher plane of thought has been reached by the kindred *Melanesians*, though not in the ethical order. They are still mostly inveterate head-hunters and cannibals, as is clearly shown by the very latest observers, such as Dr. H. Schnee and Carl Ribbe. The treacherous and sanguinary head-hunters of the Solomon Islands are referred to by Ribbe as 'von Natur lugnerisch, verraterisch, räuberisch, hinterlistig, diebisch, und grausam angelegten Kannibalen' (*Zwei Jahre unter den Kannibalen der Salomo-Insulen*, 1903). They appear to have even deteriorated since their first contact with Europeans; and, if not devil-worshippers in the strict sense of the term, they certainly betray great fear of the surrounding demons, in many places setting up scarecrows to drive them away. An equally dark picture is drawn by Dr. Schnee of the Bismarck and Admiralty natives, amongst whom cannibalism with all its attendant horrors, such as the lingering death of the victims and the bartering of dead bodies in the local 'markets,' is far more prevalent than had hitherto been sus-

pected (*Bilder aus der Südsee*, 1904, *passim*). Yet the strictly religious views of these undoubted savages may be called 'respectable,' in some instances almost elevated—a phenomenon obviously due, perhaps like their language, to the proximity of the Indonesians of the Eastern Pacific. Although the English word 'devil' is common enough, adopted by the natives in ignorance of its meaning, there is very little true demonolatry. Dr. Codrington says none at all: 'It may be asserted with confidence that a belief in a devil, that is, of an evil spirit, has no place whatever in the native Melanesian mind' (*The Melanesians*, p. 117). This seems to be stated rather too forcibly; but the writer is our very best authority on the religious beliefs of these aborigines. Even gods are little in evidence; at least, there is not a Supreme Being nor are there any very powerful subordinate deities, nor yet true fetishes, that is, natural objects, such as a tree, rock, storm, or waterfall animated by an indwelling spirit; nor professional shamans, or hereditary priests. 'There is no priestly order, and no persons who can properly be called priests,' but any one may undertake the priestly functions who can gain access to some object of worship, and such a man 'is in a way their priest and sacrifices for them all' (*ib.* p. 127).

The quintessence of the Melanesian system appears to be a belief in spirits and in the subtle power called *mana*, which is common also to Polynesia, and presents analogies with the *wakanda* of the Dakotans (see art. AMERICA, i. 382[a]) and with the Augustinian *grace*.

For Maoriland, Hamilton defines *mana* as 'power, authority, influence, prestige' (*op. cit.* p. 396). The same definition would also apply to the *orenda* of the Iroquoians, 'which exactly expresses this potentiality, this atmosphere, which they believe inheres in and surrounds every personality. . . . Anything reputed to have been instrumental in obtaining some good or accomplishing some end is said to possess *orenda*' (Sidney Hartland, *Address*, 1906, p. 5).

With regard to spiritual beings, the essential point to note is the distinction clearly drawn by the natives between two classes of spirits, the *bodiless* and the *disembodied*—that is, pure spirits that never were men, and the ghosts of the departed. Both are worshipped, the homage paid to the first being pure psycholatry, to the second ancestor-cult, so that the two primitive forms of animism have been evolved in Melanesia. In general, all pure spirits, most ghosts, and some men have *mana*, and after death those souls alone are worshipped who are supposed to possess it. These are, of course, mainly the chiefs; hence the remark of the Fijian chief that after death he would be a *kalou*, that is, would be invoked and worshipped; while common people, having no *mana* in this life, would have none in the next, and so would be neglected and soon forgotten. There are numerous minor deities—gods of the sea, land, mountains, valleys; and these may apparently be either pure spirits or ghosts, the natives themselves getting confused when it comes to particulars. For details and accessories (magic, witchcraft, weather-doctoring, sacrifices, Hades, and the like), see art. MELANESIA.

For *Micronesia*, where both Papuasian and Polynesian elements are represented, one of our best guides is J. Kubary, who has made a thorough study especially of the *Mortlock Islanders* on the south-central fringe of the Caroline Archipelago. Here the influence of the Indonesian myth-mongers already begins to be felt, while the dominant ancestor-worship presents some peculiar features, its main purpose being to uphold the prestige of the chiefs both in this and in the next world. In some places the headmen have both a temporal and a divine aspect, being at once the supreme rulers, the supreme gods (*die Hauptgottheiten*), and the priests of their several tribes. At the same time, the officials honour the spirits of their own forefathers, invoking them on all ordinary occasions before the somewhat costly appeal in the last resort to the supreme god—that is, to the tribal chief. In theory this chief is absolute, but does not receive divine honours till after his death, and, as the souls of all the departed are also supposed to be deified, the number of the *anu* (spirits, minor gods) would be legion, but for the provision that practically only those are honoured who were distinguished by some special qualities when alive. They do not communicate directly with mortals, but only through the *au-ua-ro-ar*, a kind of shaman, whose office is not hereditary, each deity choosing one for himself without monopolizing his services, since he is still free to act on behalf of any other god willing to employ him. Besides the tribal (ancestral) gods there are several others, such as the war-god *Arong*, honoured in the form of a fish, and *Anu-set*, the sea-god. Arong represents a famous hero, Rassau, who was slain in the island of Lukunor and buried in the sea; hence all warriors who fall in battle are now also buried in the sea, so that they may join the brave Rassau, the mythical god of the sea. Whether the myth was invented to explain the practice, or is a local tradition coloured by the surroundings, is uncertain, but it shows how 'religion, like all other institutions, has been profoundly influenced by physical environment, and cannot be understood without some appreciation of those aspects of external nature which stamp themselves indelibly on the thoughts, the habits, the whole life of a people' (J. G. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*).

Besides the ancestral and other gods, there is no lack of demons, one of whom infests the large trees, but is dangerous only to young girls and children. Apparitions and other supernatural phenomena are much dreaded, and no Micronesian would venture from home alone after nightfall. They also believe in divination, and 'have two ways of foretelling the future, one by means of knotted cocoa leaves, the other more complicated, but known only to the professional soothsayers' (Kubary, *Die Bewohner der Mortlock Inseln*, p. 259). Tabu is universal, and there is a 'mourning tabu' for the great chiefs, which is exceedingly burdensome to their bereaved subjects. Other forms are concerned with the food question, as in New Guinea and New Caledonia.

Polynesia (see Table, p. 236[a], No. IV.) is a region of surprising, almost monotonous, uniformity in the physical and mental characters, the speech, social and religious institutions, and oral literature of its Indonesian inhabitants. The oral literature is partly historical and traditional, but mainly sacred and religious—cosmogonies and theogonies merging into semi-divine dynastic genealogies, all based on an underlying system of primitive religious notions, without some knowledge of which it is impossible to understand them. Despite the labours of Sir G. Grey, G. Turner, W. W. Gill, A. Fornander, Percy Smith, and some other Indonesian students, only a few of these legends have yet been rescued from oblivion, and so great are their volume and variety that Adolph Bastian, their chief interpreter, ventures to say that 'the Polynesian range of thought is next to or beside the Buddhist the most extensive in the world, stretching through the length and breadth of the Pacific Ocean, and even farther if Micronesia and Melanesia as far as Malaya be included'; and he adds that the mythologies are meaningless without a knowledge of the religious substratum on which they are

raised (*Die heilige Sage der Polynesier*, p. ix.). In this work Bastian himself has published three priceless documents with valuable commentaries: a very old creation myth from New Zealand (*Die Schopfungssage der Maori*); from Hawaii a complete theogony, beginning, like all Polynesian myths, with Chaos and Night; and *The History of Ancient Hawaii* in the Hawaiian language, by David Malo, a converted native.

Apart from their great variety and the sublime cosmic concepts often embodied in the texts, students are puzzled to understand how such voluminous unwritten records could be accurately handed down from very remote times, as many of them certainly have been. On this point Mr. Percy Smith remarks that 'it is difficult for a civilized people which habitually uses writing in recording events to conceive of the powers of memory possessed by people who have nothing but the memory to trust to. Some few instances of this may be mentioned. A Maori and his wife dictated to Mr. Elsdon Best over 400 songs, and could generally tell the names of the composers and the incidents alluded to in them. Another dictated to the writer 164 songs, and these were so impressed on his memory that the quotation of one line was sufficient to recall the whole of the song at once. Another has written eleven volumes of MS. treating of the traditions, songs, customs, etc., of the Maoris, and this at a very advanced age, all of this matter having been retained in his mind, and including hundreds of proper names' (Smith, *Hawaiiki*, p. 20). It is to be remembered that most of the documents are of a sacred character, hence jealously guarded by the priests, who were mostly hereditary, so that 'it was the duty of the father, and very often the grandfather, to educate their offspring in the tribal lore. This teaching was accompanied with many ceremonies and *karakias*, or incantations, invocations, etc., in order to impress the pupil with the importance of the matter. There was a special sanctity attached to many things taught; deviation from the accepted doctrines was supposed to bring on the offender the wrath of the gods' (*ib.* p. 19). The statement may thus be accepted that the Maori cosmogony is of immense antiquity, having been transmitted *verbatim* from priest to priest for thousands of years.

In this as in many other such records the distinction is not always clearly drawn between the divine and the human elements. Sometimes gods become men and men gods, while the theogonies are called genealogies, and often merge imperceptibly in the human genealogies, as if the 'inspired singers,' after deriving the deities from mortals, had redressed the balance by reversing the process. Thus *Maui*, who looms so largely in Polynesian romance, appears to be at first human, and then through his exploits becomes clothed by later generations with divine attributes, and in another place we are told that one Maui (for there are several) is the son of *Tangaroa*, and becomes man, Tangaroa himself being both god and man. The renowned chief Tu-tarangi also, who in Rarotonga is only an eponymous hero, or at most a demigod, is known to the Niue islanders as a deified ancestor. Now Turner, a great authority, tells us that 'the Savage [Niue] islanders worshipped the spirits of their ancestors' (*Samoa a Hundred Years Ago*, p. 306). Here perhaps we have an explanation of the apparent confusion. The all-pervading ancestor-cult evidently underlies the whole mythological superstructure, and from this source were derived the gods of the Polynesian Olympus. But the living chiefs are the direct heirs of these Olympians, consequently their genealogies are mere continuations of the theogonies, and to the native mind there is no real confusion at all. Thus it is that, as above remarked (by Bastian), everything becomes clear when we grasp the root ideas out of which flourish these wonderful efflorescences of Indonesian thought.

At times the Polynesian singers appear to soar into the ethereal spaces and to realize the concept of a Supreme Being, as when out of the transformed body of Tangaroa (Taaroa and other variants) the lesser gods, the demiurges, fabricate the universe, and Taaroa himself is spoken of as *Toivi*, the 'Eternal,' or else, like the Hindu Brahma, or the Dodonian Zeus that 'was, is, and shall be,' is described in the loftiest language as dwelling 'in the limitless void of space, when the World was not yet, nor the Heavens, nor the Sea, nor Man; from on high he calleth, changing to fresh forms, root of the earth, under-prop of the rocks, Taaroa as the Sea-sands in the broad expanse, bursts into Light, cometh down as Wisdom, born the Hawaii land, Hawaii the Great, the Holy.' Similar elevated language pervades the Mangaian cosmogony, which begins with *Te-aka-ia-Roe*, the 'Root of all Being,' and is logically developed in harmony with those of the other Polynesian systems (Gill, *Myths and Songs, passim*). Here, too, the genealogies of the gods pass gradually, as in Hawaii, and with scarcely a break, to those of mortals, all in the interest of the living rulers of the land. Such sublime conceptions, such subtle theosophies, such personifications of Chaos, Immensity, Gloomy Night, and other pure abstractions, in these children of nature, excite wonder and remain inexplicable in their present fragmentary state. Everywhere we find Heaven, Earth, the Universe, the After-World, recurring under diverse names and forms, personified by language, embodied in theocratic and anthropomorphic philosophies—echoes, as it were, of the Vedic hymns reverberating from isle to isle over the broad Pacific waters. The question arises, Have there been Vedic contacts? It is a chronological question which cannot be answered until the date is approximately determined of the eastward migration of the Indonesians from Malaysia. Did the migration precede or follow the arrival of the Hindu missionaries in that region? This vital point has engaged the attention of Mr. R. Studholme Thompson, whose 'Origin of the Maori' appeared in *The Maori Record* for 1906-1907.

Some light is thrown on the origin of a whole class of bird-omens by what Dr. Turner tells us of a superstition prevalent in Savaii (Samoa group), where '*Sepo Malosi* ("Sepo the Strong") was worshipped as a war-god, and incarnate in the large bat, or flying-fox. While the bat flew before the warriors all was right, but if it turned round and shut up the way it was a sign of defeat and a warning to go back' (*op. cit.* p. 51). And again: 'The bat was also an incarnation [of Taisumalie, "Tide gently Rising"]. One flying ahead of the troops was always a good omen' (p. 57). We are at once reminded of the flights of the eagles seen by Romulus and Remus at the foundation of Rome, although at that time the Western Aryans may have ceased to believe in any spirits incorporated in the birds. We also learn something about the origin of ordeals from the statement that in the Samoan temples were kept conchs, stones, coconut shells, and other such objects of superstitious veneration, which were used as aids in the administration of justice. In the presence of such ordeals 'the truth was rarely concealed. They firmly believed that it would be death to touch the cup [coco-nut shell] and tell a lie' (*ib.*). And when these things became discredited, as having lost their hidden virtue—their *mana*, so to say—they were replaced by more efficacious processes: the poison-cup, hot iron bars, stones to be fished out

of boiling water, duelling, and the like. But the principle was the same, a steadfast belief in a supernatural power regulating the application of the tests in the interests of justice. For other Indonesian beliefs and religious observances, see art. POLYNESIA.

Owing perhaps to the difficulty of distinguishing between the purely social and the religious institutions of primitive peoples, a great diversity of opinion prevails even amongst the best observers regarding the religious views of the *Australian aborigines*. Some hold with Ernest Giles that they have no beliefs on the subject of gods or an after-life, and that those who credit them with such notions 'have been imposed upon, and that until they had learned something of Christianity from missionaries and others, the blacks had no beliefs or practices of the sort' (*Australia Twice Traversed*, Lond. i., 1889, 45). This may be taken as the extreme view on the negative side, and with it Carl Lumholtz so far agrees as to assert that 'at all events it is certain that neither idolatry nor sacrifices are to be found in Australia. Nor have the natives, so far as I know, ever been seen to pray' (*Among Cannibals*, p. 284). Elsewhere we read that 'it is a well-known fact that the Australian natives are almost wholly devoid of religious susceptibilities' (p. 339), and that to deposit food or other things with the dead 'was an idea which they could not comprehend' (p. 275), implying disbelief in an after-life. And the remarks of George Angas are quoted (p. 284) on the Murray River tribes, who 'appear to have no religious observances whatever. They acknowledge no Supreme Being, worship no idols, and believe only in the existence of a spirit, whom they consider as the author of ill, and regard with superstitious dread. They are in perpetual fear of malignant spirits, or bad men, who, they say, go abroad at night; and they seldom venture from the encampment after dusk . . . without carrying a fire-stick in their hands, which they consider has the property of repelling these evil spirits.'

This belief in an evil spirit is already something; but Lumholtz himself goes much further, and after referring inconsistently to 'their fear of *the spirits of the departed*' (p. 277), admits 'a wide-spread belief in the soul's existence independently of matter, the Kulin tribe (Victoria) believing that every man and animal has a *Muurup* (spirit) which can pass into other bodies, leave a person in his lifetime, and visit other people in their dreams. After death it may appear again, visit the grave of its former possessor, eat remnants of food lying near the camp, and warm itself by their night fires. A similar belief has been observed among the blacks of Lower Guinea' (p. 279; here read 'Upper Guinea,' and cf. the *kra* described in art. ETHNOLOGY, § 9). Then a native woman is mentioned who 'repeatedly brought food to the grave of her deceased husband' (p. 282); and 'definite religious notions' are credited to the southern tribes, while 'some very interesting information in regard to the idea of a God . . . has been furnished by Mr. Manning, who in 1845 discovered among some tribes of New South Wales a doctrine of the Trinity (*sic*), which bears so striking a resemblance to that of the Christian religion that we are tempted to take it to be the result of the influence of missionaries. But according to the author, the missionaries did not visit these tribes until many years later' (p. 283). They recognize a supreme, benevolent, omnipotent Being, *Boyma*, with an omniscient son, *Grogoragally*, mediator between Boyma and mortals, and a third person, half human, half divine, *Mooqeegally*, the great lawgiver to men, and lastly 'a hell with everlasting fire, and a heaven where the blessed dance and amuse themselves' (*ib.*). After this the passage quoted in *Primitive Culture*[3] (i. 418) by Tylor, that they have no idea of a supreme divinity, creator, and judge—that, 'in short, they have nothing whatever of the character of religion, or of religious observance, to distinguish them from the beasts that perish'—will appear extravagant to all competent observers of these aborigines.

The extreme view on the positive side of the question, that is, the belief in 'a tribal All-Father,' is perhaps most clearly emphasized by Dr. A. W. Howitt, who finds this belief wide-spread in 'the whole of Victoria and of New South Wales, up to the eastern boundaries of the tribes of the Darling River' (*Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 500). Amongst those of New South Wales are the *Euahlayi*, whom Mrs. Langloh Parker (*Euahlayi Tribe*, Lond. 1905) describes as having a more advanced theology and a more developed worship than any other Australian tribe. These now eat their hereditary totems without scruple—a sure sign that the totemic system is dying out, although still outwardly in full force. Amongst the Aruntas, Kaitish, and the other Central and Northern tribes studied by Spencer and Gillen, the system still survives, and totems are even assigned to the mysterious *Iruntarinia* entities, vague and invisible incarnations of the ghosts of ancestors who lived in the *Alcheringa* (*q.v.*) time, the dim remote past, the beginning of everything. They are far more powerful than living men, because their spirit part is associated with the so-called *churinga*, stocks, stones, or any other object which is deemed sacred as possessing a kind of *mana* which makes the yams and grass to grow, enables a man to capture game, and so forth. That the *churinga* are simply objects endowed with *mana* is the happy suggestion of Sidney Hartland, whose explanation has dispelled the dense fog of mystification hitherto enveloping the strange beliefs and observances of these Central and Northern tribes.

'They are mysterious objects in the closest association with the tribal ancestors, the outward and visible sign, if not the embodiment, of the ancestral souls or invisible portions, and as such regarded with veneration. They are endowed with *mana*, emanating from the ancestors whom they represent—*mana*, which not merely heals wounds, but when the churinga are brought ceremonially in contact with the body, produces other physical, mental, and even moral effects. . . . The churinga is intimately associated with the ancestor, and has "feelings" just as human beings have, which can be soothed by the rubbing in the same way in which those of living men can be' (Address at Brit. Assoc., York, 1906).

Hence a man, as he sings and rubs it with his hand, 'gradually comes to feel that there is some special association between him and the sacred object—that a virtue of some kind passes from it to him, and also from him to it' (Spencer-Gillen, *Northern Tribes*, ch. viii. p. 278 f.). By whatever name it be called, this is obviously *arungqultha*, the Australian *mana*, and it is equally obvious that the primitive Australian religions are still interwoven with magic (see above).

About the religious and ethical views of the extinct *Tasmanians* a good deal of information has been gathered from various sources by Brough Smyth (*Aborigines of Victoria*), J. Bonwick (*Daily Life*, etc., *of the Tasmanians*), and Tylor (*JAI* xxiii. 141, Nov. 1893). Socially they appear 'to have remained to our day living representatives of the early Stone Age, left behind in industrial development even by the ancient tribes of the Somme and the Ouse. . . . The life of these savages proves to be of undeveloped type alike in arts and institutions, so much so that the distinction of being the lowest of normal tribes may be claimed for them' (Tylor, *loc. cit.* 148, 152). Yet the religious sense had certainly been awakened. They feared to move about after dark, believing that their deceased relatives might be hovering about, and

there was a god who presided over the day and an evil spirit or demon over the night, and to the god the women addressed songs or prayers to secure the safe return of their absent husbands (Smyth, ii. 390). Bonwick, however, doubts this, while admitting that 'the Tasmanians had some dim apprehension of a future state' (p. 167), and refers to the case of a native who put a spear in a tree beside a dead body, 'to fight with when he sleep' (p. 174). The evidence is altogether very conflicting, although on the whole rather against the belief in a beneficent deity, and Dr. Nixon, first bishop of Tasmania, is quoted as saying that 'no trace can be found of the existence of any religious usage, or even sentiment, amongst them, unless, indeed, we may call by that name the dread of a malignant and destructive spirit, which seems to have been their predominant, if not their only, feeling on the subject' (p. 172). And there the matter must rest, since the last of the race died about 1890.

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AUSTRALIA. — **1. Introduction.** — Linguistic research shows that Australia is occupied by three distinct groups of languages, of which two are related to each other, while the third is independent of them in vocabulary and grammar, and shows little internal cohesion. The last group, named 'northern' by Schmidt, occupies the north of Australia and descends beyond 20° S. only in the centre, where it is found as far as 27° S. (the Aruntas). The other two groups, 'old' and 'new' Australian, distinguished by the way in which they form the genitive, occupy the remainder of the continent. By far the greater area falls to the 'new' group, split into nine sub-groups. The main 'old' Australian area is in Victoria with traces along the east coast; it seems to be related to the Tasmanian languages. The two Australian groups are related to each other in syntax and vocabulary, but less intimately than are the component parts of each group among themselves (*Man*, 1908). The grouping of tribes arrived at on this philological basis does not correspond very closely to those given by any other mode of classification, for material culture, social organization, initiation ceremonies, and burial customs give somewhat conflicting results; but on the whole the three last are distributed in a way which may be harmonized with the linguistic data, if we allow for a certain amount of lateral transmission. Thus, the eight-class tribes are wholly within the 'northern' area; they reckon descent in the male line, and though there are other districts in Australia—notably parts of Victoria and the coast of Queensland—where there is patrilineal descent of the classes or phratries, both these and the no-class areas belong to the old Australian speech-groups or are contiguous to them.

The same holds good with regard to the initiation ceremonies. The rites of circumcision and sub-incision are unknown in Victoria, New South Wales, the greater part of Queensland, and the coastal portions of West Australia; but we may readily explain their penetration into the Neo-Australian south-central area as the result of transmission, though, of course, some amount of infusion of foreign blood may have contributed to the result. Simple burial is, as a rule, characteristic of both the Australian groups, and in the old group it is accompanied by the practice of building a hut upon the grave—a custom which they shared with their neighbours, the Tasmanians. The grave seems to be looked upon as the abode of the soul, though we find sporadically the belief that the spirits of the dead travel to the west, or, where there is a belief in a god, to reside with him. In the 'Northern' area, on the other hand, and certain adjacent districts, the body is submitted to various processes, and the essential funerary rite seems to be the disposal of the bones, which marks the time at which the spirit of the dead is believed to go to its own place. It may be noted that special treatment of the bones is a well-marked feature of funeral rites in parts of New Guinea.

When we come to deal with the more intangible sphere of beliefs, we are on more uncertain ground; it is indisputable that belief in a tribal All-Father prevailed in Victoria, New South Wales, and parts of South Australia; that it has been recorded but rarely outside this area does not necessarily mean more than that the recorder has not penetrated very far into the ideas of the natives with whom he was familiar. So far, however, as our evidence goes, it seems that the All-Father belief is pre-eminently characteristic of the old Australian group; it is found among important tribes of the Neo-Australian group, such as the Wiradjuri and the Kamilaroi, but there is no record of it among the Darling tribes and in the greater part of Queensland. So far as we have evidence for it, the totemism of the northern area seems to differ widely from that which is found elsewhere in Australia, and save among the Dieri and other contiguous tribes there is no record of *Intichiuma* ceremonies except in this part of the continent.

2. Religion.—There has been a good deal of controversy as to the genuine aboriginal character, and, this being conceded, the real status of the Australian All-Father. There is, however, satisfactory evidence that Baiame, about whom the controversy has turned in the main, was recognized in the Wellington valley before the advent of the Church of England Mission in 1832 (*Man*, 1905, No. 28); and, though a Wesleyan mission existed there in 1828, before Henderson collected his facts, there is no reason to suppose that it could have exerted any great influence, certainly not enough to introduce such a figure as Baiame into the initiation rites of the aborigines, as it must have done if the theory of the missionary origin of these anthropomorphic beings is to be maintained.

There is naturally more doubt as to the precise position occupied in the aboriginal view of the universe by Baiame and his congeners; some authors have denied that the term 'god' can properly be applied to them (*Folklore*, ix. 290–329), while others have maintained that they are eternal, omniscient, all-powerful creators. Probably the truth lies nearer the latter than the former view. At the initiation ceremonies of the Euahlayi tribe, according to Mrs. Langloh Parker, an excellent

authority, Baiame is proclaimed as 'Father of All, whose laws the tribes are now obeying.' He established the rule that tribes at the fishing ground should keep peace; he gives rain to the orphan who cries for it; he is prayed to at the *bora* ('initiation ceremonies') and at funerals, and his name means 'great'; his figure is made in earth on the *bora* ground (Parker, *Euahlayi Tribe*, 7 f.). Some of the difficulties which surround the question of the status of the Australian All-Father have arisen, however, because the disputants have overlooked the fact that the beliefs of the various tribes show not only different degrees of development, but actual differences in kind. Schmidt has pointed out (*Anthropos*, 1908) that we seem to have three strata: (1) the belief in an All-Father pure and simple; (2) the belief in an All-Father who has taken over features of a tribal ancestor; (3) the belief in a being of this kind who is also the creator, has wives and children, and (in the case of Baiame) is sometimes depicted as ruling the world through a subordinate. As examples of these three classes of belief may be cited: (1) the Kurnai view of Mungan-ngaua; (2) the Theddora, Wolgal, Ngarego, and Yuin view of Daramulun; and (3) the Wiradjuri, Kamilaroi, and Euahlayi view of Baiame. Bunjil also, the All-Father of the Central Victorian tribes, belongs to the third category. This theory depends on complicated considerations connected with the distribution (*a*) of phratries, (*b*) of totems, and (*c*) of sex-totems, from which Schmidt has produced evidence in favour of a primary dark race, represented by the crow, upon which two successive waves of migration, represented by the eaglehawk and the emu, have descended. He argues that both Daramulun and Baiame were not indigenous, but originally tribal heroes of the invaders, the former of the eaglehawk race, the latter of the emu race; or, at any rate, that Baiame, if he were the All-Father of the indigenous tribes, combined therewith the character of tribal ancestor of the invading tribes. On this point there is not much evidence on either side, but, such as it is, it tells in favour of the view that Baiame was introduced by the invaders; for it is reported (*Australian Anthropological Journal*, i. 14) that the Minkins, on the Lower Leichardt, south of the Gulf of Carpentaria, believe in a god Gooaree who lives in Warnoo; Baiamai came from Warderah and taught them initiation ceremonies. So, too, the Mikadoons in the same neighbourhood believe in Gumboo, and say that Baiamai, who taught them initiation ceremonies, came from an island beyond Australia. Howitt has already called attention (*Native Tribes*, p. 498) to the fact that the evil spirit, Coen, at Sydney, had a namesake Kohin on the Herbert River; and if, as it seems, we are entitled to regard these as identical, there is no reason for mistrusting the evidence for a belief in Baiame just south of the Gulf on the score of its distance from the seat of the Baiame-cult in N. S. Wales. In this connexion it may be noted that precisely at this point south of the Gulf the Neo-Australian languages stretch northwards into the territory of the northern group. In this account Baiame figures as tribal hero, not as creator or All-Father, precisely as Schmidt's theory requires.

The following tribes are mentioned by Howitt (*op. cit.* 488 ff.) as having the All-Father belief: Narrinyeri (Nurrundere or Martummere); Wiimbaio (Nurelli); S. W. Victoria (Pirnmeheal); Wotjobaluk, Kulin, and Woëworung (Bunjil, Maminggorak, or Mamingata); Kurnai (Mungan-ngaua); Wathiwathi (Tha-tha-puli); Tatathi (Tulong); Theddora, Ngarego, and Yuin (Daramulun, Papang, or Biamban); Kamilaroi and Wiradjuri (Baiame); Port Stephens and Herbert River (Coen); S. Queensland (Maamba and Birral). About some of these, however, *e.g.* Birral, we have no information, and it is mere guesswork to include them among the All-Fathers. Birral may well be identical with Bedall (Thorne, *Queen of the Colonies*, 317), who is said to have made the world long ago, when he floated on the water, in form like a huge turtle two miles across the back. In this being we see few or none of the traits of the All-Father. In the Moreton Bay district, however, Buddai seems to have been the equivalent of Baiame (Lang, *Cookesland*, 1847, 459).

There is therefore good *prima facie* evidence for the existence of the belief in an All-Father south-east of the line from the mouth of the Murray to Moreton Bay. Beyond this area we have certain evidence only from the west coast between Geraldton and Albany, where Mamma Gnaia, Father of All, is reverenced (*Trans. Roy. Soc. S. Aust.* xvi. 488). Captain Bradshaw has informed the present writer that on the Victoria River a being is recognized who watches over the morals of the tribes, and the same is reported of Kohin on the Herbert River; but in neither case is the epithet 'Father of All' reported, and there is no evidence even of moral influence on the part of the beings reported from the Larrakia of Port Darwin by Foelsche (Curr, *Australian Race*, i. 253). The Cape River tribes are said (*ib.* iii. 146) to believe in a being in the sky, to whom good men go when they die.

In the central area some tribes seem to believe in a being not unlike Baiame; but the evidence as to the beliefs of these peoples is hardly satisfactory. Spencer and Gillen (*Northern Tribes*, 502 f.) say that Twanyirika of the Aruntas and Unmatjeras, and Katajalina of the Binbingas are bugbears, pure and simple, whose function is to keep the women and children in subjection; Tumana of the Kaitish and Murtu-murtu of the Warramungas are simply Alcheringa (*q.v.*) ancestors. Atnatu of the Kaitish stands by himself; he made the Alcheringa and stands in a real relation to the initiation ceremonies; for he is pleased when the operators sound the bull-roarer, and angry when they do not; but he does not trouble himself about morality.

In this account, however, there is no mention of the being known as Altjira, whom Strehlow reports as known to the Aruntas (*Veroffentlichungen aus dem Volker-Museum Frankfurt*, i. 1), and who seems to have been mentioned by Gillen in the *Report of the Horn Expedition* (1896) under the name of Ulthaana ('spirit'). It is therefore open to question how far the account given by Spencer and Gillen in *Northern Tribes* can be regarded as exhaustive.

For the Dieri our evidence is equally uncertain. Gason reported that they believed in a good spirit Mura-mura; but subsequently the Mura-mura were ascertained to be mythical ancestors, like the Muk-Kurnai and the Alcheringa ancestors generally (Howitt, *op. cit.* 487). Recently, however, it has been asserted that the Dieri believe in Mura, a good spirit, distinct from the Mura-mura.

Associated with the All-Father of the south-eastern area is often an evil being, sometimes described as his son, sometimes independent. Thus Henderson (*Notes*, 147) says:

> 'Mudgegong is an evil spirit, who, after having derived his existence from Piame (=Baiame), declared war upon him and now endeavours with all his power to frustrate his undertakings. The offspring of Piame were numerous, but the whole with the exception of two were destroyed by Mudgegong, who converted them into different wild animals. . . . The evil spirit seemed to be described under the form of the eaglehawk. . . . Certain dramatic representations appear to be performed; the principal one is emblematic of the destruction of the eaglehawk by Piame.'

Another account (Macarthur, *N. S. Wales*, 1837, ii. 301) makes Wandong—one of the sons of Baiame mentioned by Henderson—the author of evil; and a third makes Daramulun himself the opponent (on these myths and their explanation see Schmidt,

in *Anthropos*, iii.). The same antithesis is made between Bunjil and Palyan, Coen and Potoyan, etc. Schmidt's view is that these myths date from the racial conflicts: where the crow race gained the day, Bunjil ('eaglehawk') is the defeated; elsewhere Mudgegong ('eaglehawk') is also defeated, but not by the crow.

It should be noted that there is a certain amount of confusion in the various reports; thus Coen, whom Howitt regards as equivalent to Daramulun, is depicted as an evil being (see Howitt, *op. cit.* 486). Other evil beings are Brewin among the Kurnai (*JAI* xiii. 191, xiv. 321, note 2), Tou in South Australia, Koochie among the Dieri, Jingi in West Australia.

It has, however, frequently happened that an evil being has been reported, who, on examination, turns out to be simply the spirit of a dead man. Thus among the Wiradjuri *buggeen* is not a proper name; in Western Victoria Nisbet (*Colonial Tramp*, 1891, 99) reports an evil deity Muurup, who comes in the lightning to destroy them, eats children, etc.; the owl is his messenger; he lives under ground and commands the evil spirits. But we learn from Howitt that *Muurup* is the soul of a dead man; hence the name can hardly be of any specific deity, but must apply to the dead in general, who are especially feared in the south of Australia.

Female deities are unknown in Australia, but in a certain number of cases the evil being is believed to be of the female sex; thus Kurriwilban, wife of Kogorowen, is described as an enemy of mankind (Threlkeld, *Aust. Language*, 1892, 48).

3. Burial.—From the point of view of burial customs, the Australian tribes fall into two groups. (1) In New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and the coastal portions of West Australia, simple burial without alternative rites, such as cremation, is the rule, save in an enclave near the mouth of the Murray River. (2) In Northern Territory and Queensland, simple burial without alternative rites is also found, though how far the absence of alternative rites means that our information is defective is an open question; but, as a rule, the body is exposed on a platform, or the flesh is eaten, or the body is buried and the bones subsequently exhumed. The main funeral ceremony is connected with the disposal of the bones. This rite, however, is often reserved, as is cannibalism, for specially favoured individuals, such as warriors, magicians, etc. Alternative rites are used where the subject was unimportant, owing to old age or youth.

Corresponding to these two classes—simple burial and complex rites—there seem to be different views as to the destiny of the soul. In the south the grave seems to be regarded in many cases as its abode; in the north it remains with the body or the bones till the latter are finally disposed of, and then goes to its own place. Fear of the dead seems to be more prominent in the south.

In Victoria and the south of N. S. Wales a hut was frequently built upon the grave, in which the widow or another relative sat during the time of mourning. This is also a Tasmanian custom, and strengthens the evidence for the intimate connexion of the Victorian tribes with the Tasmanian (see *Folklore*, vol. xix. [1908] p. 388).

4. Future life.—Australian beliefs as to a future life are generally vague, and our information is defective. At Port Lincoln (*Trans. Philosophical Institute of Victoria*, v. 188) it was believed that the soul was so small as to be able to pass through a chink; after death it went to an island, and could dispense with further nourishment; a redbill accompanied the soul on its journey. Near Adelaide, however (Gerstäcker, *Reisen*, 1854, iv. 361), it was held that the soul lived in trees during the day, and came down at night to eat caterpillars, frogs, etc.; concurrently with this (?), it was believed that the soul went west to an abyss at death. The Euahlayi believe that the spirit of a dead man goes with the spirits of dead relatives to Oobi Oobi, a sacred mountain, from which he is hoisted to Bullimah, Baiame's residence, by certain spirits called *Mooroobeaigunnul* (Parker, *Euahlayi Tribe*, 90 f.).

According to Spencer-Gillen[b] (145, 174), re-incarnation is everywhere the creed. This has been questioned by Strehlow (*Globus*, xci. 285, xcii. 123; *Veroffentlichungen aus dem Volker-Museum Frankfurt*, i., Introduction), and the real facts are not yet ascertained. Strehlow, however, reports two Aranda beliefs. According to one, there is an island of the dead, from which a spirit returns for temporary re-incarnation, lasting for a year or two, and is finally annihilated; the other affirms that the good dead live with Altjira, the sky-being. In the place of the re-incarnation doctrine, Strehlow finds the belief that the germ (*ratapa*) of a child issues from the body of a totemic ancestor, or that an ancestor throws a small bull-roarer at a woman, in whose body it changes to a child.

5. Cult of the dead.—Although totemic ancestors figure largely in myth in some parts, there is nothing in the nature of a cult of ancestors. The dead are feared; certain powers are ascribed to them, such as raising storms, sending rain, procuring a good catch of fish, and appeals of various sorts are made to them (Collins, *Eng. Colony in N. S. Wales*, 1798–1802, i. 601; J. S. Lang, *Aborigines*, 31; Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals*, 1889, 282; Ogle, *Colony of West Aust.*, 1839, 58; Salvado, *Mémoires historiques*, 1854, 276; Stephens, *Hist. of S. Aust.*, 1838, 78, etc.), but not specially as ancestors. Near Adelaide the spirits of enemies were kept quiet by magic spells (*Verh. d. Gesell. f. Erdkunde*, i. 194). Sleeping on the grave of a dead man was one of the methods of becoming a magician (Mauss, *Pouvoirs*, 17, etc.). There is a wide-spread belief that natives, when they die, return as white men (Roth, *Bull.* 5, p. 16). There are also traces of a belief in transmigration (*Man*, 1905, No. 28).

6. Soul.—All natives of Australia seem to have held an animistic view of man, though the sky-beings are regarded as corporeal. But as to their view of the soul, etc., we have only scanty information. Mrs. K. L. Parker records that the Euahlayi attributed to each person three spirits: Yowee, the soul which leaves the body only at death; Dowee, a dream spirit; Mulloowil, a shadow spirit; and, sometimes, Yunbeai, or tutelary animal ([?] spirit) (*Euahlayi Tribe*, 35).

On the Tully R., Qu., the soul is associated with the shadow and the breath; the *koi* goes away during sleep; after death it goes into the bush. On the Bloomfield R. the *wau-wau* is associated with the breath, but is independent of the ghost. At Cape Bedford it is part and parcel of a man's spiritual part. On the Pennefather R. the *ngai* and the *choi* are distinguished; the latter leaves the corpse at death and wanders in the bush; the former passes into the body of son, daughter, or sister. Both are associated with the heart and afterbirth (Roth, *Bull.* 5. 17–19).

7. Magic.—With regard to magical practices, there are well-marked differences between the northern group and the remainder of Australia. Among the central tribes magic is practised by both men and women without special initiation, save in the Anula tribe, where the magician is the producer of evil, not the doctor. The initiated medicine-man has the duty of protecting the community or individual members against the magic of others. Among the south-eastern tribes, however, the medicine-man is both worker of magic and doctor indifferently; and, so far as can be seen,

the practice of magic is usually confined to initiated men, though Mrs. Parker mentions a witch-woman among the Euahlayi.

In some tribes the magician is so by birth; among the Anulas only one kin performs these functions; among the Tongarankas a boy inherits his powers from his father (Mauss, *op. cit.* 10; Howitt, 404). More often, however, initiation is by revelation from the dead, from spirits, or from the All-Father, or else knowledge is communicated by other magicians. Occasionally a man who has escaped miraculously from a violent death is reputed a magician.

It is commonly believed that at their initiation medicine-men have introduced into their bodies certain stones, usually fragments of quartz, upon which their magic powers depend, and which may be caused to leave their bodies if they partake of alcohol, hot drinks, etc., or are bitten by ants. The Euahlayi believe that all magicians have a *nagual* ('individual totem'), which is forbidden food to them, which they can cause to appear to others, and whose shape they can themselves assume.

The commonest form of magic, practised all over Australia, is 'pointing'; hair, etc., are used in the south and east; spells are common; in Queensland a man's lifeblood is said to be withdrawn by the *mangani*; and magic may be worked by an effigy of the victim (Roth, 5. 28; Howitt, 354; Spencer-Gillen[b], 455; Mauss, *Pouvoirs, passim*, etc.).

In connexion with magic, mention must be made of rain-making. The office of rain-maker was often distinct from that of medicine-man, especially among the Dieri, where all participated in the rites; the ceremonies may almost be termed religious. The same remark applies to the totemic ceremonies of the centre and north.

8. Totemism.—The *nagual*, associated with the magician among the Euahlayi and elsewhere, is probably rare in most parts of Australia (for possible cases see *Aust. Assoc. for the Advancement of Science Reports*, iii. 515, v. 638; *Science of Man*, vii. 91; cf. *Man*, 1904, No. 53). Of kin totemism in the S. and E. we know little beyond the names of the animals. In some cases the killing of the animal is forbidden, but among the Euahlayi there is no restriction. It is the *nagual* that is sacrosanct, but it is forbidden to mimic or speak ill of a totem. The totem also helps the human being (Howitt, 400; Parker, 21).

The totemism of the north and centre appears to be generically different from that on the south and east. The local grouping, the great number of totems, and their connexion with *Intichiuma* ceremonies, are all important differentia. Still more important perhaps is the fact that in the south-east totems are animals; in the south, centre, and in South Queensland, animals and plants, the latter fewer than the former; among the Aruntas both in fairly equal numbers; and in North Australia, as in New Guinea, the plant totems outnumber the animals (see Schmidt, in *Anthropos*, iii.).

A progressive change is also noticeable with regard to the eating of the totem, which is permitted among the Arandas alone; in both the Aranda and the Kaitish tribes the totem must be eaten at the *Intichiuma* ceremonies. Among the Warramungas it is offered to men of the totem by others, but not eaten. Finally, in the Binbinga and other tribes it is neither eaten nor offered. It has been mentioned above that the *yunbeai* ('nagual') may be regarded as a fourth soul. There are traces of a similar animistic view of ordinary totemism. Among both the Euahlayi and the Warramungas one of the divinatory ceremonies to discover a murderer consists in observing the tracks near the body; the track of a snake indicates that a man of the snake totem is the culprit (Spencer-Gillen[b], 519, 526; K. L. Parker, *op. cit.* 89).

So-called 'sex totemism' is found in South Australia, Victoria, and New South Wales, mainly on the coast. Each sex has a 'brother' or 'sister,' whom they respect and regard as the creator of their sex. The sacrosanct animals are usually small birds (wren, nightjar, etc.) or the bat.

9. Initiation ceremonies.—The initiation ceremonies fall into two main groups: (1) the central tribes west of a line from near Adelaide to the south end of the Gulf of Carpentaria practise circumcision, and, with the exception of a small area near Adelaide, sub-incision also; knocking out of teeth is known and practised in this part of Australia, but has no special significance; and (2) along the west coast and in Victoria and New South Wales the initiation ceremony consists in the knocking out of the boy's tooth. North of the Queensland border even this feature is wanting, and combats, real, not simulated, with spears, clubs, etc., test the manhood of the youths. Whereas in the central area the ceremonies are performed by successive stages, so that a youth attains his privileges gradually, the initiation customs of the eastern tribes admit him at once to all the privileges of manhood, though, of course, his share in the government of the tribe is naturally small until he has attained riper years (Howitt, 509-677; Curr, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Spencer-Gillen[b], *passim*).

In connexion with the initiation ceremonies, mention must be made of the system of food prohibitions, which perhaps attains a greater development in Australia than in any other part of the world. Eyre (*Journal*, 1845, ii. 293) records particulars of South Australian customs. Up to the age of nine or ten, boys were free to eat any food; then twenty or thirty different animals and birds were forbidden them; ten years later some of these restrictions were relaxed, but new ones were imposed; married men up to the age of thirty-five were forbidden eight or ten articles of diet; old men were, again, free to follow their inclinations. There were similar lists of prohibited foods for girls and women.

10. Bull-roarer.—There are well-marked variations with regard to the bull-roarer. In the south-east of New South Wales it is associated with Daramulun; elsewhere in the colony and in Central and North Australia it is associated with a spirit or spirits in the exoteric doctrine; but the young men are taught its real nature at initiation. Both in New South Wales and in South Australia two bull-roarers were used, one large, the other small, which were sometimes said to be male and female. Among the west coast tribes of the Gulf the bull-roarer is rare, but here too the women are told that it is the voice of an evil spirit. On the Georgina River a large sacred bull-roarer is found, and side by side with it a small one, which is simply a toy. In some parts of North Queensland children of both sexes use it as a toy, in others only boys. On the Bloomfield River the boys are taught the use of it at the initiation ceremonies; but they are permitted to use it in the presence of women, so that it partakes more of the character of a toy. See BULL-ROARER.

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iii. MAGIC: Mauss, *L'Origine des pouvoirs magiques*, Paris, 1904; Van Gennep, *Mythes et légendes d'Australie*, Paris, 1906.

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AUTHORITY. — *Definition and scope.* — The word 'authority,' as used in ordinary language, always implies a certain amount of coerciveness. The most common meaning is that of a power to enforce obedience. But the sense varies according to the sphere in which the authoritative power is exercised. As regards action, it is the power which enforces obedience. Authority and obedience are correlative terms, supremacy being implied on the part of authority, and dependence on the part of those who have to obey. Authority has the right and the power to say the last word, and to give a decision from which there is no appeal. Its judgment is final. But there is also a use of the word which reveals it as operative in the sphere of opinion, belief, and action. The final test of belief and of opinion is action, and authority in this regard is the power which is held to have the right to influence opinion, to induce belief, and so to lead to action. That is to say, this view really is a phase of the view which looks on authority as the power that enforces obedience, for it shows authority at work in that sphere which ultimately issues in obedience. It reveals the process by which obedience is won. The right to influence opinion, to induce belief, to persuade a man to take a certain course of conduct, which belongs to authority, is thus the way to command obedience. Yet there is a shade of difference in the two aspects of authority set forth above. In that view which regards authority as the power that commands obedience, we abstract from the way and means by which it persuades the man to obey, and fix our attention on the categorical command which must be obeyed. In the other case, authority is presented as rational, as proving its right to command, as presenting itself in an attitude of persuasion, as leading the object of authority to lend his own assent to the demand made on him. The power to create opinion, to influence belief, and to constrain to action is exercised with a view to enforce obedience. This power may be exercised in many ways, varying according to the sphere of operation, the means available, and the end in view. In the intellectual sphere it may take the form of authoritative opinion, the view of a man who has the expert knowledge which few others have at command. It may take the form of testimony as to matters of fact of which he is or has been the only witness. In short, it may take a thousand forms; but the outcome in every case is to win assent, to constrain belief, and to influence action.

The common element in all forms of authority is ultimately to enforce opinion, and to constrain belief. Without this element of coerciveness, authority has no real meaning. All authority inhibits, forces, or pains. It is of its very nature so to act. But, on the other hand, authority must be prepared to justify itself, and to show that it has the right to command, and the power to enforce its behests. It is not an end in itself; it is a means to an end. What that end may be it is not necessary here to determine. It may be that Höffding is correct when he says:

'Authority can never be anything but a means, and the principle of authority is subordinate to the principle of personality, as mediate value must always be subordinate to immediate value. The burden of proof must always lie with those who wish to inhibit, limit, force, or pain. Authority pleads as its justification that it is the necessary condition for the complete carrying out of the principle of personality' (*The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 279).

To Höffding the principle of authority, while it has its own place and function, is subordinate to the principle of personality. This is a different contrast from the familiar one of the antithesis of authority and reason, with which literature is so well acquainted. Höffding is concerned with the principle of the Conservation of Values, and for the right estimate of values the principle of Personality, he holds, is of supreme worth. It is not necessary to enter into his theory, or to discuss it. The main thing is that for him the principle of authority is not ultimate. It must justify itself. There is another view which we may take from Mr. Arthur Balfour.

'Authority, as I have been using the term, is in all cases contrasted with Reason, and stands for that group of non-rational causes, moral, social, and educational, which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning' (*The Foundations of Belief*, p. 219). 'If we are to judge with equity between these rival claimants, we must not forget that it is Authority rather than Reason to which, in the main, we owe not religion only, but ethics and politics; that it is Authority which supplies us with essential elements in the premises of science; that it is Authority rather than Reason which lays deep the foundations of social life; that it is Authority rather than Reason which cements its superstructure. And though it may seem to savour of paradox, it is yet no exaggeration to say that, if we would find the quality in which we most notably excel the brute creation, we should look for it not so much in our faculty of convincing and being convinced by the exercise of reasoning, as in our capacity for influencing and being influenced through the action of Authority' (*ib.* p. 229 *f*).

In drawing out the contrast between authority and reason, Mr. Balfour dwells with delight on customary opinion, habit, and on that 'group of non-rational causes—moral, social, and educational—which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning.' He has forgotten to observe that in all these processes reason is, at all events, implicit. For the customs, traditions, and social, moral, and educational influences in the midst of which we live, have been the products of rational beings, of beings, in short, who have been implicitly rational from the beginning. All the causes which he claims for authority may be better assigned to reason. He refuses to let reason possess authority, for, he says, 'Authority as such is, from the nature of the case, dumb in the presence of argument.' It is instructive to read why it should be so. But we may not linger over his ingenious argumentation. Our contention is that authority need not fear argument, when it insists on its legitimate claim to influence or coerce men. But then its claim must, like all claims, submit to criticism; and, when it does so, it need not take refuge in groups of non-rational causes, or in that dim mysterious region of instinct to which Mr. Balfour consigns it. For there are many voices which speak to us with authority, and to none of them can we turn a deaf ear without paying an appropriate penalty. That penalty may be stated, and the sanction of any true authority may be vindicated, to the satisfaction of reason.

It may be broadly stated that in every sphere of human activity, and in every sphere of human thought, there is something which may rightly be called authority. The sanctions by which authority vindicates its attitude may vary with each sphere, but in all of them there is authority with its appropriate sanctions. It is not our purpose to make an exhaustive enumeration of the spheres in which authority has its appropriate place and function. To do so would be to enumerate all the sciences, all the arts, all the philosophies, and, in short, all those achievements of the human mind which are embodied in the literature of the world. But we may ask—

1. Is there an **authority in science?** And if so, what are its functions, and what are its sanctions? Waiving the question as to the abstract nature of science, and as to the depreciation of it on that account, may we not say that it is through the achievements of science that we have won control over the external world, and subdued it to the uses of man? It may be quite true that nature is more complex and more subtle than our sciences, and that, while we speak of heat, light, electricity, gravitation, and dwell on these in our abstract fashion, every particle of matter is at the same

time in some state of temperature, in some electric condition, and so on. Yet so far science has read the meaning of nature, and has subjected itself to the authority of nature. The external world has been controlled by man, and subdued to his uses only because he has submitted himself to its authority. It is possible for a man to strive to ignore the law of gravitation, but, if he does so, he will never build a house. Practical work in the external world is possible only if a man submits to the authority placed on him by the nature of that world. We do not mean only that he must recognize those great and universal characteristics of nature which science has expressed under such generalizations as the law of gravitation, the law of the conservation of energy, and such like,—he must have regard to the particular nature of every natural object with which he has to do. He must deal with stones according to the qualities of stones, with timber according to the qualities of timber, and with other things after their kind. These dictate to science and to men generally the conditions under which work must be done. In building his bridges man must make allowance for the contraction of iron under cold and for its expansion under heat. The nature of his material and the laws of physics speak to him with an authoritative voice, and if he ventures to disregard that authority, he must pay the price. He will find it sanctioned by tumbling houses, falling bridges, and general wreck and ruin. Nature will do anything for one who knows how to make her work, but she will do nothing for one who does not know her way and her limitations. We take from the sciences our first example of authority, and we have begun here because we find that the authority of nature can be justified, and that reason quite recognizes the validity of the claim which nature presents to man in the system in which he lives.

Reason can recognize the processes and methods of nature. Indeed, the possibility of science depends on the presupposition of the rationality of nature. Acting on that supposition, science has questioned nature, has experimented with her, has come to know her, has summed up its knowledge of nature in the special sciences, and has succeeded in this venture just because it has recognized the order of nature as real, objective, authoritative. The value of the generalizations of science lies in the fact that they represent nature, and that they may be verified in the processes and in the facts of nature. This means that the order of nature is recognized by man as authoritative, and science has taken it as such. No doubt, there is a correspondence between the order of nature and the constitution of the human mind. The correspondence exists, whatever the explanation of it may be. It would lead us too far afield to inquire into the origin and character of the correspondence. Nor is it necessary; for, whether we hold that mind gives laws to nature or the converse, the correspondence stands. Mind and nature are related the one to the other. So, whether we inquire into the order of nature or into the constitution of mind, we are led to something common to both. For nature is rational, is a system, and mind finds that the rationality in nature is akin to the rationality of which it is conscious in itself.

2. Authority of the laws of reason.—When we inquire, therefore, into the constitution of mind, we start with the presupposition that we shall find it rational, just as we have found nature to be rational. One of the chief characteristics of mind is that it has the power of transcending particular experiences, and of making universal and necessary propositions, which it believes to be true always and everywhere. These judgments are disclosed to it on reflexion, but from their very nature they lie at the foundation of all experience, and without them experience would not be possible. They are of such a kind that the mind recognizes their truth and validity as soon as it understands them. They bear on the face of them their own irresistible evidence. It is impossible for us to think of an event happening without a cause. The law of causation rules our thinking, and of an unrelated event we are unable to conceive. Axioms are axiomatic. We cannot think without them. It makes no difference whether we call them 'axioms,' or designate them 'postulates'; in either case they are there as the foundation of all our thinking. Without them we should fall into contradiction, and lapse into confusion. Thought must be consistent with itself, that is, it must not be self-contradictory, and thought must be consistent with reality. On the other hand, these universal and necessary judgments must be prepared to vindicate their validity. They must submit to criticism, and show themselves in their universal and necessary character. They must show themselves in all the glory of their self-evidence; they must be prepared to prove that the opposite of them is inconceivable; and they must prove that, unless we accept them, our thinking will be self-contradictory. It is not necessary to enumerate these axioms. Two and two make four, a thing cannot be and not be at the same time—on such axioms as these all are agreed, whatever the explanation of their validity may be. All thinking must assume the law of non-contradiction, as all fruitful thinking must recognize the validity of the laws of logic.

These axioms are authoritative, and are authoritative in the ordinary meaning of the term. They enforce obedience to them under the sanction that, if they are disregarded, thinking will be inept, unfruitful, nonsensical. In this sphere the antinomy between authority and freedom, between authority and reason, between the principle of authority and the principle of personality, does not emerge. For the principle of authority here is the very principle of reason itself, and these necessary and universal judgments are those which make freedom, personality, and reason possible. For reason can be exercised only on the basis of universality and necessity. Because there is a fixed order of nature, and necessary laws of reason, freedom is possible, and ideals may be conceived and realized. If there were no axioms, if there were no universal and necessary judgments, no fixed properties of things, it would not be possible for mind to conceive ends and adopt means for their realization. Nor would it be possible for man to maintain a rational relation to a random world. The main thing, however, to insist on here is that these universal and necessary judgments speak to us with authority, coerce our opinions and beliefs, and constrain us to action consistent with them. They have thus the note of authority, and enforce themselves on us with very drastic sanctions. Our thinking, our action, and even our feeling must be consistent with them, and must proceed with a due regard to their supremacy.

3. Authority in the sphere of civil life.—We have seen that authority is rightly exercised over us by the external order of the world, and by the laws of mind itself, and that the sanctions are of the most real and emphatic order. Can we find a legitimate sphere for authority, with appropriate sanctions, in the sphere of civil life, in the sphere of morals, and in the sphere of religion? It is impossible to say that in these spheres a denial of authority involves self-contradiction. Disloyalty,

disobedience, and anarchy are possible, as history abundantly shows. Take the case of government, and ask, What is the place of authority in it? Here clearly we must bring in a number of considerations which were not needed in relation to the authoritativeness of laws of nature and laws of mind. With his usual insight and sagacity, Bishop Butler sets forth the essential note of government when he says:

'The annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the proper formal notion of government. . . . If civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws take place, without interposing at all, after they had passed them, without a trial and the formalities of an execution, if they were able to make their laws execute themselves, or every offender to execute them upon himself—we should be just in the same sense under their government then as we are now; but in a much higher degree, and more perfect manner' (*Analogy*, pt. 1, ch. ii.).

Attaching pleasure to some actions and pains to others, and giving notice of the appointment beforehand, is the proper notion of government. Let us take this conception with us, as we seek to investigate the function of authority in civil government. The State is the source of authority within its dominions. It is the maker of laws: in its judicial function it is the administrator, and in its executive function it is the active agency in enforcing obedience. All local authorities are derived from the State. These may be administrative, like town and county authorities, authorities dealing with public health, and so on; they may be judicial; or they may be commercial; yet each delegated authority derives its power from the State, and is responsible to the State for its exercise. The authority of each independent State is supreme within its own dominion. It might be asked, What is the State, and from what source is its authority derived? That is too large a question to be discussed here (see art. GOVERNMENT). But it may be well to learn from competent authority what is meant by law, by sovereignty, and by subjection and obedience. Austin tells us that—

'Laws set by God to men, laws established by political superiors, and laws set by men to men (though not by political superiors) are distinguished by numerous and important differences, but agree in this, that all of them are set by rational and intelligent beings to intelligent and rational beings' (*Lectures on Jurisprudence*, vol. i. p. 3 [3-vol. ed. 1861]). Again, 'Of the laws set by men to men, some are established by political superiors, sovereign and subject; by persons exercising supreme and subordinate government, in independent nations, or independent political societies' (p. 2). As to the source of law, it is thus stated: 'Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme. Or, changing the expression, it is set by a monarch or sovereign member to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author' (p. 169). Again, 'The notions of sovereignty and independent political society may be expressed concisely thus. If a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent' (p. 170).

It may be well to refer in this connexion to Maine's *The Early History of Institutions*, p. 349 f., for an independent contribution to Austin's theory of sovereignty and subjection. As to the theory itself, it is very abstract, and the great political facts are reduced and attenuated to abstractions, in which the fact of sovereign service and the loyalty of subjects have disappeared. It is well to have a description of abstract sovereignty and abstract obedience attenuated to the uttermost. Yet, after all, it does not help us much in our inquiry. It may be desirable for the student to read more modern contributions to the theory of the State, especially those which have been influenced by the philosophy of Kant, and by the great idealist school more or less dominated in this regard by Hegel. Reference may be made to Green's 'Principles of Political Obligation' (*Collected Works*, vol. ii. p. 445):

'It is a mistake to think of the State as an aggregation of individuals under a sovereign—equally so whether we suppose the individuals as such, or apart from what they derive from society, to possess natural rights, or suppose them to depend on the sovereign for the possession of rights. A State presupposes other forms of community, with the rights which arise out of them, and exists only as sustaining, securing, and completing them. In order to make a State, there must have been families of which the members recognized rights in each other (recognized in each other powers capable of direction by reference to a common Good) there must further have been intercourse between families, or between tribes that have grown out of families, of which each in the same sense recognized rights in the other. The recognition of a right being very far short of the definition, the admission of a right in each other by two parties, whether individuals, families, or tribes, being very different from agreement as to what the right consists in—what it is a right to do or acquire—the rights recognized require definition and reconciliation in a general law. When such a general law has been arrived at, regulating the position of members of a family towards each other and the dealings of families or tribes with each other; when it is voluntarily recognized by a community of families or tribes, and maintained by a power strong enough at once to enforce it within the community and to defend the integrity of the community against attacks from without, then the elementary State has been formed.'

For the vindication of the exercise of authority in a State, it is not sufficient to dwell on the abstract relationship of sovereign and subject or on the independence of a State; the authority must be vindicated on other grounds. Green has shown that a State is not an assemblage of mere individuals under a common government. Individuals are already united by moral bonds; they are in families, in tribes, and as such are in mutual recognition of rights and duties. Those in authority must do service, and must justify their action on the ground of recognized worth or good achieved; or even on the lower ground of utility. Authority must justify its existence. Aristotle has well recognized and insisted on the obligation to service which attaches to those who exercise authority. He shows that a State is not an association formed exclusively for the acquisition of wealth, or for military strength, or for the encouragement of commerce. The object of the State is the promotion of the higher life. When men are associated together in a State, 'the object of their association is to live well—not merely to live.'

'Virtue and vice are matters of earnest consideration to all whose hearts are set upon good and orderly government. And from this fact it is evident that a State which is not merely nominally, but in the true sense of the word a State, should devote its attention to virtue. To neglect virtue is to convert the political association into an alliance differing in nothing except in the local contiguity of its members from the alliance formed between distant States, to convert the law into a mere covenant, or, as the sophist Lycophron said, a mere surety for the mutual respect of rights, without any qualification for producing goodness or justice in the citizens. But it is clear that this is the true view of the State, *i.e.* that it promotes the virtue of its citizens' (Aristotle's *Politics*, bk. iii. ch. 9, Welldon's tr. p. 124 *f.*).

The authority of a State is not justified by the mere fact of sovereignty; the sovereignty must be of a certain character. According to Aristotle, it must be an institution in which goodness, virtue, and justice are produced in the citizens. The State, in more modern phraseology, must be an institution in which a man can find himself, realize himself, and by its means be able to live a rich, full, and gracious life. It must be the home in which his ideals are so far realized, which in the history of the past and in the situation of the present affords ideals worthy of imitation to the citizen in all the variety of his manifold endeavour. The authority of a nation over its citizens is thus justified by the tradition of the nation, by its achievement in former ages, by the ideal it sets before them at the present hour, and by its promise for the future. The authority of a State can neither be measured nor justified by the material force which it has at its command to enforce obedience. Force is no remedy, nor can it win

the loyalty of the governed. Without loyalty the exercise of authority is hindered, confined, rendered ineffective. It makes no difference in the final issue whether power is exercised by a king or by the citizens themselves; for, if it is exercised unworthily, it casts a blight on the flower of loyalty, which is essential to the full exercise of authority. Briefly, it may be said that the State is an ethical institution, and while material force is needed, yet the exercise of that force is conditioned by the fact that it must always be exercised for the good of the community, and in the interests of the higher values. Authority and loyalty must go hand in hand in every State which is worthy of the name. Of the manifold relations of governor and governed, of the claims which the State has a right to make on its citizens, of the freedom of the individual over against the State, and of the limits of civil obedience it is not possible to speak here. Nor is it necessary, for the due exercise of authority in this sphere must always be in such ways as to carry with it the consent of the citizen, to arouse his loyalty, to deepen his sense of obligation to the State, and to quicken him to do the State enthusiastic service. In this sphere, too, authority has to justify itself by its fruits.

4. Authority in morals.—We have passed insensibly to the exercise of authority in the sphere of moral life. Is there a Categorical Imperative? Is there an Ought, a law binding on us, which we must obey unconditionally, and cannot disobey except at our direst peril? To these questions it is not possible to give an exhaustive answer within our limits. The facts of the moral life are so various, the explanations of them so numerous, and the theories of ethics so manifold, that it is difficult to isolate the voice of authority, and to give here a distinct and categorical answer. Yet the ordinary moral consciousness speaks of virtue and vice, of good and evil, and of right and wrong, and it has definite meanings when it uses these ethical contrasts. It has a notion that virtue and vice relate to character, that good and evil relate to the end of life, and that right and wrong refer to a standard. It is conscious, also, that they all relate somehow to an ideal of conduct. When it speaks of right and wrong, it sets up a standard of conduct; when it speaks of good and evil, it passes a judgment on the end and purpose of life; and when it speaks of virtue and vice, it recognizes an ideal of character which it feels ought to be realized in practical life.

Students of ethics will remember Kant's treatment of the ordinary moral consciousness, which in his *Metaphysic of Ethic* he analyzes, on the way towards his theoretical exposition of ethic. Kant lays stress on the Good Will as the absolute example of Good. He insists that the aim of the practical reason is to produce an absolutely good will, not a will which is good only as a means to happiness. A good will is the supreme good, though it may not have attained to completeness. Inasmuch, however, as a perfectly goodwill is not attainable in its fullness here, Kant proceeds to set forth the notion of duty. He assumes that the good will in its completeness is wholly rational, and obeys without question or hesitation the law of reason. But in a being like man, who has passions and desires as well as reason, the good will is not wholly good. Hence the need of the conception of Duty. Kant insists that duty excludes not only all direct violation of morality but all acts the motive of which is inclination, even when these are not in themselves opposed to duty. In the second place, he shows that the moral value of an action is determined by the maxim or subjective principle of will which it manifests, not in relation to the object which acts upon desire. And he concludes, in the third place, that duty may be defined as the obligation to act from reverence for law (cf. J. Watson, *The Philosophy of Kant Explained* [1901], to which the present writer is deeply indebted). Man, however, is a being whose desires are not invariably in harmony with reason. But a good will cannot be determined by natural inclination; it must be determined solely by the principle of duty for duty's sake. There is thus a dualism in human nature, there are wants and desires which demand satisfaction, and there is reason, which prescribes conformity to duty. What is the relation of duty to desire? In answering this question, Kant passes from the analysis of the moral consciousness to the problem of moral philosophy. And among other questions he asks this one, What is the nature of the supreme good? He derives it from the idea of moral perfection, which reason forms *a priori* and connects inseparably with the conception of a free will. The principle of morality is, and must be, independent of experience, and derives its authority solely from reason. As Dr. Watson says:

> 'We learn three things: firstly, that all moral conceptions proceed from reason entirely *a priori*; secondly, that it is of supreme importance to set the conceptions of morality before the mind in their purity, and not merely in the interest of a true theory of morality, but also as an aid in practical life; and thirdly, that the principles of pure practical reason, unlike those of theoretical reason, do not depend in a sense upon the peculiar nature of man, but are derived from the very conception of a rational being, and therefore apply to all rational beings' (*op. cit.* p. 317).

Following out these assumptions, Kant proceeds to set forth the metaphysic of morality. The Categorical Imperative is expounded, and in pursuance of it he sets forth the laws of the universal imperative of duty. 'Act as if the maxim from which you act were to become through your will a universal law of nature.' Another law reached by him after a prolonged discussion, into which we cannot enter, is, 'Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end, never as merely a means.' And a third law arises to complete the series: 'Act in conformity with the idea of the will of every rational being as a will which lays down universal laws of action.' [We use the translation of Dr. Watson.] Enthusiastic Kantians have compared these with Newton's three laws of motion. There need be no hesitation in recognizing their abiding worth. Nor need there be any hesitation in acknowledging the indebtedness of mankind to Kant for his lofty teaching regarding the conception of Duty. It is a permanent gain that he has shown the impossibility of deriving the Categorical Imperative from what he calls the Hypothetical Imperative. It is the practice in some schools of thought to derive the binding character of obligation from the fact that, if we are to gain an end, we must use the appropriate means. This is quite true. If I am to become a teacher, I must qualify myself for the office. And so with regard to the use of any other means by which an end is gained. I may decline to be a teacher, and so be discharged from the training needed for a teacher. But I may not decline to be moral. The demand of morality on me is absolute. For this demonstration the world is indebted to Kant.

The severely abstract character of Kant's ethic has given rise to difficulties. It is hard for the student of his ethic to find a point of contact with this working-day world. It is also severely intellectual, and seems to disregard the real nature of man. A common prayer of religious men, both in the congregation and in solitude, is, 'Incline my heart to keep Thy law.' If this prayer is answered,

and the heart is inclined to keep the law, immediately the act is removed from the sphere of duty, for inclination has nothing to do with duty. To touch morality with emotion would seem to destroy its character. Yet on some occasions Kant seems himself to be filled with emotion. This is specially the case in his commanding and striking address to Duty, and when he contemplates the majesty of the starry heavens above and the moral law within. Are we to say that in these moments Kant is lifted out of the sphere of morality? The truth seems to be that Kant in his analysis of the moral consciousness has forgotten the feelings and emotions and desires. Or, when he remembers them, he thinks of them only as disturbing elements, as hindrances to the working of the Categorical Imperative. He has not apparently contemplated the possibility of a man doing his duty because he likes to do it. If statutes may become songs, if a man may learn to love the law, how does it stand with him? Is he moral or is he outside of morality? Apparently in his analysis Kant has left out this possibility. It is curious to reflect that Herbert Spencer also comes to a similar conclusion, for he thinks that in a perfectly evolved State the sense of obligation will cease, as duty will become pleasure, and the strain will no longer be needed (*Data of Ethics*, § 47). In his exposition Dr. Watson says:

'A perfectly good will agrees with the rational will of man in conforming to objective laws, but it differs in not being under an obligation to conform to them. An imperative has no meaning as applied to the Divine will or any other holy will, such a will being by its very nature in harmony with the law of reason. Imperatives are therefore limited to beings whose will is imperfect, such as the will of man, expressing as they do the relation of objective law to an imperfect will' (*op. cit.* p. 318).

It seems a somewhat curious outcome. Is an Imperative less imperative when I consent to its rationality, and consent with my whole nature so completely that all its impulses, desires, and longings are constrained so thoroughly that all opposition to it passes away? Is the imperativeness of the Imperative less than before? Does an Imperative ever become real and operative until I lay it on myself, and make it binding on myself? Does it cease when I am able to make it wholly operative? It would seem, therefore, that there is something lacking in the analysis of the moral consciousness instituted by Kant. It neglects feeling. It forgets that the moral appeal is directed not to the intellect alone; to the will alone. It commands that the inclinations, the passions, and the desires shall be yoked to duty, and that man as a whole and as a community shall become moral. Moral authority does not cease when the will of man becomes wholly the good will, nor does obligation cease when man is wholly moralized. The statute does not cease to be a statute when it becomes a song, nor does the law vanish when the heart of man is inclined to keep it. We may not inquire further, in this place, into the nature of moral obligation, nor need we discuss the various views of it which have appeared in the history of ethics. It is sufficient for us to have indicated that morality has authority, from whatsoever source it may be conceived to flow. Man feels that he is bound to attain a certain character, to live up to a certain standard, and to attain to that ideal of life which can be described as good. The inward moral feeling must agree with an objective reality, and his judgment of values must be rooted in reality. The objective worth must be realized in the inward life. Here, however, we pass beyond the bounds of ethics, and enter into the sphere of religion.

5. Authority in religion.—In the sphere of religion, authority takes on a new form, speaks to us with a new voice, and passes from the sphere of the impersonal into that of the personal life. As Hegel finely says:

'All the various peoples feel that it is in the religious consciousness they possess truth, and they have always regarded religion as constituting their true dignity and the Sabbath of their lives. Whatever awakens in us doubt and fear, all sorrow, all care, . . . we leave behind on the shores of time; and as from the highest peak of a mountain, far away from all definite view of what is earthly, we look down calmly on all the limitations of the landscape and of the world, so with the spiritual eye man, lifted out of the hard realities of this actual world, contemplates it as something having only the semblance of existence, which, seen from this pure region, bathed in the beams of the spiritual sun, merely reflects back its shades of colour, its varied tints and lights, softened away into eternal rest' (*Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. tr., vol. i. p. 3).

It is in the sphere of religion that all the authorities referred to above are harmonized, unified, and made effective in a grander manner. For it is here that we can gather them into a unity, and see them to be one, for they reflect the absolute, central unity of the universe. When we speak of the unity of nature and the authoritative character of its system, we really mean the unity which is given to the universe by the mind which informs it, and by the presence enshrined in it. It is the primary revelation of God, and speaks to us with a Divine meaning; and when we read its meaning we are thinking the thoughts of God. So, also, when we read and decipher the laws of reason, think out the first principles of reason, and act on its axioms, we are dealing with reason which is not merely ours, but is also objective and authoritative. So, also, when we read history, dwell on the life of man organized into communities, and realize what in this sphere authority and subjection mean, here too we are in a Divine presence, and the powers which be have been ordained of God. All authority is thus ultimately Divine authority. This is true whether we regard the world from the theistic or from the pantheistic point of view. In the latter case authority comes from the perfect whole, in the former case it comes from the living God who has made, sustains, and rules the world. So, too, the binding power of morality flows from God. It is for this reason mainly that we are dissatisfied with the analysis of Kant, and regard it as imperfect. For religion comes to ethics and seeks to deliver it from the dry abstractions on which it delights to dwell, and strives to bring it into the warm relation of personal affection. It would relate moral feeling, moral aspiration, and moral obligation not to an impersonal law or to abstract truth, but to a Living Presence, to a Holy Person, to a Loving Will. Religion would not distinguish minutely between a Divine nature and a Divine will, nor would it seek to derive the Divine authority from a Divine will as distinguished from a Divine nature, for to religion the Divine will is only the expression of the Divine character.

As to the authority of nature, of truth, of civil society, of moral law, religion regards it as valid in its own place and way. They are expressions of the Divine nature, and express it as far as they can. But nature is an imperfect expression of the Divine nature. It may show forth certain aspects of the Divine nature, but the full meaning of God cannot be expressed in nature, or in human reason, or even in man as yet. God has really put a meaning into His works, and that meaning we are bound to read. Science is our interpretation of that meaning so far as we have been able to read it. There is a wider, deeper meaning in history, and in the nature of man, for here we deal with a world of persons, each of whom has or may have a meaning in himself. But even here the language of human life and destiny which God has had to use to express His meaning is not adequate to its work. For man is imperfect, man has been so far non-rational and

non-moral, and the meaning of an absolutely moral and rational Personality cannot be expressed by these imperfect means. Yet nature and history do in some measure reveal God, and their value for religion consists in the fact that they reveal the living, personal God. It is for this reason that they speak with an authoritative voice. They reveal God. But the source of all authority is God, and the motive to obedience is love to God, who has thus revealed Himself to man through nature, reason, and history. The ultimate sanction of this authority is transformed from the old mode of coercion, and has become something new. No longer is man impelled by the fear of consequences, or by the dread of an external penalty somehow connected with disobedience. The strongest sanction is that he dreads with unspeakable terror the possibility of estrangement from God, and of losing that fellowship which is his very life.

This, then, is the nature of authority in religion. And it sums up in itself all other authorities. It deepens the sources of authority, it transforms its sanctions, and in so doing makes them more than ever coercive. It is also to be observed that this authority is wielded by God Himself and by Him alone. God alone is Lord of the conscience, and He alone can command the conscience. Any other authority is at best ministerial, and is authoritative only in so far as it can produce and substantiate its credentials from Him. Laws of nature, laws of reason, laws of civil authority, laws of morals, are binding on men so far as they are laws of God, and no further. This seems to be what authority is from the religious point of view.

Again, from the religious point of view all things and agencies have their value in this, that they express God's meaning, and are of worth just so far as they are able to express that meaning. Thus they have to be supplemented and added to by those other ways of Divine expression which are to be found in the history of man and in the fullest revelations of God. This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of revelation, or of that form of it which Christians believe to be the highest and fullest, viz. the revelation of God given to man in Christ. Nor can we even indicate how in the revelation of God in Christ there is a complete expression of the Divine nature, and the manifestation of authority binding on all. Truth for the intelligence, life for the heart, and energy for the will are summed up in Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life.

Leaving these topics for adequate treatment in their proper places, we may note here that the authority of God vindicates itself on every ground on which it could be vindicated. We instinctively bow down in obedience to the highest and the best, to the wisest and the most pure, to the mightiest and the greatest. We bow down to this authority and regard its behests as binding, not merely because we recognize its right to command, but because we find also that its service is perfect freedom, because we are persuaded that it can guide, strengthen, comfort, and console. Here also authority appears finally in its strongest and most persuasive form. Perhaps the most picturesque, as it is also the strongest form of authority, is that exerted by a person upon persons. Think of the loyalty of soldiers to the general in whom they trust, think of the devotion of disciples to a master, think of the loyalty of men to a great political leader; they will work for him, serve him, live for him, die for him; his word will send them forth to fulfil his will or die. This element of personal devotion appears in religion in the very form which religion in its highest flights takes. From this point of view natural laws, laws of reason, laws of morals, become ways by which we acquaint ourselves with God; but these do not satisfy, they simply impel us on to acquaint ourselves with God and be at peace.

From this point of view certain discussions regarding the ways by which God makes Himself known simply become irrelevant. There is no need to inquire into infallibility, or inerrancy, or any other categories of the same kind. These are categories which men cannot use. Nor are they needed. For the ways by which God makes Himself known are simply means to an end, and we need not spend time on their characteristics. We only ask, Do they lead to God? However good and sure the ways may be, their ultimate value lies in this—that they lead to God. Yet men may linger in them, admire them, speculate about them, their beauty, inerrancy, and so on, till they place them in a position which belongs to God alone. It is time that men should use them as they are meant to be used, and cease to attribute to them qualities which belong to God alone.

Authority then is real, is ever present with men, is indispensable for the training and education of man. It is exercised in many ways and in many degrees. It has to justify itself not merely by the exercise of power, and by the ruder kinds of penalty; it has to meet the demands of human reason, to satisfy the requirements of the human conscience, and to prove itself the guide, the counsellor, the friend of man. The will must find in it purpose, guidance, and energy; the heart must find in it something to stir the emotions, to win the affections, and to arouse the higher passions of love and desire. And the intelligence must find in it truth, principle, and reality. When we trace all authority up to God, we have named that name which at once satisfies all the demands that men have a right to make on the authority which confronts them with an absolute claim to loyalty and obedience.

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JAMES IVERACH.

AUTOMATISM.—Originally the 'automatic' meant that which happens of itself and without any visible external cause, and the uses of the word in the various sciences may all be traced back to this etymological signification.

1. The first of these is the *physiological*. When motions are observed in an organism which are not apparently initiated by any external stimulation, the action is described as automatic, and this automatism is one of the chief marks of a living body. Physiologists, however, generally hold that such spontaneity is only apparent, being really a secondary rearrangement and interaction of the chemical and physical forces which have been taken into the organism.* All physiological activity is thus taken as continuous with and included in the general scheme of physical interactions.

* See, however, art ATTENTION, p. 213[a], and H. Driesch, *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, London, 1908.

2. When this point of view is extended to the *psychological* plane and confronted with the fact of consciousness, it may engender that form of psycho-physical parallelism known as psycho-physical automatism, or the Automaton Theory. As the various physical energies are taken to form a closed system with a fixed amount of energy and incapable of being affected by anything alien or extraneous (such as consciousness), it must on this theory be denied that consciousness has any efficacy, *i.e.* that its presence in any way alters the course of physical change. Why it should exist at all becomes a problem; but it may be regarded as an *epi-phenomenon*, a sort of unsubstantial reflexion which accompanies, and is probably in some unexplained way produced by, the flux of physical changes, or as a series of changes running parallel to, and somehow corresponding with, the physical changes, but of a fundamentally different order. The scientific aim of the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism is to distinguish sharply between psychical and physical process, and it has the methodological advantage of freeing the consideration of the latter from the perplexing influence of the former. It may assume a double form, according as the automatism is supposed to be conscious or not. If the automatism is unconscious, the motions of the organism merely simulate the phenomena of feeling and consciousness. According to Descartes, animals are unconscious automata of this kind. But inasmuch as the only consciousness of which any one has direct experience is his own, this argument may, and indeed must, be extended also to human actions. Another's consciousness is always an inference by analogy drawn from his actions. We assume our fellow-men to be conscious, because they behave as we do, who are. But though in our own case we have direct experience of the existence of consciousness, we have not even here direct experience of its *efficacy*, if (with, *e.g.*, Hume) we choose to set aside the testimony of the direct experience of agency as a proof of 'causation.' The theory of psycho-physical automatism, then, fits in well enough with the assumptions of physics; but it comes into conflict with the biological presumption of the survival-value of any characteristic of life which has been progressively developed. For, unless consciousness possessed efficacy and altered the course of physical change, it is hard to see how it could have had survival-value. A complete refutation of psycho-physical automatism, however, can be achieved only by displaying the methodological nature of its fundamental assumptions.

3. *In psychology proper*, action is said to be automatic wherever the organism functions without the voluntary control (and in extreme cases even without the knowledge) of consciousness. Thus functions which are 'automatic' in the first sense may or may not be 'automatic' also in this; while, if the second sense of 'automatism' is adopted, it follows that *all* bodily motions are 'automatic' also, in this third sense. In practice, however, psychologists do not work with this theory, but are wont to distinguish between voluntary and automatic psychic processes. Automatism in this sense is closely related to the phenomena of Volition (*q.v.*) and Habit (*q.v.*). Fully conscious volition occupies an extreme position on a continuous scale, the other end of which is steeped in complete automatism. Such volition appears to be the condition of organic response only to relatively *new* situations, and, as involving effort, strain, thought, and time, is too expensive a process biologically not to be economized as much as possible. Accordingly, the volitional character of an action recedes more and more into the background as a function becomes established. As actions become familiar and habitual by repetition, volition and consciousness both tend to fade from the experience which accompanies the action, though for a long time the continuance of these factors as powers kept in reserve is suggested by their re-appearance in emergencies. In this way what was originally a highly conscious, difficult, and volitional act (*e.g.* walking or reading) may become degraded into almost any degree of facile automatism, though it should always be remembered that this psychological declension means a biological gain. Hence it may even be maintained that the distinction between the *secondary* automatism which is acquired, and the *primary* automatism of all the organic functions which are not (normally) under the control of the will or within the cognizance of consciousness, may ultimately be abolished. The difference between them may be reduced to one between acquisitions of a newer and of an older date, and primary automatism may be regarded as that part of vital functioning which has become so regular and certain as no longer to require conscious supervision. This interpretation is evidently attractive from an evolutionary standpoint, but as evidently it needs to be combined with some biologically acceptable theory of the transmission (or apparent transmission) of habits.

The philosophic importance of this secondary automatism is considerable. For it enables the moralist to include within the sphere of his competence many acts and processes which *as experienced* are no longer voluntary or even conscious, and so facilitates the evolutionary treatment of ethical data. It plainly suggests, moreover, a definite theory of the origin, function, and future of consciousness. If it is a law of function to tend from the conscious and volitional towards the habitual, involuntary, and unconscious, it would seem that any perfectly adjusted functioning must be unconscious, that consciousness itself was essentially a concomitant of a disturbance of habit, and that unconscious functioning was both the beginning and the end of conscious life. Thus consciousness would be essentially evanescent and transitory. This inference can be avoided only by denying that the growth of automatism is to be conceived as a mechanical process. It must be conceived as teleologically conditioned throughout, *i.e.* as a device for the facilitation of reactions upon stimulation, and for the economizing of a consciousness which always has more work than it can properly attend to, and so attends to the calls upon it in the order of their urgency. A good deal of evidence may be adduced, from the actual distribution of consciousness and automatism in the performance of organic functions of the same antiquity, to show that the lapsing into automatism does in point of fact occur in this teleological way.

4. In addition, however, to the actions which are removed from conscious control after having once been conscious, other automatisms are found to occur which seem never to have formed part of the conscious personality. They seem to be initiated outside the normal course of experience, and to intrude upon it as aliens. They may assist it, or more frequently disturb it, whence they are usually regarded as *pathological*. Such automatisms are usually sporadic and discontinuous, but may attain to a considerable degree of coherence and persistence in cases of 'multiple' and 'alternating' personality (*q.v.*). They have been classified as *sensory* (*e.g.* dreams [*q.v.*] and visual and auditory hallucinations [*q.v.*]) and *motor* (automatic speaking and writing), and their interpretation raises the important question of *sub-*

conscious mental life (see SUBCONSCIOUSNESS) and its relation to consciousness. It is also thought by some that in such automatisms traces of supernormal knowledge and powers may be detected, and these have been claimed as evidence of the possibility of communications from the departed. Their biological value for the guidance of conduct is not as a rule great, and this is precisely the reason why they are usually treated as pathological. But the whole subject has not yet been adequately studied. It is clear, however, that historically these automatisms have contributed greatly to the belief in possession, inspiration, and in the supernatural generally.

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F. C. S. SCHILLER.

AUTONOMY.—The term 'autonomy,' as employed by very early writers, is distinctly political, signifying civil or national independence. Some authors of the 17th and 18th cents. use it to denote the freedom of the religious conscience. Kant is the only one who introduces it into the language of moral philosophy, in a truly characteristic sense ('Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,' *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Rosenkranz, Leipzig, 1838-1842, viii. 71 ff.; 'Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,' *ib.* p. 145 ff.). By autonomy of the will, Kant means the faculty that the will possesses of being its own lawgiver, of being itself, by its own nature, the source and substance of the moral law, the moral law itself.

Under what conditions can the will be autonomous? When it is determined by its own form, not by its object. This condition is fulfilled if the will obeys only general laws, if it admits only of those maxims (*i.e.* motives) which can be transformed into general laws. The will which always acts with regard to the universal, as such, provides its own laws: it is autonomous; it is free. For to be free is to obey absolute imperatives, and imperatives of this kind are not the outcome of experience, but solely of reason as practical reason.

The opposite of autonomy is heteronomy. It is simply the subjection of the will to some object or other, *i.e.* ultimately, to the desire of being happy. Heteronomous imperatives are never absolute, because they imply empirical conditions in the subject and object, which do not exist everywhere and at all times. They therefore cannot submit to that moral position which consists in the unconditional surrender of the free will to absolute laws (*i.e.* of the will to itself, for nothing is absolute in the practical order of things except liberty itself); or, in other words, of the empirical will to the pure will. One form of heteronomy is theonomy. It consists in obeying God, because He has sanctioned certain laws, arbitrarily imposed by Him, by means of punishments and rewards

The ethics of autonomy, therefore, is the ethics of the pure will or of liberty. This pure will naturally has an object, but it is not the matter of this object that determines it; it is its form only, or rather the quality that makes it worthy of being sought after by a will which aims at realizing the universal, *i.e.* general, laws. Thus general happiness can be sought after by a free will; yet not always so far as to embrace the well-being of humanity, which is of interest to our human sensibilities, but only in so far as it can form the contents of a general law, which concerns the understanding of all rational beings.

Autonomy is a kind of summary, forming the kernel, of Kantian ethics. Before it can be thoroughly appreciated and criticized, a general examination of the ethics must be made. We shall confine ourselves to a few brief remarks. In particular, notice that in Kant the idea of an autonomous will has two motives. (1) The first is the conception of liberty that it has within it. According to Kant, the will ceases to be free when it is determined by the attraction which any object other than itself may exercise over it. This is what might be called the ascetic element of Kant's ethics. In all love, of whatever kind it is, he perceives only motives that are governed by the passions and self. (2) We must desire the universal, for only the universal is presented to us as an element of pure reason; all that is empirical is contingent. Here we find ourselves in the presence of the rational and social element of Kant's ethics. These two arguments, which in Kant are blended in one, are in reality of very different kinds. The submission of the empirical will to the pure will is not connected with the idea of the universal, which Kant identifies elsewhere with the social; on the other hand, this notion of the universal affects the will only when it becomes the object of an attraction, the contents of a feeling. Kant's ideal is a will which is identical with reason, but experience does not bear out the inference, and it is not conclusively proved, that the man whose will has become 'pure,' in the sense implied by Kant, is the moral man *par excellence*. It seems, indeed, that he would lack what constitutes the soul of all complete and profound morality. The Kantian idea of autonomy is an abstract idea stripped of all psychological basis. It expresses an ideal of liberty indeed, but Kant was quite unable to deduce from it practical rules for human conduct.

Of present-day philosophers, the chief to revive the idea of autonomy is Cohen ('Die Ethik des reinen Willens,' *System der Philosophie*², 1907, pt. ii.). But, inspired by Fichte's ideas, Cohen conceives autonomy, not as the faculty of practical reason, producing laws freely for human conduct, but as the faculty of man, making the human individual the supreme end of all his actions. Under this conception, autonomy becomes, in a direct and positive manner, a social principle, which it is in Kant only indirectly or rather negatively.

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EUGÈNE EHRHARDT.

AVALOKITEŚVARA.—1. *The name.**—(*a*) Īśvara, which, among *naiyāyikas* (philosophers) and *bhāktas* (devotees) alike, refers to the personal and supreme god, means etymologically 'king,' 'monarch.' It is an epithet common to the Bodhisattvas, or at least—for that name includes every individual who seeks to attain the Bodhi, even although he is still a 'natural man' (*pṛthagjana*)—to all the Bodhisattvas who are in complete possession of the qualifications of Bodhisattvas, viz. those who are 'great Bodhisattvas' (Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva), 'masters of the ten stages of Bodhisattva-ship' (*daśabhūmi-īśvara*) (see *Mahāvyutpatti*, 22, 15). But, when speaking of Avalokita, who is not only a 'great god,' but a 'god-providence,' we cannot forget that Śiva is called the 'great lord' (Maheśvara) or simply, 'the lord' (Īśvara).

(*b*) The meaning of the compound 'Avalokiteśvara' is not at all clear. Scholars do not agree as to its signification. It may mean either 'the lord of what we see,' *i.e.* 'of the present world,' or 'of

* These numbers refer to the paragraphs of the article.

* See Kern, *Gesch.* i 324, *Inscr. uit Battambang*, 76; Burnouf, *Introduction*, 226; Minayeff, *Grammaire palie*, p. 7: 'le souverain qui voit tout'; Grunwedel, *Lamaism*, p. 130; Rhys Davids, *Buddhism* (1880), p. 200 ff.; Waddell, *Lamaism*, p. 40, and *JRAS*, 1894; Watters, *Yuan-Chwang*, i. 343: 'the beholding lord.'

the view,' or 'the lord whom we see,' 'the lord revealed,' 'the master who is or was seen.'*

But the Tibetans, and no doubt their Indian authorities also, took it to mean 'the lord who looks'; for their translation 'Spyan-ras-gzigs' seems to dispense with the idea of 'visible lord.'† Some modern interpreters have understood the Sanskrit name to signify: 'lord who looks down from on high.' This meaning is not quite satisfactory, for Avalokita, like all Bodhisattvas, looks both at the Buddha (*'Bhagavanmukhāvalokana-para'*) and at the creatures with a look of compassion (*'karuṇāsnigdhāvalokana'*).‡

This interpretation makes Avalokita an active present participle, which, as M. Kern remarks, is bad grammar; but Burnouf failed to see in this inaccuracy a decisive argument against the current interpretation, and we may agree with him.§ Further, from the grammatical point of view, Avalokiteśvara, 'lord of compassionate glances' =Avalokana, 'lord of special mercies,' 'lord with compassionate glances.'‖ Avalokita is the god whose face is turned in every direction in order to see everything and to save everybody; he is called 'the all-sided one,' *'samantamukha.'*¶

(*c*) One of the most notable names of Avalokita, and certainly the one which gives us the best idea of the character which had been ascribed to him for a very long time, is *Lokeśvara, Lokanātha,* 'Lord, Protector of the world.' M. Kern expresses it very well when he says that he is the 'god of the present,' 'he who bears the world,' 'son of a Buddha (Amitābha), as the present is the son of the past,' the concrete counterpart of the 'Body of Law' (*Dharmakāya*), the present form of the Buddha, 'the god of daylight and of the living, as Amitābha, who dwells in the setting sun, is the god of Paradise.'** The texts clearly show that Avalokita is the sun; and, in fact, Padmapāṇi, 'lotus-bearer,' which is a name of Avalokita, is also a name of Sūrya ('sun'). Avalokita is the Viṣṇu of the Buddhists.

2. If Avalokiteśvara signified originally 'the lord who is seen,' 'de geopenbaarde Herr,' 'the revealed god,' it looks as if we ought to trace back this conception to the very origin of the personage under discussion. This would present difficulties.* However that may be, as it is very difficult to arrange our literary and iconographic material historically, we shall content ourselves with placing it in logical order. There will be good reason to doubt whether this plan gives an accurate idea of the evolution of Avalokita, because popular religion and religion as described by the sources are two very different things.

3. Although the *Mahāvastu* gives a sketch of the theory of the *bhūmis* ('spiritual stages') of the Bodhisattvas, although it abounds with 'areas' or 'fields of Buddhas' (*Buddhakṣetra*), there are no Great Bodhisattvas in it, playing the part of protector of creatures and patron of Buddhas, and there is not a trace of Avalokita.

In the *Lalita*, among the 32,000 Bodhisattvas, who listen to Buddha, the author mentions Maitreya, Dharaṇiśvara,† several others, and particularly a *Mahākarunāchandrin*. Dr. Waddell remarks that, in the Tibetan translation, this last name is replaced by *Mahākaruṇasattva* ('Sñin-rje chen-po sems-dpa'); now *Mahākaruṇa*, 'the great and merciful one,' is one of the innumerable synonyms of Avalokita. We leave it to the reader to judge whether this information is sufficient to contradict the popular opinion that there is no mention of Avalokita in the *Lalita*.‡

4. A great many authorities§ do not give Avalokita unrivalled supremacy, but place him along with a certain number of companions, five or eight, apart from the crowd of Bodhisattvas, and accord him a kind of pre-eminence: 'the sons of Buddha, with Avalokita and Mañjughoṣa at their head . . .,' 'Avalokita, Samantabhadra ('the wholly auspicious'), Mañjughoṣa ('lovely voice' = Mañjuśrī'), Kṣitigarbha ('earth-womb'), and Vajrin ('thunderbolt-holder' = Vajrapāṇi),' whose special task is the struggle against the demons.

In these texts we are confronted with a great superhuman saint, the chief of that noble group of Bodhisattvas who, according to the Great Vehicle, constitute 'the congregation' (*Saṅgha*) or third jewel. Avalokita plays a most important part in some of the sūtras, *e.g.* in the *Dharmasaṅgīti*, where he extols charity, 'the great compassion,' the only function of the Bodhisattvas, to which one must give oneself up entirely without fear of committing sin; if the exercise of charity involves wrong-doing, it is yet better to suffer the pains of hell than to deprive a creature of the hope he has

* See Kern, *Inscr. uit Battambang*: 'lord contemplated'= Avalokita iśvara=vyakta iśvara, *i.e.* a name of Śiva; 'lord of the view *or* of that which is seen'=dṛṣṭi-guru, *i.e.* another name of Śiva.

† *Spyan-ras=chakṣus*, 'eye.' It is a lofty expression. We have, *e.g.*, 'thugs-rjei spyan-ras-kyis gzigs-pa: karunāchakṣuṣā avalokayan' (Sarat Chandra, *Dict.*). *Gzigs* also is a word of elevated style, meaning 'to see,' and, owing to the influence of the name of Avalokita, meaning 'to give,' 'compassion.' If the Tibetan translation caused any doubt, the following quotation from the versified Kāranda (Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 226) would dispel it: 'He is so called because he regards with compassion beings suffering from the evils of existence.' The Mongol has *niduber utchekitchi*, 'who beholds,' from *niduber utchego*, 'to see,' from *nidun*, 'eye.'

‡ *Sādhana* (text of incantation), quoted by Foucher, *Icon.* ii. pp. 16, 18. Waddell explains 'look down from on high' by the fact that the usual dwelling-place of Avalokita is on mountains. This information is correct, and establishes a point of contact between Avalokita and Śiva. But the prefix *ava* has no such precise meaning. The *vyavalokana*, 'glance,' like the smile (*smita*) and the beam (*raśmi*), is a mode of communication.

§ Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 226, note. *Parijita* (*Mahāvyutpatti*, 126, 63) seems quite clearly to mean *parijitavān*, and it is possible that there are other examples.

‖ See Bothlinck-Roth, *s.v. lok* with *ava* (§ 2). Further, *avalokita* means 'a person to whom good-bye has been said,' 'one who has been seen for the last time' (see indexes to *Divyāvadāna* and *Mahāvastu*). Avalokiteśvara is indeed the lord of the departed and the help of the dying. The present writer owes these valuable observations to Mr. F. W. Thomas.

¶ *Lotus*, ch. xxiv; Kern, ii. 171; Beal, *Catena*, 384. Like *samantachandra* and *samantālokha*, it is an epithet common to all the Bodhisattvas (*Lalitavistara*, 550, 11).

** See Kern, *op. cit.* With regard to the solar character of Amitābha and Avalokita, the first of the meditations on Amitābha, as it is described in the *Amitāyurdhyāna*, is full of information: 'all beings . . . see the setting sun' (see § 9). Amitābha is Śiva unrevealed; Avalokita is Śiva revealed. The infinite indivisible light which characterizes the former (*amita-ābha*) is contrasted with the finite light (*mita*) of the latter: 'Brilliant is Lokeśvara, who bears on his head Amitābha, brilliant with, as it were, the appearance of the sun and the moon with their finite splendour.' Elsewhere Avalokita is represented as having the sun as his body (*dinakaravapus*). The Paradise of Amitābha is closely connected with the town of Varuṇa in the West, the city of the sunset, which is usually called Sukhā (Max Muller, *SBE* xlix. p. 22). It may also have some connexion with the city of Kuśāvati, where the 'great King of Glory' reigns (*Mahāsudassanasutta*, *SBE* xi. p. 247).

* The present writer thinks that M. Kern gives a perfect explanation of the nature of Avalokiteśvara, who is a Buddhist Śiva in visible form, while Amitābha is the Śiva Brahman. The former is characterized by the 'measured' light of the sun and the moon, the latter is ethereal and infinite light (*amita*). The Battambang inscription is very clear. But the present writer thinks that before becoming Śiva, Avalokiteśvara was a Bodhisattva, and, as such, was named Avalokita.

† 'Lord of the earth,' one of Śiva's names, a 'dhyānibuddha' in the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*; according to Waddell, 'a common title for Mañjuśrī' (*JRAS*, 1894, p. 55).

‡ Lunar names (*chandra*) are frequent among the Bodhisattvas (cf. *Mahāvyutpatti*, 23).

§ *e.g. Bodhicharyāvatāra* (ch. ii. 1, 48). In *Mahāvyutpatti* (published A.D. 816-838) 23, we find the following order: Avalokiteśvara, Maitreya, Ākāśagarbha, Samantabhadra, Vajrapāṇi, Mañjuśrīkumārabhūta, Sarvanivaraṇaviskambhin, Kṣitigarbha, Mahāsthāmaprāpta, Ratnaketu, Ratnapāṇi, etc. It must be observed that Ratnapāṇi (a future so-called Dhyānibodhisattva) is not the first of the Bodhisattvas 'beginning with Ratna,' and also that Mañjuśrī holds quite a subordinate place. Cf. *Dharmasaṅgraha*, xii., where among the eight Bodhisattvas there is no mention of Avalokita.

placed in you.* Avalokita is a Great Bodhisattva, but he is not the only one, nor is he unquestionably the first.

It is probably this stage in the history of Avalokita that is represented in the very old reliefs, where a 'Lotus-bearer' Padmapāṇi (afterwards the equivalent of Avalokita) appears with four or seven other Bodhisattvas, surrounding a Buddha or below a Buddha.†

There is reason to believe that Maitreya (the future Buddha), for example, whose doctrinal position is better established, must originally have taken precedence of him,‡ and there are noteworthy and well-authenticated writings, such as the Sanskrit-Tibetan Lexicon (*Mahāvyutpatti*) and the Chinese records, which lead us to believe that Maitreya was able to maintain his position. In any case, it must be noticed that the rôle of 'Good Bodhisattva,' helpful and divine, the very noble (*paramārya*), the giver of security (*abhayandada*), etc., was divided among Kṣitigarbha and his companions, before it became the more or less exclusive designation of Avalokita.§ Now it must be borne in mind that the preceding remarks are very hypothetical; for, from the dawn of the Christian era, in certain circles at least, Avalokita became an important personage and a jealous god.

5. *Lotus of the True Law, Sukhāvatīvyūha, Amitāyurdhyānasūtra.*—(*a*) Avalokita is not the protagonist of the *Lotus*, but there is a whole chapter on his *ἀρισταία*, his 'gesta,' in Skr. his *māhātmya*.‖ He is far superior to the other Great Bodhisattvas (Akṣayamati, etc.), who along with him listen to Śākyamuni, with the single exception of Mañjuśrī, who is probably his equal. He is the 'saviour'; it is better to think of him than to do honour to thousands of Buddhas. He assumes the form¶ of Buddha, Bodhisattva, Maheśvara, Kuvera, Vajrapāṇi,** as the case may be, the more easily to fulfil his task of mercy. Akṣayamati ('undecaying intelligence') presents him with flowers; he divides them between Śākya and the stūpa of an 'extinct' Buddha. According to the versified text, his real dwelling-place is in the 'Sukhākara,' the paradise of Amitābha, where he sits sometimes on the right and sometimes on the left of Buddha.

(*b*) The *Sukhāvatī* and the *Amitāyurdhyānasūtra** supply us with a very fine theology of Amitābha and Avalokita, a theology which has the twofold distinction of being almost orthodox, while seeking to present a rational account of all the exaggerations of *bhakti*, or devotion.

Amitābha or Lokanātha was in ancient times a *bhikṣu* called Dharmākara,† 'mine of the law'; it is now ten ages (*kalpas*) since he became Buddha, and it will be a very long time before he is extinct. In principle all the Buddhas are equal; they possess the same intrinsic perfections, the same knowledge.‡ But it is very probable that they are differentiated in the exercise of their Buddhahood, according to the vow that they have made. Now Dharmākara, the future Amitābha, under the Buddha Lokeśvararāja,§ vowed that, when he reached Buddhahood, he would have a 'Buddha field,' wondrously blessed, the happy land (*Sukhāvatī*),‖ and that is why there flock to him from all the 'Buddha fields' the beings appointed to *nirvāṇa*, either as future arhats or as Buddhas.¶ It is with Amitābha that those who are guilty but possess the promise and potency of deliverance spend their period of probation in lotus-flowers; with him also the Bodhisattvas become prepared for their last birth, by having good opportunities of going to visit, to honour, and to listen to the Buddhas of all the worlds.** After this period these Bodhisattvas will become Buddhas, and will have in their turn spheres of their own. As regards Avalokita, it is at the end of our age that he will appear as the thousandth and last Buddha of the age.††

The Bodhisattvas are not equal among themselves. In the heaven of Amitābha there are two, Avalokita and Mahāsthāmaprāpta,‡‡ almost as great and luminous as Buddha, who sit on thrones equal to his. Avalokita is the more majestic; this is due to his vow to bring all beings, without exception, into the 'happy land.' And while his glorious body illumines a great many worlds, he traverses them all in different forms, sometimes real and sometimes magical; like Amitābha himself, he has parts of himself incarnated here and there; he never forgets for a moment his rôle as provider of the Sukhāvatī. And it is he, rather

* See *Śikṣās*, p 286; *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, p. 314.

† See Grunwedel, *Buddh. Art in India*, pp. 196, 201 ff

‡ Maitreya is the only Bodhisattva acknowledged in the Little Vehicle. He is the second in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 23, the first in *Dharmasaṅgraha*, xii; and plays the chief part in the foundation of the Great Vehicle. Grunwedel (*Buddhistische Kunst*) has some hesitation in recognizing Avalokita in the Gāndhāra sculptures, and is certain only of the identification of Maitreya (*Buddh. Art in India*, p 192 n). Nevertheless, the view which, following his example, we express on the chronological and dogmatic priority of Maitreya is supported not only by the fact that Maitreya alone is recognized by the Little Vehicle (Beal, *Buddhist Records*, ii. 61), but also by certain statements of the Chinese pilgrims, who were more interested in the heaven of Maitreya than in that of Amitābha, more interested in the coming of Maitreya than in the present living Avalokita (see especially *ib.* ii. 223, i. 227)

§ More or less exclusive, according to Wassilieff, as is proved by the collections of the one hundred and eight names, of divinities in Kandjur, *Rgyu*, xiv.: Avalokita, Maitreya, Ākāśagarbha (Khagarbha), Samantabhadra, Vajrapāṇi, Mañjuśrī, Sarvanivaraṇaviṣkambhin and Kṣitigarbha (Wass., 175), the eight Bodhisattvas of the *Dharmasaṅgraha*, with the addition of Avalokita and the omission of Gaganagañja.

‖ See the translations of Burnouf and Kern. The *Māhātmya* forms ch. xxv. of the Chinese edition. In China it is one of the official texts of the religion of Avalokita (see I-tsing, in Takakusu, 162; Beal's tr., *Catena*, p. 389).

¶ The *Śikṣās* ascribes to every Bodhisattva this power of transformation. Even the wish of all the Bodhisattvas to become food and drink (*pānabhojana*) in times of famine is taken literally.

** The association of Vajrapāṇi with divinities who are anything but Buddhist is worthy of note. In the hundred and eight names of Tārā (ed. de Blonay) Vajrapāṇi begs for mystical recipes from Avalokita. See E. Senart, *Congrès d'Alger*, 'Vajrapāṇi'; and below, p. 259b n. ‖.

* *Sukhāvativyūha* (Chinese tr. 147–186), in two redactions, edited by Max Muller, *Anecd. Oxoniensia*, and also in fac-simile Musée Guimet, II., translated in *SBE* xlix, with the *Amitāyus*, the Skr. original of which seems to be lost (translated into Chinese in 424). On this text cf also *JBTS*, 1894, 2, 1.

† On the human antecedents of Amita and Avalokita, cf. also Rémusat, *Fo-koue-ki*.

‡ There are two things which have no limit, the brilliance of Amitābha and the *prajñāpratibhāna* of every Buddha. The light of Amitābha illumines all the fields of Buddha, owing to the 'special vow' of this Buddha to lighten his own field and an infinite number of other fields. Although Amitābha is praised, glorified, and preached by all the Buddhas, he cannot lay claim to any kind of monarchy. A fairly just idea of the system may be formed by regarding the Buddhas as saints (in the Roman Catholic sense of the word), who are all saints for the same reason, but among whom piety distinguishes more or less powerful saints. Cf. *Mahāvastu*, iii. 330. 15.

§ A name of Avalokita.

‖ More refined in charity is the wish expressed in *Karuṇapuṇḍarika* 'to have a Buddha field' inhabited by inferior beings overwhelmed by calamities, in order to have a more worthy object of pity.

¶ In the kingdom of Amitābha all the Bodhisattvas are in their last birth, and live there without limit, owing to their special wish (*pranidhānaviśeṣa*) to save others. It is noteworthy that our text admits the existence of arhats, saints according to the Little Vehicle, *i.e.* beings appointed to attain to *nirvāṇa* without passing through the stage of Buddhahood. The Great Vehicle believes that all beings will become Buddhas, but this was not the belief of Hiuen Tsiang.

** They do not even have to move in order to worship and listen to the Buddhas of all the worlds.

†† Schmidt, *Über die tausend Buddhas* (p. 106); and Rémusat, *Cosmogonie, Mélanges Posthumes*.

‡‡ In modern (Tibetan) pictures of the Sukhāvatī, Vajrapāṇi takes the place of Mahāsthāma (Foucher, *Catalogue*, p. 33). The Japanese representation of the Sukhāvatī is nearer the original text. Maitreya, Avalokita, and Mahāsthāma often have stūpas on their heads (Grunwedel, *Buddh. Kunst*, p. 193 and fig 83).

than Amitābha himself, who is the lord of the Sukhāvatī.*

This ostentatious and short-sighted glorification of Amitābha and Avalokita corresponds, in our opinion, to a doctrine of salvation, very different from the ordinary doctrine of the Great Vehicle. According to the Little Vehicle, the Buddhas were only instructors; in the 'rationalist' Great Vehicle they have become models, and the Bodhisattvas appear as friends, counsellors, protectors;† their presence does not in any way lessen the necessity for personal effort. In the Sukhāvatī, Amitābha and Avalokita save the faithful almost in spite of themselves, as the cat saves her young by taking them in her mouth (a Kraiṣṇavite metaphor). There is, however, one reservation: beings guilty of 'mortal sins' are excluded from the Sukhāvatī. The *Amitāyurdhyāna* does away with this restriction: the parricide is saved if he pronounces the name of Amita. In a word, our theologians, as well as those of the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, have to distinguish between ordinary people who are liable to hell, etc., and devotees who are naturally exempt.

(*c*) It is to this period that the iconographic monuments seem to belong, about which the Chinese pilgrims had given us their testimony, before the archæologists examined them; and we are quite justified in referring to them here, as the *Amitāyurdhyāna* speaks of statues in which the characteristics of the god are reproduced. We find isolated statues of Avalokita, among which the giant statues deserve mention, and groups in which he is facing Maitreya, Tārā, and Mañjuśrī, and probably also Mahāsthāma—wonderful statues, recurring throughout the whole Buddhist world from the extreme North-West to Ceylon.‡ They give us a sculptured representation of the texts, which describe in detail the attitude, colour, and qualities of the gods. The *Amitāyurdhyānasūtra* places a 'magical' Buddha, twenty-five leagues high, on the head of the glorious body of Avalokita, seated on the left of Amitābha; this is clearly represented in the icons (to which attention has already been drawn by Hiuen Tsiang), where Avalokita wears in his head-dress a seated statue of a Buddha, who, at a very early date, if not from the very beginning, was identified with Amitābha.§

The Chinese pilgrims seem to have recognized a characteristic of the Great Vehicle in the fact that worship was bestowed on the Bodhisattvas, Mañjuśrī and Avalokita, and on the Prajñā. Hiuen Tsiang mentions that a statue of Maitreya was worshipped in a district which is quite 'hīnayānistic' (*Buddh. Records*, ii. 61)—the same thing happened with the statues of Avalokita in Ceylon—but he tells the curious story of Guṇaprabha, who, when he was transferred to the heaven of Maitreya, refused to worship him, because an 'ordained bhikṣu' is superior to a Bodhisattva (i. 192).‖

6. Avalokita rises still higher in the *Kāraṇḍavyūha** and in the *Śūraṅgama*;† but here the theology seems to be extremely involved; we have now to deal not with a sūtra, but with Purānic literature. On the other hand, the iconography and the manuals on incantation demonstrate that, on account of the above-described notion of the providential polymorphism of Avalokita, that god is identified with all the Hindu deities, both mild and cruel. Avalokita is a Buddhist Śiva, an ascetic and a magician.

(*a*) In some of its features the *Kāraṇḍavyūha*‡ recalls the *Lotus* and the *Amitāyurdhyāna*: Avalokita learns the law from Amitābha, he comes to worship Śākyamuni, and brings him flowers and Amitābha's compliments; he is therefore in some way inferior to the Buddhas. But, on the other hand, he is far superior to the Buddhas and also to Samantabhadra: no Buddha possesses clairvoyance (*pratibhāna*) equal to his, all the Buddhas together could not estimate his worth. No other being besides him has a marvellous body, which the Buddhas have difficulty in seeing, and each pore of which contains thousands of Buddhas, saints of all kinds, and entire worlds. And it is from the body of Avalokita (Foucher, *Cat.* p. 25), regarded from another point of view, that the inferior gods issue: the sun and the moon come out of his eyes;§ Maheśvara, who will be called Mahādeva, and receives the promise of Buddhahood, comes from his forehead; Brahmā from his shoulder, etc. We have said that, in addition to being demiurge, Avalokita is also a saviour; from his fingers flow rivers which cool the hells and feed the *pretas* ('ghosts'); he terrifies all the demons and puts Vajrapāṇi to flight.‖

There is no need for astonishment at this extraordinary mastery over men and things. Avalokita is the great yogin, the great magician (*vidyādhipati, anekamantraśatāvakīrṇa*); he is in possession of the formulæ (in which he glories in the *Amitāyurdhyāna*); but, above all, he possesses the only, the true, formula *ōṁ maṇi padme hūṁ*.¶

* See the Calcutta edition, 1873; Csoma-Feer, p. 246; Hodgson, *Extracts*; the summary of Rajendralāla (*Buddh. Lit.* pp. 95, 101); the masterly exposition of Burnouf (*Introd.* p. 221). The Tibetan translation probably belongs to A.D. 616 (Schlagintweit, p. 84; Rockhill, p. 212), but the original is supposed to have been in existence from the time of the mythical king Lha-tho-tho-ri (A.D. 427); see Grunwedel, *Myth.* 451, 247. On the *Maṇi-bka-ḥbum*, 'the hundred thousand precious commandments,' a glorification of Avalokita, which is wrongly supposed to belong to this time, see Rockhill, 212, and Schlagintweit, 84. For the history of the Rākṣasīs, cf. Beal, *Buddhist Records*, ii. 241.

† Ch. vi. See Beal, *Catena*, 39. 284; Nanjio, 399 (tr. A.D. 384–417); Wass, 175; Csoma-Feer, 249, and the quotations from the *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*. Enumerating the innumerable, we distinguish 32 manifestations of the god, 14 cases in which he provides safety, etc. For the worship of Avalokita and Amitābha the reader is referred also to the Chinese sources.

‡ Śākyamuni speaks to Maitreya, Sarvanivaraṇaviṣkambhin and Ratnapāṇi. Avalokita receives 61 designations. Are the lists of 108 names later?

§ *Sūryāvalokanakara* (see Foucher, *loc. cit.*); cf. the name Avalokita.

‖ *Vajrapāṇividrāvaṇakara*. In the *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, Vajrapāṇi is *par excellence* the demon-dispeller, and the charitable visitor of hells; but from most ancient times Avalokita too has been engaged in the salvation of infernal beings

¶ It is this famous formula that is in view in the *Divyāvadāna* (foot of p. 613) which makes no mention of Avalokita. Śākyamuni imparts it to Ānanda; it was preached by the six Buddhas, it is known to Śakra, Indra, etc.; it constitutes a talisman of the first rank (see Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 541, Kern, *Gesch* i 400). The Tibetans claim that it fell down to them from heaven about A.D. 400. So far as the present writer knows, it is neither mentioned nor contemplated in Nanjio, No. 326 (tr. A.D. 420), which contains two *dhāraṇīs* and two *bījas*. A great deal has been written about the 'formula of six syllables.' We may mention Klaproth, *JA*, March 1831; Rémusat, *Mélanges*, p. 99, *Fo-koue-ki*, p 118; Schlagintweit, pp. 54 and 55, Grunwedel, *Lamaism*, p. 82.

There is no doubt that the tantrik literature gives it an obscene interpretation. *Maṇi* and *padme* in this jargon have a very distinct value. On the other hand, Rémusat's cosmological explanation does not seem altogether improbable. See F. W. Thomas, *JRAS*, 1906, p. 464.

* He is called Sukhāvatīśvara (*Ārya-kāraṇḍaśesa*).

† See the 'Code du Mahāyāna en Chine,' where Avalokita does not play any part at all (J. J. M. de Groot, p. 98).

‡ The information of the Buddhist pilgrims on this point is confirmed and explained by the miniatures published by M. Foucher. The last inscription devoted to Avalokita is dated 1229 (Oudh). On Avalokita in Ceylon, cf. Foucher, *Icon.* 110; Beal, *Buddhist Records*, II. 247; *JRAS*, 1900, p. 42. Some authors think that Mount Potala, to the east of the Malay Mountains, is perhaps the original home of Avalokita. It is well known that this Potala has been transported to China and to Tibet (*Tāranātha*, 144, 203; Foucher, *Icon.*, 28; Waddell, *Lhasa*, 1905, pp. 364, 388).

§ The relation between 'Dhyānibuddhas' and their Bodhisattvas is explained in the art. ĀDIBUDDHA. Wassilieff mentions Vairochana as the father of Avalokita. Cf. Grunwedel, *Buddh. Art in India*, p. 196 f.

‖ For a study of this problem the reader is referred to art. MAHĀYĀNA. To avoid any misunderstanding, let us merely point out that the *Avalokitavrata* and the *Bhadracharīpraṇidhāna* (Nanjio, 1142), which corresponds closely to it, are looked upon as sacred texts by the Sautrāntikas, who are supposed to belong to the Little Vehicle.

Is there a Buddha who possesses this 'hexasyllabic (*ṣaḍakṣarī*) knowledge (*vidyā*)'? No. Is there a being who possesses it? No. It belongs to Avalokita alone, and he reveals it to whomsoever he pleases. This magical omnipotence has its other side: whoever knows the formula does away with the god, whose 'heart,' *i.e.* 'mystery,' the formula is, and in his way is another Avalokita.*

Further, the single word 'Adored one' (*vandita*) is a sufficient description of him. He is the refuge, Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha all in one. Whosoever pronounces or traces on his body the magical syllables receives a body which participates in the body of the thunderbolt (*vajrakāyaśarīra*), the apex of knowledge of the Buddhas (*Tathāgata-jñānakoṭi*), and becomes like a *dhātustūpa*, a stūpa with relics.†

(*b*) Iconography and the manuals of incantation,‡ which illustrate and supplement each other in a marvellous way, prove that this deification of Avalokita is not merely verbal, but that it is in close connexion with worship and daily idolatry.§ All the Tibetan forms of Avalokita are replicas of the Hindu cults, which are attested as early as the 10th and 11th cents., but are undoubtedly much more ancient. In fact, our literary evidences (*sādhanas*) prove that the foreigner had had an influence on the mother-country, for there are representations of Avalokita, as well as of other gods, after the fashion of Udyāna, of China and other places.

It would be impossible to describe the whole iconography of Avalokita; that task has quite recently been performed extremely well.‖ We shall merely notice a few characteristic features.

Avalokita is polymorphous; but, in many cases and until the more degenerate times, he retains the human form, two arms and a head. There is usually on his head a small figure of the Jina Amitābha.¶ In one hand he bears the lotus (*padma*),** with the other he makes the gesture of the 'bestower of favour,' and a ghost (*preta*) is represented holding up its thin lips towards the ambrosia which flows from his fingers. As satellites Avalokita has Tārā (sometimes in two forms, calm and angry), Hayagrīva ('horse-necked'), the guardian of the 30,500,000 magical formulæ, and Sudhana, who is also a friend of Maitreya. When Avalokita has four arms, two of them are joined in *añjali* (the hands forming a cup) as a sign of respect; the other two hold the lotus and the rosary. But the ascetic attributes are the antelope's skin and the water-pot. And then, when the god receives the names of Śiva, Amoghapāśa, Hālāhala, Nīlakaṇṭha, Padmanarteśvara, etc., his arms, his faces, and his eyes become multiplied, and he carries tridents encircled with serpents, skulls filled with flowers, bows, arrows, etc.

Among the curious figures, besides those which clearly show the identification with Śiva, the following are noteworthy: (1) the figure of Siṁhanāda ('lion's cry'). This was the name given to the solemn declarations of Śākyamuni; Mañjuśrī, who in Buddhism is the personification of wisdom, is mounted on a lion. Avalokita becomes confused with Mañjuśrī, is seated on the lion, carries the book and the sword of Mañjuśrī, but all the time retains his own attributes as well. (2) The figure with the thousand arms, in which the arms, arranged in the form of a peacock's tail, give a graphic representation of the metaphor;* this is a sculptured interpretation of the universality of the god. (3) The figure with eleven heads (three, three, three, one, one, the last one being the head of Amitābha) and a thousand arms is the translation, as it were, of his former name Samantamukha.† It corresponds to a legend which shows very clearly the character of Avalokita: 'May my head split asunder,' the god had said, 'if I fail in my vow to save beings!'—an old Buddhist expression. As a matter of fact, he did give way for an instant to discouragement, on seeing the inefficacy of his efforts; his head split into a thousand pieces, and Amitābha put it together again. There are several forms of this story, in which the old is mixed with the new.

We shall also quote a modern Nepalese inscription which gives a good account of the dignity and the physiognomy of our hero: 'The chiefs of the Yogins call him the King of the Fishes (*Matsyendra*), the devotees of the female deities (*śāktas*) call him *Śakti*, the Buddhists call him *Lokeśvara*. All honour to this being, whose true form is Brahman.'‡ This identification of Avalokita with the Śakti *par excellence*, *i.e.* with the personification of the cosmic female energy, shows, in a more striking way than the coupling of the god with the twenty-one Tāras,§ that the Chinese transformation of Avalokita into a woman had probably been already effected in India.‖

7. We need not say very much about the Tibetan doctrine of incarnations, according to which all

* This magician (*māyāvin*) with eleven heads—this shows the best and truest form of his polymorphism—is incomprehensible. He appears and disappears like a meteor (*jvalann ivāgnipiṇḍaḥ*). He has a hundred thousand arms and a hundred thousand times ten million eyes. He exists in the past, the present, and the future (*trikāla*). He was at work when Śākya muni was merely a worshipper. There is no limit put upon his activity except when all beings have entered nirvāna. The Buddhas, in fact, are only some of the saints whom he has 'matured,' and who owe everything to him; there is deliverance only in the hexasyllabic formula.

† Let us recall the fact that the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* in verse adds some details in the 'Adibuddhistic' sense (see art. ĀDIBUDDHA). But note that there is nothing to indicate the generation of Avalokita by Amitābha (in the *Maṇi-bka-hbum*, Avalokita is born from a white ray from Amitābha's left eye, or he issues from a lotus as a young man of sixteen years of age); nor is there any trace to be found of the system of the 'Dhyānibuddhas' and their 'sons'; Vajrapāni is a malevolent being, Ratnapani is a personage of secondary rank. Avalokita is nowhere, so far as we can see, called Padmapāni.

‡ The *bīja* of Avalokita seems always to be *hrīḥ*; his *mantra* is the hexasyllabic formula (see the beautiful plate, Schlagintweit, p. 55), but sometimes we find *oṁ vajradharma hrīḥ*

§ There are representations of Avalokita after the style of the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* and of the *Māyājālābhisambodhi*.

‖ Foucher, *Iconographie*, i. and ii.

¶ *Trikāṇḍaśeṣa*, which gets its information from Vyādi (Vindhyavāsin?) gives the names Lokeśvara, Amitābhaśekhara, Padmapāni, and also Khasarpana, Kāraṇḍavyūha, Sukhāvatiśvara. Tārā is the daughter of Avalokita.

** Already at Sāñchi the 'lotus' is represented in the hand of a great many personages, as an offering intended for Buddha. Those who carry lotuses are not all Avalokitas, for Maitreya is among them (see Grunwedel, *Buddh. Kunst*, p. 167). It is worthy of notice that neither the *Lotus of the True Law* nor the *Sukhāvatī* nor the *Amitāyus* nor the *Kāraṇḍa* seems to know Padmapāni.

* 'With an eye in the palm of each hand' (Sandberg, *Colloquial Tibetan*, p. 197). Sometimes *only* sixty-six arms are represented (Foucher, *Catal.* 15).

† See Schlagintweit, p. 54; Schmidt, *Forschungen*, p. 202 (the head is broken into ten pieces). This number *eleven* recalls the eleven Rudras, and shows us Avalokita as a disguised Śiva. [Being Vāgiśvara, he is none the less Brahmā when he becomes Śiva.] It may be useful to mention that the *Avalokitaekadaśamukhadhāraṇīs* (Nanjio, 327, 328) were translated into Chinese in 557-581. Among the other *Samanta°* (*Mahāvyutpatti*, 23, 31, 36, 38, 63) the most famous is Samantabhadra (*Lotus*, xxvi.; Kern, p. 437, note), a double of Śiva, and the only one of the 'Dhyānibodhisattvas' who is not a *pāṇi* (*vajra*, *ratna*, *padma*, *viśvapāṇi*).

‡ Inscription dated 792; see *Ind. Antiquary*, ix. 192, Kern, *Vermenging*, p. 14; on Matsyendra, see Wilson, ii. 30, and i. 214; Kern, *op. cit.*, 42, and Lévi, *Népal*, i. 349 ff. He belongs to the mysterious line of 'Siddhas,' masters of the Haṭhayoga, civilizers (?) of Nepal. Sometimes he is the son of Ādināṭha, and is placed five spiritual generations previous to Gorakhnāth; sometimes he is Gorakhnāth's disciple. There may be concealed under his name a historical personage identified with Abjapāni = Padmapāni. But although the mythical explanation finds very little favour, euhemerism in such a subject seems almost chimerical. An important iconographic detail is that Avalokita is white, except in Nepal, where he is red (Foucher, *Cat* 15, etc.).

§ *JBTS*, 1894, 2. 1.

‖ On the Chinese Avalokita, see Eitel, *Handbook*, p. 22.

the monastic dignitaries are *nirmāṇas* (sprul-pa = khoubilgan) of the chief deities; it will be sufficient to refer the reader to the article LĀMAISM and to the sources. We shall merely say that Avalokiteśvara, the patron of the Tibetan Church, is incarnated in the person of the Great Lāma (rgyal-ba ryga-mtsho), while Amitābha dwells in the Great Pandit (Pan-chen) of the rival monastery. Waddell, though without adequately setting forth his proofs, maintains that the theory is a recent invention (1640). There is no doubt that Lāmaic hierarchy is peculiarly Tibetan; but it is quite as certain that many Hindu Siddhas or Yogins have, by their magic, succeeded in identifying themselves with gods.

LITERATURE.—Detailed bibliography in Burgess, *Arch. Survey of Western India*, No. 5 (1883), p. 14, and Grünwedel, *Mythologie*, 1900, notes 29.

ORIGINAL SOURCES.—Lexicons; Mahāvyutpatti, Dharmasaṅgraha, Trikāṇḍaśeṣa, Saddharmapuṇḍarika, Sukhāvatīvyūha, Amitāyurdhyānasūtra, Bodhicharyāvatāra, Kāraṇḍavyūha.

TIBETAN SOURCES.—Csoma-Feer, *AMG* ii. 330; Sarat Chandra Das, *Dictionary*, p. 806, *JASB* (1882) ii. 126.

CHINESE SOURCES.—Nanjio, *Catalogue*, 1883, Nos. 327 ff.; Beal, *Catena*, 1878 (Śūraṅgama); the Buddhist pilgrims.

Besides the general works of Hodgson, Burnouf, Wassilieff, Kern, Koppen, Schlagintweit, Pander, Waddell, and Grunwedel, the reader is referred to Wilson, *Select Works*, i. 213, ii. 1-39, *Bauddha Tracts from Nepal*, 1862; Kern, *Inscrip. uit Battambang*, Amsterdam, 1899, *Vermenging van Çivaisme*, 1888; Foucher, *Iconographie*, i., 1899, and ii., 1905; Blonay, *Déesse Tarā*, 1895; Grünwedel-Burgess, *Buddh. Art in India*[2], 1901; Waddell, 'The Indian Cult of Avalokita,' *JRAS*, 1894, 51-89, *Gazetteer of Sikhim*, 1893, p. 250; specially on Iconography, Burgess, *Arch. Surv. Rep. of Western India*, No. 9, Bombay, 1879, and No. 5, 1883; Pander, *Panthéon des Tschangtscha Hutuktu*, Berlin, 1890.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

AVARICE.—Avarice may be defined as an absorbing passion for earthly possessions and a selfish gratification in their retention. It includes both the getting and the keeping of wealth. In the getting the avaricious man is tempted to put aside all considerations that stand between him and his object, and in the retention he looks less to the beneficial use to which any possession can be put than to his own luxury in possessing it. In ordinary language, avarice is largely restricted to this second feature, while the passionate desire that begets the avaricious character is described as covetousness (wh. see). Avarice is thus applied more frequently to parsimony in the storing of wealth, and covetousness to rapacity in seeking after wealth. Covetousness stirs up the discontented to clutch at what other people have; avarice begets the miser who hoards greedily all that he has.

The avaricious mind seems almost to make money or possessions ends in themselves, and yet it may be doubted whether money is not always thought of as a means of gratifying the love of pleasure or the love of power in some of their many forms. The miser gloats over his gold, but even in his most debased state he probably sees in it the possibility of acquiring ease or satisfying ambition. He probably pictures in his imagination the splendour with which he might surround himself, the security he has against poverty, or the greatness of the one who will inherit all as his heir. Certainly, at first, avarice leads men to amass money because of the command it gives over the conveniences and luxuries of life, and because of its efficacy as an instrument of ambition (cf. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[2], 1886, ii. 172).

Avarice springs, therefore, from two of the strongest human passions, the love of pleasure and the love of power; although it may continue even when pleasure and power seem no longer likely to be gratified. In its last stage it becomes repellent to all, as its selfish absorption reveals the degradation and folly of the mammon-worshipper.

The degradation of avarice is graphically described by Dante, who represents the miser as cleaving to the dust, in *Purgatory* (Longfellow's tr. xix. 120 ff.)—

> 'Even as our eye did not uplift itself
> Aloft, being fastened upon earthly things,
> So justice here has merged it in the earth.'

A similar conception is found in Milton's description of Mammon (*Par. Lost*, i. 680 ff.), whose looks and thoughts even in heaven were always downward bent—

> 'admiring more
> The riches of heav'n's pavement, trodden gold,
> Than aught, divine or holy, else enjoy'd,
> In vision beatific.'

Cf. also Bunyan's account of the man with the muck-rake, who was so intent upon the things of earth that he had no eye for the crown of glory. It is little wonder that the folly of the miser in giving up his life to the hoarding of earthly possessions is keenly felt by the noblest writers. Dante (*Inferno*, vii. 64) expresses the thought of all spiritual minds when he depicts the ignorance and folly of avarice—

> 'For all the gold that is beneath the moon,
> Or ever has been, of these weary souls
> Could never make a single one repose.'

The miser is represented frequently in literature, as in Molière's *L'Avare* and in Plautus's *Aulularia*, on which Molière's play was founded. The unhappiness of the avaricious is well summed up in the closing words of Eucho, the miser in the *Aulularia*: 'Nec noctu, nec diu, quietus unquam eram. nunc dormiam.' He has bestowed his treasure upon his son-in-law, and has thus divested himself of all future cares *Now* he hopes to sleep quietly, while formerly he had no rest by day or night.

The petty meannesses of the miser are illustrated in the *Characters* of Theophrastus (ed. Ussing): 'If he gives a dinner, he does not serve up as much food as is necessary. . . . When sent out . . . on a public commission, he leaves the provisions for the journey to his family, and lives at the expense of his fellow-travellers. . . . If one of his friends is to have a wedding, or is about to have his daughter married, he speedily undertakes a journey to spare the marriage present.'

Restraints may be put upon avarice by the laws of a country. Thus, certain methods of increasing wealth may be declared illegal. Stealing, fraudulent practices in trade, adulteration to make extra profit, the exaction of exorbitant interest, may all be declared punishable offences. Law may also deal with the misuse of wealth, *e.g.* money may not be hoarded by any one in such a way that his functions as a citizen are not performed. A man is not allowed to be dependent on the State for support while he has money at his command. A father is bound to use his wealth to support his children. Children are bound to support their parents. In these and other ways law may put limits to the right of a citizen to hoard possessions.

A further extension of these social restraints is bound up with all theories of socialism or communism. Under these all private capital would be almost, if not altogether, abolished. Rent might still be paid to the community, but interest would cease. Each individual would be remunerated in proportion to the services he had rendered. Thus socialism would seek, by abolishing the present system of competing capitalists, served by competitive wage-labour, to strike at the system that encourages the avaricious nature.

In the individual life an effort may be made to check avarice by one great act, as by the vow of poverty, depriving the subject of all personal interest in property and all power over it. This vow, along with the vow of chastity and obedience, was adopted by the Dominicans and Franciscans to complete the irrevocable surrender of those who entered the religious state.

For the most part avarice has been restrained by the application of general ethical and Christian truths to the personal life, and in particular to the earning, saving, and spending of wealth. Christianity teaches that selfishness is a deadly sin which must give place to a supreme love for God, and to the love of neighbour as well as self. Wealth is to be looked upon not as an end in itself, but only as a means towards attaining higher ends in life. When a man earns money, he should not be taken possession of by worldly things, but possess them as if he possessed them not. He should not hoard wealth uselessly in fear of want, for he should believe that, if he seeks first the kingdom of God, all things needful for life will be added by God.

In using wealth, he is not to allow himself to be dominated by the selfish love of pleasure or of power, but, regarding himself as a steward of God, he is to use it as a means of procuring a free and independent human existence and development for himself and those around him.

LITERATURE.—Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, London, 1875; Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[2], London, 1886; Stalker, *Seven Deadly Sins*, London, 1901; Mozley, *University Sermons*[2], London, 1876; Fowler and Wilson, *Principles of Morals*, Oxford, 1894; Hannay, *Spirit and Origin of Christian Monasticism*, London, 1903.

D. MACRAE TOD.

AVERROËS, AVERROISM.—1. Life.—'Averroës' is a corruption of the Arabic name Ibn Rushd. Abu 'l-Walid Muhammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Rushd was born at Cordova in the year A.H. 520 (A.D. 1126), of a family of standing. His grandfather, who was kādi of Cordova, wrote some important works on law. His father also, and afterwards Averroes himself, held the post of kādi. He studied law in his native town, and medicine under the guidance of Abū Jafar Hārūn of Truxillo. He enjoyed the friendship of Ibn Zuhr, a famous physician, and the acquaintance of the celebrated theosophist Ibn 'Arabī. In 548 we find him at Marrakesh (Morocco), being presented by Ibn Ṭufaīl to the Amir of the Faithful, the Almohad Abū Ya'qūb Yusūf. His account of this introduction has been communicated as follows:

'When I came into the presence of the Amir of the Faithful,' he says, 'I found him alone with Ibn Ṭufail, who began to eulogize me. . . . After asking my own, my father's, and my family name, the Amir opened the conversation with the question: "What is the opinion of philosophers on the sky? Is it an eternal substance, or did it have a beginning?" A sudden fear seized me, and rendered me speechless.' The Amir, however, soon put him at ease by himself treating the question with a knowledge unlooked for in a prince, and sent him away laden with presents.

It was Ibn Ṭufaīl too who advised Averroës to write a commentary on Aristotle. He told him that the Amir often complained about the obscurity of the Greek philosophers, and of the translations then existing, and said that he ought to undertake the explaining and arranging of them. There is a passage in Ibn Ṭufaīl's philosophical romance, *Ḥayy ben Yaḳẓān*, that is supposed to be an allusion to Averroës, who was just then beginning to write.

In A.H. 565 Averroës was appointed a kādi at Seville, and, about 567, was installed at Cordova. From this time onwards he devoted himself to the composition of his greatest works, although he felt burdened all the time with public duties. He travelled a great deal. In 574 he was at Marrakesh, in 575 at Seville, and in 578 back again at Marrakesh, where Yusūf appointed him his chief physician, a post that had been held by Ibn Ṭufaīl. When Yusūf sent him back to Cordova, he bore the title of 'Grand Kādi.'

Averroes continued in favour during the beginning of the reign of Ya'qūb al-Mansūr, Yusūf's successor; then he fell into disgrace. This was the result of the opposition his writings encountered from the theologians, and it bears witness to the influence that his philosophy was beginning to exercise. They accused him of various heresies (see below, § 3); and even went the length of trying to make him pass for a Jew. After undergoing an examination on the subject of his orthodoxy, he was banished to Lucena, near Cordova. The Amir also ordered (*c.* 1195 A.D.) all the works of the philosophers to be burned except treatises on Medicine, Arithmetic, and elementary Astronomy.

These decrees were afterwards reversed, and Averroes was recalled to Marrakesh; but he did not long enjoy his return to favour, dying on the 9th of Safar, A.H. 595 (11th Dec. A.D. 1198). His tomb is at Marrakesh, outside the Tagazūt gate.

2. Works.—Averroës' great claim to glory lies in his being pre-eminently Aristotle's commentator. To this he owes his renown and popularity in the West in the Middle Ages. His philosophy proper has been fiercely attacked, and, in the present writer's opinion, often misunderstood. But the care with which he composed his commentaries, their compass, their abundance, and their ingenuity, have caused them to be used as a basis for the study of philosophy in schools.

In accordance with a custom which still prevails in Musalmān teaching, these commentaries are of three kinds: short, medium, and long. These three degrees correspond to the three years or three periods into which philosophical instruction was divided. It is in this way too that the Qur'ān or the *'aḳāid* ('articles of faith') is commented on in the universities of Islām, recourse being had to more and more comprehensive glosses, according to the progress of the pupils.

In Latin or Hebrew we have the three kinds of Averroistic commentaries for the *Second Analytics*, the *Physics*, the treatises on the *Sky* and the *Soul*, and the *Metaphysics*; but no long commentaries for the other works, and none at all for the *History of Animals*, and the *Politics*. In Arabic we have the medium commentaries on *Politics* and *Rhetoric*, a treatise on four books of Aristotle on *Logic*, and a translation of fragments of Alexander's commentary on *Metaphysics*. H. Derenbourg has brought into evidence the existence of an Arabic collection of short commentaries or compendiums (*jawāmi'*) in the library of the Escurial. This work has almost exactly the same contents as that mentioned by the author of the *History of the Almohads* (Fagnan's tr. p. 211).

Besides this great work, his commentaries, we have a somewhat important work on Polemics, the *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* ('Vanity of Vanities'), which was levelled against the theologians. It is in the Arabic text. There are also a few fragments in Arabic which are not so important. Among the works that Renan mentions as having been written by Averroës besides his commentaries, but which are perhaps not all clearly distinct from them, are: commentary on Plato's *Republic*, opinions on al-Fārābī's *Logic* and on his manner of comprehending Aristotle, discussions on a few of Avicenna's theories, commentary on Nicolaus's *Metaphysics*, treatises on the abstract intellect and its relation to man's, and a commentary on the Profession of Faith (*'Aḳīdah*) of the Mahdī Ibn Tūmart. Averroes was the author also of works on Jurisprudence, Astronomy, and Medicine. Of the last named, we possess the text of a treatise which, in the Middle Ages, enjoyed a somewhat wide-spread reputation, the *Kulliyāt* (*i.e.* 'Generalities').

3. Doctrine.—It is by no means certain that the Western writings which we possess on Averroes give us a very true idea of his doctrine. His philosophy was fiercely attacked by the theologians, who represented it in the light most favourable for their own ends. With the intention of pointing out the dangers that it presented to the faith, they forced assertions out of it, they drew overstrained inferences from it, they told whither, according to them, this doctrine led rather than what it really was. We know this method of procedure well from the work of al-Ghazālī entitled *Tahāfut* ('Destruction,' or 'Vanity of Philosophers'), where he applies it to al-Fārābī and Avicenna. This work has now been carefully studied. It is clear that al-Ghazālī reproaches 'philosophers,' not so much for explicitly professing anti-religious doctrines, as for holding opinions and hypotheses which are not likely to be useful for proving religious truth, but from which conclusions contrary to the faith would rather be

inferred. This does not mean that al-Fārābī and Avicenna did not seek sincerely to establish a philosophy compatible with dogma.

Now the same thing happened in the case of Averroës. He was opposed by theologians, not only by Musalmāns, but by Christians as well; and we see his system not from his own point of view, but through the distorting criticism of these theologians. Some of these authors are, indeed, more accessible than Averroës, whose ideas have to be sought either in the rare Arabic texts or in the Latin translations, whose style is very obscure and difficult.

It seems that even Renan, in spite of all his intelligence, his facility, and his perspicacity, has not absolutely guarded against this fundamental injustice; and too often, in his slightly wavering explanation of Averroës' philosophy, he presents not so much the authentic doctrine of Averroës as that which has been attributed to him. The following is, very briefly, Averroes' doctrine according to Renan:

> It had a very evolutionary character. Eternal matter, the evolution of the germ by its latent power, an undetermined God, the impersonality of the intelligence, the emersion and reabsorption of the individual, constitute its essential points. He further represents Averroes as a downright determinist, whose God does not recognize individuals, but can recognize only the general laws of the universe. He says, moreover, in several places that Averroes denies resurrection. Not firmly enough impressed with the great influence of Neo-Platonism in Islām — an influence brought into evidence by Dieterici—he tries to trace the ideas of the Arabic philosopher to Aristotle, which he sometimes finds rather difficult, and is surprised that the theories to which the Arabs give preference are precisely those that appear in Aristotle only in an obscure and secondary manner.

We cannot quite agree with these different ways of looking at Averroës. We believe that he must be studied as belonging to the school called *al-falāsifa* ('Philosophers'), of which we shall hear more in connexion with al-Fārābī and Avicenna; that the doctrine of this school is more Neo-Platonic than Peripatetic; that Averroes' doctrine is precisely the same in principle, differing from it only in unessentials; and this is exactly what appears from a perusal of the work entitled *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* ('Vanity of Vanities') which Averroes wrote in reply to al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut*. Al-Ghazālī attacked al-Fārābī and Avicenna. Now it frequently happens that Averroës finds al-Ghazālī's criticism justified, and he reproaches his predecessors for giving him this advantage. Then he modifies something in their system; but these modifications deal only with details, or with the manner of exhibiting the doctrines; they are not really essential.

Is there any need, as has been suggested, to regard these modifications of Averroës on the doctrines of the school of 'Philosophers' as an approximation to the system of the Peripatetics? This, again, is by no means certain. It is doubtful whether there is much less Neo-Platonism in Averroës than in his predecessors. His opponents in the Middle Ages accused him of having often misunderstood Aristotle, and sometimes their criticism seems well founded.

Let us now exhibit some of the chief points in Averroës' philosophy by comparing them with the corresponding points in Avicenna's philosophy. This is not a very easy task; for Averroes himself seems, more than Avicenna, to feel the difficulties of the philosophical problems. He is less confident, less systematic, more analytic; he disputes more, is more troubled about the opinions of others, and seems to have less firmness about his own conclusions.

(1) *Eternity of the world.*—The doctrine of the eternity of the world had early partisans in Islām in the *Mu'tazilites*, such as Abu'l-Hudaīl and Tumāmah. The former considered the creation as simply the act of putting the universe in motion. We have a fragment of Averroës, published by Dr. Worms, which is very clear on this question. He recognizes that there is a creation, and that the world needs a motive power; but he interprets these two ideas in a different manner from the theologians. He believes in a creation that is being renewed every instant in a constantly changing world, always taking its new form from the preceding; but he does not admit creation *ex nihilo*. According to him, this continuous and incessant creation is more worthy of the name of creation than that which is accomplished once for all. Averroës claims that fundamentally this idea does not differ from that of the theologians. The fact remains, however, that in his system infinity can be reached in time—a point which the orthodox doctrine does not admit. But for him, as well as for the theologians, creation does not take place in time: it is produced for all eternity; and time is produced and created at the same moment as the world, according to the doctrine of the orthodox school. Time, for all these Musalmān thinkers, is the result of the existence of the world, and is manifested in the movement of the spheres.

The world then, although it is eternal, has a 'mover' or 'agent.' On this point Averroes rectifies a proof of Avicenna's which does not seem conclusive to him. The mover or agent is that cause of the world, eternal, like it, which produces it each instant and moves it. Celestial bodies, indeed, do not have a perfected existence except through movement; that which gives them this movement is their 'agent.' In this way Averroes distinguishes between eternity with cause and eternity without cause (*æternitas secundum tempus, æternitas secundum essentiam*). God alone is eternal without cause and without mover or agent. The world is eternal, but has an agent.

(2) *Origin of multiplicity.*—Renan remarks that the problem which engrossed Averroes most was that of the origin of beings; we might say, with more precision, the origin of multiplicity. Indeed, it engrossed the whole Arabic school. God being one, how does multiplicity emerge from Him? Avicenna recognized the principle that 'out of one only one can spring'; consequently, he thought that first of all there came from God a primary being, one alone, called the 'first cause,' from whom then evolved the multiplicity of beings. Averroës does not absolutely maintain this principle. The opinion he professes is neither so clear nor so absolute, although he meant it to be more supple and synthetic.

He admits, like all his school, the succession of the celestial spheres, considered as incorruptible, animated, and moved by intelligences. He makes a few changes in the details of their procession. He holds that multiplicity exists, not only in the different aspects of knowledge that they have of one another, but also in their mutual distances and in the 'dispositions' that they have in them. Averroës, moreover, does not admit that the celestial bodies are composed of matter and form, as Avicenna admitted—an opinion which leads to the conclusion that the existence of these bodies is not necessary, for matter and form depend on one another for subsistence. By rejecting this opinion, Averroes continues to diminish the importance of the rôle of creator.

A single power, he holds, comes from the first principle. The whole world results from it, and all its parts are so ordered and connected that the whole, moved by this single energy, acts in concert. Thus, in animals, the different faculties, the members, and the actions, are united in a single body; and each animal is judged a single being, having at its disposal a single power. It is because of this diffusion of power, intellect, and soul, in the

heavens and in the sublunary sphere, that it can be said that God created, maintains, and preserves the world, as we read in the Qur'ân. It does not necessarily follow that, because this power penetrates into manifold beings, it is itself manifold. There flows then from the unit, *i.e.* from the first principle, a power, single itself, which becomes manifold in the beings that participate in it.

This system certainly shows how the lives of the different beings that compose the world harmonize. But Averroës seems to have avoided explaining the origin of these beings.

(3) *Knowledge in God.*—Averroës gives us his idea of the philosophic argument that 'the first principle comprehends only its own essence.' He does not agree with the theologians that we are then driven to the conclusion that God is ignorant of the whole world, and does not know His own creation. The meaning of this assertion is that God comprehends in His essence beings in their most exalted state of existence; and when the philosophers say that He does not comprehend the beings that are below Him, it signifies that He does not know them in the way in which we know them, but in a certain manner that is peculiar to Him. For if any other being existed who possessed a knowledge similar to God's, God would have an 'associate' in His knowledge, and He would no longer be unique. This is why it is impossible to say that Divine knowledge is general, or that it is particular; these are modes of human knowledge, and they refer to beings, who are the causes of human knowledge, but who cannot be the cause of God's knowledge.

To sum up: we cannot, according to Averroes, admit that the knowledge of God depends on beings, for then the less perfect would be necessary to the more perfect; nor that God does not comprehend in His essence things and their order, for then He would not be intelligent. It stands to reason, therefore, that He conceives things in a higher order of existence than that in which we know them.

This theory of the different orders of existence is, nevertheless, a little obscure. Averroes tries to explain it by comparing it to colour, which is one in its essence but has different degrees of existence, according as it is in bodies, or in our sight, or our imagination, or our other faculties in their order. In view of this explanation it would be unjust to claim that Averroes' system denies Providence.

(4) *The soul and the intellect.*—We may take it that Averroës' psychology is, as a whole, constructed like that of Avicenna. But there is one point in this system which we must not forget, the distinction between the soul and the intellect.

This distinction is especially important in its bearing on the question of the survival of the soul and its 'unity.' It has often been said that Averroes taught the 'unity of the soul' and the unity of the intellect in the universe, and that he denied the immortality of the individual soul. The present writer does not believe that this latter assertion is correct; the former, about the universal unity of the soul or of the intellect, undoubtedly is. But still we must try to discover the exact meaning of this expression.

According to the school of 'Philosophers,' the intellect and the soul are not merely distinct in degree; that is to say, the intellect is not merely the most elevated kind of soul. We feel that there is a more profound difference between these two ideas, a real difference in their nature. The intellect alone seems absolutely free from all matter; it is essentially that which is opposed to the common idea of matter; it represents the higher domain of general or abstract; it is pure thought. The same can by no means be said of the soul. The idea of soul, in Musalmân philosophy, is closely allied to our modern ideas of power and energy. The soul is the energy that animates matter; and as such, far from being absolutely opposed to matter, it is, on the contrary, profoundly mixed up with and involved in it. At times we are inclined to believe that the Arabic philosophers have an idea of this power similar to that of the modern psychical schools, and that they believe that it depends on some subtle matter, which is more delicate than ordinary matter, and is not usually apprehended by the senses. That is the impression given by reading passages like the following:—

'There are some who say that the soul resides in a subtle thing called celestial heat, in which are the souls that form the bodies. No philosopher will deny that there is a celestial heat in the elements which serve as support for the faculties of animals and plants. Some call this heat the "natural celestial faculty." Galen calls it the "informing faculty." These souls form bodies; this is the reason why Plato says that the soul is separate from the body; for if it depended on it, it would not create it. The soul is something that is added to the innate celestial heat. Each species has its soul, intermediary between those of the celestial bodies and the souls that are here below in the visible bodies. It has therefore been said: "At the death of the bodies, the souls return to their spiritual condition and to those subtle bodies which none can see."' (*Tahâfut*, p. 138).

It follows, then, that if the intellect exists perfectly and actually only when general and freed from the conditions of individuality, the soul, on the contrary, though belonging to the universal power that circulates in the world, may be individual and remain so. That is what Averroes points out after a passage in which he has been speaking of the unity of the intelligence: 'This argument,' he says, 'is of value for the intelligence, for there is nothing in the intelligence of the nature of individuality; but it is a different thing with the soul; for even if it is despoiled of the accidents by which individuals are multiplied, the most celebrated of the sages say: "It is not exempt from the condition of individuality"' (*op. cit.* p. 137).

The soul, therefore, according to this doctrine, may remain individualized after the death of the body. It *may* do so. Arguments of a purely philosophical order do not force us to believe that this individuality really exists, but they show that it is possible. Such seems to be Averroes' point of view on the question of the immortality of the soul. In the end, he leaves it to revelation to settle this question. 'It is a very difficult problem,' he says. The philosophical introduction to the problem is pushed to the point we have just seen—the knowledge that the soul forms the body, and that, since it forms it, it cannot depend upon it. We cannot therefore deduce the destruction of the soul from that of the body. This agrees with what we find in Avicenna.

Belief in the survival of individual souls, combined with belief in the eternity of the world, brings up a difficulty with regard to infinite number. Since the number of souls produced at the beginning of the world is without end, there would be an infinite number of individuals existing at one and the same time. Now, most of the Arabic philosophers, Avicenna excepted, refused to admit infinite number. Averroës agrees with the majority. He seems to solve the difficulty by counting only a single soul as a principle; he does not apply number to the particular souls that are bound to it. There is but one soul, just as there is but one light; its multiplication to infinity in individuals is only a secondary matter. In short, Averroes refuses to admit infinite number in the case of objects that are quite detached from one another; but he does admit it, in a secondary manner, in the case of objects previously bound to a general unity.

Such is, as nearly as we can judge, the real import of Averroes' system on the problem of the unity and the survival of the soul. It is also evident that it is quite impossible to admit the contrary opinion, which is that Averroes denied the survival of the soul. For there is no doubt that Averroës claimed to remain one of the faithful. Now it is an absolute impossibility that he could believe himself a Musalmân and at the same time deny the immortality of the soul. His thought must have been, like that of the whole school of Philosophers, that the former philosophy was true in the main, and that the Muhammadan faith was also true; that consequently there should be no essential point of contradiction between them,

but that, on the contrary, the one should complete and explain the other.

As for the question of 'the unity of the intellect,' it is by no means the same as that of 'the unity of the soul.' It is, moreover, a question that presents no difficulty if it is made quite clear what the author means by the terms in question.

The unity of the intellect signifies merely the universality of general ideas. Averroës explains this universality of rational knowledge at the same time as its perpetuity: 'Ghazālī,' he says, 'has taken this argument from the Philosophers: the intelligence, starting with the individuals of any species, lays hold on a single conception, which is the quiddity of this species, and which is not divided with the persons that are multiplied through origin, position, or constituent. This conception, therefore, cannot be subjected to birth and destruction, like the individuals to which it pertains. This is why the sciences are eternal; neither are they born nor do they die except by accident, that is to say, by their relation to such and such an individual. They are not perishable in themselves.'

General ideas, according to the school of Philosophers, exist really in the active intellect, *i.e.* in the world of celestial intelligences. This world is eternal, and is harmoniously arranged under the First Principle, which is God. The human intelligence perceives general ideas only in so far as they succeed in entering into relation with the active intellect, in which these ideas reside. These exist actually. Whenever man's intellect perceives them, this intellect itself becomes perfect; it is completely developed and actual. Before this, it was incomplete, unfinished; it was not yet the intelligence but only a prelude to the intelligence, a general possibility of understanding, what the Philosophers call the 'material,' or passive, intellect. We see in the works of al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna the different degrees through which the intelligence passes in order to become actual instead of 'material,' as it originally was, *i.e.* to pass from the potentiality to the fact.

This system is quite clear. It is very evident that the material intelligence, which is a mere possibility, is not persistent in itself. The only persistent intellect is the realized, 'acquired,' or 'perfected' intellect, as the Philosophers call it. It is, therefore, a grave error to deduce, as Munk has done, from the non-immortality of this material intellect, the non-immortality of the human soul.

From this point of view, then, it can easily be understood why the Philosophers considered the question of individual survival in connexion with the unity of the soul, but not in connexion with the unity of the intellect.

(5) *Resurrection.*—Al-Ghazālī accused the school of Philosophers of denying resurrection. The accusation was grave, considering the importance of this dogma in the Qur'ān. Averroës denies the charge, and gives his views on this subject at the end of his *Tahāfut*. Renan gives a somewhat free translation of a few lines of this passage (*Aver.* p. 158). Averroes says that the theory that denies resurrection is nowhere found among the Philosophers. He remarks that the religious law, prior to philosophy, always taught resurrection, and that this dogma is useful for leading people to seek after the happiness of the beyond. 'Philosophers,' he says, 'teach happiness only to a few well-educated men, while religions make it their aim to teach the crowd; but this special class of philosophers arrive at complete existence and perfect happiness only by associating with the multitude' (*Tahāfut*, p. 139). They must therefore accept the teaching that suits the people, interpreting it as best they can.

Averroës interpreted this doctrine thus: the body which we shall have in the other life will not be the same as that of this life; 'that which will be resuscitated will be a representation of what is seen in this world; it will not be that very thing *in essentia*. For what has perished cannot be born again, except in so far as it is individualized; and existence can be bestowed only on the semblance of what has perished, not on the object that has perished in its identity.' To strengthen his argument, he uses the words of Ibn 'Abbās, a traditionist who had great authority in Islām: 'There is of the other world nothing but names in this world.' 'That proves,' says Averroes, 'that the future existence has a kind of generation more elevated than that of actual existence, and constitutes a more excellent order than the order of this world' (*op. cit.* p. 140).

Here again it is clearly a question of interpretation, not a denial of the doctrine. In the same way, we must not understand in a dogmatical sense passages such as Renan quotes (pp. 156, 157), in which Averroës disapproves of the use of myths regarding the state of souls after death, or says that it is not the sanctions of the other life that must press men on towards virtue in this life. That simply means that too precise a representation of the other world may be false and dangerous, and that virtue may have nobler motives than fear of punishment or promise of reward.

(6) *Truth and law.*—In politics, Averroes, like al-Fārābī, follows in the footsteps of Plato, whose *Republic* he commented on; and, according to the custom of Oriental thinkers of his school, he does not criticize the text he comments on. He accepts it as truth, almost as religious truth. He accepts, therefore, that political ideal, half socialistic, half mystic, which on many points, such as the status of woman, does not at all agree with the customs of Islām.

We must not lose sight of the part played by syncretism, which dominated the whole philosophy of the Oriental Middle Ages. Ancient philosophy was considered true as a whole; and all its documents, even the most diverse, could be brought into accord, the commentator having the settled conviction that they could neither contradict one another nor contradict religious truth. There are two important treatises of Averroes in which he tries to point out this conformity between religious truth and philosophical truth. This work required some 'interpreting' of the Qur'ān and a slight changing of its meaning. We get used to efforts of this kind in the study of the philosophers previous to Averroes, and certain more or less heterodox sects in Islām, like those of the Faithful Brothers of Baṣra or the Brothers of Purity. We find, too, in Averroes the extreme form of this conception, which, admitting *a priori* the two truths, philosophical and prophetic, ends in assimilating the philosopher and the prophet. Just as there must always be prophets here on earth, or at least great mystics, who bring the human world into relation with the world beyond, so also must there be philosophers. And here the idea takes a distinct turn that makes it still more unusual. As the human intelligence exists in actuality only by its union with the active intellect, there must always be in the human race, if this intelligence is really to exist and subsist, a few men of great intellectual gifts, a few great philosophers whose spirit participates in eternal truth.

In this passage, Averroes is no longer Peripatetic; but neither is he original; he is merely in accord with his world and his time. He is a syncretist; he is combining mysticism with a system that, from many points of view, is somewhat antagonistic to it. He is placing a kind of illuminative

system at the end and summit of his philosophy, just as his predecessors did, although he himself did not give the impression of being naturally much drawn to considerations of that kind.

4. Short history of Averroism.—Averroës' influence was felt in Jewish philosophy and Christian scholasticism. His commentaries were translated into Rabbinic Hebrew and into Latin. The Jews translated them during the 13th and the first half of the 14th century. In the 13th cent., Jacob, son of Rabbi Anatoli, of Naples, and Moses ben Tibbon, of Lunel, edited versions of several treatises; in the 14th, Kalonymus translated some others. Samuel b. Tibbon and Juda b. Solomon Cohen, of Toledo, compiled philosophical encyclopædias in which, we might say, they transcribe Averroës' works. The Spaniard Shem-Ṭob b. Joseph b. Falaquera inserted several long passages from Averroes in his own works. Towards the middle of the 14th cent. Averroism reached its zenith in Jewish schools, and Levi b. Gerson of Bagnols commented on Averroes, just as Averroës had commented on Aristotle. This great influence on the Jews lasted until the 15th century. At this period, we still find Pico della Mirandola following the teaching of Elias del Medigo, professor at Padua, the last representative of Averroism among the Jews.

Avicenna was translated into Latin before Averroes. The first translators were Dominico Gondisalvus, Archdeacon of Toledo, and the Jew, Juan Avendeath of Seville; they worked under the direction of Raymond, Archbishop of Toledo. Their translations were made from 1130 to 1150. The Jews had cut down the work; the translators put into form the version prepared by the Jews.

A few years later, translations of al-Kindi and al-Fārābī were edited by Gerard of Cremona and Alfred of Morlay. In 1230, Michael Scot, a courtier of Frederick of Hohenstaufen, began to translate Averroes. Of most importance are his interpretations of the commentary on *de Cœlo et Mundo* and of the treatise *On the Soul*. Hermann, a German, likewise attached to the house of Hohenstaufen, translated, from Averroes, the *Ethics* in 1240 and the *Poetics* in 1256. Alfonso X. and Frederick II. were the patrons of these works. It is well known that in 1240 Frederick addressed a series of philosophical questions to the Musalmān scholars, to which he received only very vague answers.

Is it really owing to these versions, executed from the Arabic, that Aristotle's works have passed into the West; or have the Latin versions, taken directly from the Greek, played the principal part in this transmission? M. Forget, who, a few years ago, again took up this question, concluded that the priority cannot be given comprehensively either to the one or to the other group of versions. It depends upon the treatise. The Arabic was the first to make known the eight books of *Physics*, the nineteen books on *History of Animals*, the treatises *On the Sky and the World*, *On Plants*, *On Meteors*, and summaries of the *Rhetoric*, and the *Poetics*. The first complete version of the *Ethics* was from the Arabic. The treatise on *The Soul* and a part at least of the *Metaphysics* were first known from the versions made directly from the Greek.

At the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th cent., when Averroism reached its zenith in North Italy, Niphus and Zimara made some corrections on the old versions of the commentaries of Averroës. Then new versions were written, based on the Hebrew translations. These new translations were, for the most part, very obscure. Among the translators may be mentioned Jacob Mantino of Tortosa, a Jew, physician to Paul III., Abraham of Balmes, also a Jew, and Giovanni Francesco Buiana of Verona, a Christian.

Averroism encountered the same opposition from the theologians in the Christian world as it had met with from the Musalmāns. Later, because of its unusual form, it was opposed by the Humanists, who loved to philosophize in a freer manner and a more elegant style. The Hellenistic scholars criticized Averroës' interpretation of Aristotle, and the Platonists, having Marsilio Ficino in their mind, placed the doctrine of the Academy in all the freshness of its renaissance in opposition to Aristotle and his commentator.

In the Middle Ages, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Gilles of Rome wrote against Averroism. Raymond Lully attacked it fiercely. Petrarch declared his dislike towards it, and intended to refute it. Formal condemnations of Averroism were passed at different periods: by the provincial council of Paris in 1209; by Robert de Courson in 1215; by William, bishop of Paris, in 1240; by Etienne Tempier, also bishop of Paris, in 1270 and 1277. Shortly after, these censures were ratified by the theologians of Oxford, over whom Robert of Kilwardeby, Archbishop of Canterbury, presided.

Averroism, which, through the Jews, had held sway in the centre of France until the 14th cent., continued in vogue in the schools of Northern Italy until the 16th century. In the school of Padua it raised the famous disputes in which Achillini and Pomponazzi took part. Its reign extends down to the appearance of modern experimental science, that is, to the time of Galileo.

LITERATURE.—I. *EDITIONS OF AVERROËS' WORKS.*—The two most important Latin editions of Averroes are those of Niphus, 1495-97, and of Junta, 1553. Arabic or Hebrew texts: *Taháfut al-Tahafut*, Cairo, A.H. 1303; J. Müller, *Philosophy and Theology of Averroes*, Munich, 1859 (Germ. tr. 1875); *Il commento medio di Averroe alla Poetica di Aristotile*, edited in Arabic and in Hebrew by Lasinio, with Ital. tr., 1872; *Il testo arabo del commento medio di Averroe alla Rettorica di Aristotile*, by the same editor; Freudenthal and Fränkel, 'Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles,' with translation into German, in *MBAW*, 1884, M. Worms, 'Die Lehre von der Anfangslosigkeit der Welt bei den mittelalterlichen arabischen Philosophen,' in Baeumker and von Hertling's *Beitrage*, Munster, 1900.

II. *WORKS ON AVERROISM.*—Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroisme*[3], Paris, 1869; Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, Paris, 1857, also art. in Franck's *Dictionnaire des Sciences philosophiques*; F. Lasinio, 'Studi sopra Averroe,' *Annuario della società italiana per gli studi or.*, 1872-73; A. F. Mehren, 'Et sur la philosophie d'Averroès, concernant ses rapports avec celle d' Avicenne et de Gazzâli,' *Muséon*, vii. 613; Forget, 'Les philosophes arabes et la philosophie scolastique,' *Compte rendu du troisième congrès scientifique international des catholiques*, Brussels, 1895; P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant l'Averroisme latin au xiiie siècle*, 1899; T. J. de Boer, *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, London, 1903.

BON CARRA DE VAUX.

AVESTA.—The Avesta, the sacred book of ancient Iran, contains the teachings of the prophet Zarathushtra, or Zoroaster, and serves at the present day as the holy scriptures of the Parsis of India and the so-called Gabars of Persia (see artt. GABARS, PARSIS). Although fragmentary in its present form, the Avesta is one of the great religious monuments of antiquity, and preserves the records of a faith that was once among the greatest in the Orient, and that might well have spread through Europe in early ages, but for the victories of the Greeks over the Persians at Marathon, Platæa, and Salamis, and for the triumphal incursion of Alexander into the East.

1. Name.—The designation 'Avesta' is derived from the Pazand *avastā*, Pahlavi *āpastāk*, or *avistāk*, a word of uncertain meaning and derivation. Possibly this term, like the Sanskrit *veda*, may signify 'wisdom,' 'knowledge'; more probably, however, it is derived from a presumable Av. form *upastā*, and denotes 'the original text,' 'the scriptures,' as opposed to the term *zand* (cf. Av. *āzainti*), 'commentary,' 'explanation.' In the exegetical and religious works of the Middle

Persian period these two words occur together constantly in the phrase *āpastāk va zand*, which refers to the original Avestan text and its Pahlavi paraphrase and commentary, and it is the erroneous inversion of these words that gave rise to the name *Zend-Avesta*, which was used by Hyde (1700) and by Anquetil du Perron (1771), and was adopted from the latter by the earliest succeeding translators.

2. Original form.—The Avesta in its present form is only a small remnant of a sacred literature of considerable extent. Pahlavi tradition tells of scriptures in 1200 chapters, the Arab historians Ṭabarī (*Annales*, i. 675) and Mas'ūdī (ed. Barbier de Meynard, ii. 123) refer to a copy inscribed on 12,000 cowhides, various Syriac writers allude to an extensive sacred book, and Pliny the Elder (*HN* xxx. 1. 2) mentions 2,000,000 verses composed by Zoroaster. Such direct references to the extent of the original Avestan writings are in agreement with the frequent insistence in Pahlavi literature on the loss of texts during the dark centuries after Alexander, and they are further confirmed by the fragmentary character of the Avesta as now extant. All doubts as to the existence of that larger literature, however, are removed by the Pahlavi *Dīnkarṭ* and the later Persian *Rivāyats*, which give a detailed account of the early scriptures and a summary of their contents.

According to these works, there were originally 21 Nasks (Nosks), or books, each of which was considered to correspond with one of the 21 words of the Ahuna-Vairya (*q.v.*) prayer, and comprised both the Avestan text and the Pahlavi commentary. These 21 Nasks were divided into three groups of seven books each, the first (called *gāsān*, or Gāthā group, and consisting of Nasks 21, 1, 2, 3, 11, 20, 13) containing the spiritual and moral teachings, the second (called *dāṭik*, or legal group, and consisting of Nasks 15–19, 12, 14) containing laws and prescriptions, and the third (called *hātak-mānsarīk*, or Hadhamanthra group, and consisting of Nasks 4–10) containing matters belonging partly to the first and partly to the second group. The number of sections in each Nask varied from 22 to 65, but many of these sections were no longer extant at the time of the composition of the *Dīnkarṭ*. Of Nasks 8, 9, and 10, for example, each of which had originally 60 sections, only 12, 15, and 10 sections respectively are said to have existed 'after Alexander.' The subjects treated in the Nasks may be briefly summed up as follows: Nask 1, virtue and piety; 2, religious observances; 3, exegetical—the three chief prayers of the religion being explained in it; 4, cosmogony; 5, astronomy and astrology; 6, performance of the ritual, and the benefit to be derived therefrom; 7, qualifications and duties of the priesthood; 8, ethical considerations and various aspects of human life; 9, directions for various ceremonies; 10, conversion and instruction of King Gushtāsp (Vishtāspa) and his wars with Arjāsp; 11, various religious and worldly duties; 12, an account of mankind from the creation of the primeval man to the advent of Zoroaster, and various genealogical information; 13, account of Zoroaster and the Saviour that is to come; 14, worship of Ormazd and the archangels; 15, dispensing of justice and various laws; 16, criminal, civil, and military law; 17, priestly and ritual code, general regulations; 18, law of property and family relations; 19, the Vīdēvdād, or Vendīdād, pollution and purification; 20, religious duties, good attributes and qualities; 21, praise of Ormazd and the archangels. From this summary it appears that the original work was not purely religious, but was somewhat encyclopædic in character.

3. History.—According to traditions, the substance of which there is no good reason to doubt, the Zoroastrian scriptures were preserved with great care in the early centuries of the faith, especially under the later Achæmenians. Ṭabarī states that King Vishtāspa, Zoroaster's patron, sent the original copy of the Avesta, written in letters of gold, to the 'Stronghold of Records' at Stakhra (Persepolis)—a tradition which is in substantial agreement with the Pahlavi account in the *Dīnkarṭ* (III. 3, VII. vii. 3 n., V. iii. 4) of a sumptuous copy that was preserved in the 'treasury of Shapīgān' at Persepolis (cf. Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, p. 306 f.). According to the Pahlavi treatise *Shatroīhā-ī Airān*, another copy, containing 1200 chapters inscribed on gilded tablets, was kept in the 'treasury' of the fire-temple at Samarkand (cf. Modi, *Aiyādgār-i Zarirān, Shatrōihā-i Airān*, Bombay, 1899, pp. 133–136, and *JRASBo* xx, No. 54; and Jackson, *Nöldeke Studien*, Strassburg, 1906, pp. 1031–1033). These two archetype copies, hitherto preserved with zealous care, were destroyed in the invasion of 'the accursed Iskandar' (Alexander) in B.C. 330, when he burned the palace of the Achæmenians at Persepolis, and when his conquering hosts took possession of Samarkand.

The ravages of Alexander broke the power of the Zoroastrian faith, and the Seleucid and Parthian rule in the five following centuries forms a period of depression and darkness in its history, entailing a loss of extensive portions of the original scriptures. Despite the consequent neglect, considerable portions of the texts were preserved in scattered works and in the memory of the priests. Under the last of the Arsacids, early in the 3rd cent. A.D., an attempt was made to collect such parts of the Avesta as had survived. According to a proclamation of Khusru Anūshirvān (A.D. 531–579), King Valkhash, who is generally identified with Vologeses I., ordered that all sacred writings should be searched for, and that such portions as were preserved only in oral tradition should again be written down. This work was eagerly continued by the founder of the Sasanian dynasty, Artakhshīr* Pāpakān (A.D. 226–240), who commissioned the high priest Tansar to collect the scattered fragments, and by his son, Shāhpūhr I. (A.D. 241–272). In the reign of Shāhpūhr II. (A.D. 309–380) a final revision of the Avestan texts was made by his prime minister, Ādarbād Māraspand, and this collection, consisting of a fixed number of books, was then declared canonical (see Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, iii. Introd. pp. xx–xxxvi, 'Zend-Avesta,' *SBE* iv. pp. xxx–xlvii, and *JA*, new series, iii., Paris, 1894, pp. 185–250, 502–555; consult also the discussion of Darmesteter's article, in two papers, by the Parsi High Priest Darab Dastur Peshotan Sanjana, *Tansar's Alleged Letter*, Leipzig, 1898, and the same author's *Observations on Darmesteter's Theory*, Leipzig, 1898; and Mills, *Zarathushtra, Philo, the Achæmenids, and Israel*, Chicago, 1906, pp. 21–76).

Far more serious even than the ravages of Alexander and the centuries of neglect, were the results of the Muhammadan conquest of Persia and the inroads of the Qur'ān. Through religious persecutions and civic disabilities the worshippers of Ormazd were compelled to abandon their faith or go into exile, and as many Zoroastrian books as could be found were ordered to be burned. The small body of texts that escaped destruction and loss was preserved by the few Zoroastrians who remained in Persia and by the Parsis, their co-religionists who had taken refuge in India; and the books contained in these manuscripts, recopied from time to time, constitute the Avesta as we now have it. The oldest Indian manuscripts date from the 13th and 14th centuries; the Persian are not older than the 17th. No single manuscript contains all the extant texts.

4. Present contents.—The Avesta in its present form consists of the following divisions: (*a*) *Yasna*, including (*b*) the *Gāthās*, (*c*) *Vīsparad*, (*d*) *Yashts*, (*e*) Minor Texts, such as *Nyaishes*, *Gāhs*, etc., (*f*) *Vendīdād*, (*g*) *Fragments*. These divisions fall naturally into two groups. (1) The first group comprises the Vendīdād, Vīsparad, and Yasna, which are classed together for liturgical purposes. In the ritual these are not recited as separate books, but are intermingled with one another, and the manuscripts often present them in the order in which they are to be used in the service. In this case the Pahlavi translation is omitted, and the collection is called *Vendīdād Sādah*, 'Vendīdād Pure,' that is, without commentary. On the other hand, these books also appear in some manuscripts

* See art. ARDASHIR I. vol. i. p. 774.

as separate entities, and in that case each part is usually accompanied by a rendering in Pahlavi. (2) The second group comprises the Minor Prayers and the Yashts, which are often included with these in the manuscripts, and is called *Khordah Avesta*, 'Abridged Avesta,' or 'Small Avesta.' This forms a species of prayer-book for the laity.

(*a*) *Yasna.*—The Yasna is the chief liturgical work of the canon. It is recited in its entirety in the Yasna ceremony, which, apart from a number of subordinate rites, is devoted chiefly to the preparation and offering of the *parāhōm* (the juice of the Haoma plant, mingled with milk and aromatic ingredients). Parts of the book, however, deal only indirectly with the ritual. The Yasna is composed of 72 chapters, called *Hāiti*, *Hā*, which are symbolized in the girdle of the Parsis (*kustī*), woven of 72 strands. Several of these chapters are mere repetitions to swell the apparent number. Chapters v. and xviii. are substantially identical with chapters xxxvii. and xlvii., and chapters lxiii., lxiv., lxvi., lxvii., and lxxii. are composed of texts occurring elsewhere. The book falls into three nearly equal divisions (i.–xxvii., xxviii.–lv., lvi.–lxxii.). The first part begins with an invocation of Ormazd and the other divinities in order of rank (i.–ii.), and the dedication of the oblation (*myazda*) and other offerings with similar formulas (iii. 1–8, iv.). After a short prayer (viii. 5–8) there follows the *Hom Yasht* (ix.–xi.), in which Haoma, the branch from whose twigs, like the Soma of the Hindus, a sacred drink was prepared, is personified and worshipped both as plant and as divinity. This section is in turn succeeded by the Zoroastrian creed (xii.) and by other formulas (xiii.). With chapter xiv. begin the so-called *Staota Yesnya*, chapters of the *Stōt-Yasht*, or twenty-first Nask, of the earlier Avesta, which continue, with interruptions, as far as chapter lviii. In the early chapters of the *Staota Yesnya* are found invocations of the spirits of the day (xvi.), of the periods of day and year, and of the various forms of fire (xvii.). Chapters xix.–xxi. contain commentaries on the three most sacred prayers, the *Ahuna Vairya*, *Ashem Vohū*, and *Yenghē Hātām*, and represent part of the third original Nask, called the Bak Nask. The succeeding chapters (xxii.–xxvii.) make up a further liturgical sequence, called *Hōmāst Yasht*, which accompanies the second preparation of the Haoma juice in the ceremony. The five *Gāthās*, which together with the *Yasna Haptanghāiti* form chapters xxviii.–liii. (excepting lii.), stand out in marked contrast with the other parts of the Yasna, and are described in the next paragraph below. Chapter liii. is a brief interpolation between the fourth and fifth Gāthās. Chapter liv. consists of but a single verse, aside from the introductory formulas, and forms the *Airyaman Ishya* prayer, with which the Saoshyants are to restore the dead to life at the day of resurrection. After a brief poetical summary of the Gāthās (lv.) comes the *Srōsh Yasht* (lvii.), a long and detailed glorification of the angel Sraosha, preceded by a briefer chapter in the same vein (lvi.) by way of introduction. Chapter lviii. is in praise of prayer in general, and especially of the prayer to be recited at the Last Judgment. The following chapter (lix.), with its renewed invocations, leads over to a formula of blessing on the house of a pious worshipper (lx.), a formula of exorcism (lxi.), and a series of stanzas to be recited in propitiation of the sacred fire (lxii.). Chapters lxiii.–lxviii. constitute the *Āb-zōr*, 'offering to the waters,' which consists of an introduction (lxiii.–lxiv.), praises of Anāhitā, the goddess of the waters (lxv.), and the formulas used in the consecration and offering of the holy water (lxvi.–lxviii.). The book ends with further invocations (lxix.–lxxii.), which mark the conclusion of the Yasna ceremony.

(*b*) *Gāthās.*—The metrical Gāthās ('songs,' 'psalms') constitute the oldest as well as the most important part of the whole Avesta, and differ from the other parts in language, metre, and style. They are five in number, comprising 17 hymns (*Yas.* xxviii.–xxxiv., xliii.–xlvi., xlvii.–l., li., liii.), and are arranged according to their metres, and named Ahunavaiti, Ushtavaiti, Spenta Mainyu, Vohu Khshathra, and Vahishtoishti, after their opening words. These Zoroastrian psalms contain the teachings, exhortations, and revelations of the prophet Zoroaster himself, who seems a more distinct personality here than elsewhere in the Avesta. The style of the Gāthās is noticeably different from that of other parts, being almost free from the tiresome uniformity and barren reiteration of some of the later portions; and although there is a constant recurrence of the cardinal tenets, these do not become monotonous, because of their varying expression. Ceremonies and ritual observances are but little referred to, and the Haoma-cult, the *Fravashis*, and the whole naturalistic pantheon do not appear in these hymns, either because they present the religion in an earlier and loftier form, or, more probably, because they are concerned chiefly with the prophet's teaching regarding the conflict between Ormazd and Ahriman, the relation of the human individual to that conflict, its ultimate outcome in the routing of the forces of evil and the final victory of Ormazd, the last judgment, and the longed-for kingdom of Ormazd. The detached character of the verses, which nevertheless are a logical sequence, has led to the supposition that, like the verse portions of many Buddhistic works, they were the text of discourses of the prophet and a summary of his teachings in a form available for oral tradition (cf. Pischel and Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, Stuttgart, 1889, i. 287).

In the midst of the Gāthās is inserted the so-called 'Yasna of the Seven Chapters' (*Yasna Haptanghāiti*), which is written in prose, but in the same dialect as the Gāthās. It consists of a number of prayers and ascriptions of praise to Ormazd, the Amesha Spentas, or archangels, the souls of the righteous, the fire, the waters, and the earth. By some scholars it is held to represent a later and more developed form of the religion than appears in the Gāthās. Its language, in fact, shows certain departures from the Gāthic dialect. Under the Gāthās are also included four specially sacred prayers or formulas. These are the *Ahuna Vairya* (*Yas.* xxvii. 13), the *Ashem Vohū* (*Yas.* xxvii. 14), *Yenghē Hātām* (*Yas.* iv. 26), and the *Airyaman Ishya* previously mentioned (*Yas.* liv. 1).

(*c*) *Vīsparad.*—The Vīsparad (Av. *vīspē ratavō*, 'all the lords') is not a body of connected texts, but consists merely of additions to portions of the Yasna, which it resembles in language and form. It comprises 24 (according to some, 23 or 27) chapters, called Kardah, and is about one-seventh as long as the Yasna. The Vīsparad contains invocations and offerings of homage to 'all the lords,' whence its name. In the ritual its chapters are inserted among those of the Yasna.

(*d*) *Yashts.*—The Yashts (Av. *yeshti*, 'worship by praise') form a poetical book of 21 hymns, chiefly in verse, in which the angels of the religion (*yazatas*) and the heroes of ancient Iran are praised and glorified. The order in which the divinities are worshipped corresponds largely with the sequence in which they are used to name the days of the month. In external form the Yashts are characterized by their identical introduction and conclusion, but they differ greatly in length, age, and character. The first four are largely composed of

late and ungrammatical material, and the last two consist chiefly of regular Yasht formulas with a number of quotations from other passages. On the other hand, the intervening longer Yashts are almost entirely in verse, and have considerable poetic merit. Of chief importance among these are: Yasht v., in praise of Ardvī Sūrā Anāhitā, the goddess of the waters; Yasht viii., which exalts the star Tishtrya, and recounts his victory over the demon of drought; Yasht x., dedicated to Mithra, who, as the god of light and of truth, rides out in lordly array to wreak vengeance on those who have belied their oath or broken their pledge; Yasht xiii., devoted to glorifying and propitiating the guardian spirits (*fravashis*) of the righteous; Yasht xiv., in honour of Verethraghna, the incarnation of victory; and Yasht xix., which sings the praises of the Kingly Glory (*kavaya hvarenah*), a sort of halo or radiance said to have been possessed by kings and heroes of Iran in olden times as a sign of their rulership by divine right. Much of the material in the Yashts is evidently drawn from pre-Zoroastrian sages; there is a mythological and legendary atmosphere about them, and Firdausi's *Shāh Nāmah* serves to throw light on many of the events which they portray, and on allusions that would otherwise be obscure.

(*e*) *Minor Texts.*—Chief among the Minor Texts are the *Nyaishes*, or Zoroastrian Litanies, a collection of five short prayers or ascriptions of praise addressed to the Sun, Moon, Water, and Fire, and to the angels Khurshēd, Mihr (Mithra), Māh, Ardvisūr (Ardvī Sūrā Anāhitā), and Ātash, who preside over these elements. These litanies form an important part of the Khordah Avesta. They are composed of fragments from the Yasna and Yashts, and contain invocations, supplications, deprecations, and obsecrations employed daily by the laity as well as by the priesthood. Under the heading of Minor Texts come also the five *Gāhs*, addressed to the spirits of the five periods of the day; the two *Sīrōzahs*, the greater and the lesser, which in their 30 paragraphs invoke in turn the divinities of each day of the month, and which are recited especially on the thirtieth day after the death of a Zoroastrian; the *Āfrīngāns*, or blessings, four in number, used for various purposes with an accompanying offering: the *Āfrīngān-i Dahmān*, repeated in honour of those who have died in the faith; the *Āfrīngān-i Gāthā*, recited on the five concluding days of the year, when the souls of the dead revisit the earth; the *Āfrīngān-i Gahanbār*, composed chiefly of instructions to worshippers concerning participation in the celebration of the six special festivals of the year; and the *Āfrīngān-i Rapithwin*, recited at the beginning and end of summer. All of these belong to the Khordah Avesta.

(*f*) *Vendīdād.* — The Vendīdād (Av. *vīdaēvodāta*, 'the law against the demons'), although inserted for liturgical purposes among the Gāthās in the Zoroastrian ritual, is not actually a liturgical work but a priestly code prescribing the various purifications, penalties, and expiations. It originally formed the nineteenth Nask of the Avesta handed down to Sasanian times, but its parts vary greatly both in point of style and in time of composition. Much of it must be of late origin.

In its present form it contains 22 chapters, called fargards. Chapter i. is a dualistic account of creation that attributes all the disagreeable features of the otherwise delightful regions of the earth to the counter-creative activity of Ahriman. Chapter ii. tells the legend of Yima, of the Golden Age, and of the coming of a terrible winter and destructive floods, to preserve mankind from which the princely Yima is directed by Ormazd to build an enclosure (*vara*). The following chapter (iii.) treats of the pleasures and pains of earthly life, the manner of life prescribed for bearers of corpses (a special class of men), praise of agriculture, and the defilement of the earth by corpses. Chapter iv. concerns legal matters—breaches of contract, assault, punishments. Chapters v.–xii. relate mainly to impurity incurred through contact with the dead and to the methods of purification for removing the pollution, notably by undergoing an elaborate lustration for nine nights, the so-called *Barashnūm* (ix.). Chapters xiii.–xv. are devoted chiefly to the treatment to be accorded to the dog, an animal held in almost reverential regard by the early pastoral Zoroastrians. In chapters xvi.–xvii. instructions are given for purification from several sorts of uncleanness, and for the disposal of parings of the nails and clipped ends of the hair. Chapter xviii., one of the most interesting and instructive in the Vendidād, deals, among other things, with the character of the true and the false priest, and with the cock that wakes the pious to prayer early in the morning; and it relates a conversation between the angel Sraosha, club in hand, and the evil spirit Druj, concerning the progeny of the latter. In chapter xix. are found an account of the temptation of Zoroaster and the revelation of the destiny of the soul after death. Chapters xx.–xxii. are chiefly of a medical character.

(*g*) *Fragments.*—In addition to the preceding books there are also a considerable number of fragments. There survive, for example, three chapters from the original Hādōkht Nask, the last two of which are eschatological in character, and deal with the destiny of the soul after death. Of special interest is a similar metrical fragment (Fr. W. 4), which refers to the efficacy of the *Airyaman Ishya* prayer, which is to be chanted by the Messianic Saoshyants at the day of judgment, to confound Ahriman and his hellish crew and to raise up the dead (cf. Haas, 'An Avestan Fragment on the Resurrection,' *Spiegel Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1908, pp. 181–187). Among the longer fragmentary texts may be mentioned also the *Āfrīn-i Paighambar Zartusht* in honour of Zoroaster, a blessing invoked upon kings, and the so-called *Vīshtāsp Yasht*, an enigmatical compilation, disconnected and ungrammatical, which is in no wise related to the regular Yashts. Many fragments are found as quotations in the Pahlavi ancillary literature. Most important of these is the *Nīrangistān*, a work in three fargards, or chapters, collecting and commenting upon a number of Avestan *Nīrangs*, or ritual prescriptions. The commentary cites additional directions of the same kind from another source. This work is of value for our knowledge of the ritual and for Avestan lexicography, but unfortunately the manuscript material is poor and the text consequently imperfect. Another Pahlavi treatise that contains Avestan passages is the *Āfrīn-i Dahmān*, also called *Aogemadaēcā* after the first quoted Avestan word. The Pahlavi commentaries on the Vendīdād and the Yasna, and other Pahlavi works, such as the *Shāyast-lā-Shāyast*, the *Vijirkart-i Dīnik*, and the *Pursishnīhā*, contain a large number of Avestan quotations, many of them from the lost Nasks, and brief formulas and prayers are found here and there in manuscripts of the Khordah Avesta. Mention should likewise be made of the additions to Avestan lexicography in the *Frahang i-Ōīm*, an Avesta-Pahlavi glossary (ed. Hoshangji Jamaspji and Haug, Bombay, 1867; cf. Reichelt, in *WZKM* xiv. 172–213, xv. 117–186). For a complete list of fragments and their editions see Bartholomae, *Altiran. Wörterbuch*, pp. viii–x.

The extant parts of the Avesta owe their preservation chiefly to their employment in the ritual. The liturgical portions, constantly used in priestly observances and ceremonies, were naturally considered of greater importance and cherished with greater care, whereas the other books that may have escaped destruction gradually fell into desuetude and neglect, were not copied as much as the parts occurring in the ritual, and finally disappeared altogether. Thus it happens that the present Avesta corresponds but little with the traditional 21 Nasks in arrangement or in extent. Only two of these original 21 books are now represented with any degree of completeness. The Vendīdād, or nineteenth Nask, has

survived in approximately its full form; yet even this shows evidence of having been patched up and pieced together. Many of the chapters of the Stōt-Yasht, or twenty-first Nask, are contained in the Yasna, where they extend, with interruptions, from chapter xiv. to chapter lviii. (cf. Geldner, 'Awesta-litteratur,' in *GIrP* ii. 25–26). There exist also, in addition to these two remnants, an important part of the Bakān Yasht, or fourteenth Nask (most of the Yashts being referred back to this otherwise lost book), and portions or fragments of others are extant. Altogether there are preserved specimens of about 15 of the original 21 Nasks. This material is supplemented, however, by various passages that have been translated from the Avesta into Pahlavi, and have come down to us in that form. The Pahlavi *Būndahishn*, for example, is largely based on the old Avestan Dāmdāt Nask, and serves in a measure to replace its loss.

5. **Age and growth.**—The present form of the Avesta dates, as has been mentioned above, from the Sasanian period, but the various portions differ considerably from one another in age. The relative age of the component parts can be approximately determined by a study of their metre, grammar, and style. Although it is impossible to go into details here, it may be said in general that the later texts as a rule are written in prose, show lack of grammatical knowledge on the part of their authors or compilers, and consist to a very great extent of formulaic material. The application of this threefold criterion shows the chronological order of the texts to be somewhat as follows: (1) Gāthās (*Yas.* xxviii.–liii.), including (2) the Yasna Haptanghāiti (*Yas.* xxxv.–xlii.) and some other compositions in the Gāthā dialect (*Yas.* xii., lviii. and the four most sacred prayers, or formulas, mentioned above), (3) metrical Yasna and Yashts (*Yas.* ix.–xi., lvii., lxii., lxv.; *Yt.* v., viii.–x., xiv., xv., xvii., xix.), portions of Vendīdād ii.–v., xviii.–xix., and scattered verses in the Vīsparad, Nyaishes, Āfrīngāns, etc., and (4) the remaining prose portions of the Avesta.

The determination of the actual date of composition of the different parts of the Avesta is largely a matter of speculation. According to the generally accepted view, the Gāthās, the oldest part in substance as well as in form, date back to an early period of the religion, if not to the prophet Zoroaster himself, whereas certain minor portions of the scriptures may have been written or compiled as late as the time of Shāhpūhr II. of the Sasanian dynasty. The extreme limits of the period of development would thus be about B.C. 560 and A.D. 375. In his latest works (*Le Zend-Avesta*, iii., Introd.; see also *Zend-Avesta*[2], *SBE* iv.), the brilliant French scholar, Darmesteter, put forth a radical theory in regard to the composition of the Avesta as we now have it. In his opinion all sacred writings that may have existed under the Achæmenians were lost after the invasion of Alexander, and not a page of any earlier work has come down intact. The pre-Alexandrian spirit may be recognized, however, in the Vendīdād, which, although later than the Gāthās in composition, is older in material and Achæmenian in tone. According to this theory, the Gāthās, though the oldest part of the Avesta in form, represent the latest growth of the Zoroastrian spirit and show the influence of Gnosticism, the school of Philo Judæus, and Judaism. Darmesteter assigns their origin to the middle of the 1st cent. A.D. This radical hypothesis concerning the age and growth of the Avesta met at once with spirited opposition on the part of scholars best qualified to judge, and can hardly be said to have any acceptance to-day. Avestan specialists are at present agreed that there is no adequate reason for making so strong a claim that the tradition was lost. It is known that the latest Parthian monarchs were filled with the true Zoroastrian spirit, and it can be proved from Greek, Latin, and other writings that the tradition of the wisdom of Zoroaster lived on during the long period between Alexander and the rise of the house of Sāsān in the 3rd cent. A.D.

6. **Language.**—The language in which the Avesta is written is named 'Avestan.' It belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-Germanic family of tongues, and is most closely allied to the Sanskrit, though individually quite distinct from the latter. This relation to the Sanskrit was one of the means of establishing the authenticity of the Avesta, and is still of the greatest importance in its interpretation. In its phonology Avestan agrees with Sanskrit in its vowels in general, but shows a greater variety in its *e* and *o* sounds. Final vowels, except *ō*, are, as a rule, short. A striking peculiarity is the insertion of transitional and epenthetic vowels, the latter giving rise to improper diphthongs. Some of the consonants are identical with those of Sanskrit, others correspond uniformly with certain Sanskrit sounds. The Sanskrit voiceless stops *k, t, p*, for example, are generally represented in Avestan by the spirants *kh, th, f*, when followed by consonants; Sanskrit initial *s* appears in Avestan as *h*. Because of this close correspondence, many Avestan words and phrases may be changed at once into their Sanskrit equivalents by the mere application of certain phonetic laws. In inflexion the language shows nearly the richness of Vedic Sanskrit, and it possesses almost equal facility of word-formation. In syntax it differs from the Sanskrit in certain points, showing marked individuality, especially in the later portions.

Two dialects may be recognized in the Avesta: one the Gāthā dialect, the language of the oldest parts, often called *Gāthā Avestan* (*GAv.*); the other, the language of the great body of the Avesta, called *Younger Avestan* (*YAv.*). The Gāthā dialect is more archaic, bearing to the Younger Avestan somewhat the relation of the Vedic to the classical Sanskrit. Possibly this older dialect may owe some of its peculiarities also to an original difference of locality. Its chief characteristic is the lengthening of all final vowels and the frequent use of parasitic vowels. Its grammatical structure is remarkably pure. The same cannot be said of all the texts written in Younger Avestan, as the late compositions in this dialect, owing to linguistic decay, show many corruptions and confusions. All that is old or written in metre, however, is correct, and occasional inaccuracies in such parts must be attributed to faulty transmission.

7. **Metres.**—The metres of the Avesta deserve considerable attention, because they assist in determining the relative age of the various parts. Almost all the oldest portions of the texts are found to be metrical; the later, or inserted portions, are, as a rule, though not always, written in prose. The Gāthās are composed in metres that have analogies in the Vedas. These were the only metrical parts known to the later Zoroastrians until Western scholars discovered the rhythmical structure of many passages in the later texts. Almost all of these versified portions, especially frequent in the Yashts, are written in eight-syllable lines (cf. Geldner, *Über die Metrik des jungeren Avesta*, Tübingen, 1877).

8. **Alphabet.**—The Avesta is written in an alphabet far younger than the language it presents. The characters are derived from the Sasanian Pahlavi, which was used to record the oral tradition when the texts were collected and edited in Sasanian times. The writing is read from right

to left. Nothing is known about the original Avestan script.

9. Pahlavi version.—The Pahlavi version of the Avesta was made in Persia in Sasanian times, when the general understanding of the sacred texts became more and more imperfect. Some of the exegetical portions and works of interpretation belong even to Muhammadan times, and may be assigned to the period between 700 and 900 A.D. Of the Pahlavi version there are now extant the entire Yasna, Visparad, and Vendīdād, with some portions of other texts. The rendering is a word for word translation of the original, with the addition of occasional independent explanatory glosses. The original Avestan construction is usually adhered to verbatim, and the glossator has to eke out the inflexional poverty of the language in his day by the use of particles. These determinatives, however, are often omitted, and the loss of the sole means of indicating syntactical relation adds greatly to the ambiguity of the Pahlavi paraphrase. This version, with the accompanying glosses, presents the traditional Zoroastrian interpretation from an early time, and is of the greatest value for an understanding of obscure ideas and an insight into native thought. It is also of material assistance in determining the meaning of a word or phrase, and it serves to check the results of purely linguistic analysis. It must be conceded, nevertheless, that it abounds in errors and inaccuracies, and that its explanations are often fanciful. Furthermore, the more abstract or obscure the original, the less the commentator attempts to explain it. The Gāthās, for example, have in general very few glosses, whereas some other parts of the Avesta are accompanied by an elaborate commentary. The chief defect of the version lies in its disregard of the principles of the grammar, of which its authors seem to have had scarcely any knowledge. As a result of the slavish adherence to the original, the style of the Pahlavi version is very clumsy in comparison with the Pahlavi of independent treatises.

About the year 1200 a large part of the Pahlavi version was translated into Sanskrit by Neryosangh, son of Dhaval, a Zoroastrian priest, who seems to have possessed a thorough knowledge of Pahlavi. His translation is of great value as a help in understanding the Pahlavi version, which he follows in construction and renders word for word. This method often obliges him to sacrifice the Sanskrit syntax to that of the original Pahlavi, and his language consequently assumes a peculiar Iranicized aspect. A further striking peculiarity of the Sanskrit of Neryosangh's version is his disregard of the rules of *sandhi*, or euphonic vowel-combination, so uniformly observed in other Sanskrit works. Neryosangh seems on occasion to have corrected the Pahlavi rendering when he thought it at fault, thus showing that he must have referred at times to the Avestan text itself and reached an independent decision as to its meaning.

A modern Persian translation of portions of the Pahlavi version of the Khordah Avesta was prepared in Persia at some time between 1600 and 1800 A.D., and two separate translations into Gujarati were made in India early in the last century, and appeared at Bombay in 1818 within five months of one another. These are the last independent native versions made before the percolation into India of the influence of Western scholarship. These later versions have some merit, in that they occasionally help us to understand an obscure or ambiguous passage in the Pahlavi, but they never venture upon an explanation other than that of the version on which they are based, and consequently they content themselves with reproducing the Pahlavi paraphrase and commentary without change.

10. Discovery.—The story of the discovery, or opening, of the Avesta to Europe has a special interest, since the Avesta has been known to the Western world for only a little more than a century. A manuscript of the Yasna seems to have been brought to Canterbury as early as 1633, and a copy of the Vendidād Sādah was brought from Surat in 1723 by an Englishman, George Boucher, and deposited in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, where it was for a long time chained to the wall as a curiosity. No one, however, was able to read these manuscripts, and Thomas Hyde (*Historia Religionis Veterum Persarum*, Oxford, 1700) drew his information chiefly from later Parsi sources. To a young Frenchman, Anquetil du Perron, belongs the honour of being the first to decipher these texts. Some tracings made from the Oxford manuscript were sent to Paris and came to his notice. Du Perron at once conceived the idea of going to India or Persia and obtaining from the priests themselves the knowledge of their sacred books. In his eagerness to carry out his plan he did not wait for promised financial support from the French Academy, but enlisted as a soldier among the troops about to start for India, and left Paris with them in November, 1754. Before he had gone far on his journey, however, the government gave him his discharge from the army, and presented him with his passage to India. After innumerable discouragements, and in spite of almost insurmountable obstacles, he succeeded in winning the confidence of the priests, with whom he was able to communicate after learning Modern Persian. These he gradually induced to teach him the language of the Avesta, to let him have some of the manuscripts, and even to initiate him into some of the rites and ceremonies of their religion. After seven years among the Parsis, he returned to Europe in 1761, stopping at Oxford, before he returned to Paris, to compare his manuscripts with the one in the Bodleian Library in order to assure himself of their authenticity. During the next ten years he worked upon the texts and prepared a translation, which, together with explanatory material, he published in 1771 under the title *Zend-Avesta, Ouvrage de Zoroastre*.

The enthusiasm aroused by this discovery was soon followed by discussions regarding the authenticity of the scriptures that had been made accessible. Some scholars were disappointed not to find the important philosophical and religious ideas they had expected, and did not sufficiently realize the difficulties of pioneer work of this kind. It was suggested, therefore, that the so-called Zend-Avesta was not genuine, but a forgery. The foremost advocate of this view was the Orientalist Sir William Jones, who claimed that the Parsis had palmed off on du Perron a conglomeration of worthless fabrications and absurdities. In France the genuineness of the book was accepted almost universally, and the German scholar Kleuker was an ardent supporter of its authenticity, translating du Perron's work into German, and adding a collection of classical allusions to the Magi and the religion of the ancient Persians (9 parts, Riga and Leipzig, 1776–83). This discussion as to the authenticity lasted for fifty years, during which time little or no work was done on the texts themselves.

About the year 1825 the texts began to be studied by Sanskrit scholars. The close affinity between the two languages had already been noticed by various scholars, but the Danish philologian Rask first pointed out more exactly the relation between them. He had travelled in Persia and India, and had brought back with him many valuable manuscripts of the Avesta and the Pahlavi writings. In a little volume published in 1826 he

proved the antiquity of the language in which the Avesta was preserved, showed that it was distinct from Sanskrit, though closely related to it, and made some investigation into the alphabet of the texts. At about the same time the French scholar Burnouf began to study the Avesta. He soon found philological inaccuracies in Anquetil's translation; and with the help of Neryosangh's Sanskrit version, he was able to restore sense in many passages where before there had been but little. These further steps soon settled the question of authenticity. The foundation thus laid was built upon by such scholars as Bopp, Haug, Windischmann, Westergaard, Roth, and Spiegel, whose efforts were directed mainly to the establishment of a better text and the development of principles of investigation. For a long time the battle raged about the question of the relative value of the traditional and the linguistic methods, some scholars extolling the value of the Pahlavi version and the priestly tradition, and others placing supreme faith in the results of comparison with Sanskrit and other tongues. It is only in recent years that it has become generally recognized that in the interpretation of the Avesta neither of these methods should be employed to the exclusion of the other. Both have positive value, and a judicious balance of these two principles will henceforth doubtless be a fundamental requisite for sound scholarship in this field, which is being cultivated by a small but active band of workers.

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AVICENNA, AVICENNISM.—1. Life.—The name 'Avicenna' is the Latinized form of the Hebrew 'Aven Sînâ,' the transcription of the Arabic 'Ibn Sînâ.' Abû 'Alî al-Ḥusain ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Sînâ was born in the year A.H. 370 (A.D. 980–981), in the city of Kharmaitan. The son of a money-changer, and very precocious as a child, he received a first-class education. According to Musalmân custom, he began by learning the Qur'ân and belles-lettres (*adab*). He then studied Indian arithmetic under the guidance of a greengrocer. His next tutor was a philosopher called Nâtili, otherwise unknown, who came to reside with his father at Bokhara, and taught the boy the elements of Logic, Euclid, and the Almagest. Avicenna studied medicine without the help of a teacher, and, while quite young, began to visit the sick. Aristotle's *Metaphysics* presented great difficulty to him at first. He read it forty times without understanding it, but at last grasped its purport by means of al-Fârâbî's commentaries.

His medical talent soon brought him into favour with royal households. He cured the Sâmânid Sultan of Bokhara, Nuḥ, son of Manṣûr, and then became one of his intimate friends. This gave him access to the Sultan's library, a very valuable one, which shortly afterwards was unfortunately burned. Avicenna was officially employed at the court of Bokhara. Nevertheless, he soon turned his back on it, and travelled through many towns in search of a suitable patron. After short sojourns in Korkanj, Nasâ, Abîward, and Ṭûs, he arrived at Jorjân, where he became connected with al-Juzjâni, who afterwards became his disciple. In fact, it is to him we are indebted for the rest of his life-story. The first part of this biography is culled from Avicenna's own account, which has been preserved by Ibn Abî Uṣaibia. This work is doubly precious to us because there are very few autobiographies in Arabic literature.

The *Shaikh*, as Avicenna was called, continued to lead this wandering life, like many savants of his time, in the hope of finding a powerful and faithful patron, whose influence and favour would be lasting. He became, for a time, the protégé of an admirer in Jorjân, then of the Princess of Rai; but he soon passed on to Kazvîn and Hamadân. He cured the Amir of Hamadân, and was entrusted with the post of Vizier. But his term of government was not a happy one. He accordingly renounced all public functions, and, hidden in the house of a druggist, became immersed in the composition of his greatest works. As he had a strong desire to leave Hamadân, he applied secretly to the Amir of Iṣfahân. The Amir of Hamadân discovered this step and straightway imprisoned him; but his captivity did not interrupt his literary work. After many adventures, he succeeded in escaping along with his brother, Juzjâni, and two servants, all five disguised as Ṣûfîs, and at last found a sure refuge with the Buwayhid prince Alâ ad-Daula, who reigned in Iṣfahân. There he received the honour and dignities he so well deserved; and there he enjoyed, what he appreciated far more than any honours, tranquillity. At night, he held philosophical meetings, over which the Amir himself sometimes presided.

And meantime he finished his greatest works. Avicenna died in A.H. 428 (A.D. 1036–7), at the age of 58, in the course of a journey, made in the train of his master, to Hamadan.

His biography gives the impression of very great activity—an activity, too, which was exercised in more ways than one. Avicenna loved wine and pleasure almost as much as intellectual work; and he committed excesses which shortened his life. Legend has seized upon his character, and has made of him a sort of powerful but beneficent sorcerer, the hero of strange adventures and burlesque farces. A whole volume of Turkish tales is devoted to him.

2. Works.—Avicenna's works are very numerous. In Philosophy, the greatest is *ash Shifā* ('the Cure'). The Shaikh composed it by degrees at his different residences during his wanderings. When it was finished, he made an abridgment of it entitled *Najāt* ('Healing'). This abridgment, written in very concise language, but clear and logical, is suitable for study. Another famous philosophical work is entitled *Ishārāt*. The full title is *Kitāb al-ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt*, that is to say, 'Book of theorems and propositions.' Juzjani considered this Avicenna's best work, while he himself put a high value on it. It has been commented on by the scholar Nasīr ad-Dīn Tusi († A.H. 672 [A.D. 1273–4]).

Avicenna's other philosophical treatises are: *Philosophy el-Arudi*, *Philosophy el-Alāi*, so called from the names of the patrons to whom they are dedicated; *Guide to Wisdom*, composed by the Shaikh when in prison, and often commented on; an epistle on *The Fountains of Wisdom*, printed several times in the East; several treatises on *Logic*, one of which forms a part of the *Najāt*; a treatise *On the Soul*; a short poem on *The Soul*, rather a mysterious piece, which has been commented on; an epistle on *The Human Faculties and their Perceptions*, printed at Constantinople; lastly, a series of mystical treatises, and a few poems in Persian.

In Medicine, Avicenna composed the voluminous work entitled *Canon of Medicine*, so celebrated in the Middle Ages. He also produced works on the different sciences, abridged Euclid and the Almagest, and devoted some time to Astronomy. Shortly before his death, he asked Ala ad-Daula for permission to resume the astronomical observations which had been interrupted by troubles and wars. He was also credited in the Middle Ages with some treatises on Alchemy.

3. Antecedents and characteristics.—Avicenna belongs to the school which in Arabic literature took the name of 'School of Philosophers' (*al-falāsifa*). This name denotes all the philosophers who made a special study of Greek works, and the scholars who translated them. Shahrastāni (tr. Haarbrucker, ii. 212 f.) gives a list of about twenty who, before Avicenna's time, received this title of Philosopher. Among them are the Christian or Sabæan translators, Hunain son of Ishāq, Thābit son of Qurra, Yahyā son of Adi. Among the Musalmāns, the most celebrated representatives of this school, before Avicenna, are al-Kindi and al-Fārābī. Of these, al-Kindi is the real organizer of Arabic Scholasticism, while to al-Fārābī Avicenna is greatly indebted in Metaphysics, as he acknowledges, and probably also in Logic and Psychology. It is now generally granted that this school was a development of Neo-Platonism rather than strictly Peripatetic. Avicenna seems to have cleared up and systematized the work of his predecessors. In the following account of his original work, we shall not consider the medical or merely scientific portions, but confine our attention to his philosophical outlook.

4. Philosophy.—Avicenna's Philosophy may be sub-divided as follows: Logic, Physics, Psychology, Metaphysics, Mysticism, and Ethics. This division is in conformity with the custom of his school.

(1) *Logic.*—The parts of the *Najāt* relating to Logic were translated into French by Pierre Vattier (see Lit. at end of art.). The *Ishārāt* also contains some important passages in this connexion. In a treatise on the *Classification of the Sciences*, Avicenna gives Logic a very prominent place indeed among the sciences. His reason is not only the importance of Logic in itself, but also the comparatively extensive knowledge that the Arabs had of Aristotle's logical works. They were not so intimate with his other philosophical works. In this same treatise Avicenna further subdivides the science of Logic into nine different parts, which correspond respectively to the eight books of Aristotle, preceded by Porphyry's *Isagoge*, one of the best-known works of the Oriental Middle Ages.

The first part, corresponding to the *Isagoge*, is a kind of general philosophy of language, and is occupied with the terms of speech and their abstract elements; the second treats of simple abstract ideas, applicable to all beings, and is called by Aristotle the *Categories*; the third deals with the composition of simple ideas in order to form propositions, which is the subject of the *Hermeneutics*; the fourth unites the propositions together to form demonstrations, and corresponds to the First *Analytics*; the fifth discusses the conditions to be fulfilled by the premisses of reasoning, and is like the Second *Analytics*; the sixth, seventh, and eighth parts respectively treat of probable reasoning, false reasoning, and the art of persuading, and correspond to the *Topics* or *Dialectics*, the *Sophistic*, and *Rhetoric*. The ninth and last part treats of discourses whose aim is to stir the soul or the imagination, like the *Poetics*.

Logic, then, is taken here in a very broad sense; syllogistic is only a part of it. Syllogistic with Avicenna has no very special quality except that of being clear and well arranged, free from vain subtleties and all scholastic trifling.

Although, as we have seen, Avicenna gave Logic a very important place, he did not, at the same time, exaggerate its power. He shows very clearly that this power is, above all, negative. 'The aim of Logic,' he says in the *Ishārāt*, 'is to provide mankind with a rule, the observance of which will prevent him from erring in his reasoning.' Logic then, strictly speaking, does not discover truths, but helps man to make the best use of those he already possesses, and prevents him from making a wrong use of them.

Reasoning, according to Avicenna, starts from terms settled at the outset — the first data of experience and the first principles of understanding. The chain of deductions proceeding by a known deduced from a previously known is not unlimited; it must have a starting-point, found outside of the reasoning, which will be the base of the logical fabric. First, from direct experiences or ideas, descriptions or definitions are formed, and then, by means of these, arguments are arranged. Avicenna cleverly explains what definition is: by definition man is enabled to represent objects; by argument he is able to persuade. Avicenna gives both the senses and the reason a share in the formation of the primary data of the sciences. According to him, imagination always supports reason; opinion also, and even memory, fulfil the same office. There are primary principles which all hold because of common feeling, or because of the opinion of scholars which the illiterate do not contradict; others, again, arise from habits formed in childhood; and others are based on the experiences of life. All these principles (of feeling) join with the first principles, or principles of reason, which are produced in a man by his intellectual faculty without requiring the slightest conscious effort to persuade him of them. The mind realizes itself convinced and is

not even aware of how the conviction has arisen. A self-evident example of these first principles is: 'The whole is greater than the part.' This philosophy is very sound. It is a scholasticism, not yet antiquated, open and sincere, in many places recalling the analyses of Leibniz.

Avicenna further discusses the form and matter of definitions and arguments, distinguishes between definition and description, and sums up, in the manner of the Peripatetics, the different kinds of questions that arise in science: first of all, what a thing is, and if it is; next, where it is, when it is, how it is; and, lastly, why it is. We see here an application of the doctrine of the Categories. Avicenna recognizes the four causes — material, formal, efficient, and final. He shows that they may all appear together in a definition. Thus an axe may be defined as 'an iron implement, of such and such a shape, for cutting wood.' At the very beginning of his Logic, Avicenna explains species, difference, property, and common accident, which together furnish another method of constituting definition.

The Sciences are founded on experiences and reasonings. They have objects, questions, and premisses. As there are universal premisses (see above), so each science has its own peculiar premisses. The different objects of the sciences establish a hierarchy among themselves, according to their dignity. Besides this, the sciences are divided into theoretical science and practical science. The principal subjects of theoretical science are Physics, Mathematics, and Theology; and of practical, Applied Physics, Mechanics and Art, and Ethics. The problem of the classification of the sciences was very popular in the Middle Ages, both in the East and in the West.

(2) *PHYSICS.*—In the philosophical part of his Physics, Avicenna discusses several of the primary ideas of the human intellect, *e.g.* power, time, and movement. He desires from Physics a first acquaintance with the ideas which Scholasticism employs in Logic and Metaphysics, that is to say, with the ideas of form and matter and the categories. The ideas of form and matter are suggested by observation of the physical world: 'Physical bodies, strictly speaking, are constituted of two principles, matter and form; then there are attached to them the accidents which arise from the existence of the nine categories.' Scholasticism divides these accidents into primary qualities, which are inherent in the body, and secondary qualities, which can be taken away without annihilating the body, but which contribute to its perfection.

Avicenna's conception of power is more closely allied to dynamics than to statics. He is interested in the energy acting from within the body rather than in the forces which move it from without. Like Aristotle, he allows that each body has a natural place, to which it always returns, by some hidden power, when it has been removed from it. The commonest example of these innate powers is 'weight.' This idea of power is developed in Psychology and Metaphysics. In Physics there is no infinite power. Its effects are always either greater or less. Avicenna recognized the principle of mechanics that 'what is gained in power is lost in speed.'

Time he explains by movement, and it cannot be imagined otherwise. Time cannot be conceived in immobility; it would then be of fixed duration, and no longer true time. 'Bodies,' says Avicenna, 'are in time, not in their essence, but because they are in movement, and movement is in time.' Time was created, and it is nowhere except in itself. For the world in general, it is measured by the movement of the stars.

Avicenna also speaks of the locality of bodies, then of space and impenetrability. He tries to show, by somewhat subtle reasoning, that bodies cannot move in a vacuum, because, he thinks, the dimensions of a vacuum are impenetrable, from which he concludes that a vacuum does not exist. He does not admit the possibility of actual infinity. Like the ancients, he believes that the world is finite, and that there is outside of it neither fullness nor emptiness, but absolute nothingness. He admits, again, that bodies are divisible *in potentia* to infinity, and he rejects atomism. Atomism had its partisans at this time, the *mutakallim* ('theologians'), with whom Avicenna disputes. In this connexion too, he analyzes the idea of contact very cleverly.

Avicenna unfortunately hardly managed to rid himself of the errors of Peripatetic Physics, although he had the opportunity several times. Yet, from a philosophical point of view, his account, besides forming interesting reading, bears witness to a very acute intellect.

(3) *PSYCHOLOGY.*—In Avicenna's doctrine, Psychology is carefully systematized, and adheres to the scholastic form. Beings, and also the faculties, are classified methodically according to a hierarchic arrangement. The general plan of this grand construction is as follows:

There are three kinds of minds These are, in ascending order, the vegetable mind, the animal mind, and the reasonable or human mind.

The vegetable mind, or nature, possesses three faculties: (1) nutritive power, which, when resident in a body, changes another body into the form of the first; (2) power of growing, by which the body itself increases, without changing its form, until it has attained its full maturity; (3) power of generation, which draws from the body a part similar to itself *in potentia*, which will, in its turn, produce other bodies similar to it *in actu*.

The animal mind possesses two kinds of faculties: motive faculties and apprehensive or perceptive faculties (1) The motive faculties embrace appetitive power and efficient power. The appetitive power itself is either attractive or repulsive If attractive, it is simply desire, concupiscence, if repulsive, it is irascibility, passion. The efficient power, which is the producer of movement, resides in the motor nerves and the muscles. (2) The perceptive faculties of the animal mind are classified as external and internal The former include the five senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch The latter have their beginning in the common sense, a sort of centre in which all the perceptions assemble before being elaborated by the higher faculties. The common sense is situated in the front part of the brain The first faculty to act on the perceptions is the formative faculty or imagination. It strips the sensible form of the conditions of place, situation, and quantity, and then retains it after the object has ceased to make an impression on the senses. The formative is followed by the cogitative faculty, which works first of all by way of abstraction on the perceptions, now prepared, and draws notions out of them. The estimative faculty next groups these notions into what might be called judgments, but which are quite instinctive and not intellectual. This faculty it is which constitutes 'animal intelligence' For example, the sheep knows by it to flee from the wolf. The last of the faculties of the animal mind is memory, which is situated in the back part of the brain.

The human mind alone possesses intelligence. This intelligence is divided into active intelligence, or practical reason, upon which morality depends, and speculative intelligence, or theoretical reason, which perceives ideas. The perception of ideas is built up through three faculties, which act so as to make the intelligence pass from mere power to actuality. The first of these faculties, the material intellect, is only a general possibility of knowing; the second, the intellect of possession, recognizes first principles; the third is that which is directly fitted to receive the forms of things that are intelligible. It is called the perfected intellect. It seizes hold of that which is intelligible, when, outside the human mind, it unites with the 'active intellect.'

There naturally arise, in the course of this theory, physiological questions regarding the functions of the senses and the localization of the different faculties. Avicenna treats of these as

best he could at a time when the biological sciences were as yet hardly in their infancy.

For example, he discusses the manner in which visual images are transmitted to the eyes, and draws a parallel between two processes of explanation, which he attributes respectively to Aristotle and Plato. He accepts Aristotle's method and rejects Plato's.

The discussion of the intelligence also brings up the question of universals. This question was not so pre-eminently important in Arabic as in Western scholasticism. Avicenna is a realist. Like the Neo-Platonists, he admits that the intelligibles, which are universals, exist in the active intellect. The human intelligence comprehends them *in actu*, when it unites with the active intellect. It also frees them from the particulars which the senses recognize. But this process of abstraction is not sufficient; it is only preparatory, and gives the comprehension of the universals only *in potentia*. Before this can pass to actuality, man's intelligence must become united with a superior intelligence. The reasonable mind starts from the sensible, and little by little rises above it, approaching meanwhile the region of universal realities. Psychology ends in Metaphysics.

The following are Avicenna's proofs of the spirituality of the soul. The soul perceives its own peculiar essence; intellectual power perceives ideas apart from organs; the locale of intelligibility cannot be a body. The immortality of the soul follows directly from its spirituality. The dependence of the soul on the body is not essential but accidental. Another form of this proof is that the soul is a simple substance.

Avicenna believes that the soul is created at the same time as the body is formed, and is to a certain extent in harmony with the body it is to animate. This condition of compatibility with the body makes metempsychosis impossible.

(4) *METAPHYSICS.*—There is one part of Avicenna's Metaphysics which seems quite old-fashioned now, and we must go back in imagination to the beginning of science to find any sense in it. It treats of the procession of the superior intelligences and the production of the celestial spheres. On the other hand, there is a part which seems still good and sound, although it has a systematic character no longer found in modern works of philosophy. This part treats of primary cause and necessary being. The following is, very briefly, the theory of the spheres:

The scale of beings, mentioned above [see § (3)], from the vegetable world up to man, is continued beyond man into the region of the stars. At the top of this scale is the Necessary Being, the principle of principles, who is perfect unity. From this first Being emerges the world of ideas, which is a collection of pure intelligences, simple substances, exempt from multiplicity and change. Below this world of ideas or intelligences is the world of souls. The souls are essences, bound to pure intelligences, which animate bodies. The bodies that they animate in this supra-human region are the stars, which are classed after the manner of ancient astronomy. Beneath the intelligences of the stars, below the last of them, which animates the moon, is the active intellect. From it flows the sublunary world.

Very noticeable in this theory is the analysis of the world of ideas into active intellect and astronomical intelligences. The unchangeableness of the stars is an old belief which was disputed down to the time of Galileo; and the comparison of their spheres with a superior kind of animal is an idea which dates back further than the Hellenic world, and which was long dear to the East.

In connexion with this system, which strikes a modern reader as uncouth, Avicenna discusses in a dignified manner the metaphysical theory of causality. He considers that the pure intelligences are the causes of each other in descending order, and the causes also of the souls of the spheres, and, through them, of their bodies. He holds, then, that intelligence is essentially active; it is even productive of being; and cause usually is simply intelligence. Elsewhere cause is identified with being itself; it is perceptible especially in the primary Being, who is intelligence and principle at the same time, and includes in His essence everything of which He is the principle. 'He comprehends everything in a universal manner, and at the same time no attribute of any particular thing, in the heavens or on the earth, is hid from Him, not even the weight of a *dirrah* (an atom).' He is, at the same time, a final and an efficient cause. The final cause precedes the efficient *in potentia; in actu* the efficient precedes. The cause of the efficient cause is the final end and aim.

God is not the actual moving power of the stars, for this function would beget a certain multiplicity in Him, and, according to the spirit of Avicennism, He must above all safeguard His simplicity. He moves the stars by the intermediation of the first caused, that is, of the first intelligence which springs from Him. This intelligence knows itself and it knows God. From this double knowledge arises a duality. The duality then changes to triplicity when the first caused still knows itself as possible in itself, and as necessary in the primary Being. In this way this philosophy introduces multiplicity into the world.

The doctrine of universals reappears in connexion with that of causes. There are causes of kind and causes of individual; the general has its own causes, the particular has others. A thing has a cause of its quiddity and another of its being, *i.e.* a cause by which it is what it is, and another by which it exists. If a thing is to be individualized, its idea must be able to receive the effect of particular causes.

The idea of the necessary Being is the terminus of the theory of causality. The necessary Being as such has no need of causes. He exists from the beginning complete, with all His qualities. He is absolute. He is pure good, for He possesses the perfection of existence, and existence in itself is goodness: existence, always *in actu*, is pure good. He is pure truth, for that is called true which can justly be said to exist, and, as His existence is necessary, He is therefore absolute truth.

The theory then takes quite a geometrical form. A demonstration composed of three lemmas proves the necessary Being:

(1) All possibles cannot spring from one possible cause, on which their series mounts up infinitely, (2) a series of causes finite in number cannot be possible in themselves and necessary to each other, so that they depend on one another in a circle, (3) everything produced has a cause, and every cause is determinating. This consequently signifies that all possibles must have cause, that causes are not linked together infinitely, and do not return on themselves. Therefore the series of possibles ends in the necessary Being.

This theory is a very fine effort to prove God and to deduce the world from Him in a vigorous way, by a dialectic of mathematical precision. Faith in the power of reason is manifested in this system. To us, who are now more sceptical, it seems pure rationalism, but rationalism in its infancy and slightly deceived by itself. It is redeemed, however, by its vigour and power.

(5) *MYSTICISM.*—It is doubtful whether Avicenna was really a mystic in the religious sense of the word. Here again he has followed the custom of the Neo-Platonic school, regarding mysticism as primarily a subdivision of philosophy. Ibn Ṭufail seems to say that Avicenna had a kind of esoteric doctrine called *ḥikmat-al-ishrāq*, 'philosophy of illumination,' which really contained his true ideas. But we know from one of the treatises of Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl that this philosophy is almost exactly Avicenna's own Neo-Platonism with a different nomenclature.

Passing over mysticism as related to asceticism,

of warfare between different peoples, the ravages of diseases whose nature and cause are misunderstood, and many other things, are productive of much suffering and call for great endurance on the part of those whom they affect. More particularly women must undergo many austerities, whether as mothers, or as workers, or as suppliers of food; yet many of these are cheerfully undergone. Thus in carrying her child for miles on long journeys in great heat and often with little food, and in relieving its wants at the expense of her own comfort, the savage mother, in thus fulfilling her functions of motherhood, will willingly bear pain and discomfort. Nor are similar forms of austerity lacking, especially among the poor, even in our highest forms of civilization, where want, toil, and suffering must be undergone to satisfy the conditions of existence. The savage methods of punishment, the various forms of the ordeal, of revenge or recrimination, are usually of the most cruel and painful kind. But all such forms of austerity do not concern us here. Those alone are dealt with which are self-inflicted or which are willingly borne, for definite purposes, subserving now magical, now religious, now ethical ends.

Unwilling as the savage is to suffer pain, his theory of the universe constrains him to undergo it on many occasions in order to fit him better for the ends of life, or to make life more tolerable, or to please the gods or spirits by whom he believes himself to be surrounded. Such austerities, undergone at one time for magical purposes, frequently change their nature. Thus they may come to be regarded as possessing a disciplinary character, in which case they are hardly to be differentiated outwardly from the disciplinary exercises, often of the same kind, of a higher asceticism, though they may not possess the same ethical or religious content. Others, again, as time goes on, may assume a more or less symbolic character, their excessive severity being then much lessened. On the other hand, even where such earlier forms of austerity survive in higher forms of religion, their severity is often by no means decreased, although the motive may have become a nobler one. Examples of this will be found in the various forms of austerity discussed here. These are mainly austerities connected with a variety of initiatory ceremonies, flagellation, fasting, mutilations of the body, tatuing, and medical rites, while some notice must be taken of self-restraint among savage races

Before passing on to these, we may notice that the universal custom of sacrifice, involving a greater or less renunciation of property and possessions, of food-stuffs, and not infrequently life itself, or, as a substitute for that, of some part of the body, is a marked form of austerity; and its equivalent in the higher ascetic life—the devotion to poverty, the willing renunciation of comfort and luxury for the sake of love to God—has surely received a considerable impulse from this wide-spread custom of ethnic religion, though by no means wholly derived from it. In other cases, which need not be more fully detailed here, life itself is sacrificed in suicide, often through pride or shame or a sense of duty (see A. Sutherland, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, London, 1898, ii. 35). Or, where it is thought that one ought to pass into the other world before the body and mind have become frail, decrepit, and worn out, life is often freely yielded up by the aged or the sick (see ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE). Though the custom may appear cruel and frequently is accomplished by cruel means, it is mostly a willing self-surrender of life that a higher life may be attained beyond the grave (see Letourneau, *Sociology*, London, 1893, 154 ff.; Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. i., London, 1906, p. 383 ff.).

2. Adolescence initiation ceremonies.—Among savage tribes the passing of a boy or girl to manhood or womanhood is usually accompanied by a number of ceremonies, several of which are most severe and painful, but must be undergone willingly in order to preserve their effect. This stage of life, being a highly critical one, the beginning of sexual existence properly so called, demands many safeguards, and, taken as a whole, the various ceremonies are intended to ward off or neutralize the evil influences incident to that period. Where a youth is concerned, there is the beginning of a new life which requires ceremonies of a purificatory kind, besides preparation for entrance upon a stage of new relations with the other sex. Hence there must be seclusion for a time, while the youth is usually debarred from intercourse of any kind with the other sex, and silence is frequently imposed. Fasting is also made use of, either in the sense of complete abstinence from food for a longer or shorter period, or abstinence from certain foods which are tabu at such a stage. This is intended to prevent the entrance of evil influences to the body with such foods, or to prepare the way for receiving them later on. Other ceremonies have the purpose of strengthening the youth for manhood; these are often of a severe character, and, joined with others which are intended to purify from the contagion of evil, easily pass over into tests of endurance. Some form of mutilation, more or less severe—the more severe forms being circumcision, loss of a tooth, or cutting of the flesh, —is frequent. In this case, perhaps, the primary intention is, by losing some part of the body, to secure the rest from evil influences; but it easily passes over into the idea of sacrifice, or some purificatory ceremony, or simply a test of endurance. Again, the youth at this period sometimes obtains a guardian spirit, whose nature is revealed to him in most cases by fasting in solitude, exposed to all the terrors which imagination and the sense of mystery may conjure up. This sense of mystery exciting fear is usually present at all these initiatory ceremonies, for now the youth is instructed not only in sexual matters but in such tribal lore—magical, religious, moral, or otherwise —as is confined to the men. Thus, though in different places the nature of the rites may vary, or their severity be greater or less, they call for the endurance of great austerities on the part of the youth. See art. INITIATION.

A few examples chosen from different localities will show the nature of the austerities undergone at this period. Among the northern tribes of Central Australia the long and complicated ceremonies of initiation to manhood include beating, which must not be resented, circumcision, sub-incision or cutting open the urethra, and biting the youth's scalp; while, as a rule, though fasting is not carried to an extreme, several foods are tabu. During the painful rites of circumcision and sub-incision the youth's mouth is gagged with 'fur-string' to prevent his crying out, while no attempt is made to spare him pain when his scalp is bitten, the object being to cause a plentiful growth of hair. With some of the tribes knocking out a tooth is part of the ceremony, with others it has no connexion with it (Spencer-Gillen[b], ch. i.). Among the Macquarrie tribes any exhibition of shrinking when the tooth is knocked out or the body scarified makes the youth unfit for manhood (Angas, *Savage Life*, London, 1847, ii. 224). With other tribes scourging is practised, and the young men must endure it silently (Ridley, *Kamilaroi and other Aust. Lang*, Sydney, 1877, 154). With the Andamanese the initiatory period—for both youths and girls a period of fasting from several tabued foods—begins from the 11th to the 13th year, and lasts from one to five years, though sometimes a youth will extend the period in order to boast of his powers of endurance afterwards. It is said to be intended as a test of endurance or self-denial, but as various complicated ceremonies mark the first partaking of these foods at the time when tabu is raised from each, the intention probably goes further than this (Man, *JAI*, 1882, xii. 94, 129). In New Guinea the initiation of boys to the Malu cult is attended with great mystery and severity. They are not allowed to cut or dress the hair, to dance, feast, smoke, or behave in an unseemly way; they are beaten with clubs and severely wounded. These rites are said to have had a strong educative effect. Boys among the Cape York natives were secluded for a year, at the

end of this time a tooth was knocked out, and a year later a further test of endurance was applied (Haddon, *Head Hunters*, London, 1901, 50 ff., 191). Similarly in Mabuiag lads were tortured and chastised, and the tests increased with a refractory boy, who was speared, scraped, or beaten with the nests of green ants which stung him furiously (*ib.* 140). In many parts of Africa similar rites are found. Thus among the natives of the Bondei region the *galo* ceremonies include passing the boy through a narrow pit smeared with the juices of a plant which burn his skin, incision of tribal marks on the arm, and the performance of secret ceremonials in some of which he is severely handled, death occasionally resulting (Dale, *JAI*, 1895, xxv. 189 ff.).

But it was among the tribes of North America that such austerities at initiation were most severe, especially where they were connected with the choice of a *manitou*. Thus among the Californian tribes abstinence and indifference to hardship and privations were insisted upon, and before the youth could rank as a warrior his naked body was stung with nettles till he could not move, after which he was laid on the nest of a virulent species of ant, which, swarming over his body and stinging it, caused him fearful agony. To discover his *manitou* he was made to fast for three or four days, and was intoxicated and harassed until he confessed to seeing it. A figure of the *manitou* was then moulded and placed on his breast, where it was ignited so that the figure might be indelibly marked on the flesh (Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, London, 1875, i. 413 ff.). Among the New Mexicans the ordeal consisted in scarifying the skin till the blood ran, the candidate being expected to show no sign of pain (*ib.* i. 580). With the tribes of British Columbia boys were secluded at puberty and made to eat and drink very sparingly: in other cases they were made to bathe in all weathers, their naked bodies were whipped daily, they had to gash themselves with knives in the sweat-house, or lie out exposed to the elements all night. Prolonged fasts, bathings, forced vomitings, and other exhausting exercises for a longer or shorter period were among the means employed in solitude for obtaining mystic dreams and a knowledge of the *manitou* (Hill Tout, *JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 32, 316; 1905, xxxv. 143-144). Rigorous fasting was compulsory on boys and girls among the Algonquin tribes, and the longer the period of abstinence the greater the merit which accrued. During these fasts, which were common to practically all the American Indian tribes, the greatest attention was paid to dreams, for it was mainly through these that the revelation of the *manitou* came (Tanner, *Narrative*, New York, 1830, 288; Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes*, Philadelphia, 1857-1860, *passim*; Beverley, *Hist. of Virginia*, London, 1722, 177 ff.).

Similar austerities are found among the South American tribes. Thus, in Guiana, before the youth can marry he must endure the infliction of flesh-wounds, or he is sewn up in a hammock full of fire-ants, or undergoes other hardships (Im Thurn, *Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, 221). Among the ancient Peruvians, at fifteen or sixteen years, boys had to practise rigorous fasts until they were worn out, to watch for twelve nights in succession, to fight with each other at the risk of wounds, or death, to undergo flogging, and many other privations, before receiving the signs of their new position as men (Garc. de la Vega, *Comm. Real.*, Madrid, 1609, vi. 35). So in ancient Mexico, before being introduced to the aristocratic warrior class, the youth, covered with rags, was shut up in different temples in succession, offering his blood to the divinity, watching and fasting for periods of four days and four nights (Lopez de Gomara, *Hist.*, Madrid, 1852, ii. 78). See § 8 (3).

In the case of girls, the arrival of puberty, in accordance with the universal theory of menstruation as containing an element of danger to the girl herself, but more especially to others, and even to nature itself, is marked by several painful ordeals. Among these the most common is the absolute seclusion of the girl for a longer or shorter period, so that no man may see her and that the sun may not shine on her. Fasting, excision, cuttings, and other barbarities are also commonly found at this period.

Girls in New Guinea, on the first signs of puberty, are shut up for three months and permitted only vegetable food (Haddon, *op. cit.* 135). In New Ireland they are confined for several years in the dark in small cages, and this custom is general over Melanesia (*JAI*, 1888, xviii. 284). Seclusion is also found among most African tribes, as among the Kafirs (MacLean, *Kaffir Laws and Customs*, Mount Coke, 1858, 101) and in Loango (Ploss, *Das Kind*, Leipzig, 1884, ii. 439). With the Bondei people the rite for girls, corresponding to the *galo* of the boys, lasts for twelve days. On the last day the girl fasts. During this period she is taught the *vihili*, or secrets, and this teaching is accompanied by severe and painful ordeals (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 193). The custom of seclusion is common among the N. American tribes, varying from a few days to a year or longer. Girls among the Ahts are hidden behind mats in the house, where they can see neither sun nor fire, and are allowed no food for several days (Sproat, *Savage Life*, London, 1868, 93 ff.). Among Alaskan tribes the girl was shut up in a cage with a small air-hole, or in a hut, where she remained on hands and knees. This treatment lasted for a year, and no communication with others or exercise of any kind was allowed (*GB*² iii. 211). Bancroft cites many instances among the tribes of the Pacific coast. Thus among the Isthmian tribes the girl was closely confined, sometimes for a period of two years (*NR* i. 772, cf. 82, 110, 197, 278). Among the Californian tribes she was laid over a hole previously heated, and kept without food for some days. Or she was buried up to the neck and the ground about her beaten till she perspired profusely (*ib.* 411). Among the Salish tribes of British Columbia, seclusion in a cubicle for ten days was the rule, the girl being allowed little food or water. With other Salish tribes she was secluded outside the settlement for a month under many food restrictions (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 32, 319). In other tribes she had to squat for some days in a hole made in the hut, while her seclusion lasted for a much longer period. She fasted entirely for four days, and afterwards abstained from all fresh meats (*ib.* xxxv. 136). In S. America these customs also flourished among most of the tribes, as in Brazil, where the girl's back was cut with a sharp tooth, after which she was bound and hung in a hammock, in which she remained without food or drink for three days. New gashes were then inflicted upon her, and she remained in the hammock under less strict rules of abstinence until the third month (Lafitau, *Mœurs des Sauvages Amér.*, Paris, 1724, i. 290 ff.). The Uaupes of Brazil also seclude the girl for a month on an abstemious diet. When released she receives several severe scourgings at intervals, death sometimes ensuing as the result (Wallace, *Amazon*, London, 1895, 345). In Guiana the hammock seclusion lasted for a month, after which the girl's naked body was exposed to the bites of venomous ants (Labat, *Voy. en Guinée*, Amsterdam, 1731, iv. 365).

Similar instances might be cited, occurring among more advanced races, *e.g.* the Hindus, though with less severity. Here it may also be noted that, on account of similar beliefs regarding the danger and impurity of menstruation, women, among most savage tribes, must go into seclusion, often at some distance from the village, abstain from certain foods, or fast (see Stoll, *Geschlechtsleben in der Volkerpsychologie*, Leipzig, 1908, 835 ff.; *NR* i. 549; *JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 323; *GB*² iii. 222 ff.). This is also found at higher levels of civilization (cf. Lv 15[19ff]; Avesta, *Vendîdâd*, xvi.) Similarly, women, being tabu among many peoples at pregnancy on account of the danger arising from this critical period of their life, have frequently to go into entire seclusion, or are in some way separated from others, and must abstain from certain kinds of food (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, 9, 167, 200, 417; *NR* i. 413, 734; *JAI*, 1882, xii. 354) See also §§ 6 (*b*), 8 (5).

3. **Admission to secret societies** or 'mysteries' at opening manhood or womanhood was, in many cases, also characterized by severe austerities, which, though no doubt intended as a preparation for the revelation of secret knowledge, myths, or ritual, can hardly be separated in their origin from the pains undergone at puberty, while in some cases they seem to have been intended also as puberty ceremonies. Yet, in so far as these and certain ordinary initiatory ceremonies pave the way for the communication of religious and, occasionally, moral teaching, we see such forms of austerity almost passing over to a kind of disciplinary asceticism, and certainly possessing the primitive meaning of ἄσκησις as 'training.' In Australian mysteries, for example, the advice given by the old men was intended to 'soften the heart,' and, as among the Kurnai, the stomachs of the boys were kneaded to drive out selfishness and greed (*JAI*, 1883, xiii. 296; 1884, xiv. 313), while unselfishness is taught in the Yao mysteries, a selfish person being called 'uninitiated' (Macdonald, *Africana*, London, 1882, i. 130; cf. the moral teaching given by headmen to boys at circumcision and initiation during the painful rites attendant thereon among the Mavendas of S. Africa, *JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 268). Further, in many of these mysteries, the initiation to which lasts for a long period of time, the candidate is supposed to die and come to life again as a new being. Although this idea may not have the intention of ascetic renunciation—*Stirb und werde*—yet in it and in the moral training for the attainment of 'selflessness,' so far as a savage can grasp the idea, we see a connexion with the later ascetic ideals.

In Africa, examples of such initiations are numerous. Among others may be cited those of the west coast, in which the youths are taken by their instructors into the depth of the forest, where they are subjected to a severe course of training during a year; they are naked and smeared with clay (M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, London, 1897, 531). In the Mwetyi society of the Shekani tribes—a woman's society—the initiation lasts for two weeks, and is accompanied by severe ordeals and fasting, while the girls must gaze at the sun until they fall back in a swoon. Most of the ordeals are intentionally hard, so that the wills of the candidates may be broken and secrecy ensured (Nassau,

Fetichism in W. Africa, London, 1904, 249). With candidates for the Malanda society among the Batangas the sungazing ordeal is applied to the lads; then, while everything is done to augment their sense of awe and mystery, they are confined in a hut for twenty days along with a corpse, and beaten severely with rods until they are submissive (*ib.* 322). In Melanesia entrance to such societies is possible only after a severe initiation, including hardships and tortures. In other cases the candidates are stung with leaves of the nettle-tree, made to fast and to take live embers in their hands, and are trodden upon, or, as in the Welu society, they are each placed in a hole in the ground and burning fronds of the coco-nut palm are thrown on their backs, yet they must not utter a cry (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, London, 1891, 82, 87, 88). In these and many similar initiation rites the youths are daubed with clay, charcoal, mud, or filth, which must not be washed off till the ordeal is at an end; this rite may signify the putting away of the old life, as it did in certain Greek mysteries (Lang, *Custom and Myth*, London, 1884, 40; *JAI*, 1889, xix. 261; Demosthenes, *de Corona*, 313). Here, too, may be noted the initiatory customs used in the Eleusinian and other Greek mysteries, in which, besides other tests, the candidates had to prepare themselves by fasting for several days; the similar fasting before initiation to the cult of Osiris and Isis in Egypt; and the various tests of endurance undergone by candidates for initiation to Mithraism (see artt. MYSTERIES, MITHRA, SECRET SOCIETIES, and Apul. *Metam.* xi.).

4. Initiation to the priesthood.—As in savage societies the priest, sorcerer, or medicine-man has a commanding station and exercises so much influence by virtue of his relation to the spiritual world, it is natural that those who seek to enter upon that profession should be subjected to a severe course of training, involving many austerities. And as the communications of the medicine-man with the other world are usually associated with a state of trance, or his revelations are given in some ecstatic condition, the candidate's course of training is intended to adapt him for the production of these states either by reducing him to an abnormal condition of body and mind, or by accustoming him to the use of such severe methods as will readily produce them. The phenomena of hysteria, epilepsy, catalepsy, and such-like diseases are believed by savages, and indeed by many peoples at a higher grade, to denote possession or inspiration by gods, spirits, or demons. Hence such persons as are subject to them are often deliberately chosen for the profession of medicine-man, while their abnormal states are only heightened by the austerities undergone. In other cases, in accordance with the prevailing theory of the nature of inspiration and of the state into which the inspired person is thrown, the production of such states at will is the object of the painful processes to which the candidate must submit. The course of training includes solitude, exposure to the elements, scarifying the body, castigation, fasting, and drinking various unwholesome beverages. By all these means the candidate soon arrives at a hysterical or abnormal state. He acquires the faculty of seeing visions, of producing a convulsionary state of body, or of falling into a trance. A few examples of the method of training will suffice to show its severity and the painful nature of the austerities undergone (see also artt. MEDICINE-MAN and PRIEST).

In Greenland the preparation for the profession of *angakok* begins at an early age, and includes retirement into solitary places and a severe course of fasting. By these methods trances are produced in which the novice obtains a *tornak*, or guardian spirit, or falls into fits in which his ravings are held to be communications from the spirits (Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, London, 1875, 58; Cranz, *Gronland*, Leipzig, 1770, 268). Among the American Indians similar methods are adopted: protracted fasts, severe bodily exercises, and solitary vigils all reduce the candidate to a hysterical state, in which he dreams or has revelations; and the greater his austerities the more vivid and copious are his visions, and hence the higher is the estimation in which he is held (*JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 26; Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes, passim*). Among the Isthmian tribes, youths are chosen for their natural aptitude to the office of *piaces*, or sorcerers, and are confined in a solitary place, subjected to a severe discipline for two years, fasting from all flesh meat and living only on a scanty diet of vegetables and water; while all sexual intercourse is prohibited (*VR* i 777). In S. America we find similar methods employed. Among the Abipones the aspirants had to remain seated on the branches of a tree and to fast for several days. By this means they contracted 'a weakness of brain, a giddiness, and kind of delirium, which makes them imagine that they are gifted with superior wisdom, and give themselves out for magicians' (Dobrizhoffer, *Abipones*, London, 1822, ii. 68). Training for the office of *peaiman* in Guiana involves a painful and severe trial of endurance. The candidate fasts for protracted periods, wanders alone in the forest, and accustoms himself to drinking large draughts of tobacco-juice mixed with water The terrors of solitude and the drinking of the nicotine produce intense delirium, in which he holds converse with spirits. Epileptic subjects are preferred for the office (Im Thurn, 334).

In Africa, among the Zulus, those who wish to become diviners have to acquire the power of intercourse with the spirits in states of coma or ecstasy by solitude, prolonged fastings, and flagellation, until they become a 'house of dreams' (Callaway, *Rel of Amazulu*, London, 1884, 387; Grout, *Zulu-Land*, London, 1865, 158). Among the Bondeis the youth who aspires to be a doctor must submit to be scarified all over his body (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 213). The *manangs*, or medicine-men, among the Sea Dayaks must prove their call to the office by prolonged fasting, and by ecstatic states and trances in which they foam at the mouth (Ling Roth, *Natives of Sarawak*, London, 1896, i. 266). And among the Todas, the *palal*, or priest, at his initiation must remain naked for three days and two nights, whether the weather is hot or freezing, and eat only a little porridge at night (Reclus, *Primitive Folk*, London, 1891, 221).

For similar trials among American tribes before appointment to the office of chief, etc., including fasting, flagellation, stinging with ants, see Letourneau, *Sociology*, 473; Biet, *Voy. en l'Isle de Cayenne*, Paris, 1664, iii. 10.

In these and hundreds of similar cases the discipline may be more or less severe, and its period longer or shorter, but the intention in all is the same. Not only so, but in future the medicine-man, or shaman, previous to communicating with the spirits, giving oracles, healing, and the like, must produce the abnormal state by these painful processes, which will, of course, be more or less extensive according as he readily passes over into that state or not. Frequently it is spontaneously produced, either because the shaman is a hysterical subject or on account of the training he has undergone; but generally it is artificially produced by fasting, by wild dances and screams, by contortions of the body, by flagellation, by cutting the flesh, or by swallowing various narcotics and herbs (cf. Parish, *Hallucinations*, London, 1897, 40). The result is a trance, a nervous seizure, frenzied movements, foaming at the mouth, and raving utterances. Similar results followed the hysterical excitement which attacked whole communities in the Middle Ages, and which was often produced by such artificial means, especially convulsive movements and dancing. They are seen again in the American Indian ghost-dances, in which, following convulsive gyrations, trance and catalepsy are induced, or in the indifference to pain and wounds among Muhammadan dervishes in consequence of ecstasy produced by similar movements (Tuckey, *Psycho-Therapeutics*[3], London, 1891, 12; Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, London, 1902, ii. 161; Myers, *Human Personality*, London, 1903, ii. 190; and *Proc. Psych. Research Soc.* 1885, p. 31).

5. Flagellation. — As has been said above, scourging or beating is a frequent practice at the various forms of initiation. A wider view of this rite among savages and as a folk-survival leaves little doubt as to its original purpose. The scourging is intended to drive away the contagion of evil, and the malignant presence of demoniacal powers. The pain is inflicted less as a means of hurting the victim than of making these evil influences suffer, or of frightening them so that they will depart. This is especially noticeable where the scourging is done not with rods, but with branches or plants which are supposed to possess magical virtues; in such cases it is not always necessarily painful. It may, however, be made painful where the plant has poisonous juices or is of a stinging variety. But its original intention soon passes over into that of simply inflicting pain or undergoing voluntary suffering, either by way of hardening or as a means of self-discipline with a definitely religious or moral end. Here it becomes a true ascetic

austerity, but it may also be a pathological form of asceticism. Or, again, it may be used as an erotic stimulation, though here it assumes a pathological form as subserving genesic excitability. In other cases its religious disciplinary use is conjoined with some pathological erotic purpose, as in the case of Brother Cornelius and his penitents, or of Père Girard (Cooper, *Hist. of the Rod*, London, 1870, 122 ff.; Zockler, *Askese und Monchtum*[2], 609). The pain caused by flagellation, again, made it an obvious and well-nigh universal form of punishment. With this and its previous use we are not concerned here. Finally, it remains to notice how, while subserving its primitive purpose or used simply as a means of producing pain, it may be regarded as a form of sacrifice to gods who will that their worshippers should suffer, or it may pass as a substitute for an offering of the person himself as a human sacrifice. Most of these purposes are also served by using instead of a scourge some stinging plant or some substance causing pain to the tissues when applied to the body, as has been seen in several cases of initiation rites.

The primitive purpose of flagellation is seen in the fact that those animals or men on whom the evils of a community were laid (scape-goat), and who were driven away or slain, had probably in the first instance been regarded as representatives of a spirit of vegetation who was slain. They were frequently scourged, and the scourging had the effect of driving off 'any malignant influence by which at the supreme moment they might conceivably be beset' (*GB*[2] iii. 128). When they were regarded simply as scapegoats, the scourging became a means of causing pain. Instances of this use of flagellation to drive away evil are found in many places. When a king was installed in the Sandwich Islands, the priest struck him on the back with a sacred branch, in order to purify him from defilement (Ellis, *Polynes. Researches*, London, 1829, iii. 110). Brazilian Indians scourge themselves on the genital organs with a certain plant at the time of the new moon (Nery, *Folk-lore brésilien*, Paris, 1889, 253). Sometimes the scourging is done on a substitute, as in New Caledonia, where, when a chief is ill, a girl is severely whipped to drive away the evil (Featherman, *Soc. Hist. of Races of Mankind*, London, 1891, ii. 92). Or it may be mutually inflicted, as in Peru at an autumn festival, where the people beat each other with torches, saying, 'Let all harm go away' (Acosta, *Hist. of the Indies*, Hakl. Soc. 1880, ii. 375). Similar practices still survive in folk-custom (*GB*[2] iii. 131 ff.).

With the same object of driving out the demon of disease which has entered into a patient's body, in accordance with the universal primitive view of the cause of sickness, flagellation is resorted to in savage medicine, the patient often undergoing great suffering through this cure. Thus among the Californian Indians, in cases of paralysis, the affected parts are whipped with nettles (*NR* i. 419). Among the Ainus beating with herbs to drive out the demons of sickness is part of the healer's method (Batchelor, *Ainus and their Folklore*, London, 1901, 313). In Timor-Laut, if a smallpox *prao* should be stranded on the coast, the people are beaten with branches, which are then put on the *prao* before it is launched away again, and the demon of smallpox is besought to depart (*GB*[2] iii. 98, citing Riedel). Women suffering from demoniacal possession in Burma are thrashed with a stick, the demon alone being supposed to feel the blows (Bastian, *Ostl. Asien*, Jena, 1866–71, ii. 152). These methods survived into later medicine, especially in the case of madness, though here the curative virtue was evidently supposed to lie in the rough treatment to which the patient was subjected (Cooper, *op. cit.* 204).

The magical value of flagellation is seen in the flogging of women with thongs cut from the skins of the sacrificial goats by the Luperci at the Lupercalia in Rome. This act, communicating to them magically the beneficent influence of divinity, was believed to render them prolific (Ovid, *Fasti*, ii. 267 ff.). Although the numerous cases of scourging or stinging at initiation frequently have the primitive purpose here discovered, they are sometimes expressly said to be done with the view of causing pain or testing endurance. Thus, among the Bavendas, after circumcision, the youths, stripped naked, are beaten and suffer other hardships by exposure to the intense night cold, in order to harden them (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 252). Among other Bechuana tribes, after circumcision the youths are scourged at intervals with great severity, and it is a point of honour that they should show absolute impassibility even though the blood spouts from their backs, and the whip leaves life-long scars. At the same time they are allowed no flesh meat but what they can themselves obtain, and are subjected to the endurance of cold and hunger (Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, London, 1857, 146 ff.; *JAI*, 1889, xix. 268 ff.).

The primitive view of scourging has here, as in other cases, been superseded by a later conception of it as a painful test of endurance. At this point the cruel flogging of youths at Sparta in connexion with the cult of Artemis—the blood from the wounds caused by the whip being shed on the altar—can scarcely be viewed in any other light than that of a survival of earlier rites of initiation, especially as the Spartan youths, like the Bechuanas, were allowed no food save what they could discover for themselves. The flogging was done in presence of their parents, who encouraged them to show no sign of suffering; and so severe was it that the youths sometimes died. Various mythical explanations of this flogging were current, but it was generally regarded as a substitute for human sacrifice ordained by Lycurgus (Paus. iii. 16; Lucian, *Anacharsis*). But in the light of similar customs elsewhere, the origin must be sought in old initiation rites of a savage past, remains of which, like the 'bull-roarer' (ῥόμβος) and daubing with mud, were also found in the Greek mysteries. Similar scourgings took place elsewhere in Greece (Potter, *Antiq. of Greece*, Edinburgh, 1824, i. 258); and among the Thracians, according to Artemidorus, flagellation in honour of their Artemis was also practised.

Such tests of endurance by flagellation enter sometimes into festival dances, as among the Arawaks, where the men armed with whips lashed each other alternately until they were covered with bleeding wounds, yet the pain was 'borne and inflicted with perfect good temper' (Im Thurn, 326; cf. a striking match, resulting often in death, among the Mosquito Indians, *NR* i. 735). Probably this is to be connected with a group of rites in which blows, effusion of blood, etc., are intended to promote fertility (see § 8 (*b*)). For the discipline of self-flagellation in the Christian Church, see artt. ASCETICISM, FLAGELLANTS; Zockler, *op. cit.* 458, 528 ff.; Cooper, *op. cit.* Beginning as an act of monastic asceticism in the 11th cent., it assumed a pathological form with the later orders of Flagellants (especially during the ravages of the Black Death), who regarded it as more efficacious than the sacraments.

Flagellation as a sacrifice or as a substitute for sacrifice has already appeared in the case of the Spartan youths. Perhaps the mutual flagellation of the Galli at the spring festival at Hierapolis, accompanied as it was by self-cuttings (Lucian,

de Dea Syria, 50), and the flagellation of the Egyptians at Busiris during the festival of Isis (Herod. ii. 61, 'for whom they beat themselves it would be impious for me to divulge'), also had this character. An analogous instance may be found in the custom of the Indians of Guiana who rub red pepper into their eyes when approaching any place haunted by spirits, in order that the latter may not see them. But it is probably in its intention a sacrificial act—the suffering endured being intended to placate the spirits (Im Thurn, 368). See art. FLAGELLANTS.

6. Fasting.—Fasting as a form of austerity enters largely into savage life. Hunger is one of the most pressing trials of the savage, although he can go for long periods with little food, like the Bushman observed to live for fifteen days on water and salt (Thompson, *Trav. in S. Africa*, London, 1827, 99). Sometimes, too, the savage will undergo fasting as a purely unselfish act, giving his food to his starving children or sharing his scanty supply with his fellows, who, when it is exhausted, starve to death with him (Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, London, 1893, 103, 115). Frequent periods of abstinence, especially in regions where the food supply is scarce, are forced upon him. We are here concerned, however, with voluntary fasts rather than with those imposed upon savage man. Although he regards fasting quite differently from the civilized ascetic, and probably has no strong wish to suffer the pangs of hunger, yet voluntary fasting is forced upon him for different reasons.

The origin of fasting is complex, but on the whole it seems to have been adopted at first for magical reasons. Man's experience of hunger in times of scarcity may have suggested to him that to fast voluntarily might guarantee him against scarcity, and also have the effect of increasing the food supply. Thus at the Intichiuma ceremonies of Central Australian tribes, which have for their purpose the increase of the totem food supply, fasting is a part of the rite (Spencer-Gillen[b], 290). On more purely religious grounds an analogy is found where the sacrifice of one person wards off danger menacing a whole group. Fasting is also intimately connected with the system of food tabus. In some cases these may arise from the selfishness of stronger members of a human group, who forbid others to touch certain foods sacred to themselves, or again from the wise practice of establishing a 'close' time when certain foods are likely to become scarce, as in Polynesia, where, if a bad harvest is feared, a tabu is placed on bananas, hens, etc., to establish a reserve (Letourneau, *Sociology*, 489). But they often arose out of man's peculiar views regarding the contagion of evil influences which might be warded off by, so to say, sacrificing a part in lieu of the whole. Food was eminently a vehicle for evil influences entering the body, hence by the tabuing of some particular food other foods would be rendered harmless. Tabu is also connected with totemism, where some particular animal or plant species is not eaten by those whose totem it is. But it also has a much wider range, and affects foods which may not be eaten at certain periods of life, *e.g.* before a youth is initiated, before marriage, during pregnancy, at the time of the couvade, during hunting or war. In this aspect fasting from the tabued food also acts as a kind of purification. Fasting in all such cases includes such varieties as abstinence from certain foods, or from meat, or from food with which women have had to do (sexual tabu), or from all food for a varying period. In certain cases kings or priests might not eat certain foods for tabu and other magical reasons, such as their being recognized as incarnate divinity, which often occurs. Frequently, too, women might not eat men's food, and *vice versa* (see Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 172, etc.; cf. an instance cited by Im Thurn, 256, where the Indians would have starved rather than resort to cooking some cassava roots, because cooking was woman's work).

Whatever be the reason for a food-tabu, it argues considerable self-restraint, akin to the restraint which desires to discipline the body through fasting among peoples of a higher culture. To break such a tabu is universally considered the greatest crime, to be visited by severe punishment or by automatic results—sickness or death. Many instances are known where a savage would rather starve to death than eat some tabued food though that alone was available, and though all risk of detection by fellow-clansmen was out of the question. Again, since during periods of fasting as the result of famine, morbid conditions of psychic life are induced, with dreams and visions, fasting is in turn resorted to in order to produce these, as has already been seen (§ 4). Finally, since it is believed that the gods are pleased with suffering, fasting becomes a painful service rendered to them, or, again, it is used as a penitential discipline. This occurs in many barbaric cults at a higher stage than mere savagery, and in the later usage fasting speedily becomes an ascetic exercise (see art. FASTING).

(*a*) Fasting before marriage has mainly a magical aspect, and is doubtless intended as one means out of many of lessening the dangers supposed to attend this critical stage of sexual life, while it avoids the possibility of evil influences entering the body through food. The following typical examples will suffice. Among the Macusis the man must abstain from meat for some time before marriage, and will rather go without food altogether upon occasion than break this tabu (Im Thurn, 222). The newly-married pair among the Wa-teetas are shut up for three days without food, and among the Bondeis they eat nothing and only wash out their mouths with water on the day of the wedding (Thompson, *Travels in S. Africa*, London, 1827, 343; *JAI*, 1895, xxv 199). Similarly with the Thlinkets, bride and bridegroom must fast for two days, then eat a little food, and again fast for two days (*NR* i. 111).

(*b*) The custom of a woman's abstaining from certain foods or fasting before the birth of a child, in which abstinence the husband frequently joins her, is intimately associated with and has the same *rationale* as the husband's fasting during the period of the couvade in which he lies in instead of his wife. The reason for the practice of fasting here is the intimate connexion between parents and child which is emphasized at such a time, so that they must abstain from all such foods as might injure the child through eating them. Thus in the Andaman Islands the mother abstains from pork, turtle, honey, iguana, and paradoxurus, and after a time her husband avoids the two last, 'in the belief that the embryo would suffer were he to indulge in such food' (*JAI*, 1882, xii 354). Among the Californian Indians the mother fasted for three days after the birth, drinking nothing but warm water. This formed part of a ceremony of purification, and for two moons she was allowed no meat (*NR* i. 413). Where the couvade is concerned, the husband usually abstains for some weeks from all flesh food and lives on a very abstemious diet, and such customs are widely prevalent among most savage peoples (see art. COUVADE, and Lubbock, *Origin of Civilization*, London, 1870, 16 ff.).

(*c*) In many cases where fasting occurs at initiation, we almost see it passing over from its magical intention of the avoidance of evil influences and of a preparation for the reception of new food to an act of religious preparation for the divine and ethical revelations about to be made to the lad. A similar transition to a more religious view of fasting is seen in other cases. Among many peoples when the harvest, whether of corn, yams, bananas, etc., has been gathered in, no one may eat of it until the first fruits have been offered to a divinity or partaken of by a priest, chief, or king, and in some cases a fast of several days' duration takes place. This, though it is primarily a preparation for the reception of new food, is also part of a group of purificatory rites, while it has also a religious element. Thus, among the Creek Indians, part of the elaborate ceremonies included a strict fast for two nights and one day, while a bitter decoction was drunk in order 'to purge their sinful bodies.' This was followed by a sacramental eating of the new crops (Adair, *Hist. of the Amer. Ind.*, London, 1775, 96 ff.) A similar solemn fast took place among the Natchez for three days along with the observance of silence at the Fire Festival, when the maize was offered on the altar of the Sun; and was also observed among the Cherokees by the warriors, who at the same time abstained from sexual intercourse (Chateaubriand, *Voyage en Amérique*, Paris, 1835, 130 ff.; Featherman, *op. cit.* iii. 157). The Comanches had yearly gatherings to light the sacred fires, when they took 'medicine' for purification and fasted for seven days. Those who could endure to keep the fast unbroken became sacred in the eyes of the others (Palmer,

Harper's Magazine, 1889, xvii. 451). Again, where foods are tabu, either through totem restrictions or for some other reason, abstinence from them is frequently regarded as an honour done to the totem animal or to a divinity who would resent any breach of the rule, or it has the nature of a sacrificial act of self-denial. Thus among the Samoans, Fijians, and others, certain animals, which were probably earlier totems, were believed to be incarnate gods or sacred to particular deities, and each man had some particular animal species, which he would under no circumstances eat (Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, 112; Williams, *Fiji*, Lond. 1858, i. 219). Or among the Andaman Islanders at certain seasons a number of foods are abstained from because the god Puluga requires them at those times (*JAI* xii. 154). Or, as among various West African tribes, certain prohibited foods, or *orunda*, which a man will not eat even when suffering from hunger, are 'literally a sacrifice ordained for the child by its parents and the magic doctor as a gift to the governing spirit of his life,' and to eat of it would be a sin at once punished by the spirit and requiring atonement by expensive ceremonies and gifts (Nassau, *op. cit.* 78; M. H. Kingsley, *Travels*, 456), or they are not eaten because they are dedicated by man to the use of his attendant spirit (Dennett, *Folk-lore of the Fjort*, London, 1898, xxix.). Abstinence in all such cases is a religious rather than a magical act.

(*d*) Fasting to induce visions in which the spirits or divinities reveal themselves has already been noticed, but a few further instances will serve to show the austere character of the act. The Algonquins would fast six or seven days, 'till both their bodies and their minds became free and light, which prepared them to dream' (Tylor, ii. 411–412). Chiefs among the Columbians in times of perplexity practise both fasting and laceration (*NR* i. 203). In general, the American Indian fasted before any undertaking in order to receive direction in his dreams. Among the Caribs a father fasted for a long period in order to see in a vision the destiny of his newly-born son (Muller, *Amer. Urrel.* Basel, 1855, 214). Similar fasts were customary in Greece among the priests and priestesses of oracular shrines, in order to obtain visions (Paus. i. 24); and in India fasting is a recognized mode of obtaining intercourse with the gods (Meiners, *Gesch. der Relig.*, Hanover, 1806-1807, ii. 147). The visions and revelations obtained by Christian saints and ascetics are in some degree due to similar austerities.

(*e*) From the use of abstinence and fasting as a general religious act to its use as a species of sacrifice by which the gods are appeased, or as a penitential discipline, the step is not a long one. Instances of such uses are found mainly among barbaric and civilized peoples, though not unknown among savages; while fasting, either as a means of purification, or as a penitential discipline, or as a preparation for mystical illumination, rapidly became part of the practice of the Christian Church. Penance, including fasting, self-torture, and confession of evil, is found among many tribes of the American Indian stock, but among the ancient Mexicans it had an especially prominent place. Some fasts of a rigorous kind lasted from three to five days; others, probably less rigorous, from twenty to 160 days. These were binding upon either individuals or the whole people, were intended both as purifications and as penances, and, in the latter form, were accompanied by other extreme forms of self-discipline for sins committed. Such were generally imposed by the priests (Clavigero, *Hist. Mex.*, London, 1787, i. 353, 397 ff.). Fasts of a similar character and intention were also common in Peru. In Babylonia and Assyria fasting had also a systematic form, either for the whole people in times of danger (cf. Jon 3[5]), or for individuals as part of the penitential discipline with which men approached the gods seeking forgiveness, as is seen in the penitential psalms, *e.g.* 'Food I have not eaten, weeping is my nourishment' (Jastrow, *Rel. of Bab.*, Lond. 1898, 332; Sayce, *Rel. of Anc. Egypt and Bab.*, Edin. 1902, 418, 477). The more primitive savage custom of appealing to the gods through the pain borne by their worshippers is seen in a Fijian custom. A priest, after unsuccessfully supplicating his god for rain, slept for several successive nights exposed on the top of a rock without mat or pillow, hoping thus to move the obdurate deity to send a shower (Williams, i. 232).

In certain cases men fast until some act of revenge is performed, as in Fiji, where, to indicate sworn revenge, a man would deprive himself of favourite or necessary food (Williams, i. 129). Compare the curious Celtic custom of 'fasting against' a person (see ASCETICISM [Celtic]). This was a legal process in Ireland, by which any one who desired a stronger person to yield to his plaint sat fasting at his door until he yielded (*Ancient Laws of Ireland*, Dublin, 1869-79, i. 112 ff., ii. 46; Joyce, *Social Hist. of Ancient Ireland*, Lond. 1903, i. 204–207).

7. Mourning ceremonies.—Here again universally in savage and barbaric life the death of a relative or of some chief or great warrior, etc., involves the practice of many austerities, varying in degree, among the survivors. The motive of these is complex; and, though all may be regarded as different ways of showing grief, it seems certain that they did not all originate from that ground. Among mourning ceremonies of a simpler and less painful class may be enumerated wailing, wearing old or unusual clothes, the rejection of ornaments, rubbing charcoal, clay, and other substances on the body, shaving the hair or allowing it to grow unusually long, the discarding of pleasant food or of customary unguents, sleeping on the grave or in the open air (cf. Nassau, 10; Williams, *Fiji*, London, 1858, i. 4; M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, 483, 487; Haddon, *Head Hunters*, 206; *JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 417). But others of a much more severe character are also extremely common, *e.g.* gashing or cutting the body, amputating a finger, and fasting.

(1) The origin of gashing or cutting the body may be found simply in an ecstatic expression of grief, at first spontaneous, then reduced to a custom. The pain caused by such methods of wounding, though in the ecstasy and delirium of grief it may be less than we imagine (Beckworth says of the horrible gashings of the Crow Indians that 'they seemed to feel no pain,' *14 RBEW*, p. 898), is itself an expression of sorrow. But other meanings were perhaps given to these self-inflicted wounds. Thus there may have been some idea of union with the dead through the blood spilt on the grave, as in N. S. Wales, where the men stood over it and cut each other with their boomerangs, letting the blood trickle down into it (cf. W. R. Smith, 305). This bond of union with the dead implies 'on the one side submission, on the other friendliness' (Spencer, *Cerem. Inst.*, London, 1879, 70). Or, again, the blood may be an offering to the dead in order to refresh them (*ib.*; cf. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, i. 476). In either case the rite would have a propitiatory aspect. It is found among the Australians, Melanesians, Polynesians, in Africa and America, and it existed in ancient Israel (Lv 19[28]), among the Greeks, Turks, Huns, etc. (cf. Stoll, *op. cit.* 88 ff.; Spencer, *op. cit.* 70–71), and with some of these peoples assumed a ghastly form, while it was frequently proportionate to the rank of the dead person. The wounds included lacerating or cutting the arms, breasts, or legs, piercing them, slitting the ear lobes, wounding the head, etc. Thus the Crow Indians made two cuts down the length of the arm, tearing away the skin, or cut the flesh on the breast and shoulders (*BE*, *loc. cit.*); the Tongans cut and bruised themselves with shark's teeth, shells, axes, clubs, and knives (Mariner, *Tonga Islands*, London, 1817, i. 380, 403); the Spartans tore the flesh from their foreheads with pins and needles to gratify the ghosts of the dead (Potter, *op. cit.* ii. 204). The descriptions of mourning ceremonies among all savage tribes supply copious instances of the severity of these lacerations.

(2) The mutilation of some member of the body, usually a finger, occasionally an ear, is also found as a common sign of grief at mourning ceremonies. Spencer regards this as an act of sacrificial propitiation of the dead and a sign of submission (*op. cit.* 56), and it certainly has the significance of a propitiation of divinities or spirits, *e.g.* in cases of illness, etc. (see § 8, 2). In some cases it may be regarded as a substitute for human sacrifice, giving a part in place of the whole, as when a widow has her finger chopped off in the Nicobar Islands, evidently in place of being slain at her husband's grave (Tylor, ii. 363). But it might readily become a formal expression of grief, as in Fiji, where, on the death of a chief, orders were given that a hundred fingers should be cut off (Williams, i. 197). Yet even in Fiji a child's finger was cut off as a sign of affection for a dead father (*ib.* i. 177). Usually a joint or the whole of the little finger is cut off, though another finger may be removed later when this is lacking. This painful custom is found among some Australian tribes, in Tonga and Fiji, among various N. and S. American Indian tribes, among the Hottentots

when a widow re-marries, and occasionally with Chinese widows as a sign that they will not re-marry (Stoll, *op. cit.* 274 ff.; Spencer, *op. cit.* 55 ff.; Kolb, *Caput Bonæ Spei*, Nuremberg, 1719, 572; Giles, *China and the Chinese*, London, 1879, 202).

(3) The custom of fasting is here met with once more as a natural expression of mourning, often of a severe and prolonged character. The Fijians fasted for a dead chief for ten or twenty days (Williams, i. 197). Some of the Salish tribes of British Columbia fast for four days after a death, while a widow must not eat fresh meat for a year, a widower for a shorter period (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 138–9). The Andamanese must abstain from certain favourite foods, and here relations are often joined in this custom by other members of the tribe as a token of sympathy (*JAI*, 1882, xii. 142, 146). The Japanese partake only of a spare vegetable diet during the period of mourning, while in Korea the mourners drink rice water for some days, and then are allowed to partake of gruel for the rest of the time (*JAI* xii. 225, xxv. 350).

(4) Finally, though the custom of a wife's being slain at her husband's death may have become a mere customary rite, and though its origin may be sought in sacrificial ideas and in the belief that she must accompany him beyond the grave, it is frequently found as an extreme act of austere devotion, the wife devoting herself to death out of affection. Instances of this are found in Fiji (Williams, i. 189), where wives were frequently sacrificed at their own instance; in India, where a wife lit the pyre with her own hands; in China, where wives will take their own lives to follow their husbands into the next world (de Groot, *Rel System of China*, Leyden, 1894, ii. 1. 735 ff.); among the ancient Greeks, with whom historic instances of this suicidal devotion are recorded (Euripides, *Supp.* 1000 ff.; Paus. iv. 2. 7); and among the ancient Celts (Leahy, *Heroic Romances of Ireland*, London, 1905, i. 105; cf. Cæsar, vi. 19, slaves and clients beloved by the dead; Mela, iii. 2. 19; see artt. SATI and MOURNING).

8. Mutilations.—A great variety of ethnic mutilations involving a considerable degree of pain may be classed among austerities. Each one of these may have a different origin or intention, some may be mere customary or symbolic followings of archaic rites, but this makes no difference in the degree of suffering which is borne or in the stoical patience with which it is endured (see art. MUTILATIONS).

(1) The custom of *cutting the body* and using the blood for some specific purpose is widely extended, and has already been met with as a mourning ceremony.

(*a*) It is found as part of the ceremonies of initiation in various quarters. Thus in North Central Australia the final ceremony among several of the tribes consists of making a series of cuts on the back and one on the neck of the candidate. These are said to commemorate certain events in the *Alcheringa*, or mythical period (Spencer and Gillen[b], 335). A similar rite is found among S. Australian tribes (Schürmann, in *Nat. Tribes of S.A.*, Adelaide, 1879, 231 ff.). Scars are also made on the face and body at puberty among the Ba-Mbalas (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 402) and elsewhere in Africa (Burton, *Abeokuta*, London, 1863, i. 104; Denham, *Travels in Africa*, London, 1828, iii. 175: 'the process is said to be extremely painful on account of the heat and flies'). These appear to be of the nature of totem or tribal marks. Among the Abipones the marks were made with thorns, and ashes were rubbed into the wounds—a species of tatuing (Dobrizhoffer, ii. 36 ff.).

(*b*) Cutting or gashing the body in order to obtain blood, usually for magical purposes or for use in various ceremonies, is found all over Australia. Thus among the Dieri two men are bled with a sharp flint, and the blood is allowed to flow on others of the tribe. The ceremony was intended to produce rain, the blood representing rain (Gason, in *Nat. Tribes of S. Aust.* 276). Among the Wiradthuri tribes, at initiation rites men wounded their gums or the flesh under their tongues with sharp pieces of bone, and allowed the blood to fall on the seat used in the ceremony; and among the Kamilaroi, at the *bora*, quantities of blood were collected from gashes made in men's arms with flint or shell (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 301, 325). Among the Central Australian tribes 'it is astonishing what an enormous amount of blood is used for decorative purposes by these savages, one of whom will think nothing of bleeding himself perhaps twice a day for a week or two in succession.' Here it is also drawn from gashes in the body for a variety of other purposes—to seal a covenant, to be administered as a strengthening potion, or applied to the body of the sick or aged (Spencer-Gillen[b], 596 ff.). Among the Basutos the hands of those who have carried a corpse to the grave are scratched with a knife, and magic stuff is put into the wounds to remove the contagion of death (*GB*[2] i. 302). Here, too, may be mentioned a group of customs already alluded to (§ 5), in which the inhabitants of a district divide into two parties and engage in a sham fight, in which, however, severe blows are given and received, blood is shed, limbs are broken, and sometimes life itself is taken, the fight lasting for some hours. This fight takes place at some given moment in the processes of agriculture, and has for its object the promotion of fertility. The *rationale* probably is that the blood shed fertilizes the earth, for among the Acobambans of Peru women caught the blood and sprinkled it on the fields (Bastian, *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*, Jena, 1860, iii. 73). Similar fights, more or less severe, have been observed among the Tongans, American Indians, African tribes, among the Khonds, in China; they occurred in the form of stone-throwing in Greece at certain festivals; and they still occur in modified form in European folk-custom (see Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 267).

(*c*) Incisions in the flesh and blood-letting are also customary before marriage in many places. Incisions which leave raised scars are made on the bodies of young men and women among the Kikuyus of E. Africa, the purpose being ornamental (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 255). Elsewhere the blood-letting, followed by each spouse drinking or swallowing the blood in food, has the purpose of uniting them, and shrinks in some cases to a mere symbol (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 385; see artt. BLOOD, BROTHERHOOD [artificial]). Or, again, the opening of a vein in both bride and bridegroom is a species of blood-offering, mainly among American Indian tribes (Zockler, *op. cit.* 80).

(*d*) Frequently the making of scars and cicatrices, painful as the process is, seems to have mainly an ornamental purpose, as among the Australians (Spencer-Gillen[b], 56), Tasmanians and Melanesians (Letourneau, *Sociology*, 80), and N. American tribes, *e.g.* the Thlinkets (*NR* i. 97), though with most of these they are also made for other purposes. Among West Coast African tribes, with whom tatuing is rare, cicatrices are made by cutting the skin and then placing in the wound the fluff of the silk cotton tree (M. H. Kingsley, *op. cit.* 530). In New Guinea women make scars on the chest when a brother spears his first dugong (Haddon, 113).

(*e*) Finally, gashes are frequently used to draw blood as a propitiation of the gods. Thus, among

the Mosquito tribes of Central America, besides sacrifices to influence the gods before war or any important undertaking, blood was drawn from tongue, ears, or other parts of the body (*NR* i. 723, 740). Similar gashings were made by the priests of Baal (1 K 18[28], cf. Jer 41[5]), the Aztecs at the feast of the Earth-goddess, and the Peruvians, both of whom drew blood from gashes in arms, legs, ears, nose, etc. (Garcilasso de la Vega, i. 52; Zockler, *op. cit.* 84). These are sometimes thought to be relics of earlier human sacrifice, like the commutation of a human victim among the Gauls, who made an incision in the victim's flesh (Pomp. Mela, iii. 2, 18). But possibly they may have been intended to promote union with the divinity through the vehicle of blood. Connected with this is the custom of self-castration seen in the Phrygian worship of Cybele and analogous cults in Syria, etc. In these the priests also wounded themselves in the arms and scourged each other (Tert. *Apol.* 25; Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 50). Similarly in the Roman cult of Bellona the priests made gashes in their shoulders and the blood was sprinkled on the image of the goddess and used in the sacrifices (Lactantius, i. 21; W. R. Smith, 304).

(2) *Amputation of fingers.*—This practice, already met with as a mourning ceremony, is also found sporadically as a sacrificial observance. In sickness Bushmen sacrifice a joint of their fingers (Farrer, *Prim. Manners and Customs*, London, 1879, 143). The Cochimis of California, when all other means had failed, cut off a finger from a daughter or sister of a sick man, in the belief that the blood would preserve him (Adelung, *Gesch. von Califor.*, Lemgo, 1769, i. 76). This was also done by the Tongans in cases of illness as a propitiatory offering to the gods, while a man would also cut off his own finger to avert their anger when danger threatened (Mariner, *Tonga Islands*, i. 454, ii. 210). During initiation the candidate among the Mandans held up his finger to the Great Spirit expressing his willingness to offer it, and then had it chopped off with a hatchet (Lewis and Clarke, *Travels*, London, 1817, 86). In India the practice is found in custom and myth. Mothers will cut off their own fingers as sacrifices for the preservation of their children, while Siva is said to have cut off his finger to appease the wrath of Kali (Tylor, ii. 401). Mothers in Bengal frequently draw blood from their chests, when a husband or son is ill, to propitiate the goddess Chandika (Rajendralāla Mitra, *Indo-Aryans*, London, 1881, i. 111). This may also have been a Celtic practice, since in one legend Ethne the Horrible is said to have cut off the ends of her children's little fingers to make them longer-lived (Windisch-Stokes, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1891–1897, iii. 363). We may compare with these rites the Chinese custom of cutting pieces of flesh from the thighs, while offering a prayer to Heaven to accept this as a species of self-immolation on behalf of a sick relative, who then was given the flesh to eat (de Groot, *op. cit.* iv. 2, 386).

(3) *Circumcision.*—This has already been found as one of the rites of initiation to manhood; and, in general, where it occurs it is performed at puberty, though sometimes, as with the Jews, it takes place in childhood. We are not concerned here with the various reasons assigned for it by the different peoples who practise it, or with its original intention, though this may have been, as already suggested in other cases, to ward off danger from the whole organ by removing a part, which part might also harbour dangerous influences. What concerns us here is the painful nature of the rite, and its wide-spread use. Practised by many peoples of antiquity, Egyptians and others (Herod. ii. 104), it is found among most African tribes, in N. and S. America, in Polynesia, Australia, and parts of Melanesia, and sporadically elsewhere. Among most of these peoples it is regarded as a disgrace not to have it done, or as rendering a man unclean. If the patient shrieks or cries, this is frequently considered unmanly, but occasionally he is in such a frenzied state as not to feel pain at the moment. But sometimes, besides the actual pain of the cutting, the youth has to undergo other ordeals. Thus, among the Bantu peoples of W. Africa cayenne pepper is squirted on the wound (Nassau, *op. cit.* 12), and among the Mavendas of S. Africa the candidates are subjected to exposure for some time in a nude condition and to treatment of a harsh nature (*JAI* xxxv. 268). See art. CIRCUMCISION, and Andree, *Ethnographische Parallelen*, Leipzig, 1889, 166 ff.; Ploss, *Das Kind*, Leipzig, 1884, i. 340 ff.; Stoll, *op. cit.* 499 ff.; Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, Edinburgh, 1885, 360; *L'Anthropologie*, Paris, 1896, vii. 653 ff.

(4) The practice of *sub-incision* or *mika* or *pura-arilthа-kuma* has already been referred to (§ 2). This terrible rite involves the slitting open of the under side of the urethra, and is found in Queensland, N. S. Wales, S. Australia, and among N. and W. Australian tribes (Spencer-Gillen[a], 212 ff.; *ib.*[b] 133, 328 ff.). Analogous to this is the custom of semi-castration, practised, according to Kolb, by the Hottentots (*op. cit.* 420 ff.), though it has been questioned by later observers; it is also found among the Ponapes in the Caroline Islands and in the Friendly Islands (Finsch, *ZE* xii. 316). For other mutilations of the sexual organs for different purposes among the Dayaks, Battas, ancient Romans, etc., see O. Hovorka, *Mitt. der Anthr. Gesell. in Wien*, 1894, xxiv. fasc. 3; *JAI*, 1892, xxii. 45; Stoll, *op. cit.* 496 ff., 921 ff.

(5) Girls at puberty among many separate peoples must also undergo the equally painful rite of excision, probably with the same original intention as circumcision, and like it frequently an initiation ceremony. It is found among various African peoples, in Nubia, Abyssinia, Galla and Masai Lands, on the west coast, and also in the south, while it is also met with among several S. American peoples, occasionally in N. America, and sporadically in Indonesia (Stoll, *op. cit.* 523; Ploss, *Das Kind*, i. 379 ff.; Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904, 60 ff.; Martius, *Zur Ethnog. Amerikas*, Leipzig, 1867, 445; *JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 133). With it may be classed the cutting or artificial rupture of the hymen, mainly among several Australian tribes, but occurring elsewhere also. With the Australians it is an initiatory rite, and also serves as an immediate preparation for marriage (Spencer-Gillen[a], 93; *ib.*[b] 133). Even more painful is the rite of 'infibulation' of marriageable girls, which is found mainly in the Nile region, the Sudan, Galla and Somali Lands, Nubia, Kordofan, and the Abyssinian highlands, and also in Pegu (Stoll, *op. cit.* 548 ff.).

(6) Among other forms of mutilation causing considerable suffering may be mentioned (*a*) knocking out one or more of the front teeth, usually as an initiation ceremony, though various interpretations of its purpose are current among those who practise it, and with some it is regarded as an ornament. Perhaps arising as a preparation for the reception of new food at puberty, it soon became a mark of acquired manhood, and sometimes, as with the Kavirondos, any one not undergoing it endangered his life in battle (Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, London, 1902, ii. 728). Among many Australian tribes it is found as a regular initiation ceremony performed only on youths, but among the central tribes it has ceased to be so, and is performed on both sexes indifferently (Spencer-Gillen[a], 588 ff.). The custom is found among most African tribes,

Bantu and Negro; in N. America, *e.g.* among the Seri Indians, who practise it on girls before marriage (*17 RBEW*, p. 169); in Formosa among the Pepos, who think it assists breathing (Ploss, *Das Kind*, ii. 424); while it was practised by the ancient Peruvians, who regarded it as a punishment ordained on their ancestors and binding upon themselves, or as a service rendered to the divinity (Garcilasso de la Vega, ix. 3; Herrera, *Historia general*, Madrid, 1730, v. 6, 1). It is also found as a mourning mutilation at the death of a chief in the Sandwich Islands (Ellis, *Tour through Hawaii*, London, 1826, 146).

(*b*) Filing the teeth, usually to sharp points, grinding them down, and breaking part of them, are found sporadically, sometimes as initiation ceremonies. Among the Malays the first method takes place soon after circumcision; the rite, though painful to behold, is borne with great patience (Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, 355). Elsewhere, as in Sumatra, Borneo, etc., the teeth are filed, broken, or pierced, and then ornamented with gold or blackened, the operation sometimes causing great pain (Marsden, *Sumatra*, London, 1811, 52; *Hist. gén. des voyages*, Hague, 1757, xv. 97; Ling Roth, *Natives of Sarawak*, ii. 78). But the custom is also supposed to preserve the teeth. Filing the teeth was also practised by the Mayas of Yucatan (Diego de Landa, *Relación*, Paris, 1864, 31), as it is still among some East African tribes (*JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 138), and peoples of the Congo region (Stoll, *op. cit.* 255); and, as among the Californian tribes, they were ground down to the gums (*NR* i. 333 f.; see also Frazer, *Totemism*, Edinburgh, 1887, 28; *ZE* xiv. 213).

(*c*) Making holes or slits in the nose, lips, cheek, or ears, in which are inserted various objects, is a world-wide practice, and, though regarded as a means of ornamentation, was probably in its origin of a magical character (the objects serving as amulets), while it was also and still is in many cases associated with initiation rites. Frequently the hole or slit is begun in childhood, but the permanent object is inserted only at puberty. Only the most extreme instances of this form of mutilation need be referred to here. Among the Thlinkets the under lip of female children is pierced and a small object inserted. As time goes on, a larger object is placed in the slit to extend the aperture, causing a painful and continuous strain, until, at the age of maturity, a grooved block of wood sometimes six inches long and half an inch thick can be inserted (*NR* i. 99) The Botocudos of S. America treat the under lip and the ear lobe in the same manner, gradually enlarging the apertures, until wooden plugs of a considerable size can be inserted, the ear lobe sometimes reaching to the shoulder (von Wied-Neuwied, *Reise nach Brasilien*, Frankfort, 1820, ii. 5). Every variety of these mutilations, either singly or together, is found over the American continent; lip-slitting occurs in Africa, ear-slitting and ear-extension in Fiji, Easter Island, and the Nicobar islands, while ear-piercing, with a religious significance, occurs all over India, Burma, and the Malay Peninsula (see Stoll, *op. cit.* 98 ff.; Hovorka, 'Verzierungen der Nase,' *Mitt. der anthr. Ges. in Wien*, xxv. pts. 4 and 5, 1875; *3 RBEW*, p. 76 ff.).

(*d*) The well-known and painful custom of deformation of the foot among Chinese women is regarded as the chief point of beauty and attractiveness, while it has apparently also some erotic character. The process is begun in early childhood by bandaging the feet firmly so that all growth is hindered, until they become little more than stumps, rendering walking a matter of difficulty (Brandt, *Sittenbilder aus China*, Stuttgart, 1895, 53 ff.; Ploss-Bartels, *Das Weib*, Leipzig, 1904, i. 173 ff.). A similar custom is found among the Kutchin Indians, where a child's feet are bandaged to prevent growth, small feet being there thought handsome (Richardson, *Arctic Searching Expedition*, London, 1851, 384).

9. **Tatuing.**—This custom is of world-wide extent; but while every variety of motive is ascribed to it, it frequently has a religious or magical significance, and it is commonly done as an initiation rite. Among the Eskimos the process usually consists in passing a needle and thread dipped in soot below the skin (Egede, *Besch. von Gronland*, Copenhagen, 1790, 153). More usually pricking the skin or cutting it, and then rubbing in some pigment, is resorted to. Or in some cases figures are cut or cauterized on the skin and the cicatrices painted, as in the Deccan and among the Mosquito Indians (Forster, *Voyage round the World*, London, 1777, 588; *NR* i. 716). Still, however done, the process involves much suffering, especially where great parts of the body are tatued; but to shrink from it or to show signs of suffering is held as evidence of cowardice. Mœrenhout says of the operation in Polynesia that it was the cause of such sufferings that sometimes the girl died under them. Yet in spite of this the operation, which is a tedious one, is seldom or never refused (Wilson, *Miss. Voyage*, London, 1799, 339). Nearly every observer of the actual carrying out of the process speaks of its extremely painful and even dangerous character. Hence it may be regarded, for whatever purpose it is undergone, as by no means the least serious of the many kinds of austerities practised by lower races. Thus, when it is undergone at puberty, it affords a test of the individual's capacity for enduring pain and showing courage (cf. *JAI*, 1882, xii. 331). Where it has a religious significance, as in Fiji, where it was held to have been appointed by the god Ndengei, it may be regarded as a kind of offering made to a divinity, while it also secured the entrance to, or the recognition of the individual in, the other world, un-tatued persons being there subjected to torture (Williams, *Fiji*, i. 160; cf. *FL*, 1894, v. 33, 318; Hall, *U.S. Explor. Exped.*, Philadelphia, 1846, 99, for other instances). The practice of making marks or designs on the body by cuts or scars, into which some pigment is often rubbed, is found among many peoples, especially those with darker skins (Australians, Tasmanians, Papuans, etc.), and must involve considerable suffering. See art. TATUING; Joest, *Tatowiren, Narbenzeichnen und Korperbemalen*, Berlin, 1887.

10. **Medical austerities.**—The methods of healing used by the medicine-man, or doctor, in savage societies are often of a drastic and acutely painful nature, though they are generally borne submissively by the patient. Resting mainly upon the theory that all disease is caused by evil spirits, the object of the treatment is to drive these away or to obtain possession of the object which they have placed in the body. Hence a great part of the treatment consists of yelling and singing, noises of all kinds, dances, and fumigations. But in addition the patient is subjected to a variety of vigorous remedies wrought upon his person. Among the most common of these are scarifying the flesh and bleeding. Thus among the Andamanese the flesh is cut with quartz or glass flakes (*JAI*, 1882, xii. 85), elsewhere, as among the Dinkas (*JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 156), with knives, and sometimes, as among the Bondeis, a very smarting medicine is rubbed in (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 215). Similar scarifications are used by many other peoples—Australians, Papuans, American Indians, both north and south. A primitive method of cupping is found in different parts of Africa, consisting of making an incision in the flesh, placing a horn above the incision, exhausting the air by

suction, and then closing the orifice. The horn is then gradually filled with blood (Nassau, *op. cit.* 183). Sucking the surface of the skin till it is blistered, or sucking blood from an incision in the flesh, is common, *e.g.* in N. America (Bancroft, *passim*; Pétitot, *Traditions indiennes*, Paris, 1886, 434). There, too, kneading and pounding the body violently, and pressing the fists into the pit of the stomach until the patient's strength is exhausted, are in great favour, and occasionally the medicine-man bites the patient with his teeth and shakes him (*NR* i. 246, 355; Kane, *Wanderings*, London, 1859, 225). Another remedy is to make the skin smart by applying pungent spices, or by stinging it with ants or whipping it with nettles (*GB*[2] i. 301, iii. 216). Thus, like flagellation in cases of madness, is intended to drive off the demon of disease. A favourite remedy for fever and other diseases among American Indians is the sweat-bath. This is a small hut which by various means is heated to suffocation. In it the patient is placed, and afterwards, dripping with perspiration, he rushes out and plunges into cold water. This treatment sometimes causes death, but it is also in use as a purificatory rite (*NR* i. 246, 285). A similar remedy for madness is found in Gabun (Nassau, *op. cit.* 273). It is to be noticed also that sometimes the relatives of the patient, or even of the medicine-man, fast, to assist the progress of the remedy (Ploss, *Das Kind*, i. 150; Dall, *3 RBEW*, p. 426). See Bartels, *Medecin der Naturvolker*, Leipzig, 1893.

11. **Self-restraint.**—A certain degree of self-restraint, especially in marital relations, though scarcely coming under the heading of 'Austerities' as do other forms of self-restraint, *e.g.* fasting, is found on particular occasions among lower races and may be taken notice of here, since it shows the power of current theories or beliefs or customs to strengthen the will even of a savage, and cause it to stifle bodily desires. Thus, though the ultimate purpose is no doubt different, such forms of self-restraint are yet akin to the self-discipline and continence of later forms of asceticism. Examples of continence are most marked during war or hunting, the intention probably being the avoidance of possible loss of strength and also of the potential dangers lurking in sexual relations generally. But in some cases the prohibition has assumed a religious sanction, especially among American Indian tribes. The Winnebagos observe continence in war because it was commanded by the Great Spirit; among other tribes it is said to be based on religious grounds, and the Dakotas thought that the violation of captives would be resented by the spirits of the dead (Drake, *Ind. Tribes*, Philadelphia, 1884, i. 188; Waitz-Gerland, *Anthrop.*, Leipzig, 1859–1871, iii. 158; Schoolcraft, *op. cit.* iv. 63).

A religious motive is also to be seen in those cases where such continence has become a binding form of tabu, as among the Maoris, with whom, not only during war, but on other important occasions, women are strictly tabu to men, who must not approach their wives until war is over (*JAI*, 1889, xix. 111; Waitz-Gerland, vi. 349). This is also found in parts of New Guinea, where the warriors are *helega*, or sacred, for some days before fighting, and must not even see a woman (Chalmers, *Pioneering in N. G.*, London, 1885, 65). But the original basis of such continence may be seen in the Seminole belief that connexion with women enervated men and unfitted them for their duties as warriors (Schoolcraft, v. 272); or, as in Halmahera, that they must practise continence during war else they will lose their strength (Riedel, *ZE* xvii. 69). This rule of continence is practically universal among savages, and applies to the period immediately preceding war or during the actual course of the war, while it also appears at higher levels of civilization (cf. Cæsar, vii. 66; 2 S 11[11]). The rule also applies frequently before or during a hunting or fishing expedition. Chastity is part of a seven days' tabu among the Malays when fishing (Skeat, *op. cit.* 315), but a similar rule prevails generally in such cases; while, as among the Aleuts, it is connected with religious beliefs, since during a whaling expedition unfaithfulness on the part of the men or their wives would be punished by the whale, an object of reverence to them (Reclus, *op. cit.* 53). In some cases, too, the rule of continence is accompanied by fasting, ceremonial preparations, and the infliction of pain. Thus, among the Nutkas, before war, some weeks are spent in preparation, which consists mainly of abstinence from women, bathing, scrubbing the skin with briers till it bleeds, and finally painting the whole body jet-black (*NR* i. 189). Among the Bondeis a man is scarified down the arms as a charm against sword-cuts (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 205); while, before hunting, the Indians of Guiana subject themselves to the stings of ants and the irritation caused by the hairs of certain caterpillars (Im Thurn, 229). Again, probably on the principle of sympathetic magic and the intimate connexion between a man and his wife, fasting and other forms of rigorous discipline are enjoined on women in many quarters while the men are absent on war or the chase, as in the Babar Islands, where women must fast and abstain from sexual intercourse (Riedel, *Sclebes en Papua*, Hague, 1886, 341).

The rule of continence is also followed in various other circumstances. In Congo, when the *Chitomé* is on circuit, a fast of continence is proclaimed, the penalty for breaking it being death. By such continence 'they preserve the life of their common father' (Reade, *Savage Africa*, London, 1863, 362). Strict continence is also observed by men during the Cherokee new year's festival of purification already referred to (§ 6 (*c*)). It is also a common tabu after slaying a man or touching the dead, here probably connected with the contagion of death, which necessitates the avoidance of one's fellows till a certain time has elapsed or certain purifications have been performed. Fasting frequently accompanies continence on such occasions. Contact with women is forbidden for one month after the shedding of blood among the Kikuyus of E. Africa (*JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 264); and among the Natchez, after the first scalp-taking or securing a prisoner, the warrior had to abstain from seeing his wife or eating flesh for a month (Charlevoix, *Histoire de la Nouvelle France*, Paris, 1744, vi. 186; cf. Westermarck, *op. cit.* i. 375). In many places continence must be observed for a time after marriage and after a birth (Crawley, *op. cit.* 345 ff.; Lubbock, *op. cit.* 81).

Even among savages chastity on the part of the priesthood is sometimes a necessity. Thus Algonquin priests were ordained to a life of chastity, and could not eat food prepared by a woman (*NR* ii. 212), and in Yucatan the 'captain,' during his three years' tenure of office, had to observe the same rule (*ib.* ii. 741). This corresponds to the general rule of chastity found among higher priesthoods, while there, too, celibate orders are found, *e.g.* those in Mexico dedicated to the service of Quetzalcoatl, and the virgins of the sun in Peru, who, though regarded as the brides of the Inca, had otherwise, on pain of a cruel death, to live in chastity, in this exactly resembling the Vestal virgins in Rome (Zockler, *op. cit.* 85; Prescott, *Peru*, London, 1890, 53; cf. also the purity enjoined on the Roman Flamen Dialis and his household).

See also the articles on ASCETICISM.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the article.

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AUSTRALASIA (Ethnology, Religions, and Ethics).—*Australasia* is here taken in its widest sense, so as to cover the great insular world which comprises nearly the whole of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, and constitutes one of the five main divisions of the globe. The term is practically synonymous with *Oceania*, which is still favoured by most Continental geographers, but for which English writers now generally substitute *Australasia*, as harmonizing better with the other divisions, and at the same time serving to recall its essential characteristics—'firstly, that it is geographically a southern extension of Asia; and secondly, that the great island-continent of Australia forms its central and most important feature' (A. R. Wallace, *Australasia*, p. 2).

As thus understood, this Oceanic region comprises five main insular groups, which form the subjects of separate articles, but may here be summarily tabulated with their more important subdivisions:

I. Australia with Tasmania.
II. Malaysia, comprising the Malay Peninsula; the large Sunda Islands (Sumatra and Java); the Lesser Sunda Islands (Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Sumba, Allor or Ombay, Timor, Wetta, Serwatti); Borneo; Celebes; Jilolo or Halmahera, Ceram, the Moluccas; Sulu; the Philippines; Formosa; and the outlying Andaman and Nicobar groups.
III. Papuasia, with two sections:
1. *New Guinea*, with the D'Entrecasteaux, Louisiade, and other insular dependencies.
2. *Melanesia*, comprising the Bismarck Archipelago (New Britain, New Ireland, Duke of York); Solomon, Santa Cruz; Banks; Fiji; New Hebrides, New Caledonia; and Loyalty Archipelagoes.
IV. Polynesia, including New Zealand, Tonga (Friendly); Cook or Hervey (Mangaia, Rarotonga, etc.); Austral (Tubuai); Society (Tahiti), Low (Tuamotu); Marquesas (Nukahiva, Fatuhiva, etc), Navigator (Samoa); Union (Tokelau); Ellice (Funafuti); Savage (Niue); Sandwich (Hawaii) and Easter (Rapanui) groups.
V. Micronesia, comprising the Pelew (Palau); Ladrones (Marianne); Caroline; Marshall (Rahck, Radak); Gilbert (Kingsmill); Phœnix and Penrhyn (Manahiki) groups.

For Madagascar, which should properly be included in No. II., see art. Africa. The Seychelles, Mascarenhas, and other scattered clusters in the Indian Ocean are excluded because uninhabited when discovered, and the same remark applies also to Norfolk, Kermadec, Pitcairn, and a few other South Sea islands. Note that South Sea is synonymous with Pacific Ocean.

All the lands in this table have been occupied by man since the remotest times, and it is argued in the art. Asia that the cradle of the human family lay most probably in Malaysia (Java). From this central area of dispersion the first migratory movements ranged north to Asia, west to Africa, and east and south over the whole of the Oceanic world by land connexions which have since been greatly reduced by subsidence (see art. Ethnology, § 3). It would thus appear that the first inhabitants of Australasia must have been direct descendants of a Pleistocene precursor whose prototype is found in the Javanese *pithecanthropus erectus*, and who are themselves represented by the black elements still persisting in Malaysia (Malay Peninsula, Flores, Timor), in Papuasia, Australia, and even in Polynesia and Micronesia, though here mostly absorbed or assimilated by later intruders from Asia. As in Africa, there are two black elements in Oceania: (*a*) the dwarfish *Negritos* surviving in the Andamans, in the Malay Peninsula (Sakais, Semangs), in the Philippines (Aëtas), and in Java (the nearly extinct Kalangs); and (*b*) the medium-sized or even tall *Papuasians*, who form nearly the whole of the population in New Guinea (Papuans proper), and throughout Melanesia. For several reasons, such as their physical, linguistic, and religious differences, it is desirable to treat the Papuans proper and the Melanesians as two distinct though closely related sub-groups, while both may be conveniently comprised under the collective name of *Papuasians*. The Melanesians, for instance, are of Malayo-Polynesian speech, and worship no devils, whereas the Papuans speak numerous languages fundamentally distinct from any others, and are pronounced demonolaters. Dr. Hamy speaks of their origins as lost 'dans les profondeurs d'un insondable passé,' while W. Volz shows that in pre-Malay times they occupied all the Pacific Ocean (*AA*, Nov. 1894). Their westward extension to the large Sunda Islands, where no full-blood Papuans are now found, is also established by B. Hagen, who groups together the Battas, Gayos, and Alas of Sumatra, the Ulu-ayars of Borneo, the Semangs and Aëtas of Malacca and the Philippines, the Torajas, and the Toalas recently discovered by Dr. Sarasin in Celebes, the Melanesians, Papuans, and Australians, 'as local varieties and remains of a great wide-spread primitive southern race,' which he calls 'the old pre-Malay ethnical element' in Oceania (*Globus*, 1904, 76, No. 2, p. 24 f.). These pre-Malayans therefore constitute the substratum, the true aborigines, everywhere in Australasia.

Their watery domain was later, but still in remote pre-historic times, encroached upon first by Caucasic and then by Mongoloid immigrants, both from the Asiatic mainland. It is shown in art. Asia that during the Stone Ages two branches of the western Caucasians reached the uttermost confines of the continent, one probably from Europe through Mongolia to Korea and Japan, the other from North Africa through Irania to India and Indo-China. Some of the northern branch, all dolmen or megalithic builders, appear to have passed from Japan to Micronesia, where they may have joined hands with those of the southern branch who ranged from Indo-China southwards to Malaysia and thence eastwards to Polynesia. Thus are explained those astonishing *marais* and other monolithic structures which are found scattered over the Pacific islands as far east as Rapanui (Easter Island), and culminating in the stupendous works of Ponapé (Eastern Carolinas) with cyclopean walls 10 to 18 feet thick, constructed of huge basaltic blocks, some measuring 25 ft. in length by 8 ft. in circumference (F. J. Moss, *Atolls and Islands*, *passim*). There is a trilithon at Maui (Tonga group) which looks like one of those 'Druidical-like shrines' seen by Mr. R. T. Turley in North Korea, where some of the people 'show Caucasian and not Mongolian features' (*Geograph. Jour.*, April 1904, pp. 478, 479). That the two Caucasic streams must have met and commingled in these North Pacific waters is shown, amongst other indications, by the fact that the Nukuor islanders near Mortlock (Central Carolinas) still speak a pure but archaic form of the Maori language away to the south (New Zealand).

In order to distinguish between the Mongoloid (Malayan) peoples and these primitive Caucasians who long sojourned in the Eastern Archipelago, and are there still represented, amongst others, by the Mentawi islanders (west coast Sumatra), Logan introduced the term *Indonesian*, which has now been extended to all the natives of European type throughout Australasia. They are found sporadically in Papuasia and Melanesia, and are in exclusive possession of Polynesia, so that all the South Sea Islanders east of a line running from New Zealand by Samoa to Hawaii may be called Indonesians, and the collective names *Mahori*, *Sawaiori*, and others formerly applied tentatively to them may now be discarded. Their claim to be regarded as an Oceanic section, not of the 'Aryans,' as is sometimes assumed, but of the pre-Aryan Hamitic and Iberian Caucasians, can no longer be seriously questioned, since by the unanimous testimony of all competent observers they are one of the very finest races on the globe, with physical characters connecting them anthropologically with

the western Caucasians. Of the Tonga natives Lord George Campbell writes:

'There are no people in the world who strike one at first so much as these Friendly Islanders. Their clear light copper-brown coloured skins, yellow and curly hair, handsome faces, their *tout ensemble*, formed a novel and splendid picture of the *genus homo*; and, as far as physique and appearance go, they gave one certainly an impression of being a superior race to ours' (*Log Letters from 'The Challenger'*; and see also Guillemard's *Australasia*, ch. 14).

But it was shown above that the whole Oceanic area was first peopled by the Papuasians, which explains the constant occurrence of a black strain, very marked in Micronesia, but also met with all over Polynesia. The natives of Niuë (Savage Island) have a tradition that, when they occupied the island from Samoa, they found a black population with whom they intermixed. The same statement is made by the Hervey people, and is confirmed by their dark complexion and kinky hair, while in Mangaia the Melanesian features—frizzled hair, dark-brown skin, and full beard—predominate. Even the Tahitians and Maoris, both in other respects splendid Caucasians, here and there betray the dark element in their protruding lips, very dark-brown skins, curly hair, and slightly developed beard. In Malaysia the above-mentioned Mentawi islanders are the finest of all the surviving Indonesians, and of them Von Rosenberg writes that, 'as regards physical appearance, speech, customs, and usages, they stand almost quite apart. They bear such a decided stamp of a Polynesian race that one might far sooner compare them with an inhabitant of the South Sea Islands' (*Der malayische Archipel*. i. 189).

'It is somewhat difficult to say what the original type of the true Polynesian was; but it is probable that the handsome, tall, oval-faced, high-browed, lithe, active, light brown, black straight-haired, black or very dark brown-eyed, cheerful, dignified individual so frequently met with, is the nearest to the true original Polynesian' (Percy Smith, *Hawaiki*, p. 14).

As the western Indonesians moved eastwards to their present homes in the Pacific, their place was taken by the Asiatic Mongols, who are now represented in the Eastern Archipelago by the light- or olive-brown populations commonly called *Malays*. They form, in fact, the Oceanic section of the Mongol family, and as their right to be regarded as members of this family is no longer contested, the point need not here be laboured. Interminglings with the pre-Malayan dark and fair elements (Papuans and Indonesians) have caused considerable local modifications and given rise to some marked varieties, such as the Nias Islanders, the Bornean Dayaks and Kayans, the Bugis and Minahassas of Celebes, the Tagalogs and others of the Philippines, and the Formosan aborigines. But the dominant historical Malays, whose original home was in the Menangkabau district of Sumatra, and whose language has become the *lingua franca* of the Archipelago, are a true Mongoloid people, distinguished by their 'light yellowish and brownish skins, long lank and black hair, small stature, rather oblique eyes, and prominent cheek-bones' (Meyer, *Minahassa auf Celebes*, Berlin, 1876, p. 7). These Oceanic Mongols do not occupy the whole of the Archipelago, the eastern parts of which are still held by full-blood and half-caste Papuans, the ethnical parting line, as drawn by Wallace, running from east of the Philippines along the west side of Jilolo through Bouro, and curving round the west end of Flores, then bending back by Sandalwood so as to take in Rotti near Timor (Wallace, *Malay Archipelago*[5], p. 590).

Now comes a difficulty. All the Australasian peoples except the Papuans and Australians—Malayans, Malagasy, Philippine Islanders, Melanesians, Indonesians, and Micronesians—speak numerous idioms which differ greatly in their lexical and phonetic characters, and often even in their grammatical structure, but are none the less regarded as members of a common stock language which is usually called Malayo-Polynesian, and has a prodigious range—from Madagascar to Easter Island, within some 2000 miles of the South American coast, and from New Zealand across the Pacific to Hawaii. All are *polysyllabic* and *untoned*, whereas those of the south-eastern Mongols—Indo-Chinese and others—are *monosyllabic* and *toned*. But the Malayans belong to this connexion, hence should presumably speak toned languages like Burmese, for instance, or Siamese, or Annamese. The explanation seems to be that the Oceanic Mongols reached their present domain in remote times, before the Indo-Chinese tongues had become disintegrated—that is, before the development of monosyllabism by phonetic decay. Not only do such untoned languages still survive on the mainland, but they so closely resemble the Oceanic tongues that they may be called proto- or archaic-Malayan. Of the continental Malay mother tongue there are several varieties, such as Khmer (Cambodian), Redais, Bahnar, Samré, and Charay, which are all toneless, and have a great number of words in common with the Oceanic Malay, while 'the grammatical structure of both is absolutely identical' (C. Fontaine, quoted by H. Mouhot, in *Voyage dans les royaumes de Siam*, etc., Paris, 1868, p. 216). The organic kinship is seen especially in the characteristic infix system, which is everywhere precisely the same, as in the Khmer *sauk*, 'to corrupt,' *samnauk*, 'a bribe'; the Malagasy *tady*, 'twisted,' 'a rope,' *tomady*, 'strong'; the Javanese *hurub*, 'flame,' *humurub*, 'to flare up'; the Tagalog *kapatir*, 'brother,' *kinapatir*, 'brotherly'; the Malay *sipit*, 'to grasp,' *sinipit*, 'an anchor,' and so on (the infix elements always the same, *m*, *n*, and *mn*).

A harder problem is the extension of this *vrai groupe malay continental* (Dr. Hamy) not only to the Mongoloid Oceanic lands, but also to Melanesia, whose black inhabitants speak many more primitive varieties of Malayo-Polynesian than either the Polynesians or the Malayans, although they are neither Polynesians nor Malays themselves, but a branch of the primordial Oceanic Negroid race. Here Dr. Codrington, the leading authority on the subject, vouches for three essential points: (1) the substantial unity and homogeneous character of the Melanesian tongues, under considerable dialectic diversity, and apart from a number of Indonesian enclaves, such as Uea, Futuna, Fate, Mae, Tikopia, and Ongtong Java; (2) their fundamental kinship with the Malayo-Polynesian family; and (3) their archaic character as compared with all the other members of that family. 'As compared with Fiji [a Melanesian tongue], the languages of Tonga and Samoa [Indonesian] are late, simplified, and decayed' (Codrington, *Melanesian Languages*, Oxf. 1885, p. 26). The question therefore arises, How came these savage head-hunters and cannibals to lose their original forms of speech, such as still survive amongst the kindred black peoples of New Guinea and of Australia, and have but recently become extinct in Tasmania? And then, how did they everywhere, from the Bismarck to the Loyalty groups, acquire Malayo-Polynesian languages of primitive type? Early Indonesian or Malayan conquests, followed by miscegenation, naturally suggest themselves, but are excluded by the absence of those modified Negroid physical characters which must necessarily have resulted from such postulated interminglings. The Melanesians are quite as full-blood Negroes as the Papuans, and show even more marked Negro features than the somewhat modified Australian aborigines. Codrington, who gives a few instances of mutual assimilation and interchange of type and speech, especially in Fiji, remarks that—

'It is conceivable, on the supposition that the languages now spoken by Melanesians are not originally their own, that the original stock is not now represented anywhere, either in vocabulary or in grammar, that languages derived from without have entirely taken the place of some earlier [Papuasian?] speech; but it is difficult to allow it to be more than possible. . . . There is the great difficulty that the present Melanesian languages certainly have not been introduced by intruders speaking the present Malay or Polynesian languages.' He then suggests a tentative solution of the problem which 'would account for the Polynesians having a language allied both to the Malay and to the Melanesian' (p. 31).

It should be added that Malayo-Polynesian has not the remotest connexion either with the heterogeneous tongues of the New Guinea Papuans or with the homogeneous agglutinating languages of the Australian aborigines. As a rule the Negritos both of the Philippines and of Malacca have lost their original tongues, and now generally speak those of the surrounding Malayan peoples. On the other hand, the Andamanese may claim to have developed in their long secluded island homes perhaps the most remarkable form of speech known to philology. It has no kinship with any other, and its most striking feature is a superabundance of pronominal prefixes and formative postfixes, so that 'in adding their affixes they follow the principles of the ordinary agglutinative tongues; in adding their prefixes they follow the well-defined principles of the South African [Bantu] tongues. Hitherto, as far as I know, the two principles in full play have never been found together in any other language. In Andamanese both are fully developed, so much so as to interfere with each other's grammatical functions' (R. C. Temple, *Anthrop. Journ.* 1882, p. 123). Yet, like the Australians, these paradoxical 'Mincopies,' as they were formerly called, have an infantile arithmetic with no words for the numerals beyond *two*.

In the Oceanic area the various religious systems may be broadly described as consisting of diverse forms of the crudest and the most advanced animism, leading in some places to the purest psycholatry, in others to nature- and ancestor-worship, above which has been raised a luxuriant growth of myth and legend. With all this are combined some strange aspects of demonology and tabu, wide-spread over the Indo-Pacific domain, besides totemism, ordeals, omens, and fetishism, in forms which throw light on the origin of these practices. Less wide-spread are true idolatry, shamanism, priestcraft, animal and human sacrifices, lycanthropy, tree-cult, witchcraft, the evil eye, rain- and weather-doctoring, and the other superstitions usually associated with primitive religions. The ethical standards present enormous differences, although the Oceanic peoples may in a general way be spoken of rather as non-moral than immoral. In fact, the moral sense, as understood by more advanced races, must be regarded as still dormant amongst Polynesians, who indulge openly in unbridled licence; Melanesians and Borneans, who glory in the trophies acquired in their head-hunting expeditions; and Papuan marauders, who treat with fiendish cruelty the captives secured for their cannibal feasts. Nor are these atrocities confined to the lower races, as seen by the unspeakable horrors of the cage-prisons in the unprotected Malay States described by H. Clifford (*In Court and Kampong*, p. 161 f.).

In Sumatra also the Battas open hostilities by offering to their war-god a boy eight or ten years old, who is buried to his neck in the ground and then stuffed with a mixture of sliced ginger, red pepper, and salt. When he is nearly raving mad with thirst, he is induced by the offer of a little water to promise to plead the tribal cause in the next world. But, the promise made, molten lead instead of water is poured down his throat, and his head is cut off and buried in an earthenware pot under a large tree in the village. These Battas are idolatrous cannibals, who, before the fight begins, prepare a rudely carved wooden effigy with a square hole in the place of the navel. The pot is then dug up and the soft parts of the head are thrust into the hole, which is closed with a leaden plate. The idol thus becomes animated (*hat hierdurch seine Seele bekommen*), and is at once sent off to the enemy, from whom another is received in exchange, and the pot is put aside for future use (Von Rosenberg, *Die malayische Archipel*, i. 60). And thus we seem to get a hint of how crude animism may in some places have passed through the fetish stage of the indwelling soul up to true idolatry or image-worship. The *Panghulu-balang*, as the Battas call this wooden effigy, has already become a true anthropomorphic entity—'has received its soul'—and, like the war-gods of Olympus, can now champion their cause in this and the next world.

Amongst the Karo Battas the doctrine of soul receives its utmost development. Here the *tendi*, like the *kra* of the Gold Coast negroes (see art. ETHNOLOGY, § 9), is a second *ego*—a sort of 'double' dwelling in the body, which it may occasionally leave—and at death becomes a *begu* (spirit, properly 'shade') on earth, or a *dibatta* (god) of the middle spaces. Often there are as many as seven such *tendis*, which are partly generated as individualized activities or properties of man. Two are clearly distinguished, one more specialized which later becomes a *begu*, the other representing more generally the vital force, and after death resolved into breath, or becoming wind, and returning to the soul of the world (*Weltseele*). Not only men, but animals and even plants, are endowed with *tendis*, and the *Si Dayang*, as the rice *tendi* is called, is represented as a goddess who plays a great part in the creation myth. She is the maker of man, the creative and sustaining power of the universe, the All-life, the gracious mother of nature, these cosmic notions being no doubt due to later Hindu influences (J. H. Neumann, quoted by W. Foy, in *Centralblatt f. Anthrop.* 1904, v. 299).

In the neighbouring Nias archipelago the Malayan natives are both idol- and devil-worshippers, and also head-hunters in the southern districts. Having no idea of a pure bodiless spirit, they fabricate numerous stone and wooden statuettes as tutelar deities, protectors of the chief, of the village, of the weapon, or else guardians against sickness and other troubles. The chief god, however, is *Lubu-langi*, who dwells in the wind, which, although it is invisible, can still be felt. This god is conceived as a tree waving in the atmosphere and shedding fruits which become either spirits or men, forefathers of the present generation, according as they fall in space or on the ground. In fact, Lubu-langi is the origin of everything, and from him comes nothing but good. Their forefathers dwell in constant association with him, and that is why they are invoked for blessings and against all kinds of evils. Here we have a peculiar form of ancestor-cult, which is paid also to the subordinate chthonic god *Batubeana*, while appeal is likewise made to the other deities, amongst them some goddesses, all collectively called *Aju*. But more numerous appear to be the demons, of whom the most powerful and most dreaded is *Nadúya*. Of them no images are made, since they dwell in the woods, the fields, the gardens, the houses, even in men and animals when they fall sick. Then they send for the *Eré* (wizard), who smells out the particular spook that is causing the mischief, and bribes him with the heart and blood of a fowl to leave the sick man and go away. If this and stronger measures fail, it is concluded that there are several devils about, and these are got rid of by stopping all the

doorways except one, through which they are driven off by cutting and slashing in all directions and making a tremendous uproar with much shouting, tom-tomming, and beating of pots and cans. The Nias people are not clear about an after-life, but say that the body came from and returns to nothing, while the soul joins the company of the ancestors with Lubu-langi, nothing being said about rewards or penalties. Earthquakes, the tides, eclipses, and other natural phenomena are due to sinister influences, even the rainbow being a net cast out by Nadáiya to ensnare mortals, while comets consist of an ordinary star with a long tail to which a devil clings, careering through space to strew the (Nias) world with woes.

Farther south the Indonesian Mentawi people are similarly plagued with demons, and here, strange to say, the natives of Pora Island migrate after death to an adjacent islet where all become devils, hence this is called 'Devil Island.' Hence also after the burial everybody makes off in all haste, fearing the return of the new-made demon. There are no idols or religious rites, but numerous oracles and omens and divinations by the inspection of birds' entrails, exactly as amongst the old Etruscan *haruspices*; and children are specially guarded against the evil eye of passing strangers. Much dancing accompanies all festive gatherings, which would appear to have a sacred character, since they wind up, if possible, with a human sacrifice, the victim being obtained by raiding a neighbouring island. The *sinétu* (fiends) are of course the root of all evil, and when they are appealed to in the woodlands which they infest, they are supposed to reply in the thin squeaking voice of an old man (Von Rosenberg, i. *passim*).

Most of the other Sumatrans, and all the Javanese, formerly Buddhists and Brāhmans, have been Muhammadans since about the close of the 15th cent.; but the new religion is merely lip service, a threadbare cloak thrown over the still fresh garb of Hinduism, which itself barely conceals the everlasting vesture of pagan times. Here, therefore, and especially in Java, we have three religious systems intermingled, or rather superimposed one on the other (cf. art. ABORIGINES, § 5). Hindu blood still flows in the veins of the Javanese nobility, such as the 'Emperor' of Solo (Surakarta), and the Prince of Jokjokarta, while the triumphs of Hindu architecture are still everywhere conspicuous, as on the Batta and Padang uplands of Sumatra, even in Bali and Sumbawa, and culminate in the stupendous temple of Boro-budur in Central Java. Hence it is not perhaps surprising that the early Indian religious and moral notions still survive and display a more vigorous growth than the arid teachings of Islām. The Qur'ānic texts may be daily read in the tasteless mosques, but in serious trouble Allāh and his Prophet are forgotten, and resort is had to the ancient shrines, where sacrifices and prayers are still offered to the old Hindu deities. Even the primeval tree-cult is kept alive, the chief objects of veneration being various species of the fig-tree, such as the pipal (*Ficus religiosa*) and *F. benjamina*. Beneath the shade of these wide-branching giants the natives often gather to worship the old earth-gods, for whose long-forgotten names those of the Hindu pantheon are substituted. Respect is also paid to the turtle-doves and to the monkeys (*Cercopithecus* and *Somnopithecus*) which have their homes in the branches of the sacred pipal-tree, and even to certain strangely shaped blocks and rocks, carrying the mind back to the stone-cult of primeval times (E. Carthaus, in *Kolnische Zeit.*, Aug. 26, 1906).

Hinduism still holds its ground in Bali and parts of Lombok, but is here also associated with many old superstitions, so that these islands present the strange spectacle of large Hindu communities professing every form of belief, from the grossest heathendom to pure pantheism. It is everywhere evident enough that 'just as Hinduism has only touched the outer surface of their religion, it has failed to penetrate into their social institutions, which, like their gods, originate from the time when Polynesian [Indonesian] heathendom was all-powerful' (W. Cool, *With the Dutch in the East*, p. 139).

A local myth relates how these gods established themselves in Bali after their expulsion from Java by the Muslim invaders in the 15th century. They had first to contend with the wicked Rakshasas, who fiercely resented the intrusion, but in the struggle were annihilated, all but the still worshipped Mraya Dewana. Then new thrones for the Olympians had to be erected as in Java; but there being no mountains at that time in Bali, the four nearest hills in East Java were brought over and set down in the east, west, north, and south, and assigned to the different gods according to their respective ranks.

Hinduism never made much progress in Borneo; nor has Islām anywhere penetrated much beyond the seaboard, so that the great bulk of the Dayaks, Kayans, and other aborigines are still pagans. Head-hunting, cannibalism, and human sacrifices, attended with shocking barbarities, are being slowly repressed by the British and Dutch authorities; but the Muslim and Christian propagandists appear to make little headway amongst the heathen tribes of the interior. All are still in the wild state, and the whole island has not inaptly been described as '300,000 square miles of savagery.' As in Africa, the human sacrifices, formerly universal, were the direct outcome of the prevalent ancestor-worship, the ostensible motive being to dispatch messages to dead relatives, or to honour them by these sanguinary rites. For this purpose a slave was tied up and bound round with cloths, and then, 'after some preliminary dancing and singing, one after another would stick a spear a little way—an inch or so—into his body, each one sending a message to his deceased friend as he did so' (W. B. Pryer, *JAI*, 1886, xvi. 234). The wicked, however, cannot receive their messages, since they are doomed, Sisyphus-like, to be everlastingly clambering up the rugged slopes of Kina Balu, the highest peak in Borneo (nearly 14,000 feet). The good, that is, those who have collected most human heads in this world for provision in the next, easily reach the top, whence they are ushered into heaven. But in other places, where the mountains are not so high, even the elect have to overcome many obstacles during their long wanderings up hill and down dale, across rivers, through fire and water, until 'at last they are safely landed in the heaven of their tribe' (C. Bock, *Headhunters of Borneo*, p. 223).

Dr. W. H. Furness describes the Borneans as 'savages of a high order,' without 'any definite forms of religious worship,' although they make 'wooden idols,' regarded apparently as mere 'scarecrows to frighten off evil spirits' (*Folklore in Borneo*, p. 4). They are 'saturated with superstitions; every pool, every tree, every rock is the home of an evil spirit, and all mysterious noises in the forest are ghostly whisperings. Everywhere are signs and omens to warn man of danger, or direct his course,' and the mountains are so infested with *antu* (demons) that 'the summits can be gained only at the risk of body, and, still worse, of soul' (*ib.* p. 6). Head-hunting 'is part of their religion; no house is blest which is not sanctified by a row of human skulls, and no man can hope to attain to the happy region of *Apo Leggan* unless he, or some relative of his, has added a head to the household collection' (p. 14). The practice is explained by the myth of the great chief *Tokong*, who when on a raid was told by *Kop*, the frog, to carry off the heads of the enemy. Having done so, the war party retreated quickly to the river

down which they had come. After they had again embarked, the current of the stream was, for their sakes, reversed, and like a flash they were carried up-stream to their homes. During their short absence the rice crop had ripened, the sick were all well again, the lame could walk and the blind see; so they ever afterwards observed the custom that Kop had taught them (p. 15). In the Kayan cosmogony there was at first nothing but sky and water, when a huge rock fell from the heavens, and rising above the surface was covered with soil by the action of the little *halang* worms. Then from the sun was dropped the wooden handle of a big sword, which, taking root in the soil, grew to a great tree, with branches spreading over all the new land, and this was followed by a rope-like vine from the moon, which also took root and twined round the tree. Now the vine became the husband of the tree, which gave birth to a male and a female, from whose union are sprung the Kayans and all the other Bornean tribes, and lastly Tokong, father of head-hunting. At first they were only half-human, with head, chest, and arms, but no legs, so that they had to crawl along the ground by their arms, an idea perhaps suggested by the octopus, which plays such a large part in the Oceanic mythologies (pp. 7–9). The Kayan Hades is not in the sky but underground, and, like the Greek Hades, has its Charon and its Styx, a deep wide ditch swarming with worms, and crossed, not by a ferry, but by a fallen tree-trunk which is guarded by the great demon *Maligang*. By him all comers are challenged, and if they have no record of bravery, no store of captured heads, the tree-trunk is shaken until they fall into the ditch, to be tortured for ever by the worm that dieth not. But there are 'many mansions,' as for those dying a violent death, or on the battlefield; for mothers dying in child-birth, or for suicides. In *Apo Leggan*, one of the chief divisions, dwell those dying of sickness or old age, and these 'have much the same lot as they had in this world; the poor remain poor, and the rich maintain their rich estate' (p. 16).

In Malacca the dominant Malays are all nominal Muhammadans; but here, as elsewhere in the Malay world, the cloak of religion is a very loose garment which covers a multitude of primeval rags and tatters. These were never touched or repaired by Brāhman or Buddhist, who appear to have got no farther than *Singapore*, the 'Lion City' over against the mainland. Hence Islām is here directly superimposed on the old heathendom, which it has barely penetrated a little below the surface. Raja Dris, himself a Musalmān, tells us that the people of Perak are still specially noted for many strange customs and superstitions 'utterly opposed to Muhammadan teaching, and savouring strongly of devil-worship. . . . An enormous belief in the supernatural is possibly a relic of the pre-Islām state' (*JAI*, 1886, xvi. 227). One is here reminded, however, that even the Arabs, if they do not worship the devil, still pelt him with stones at Muna near Mecca 'in the name of Allāh.' Referring to the Malays generally, Miss Bird (Mrs. Bishop) wishes that, 'it were possible to know to what extent they are a *religious* people as Muslims. That they are bigots and have successfully resisted all attempts to convert them to Christianity there is no doubt, as well as that they are ignorant and grossly superstitious' (*Golden Chersonese*, Lond. 1883, p. 361). Elsewhere (p. 314) she tells us that 'buffaloes are sacrificed on religious occasions, and at the births, circumcisions, marriages, and shaving of the heads of the children of wealthy people. The buffalo sacrificed for religious purposes must be always without blemish. Its bones must not be broken after death, neither must its horns be used for common purposes. It is slain near the mosque with solemn sacrificial ceremonies, and one half is usually cooked and eaten on the spot by the "parishioners."'

But the most striking survival from pagan times is the universal belief in the wer-wolf superstition, which here of course takes the form of the wer-tiger. In Borneo there are wooden idols of tigers with indwelling souls (C. Bock, *op. cit.* p. 226). But in the Malay lands the tiger himself is worshipped, and the belief that men assume his form at night is inextinguishable. H. Clifford remarks that—

'In the Malay Peninsula we live in the Middle Ages. Magic and evil spirits, witchcraft and sorcery, spells and love-potions, charms and incantations are as real and as much a matter of everyday life as are the miracle of the growing rice and the mysteries of the reproduction of species. Tales of the marvellous and the supernatural excite interest and fear in the Malay, but they occasion no surprise. Every Malay knows that strange things have happened in the past, and are daily occurring to them and to their fellows. Thus the existence of the Malayan Loup Garou to the native mind is a fact and not a mere belief. The Malay *knows* that it is true' (*op. cit.* p. 65).

Then follows a wer-tiger story which for vividness and intense horror could scarcely be surpassed. For details, see art. LYCANTHROPY; and for prevalent religious notions in Minahassa and other parts of Celebes, see art. AIR.

Even magic, which becomes gradually divorced from the religions of more advanced peoples, is still interwoven with the beliefs and practices of the Malayan Muhammadans. In his *Malay Magic* (p. 60) W. Skeat tells us that one of the ways by which the Malays 'get magic' is to run against the ghost of a murdered man. As this is not easy, a mystic ceremony must be performed at the grave on a Tuesday at full moon, when the person needing help conjures the departed spirit and states his request. After a time an aged man appears, and to him the request is repeated, and is supposed to be ultimately granted. The magic here in question appears to be what is elsewhere called *mana* (Melanesians), *wakanda* (Dakotans), *orenda* (Iroquoians), *arungquiltha* (Aruntas), and by other names. It colours all primitive beliefs, from which it is inseparable, although by some recent theorists it has been regarded as something apart from religion.

A link between the Malayan and Papuan domains was discovered by Wallace in the island of Jilolo (Halmahera), whose 'Alfuro' inhabitants 'are radically distinct from all the Malay races. Their stature and their features, as well as their disposition and habits, are almost the same as those of the Papuans; their hair is semi-Papuan, neither straight, smooth and glossy, like all true Malays, nor so frizzly and woolly as the perfect Papuan type, but always crisp, waved, and rough, such as often occurs among the true Papuans, but never among the Malays' (*op. cit.* p. 316). The term *Alfuro* applied to these aborigines has no ethnical value, being the general Malay designation of the uncultured non-Muslim peoples in the eastern parts of Malaysia.

From them the transition is easy to New Guinea, the home of the true *Papuans*, on whose religious views much light has been thrown in recent years. In the western parts, subject to Holland as far as 140° E., prevalent features are pure demonolatry and the worship of ancestors represented by the so-called wooden *karwar* effigies of the dead, fashioned by the wizards. In the Sekar district, lately visited by J. S. A. van Dissel, scraps of food, tobacco, and sugar-cane are scattered about wherever goblins are suspected to be lurking. Here the arch-fiends are the so-called *Atitigi*, gigantic monsters of white colour, with an eye in front and another behind, six fingers on each hand, and the right index finger furnished with a very

long sharp nail. They dwell in underground caves, and hunt down mortals, whom they eat if the flesh is found to their taste. To test the quality, a piece of the flesh is first scooped out with the long finger-nail, and if palatable the victim is roasted and eaten, but otherwise is allowed to go free. These supernatural beings are vulnerable only in the eye-sockets. Here the tabu marks (*kèra-kèra*)—leaves, rags, shells, bast, and the like, with a painted male figure attached to a post sunk in the ground—are very effective, since their violation would bring on not only the vengeance of the owner, but also the wrath of the presiding deity, causing illness and death (W. Foy, *loc. cit.* p. 305).

Dr. A. B. Meyer has made a careful study of the above-mentioned *karwars*, which are met with among the *Mafors* (not *Nufors*) of the North-West Coast, and appear to be real idols, not merely ornaments or emblems, as is often asserted. He calls them *Ahnenbilder*, 'ancestral effigies.'

'After a burial a block of wood is brought from the forest, and first roughly hewn and then furnished with eyes, nose, ears, and mouth, usually by the village magician, all amid much feasting and dancing, which is kept up for several days. When the supplies, mostly sago and palm-wine, run out, more is sent for. Meanwhile the soul of the departed is still flitting about, and every effort is now made to entice him into the finished image. A tremendous uproar is raised with shouting, yelling, and drum-beating in all the houses and neighbouring hamlets, and this is continued for several evenings, a wizard all the time holding the block in his hands with much contortion of face until he falls down—a sign that the soul has entered its future abode, from which it can no longer escape and go about working mischief. Henceforth much homage is paid to the idol, which is carefully put away under the best mats in a corner of the house, and hidden from the eyes of any uninvited guests. It is consulted and invoked on all occasions by the near relatives, its intercession being sought by offerings of tobacco, by adorning it with shreds of bright cloth, and holding it in the hand till it moves, that is, till it answers. It accompanies travellers on long journeys to guard them from harm, until at last, having lost its virtue [its *mana* ?], it is thrown aside as so much lumber, or otherwise disposed of, for this point still remains obscure. But there is no doubt that 'the Mafors worship the departed spirits. This belief in the immortality of the soul is the main principle of their religion, and with it are associated many rites and usages' (*Glauben u. Sitten der Papúas*, etc., *passim*).

In recent times the upper reaches of the Fly River, about the Anglo-Dutch frontiers, have been depopulated by the incessant razzias of the ferocious west coast tribes, especially the *Tugare* or *Tugere* cannibals, whose extreme savagery and cruelty may be taken as representing the lowest state of human culture in New Guinea, if not in the whole world. Little is known about their religious views, if they have any; but we have now *official* information regarding the almost incredible horrors accompanying their slave-raiding expeditions. 'They are a cannibal tribe of pirates,' writes the Rev. S. MacFarlane, 'who make periodical raids upon the villages along the eastern coast. They break the arms and legs of the prisoners, so as to prevent their fighting or running away, and then keep them as fresh meat until required, cooking one or two bodies at a time' (*Cannibals of New Guinea*, London, 1888, p. 106). Or else the captives' palms are pierced, a string passed through the holes, and the arms tied together at the back. When the flotilla arrives they are thrown into the water, and fished out by those on the beach sticking barbed spears into the fleshy parts. Then they are put on mats, a rope secured to a tree is passed round their necks to make them sit up, and after much slow torture they are wrapped in dry cocoa-nut leaves, hoisted some six feet from the ground, and slowly roasted with fire-sticks. 'When the rope is burnt, and the body falls to the ground, the wildest and most savage scene takes place. The natives rush with knives in their hands, each slashing a piece of the body, which may be still alive, in the midst of diabolical noise and yells of rejoicing' (L. Loria, *Official Report*, 1895, Appendix S, p. 44 f.).

In British New Guinea, witchcraft causes much trouble, and everywhere presents the same general features. A sorcerer, paid for the purpose, prepares a parcel of rubbish containing a hair or something taken from the person to be operated upon. The parcel then acquires diabolical powers and frightens people, who sometimes sicken and die through fear. Thus the sorcerers cause great trouble, and 'the people generally would gladly see them put down, but fear keeps them from reporting their threats and swindles' (*Report* for 1892–4, p. 37).

Various forms of tabu are met everywhere, but in the British districts 'it has never been grounded on any deep religious sentiment, consequently has never taken deep root. So far as is known at present, it is used only in order to store up food for a coming feast. It is most frequently applied to coco-nut and betel-nut trees. In some places the prohibition is announced by a syren of wood on a string wielded by a fishing-rod. From the Fly River to the far east, branches, usually of sago, are tied on the prohibited trees. Sometimes strings are put round gardens; branches are tied into the door of a house that is not to be entered, or are laid across a road that is not to be traversed' (*ib.* p. 38). With the statement about storing up food should be compared the practice in New Caledonia at the other end of Papuasia. Here *tapu* has no religious significance, and is associated exclusively with the question of food—that is, the question which most interested primitive man. It is much the same in the Marshall Islands, where Mr. F. J. Moss tells us that recently the despotic king of Majuro speared a man for picking a green coco-nut 'when the tapu had been placed upon them' (*Through Atolls and Islands*, p. 126). The reservation and safeguarding of food, particularly in times of scarcity, would thus appear to be the original purpose of the institution, the religious sanction being a later development, as amongst the more advanced Indonesians of New Zealand, where 'tapu and its observances, in a sense, took the place of religion' (A. Hamilton, *Art Workmanship of N. Z. Maori Race*, 1898, p. 370).

Both in British and German New Guinea ancestor-worship is a prominent feature of the religious systems, and here the moral sense is scarcely yet awakened, so that little or no provision is made for saints and sinners in the after life. Thus in Murua (Woodlark Island), at the east end of New Guinea, 'all people, whether good or bad, when snatched away by death, go like the wind to the small island of Watum; there they enjoy the full pleasures of life, the women cultivating and cooking food for their lords and masters' (J. P. Thomson, *British New Guinea*, p. 184).

A far higher plane of thought has been reached by the kindred *Melanesians*, though not in the ethical order. They are still mostly inveterate head-hunters and cannibals, as is clearly shown by the very latest observers, such as Dr. H. Schnee and Carl Ribbe. The treacherous and sanguinary head-hunters of the Solomon Islands are referred to by Ribbe as 'von Natur lugnerisch, verraterisch, räuberisch, hinterlistig, diebisch, und grausam angelegten Kannibalen' (*Zwei Jahre unter den Kannibalen der Salomo-Insulen*, 1903). They appear to have even deteriorated since their first contact with Europeans; and, if not devil-worshippers in the strict sense of the term, they certainly betray great fear of the surrounding demons, in many places setting up scarecrows to drive them away. An equally dark picture is drawn by Dr. Schnee of the Bismarck and Admiralty natives, amongst whom cannibalism with all its attendant horrors, such as the lingering death of the victims and the bartering of dead bodies in the local 'markets,' is far more prevalent than had hitherto been sus-

pected (*Bilder aus der Südsee*, 1904, *passim*). Yet the strictly religious views of these undoubted savages may be called 'respectable,' in some instances almost elevated—a phenomenon obviously due, perhaps like their language, to the proximity of the Indonesians of the Eastern Pacific. Although the English word 'devil' is common enough, adopted by the natives in ignorance of its meaning, there is very little true demonolatry. Dr. Codrington says none at all: 'It may be asserted with confidence that a belief in a devil, that is, of an evil spirit, has no place whatever in the native Melanesian mind' (*The Melanesians*, p. 117). This seems to be stated rather too forcibly; but the writer is our very best authority on the religious beliefs of these aborigines. Even gods are little in evidence; at least, there is not a Supreme Being nor are there any very powerful subordinate deities, nor yet true fetishes, that is, natural objects, such as a tree, rock, storm, or waterfall animated by an indwelling spirit; nor professional shamans, or hereditary priests. 'There is no priestly order, and no persons who can properly be called priests,' but any one may undertake the priestly functions who can gain access to some object of worship, and such a man 'is in a way their priest and sacrifices for them all' (*ib.* p. 127).

The quintessence of the Melanesian system appears to be a belief in spirits and in the subtle power called *mana*, which is common also to Polynesia, and presents analogies with the *wakanda* of the Dakotans (see art. AMERICA, i. 382[a]) and with the Augustinian *grace*.

For Maoriland, Hamilton defines *mana* as 'power, authority, influence, prestige' (*op. cit.* p. 396). The same definition would also apply to the *orenda* of the Iroquoians, 'which exactly expresses this potentiality, this atmosphere, which they believe inheres in and surrounds every personality. . . . Anything reputed to have been instrumental in obtaining some good or accomplishing some end is said to possess *orenda*' (Sidney Hartland, *Address*, 1906, p. 5).

With regard to spiritual beings, the essential point to note is the distinction clearly drawn by the natives between two classes of spirits, the *bodiless* and the *disembodied*—that is, pure spirits that never were men, and the ghosts of the departed. Both are worshipped, the homage paid to the first being pure psycholatry, to the second ancestor-cult, so that the two primitive forms of animism have been evolved in Melanesia. In general, all pure spirits, most ghosts, and some men have *mana*, and after death those souls alone are worshipped who are supposed to possess it. These are, of course, mainly the chiefs; hence the remark of the Fijian chief that after death he would be a *kalou*, that is, would be invoked and worshipped; while common people, having no *mana* in this life, would have none in the next, and so would be neglected and soon forgotten. There are numerous minor deities—gods of the sea, land, mountains, valleys; and these may apparently be either pure spirits or ghosts, the natives themselves getting confused when it comes to particulars. For details and accessories (magic, witchcraft, weather-doctoring, sacrifices, Hades, and the like), see art. MELANESIA.

For *Micronesia*, where both Papuasian and Polynesian elements are represented, one of our best guides is J. Kubary, who has made a thorough study especially of the *Mortlock Islanders* on the south-central fringe of the Caroline Archipelago. Here the influence of the Indonesian myth-mongers already begins to be felt, while the dominant ancestor-worship presents some peculiar features, its main purpose being to uphold the prestige of the chiefs both in this and in the next world. In some places the headmen have both a temporal and a divine aspect, being at once the supreme rulers, the supreme gods (*die Hauptgottheiten*), and the priests of their several tribes. At the same time, the officials honour the spirits of their own forefathers, invoking them on all ordinary occasions before the somewhat costly appeal in the last resort to the supreme god—that is, to the tribal chief. In theory this chief is absolute, but does not receive divine honours till after his death, and, as the souls of all the departed are also supposed to be deified, the number of the *anu* (spirits, minor gods) would be legion, but for the provision that practically only those are honoured who were distinguished by some special qualities when alive. They do not communicate directly with mortals, but only through the *au-ua-ro-ar*, a kind of shaman, whose office is not hereditary, each deity choosing one for himself without monopolizing his services, since he is still free to act on behalf of any other god willing to employ him. Besides the tribal (ancestral) gods there are several others, such as the war-god *Arong*, honoured in the form of a fish, and *Anu-set*, the sea-god. Arong represents a famous hero, Rassau, who was slain in the island of Lukunor and buried in the sea; hence all warriors who fall in battle are now also buried in the sea, so that they may join the brave Rassau, the mythical god of the sea. Whether the myth was invented to explain the practice, or is a local tradition coloured by the surroundings, is uncertain, but it shows how 'religion, like all other institutions, has been profoundly influenced by physical environment, and cannot be understood without some appreciation of those aspects of external nature which stamp themselves indelibly on the thoughts, the habits, the whole life of a people' (J. G. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*).

Besides the ancestral and other gods, there is no lack of demons, one of whom infests the large trees, but is dangerous only to young girls and children. Apparitions and other supernatural phenomena are much dreaded, and no Micronesian would venture from home alone after nightfall. They also believe in divination, and 'have two ways of foretelling the future, one by means of knotted cocoa leaves, the other more complicated, but known only to the professional soothsayers' (Kubary, *Die Bewohner der Mortlock Inseln*, p. 259). Tabu is universal, and there is a 'mourning tabu' for the great chiefs, which is exceedingly burdensome to their bereaved subjects. Other forms are concerned with the food question, as in New Guinea and New Caledonia.

Polynesia (see Table, p. 236[a], No. IV.) is a region of surprising, almost monotonous, uniformity in the physical and mental characters, the speech, social and religious institutions, and oral literature of its Indonesian inhabitants. The oral literature is partly historical and traditional, but mainly sacred and religious—cosmogonies and theogonies merging into semi-divine dynastic genealogies, all based on an underlying system of primitive religious notions, without some knowledge of which it is impossible to understand them. Despite the labours of Sir G. Grey, G. Turner, W. W. Gill, A. Fornander, Percy Smith, and some other Indonesian students, only a few of these legends have yet been rescued from oblivion, and so great are their volume and variety that Adolph Bastian, their chief interpreter, ventures to say that 'the Polynesian range of thought is next to or beside the Buddhist the most extensive in the world, stretching through the length and breadth of the Pacific Ocean, and even farther if Micronesia and Melanesia as far as Malaya be included'; and he adds that the mythologies are meaningless without a knowledge of the religious substratum on which they are

raised (*Die heilige Sage der Polynesier*, p. ix.). In this work Bastian himself has published three priceless documents with valuable commentaries: a very old creation myth from New Zealand (*Die Schopfungssage der Maori*); from Hawaii a complete theogony, beginning, like all Polynesian myths, with Chaos and Night; and *The History of Ancient Hawaii* in the Hawaiian language, by David Malo, a converted native.

Apart from their great variety and the sublime cosmic concepts often embodied in the texts, students are puzzled to understand how such voluminous unwritten records could be accurately handed down from very remote times, as many of them certainly have been. On this point Mr. Percy Smith remarks that 'it is difficult for a civilized people which habitually uses writing in recording events to conceive of the powers of memory possessed by people who have nothing but the memory to trust to. Some few instances of this may be mentioned. A Maori and his wife dictated to Mr. Elsdon Best over 400 songs, and could generally tell the names of the composers and the incidents alluded to in them. Another dictated to the writer 164 songs, and these were so impressed on his memory that the quotation of one line was sufficient to recall the whole of the song at once. Another has written eleven volumes of MS. treating of the traditions, songs, customs, etc., of the Maoris, and this at a very advanced age, all of this matter having been retained in his mind, and including hundreds of proper names' (Smith, *Hawaiiki*, p. 20). It is to be remembered that most of the documents are of a sacred character, hence jealously guarded by the priests, who were mostly hereditary, so that 'it was the duty of the father, and very often the grandfather, to educate their offspring in the tribal lore. This teaching was accompanied with many ceremonies and *karakias*, or incantations, invocations, etc., in order to impress the pupil with the importance of the matter. There was a special sanctity attached to many things taught; deviation from the accepted doctrines was supposed to bring on the offender the wrath of the gods' (*ib.* p. 19). The statement may thus be accepted that the Maori cosmogony is of immense antiquity, having been transmitted *verbatim* from priest to priest for thousands of years.

In this as in many other such records the distinction is not always clearly drawn between the divine and the human elements. Sometimes gods become men and men gods, while the theogonies are called genealogies, and often merge imperceptibly in the human genealogies, as if the 'inspired singers,' after deriving the deities from mortals, had redressed the balance by reversing the process. Thus *Maui*, who looms so largely in Polynesian romance, appears to be at first human, and then through his exploits becomes clothed by later generations with divine attributes, and in another place we are told that one Maui (for there are several) is the son of *Tangaroa*, and becomes man, Tangaroa himself being both god and man. The renowned chief Tu-tarangi also, who in Rarotonga is only an eponymous hero, or at most a demigod, is known to the Niue islanders as a deified ancestor. Now Turner, a great authority, tells us that 'the Savage [Niué] islanders worshipped the spirits of their ancestors' (*Samoa a Hundred Years Ago*, p. 306). Here perhaps we have an explanation of the apparent confusion. The all-pervading ancestor-cult evidently underlies the whole mythological superstructure, and from this source were derived the gods of the Polynesian Olympus. But the living chiefs are the direct heirs of these Olympians, consequently their genealogies are mere continuations of the theogonies, and to the native mind there is no real confusion at all. Thus it is that, as above remarked (by Bastian), everything becomes clear when we grasp the root ideas out of which flourish these wonderful efflorescences of Indonesian thought.

At times the Polynesian singers appear to soar into the ethereal spaces and to realize the concept of a Supreme Being, as when out of the transformed body of Tangaroa (Taaroa and other variants) the lesser gods, the demiurges, fabricate the universe, and Taaroa himself is spoken of as *Toivi*, the 'Eternal,' or else, like the Hindu Brahma, or the Dodonian Zeus that 'was, is, and shall be,' is described in the loftiest language as dwelling 'in the limitless void of space, when the World was not yet, nor the Heavens, nor the Sea, nor Man; from on high he calleth, changing to fresh forms, root of the earth, under-prop of the rocks, Taaroa as the Sea-sands in the broad expanse, bursts into Light, cometh down as Wisdom, born the Hawaii land, Hawaii the Great, the Holy.' Similar elevated language pervades the Mangaian cosmogony, which begins with *Te-aka-ia-Roe*, the 'Root of all Being,' and is logically developed in harmony with those of the other Polynesian systems (Gill, *Myths and Songs*, *passim*). Here, too, the genealogies of the gods pass gradually, as in Hawaii, and with scarcely a break, to those of mortals, all in the interest of the living rulers of the land. Such sublime conceptions, such subtle theosophies, such personifications of Chaos, Immensity, Gloomy Night, and other pure abstractions, in these children of nature, excite wonder and remain inexplicable in their present fragmentary state. Everywhere we find Heaven, Earth, the Universe, the After-World, recurring under diverse names and forms, personified by language, embodied in theocratic and anthropomorphic philosophies—echoes, as it were, of the Vedic hymns reverberating from isle to isle over the broad Pacific waters. The question arises, Have there been Vedic contacts? It is a chronological question which cannot be answered until the date is approximately determined of the eastward migration of the Indonesians from Malaysia. Did the migration precede or follow the arrival of the Hindu missionaries in that region? This vital point has engaged the attention of Mr. R. Studholme Thompson, whose 'Origin of the Maori' appeared in *The Maori Record* for 1906–1907.

Some light is thrown on the origin of a whole class of bird-omens by what Dr. Turner tells us of a superstition prevalent in Savaii (Samoa group), where '*Sepo Malosi* ("Sepo the Strong") was worshipped as a war-god, and incarnate in the large bat, or flying-fox. While the bat flew before the warriors all was right, but if it turned round and shut up the way it was a sign of defeat and a warning to go back' (*op. cit.* p. 51). And again: 'The bat was also an incarnation [of Taisumalie, "Tide gently Rising"]. One flying ahead of the troops was always a good omen' (p. 57). We are at once reminded of the flights of the eagles seen by Romulus and Remus at the foundation of Rome, although at that time the Western Aryans may have ceased to believe in any spirits incorporated in the birds. We also learn something about the origin of ordeals from the statement that in the Samoan temples were kept conchs, stones, cocoanut shells, and other such objects of superstitious veneration, which were used as aids in the administration of justice. In the presence of such ordeals 'the truth was rarely concealed. They firmly believed that it would be death to touch the cup [coco-nut shell] and tell a lie' (*ib.*). And when these things became discredited, as having lost their hidden virtue—their *mana*, so to say—they were replaced by more efficacious processes: the poison-cup, hot iron bars, stones to be fished out

of boiling water, duelling, and the like. But the principle was the same, a steadfast belief in a supernatural power regulating the application of the tests in the interests of justice. For other Indonesian beliefs and religious observances, see art. POLYNESIA.

Owing perhaps to the difficulty of distinguishing between the purely social and the religious institutions of primitive peoples, a great diversity of opinion prevails even amongst the best observers regarding the religious views of the *Australian aborigines*. Some hold with Ernest Giles that they have no beliefs on the subject of gods or an after-life, and that those who credit them with such notions 'have been imposed upon, and that until they had learned something of Christianity from missionaries and others, the blacks had no beliefs or practices of the sort' (*Australia Twice Traversed*, Lond. i., 1889, 45). This may be taken as the extreme view on the negative side, and with it Carl Lumholtz so far agrees as to assert that 'at all events it is certain that neither idolatry nor sacrifices are to be found in Australia. Nor have the natives, so far as I know, ever been seen to pray' (*Among Cannibals*, p. 284). Elsewhere we read that 'it is a well-known fact that the Australian natives are almost wholly devoid of religious susceptibilities' (p. 339), and that to deposit food or other things with the dead 'was an idea which they could not comprehend' (p. 275), implying disbelief in an after-life. And the remarks of George Angas are quoted (p. 284) on the Murray River tribes, who 'appear to have no religious observances whatever. They acknowledge no Supreme Being, worship no idols, and believe only in the existence of a spirit, whom they consider as the author of ill, and regard with superstitious dread. They are in perpetual fear of malignant spirits, or bad men, who, they say, go abroad at night; and they seldom venture from the encampment after dusk . . . without carrying a fire-stick in their hands, which they consider has the property of repelling these evil spirits.'

This belief in an evil spirit is already something; but Lumholtz himself goes much further, and after referring inconsistently to 'their fear of *the spirits of the departed*' (p. 277), admits 'a wide-spread belief in the soul's existence independently of matter, the Kulin tribe (Victoria) believing that every man and animal has a *Muurup* (spirit) which can pass into other bodies, leave a person in his lifetime, and visit other people in their dreams. After death it may appear again, visit the grave of its former possessor, eat remnants of food lying near the camp, and warm itself by their night fires. A similar belief has been observed among the blacks of Lower Guinea' (p. 279; here read 'Upper Guinea,' and cf. the *kra* described in art. ETHNOLOGY, § 9). Then a native woman is mentioned who 'repeatedly brought food to the grave of her deceased husband' (p. 282); and 'definite religious notions' are credited to the southern tribes, while 'some very interesting information in regard to the idea of a God . . . has been furnished by Mr. Manning, who in 1845 discovered among some tribes of New South Wales a doctrine of the Trinity (*sic*), which bears so striking a resemblance to that of the Christian religion that we are tempted to take it to be the result of the influence of missionaries. But according to the author, the missionaries did not visit these tribes until many years later' (p. 283). They recognize a supreme, benevolent, omnipotent Being, *Boyma*, with an omniscient son, *Grogoragally*, mediator between Boyma and mortals, and a third person, half human, half divine, *Moogeegally*, the great lawgiver to men, and lastly 'a hell with everlasting fire, and a heaven where the blessed dance and amuse themselves' (*ib.*). After this the passage quoted in *Primitive Culture*[3] (i. 418) by Tylor, that they have no idea of a supreme divinity, creator, and judge—that, 'in short, they have nothing whatever of the character of religion, or of religious observance, to distinguish them from the beasts that perish'—will appear extravagant to all competent observers of these aborigines.

The extreme view on the positive side of the question, that is, the belief in 'a tribal All-Father,' is perhaps most clearly emphasized by Dr. A. W. Howitt, who finds this belief wide-spread in 'the whole of Victoria and of New South Wales, up to the eastern boundaries of the tribes of the Darling River' (*Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 500). Amongst those of New South Wales are the *Euahlayi*, whom Mrs. Langloh Parker (*Euahlayi Tribe*, Lond. 1905) describes as having a more advanced theology and a more developed worship than any other Australian tribe. These now eat their hereditary totems without scruple—a sure sign that the totemic system is dying out, although still outwardly in full force. Amongst the Aruntas, Kaitish, and the other Central and Northern tribes studied by Spencer and Gillen, the system still survives, and totems are even assigned to the mysterious *Iruntarinia* entities, vague and invisible incarnations of the ghosts of ancestors who lived in the *Alcheringa* (*q.v.*) time, the dim remote past, the beginning of everything. They are far more powerful than living men, because their spirit part is associated with the so-called *churinga*, stocks, stones, or any other object which is deemed sacred as possessing a kind of *mana* which makes the yams and grass to grow, enables a man to capture game, and so forth. That the *churinga* are simply objects endowed with *mana* is the happy suggestion of Sidney Hartland, whose explanation has dispelled the dense fog of mystification hitherto enveloping the strange beliefs and observances of these Central and Northern tribes.

'They are mysterious objects in the closest association with the tribal ancestors, the outward and visible sign, if not the embodiment, of the ancestral souls or invisible portions, and as such regarded with veneration. They are endowed with *mana*, emanating from the ancestors whom they represent—*mana*, which not merely heals wounds, but when the churinga are brought ceremonially in contact with the body, produces other physical, mental, and even moral effects. . . . The churinga is intimately associated with the ancestor, and has "feelings" just as human beings have, which can be soothed by the rubbing in the same way in which those of living men can be' (Address at Brit. Assoc., York, 1906).

Hence a man, as he sings and rubs it with his hand, 'gradually comes to feel that there is some special association between him and the sacred object—that a virtue of some kind passes from it to him, and also from him to it' (Spencer-Gillen, *Northern Tribes*, ch. viii. p. 278 f.). By whatever name it be called, this is obviously *arungqultha*, the Australian *mana*, and it is equally obvious that the primitive Australian religions are still interwoven with magic (see above).

About the religious and ethical views of the extinct *Tasmanians* a good deal of information has been gathered from various sources by Brough Smyth (*Aborigines of Victoria*), J. Bonwick (*Daily Life*, etc., *of the Tasmanians*), and Tylor (*JAI* xxiii. 141, Nov. 1893). Socially they appear 'to have remained to our day living representatives of the early Stone Age, left behind in industrial development even by the ancient tribes of the Somme and the Ouse. . . . The life of these savages proves to be of undeveloped type alike in arts and institutions, so much so that the distinction of being the lowest of normal tribes may be claimed for them' (Tylor, *loc. cit.* 148, 152). Yet the religious sense had certainly been awakened. They feared to move about after dark, believing that their deceased relatives might be hovering about, and

there was a god who presided over the day and an evil spirit or demon over the night, and to the god the women addressed songs or prayers to secure the safe return of their absent husbands (Smyth, ii. 390). Bonwick, however, doubts this, while admitting that 'the Tasmanians had some dim apprehension of a future state' (p. 167), and refers to the case of a native who put a spear in a tree beside a dead body, 'to fight with when he sleep' (p. 174). The evidence is altogether very conflicting, although on the whole rather against the belief in a beneficent deity, and Dr. Nixon, first bishop of Tasmania, is quoted as saying that 'no trace can be found of the existence of any religious usage, or even sentiment, amongst them, unless, indeed, we may call by that name the dread of a malignant and destructive spirit, which seems to have been their predominant, if not their only, feeling on the subject' (p. 172). And there the matter must rest, since the last of the race died about 1890.

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AUSTRALIA. — **1. Introduction.** — Linguistic research shows that Australia is occupied by three distinct groups of languages, of which two are related to each other, while the third is independent of them in vocabulary and grammar, and shows little internal cohesion. The last group, named 'northern' by Schmidt, occupies the north of Australia and descends beyond 20° S. only in the centre, where it is found as far as 27° S. (the Aruntas). The other two groups, 'old' and 'new' Australian, distinguished by the way in which they form the genitive, occupy the remainder of the continent. By far the greater area falls to the 'new' group, split into nine sub-groups. The main 'old' Australian area is in Victoria with traces along the east coast; it seems to be related to the Tasmanian languages. The two Australian groups are related to each other in syntax and vocabulary, but less intimately than are the component parts of each group among themselves (*Man*, 1908). The grouping of tribes arrived at on this philological basis does not correspond very closely to those given by any other mode of classification, for material culture, social organization, initiation ceremonies, and burial customs give somewhat conflicting results; but on the whole the three last are distributed in a way which may be harmonized with the linguistic data, if we allow for a certain amount of lateral transmission. Thus, the eight-class tribes are wholly within the 'northern' area; they reckon descent in the male line, and though there are other districts in Australia—notably parts of Victoria and the coast of Queensland—where there is patrilineal descent of the classes or phratries, both these and the no-class areas belong to the old Australian speech-groups or are contiguous to them.

The same holds good with regard to the initiation ceremonies. The rites of circumcision and sub-incision are unknown in Victoria, New South Wales, the greater part of Queensland, and the coastal portions of West Australia; but we may readily explain their penetration into the Neo-Australian south-central area as the result of transmission, though, of course, some amount of infusion of foreign blood may have contributed to the result. Simple burial is, as a rule, characteristic of both the Australian groups, and in the old group it is accompanied by the practice of building a hut upon the grave—a custom which they shared with their neighbours, the Tasmanians. The grave seems to be looked upon as the abode of the soul, though we find sporadically the belief that the spirits of the dead travel to the west, or, where there is a belief in a god, to reside with him. In the 'Northern' area, on the other hand, and certain adjacent districts, the body is submitted to various processes, and the essential funerary rite seems to be the disposal of the bones, which marks the time at which the spirit of the dead is believed to go to its own place. It may be noted that special treatment of the bones is a well-marked feature of funeral rites in parts of New Guinea.

When we come to deal with the more intangible sphere of beliefs, we are on more uncertain ground; it is indisputable that belief in a tribal All-Father prevailed in Victoria, New South Wales, and parts of South Australia; that it has been recorded but rarely outside this area does not necessarily mean more than that the recorder has not penetrated very far into the ideas of the natives with whom he was familiar. So far, however, as our evidence goes, it seems that the All-Father belief is pre-eminently characteristic of the old Australian group; it is found among important tribes of the Neo-Australian group, such as the Wiradjuri and the Kamilaroi, but there is no record of it among the Darling tribes and in the greater part of Queensland. So far as we have evidence for it, the totemism of the northern area seems to differ widely from that which is found elsewhere in Australia, and save among the Dieri and other contiguous tribes there is no record of *Intichiuma* ceremonies except in this part of the continent.

2. Religion.—There has been a good deal of controversy as to the genuine aboriginal character, and, this being conceded, the real status of the Australian All-Father. There is, however, satisfactory evidence that Baiame, about whom the controversy has turned in the main, was recognized in the Wellington valley before the advent of the Church of England Mission in 1832 (*Man*, 1905, No. 28); and, though a Wesleyan mission existed there in 1828, before Henderson collected his facts, there is no reason to suppose that it could have exerted any great influence, certainly not enough to introduce such a figure as Baiame into the initiation rites of the aborigines, as it must have done if the theory of the missionary origin of these anthropomorphic beings is to be maintained.

There is naturally more doubt as to the precise position occupied in the aboriginal view of the universe by Baiame and his congeners; some authors have denied that the term 'god' can properly be applied to them (*Folklore*, ix. 290–329), while others have maintained that they are eternal, omniscient, all-powerful creators. Probably the truth lies nearer the latter than the former view. At the initiation ceremonies of the Euahlayi tribe, according to Mrs. Langloh Parker, an excellent

authority, Baiame is proclaimed as 'Father of All, whose laws the tribes are now obeying.' He established the rule that tribes at the fishing ground should keep peace; he gives rain to the orphan who cries for it; he is prayed to at the *bora* ('initiation ceremonies') and at funerals, and his name means 'great'; his figure is made in earth on the *bora* ground (Parker, *Euahlayi Tribe*, 7 f.). Some of the difficulties which surround the question of the status of the Australian All-Father have arisen, however, because the disputants have overlooked the fact that the beliefs of the various tribes show not only different degrees of development, but actual differences in kind. Schmidt has pointed out (*Anthropos*, 1908) that we seem to have three strata: (1) the belief in an All-Father pure and simple; (2) the belief in an All-Father who has taken over features of a tribal ancestor; (3) the belief in a being of this kind who is also the creator, has wives and children, and (in the case of Baiame) is sometimes depicted as ruling the world through a subordinate. As examples of these three classes of belief may be cited: (1) the Kurnai view of Mungan-ngaua; (2) the Theddora, Wolgal, Ngarego, and Yuin view of Daramulun; and (3) the Wiradjuri, Kamilaroi, and Euahlayi view of Baiame. Bunjil also, the All-Father of the Central Victorian tribes, belongs to the third category. This theory depends on complicated considerations connected with the distribution (*a*) of phratries, (*b*) of totems, and (*c*) of sex-totems, from which Schmidt has produced evidence in favour of a primary dark race, represented by the crow, upon which two successive waves of migration, represented by the eaglehawk and the emu, have descended. He argues that both Daramulun and Baiame were not indigenous, but originally tribal heroes of the invaders, the former of the eaglehawk race, the latter of the emu race; or, at any rate, that Baiame, if he were the All-Father of the indigenous tribes, combined therewith the character of tribal ancestor of the invading tribes. On this point there is not much evidence on either side, but, such as it is, it tells in favour of the view that Baiame was introduced by the invaders; for it is reported (*Australian Anthropological Journal*, i. 14) that the Minkins, on the Lower Leichardt, south of the Gulf of Carpentaria, believe in a god Gooaree who lives in Warnoo; Baiamai came from Warderah and taught them initiation ceremonies. So, too, the Mikadoons in the same neighbourhood believe in Gumboo, and say that Baiamai, who taught them initiation ceremonies, came from an island beyond Australia. Howitt has already called attention (*Native Tribes*, p. 498) to the fact that the evil spirit, Coen, at Sydney, had a namesake Kohin on the Herbert River; and if, as it seems, we are entitled to regard these as identical, there is no reason for mistrusting the evidence for a belief in Baiame just south of the Gulf on the score of its distance from the seat of the Baiame-cult in N. S. Wales. In this connexion it may be noted that precisely at this point south of the Gulf the Neo-Australian languages stretch northwards into the territory of the northern group. In this account Baiame figures as tribal hero, not as creator or All-Father, precisely as Schmidt's theory requires.

The following tribes are mentioned by Howitt (*op. cit.* 488 ff.) as having the All-Father belief: Narrinyeri (Nurrundere or Martummere); Wiimbaio (Nurelli); S. W. Victoria (Pirnmeheal); Wotjobaluk, Kulin, and Woĕworung (Bunjil, Maminggorak, or Mamingata); Kurnai (Mungan-ngaua); Wathiwathi (Tha-tha-puli); Tatathi (Tulong); Theddora, Ngarego, and Yuin (Daramulun, Papang, or Biamban); Kamilaroi and Wiradjuri (Baiame); Port Stephens and Herbert River (Coen); S. Queensland (Maamba and Birral). About some of these, however, *e.g.* Birral, we have no information, and it is mere guesswork to include them among the All-Fathers. Birral may well be identical with Bedall (Thorne, *Queen of the Colonies*, 317), who is said to have made the world long ago, when he floated on the water, in form like a huge turtle two miles across the back. In this being we see few or none of the traits of the All-Father. In the Moreton Bay district, however, Buddai seems to have been the equivalent of Baiame (Lang, *Cooksland*, 1847, 459).

There is therefore good *prima facie* evidence for the existence of the belief in an All-Father south-east of the line from the mouth of the Murray to Moreton Bay. Beyond this area we have certain evidence only from the west coast between Geraldton and Albany, where Mamma Gnara, Father of All, is reverenced (*Trans. Roy. Soc. S. Aust.* xvi. 488). Captain Bradshaw has informed the present writer that on the Victoria River a being is recognized who watches over the morals of the tribes, and the same is reported of Kohin on the Herbert River; but in neither case is the epithet 'Father of All' reported, and there is no evidence even of moral influence on the part of the beings reported from the Larrakia of Port Darwin by Foelsche (Curr, *Australian Race*, i. 253). The Cape River tribes are said (*ib.* iii. 146) to believe in a being in the sky, to whom good men go when they die.

In the central area some tribes seem to believe in a being not unlike Baiame; but the evidence as to the beliefs of these peoples is hardly satisfactory. Spencer and Gillen (*Northern Tribes*, 502 f.) say that Twanyirika of the Aruntas and Unmatjeras, and Katajalina of the Binbingas are bugbears, pure and simple, whose function is to keep the women and children in subjection; Tumana of the Kaitish and Murtu-murtu of the Warramungas are simply Alcheringa (*q.v.*) ancestors. Atnatu of the Kaitish stands by himself; he made the Alcheringa and stands in a real relation to the initiation ceremonies; for he is pleased when the operators sound the bull-roarer, and angry when they do not; but he does not trouble himself about morality.

In this account, however, there is no mention of the being known as Altjira, whom Strehlow reports as known to the Aruntas (*Veroffentlichungen aus dem Volker-Museum Frankfurt*, i. 1), and who seems to have been mentioned by Gillen in the *Report of the Horn Expedition* (1896) under the name of Ulthaana ('spirit'). It is therefore open to question how far the account given by Spencer and Gillen in *Northern Tribes* can be regarded as exhaustive.

For the Dieri our evidence is equally uncertain. Gason reported that they believed in a good spirit Mura-mura; but subsequently the Mura-mura were ascertained to be mythical ancestors, like the Muk-Kurnai and the Alcheringa ancestors generally (Howitt, *op. cit.* 487). Recently, however, it has been asserted that the Dieri believe in Mura, a good spirit, distinct from the Mura-mura.

Associated with the All-Father of the south-eastern area is often an evil being, sometimes described as his son, sometimes independent. Thus Henderson (*Notes*, 147) says:

> 'Mudgegong is an evil spirit, who, after having derived his existence from Piame (= Baiame), declared war upon him and now endeavours with all his power to frustrate his undertakings. The offspring of Piame were numerous, but the whole with the exception of two were destroyed by Mudgegong, who converted them into different wild animals. . . . The evil spirit seemed to be described under the form of the eaglehawk. . . . Certain dramatic representations appear to be performed; the principal one is emblematic of the destruction of the eaglehawk by Piame.'

Another account (Macarthur, *N. S. Wales*, 1837, ii. 301) makes Wandong—one of the sons of Baiame mentioned by Henderson—the author of evil; and a third makes Daramulun himself the opponent (on these myths and their explanation see Schmidt,

in *Anthropos*, iii.). The same antithesis is made between Bunjil and Palyan, Coen and Potoyan, etc. Schmidt's view is that these myths date from the racial conflicts: where the crow race gained the day, Bunjil ('eaglehawk') is the defeated; elsewhere Mudgegong ('eaglehawk') is also defeated, but not by the crow.

It should be noted that there is a certain amount of confusion in the various reports; thus Coen, whom Howitt regards as equivalent to Daramulun, is depicted as an evil being (see Howitt, *op. cit.* 486). Other evil beings are Brewin among the Kurnai (*JAI* xiii. 191, xiv. 321, note 2), Tou in South Australia, Koochie among the Dieri, Jingi in West Australia.

It has, however, frequently happened that an evil being has been reported, who, on examination, turns out to be simply the spirit of a dead man. Thus among the Wiradjuri *buggeen* is not a proper name; in Western Victoria Nisbet (*Colonial Tramp*, 1891, 99) reports an evil deity Muurup, who comes in the lightning to destroy them, eats children, etc.; the owl is his messenger; he lives under ground and commands the evil spirits. But we learn from Howitt that *Muurup* is the soul of a dead man; hence the name can hardly be of any specific deity, but must apply to the dead in general, who are especially feared in the south of Australia.

Female deities are unknown in Australia, but in a certain number of cases the evil being is believed to be of the female sex; thus Kurriwilban, wife of Kogorowen, is described as an enemy of mankind (Threlkeld, *Aust. Language*, 1892, 48).

3. Burial.—From the point of view of burial customs, the Australian tribes fall into two groups. (1) In New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and the coastal portions of West Australia, simple burial without alternative rites, such as cremation, is the rule, save in an enclave near the mouth of the Murray River. (2) In Northern Territory and Queensland, simple burial without alternative rites is also found, though how far the absence of alternative rites means that our information is defective is an open question; but, as a rule, the body is exposed on a platform, or the flesh is eaten, or the body is buried and the bones subsequently exhumed. The main funeral ceremony is connected with the disposal of the bones. This rite, however, is often reserved, as is cannibalism, for specially favoured individuals, such as warriors, magicians, etc. Alternative rites are used where the subject was unimportant, owing to old age or youth.

Corresponding to these two classes—simple burial and complex rites—there seem to be different views as to the destiny of the soul. In the south the grave seems to be regarded in many cases as its abode; in the north it remains with the body or the bones till the latter are finally disposed of, and then goes to its own place. Fear of the dead seems to be more prominent in the south.

In Victoria and the south of N. S. Wales a hut was frequently built upon the grave, in which the widow or another relative sat during the time of mourning. This is also a Tasmanian custom, and strengthens the evidence for the intimate connexion of the Victorian tribes with the Tasmanian (see *Folklore*, vol. xix. [1908] p. 388).

4. Future life.—Australian beliefs as to a future life are generally vague, and our information is defective. At Port Lincoln (*Trans. Philosophical Institute of Victoria*, v. 188) it was believed that the soul was so small as to be able to pass through a chink; after death it went to an island, and could dispense with further nourishment; a redbill accompanied the soul on its journey. Near Adelaide, however (Gerstäcker, *Reisen*, 1854, iv. 364), it was held that the soul lived in trees during the day, and came down at night to eat caterpillars, frogs, etc.; concurrently with this (?), it was believed that the soul went west to an abyss at death. The Euahlayi believe that the spirit of a dead man goes with the spirits of dead relatives to Oobi Oobi, a sacred mountain, from which he is hoisted to Bullimah, Baiame's residence, by certain spirits called *Mooroobeaigunnul* (Parker, *Euahlayi Tribe*, 90 f.).

According to Spencer-Gillen[b] (145, 174), re-incarnation is everywhere the creed. This has been questioned by Strehlow (*Globus*, xci. 285, xcii. 123; *Veroffentlichungen aus dem Volker-Museum Frankfurt*, i., Introduction), and the real facts are not yet ascertained. Strehlow, however, reports two Aranda beliefs. According to one, there is an island of the dead, from which a spirit returns for temporary re-incarnation, lasting for a year or two, and is finally annihilated; the other affirms that the good dead live with Altjira, the sky-being. In the place of the re-incarnation doctrine, Strehlow finds the belief that the germ (*ratapa*) of a child issues from the body of a totemic ancestor, or that an ancestor throws a small bull-roarer at a woman, in whose body it changes to a child.

5. Cult of the dead.—Although totemic ancestors figure largely in myth in some parts, there is nothing in the nature of a cult of ancestors. The dead are feared; certain powers are ascribed to them, such as raising storms, sending rain, procuring a good catch of fish, and appeals of various sorts are made to them (Collins, *Eng. Colony in N. S. Wales*, 1798–1802, i. 601; J. S. Lang, *Aborigines*, 31; Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals*, 1889, 282; Ogle, *Colony of West Aust.*, 1839, 58; Salvado, *Mémoires historiques*, 1854, 276; Stephens, *Hist. of S. Aust.*, 1838, 78, etc.), but not specially as ancestors. Near Adelaide the spirits of enemies were kept quiet by magic spells (*Verh. d. Gesell. f. Erdkunde*, i. 194). Sleeping on the grave of a dead man was one of the methods of becoming a magician (Mauss, *Pouvoirs*, 17, etc.). There is a wide-spread belief that natives, when they die, return as white men (Roth, *Bull.* 5, p. 16). There are also traces of a belief in transmigration (*Man*, 1905, No. 28).

6. Soul.—All natives of Australia seem to have held an animistic view of man, though the sky-beings are regarded as corporeal. But as to their view of the soul, etc., we have only scanty information. Mrs. K. L. Parker records that the Euahlayi attributed to each person three spirits: Yowee, the soul which leaves the body only at death; Dowee, a dream spirit; Mulloowil, a shadow spirit; and, sometimes, Yunbeai, or tutelary animal ([?] spirit) (*Euahlayi Tribe*, 35).

On the Tully R., Qu., the soul is associated with the shadow and the breath; the *koi* goes away during sleep; after death it goes into the bush. On the Bloomfield R. the *wau-wu* is associated with the breath, but is independent of the ghost. At Cape Bedford it is part and parcel of a man's spiritual part. On the Pennefather R. the *ngai* and the *choi* are distinguished; the latter leaves the corpse at death and wanders in the bush; the former passes into the body of son, daughter, or sister. Both are associated with the heart and afterbirth (Roth, *Bull.* 5, 17–19).

7. Magic.—With regard to magical practices, there are well-marked differences between the northern group and the remainder of Australia. Among the central tribes magic is practised by both men and women without special initiation, save in the Anula tribe, where the magician is the producer of evil, not the doctor. The initiated medicine-man has the duty of protecting the community or individual members against the magic of others. Among the south-eastern tribes, however, the medicine-man is both worker of magic and doctor indifferently; and, so far as can be seen,

the practice of magic is usually confined to initiated men, though Mrs. Parker mentions a witch-woman among the Euahlayi.

In some tribes the magician is so by birth; among the Anulas only one kin performs these functions; among the Tongarankas a boy inherits his powers from his father (Mauss, *op. cit.* 10; Howitt, 404). More often, however, initiation is by revelation from the dead, from spirits, or from the All-Father, or else knowledge is communicated by other magicians. Occasionally a man who has escaped miraculously from a violent death is reputed a magician.

It is commonly believed that at their initiation medicine-men have introduced into their bodies certain stones, usually fragments of quartz, upon which their magic powers depend, and which may be caused to leave their bodies if they partake of alcohol, hot drinks, etc., or are bitten by ants. The Euahlayi believe that all magicians have a *nagual* ('individual totem'), which is forbidden food to them, which they can cause to appear to others, and whose shape they can themselves assume.

The commonest form of magic, practised all over Australia, is 'pointing'; hair, etc., are used in the south and east; spells are common; in Queensland a man's lifeblood is said to be withdrawn by the *mangani*; and magic may be worked by an effigy of the victim (Roth, 5. 28; Howitt, 354; Spencer-Gillen [b], 455; Mauss, *Pouvoirs*, *passim*, etc.).

In connexion with magic, mention must be made of rain-making. The office of rain-maker was often distinct from that of medicine-man, especially among the Dieri, where all participated in the rites; the ceremonies may almost be termed religious. The same remark applies to the totemic ceremonies of the centre and north.

8. Totemism.—The *nagual*, associated with the magician among the Euahlayi and elsewhere, is probably rare in most parts of Australia (for possible cases see *Aust. Assoc. for the Advancement of Science Reports*, iii. 515, v. 638; *Science of Man*, vii. 91; cf. *Man*, 1904, No. 53). Of kin totemism in the S. and E. we know little beyond the names of the animals. In some cases the killing of the animal is forbidden, but among the Euahlayi there is no restriction. It is the *nagual* that is sacrosanct, but it is forbidden to mimic or speak ill of a totem. The totem also helps the human being (Howitt, 400; Parker, 21).

The totemism of the north and centre appears to be generically different from that on the south and east. The local grouping, the great number of totems, and their connexion with *Intichiuma* ceremonies, are all important differentia. Still more important perhaps is the fact that in the south-east totems are animals; in the south, centre, and in South Queensland, animals and plants, the latter fewer than the former; among the Aruntas both in fairly equal numbers; and in North Australia, as in New Guinea, the plant totems outnumber the animals (see Schmidt, in *Anthropos*, iii.).

A progressive change is also noticeable with regard to the eating of the totem, which is permitted among the Arandas alone; in both the Aranda and the Kaitish tribes the totem must be eaten at the *Intichiuma* ceremonies. Among the Warramungas it is offered to men of the totem by others, but not eaten. Finally, in the Binbinga and other tribes it is neither eaten nor offered. It has been mentioned above that the *yunbeai* ('nagual') may be regarded as a fourth soul. There are traces of a similar animistic view of ordinary totemism. Among both the Euahlayi and the Warramungas one of the divinatory ceremonies to discover a murderer consists in observing the tracks near the body; the track of a snake indicates that a man of the snake totem is the culprit (Spencer-Gillen [b], 519, 526; K. L. Parker, *op. cit.* 89).

So-called 'sex totemism' is found in South Australia, Victoria, and New South Wales, mainly on the coast. Each sex has a 'brother' or 'sister,' whom they respect and regard as the creator of their sex. The sacrosanct animals are usually small birds (wren, nightjar, etc.) or the bat.

9. Initiation ceremonies.—The initiation ceremonies fall into two main groups: (1) the central tribes west of a line from near Adelaide to the south end of the Gulf of Carpentaria practise circumcision, and, with the exception of a small area near Adelaide, sub-incision also; knocking out of teeth is known and practised in this part of Australia, but has no special significance; and (2) along the west coast and in Victoria and New South Wales the initiation ceremony consists in the knocking out of the boy's tooth. North of the Queensland border even this feature is wanting, and combats, real, not simulated, with spears, clubs, etc., test the manhood of the youths. Whereas in the central area the ceremonies are performed by successive stages, so that a youth attains his privileges gradually, the initiation customs of the eastern tribes admit him at once to all the privileges of manhood, though, of course, his share in the government of the tribe is naturally small until he has attained riper years (Howitt, 509–677; Curr, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Spencer-Gillen [b], *passim*).

In connexion with the initiation ceremonies, mention must be made of the system of food prohibitions, which perhaps attains a greater development in Australia than in any other part of the world. Eyre (*Journal*, 1845, ii. 293) records particulars of South Australian customs. Up to the age of nine or ten, boys were free to eat any food; then twenty or thirty different animals and birds were forbidden them; ten years later some of these restrictions were relaxed, but new ones were imposed; married men up to the age of thirty-five were forbidden eight or ten articles of diet; old men were, again, free to follow their inclinations. There were similar lists of prohibited foods for girls and women.

10. Bull-roarer.—There are well-marked variations with regard to the bull-roarer. In the south-east of New South Wales it is associated with Daramulun; elsewhere in the colony and in Central and North Australia it is associated with a spirit or spirits in the exoteric doctrine; but the young men are taught its real nature at initiation. Both in New South Wales and in South Australia two bull-roarers were used, one large, the other small, which were sometimes said to be male and female. Among the west coast tribes of the Gulf the bull-roarer is rare, but here too the women are told that it is the voice of an evil spirit. On the Georgina River a large sacred bull-roarer is found, and side by side with it a small one, which is simply a toy. In some parts of North Queensland children of both sexes use it as a toy, in others only boys. On the Bloomfield River the boys are taught the use of it at the initiation ceremonies; but they are permitted to use it in the presence of women, so that it partakes more of the character of a toy. See BULL-ROARER.

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iii. MAGIC: Mauss, *L'Origine des pouvoirs magiques*, Paris, 1904; Van Gennep, *Mythes et légendes d'Australie*, Paris, 1906.

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AUTHORITY.—*Definition and scope.*—The word 'authority,' as used in ordinary language, always implies a certain amount of coerciveness. The most common meaning is that of a power to enforce obedience. But the sense varies according to the sphere in which the authoritative power is exercised. As regards action, it is the power which enforces obedience. Authority and obedience are correlative terms, supremacy being implied on the part of authority, and dependence on the part of those who have to obey. Authority has the right and the power to say the last word, and to give a decision from which there is no appeal. Its judgment is final. But there is also a use of the word which reveals it as operative in the sphere of opinion, belief, and action. The final test of belief and of opinion is action, and authority in this regard is the power which is held to have the right to influence opinion, to induce belief, and so to lead to action. That is to say, this view really is a phase of the view which looks on authority as the power that enforces obedience, for it shows authority at work in that sphere which ultimately issues in obedience. It reveals the process by which obedience is won. The right to influence opinion, to induce belief, to persuade a man to take a certain course of conduct, which belongs to authority, is thus the way to command obedience. Yet there is a shade of difference in the two aspects of authority set forth above. In that view which regards authority as the power that commands obedience, we abstract from the way and means by which it persuades the man to obey, and fix our attention on the categorical command which must be obeyed. In the other case, authority is presented as rational, as proving its right to command, as presenting itself in an attitude of persuasion, as leading the object of authority to lend his own assent to the demand made on him. The power to create opinion, to influence belief, and to constrain to action is exercised with a view to enforce obedience. This power may be exercised in many ways, varying according to the sphere of operation, the means available, and the end in view. In the intellectual sphere it may take the form of authoritative opinion, the view of a man who has the expert knowledge which few others have at command. It may take the form of testimony as to matters of fact of which he is or has been the only witness. In short, it may take a thousand forms; but the outcome in every case is to win assent, to constrain belief, and to influence action.

The common element in all forms of authority is ultimately to enforce opinion, and to constrain belief. Without this element of coerciveness, authority has no real meaning. All authority inhibits, forces, or pains. It is of its very nature so to act. But, on the other hand, authority must be prepared to justify itself, and to show that it has the right to command, and the power to enforce its behests. It is not an end in itself; it is a means to an end. What that end may be it is not necessary here to determine. It may be that Höffding is correct when he says:

'Authority can never be anything but a means, and the principle of authority is subordinate to the principle of personality, as mediate value must always be subordinate to immediate value. The burden of proof must always lie with those who wish to inhibit, limit, force, or pain. Authority pleads as its justification that it is the necessary condition for the complete carrying out of the principle of personality' (*The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 279).

To Höffding the principle of authority, while it has its own place and function, is subordinate to the principle of personality. This is a different contrast from the familiar one of the antithesis of authority and reason, with which literature is so well acquainted. Höffding is concerned with the principle of the Conservation of Values, and for the right estimate of values the principle of Personality, he holds, is of supreme worth. It is not necessary to enter into his theory, or to discuss it. The main thing is that for him the principle of authority is not ultimate. It must justify itself. There is another view which we may take from Mr. Arthur Balfour.

'Authority, as I have been using the term, is in all cases contrasted with Reason, and stands for that group of non-rational causes, moral, social, and educational, which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning' (*The Foundations of Belief*, p. 219). 'If we are to judge with equity between these rival claimants, we must not forget that it is Authority rather than Reason to which, in the main, we owe not religion only, but ethics and politics; that it is Authority which supplies us with essential elements in the premises of science; that it is Authority rather than Reason which lays deep the foundations of social life; that it is Authority rather than Reason which cements its superstructure. And though it may seem to savour of paradox, it is yet no exaggeration to say that, if we would find the quality in which we most notably excel the brute creation, we should look for it not so much in our faculty of convincing and being convinced by the exercise of reasoning, as in our capacity for influencing and being influenced through the action of Authority' (*ib.* p. 229 f.).

In drawing out the contrast between authority and reason, Mr. Balfour dwells with delight on customary opinion, habit, and on that 'group of non-rational causes—moral, social, and educational—which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning.' He has forgotten to observe that in all these processes reason is, at all events, implicit. For the customs, traditions, and social, moral, and educational influences in the midst of which we live, have been the products of rational beings, of beings, in short, who have been implicitly rational from the beginning. All the causes which he claims for authority may be better assigned to reason. He refuses to let reason possess authority, for, he says, 'Authority as such is, from the nature of the case, dumb in the presence of argument.' It is instructive to read why it should be so. But we may not linger over his ingenious argumentation. Our contention is that authority need not fear argument, when it insists on its legitimate claim to influence or coerce men. But then its claim must, like all claims, submit to criticism; and, when it does so, it need not take refuge in groups of non-rational causes, or in that dim mysterious region of instinct to which Mr. Balfour consigns it. For there are many voices which speak to us with authority, and to none of them can we turn a deaf ear without paying an appropriate penalty. That penalty may be stated, and the sanction of any true authority may be vindicated, to the satisfaction of reason.

It may be broadly stated that in every sphere of human activity, and in every sphere of human thought, there is something which may rightly be called authority. The sanctions by which authority vindicates its attitude may vary with each sphere, but in all of them there is authority with its appropriate sanctions. It is not our purpose to make an exhaustive enumeration of the spheres in which authority has its appropriate place and function. To do so would be to enumerate all the sciences, all the arts, all the philosophies, and, in short, all those achievements of the human mind which are embodied in the literature of the world. But we may ask—

1. Is there an authority in science? And if so, what are its functions, and what are its sanctions? Waiving the question as to the abstract nature of science, and as to the depreciation of it on that account, may we not say that it is through the achievements of science that we have won control over the external world, and subdued it to the uses of man? It may be quite true that nature is more complex and more subtle than our sciences, and that, while we speak of heat, light, electricity, gravitation, and dwell on these in our abstract fashion, every particle of matter is at the same

time in some state of temperature, in some electric condition, and so on. Yet so far science has read the meaning of nature, and has subjected itself to the authority of nature. The external world has been controlled by man, and subdued to his uses only because he has submitted himself to its authority. It is possible for a man to strive to ignore the law of gravitation, but, if he does so, he will never build a house. Practical work in the external world is possible only if a man submits to the authority placed on him by the nature of that world. We do not mean only that he must recognize those great and universal characteristics of nature which science has expressed under such generalizations as the law of gravitation, the law of the conservation of energy, and such like,—he must have regard to the particular nature of every natural object with which he has to do. He must deal with stones according to the qualities of stones, with timber according to the qualities of timber, and with other things after their kind. These dictate to science and to men generally the conditions under which work must be done. In building his bridges man must make allowance for the contraction of iron under cold and for its expansion under heat. The nature of his material and the laws of physics speak to him with an authoritative voice, and if he ventures to disregard that authority, he must pay the price. He will find it sanctioned by tumbling houses, falling bridges, and general wreck and ruin. Nature will do anything for one who knows how to make her work, but she will do nothing for one who does not know her way and her limitations. We take from the sciences our first example of authority, and we have begun here because we find that the authority of nature can be justified, and that reason quite recognizes the validity of the claim which nature presents to man in the system in which he lives.

Reason can recognize the processes and methods of nature. Indeed, the possibility of science depends on the presupposition of the rationality of nature. Acting on that supposition, science ha questioned nature, has experimented with her, has come to know her, has summed up its knowledge of nature in the special sciences, and has succeeded in this venture just because it has recognized the order of nature as real, objective, authoritative. The value of the generalizations of science lies in the fact that they represent nature, and that they may be verified in the processes and in the facts of nature. This means that the order of nature is recognized by man as authoritative, and science has taken it as such. No doubt, there is a correspondence between the order of nature and the constitution of the human mind. The correspondence exists, whatever the explanation of it may be. It would lead us too far afield to inquire into the origin and character of the correspondence. Nor is it necessary; for, whether we hold that mind gives laws to nature or the converse, the correspondence stands. Mind and nature are related the one to the other. So, whether we inquire into the order of nature or into the constitution of mind, we are led to something common to both. For nature is rational, is a system, and mind finds that the rationality in nature is akin to the rationality of which it is conscious in itself.

2. Authority of the laws of reason.—When we inquire, therefore, into the constitution of mind, we start with the presupposition that we shall find it rational, just as we have found nature to be rational. One of the chief characteristics of mind is that it has the power of transcending particular experiences, and of making universal and necessary propositions, which it believes to be true always and everywhere. These judgments are disclosed to it on reflexion, but from their very nature they lie at the foundation of all experience, and without them experience would not be possible. They are of such a kind that the mind recognizes their truth and validity as soon as it understands them. They bear on the face of them their own irresistible evidence. It is impossible for us to think of an event happening without a cause. The law of causation rules our thinking, and of an unrelated event we are unable to conceive. Axioms are axiomatic. We cannot think without them. It makes no difference whether we call them 'axioms,' or designate them 'postulates'; in either case they are there as the foundation of all our thinking. Without them we should fall into contradiction, and lapse into confusion. Thought must be consistent with itself, that is, it must not be self-contradictory, and thought must be consistent with reality. On the other hand, these universal and necessary judgments must be prepared to vindicate their validity. They must submit to criticism, and show themselves in their universal and necessary character. They must show themselves in all the glory of their self-evidence; they must be prepared to prove that the opposite of them is inconceivable; and they must prove that, unless we accept them, our thinking will be self-contradictory. It is not necessary to enumerate these axioms. Two and two make four, a thing cannot be and not be at the same time—on such axioms as these all are agreed, whatever the explanation of their validity may be. All thinking must assume the law of non-contradiction, as all fruitful thinking must recognize the validity of the laws of logic.

These axioms are authoritative, and are authoritative in the ordinary meaning of the term. They enforce obedience to them under the sanction that, if they are disregarded, thinking will be inept, unfruitful, nonsensical. In this sphere the antinomy between authority and freedom, between authority and reason, between the principle of authority and the principle of personality, does not emerge. For the principle of authority here is the very principle of reason itself, and these necessary and universal judgments are those which make freedom, personality, and reason possible. For reason can be exercised only on the basis of universality and necessity. Because there is a fixed order of nature, and necessary laws of reason, freedom is possible, and ideals may be conceived and realized. If there were no axioms, if there were no universal and necessary judgments, no fixed properties of things, it would not be possible for mind to conceive ends and adopt means for their realization. Nor would it be possible for man to maintain a rational relation to a random world. The main thing, however, to insist on here is that these universal and necessary judgments speak to us with authority, coerce our opinions and beliefs, and constrain us to action consistent with them. They have thus the note of authority, and enforce themselves on us with very drastic sanctions. Our thinking, our action, and even our feeling must be consistent with them, and must proceed with a due regard to their supremacy.

3. Authority in the sphere of civil life.—We have seen that authority is rightly exercised over us by the external order of the world, and by the laws of mind itself, and that the sanctions are of the most real and emphatic order. Can we find a legitimate sphere for authority, with appropriate sanctions, in the sphere of civil life, in the sphere of morals, and in the sphere of religion? It is impossible to say that in these spheres a denial of authority involves self-contradiction. Disloyalty,

disobedience, and anarchy are possible, as history abundantly shows. Take the case of government, and ask, What is the place of authority in it? Here clearly we must bring in a number of considerations which were not needed in relation to the authoritativeness of laws of nature and laws of mind. With his usual insight and sagacity, Bishop Butler sets forth the essential note of government when he says:

'The annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the proper formal notion of government. . . . If civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws take place, without interposing at all, after they had passed them, without a trial and the formalities of an execution; if they were able to make their laws execute themselves, or every offender to execute them upon himself—we should be just in the same sense under their government then as we are now; but in a much higher degree, and more perfect manner' (*Analogy*, pt. 1, ch. ii.).

Attaching pleasure to some actions and pains to others, and giving notice of the appointment beforehand, is the proper notion of government. Let us take this conception with us, as we seek to investigate the function of authority in civil government. The State is the source of authority within its dominions. It is the maker of laws: in its judicial function it is the administrator, and in its executive function it is the active agency in enforcing obedience. All local authorities are derived from the State. These may be administrative, like town and county authorities, authorities dealing with public health, and so on; they may be judicial; or they may be commercial; yet each delegated authority derives its power from the State, and is responsible to the State for its exercise. The authority of each independent State is supreme within its own dominion. It might be asked, What is the State, and from what source is its authority derived? That is too large a question to be discussed here (see art. GOVERNMENT). But it may be well to learn from competent authority what is meant by law, by sovereignty, and by subjection and obedience. Austin tells us that—

'Laws set by God to men, laws established by political superiors, and laws set by men to men (though not by political superiors) are distinguished by numerous and important differences, but agree in this, that all of them are set by rational and intelligent beings to intelligent and rational beings' (*Lectures on Jurisprudence*, vol. i. p. 3 [3-vol. ed. 1861]). Again, 'Of the laws set by men to men, some are established by political superiors, sovereign and subject; by persons exercising supreme and subordinate government, in independent nations, or independent political societies' (p. 2). As to the source of law, it is thus stated: 'Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme. Or, changing the expression, it is set by a monarch or sovereign member to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author' (p. 169). Again, 'The notions of sovereignty and independent political society may be expressed concisely thus: if a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent' (p. 170).

It may be well to refer in this connexion to Maine's *The Early History of Institutions*, p. 349 f., for an independent contribution to Austin's theory of sovereignty and subjection. As to the theory itself, it is very abstract, and the great political facts are reduced and attenuated to abstractions, in which the fact of sovereign service and the loyalty of subjects have disappeared. It is well to have a description of abstract sovereignty and abstract obedience attenuated to the uttermost. Yet, after all, it does not help us much in our inquiry. It may be desirable for the student to read more modern contributions to the theory of the State, especially those which have been influenced by the philosophy of Kant, and by the great idealist school more or less dominated in this regard by Hegel. Reference may be made to Green's 'Principles of Political Obligation' (*Collected Works*, vol. ii. p. 445):

'It is a mistake to think of the State as an aggregation of individuals under a sovereign—equally so whether we suppose the individuals as such, or apart from what they derive from society, to possess natural rights, or suppose them to depend on the sovereign for the possession of rights. A State presupposes other forms of community, with the rights which arise out of them, and exists only as sustaining, securing, and completing them. In order to make a State, there must have been families of which the members recognized rights in each other (recognized in each other powers capable of direction by reference to a common Good); there must further have been intercourse between families, or between tribes that have grown out of families, of which each in the same sense recognized rights in the other. The recognition of a right being very far short of the definition, the admission of a right in each other by two parties, whether individuals, families, or tribes, being very different from agreement as to what the right consists in—what it is a right to do or acquire—the rights recognized require definition and reconciliation in a general law. When such a general law has been arrived at, regulating the position of members of a family towards each other and the dealings of families or tribes with each other; when it is voluntarily recognized by a community of families or tribes, and maintained by a power strong enough at once to enforce it within the community and to defend the integrity of the community against attacks from without, then the elementary State has been formed.'

For the vindication of the exercise of authority in a State, it is not sufficient to dwell on the abstract relationship of sovereign and subject or on the independence of a State; the authority must be vindicated on other grounds. Green has shown that a State is not an assemblage of mere individuals under a common government. Individuals are already united by moral bonds; they are in families, in tribes, and as such are in mutual recognition of rights and duties. Those in authority must do service, and must justify their action on the ground of recognized worth or good achieved; or even on the lower ground of utility. Authority must justify its existence. Aristotle has well recognized and insisted on the obligation to service which attaches to those who exercise authority. He shows that a State is not an association formed exclusively for the acquisition of wealth, or for military strength, or for the encouragement of commerce. The object of the State is the promotion of the higher life. When men are associated together in a State, 'the object of their association is to live well—not merely to live.'

'Virtue and vice are matters of earnest consideration to all whose hearts are set upon good and orderly government. And from this fact it is evident that a State which is not merely nominally, but in the true sense of the word a State, should devote its attention to virtue. To neglect virtue is to convert the political association into an alliance differing in nothing except in the local contiguity of its members from the alliance formed between distant States, to convert the law into a mere covenant, or, as the sophist Lycophron said, a mere surety for the mutual respect of rights, without any qualification for producing goodness or justice in the citizens. But it is clear that this is the true view of the State, *i.e.* that it promotes the virtue of its citizens' (Aristotle's *Politics*, bk. iii. ch. 9, Welldon's tr. p. 124 f.).

The authority of a State is not justified by the mere fact of sovereignty; the sovereignty must be of a certain character. According to Aristotle, it must be an institution in which goodness, virtue, and justice are produced in the citizens. The State, in more modern phraseology, must be an institution in which a man can find himself, realize himself, and by its means be able to live a rich, full, and gracious life. It must be the home in which his ideals are so far realized, which in the history of the past and in the situation of the present affords ideals worthy of imitation to the citizen in all the variety of his manifold endeavour. The authority of a nation over its citizens is thus justified by the tradition of the nation, by its achievement in former ages, by the ideal it sets before them at the present hour, and by its promise for the future. The authority of a State can neither be measured nor justified by the material force which it has at its command to enforce obedience. Force is no remedy, nor can it win

the loyalty of the governed. Without loyalty the exercise of authority is hindered, confined, rendered ineffective. It makes no difference in the final issue whether power is exercised by a king or by the citizens themselves; for, if it is exercised unworthily, it casts a blight on the flower of loyalty, which is essential to the full exercise of authority. Briefly, it may be said that the State is an ethical institution, and while material force is needed, yet the exercise of that force is conditioned by the fact that it must always be exercised for the good of the community, and in the interests of the higher values. Authority and loyalty must go hand in hand in every State which is worthy of the name. Of the manifold relations of governor and governed, of the claims which the State has a right to make on its citizens, of the freedom of the individual over against the State, and of the limits of civil obedience it is not possible to speak here. Nor is it necessary, for the due exercise of authority in this sphere must always be in such ways as to carry with it the consent of the citizen, to arouse his loyalty, to deepen his sense of obligation to the State, and to quicken him to do the State enthusiastic service. In this sphere, too, authority has to justify itself by its fruits.

4. Authority in morals.—We have passed insensibly to the exercise of authority in the sphere of moral life. Is there a Categorical Imperative? Is there an Ought, a law binding on us, which we must obey unconditionally, and cannot disobey except at our direst peril? To these questions it is not possible to give an exhaustive answer within our limits. The facts of the moral life are so various, the explanations of them so numerous, and the theories of ethics so manifold, that it is difficult to isolate the voice of authority, and to give here a distinct and categorical answer. Yet the ordinary moral consciousness speaks of virtue and vice, of good and evil, and of right and wrong, and it has definite meanings when it uses these ethical contrasts. It has a notion that virtue and vice relate to character, that good and evil relate to the end of life, and that right and wrong refer to a standard. It is conscious, also, that they all relate somehow to an ideal of conduct. When it speaks of right and wrong, it sets up a standard of conduct; when it speaks of good and evil, it passes a judgment on the end and purpose of life; and when it speaks of virtue and vice, it recognizes an ideal of character which it feels ought to be realized in practical life.

Students of ethics will remember Kant's treatment of the ordinary moral consciousness, which in his *Metaphysic of Ethic* he analyzes, on the way towards his theoretical exposition of ethic. Kant lays stress on the Good Will as the absolute example of Good. He insists that the aim of the practical reason is to produce an absolutely good will, not a will which is good only as a means to happiness. A good will is the supreme good, though it may not have attained to completeness. Inasmuch, however, as a perfectly goodwill is not attainable in its fullness here, Kant proceeds to set forth the notion of duty. He assumes that the good will in its completeness is wholly rational, and obeys without question or hesitation the law of reason. But in a being like man, who has passions and desires as well as reason, the good will is not wholly good. Hence the need of the conception of Duty. Kant insists that duty excludes not only all direct violation of morality but all acts the motive of which is inclination, even when these are not in themselves opposed to duty. In the second place, he shows that the moral value of an action is determined by the maxim or subjective principle of will which it manifests, not in relation to the object which acts upon desire. And he concludes, in the third place, that duty may be defined as the obligation to act from reverence for law (cf. J. Watson, *The Philosophy of Kant Explained* [1901], to which the present writer is deeply indebted). Man, however, is a being whose desires are not invariably in harmony with reason. But a good will cannot be determined by natural inclination; it must be determined solely by the principle of duty for duty's sake. There is thus a dualism in human nature, there are wants and desires which demand satisfaction, and there is reason, which prescribes conformity to duty. What is the relation of duty to desire? In answering this question, Kant passes from the analysis of the moral consciousness to the problem of moral philosophy. And among other questions he asks this one, What is the nature of the supreme good? He derives it from the idea of moral perfection, which reason forms *a priori* and connects inseparably with the conception of a free will. The principle of morality is, and must be, independent of experience, and derives its authority solely from reason. As Dr. Watson says:

'We learn three things: firstly, that all moral conceptions proceed from reason entirely *a priori*; secondly, that it is of supreme importance to set the conceptions of morality before the mind in their purity, and not merely in the interest of a true theory of morality, but also as an aid in practical life; and thirdly, that the principles of pure practical reason, unlike those of theoretical reason, do not depend in a sense upon the peculiar nature of man, but are derived from the very conception of a rational being, and therefore apply to all rational beings' (*op. cit.* p. 317).

Following out these assumptions, Kant proceeds to set forth the metaphysic of morality. The Categorical Imperative is expounded, and in pursuance of it he sets forth the laws of the universal imperative of duty. 'Act as if the maxim from which you act were to become through your will a universal law of nature.' Another law reached by him after a prolonged discussion, into which we cannot enter, is, 'Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end, never as merely a means.' And a third law arises to complete the series: 'Act in conformity with the idea of the will of every rational being as a will which lays down universal laws of action.' [We use the translation of Dr. Watson.] Enthusiastic Kantians have compared these with Newton's three laws of motion. There need be no hesitation in recognizing their abiding worth. Nor need there be any hesitation in acknowledging the indebtedness of mankind to Kant for his lofty teaching regarding the conception of Duty. It is a permanent gain that he has shown the impossibility of deriving the Categorical Imperative from what he calls the Hypothetical Imperative. It is the practice in some schools of thought to derive the binding character of obligation from the fact that, if we are to gain an end, we must use the appropriate means. This is quite true. If I am to become a teacher, I must qualify myself for the office. And so with regard to the use of any other means by which an end is gained. I may decline to be a teacher, and so be discharged from the training needed for a teacher. But I may not decline to be moral. The demand of morality on me is absolute. For this demonstration the world is indebted to Kant.

The severely abstract character of Kant's ethic has given rise to difficulties. It is hard for the student of his ethic to find a point of contact with this working-day world. It is also severely intellectual, and seems to disregard the real nature of man. A common prayer of religious men, both in the congregation and in solitude, is, 'Incline my heart to keep Thy law.' If this prayer is answered,

and the heart is inclined to keep the law, immediately the act is removed from the sphere of duty, for inclination has nothing to do with duty. To touch morality with emotion would seem to destroy its character. Yet on some occasions Kant seems himself to be filled with emotion. This is specially the case in his commanding and striking address to Duty, and when he contemplates the majesty of the starry heavens above and the moral law within. Are we to say that in these moments Kant is lifted out of the sphere of morality? The truth seems to be that Kant in his analysis of the moral consciousness has forgotten the feelings and emotions and desires. Or, when he remembers them, he thinks of them only as disturbing elements, as hindrances to the working of the Categorical Imperative. He has not apparently contemplated the possibility of a man doing his duty because he likes to do it. If statutes may become songs, if a man may learn to love the law, how does it stand with him? Is he moral or is he outside of morality? Apparently in his analysis Kant has left out this possibility. It is curious to reflect that Herbert Spencer also comes to a similar conclusion, for he thinks that in a perfectly evolved State the sense of obligation will cease, as duty will become pleasure, and the strain will no longer be needed (*Data of Ethics*, § 47). In his exposition Dr. Watson says:

'A perfectly good will agrees with the rational will of man in conforming to objective laws, but it differs in not being under an obligation to conform to them. An imperative has no meaning as applied to the Divine will or any other holy will, such a will being by its very nature in harmony with the law of reason. Imperatives are therefore limited to beings whose will is imperfect, such as the will of man, expressing as they do the relation of objective law to an imperfect will' (*op. cit.* p. 318).

It seems a somewhat curious outcome. Is an Imperative less imperative when I consent to its rationality, and consent with my whole nature so completely that all its impulses, desires, and longings are constrained so thoroughly that all opposition to it passes away? Is the imperativeness of the Imperative less than before? Does an Imperative ever become real and operative until I lay it on myself, and make it binding on myself? Does it cease when I am able to make it wholly operative? It would seem, therefore, that there is something lacking in the analysis of the moral consciousness instituted by Kant. It neglects feeling. It forgets that the moral appeal is directed not to the intellect alone; to the will alone. It commands that the inclinations, the passions, and the desires shall be yoked to duty, and that man as a whole and as a community shall become moral. Moral authority does not cease when the will of man becomes wholly the good will, nor does obligation cease when man is wholly moralized. The statute does not cease to be a statute when it becomes a song, nor does the law vanish when the heart of man is inclined to keep it. We may not inquire further, in this place, into the nature of moral obligation, nor need we discuss the various views of it which have appeared in the history of ethics. It is sufficient for us to have indicated that morality has authority, from whatsoever source it may be conceived to flow. Man feels that he is bound to attain a certain character, to live up to a certain standard, and to attain to that ideal of life which can be described as good. The inward moral feeling must agree with an objective reality, and his judgment of values must be rooted in reality. The objective worth must be realized in the inward life. Here, however, we pass beyond the bounds of ethics, and enter into the sphere of religion.

5. Authority in religion.—In the sphere of religion, authority takes on a new form, speaks to us with a new voice, and passes from the sphere of the impersonal into that of the personal life. As Hegel finely says:

'All the various peoples feel that it is in the religious consciousness they possess truth, and they have always regarded religion as constituting their true dignity and the Sabbath of their lives. Whatever awakens in us doubt and fear, all sorrow, all care, . . . we leave behind on the shores of time; and as from the highest peak of a mountain, far away from all definite view of what is earthly, we look down calmly on all the limitations of the landscape and of the world, so with the spiritual eye man, lifted out of the hard realities of this actual world, contemplates it as something having only the semblance of existence, which, seen from this pure region, bathed in the beams of the spiritual sun, merely reflects back its shades of colour, its varied tints and lights, softened away into eternal rest' (*Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. tr., vol. i. p. 3).

It is in the sphere of religion that all the authorities referred to above are harmonized, unified, and made effective in a grander manner. For it is here that we can gather them into a unity, and see them to be one, for they reflect the absolute, central unity of the universe. When we speak of the unity of nature and the authoritative character of its system, we really mean the unity which is given to the universe by the mind which informs it, and by the presence enshrined in it. It is the primary revelation of God, and speaks to us with a Divine meaning; and when we read its meaning we are thinking the thoughts of God. So, also, when we read and decipher the laws of reason, think out the first principles of reason, and act on its axioms, we are dealing with reason which is not merely ours, but is also objective and authoritative. So, also, when we read history, dwell on the life of man organized into communities, and realize what in this sphere authority and subjection mean, here too we are in a Divine presence, and the powers which be have been ordained of God. All authority is thus ultimately Divine authority. This is true whether we regard the world from the theistic or from the pantheistic point of view. In the latter case authority comes from the perfect whole, in the former case it comes from the living God who has made, sustains, and rules the world. So, too, the binding power of morality flows from God. It is for this reason mainly that we are dissatisfied with the analysis of Kant, and regard it as imperfect. For religion comes to ethics and seeks to deliver it from the dry abstractions on which it delights to dwell, and strives to bring it into the warm relation of personal affection. It would relate moral feeling, moral aspiration, and moral obligation not to an impersonal law or to abstract truth, but to a Living Presence, to a Holy Person, to a Loving Will. Religion would not distinguish minutely between a Divine nature and a Divine will, nor would it seek to derive the Divine authority from a Divine will as distinguished from a Divine nature, for to religion the Divine will is only the expression of the Divine character.

As to the authority of nature, of truth, of civil society, of moral law, religion regards it as valid in its own place and way. They are expressions of the Divine nature, and express it as far as they can. But nature is an imperfect expression of the Divine nature. It may show forth certain aspects of the Divine nature, but the full meaning of God cannot be expressed in nature, or in human reason, or even in man as yet. God has really put a meaning into His works, and that meaning we are bound to read. Science is our interpretation of that meaning so far as we have been able to read it. There is a wider, deeper meaning in history, and in the nature of man, for here we deal with a world of persons, each of whom has or may have a meaning in himself. But even here the language of human life and destiny which God has had to use to express His meaning is not adequate to its work. For man is imperfect, man has been so far non-rational and

non-moral, and the meaning of an absolutely moral and rational Personality cannot be expressed by these imperfect means. Yet nature and history do in some measure reveal God, and their value for religion consists in the fact that they reveal the living, personal God. It is for this reason that they speak with an authoritative voice. They reveal God. But the source of all authority is God, and the motive to obedience is love to God, who has thus revealed Himself to man through nature, reason, and history. The ultimate sanction of this authority is transformed from the old mode of coercion, and has become something new. No longer is man impelled by the fear of consequences, or by the dread of an external penalty somehow connected with disobedience. The strongest sanction is that he dreads with unspeakable terror the possibility of estrangement from God, and of losing that fellowship which is his very life.

This, then, is the nature of authority in religion. And it sums up in itself all other authorities. It deepens the sources of authority, it transforms its sanctions, and in so doing makes them more than ever coercive. It is also to be observed that this authority is wielded by God Himself and by Him alone. God alone is Lord of the conscience, and He alone can command the conscience. Any other authority is at best ministerial, and is authoritative only in so far as it can produce and substantiate its credentials from Him. Laws of nature, laws of reason, laws of civil authority, laws of morals, are binding on men so far as they are laws of God, and no further. This seems to be what authority is from the religious point of view.

Again, from the religious point of view all things and agencies have their value in this, that they express God's meaning, and are of worth just so far as they are able to express that meaning. Thus they have to be supplemented and added to by those other ways of Divine expression which are to be found in the history of man and in the fullest revelations of God. This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of revelation, or of that form of it which Christians believe to be the highest and fullest, viz. the revelation of God given to man in Christ. Nor can we even indicate how in the revelation of God in Christ there is a complete expression of the Divine nature, and the manifestation of authority binding on all. Truth for the intelligence, life for the heart, and energy for the will are summed up in Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life.

Leaving these topics for adequate treatment in their proper places, we may note here that the authority of God vindicates itself on every ground on which it could be vindicated. We instinctively bow down in obedience to the highest and the best, to the wisest and the most pure, to the mightiest and the greatest. We bow down to this authority and regard its behests as binding, not merely because we recognize its right to command, but because we find also that its service is perfect freedom, because we are persuaded that it can guide, strengthen, comfort, and console. Here also authority appears finally in its strongest and most persuasive form. Perhaps the most picturesque, as it is also the strongest form of authority, is that exerted by a person upon persons. Think of the loyalty of soldiers to the general in whom they trust, think of the devotion of disciples to a master, think of the loyalty of men to a great political leader; they will work for him, serve him, live for him, die for him; his word will send them forth to fulfil his will or die. This element of personal devotion appears in religion in the very form which religion in its highest flights takes. From this point of view natural laws, laws of reason, laws of morals, become ways by which we acquaint ourselves with God; but these do not satisfy, they simply impel us on to acquaint ourselves with God and be at peace.

From this point of view certain discussions regarding the ways by which God makes Himself known simply become irrelevant. There is no need to inquire into infallibility, or inerrancy, or any other categories of the same kind. These are categories which men cannot use. Nor are they needed. For the ways by which God makes Himself known are simply means to an end, and we need not spend time on their characteristics. We only ask, Do they lead to God? However good and sure the ways may be, their ultimate value lies in this—that they lead to God. Yet men may linger in them, admire them, speculate about them, their beauty, inerrancy, and so on, till they place them in a position which belongs to God alone. It is time that men should use them as they are meant to be used, and cease to attribute to them qualities which belong to God alone.

Authority then is real, is ever present with men, is indispensable for the training and education of man. It is exercised in many ways and in many degrees. It has to justify itself not merely by the exercise of power, and by the ruder kinds of penalty; it has to meet the demands of human reason, to satisfy the requirements of the human conscience, and to prove itself the guide, the counsellor, the friend of man. The will must find in it purpose, guidance, and energy; the heart must find in it something to stir the emotions, to win the affections, and to arouse the higher passions of love and desire. And the intelligence must find in it truth, principle, and reality. When we trace all authority up to God, we have named that name which at once satisfies all the demands that men have a right to make on the authority which confronts them with an absolute claim to loyalty and obedience.

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JAMES IVERACH.

AUTOMATISM.—Originally the 'automatic' meant that which happens of itself and without any visible external cause, and the uses of the word in the various sciences may all be traced back to this etymological signification.

1. The first of these is the *physiological*. When motions are observed in an organism which are not apparently initiated by any external stimulation, the action is described as automatic, and this automatism is one of the chief marks of a living body. Physiologists, however, generally hold that such spontaneity is only apparent, being really a secondary rearrangement and interaction of the chemical and physical forces which have been taken into the organism.* All physiological activity is thus taken as continuous with and included in the general scheme of physical interactions.

* See, however, art ATTENTION, p. 213[a], and H. Driesch, *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, London, 1908.

2. When this point of view is extended to the *psychological* plane and confronted with the fact of consciousness, it may engender that form of psycho-physical parallelism known as psycho-physical automatism, or the Automaton Theory. As the various physical energies are taken to form a closed system with a fixed amount of energy and incapable of being affected by anything alien or extraneous (such as consciousness), it must on this theory be denied that consciousness has any efficacy, *i.e.* that its presence in any way alters the course of physical change. Why it should exist at all becomes a problem; but it may be regarded as an *epi-phenomenon*, a sort of unsubstantial reflexion which accompanies, and is probably in some unexplained way produced by, the flux of physical changes, or as a series of changes running parallel to, and somehow corresponding with, the physical changes, but of a fundamentally different order. The scientific aim of the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism is to distinguish sharply between psychical and physical process, and it has the methodological advantage of freeing the consideration of the latter from the perplexing influence of the former. It may assume a double form, according as the automatism is supposed to be conscious or not. If the automatism is unconscious, the motions of the organism merely simulate the phenomena of feeling and consciousness. According to Descartes, animals are unconscious automata of this kind. But inasmuch as the only consciousness of which any one has direct experience is his own, this argument may, and indeed must, be extended also to human actions. Another's consciousness is always an inference by analogy drawn from his actions. We assume our fellow-men to be conscious, because they behave as we do, who are. But though in our own case we have direct experience of the existence of consciousness, we have not even here direct experience of its *efficacy*, if (with, *e.g.*, Hume) we choose to set aside the testimony of the direct experience of agency as a proof of 'causation.' The theory of psycho-physical automatism, then, fits in well enough with the assumptions of physics; but it comes into conflict with the biological presumption of the survival-value of any characteristic of life which has been progressively developed. For, unless consciousness possessed efficacy and altered the course of physical change, it is hard to see how it could have had survival-value. A complete refutation of psycho-physical automatism, however, can be achieved only by displaying the methodological nature of its fundamental assumptions.

3. *In psychology proper*, action is said to be automatic wherever the organism functions without the voluntary control (and in extreme cases even without the knowledge) of consciousness. Thus functions which are 'automatic' in the first sense may or may not be 'automatic' also in this; while, if the second sense of 'automatism' is adopted, it follows that *all* bodily motions are 'automatic' also, in this third sense. In practice, however, psychologists do not work with this theory, but are wont to distinguish between voluntary and automatic psychic processes. Automatism in this sense is closely related to the phenomena of Volition (*q.v.*) and Habit (*q.v.*). Fully conscious volition occupies an extreme position on a continuous scale, the other end of which is steeped in complete automatism. Such volition appears to be the condition of organic response only to relatively *new* situations, and, as involving effort, strain, thought, and time, is too expensive a process biologically not to be economized as much as possible. Accordingly, the volitional character of an action recedes more and more into the background as a function becomes established. As actions become familiar and habitual by repetition, volition and consciousness both tend to fade from the experience which accompanies the action, though for a long time the continuance of these factors as powers kept in reserve is suggested by their re-appearance in emergencies. In this way what was originally a highly conscious, difficult, and volitional act (*e.g.* walking or reading) may become degraded into almost any degree of facile automatism, though it should always be remembered that this psychological declension means a biological gain. Hence it may even be maintained that the distinction between the *secondary* automatism which is acquired, and the *primary* automatism of all the organic functions which are not (normally) under the control of the will or within the cognizance of consciousness, may ultimately be abolished. The difference between them may be reduced to one between acquisitions of a newer and of an older date, and primary automatism may be regarded as that part of vital functioning which has become so regular and certain as no longer to require conscious supervision. This interpretation is evidently attractive from an evolutionary standpoint, but as evidently it needs to be combined with some biologically acceptable theory of the transmission (or apparent transmission) of habits.

The philosophic importance of this secondary automatism is considerable. For it enables the moralist to include within the sphere of his competence many acts and processes which *as experienced* are no longer voluntary or even conscious, and so facilitates the evolutionary treatment of ethical data. It plainly suggests, moreover, a definite theory of the origin, function, and future of consciousness. If it is a law of function to tend from the conscious and volitional towards the habitual, involuntary, and unconscious, it would seem that any perfectly adjusted functioning must be unconscious, that consciousness itself was essentially a concomitant of a disturbance of habit, and that unconscious functioning was both the beginning and the end of conscious life. Thus consciousness would be essentially evanescent and transitory. This inference can be avoided only by denying that the growth of automatism is to be conceived as a mechanical process. It must be conceived as teleologically conditioned throughout, *i.e.* as a device for the facilitation of reactions upon stimulation, and for the economizing of a consciousness which always has more work than it can properly attend to, and so attends to the calls upon it in the order of their urgency. A good deal of evidence may be adduced, from the actual distribution of consciousness and automatism in the performance of organic functions of the same antiquity, to show that the lapsing into automatism does in point of fact occur in this teleological way.

4. In addition, however, to the actions which are removed from conscious control after having once been conscious, other automatisms are found to occur which seem never to have formed part of the conscious personality. They seem to be initiated outside the normal course of experience, and to intrude upon it as aliens. They may assist it, or more frequently disturb it, whence they are usually regarded as *pathological*. Such automatisms are usually sporadic and discontinuous, but may attain to a considerable degree of coherence and persistence in cases of 'multiple' and 'alternating' personality (*q.v.*). They have been classified as *sensory* (*e.g.* dreams [*q.v.*] and visual and auditory hallucinations [*q.v.*]) and *motor* (automatic speaking and writing), and their interpretation raises the important question of *sub-*

conscious mental life (see SUBCONSCIOUSNESS) and its relation to consciousness. It is also thought by some that in such automatisms traces of supernormal knowledge and powers may be detected, and these have been claimed as evidence of the possibility of communications from the departed. Their biological value for the guidance of conduct is not as a rule great, and this is precisely the reason why they are usually treated as pathological. But the whole subject has not yet been adequately studied. It is clear, however, that historically these automatisms have contributed greatly to the belief in possession, inspiration, and in the supernatural generally.

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F. C. S. SCHILLER.

AUTONOMY.—The term 'autonomy,' as employed by very early writers, is distinctly political, signifying civil or national independence. Some authors of the 17th and 18th cents. use it to denote the freedom of the religious conscience. Kant is the only one who introduces it into the language of moral philosophy, in a truly characteristic sense ('Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,' *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Rosenkranz, Leipzig, 1838–1842, viii. 71 ff.; 'Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,' *ib.* p. 145 ff.). By autonomy of the will, Kant means the faculty that the will possesses of being its own lawgiver, of being itself, by its own nature, the source and substance of the moral law, the moral law itself.

Under what conditions can the will be autonomous? When it is determined by its own form, not by its object. This condition is fulfilled if the will obeys only general laws, if it admits only of those maxims (*i.e.* motives) which can be transformed into general laws. The will which always acts with regard to the universal, as such, provides its own laws: it is autonomous; it is free. For to be free is to obey absolute imperatives, and imperatives of this kind are not the outcome of experience, but solely of reason as practical reason.

The opposite of autonomy is heteronomy. It is simply the subjection of the will to some object or other, *i.e.* ultimately, to the desire of being happy. Heteronomous imperatives are never absolute, because they imply empirical conditions in the subject and object, which do not exist everywhere and at all times. They therefore cannot submit to that moral position which consists in the unconditional surrender of the free will to absolute laws (*i.e.* of the will to itself, for nothing is absolute in the practical order of things except liberty itself); or, in other words, of the empirical will to the pure will. One form of heteronomy is theonomy. It consists in obeying God, because He has sanctioned certain laws, arbitrarily imposed by Him, by means of punishments and rewards.

The ethics of autonomy, therefore, is the ethics of the pure will or of liberty. This pure will naturally has an object, but it is not the matter of this object that determines it; it is its form only, or rather the quality that makes it worthy of being sought after by a will which aims at realizing the universal, *i.e.* general, laws. Thus general happiness can be sought after by a free will; yet not always so far as to embrace the well-being of humanity, which is of interest to our human sensibilities, but only in so far as it can form the contents of a general law, which concerns the understanding of all rational beings.

Autonomy is a kind of summary, forming the kernel, of Kantian ethics. Before it can be thoroughly appreciated and criticized, a general examination of the ethics must be made. We shall confine ourselves to a few brief remarks. In particular, notice that in Kant the idea of an autonomous will has two motives. (1) The first is the conception of liberty that it has within it. According to Kant, the will ceases to be free when it is determined by the attraction which any object other than itself may exercise over it. This is what might be called the ascetic element of Kant's ethics. In all love, of whatever kind it is, he perceives only motives that are governed by the passions and self. (2) We must desire the universal, for only the universal is presented to us as an element of pure reason; all that is empirical is contingent. Here we find ourselves in the presence of the rational and social element of Kant's ethics. These two arguments, which in Kant are blended in one, are in reality of very different kinds. The submission of the empirical will to the pure will is not connected with the idea of the universal, which Kant identifies elsewhere with the social; on the other hand, this notion of the universal affects the will only when it becomes the object of an attraction, the contents of a feeling. Kant's ideal is a will which is identical with reason, but experience does not bear out the inference, and it is not conclusively proved, that the man whose will has become 'pure,' in the sense implied by Kant, is the moral man *par excellence*. It seems, indeed, that he would lack what constitutes the soul of all complete and profound morality. The Kantian idea of autonomy is an abstract idea stripped of all psychological basis. It expresses an ideal of liberty indeed, but Kant was quite unable to deduce from it practical rules for human conduct.

Of present-day philosophers, the chief to revive the idea of autonomy is Cohen ('Die Ethik des reinen Willens,' *System der Philosophie*², 1907, pt. ii.). But, inspired by Fichte's ideas, Cohen conceives autonomy, not as the faculty of practical reason, producing laws freely for human conduct, but as the faculty of man, making the human individual the supreme end of all his actions. Under this conception, autonomy becomes, in a direct and positive manner, a social principle, which it is in Kant only indirectly or rather negatively.

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EUGÈNE EHRHARDT.

AVALOKITEŚVARA.—1. *The name.**—(*a*) Iśvara, which, among *naiyāyikas* (philosophers) and *bhāktas* (devotees) alike, refers to the personal and supreme god, means etymologically 'king,' 'monarch.' It is an epithet common to the Bodhisattvas, or at least—for that name includes every individual who seeks to attain the Bodhi, even although he is still a 'natural man' (*pṛthagjana*)—to all the Bodhisattvas who are in complete possession of the qualifications of Bodhisattvas, viz. those who are 'great Bodhisattvas' (Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva), 'masters of the ten stages of Bodhisattva-ship' (*daśabhūmi-īśvara*) (see *Mahāvyutpatti*, 22, 15). But, when speaking of Avalokita, who is not only a 'great god' but a 'god-providence,' we cannot forget that Śiva is called the 'great lord' (Maheśvara) or simply, 'the lord' (Iśvara).

(*b*) The meaning of the compound 'Avalokiteśvara' is not at all clear. Scholars do not agree as to its signification. It may mean either 'the lord of what we see,' *i.e.* 'of the present world,' or 'of

* These numbers refer to the paragraphs of the article.

* See Kern, *Gesch.* i. 324, *Inscr. ut Battambang*, 76; Burnouf, *Introduction*, 226; Minayeff, *Grammaire palie*, p. 7: 'le souverain qui voit tout'; Grunwedel, *Lamaism*, p. 130, Rhys Davids, *Buddhism* (1880), p. 200 ff.; Waddell, *Lamaism*, p. 40, and *JRAS*, 1894; Watters, *Yuan-Chwang*, i. 343: 'the beholding lord.'

the view,' or 'the lord whom we see,' 'the lord revealed,' 'the master who is or was seen.'*

But the Tibetans, and no doubt their Indian authorities also, took it to mean 'the lord who looks'; for their translation 'Spyan-ras-gzigs' seems to dispense with the idea of 'visible lord.'† Some modern interpreters have understood the Sanskrit name to signify: 'lord who looks down from on high.' This meaning is not quite satisfactory, for Avalokita, like all Bodhisattvas, looks both at the Buddha ('*Bhagavanmukhāvalokana-para*') and at the creatures with a look of compassion ('*karuṇāsnigdhāvalokana*').‡

This interpretation makes Avalokita an active present participle, which, as M. Kern remarks, is bad grammar; but Burnouf failed to see in this inaccuracy a decisive argument against the current interpretation, and we may agree with him.§ Further, from the grammatical point of view, Avalokiteśvara, 'lord of compassionate glances' =Avalokana, 'lord of special mercies,' 'lord with compassionate glances.'‖ Avalokita is the god whose face is turned in every direction in order to see everything and to save everybody; he is called 'the all-sided one,' '*samantamukha*.'¶

(*c*) One of the most notable names of Avalokita, and certainly the one which gives us the best idea of the character which had been ascribed to him for a very long time, is *Lokeśvara*, *Lokanātha*, 'Lord, Protector of the world.' M. Kern expresses it very well when he says that he is the 'god of the present,' 'he who bears the world,' 'son of a Buddha (Amitābha), as the present is the son of the past,' the concrete counterpart of the 'Body of Law' (*Dharmakāya*), the present form of the Buddha, 'the god of daylight and of the living, as Amitābha, who dwells in the setting sun, is the god of Paradise.'** The texts clearly show that Avalokita is the sun; and, in fact, Padmapāṇi, 'lotus-bearer,' which is a name of Avalokita, is also a name of Sūrya ('sun'). Avalokita is the Viṣṇu of the Buddhists.

2. If Avalokiteśvara signified originally 'the lord who is seen,' 'de geopenbaarde Herr,' 'the revealed god,' it looks as if we ought to trace back this conception to the very origin of the personage under discussion. This would present difficulties.* However that may be, as it is very difficult to arrange our literary and iconographic material historically, we shall content ourselves with placing it in logical order. There will be good reason to doubt whether this plan gives an accurate idea of the evolution of Avalokita, because popular religion and religion as described by the sources are two very different things.

3. Although the *Mahāvastu* gives a sketch of the theory of the *bhūmis* ('spiritual stages') of the Bodhisattvas, although it abounds with 'areas' or 'fields of Buddhas' (*Buddhakṣetra*), there are no Great Bodhisattvas in it, playing the part of protector of creatures and patron of Buddhas, and there is not a trace of Avalokita.

In the *Lalita*, among the 32,000 Bodhisattvas, who listen to Buddha, the author mentions Maitreya, Dharaṇiśvara,† several others, and particularly a *Mahākaruṇāchandrin*. Dr. Waddell remarks that, in the Tibetan translation, this last name is replaced by *Mahākaruṇasattva* ('Sñin-rje chen-po sems-dpa'); now *Mahākaruna*, 'the great and merciful one,' is one of the innumerable synonyms of Avalokita. We leave it to the reader to judge whether this information is sufficient to contradict the popular opinion that there is no mention of Avalokita in the *Lalita*.‡

4. A great many authorities§ do not give Avalokita unrivalled supremacy, but place him along with a certain number of companions, five or eight, apart from the crowd of Bodhisattvas, and accord him a kind of pre-eminence: 'the sons of Buddha, with Avalokita and Mañjughoṣa at their head . . .,' 'Avalokita, Samantabhadra ('the wholly auspicious'), Mañjughoṣa ('lovely voice' = Mañjuśrī'), Kṣitigarbha ('earth-womb'), and Vajrin ('thunderbolt-holder' = Vajrapāṇi),' whose special task is the struggle against the demons.

In these texts we are confronted with a great superhuman saint, the chief of that noble group of Bodhisattvas who, according to the Great Vehicle, constitute 'the congregation' (*Saṅgha*) or third jewel. Avalokita plays a most important part in some of the sūtras, *e.g.* in the *Dharmasaṅgīti*, where he extols charity, 'the great compassion,' the only function of the Bodhisattvas, to which one must give oneself up entirely without fear of committing sin; if the exercise of charity involves wrong-doing, it is yet better to suffer the pains of hell than to deprive a creature of the hope he has

* See Kern, *Inscr. ut Battambang*: 'lord contemplated'= Avalokita iśvara=vyakta iśvara, *i.e.* a name of Śiva, 'lord of the view *or* of that which is seen'=drṣṭi-guru, *i.e.* another name of Śiva.

† *Spyan-ras=chakṣus*, 'eye.' It is a lofty expression. We have, *e.g.*, 'thugs-rjei spyan-ras-kyis gzigs-pa: karuṇāchakṣuṣā avalokayan' (Sarat Chandra, *Dict.*). *Gzigs* also is a word of elevated style, meaning 'to see,' and, owing to the influence of the name of Avalokita, meaning 'to give,' 'compassion.' If the Tibetan translation caused any doubt, the following quotation from the versified Karanda (Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 226) would dispel it: 'He is so called because he regards with compassion beings suffering from the evils of existence.' The Mongol has *niduber utchekitchi*, 'who beholds,' from *niduber utchego*, 'to see,' from *nidun*, 'eye'

‡ *Sādhana* (text of incantation), quoted by Foucher, *Icon.* ii. pp. 16, 18. Waddell explains 'look down from on high' by the fact that the usual dwelling-place of Avalokita is on mountains. This information is correct, and establishes a point of contact between Avalokita and Śiva. But the prefix *ava* has no such precise meaning. The *vyavalokana*, 'glance,' like the smile (*smita*) and the beam (*raśmi*), is a mode of communication.

§ Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 226, note. *Parijita* (*Mahāvyutpatti*, 126, 63) seems quite clearly to mean *paryitavān*, and it is possible that there are other examples.

‖ See Bothlinck-Roth, *s.v. lok* with *ava* (§ 2). Further, *avalokita* means 'a person to whom good-bye has been said,' 'one who has been seen for the last time' (see indexes to *Divyāvadāna* and *Mahavastu*). Avalokiteśvara is indeed the lord of the departed and the help of the dying. The present writer owes these valuable observations to Mr. F. W. Thomas.

¶ *Lotus*, ch. xxiv; Kern, ii. 171; Beal, *Catena*, 384. Like *samantachandra* and *samantālokha*, it is an epithet common to all the Bodhisattvas (*Lalitavistara*, 550, 11).

** See Kern, *op. cit.* With regard to the solar character of Amitābha and Avalokita, the first of the meditations on Amitābha, as it is described in the *Amitāyurdhyāna*, is full of information: 'all beings . . . see the setting sun' (see § 9). Amitābha is Śiva unrevealed; Avalokita is Śiva revealed. The infinite indivisible light which characterizes the former (*amita-ābhā*) is contrasted with the finite light (*mita*) of the latter: 'Brilliant is Lokeśvara, who bears on his head Amitābha, brilliant with, as it were, the appearance of the sun and the moon with their finite splendour.' Elsewhere Avalokita is represented as having the sun as his body (*dinakaravapus*). The Paradise of Amitābha is closely connected with the town of Varuna in the West, the city of the sunset, which is usually called Sukhā (Max Muller, *SBE* xlix. p. 22). It may also have some connexion with the city of Kusāvatī, where the 'great King of Glory' reigns (*Mahāsudassanasutta*, *SBE* xi. p. 247).

* The present writer thinks that M. Kern gives a perfect explanation of the nature of Avalokiteśvara, who is a Buddhist Śiva in visible form, while Amitābha is the Śiva Brahman. The former is characterized by the 'measured' light of the sun and the moon, the latter is ethereal and infinite light (*amita*). The Battambang inscription is very clear. But the present writer thinks that before becoming Śiva, Avalokiteśvara was a Bodhisattva, and, as such, was named Avalokita.

† 'Lord of the earth,' one of Śiva's names, a 'dhyānibuddha' in the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*; according to Waddell, 'a common title for Mañjuśrī' (*JRAS*, 1894, p. 55).

‡ Lunar names (*chandra*) are frequent among the Bodhisattvas (cf. *Mahāvyutpatti*, 23).

§ *e.g. Bodhicharyāvatāra* (ch. ii. 1, 48). In *Mahāvyutpatti* (published A.D. 816–838) 23, we find the following order: Avalokiteśvara, Maitreya, Ākāśagarbha, Samantabhadra, Vajrapāni, Mañjuśrikumārabhūta, Sarvanivaraṇaviskambhin, Kṣitigarbha, Mahāsthāmaprāpta, Ratnaketu, Ratnapāni, etc. It must be observed that Ratnapāni (a future so-called Dhyānibodhisattva) is not the first of the Bodhisattvas 'beginning with Ratna,' and also that Mañjuśri holds quite a subordinate place. Cf. *Dharmasaṅgraha*, xii., where among the eight Bodhisattvas there is no mention of Avalokita.

placed in you.* Avalokita is a Great Bodhisattva, but he is not the only one, nor is he unquestionably the first.

It is probably this stage in the history of Avalokita that is represented in the very old reliefs, where a 'Lotus-bearer' Padmapāṇi (afterwards the equivalent of Avalokita) appears with four or seven other Bodhisattvas, surrounding a Buddha or below a Buddha.†

There is reason to believe that Maitreya (the future Buddha), for example, whose doctrinal position is better established, must originally have taken precedence of him,‡ and there are noteworthy and well-authenticated writings, such as the Sanskrit-Tibetan Lexicon (*Mahāvyutpatti*) and the Chinese records, which lead us to believe that Maitreya was able to maintain his position. In any case, it must be noticed that the rôle of 'Good Bodhisattva,' helpful and divine, the very noble (*paramārya*), the giver of security (*abhayandada*), etc., was divided among Kṣitigarbha and his companions, before it became the more or less exclusive designation of Avalokita.§ Now it must be borne in mind that the preceding remarks are very hypothetical; for, from the dawn of the Christian era, in certain circles at least, Avalokita became an important personage and a jealous god.

5. *Lotus of the True Law, Sukhāvatīvyūha, Amitāyurdhyānasūtra.*—(*a*) Avalokita is not the protagonist of the *Lotus*, but there is a whole chapter on his *ἀριστεία*, his 'gesta,' in Skr. his *māhātmya*.‖ He is far superior to the other Great Bodhisattvas (Akṣayamatī, etc.), who along with him listen to Śākyamuni, with the single exception of Mañjuśrī, who is probably his equal. He is the 'saviour'; it is better to think of him than to do honour to thousands of Buddhas. He assumes the form¶ of Buddha, Bodhisattva, Maheśvara, Kuvera, Vajrapāṇi,** as the case may be, the more easily to fulfil his task of mercy. Akṣayamatī ('undecaying intelligence') presents him with flowers; he divides them between Śākya and the stūpa of an 'extinct' Buddha. According to the versified text, his real dwelling-place is in the 'Sukhākara,' the paradise of Amitābha, where he sits sometimes on the right and sometimes on the left of Buddha.

(*b*) The *Sukhāvatī* and the *Amitāyurdhyānasūtra*** supply us with a very fine theology of Amitābha and Avalokita, a theology which has the twofold distinction of being almost orthodox, while seeking to present a rational account of all the exaggerations of *bhakti*, or devotion.

Amitābha or Lokanātha was in ancient times a *bhikṣu* called Dharmākara,† 'mine of the law'; it is now ten ages (*kalpas*) since he became Buddha, and it will be a very long time before he is extinct. In principle all the Buddhas are equal; they possess the same intrinsic perfections, the same knowledge.‡ But it is very probable that they are differentiated in the exercise of their Buddhahood, according to the vow that they have made. Now Dharmākara, the future Amitābha, under the Buddha Lokeśvararāja,§ vowed that, when he reached Buddhahood, he would have a 'Buddha field,' wondrously blessed, the happy land (*Sukhāvatī*),‖ and that is why there flock to him from all the 'Buddha fields' the beings appointed to *nirvāṇa*, either as future arhats or as Buddhas.¶ It is with Amitābha that those who are guilty but possess the promise and potency of deliverance spend their period of probation in lotus-flowers; with him also the Bodhisattvas become prepared for their last birth, by having good opportunities of going to visit, to honour, and to listen to the Buddhas of all the worlds.** After this period these Bodhisattvas will become Buddhas, and will have in their turn spheres of their own. As regards Avalokita, it is at the end of our age that he will appear as the thousandth and last Buddha of the age.††

The Bodhisattvas are not equal among themselves. In the heaven of Amitābha there are two, Avalokita and Mahāsthāmaprāpta,‡‡ almost as great and luminous as Buddha, who sit on thrones equal to his. Avalokita is the more majestic; this is due to his vow to bring all beings, without exception, into the 'happy land.' And while his glorious body illumines a great many worlds, he traverses them all in different forms, sometimes real and sometimes magical; like Amitābha himself, he has parts of himself incarnated here and there; he never forgets for a moment his rôle as provider of the Sukhavatī. And it is he, rather

* See *Śikṣās*, p. 286; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 314.

† See Grunwedel, *Buddh. Art in India*, pp. 196, 201 ff.

‡ Maitreya is the only Bodhisattva acknowledged in the Little Vehicle. He is the second in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 23, the first in *Dharmasaṅgraha*, xii; and plays the chief part in the foundation of the Great Vehicle. Grunwedel (*Buddhistische Kunst*) has some hesitation in recognizing Avalokita in the Gāndhāra sculptures, and is certain only of the identification of Maitreya (*Buddh. Art in India*, p. 192 n.). Nevertheless, the view which, following his example, we express on the chronological and dogmatic priority of Maitreya is supported not only by the fact that Maitreya alone is recognized by the Little Vehicle (Beal, *Buddhist Records*, ii. 61), but also by certain statements of the Chinese pilgrims, who were more interested in the heaven of Maitreya than in that of Amitābha, more interested in the coming of Maitreya than in the present living Avalokita (see especially *ib.* ii. 223, i. 227).

§ More or less exclusive, according to Wassilieff, as is proved by the collections of the one hundred and eight names, of divinities in Kandjur, *Rgyu*, xiv.: Avalokita, Maitreya, Ākāśagarbha (Khagarbha), Samantabhadra, Vajrapāṇi, Mañjuśrī, Sarvanīvaraṇaviṣkambhin and Kṣitigarbha (Wass., 175), the eight Bodhisattvas of the *Dharmasaṅgraha*, with the addition of Avalokita and the omission of Gaganagañja.

‖ See the translations of Burnouf and Kern. The *Māhātmya* forms ch. xxv. of the Chinese edition. In China it is one of the official texts of the religion of Avalokita (see I-tsing, in Takakusu, 162; Beal's tr., *Catena*, p. 389).

¶ The *Śikṣās* ascribes to every Bodhisattva this power of transformation. Even the wish of all the Bodhisattvas to become food and drink (*pānabhojana*) in times of famine is taken literally.

** The association of Vajrapāṇi with divinities who are anything but Buddhist is worthy of note. In the hundred and eight names of Tārā (ed. de Blonay) Vajrapāṇi begs for mystical recipes from Avalokita. See E. Senart, *Congrès d'Alger*, 'Vajrapāṇi'; and below, p. 259b n. ‖.

* *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (Chinese tr. 147–186), in two redactions, edited by Max Muller, *Anecd. Oxoniensia*, and also in fac-simile Musée Guimet, II., translated in *SBE* xlix, with the *Amitāyus*, the Skr. original of which seems to be lost (translated into Chinese in 424). On this text cf. also *JBTS*, 1894, 2, 1.

† On the human antecedents of Amita and Avalokita, cf. also Rémusat, *Fo-koue-ki*

‡ There are two things which have no limit, the brilliance of Amitābha and the *prajñāpratibhāna* of every Buddha. The light of Amitābha illumines all the fields of Buddha, owing to the 'special vow' of this Buddha to lighten his own field and an infinite number of other fields. Although Amitābha is praised, glorified, and preached by all the Buddhas, he cannot lay claim to any kind of monarchy. A fairly just idea of the system may be formed by regarding the Buddhas as saints (in the Roman Catholic sense of the word), who are all saints for the same reason, but among whom piety distinguishes more or less powerful saints. Cf. *Mahāvastu*, iii. 330. 15.

§ A name of Avalokita.

‖ More refined in charity is the wish expressed in *Karuṇapuṇḍarika* 'to have a Buddha field' inhabited by inferior beings overwhelmed by calamities, in order to have a more worthy object of pity.

¶ In the kingdom of Amitābha all the Bodhisattvas are in their last birth, and live there without limit, owing to their special wish (*pranidhānaviśeṣa*) to save others. It is noteworthy that our text admits the existence of arhats, saints according to the Little Vehicle, *i.e.* beings appointed to attain to *nirvāna* without passing through the stage of Buddhahood. The Great Vehicle believes that all beings will become Buddhas, but this was not the belief of Hiuen Tsiang.

** They do not even have to move in order to worship and listen to the Buddhas of all the worlds.

†† Schmidt, *Über die tausend Buddhas* (p. 106); and Rémusat, *Cosmogonie, Mélanges Posthumes*.

‡‡ In modern (Tibetan) pictures of the Sukhāvatī, Vajrapāṇi takes the place of Mahāsthāma (Foucher, *Catalogue*, p. 33). The Japanese representation of the Sukhāvatī is nearer the original text. Maitreya, Avalokita, and Mahāsthāma often have stūpas on their heads (Grunwedel, *Buddh. Kunst*, p. 193 and fig 83).

than Amitābha himself, who is the lord of the Sukhāvatī.*

This ostentatious and short-sighted glorification of Amitābha and Avalokita corresponds, in our opinion, to a doctrine of salvation, very different from the ordinary doctrine of the Great Vehicle. According to the Little Vehicle, the Buddhas were only instructors; in the 'rationalist' Great Vehicle they have become models, and the Bodhisattvas appear as friends, counsellors, protectors;† their presence does not in any way lessen the necessity for personal effort. In the Sukhāvatī, Amitābha and Avalokita save the faithful almost in spite of themselves, as the cat saves her young by taking them in her mouth (a Kraiṣṇavite metaphor). There is, however, one reservation: beings guilty of 'mortal sins' are excluded from the Sukhāvatī. The *Amitāyurdhyāna* does away with this restriction: the parricide is saved if he pronounces the name of Amita. In a word, our theologians, as well as those of the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, have to distinguish between ordinary people who are liable to hell, etc., and devotees who are naturally exempt.

(*c*) It is to this period that the iconographic monuments seem to belong, about which the Chinese pilgrims had given us their testimony, before the archæologists examined them; and we are quite justified in referring to them here, as the *Amitāyurdhyāna* speaks of statues in which the characteristics of the god are reproduced. We find isolated statues of Avalokita, among which the giant statues deserve mention, and groups in which he is facing Maitreya, Tārā, and Mañjuśrī, and probably also Mahāsthāma—wonderful statues, recurring throughout the whole Buddhist world from the extreme North-West to Ceylon.‡ They give us a sculptured representation of the texts, which describe in detail the attitude, colour, and qualities of the gods. The *Amitāyurdhyānasūtra* places a 'magical' Buddha, twenty-five leagues high, on the head of the glorious body of Avalokita, seated on the left of Amitābha; this is clearly represented in the icons (to which attention has already been drawn by Hiuen Tsiang), where Avalokita wears in his head-dress a seated statue of a Buddha, who, at a very early date, if not from the very beginning, was identified with Amitabha.§

The Chinese pilgrims seem to have recognized a characteristic of the Great Vehicle in the fact that worship was bestowed on the Bodhisattvas, Mañjuśrī and Avalokita, and on the Prajñā. Hiuen Tsiang mentions that a statue of Maitreya was worshipped in a district which is quite 'hīnayānistic' (*Buddh. Records*, ii. 61)—the same thing happened with the statues of Avalokita in Ceylon—but he tells the curious story of Gunaprabha, who, when he was transferred to the heaven of Maitreya, refused to worship him, because an 'ordained bhikṣu' is superior to a Bodhisattva (i. 192).‖

6. Avalokita rises still higher in the *Kāraṇḍavyūha** and in the *Śūraṅgama*;† but here the theology seems to be extremely involved; we have now to deal not with a sūtra, but with Purānic literature. On the other hand, the iconography and the manuals on incantation demonstrate that, on account of the above-described notion of the providential polymorphism of Avalokita, that god is identified with all the Hindu deities, both mild and cruel. Avalokita is a Buddhist Śiva, an ascetic and a magician.

(*a*) In some of its features the *Kāraṇḍavyūha*‡ recalls the *Lotus* and the *Amitāyurdhyāna*: Avalokita learns the law from Amitābha, he comes to worship Śākyamuni, and brings him flowers and Amitābha's compliments; he is therefore in some way inferior to the Buddhas. But, on the other hand, he is far superior to the Buddhas and also to Samantabhadra: no Buddha possesses clairvoyance (*pratibhāna*) equal to his, all the Buddhas together could not estimate his worth. No other being besides him has a marvellous body, which the Buddhas have difficulty in seeing, and each pore of which contains thousands of Buddhas, saints of all kinds, and entire worlds. And it is from the body of Avalokita (Foucher, *Cat.* p. 25), regarded from another point of view, that the inferior gods issue: the sun and the moon come out of his eyes;§ Maheśvara, who will be called Mahādeva, and receives the promise of Buddhahood, comes from his forehead; Brahmā from his shoulder, etc. We have said that, in addition to being demiurge, Avalokita is also a saviour; from his fingers flow rivers which cool the hells and feed the *pretas* ('ghosts'); he terrifies all the demons and puts Vajrapāni to flight.‖

There is no need for astonishment at this extraordinary mastery over men and things. Avalokita is the great yogin, the great magician (*vidyādhipati, anekamantraśatāvakīrṇa*); he is in possession of the formulæ (in which he glories in the *Amitāyurdhyāna*); but, above all, he possesses the only, the true, formula *ōṁ maṇi padme hūṁ*.¶

* See the Calcutta edition, 1873; Csoma-Feer, p. 246; Hodgson, *Extracts*; the summary of Rajendralāla (*Buddh. Lit.* pp. 95, 101); the masterly exposition of Burnouf (*Introd.* p. 221). The Tibetan translation probably belongs to A.D. 616 (Schlagintweit, p. 84; Rockhill, p. 212), but the original is supposed to have been in existence from the time of the mythical king Lha-tho-tho-ri (A D. 427); see Grunwedel, *Myth.* 451, 247. On the *Maṇi-bka-hbum*, 'the hundred thousand precious commandments,' a glorification of Avalokita, which is wrongly supposed to belong to this time, see Rockhill, 212, and Schlagintweit, 84. For the history of the Rākṣasīs, cf. Beal, *Buddhist Records*, ii. 241.

† Ch. vi. See Beal, *Catena*, 39. 284; Nanjio, 399 (tr. A D. 384-417); Wass, 175; Csoma-Feer, 249, and the quotations from the *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*. Enumerating the innumerable, we distinguish 32 manifestations of the god, 14 cases in which he provides safety, etc. For the worship of Avalokita and Amitābha the reader is referred also to the Chinese sources.

‡ Śākyamuni speaks to Maitreya, Sarvanivaraṇaviṣkambhin and Ratnapāni. Avalokita receives 61 designations. Are the lists of 108 names later?

§ *Śūryāvalokanakara* (see Foucher, *loc. cit.*); cf. the name Avalokita.

‖ *Vajrapāṇividrāvaṇakara*. In the *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, Vajrapāni is *par excellence* the demon-dispeller, and the charitable visitor of hells; but from most ancient times Avalokita too has been engaged in the salvation of infernal beings

¶ It is this famous formula that is in view in the *Divyāvadāna* (foot of p. 613) which makes no mention of Avalokita. Śākyamuni imparts it to Ānanda; it was preached by the six Buddhas, it is known to Sakra, Indra, etc.; it constitutes a talisman of the first rank (see Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 541; Kern, *Gesch.* i. 400). The Tibetans claim that it fell down to them from heaven about A.D. 400. So far as the present writer knows, it is neither mentioned nor contemplated in Nanjio, No 326 (tr. A.D. 420), which contains two *dhāraṇis* and two *bījas*. A great deal has been written about the 'formula of six syllables' We may mention Klaproth, *JA*, March 1831; Rémusat, *Mélanges*, p. 99, *Fo-koue-ki*, p. 118; Schlagintweit, pp. 54 and 55; Grunwedel, *Lamaism*, p. 82.

There is no doubt that the tantrik literature gives it an obscene interpretation. *Maṇi* and *padme* in this jargon have a very distinct value. On the other hand, Rémusat's cosmological explanation does not seem altogether improbable. See F. W. Thomas, *JRAS*, 1906, p. 464.

* He is called Sukhāvatīśvara (*Trikāṇḍaśesa*).

† See the 'Code du Mahāyāna en Chine,' where Avalokita does not play any part at all (J. J. M. de Groot, p. 98).

‡ The information of the Buddhist pilgrims on this point is confirmed and explained by the miniatures published by M. Foucher. The last inscription devoted to Avalokita is dated 1229 (Oudh). On Avalokita in Ceylon, cf. Foucher, *Icon.* 110; Beal, *Buddhist Records*, II. 247; *JRAS*, 1900, p. 42. Some authors think that Mount Potala, to the east of the Malay Mountains, is perhaps the original home of Avalokita. It is well known that this Potala has been transported to China and to Tibet (*Tāranātha*, 144, 203; Foucher, *Icon.*, 28; Waddell, *Lhasa*, 1905, pp. 364, 388).

§ The relation between 'Dhyānibuddhas' and their Bodhisattvas is explained in the art. ĀDIBUDDHA. Wassilieff mentions Vairochana as the father of Avalokita. Cf. Grunwedel, *Buddh. Art in India*, p. 196 f.

‖ For a study of this problem the reader is referred to art. MAHĀYĀNA. To avoid any misunderstanding, let us merely point out that the *Avalokitavrata* and the *Bhadracharipraṇidhāna* (Nanjio, 1142), which corresponds closely to it, are looked upon as sacred texts by the Sautrāntikas, who are supposed to belong to the Little Vehicle.

Is there a Buddha who possesses this 'hexasyllabic (*ṣaḍakṣarī*) knowledge (*vidyā*)'? No. Is there a being who possesses it? No. It belongs to Avalokita alone, and he reveals it to whomsoever he pleases. This magical omnipotence has its other side: whoever knows the formula does away with the god, whose 'heart,' *i.e.* 'mystery,' the formula is, and in his way is another Avalokita.*

Further, the single word 'Adored one' (*vandita*) is a sufficient description of him. He is the refuge, Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha all in one. Whosoever pronounces or traces on his body the magical syllables receives a body which participates in the body of the thunderbolt (*vajrakāyaśarīra*), the apex of knowledge of the Buddhas (*Tathāgata-jñānakoṭi*), and becomes like a *dhātustūpa*, a stūpa with relics.†

(*b*) Iconography and the manuals of incantation,‡ which illustrate and supplement each other in a marvellous way, prove that this deification of Avalokita is not merely verbal, but that it is in close connexion with worship and daily idolatry.§ All the Tibetan forms of Avalokita are replicas of the Hindu cults, which are attested as early as the 10th and 11th cents., but are undoubtedly much more ancient. In fact, our literary evidences (*sādhanas*) prove that the foreigner had had an influence on the mother-country, for there are representations of Avalokita, as well as of other gods, after the fashion of Udyāna, of China and other places.

It would be impossible to describe the whole iconography of Avalokita; that task has quite recently been performed extremely well.‖ We shall merely notice a few characteristic features.

Avalokita is polymorphous; but, in many cases and until the more degenerate times, he retains the human form, two arms and a head. There is usually on his head a small figure of the Jina Amitābha.¶ In one hand he bears the lotus (*padma*),** with the other he makes the gesture of the 'bestower of favour,' and a ghost (*preta*) is represented holding up its thin lips towards the ambrosia which flows from his fingers. As satellites Avalokita has Tārā (sometimes in two forms, calm and angry), Hayagrīva ('horse-necked'), the guardian of the 30,500,000 magical formulæ, and Sudhana, who is also a friend of Maitreya. When Avalokita has four arms, two of them are joined in *añjali* (the hands forming a cup) as a sign of respect; the other two hold the lotus and the rosary. But the ascetic attributes are the antelope's skin and the water-pot. And then, when the god receives the names of Śiva, Amoghapāśa, Hālāhala, Nīlakaṇṭha, Padmanarteśvara, etc., his arms, his faces, and his eyes become multiplied, and he carries tridents encircled with serpents, skulls filled with flowers, bows, arrows, etc.

Among the curious figures, besides those which clearly show the identification with Śiva, the following are noteworthy: (1) the figure of Siṁhanāda ('lion's cry'). This was the name given to the solemn declarations of Śākyamuni; Mañjuśrī, who in Buddhism is the personification of wisdom, is mounted on a lion. Avalokita becomes confused with Mañjuśrī, is seated on the lion, carries the book and the sword of Mañjuśrī, but all the time retains his own attributes as well. (2) The figure with the thousand arms, in which the arms, arranged in the form of a peacock's tail, give a graphic representation of the metaphor;* this is a sculptured interpretation of the universality of the god. (3) The figure with eleven heads (three, three, three, one, one, the last one being the head of Amitābha) and a thousand arms is the translation, as it were, of his former name Samantamukha.† It corresponds to a legend which shows very clearly the character of Avalokita: 'May my head split asunder,' the god had said, 'if I fail in my vow to save beings!'—an old Buddhist expression. As a matter of fact, he did give way for an instant to discouragement, on seeing the inefficacy of his efforts; his head split into a thousand pieces, and Amitābha put it together again. There are several forms of this story, in which the old is mixed with the new.

We shall also quote a modern Nepalese inscription which gives a good account of the dignity and the physiognomy of our hero: 'The chiefs of the Yogins call him the King of the Fishes (*Matsyendra*), the devotees of the female deities (*śāktas*) call him *Śakti*, the Buddhists call him *Lokeśvara*. All honour to this being, whose true form is Brahman.'‡ This identification of Avalokita with the Śakti *par excellence*, *i.e.* with the personification of the cosmic female energy, shows, in a more striking way than the coupling of the god with the twenty-one Tāras,§ that the Chinese transformation of Avalokita into a woman had probably been already effected in India.‖

7. We need not say very much about the Tibetan doctrine of incarnations, according to which all

* This magician (*māyāvin*) with eleven heads—this shows the best and truest form of his polymorphism—is incomprehensible. He appears and disappears like a meteor (*jvalann ivāgnipiṇḍaḥ*). He has a hundred thousand arms and a hundred thousand times ten million eyes. He exists in the past, the present, and the future (*trikāla*). He was at work when Śākya muni was merely a worshipper. There is no limit put upon his activity except when all beings have entered nirvāna. The Buddhas, in fact, are only some of the saints whom he has 'matured,' and who owe everything to him; there is deliverance only in the hexasyllabic formula.

† Let us recall the fact that the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* in verse adds some details in the 'Adibuddhistic' sense (see art ĀDIBUDDHA). But note that there is nothing to indicate the generation of Avalokita by Amitabha (in the *Maṇi-bka-hbum*, Avalokita is born from a white ray from Amitābha's left eye, or he issues from a lotus as a young man of sixteen years of age), nor is there any trace to be found of the system of the 'Dhyāni-buddhas' and their 'sons'; Vajrapāṇi is a malevolent being, Ratnapāṇi is a personage of secondary rank. Avalokita is nowhere, so far as we can see, called Padmapāṇi.

'‡ The *bīja* of Avalokita seems always to be *hrīḥ*; his *mantra* is the hexasyllabic formula (see the beautiful plate, Schlagintweit, p. 55), but sometimes we find *oṁ vajradharma hrīḥ*.

§ There are representations of Avalokita after the style of the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* and of the *Māyājālābhisambodhi*.

‖ Foucher, *Iconographie*, i. and ii.

¶ *Trikāṇḍaśeṣa*, which gets its information from Vyādi (Vindhyavāsin?) gives the names Lokeśvara, Amitābhaśekhara, Padmapāṇi, and also Khasarpana, Kāraṇḍavyuha, Sukhāvatiśvara. Tārā is the daughter of Avalokita.

** Already at Sāñchi the 'lotus' is represented in the hand of a great many personages, as an offering intended for Buddha. Those who carry lotuses are not all Avalokitas, for Maitreya is among them (see Grunwedel, *Buddh. Kunst*, p. 167). It is worthy of notice that neither the *Lotus of the True Law* nor the *Sukhāvatī* nor the *Amitāyus* nor the *Kāraṇḍa* seems to know Padmapāṇi.

* 'With an eye in the palm of each hand' (Sandberg, *Colloquia Tibetan*, p. 197). Sometimes *only* sixty-six arms are represented (Foucher, *Catal* 15)

† See Schlagintweit, p. 54; Schmidt, *Forschungen*, p. 202 (the head is broken into ten pieces). This number *eleven* recalls the eleven Rudras, and shows us Avalokita as a disguised Śiva. [Being Vāgīśvara, he is none the less Brahmā when he becomes Śiva.] It may be useful to mention that the *Avalokitaekadaśamukhadhāraṇīs* (Nanjio, 327, 328) were translated into Chinese in 557-581 Among the other *Samanta°* (*Mahāvyutpatti*, 23, 31, 36, 38, 63) the most famous is Samantabhadra (*Lotus*, xxvi.; Kern, p. 437, note), a double of Śiva, and the only one of the 'Dhyānibodhisattvas' who is not a *pāṇi* (*vajra*, *ratna*, *padma*, *viśvapāṇi*).

‡ Inscription dated 792; see *Ind. Antiquary*, ix. 192, Kern, *Vermenging*, p. 14; on Matsyendra, see Wilson, ii. 30, and i. 214; Kern, *op. cit.*, 42, and Lévi, *Népal*, i. 349 ff He belongs to the mysterious line of 'Siddhas,' masters of the Haṭhayoga, civilizers (?) of Nepal. Sometimes he is the son of Ādinātha, and is placed five spiritual generations previous to Gorakhnāth; sometimes he is Gorakhnāth's disciple There may be concealed under his name a historical personage identified with Abjapāni = Padmapāni. But although the mythical explanation finds very little favour, euhemerism in such a subject seems almost chimerical. An important iconographic detail is that Avalokita is white, except in Nepal, where he is red (Foucher, *Cat.* 15, etc.).

§ *JBTS*, 1894, 2. 1.

‖ On the Chinese Avalokita, see Eitel, *Handbook*, p. 22.

the monastic dignitaries are *nirmāṇas* (sprul-pa = khoubilgan) of the chief deities; it will be sufficient to refer the reader to the article LĀMAISM and to the sources. We shall merely say that Avalokiteśvara, the patron of the Tibetan Church, is incarnated in the person of the Great Lāma (rgyal-ba ryga-mtsho), while Amitābha dwells in the Great Pandit (Pan-chen) of the rival monastery. Waddell, though without adequately setting forth his proofs, maintains that the theory is a recent invention (1640). There is no doubt that Lāmaic hierarchy is peculiarly Tibetan; but it is quite as certain that many Hindu Siddhas or Yogins have, by their magic, succeeded in identifying themselves with gods.

LITERATURE.—Detailed bibliography in Burgess, *Arch. Survey of Western India*, No. 5 (1883), p. 14, and Grünwedel, *Mythologie*, 1900, notes 29.

ORIGINAL SOURCES.—Lexicons; Mahāvyutpatti, Dharmasaṅgraha, Trikāṇḍaśeṣa, Saddharmapuṇḍarika, Sukhāvatīvyūha, Amitāyurdhyānasūtra, Bodhicharyāvatāra, Kāraṇḍavyūha.

TIBETAN SOURCES.—Csoma-Feer, *AMG* ii. 330; Sarat Chandra Das, *Dictionary*, p. 806, *JASB* (1882) ii. 126.

CHINESE SOURCES.—Nanjio, *Catalogue*, 1883, Nos. 327 ff.; Beal, *Catena*, 1878 (Śūraṅgama); the Buddhist pilgrims.

Besides the general works of Hodgson, Burnouf, Wassilieff, Kern, Koppen, Schlagintweit, Pander, Waddell, and Grünwedel, the reader is referred to Wilson, *Select Works*, i. 213, ii. 1-39, *Bauddha Tracts from Nepal*, 1862, Kern, *Inscrip. uit Battambang*, Amsterdam, 1899, *Vermenging van Çivaisme*, 1888; Foucher, *Iconographie*, i., 1899, and ii., 1905; Blonay, *Déesse Tārā*, 1895; Grunwedel-Burgess, *Buddh Art in India*[2], 1901; Waddell, 'The Indian Cult of Avalokita,' *JRAS*, 1894, 51-89, *Gazetteer of Sikhim*, 1893, p. 250; specially on Iconography, Burgess, *Arch. Surv. Rep. of Western India*, No. 9, Bombay, 1879, and No. 5, 1883; Pander, *Panthéon des Tschangtscha Hutuktu*, Berlin, 1890.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

AVARICE.—Avarice may be defined as an absorbing passion for earthly possessions and a selfish gratification in their retention. It includes both the getting and the keeping of wealth. In the getting the avaricious man is tempted to put aside all considerations that stand between him and his object, and in the retention he looks less to the beneficial use to which any possession can be put than to his own luxury in possessing it. In ordinary language, avarice is largely restricted to this second feature, while the passionate desire that begets the avaricious character is described as covetousness (wh. see). Avarice is thus applied more frequently to parsimony in the storing of wealth, and covetousness to rapacity in seeking after wealth. Covetousness stirs up the discontented to clutch at what other people have; avarice begets the miser who hoards greedily all that he has.

The avaricious mind seems almost to make money or possessions ends in themselves, and yet it may be doubted whether money is not always thought of as a means of gratifying the love of pleasure or the love of power in some of their many forms. The miser gloats over his gold, but even in his most debased state he probably sees in it the possibility of acquiring ease or satisfying ambition. He probably pictures in his imagination the splendour with which he might surround himself, the security he has against poverty, or the greatness of the one who will inherit all as his heir. Certainly, at first, avarice leads men to amass money because of the command it gives over the conveniences and luxuries of life, and because of its efficacy as an instrument of ambition (cf. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[2], 1886, ii. 172).

Avarice springs, therefore, from two of the strongest human passions, the love of pleasure and the love of power; although it may continue even when pleasure and power seem no longer likely to be gratified. In its last stage it becomes repellent to all, as its selfish absorption reveals the degradation and folly of the mammon-worshipper.

The degradation of avarice is graphically described by Dante, who represents the miser as cleaving to the dust, in *Purgatory* (Longfellow's tr. xix. 120 ff.)—

> 'Even as our eye did not uplift itself
> Aloft, being fastened upon earthly things,
> So justice here has merged it in the earth.'

A similar conception is found in Milton's description of Mammon (*Par. Lost*, i. 680 ff.), whose looks and thoughts even in heaven were always downward bent—

> 'admiring more
> The riches of heav'n's pavement, trodden gold,
> Than aught, divine or holy, else enjoy'd,
> In vision beatific.'

Cf. also Bunyan's account of the man with the muck-rake, who was so intent upon the things of earth that he had no eye for the crown of glory. It is little wonder that the folly of the miser in giving up his life to the hoarding of earthly possessions is keenly felt by the noblest writers. Dante (*Inferno*, vii. 64) expresses the thought of all spiritual minds when he depicts the ignorance and folly of avarice—

> 'For all the gold that is beneath the moon,
> Or ever has been, of these weary souls
> Could never make a single one repose.'

The miser is represented frequently in literature, as in Molière's *L'Avare* and in Plautus's *Aulularia*, on which Molière's play was founded. The unhappiness of the avaricious is well summed up in the closing words of Euclio, the miser in the *Aulularia*: 'Nec noctu, nec diu, quietus unquam eram: nunc dormiam.' He has bestowed his treasure upon his son-in-law, and has thus divested himself of all future cares. *Now* he hopes to sleep quietly, while formerly he had no rest by day or night.

The petty meannesses of the miser are illustrated in the *Characters* of Theophrastus (ed. Ussing): 'If he gives a dinner, he does not serve up as much food as is necessary. . . . When sent out . . . on a public commission, he leaves the provisions for the journey to his family, and lives at the expense of his fellow-travellers. . . . If one of his friends is to have a wedding, or is about to have his daughter married, he speedily undertakes a journey to spare the marriage present.'

Restraints may be put upon avarice by the laws of a country. Thus, certain methods of increasing wealth may be declared illegal. Stealing, fraudulent practices in trade, adulteration to make extra profit, the exaction of exorbitant interest, may all be declared punishable offences. Law may also deal with the misuse of wealth, *e.g.* money may not be hoarded by any one in such a way that his functions as a citizen are not performed. A man is not allowed to be dependent on the State for support while he has money at his command. A father is bound to use his wealth to support his children. Children are bound to support their parents. In these and other ways law may put limits to the right of a citizen to hoard possessions.

A further extension of these social restraints is bound up with all theories of socialism or communism. Under these all private capital would be almost, if not altogether, abolished. Rent might still be paid to the community, but interest would cease. Each individual would be remunerated in proportion to the services he had rendered. Thus socialism would seek, by abolishing the present system of competing capitalists, served by competitive wage-labour, to strike at the system that encourages the avaricious nature.

In the individual life an effort may be made to check avarice by one great act, as by the vow of poverty, depriving the subject of all personal interest in property and all power over it. This vow, along with the vow of chastity and obedience, was adopted by the Dominicans and Franciscans to complete the irrevocable surrender of those who entered the religious state.

For the most part avarice has been restrained by the application of general ethical and Christian truths to the personal life, and in particular to the earning, saving, and spending of wealth. Christianity teaches that selfishness is a deadly sin which must give place to a supreme love for God, and to the love of neighbour as well as self. Wealth is to be looked upon not as an end in itself, but only as a means towards attaining higher ends in life. When a man earns money, he should not be taken possession of by worldly things, but possess them as if he possessed them not. He should not hoard wealth uselessly in fear of want, for he should believe that, if he seeks first the kingdom of God, all things needful for life will be added by God.

In using wealth, he is not to allow himself to be dominated by the selfish love of pleasure or of power, but, regarding himself as a steward of God, he is to use it as a means of procuring a free and independent human existence and development for himself and those around him.

LITERATURE.—Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, London, 1875; Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[2], London, 1886; Stalker, *Seven Deadly Sins*, London, 1901; Mozley, *University Sermons*[2], London, 1876; Fowler and Wilson, *Principles of Morals*, Oxford, 1894; Hannay, *Spirit and Origin of Christian Monasticism*, London, 1903.

D. MACRAE TOD.

AVERROËS, AVERROISM.—1. Life.—'Averroës' is a corruption of the Arabic name Ibn Rushd. Abu 'l-Walid Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Rushd was born at Cordova in the year A.H. 520 (A.D. 1126), of a family of standing. His grandfather, who was kādi of Cordova, wrote some important works on law. His father also, and afterwards Averroës himself, held the post of kādi. He studied law in his native town, and medicine under the guidance of Abū Jafar Hārūn of Truxillo. He enjoyed the friendship of Ibn Zuhr, a famous physician, and the acquaintance of the celebrated theosophist Ibn 'Arabī. In 548 we find him at Marrakesh (Morocco), being presented by Ibn Ṭufaīl to the Amir of the Faithful, the Almohad Abū Ya'qūb Yusūf. His account of this introduction has been communicated as follows:

'When I came into the presence of the Amir of the Faithful,' he says, 'I found him alone with Ibn Ṭufaīl, who began to eulogize me. . . . After asking my own, my father's, and my family name, the Amir opened the conversation with the question: "What is the opinion of philosophers on the sky? Is it an eternal substance, or did it have a beginning?" A sudden fear seized me, and rendered me speechless.' The Amir, however, soon put him at ease by himself treating the question with a knowledge unlooked for in a prince, and sent him away laden with presents.

It was Ibn Ṭufaīl too who advised Averroës to write a commentary on Aristotle. He told him that the Amir often complained about the obscurity of the Greek philosophers, and of the translations then existing, and said that he ought to undertake the explaining and arranging of them. There is a passage in Ibn Ṭufaīl's philosophical romance, *Ḥay ben Yaḳẓān*, that is supposed to be an allusion to Averroës, who was just then beginning to write.

In A.H. 565 Averroes was appointed a kādi at Seville, and, about 567, was installed at Cordova. From this time onwards he devoted himself to the composition of his greatest works, although he felt burdened all the time with public duties. He travelled a great deal. In 574 he was at Marrakesh, in 575 at Seville, and in 578 back again at Marrakesh, where Yusūf appointed him his chief physician, a post that had been held by Ibn Ṭufaīl. When Yusūf sent him back to Cordova, he bore the title of 'Grand Kādi.'

Averroes continued in favour during the beginning of the reign of Ya'qūb al-Mansūr, Yusūf's successor; then he fell into disgrace. This was the result of the opposition his writings encountered from the theologians, and it bears witness to the influence that his philosophy was beginning to exercise. They accused him of various heresies (see below, § 3); and even went the length of trying to make him pass for a Jew. After undergoing an examination on the subject of his orthodoxy, he was banished to Lucena, near Cordova. The Amir also ordered (*c.* 1195 A.D.) all the works of the philosophers to be burned except treatises on Medicine, Arithmetic, and elementary Astronomy.

These decrees were afterwards reversed, and Averroës was recalled to Marrakesh; but he did not long enjoy his return to favour, dying on the 9th of Safar, A.H. 595 (11th Dec. A.D. 1198). His tomb is at Marrakesh, outside the Tagazūt gate.

2. Works.—Averroës' great claim to glory lies in his being pre-eminently Aristotle's commentator. To this he owes his renown and popularity in the West in the Middle Ages. His philosophy proper has been fiercely attacked, and, in the present writer's opinion, often misunderstood. But the care with which he composed his commentaries, their compass, their abundance, and their ingenuity, have caused them to be used as a basis for the study of philosophy in schools.

In accordance with a custom which still prevails in Musalmān teaching, these commentaries are of three kinds: short, medium, and long. These three degrees correspond to the three years or three periods into which philosophical instruction was divided. It is in this way too that the Qur'ān or the *'aḳāid* ('articles of faith') is commented on in the universities of Islām, recourse being had to more and more comprehensive glosses, according to the progress of the pupils.

In Latin or Hebrew we have the three kinds of Averroistic commentaries for the *Second Analytics*, the *Physics*, the treatises on the *Sky* and the *Soul*, and the *Metaphysics*; but no long commentaries for the other works, and none at all for the *History of Animals*, and the *Politics*. In Arabic we have the medium commentaries on *Politics* and *Rhetoric*, a treatise on four books of Aristotle on *Logic*, and a translation of fragments of Alexander's commentary on *Metaphysics*. H. Derenbourg has brought into evidence the existence of an Arabic collection of short commentaries or compendiums (*jawāmi'*) in the library of the Escurial. This work has almost exactly the same contents as that mentioned by the author of the *History of the Almohads* (Fagnan's tr. p. 211).

Besides this great work, his commentaries, we have a somewhat important work on Polemics, the *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* ('Vanity of Vanities'), which was levelled against the theologians. It is in the Arabic text. There are also a few fragments in Arabic which are not so important. Among the works that Renan mentions as having been written by Averroes besides his commentaries, but which are perhaps not all clearly distinct from them, are: commentary on Plato's *Republic*, opinions on al-Fārābī's *Logic* and on his manner of comprehending Aristotle, discussions on a few of Avicenna's theories, commentary on Nicolaus's *Metaphysics*, treatises on the abstract intellect and its relation to man's, and a commentary on the Profession of Faith (*'Aḳīdah*) of the Mahdī Ibn Tūmart. Averroës was the author also of works on Jurisprudence, Astronomy, and Medicine. Of the last named, we possess the text of a treatise which, in the Middle Ages, enjoyed a somewhat wide-spread reputation, the *Kulliyāt* (*i.e.* 'Generalities').

3. Doctrine.—It is by no means certain that the Western writings which we possess on Averroes give us a very true idea of his doctrine. His philosophy was fiercely attacked by the theologians, who represented it in the light most favourable for their own ends. With the intention of pointing out the dangers that it presented to the faith, they forced assertions out of it, they drew overstrained inferences from it, they told whither, according to them, this doctrine led rather than what it really was. We know this method of procedure well from the work of al-Ghazālī entitled *Tahāfut* ('Destruction,' or 'Vanity of Philosophers'), where he applies it to al-Fārābī and Avicenna. This work has now been carefully studied. It is clear that al-Ghazālī reproaches 'philosophers,' not so much for explicitly professing anti-religious doctrines, as for holding opinions and hypotheses which are not likely to be useful for proving religious truth, but from which conclusions contrary to the faith would rather be

inferred. This does not mean that al-Fārābī and Avicenna did not seek sincerely to establish a philosophy compatible with dogma.

Now the same thing happened in the case of Averroës. He was opposed by theologians, not only by Musalmāns, but by Christians as well; and we see his system not from his own point of view, but through the distorting criticism of these theologians. Some of these authors are, indeed, more accessible than Averroës, whose ideas have to be sought either in the rare Arabic texts or in the Latin translations, whose style is very obscure and difficult.

It seems that even Renan, in spite of all his intelligence, his facility, and his perspicacity, has not absolutely guarded against this fundamental injustice; and too often, in his slightly wavering explanation of Averroës' philosophy, he presents not so much the authentic doctrine of Averroes as that which has been attributed to him. The following is, very briefly, Averroës' doctrine according to Renan:

> It had a very evolutionary character. Eternal matter, the evolution of the germ by its latent power, an undetermined God, the impersonality of the intelligence, the emersion and reabsorption of the individual, constitute its essential points. He further represents Averroes as a downright determinist, whose God does not recognize individuals, but can recognize only the general laws of the universe. He says, moreover, in several places that Averroes denies resurrection. Not firmly enough impressed with the great influence of Neo-Platonism in Islām—an influence brought into evidence by Dieterici—he tries to trace the ideas of the Arabic philosopher to Aristotle, which he sometimes finds rather difficult, and is surprised that the theories to which the Arabs give preference are precisely those that appear in Aristotle only in an obscure and secondary manner.

We cannot quite agree with these different ways of looking at Averroës. We believe that he must be studied as belonging to the school called *al-falāsifa* ('Philosophers'), of which we shall hear more in connexion with al-Fārābī and Avicenna; that the doctrine of this school is more Neo-Platonic than Peripatetic; that Averroes' doctrine is precisely the same in principle, differing from it only in unessentials; and this is exactly what appears from a perusal of the work entitled *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* ('Vanity of Vanities') which Averroës wrote in reply to al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut*. Al-Ghazālī attacked al-Fārābī and Avicenna. Now it frequently happens that Averroës finds al-Ghazālī's criticism justified, and he reproaches his predecessors for giving him this advantage. Then he modifies something in their system; but these modifications deal only with details, or with the manner of exhibiting the doctrines; they are not really essential.

Is there any need, as has been suggested, to regard these modifications of Averroës on the doctrines of the school of 'Philosophers' as an approximation to the system of the Peripatetics? This, again, is by no means certain. It is doubtful whether there is much less Neo-Platonism in Averroës than in his predecessors. His opponents in the Middle Ages accused him of having often misunderstood Aristotle, and sometimes their criticism seems well founded.

Let us now exhibit some of the chief points in Averroës' philosophy by comparing them with the corresponding points in Avicenna's philosophy. This is not a very easy task; for Averroes himself seems, more than Avicenna, to feel the difficulties of the philosophical problems. He is less confident, less systematic, more analytic; he disputes more, is more troubled about the opinions of others, and seems to have less firmness about his own conclusions.

(1) *Eternity of the world.*—The doctrine of the eternity of the world had early partisans in Islām in the *Mu'tazilites*, such as Abu'l-Hudaīl and Tumāmah. The former considered the creation as simply the act of putting the universe in motion. We have a fragment of Averroës, published by Dr. Worms, which is very clear on this question. He recognizes that there is a creation, and that the world needs a motive power; but he interprets these two ideas in a different manner from the theologians. He believes in a creation that is being renewed every instant in a constantly changing world, always taking its new form from the preceding; but he does not admit creation *ex nihilo*. According to him, this continuous and incessant creation is more worthy of the name of creation than that which is accomplished once for all. Averroës claims that fundamentally this idea does not differ from that of the theologians. The fact remains, however, that in his system infinity can be reached in time—a point which the orthodox doctrine does not admit. But for him, as well as for the theologians, creation does not take place in time: it is produced for all eternity; and time is produced and created at the same moment as the world, according to the doctrine of the orthodox school. Time, for all these Musalmān thinkers, is the result of the existence of the world, and is manifested in the movement of the spheres.

The world then, although it is eternal, has a 'mover' or 'agent.' On this point Averroes rectifies a proof of Avicenna's which does not seem conclusive to him. The mover or agent is that cause of the world, eternal, like it, which produces it each instant and moves it. Celestial bodies, indeed, do not have a perfected existence except through movement; that which gives them this movement is their 'agent.' In this way Averroës distinguishes between eternity with cause and eternity without cause (*æternitas secundum tempus, æternitas secundum essentiam*). God alone is eternal without cause and without mover or agent. The world is eternal, but has an agent.

(2) *Origin of multiplicity.*—Renan remarks that the problem which engrossed Averroes most was that of the origin of beings; we might say, with more precision, the origin of multiplicity. Indeed, it engrossed the whole Arabic school. God being one, how does multiplicity emerge from Him? Avicenna recognized the principle that 'out of one only one can spring'; consequently, he thought that first of all there came from God a primary being, one alone, called the 'first cause,' from whom then evolved the multiplicity of beings. Averroes does not absolutely maintain this principle. The opinion he professes is neither so clear nor so absolute, although he meant it to be more supple and synthetic.

He admits, like all his school, the succession of the celestial spheres, considered as incorruptible, animated, and moved by intelligences. He makes a few changes in the details of their procession. He holds that multiplicity exists, not only in the different aspects of knowledge that they have of one another, but also in their mutual distances and in the 'dispositions' that they have in them. Averroës, moreover, does not admit that the celestial bodies are composed of matter and form, as Avicenna admitted—an opinion which leads to the conclusion that the existence of these bodies is not necessary, for matter and form depend on one another for subsistence. By rejecting this opinion, Averroës continues to diminish the importance of the rôle of creator.

A single power, he holds, comes from the first principle. The whole world results from it, and all its parts are so ordered and connected that the whole, moved by this single energy, acts in concert. Thus, in animals, the different faculties, the members, and the actions, are united in a single body; and each animal is judged a single being, having at its disposal a single power. It is because of this diffusion of power, intellect, and soul, in the

heavens and in the sublunary sphere, that it can be said that God created, maintains, and preserves the world, as we read in the Qur'ān. It does not necessarily follow that, because this power penetrates into manifold beings, it is itself manifold. There flows then from the unit, *i.e.* from the first principle, a power, single itself, which becomes manifold in the beings that participate in it.

This system certainly shows how the lives of the different beings that compose the world harmonize. But Averroës seems to have avoided explaining the origin of these beings.

(3) *Knowledge in God.*—Averroës gives us his idea of the philosophic argument that 'the first principle comprehends only its own essence.' He does not agree with the theologians that we are then driven to the conclusion that God is ignorant of the whole world, and does not know His own creation. The meaning of this assertion is that God comprehends in His essence beings in their most exalted state of existence; and when the philosophers say that He does not comprehend the beings that are below Him, it signifies that He does not know them in the way in which we know them, but in a certain manner that is peculiar to Him. For if any other being existed who possessed a knowledge similar to God's, God would have an 'associate' in His knowledge, and He would no longer be unique. This is why it is impossible to say that Divine knowledge is general, or that it is particular; these are modes of human knowledge, and they refer to beings, who are the causes of human knowledge, but who cannot be the cause of God's knowledge.

To sum up: we cannot, according to Averroes, admit that the knowledge of God depends on beings, for then the less perfect would be necessary to the more perfect; nor that God does not comprehend in His essence things and their order, for then He would not be intelligent. It stands to reason, therefore, that He conceives things in a higher order of existence than that in which we know them.

This theory of the different orders of existence is nevertheless, a little obscure. Averroes tries to explain it by comparing it to colour, which is one in its essence but has different degrees of existence, according as it is in bodies, or in our sight, or our imagination, or our other faculties in their order. In view of this explanation it would be unjust to claim that Averroes' system denies Providence.

(4) *The soul and the intellect.*—We may take it that Averroës' psychology is, as a whole, constructed like that of Avicenna. But there is one point in this system which we must not forget, the distinction between the soul and the intellect.

This distinction is especially important in its bearing on the question of the survival of the soul and its 'unity.' It has often been said that Averroes taught the 'unity of the soul' and the unity of the intellect in the universe, and that he denied the immortality of the individual soul. The present writer does not believe that this latter assertion is correct; the former, about the universal unity of the soul or of the intellect, undoubtedly is. But still we must try to discover the exact meaning of this expression.

According to the school of 'Philosophers,' the intellect and the soul are not merely distinct in degree; that is to say, the intellect is not merely the most elevated kind of soul. We feel that there is a more profound difference between these two ideas, a real difference in their nature. The intellect alone seems absolutely free from all matter; it is essentially that which is opposed to the common idea of matter; it represents the higher domain of general or abstract; it is pure thought. The same can by no means be said of the soul. The idea of soul, in Muslmān philosophy, is closely allied to our modern ideas of power and energy. The soul is the energy that animates matter; and as such, far from being absolutely opposed to matter, it is, on the contrary, profoundly mixed up with and involved in it. At times we are inclined to believe that the Arabic philosophers have an idea of this power similar to that of the modern psychical schools, and that they believe that it depends on some subtle matter, which is more delicate than ordinary matter, and is not usually apprehended by the senses. That is the impression given by reading passages like the following:—

'There are some who say that the soul resides in a subtle thing called celestial heat, in which are the souls that form the bodies. No philosopher will deny that there is a celestial heat in the elements which serve as support for the faculties of animals and plants. Some call this heat the "natural celestial faculty" Galen calls it the "informing faculty." These souls form bodies; this is the reason why Plato says that the soul is separate from the body; for if it depended on it, it would not create it. The soul is something that is added to the innate celestial heat. Each species has its soul, intermediary between those of the celestial bodies and the souls that are here below in the visible bodies. It has therefore been said: "At the death of the bodies, the souls return to their spiritual condition and to those subtle bodies which none can see."' (*Tahāfut*, p. 138).

It follows, then, that if the intellect exists perfectly and actually only when general and freed from the conditions of individuality, the soul, on the contrary, though belonging to the universal power that circulates in the world, may be individual and remain so. That is what Averroes points out after a passage in which he has been speaking of the unity of the intelligence: 'This argument,' he says, 'is of value for the intelligence, for there is nothing in the intelligence of the nature of individuality; but it is a different thing with the soul; for even if it is despoiled of the accidents by which individuals are multiplied, the most celebrated of the sages say: "It is not exempt from the condition of individuality"' (*op. cit.* p. 137).

The soul, therefore, according to this doctrine, may remain individualized after the death of the body. It *may* do so. Arguments of a purely philosophical order do not force us to believe that this individuality really exists, but they show that it is possible. Such seems to be Averroes' point of view on the question of the immortality of the soul. In the end, he leaves it to revelation to settle this question. 'It is a very difficult problem,' he says. The philosophical introduction to the problem is pushed to the point we have just seen—the knowledge that the soul forms the body, and that, since it forms it, it cannot depend upon it. We cannot therefore deduce the destruction of the soul from that of the body. This agrees with what we find in Avicenna.

Belief in the survival of individual souls, combined with belief in the eternity of the world, brings up a difficulty with regard to infinite number. Since the number of souls produced at the beginning of the world is without end, there would be an infinite number of individuals existing at one and the same time. Now, most of the Arabic philosophers, Avicenna excepted, refused to admit infinite number. Averroes agrees with the majority. He seems to solve the difficulty by counting only a single soul as a principle; he does not apply number to the particular souls that are bound to it. There is but one soul, just as there is but one light; its multiplication to infinity in individuals is only a secondary matter. In short, Averroës refuses to admit infinite number in the case of objects that are quite detached from one another; but he does admit it, in a secondary manner, in the case of objects previously bound to a general unity.

Such is, as nearly as we can judge, the real import of Averroes' system on the problem of the unity and the survival of the soul. It is also evident that it is quite impossible to admit the contrary opinion, which is that Averroes denied the survival of the soul. For there is no doubt that Averroës claimed to remain one of the faithful. Now it is an absolute impossibility that he could believe himself a Musalmān and at the same time deny the immortality of the soul. His thought must have been, like that of the whole school of Philosophers, that the former philosophy was true in the main, and that the Muhammadan faith was also true; that consequently there should be no essential point of contradiction between them,

but that, on the contrary, the one should complete and explain the other.

As for the question of 'the unity of the intellect,' it is by no means the same as that of 'the unity of the soul.' It is, moreover, a question that presents no difficulty if it is made quite clear what the author means by the terms in question.

The unity of the intellect signifies merely the universality of general ideas. Averroës explains this universality of rational knowledge at the same time as its perpetuity: 'Ghazālī,' he says, 'has taken this argument from the Philosophers: the intelligence, starting with the individuals of any species, lays hold on a single conception, which is the quiddity of this species, and which is not divided with the persons that are multiplied through origin, position, or constituent. This conception, therefore, cannot be subjected to birth and destruction, like the individuals to which it pertains. This is why the sciences are eternal; neither are they born nor do they die except by accident, that is to say, by their relation to such and such an individual. They are not perishable in themselves.'

General ideas, according to the school of Philosophers, exist really in the active intellect, *i.e.* in the world of celestial intelligences. This world is eternal, and is harmoniously arranged under the First Principle, which is God. The human intelligence perceives general ideas only in so far as they succeed in entering into relation with the active intellect, in which these ideas reside. These exist actually. Whenever man's intellect perceives them, this intellect itself becomes perfect; it is completely developed and actual. Before this, it was incomplete, unfinished; it was not yet the intelligence but only a prelude to the intelligence, a general possibility of understanding, what the Philosophers call the 'material,' or passive, intellect. We see in the works of al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna the different degrees through which the intelligence passes in order to become actual instead of 'material,' as it originally was, *i.e.* to pass from the potentiality to the fact.

This system is quite clear. It is very evident that the material intelligence, which is a mere possibility, is not persistent in itself. The only persistent intellect is the realized, 'acquired,' or 'perfected' intellect, as the Philosophers call it. It is, therefore, a grave error to deduce, as Munk has done, from the non-immortality of this material intellect, the non-immortality of the human soul.

From this point of view, then, it can easily be understood why the Philosophers considered the question of individual survival in connexion with the unity of the soul, but not in connexion with the unity of the intellect.

(5) *Resurrection.*—Al-Ghazālī accused the school of Philosophers of denying resurrection. The accusation was grave, considering the importance of this dogma in the Qur'ān. Averroës denies the charge, and gives his views on this subject at the end of his *Tahāfut*. Renan gives a somewhat free translation of a few lines of this passage (*Aver.* p. 158). Averroes says that the theory that denies resurrection is nowhere found among the Philosophers. He remarks that the religious law, prior to philosophy, always taught resurrection, and that this dogma is useful for leading people to seek after the happiness of the beyond. 'Philosophers,' he says, 'teach happiness only to a few well-educated men, while religions make it their aim to teach the crowd; but this special class of philosophers arrive at complete existence and perfect happiness only by associating with the multitude' (*Tahāfut*, p. 139). They must therefore accept the teaching that suits the people, interpreting it as best they can.

Averroës interpreted this doctrine thus: the body which we shall have in the other life will not be the same as that of this life; 'that which will be resuscitated will be a representation of what is seen in this world; it will not be that very thing *in essentia*. For what has perished cannot be born again, except in so far as it is individualized; and existence can be bestowed only on the semblance of what has perished, not on the object that has perished in its identity.' To strengthen his argument, he uses the words of Ibn 'Abbās, a traditionist who had great authority in Islām: 'There is of the other world nothing but names in this world.' 'That proves,' says Averroes, 'that the future existence has a kind of generation more elevated than that of actual existence, and constitutes a more excellent order than the order of this world' (*op. cit.* p. 140).

Here again it is clearly a question of interpretation, not a denial of the doctrine. In the same way, we must not understand in a dogmatical sense passages such as Renan quotes (pp. 156, 157), in which Averroes disapproves of the use of myths regarding the state of souls after death, or says that it is not the sanctions of the other life that must press men on towards virtue in this life. That simply means that too precise a representation of the other world may be false and dangerous, and that virtue may have nobler motives than fear of punishment or promise of reward.

(6) *Truth and law.*—In politics, Averroes, like al-Fārābī, follows in the footsteps of Plato, whose *Republic* he commented on; and, according to the custom of Oriental thinkers of his school, he does not criticize the text he comments on. He accepts it as truth, almost as religious truth. He accepts, therefore, that political ideal, half socialistic, half mystic, which on many points, such as the status of woman, does not at all agree with the customs of Islām.

We must not lose sight of the part played by syncretism, which dominated the whole philosophy of the Oriental Middle Ages. Ancient philosophy was considered true as a whole; and all its documents, even the most diverse, could be brought into accord, the commentator having the settled conviction that they could neither contradict one another nor contradict religious truth. There are two important treatises of Averroes in which he tries to point out this conformity between religious truth and philosophical truth. This work required some 'interpreting' of the Qur'ān and a slight changing of its meaning. We get used to efforts of this kind in the study of the philosophers previous to Averroes, and certain more or less heterodox sects in Islām, like those of the Faithful Brothers of Basra or the Brothers of Purity. We find, too, in Averroes the extreme form of this conception, which, admitting *a priori* the two truths, philosophical and prophetic, ends in assimilating the philosopher and the prophet. Just as there must always be prophets here on earth, or at least great mystics, who bring the human world into relation with the world beyond, so also must there be philosophers. And here the idea takes a distinct turn that makes it still more unusual. As the human intelligence exists in actuality only by its union with the active intellect, there must always be in the human race, if this intelligence is really to exist and subsist, a few men of great intellectual gifts, a few great philosophers whose spirit participates in eternal truth.

In this passage, Averroes is no longer Peripatetic; but neither is he original; he is merely in accord with his world and his time. He is a syncretist; he is combining mysticism with a system that, from many points of view, is somewhat antagonistic to it. He is placing a kind of illuminative

system at the end and summit of his philosophy, just as his predecessors did, although he himself did not give the impression of being naturally much drawn to considerations of that kind.

4. Short history of Averroism.—Averroës' influence was felt in Jewish philosophy and Christian scholasticism. His commentaries were translated into Rabbinic Hebrew and into Latin. The Jews translated them during the 13th and the first half of the 14th century. In the 13th cent., Jacob, son of Rabbi Anatoli, of Naples, and Moses ben Tibbon, of Lunel, edited versions of several treatises; in the 14th, Kalonymus translated some others. Samuel b. Tibbon and Juda b. Solomon Cohen, of Toledo, compiled philosophical encyclopædias in which, we might say, they transcribe Averroes' works. The Spaniard Shem-Ṭob b. Joseph b. Falaquera inserted several long passages from Averroes in his own works. Towards the middle of the 14th cent. Averroism reached its zenith in Jewish schools, and Levi b. Gerson of Bagnols commented on Averroes, just as Averroës had commented on Aristotle. This great influence on the Jews lasted until the 15th century. At this period, we still find Pico della Mirandola following the teaching of Elias del Medigo, professor at Padua, the last representative of Averroism among the Jews.

Avicenna was translated into Latin before Averroes. The first translators were Dominico Gondisalvus, Archdeacon of Toledo, and the Jew, Juan Avendeath of Seville; they worked under the direction of Raymond, Archbishop of Toledo. Their translations were made from 1130 to 1150. The Jews had cut down the work; the translators put into form the version prepared by the Jews.

A few years later, translations of al-Kindi and al-Fārābī were edited by Gerard of Cremona and Alfred of Morlay. In 1230, Michael Scot, a courtier of Frederick of Hohenstaufen, began to translate Averroes. Of most importance are his interpretations of the commentary on *de Cœlo et Mundo* and of the treatise *On the Soul*. Hermann, a German, likewise attached to the house of Hohenstaufen, translated, from Averroes, the *Ethics* in 1240 and the *Poetics* in 1256. Alfonso X. and Frederick II. were the patrons of these works. It is well known that in 1240 Frederick addressed a series of philosophical questions to the Musalmān scholars, to which he received only very vague answers.

Is it really owing to these versions, executed from the Arabic, that Aristotle's works have passed into the West; or have the Latin versions, taken directly from the Greek, played the principal part in this transmission? M. Forget, who, a few years ago, again took up this question, concluded that the priority cannot be given comprehensively either to the one or to the other group of versions. It depends upon the treatise. The Arabic was the first to make known the eight books of *Physics*, the nineteen books on *History of Animals*, the treatises *On the Sky and the World*, *On Plants*, *On Meteors*, and summaries of the *Rhetoric*, and the *Poetics*. The first complete version of the *Ethics* was from the Arabic. The treatise on *The Soul* and a part at least of the *Metaphysics* were first known from the versions made directly from the Greek.

At the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th cent., when Averroism reached its zenith in North Italy, Niphus and Zimara made some corrections on the old versions of the commentaries of Averroës. Then new versions were written, based on the Hebrew translations. These new translations were, for the most part, very obscure. Among the translators may be mentioned Jacob Mantino of Tortosa, a Jew, physician to Paul III., Abraham of Balmes, also a Jew, and Giovanni Francesco Burana of Verona, a Christian.

Averroism encountered the same opposition from the theologians in the Christian world as it had met with from the Musalmāns. Later, because of its unusual form, it was opposed by the Humanists, who loved to philosophize in a freer manner and a more elegant style. The Hellenistic scholars criticized Averroës' interpretation of Aristotle, and the Platonists, having Marsilio Ficino in their mind, placed the doctrine of the Academy in all the freshness of its renaissance in opposition to Aristotle and his commentator.

In the Middle Ages, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Gilles of Rome wrote against Averroism. Raymond Lully attacked it fiercely. Petrarch declared his dislike towards it, and intended to refute it. Formal condemnations of Averroism were passed at different periods: by the provincial council of Paris in 1209; by Robert de Courson in 1215; by William, bishop of Paris, in 1240; by Etienne Tempier, also bishop of Paris, in 1270 and 1277. Shortly after, these censures were ratified by the theologians of Oxford, over whom Robert of Kilwardeby, Archbishop of Canterbury, presided.

Averroism, which, through the Jews, had held sway in the centre of France until the 14th cent., continued in vogue in the schools of Northern Italy until the 16th century. In the school of Padua it raised the famous disputes in which Achillini and Pomponazzi took part. Its reign extends down to the appearance of modern experimental science, that is, to the time of Galileo.

LITERATURE.—I. *EDITIONS OF AVERROËS' WORKS.*—The two most important Latin editions of Averroes are those of Niphus, 1495-97, and of Junta, 1553. Arabic or Hebrew texts: *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, Cairo, A.H. 1303; J. Muller, *Philosophy and Theology of Averroes*, Munich, 1859 (Germ. tr. 1875); *Il commento medio di Averroe alla Poetica di Aristotile*, edited in Arabic and in Hebrew by Lasinio, with Ital. tr., 1872; *Il testo arabo del commento medio di Averroe alla Rettorica di Aristotile*, by the same editor; Freudenthal and Fränkel, 'Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles,' with translation into German, in *MBAW*, 1884; M. Worms, 'Die Lehre von der Anfangslosigkeit der Welt bei den mittelalterlichen arabischen Philosophen,' in Baeumker and von Hertling's *Beitrage*, Munster, 1900.

II. *WORKS ON AVERROISM.*—Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*[3], Paris, 1869; Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, Paris, 1857, also art. in Franck's *Dictionnaire des Sciences philosophiques*; F. Lasinio, 'Studi sopra Averroe,' *Annuario della società italiana per gli studi or.*, 1872-73; A. F. Mehren, 'Et sur la philosophie d'Averroès, concernant ses rapports avec celle d' Avicenne et de Gazzāli,' *Muséon*, vii. 613; Forget, 'Les philosophes arabes et la philosophie scolastique,' *Compte rendu du troisième congrès scientifique international des catholiques*, Brussels, 1895; P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant l'Averroïsme latin au xiiie siècle*, 1899, T. J. de Boer, *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, London, 1903.

BON CARRA DE VAUX.

AVESTA.—The Avesta, the sacred book of ancient Iran, contains the teachings of the prophet Zarathushtra, or Zoroaster, and serves at the present day as the holy scriptures of the Parsis of India and the so-called Gabars of Persia (see artt. GABARS, PARSIS). Although fragmentary in its present form, the Avesta is one of the great religious monuments of antiquity, and preserves the records of a faith that was once among the greatest in the Orient, and that might well have spread through Europe in early ages, but for the victories of the Greeks over the Persians at Marathon, Platæa, and Salamis, and for the triumphal incursion of Alexander into the East.

1. Name.—The designation 'Avesta' is derived from the Pazand *avastā*, Pahlavi *āpastāk*, or *avistāk*, a word of uncertain meaning and derivation. Possibly this term, like the Sanskrit *veda*, may signify 'wisdom,' 'knowledge'; more probably, however, it is derived from a presumable Av. form *upastā*, and denotes 'the original text,' 'the scriptures,' as opposed to the term *zand* (cf. Av. *āzainti*), 'commentary,' 'explanation.' In the exegetical and religious works of the Middle

Persian period these two words occur together constantly in the phrase *āpastāk va zand*, which refers to the original Avestan text and its Pahlavi paraphrase and commentary, and it is the erroneous inversion of these words that gave rise to the name *Zend-Avesta*, which was used by Hyde (1700) and by Anquetil du Perron (1771), and was adopted from the latter by the earliest succeeding translators.

2. Original form.—The Avesta in its present form is only a small remnant of a sacred literature of considerable extent. Pahlavi tradition tells of scriptures in 1200 chapters, the Arab historians Ṭabarī (*Annales*, i. 675) and Mas'ūdī (ed. Barbier de Meynard, ii. 123) refer to a copy inscribed on 12,000 cowhides, various Syriac writers allude to an extensive sacred book, and Pliny the Elder (*HN* xxx. 1. 2) mentions 2,000,000 verses composed by Zoroaster. Such direct references to the extent of the original Avestan writings are in agreement with the frequent insistence in Pahlavi literature on the loss of texts during the dark centuries after Alexander, and they are further confirmed by the fragmentary character of the Avesta as now extant. All doubts as to the existence of that larger literature, however, are removed by the Pahlavi *Dīnkarṭ* and the later Persian *Rivāyats*, which give a detailed account of the early scriptures and a summary of their contents.

According to these works, there were originally 21 Nasks (Nosks), or books, each of which was considered to correspond with one of the 21 words of the Ahuna-Vairya (*q.v.*) prayer, and comprised both the Avestan text and the Pahlavi commentary. These 21 Nasks were divided into three groups of seven books each, the first (called *gāsān*, or Gāthā group, and consisting of Nasks 21, 1, 2, 3, 11, 20, 13) containing the spiritual and moral teachings, the second (called *dāṭik*, or legal group, and consisting of Nasks 15-19, 12, 14) containing laws and prescriptions, and the third (called *hātak-mānsarīk*, or Hadhamanthra group, and consisting of Nasks 4-10) containing matters belonging partly to the first and partly to the second group. The number of sections in each Nask varied from 22 to 65, but many of these sections were no longer extant at the time of the composition of the *Dīnkarṭ*. Of Nasks 8, 9, and 10, for example, each of which had originally 60 sections, only 12, 15, and 10 sections respectively are said to have existed 'after Alexander.' The subjects treated in the Nasks may be briefly summed up as follows: Nask 1, virtue and piety; 2, religious observances; 3, exegetical—the three chief prayers of the religion being explained in it; 4, cosmogony; 5, astronomy and astrology; 6, performance of the ritual, and the benefit to be derived therefrom; 7, qualifications and duties of the priesthood; 8, ethical considerations and various aspects of human life; 9, directions for various ceremonies; 10, conversion and instruction of King Gushtāsp (Vishtāspa) and his wars with Arjāsp; 11, various religious and worldly duties; 12, an account of mankind from the creation of the primeval man to the advent of Zoroaster, and various genealogical information; 13, account of Zoroaster and the Saviour that is to come; 14, worship of Ormazd and the archangels; 15, dispensing of justice and various laws; 16, criminal, civil, and military law; 17, priestly and ritual code, general regulations; 18, law of property and family relations; 19, the Vidēvdād, or Vendidād, pollution and purification; 20, religious duties, good attributes and qualities; 21, praise of Ormazd and the archangels. From this summary it appears that the original work was not purely religious, but was somewhat encyclopædic in character.

3. History.—According to traditions, the substance of which there is no good reason to doubt, the Zoroastrian scriptures were preserved with great care in the early centuries of the faith, especially under the later Achæmenians. Ṭabari states that King Vishtāspa, Zoroaster's patron, sent the original copy of the Avesta, written in letters of gold, to the 'Stronghold of Records' at Stakhra (Persepolis)—a tradition which is in substantial agreement with the Pahlavi account in the *Dīnkarṭ* (III. 3, VII. vii. 3 n., V. iii. 4) of a sumptuous copy that was preserved in the 'treasury of Shapīgān' at Persepolis (cf. Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, p. 306 f.). According to the Pahlavi treatise *Shatroīhā-ī Airān*, another copy, containing 1200 chapters inscribed on gilded tablets, was kept in the 'treasury' of the fire-temple at Samarkand (cf. Modi, *Aiyādgār-i Zarirān, Shatroīhā-i Airān*, Bombay, 1899, pp. 133–136, and *JRASBo* xx, No. 54; and Jackson, *Nöldeke Studien*, Strassburg, 1906, pp. 1031–1033). These two archetype copies, hitherto preserved with zealous care, were destroyed in the invasion of 'the accursed Iskandar' (Alexander) in B.C. 330, when he burned the palace of the Achæmenians at Persepolis, and when his conquering hosts took possession of Samarkand.

The ravages of Alexander broke the power of the Zoroastrian faith, and the Seleucid and Parthian rule in the five following centuries forms a period of depression and darkness in its history, entailing a loss of extensive portions of the original scriptures. Despite the consequent neglect, considerable portions of the texts were preserved in scattered works and in the memory of the priests. Under the last of the Arsacids, early in the 3rd cent. A.D., an attempt was made to collect such parts of the Avesta as had survived. According to a proclamation of Khusru Anūshirvān (A.D. 531–579), King Valkhash, who is generally identified with Vologeses I., ordered that all sacred writings should be searched for, and that such portions as were preserved only in oral tradition should again be written down. This work was eagerly continued by the founder of the Sasanian dynasty, Artakhshīr* Pāpakān (A.D. 226–240), who commissioned the high priest Tansar to collect the scattered fragments, and by his son, Shāhpūhr I. (A.D. 241–272). In the reign of Shāhpūhr II. (A.D. 309–380) a final revision of the Avestan texts was made by his prime minister, Ādarbād Māraspand, and this collection, consisting of a fixed number of books, was then declared canonical (see Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, iii. Introd. pp. xx–xxxvi, 'Zend-Avesta,' *SBE* iv. pp. xxx–xlvii, and *JA*, new series, iii., Paris, 1894, pp. 185–250, 502–555; consult also the discussion of Darmesteter's article, in two papers, by the Parsi High Priest Darab Dastur Peshotan Sanjana, *Tansar's Alleged Letter*, Leipzig, 1898, and the same author's *Observations on Darmesteter's Theory*, Leipzig, 1898; and Mills, *Zarathushtra, Philo, the Achæmenids, and Israel*, Chicago, 1906, pp. 21–76).

Far more serious even than the ravages of Alexander and the centuries of neglect, were the results of the Muhammadan conquest of Persia and the inroads of the Qur'ān. Through religious persecutions and civic disabilities the worshippers of Ormazd were compelled to abandon their faith or go into exile, and as many Zoroastrian books as could be found were ordered to be burned. The small body of texts that escaped destruction and loss was preserved by the few Zoroastrians who remained in Persia and by the Parsis, their co-religionists who had taken refuge in India; and the books contained in these manuscripts, recopied from time to time, constitute the Avesta as we now have it. The oldest Indian manuscripts date from the 13th and 14th centuries; the Persian are not older than the 17th. No single manuscript contains all the extant texts.

4. Present contents.—The Avesta in its present form consists of the following divisions: (*a*) *Yasna*, including (*b*) the *Gāthās*, (*c*) *Vīsparad*, (*d*) *Yashts*, (*e*) Minor Texts, such as *Nyaishes*, *Gāhs*, etc., (*f*) *Vendidād*, (*g*) *Fragments*. These divisions fall naturally into two groups. (1) The first group comprises the Vendidād, Vīsparad, and Yasna, which are classed together for liturgical purposes. In the ritual these are not recited as separate books, but are intermingled with one another, and the manuscripts often present them in the order in which they are to be used in the service. In this case the Pahlavi translation is omitted, and the collection is called *Vendīdād Sādah*, 'Vendīdād Pure,' that is, without commentary. On the other hand, these books also appear in some manuscripts

* See art. ARDASHIR I. vol. i. p. 774.

as separate entities, and in that case each part is usually accompanied by a rendering in Pahlavi. (2) The second group comprises the Minor Prayers and the Yashts, which are often included with these in the manuscripts, and is called *Khordah Avesta*, 'Abridged Avesta,' or 'Small Avesta.' This forms a species of prayer-book for the laity.

(*a*) *Yasna.*—The Yasna is the chief liturgical work of the canon. It is recited in its entirety in the Yasna ceremony, which, apart from a number of subordinate rites, is devoted chiefly to the preparation and offering of the *parāhōm* (the juice of the Haoma plant, mingled with milk and aromatic ingredients). Parts of the book, however, deal only indirectly with the ritual. The Yasna is composed of 72 chapters, called *Hāiti, Hā*, which are symbolized in the girdle of the Parsis (*kusti*), woven of 72 strands. Several of these chapters are mere repetitions to swell the apparent number. Chapters v. and xviii. are substantially identical with chapters xxxvii. and xlvii., and chapters lxiii., lxiv., lxvi., lxvii., and lxxii. are composed of texts occurring elsewhere. The book falls into three nearly equal divisions (i.–xxvii., xxviii.–lv., lvi.–lxxii.). The first part begins with an invocation of Ormazd and the other divinities in order of rank (i.–ii.), and the dedication of the oblation (*myazda*) and other offerings with similar formulas (iii. 1–8, iv.). After a short prayer (viii. 5–8) there follows the *Hom Yasht* (ix.–xi.), in which Haoma, the branch from whose twigs, like the Soma of the Hindus, a sacred drink was prepared, is personified and worshipped both as plant and as divinity. This section is in turn succeeded by the Zoroastrian creed (xii.) and by other formulas (xiii.). With chapter xiv. begin the so-called *Staota Yesnya*, chapters of the *Stōt-Yasht*, or twenty-first Nask, of the earlier Avesta, which continue, with interruptions, as far as chapter lviii. In the early chapters of the *Staota Yesnya* are found invocations of the spirits of the day (xvi.), of the periods of day and year, and of the various forms of fire (xvii.). Chapters xix.–xxi contain commentaries on the three most sacred prayers, the *Ahuna Vairya, Ashem Vohū*, and *Yenghē Hātām*, and represent part of the third original Nask, called the Bak Nask. The succeeding chapters (xxii.–xxvii.) make up a further liturgical sequence, called *Hōmāst Yasht*, which accompanies the second preparation of the Haoma juice in the ceremony. The five *Gāthās*, which together with the *Yasna Haptanghāiti* form chapters xxviii.–liii. (excepting lii.), stand out in marked contrast with the other parts of the Yasna, and are described in the next paragraph below. Chapter liii. is a brief interpolation between the fourth and fifth Gāthās. Chapter liv. consists of but a single verse, aside from the introductory formulas, and forms the *Airyaman Ishya* prayer, with which the Saoshyants are to restore the dead to life at the day of resurrection. After a brief poetical summary of the Gāthās (lv.) comes the *Srōsh Yasht* (lvii.), a long and detailed glorification of the angel Sraosha, preceded by a briefer chapter in the same vein (lvi.) by way of introduction. Chapter lviii. is in praise of prayer in general, and especially of the prayer to be recited at the Last Judgment. The following chapter (lix.), with its renewed invocations, leads over to a formula of blessing on the house of a pious worshipper (lx.), a formula of exorcism (lxi.), and a series of stanzas to be recited in propitiation of the sacred fire (lxii.). Chapters lxiii.–lxviii. constitute the *Āb-zōr*, 'offering to the waters,' which consists of an introduction (lxiii.–lxiv.), praises of Anāhitā, the goddess of the waters (lxv.), and the formulas used in the consecration and offering of the holy water (lxvi.–lxviii.). The book ends with further invocations (lxix.–lxxii.), which mark the conclusion of the Yasna ceremony.

(*b*) *Gāthās.* — The metrical Gāthās ('songs,' 'psalms') constitute the oldest as well as the most important part of the whole Avesta, and differ from the other parts in language, metre, and style. They are five in number, comprising 17 hymns (*Yas.* xxviii.–xxxiv., xliii.–xlvi., xlvii.–l., li., liii.), and are arranged according to their metres, and named Ahunavaiti, Ushtavaiti, Spenta Mainyu, Vohu Khshathra, and Vahishtoishti, after their opening words. These Zoroastrian psalms contain the teachings, exhortations, and revelations of the prophet Zoroaster himself, who seems a more distinct personality here than elsewhere in the Avesta. The style of the Gāthās is noticeably different from that of other parts, being almost free from the tiresome uniformity and barren reiteration of some of the later portions; and although there is a constant recurrence of the cardinal tenets, these do not become monotonous, because of their varying expression. Ceremonies and ritual observances are but little referred to, and the Haoma-cult, the *Fravashis*, and the whole naturalistic pantheon do not appear in these hymns, either because they present the religion in an earlier and loftier form, or, more probably, because they are concerned chiefly with the prophet's teaching regarding the conflict between Ormazd and Ahriman, the relation of the human individual to that conflict, its ultimate outcome in the routing of the forces of evil and the final victory of Ormazd, the last judgment, and the longed-for kingdom of Ormazd. The detached character of the verses, which nevertheless are a logical sequence, has led to the supposition that, like the verse portions of many Buddhistic works, they were the text of discourses of the prophet and a summary of his teachings in a form available for oral tradition (cf. Pischel and Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, Stuttgart, 1889, i. 287).

In the midst of the Gāthās is inserted the so-called 'Yasna of the Seven Chapters' (*Yasna I aptanghāiti*), which is written in prose, but in the same dialect as the Gāthās. It consists of a number of prayers and ascriptions of praise to Ormazd, the Amesha Spentas, or archangels, the souls of the righteous, the fire, the waters, and the earth. By some scholars it is held to represent a later and more developed form of the religion than appears in the Gāthās. Its language, in fact, shows certain departures from the Gāthic dialect. Under the Gāthās are also included four specially sacred prayers or formulas. These are the *Ahuna Vairya* (*Yas.* xxvii. 13), the *Ashem Vohū* (*Yas.* xxvii. 14), *Yenghē Hātām* (*Yas.* iv. 26), and the *Airyaman Ishya* previously mentioned (*Yas.* liv. 1).

(*c*) *Vīsparad.*—The Visparad (Av. *vīspē ratavō*, 'all the lords') is not a body of connected texts, but consists merely of additions to portions of the Yasna, which it resembles in language and form. It comprises 24 (according to some, 23 or 27) chapters, called Kardah, and is about one-seventh as long as the Yasna. The Visparad contains invocations and offerings of homage to 'all the lords,' whence its name. In the ritual its chapters are inserted among those of the Yasna.

(*d*) *Yashts.*—The Yashts (Av. *yeshti*, 'worship by praise') form a poetical book of 21 hymns, chiefly in verse, in which the angels of the religion (*yazatas*) and the heroes of ancient Iran are praised and glorified. The order in which the divinities are worshipped corresponds largely with the sequence in which they are used to name the days of the month. In external form the Yashts are characterized by their identical introduction and conclusion, but they differ greatly in length, age, and character. The first four are largely composed of

late and ungrammatical material, and the last two consist chiefly of regular Yasht formulas with a number of quotations from other passages. On the other hand, the intervening longer Yashts are almost entirely in verse, and have considerable poetic merit. Of chief importance among these are: Yasht v., in praise of Ardvī Sūrā Anāhitā, the goddess of the waters; Yasht viii., which exalts the star Tishtrya, and recounts his victory over the demon of drought; Yasht x., dedicated to Mithra, who, as the god of light and of truth, rides out in lordly array to wreak vengeance on those who have belied their oath or broken their pledge; Yasht xiii., devoted to glorifying and propitiating the guardian spirits (*fravashis*) of the righteous; Yasht xiv., in honour of Verethraghna, the incarnation of victory; and Yasht xix., which sings the praises of the Kingly Glory (*kavaya hvarenah*), a sort of halo or radiance said to have been possessed by kings and heroes of Iran in olden times as a sign of their rulership by divine right. Much of the material in the Yashts is evidently drawn from pre-Zoroastrian sages; there is a mythological and legendary atmosphere about them, and Firdausi's *Shāh Nāmah* serves to throw light on many of the events which they portray, and on allusions that would otherwise be obscure.

(*e*) *Minor Texts.*—Chief among the Minor Texts are the *Nyaishes*, or Zoroastrian Litanies, a collection of five short prayers or ascriptions of praise addressed to the Sun, Moon, Water, and Fire, and to the angels Khurshēd, Mihr (Mithra), Māh, Ardvisūr (Ardvī Sūrā Anāhitā), and Ātash, who preside over these elements. These litanies form an important part of the Khordah Avesta. They are composed of fragments from the Yasna and Yashts, and contain invocations, supplications, deprecations, and obsecrations employed daily by the laity as well as by the priesthood. Under the heading of Minor Texts come also the five *Gāhs*, addressed to the spirits of the five periods of the day; the two *Sīrōzahs*, the greater and the lesser, which in their 30 paragraphs invoke in turn the divinities of each day of the month, and which are recited especially on the thirtieth day after the death of a Zoroastrian; the *Āfrīngāns*, or blessings, four in number, used for various purposes with an accompanying offering: the *Āfrīngān-i Dahmān*, repeated in honour of those who have died in the faith; the *Āfrīngān-i Gāthā*, recited on the five concluding days of the year, when the souls of the dead revisit the earth; the *Āfrīngān-i Gahanbār*, composed chiefly of instructions to worshippers concerning participation in the celebration of the six special festivals of the year; and the *Āfrīngān-i Rapithwin*, recited at the beginning and end of summer. All of these belong to the Khordah Avesta.

(*f*) *Vendīdād.* — The Vendīdād (Av. *vīdaēvodāta*, 'the law against the demons'), although inserted for liturgical purposes among the Gāthās in the Zoroastrian ritual, is not actually a liturgical work but a priestly code prescribing the various purifications, penalties, and expiations. It originally formed the nineteenth Nask of the Avesta handed down to Sasanian times, but its parts vary greatly both in point of style and in time of composition. Much of it must be of late origin.

In its present form it contains 22 chapters, called fargards. Chapter i. is a dualistic account of creation that attributes all the disagreeable features of the otherwise delightful regions of the earth to the counter-creative activity of Ahriman. Chapter ii. tells the legend of Yima, of the Golden Age, and of the coming of a terrible winter and destructive floods, to preserve mankind from which the princely Yima is directed by Ormazd to build an enclosure (*vara*). The following chapter (iii.) treats of the pleasures and pains of earthly life, the manner of life prescribed for bearers of corpses (a special class of men), praise of agriculture, and the defilement of the earth by corpses. Chapter iv. concerns legal matters—breaches of contract, assault, punishments. Chapters v.-xii. relate mainly to impurity incurred through contact with the dead and to the methods of purification for removing the pollution, notably by undergoing an elaborate lustration for nine nights, the so-called *Barashnūm* (ix.). Chapters xiii.-xv. are devoted chiefly to the treatment to be accorded to the dog, an animal held in almost reverential regard by the early pastoral Zoroastrians. In chapters xvi.-xvii. instructions are given for purification from several sorts of uncleanness, and for the disposal of parings of the nails and clipped ends of the hair. Chapter xviii., one of the most interesting and instructive in the Vendīdād, deals, among other things, with the character of the true and the false priest, and with the cock that wakes the pious to prayer early in the morning; and it relates a conversation between the angel Sraosha, club in hand, and the evil spirit Druj, concerning the progeny of the latter. In chapter xix. are found an account of the temptation of Zoroaster and the revelation of the destiny of the soul after death. Chapters xx.-xxii. are chiefly of a medical character.

(*g*) *Fragments.*—In addition to the preceding books there are also a considerable number of fragments. There survive, for example, three chapters from the original Hādōkht Nask, the last two of which are eschatological in character, and deal with the destiny of the soul after death. Of special interest is a similar metrical fragment (Fr. W. 4), which refers to the efficacy of the *Airyaman Ishya* prayer, which is to be chanted by the Messianic Saoshyants at the day of judgment, to confound Ahriman and his hellish crew and to raise up the dead (cf. Haas, 'An Avestan Fragment on the Resurrection,' *Spiegel Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1908, pp. 181–187). Among the longer fragmentary texts may be mentioned also the *Āfrīn-i Paighambar Zartusht* in honour of Zoroaster, a blessing invoked upon kings, and the so-called *Vīshtāsp Yasht*, an enigmatical compilation, disconnected and ungrammatical, which is in no wise related to the regular Yashts. Many fragments are found as quotations in the Pahlavi ancillary literature. Most important of these is the *Nīrangistān*, a work in three fargards, or chapters, collecting and commenting upon a number of Avestan *Nīrangs*, or ritual prescriptions. The commentary cites additional directions of the same kind from another source. This work is of value for our knowledge of the ritual and for Avestan lexicography, but unfortunately the manuscript material is poor and the text consequently imperfect. Another Pahlavi treatise that contains Avestan passages is the *Āfrīn-i Dahmān*, also called *Aogemadaēcā* after the first quoted Avestan word. The Pahlavi commentaries on the Vendīdād and the Yasna, and other Pahlavi works, such as the *Shāyast-lā-Shāyast*, the *Vijirkart-i Dīnik*, and the *Pursishnīhā*, contain a large number of Avestan quotations, many of them from the lost Nasks, and brief formulas and prayers are found here and there in manuscripts of the Khordah Avesta. Mention should likewise be made of the additions to Avestan lexicography in the *Frahang i-Ōīm*, an Avesta-Pahlavi glossary (ed. Hoshangji Jamaspji and Haug, Bombay, 1867; cf. Reichelt, in *WZKM* xiv. 172–213, xv. 117–186). For a complete list of fragments and their editions see Bartholomae, *Altiran. Wörterbuch*, pp. viii–x.

The extant parts of the Avesta owe their preservation chiefly to their employment in the ritual. The liturgical portions, constantly used in priestly observances and ceremonies, were naturally considered of greater importance and cherished with greater care, whereas the other books that may have escaped destruction gradually fell into desuetude and neglect, were not copied as much as the parts occurring in the ritual, and finally disappeared altogether. Thus it happens that the present Avesta corresponds but little with the traditional 21 Nasks in arrangement or in extent. Only two of these original 21 books are now represented with any degree of completeness. The Vendīdād, or nineteenth Nask, has

survived in approximately its full form; yet even this shows evidence of having been patched up and pieced together. Many of the chapters of the Stōt-Yasht, or twenty-first Nask, are contained in the Yasna, where they extend, with interruptions, from chapter xiv. to chapter lviii. (cf. Geldner, 'Awesta-litteratur,' in *GIrP* ii. 25–26). There exist also, in addition to these two remnants, an important part of the Bakān Yasht, or fourteenth Nask (most of the Yashts being referred back to this otherwise lost book), and portions or fragments of others are extant. Altogether there are preserved specimens of about 15 of the original 21 Nasks. This material is supplemented, however, by various passages that have been translated from the Avesta into Pahlavi, and have come down to us in that form. The Pahlavi *Būndahishn*, for example, is largely based on the old Avestan Dāmdāt Nask, and serves in a measure to replace its loss.

5. **Age and growth.**—The present form of the Avesta dates, as has been mentioned above, from the Sasanian period, but the various portions differ considerably from one another in age. The relative age of the component parts can be approximately determined by a study of their metre, grammar, and style. Although it is impossible to go into details here, it may be said in general that the later texts as a rule are written in prose, show lack of grammatical knowledge on the part of their authors or compilers, and consist to a very great extent of formulaic material. The application of this threefold criterion shows the chronological order of the texts to be somewhat as follows: (1) Gāthās (*Yas.* xxviii.–liii.), including (2) the Yasna Haptanghāiti (*Yas.* xxxv.–xlii.) and some other compositions in the Gāthā dialect (*Yas.* xii., lviii. and the four most sacred prayers, or formulas, mentioned above), (3) metrical Yasna and Yashts (*Yas.* ix.–xi., lvii., lxii., lxv.; *Yt.* v., viii.–x., xiv., xv., xvii., xix.), portions of Vendīdād ii.–v., xviii.–xix., and scattered verses in the Visparad, Nyaishes, Āfrīngāns, etc., and (4) the remaining prose portions of the Avesta.

The determination of the actual date of composition of the different parts of the Avesta is largely a matter of speculation. According to the generally accepted view, the Gāthās, the oldest part in substance as well as in form, date back to an early period of the religion, if not to the prophet Zoroaster himself, whereas certain minor portions of the scriptures may have been written or compiled as late as the time of Shāhpūhr II. of the Sasanian dynasty. The extreme limits of the period of development would thus be about B.C. 560 and A.D. 375. In his latest works (*Le Zend-Avesta*, iii., Introd.; see also *Zend-Avesta*[2], *SBE* iv.), the brilliant French scholar, Darmesteter, put forth a radical theory in regard to the composition of the Avesta as we now have it. In his opinion all sacred writings that may have existed under the Achæmenians were lost after the invasion of Alexander, and not a page of any earlier work has come down intact. The pre-Alexandrian spirit may be recognized, however, in the Vendīdād, which, although later than the Gāthās in composition, is older in material and Achæmenian in tone. According to this theory, the Gāthās, though the oldest part of the Avesta in form, represent the latest growth of the Zoroastrian spirit and show the influence of Gnosticism, the school of Philo Judæus, and Judaism. Darmesteter assigns their origin to the middle of the 1st cent. A.D. This radical hypothesis concerning the age and growth of the Avesta met at once with spirited opposition on the part of scholars best qualified to judge, and can hardly be said to have any acceptance to-day. Avestan specialists are at present agreed that there is no adequate reason for making so strong a claim that the tradition was lost. It is known that the latest Parthian monarchs were filled with the true Zoroastrian spirit, and it can be proved from Greek, Latin, and other writings that the tradition of the wisdom of Zoroaster lived on during the long period between Alexander and the rise of the house of Sāsān in the 3rd cent. A.D.

6. **Language.**—The language in which the Avesta is written is named 'Avestan.' It belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-Germanic family of tongues, and is most closely allied to the Sanskrit, though individually quite distinct from the latter. This relation to the Sanskrit was one of the means of establishing the authenticity of the Avesta, and is still of the greatest importance in its interpretation. In its phonology Avestan agrees with Sanskrit in its vowels in general, but shows a greater variety in its *e* and *o* sounds. Final vowels, except *ō*, are, as a rule, short. A striking peculiarity is the insertion of transitional and epenthetic vowels, the latter giving rise to improper diphthongs. Some of the consonants are identical with those of Sanskrit, others correspond uniformly with certain Sanskrit sounds. The Sanskrit voiceless stops *k*, *t*, *p*, for example, are generally represented in Avestan by the spirants *kh*, *th*, *f*, when followed by consonants; Sanskrit initial *s* appears in Avestan as *h*. Because of this close correspondence, many Avestan words and phrases may be changed at once into their Sanskrit equivalents by the mere application of certain phonetic laws. In inflexion the language shows nearly the richness of Vedic Sanskrit, and it possesses almost equal facility of word-formation. In syntax it differs from the Sanskrit in certain points, showing marked individuality, especially in the later portions.

Two dialects may be recognized in the Avesta: one the Gāthā dialect, the language of the oldest parts, often called *Gāthā Avestan* (*GAv.*); the other, the language of the great body of the Avesta, called *Younger Avestan* (*YAv.*). The Gāthā dialect is more archaic, bearing to the Younger Avestan somewhat the relation of the Vedic to the classical Sanskrit. Possibly this older dialect may owe some of its peculiarities also to an original difference of locality. Its chief characteristic is the lengthening of all final vowels and the frequent use of parasitic vowels. Its grammatical structure is remarkably pure. The same cannot be said of all the texts written in Younger Avestan, as the late compositions in this dialect, owing to linguistic decay, show many corruptions and confusions. All that is old or written in metre, however, is correct, and occasional inaccuracies in such parts must be attributed to faulty transmission.

7. **Metres.**—The metres of the Avesta deserve considerable attention, because they assist in determining the relative age of the various parts. Almost all the oldest portions of the texts are found to be metrical; the later, or inserted portions, are, as a rule, though not always, written in prose. The Gāthās are composed in metres that have analogies in the Vedas. These were the only metrical parts known to the later Zoroastrians until Western scholars discovered the rhythmical structure of many passages in the later texts. Almost all of these versified portions, especially frequent in the Yashts, are written in eight-syllable lines (cf. Geldner, *Über die Metrik des jüngeren Avesta*, Tübingen, 1877).

8. **Alphabet.**—The Avesta is written in an alphabet far younger than the language it presents. The characters are derived from the Sasanian Pahlavi, which was used to record the oral tradition when the texts were collected and edited in Sasanian times. The writing is read from right

to left. Nothing is known about the original Avestan script.

9. Pahlavi version.—The Pahlavi version of the Avesta was made in Persia in Sasanian times, when the general understanding of the sacred texts became more and more imperfect. Some of the exegetical portions and works of interpretation belong even to Muhammadan times, and may be assigned to the period between 700 and 900 A.D. Of the Pahlavi version there are now extant the entire Yasna, Visparad, and Vendidad, with some portions of other texts. The rendering is a word for word translation of the original, with the addition of occasional independent explanatory glosses. The original Avestan construction is usually adhered to verbatim, and the glossator has to eke out the inflexional poverty of the language in his day by the use of particles. These determinatives, however, are often omitted, and the loss of the sole means of indicating syntactical relation adds greatly to the ambiguity of the Pahlavi paraphrase. This version, with the accompanying glosses, presents the traditional Zoroastrian interpretation from an early time, and is of the greatest value for an understanding of obscure ideas and an insight into native thought. It is also of material assistance in determining the meaning of a word or phrase, and it serves to check the results of purely linguistic analysis. It must be conceded, nevertheless, that it abounds in errors and inaccuracies, and that its explanations are often fanciful. Furthermore, the more abstract or obscure the original, the less the commentator attempts to explain it. The Gathas, for example, have in general very few glosses, whereas some other parts of the Avesta are accompanied by an elaborate commentary. The chief defect of the version lies in its disregard of the principles of the grammar, of which its authors seem to have had scarcely any knowledge. As a result of the slavish adherence to the original, the style of the Pahlavi version is very clumsy in comparison with the Pahlavi of independent treatises.

About the year 1200 a large part of the Pahlavi version was translated into Sanskrit by Neryosangh, son of Dhaval, a Zoroastrian priest, who seems to have possessed a thorough knowledge of Pahlavi. His translation is of great value as a help in understanding the Pahlavi version, which he follows in construction and renders word for word. This method often obliges him to sacrifice the Sanskrit syntax to that of the original Pahlavi, and his language consequently assumes a peculiar Iranicized aspect. A further striking peculiarity of the Sanskrit of Neryosangh's version is his disregard of the rules of *sandhi*, or euphonic vowel-combination, so uniformly observed in other Sanskrit works. Neryosangh seems on occasion to have corrected the Pahlavi rendering when he thought it at fault, thus showing that he must have referred at times to the Avestan text itself and reached an independent decision as to its meaning.

A modern Persian translation of portions of the Pahlavi version of the Khordah Avesta was prepared in Persia at some time between 1600 and 1800 A.D., and two separate translations into Gujarati were made in India early in the last century, and appeared at Bombay in 1818 within five months of one another. These are the last independent native versions made before the percolation into India of the influence of Western scholarship. These later versions have some merit, in that they occasionally help us to understand an obscure or ambiguous passage in the Pahlavi, but they never venture upon an explanation other than that of the version on which they are based, and consequently they content themselves with reproducing the Pahlavi paraphrase and commentary without change.

10. Discovery.—The story of the discovery, or opening, of the Avesta to Europe has a special interest, since the Avesta has been known to the Western world for only a little more than a century. A manuscript of the Yasna seems to have been brought to Canterbury as early as 1633, and a copy of the Vendidad Sadah was brought from Surat in 1723 by an Englishman, George Boucher, and deposited in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, where it was for a long time chained to the wall as a curiosity. No one, however, was able to read these manuscripts, and Thomas Hyde (*Historia Religionis Veterum Persarum*, Oxford, 1700) drew his information chiefly from later Parsi sources. To a young Frenchman, Anquetil du Perron, belongs the honour of being the first to decipher these texts. Some tracings made from the Oxford manuscript were sent to Paris and came to his notice. Du Perron at once conceived the idea of going to India or Persia and obtaining from the priests themselves the knowledge of their sacred books. In his eagerness to carry out his plan he did not wait for promised financial support from the French Academy, but enlisted as a soldier among the troops about to start for India, and left Paris with them in November, 1754. Before he had gone far on his journey, however, the government gave him his discharge from the army, and presented him with his passage to India. After innumerable discouragements, and in spite of almost insurmountable obstacles, he succeeded in winning the confidence of the priests, with whom he was able to communicate after learning Modern Persian. These he gradually induced to teach him the language of the Avesta, to let him have some of the manuscripts, and even to initiate him into some of the rites and ceremonies of their religion. After seven years among the Parsis, he returned to Europe in 1761, stopping at Oxford, before he returned to Paris, to compare his manuscripts with the one in the Bodleian Library in order to assure himself of their authenticity. During the next ten years he worked upon the texts and prepared a translation, which, together with explanatory material, he published in 1771 under the title *Zend-Avesta, Ouvrage de Zoroastre.*

The enthusiasm aroused by this discovery was soon followed by discussions regarding the authenticity of the scriptures that had been made accessible. Some scholars were disappointed not to find the important philosophical and religious ideas they had expected, and did not sufficiently realize the difficulties of pioneer work of this kind. It was suggested, therefore, that the so-called Zend-Avesta was not genuine, but a forgery. The foremost advocate of this view was the Orientalist Sir William Jones, who claimed that the Parsis had palmed off on du Perron a conglomeration of worthless fabrications and absurdities. In France the genuineness of the book was accepted almost universally, and the German scholar Kleuker was an ardent supporter of its authenticity, translating du Perron's work into German, and adding a collection of classical allusions to the Magi and the religion of the ancient Persians (9 parts, Riga and Leipzig, 1776–83). This discussion as to the authenticity lasted for fifty years, during which time little or no work was done on the texts themselves.

About the year 1825 the texts began to be studied by Sanskrit scholars. The close affinity between the two languages had already been noticed by various scholars, but the Danish philologian Rask first pointed out more exactly the relation between them. He had travelled in Persia and India, and had brought back with him many valuable manuscripts of the Avesta and the Pahlavi writings. In a little volume published in 1826 he

proved the antiquity of the language in which the Avesta was preserved, showed that it was distinct from Sanskrit, though closely related to it, and made some investigation into the alphabet of the texts. At about the same time the French scholar Burnouf began to study the Avesta. He soon found philological inaccuracies in Anquetil's translation; and with the help of Neryosangh's Sanskrit version, he was able to restore sense in many passages where before there had been but little. These further steps soon settled the question of authenticity. The foundation thus laid was built upon by such scholars as Bopp, Haug, Windischmann, Westergaard, Roth, and Spiegel, whose efforts were directed mainly to the establishment of a better text and the development of principles of investigation. For a long time the battle raged about the question of the relative value of the traditional and the linguistic methods, some scholars extolling the value of the Pahlavi version and the priestly tradition, and others placing supreme faith in the results of comparison with Sanskrit and other tongues. It is only in recent years that it has become generally recognized that in the interpretation of the Avesta neither of these methods should be employed to the exclusion of the other. Both have positive value, and a judicious balance of these two principles will henceforth doubtless be a fundamental requisite for sound scholarship in this field, which is being cultivated by a small but active band of workers.

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AVICENNA, AVICENNISM.—1. Life.—The name 'Avicenna' is the Latinized form of the Hebrew 'Aven Sînâ,' the transcription of the Arabic 'Ibn Sînâ.' Abû 'Alî al-Ḥusain ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Sînâ was born in the year A.H. 370 (A.D. 980–981), in the city of Kharmaitan. The son of a money-changer, and very precocious as a child, he received a first-class education. According to Musalmân custom, he began by learning the Qur'ân and belles-lettres (*adab*). He then studied Indian arithmetic under the guidance of a greengrocer. His next tutor was a philosopher called Nâtili, otherwise unknown, who came to reside with his father at Bokhara, and taught the boy the elements of Logic, Euclid, and the Almagest. Avicenna studied medicine without the help of a teacher, and, while quite young, began to visit the sick. Aristotle's *Metaphysics* presented great difficulty to him at first. He read it forty times without understanding it, but at last grasped its purport by means of al-Fârâbî's commentaries.

His medical talent soon brought him into favour with royal households. He cured the Sâmânid Sultan of Bokhara, Nuh, son of Manṣûr, and then became one of his intimate friends. This gave him access to the Sultan's library, a very valuable one, which shortly afterwards was unfortunately burned. Avicenna was officially employed at the court of Bokhara. Nevertheless, he soon turned his back on it, and travelled through many towns in search of a suitable patron. After short sojourns in Korkanj, Nasâ, Abîward, and Ṭûs, he arrived at Jorjân, where he became connected with al-Juzjâni, who afterwards became his disciple. In fact, it is to him we are indebted for the rest of his life-story. The first part of this biography is culled from Avicenna's own account, which has been preserved by Ibn Abî Uṣaibia. This work is doubly precious to us because there are very few autobiographies in Arabic literature.

The *Shaikh*, as Avicenna was called, continued to lead this wandering life, like many savants of his time, in the hope of finding a powerful and faithful patron, whose influence and favour would be lasting. He became, for a time, the protégé of an admirer in Jorjân, then of the Princess of Rai; but he soon passed on to Kazvîn and Hamadân. He cured the Amir of Hamadân, and was entrusted with the post of Vizier. But his term of government was not a happy one. He accordingly renounced all public functions, and, hidden in the house of a druggist, became immersed in the composition of his greatest works. As he had a strong desire to leave Hamadân, he applied secretly to the Amir of Iṣfahân. The Amir of Hamadân discovered this step and straightway imprisoned him; but his captivity did not interrupt his literary work. After many adventures, he succeeded in escaping along with his brother, Juzjâni, and two servants, all five disguised as Ṣûfîs, and at last found a sure refuge with the Buwayhid prince Alâ ad-Daula, who reigned in Iṣfahân. There he received the honour and dignities he so well deserved; and there he enjoyed, what he appreciated far more than any honours, tranquillity. At night, he held philosophical meetings, over which the Amir himself sometimes presided.

And meantime he finished his greatest works. Avicenna died in A.H. 428 (A.D. 1036–7), at the age of 58, in the course of a journey, made in the train of his master, to Hamadan.

His biography gives the impression of very great activity—an activity, too, which was exercised in more ways than one. Avicenna loved wine and pleasure almost as much as intellectual work; and he committed excesses which shortened his life. Legend has seized upon his character, and has made of him a sort of powerful but beneficent sorcerer, the hero of strange adventures and burlesque farces. A whole volume of Turkish tales is devoted to him.

2. Works.—Avicenna's works are very numerous. In Philosophy, the greatest is *ash Shifā* ('the Cure'). The Shaikh composed it by degrees at his different residences during his wanderings. When it was finished, he made an abridgment of it entitled *Najāt* ('Healing'). This abridgment, written in very concise language, but clear and logical, is suitable for study. Another famous philosophical work is entitled *Ishārāt*. The full title is *Kitāb al-ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt*, that is to say, 'Book of theorems and propositions.' Juzjani considered this Avicenna's best work, while he himself put a high value on it. It has been commented on by the scholar Nasīr ad-Dīn Tusi († A.H. 672 [A.D. 1273–4]).

Avicenna's other philosophical treatises are: *Philosophy el-Arudi*, *Philosophy el-Alāi*, so called from the names of the patrons to whom they are dedicated; *Guide to Wisdom*, composed by the Shaikh when in prison, and often commented on; an epistle on *The Fountains of Wisdom*, printed several times in the East; several treatises on *Logic*, one of which forms a part of the *Najāt*; a treatise *On the Soul*; a short poem on *The Soul*, rather a mysterious piece, which has been commented on; an epistle on *The Human Faculties and their Perceptions*, printed at Constantinople; lastly, a series of mystical treatises, and a few poems in Persian.

In Medicine, Avicenna composed the voluminous work entitled *Canon of Medicine*, so celebrated in the Middle Ages. He also produced works on the different sciences, abridged Euclid and the Almagest, and devoted some time to Astronomy. Shortly before his death, he asked Ala ad-Daula for permission to resume the astronomical observations which had been interrupted by troubles and wars. He was also credited in the Middle Ages with some treatises on Alchemy.

3. Antecedents and characteristics.—Avicenna belongs to the school which in Arabic literature took the name of 'School of Philosophers' (*al-falāsifa*). This name denotes all the philosophers who made a special study of Greek works, and the scholars who translated them. Shahrastāni (tr. Haarbrucker, ii. 212 f.) gives a list of about twenty who, before Avicenna's time, received this title of Philosopher. Among them are the Christian or Sabæan translators, Hunain son of Ishāq, Thābit son of Qurra, Yahyā son of Adi. Among the Musalmāns, the most celebrated representatives of this school, before Avicenna, are al-Kindi and al-Fārābī. Of these, al-Kindi is the real organizer of Arabic Scholasticism, while to al-Fārābī Avicenna is greatly indebted in Metaphysics, as he acknowledges, and probably also in Logic and Psychology. It is now generally granted that this school was a development of Neo-Platonism rather than strictly Peripatetic. Avicenna seems to have cleared up and systematized the work of his predecessors. In the following account of his original work, we shall not consider the medical or merely scientific portions, but confine our attention to his philosophical outlook.

4. Philosophy.—Avicenna's Philosophy may be sub-divided as follows: Logic, Physics, Psychology, Metaphysics, Mysticism, and Ethics. This division is in conformity with the custom of his school.

(1) *Logic.*—The parts of the *Najāt* relating to Logic were translated into French by Pierre Vattier (see Lit. at end of art.). The *Ishārāt* also contains some important passages in this connexion. In a treatise on the *Classification of the Sciences*, Avicenna gives Logic a very prominent place indeed among the sciences. His reason is not only the importance of Logic in itself, but also the comparatively extensive knowledge that the Arabs had of Aristotle's logical works. They were not so intimate with his other philosophical works. In this same treatise Avicenna further subdivides the science of Logic into nine different parts, which correspond respectively to the eight books of Aristotle, preceded by Porphyry's *Isagoge*, one of the best-known works of the Oriental Middle Ages.

The first part, corresponding to the *Isagoge*, is a kind of general philosophy of language, and is occupied with the terms of speech and their abstract elements, the second treats of simple abstract ideas, applicable to all beings, and is called by Aristotle the *Categories*; the third deals with the composition of simple ideas in order to form propositions, which is the subject of the *Hermeneutics*; the fourth unites the propositions together to form demonstrations, and corresponds to the First *Analytics*; the fifth discusses the conditions to be fulfilled by the premisses of reasoning, and is like the Second *Analytics*; the sixth, seventh, and eighth parts respectively treat of probable reasoning, false reasoning, and the art of persuading, and correspond to the *Topics* or *Dialectics*, the *Sophistic*, and *Rhetoric*. The ninth and last part treats of discourses whose aim is to stir the soul or the imagination, like the *Poetics*.

Logic, then, is taken here in a very broad sense; syllogistic is only a part of it. Syllogistic with Avicenna has no very special quality except that of being clear and well arranged, free from vain subtleties and all scholastic trifling.

Although, as we have seen, Avicenna gave Logic a very important place, he did not, at the same time, exaggerate its power. He shows very clearly that this power is, above all, negative. 'The aim of Logic,' he says in the *Ishārāt*, 'is to provide mankind with a rule, the observance of which will prevent him from erring in his reasoning.' Logic then, strictly speaking, does not discover truths, but helps man to make the best use of those he already possesses, and prevents him from making a wrong use of them.

Reasoning, according to Avicenna, starts from terms settled at the outset — the first data of experience and the first principles of understanding. The chain of deductions proceeding by a known deduced from a previously known is not unlimited; it must have a starting-point, found outside of the reasoning, which will be the base of the logical fabric. First, from direct experiences or ideas, descriptions or definitions are formed, and then, by means of these, arguments are arranged. Avicenna cleverly explains what definition is: by definition man is enabled to represent objects; by argument he is able to persuade. Avicenna gives both the senses and the reason a share in the formation of the primary data of the sciences. According to him, imagination always supports reason; opinion also, and even memory, fulfil the same office. There are primary principles which all hold because of common feeling, or because of the opinion of scholars which the illiterate do not contradict; others, again, arise from habits formed in childhood; and others are based on the experiences of life. All these principles (of feeling) join with the first principles, or principles of reason, which are produced in a man by his intellectual faculty without requiring the slightest conscious effort to persuade him of them. The mind realizes itself convinced and is

not even aware of how the conviction has arisen. A self-evident example of these first principles is: 'The whole is greater than the part.' This philosophy is very sound. It is a scholasticism, not yet antiquated, open and sincere, in many places recalling the analyses of Leibniz.

Avicenna further discusses the form and matter of definitions and arguments, distinguishes between definition and description, and sums up, in the manner of the Peripatetics, the different kinds of questions that arise in science: first of all, what a thing is, and if it is; next, where it is, when it is, how it is; and, lastly, why it is. We see here an application of the doctrine of the Categories. Avicenna recognizes the four causes — material, formal, efficient, and final. He shows that they may all appear together in a definition. Thus an axe may be defined as 'an iron implement, of such and such a shape, for cutting wood.' At the very beginning of his Logic, Avicenna explains species, difference, property, and common accident, which together furnish another method of constituting definition.

The Sciences are founded on experiences and reasonings. They have objects, questions, and premisses. As there are universal premisses (see above), so each science has its own peculiar premisses. The different objects of the sciences establish a hierarchy among themselves, according to their dignity. Besides this, the sciences are divided into theoretical science and practical science. The principal subjects of theoretical science are Physics, Mathematics, and Theology; and of practical, Applied Physics, Mechanics and Art, and Ethics. The problem of the classification of the sciences was very popular in the Middle Ages, both in the East and in the West.

(2) *PHYSICS*.—In the philosophical part of his Physics, Avicenna discusses several of the primary ideas of the human intellect, *e.g.* power, time, and movement. He desires from Physics a first acquaintance with the ideas which Scholasticism employs in Logic and Metaphysics, that is to say, with the ideas of form and matter and the categories. The ideas of form and matter are suggested by observation of the physical world: 'Physical bodies, strictly speaking, are constituted of two principles, matter and form; then there are attached to them the accidents which arise from the existence of the nine categories.' Scholasticism divides these accidents into primary qualities, which are inherent in the body, and secondary qualities, which can be taken away without annihilating the body, but which contribute to its perfection.

Avicenna's conception of power is more closely allied to dynamics than to statics. He is interested in the energy acting from within the body rather than in the forces which move it from without. Like Aristotle, he allows that each body has a natural place, to which it always returns, by some hidden power, when it has been removed from it. The commonest example of these innate powers is 'weight.' This idea of power is developed in Psychology and Metaphysics. In Physics there is no infinite power. Its effects are always either greater or less. Avicenna recognized the principle of mechanics that 'what is gained in power is lost in speed.'

Time he explains by movement, and it cannot be imagined otherwise. Time cannot be conceived in immobility; it would then be of fixed duration, and no longer true time. 'Bodies,' says Avicenna, 'are in time, not in their essence, but because they are in movement, and movement is in time.' Time was created, and it is nowhere except in itself. For the world in general, it is measured by the movement of the stars.

Avicenna also speaks of the locality of bodies, then of space and impenetrability. He tries to show, by somewhat subtle reasoning, that bodies cannot move in a vacuum, because, he thinks, the dimensions of a vacuum are impenetrable, from which he concludes that a vacuum does not exist. He does not admit the possibility of actual infinity. Like the ancients, he believes that the world is finite, and that there is outside of it neither fullness nor emptiness, but absolute nothingness. He admits, again, that bodies are divisible *in potentia* to infinity, and he rejects atomism. Atomism had its partisans at this time, the *mutakallim* ('theologians'), with whom Avicenna disputes. In this connexion too, he analyzes the idea of contact very cleverly.

Avicenna unfortunately hardly managed to rid himself of the errors of Peripatetic Physics, although he had the opportunity several times. Yet, from a philosophical point of view, his account, besides forming interesting reading, bears witness to a very acute intellect.

(3) *PSYCHOLOGY*.—In Avicenna's doctrine, Psychology is carefully systematized, and adheres to the scholastic form. Beings, and also the faculties, are classified methodically according to a hierarchic arrangement. The general plan of this grand construction is as follows:

There are three kinds of minds. These are, in ascending order, the vegetable mind, the animal mind, and the reasonable or human mind.

The vegetable mind, or nature, possesses three faculties: (1) nutritive power, which, when resident in a body, changes another body into the form of the first; (2) power of growing, by which the body itself increases, without changing its form, until it has attained its full maturity; (3) power of generation, which draws from the body a part similar to itself *in potentia*, which will, in its turn, produce other bodies similar to it *in actu*.

The animal mind possesses two kinds of faculties: motive faculties and apprehensive or perceptive faculties. (1) The motive faculties embrace appetitive power and efficient power. The appetitive power itself is either attractive or repulsive. If attractive, it is simply desire, concupiscence; if repulsive, it is irascibility, passion. The efficient power, which is the producer of movement, resides in the motor nerves and the muscles. (2) The perceptive faculties of the animal mind are classified as external and internal. The former include the five senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. The latter have their beginning in the common sense, a sort of centre in which all the perceptions assemble before being elaborated by the higher faculties. The common sense is situated in the front part of the brain. The first faculty to act on the perceptions is the formative faculty or imagination. It strips the sensible form of the conditions of place, situation, and quantity, and then retains it after the object has ceased to make an impression on the senses. The formative is followed by the cogitative faculty, which works first of all by way of abstraction on the perceptions, now prepared, and draws notions out of them. The estimative faculty next groups these notions into what might be called judgments, but which are quite instinctive and not intellectual. This faculty it is which constitutes 'animal intelligence.' For example, the sheep knows by it to flee from the wolf. The last of the faculties of the animal mind is memory, which is situated in the back part of the brain.

The human mind alone possesses intelligence. This intelligence is divided into active intelligence, or practical reason, upon which morality depends, and speculative intelligence, or theoretical reason, which perceives ideas. The perception of ideas is built up through three faculties, which act so as to make the intelligence pass from mere power to actuality. The first of these faculties, the material intellect, is only a general possibility of knowing; the second, the intellect of possession, recognizes first principles; the third is that which is directly fitted to receive the forms of things that are intelligible. It is called the perfected intellect. It seizes hold of that which is intelligible, when, outside the human mind, it unites with the 'active intellect.'

There naturally arise, in the course of this theory, physiological questions regarding the functions of the senses and the localization of the different faculties. Avicenna treats of these as

best he could at a time when the biological sciences were as yet hardly in their infancy.

For example, he discusses the manner in which visual images are transmitted to the eyes, and draws a parallel between two processes of explanation, which he attributes respectively to Aristotle and Plato. He accepts Aristotle's method and rejects Plato's.

The discussion of the intelligence also brings up the question of universals. This question was not so pre-eminently important in Arabic as in Western scholasticism. Avicenna is a realist. Like the Neo-Platonists, he admits that the intelligibles, which are universals, exist in the active intellect. The human intelligence comprehends them *in actu*, when it unites with the active intellect. It also frees them from the particulars which the senses recognize. But this process of abstraction is not sufficient; it is only preparatory, and gives the comprehension of the universals only *in potentia*. Before this can pass to actuality, man's intelligence must become united with a superior intelligence. The reasonable mind starts from the sensible, and little by little rises above it, approaching meanwhile the region of universal realities. Psychology ends in Metaphysics.

The following are Avicenna's proofs of the spirituality of the soul. The soul perceives its own peculiar essence; intellectual power perceives ideas apart from organs; the locale of intelligibility cannot be a body. The immortality of the soul follows directly from its spirituality. The dependence of the soul on the body is not essential but accidental. Another form of this proof is that the soul is a simple substance.

Avicenna believes that the soul is created at the same time as the body is formed, and is to a certain extent in harmony with the body it is to animate. This condition of compatibility with the body makes metempsychosis impossible.

(4) *METAPHYSICS.*—There is one part of Avicenna's Metaphysics which seems quite old-fashioned now, and we must go back in imagination to the beginning of science to find any sense in it. It treats of the procession of the superior intelligences and the production of the celestial spheres. On the other hand, there is a part which seems still good and sound, although it has a systematic character no longer found in modern works of philosophy. This part treats of primary cause and necessary being. The following is, very briefly, the theory of the spheres:

The scale of beings, mentioned above [see § (3)], from the vegetable world up to man, is continued beyond man into the region of the stars. At the top of this scale is the Necessary Being, the principle of principles, who is perfect unity. From this first Being emerges the world of ideas, which is a collection of pure intelligences, simple substances, exempt from multiplicity and change. Below this world of ideas or intelligences is the world of souls. The souls are essences, bound to pure intelligences, which animate bodies. The bodies that they animate in this supra-human region are the stars, which are classed after the manner of ancient astronomy. Beneath the intelligences of the stars, below the last of them, which animates the moon, is the active intellect. From it flows the sublunary world.

Very noticeable in this theory is the analysis of the world of ideas into active intellect and astronomical intelligences. The unchangeableness of the stars is an old belief which was disputed down to the time of Galileo; and the comparison of their spheres with a superior kind of animal is an idea which dates back further than the Hellenic world, and which was long dear to the East.

In connexion with this system, which strikes a modern reader as uncouth, Avicenna discusses in a dignified manner the metaphysical theory of causality. He considers that the pure intelligences are the causes of each other in descending order, and the causes also of the souls of the spheres, and, through them, of their bodies. He holds, then, that intelligence is essentially active; it is even productive of being; and cause usually is simply intelligence. Elsewhere cause is identified with being itself; it is perceptible especially in the primary Being, who is intelligence and principle at the same time, and includes in His essence everything of which He is the principle. 'He comprehends everything in a universal manner, and at the same time no attribute of any particular thing, in the heavens or on the earth, is hid from Him, not even the weight of a *dirrah* (an atom).' He is, at the same time, a final and an efficient cause. The final cause precedes the efficient *in potentia; in actu* the efficient precedes. The cause of the efficient cause is the final end and aim.

God is not the actual moving power of the stars, for this function would beget a certain multiplicity in Him, and, according to the spirit of Avicennism, He must above all safeguard His simplicity. He moves the stars by the intermediation of the first caused, that is, of the first intelligence which springs from Him. This intelligence knows itself and it knows God. From this double knowledge arises a duality. The duality then changes to triplicity when the first caused still knows itself as possible in itself, and as necessary in the primary Being. In this way this philosophy introduces multiplicity into the world.

The doctrine of universals reappears in connexion with that of causes. There are causes of kind and causes of individual; the general has its own causes, the particular has others. A thing has a cause of its quiddity and another of its being, *i.e.* a cause by which it is what it is, and another by which it exists. If a thing is to be individualized, its idea must be able to receive the effect of particular causes.

The idea of the necessary Being is the terminus of the theory of causality. The necessary Being as such has no need of causes. He exists from the beginning complete, with all His qualities. He is absolute. He is pure good, for He possesses the perfection of existence, and existence in itself is goodness: existence, always *in actu*, is pure good. He is pure truth, for that is called true which can justly be said to exist, and, as His existence is necessary, He is therefore absolute truth.

The theory then takes quite a geometrical form. A demonstration composed of three lemmas proves the necessary Being:

(1) All possibles cannot spring from one possible cause, on which their series mounts up infinitely, (2) a series of causes finite in number cannot be possible in themselves and necessary to each other, so that they depend on one another in a circle; (3) everything produced has a cause, and every cause is determinating. This consequently signifies that all possibles must have cause, that causes are not linked together infinitely, and do not return on themselves. Therefore the series of possibles ends in the necessary Being.

This theory is a very fine effort to prove God and to deduce the world from Him in a vigorous way, by a dialectic of mathematical precision. Faith in the power of reason is manifested in this system. To us, who are now more sceptical, it seems pure rationalism, but rationalism in its infancy and slightly deceived by itself. It is redeemed, however, by its vigour and power.

(5) *MYSTICISM.*—It is doubtful whether Avicenna was really a mystic in the religious sense of the word. Here again he has followed the custom of the Neo-Platonic school, regarding mysticism as primarily a subdivision of philosophy. Ibn Ṭufail seems to say that Avicenna had a kind of esoteric doctrine called *ḥikmat-al-ishrāq*, 'philosophy of illumination,' which really contained his true ideas. But we know from one of the treatises of Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl that this philosophy is almost exactly Avicenna's own Neo-Platonism with a different nomenclature.

Passing over mysticism as related to asceticism,

ecstasies, and illumination, we shall confine our attention to Avicenna's teachings on Providence and the future happiness of the soul, in so far as they are complementary to metaphysics and morals. He describes Providence as the fact that the whole world is encompassed by the knowledge of primary Being. This knowledge is cognizant of the most perfect order as that which flows naturally from the Being. The theory of optimism, exhibited in this idea, is similar to Leibniz's: evil is not a part of Divine decree *in essentia*; its place there is accidental. Avicenna recognizes the three kinds of evil: want, physical suffering, and sin. We find evil only in what is still *in potentia*, and has not yet attained perfection. It affects only the individual; species are shielded from it. Evil, moreover, is always a good from some superior point of view. 'It does not enter into the plan of Divine wisdom to abandon lasting and universal good, because of fleeting evil in individual things.' Like Leibniz, Avicenna decides that, however common it may be, evil is not the general rule; it is only the exception to the good.

After death, the reasonable soul attains perfection. To effect this, it must become conscious and intelligent, and receive within it the form of harmony and well-being which pervades the world of superior essences. It unites with this idea of perfection, and so becomes like it. Only the soul which has been prepared by the practice of the virtues enjoys this happiness. Otherwise its taste is vitiated; it cannot attain its end, and accordingly suffers. But if a man has lived a mediocre life, his actions never reaching the height of his intentions, his soul, when freed from the body, becomes the centre of a struggle between his pure desires and his bad habits. Only when purified by this grievous struggle does it attain perfect bliss.

(6) *ETHICS.*—Avicenna, enamoured of the speculative part of philosophy, was on that account less interested in practical philosophy and moral analysis. In his mystical works, he has some fine pages on morals, but their character is distinctly metaphysical. He also wrote on ethics as well as a short treatise on *Government*, which was published recently. It is written in a practical spirit, but is really an elementary treatise in economics. It explains how a man should govern himself, his wives, his children, and his servants.

From the very earliest times, humanity felt a need of organization First of all, man had to settle in places where he could most easily and comfortably live. This led to the setting up and choice of dwellings Once established, these required looking after This duty was entrusted to the woman. From the woman the family was born, and, as it increased, servants were added to the household.

Man's need of subsistence was also the primary promoter of commerce and the arts. Avicenna divides the arts into three kinds: (1) those which are dependent on intelligence of the highest order, *e.g.* guidance, judgment, counsel; these are exercised only by the great; (2) those dependent on education, *e.g.* writing, speaking, medicine; (3) those founded on strength and courage, as military arts. Every individual should learn one of these and apply himself to it.

The good wife is her husband's associate in ruling and guiding. The best kind of wife is intelligent, religious, fond of her children, and sparing in words.

The management of the family is based on fear, dignity, and care. If a man does not make himself feared, his wives will domineer over him The husband must see to the dignity of the family life by providing for clothing, veiling his wives, and preventing any jealousy from arising among them. The wife must give unremitting attention to her children and servants Avicenna says a few words about the education of the one and the choice of the other. The woman whose mind is not occupied with domestic cares thinks of nothing except how she can best attract the attention of men by the beauty of her dress, and forgets the honour due to her husband

5. Avicenna's school.—The school of Avicenna does not boast any very celebrated names. His philosophy was combated and refuted among the Musalmāns of the East by orthodox theologians, especially by al-Ghazālī. For the history of the school of 'Philosophers' proper in Western Islām, see AVERROËS, AVERROISM.

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(*b*) The *Najāt* was published at Rome along with the *Canon of Medicine* in 1593; the *Ishārāt*, ed. Forget, Leyden, 1892; *La Logique du fils de Sinā*, tr. Vattier, Paris, 1658.
(*c*) On logic, Al-Fārābī, *Documenta philosophiæ Arabum*, ed. Schmolders, Bonn, 1836 On psychology, Landauer, 'Die Psychologie des Ibn Sinā,' in *ZDMG*, 1876; Martin Winter, *Über Avicennas opus egregium de anima*, Munich, 1903; Carra de Vaux, 'La Kaçidah d'Avicenne sur l'âme,' in *JA*, 1899. On mysticism, see collection of treatises published by Mehren: 'L'Oiseau,' in *Muséon*, 1887, 'Hây ben Yaqzân,' in *Muséon*, 1886, *L'allégorie mystique Hây ben Yaqzân*, Leyden, 1889, *L'Oiseau*, 1891, *La Prière*, *La Fréquentation des lieux saints*, *La Délivrance de la crainte de la mort*, 1894, *Le Destin*, 1899; Ethé, *Avicenne comme lyrique persan*, Carra de Vaux, 'La Philosophie illuminative d'après Suhrawerdi Meqtoul,' in *JA*, 1902. On morals, 'Un Traité inédit d'Avicenna,' in the *Mashriq*, Beirut, 1906 (text). BON CARRA DE VAUX.

AWE.—In the presence of an awe-inspiring object, we feel ourselves subdued, but are placid. we are powerfully laid hold of, but neither resist nor desire to be set free. On the contrary, we are drawn towards the object, and its presence is welcomed by us, though with a serious and pensive joy. The affections, then, are enlisted, as well as the imagination. The appeal is made to that part of our nature that is open to influences from what is higher or greater or grander or better than ourselves. We feel our inferiority, indeed, but there is no resentment; we are conscious that the superiority in the case is the complement, and not the contradiction, of ourselves. This is in line with the experience of the finite resting on, and complemented by, the infinite, and of 'the less being blessed of the better.'

Greater, higher, grander, better—these are the conditions of the possibility of the emotion of awe; and there is the further condition that these should not appear as threatening us with danger, but as friendly, or, at any rate, as not unfriendly. If all were on our own level, this peculiar emotion could not arise; and if we were threatened with evil, a contrary emotion would be aroused. The antithesis to the awe-inspiring in objects is the commonplace and the obvious, or the despicable and the mean—everything that tends to lower, and not to elevate, the soul. Dealing with what impresses us, awe is by its very nature contemplative and ennobling; it allies itself with our ideals and our aspirations, and is helpful towards enabling us to purify and to perfect character. That is its ethical value. Hence, mystery intensifies it—the unknown and the unknowable. We cannot but be serious in the presence of mystery. The feeling of the mysterious, when it takes possession of us, necessarily subdues us and keeps us humble.

We shall better understand the nature of the emotion, if we note the objects that call it forth. Some of these are impersonal, and some are personal. Of the impersonal causes, we have (*a*) phenomena of nature showing either the vast or the incomprehensible, objects that transcend our power of understanding or that give special scope and exercise to our imagination—such, therefore, as are exceptionally impressive and create in us a certain indefinite yearning, wonder, and admiration; *e.g.*, the starry heavens, the magnitude or vastness of

space, the infinity of time, the origin of life, the mystery of generation, and the like. But, besides these, we have (*b*) intellectual theories and moral principles—generalizations of commanding sweep and laws of transcendent excellence. Of the two things that made the profoundest impression on Kant, the Moral Law was one: the grandeur of it, the unconditionality of it, the authority of it—all contributed to make it awe-inspiring to a degree. In all this we have the feeling of feebleness or unworthiness on our part, and the contrast of might and worth set over against our impotence and imperfections. Next, we have (*c*) awe as associated with persons—an intellectual genius like Plato or Aristotle, a literary genius like Shakespeare or Goethe, a scientific genius like Newton, an ethical or a religious genius like St. John or St. Paul. But, of course, the highest of all examples is God—supreme in Majesty, the source of all the excellences ('wisdom, love, might'), and the fountain of Holiness. We have here the realization of the Ideal, which points the contrast, —'Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts' (Is 6^5). It is the contrast of the sinful and the weak, in presence of the Pure and the Strong; and yet, the purity and strength do not repel but attract us. It is felt that underneath the majesty and greatness lie beneficence and mercy: in the hands of the Supreme, we feel ourselves secure. Again, we have (*d*) things sacred causing awe—things associated, therefore, with the Divine. Such are shrines and holy places (see art. 'Bethel' in Hastings' *DB* and in *EBi*), the soul-moving services of religion on special occasions—the dispensing of Communion in Protestant Churches and the Elevation of the Host in the Church of Rome. Last of all, and akin to this, is (*e*) the awe that is associated with solemnity—*e.g.* the presence of Death, the death-chamber, funeral rites. Speaking of St. Edmund, Carlyle says:—

'They embalmed him with myrrh and sweet spices, with love, pity, and all high and awful thoughts; consecrating him with a very storm of melodious adoring admiration, and sun-dyed showers of tears;—joyfully, yet with awe (as all deep joy has something of the awful in it), commemorating his noble deeds and Godlike walk and conversation while on Earth' (*Past and Present*, bk. ii. ch iii.).

Now, this being so, there can be little difficulty in perceiving the relation between awe and fear. The dictionary subsumes the one under the other: it makes awe simply a species of fear or dread. No greater error could be committed; for neither in their nature nor in their results have the two much in common. It would be ill both for ethics and for religion if they had.

It is the peculiarity of **fear** (*q.v.*) to agitate and unsettle us. It deranges the body and unhinges the nerves, producing well-marked outward effects (shaking of the limbs and frame, disturbance of vocal utterance, erection of the hair, and such like); but it has well-marked psychical effects also—intellectual and volitional. The first effect of fear is to stimulate us to resistance or to circumvention, and, if the terror is not excessive, it braces us for the effort; but, beyond that stage, it becomes detrimental and may be ultimately disastrous. However exhilarating fear in moderation may be, its normal action on the intellect is disturbing and disconcerting: it destroys the power of correctly appreciating the situation, and creates a tendency to magnify the danger, and so an inability to perceive the right course of action to be pursued if the impending evil is to be prevented. If at one moment the intellect, under fear, counsels resistance, at another moment it encourages to flight; till, last of all, it becomes powerless to counsel in any form—it simply collapses. So that, thus far, fear may be defined as 'nothing else but a surrender of the succours which reason offereth' (*Wisdom of Solomon* 17^{12}). But the effect on the will is no less conspicuous. Danger, if moderate, may act advantageously on the will and arouse it to effective opposition; but, beyond this point, the result is disquieting and weakening, until, in extreme cases, absolute paralysis sets in, and the subject can do nothing but remain helpless and await his fate. And so, fear *repels*, and does not attract; and its tendency is to *paralyze* both intellect and will and bring about disaster. Moreover, when the moment of fear is past, our attitude towards the object that created it is one of *hatred* or *dislike*.

Not so with awe. In most of the respects now enumerated, it is the antithesis of fear. It has a calming and quieting influence on the body (as seen in the bowed head, the soft walk, the restrained speech, and the reverential look, of the subject of it); and, inasmuch as it *attracts*, instead of repelling, it produces satisfaction and contentment, and a desire to continue in the presence or under the influence of the object that inspires it. In awe, we feel ourselves in the hands of superior power, but power that is conceived as beneficent or not maleficent, as well-disposed, or at least not ill-disposed, towards us, and under whose protection we may rest *secure*. The consciousness of danger (and therefore fear) is wanting, and the feeling of reliance takes its place. We trust the awe-inspiring object, and are attracted towards it, and we rest in the experience of it, and are satisfied. Hence the importance and significance of awe as a religious emotion, with its concomitants of reverence and veneration. It lies at the root of worship, and is the indispensable condition of the highest spiritual peace.

Hence, further, awe enters into the sublime. Not every sublime object, indeed, need beget awe (for pain sometimes is associated with sublimity, and fear is a distinctly felt ingredient of it, producing uneasiness); but much that is sublime also impresses us with awe. Both are results of the manifestation of power or excellence, and both are most effective when associated with Personality. Moral heroism, for instance, and magnanimity are of this stamp—greatness of soul rising superior to misfortune or adverse circumstances. 'Athanasius contra mundum' (a unique figure defying opposition, standing erect in solitary grandeur in the face of fearful odds) can never cease to move us strongly—to draw forth our admiration and to enlist our regard; and there are many acts of self-sacrifice and many lives of disinterested devotion that are sublime and awe-inspiring in the highest degree. They elevate our thoughts and win our affections; they purify our souls, and we feel that we are all the better for the contemplation of them.

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WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON.

AXE.—There were several forms of axe, or adze, in use amongst the Greeks, as amongst other nations; but a special controversy has arisen over the πέλεκυς or λάβρυς with double blade, owing to its association with Zeus Labrandeus.

The double axe is derived from one of the Stone Age types, in which the handle passes through the middle, and the stone is thinned away to the two flanges. Examples of this type may be seen in

any good collection, such as the Pitt-Rivers Museum at Oxford. The type was first translated into bronze, and then the form was modified, the wings growing and assuming a more curved outline. It may have been some variety of this axe that permitted the feat of Odysseus.[1] The axe is an ordinary tool or weapon in common use. In the black-figured vase-paintings of the Birth of Athene, Hephaistos uses it to split the divine skull.[2] Specimens with the marks of use on them have been found with other tools in a carpenter's shop at Anthedon,[3] and with other tools at Gournia and Palaikastro in Crete,[4] and at Troy.[5] A late Attic relief shows a youth holding one as a tool.[6] On other works of art, Ino attempts to kill Phrixus with this axe,[7] Theseus fights with it,[8] the Amazons are frequently armed with it.[9] It is represented as part of Gaulish war-spoil, along with other arms and weapons, upon many reliefs;[10] and it was dedicated as war-spoil.[11] It was used to slay the sacrificial victim by the Hittites and at Pagasæ,[12] and in Crete, where a priestess is represented with one in each hand,[13] and there is other evidence to be considered anon. Here is enough to prove that this axe was a war-weapon, or tool, and a sacrificial implement in common use.

We are now in a position to understand its meaning in the hands of divine persons. Zeus of Labranda is well known to have held it:[14] but so does Artemis,[15] so does Dionysus,[16] so does Apollo in Asia Minor,[17] so do the local heroes in Asia[18] and elsewhere.[19] These use it, no doubt, as a weapon of war; and Zeus with his axe manifestly protects Labranda as Athene armed cap-à-pie protects Athens, or any other armed deity stands forth in his might. We may even fairly suggest that the name Labranda has some such relation to *labrys* as Damascus or Toledo to their famous sword-blades.

The use of the axe in sacrifice seems to be enough to account for its representation along with the ox-skull, first as a memorial of sacrifice, and then as a decorative scheme. Here our evidence comes largely from Crete and the Mycenæan age. Mr. A. J. Evans has found representations in which the ox-head is surmounted by an axe, the handle being fixed in the skull: one is a Knossian seal,[20] another a Mycenæan vase-painting from Salamis.[21] The object called by Evans 'horns of consecration' (see ÆGEAN RELIGION), which is obviously a stand of some sort, and apparently is a conventionalized ox-skull,[22] also had the axe fixed in it;[23] one was found in the Knossian shrine with a hole, and a small double axe of steatite lying near, so that it may be fairly assumed that the axe stood in the hole.[24] The axe also becomes an ornament of vases and other works of art.[1] We may compare with this the use of the ox-head with wreaths in a frieze, so common in Roman times; and the reliefs of ox-heads with other sacrificial implements carved on altars.[2] The axe shown is found carved with a late dedication to Apollo in Asia Minor, once apparently to commemorate the sacrifice of a bull.[3] It may perhaps be mentioned that the ox-skull, or its model, is hung up as a charm in gardens and vineyards by the modern Greeks, commonly in the Asiatic islands, and less commonly elsewhere.

The axe was an object of dedication, like any other weapon or tool. We have seen it as part of war-spoil; the axe was also dedicated to Apollo at Delphi;[4] and in the Dictæan cave of Zeus 19 axes were found,[5] along with 20 lance-heads, 25 darts, 160 knives, pins, and tweezers, a cart drawn by oxen, human and animal figures, vases, and other things. All the Cretan axes are *simulacra*, being too thin or too small for use; but most are perforated, and some have handles. Other tiny axes of this sort have been found, of different types: thick and solid, like stone axes; thin, and sometimes marked with dots like dice; sometimes the handles are perforated for hanging. These have been also dedicated to Zeus in Dodona, Olympia, and Palaikastro (Crete);[6] to Artemis in Arcadia,[7] in Ithaca,[8] and at Ephesus;[9] and to Athene and Artemis Orthia at Sparta.[10] The axe also becomes a motive of ornament;[11] and axes were found made of gold and bone in tombs and elsewhere.[12]

It is obvious that these dedications cannot be held to have any peculiar appropriateness to Zeus, because they are dedicated also to Athene, Apollo, and Artemis, and with them are found many other things that are not peculiar to Zeus. They are not for use; they may be either models of war-spoil,[13] or ornaments, or perhaps fractions of the axe-unit of exchange. Similar axes are known in modern times as fractions of the axe-unit, and there are indications that the unit was known in Greece;[14] or again, the shape may have remained as traditional after they ceased to be used in exchange.

It remains to discuss the graphic representations of the axe. The blocks that compose the walls of the palaces at Knossos and Phaistos are scored with a number of different signs, which occur either alone or in conjunction, just as the symbols of writing might do. Amongst these is the double axe, which is repeated alone a number of times on the four sides of a square pillar in the corridor at Knossos. Whether the pillar be sacred or not[15]—and there is at least room for doubt—there is no sufficient ground for regarding these signs as sacred. Such an explanation would account for only one out of many signs, all used together in the same way. It must also be

1 *Od.* xix. 572, with Monro's note.
2 Gerhard, *Ausserlesene Vasenbilder.*
3 *Am. Journ. Arch.* vi. 104, pl. xv.
4 *Jahreshefte*, p. 44, pl. xii.; *BSA* ix. 133 (found in a dwelling-house, with needle, chisel, and knife).
5 Schmidt, *Schliemann's Sammlung*, 6135.
6 *Jahreshefte*, vi. 98. 7 *Annali*, xxxix. pl. c.
8 Stephani, *Compt. rend. S. Petersb.* 1867, 77.
9 *Ib.*, 1863, 128 ff.; *Recueil*, 148.
10 Espérandieu, *Recueil Gén. des Basrel. de la Gaule romaine*, i. 46, 533, 688, 691, 692, 700, 701, 712, 713, 715, 726, 733, 826, cf. 234, 239, 532, 698.
11 Plutarch, *Quæst. Gr.* 45.
12 Perrot and Chipiez, iv. 637; Ridgeway, *Early Age*, i. 270.
13 Ἐφ' Ἀρχ., 1900, 37. 14 Plutarch, *Quæst. Gr.* 45.
15 On coins of Laodicea in Syria; Hogarth, *Ephesus*, 333.
16 Stephani, *loc. cit.* 1863, 128 ff.
17 *Cat. Brit. Sculpt.* 680; cf. *BSA* xi. 28.
18 *Ath. Mitth.* x. 12; *BCH* iv. 294.
19 *Jahresh.* vi. 98, fig. 96.
20 *BSA* ix. 114, fig. 70. 21 *JHS* xxi. 107, fig. 3.
22 *JHS* xxi. 135: the title really begs the question, as implying an ideal meaning.
23 *Ib.* 107. The silver ox-head found at Mycenæ had a hole, perhaps for the same purpose (*Arch. Anzeiger*, xviii. 161).
24 *BSA* viii. 96, fig. 55.

1 *BSA* vi. 109, ix. 115, fig. 71, etc.
2 *Recueil*, 317, 318, 320 ('taurobolium'). So at Eleusis we have carvings of crossed torches, sheaf, basket, and cista.
3 *BSA* xi. 38 (Ἀπόλλωνι Προπυλαίῳ Ἀχιλεὺς εὐξάμενος ἀνεθηκεν); *Arch. Zeit.* 28, p. 38, *Cat. Brit. Sculpt.* 681 (ἀνθέστησαν οἱ Ἀρτέμωνος υἱοὶ τὸ κατηχθὲν στηλλάριον ὑπὸ τοῦ βοος Ἀπόλλωνι Ταρσεί).
4 Plutarch, *de Pyth. Or.* 12; Pausanias, v. xxix. 9, x. ix. 3, x. xiv. 1. An axe found in Calabria is inscribed as a butcher's tithe to Hera (*IGA* 543).
5 *BSA* vi. 109.
6 Carapanos, *Dodona*, pl. liv.; *Bronzen von Ol.* xxvi. 520-7; *BSA* xi. 306; Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings*, 387-88, with figs.
7 *Jahresh.* iv. 69. 8 *BCH* xxx. 149.
9 Hogarth, *Ephesus*, 103, 333.
10 *BSA* xiii. 154, 46, fig. 6 *e*, with ten circular eyes stamped on it.
11 Hogarth, *Ephesus*, 333, pl. vi.; *BCH* iii. 129.
12 Rouse, *op. cit.* 388. 13 Cf. *BSA* viii. 258.
14 Rouse, *op. cit.* 92, 389, with pl. ii. and fig. 63.
15 A. J. Evans, 'Mycenean Tree and Pillar Cult,' in *JHS* xxi. 106 ff.

remembered that these signs were certainly covered over with plaster, as some of them still partially are. The Italian excavators of Phaistos regard them as literary signs; they all, or nearly all, occur on gems. Several, including the double axe, occur on the literary tablets of Knossos, and are interpreted as writing by Evans himself.[1] They are probably masons' marks; and some of them, including the double axe, have been noticed on stone blocks, apparently used for masons' marks, in other places, as the old Hellenic blocks used to build the mediæval fortress of Cos,[2] and the stones of Heriot's Hospital, Edinburgh.[3]

The above is enough to show that the double axe is not necessarily sacred, or necessarily connected with Zeus. But this is no reason why the axe should not have been the object of worship. Axe-worship is, of course, not fetish-worship, as some have loosely called it; but instances are not uncommon of weapons being worshipped, whether as weapons or as iron. Evans, in his paper on 'Mycenean Tree and Pillar Cult,'[4] has alluded to the subject; and A. B. Cook has collected evidence for axe-worship outside Crete.[5] The evidence for Crete is of varying value: the most weighty piece of evidence is the representation on the Hagia Triadha sarcophagus: a priestess is pouring some red liquid into a jar between two double axes.[6] The other evidence, such as axes set between horns, held in the hands of god or priestess, or visible on the ground of engraved seals, is indeterminate; but these may strengthen the case for worship, if it be established otherwise. Cook publishes a cut of a priest sacrificing before a number of objects, including an ibex, a star, a crescent moon, and two knobbed sceptres with a (one-flanged) axe set upright upon a stool (Assyrian); a Persian seal shows a worshipper before a stool with similar objects upon it. A coin of Tenedos[7] shows an axe upright standing on steps between two supports; another, an axe connected with a jar by a fillet. These seem to be the most significant facts that bear on an axe-cult; it is impossible here to recount all that has been brought in evidence to prove it, or to discuss the far-reaching and often fanciful inferences that have been drawn from them. The reader, however, may be reminded that there are several distinct questions, which have been often confused: (1) Was there an axe-cult? (2) Was the axe specially connected with Zeus? (3) Was the axe a symbol of Zeus, that is, was it treated as Zeus because associated with Zeus? (4) Is λαβύρινθος derived from λάβρυς? (5) Is the Knossian palace the Labyrinth?

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the article.

W. H. D. ROUSE.

AXIOM.—I. Meanings of the term.—The various senses in which the term 'axiom' is used are easily confused, and require to be carefully distinguished. We may mention five senses of the term, all of which are historically important. (1) Axiom in a predominantly *epistemological* sense: a proposition whose truth is self-evident; an immediately certain, objective truth. (2) Axiom in a predominantly *psychological* sense: a proposition of whose truth the man who calls it an axiom feels a fixed persuasion, while he regards the proposition as indemonstrable, and his faith as something fundamental and, for him, necessary; a proposition held to be true with an unwavering faith. (3) Axiom in a predominantly *logical* sense: a first principle which, itself not demonstrated, can be used as a basis for demonstrations. (4) Axiom in a predominantly *social* sense: an opinion which is, as a fact, accepted by all who are competent to understand its import. (5) Axiom in a predominantly *psycho-genetic* sense: an opinion which the innate constitution and the original instinctive tendencies of the mind lead us to accept, and which we therefore do not derive merely from our experience.

1. From the point of view of sense (1) all our knowledge is supposed to be either 'mediate' or 'immediate.' An axiom is a proposition known to be true, not 'mediately,' but 'immediately.' For this view, 'intuitive knowledge,' 'immediate insight,' 'direct assurance,' or 'evidence' is presupposed, as a possible form of knowledge and of consciousness. The criterion of an axiom is said to be that, when we consider the import of a given axiomatic proposition, this state of consciousness, this direct assurance, arises, and makes wholly unquestionable the truth of the particular axiom which comes under our observation. Here the stress is laid, therefore, first upon the *immediacy* of the insight in question. To think the axiom, and to know it to be true, are supposed to be simply inseparable acts. The assurance or 'intuitive knowledge' in question is further regarded according to sense (1) as *objective*. One does not mean by the term 'axiom,' when thus used, merely to point out the fact that a given person *feels sure* that this axiom is true. Sense (1) implies that whoever accepts the truth of the axiom 'intuitively knows,' that is, directly observes, the perfectly objective fact that the axiom is true.

2. Sense (2), on the contrary, lays stress upon what may turn out to be the *subjective necessity* with which some one *feels convinced* of the truth of the proposition. When such a feeling of necessity attends a conviction, and when no demonstration of the truth of the conviction can be given beyond the mere observation that, so long as one conceives the meaning of the proposition, one feels thus convinced, sense (2) requires one to call the proposition an axiom. Sense (2) therefore makes the criterion of an axiom *relative to the subject who feels the necessity*, and who is unable to give other reason for his conviction.

Sense (1) is present in the mind of Descartes when he speaks of propositions which we 'clearly and distinctly perceive to be true.' Sense (2) is emphasized if one lays stress upon some sort of 'unswerving' and, as one conceives, necessary 'faith' or 'assurance.' Aristotle maintains that the 'principle of contradiction' is immediately evident in sense (1). But in sense (2) various subjects, appealing each to his own subjective necessity, may regard as axioms propositions which other thinkers are known to regard as false. Thus the proposition that 'water cannot turn solid' might be regarded as an axiom in sense (2) by a dweller in the tropics, who, hearing for the first time a story of frosty weather in high latitudes, rejected it as essentially incredible, and found his unbelief wholly insurmountable.

Senses (1) and (2) are often confused. The question as to the relation between objective 'evidence' and subjective 'certainty' is central in the theory of knowledge, and only a thoroughgoing sceptic will deny that there is indeed a close connexion between at least *some* of our 'assurances' and the objective truth. But the danger of confounding mere 'conviction' with objective 'evidence' is manifest throughout the history both of science and of religion.

3. Sense (3) makes the use of the term 'axiom' *relative to a given or proposed theory or system*, consisting of propositions and of reasonings. In this third sense an axiom is a proposition which is not demonstrated in the course of the development of the system in question, but is assumed or accepted at the outset, and used as a basis for demonstrations that form parts of that system. If the system in question constitutes, or is regarded as constituting, the *whole* of the possible system of knowledge, then the axioms in sense (3) appear as

[1] *JHS* xvii. 38-46, xxi. 273; *BSA* vi. pl. ii.
[2] *Arch. Anzeiger*, xvi. 133
[3] *Heriot's Hospital* (Edinburgh), plates facing p. 174.
[4] *JHS* xxi. 106 ff.
[5] *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions*, 1908, ii. 184-194; A. B. Cook, *Cretan Axe-Cult outside Crete*.
[6] Cook, p. 189.
[7] *Ib.* p. 184, figs. 2, 4; p. 191, fig. 14

'absolutely first principles,' since, by hypothesis, they are essential to the rational demonstration of the truths of this system, and are nowhere to be proved in the course of any investigation that we can make. But if one is explicitly confining one's attention to some more or less *limited* province of knowledge, or to some special system of propositions, axioms in sense (3) may be entirely relative to that special system, and are then merely the principles presupposed, used, but not demonstrated, by the system in question.

Axioms in sense (3) might therefore be neither self-evident truths nor yet necessary convictions of anybody, but merely 'assumptions' or 'postulates.' On the other hand, sense (3), in so far as it requires an axiom to be a 'first principle,' emphasizes a character which we are all especially accustomed to connect with the term, namely, that character of logical *universality* which a majority of axiomatic propositions are very commonly regarded as possessing. Senses (1) and (2) could be satisfied by particular, or even by individual, propositions. Thus the proposition 'I suffer,' uttered by one who has toothache, may be viewed by the sufferer either as a necessary persuasion of his own or as a 'self-evident' objective truth. Various theories of knowledge have used such 'intuitive evidence' of present experience as the very type of axiomatic knowledge. But particular propositions and reports of experience can be used as the principles of a set of demonstrations only when they are asserted along with universal propositions. And therefore at least some axioms, in sense (3) of the term, must be universal assertions. It especially belongs to sense (3) to emphasize this universal character of at least part of the axioms of any theories.

Sense (3), in contrast with, and sometimes to the exclusion of, senses (1) and (2), has been made prominent in various modern logical discussions of the principles of theoretical science. Thus, by the 'axioms' of a given mathematical theory, recent writers mean, in many cases, propositions which one uses simply as the 'fundamental hypotheses' of the theory in question (*e.g.*, of the theory of some one of the 'non-Euclidean' or 'non-Archimedean' geometries, or of the Cantorean 'Theory of Assemblages') One need not assert such hypotheses to be true, except in the sense that one treats them, at least provisionally, as self-consistent assumptions about a logically possible state of things, and uses them as 'principles' or as 'primitive propositions' in some statement of a theory. An axiom, in this sense, is often opposed to a *theorem*, which is a proposition that is shown to follow from the principles, and that is, in this sense, demonstrated in the course of the theory in question. In two different statements of a theory (*e.g.* in two different theoretical developments of geometry or of number-theory) decidedly different sets of 'hypotheses' or 'postulates' may be used as the axioms of the theory. In such cases what is an axiom in one statement of a theory may appear as a theorem in another statement, and conversely; and the concept of a 'first principle' becomes then relative, not merely to the theory in question, but to a particular way of stating that theory, and of showing that certain propositions follow from certain other propositions.

If one insists, as Aristotle did, upon sense (3) as applying to certain propositions which are said to form the indemonstrable principles of *all* science, so that, without these absolutely first principles, no system of knowledge whatever is possible, then indeed, *unless* one is a philosophical sceptic, one has to assert that the absolutely first principles are also axioms in sense (1). For if all science rests upon a determinate set of absolutely first principles, and if no science can demonstrate these principles, then either all science is uncertain or some principle is 'immediately evident.' Hence for Aristotle, and for those who follow his way of treating the theory of knowledge, there are propositions which are axioms both in sense (1) and in sense (3). In consequence of the Aristotelian tradition, senses (1) and (3) have therefore come to be viewed by many philosophers as actually inseparable; so that the 'first and fundamental truths' and the 'self-evident' or 'immediately known' propositions are, in discussions of the problems relating to axioms, not infrequently simply identified. But the logically important distinction between the relatively first principles of a given theory and the intuitively evident propositions (if such there be) has been brought afresh to light, especially by the modern logical investigations of scientific theories, and should never be forgotten in dealing with the topic. If a proposition is to be called an axiom both in sense (1) and in sense (3), special reasons (such, for instance, as those of Aristotle) should be advanced for asserting that this is the case. As a fact, it can never be 'self-evident' that a proposition is an axiom in sense (3); for one can ascertain that a principle is indeed a logical basis for certain demonstrations only by taking the trouble to go through the demonstrations themselves—a highly 'mediated' procedure.

4. Sense (4) uses as the criterion of an axiom the 'universal assent,' the 'consensus' of 'all rational beings,' or sometimes the consensus of all the 'competent,' of all the 'normal,' or of the 'wise,' or of some class of knowing beings whose common opinion in the matter is treated as the standard opinion. The criterion here in question has frequently been emphasized, and its history forms part of the long annals of the doctrine of Nature, or of 'the natural,' or of the 'Law of Nature' and the 'consensus of humanity' as the standard whereby both opinions and deeds are to be judged. Criterion (4) becomes an exact one only for those who hold that, as a fact of human nature, there are indeed propositions which *nobody* denies, or which *all* who understand their import affirm. In practice, however, those who appeal to 'universal assent' as the warrant for an axiom usually render their criterion somewhat inexact, by the very fact that they employ this criterion in arguments directed against opponents, who, as appears, call in question either the truth, or the evidence, or the interpretation, of the axiom that is under consideration. If the opponent himself does not wholly assent, one can hardly appeal to 'universal assent' as an evidence against him, without modifying the sense in which one calls the assent 'universal.' Such modification occurs if one regards the consensus in question as that of the 'wise,' or of the 'competent,' or if one insists, in a well-known polemic fashion, that 'nobody who is in his senses' doubts the supposed axiom. Thus, in practice, an axiom in sense (4) is usually conceived in some close connexion with senses (1) and (2)—the connexion being often much confused in controversy. Not infrequently a thinker first explicitly asserts that a proposition is, for himself personally, an axiom in sense (2); then he draws the conclusion that it therefore must be an axiom in sense (1); and thus he proves, by a more or less lengthy mediate course of reasoning, that the proposition, being 'immediately evident,' cannot be proved. Since, perhaps, some opponent still remains unconvinced, and declines to admit the 'immediate evidence,' the defender of the proposition in question hereupon makes use of sense (4), and now undertakes quite convincingly to silence the objector by assuring him that nobody objects to the proposition, since it is 'known to all.' Or, if the opponent even yet persists in calling attention to the 'immediately evident' truth that at least he himself objects, the defender of the axiom finally confuses sense (4) itself by a convenient definition of the 'assent of all,' whereby the opponent is excluded from the 'all' who are worthy of consideration; and hereupon the matter becomes, of course, quite clear, although not to the opponent.

Such processes have played a great part in the history of controversy. A famous example is furnished by the controversies which have been suggested by Locke's revival, in

the First Book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, of the ancient questions as to whether all men possess in common a knowledge of logical, of mathematical, and of moral truths. Especially in the case of moral principles has the interest in making out whether there is any agreement amongst all men regarding the distinction between Right and Wrong been prominent in controversy ever since Locke. Numerous defenders of an axiomatic basis for morals have sought in Anthropology for the evidence that, regarding some moral opinions, all men agree, and have conceived their principles as definable in terms of sense (4).

5. Finally, in sense (5) of our list, an axiom is defined by reference to the famous doctrine of 'innate ideas.' This doctrine is one which Locke's equally famous attack upon it, in the First Book of his *Essay*, long made central in controversy; and the partisans of innate ideas, in the various forms which this doctrine has since assumed, have frequently connected, in many often conflicting ways, senses (1), (2), and (4), and to a certain extent sense (3), with the use of the criterion for an axiom which sense (5) emphasizes. From the point of view of sense (5) it is essential to an axiom that it should come to our consciousness by reason of the very 'constitution' or 'original nature' of the mind. Since the modern evolutionary view of the mind emphasizes the importance of our instinctive tendencies and inherited aptitudes as psychologically determining our whole intellectual life, evolutionists of the type of Spencer have been led to favour a theory of the innateness of those predispositions which, when developed through our individual experience, lead us to regard some propositions as certainly true, and as true far beyond the range of our personal experience. For Spencer an axiom is, in general, an expression in an individual of the results of the 'experience of the race,' and is in so far, indeed, innate in the individual. Such a doctrine has established new connexions between senses (4), (5), and (2), and has to some extent connected senses (1) and (3) with (5).

Nevertheless, it is at least possible that an axiom in sense (5) might prove to be an actually false proposition, for the 'innate constitution of the mind' might involve one or another aptitude to believe error. In fact, an evolutionary view, closely resembling Spencer's, might lead, in a thinker less optimistic about human nature than is Spencer, to the doctrine that certain instinctive tendencies, determined by evolution, are still such as to deceive the individual. Thus the innate hostility and resentfulness which form one aspect of human nature may be viewed, by an evolutionist, as a necessary result of the conditions of conflict under which humanity has developed. And such tendencies might easily lead, in a civilized man, to a belief regarded by the individual as axiomatic in sense (5), and probably also in sense (2). This belief might take the form of the principle that one ought to avenge all injuries, and to destroy, if possible, all enemies. As a fact, however, this belief, although dependent upon the very 'constitution' of the mind of one whose ancestors have lived by war and have enjoyed blood revenge, may be, and is, a false principle of ethics. Or again, a lover's beliefs about his beloved are deeply affected by the innate constitution of his mind, and may appear to him to be, not only in sense (5) but also in sense (2), axiomatic. Yet they may be in many respects false. A pessimist, such as Schopenhauer, is fond of emphasizing the innate 'illusions' which, according to him, characterize human nature. Buddhistic doctrine is equally emphatic in characterizing the most cherished and innate convictions of common sense as both logically false and morally destructive. Salvation for the Buddhist depends upon discovering axioms in sense (1) which are extremely hard to discover, so that only the Buddhas ever attain to them. But, when once seen, these axioms are for the enlightened indeed 'self-evident.' And the knowledge of them sets aside those axioms in sense (2) which are also axioms in sense (5), and which, according to Buddhism, are due to the innate deceitfulness of desire. So little, for some men, does either innateness or subjective necessity imply self-evidence and truth.

Axioms in sense (5), furthermore, need not always be axioms in sense (2); for, as partisans of innate ideas generally admit, any individual may remain unaware of some of his inherited aptitudes for conviction. On the other hand, there is no reason why a *new* assurance, or an axiom in sense (2), may not appear in the life of somebody whom revelation or a sudden growth or 'mutation' (such as may occur in the course of evolution) endows with a faith which, just because it is novel, does not constitute an axiom in sense (5).

As for senses (4) and (5), they very frequently coincide in their denotation, but need not do so. Although what 'the very constitution of the human mind determines us to believe' is, *ipso facto*, 'believed by all,' *in case* the constitution in question is precisely the constitution 'common to all human minds,' there is no reason why the innate might not also be the individual, the congenital *variation* of this or of that mind. The individual may possess an aptitude for conviction which belongs to his 'constitution,' but which no other man, or nobody who has preceded him, possesses or has possessed. This is as possible as is a new individual revelation due to any other source than the inherited temperament of the individual. Prophets, Buddhas, poets, geniuses generally, have often been credited with such aptitudes for forming out of the depths of their own natures new convictions, which they have then taught to other men. On the other hand, as Locke and other empiricists have frequently insisted, those convictions which in sense (4) are more or less common to many or even to all men need not on that account be regarded as mainly determined by our innate constitution. They may be supposed to be due to experience, which moulds men to common results.

The foregoing survey shows us that the five senses of the term 'axiom' here in question are in a large measure independent of one another, so far as their logical intension is concerned, while by virtue of their various applications, now to the same, now to different sets of propositions, these five meanings of the term 'axiom' have become painfully confused in the history of controversy and of the theory of knowledge. The result is that the term 'axiom' is a very attractive and a very dangerous term, which should never be employed by a careful thinker without a due consideration of the sense in which he himself proposes to employ it.

II. **History of the term.**—As to the history of the term 'axiom' and of its uses, the ancient sources are above all: (i.) Aristotle's theory of the axioms as propositions conforming both to our sense (1) and to sense (3); (ii.) Euclid's actual use of his axioms in his geometry, especially in sense (3), and in union with certain propositions called 'postulates' (which were also theoretical principles in our sense (3)). The treatment of the principles of science and of morals in sense (4) as principles 'known to all,' or as known to the 'wise' or to the 'competent,' has its beginnings in pre-Socratic philosophy, plays an important part in the Platonic *Dialogues*, and is in various special cases and passages carefully considered by Aristotle; but becomes especially prominent in the Stoical theory of knowledge and of ethics. While sense (2) plays a part throughout the history of ancient thought, it becomes especially important in Christianity and in modern discussions of the psychological aspects of the problem of knowledge.

Sense (5), implied by the Platonic theory of reminiscence, but long put into the background by the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, has come to play a very great part in modern discussion. Its completest classic expression is probably the one to be found in Leibniz's *Nouveaux Essais*.

The later discussion of the nature, the existence, the various senses, and the use of axiomatic truths, has been dominated since 1781 by three great movements: (1) the critical philosophy of Kant; (2) the various forms of modern Empiricism, Positivism, 'Pragmatism'; (3) the modern logical investigations of the principles of science—investigations which were especially stimulated by the famous inquiry into the axioms of Euclid's geometry, and which have since extended to the whole range of the foundations of mathematics, and also to the principles of theoretical physics, and to still other branches of scientific theory.

III. **Significance for modern philosophy.**—In the attempt to deal with the extremely complex philosophical problems which are suggested by the foregoing five senses of the term 'axiom,' there are one or two guiding considerations which any student of the topic may well bear in mind.

(*a*) First, not every philosophy which tries to avoid scepticism is forced to admit the existence of axioms in sense (1). The necessity of such an admission as the sole alternative to scepticism exists, indeed, for one who holds the opinions ascribed in the foregoing sketch to Aristotle. If all science depends upon a determinate set of absolutely 'first principles' (in sense (3)), then, unless these principles are also axioms in sense (1), our result would remain sceptical, for all scientific theory would lack basis. But the Aristotelian theory of scientific procedure is not the only possible one. That theory depends upon conceiving the structure of scientific theory as necessarily linear, with chains of syllogisms leading from determinate beginnings to the conclusions that constitute the scientific theory. But for a thinker such as Hegel, the ideal form of the totality of scientific theory is cyclical rather than linear. Truth may be, as a whole, a system of mutually supporting truths, whose absoluteness does not depend upon any one set of first principles, but consists in the rational coherence and inevitableness of the *totality* of the system. To assert such a doctrine involves considerations which cannot be developed here. It is enough that such a thesis has been attempted. From the point of view there would indeed be axioms in sense (3), viz., in relation to certain *partial* systems, such as this or that mathematical or logical doctrine, whose theoretical development would indeed depend upon chains of deductive reasoning. And there would also be necessary truth, both in the parts and in the whole system. But there would be no *absolutely* first principles, and there would also be no *immediate* certainties—nothing, in fact, that is *purely* immediate in the whole system of truth. The whole would be mediated by the parts, and conversely.

(*b*) Second, the traditional alternative: either this proposition is self-evident or else it is dependent upon some other proposition from which it is deduced, or else it remains uncertain, does *not* exhaust the logical possibilities regarding the rational discovery of truth. Omitting here the complex problem as to the relation between our experience of particular facts and the general truths which our scientific theories aim at establishing, we may point out that there are propositions such that *to deny them implies that they are true.* As Aristotle already observed, the principle of contradiction is itself a proposition of this type. Euclid's geometry contains more than one instance where a proposition is demonstrated by showing that the contradictory of the *probandum* implies the truth of this *probandum.* The proof that this is, in fact, the case may be no easy one, and may involve elaborate mediations. But any proposition A, such that the contradictory of A implies A, is, *ipso facto*, a true proposition, although nobody may yet have come to *feel* its necessity.

When we prove a proposition, however, by showing that its contradictory implies it, we do not make this proposition 'self-evident.' Nor yet do we demonstrate the proposition merely by reference to other propositions which we have to assume as prior certainties. What we find, in such cases, is not so much 'self-evidence,' as 'self-mediation'—an essentially cyclical process of developing the inter-relations which constitute the system of truth. In case, then, there are no axioms in sense (1), we need not abandon either the ideal or the hope of the attainment of rational truth.

(*c*) Third, axioms in sense (2) we need and use wherever and whenever we are engaged in practical activities, or are absorbed in contemplations, such as require a laying aside of the critical sense and a limitation of the business of reflexion. But the assertion 'I am sure of this' is never logically equivalent to the assertion 'This is true.' And it is no part of the business of science or of philosophy to seek, or to remain content with, merely private 'convictions' or 'persuasions,' however 'necessary' the subject feels them to be.

(*d*) Fourth, axioms in senses (4) and (5) interest the anthropologist, and the student of society, of history, of religion, of psychology; they can never satisfy the student of philosophy, or in particular, of logic, and of truth for its own sake.

(*e*) Finally, sense (3), interpreted not absolutely but relatively, so that an axiom is a principle which lies at the basis of a certain selected system of propositions, and which is not demonstrated in the course of that system, remains *the sense in which the term 'axiom' is still most serviceably employed in modern theory.* Philosophy seeks not absolute first principles, nor yet purely immediate insights, but the self-mediation of the system of truth, and an insight into this self-mediation. Axioms, in the language of modern theory, are best defined, neither as certainties nor as absolutely first principles, but as those principles which are used as the first in a special theory.

LITERATURE.—A complete view of the literature of the problems regarding axioms is impossible, since the topic is connected with all the fundamental philosophical issues. A few sources are:—**Aristotle**, *Analyt. Post.* i. 2, 3, *Metaphys.* iii. 2, iv. 3, 4; see also **Zeller**, *Philos. d. Griechen*[3], II. ii. 234–240. Of works bearing on the topic we may specially name:—**Descartes**, *Discourse on Method*, and *Meditations*; **Spinoza**, *Tract. de Emend. Intellectus*, and *Ethics*, especially pts. i. and ii.; **Locke**, *Essay on the Human Understanding*, esp. bks. i. and iv.; **Leibniz**, *Nouveaux Essais*; **Reid**, *Inquiry into the Human Mind*[7], 1814, and *Essay on the Powers of the Human Mind*[3], 1812; **Kant**, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*; J. S. **Mill**, *Logic*[8], 1872; **Hegel**, *Logic*; H. **Spencer**, *Principles of Psychology*[2], 1870–72. **Bertrand Russell's** *Foundations of Geometry*, 1897, and *Principles of Mathematics*, 1903, and L. **Couturat's** *Logique mathematique*, contain summaries of the principal problems and results regarding the mathematical 'first principles' which are of philosophical importance.

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AZAZEL.—When the word 'Azazel' was first introduced into a Western Bible or language is unknown to the present writer. It does not occur in the Concordances of the Greek, Latin, and German Bibles; it found a place in AVm at Lv 16[8. 10. 26] for the 'scapegoat' of the text, and in the text of the RV, 'dismissal' being its interpretation on the margin. In Greek it seems to have appeared first in print in Montfaucon's *Hexapla*, 1713, at Lv 16[26], from Cod. X (Coislinianus, now M). It is found a second time, according to Field, in the text of that Codex at v.[10], *εἰς ἀζαζὴλ εἰς τὴν ἔρημον τὴν ἀποπομπήν*; this reading

being shared, according to Holmes-Parsons, by Cod. 18. (In Redpath, *Concordance to the Proper Names of LXX*, p. 7, this reference to v.[10] is missing.) Though it appears in the Hebrew Bible three times in the famous chapter on the yearly Feast of the Atonement, lexicographers as yet completely disagree as to its explanation. The latest work on Hebrew lexicography, that of Brown-Driver-Briggs (1900), explains the word as '*entire removal*,' seeing in the form a 'redupl. intens. abstr.' from √[עול]=Arab. عزل, 'remove' ='entire removal' of sin and guilt from sacred places into the desert on the back of a goat, the symbol of entire forgiveness. This explanation is said to be preferable to another, which finds in it a proper name, either of a rough and rocky mountain (*Yoma*, 67*b*, קשה שבהרים), or of a spirit haunting the desert. The form עֲזָאזֵל is, in this case, considered as changed from עֲזָאזֵל; עֲזָא, עֲזָאל being another name of a fallen angel. The name is not found elsewhere in Hebrew. In the Syriac Bible it is pronounced 'ăzāzā'il, and explained by the lexicographers as another name of the archangel Michael (after Theodore of Mopsuestia, *Thesaurus Syriacus*, p. 285*i*). The name became well known among the Syrians as that of a martyr in the days of Maximian, identified with St. Pancras of the Western calendars; see 'Histoire de Saint Azazaïl, texte syriaque inédit avec introduction et traduction française: précédée des actes grecs de Saint Pancrace, publiés pour la première fois par Frédéric Macler,' Paris, 1902 (*Bibliothèque de l'École pratique des hautes études*, fasc. 141), and cf. on it H. Delahaye, *Analecta Bollandiana*, xxiv. 93-95, and Brockelmann, *ZDMG* lviii. 499-501. Recently the whole conception has been derived from the Babylonians; cf. J. Dyneley Prince, 'Le Bouc Emissaire chez les Babyloniens' (*JA* x. 2. 1, pp. 133-156, Ju.-Ao. 1903); but M. Fossey (*La Magie assyrienne*, Paris, 1902, p. 85) seems to be right when he declares: 'Je ne puis rien voir de semblable.' If one reads Lv 16 with an open mind, the impression is that Azazel must be a being related to Jahweh in something of the same way as Ahriman to Ormazd, or Satan (Beelzebub) to God. To go into details on the rite of Atonement or the stories about the fallen angels (Gn 6[1-4]) is outside the scope of this article.*

LITERATURE.—**Driver**, art. 'Azazel,' in Hastings' *DB*; **Benzinger-Cheyne** in *Encyc. Bibl.*; **Volck** in *PRE*[3]; *Jew. Encyc.*; the Comm. on Leviticus; **Marmorstein**, *Studien zum Pseudo-Jonathan Targum*, 1905, p. 37 ff. EB. NESTLE.

* In the Book of Enoch (ch. 6), *Asaël* is the name of one of them, in the Greek text (ed. Radermacher) Ἀσεάλ, Syncellus Ἀζαήλ; in ch. 8 ff. *Azazel* in the Ethiopic, Ἀζαηλ in the Greek and Syncellus, Ἀζαζήλ according to Irenæus; he is thrown εἰς τὴν ἔρημον τὴν οὖσαν ἐν τῷ Δουδαήλ (Gr. Δαδουήλ), explained by Geiger as abbreviated from *Beth Hadudo* (the modern *Beth-ḥudēdun*), the crag down which the goat for Azazel was pushed

B

BAAL, BEEL, BEL (fem. **Baalat, Beela, Beltu**). — Ba'al is a primitive title of divinities, which is found in all branches of the Semitic race (Arab. بعل, *ba'l*; Eth. *ba'ăl, bā'l*; Min. and Sab. *ba'l*; Sin. בעלי, *ba'lu*; Nab. בעל; Canaanite and Heb. בַּעַל, *ba'al*; Phœn. and Pun. בעל, *ba'l*; Aram. and Syr. בעל, ܒܥܠ, *be'el*; Palm. בול, *bôl*, and בל, *bêl*; Bab. and Assyr. *bêl*).

i. *PRIMITIVE MEANING OF THE NAME.*—The application of this name to deities is secondary; primarily it is a common noun denoting 'possessor,' 'owner.'

(1) It denotes ownership of physical objects. Thus the *ba'al* of a house, field, ditch, or animal is its 'proprietor'; the *ba'alat*, its 'proprietrix' (so in Heb. Phœn. Aram. Assyr. Arab. Eth.). The *b'ălûm* of a town are its 'citizens' (so in Heb. Phœn.). Even in the singular the word may be used for 'citizen' (cf. *CIS* 120, חרנא בעלת בונתי, 'Irene, a citizen of Byzantium'). (2) It denotes a 'possessor' of certain physical characteristics. Thus a two-horned ram is described as a *ba'al* of two horns; a bird, as a *ba'al* of two wings; a hairy man, as a *ba'al* of hair (so in Heb. Assyr. Aram. Eth.). (3) It denotes a 'possessor' of certain mental qualities. Thus a discerning man is called a *ba'al* of discernment; a hostile man, a *ba'al* of hostility; a sinful man, a *ba'al* of sin; a dreamer, a *ba'al* of dreams; an eloquent man, a *ba'al* of the tongue (so in Heb. Assyr. Aram. Eth.). (4) It denotes a 'possessor' of certain rights or claims over others. Thus a plaintiff is called *ba'al* of a case; a prosecutor, *ba'al* of one's justice; a confederate, *ba'al* of one's covenant (so Heb. Assyr. Aram. Eth.). (5) *ba'al* denotes a 'husband' as the 'owner' of a wife (cf. Dt 5[18 (21)] where house, field, male slave, female slave, ox, and ass are enumerated with wife as a man's possessions) (so in Heb. Nab. Palm. Aram. Arab. Assyr.). It is noteworthy, however, that *ba'al* is not used of the master of a slave, or of any other person who exercises authority over men. For the idea 'master,' or 'lord,' the Semitic languages in general use the words *'ādhôn, mār, rabb*, but not *ba'al*. Only in Bab.-Assyr. has *bêl* (=*ba'al*) developed the general meaning of 'lord' and become a synonym of the other names of authority; but this usage is evidently secondary, since it is not found in the other dialects. Even the meaning 'husband' cannot be primitive, because the *ba'al* or 'owner' type of marriage was not original among the Semites. The evidence is abundant that the primitive constitution of Semitic society, as of so many other early peoples, was matriarchal (see ASHTART, 2). In such a society, where the mother was supreme and marriage was only a temporary union with men of other tribes, the husband obviously could not be called *ba'al* or 'owner,' since the wife was far too independent. He was known rather as *'abu*, 'nourisher,' which in the meaning of 'husband' is older than in the meaning of 'father' (cf. Jer 3[4] and old Bab. usage). In the stage of fraternal polyandry, which among some at least of the Semites succeeded the matriarchal stage, the husband was not yet a *ba'al*, and was probably still known as *'abu* (see 'AMM). Only at a relatively late date, when society had finally passed to the monogamous or polygamous stage and wives were secured by purchase, did the husband become an 'owner.' The old word *abu* could no longer be used in the sense of 'husband,' and was set apart to express the idea of 'father,' which now for the first time became important, since children now first knew their fathers. A new term, accordingly, had to be found to express the new conception of the husband as an 'owner.' The other names of authority, *'ādhôn, mār, rabb*, had already been pre-empted to express the relation of master to slave and of superior to inferior, but *ba'al*, 'owner,' was an indefinite word that might be applied to the new relationship. It appears, accordingly, that in primitive Semitic usage *ba'al* designated an owner of things or qualities, but not an owner of persons.

As a title of deity, *ba'al* retained its primitive meaning as a common noun, and described the divinity in question as an 'owner' or 'occupier' of some physical object or locality, possibly also as a 'possessor' of some attribute (see below, ii. 10). If the numen was regarded as masculine, it was called a *ba'al*; if feminine, a *ba'alat*. The name was thus the equivalent of Arab. *dhû* (fem. *dhât*), 'he of, possessor of,' which in the South Arabian inscriptions alternates with *ba'al* in names of gods. In Babylonian the common noun *bêl* (=*ba'al*) developed the secondary meaning of 'master,' or 'lord,' and, corresponding to this, in the Assyro-Babylonian religion *bêl* described the god as an 'owner' or 'lord' of persons. Thus in their inscriptions the Assyrian kings group the great gods of the nation under the general formula *bêlê rabûte bêlêya*, 'the great lords, my lords.' In such cases we have *ba'als* of tribes and *ba'als* of persons, but this conception is

not found among the other Semites and cannot be primitive. Corresponding to the original usage which limited the name *ba'al* to owners of things, the *b'ālîm* are elsewhere uniformly regarded as proprietors of objects and of places, not as owners of persons. Lords of tribes or of individuals are *'ĕlôhîm, 'ădhônîm, mĕlākhîm, rabbîm, marîn*, but never *b'ālîm*. One never meets *Ba'al-Israel, Ba'al-Moab, Ba'al-Ammon*, as one meets *Ba'al-Sidon, Ba'al-Lebanon, Ba'al-Maon*, but instead *'Ĕlôhê-* or *Melek-Israel, -Moab, -Ammon*.

In Bab.-Assyr. the worshipper addresses his god as *Bêlî*, 'my lord,' or *Bêltî*, 'my lady' (cf. *Madonna, Notre Dame*); but this is not found in the other dialects, except where there is direct borrowing from the Babylonian. This is the case in *Bêlti* of Palmyra (de Vogué, *Inscr. Sémit.* 1868, 52, 155). She is the consort of the Babylonian *Bêl*, who is worshipped alongside of the native *Bôl*. The *Ba'alat* of Gebal appears in Greek and Latin writers as *Beltis* (=בעלתי), Βῆλτις (Abydenus in Muller, *FHG* iv. 283, 9), Βήλθης (Hesychius, *s.v.*), Βαάλτις (Philo Byblius in *FHG* iii. 569, 25), *Balti* (*CIL* iii. Suppl. 10393, 10964); but this is never found in native Sem. inscriptions, and is due to late syncretistic identification of the *Ba'alat* of Gebal with *Bêltis* of Babylon. The same is true of Βαλδάνιος (=בעלן), 'our ba'al,' a title of Juppiter Heliopolitanus in *Chron. Pasch.* i. 561. It is noteworthy, however, that, while the worshipper does not speak of the god as 'my *ba'al*,' he may call himself 'slave of the *ba'al*,' e.g. in the Phœn. proper names *'Abd-ba'l*, and the Palmyrene name *'Abdi-bôl*.

Where *ba'al*, 'proprietor,' is identified with *mêlek*, 'king,' as is the case in certain Phœnician inscriptions, this is due to syncretistic combination of the tribal god of the invading Semites with the local numen of Tyre, and is analogous to the syncretism that is seen in such Heb. proper names as *Ba'al-Yah*, 'the *ba'al* is Jahweh' (1 Ch 12[5]), or *Yo-ba'al*, 'Jahweh is the *ba'al*,' if Kuenen's restoration of Jg 9[26] be correct. Here Jahweh, the conquering God of Israel, is identified with one of the local *ba'als*. Thus Melkart (=מלך קרית), 'king of the city,' is called the *ba'al* of Tyre (*CIS* 121, לארנן למלקת בעל צר, 'to our lord, to Melkart, the *ba'al* of Tyre'). Similarly we find *Milk-Ba'l*, 'king-owner,' a compound deity like *Milk-'Ashtart* (*CIS* 123*a*, 147, 194, 380); *Ba'al-Malûku*, the name of a son of the king of Arvad (*KIB* ii. 173), perhaps the prototype of the obscure *Ba-al-ma-la-gi-e* of the treaty of Esarhaddon (*KAT*[3] 457); and *Malak-bêl* in Palmyra (cf. also Jer 32[35]). In *CIS*, p. 155, the god בעלארן (=*Ba'al-Adonis*) occurs; cf. the proper name ארנבעל, Lat. *Idnibal* (*CIS* 139), and Βεελ-μαρι (*CIS* I. i. p. 111). Such late combinations in Phœnician do not invalidate the general conclusion that *ba'al* as a divine name designates primarily the owner of a sanctuary and not the master of his worshippers.

If this be true, it follows that there are as many *b'ālîm* as there are sacred objects and sacred places which they inhabit. Except in late theological abstraction, there is no such thing as a god *Ba'al*. The OT speaks habitually of the *b'ālîm* in the plural (Jg 2[11] 3[7] 8[33] 10[6. 10], 1 S 7[4] 12[10], 1 K 18[18], 2 Ch 17[3] 24[7] 28[2] 33[3] 34[4], Jer 2[23] 9[13 (14)], Hos 2[15 (13). 19 (17)] 11[2]). According to Jer 2[28] 11[13], they were as numerous as the cities. This plural cannot be understood of images of one god *Ba'al* (so the older interpreters, and more recently Baethgen and Baudissin), for idols are never mentioned along with altars, standing stones, or asheras as part of the equipment of sanctuaries of the *b'ālîm*. Neither can it be treated as a 'plural of majesty' like *Elohim*, for, unlike *Elohim*, when a divine name it is never construed as a singular. It can be taken only as indicating a multitude of local numina. When the singular *ba'al* is used, it requires a noun in the genitive to indicate which *ba'al* is meant; e.g. *Ba'al-Ḥazor, Ba'al-Ṣidon, Ba'al-Ḥarran*, etc. The contention of Baudissin (*PRE*[3] 326) that these are merely the local forms of one god *Ba'al*, like the local forms of *Zeus* among the Greeks, is untenable, because there is no evidence that *ba'al* ever became a proper name like *Zeus*, and because the Semites never combined names of gods with names of places in this fashion; *e.g.* we never meet such combinations as *'Ashtart-Ṣidon, 'Ashtart-Gebal* to distinguish the various forms under which *'Ashtart* was worshipped.

If *ba'al* is used without a following genitive, it regularly takes the article in the OT and in the inscriptions. Thus the *ba'al* of Jg 6[25. 28. 30. 31. 32] is the local numen of Ophrah, 'the *ba'al*' of 1 K 16[31. 32] 18[21. 22. 25. 26. 40] 19[18] 22[54 (53)], 2 K 3[2] 10[18-28] 11[18] 17[16] 21[3] 23[4. 5] (and the corresponding passages in Ch), Jer 2[8] 7[9] 11[13. 17] 12[16] 19[5] 23[13. 27] 32[29. 35], Hos 2[10 (8)] 13[1], Zeph 1[4] is Melkart, the *ba'al* of Tyre, whose cult was introduced into Israel in the reign of Ahab (1 K 16[31f.]), whence it spread to Judah through the influence of Ahab's daughter Athaliah (1 K 22[54 (53)], 2 K 8[18]). In these cases it cannot be said that 'the *ba'al*' means the image of one god Ba'al, or that the article is used to distinguish the local manifestations of one deity (Baudissin, *PRE*[3] 328).

In Babylonian, where there is no article, *Bêl* alone, as a designation of Marduk, the chief god of Babylon, becomes a true proper name; but this usage is not found in the other dialects. The insertion of the article in Heb. and in Phœn. shows that *ba'al* has not yet lost its appellative force.

Only in proper names is the article with *ba'al* omitted, *e.g.* in the place names *Bamoth-ba'al, Kiryath-ba'al*, in the Heb. personal names *Jerubba'al, Ish-ba'al, Meri-ba'al, Bi'al-yada', Ba'al-Yah, Ba'al-ḥanan*, and in numerous similar Phœn. personal names, such as *Ba'al-ḥanan, Ḥanni-bal, Ba'al-yaton* (see Bloch, *Phön. Glossar. s.v.* בעל; Scholz, *Götzendienst*, 168 ff.); but these formations do not prove that *ba'al* is a proper name any more than the similar formations with *'ab*, 'father,' *'ah*, 'brother,' *'am*, 'uncle,' *melek*, 'king,' *'ādhôn*, 'lord,' prove that these words are personal names of deities. The absence of the article in these cases is due to the fact that these formations go back to a time when the article had not yet been developed in the various Semitic dialects. *Ba'al* is no more a proper name in these compounds than *θεός* in analogous Greek names. In the same manner we must estimate the omission of the article in names of gods compounded with *ba'al*, e.g. *Milk-ba'al, 'Adhôn-ba'al, 'Ashtart-shêm-ba'al, Tanit-pen-ba'al*, perhaps *Ba'al-Gad* and *Ba'al-Ẓāphôn* (see below, ii. 8, 10). When Βῆλος without the article is mentioned in the Greek inscriptions, the context shows that only the local deity is meant. Even in the Occident no one god Ba'al arose, but there were many local *ba'als*, whose names were either transliterated or translated into Greek or Latin. Augustine was still conscious of the appellative force of the name in Punic, when in his commentary on Judges (*PL* iii. 797) he translated *ba'al* 'dominus.' Jerome in his commentary on Hos 1[2] translates it 'ἔχων, id est habens'; and Servius (*ad Æn.* i. 621) says, 'lingua Punica Baal deus dicitur.' In view of these facts it is impossible to agree with Baethgen (*Beitrage*, p. 16) when he says, 'It is clear that there was originally always one and the same Ba'al, who stood in relations to various localities'; or with Baudissin (*PRE*[3] 327), 'Ba'al was apparently originally a title of the male divinity in general. Afterwards, when a number of such divinities were worshipped alongside of one an-

other, this word became the designation of the chief god of each locality.' On the contrary, in Sem. inscriptions and in Sem. literature, outside of Babylonia and Assyria, *ba'al* never loses its appellative force. Only in the theological speculations of Gr. and Lat. writers does *Belus* appear as a great god. This syncretism is to be regarded as the work of the Greeks, who were ignorant of the primitive meaning of *ba'al*, and thus were able to identify all the Sem. *be'ālîm* with the Bab. *Belus* (see below, iii. 7).

If there was no such thing as a god *Ba'al*, and this name designated merely the individual proprietor of a particular sanctuary, then it is evident that the traditional identification of this deity with the sun has no foundation. It is true that the sun was the *ba'al* of certain places, as Larsa, Sippar, Heliopolis (Ba'al-bek), Beth-Shemesh; but this was only one of many kinds of *ba'als*. The moon was the *ba'al* of Ur, of Ḥarran, of Palmyra, and perhaps also originally of Sin-ai (from Sin, the moon-god). Other gods of all sorts were *ba'als* of other places. If *Ba'al-ḥammān* has anything to do with the sun, this proves only that the sun was the *ba'al* of certain places (see below, ii. 5). By the Greeks and the Romans the local *ba'als* were identified with Zeus, Saturn, and Herakles as well as Sol. Only in the speculations of late writers such as Macrobius, who are disposed to regard all gods as of solar origin, is *Ba'al* formally identified with the sun. This theory has been revived and has been given wide currency in modern times (*e.g.* Creuzer, *Symbolik u. Mythologie*[3], ii. 413; Movers, *Phönizier*, i. 169; Baudissin, *PRE*[2] 329 ff.), but is nevertheless destitute of scientific foundation. So also Baethgen's theory that *ba'al* was primarily the god of heaven (*Beiträge*, p. 264), or any other theory that identifies *ba'al* with a single god, goes to pieces on the fact that this word is not a proper name but an appellative.

In the light of these facts it appears that the *ba'al*-cult carries us back to the polydæmonistic stage of religion (see POLYDÆMONISM). Among the Semites, as among other ancient peoples, and as among savages in all parts of the world, every object in nature that could do something, or that was believed to be able to do something, was reverenced as divine. The objects of worship were conceived, after the analogy of human beings, as living persons consisting of soul and body. The phenomenon was the body, the indwelling spirit was the *ba'al* or 'owner.' In the case of celestial or atmospheric phenomena the name of the divinity was usually the same as that of the phenomenon (see below, ii. 8). Thus Shemesh was at once the sun and the sun-god; Ramman, the thunder and the thunder-god. In other cases the numen was distinguished from the physical object by being called its *ba'al*. This is a striking difference between Indo-European and Semitic polydæmonism. Among the Indo-Europeans *Daphne*, 'the laurel,' is also the name of the nymph that inhabits this tree; *Amymone*, the sacred spring at Nauplia, is also the name of its indwelling nymph; *Athene*, the patron goddess of Athens, bears the same name as her city: but among the Semites the numen of a palm-tree is not called *Tamar* but *Ba'al-tamar* (Jg 20[33]); the numen of a well, not *Be'ēr* but *Ba'alath-be'ēr* (Jos 19[8]); the numen of a mountain, not *Lebanon* but *Ba'al-Lebanon* (*CIS* 5); the numen of a city, not *Sidon* or *Gebal* but *Ba'al-Sidon* (*CIS* 3) and *Ba'alat-Gebal* (*CIS* 177). This difference of conception is significant for the later developments of Indo-European and of Semitic religion. The Indo-European could never free himself from the identification of his gods with nature, and consequently the highest forms of his religion remained pantheistic. The Semite, on the other hand, was accustomed from the earliest times to distinguish between the object and its *ba'al*. His religion tended towards transcendentalism, and in its highest form among the Hebrews became pure theism. Apart from this more independent relation of Semitic numina towards the physical objects that they inhabited, there was no essential difference between the *be'ālîm* and the nymphs, dryads, satyrs, fauns, genii, fairies, gnomes, elves, and local gods of primitive Indo-European religion (see Usener, *Götternamen*). The *be'ālîm*, as a rule, had no names of their own and no identity or existence apart from the objects or localities that they inhabited. Their cult was a lower stage of religion than polytheism, for they were not gods in any proper sense, but only *δαίμονες*, *numina*, spirits. Hence the name polydæmonism, which recent writers apply to this sort of religion instead of the ambiguous term 'animism' used by earlier writers. Out of the *be'ālîm* gods might grow by groups of phenomena coming to be regarded as manifestations of a single power, or by a particular *ba'al* coming to be the patron of a tribe or of a city; but, apart from such developments, the *be'ālîm* remained simply local dæmons.

ii. *CLASSIFICATION OF THE BA'ALS.* — The ba'als may be classified, according to the physical objects which they inhabit, as terrestrial and celestial. Among the terrestrial ba'als we may enumerate:

1. **Ba'als of springs.**—For the primitive Semitic nomad in the desert the spring was the most wonderful object in nature. Its waters gushed miraculously out of the arid sands, giving life to vegetation, to man, and to beast. On it the existence of the tribe depended, and about it as a centre the tribe rallied. It is no wonder, therefore, that it was reverenced as divine, and that its numen was regarded as the mother of the tribe, the giver of all earthly blessings (see ASHTART, 3). In all branches of the Sem. race springs retained their sanctity down to the latest times.

The following sacred springs may be mentioned.—Among the Arabs: the *Zemzem* at Mecca (Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], 103 f.); among the Canaanites and Hebrews, *'En-mishpaṭ*, 'the spring of decision,' an oracular fountain at Ḳadesh, 'the sanctuary' (Gn 14[7]), *Beer-lahai-roi*, between Kadesh and Bered (Gn 16[14]), *Beer-sheba'*, 'well of seven' (Gn 21[31] 26[33], Am 5[5] 8[14]); *'En-rogel*, near Jerusalem, by the sacred stone Zoheleth, where Adonijah offered sacrifices and was proclaimed king (1 K 1[9]); *Gihon*, 'the gusher,' an intermittent spring near Jerusalem, where Solomon was crowned (1 K 1[33]), probably the same as Bethesda (Jn 5[2-4]), the modern Virgin's Fountain, which is still regarded with superstitious reverence by the people of Jerusalem; the *Dragon's Well*, also near Jerusalem (Neh 2[13]); *'En-shemesh*, 'spring of the sun' (Jos 15[7] 18[17]); *Baal-Gad*, or *Baal-Hermon*, probably the sanctuary at the source of the Jordan at Panias (belonging to the god Pan), or Cæsarea Philippi, the modern Banias.—Among the Phœnicians: a spring at Joppa connected with the myth of Perseus and Andromeda (Paus. iv. 35 9), the 'sanctuary of the spring *Yidlaʿ*' (*Eshmunazar Inscr.*, line 17); the nymph Ἀρωβρέτ (= עין עברת, 'overflowing spring') in Philo Byb. (*FHG* iii. 570 f., frag. 4, 5); the river *Adonis* (= אדוני, 'my lord'), the modern Nahr Ibrahim, which bursts from a cave in the side of Lebanon at Afḳa, the seat of the cult of 'Ashtart and Adonis, according to Lucian (*Dea Syr.* 6) and Euseb. (*Vit. Const.* iii. 55); the river *Asklepios* (the Gr. equivalent of the Phœn Eshmun), near Sidon (Antonnus Martyr, ed. Tobler, p. 1; Levy, *Phön. Stud.* i. 30 f.).—In the Phœnician colonies: the spring Μακαρία (= מקור, 'fountain'), the daughter of Herakles (Melḳart), at Marathon (Paus i. 32 6); the spring Κυάνη at Syracuse (Diod Sic v 4 1), and the hot springs at Himera, in Sicily (*ib* iv. 23. 1), both of which were connected with myths of the Tyrian Melḳart-Herakles; the spring at Gades, in Spain (Strabo, iii. 5. 7, Plny, *HN* 97 [100], 219).—In Syria: *Mabbog* (= מבוג, 'spring'), the native name of Bambyce or Hierapolis, the sanctuary of the goddess Atargatis (see ATARGATIS), the oracular spring Kandalia, at Antioch (Sozomen, *HE* v. 19).—In Assyria *Rish-Eni*, 'the fountain-head' (Ashurnasirpal, *Annals*, i. 104). Many of these sanctuaries have retained their holiness down to the present time, being regarded as the seats of Christian saints or Muslim *awliyā'* (pl. of *walī*, 'patron saint'), and in all parts of the Muslim world springs are still regarded as the abodes of powerful spirits, whose favour is sought through sacrifice and offerings

(see Curtiss, *Ursem. Religion*, pp 91 ff., 113 ff., 121 f., 163, 270). On spring worship in general see Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 154–170, and the bibliography there given on p 154.

The numina that inhabited the sacred springs were known as their *b'ᵉālîm*; thus **Ba'alath-be'ēr**, 'proprietrix of the well,' is the name of a town in the Negeb (Jos 19⁸, cf. **Beālôth**, Jos 15²⁴, 1 K 4¹⁶). In 2 S 5²⁰ (=1 Ch 14¹¹) the name **Ba'al-pᵉrāzim** is explained in such a way as to indicate that it meant originally 'proprietor of the breaking forth of waters.' It was one of the fountains that gush out of the sides of the Valley of Rephaim, the modern Wady el-Werd. The sacred river **Bēlus**, near Ptolemais (Acre), took its name from the *ba'al* that inhabited it (Pliny, *HN* xxxvi. 26 [65], 190; Jos. *BJ* ii. 10. 2). In Arabic the phrase 'that which the *ba'l* waters,' or simply '*ba'l*,' means land irrigated by subterranean waters (Lane, *Arab. Lex. s.v.*; Nestle, *Isr. Eigennamen*, p. 126; W. R. Smith, p. 99 ff; Wellhausen, *Reste*², p. 146). The same usage survives in Mishnic Heb. שדה הבעל (*Baba bathra*, iii. 1), or simply בעל (*Suk.* iii. 3; *Terum.* x. 11; *Sheb.* ii. 9), and in the Gemara בית הבעל, in the meaning of 'land subterraneously watered' (see Levy, *Chald. Worterb. s.v.*). If the text of Ca 8¹¹ be correct, **Ba'al-hāmôn** can mean only 'owner of the torrent,' but it is possible that this name is corrupted out of the better known *Ba'al-Hermôn* (see below, 4) or *Ba'al-ḥammān* (see 5). The title בעלמ, which follows the name of Hadad on the Hadad statue from Zenjirli, possibly means 'owner of water' (see D. H. Müller, *WZKM* vii., 1893, p. 50 ff.). On the strength of the Arabic expression *ba'l* for 'land subterraneously watered,' and of Hos 2⁸[10], which speaks of the *b'ᵉālîm* as givers of corn, wine, oil, wool, flax, vines, and fig-trees, W. R. Smith (p. 104 ff.) concludes that the *b'ᵉālîm* were primarily the numina of subterranean waters, and that they became the 'owners' of land by making it fruitful, just as the husbandman creates ownership in otherwise worthless land by irrigating it. These were doubtless an important class of the *b'ᵉālîm*; but in view of the numerous other sorts that we shall consider in the following paragraphs, it cannot be said that they were the only kind, or even the original kind. Here, as elsewhere, the attempt to trace religious conceptions to a single root is a failure. Polydæmonism was complex in its origin and protean in its manifestations.

2. Ba'als of trees.—In the Arabian desert, trees grew only in watered oases, consequently they shared the sanctity of springs in the esteem of the primitive Semites. The date-palm in particular, whose fruit formed one of the staples of life, could not fail to be worshipped as a divine benefactor. The Garden of Eden, with the tree of knowledge of good and evil and the tree of life, in Gn 2⁸⁻¹⁷ is a primitive Sem. tradition of an oasis with its sacred palm-trees.

According to Tabarî (ed. de Goeje, i. 922; ed. Noldeke, p 181), in the city of Najran, before the introduction of Christianity, a great palm was worshipped and hung with garments and ornaments at the time of the annual feasts (see Osiander, *ZDMG* vii., 1853, p. 481). The sanctuary of the goddess al-'Uzza at Nahla, 'the date-palm,' consisted of three *samura* trees, of which one was regarded as the proper abode of the goddess (Wellhausen, *Reste*², p. 38). This seems to have been the same as the tree known as *Dhât anwât*, 'she of the hanging,' to which the people of Mecca resorted yearly to adorn it with their weapons and to offer sacrifice (Krehl, *Rel der vorislam. Araber*, p. 73 *f.*). By the holy spring Zemzem, at Mecca, there once stood a sacred tree (Dozy, *Israeliten zu Mekka*, p 93). According to the Qur'ân (*Sura* xix. 23–25), the Virgin Mary was nourished before the birth of Jesus by the fruit of a palm-tree miraculously produced out of season.

Among the Canaanites and Hebrews the cult of trees is copiously attested by the OT. According to Hos 4¹³, they sacrificed under oaks, and poplars, and terebinths (cf. Is 1²⁹) Dt 12², Jer 2²⁰ 3⁶ ¹³ 17², Ezk 6¹³ 20²⁸, 1 K 14²³, 2 K 16⁴ 17¹⁰, Is 57⁵ state that they sacrificed 'under every green tree,' and Is 65³ 66¹⁷ speak of sacrifice in gardens. The following individual holy trees are mentioned: the burning bush at Sinai (Ex 3²), the tamarisk at Beersheba (Gn 21³³, cf. 26²⁵ 46¹); the oracular mulberry trees in the valley of Rephaim (2 S 5²⁴= 1 Ch 14¹⁵), the pomegranate at Gibeah (1 S 14²); the tamarisk at Ramah (1 S 22⁶); the palm-tree of Deborah between Ramah and Bethel (Jg 4⁵); the 'oak of weeping' below Bethel (Gn 35⁸); the terebinth at Ophrah, where the angel appeared to Gideon, and where he offered sacrifice and built an altar (Jg 6¹¹. ¹⁹ ²⁴); the terebinth of Moreh, 'the diviner,' at Shechem, where Jahweh appeared unto Abram, and Abram built an altar (Gn 12⁶ᶠ 13¹⁸), and where Jacob buried the images and the jewels (35⁴), probably the same as 'the terebinth of the diviners' (Jg 9³⁷) and 'the terebinth of the standing stone that was by the sanctuary of Jahweh' (Jos 24²⁶, Jg 9⁶); the tamarisk at Jabesh (1 S 31¹³, cf. 1 Ch 10¹²). The *'ăshērāh*, or sacred post, so often mentioned in the OT as part of the equipment of a sanctuary, was perhaps merely a conventionalized symbol of a living tree. If so, its use is an additional evidence of tree-worship among the Canaanites and Hebrews (see Poles). The persistence of this cult among the Hebrews is shown also by the combination of cherubim and palm-trees in the decoration of the Temple (1 K 6²⁹ ³² ³⁵) Such passages as Ps 52¹⁰ (⁸) and 92¹⁴ (¹³) suggest also that trees were planted in the court of the Temple, as in the modern Haram. Even so late a writer as Zechariah sees myrtle trees at the entrance to Jahweh's abode (Zec 1⁸ ¹¹) The cult still lingers in the Talmud, in the belief that certain trees are inhabited by demons (Grunbaum, *ZDMG* xxxi 253 ff)

Of the Phœnicians, Philo Byblius says that the plants of the earth were in ancient times esteemed as gods and honoured with libations and sacrifices, because from them the successive generations of men drew the support of their life (Müller, *FHG* iii. 565). Tyrian coins frequently exhibit cypresses standing in temple enclosures and palm-trees adored by a worshipper. There was a grove of Asklepios (Eshmun) between Beirut and Sidon (Strabo, xvi. 2. 6), a tree believed to enclose the body of Adonis at Gebal (Plut. *de Is. et Osir.* 15 f.), and a grove sacred to 'Ashtart at Aphaka (Euseb. *Vit. Const* iii. 55, *Laud. Const.* 8). In the Phœn colonies sacred trees existed in Arados (Lajard, *Mithra*, pl. vi. 1, 2), in Cyprus (Servius, *ad Æn* v 72; Athenæus, iii. 27, Strabo, xiii 1. 51–65), in Rhodes (Paus iii 19. 10), in Crete (Diod. Sic v. 66, 1; Athen. i 49), at Corinth (Paus. ii. 1. 3, ii. 2. 4; Athen xv. 22, p. 678*b*), in Arcadia (Paus. viii. 24), at Naukratis (Athen xv 18, p. 675 f), at Carthage (Virg *Æn* i 441 ff; Tert *Apol.* 9), in Iberia (Lajard, *Mithra*, p 287 ff.)

In Syria holy trees were known at Baalbek (Mionnet, *Medailles Antiques*, v. 302 f), at Damascus (Mionnet, v 292 ff), at Palmyra (Lajard, *Cyprès*, pl. iii. 1), at Antioch (Strabo, xvi. 2. 6; Soz. *HE* v 19), at Mount Kasios (Servius, *ad Æn* iii 680) The early Syrian Christians felt it their duty to cut down 'the trees of the demons,' but many could not resist the temptation to turn to them for help when they were sick (Kayser, *Jacob v. Edessa*, p 141). For survivals of tree-worship among the Sabians of Mesopotamia, see Chwolson, *Ssabier*, i 293, ii 29, 33, 34. The cult of trees in Babylonia and Assyria is attested by numerous reliefs and inscriptions on seals. Most frequently the female date-palm is depicted being fertilized by winged figures that symbolize the winds (see Schrader, *MBAW*, 1882, p 426 ff.; Bonavia, *Bab. and Or. Record*, iii , Tylor, *PSBA* xii. 181–184) In all parts of the modern Sem world holy trees are still found which are visited with prayer and sacrifice, and on which bits of cloth torn from the garments are hung to serve as reminders of the worshipper (Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, i. 448 *f*; Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel.* pp. 96 ff, 154 ff). For literature on tree-worship see Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 181

The numina that inhabited such sacred trees were known as their *b'ᵉālîm* or *bᵉ'alôth*, as the case might be. Thus in Arab. a palm-tree that imbibed water with its roots, and did not need to be watered, was known as *ba'l* (Lane, *Arab. Lex. s.v.*). A village near Gibeah bore the name of **Ba'al-tamar**, abbreviated from *Beth-ba'al-tamar*, 'house of the ba'al of the palm' (see below, iii. 2; Jg 20³³; Euseb. *Onom. Sac.* 238. 75). With this Baudissin (*Studien*, ii. 211) compares **Zeus Demarous**, the father of Herakles-Melkart in Philo Byblius (Müller, *FHG* iii. 569, fr. 2, 24), which represents a Sem. *Ba'al-Timār*, or *Ba'al-Tmārôn*, just as *Zeus Karmelos* represents *Ba'al-Carmel* (see below, 4). With this is also to be compared the river *Tamuras*, in Strabo (xvi. 2. 22), the modern Nahr Damûr. Precisely analogous are the Arab. names of gods **Dhu-'Anama** (*ZDMG*, 1875, p. 611) and **Dhu-l-Ḥalaṣa** (Wellhausen, *Reste*², p. 47), which describe the deities in question as owners of the plants known as *'anama* and *ḥalaṣa*.

3. Animal ba'als.—In all branches of the Sem. race names of animals used as proper names, particularly of clans and of places, prove a primitive totemistic cult.

Thus in the OT we have the names *Aṭah*, 'vulture', *Ayalon*, 'stag'; *Arieh*, 'lion'; *Becher* and *Bichri*, 'young camel'; *Gemalli*, 'camel'; *Gedi*, 'kid'; *Deborah*, 'bee'; *Dishon*, 'mountain goat'; *Zeeb*, 'wolf'; *Zimran*, 'mountain sheep';

Hagabah, 'locust'; *Ḥezir*, 'swine'; *Ḥuldah*, 'weasel'; *Ḥamor*, 'ass'; *Ḥumṭah*, 'lizard'; *Ṭelaim*, 'lambs'; *Yonah*, 'dove'; *Ja'el*, 'mountain goat'; *Car* and *Cheran*, 'lamb'; *Caleb*, 'dog'; *Lebaoth*, 'lions'; *Laish*, 'lion'; *Naḥash*, 'serpent'; *Nimrah*, 'leopard'; *Susah*, 'mare'; *'Eglah*, 'heifer'; *'Epher*, 'young gazelle'; *'Achbor*, 'mouse'; *'Oreb*, 'raven'; *'Arad*, 'wild ass'; *'Eṭam*, 'vulture'; *'Aḳrabbim*, 'scorpions'; *Parah*, 'cow'; *Ẓibiah*, 'gazelle'; *Ẓippor*, 'sparrow'; *Ẓorah*, 'hornet'; *Pir'am*, 'wild ass'; *Par'osh*, 'flea'; *Rachel*, 'ewe'; *Śeirah*, 'goat'; *Shu'al*, 'fox'; *Shaphan*, 'badger'; *Shephuphan*, 'a kind of serpent'; *Tola'*, 'worm'; *Taḥash*, 'porpoise'; *Ẓibe'on*, 'hyæna'; *Sha'albim*, 'fox'; *Leah*, 'wild cow'; *Nun*, 'fish'; *Ḥoglah*, 'partridge' (list taken from Gray, *Heb. Proper Names*, p. 88 f.). For similar animal names among the Arabs and Syrians see W. R. Smith, *JPh* ix. 75–100, Noldeke, *ZDMG*, 1886, pp. 148–187. The worship of the bullock among the Hebrews is attested by Ex 32[4f.], 1 K 12[28f.], Hos 8[6] 10[5] 13[2], and by the survival of אבּיר, 'bullock,' as a title of Jahweh. Such place names as *Beth-car*, 'house of the lamb'; *Beth-lebaoth*, 'house of lions'; *Beth-nimrah*, 'house of the leopard'; *Beth-ḥoglah*, 'house of the partridge,' are analogous to *Beth-Dagon*, *Beth El*, *Beth-Shemesh*, compounded with names of gods, and seem to indicate that these places were seats of totemic animal-worship. If the name Dagon be derived from *dag*, 'fish,' this is an additional evidence of Sem. animal-worship (see DAGON). The *se'irim*, 'hairy ones, he-goats,' of Lv 17[7], Is 13[21] 34[14], 2 Ch 11[15], like the hairy Jinn of the Arabs (W. R. Smith, p. 119 ff.), are survivals of the same sort of cult. In Arabia we find also *Asad*, 'lion'; *Nasr*, 'vulture'; *'Auf*, 'bird of prey' (see ARABS, I. 3); in Babylonia, *NIN-SHAḪ* = *Bêl-shaḫi*, 'lord of the wild boar.'

Totemic animals were classed by OT writers along with other local numina under the general name of the *be'ālîm*, but it was not Semitic usage to speak of the *ba'al* of an animal as one spoke of the *ba'al* of a spring or of a tree. The bullock was worshipped directly, not the *ba'al* of the bullock (yet compare *Bêl-shaḫi* above). The reason for this, apparently, was a stronger sense of personality in the animal. It was an individual like a man, while a spring or tree was not an individual but an abode of one. The only exception to this rule is the name **Ba'al-zebub**, the god of Ekron, whose oracle was consulted by Ahaziah (2 K 1[2. 3. 6. 16]). If the text be sound, this means 'owner of flies'; so LXX Βάαλ μυῖα θεός. Baudissin (*PRE*[3] ii. 515) compares Ζεὺς ἀπόμυιος in Paus. v. 14. 1, viii. 26. 7; Clem. of Alex. *Protrept.* ii. 38, ed. Dindorf (cf. Pliny, *HN* x. 28 [40]. 75; Aelian, *Nat. Anim.* v. 17), but there is no evidence that the cult of this deity was of Sem. origin. The name *Ba'al-Zebub* occurs nowhere else than in the passage just cited in 2 Kings. Cheyne (*EBi* i. 407) holds that this form is a contemptuous Jewish perversion of **Ba'al-zebul** = *Be'el-zebul*, 'owner of the dwelling,' the form which occurs in the best MSS of Mt 10[25] 12[24], Mk 3[22], Lk 11[15. 18f.] (see below, 6). If so, this name has nothing to do with flies, and the one instance of a compounding of *Ba'al* with the name of an animal disappears (see BAALZEBUB).

4. Ba'als of mountains.—The sanctity of mountains among all the Semites was due, perhaps, to the awe which their grandeur inspired, perhaps to their connexion with clouds and storms.

In Arabia, Sinai was counted holy from the earliest times (Ex 3[1] 4[27] 24[13]). Its name is probably derived from the moon-god Sin. It retained its sanctity down to a late date (1 K 19[8]). Other Arabian holy mountains were Ḥirâ, Taur, Tabîr, Ko'aika'ân, and 'Arafât (v. Kremer, *Culturgeschichte des Orients*, ii. 14). In Ethiopic *dabr* means both 'mountain' and 'monastery.' According to Dt 12[2], Jer 2[20] 3[6] 17[2], Ezk 6[13] 20[28], 1 K 14[23], 2 K 16[4] 17[10], Is 57[7], Hos 4[13], the Canaanites and Hebrews sacrificed 'upon every high hill.' So conspicuous was this cult that it seemed to the Aramæans that the gods of the Hebrews were gods of the hills (1 K 20[23 28]). The following holy mountains are known in Canaan:—Hor (Nu 20[25ff.]), Peor (Nu 23[28f.]), Nebo (Dt 32[49] 34[1]), which derives its name from the Babylonian god Nebo (Is 46[1]); the hill at Kiriath-jearim where the ark was kept (1 S 7[1]), the mountain of the land of Moriah (Gn 22[2. 14]), Zion (Is 2[2 3] and often), the Mount of Olives (2 S 15[32], 1 K 11[7]), Mizpah (Jg 20[1. 18 26 28] 21[1. 2 5], 1 S 7[5]), Ramah (1 S 7[17] 9[12 14 19 25]), Gibeah (1 S 10[5 13]), Gibeon (1 K 3[4]), the mountain at Ophrah (Jg 6[28]), Ebal and Gerizim (Dt 27[4. 12], Jos 8[30. 33], Jn 4[20]), Tabor (Jg 4[6. 12 14], Hos 5[1]), Carmel (1 K 18[20. 30]), Gilead (Gn 31[45 54]), Hermon (Jerome, *Onom. Sac.*, ed. Lagarde, p. 90, 19 ff.; Euseb *Onom. s.v.* Ἑρμών). In the case of Hermon the ancient sanctity is still attested by the numerous ruins of temples that remain upon its slopes. The word *bāmāh*, which in the OT has come to be the general designation of seats of idolatrous worship, seems to denote primarily a 'height.' It is thus a witness to the wide diffusion of worship on hill-tops (see HIGH PLACE). Among the Phœnicians, Philo Byblius names Anti-lebanon, Lebanon, Kasios, and Brathy as holy mountains (Muller, *FHG* p. 566, frag. 2, 7). Baudissin (*Studien*, ii. 247) conjectures that Brathy is a corruption of Tabor. Strabo (xvi. 2. 15 f.) also mentions a sacred promontory near Tripolis For holy mountains in the Phœn. colonies see Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 249. For holy mountains in Northern Syria and Mesopotamia see Baudissin, ii. 246 For modern survivals of this cult see Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel.* p. 153 ff.

The divinities that inhabited these mountains were their *be'ālîm*. The name of Serbâl, the traditional Sinai, is probably compounded with *ba'al*. An Egyptian text speaks of the '*ba'al* upon the mountains' (W. M. Muller, *Asien u. Europa*, p. 309). In Canaan we find **Ba'al-Pe'or** (Nu 25[3-5], Dt 4[3], Hos 9[10], Ps 106[28]), or simply *Pe'or*, as the name of the god (Nu 25[18] 31[16], Jos 22[17], cf. *Beth-Pe'or*, Dt 3[29] etc.); **Bāmôth-ba'al**, 'the high places of the *ba'al*' (Nu 22[41] 23[1f.], Jos 13[17]); **Har-hab-ba'ălāh**, 'mount of the *ba'ālāh*' (Jos 15[11]); *Zeus Atabyrios* = **Ba'al-Tabor** (Gesenius, *Thes. s.v.* תבור); **Ba'al-Ḥermon** (Jg 3[3], 1 Ch 5[23]); *Zeus Karmelos* = **Ba'al-Carmel** (Tac. *Hist.* ii. 78); among the Phœnicians, **Ba'al-Lebanon** (*CIS* 5), probably the same as the god 'Amunu, lord of the mountain' (Reisner, *Hymn.* p. 139, lines 143, 145; cf. *KAT*[3] 433), and Ζεὺς ὄρειος of Philo Byblius; *Ba'li-ra'si* = **Ba'al-ra's**, 'ba'al of the promontory' (Shalmaneser II., fragment of annals, *KIB* i. 141); *Zeus Kasios* = **Ba'al-Ḳaṣiw**, 'ba'al of the precipice,' in Nabatæan inscriptions אלה קצו (Baudissin, *Studien* ii. 238); at Carthage, *Saturnus Balcaranensis* = **Ba'al-Ḳarnaim**, '*ba'al* of the two horns,' who was worshipped on a two-peaked mountain near Carthage, the modern Jebel bu Ḳurnein, where a temenos and altar have been discovered with hundreds of stelæ, dating from the 2nd and 3rd cents. A.D., bearing the inscription 'Saturno Balcaranensi, domino, magno, sancto, augusto' (Toutain, *Mélanges école franç.*, Rome, 1892, pp. 1–124, pl. i.–iv.).

5. Ba'als of stones.—Among the Semites, as among other primitive peoples, *maṣṣēbôth*, or fetish-stones, were reverenced as abodes of spirits.

Among the Arabs the most famous instance is the black stone at Mecca, which still forms the religious centre of the Muslim world. There was also a holy stone at the sanctuary of al-'Uzza at Nahla (Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], p. 39), and at the sanctuary of the god of Petra (Suidas, *s.v.* Ζεὺς ἄρτης; Epiphan *Panarion*, li.). The prohibitions of the Law assume that such stones were standing in all parts of Canaan, and were adopted by the Israelites as part of the worship of Jahweh (Lv 26[1], Dt 12[3] 16[22], Jer 2[27] 3[9]). The following holy stones are particularly mentioned: the twelve pillars at Sinai (Ex 24[4]); 'Lot's Wife' (Gn 19[26]); the stones at Gilgal, 'the circle' (Jos 4[3 20]); the stone at Beth-Shemesh (1 S 6[18]), at Zor'ah (Jg 13[19]), the pillar of Rachel's grave at Bethlehem (Gn 35[20]); the stone of Bohan (Jos 15[6] 18[17]); the stone Zoheleth, near Jerusalem (1 K 1[9]); the 'foundation-stone' in the Temple (Bab. Talm. *Yoma*, 54*a*), the stone of help at Mizpah (1 S 7[12]), the stone 'Ezel, near Gibeah (1 S 20[19]), the stone at Bethel (Gn 28[18-22] 31[13] 35[14]), at Ophrah (Jg 6[20]), at Shechem (Jos 24[27], Jg 9[6]); the stones on Ebal (Dt 27[4]), on Mount Gilead (Gn 31[45-52]) Among the Phœnicians the name Ẓur, Tyre, 'rock,' is perhaps derived from the sacred stone of the local god. Coins of Seleucia, in Pieria, bear the inscription 'Zeus Kasios,' and show an upright stone standing in a temple (Mionnet, *Médailles Ant.* v. 276 f.). The goddesses of Gebal and of Paphos were similarly represented (see 'ASHTART, 4), so also in Syria the god Elagabal at Emesa (Cohen, *Description des monnaies*, p. 530 ff., Nos 126–129, pl. xv 127). At Nisibis in the 4th cent there was a similar holy stone (*Beitr. z. Alterthumskunde*, 1880, p. 772; see MASSĒBĀH). For stone-worship in modern Arabia see Zwemer, *Arabia*, pp. 36, 39, 284, and for modern Syria see Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel* p. 90 ff

Similar in character to the *maṣṣēboth*, or 'standing stones' were the *ḥammānîm*, which along with altars, *'ashērîm*, and idols formed part of the equipment of high places (Lv 26[30], Is 17[8] 27[9], Ezk 6[4. 6], 2 Ch 14[4 (5)] 34[4 7]) In the Palmyrene inscription (de Vogué, *op. cit.* 123*a*) a *ḥammāna* is dedicated to the sun. In an inscription from Um el-'Awamid (*CIS* 8) and in the Ma'sub inscription (Hoffmann, 'Phön Inschr.' *ZDMG* xxxvi., 1890, p. 20 ff.) the deity *'El-ḥamman* occurs. Over 200 inscriptions on small upright stelæ, like gravestones, from Carthage, bear the inscription, 'To the Lady Tanit, face of Ba'al, and to the Lord *Ba'al-ḥammān*, so and so has dedicated this.' Ba'al-hammān is also mentioned frequently in inscriptions from Malta, Sicily, and Sardinia. In three inscriptions (*CIS* 404, 405, Euting, *Karth Inschr.* 123) the dedication is to *Hamman* without the prefixed *Ba'al*. Rashi first suggested that *ḥammān* was derived from the late Heb. and Rabbinic word *ḥammā*, 'sun,' and translated it

'sun-images'—an opinion that has been followed by many modern versions and commentators; but this translation is unknown to the ancient versions. LXX renders ξύλινα, βδελύγματα, εἴδωλα, τεμένη, ὑψηλά; Jerome, *simulacra, delubra*. No support is afforded to this theory by the fact that a *ḥammāna* is dedicated to the sun, since, according to 2 Ch 34[4], the *ḥammānîm* belonged to 'the *bĕ'lîm*' in general. That *Ba'al-ḥammān* had solar attributes, or that the name means 'owner of the sun' or 'glowing *ba'al*,' has not been proved. *Ba'al* is never compounded with *shemesh*, 'the sun,' or with the names of any of the other heavenly bodies (see below, 8); it is unnatural, therefore, to regard *ḥamman* as a synonym of *shemesh*. To take it as an adjective, 'glowing,' agreeing with *Ba'al*, is also without analogy (see below, 10). The suggestion of Renan (*CIS* I. i. 288 f.), that *ḥammān* is the same as the Egyptian god Amun Ra, is untenable, because in Heb. his name appears as 'Amon. The theory of Halévy (*Mélanges*, p. 426), that *ḥammān* is Mt. Amanus, and that *Ba'al-ḥammān* is the *Ba'al* of this mountain, is more in accordance with Sem analogy; but in the Bab.-Assyr. inscriptions Amanus appears as Amana without the strong initial guttural. It is also hard to see how objects used in the cult of this deity should have been called 'Amanuses.' For such a usage there is no analogy in the worship of other mountain-gods. We seem accordingly to be shut up to the view that *ḥammān* is a cult-object of unknown etymology, and that *Ba'al-ḥammān* is the deity that inhabits this object. This is strictly in accordance with the analogy of such names as *Ba'al-tamar*, 'Ba'al of the palm,' and *Ba'alath-bĕ'ēr*, 'Ba'alath of the well.' From the OT references it appears that the *ḥammānîm* were artificial products, 'the work of their fingers' (Is 17[8]), that they 'rose up' (Is 27[9]) 'above the altars' (2 Ch 34[4]), that they could be 'cut off' (Lv 26[30]), 'broken' (Ezk 6[4]), and 'hewn down' (Ezk 6[6], 2 Ch 31[7]). These expressions seem most applicable to stone pillars similar to the *maṣṣēbôth*. It is interesting to note that in none of the passages where *ḥammānîm* are mentioned are *maṣṣēbôth* mentioned. On the contrary, the *ḥammānîm* are combined with the *'ăshērîm* in Is 17[8] 27[9], 2 Ch 34[4 7], just as the *maṣṣēbôth* and the *'ăshērîm* are ordinarily combined. This suggests that the *ḥammānîm* are only variant forms of the *maṣṣēbôth*, perhaps artificially hewn, while the latter were native rock. In all probability the stelæ dedicated to *Ba'al-ḥammān* at Carthage and other Phœnician colonies were just such *ḥammānîm*.

A survival of stone-worship is seen in proper names compounded with *ṣûr*, צור, 'rock,' *e.g. Zuri-el*, 'my rock is a god'; *Zur-Shaddai*, 'a rock is Shaddai'; *Eli-ṣur*, 'my god is a rock'; *Beth-ṣur*, 'house of rock'; and, in the Panammu inscription from Zenjirli, *Bar-ṣur*, 'son of rock' (Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epig.* p. 442). In the light of these facts we should probably estimate the use of *Ṣur* as a name of Jahweh (Dt 32[4. 15 18 30f], 1 S 2[2], 2 S 22[3 32 47], Is 17[10] 30[29], Hab 1[12] etc.). The proper name *Ṣaphaḥ*, 'hot stone,' probably refers to a meteoric stone or supposed 'thunderbolt' that was reverenced as a fetish.

The sacred stone was regarded as the residence of a divinity, and therefore was known as *beth-el*, 'abode of deity' (cf. Gn 28[18-22], where Jacob calls the stone that he sets up *beth-el*, and Gn 31[13], where God says, 'I am the God of Bethel, where thou didst anoint a *maṣṣēbāh*, where thou didst vow a vow'). This name for holy stones was common also among the Phœnicians, from whom it spread to the Greeks and the Romans as βαίτυλος, βαιτύλιον (see STONES).

The divine proprietor of the 'house of deity' was its *ba'al*, just as the human owner of a house was its *ba'al*; *e.g.* Ba'al-hammān, 'owner of the stele,' in the numerous Punic inscriptions referred to above. The form *Ba'al-maṣṣēbāh* does not happen to occur, but is perfectly in accord with Sem. habits of thought, and is the necessary counterpart to the conception of the *maṣṣēbāh* as a *beth-el*.

6. Ba'als of sanctuaries.—In a few cases, apparently, the *ba'al* is not named from the sacred object in which he is supposed to reside, but from the sacred enclosure that surrounds this object. The Sabæan goddess **Dhât Himâ**, 'she of the holy ground' (*ZDMG*, 1877, p. 84), thus takes her name from her temenos. A similar formation seems to be found in בעלת החרת (*CIS* 41), which with Renan is probably to be rendered '*Ba'alat* of the inner sanctuary.' After this analogy also we should perhaps interpret **Bal-addiris** (= בעל חדר), who was worshipped at Sigus, in Numidia (*CIL* viii. 5279; Suppl. 19121-19123). If **Ba'al-zebul** be the correct reading instead of *Ba'al-Zebub* (see above, 3), then this '*ba'al* of the dwelling' may take his name from the sanctuary in which he was worshipped (but see below, 8).

7. Ba'als of places.—In the foregoing cases we are told what the particular natural phenomenon was with which the *ba'al* was connected. In other cases the phenomenon is not mentioned, but the *ba'al* is named from the place in which he was worshipped. Thus in Canaan we find **Ba'al-Me'on** (Nu 32[38], Jos 13[17], Ezk 25[9], 1 Ch 5[8]), **Ba'al-Shalishah** (2 K 4[42]), **Ba'al-Ḥazor** (2 S 13[23]); in Phœnicia, **Ba'al-Ṣidon** (*CIS* 3), **Ba'al-Tyre** (Hoffmann, *AGG* xxxvi., 1890, p. 19), **Ba'alat-Gebal** (*CIS* 1, 177); in Syria, **Belos of Apamea** (*CIL* xii. 1277); in Asia Minor, **Ba'al-Tarsus** (Scholz, *Götzendienst*, 149), **Ba'al-Gazur** (Head, *Hist. Num.* 631). In all these cases we must suppose that the divinity was connected with some striking physical phenomenon, only we are not told what this was, but are merely given the name of the town where it was located. Sometimes we know from other sources that there were sacred springs, trees, or stones in the places in question.

8. Celestial ba'als.—The object with which the divinity was connected was not necessarily situated on the earth; it might be the sky, one of the heavenly bodies, or some atmospheric phenomenon. Thus in Palmyrene, Phœnician, and Punic inscriptions we find frequent mention of **Be'ēl-shemayin**, **Ba'al-shāmēm**. This name is not derived from *shemesh*, 'sun,' as many have supposed, on the strength of identifications of this god with the sun by late Greek writers, but is derived from *shāmayim*, 'sky,' as Augustine (*Quæst. in Jud.* xvi.) correctly translates, 'Balsamem quasi dominum cœli Punici intelliguntur dicere.' It does not mean 'Lord of Heaven' in any abstract theological sense, but 'the one who lives in the sky.' It is thus the exact equivalent of the Sabæan god, *Dhû-Samâwî*, 'he of the sky.' *Ba'al-Shāmēm* is the Sem. counterpart of Varuna, Οὐρανός, among the Indo-Europeans. It is noteworthy, however, that, while the latter worship the sky directly, the former worship the *ba'al* of the sky (Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris*, i. 3).

Closely connected with *Ba'al-shāmēm* in conception is **Ba'al-ẓephôn (ẓāphôn)**, 'owner of the north.' This was the name of a town on the Red Sea (Ex 14[2. 9], Nu 33[7]). A goddess, **Ba'alat-zāphôn**, was also worshipped at Memphis (W. M. Muller, *Asien u. Europa*, p. 315). In the annals of Tiglath-pileser III. (*KIB* ii. 26 f.) a peak of Lebanon bears the name *Ba'ali-ṣapuna* (cf. Sargon, *Annals*, 204). In the treaty between Ba'al, king of Tyre, and Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, one of the gods mentioned is *Ba'al-ṣapunu* (*KAT*[2] 357). There was a town Zaphon in Gad (Jos 13[27], Jg 12[1]), also in Southern Palestine (*KIB* v., No. 174, 16), but it does not seem likely that this god can have derived his name from either of these insignificant places, since his cult spread all the way from Phœnicia to Egypt. *Ẓāphôn* is rather an abbreviation of *Ba'al-ẓāphôn*, and that in its turn of *Bêth-ba'al-zāphôn*, just as we find the series *Mā'ôn*, *Ba'al-Mā'ôn*, and *Beth-ba'al-Mā'ôn* (Nu 32[3. 38], Jos 13[17]). Moreover, *Ẓāphôn* alone occurs as the name of a deity in the Phœn. proper names ברצפן from Abydos (*CIS* 108), עברצפן from Carthage (*CIS* 265), צפנבעל from Carthage (*CIS* 207, 857). The last name is *Ba'al-ẓāphôn*, with the elements reversed. The name *Gir-ṣapûnu*, 'client of *Ẓāphôn*,' appears also as the name of an eponym in the time of Ashurbanipal (*KIB* i. 207, iv. 139). These names throw light upon the Heb. proper names Ẓaphon, Ẓephon, Ẓephonites, Ẓiphion. If *Ẓāphôn* is a god, we may either suppose with Gray (*Heb. Pr. Names*, p. 135) that this is a case of compounding two divine names, like Jahweh-Elohim, or, more probably, we may regard *Ẓāphôn*, 'the north,' as an object that might either be worshipped directly or be regarded as the abode of a deity, so that the god might be called indifferently *Ẓāphôn* or *Ba'al-Ẓāphôn*. The sanctity of the north as the dwelling-place of the gods is widely attested among the Semites (Is 14[13]; cf. Baethgen, *Beitrage*, p. 22 f.; Baudissin, *Studien*, i. 278). *Ba'al-*

ẓāphôn, 'owner of the north,' accordingly, is nearly synonymous with *Ba'al-shāmēm*, 'owner of the sky,' although in the Phœn. pantheon the two deities existed side by side (*KAT*[3] 357). The name *Ba'al-zebul*, 'owner of the dwelling' (see above, 3 and 6), may be given with reference to this heavenly abode rather than with reference to an earthly sanctuary (so Cheyne, *EBi* 514).

The worship of the sun, moon, and stars was universal among the ancient Semites (cf. Baethgen, *Beitrage*, p. 61; Grunwald, *Eigennamen*, pp. 30–35; Jastrow, *Rel. Bab.*[2] pp. 134, 151; *KAT*[3] pp. 361–370); but, as noted above, it was not customary to speak of the *be'ālîm* of these celestial objects as one spoke of the *ba'al* of the sky or the *ba'al* of the north. Like animals, they seemed to possess personality, and were worshipped directly as gods rather than as the abodes of gods. By the Hebrews they were spoken of collectively, not as the *be'ālîm*, but as 'the host of heaven.' The same holds true of atmospheric phenomena. *Ramman*, 'thunder' (*KAT*[3] 442); *Regem*, 'storm'; *Barak*, 'lightning' (*KAT*[3] 446); *Resheph*, 'flame' (*KAT*[3] 478); *Riẓpah*, 'thunderbolt' (?); *Barad*, 'hail'; *Maṭar*, 'rain'; *Geshem*, 'shower'; *Ṭal*, 'dew'; *Ḥôreph*, 'frost,' are shown by the evidence of proper names to have been objects of worship in all branches of the Semitic race (Grunwald, *Eigennamen*, p. 28 f.). These phenomena are worshipped directly. *Ramman*, *Regem*, *Barak*, and *Resheph* are the gods' own names, and we never meet *Ba'al-Ramman* or *Ba'al-Regem* as the name of a god, although such formations are common in names of men (see below, 9). In this respect Semitic and Indo-European nature-worship were strictly parallel (see ARABS, I. 1).

9. Adopted ba'als.—Celestial and atmospheric phenomena that could not be reached in their proper abodes like terrestrial *be'ālîm* often had sanctuaries built for them on earth, and thus by a sort of adoption became the *be'ālîm* of these places. Thus *Dhû-Samâwî*, 'he of the sky,' appears in the Sabæan inscriptions also as *ba'al* of Baqîr; and in like manner *Ba'al-shāmēm*, 'owner of the sky,' is *ba'al* of Tyre (*KAT*[3] 357), of the Phœnician colonies (Baethgen, *Beitr.* p. 25), and of Palmyra (de Vogüé, *op. cit.* 50). *Ba'al-ẓāphôn*, 'owner of the north,' as we have seen above, is also a *ba'al* of Egypt and of Phœnicia. *Shams*, 'the sun,' is in the Sabæan inscriptions also *ba'alat* of Guhfat (*CIS* iv. 11. 1) and *ba'alat* of Gabbaran (*CIS* iv. 43. 3). The sun was the *ba'al* of Ba'al-bek (Heliopolis), and Marduk, the spring sun, was the *bêl* of Babylon. Sin, the moon-god, was the *bêl* of Ur and of Ḥarran (Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epig.* p. 444, pl. xxiv.), and in Palmyra a god bore the name *Yarchi-bôl* (ירחבול), 'the moon is *ba'al*.' On a Syrian seal (Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris*, i. 12) the name *Ba'al-Regem* appears, which shows that in some districts *Regem*, 'the storm,' had become the local *ba'al*. Similarly, various *'ădhônîm*, *mᵉlākhîm*, *'ashtārôth*, and other tribal gods, that had originally no connexion with physical phenomena, might become the *be'ālîm* of certain places, through the circumstance that their worshippers settled in these places. Thus Jahweh became for the ancient Hebrews the *ba'al* of Canaan, Melḳart for the Phœnicians the *ba'al* of Tyre, and Ashtart for the Gebalites the *ba'alat* of Gebal. Certain local *be'ālîm* also became so important that their cults migrated to other cities, so that they became the *be'ālîm* of these new places. Under the name of *Zeus Atabyrios* the cult of *Ba'al-Tabor* spread to Rhodes and Sicily (Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 247). *Zeus Kasios* (=*Ba'al-Ḳaṣiw*) was also the *ba'al* of Pelusium (Strabo, xvi. 2. 33; Philo Bybl. in Müller, *FHG* p. 568). Melḳart, the *ba'al* of Tyre, was also worshipped at Carthage and the other Phœn. colonies. *Ba'al-Ḥarran* was also one of the gods of Sam'al (Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epig.* 444, pl. xxiv.). In such cases as these, where *be'ālîm* were not originally connected with sanctuaries, but became their proprietors by adoption, they might have individual personal names; ordinarily they were nameless, and were known merely by the locality in which they had their abode.

10. Departmental ba'als.—The *ba'als* studied thus far all derived their titles from the fact that they were the 'proprietors' of certain physical objects or places. This usage of the divine name corresponds to the meaning 'owner' or 'citizen' of the common noun *ba'al*. The question now arises whether the divine name is also used like the common noun in the sense of 'possessor of an activity.' Numina, which preside over abstract qualities or activities, are very common in the Indo-European religions, and by Usener (*Gotternamen*) have been entitled 'departmental deities.' Of the existence of such *be'ālîm* in the Semitic religions there is no clear evidence. At the temple of Deir el-Qal'a, near Beirut, inscriptions have been found in honour of Βαλμαρκώδης, Βαλμαρκώθ. This name is translated κοίρανος κώμων, 'leader of dances' (le Bas, 1855=Kaibel, *Epig. Gr.* 835), which indicates that the Phœn. original is **Ba'al-Marqôd.** *Marqôd* is evidently a derivative of *raqad*, 'dance,' and may express the abstract idea of 'dancing.' This interpretation seems to be favoured by the Greek translation. In this case we have a *ba'al* who presided over a human activity, like the Indo-European departmental deities. *Marqôd*, however, also denotes 'dancing-place,' and may have been the name of the locality where the temple was situated. 'Owner of the dancing-place' could easily have been paraphrased in Greek as 'leader of dances.' In this case we have simply a *ba'al* who takes his name from the locality where he is worshipped, like all the other *ba'als* we have studied thus far.

In an inscription from Cyprus (*CIS* 41) we meet בעל מרפא. This is commonly read **Ba'al-marpē**, 'possessor of healing,' or *Ba'al-mᵉrappē*, 'Baal the healer,' in which case we have another departmental *ba'al*; but *marpē*, 'healing-place,' or *mᵉrappē*, 'healer,' may equally well have been the name of a medicinal spring of which this *ba'al* was the owner. This will then be a local *ba'al* of the familiar type.

In Jg 8[33] 9[4] mention is made of **Ba'al-berîth** (cf. 9[46] *El-berîth*). This is commonly interpreted '*Ba'al* of the covenant.' The 'covenant' is then understood of the relation between the deity and his worshippers (Baethgen, Sayce), or of an alliance between Israelites and Canaanites (Bertheau, Kittel), or of an alliance between Shechem and neighbouring Canaanite towns (Ewald, Kuenen, Wellhausen, Cheyne), or of agreements in general, as Ζεὺς Ὅρκιος (Nöldeke, *ZDMG* xlii., 1888, p. 478). On any of these interpretations the name stands without confirmation elsewhere in the OT, and without analogy in the whole field of Semitic religion. Under these circumstances it is reasonable to suspect textual corruption in the passage in Judges. Instead of בריח, *be'rîth*, we should perhaps read ברוח, *be'rûth*, 'cypress' (Ca 1[17]). The worship of a Phœn. goddess, *Bērouth*, is attested by Philo Bybl. (Müller, *FHG* p. 567, fr. 2, 12). There was a famous holy tree at Shechem (see above, ii. 2). Or perhaps we should read באורת, *be'ērôth*, 'wells.' *Ba'al-be'ērôth* would then be the counterpart of *Ba'alath-be'ēr* (Jos 19[8]). Less likely is the suggestion of Bochart and Creuzer, that we should read *Ba'al-Bērôth*, Ba'al of Beirut (Berytus).

Ba'al-Gad (Jos 11[17] 12[7] 13[5]) is commonly rendered 'lord of fortune,' and is supposed to be a deity whose function it was to bring good luck; but *Gad* is also the name of a god in Is 65[11], probably also in the proper names *Migdal-Gad* (Jos 15[37]) and *Gaddi-El* (Nu 13[10]), *Gaddi* (Nu 13[11]), and the tribal name *Gad*. The name *Gad-melek*, 'Gad is king,' occurs on a

Heb. seal; *Gudu-bal* = *Gad-ba'al* (Hoffmann, *Phœn. Inscr.* 27) and such names as *Gadi-ya*, *Gadi-ilu*, in Assyrian business documents (Johns, *Deeds*, No. 275, 5; 443, etc.). For the cult of this god in Syria see Baethgen (*Beitr.* p. 76), and in Arabia, Wellhausen (*Reste*², p. 146); see 'Gad' in *HDB* and *EBi*. If *Gad* be regarded as the name of a deity in *Ba'al-Gad*, the difficulty arises that this is an abnormal formation for names of places. Such compounds as *Ba'al-Gad*, 'the owner is Gad,' and *Gudu-ba'l*, 'Gad is the owner,' are common as names of persons, but not as names of places (Gray, *Heb. Pr. Names*, p. 134). *Ba'al-Ẓāphôn* furnishes no real analogy, since *Ẓāphôn* is not only the name of a god, but also the name of a place, 'the north.' If we might suppose that *Ba'al-Gad* was originally the name of a man, and that the place was named after him, the difficulty would be solved; but there are no trustworthy analogies for such a procedure. Baethgen (*Beitr.* pp. 79, 254) regards this as a case of the synthesis of two deities, like *'Ashtar-Chemosh*, *'Atar-'Ate*, *Jahweh-Elohim*; but this implies that *ba'al* had become a proper name, and of this there is no evidence among the Hebrews or among any of the other West Semites until a late period. Accordingly, it is best to follow with Stade (*Gesch. Isr.* i. 272 n.) the analogy of the other *ba'als*, and to regard *Gad* as the name of the district occupied by the tribe of Gad. The name of *Ba'al-Gad* will then be parallel to *Ba'al-Judah*. Even if *Ba'al-Gad* were not situated in the tribe of Gad, this would make no difference, for, as we have just seen, *be'ālîm* frequently migrated.

The name בעל ימם (*CIS* 86*b*. 4) is commonly regarded as the equivalent of Heb. **Ba'al-yāmîm**, 'owner of days,' and is supposed to be a sort of Sem. Kronos; but the reading is very uncertain, and the name may be the equivalent of *Ba'al-yammim*, 'owner of the seas.'

These are all the cases that can be cited of apparent departmental *ba'als*. All are capable of an interpretation which makes them local *ba'als* of the familiar type. Accordingly we are probably justified in concluding that *ba'als* who presided over human activities or abstract qualities were unknown to Semitic thought. Such functions belonged rather to *'ădhônîm*, *mᵉlākhîm*, and other tribal deities. Thus Eshmun, the great god of the Phœnicians, was the god of healing, and Ishtar of Babylon was known as *Mu'allidtu*, *Mylitta*, the goddess of childbirth. From our investigation, we reach the conclusion that the *be'ālîm* were originally all numina of physical objects or localities, and that the only sense in which *ba'al* was used as a divine name was that of 'owner' or 'proprietor.'

iii. *HISTORY OF THE BA'AL-CULT.* — 1. **In Arabia.**—In South Arabian inscriptions *ba'al* is constantly used to describe the great gods as 'proprietors' of particular shrines established in their honour. Thus, Ta'lab Riyam, *ba'al* of Tur'at, or *ba'al* of Ḳaduman; Ḥagar, *ba'al* of Maryab; Ilmakḳah, *ba'al* of 'Awwam, or *ba'al* of Bar'ān; 'Athtar, *ba'al* of 'Alam; Shams, *ba'alat* of Guḥfat, or *ba'alat* of Gabbaran (*CIS* iv. 2. 3, 11. 1, 19. 2 f., 28. 1 f., 41. 2 f., 43. 2 f., 46. 5, 67. 3, 74. 3 f., 80. 2 f., 99. 2 ff., 100. 1). These names all belong to the ninth class noted above, 'adopted *ba'als*.' To express the primary relation of a god to the physical objects that he inhabits, or the sanctuary where he is originally at home, the Minæan and Sabæan inscriptions use *dhû* (fem. *dhât*), 'he of,' 'she of.' Thus instead of *Ba'al-Shāmêm* we meet *Dhû-Samâwî*, 'he of the sky,' who is also *ba'al* of Baqîr; and similarly *Dhât Ḥimay*, *Dhât-Ba'dân*, *Dhât-Gadrân*, who also become the *ba'als* of various shrines (*CIS* iv. 145, 155).

In Ethiopic *ba'al* occurs as a loan-word in the version of the OT as a name of the Canaanitish deity, but is not used elsewhere. A trace of the old religious meaning of the word survives, however, in *ba'āl*, 'feast.' In the Sinaitic inscriptions *ba'al* occurs as a designation of the god of the mountain. Thus קדם אלבעלו, 'in the presence of the *ba'al*' (Euting, *Sin. Inschr.* 327); also in proper names, e.g. *Ausalba'lī*, *Garmalba'lī*, *'Abdalba'lī* (see Euting). In Nabatæan the name occurs in *Be'ēl-Shāmîn* (*CIS* 163, cf. 176) and in the personal names *Aiti-bêl* (*CIS* 196) and *Ba'al-Adhôn* (? *CIS* 192). This *ba'al* apparently has been borrowed from Syria. In classical Arabic *ba'al* is not used as a title of divinities. From this W. R. Smith (109 ff.) infers that the *be'ālîm* were deities of watered land and of agriculture, who were unknown to the desert Semites, and were first worshipped in the fruitful lands of Syria and Mesopotamia. This conclusion is unwarranted, (1) because, as noted above, the *be'ālîm* cannot be limited to watered land, and *be'ālîm* of trees, stones, mountains, celestial bodies, etc., can be worshipped in the desert as well as anywhere else; (2) because there is no evidence that the phrase *ba'l*, or what the *ba'l* waters (='Athtar-land) or a *ba'l*-palm, is borrowed from the Aramaic; (3) because the word can be used in such expressions as 'the (Christian) Igal have the cross as their *ba'l*,' and the verb *ba'ila*, 'be *ba'l*-struck, frightened'; (4) because the sacred mountain *Serbal* is probably a compound of *sarw* and *ba'l*. These are sufficient indications that *ba'l* was once a designation of deities in Arabic, although in the classical literature it has dropped out of use (so Nöldeke, *ZDMG* xl., 1886, p. 174; Wellhausen, *Reste*², p. 146; art. ARABS, I. 9). Instead of *ba'l*, *dhû*, which has already begun to displace it in Sabæan and Minæan, is commonly used in Arabic in forming titles of gods, e.g. *Dhû-l-Ḥalaṣa*, *Dhû-l-Rigl*, *Dhû-l-Kaffain*, *Dhû-'Anama*, *Dhât-Anwât*, *Dhû-l-Labba*, *Dhât-Hima*, *Dhû-sh-Sharâ*. These all describe the divinity in question as belonging to a particular object or locality, and are thus the exact equivalent of *ba'al* names. On *Dhû-sh-Sharâ*, Wellhausen (p. 51) remarks that three Sharâs are known, all wooded thickets with water. This god was widely worshipped in Arabia (Wellhausen, *op. cit.* pp. 48–51), and was the chief god of the Nabatæans (Baethgen, *Beitr.* pp. 92, 108). The primitive religion of Arabia was evidently the worship of a multitude of local numina. Subsequently, through trade and shifting of population, cults migrated, and gods became *ba'als* of regions far removed from their original homes. Thus at Mecca, in the time of the Prophet, there were 360 different gods. Under Islām these old *be'ālîm* still survive as the *jinn* (W. R. Smith, 119 ff.) and the *ulia* (Zwemer, *Arabia*, p. 47 ff.).

2. **In Canaan.**—The earliest evidence of the *ba'al*-cult in Canaan is found in the Egyptian inscriptions, where *b-'-r* (=*ba'al*) is mentioned as a god of the Canaanites and of the Hyksos invaders (see E. Meyer, *Set-Typhon*, p. 47; *ZDMG* xxxi., 1877, p. 725; W. M. Muller, *Asien*, p. 309). In the Tell-el-Amarna letters the *ba'alat* of Gebal is frequently mentioned (*KIB* v., Nos. 18. 25, 55 ff.; 61. 54). *Ba'al* does not occur. In the personal names *Bêl-garib* and *Bêl-ram*, the god may be the Babylonian *Bêl*. It is probable that the ideogram *IM* in these letters should often be read *Ba'al* instead of *Adad* (Hommel, *Altisr. Ueberlief.* p. 220; Knudtzon, *Beitr. Ass.* iv. 320 f.; Zimmern, *KAT*³ 357). The OT says that the *be'ālîm* were the gods of the Canaanites, and that they were adopted by Israel after the conquest of the land (Jg 2^{11-13} 10^{6}, Hos 2^{2-13}); consequently it is possible to learn a good deal about them from survivals in Israel. With the exception of *Ba'al-Judah* (2 S 6^{2}), and possibly *Ba'al-Gad* (Jos 11^{17}), all the place names

in the OT compounded with *ba'al* were probably derived from the earlier inhabitants. The original form of such names was like *Beth-ba'al-Ma'on*, 'house of the owner of Ma'on' (Jos 13[17]), which might then be abbreviated into *Ba'al-Ma'on* (Nu 32[38]) or *Beth-Ma'on* (Jer 48[23]). The following names occur: *Ba'alath-b'ēr* or *Ba'al* (Jos 19[8], 1 Ch 4[33]), *Ba'alah* (Jos 15[29]), *Ba'alath* (Jos 19[44]), *Be'aloth* (Jos 15[24]), *Ba'al-berîth* (Jg 9[4]), *Ba'al-Hāmôn* (Ca 8[11]), *Ba'al-Ḥaṣor* (2 S 13[23]), *Ba'al-Ḥermon* (Jg 3[3]), *Ba'al-p'rāṣîm* (2 S 5[20]), *Ba'al-Shalîshah* (2 K 4[42]), *Ba'al-tamar* (Jg 20[33]), *Har-hab-ba'ălah* (Jos 15[11]), *Kiryath-ba'al* (Jos 15[60]). These names are found in Benjamin, Gad, Judah, Simeon, Reuben, Dan, so that they witness to a general diffusion of the *ba'al*-cult throughout Canaan. There must have been innumerable other *b'ᵉ'ālîm* whose names have not come down to us, since, according to Jer 2[28] 11[13] 2[20], they were as numerous as the towns, and were worshipped on every high hill and under every green tree. The existence of *ba'al*-worship in Philistia is attested by the name *Ba'al-zebub* (*Ba'al-zebul*) at Ekron (2 K 1[2f.]); in Edom by the personal name *Ba'al-ḥanan* (Gn 36[38ff.]); in Moab, by the names *Ba'al-Peor* (Nu 25[3]), *Bamoth-ba'al* (Nu 22[41]), *Beth-ba'al-Ma'on* (Jos 13[17], *Mesha Inscr.* lines 9, 30); in Ammon perhaps by the personal name *Ba'alis* (Jer 40[14]; see AMMONITES).

The *b'ᵉ'ālîm* who were worshipped in the fertile region of Israel where Hosea lived were regarded as the givers of wool and flax, oil and wine, grain, vines, and fig-trees (Hos 2[5. 9. 12]); but it is unsafe to infer from this that all the *b'ᵉ'ālîm* of Canaan had an agricultural character. As the names just enumerated show, there were also *b'ᵉ'ālîm* of springs, trees, mountains, and cities that did not necessarily have such a character. The Old Testament often combines the *b'ᵉ'ālîm* with the *'ashtārôth* in such a way as to suggest that the *'ashtārôth* were regarded as the consorts of the local *b'ᵉ'ālîm* (*e.g.* Jg 2[13] 10[6], 1 S 7[4] 12[10]). Perhaps we may suppose that, under the influence of the meaning 'husband,' which the common noun *ba'al* had, every *ba'al* was regarded as the 'husband' of an *'ashtart*. It was the introduction of this sexual element into the *ba'al*-cult of Canaan that made it peculiarly obnoxious to the prophets, and led them to stigmatize it as adultery (Am 2[7], Hos 4[11-14] 7[4]). The places where the *b'ᵉ'ālîm* were worshipped were known as *bāmôth*, 'high places' (see HIGH PLACE; cf. the place-names *Bamoth-ba'al* [Nu 22[41]] and *Bambula* at Citium in Cyprus [?]). The rock-hewn high places that have lately been discovered at Petra give a good idea of the arrangement of such sanctuaries (see Robinson, *Bibl. World*, 1908, pp. 8–21). Such high places contained altars, *'ăshērîm*, *maṣṣēbhôth*, and *ḥammānîm* (Jg 6[25], 2 Ch 14[3-5] 34[4-7]). Idols are not mentioned in connexion with the *b'ᵉ'ālîm*, and were probably not found in most of the high places. They belonged rather to the temples of the great gods. The existence of altars implies sacrifice. The offerings were doubtless similar to those which Israel brought Jahweh in the developed Hebrew cult, and to the offerings of the Phœnicians. Hos 2[8] indicates that grain, new wine, oil, silver and gold were presented to the *b'ᵉ'ālîm*. Hos 2[13] speaks of 'the days of the *b'ᵉ'ālîm* unto which she (Israel) burned incense, when she decked herself with her ear-rings and her jewels, and went after her lovers' (see CANAANITES).

3. **In Israel.**—The conquest of Canaan by Israel was a process extending over several centuries. The Hebrews did not exterminate the aborigines, but certain clans forced their way into the land, and occupied the rural districts, while the cities remained in the hands of the Canaanites. For some time there was constant warfare between the two races, but gradually hostilities ceased and they began to mingle. Little by little Israel acquired agriculture, industries, and all the other forms of Canaanitish civilization. With this came inevitably the adoption of the worship of the local gods of Canaan. Agriculture could not be carried on without observing the ceremonies that accompanied the planting of the grain and the reaping of the harvest. Altars, shrines, sacred trees, and holy stones in all parts of the land could not be appropriated without taking with them the divinities that belonged to them. As the Book of Judges and the early prophets repeatedly inform us, 'Israel served the *b'ᵉ'ālîm*'; that is, alongside of Jahweh the national God it also worshipped the local numina of the land that it had conquered. Through this process it was in danger of losing the measure of national unity that had been achieved by Moses, and of splitting up into a number of small communities that rallied about the local *ba'al*. Consciousness of this peril was awakened through the rapid development of the Philistine power. About B.C. 1050 the Philistines conquered Israel, taking captive the ark and burning its sanctuary at Shiloh (1 S 4, Jer 26[6]). Hebrew nationality was now in danger of extinction, and the only thing that could save it was a union of all the clans in a supreme effort to shake off the Philistine yoke. No one of the *b'ᵉ'ālîm* of Canaan was important enough to form a centre for such a union; but Jahweh, the God of Sinai, who had brought Israel out of Egypt, and who had united the clans in a common cult in the desert, was able once more to rally them for the common defence. The leaders of Hebrew thought perceived that the only way to save Israel was to forsake the *b'ᵉ'ālîm* and to return to Jahweh. Some extremists, such as the Kenites and the Nazirites, wished also to reject agriculture, life in towns, and the other elements of Canaanitish civilization that were associated with the *b'ᵉ'ālîm*; but the wisest men saw that it was impossible to return to the life of the desert. If the *b'ᵉ'ālîm* were to be conquered, it could only be by appropriating to the service of Jahweh all that had hitherto belonged to them. Through the efforts of the Levites, the so-called 'Judges' or Vindicators, the Seers, and other enthusiasts for Jahweh, He finally triumphed over the *b'ᵉ'ālîm*, not by avoiding them, or by destroying them, but by absorbing them. The name *ba'al* became a synonym of Jahweh, and the *b'ᵉ'ālîm* were regarded as local manifestations of Jahweh. He ceased to be the God of Sinai and became the God of Canaan, the patron of agriculture and civilization. The ancient shrines of the land became His shrines, and the legends connected with them were retold as stories of His dealings with the patriarchs. The agricultural ritual and the harvest festivals of the *b'ᵉ'ālîm* were re-consecrated to His service. By the time of David the process was complete. Jahweh had appropriated everything that belonged to the *b'ᵉ'ālîm* that was worth saving. Observe how in 2 S 5[20] David interprets the name *Ba'al-p'rāṣîm* as meaning 'Jahweh hath broken mine enemies before me like the breach of waters.'

This process of syncretism has left an interesting monument in some personal names of the period of the early monarchy. These are as follows: *Jerub-ba'al*, 'the *ba'al* contends' (Jg 8[35]); *Ish-ba'al*, 'man of the *ba'al*,' a son of Saul (1 Ch 8[33]), also one of David's heroes (1 Ch 11[11]); *Merib-ba'al*, a son of Jonathan (1 Ch 9[40] 8[34]); *Ba'al-yāda'*, 'the *ba'al* knows,' a son of David (1 Ch 14[7]); *Ba'al-ḥanan*, 'the *ba'al* is gracious,' a Gederite (1 Ch 27[28]). No names of this type are found after the time of David. In most of these cases it is certain that *ba'al* is not a foreign god, but a title of

Jahweh, who has become the *ba'al* of Canaan, since Jerub-ba'al, Saul and David, were all loyal adherents of Jahweh. In *Ba'al-Yah*, 'the *ba'al* is Jahweh,' the name of one of David's helpers (1 Ch 12^5), the identity of the *ba'al* with Jahweh is asserted; so also in *Yo-ba'al* (Jg 9^{26}), if Kuenen's emendation be correct. These names accordingly belong to a period when worshippers of Jahweh were conquering the *be'ālîm* by identifying them with Jahweh. In popular conception in the time of Hosea the *be'ālîm* were not foreign gods, but local Jahwehs. Hos 2^{16} says that Israel has called Jahweh *ba'al*, and $2^{11.13}$ identify the feasts of Jahweh with the days of the *be'ālîm*. As a result of this process the *be'ālîm* lost their power, and Jahweh became the God of Canaan; but the victory was purchased at the cost of a mixture of the religion of Jahweh with all sorts of alien elements. The early prophets faced the problem how to maintain the supremacy of Jahweh; the later prophets from Amos onward faced the problem how to purge the religion of Jahweh from the heathen innovations that had entered it. Their efforts were only partially successful, and Judaism, as seen in its chief literary monument, the Law, is properly regarded as a compromise between Prophetism and Ba'alism.

A totally different sort of *ba'al*-cult was the worship of **Melkart, ba'al of Tyre** (see below, 4), which was introduced into Israel in the time of Ahab. Pressed by repeated attacks of Damascus, Ahab was constrained to seek the help of Phœnicia, and formed an alliance by marrying Jezebel, the daughter of Ethba'al, king of Tyre (1 K 16^{31}). Such a relation of dependence usually involved the worship of the chief god of the protecting State (cf. 2 K $16^{7\text{-}16}$); consequently Ahab was compelled to establish the cult of Melkart in Samaria (1 K $16^{31\text{ff.}}$). Against this religious innovation Elijah and Elisha warred (1 K 18. $19^{16\text{-}18}$, 2 K 9. 10). There is no record that either of these prophets opposed the old native *be'ālîm* that were identified with Jahweh. The golden bullock at Bethel, for instance, they never attacked as Hosea did subsequently; but the *ba'al* of Tyre was a foreign god, and to worship him was to repudiate Jahweh (1 K 18^{21}), hence the intensity of the opposition of these prophets. According to 1 K 18, Elijah was successful, and in agreement with this we learn from the annals of Shalmaneser II. that in B.C. 856 Ahab was no longer in alliance with Phœnicia, but was fighting with Damascus against Assyria. Probably Damascus was so hard pushed that it was willing to grant an alliance without the condition of the adoption of its god Rimmon by Israel, and public sentiment was sufficiently strong in Israel to compel Ahab to give up the Phœnicians and their god and seek this new ally. Subsequently Ahab must have repudiated the Syrian alliance and have re-established relations with Phœnicia, for he died fighting against the Syrians (1 K 22^{35}). After his death, under the influence of the queen-mother, Jezebel, the cult of the Tyrian *ba'al* was introduced once more in full force (1 K 22^{53}). This cost the dynasty of Omri the throne. Instigated by Elisha, Jehu slew Jezebel and her son Jehoram, and exterminated the worship of Melkart with fire and sword (2 K 9. 10). Immediately after this, in B.C. 842, we find him paying tribute to Assyria instead of Phœnicia, apparently on terms that did not demand the worship of Ashur. Melkart never again gained a foothold in the northern kingdom. The problem which confronted Amos and Hosea was not the expulsion of this foreign deity, but the purification of the religion of Jahweh from admixture with rites of the ancient *be'ālîm* of Canaan.

The worship of the Tyrian *ba'al* was introduced into Judah by Athaliah, the daughter of Jezebel (1 K $22^{54\ (53)}$, 2 K 8^{18}), doubtless as the price of a Phœnician alliance that maintained her on the throne. In the subsequent revolution that was incited by the priests Athaliah perished, 'and all the people of the land went into the house of the *ba'al* and brake it down; his altars and his images brake they in pieces thoroughly, and slew Mattan the priest of the *ba'al* before the altars' (2 K 11^{18}). In the recrudescence of all sorts of heathenism under Manasseh, the Tyrian *ba'al* was once more worshipped (2 K 21^3). To this Jeremiah and Ezekiel allude whenever they speak of 'the *ba'al*' in contrast to 'the *be'ālîm*.' Under Josiah this cult was stamped out (2 K $23^{4.\ 5ff.}$), and did not again gain a foothold in Judah. It was a foreign religion that never appealed strongly to the mass of the people.

With the old *be'ālîm* of Canaan it was very different. They were so thoroughly identified with Jahweh in the conception of the nation that it was unconscious of apostasy in worshipping them. All the efforts of the pre-exilic prophets to banish them were unsuccessful. Under the reign of every good king, and after every attempted reformation, the editor of Kings records: 'Nevertheless the high places were not taken away, the people still sacrificed and burned incense in the high places.' The Book of Deuteronomy and the reformation of Josiah had for their central aim the destruction of the *be'ālîm* by the centralization of worship at Jerusalem; but both Jeremiah and Ezekiel confess that the effort was unsuccessful. It was the Exile, which removed Israel from the old holy places and old religious associations of Canaan, that finally eradicated this cult. Orthodox Judaism detested this inveterate habit of the forefathers, and, interpreting literally the words of Hos $2^{19\ (17)}$ 'I will take away the names of the *be'ālîm* out of her mouth,' substituted *bôsheth*, 'shameful thing,' in the place of *ba'al* in the reading of the Scriptures. In Jer 3^{24} and elsewhere *bôsheth* has actually taken the place of *ba'al* in the Heb. text. The Greek version often has ἡ Βάαλ to indicate that the reader is to substitute *αἰσχύνη* for *ba'al*, and in 1 K $18^{19\text{-}25}$ this alternates with *ba'al* in the text. Particularly in the Books of Samuel *ba'al* has been eliminated from names of persons, although it has been allowed to stand in the parallels in Chronicles. Thus *Ish-ba'al* (1 Ch 8^{33}) = *Ish-bosheth* throughout Samuel (*Ish-vi*, 1 S 14^{49}); *Ish-ba'al* (1 Ch 11^{11}) = *Josheb-bashshebeth* (2 S 23^8); *Meri-ba'al* (1 Ch 9^{40b}), or *Merib-ba'al* (1 Ch 9^{40a}, 1 Ch 8^{34}) = *Mephi-bosheth* (2 S 4^4, cf. the other *Mephi-bosheth*, 2 S 21^8); *Ba'al-yāda'* (1 Ch 14^7) = *El-yāda'* (2 S 5^{16}). *Abi-albon* (2 S 23^{31}) is perhaps a perversion of *Abi-ba'al*, and *'Ebed*, 'slave' (Jg 9^{26}), of some *ba'al* compound (see Geiger, *ZDMG* xvi., 1862, pp. 728-732; Nestle, *Die isr. Eigennamen*, pp. 108-132; Dillmann, *SBAW*, phil.-hist. Kl., 1881, p. 609 ff.; Wellhausen, *B. Samuelis*, pp. xii ff., 30 f.; Driver, *Samuel*, pp. 186, 195 f., 279; Gray, *Heb. Proper Names*, pp. 121-136). In spite of these efforts, however, *ba'al* remained in Mishnic Heb. as a designation of naturally irrigated land (see above, ii. 1), and under modified forms the *ba'al* cult lingered in the rural districts. In modern Palestine, the Jews unite with the Christians and Muslims in reverencing numerous local saints that are only the thinly-disguised *be'ālîm* of earlier days. In spite of all the efforts of Judaism, Christianity, and Muhammadanism, one may still say with the author of Kings, 'Nevertheless the high places are not taken away, the people still sacrifice and burn incense in the high places' (see Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel.* p. 81 ff.).

4. In Phœnicia and the Phœnician colonies.—In Phœnicia the name seems to have been pronounced *ba'l*, to judge from such proper names as

Hannibal, *Asdrubal* (Schroder, *Die Phon. Sprache*, p. 84). The most important of all the Phœn. *bᵉʿālîm* was 'our lord **Melḳart, the ba'al of Tyre**' (*CIS* 121). He is mentioned in the treaty of Esarhaddon with Ba'al, king of Tyre (*KAT*³ 357), as (*ilu*) *Mi-il-ḳar-ti*, one of the great gods of Tyre. His name Melḳart (=*Melek-ḳiryath*, 'king of the city') shows that he was originally a tribal god who was identified with the local *ba'al*, just as Jahweh was identified with the *bᵉʿālîm* of Canaan. In all the names of the kings of Tyre the element *ba'al* refers to Melḳart: thus, *Abi-ba'al*, the father of Hiram; *Ba'al-'azar I.*, the contemporary of Rehoboam; *Eth-ba'al* (Assyr. *Tu-ba-'-lu*), the contemporary of Ahab (1 K 16³¹); *Ba'al-'azar II.*, the successor of Eth-ba'al; *Ba'al I.*, the contemporary of Sennacherib; *Eth-ba'al II.*, the contemporary of Nebuchadrezzar; *Ba'al II.* (B.C. 573–564), and somewhat later *Mer-ba'al*. He is also the *ba'al* meant in the numerous Tyrian proper names compounded with this name (see Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epig.* 239 ff.). Under the name of Herakles his temple at Tyre is mentioned by Menander in Josephus (*Ant.* VIII. v. 3, *cont. Ap.* i. 18) and by Herodotus (ii. 44). In regard to his cult little is known from native sources. Our fullest information is derived from the OT accounts of his worship in Israel. He had a temple, an altar, and an *'ăshērāh* (1 K 16³², 2 K 10²¹ 11¹⁸), also a *maṣṣēbāh*, or standing stone (2 K 3² 10²⁶). An image is mentioned (2 K 11¹⁸), and is implied in 1 K 19¹⁸, Hos 2¹⁰ (⁸). There were prophets of the *ba'al* and of the associated *'ăshērāh* (1 K 18¹⁹), also *Chemarim*, or priests of the *ba'al* (2 K 23⁵, Zeph 1⁴). The bullock was sacrificed to him (1 K 18²⁶). Like other *mᵉlākhîm*, Melḳart received human sacrifice (see under art. AMMONITES, vol. i. p. 391; and cf. Jer 19⁵ 32³⁵), but this was in his capacity as *melek* and not as *ba'al*. From this the inference cannot be drawn that such sacrifices were customary in the service of other *bᵉʿālîm*. Kissing his image is mentioned as a rite in 1 K 19¹⁸; dancing round the altar, and cutting the body with knives and shouting the name of the god, in 1 K 18²⁶⁻²⁸.

Distinguished from *Ba'al-Melḳart* in the treaty of Esarhaddon, in spite of its identical etymology, is *Ba'al-ma-la-gi-e* (*KAT*³ 357). This is apparently **Ba'al-Malki**, 'Ba'al my king,' and is the same as *Milk-ba'al* of the Phœnician colonies (*CIS* 123*a*, 147, 194, 380). What his character was, and how he was differentiated from Melḳart is unknown. *Ba-al-sa-me-me* = **Ba'al-shāmēm**, 'owner of the sky' (see above, ii. 8), is also mentioned as one of the great gods of Tyre in the treaty of Esarhaddon (*KAT*³ 357). In an inscription from Um-el-'Awamid, near Tyre (*CIS* 7), a certain Abdelim states that he has dedicated to *Ba'al-shāmēm* a doorway and its doors, that it may serve as a memorial of him and a good name under the feet of his lord *Ba'al-shāmēm*. Philo Byblius also records the worship of Βεελσάμην in Phœnicia (Müller, *FHG* p. 566). Menander and Dius in Josephus (*Ant.* VIII. v. 3; *cont. Ap.* i. 17 f.) speak of the golden pillar in the temple of *Zeus Olympios* (*Ba'al-shāmēm*), which they distinguish from the temple of Herakles (Melḳart). Herodotus (ii. 44) also distinguishes the temple of the Thasian Herakles from that of Melḳart. As a different deity from *Ba'al-shāmēm* the treaty of Esarhaddon mentions *Ba-al-ṣa-pu-nu* = **Ba'al-ṣāphôn**, 'owner of the north' (see above, ii. 8). *Ba'al-ḥammān* (see above, ii. 5) is apparently mentioned in the Ma'sub inscription, line 3 (*RA*, 1885, p. 380 ff.), and in the second inscription from Um-el-'Awamid (*CIS* i. 8). Besides these *bᵉʿālîm* which had risen to the rank of great gods, there were numerous local *bᵉʿālîm* of a more primitive character. *Ba'al-Lebanon* is mentioned in *CIS* 5 (see above, ii. 4). The worship of *Zeus Atabyrios* (=*Ba'al-Tabor*) in the Phœnician colonies makes it certain that he must also have been worshipped in the mother-country (see above, ii. 4). The river *Belus*, near Acre, proves the existence of a local *ba'al* of the stream (see above, ii. 1). *Ba'al-Ṣidon* is mentioned in *CIS* 3. With him was associated *'Ashtart shem-ba'al*, "Ashtart name of the *ba'al*.' He still survives in *Neby Ṣauda*, the Muslim patron saint of modern Ṣidon. At Deir el-Qal'a, near Beirut, there was *Ba'al-Marqôd* (see above, ii. 10), and *Ba'al-rosh*, 'owner of the promontory,' at the mouth of the Nahr el-Kelb just north of Beirut (*KAT*³ 43). At Gebal 'Ashtart was worshipped as the local *ba'alat* in connexion with her spouse Adonis (*CIS* 1; *KIB* v., No. 55; Philo Bybl., ed. Muller, p. 569; Lucian, *Dea Syr.* 6; see 'ASHTART).

In the Phœnician colonies all the great *bᵉʿālîm* of the mother-country were worshipped, and in addition a number of new local *bᵉʿālîm*. Ba'al-Ẓāphôn is found in Egypt (Ex 14²·⁹, Nu 33⁷), and in the proper name *Bod-Ẓāphôn* at Abydos (*CIS* 108); also *Ba'altu-ṣapunā* at Memphis (Muller, *Asien*, p. 315). *Zeus Kasios* (=Ba'al-Ḳaṣiw) was transplanted from his mountain near Antioch to Pelusium (see above, ii. 9). In Cyprus we find Melḳart the *ba'al* of Tyre (*CIS* 88. 3-7) and the proper name *Abd-Melḳart* (*CIS* 14. 7); *Zeus Keraunos* (Waddington, 2739), who in a Palmyrene bilingual is equated with Ba'al-shāmēm (de Vogué, 50=le Bas, iii. 2631); Ba'al-Lebanon (*CIS* 5); Ba'al-Mrp' (*CIS* 41) and Ba'al-ymm (*CIS* 84*b*. 4; see above, ii. 10). In Rhodes there is *Zeus Atabyrios* (=Ba'al-Tabor) (see Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 247); in Corcyra, *Zeus Kasios* (Baudissin, ii. 243); in Thasos, *Melḳart* (Paus. v. 25; Herod. ii. 44). At Carthage, Melḳart the *ba'al* of Tyre appears frequently in proper names, *e.g.* *'Abd-Melḳart* (*CIS* 179, 234, and often). *'Abd-Melḳar* (Euting, *Karth. Inschr.* 18=*Ammicar*, *CIL* viii. 68), *Ammat-Melḳart* or *Mat-Melḳart* (Euting, 153, 320), *Bod-Melḳart* (Euting, 28, 261) = *Bodmilcar* (*CIL* 9618), *Ḥat-Melḳart* (Euting, 213), *Ba'm-Melḳart* for *Ba'l-Melḳart* (Euting, 15), *Melḳart-mashal* (Euting, 130), *Melḳart-ḥalaz* (*CIS* 234; Euting, 48), *Ḥan-Melḳart* (Euting, 165), and many others. The compound deity Milk-Ba'al is also found, as in Phœnicia (*CIS* 123*a*, 147, 194). Ba'al-Adon (*CIS* i. p. 155) is a combination of the *ba'al* of Tyre with the *Adonis* of Gebal. Ba'al-shāmēm also appears (*CIS* 379). In Plautus (*Pœnulus*, 1027), Hanno swears *guneb Balsamem* (=גאנבי בעלשמם). Augustine also knows him as a Punic deity (*PL* iii. 797). The worship of Ba'al-Ẓāphôn at Carthage is attested by the proper names *Ẓāphôn-ba'al* (*CIS* 207, 857) and *'Abd-Ẓāphôn* (*CIS* 265). Ba'al-hammān (see above, ii. 5) attained at Carthage the rank of a patron deity. More inscriptions have been found in honour of him than of any other Punic god. In Carthage itself he is always associated with the goddess Tanit, whose name stands first, showing that she was considered the more important deity. In the Carthaginian dependencies Ba'al-ḥammān is named alone. The god is represented with rays surrounding his head, and holds a tree in his hand. Above him stands the sun. On another stele he grasps a grape-vine with his right hand and a pomegranate with his left. Still other stelæ bear representations of palms, flowers, and fishes. The god is thus seen to have been a patron of fertility, like the *bᵉʿālîm* of Canaan (see Gesenius, *Phœn. Monumenta*, 'Numid.' i. ii. iv.). Balcaranensis (=*Ba'al-Ḳarnaim*, 'owner of the two horns'), was a local divinity who was worshipped on a two-peaked mountain near Carthage (see above, ii. 4). Ba'alath-hdrt and Bal-addiris are also local Numidian deities (see above, ii. 6). In Malta, Melḳart *ba'al*

of Tyre is named in inscriptions on two votive pillars (*CIS* 121). Another pillar from Malta bears the inscription, 'Pillar of Milk-Ba'al, which Nahum has placed for Ba'al Ḥamman the lord, because he has heard the voice of his words' (*CIS* 123*a*). This shows syncretism of the already compound deity *Milk-Ba'al* with *Ba'al-ḥammān*. In Sicily we find a *Rosh-Melkart* (Renan, *Mission*, p. 145) and *Zeus Atabyrios* (= *Ba'al-Tabor*, see Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 247); in Sardinia, the proper names *'Abd-Melkart* (*CIS* 152) and *Bod-Melkart* (*CIS* 138), *Milk-Ba'al* and *Ba'al-ḥammān* (*CIS* 147), *Ba'al-shāmēm* (*CIS* 139). The sacrificial tablet of Marseilles belonged perhaps to a temple of *Ba'al-ṣāphôn* (*CIS* i. 227). At Tartessus in Spain the Tyrian Hercules (Melkart) was worshipped (Arrian, *Alex.* ii. 16. 5); also at Gades (Scholz, *Götzendienst*, p. 201 ff.), and at Lixus on the West Coast of Africa (Pliny, *HN* v. 1, 19–22).

5. In Syria, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia.—In the Aramaic dialects the name assumes the form בְּעֵל *bĕ'ēl* (cf. LXX *Beelphegor* [Nu 25[3. 5]], *Beelzebul* [Mt 10[25]]). The name *Ba'albek* is evidently a compound with *ba'al*, but what the second element of the name means is uncertain. Hoffmann (*ZA* xi. 216 f.) thinks that it is a broken-down form of *melek* (cf. *Milk-Ba'al* in Tyre and *Malak-bel* in Palmyra). *Balanios* (= *ba'alan*, 'our *ba'al*') is given as a title of Juppiter Heliopolitanus (*Chron. Pasch.* i. 561). The Greek name of this place, Heliopolis, shows that the sun was the local *ba'al*. In Damascus, *Juppiter Damascenus* (= בעל דמשק) was worshipped with *'Athtar* (='*Ashtart*) as his consort (Justin, xxxvi. 2; *Etym. Mag. s.v.* Δαμασκός). Inscriptions from Damascus show that his temple was richly endowed (le Bas-Waddington, 1879; cf. 2549 f.). His cult was important enough to spread to Italy (*CIL* vi. 405, x. 1576).

The recently discovered inscription of Zakir, king of Ḥamath and La'ash, which probably comes from a place lying between Ḥamath and Damascus, states that *Beelshamayin* (written as one word) has given Zakir his sovereignty, and has helped him against Bar-Hadad, son of Hazael, king of Aram, and his allies. Seven kings have besieged his city, but Zakir has raised his hands to *Beelshamayin*, and he through his seers has spoken to him a message of cheer. This inscription by its mention of the Benhadad of the OT is shown to belong to 8th cent. B.C.; and, like the inscription of Esarhaddon mentioned above, witnesses to the antiquity of the cult of *Ba'al-shamayim* (see Pognon, *Inscriptions sémitiques*, 1908, pp. 156–178).

In Palmyra, *Ba'al-shāmēm*, 'owner of the sky,' whom we have met already among the Nabatæans, the Phœnicians, and in the Phœnician colonies, appears as the chief god under the form **Be'ēl-shāmîn**, בעל שמין (de Vogüé, *Inscr. Sem.* 19, No. 16; 50, note 1; 53, No. 73; Euting, *Berichte Akad. Berlin*, 1885, 669, 4). His full Sem. title בעל שמין מרא עלמא, 'owner of the sky, lord of the world,' is in the Gr. parallel translated, Διὶ μεγίστῳ κεραυνίῳ. Most of the altars dedicated to him do not bear his name, but have the inscription, 'To Him whose name is for ever blessed, the good and compassionate' (de Vogüé, *Palm.* 74–105 *al.*); that he is meant, however, seems to be clear from the Greek parallels which read, Διὶ ὑψίστῳ καὶ ἐπηκόῳ. One inscription (de Vogüé, 16) is so restored by de Vogüé as to identify him with Ἥλιος; but this is very doubtful. The form *bĕ'ēl* in his name shows that he is of foreign origin. בעל does not appear in Palmyrene proper names, and is not used except in the sense of 'husband.' Instead of this the native form of the word as a title of gods and in proper names is *bôl*. *Ba'al-shāmēm* was probably originally a Phœnician deity. Thence, as *Bĕ'ēl-shāmîn*, his cult migrated to Syria, Palmyra, and the Nabatæans. In the Palmyrene inscriptions the god has a lofty ethical character beyond that of most of the *be'ālîm* of the Sem. world.

Associated with him are the subordinate deities *'Agli-bôl* and *Malak-bêl* (de Vogüé, 93). Apart from *Be'ēl-shāmîn*, these two deities are also frequently mentioned in the inscriptions (*ZDMG* xviii. 99 f.; *CIG* 6015; de Vogué, 140, 153). **'Agli-bôl** (עגלבול, Ἀγλίβωλος) was evidently a moon-god, since he is depicted as a young warrior with a crescent on his shoulders. The etymology of his name is obscure. De Vogüé connects *'Agli* with עגל, 'bullock,' as a symbol of the new moon. He was probably the original *ba'al* of Palmyra, and he is meant in proper names compounded with *bôl*; *e.g.* *'Abdi-bôl*, Ἀβδίβωλος (Vog. 6), *Zebad-bôl* (frequently), *Repha-bôl*, Ῥεφάβωλος (Vog. 66), Δανίβωλος (*CIG* 4665), Μαθθαβωλίων (Waddington, 2579), *Bôl-barak*, *Bôl-laha*, *Bôl'azor*, etc. (On the use of *bôl* over against *bĕ'ēl* and *bêl* in Palm. see Noldeke, *ZDMG* xlii., 1888, p. 474; Baudissin, *PRE*[3] 324; on the proper names, Ledrain, *Dictionnaire des noms propres palmyréniens.*) **Malak-bêl** (מלכבל, Μαλάχβηλος), like *Milk-ba'al* (see above, i., iii. 4), is a compound of *Malak* (= *Melek*, *Molech*, *Milcom*), 'king,' with *bêl* (= *ba'al*). The form *bêl* suggests that the deity is of Bab. origin (on *Malik* as a Babylonian god see Zimmern, *KAT*[3] 469; Jastrow, *Die Rel. Bab. u. Ass.* p. 162). The rays with which this god is represented on the monuments (Lajard, *Cyprès*, pl. I., II.) suggest that he was a sun-god like the Babylonian *Bêl-Marduk* (see below, 6). In the Lat. version of the Palmyrene inscription of the Capitol (*ZDMG* xviii. 101 f.) the god is called 'sol sanctissimus.'

Another pair of Palmyrene deities that appear together in the inscriptions are *Bêl* and *Yarḥi-bôl* (de Vogué, p. 64). **Bêl**, as the form of his name and his conjunction with *Belti* show, is imported from Babylonia. He is *Marduk*, the great *bêl* of Babylon (see below, 6). His name occurs with special frequency on seals (Mordtmann, 50, 51; de Vogué, *op. cit.* 132, 133, 134). Many proper names are compounded with *bêl* as with *bôl*, *e.g.* *Ela-bêl* (Ἐλάβηλος), *Bêl-'aqab* (Βηλάκαβος), *Bêl-barak*, *Bêl-suri* (Βηλσούρου), *Nûr-bêl* (Νουρβήλου), *'Abdi-bêl* (see Ledrain, *Dictionnaire*). As in Babylon, so in Palmyra *Bêl* is a solar deity. Seals bearing his name show also the disc of the sun (Mordtmann, 77, 78), and one seal (Mordtmann, 77) bears the two names *Bêl*, *Shemesh*. As in Babylonia, *Bêl* has his consort **Bêltî**, 'my lady' (de Vogué, 52, 155). Bêl's *paredros* **Yarḥi-bôl** ('Ιαρίβωλος) has the masculine predicates אלה and *θεός*. The name is compounded of ירח, 'the moon,' and בול = *ba'al* (de Vogüé, 93; Waddington, 2571*c*). *Yarḥi* alone occurs as a personal name (de Vogüé, 16). To *Yarḥi-bôl* a medicinal spring called Ἔφκα (= אפקא) was dedicated (de Vogué, 99; Waddington, 2571*c*). Like *'Agli-bôl*, *Yarḥi-bôl* is to be regarded as a genuine Palmyrene deity. How these two moon-*ba'als* came to be worshipped side by side, or how they were differentiated from one another, is unknown. Still another Palmyrene *ba'al* seems to be found in Βωλάθη, known to Damascius (in Photius, cod. 242). This is a compound of the two gods *Bôl* and *'Ate* (see 'Ατε). On the *ba'al*-cult at Palmyra see de Vogüé, *Palmyra*; and Baethgen, *Beitrage*, pp. 81–88.

A Ba'al of Apamea, 'fortunæ rector mentisque magister,' is mentioned in a Gallic inscription (*CIL* xii. 1277). From him Caracalla received an oracle, according to Dio Cass. (lxxviii. 8). He is perhaps to be identified with *Zeus Baitokaikeus*, the *ba'al* of the village of Baitokaike, near Apamea (*CIG* 4474 = Le Bas, 2720*a*; *CIL* iii. 181 and p. 972). Specially famous was *Zeus Kasios* (= **Ba'al-Ḳaṣiw**), whose cult we have found al-

ready in Egypt. Among the Nabatæans he appears as *Ḳaṣiw* or *Ela Ḳaṣiw* (de Vogué, *Syr. Cent. Nabat.* iv. 2, vi. 2, vii. 1, 2; *Hauran.* v.). Baudissin conjectures that he is the same as *Koze*, the chief god of the Edomites (see EDOMITES). He was worshipped on a lofty mountain on the sea-coast near Antioch. His name, which is evidently derived from the root קסס, 'cut off,' de Vogüé refers to the 'precipice' on which his temple stood. Baudissin thinks that it rather means 'decider, judge.' The former interpretation is more in accordance with the local character of most *ba'al* names. At his sanctuary a feast was celebrated by the people of Antioch (Strabo, xvi. 2. 5). Seleucus Nicator obtained an oracle from him concerning the building of Seleucia (Malalas, ed. Dindorf, p. 199). The emperor Julian also consulted him (*Misopog.*, ed. Spanheim, p. 361; Ammianus Marcellinus, xx. 14. 4). Trajan dedicated gifts to his temple, and an epigram of Hadrian was preserved there (Suidas, *s.v.* Κάσιον ὄρος). Euhemerus (in Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* ii. 2) and Philo Byblius (*FHG*, p. 566) say that Kasios was formerly a ruler of this part of the country. Coins of Northern Syria bear the name *Zeus Kasios*, and show the sacred stone of the god standing in his temple (Mionnet, *Description des médailles*, iv. 276–280). It is evident that *Ba'al-Ḳaṣiw* was one of the chief divinities of Northern Syria (on his cult see de Vogüé, *Syr. Cent. Inscriptions*, pp. 103–105; Scholz, *Gotzendienst*, p. 144; Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 238–242). The famous **Ba'alat of Mabbog** (Bambyce, Hierapolis), on the road between Antioch and the Euphrates, was Atargatis (see ATARGATIS). At Sam'al (Zenjirli), at the foot of Mt. Amanus, *Ba'al-Ḥarran, i.e.* Sin, the moon-god of Ḥarran, was worshipped (Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epig.* p. 444, pl. xxiv.). At Tarsus there was a *Zeus Tarsios* = בעל תרז (Scholz, *Gotzendienst*, p. 149). In Cappadocia the name **Ba'al-Gazur** appears on coins of Ariarathes I. († B.C. 322) that were probably minted in the old capital Gaziura. The god is represented seated on a throne with a sceptre and an eagle, holding an ear of grain and a dove (Head, *Hist. Num.* 631; Reinach, *Trois royaumes d'Asie Mineure*, p. 28 f.).

The **Ba'al of Ḥarran** in Mesopotamia is mentioned in the inscription from Zenjirli referred to above, and occurs in numerous Assyrian proper names of the time of Sennacherib, Esarhaddon, and Ashurbanipal. This was Sin, the ancient Babylonian moon-god. His cult seems to have been indigenous in Ur in Southern Babylonia, and to have migrated to Ḥarran at a very early period (cf. Abram's journey from Ur of the Chaldees to Ḥarran in Gn 11[31]). From the earliest to the latest times he received the homage of the Babylonians and Assyrians along with their domestic deities. Sargon, king of Assyria (B.C. 722–706), confirmed the exemption from taxes that Ḥarran enjoyed as the city of Sin (*Annals*, ed. Winckler, xiv. 5). Nabonidus, the last king of Babylon (B.C. 555–539), rebuilt the temple of Sin at Ḥarran (Rawlinson, v. 64, col. i. 8–ii. 46). At a later date we find the cult of **Be'ēl-shāmîn**, 'the owner of the sky,' at Ḥarran, perhaps through syncretism of the Syrian god with the ancient moon-god (Jacob of Sarug, in *ZDMG* xxix. p. 131). *Be'ēl-shāmîn* is also found in Nisibis (Isaac of Antioch, i. 209, v. 78 ff.; Bickel, *Be'ēl-Shamin princeps deorum Nisibis*, etc.). From Mesopotamia the worship of this god spread even into Armenia. Βαρσαμήνης (*Barshimnia*, *Parshamin*, *Parsham*), who had a famous temple in the town of Thoran in Armenia, was none other than *Be'ēl-shāmîn* (Agathang. 131, and Lagarde's note). According to Moses of Chorene, Tigranes brought back his image of gold, silver, and crystal from Mesopotamia (Langlois, *Historiens de l'Arménie*, i. 24, 40, 166; ii. 66, 88). It is clear that during the Greek period the cult of Be'ēl-shāmîn was generally diffused throughout Syria and Mesopotamia, and that he attained the rank of *summus deus*. This was doubtless due to his identification with *Zeus Olympios* in Phœnicia, Palmyra, and elsewhere. Zeus was the chief god of the Greek pantheon, and, therefore, wherever the Greeks went, his supposed Syrian counterpart enjoyed his pre-eminence (cf. his titles 'lord of the world,' μέγιστος, ὕψιστος, at Palmyra). Identification with Anu, the Lord of Heaven, in the Bab. religion may also have assisted in the process. In Syriac writers his name appears as a translation of Zeus (2 Mac 6[2]; Isocrates in Lagarde, *Analecta Syriaca*, 176, line 24). In Dn 12[11] *Ba'al-shāmēm*, as a translation of *Zeus Olympios*, whose cult Antiochus Epiphanes established in the Temple at Jerusalem, has been perverted by the Jewish scribes into *shiḳḳûṣ-shômēm*, 'the appalling abomination.'

6. In Babylonia. — Babylonia was originally occupied by the non-Semitic race now commonly known as Sumerian. The religion of these people was a polydæmonism that differed in no essential respect from the polydæmonism of the Semites. There was a multitude of divinities presiding over all sorts of natural objects and localities. A male numen was known as *en*, 'owner, lord,' and a female one as *nin*, 'proprietrix, mistress'; thus, *En-ki*, 'master of the sea'; *En-zu*, 'master of wisdom'; *Nin-ki*, 'mistress of the sea'; *Nin-ḫarsag*, 'mistress of the great mountain'; *Nin-sun*, 'mistress of destruction'; *Nin-e-gal*, 'mistress of the great house (temple)'; *Nin-Mar*, 'mistress of Mar'; *Nin-a*, 'mistress of water' (?). By a process common among the Semites (cf. 'ASHTART, 2) many originally feminine divinities were transformed into masculine ones (cf. Barton, *Sem. Origins*, p. 192), so that *nin* eventually became an element in names of gods in the same sense as *en*; thus, *Nin-Girsu*, 'master of Girsu'; *Nin-a-gal*, 'master of great strength,' the patron of blacksmiths; *Nin-shaḫ*, 'master of the wild boar'; *Nin-gish-zida*, 'master of the tree of life.' Celestial phenomena were objects of special reverence, and gave the religion of Babylonia an astral character which it retained down to the latest times. Here may be mentioned *Anu*, 'the sky'; *En-lil*, 'master of the wind,' not 'master of the spirits,' as many have rendered his name, since Gudea (*Cylinder*, A 23. 14, 19 = *VAB* [*Vorderasiatische Bibliothek*], I. i. 114) calls him 'king of the storm, king of the whirlwind'; *Utu*, 'the sun'; *Ur* or *En-zu*, 'the moon'; and all the planets. As among the Semites, these celestial powers became in one way or another the 'proprietors' of certain cities that were specially devoted to their worship. Thus Erech became 'the residence of Anu' (*KIB* vi. 63) and Der 'the city of Anu' (*KIB* iii. 165); Nippur, the residence of *En-lil*; Sippar and Larsa of *Utu*; and Ur, of *Ur*. Through the growth and the conquests of certain cities their local divinities became great gods whose worship spread throughout all Babylonia. If, subsequently, these centres declined in political importance, their patrons still retained much of their old dignity, though they might be subordinated in the theological systems to the god of the conquering city.

At the earliest period disclosed to us by the Babylonian inscriptions, **En-lil**, the god of Nippur, had become the most important of all the Sumerian deities. He was the *en*, or 'lord,' *par excellence*, and was worshipped in all parts of Babylonia as well as at his proper residence. He bore the titles 'king of heaven and earth' (*VAB* p. 15), 'king of the lands, father of the gods' (*VAB* p. 37). As chief of the gods, who had his seat upon the

mountain of the north where the gods assembled, he was called 'great mountain.' His tower-temple at Nippur was known as *E-kur*, 'the mountain house.' All this indicates that Nippur must once have been the political as well as the religious centre of Babylonia; but this was in pre-historic times. In the period represented by the earliest inscriptions (c. 4000 B.C.), Nippur had lost the political hegemony, although its god still retained his ancient pre-eminence.

Alongside of *En-lil* stood his consort **Nin-lil**, who shared the high rank of her husband. She was known as 'the lady of the lower world, the mistress of heaven and earth.' One of her common titles was *Nin-ḫar-sag*, 'lady of the great mountain,' with reference to her supremacy on the mountain of the gods. Associated with *En-lil* as the greatest gods of the Sumerian pantheon were *Anu*, 'the sky,' and *En-ki*, 'lord of the sea.' **Anu** is mentioned in the earliest inscriptions, and, like *En-lil*, had temples in all parts of Babylonia. **En-ki**, otherwise known as *E-a*, 'house of water,' was the patron-god of Eridu. In pre-historic times this city lay at the head of the Persian Gulf, and must have been politically one of the most important cities of Babylonia. In the inscriptions of Lugalzaggizi (perhaps as early as B.C. 4000) the triad *En-lil*, *Anu*, and *En-ki* is already known (*VAB* i. 155), and it is frequently mentioned in the oldest inscriptions. Thus the visible universe was portioned out between *Anu*, lord of the sky; *En-lil*, lord of the earth; and *En-ki* or *E-a*, lord of the sea. There is reference perhaps to this triad in the words of the second commandment, 'the heavens above, and the earth beneath, and the waters under the earth' (Jastrow, *Die Rel. Bab.* p. 140). A second triad of inferior dignity consisted of **Ur**, the moon-god of Ur; **Utu**, the sun-god of Sippar; and **Nana**, the goddess of Erech. The superior rank of the moon-god in this triad was due to the greater political importance of his city, Ur.

The Semites who entered Babylonia used the word *bêl* (=*ba'al*, cf. Aram. בַּעַל) in all the senses in which it was used by the other Semites, and, in addition, developed the meaning 'master' or 'lord,' which is not found in the other dialects. They spoke of their gods as *bêl*, both with reference to their ownership of physical objects and places, and with reference to their authority over tribes and individuals. The worshipper addressed his god as *bêli*, 'my lord'—a usage that is not found in the other Semitic languages. When they conquered Babylonia, they found the Sumerian gods on the ground, and adopted them as their own, just as Israel adopted the *be'ālim* of Canaan. The *en* of a particular object or locality became for them the *bêl*; the *nin*, the *bêlit*. The old Sumerian moon-god *Ur* became *Sin*, the *bêl* of Ur; the sun-god of Sippar, *Shamash*, the *bêl* of Sippar; *Nana* of Erech, *Ishtar*, the *bêlit* of Erech. The names of other Sumerian gods, such as *Ea* and *Ningirsu*, were retained untranslated, and they were known as the *bels* or *bêlits* of their respective sanctuaries. *En-lil*, as the chief god of Babylonia, was known as **Bêl** *par excellence* (there is no article in Bab.), and in course of time this appellative drove the old name out of use and became the common designation of the god, so that, when *Bêl* was mentioned without any qualifying word, *En-lil* was understood to be meant. Thus in Babylonia *Bêl* became the name of an individual god in a way that was never true of *Ba'al* among the West Semites. In like manner, *Nin-ḫar-sag*, the consort of *En-lil*, was known as *Bêlit*, 'the lady.' For many centuries after the conquest of Babylonia by the Semites their language was not reduced to writing, and the ancient Sumerian was employed as a sacred tongue for all the inscriptions in the temples. The result is that before the time of Ḫammurabi the name of the god of Nippur is always written *En-lil*, although it is certain that the Semites habitually called him *Bêl*. From the time of Ḫammurabi onward Semitic inscriptions begin to be common, and then the name of the god appears written phonetically *Bêl* or *Bêlu*. The old name *En-lil* continued, however, to be used as an ideogram for *Bêl* down to the latest times. The Sem. kings of all parts of Babylonia have left inscriptions in honour of this god. Eannatum, king of Lagash (*c.* 3000 B.C.), calls him 'the lord of heaven and earth,' and speaks of Sin, the moon-god of Ur, as 'the strong calf of *En-lil*.' When he conquers the people of Gishḫu, it is in the name of *En-lil* (*VAB* i. 14). He speaks of himself as 'endued with strength by *En-lil*, nourished with holy milk by *Nin-ḫar-sag*' (*VAB* i. 19). He owes his position as king to the fact that 'his name has been spoken by *En-lil*' (*VAB* i. 19). Entemena of Lagash undertook restorations of the temple at Nippur, and constructed there a laver for the god (*VAB* i. 34). Gudea also ascribes his appointment as king of Lagash to *En-lil* (*VAB* i. 114), and wages his wars in the name of *En-lil* (*VAB* i. 128, 130). *Ningirsu*, the patron-god of Lagash, is called the son of *En-lil* (*VAB* i. 123). The temple of *En-lil* at Shirpurla, the capital of Lagash, was called *E-adda*, 'house of the father,' which shows the superior position that he held over against the local god. Ur-engur, king of Ur, rebuilt *E-kur*, the temple of *En-lil* at Nippur (*VAB* i. 189). By the dynasty of Ur *En-lil* was honoured to an extraordinary degree (cf. *VAB* 196*b–c*, 198, 200*b–d*). Aradsin of Larsa calls *En-lil* his god, who has given him the throne (*VAB* i. 212). Votive inscriptions in his honour from kings in all parts of Babylonia have been found by the expedition of the University of Pennsylvania at Nippur. His worship spread even as far as Elam (*VAB* i. 181).

The primitive character of *Bêl* of Nippur is difficult to determine, on account of the confusion of this god with Marduk in all the later religious texts. From the oldest inscriptions we gather that he was conceived as a mighty warrior, armed with a net, who marched forth for the destruction of the enemies of his worshippers (*VAB* i. 14, 19, 128, 130). The Creation-epic shows that in its original form he was regarded as the creator of heaven and earth. He determined the fates of men (*VAB* i. 21, 122). Oaths were administered in his name, and he punished those who violated them (*VAB* i. 14). On his temple at Nippur and the remains there found see Peters, *Nippur*; Hilprecht, *Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania*, and *Explorations in Bible Lands*.

The high position that *Bêl* of Nippur maintained for centuries he finally lost through the rise of the city of Babylon to political supremacy. Before the time of Ḫammurabi (*c.* 2200 B.C.), Babylon was a relatively obscure place, and its chief god, **Marduk**, enjoyed only a local celebrity. He is never mentioned in the inscriptions of kings who reigned before the first dynasty of Babylon. He was originally the god of the morning and the spring sun, who had become the *bêl* of Babylon by a process similar to that by which Sin, the moon-god, had become the *bêl* of Ur. When Ḫammurabi expelled the Elamites and united all Babylonia beneath his rule, Babylon became the chief city of the empire, and Marduk, its god, was suddenly exalted to the chief place in the pantheon. He now became **Bêl**, or 'lord,' *par excellence*; and this title presently became a proper name that was used even more frequently than his real name, Marduk. There were now two *Bêls* in Babylonia—the old *Bêl* of Nippur, who, in spite of the fallen state of his city, was still reverenced through force

of religious conservatism, and the new *Bêl* of Babylon, who had proved himself to be the *de facto* lord through the strength of Ḫammurabi's arms. What was more natural than to attempt to prevent conflict between the two potentates by affirming their identity? This step was taken by the priests of Babylon as early as the reign of Ḫammurabi. All the attributes of the old *Bêl* of Nippur, 'lord of lords,' 'lord of heaven and earth,' 'lord of the lands,' 'creator,' etc., were transferred directly to the new *Bêl* of Babylon. All the ancient hymns and prayers to *Bêl* of Nippur were appropriated to the use of his rival. When Ḫammurabi and his successors of the first dynasty speak of *Bêl*, and use the language of the ancient inscriptions, they mean Marduk. In spite of this attempted syncretism, however, the priests were unable to banish the old *Bêl* entirely even from Babylon. As a member of the supreme triad—*Anu, Bêl, Ea*—*Bêl* held his own, and was constantly invoked in the inscriptions along with *Bel-Marduk*; but this was more a religious formula inherited from the past than an active belief. For all practical purposes of worship, *Enlil-Bêl* was absorbed by *Marduk-Bêl*. Outside of the city of Babylon the claim of *Marduk* to be the same as the older *Bêl* was not received without opposition, and there are evidences of a long struggle before it became a dogma acknowledged throughout Babylonia. The priests of Nippur naturally never accepted it, and throughout the entire period of the Kassite third dynasty Nippur retained its place as a sanctuary, to which pilgrims flocked from all parts of Babylonia. The Kassite kings had no special fondness for the patron-god of the dynasty of Ḫammurabi, and they bestowed special honour upon the old *Bêl* of Nippur (Hilprecht, *Old Bab. Inscr.* I. i. Nos. 28–32). With the fall of the Kassites and the establishment of a native Babylonian dynasty, *Marduk* regained the place that Ḫammurabi had given him, and *Bêl* of Nippur waned until little remained but the memory of his former glory. Curiously enough, *Bêlit* of Nippur did not share the fate of her husband and become the wife of *Marduk* when he was identified with *Bêl*. *Marduk* had already a consort, *Sarpanitum*, a relatively unimportant goddess, who was in no way comparable with the old *Bêlit* of Nippur. The two were never identified, as logical consistency would have demanded, but *Bêlit* held her own as an independent great goddess.

In the inscriptions of the Assyrian kings, *Bêl* usually means *Marduk*. He occupies the second place in the pantheon (after *Ashur*), and is usually named in connexion with his 'son' *Nabu*, the patron-god of Borsippa. The Assyrian kings showed him the highest reverence; and even when they conquered Babylonia, they claimed to do it in the service of *Bêl*, and took the throne by the formal ceremony of grasping the hands of *Bêl* at Babylon. Along with this there existed also the cult of the older *Bêl* of Nippur. The old triad, *Anu, Bêl, Ea*, still stands at the head of lists of gods in which *Marduk* appears as a separate deity; and when the Assyrian kings speak of *Bêl*, the lord of the lands, who dwells on the holy mountain, they mean the *Bêl* of Nippur. Tiglath-Pileser I. states expressly that he restored a temple of 'the old *Bêl*' at Ashur (Rawlinson, i. pl. 14, col. vi. 87). This double use of *Bêl* as a proper name lasted through the entire Assyrian period, and, besides this, *bêl* retained its generic meaning as a title of all the gods. The standing formula for the gods in general is *ilâni rabûti bêlêya*, 'the great gods my lords.' *Bêlit* was worshipped in Assyria partly as the ancient goddess of Nippur, partly as the consort of *Anu* or *Ashur*. Her name is also used as a title of the Assyrian *Ishtar*. This confusion is due to the fact that the common noun *bêlit* never lost its appellative meaning of 'mistress.' Many goddesses might be called 'mistress,' and then through this similarity of title be confused with one another. When Ashurbanipal wishes to distinguish the older *Bêlit*, he calls her *Bêlit* of Nippur (Rawlinson, v. 8, col. viii. 98, 99).

In the New Bab. period *Bêl-Marduk* regained the supremacy that in the Assyr. period he temporarily surrendered to Ashur. His cult was revived with great glory by Nabopolassar, Nebuchadrezzar, and Nabonidus, and all the attributes of supreme divinity were heaped upon him. Throughout Babylonia he was acknowledged without question as the *Bêl*, and his cult spread widely in the provinces of the empire. We have found it already at Palmyra (see above, iii. 5). Its presence at Edessa is attested by Jacob of Sarug (*ZDMG* xxix., 1875, p. 131). When *Bêl* is mentioned in the OT and Apoc. it is always *Marduk* that is meant. The old *Bêl* is unknown, except in so far as his character survives in his successor. In Jer 51^{44} he is called '*Bêl* of Babylon.' In Is 46^{1} he is named in connexion with *Nebo*, the god of Borsippa, the suburb of Babylon. In Jer 50^{2} *Merodach* (=*Marduk*) stands in poetic parallelism with *Bêl*. Cf. also *Bel and the Dragon* (=Dn 14 in LXX), Baruch 6^{41} (cf. 6^{15}). *Bêl* also occurs in a few late Heb. proper names.

7. Among the Greeks and Romans.—Through Phœn. colonies in all parts of the coast of the Mediterranean, and through Greek colonies in Syria, the worship of the old Sem. *bᵉ'ālîm* was widely disseminated throughout the Græco-Roman world, and exerted a deep influence upon Occidental thought. The local divinity was either called by his original Sem. name, *e.g.* **Balanios** at Heliopolis, **Balsamem** at Tyre, Palmyra, and the Phœnician colonies, **Balmarcodes** at Deir el-Qal'a, **Beelmaris** at Tyre, **Balcaranensis** at Carthage, **Baladdiris** at Sigus, **Aglibolos** and **Iaribolos** at Palmyra; or else his name was translated into its supposed Gr. or Lat. equivalent. The local *ba'al* was everywhere regarded as the supreme god, hence he was frequently identified with Zeus or Juppiter, the name of his city being appended to distinguish him from other similar divinities, *e.g.* **Zeus Kasios, Zeus Damascenos, Zeus Karmelos, Zeus Atabyrios, Zeus Tarsios, Juppiter Heliopolitanus** (see above under the corresponding Semitic names). Other *ba'als* had peculiarities which led to their identification with *Kronos-Saturn*. *Balcaranensis* of Carthage, for instance, is regularly called *Saturnus* in the inscriptions (cf. Alex. Polyh., frag. 3 in *FHG* iii. 212; Servius, *Aen.* i. 642, 729; Damascius, *Vit. Isid.* § 115; Joh. Chrys. on Ps. 105, § 3; Theodoret on Ps 105^{28} in *PG* lm. 1730). The *ba'al* of Heliopolis, who was the sun, was, of course, identified with *Helios* and *Sol*. *Malak-Bel* at Palmyra is in the Latin parallel called 'Sol sanctissimus' (cf. Servius, *Aen.* i. 642, 729; Nonn. *Dionys.* xl. 392 ff.; Macrobius, *Saturn.* i. 23). Hesychius (*s.v.* Βῆλος), the *Etym. Mag.* (*s.v.* Βῆλ), and Parmenius (in Becker, *Anecd.* 225), connect *ba'al* with *Ouranos*. *Ba'al-Melḳart* of Tyre is almost uniformly identified by classical writers with *Herakles* (cf. Baethgen, *Beitrage*, 20 f.). Late writers assert that in Persian *Ba'al* is the same as *Ares* (Malalas, p. 19; John of Antioch, frag. 5, in *FHG* iv. 542; *Chron. Pasch.* i. 18). This variety in the identification bears witness to the multiplicity of the *bᵉ'ālîm* with which Greeks and Romans came into contact (see Scholz, *Gotzendienst*, p. 148 ff.; Baethgen, *Beitrage*, p. 19 ff.).

The Bab. *Bêl* is also known to the classical writers. In Servius (*Aen.* i. 612) a dim memory survives of a distinction between the older and the younger *Bêl*, but in general only *Marduk-Bêl* is known, and all the attributes of *Enlil-Bêl* are

ascribed to him, as in the later Bab. theology. Eudemos (in Damascius, *de Princip.* 125) knows that he is the son of *Aos* (*Ea*) and *Dauke* (*Damkina*). Berossus (in *FHG* ii. 497, 4 ff.) and Castor (in Euseb. *Chron.*, ed. Schoene, p. 53) narrate, in direct dependence upon the Bab. Creation-story, how *Bêl* slew the dragon of the deep, and out of her body created heaven and earth. Of him Arrian (*Anab.* iii. 16. 4) says that the Babylonians honour him most of all the gods (cf. Minucius Felix, vi. 1). The building of his temple at Babylon is ascribed to Semiramis (Diod. ii. 9; Dionysius Periegetes, 1007). Berossus (in Euseb. *Chron.* ed. Schoene, p. 48) and Josephus (*Ant.* x. xi. 1) tell how it was beautified by Nebuchadrezzar; Arrian (*Anab.* iii. 16. 4), how it was destroyed by Xerxes and rebuilt by Alexander. It is often mentioned by the classical writers (Herod. i. 181; Paus. i. 16. 3, viii. 33. 3; Pliny, vi. 121; Mart. Capell. vi. 701; Solin. lx. 3). A grave of *Bêl* at Babylon was known to Ctesias (frag. 29, 216; cf. Aelian, xii. 3; Strabo, xvi. 738; Diod. xvii. 102). The cult of the Bab. *Bêl* was never directly adopted by the Greeks or the Romans, as were the cults of the Phœn. and Syr. *bᵉ'ālîm*; but indirectly many elements of Bab. theological speculation concerning his character and his creation of the world drifted into the Occident, and re-appear in the worship of Mithra (see MITHRA). Through the Bab. use of *Bêl* as a proper name, and through the exalted Bab. conception of his character as creator and supreme god, the Greeks were led to the idea that there was a single god *Bêl*, of whom the numerous Syr. and Phœn. *bᵉ'ālîm* were only the local manifestations. Strabo speaks of *Belos* as a great god, worshipped throughout Africa and in Asia as far as Persia (xvi. 744; cf. *Excerpta Barbari* in Frick, *Chron. Min.* 281, 27; Curtius, iii. 3, 16). The form *Bēlos* as a proper name without additional determinative is evidently derived from the Bab. *Bêl* rather than from the Phœn. *ba'al*, and shows that the idea of a single god *Ba'al* is ultimately of Babylonian origin. On the Bab. *Bêl* in Greek writers see Scholz, *Gotzendienst* (p. 365 ff.).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the special discussions mentioned above, see on the *ba'al*-cult in general, Selden, *de Dis Syris*, 1617; J. G. Voss, *de Theol. Gentili*, 1642; Gesenius, art. 'Bel' in Ersch and Gruber's *Enc.*; Creuzer, *Symbolik u. Mythologie* ³, 1841, ii 411 ff.; Winer, *RWB*, art. 'Baal'; Diestel, 'Monotheismus des altesten Heidenthums,' *JDTh*, 1860, 719 ff.; Merx, art. 'Baal' in Schenkel, 1869, Schlottmann, art. 'Baal,' in Riehm's *HWB*, 1875; Scholz, *Götzendienst u. Zauberwesen bei den alten Hebräern*, 1877, 187 ff.; Baudissin, *Studien zur sem. Religionsgesch.* ii. 1878; E. Meyer, art. 'Baal,' in Roscher's *Lex.*, 1884; Baethgen, *Beitr. zur sem. Religionsgesch.* 1888, 17 ff.; W. R. Smith, *Rel. of Semites* ², 1894, 93 ff.; Baudissin, art. 'Baal, Bel,' in *PRE* ³, 1897; Peake, art. 'Baal,' in *HDB*, i. (1898) p. 209, and Kautzsch, *ib.* v. (1904) p. 645; Moore, art. 'Baal,' in *EBi*, 1899.

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On the *ba'al*-cult in Syria and Mesopotamia see Chwolson, *Die Ssabier*, 1856, ii. 165 ff.; Levy, *ZDMG* xviii., 1864, 99 ff.; de Vogué, *Syrie Centrale, Inscr. Sémit.*, 1868, 62 ff.; Sachau, 'Baal-Harran in einer altaramaischen Inschrift,' *SBAW*, 1895, 174 ff; Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epigraphik*, 1898, 239, and *Ephemeris fur semit. Epigraphik*, vol. i. pt. iii. 1901.

On the *ba'al*-cult in Babylonia see Munter, *Religion der Babylonier*, 1827, 14 ff.; Schrader, 'Baal und Bel,' in *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1874, 335 ff.; Schrader, *KAT* ², 1883, 173 ff.; Jensen, *Kosmologie der Babylonier*, 1890, 19 ff., 84 ff.; Jeremias, art. 'Marduk,' in Roscher's *Lex.*, 1895; Tiele, *Gesch. der Rel. im Alterthum*, i., 1896, 125 ff.; Jeremias, in de La Saussaye ³, 1905, i. 281 f.; Jastrow, *The Rel. of Bab. and Assyria*, 1898, 2nd ed. in German (1902 ff.), and art. 'Rel. of Babylonia,' in *HDB* v. (1904), p. 538; Zimmern, *Vater, Sohn, und Fürsprecher in der Babylonischen Gottesvorstellung*, 1896, and *KAT* ³, 1902, 351 ff., 370 ff.; Clay, 'Ellil, the God of Nippur,' in *AJSL* xxiii., 1907, p. 269 ff.; Radau, *Bel the Christ of Ancient Times*, 1908.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON.

BAALZEBUB and **BEELZEBOUL.**—These two names probably refer to the same supernatural being; or, at any rate, the second of them is derived from the first. Baalzebub (בעל זבוב) is the OT form (2 K 1[2. 3. 6. 16]), and Beelzeboul * (βεελζεβούλ, WH βεεζεβούλ) the NT form (Mt 10[25] 12[24. 27], Mk 3[22], Lk 11[15. 18. 19]).

Baalzebub is in the OT represented as the god of the Philistine city of Ekron, whose oracle was so famous that Ahaziah, king of Israel, sent to consult it, to the neglect of the oracles of Jahweh. The Hebrew word בעל זבוב would mean 'lord of flies'; זבוב = Assyrian *zumbu*, 'a fly' (cf. Ec 10[1]). The LXX and Josephus so understood it, since they make the name of the god βάαλ μυῖαν (cf. LXX, *ad loc.*, and Jos. *Ant.* IX. ii. 1). Aquila supports the same reading by transliterating βααλζεβούβ, while Symmachus supports the NT form βεελζεβούλ. Bezold found, in an inscription of the Assyrian king Assur-bel-Kala (11th cent.), mention made among the gods of *Ebir-nari* (a name applied in Neh 2[7. 9] to Syria and Palestine) of a god Bel-ze-bubi (or-na). Were the last syllable certain, it would show that *Baalzebub* was found there earlier (see *Catalogue*, K. 3500, and Hommel, *AHT* 195). Movers (*Die Phönizier*, i. 260 ff.) held that the original name was בעל זבול = 'lord of the mansion,' which originally meant a heavenly mansion, but afterwards the god of the nether world. This view is of very doubtful certainty, since זבל in the sense of 'house' (1 K 8[13] and Ps 49[14]) is very uncertain (cf. LXX). In Is 63[15] and Hab 3[11] it is used of a station or abode in the heavens, while in the Talmud (*Chaqiga*, 12*b*) זבול is the fourth heaven, in which are the heavenly Jerusalem and the altar. This would hardly be possible, it in Jewish thought the word had ever represented a region the lord of which was the prince of demons. Halévy (*JA* xix. [1892] p. 304 and *CAIBL* xx. [1892] p. 74) thinks Zebub the name of a place, comparing the *Ṣapuna* of the el-Amarna letters (*KB* v. 174. 16)—a theory which Kittel ('Könige,' in Nowack's *Handkommentar, ad loc.*) rightly rejects. The resemblance between Zebub and Sapuna is too slight, and the Biblical text states that the deity in question was the god of Ekron. In all probability Baalzebub means 'lord of flies,' which are very numerous in the neighbourhood of Ekron (see Barton, *A Year's Wandering in Bible Lands*, 1904, p. 216 ff.). This title was given as an epithet to the god, whether by the Ekronites or the Hebrews we do not know, though Baethgen (*Beit. z. sem. Religionsgesch.* 1888, p. 25) holds that he represented a process of divination by flies. In the NT, as already noted, the name is βεελζεβούλ and is applied to the lord of the devils, and made a synonym of Satan (cf. Mk 3[22. 23], Lk 11[15. 18]). Cf. above, p. 287[a].

These facts have given rise to various conjectures. (1) The theory of Movers already referred to, that the name was בעל זבול, is thought by some to receive confirmation from the fact that in Mt 10[25] οἰκοδεσπότης (= 'master of the house' †) may be considered a translation of it. There is no real reason, however, to consider one of these words a translation of the other. If זבול (= 'house') was an original element of the name, a punning Jew would easily have זיבול (= Syr. זִבְלָא = 'dung') suggested to him, and might so understand the

* Beelzebub of AV has no authority in Greek MSS. It owes its currency to the Vulgate.

† Cheyne (*EBi*, col. 514) holds that οἰκοδεσπότης suggests the reading בעל זביר, ר = Aram. 'of,' and זביר changed from בית = 'house'

name (so Gould, 'Mark,' in *Inter. Crit. Com.* p. 62). (2) It is supposed that the name is a variation of *Baalzebub*, and that both the form and the significance have undergone change. As to the form, it is supposed (*a*) that the final *b* was changed to *l* by conscious perversion, so as to make it mean 'dung,' as *ba'al* (='lord') is sometimes changed to *bôsheth* (='shame') (cf. *Esh-baal*, 1 Ch 9^{39}, with *Ish-bosheth*, 2 S 2^{10}); this perversion transformed 'fly' to 'dung,' or 'filth.' (*b*) Baudissin (*PRE*^{3}) holds that *b* was changed to *l* in popular pronunciation, without intent to change the meaning, as *Bab-el-Mandeb* is sometimes changed to Bab-el-Mandel; and (*c*) Riehm (*HWB*^{2}) held that in the time of Christ *Baal-zebub* was Aramaized to בעל־דבבא (='lord of enmity'), and so was the exact equivalent of Διάβολος, or Satan.

As to the significance of Beel-zeboul in the NT period different theories have been proposed to account for his evolution from the OT god. Geiger (*Urschrift*, p. 53) thought that the god of the hated Philistines became the representative of heathen power, and so the arch-enemy of Israel. He found confirmation of his view in the fact that, in Aramaic, זבוב would be phonetically transformed into דבב (='hostility'). This theory, though plausible, lacks historical confirmation. The Philistines were not a formidable enemy after the early days of the kingdom. Syrians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans took successively the place of principal enemy, and it is hardly probable that the god of Ekron, who is mentioned in but one narrative of the OT, could have continued to hold this place. Had he done so, he could not have escaped mention.

Another view is expressed in the Talmud, which regards the fly as the representative of evil. In *B'rākhōth*, 61*a*, it is said: 'The evil spirit lies like a fly at the door of the human heart.' Again, in *B'rākhōth*, 10*b*, it is said that the Shunammite woman (2 K 4^8 ff.) perceived that Elisha was a man of God, because no fly crossed his table. This estimate of the fly goes back to the *Mishna*, for in *Aboth*, 5^8, we read: 'A fly, being an impure thing, was never seen in the slaughter-house of the temple.' In reality the revival of interest in Baal-zebub in the NT was due to literary causes. Cheyne has pointed out that Lk 9^{54} shows that in the time of Christ the narrative of 2 K 1 possessed a strange fascination for people. Probably both the hostility to Baal-zebub expressed in that narrative and the perversion of his name into the Aramaic בעל דבבא (='lord of hostility') helped this literary interest to make Beel-zebub a synonym of Satan. As the name meant 'lord of flies,' this would be sufficient to call into existence the Talmudic conception that the fly is a kind of imp, especially as Lv 11 and Dt 14 imply that it was to be reckoned among unclean flying things.

The change of *zebub* to *zebul* in the NT was, no doubt, due to conscious perversion. In addition to the analogy of *bôsheth*, cited above, the Talmud (*'Abōdā zārā*, 18*b*, cf. Dalman, *Aram. Gram.* p. 137) shows that זבח as applied to the sacrifices of the heathen was changed to זבל ('dung').

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GEORGE A. BARTON.

BĀB, BĀBIS.—*Bāb* (باب='Gate' in Arabic) was the title first assumed by Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad, a young Sayyid of Shīrāz, who in A.H. 1260 (=A.D. 1844) began to preach a new religion, which spread through Persia with extraordinary rapidity, and, in spite of violent persecutions, culminating in the execution of the founder on July 9, 1850, and of some twenty-eight of his principal disciples on September 15, 1852, has continued to gain strength until the present day. Both the history and the doctrines of this religion present so many remarkable features, that the subject has, almost from the first, attracted a great deal of attention, not only in the East but in Europe, and latterly in America; and the literature dealing with it, even in European languages, is very extensive; while the Arabic and Persian writings, manuscript, lithographed and printed, connected with it are so numerous and, in some cases, so voluminous, that it would hardly be possible for the most industrious student to read in their entirety even those which are accessible in half a dozen of the best-known collections in Europe. An exhaustive treatment of the subject is therefore impossible, and we must content ourselves with a sketch of the most important outlines of the history, doctrines, and literature of the religion in question.

1. **Antecedents.**—In order to understand properly the origins and developments of Bābī doctrine, it is, of course, essential to have a fair knowledge of Islām, and especially of that form of Islām (the doctrine of the *Ithnā 'ashariyya* division of the Shī'a, or 'Sect of the Twelve' Imāms), of which Persia has from the earliest Muhammadan times been the stronghold, and which, since the 16th cent. of our era, has been the State religion of that kingdom. Information on this subject must be sought elsewhere in this Encyclopædia under the appropriate headings; but, even for the most elementary comprehension of the early Bābī doctrine, it is essential to grasp the Shī'ite doctrine of the Imāmate, and especially the Messianic teaching concerning the Twelfth Imām, or Imām Mahdī.

According to the Shī'ite view, the prophet Muḥammad appointed to succeed him, as the spiritual head of Islām, his cousin 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, who, being married to Fātima, was also his son-in-law. 'Alī's rights were, however, usurped in turn by Abū Bakr, 'Umar, and 'Uthmān; and though he was elected Khalīfa after 'Uthmān's death, he was assassinated after a brief and troubled reign of five years (A.D. 656–661). His eldest son, al-Ḥasan, the second Imām, abdicated five or six months after his father's death in favour of the Umayyad Mu'āwiya. His younger son, al-Ḥusayn, the third Imām, attempted to regain his temporal rights by a rash revolt against the Umayyads, but perished on the fatal field of Karbalā (Kerbelā) on Muḥarram 10, A.H. 61 (Oct. 10, A.D. 680), a day still celebrated with wailing and mourning in all Shī'ite communities, especially in Persia. The nine remaining Imāms all lived in more or less dread of the Umayyad, and afterwards of the 'Abbāsid khalīfas, and many of them died by poison or other violent means. They were all descended from al-Ḥusayn, and, according to the popular belief, from a daughter of Yazdigird III., the last Sāsānian king, who was taken captive by the Arabs after the battle of Qādisiyya, and given in marriage to al-Ḥusayn. This belief, which was prevalent at least as early as the 3rd cent of the Hijra, since it is mentioned by the historian al-Ya'qūbī (ed. Houtsma, ii. 293, 363), undoubtedly explains, as remarked by Gobineau,* the affection in which the Imāms are held in Persia, since they are regarded as the direct descendants not only of the prophet Muhammad, but also of the old royal house of Sāsān. The Divine Right of the Imāms to the temporal supremacy of which they had been unjustly deprived, and the absolute dependence

* *Rel. et Philos. dans l'Asie Centrale* (ed. 1866), p. 275.

of the faithful on the spiritual guidance of the 'Imām of the Age,' thus became the two most characteristic and essential dogmas of all the various Shī'ite sects. 'Whosoever dies,' says a well-known Shī'ite tradition, 'without recognizing the Imām of his time, dies the death of a pagan.'

Now, according to the 'Sect of the Twelve,' the Twelfth Imām, or Imām Mahdī, was the last of the series. But since, according to their belief, the world cannot do without an Imām, and since this last Imām, who succeeded his father in A.H. 260 (= A.D. 873–4), disappeared from mortal ken in A.H. 329 (= A.D. 940–1), it is held that he never died, but is still living in the mysterious city of Jābulqā, or Jābulsā, surrounded by a band of faithful disciples, and that at the end of time he will issue forth and 'fill the earth with justice after it has been filled with iniquity.' This Messianic Advent is ever present in the mind of the Persian Shī'ite, who, when he has occasion to mention the Twelfth Imām, or Imām Mahdī (also entitled *Ḥujjatu'llāh*, 'the Proof of God,' *Baqiyyatu'llāh*, 'the Remnant of God,' *Ṣāḥibu'z-Zamān*, 'the Lord of the Age,' and *Qā'imu 'Alī Muḥammad*, 'He who shall arise out of the house of Muḥammad'), always adds the formula عجّل الله فرجه ('May God hasten his glad Advent!').

Now, in connexion with Bābī doctrine, it is to be noticed first of all that the 'Manifestation' (ظهور) of Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad the Bāb took place, as already said, in A.H. 1260, exactly a thousand years after the succession of the Imam Mahdī to the Imāmate, or, in other words, at the completion of a millennium of 'Occultation' (غیبت). For the Imām Mahdī, according to the Shī'ite belief, appeared in public once only, on his accession, when he performed the funeral service over his father, after which he became invisible to the bulk of his followers. During the first 69 years of the millennium of 'Occultation,' however, his instructions and directions were communicated to his followers, the Shī'a, through four successive intermediaries, each of whom bore the title of *Bāb*, or 'Gate.'* This period is known as 'the Minor Occultation' (غیبت صغری). In A.H. 329, however, this series of 'Gates,' or channels of communication between the Imām and his followers, came to an end, and such communication became impossible. This later and longer period (which, according to the Bābī view, lasted from A.H. 329 to A.H. 1260) is known as 'the Major Occultation' (غیبت کبری).

It was in this sense, then, that Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad, at the beginning of his career, declared himself to be the *Bāb*, or 'Gate,' viz., the gate whereby communication, closed since the end of the 'Minor Occultation,' was re-opened between the Hidden Imām and his faithful followers. He did not invent this term, nor was he even the first to revive it, for it was used in the same sense by ash-Shalmaghānī, a Messiah of the 10th cent. of our era, and by others.† So far as recent times are concerned, however, it was the Shaykhī school, founded by Shaykh Aḥmad al-Aḥsā'ī (b. A.D. 1733, d. A.D. 1826) which revived the idea that amongst the faithful followers of the Twelfth Imām there must always exist one, whom they entitled *Shī'a-i-Kāmil* (شیعهٔ کامل), 'the Perfect Shī'ite,' who was in direct spiritual communication with him. Neither Shaykh Aḥmad nor his successor Sayyid Kāẓim of Rasht (d. A.D. 1843–1844) made use of the title 'Bāb,' but their conception of 'the Perfect Shī'ite' was practically identical with the idea connoted by that title. To this Shaykhī school, or sect, belonged not only Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad himself, but Mullā Ḥusayn of Bushrawayh, Qurratu'l-'Ayn, and many others of his first and most zealous disciples. On the death of Sayyid Kāẓim his followers were naturally impelled by their doctrine concerning 'the Perfect Shī'ite' to seek his successor. There were two claimants, Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad, who on May 23, 1844,* within a short time of Sayyid Kāẓim's death, announced himself to be the 'Bāb,' and whose followers were consequently called 'Bābīs'; and Ḥājjī Muḥammad Karīm Khān, a scion of the Qājār Royal Family, who was recognized, and whose descendants are still recognized, by the conservative or stationary Shaykhīs as their spiritual head. It is in the teachings of the Shaykhī school, therefore, that the immediate origins of early Bābī doctrine must be sought; but no European scholar has yet made a critical study of the works and doctrines of Shaykh Aḥmad and Sayyid Kāẓim. Those who desire somewhat fuller information on this subject may be referred to the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 234–244. A full and critical study of the Shaykhī doctrines would, however, form an indispensable preliminary to such a philosophical history of the Bābīs as must some day be written.

2. History of the movement during the life of the founder. — The first period of Bābī history begins with the 'Manifestation' on May 23, 1844, and ends with the martyrdom of the Bāb at Tabrīz on July 9, 1850. The detailed history of these six years will be found in the translations of the *Traveller's Narrative* (Camb. 1891) and the *New History of . . . the Báb* (Camb. 1893), while a fairly complete bibliography of earlier works on the subject, both European and Oriental, is given in the former work (ii. 173–211). In the *JRAS* for 1889 (vol. xxi. new ser. pp. 485–526 and 881–1009) are also discussed critically various matters connected with both the history and the doctrines of the sect. Of the three chief histories composed in Persian by members of the sect, the earliest and most instructive is that written between 1850 and 1852 by Ḥājjī Mīrzā Jānī of Kāshān, who must have finished it only a little while before he was put to death among the twenty-eight Bābīs who suffered martyrdom at Ṭihrān (Teheran) on September 15, 1852. Of this work the only complete manuscript, so far as the present writer can ascertain, which existed (until he caused it to be transcribed for himself) was *Suppl. Pers.* 1071 in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, one of the MSS brought from Persia by M. le Comte de Gobineau, the talented author of *Les Religions et les philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale*. Another MS in the same collection (*Suppl. Pers.* 1070) contains the first third of it, while the *New History* (تاریخ جدید) is a recension made (about A.D. 1875–1880) by Mīrzā Ḥusayn of Hamadān, containing many additions, but also remarkable for some extremely important omissions and alterations. There is thus sufficient material for an edition of this most important document, which the present writer is now (1908) printing. The *Traveller's Narrative*, the third of the three principal systematic accounts compiled by the

* For their names, and a fuller account of the whole matter, see the present writer's tr. of the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 296 ff.

† For a full discussion of this matter, see the note on the meaning of the title 'Báb' in the tr. of the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 226–234.

* This date, and even the exact hour of his 'Manifestation,' is given by the Báb in two passages of the Persian *Bayán* (Wáḥid ii. 7, and vi. 13). See *Trav. Narr.* ii. 218–226.

Bābīs of their history, is not only later, but deals less with the early history of the movement than with the biography and writings of Bahā'u'llāh, to whose son 'Abbās Efendi (also called 'Abdu'l-Bahā) its authorship is ascribed. The accounts of Bābī history given by Muḥammadan writers (notably by the Lisānu'l-Mulk in the *Nāsikhu't-Tawārīkh* and by Riẓā-qulī-Khān in his supplement to the *Rawẓatu'ṣ-Ṣafā*) must, as a rule, be used with great caution, but exception must be made in favour of the late Sayyid Jamālu'd-Dīn al-Afghān's article on the Bābīs in Buṭrusu'l-Bustāni's Arabic encyclopædia the *Dā'iratu'l-Ma'ārif* (Beirut, 1881), and of a more recent history compiled in Arabic by a Persian doctor named Za'īmu'd-Dawla, and published at Cairo in A.H. 1321 (A.D. 1903–4),* from both of which, in spite of the prejudice against the Bābīs which they display, important facts may be gleaned.

A very brief summary of the events of this first period (A.D. 1844–1850) is all that can be given here. The Bāb himself, who was only twenty-four years old at the time of his 'Manifestation,'† and not thirty when he suffered martyrdom, was a captive in the hands of his enemies during the greater portion of his brief career, first at Shīrāz (August–September 1845—March 1846), then at Iṣfahān (March 1846—March 1847), then at Mākū near Urumiyya, and, for the last six months of his life, at the neighbouring castle of Chihrīq. He enjoyed the greatest freedom at Iṣfahān, where the governor, Minūchihr Khān, a Georgian eunuch, treated him with consideration and even favour; but he was able to continue his writings and to correspond with, and even receive, his followers during the greater part of his captivity, save, perhaps, the last portion. He himself, however, took no part in the bloody battles which presently broke out between his followers and their Muslim antagonists. Of these armed risings of the Bābīs the chief were in Māzandarān, at Shaykh Ṭabarsī near Bārfurūsh, under the leadership of Mullā Ḥusayn of Bushrawayh and Ḥājji Mullā Muhammad 'Alī of Bārfurūsh (autumn of 1848 to summer of 1849); at Zanjān, under Mullā Muhammad 'Alī Zanjānī (May–December 1850); and at Yazd and Nīrīz, under Aghā Sayyid Yahyā (summer of 1850), while a second rising at Nīrīz seems to have occurred in 1852.‡ Amongst other events of this period to which the Bābīs attach special importance, and of which they have preserved detailed accounts, is the martyrdom of 'the Seven Martyrs' at Ṭihrān, which also took place in the summer of 1850.§ During the later period of his career Mīrzā 'Alī Muhammad discarded the title of 'Bāb' (which he conferred on one of his disciples) and announced that he was the *Qā'im*, or expected Imām, and even more than this, the *Nuqta* (نقطه), or 'Point.' It is by this title (*Ḥaẓrat-i-Nuqṭa-i-Ūlā*, 'His Holiness the First Point'), or by that of *Ḥaẓrat-i-Rabbiyu'l-A'lā*, 'His Holiness my Lord Most High,' that he is generally spoken of by his followers, though latterly the Bahā'īs, desiring to represent him as a mere forerunner of Bahā'u'llāh—a sort of John the Baptist—seem to have abandoned the use of these later and higher titles. But from the Bāb's own later writings, such as the Persian *Bayān*, as well as from what is said by Mīrzā Jānī and other contemporary writers, it is clear that he was regarded as a divine being, and that in a very full sense, as will be shown when the doctrines of the Bābīs are discussed, when the term 'Point' (*Nuqta*) will also be explained. The circumstances attending the execution of the Bāb at Tabrīz on July 9, 1850, and especially his strange escape from the first volley fired at him,* are fully recorded in the histories already mentioned, and need not be recapitulated here. His body, after being exposed for several days, was recovered by his disciples, together with that of his fellow-martyr Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī of Tabrīz, wrapped in white silk, placed in a coffin, and concealed for some seventeen years in a little shrine called Imām-zāda-i-Ma'ṣūm between Ṭihrān and Ribāt-Karīm. At a later date it was transferred to 'Akkā (St. Jean d'Acre) by order of Bahā'u'llāh, where it was placed in a shrine specially built for that purpose.†

3. **Period of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel's supremacy** (A.D. 1850–1868).—Before his death the Bāb had nominated as his successor a lad named Mīrzā Yahyā, son of Mīrzā Buzurg of Nūr, and half-brother of the afterwards more famous Mīrzā Ḥusayn 'Alī, better known as Bahā'u'llāh. Mīrzā Yahyā was, according to Mīrzā Jānī, only 14 years old at the time of the Bāb's 'Manifestation,' so that he must have been born about A.H. 1246 (=A.D. 1830–1831). His mother died when he was a child, and he was brought up by his step-mother, the mother of his elder half-brother Bahā'u'llāh, who was about 13 years his senior.‡ Mīrzā Jānī, our oldest, best, and most unprejudiced authority (since he was killed in 1852, long before the schism between the Ezelis and Bahā'īs took place) reports Bahā'u'llāh as saying that he did not then know how high a position Mīrzā Yahyā was destined to occupy. At the early age of 15, about a year after the 'Manifestation,' he was so attracted by what he heard of the Bāb and read of his writings, that he set off for Khurāsān and Māzandarān, met Janāb-i-Quddūs (*i.e.* Mullā Muḥammad 'Alī of Bārfurūsh) and Qurratu'l-'Ayn, and, with Bahā-'u'llāh, attempted to join the Bābīs who were besieged at Shaykh Ṭabarsī, but was prevented by the governor of Amul. In the fifth year of the 'Manifestation' (A.H. 1265=A.D. 1849), shortly after the fall of Shaykh Ṭabarsī, the Bāb, having heard of Mīrzā Yahyā's youth, zeal, and devotion, declared that in him was fulfilled the sign of the Fifth Year given in the tradition of Kumayl, 'A Light shining from the Dawn of Eternity,' conferred on him the title *Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel* ('the Dawn of Eternity'), sent him his own rings and other personal possessions, authorized him, at such time as he should see fit, to add 8 *wāḥids* (or 'Unities' of 19 chapters each) to the *Bayān*, and appointed him his successor. On the Bāb's death, therefore, Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, as we shall now continue to call him, was recognized with practical unanimity by the Bābīs as their spiritual head; but, owing to his youth and the secluded life which he adopted, the practical conduct of the affairs of the Bābī community devolved chiefly on his elder half-brother Bahā'u'llāh, or Janāb-i-Bahā, as he is called by Mīrzā Jānī. There seem to have been some rival claimants, notably Mīrzā Asadu'llah of Tabrīz, entitled 'Dayyān,' who was, according to Gobineau (p. 277 f.), drowned in the Shaṭṭu'l-'Arab by some of the Bābīs who wished to put an end to his pretensions; and, according to Mirzā Jānī, certain other persons, such as 'the Indian believer' Sayyid Baṣīr, Āghā Muhammad Karāwī, and a young confectioner entitled 'Dhabīh' (ذبیح).

* This work is entitled *Miftāḥu Bābi'l-Abwāb* ('the Key of the Gate of Gates').

† The most reliable evidence points to October 9, 1820, as the date of his birth. Mīrzā Ḥusayn 'Alī, afterwards known as *Bahā'u'llāh* was a year or two older (see *Trav. Narr.* ii. 218 ff.).

‡ See *Trav. Narr* ii. 253–261. § *Ib.* ii. 211–218

* See, however, the *New History*, p. 301, n. 1 *ad calc.*, which contains a correction of a detail given by Gobineau.

† See the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii 46, and n. 1 *ad calc*

‡ The date of Bahā'u'llāh's birth is given in Nabil's rhymed chronicle as 2 Muḥarram, A.H. 1233 (=November 12, 1817). See *JRAS*, 1889, p 521.

(فنان), claimed to be theophanies or Divine Manifestations.* Mīrzā Jānī actually exulted in this state of things, declaring that just as the tree which bears most fruit is the most perfect, so the religion which produces most divine or *quasi*-Divine Manifestations thereby shows its superiority to other creeds. But none of these persons appears to have had any considerable following, and for some time Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel enjoyed, nominally at least, an uncontested supremacy.

For two years (July 1850–August 1852) little was heard of the Bābīs; but on August 15, 1852, three or four adherents of the sect made an attempt on the life of Nāṣiru'd-Dīn Shāh as he was leaving his palace at Niyāvarān to go out hunting. The attempt, which appears to have had no countenance from the leaders of the Bābīs, failed, but led to the fierce persecution of the sect, of whom some twenty-eight prominent members, including the beautiful poetess Qurratu'l-'Ayn, Mullā Shaykh 'Alī, called 'Janāb-i-Aʿẓīm,' Āghā Sayyid Ḥusayn of Yazd the Báb's secretary Sulaymān Khān, and our historian Ḥājji Mīrzā Jānī, were among the most conspicuous victims. The object being to make all classes participators in their blood, the doomed Bābīs were divided among the different classes and gilds, beginning with the *'ulamā*, the princes of the Royal House, and the different Government offices, and ending with the royal pages and students of the *Dāru'l-Funūn*, one victim being assigned to each, and a rivalry in cruelty was thus produced which made that day, Wednesday, September 15, 1852, equally memorable and horrible to all who witnessed it. The fortitude of the Bābī martyrs, and especially the death-ecstasy of Sulaymān Khān, produced a profound impression, and, as Gobineau says, probably did more to win converts to the new faith than all the previous propaganda.†

Bahā'u'llāh and Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel both escaped death on this occasion, though the former was arrested,‡ and a price was set on the apprehension of the latter.§ Both ultimately escaped to Baghdad, where they arrived about the end of 1852, Bahā'u'llāh, who was imprisoned in Ṭihrān for four months, arriving soon after his half-brother.‖ For the next eleven or twelve years (1853–1864) Baghdad was the headquarters of the sect, of which Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel continued to be the ostensible head, and is even implicitly acknowledged as such by Bahā'u'llāh in the *Iqān*, composed by him in 1861–1862. In the *Traveller's Narrative* (ii. 54 ff., especially pp. 55 and 62–63 of the translation), which contains the official Bahā'ī version of these transactions, it is implied that the nomination of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel was a mere blind, that Bahā'u'llāh was from the first intended, and that his 'Manifestation' took place in A.H. 1269 (=A.D. 1853), which the Bābīs call the year of 'after a while' (سنة بعد حين, for حين, 'while,' = 8 + 10 + 50 = 68, and the year 'after' is '69). Ostensibly, however, his claim to be 'He whom God shall manifest' dates from A.H. 1283 (A.D. 1866–1867), the end of the Adrianople period, which agrees with Nabīl's statement¶ that he was fifty years old when he thus manifested his true nature, for he was born in A.H. 1233 (=A.D. 1817).

* Another such claimant, according to Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, was Ḥusayn of Mīlān, who perished in the persecution of 1852 (see the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 330 f.), while two other claimants, Sayyid Ḥusayn of Hindiyān and Shaykh Ismā'īl, are mentioned (see also p. 357 f. of the same, where other pretenders are named).

† For further details see the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 323–334.

‡ *Ib.* pp. 51–53 and 327. § *Ib.* p. 374 f.

‖ See *JRAS*, 1889, pp. 945–948.

¶ *JRAS*, 1889, pp. 984 and 988, verse 10.

The records of the Baghdad period are comparatively scanty, but the propaganda went steadily on, though conducted with a caution and prudence foreign to the early days of the sect. About a year after his arrival at Baghdad, Bahā'u'llāh retired alone for two years into the highlands of Turkish Kurdistān, living chiefly at a place called Sarkalū, and occasionally visiting Sulaymāniyya.* By the Bahā'īs this retirement is regarded as a kind of preparation and purification; by the Ezelīs, as due to annoyance at the opposition which he encountered in his plans from several prominent Bābīs of the old school. Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, a man of modest and retiring disposition, seems to have lived in great seclusion both before and after this event, and the disputes which appear to have occurred at this period seem to have been chiefly between Bahā'u'llāh and his adherents on the one hand, and Mullā Muḥammad Ja'far of Niriāq, Mullā Rajab 'Alī *Qahir*, Sayyid Muḥammad of Iṣfahān, Sayyid Jawād of Kerbelā and the like on the other. Ultimately, owing to the hostility of the Persian Consul at Baghdad, Mīrzā Buzurg Khān of Qazwīn, and Mīrzā Ḥusayn Khān *Mushīru'd-Dawla*, the Persian Ambassador at Constantinople, the Turkish government was induced to expel the Bābīs from Baghdad, where their proximity to the Persian frontier, and to the Shī'ite shrines of Kerbelā and Najaf, afforded them great opportunities of proselytizing among their countrymen. This took place in the spring or early summer of 1864. They were first taken to Constantinople, where they remained for four months, and thence banished to Adrianople, where they arrived about the end of the year above mentioned. There they remained for nearly four years (Dec. 1864–August 1868), and there it was that in A.H. 1283 (A.D. 1866–67) Bahā'u'llāh publicly announced that he was 'He whom God shall manifest,' foretold by the Báb, and called on all the Bābīs to recognize him as such, and to pay their allegiance to him, not merely as the Báb's successor, but as him of whose Advent the Báb was a mere herald and forerunner.

This announcement, which naturally convulsed the whole Bābī community, was gradually accepted by the majority, but was strenuously opposed not only by Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel but by a considerable number of prominent Bābīs, including more than one of the original 18 disciples of the Báb known as the 'Letters of the Living' (حروف حي). The strife waxed fierce; several persons were killed; † charges of attempted poisoning were hurled backwards and forwards between the two half-brothers; ‡ and at length the Turkish government again intervened and divided the two rival factions, sending Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel with his family to Famagusta in Cyprus, and Bahā'u'llāh with his family and a number of his followers to 'Akkā in Syria, which places they respectively reached about the end of August 1868. To check their activities, however, and provide the government with the services of a band of unpaid informers, they caused four Bahā'īs with their families and dependents to accompany Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, and four of the Ezelīs to accompany Bahā'u'llāh. All of the latter were killed, one before they left Adrianople, and the other three soon after their arrival at 'Akkā. Of the Bahā'īs at Famagusta, one died in 1871 and one in 1872, while the third escaped to Syria in 1870. The fourth, Mushkīn Qalam, a celebrated calligraphist, remained in Cyprus for some time after the British occupation, but finally left on

* *Traveller's Narr.* ii. 64 f., 356 f. Nabīl says that he was 38 years of age when he withdrew, and 40 when he returned.

† See *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 362–364

‡ *Ib.* pp. 359 f. and 365–369

Sept. 14, 1886, for 'Akkā, where the present writer met him in April 1890. The Famagusta exiles numbered in all thirty persons, of whom full particulars are preserved, in consequence of the allowances to which they are entitled, in the State Papers of the Island government, which are epitomized in the *Traveller's Narrative* (ii. 376–389). Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel and some of his family are still (1908) residing at Famagusta, while descendants of some of the other exiles are also living in the island in various capacities. Concerning those banished to 'Akkā the same detailed information is not available, but their number appears to have considerably exceeded that of the Ezelīs.

4. Period of Bahā'u'llāh's supremacy (A.D. 1868–1892).—The schism which divided the Bābīs into the two sects of Bahā'īs and Ezelīs, though its beginnings go back to the earlier period of which we have just spoken, now became formal and final, and henceforth we have to consider two opposed centres of Bābī doctrine, 'Akkā in Syria, and Famagusta in Cyprus. Although there is much to be urged in favour of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel's position, it cannot be denied that practically his influence is very slight and his followers very few. When the present writer visited him in 1890, apart from his own family only one of his adherents, an old man named 'Abdu'l-Aḥad, whose father was among the Bābīs who perished at Zanjān in 1850,* was resident at Famagusta. In Persia very few Ezelīs were met, and those chiefly at Kirmān. One of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel's sons-in-law, Shaykh Aḥmad of Kirmān, was a man of considerable talent and learning, but he was put to death at Tabrīz in 1896 on a charge of complicity in the assassination of Nāṣiru'd-Dīn Shāh in May of that year. He was the author of the *Hasht Bihisht*, a lengthy treatise on the philosophy, doctrine, and history of the Bābī religion, from the polemical portions of which, directed against Bahā'u'llāh, extracts are cited in the *Traveller's Narrative* (ii. 351–373). Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel is still (July 1908) alive and well; but, interesting as he is historically and personally, he can no longer be reckoned a force in the world, though as a source of information about the early history and doctrines of the Bābīs he is without a rival, and speaks with a freedom and frankness not to be found at 'Akkā, where policy and 'the expediency of the time' necessarily play a much larger part. Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel may, in short, in his island seclusion, be compared to Napoleon I. in St. Helena—a man who has played a great rôle in stirring events and times, but whose active life and power to mould men's thoughts and deeds have passed away. His writings are numerous, but little known or read outside his immediate circle, and no one has yet devoted himself to the study of the large collection of those acquired by the British Museum in recent years, through the instrumentality of Mr. C. Delaval Cobham, lately Commissioner at Larnaca in Cyprus. Of Bābīism as a living force, affecting both East and West, 'Akkā has been the centre for the last forty years, and seems likely so to remain; and thither we must now divert our attention.

The claim of Bahā'u'llāh to be a new and transcendent 'Manifestation' of God steadily and rapidly gained ground among the Bābīs, and involved a complete re-construction of the earlier Bābī conceptions. For if, as Bahā'u'llāh declared, the Bāb was a mere precursor and harbinger of his advent, then, in the blaze of light of the New Day, the candle lit by Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad ceased to merit attention, and, indeed, became invisible. The Bahā'īs, as a rule, show a marked disinclination to talk about the Bāb or his early disciples, or to discuss his life or doctrines, or to place his writings in the hands of the inquirer, while latterly they have avoided calling themselves Bābīs, preferring to be known simply as Bahā'īs. The Bāb's doctrines were, in their eyes, only preparatory, and his ordinances only provisional, and Bahā'u'llāh was entitled to modify or abrogate them as seemed good to him. The real question at issue between Ezel and Bahā was admirably described by Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, lately British Minister at Tihrān, as entirely similar to that which divided the respective followers of St. Peter and St. Paul in the early days of the Christian Church—the question, namely, whether Christianity was to be a Jewish sect or a new World-religion. The old Bābī doctrine, continued unchanged by the Ezelīs, was in its essence Shī'ite; for, though the Bābīs put themselves outside the pale of Islām by rejecting the finality of the Qur'ān and the mission of Muḥammad, as well as by many other innovations both in doctrine and practice, their whole thought is deeply tinged with Shī'ite conceptions, shown, for example, even by their heterodox views as to the 'return to the life of the world' of the Prophet Muḥammad, his daughter Fāṭima, and the Twelve Imāms, and their identification of their own protagonists with one or other of these holy personages.

A wholly different spirit pervades the teachings of Bahā. His religion is more practical, his teaching more ethical and less mystical and metaphysical, and his appeal is to all men, not especially to Shī'ite Muḥammadans. His attitude towards the Shāh and the Persian government is, moreover, much more conciliatory, as is well seen in the celebrated Epistle to the King of Persia (*Lawḥ-i-Sulṭān*) which he addressed to Nāṣiru'd-Dīn Shāh soon after his arrival at 'Akkā.* This letter, of which a translation will be found in the *Traveller's Narrative* (ii. 108–151 and 390–400), was sent by the hand of a young Bahā'ī called Mīrzā Badī', who succeeded in carrying out his instructions and delivered it in person to the Shāh, for which boldness he was tortured and put to death.† At the same time Bahā'u'llāh addressed other letters (called by the Bahā'īs *Alwāḥ-i-Salāṭīn*, 'Epistles to the Kings') to several other rulers, including Queen Victoria the Tsar of Russia, Napoleon III., and the Pope.‡

For a complete history of the sect during this period full materials are not available, but generally speaking it may be said to consist, so far as 'Akkā itself is concerned, of alternations of greater and less strict supervision of the exiles by the Ottoman government, gradual development of organization and propaganda, and the arrival and departure of innumerable pilgrims, mostly Persians, but, since the successful propaganda in the United States, including a good many Americans. In Persia, where the religion naturally counts most of its adherents, there have been sporadic persecutions, to which the Bahā'īs, in accordance with Bahā's command, 'It is better that you should be killed than that you should kill,' have patiently submitted. Among these persecutions may be especially mentioned, since the execution of Mīrzā Badī' in July 1869, the following. About 1880 two Sayyids of Iṣfahān, now known to their co-religionists as *Sulṭānu'sh-Shuhadā* ('the King of Martyrs'), and *Maḥbūbu'sh-Shuhadā* ('the Beloved of Martyrs'), were put to death by the clergy of that city.§ In October 1888, Āghā Mīrzā Ashraf of Ābāda was put to death in the same

* In *JRAS*, 1897, pp. 761–827, the present writer published a tr. of a memoir on the insurrection at Zanjān, written for him by this old man.

* Probably in the summer of 1869 (see *Trav. Narr.* ii. 392).

† See *Trav. Narr.* ii 102–106.

‡ Extracts from these, translated into English, will be found in *JRAS*, 1889, pp 953–972

§ See *JRAS*, 1889, pp. 489–492; *Trav. Narr.* ii. 166–169.

place, and his body mutilated and burned.* In the summer of the following year, seven or eight Bābīs were put to death with great cruelty, at the instigation of Āghā-yi-Najafī, in the villages of Si-dih and Najaf-ābād near Iṣfahān.† On Sept. 8, 1889, a prominent Bahā'ī named Ḥājji Muḥammad Riżā of Iṣfahān was stabbed to death in broad daylight in one of the chief thoroughfares of 'Ishqābād (Askabad) by two Shī'ite *fida'is* sent from Mashhad for that purpose. The assassins were sentenced to death by the Russian military tribunal before which they were tried, but this sentence was commuted to one of hard labour for life. This was the first time in the fifty years during which the sect had existed that condign punishment had been inflicted on any of their persecutors; their rejoicings were proportionately great, and Bahā'u'llāh made the event the occasion of two revelations in which Russian justice was highly extolled,‡ and Bahā's followers were enjoined not to forget it. In May 1891 there was a persecution of Bābīs at Yazd, in which seven of them were brutally killed (on May 18), while another, an old man, was secretly put to death a few days later. In the summer of 1903 there was another fierce persecution in the same town, of the horrors of which some account is given by Napier Malcolm in his *Five Years in a Persian Town* (Lond. 1905).

One of the most interesting phenomena in the recent history of the Bahā'īs has been the propaganda carried on with considerable success in America. This appears to have been begun by a Syrian convert to Bahāism named Ibrāhīm George Khayru'llāh, who is the author of many English works on the subject, and is married to an English wife. He seems first to have lectured on the subject at Chicago about 1892, for in the Preface to his book, *Behā'u'llāh* (Chicago, 1900), he says (p. vii.) that he 'began to preach the fulfilment of the truth which Christ and the Prophets foretold over seven years ago.'§ Born in Mount Lebanon, he lived twenty-one years in Cairo, and was then converted to the Bahā'ī doctrine by a certain 'Abdu'l-Karīm of Ṭihrān. Afterwards he settled in America and became naturalized as a citizen of the United States. The propaganda which he inaugurated seems to have been at its height in 1897 and 1898, and there is now a community of several thousand American Bahā'īs, a considerable American literature on the subject, and a certain amount of actual intercourse between America and the headquarters of the religion at 'Akkā. More will be said on this subject presently.

5. From the death of Bahā'u'llāh until the present day (A.D. 1892–1908).—Bahā'u'llāh died on May 16, 1892, leaving four sons and three daughters. Differences as to the succession arose between the two elder sons, 'Abbās Efendi (also called *'Abdu'l-Bahā*, 'the Servant of Bahā,' and *Ghusn-i-A'ẓam*, 'the Most Mighty Branch') and Mirzā Muḥammad 'Alī (called *Ghusn-i-Akbar*, 'the Most Great Branch'). Bahā'u'llāh left a testament, entitled *Kitābu 'Ahdī*, which was published, with some introductory remarks and a Russian tr., by Lieut. Tumanski in the *Zapiski* of the Oriental Section of the Imperial Russian Archæological Society, viii. (1892). In this important document he says:

'God's injunction is that the Branches (*Aghṣān*), and Twigs (*Afnān*),* and Kinsfolk† (*Muntasabīn*) should all look to the Most Mighty Branch (*Ghuṣn-i-A'ẓam*, i.e. 'Abbās Efendi). Look at what We have revealed in my (*sic*) Most Holy Book (*Kitāb-i-Aqdas*): "When the Ocean of Union ebbs, and the Book of the Beginning and the Conclusion is finished, then turn to Him whom God intendeth (*man arādahu'llāh*), who is derived from this Ancient Stock." He who is meant by this blessed verse is the Most Mighty Branch: thus have we made clear the command as an act of grace on our part. Verily, I am the Bountiful, the Gracious. God hath determined the position of the Most Great Branch (*Ghuṣn-i-Akbar*, i.e. Mirzā Muhammad 'Alī)‡ after his position. Verily, He is the Commanding, the Wise. Verily, we have chosen the Most Great after the Most Mighty, a command on the part of One All-knowing and Wise. . . . Say, O Servants! Do not make the means of order a means of disorder, nor an instrument for [producing] union into an instrument for [producing] discord . . .'

Thus far, then, it would appear that, in face of so clear a pronouncement, no room for dissension was left to Bahā'u'llāh's followers. But almost immediately, it would seem (for the history of this fresh schism has not yet been dispassionately investigated, though much has been written on either side, not only in Persian but in English), the old struggle between what may be described as the 'stationary' and the 'progressive' elements broke out. 'Abbās Efendi apparently claimed that the Revelation was not ended, and that henceforth he was to be its channel. This claim was strenuously resisted by his brother Mīrzā Muhammad 'Alī and those who followed him, among whom were included his two younger brothers, Mīrzā Badī'u'llāh and Mīrzā Ziyā'u'llāh,§ Bahā'u'llāh's amanuensis, entitled *Janāb-i-Khādimu'llāh* ('the servant of God,' Mīrzā Āghā Jān of Kāshān), and many other prominent Bahā'īs, who held that, so far as this manifestation was concerned, the book of Revelation was closed, in proof of which view they adduced the following verse from the *Kitāb-i-Aqdas*, or 'Most Holy Book': 'Whosoever lays claim to any authority‖ before the completion of a millennium is assuredly a liar and a calumniator.' The dispute has been darkened by a mass of words, but in essence it is a conflict between these two sayings, viewed in the light of the supernatural claim—whatever its exact nature—which 'Abbās Efendi did and does advance. On the one hand, Bahā'u'llāh's *Testament* explicitly puts him first in the succession; on the other, being so preferred, he did 'lay claim to an authority' regarded by the partisans of his brother as bringing him under the condemnation equally explicitly enunciated by Bahā'u'llāh in the *Kitāb-i-Aqdas*. As in the case of the previous schism between Bahā'u'llāh and Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, so here also the conflict was between those who held that every day of Theophany must be succeeded by a night of Occultation, and those who felt that the Light by which they had walked could not be extinguished, but must rather increase in brightness. And, as before, the conservative or stationary party was worsted. For a time a certain equilibrium seems to have been maintained, but steadily and surely the power and authority of 'Abbās Efendi waxed, while that of his brother waned. Very bitter feeling was again aroused, and this time over a large area; for not only Persia, but Egypt, Syria, and America were involved. Ibrāhīm Khayru'llāh, the protagonist of the Bahā'ī faith in America, finally espoused the cause of Muḥammad 'Alī;¶

* See *Trav. Narr.* ii. 169 and 400–406.

† *Ib.* i. 406–410.

‡ See *Trav. Narr.* ii. 411 f. The texts of the revelations were published by Baron Rosen on pp. 247–250 of *Collections Scientifiques de l'Institut des Langues Orientales*, vi. (St. Petersburg, 1891).

§ It was at the 'Parliament of Religions,' held at Chicago in 1893, that the Bahā'ī doctrines first began to arouse considerable attention in America.

* 'The Branches' (*Ghuṣn*, pl. *Aghṣān*) are Bahā'u'llāh's descendants; the 'Twigs' (*Afnān*) are the Bāb's kinsfolk.

† Or perhaps 'adherents' is meant by *Muntasabīn*.

‡ *i.e.* We have placed 'Abbās Efendi first, then Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī.

§ One of these brothers subsequently died, and in 1903 the other joined 'Abbās Efendi and renounced his previous allegiance.

‖ *i.e.* authority to promulgate fresh revelations, and enact new or repeal old ordinances.

¶ According to his own statement (*The Three Questions*, p. 23), he visited 'Akkā and was well received by 'Abbās Efendi, but was not allowed to hold intercourse with the other brothers. Only seven months after his return to America did he denounce 'Abbās Efendi and declare his allegiance to Muḥammad 'Alī.

but missionaries, including the aged and learned Mírzá Abu'l-Faẓl of Gulpáyagán, were sent out in the beginning of 1902 to the United States to oppose him,* and at one time he professed to be in fear of his life.

6. Doctrine.—A full discussion of Bábí and Bahá'í doctrine, even were the time ripe for it, would far exceed the limits of an encyclopædia article. Before proceeding to set forth such a sketch of its most salient features as is possible within these limits, we must call the reader's attention to one or two general considerations.

(1) The Báb's own doctrine underwent considerable development and change during the six years (A.D. 1844–1850) which elapsed between his 'Manifestation' and his death, and to trace this development it would be necessary to examine all his voluminous writings in a much more careful, detailed, and systematic manner than has yet been done. To mention only a few of the chief substantive works which issued from his pen, there is the *Ziyárat-náma* (of which Gobineau quite misunderstood the nature when he described it as the *Journal du Pèlerinage*, for it is a devotional work designed for the use of pilgrims to the shrines of the Imáms) and the *Ṣaḥífatu Bayna'l-Haramayn*, both composed in the year of the 'Manifestation.' Then there is the *Dalá'il-i-sab'a* ('Seven Proofs'), and a number of Commentaries (*Tafásír*) on different *súras* of the Qur'án, notably the *Commentary on the Chapter of Joseph* (also called *Qayyúmu'l-Asmá*), and the Commentaries on the *súras* entitled respectively *al-Baqara*, *al-Kawthar*, *al-'Aṣr*, etc., all of which belong to the earlier period before the Báb announced that he was not merely the 'Gate' leading to the hidden Imám, but the Imám himself, nay the 'Point' (*Nuqta*) of a new Revelation. Of his later writings, to all of which, as we shall see, the name *Bayán* ('explanation,' 'utterance') is applied, the Persian *Bayán* is, perhaps, the most systematic, but there are also several Arabic *Bayáns*, a *Kitábu'l-Ahkam*, or 'Book of Laws' (tr. by Gobineau at the end of his *Religions et Philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale*), and one or two 'Books of Names' (*Kitábu'l-Asmá*). Few of these books are easy reading, and he who has read even one or two of them will be inclined to agree with Gobineau's judgment, 'le style de Mírza Alí Mohammed est terne, raide et sans éclat'; while some are so confused, so full of repetitions, extraordinary words, and fantastic derivatives of Arabic roots, that they defy the most industrious and indefatigable reader. The works of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel closely resemble those of the Báb, but the Bahá'í writings, especially in the later period, are much clearer and easier of comprehension, besides which the tendency of Bahá'í thought was to avoid abstruse metaphysics and unintelligible rhapsodies, and to treat chiefly of ethical subjects.

(2) As there has never been anything corresponding to a 'Church Council' among the Bábis, the greatest divergence of opinion will be found among them even on questions so important as the Future Life. All agree in denying the Resurrection of the Body as held by the Muḥammadans; but while certain passages in the Persian *Bayan* seem to indicate that the spirit of the deceased continues to take an interest in his earthly affairs, and while certain sayings of the older Bábis lend colour to the assertion of their enemies that they inclined to the doctrine of Metempsychosis (*Tanásukh-i-Arwaḥ*), generally held in abhorrence by the Musalmáns, other Bábis understand the 'Return (*Ruj'at*) to the life of this World' in a less material and more symbolic sense, while some disbelieve in personal immortality, or limit it to those holy beings who are endowed with a spirit of a higher grade than is vouchsafed to ordinary mortals.

(3) It must be clearly understood that Bábiism is in no sense latitudinarian or eclectic, and stands, therefore, in the sharpest antagonism to Súfiism. However vague Bábí doctrine may be on certain points, it is essentially dogmatic, and every utterance or command uttered by the 'Manifestation' of the period (*i.e.* by the Báb, Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, Bahá'u'lláh, 'Abbás Efendi, and Muḥammad 'Alí respectively) must be accepted without reserve. Tolerance is, indeed, inculcated by Bahá'u'lláh: 'Associate with [those of other religions with amity and harmony' is one of the commands given in the *Kitáb-i-Aqdas*. But the same book begins as follows: 'The first thing which God has prescribed unto His servants is Knowledge of the Day-spring of His Revelation and the Dawning-place of His Command, which is the Station of His Spirit in the World of Creation and Command. Whosoever attaineth unto this hath attained unto all good, and whosoever is debarred therefrom is of the people of error, even though he produce all [manner of good] deeds.' In other words, works without faith are dead. The Báb himself, and his immediate followers, were still less inclined to tolerance; according to the *Bayán*, no unbelievers were to be suffered to dwell in the five principal provinces of Persia, and everywhere they were, as far as possible, to be subjected to restrictions, and kept in a position of inferiority. The Bábis are strongly antagonistic alike to the Súfís and to the Muḥammadans, but for quite different reasons. In the case of the Súfís they object to their latitudinarianism, their pantheism, their individualism, and their doctrine of the 'Inner Light.' With the Muḥammadan outlook they have really more in common; but, apart from the natural resentment which they feel on account of the persecutions which they have suffered at the hands of the *'ulamá* of Islám, they condemn the refusal of the Muslims to see in this new 'Manifestation' the fulfilment of Islám, and, in short, regard them much as the Christians regard the Jews. For similar reasons the Bahá'is detest the Ezelis, whilst among the former the followers of 'Abbás Efendi dislike and despise the followers of his brother Muḥammad 'Alí.

According to the Bábí conception, the Essence of God, the Primal Divine Unity, is unknowable, and entirely transcends human comprehension, and all that we can know is its Manifestations, that succession of theophanies which constitutes the series of Prophets. In essence all the Prophets are one; that is to say, one Universal Reason or Intelligence speaks to mankind successively, always according to their actual capacities and the exigencies of the age, through Abraham, Moses, David, Christ, Muḥammad, and now through this last Manifestation, by which the old Bábis and the present Ezelis understand the Báb (whom they commonly speak of as *Ḥazrat-i-Nuqta*, 'His Holiness the Point'; *Ḥazrat-i-Rabbiyu'l-A'lá*, 'His Holiness my Lord the Supreme,' etc.), while the Bahá'ís, who reduce the Báb's position to that of a mere forerunner, or herald (*mubashshir*), comparing him to John the Baptist, understand Bahá'u'lláh. In essence all the Prophets are one, and their teaching is one; but (to use one of the favourite illustrations of the Bábís) just as the same teacher, expounding the same science, will speak in different, even in apparently contradictory, terms, according to whether he is addressing small children, young boys and girls, or persons of mature age and ripe understanding, so will the Prophet regulate his utterances and adjust his ordinances according to the degree of development attained by the community to which he is sent. Thus the material Paradise and Hell preached by Muḥammad do not really exist, but no more accurate conception of the realities which they symbolize could be conveyed to the rough Arabs to whom he was sent. When the world has outgrown the teaching of one 'Manifestation,' a new 'Manifestation' appears; and as the world and the human race are, according to the Bábí view, eternal, and progress is a universal law, there can be no final Revelation, and no 'last of the Prophets and seal of the Prophets,' as the Muḥammadans suppose. No point of the Báb's doctrine is more strongly emphasized than this. Every Prophet has foretold his successor, and in every case that successor, when he finally came, has been rejected by the majority of that Prophet's followers. The Jews rejected their Messiah, whose advent they professed to be awaiting with such eagerness; the Christians rejected the Paraclete or Comforter whom Christ foretold in prophecies supposed by the Muḥammadans to have been fulfilled by the coming of Muḥammad; the Shí'ite Muḥammadans never mention the Twelfth Imám, or Mahdí, without adding the formula عجل الله فرجه ('May God hasten his glad Advent!'), yet when at last after a thousand years the expected Imám returned (in the shape of the Báb), they rejected, reviled, imprisoned, and finally slew him. The Báb was determined that, so far as it lay in his power to prevent it, his followers should not fall into this error, and he again and again speaks of the succeeding Revelation which 'He whom God shall manifest' (من يظهره الله) shall bring, and of other later Revelations which in turn shall succeed that *ad infinitum*. Indeed, he goes so far as to

* Several American papers describing this mission are in the present writer's possession. One (*The North American*, Feb. 16, 1902) gives portraits of Mírzá Abu'l-Faẓl, his companion Ḥájji Niyáz of Kirmán, and of 'Abbás Efendi himself, and heads its leading article 'Astonishing Spread of Babism.'

say that if any one shall appear claiming to be 'He whom God shall manifest,' it is the duty of every believer to put aside all other business and hasten to investigate the proofs adduced in support of this claim, and that, even if he cannot convince himself of its truth, he must refrain from repudiating it, or denouncing him who advances it as an impostor. It is these provisions, no doubt, which have always given so great an advantage to every fresh claimant in the history of Bābīism, and have placed what may be called the 'Stationary Party' (*e.g.* the followers of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel and, later, of Muhammad 'Alī) at so great a disadvantage.

From what has been said above, the Western reader may be tempted to think of the Bābī doctrine as embodying, to a certain extent, the modern Western rationalistic spirit. No mistake could be greater. The belief in the fulfilment of prophecies; the love of apocalyptic sayings culled from the Jewish, Christian, and Muhammadan Scriptures and traditions; the value attached to talismans (especially among the early Bābīs); the theory of correspondences, as illustrated by the mystical doctrine of the Unity and its manifestation in the number 19, and the whole elaborate system of equivalences between names, based on the numerical values of letters, point to a totally different order of ideas, and are, moreover, ingrained in the true Bābī doctrine, as distinguished from the same doctrine as presented to and understood by most American and European believers. Even the practical reforms enjoined or suggested by the Bāb are generally based on some quite non-utilitarian ground. Thus the severe chastisement of children is forbidden, and consideration for their feelings enjoined; but the reason for this is that when 'He whom God shall manifest' comes, he will come first as a child, and it would be a fearful thing for any one to have to reproach himself afterwards for having harshly treated the august infant. This and other similar social reforms, such as the amelioration of the position of women, are not, as some Europeans have supposed, the motive power of a heroism which has astonished the world, but rather the mystical ideas connected with the 'Manifestations,' 'Unities,' numbers, letters, and fulfilment of prophecies, which to European rationalists appear so fantastic and fanciful. But, above all, the essence of being a Bābī or a Bahā'ī is a boundless devotion to the 'Person of the Manifestation,' and a profound belief that he is divine and of a different order from all other beings. The Bāb, as we have seen, was called by his followers 'His Holiness my Lord the Supreme,' and Bahā'u'llāh is called not only 'the Blessed Perfection' (*Jamāl-i-Mubārak*), but, especially in Persia, 'God Almighty' (*Ḥaqq ta'ālā*). Then also there are differences of opinion as to the degree of divinity possessed by the 'Person of the Manifestation,' and not all the faithful go so far as the poet who exclaims: 'Men call thee "God," and I am filled with angry wonder as to how long thou wilt endure the shame of Godhead!'

Something more must now be said as to the 'Point,' the 'Unity,' and its manifestation in the number 19, and other kindred matters. The idea of the 'Point' (نقطة) seems to rest chiefly on two (probably spurious) Shī'ite traditions. 'Knowledge,' says one of these, 'is a point which the ignorant made multiple.' It was this 'point of knowledge'—not detailed knowledge of subsidiary matters, but vivid, essential, 'compendious' knowledge of the eternal realities of things—to which the Bāb laid claim. The second tradition is ascribed to 'Alī, the first Imām, who is alleged to have declared that all that was in the Qur'ān was contained implicitly in the *Sūratu'l-Fātiha*, or opening chapter of the Qur'ān, and that this in turn was contained in the *Bismi'llāh* which stands over it, this in turn in the initial B (ب) of the *Bismi'llāh*, and this in turn 'in the Point which stands under the ب'; 'and,' 'Alī is said to have added, 'I am the Point which stands under the ب.'

Now the formula بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ('In the Name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving') comprises 19 letters, which, therefore, are the 'Manifestation' of the 'Point under the ب,' just as the whole Qur'ān is the further 'Manifestation,' on a plane of greater plurality, of the *Bismi'llāh*. Moreover, the Arabic word for 'One' is *Wāḥid* (واحد), and the letters composing the word *Wāḥid* (و=6; ا=1; ح=8; د=4) give the sum-total of 19. This 'first Unity' of 19 in turn manifests itself as 19 × 19 (19^2) or 361, which the Bābīs call 'the Number of All Things' (عدد كلّ شيء), and the words *Kullu shay* ('All Things') are numerically equivalent to (ك=20 + ل=30 + ش =300 + ى=10) 360, to which, by adding 'the one which underlies all plurality,' 361, 'the Number of All Things,' or 19^2, is obtained.

To the number 19 great importance is attached by the Bābīs, and, so far as possible, it is made the basis of all divisions of time, money, and the like. Thus the Bābī year comprises 19 months of 19 days each, to which intercalary days 'according to the number of the H (ه),' *i.e.* 5, are added to bring the solar year (which they proposed to restore in place of the Muhammadan lunar year) up to the requisite length. The same names (*Bahā*, *Jalāl*, *Jamāl*, etc.) serve for the months and the days, so that once in each month the day and the month (as in the Zoroastrian calendar) correspond, and such days are observed as festivals. The year begins with the old Persian *Naw-rūz*, or New Year's Day, corresponding with the Vernal Equinox, and conventionally observed on March 21. The month of fasting, which replaces the Ramaḍān of Islām, is the last month of the year, *i e.* the 19 days preceding the *Naw-rūz*. The Bāb's idea of a coinage having 19 as its basis has been abandoned, along with many other impracticable ordinances, some of which are explicitly abrogated in the *Kitāb-i-Aqdas* or others of Bahā'u'llāh's writings. The 'Unity' is also manifested in the divine attribute *Ḥayy* (حيّ), 'the Living,' which equals 8+10=18, or, with the 'one which underlies all plurality,' 19. The Bāb accordingly chose 18 disciples, who, with himself, constituted the 'Letters of the Living' (حروف الحيّ) or 'First Unity.' The choice of Mīrzā Yaḥyā, 'Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel' ('the Dawn of Eternity'), by the Bāb as his successor, was probably also determined by the fact that the name *Yaḥyā* (يحيى = 36) was a multiple of 18, on which account Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel was also called *Wāḥid* (وحيد), which is numerically equivalent to 28 (the number of the letters constituting the Arabic alphabet), and signifies 'unique,' *i.e.* manifesting the Unity.

The importance attached by the Bābīs to the numerical equivalents of words is seen elsewhere,

and especially in their habit of referring cryptically to towns connected with their history by names of an equivalent value. Thus Adrianople, called in Turkish *Edirné* (ادرنه), is named *Arẓu's-Sirr* (ارض السر), 'the Land of the Mystery,' both words, *Edirné* and *Sirr*, being numerically equivalent to 260. So Zanjān (زنجان=111) is called *Arẓul'-A'lā* (اعلی=111), and so on. Other strange expressions with which the Bābī writings (especially the earlier writings) abound constantly puzzle the uninitiated reader, who will have to discover for himself that, for example, the expression 'the Person of the Seven Letters' (ذات احروف السبعه) is one of the titles of the Bāb, whose name, 'Alī Muhammad, consists of seven letters. Even in Bahā'u llāh's works such obscure terms occur as *al-Buq'atu'l-Ḥamrā*, 'the Red Place,' which means 'Akkā, and the like.

The Bāb laid down a number of laws, dictated in many cases by his personal tastes and feelings, which have practically fallen into abeyance. Such are his prohibition of smoking and the eating of onions (though these are still observed by the Ezelis), his regulations as to clothing, forms of salutation, the use of rings and perfumes, the names by which children might be named 'in the *Bayān*,' the burial of the dead, and the like. The laws enacted by Bahā'u'llāh in the *Kitāb-i-Aqdas*, with the exception of the law of Inheritance, are simpler and more practical, and the whole tone of the Bahā'ī scriptures (which, of course, according to the Bahā'ī view, entirely abrogate the Bāb's writings) is more simple, more practical, and more concerned with ethical than metaphysical questions. Historically, there is much to be said in favour of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel's claim, since he was certainly nominated by the Bāb as his immediate successor, and was equally certainly so recognized for a good many years by the whole Bābi community; while, assuming the Bāb to have been divinely inspired (and this assumption must be made not only by every Bābī but by every Bahā'ī), it is difficult to suppose that he should choose to succeed himself one who was destined to be the chief opponent of 'Him whom God shall manifest.' Yet practically it cannot be doubted that the survival and extension of the religion formed by the Bāb were secured by the modifications effected in it by Bahā'u'llāh, for in its original form it could never have been intelligible, much less attractive, outside Persia; and even there, when once the ferment attending its introduction had subsided, it would probably have sunk into the insignificance shared by so many Muslim sects which once played an important rôle in history.

At the present day there are a few Bābīs of the old school who call themselves 'Kullu-shay'īs,' and decline to enter into the Ezelī and Bahā'ī quarrel at all; there is a small, and probably diminishing, number of Ezelīs; and a large, but indeterminable number of Bahā'īs, of whom the great majority follow 'Abbās Efendi ('Abdu'l-Bahā), and the minority his brother Muḥammad 'Alī. Latterly the followers of Bahā'u'llāh have shown a strong disposition to drop the name of Bābī altogether, and call themselves Bahā'ī, and to ignore or suppress the earlier history and literature of their religion. Alike in intelligence and in morals the Bābīs (or Bahā'īs) stand high; but it is not certain to the present writer that their triumph over Islām in Persia would ultimately conduce to the welfare of that distracted land, or that the tolerance they now advocate would stand the test of success and supremacy.

LITERATURE.—An exhaustive treatment of the literature of this subject would have to deal with the following divisions:

i *BĀBĪ SCRIPTURES*, all in Arabic or Persian, regarded by all or by certain sections of the Bābīs as revelations, and including:

(*a*) *Writings of* Mīrzā 'Alī Muhammad the Bāb (A.D. 1844–1850).—These were divided by the Bāb himself into 'five grades' (*Shu'ūn-i-Khamsa*, شؤون خمسه), viz. verses (*āyāt*, آیات), supplications (*munājāt*, مناجات), commentaries (*tafsīr*, تفاسیر), scientific treatises (*Shu'ūn-i-'ilmiyya*, شؤون علمیه, or *ṣuwar-i-'ilmiyya*, صور علمیه), and Persian writings (*Kalimāt-i-Farsiyya*). The term *Bayan* applies especially to the writings of the 'first grade,' and includes all the *āyat*, or verses in the style of the Qur'an, produced by the Bab during his whole career. To special collections of such verses the term *Bayan* is also applied, and in this sense there are several Arabic *Bayans* and one Persian *Bayān*, which last is, on the whole, the most systematic and intelligible of the Bab's writings.*

(*b*) *Writings of* Mīrzā Yahyā, 'Subḥ-i-Ezel.'—Of these one of the earliest (composed before 1865, since it is mentioned by Gobineau, whose book was published in that year) is the *Kitāb-i-Nūr*, or 'Book of Light.' A list of some of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel's writings, drawn up by himself, will be found in *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 340 ff. Others are described in the 'Catalogue and Description of 27 Babi Manuscripts' by the present writer, published in *JRAS*, 1892 (xxiv. 483–493, 600–662, etc.). In the last few years the British Museum Library has, through the good offices of Mr Claude Delaval Cobham, lately Commissioner at Larnaca in Cyprus, been enriched by an extensive collection of manuscript works by Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel.

(*c*) *Writings of* Mīrzā Husayn 'Alī 'Bahā'u'llāh.'—One at least of these—a polemical work in Persian named *Iqan*, 'the Assurance'—was composed about A.D. 1858–1859, during the Baghdad period, that is to say, previously to Bahā'u'llāh's 'Manifestation.' The remainder belong chiefly to the period intervening between that event and Bahā'u'llāh's death (A.D. 1866–1892). Since every letter (*lawḥ*, لوح='tablet') written at Bahā'u'llāh's dictation—and many were written every day—is regarded by his followers as a revelation, it would be manifestly impossible for any human being (except, possibly, his amanuensis) to enumerate them. The most important of his books, besides the earlier *Iqān*, the *Sūra-i-Haykal*, the *Alwāḥ-i-Salaṭīn*, or 'Letters to the Kings' (including the letter sent to Nāṣiru'd-Dīn Shāh, as above described, in A.D. 1869), are the *Kitāb-i-Aqdas* (which contains the most systematic and compendious statement of the doctrines, laws, and ordinances promulgated by Bahā'u'llah), the *Lawḥ-i-Bashārāt*, the *Kalimat-i-Maknūna*, and, lastly, the final Testament (*Kitābu 'Ahdi*) already mentioned. Several 'authorized' collections of these and other Bahā'ī scriptures have been lithographed in the East. The *Kitāb-i-Aqdas* has been printed at St. Petersburg, in 1899, with a Russ. tr., by Captain Tumanski, who also published the *Kitabu 'Ahdi* in 1892. In the same year Baron Victor Rosen published the *Lawḥ-i-Bashārāt*. The whole of the Epistle to Nāṣiru'd-Dīn Shāh and portions of the other Epistles to the Kings have been translated by the present writer in the *JRAS*, 1889, and in *Traveller's Narrative*, ii.; and a French translation of the *Iqān* ('Livre de la Certitude') was published by M. Hippolyte Dreyfus and Mīrzā Ḥabību'llāh Shīrāzī in 1904.

(*d*) *Writings of* 'Abbās Efendi (now called 'Abdu'l-Bahā).—Of these mention may be made of the *Mufāwaẓat* (مفاوضات), or 'Outpourings,' recently published in the original Persian, and in Fr. and Eng. translations, by Miss Laura Barney and M. Hippolyte Dreyfus.

(*e*) *Writings of* Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī, the brother and rival of 'Abbās Efendi.

ii *DEVOTIONAL, DOCTRINAL, AND APOLOGETIC WORKS* by companions and disciples of the Bāb, Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, Bahā'u'llāh, 'Abbās Efendi, and Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī, of which in recent times a considerable number have been composed in English by American believers and a smaller number in French. Many of the early Bābis, such as Mulla Muḥammad 'Alī of Bārfurūsh (*Janāb-i-Quddūs*), left writings which have been preserved in manuscript.† Mīrzā Abu'l-Faẓl of Gulpāyagan, a devoted fol-

* See the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 335–347, especially the definitions from the Persian *Bayān* given on p. 344 f. concerning the 'five grades'; see also *JRAS* xxiv. (1892) 452 f.

† For description of such a collection of the writings of *Janāb-i-Quddūs*, see *JRAS*, 1892, 483–487.

lower of Bahā'u'llāh, composed, about A.D. 1887, a Persian tract called *Istidlāliyya*,* in which he endeavoured to prove to the Jews that the advent of their expected Messiah was fulfilled by the 'Manifestation' of Bahā'u'llāh; and he also wrote and published in Cairo a Persian work of 731 pages entitled *Kitābu'l-Fara'id*, in which he replied to attacks made on the Bahā'īs by Shaykh 'Abdu's-Salām. In defence of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel's position and in elucidation of the primitive Bābī doctrine and the philosophical ideas underlying it, there is the very rare and instructive *Hasht Bihisht* † of Shaykh Aḥmad of Kirmān (called Rūḥī), who was put to death at Tabriz about 1896. There is also a considerable literature, manuscript and lithographed, connected with the controversy which arose after the death of Bahā'u'llāh between his sons,‡ and this controversy is reflected in numerous English printed works produced in America by the respective partisans of the two brothers.

iii. *HISTORICAL WORKS* written by believers (such as the *History of Mīrzā Jānī of Kāshān*, the *New History*, the *Traveller's Narrative*, and part of the *Hasht Bihisht*), or by opponents (such as the account given by the official historians of the Persian Court, Riẓā-quli-Khān and the Lisānu'l-Mulk, in the supplement to the *Rawẓatu'ṣ-Ṣafā* and the *Nāsikhu't-Tawārikh* respectively), or by more or less impartial observers, Asiatic or European. Among the most valuable of those written in the East from a hostile, or at least a critical and not very friendly, point of view, mention should especially be made of Sayyid Jamālu'd-Dīn's art in the *Dā'iratu'l-Ma'ārif*, or Arabic Encyclopædia, of Buṭrusu'l-Bustānī, and of Mīrzā Muḥammad Mahdī-Khān Za'īmu'd-Dawla's *Miftāḥu Bābi'l-Abwāb*, also in Arabic, published at Cairo in A.H. 1321 (A.D. 1903-1904). This last, though written in the form of a history, is rather polemical than historical, but it contains important information obtained from original oral sources, and a certain number of *pièces justificatives*. Another more purely polemical work, composed in Persian by a Christian convert to Islam, named Ḥusayn-quli, dedicated to some of the *mujtahids* of Kerbelā and Najaf, entitled *Minhāju't-Ṭālibīn fi radd'l-Babiyya*, and lithographed at Bombay in A.H. 1320 (A.D. 1902), also deserves mention.

iv. *BABI POEMS.*—From the time of Qurratu'l-'Ayn, the Bābī heroine who suffered martyrdom in A.D. 1852, until the present day, poetry of a religious and often of a rhapsodical character has been produced, though not in very great abundance, by Bābī writers. The most celebrated Bābī poets since the time of Qurratu'l-'Ayn are Nabīl, 'Andalīb, Na'im of Ābada, and Mirzā Yaḥyā *Sar-Khush*, but their poems are sporadic, and there does not seem to be any considerable collection of Bābī poems, either from one or from diverse pens.

v. *POLEMICAL WORKS.*—Some of these have been incidentally mentioned above under classes ii. and iii., but there exist others, such as the *Rajmu'sh-Shaytan fi raza'ili'l-Bayan* ('Stoning of the Devil, on the vices of the *Bayan*'), by Hājji 'Abdu'r-Raḥīm, lithographed (without date or place of issue) about A.D. 1892. This tract professes to be written in refutation of a Bābī apology entitled *Kitābu'l-Imān fi izhhāri-Nuqtati'l-Bayān* ('the Book of Belief, setting forth the Point of Revelation,' *i.e.* the Bāb), which apology is incorporated in the refutation. There are, however, reasons for believing that, under the guise of a weak and unconvincing refutation, the writer's object was to argue in favour of the Bābī doctrine, as held by the elder Bābīs and the Ezelīs, since he speaks respectfully of the Bāb 'on account of his holy lineage,' makes the refutation of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel depend on that of the Bāb (whom he does not effectively refute), and practically confines his attacks to Bahā'u'llāh.

vi. *THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH WRITINGS* of American and French believers in Bahā'ism (for only in the latter days of Bahā'u'llah did the doctrines of which the Bāb was the originator spread beyond Asia) may conveniently be placed in a separate class. The chief of those which have come into the present writer's hands (and there are, no doubt, many others with which he is unacquainted, for Bahā'ism is now active in America, and has its centres, associations, schools, and endowments) are, in chronological order, as follows:

Ibrāhīm George Kheiralla (*i.e.* Khayru'llāh) assisted by **Howard MacNutt**, *Behā'u'llāh* ('The Glory of God'), 2 vols., Chicago, 1900; *Facts for Behaists*, tr. and ed. by **I. G. Kheiralla** (this pamphlet deals with the dispute between 'Abbās Efendi and his brother Muḥammad 'Alī, and supports the claims of the latter), Chicago, 1901; **Ibrāhīm George Kheiralla**, *The Three Questions*, 26 pp. of English and 15 pp. of Arabic *pièces justificatives* (n.d.); **Stoyan Krstoff Vatralsky**, *Mohammedan Gnosticism in America: the origin, history, character, and esoteric doctrines of the Truth-knowers* (from *AJTh*, Jan. 1902, pp. 57-78), Boston, 1902; **Gabriel Sacy**, *Le Règne de Dieu et de l'Agneau, connu sous le nom de Babysme*, Cairo, 1902; *Le Livre des Sept Preuves* (a tr. of the Bāb's *Dalā'il-i-Sab'a*), tr. by **A. L. M. Nicolas**, Paris, 1902; *The Revelation of Bahā'u'llāh*, compiled by **Isabella D. Brittingham**, U.S.A., 1902; **Myron H. Phelps**, *The Life and Teachings of Abbās Effendi*, with Introduction by **Edward G. Browne**, London and New York, 1903; *Le Livre de la Certitude* (a tr. of the *Iqān*), tr. by **Hippolyte Dreyfus** and **Mīrzā Habību'llāh Shīrazī**, Paris, 1904; *Le Béyân Arabe, le livre sacré du Babysme de Séyyèd Ali Mohammed dit le Bab*, tr. from the Arabic by **A. L. M. Nicolas**, Paris, 1905; **Arthur Pilsbury Dodge**, *Whence? Why? Whither? Man: Things: Other things*, Westwood, Mass., 1907. One Ezelī manifesto, consisting chiefly of extracts from the *New History*, the *Traveller's Narrative*, and other works by the writer of this article, has also appeared in America under the title of *A Call of Attention to the Behaists or Babists of America*, by **August J. Stenstrand**, and is dated from Naperville, Ill., Feb. 13, 1907; Miss **Laura Clifford Barney**, who at different periods spent a considerable time at 'Akkā, and has also travelled in Persia, collected orally the answers of 'Abbās Efendi to a number of questions which she put to him on all sorts of subjects, and to which he replied from time to time. These replies have been published in the original Persian, in English, and in French almost simultaneously. The Persian text is entitled *An-Nūru'l-abhā fi Mufāwaḍāti 'Abdi'l Bahā*, and on the English title-page *Table Talks, collected by Laura Clifford Barney*, London, 1908. The English version is entitled *Some Questions answered . . . from the Persian of 'Abdul-Bahā*, translated by Miss L. C. Barney. The French version, translated from the Persian by Hippolyte Dreyfus, is entitled *Les Leçons de St. Jean d'Acre . . . recueillies par Laura Clifford Barney*, Paris, 1908.

EDWARD G. BROWNE.

BĀBĀ LĀLĪS.—The name of a modern Indian monotheistic sect founded by one Bābā Lāl in the first half of the 17th cent. A.D. The sect is apparently now extinct. Bābā Lāl was a Khattrī by caste, born in Mālwā in Rājputāna. He became the pupil of a *Bhakti* apostle (see BHAKTI-MĀRGA) named Chetan Swāmi, whom he followed to Lahore. He finally settled at Dehanpur, near Sarhind (Sirhind) in the Panjāb, where he founded the sect which bears his name.

Bābā Lāl was one of those Indian reformers of the 16th and 17th cents. who, like Kabīr, Dādū, and the Emperor Akbar, endeavoured to found a purely monotheistic religion, combining elements derived partly from the beliefs of the Musalman Sūfis and partly from those of the followers of the Hindū Bhakti-mārga. Like Kabīr, he followed the Bhakti-mārga in the name by which he referred to the Supreme, viz. Rāma; but also, as in Kabīr's teaching, this Rāma was not to him the Deity incarnate as the earthly prince of Oudh, but was God the Father Himself, or, in other words, Rāma after he had returned to heaven from his incarnate sojourn upon earth. The doctrine of incarnation, which is an important part of the teaching of the Bhakti-mārga, had no place in his system. On the other hand, as in the Bhakti-mārga and as in Sūfiism, the keynote of his system was an all-absorbing love directed to a gracious personal God. As he himself says, 'The feelings of a perfect disciple have not been, and cannot be, described; as it is said: "A person asked me, What are the sensations of a lover?" I replied: "When you are a lover, you will know."'

Bābā Lāl's doctrine attracted the attention of the liberal-minded prince Dārā Shukoh, the eldest and favourite son of the Emperor Shāh Jahān, who sent for him and had several interviews with him in the year A.D. 1649. A report of these interviews is preserved in a Persian work entitled the *Nādiru'n-nikāt*, our only authority on Bābā Lāl's teaching. From this we gather that, besides the devoted love which was the essence and foundation of his religion, he taught that the human soul is a particle of the Supreme Soul, just as water contained in a flask is a part of the water of, say, the river Ganges. The flask which separates it from its source is the body, and blessed is the moment when the flask ceases to exist, and the water once contained in it can be reunited with the parent stream. The difference between the water in the flask and that in the Ganges is that a drop of wine added to the former would impart to

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* *JRAS*, 1892, pp. 701-705. † *Ib.* pp. 685-695.

‡ Of works belonging to this class the two following (published in A.H. 1318 and 1319 [=A.D. 1900-1901 respectively]), of which the present writer happens to possess copies, are in defence of Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī and against the claims of 'Abbās Efendi. The first is entitled *Ityānu'd-Dalīl li-man yurīdu'l-Iqbāla ila siwā'i's-sabīl*, and the second appears to be from the pen of Mīrzā Āqā Jān of Kāshān, called *Khādimu'llāh* ('the Servant of God'), who was for many years Bahā'u'llāh's amanuensis, and was afterwards among the most prominent of the supporters of Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī and the opponents of 'Abbās Efendi.

it its flavour, but would be lost in the river. Similarly the Supreme Soul, or in other words the Deity, is beyond accident, while the human soul is afflicted by sense and passion.

Withdrawal from worldly life is prudent, but not necessary. The real 'world' from which the disciple must withdraw is forgetfulness of God, not clothes, or wealth, or wife, or offspring. All created things are derived from one material source, or Nature, as the tree is derived from the seed, but the evolution of the former from the latter requires the interference of an evolving Cause, or the interposition of the Creator.

LITERATURE.—A fuller account of the sect will be found in Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus* (vol. I. of 'Works'), London, 1862, p. 347 ff., from which most of the above has been drawn.

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS.

[H. ZIMMERN.]

Introduction.—At the present moment it is an exceedingly difficult task to give a short comprehensive account of the Babylonian religion. In the first place, in spite of much diligent research, particularly in the course of the last two decades, the copious materials derived from the cuneiform inscriptions, which are ever increasing through new discoveries and publications, are far from being thoroughly investigated or arranged in a systematic form. The difficulty of acquiring a clear knowledge of the fundamental principles and the historical development of the Bab. religion is increased by its complex character, due to an intermingling, not only of Sumerian and Semitic, but of other foreign elements which find expression in it. Then, finally, it must be noted that among students of the subject great differences of opinion exist as to the essential character and historical evolution of this religion. In an objective account, such as is here demanded, these differences must necessarily be referred to. We have to deal, in the first place, with the following question: Are we to hold, with Winckler especially, that the religion of the Babylonians and their theory of the universe in general are to be regarded, at the time when our sources begin, *i.e.* about B.C. 3000, as essentially complete—a fixed system, based on astronomical principles, which arose in a period which, for us, is entirely pre-historic? Or, are the undoubted traces of the systematizing of the religion, which are found in our sources, and its close connexion with an astral scheme, only the product of a comparatively late period? Was it only in the post-Babylonian, the Hellenistic, period that the system was perfectly completed, instead of having taken place, as Winckler supposes, in the earliest known historical period? The present writer feels compelled, from his study and interpretation of the sources, to adopt an intermediate theory between the two extremes just mentioned. It seems to him undeniable that there was among the Babylonians, even at an early date, a tendency to reduce the world of the gods to a single system, and to carry out the law of correspondence between great and small, heavenly and earthly, time and space, the macrocosm and the microcosm. At the same time, he does not feel inclined to exclude the element of historical evolution from the actually known period of Assyro-Babylonian history to the same extent as Winckler does. In particular, it seems to him that the close connexion between almost all the chief deities and heavenly bodies and the proportionate distribution of the cosmos among them rest on a secondary element in our sources, which it is still possible to trace, at least partially, in the history. The present writer further feels inclined to ascribe a more individual character to the several Babylonian divinities than is done by Winckler, and to harbour a strong suspicion of the theory that even in ancient times the several divine forms were regarded in Babylonia as only partial manifestations of a single deity, so that they could at will be substituted for each other. Moreover, to a far larger extent than Winckler is disposed to admit, we seem to have to deal in the Babylonian religion with unreconciled differences, due partly to widely deviating local cults which once existed, and partly to the combination of Sumerian and Semitic elements already mentioned, as well as to the varied survivals from older stages of the Babylonian religion. We cannot, then, speak of a finished scheme as present in the Bab. *Weltanschauung* and consequently in its religion. At the same time, it must be conceded that Winckler's construction of a Bab. *Weltanschauung* has in many ways, in spite of its one-sidedness and evident exaggeration, made possible a better understanding of the religion of the Babylonians.

1. History: The principal places of worship and the character of the Babylonian religion in general.—At the very commencement of the cuneiform sources, about the year B.C. 3000, we find in the original documents—royal inscriptions and documents pertaining to civil law—a perfectly confusing multitude of divine figures and names of temples. On closer inspection, these distribute themselves among various local cults, which possess greater or less importance, according to the political or religious eminence of the respective seats of worship. Now, seeing that in Babylonia, in the earliest times, the seat of the supreme political power often changed, it is clear that the city-gods of different and successive capitals might, in turn, have supreme significance for the whole land—a significance which, as a rule, continued to influence the cult long after the city in question had lost its political supremacy. In connexion with this change of the seat of political power, it must early have been felt necessary to harmonize the local cults, which originally differed widely, and to bring the gods of the different places of worship into some definite relation to each other. In this way would be formed a divine State and divine families—preferably in the triad of father, mother, son—after the model of the earthly State and the human family. Along with this went the division of the different parts of the cosmos among the several gods. The matter is still further complicated by the fact that in most cases, particularly in towns of South and Middle Babylonia, the cult of an earlier Sumerian population was taken over by their Semitic successors. Here there must naturally have taken place new combinations of the original Sumerian and the imported Semitic religious ideas.

The most important seats of worship and their local deities which have to be considered are, proceeding from south to north, as follows: *Eridu* with the cult of Ea, *Uru* (Ur) with Sin (the moon-god), *Larsa* with Shamash (the sun-god), *Uruk* (Erech) with Anu and Ishtar-Nanâ, *Lagash* with Ningirsu, *Nippur* with Enlil, *Isin* with Bêlit-Isin, *Kish* with Zamama (Ninib), *Kutû* (Cuthah) with Nergal, *Babîlu* (Babylon) with Marduk (Merodach), *Barsip* (Borsippa) with Nabû (Nebo), *Sippar* with Shamash, *Akkad* with Ishtar-Anunîtu. In addition to these, we have in the Assyrian domain: *Ashshur* with the god Ashshur, *Ninua* (Nineveh) with Ishtar, *Arbail* (Arbela) with Ishtar, and in Mesopotamia *Harrân* with Sin.

Among these cities or seats of worship, Uruk, Nippur, and Eridu must in the earliest times have been very specially prominent, since their gods, Anu, Enlil, and Ea, occupy from ancient days the chief place in the Babylonian pantheon—a position which they retained (even if this was often a mere

form) down to the latest times. But Uru and Larsa must also at one time have held a chief place (as can be partially traced in the actual history), for their local deities, Sin and Shamash, play quite a pre-eminent part in the whole scheme of the Babylonian religion. We cannot say with equal certainty whether the important rôle assigned to Ishtar is due to her position as city-goddess of Uruk or as that of Akkad. Undoubtedly in the case of the cults of Shamash and Sin we have from the very beginning to do with worship of the sun and the moon; but it is not so certain that, in the later systematic scheme of the pantheon, the connexion of heaven with Anu, the earth with Enlil, and the water with Ea, corresponds entirely with the original nature of these three gods. Rather may it have been that, under the influence of the systematizing process which had set in, particular features connecting one of these gods with heaven, a second with earth, a third with water, were so utilized as afterwards to distinguish them sharply in these three directions, and to distribute the cosmos among them correspondingly. Again, in the case of Ishtar it is a question whether her cult had originally to do with the worship of the morning (and the evening) star, the planet Venus, or whether here once more the astral character of Ishtar is not a secondary phenomenon, so that we have originally in this deity a personification of fertility in human, animal, and plant life. It is still less certain that the gods Marduk, Nabû, Ninib, Nergal, who in later times were associated on the one hand with phases of the sun, and on the other with the four remaining planets known to the ancients, had, to begin with, any solar or astral significance. There is much, on the other hand, to indicate that the connexion of these gods with the heavenly bodies did not belong to their original cult and nature, but that other features connecting them with nature and human life are the real key to their original character.

Accordingly, we are of opinion that it is impossible to postulate a purely astral basis for the Babylonian religion, either in its Sumerian or its Semitic elements. On the other hand, it must certainly be granted that at a relatively very early date, *i.e.* partially at least, in the period represented by our oldest sources, all the chief gods, and not merely those who, like Shamash and Sin, had their origin in the worship of the heavenly bodies, had been connected with the stars and the cosmos, and that the Babylonian religion had assumed an astral stamp. This comes to light in all the outward forms of the religion, and finds particularly clear expression in the cults and the mythology. This wide-spread astral vein must undoubtedly be regarded as an inheritance from the Sumerians. In its origin it is connected with the remarkable conception of the world as a unity—another undoubted heirloom received from the Sumerians, which Winckler has set before us so clearly. According to this view of the universe, all phenomena in the macrocosm and in the microcosm, in heaven and on earth, are in a relation of mutual correspondence.

2. The chief figures of the pantheon.—Some of these have been already mentioned, but we must now proceed to notice and characterize them more fully.

Anu (Anum) stands at the head of the supreme divine triad—Anu, Enlil, Ea. Whatever may have been the original signification of the name, it was interpreted as meaning 'heaven,' corresponding to the Sumerian *ana*, 'heaven,' and thus the deity was regarded as the heaven-god, over-against Enlil (the earth-god) and Ea (the water-god). He was thought of as enthroned in heaven, especially on the northern pole, which is eternally at rest. Here he reigned as king and father of the gods, who, for their part, had their homes in the stars which circle round the pole. Even the evil demons are in the last resort subject to him. The chief seat of the worship of Anu was Uruk; but in later times he had also a temple at Ashshur, in common with the storm-god Adad. But, at least in the period known to us from our sources, his cult retired strangely into the background. On the other hand, he continues to play a certain part in the mythology, where he is regarded as the supreme disposer of all events. The high esteem which, notwithstanding, Anu at all periods continued to enjoy as the chief of the gods, can only be explained as the after effect of a wide-spread Anu-worship belonging to a pre-historic time. We find *Antu*, or *Anatu*, mentioned as the wife of Anu. She appears sometimes as the goddess of the earth, in contrast with her husband, the god of the heavens.

Enlil (Ellil)—a name which used to be generally misread *Bel*—is the second god of the highest triad. Here he is regarded as the lord of lands, as contrasted with Anu, the lord of the heavens. From the mythical (cosmic) great mountain of the world (earth-mountain), where he had his dwelling-place, he bears the frequent epithet of the 'great mountain.' His wife is called *Ninlil*, also *Bēlit-mātāte*, the 'lady of lands,' as well as *Bēlit-ile*, the 'lady of the gods,' the mother-goddess *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. Enlil's seat of worship was the city Nippur, with the temple E-kur, whose remains have been excavated by an American expedition. The worship of this deity must have held a specially important place in the earlier Babylonian period. This can be gathered, not only from the direct evidence of the excavations at Nippur, but also from the rôle which, down to the latest times, Enlil plays in the Bab. mythology (cf. the story of the Flood) and hymns. For, although in later days much which had been ascribed to Enlil was transferred to other gods, particularly to Marduk of Babylon, this very fact proves that at a certain period Enlil must have occupied the chief place.

Ea is the third god of the highest triad, and, as such, ruler of the water-depths. The pronunciation of the name as *Ea* has not yet been quite fully established. Perhaps, judging from the Ἀός in Damascius, the name ought rather to be read *Ae* or something similar. His seat of worship was Eridu in the south of Babylonia, lying near the sea and the embouchure of the Euphrates and the Tigris. The cult of Ea must also once have enjoyed the highest reputation, as is indicated by the after-effects in the myths (cf., again, the story of the Flood) and the literature of exorcism. Owing to the fact that at a later date the cult of Eridu came, in a way that is not yet quite clear, to be combined with the cult of Babylon, Ea as the father of Marduk remained an object of living worship to the latest period of the Babylonian religion. He is regarded as the one of the great gods who stands nearest to mankind, and is thus most ready to help in difficult situations, and who, as the wise god, the lord of wisdom, has always the necessary means of assistance at hand. In particular, he helps by means of his own element, the healing water of the streams and the underground springs, which play an exceedingly important part in exorcism—the peculiar domain of the Ea-cult. Here he is assisted by his son Marduk, who in this connexion is to be regarded not as the city-god of Babylon, but rather as a deity of Eridu, whose identification with the god of Babylon was only secondary. Ea's wife is *Damkina*.

Sin, the moon-god, the first of the second triad of gods consisting of Sin, Shamash, and Ishtar (or also Sin, Shamash, and Adad), is the city-god of

Uru (OT *Ur*) in South Babylonia, where his temple, *E-kishshirgal* ('house of light'), stood. But the Sin-cult had a strong hold at an early date also at Harrān in Mesopotamia. For even as early as the sources derived from Boghazköi (middle of the 2nd mill. B.C.), Sin of Harrān is mentioned. Here also a name readily applied to him is *Bēl-Ḫarrān*, 'lord of Harrān.' His wife is always called *Ningal*, 'the great lady,' 'the queen.' His son is Shamash, the sun-god (in Harrān, Nusku specially appears as the son of Sin). According to the one view at least, Ishtar is regarded as his daughter. The figure of Sin was undoubtedly connected from the very first with the worship of the moon, for the name *Sin* was actually used by the Babylonians as an appellative for the moon. Moreover, in the hymns addressed to Sin his character as moon-god is quite clear; and it may be noted in this connexion that the moon-god is regarded as a pre-eminently benignant and well-disposed deity. Also connected with the moon is Sin's rôle as the god of oracles, although in this respect he is somewhat overshadowed by Shamash, the oracle-god *κατ' ἐξοχήν*.

Shamash, the sun-god, comes next to Sin in the series of deities, and is regarded as his son—a circumstance to be explained perhaps by a later sun-cult having displaced an earlier cult of the moon. In the case of Shamash also the name of the god is identical with the Babylonian and the common Semitic name for the sun, so that here also the connexion of this deity with the great star of day is at all events original. The sun-god, moreover, of Babylonian religion is always of the male sex; whereas in South Arabia, *e.g.*, the sun was worshipped as a goddess. The seats of worship peculiar to Shamash are: in Southern Babylonia, Larsa; in Northern, Sippar. In both of these places his temple was called *E-babbar*, 'clear shining house,' that which 'is as the dwelling of heaven.' His wife or mistress is *Aja*, 'the bride.' As son of Sin he is also regarded as the brother of Ishtar. As children of his we find mentioned Kettu, 'justice,' and Mēsharu, 'rectitude'—personifications of qualities which belong to Shamash pre-eminently as the supreme divine judge. There is further associated with him his charioteer, Bunene. In many hymns Shamash is celebrated as the sun-god, who every morning favours mankind with his light, who is the champion of all good and the enemy and avenger of all evil. Thus he is specially regarded, as is noted above, as the supreme judge in heaven and on the earth, to whom all legislation is ascribed (cf. the introduction to the laws of Ḫammurabi and the relief figure of Shamash on the stele containing this code). As sun-god he was at the same time the supreme oracle-god, in whose name all soothsaying was carried on, and who was the patron-god of the gild of soothsaying priests which held so important a place in Babylonia.

Ishtar, often placed third in the triad of divinities along with Sin and Shamash, is the most prominent female deity in the Babylonian pantheon. Starting with local cults in which, as a female deity, she occupied the chief place, Ishtar came in the end practically to absorb all other goddesses of the Assyro-Babylonian pantheon, so that her name became, even at an early date, a Bab. appellative for 'goddess.' Whether her cult, like that of Sin and Shamash, was from the beginning connected with star-worship—especially that of Venus—cannot be decided with certainty, although this connexion of Ishtar with the planet Venus and her character as 'queen of heaven' may go back to remote antiquity. The name *Ishtar*, whose origin and etymology are still matter of dispute, does not enable us to come to any definite conclusion on this point. As little can we gather any certain information from the Astarte figures of the other Semitic religions, which are in name and character closely related to the Babylonian Ishtar. Possibly we ought rather to assume a greater antiquity for her character as the goddess of fertility. Her principal seats of worship were Uruk (where she was also worshipped as Nanā), Akkad (here worshipped as Anunītu), Nineveh, and Arbela. Here too, as is indicated by the very names Nanā and Anunītu, we have undoubtedly to do with what were originally independent local deities, who came only in the course of time to be connected and identified. This no doubt also accounts for the way in which, in the later Assyro-Babylonian religion, quite heterogeneous elements are combined in the figure of Ishtar. Her many-sided origin is again reflected in the varying genealogical relation in which she is placed to the other gods. Thus she appears at one time as the daughter of Anu, at another as the daughter of Sin. The following are the most prominent of the varied qualities of Ishtar. She is the goddess of love and of the life of Nature in general, the goddess in whose cult, particularly at Uruk, temple-prostitution was a feature. In the mythological literature, especially in 'Ishtar's descent to Hades,' this characteristic of Ishtar as the goddess of the sexual impulse occupies a prominent place. On the other hand, she is expressly the goddess of war and of the chase. In this aspect she is hailed with predilection by the Assyrian kings who were lovers of war and the chase. The character of a mother-goddess appears to have been attached to the person of Ishtar only after the figures of other mother-goddesses, particularly Ninlil (Bēlit-ile) and Damkina, had been assimilated by her. In respect of astral connexion, we find Ishtar associated not only with the planet Venus, but also with the brightest fixed star Sirius. Her sacred animal is the lion, but perhaps the dove also belongs to her. In the countless hymns addressed to her Ishtar is hailed as goddess in all the aspects mentioned above. But these Ishtar-hymns sometimes reach also a relatively high ethical level, glorifying her as the mightiest and most merciful helper of mankind, who frees from curse and sickness, and forgives sin and guilt. A unique feature in Bab. mythology is the relation between Ishtar and Tammūz (see below, under 'Tammūz').

Marduk (OT *Merodach*), the city-god of Babylon, is, from the point of view of his significance in the Bab. mythology, most closely connected with the fate of the city of Babylon. Just as Babylon came to the front politically at a late date as compared with the other cities of Babylonia, but thereafter always overshadowed the whole in importance and power, so also Marduk is a younger figure in the Babylonian system of deities, and yet he finally comes near to absorbing all the other gods. The meaning of the name *Marduk* has not yet been satisfactorily explained. His temple in Babylon was called *E-sagila* ('lofty house'), with the temple-tower *E-temenanki* ('house of the foundation of heaven and earth'). Mention is found of his wife *Ṣarpanitu* ('the silver-gleaming one'), of his father Ea, and of his son Nabū. But this connecting of Marduk with Ea and Nabū is undoubtedly accounted for by an assimilation of the local cults of Eridu and Borsippa and their gods Ea and Nabū with those of Babylon. On the other hand, an original feature of the Marduk-cult at Babylon appears to be present in the fact that his chief feast, the later general New Year festival of Babylonia, fell at the time of the spring equinox. This fact, along with many other phenomena,

leads us to conclude that Marduk was essentially a deity who, as far as the year is concerned, was conceived as embodied in the spring sun bringing new life and light, and similarly embodied in the morning sun by day. At a still earlier date, perhaps, he was regarded as only a god of vegetation, who had his chief form of manifestation in the reviving vegetation of spring-time. On the other hand, the rôle of arbiter of destiny, which Marduk assumes at this New Year festival, seems to have been first taken over from Nabū. The same holds good with regard to further features, which came later to be regarded as essential characteristics of Marduk, although certain original traits in his character may have facilitated this assimilation. Thus the quality of Marduk as the god of healing and the helper in all sickness and need—the rôle which he accordingly plays in the literature of exorcism—is derived, as we saw in the case of Ea, from the cult of Eridu. The same source, in all likelihood, is responsible for the emphasis laid on Marduk as the wise and prudent among the gods. In like manner, the rôle of creator, ascribed to Marduk in the Bab. mythology, was only secondary and transferred to him from other gods, like Enlil of Nippur and Ea of Eridu—a conclusion clearly indicated by the respective myths themselves. The connecting of Marduk with one of the planets—during the supremacy of the city of Babylon, with the clear shining Juppiter—is certainly not original, but merely a product of priestly astral speculation. We have still to mention that the proper name *Marduk* was, in the later period, more and more displaced by the appellative *bēlu*, 'the lord,' so that finally Marduk was almost exclusively designated as *Bēl*. In like manner, his spouse came to be called by preference *Bēlit*, 'lady.' In the extant hymns to Marduk naturally all the features are reflected which were finally ascribed to him as the supreme being, the king of all the gods. Like the hymns addressed to Ishtar and Shamash, the Marduk-hymns belong to the noblest and relatively highest ethical products of the Babylonian literature.

Nabū (OT *Nebo*), the city-god of Barsip (Borsippa), occupied, it would seem, in the more ancient period before the rise of Babylon as the recognized capital, a more important position than later, when in the system of the Babylonian priesthood he is regarded merely as 'son' of Marduk and as 'recorder' of destiny at the New Year festival. The name *Nabū* is Semitic, and signifies 'announcer.' What kind of 'announcement'—possibly that of destiny—is in view is uncertain. His later function, already mentioned as recorder, writer of destiny, at all events favours the notion that the determining of destiny belonged originally to him, and was perhaps transferred from him to Marduk. Nabū is regarded not only as the writer of destiny, but in general as the god of the art of writing and of science. Among other essential qualities of Nabū we have to note that he often appears as a god of vegetation—probably one of the most original traits in his nature. On the other hand, Nabū probably owes his connexion with a planet—latterly Mercury, in the pre-Babylonian period possibly Juppiter—to priestly speculation, which drew all the deities into its astro-mythological system. The same reason will account also for sporadic references associating him with the darker half of the year, in opposition to Marduk, the god of the bright half. The temple of Nabū in Borsippa bore the name *E-zida* ('perpetual house'), with the tower *E-urıminanki* ('house of the seven rulers of heaven and earth'). Nabū's wife is called *Tashmētu*, a personification of an abstract idea, 'audience,' without much living content. Nanā, too, frequently appears as the wife of Nabū, and so does Nisaba the goddess of corn.

Ninib is merely the conventional pronunciation of the name of a chief god of the Babylonians and Assyrians. Unfortunately we are still in ignorance as to the real phonetic reading of the name. Lately, indeed, we have got nearer the goal by the discovery that the Aramaic reproduction of the name of this god was composed of the consonants *'-n-w-š-t*; but opinion is still divided as to the Bab. prototype of this Aram. equivalent. Ninib originally belonged to the cult which had its seat at Nippur. Here he was regarded as the first-born son of Enlil, and the third of a triad composed of father, mother, and son (Enlil, Ninlil and Ninib), which we encounter in a similar fashion in most of the old Bab. seats of worship. His essential character is that of a mighty hero, who victoriously casts down all opposing powers—the aspect under which he was afterwards taken over by the Assyrians as specially the god of war and the chase. In this aspect Zamama of Kish closely resembles Ninib, and is occasionally directly identified with him. At the same time, Ninib is a god of healing—a quality which is specially ascribed also to his wife *Gula*, the great physician, the guardian patroness of the healing art. He is further regarded as a god of the fields—a trait which brings him into close contact with Ningirsu, the city-god of Lagash, a deity who in later times was very often directly identified with Ninib. Here again, perhaps, as in the similar case of Nabū, it is possible that this relation to vegetation is one of the oldest features in the character of Ninib. On the other hand, the solar and astral traits in Ninib may again be due to his introduction into the priestly astro-mythological system. As far as his solar character is concerned, it is still doubtful whether he is to be regarded as connected with the morning and spring sun, or rather to be thought of as associated with the sun of noon and summer. The planet associated with him is called Kaimānu (Kēwān)—the name in the Babylonian period at least for Saturn, but perhaps in the earlier period for Mars. In the heaven of fixed stars he was localized in Orion, and it is very likely that the conception of the constellation of Orion as a warrior goes back to the elevation of the warlike Ninib to the skies.

Nergal is properly the city-god of Kutū (OT *Cuthah*), where his temple bore the name of *E-shutlam*. The (Sumerian) name *Nergal* is unfortunately of uncertain significance, although the pronunciation is fixed by its reproduction in the OT and on other grounds. Nergal has quite a peculiar position in the Babylonian pantheon and mythology, being expressly the god of the under world, ruler of the realm of the dead, and as such the husband of *Ereṣh-kigal*, the sovereign lady of the under world (although goddesses with other names—Laṣ (Laz) and Mamītu—are associated with him as city-goddesses of Cuthah). It is very questionable, however, whether this relation of Nergal to the realm of the dead is original, and not a later development due to some other trait in his character, or some peculiarity of the city of Cuthah. Thus Nergal is also a god of plague and fever, and as such stands very close to Ira, the plague-god proper, and is often identified with him. Like Ninib, he also appears as the god of war and of the chase. Again, in the same way as Ninib, he also appears as a benevolent god of the fields, granting fertility. It is possible, as was suggested in the case of Ninib, that in this relation to vegetation is to be found the original feature of his character. On the other hand, the solar and astral associations may in his case also be secondary. For the connexion of Nergal with

the sun, the destructive influence of the noonday and midsummer sun would be the determining factor. As far as connexion with the planets is concerned, he was, at least in the Babylonian period, associated with Mars, but possibly at an earlier date with Saturn. In the firmament of fixed stars he was probably represented in the constellation of Leo (which was known in the Babylonian age), as we meet elsewhere with the lion as the symbol of Nergal.

Nusku (or Nushku), the meaning of whose name is still uncertain, belongs to the cult-group of Nippur, where he appears as the great plenipotentiary of Enlil. Besides, he is met with in the sphere of Sin of Harrān, and is here occasionally introduced directly as the son of Sin. As to his nature, we are at least certain that he is a god of light. Frequently his name even alternates with that of the fire-god Girru (Gibil). Hence, like the latter, Nusku is ethically regarded as the enemy and conqueror of all evil and the promoter of all good. As thus connected with the moon-god Sin, Nusku is specially associated with the sickle of the crescent moon.

Girru (the Sem. form of the Sumer. *Gibil*) is the personification of fire, the fire-god proper of the Bab. pantheon. As such, he is, for instance, the god of smith-craft; he is also the god of the holy sacrificial fire. But, above all, he readily assumes an ethical aspect, as the terrible god, who destroys evil by his purifying fire.

Ramman (also called **Adad**) is the special storm- and thunder-god of the Babylonians. Both forms of his name, Ramman and Adad, of which the latter is the more common in Assyria, are of Semitic origin, and may refer to the roar of the thunderstorm. It is likely that the designation Adad is not native to Assyro-Babylonia, but goes back to the Western Semitic *Hadad*. But in any case the figure of a storm-god as such is of very old standing in the Babylonian pantheon, being found even in the Sumerian period, when he seems to have borne the name *Ishkur*. The great importance assigned to the storm-god in the Babylonian pantheon is evident not only from the rôle which he plays in the myths (*e.g.* the story of the Flood), but also, *e.g.*, from the fact that, in the official lists of the gods, he often occupies the third place in the second divine triad, namely, Sin, Shamash, and Adad, instead of the usual Sin, Shamash, and Ishtar. As storm-god he was naturally hailed as the giver of the beneficent rains; while, on the other hand, by withholding rain he could bring drought and famine on the land. In his aspect as thunder-god he is readily viewed as one who by his thunder and lightning destroys the host of the enemy. His symbol is the thunderbolt, his sacred animal the ox. In Babylonia, among other seats of Ramman-worship, there is mention of Karkara and Khallab; in Assyria, at the ancient capital Ashshur, a temple was consecrated to him in common with Anu, who is represented as his father. Ramman also appears with Shamash as the god of oracles. The name of his wife is given as *Shala*.

Tammūz is a deity who occupies an altogether unique position in the Bab. pantheon. He does not belong to the number of the great principal gods. His cult must, notwithstanding, have enjoyed great prestige. This is indicated by the fact that the Tammūz-cult survived in the lands adjoining Babylonia on the west, and in the post-Babylonian period. The name *Tammūz* is derived from the Sumer. *Dumuzi*, and signifies literally 'real child'; the older form is *Dumuzi-zuab* = 'real child of the water-depths.' He is described as the god of the green plant-growth, which is produced and nourished by fresh water. For Tammūz is essentially the god of vegetation, whose reviving in spring and withering in midsummer this deity personifies. Our sources do not, so far at least, enable us to decide whether (as in the Egyptian Osiris-cult and probably in the later Tammuz-Adonis-cult outside Babylonia) the native Bab. Tammūz-cult saw in that deity a figure of human life with its growth and decay, and even included the hope of a continuance of life for man after death. One of the main features of this cult is the mourning for the premature death of the youthful Tammūz, which found expression in the weeping for him by male and female professional mourners—a custom witnessed to by a number of hymns referring to it. There are also traces of a joyous festival in honour of the revivification of Tammūz. The myth of Tammūz brings him into close connexion with Ishtar, making him her husband, or rather her lover. True, it is Ishtar also at whose door, according to the Gilgamesh epic, lies the responsibility for the yearly mourning for Tammūz. But side by side with this appears another conception, for instance in several Tammūz-hymns and in the so-called 'Descent of Ishtar to Hades,' according to which it is Ishtar that follows Tammūz to the depths of the under world and seeks to bring him up again. The sister of Tammūz, Geshtinanna, is also found playing this part.

Ashshur, the national god of the Assyrians, also deserves special mention. Originally the local god of the city bearing the same name, the old capital of Assyria, Ashshur thus gained the position of supreme god of Assyria. As such he appears at the time of the Assyrian supremacy especially as a god of war, who during campaigns gives the Assyrian kings victory over their enemies, and calls them to hold sway over all nations. It is easy to understand how all that was attributed originally to the supreme gods of Babylon—such as Anu, Enlil, and Marduk—came to be transferred, not only in the mythology but elsewhere, to Ashshur, as the chief god of Assyria. Thus, *e.g.*, he undertakes the conflict with the sea-monster Tiāmat, which plays so large a part in the Bab. Creation epic.

Finally, mention must be made of the names *Igigi* and *Anunnaki*—designations for the Bab. deities as a whole, in their arrangement as gods of heaven and gods of the earth (under world). In the astral sense, in particular, we have to understand by the *Igigi* the gods who were thought of as embodied in the stars above the horizon; while the star-gods, who had sunk below the horizon, were regarded as *Anunnaki*.

Alongside of the great gods, properly speaking, whose chief representatives have been described above, the Babylonians included in their religious system a great number of lesser divine beings. These again were divided into those who manifested a character positively good and well-disposed to mankind, and those who showed a disposition positively hostile to man, and a desire to injure him. To the *good spirits* belong, among others, the guardian deities (god and goddess), one of whom was supposed to be assigned to every man. The *evil demons* by a favourite conception make their appearance in groups of seven. They play a very important part in the literature of exorcism, as all misfortune and sickness against which the exorcisms were directed were traced back to their evil influence. In the same category with these evil demons were placed the spirits of the dead, the ghosts, to whom all kinds of hostile action towards the living were ascribed.

3. The myths and epics.—In the study of the Babylonian religion we have at our command a considerable treasure of myths and epics. The following is a list of those which are most important for our purpose, and thus far best known from the excavations: the Creation and cognate

myths, the Adapa myth, the story of the Flood with the other Atrakhasīs myths and the myth of the primeval kings, the Ira myth, the Labbu myth, the Zū myth, the Etana myth, Nergal and Eresh-kigal, Ishtar's descent to Hades, the Gilgamesh epic. Most of these literary remains are derived, in the form in which we now have them, for the greater part, from the library of Ashurbanipal. But internal and external evidence shows that their composition belongs to a much earlier period. In the case of some of them we have even actual copies of an earlier date (*c.* 2000–1500 B.C.).

(*a*) *The Creation.*—This part of the Babylonian mythology—partially known to us, even before the re-discovery of ancient Babylonia, from the Greek tradition of Berossus—receives fullest treatment in the cuneiform mythological literature in the seven-tablet epic *Enuma elish*, so called from its opening words. The contents are briefly as follows: Before the heavens and the earth were made, the primeval father Apsū and the primeval mother Tiāmat (both personifications of the primeval ocean) along with their son Mummu were in existence. From these in a succession of generations sprang the gods. Apsū and Tiāmat, disturbed in the peace they had up to this time enjoyed, and accordingly discontented with the new condition of affairs, devise a plan against the new world of gods. Apsū perishes at this stage. But Tiāmat vigorously prosecutes the scheme, and chooses for herself a new husband and assistant in the person of Kingu, to whom she gives the tablets of destiny. She attracts a section of gods to her side, and creates a number of monsters—the eleven—to help her in the battle against the gods. The contest at once begins. After several other gods have attempted in vain to overcome Tiāmat, Marduk at last offers to enter the lists against her. But he stipulates that, if he is victorious, the highest place among the gods shall in future belong to him. In a solemn conclave of the gods this condition is accepted, and homage is done to him as the future king of the gods. Then comes a detailed and most vivid picture of the preparations for the battle of Marduk with Tiāmat and of the battle itself. Marduk proves victor, and puts an end to Tiāmat. He then turns his attention to the gods in her train, overcomes these also, and makes them prisoners. In the same way he renders harmless the monsters she has created to assist her, and finally her husband Kingu suffers the same fate. Marduk then returns to the corpse of Tiamat and cuts it in two parts, from which he fashions the heavens and the earth. Then follow the several acts of creation. Accounts have been discovered of the formation of the heavenly bodies, and, after a large gap, the beginning of an account of the creation of man. The whole concludes with a hymn to Marduk as the creator-god. It is worthy of note that this version of the Creation myth is clearly adapted to the position of Marduk as city-god of Babylon, the rôle of creator being ascribed to him, although in other versions and at other centres of worship it was filled by such gods as Anu, Enlil, or Ea. The creation of the world by Marduk forms at the same time the festal legend of the Babylonian New Year festival, the creation of the world being evidently paralleled with the annual reviving of nature in the spring. Alongside of this highly detailed version of the Creation myth we possess a shorter one, which, apart from a number of other marked variations, differs from the other particularly in this, that it knows nothing of the battle of Marduk with Tiāmat, but describes the world as arising—here also out of the ocean—without conflict, in quite a peaceful manner.

(*b*) While, as yet at least, we cannot prove the existence in Babylon of a so-called Paradise legend proper, we have in the myth of *Adapa* a story which seems intended to explain the mortality of man as opposed to the immortality of the gods. Adapa, a son of Ea, has received from his father a high degree of wisdom—hence his designation 'the superlatively prudent' (*Atrakhasīs*)—but not the gift of eternal life. On account of an act of violence committed by him, he is cited to appear before the throne of Anu, the god of heaven. Adapa here had the opportunity, by partaking of the food and water of life which Anu offered him, of acquiring immortality for himself. But, acting on a prior counsel of Ea, he rejected the offered gifts, and thus forfeited eternal life.

(*c*) Between the Creation and the Flood the Bab. mythical chronology, at least as we know it from Berossus,—the cuneiform originals supply as yet only sporadic traces,—interposes a list of *ten primeval kings*, of whom the hero of the Flood, Utnapishtim-Atrakhasīs (in Berossus, *Xisuthros*), is the last. The inscriptions hitherto have yielded no details concerning any of these kings except the seventh in Berossus' list, Evedoranchos. According to them, Enmeduranki—the native form of the name—was king in Sippar, the city of the sun-god Shamash. The latter adopted him as his associate, and taught him all the secrets of the soothsayer's art. Hence Enmeduranki was regarded by the Babylonians as the ancestor of the highly esteemed soothsaying priests.

(*d*) It is most likely the same *Atrakhasīs* as the hero of the legend of the Flood that meets us in another mythical story. This myth tells how all kinds of plague, blight, pestilence, famine, and sickness were sent upon men by Enlil, the lord of gods, on account of their constantly repeated transgressions. But Atrakhasīs, who also appears in this myth as a confidant of Ea, always succeeds by his intercession in securing the cessation of the judgment. The connexion of this with the Flood myth is probably that the Flood was thought of as the last great judgment of Enlil on men because of their continual relapses into sin—a judgment from which there was no escape except for Atrakhasīs himself.

(*e*) It is not so certain whether the myth of the destroying god *Ira* should be placed in the same category, *i.e.* among the judgments preceding the Flood. In this myth Ira's plenipotentiary, Ishum, at his command traverses all lands, and works a frightful carnage among men.

(*f*) The Bab. *Flood narrative*, like that of the Creation, was long known from the pages of Berossus. In the original recovered by the excavations, the story forms part of the Gilgamesh epic, although there are clear indications that it once existed independently. The chief features of the story are briefly as follows. The gods in solemn assembly determine to send a flood in order to punish men for their sins (this is plainly stated, at least at the close of the narrative). The god Ea, who had been present at the council, reveals this design to a protégé of his, Utnapishtim—also called *Atrakhasīs*, 'the superlatively prudent'—of the city of Shurippak, and commands him to build a ship for his safety, and to take living creatures of every kind with him into it. Utnapishtim carries out the command, builds his ship according to a scale supplied by the god, and introduces his family and relatives, as well as all kinds of animals, into it. Shortly before the beginning of the flood, whose advent had been previously indicated to him by a divine sign, he enters the ship himself and closes the door, entrusting the steersman with the guidance of the vessel. Early next morning the flood breaks forth, accompanied by violent storms and thick darkness. The gods themselves are afraid of the

flood, and ascend to heaven. The mother of the gods laments over the destruction of her human offspring, and repents having given her assent to the flood in the conclave of the gods. Six days and six nights the flood rages. But on the seventh day the sea is calm and the storm ceases. Utnapishtim opens an air-hole, and the light falls on his cheeks. Then land begins to appear, and the ship grounds on the mountain Niṣir. After seven days, Utnapishtim lets a dove fly from the ship. But she comes back because she finds no resting-place. The same happens with a swallow, which Utnapishtim next sets free. At last a raven, which was the third bird liberated, does not return, having settled down to feed. Then Utnapishtim brings out all that are in the ship, and offers a sacrifice, whose sweet smell the gods perceive with pleasure. Then follows a scene in which the mother of the gods and Ea wrangle with Enlil for having caused the flood. Enlil himself, however, is enraged that all men did not perish, and that one, Utnapishtim, with his family, has been saved. In the end, however, he changes his mind, and even endows Utnapishtim and his wife with the divine nature, and removes them to the realm far distant, to the 'estuary of the streams.'

We do not purpose here to discuss the real meaning of the Babylonian Flood myth—a subject on which the opinions of students are very much divided. We may say, however, that in all probability no actual historical occurrence is even reflected in it; it is more likely that we have to do with a nature myth whose background is formed by events in the daily and yearly course of the sun.

(*g*) The subject of the *Labbu myth* is the raging of a fabulous lion-like monster, allied with a mythical water-serpent, against men on the earth. After vain attempts on the part of other gods, one god finally succeeds in overcoming this lion (*labbu*), and thereby procures for himself divine supremacy, as Marduk did after his victory over Tiāmat.

(*h*) The *Zū myth* relates how the tablets of destiny, whose possession ensures the supreme power, were once stolen from Enlil by the storm-god Zū. Here, again, the supremacy is promised to whoever recovers the tablets from Zū. And, as in the case of Tiāmat and of Labbu, it happens that various gods make vain attempts till at last—for so we may complete the defective text—one of them is successful.

(*i*) The *Etana myth* has for its principal figure Etana, a primeval hero, who seems to be regarded as the founder of the kingship on earth. In order to bring about the happy birth of his son, who is to be the first king on earth, he applies, by the advice of Shamash, to the eagle for help to bring from heaven the medicinal herb which shall secure a safe delivery. Etana, seated upon the eagle, undertakes a journey, described with epic fulness of detail, to the highest heaven, to the throne of the queen of heaven, Ishtar, where the wonder-working plant is kept. But when he has almost reached his goal, Etana is overcome with fear, and drags the eagle down with him till both fall on the earth. Unfortunately, the conclusion is wanting, but presumably it was to the effect that the child, in spite of the deadly fall of Etana, came happily into the world and became the ruler of the land. The same myth further tells how this eagle, as an enemy of the serpent, once devoured its brood, in return for which the serpent plucked his wings and left him in a pitiable condition in a ditch. This event seems to have taken place before the flight to heaven with Etana; hence we may assume that, after his misfortune with the serpent, the eagle regained his lost powers.

(*j*) The myth of *Nergal and Eresh-kigal* tells how Nergal effected a violent entrance into the under world and threatened its goddess, Eresh-kigal, but afterwards became her husband and king of that realm. The visit of Nergal to the lower world was occasioned by a dispute, caused by Nergal, between Eresh-kigal and the gods of the upper world. In his passage he is accompanied by twice seven fever-demons.

(*k*) The following are the principal points in the so-called *Descent of Ishtar to Hades*. Ishtar, the daughter of Sin, directs her steps to the realm of the dead, which, so far as its appearance and inhabitants are concerned, is painted in the darkest colours. On arriving at the door of the realm of death, she imperiously demands entrance from the doorkeeper, and, on the command of Eresh-kigal, this is granted. At every one of the seven doors, however, an article of clothing is taken from her by the doorkeepers, so that finally she has to enter the kingdom of the dead perfectly naked. Here she is imprisoned by Namtaru, at the command of his mistress Eresh-kigal. Coincident with Ishtar's descent to the lower world, all sexual intercourse ceases on earth among both men and animals. In this extremity Ea interposes. He creates a messenger, Ṣītushunamir, and sends him to the under world, with the result that Eresh-kigal, although against her will, commands Namtaru to sprinkle Ishtar with 'water of life' and to lead her out through the seven doors of the under world, restoring her garments as she goes. The conclusion of the mythical narrative then refers, in a way as yet not very clearly understood, to Tammūz, the youthful husband of Ishtar, and his worship, which seems to be connected with the cult of the dead.

(*l*) The *Gilgamesh epic* is, so far as we can now judge, the most extensive epic poem of the Babylonians. It is specially rich in mythological matter, and hence, in spite of its being for the most part a heroic epic, its main contents deserve to be indicated here. The story is as follows. Gilgamesh is the ruler of the city of Uruk. His yoke rests heavily on the citizens. In answer to the prayer of the people of Uruk, the goddess Aruru creates Eabani in order that he may go on adventures with Gilgamesh. Eabani, a creature possessed of great strength of body and violent sensual desires, dwells at first in the steppes with the wild beasts. It is only by means of a variety of treacherous devices, among which the seductive arts of a prostitute play the chief rôle, that he can be prevailed upon to enter Uruk and become the companion of Gilgamesh. Together, the two make an expedition to the cedar mountain in the East, where dwells the goddess Ishtar—probably the city-goddess of Uruk, who had been carried off by the Elamites—guarded by the watchman Ḫumbaba. Their aim is to kill the watchman and obtain possession of Ishtar. After a fierce conflict, Gilgamesh and Eabani succeed in slaying Ḫumbaba. Ishtar then offers her love to the victorious Gilgamesh, who, however, repels her advances, because she has had many lovers and has always destroyed them. Highly incensed at this affront, Ishtar gets her father Anu to create the ox of heaven, and sends him against Gilgamesh to destroy him. But Gilgamesh and Eabani succeed in slaying the ox, and thereby rouse afresh the wrath of Ishtar, who is besides cruelly taunted by Eabani. It may be as a consequence of this conduct that we find Eabani attacked by severe sickness which ends in his death. Gilgamesh, deeply affected by the death of his comrade, hurries unresting over the steppes. His object is to seek in the far distance, at 'the estuary of the streams,' his deified ancestor, Utnapishtim—

also called Khasīsatra (Atrakhasīs), 'the superlatively wise'—the hero of the Flood. But the way is exceedingly difficult. First it leads through the uncultivated steppe, where lions have their dens; then it goes through the dark mountain Mashu, whose entrance is guarded by two terrible scorpion-like men, who only with difficulty allow him to pass. When he emerges on the other side of the mountain Mashu, Gilgamesh comes to a wonderful park of the gods, lying on the seashore, where the goddess Ṣabītu, covered with a veil, sits on the 'throne of the sea.' From her Gilgamesh receives directions as to the way to Utnapishtim, and is advised to apply to his boatman in the neighbourhood that he may ferry him over the sea and the 'water of death' to his great ancestor. Gilgamesh follows this counsel, finds the boatman, and after all kinds of adventures, especially in crossing the 'water of death,' he reaches Utnapishtim. That hero imparts to the new arrival instruction regarding the meaning of human life, and, at his request, gives him a detailed account of the Flood and of his own translation to his present dwelling-place at the close of the Flood. It is, in fact, the Babylonian account of the Deluge, shortly sketched above, which is here interwoven as an episode into the Gilgamesh epic. At the close of this narrative, Utnapishtim and his wife have recourse to all kinds of magic manipulations, in order to assist their guest to 'life,' but only with very imperfect success. By direction of Utnapishtim, the boatman then causes Gilgamesh to bathe at the place of purification, and thereafter embarks with him to restore him to his home. Gilgamesh luckily finds in the deep waters a wonder-working plant mentioned by Utnapishtim, to which he gives the name 'when grey-haired, the man becomes young again.' This he intends to take with him to Uruk, to eat it, and to return to the condition of youth. But on the way the wondrous plant is snatched from him by a serpent. Great lamentation follows. Finally, along with the boatman, he reaches Uruk, but without the plant. The conclusion of the epic then relates how Gilgamesh, by means of necromancy, enters into communication with the spirit of his dead friend Eabani, and obtains information from him regarding the nature of the realm of the dead.

4. The realm of the dead and belief in a future life.—The ideas of the Babylonians regarding a life after death are to be discovered from various passages in the mythological literature containing descriptions of the realm of the dead: *e.g.* the Descent of Ishtar to Hades, the IInd, Xth, and XIIth tablets of the Gilgamesh epic, the myth of Nergal and Eresh-kigal, and a variety of sporadic passages. On the other hand, certain pictorial representations, the so-called Hades reliefs, which were formerly regarded as pictures of funeral rites and of the Babylonian hell, cannot, according to later investigation, be viewed in this light. The Bab. realm of the dead is depicted in the above passages as a dark place under the surface of the earth, full of dust, wherein the dead, clothed in winged raiment, spend a shadowy existence, having the dust of the earth as their food. The approach to this home of the dead appears to be situated in the western region of the earth, and is effected through seven gates, and therefore seven walls. The entrance is guarded by sentinels. The fate of the dead in the lower world seems to vary according to the way in which they passed from life—those, for instance, who fell in battle obtain a relatively endurable lot (drinking pure water)—or according to the degree in which they are provided with offerings by surviving relatives. The worst fate, according to Bab. notions, that could befall a dead person was to remain unburied. The judgment, too, which the *Anunnaki* pronounced at the entrance of a dead man into the under world no doubt determined largely the conditions of his sojourn there. The ruler of the realm of the dead is the goddess Eresh-kigal, also called Allatu, who is enthroned in a palace as queen. Her husband appears sometimes as Nergal and again as Ninazu. To her retinue belong also Bēlit-ṣēri, the great recorderess of the under world, and Namtaru, the attendant of Eresh-kigal, who carries out her commands. In this place of the departed there is also to be found a spring of 'the water of life,' which seems to be under the control of the *Anunnaki*. The fate of the dead in the under world seems, according to Bab. conceptions, to have been unalterable and permanent. Thus far, at all events, no certain traces have been found in the Bab. literature of any belief in a general resurrection or in the transmigration of souls. The deification of the kings in the old Bab. period—partially during their lifetime and especially after their death—is to be otherwise interpreted, and proves nothing regarding a belief in a general resurrection.

The cult of the dead had an important place in Babylonia and Assyria, although not nearly to the same extent as in Egypt. Among its rites were the arranging of the obsequies, coupled with the appropriate funeral dirge and the usual mourning ceremonies, as well as the regular provision of food and drink as offerings to the departed. The method of disposing of the corpse was always, at least in the historic period (as we learn from the inscriptions and the excavations), that of burial; and all kinds of ornaments and utensils accompanied the body into the grave.

5. Soothsaying and exorcism. — Soothsaying and exorcism in their various forms play a very large rôle in the Bab. religion. Both of these arts were not merely practised unofficially, but formed an important part of the official State religion. Thus in all the inscriptions of the Bab. and Assyr. kings, from the earliest to the latest date, we read of their having recourse to the soothsayer and exorcist at every critical moment of their undertakings as well as in connexion with all important religious ceremonies. This accounts for the high esteem which was always enjoyed by the priestly soothsayer and the priestly exorcist in Babylonia and Assyria. For the same reason the texts relating to soothsaying and exorcism are so exceedingly numerous as to form the chief component of the whole Bab. religious literature.

The principal spheres from which the soothsayer drew his omens were the heavens—particularly solar, lunar, and planetary phenomena—and entrails—particularly the liver of sheep offered in sacrifice. Thus, astrology on the one hand and examination of livers on the other could almost be described as the characteristic features of Bab. soothsaying. There were, however, numerous other phenomena from which omens were obtained. Thus, even as early as the Hammurabi period, we have texts relating to hydromancy. There are also numerous instances of soothsaying from dreams, from the action of animals of all kinds, especially from the flight of birds, from unnatural phenomena such as monstrous births — human or animal, — from atmospheric changes, and so on. The copious Bab. literature on the subject consists of exhaustive catechism-like text-books for the soothsaying priests. All possible occurrences are casuistically stated, and their various interpretations given, according to a scheme such as the following: 'If such and such is the condition of the liver of the sheep, then the king (or the land) will have such and such an experience (happy or otherwise).' Inscribed clay models of sheep livers, of which only two specimens have as yet been discovered, were

even used to educate in this kind of soothsaying. There have also come down to us very minute instructions regarding the ritual to be observed in practising the art in question. The patron of the soothsaying priests was Shamash, although Adad's name is frequently coupled with his as occupying a secondary place.

From a religious point of view a much higher stage than this act of soothsaying in the narrower sense exhibits is to be found in oracular responses of a comforting and encouraging character, which were given by priests and especially by priestesses, in the name of the deity. But the extant literature belonging to this department cannot with certainty be dated earlier than the 7th cent., the time of Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal.

The art of exorcism occupies a similarly important place in the Assyro-Babylonian religion. The priest-exorcist found his sphere of work especially in cases of sickness, where the function of the physician was only gradually evolved from that of the exorcist. It was the duty of the latter to remove the ban which was supposed to lie on the sick person, and to drive out the hostile demons who had presumably caused the trouble. But in addition to cases of actual sickness, the exorcist was called in whenever there was any suspicion of enchantment by evil demons or human beings—witches and wizards—who were conceived to act as the instruments of demons. In the same way it fell to the exorcist to assist at all kinds of ceremonial actions, such as the consecration of temples, the erection of pictures of the gods, etc., and also at the worship of the dead—in short, on every occasion on which men believed they had to fear the interposition of hostile divine powers, and where accordingly the exorcist by means of his charms would be able to counteract the activity of evil spirits. The means used by the exorcist in the ritual consisted, in the first place, in the repetition of incantations, a huge mass of which have been handed down to us in the Babylonian and Assyrian literatures. In addition, there were a great many ritual actions, such as sprinkling with water, smearing the body of the patient, the practice of symbolic ceremonies such as the burning of all kinds of objects, and the like. An important rôle was played also by the penitent who was the subject of exorcism. He had to take a multiform part in the whole proceeding, by recitation and various other actions, such as casting himself on the ground, kneeling, etc. As in the case of soothsaying so in the service of exorcism, an extremely complicated ritual was in use, of which we possess extensive fragments in the form of texts relating to liturgical arrangements. Ea and Marduk appear as the chief gods of the exorcist cult. Eridu, the seat of Ea's worship, is regarded as the home of the rites of exorcism.

6. Hymns and prayers.—The Bab. hymns and prayers to the gods reach a much higher religious level than the extensive literature of soothsaying and exorcism. Here again a large literature is at our disposal, although much of it is unfortunately as yet in a very fragmentary condition. This hymn-literature, as we are now able to prove from identical copies belonging to the old Bab. period, emanated preponderatingly from this very early date. From that time they were handed down with little variation, through thousands of years, to the latest times of the cuneiform inscriptions. We obtain from these hymns valuable insight into the religious ideas of the earliest Babylonian period. On the other hand, they can hardly be used as sources for the knowledge of the Assyro-Babylonian religion of the later epochs. For this we have rather to take account of the prayers and hymn-like invocations which are frequently introduced in the royal inscriptions of Bab. and Assyr. rulers, and whose date can thus be exactly fixed. It must also be noted that the Babylonian hymnology, so far as yet known, is almost exclusively of a liturgical character. Further, by far the greater number of the hymns in question belong to the ritual of exorcism, although the connexion of a hymn with this cult must often have been only secondary. As to form, the Bab. hymns are, as was to be expected, characterized by a strongly marked rhythm. This strikes the eye at once from the fact that the verses each occupy a separate line, and often half-verses are indicated by the writing being in columns. The same impression is made on the eye by the frequent combination of two verses into a double verse. Similar phenomena are found in the other poetical literature of the Babylonians, in the myths, epics, incantations, etc.

Most of the liturgical pieces, so far as they are not formulæ for exorcism, consist of festal hymns in honour of a god or goddess. These were sung by the priests or priestesses on the particular feast days, and were intended for the glorification of a particular deity—often through the description of his exploits as portrayed in the myths. Thus we possess a series of New Year hymns, which were intended to be sung at the New Year festival, Marduk's festival in the spring. So there are a number of hymns to Tammūz, which no doubt were used especially on the occasions of the weeping for Tammūz and the rejoicing for his return. In the case of many other hymns, such, for instance, as those to Sin, Shamash, or Ishtar, there is little doubt that these also were intended mainly for festivals in honour of these deities. On the other hand, the numerous incantation hymns, as is at once indicated through their frequent introduction into the exorcistic liturgies, were destined for the mouth either of the priest or of the penitent, to be employed for purposes of exorcism. These incantation formulæ, like the act of exorcism itself, exhibit a fixed type, the different successive acts of the ritual finding expression in the hymn, now in a shorter and now in a longer form. In the case of the priest we have the recitation of his credentials, the description of the action of the demon, the praise of the god who overcomes the hostile demon, and finally the act of exorcism proper. In the case of the penitent, there is the confession of sin, the singing of a lament, the repetition of a penitential litany, and, finally, the offering of a prayer of thanksgiving, and the singing of a hymn of praise for the divine help received. So far as their contents are concerned, we constantly encounter, alike in the festal hymns and the incantation formulæ, the most elevated religious and ethical conceptions to be met with in the whole Babylonian literature.

7. Temples, priests, sacrifices, rites, festivals.—The inscriptions, from the earliest to the latest period, all go to show how numerous were the *temples* which the Babylonians and Assyrians erected for the worship of their gods. Not only had every city-god his chief sanctuary at his special seat of worship, but also all the gods belonging to the same group with him, as well as a multitude of gods outside it, had temples erected for their worship, at least in all the larger cities. The structural plan of the Babylonian temple can to a certain extent be gathered from the numerous inscriptions of Bab. and Assyr. kings relating to temples built by them. Lately our information has been extended by the discoveries in Nippur, Babylon, and Ashshur, where a number of ground-plans have been unearthed. Allowing for all kinds of variations in detail, the general type of building seems to have been as follows. A large rectangular

court, approached through a smaller fore-court, occupied the principal space. At the end farthest from the entrance there was a small sanctuary, the most holy place of the temple, where the image of the god was set up. At the sides of the great hall there were to be found a variety of side-chambers, used for keeping the temple-vessels, and as apartments for the priests. The temple proper had attached to it a storeyed tower (*ziqqurat*) rising from a square foundation. This tower was regarded as specially sacred, and bore a special name. Like the temple as a whole, the tower in particular was looked on as an earthly copy of the world-structure, which was also conceived as of storeyed form. The tower seems also to have been frequently looked on as the 'grave' of the god to whom the temple belonged. The names of the temples and temple-towers belong almost exclusively to the old sacred Sumerian language —an indication of the influence which ideas originally Sumerian continued to exert on the Bab. cult. We must note also a very important part that was played by the temples in the great cities such as Babylon, Nippur, and Sippar, altogether apart from the religious sphere. Owing to their possession of extensive lands and their wealth derived from other sources, they were a determining factor in the economic life of Babylon, becoming to a large extent centres of trade. Proof of this is found in the numerous commercial contracts, belonging to the earliest as well as the latest period, which have been discovered in the temple archives.

In view of the important place which religion occupied in the life of the Babylonians and Assyrians, the prestige and power of the *priests* were at all periods naturally very great. Whenever any of the kings, as, *e.g.*, Sennacherib, attempted to free himself from the tyranny of the priesthood, his action simply recoiled upon himself, and a reaction always set in which only intensified the power of the priests. The subdivisions of the priesthood were many, as is sufficiently evidenced by the great variety of designations applied to them. A specially important place was held by the priestly soothsayers and the exorcists or propitiatory priests, whose functions have been dealt with in the foregoing section on 'Soothsaying and exorcism.' A peculiar position was occupied also by the priestly musicians, whose duty it was to sing the hymns in the performance of the cult. For each of these separate classes of priests there were special ritual instructions, which are still partially extant. These give most minute directions regarding the separate functions of the priests in the various acts of worship. The different classes of priests also formed among themselves exclusive bodies with their own traditions. In this connexion the gild of soothsayers was specially exclusive, the office descending from father to son, and very strict rules being laid down as to physical condition as a qualification for priestly service. Similar, though presumably not quite so stringent, regulations would apply to other priestly gilds. The fact that the arts of reading and writing, and indeed every branch of knowledge, were in the hands of the priests, readily explains why in the Bab. literature almost every subject is looked at from the point of view of religion and priestly wisdom. This knowledge as well as acquaintance with writing and literature—in Babylonia no easy attainment—were communicated esoterically in the priestly schools, where successive generations of priests underwent long years of instruction. Of this we have abundant evidence through our possession of the actual tablets used in this training. Priestesses are also repeatedly to be met with in Babylonia, especially in connexion with the cult of Ishtar; but women make their appearance in the cult more especially as discharging the function of *hierodouloi* or temple-prostitutes.

At all periods of the Assyro-Babylonian religion the *sacrificial system* was extensive and multiform. Much can be gathered about Bab. sacrificial customs not only from numerous notices in the inscriptions, but also from pictorial representations of sacrificial scenes. Very frequently the sacrifice is regarded, quite in accordance with its original idea, as a gift, supplying the god with food or drink, or (in the case of the 'incense'-offering) causing him to smell a sweet odour. But in other passages the idea clearly emerges that the animal sacrifice is a substitute for a human sacrifice that would otherwise have to be offered to the gods. At the same time, there is not any certain trace of actual human sacrifice either in the literature or in the pictorial representations. The offerings came to be regarded to a large extent as simply a temple-due, and as means of support for the numerous priests. The materials of the bloodless offerings were chiefly bread, wine, water, mead, honey, butter, milk, oil, grain, and fruit. The animal sacrifices usually consisted of oxen and sheep, but other domestic animals were also offered, as well as fowls and fish, and even wild animals. For the 'incense'-offering cedar and cypress wood, and flour, cane, and myrtle were used. In the case of the animal sacrifices, definite parts were reserved for the god, while other parts became the portion of the priests. Strangely enough, the blood of the sacrificial victim does not seem to have played any conspicuous part in the Bab. ritual. In addition to the offerings proper, it was customary at all periods of Bab. antiquity to bring the most varied gifts to the temple as votive offerings.

Side by side with sacrifices and votive offerings, there was a great variety of other *rites* in the Bab. religion. Among these an important place is held by the propitiatory rites practised by the exorcizing priests, who have been referred to in the section on 'Soothsaying and exorcism.' Then we have also the mourning customs connected with the cult of the dead. These included such practices as the beating of the thigh and the breast, the plucking out of the beard, and the mutilation of the body by means of knives. The supreme occasions of the cult were naturally *the festivals*. Of these by far the most prominent was the Babylonian New Year festival. This feast was in earlier times held in honour of other gods. But when the Marduk-cult of the capital, Babylon, came to the forefront, the New Year feast became at once the chief festival of Marduk and the greatest and most important festival in the Bab. calendar. It was celebrated on the first days of the month Nisan, at the time of the spring equinox. One feature of it was a procession, in which the image of Marduk was taken in a gorgeously equipped ship-car along the festal street from his temple, E-sagilā, to the house of the New Year festival, and thence back to his temple. Neighbouring towns also brought the images of their gods to Babylon to join in this procession. At the time of the festival the gods were supposed to sit in solemn conclave, under the presidency of Marduk, in the chamber of destiny, in order to determine the fates for the coming year. Among other festivals mentioned in the Bab. literature, a special place belongs to the lament for Tammūz in midsummer, in the month called after him. Prominent also is the feast of Ishtar in the following month, Ab. Among the days of each month the 7th, 14th, 21st, 28th, and also the 19th were supposed to be specially unlucky, and therefore there was a general suspension of business on these days.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE CHARACTER OF THE BABYLONIAN RELIGION.—It is very difficult to form a just estimate of the value and relative standing of Babylonian religious thought. This is due to the fact that we are for the most part dependent on official documents, such as royal inscriptions, liturgical collections, etc.; we have very few documents of a private and individual nature which would give us actual insight into the religious ideas which the people connected with the external and traditional ritual forms and doctrines. But we may regard it as practically certain that in course of time, even when external religious forms were retained unaltered, the mental attitude towards them underwent important changes. This may be assumed, in particular, for the later Assyrian and the New Bab. period, and it finds support in isolated expressions in the inscriptions. Again, it is difficult to judge whether, and to what extent, there existed a simple unquestioning piety among the people, alongside of the learning and partially conscious deception of the priestly speculations. The presence among the Babylonians of this simple piety, a child-like trust in the divine help in all situations of life, is proved—and that even in the earliest period—by many deeply religious passages in the hymns and prayers, as well as by other indications, *e.g.* the religious ideas which find expression in the formation of Bab. proper names. The religious sense of the Babylonians admittedly never rose beyond a certain limit. They never attained to a stage at all corresponding to the ethical monotheism of the Hebrew prophets, or even the ethically elevated Ahura Mazda religion of the Persians. A purer development of the nobler germs present in the Babylonian religion was hampered by the strong predominance of the magical and superstitious element, which at all periods played so great a part in it. At the same time, the Babylonian religion is a historical factor whose importance in its own genus must be fully recognized. Even the strong emphasis laid on the astral element led, in movements historically connected with it, to many pure and elevated ideas, if also to much that was abstruse and superstitious.

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II. *ON SPECIAL POINTS.*—In addition to the general accounts contained in the works just cited, cf. the following (omitting works which consist exclusively of editions of the original texts):

(*a*) *Myths and Epics*: P. Jensen, 'Assyr.-bab. Mythen und Epen,' Berlin, 1900 (*KIB* vi. 1); L. W. King, *The Seven Tablets of Creation*, 2 vols., London, 1902; F. Hrozný, 'Sumer.-bab. Mythen von dem Gotte Ninrag (Ninib),' Berlin, 1903 (*Mitteil. der vorderas. Gesellschaft*, viii. 5); P. Dhorme, *Choix de textes rel. assyr.-bab.*, Paris, 1907.

(*b*) *Realm of the dead and belief in a future life*: A. Jeremias, *Die bab.-assyr. Vorstellungen vom Leben nach dem Tode*, Leipzig, 1887, also 'Holle und Paradies bei den Babyloniern'[2], Leipzig, 1903 (*Der Alte Orient*, i. 3).

(*c*) *Soothsaying and Exorcism*: K. Tallqvist, *Die Assyr. Beschworungsserie Maqlû*, Leipzig, 1895; H. Zimmern, 'Die Beschwörungstafeln "Shurpu",' in his *Beitrage zur Kenntnis der bab. Rel.* (i.), Leipzig, 1896; J. A. Knudtzon, *Assyr. Gebete an den Sonnengott*, Leipzig, 1893; R. C. Thompson, *The Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, 2 vols., London, 1903–1904, also *The Reports of the Magicians and Astrologers of Nineveh and Babylon*, 2 vols., London, 1900; J. Hunger, *Becherwahrsagung bei den Babyloniern*, Leipzig, 1903; D. W. Myhrman, 'Die Labartu-Texte,' in *ZA* xvi., 1902; A. Boissier, *Choix de textes relatifs à la divination assyr.-bab.*, 2 vols., Geneva, 1905–1906; F. Küchler, *Beitrage zur Kenntnis der assyr.-babylonischen Medizin*, Leipzig, 1904; C. Virolleaud, *L'astrologie chaldéenne*, Paris, 1903 ff.; C. Fossey, *La magie assyrienne*, Paris, 1902; K. Frank, *Bab. Beschwörungsreliefs*, Leipzig, 1908

(*d*) *Hymns and Prayers*: H. Zimmern, *Bab. Busspsalmen*, Leipzig, 1885, also 'Bab. Hymnen u. Gebete in Auswahl,' Leipzig, 1905 (*Der Alte Orient*, vii. 3), and 'Sumer.-bab. Tamüzlieder,' Leipzig, 1907 (*SSGW*, philol.-histor. Klasse, lix. 4); L. W. King, *Bab. Magic and Sorcery*, London, 1896; F. Hehn, 'Hymnen und Gebete an Marduk,' in *Beitrage zur Assyriologie*, v. 3, 1905; J. Bollenrücher, *Gebete und Hymnen an Nergal*, Leipzig, 1904; E. G. Perry, *Hymnen und Gebete an Sin*, Leipzig, 1907; Et. Combe, *Hist. du culte de Sin*, Paris, 1908; S. Langdon, *Sumerian and Bab. Psalms*, Paris, 1909.

(*e*) *Rites, Festivals, etc.*: H. Zimmern, 'Ritualtafeln für den Wahrsager, Beschworer und Sanger,' in his *Beitrage zur Kenntnis der bab. Rel.*, ii., Leipzig, 1901, also 'Zum bab. Neujahrsfest,' Leipzig, 1906 (*SSGW*, philol.-histor. Klasse, lviii. 3); W. Schrank, *Bab. Sühnriten*, Leipzig, 1908; J. Morgenstern, 'The Doctrine of Sin in the Bab. Religion,' Berlin, 1905 (*Mitteil. der vorderas. Gesellschaft*, x. 3).

(*f*) *Miscellaneous*: F. Martin, *Textes religieux assyr. et bab.*, Paris, 1900, 1903; E. Behrens, *Assyr.-bab. Briefe kultischen Inhalts aus der Sargonidenzeit*, Leipzig, 1906; K. Frank, *Bilder und Symbole bab.-assyr. Gotter*, Leipzig, 1906; J. Hehn, *Siebenzahl und Sabbat bei den Babyloniern und im AT*, Leipzig, 1907.

H. ZIMMERN.

BACKSLIDING.—A falling from grace after identification with religion, a reversion to sin and worldly ways after conversion, or a return to old habits after reformation. The term historically has several times shifted the centre of weight of meaning. One can distinguish perhaps four different qualities of interpretation, although the various meanings will much overlap. (1) The first is that before it acquired any special technical significance. This applies, for example, to the use of 'backsliding' (קְשׁוּבָה) in the OT, although the more special sense is recognized in the numerous Scripture precepts to constancy, and in such examples as Saul, Judas, and Demas. Our Lord predicts times of falling away in times of trial (Mt 24[10. 12]) and the First Epistle of John and the Epistle to the Hebrews are full of warnings against the same danger. During early Christian centuries the fact of backsliding was also fully appreciated, but the content of the term had its discussion chiefly under the heading of 'apostasy' (*q.v.*), or of 'perseverance' (*q.v.*).

(2) The second stage in its use was that in which it assumed a theological meaning. It was at the time of and following the Calvinist and Arminian controversy that the distinctly practical human interest in the idea was drafted off in the direction of speculative theology. If the salvation of the elect is foreordained, how can it be otherwise than that the chosen of the Lord shall persevere to the end? The Arminians said, however, that if the will of man is in any sense free, if the unction of the gospel has any significance, and if the efforts of the righteous have any value, there must be not only the possibility, but the danger of falling away. The Arminians busied themselves in explaining away such passages as Ro 8[28-30], which formulate a doctrine of predestination and election, and in softening the 'impossibility of repentance' on the part of those who 'fall away,' as presented in He 6[4-6] (cf., *e.g.*, Tillotson, *Works* [London, 1820], vi. 65 ff.). It is an interesting fact that Calvinists have been almost as diligent in preaching the need

of perseverance as have the Arminians. Jonathan Edwards, for example, writes:

'As persons are commanded and counselled to repent and be converted, though it is already determined whether they shall be converted or no; after the same manner, and with the same propriety, persons are commanded and counselled to persevere, although by their being already converted, it is certain that they shall persevere. By their resolutely and steadfastly persevering through all difficulties, opposition, and trials, they obtain an evidence of the truth and soundness of their conversion; and by their unstableness and backsliding, they procure an evidence of their unsoundness and hypocrisy' (*Works*, N.Y. 1830, vol. VII. p. 483).

(3) Another change in meaning was that in which the idea assumed an evangelistic flavour. After pronounced conversions came to receive a high degree of emphasis among Protestants as the desirable, if not the only, method of regeneration, the danger of backsliding came to be accepted as a matter of course, and was made the subject of the most zealous admonitions and sermons (cf. Baxter, *Works* [London, 1830], iv. 351–371). The need of a 'renewal' after backsliding was a common experience, and the frequency of such an occurrence may be regarded as the occasion of the formulation of the notion of the 'second experience' or 'sanctification' (*q.v.*).

(4) Later there has arisen the psychological interpretation of the term. Even at the height of the evangelical interest in the question, say during the first half of the nineteenth century, the groundwork was being laid for an explanation of the lapses from the lively experiences at the inception of the religious life. Among the causes of backsliding usually specified in treatises and theological dictionaries were: 'the cares of the world, improper connexions, inattention to secret and closet duties, self-conceit and dependence, indolence and listening to and parleying with temptations.' As early as 1835 there was published a novel in Boston, entitled *The Backslider*, the chief point of which seems to have been to show the differences in the temperamental and other characteristics of the hero and heroine of the tale, which would account for the constancy of the one and the backsliding of the other; and a reviewer in the *Christian Register* [1836], vol. ii. pp. 198–206) expresses the conviction that we shall 'succeed in the attempt to arrange the present multifarious mass of mental phenomena, and evolve the first principles to which they must all be referable,' as is being done in the material sciences; and he appeals by analogy to the success of Mr. Louis in the investigation of the causes and conditions of diseases. Recently, something of a study has been made, of a statistical and psychological character, upon backsliding (see Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*, 1899, pp. 354–391).

It appears that nearly all persons who experience conversion are sooner or later beset with difficulties. When the character of these difficulties is catalogued, they are clearly the same in kind, essentially, as those which ordinarily belong to adolescent development when not attended with conversion. It is worthy of note that the frequency of troubles is slightly greater among those who have undergone conversion than among the others. One may look for the cause of this difference in several directions. In the first place, those who experience conversion are more open to suggestion and more impressionable, and accordingly more liable to have mental crises. Their emotional difficulties predominate, while intellectual doubts and questionings are more common among those whose growth is not attended by conversion. The difference seems to be due in part, likewise, to the fact that at conversion the ideal life and the past life are brought into definite conflict. There is a sharper cleavage between the higher and lower selves; an ideal is established which is more difficult to attain because of its great incongruity with the old life. The person is suddenly expected to identify himself with the conventional ways of the Churches, which are at variance with his usual habits of life. It seems natural, if these causes obtain, that the conflict and friction in the adjustment of life to the new standard should be greater in the case of the conversion type.

Still another cause of backsliding is the persistence of old habits which for the time have lost their force, and are hidden from view in the presence of new lines of activity. When, after a time, the newly-acquired enthusiasm has partially spent itself, the old habits re-assert themselves. The difficulties usually continue until there is formed a new set of neural habits which correspond to the conduct of life on the spiritual plane, and have become so deeply ingrained that life expresses itself naturally and easily through them.

A very central condition underlying backsliding seems to be found in the natural tendency of human interests to ebb and flow. Nervous energy, when directed vigorously in a certain way, completely expends itself, and must then have a period of recuperation. Rhythms in the supply of available energy are fully recognized, as is shown in experiments upon continuous muscular activity, in the rise and fall of the wave of attention when focused upon a continuous object, in the successive presence and absence of a stimulus on the threshold of sensation, and in many like phenomena. It is observable in the spells of depression that follow an exceptionally busy day, and in subnormal temperatures following fever. Persons very active in religious matters are apt to have ups and downs in their degree of religious enthusiasm. Those have been found who have experienced wave-like fluctuations of religious interest at pretty regular intervals. If a rhythmical flow of energy is a law of life, it should be expected that, following the great enthusiasm attendant upon conversion, there should be a decline.

The rise and fall of religious feelings may sometimes be the attendant of other natural rhythms. One person reports that during five successive years he was awakened to a religious enthusiasm during the winter, which declined during the summer; and many other similar, though less striking, instances are on record. It has been ascertained by Malling-Hausen that physical growth is accelerated during the autumn months and retarded from April to July. The rise and fall of religious feeling may be conditioned somewhat by the rate of the metabolisms going on in the organism at different times of the year. It is an interesting coincidence that religious revivals are held most commonly during the winter.

There is a distinction between backsliding in so far as it affects the will-attitudes and that which centres in a fluctuation of warmth of feeling. While there are many instances of the former, due, perhaps, to the re-assertion of old habitual modes of reaction, the analysis of religious confessions shows another type, in whom the changed attitude towards life brought about through conversion is fairly constant, in spite of the fact that the intensity of their religious ardour suffers a decline. Their real religious status seems not to be affected even while they are inactive in the direction of the new life. These would seem to require a different spiritual regimen from those who backslide in the former sense.

The point of greatest practical significance, perhaps, in respect of the post-conversion experience, is that the new insight or mode of conduct, however genuine it may be, must, in order to be permanent, become so incorporated into a new set of neural habits that the new life may be as natural and spontaneous as the old. The former

type of life which is still structurally a part of consciousness, must either be refined and co-ordinated with the new, or the newly acquired spiritual selfhood become so persistent and constant as to draft off the available energy and so cast out the evil with the good.

LITERATURE. — **Tillotson**, *Works*, London, 1820, vi. 65 ff.; **Calvin**, *Institutes*, bk. iii. ch. 23; **Wesley**, *Works*, vi. 50 ff.; **Edwards**, *Works*, New York, 1830, vii. 483 ff.; **Baxter**, *Works*, London, 1830, iv. 351–371; **Starbuck**, *The Psychology of Religion*, London, 1899, pp. 354–391; **William James**, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York and London, 1902; **J. B. Pratt**, *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, New York, 1907. EDWIN D. STARBUCK.

BACON, FRANCIS. — **1. Life.** — The second greatest of the stars that shed their brilliance upon Elizabethan England,—great both in power and achievement within his chosen field of speculation,—Francis Bacon has left a name that is a byword among popular moralists. Conscious of failure in his own time, he trusted his name and memory 'to men's charitable speeches, to foreign nations, and the next ages,' but the stain of his deeds, or of his omissions, has not yet allowed the splendour of his intellect to be clearly seen and understood.

He was born in London on the 22nd of January 1561, his father, Sir Nicholas Bacon, being then Lord Keeper to Queen Elizabeth. His mother, second wife of Sir Nicholas, was a sister of the wife of Sir William Cecil, afterwards Lord Burghley, the Queen's chief minister. His father had the gifts of humour, audacity, and duplicity essential to success at Elizabeth's court; his mother possessed a classical training and resultant taste, which were grafted upon a rigid Calvinism in religion. Some trace of all of these influences may be found in the character and attainments of the son. At the age of twelve, Francis Bacon entered Trinity College, Cambridge, of which Whitgift, the future 'moderate' Archbishop, was the head. He remained till he was almost fifteen (Christmas 1575), forming at the time a boyish disapproval of Aristotle's philosophy, which was afterwards gravely recorded. In 1576 he became a member of the Society of Gray's Inn, being destined no doubt for political office, to be secured through the profession of the Law. From 1576 to 1579 he was in the retinue of Sir Amyas Paulet, Ambassador of the Queen to France, but was summoned home on the sudden death of his father in the latter year. Dean Church dates from this event, and the immediate downfall of his reasonable hopes which it occasioned, the deterioration of Bacon's character. At any rate he began soon afterwards the series of canvassing, importuning, obsequious, and servile letters to his relatives and others, asking for promotion or help, which are so pitiful to read, as coming from one so nobly endowed. He entered into residence at Gray's Inn, became an 'Utter Barrister' in 1582, and a 'Bencher' (which gave him the right to practise) in 1586. Meantime he had entered Parliament as member for Melcombe Regis in 1584, and in subsequent Parliaments he sat successively for Taunton, Liverpool, and Middlesex. He became one of the foremost speakers of the day, and one of the most eloquent, according to the well-known description of Ben Jonson: 'There happened in my time one noble speaker who was full of gravity in his speaking. His language, when he could spare or pass by a jest, was nobly censorious. No man ever spoke more neatly, more pressly, more weightily, or suffered less emptiness, less idleness, in what he uttered. No member of his speech but consisted of his own graces. . . . The fear of every man that heard him was lest he should make an end' (Ben Jonson, *Timber or Discoveries*, ed. Schelling, p. 30).

In politics, both in the reign of Elizabeth and in that of her successor, he supported the supremacy of the *personal* authority of the sovereign, but urged, wherever possible, toleration and moderate reform. In 1591 he made the acquaintance of the Earl of Essex, a young favourite of the Queen, between whom and Bacon a strong friendship speedily grew up. In 1593, Bacon's action in the House of Commons upon the Subsidy Bill, which he opposed for good reasons, brought him into disfavour with the Queen. Although he did not recant his opinion, Bacon prostrated himself at the feet of the Queen and her Minister, but beyond his recognition as one of the Counsel to the Crown, he did not either then or during the Queen's lifetime receive any public appointment. His uncle seems to have looked with distrust upon his brilliant abilities, and may have feared him as a rival to his own son (and successor), Sir Robert Cecil. Queen Elizabeth herself, it is recorded, said of him that he had 'a great wit, and an excellent gift of speech, and much other good learning, but in law thought he could rather show to the uttermost of his knowledge, than that he was deep' (Spedding, *Letters and Life of Bacon*, vol. i. p. 297). His share in the trial and condemnation of Essex will always remain a blot upon his character, however many the extenuating circumstances that may be urged. To strengthen his waning authority with the Queen, Essex obtained the appointment of Commander-in-Chief in Ireland for himself. He failed lamentably and utterly, and returned to face his 'enemies' at Court, after being expressly forbidden to leave his post. Placed under arrest, but afterwards released, he entered into a plot to seize the Queen's person, control the appointment of her ministers, and, above all, force the nomination of her successor. The rash attempt, foolishly conceived and recklessly begun, might have had the gravest consequences. Essex was (along with the conspirators) arrested, arraigned for high treason, condemned and executed (1601). Bacon, as Counsel to the Crown, was one of those selected to carry out the preliminary examination, and he took active part in the trial — to the prejudice of the prisoner's chances. Essex being a popular hero, it was necessary to justify his execution, and Bacon was entrusted with the task of blackening the memory of his friend and benefactor. It is true that Bacon was bound, and had always professed, to place the service of his Queen and country above that of his friend; and, as it has been pointed out, it is difficult to see at what stage he could either honourably, or even safely, have withheld his services. One can only regret that he showed himself so zealous. Perhaps he could not, and should not, have saved the life of Essex, but he need not have lent a hand in vilifying his name.

After the death of the Queen and the accession of James in 1603, Bacon rapidly rose in honour and position. He married the daughter of an alderman, with a good dowry, in 1606, became Solicitor-General in 1607, Attorney-General in 1613, and Lord Keeper (a title which was soon exchanged for the higher one of Lord Chancellor) in March 1616–17. When he was Attorney-General there occurred the famous Peacham case, of which Macaulay has made unscrupulous use against Bacon. The discovery of a sermon, evidently intended for publication, and containing treasonable language, suggested a conspiracy, and it was decided to apply torture to Peacham in order to elicit the names of his fellow-conspirators. The warrant was signed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and by leading members of the Lords and of the Commons. Bacon, as Attorney-General, attended the examination, but cannot by any stretch of the imagination be held responsible for it. It was one of the last occasions on which torture was applied in England; Bacon, however, was not, in this matter, in advance of his time. Another of the unpopular cases in which Bacon, owing to his position, was involved, was that of the trial and execution of Sir Walter Raleigh (1618) after his worse than foolish expedition to South America.

The real evil of his life, however, now as ever, was his subservience, sometimes immoral, and always mean, to the great men of the day, who under King James were invariably selfish, grasping, regardless of popular rights and even of the common virtues of life. Buckingham, whom Bacon allowed to intervene in the Courts and to influence the judges, is the most conspicuous instance. Bacon, who had been knighted in 1603, was in 1618 made Baron Verulam, and in January 1620–21 Viscount St. Albans.

But at the very moment when fortune seemed to smile most sweetly upon him, she was preparing a *volte-face* unparalleled in history. James, who for many years had been governing without a Parliament, but who was in urgent need of subsidies, called a Parliament at last, which began to sit in 1621. From the first the members showed that money would not be voted for nothing: they began an investigation into certain abuses, the infamous monopoly-system and other matters. But it was soon clear that the Lord Chancellor himself was the principal quarry they hunted. Certain evidence was brought forward of his having taken presents of money from suitors after, and even during, the hearing of their cases. It was not proved that Bacon had ever actually given a wrongous decision on account of the bribes; the practice was common at the time, along with much worse practices. But the fact remains that Bacon, from the moment he discovered that he himself was in danger, showed the white feather. He was in ill health and unable to attend the House of Lords when his case was being tried; he confessed to every item of a long series of charges, and was condemned to be imprisoned in the Tower, to pay a fine of £40,000, to be deprived of all his offices, and to forfeit the right to sit in Parliament. The imprisonment lasted only a few days, and the fine appears never to have been enforced, but Bacon was irretrievably ruined in character and in fortune. He had never been wise in money matters, or indeed in any of the practical affairs of life, and he now found himself hard pressed. He showed courage, however, in his misfortune, declaring, 'I was the justest judge that was in England these fifty years: but it was the justest censure in Parliament that was these two hundred years.' Melodramatic as the statement sounds, it was probably correct. He had certainly been one of the most expeditious judges of his time. Although in 1624 Bacon's punishment was finally remitted and he was even summoned to sit in Parliament, he did not return to public life. The remainder of his life he spent in retirement, working at his great project of the renovation of the sciences. His death was directly caused by an experiment entered upon to determine whether animal bodies can be preserved by cold. He caught a sudden chill in the process, and was carried to the house of Lord Arundel, where he died on 9th April 1626. To his host he had written, shortly before his death,—in expectation of a speedy recovery—'As for the experiment itself, it succeeded excellently well' (printed in Sir Tobie Matthew's *Collection of Letters*, 1660, p. 57).

2. Works. — Bacon's earliest printed work, and the most famous of all, was the *Essays*. It was published first in 1597, and consisted of ten essays, along with which were printed the *Meditationes Sacræ* and the *Colours of Good and Evil*. This edition was reprinted several times, but in 1612 it

was expanded into forty essays, and in 1625 into fifty-eight, the final number. Within its own field, it is undoubtedly one of the great books of the world. The terseness and brilliancy of its phrases, the delicacy and point of its criticisms upon life's various phases, the depth and yet the lightness of its observations, have made it a 'classic' almost from the date of its publication. It was followed in 1605 by the *Two Books on the Advancement of Learning*. This work was afterwards regarded by Bacon as a part of the 'Great Renovation' (*Instauratio Magna*), was translated into Latin (the second book being expanded into eight new books), and published in 1623 as the *de Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, Libri IX*. It is a review of the whole state of knowledge as it was in Bacon's time, and as Bacon desired it should be. It pointed out the defects of man's present knowledge, the *lacunæ* or *desiderata*, and suggested a detailed classification and systematization of the various branches of knowledge. The *de Sapientia Veterum*, 1609, is a fanciful attempt to show that in the Myths of the Ancients lies concealed a body of physical and moral knowledge which dates from an earlier, greater, golden age of man. The work on which Bacon's fame as a philosopher chiefly rests is the *Novum Organum*, published, although incomplete, in 1620. It contains his logical method, his criticism of earlier methods of scientific study, his warnings as to the dangers of fallacy which lie in wait for human thought—the famous doctrine of the *Idola*, etc. The treatise had been written and re-written by Bacon no fewer than twelve times. 'Severe as it is,' says Church, 'it is instinct with enthusiasm, sometimes with passion. The Latin in which it is written answers to it; it has the conciseness, the breadth, the lordliness of a great piece of philosophical legislation' (*Bacon*, p. 225). Few other works (*Historia Ventorum, Historia Vitæ et Mortis, History of Henry the Seventh*) were published during Bacon's lifetime, but a great number of works and fragments appeared at different dates after his death. The *Sylva Sylvarum*—a collection of facts, fables, and problems in various branches of Natural History—and the *New Atlantis*—Bacon's scientific Utopia—were edited by Rawley in 1627. Others followed in 1629 (*Certaine Miscellany Works*), 1638 (*Opera Moralia et Civilia*), 1648 (*Remains of Francis, Lord Verulam*), 1653 (*Scripta in Nat. et Univ. Philosophia*: Gruter), 1657 (*Resuscitatio*), 1658 (*Opuscula Varia Posthuma*), 1679 (*Baconiana*: Tenison). The majority of these were edited by Rawley, who was Bacon's secretary in the last years of his life, and who remained his profound admirer. The complete works are to be found in Ellis, Spedding, and Heath's edition, referred to below. The works include many occasional pieces of historical and legal interest, as well as a number of sketches and appendixes to Bacon's *Instauratio Magna* of the Sciences. The majority of these are in Latin, but the more important pieces, along with the *de Augmentis*, and the *Novum Organum*, are translated by Spedding in the 4th and 5th volumes of the Complete Edition.

3. Philosophy.—Bacon, said Macaulay, 'moved the intellects which have moved the world': he did not himself produce anything original in Science, in Philosophy, or in his own chosen region of the latter, Logic. But he inspired others with his enthusiasm for Natural Science, his hopes of the great issues for man which depended on its study, his ideal of the methods by which it was to be approached. It is largely through his inspiration that what is vaguely described as the Scientific Method, the Positive or Empirical Method, is universally applied to-day to the investigation not merely of natural, but of psychological, ethical, social, and religious phenomena. When Bacon wrote, thought had already awakened from the sleep of the Middle Ages; here and there observers had arisen who looked to nature itself rather than to human authority for information, and who had recourse to experiment to compel nature to answer their questions. Such were Roger Bacon, Nicolaus of Cusa, Leonardo da Vinci, Copernicus, Vesalius, Telesio, Severinus, Tycho Brahe, Bruno, Gilbert, Galileo, Kepler, and Harvey. The mental horizon had been widened equally with the physical horizon: the discovery of America and the invention of printing were still novelties to the world into which Bacon was born. There seemed no limit to the possibilities of wealth, of happiness, of knowledge, within man's reach. In Bacon's view it was the last of these, knowledge, that was to be the means of gaining the other two: and from the beginning of his maturer life he set himself the task of showing men how the knowledge, which was also power, was to be attained. At 25 he wrote an essay on the subject which he called the 'Greatest Birth of Time' (*Temporis Partus Maximus*), and, six years later, sent to Burghley the letter in which occur the famous words, 'I confess I have as vast contemplative ends as I have moderate civil ends: for I have taken all knowledge to be my province' (*Letters and Life*, i. 108 f.). In the fragment called *de Interpretatione Naturæ Proœmium* (complete ed. iii. 518), he describes his qualifications for the task:

> 'For myself, I found that I was fitted for nothing so well as for the study of Truth; as having a mind nimble and versatile enough to catch the resemblances of things (which is the chief point), and at the same time steady enough to fix and distinguish their subtler differences; as being gifted by nature with desire to seek, patience to doubt, fondness to meditate, slowness to assert, readiness to reconsider, carefulness to dispose and set in order; and as being a man that neither affects what is new nor admires what is old, and that hates every kind of imposture. So I thought my nature had a kind of familiarity and relationship with Truth' (Spedding's tr., *Letters and Life*, iii. 85).

This is no mere bombast, for these were strictly the real qualities of Bacon's mind when face to face with the facts of nature. Truth became the passion of his life—or rather the discovery of truth, for truth itself he regarded rather as a means to man's advancement than as an end in itself. From the first he set before him as his goal the Kingdom or Empire of Man—*Regnum Hominis*—the dominion of man over nature, and, *through* this power, the increase of his happiness and his dignity. In this sense, no doubt, he was the true forerunner of the Utilitarians in England. Of Salomon's House—the college which was the 'eye' of the kingdom of *New Atlantis*—it is said: 'The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes and secret motions of things; and the *enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible.*'

In Bacon's design the *Instauratio Magna* was to consist of six parts, only one of which, the first, was completed by him. The parts are as follows: (1) *Partitiones Scientiarum*: classification of the sciences, and the distribution of inquiries among them, a map of the conquests already made, and a survey of the unoccupied lands. (2) *Novum Organum, sive Indicia de Interpretatione Naturæ*: the new method of discovery, or suggestions on the interpretation of nature, by which the old and futile method of 'anticipating' nature was to be displaced. (3) *Phænomena Universi*: tables of facts, the results of observation and experiment, on which philosophy (or science) was to be built up. (4) *Scala Intellectus sive Filum Labyrinthi*: 'the ladder of the intellect,' or 'clue of the labyrinth,' was to consist in examples, types, or models of the method in actual working, concrete applications of Bacon's inductive scheme. (5) *Prodromi, sive Anticipationes Philosophiæ Secundæ*: anticipations of the new philosophy, before the latter should have been completed, a kind of foretaste, or, as

Bacon suggests, a kind of interest before the principal is produced. The last part (6), *Philosophia Secunda*, or *Scientia Activa*, was to be the final completion and crowning of the whole structure. Bacon himself was merely laying the foundations, it was to be left to others to finish; indeed, it could only be the work of many hands and brains. Bacon long hoped for royal support for his cause; he constantly writes as if he desired wealth and position only that he might have more influence and authority in promulgating his ideas. He was to be the bell-ringer, who is 'first up, to call others to church,' the man who sounds the clarion, but enters not into the battle. His hope was in a Society such as he describes in *New Atlantis*, and such as the Royal Society became soon after his day—a body of workers directing their powers of observation and inference upon limited fields of inquiry, after the first great collection of facts has been made. In one passage he anticipates that the future judgment passed upon himself would be that he did no great things, but simply made less account of the things that were accounted great (*Nov. Org.* i. Aph. 97).

(1) It is unnecessary here to give Bacon's classification of the Sciences in full, although it is important in the history of scientific method. It appears in the *Advancement of Learning*, the *de Augmentis*, and the *Descriptio Globi Intellectualis*, with certain variations. The ground of division is the radically false one of the human mental faculties—*Memory*, *Imagination*, *Reason*. Thus the branches of knowledge are classified under three heads: History (corresponding to Memory, and dealing with Individuals), Poetry (corresponding to Imagination, and also dealing with Individuals), and Philosophy (corresponding to Reason, dealing with General Notions or Universals). Poetry is merely feigned history. 'As all knowledge is the exercise and *work* of the mind, so poesy may be regarded as its *sport*. In philosophy the mind is bound to things, in poesy it is released from that bond, and wanders forth, and feigns what it pleases' (complete ed. v. 503). The term 'Philosophy' with Bacon covers all Arts and Sciences, as well as Philosophy in the narrow sense. Parallel to the three divisions of Rational or Acquired Knowledge are those of Theology, or Revealed Knowledge. Like Locke, Bacon regarded the senses as the ultimate and only source of natural knowledge; the *notions* of science are abstracted from sense-impressions by composition and division according to the Laws of Nature and evidence of the things themselves (*ib.* i. 494). Bacon anticipates modern methods in his insistence on keeping close to nature, and in his suggestion that Natural History should take special account of aberrations and monsters, *i.e.* pathological or morbid phenomena, and also of the products of human art, as well as of the normal and unmodified phenomena of Nature. In other words, he insisted both on the unity of Nature, on the identity in substance of the natural and the artificial, and on the value to science of a knowledge of limiting cases and borderland phenomena (cf. also *Nov. Org.* ii. 28, 30). Philosophy or Science, with its three subdivisions—Divine Philosophy or Natural Theology, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Man—was to be preceded by a *Prima Philosophia*, a form of Metaphysics; the Sciences were to be 'like branches of a tree that meet in one stem, which stem grows for some distance entire and continuous before it divides itself into arms and boughs' (complete ed. i. 540). It was intended by Bacon to deal with two sets of subjects: (*a*) the most general principles, those which are common to several of the sciences, and (*b*) the 'adventitious conditions of essences,' such as Much-Little, Like-Unlike, Possible-Impossible. The second part was to be a kind of Teleology; it was to give the reasons or grounds of the distribution of Much-Little, etc.—why there is much of one thing, little of another. In other words, *Prima Philosophia* was to take the parts which are played now by the Theory of Knowledge on the one hand, and the Doctrine of Evolution on the other. Metaphysics was also to form one of the divisions (Physics being the other) of the Speculative part of Natural Philosophy, or that which was to inquire into the *causes* of things. Physics was to deal with the Efficient and Material Causes, Metaphysics with the Formal and Final Causes. The latter Bacon therefore excluded from Physics, but not from Natural Philosophy itself. 'The inquisition of Final Causes is barren, and, like a virgin consecrated to God, produces nothing,' he said in the *de Aug.* (iii. ch. 5). According to Fowler, Bacon meant not that the knowledge of them is useless, but that knowing the purpose or end an object serves does not help us to produce the object, which is the true aim of Science.

The Classification, with its wealth of subdivisions, details, appendixes, should be studied, as showing the remarkable comprehensiveness, fertility, and penetration of Bacon's mind. It has, of course, been superseded by the actual advance of the Sciences themselves, in many instances along different lines from those anticipated by Bacon, but it is still fruitful of suggestion in this age of specialists.

(2) The second part of the *Instauratio*, to which the *Novum Organum* belongs, and which remains incomplete, was to reveal the New Logic of Discovery. It was to differ from the ordinary Logic in three things—its end, its methods of proof, its principles of inquiry. Its end was to be, not arguments, but arts; its method, not syllogism, but induction; its principles, not the first notions of the mind, or the immediate data of the senses, but notions duly abstracted by the mind purified of its errors and prejudices, according to the evidence of things themselves (complete ed. i. 135 ff.).

Bacon's influence on scientific method has lain chiefly in the fact that he showed so clearly and incisively the errors and the psychological sources of the errors to which inquirers are liable, and to which they had before his day so conspicuously fallen victims. The mind must become as far as possible a *tabula abrasa*, if it is to be a true mirror of Nature; to this end it must first be cleared of its prejudices or preconceptions. The famous doctrine of the *Idola* (or 'phantoms') of the mind (see *Nov. Org.* i. Aph. 38–70, and the *Distrib. Operis*) classifies these as: (1) *Idola Tribus*, Phantoms of the Tribe, or those common to all men; (2) *Idola Specus*, Phantoms of the Cave, those which depend on the nature, character, or training of the individual; (3) *Idola Fori*, Phantoms of the Market-place, those that spring from words, the counters which men exchange so carelessly in society, but which so often are false coins, suggesting a value which does not exist; (4) *Idola Theatri*, Phantoms of the Theatre, which include the false philosophies, the Sophistical, the Empirical, and the Superstitious (see also the *Redargutio Philosophiarum* and the *Cogitata et Visa*), which had held the stage of thought until Bacon's time, and which, it was necessary to show, were mere vain imaginations, fantastic shows, neither realities nor copies of reality; this is the idea underlying the term 'Theatre.' But the mind, once cleared, would only grow another crop of weeds if left to itself (*intellectus sibi permissus*). How the Tree of Knowledge is to spring, to branch and to blossom in the mind, it is the purpose of the Method to show. It was to be purely mechanical: 'My way of discovering sciences goes far to level men's wits, and leaves but

little to their individual excellence, because it performs everything by the surest rules and demonstrations' (*Nov. Org.* i. Aph. 122). The steps are (*a*) the collection of facts in the Natural and Experimental History, (*b*) the arrangement of these facts according to Topics or Natures. Bacon thought Nature was like a printed book, containing many and varied combinations of a few simple natures or elementary qualities or forces. Given the knowledge of these, the book might be read by any one. Further, he seems to have thought that each *nature* is a limitation or 'mode' of some more general nature, irrespective of the supposed simplicity of the former nature. This more general nature is the *Form*. At other times, however, the 'form' seems to mean the nature itself which is being inquired into, *i.e.* its essence, or simple state, when apart from the many other natures with which it is combined in things. Thus the 'form' of heat is something which is common to all instances of heat, diverse as these may be in other respects, and which is absent from all instances from which heat is absent. According to Fowler (*Nov. Org.*[2] Introd.), Bacon's 'Form' sometimes means *Essence* or *Definition*, at other times *Cause* or *Law* of Production ('veræ rerum differentiæ,' 'res ipsissima,' 'natura alia quæ sit cum natura data convertibilis et tamen sit limitatio naturæ notioris,' 'fons emanationis,' 'lex actus puri,' etc., *Nov. Org.* i. 75, ii. 1, 2, 4). Both of these conceptions are contained in the modern idea of Cause. Thus, in his own remarkable example of the working of his method, he shows that heat is a kind of motion, a motion of restrained or checked expansion, in the smaller particles of a body (*Nov. Org.* ii. 20); this motion would be the 'form' of heat, *i.e.* its statement would give the definition of heat, and its production would mean the production of heat. Needless to say, it was the latter result, *operation*, that Bacon aimed at, although he held that Light-bringing experiments should be tried rather than Fruit-bringing, in the first instance.

(3) The third step in the Method is the arrangement of the Material, for a given nature or quality, into certain Tables as a basis for Induction—*Tables* of *Essence* or *Presence*, i.e. of instances which agree in the presence of the given quality, *e.g.* all cases and kinds of heat; *Tables* of *Deviation*, or of *Absence*, i.e. negative instances, or instances, *analogous to the affirmative instances*, in which the nature is absent; and *Tables* of *Degrees* or *Comparison*, instances in which the nature occurs in varying degrees.

(4) The fourth step was to be the *Exclusion* of all those natures which are either absent when the given nature is present (by the first Table), present when the latter is absent (by the second Table), or which increase when the given nature decreases, or *vice versa* (by the third Table). And it is on the application of Exclusion that Bacon places the main stress of his Induction. He expected that within a few years after the Experimental History had been formed, everything would be known about Nature! As a matter of fact, the Exclusion itself, for a single quality, would have been an endless process.

The two chief flaws in Bacon's Method are his erroneous conception of the simplicity of Nature, and his disregard of hypothesis, of the scientific imagination, as a source of 'probable' knowledge. Bacon looked for certainty, not probability. Yet he recognizes the value of hypothesis, first, in his own *Vindemiatio Prima*, or First Vintage—the example he gives of an anticipatory induction (*Nov. Org.* ii. 20, on the Form of Heat); and secondly, in the aids to Induction, of which only one class were dealt with by him, viz. the *Prerogativæ Instantiarum*, or Prerogative Instances (*ib.* ii. 21–51). These are instances such as throw light more readily or effectively than others upon the true nature of a quality; they include such well-known terms as 'Solitary,' 'Striking' or 'Glaring,' 'Parallel,' 'Limiting' or 'Borderland,' and 'Crucial' or 'Finger-post' Instances. It is possible to say that his statement of these Prerogative Instances, and the illustrations he gives, have had more influence upon scientific procedure than his Method itself has had. For the rest, the laws expressing the Forms were to give the lowest principles of Induction, from which men were to rise, first, to Middle Principles, and thence to the Highest Principles; from these, and from these only, the *Deduction* of new particulars and operations was to take place; they were to express the very heart or marrow of Nature. Such axioms, so derived and abstracted, would, Bacon believed, bring whole 'flocks of works' in their train.

Of the remaining parts of the intended *Instauratio*, Bacon wrote only some chapters of a description of the Universe—the Natural and Experimental History—in the History of the Winds, of Life and Death, of the Dense and the Rare, the *Sylva Sylvarum*, etc.; but it was not a work for which he felt himself fitted, and much that he has collected is absurd, superstitious, or unverified report from unknown or untested authorities. Active science was not his part in life. But he undertook the work only because it was a necessary preliminary, and he could get no others to do it for him. It remains true of his Method as a whole, that it was neither so novel as he believed nor so effective as he hoped. No discoveries were made by its use, and the great scientific masters that followed him employed the imagination much more than his doctrine allowed. Nor can it be otherwise; science is further than ever from Bacon's ideal, viz. that of a method which any one whatever may learn and apply. At the same time, Bacon stands, along with Aristotle, as one of the 'masters of those who know'; he stimulated, if he did not awaken, the passionate devotion to Nature and to the pursuit of truth which has been a characteristic of European science since his day. Directly or indirectly, he initiated the study of mental, moral, and social phenomena by scientific and experimental methods. He laid the foundation-stone of English Empiricism, and of the French Enlightenment. A more specific claim is made by Fowler (*Francis Bacon*, p. 91): 'Inductive Logic, that is, the systematic analysis and arrangement of inductive evidence, as distinct from the natural induction which all men practise, is almost as much the creation of Bacon as Deductive Logic is that of Aristotle.' And of both Dean Church says: 'The combination of patient and careful industry, with the courage and divination of genius, in doing what none had done before, makes it equally stupid and idle to impeach their greatness' (*Bacon*, p. 204). While ignorant or unappreciative of many of the great discoveries of his predecessors and contemporaries, Bacon's remarkable catholicity of interest and impartial judgment enabled him to anticipate, or at least to foreshadow, many of the most recent generalizations of science.

Moral Philosophy Bacon still regarded as the Handmaid of Theology; and neither in his division of its parts (*de Augmentis*, bk. 7) nor in the practical rules and wisdom of the *Essays* is he ahead of his time. In Theology he was whole-heartedly with the Moderate party in his Church; he defended toleration both by his voice and by his pen, but he preferred Atheism to Superstition (*i.e.* Romanism). Theoretically, he insisted on the complete separation between Theology and Philosophy or Science, between Faith and Reason, Revelation and Natural Experience, just as in Psychology also

he recognized in the soul of man two principles or parts, the one divine, inspired, immortal, the other animal, created, perishing—a doctrine adopted from Telesio, but ultimately Aristotle's. For the deeper questions of Metaphysics or of Theology he had, however, no taste, and it is only in his criticism of his predecessors and in his inspired proclamation of the New Method of Discovery that he has influenced the thought of the world.

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III. *PHILOSOPHY, METHOD, ETC*—**Ch. Adam**, *Philosophie de Fr. Bacon*, Paris, 1890; **Barthélemy St.-Hilaire**, *Étude sur Fr. Bacon*, Paris, 1890; **Kuno Fischer**, *Francis Bacon von Verulam, die Real-philosophie und ihre Zeitalter*, 1856 [2nd ed. 1875; Eng. tr. by John Oxenford, 1857]; **Efraim Liljequist**, *Om Francis Bacon's filosofi*, Upsala, 1894 (with special reference to Bacon's Moral Philosophy); **Hans Natge**, *Ueber Francis Bacons Formenlehre*, Leipzig, 1891.

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BĀDARĀYAṆA.—The name of the supposed author of the *Vedānta-* or *Brahma-sūtras*. In Indian tradition he also bears the name of *Vyāsa*, *Vedavyāsa*, or *Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana*; but nothing is known of his person or life. Cf. F. Max Muller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899, p. 153 ff., and art. VEDĀNTA.

R. GARBE.

BAD(A)RĪNĀTH.—A famous temple and place of pilgrimage situated on the banks of the Vishnugangā, a tributary of the Alaknandā (wh. see), in British Garhwāl, on the lower slopes of the Himālaya, lat. 30° 44′ 15″ N.; long. 79° 30′ 40″ E. The place takes its name from the worship of Vishnu in his manifestation as Badarīnātha or Badarīnārāyana, 'Lord of the *badarī* or jujube tree' (*Zizyphus jujuba*), which, however, does not now grow there. Probably an ancient tree-cult is here associated with the thermal spring close by, which suggested the sanctity of the place; and it has been from time immemorial a resort of pilgrims, the merit of the pilgrimage being enhanced by the difficulties of the journey to the spot. The temple is said to owe its foundation to the great teacher Śankarāchārya, a Malabar Brāhman, who lived about the beginning of the 8th cent. A.D., and was the leading Brāhmanical missionary to Northern India. But the building has been repeatedly devastated by earthquakes and avalanches, and the present temple has no appearance of great antiquity.

'The idol in the principal temple,' writes Atkinson (*Himalayan Gazetteer*, iii. 24 f.), 'is formed of black stone or marble about three feet high. It is usually clothed with rich gold brocade, and above its head is a small mirror which reflects the objects from the outside. In front are several lamps always burning, and a table also covered with brocade. To the right are images of Nar and Nārāyana, and on the left those of Kuvera and Nārada. The idol is adorned with one jewel, a diamond of moderate size, in the middle of its forehead, whilst the whole of the properties, including dresses, eating vessels, and other paraphernalia are not worth more than Rs. 5000 (£333).'

'A good deal of ostentatious attention is paid to the personal comfort of the idol at Badarī. It is daily provided with meals, which are placed before it; the doors of the sanctuary are then closed, and the idol is left to consume its meals in quietness. The doors are not opened again till after sunset; and at a late hour, its bed being prepared by the attendants, the doors are again closed until morning. The vessels in which the idol is served are of gold and silver, and a large establishment of servants is kept up, both male and female, the latter as dancing-girls and mistresses of the celibate priests. The only persons who have access to the inner apartments are the servants, and no one but the Rāwal himself is allowed to touch the idol' (*ib.*).

The temple is closed in November, and the treasure and valuable utensils are shut up in a vault beneath the shrine, after which all the establishment retires to a lower valley in the hills. As a rule, from November until the end of May the temple is covered with snow. The idol itself is said to have been miraculously discovered in the bed of the river, and, as it bears scarcely any resemblance to the human form and exhibits obvious traces of having been worn by water action, this seems probable. As an illustration of the miraculous powers attributed to the image, it is said that a Sonār, or goldsmith, visited the shrine, and, finding that his iron ring on touching the image became gold, cut off one of the god's fingers for his private use. But the stump began to ooze with unmistakable blood, and from that day to this no Sonār dares to approach the shrine and risk incurring the judgment which befell the sinner, who was immediately struck blind (Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, iv. 340).

The close connexion of the temple and its ritual with Southern India is shown by the fact that the principal priests are Nambūri or Nambūtiri Brāhmans from Malabar, the head man of whom is called Rāval (Skr. *rāja-kula*, 'king's family'). In order to provide for the succession in the event of the illness or death of the Rāval, a disciple (*chelā*) is always in attendance to take his place. Formerly the priests were supposed to be celibate, but they excuse their failure to maintain this rule by the fact that they have almost altogether broken off their connexion with Southern India. The chief pilgrims to the shrine, which can be reached only after a dangerous and difficult journey, are Yogin (*q.v.*) and Bairāgin (*q.v.*) ascetics. Every twelfth year, when the sun is in the sign of Aquarius, is held the Kumbha fair, and the Ādhkumbha, or 'half Kumbha,' every sixth year. On these occasions the shrine is visited by large numbers of pilgrims.

LITERATURE.—**Atkinson**, *Himalayan Gazetteer*, iii. 23 ff; **Traill**, *Statistical Account of Kumaun*, ed Batten, p. 57; *Punjab Notes and Queries*, iv. 196. For a full account of the Nambūtiri Brāhmans of the Malabar Coast, see **Fawcett**, *Bulletin of the Madras Museum*, iii. pt. i. 33 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BADGES.—1. Totem marks and tribal badges.—The earliest and most wide-spread use of badges was their employment on the persons of men; among savage peoples every man bore on his body his *totemic mark*, in addition to his *tribal badge*. These two are quite distinct; the totem mark, which is by far the more ancient, was intended to indicate the totem from which the bearer believed himself to be descended, so that all the members of the same stock were recognized by their totem mark. It was a later stage in civilization when a number of stocks, or clans, joined together, and thus brought about the formation of tribes; the communities which were so formed were differentiated from each other by their tribal badge. The religious significance of these badges must at one time have been very great; for, though the totem mark was not originally religious in character, yet with the development of the religious instinct it became so in process of time.

'A totem tribe—which is not necessarily a local unity . . . is one in which the belief that all members of the tribe are of one blood is associated with a conviction, more or less religious in character, that the life of the tribe is in some mysterious way derived from an animal, a plant, or more rarely some other natural object.'

'Totem tribesmen in savage countries often affect a resemblance to their sacred animal, even at the cost of slight mutilations and other self-inflicted deformities. In other cases stocks are distinguished by the patterns of their tattooing, which there is reason to believe were in many cases originally meant as rude pictorial representations of the totem.'*

* Robertson Smith, *Kinship*[2] (1903), pp. 217 f., 247.

Some examples of these totemic badges are as follows. Among the Omahas, a North American tribe, the Buffalo clan wear two locks of hair in imitation of horns; the members of another Buffalo clan 'wear a crest of hair about two inches long, standing erect and extending from ear to ear; this is in imitation of the back of a buffalo.' A bird clan among the same people 'leave a little hair in front, over the forehead, for a bill, and some at the back of the head, for the bird's tail, with much over each ear for the wings.' The Bakotas, in Africa, knock out the upper front teeth in order, as they say, to be like oxen; the Mangangas chip their teeth in order to make them resemble those of a cat or a crocodile.* Tatuings, cicatrices, and the like are now often of a merely ornamental character, but it seems certain that originally they always denoted something more specific; the fact that they are very frequently made at initiation ceremonies is significant.† The tribal badge, as indicating kinship with a god, was probably a religious emblem from the beginning.

2. Totem dress.—A badge of a different kind, but lineally descended from the totem badge, is that which indicates being under the special protection of a totem-god; this is the totem dress. It is represented in a great variety of forms, but the principle underlying each is the same, namely, that of effecting a resemblance as close as possible to the totem-god, and thus ensuring his protection. Association of ideas, not reason, is what guides men in the stage of undeveloped civilization in these things. It is at the great crises of life, such as initiation, marriage, and death, that these badges are assumed; for example, among many savage peoples, when a youth is definitely made a member of his tribe by being initiated into the tribal mysteries, he is dressed or painted or otherwise made to resemble the totem—or god, as the case may be—by some means or other; that is to say, he is brought into closer contact than usual with it. The custom of which Lucian gives an example is probably connected with this:

'When a man intends to go on a pilgrimage to Hierapolis, he offers up a sheep and eats some of its flesh. He then kneels down and draws its head over his own head, and prays at the same time to his god';‡

3. Secret Society badge.—Of an entirely different character are the badges worn among certain savage peoples to indicate membership of a secret society. Among the most striking examples of this category are the leaf or flower badges of the various *tamate* associations which exist in the Banks Islands and the neighbouring Torres group. Here the badge is usually worn on the head, the distinctive flower or leaf being stuck in the hair.§ To assume the badge without being a member of the *tamate* is an offence against the society, and is punished according to the power and position of the society offended.‖

4. Analogous customs among Semites.—What has been said may be paralleled by analogous customs among races within the Semitic area. While direct evidence for the existence of the totem badge among the Semites is wanting, there are a good number of data to be gathered from various sources which suggest that examples of this must at one time have existed among them. Thus among the Arabs every tribe has its *wasm* ('tribal mark'), which is branded on its cattle;* this is paralleled by the custom of the Bechuanas, who mark the ears of their cattle with an incision which resembles the open jaws of a crocodile, one of their totems.† The Indian hook-cross, or *swastika*—whatever its origin—was likewise a badge of ownership, which was branded on the ears of the cattle.‡ The same custom, though the badge was different, was practised by the ancient Icelanders, by the Madagascans, Somalis, etc.;§ as regards the Romans, Columella gives the following testimony: 'His etiam diebus maturi agni, et reliqui fœtus pecudum, nec minus majora quadrupedia charactere signari debent.'‖ These, and many other examples that might be given, doubtless all descend from similar origins.

Such analogous instances among peoples, some of whom still use totem badges on their persons, suggest the probability that originally the *wasm* among the Arabs was branded on the tribesmen as well as on their cattle;¶ this is confirmed by the fact that, according to Lucian, all the Syrians bore *stigmata* of religious significance on their wrist or neck.** Just as the cattle were marked with the badge of ownership, so, one may reasonably surmise, in earlier days men were marked with the badge of their god to denote that they belonged to him and were under his protection. Herodotus tells us that fugitive slaves who fled for sanctuary to the Heracleum at the fish-curing station near the Canopic mouth of the Nile, were dedicated by being tatued with sacred marks, and were thus made over to the god, so that they could not be reclaimed by their master.†† Among the Semites generally it may be said that all marks upon the body, within the categories referred to, were badges of relationship either to a god or to a fellow-creature. The nature of these relationships differed, of course. In a large number of cases, as we have seen, it denoted ownership; but it is probable that both types of relationship go back to a common original, viz. the totemic badge.‡‡ Perhaps one may conceive the sequence of ideas and practice to have been, roughly speaking, something of this kind. The totem formed the background; from this arose the totem mark, or badge of kinship with the totem; the next step would be the development of totem gods, necessarily conceived of as tribal ancestors, to whom worshippers would dedicate themselves by stigmatization; closely related to the latter would be the mourning custom known as 'cuttings for the dead,' which was a remnant of part of the ritual connected with ancestor-worship. Thus the badge of kinship became the god's mark of ownership. Regarding the relationship between the god and his worshippers there were always reciprocal duties; in return for worship, and all that this implied, the god was bound to look after his people. It was always, therefore, a question of *covenant*, and the stigmatization became thus the *badge of the covenant* between the god and his worshippers. This is brought out by the fact that the ultimate Semitic root is the same for 'mark' and 'covenant' (cf. the

* **Frazer**, *Totemism* (1887), p. 27 *f.*, where many other examples are given.

† *Cf.*, *e.g.*, Haberlandt, *Mittheilungen der anthrop. Ges. in Wien*, xv. (1885) p. 53 ff.; Brough Smyth, *Aborigines of Victoria* (1878), i. 295, ii. 313; Frazer, *op. cit.* p. 29; Lang, *Modern Mythology* (1897), p. 71; A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-east Australia* (1904), pp. 619-636, 658 f., 743 ff.

‡ *de Dea Syria*, 55.

§ Ornamentations of this kind must not be confused with the head decorations of the most varied character worn to indicate success in battle and the like, *i.e.* honorific badges; for examples of these see R. Andree, *Ethnographische Parallelen und Vergleiche*, Stuttgart (1878), p. 190 f.

‖ Codrington, *The Melanesians* (1891), pp. 75, 76, 87.

* Robertson Smith, *Kinship*², p. 247; Burckhardt, *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahdbys* (1830), p. 112 f.; see, in the latter work, the plates containing a large number of these marks.

† E. Casalis, *Les Bassoutos* (1859), p. 221.

‡ R. Andree, *Ethnog. Par. und Vergleiche* (new ser.) (1889), pp. 75, 76.

§ *ib.* p. 77 ff., where many examples are given.

‖ *de Re rustica*, xi. 2, quoted by A. L. J. Michelsen, *Die Hausmarke* (1853), p. 17.

¶ Cf. Robertson Smith, *Kinship*², p 248; Wetzstein, *Verhandl. der Berl. anthropol. Ges.* xiv. (1877).

** *de Dea Syria*, 59.

†† Herodotus, ii. 113; cf. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*², p. 148.

‡‡ Cf. Andree, *op. cit.* p. 82 ff.

Arabic *sharaṭ*, 'a mark,' and *sharṭ*, 'a covenant'; cf. Gn 9^{13} 31^{48}).* On the analogy of this badge of covenant between a god and his people arose that of a covenant between man and man. Among the Arabs, when two men made a covenant, they inflicted a wound in their flesh, either in the hand or arm, and drank each other's blood.† It is true that the reciprocal blood-drinking constituted the central act, but the mark left on the person of each party to the covenant was the visible badge of the covenant.‡

What has been said may be illustrated by some Old Testament data. We shall not expect to find here any reference to marks which could be considered as directly totemic, for it is only remnants of the later stages, referred to above, that we come across in the OT; at the same time, the existence of animal names of clans and men§ suggests the probability that totemism existed among the early ancestors of the Israelites. Circumcision was the badge of the covenant between Jahweh and His worshippers (cf. Gn 17^{14}). Originally it must have denoted something else. This is proved by the very wide observance of the custom by a great variety of peoples,‖ and more especially by the fact that there are strong reasons for the belief that the rite came to the Israelites through Egypt;¶ but to the Israelites it became the distinguishing mark of Jahweh's ownership. Belonging to the same category was the *prophet's badge*. The story preserved in 1 K 20^{35-43} is sufficient evidence of the existence of such a badge. As the prophets were dedicated to the service of Jahweh in a special manner, a badge peculiar to their order in early times would be appropriate enough. Of the character of this badge nothing is known beyond the fact that it was made on the forehead or on the top of the head (cf. the tonsure of later days). An interesting parallel is the Buddhist badge of priesthood. After having served his novitiate, the candidate goes through the ceremony of admission to the priesthood; he kneels before the idol, and 'three small heaps of incense are laid upon his forehead, and these are set fire to. The man must kneel till the incense heaps burn down, and thus burn an indelible mark on the head. This ordeal is repeated, as the man rises in the priesthood, till he bears nine scars upon his scalp.'** The distinctive dress of the Israelite prophet, which may be regarded as a badge of office, is paralleled by the yellow robe of the Buddhist priest. The Taoist priest also wears a distinctive dress, which differs from that of the Buddhist priest.

'Cuttings for the dead' (cf. above) are mentioned in Lv 19^{28} (cf. 21^{5}, Dt 14^{1}). In the last passage it says: 'Ye shall not cut yourselves, nor make any baldness [the cognate Arabic root means 'wound'] between your eyes for the dead.' The custom is prohibited on account of its being a heathen rite. From this it is permissible to assume that it was both ancient and widely prevalent. Cuttings in the body such as those mentioned in 1 K 18^{27-29} may perhaps be a remnant of a practice whereby a god was, in times of great emergency, reminded of the badge denoting his ownership, and thereby called upon to fulfil his part of the covenant.

Badges which may also have at one time pro-

* Robertson Smith, *Kinship*², p. 259.

† Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heident*² p. 125; Doughty, *Travels in Arab. Des.* i. 540, ii. 41 (1888).

‡ On another covenant-sign, viz. the cairn, see Frazer, in *Anthrop. Essays*, 1907, p. 131 ff.

§ *e.g.* 'the house of Caleb' (1 S 25^{3}); cf. the 'dog tribes' in various parts of Arabia; see Robertson Smith, *Kinship*², p. 233 ff.; 'Akbor (2 K 22^{12}), 'mouse'; Levi, 'antelope'; Rachel, 'ewe'; see, further, Robertson Smith in *JPh* ix. (1879) p. 75 ff.

‖ See, *e.g.*, Frazer, 'The Origin of Circumcision,' in *The Independent Review* (Nov. 1904).

¶ Cf. Stade, *Biblische Theologie des AT* (1905), p. 45.

** Deans, in *Expos. Times*, xviii. (Dec. 1906) p. 144.

claimed Jahweh's ownership were the 'sign' on the hand and the 'memorial' between the eyes mentioned in Ex $13^{9.16}$ (cf. Rev 20^{4}). These must originally have been marks cut into the hands and forehead, and were preserved perhaps in their original form only by the prophetical order; later on the 'phylacteries' took their place (see Dt 6^{8} 11^{18} etc.).* Lineally descended from these, too, is perhaps the badge referred to in Job 31^{35} ('Lo, here is my mark, let the Almighty answer me'). The word used here for 'mark' comes from the root meaning 'to wound,' and it is the same as that used in Ezk 9^{4-6}, the reference being to those who are true to God, and therefore belong to Him.

A mark of an entirely different character is the badge of the manslayer, mentioned only once in the OT, in reference to Cain.†

5. Jewish Badge.—One of the most extraordinary uses of badges is exemplified in the various forms of the 'Jewish badge' worn by the Jews during the Middle Ages. This first originated among the Muhammadans; by the 'Pact of Omar' (640) all Jews living in Muhammadan countries were ordered to wear a yellow seam on their upper garments.‡ In later times Jews in Egypt were compelled to wear bells on their garments, and a little calf carved of wood; the latter, according to Lane-Poole, was to remind them of the Golden Calf. In the 14th cent. the badge took the form of a yellow turban§ among Jews in Egypt; in other parts, *e.g.* in Tripoli, a parti-coloured turban marked the Jew.‖ It was, in the first instance, the Muhammadan precedent which was followed when in Christian lands the Jewish badge was introduced. It appears that this badge was already in use in some lands before the central authority in Rome put forth an ordinance on the subject applying to all Christendom; thus in France the badge was in use in 1208;¶ but its use was made universal by a decree, prompted by Innocent III., of the fourth Lateran Council (1215), and it applied to Muhammadans as well as to Jews. The reason given for the decree was the need of preventing inter-marriage and concubinage between Christians and non-Christians.

'Contingit interdum quod per errorem Christiani Judæorum seu Saracenorum et Judæi seu Saraceni Christianorum mulieribus commisceantur. Ne igitur tam damnatæ commixtionis excessus per velamentum erroris hujusmodi excusationis ulterius possint habere diffugium, statuimus ut tales utriusque sexus in omni Christianorum provincia et omni tempore qualitate habitus publici ab aliis populis distinguantur.'**

In accordance with this the badge was everywhere enforced; but it differed in size, shape, and colour in different countries. In France it was a circular piece of cloth, usually yellow in colour, sewn on to the outer garment. The alternative of a yellow head-dress was permitted, while Jewesses wore a distinctive veil. The age at which Jews had to begin to wear the badge varied in different parts of France, at some places seven years, at others not until fourteen. The badge could be worn on the breast, or left shoulder, or on the girdle, or even on the hat. In France, Spain, and Italy the customs were similar; in these countries, too, exemptions from wearing the badge were often permitted, usually in consideration of a money payment. In Germany the badge took the form of a special hat, the 'Judenhut.' It was pointed

* At the present day all orthodox Jews wear the 'head-tefillah' and the 'hand-tefillah' when at their prayers; see Oesterley and Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue* (1907), p. 418 ff.

† See Frazer, in *Anthropological Essays* (1907), pp. 102–110; Hastings' *SDB*, *s.v.* 'Marks.'

‡ D'Ohsson, *Hist. des Mongols*, iii. (1854) p. 274, quoted in *JE* ii. 425b.

§ Lane-Poole, *Hist. of Egypt*, vi. (1901) pp. 126 ff., 300 ff.

‖ Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages* (1896), p. 302.

¶ Robert, *Les Signes d'infamie au moyen-âge* (1891), p. 11

** Labbe, *Sacrosancta concilia ad regiam editionem exacta*, xiii. col. 1003 and 1006, quoted by Abrahams, *op. cit.* p. 296.

at the top, and the brim was often twisted into the shape of a pair of horns. Red was the usual colour, in later times green. But the wheel-badge, of yellow or saffron and of various sizes, was also worn in Germany in the 15th cent. by the men, while Jewesses were obliged to wear two blue stripes on their veils or cloaks. Sometimes the letter S (=*signum*) appeared in the yellow circle. In Switzerland the badge took the form of a piece of red cloth shaped like a pointed hat; later on it became a wheel fixed on the back.* In Crete the circle was worn; this was also marked upon the houses of Jews, a custom which is in vogue even at the present day.† In England it would almost seem as though the badge was at first introduced as a safeguard for the Jews. The Earl of Pembroke, who was regent during the early years of the minority of Henry III., sought to encourage the settlement of the Jews again in England after their cruel experiences during the reign of John. It was to ensure their security, so that no one could plead that he had assaulted a Jew in ignorance of his race, that the badge was, so far as is known, first introduced into England, and worn by Jews whenever they appeared in public. The ordinance containing this provision was put forth in 1218. The badge consisted of two strips of white linen or parchment, imitative of the Two Tables of stone, which were fastened to the dress in a prominent manner. Originally these were white in colour, but later yellow was ordered. By the statute of Edward I., *de Judaismo* (3 Edw. I. 1274-1275),‡ which dealt exhaustively with the Jewish Question, Jewesses as well as Jews were forced to wear a badge, and its object now was to mark out Jews, who by this statute were prohibited from mixing with Christians. Thus it became, as in other countries, a badge of shame.§

LITERATURE.—There do not seem to be any works definitely occupied with the subject of badges. Data have to be gathered from a great variety of sources. See the references in the footnotes above, which represent only a selection.

W. O. E. OESTERLEY.

BĀGDĪ.—A Dravidian, cultivating, fishing, and menial caste of Central and Western Bengal, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 1,042,550. Their religion is a compound of orthodox Hinduism with survivals of animism and nature-worship. In the former stage, the regular Hindu deities are worshipped in a more or less intelligent fashion. But besides these they venerate Gusain Erā, the goddess of the Santāls, and Bar Pahār or Marang Buru, the mountain-god of the hill races (see ORĀON). According to their own statement, their favourite deity is the snake-goddess, Manasā, whose image, represented with four arms, crowned by a tiara of snakes, and grasping a cobra in each hand, is paraded through their villages, and finally flung into a tank—apparently a rite of mimetic magic intended to remove her dangerous influence. They also parade the effigy of a female saint named Bhādū, who is said to have been daughter of the Rājā of Pachet, and who died a virgin for the good of the people. Her worship consists of songs and wild dances, in which men, women, and children take part. The legend supplies one more instance of the development of local gods in India from actual historical personages, as illustrated by Lyall (*Asiatic Studies*[2], i. 39 ff.).

LITERATURE.—**Risley**, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 1891, i. 41 f.

W. CROOKE.

BAGHDAD.—1. Sketch of history.—Baghdad is the capital of the Eastern Khalifate, founded in A.D. 754 (A.H. 136) by al-Manṣūr, second Khalīf of the 'Abbâsid dynasty, whose metropolis it remained, except for the period 836-862, when the court was transferred to Samarra, until the overthrow of the dynasty by the Mongol Hûlâgû in 1258 (A.H. 656), after which the seat of the Khalifate was removed to Cairo. Baghdad remained in the hands of the Ilchans, or Persian Mongols, till 1507, when it was taken by Shah Ismâ'îl, founder of the Safawid dynasty, from whom it was taken in 1534 by the Ottomans, in whose hands it has ever since continued, except for the brief period of occupation by the Persians.

The name Baghdad (*bâgha-dâta*, 'given by Bagha *or* God') is one of the many cases in which the older name of a locality outlasts newer appellations. The name which Manṣûr gave his city was either his own, or *Madînat al-Salâm*, 'City of Peace.' Another appellation was *al-Zaurâ*, 'the Crooked,' on the analogy of similar names given to the chief cities of Islâm. Of the older name there are several dialectic forms. Jews and Christians often called it Babel.

An account of the secular history of this city should be sought in historical works dealing with the Khalifate, or in the monograph of Guy le Strange, *Baghdad under the Abbasid Caliphate*, Oxford, 1900. We shall confine ourselves to its importance for the history of Religion and Ethics.

The accession of the 'Abbâsid dynasty marked the recognition in Islâm of a principle which at the first had been vehemently repudiated—the hereditary right of the Prophet's family to the sovereignty (*imâma*). The rise of this is clearly due to the hereditary principle having been adopted by the usurper Mu'âwiyah, founder of the Umayyad dynasty; when it was once recognized that the sovereignty belonged to one family, the majority of Muslims would be disposed to agree that that family should be the Prophet's. Only, since the Prophet's line was continued through a daughter, there was room for difference of opinion as to which of two families had the right to his inheritance. The law of the Qur'ân seemed to favour the doctrine that, where there was no male issue, the father's brother succeeded, and on this theory the claim of the 'Abbâsids was based. But to those who held that there could be succession through the female line the Prophet's heirs were the descendants of his daughter Fâṭima and her husband 'Alî—the 'Alids, 'Alawids, or Fâṭimids.

So long as the problem was to dispossess the Umayyads, these two families worked together, leaving the question between themselves to be decided later; but when the organizing genius of Abû Muslim had won the throne for the 'Abbâsids, they fell out, and, the latter being in possession, the 'Alids were perpetually rising, but never produced in the Eastern provinces a leader capable of securing success; they were decimated by massacres, and were intimidated by torture and imprisonment. Nevertheless they formed a potent factor in Baghdad politics till the coming of the Mongols, and in the *fatwâ* which decided the assassination of the last of the Khalîfs of Baghdad the influence of 'Alid sentiment is noticeable. The Mongol general asked whether it was true that the execution of the Khalîf would cause a general convulsion of nature. The jurists whom he consulted replied that, if such an act could cause a natural convulsion, nature would have been convulsed by the death of 'Alî and that of his son Ḥusain.

The site of the 'Abbâsid capital was selected with a view to avoid Syria, where the Umayyads were popular, and Arabia, where the 'Alid cause was strong, and to be near Persia, especially Khorasan, where the 'Abbâsids had their chief adherents. And, indeed, the triumph of the 'Abbâ-

* Abrahams, *op. cit.* p. 298.

† *JE* ii 427[a]; see, too, the interesting plate given.

‡ See Rigg, *Select Pleas, Starrs, and Records of the Jewish Exchequer* (1902), p. xxxviii.

§ See, further, A. M. Hyamson, *A History of the Jews in England* (1908), pp. 62, 94 ff.

sids is sometimes regarded as the re-conquest by Persia of its ancient hegemony. Persian influence speedily grew strong at the Khalîf's court, and the institution of a foreign bodyguard soon took all power out of the Khalîf's hands, and placed it in those of a Dailemite or a Turkish Sultan.

2. Literary importance of the foundation of Baghdad.—The rise of the new dynasty synchronized with the popularization of *paper*, an invention nearly as momentous for the diffusion of knowledge as that of printing. It also broke with the illiterate tradition of the earlier periods of Islâm, which indeed some of the Umayyads had shown a tendency to discard. The production of literary works proceeded apace, and the 3rd cent. of Islâm produced polygraphs such as Isḥâḳ of Mauṣil and Jâḥiẓ of Baṣra. Translation from foreign languages was encouraged, especially Greek, Syriac, and Pahlavi; a royal library was founded by Ma'mûn (ob. A.D. 833), and his example was followed by other men of eminence, such as the vizier of Mutawakkil, al-Fatḥ b. Khâḳân (ob. 861). The respect which the creations of the Greek genius have universally won was accorded to them at Baghdad, where indeed the dogma of the infallibility of the Greeks in all scientific questions had its adherents. Debates, in which religious questions were not absolutely avoided, were encouraged by literary viziers, and fanaticism on such occasions was at times unfashionable (cf. Yâḳût, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, ii. 46 and the Pahlavi *Gujastak-Abālish*, ed. Barthélemy, Paris, 1887). A public library with endowments for the assistance of students was founded in the 4th cent. A.H. by the vizier Sâbûr b. Ardashîr; and the building of colleges on a large scale characterized Seljûḳ rule in the 5th.

3. Islâmic religious buildings in Baghdad.—The founder of the city, Manṣûr, built a mosque, known subsequently as *al-Ṣaḥn al-'Atîḳ*, 'the Old Court,' side by side with his Palace of the Golden Gate. This was subsequently enlarged by succeeding Khalîfs, and appears to have survived the sack of the city by Hûlâgû, though no trace remains of it now (le Strange, *op. cit.* 32-37). Since the building of mosques counted as a meritorious act, apart from the needs of worshippers, they continued to be erected so long as the Khalîfate lasted; and the quarter called 'the Baṣra Gate' was said to contain 30,000 of these edifices (Ṣafadî, *Com. on Lâmiyyat al-'Ajam*, i. 64). Round the tombs of famous men several notable sanctuaries arose; such were the *mashhads* of Abû Ḥanîfa and Mûsâ b. Ja'far, the tomb of Ma'rûf of Karkh, etc. Preachers and teachers built or had built for themselves hermitages, called *ribâṭ*, of which the number must have been very great; perhaps the most celebrated of these was the *ribâṭ* of the Shaikh al-Shuyûkh, built by order of 'Amîd al-'Irâḳ for the Ṣûfî Abû Sa'd of Nîsabur (ob. 1086: Ibn al-Athir, *annis* 450 and 479 A.H.). Another of some note was the *ribâṭ* of al-Zauzanî, opposite the mosque of Manṣûr, built for 'Alî b. Maḥmûd al-Zauzanî (ob. 1060). The preacher 'Abd al-Qâdir al-Jîlânî (*q.v.*) had a *ribâṭ* as well as a school. The works hitherto made accessible on the topography of Baghdad do not offer the same variety of names for mosques as is exhibited by the topographies of Cairo, but this is likely to be accidental. The doors of the mosques were used for placarding government notices (Ibn al-Athir, A.H. 533), and the inside of the buildings served for many uses not directly connected with religion, *e.g.* the recitation of verses, and the narrating of stories (Jâḥiẓ, *Ḥayawân*, iii. 8: 'Mosque of 'Attâb'), or the publication of political intelligence (Ṭabarî, iii. 2216: 'in the two public mosques of Baghdad'; 2224, 13: 2249, 3, etc.).

4. Religious history of Baghdad.—Shortly after the founding of the city an inquisition was started by Manṣûr with the view of suppressing the *zindîḳs* (see art. ATHEISM [Muhammadan]), and this was continued by his successors Mahdî and Hâdî (*Aghanî*, xii. 100, xiii. 74; Ṭabarî, iii. 517, 548); on the accession of Hârûn al-Rashîd all criminals except those under this charge were released. After the taking of the city by Ma'mûn's forces (A.D. 813) the dogma of the createdness of the Qur'ân was adopted by the new Khalîf, who instituted an inquisition into the tenets of his subjects, and violently persecuted those who rejected this doctrine: the inquisition was maintained by the two succeeding Khalîfs, and was finally stopped in the second year of Mutawakkil (A.D. 848–849, W. M. Patton, *Ahmed Ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna*, Leyden, 1897). The followers of the most distinguished martyr in these persecutions, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, presently became a power in the city, and riots between them and the Shâfi'ites took place at many periods; they are first mentioned in the year 934, when the Ḥanbalites endeavoured to enforce their ascetic rules on the population by a variety of violent proceedings. A furious manifesto was fulminated against them by the Khalîf Râḍî, charging them with anthropomorphism, and threatening them with the extreme penalty of the law unless they abandoned their system. Similar troubles are mentioned as late as 1082. The Khalîf Râḍî, immediately after his accession (A.H. 322, A.D. 934), had started an inquisition, having for its purpose the suppression of the sect which believed the deity to be incarnate in one Ibn Abî l-'Azâḳir al-Shalmaghânî. His published letter on this subject is in part preserved (see Yâḳût, *op. cit.* i. 298). One of this person's followers refused to retract his opinion even when the alleged possessor of deity was publicly scourged. The sect was not extinguished by this persecution, as in the year 952 a fresh inquisition was instituted by the vizier Muhallabî.

The chief cause for religious riots, however, was the ceaseless dispute between Sunnites and Shî'ites, whose differences, in spite of the centuries that have intervened, are still a cause of trouble in India and elsewhere. The dispute was in origin, as has been seen, more political than religious; and although the founder of Baghdad massacred the Alids, some of the later 'Abbâsids were inclined to favour their cause, and it is asserted that Ma'mûn had the intention of willing away the sovereignty to a member of their family. This was frustrated; and the perpetual risings of the 'Alids led Mutawakkil in the year 850 to destroy the grave of al-Ḥusain, and penalize visits to it, an act which was regarded by his son as justifying parricide. The process by which Shî'ism was transformed from a political movement into a religion is not quite easy to trace; but it seems likely that the fantastic beliefs which gathered round the person of 'Alî and his descendants were due to the infusion of Indian and Persian ideas into Islâm. It is probable that the separation of Shî'ism from Sunnism, as a system with a code and a liturgy of its own, was due to the rise of the Fâṭimid dynasty of N. Africa, whose rulers after their conquest of Egypt proceeded to the work of codification, their practice having doubtless existed some time before. In the disputes between Turks and Dailemites which marked the 4th and 5th cents. of Islâm, the former theoretically favoured Sunnism, the latter Shî'ism; and the Buyid (Dailemite) conqueror of Baghdad, Mu'izz al-Daula, in 962 ordered certain Shî'ite execrations to be affixed to the mosque doors. These were erased by the populace; and on the advice of his vizier Muhallabî he had a harmless formula substituted. The next

year, however (963), he insisted on the observance of the fast of Muharram 10 in Shî'ite fashion; and this practice continued some time after his death, as in 968 it is spoken of as 'celebrated as usual.' His successors appear to have been far less keenly attached to Shî'ite doctrine; and it is asserted by a good authority (*Rasâ'il* of Hamadhânî, p. 424) that 'Adud al-Daula went so far as to impose a poll-tax on the Shî'ites, as being members of a tolerated religion. The practice of the fast appears to have become gradually restricted to the Shî'ite quarter of the city, which in 971 (perhaps for the first time) appears as Karkh, also at that time 'the quarter of the merchants.' In the first riot (of that year) many sects and parties are involved, but on subsequent occasions the Sunnites and Shî'ites appear to have been the chief combatants. In 973, when the dispute between Bakhtiyar and Subuktakin gave the Turkish party the upper hand for the time in Baghdad, the Sunnites, who were in possession of 'the Food Market,' mounted a woman on a camel, and called her 'Â'isha, and made two of their number represent Ṭalḥa and Zubair respectively; they then made an onslaught on the Shî'ites, thus reproducing the Battle of the Camel, in which 'Â'isha and her allies had attacked the forces of 'Alî. In 1015 there was a riot between the two parties, resulting in the Shî'ites being forbidden to celebrate the Fast by order of Fakhr al-Mulk; we find the Shî'ites still in occupation of the quarter called Karkh, whereas the Ḳallâ'în and Barley-gate were in possession of the Sunnites: in 1048 the Bâb al-Âzaj (Eastern side) and the 'Cobblers' are further specified as Sunnite abodes. The following year, owing to an armed force having attempted to prevent the Shî'ites from celebrating the Muharram lamentations, the latter began to fortify their quarter (Karkh) with a wall; and the Sunnites proceeded to do the same with their Ḳallâ'în quarter, which immediately adjoined the other. After considerable fighting the parties agreed to a truce, with the view of preventing government intervention; they proceeded, however, with their fortifications, and a fresh outbreak was caused by the Shî'ites building towers on which they inscribed the words 'Muhammad and 'Alî are the best of mankind; whoso assents shows gratitude, but whoso denies is an unbeliever' —P formula which charged the Sunnites (with whom Abû Bakr is the *second best* of mankind) with unbelief. The Sunnites were headed by the Ḥanbalites. The *mashhad* Bâb al-Ṭibn (according to le Strange's maps, at a long distance from the disturbed quarter), apparently a Shî'ite sanctuary, was in the course of these riots violated, plundered, and burned by the Sunnites, to avenge the death of one of their number. The Shî'ites in revenge burned the Ḥanafite institutions. The disturbance soon spread to the eastern city, where the dwellings of the sects were also divided. At the beginning of 1053 the Turkish mercenaries mixed themselves up with the dispute, and killed a member of the 'Alid family; in the riots which followed, a large part of the Karkh quarter was burned down, and the inhabitants moved to other parts of Baghdad. Karkh, however, remained the headquarters of the Shî'ites, and in 1086 we hear of a riot between them and their Sunnite neighbours on the west, in the Baṣra Gate Quarter. Something like a final reconciliation between the two parties was effected in 1108, when the people of Karkh, fearing a fresh persecution, gave the Sunnites free passage through their quarter on a visit to the tomb of Muṣ'ab b. Zubair, a practice which had been forbidden for fear of giving offence to the Shî'ites; and the Sunnites in their turn granted some corresponding concessions. Karkh, however, remained the Shî'ite quarter after this settlement of the dispute (Sibṭ Ibn al-Ta'âwîdhî, ed. Margoliouth, p. 215).

Besides the disputes which led to riots, there were frequent bickerings between members of rival sects, and it would appear that all which were started had some representation at the capital. Attempts were at times made to suppress the discussions between them, but without permanent success.

The history of Muslim ritual was doubtless largely influenced by Baghdad practice, which itself was at times dictated by political motives. So we are told (Ibn al-Athir, *anno* 494 A.H.) that the practice of crying aloud the formula called *basmala* had been abandoned for years in the mosques of Baghdad, because it had been adopted in the rival Khalîfate of Cairo; the Khalîf who re-introduced this practice adopted another which was also against the principles of the Shî'a. Islâm in these matters is extraordinarily conservative, and innovations found little favour.

5. Standard of morality.—The Islâmic principles of the relations between the sexes, embodied in the practices of polygamy, concubinage, and the veiling and seclusion of women, render the morality of a Muslim community too different from that of a Christian or Aryan community to admit of comparison. Thus we find a leading theologian at Baghdad having 148 concubines (Ibn Khallikan, i. 386) without offending public opinion. Such pictures as have come down to us of Baghdad society, as in the *Arabian Nights*, imply a state of affairs on which it would be painful to dwell; of the most elaborate of these descriptions (Abu' l-Ḳâsim, *Ein Bagdâder Sittenbild*, of the 4th century; ed. A. Mez) few pages could be rendered into a modern language without infamy. The dignity of the highest offices of state, the Khalîfate and the Vizierate, did not appear inconsistent with the bandying of the grossest jests (see, *e.g.*, Ibn Khallikan, tr. de Slane, i. 29). Allusions to immoralities not sanctioned by the Muslim law are also so common in the literature of the period, that we can only suppose the practices to have been widespread. Towards drunkenness popular opinion was more decidedly unfavourable; yet this vice seems to have been prevalent in fashionable circles, and scenes in which the leading men and their associates are all under the influence of liquor are common during the whole period. An example may be taken from the middle of the fourth century, which is recorded by Yâḳût (*op. cit.* i. 342): a letter comes from the Sultan Mu'izz al-Daula to the vizier al-Muhallabî, who has all his secretaries and under-secretaries with him. The letter is urgent, but every man in the room has drunk deep. Ibrâhîm the Ṣabian has drunk no less than the others, but, having a stronger head than they, is able to write the necessary reply. We have another contemporary description of the wine-parties of this vizier (*Yatîmat al-dahr*, ii. 106), which took place twice a week; the chief judge of Baghdad with other judges took part on these occasions, when each 'received a gold cup weighing 1000 *mithḳâls* or less, into which he would plunge his beard; after exhausting most of the contents, they would sprinkle the remains on each other and then dance.' In the 6th cent. the poet Ibn al-Ta'âwîdhî introduces descriptions of wine-drinking into his encomiums on Khalîfs (p. 162) and other distinguished persons (p. 86). From the 4th cent. onwards the history of Baghdad is frequently occupied with the *'ayyârûn*, or robbers; and the *Maḳâmahs* of Hamadhânî (late 4th cent.) furnish us with a list of thieves' tricks showing that their trade was highly specialized; the contemporary anecdotes of Tanûkhî indicate, however, that the metropolis was fairly well policed. The same

tales indicate that the practice of banking was fairly developed, implying the existence of a well-established code of rectitude in monetary transactions; they also show that there was a considerable amount of sympathy and mutual kindness between the poorer members of the community, but great disregard for the sanctity of human life, and an insufficient sense of responsibility in the domestic relations. Public opinion seems to have been ordinarily in favour of the kindly treatment of slaves (Jâḥiẓ, *Misers*, p. 38), and against severe punishments.

6. Agencies for reform.—For dealing with the criminal classes the rulers of Baghdad employed spies, whose business it was to report at headquarters whatever seemed to them worthy of notice; certain rulers occupied themselves particularly with public morality: so the Khalîf Mu'tamid (A.D. 892) issued an edict forbidding story-tellers, astrologers, or fortune-tellers to sit in the street or in the great Mosque; while booksellers had to take an oath that they would sell no metaphysical or theological works. Similarly the Khalîf Muḳtadir (ob. A.D. 1094) banished from the capital all singing-women and *filles de joie*, forbade the entry to the public baths except in decent attire, and ordered the demolition of various galleries in which games were played, and which permitted the players to look down into people's houses. Probably the efficacy of these and similar edicts was of no long duration. In the year 816 we read (Ṭabarî, iii. 1008) of an interesting case of a voluntary organization of the peaceful citizens of Baghdad to repress crime and outrages; one of the leaders in this movement 'hung a Qur'ân on his neck, and began by exhorting the inhabitants of his locality; and when he had obtained a hearing, proceeded to admonish all the inhabitants of Baghdad, high and low, beginning with the noblest family of all, the Banû Hâshim; he established a register in which he inscribed the names of all those who undertook to observe his regulations and coerce those who disobeyed them. With the followers thus acquired he patrolled the streets of Baghdad, and put a stop to robbery and blackmailing.' His proceedings were at first disapproved by the government, but afterwards they acquiesced and bade him continue. A less drastic method of dealing with the vicious propensities of the citizens was furnished by the efforts of the preachers, of whom we have notices for all periods of the Khalîfate; the satirists Hamadhânî and Ḥarîrî endeavour to represent them as shameless hypocrites, whose interest lay only in the collection, but there is no reason for believing this account to have been ordinarily correct. The earliest of these preachers whose sermons have come down to us is al-Ḥârith b. 'Abdallah al-Muḥâsibî (ob. 857); they are practical in character, but are said to have attracted vast audiences, and to have produced ecstatic phenomena among their hearers. It is chiefly in and after the 5th cent. of Islâm that the historians call attention to the performances of the Baghdad preachers, for whom colleges (or, as we should say, chapels) were often erected. In 1093 the capital was visited by a preacher from Merv, Ardashîr b. Manṣûr; he met with such signal success that, when the ground occupied by his hearers was measured, it was found to cover 157 by 120 cubits. The Khalîf himself at times condescended to attend these discourses, which were occasionally used for political or seditious purposes. The aim of the preachers was not only to ameliorate the morals of their co-religionists, but to convert members of other communities to Islâm; and fabulous accounts are given in their biographies of their success in both endeavours. The preacher about whom we possess the largest amount of information is 'Abd al-Qâdir al-Jîlânî (ob. A.D. 1165). He appears to have carried on an agency in which the temporal as well as the spiritual wants of his converts were served. Money for the purpose was provided partly by four wealthy wives of the preacher, and partly by gifts taking the form of thank-offerings which came in from the many regions whither his fame had spread; and others who followed this calling were financed in the same way.

7. Christian communities in Baghdad.—Religious toleration, as understood by the Muslim community, was practised by the 'Abbâsid Khalîfs, and a Christian community began to gather in Baghdad almost immediately after its foundation. Perhaps the earliest scene which introduces Christians in this city is one recorded in the *Chronicle* of Dionysius of Tell-Mahré, when the Jacobites in the year A.D. 767 refer to the Khalîf Manṣûr the question of appointing a Patriarch for their sect. The Khalîf, ordinarily terrible, treats them with courtesy, and tells them to make the choice themselves; they select one David of Dara, and the Khalîf gives him a deed of investiture, authorizing him to punish with the extreme penalty of the law any Jacobite who fails to acknowledge his authority. The Nestorian sect, however, was of greater importance than that of the Jacobites at the 'Abbâsid capital. In the reign of Mahdî (A.D. 775–785) the great Nestorian monastery, called Dair al-Rûm, was founded in the Shammasiya Quarter, where the chief Christian settlement, called Dar al-Rum, was located. It was followed by the erection of many more churches and monasteries, several of which were destroyed when Baghdad was taken by Hûlâgû; their names are collected by le Strange (*op. cit.* 208–212). The different sects had different churches, and kept apart in religious matters; only at some time the Nestorian Patriarch, whose residence was in Baghdad, came to be regarded as the official head of the whole Christian community, and as such he is described in the deed of investiture of the year A.D. 1138 (H. F. Amedroz, in *JRAS*, 1908, p. 448). The sects there enumerated are four: the two already mentioned, the Melchites, or Greek orthodox, and the Rûm, whom there is some reason for identifying with the Franks, or Roman Catholics. Owing, probably, to the superiority of Christian morality and education, the members of these communities had a tendency to monopolize all the professions, trades, and situations in which skill and trustworthiness were required. The humiliating and intolerant edicts of Omar I. had repeatedly to be proclaimed, owing to outbreaks of Muslim jealousy (A.D. 849, 853, 1091, etc.), but fell quickly into abeyance; Mutawakkil, who in the year A.D. 849 tried to enforce them, ten years later put into the charge of a Christian scribe the money for the building of his contemplated city, Jafariyyah. Normally it would appear that the Christian doctors (in all senses of the word) enjoyed high favour at the Khalîfs' and Sultans' courts. The *History of the Nestorian Patriarchs* (ed. Gismondi, Rome, 1896) tells of the familiar intercourse enjoyed by the Patriarch Timotheus with the Khalîfs Hâdî (A.D. 785–786) and his son the famous Hârûn al-Rashîd. A specimen of their conversation is there given (p. 65): 'O father of the Christians,' said Hârûn to the Patriarch, 'tell me briefly which religion is the true one in God's eyes.' Without hesitation Timotheus answered: 'That religion of which the rules and precepts correspond with the works of God.' The reply was regarded as felicitous, because the Khalîf's request contained a dangerous trap; and the mere rumour that a Christian had spoken disrespectfully of Islâm or its Prophet would have been sufficient

to cause a riot (Ṭabarî, iii. 2162). The sanguinary rule that punished apostasy from Islâm with death remained unaltered (*ib.* 1434, A.D. 856); but, owing to the mild spirit of Abû Ḥanîfa's legislation, there was a tendency to mitigate the more barbarous regulations of 'the Pious Khalîfs,' and the tone of the code drawn up by his pupil Abû Yûsuf for the Khalîf Hârûn is decidedly humane. The magnificence with which the Christian feasts were celebrated attracted many Muslims to take part in these occasions, and even attend services in the churches; if the poet Sibṭ Ibn al-Ta'âwîdhî may be believed (ed. D. S. Margoliouth, p. 400), he went so far as to fast fifty days in order to gratify his Christian friends. The monasteries were also visited by Muslims anxious to purchase wine, the sale of which in shops was, nominally at least, forbidden (*ib.* 240, 14–18); while the beauty of the youthful deacons attracted other visitors for a still less reputable reason (*ib.* 52). The form of immorality alluded to appears at times to have led to shameful persecution (Yâḳût, *op. cit.* ii. 26, where the scene is at Edessa).

8. Other religious communities.—The Jews enjoyed the same rights as Christians in Baghdad, and had a special quarter, with a bridge called after them. Numerous synagogues were founded, of which the largest was called Bar-Nashala (?) (Gratz, *Geschichte der Juden*, v. [1895] 198). References to the Jews are not very common in the historical and anecdotic literature concerned with the city; they appear, however, to have had their share of the State appointments, and, indeed, in A.D. 1091 we read of one holding the very high posts of Vice-Sultan (*wakil al-Sultân*) and Manager of the Empire (*Niẓâm al-Mulk*). They practised the medical profession, and probably various trades, including that of scribe; as early as the time of Ma'mûn (813–833) we read of one who made his living by executing copies of the Old and New Testaments and the Qur'ân (Amedroz, in *JRAS*, 1907, p. 38). At times they were in possession of great wealth, and were notorious for the display of finery (Ghazâlî, *Revival of the Religious Sciences*, iii. 182). It was thought meritorious to refuse to teach them Arabic grammar even for large sums, as the proof-passages came from the Qur'ân; and insulting language about them is used by poets (Sibṭ Ibn al-Ta'âwîdhî, 75, 246). Nevertheless the foundation of Baghdad and the improvement in their condition, due to the greater toleration of the 'Abbâsids, seem to have been epoch-making for the Jewish community. Jewish literature from this time follows Muslim literature almost slavishly, the various departments of grammar, codification, philosophy, poetry, elegant prose, homiletics, collections of anecdotes, all taking their rise from Arabic models; and since no Jewish non-Biblical MS earlier than the 'Abbâsid period has hitherto been discovered, it has been argued by the present writer that the remaining departments of Jewish literature (notably the collections of Tradition) are based on Islâmic models also (cf. *JE* ii. 435–8).

A community which produced some men of eminence in the scientific and literary world of Baghdad, chiefly in the 4th cent. of Islâm, were the *Sabians*, who arbitrarily took a Qur'ânic appellation, properly belonging to a very different sect. The most distinguished member of it, the state-secretary Ibrâhîm, appears to have found in his religion no obstacle in the way of promotion, and to have enjoyed the friendship of even such ecclesiastical dignitaries as the Registrar of the 'Alids, who honoured him with a memorial poem; while the familiar acquaintance with the Qur'ân which his profession demanded was regarded as a merit. His grandson, however, found it desirable to embrace Islâm. The *Magian*, or Mazdayan, system enjoyed fewer privileges than the above-named sects, as intermarriage with them and the use of meat slaughtered by them were forbidden the Muslims; nor were they allowed to have acknowledged places of worship. Nevertheless it would appear that some of them were settled in Baghdad, and even enjoyed wealth. They were to be found (according to Jâḥiẓ, *Misers*, p. 111) all over Baghdad and the other cities of Irâḳ, distinguished by their bare feet or their laceless shoes. Of other sects, usually offshoots of those which have been mentioned, there are occasional notices.

LITERATURE.—To the references given throughout the article there may be added the historical romance (Arabic), *Ḥaḍârat al-Islâm fi Dâr al-Salâm*, by a modern writer, Jamîl Nakhlah al-Mudawwar (Cairo, 1905). D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

BAHAISM.—See BĀB, BĀBIS.

BAHELIA (Skr. *vyādha*, 'one who wounds').—A tribe of hunters and fowlers in Northern India, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 53,554, the majority of whom are found in the United Provinces and Bengal. They are probably survivors of a non-Aryan race, who still practise their primitive occupation of hunting, trapping birds, and collecting jungle produce. They are, in name at least, all Hindus, but are never initiated into any of the orthodox sects. They worship a pantheon of deified ghosts, such as Kālū Bīr, Parihār, Hardeo or Hardaur Lālā, the cholera godling, Kālē Deo, and Miyān, probably the Musalmān saint of Amrohā in the Morādābād district. To these, sacrifices of fowls, goats, or pigs are made, with offerings of cakes, fruits, and grain. Parched grain and milk are offered to the household snake at his festival, the Nāgpañchamī, or Dragon's Fifth. Besides these they observe the ordinary Hindu feasts, and their religious rites are superintended by a low class of village Brāhmans.

LITERATURE.—Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 109. W. CROOKE.

BAIDYĀ (Skr. *vaidya*, 'one learned in the Veda,' esp. in the Āyur Veda, on which the Hindu system of medicine is based).—The Bengal caste of physicians, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 90,036, found under this name only in Bengal and Assam. They are a highly respected caste, claiming descent from a Brāhman father and Vaiśya mother. Their religion is that of the orthodox high-caste Hindu. The older families worship the Śaktis, or Mother-goddesses. Some among the poorer classes follow the rule of Viṣṇu. Many have in recent years joined the Brahmo Samāj. They were closely associated with the Neo-Vaisnavism preached by Chaitanya (*q.v.*) in Bengal (*q.v.*), and several of the best known Guṣains, or spiritual guides, of that sect are drawn from the ranks of the Baidyās. The business of a physician is naturally confined to men of high caste, because taking medicine from the hands of a Baidyā is a sort of sacramental act, so that some orthodox Hindus in Bengal, when at the point of death, call in a Baidyā to prescribe for them, in the belief that by swallowing the drugs he orders they obtain absolution from their sins. In the Deccan the Vaidūs, who have adopted a name derived from the same Skr. root, are wandering Telugu beggars, who gather healing drugs and simples and hawk them from door to door, or beg for alms. Their religion is of the vaguest type, their family-god being Vyānkoba of Giri or Tirupati (*q.v.*), in North Arcot. But when they are on their begging tours they seldom carry his image with them. They never go on pilgrimages or keep any fast or feast, except the Dasahrā in September, when they offer

boiled mutton to their god, and after laying it on his altar eat it themselves.

LITERATURE.—For the Bengal Baidyās, Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, 1891, i. 49; for the Deccan Vaidūs, *Bombay Gazetteer*, xvii. 212*f.*

W. CROOKE.

BAIGĀ.—A term of Dravidian origin, applied to designate the non-Brāhmanic priests of the Gonds and kindred races along the hills of the Cent. Prov. and Bengal. It has been specially applied to a cultivating tribe, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 33,914, found in the Cent. Prov. and in Cent. India. The best account of them is that by Ward, who found them in the Mandlā district of the Cent. Provinces. He describes them as the acknowledged superiors of the Gond races, being their priests and authorities in all points of religious observance. The decision of a Baigā in a boundary dispute is almost always accepted as final, and, from this right as children of the soil and arbiters of the land belonging to each village, they are said to have derived their title of Bhūmiyā (Skr. *bhūmi*, 'the land').

These Baigās, who are found in the eastern districts of the Cent. Prov., are reported to be quite different from the Gonds, their vocabulary consisting almost entirely of Hindi words. Those who occupy the Maikal range of hills do not show the flat head and nose and receding forehead characteristic of the Gonds, but have longer heads, more aquiline features, and particularly small hands. It is thus possible that they may represent an intruding race from the Gangetic valley, who introduced the northern culture among the Gonds and gained the position of priests among that people, with whom they afterwards intermingled. Their religion much resembles that of the Gonds (*q.v.*), and they reverence the same gods, adding to the Gond pantheon Māī Dharitrī, or Mother Earth. The god in charge of the village is Thākur Deo, the 'Divine Lord,' and he is honoured accordingly. But they fully believe also in the spirits which haunt the forests—the primary basis of the religion of the Dravidians of Northern India—and in the places which are regarded as more especially the haunts of these spirits, shrines (*pāt*) are erected, each under the charge of a special member of the tribe. There is no special rule regulating the erection of these shrines, except that they are built at places where it is believed there has been a spirit manifestation. Sometimes it is a place where a man has been killed by a tiger or a snake, or has met his death in a sudden or tragical manner; and a special rite is performed to lay the ghosts of those who have died in an unexpected way. Some members of the tribe are supposed to be gifted with special powers of magic or witchcraft, and it is common for the Baigā medicine-man to be called in to bewitch the tigers and prevent them from carrying off the village cattle. The Gonds thoroughly believe that they are possessed of powers such as these.

The religious rites of the Baigās are of the same type as those of the Gonds; at marriages, births, and deaths the customs of the two tribes are identical. In the Chhattīsgarh District the Baigā worship centres round Dūlhā Deo, the deified bridegroom god, and Devī, the Mother-goddess, in her manifestation as Bhavānī. They have a peculiarly brutal mode of sacrificing a pig in honour of Nārāyan Deo, who is identified with the Sun, and is regarded as their household god. The wretched animal is crushed to death under a beam, after having been cruelly tortured—this rendering the sacrifice more acceptable to the deity.

Further east, in the hill country of the United Provinces and Bengal, the Baigās do not form a special tribe, but are the exorcists, medicine-men, and priests of the hill races. They are generally drawn from the wilder and more secluded tribes who are supposed to have maintained the race traditions in the most perfect way. They discharge all the religious duties of these peoples, the functions of the priest being as yet differentiated from those of the exorcist or sorcerer only in the most imperfect way, if at all.

LITERATURE.—*Central Provinces Gazetteer*, 1870, 278 ff.; *JASB* lviii. pt. i. 291; *Punjab Notes and Queries*, iii. 20, J. Lampard, *Imperial Gazetteer*, new ed. 1908, vi. 214 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BAIN.—1. Life and personality.—(1) Born in the part of Aberdeen known as Gilcomston, on the 11th of June 1818, Alexander Bain died at Ferryhill Lodge, in his native city, on the 18th of September 1903, in the eighty-sixth year of his age. Although he reached this long term of years, he was never a man of very robust constitution: on the contrary, from the time, in early days, when a serious breakdown in health occurred, he had to husband his strength, and to make the most of favouring circumstances. This he did by careful habits and a well-planned system of simple living, subjecting everything to rule and method. He was specially attentive to diet and to physical exercise; and walking in particular (his chief recreation) was timed and regulated with almost mathematical precision. As a boy, and during his student days at Aberdeen, he worked as a handloom weaver—his father's occupation. When he was a pupil at Gilcomston Church School, his ability was recognized; and as he was emerging into youth he had the good fortune to attract the attention of the Rev. John Murray, minister of the North Parish of Aberdeen, who introduced him as a promising youth to Dr. John Cruickshank, then Professor of Mathematics at Marischal College, and a patron of talented and aspiring young men. This was in 1835. From that moment, Dr. Cruickshank took young Bain by the hand; and his interest in him was fully rewarded by the high position that the pupil achieved in most of the University classes. In 1841, Bain (having just passed from studentdom) received an appointment in the University as Assistant to Dr. Glennie, Professor of Moral Philosophy, who had fallen into ill health. In this capacity he had to conduct the class on the Professor's approved methods, and to read the Professor's lectures, being responsible for the order of the class. In the interests of discipline, he made innovations little by little in the teaching, bringing the subject more up to date, and giving expression (in more or less guarded fashion) to his own views. This, when discovered by the Professor, was resented, and led, after three sessions, to Bain's losing the post of Assistant. Thereafter he made his way to London, the goal of all ambitious Scotsmen, where, in 1848, he was appointed to an office in the Board of Health under Edwin Chadwick. In London he soon came into contact with great literary and political leaders—more especially with George Grote and J. S. Mill, who became his fast friends, and with whom he was closely associated in philosophical and other work. From London he returned to Scotland, where he wrote many literary productions for Messrs. Chambers of Edinburgh; then went again to London, where he married and settled down for a time, producing there his two great philosophical works, *The Senses and the Intellect* in 1855, and *The Emotions and the Will* in 1859.

These works raised him at once to the front rank of psychologists. Consequently, when the two Universities of Aberdeen (King's and Marischal) were united (or, as the local term is, 'fused') in 1860, Bain was presented by the Crown, on the

recommendation of Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, then Home Secretary, to the Chair of Logic and English in the united University. For twenty years from this date—down, that is, to the year 1880—he occupied this Chair with great distinction, teaching the two subjects of English and Logic (including in the latter Psychology) and making his influence felt. These were years of enormous intellectual activity and literary productiveness, when there issued from his pen in unceasing flow works on English Grammar, on Rhetoric, on Logic, on Psychology, on Ethics, and on Education; when also he originated the philosophical journal *Mind*, which he owned and financially carried on for sixteen years at considerable pecuniary loss; and when, in the Senatus and the Council of his University, he pushed forward with untiring energy, and in the face of strenuous opposition, projects of University reform. Nor did his activity diminish when he resigned the Chair in 1880. There ceased only, at that time, his class-teaching. His writing of books went on, as well as his active interest in local affairs; and it was while he was Emeritus Professor that the students of the University, appreciating his genius and his faculty for practical work, and proud of his fame, elected him their Lord Rector for two separate terms of three years each. This entailed his constant attendance at, and presiding over, the meetings of the University Court, and his indefatigable piloting of University schemes to successful issue at a most important and electrically charged moment of the University's existence.

His professorial labours were in part rewarded when former pupils, in 1884, had his portrait painted by Sir George Reid, and presented as a lasting memorial to the University. Reward for services done to the community came also about the same time, or somewhat later—in particular, the presentation of his bust in marble to the Free Public Library, in 1892, in recognition of his long-continued and whole-hearted interest in the education of the masses, dating from his student days, and his early connexion, as lecturer and as secretary, with the Mechanics' Institute of the city. All the while, his pen continued active. New works appeared, old works were revised (often in large part re-written); and, though the energy slackened by degrees as the years advanced, it could hardly be said ever to have actually ceased, for, as late as 1903 (the year of his death), appeared his *Dissertations on Leading Philosophical Topics*, and to the end he retained a keen interest in the progress of Psychology and the movement of Philosophy. Passing by minor productions, his chief works are these:—*The Senses and the Intellect* (1855), *The Emotions and the Will* (1859), *On the Study of Character, including an Estimate of Phrenology* (1861), *An English Grammar* (1863), *English Composition and Rhetoric* (1866, enlarged ed. 1887–8), *Mental and Moral Science* (1868), *Logic* (1870), *Mind and Body* (1872), *A Higher English Grammar* (1873), *Education as a Science* (1879), *James Mill—a Biography* (1882), *John Stuart Mill—a Criticism, with Personal Recollections*, (1882), *Practical Essays* (1884), *On Teaching English* (1887), *Dissertations on Leading Philosophical Topics* (1903), *Autobiography* (1904).

(2) His personality was striking; and a stranger seeing him for the first time could not but ask who he was. A dapper figure, somewhat under medium height, he had a well-knit frame, with expansive chest and broad shoulders; a finely formed head, with a brow marked by notable prominences at the temples; keen, piercing hazel eyes, with unusually long eyelids; a strong curved nose; thin lips, which gave the mouth the character of determination, and readily expressive either of satisfaction or of contempt; a face covered by a copious beard—all save the upper part of the chin, which, till his later years, was clean shaved; hands with long fingers, and particularly expressive thumbs, which bent back in a significant fashion as he gesticulated. His gait was peculiar. While walking, he bent his body forward and placed a hand behind his back, as if steadying the movement, and forthwith accelerated his pace till it became a moderated run—indicative of mental activity, exhilaration, and the utter absence of self-consciousness and regard for outward appearance. Keen as a needle intellectually, he never spoke in public or wrote for publication without showing the logician's subtle power; and, in private talk, one could not help feeling that one was in the presence of a supremely observant and analytic mind—a modern Aristotle, noting and dissecting everything. Yet he was a man of very wide interests and of warm heart. He took an active part in many public duties—School Board, Mechanics' Institute, Free Library, etc. His feelings were always under control, and those who met him casually (and to whom he would be dry and reserved) pronounced him to be hard and unsympathetic (as, indeed, he not infrequently was, if he met conventional and commonplace people). But let genius or sterling character appear, no matter where (it might be in the humblest ranks of life), and he was immediately attracted. It was genuine worth alone that counted with him.

Readers of his works have often complained that his writings are devoid of emotion. They have ground for their complaint. Bain did himself an injustice here. Whenever he took up the pen, his feelings seemed to forsake him. But with a special friend—say, a favourite student (these were not many, but they were choice)—looking to him for help or counsel, his real nature came forth. All his resources—his advice, his ideas, his MSS, his library, his patronage—were put at his disposal; and he spared no effort to further his interests and aspirations. Underlying all was true generosity of disposition. In like manner, in the small circle of his intimates, his gentler and more attractive qualities came out. He had wit and humour; and he possessed a fund of anecdotes, which he told well. He was a kind host, and a staunch friend. On the other hand, he had his dislikes and his animosities. Like all true-hearted people, he was sensitive to insult and determined in his opposition. It was no light matter to arouse his enmity. He was a man of strong convictions and loved a controversy; and in debate he hit hard, but never took a mean advantage of an opponent. Meanness raised his indignation and contempt, and he had none of it himself. He was dominated by a sense of justice and of truthfulness (few men more so), and his judgment was ever balanced—a fact that comes clearly out in his published writings, as it did in his daily life. He had the power of judging apart from personal feeling, to a degree that is very unusual. Hence his criticisms were pre-eminently impartial. And it mattered not whether he were criticizing himself or others. As he looked back upon it, his own work was viewed with a clear unprejudiced eye, and commented on and appraised accordingly—as may be seen in some striking instances in the *Autobiography*. In like manner, his criticisms of others' work were frank and honest, and they frequently gave offence to friends. He had not learned the art of saying what he did not mean, and such an art he heartily despised. He had many fine qualities, which those who knew him best could best appreciate; and his defects not infrequently arose from these.

2. Position in Literature and in Philosophy.—In estimating Bain's position in Literature and in Philosophy, we must keep his offices apart.

(1) First of all, let us take him as *grammarian*. This need not detain us long. His works show his merit to be that of a subtle analyst and a clear expositor—scientific and methodical, and not afraid to express his views, even when they might be unacceptable; and when we remember the backward condition of the North of Scotland in grammatical attainments at the time when Bain came as Professor to Aberdeen, we can see the magnitude of the task that lay before him as he set forth to instruct in grammar. But the task was successfully accomplished, although not without difficulty. He had to get hold of the teachers, and these were apathetic, when not actively hostile. He solved the difficulty by indoctrinating his students, a large proportion of whom were to be teachers, with newer and progressive views, and thus by degrees revolutionized the teaching of English in Scotland, and made his name one to conjure with throughout the North.

(2) But his work as *rhetorician* is even more remarkable. Campbell and Blair had ruled supreme in this realm; but now a new impulse was given to the study and the practice of composition, and the effect for good was soon visible on all hands. It has sometimes been objected to Bain's teaching that he did not produce stylists. It may very well be doubted whether the stylist is not a man 'born and not made.' But, be that as it may, the objection is superficial. For style is wherever clearness of exposition is, and wherever there is a writer who has an intelligent appreciation of the shades of meaning in words and can give utterance to his thoughts in definite logical form and with exact precision. Such writers Bain produced in abundance. Rhetoric was to him, first and foremost, an intellectual discipline, designed to secure clearness of expression; and for this end he was supremely critical. Not even Shakespeare, still less the minor poets, neither Bacon nor De Quincey nor Macaulay nor Carlyle among our master prose writers, escaped his scalpel: all were subjected to analysis and dissection, so that the student might be warned against their faults, while encouraged to imitate their virtues. This cold, critical, dissecting process has been greatly objected to in the teaching of style; and perhaps it may be admitted that Bain made too drastic a use of it. But if it be the safeguard against that florid vacuous writing which so frequently passes for style, a little excess in the use of it may be tolerated with equanimity, if not actually excused.

(3) As an *educationist*, Bain holds a very high position. He held advanced views on University reform, and advocated the due recognition of the modern languages (as against the traditional monopoly of Classics), and the right of Natural Science to have an equal place in the University training with the older established subjects. But besides, he went outside University requirements and took a wide view of Education, raising the question of Education in general and the grading of subjects at the various stages of instruction. In this connexion he gave expression to very definite notions about the proper order of studies, and about how teaching should be conducted so as to be best suited to the harmonious development of the individual mind. His contributions to this highly important subject are to be found chiefly in his book on *Education as a Science*.

(4) As *logician*, Bain holds a place with J. S. Mill. He never pretended to start afresh here, but simply to amend and carry forward Mill. This he succeeded in doing. His amendments and additions are noteworthy, both in Deductive and in Inductive Logic; but specially valuable is his carrying of logical principles to their practical issues and his splendid application of them to the sciences in detail (see bk. v. of his *Logic*). This stands by itself in Logic manuals.

(5) But Bain's greatest fame must ever rest on his *psychology*. He was a reformer here in a supreme and lasting sense. One of the earliest in modern times to recognize the importance of bringing psychology into close relation with physiology, he devoted much attention to the elaboration of this position, and presented it in a striking fashion. From the standpoint of the cerebro-psychologist, he handled mind in all its processes—emotive, intellectual, and volitional. This led to his discarding the old 'faculty' psychology, which looked upon the mind far too much as if made up of self-contained compartments, where the processes worked in independence of each other, and in which the connexion with the body was slurred over or ignored; and it led also to his devising a natural-history plan for the description of mental phenomena—a plan where the physical embodiment of mental states was recognized as rigorously as the specifically psychical aspect of them. It is obvious that we have here the precursor of what has come to play so prominent a part in more recent psychology, viz. psychophysics and the experimental determination (determination by experiments systematically carried out in the laboratory) of the workings of mind. Next, Bain was supreme among his fellow-psychologists in the persistent application of Association and its laws to the interpretation of mind, and in the thorough treatment that these laws received at his hands (see also art. ASSOCIATION). He is first and chiefly an Associationist, and his whole strength is devoted to showing that the great problems of psychology—especially the problem of the Perception of an External (Material) World—are to be solved on Associationist principles. This stupendous task he accomplished in a way that, whether we be fully satisfied with the result or not, gives him a foremost place in the history of psychology. No one can know what modern Associationism is at its best who does not go to *The Senses and the Intellect* for information; but this must be supplemented by Bain's most recent utterances in other productions. For example, the objection had frequently been made that his Associationist explanation is too mechanical, and neglects to take account of the activity of the mind. Here is his reply, given in *Mind*, in criticism of Wundt, and reprinted in *Dissertations on Leading Philosophical Topics* (pp. 50, 51):

'I propose to remark upon the bearing of Wundt's speculation upon the laws of Association, properly so called. Notwithstanding the stress put upon the action of the will, he still allows that will is not everything: he does not shunt the associating links, and lay the whole stress of the exposition on the apperceptive volition. What he says as to the essential concurrence of emotion and will with the workings of association we fully admit. No associating link can be forged, in the first instance, except in the fire of consciousness; and the rapidity of the operation depends on the intensity of the glow. In like manner, the links thus forged are dormant and inactive, until some stimulus of consciousness is present, whether feeling or will. . . . The subsequent rise or resuscitation of ideas consequent on association is a fresh field of study. . . . Over and above the original adhesion, there are circumstances that assist in the reproduction, and make it a success or a failure. Chief among these is the power of the will, but not to the exclusion of other influences. Even the addition of emotional excitement, which of itself counts for a great deal—that is, apart from moving the will—is not all. The purely intellectual conditions, under which I include the number and nature of the associating connexions at work in a given case, bear a large part in the process of resuscitation. More particularly, as to the influence of the will in apperception, everything that Wundt advances is supported by our experience. The will may make up, in some small degree, for the feebleness of a contiguous linking, partly by a more strenuous attention, but far more by the search for collateral links in aid. It may likewise favour the recall of a resembling image. But neither of

these two cases represents its habitual and all-powerful efficacy: in both, the limits of its reproductive force are still narrow. The operation that represents Wundt's Apperception in its full sweep is that crowning example of voluntary power—the command of the thoughts, by detaining some and dismissing others, as they arise, and are found suitable, or the contrary. Too much cannot be said as to the importance of voluntary attention in this lofty sphere. All thinking for an end—whether it be practical or speculative, scientific or æsthetic—consists in availing ourselves of the materials afforded by association, and choosing or rejecting according to the perceived fitness or unfitness for an end. When, therefore, Wundt says that Association alone does not explain the higher intellectual functions, he only says what we all admit, namely, that Association needs the control of will and feelings, in order to bring forth our more important thinking products In the absence of some degree of conscious intensity, Association can no more unite ideas, or restore the past by virtue of such unions, than a complete set of water-pipes can distribute water without a full reservoir to draw from. The scheme of Wundt does not lead to the slighting of Association as a great intellectual factor. His Apperception would be nothing without it'

Next, Bain excels in his analysis of mental states and processes and his fullness of telling illustrations. We have only to look at his handling of the Sensations, or at his treatment of the Emotions, to see that he has subtlety and insight of a very exceptional kind. Even when dissenting from him, we must confess that he is penetrative and suggestive to a degree. He is too analytic at times—this we may frankly allow; but his keen dissection is a helpful preliminary to a better understanding of the phenomenon dissected. Where his psychology stands him in least stead is when the distinction between psychology and epistemology comes in and needs to be specially attended to. Though he was quite aware of this distinction, it never assumed in his thoughts its rightful place; and his exposition sometimes suffers accordingly. He is also, in his general handling of mind, too individualistic. Although in his later years he explicitly recognized that the growth of the human mind cannot be thoroughly explained without taking into consideration the fact of Heredity (see, for example, the *latest* edition of *The Senses and the Intellect*), he had originally shaped his theory on the supposition that each individual had to learn for himself what he comes ultimately to attain, and this prevented his ever giving to the wider conception the due scope in psychology that it merits. In like manner, he never laid sufficient stress on what the fact of his being born into a formed language does for the individual, enabling him to appropriate with comparative ease, at an early age and in a comparatively short time, knowledge which, if he had to acquire it for himself from the beginning without such aid, would take him an indefinitely long time, and perhaps might not be achieved at all within the three score years and ten of his life.

(6) It was in line with Bain's psychological principles and with his democratic nature that, in *Ethics*, he should be a thoroughgoing *Utilitarian*. The same analytic spirit that he had shown in his handling of intellectual and emotional phenomena he shows in his treatment of the will. His analysis of conscience and his review of moral principles in his *Moral Science* show what Associationism can do in explanation of our ethical nature. They are certainly subtle and practical, and put the matter with calm scientific precision. Ethics is to him a *science* or nothing at all. He, therefore, has no trust in high ideality: principles tested by concrete facts of experience are what he requires. Yet, the whole of the facts must be attended to. Hence, he was emphatic in acknowledging the altruistic and disinterested, as well as the egoistic, side of our ethical constitution. Consequently, if we take morality as simply concerned with our relations as members of society, having our own and other men's interests in view, then Bain's teaching commands attention and no small measure of approval. It is essentially a doctrine of justice as between man and man, and between the individual and the community, and of the right of the State, having regard to the interests of the social units, to legislate with authority. It would, if accepted and consistently acted on, produce good citizens and promote the general welfare. Where it is defective is in not recognizing the value of the *ideal* side of morality and in not making adequate allowance for the strength and potency of the emotions in moral conduct. Appeals to ideality and the dignity of man appeared to him 'gross pandering to human vanity'; and he did not think that much practical good could come from that. Man, as we actually find him, is too frail and erring, and, what is worse, too malevolent by nature (for Bain was insistent on the native malignity of human nature) to permit our catering with impunity to his self-conceit. We must view him as he is, not blinking the disagreeable facts, and legislate accordingly; and, doing so, our Ethics must be sober and reasonable. Hence, his teaching lacks the glow which the Ethics that recognizes the Ideal as supreme unquestionably possesses.

(7) Bain was not, in the strict sense of the term, a *metaphysician*. Indeed, it was his claim to have purged psychology of metaphysics, and he had an inveterate distrust of unbridled speculation. Speculation, indeed, was not absolutely forbidden; but it must be speculation based on experiential data, and verifiable by appeal to experience again. Here he was the prototype of modern Pragmatism. In both, we have the same inductive spirit, the same determination to trust experience alone, the same regard to utility or the practical needs of man—experience the test, practicality the end. True, he could not avoid occasionally being himself, at least, half metaphysical; as, for example, when, at the end of his chapter on the 'History of the Theories of the Soul' in *Mind and Body*, he says:

'The arguments for the two substances have, we believe, now entirely lost their validity. . . . The one substance, with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental—a *double-faced unity*—would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case. We are to deal with this as, in the language of the Athanasian Creed, not confounding the persons nor dividing the substance.'

Nevertheless he regarded the higher philosophical thinking, as we find it, *e.g.*, in Spinoza or in Hegel or in Kant, with great suspicion. Such metaphysical terms as 'personality,' 'self-consciousness,' 'the Absolute,' he would, if he could, have banished from the language. He constantly protested his inability to read any meaning into them. He also refused, because of the ambiguity of the term 'self,' to accept 'self-realization' as adequate to express the ultimate ethical end. Moreover, the great metaphysical problems—those of the External World and of the Freedom of the Will—seemed to him to be in great measure mere word-puzzles: they arose from our inability to find a formula or a linguistic setting fully adequate to express what we are conscious of in our experience.

Such, then, was Professor Bain as a thinker and a writer. His attitude towards Metaphysics being discounted, he made a name in Logic and in Ethics, as well as in the spheres of Grammar and Rhetoric. But in the realm of Psychology he occupies a position all his own. It is here that his influence has been greatest, and it will continue. Not only has the professed psychologist learned from him, but his principles have been effective in their practical application to many sciences (such as Education), and they cannot be ignored by any teaching that has respect to experience and the nature of man as we actually find it. What is best in his

system has been assimilated by philosophy, and is being carried forward to greater issues. That, perhaps, is the highest compliment that can be paid to a thinker.

LITERATURE.—A. Bain, his works as enumerated in this article; Th. Ribot, *La Psychologie anglaise contemporaine* (1870); W. L. Davidson, art. in *Mind*, xiii. (new series) 151–155 and 161–179, also art. 'Bain, Alexander,' in *EBr*[10] xxvi. 77–79. WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON.

BAIRĀGĪ (Skr. *Vairāgin* [*vi-rāga*, 'one who has subdued all earthly desires']).—A sect of Hindu ascetics, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 765,253, of whom the vast majority are found in Bengal and Rājputāna. The term is usually restricted to those who follow the cult of Vishṇu, or of one of his incarnations, especially those of Rāma and Kṛishṇa. There is some evidence to prove that this worship, which is specially popular in Northern India, arose on the spread of the Rājput power which followed the overthrow of the Buddhist dynasties. The Bairāgīs

'probably represent a very old element in Indian religion, for those of the sect who wear a leopard's skin doubtless do so as personating Narasiṁha, the leopard incarnation of Vishṇu, just as the Bhagautī faqir imitates the dress, dance, etc., of Kṛishṇa. The priest who personates the god whom he worships is found in "almost every rude religion, while in later cults the old rite survives, at least in the use of animal masks," a practice still to be found in Tibet' (Rose, *Panjāb Census Report*, 1901, i. 131, quoting Trumpp, *Ādi-Granth*, 98; Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], 437; see also Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, 64 ff.).

Though the particular cult followed by this sect is most influential in the Gangetic valley and in Rājputāna, it arose in Southern India from the teaching of Rāmānujāchārya, who was born about A.D. 1017 at Śrīperumbūdūr, near Madras. He taught the existence of a triad of principles (*padārtha-tritayam*), viz.: (1) the Supreme Spirit (*Para-Brahman* or *Īśvara*); (2) the separate spirits (*Chit*) of men; and (3) non-spirit (*A-chit*). Vishnu is identified with the Supreme Spirit; individual beings are separate spirits; the visible world (*dṛśyam*) is non-spirit. All these have eternal existence and are inseparable; yet Chit and A-chit are different from, and at the same time dependent upon, Īśvara (Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], 119 f.). But the sect did not attain much prominence in Northern India until the time of Rāmānanda, who was born at the close of the 13th, and preached in Northern India at the beginning of the 14th, century. Indeed, it is only to the followers of Rāmānanda and his contemporaries that the title Bairāgī is properly applied. His teaching marked the progressive popularization of Hinduism; and in particular the ascetic Orders, which had been previously monopolized by Brāhmans and Kshatriyas, were now opened to men of lower rank. In addition to this, the religious books published by the adherents of Rāmānanda were now written in Hindī, not in Skr., and thus Northern India was provided with a new national religion of a very clear and vigorous type.

Though this liberal movement marked a decided advance, the Bairāgīs since the time of Rāmānanda have been outdone by the still more liberal teaching for which he provided the impulse, and at the present day Bairāgīs may be regarded as representing the more conservative, orthodox school of Hindu theology. As a rule, they are followers of Vishnu in one or other of his incarnations, and they are all agreed in the veneration of both Kṛishna and Rāma; but some sections pay more reverence to one, and some prefer the other. In the Panjāb this divergence is represented by the Rāmānandī and Nimānandī sections, the former specially addicted to the worship of Rāma, the latter to that of Kṛishna. Each has different sectarian marks, and each visits the sacred places, and studies the literature, connected with the deities which are special objects of their veneration. In the Central Provinces the old rule that admission to the Order was gained only by a rite of initiation is now generally neglected, and many are married and have families. Thus the Order is gradually tending to become a caste (Russell, *Census Report*, 1901, i. 162). In the United Provinces there are four sections, of which the two most important are the Rāmānuja or Śrī Vaishṇava, and the Nīmāvat or Nīmbārak. The former, the most ancient and respectable of the reformed Vaishṇava communities, is based on the teaching of Rāmānuja, and its special tenet is that Vishṇu, the one Supreme God, though invisible as a cause, is visible as effect in a secondary form in material creation. They refuse to follow the example of other Mathura sectaries in worshipping Rādhā, the spouse of Krishṇa, whom they either completely ignore or regard as merely the mistress of the deity. This branch is also divided into the Tengalai or Southerners, and the Vadagalai or Northerners, who differ in some points of doctrine, which, however, they consider to be of less importance than the manner in which the frontal sectarian mark is to be made. Of the other sect, the Nīmbārak, the doctrines, so far as they are known, are of a very enlightened character. As Growse (*Mathura*, 181 f.) writes:

'Thus their doctrine of salvation by faith is thought by many scholars to have been directly derived from the Gospel; while another article in their creed, which is less known, but is equally striking in its divergence from ordinary Hindu sentiment, is the continuance of conscious individual existence in a future world, when the highest reward of the good will be, not extinction, but the enjoyment of the visible presence of the divinity whom they have served on earth; a state, therefore, absolutely identical with heaven, as our theologists define it. The one infinite and invisible God, who is the only real existence, is, they affirm, the only proper object of man's devout contemplation. But, as the incomprehensible is utterly beyond the reach of human faculties, He is partially manifested for our behoof in the book of Creation, in which natural objects are the letters of the universal alphabet, and express the sentiments of the Divine Author. A printed page, however, conveys no meaning to any one but a scholar, and is liable to be misunderstood even by him; so, too, with the book of the world. Thus it matters little whether Rādhā and Kṛishṇa were ever real personages; the mysteries of Divine love which they symbolize remain though the symbols disappear'

Though the Bairāgī, a follower of the mild-natured Vishnu, does not as a rule practise the austerities characteristic of Śaiva ascetics, like the Yogī or Paramahaṁsa, we find him occasionally lying on the nailed couch, the Śaraśayyā, or 'arrowy bed' of Bhīshma, as described in the Mahābhārata (*Bhīshma parva*, 119 ff., tr. M. N. Dutt, vi. 208 ff., tr. Kisari Mohan Ganguli, iv. 444). Monier Williams (*op. cit.* 560 f.) describes an ascetic of this kind whom he met at the Lake Pushkar. But even he, with the catholic feeling of Hinduism, included in his worship not only the Śālagrāma, or ammonite of Vishnu, but the Bāna-linga, or white stone of Śiva, and the red stone of Ganeśa.

LITERATURE.—Growse, *Mathura, a District Memoir*[3], 1883, 179 f.; Jogendranath Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, 443 ff.; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 112; *Panjāb Census Report*, 1891, i. 122; *Bombay Gazetteer*, viii. 155; Nagam Aiya, *Travancore State Manual*, ii. 292 f. W. CROOKE.

BAITARANĪ.—A river of North India in the Keonjhar State of Orissa, which, after joining the Brāhmanī, flows, under the name of Dhāmra, into the Bay of Bengal. The name represents Skr. *Vaitaraṇī* (*vi-tarana*, in the sense of 'crossing' or 'giving'), liberality to Brāhmans being supposed to assist the soul in crossing this, the Hindu Styx or River of Death. The term *Vaitaraṇī* is also applied to one of the many Hindu hells, which, according to the Vishnu Purāṇa (tr. Wilson, 209), is reserved for the man who destroys a beehive or pillages a hamlet. An important part of the Hindu death-rites is devoted to assisting the soul to cross this terrible river, the current of which is supposed to run with great impetuosity, hot, fetid

in odour, and filled with blood, hair, and all manner of foulness. After the lustration, done at an early period of the mourning, it is customary to present the funeral priest with a vessel full of black sesamum (*tila*), and a cow to whose tail the ghost may cling in crossing the hated waters—a belief, as Ward (*Hindoos*[2], ii. 62) suggests, based upon the common habit of cowherds in Bengal, who cross rivers in this way. He doubts whether the Hindus ever imagined the existence of a Charon to escort the dead over the stream. But Risley (*Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, i. 359) says that the Jugīs place with the dead four cowries with which 'the spirit pays the Chāran (see BHĀṬ) who ferries it across the Vaitaranī.' This is an example of the world-wide belief that the departing soul on its way to the land of the dead must cross a river, which is sometimes spanned by a bridge (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], ii. 94, *Researches into the Early History of Mankind*, 349 ff.). The legend of the Juāngs, that remarkable tribe which down to quite recent times, and perhaps still in some places, wears only aprons of leaves, tells that when the river-goddess, Baitaranī, emerged for the first time from a rock, she 'came suddenly on a rollicking party of Juāngs dancing naked, and, ordering them to adopt leaves on the moment as a covering, laid on them the curse that they must adhere to that costume for ever or die' (Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, 156).

LITERATURE.—To the literature mentioned throughout the art. add *Imperial Gazetteer*, new ed., 1908, vi 218*f*.

W. CROOKE.

BALI.—The term *bali*, a Kanarese word corresponding to *bari* in Tamil and *bedagu* in Telugu, means an exogamous totemistic section, that is to say, a section of a caste or tribe worshipping a totem and strictly prohibiting marriage between those who have the same totem. The term is derived from an old Kanarese word meaning (1) way, road, (2) place, spot, (3) vicinity, nearness, company, (4) way, order, (5) race or lineage.* It also means the navel. It is in use among the cultivating, fishing, and forest tribes and castes of the Kanarese tracts of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, and of the Mysore State. A *bali* is thus the name of an exogamous section. It may be named after some well-known animal, fish, bird, tree, fruit, or flower. The following are common names of *balis* in the districts referred to: the elephant, elk, spotted deer, hog deer, mouse deer, wolf, pig, monkey, goat, porcupine, tortoise, scorpion, the nágchampa (*mesua ferrea*), turmeric, the screw pine (*pandanus odoratissimus*), the honne tree (*pterocarpus marsupium*), the neral (*eugenia jambolana*), the soapnut (*acacia concinna*), and many other local trees and shrubs.

It is noteworthy that the section named after one of these *balis* not only worships the animal or object after which it is named, but obeys strict rules framed to protect the animal or object from injury. Thus, a member of the elephant section may not wear ornaments of ivory, a woman of the *nágchampa* section must never wear the flowers of the *mesua ferrea*, and turmeric must not be used in the marriage ceremonies of the turmeric section, though commonly applied to the bride and bridegroom in the weddings of many Indian castes. The mouse deer section will not kill the mouse deer, and the screw pine section will not cut the branches, pluck the leaves, or even sit in the shade of the screw pine. The *bali*, or totem, of these primitive people, or an image of the same in stone or wood, is usually to be found installed in a rude temple near the village site. Ordinarily the temple is a mere thatched shed of mud walls, surrounded by a small mud-wall enclosure. Here will be found the image of an elk, or a branch of the tree representing the object from which the *bali* takes its name. To this coco-nuts and other suitable offerings are constantly brought, with the object of securing its favours and protection. At certain seasons the members of the section assemble from the surrounding villages, and make special offerings under the guidance of the caste priest. Contact with more advanced castes and tribes, who are organized by family stocks, or *kuls*, is tending rapidly to supplant the *balis* of the Kanarese country, which are forgotten or ignored as something to be ashamed of, by a system of family stocks named after an ancestor. It is not easy to induce these primitive people to describe their *balis* in reply to inquiries. The offspring of parents who, under the system above described, must be members of different *balis*, is sometimes allotted to the *bali* of the father, in other cases, of the mother. The practice varies with different tribes. It is probable that the earliest practice was to trace the *bali* through the mother, and that this system is gradually being supplanted by the Aryan custom of tracing descent through the father.

The *bali*, or totem, organization is a primitive system of which traces are to be found in India in many castes that stand high in the social scale. A remarkable instance of this is the Marathas and the allied castes of undoubted Maratha origin, which have crystallized into separate castes, such as washerman, carpenter, blacksmith, or grain parcher, owing to the influence of occupation. Among these, in varying degree, is to be found a system of *devaks*, or marriage guardians, closely resembling the *balis* of the Kanarese country, though the *devak*, by the progress of events, has in many cases ceased to regulate marriage, and no longer forms a bar to the union of two worshippers of one *devak*. The *devak* is usually some common tree such as the bel (*ægle marmelos*), fig (*ficus religiosa*), banyan, or the sami (*prosopis spicigera*). In its commonest form it is the leaves of five trees, of which one, as the original *devak* of the section, is held specially sacred. It is worshipped chiefly at the time of marriage, which suggests its former close connexion with marriages. It is also worshipped at the time of entering a new house. The installation of the *devak* is still an important part of the marriage ceremony in many castes in the Maratha country.

The existence of the *bali* in Southern India as an obsolescent system of totem-worship, and the survival of traces of a similar system farther north, seem to point to a time previous to the Aryan penetration into the central portion of the Indian continent, when a wide-spread system of totemism prevailed among the Dravidian population.

LITERATURE.—See literature under TOTEMISM.

R. E. ENTHOVEN.

BALLABHPUR (Skr. *Vallabhapura*, 'city of the beloved').—A suburb of Serampore in the Hooghly District of Bengal (lat. 22° 45′ 26″ N.; long. 88° 23′ 10″ E.), famous for the ceremonies performed in honour of Vishnu in the form of Jagannātha, 'Lord of the World.' Ward (*Hindoos*, ii. 164 ff.) describes the rites of the Snāna-yātra, or ceremonial bathing of the god, and the Ratha-yātra, or car procession. In the first, held in the month Jyeshṭha (May–June), Brāhmans, in the midst of an immense concourse of spectators, bathe the god by pouring water on his head, while incantations are recited. The worshippers prostrate themselves before the image, and depart after being assured by the priests that they shall not be subject to re-birth, but be admitted to heaven after the death of the body. About seventeen days after this rite the Ratha-yātra is performed. The idol, after

* Kittel, *Kanarese Dictionary*, *s.v.*

being worshipped, is placed in an enormous car. Jagannātha (see JAGANNĀTH) is here accompanied by his brother, Balarāma, and his sister, Subhadrā. This triad of deities is believed to be an adaptation of the Triratna of the Buddhists, or of the Triśūla, or trident. The former, the Three Jewels, symbolizes Buddha, Dharma, or Law, and Sangha, or the Congregation. It is, however, doubtful whether this symbolism is found in India (Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, 346). The modern triple image is probably due to a modification of the familiar Triśūla, or trident symbol (D'Alviella, *Migration of Symbols*, 254 ff.). As these idols are moved, an attendant fans them with a tail of the holy Tibetan cow. The object of the procession is that the triple deity should visit the temple of the god Rādhāvallabha, 'lover of Rādhā,' one of the forms of the erotic cult of Kṛishṇa. The visit lasts eight days, and the gods then return to their own temple. The rite is said to commemorate the sports of Krishna with the Gopīs, or milkmaids. It really marks the association of Jagannāth, a survival of Buddhism, with the cultus of Kṛishṇa and its adoption by Vaishnavism. The pilgrimage, the Rath-yātra, everything in fact connected with the worship of Jagannāth, as Fergusson says (*Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, 429), 'is redolent of Buddhism, but of Buddhism so degraded as hardly to be recognizable by those who know that faith only in its older and purer form.' The idol car is found still in the Buddhism of Tibet (Waddell, *op. cit.* 313).

LITERATURE.—The most important references have been given in the article. W. CROOKE.

BALUCHISTĀN. — The country of Baluchistān, in the widest sense of the word, comprises all the territory occupied by the Baluch and Brāhūī races and some minor tribes subordinate to or mixed up with them, and must be understood as including not only the Baluchistān Agency under the Government of India (that is, the Khanat of Kalāt, Makrān, and Las Bela), but also the southern part of the Province of British Baluchistān, parts of the Districts of Dera Ghāzi Khān in the Panjāb, Jacobābād in Sind, and the Province of Persian Baluchistān.

The two main races, the Baluch and Brāhūī, although differing from one another in origin, appearance, and language, are yet bound together as members of one social organization. The tribes of both races live in close contact, and their religious beliefs and practices cannot easily be discriminated. The universal religion among them is Muhammadanism. The few Hindu traders found scattered through the country are either themselves immigrants from India or the descendants of recent settlers. The Baluches and Brāhūīs all profess to be Sunnīs, or followers of the orthodox creed; but in practice they show great laxity, and follow many customs rather resembling those of the Shī'ahs and others, which no doubt go back to the days of paganism. They show the greatest respect to 'Alī, Ḥasan and Ḥusain, and observe the full ten days of the Muharram fast, like the Shī'ahs, and not only the last day, as among the strict Sunnīs. The observance of the five times of prayer prescribed for all Musalmāns has till lately not been at all prevalent among the hill-tribes. It was considered sufficient for the chief of a tribe to say prayers for the whole body of tribesmen.

The Baluches all wear their hair long, and cut neither hair nor beard, except to clip the ends of their moustache in the Sunnī fashion, to show that they are not Shī'ahs. Many of their more civilized or orthodox neighbours say that Baluch orthodoxy consists of little else, and indeed deny them the possession of any religion except one of a negative kind. They are fond of repeating a Persian verse to the effect that a Baluch earns heaven for seven generations of his ancestors by committing robbery and murder. This is unjust; for although the tribesmen are addicted to raiding and the blood-feud, yet many of them have a keen sense of right and wrong, and their defects are those common to all races in the same stage of civilization. Their laxity has its good side, for it is accompanied by a tolerant spirit and an absence of the fanaticism so prevalent among their Afghan neighbours. As Sir D. Ibbetson has well observed of the Baluch, if 'he has less of God in his creed he has less of the devil in his nature.'* His faithfulness to his code of honour, and the respect shown to women and children (who are never injured in Baluch raids), are points in his favour which should not be forgotten. There are few Mullahs and Sayyids among the Baluches, nor have they great influence; on the other hand, great respect is shown to the shrines of saints, as will be described below. Mosques are not common, and, where found, often consist only of a pattern of stones roughly marked out on the hillside, sufficient to indicate the *qibla*, or direction of Mecca.

The conversion of the Baluches and Brāhūīs to the Muhammadan faith had taken place before their settlement in the country now known as Baluchistān, and may be assigned to the period following the first Arab conquest of south-east Persia. The Baluches occupied the mountains and deserts of Kirmān, and were associated with another race known to the Arabs as Qufs and to the Persians as Koch, who may possibly be identical with the Brāhūīs; but the origin of this race is obscure. In any case, there is no historical information regarding their presence in Baluchistān until after the Baluch settlement there. The conversion of these races is ascribed by the historian Istakhrī, who wrote in the 10th cent., to the period of the Abbāsid Khalīfs. Yāqūt, on the authority of er-Rohini, speaks of the Qufs as savages without religion of any sort; but er-Rohini added that they did show some respect for 'Alī out of imitation of their neighbours. The hatred of a Sunnī writer for Shī'ahs is clearly perceptible here, and his language is very like that used to-day regarding the Baluch and Brāhūī mountaineers.

The settlement of the Baluches in the country they now occupy took place during a period extending from the 13th to the 16th century. They gradually spread over Makrān, and in the beginning of the 16th cent. a great migration took place in the Indus valley, the Brāhūīs taking the place of the Baluches on the plateau of Kalāt. The invasion of India was led by Mīr Chākur and his son Shahzād. It is probable that the Shī'ah sect was still prevalent among the Baluches, for Ferishta relates that Shahzād was the first person to bring the Shī'ah creed into vogue at Multān. Baluch legend represents Shahzād as of mysterious origin. A shadow (that of 'Alī) fell upon his mother while she was bathing, during Mīr Chākur's absence at the siege of Delhi with the emperor Humāyūn. She conceived and gave birth to a son shortly before her husband's return. When he returned, the child, who was then three months old, addressed him and told him to fear nothing, as he had been begotten by the influence of the saint. A mystical poem, half in Baluchi and half in corrupt Persian, which is attributed to Shahzād has been verbally handed down to the present day. The following extract will give an idea of its nature:

'I gaze upon the brightness of the King; he created the golden throne of Heaven, his speech was sweet and heart-entrancing, he was like unto the Lord of Light. Day and night he created, day and night are of small account to him.

* D. Ibbetson, *Outlines of Panjāb Ethnography*, 1883.

The dry earth he created, and the smoke that went upwards. There was neither sky nor firmanent: there was neither existence nor speech; there was neither Grandmother Eve nor Grandfather Adam. There was no Ibrāhim the Friend of God, nor was there the ark of Noah, nor Īsā the Spirit of God, nor the throne of Sulaimān. He himself was "He is," Hamīd 'Alī.'

After this period the Baluches seem gradually to have adopted the Sunnī faith, in name at least, although the change has made little practical difference.

'Alī figures largely in Baluch legend, and in some of the stories about him it is impossible not to suspect a Buddhist origin. Such is the legend of the hawk and the pigeon. A pigeon was struck down by a hawk at 'Alī's feet and appealed to him for protection. The hawk, on the other hand, represented that he had left his young ones starving, and could find no other food for them but the pigeon. 'Alī in order to satisfy the hawk cut off a piece of his own flesh. Whereupon both the pigeon and hawk revealed themselves as angels sent by God to try him.

On another occasion 'Alī had himself sold as a slave in order to pay the marriage portion of the daughter of a petitioner. Again he is said to have given a whole caravan of money to a blind beggar by the roadside, who afterwards developed into the celebrated saint Sakhī Sarwar, whose shrine at Nigāhā, near Dera Ghāzi Khān, is one of the chief places of pilgrimage, not only for Baluches but equally for Hindus and Musalmāns from all parts of the Panjab.

The shrines of saints, or *pīrs*, are centres of worship and pilgrimage throughout the country, and form the most important feature in the actual religion of the people. In many cases there can be no doubt that these shrines have been in existence from times preceding the introduction of Islām, and that most of them were found already established by the Baluches and Brāhūīs when they settled in the country. Some are of great importance, and attract visitors from far and wide, while others are known only locally. Pieces of cloth, bells, horns, fossils, and other objects are left at the shrines by pilgrims in fulfilment of their vows.* Among the most frequented shrines are those of Sakhī Sarwar (already mentioned); Sulaimān Shāh of Tauñsa Sharīf, a modern orthodox Muhammadan shrine; Hazrat Ghaus on Mt. Chihl-tan, or Forty Saints, so called from the saint's forty children who were exposed on the mountain;† Pīr Sohrī at Sohrī Kushtagh in the Bughti country, a truly Baluch shrine;‡ Chetan Shah near Kalāt; Pīr 'Umar near Khozdār, where the ordeal by water is applied; Sultan Shāh in Zehri, visited by sufferers from fever;§ and Jive Lāl (otherwise called Lāl Shāhbāz) at Sehwān in Sind.‖

A strict adhesion to the tribal code of honour is regarded by all Baluches as of supreme importance, and this code has greater influence than the tenets of their nominal religion. Liberality to all petitioners and hospitality to all comers stand first, and all people are judged by this standard, which plays a large part in the legends of the saints. The legendary hero most admired is Nodhbandagh, who gave away all his possessions; and his verses in praise of giving are often quoted:

'Whatsoever comes to me from the Creator, a hundred treasures without blemish, I will seize with my right hand, I will cut with my knife, I will deal out with my heart, I will let nothing be kept back.'

Next comes the duty of supporting and protecting refugees, and refusing to surrender them to their enemies or to the law. The maintenance of family honour by the punishment of infidelity in wives is considered also of the greatest importance, and death is the penalty both for the woman and for her paramour, although in modern times under British influence compensation is accepted. This is fixed in money, but in practice the debt is generally discharged by the marriage or betrothal of a woman belonging to the family of the aggressor to a man of the family of the injured husband. These are the principal articles of the tribal code, and in addition to these customs there are others of a superstitious nature. Signs and omens are observed, and augury is carried out by examining the blood-vessels on the surface of the shoulder-blade of a newly killed sheep. To see a shrike on the left hand when starting on a journey is an inauspicious omen, and is sufficient to make a whole band of horsemen turn back. The flesh of swine is, of course, forbidden, as to all Musalmāns, but the Baluches add certain national or tribal prohibitions. Fish is universally avoided by them, the reason assigned being that they cannot be killed in the orthodox fashion by cutting the throat; and eggs also are often considered carrion or unclean. The Sardār Khels among the Rinds of Kachhi will not eat camels' flesh, and the Lashari clan of the same tract avoid the *ālro* or *lauñsh*, a small milky-juiced plant much eaten by the hillmen generally. It is possible that some of these prohibitions have a totemistic origin. A few tribal or clan names are derived from the names of plants or animals—which gives some countenance to this idea. There is, however, no instance of an actual survival of totemistic practice among either Baluches or Brāhūīs. The wearing of the hair and beard long is a national custom almost possessing the force of a religious precept, as among the Sikhs. It is considered most disgraceful for a Baluch to cut either hair or beard, although the moustache is trimmed in the Sunnī fashion.

The ordeal by fire and water is still occasionally met with. A case of the ordeal by fire occurred among the Bozdars in the present writer's own experience in 1889,* and Mr. Hughes-Buller describes a slightly differing form, as also the ordeal by water.

There are certain tribes or sections of tribes which have special Levitical functions, and whose members are believed to have the power of curing the sick by breathing on them. Such are the Nothani clan among the Bughtis, the Kahiri tribe, and the Kalmati tribe. The last named are probably not Baluch by origin, although now assimilated. There seems to be a probability that they are the descendants of the Karmatī or Karmathian heretics who were expelled from Multān by Mahmūd of Ghaznī at the commencement of the 11th century.

The only heretical sect which now has any influence in Baluchistān is that known as the Zikrī, which is powerful in Makrān and Las Bela. Its members appear not to be Baluches but Jats and other tribes of Indian or indigenous origin, and some Brāhūīs, especially the Bizanjo tribe. The Zikrīs believe that their founder, Dost Muhammad, was the twelfth Mahdī, and his abode, Koh-i-Murād, near Turbat, takes the place of Mecca as the object of their pilgrimages. Their Mullahs have great power.†

The Baluches are much given to poetry, both ancient and modern; and, in addition to their ballads of war and love, poems on religious subjects are by no means uncommon. To illustrate their feelings and ideas on these subjects, we append translations of some extracts from religious poems taken down from verbal recitation among the Baluches, in the case of the first poem from the author himself:

1. *By Brahīm Shambānī:*

'I remember 'Alī the King, who has poured a torrent into my heart, and the pure Prophet who sits upon his throne to do judgment and justice.

'The true God is merciful, with him is neither greed nor avarice; nor is he father of any fair son; nor is there mother

* See 'Balochi Folklore,' in *Folklore*, 1902, pp. 259–263.

† Masson, *Travels*, ii. pp. 83–85; *Folklore*, 1893, p. 295.

‡ Hetū-Rām, *Bilūchī-nāma*, tr. by Douie, Calcutta, 1885, p. 77.

§ *Baluchistan Census Report*, p. 40.

‖ Burton, *Sind Revisited*, 1877, ch. xxv.

* See *JRASBo*, 1890.

† A full account of this sect is given by Mr. Hughes-Buller in the *Baluchistan Census Report*, 1902.

or sister with him. I cannot tell who has begotten him, nor can I fathom his might. Five angels stand close to him in his service to do his bidding. The first is Wahī (Jibrā'īl or Gabriel), then 'Azrā'īl, the third is Khwaja Khidr (instead of Mikā'īl or Michael), and the fourth is the trumpet-blower (Isrāfīl), who sends forth the winds that blow upon the earth. Lastly, there is Shaitān, who rebelled on account of the creation of mankind.

He sits alone, and adds up the full reckoning of every man, and then he gives his command to 'Azrā'īl to take his breath at once. He looks not at good or evil, he heeds not prayer or supplication, he carries away sons from parents, nor does he take their money or sheep or goats with them. He carries a man away by the hair; there is no pity in his stony heart, and he is no man's enemy.

The poet Brahīm has spoken. Listen to my words, to the story of God. I have heard with my ears that there was no heaven and earth, neither Mother Eve nor Adam. In a moment he made the firmament; by his might he made the water; from the foam he created the dry land; he spread forth the mountains and trees and placed them on the earth, and the smoke he made to go upwards. He built up the seven heavens, and the Garden of Paradise, and hell.

And these are the tokens of heaven. A tree stands by the gate to shade the city The fruit of the garden ripens at all seasons; by his might there are figs and olives, grapes, pomegranates, and mangoes, and the scent of musk and attar. There the Peris may not enter. There is the place of the great assembly where he himself sits with the martyrs, the king Kāsim sits by him, and royal Ḥusain with his followers. Beds and couches are spread, hūris are their attendants standing in their service. There dwell the men of Paradise and eat of the fruit of the garden.

Listen, oh young men! I have seen the greatness of God, of the Lord the breaker-down of strongholds. I have seen, and am terrified, how hundreds of thousands are born, and if he does not give them breath their bodies are dust and their souls go to meet their fate. Some are lords of the land, some are poor and hungry. I am not a great man, I fear how I shall speak, I ask of the Mullahs. . . .

Save me from Doomsday, from the fiery flames of hell; make my passage over Sirāt like the crossing of a bridge. May I pass over at once by the order of God the Creator, and enter into Paradise!'

2. *By Lashkarān Sumelānī:*

'. . . No one is free from sin. I am in dread of thy wrath. When Munkar and Nakīr examine me, and the clouds come rolling up, and the turbaned heads are laid low, with both hands they heave up a weighty fiery club. God preserve my body in the heat of that fiery wrath! Having gone through that narrow pass, clouds again gather beyond. Have mercy at that time! . . .

When the earth heats like copper, the son will not love his father, brother will be separated from brother, the babe torn from the mother. Each must bear his burden on his own head, each pour forth his own sweat. Eve and Adam are departed, they have gathered what their hands sowed. . . . Have mercy through the Prophet's intercession; let me pass over Sirāt behind him. Those who are misers, cowards, and usurers lose their souls in their accounts, the Kārūns (Corahs) are the world's carrion; the cowardly wretches groan in their grief; they are cut off from the scent of Paradise. Their eyes are fixed on the sun so that their heads boil in hell. My brethren and friends, hear the words of a Rind. This is the song of the hospitable. Their sins are forgotten, they sit on an equality with martyrs and pluck the fruit of the Tūba-tree by the golden dwellings of Paradise and the noble fountains of Kaunsar.'

3. *Another by the same author*

'Mighty is the Lord without companion; by his power he created the world. God is King, Muhammad his minister, 'Alī the helper and attendant of the Imāmat. There are four angels at the holy gate; one (*Jibrā'īl*) is the ambassador to the prophet, the second (*Mikā'īl*) rides upon the storm-clouds, the third (*Azrā'īl*) wanders about at deaths, the fourth (*Isrāfīl*) has the trumpet in his mouth, his loins girt up, his eyes on his Lord: the north wind blows from his mouth, and when the Lord gives the order he sweeps all things away.

The pure spirit looks upon his creation; one half he colours like a skilful craftsman, the other half is left plain, with a life of distress. My soul! Do not possess your heart in grief, the place of all is one, in the dust and clay. The prophet is responsible for all creation, men of the faith carry their own provisions for the journey, the five times of prayer and fasting for their sins. Debts are due to God by his slaves, for all are mad and out of their minds; the Almighty will demand his debts, and our hope of paying is in our Surety. With my hands I cling to thy skirt, my eyes are open, my trust is in thee.

When he attacks the infidels and beats the gong of the faith against the ranks of the heathen, men and horses fall in the midst as a tree sheds its leaves. The King breaks the rear of the infidels and they flee at the sight of the Lord Jesus. Then by God's mercy the clouds come, rain pours down with a rainbow, and the earth becomes cool. The prophet will return and proclaim his message to the four quarters, the gardens will bloom for those firm in the faith.'

4. *A Story of Moses the prophet and Sultān Zumzum:*

'Moses the prince was given to wandering, and one day while out hunting he saw a skull lying in a desert place. Seven times did he address the skull, and at the eighth it spoke to him and said:

"I was a king, my name was Sultān Zumzum. I was a king, but I was blind in my rule, a tyrant, and harsh to the poor. I had wealth beyond that of Kārūn. Your herd of camels is three thousand all told (*i.e.* including females and young), but I had three thousand strong male camels of burden, and three thousand youths rode with me, all with golden rings in their ears. As many as your friends are, so many drank of my cup, and when they raced their steeds they spread mattresses on the ground lest the dust which arose from the hard hoofs of the chestnuts should settle on the turban of Zumzum.

One day I took the fancy to go a-hunting; I saw a wild goat in the wilderness and spurred after it, but it disappeared into the air, and I thereupon fell sick of a fever. I became insensible, delirium seized me, and my tongue wandered. Men came to give medicine to Zumzum, but with the Angel of Death medicine is worthless. One hundred and thirty remedies were in my red pouch, but when *he* swoops down he comes on a man suddenly. With a thousand insults he dragged out my breath; they carried out my body to bury it, and when they had buried it, and the funeral procession turned back, I was brought to the Lords of the Club (Munkar and Nakīr), who raised their clubs and struck me in the face, and made my body earth and ashes and fine dust. Ants and snakes feed under my ears, and black wasps make their nests in the hollow of my nostrils. My shrunken eyes are filled with earth and dry sand, and my dried-up teeth are like shrunken betel-nut. . . .

For a while I stayed in that place, and there I saw women with their locks all matted, women who had killed their little children; they were ground under rocky millstones, and their loud lamentations came over the blue water.

For a while I stayed in that place, and there I saw men with their faces and beards all withered up. These are those men who followed unlawful lusts, and cast their eyes on their fathers' and brothers' wives, and trod their brethren under foot.

Pass on now, and tell all the youths who follow after to stay their passions, and to give freely to all who come, without dissimulation. Leave me now and do good to the poor."'

LITERATURE.—Little information is to be found in the works of most travellers in Baluchistān, with the exception of **Pottinger** (1815) and **Masson** (1844). Some information may be obtained from **Burton's** *Sind Revisited* (1877), and from Doune's translation of **Hetū-Rām's** *Bilūchi-nāma* (Calcutta, 1885). The chapter on Religions by **Hughes-Buller** in the *Baluchistan Census Report*, 1902, is most valuable. The present writer's monograph, 'The Baluch Race' (*Royal Asiatic Society*, 1904) and an article on 'Balochi Folklore' (*Folklore*, 1902) may also be referred to.

M. LONGWORTH DAMES.

BAMBINO.—'Bambino' is the Italian word for a male infant, especially applied to artistic representations of the Infant Christ, but particularly to certain images or doll-like figures exhibited in churches about the time of the Christmas and Epiphany festivals.

1. Early representations of the Christ Child.—Christian art only by degrees ventured to depict the Saviour. Yet as early as the 2nd cent. a fresco in the catacomb of S. Priscilla at Rome has for its subject the Virgin (represented as a woman of classical type) holding on her knee the Child, naked, his hand on her breast, his face turned round towards the spectator, as in the best artistic types of much later times. To the left stands a male figure, the prophet Isaiah, pointing to a star (Michel, *Histoire de l'Art*, Paris, 1906, i. 134; Liell, *Die Darstellungen der allerseligsten Jungfrau und Gottesgebarerin Maria*, Freiburg, 1887, 316). A similar fresco with the same figures is found in the catacomb of Domitilla, and dates from the 3rd century. The Virgin and Child is the subject of several other frescoes on the walls of the catacombs, and doubtless many more have perished. In certain cases the adoration of the Magi before the Child is represented, the Magi being two (catacomb of SS. Peter and Marcellin, 3rd cent.), three, or four (catacomb of Domitilla) in number. Here the infant is naked, in swaddling-clothes, or clad in a tunic and seated on his mother's knee (Michel, i. 34; Leclercq, *Manuel d'Archéol. chrétienne*, Paris, 1907, i. 194). The prototype of all these Magi representations occurs in the catacomb of Priscilla, where the Child is in swaddling-clothes (Liell, 225). From the time of Constantine onwards, if not before, the scenes of the Infancy were depicted in fresco on the walls of churches—the Nativity, the crib with the Child, the ox and ass looking on, the shepherds, the adoration of the Magi, etc. (S. John Damascene, *Epist. ad Theophilum*, c. 3; Michel, i. 171; Leclercq, ii. 186). To the period after the peace of the Church belongs a

new method of representing these scenes of the Infancy, viz. in mosaic, an art already in use in the catacombs. An early example is found in the decorations of S. Maria Maggiore in the 5th cent. by Sixtus III., where among other subjects is that of the Adoration, the Magi presenting gifts to the Child, who is seated on a throne and makes a gesture of benediction (Michel, i. 49). The arts of bas-relief and sculpture also depicted the scenes of the Infancy. The earliest known examples of these are found on sarcophagi from the catacombs, which give the first representation of the crib. The Child lies in a basket crib; the ox and ass, Joseph and the Virgin, the Magi, and the shepherds are also represented. To the year A.D. 343 belongs the first example which has been preserved (Michel, i. 66; Leclercq, ii. 317). Similar scenes were represented in statuesque decorations of churches. Figures of the Magi seeking and adoring the Infant Christ seated on his mother's knee were sculptured on the ambon of a church at Salonica, dating from the 5th cent. (Michel, i. 261); while a fragment of a statue of the Virgin and Child, probably from another 4th cent. church, exists in a museum at Constantinople (Reinach, *Catalogue du musée d'antiquités*, Constantinople, 1882, 62). The Virgin and Child are also represented on early gems, one in the Cabinet de France being dated before A.D. 340 (Babelon, *Guide Illustré*, Paris, 1900, 1400*b*), and on a variety of works in metal, glass, etc. The themes of the Nativity, and the Madonna and Child, were favourite subjects for art treatment in every department, but especially in painting, which down to the present time has produced innumerable examples, some attaining the highest degree of artistic skill, of the Mother and her Divine Child.

It has sometimes been claimed that the representations of the Madonna and Child are founded on those of the Egyptian Isis suckling Horus (cf. Budge, ii. 220-221). But whatever the stories of the Apocryphal Gospels and the later cult of the Virgin may owe to the myth and cult of Isis, the earliest examples in which the Madonna and Child are represented are purely classical in form, and there is no reason to doubt their originality. Certain Coptic representations may continue the pagan Egyptian types, since there is a close resemblance between the two, while later Byzantine images or paintings probably borrow certain accessories from pagan sources, perhaps through Gnostic influences, especially after the cult of the Virgin developed. But the simplicity of the composition—a mother suckling or holding her child, would tend to make all representations, whether pagan (a goddess and child) or Christian (the Madonna and the Infant Christ), similar in character and type; and there is no reason to suppose that the early Christian artists had to borrow the *motif* from existing pagan models. Thus certain Buddhist examples closely resemble the Christian representations, while an Egyptian stele, which almost certainly depicts Isis and Horus and a worshipper, had been adapted to Christian uses, and has frequently been regarded as depicting the Virgin and Child (Leclercq, ii. 325). The same *motif* is found in Græco-Roman, Assyro-Babylonian, and Hindu religious art. The council of Ephesus (A.D. 431) defined the manner in which the Virgin and Child were to be represented.

2. Liturgical drama.—The Bambino as an image is connected with the liturgical and symbolic elements of the Christmas festival. The dramatic aspect of Christian beliefs, culminating in the Mystery-plays, was already present in germ both in liturgy and ceremonial. First, the custom of antiphonal singing and the use of antiphons suggested dialogue, while the symbolical actions in various parts of the service suggested dramatic action. But more particularly the tropes sung at festivals in the form of dialogue were a point of departure for the Mystery-play. Thus a 9th cent. MS at S. Gall already has a dialogued trope for Easter (Gautier, *Hist. de la poésie liturgique*, Paris, 1887, i. 216). This seems to have given rise to others of the same character for Christmas. One of these is found in an 11th cent. MS, in which two *cantores* represent the shepherds, and are addressed by two deacons in the words: 'Quem quæritis in præsepe, pastores, dicite?' They answer: 'Salvatorem Christum Dominum, infantem pannis involutum, secundum sermonem angelicum.' To this the deacons reply: 'Adest hic parvulus cum Maria,' etc. (Gautier, 215). These tropes at first had their place before mass, but were sometimes separated from it. In the 10th cent. the Easter tropes are connected with the mimetic action and exhibition of the empty sepulchre, which probably had a separate origin as a symbolic act (see the *Concordia Regularis* of S. Ethelwold, Dugdale, *Monasticon*, I. xxvii.). Similarly the Christmas tropes gave rise to a liturgical drama, in which a *præsepe* ('manger' or 'crib') with an image of the Virgin and Child was the central feature. Clergy as shepherds approached the choir, and heard a boy as the angel singing 'Gloria in excelsis.' They were met by priests *quasi obstetrices* singing 'Quem quæritis,' etc., and the dialogue of the trope and adoration by the shepherds followed. This is from an *Officium Pastorum* used in the 14th cent., and probably earlier, at Rouen (Davidson, *English Mystery Plays*, 1892, 173). A similar office occurs in the *Ordinarium* of Amiens, 1291; and here the figure of a child was placed in the *præsepe*, and it is supposed that the office originated not later than the 11th century. But here, as in the Easter drama, the *præsepe* probably had a separate existence before it was connected with the dialogued trope. This *Officium Pastorum* was early connected with a similar dramatic representation of the Three Kings, which originally had also a central symbolic action, that of the movement of a star across the church. In a Rouen *Officium Stellæ* (Davidson, 176) the kings point to a star and sing. The office included the showing of the Virgin and Child to the kings, while they worshipped and offered their gifts. Elsewhere the two offices followed each other, and occasionally they were combined into one drama. In 1336, at Milan, an elaborate representation took place, the kings, with their attendants, walking in procession to a church, on one side of the high altar of which was a *præsepe* with the ox and ass, and the Madonna and Child (Chambers, *Book of Days*, 1863, i. 62). To such early dramatic forms the rise of the Mystery-play must be traced. But the exhibition of the *præsepe* was probably not at first connected with the liturgical office, and it still exists as a mere spectacle, without accompanying dramatic action (see Chambers, *Mediæval Stage*, 1903, ii. chs. 18, 19).

3. The præsepe.—Later tradition ascribed the origin of the *præsepe* to S. Francis of Assisi in the year 1223. Having obtained the Pope's permission, he caused a scenic representation to be prepared in the church at Greccio on Christmas Eve. In it an ox and ass figured, and all was prepared in accordance with the narrative of the Nativity in realistic detail. The whole population flocked to see the sight, the saint stood rapt by the manger, and mass was said (Mrs. Oliphant, *Francis of Assisi*, 1871, 223). But such *præsepia* were certainly in existence long before. The earliest form of such representations is probably not now discoverable, but Origen says: 'There is shown at Bethlehem the cave where Christ was born, and the manger in the cave where He was wrapped in swaddling-clothes. And this sight is greatly talked of in surrounding places' (*adv. Celsum*, bk. i. cap. 1). S. Jerome complains that pagans celebrated the rites of Adonis in the cave (*Ep. ad Paulinum*, 58), but after S. Helena built the basilica over the cave in A.D. 335 it became a regular place of pilgrimage, and was luxuriously adorned. A homily ascribed to S. Gregory Thaumaturgus, and dating at latest about the beginning of the 5th cent., and certain sermons of S. Proclus, bp. of Constantinople (A.D. 432-446), both use language which suggests actual representations in churches of the Virgin and Child and Joseph in a Nativity scene (Pitra, *Anal.*

Sacra, iv. 394; *PG* lxv. 711). Such figured representations may first have been introduced in connexion with the manger-cave of the basilica at Bethlehem, and, if so, would rapidly be imitated elsewhere. In the West the earliest notices of a *præsepe* are connected with the Church of S. Maria Maggiore at Rome. This church, originally built in the 4th cent. by Pope Liberius, was re-constructed and dedicated to the Virgin by Sixtus III. (432–440). In the 7th cent., if not earlier, it was known as *S. Maria ad præsepe*; and this points to a 'crib' in the church, which may even have existed in the basilica as built by Liberius (Usener, *Religionsgesch. Untersuchungen*, Bonn, 1889, i. 288, 290). This 'crib' was in a chapel in the right aisle, described in the time of Gregory III. (731–741) as an 'oratory,' and in that of Sergius II. (843–847) as a 'chamber' (*Lib. pontif.*, *ap.* Usener, i. 280). Here the Pope celebrated mass on Christmas Eve, the crib serving as an altar. Probably the 'manger' was at first only a copy of that in the cave at Bethlehem, but figures may have been associated with it at an early date. Gregory III. furnished it with a statue of the Madonna and Child in gold. This crib-chapel became the model for others. Gregory IV. (827–843) erected a similar one in the Church of S. Maria in Trastevere, which he provided with 'imaginem auream habentem historiam dominæ nostræ cum diversis et pretiosis gemmis.' This probably refers to actual figures in a Nativity scene (Usener, i. 291). To such crib-chapels may be traced all others, whether permanent or temporary, in mediæval and later church usage.

4. The Santissimo Bambino.—Of all examples of the *præsepe* with figures of the Child, that of the Church of S. Maria in Ara-Cœli at Rome is the most famous. It is arranged with many accessories—side-scenes, vistas, and lights in the Chapel of the Presepio—and exhibited from Christmas to Epiphany. In a grotto are the Virgin, with the Bambino on her knee, and S. Joseph. Behind are the ox and ass, and grouped around are the shepherds and kings. Arranged in perspective in the background is a pastoral landscape, with small figures of shepherds and flocks, giving the idea of distance. Women are represented bringing presents of fruit. The whole scene is beautifully arranged to give the illusory effect of reality, while above is represented the Father, with angels and cherubs. Formerly Augustus and the Sibyl pointed to the Child, the legend being that the Emperor raised an altar on the site of the church to the Son of God, whose advent was made known to him from the Sibylline books. During the festival season the Presepio is visited by crowds of people. On Epiphany, mass being concluded, a procession of clergy moves towards the chapel, and, arrived there, the bishop removes the Bambino from the arms of the Madonna with much solemnity. To the strains of triumphal music, the image is borne through the church to the great outer steps. There it is elevated by the bishop before the kneeling crowd, while the music thunders and censers are swung. This done, it is carried back to the chapel. The more important figures are of life-size, painted and appropriately dressed. The Bambino is of olive wood, rudely carved and painted. It is magnificently dressed, and covered with great numbers of costly jewels, while during the period of its exhibition it wears a crown encrusted with rich gems. During the festal season the stairway of the church is thronged with pedlars selling sacred objects, among others prints of the Bambino, and wax dolls clad in cotton wool representing the Child. During the rest of the year the Bambino is kept in the inner sacristy, where it is shown to pilgrims and visitors. An inscription in the sacristy relates that a devout Minorite carved the image in Jerusalem out of wood from the Mount of Olives, that it might be used at this festival. But, as paint was lacking to make it more lifelike, prayer was offered that fresh colours might be bestowed upon it by Divine interposition. The vessel which carried it to Rome was wrecked, but the image was floated ashore in its case, and, being recognized by the brethren there (for its fame had spread from Jerusalem to Italy), it was brought to its destination in safety. According to popular belief, the painting was miraculously done by St. Luke or by an angel.

To the Bambino are ascribed miraculous powers of healing, and it is taken with great ceremony to patients in cases of severe illness. A special carriage is provided for the image, which is accompanied by two *frati*; and, as it passes through the streets, the people show it great devotion, kneeling or crossing themselves, while some implore its assistance for their needs, spiritual or temporal. At one time the Bambino was left on the bed of the patient, but now it is never out of sight of its attendants; because on one occasion a woman, feigning illness, exchanged another image for the Bambino, sending the fraud back in its place. During the night the *frati* were disturbed by knocking at the door of the church. Hastening thither and opening it, they found the Bambino waiting to be admitted, having returned of its own accord. In a variant of this tale, the Bambino was stolen from the church and returned at night, the thief being thus discomfited. The story is referred to in the inscription. It is obvious that the Bambino is regarded as a species of fetish; and this appears further in the popular belief that, when carried to the sick-bed of a child, it reddens if the child is to recover, and turns pale if it is to die (Story, *Roba di Roma*, 1875, 741 ff.; Rouse, *FL*, 1894, v. 7; Hare, *Walks in Rome*, 1903, i. 102; Tuker and Malleson, *Handbook to Christian and Eccl. Rome*, 1900, ii. 212). Similar exhibitions of the *præsepe*, some of them equally elaborate, are seen in other Italian churches (see Rouse, *loc. cit.*), and they are a usual feature in most Roman Catholic and in some Anglican churches, the equivalent name being *crèche* or 'crib.'

Other images of the Infant Christ, though not used in the representation of a *præsepe*, have acquired great fame. Some of these are black, as in the parish church of Mont-Saint-Michel in Brittany, and some are well known as being equally miraculous with the Santissimo Bambino, *e.g.* the famous miraculous image, dating from the 17th cent., in the church of the Carmelite Fathers at Prague.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in full in the course of the article.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

BAN.—See CURSING AND BLESSING.

BANERJEA, KRISHNA MOHAN.—Krishna Mohan Banerjea was one of the early converts of the North India Protestant Missions, and one of the most learned Indians of his time. He was born at Calcutta in 1813, and spent his life in that city. A Brāhman by caste, even among Brāhmans he belonged to the *kulins*, or recognized aristocracy, his family claiming descent from one of the *ṛṣis* or ancient sages. The distinguished Indians of the 19th cent. were the product of the new life inspired by India's contact with the West through British rule. Dr. K. M. Banerjea was no exception, and in the capital of India, where he was brought up, the new influences were naturally most direct and concentrated. In 1828 the Brāhmo Samāj, or Indian Theistic Church, had been founded at Calcutta by Rammohun Roy and others. In

1830, Dr. Duff, first missionary of the Church of Scotland, had landed in Calcutta. But the influence that confessedly formed young Banerjea in his teens was that of a Eurasian, Derozio, a master in the Calcutta Hindu College, which Banerjea had entered in 1824. Derozio's openness of manner, his enthusiasm, and his thoroughgoing rationalism and radicalism quite carried away his youthful disciples, and indeed affected the minds of a whole generation in Calcutta. In that atmosphere of negation and destruction, in 1830, we find K. M. Banerjea leader of a youthful band publicly repudiating Hinduism and all religious belief, and demanding the abolition of caste and the education of Hindu women. On one occasion, in 1831, the leaders went to the extreme of throwing pieces of beef into Hindu houses, wantonly and grossly outraging the feelings of Hindus. The insult was naturally followed by the excommunication of young Banerjea from his family and caste; but a few European, Eurasian, and Hindu friends still gave him countenance, and the reformer thus contrived to continue what he felt to be a holy war on behalf of religion and his countrymen. Gradually he came under the influence of Dr. Duff, in whom he found an equally ardent temperament, but also convictions as definite and positive as his own had been merely negative and critical. October 1832 finally saw Krishna Mohan Banerjea received into the Christian Church by Dr. Duff.

The great native reformer, Rammohun Roy, was still living in 1832 at the time of Banerjea's conversion. Both men possessed an acute and powerful intellect, and manifested an independence of character which would have been noteworthy even in a European. But the younger possessed an intensity of temperament lacking in his great contemporary. Rammohun Roy's campaign had been that of reason against unreason, and his progress was from Hinduism to Hindu Theism [as he conceived it to be], and thence to non-militant Unitarian Christianity, of an orthodox type. The progress of K. M. Banerjea, on the other hand, was from Hinduism to repudiation of religious belief; out of which, again, he passed, as decidedly, to strong personal Christian faith and strenuous advocacy of what he believed.

Taking orders in the Church of England in 1839, K. M. Banerjea thus became the first ordained native clergyman of that Church in North India, the first in all probability of any non-Roman Church. In the Anglican community in Calcutta he soon became the leading figure, taking a large share in the work of the Anglican Mission College [Bishop's College] and in the translation of theological and religious literature for the young Christian community. He has justly been called the Father of Bengali Christian Literature. But his activity was by no means limited to the Indian Christian community. In journalism and in every public movement connected with education or the general welfare, he was in the forefront. Two of his articles in the early numbers of the *Calcutta Review*, founded in 1844, on 'The Kulin Brāhman of Bengal' and 'Hindu Caste,' are of special value to the historical student as first-hand and reliable evidence of former socio-religious conditions now considerably modified. With these may be conjoined a later paper on 'Human Sacrifice' in the *JRAS*, written in 1876. In 1846 he began the publication of a work of great importance in its day, the *Encyclopædia Bengalensis*, a series of thirteen volumes in English and Bengali. In it, for the first time, Euclid was presented to the people of India in one of their vernaculars. In later years we find his attention devoted more particularly to Sanskrit and Hindu Philosophy. For the Asiatic Society of Bengal he edited two Sanskrit texts, the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* and the *Nārada Pañcharātra*, both published in the Society's *Bibliotheca Indica*; subsequently also, for the same Society, an English translation of the *Brahma Sūtras* with Saṅkara's Commentary, and of the *Mahimnastava*, a hymn to Śiva. An edition of a portion of the *Rigveda* with notes and an introductory essay appeared in 1875.

The work by which Dr. K. M. Banerjea is best known to students of India is his *Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy*, an English work, published in 1861 both at Calcutta and London, and afterwards translated into Bengali. In the dialogues, Satyakāma [Desire of Truth], representing the modern spirit of impartial philosophic inquiry, discusses with representatives of traditional orthodoxy the relationship of the Vedas, Buddhism, the six philosophical systems, and Brāhmanism. Satyakāma proceeds by the historical method, setting forth as foundation the chronological relationship of the various systems to one another and to Buddhism. The six systems he regards as rationalizing efforts on the part of the Brāhmanical order, partly the outcome of the rationalistic spirit that had already called forth Buddhism, and partly designed to controvert Buddhism. Of the philosophical systems, all of which Dr. Banerjea thus dates later than Buddhism, he puts the Nyāya earliest, then the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya. The application of the historical method to a subject so involved and obscure constitutes the chief merit and originality of the *Dialogues*. As a critic in the *Westminster Review* in 1862, believed to be Professor Goldstucker of London University, observes, no writer before Dr. Banerjea 'had ever attempted to give so continuous and graphic a sketch of the origin and sequence of the various portions of Hindu Philosophy.' It was, of course, almost inevitable, where so much is mere inference, that the historical conclusions of the pioneer should not go unchallenged. Dr. Goldstucker himself regarded the Mīmāṁsa system as the oldest. Professor Macdonell (*Sanskrit Literature*) and others regard the Sāṅkhya as the oldest among the Hindu rationalizing and systematizing schemes, and as forming the basis of the two heterodox systems of Buddhism and Jainism. Apart from the chronological order, however, Dr. Banerjea's exposition of the systems is justified by the latest writers as against his early critic. His declaration regarding the Sāṅkhya denial of a Supreme Soul is now accepted without question by modern students. The atheism of the Sāṅkhya system and the fundamental ignoring of deity in other systems Dr. Banerjea associates with the conception of the eternity of souls implied in the doctrine of transmigration common to all the systems alike. That again is virtually the position of Professor Macdonell, viz. that the doctrine of transmigration scarcely leaves room for the idea of deity. Dr. Banerjea's position in regard to Vedāntic pantheism, repudiated by his critic in the *Westminster Review*, is similarly not far from the position of modern Sanskritists. Vedantic pantheism, according to the *Dialogues*, is essentially as much a denial of deity as it is professedly a denial of man, and fails to supply the dualism implied and inherent in the idea of duty.

The author's erudition we find more directly enlisted in the cause of Christianity and his countrymen in *The Arian* [Aryan] *Witness to Christianity*, published in 1875 It belongs to the period of Indian missionary work in the 19th cent., in which stress was laid upon the discovering in Hinduism of a preparation or call for Christianity, if not also of the rudiments of Christian doctrines. Dr. Banerjea's main point, for example, is that in

the sacrifice of Puruṣa, the primeval male,* elsewhere put as the self-sacrifice of Prajāpati himself, the Lord of Creation, we have ideas closely akin to those of the voluntary atoning death of Christ, the Eternal Son of God, who was both God and Man. Such reasoning, however, has no longer the same prominence. Experience has shown that such parallels, while confirmatory and helpful to men already convinced, bring Christianity no nearer to Hindus than it brings Christianity to Hinduism.

Dr. Banerjea was all his life a standing refutation of the libel on Indian Christians that they are unpatriotic. He was one of the first *elected* representatives to the Calcutta Municipality in 1876; and in his old age, in 1883, he identified himself with a movement for constitutional political agitation both in India and Britain, of which the National Congress may be called the fruit. Native education likewise had no warmer advocate, as his earlier publications and his evidence before the Education Commission of 1883 testify. Without fear of either native or English opinion, he was a man of public spirit in the truest sense. The University of Calcutta recognized his position as a scholar by electing him President of the Faculty of Arts, 1867–1869, and further, in 1876, by the bestowal of the honorary degree of D.L., which has been given to only two other Indians during the fifty years' existence of the University. His public services were recognized by the conferring upon him of the 'Companionship of the Indian Empire' in 1885, the year of his death.

LITERATURE.—*Biographical Sketch* by Ramachandra Ghosha, Calcutta, 1893; cf. *History of the Church Missionary Society*, London, 1899, vol. i. pp. 307 f., 315, vol. ii. pp. 508–524; G. Smith, *Life of Alexander Duff*, London, 1879.

JOHN MORRISON.

BANIĀ, BANYĀ (Skr. *vaṇijya, baṇijya*, 'trade, traffic').—A generic name for the great merchant caste of Northern and Western India. Under the titles of Baniā, Banyā, or Vānī, persons numbering 2,898,126 recorded themselves at the Census of 1901. But this does not include numerous practically identical castes, like the Agarwālā, numbering 557,596; the Oswāl, 382,712; the Mārwāṛī, 49,108, and many others. These may be taken as examples of the religion of this caste in general.

The Agarwālā, who are found in greatest numbers in the United Provinces and Rājputāna, are mostly orthodox Hindus, the Jaina element being quite inconsiderable. Like all classes of the population who, under the protection of British rule, obtain promotion to a higher social rank than they ever acquired under the native governments, they are precise and liberal in the observances of their religion; and at domestic ceremonies, such as birth, marriage, and death, are notorious for their lavish expenditure on Brāhmans. Most of them follow the humanitarian cult of Vishṇu; and though a small minority observe the rule of Śiva and of the Śakti, or Mother-goddesses, in deference to tribal feeling they abstain from sacrificing animals and consuming meat and spirituous liquor. The small Jaina section observe the same social rules, and are even more careful of animal life than those who are orthodox Hindus. Hence, owing, perhaps, to the uniformity in matters of diet and other social observances, there is no bar to intermarriage between the followers of the two creeds. When husband and wife differ in religion, the wife is usually admitted formally into the religion of her husband, and, accordingly, when she visits the home of her parents, she must have her food separately cooked. The usual tribal deity of the Agarwālā sub-caste is Lakshmī, goddess of fortune and beauty, who in the later mythology is frequently identified with Śrī, and is regarded as the consort of Vishṇu. They are careful to perform the *Śrāddha*, or mind-rite, for the repose of the souls of their deceased ancestors. Their tribal legends connect them closely with a primitive snake-cult, and the women worship the snake as an important part of the domestic rites. Among trees they pay special reverence to the *pīpal*, or sacred fig.

The other side of Baniā religion appears among the Oswāl, who, except an insignificant minority, belong to the Jaina faith. They take their name from the old town of Osī in Mārwār, and all their associations connect them with Rājputāna. They employ for their domestic rites a class of Brāhmans, who, when their clients adopted the new Jaina rule, fell from their high estate, and became known by the significant name of Bhojak, 'eaters.' They preside over and receive the offerings dedicated to the footprints of the saints who have passed into a state of beatitude. But the real priests of the Oswāl are the Jaina Jatīs, who are bound by the strictest rules of ceremonial purity, and in particular must avoid any possibility of destroying animal life. The Oswāl make pilgrimage to the chief holy places of Jainism—Mount Ābū, Palitānā, Parasnāth (see artt.); Sametā Sikharā, in Western Bengal, where twenty of the Jinas are said to have attained beatitude; Satrañjāyā and Girnār in Kāṭhiāwār, sacred respectively to the Jinas Ṛishabhanātha and Neminātha; Charidrapuri, where Vāsupūjya died; and Pāwā in Bengal, the scene of the death of Vardhamāna. The worship thus largely concentrates itself on the cult of the Tīrthakaras, 'the finders of the ford' through the ocean of *saṁsāra*, the revolution of birth and death. They also visit the sacred places of the Hindus, like Benares and Ajudhyā. Of course, no animal sacrifice of any kind is permitted in their temples, and the sordid ostentation of the worshippers is shown by the rule which prevails in some of the Western Indian temples, under which the right to make the daily offerings is set up to auction and sold to the highest bidder. Their chief solemnity is that held in the rainy season, which resembles the retreat (*vārśika*) of the Buddhists, when the wandering monks rested during the inclemency of the monsoon (Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, 80).

Another important sub-caste of the Baniās is the Mārwāṛī, who take their name from the State of Mārwār in Rājputāna. According to the Census of 1901, they number 49,108, the vast majority being Hindus. They are most numerous in Hyderābād, but settle in all parts of the Peninsula in search of trade. They are the most active, niggardly money-lenders and small traders in the country. They generally worship the local gods of their native land. Thus in Kanara they worship as their family deities Ambū, Jaypāl, and Hilāji, whose shrines are at Sirohī in Mārwār; but those of Ahmadnagar worship Bālājī of Tirupati in North Arcot, and in Poona, Kshetrapāla, the guardian deity of Mount Ābū.

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They are thus described by Growse at Mathura:

'They are the Epicureans of the East, and are not ashamed to avow their belief that the ideal life consists rather in social enjoyment than in solitude and mortification. Such a creed is naturally destructive of all self restraint, even in matters where indulgence is by common consent held criminal; and the profligacy to which it has given rise is so notorious, that the Mahārājā of Jaipur was moved to expel from his capital the ancient image of Gokul Chandrama, for which the sect entertained special veneration, and has further conceived such a prejudice against Vaishṇavas in general, that all his subjects

* *Rigveda*, Maṇḍala, x. 90.

1830, Dr. Duff, first missionary of the Church of Scotland, had landed in Calcutta. But the influence that confessedly formed young Banerjea in his teens was that of a Eurasian, Derozio, a master in the Calcutta Hindu College, which Banerjea had entered in 1824. Derozio's openness of manner, his enthusiasm, and his thoroughgoing rationalism and radicalism quite carried away his youthful disciples, and indeed affected the minds of a whole generation in Calcutta. In that atmosphere of negation and destruction, in 1830, we find K. M. Banerjea leader of a youthful band publicly repudiating Hinduism and all religious belief, and demanding the abolition of caste and the education of Hindu women. On one occasion, in 1831, the leaders went to the extreme of throwing pieces of beef into Hindu houses, wantonly and grossly outraging the feelings of Hindus. The insult was naturally followed by the excommunication of young Banerjea from his family and caste; but a few European, Eurasian, and Hindu friends still gave him countenance, and the reformer thus contrived to continue what he felt to be a holy war on behalf of religion and his countrymen. Gradually he came under the influence of Dr. Duff, in whom he found an equally ardent temperament, but also convictions as definite and positive as his own had been merely negative and critical. October 1832 finally saw Krishna Mohan Banerjea received into the Christian Church by Dr. Duff.

The great native reformer, Rammohun Roy, was still living in 1832 at the time of Banerjea's conversion. Both men possessed an acute and powerful intellect, and manifested an independence of character which would have been noteworthy even in a European. But the younger possessed an intensity of temperament lacking in his great contemporary. Rammohun Roy's campaign had been that of reason against unreason, and his progress was from Hinduism to Hindu Theism [as he conceived it to be], and thence to non-militant Unitarian Christianity, of an orthodox type. The progress of K. M. Banerjea, on the other hand, was from Hinduism to repudiation of religious belief; out of which, again, he passed, as decidedly, to strong personal Christian faith and strenuous advocacy of what he believed.

Taking orders in the Church of England in 1839, K. M. Banerjea thus became the first ordained native clergyman of that Church in North India, the first in all probability of any non-Roman Church. In the Anglican community in Calcutta he soon became the leading figure, taking a large share in the work of the Anglican Mission College [Bishop's College] and in the translation of theological and religious literature for the young Christian community. He has justly been called the Father of Bengali Christian Literature. But his activity was by no means limited to the Indian Christian community. In journalism and in every public movement connected with education or the general welfare, he was in the forefront. Two of his articles in the early numbers of the *Calcutta Review*, founded in 1844, on 'The Kulin Brāhman of Bengal' and 'Hindu Caste,' are of special value to the historical student as first-hand and reliable evidence of former socio-religious conditions now considerably modified. With these may be conjoined a later paper on 'Human Sacrifice' in the *JRAS*, written in 1876. In 1846 he began the publication of a work of great importance in its day, the *Encyclopædia Bengalensis*, a series of thirteen volumes in English and Bengali. In it, for the first time, Euclid was presented to the people of India in one of their vernaculars. In later years we find his attention devoted more particularly to Sanskrit and Hindu Philosophy. For the Asiatic Society of Bengal he edited two Sanskrit texts, the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* and the *Nārada Pañcharātra*, both published in the Society's *Bibliotheca Indica*; subsequently also, for the same Society, an English translation of the *Brahma Sūtras* with Śaṅkara's Commentary, and of the *Mahimnastava*, a hymn to Śiva. An edition of a portion of the *Rigveda* with notes and an introductory essay appeared in 1875.

The work by which Dr. K. M. Banerjea is best known to students of India is his *Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy*, an English work, published in 1861 both at Calcutta and London, and afterwards translated into Bengali. In the dialogues, Satyakāma [Desire of Truth], representing the modern spirit of impartial philosophic inquiry, discusses with representatives of traditional orthodoxy the relationship of the Vedas, Buddhism, the six philosophical systems, and Brāhmanism. Satyakāma proceeds by the historical method, setting forth as foundation the chronological relationship of the various systems to one another and to Buddhism. The six systems he regards as rationalizing efforts on the part of the Brāhmanical order, partly the outcome of the rationalistic spirit that had already called forth Buddhism, and partly designed to controvert Buddhism. Of the philosophical systems, all of which Dr. Banerjea thus dates later than Buddhism, he puts the Nyāya earliest, then the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya. The application of the historical method to a subject so involved and obscure constitutes the chief merit and originality of the *Dialogues*. As a critic in the *Westminster Review* in 1862, believed to be Professor Goldstucker of London University, observes, no writer before Dr. Banerjea 'had ever attempted to give so continuous and graphic a sketch of the origin and sequence of the various portions of Hindu Philosophy.' It was, of course, almost inevitable, where so much is mere inference, that the historical conclusions of the pioneer should not go unchallenged. Dr. Goldstucker himself regarded the Mīmāṁsa system as the oldest. Professor Macdonell (*Sanskrit Literature*) and others regard the Sāṅkhya as the oldest among the Hindu rationalizing and systematizing schemes, and as forming the basis of the two heterodox systems of Buddhism and Jainism. Apart from the chronological order, however, Dr. Banerjea's exposition of the systems is justified by the latest writers as against his early critic. His declaration regarding the Sāṅkhya denial of a Supreme Soul is now accepted without question by modern students. The atheism of the Sāṅkhya system and the fundamental ignoring of deity in other systems Dr. Banerjea associates with the conception of the eternity of souls implied in the doctrine of transmigration common to all the systems alike. That again is virtually the position of Professor Macdonell, viz. that the doctrine of transmigration scarcely leaves room for the idea of deity. Dr. Banerjea's position in regard to Vedantic pantheism, repudiated by his critic in the *Westminster Review*, is similarly not far from the position of modern Sanskritists. Vedantic pantheism, according to the *Dialogues*, is essentially as much a denial of deity as it is professedly a denial of man, and fails to supply the dualism implied and inherent in the idea of duty.

The author's erudition we find more directly enlisted in the cause of Christianity and his countrymen in *The Arian* [Aryan] *Witness to Christianity*, published in 1875. It belongs to the period of Indian missionary work in the 19th cent., in which stress was laid upon the discovering in Hinduism of a preparation or call for Christianity, if not also of the rudiments of Christian doctrines. Dr. Banerjea's main point, for example, is that in

the sacrifice of Puruṣa, the primeval male,* elsewhere put as the self-sacrifice of Prajāpati himself, the Lord of Creation, we have ideas closely akin to those of the voluntary atoning death of Christ, the Eternal Son of God, who was both God and Man. Such reasoning, however, has no longer the same prominence. Experience has shown that such parallels, while confirmatory and helpful to men already convinced, bring Christianity no nearer to Hindus than it brings Christianity to Hinduism.

Dr. Banerjea was all his life a standing refutation of the libel on Indian Christians that they are unpatriotic. He was one of the first *elected* representatives to the Calcutta Municipality in 1876; and in his old age, in 1883, he identified himself with a movement for constitutional political agitation both in India and Britain, of which the National Congress may be called the fruit. Native education likewise had no warmer advocate, as his earlier publications and his evidence before the Education Commission of 1883 testify. Without fear of either native or English opinion, he was a man of public spirit in the truest sense. The University of Calcutta recognized his position as a scholar by electing him President of the Faculty of Arts, 1867-1869, and further, in 1876, by the bestowal of the honorary degree of D.L., which has been given to only two other Indians during the fifty years' existence of the University. His public services were recognized by the conferring upon him of the 'Companionship of the Indian Empire' in 1885, the year of his death.

LITERATURE.—*Biographical Sketch* by **Ramachandra Ghosha**, Calcutta, 1893; cf. *History of the Church Missionary Society*, London, 1899, vol. i. pp. 307 f., 315, vol. ii. pp. 508-524; **G. Smith**, *Life of Alexander Duff*, London, 1879.

JOHN MORRISON.

BANIĀ, BANYĀ (Skr. *vaṇijya, banijya*, 'trade, traffic').—A generic name for the great merchant caste of Northern and Western India. Under the titles of Baniā, Banyā, or Vānī, persons numbering 2,898,126 recorded themselves at the Census of 1901. But this does not include numerous practically identical castes, like the Agarwālā, numbering 557,596; the Oswāl, 382,712; the Mārwārī, 49,108, and many others. These may be taken as examples of the religion of this caste in general.

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* *Rigveda*, Maṇḍala, x. 90.

are compelled, before they appear in his presence, to mark their foreheads with the three horizontal lines that indicate a votary of Śiva.'

LITERATURE.—For the Agarwālā and Oswāl, see Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 1891, i. 4 ff., ii. 150 f.; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 23, iv. 104 f. For the Mārwāṛī, *Bombay Gazetteer*, xv. pt. i. 191, xvii. 75, xviii. pt. i. 278; *Rājputāna Census Report*, 1901, i. 155; *Panjāb*, do i. 327 f. For the Vallabhāchārya, [Karsandas Mulji], *History of the Sect of the Maharajas or Vallabhacharyas in Western India*, 1865; *Report of the Maharaj Libel Case*, Bombay, 1862; Growse, *Mathura, a District Memoir*[3], 1883, 261 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BANISHMENT.—1. Banishment (putting under 'ban' or proclamation as an outlaw) is the punishment of expelling an offender from his native land. By analogy with the most primitive surviving social systems, we can infer that in very early stages of civilization the family was the unit of society, and that any member of a family who disputed the rule of its head was cast out. As civilization advanced, and families and tribes united to form States, the easiest way, short of summary execution, to rid the State of an evil-doer was to expel him from its boundaries. We find evidence of this in the records of all ancient nations.

2. In ancient Israel, banishment invariably occurs as a Divine, not a human, punishment. Such was the banishment of Adam from the Garden of Eden (Gn 3^{24}), and of Cain from the presence of the Lord (Gn 4^{16}). This penalty was inflicted not only on individuals, but on the whole nation. The Captivities befell the idolatrous people, but the assurance, 'the Lord will gather thee, and will bring thee into the land which thy fathers possessed' (Dt $30^{4ff.}$), lent to banishment the character of a temporary punishment, of a trial of faith. In Rabbinical Law, banishment (*gālūth*) is the name given to the fleeing of the manslayer, in cases of unintentional murder, to one of the Cities of Refuge (*Sifrê Num.* 60; *Mak.* ii. 6). The banishment spoken of by Abtalion (*Aboth.* i. 12, ed. Taylor) as befalling 'the wise' refers to political events. The Pharisees, during the reign of Queen Salome Alexandra, exerted 'the power and authority of banishing and bringing back whomsoever they chose' (Jos. *BJ* I. v. 2; cf. also *JE* ii. 490 f.).

3. In India, banishment was a recognized form of punishment as early as the Vedic period, for *Rigveda* X. lxi. 8 clearly alludes to the 'exile' (*parārṛj*) as fleeing to the south; while the later codes prescribe banishment for those who express hostile sentiments concerning the king, or for false witnesses; and crimes punished by death in the case of the lower castes, were visited with banishment in the case of Brāhmans (Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, Strassburg, 1896, pp. 127, 129, 142). Among the Teutonic peoples, banishment was equally well known, as is shown by Old High German *reccho*, Old Norse *rekr*, Old Saxon *wrekkio*, and Anglo-Saxon *wrecca*, 'exile,' 'outcast,' 'wretch' (cf. Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogerm. Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 835); while among the Gauls, at least in some cases, murder of a compatriot was punished by banishment, at all events from the territory of the city (Dottin, *Manuel pour servir à l'étude de l'antiquité celtique*, Paris, 1906, p. 191 f.).

4. In Greece, banishment seldom appears as a punishment appointed by law for particular offences. The general term φυγή, in heroic times, was applied, for the most part, to those who, to escape some punishment or danger, fled from their own State to another. This was the rule in cases of homicide. Even in historical times, exile was usually voluntary, to escape the death-sentence for murder. The accused was permitted to leave the country after the first day of trial; but in that case he was condemned to perpetual banishment and confiscation of property. When appointed by law as the punishment for certain offences, banishment might be for a specified period, as in cases of accidental homicide; or, if the crime was sacrilege, the murder of a non-citizen, or wounding with intent to kill, the penalty was exile for life. Ostracism (*q.v.*), a form of banishment peculiar to Athens, was designed to guard against any citizen becoming a tyrant. After passing a decree that an ostracism should take place, on a fixed day the citizens voted by tribes in the agora, each writing on an ὄστρακον the name of the man he considered a danger to the State. He who obtained the majority of votes, provided there was a minimum of 6000, was banished for ten years, though he might be recalled earlier by a special vote.

5. In Rome, during the Republic, *exsilium* meant banishment inflicted by the State as a punishment, accompanied by loss of *civitas*; if the person banished did not cease to be a *civis*, it was not properly *exsilium* but *relegatio*. Since the Romans shrank from depriving a man of his citizenship, *exsilium* was very rare. The accused, however, might voluntarily go into exile to escape capital punishment; and in the earlier times of the Republic, a Roman citizen had the right of going into *exsilium* to another State, by virtue of the isopolitical relations between that State and Rome. The voluntary withdrawal of the criminal being regarded as an admission of his guilt, the Romans confirmed it by a *plebiscitum*, which gave it a legal character; and, to prevent his return, forbade the citizens to afford him shelter, fire and water (*aquæ ignis tecti interdictio*). In later times it became usual to inflict this punishment as an ordinary penalty, independent of any voluntary withdrawal on the part of the criminal. The Emperors introduced a new form of banishment—*deportatio in insulam*—by which the criminal was confined for life, or for an indefinite time, to an island or other prescribed space, within which he had personal liberty though he suffered loss of *civitas*. This gradually supplanted the old *interdictio*.

6. During the Middle Ages banishment was a common punishment, and indeed still occurs among many nations. In England the punishment of banishment was prohibited by Magna Charta, but was still practised, as a criminal was permitted to go into voluntary exile to escape death. The punishment was again made legal by the Vagrancy Act of Queen Elizabeth, which, by giving Justices power 'to banish offenders and remove them to such parts beyond the seas as should be assigned by H.M. Privy Council,' contained the germ of transportation. This Act was given full effect in the reign of James I., 1619 ('100 dissolute persons to be sent to Virginia'), though the name 'transportation' does not occur till the reign of Charles II. In 1718 the system of transportation became more fully developed; political offenders and others who had escaped the death-penalty were handed over to contractors for transportation to the American Colonies, and these contractors farmed out the convicts to the planters as labourers. The War of Independence, however, ended this system. After 1787, Penal Colonies were founded in Australia, in New South Wales. At first the convicts were employed on Government works, but as their numbers increased they were hired out to private employers. Supervision was necessarily lax, and the convicts terrorized the country, so that the worst offenders were returned to the care of the Government and confined in the penal settlements. The Australians began to protest in 1835, and transportation gradually diminished, till in 1867 the penal settlements in Australia and Tasmania were abolished in favour of convict prisons at home. France and Russia still maintain the system of transportation. The French penal settlements founded in French

Guiana in 1853 were disastrous, owing to the unhealthy climate and the harsh regulations, so they were abandoned in 1864 except for Negro and Arab convicts. The Settlements in New Caledonia, however, are still continued. Russia transports criminals and political offenders to Siberia, where, after a term of imprisonment, they are employed in mining and agriculture.

Transportation has not been found to act as a deterrent from crime. It does not possess the reformatory qualities which are an essential part of an effective system of punishment. See OSTRACISM, OUTLAWRY, PUNISHMENT.

W. D. MORRISON and I. LOW.

BANJĀRA (Skr. *vaṇij*, 'a merchant,' *kāraka*, 'doing').—The tribe of wandering grain-carriers in India, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 765,861, most numerous in Hyderābād, but found in all the Indian provinces. As a result of their wandering habits, which have now much decreased since the carrying trade has fallen into the hands of the railway authorities, they are a very mixed race. Their origin is probably Dravidian, but they now all trace their descent from the Brāhman or Rājput tribes of Northern India. It is in the Deccan and in the State of Hyderābād that they still retain more of their primitive beliefs and customs than in the scattered colonies in the more northern parts of the country, where they have largely fallen under Hindu or Muhammadan influence. Of the Deccan branch an excellent account has been given by Cumberlege from the Wūn district of the province of Berār. There they seem to be descendants of the emigrant sutlers who followed the Muhammadan armies into Southern India. Though some vague references to them have been traced in the earlier Sanskrit literature, the first mention of them in Musalmān history is in the account of Sikandar's attack on Dholpur in A.D. 1504 (Elliot, *History of India*, v. 100; Briggs, *Ferishta*, i. 579).

1. *Religion of the Deccan Banjāras: witchcraft.*—In the legends of the Deccan branch of the tribe, Guru Nānak, the founder of the Sikh faith, figures as a worker of miracles and as their spiritual adviser. They have a priest or medicine-man, known as a *bhagat*, or devotee (Skr. *bhakti*, 'faith,' 'devotion'). He is called in to cure all manner of disease, which they believe to be the result of the attacks of evil spirits, sorcery, or witchcraft. In fact, there are few Indian tribes more witch-ridden than the Banjāra. They are, says Lyall (*Asiatic Studies*[2], 1st series, 117 f.),

'terribly vexed by witchcraft, to which their wandering and precarious existence especially exposes them, in the shape of fever, rheumatism, and dysentery. Solemn inquiries are still held in the wild jungles where these people camp out like gypsies, and many an unlucky hag has been strangled by sentence of their secret tribunals. In difficult cases they consult the most eminent of their spiritual advisers or holy men who may be within reach; but it is usual, as a proper precaution against mistakes which even learned divines may commit, to buy some trifling article on the road to the consultation, and to try the diviner's faculty by making him guess what it may be, before proceeding to matters of life or death. The saint works himself into a state of demoniac possession, and gasps out some woman's name. She is killed by her nearest relative or allowed to commit suicide, unless indeed her family are able to make it worth the diviner's while to have another fit, and to detect some one else.'

2. *Gods of the Deccan branch.*—These Deccan Banjāras have a large pantheon of deities. First comes Mariyāī or Mahākālī, the great Mother-goddess in her most terrible form. It is she who is supposed to enter the *bhagat* medicine-man and inspire him to utter oracles. The Chāran branch are deists, with special proclivities towards Sikhism, which they brought with them from their original home in the Panjāb. With them Guru Nānak, the founder of Sikhism, is supreme. They also worship Bālājī, or Kṛishṇa in his infant form; Tuljā Devī, the famous South Indian Mother of Tuljāpur in the State of Hyderābād; a number of deified men, such as Śiva Bhaiyyā, a holy man of Pohorā in the Wūn district in the Berār province; Satī, the ghost of some noted woman who perished on the funeral pyre of her husband; and Miṭṭhū Bhūkiyā, a famous freebooter of olden days. For the last a hut is set apart in every camp, and, when a white flag is raised before it, this is a sign that the people are engaged in the worship of Miṭṭhū Bhūkiyā, who is always invoked to give his aid when any plundering expedition or other crime is being planned. In such cases an appeal is also made to the deified Satī. Clarified butter is placed in a saucer, and in this a wick is lighted. Appeal is then made to Satī for an omen, the worshippers mentioning in a low tone the object of the contemplated expedition. The wick is watched, and, should it drop, the omen is regarded as auspicious.

3. *Ox-worship in Central India.*—In Central India the Banjāras have a peculiar form of ox-worship. This animal is known as Hatādiyā (Skr. *hatya-ādhya*, 'he whom it is an exceeding sin to slay'), and he is devoted to the service of the god Bālājī, or Kṛishṇa in his infant form. No burden is ever laid upon the animal, and he is decorated with streamers of red silk and tinkling bells, with many brass chains and rings on his neck and feet, and strings of cowry shells and tassels. He moves steadily at the head of the convoy, and wherever he lies down there they make their halting-place during the heat of the day. At his feet they make vows whenever trouble befalls them, and in illness, whether of themselves or among their cattle, they trust to the worship of him for a cure.

4. *Forms of worship in Kāṭhiāwār.*—In Kāṭhiāwār their worship is paid to the dread Mother-goddess, Kālikā Mātā. In Khāndesh they mostly worship Bālājī and Khandobā, and in honour of the latter a dance known as the Gondhal is often performed in discharge of a vow or on the completion of a marriage. On the day after the Holī, or spring fire-festival, the Lād branch of the tribe have what is known as the Vīra, or hero procession, when one of the descendants of an ancient warrior who died in battle is led in triumph round the camp. At marriages, two married couples, one representing the bride and the other the bridegroom, fast all day, and at night cook a mess of rice, grain, molasses, and butter. While cooking this they cover their faces with a cloth, as the touch of the steam rising from the pot bodes evil to the couple. This food, when cooked, is eaten by the men of the party, and anything that remains must be given to a cow or thrown into a river. To allow a stranger, or the son of a slave, to partake of this holy food is considered a grievous sin, which will bring a fatal curse upon the family. This is known as the worship of Vādhī Devatā, the god of increase. If this rite, which seems to be an elaborate form of *confarreatio*, be not performed at a wedding, the married pair are looked down on by the community. All the sections of the tribe in Khāndesh wear the sacred Brāhmanical thread, worship Bālājī, and celebrate the Gokul-ashṭamī feast, or birthday of Krishna, with rejoicings and public entertainments. In Nāsik the Lād section worship Khandobā, Bhairobā, Devī, and Ganapati or Gaṇeśa, and keep in their houses images representing their ancestors. When they arrive at a village where there is a temple of Māruti or Hanumān, the monkey god, they worship him daily. In Ahmadnagar their family deities are Vyānkobā of Tirupatī in North Arcot, and Mariyāī, the Mother-goddess, whom they worship in conjunction with the other Hindu gods. Their special pilgrimages are made to Jejurī in Poona, Pandharpur in Sholāpur, and

Tuljāpur in Hyderābād. In Kanara they are specially devoted to the Kṛishṇa cultus.

5. *Religion of the North India Banjāras.*—Passing to Northern India—in Chhattīsgarh of the Cent. Prov. they have a special tribal goddess, Banjārī, the impersonated female energy of the tribe, who is represented by a piece of stone daubed with vermilion at the Divālī, or feast of lamps. Farther north those who are Hindus worship the local gods of the places where their camps or settlements are situated. This pantheon is of a very heterogeneous description, including Musalmān saints, like Zāhir Pīr and the Miyān of Amrohā in the Moradābād District, and deified ghosts like Hardaur Lālā, the cholera-god, and Kālū Deo. To these, sacrifices of goats are offered; but sometimes there is not a complete sacrifice, the ear of the animal being only pierced, and a drop or two of blood sprinkled on the altar. In some places, as in the Kherī District of Oudh, they incline towards monotheism, and worship a single Creator under the name of Bhagvān or Parameśvara.

LITERATURE.—The best account of the Banjāras of the Deccan is to be found in a pamphlet by N. R. Cumberlege, printed in abstract in *Berar Gazetteer*, 195 ff., and in full with additions in *North Indian Notes and Queries*, iv. 163 ff. For the United Provinces, see Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 149 ff., where references to the literature will be found. For the Bombay branch, *BG* viii. 159, xii. 107, 112, xv. pt. i. 339, xvi 62, xvii. 161 ff. For Central India and the Central Provinces, *JASB* lvii. pt. i. 299.

W. CROOKE.

BANNERS.—1. In considering the use of banners from very early times, and onwards, we must employ the word in a wide sense, for both in form and significance banners have passed through a long and varied history. In their origin, and throughout their history—until down to, comparatively speaking, recent times—banners served primarily a 'religious' purpose, and their object was, in the first instance, to *indicate* something rather than to gather people together. The including of banners, standards, flags, and ensigns within one comprehensive category, while justifiable perhaps in view of modern usage, tends to obscure the originally clear distinction between what corresponded to the staff and the flag respectively. There seems to be no doubt that each of these was represented in very early times; nevertheless, the 'staff'—whether of stone or, later on, of wood—might, and evidently often did, do service for the 'flag' as well. Sometimes what corresponded to the 'flag' was a rude engraving figured *upon* the 'staff,' while at other times the 'flag' was a separate object which was attached to the 'staff'; for as banners always had the primary purpose of indicating something, or of drawing attention to something, the thing indicated could be represented upon the upper part of the 'staff' itself, or else it might be a separate object attached to the 'staff.' The Phœnician *cippi*, for example, dedicated to Tanith and Baal Ḥammān, which often have a hand figured on them, must be objects which have a long history behind them, and represent, as one may reasonably suppose, an early form of 'sign-post.' That primitive pillars of this kind were the originals from which in later times monuments on the one hand, and banners on the other, developed and diverged, seems fairly obvious when all the facts are taken into consideration. An instructive example of a very early kind may be seen, for instance, in the 'banner-stones' of the American Indians. In form these vary greatly, but there are certain fundamental features of their shape which are practically constant, and which are of such a nature as to suggest the justifiable use of this term 'banner-stone.' These features are the 'axial perforations and the extension of the body or midrib into two wing-like projections.' They are strongly reminiscent of the 'double axe' which played such an important part in Minoan worship.* The presence of the perforations makes it probable that these 'banner-stones' were mounted for use on a staff, or on a handle as a ceremonial weapon, or on the stem of a calumet.

'These objects are usually made of varieties of stone selected for their fine grain and pleasing colour, and are carefully shaped and finished. In Florida, and perhaps elsewhere, examples made of shell are found. The perforation is cylindrical, and is bored with great precision longitudinally through the thick portion or midrib, which may symbolically represent the body of a bird. . . . They are found in burial mounds and on formerly inhabited sites generally, and were probably as a class the outgrowth of the remarkable culture development which accompanied and resulted in the construction of the great earthworks of the Mississippi valley.' †

2. Banners of a different character were the poles carried in battle by the *North American Indians*, to the top of which eagles' feathers were attached. A similar custom prevailed among many other savage tribes. These were probably the predecessors of the types of banners in vogue among the nations of ancient civilization. Thus the banners of the *Egyptians* consisted of representations of various kinds—holy animals, the sacred boat, and other emblems, sometimes also the name of a king,‡ fans and feather-shaped symbols—which were raised on the end of a staff, and carried by the standard-bearers of each company when an army was marching out to battle.

'Being raised on a spear or staff, which an officer bore aloft, each standard served to point out to the men their respective regiments, enabled them more effectually to keep their ranks, encouraged them to the charge, and offered a conspicuous rallying point in the confusion of battle.' §

Besides these ordinary banners, there were also the royal banners and those borne by the principal persons of the household near the king himself. Only royal princes or sons of the nobility could carry these.‖ The earliest known representations of Egyptian banners are those found on the votive tablet of Nar-Mer (B.C. 4000–5000) at Hierakonpolis; on this are represented four bearers carrying poles with various emblems on the top of them. Something similar, though the pole is not so long, is found on a relief of Rameses I.; the banner-bearer precedes a company of archers. Banners seem also to have been placed on fortresses; on the Ḥeta-fortress of Dapuru, for example, a standard is fixed; it consists of a shield pierced with arrows upon a pole. This is shown in the representation of a siege.¶ Mention should also be made of the masts which stood in front of the *pylons* and *propylons* of Egyptian temples. These masts were decorated with small flags.** The *Assyrian* banners usually took the form of the representation of a deity placed within a disc fixed to the top of a pole. Immediately beneath the disc there was sometimes a species of ornamentation in the shape of flag-like streamers. Judging from the inscriptions, they were fixed to the chariots. It is noteworthy that in none of the battle scenes given in Layard's magnificent series

* See Evans, 'The Minoan Cult of the Double Axe,' in the *Report of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions* (1908), and art. AXE.

† See F. W. Hodge in the *Handbook of American Indians* ('Bureau of American Ethnology,' Bulletin 30, pt. i., 1907), art. 'Banner Stones,' where the whole subject is treated, and where further literature is referred to. See also Squier and Davis, *Ancient Monuments of the Mississippi Valley* (1848); Wilson, *Prehistoric Man* (1862); Fergusson, *Rude Stone Monuments* (1872); Squier, *Peru* (1877); Schliemann, *Mycenæ* (1878); Moorehead, *Prehistoric Implements* (1900); Evans, *The Ancient Stone Implements, Weapons, and Ornaments of Great Britain*[2] (1897).

‡ D'Alviella, *Migration of Symbols*, p. 220 ff

§ Diodorus, i. 86, quoted by Wilkinson, *The Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians* (new ed 1878), i. 196.

‖ Wilkinson, *ib.*; see, further, Rosellini, *Mon. Civili*, pl. cxvi. Nos 1–15; Rawlinson, *Hist. of Ancient Egypt* (1881), i. 463 ff.

¶ Perrot and Chipiez, *Hist. of Art in Ancient Egypt* (1883), ii. 46.

** Perrot and Chipiez, *op. cit.* ii. 158 f.; cf. Champollion, *Monuments de l'Égypte et de la Nubie, notices descriptives* (1831), p. 504.

do banners figure in connexion with foot-soldiers, though in several cases chariots are furnished with them.* The device usually represented is that of a deity.† In the few *Phœnician* battle-scenes and the like which are extant no sign of any banners appears.‡ The *Persians*, like the Assyrians, fixed their banners on chariots. One of their banner-designs consisted of a golden eagle upon a lance. They also appear to have had masts, similar to those which stood in front of the entrances to Egyptian temples. These, too, were probably decorated with flags.§ The earliest form of banner among the *Greeks* consisted of a piece of armour fixed to the top of a spear; in later times different cities carried sacred emblems, *e.g.* the Athenians the owl and the olive, the Thebans a sphinx, and so on. The Dacians carried on their standard the representation of a serpent, also a dragon; this latter was the military ensign of the Parthians, and is that of the Chinese at the present day. Among the *Romans* there was, firstly, the *vexillum*. This appears to have been the oldest form of banner in the Roman army.‖ It corresponds to the modern flag, its main feature being a piece of cloth with a fringe which hung down from a transverse beam; the name of the legion was embroidered on this. The *vexilla* were the 'standards of those divisions of infantry which were separated from the main division for some special duty, or of the troops of discharged veterans called out for further service.'¶ Secondly, in the Roman army each *maniple* had its own *signum*. When the army was on the march the *signa* were borne in front, but during the battle the *signiferi* stood behind the hindmost rank. The pole of the *signum* was a lance pointed at the lower end so that it might the more easily be fixed into the ground. It had a transverse bar near the top from which ribands hung down. Below this bar there were several discs, varying in number from two to seven. These were usually of silver; below them was the crescent moon, above them either a small shield, or a *corona aurea*, or a symbol of some other kind. These discs could be removed from the pole; this was done at military funerals. The *signum* was also carried on war-galleys.** The standards of the prætorians differed from those of the legions in that crowns took the place of the *phaleræ*; a medallion containing a picture of the Emperor was placed in the middle of the pole. These *imagines*, 'effigies' (προτομαί), represented the reigning and earlier Emperors. Another of the Roman standards was the *aquila*, i.e. an eagle with outstretched wings, placed on the top of a long pole; this was usually of silver, but sometimes of gold. The eagle was sometimes represented with an oak-leaf in its beak, perhaps as a presage of victory.††

Among the Indo-Germanic peoples, indeed, the use of banners goes back to very early times. The *Atharva Veda* (v. xxi. 12) speaks of the armies of the gods as *sūryaketu* ('sun-bannered'), and the *Mahābhārata* (XIV. lxxxii. 23) of the hero Meghasandhi as *vānaraketana* ('monkey-bannered'), while *vṛṣabhadhvaja* ('bull-bannered') and *makaraketana* ('dolphin-bannered') are conventional epithets of Śiva and Kāma (the god of love) respectively. In the Avesta (*Yasna* x. 14) there is mention of the 'kine banner' (*gāuš drafšō*), which, in view of the sanctity attached to kine by the Indo-Iranians, may not be without an ultimate totemistic significance. In Rome, besides the instances already noted, previous to the second consulate of Caius Marius, wolves, minotaurs, horses, and boars had figured on the standards of the army in addition to the eagle (Pliny, *HN* x. 16). A similar state of things is implied for the ancient Teutons by Tacitus (*Germania*, vii.), and this is borne out by the fact that the Old High German *chumbirra*, 'tribe,' is cognate etymologically with the Anglo-Saxon *cumbor*, *cumbol*, 'sign' (especially 'military standard'). The Gauls, in like manner, possessed banners with images of theriomorphic deities which were carried into battle, 'car ces enseignes à représentations animales ont une sorte de vie magique; elles menacent véritablement ceux vers qui on les tourne; . . . il se dégageait d'elles des effluves magiques, salutaires à leurs défenseurs, funestes à leurs ennemis, et les dieux se mêlaient ainsi aux guerres des hommes' (Renel, *Religions de la Gaule avant le christianisme*, p. 185). The Arch of Orange represents a number of the Gallic banners, chiefly of boars, though the horse also occurs. It should also be noted that the figure of the theriomorphic deity was often affixed to the helmet among the Gauls as among the Anglo-Saxons (cf. Anglo-Saxon *eoforcumbol*, 'boar-sign,' 'helmet'). The use of banners in war was equally common among the ancient Irish, their word for 'banner' being *meirge*, cognate with the English *mark*, 'sign.'*

All these were originally, without doubt, carried in the belief that they would ensure victory,† a fact which further emphasizes their religious character. The employment of banners as rallying-centres, though very ancient, was a secondary idea; this, however, appears to have been their main use among the *Israelites*. An ensign was set up upon a hill for the purpose of gathering the people together (Is 13^4, cf. 11^{10} 18^3).‡ This was called a נֵס (*nês*), a word which is used in connexion with the setting up of the brazen serpent in the wilderness (Nu 21^9). Another word used in the OT is דֶּגֶל (*degel*); this would perhaps correspond more with banner in the stricter sense, though the character of both types is conjectural, since no hints as to this are given in the OT.§ According to Nu $2^{2ff.}$ each tribe had its own standard. In *Midrashic literature*‖ it is said that the various emblems and colours of these standards corresponded to the twelve precious stones set in the breast-plate of the high priest. The emblems comprised a lion, a mandrake, the sun and moon, a ship, a snake, etc.¶ On the analogy of the character of other ancient banners, it is possible that a substratum of historical truth may underlie this statement. According to a legend preserved in the *Targum Jerushalmi*, the banner of the Hasmonæans had inscribed upon it the letters מכבי, an abbreviation for מי כמך באלים יי ('Who is like thee among the mighty, Jahweh!').

3. As an example of another and altogether different use of banners, reference may be made to what

* Layard, *The Monuments of Nineveh*, 1st series (1849), pl. 14, 22, 27; 2nd series (1853), pl. 24.

† See also Ragozin, *Assyria*, 1888, p. 252.

‡ See Perrot and Chipiez, *Hist. of Art in Phœnicia* (1885).

§ Perrot and Chipiez, *Hist. of Art in Persia* (1892), ii. 342.

‖ On a tombstone found at Worms, belonging to the 1st cent. A.D., a soldier is represented carrying this on horseback.

¶ Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, ii. 673.

** An illustration of this may be seen, for example, in Du Fresne, *Familiæ Augustæ Byzantinæ* (1682), pl. v. p. 21.

†† See the exhaustive treatment of the subject in von Domaszewski, *Die Fahnen im römischen Heere* (1885).

* Renel, *Religions de la Gaule avant le christianisme* (1906), pp. 185–186; Jullian, *Recherches sur la religion gauloise* (1903), pp. 70–71; Joyce, *Social History of Ancient Ireland* (1903), i 135–137. On Indo-Germanic banners in general, see Schrader, *Reallexikon der indog. Altertumskunde* (1901), pp. 207–209, *s.v.* 'Fahne.'

† Cf. the Ark of Israel in battle, 1 S 4^{4-8}, and the little dwarf figures (*pittuḥim*) carved on the prow of Phœnician war-galleys.

‡ Cf. the 'Eighteen Blessings' in the modern Jewish Liturgy; in the tenth Blessing occur the words: 'Sound the great horn for our freedom; lift up the ensign to gather our exiles, and gather us from the four corners of the earth'; see Oesterley and Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue* (1907), p. 222.

§ Cf., for OT data on the subject, Cheyne's art. 'Ensigns and Standards,' in *EBi* ii. 1298 f.

‖ *Bamidbar Rabbah*, ii.

¶ *JE* v. 405b.

are called 'Trees of the Law' among the *Tibetans*. These are lofty flagstaffs, with silk flags upon them emblazoned with that mystic charm of wonder-working power, the sacred words: *Om Mani padme hūm* ('Ah, the jewel is in the lotus,' *i.e.* [?] the Self-creative force is in the Kosmos).

'Whenever the flags are blown open by the wind, and "the holy six syllables" are turned towards heaven, it counts as if a prayer were uttered—a prayer which brings down blessings, not only upon the pious devotee at whose expense it was put up, but also upon the whole country-side. Everywhere in Tibet these flagstaffs meet the eye.' *

4. Ecclesiastical banners, which were adapted from military usage, have always played a great part in Church ceremonial. The idea underlying the use of these is that of the Christian emblem, figured on the banner, going before the army of Christian soldiers. They are thus intended for processional use. Banners of this kind are, as a rule, attached to a transverse bar which is fixed by means of a cord to the staff; in this way the representation of a cross is made. The banner itself is made of silk, linen, or other material, on which is embroidered or painted the picture of a saint, or a sacred symbol expressive of some Christian truth, or else mottoes, either Biblical or based on some Scripture passage, are inscribed upon it. The use of banners in the Christian Church dates from a very early period, namely, from the time of the Emperor Constantine, at the beginning of the 4th century. According to the well-known story, Constantine saw in a vision the Cross upon a banner which bore the inscription, τουτῷ νίκα. On awaking, he caused a banner to be made after the pattern of this, and henceforward the *labarum*, as it was called, was carried before his troops. Upon it was figured the Cross in combination with the initial letters of the name of Christ. The *labarum* was the ordinary cavalry standard (*vexillum*) adapted to a specifically Christian use by having Christian symbols upon it. The eagle of victory surmounting the pole gave place to the sacred monogram placed within a chaplet; other Christian emblems were embroidered upon the banner itself.† Banners used in procession must have come into vogue soon after this. The bearers were called *draconii* or *vexillıferi*. Bede, in describing the approach of St. Augustine and his followers to King Ethelbert, says that they came 'bearing a silver cross for a standard, and the image of the Lord and Saviour painted on a panel.'‡ Gregory of Tours, also, in referring to a procession to a basilica, uses the words 'post crucem præcedentibus signis.'§ A later custom was that of carrying a banner of sackcloth in processions of the reconciliation of penitents. This is prescribed, for example, in the Sarum Use.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully throughout the article. W. O. E. OESTERLEY.

BĀṄSPHOR (Hindī *bāṅs*, 'a bamboo,' *phoṛna*, 'to split').—A branch of the Ḍom tribe (wh. see), with whom in the Census returns of 1901 the Basor and Basuhā are included, the whole numbering 95,979, of whom a large majority are found in the United and Central Provinces. The chief occupation of Bānsphoṛs is, as their name implies, working in bamboo, out of which they make fans, baskets, and boxes. But they also occasionally take service as sweepers, and are therefore subject to the tabu which all orthodox Hindus impose on those who practise a trade of this kind. Their religion is of the animistic type found among all branches of the Ḍom tribe, their chief deities being in Upper India the Vindhyabāsinī Devī, the mountain-goddess of the Vindhyan hills, whose temple is at Bindhāchal in the Mirzāpur District. They also worship local village gods who are venerated in the places where they settle, such as Kālikā and Samai. To the former, at household celebrations, such as marriage and childbirth, a young pig, spirituous liquor, flowers, and ground rice boiled in treacle and milk are offered, all the food after dedication being consumed by the worshippers. The offering to Samai is a yearling pig. The ordinary Hindu feasts are observed, among which in particular the Holī, or fire feast, in spring is celebrated with drinking and coarse revelry, and the Kajarī in the rainy season, when drunkenness prevails and all rules of sexual morality are disregarded. They have a great respect for the snake, and, at the Guṛiyā feast, girls make dolls of rags, which are supposed to represent snakes and are beaten with rods by boys and flung into a tank—the real origin of the celebration probably being the expulsion of the powers of evil impersonated in the snake. They fear the spirits of the dead, and propitiate them by laying out food for them, which is afterwards eaten by the children and by crows. The ancestors, especially, rejoice in the savour of roast pork, and if not honoured by the sacrifice of a pig, which is cooked and eaten by the worshippers, may bring trouble upon the household. At a birth the Bānsphoṛ worship the spirit of the well from which they draw water, and they hold the Pīpal tree (*Ficus indica*) in great respect, and will not cut or injure it. The same reverence is felt with regard to the Gūlar (*Ficus glomerata*) and the Semal (*Bombax heptaphyllum*). No Brāhman officiates at any of their rites, all of which are performed by a member of the tribe or household.

LITERATURE.—Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 171 f. W. CROOKE.

BANTU AND S. AFRICA.

[E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.]

1. Race and geographical distribution of the Bantu.
2. Culture and organization.
3. Totemism.
4. Worship of the dead and other spirits. Burial rites.
5. Idols.
6. Priests, medicine-men, diviners, and sorcerers.
7. Supreme Being, Nature-spirits.

1. Race and geographical distribution of the Bantu.—The term *Bantu* (pl. of *Muntu*, a native word meaning 'man') is applied to that variety of the Negro race which, prior to the coming of Europeans, was politically, and still is numerically, predominant in South Africa. The Bantu are distinct alike from the West African or true Negroes, and from the Nilotic Negroes of the Sudan and adjacent lands. They were differentiated at some remote period, probably by intermixture with a Hamitic stock. They seem to have originated as a distinct variety somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Great Lakes, and thence to have spread southward and westward over the greater part of the continent. North of the equator they are found from the northern shores of Lake Victoria Nyanza right across to the Gulf of Guinea, thus embracing the entire valley of the Congo. Still further to the north they have thrown out numerous colonies, as far as the northern Cameroon, among the true Negroes. On the other hand, the latter are traceable down the eastern side of the Gulf of Guinea until they finally disappear in French Congo, giving place to the Bantu not very far south of the Equator. The Bantu never penetrated

* Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, new ed. 1899, p. 210 f.

† See, further, Eusebius, *Vit. Const.* i. 31; and for illustrations of the *labarum* see Du Fresne, *op. cit.* pl. xii. xiii pp. 34, 37; Lowrie, *Chr. Art and Archæol.* p. 240. One of the earliest extant representations of it is on a gold coin of the Emperor Theodosius (d 395).

‡ *Eccles Hist.* i xxv. For a cross instead of a standard see the illustrations in Cabrol's *Dict. d'Archéologie Chrét.*, fasc. xii. p. 247.

§ *Hist. Franc.* v. 4. See, further, Maskell, *Monumenta Ritualia*², 1882, i. cxi.

into that part of Cape Colony which lies west of the Great Fish River, or into the southern portion of German South-west Africa.

The Bantu are usually divided into three main groups, distinguished by the manner in which the plural name is formed, viz. :—

1. The South-eastern tribes (Ama-Zulu, Ama-Xosa, etc.).
2. The Central tribes (Be-Chuana, Ba-Suto, Ma-Shuna, etc.).
3. The South-western tribes (Ova-Mbo, Ova-Herero, etc.).

To these, however, we may conveniently add as distinct groups—

4. The Northern tribes still living in the region of the Great Lakes, such as the Baganda, Warundi, Awemba, and others.
5. The Western or Forest tribes, occupying the Congo valley and a large tract of country north and south of that region, such as the Ovimbundu, Bavili, etc.

This distribution, though geographical, corresponds in the main to the ethnical peculiarities of the different groups, due doubtless to the streams of emigration and the various influences, human and climatic, which met the immigrant tribes on their way to the regions where they finally settled. It would occupy too great a space to discuss the details here. The causes of difference are largely conjectural, and the questions raised are greatly complicated by the incessant wars which have resulted in the intermingling or extermination of many distinct tribes, or in wholesale emigrations of hordes which have broken away from the parent stock after it had settled in its present *habitat*.

2. **Culture and organization.** — The primary application of the term *Bantu* is linguistic. The Bantu languages are formed on common principles, and are related to one another in the same way as the Aryan languages of Europe and Asia are related to one another. But, since the peoples speaking those languages belong, with few exceptions, to a well-marked anthropological type, it is usually and conveniently applied to that type. The Bantu peoples are in a fairly uniform stage of culture, and may be generally described as both pastoral and agricultural. As the climate of the continent varies from desert to forest, from table-land intersected by broad but often intermittent rivers to mountain regions embracing deep fertile valleys and vast inland seas, so necessarily do the occupations of the people differ. On the western side the extremes are found—that of the Hereros, who, living in a waste and well-nigh waterless country, practise no agriculture at all, and that of the tribes of the Congo, among whom the rearing of domestic animals is reduced to a minimum. All the Negroid peoples of Africa are acquainted with the use of iron; some of them are capable and ingenious smiths. Excellent spears, or assagais, knives, and hoes are produced by their simple forges. Small implements are carved from horn or bone; and among many tribes basket-work is much developed. The typical Bantu house is a circular hut, beehive-shaped among some tribes such as the Zulus, or with a true roof. These huts are built in groups, or villages, enclosed with a palisade, a hedge, or a wall of mud or stones. Every village is ruled by a chief, who in some tribes may be a woman, and whose authority varies, according to the tribe, from absolute rule to a rule exercised with the concurrence of the heads of the houses composing the village. In the more highly organized and military tribes the village chiefs are subject to a very real control by the supreme chief or king, who is surrounded by a number of ministers, and often keeps up a large measure of barbaric state. His power is in such cases exercised ruthlessly, and, however limited in theory, is in practice checked only by the dread of assassination, or (at all events in the southern portions of the continent) by the knowledge that his people may gradually desert him and go to augment the following of a more popular rival. The continuance, therefore, of a Bantu realm depends upon the political genius of its king. Within a couple of generations the mightiest kingdom is apt to fall to pieces, and another will arise on its ruins. This instability could be illustrated again and again from South African history; it has been a serious barrier to the progress of the arts of peace, has frequently depopulated large tracts of country, and has caused endless confusion and misery in every direction.

In addition to their political divisions, all the Bantu peoples are divided into stocks or clans. The members of each of these clans are united by a real or imputed community of blood, symbolized by a common name, usually derived from some animal or plant. Two opposite methods of reckoning the kinship are in use. It is probable that mankind originally reckoned kinship only through females. This mode of reckoning is called mother-right. The Western, or Forest, and some of the Northern tribes are still in this stage. Consequently the husband and father, though the head of the household, has a very limited power over the children, who in many cases are liable to be sold into slavery by their mother's brother, or pawned for his debts. Their mother's brother is their nearest male relative, and they inherit his property and liabilities. When a Bantu marries, he is required to pay what is usually, but inaccurately, called a 'bride-price.' Where kinship is reckoned through women only, this is often paid to the bride's maternal uncle. On the other hand, the Eastern and Central tribes have advanced to the stage of father-right, or the reckoning of kinship through males only. The husband and father owns the children of his wife, by whomsoever they are begotten. He has extensive powers over them, though these powers are often, as among the Basuto, limited by the rights of the wife's eldest brother. The *malume*, as the wife's brother is called, is the special protector of the child. The Basuto perform the rite of circumcision about the age of puberty. On this occasion the *malume* makes his nephew a present of a javelin and a heifer. He subsequently furnishes a part of the bride-price on the youth's marriage; and, if surviving, he presides at his funeral. He is entitled to a share of the spoil taken by his sisters' sons in war, and of the cattle which form the bride-price of his sisters' daughters. These rights and duties are best explained as a survival from the stage of mother-right.

If we turn to the South-western tribes, we find among the Ovaherero a peculiar organization intermediate between mother-right and father-right. The Ovaherero are the predominant Bantu people of German territory. According to the older organization, they were divided into clans called *eanda* (pl. *omaanda*), in which kinship was reckoned exclusively through females. These are now being superseded by clans called *oruzo* (pl. *otuzo*), in which kinship is reckoned exclusively through males. The consequence is that every Herero belongs to two distinct stocks—to an *eanda* through his mother, and to an *oruzo* through his father. Kinship is thus reckoned through both lines. The *patria potestas* is, as might be surmised, greatly limited. The husband and father is responsible to his wife's kin for the death of wife or child in consequence of his acts. The wife is capable of owning property apart from her husband, to which on her death he does not as a rule succeed. It is taken by her kin reckoned through the *eanda*. On the death of a man his property does not necessarily fall to his son as in strict father-right; but the claims of the son as *oruzo*-heir and of his sisters' sons or other *eanda*-heirs are the subject of adjustment (Dannert, 32, 47, 58).

3. **Totemism.**—The object from which a Bantu clan or *gens* derives its name is, as already stated, usually a species of animal or plant, generally the former. More rarely, such an object as the sun or rain, iron or an artificial product like the hoe, is found as the name and symbol of a clan.

The organization in clans thus distinguished was first observed among the North American Indians; and *totem*, the name scientifically adopted to denote the clan-symbol, is derived from an Ojibwa word. The condition or status of peoples thus organized and possessing totems is known as totemism. Much obscurity still hangs over the origin of totemism. Without discussing the question here, it is sufficient to observe that totemism takes its rise in savagery and among peoples who trace their descent exclusively through the mother. A special bond unites every member of the clan to every individual of the totem-species, all of which are under a ban or tabu. They are sacrosanct. Save in special cases, they may not be killed or eaten or used in any way; if killed or found dead, they are often honoured with funeral rites and mourning, like human members of the clan. At puberty the children of the clan usually undergo initiation into the mysteries and privileges of the clan; not until then are they considered full members. Marriage is contracted exclusively outside the clan, sexual relations being wholly forbidden between members of the same clan. As soon as the stage of pure savagery is passed, totemism begins to decay. No Bantu tribe is in the stage of pure savagery. Consequently totemism, though found among them as the basis of their social organization, is nowhere in its pristine power and development. From many of the tribes, indeed, it has disappeared, leaving only traces of its former presence. Totemism is often regarded as an incipient form of religion; but it should be observed that it lacks some of what we are accustomed to consider distinctive features of religion, such as prayer and sacrifice. See, further, art. TOTEMISM.

(*a*) *Central and South-eastern tribes.*—The **Bechuana** are a congeries of tribes in the centre of South Africa, for the most part of common origin. Livingstone tells us that the different tribes 'are named after certain animals. . . . The term *Bakatla* means "they of the monkey"; *Bakuena*, "they of the alligator"; *Batlapi*, "they of the fish"; each tribe having a superstitious dread of the animal after which it is called. They also use the word *bina*, "to dance," in reference to the custom of thus naming themselves, so that, when you wish to ascertain what tribe they belong to, you say, "What do you dance?" It would seem as if that had been a part of the worship of old. A tribe never eats the animal which is its namesake, using the term *ila*, "hate *or* dread," in reference to killing it. We find traces of many ancient tribes in the country in individual members of those now extinct, as the *Batau*, "they of the lion"; the *Banoga*, "they of the serpent"; though no such tribes now exist' (*Missionary Travels*, 13).

It is right to call attention here to the confusion between *tribe*, the local or political unit, and *clan*, the social unit. This arises partly from the great explorer's loose terminology; but it must be said that the tracing of descent through the father instead of through the mother tends to localize the clans, and the political instability already mentioned from time to time wipes out many of the clans thus localized, or absorbs them among the followers and subjects of one or more of the powerful chiefs. A body of men belonging to different clans localized under the rule of a chief soon learns, in the stage of father-right, to reverence his ancestors and his totem, and to regard their own as of less importance.

In the middle of the 19th cent. the clan of the Bakuena was thus an important tribe living about the sources of the Notuani river. They are reported as calling the crocodile their father, celebrating it in their festivals, swearing by it, and making an incision, resembling the mouth of a crocodile, in the ears of their cattle to distinguish them from others. The chief was called 'Great Man of the Crocodile' (Casalis, *The Basutos*, Lond. 1861, 211). None of the Bakuena would approach a crocodile. If they happened to go near one, they would spit on the ground, and indicate its presence by saying *Boleo ki bo*, 'There is sin.' They imagined the mere sight of it would give inflammation of the eyes (Livingstone, *op. cit.* 255). In the decay of totemism, however, either the wide distribution of the crocodile clan, or the power of chiefs belonging to it, has resulted in an extension of *quasi*-religious practices relating to the crocodile far beyond the bounds of the Bakuena clan. The nation of the Basuto was formed by the genius of its great ruler, Moshesh, of men belonging to many clans and, indeed, of different tribes. But Moshesh belonged to the Bakuena; and he succeeded in transmitting his rule to his descendants, one of whom still wields the power under British protection. Consequently the crocodile has become the sacred animal of the whole nation, and is the subject of various rites. The blood of a young crocodile, caught alive and afterwards returned to the water, is a favourite 'medicine' to make a chief 'strong.' 'Medicine' for a kraal is prepared with the brain of a crocodile mixed with that of a man. Both among the Basuto and the Bechuana a man who is bitten by a crocodile is expelled from his village; for the people say, 'A man who is so bad that the crocodile bites him can come no more into our community,' as if they saw in this bite a Divine judgment. The death of a crocodile causes the children to cough. Its body is handed over to the medicine-men, who slay a black sheep on the spot where it was killed, as a sort of atonement for its death. The crocodile's blood kneaded up with mud, its hide, teeth, and claws, are used as talismans (Merensky, *Beitrage zur Kenntniss Sud-Afrikas*, Berlin, 1875, 92, 132). These usages and others that might be named probably result from a decay of totemism under the social and political influences dominant on the central plateau of South Africa. Among more certain evidences of still existing totemism is the practice of addressing the chief of a clan as the animal itself. The totem of Khama, the famous chief of the Bamangwato, was a duyker antelope. If one were in agreement with something he had just said, it would be highly respectful to reply, 'Yes, Duyker.' Similarly it would be proper to say to the chief of the Bakuena, 'Yes, Crocodile' (W. C. Willoughby, in *JAI* xxxv. 301). No one dares to eat the flesh or clothe himself with the skin of the animal whose name he bears. Even if this animal be hurtful, as a lion for instance, it may not be killed without great apologies being made to it, and its pardon being asked. Purification is necessary after the commission of such sacrilege (Casalis, 211). The great oath of the Baperi 'is that of *ka noku*, "by the porcupine," because the majority of them *sing*, to use the consecrated phrase, intimating that they feast, worship, or revere that animal. . . . When they see any one maltreat that animal, they afflict themselves, grieve, collect with religious care the quills, if it has been killed, spit upon them, and rub their eyebrows with them, saying, "They have slain our brother, our master, one of ours, him whom we sing." They fear that they will die if they eat the flesh of one' (Arbousset, *An Exploratory Tour to the N.E. of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope*, Lond. 1852, 176).

Most of the central tribes practise *circumcision*. The ceremony is performed upon boys about the age of puberty. It takes place at intervals of time which depend on the number of candidates. The lads who are to be subjected to it are gathered into a hut, where they have to reside for several weeks, and where they are initiated into the traditions of the tribe and the duties of manhood. When they are at length released, they issue with the rights of adult and fully qualified members of the tribe. Among some tribes, such as the Basuto of the Transvaal, the 'schools,' as they are often called, are spread over three periods, held at intervals of three years; but they are more usually completed in one term. The discipline undergone by the candidates is intended to harden them and develop their endurance and self-restraint. In regard to sexual matters, however, it is the reverse of what we should consider moral. The actual performance of circumcision is not an original or necessary part of the initiation ceremonies. Though ancient among many of the tribes, it has only recently been introduced among some, and is still rejected by others. Among the Baronga it fell into

desuetude in the early years of the last century; and Chaka, the great Zulu king, abolished it about the same time among the Zulus (Maclean, 94, 153; Alberti, *De Kaffers*, Amsterdam, 1810, p. 73; *Journ. African Soc.* v. 247; *JAI* xxxv. 251, 267, 372; Junod, 28). The Basuto of Basutoland, the Bechuana, and many other tribes require a similar period of retirement and instruction to be undergone by girls before they are esteemed marriageable.

The Zulus, the Xosas, the Pondos, and other tribes of the south-east, observe the rule of *exogamy*. They are forbidden to marry members of the same clan, though belonging to different tribes. The rule, however, is breaking down (Theal, *Kaffir Folk-Lore*, Lond. 1882, 198; Shooter, *Kafirs of Natal*, Lond. 1857, 45). Among the tribes of the interior it has rarely been recorded. A somewhat similar rule forbidding marriage within the kin has recently, however, been noted by a German traveller as characteristic of the Batauana, an offshoot of the Bamangwato inhabiting the Okawango marshland near Lake Ngami (*ZE* xxxvi. 704); and though it has escaped record, it is possible that it may be observed by others of the central and south-eastern tribes.

(*b*) *Northern tribes.*—Among the northern tribes, such as the Baganda and the Banyoro around the Victoria Nyanza, totemism is still a powerful part of the social organization. Sir Harry Johnston gives a list of twenty-nine clans in Uganda proper and its southern province of Buddu, named after various animals and vegetables. The object which serves as the name of the clan is in some way identified with the original founder, though there is no evidence that the clan is believed to be actually descended from it. It is held so far sacred that the members of the clan do not willingly destroy or eat it. The *mamba*, or lung-fish, though generally appreciated as an article of diet, is not killed or eaten by the Mamba clan; the elephant is not injured by the members of the Elephant clan; members of the Leopard or the Lion clan will endeavour to avoid killing the animal whose name they bear; and so on. The word used for 'totem' is *muziro*, 'something tabued or avoided,' and is, Sir Harry Johnston declares, 'a fair translation' of the word *totem* (Johnston, ii. 587, 588, 691, 692). The same distinguished author was of opinion that there was no prohibition of marriage within the clan. More recent investigations, however, have resulted in a different conclusion; and it seems fairly certain that, whatever was the custom among the Banyoro, the Baganda and probably the Basoga forbade marriage between even the most distant members of the same clan. As elsewhere, the kin is reckoned through the father, and has the consequent tendency to localize itself. Every family has its *kialo*, or place of origin; and the residents in a given village usually belong to the same totem. Circumcision and other initiatory ceremonies appear to be unknown.

Meagre as is our information with regard to the Uganda Protectorate, we know still less of the totemism of the other northern peoples. Father van der Burgt, to whose monograph we are indebted for all that we know of the Warundi of German East Africa, uses the word without any clear notion of its meaning. The goat, the wild boar, and the domestic fowl are not eaten, though the first and last are offered in sacrifice. Mutton is not eaten by every one. Fish is not eaten, save on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. But whether these tabus are totemic we cannot say. The Warundi seem to count kinship through the father. The wife, however, occupies a much better position than among the tribes south of the Zambesi. Indications given here and there by Father van der Burgt point to an organization in clans. How far it is effective, and whether the clans are exogamous, does not appear. Circumcision is not practised. On puberty rites we have no information; but secret societies exist, and serpents and other animals are said to play a part in their ceremonies. Nothing, however, is really known of the facts.

On the Shire Highlands, between Lake Nyasa and the Zambesi, the Wayao and Mang'anja reckon descent through the mother. When a man marries, he settles in his wife's village. He does not, as a rule, take a second wife while the first is living, unless he inherits her from his elder brother or maternal uncle. When he dies, any property he may have which is not buried with him or consumed in the funeral feast and expenses devolves on his next brother, or, failing younger brothers, on his eldest sister's son, and so on (Macdonald, *Africana*, i. 187; Werner, 132). The Wayao are divided into exogamous clans. These clans appear to be totemic, but no list has been made of them. Each of them is said to have a *mwiko*, or tabu, with regard to some animal. The subject, however, still awaits investigation (Werner, 252). Girls and boys undergo initiation about the age of puberty. The retirement and ceremonies for a girl occupy about a month, for a boy about six weeks. A boy's name is changed, and after he has gone through the mysteries it is not permitted to call him by his previous name. Among the Mang'anja only the girls undergo puberty rites. Their names are changed, like those of the Yao boys (Macdonald, *op. cit.* i. 125; Werner, 123). The front teeth of both sexes are chipped into saw-like points; but this does not appear to be done at the puberty rites.

The Awemba inhabiting North-Eastern Rhodesia between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Bangweolo have totems which descend exclusively through women. The crocodile, the hoe, and the mushroom are stated to be totems. 'But no special worship is paid to the crocodile, though the natives believe that the souls of the drowned migrate into the bodies of crocodiles' (*JAI* xxxvi. 154). Our information is at present too meagre to enable us to judge how far totemism is still the basis of society.

(*c*) *South-western tribes.*—Turning to the Hereros in the south-west, we find a curious condition corresponding to the double reckoning of kinship already noted. Each *eanda* has a totem, and nearly all of them a number of sub-totems. Most of the characteristics of totemism have, however, been taken over by the *otuzo*, and are no longer observed by the *omaanda*. Thus the chameleon is sacred to the *oru-esembi* (the *oruzo* of the chameleon). The members of the clan call it 'Our Old Ancestor,' and they will not touch it. The members of the *oruzo* of the sun eat and drink only while the sun is above the horizon. The chief tabus of the *oruzo* have been concentrated on domestic animals. The *oruzo* of the chameleon prefer brown and especially piebald cattle; they neither keep nor eat sheep or oxen into the colour of which grey enters. Another *oruzo* neither keep nor eat yellow or grey cattle; they are forbidden to eat the tongue or other part of the flesh of pack-oxen. The *oruzo* of the Koodoos not only eat no koodoo-flesh; they keep no cattle or sheep without horns or with mutilated horns; nor will they eat of such as have lost their ears. At the death of a member of the clan no sacrifice is offered. Hence the characteristic ornament of Herero graves —that of the ox-horns—is wanting; but koodoo-horns are laid on the grave and by the sacred fire at the *werft* ('village'). These tabus of domestic animals having certain colours and other marks, and of portions of animals, bear the stamp of comparatively recent origin—an attempt to import into the *oruzo* a distinctive series of observances parallel with, and yet different from, those which were pro-

bably characteristic of the *eanda*, but which have now disappeared. The blood-feud, however, still attaches to the *eanda*, and has not been transferred to the *oruzo*. It is to be inferred that the *eanda* was exogamous. At present the Herero prefers to marry within the circle of his relatives; but—significant exception—children of two sisters or of two brothers cannot intermarry. According to the Herero reckoning, they are themselves brother and sister. If children of two sisters, they would belong to the same *eanda*; if children of two brothers, to the same *oruzo*. There appear to be no puberty-mysteries for either boys or girls. Circumcision is practised, but it is an individual rite performed for the most part at a very early age. The hair of a girl, except a tuft on the middle of the head, is shaved in her eighth year. The lower front teeth of both sexes are broken out, and the upper teeth chipped into a pointed form, between their eleventh and fourteenth years. These appear to be relics of puberty-rites; but none of them are said to be performed collectively when the parents can afford the sole expense of the festivities usual on the occasion. Only from motives of economy are these rites now imposed upon the young people in companies.

(*d*) *Western or Forest tribes.*—So far as our information goes, the vestiges of totemism among the Western tribes are few and uncertain—and this in spite of the fact that most of the tribes are still in the stage of mother-right. The prevalent tabus, especially those of food, however, point to a totemic origin. They are generally known under the name of *xina*, *orunda*, or *kazila* (compare the *ila* of the Bechuana), or some dialectic variation of one or another of those words. The Congo tribes inhabiting the lower reaches of the river as far inland as Stanley Pool call a tabu *mpangu*. These tabus are of two kinds.

There is, first, the personal *orunda*, observed by virtue of a vow by the individual concerned or of the directions of a medicine-man, or else promised and vowed, after divination, for an infant at birth, and sometimes expressed in his name. Many of these prohibitions are attributed to the direct commands of a *Nkici* (tutelary god or 'fetish'). Many are self-imposed as a religious observance in honour of a *Nkici*, or as a measure of precaution. Some are connected with a secret society, and are required of all its members. Natives are frequently named after animals; and such of the prohibitions as go with the name of an animal may have been taken over from totemism. The rest are perhaps due to the development of 'fetishism' and idol-worship (see § 5).

The other kind of *orunda* is observed by entire families. In Calabar, as we are told by a missionary, 'certain kinds of food are forbidden by some juju law or custom of their own to families and persons bearing certain names' (Waddell, *Twenty-nine Years in the West Indies and Central Africa*, Lond. 1863, 369). Among the Bavili or Fyât, in French Congo, the pig is forbidden to all royal blood; other families 'will not touch certain animals because their ancestors owe such animals a debt of gratitude.' The buffalo is forbidden 'to the Bakutu, as a punishment to them for not listening to the words of Maloango; the antelope to a family round about Fahi, for refusing to give water to a voice in the bush when asked for it; fish of certain inland waters to certain people, near Cabinda, for not giving water to Nzambi (§ 7) and her child; and so on' (Dennett, *Folkl. of the Fjort*, 10, 149; cf. Bastian, *Loango-Kuste*, i. 183 ff.). Du Chaillu's evidence is to the same effect. He tells us that the flesh of the *Bos brachiceros* was an abomination to the king of the Bakalai and all his family, because many generations previously one of their women gave birth to a calf instead of a child; that the crocodile was forbidden food to another family for the same reason; and that further inquiry disclosed the fact that 'scarce a man could be found to whom some article of food' was not *orunda*. Crocodile, hippopotamus, monkey, boa, wild pig are enumerated by the traveller as objects of such prohibition, which is observed even at the risk of starvation, and under the belief of supernatural punishment by miscarriage of women of the family or the birth of monstrosities in the shape of the prohibited animal (du Chaillu, *Equat. Afr.*, Lond. 1861, 308). The word 'family' used by our authorities corresponds with little doubt to a clan tracing its membership through women; and the fact that the name frequently indicates the prohibited food lends countenance to the belief that we have here a survival of a genuine totemic tabu. It seems, however, that by a curious exception, the totem, if totem it be, descends, among the tribes of the Lower Congo, always from father to son, though in other respects the tribes in question are in the stage of mother-right (Bentley, *Pioneering on the Congo*, i. 263). Further investigation is needed on this point.

The **Barotse** are an outlying Western tribe on the upper waters of the Zambesi. They reckon descent through the father only, though traces linger of the earlier form of organization. Our information as to their food-prohibitions is very meagre. The members of the royal family are forbidden the flesh of the sheep and the goat. The pig seems more generally tabued; and the young women abstain from a certain fish lest it render them sterile (Béguin, *Les Ma-Rotsé*, Lausanne, 1903, p. 124). But whether the latter prohibitions are confined to the Barotse themselves or apply also to any of their subject peoples does not appear.

More uncertain as a trace of totemism are the puberty-rites. Circumcision is very general, except among the Barotse; and though sometimes performed upon boys individually when they arrive at the proper age, and, indeed, among certain of the Upper Congo tribes a few days after birth, it is frequently, as in Angola, a collective rite, at which the boys who are subjected to it live for a month in seclusion under the care of a *nganga* (§ 6). Girls on reaching puberty are required to undergo seclusion in a hut called 'the paint-house,' where they are instructed by an old woman in the duties of adult life, and whence they often do not issue until they are about to be married. But this is an individual rite. Secret Societies flourish all down the West Coast. They have probably been introduced from the Negro tribes, and seem to be connected with the worship of special gods. Boys and often girls about the age of puberty are compelled to be initiated. They are taken away into the bush for a season and there instructed in the cult of the Society. Absolute obedience to its commands is required; and oaths of secrecy are imposed. So well are these kept that even converted natives refuse to speak of the rites. Consequently very little is known of them. As among many of the Australian tribes, it is believed by the uninitiated that the novices are killed and brought to life again. On returning to the village they feign ignorance of their language, and even of their nearest relatives and the most familiar objects of their daily life. 'They appear dazed, and cannot talk. They want whatever they see, seize whatever takes their fancy. No one is allowed to resist, because "they do not know any better." They behave like lunatics, and pretend not to know how to eat; even food has to be masticated for them, so well do they act their part. After a few days the excitement and interest of the deception

wear off, and they gradually resume intelligence' (Bentley, i. 287). The Societies wield enormous political and social power, of which they frequently give public demonstration; and it is one of the main objects of civilized governments to put them down. We may conjecture that here, as elsewhere in the lower culture, they are a development of the puberty-rites arising on the decay of totemism.

Certain of the tribes also, both inland and on the coast, knock out the two middle front teeth in the upper jaw at puberty. The Mushicongos, like the Hereros, chip all their front teeth into points (Decle, *Three Years in Savage Africa*, Lond. 1898, 81; Monteiro, *Angola and the River Congo*, Lond. 1875, i. 262). The one or the other mutilation is common in Africa, as well as in other parts of the world; and although generally connected with puberty cannot be reckoned as necessarily a relic of totemism.

The laws of marriage, so far as relates to prohibited degrees, have scarcely been investigated; but at all events some of the tribes forbid marriage within the clan, however remote the relationship according to our reckoning.

4. Worship of the dead and other spirits. Burial rites.—(*a*) *Central and South-eastern tribes.*—The principal factors in the decay of the totemism of the Central and South-eastern tribes have been their pastoral and warlike habits. These have necessitated a higher social organization with father-right as its basis. As already pointed out, the change from mother-right to father-right tends to localize the clans, and to merge them in the local organization under the recognized head of the clan. The social and religious rites of each household are performed by its head; those of the tribe are performed by its chief. Thus they gradually centre round him while living; nor does his power cease with his death. The very ancient and world-wide belief in the life after death leads to the conviction that the chief is still a chief; the father of a household still exercises his functions of owner, provider, controller, preserver, behind the veil that separates him from his survivors and descendants. No other life can be imagined for him; and the people over whom and for whom he exercises these functions are the same whom he ruled in his lifetime. The chief is the father of his tribe; he is its head, and his tribesmen are in a sense his children. In South Africa the tribe is often called by his name. Many a tribe credits its chief with extraordinary powers: he controls the rain; he gives or withholds plenty; he performs the ceremonies which give success in war. 'The chief,' says Merensky, 'is the focus of witchcraft and superstition; he is the high priest of his people; and faith in his supernatural power is the strongest bond which unites his subjects to himself' (*Beitrage*, 116). Such an one receives in his lifetime a reverence hardly distinguishable from worship. That reverence is exalted and intensified by death. His powers are now released from many of their limitations, and are exercised in more terrible, because more mysterious, ways. He becomes part of the tribal religion, for the moment the most prominent object of worship; and such he remains until his successor in his turn supplants him.

Ancestor-worship thus developed—worship of their ancestors by the members of a family, and of their departed chiefs by a whole tribe—is the religion of the Central and South-eastern Bantu peoples.

It is to the ancestors of the reigning chief, says M. Junod, speaking of the Baronga, 'that prayers and sacrifices are always presented when the interest of the tribe as a whole is concerned—in national calamities, in time of famine, drought, war, or at the opening of a new season when it is desired to obtain from the divinities an abundant harvest. Their names compose the genealogy of the royal family. They are invoked one after another; and it is doubtless this religious practice which has saved from oblivion the names of these revered chiefs, become the protecting genii of the tribe. Moreover, each family possesses also its string of *chikwembo* [ancestral *manes*], longer or shorter, better or worse preserved. If the family pride be well developed, if the ancestors have been men of mark, and if their sons have guarded the family tradition with intelligence, this family religion will be well developed' (*Les Barongas*, 382).

As the ancestors of the chief are worshipped on national occasions, the ancestors of the family are worshipped on occasions of family interest, such as marriage, death, or sickness, or any occasion of rejoicing, prayer, or mourning.

The Central and South-eastern Bantu believe that the ordinary existence of the soul after death is led underground (a conception which is the natural consequence of burial), often in villages like those on earth, and with cattle variously said to be entirely white or (among the Basuto) of a blue colour with red and white spots. But the dead retain the power of appearing in dreams, or of assuming the form of animals. Sometimes they enter into men and inspire them. They retain their human feelings, and desire to be remembered by their descendants and nourished by sacrifice. It would seem as if they were dependent for their continued existence, or at all events for their comfort, on the continuance of their line. If they have no one to remember them and to offer sacrifices to them, they will be reduced to eating grasshoppers, and they will 'die of cold on the mountains.' This expression is perhaps not to be taken literally; but at least it indicates a state of extreme misery (Callaway, *Rel. Syst.* 145, 225; Arbousset, 237). Though worshipped, the dead are feared rather than loved. They are possessed of more than human power and knowledge, and appear sometimes for beneficent purposes, as to warn of danger, or to reveal medicines. Sneezing is caused by the *manes*; it is a sign that the spirit of an ancestor is with the man to help him. More usually, however, the visits of the dead are to demand sacrifice or to call the living. They often harass the living by their presence, and must be laid. The dead husband is jealous of his wife; and, before she marries another, the spirit must be laid, and she must be 'purified.' When the dead reveal themselves to their descendants and tribesmen in dreams, they usually appear in their own proper forms. When they appear otherwise than in dreams, it is as animals. Buffaloes, hippopotami, lizards, and even mice are mentioned among the animals held by the Zulus to be manifestations of their dead. Among the Matabele and the Mashuna the dead may be changed into animals such as elephants, bucks, lions, and so forth. Other tribes hold crocodiles or hyænas to be manifestations of their departed members. In fact, almost any animal may be credited with being an incarnation of the dead. But by far the commonest form assumed is that of a snake. Several kinds of such snakes are distinguished by the Zulus. Some of them are appropriated to deceased chiefs; others are incarnations of the common people; and one kind is shared by chieftainesses with commoners (Callaway, *op. cit.* 196). All animals to which these beliefs attach are, of course, treated with respect; offerings are made to them; and they are never killed or injured.

In addition to the animals referred to in the foregoing paragraph, a sacred character attaches to the ox. The chief wealth of these tribes consists of their domestic cattle. The Zulu cattle-pen, or *kraal*, is placed in the centre of the village, and the human habitations are built round it in a circle. The Pondos build their villages in horse-shoe form, with the kraal between the two ends. Farther to the north the Bavenda huts are scattered irregularly in a palisaded enclosure on a hill-side, the kraal occupying one of the lower corners. Each tribe has its own type of village; but in any case, the kraal

Baptism never appears among the conditions of discipleship (*c.g.* Mt $8^{21f.}$, Lk 9^{59-62}); and this silence can hardly be accidental. We find instead, in final interviews with the inner circle, promise of a Spirit-baptism, to which John had referred as distinctive of Messiah (see Lk 24^{49}, Ac $1^{4f.}$ 11^{16}, Jn 20^{22}, cf. Jn 14–16). But nothing is said as to water-baptism as entering into Messianic baptism (the two are contrasted in Ac 1^{5} 11^{16}), which is referred to in terms recalling His own words about the purely spiritual baptism of suffering (Mk $10^{38f.}$||). Christ's direct sanction, then, for water-baptism by His followers after His own earthly life (Jn 3^{5} does not apply here) must depend on our view of Mt 28^{19} [Mk 16^{16} not being an original part of Mark's Gospel].

There is no real ground for doubting the authenticity of Mt 28^{19} as part of Mt.'s Gospel in its final form (*cf.* F. H. Chase in *JThSt* vi. 483 ff.). But this is far from settling its historicity as a word of Jesus Himself. The clause touching baptism as part of the 'discipling' of 'all the nations' might easily arise as merely descriptive and directive of the Church's actual practice in the matter, whenever and wherever this Gospel was composed. For the same reasons it cannot be held to settle the question of the formula originally used (see the careful discussion in Rendtorff, *Die Taufe im Urchristentum*, 1905, p. 39 ff., for both points). Further, had Paul known of such a commission to baptize, he could hardly have said, as he does in 1 Co 1^{17} 'Christ did not commission me to baptize, but to evangelize.' Cf. p. 381[a].

(*c*) *Apostolic baptism.*—This, in its conjunction of water-baptism with the Spirit sensibly outpoured, seems due to the Apostles' own initiative, like other primitive Christian rites, the forms of which were adopted instinctively from their Jewish training. Thus when, on the crucial Day of Pentecost, the Messianic Spirit described in Jl $2^{28ff.}$ was felt to be 'poured out' upon Messianic Israel, in fulfilment of Jesus' promise and in ratification of His Messianic dignity (Ac 2^{33-36}), it was most natural that Peter, appealed to for the terms of participation in the manifest Divine presence, should reply: 'Repent, and let each of you get baptized in the name of Jesus Messiah unto remission of your sins, and ye shall receive the free gift of the Holy Spirit,' and so escape the fate of 'this crooked generation'—revealed as such in its treatment of Messiah. This thought connected itself with the closing words of the passage just cited from Joel: 'And it shall be, that whosoever shall invoke the name of the Lord shall be saved,' *i.e.* from wrath in 'the day of the Lord, the great and notable day.' There was a recognized connexion between solemn invocation of the Lord as Protector and the rite of baptism. Possibly this had existed in John's baptism; it certainly did so in that of proselytes, with which the former was perhaps felt to have affinity—an affinity which affronted Pharisees and scribes (Lk 7^{30}). Thus Maimonides (*Issure Biah*, 13) says: 'Israel was admitted into covenant by three things; namely, by circumcision, baptism, and sacrifice. Circumcision was in Egypt. . . . Baptism was in the wilderness before the giving of the Law, for it is said: "Thou shalt sanctify them . . . and let them wash their garments . . ." So, whenever a Gentile desires to enter the Covenant of Israel and place himself under the wings of the Divine Majesty, and take the yoke of the Law upon him, he must be circumcised and baptized, and bring a sacrifice.' This passage bears directly upon the baptism of Gentile Christians; but it casts light also on the genesis of Jewish Christian baptism; for, apart from circumcision, the cases were largely parallel. Sinful Israelites, too, needed to re-enter the covenant in a deeper sense ('the new covenant' of Jer $31^{31ff.}$, Mk 14^{24}||, 1 Co 11^{25})—on the basis of Messiah's 'sacrifice' for them (Is $53^{4ff.}$, cf. Ac $8^{30ff.}$, He 9–10)—so placing themselves 'under the wings of the Shekinah' for protection (cf. He 6^{1} 'Repentance from dead works and faith fixed upon God,' and Ac 20^{21} 'Repentance towards God and faith towards our Lord Jesus'), and pledging themselves to obedience to the Lord's will, under the yoke of His Law; and in this connexion the 'clean water' of Ezk $36^{25ff.}$ would readily occur to mind (cf. Zec 13^{1}). Here the words of Ananias to Saul are instructive: 'Arise, get thyself baptized (middle voice, as usual), and so wash away from thyself thy sins, invoking his name' (Ac 22^{16}).

How fundamental was this conception of water-baptism as denoting, on the one hand, confession of sins and renunciation of the old, false allegiance they involved, and, on the other, confession of Jesus as Messiah or Lord (as Jahweh was Israel's Lord) and loyalty to the new and true allegiance (cf. Ac 20^{21}), appears from Ro $10^{8ff.}$, in allusion to the act of baptism. In that passage Christians are described as 'those who invoke Jesus as Lord,' Jl 2^{32} being cited in support of the description (cf. Ac $9^{14.\ 21}$). 'With the mouth confession is made unto salvation' (Ro 10^{10}); that is the outward or objective side of the faith in the heart on which 'righteousness' is bestowed, and which expresses itself both in the water of baptism and in the word of the mouth to which Paul here directs attention. The very phrasing of this parallel statement suggests that salvation was at first thought of mainly in its collective aspect (in keeping with OT religion). It was the community's state of true prosperity, in which through confession of faith in baptism—*from* the old sinful state *to* the new, holy, or consecrate one—the justified individual came to participate. Indeed, Judæo-Christians tended always to realize this objective side of admission to the covenant sphere of 'the saints' (cf. Col $1^{13f.}$ 'who rescued us from the sway (ἐξουσία) of darkness, and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love; in whom we have the redemption, the remission of sins') more than the subjective side of the believer's fitness, *qua* believer, for such admission, formally and definitively, in the act and article of baptism, 'sealed' by manifest Holy Spirit power or inspiration. Hence, though Paul's teaching as to baptism starts from the common basis of primitive Judæo-Christian thought, it goes far further in inwardness and psychological analysis; and it is needful to study the two types of representation apart, when we come to consider more closely the significance attaching to the rite and its symbolism.

Baptismal 'laying on of hands' confirms the view of baptism as simply an Apostolic practice derived from Jewish usage. As referred to in He 6^{2}, 'doctrine of baptisms (Christian and Jewish, *e.g.* John's, cf. Jn 3^{25}, Ac 19^{2ff}) and of laying on of hands,' it is a piece of Jewish symbolism for which no word of Christ can be cited, adopted to express union between the new believer and the holy community. As such it constituted the psychological moment when the Messianic gift, or Spirit-baptism, was, as a rule, experienced (Ac 8^{17} 19^{6}, yet see $10^{44ff.}$ for 'the gift' before baptism and apart from laying on of hands). There is no evidence that this act was confined to Apostles (the case in Ac $8^{15ff.}$ is exceptional, as the admission through Apostles of a *new class* of believers, the Samaritans); it might be performed by any member of the Spirit-bearing community. This appears not only from Ac 9^{17} (cf. 8^{38}) but also from 1 Co 1^{14}, where Paul could not so have spoken had he performed this most impressive part of baptism in the case of his Corinthian converts generally. It was an edifying symbol, with no constant or essential relation (save, perhaps, in the minds of the simpler sort) to Spirit-baptism, God's 'seal' of 'ownership' upon His 'heritage' in 'the saints' (Eph $1^{14.\ 18}$, cf. Tit 2^{14}).

2. Significance of baptism.—(*a*) *One, yet various.*—From the first, and in all circles, baptism implied definite identification with Jesus as Messiah or Lord, the head of the Messianic kingdom or the Body, the determinative centre of life for the whole spiritual organism. After 'baptism in the name of the Lord,' a man was regarded as 'in Christ' or 'in the Lord.' Jesus the Christ was Himself the Covenant (Is 49^{8}) for His own, and He,

as Lord, became the very sphere of the religious personality of the baptized, hence fitly called 'Christians.' The metaphor of the marriage bond, used in the OT of the moral union between Jahweh and Israel, is in the NT applied to the relation between Christ and the Church; and baptism was as the marriage rite, openly sealing for the individual this intimate spiritual relation already virtually present in faith, as marriage is in plighted love (Eph 5^{28-32}, cf. 1 Co 6^{17} 'he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit'). The matter was, however, conceived rather differently in different circles. Jewish Christians viewed baptism mainly on its objective or collective side, through the OT associations of covenant and Messiah, as related to the solidarity of Israel, the chosen people; while Paul thought more of the subjective and personal side, bound up with his profound idea of faith as the bond between the believer and his spiritual Head, 'our life' (Col 3^4). But to both baptism was corporate in idea, 'into one body' (1 Co 12^{13}, cf. $10^{1ff.}$), while repentance and faith were presupposed in the baptized, by Jewish Christians no less than by Paul. Still the difference of emphasis remains, and shows itself in the figures used, Paul's being the more experimental or psychological. He alone could pen passages like Ro $6^{5ff.}$, Gal 2^{19-21}, implying such spiritual identity with Christ by faith as resulted in his distinctive metaphor of baptism as formally marking transition from death to new life (Ro $6^{1ff.}$, 2 Co 5^{14-17}, cf. 1 P 3^{21} $4^{1ff.}$ $1^{3.\ 22f.}$ 2^2, which are probably adaptations of Pauline ideas to a less mystical mode of thought).

(*b*) *The psychological side of baptism.* — In all attempts to extract from the NT a connected view of primitive baptismal thought and practice, we must never forget its essentially experimental nature. Really to enter into its meaning, we must enter the very souls of the primitive Christians and share their experiences. In so doing, we get our best aid from analogous fresh Christian beginnings, whether in revivals of religious life, as seen, *e.g.*, in George Fox's *Journal*, or on the more virgin soil of the mission field. While the former analogy warns us against exaggerating the value of the rite, as compared with the Spirit-baptism—the distinctive Christian element (Ac 1^5),—the latter saves us from divorcing the inner reality altogether from the outer symbol. Due proportion between the two is preserved by the vital experiences of mission converts, in relation both to previous state and to alien environment. So seen, baptism is the seal by which life-giving faith (as in Abraham's circumcision, Ro $4^{10f.}$) is ratified, and so confirmed through a definitive *act* in which consciousness of separation *from* the sphere of moral deadness, and *unto* that of full moral life, is enhanced and made the more effective for the subsequent 'walk in newness of life.' It is thus truly an 'efficacious seal' for faith, yet only for faith. It completes and makes more vivid the experience of 'regeneration'—both objective, as between the old social world and the new, and subjective, as between two inner states of the soul. So is it 'regenerative washing and Holy Spirit renewal' (Tit 3^5) in an experimental, a religiously real sense; it is the final stage in experience of 'salvation' (in principle) from self and 'the world' to God and His Kingdom of Christian fellowship.

(*c*) *Symbol and sacrament.* — It is not a bare symbol, as of something already complete, but a sacrament, *i.e.* a symbol conditioning a present deeper and decisive experience of the Divine grace, already embraced by faith. But all is psychologically conditioned, being thereby raised above the level of the magical or *quasi*-physical conception of sacramental grace, native to paganism, but alien to perfected Hebraism—the religion of revelation and faith.

The recent attempt of the strict 'religious-historical' school in Germany and elsewhere to trace the influence of the magical, non-ethical notion of sacraments, prevalent in the 'syncretist' or mixed religious consciousness of the age, upon the NT writers and their circles, is for the most part mistaken. It minimizes the Hebraic basis of primitive Christianity, not only in Palestine, but also outside it. In particular, it fails to read Paul's language sufficiently in relation to his personal experience and essential teaching of faith as the universal coefficient of all spiritual blessing (ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, Ro 1^{17}); while it does not distinguish enough between Paul's own belief and the suggestions of terminology used by him in becoming 'to the Greeks a Greek.' In a word, it confuses Paul the missionary with Paul the theologian. The only excuse for this theory as regards baptism lies in false exegesis of a single passage, 1 Co 15^{29}, where Paul in passing seized upon an *arg. ad hom.* from a usage existing among his Christian converts, without meaning to give it his positive sanction (see 11^{34} for minor abuses as left over against his own coming). On the whole subject see Rendtorff, *Die Taufe im Urchristentum*, pp. 16–37.

3. **The baptismal formula.**—To sum up: as baptism had in Judaism come to mean *purificatory consecration*, with a twofold reference—from an old state and to a new—, so was it in Christianity. It denoted (1) the convert's attitude towards his past sinful state with its 'dead works,' or towards God as sinned against (He 6^1, Ac 20^{21})—repentance; and (2) his new attitude, faith towards God (He 6^1) or Christ (Ac 20^{-1}), as the ground of hope for the future, of which Christ's resurrection was the guarantee or type (cf. 1 P 3^{21}). The practical effect was remission of past sins or justification, the token of which was the gift of the Holy Spirit, in sensible experience, as marking Divine acceptance of the new subject of Messiah's Kingdom.

All this is present in germ in Peter's words (Ac 2^{38-40}), 'Repent, and let each of you get himself baptized in the name of Jesus Christ unto remission of sins,' etc. The phrase 'in the name' now calls for closer consideration. It is clear from contemporary usage (*e.g.* Ac 1^{15}, Rev 3^4 11^{13}) that 'name' was an ancient synonym for 'person.' Parallels, moreover, from the colloquial Greek of the time show that the expression 'in the name' was itself widely used, especially in solemn or formal connexions, and with special reference to proprietorship. Thus a payment is made εἰς ὄνομά τινος, 'into so-and-so's account'; a petition is presented εἰς τὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ὄνομα, 'to the king's person'; and, still more significantly in our connexion, soldiers swear 'in the king's name' (Rendtorff, *op. cit.* p. 9 f.). Such solemn invocation of the king's name in token of personal allegiance answers exactly to one marked aspect of baptism (cf. 2 Ti $2^{3f.}$), which was further developed in Christian thought after the Apostolic Age, in the notion of the *militia Christi* (see Harnack's monograph so entitled). Only, in primitive Christian baptism, 'the name,' possibly as sum of the Divine perfections (cf. Ps 115^1 where 'mercy' and 'truth' are elements of God's name), was invoked, in the first instance, for mercy and protection. In any case the formula 'in the name of,' with or without associations from OT usage (= שֵׁם rather than בְּ, so Dalman), came to have in all Christian circles—though with different shades of thought, as between typical Jews and others—the pregnant sense of identification between the baptized and Him in whose name baptism took place. The one became thereby the personal property of the other, as part of the people of peculiar possession (λαὸς εἰς περιποίησιν with other synonyms in 1 P $2^{9f.}$; περιούσιος, Tit 2^{14}) and the 'bondservant' of the true Lord (see 2 Co 4^5), as all NT writers agree in putting it. That this was the essence of the matter appears from the very title, 'the Lord Jesus,' usual among Gentile converts, just as 'the Christ' or 'Christ Jesus' was in more Jewish circles. 'The Lord Jesus' seems, indeed, to grow out of the central phrase of the baptismal con-

fession, viz., 'Jesus is Lord.' Reading 1 Co 12^{3} 'No man can say Κύριος Ἰησοῦς save in Holy Spirit' (cf. 1^{2b} 6^{11}), in the light of Ro 10^{9} 'If thou confess "the utterance" (ῥῆμα, more fully τὸ ῥ. τῆς πίστεως ὃ κηρύσσομεν) in thy mouth (phrases just quoted from Dt 30^{14}, cf. Eph 5^{26} 'cleansing it with the washing of water ἐν ῥήματι'), to wit, Κύριος Ἰησοῦς (cf. Ph 2^{11}), and believe in thy heart that God raised him from out the dead (in proof of Messianic Lordship, Ro 1^{4}), thou shalt be saved'—one perceives this clearly. 'Christ Jesus,' as distinct from 'Jesus Christ' (=Jesus the Christ), perhaps arose from a similar Jewish Christian form of confession, 'Jesus is Christ (Messiah)'—whence 'one Lord, one faith, one baptism' (Eph 4^{5}). But did the formula used in baptism, εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ (Ac 8^{16} 19^{5}, 1 Co 6^{11}), embrace more than this distinctive element, having, for instance, such explicit reference to the unity of God as must have been the heart of proselyte baptism? This is suggested not only by 1 Co 8^{6} (ἡμῖν εἷς θεός, ὁ πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν, καὶ εἷς Κύριος, Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ, cf. Eph $4^{5f.}$), but also by the constant dual form of Apostolic salutations and benedictions (cf. Rev 14^{1} 'having his name and the name of his Father written on their foreheads'). The use of a Trinitarian formula of any sort is not similarly suggested, in spite of 2 Co 13^{14}. Ac $19^{2f.\,5}$ tells against any view that explicit reference to the Holy Spirit occurred in baptism: so also 1 Co 6^{11}. It is probable, then, that God the Creator was in some way confessed in baptism (cf. Hermas, *Mand.* i. 1: 'First of all yield belief [πίστευσον] that God is one,' etc.); yet exactly in what form remains an open question, one which depends upon another, to which attention has recently been directed (see A. Seeberg, *Der Katechismus der Urchristenheit*, 1903).

4. Procedure in baptism.—Here light is cast forward by Jewish proselyte baptism and backward by sub-Apostolic Christian usage, both of which make it unlikely that baptism was a bare rite of confessing a sacred Name, followed by immersion in water. This were too formal and abstract a conception to suit the intense moral reality of the religious crisis in question. The rite itself had a concrete setting of ethical exhortation and pledging, to which missionary experience of all ages affords parallels. According to this conception, the confession Κύριος Ἰησοῦς was probably the answer of practical allegiance, given by the candidate for baptism, to instruction in the rudiments of Christian piety, on lines best indicated by the 'Two Ways' of Life and Death, preserved in expanded form in the first half of the *Didache*. Thus the confession in baptism ('in the name of the Lord,' *Did.* 9^{5}, and perhaps originally in 7^{1} likewise) pledged the baptized to the Christian obedience (cf. Justin, *Apol.* 6, βιοῦν οὕτως δύνασθαι ὑπισχνῶνται)—a pledge which may have been weekly renewed in early Christian worship, at least in certain regions. For in Bithynia-Pontus, according to Pliny's *Epistle* of c. 112 A.D., the Christians used in their Lord's Day morning meeting to 'pledge themselves with a solemn oath (*sacramento se obstringere*) not to the commission of any crime, but to avoidance of theft, robbery, adultery, breach of faith, denial of deposit when called upon.' This is most suggestive, not only as to the genius of primitive Christian worship as profoundly ethical in tone, but also as to the obligations undertaken in baptism, no doubt in very solemn and explicit fashion, including the witness of those best able to answer (sponsors) for the candidate's good faith and fitness. Thus the *Didache*, after giving the 'Two Ways,' continues: 'All these things first pronounce and so baptize,' a practice probably referred to in Mt 28^{19} 'Disciple all nations, baptizing them into the name . . ., teaching (διδάσκοντες) them to observe all the precepts I have given to you' (ὅσα ἐνετειλάμην=a διδαχὴ Κυρίου consisting of ἐντολαί). There is, moreover, hardly a doubt that the bulk of the 'Two Ways,' as found in the *Didache* and related documents, goes back to the Jewish ethical instruction, on a monotheistic basis, given to proselytes among the Diaspora, under the figure of a Way of Life and a Way of Death set before men, found in the OT, but also among Greek moralists. To this, in its earliest Christian form, reference may be found even in the Pauline letters (*e.g.* 2 Th 2^{15} παραδόσεις ἃς ἐδιδάχθητε, Ro 16^{17} τοὺς . . . παρὰ τὴν διδαχὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐμάθετε ποιοῦντας, where διχοστασίαι and σκάνδαλα are in view, 1 Co 4^{17} τὰς ὁδούς μου τὰς ἐν Χριστῷ [Ἰησοῦ], καθὼς πανταχοῦ ἐν πάσῃ ἐκκλησίᾳ διδάσκω). Most significant is the language of Ro $6^{15ff.}$, where occurs the notion of prior 'bond-service' to sin 'unto death,' followed by obedience to a τύπος διδαχῆς issuing in new 'bond service' to 'righteousness,' or to God and Christ, and the end 'life eternal.' So again 2 Ti 2^{19} 'Let every one that nameth the name of the Lord forthwith abstain from iniquity,' which is the human side of the seal placed on God's firm 'foundation' of piety among men. All this suggests such a formal renunciation of the service of Sin as the Way of Death, and a placing of oneself under obedience to Christ as Lord, as emerges after the sub-Apostolic age in the *abrenuntiatio diaboli* and the ranging of oneself with Christ (Χριστῷ συντάσσομαι; cf. the Two Ways of 'teaching and dominion' in Barn. 18). This is perhaps the key to the description of baptism in 1 P 3^{21}, 'not a putting away of filth in the sphere of the flesh (as by water), but the appeal of a good conscience directed to God,' as pledged to give part and lot in Christ's resurrection to those who yield 'obedience of faith' to God in Him. This appeal may refer specially to the invocation of the Name by the candidate, in answer to the baptizer's interrogation as to his acceptance *ex animo* of the true allegiance; whereupon the latter sealed the reception of the candidate into the holy community by invoking 'the fair name' of the Lord Jesus upon his head (see Ja 2^{7}, cf. Rev 7^{3} 9^{4} 14^{1} 22^{4}).

This human sealing by sacred formula was normally countersigned, as it were, on the Divine part by the Messianic gift of a holy enthusiasm ('Holy Spirit' as a phenomenon in the human spirit), the spirit of adoption, through the deeper and abiding consciousness of which the Christian henceforth utters his soul in the word 'Father' (Ro 8^{15}, the Aramaic exclamation, *Abba*, even passing into use in Gentile circles; cf. *Maranatha*, 'Lord come,' 1 Co 16^{22}, *Did.* 10). Such Divine 'confirming' of the baptized 'into Christ' as a member of His Body, by an 'unction,' a sealing, a giving of the Spirit in 'earnest' (ἀρραβών, 2 Co $1^{21f.}$), took place in experience at baptism. But as it issued from a more secret working of the Spirit, as author of the faith which qualified for baptism, so it gave place to an abiding 'fellowship of the Holy Spirit' (2 Co 13^{14}) in which Christians shared and by which they were 'led' in their 'walk' (Ro $8^{9.\,14.\,16}$, Gal 5^{16-26}). The effect of all this was such a spiritually real, or mystical, union with Christ that in baptism Paul regarded Christ as 'put on' like a robe (Gal 3^{27}), or again as entering the believer as his 'life' (Ro 8^{10}, Gal 2^{20}).

Immersion and affusion.—Immersion seems to have been the practice of the Apostolic age, in continuity with Jewish proselyte baptism; and it is implied in Paul's language, especially in his figure of baptism as spiritual burial and resurrection (Ro 6^{3-5}, Col 2^{12}). But the form was not held

essential; and when conditions presented practical difficulties—whether local, climatic, or due to physical weakness—it came to be modified (cf. *Did.* 7). The most usual form, of which we have evidence from the 2nd cent. onwards, as regards adults, was that of standing semi-immersed in water, up to knees or waist, combined with threefold pouring over the head (trine affusion).

5. **Adult and infant baptism.**—So far we have been dealing with adult baptism only. It alone occupies attention in the NT, as it does mainly in missionary literature to-day. But this by no means exhausts the facts of the case, as we may learn from the analogy of Jewish missions and their baptism of proselytes. The idea that a parent should enter a religion or covenant-relation with God as an individual merely, *i.e.* by himself as distinct from his immediate family, would never occur to the ancients, least of all to a Jew. There were no 'individuals' in our sharp modern sense of the term. All were seen as members of larger units, of which the family was the chief in the time of Christ, when the clan and nation were no longer so overshadowing as in earlier days. The *paterfamilias* included legally and in social ethics the members of his household. Any change in his religious status *ipso facto* affected them. Hence to any one familiar with the modes of antique thought, no proof in any given case is needed that children from their birth were regarded as sharing their parents' religious status, objectively or socially considered: the *onus probandi* falls entirely on those who, under the influence of certain modern modes of thought, would maintain the contrary. Now, not only is there no evidence in the NT read historically, *i.e.* with due regard to the interest of the writer and his original readers in what is said or implied, that children stood to the Christian community in a different relation from that belonging to them in ancient religions generally, and especially in Judaism; but what we know of the Jewish practice touching proselytes—which usually regulated practice among Gentile Christians—makes it most improbable that Christianity here introduced any novel usage. Had such been the case, it must have been emphasized, and could hardly have failed to leave its mark somewhere on the NT. Those who were to be reared 'in the Lord's training and admonition,' and to obey their parents 'in the Lord' (*i.e.* for Christian motives, Eph 6^{1-4}), must have been viewed as already Christians in status or objectively—ranking, according to their stage of development, with 'those of the household of faith' and not with 'those without.' This went back to infancy; for Paul regards the child of faith, even on one side only, as thereby 'holy,' *i.e.* objectively in covenant with God (1 Co 7^{14}). No subjective difference between such children and others is implied any more than in Judaism itself. But as in Judaism the child's objective status was conditioned by circumcision, it is natural to suppose that in the Church it was so by baptism (cf. Col $2^{11ff.}$). The only possible doubt is whether the child was regarded as baptized vicariously in its parent, or whether the rite was administered to it also. For the latter alternative we have not only the analogy of circumcision in Israel, but also proselyte baptism. Thus we read that 'a little proselyte' is baptized without his intelligent consent, on the principle that one may act for another to his advantage, though not to his disadvantage, apart from his knowledge and consent. Where the proselyte father brings the children, their solidarity with him as their head or authority is enough to warrant baptism; where only the mother, baptism is conferred 'on the authority of a *beth din*' or Jewish court of law (see C. Taylor, *Two Lectures on the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*, p. 54 ff.). In either case its effect is only provisional; the child is brought within the covenant so far as social or family life goes, but his personal or subjective relation to the covenant waits on the development of reflective will, just as with the circumcision of a born Jew, who, as a rule, became a 'son of the Law,' and was publicly accepted into the visible membership of the Synagogue, only on his thirteenth birthday. Thereupon a father became free from the burden of his son's sins, *i.e.* full responsibility for his religious condition. Here is the obvious analogue of Christian 'Confirmation,' or joining the Church on personal confession. The regeneration effected by baptism in the case of an adult proselyte was meant in an objective sense, to define his new relations with his holy environment; for 'a newly made proselyte is like a newborn child' (Bab. *Yebamoth* 48*b*). So was it with children both of proselytes and of Christians. Their status of holiness or salvation was objective, and from the nature of the case only objective. It related to the holy or saving environment amid which they stood, first by birth and then by formal covenant seal—ratifying their birthright of good (cf. Ac 2^{39}) so far as human act and recognition could, *i.e.* corporately and as basis for 'training and admonition' in the Lord. The subjective reality waited for the emergence of the subjective conditions, as with child proselytes, who, on coming to years of discretion (like young Jews), were free to repudiate the objective relations in which they found themselves, without thereby being classed and treated as 'apostates.' That is, all was provisional as regards subjective reality. There was no idea of infant baptismal 'regeneration' in the later and still prevalent sense, a confusion of thought responsible for anti-pædobaptist reaction—away from primitive practice, to some extent also away from the primitive attitude to the 'children of the covenant.' Such confusion between the objective and subjective senses of holiness and salvation (united in the case of adult subjects of baptism) arose naturally enough once terms were transferred from Jewish to Gentile soil, with its less ethical and more physical notions of religious grace. Here the influence of the 'Mysteries' played a considerable part in working a change, which was unconscious for the most part in the minds of Gentile converts. See, further, § 2 of next article.

LITERATURE.—For Jewish baptisms, especially that of proselytes: Schurer, *HJP* II. ii. 310 ff. (later German ed. 1898, iii. 129 ff.); see also separate article BAPTISM (Jewish), and *JE*, art. 'Baptism.' For Jewish practice in relation to Christian: C. Taylor, *Two Lectures on the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*, 1886, p. 54 ff.; J. E. Hanauer, *Baptism, Jewish and Christian*, 1906. For the Greek and other ethnic analogies: F. M. Rendtorff, *Die Taufe im Urchristentum*, Leipzig, 1905, where full references will be found to recent German discussions of the *Religionsgeschichtliche* type and a sober criticism of the same (cf. preceding art.). Fuller reff. in Hastings' *DB*, art 'Baptism,' to which may be added E. Vaucher, *Le Baptême*, Paris, 1894. J. V. BARTLET.

BAPTISM (Early Christian).—1. The origin of Christian baptism.—There are three possible views. The traditional belief is that baptism was instituted by Christ in His parting address to His disciples; but in recent times it has been maintained either that baptism was a custom used by the Jews, practised by John the Baptist, and inherited by the early Christians, or that it was adopted by the Christians from the Græco-Roman world. Of these three the choice must probably be made between the first and the second—the third is not by itself adequate to explain the facts, though it is probable that the general ideas of the Græco-Roman world did much to determine and modify the exact form which early Christian baptism took. The evidence consists so largely of the

exegesis and criticism of the same passages that the case for and against each view cannot be put separately. The main Scripture passages concerned are Mt 28[19], Mk 16[16], and Jn 3[5], of which Mt 28[19] is the central piece of evidence for the traditional view of the institution of baptism by Christ. It describes the Risen Lord as saying to His disciples, 'Go ye and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.' If it were undisputed, this would, of course, be decisive, but its trustworthiness is impugned on the grounds of textual criticism, literary criticism, and historical criticism.

(*a*) *Textual criticism.*—In all extant MSS and versions the text is found in the traditional form, πορευθέντες οὖν μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, βαπτίζοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, διδάσκοντες αὐτοὺς τηρεῖν πάντα ὅσα ἐνετειλάμην ὑμῖν, though it must be remembered that the best manuscripts both of the African Old Latin and of the Old Syriac versions are defective at this point. The evidence of Patristic quotations is not so clear. It was formerly thought to be as unanimous as that of the MSS and Versions, but F. C. Conybeare (*ZNTW*, 1901, p. 275 ff.) has shown that this is not true, at least in the case of Eusebius of Cæsarea.

The facts are in summary that Eusebius quotes Mt 28[19] twenty-one times, either omitting everything between ἔθνη and διδάσκοντες or in the form πορευθέντες μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου, διδάσκοντες, κ.τ λ., the latter form being the more frequent. He also quotes it four times in the ordinary text; but it is significant that these four quotations are all in the later writings of Eusebius [once in the Syriac Theophany, iv 8 (Lee's tr p 223), once in *contra Marcellum*, p 3 C, once in the *de Ecclesiastica Theologia*, v. p. 174*a*, and once in the letter of Eusebius to the Church at Cæsarea quoted by Socrates, *HE* i. 8. 38; it should be noted that there is reason to think that the Syriac translator is giving, not the text of Eusebius, but the version to which he was accustomed (cf. Burkitt, *Evangelion da-Mepharreshe*, ii. 171), and that the authorship of the *contra Marcellum* and the *de Ecclesiastica Theologia* is doubtful (cf. Conybeare, *ZNTW*, 1905, p. 250 ff., and a reply by Gerhard Loeschcke, *ib.* 1906, p. 69 ff.)]. At first sight this evidence seems to prove that Eusebius, in his earlier writings at all events, used MSS of the Gospels which omitted the command to baptize in Mt 28[19], but Riggenbach ('Die trinitarische Taufbefehl,' *Beitrage zur Forderung christl. Theol.* 1903) and Chase (*JThSt*, 1905, p 481 ff.) have argued that his method of quotation is due to the influence of the *arcani disciplina*. This suggestion does not seem to bear examination, for the quotations in Eusebius are not found in works intended for unbelievers or for catechumens. The most reasonable view seems to be that Conybeare has shown that the quotations in Eusebius point to a text which omitted the baptismal formula, though it is still open to question whether Eusebius knew also the traditional form. It is naturally important to ask whether there is any other evidence for the 'Eusebian' type of text. Conybeare thinks that he can see traces of it in Justin Martyr, *Dial.* xxxix. 258, and lni. 272, and in Hermas, *Simil.* ix. 17. 4; but none of these passages is convincing, and perhaps more striking than any of them is the passage in which Justin gives a description of the regeneration of Christian converts in connexion with baptism (*Apol* i. 61). Here he quotes a saying of Christ ('Except ye be born again ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven') as a proof of the necessity of regeneration, but falls back upon the use of Isaiah and Apostolic tradition to justify the practice of baptism and the use of the trine formula. This certainly suggests that Justin did not know the traditional text of Mt 28[19].

Whether the 'Eusebian' text, if its existence be granted, has any real claim to be regarded as a serious rival to the traditional form, is a wholly different question. The answer depends on the view taken of the general problem of textual criticism. If a high value be attached to the existing MSS of the NT, the traditional text, though no longer unassailed, must be accepted. But if it be thought (as many critics think) that no MSS represent more than comparatively late recensions of the text, it is necessary to set against the mass of manuscript evidence the influence of baptismal practice. It seems easier to believe that the traditional text was brought about by this influence working on the 'Eusebian' text, than that the latter arose out of the former in spite of it.

(*b*) *Literary criticism.*—The objection raised to Mt 28[19] by literary criticism is that it can be shown by a comparison with the other Gospels to be no part of the earliest tradition. The greater part of Mt 28 rests on a source almost or quite identical with our Mark, which is generally recognized as the oldest and best account of the life of Christ; it is possible, though perhaps improbable, that the writer was acquainted with the lost conclusion of Mark, but the method in which Matthew treats his sources is such that it is impossible to be certain that any one sentence (such as 28[19]) was found in it. The other accounts of the parting words of our Lord differ so much, that it is improbable that they may be traced to any common documentary source. Still it is possible that they represent a common tradition which reported our Lord's parting words, and they may be examined in order to see if they suggest that those parting words contained any command to baptize, whether in the trine name or in the name of the Lord.

The accounts which we possess are Mt 28[18-20], Mk 16[15-18], Lk 24[44-49], and perhaps Jn 20[21-23]. Of these Mk 16[15-18] is generally considered to be a patchwork composition based on Matthew and Luke. If this be so, it affords evidence that at the time when it was written baptism was connected with the preaching of the gospel. It does not support the trine formula, but rather the 'Eusebian' text (cf. ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου in 16[17]), and it is as easy to think that the reference to baptism was derived from contemporary usage as from Mt 28[19]. Lk 24[47] is more closely allied with the Eusebian than with the traditional text, and both this passage and Jn 20[21-23] suggest that the earliest form of tradition as to the Lord's parting words to the disciples said nothing about baptism. It may be argued that the idea of repentance and forgiveness of sin was for early Christianity so closely connected with that of baptism that one implies the other. But this is not the point. It is probable that baptism and the preaching of the gospel went hand in hand from the beginning. The question is whether this was due to their direct association in the 'parting words' of the Lord, or to other causes. The evidence of Mt 28[19], if the traditional text be sound, points to the former alternative, but the Third and Fourth Gospels suggest that the earliest tradition knew only of a command to preach the gospel of repentance for the forgiveness of sins. In the case of the Third Gospel this argument is especially strong. Either Luke knew of the commission to baptize (whether in the trine name or not) and omitted it, or he did not know it. It seems impossible to find any reason why he should have omitted it. At first sight this argument holds equally good for the Fourth Gospel, but it is not nearly so strong, as the writer has not unreasonably been thought to show a tendency to omit the material side of the sacramental rites of early Christianity, because of a tendency to over-emphasize its importance. Hence he omits the institution of the Eucharist. So that his omission to connect baptism with the forgiveness of sins in Jn 20[23] is not so strong an argument as is the similar omission by Luke.

On the whole, then, the evidence of literary criticism is against the historical character of the traditional text of Mt 28[19].

(*c*) *Historical criticism.*—The objection made to the authenticity of Mt 28[19] from the standpoint of historical criticism is that the references to baptism in the Acts point to the earliest form as baptism 'in the name of the Lord.' Thus it is not, like the previous objections, directed against the command as a whole, but against the formula used in it.

Christian baptism, when connected with the mention of a formula, is alluded to four times in the Acts (2[38] 8[16] 10[48] 19[5]), and the formula is never that of Mt 28[19], but is twice ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (2[38] 10[48]) and twice εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ (8[16] 19[5]). That this was the usual formula of Christian baptism is supported by the evidence of the Pauline Epistles, which speak of being baptized only εἰς Χριστόν (Gal 3[27]) or εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν (Ro 6[3]). Is it possible to reconcile these facts with the belief that Christ commanded the disciples to baptize in the trine name? The obvious explanation of the silence of the NT on the trine name, and the use of another formula in Acts and Paul, is that this other formula was the earlier, and that the trine formula is a later addition. It would require very strong arguments to controvert this presumption, and none seems to exist (a statement of curious attempts, ancient and modern, is given in 'Baptism' in Hastings' *DB*, vol. i., by Dr. A. Plummer).

The cumulative evidence of these three lines of criticism is thus distinctly against the view that Mt 28[19] represents the *ipsissima verba* of Christ in

instituting Christian baptism. If this be so, it is plain that neither Mk 16^{16} nor Jn 3^{5} can prove the institution. Mk 16^{16} has been incidentally dealt with; Jn 3^{5} is more difficult. Doubts have been cast on the text of this verse, so far as the reference to water is concerned, but for the present it is enough to point out that, even if the reference to baptism be undisputed, it does not follow that it implies the institution of baptism by Christ; it rather suggests a practice which He found existing and accepted. It is also necessary to remember that in the present position of the criticism of the Fourth Gospel no one can confidently build on historical statements which are found only in that document.

The case against the indirect evidence in support of the traditional view is less convincing. The position in defence of that view is that, even if the evidence in Acts be admitted to prove that baptism in the trine name was not instituted by Christ, it shows that from the beginning it was unquestioningly practised by all Christians, and it is urged that this would not be so if it had not been instituted by Christ. Against this it is alleged that the last conclusion is unwarranted, and that some of the evidence in the Epistles, properly regarded, tells against rather than for the traditional view. The crucial passage is 1 Co $1^{14\text{-}17}$:

εὐχαριστῶ ὅτι οὐδένα ὑμῶν ἐβάπτισα εἰ μὴ Κρίσπον καὶ Γάϊον ἵνα μή τις εἴπῃ ὅτι εἰς τὸ ἐμὸν ὄνομα ἐβαπτίσθητε. ἐβάπτισα δὲ καὶ τὸν Στεφανᾶ οἶκον· λοιπὸν οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τινα ἄλλον ἐβάπτισα. οὐ γὰρ ἀπέστειλέν με Χριστὸς βαπτίζειν ἀλλ' εὐαγγελίζεσθαι.

It is urged with great force that Paul could not possibly have written this if Christ had given the definite command to baptize, related in Mt 28^{19}. It is possible to argue that Paul is speaking of himself, not of the other disciples; but this introduces a limitation into the commission to baptize which cannot be supported, and is also contrary to the constant claim of Paul that he has the Apostolic commission as fully as any of the other apostles.

Thus, so far as the negative side of the argument is concerned, the opponents of the traditional view have decidedly the better case. The weak spot in their position is when they attempt to give any positive explanation of the origin of Christian baptism. The suggestion is that baptism was an already existing custom which the Church took over from the beginning. But if so, from what source did it take it? The answer is that that side of baptism which is concerned with cleansing from sin is found in Græco-Roman and Jewish as well as in Christian baptism, and was a feature of John's baptism, in which also it had an eschatological significance. It was, in fact, part of the common stock of ideas of the 1st century.

Similarly, the use of the 'name' in baptism is only part of the complex of doctrine connected with the use of names as a means of employing the power which belonged to the original owner of the name. This also was common to Jew and Gentile alike. It is therefore plain that, on what may be termed the negative side of baptism, *i.e.* the side which is especially connected with purification, and so far as the use of the 'name' is concerned, there is no reason to quarrel with the view that Christian baptism is an adaptation of customs and ideas which were common to the whole world in the time of Christ. There is nothing in them so strange as to force us to suppose that they were due to the special institution of Christ. The more difficult side of the question is concerned with the relation of baptism to the gift of the Spirit. The baptism of John did not claim to give the Spirit, nor did Jewish baptism. It is also not quite possible to prove the existence of exactly the same thing in the Mysteries, though they did undoubtedly present cognate ideas, especially that of regeneration. This is therefore the strongest point of the argument for either a specifically Christian or a specifically Græco-Roman origin for baptism. The Pauline Epistles are the earliest evidence for a connexion between baptism and the gift of the Spirit. If this view was not known to the Jews, St. Paul must have received it from the original disciples (who again received it from Christ), or have adopted it from the general stock of Græco-Roman ideas. Yet the *prima facie* strength of this argument must be qualified by the following considerations:

(1) In the first place, it may be thought with much reason that Christ spoke of the Spirit, and compared it, as the ground of Christian life, with baptism, which was the ground of discipleship to John the Baptist. If so, a natural confusion of thought would be made stronger by the fact that the beginning of the life in the Spirit did, in fact, often coincide with the water-baptism which marked the initiation of the Christian. That it was coincidence and not identity would not be observed until later, but that it was observed can be seen in the Acts.

(2) In the second place, there seems no reason to doubt the tradition in the Gospels that John the Baptist himself referred to a baptism in the Spirit. Such a reference seems to go back to the use of a passage in the OT which lies behind his baptism, viz. Ezk $36^{25\text{-}27}$. In 36^{25f} we read: 'I will sprinkle clean water upon you and ye shall be clean (baptism). . . . A new heart will I put within you (μετάνοια [?]).' This clearly is the background of John's preaching; but it leads up to the next verse: 'And I will put my spirit within you.' It does not therefore seem too much to say that the teaching by John the Baptist of a water-baptism of repentance for the remission of sins, to the mind of any Jew familiar with the OT, seemed to fulfil this passage, and so inevitably suggested that the gift of the Spirit, which fulfilled the second half and was found in the Christian Church, was to be looked for also in baptism.

(3) Moreover, our real knowledge of popular Jewish theology and religious observances in the time of Christ is small. It is true that the official Rabbinical religion had no sacramental washings or baptisms, and probably did not give any such interpretation to the baptism of proselytes; but the Essenes probably went further in this direction, attaching a sacramental meaning to their baptisms; and it is possible that this view was common among the people outside the official classes. If so, this may have been an important factor in the genesis of Christian baptism (see Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums*, pp. 230 and 529 ff.).

These arguments cannot be said to prove that Christ did not institute baptism, but they may fairly be said to show that the existence of Christian baptism is most intelligible on the supposition that it was a Jewish custom which the Christians took over, modifying it by the natural adoption of the 'name,' and by an equally natural connexion with the gift of the Spirit. Moreover, there is certainly no satisfactory positive evidence that Christ did institute baptism. It is therefore more probable that the origin of Christian baptism is the adoption and adaptation of a Jewish custom than that it was directly and specially instituted by Christ. This is also far more probable than that it was first borrowed by St. Paul from the Græco-Roman world. At the same time, baptism was certainly one of the elements in Christianity which was most likely to obtain a favourable reception from the Roman world, and this may have led to the emphasis which was laid upon it, and to the rapid development of the doctrine connected with it.

2. Baptism in the NT. — i. *DOCTRINE OF BAPTISM.* — (1) IN THE PAULINE EPISTLES. — There are four main ways in which baptism is regarded in the Pauline Epistles.

(*a*) *Union with Christ.*—In Ro $6^{3ff.}$ the immersion in and the rising out of the water are regarded as a union with the death and resurrection of Christ. 'Are ye ignorant that all we who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death? We were buried with him through baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life.' Baptism is thus the beginning of a new life of union with the risen Christ. The same idea is found in Gal 3^{27} 'As many of you as were baptized into Christ did put on Christ,' and in Col 2^{12} '. . . buried with him

in baptism, wherein ye were also raised with him . . .' In the light of these passages it is difficult to doubt that St. Paul regarded baptism as more than symbolical; it was an act which really brought about the result ascribed to it, and not merely an acted description of that result, which was actually caused by something else.

(*b*) *The gift of the Spirit.*—In 1 Co 12[12] the baptized are regarded as members of Christ's body, inspired by the same Divine spirit: 'For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of the body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. For in one Spirit were we all baptized into one body . . .' At first sight this seems an idea which is difficult to reconcile with the former; but the difference is probably quite superficial. To St. Paul the Christ of spiritual experience and the Spirit were almost if not quite identical. This may be seen in Ro 8[9-17] and 2 Co 3[17].

(*c*) *Cleansing from sin.*—In 1 Co 6[11], where baptism is not mentioned but certainly implied, it is represented as a cleansing effected through the name of the Lord and through the Divine spirit: 'Ye were washed, ye were sanctified, ye were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God.' This view is complementary to the others, and describes some of the results which follow from them. The importance of this passage is that it explains that baptism can produce these effects because it works 'in the name,' and so links up baptism with the view, prevalent at the time in almost every circle, that the pronunciation of the name of any one could, if properly used, enable the user to enjoy the benefit of the attributes attached to the original owner of the name (see also art. NAME).

Thus the Pauline doctrine of baptism is that on the positive side it gives the Christian union with Christ, which may also be described as inspiration with the Holy Spirit, while on the negative side it cleanses from sin. This it accomplishes by the power of the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and by the sacramental effect of the water, according to the well-known idea that results could be reached in the unseen spiritual world by the performance of analogous acts in the visible material world. Baptism is regarded as really giving these results, and not merely as a sign that they have been, or can be, obtained in some other way.

(*d*) *Vicarious baptism.*—It would also seem from 1 Co 15[29] that St. Paul recognized the practice of vicarious baptism for the dead. It is impossible that 'Else what shall they do who are baptized for the dead? If the dead are not raised at all, why then are they baptized for them?' can refer to anything except vicarious baptism.

(2) IN THE PAULINE EPISTLES OF DOUBTFUL AUTHENTICITY.—Under this heading it is perhaps wisest to deal with the evidence of Eph 5[26f.], Tit 3[5-7].

In Ephesians the cleansing efficacy of the water is emphasized, and is connected with the 'word' ('having cleansed it by the washing of water with the word') This emphasis is somewhat stronger than anything in the unquestioned Epistles, but it is practically implied in 1 Co 6[11], in which passage also the 'name' may correspond to the 'word' (ῥῆμα) of Ephesians In Titus the union with Christ's risen life is regarded as a new birth; 'according to his mercy he saved us through the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Spirit.' The phrase 'regeneration' is strange to the Pauline vocabulary, but the idea which it conveys is involved in Ro 8[14] 'For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God,' when taken in connexion with the view that the Spirit was given in baptism (cf. also Gal 3[26f], where the idea of sonship to God and baptism are closely connected).

(3) IN 1 PETER.—The only place in the Catholic Epistles which explicitly speaks of baptism is 1 P 3[21] '. . . which (*i.e.* water) in the antitype doth now save you, namely baptism, not a putting away of the filth of the flesh, but a "question" of a good conscience toward God. . . .' Here the doctrine of the 'real' efficacy of baptism is clearly asserted; but there is a protest against too material an emphasis on the water, to counteract which mention is made of a συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα. It is not quite certain what this phrase means. It is improbable that it refers to prayer to God, for ἐπερωτῶ is never used in this sense, or of inquiry after God, for this would require ἐπερώτησις, and the best interpretation seems to be that it is a reference to the question directed to a convert at his baptism (see C. Bigg, '1 Peter' in *The Intern. Crit. Comment.* p. 165). In this 'a good conscience' probably defines the content of the demand made on the candidate—it was of a moral rather than a doctrinal nature. The writer also goes on to explain that the water of baptism receives this power 'through the resurrection of Jesus Christ, who is on the right hand of God, having gone into heaven, angels and authorities and powers being made subject unto him.' This seems to be an explanation why the name of the Lord was so potent in baptism: He had triumphed over death, and regained life, and those who used His name were able to use His power to do the same. It is true that no actual statement is made in 1 Peter that baptism was in the name of the Lord, but no one is likely to dispute that this was the case.

(4) IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.—Christian baptism is mentioned only in Mt 28[19] and Mk 16[16]. The former passage ('Go ye into all the world and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit') claims the direct institution of baptism by Christ, but its authenticity is open to doubt (see § 1).

Here it is only necessary to ask, What is the meaning of the formula translated 'in the name of'? The question is whether εἰς τὸ ὄνομα means the same as ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι. The probability seems to be that the two phrases are, in the late Greek of the NT, identical. It is now common knowledge that εἰς and ἐν were interchangeable in late Greek, and the Latin and Syriac translators of Mt 28[19] clearly took this view, which is convincingly defended by J. Armitage Robinson in *JThSt* vii. (Jan. 1906) in answer to an article by F. H. Chase in *JThSt* vi. (July 1905). The meaning of the writer of the Gospel (or of the redactor who added the clause relating to baptism) was that Christians had the power of baptizing in the name communicated to them by the Lord who had gained the power (ἐξουσία) over everything in heaven and earth. The idea is parallel with that in 1 P 3[21f].

In Mk 16[16] ('He that believes and is baptized shall be saved') baptism is regarded as a necessary means to salvation, but no further details are given.

(5) IN THE ACTS.—The references to baptism in the Acts are doctrinally important in connexion with the formula used, and with the relation between baptism and the gift of the Spirit. The former point is sufficiently discussed in § 1. The latter may best be formulated thus: (*a*) There is in the Acts a series of passages in which baptism seems to be clearly identified with the gift of the Spirit; (*b*) there is a second series in which it is clearly distinguished from this gift; and (*c*) there is a third series which either does not allude to the point, or may be interpreted equally well on either hypothesis. This third series can, of course, be disregarded (such passages are Ac 8[36-39] 16[15] 16[33] 18[8] 22[16]); but an attempt must be made either to interpret the two others in such a way as to remove the apparent contradiction, or to see in the difference between them an indication of different sources.

(*a*) The passages which seem to identify baptism with the gift of the Spirit are Ac 1[5] 2[38] 11[16] and 19[2-6]. In 1[5] ('John indeed baptized with water; but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit not many days hence') a contrast is apparently drawn between John's baptism and Christian baptism, the latter being regarded as baptism with the Holy Spirit; but as the narrative goes on to describe the fulfilment of this promise on the day of Pentecost, in which there is no suggestion of baptism

in the ordinary literal sense, it is probable that the word 'baptize' in 1^5 is used metaphorically, and not with reference to ordinary Christian baptism. This interpretation is supported by Ac 11^{16}, where the words of 1^5 are quoted by St. Peter in connexion with the episode of Cornelius, for here the gift of the Spirit is conferred without baptism in water, and baptism in water is given to those who have already received the Spirit. In Ac 2^{38} St. Peter says: 'Repent and be baptized . . . and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit.' This certainly seems to identify the gift of the Spirit with baptism, but it is not decisive. The context is that the promise made in Ac 1^5 has just been fulfilled, and St. Peter says, 'Be baptized and you also shall receive the same gift.' The *prima facie* suggestion that this means: 'You shall receive it through baptism,' is discounted by the fact that this was not the way in which the disciples had received it, and it is significant that we are not told that those who were baptized did receive the Spirit, but merely that they were added to the Church. Thus it is possible that the meaning of the passage really is that baptism was the means of entry into the Church, to the members of which the Spirit would ultimately be given. Similarly ambiguous is Ac $19^{2\,6}$. Here we have the case of certain Ephesians who had become Christians, but had been baptized not with Christian baptism, but with the baptism of John. St. Paul said to them: 'Did ye receive the Holy Spirit when ye believed? And they said unto him, Nay, we did not so much as hear whether the Holy Spirit was given. And he said, Into what then were ye baptized? And they said, Into John's baptism. And Paul said, John baptized with the baptism of repentance, saying unto the people that they should believe on him which should come after him, that is, on Jesus. And when they heard this, they were baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus. And when Paul had laid his hands upon them, the Holy Spirit came on them.' The *prima facie* interpretation certainly connects the gift of the Spirit with baptism; not so much because the Spirit was actually given, as because of St. Paul's second question. It is, however, possible that his surprised question was due, not to the non-reception of the Spirit, but to their ignorance; his first question supports this view, for it seems to contemplate the possibility of Christian belief and baptism without the gift of the Spirit. If so, the writer may have intended to connect the gift of the Spirit with the laying on of hands rather than with baptism. Thus in each case the *prima facie* connexion of baptism with the gift of the Spirit is indecisive: a different interpretation is possible, and which of the two should be followed must depend on the evidence of the other series of passages.

(*b*) The passages which distinguish baptism from the gift of the Spirit are Ac $8^{12f.}$ and $10^{47f.}$ The former is the incident of the first Samaritan converts. When Peter and John came to Samaria, they prayed for the converts 'that they might receive the Holy Spirit, for as yet he was fallen upon none of them, only they had been baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus. Then laid they their hands on them, and they received the Holy Spirit.' Here it is plain that the gift of the Spirit was separate from baptism, and there is no suggestion that the baptism was imperfect; the 'name of the Lord Jesus' is the usual formula in Acts for Christian baptism. In $10^{47f.}$ the matter is less simple. The narrative relates that, while St. Peter was speaking, the Holy Spirit fell on Cornelius and his company. 'Then answered Peter, Can any man forbid water that these should not be baptized, which have received the Holy Ghost as well as we? And he commanded them to be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ.' Obviously in this case the gift of the Spirit was not dependent on baptism, but it appears true that the case of Cornelius was regarded as an exception. The general rule was that baptism came first, and the gift of the Spirit afterwards. The implication is that the two were separate even in normal cases, but this is not definitely stated.

If an attempt be made to bring these data together, and so establish the doctrine of baptism held by the writer of the Acts, the starting-point must be Ac $8^{12f.}$ as the most definite of all the passages. It shows that (*a*) baptism was the regular and general initiation to membership in the Church; (*b*) the Spirit was not conferred in baptism, but given after it, and was specially connected with the laying on of hands by the Apostles. This explains Ac $19^{2ff.}$, in which the situation partly resembles that in Ac $8^{12ff.}$. The Ephesians, like the Samaritans, were, at least in some sense, Christians, but had not received the Spirit. The difference between the two incidents is that the Ephesians, unlike the Samaritans, had received imperfect baptism. Therefore St. Paul did not merely 'lay hands' on the Ephesians, as the Apostles did on the Samaritans, but first had them baptized. The gift of the Spirit was, however, due to the laying on of hands, and not to the baptism. In this way the two classes of passages can be so interpreted that they all fall into place in one system of doctrine, and there is no need to postulate a variety of sources in the Acts with different views on baptism.

A difficulty, however, arises out of the relation of Acts to the Pauline Epistles. Which is the truer or earlier presentment of early Christian thought—that which closely connects baptism and the gift of the Spirit, as the Epistles do, or that which separates them, as the Acts does? The followers of van Manen would probably say that Acts represents an earlier stratum of thought, that early Christian baptism was like John's—only for the remission of sin—and that the idea of the gift of the Spirit in this connexion was a late ecclesiastical figment due to external influences, which has left traces in the Epistles. But this is probably an inadequate view. The fact is that the Acts distinguishes where the Epistles do not, and so is probably the later document. St. Paul simply connects baptism with the gift of the Spirit; he makes no fine distinctions. St. Luke, while constantly bringing the two together, is apparently anxious to maintain that the gift of the Spirit is not the direct result of baptism, but is more closely bound up with the laying on of hands by the Apostles.

(6) In the Epistle to the Hebrews.—In He 6^{4-6} and in $10^{22.\,23}$ the references to baptism are probable but not explicit. In the latter passage the writer says:

'Let us draw near with a true heart in fulness of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, and our body washed with pure water: let us hold fast the confession of our hope that it waver not.'

It is almost certain that this is an indication that the writer regarded baptism as the necessary beginning of Christian life; but, like the writer of 1 Peter, he connects the spiritual cleansing with a good conscience (though he expresses it negatively and 1 Peter positively); and in the last sentence it is probably possible to see a reference to the baptismal profession of faith represented in 1 Peter by ἐπερώτημα. In the former passage he says:

'For as touching those who were once enlightened and tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the age to come, and fell away, it is impossible to renew them again unto repentance.'

Here the reference to baptism is rendered probable by the fact that φωτισμός afterwards became a technical term for baptism. It is, however, necessary to point out one qualification to the view that 'enlightenment' means baptism.

In the immediately preceding verses the writer says: 'Therefore let us cease to speak of the first principles of Christ, and press on unto perfection; not laying again a foundation of repentance from dead works and of faith towards God, of the teaching (*v.l.* namely, the teaching) of baptisms and laying on of hands, and of resurrection from the dead, and eternal judgment' (He $6^{1.\,2}$). Here he regards baptism as one of the foundations of Christian life, but he joins to it the laying on of hands. Now it seems probable that St. Luke connected the gift of the Spirit with the laying on of hands rather than with baptism itself (see § 2, i. (5)), whereas St. Paul connected it with the latter. Therefore it is impossible to say precisely what the writer of Hebrews regarded as the effect of baptism, and what as the effect of the laying on of hands. It is possible that enlightenment and tasting of the heavenly gift may be intended to be especially connected with baptism, and the gift of the Spirit with the laying on of hands; but in the absence of further evidence certainty is impossible, and perhaps the writer was not concerned with this question. His interest lay rather in the question of sin after baptism; from passages such as $2^{1\,4}$ $3^{12-4\,11}$ 6^{4-12} and $10^{19\,31}$, it is clear that he regarded a relapse into sin as unforgivable, and it is probable that 6^6 ought to be regarded as implying the existence of a school of thought which maintained the possibility of a second baptism in case of relapse.

(7) In the Johannine writings.—These books give little information on the subject of baptism. In Jn 3^{22} it is stated that Jesus baptized, but the text is open to suspicion in view of Jn 4^2 which denies that He did so: 'Jesus himself used not to baptize, but his disciples.' In any case there is no reference to the doctrine of baptism. In Jn 3^5 in the received text there is a clear reference to baptism, which is described as regeneration by

water and the Spirit. It may, however, fairly be questioned whether the words 'water and' are really original in the text. They are without connexion with the context, and seem to have been unknown to Justin Martyr. If they be omitted, the reference to baptism is only indirect; in view of such passages as Tit 3^{5-7} it can scarcely be doubted that there is some connexion, but it would seem to be rather of the nature of a significant silence as to the material element, which amounts to a protest against the emphasis laid on it in other circles. Even if the words be retained, it remains true that the emphasis in the passage is entirely on the Spirit and not the water. This characteristic treatment of baptism is exactly parallel with that of the Eucharist, the institution of which is not mentioned, but the doctrine of which is fully expounded on the spiritual side.

In the Johannine Epistles there is no definite allusion to baptism; there are many references to the gift of the Holy Spirit, but there is no proof that the writer connected it with baptism, though in the light of the information of other documents it is extremely probable that this is the meaning in 1 Jn $2^{20\ 27}$ of the reference to an 'anointing from above'—it is the gift of the Spirit bestowed in (or at least connected with) baptism. Perhaps more important, though even less explicit, is 5^{16f} 'If any man see his brother sinning a sin not unto death, he shall ask, and God will give him life for them that sin not unto death. There is sin unto death: not concerning this do I say that he should make request. All unrighteousness is sin, and there is sin not unto death.' This passage is intelligible only in light of the discussion as to the possibility of forgiveness for sin after baptism. The writer tries to solve the difficulty by introducing a distinction between mortal and venial sin.

Summary of doctrine of baptism in NT.—As a summary of these results from a study of the NT, certain lines of development of doctrine which begin to manifest themselves may be pointed out. The earliest writings, the Pauline Epistles, regard baptism as a cleansing from sin and as the means whereby Christians join the life of Christ—which in Pauline thought is almost (and probably quite) identical with the gift of the Spirit. There is, however, no attempt to explain its working except that it was 'in the name of,' and so endued with the power of, the Lord Jesus Christ, who had been raised from the dead. In later documents the development of more than one line of thought may be traced. In the Pauline Epistles of doubtful authenticity emphasis is laid on the cleansing from sin given by the water of baptism, and the idea (already implied by the other Epistles) of regeneration is formulated. This development was rather in the direction of a magical conception of baptism. Against this we find traces of protest. (*a*) The writer of the Acts would seem to represent a school of thought which associated the gift of the Spirit with the laying on of the hands of the Apostles rather than with baptism itself. (*b*) In 1 Peter and perhaps in Hebrews emphasis is laid on a confession of faith by the baptized person, probably of a moral rather than a theological nature. It is possible that this is a protest against a magical view of 'the name' in baptism. (*c*) The writer of the Fourth Gospel is anxious to emphasize the importance of the gift of the Spirit rather than that of the water; obviously this is closely related to the line of thought represented by Acts; and if 1 Peter represents a protest against a magical view of 'the name,' these documents represent a protest against a magical view of the water. (*d*) A different line of development is testified to by the Epistle to the Hebrews and 1 John. As soon as baptism was regarded as the forgiveness of sin,—that is, from the beginning,—the question of sin after baptism must have arisen. Hebrews bears witness to, and protests against, a tendency to allow a repetition of baptism. The writer regards sin after baptism as beyond forgiveness. The writer of 1 John, on the other hand, bears witness to the fact that this teaching was already found to be too severe, and begins the distinction, so important for the later Church, between mortal and venial sin.

ii. *METHOD OF BAPTISM.*—On this point we have hardly any information in the NT. The language of Ro $6^{1ff.}$ is thought to point to immersion, and it is said that this is confirmed by the descriptions in the Gospels of the baptism of Christ; but these arguments cannot be pressed. It is still less safe to argue from the etymological meaning of *βαπτίζω* as a frequentative of *βάπτω*; for the meaning of words depends ultimately on use, not on etymology, and *βαπτίζω* means by use 'to wash ceremonially' (cf. Lk 11^{38} 'he wondered that he had not washed [*ἐβαπτίσθη*] before dinner'). Here partial ablution is certainly intended; and it must remain doubtful whether immersion was ever actually practised, though St. Paul's language certainly points to the view that it was regarded as an ideal. The formula used was 'in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ' or some synonymous phrase; there is no evidence for the use of the trine name. There was no doubt from the beginning a confession of faith by the convert, but the only probable reference to this as a formal part of the act of baptism is 1 P 3^{21} [the text of Ac 8^{37} in the AV is certainly late].

There is no indication of the baptism of children, and no suggestion that baptizing was the privilege of a class; but it would seem from 1 Co 1 that St. Paul delegated the office of baptizing to some one else, and Blass argues that this is implied by Ac 10^{48} 'And he (St. Peter) commanded them to be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ.' The suggestion is that he did not actually baptize them himself.

3. Baptism in the 1st and 2nd centuries.—i. *IN ORTHODOX CIRCLES.*—(1) BARNABAS.—The writer of Barnabas is interested in baptism only so far as it concerns his main thesis that the promises in the OT refer to the Christians and not to the Jews. In ch. 11 he illustrates this thesis from baptism. He argues that Is $16^{1ff.}$ $45^{2ff.}$ $33^{16ff.}$, Ps 1^{3-6} are all prophecies which find a fulfilment in Christian baptism. It is only incidentally in the last paragraph (§ 11) that he gives any description of baptism: *καταβαίνομεν εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ γέμοντες ἁμαρτιῶν καὶ ῥύπου, καὶ ἀναβαίνομεν καρποφοροῦντες ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τὸν φόβον καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα εἰς τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐν τῷ πνεύματι ἔχοντες.* This seems to imply immersion, but otherwise throws no light on baptismal practice. Doctrinally it shows that the writer regarded baptism as a 'real' cleansing from sin *opere operato*. It is possible that he regarded it as conferring the gift of the Spirit, and that this is the meaning of the phrase *ἐν τῷ πνεύματι*; but obviously this exegesis is open to doubt. Finally, the phrase *εἰς τὸν Ἰησοῦν* may be a reference to the baptismal formula, but the text is uncertain.

(2) I CLEMENT.—There is no reference to baptism in this document.

(3) IGNATIUS.—Nothing in the genuine epistles of Ignatius throws any light on the doctrine of baptism, but in accordance with his general emphasis on episcopal supremacy he insists that baptism may not be performed 'without the bishop'—*οὐκ ἐξόν ἐστιν χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπισκόπου . . . βαπτίζειν* (*Smyrn.* viii. 2)—which probably means without the permission of, rather than without the presence of, the bishop.

(4) HERMAS.—The *Shepherd* of Hermas gives little information as to the practice of baptism, but manifests a considerable interest in the doctrine. The passages which are important are *Vis.* iii. 3, iii. 7, *Mand.* iv. 3, *Sim.* ix. 16. The foundation, he says, is a belief in the necessity and efficacy of baptism. In *Vis.* iii. 2 the Church is represented as a tower built over water, and in iii. 3 it is explained that this is because *ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν*

διὰ ὕδατος ἐσώθη καὶ σωθήσεται. This must mean that baptism is the foundation of the Christian life, and the next sentence may be a reference to the baptismal formula: τεθεμελίωται δὲ ὁ πύργος τῷ ῥήματι τοῦ παντοκράτορος καὶ ἐνδόξου ὀνόματος. This is rendered probable by the fact that in *Sim.* ix. the condition of entry is described as the 'name of the Son of God.' It is also clear that baptism was regarded as really effecting an essential change in Christians; and from the emphasis which is laid upon it, it would seem that this was regarded as primarily due to 'the name'; but the water is also mentioned. The most important passage is *Sim.* ix. 16. 3 f.:

πρὶν γάρ, φησί, φορέσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ νεκρός ἐστιν· ὅταν δὲ λάβῃ τὴν σφραγῖδα, ἀποτίθεται τὴν νέκρωσιν καὶ ἀναλαμβάνει τὴν ζωήν. ἡ σφραγὶς οὖν τὸ ὕδωρ ἐστίν· εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ οὖν καταβαίνουσι νεκροὶ καὶ ἀναβαίνουσι ζῶντες.

But this strongly defined doctrine naturally called for development on various points.

(*a*) There was the danger of a purely magical and unethical view of baptism. To counteract this, in *Sim.* ix. great emphasis is laid on the insufficiency of 'the name' if it be not accompanied by the Christian virtues. These are represented as twelve virgins, and the explanation given of them in *Sim.* ix. 13. 2 is that they are ἅγια πνεύματα. Without being endued with them no one can enter the kingdom of God—ἐὰν γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα μόνον λάβῃς, τὸ δὲ ἔνδυμα παρὰ τούτων μὴ λάβῃς, οὐδὲν ὠφελήσῃ· αὗται γὰρ αἱ παρθένοι δυνάμεις εἰσὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ. ἐὰν τὸ ὄνομα φορῇς, τὴν δὲ δυναμιν μὴ φορῇς αὐτοῦ, εἰς μάτην ἔσῃ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ φορῶν.

(*b*) A natural result of the emphasis laid on the insufficiency of baptism without virtue was a proportionately increased emphasis on the question as to sin after baptism which (cf. § 2 1 (6)) seems to be discussed in Hebrews and to be implied in 1 John. The distinction between various sins which appears in 1 John is unknown, and the position adopted in Hebrews, though substantially confirmed, is in some degree relaxed. This question is dealt with in *Mand* iv. 3. Hermas asks the Shepherd ἤκουσα, φημί, κύριε, παρά τινων διδασκάλων ὅτι ἑτέρα μετάνοια οὐκ ἐστιν εἰ μὴ ἐκείνη, ὅτε εἰς ὕδωρ κατέβημεν καὶ ἐλάβομεν ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν τῶν προτέρων (considering that Hermas is a Roman document, and that the earliest witness to Hebrews is the earlier Roman document I Clement, it is not impossible that this is a reference to Hebrews 6[4-6]) and the answer is καλῶς ἤκουσας, οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ἔδει γὰρ τὸν εἰληφότα ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν μηκέτι ἁμαρτάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἁγνείᾳ κατοικεῖν. This is simply a re-affirmation of the doctrine of Hebrews, but a relaxation is then introduced. God has instituted μετάνοιαν, and has appointed the Shepherd as the angel to watch over it; but this may be used only once—μετὰ τὴν κλῆσιν ἐκείνην τὴν μεγάλην καὶ σεμνὴν ἐάν τις ἐκπειρασθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου ἁμάρτῃ μίαν μετάνοιαν ἔχει. One of the main objects of the Shepherd seems to have been the emphasizing of μετάνοια, which is clearly (cf. esp. the *Similitudes*) regarded in a concrete way which approached the later ecclesiastical use, and is half-way to meaning 'penance.'

(*c*) Another result in practice of the assertion of the high standard of Christian life, and the danger of relapse after baptism, was a tendency to postpone baptism. Against this Hermas protests in *Vis.* iii. 7, where those who shrink from baptism for this reason are compared with the stones which he saw in *Vis.* iii, 2: πίπτοντας ἐγγὺς ὑδάτων καὶ μὴ δυναμένους κυλισθῆναι καὶ ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ.

(*d*) In the sphere of doctrine a natural consequence of the stress laid on the necessity of baptism was inquiry into the ultimate fate of the righteous unbaptized dead. Hermas settled this inquiry by ascribing to the apostles the function of baptizing in Hades (cf. esp. *Sim.* ix. 16. 5 and 6: οἱ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ διδάσκαλοι οἱ κηρύξαντες τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, κοιμηθέντες ἐν δυνάμει καὶ πίστει τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκήρυξαν καὶ τοῖς προκεκοιμημένοις, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔδωκαν αὐτοῖς τὴν σφραγῖδα τοῦ κηρύγματος. . . . ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ γὰρ ἐκοιμήθησαν καὶ ἐν μεγάλῃ ἁγνείᾳ· μόνον δὲ τὴν σφραγῖδα ταυτην οὐκ εἶχον).

(5) THE DIDACHE.—In this document there is no information as to the doctrine of baptism, but much concerning the practice, and it is unfortunate that there is no possibility of fixing either its date or provenance with certainty. The passage which actually deals with baptism is ch. vii., and runs thus:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ βαπτίσματος, οὕτω βαπτίσατε· ταῦτα πάντα προειπόντες βαπτίσατε εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐν ὕδατι ζῶντι. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς ὕδωρ ζῶν, εἰς ἄλλο ὕδωρ βάπτισον· εἰ δ' οὐ δύνασαι ἐν ψυχρῷ, ἐν θερμῷ. ἐὰν δὲ ἀμφότερα μὴ ἔχῃς, ἔχεον εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν τρὶς ὕδωρ εἰς ὄνομα πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος. πρὸ δὲ τοῦ βαπτίσματος προνηστευσατω ὁ βαπτίζων καὶ ὁ βαπτιζόμενος καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι δύνανται· κελεύεις δὲ νηστεῦσαι τὸν βαπτιζόμενον πρὸ μιᾶς ἢ δύο.

The main points in the ceremony thus described seem to be these:

(*a*) The recitation of the previous part of the *Didache* (the 'Two Ways'). This seems to imply a developed system of preparation for candidates for baptism, of a moral rather than a theological kind.

(*b*) Baptism in the trine name. But it must be noted that in the following Eucharistic section mention is made of those who are baptized 'into the name of the Lord.'

(*c*) Immersion, by preference in running (ζῶν) water, is the rule, but affusion is recognized as legitimate.

(*d*) Previous to the ceremony, the baptizer, the baptizand, and any other who will are to fast.

It is probable that this document belongs to the 2nd cent., perhaps to the earlier half; but the evidence is not conclusive, and one must not regard arguments based on the 'Two Ways' as valid for the dating of the *Didache* as a whole.

(6) II CLEMENT.—In II Clement vi. 9, vii. 6, and viii. 5–6 there are three indirect references to baptism, which is spoken of as the seal (σφραγίς). They are all concerned with emphasizing the necessity of sinless life after baptism, and so form one of the links between this document and Hermas; but they are only homiletic, and do not throw any light on the question of repentance after baptism.

The use of σφραγίς, which afterwards became very common, has sometimes been traced to the influence of the Mysteries; but this is probably not the case—at least directly. More than any other expression it emphasizes the eschatological hope which was never far from the early Christian mind: those who had the correct seal would pass into the Messianic Kingdom at the day of judgment. It thus helped to unite the two—logically somewhat inconsistent—ideas of sacramental and eschatological salvation. Passages of importance, besides those in II Clem., are Hermas, *Sim.* viii. 6, ix. 16; Clem. Al. *Quis Deus salv.* 39. 42, *Strom.* ii. 3, *Exc. Th.* 83. 86, *Ecl. Proph.* 25: and in later writers, *Clem. Hom.* xvi. 19; *Acta Theclæ*, 25; *Const. Apost.* 2 14, 30, 3. 16; Hippol *de Antichristo*, 6. 59; Ps.-Hippol. *de Consumm.* 42; *Acta Philippi*, 28; Eus. *HE* 6. 5, 6, *Vit. Const.* 4. 62. 1. See also Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 295 ff.; Anrich, *Das antike Mysterienwesen*, p. 120 f.; and Gebhardt and Harnack, *Patres Apost.*, note on II Clem. vi. 6.

(7) JUSTIN MARTYR.—In his first *Apology* (*c.* 150) Justin gives (ch. 61 ff.) a description of Christian baptism. It may be best treated as falling under three heads: (*a*) a description of the rite, (*b*) an exposition of the doctrine concerning it, and (*c*) a justification of this doctrine.

(*a*) *Description of the rite.*—This is given in ch. 61. 65:

Ὅσοι ἂν πεισθῶσι καὶ πιστεύωσιν ἀληθῆ ταῦτα τὰ ὑφ' ἡμῶν διδασκόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα εἶναι, καὶ βιοῦν οὕτως δύνασθαι ὑπισχνῶνται, εὔχεσθαί τε καὶ αἰτεῖν νηστεύοντες παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ προημαρτημένων ἄφεσιν διδάσκονται, ἡμῶν συνευχομένων καὶ συννηστευόντων αὐτοῖς. ἔπειτα ἄγονται ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἔνθα ὕδωρ ἐστί, καὶ τρόπον ἀναγεννήσεως, ὃν καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ ἀναγεννήθημεν, ἀναγεννῶνται. ἐπ' ὀνόματος γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου τὸ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τότε λουτρὸν ποιοῦνται . . . (c. 65) ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ τὸ οὕτως λοῦσαι τὸν πεπεισμένον καὶ συγκατατεθειμένον ἐπὶ τοὺς λεγομένους ἀδελφοὺς ἄγομεν, ἔνθα συνηγμένοι εἰσί, κοινὰς εὐχὰς ποιησόμενοι ὑπέρ τε ἑαυτῶν καὶ τοῦ φωτισθέντος καὶ ἄλλων πανταχοῦ πάντων εὐτόνως, ὅπως καταξιωθῶμεν τὰ ἀληθῆ μαθόντες καὶ δι' ἔργων ἀγαθοὶ πολιτευταὶ καὶ φύλακες τῶν ἐντεταλμένων εὑρεθῆναι, ὅπως τὴν αἰώνιον σωτηρίαν σωθῶμεν. Ἀλλήλους φιλήματι ἀσπαζόμεθα παυσάμενοι τῶν εὐχῶν . . . and then follows an account of the Eucharist, which was immediately celebrated.

The important points in this description are the definite allusion to a period of instruction preceding baptism; the trine formula; the 'moral' vow; and the obviously developed character of the service. It is also usually thought, probably rightly, that the opening words of the description imply a reference to a definite creed; if so, this may perhaps be identified with an early form of the *Symbolum Romanum*, to which some critics see allusions in *I Apol.* 13, 21, 31, 42, 46, 52, in *Dial.* 32, and in some other passages which are collected in Gebhardt and Harnack's *Patres Apost.* 1. 2, p. 128 ff. Negatively it is remarkable that there is no allusion to the laying on of hands, such as is prominent in Acts, or to any connexion of baptism with the bishops, such as is found in Ignatius. The agreement with the *Didache*, both negatively and positively, is remarkable.

(*b*) *The doctrine of baptism.*—Justin regards baptism chiefly as a new birth, and in the passage quoted above refers to it as ἀναγέννησις. He also regards it as a forgiveness for past sin; and he

expresses his doctrine (apparently using some older source, see below) on this point in ch. 61:

ἐπειδὴ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν ἡμῶν ἀγνοοῦντες κατ' ἀνάγκην γεγεννήμεθα ἐξ ὑγρᾶς σπορᾶς κατὰ μίξιν τὴν τῶν γονέων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐν ἔθεσι φαύλοις καὶ πονηραῖς ἀνατροφαῖς γεγόναμεν, ὅπως μὴ ἀνάγκης τέκνα μηδὲ ἀγνοίας μένωμεν, ἀλλὰ προαιρέσεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀφέσεως δὲ ἁμαρτιῶν ὑπὲρ ὧν προημάρτομεν τύχωμεν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, ἐπονομάζεται τῷ ὕδατι τῷ ἑλομένῳ ἀναγεννηθῆναι καὶ μετανοήσαντι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμαρτημένοις τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ δεσπότου θεοῦ ὄνομα, κ.τ.λ.

Thus, if one may press his words, he seems to have connected forgiveness especially with the water, and the new life with 'the name.' It was, however, the name that gave the water the power to remove sin. Justin also regarded baptism as bestowing the gift of the Spirit. In *Dial.* 29 he says: τίς ἐκείνου (*i.e.* Jewish) τοῦ βαπτίσματος χρεία ἁγίῳ πνεύματι βεβαπτισμένῳ. Also, at the conclusion of the passage just quoted from ch. 61, he describes baptism as an 'enlightenment' (καλεῖται δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λουτρὸν φωτισμός, ὡς φωτιζομένων τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν ταῦτα μανθανόντων).

(*c*) *Justification of baptism.*—The correctness of the doctrine and practice of baptism is proved by Justin by an appeal to the OT, to the words of Christ, and to Apostolic tradition. The necessity of regeneration is proved by the saying of Christ, ἂν μὴ ἀναγεννηθῆτε οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθητε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν, which seems to be a free quotation of Jn 3^{3}. That this regeneration can be effected by baptism is proved by Is $1^{16\text{-}20}$ 'Wash you, make you clean,' etc.; and the explanation of the way in which this was effected is introduced by καὶ λόγον δὲ εἰς τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἐμάθομεν τοῦτον, and then follows the passage quoted above (*Apol.* 61). It is remarkable that it is to this λόγος, and not to Mt 28^{19}, that Justin turns for a justification of the trine formula.

Besides this direct justification, Justin uses a curious argument from heathen religion. His view was that this was the result of demonic attempts to deceive the world by producing false fulfilments of prophecy. This theory he applied to the whole of Christian and heathen systems, which represented the true and false fulfilment of OT prophecy. Thus the lustrations of the Greeks were demonic recognition of the truth of baptismal doctrine.

(8) IRENÆUS.—This writer nowhere gives an account of the practice of baptism, but his doctrine concerning it is expressed positively in the Ἀπόδειξις τοῦ ἀποστολικοῦ κηρύγματος and negatively in his *adversus Hæreses*, while from these passages it is also possible to find some reference to the practice of the Church in his time.

In the Ἀπόδειξις, ch. 3 (*TU* xxxi. 1), he says:

'The Faith . . . as the Presbyters, the disciples of the Apostles, have delivered it to us . . . above all teaches us that we have received baptism for the forgiveness of sins in the name of God the Father, and in the name of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who was incarnate, died, and rose again, and in the Holy Spirit of God; and that this baptism is the seal of eternal life, and the regeneration to God, by which we become the children, not of mortal man, but of the eternal and everlasting God'

In ch. 7 he explains why the trine formula was necessary:

'And therefore the baptism of our regeneration takes place through these three points, because God the Father blesses us with regeneration through the Holy Spirit by means of His Son. For those who bear the Spirit of God in themselves are led to the Word, that is, to the Son, but the Son leads them to the Father, and the Father lets them receive incorruptibility. Therefore without the Spirit it is impossible to see the Word of God, and without the Son no one can approach the Father. For the recognition of the Father is the Son, and the recognition of the Son is through the Holy Spirit, but the Son gives the Spirit, in accordance with His function, following the good pleasure of the Father, to those whom the Father will have and as the Father will.'

This positive statement is borne out by the negative statements in the *adversus Hæreses*. In III. xviii. 1 (ed. Harvey) he refers to baptism as the *potestatem regenerationis in Deum*, and identifies it with the gift of the Holy Spirit. Similarly in I. xiv., when speaking of the Marcosian heresy in relation to baptism, he implies that baptism is the ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ Χριστοῦ κατελθόντος, which the Marcosians regarded as a separate rite, though his own phrase is again τοῦ βαπτίσματος τῆς εἰς θεὸν ἀναγεννήσεως.

The two important pieces of information concerning the practice of baptism conveyed in these passages are (1) the use of the trine formula, which for the first time is connected definitely with Mt 28^{19}; and (2) the use of a Confession of Faith, as distinct from any moral or ethical vow. The allusions to this Confession in *adversus Hæreses*, I. i. 20 and I. ii. 1 identify it with an early form of the *Symbolum Romanum*; and the passage quoted above from the Ἀπόδειξις, ch. 3, suggests that Irenæus derived it from the teaching of those Presbyters of Asia Minor to whom he so often alludes. The fact mentioned above (7), that Justin also seems to show signs of a knowledge of the *Symbolum Romanum*, suggests that the λόγος of the Apostles to which he alludes in *Apol.* i. 61 may be the same writing or tradition of the Presbyters as that referred to by Irenæus.

(9) TERTULLIAN.—This writer tells us more about the practice and doctrine of baptism than any previous authority.

(*a*) *The practice.*—This is summed up in *de Corona*, 3:

'Aquam adituri ibidem sed et aliquanto prius in ecclesia sub antistitis manu contestamur nos renuntiare diabolo et pompæ et angelis ejus. Dehinc ter mergitamur amplius aliquid respondentes quam dominus in evangelio determinavit. Inde suscepti lactis et mellis concordiam prægustamus, exque ea die lavacro quotidiano per totam hebdomadem abstinemus.'

But this sketch was not intended to be complete, being given only as a proof that catholic practice outran Scripture, and must be supplemented by numerous allusions in other books. From these we can form the following scheme for the practice of baptism in the Church of Africa in the time of Tertullian.

(*α*) There was a preliminary period of preparation by fasting, vigils, and confession (cf. *de Bapt.* 20 'Ingressuros baptismum orationibus crebris jejunis et geniculationibus et pervigilio orare oportet et cum confessione omnium retro delictorum').

(*β*) A public renunciation of the devil before the head of the community (*antistes*) followed (cf *de Cor.* 3), at which sponsors or a sponsor were also present (*de Bapt* 18) This 'renunciatio' seems to take the place of the moral vow implied by 1 Peter, Justin Martyr, and the *Didache* As it is practically certain that Tertullian was acquainted with the *Symbolum Apostolicum*, it is probable that this also formed part of the baptismal rite; but there appears to be no definite statement to that effect in Tertullian.

(*γ*) The name of God was invoked on the water, in order to give it the power of sanctifying those who were baptized (*de Bapt.* 4): see passages quoted below.

(*δ*) Trine immersion in the trine name (cf. *de Cor.* 3 6c and *adv. Prax.* 26: 'nam nec semel sed ter ad singula nomina in personas singulas tinguimur').

(*ε*) Immediately after coming out of the water unction was administered (*de Bapt.* 7: 'Exinde egressi de lavacro perunguimur benedicta unctione de pristina disciplina, qua ungui oleo de cornu in sacerdotio solebant,' etc.).

(*ζ*) There followed the laying on of hands (*de Bapt.* 8): 'Dehinc manus imponitur per benedictionem advocans et invitans spiritum sanctum').

(*η*) After this there was a ceremonial tasting of milk and honey (*de Cor* 3: 'Inde suscepti lactis et mellis concordiam prægustamus,' and *adv. Marc.* 1. 14: 'sed ille quidem usque nunc nec aquam reprobavit creatoris qua suos abluit . . . nec mellis et lactis societatem qua suos infantat'), followed by abstinence from washing for the whole of the next week (*de Cor.* 3. 'exque ea die lavacro quotidiano per totam hebdomadem abstinemus'). The minister of this ceremony was usually the bishop or, with his sanction, the presbyters and deacons; but this was a 'right of order' not 'of necessity,' and every Christian man (but not woman) might baptize in case of need (*de Bapt* 17. 'Dandi quidem habet jus summus sacerdos qui est episcopus; dehinc presbyteri et diacoui, non tamen sine episcopi auctoritate, propter ecclesiæ honorem, quo salvo salva pax est. Alioquin etiam laicis jus est Quod enim ex æquo accipitur ex æquo dari potest . . proinde et baptismus æque dei census ab omnibus exerceri potest') No special time was necessary for baptism, but Easter and Whitsun were especially suitable (*de Bapt.* 19: 'Diem baptismo sollemniorem Pascha

præstat . . . exinde Pentecoste ordinandis lavacris lætissimum spatium est. . . . Ceterum omnis dies domini est, omnis hora, omne tempus habile baptismo; si de sollemnitate interest, de gratia nihil refert').

(*b*) *The doctrine of baptism.*—Tertullian's views, though in the main the same as those of earlier writers, show a development on certain points. Baptism is the source of salvation and of forgiveness of sins, a regeneration, and a gift of the Holy Spirit. But the following points are elaborated:—

(α) The question is raised in the *de Baptismo* 3–6 why and how sanctification was to be found in baptism. The answer given by Tertullian is too long to quote in full, but the argument is as follows:—There was from the beginning a special affinity between water and the spirit, which had hovered over it at the Creation (Gn 1[2]), and the same spirit returns to the water if God be invoked, and so gives it the power of imparting sanctification. He argues that there is no reason for doubting this, seeing that it is generally recognized that water is frequently the means by which evil spirits entrap unwary men. Moreover the incident of the pool of Bethsaida (Bethesda) in Jn 5[1-9] led him to think that the sanctification of the water was effected by an angel who descended for the purpose. It is not plain, nor is it for the present purpose material, how far Tertullian identified this angel with the Spirit itself (cf. Adam, 'Lehre v. d. hl. Geist in Hermas und Tertullian' in the *Theol. Quartalschrift*, Jan. 1906).

(β) The distinction between cleansing from sin and the gift of the Spirit, which is made in Acts, is emphasized, and a further distinction is introduced between the cleansing of the soul and of the body. The body is cleansed from sin by the water, the soul by the 'answer' of the candidate (*de Resurr. Carn.* 48 [where it is argued that baptism implies a resurrection of the flesh]: 'anima enim non lavatione sed responsione sanctitur'). The gift of the Spirit in baptism is connected with the laying on of hands and not with the water (*de Bapt* 6 and 8: 'non quod in aquis spiritum sanctum consequamur, sed in aqua emundati sub angelo spiritui sancto præparamur . . . dehinc manus imponitur. . . . Tunc ille sanctissimus spiritus super emundata et benedicta corpora libens a patre descendit . . .'). The 'benedicta' in the last phrase explains the meaning attached by Tertullian to the unction: it blessed the body (and sacramentally the soul) of the candidate just as the water cleansed it, and so prepared it for the gift of the Spirit.

(γ) Tertullian held strong views as to the proper recipients of baptism. These were due to his belief that sin after baptism was either unforgivable (only martyrdom could atone for some sins [cf. *de Pud.* 9]), or at least exceedingly dangerous (cf. *e.g. de Bapt.* 8: 'Itaque igni [*sc.* mundus] destinatur, sicut et homo qui post baptismum delicta restaurat'). The result was that he objected to child baptism as dangerous both to the child and to the sponsors (*de Bapt.* 18: 'Itaque pro cuiusque personæ condicione ac dispositione etiam ætate cunctatio baptismi utilior est, præcipue tamen circa parvulos . . .'). For the same reason he dissuaded the unmarried and widows from baptism (*de Bapt* 18: 'non minore de causa innupti quoque procrastinandi in quibus tentatio præparata est tam virginibus per maturitatem quam viduis per vacationem, donec aut nubant aut continentiæ corroborentur'). The suggestion of his words is that he would not countenance the marriage of the baptized, a position maintained later on in Edessa by Aphraates, but was willing to baptize those who were already married—unlike Marcion, who would consent to baptize only those who were unmarried or had divorced their wives.

(δ) In two passages (*de Resurr. Carn.* 48, and *adv. Marcion.* 5. 10) Tertullian speaks of the reference in 1 Co 15[29] to a baptism for the dead. In the former place he uses it as an argument for the resurrection of the flesh: 'certe illa præsumptione hoc eos instituisse contendit qua alii etiam carni ut vicarium baptisma profuturum existimarent ad spem resurrectionis, quæ nisi corporalis non alias sic baptismate corporali obligaretur.' Here there is nothing to show whether Tertullian was actually acquainted with a vicarious baptism for the dead, but the suggestion of the other passage is that he had no such knowledge. Here he uses the same argument in favour of a material resurrection, but prefaces the following obscure statement. 'quid, ait, facient qui pro mortuis baptizantur si mortui non resurgunt? Viderit institutio illa. Kalendæ si forte Februariæ respondebunt illi pro mortuis petere. Noli ergo apostolum novum statim auctorem aut confirmatorem eius denotare, ut tanto magis sisteret carnis resurrectionem, quanto illi qui vane pro mortuis baptizarentur fide resurrectionis hoc facerent.' In view of the generally affirmative sense of 'si forte' in Tertullian, it seems probable that he means that St. Paul was using an argument from the Roman custom of special sacrifices for the departed (cf. Oehler's note, *ad loc.*), and thus renders it improbable that Tertullian was acquainted with any contemporary Christian custom of baptism for the dead.

(ε) The question of heretical baptism first appears in Tertullian. He did not recognize it as in any sense valid, and a heretic who afterwards joined the Church was re-baptized (*de Pud.* 19: 'unde et apud nos ut ethnico par immo et super ethnicum hæreticus etiam per baptismatis veritatis utroque homine purgatus admittitur'; *de Bapt.* 15: 'Hæretici autem nullum habent consortium nostræ disciplinæ, quos extraneos utique testatur ipsa ademptio communicationis. Non debeo in illis cognoscere quod mihi est præceptum, quia non idem deus est nobis et illis, nec unus Christus, id est idem, ideoque nec baptismus unus quia non idem, quem cum rite non habent sine dubio non habent . . .'; cf. also *de Præscr. Hær.* 12). It should be noted that the *de Baptismo* probably belongs to the pre-Montanist period of Tertullian, while the *de Pud.* is Montanist.

(10) CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.—Clement does not so frequently discuss baptism as do some of the other writers, but his standpoint seems to be similar to theirs. The chief passages in which he deals with baptism are in the *Pædagogus*. He draws a parallel between the baptism of Christ and that of Christians, and claims that each had the same effect. Christ, on the side of His human nature, was regenerated in baptism and made perfect by the regeneration; so also with Christians:

τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ἡμᾶς, ὧν γεγονεν ὑπογραφὴ ὁ κύριος· βαπτιζόμενοι φωτιζόμεθα, φωτιζόμενοι υἱοποιούμεθα, υἱοποιούμενοι τελειούμεθα, τελειούμενοι ἀπαθανατιζόμεθα 'ἐγώ' φησί 'εἶπα, θεοί ἐστε καὶ υἱοὶ ὑψίστου πάντες·' καλεῖται δὲ πολλαχῶς τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο, χάρισμα καὶ φώτισμα καὶ τέλεον καὶ λουτρόν (*Pæd.* 1. 6, the whole of which chapter is important for defining Clement's attitude).

But Clement's chief interest was directed to proving not so much that baptism was the beginning of the new life as that it was complete, in opposition to the Gnostics, who introduced a series of stages. Of course, Clement did not mean to exclude the idea of progress, but only to assert that baptism was the dividing line between two states essentially differing from each other. Probably the doctrine of Tertullian as to the relation between the water and the Spirit would not have been strange to Clement. He argues that there is a special reason for water in baptism, because of its power of mixing with milk, which represents the Logos, and thinks that the union of the Logos with baptism is similar to that of milk with water:

καὶ ἦν ὁ Λόγος ἔχει πρὸς τὸ βάπτισμα κοινωνίαν, ταύτην ἔχει τὸ γάλα τὴν συναλλαγὴν πρὸς τὸ ὕδωρ, δέχεται γὰρ μόνον τῶν ὑγρῶν τοῦτο καὶ τὴν πρὸς το ὕδωρ μίξιν ἐπὶ κάθαρσιν παραλαμβανόμενον καθάπερ τὸ βάπτισμα ἐπὶ ἀφέσει ἁμαρτιῶν (*Pæd.* 1. 6, p. 120, ed. Stahlin).

Similarly in *Protrep.* 10 (p. 72, ed. Stahlin) he speaks of the ὕδωρ λογικόν. Yet it must be admitted that it is not easy to say precisely what was Clement's view as to the exact relation between symbols and their signification; there is room for a good monograph on his sacramental doctrine.

Clement, like Tertullian, did not recognize the baptism of heretics as genuine. This is proved by an exegesis of Pr 9[18a]:

εἶτα ἐπιφωνεῖ 'οὐτω γὰρ διαβήσῃ ὕδωρ ἀλλότριον' τὸ βάπτισμα αἱρετικὸν οὐκ οἰκεῖον καὶ γνήσιον ὕδωρ λογιζομενη (*Strom.* i. 19, p 62, ed. Stahlin).

On the question of repentance after baptism, Clement takes a much more lenient position than Tertullian or even Hermas. In the *Quis dives salvetur* (chs. 39–42) he devotes a long argument to proving that genuine repentance and consequent salvation is never too late, and supports it by the long and well-known story of St. John and the brigand captain.

ii. *AMONG HERETICS.*—(1) MENANDER.—Menander, who, according to Irenæus, was the successor of Simon Magus, attributed to baptism the power of conferring immortality.

Cf. Iren. i. 17. 'Resurrectionem enim per id quod est in eum baptisma accipere ejus discipulos et ultra non posse mori sed perseverare non senescentes et immortales,' and Tert *de Anima*, 50: 'Menandri Samaritani furor conspuatur dicentis mortem ad suos non modo non pertinere, verum nec pervenire In hoc scilicet se a superna et arcana potestate legatum, ut immortales et incorruptibiles et statim resurrectionis compotes fiant qui baptisma ejus induerint.'

It is, however, difficult to think that a view of this kind could have long endured; that baptism, in a certain sense, conveyed immortality was a generally received Christian teaching, and possibly Menander did not mean much more than this.

(2) THE VALENTINIANS.—The main authority for the doctrine of these heretics is the *Excerpta Theodoti* of Clement of Alexandria. The whole passage, *Exc. Theod.* 76–86, is most instructive, and is the most important extant passage for deter-

mining the doctrine of baptism as it existed among the Valentinians, or, indeed, any other heretics, for it differs from the evidence of almost all other writers in being extracted from heretical writings, and not from orthodox polemical books.

Baptism is an *ἀναγέννησις*. By its means we are born into the world dominated by Father, Son, and Spirit, and so become superior to all other powers. It is also a death to the previous life, but this refers to the soul (*ψυχή*), not to the body (*σῶμα*). Up to the time of baptism man is under the control of Fate (*εἱμαρμένη*), but by baptism and *γνῶσις* he is released from this control, and the verdict of astrologers (which is recognized as valid for the rest of mankind) is rendered unimportant. The baptized person is, through regeneration by Christ, taken up into the Ogdoad. It was further explained that as the water of baptism quenched *τὸ αἰσθητὸν πῦρ*, the invisible part could quench the *νοητὸν πῦρ*. So far as the rite is concerned, we are told that fasting and prayer are desirable before baptism in order to prevent the entrance of evil spirits in addition to the Holy Spirit. From ch. 22 of the *Excerpta Theodoti* it also appears that the rite of baptism contained an imposition of hands, and that the formula used ended with the phrase *εἰς λύτρωσιν ἀγγελικην* (for a formula used by the Marcosians containing this phrase see below). The doctrine underlying this is that the angels, with whom we are in some way connected, have been baptized for us; and this explanation is given to 1 Co 15[29]—in which the 'they' refers to the angels, and 'the dead' for whom they are baptized is mankind.

(3) THE MARCOSIANS.—The authorities for these heretics are Irenæus and Hippolytus. They belonged to the Valentinian school, and, like the class of heretics who are represented later in a more developed form by the Pistis Sophia, did not merely, as Marcion, allow a repetition of baptism in case of sin, but had actually two forms differing from each other in function. Their first baptism was not a means of regeneration; it merely had the negative function of the forgiveness of sin, and is described in Iren. I. xiv. 1 as a baptism *τοῦ φαινομένου Ἰησοῦ ἀφέσεως ἁμαρτιῶν*. The second baptism was called *ἀπολύτρωσις*, and according to Hippolytus was regarded as raising those who participated in it above the power of sin, even though they committed it (. . . *εὐκόλους μὲν εἶναι διδάξας πρὸς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν, ἀκινδύνους δὲ διὰ τὸ εἶναι τῆς τελείας δυνάμεως, καὶ μετέχειν τῆς ἀνεννοήτου ἐξουσίας, οἷς καὶ μετὰ τὸ βάπτισμα ἕτερον ἐπαγγέλλονται ὃ καλοῦσιν ἀπολύτρωσιν* . . . Hippol. *Refut.* vi. 41). The justification for this was found, as Marcion found his for a renewed baptism, in Lk 12[50] ('I have a baptism,' etc.); and the references in the Epistles to an *ἀπολύτρωσις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* were explained as references to this sacrament (Iren. *l.c.*). This 'redemption' was regarded as the same as that of the Spirit which entered Jesus at His baptism, and was the power of regeneration and of entrance into the Pleroma (*λέγουσι δὲ αὐτὴν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι τοῖς τὴν τέλειαν γνῶσιν εἰληφόσιν, ἵνα εἰς τὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα δύναμιν ὧσιν ἀναγεγεννημένοι· ἄλλως γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἐντὸς πληρώματος εἰσελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ εἰς τὸ βάθος [τοῦ βύθου] κατάγουσα αὐτούς*, Iren. *l.c.*).

As to the rite itself there seems to have been no uniformity of practice. Irenæus distinguishes seven varieties, and leaves it quite uncertain what was the relationship subsisting between them (Iren. I. xiv. 2).

The seven varieties are as follows: (*a*) A ceremony referred to as a spiritual marriage. There is no definite statement that a water-baptism formed part of it, and perhaps the contrary is to be inferred from the general drift of Irenæus's language. (*b*) A ceremony of baptism with the formula *Εἰς ὄνομα ἀγνώστου πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων, εἰς ἀλήθειαν μητέρα πάντων, εἰς τὸν κατελθόντα εἰς Ἰησοῦν, εἰς ἕνωσιν καὶ ἀπολύτρωσιν καὶ κοινωνίαν τῶν δυνάμεων*. (*c*) In another circle a Hebrew or Syriac formula was used, of which the text is very corrupt in Irenæus, but the meaning, according to Harvey's re-construction, was 'in the name of the Wisdom of the Father, and of Light, which is called the Spirit of Holiness, for the Angelic Redemption.' It is not stated whether this formula was used in connexion with water; but it probably was. (*d*) Irenæus gives an important extract from the rites of a fourth, but his meaning is not clear, and the Syriac words are difficult to re-construct (see Harvey's note); it is therefore best to give the text: *Ἄλλοι δὲ πάλιν τὴν λύτρωσιν ἐπιλέγουσιν οὑτως· τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἀποκεκρυμμένον ἀπο πάσης θεότητος, καὶ κυριότητος, καὶ ἀληθείας, ὃ ἐνεδυσατο Ἰησοῦς ὁ Ναζαρηνὸς ἐν ταῖς ζωαῖς τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ, Χριστοῦ ζῶντος δια πνεύματος ἁγίου εἰς λυτρωσιν ἀγγελικήν. Ὄνομα τὸ τῆς καταστάσεως· Μεσσία οὐφαρὲγ ναμεμψαιμὰν χαλδαίαν μοσομηδαέα ἀκφραναὶ ψαούα Ἰησοῦ Ναζαρία. καὶ τούτων δὲ ἑρμηνεία ἐστὶ τοιαύτη· οὐ διαιρῶ τὸ πνεῦμα, τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τὴν ὑπερουράνιον δύναμιν τὴν οἰκτίρμονα· ὀναίμην τοῦ ὀνόματος σου, Σωτὴρ ἀληθείας. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπιλέγουσιν οἱ αὐτοὶ τελοῦντες. Ὁ δὲ τετελεσμένος ἀποκρίνεται· ἐστήριγμαι, καὶ λελύτρωμαι, καὶ λυτροῦμαι τὴν ψυχήν μου ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, καὶ πάντων τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ Ἰαώ, ὃς ἐλυτρώσατο τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ τῷ ζῶντι. Εἶτα ἐπιλέγουσιν οἱ παρόντες· Εἰρήνη πᾶσιν, ἐφ' οὓς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἐπαναπαύεται· ἔπειτα μυρίζουσι τὸν τετελεσμένον τῷ ὀπῷ τῷ ἀπὸ βαλσάμου [τῷ ὀποβαλσάμῳ]· τὸ γὰρ μύρον τοῦτο τύπον τῆς ὑπὲρ τὰ ὅλα εὐωδίας εἶναι λέγουσιν.* Whatever the precise meaning of this extract may be, it is clear that the service bore a marked resemblance to Catholic practice. There is the use of a formula 'in the name of'; a service of question and answer alternating between the administrator and the recipient of the rite; unction; and apparently at an earlier part of the ceremony water-baptism. This last point is rendered probable by the beginning of the next section. (*e*) A fifth party rejected water, but used instead an unguent of water and oil, with a formula similar to those given above, and also using balsam. (*f*) A sixth party rejected the whole of the outward ceremony, and said that knowledge alone was the true Redemption. (*g*) Finally, there were those who in other respects seem to have agreed with those mentioned above as the fifth party, but deferred baptism until after death. Epiphanius perhaps thought that this must mean 'in articulo mortis' (Epiph. xxxvi. 2), but the text of the Latin Irenæus is clear: 'Alii sunt qui mortuos redimunt ad finem defunctionis, mittentes eorum capitibus oleum et aquam,' etc. (Iren. I. xiv. 4); for 'mortuos' can only mean dead, and Theodoret (*HE* i. 11) alludes to the same practice. The object of this was to safeguard the soul of the dead person in its journey through the realm of the spirit-world. This view may be paralleled with the Pistis Sophia, and seems to have Egyptian affinities.

(4) THE CARPOCRATIANS.—Irenæus (I. xx. 3) says of these heretics: *τούτων τινὲς καὶ καυτηριάζουσι τοὺς ἰδίους μαθητὰς ἐν τοῖς ὀπίσω μέρεσι τοῦ λοβοῦ τοῦ δεξίου ὠτός*. It seems probable that this was an attempt to provide a literal fulfilment of the promise of a baptism with the Holy Spirit and with Fire.

(5) MARCION.—The evidence for Marcion is given by Tertullian and Epiphanius. According to Tertullian (*adv. Marc.* iv. 11), Marcion 'morti aut repudio baptisma servat,' which seems to mean that he refused baptism except to those who were prepared to put away their wives, or were at the point of death. The reason for this provision was that Marcion's doctrine led him to exclude married life. Epiphanius (*adv. Hær.* I. xlii. 3) says that Marcion admitted a second and third baptism in case of sin after baptism (*ἔξεστιν ἕως τριῶν λουτρῶν, τουτέστι βαπτισμῶν, εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν διδόσθαι*). He adds that Marcion had himself been obliged to make use of this provision, and that a Scripture basis was found in Lk 12[50] (*βαπτισθεὶς ὁ κύριος ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἰωάννου ἔλεγε τοῖς μαθηταῖς, βάπτισμα ἔχω βαπτισθῆναι* . . . *καὶ οὕτω τὸ διδόναι πλείω βαπτίσματα ἐδογμάτισεν*). Esnik, an Armenian writer, also attributes vicarious baptism to him.

(6) TERTULLIAN'S OPPONENTS.—From the language used by Tertullian in the *de Baptismo* it is clear that there was a party which denied the necessity of baptism. One of them he identifies (*de Bapt.* i. 1) with the Cainites, but it does not follow that this applies to them all. From his treatise we can re-construct, at least partially, their arguments.

The following can be distinguished:—(*a*) The Lord Himself did not baptize (see the reply in *de Bapt.* 11). (*b*) The Apostles were never baptized (answered in *de Bapt.* 12). (*c*) Baptism is not necessary to those who have faith, as Abraham had (answered in *de Bapt.* 13). (*d*) St. Paul says: 'Christ sent me not to baptize' (answered in *de Bapt.* 14).

(7) THE ACTS OF THOMAS.—This curious document probably represents views and practices which obtained in the neighbourhood of Edessa towards the close of the 2nd century. It is doubtful whether they come from an orthodox circle, and it is perhaps probable that they represent the views of Bardesanes.

The following accounts of baptism are to be found:—(*a*) In chs. 26–27, the baptism of King Gundaphorus and his brother Gad. Of this the text presents two recensions. The shorter (probably a 'Catholic' version) only relates the fact; it mentions the water and the trine formula. The longer (apparently Gnostic) does not mention water, but only an anointing with

oil, which is called σφραγίς. The formula which is used is: ἐλθὲ τὸ ἅγιον ὄνομα τοῦ Χριστοῦ τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα· ἐλθὲ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὑψίστου καὶ ἡ εὐσπλαγχνία ἡ τελεία· ἐλθὲ τὸ χάρισμα τὸ ὑψιστον· ἐλθὲ ἡ μήτιρ ἡ εὔσπλαγχνος· ἐλθὲ ἡ κοινωνία τοῦ ἄρρενος· ἐλθὲ ἡ τὰ μυστήρια ἀποκαλύπτουσα τὰ ἀπόκρυφα· ἐλθὲ ἡ μήτηρ τῶν ἑπτὰ οἴκων ἵνα ἡ ἀνάπαυσίς σου εἰς τὸν ὄγδοον οἶκον γένηται· ἐλθὲ ὁ πρεσβύτερος τῶν πέντε μελῶν, νοὸς ἐννοίας φρονήσεως ἐνθυμήσεως λογισμοῦ, κοινώνησον μετὰ τούτων τῶν νεωτέρων· ἐλθὲ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα καὶ καθάρισον τοὺς νεφροὺς αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν καρδίαν, καὶ ἐπισφράγισον αὐτοὺς εἰς ὄνομα πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος. After this baptism the Eucharist followed immediately.

(*b*) In ch. 121 Mygdonia is baptized in the trine name, and the Eucharist follows immediately.

(*c*) In chs. 131–133 is the account of the baptism of Siphor. Here we are given a valuable statement of the doctrine of baptism: τὸ βάπτισμα τοῦτο ἁμαρτιῶν ἐστὶν ἄφεσις· τοῦτο ἀναγεννᾷ φῶς περιεκχυνόμενον· τοῦτο ἀναγεννᾷ τὸν νέον ἄνθρωπον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μειγνύον πνεῦμα καινοῦν ψυχήν, ἁνιστῶν τρισσῶς καινὸν ἄνθρωπον, καί ἐστι κοινωνὸν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἀφέσεως. So far as the rite is concerned, it consists of unction with the formula Σοὶ δόξα ἡ τῶν σπλάγχνων ἀγάπη· σοὶ δόξα το τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὄνομα· σοὶ δόξα ἡ ἐν Χριστῷ δύναμις ἱδρυμένη. After this follows baptism in water (for which purpose a basin [σκάφην] is used—so that submersion was not practised) in the trine name, and finally the Eucharist.

(*d*) In chs. 157–158 is the account of the baptism of Ouazenes, Tertia, and Mnesara. The main features are the same: first, unction with oil (over which the name of Jesus has been invoked) with the formula—Ἐν ὀνόματί σου, Ἰησοῦ Χριστέ, γενέσθω ταῖς ψυχαῖς ταύταις εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν καὶ εἰς ἀποτροπὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ εἰς σωτηρίαν τῶν ψυχῶν αὐτῶν; secondly, baptism in water in the trine name; and, thirdly, the Eucharist. It is noteworthy, in view of Tertullian's protest against the custom of baptism by women, that Mygdonia, not Judas Thomas, anoints the women.

Thus it would seem that the circle of Christians whose practice is represented by the *Acts of Thomas* used a form of baptism in which unction with an elaborate formula of consecration preceded baptism, properly so called, in the trine name, and that the Eucharist always followed immediately. The unction with oil was more important than the water-baptism—so much so that in ch. 26 the latter is not mentioned at all. It is even possible that the references to water-baptism in the other passages are interpolations. The doctrinal ideas which play the greatest part are regeneration, forgiveness of sin, a new life, and the gift of the Spirit, which seem to be communicated directly through the unction. It is also noticeable that the *Acts of Thomas* regards baptism and married life as incompatible.

Summary of 1st and 2nd centuries.—The data supplied by the preceding paragraphs give the material for making certain generalizations as to the practice and doctrine of baptism, during the 1st and 2nd centuries. It is, of course, the special object of an Encyclopædia article to give information rather than draw conclusions; but attention may be directed to the following points, which seem to be cardinal:—

(1) The information given as to the practice of baptism is, as a rule, incidental, and never quite explicit; yet the main features are fairly clear. As might have been expected, the rite gradually became more and more complicated. The earliest form, represented in the Acts, was simple immersion (not necessarily submersion) in water, the use of the name of the Lord, and the laying on of hands. To these were added, at various times and places which cannot be safely identified, (*a*) the trine name (Justin), (*b*) a moral vow (Justin and perhaps Hermas, as well as already in the NT in 1 Peter), (*c*) trine immersion (Justin), (*d*) a confession of faith (Irenæus, or perhaps Justin), (*e*) unction (Tertullian), (*f*) sponsors (Tertullian), (*g*) milk and honey (Tertullian). There was also, no doubt, an infinite variety of expansion in detail, especially among heretical sects (cf. especially the Marcosians), and there were probably fixed forms for the administration of the sacraments, of which traces may be seen even in this period (Justin, Tertullian, and especially the *Didachè*), but the existing baptismal services strictly belong to the 3rd century.

(2) As to the doctrine of baptism we have more information, though here also much of it is incidental. The dominant ideas were those of forgiveness of sin, regeneration, and the gift of the Holy Spirit. To some extent these three ideas may be fairly described as three ways of regarding baptism rather than as three separate benefits conferred by it. In baptism, the Christian passes from one sphere of life to another. He is born again to another world, and, whereas in the world which he leaves he was under the control of sin, evil spirits, and fate,* in the world which he enters he is under the control of the Holy Spirit. So far is this view carried, that baptism can be spoken of as a resurrection, though, as a rule, the gift conferred in baptism was regarded eschatologically so far as its complete realization was concerned (see the use of σφραγίς in II Clem., p. 385[b] above).

The change effected by baptism was attributed to the 'name' and to the water, which were regarded as actually effective and not merely symbolic. This view is strange to modern minds, especially to Protestants, but it was part of the common stock of ideas of the 2nd cent., among heathen and Christians alike. A somewhat subordinate part is usually played by the laying on of hands and by unction; but probably both of these were regarded as cardinal in some places (see especially Tertullian and the *Acts of Thomas*). The general theory which underlies these views seems to be the well-known belief that by using the correct name it was possible to exercise the power of the bearer of the name. By this means the Spirit was brought into the water (in the *Acts of Thomas* into the oil) and thus communicated to the baptized person. The clearest expression of this view is found in Tertullian, but in a more or less developed form it was no doubt universal, except among a few heretics (*e.g.* Tertullian's opponents, and some of the Marcosians).

As the rite became more complicated, there was a tendency to connect various details with various sides of the doctrine. Especially was this so with regard to the laying on of hands; this, at least sometimes, was peculiarly connected with the gift of the Spirit, and the effect of the immersion in water was limited to the forgiveness of sins (see especially Tertullian, and compare the same tendency even earlier in the Acts). But this distinction was probably never universal, or to any large extent the subject of discussion.

In its crudest form the theory of baptism was quite unethical; and there are many traces among early writers that they were aware of this difficulty. None of them, however, really succeeded in doing more than putting ethical requirements side by side with their sacramental theories, and demanding both without really co-ordinating them intelligibly (cf. Hermas and the development of the moral vow of which the first traces can probably be found in 1 Peter).

In connexion with the name (which may mean one or more names) the question of formula arises. The earliest known formula is 'in the name of the Lord Jesus,' or some similar phrase; this is found in the Acts, and was perhaps still used by Hermas, but by the time of Justin Martyr the trine formula had become general. It is possible that the older formula survived in isolated communities, but there is no decisive contemporary evidence. The tendency was all the other way, and it is probable that there were in use many formulæ of an elaborate nature (see the Marcosians and the *Acts of Thomas*). The difficulty is to distinguish between

* The question of Fate will receive a full treatment in a separate article. Justin and orthodox writers generally were inclined to deny its influence, but some Gnostics recognized its supremacy over the unbaptized (Theodotus in Clement of Alexandria).

the formula properly so called, and what we should now call the baptismal service attached to it. Probably the truth is that this distinction was somewhat foreign to the spirit of the 2nd cent.; it was only gradually that a difference began to be made between the essential formula and other words which were connected with it.

Starting from the belief that baptism was the beginning of a new life, released from sin and inspired by the Holy Spirit, men naturally were forced to ask what was the relation of the regenerate person to sin. The earliest view was that sin was excluded. Probably some even thought that sin was impossible to the baptized, but at least it is clear from the Epistle to the Hebrews that sin after baptism was in some circles regarded as irremediable. Practical experience must soon have shown that if this view were held few could hope to see salvation, and the problem which thus arose was dealt with in diverse ways. The most obvious solution was to re-baptize those who sinned. This view was adopted by the school opposed to that of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and was common to most of the Gnostic sects (see *e.g.* Marcion). In the orthodox (as they afterwards came to be) circles this view was always rejected, and the difficulty was met in two ways—by the introduction of the theory of μετάνοια, rapidly developing into Penance, and by the attempt to distinguish between deadly and venial sin (cf. especially Hermas and 1 John). Among the practical results of this difficulty was the tendency, which long survived, to postpone baptism until death was approaching (cf. especially Hermas and Tertullian; similarly the Marcosians, whose sacrament of 'Redemption' was partly a repetition of baptism, partly a new rite that seems sometimes to have postponed its reception to the time of death). It would be an interesting subject for study how far the Catholic practice of extreme unction may once have been connected with a similar view. It is, however, plain that this postponement must sometimes have been carried too far, and death anticipated baptism. Baptism for the dead seems to have been practised by the Marcosians in such cases, and there are a few traces of a parallel custom of vicarious baptism.

Besides this line of development, which recognized that sin after baptism was possible, there was another which denied that the regenerate were able to sin. They were risen from death, and any sin which their bodies might commit belonged to the realm of death: it was thus indifferent, and could not affect the risen life of the regenerate. This theory, which was obviously likely to give rise to the wildest excesses, is probably a partial explanation of the charge of immorality often brought against Christians. It appears from Hippolytus that some of the Marcosians adopted this view, and it is probable that the same is true of the Carpocratians.

The relation of baptism to marriage is a cognate question. Some sects certainly thought that marriage was of the nature of sin, and rejected it altogether (cf. especially Marcion and the *Acts of Thomas*). The Church in general never seems to have taken this view; but Tertullian, probably even in his pre-Montanist days, regarded marriage as forbidden to those who had already been baptized.

In the earliest part of this period it seems probable that baptism was regarded as a sacrament which could be administered by all Christians, though it was in practice doubtless reserved for the head of the community (cf. Justin Martyr). The line of thought, as mentioned above, represented in the Acts, which distinguished between the actual immersion in water (which gave forgiveness of sins, and could be administered by every Christian) and the laying on of hands (which gave the Spirit, and was the prerogative of the Apostles), perhaps survived only in part. Tertullian shows that the doctrinal distinction was observed in the African Church (it seems very doubtful if this was true of every Church), but the evidence is not clear that the distinction was made between the ministerial rights of clergy and laity. In any case, as it was certainly the practice for the clergy—not the laity—to baptize, the question was not likely to come to the front. But a similar problem began to appear during the 2nd century. What was the value of heretical baptism? The answer, of course, turned on that given to the implied previous question, 'What is a Christian?' The 2nd cent. writers did not really reach a more advanced point than the affirmation that only a Christian could give Christian baptism (the attempt of Ignatius to confine the administration of the rite to the bishop and those whom he licensed was really only a secondary result of quite a different question), and the Catholic Church triumphed in its attempt to exclude all the heretical sects as non-Christian. Thus the rule was more or less fixed that heretical baptism was invalid, but 'heretical' meant heretics such as the Marcosians and other Gnostics, and the question probably never became a burning one. Still the principle was established, and became extremely important in the 3rd cent., when it was applied to the quite different types of heresy which then became predominant.

LITERATURE.—There is no satisfactory book on the history of early Christian baptism before the great baptismal controversy in the 3rd century. Useful information will be found in Höfling, *Das Sacrament d. Taufe*, Erlangen, 1848; W. Heitmüller, *Im Namen Jesu*, Gottingen, 1903, and *Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus*, Gottingen, 1905; F. M. Rendtorff, *Die Taufe im Urchristentum*, Leipzig, 1905; W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Gottingen, 1907; H. Windisch, *Taufe und Sunde im altesten Christentum*, Tubingen, 1908.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

BAPTISM (Later Christian).—**1. From the second to the eighth century.**—'Since the middle of the second century the notions of baptism in the Church have not essentially altered. The result of baptism was universally considered to be forgiveness of sins, and this pardon was supposed to effect an actual sinlessness which now required to be maintained' (Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr. vol. ii. p. 140). Baptism, in the words of Firmilian, was the life-giving bath (*lavacrum salutare*), the second nativity: it involved the washing away of the filth of the old man, the forgiveness of the old sins of death, the becoming sons of God through a heavenly re-birth, the being renewed unto life eternal by the sanctification of the Divine bath (see *Ep.* 75, *ap.* Cyprian). How the nature and effects of regeneration were conceived by some of the leading writers in these centuries will be discussed in a later paragraph. The net result of the development of thought and practice in this period was to define the essentials of Baptism, and to lay stress on the importance of the ritual act, as itself conferring indispensable spiritual blessings. 'In Baptism by the institution of God, the material element of water, together with the prescribed form of words, is used to confer spiritual gifts' (Stone, *Holy Baptism*, p. 214). This sentence from a modern writer adequately describes the conviction which, with increasing clearness, controlled the mind of the Church subsequently to the 2nd century.

I. *THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF THE RITUAL ACT.*—This was emphasized principally (*a*) in the dread of repetition, (*b*) in the diminished importance attaching to the administrator of the rite, (*c*) in the tendency to regard conscious faith on the part of the recipient as non-essential. The first two points are evidenced mainly by the recognition of schis-

matic and even of heretical baptism as valid, provided water was used, and the subjects were baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. The third point most clearly emerges in the growing custom of infant baptism.

(*a*) The question of *heretical baptism* was raised acutely in the controversy between Cyprian and Pope Stephen. In dealing with converted heretics, different Churches followed divergent traditions. The Roman Church required only that the returning heretic be received with the laying on of hands. Pope Stephen's position is summed up in the sentence: 'Si quis ergo a quacumque hæresi venerit ad vos, nihil innovetur nisi quod traditum est, ut manus illi imponatur in pœnitentiam' (Cyp. *Ep.* 74). The practice in Alexandria appears to have been the same (Eus. vii. 2, 7). Firmilian, bp. of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, opposes the custom of Asia Minor to the custom of the Romans. There it had always been assumed that any baptism outside the Church was invalid. Returning heretics were re-baptized, or rather received true baptism for the first time. At Carthage, the Roman custom seems to have prevailed (in spite of the attitude of Tertullian [see above, p. 386 f.]), and Cyprian was making an innovation when he insisted that all heretics should be baptized on joining the Church (see Eus. *HE* vii. 3, and note Cyprian's defence of truth against custom in *Epp.* 70–76). The African bishops followed Cyprian's lead.

The divergence in the customs of Rome and Asia may be accounted for by the differing characters of the heresies with which each had to deal. Asia Minor in particular and the East in general were troubled with a variety of fantastic sects, and it appears from a letter of Dionysius, in Eus. *HE* vii. 9, that some who came over from heresy had the gravest misgivings as to the worth of the baptism they had received. The sects in the East frequently adopted such peculiarities both in creed and practice as to render the position of Firmilian natural, if not inevitable. At Rome, on the other hand, the practical issue lay in the re-admission of Novatians, who were schismatics rather than heretics. They had broken from the Church on a question of discipline. In matters of faith they were quite orthodox. Their baptism did not seriously depart from the Church's model. There was no difficulty in accepting such baptism as valid.

The central arguments advanced by Stephen and his supporters were: (1) the appeal to tradition, for which Stephen claimed Apostolic authority (cf. Anon. *de Rebaptismate*, opening); (2) the majesty of the name of Jesus, which could not but be effective wherever and however pronounced. Thus Cyp. in *Ep.* 74 states his adversaries' position as follows: 'Effectum baptismi majestati nominis tribuunt, ut qui in nomine Jesu Christi ubicumque et quomodocumque baptizantur, innovati et sanctificati judicentur' (cf. also Firmilian, *Ep.* 75, *ap.* Cyp.). It is not clear that Stephen regarded baptism 'in nomine Jesu Christi' as valid; but the anonymous author of the *de Rebaptismate* apparently accepted the use of the earlier formula as sufficient. 'The invocation of the name of Jesus ought never to seem vain to us, because of the reverence due to it and the power that resides in it.' Stephen was prepared to adopt the conclusion that, where water and the correct formula were used, the character and creed of the administrators became a matter of indifference.

The positions laid down by the author of the *de Rebapt.* are not necessarily representative of his side, but they deserve notice. He held that heretical baptism did not of itself confer the gift of the Spirit, but it created a possibility of spiritual receptiveness which made its repetition superfluous. The imposition of hands supplied all defects. He distinguished baptism with water from baptism with the Spirit; and though within the Church the two were usually connected, they are clearly separable in the NT, and may be administered distinctly at all times; so that a man may receive water-baptism among the heretics, and the baptism with the Spirit through the laying on of hands at his entrance into the Church. He also claims that sound faith in the administrator cannot be an essential to the validity of water-baptism; for the disciples baptized while the Lord was with them, and while they understood His doctrine very imperfectly. The Divine name possesses peculiar powers, even when invoked by men who do not believe. Strangers to Christ, workers of iniquity, have cast out devils in His name. Consequently the name, by whomsoever invoked in baptism, is of itself operative, and a further invocation means reiterating baptism.

This distinction between water-baptism and baptism with the Spirit really turned the flank of Cyprian's position. He maintained that heretics could not give Christian baptism, because they did not possess the Holy Spirit. To Cyprian, the Romans seemed to be involved in the contradiction of asserting that a man could be born spiritually in a community destitute of the Spirit (*Ep.* 74). A valid baptism requires the invocation of the Holy Spirit; but it is impossible for heretics who do not possess the Holy Spirit to call down His blessing on the water (*Ep.* 70). If baptism is essentially spiritual, if it means regeneration, then it is impossible outside the Church. Nor can it be contended that the heretics hold the same faith. Even mere schismatics, like the Novatians, are at bottom heretics, and do not hold the same creed. Their baptismal confession does not coincide with that of the Catholic Church; for when they question the candidate and say, 'Credis remissionem peccatorum et vitam æternam per sanctam ecclesiam?' then they lie, because they have not the Church. The heretic and the schismatic cannot bestow forgiveness of sins; that is, their baptism cannot confer any of the blessings associated with baptism. In other words, they cannot baptize. There is only one baptism, that of the Church; and so, Cyprian maintained, those who come over from heresy are not re-baptized in the Church, but baptized (*Ep.* 71).

The controversy did not immediately arrive at a definitive issue. The divergence of practice did not at once disappear. The Donatists in the 4th century practically took their stand on Cyprian's rejection of heretical baptism, and they seem at one time to have represented national feeling in Africa. But in general neither Cyprian's sweeping rejection nor Stephen's indiscriminate acceptance received the approval of the Church. The Catholic line was that laid down in the Council of Arles (314), whose eighth canon runs thus: 'De Afris quod propria lege sua utuntur ut rebaptizent, placuit ut si ad ecclesiam aliquis de hæreticis venerit, interrogant eum symbolum, et si perviderint eum in Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum esse baptizatum, manus ei tantum imponatur ut accipiat Spiritum Sanctum. Quod si interrogatus non responderit hanc trinitatem, baptizetur.' In this council the African bishops, who sided with Cæcilian against the Donatists, abandoned Cyprian's attitude towards heretical baptism. This rule eventually met with general acceptance. In the East, at any rate in Asia, it was reluctantly adopted (Cyril) and carefully applied. The title-deeds of any heretical baptism were carefully scrutinized. Any departure from orthodox custom, such as the Eunomians' substitution of one immersion for three, was eagerly noted and condemned. Basil clearly leans to the view of Firmilian and Cyprian, but grudgingly admits the canonical validity of baptism by the Cathari (see letter 1881 in 'Library of Post-Nicene Fathers'). In the West, the rule was more readily adopted and more graciously applied. The weight of Augustine's authority was thrown on this side (see *de unico bapt. c. Petil.* ch. 3, for the main principle).

The central significance of the whole controversy lay (1) in the assumption, common to both parties, that there can be only one baptism,* and that this baptism is essential to salvation; and (2) in the progress made towards establishing the objective validity of the sacrament, defined as complete in the use of the correct material and the orthodox formula.

(*b*) *The Donatist controversy* carried the insistence on the objective validity of the sacrament still further. The gist of the Donatist contention was that the sacrament was invalidated by the misbelief or misconduct of the administrator. More particularly, the denial of the faith in time of persecution rendered all the sacramental acts of such traitors worthless. The Donatists followed Cyprian in believing that the character of the administrator affected the value of the rite. To admit this would have thrown doubt on the sacramental life of the past, and would have made the efficacy of the sacraments depend upon men. The defenders of the Catholic position would never consent to this conclu-

* Ultimately this was disputed only by the obscure sect of Hemerobaptists.

sion. Optatus asserts unhesitatingly the essential efficacy of the ritual act: 'The sacraments are holy in themselves, not through men' ('sacramenta per se esse sancta, non per homines,' *de Schismate Don.* v. 4). The three essentials to baptism are the Holy Trinity, the believer, and the administrator. But, while the first two are indispensable, the last is only *quasi*-necessary. The administrator is not the lord of baptism, but the agent: *i.e.* any administrator will serve the purpose (see Harnack, *op. cit.* v. 45). Augustine took up a similar standpoint. Baptism, as defined in the 8th canon of the Council of Arles, confers an indelible stamp on the recipient, which *ipso facto* requires no renewal. To suppose that it does not is to do wrong to the sacrament, to deny the power of God in it. It is impossible to summarize here the numerous writings of Aug. against the Donatists, but the following points may be noted:—

(1) Aug. is clear that the use of water, together with the words prescribed in the Gospel, suffices to make a valid baptism. The correct episcopal benediction is not essential. Heretical prayers may even be pernicious, but they cannot destroy the efficacy of the sacrament, provided the Gospel words are employed (*de Bapt. contra Don.* vi. 25). Here Aug. distinctly denies the importance attributed by Cyprian (see above) to the cleansing of the water by a correct benediction.—(2) In accordance with his own principles, Aug regards lay baptism as valid. He is inclined to assert that any one who has truly received baptism * can pass on the gift, though, of course, he distinguishes the *sacramentum baptismi* from the *sacramentum dandi baptismum*. But Aug. does not doubt that a layman who baptizes in the name of the Trinity has conferred a valid baptism, whether he acts under the pressure of necessity or not. If he acts in a case of urgency, his action is at least pardonable, if not praiseworthy. If he baptizes when there is no need for him to undertake another man's office, his action is wrong, and may mean damnation for baptizer and baptized alike, but none the less is the baptism valid (*contra Ep Parm* ii 13). This is an emphatic statement of the comparative unimportance of the minister, and of the all-importance of the ritual act.—(3) It is difficult to see what Aug. understood by the stamp (χαρακτήρ) conveyed in baptism, but it seems to be a permanent possibility of spiritual receptiveness, such as is suggested by the author of the *de Rebaptismate*. At least, Aug. is prepared to concede this efficacy to heretical baptism, because in itself the stamp does not connote the spiritual blessings secured by baptism within the Church. Heretical baptism conveys a something which is essential to salvation,—this must be maintained, if the sacrament is not to suffer wrong,—but the heretic derives no benefit from this possession so long as he remains a heretic. He possesses baptism, but he does not possess it unto salvation. 'Aliud est non habere, aliud non utiliter habere.' In fact, the stubborn heretic or schismatic receives baptism, not to his profit, but to his eternal loss. The man who has received heretical baptism carries about with him a hidden treasure, which he can enjoy only in the bosom of the Church. In this way Aug. was able to reconcile his belief in the objective efficacy of the sacrament with his conviction that union with the Catholic Church could alone ensure a saving use of baptismal grace.

The Donatist controversy thus completed the development initiated in the dispute between Cyprian and Stephen. The two essentials of baptism, water and the Gospel formula, stand out with increasing clearness, and the minister is recognized to be of comparative unimportance.

(*c*) The insistence on the intrinsic efficacy of the ritual act is further evidenced by *the tendency to regard conscious faith on the part of the recipient as non-essential*. It is interesting to notice that this was one of the points of difference between the Manichæans and the Christians. To the former, a baptism apart from conscious faith was absurd.

There is an illuminating story in Aug.'s *Confessions*, bearing on this point. A sick friend of his was baptized while unconscious. Aug., who was at the time under the influence of Manichæan ideas, was ready to treat the matter as a joke, thinking that he would laugh at a baptism which he had received 'while utterly absent both in mind and feeling' (*mente ac sensu absentissimus*). The friend, however, took the matter more seriously, and Aug., as he tells the tale, clearly thinks that the baptism had wrought a real change *in corpore nescientis* (*Conf.* iv. 4).

But the principal evidence for the growth of the view that baptism was of worth apart from conscious faith in the recipient is to be found in the custom of **infant baptism**. The existence of the custom from the time of Tertullian is undeniable, and Tertullian's plea for delaying the baptism of children does not imply that the practice against which he protests was of recent growth *

Origen is familiar with the practice of child baptism, and assumes that it comes down from Apostolic times (*Com. in Rom.* v.). Cyprian's letter to Fidus (*Ep.* 59) discusses the question whether, in the case of infants, baptism should be postponed till the eighth day or not. Fidus wished to make the rite parallel with circumcision, and suggested that the babe was unclean immediately after birth. Cyprian and his colleagues decided that a babe might be baptized at the earliest possible moment, and they repudiated Fidus's suggestion, by saying that to kiss a new-born babe is in a manner to kiss the hands of God the creator. The whole discussion implies that infant baptism had long been in vogue. In the third century, infant baptism was regarded as an Apostolic institution at least in North Africa and in the Alexandrian churches. But while the evidence for the existence of the custom in the third century is overwhelming, we are, as Harnack says, 'in complete obscurity as to the Church's adoption of the practice.' The clear 3rd cent. references to child baptism interpret it in the light of original sin, and if the adoption of the practice is due to this interpretation, it is almost certainly a late 2nd cent. development. Cyprian clearly understands infant baptism in this sense (*Ep.* 59). Origen seems to have based its necessity on the pollution acquired in birth (*Hom.* viii. and xii. *in 1 Cor.*), while in his case the idea of pre-existence also suggested that infants were burdened with the sins of a previous life which might be removed in baptism (*de Prin.* iii. 5). This deduction of the need of infant baptism from the idea of original sin, or from that of pre-existence, may safely be regarded as a theological after-thought. The first is the product of reflexion on the writings of St. Paul. It is probable that men pondered long on the conception of original sin before they drew any such conclusion. References to original sin in Clement of Rome or other writers earlier than Cyprian cannot be held to imply a knowledge of the custom of infant baptism. Moreover, the idea that infants needed to be baptized for the remission of sins is contrary to all that is known of early Christian feeling towards childhood. The teaching of Jesus about children runs counter to any such notion, and, however little His sympathy for the young was appreciated, it was not forgotten (see Burkitt, *Gospel Hist. and its Transmission*, p. 285 f.). The most natural interpretation of the much-disputed text in St. Paul, 1 Co 7^{14}, is that Christian parentage in itself somehow hallowed childhood. Tert. speaks of the innocence, the guiltlessness of children, and apparently deduced from it that baptism was unnecessary (see *de Bapt.*, ed. Lupton, p. 52, n. 1). In this he represents what seems to have been the primitive Christian feeling, if the *Apology of Aristides* interprets that feeling aright: 'And when a child is born to any one of them, they praise God; and if, again, it chance to die in its infancy, they praise God mightily, as for one who has passed through the world without sins' (Syriac Version, c. 15, ed. J. Rendel Harris, Camb. *TS*). Perpetua's vision of her little brother Dinocrates, as in heaven, alive and well, shows how people clung to the idea that children as such belong to the

* This is Jerome's position: 'Ut enim accipit quis, ita et dare potest' (*Dial. c. Luciferianos, ap.* Hofling, i. p. 505).

* The fact that Tert. uses the term *parvulus* and not *infans* is of no particular significance. He is not thinking of new-born babes, but the reference to sponsors (and indeed his whole discussion) implies that the children concerned are incapable of a public profession of faith. The principle involved is the same, though clear evidence for the baptism of new-born babes is not forthcoming till Cyprian's letter to Fidus.

Kingdom. In such an atmosphere, a baptism of infants for the remission of sins is hardly conceivable.

But it is probable that the custom did not originate with theologians. It should be noted that even in the 3rd cent. infant baptism cannot be described as a Church-custom. That the Church allowed parents to bring their infants to be baptized is obvious: that some teachers and bishops may have encouraged them to do so is probable, though there is no reason to suppose that Tertullian's position was peculiarly his own. But infant baptism was not at this time enjoined or incorporated in the standing orders of the Church. [It was not till the middle of the 5th cent. that the Syrian Church made infant baptism obligatory (see *DCA* p. 170).] Indeed, in the 4th cent. so prominent a teacher as Gregory of Nazianzus, who was in general eager to persuade people not to postpone baptism, urged the inadvisability of baptizing children before they were three years old, 'when they are capable to hear and answer some of the holy words' (*Or. de Bapt.*, *ap.* Wall, ch. 11, § 7). Again, this does not sound like a personal idiosyncrasy of Gregory. In any case, it is probable that the custom arose from the pressure of parents and not through the direct advocacy of the Church. If this be so, the reason for the adoption of the custom may perhaps be sought outside the idea of the remission of sins. The Pelagians held that infants were baptized, not in order that their sins might be remitted, but in order that they might be sure of admission into the Kingdom of Heaven. Unbaptized infants would not be punished, but could not go to Heaven. Among other passages, they set great store by a well-known utterance of John Chrysostom, which runs thus:

'You see how many are the benefits of Baptism. And yet some think that the Heavenly grace consists only in forgiveness of sins. but I have reckoned up ten advantages of it. For this cause we baptize infants also, though they are not defiled with sin: that there may be superadded to them Holiness, Righteousness, Adoption, Inheritance, a Brotherhood with Christ, and to be made Members of him' (see Aug. *c Julian* I. VI. f).

Aug., in commenting on this extract, has no difficulty in showing that Chrysostom believed in original sin; but he does not succeed in disproving the Pelagian contention that Chrysostom found a reason for baptizing infants other than the need of the remission of sins or the need of getting rid of original sin. And though at first sight the Pelagian view of the necessity of infant baptism—the view that through it alone can certain positive advantages be secured—looks as if it were hammered out in the exigencies of controversy, yet it may after all be more primitive than that which eventually came to the front through the influence of Augustine.

Undoubtedly the Pelagian position harmonizes with some seemingly primitive Christian ideas about baptism. It has been suggested that baptism was from he first regarded as a Messianic sign. To be baptized was to be sealed for the coming Kingdom (see Schweitzer, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, p. 373 f.; and note use of term σφραγίς referred to on p. 385[b], and on Hermas, p. 384 f.). Baptism had a positive eschatological importance. To enter the Kingdom at all, one must wear the seal. The thought is expressed most simply in the apocryphal *Acts of Thomas*, where one of the Apostle's converts says: 'Give us the seal: for we have heard you say that the God whom you preach recognizes His sheep by the seal.' In the narrative, an anointing with oil follows; but this not improbably represents a primitive Christian view of baptism. Now it is possible that this thought even in NT times may have led parents to wish to have their children baptized. The primitive eschatological expectations may have introduced the custom—in which case it will be very early. In any event, the influence of Jn 3[5], as Hofling points out, played an all-important part in developing the custom of infant baptism. This text laid hold of the imagination in the 2nd century. Before any explanation of the necessity of re-birth had been thought out, the mere statement that to see the Kingdom a man must be born of water would trouble the minds of some whose children had died unbaptized. To such doubt and fear the practice probably owed its origin. The influence of the OT, and especially of the rite of circumcision, must also be taken into consideration; but, in general, the idea *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* made people anxious to enrol their children as Church members as quickly as possible.

When once the custom had been introduced, the interpretation which Aug. put upon it was almost inevitable. The conviction that there could be only one baptism, and that therefore baptism means always the same thing, to wit, remission of sins (the reference to 'one baptism' in Eph. is a constant factor in all discussions in this period); the use of the term 're-birth' in Jn 3, suggesting that baptism is a necessary supplement to natural birth; the ascetic view of marriage; the Pauline doctrine that flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God—all these elements combined to establish Aug.'s view. The Pelagians, in saying that children must be baptized, not in order to secure the remission of sins, but in order to secure the Kingdom, were introducing two baptisms—as clear a heresy as re-baptism itself. Moreover, the Pelagians could give no satisfactory account of the fate of infants who died unbaptized. They would obtain eternal life and happiness, but not the Kingdom. Aug. denies the distinction (see *ad Marc.* i. 20, and *Sermo* 294, where he says: 'hoc novum in ecclesia prius inauditum est, esse salutem æternam præter regnum Dei'). If those who die unbaptized are outside the Kingdom, they must be in eternal misery, even though their torment be *mitissima et tolerabilior* (*Enchiridion*, 93). Baptism would be needless if it did not mean remission of sin. Since then the Pelagians admit that children should be baptized, and since children are innocent, the sin remitted to them must be original sin. That they are sinful is clear from the fact that Jesus called them to Himself, and He came to call not the righteous, but sinners (*ad Marc.* i. 19). But from Aug.'s standpoint the more serious error of the Pelagians lay in their optimistic view of human nature. To Aug. original sin was the most awful and obvious fact about men. The impossibility of keeping God's law apart from God's grace is written clear in all experience. The human will in itself is hopeless. 'We cannot do justly unless we are helped of God' (*ad Marc.* ii. 5). Human nature is tainted, and grace is a necessity from the first. The taint is explained monastically. Aug. admits that there is such a thing as a *bonum conjugii*, a legitimate use of wedlock, but he claims that all men are born of incontinence, and 'hoc est malum peccati in quo nascitur omnis homo. . . . Sed nemo renascitur in Christi corpore, nisi prius nascitur in peccati corpore' (*ad Marc.* I 29; cf. the discussion of the significance of virgin-birth, *Ench.* 34). In all this, Aug. is developing the thought already suggested in Cyprian. His position found emphatic approval in the Council of Carthage held in 418–9, which promulgated the following canon:

'Item placuit ut quicunque parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat, aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati quod lavacro regenerationis expietur (unde sit consequens ut in eis forma baptismatis in remissionem peccatorum non vera sed falsa intelligatur) Anathema sit' (*ap.* Wall, *Infant Baptism*, ch. 19).

Though, as Hofling maintains, the final preva-

lence of infant baptism must not be ascribed entirely to Aug., yet his defence of the practice must have done much to commend it. The emphasis on original sin made the rite seem natural and reasonable; for if, by their first unconscious and involuntary birth, children were born into an inheritance of sin, it was just that a second birth equally involuntary and unconscious should give them at least the chance of being co-heirs with Christ.* But however they interpreted the practice, the whole development implies the concentration of attention on the intrinsic efficacy of the ritual act. Aug. commends the African Christians because they spoke of baptism as salvation (*salus*). The giving of the sacrament to those 'who could not with their own heart believe unto righteousness, nor with their own mouth make confession unto salvation' witnesses to man's conviction of its inherent power to bestow spiritual blessings.

The growth of the practice of infant baptism broke in on the natural connexion between instruction, conscious faith, and the sacrament. The customary arrangements for the ceremony and the prescribed order rested on the assumption of conscious faith in the subjects. Up to the close of the 5th cent., baptism was still administered as a rule by the bishop (though later on the presbyters became the usual ministers—the anointing with oil on the forehead and confirmation being reserved for the bishop), and special seasons were devoted to the administration of baptism. Easter and Pentecost were observed in the West, and from the close of the 4th cent. many Popes made repeated attempts to confine baptisms to those seasons (see *DCA*, p. 165). The Eastern Churches further set apart Epiphany for this purpose, and local churches developed special usages. In case of necessity, baptism was administered at any time. Arrangements of this kind were natural when baptism regularly followed the catechumenate. The special seasons disappear when infant baptism becomes universal. Similarly, the whole ritual was designed for adults. The confession of faith in particular points to this; and it must be admitted that the institution of sponsors was a somewhat clumsy device to adapt to infants a ceremony which had clearly been ordered at a time when their baptism was not thought of. The Church reckoned baptized children as being among the faithful. The awkwardness of speaking of infants as *fideles* was felt by Bp. Boniface, to whom Aug. addresses a letter on the subject (*Ep.* 23). In the 8th cent., Theodulph (*de Ordine Baptism.* 1) naively remarks: 'Infantes ergo et audientes et catechumeni fiunt, non quo in eadem ætate et instrui et doceri possint, sed ut antiquus mos servetur, quo apostoli eos quos baptizaturi erant primum docebant et instruebant.' The ritual is frankly unsuitable for infants, but it is retained because the tradition that instruction and faith precede baptism is undeniably primitive.†

It should, however, be noted in this connexion, that it was never supposed that baptism apart from faith would suffice to secure eternal life.‡ Faith was still essential; but whereas faith had as a rule preceded baptism, it was now held that baptism would be equally effective if it preceded faith. And even so, a vicarious faith was required for the valid baptism of infants. Not only the sponsors, but the whole congregation, help to forward the communication of the Holy Spirit to the baptized child (see Aug. *Ep.* 23 *ad Bonifacium*). It is also true that baptism was administered only to children who would be instructed and trained in the Christian faith. It was never thought, or at least men were never encouraged to think, that the mere isolated act of baptism ensured salvation, even though the African Christians called it *salus*.

It remains to explain the ultimate prevalence of infant baptism. The catechumenate, and with it adult baptism, continued so long as the Church was making converts from heathenism. But infant baptism was not universally adopted by believers. For not only was the example of Constantine the Great, who postponed his baptism till near death, undoubtedly fashionable, and not only did many who were within the close range of Christian influence delay the decisive step, but there is reason to suppose that many baptized Christians did not in the 4th cent. push forward the baptism of their children. Gregory of Nazianzus, whose parents were both Christians, was not baptized till he was come to years of discretion (see Wall, vol. ii. ch. 3). The same was true of Ephraim Syrus (Butler, *Lives of the Saints*), and probably of Basil the Great (see Introd. to vol. viii. in 'Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,' p. xvi). The want of reference to infant baptism in Basil's discussions of the subject, and the general character of his treatise, suggest that many were brought up in their homes, and were not put forward as candidates for baptism until they entered the catechumenate in riper years. The postponement of Aug.'s baptism till he was thirty-three years old is usually attributed to the heathenism of his father. But the passage in the *Confessions* (bk. I. ch. xi. in Gibb and Montgomery's ed.) suggests that Monica was not anxious to have Aug. baptized, except when he was in danger of dying. During an illness, Aug. was on the point of being baptized, when he recovered. The crucial passage runs thus: 'Dilata est itaque mundatio mea, quasi necesse esset, ut adhuc sordidarer, si viverem, quia videlicet post lavacrum illud maior et periculosior in sordibus delictorum reatus foret.' The alleged reason must have weighed with his Christian mother, not with his heathen father. If this interpretation be correct, then Monica's view was characteristic of many Christians in the 4th century. 'Although,' says Harnack, 'the principle was maintained that baptism was indispensable to salvation, still people dreaded more the unworthy reception of it than the risk of ultimately failing to receive it. In the 4th cent. it was still very common to postpone it, in order not to use this sovereign remedy till the hour of death' (*op. cit.* iv. 284). Another motive of such conduct lay in the thought that a life of indulgence could be washed clean by a deferred baptism. The unbaptized man could safely enjoy himself. 'Let him alone, let him do what he will; he is not yet baptized' (Aug. *Conf.* I. xi.). This sentiment is re-echoed by the objectors to whom Basil addresses his work. Aug. and other Church teachers could not deny the main premiss here assumed. They could urge the dangers of delay, but they did not deny that baptism, so deferred, would still be efficacious if received. Aug. regards it as one of the signs that grace does much more abound that, whereas Adam's fall involves us in original sin, the grace of the Second Adam in baptism removes not only original sin but all the sins we have ourselves committed. Many were anxious that they and their children should secure this more abounding grace. Moreover, men hesitated before the *pondus baptismi*, the moral obligations of the step. In Edessa, at the time of Aphraates, baptism may have meant the adoption of celibacy and been confined to a spiritual aristocracy, 'the sons of the

* Cf. *e.g.* the sentence in Theodulph, the 8th cent. bp. of Orleans, who says (*de Ordine Baptism.* 7): 'nec immerito dignum est ut qui aliorum peccatis obnoxii sunt, aliorum etiam confessione per mysterium baptismatis remissionem originalium percipiant peccatorum.' Aug. provided just this kind of *raison d'être* for infant baptism.

† Incidentally, the evidence of the ritual is against a very early date for the practice of infant baptism.

‡ That faith and baptism are inseparable is emphasized in Basil, *de Sp. Sanc.* 12.

Covenant' (see Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 255 f.; but see also Connolly, *JThSt* vi.).

In the course of the 5th cent. infant baptism became the prevailing usage. The action of the Syrian Church in enforcing on parents the duty of having their children baptized has already been noticed. Many causes contributed to this result. The Christianization of society diminished the numbers of adult converts, and so lowered the importance of the catechumenate. The influence of Aug. and other Church Fathers was cast on this side. The growth of the penitential system served to remove in part man's fear of the *pondus baptismi*, while the readiness of the Church to administer the *viaticum*, or last sacrament, to all (see *DCA*, p. 2014), and eventually the practice of Extreme Unction, combined to meet the needs which had previously sought satisfaction in deferred and clinic baptism. Also, towards the latter part of this period, the penitential system became the means of moral instruction, which had previously been provided by the catechumenate. In the Church's dealings with the Teutonic nations, the baptism of converts resembled the baptism of infants in so far as systematic instruction in the faith was postponed till after baptism. It is true, Clovis and his followers were baptized on confession of faith; but the rude German warriors did not submit, and were not expected to submit, to a course of instruction such as had been given to catechumens. The catechumenate disappeared in the West, 'because, as whole peoples were baptized at once, infant baptism was introduced as a matter of course' (K. Muller). The Church opened her doors to infant and barbarian, partly because only so could she influence them, and partly because she believed that baptism could of itself confer benefits before faith was instructed or even existent.

(*d*) Some further illustrations of the importance attached to baptism, at least in the earlier portion of this period, may be adduced here. (1) As soon as Christianity became the State religion, *baptisteries* were among the first public buildings to be erected by believers. 'Of the construction of baptisteries in the time of Constantine the Great we have abundant proof' (*DCA*, p. 174). The practice of erecting separate buildings for the celebration of baptism continued in the West at least all through this period. It served to add solemnity to the rite of initiation. (2) The *elaboration of the ritual* served the same end. On p. 386 f. the development up to the time of Tert. is briefly summarized. If we compare the account in Theodulph of Orleans with that statement, the following additions are obvious. The practice of infant baptism by the close of the 8th cent. has led to the inclusion of the rites of the catechumenate in the *Ordo Baptismi*. The infants are first made catechumens, then breathed upon by the priest to receive the breath of the new life (insufflation). This is followed by exorcism and the reception of salt. It is probable, from Aug.'s reference in *de Pecc. remiss. c. Pel.* i. 34, that those rites were associated with infant baptism as early as his day. The *scrutinium*, to which Theodulph next refers, can have been only a form in the case of infants. The nose and ears were then touched with spittle, while the priest said 'Ephphatha.' This was followed by an anointing of the breast and shoulders with oil. This seems to be a weakened form of the preparatory unction which was certainly in use in the East in the time of Cyril of Jerusalem (see *Catech. Lect.* xx. 3). After baptism, Theodulph mentions the bestowing of white robes and of a mystic veil on the candidate, in addition to the chrism referred to by Tertullian. The clothing of the baptized with white garments is quite early, well-attested in the 4th century. Theodulph does not refer to the practice of handing over candles or torches to the neophytes to be lit up towards the close of the service, but the usage is clearly evidenced in Gregory of Nazianzus and in Ambrose, and is still preserved in the Roman ritual (see Hofling, i. 543). The use of milk and honey, mentioned in Tert., does not appear in Theodulph, and the history of this usage is obscure. As late as the 9th cent. there seems to have been a custom in some Western churches of mixing milk and honey in the communion wine offered to infants (Hofling, i. 546). A Gallican sacramentary adds the washing of the feet (*lotio pedum*, *pedilavium*) to the other ceremonies. Perhaps the most important addition after the 2nd cent. was the elaborate renunciation of the devil, together with all his works and pomps. The ceremonial development is an elaborate repetition of the central idea of the rite in additional symbolic acts. It tended to increase the mystery element in baptism. (3) A well-known story related in Socrates (*HE* ii. 16) forms the most striking illustration of the 4th cent. belief in the objective validity of the sacrament. The story is simply that the bishop of Alexandria accepted as valid a baptism administered by Athanasius as a boy to some companions who joined him in a game of pretence in which the ceremonial was imitated. The writer in *DCA* (p. 167) remarks that, whether true or legendary, 'it serves equally to illustrate the feeling of the Church at the time the story was first told.' Though baptism declined somewhat in importance after the 5th cent., the point of view here obtained was never lost. It was held (1) that baptism is essential to salvation;* (2) that baptism is valid if water and the true formula be used; (3) that baptism so administered confers an indispensable spiritual gift. This leads on to the discussion of—

II. *THE CONCEPTION OF BAPTISMAL GRACE IN THIS PERIOD.*—The primary gift in baptism is, of course, the remission of sins. 'Baptizati sumus, et fugit a nobis solicitudo vitæ præteritæ' (Aug. *Conf.* ix. 6). In the case of children, it is the guilt of original sin which is removed. There is an interesting observation in Cyril to the effect that 'remission of sins is given equally to all, but the communication of the Holy Ghost is bestowed according to each man's faith' (*Catech. Lect.* i. 5). The grace of forgiveness was, at any rate, assured. But baptism means more than this. It is essentially regeneration, and perhaps two main ideas may be grouped under this head: (1) the loosening of Satan's hold over the soul, (2) an organic inward change. (1) It is clear that to Cyprian baptism appealed as a peculiarly strong form of exorcism. Just as the Red Sea drowned Pharaoh, so baptism drowns the devil out of a man. 'Cum tamen ad aquam salutarem, atque ad baptismi sanctificationem venitur, scire debemus et fidere, quia illic diabolus opprimitur et homo Deo dicatus divina indulgentia liberatur . . . Spiritus nequam . . . permanere ultra non possunt in hominis corpore, in quo baptizato et sanctificato incipit spiritus sanctus habitare' (*Ep.* 76). Cyprian has previously pointed out that in exorcism the devil often plays the deceiver and says he has gone out when he has not; but the life-giving water is a sure means of expulsion. Somewhat similarly, in the apocryphal *Acts of Thomas*, a woman out of whom a devil has been cast asks the Apostle to give her the seal, 'that yonder fiend may not return to me again' ('Thomasakten,' § 49; *ap.* Hennecke, *Neutest. Apoc.*). In the baptism of infants, the exorcism and the renunciation were but parts of the process which was

* The only exception contemplated was martyrdom. Thus Cyril: 'If a man receive not baptism he has not salvation, excepting only the martyrs, who even without water enter the Kingdom' (*Catech. Lect.* iii. 10; cf. BAPTISM BY BLOOD).

completed in immersion. Every one, in virtue of birth, stands within the kingdom of Satan. This, to Aug., is clear from the fact that the soul of a new-born infant suffers 'several passions and torturings of the body, and, what is more dreadful, the outrage of evil spirits' (*de Pecc.* iii. 10). Why are infants exorcised at all, if they do not belong to the household of Satan? (*de Pecc.* i. 34). Aug.'s views here rest ultimately on the grand conception of the two cities, the City of God and its rival. The transition from the latter to the former is effected in baptism.

(2) Not only, however, is the devil driven out of possession, but the soul is cleansed and reformed in the process of regeneration. At times, and in the case of some persons, even bodily tendencies are completely removed. In a wonderful letter (*Ep.* 1), Cyp. speaks of the thorough change of character wrought in baptism. He explains to Donatus that for a long time he was sceptical on the subject. He could not believe that the extravagant man could be made thrifty, the luxurious induced to return to simplicity, the licentious persuaded into chastity.

'With enticements always gripping a man fast, revelling must as usual attract, pride as usual inflate, anger inflame. Greed will not cease to disquiet, cruelty will not lose its sting. The delight of ambition, the overwhelming power of lust, will not be less. So I thought. . . . But after the taint of my past life had been washed away with the aid of the regenerating wave, after light had poured from above into my cleansed heart, now calm and pure, after the second birth had made me a new man by the draught of the heaven-born spirit, then forthwith, in a wonderful fashion, things I had doubted became certain; closed doors opened; dark places were filled with light; what had seemed difficult was now easy; what I thought impossible became possible; so that I could not but see that the "I" of my previous fleshly birth, which had lived bound to sins, had been of the earth, whereas the "I," in which the Holy Spirit now breathed, had begun to be of God' (*Ep.* 1. 3).

Without attempting to analyze this beautiful passage, we may recognize that for Cyp. baptism meant the lessening of temptation. On this he is elsewhere very emphatic; for, when a correspondent is puzzled that sick persons after being baptized are still tempted of the devil, Cyprian's answer is practically to deny the fact (see *Ep.* 76). The same thought is expressed more crudely in the *Acts of Paul and Thekla*, where Thekla says, 'Give me the seal in Christ, and no temptation will invade me' (Hennecke, *op. cit.* 'Paulusakten,' § 25). The passage in the *Confessions* (i. 11), where Aug. wonders whether it would not have been better for him to have been baptized earlier, suggests that he would have sinned less in that case, not only because of the sense of responsibility attaching to baptism, but also because of the grace to live up to that responsibility which he would thereby have received. But this idea hardly needs illustration. The lessening of the power of temptation is brought about in two ways, viz. by the loosening of the hold of previously formed sinful habits, and by the gift of new life in the Spirit. The distinction is most interestingly presented in a passage from Basil:

'Hence it follows that the answer to our question why the water was associated with the Spirit is clear; the reason is because in baptism two ends are proposed: on the one hand, the destroying of the body of sin that it may never bear fruit unto death; on the other hand, our living with the Spirit and having our fruit in holiness: the water receiving the body as in a tomb figures death, while the Spirit pours in the quickening power, renewing our souls from the deadness of sin unto their original life. This then is what it is to be born again of water and of the Spirit, the being made dead being effected in the water, while our life is wrought in us through the Spirit' (*de Sp. Sanc.* 15; Oxford tr. by C. H. Johnston).

This first end—the death unto sin in baptism—is, of course, a commonplace in all discussions of the subject. The tendency was to conceive the grace of baptism as specially directed to counteract concupiscence, which formed the primary factor in original sin (see Aug. *Ench.* 64). Among the rhetorical epithets which Gregory of Nazianzus applies to baptism, not the least significant is his description of the new birth as λυτικὴ παθῶν, in contrast to carnal birth. Basil, again, explains the pillar of cloud as 'a shadow of the gift of the Spirit who cools the flame of our passions by the mortification of our members' (*de Sp. Sanc.* ch. 14).* So much, indeed, was expected of this destruction of sinward tendencies, that Hilary had to warn his readers against supposing that baptism would restore to them the innocence of childhood. Similarly Aug. is very careful not to exaggerate the benefits of baptism when he says (*de Pecc.* i. 39):

'Evacuatur [caro peccati] non ut in ipsa vivente carne concupiscentia conspersa et innata repente absumatur et non sit, sed ne obsit mortuo [parvulo] quæ inerat nato. Nam si post baptismum vixerit, . . . ibi habet cum qua pugnet, eamque adiuvante Deo superet, si non in vacuum gratiam eius susceperit . . . Nam nec grandibus hoc præstatur in baptismo (nisi forte miraculo ineffabili omnipotentissimi creatoris) ut lex peccati quæ inest in membris repugnans legi mentis, penitus extinguatur et non sit: sed ut quicquid mali ab homine factum, dictum, cogitatum est, cum eidem concupiscentiæ subjecta mente serviret, totum aboleatur, ac velut factum non fuerit, habeatur.'

For Aug. baptism means the breaking down of sinful habit, the bestowal of a special grace of resistance, but not the entire removal of the enemy. The new life in the Holy Spirit is not altogether distinct from this loosening of sinful habit, but it is something more than this. 'Baptism purges our sins and conveys to us the gift of the Holy Spirit' (Cyril, *Catech. Lect.* xx. 6). More than once in the 4th and 5th cent. literature the thought appears that baptism makes a Divine impress (*effigies*) on the raw material (*terra*) of human nature (Aug. *Conf.* i. 11, xiii. 12). The raw material is, so to speak, cleansed for the reception of the Spirit, and then receives the stamp of the image of God. 'The water cleanses the body, the Spirit seals the soul' (Cyril, *Catech. Lect.* iii. 4). The natural powers of men did then and there receive a Divine reinforcement. Hilary claims that the doctrine of the Trinity can be understood only by the regenerate mind. 'Novis enim regenerati ingenii sensibus opus est ut unumquemque conscientia sua secundum cœlestis originis munus illuminet' (Hil. *de Trin.* i. 18). The power and presence of the Spirit were bestowed in baptism, though, according to Cyril, the gift of the Spirit was proportioned to faith (*Catech. Lect.* i. 5). Thus baptism did not simply secure the remission of sins: it tamed the fierceness of temptation; it broke 'the power of cancelled sin'; it began the new life.

Note on Confirmation and Baptism —At the beginning of the 3rd cent., Confirmation and Baptism were universally parts of the same rite. This close connexion continued to be normal for the 3rd and 4th cents., though in the West Confirmation began to be detached from Baptism 'shortly before the middle of the 3rd century' (Harnack, *op. cit.* ii. 141, n. 3). By the close of the period, they are usually separated in the West (see Theodulph, *de Ordine Baptism.* 17); but 'it was not till the thirteenth century that the two ordinances were permanently separated, and an interval of from seven to fourteen years allowed to intervene' (*DCA*, p 425)

The writers of this period do not hesitate to attribute the very highest spiritual blessings to baptism (see, *e g*, the authorities cited in Stone, *Holy Baptism*, ch. v. n 11) But it is difficult to say how far they attributed these blessings to baptism in the narrow sense of the term, as distinct from Confirmation. A definite line of doctrine associated the cleansing with immersion, and the gift of the Holy Spirit with the imposition of the hands of the bishop. The man who was baptized and not confirmed was like a cleansed temple without a Divine tenant. This view rested on a very early tradition (see p 382 f. on Acts and 387 on Tert.). It appears in Cyp. (*Ep.* 74, § 5), and most clearly in Cornelius's verdict on Novatian (Eus *HE* vi. 43). Novatian had been baptized on his bed during sickness. On recovery he failed to receive the supplementary rites: more particularly he was not sealed by the bishop Since he missed this, how could he have received the Holy Ghost? (οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔτυχε, διαφυγὼν την νόσον, ὧν χρὴ μεταλαμβάνειν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἐκκλησίας κανόνα, τοῦ τε σφραγισθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου. Τούτου δὲ μὴ τυχών, πῶς ἂν τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἔτυχε;). Perhaps this passage should not be pressed, as it is the product of controversy; but it is evidence for the practice of the Church in the case of 'clinics.' If they recovered, their baptism, which would otherwise have been counted sufficient in itself, must be completed by Confirmation

* The connexion between chastity and baptism had been overemphasized in some heretical sects. Cf. p. 388 on Marcion, and also note *Acts of Thomas* here.

if it was to be effective * It further shows that normally baptism was not complete without the laying on of hands, and consequently this part of the ceremony was essential to the reception of the Holy Ghost.

The development of thought on the subject during this period seems to have been briefly this:—

(1) Cyprian and his supporters regarded immersion and the laying on of hands as inseparable parts of the same sacrament, which could not safely be administered apart. This latter assertion is aimed at the Roman view. See *Ep.* 73, and note the strong view of Remesianus (in *Cypriani Opera*, ed Hartel, i. p. 639): 'Neque enim spiritus sanctus sine aqua separatim operari potest nec aqua sine spiritu. Male ergo sibi quidam interpretantur ut dicant quod per manus impositionem spiritum sanctum accipiant et sic recipiantur, cum manifestum sit utroque sacramento debere eos renasci in ecclesia catholica' (Harnack, ii. p. 141, n. 1).

(2) As we have seen earlier, the author of the *de Rebaptismate* contends that spiritual baptism is essentially bound up with the laying on of hands, and that, though water and Confirmation are necessary to a complete Christian baptism, yet the two parts of the one rite may be sundered in time The benefits of immersion are latent until the rite is supplemented by the laying on of hands. On this view, as on Cyprian's, the laying on of hands is essential to the gift of the Holy Spirit, but the two parts of the one sacrament are separable. It may be noted here that, even after baptism began to be more frequently administered by presbyters and deacons, and the episcopal Confirmation was separated from baptism in point of time, they were not immediately regarded as distinct sacraments. Confirmation completes baptism. Thus the Council of Elvira (324 ?) ordered that in the case of those who had been baptized by a deacon, 'sine episcopo vel presbytero,' the bishop 'per benedictionem perficere debet.' In this edict, baptism by the presbyter includes the laying on of hands: but Jerome seems to confine the latter to bishops, who were to travel round their districts and lay hands on the baptized *ad invocationem Sp. Sancti* (see *DCA*, 'Confirmation,' p. 425, where *c. Lucifer.* 4 is cited). In the 8th cent. Theodulph, as noted, expressly reserves Confirmation to the bishop. However, the canon of the Council of Elvira clearly shows that Confirmation was regarded as the necessary complement to Baptism, and that the two ordinances could be received at different times (cf. also *Tracts for the Times*, 67, p. 153 n).

(3) Jerome, in his discussion with the Luciferians, asserts that the Holy Spirit is bestowed in true baptism; and he regards the insistence on episcopal Confirmation as mainly a matter of Church order, intended rather for the honour of the priesthood than for any rule of necessity ('ad honorem potius sacerdotii quam ad legem necessitatis'). He argues that those who are baptized in outlying districts, and who fail to be confirmed, would be in a deplorable position, if the gift of the Holy Spirit can be received only through the laying on of hands. He claims that the case of the eunuch whom Philip baptized proves that the Holy Spirit is really given in baptism (*Dial. c. Lucif.*, *ap.* Hofling, i. 505). In this position, Jerome represents the development which was almost inevitable as soon as baptism and Confirmation were considered as separable within the Church, and the separation was no longer that between heretical baptism and orthodox Confirmation. In the latter case, it was natural to assert that the gift of the Holy Spirit depended on Confirmation; in the former it was equally natural to claim that there was a clear bestowal of the Holy Spirit in baptism apart from Confirmation. The ultimately predominant view in the West was expressed in a Gallician homily (author unknown) on Pentecost, from which the following sentences are taken: 'Ergo Sp. Sanctus, qui super aquas baptismi salutifero descendit illapsu, in fonte tribuit plenitudinem ad innocentiam, in confirmatione augmentum præstat ad gratiam. Quia in hoc mundo tota ætate victuris inter invisibiles hostes et pericula gradiendum est, in baptismo regeneramur ad vitam, post baptismum confirmamur ad pugnam, in b ablumur, post b. roboramur. Ac sic continuo transituris sufficiunt regenerationis beneficia, victuris autem necessaria sunt confirmationis auxilia' In this way Baptism and Confirmation tend to become two independent sacraments, each really bestowing the Spirit, and each endowed with a special grace.

In Augustine's discussion of heretical baptism, the conception of special graces attaching to baptism and the laying on of hands had been clearly emphasized. Baptism of itself imparted a certain stamp to the soul, and the *manus impositio* resulted in the bestowal of that highest gift of the Spirit, the bond of love which could be received only in communion with the Catholic Church (see passages collected in Hofling, i. 506 f.). This highest gift of love was necessary to the heretic if what he had received in baptism was not to work him eternal ruin; it was equally necessary to the orthodox believer, *ad confirmationem unitatis in ecclesia*—to borrow the phrase of a later writer, Haymo.

It should further be noted that all the effects of baptism were the work of the Holy Spirit. Even where there is a tendency to regard baptism as a preparatory cleansing, this cleansing is in itself the gift of the Holy Spirit, an evidence of the operation of the Holy Spirit in the soul of the baptized. The emphasis on this is universal. Take, *e.g.*, Origen's insistence on the importance of the invocation: 'The bath of regeneration . . . is no longer mere water: for it is sanctified by a mystic invocation' . . . οὐκέτι μὲν ψιλὸν ὕδωρ· ἁγιάζεται γὰρ μυστικῇ τινι ἐπικλήσει (*ad* Jn 3[5] fr. 36). If in Aug. the invocation is not felt to be indispensable, the reason is that all water has been consecrated, both by the baptism of Jesus and by the fact of the Holy Spirit brooding over it at creation. Water is the natural instrument of the Spirit, and it is cleansing only because the Spirit works through it. Thus in the *Ench.* Aug. points out that, though Christians are said to be born of water, they are not sons of water, but sons of the Spirit and of their mother the Church (cf. Basil, *de Sp. Sanc.* 15). All that takes place in baptism is spiritual; and even those who connect the Holy Spirit most closely with Confirmation recognize a gift of the Spirit in baptism, if they accept baptism as valid at all Indeed it is mainly in limiting the benefits of heretical baptism that the earlier view found in Tert. is pressed. When men's thoughts were not troubled with the question presented by the separation of the two ordinances, they unhesitatingly attributed the gift of the Spirit in the fullest sense to baptism. Thus Basil (*op. cit.* 15) distinctly connects the pouring in of the Spirit and the beginning of the new life with immersion. 'The water receiving the body as in a tomb figures death, while the Spirit pours in the quickening power, renewing our souls from the deadness of sin unto their original life. . . . In three immersions, then, and with three invocations, the great mystery of baptism is performed.' Though Basil even here does not use the term 'the indwelling of the Spirit,' yet surely it is implied; and this is the unembarrassed expression of the natural Christian view of baptism. For further discussion see Mason, *Relation of Confirmation to Baptism*, and Hofling, § 94.

III. *THE BEARING OF BAPTISM ON THE CHURCH LIFE OF THIS PERIOD.*—One or two general observations must be added here.

(*a*) The whole development in the earlier centuries here under review reflects *the influence of the pagan background on the Church's life.* It is true that the institution of baptism cannot be traced to a Gentile source. But the insistence on the objective efficacy of the sacrament is largely the result of pagan presuppositions. The idea of regeneration may not be derived from the heathen world; men's preoccupation with it comes from this source (cf. Heitmuller on John, in *Die Schriften des NT*, ii. 743). It may be that no parts of the Christian ceremonial are borrowed from the Mysteries: but the tendency to add to the solemnity of initiation, which is implied in the ceremonial development, is one of the characteristics of the Mysteries. The close connexion of baptism with exorcism and with the renunciation of the devil is derived not from the NT, but from the demon environment in which the Church was actually living. If the bestowal of grace through visible objects be a primitive Christian conception, the emphasis on the material means was largely evoked by pagan feeling. The purpose of the sacramental side of the Church's life may have been designed to give that assurance of real contact with God somewhere which so many despairing pagans failed to find anywhere. It may be doubted whether the certainty about God for which men longed intensely could have been mediated on any large scale to the world at that time except through the conception of sacramental means of grace.

In this connexion the reader must be referred to the popular views mentioned on p. 394. Some of these betray a non-Christian emphasis. It is probable that the Punic Christians who spoke of baptism as *salus* implied much that Aug would have hesitated to endorse. A perhaps more than Christian confidence seems to be displayed on sarcophagi of the 4th and 5th centuries, since the present writer understands that the description of the deceased as 'baptized' was as reassuring as phrases like *inter sanctos.*

(*b*) The rite of baptism *focused attention on some central Christian truths.* Thus, those who received it were led to reflect on the doctrine of the Trinity. In the teaching of Aug. the idea of regeneration in itself suggested and enforced the fundamental concept of grace. Baptism meant that salvation is God's work, and apart from Him it does not even begin (cf. *Tracts for the Times*, 67, pp. 91–97).

(*c*) As interpreted by the great teachers, *e.g.* Basil and Cyril of Jerusalem, *baptism became a powerful moral lever.* The ethical and the sacra-

* This consideration rather weakens the force of the argument based on Cyp *Ep.* 76. There Cyp. argues that *clinici*, although merely sprinkled (*perfusi*) and not immersed (*loti*), are as truly baptized as any, and that in them the Holy Spirit dwells. But, as he seems to be speaking of recovered *clinici*, it cannot be assumed with Darwell Stone (*op. cit.* p. 80) that they had not been confirmed

mental were neither separated nor opposed in the minds of the Fathers of the 4th and 5th centuries. ἄρα πᾶς ὁ βαπτισθεὶς τὸ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου βάπτισμα ὀφειλέτης ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ζῆν—is the conclusion of the discussion of the first question in Bk. ii. of Basil's work on Baptism. It is the motto of all his treatment of the subject. To him baptism is primarily a death, which commits us to a new life (see his *de Bapt.* i., and *de Sp. Sanc.* 15, § 35, and cf. Cyril, *Catech. Lect.*, Introd. § 4, and Lect. ii.). Clearly his view of baptism and its moral effects is derived from the conversions which must have been constantly associated with the rite. And his exposition of the life demanded from the baptized shows that it was possible only to a morally renewed character. The association of this moral change with baptism, and the emphasis on the moral obligations therein assumed, must have made it a powerful factor in raising the moral life. Moreover, the preparation for baptism and the actual ceremony marked most impressively the convert's complete break with paganism. The Christians thought of themselves as a distinct race (cf. Aristides); it is difficult to over-estimate the moral stimulus of the solemn initiation which made a man a member of that race. But the influence of baptism in this direction was certainly diminished as the catechumenate decayed. The moral power of infant baptism could never be as great.

(*d*) It must, however, be remembered that the decay of the catechumenate and the practice of infant baptism enabled the Church to Christianize the barbarian nations more rapidly than if the older system had been retained. 'At a later time, baptism brought a man under the jurisdiction of the Church. The Inquisition had no authority over a non-baptized person. To baptize a man was therefore to bring him under jurisdiction. Thus, in the case of the Saxons in Charles the Great's day, and the Danes in Alfred's, baptism was a token of submission' (note by Foakes-Jackson). With this readier admission to the Church went, no doubt, *the decay of the Puritan conception of the Church*. 'But it is clear that if the Church was to gain any hold upon the society of the old world which was to pass away, or upon the new races that were to take their place, it must receive them into its fold as they were' (A. V. G. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, p. 408). This was certainly true of the new races.

2. The Middle Ages and the Council of Trent.—Though Scholasticism devoted much attention to the sacraments, the mediæval Church added little to the doctrine of Baptism. The position arrived at in the earlier period was simply defended and defined against heresy and malpractice. Developments were few. The re-statement of the orthodox view in the Lateran Council of 1216 may be taken as the starting-point for a few observations. The definition there adopted was 'Sacramentum vero baptismi, quod ad invocationem individuæ trinitatis, videlicet, Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, consecratur in aqua tam parvulis quam adultis, in forma ecclesiæ a quocumque rite collatum, proficit ad salutem' (Labbe, *Concilia*, xi. 143).

(*a*) The main point asserted here is that *baptism does produce a real effect which makes for salvation, even in infants.* Innocent III. held that, as original sin was contracted by infants *sine consensu*, so they could be freed from it, *per vim sacramenti*, before they were of an age to understand and consent. Similarly, he thought that baptism would be effective if administered to men asleep or mad, provided they had previously shown an intention of receiving the sacrament. Only a definite resistance at the time of baptism could render it inoperative (Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, 341 f.). Repentant Waldensians must approve the baptism of infants (*ib.* 370). Earlier Councils had anathematized heretics who asserted 'parvulis inutiliter baptismum conferre.' The Lateran Council of 1139 condemned those who rejected the *baptisma puerorum*. Denzinger identifies these heretics with the followers of Peter of Bruys and Arnold of Brescia. Similarly, the Council of Rheims in 1148 condemned the Henricians. The general sacramentalism of most Scholastics, early and late, emphasized the real effectiveness of baptism. To Hugo de S. Victor, Augustine's definition of a sacrament as *signum rei divinæ* seemed inadequate. He preferred to speak of a sacrament as 'corporale vel materiale elementum foris sensibiliter propositum, ex similitudine repræsentans, ex institutione significans, et ex sanctificatione continens aliquam invisibilem et spiritualem gratiam.' Similarly, the sacraments of the NT differ from those of the OT by being more effective. The latter promise, whereas the former give, salvation (see the well-known sentence in Peter Lombard *ap.* Hagenbach, *Dogmengesch.*[3] 452). Later, Thomas Aquinas holds that 'necesse est dicere sacramenta novæ legis per aliquem modum gratiam causare.' That the NT sacraments work *ex opere operato* was a not uncommon view (cf. Hagenbach, p. 453, n. 7). Consequently Thomas Aquinas regarded baptism as a *causa instrumentalis* of grace, though he held that it 'does not act by virtue of its own form, but only through the impulse it receives from the principal agent' (Harnack, vi. 206). For this reason the institution or appointment of the sacrament is all-important to Aquinas. He was the first to trace all the seven sacraments of the Schoolmen back to Christ, whose Passion made them of worth. More especially in Baptism, as in Confirmation and Ordination, a certain stamp (*character*) is irrevocably assumed by the recipient (see the definition by Eugenius IV.: 'Inter hæc sacramenta, tria sunt, Baptisma, Confirmatio, et Ordo, quæ characterem *i.e.* spirituale quoddam signum a ceteris distinctivum imprimunt in anima indelebile, unde in eadem persona non reiterantur'). From this standpoint the Lateran Council of 1216 had rebuked the Greeks for re-baptizing those whom the Latins had already baptized (Denz. 361). Some of the Schoolmen seem to have doubted whether baptism conveyed to infants anything more than the remission of the guilt of original sin. But in 1312, Clement V. lent the weight of his authority to the alternative doctrine that not only was guilt remitted, but 'virtutes ac informans gratia infunduntur quoad habitum, etsi non pro illo tempore quoad usum' (Denzinger, 411).

(*b*) *The general necessity of water-baptism to salvation was steadily maintained*, Jn 3[5] being the chief authority for the position (see Bull of Eug. IV.; cf. Denz. 591). Thomas Aquinas, however, regarded Flagellants as, equally with the martyrs, baptized in blood; and such baptism made the use of water non-essential. Also, the clear intention to be baptized might stand for the deed. Thus Innocent III. declares that an unbaptized priest (!), who died *sine unda baptismatis* but strong in faith, must be held to have reached the joy of the land celestial (see Denz. 343). But baptism *aut in voto aut in re* is necessary. This position was maintained against the Cathari, who rejected water-baptism as an empty ceremony. It would also be maintained against those who, following Joachim de Flore, regarded sacraments as a temporary expedient, doomed to disappear in the Kingdom of the Spirit. That the sacraments might ultimately be left behind was not denied; but that such a stage had been reached or was imminent, or that such a stage would ever come to the Church Militant on earth, was not to be admitted.

(*c*) *The minister of baptism was usually the priest*, and in the mission churches of Germany

the ceremony was by preference administered in the mother-church of a given group (Hauck, *Kirchengesch. Deutschlands*, iv. 23). But the Lateran Council of 1216 is careful to state that baptism is valid, by whomsoever duly administered. In cases of necessity, no restriction is observed, provided the minister keeps to the Church's form and intends to do what the Church does. Eugenius IV. states the matter thus: 'Minister huius sacramenti est sacerdos, cui ex officio competit baptizare. In causa autem necessitatis non solum sacerdos vel diaconus, sed etiam laicus vel mulier, immo etiam paganus et hæreticus baptizare potest dummodo formam servet Ecclesiæ et facere intendat quod facit Ecclesia' (Denz. 591). Innocent III. does not even emphasize the occasion of necessity, and in the earlier Middle Ages lay baptism may have been not infrequent. The Church was also careful to assert that the character of the minister did not impugn the validity of the sacrament. This view was urged against the Waldensians, on whom Innocent III. imposed the following recantation: 'Sacramenta quoque . . . licet a peccatore sacerdote ministrentur, dum Ecclesia eum recipit, in nullo reprobamus' (Denz. 370). This position needed also to be upheld in the face of popular superstition. Thus, somnambulists were popularly supposed to have been baptized by drunken priests, and in 1375 there was an uproar in a Dutch town because an epidemic of St. Vitus's dance was attributed to the incontinence of the priests who had administered baptism (see Lecky, *Hist. of Rationalism*, i. 399, note). The prevalence of such ideas would make it necessary to assert that the sacrament depended on the intention and not on the character of the minister. That, however, a minister was necessary was as steadily maintained. Innocent III. condemns the self-baptism of a dying Jew (Denz. 344).

(*d*) *The essentials of baptism remained unchanged.* The rite was duly administered if the name of the Trinity was invoked, and if water was used. Some phrase must be used to state the fact that the candidate is being baptized. It is not enough to say 'In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti,' and immerse. The omission of 'Ego baptizo te' is condemned by Alexander III., and the condemnation was repeated in 1690 (Denz. 331, 1184). But both the Latin formula 'Ego baptizo te in nomine . . .' and the Greek 'Baptizatus est talis in nomine . . .' are recognized as valid by the Bull of Eugenius IV. (Denz. 591).

As to the second element, the use of true natural water, hot or cold, was alone recognized in baptism (see Eug. Bull). Innocent III. declared a baptism of an infant *in extremis* with human saliva to be invalid (Denz. 345). A special sanctity attached to water. The earlier discussions as to the possibility of baptizing in wine or milk or sand were not seriously revived.

Perhaps the only important change in the form of baptism was the general substitution in the West of sprinkling for immersion. The West seems always to have been readier to alter tradition in this matter than the East. Thus, while the East retained trine immersion, Gregory the Great had permitted, in Spain, the adoption of one immersion (*Ep.* i. 43, ratified in Council of Toledo, 633). Affusion had from the earliest times been permitted, at least in cases of necessity. In the Middle Ages, from the 13th cent. onwards, *baptisma per aspersionem* became more and more common. The decree of Innocent III., cited in the previous paragraph, implies it. Thomas Aquinas compared sprinkling with immersion, and, while preferring the latter as better representing the death to sin, regarded the former as valid. Clement V. formally recognized the practice (1305), and in the 15th century Lyndwood (iii. 25) declared that 'it is sufficient that a small drop of water thrown by the baptizer touch him who is to be baptized. It is sufficient that water which has been sprinkled touch some part of the body' (cited *ap.* Stone, p. 272). It appears that England did not so readily abandon the older practice of immersion as the Continental churches. According to Floyer (*History of Cold Bathing*, p. 63, ed. 1706), Erasmus noted it as a singularity in England that infants were still immersed, and sprinkling did not become general till after the Reformation (see Wall, pt. ii. ch. 9, for full discussion).

(*e*) In Germany, at least, *an attempt was made to magnify the office of godfather.* It was expected that godfathers would instruct their godchildren in the Creed and the Lord's Prayer (Hauck, *op. cit.* iv. 38). This was a poor substitute for systematic instruction by the priest, but it was an attempt to attach a real responsibility to the office of godfather. The Council of Trent subsequently emphasized the importance of sponsors by forbidding marriage between persons who stood in the relationship of godfather and godchild. They were regarded as within the prohibited degrees (Sessio 24, ch. 2).

The moral power and general importance of baptism were diminished by the enhanced value set on the sacrament of Penance. In the decrees of the Lateran Council of 1216, the decree relative to baptism is immediately followed by a reference to penance: 'Et si post susceptionem baptismi quisquam prolapsus fuerit in peccatum, per veram pœnitentiam *semper* potest reparari.' The early Church had refused to follow the Novatians and condemn penitents to despair; but, whereas the early Church held out hope to the penitent, the mediæval Church offered them the assurance of recovery in the sacrament of Penance. This tended to minimize the horror of post-baptismal sin, or, perhaps it would be truer to say, it recognized the absence of any such distress in the mediæval believer.

The Council of Trent systematized the mediæval doctrine and practice. In the 5th session, original sin and the relation of baptism to original sin were discussed. Adam's transgression meant that he lost his original righteousness, incurred God's wrath, became liable to death, was under the power of Satan, and suffered a change for the worse in body and spirit. These effects are transmitted to all his posterity. This sin of Adam is passed on to every one, and can be removed only by the merit of Christ. His merit avails for young and old in the sacrament of baptism. Infants are to be baptized, not that sins of their own committing may be forgiven, but 'ut in eis regeneratione mundetur quod generatione contraxerunt.' The necessity of rege[illegible] rests on Jn 3[5]. The guilt of original sin is removed in baptism, and the regenerate are no longer sinful in the eyes of God, though there remains in them a root of concupiscence which is left for them to struggle against. This concupiscence must not be called 'sin,' if by the term it is implied that there is anything in the regenerate which can properly be called sin. It is sin only in so far as it comes from sin and leads to it. During the 7th session, the Council put forth 16 anathemas on the subject of baptism. They assert the following points: the baptism of John is not the same as that of Christ; natural water is necessary to baptism; the Church of Rome has the true doctrine on this subject; heretical baptism, administered in the name of the Trinity and with the true intention of the Church, is valid; baptism is not a matter of choice, but is necessary to salvation; the baptized can lose grace, through sin, even if they retain faith; the baptized are bound not simply to believe, but also to keep the whole

law of Christ; the baptized must conform to the teaching of the Church; vows made after baptism cannot be regarded as cancelled by the baptismal confession; post-baptismal sin cannot be done away with merely by the memory of baptism; a repentant apostate does not need to be re-baptized; no one should assert that a candidate for baptism must be of the same age as our Lord at His baptism; infants must not be denied baptism because they cannot exercise conscious faith; the ratification of baptism by the baptized when of age is not optional.

The Council regarded baptism as the *causa instrumentalis* of justification, adopting the phrase of Thomas Aquinas (Sess. vi. ch. 7), and further distinguished between Baptism and Penance. In the former the priest does not act as judge. He must admit all to baptism. Baptism means a new creation, and is the free gift of grace. It cannot be repeated. Penance, on the other hand, is controlled by the priest as a judge, can be repeated, and is rightly described as a laborious baptism.

A brief analysis of the Roman ritual for administering baptism to infants may complete this section. The priest meets the company at the door of the church. After the question, What do you want of the Church? and the answer, the priest drives out the unclean spirit by exsufflation. He then makes the sign of the cross with his finger over the forehead and over the heart of the child. After two prayers, salt—the salt of wisdom—is given to the child. A further prayer is followed by exorcism. The priest now brings the child into the church and approaches the font, repeating the Creed and the Lord's Prayer as he goes. A second exorcism is pronounced, and the priest wets his finger, and with it touches the ears and nostrils of the child, saying 'Be opened.' The sponsors on behalf of the child renounce the devil with all his pomps and works, and the priest proceeds to anoint the child with holy oil, on the breast and between the shoulders, in the form of a cross. The sponsors repeat the Creed. Baptism follows by triple affusion or by immersion. Where there is a doubt whether the child has not already been baptized, the priest prefaces the formula with the words 'si non es baptizatus.' The child is now anointed with the holy chrism on the top of the head. A white cloth is placed on his head and a lighted candle is given to him or his godfather to hold. The ceremony concludes with a benediction.

The developments of the Reformation will most readily be classified by their relation to this standard of doctrine and practice.

3. The Reformation Period and after.—The mediæval development, summed up in the Tridentine decrees, had emphasized the paramount importance of the sacraments for religion. The sacraments are pre-eminently the means of grace, and by them the Divine influence is accommodated to the varying necessities of differing periods of the Christian life. With Baptism is bound up the grace of regeneration, the forgiveness of original sin, and of all actual sins committed before its reception. Without it we cannot enter on the Christian life. Other sacraments—Confirmation, Penance, and the Eucharist—are ordained of God to provide the grace demanded by the later needs of the believer. The essential efficacy of baptism was strongly asserted. It imprints even on passive recipients a Divine impress or character.* An elaborate ritual, if explained and understood, enforced the central idea of the new birth by symbolic reiteration; if unexplained and misunderstood, it still enhanced the sense of mystery surrounding the sacrament, though it tended to produce popular superstition.* For good or ill, it increased the importance of the ceremony. This standard of doctrine and practice underwent considerable modification in the Protestant Churches.

It would involve needless repetition to discuss in detail the position of each Church. Instead, we shall show how the views of the sacrament were affected by some of the leading ideas of the Reformation, giving illustrations from the formularies and practices of particular Churches. The changed conception of grace which carried with it a revised conception of the means of grace; the new idea of faith, and the fresh emphasis thrown upon it; the appeal from tradition to the Bible; the humanism and rationalism of the Renaissance—all these influences in their several ways profoundly affected the doctrine and practice of baptism. These leading forces may be discussed in order, though any attempt to keep them rigidly apart must be artificial.

A. The Conceptions of Grace and Faith.—The Reformers' conceptions of grace and faith are inseparably connected. It is a commonplace that the fundamental fact in the Reformation, at least as dominated by Luther, was the renewal of the Pauline experience of justification by faith. Forgiveness of sins and fellowship with God became realities to a penitent trust in the Divine Love. The assurance to which faith clung was mediated through the word or promise of God, however preached. The entry of the grace of God into the believing heart might be effected in many ways—by prayer, by the ministry of a preacher, by the reading of the Bible. Faith comes by hearing. Wherever the influence of Luther or of Calvin went, this kind of faith—a conscious penitent trust in the Gospel—was aroused, and it tended to revolutionize men's views of the sacraments.

(1) *The sacraments came to be regarded as one means of grace among others.* To Luther the sacraments are nothing but 'a peculiar form of the saving word of God (of the self-realizing promise of God)' (Harnack, vii. p. 216). The influence of the sacraments was thus assimilated to the influence of preaching. Calvin, in the first edition of the *Institutes*, discusses prayer and faith before he comes to the sacraments at all. *The sacraments have ceased to be central.* Other means of grace—prayer, the devotional study of the Scriptures, the development of preaching—have been placed alongside of and even above them. This tendency has worked itself out in Protestantism over against Roman Catholicism, in Calvinism as contrasted with Lutheranism, and in the Puritanism of Dissent in distinction from Anglicanism. To illustrate from the last only, the Puritans wanted lectures, Archbishop Laud wanted an altar; and, as Dr. Forsyth says, the sermon holds the central place in the church life of Nonconformity which the Mass holds in Roman Catholicism. In general, it followed that for the Reformers the sacraments were not absolutely indispensable; they did not communicate a grace which could not otherwise be mediated. 'Believers before and without the use of sacraments communicate with Christ' is one of the heads of agreement between Zürich and Geneva in 1554. It is not true, of course, that all Reformers or Reformed Churches would have accepted the following position of Calvin, but it represents an undeniable characteristic of Protestantism:

* See Tyndale, *Doctrinal Treatises*, p. 276 f.

* Attention was in the main concentrated on the gift of God in the sacrament. The grace accorded in baptism was held by the Thomists to be necessarily and reasonably associated with water, while the Scotists would regard the spiritual effect as an arbitrarily predetermined synchronism with the use of the element. In either case, emphasis is thrown on the sacrament as a certain and indispensable means of grace

'It is an error to suppose that anything more is conferred by the sacraments than is offered by the word of God, and obtained by true faith. . . . Assurance of salvation does not depend on participation in the sacraments, as if justification consisted in it. This, which is treasured up in Christ alone, we know to be communicated, not less by the preaching of the Gospel than by the seal of a sacrament, and it may be completely enjoyed without this seal' (*Inst.* IV. xiv. 14).

The Westminster Confession applies this general principle to baptism when it says that 'Grace or salvation is not so inseparably annexed unto Baptism that no person can be regenerated or saved without it.' This point of view is more clearly expressed in Calvin than in Luther. Calvin maintained that baptism is necessary, 'not to give efficacy to God's promise, but to confirm it to us,' and 'when we cannot receive the sacraments of the Church, the grace of God is not so inseparably annexed to them that we cannot obtain it by faith according to His word' (*Inst.* IV. xv. 22).

Calvin's standpoint is well illustrated (1) by his rejection of the baptism of children *in extremis* as superstitious, and (2) by his abandonment of the traditional interpretation of Jn 3[5]. Under the first head, he regarded lay baptism as unnecessary, and baptism by women as a presumptuous sin. Their only justification was the absolute necessity of baptism; but this he denied. 'Unbaptized children are not therefore excluded from the kingdom of heaven.' The elect child will be saved, baptized or unbaptized. Under the second head, he claimed that the phrase 'born of water' does not refer to baptism, but 'water and spirit' in this passage are one and the same thing—the action of the Spirit is cleansing, like that of water.

The Reformed Churches differed widely in their estimates of the importance of the sacraments, ranging from the high esteem accorded to them in the Anglican and Lutheran Churches, to their complete rejection by the Quakers. But even where baptism meant most, its absolute necessity to salvation was not asserted. Thus in the Church of England the two sacraments are held to be generally necessary to salvation. This was certainly understood by some of the Elizabethans to mean generally, *i.e.* ordinarily, though not absolutely necessary (2 Whitg. 523, 537). Wilful rejection of baptism was no doubt damnable, and a probable sign of reprobation. But God's grace was not tied to it (2 Jew. 1107; 2 Whitg. 538; 2 Bec. 215). The fathers of the Church of England refused to assert with Rome the damnation of the unbaptized, though they hesitated to make any large assertion on the other side. Hooker criticizes Calvin's supposition that predestination overrides the necessity of baptism; but for him unbaptized infants are not those who are certainly lost, but those 'whose safety we are not absolutely able to warrant' (*Eccl. Pol.* v. 60, 64). Though it is quite open to an English Churchman to hold a stricter view, the Church of England at the outset seems to have leant to the larger hope, and, while emphasizing the value of baptism, hesitated to affirm its absolute necessity. So far she sided with Protestantism against the Middle Ages. Other Protestant Churches went further. Calvin's position (see above) represents the attitude of Scottish Christianity, while the view of Independents may be summed up in this article from a Baptist Confession, on which it was hoped all Protestants would unite:

'We do believe that all little children dying in their infancy, viz. before they are capable to choose either good or evil, whether born of believing parents or unbelieving parents, shall be saved by the grace of God and merit of Christ their Redeemer, and the work of the Holy Ghost, and so being made members of the invisible Church shall enjoy life everlasting. For our Lord Jesus saith, Of such belongs the kingdom of heaven. Ergo, we conclude, that that opinion is false, which saith, that those little infants dying before baptism, are damned' (Orthodox Creed, § 44, in *Confessions of Faith*, Hanserd Knollys Soc.).

If the majority of Protestants did not fall under the anathema of Trent by regarding baptism as *liberum*, free or indifferent, none gave exactly the Roman sense to *necessarium*.

(2) It followed from this that *the outward elements in the sacrament became of less importance.* The Reformers denied the doctrine that the sacraments confer grace *ex opere operato.* At least in his earlier period, Luther held that the grace of baptism is conferred 'not certainly by the water, but by the word of God, which is with and beside the water, and by the faith which trusts in such word of God in the water' (Harnack, vii. 217 n.). Calvin was more emphatic: 'Not that such graces are included and bound in the sacrament, so as to be conferred by its efficacy, but only that by this badge the Lord declares to us that He is pleased to bestow all these things upon us' (*Inst.* IV. xv. 14). In the heads of agreement between the Churches of Geneva and Zürich, drawn up in 1554, it was asserted that the spiritual effect was not necessarily annexed to the elements: 'For those who were baptized as infants, God regenerates in childhood or adolescence, occasionally even in old age' (Calvin, *Tracts*, vol. ii. p. 218). Also, the sacraments could of themselves convey no benefit to the reprobate, who, however, undoubtedly participated in them. The Tridentine position, that the right use of the elements confers grace unless its reception is opposed by mortal sin, was therefore uncompromisingly rejected (*op. cit.* p. 217). The Westminster Confession likewise asserts that 'the grace which is exhibited in or by the Sacraments rightly used is not conferred by any power in them; . . . but [it depends] upon the work of the Spirit and the word of institution which contains, together with a Precept authorizing the use thereof, a promise of Benefit to worthy receivers.'

It should, however, be noted (*a*) that Luther later emphasized 'the objectivity of the means of grace,' and threw more stress on the outward element of water, in order to gain certainty in the face of enthusiasts who made all turn on inner feeling. This meant the retention of earlier sacramental feeling in the Lutheran Church (see Harnack, VII. 250).

(*b*) The article of the Church of England (Art. 27) speaks of baptism as the sign of regeneration, 'whereby as by an instrument they that receive Baptism rightly are grafted into the Church.' The use of the phrase, 'as by an instrument,' goes beyond the obsignatory view of the sacrament which followed from the Calvinist standpoint. It suggests the earlier idea of baptism as a *causa instrumentalis* of justification. The phrase emphasizes the value of the means used in baptism, and that this is its force is clear from the passages cited in Hardwick, *Hist. of Articles*, p. 379. Perhaps a Calvinist could have taken it to mean 'an authoritative document.' The Gorham case seems to legitimize the Calvinist view in the Church of England, but her normal doctrine is that baptism in itself bestows the grace of regeneration on all who receive it. Indeed, Dodwell, one of the Non-Jurors, set an extravagantly high value on baptism as the source of immortality (see Lecky, *Hist. of Eng.* I. 80).

(*c*) It is further of importance that both the Lutheran Church and the Church of England parted company from Calvinists on the question of the private baptism of infants. The Lutheran condemnation of the Calvinist view may be found in certain Articles of Visitation cited in Hardwick, *op. cit.* p. 379 f. Archbishop Whitgift defended the validity of baptism by women (though admittedly irregular), and also the practice of private baptism, against Cartwright. He quoted Martin Bucer's praise of the form of private baptism inserted in the Prayer-Book. Bucer thought it well 'that the baptism of infants be not deferred; for thereby is a door opened unto the devil to bring in a contempt of baptism and so of our whole redemption and communion of Christ, which through the sect of Anabaptists hath too much prevailed with many' (2 Whitg. 553). To the Calvinists, baptism was a ceremony to be confined to the Church; if a child could not be baptized in church, it should not be baptized at all. It was a matter of indifference, and, according to Cartwright, even if it did prejudice the salvation of the child, the glory of God was more important than a man's salvation. But the Calvinists usually held that such baptisms *in extremis* were mere superstition. The Church of England, on the other hand, in view of the close connexion between baptism and salvation implied in Jn 3[5], deliberately provided for private baptism, lest baptism as an instrument of salvation should be undervalued.

(3) More fundamental was *the changed conception of forgiveness* in the minds of the Reformers. Both to mediæval doctor and to Protestant divine, baptism was unto remission of sins. But, according to the earlier view, baptism conveys forgiveness

for original sin and for sins committed before baptism. According to Luther, baptism is, for penitent faith, the assurance that God is a forgiving God. According to the former, baptism brings a definite grace, a limited forgiveness, to meet particular sins. According to the latter, baptism witnesses to the constant attitude of God towards a contrite heart. It follows from this, that in the Roman view post-baptismal sin requires a fresh bestowal of grace, a further sacrament; in Luther's view, it suffices to remember the assurance of forgiveness once received in baptism. So the Council of Trent aimed the 9th anathema of Session vii. at this latter doctrine, while Luther held that the Council did not understand the Gospel.

Calvin's teaching does not differ in essentials from that of Luther on this point. Baptism is first and foremost an assurance of forgiveness and of imputed righteousness. 'In baptism we perceive that we are covered and protected by the blood of Christ, lest the wrath of God, which is truly an intolerable flame, should lie upon us' (*Inst.* IV. xv. 9). Or, as Becon says, 'By it we are removed from the fierce judging-place to the court of mercy' (2 Bec. 635, Parker Society). Calvin, too, says that 'at whatsoever time we are baptized, we are washed and purified once for our whole life. Wherefore as often as we fall we must recall the remembrance of our baptism, and thus fortify our minds' (cf. 4 Bul. 356 and 3 Whitg. 17 and 141 in Parker Society). The grace given in baptism is not confined to forgiveness. According to Calvin, baptism is conducive to faith, not only by being an assurance of forgiveness, but also by giving us the grace of the Holy Spirit, to form us again to newness of life. Christ by baptism has made us partakers of His death, ingrafting us into it. This is mortification (the death of the old man) and regeneration (the birth of the new). Moreover, baptism so unites us to Christ Himself as to make us partakers of all His blessings (*Inst.* IV. xv. 6). Somewhat similar definitions of baptismal grace may be found in Article 27 of the Church of England and in the Westminster Confession.

It should be noted that, though Calvin speaks of regeneration in baptism, his master-thought is still the forgiveness of sins and the imputing of Christ's righteousness to us. For he holds that baptism means the removal of the guilt of original sin and not the destruction of original sin itself. Ro 7 is the experience of the baptized Christian. Here he would fall under the anathema pronounced in the Tridentine decree about original sin (Sessio v. § 5). For a vigorous statement of Calvin's view, compare the Westminster Confession, 'Of the Fall.'

But more important than the definition of baptismal grace is the thought that baptism is not so much the means whereby God conveys these blessings to the soul, as the sign and seal whereby He confirms and ratifies His promises to the believer. The obsignatory view of the sacrament is the essentially Calvinist view. Baptism is a kind of sealed instrument assuring us of forgiveness. It is an authoritative declaration on God's part of His willingness to fulfil the new covenant with the baptized. The phrase 'sign and seal' is the characteristic one. Depraved human nature can dispense with no props for faith. In the sacrament, God condescends to give an outward attestation of inward blessings.

The following illustrations may be adduced:—(1) Art. 27, Church of England: 'Baptism is . . . also *a sign of regeneration* or new birth, whereby, as by an instrument, they that receive Baptism rightly are grafted into the Church: *the promises of the forgiveness of sin* and of our adoption to be the sons of God by the Holy Ghost *are visibly signed and sealed. Faith is confirmed*, and Grace increased by virtue of prayer unto God.' It has already been observed that this article goes beyond the Calvinist standpoint in regarding the sacrament as something more than a sign or seal (see above, under (2)) But the blessing of the forgiveness of sin is surely understood in the broader Protestant and not in the narrower Roman sense, and the language about the signing and sealing of the promises is quite in accord with Geneva.* (2) The Westminster Confession (ch. xxviii.): 'Baptism is a sacrament of the New Testament, ordained by Jesus Christ . . . to be unto (the party baptized) *a sign and seal of the Covenant of Grace*, of his ingrafting into Christ, of regeneration, of remission of sins, and of his giving up unto God through Jesus Christ to walk in newness of life.' The Confession goes on to say that in baptism 'the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred by the Holy Ghost, to such (whether of age or infants) as that grace belongeth unto, according to the counsel of God's own will.' But this means little more than that baptism was a reliable sign of assurance—for the elect! The last words throw the whole into doubt. The position is simply Calvinist. A Particular Baptist (*i.e.* Calvinistic Baptist) Confession of 1688 holds almost exactly the same language (see *Confessions*, Hanserd Knollys Soc. p. 226)

It was in pursuance of this obsignatory view of the sacraments that those of the OT were placed by Calvinists alongside of those of the NT. The OT sacraments and the baptism of John were similarly signs witnessing to the Divine promises. They were as effective signs as the sacraments of the NT. Calvin maintained, against the Schoolmen, that the baptism of John was the same as Christian baptism, 'only he baptized in the name of him who was to come, the Apostles in the name of him who was already manifested.' Similarly, the Westminster Confession (ch. xxvii.) asserts that 'the Sacraments of the Old Testament in regard of the spiritual things thereby signified and exhibited were, for substance, the same with those of the New' (cf. 4 Bul. 354, Parker Soc.).

(4) As Baptism is primarily a confirmation of faith, *it presupposes conscious faith.* The effectiveness of the sacraments depends on faith. The sacraments, including baptism, are appeals to faith; they cannot act where faith is not. Of sacraments in general, Luther laid down the proposition that they are efficacious, *non dum fiunt sed dum creduntur* (Harnack, vii. 216). Leo X. condemned Luther for considering it heretical to suppose that the sacraments could confer justifying grace on all who did not make active objection (Denz. 625). In other words, Luther held that passive reception was not enough, positive faith was essential. Of Baptism in particular, the Larger Catechism asserts that 'in the absence of faith, baptism continues to be a bare and ineffectual sign' (Harnack, vii. 251). Luther also claimed that baptism represents and requires a continual penitence. 'Baptism means that the old Adam must be drowned in us day by day through daily sorrow and repentance, . . . and that there must daily come forth and arise a new man' (Harnack, vii. 217 n.). Calvin is equally clear: 'From this sacrament, as from all others, we gain nothing, unless in so far as we receive in faith' (*Inst.* IV. xv. 15). The assurance of Divine forgiveness can come only to a living faith. Moreover, baptism is also a confession of such faith. It is not only God's seal to the New Covenant; it is man's. It is 'a sign of profession' (Art. 27, Church of England). Baptism had always been a confession of faith. Almost every *Ordo Baptismi* contains a recital of the Creed. But to the Protestant, faith meant more than the recital of the Creed. It presupposed penitence, and was an undertaking to walk in newness of life. A passage in Gosse, *Father and Son* (p. 200 f.) represents an idea of faith which obtained a wide currency in Protestantism:

'As a rule, no one could possess the Spirit of Christ without a conscious and full abandonment of the soul; and this, however carefully led up to and prepared for with tears and renunciations, was not, could not be, made except at a set moment of time. *Faith in an esoteric and almost symbolic sense was*

* Parallels among the Elizabethans are frequent. Thus Bradford. 'It requires that we should be regenerate, and confirms and seals our regeneration.' Or Becon: 'Of itself it brings not grace, but testifies that he who is baptized has received grace' (2 Brad. 289; 2 Bec. 220). And later, Burnet's view that 'our Saviour has made baptism one of the precepts though not one of the means necessary to salvation' develops a somewhat similar, though not exactly parallel, teaching (Burnet on Art. 27).

necessary, and could not be a result of argument, but was a state of heart.'

But if baptism be the public confession of such a faith, and if it be the assurance of God's forgiveness in answer to such faith, then it is a natural corollary that baptism should be administered only to such as have passed through this experience.

'If the fundamental evangelical and Lutheran principle is valid, that grace and faith are inseparably inter-related . . . then infant baptism is in itself no Sacrament, but an ecclesiastical observance: if it is in the strict sense a Sacrament, then that principle is no longer valid' (Harnack, vii. 251).

Not many Protestants were prepared to draw the logical conclusion and abandon the practice of infant baptism. A threefold division of the Reformed Churches followed. (*a*) There were those who confined baptism to adults, or rather to conscious believers, *e.g.* the Mennonites in Holland and Germany (see separate article), the Baptists in England and America, and the Plymouth Brethren. (*b*) Some Churches retained infant baptism, and fell back on earlier ideas of baptismal regeneration. The Lutheran and Anglican Churches represent this tendency. (*c*) Yet other Churches retained the custom, but altered its significance.

(*a*) The position of the first requires little further explanation. The earliest Baptist Confession, printed at Amsterdam in 1611, is quite explicit.

Art. 13 declares that 'every Church is to receive all their members by baptism upon the confession of their faith and sins, wrought by the preaching of the gospel, according to the primitive institution and practice And therefore Churches constituted after any other manner, or of any other persons, are not according to Christ's testament.' Art. 14: 'Baptism, or washing with water, is the outward manifestation of dying unto sin and walking in newness of life: and therefore in nowise appertaineth to infants.' Other Confessions add little to this.

The following points deserve attention: (*a*) The Baptist position involved the Puritan conception of the Church. The Church is the communion of saints. As one of the Confessions says (Hanserd Knollys Soc. i. 40), the servants of God are 'to lead their lives in a walled sheepfold, and in a watered garden.' The early Baptist Churches were apt to be strongly disciplinary. (*β*) Though in other Confessions (*op. cit.* pp. 42, 226) the benefits signified by baptism are unfolded, yet the emphasis falls on the idea of baptism as a public profession of personal faith. This is still characteristic (cf. art. ANABAPTISM, i. 410[b]). (*γ*) The essence of the Baptist doctrine was, and is, the contention that no one can or should be made a Christian without the conscious co-operation of his own will. They asserted the liberty of the individual conscience. Their opposition to 'the Bloudy Tenent of Persecution' was based on first principles, and was not simply due to their being in a minority. Similarly, it seems a natural development of their position that communion should be open. At first, most Baptists were strict Baptists, *i.e.* only baptized believers could join the Church and take part in the communion (see Art. 13 of Confession just cited). The American Churches still lean to this side. But from early days some Baptists held that the question must be left to the individual for decision, *i.e.* those who were personally convinced of the truth of believers' baptism must act up to the conviction. Those who did not share this conviction, but still professed belief in Jesus Christ, were welcomed to Church-fellowship. See app. to Confession drawn up in 1688 (*Conf. of Faith*, Hanserd Knollys Soc. p. 244): 'The known principle and state of the consciences of divers of us . . . is such that we cannot hold church communion with any other than baptized believers, and Churches constituted of such: yet some others of us have a greater liberty and freedom in our spirits that way.' The majority of Baptist Churches in England to-day are open in this sense, and the throwing open of Church membership in the face of trust-deeds led to one or two interesting lawsuits in the 19th cent. (see G. Gould, *Open Communion and the Baptists of Norwich*, 1860). The practice of open communion seems to be the natural issue of the stress laid on the individual will. (For the whole point cf. Harnack, vii. 125, on 'The Anabaptists.') (*δ*) The dangers of the Baptist position clearly lie on the side of spiritual pride and the over-development of religious self-consciousness. An exceptional, because boyish but still instructive, instance may be studied in Gosse, *Father and Son*, pp. 211–217.

(*b*) The dilemma as to infant baptism, occasioned by the new emphasis on faith, was met by Luther in another manner. 'Luther retained infant baptism rather as the sacrament of regeneration' (Harnack, vii. 251). He fell back on the Roman doctrine. He strove to retain the connexion between faith and baptism by continuing the *interrogatio de Fide* and the presence of sponsors in the rite, and by supposing that there is a kind of faith bestowed on infants. Similarly, Calvin maintained that 'infants may have infused into them a kind of faith and knowledge, though not ours.' Or, again, the faith of the parents might be taken as standing for the faith of the children. Thus Beveridge claims that the children of Christian parents are disciples. This was, in fact, the abandonment of the Protestant view of faith (see Harnack, *loc. cit.*). As already pointed out, some Calvinists were prepared to give baptism as a sign of a regeneration that should follow (see p. 401). Luther, on the other hand, distinguished between regeneration and justification. Regeneration was an inward effect, wrought in baptism. Justification, the inner experience of repentance and forgiveness, was a distinct and later stage in religious development. The Church of England retained infant baptism on somewhat similar terms. Regeneration is carefully distinguished from conversion, and the former may precede the latter.

'Conversion is the act whereby, in response to and by the power of divine grace, the soul turns to God in the desire to accept and do His will. Regeneration is the gift which God bestows on the soul by producing in its nature such a change as imparts to it the forgiveness of original sin, and makes it to be accepted by God instead of under His wrath' (Darwell Stone, *op. cit.* p. 35).

The Church of England likewise retained sponsors and the *interrogatio de Fide*, which is essentially an attempt to make faith still the introduction to baptism. Again, the Reformers' first conceptions of faith and of regeneration are abandoned, and an approximation is made to the Roman doctrine.

(*c*) The retention of infant baptism did not, however, always mean the restoration of the older interpretation of the practice. The Puritans in England objected to the institution of godfathers and godmothers, and in their Admonition of 1571 complained that 'they prophane holye baptisme, in toying folishly, for that they ask questions of an infante which cannot answere' (*Puritan Manifestoes*, p. 26). In the form of baptism adopted in Geneva there are no sponsors, and no profession of faith is made on behalf of the child. The parents or other responsible persons recite the Creed, as the faith which they hold and in which they intend to bring up the child. Thus in the order for the administration of baptism in the Presbyterian Church of England, based on the Westminster Confession, the minister says to the parents: 'Seeing it is your duty to nourish and bring up this child for God, it is fitting that you renew the confession of your faith before God and this congregation.' There is no attempt to preserve the connexion between faith and baptism by a vicarious declaration of faith and of willingness to be bap-

tized, made in the name and on behalf of the child. The Calvinist Churches thus broke with a practice that claimed to come down from Hyginus in the 2nd century. Moreover, the ritual act is not conceived as in itself conveying regeneration at the time. 'Baptism (is) the sacrament of admission into the visible Church, in which are *set forth* our union to Christ and regeneration by the Spirit, the remission of our sins and our engagement to be the Lord's' (Articles of Faith, Presbyterian Ch. of Eng. 20). And in the ritual service, the minister is directed to pray that God will grant 'that this child, *having been in God's own good time born again by the Holy Ghost*, may come to years of understanding, that he may confess the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom He has sent.' Baptism then stands not for an inner change necessarily wrought at the moment in the unconscious child, but for the recognition of the fact that the children of believers are already part of the visible Church, and should be at once admitted. It is, further, a declaration of God's goodwill towards the child, and the sign and seal that He will in His good time fulfil in the child the promises set forth therein. In baptism the parents solemnly engage themselves to bring up the child in the fear of the Lord.

The Wesleyan Church, which did not start from the Calvinist basis, but made much of conversion, retains infant baptism in a similar sense. There is no recitation of the Creed at all. After baptizing the child, the minister says: 'We receive this child into the congregation of Christ's flock, *that he may be instructed* and trained in the doctrines, privileges, and duties of the Christian religion; and *trust* that he will be Christ's faithful soldier and servant unto his life's end.' It is most significant that this declaration is followed by the four short petitions (*e.g.* 'Grant that the old Adam in this child may be buried') which in the Church of England service precede baptism. The Wesleyans pray that God will fulfil in the future the promises symbolized in the ritual act: in the Church of England, prayer is offered that these results may then and there be initiated.

To the Congregationalists infant baptism is little more than a dedication service. The Calvinist Churches generally, and some other bodies, have thus retained the practice and altered its meaning.

In the Churches which retained infant baptism, the sense of personal responsibility connected with believers' baptism was attached to a later rite of admission to the full privileges of Church membership. Confirmation in the Lutheran Church and in the Church of England, First Communion among the Presbyterians, Covenanting with God among the Wesleyans, are in practice equivalent to believers' baptism. Confirmation in the Church of England is administered to the baptized when they have come to years of discretion, 'to the end that they may themselves with their own mouth and consent ratify and confirm' the promises made for them in baptism. This view and use of Confirmation is distinctly Protestant. In the West, Baptism and Confirmation had become separated in point of time; they were still united in the East, and were administered to children in succession, being immediately followed by the Communion. The Western separation of the two Sacraments did not, however, imply that Confirmation was to be given only to those who had made a profession of conscious faith after reaching years of discretion. Confirmation was not intended to be the ratification of baptismal vows. The Council of Trent anathematized those who regarded Confirmation as nothing else than a catechetical exercise by which those on the borders of manhood professed the grounds of their faith before the Church (Sessio 7, 'De Conf.,' canon 1). The Church of England did not treat Confirmation as simply this, but, under the influence of Protestantism, she did limit it to adolescents, in order that it might serve this purpose.

[Cf. D. Stone's plea for restoring the primitive and Greek practice of confirming infants. He notes that the Church of England continued and emphasized the mediæval separation of Confirmation from Baptism. He does not sufficiently recognize that this emphasis is the result of the Reformation—a concession to the Protestant conception of faith (*Holy Baptism*, p. 186).]

The sacrament of Confirmation is in effect dependent on the previous confession of faith. This meant a recognition of the fundamental connexion between grace and faith. Instead of abandoning infant baptism, most Protestant Churches put a fresh meaning into Confirmation or its equivalent. They thus adhered to the view that the full privileges of the Christian life could not be bestowed unless consciously desired.

The reasons for the retention of infant baptism were many and complex. The Reformers were not all eager iconoclasts. Luther and the most influential Elizabethans departed only slowly from traditional doctrine and custom. Moreover, the new practice of adult baptism was connected with a party that was socially despised and politically discredited. A supporter of adult baptism might be supposed to come from Munster. All the leading Reformers ascribed Anabaptism to the devil. A cloud of suspicion and contempt hung over Baptists and Mennonites in the 17th century. They were suspected of being ignorant and revolutionary.

The Baptist historian, Thomas Crosby, is constantly twitting Neal, the learned author of the *History of the Puritans*, with an affected contempt for Baptists. Here is one passage: 'the Rev. Mr. Neal has given us an account of [Vavasor Powell], and tells us he was educated at Jesus Coll., Oxon.; and had he been an illiterate man, it's not unlikely but he would have told us also that he was a Baptist' (Crosby, *Hist. of Baptists*, III. 6).

But there were deeper reasons than conservatism and the bad name attaching to the practice of believers' baptism through the early Anabaptists. (α) Wherever a lively belief in original sin and the guilt attaching thereto continued, it was natural to bestow on infants the sign of the forgiveness of sins. It is perhaps noteworthy in this connexion that the first little group of Baptists were General or *Arminian* Baptists. (β) The doctrine of election made some recoil from the Puritan conception of the Church. It is, they argued, presumption to anticipate God's judgment by confining church membership to those apparently saved. The very attempt tends to hypocrisy. The Church ought rather to welcome all men. Along these lines Zwingli very strongly criticizes the 'Catabaptists' and defends the practice of infant baptism. As baptism is admission to the visible Church, it is not for human judgment to attach conditions. (γ) But more important than these was the feeling that in religion one cannot separate parent and child. The child of believing parents has, *ipso facto*, a claim on the Church. The Church must recognize 'the spiritual unity of the family' by welcoming the child. Burnet (on Art. 27) says, 'It is legitimate that parents be allowed to bring their children under federal obligations, and, therefore, procure to them a share in federal blessings.' The idea of the covenant, and the parallel between baptism and circumcision, powerfully influenced men's minds. A covenant that binds the parent binds the child also. And if the covenant of the OT admitted children by circumcision on the eighth day, surely the terms of the new covenant are not so harsh as to exclude children altogether. The Lord's welcome to little children, and the fact that children were reckoned holy through their parentage alone (1 Co 7^{14}), were held to put any such restriction out of court. The anomalies presented

by infant baptism to the Protestant conception of faith were met by an appeal to the parallel institution of circumcision. Baptism, Calvin admits, implies repentance; but so did circumcision, as is clear from Jer 4[4]. The rule that baptism should follow faith is not invariable: for circumcision comes after faith in Abraham and before intelligence in Isaac. It may be said that the parallel with circumcision was the chief ground for defending infant baptism as agreeable with the Scriptures, while Mk 10[14. 15] and 1 Co 7[14] were the chief reasons for supposing it to be 'agreeable with the institution of Christ.' It was further urged that, since men believed in God's goodwill towards children, the sign of that goodwill should not be withheld from them. 'How sweet is it to pious minds to be assured not only by word, but even by ocular demonstration, that they are so much in favour with their heavenly Father, that He interests Himself in their posterity! . . . It is no slight stimulus to us to bring them up in the fear of God' (Calvin, *Inst.* IV. xvi. 32). (*δ*) With others, especially in the Church of England, the earlier ideas of sacramental efficacy, coupled with the obvious sense of Jn 3[5], were the dominant influence.

(5) Before passing on to discuss the effect of the Protestant appeal to Scripture, one other development of the conceptions of faith and grace as essentially inward must be examined. *The Quakers' rejection of water-baptism* was based, no doubt, in part on principles peculiar or almost peculiar to them; but it also sprang from the renewed experience of justification by faith which they possessed in common with other Protestants. Both points require illustration.

(*a*) The doctrine of the inner light was not a universally accepted doctrine among the Reformers. Its assertion sundered the Quakers from the Calvinists. Calvin advocated the use of sacraments because carnal, depraved, human nature could grasp the spiritual only through the material, and needed every sort of aid if it was to retain faith at all. To Calvin, sin was the fundamental thing in men. But if Calvin preached sin, G. Fox preached perfection. He and his followers denied the dogma of human depravity. Deeper than sin lies the something of God in every man. Men must be turned to this inward teacher, and cease to trust in the outward and the creaturely. From this point of view sacraments are not a means of grace but a source of error, an entanglement in the lower realms of religious life.

(*b*) But, without pushing their peculiar tenets, the Quakers had a strong case in the ground they shared with Protestants in general. It was admitted that God's answer to faith was not tied to the sacraments. All Protestants agreed that the grace of God was conveyed, if not as certainly, yet as really, through preaching and through prayer as through the sacraments. To the Calvinist, baptism was the sign and seal of a spiritual reality, which it did not necessarily confer. But if this be so, if the forgiveness signified in baptism and the communion with Christ offered in the Eucharist are granted to us in other ways, why insist thus on the outward ceremonies? Our opponents, says Barclay,

'account not those who are surely baptized with the baptism of the Spirit, baptized, neither will they have them so denominated, unless they be also sprinkled with or dipped in water: but we, on the contrary, do always prefer the power to the form, the substance to the shadow: and where the substance and power is, we doubt not to denominate the person accordingly, though the form be wanting. And, therefore, we always seek first and plead for the substance and power, as knowing that to be indispensably necessary, though the form sometimes may be dispensed with, and the figure or type may cease, when the substance and antitype come to be enjoyed, as it doth in this case' (*Apology*, p. 300).

The essential thing in baptism is the answer of a good conscience towards God. Where that pure and spiritual baptism is present, the use of water is indifferent. The Quaker position raised the question of the nature of the New Covenant. Did not the new differ essentially from the old in this, that now God would directly and immediately commune with the individual? Barclay's attempts to explain away NT references to water-baptism are bits of unsuccessful exegesis; but the truth 'the kingdom of God is within you' (Lk 17[21]) does not depend on the correct interpretation of ἐντός.

(*c*) The Quakers were indirectly the successors of Joachim de Flore, who thought sacraments would disappear in the realm of the Spirit. 'The baptism of John,' said Barclay, 'was a figure, commanded for a time, and not to continue for ever' (*Apol.* Prop. xii.). He, with good reason, identified water-baptism with that of John. The other Protestant Churches vehemently denied this view of baptism as a temporary institution. Thus the Westminster Confession (ch. xxviii.) asserts that 'Baptism is by Christ's own appointment to be continued until the end of the world.' With this compare the orthodox creed in the Baptist Confessions of Faith (Hanserd Knollys Soc. p. 147).

B. THE APPEAL FROM TRADITION TO THE BIBLE.—The influence of the Reformers' appeal to Scripture is more easily traced in the realm of practice than in that of doctrine. That the study of the Scriptures suggested some new doctrines is beyond doubt. Thus the beginnings of the Baptist denomination consisted of two small groups who successively detached themselves from the Independents because they were convinced, rightly or wrongly, that in the NT baptism was administered only to believers. The first group, the General or Arminian Baptists, broke off from the Independents in Amsterdam in 1611, under John Smith and Helwisse. These two had derived their views from their own study of the Scriptures. They first baptized themselves; but when John Smith discovered that the Mennonites were already teaching the doctrine of believers' baptism, he was baptized again by a Mennonite pastor. The first Particular or Calvinistic Baptist Church was formed in a similar way in England about the year 1638. Certain members of an Independent church in London became convinced that 'Baptism was not for infants, but professed believers' (see Shakespeare, *Baptist and Congregational Pioneers*, pp. 180–184). Here, too, the influence of the study of the Scriptures was the prime factor. But all Protestant Churches claimed to justify their positions from the Scriptures, and it would be tedious to explain the justification each advanced. The more general effects of the appeal to Scripture may be traced in (*a*) the Protestant simplification of ritual, and (*b*) the tendency to take a somewhat legalistic view of the obligation of baptism.

(*a*) *The simplification of ritual* was not everywhere carried out with equal thoroughness. Luther at first retained the Roman *Ordo* almost exactly as it stood, though the traditional developments were accorded a steadily diminishing importance. When the demand for a simpler ritual, based on the appeal to Scripture, made itself effectively heard, it was resisted on the ground that the Church is free to make modifications in such comparatively non-essential matters. (For the whole history, see Höfling, vol. ii. §§ 119–121.) In England, the signing with the cross and the presence of sponsors were retained, and the other ceremonies summarized in a previous section were discarded. The Church of England, like the Lutherans, showed a greater reverence for tradition: at the same time, the simplifications introduced to avoid superstition, and to promote decency and order, were really the outcome of a desire to get nearer to NT usage.

The Puritans objected to the traditional elements still remaining in the Prayer-Book Order of Baptism, as having no warrant in Scripture. The Genevan Order was still simpler. 'Chrisms, tapers, and other pomposities' were abolished, as 'they have been devised without authority from the word of God.' Baptism by immersion was re-introduced by the believers in adult baptism, as being the Scriptural and only lawful method.* In brief, all Protestant Churches held themselves at liberty to revise the baptismal office, in so far as its elements were derived from tradition and not from Scripture; while some wished to make the ritual conform to a Scripture model.

(*b*) The authority attributed to the Scriptures went some way to create *a new legalism*. Thus the Baptists insisted on the duty of accepting immersion. This was the form instituted by Christ, and it became part of religious obedience to follow it. To be immersed was to fulfil more perfectly than others a command of Christ. This tended to legalize the religion of Jesus, and to emphasize the value of obedience to a ceremonial observance—a step towards Pharisaism. From a literalism of this kind the more conservative Churches were preserved by their adherence to tradition, and Calvin escaped through his strong common sense.† The other Churches did not escape legalism in other directions. When the sacramental efficacy of Baptism and its bearing on salvation were questioned by Rationalism, the defence was apt to be: this is part of the Divine will revealed in the NT, and it must simply be accepted. Hooker's defence of the Church of England doctrine of Baptism rests largely on the plain sense of Jn 3^5, which is taken as the final ruling of the Divine Lawgiver on this subject. This kind of appeal to Scripture is simply legalistic. It may further be paralleled in the strong tendency to interpret the NT in harmony with the OT. The explanation of baptism by means of circumcision seems to belong to a new Judaistic Christianity.

C. The Humanism and Rationalism of the Renaissance.—The Reformation was influenced by the growing interest in the natural as opposed to the supernatural, and the assertion of individual independence which marked the later Middle Ages. This favoured views of baptism which removed mystery, and which made it the sign, not of a man's dependence on, but of his adhesion to, the Church. Baptism then becomes a mere symbol or a confession of faith.

Zwingli treated baptism as a symbol, though by no means as insignificant. 'Baptismus est regenerationis symbolum . . . sed non ita ut qui baptisati sunt ob id renati sunt' (Answer to Quest. 17, in a letter on some questions raised by a Catabaptist). Some account of his views may be found in Lecky's *Hist. of Rationalism*.

Socinus emphasized the confession-side of Baptism. It is—

'the rite of imtiation by which men, after obtaining knowledge of the doctrine of Christ and acquiring faith in Him, become bound to Christ and His disciples, or are enrolled in the Church, renouncing the world . . . professing, besides, that they will regard the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as the only Guide and Master in religion, and in the whole of their life and conversation, and by their ablution and immersion and emersion, declaring and as it were exhibiting that they lay aside the defilement of sin, that they are buried with Christ, that they desire henceforth to die with Him and to rise to newness of life, and pledging themselves that they will really carry this out, receiving also at the same time at which this profession is made and this pledge taken the symbol and sign of the remission of sins and even the remission itself' (Harnack, VII. 151).

As Harnack says, the stress is laid here on the confession, and the last clause sounds like an afterthought. The tendency to emphasize the confession made in baptism was not confined to Socinianism; the Anabaptists, *e.g.*, regarded baptism mainly as a badge or mark distinguishing Christians from others (cf. art. Anabaptism, i. 410). This shows the influence of Rationalism in so far as it implies less interest in the sacramental side.

But the ultimate influence of Rationalism is to be discerned in the serious issues, for the doctrine of baptism, raised by Biblical criticism, by the science of comparative religion, and by the study of religious experience.

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Roman position: Wilhelm and Scannell, *Manual of Theology*, vol. ii [1898], give a clear concise statement; Denzinger, *Enchiridion*[5], 1874, is indispensable.

Church of England: for mediæval practice, consult Maskell, *Monumenta Ritualia*, vol. i. p. ccxlf. For Reformation settlement, see index vol. to the Parker Society's publications; Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.* bk. v. [ed. Bayne in *Every Man's Lib.* 1909]. Besides Stone, see *Tracts for the Times*, Nos. 67 and 76, and various commentators on the Articles, esp. Gibson, E.C.S. F. W. Robertson put forward a fresh and interesting view, in sermons 4 and 5 of the second series, 1889.

Lutheran Church: see Höfling, whose book, besides being of great historic value, represents the distinctly conservative Lutheran attitude.

Calvinism: Calvin, *Inst.* iv. chs. xiv.–xvi. in Beveridge's later tr. vol. ii. [1863]; *Westminster Confession*, any edition.

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Infant Baptism: W. Wall, *Hist. of Infant Baptism*, 1705 [new ed., London, 1862].

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BAPTISM (Indian).—In the initiatory rites which are peculiar to the great religions of India and their various sects, there is nothing which can be regarded as exactly parallel to Christian baptism, except the general fact that such rites imply admission to or public recognition of a definite religious status. In the Christian rite the use of water is based on a natural symbolism which has appealed to the human mind in all ages, and of this we have abundant examples in the purificatory ceremonies of all Indian religions. Hinduism abounds in such *baptisms* or washings as are referred to in Mk 7^4. These are founded on the association of religious purity with water used either in bathing or in sprinkling the person or thing to be sanctified.

In the rite of initiation into the Sikh religion we have the nearest approach to the form of Christian baptism; but even in the symbolism of the rite there is, as we shall see, a fundamental difference.

* *Sprinkling and immersion.*—It has already been noted that the dipping of infants continued in England after the custom had altered in Europe. Sprinkling became more general in England about 1600, and was apparently the accepted custom by 1610 (Denne, *Contention for Truth*, 1658). With regard to adults, the first Mennonites and Baptists received the rite by affusion. Mr. Shakespeare says of the former, that 'they administered baptism by affusion, until in 1620 a section called the Collegianten, at Rhynsberg, began to immerse.' A certain Mr. Blunt introduced baptism by immersion among the Particular Baptists at the beginning of 1642. The practice was widely taken up, many being baptized for the second, or for the third time, as the case might be. It was this that roused up Dr. Daniel Featley to write his book against Baptists, in which he claimed to dip the dippers head over ears in argument. Partly in reply to this work, the Baptist Churches published a Confession in 1646, which is their first public declaration in favour of immersion. 'That the way and manner of the dispensing this ordinance is dipping or plunging the body under water: it being a sign must answer the thing signified, which is the interest the saints have in the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ' (*Confessions*, p. 42). For the whole subject, see Shakespeare, *op. cit.* pp. 186–189.

The Socinians, as is clear from the Racovian catechism of 1619, and some Anabaptists had baptized by immersion before this.

† 'Whether a person is to be wholly immersed, and that whether once or thrice, or whether he is only to be sprinkled with water, is not of the least consequence: Churches should be at liberty to adopt either according to the diversity of climates, although it is evident that the term *baptize* means "to immerse," and that this was the form used by the primitive Church' (*Inst.* IV. xv. 19).

The Sikh religion, which is professed by about two millions of the people of the Panjāb, is of comparatively modern origin. Nānak, its founder, who flourished in the 16th cent., was one of the many religious scholars of India in whose mind the philosophy which underlies Hinduism awakened a protest against the current idolatry. He was a follower of Kabīr, and was also influenced by the writings of the Marāṭhī poet Nāmdeva, who flourished about the year A.D. 1300. Passages from the writings of Kabīr and Nāmdeva are found incorporated in the *Granth* ('the Book'), the religious book of the Sikhs ('disciples'). While Hindu pantheism easily lends itself to the support of polytheism and idolatry, that side of it which emphasizes the oneness of the Supreme Existence has always been cropping up in the form of protests against the worship of the many. Nānak may be taken as an example of this frequently repeated tendency. From the movement which he initiated, there emerged under him as its first *guru*, and under his nine successors ending with Guru Govind Singh, a religion which, rejecting idolatry and caste, emphasizes the doctrine of the Divine unity. So far as this doctrine dissociated itself from its original pantheistic foundation and approached the deistic conception, we may recognize in its subsequent development the influence of the Muhammadan religion with which it was in constant contact.

The distinct religious community into which the followers of Nānak were ultimately organized bears the name of the *Khālsa*. Initiation into the Sikh religion takes place by admission to the Khālsa by means of a rite called the *Pahul*.

The *Pahul* is thus described in the *Life of Govind Singh*, the last of the gurus:

'When the guru had returned from the hills to Anandpur, he assembled the societies of the disciples and told them that he required the head of a disciple, and that he who loved his guru should make this offering. Most of them were terror-stricken, and fled; but five of them rose and offered resolutely their heads. These five he took into a room, and told them that, as he had found them true, he would give them the *pahul* of the true religion. He made them bathe, and seated them side by side; he dissolved purified sugar in water and stirred it with a two-edged dagger, and, having recited over it some verses taken from his Granth in praise of the Timeless One, he made them drink some of this sherbet, some of it he poured on their heads and the rest he sprinkled on their bodies. Then, patting them with his hand, he cried with a loud voice, "Say, The Khālsa of the Vah Guru! Victory to the holy Vah Guru!" After he had given the *pahul* to these five in this manner, he took it likewise from them, and in this way all the rest of his disciples were initiated, to whom he gave the name of the Khālsa, adding to the name of each the epithet Singh ('lion'). Then he gave the order that whoever desired to be his disciple must always have five things with him, the names of which begin with the letter *k*, viz., his hair (*kes*) which must not be cut, a comb (*karppa*), a knife (*kathar*), a sword (*kithpal*), and breeches reaching to the knee (*kachh*); otherwise he would not consider him a disciple.'

The rite itself is older than this mention of it in the *Life of Govind Singh*, for it is referred to in the *Life of Nānak*, written by Guru Arjun, the fifth guru, in the beginning of the 17th century. As it is not mentioned in the *Granth*, it would appear to be later in origin than the time of Nānak. It was not, however, instituted by the last guru, Govind Singh, who in the passage just quoted from his life is described as administering an old-established rite.

It is by no means clear that we ought to regard this rite as parallel to baptism except in the mere fact that it marks initiation into the membership of a religious community. The place given to bathing in the description quoted is subsidiary; the essential parts are the drinking of the sherbet and the utterance of the words 'Vah Guru!' In its oldest form the rite included nothing more than this, and its original as well as its later purpose is to express communion and fellowship through joint participation in food and drink. This, according to all Hindu standards, is the ultimate test of religious fellowship, and the Sikh *pahul* appears to be only one form of expressing this fact of religious communion. It is interesting to notice that, while devotion to the guru is included in the ceremony, the stress is laid on the marks of fellowship. The Christian rite of baptism admits to the fellowship of the visible Church; but the emphasis is not laid on this side of the sacrament. The sacrament of baptism expresses in the first instance a relation of the individual to God, not to the community of His people. Even in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, while the communion of believers with each other is an important element in the meaning of the rite, the thought of the believer's relation to his Lord is predominant in every interpretation of the sacrament. This is an illustration of a characteristic difference between Indian religions and Christianity.

In orthodox Hinduism the ceremony that approaches nearest in its specific function to baptism is the *Muñj* ceremony, called also *Upanayana* (Skr. *upa* and *nī*, 'leading up to a teacher,' 'initiation'), by which the members of the twice-born (*dvija*) castes are admitted to their respective privileges. The material element in this ceremony is the investiture with the sacred thread; and, as one part of the rite consists in investing the subject with a girdle made of *muñj* grass, in the case of Brāhmans, it is known amongst them as the *Muñj* ceremony. This investiture with the sacred thread, called *upavīta* (*upa* and *vyā*, 'to cover' or 'clothe') or *yajñopavīta* because it entitles to the privilege of offering sacrifices, must take place between the ages of 8 and 16, 11 and 22, 12 and 24, in the Brāhman, Kṣatriya, and Vaiśya castes respectively.

Bathing is not an integral part of this ceremony. The *yajñopavīta*, or sacred thread, which in the case of the Brāhman is a triple thread of cotton yarn, in the case of the Kṣatriya of hemp, and in the case of the Vaiśya of wool, is placed over the left shoulder and allowed to hang down on the right side of the wearer. At the time of investiture the youth is placed with his face turned towards the sun, and is made to walk round a fire three times. Then the guru, taking the thread in his hand, consecrates it by repeating the *Gāyatrī*, the invocation to Savitṛ, the sun, taken from *Rigveda*, III. 62. 10—*tat savitur vareṇyam bhargo devasya dhīmahi dhiyo yo nah prachodayāt*, 'that we may attain the glorious light of the god Savitṛ, may he further our prayer.'

After the thread is put on, the youth takes a staff in his hand (of different kinds of wood, according to caste) and goes forth to beg alms. This alms he begs of his mother, or, if she is dead, of his maternal aunt, and, failing her, of a sister. This symbolizes a covenant to support his guru and himself.

The next step is the learning of the *sandhyā*, or prayers appointed for the principal parts of the day, morning, noon, and evening.

The last act of the ceremony is the *mauñji-bandham*, or the tying on of a girdle of *muñj* grass. Before the girdle is put on, the guru teaches the boy the Savitṛ *mantra*. Bending with his right knee on the ground and saluting the guru with *namaskār*, he says, 'Repeat to me the Savitṛ *mantra*.' Then the guru, wrapping the hands of the boy with his garment, takes hold of them with both his hands and makes him repeat the *mantra*, at first line by line, and finally the whole. The young man thus initiated enters on the *Brahmachāri* ('disciple') period of his life (see ASRAMA).

Now, while all the external features of baptism are absent from this rite, there is a certain inner

resemblance between the two in the place which each occupies in the scheme of the religious life. The most striking fact in connexion with the Hindu rite is that by virtue of its performance the initiated ranks as twice-born. The idea that a certain act of religion marks the second birth presents a parallel to the Christian idea of baptism, whether regarded as 'a sensible sign' or as a sacrament carrying with it a spiritual effect, in its relation to regeneration. Looking beneath the outward surface of the rite, may we not recognize in it the expression of a deep human conviction that man as he enters this world is not fit for his spiritual kingdom, that he must be born again if he is to possess it? 'Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God' (Jn 3^3).

If we look for any parallel to baptism in the Zoroastrian religion, which, although the ancient home of the faith is in more northern lands, is to-day an Indian religion, we may find it in the ceremony called *Naujot*, by which Parsi children, both boys and girls, receive religious initiation after they have attained the age of six years and three months. Indeed the modern Parsi sometimes actually speaks of it as baptism. The name *Naujot* indicates that it marks the beginning of a new religious authorization, the outward symbol of which is the investiture with the *sudra*, or sacred shirt, and the *kusti*, or sacred thread, a thread of seventy-two strands worn round the body. In this ceremony the officiating priest recites verses from the Avesta Scriptures, and with his own hands places the *sudra* on the boy or girl to be initiated, and binds the sacred thread. On each side stands a brazier from which flames arise, fed by pieces of fragrant sandal-wood; and, while the verses are being chanted, grains of rice are thrown towards the recipient of the ordinance. The *Naujot* is frequently made the occasion of a great social gathering, followed by a feast in which sometimes many hundreds of persons participate. So much does the social aspect predominate over the religious, that the chanting of the priest is sometimes drowned by the strains of a brass band discoursing the most secular and jovial airs. The sense of incongruity is felt by any one who tries to associate the ceremony with a spiritual purpose. In their origin such ceremonies had, no doubt, a religious meaning; but they have to a large extent lost it, and have become the badges of a community rather than a vehicle of spiritual instruction. An interesting fact in connexion with the *Naujot* ceremony is its administration to girls as well as to boys. The Parsi woman wears the sacred thread. No Hindu woman can wear it.

In the light of such developments the high spiritual significance of Christian baptism stands out more clearly; but even Christian baptism may lose its higher meaning if the purpose which it subserves as a mark of the Christian faith be permitted to overshadow its meaning for the individual soul.

LITERATURE.—See under INITIATION.

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BAPTISM (Jewish).—The fact that Judaism gained accessions from the Gentile world gave rise to an application of the practice of ceremonial ablution altogether new in Jewish religious life, viz., the baptism of proselytes. Precisely as the rite of bathing after cohabitation or nocturnal pollution was, in the period after the destruction of the Temple, regarded by the Rabbis both as a purification and as a kind of consecration for intercourse with the sacred words of the Law, so was the bathing of proselytes considered as at once a purification from heathenism and an initiation or consecration of the convert before his admission amongst the people of God. It was a ceremony not unlike Christian baptism so far as the individual who desired to become a Jew was conducted to the bath, and there immersed himself in the presence of the Rabbis, who recited to him portions of the Law. The proper term, however, is the 'immersion of proselytism' (טבילת גרות), as it is designated, *e.g.*, by Rashi.

The antiquity of proselyte baptism.—Epictetus, the Stoic philosopher, who taught in Rome till A.D. 94, and subsequently lived at Nicopolis, in Epirus, had heard of the practice, and speaks of it, indeed, as a matter of common knowledge. In his conversations, as recorded by the historian Arrian, prefect of Cappadocia, he illustrates the maxim that a man's profession of faith should be carried out in practical life, by referring to the fact that many Hellenes are called, or call themselves, Jews, Syrians, or Egyptians, simply because they have adopted the religious usages of one or other of those peoples. But, he proceeds, when a man goes only half-way in such a matter, it is usually said of him that 'he is no Jew, but has merely the semblance of one'; while, if he takes upon himself the arduous life of 'the baptized and the elect,' he is really what he calls himself (viz. a Jew).*

In the Rabbinical literature (*Mechilta*, on Ex 12^{48}) it is stated that a lady named Valeria, along with her female slaves, was received into Judaism by a bath of immersion. This story may possibly go back to a time at least equally remote. The Babylonian Talmud (*Yebhāmôth*, fol. 46*a*, at foot) contains the tradition that Eliezer and Joshua, who both flourished towards the end of the 1st cent. A.D., disagreed in their views regarding the conditions under which a proselyte should be received, Rabbi Eliezer asserting that circumcision without immersion, Rabbi Joshua that immersion without circumcision, was sufficient. It has been handed down as the admittedly valid finding that both immersion and circumcision, and—in theory at least—an oblation as well, were indispensable conditions of admission to the Jewish communion.

We have thus good authority for believing that proselyte baptism was practised towards the end of the 1st century. It is probable, however, that till about this time baptism was not regarded by all teachers or in all countries as a ceremony associated with the act of embracing Judaism. In view of this circumstance the silence of certain writers, in passages of their works where a reference to the practice might have been expected, loses the force which has sometimes been attributed to this particular case of *testimonium e silentio*.† In one passage of the Mishna, proselyte baptism seems to be merely a bath of ceremonial purification, which the proselyte must take as one who 'comes from the foreskin.'‡ The ceremonial of the practice likewise would be developed gradually. Making all the reservations necessary in view of the diffusion, conception, and various forms of the rite, we may safely assume that the Jewish baptism of proselytes was not of later origin than Christian baptism.

According to Talmudic testimony, the baptism of proselytes took the form of an immersion carried out in accordance with the Rabbinical regulations for ceremonial purification, and in presence of three, or at least two, witnesses. The candidate, if a male, was first of all circumcised, and when the wound had healed [this is left out of account in *Pes.* viii. 8] he was taken to the bath. While he stood in the water the Rabbis ('disciples of the wise') who happened to be among the witnesses once more recited to him some of the great and the lesser commandments. Then the convert made a complete immersion, and stepped forth as a fully privileged Israelite. A female was, for modesty's sake, taken to the water by women, the 'disciples of the wise,' as legal witnesses, standing behind the curtain that served as a door. She was then placed in water up to the neck, and, while she remained in this position, the Rabbis, without seeing her, but within hearing, gave their prelection upon the commandments. She thereafter drew her head under water, and at that moment it was necessary for the witnesses to look on; then, as she came out of the bath, the men retired with averted faces. The bap-

* *Dissert. Epicteti*, ii. 9 (ed. Upton, London, 1841, i. 214 f.): ὅταν δ' ἀναλάβῃ τὸ πάθος τὸ τοῦ βεβαμμένου καὶ ἡρημένου, τότε καὶ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ καλεῖται Ἰουδαῖος. The perfect participles are conclusive.

† This applies specially to Philo Alex., Josephus (*Ant.* XIII. ix., XX. ii.), and Juvenal (*Sat.* xiv. 96).

‡ *Pes.* viii. 8: 'A mourner may bathe and eat his *pesach* in the evening, but *not along with* the sacred meats. One who receives news of a death and one who gathers bones [a gravedigger] may bathe and eat (his *pesach*) *along with* the sacred meats. A proselyte who has become a proselyte on the evening before the *pesach* [*i.e.* the day before] (concerning him) the school of Shammai says: "He may bathe and eat his *pesach* in the evening." But the school of Hillel says: "One who comes from the foreskin is as one who comes from the grave."' Note that, according to Nu 19^{16}, one who touches a grave remains unclean for seven days.

tism of a proselyte could not legally be performed by night, or on a Sabbath or any other holy day.*

This description is to be understood as one of constitutive validity. Baptism, according to it, must be administered by orthodox Judaism whenever proselytes are to be received into its community.

The necessity of proselyte baptism was argued by the Talmudic scholars from the fact that, according to Ex 19[10. 14. 22], the Israelites were commanded 'to sanctify themselves' before the deliverance of the Law at Sinai. That sanctification involved ablution, but was designed by the writer as a necessary condition of meeting with Deity. The Rabbis, however, believed that this act was ordained in view of the holy covenant which was to be completed by a sacrifice (Ex 24[4-8]), but which was about to be instituted from the Divine side by the giving of the Law (Ex 20). They thus assumed that even at that early stage an ablution was the ordained means of gaining admission into the covenant.† We find, however, that proselyte baptism was regarded also as a bath of purification, designed to remove the uncleanness of heathenism (cf. the passage of the Mishna, *Pes.* viii. 8, already cited). Thus, in the case of a woman who was desirous of embracing Judaism, and who had taken the bath required after menstruation, this act was credited to her by a certain Rabbi Joshua as equivalent to the bath required of proselytes.‡ It is a current opinion among Christian theologians that baptism (of children) takes the place of circumcision. The incident just referred to might suggest the idea that proselyte baptism was originally sanctioned by Jewish teachers anxious to make converts, as a more agreeable rite than the other. This surmise, however, has not a shred of evidence to support it; while in the case mentioned by Josephus (*Ant.* XX. ii. 4), circumcision was simply remitted.

From the fact that the Jewish religion claimed to be a Divine revelation, and from such utterances as that of Philo (*de Pœn.* i.), 'the proselyte comes from darkness into light,' or the Rabbinical principle that 'the proselyte is like a newborn child,' it would be erroneous to infer that the baptism of proselytes was the rite of initiation into the mysteries of the Jewish religion. As a matter of fact, the baptism was always preceded by instruction in religious doctrine, and thenceforward there were no further revelations to be made. The Rabbinical principle just quoted, to judge from its discussion amongst the teachers themselves, was concerned exclusively with the *civil* relations of the proselyte: he was required, on this interpretation, to alienate himself entirely from his former interests, and even from his still heathen kindred; he must not inherit their property, he cannot commit incest with them, etc.§

Our prefatory note regarding the characteristics of proselyte baptism is thus confirmed by these early references. This testimony, at the very most, encourages the idea that the ceremony in question, with its twofold signification, was not seldom understood as merely a bath of purification.

LITERATURE.—Rabbinic texts (Talmudic, etc.) are collected by H. Ainsworth, *Annotations on the Pentateuch*, 1612 ff. (at Gn 17); John Lightfoot, *Horae Hebraicae* (at Mt 3[6]); J. A. Bengel, *Ueber das Alter der judischen Proselytentaufe*, 1814; M. Schneckenburger, *Ueber d. Alter d. jüd. Proselytentaufe und deren Zusammenhang mit dem johann. u. christl. Ritus*, Berlin, 1828 (pp. 4–32 are a survey of the older literature); E. Schürer, *GJV*[3], iii. 129 ff.; artt. 'Baptism,' by S. Krauss, and 'Proselyte,' by E. G. Hirsch, in *JE*; also art. 'Proselyte,' by F. C. Porter, in *HDB*.

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* All this is set forth in the Bab. Talmud, *Yebhāmōth*, fol. 45–47.

† Bab. *Yebhāmōth*, fol. 46 *a*, *b*; *Kerithōth*, fol. 9 *a*.

‡ Bab. *Yebhāmōth*, 46 *b*; cf. the Heb. commentators.

§ גר שנתגייר בקטן שגילה דמי : Mishna, *Yebhāmōth*, xi. 2; Bab. *Yebh.* fol. 62 *a*; Jerus. *Yebh.* fol. 4 *a*, *et aliis locis*.

BAPTISM (Muhammadan).—Historically considered, the Muslim rite of purificatory ablution, *wuḍū'* and *ghusl* (see MUHAMMADANISM, § 6), goes back to divergent forms of Christian baptism. Muhammad and his early followers were called by the heathen Arabs Sabæans (*q.v.*), a name applied also in the Qur'ān (ii. 59, v. 73, xxii. 17) to a sect mentioned with respect beside the Jews and the Christians. This name, evidently, is derived from the Aramaic root *ṣaba'*, or *ṣaba'*, 'to dip,' 'immerse,' and means 'dippers,' or 'baptizers,' and was used originally for different heretical Christian sects of Hemerobaptists, Elkesaites (*q.v.*), and Mandæans (*q.v.*), who practised frequent ceremonial ablution (see Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], p. 236 f.; in 1st ed. p. 205 ff.). Of baptism, however, in the precise sense, no trace appears in Islām, although there are many stories in European crusading legend of Muslims who accepted it; and that some distinguished Muslims were knighted by Christians, with all the necessary ceremonies, appears to be practically certain (Lane-Poole, *Saladin*, p. 387 ff.).

Baptism among Christians is regarded by Muslims as an initiatory rite of purification, parallel with circumcision. A very curious description of the rite, as viewed by them, is given by al-Bīrūnī, from Abū-l-Ḥusain al-Aḥwāzī, in his *Chronology of Ancient Nations* (tr. Sachau, p. 288 ff.). He introduces it under Epiphany, in giving an account of the calendar of the Melkite Syrian Christians in Khwarizm, as Epiphany for the Oriental Church is a commemoration of the baptism of Christ. This description is either fanciful and imaginary or is of some obscure local rite. It agrees with none of the great Oriental rites. In Egypt the Copts used to observe the Eve of Epiphany (*laylat al-ghiṭās*), the 10th of Tūba (=the 17th or 18th of January), as a great river-festival, plunging into the Nile as a memorial of the baptism of Christ, and believing that on that night it could prevent and cure all illnesses. In this festival and usage the Muslims also joined, and al-Mas'ūdī, who was in Egypt in A.D. 942, describes it as a great popular ceremony presided over by the Iḫshīd himself (*Murūj adh-dhahab*, ii. 364 f. of Paris ed.). It is now observed by Copts only, and by them not to any great extent. Even the plunging into the Epiphany tank in churches has become greatly disused, and the foot-washing of Maundy Thursday has taken its place. For the religious ceremony see *The Blessing of the Waters on the Eve of the Epiphany*, by John, Marquess of Bute, London, 1901. But among Muslims there is at least one curious custom which appears to be a survival. In the mosque of ad-Dashṭūṭī, just outside of the Bāb ash-Sharīya at Cairo, there is a well and a tank (*maghṭis*), and it is the popular belief that if any one afflicted with a fever (*ḥummā*) plunges into the tank three times in three weeks he will be healed (*Al-ḫiṭaṭ al-jadīda*, iv. 112). Others make the healing power of this *maghtis* much more general, and describe how the sick folk descend into it by the light of a candle (Michell, *Egyptian Calendar*, p. 122).

One obscure passage in the Qur'ān has generally been held by Muslims to be an allusion to baptism, and most translators of the Qur'ān have accepted that view. In Qur'ān ii. 132, after the story of Abraham, how he was a *ḥanīf* of the primitive religion as contrasted with the faiths of the Jews and Christians, there is an exclamatory outburst, 'The kind of dipping (*or* dip, *ṣibgha*) of Allāh! And who is better than Allāh as to a kind of dipping (*or* dip)? And we are worshippers of him.' The precise syntactical construction of *ṣibgha* we need not here consider. It is plain that, lexicographically, in the oldest Arabic usage (*Lisān*, x. 319 ff.) the word means either the act of dipping one thing into another, as, *e.g.*, a camel dips its lips

into water; or the thing into which something else is dipped. Thus *ṣibgha* came to be the regular word for 'dye,' and *ṣibgh* is used in Qur'ān xxiii. 20 for 'sauce.' The oldest exegetical tradition (Ṭabarī's *Tafsīr*, i. 423) sees in Qur. ii. 132 a reference to Christian baptism. It differs only as to the nature of 'the kind of dipping of Allāh,' some holding that it is the *fiṭrat Allāh*, the original nature in which Allāh constituted all creatures, and from which Jews and Christians are perverted only by their parents (see Krehl, in *SSGW*, hist.-phil. Klasse, July 1st, 1870, p. 99), and others that it is Islām, the religion (*dīn*) of Allāh.

In the great scholastic commentary *Mafātīḥ al-ghaib* of Rāzī (d. A.D. 1209) a considerable advance is made, and the idea of 'dipping' has become distinctly 'dyeing' (i. 505). The first explanation is that the 'dyeing' of Allāh is the religion of Islām, and that it is so called (*a*) because Christians dip their children in a yellow water and say that it is a purification, and that they have thereby become Christians; or (*b*) because Jews and Christians dye their children in their respective faiths, in the sense that they instil these into them (said to be a possible meaning of the Arabic); or (*c*) because the form of Islām appears evidently from the traces left by purification and prayer, as Allāh has said (Qur. xlviii. 29), 'Their signs are on their faces from the trace of prostration,' *i.e.* the mark of dust on the forehead; or (*d*) the difference between the true faith and the false is as evident as that between colours or dyes. Or it may be the original nature of man mentioned above, or circumcision; but Rāzī inclines to the first view.

It may, however, be doubted whether any idea of baptism was in Muhammad's mind. To him baptism would have suggested either *wuḍū'* or *ghusl*, which, indeed, had sprung from it. The chapter in which the word *ṣibgha* occurs is called 'Of the Heifer,' from a section (vv. 63–68) evidently derived from Nu 19, which prescribes how a red heifer should be slaughtered and burned and its ashes used for ritual purification ('Red Heifer' in Hastings' *DB* iv. 207 ff.). Further, the same root *ṣaba'*, used in Qur. ii. 132, is that used in Aramaic for the purificatory dipping connected with the ritual of the Red Heifer (Levy, *Chaldaisches Worterbuch*, p. 312, *s.v.*). It seems, then, at least possible that Muhammad had in mind some such process, and not either baptism or dyeing. That the oldest exegetical tradition should be in error is not surprising. The earliest interpreters of the Qur'ān were evidently as far from a genuine oral tradition going back to Muhammad himself as were the translators of the LXX from a tradition going back to the Hebrew prophets.

LITERATURE.—Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums*², Berlin, 1897; Lane-Poole, *Saladin and the Fall of the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, London, 1898; al-Bīrūnī, *Chronology of Ancient Nations*, tr. Sachau, London, 1879; John, Marquess of Bute, *The Blessing of the Waters on the Eve of the Epiphany*, London, 1901; Michell, *Egyptian Calendar*, London, 1900; Krehl, 'Ueber die Koranische Lehre von der Predestination,' in *SSGW*, hist.-phil. Klasse, July 1st, 1870; Levy, *Chaldaisches Worterbuch*, Leipzig, 1866.

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BAPTISM (Polynesian).—A rite closely resembling baptism has been observed in some of the Polynesian Islands. The best-known custom is that of New Zealand. For five days after the birth of a child both the mother and the infant are *tabu*, and remain in a sacred house. The women of the neighbourhood then assemble and give the child its first name, meanwhile dipping a twig in water and sprinkling the infant with it. Some months later, at the feast of the giving of the (second) name, the *tohunga* (priest) dips a twig in water and sprinkles the child's head, uttering formulas in an archaic and practically unintelligible dialect, the words varying according to sex. In the northern island of New Zealand the child was not sprinkled, but was immersed. In both islands the infant was dedicated to Tu, the god of war, and the mother was forbidden to see the ceremony, although, on rare occasions, young people were allowed to be present. An additional baptism was also performed when a boy reached the age of eight, that he might become strong and manly. In the Fiji Islands the first bath of a child was celebrated with a feast, although this is hardly baptism. On the other hand, there is at least an approach to baptism in the custom observed in the island of Rotuma, by which the chief rubbed the face, gums, and lips of the newborn child with a mixture of sea-water and coconut oil; while in the island of Uvea the birth of an infant was celebrated with a feast, at which the child's head was sprinkled with water. The ceremony has been described as the removal of the *tabu* which rests upon the newborn child.

LITERATURE.—Waitz-Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvolker*, vi. 131–133 (Leipzig, 1872); Ploss, *Das Kind*², i. 258 (Leipzig, 1884); Réville, *Les Religions des peuples non-civilisés*, ii. iii. (Paris, 1883).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

BAPTISM (Teutonic).—The practice of sprinkling children with water shortly after birth, as found among many aboriginal races, prevailed also among the Teutons in heathen times. In the 2nd cent. A.D. the famous physician Galen had learned that it was their custom to immerse the infant directly after birth in cold river-water; and about the same period, as well as later, it is recorded by Greek writers that the inhabitants of the Rhine country, who are designated Celts, but who were unquestionably Teutons, employed the river as a test of legitimacy, immersing all their infants therein in the belief that the illegitimate would sink. Unfortunately our authorities for the southern Teutons, and, to a large extent, those for the northern, yield no evidence regarding this primitive rite, the reason being that those authorities date almost entirely from Christian times, when Christian baptism had become the general custom. On the other hand, the practice finds frequent mention in the Icelandic sagas and the Eddic poetry. It is there spoken of as *ausa vatni*, 'to sprinkle with water,' and in the sources it is clearly discriminated from *skíra*, 'to cleanse,' 'to baptize' in the Christian sense.

The writings in which the expression occurs belong in all likelihood to the Christian period, but the people spoken of as actually observing the practice were certainly pagans (cf. K. Maurer, *Wasserweihe*, 5 ff.). The custom probably took its rise in religious ceremonial. By the Teutons, as by many other races, water was thought to be the *habitat* of supernatural, and especially of beneficent, powers, and the act of suffusion therefore brought the child under the influence of these. Hence the claim of the master-magician in the *Hávamál* (v. 158): 'This I can make sure when I suffuse a man-child with water—he shall not fall when he fights in the host; no sword shall bring him low.' The rite was performed by the child's father, or by one near of kin, or by some person of standing with whom the father was socially on familiar terms.

Intimately connected with this initiation by water was the act of naming the child. Both ceremonies, in fact, were performed at the same time by one and the same person, and between the infant and the name-giver there was thus constituted a special bond of union, which was of life-long duration, and was signalized by the name-giver's bestowing a gift upon the child at the ceremony itself. In connexion with the birth of Harald Gráfeld, for instance, we are told that 'Eirikr and Gunnhild had a son whom Haraldr

Haarfager suffused with water, and to whom he gave the name, ordaining that he should be king after his father Eirik' (*Heimskringla*, ed. F. Jónsson, i. 161). In virtue of this act of naming, which counted as the first legal transaction relative to the child, the latter acquired its status, so to speak, as a human being, and was admitted into the legal union of consanguinity. Hence, while initiation by water was in the first instance a religious function, the giving of the name was a legal one; as both were performed by the same individual, however, the former soon acquired a legal significance likewise. So long as a child had not gone through the ceremony of suffusion, its life was as fully at the father's disposal as that of a child who had taken no nourishment; he might expose it, or even kill it. After suffusion, however, the child enjoyed the full legal protection involved in consanguinity. This legal provision still remained in force in the legislation of the Northern Teutons even after the introduction of Christianity, and when baptism had superseded the older rite; according to the earlier Norwegian law, indeed, the murder of an unbaptized child was much more leniently dealt with than that of one who had been baptized. This distinction was not abolished till king Magnus Erlingsson altered the law in the latter half of the 12th century. The provincial codes of Sweden and Denmark still retain traces of this ancient heathen point of view. Even when the slayer was a stranger, *i.e.* a person other than the parents, a much more moderate wergeld was exacted by Swedish law if the victim was still a heathen, *i.e.* unbaptized. Similar enactments are found in the Anglo-Saxon and the Frankish codes.

In the legislation of the Southern Teutons, no doubt, it was the ceremony of naming rather than that of baptism that gained prominence as the function which brought the child under the higher protection of the law. From this circumstance it is inferred by Maurer that the rite of initiation by water was not of Teutonic origin at all, but was adopted from the Christian peoples with whom the Northern Teutons came into contact upon the islands of the Western Sea. Bearing in mind, however, the genuinely Teutonic principle, still firmly rooted among many Teutonic peoples, that baptism invests the child with a higher legal status, and, above all, the fact that throughout practically the entire Teutonic race a child's right of inheritance first becomes operative at its baptism—regulations never found among non-Teutonic peoples—we feel that Maurer's contention is untenable. The circumstance that among the Southern Teutons the ceremony of naming, as marking the child's entrance into his higher legal rights, took the leading place, and that, further, this ceremony was fixed for the ninth day after birth, goes rather to show the influence of the Roman practice of naming the child and presenting him in the temple on the *dies lustricus*.

LITERATURE.—K. Maurer, 'Über die Wasserweihe des germanischen Heidentums' (*Abhand. d. k. Bayr. Akad. der Wiss.*, Cl. i. vol. xv. pt. iii., Munich, 1880); K. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, iv. 314, 632 ff. (Berlin, 1900); H. Pfannenschmid, *Das Weihwasser im heidnischen u. christlichen Cultus* (Hanover, 1869); W. Mannhardt, *Germanische Mythen* (Berlin, 1858), 310 ff.; J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsaltertumer*[4] (Leipzig, 1899), i. 630 ff.

E. MOGK.

BAPTISM BY BLOOD.—Two uses of the expression 'baptism by blood' must be distinguished: (1) a literal use as applied to the practices of pre-Christian and ethnic religion, and (2) a metaphorical use, denoting the sufferings of Christian martyrs.

(1) *Literal use.*—Among all primitive races the blood of beasts or of men plays an important part in religious ceremonies. In the East especially it had peculiar purgative and propitiatory properties ascribed to it, as being the seat and vehicle of life. The ancient Arabs sprinkled blood to lay evil spirits (cf. Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*[2], 127), and a similar act was observed in Vedic ritual (cf. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Opfer und Zauber*, 176, 179). Hebrew notions concerning blood were so far spiritualized that there is only one instance in the OT (1 K 22[38]) which can properly be described as indicating a merely superstitious or magical use of blood (cf. Hastings' *DB* i. 257, *s.v.* 'Bath, Bathing'). For its employment in Jewish ceremonial see separate artt. COVENANT, PURIFICATION, SACRIFICE. Hellenic ritual is not without examples of cathartic sprinkling of blood (cf. Apollonius Rhod. *Argonaut.* iv. 704 f.; Æschylus, *Eum.* 282 f.), and in the Roman Lupercalia there was a piacular use of dog's and goat's blood (cf. Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, 311). But it was probably at a somewhat late date and under the influence of prevailing Eastern cults that the practice of immersion in blood, resulting in moral cleanness, was brought into the Empire. In the Taurobolium and Criobolium (Hæmobolium, cf. Orelli's *CIL*, No. 2334) the worshipper, issuing drenched with blood of bull or ram from the pit over which the beast had been slaughtered, was regarded as being cleansed from his sins and ready for eternity (cf. 'taurobolio criobolioque renatus in æternum,' *Berlin CIL* vi. 510). See separate artt. CRIOBOLIUM, GREAT MOTHER, TAUROBOLIUM. For savage rites of purification by blood-sprinkling, cf. J. G. Frazer, *Adonis Attis Osiris*, 251; and for Scandinavian and German parallels, cf. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[4], i. 45; and U. Jahn, *Opfergebrauche*, 31. Cf. also p. 372[b].

(2) *Metaphorical use.*—In the Christian Church allusion is very early made to a baptism by blood in connexion with martyrdom. Polycarp (A.D. 156), who stripped himself of his garments at the stake, may very well have wished to signify by so doing a preparation for baptism by blood and fire; and although the action seems to have been unusual enough to attract the attention of Lucian, who in his *de morte Peregrini* describes Peregrinus as making a similar preparation for death, it was probably not the first time that a Christian martyr tried to carry out in his own person the prophecy of Mk 10[39] (cf. H. F. Stewart, *Invocation of Saints*, 54, 55). The germ of the idea that death for Christ had the effect of baptism, viz., remission of sin, is found in Melito of Sardis (*c.* 170 A.D.), who in an extant fragment (ed. Otto, xii.) says that two things confer forgiveness of sins, viz., baptism and suffering for Christ. Hermas (*Pastor*, iii., *Simil.* 9, § 20) says much the same: 'Omnium eorum deleta sunt delicta, quia propter nomen Filii Dei mortem obierunt.'

But the first definite mention of baptism by blood in Christian literature is probably a passage in the *Passio S. Perpetuæ* (A.D. 202): 'a sanguine ad sanguinem ab obstetrice ad retiarium lotura post partum secundo baptismo' (*Passio S. Perpetuæ*, 118). To about the same date may be assigned the *de Baptismo* of Tertullian, who says: 'est quidem nobis etiam secundum lauacrum, unum et ipsum, sanguinis scilicet, de quo dominus, habeo, inquit, baptismo tingui, cum iam tinctus fuisset' (*de Baptismo*, 16, cf. Lupton's ed. *ad loc.*).

The distinction between the first and second baptism made by Tertullian in this passage and elsewhere is maintained by the anonymous author of *de Rebaptismo*, and by Cyprian, who says (*de Exhort. Martyr.* præf. 3) that the first baptism (by water) gives remission of sins, while the second (by blood) gives union with God and man, or the final victory of God and Christ.

Origen holds that baptism by blood excludes the possibility of sin, and ventures to assert its superiority over baptism by water (*Hom. in Jud.* vii. 473; cf. Redepenning, *Origenes*, ii. 28).

These notions, struck out under stress of persecution, were taken up in times of peace by later writers, *e.g.* Ambrose, Augustine, Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gennadius, and became the established teaching, until finally scholastic divinity definitely adopted the scheme of *baptismum sanguinis aquæ flaminis* (sc. *spiritus sancti*) (cf. Thomas Aq. *Summa*, p. iii., q. xi. xii., where baptism by blood is assigned a higher place than the other two).

It is doubtless possible to regard the expression baptism by blood, fire, tears as merely rhetorical (so *DCA* i. 169, *s.v.* 'Baptism'); but Hagenbach (*History of Christian Doctrine*[5], i. 286) points out that the parallel between the efficacy of water and blood rests upon the antithesis which the Fathers desired to maintain between man's free will and the influence of Divine Grace. In baptism by water man appears as a passive recipient; in baptism by blood he contributes something of his own.

LITERATURE. — H. Dodwell, *Dissertationes Cyprianicæ* Bremen, 1690; J. G. Frazer, *Adonis Attis Osiris*, London, 1907; F. W. Gass, 'Das christliche Martyrtum in den ersten Jahrhunderten' in *Zeitschrift fur die historische Theologie*, Gotha, 1859; Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[4], Berlin, 1875; Hagenbach, *History of Christian Doctrine*[5] (Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1880); U. Jahn, *Die deutschen Opfergebrauche*, Breslau, 1884; J. M. Lupton, *Tertullian de Baptismo*, Cambridge, 1908; H. F. Stewart, *Doctrina Romanensium de Invocatione Sanctorum*, London, 1907. H. F. STEWART.

BAQILĀNI.—Baqilāni († A.H. 403 = A.D. 1012) was initiated into the system of orthodox theology associated with the Ash'arites—so named from the founder of the school—by his teacher Mugāhid, a pupil of Ash'arī himself († A.H. 324 = A.D. 935) and Bāhili († A.H. 327 = A.D. 938). The aim of this school was to safeguard the doctrines of the Qur'ān against the rationalistic tendencies of the Mu'tazilites, and at the same time to maintain a conciliatory attitude towards the claims of reason and the philosophy which contended for the rational interpretation of the Qur'ān and the exclusion of all its irrational elements. Baqilāni, in his endeavour to hold the balance even between the two conflicting parties, was regarded by some as simply a Mu'tazilite, *i.e.* a rationalist and an infidel, but the majority saw in him the champion of orthodoxy among the Ash'arites. His whole active life was given to his polemic against the liberalism of the Mu'tazilites. That he had a potent influence upon Muslim theology may be inferred from the fact that his opinions are cited in conjunction with those of al-Ghazālī († A.H. 505 = A.D. 1111), the greatest theologian of Islām, and his teacher Juwaini († A.H. 478 = A.D. 1085), by ibn Taimiya († A.H. 728 = A.D. 1327) in his Letters (Cairo, 1323), p. 62, by Qushgi († A.H. 879 = A.D. 1474) in his Commentary on Tūsi's († A.H. 672 = A.D. 1273) 'System of Doctrine,' (*Tagrid*), Treatise ii., 'Inquiry concerning the will,' and by many others. Baqilāni's system is practically that of Ash'arī (see AL-ASH'ARĪ, p. 111), although he certainly grafted several philosophical doctrines upon the orthodox theology, such as the doctrine of atoms, the doctrine of empty space, the idea that the will (especially in God) abhors the contrary of the thing willed, and that one accident cannot become the substratum of a second. The extant dicta of Baqilāni, however, are too meagre to substantiate any further differences of note.

All we know of his external life is that he was born in humble circumstances, his father being a greengrocer in Baṣra, and that he held the office of a judge in the same city. From the latter fact comes the title by which he is best known, viz., Ḳāḍī Abū Bakr, but his full name was Abū Bakr Aḥmed ibn Ali ibn at-Taiyib al-Baqilāni.

M. HORTEN.

BARASHNUM, BARESHNUM.—See PURIFICATION (Parsi).

BAR COCHBA, BAR KOCHBA. — See MESSIAHS (PSEUDO-).

BARDS.

Breton (E. ANWYL), p. 412.
Irish (DOUGLAS HYDE), p. 414.
Welsh (E. ANWYL), p. 416.

BARDS (Breton).—Though the Breton tongue is closely related to Welsh, the history of Breton poetry is far more meagre than that of Wales. The reason for this is that in Brittany the ruling classes and those sections of the community that had literary interests turned, even in the early Middle Ages, to the French tongue for the satisfaction of their literary wants. The result was that in mediæval times there appears to have been in Brittany no powerful and clearly established literary tradition, carried on by professional or semi-professional bards, as there was in Wales; while, in later times, there was no popular demand for native poetry except when it was of a purely popular kind (such as the ballads called *Gwerziou* and *Soniou*), or took the form of religious drama. Count Hersart de la Villemarqué, in his zeal for his native land, imagined that in mediæval Brittany a body of heroic poetry had flourished; but there are, unfortunately, nowhere to be found any traces of such poetry. Nor have we in the case of Breton, as we have in the case of Welsh, marked evidences of that linguistic conservatism which tends to keep the literary tongue distinct from the spoken language of a people. Breton has far more of the characteristics of a colloquial language than Welsh, and it approaches nearer in many respects to some of the Southern Welsh dialects than to the Welsh literary tongue. One of the great obstacles to the view that Chrétien de Troyes derived his Arthurian material and nomenclature from Brittany is that, apart from popular folklore, there is no evidence of any Arthurian literary cycle in mediæval Brittany at all; and the other British heroes, who are associated with Arthur, do not appear even to have been known in Brittany; while in Wales, on the other hand, they were the leading heroes both of prose and of verse narrative. In Wales the centres of the bardic system were the courts of the princes, but in Brittany there is no evidence whatsoever of any systematic princely patronage given to Breton poetry. As M. Loth of Rennes says, there is no continuous Breton text of any kind before the end of the 15th century. The language certainly was written before then, since we have Breton glosses and Breton proper names in writing; so that it is all the more strange, if Brittany had a flourishing literature in Breton, that there should be in existence no single fragment of it. In his *Chrestomathie bretonne* M. Loth says:

'After having invaded all the coasts of the Armorican peninsula from the Couesnon to the Loire, after having had the upper hand in the old dioceses of Dol, Saint-Malo, Saint-Brieuc, Tréguier, Léon, Cornouailles, and Vannes on the Nantes coast, and in the interior having commenced to cross, from the 8th to the 9th cent., even the Vilaine to the neighbourhood of Redon, Breton is found, after the 11-12th cent., suddenly thrust back

towards the West, and from this period it occupies almost the same area as it does to-day. The alliances of Breton chiefs with French families, whether of French Brittany or of France itself, or of the Anglo-Norman zone, were not slow to make French the language of the aristocracy and the instrument of intellectual culture, even in the Breton-speaking zone. The most ancient texts in mediæval Breton bear witness to this: they are almost all translations or imitations from the French; they are entirely penetrated with French words.'

M. Loth shows how Breton was, even in mediæval times, relegated to a lower place. Yet, as he points out, we should not be justified in thinking that there had never been in Brittany such a thing as Breton culture or Breton literature. He argues quite justly that the very existence up to the 16th cent. of the complicated Breton system of versification implies a literary period during which that system was evolved; such a system, which, he says, has features in common with the versification of Wales and Cornwall, implies the existence at one time of a school of bards or wandering Breton poets (*trouvères bretons*). It is significant, however, that the Breton metres bear far fewer traces of professional elaboration than do those of Wales. In this case M. Loth is inclined to explain the complete disappearance of the older body of poetry by the very limited circle to which it appealed or the oral character of its transmission. The significant fact for all students of Celtic influences on French mediæval literature is that not a line of Breton mediæval literature exists before the 15th century. How meagre the remnants of Breton poetry are, as compared with those of Wales, will be seen from the following list of the fragments and portions of Middle Breton poetry from the 15th and subsequent centuries that have come down to us:

(1) A Breton fragment in the farce of M. Pathelin (Loth, *RCel* iv. 451, v. 225). (2) A score of quite mutilated verses, probably in the Vannes dialect and of the end of the 15th cent. (published by Loth, *ib.* viii. 161). (3) A metrical life of St. Nonn, the mother of St. David, in the form of a Mystery play (published in 1837 by the Abbé Sionnet, with a translation by the Breton grammarian and lexicographer, Le Gonidec, and by M. Ernault, *ib.* viii. 230 ff.) The only source of this mystery is a MS in the Bibliothèque Nationale of the 15th century. The story is that of the Latin *Life of St David* dramatized. The scene is laid mainly in Wales, but an attempt is made to localize some features of the story in Brittany, such as the burial of St. Nonn at Dirinon.

From the 16th cent. onwards the chief compositions written in Breton have been Mystery plays, which show unmistakably the influence of French models.

In 1530 there was published *Le Grand Mystère de Jésus*, of which a copy exists in the Bibliothèque Nationale. From the evidence of language, M. Loth believes that this Mystery was written about the date of its publication. A second edition was published at Morlaix in 1622 by Georges Allienne. M. Loth points out that the edition followed by the Breton translator is that of Arnoul Gresban, or rather that of Jean Michel, played at Angers in 1486, and soon afterwards printed by Vérard. The same book also contains a Breton version of the *Transitus Beatæ Mariæ* (*Tremenvan an ytron guerches Maria*), the *Fifteen Joys of Mary* (*Pemzec leuenez Maria*), and the *Life of Man* (*Buhez Mabden*). For the two latter there are no known French originals. Another Breton Mystery, which was published in the 16th cent. and afterwards in the 17th, was *Le Mystère de Sainte Barbe*. The first edition was published in 1557, and the second in 1647. The former was printed at Paris for Bernard de Leau, printer of Morlaix (see 'Bibliographie des traditions et de la littérature populaire de la Bretagne' [pp. 315–316], by H. Gaidoz and Paul Sébillot, published at Paris [1882] as an extract from the *RCel*). This Mystery has been reprinted after the 1557 edition, with the variant readings of the 1647 edition, by a distinguished Breton scholar, M. E. Ernault, professor at the Faculty of Letters of Poitiers (Nantes, Société des bibliophiles bretons, 1885). This drama is substantially the same as the printed French drama of the same name, but M. Loth shows that there are differences between the two plays sufficiently marked to justify the supposition that the Breton drama is an adaptation of a French version parallel to that which has been printed. Another Breton Mystery is *The Mirror of Death*, composed in 1519 and printed in 1575, at the Convent of St. Francis of Cuburien. This Mystery is in private hands, and M. Loth states that he was able to obtain a copy of a portion of it only through the good offices of the Abbé Corré of Lesneven, who transcribed it.

In the 17th cent. we find also some Breton hymns published by Tanguy Gueguen in 1650, but there has been no development of hymnology in Breton comparable for a moment with that of Wales. In the 18th cent. the work of adapting and copying Mystery plays was carried on vigorously, and we have the following among other compositions of this type:

(1) *Robert le Diable*, a Mystery in six acts and two days. This bears the date 30th November 1741. M. Loth shows it to be of French origin, but states that it is very different from the play of 'Robert le Diable' in the *Miracles de Notre-Dame*, t. vi. (Société des anciens textes français), and also from the *Mystère du xive siècle*, published at Rouen in 1836. (2) *The Creation of the World*. The oldest known MS of this play was written in 1760, and is, like the Cornish *Gwreans an bys* ('The Creation of the World'), an imitation of the French. (3) *The Tragedy of St. Alexis*. This was represented in 1799, and is a translation into Breton from French, though its precise French source is not known. M. Loth points out that it is very different from the Miracle play of 'St. Alexis' in the *Miracles de Notre-Dame*, t. iii. p. 282 (Société des anciens textes français).

The leading Breton poet of the 19th cent. is **Luzel** (François-Marie), who was born on 6th June 1821 at Plouaret, Côtes-du-Nord, on the boundary of Lannion and Guingamp. Breton literature and the revival of Breton life in the 19th cent. owe probably more to the work of Luzel than to that of any other man. The Vicomte Hersart de la Villemarqué (1st half of 19th cent.) undoubtedly did much to call attention to the history and literature of Brittany, but his uncritical attitude towards popular Breton poetry, which he imagined to be of remote antiquity, and his readiness even to alter, in accordance with his preconceived ideas, the text of the popular poems which he published, led to a reaction. Luzel, on the other hand, possessed the true scientific as well as the poetic spirit of his age, and was alive to the importance of basing theory on ascertained concrete fact. It is to his zeal that we owe the collection of numerous copies of Mystery plays that were scattered over Brittany. Nor did he confine his researches to plays; he also gathered together a considerable body of popular Breton ballad poetry, the *Gwerziou Breiz-Izel* and the *Soniou Breiz-Izel*. It is in these simple popular poems that we see the true reflexion of the poetic spirit of Brittany. Wales has, indeed, in her *Penillion telyn* a certain body of popular poetry, but it consists for the most part of isolated verses; and, by the side of the earlier and later traditions of that poetry which is the fruit of conscious personal skill, the popular poetry of Wales has perhaps not been adequately prized. In Wales, too, there is a considerable ballad literature, which has characteristics that are very similar to those of the popular poems of Brittany.

Breton popular poetry has a simple and artless character, but its very simplicity gives it a charm of its own. It is fond of those narrative and dramatic incidents which often occur even in the humbler life of man. It has various moods, but the graver and sadder strain of a life of toil predominates. This poetry is especially interesting as the expression of a racial psychology that has been in close touch with Nature through hard toil on land and sea, and which has had, moreover, a life far away from that of the great centres of the wider world. In spite of the close kinship of the Welsh and Breton tongues, the Welsh and Breton types of mind are at the present day in many respects very different. The Breton mind is conservative, the Welsh mind is progressive; Brittany is the great Roman Catholic stronghold of France, Wales is the great Nonconformist stronghold of Southern Britain. The individualistic as well as the collective movements of the 19th cent. have met with a hearty response in Wales; and the industrial problems of the age are nowhere more keenly felt than in some of the populous centres of Wales. The spirit of competition has pervaded even her literary sphere. Yet it is pleasing to see the growth at the present day of a certain *rapprochement* between Wales and Brittany, which is proving a stimulus to Breton literature and to Breton institutions. One feature of this *rapproche-*

ment has been the exchange of visits at the National Eisteddfod of Wales and the Celtic festivals of Brittany by delegates from the two countries. In these visits the Marquis de l'Estourbeillon, M. Fustec, M. le Goffic, and M. Jaffrennou, one of the ablest living poets of Brittany, have taken an active part. To M. le Goffic Brittany owes a deep debt of gratitude for the active part which he has taken in the publication of Breton ballads, and the stimulus which these have been to the further composition of those simple poems in which the Breton mind delights.

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E. ANWYL.

BARDS (Irish).—The earliest poems of the Irish bards are lost; but although it is not easy to re-construct for ourselves, with any degree of fullness, the functions and surroundings of the pre-Christian poets, we are by no means without data to attempt such re-construction. We know, in the first place, that the poet was regarded as possessed of powers sufficiently supernatural to make even princes tremble; for with a well-aimed satire he could raise boils and disfiguring blotches upon the countenance of his opponents, or even do them to death by it. This belief continued until the later Middle Ages; and, even down to the days of Dean Swift, the Irish poet was credited with the power of being able to rhyme at least rats and vermin to death. Again, the early Irish poet was, by virtue of his office, a judge in all cases of tribal disputes and in other matters. He was also, if not a Druid himself, probably closely allied with the Druidic order; and when Christianity superseded Druidism in the 5th cent., the mantle of Druidic learning seems to have fallen upon his shoulders; and amid Christian times he seems to a large extent to have continued the Druidic traditions. His verses prior to the 6th or 7th cent. were not rhymed, but seem to have depended for their effect upon diction—a sort of rhythm, and perhaps to some extent alliteration.

The Irish memory, always very tenacious, has handed down to us in some of our oldest MSS several verses said to be the first ever made in Ireland. These are ascribed to no less a person than Amergin, brother of Eber, Ir, and Eremon, the three early Milesian conquerors, sons of Milesius himself, to whom (or to whose uncle Ith) every free Celtic family in Ireland traces itself back to this day, just as the Teutonic races of Germany traced themselves to one of the three main stems that sprang from the sons of Mannus, whose father was the god Tuisco. These verses of Amergin, like all other very early Irish poems that have come down to us, are composed in a kind of rhetoric or unrhymed outburst, called *rosg* by the Irish; and there can be little doubt that they were handed down from grandfather to father and from father to son, perhaps for hundreds of years before the Irish Celts became acquainted with the art of writing, which they probably did in the 3rd cent., when, having become acquainted with letters through the Romanized Britons, they invented for themselves their curious Ogam alphabet. As it has always been the belief of the Gaels that these verses of Amergin's were the earliest ever composed in Ireland, it may very well be that they actually do represent the oldest surviving lines in the vernacular of any country in Europe except Greece alone:

'I am the wind which breathes upon the sea,
I am the wave of the ocean,
I am the murmur of the billows,
I am the ox of seven combats,
I am the vulture upon the rock,
I am a beam of the sun,
I am the fairest of plants,
I am a wild boar in valour,
I am a salmon in the water,
I am a lake in the plain,
I am a word of science,
I am a point of the lance of battle,
I am the man who creates in the head (*i.e.* of man) the fire (*i.e.* the thought).
Who is it that throws light upon the meeting on the mountain (if not I)?
Who announces the ages of the moon (if not I)?
Who teaches the place where couches the sea (if not I)?'

It is only natural that D'Arbois de Jubainville, whose translation of these very difficult verses is here given, should discern in them a strong vein of Pantheism, which appears to run through the poem. It may, however, have no such pregnant signification, and may be merely a panegyric, couched in metaphor, upon the prowess of the singer himself. Another poem ascribed to the same Amergin appears to be an invocation of Ireland, of which he and his brothers took possession for the Milesians. It is unrhymed, has a tendency towards alliteration, and shows a strongly marked leaning towards dissyllabic diction, as—

'I invoke thee, Erin,
Brilliant, brilliant sea,
Fertile, fertile hill,
Wavy, wavy wood,
Flowing, flowing stream,
Fishy, fishy lake,' etc.

The Irish annalists themselves have never been agreed as to the time when Amergin is supposed to have sung these verses, some dating it as far back as 1700 B.C., and others placing it as late as 800 B.C.. All that we can say with certainty is that they are very old. In like manner we find preserved the earliest satire said to have ever been pronounced in Ireland, and other pieces of the same nature, all undoubtedly of great antiquity and almost unintelligible, despite the heavy glosses added to them by the Irish of the Middle Ages.

After the general establishment of Christianity in Ireland, which was largely owing to Saint Patrick, who commenced his missionary labours about the year 432—though there were Christians in the South of Ireland before his time—we find the poets still occupying a very high position. In the preface to the old law-book the *Seanchus Mór*, some of whose tracts in their present form cannot, says Jubainville, be later than the close of the 6th cent., we read that the Old Law had been reduced to form by the Irish poets long before St. Patrick's time. 'Whoever the poet was,' says the text, 'who connected it by a thread of poetry before Patrick, it lived until it was exhibited to Patrick. The preserving shrine is the poetry, and the Seanchus, or Law, is what is preserved therein.' The tract itself begins thus:

'The Scanchus of the men of Erin—what has preserved it? The joint memory of two seniors, the tradition from one to another, *the composition of poets*.'

Here it is that we probably come upon the real secret of the early poet's importance, which, as we know, placed him next to the prince and rendered

his person sacrosanct. This importance arose from the fact that, in an age when writing was not known or used, he, and he alone, possessed the power of throwing law, history, and, above all, genealogy, into such forms as could be stereotyped upon the only material then available—the human memory. We know from Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* VI. xiv. 4) that the Gaulish Druids who could write, and who used Greek letters for ordinary purposes, nevertheless refused to commit to writing any of the considerable number of verses which they were obliged to learn. Cæsar seems to think that they did this partly to keep their lore a secret known only to themselves, and partly to strengthen the memory of their disciples. It is very probable, however, that the Druids' verses, in which, as in the verses of the early Irish poets, laws, genealogies, rights, and prohibitions were enshrined, had had their origin, in Gaul as in Ireland, long before the art of writing had been diffused, and the priestly class, always conservative by nature, had continued to hold fast to tradition, not only in the matter of their learning, but also in their manner of transmitting it. There is no indication, however, that the Irish ever imitated them in this respect, or showed any repugnance to committing to writing their own traditional lore, so soon as letters had once become common amongst them.

The schools of the Irish poets subsisted for generations, side by side with the colleges of the clergy, in Ireland, but they were perhaps less firmly localized, and showed a tendency to attach themselves to the personalities of their master-poets and teachers rather than to particular localities. It is also probable that there may have been a certain amount of confusion when the ancient Druidic schools began to break up and disintegrate, or rather before the 'sons of learning,' as the Irish called the students who attended them, began to specialize; and it is nearly certain that the offices of historian, judge, poet, and genealogist were not sharply distinguished from one another for many generations. This will be the more readily understood if we remember that one of the principal tasks of the historian in early times was to preserve the tribal genealogies upon which the holding of land, and indeed the entire tribal system, depended. But both his history and genealogy were preserved in a shrine of poetry, and whoever was master of the contents of this poetry became, naturally and inevitably, the judge, who alone was able, from his own knowledge, to settle the disputes of the tribe and the suits of its individual members. Indeed, the office of poet did once legally carry with it the office of judge as well, according to Irish accounts, until the reign of Conor Mac Messa, shortly before the birth of Christ. He it was who first made a law that the office of poet should not of necessity carry with it the office of judge also; for, says the old text, 'poets alone had the power of judicature from the time that Amergin Whiteknee [the son of Milesius mentioned above as being the first Irish poet] delivered the first judgment in Erin.'

The profession of poet was so popular in early Ireland, that at one time, it is said, one third of the patrician families followed this calling. They expected to be supported by the general public, and terrorized the wealthy with the threat of their satire. They constituted an intolerable burden upon the productive working part of the nation, and three distinct attempts were made to get rid of them altogether, the last at the Synod of Drumceat in A.D. 590, where their numbers were greatly cut down and their prerogatives restricted, though, to counterbalance this, certain endowments of land were apportioned to provide for their schools. These institutions actually continued, with scarcely a break, until the 17th cent., when those few who escaped the spear of Elizabeth fell beneath the sword of Cromwell. In these schools, which were the lineal descendants of the old pre-Christian Druidic foundations, there gradually arose a complete system of specialization in learning. There still exist fragments of the metrical text-books used in these schools, preserved in the *Book of Leinster* (*c.* 1150) and other MSS, and that they date, partially at least, from pre-Christian times seems certain from their prescribing, amongst other items of the poet's course, a knowledge of the magical incantations called *Tenmlaida*, *Imbas forosnai*, and *Dichetal do chennaibh na tuaithe*. The poet was also obliged to learn an incantation called *Cétnad*, of which the text says:

'It is used for finding out a theft: one sings it, that is to say, through the right fist on the track of the stolen beast [observe the antique assumption that the only kind of wealth to be stolen is cattle], or on the track of the thief in case the beast is dead, and one sings it three times on the one track or the other. If, however, one does not find the track, one sings it through the right fist and goes to sleep upon it, and in one's sleep the man who has brought it away is clearly shown and made known,' etc.

Another *Cétnad* to be learned is one which desires length of life, and is addressed to 'the Seven Daughters of the Sea, who shape the thread of the long-lived children.' Another curious operation with which the poet had to make himself familiar was the *glam dichinn*, intended to punish any king or prince who should refuse to a poet the reward of his poem. The poet, says the text,

'was to fast upon the lands of the king for whom the poem was to be made, and the consent of thirty laymen, thirty bishops [a Christian touch added in later times to make the passage pass muster], and thirty poets should be had to compose the satire.'

The proceedings were weird and terrifying. There were seven grades of poets, of which the *ollamh* [*ollav*] was the highest, and the whole seven were to go,

'at the rising of the sun, to a hill which should be situated at the boundary of seven lands, and each of them was to turn his face to a different land, and the *ollamh's* face was to be turned to the land of the king who was to be satirized, and their backs should be turned to a hawthorn which should be growing on the top of a hill; and the wind should be blowing from the north; and each man was to hold a perforated stone and a thorn of the hawthorn bush in his hand; and each man was to sing a verse of his composition for the king, the chief poet to take the lead with his own verse, and the others in concert after him with theirs; and each of them should place his stone and his thorn under the stem of the hawthorn tree; and, if it was they who were in the wrong in the case, the ground of the hill would swallow them; and, if it was the king who was in the wrong, the ground would swallow him, and his wife, and his son, and his steed, and his robes, and his hound,' etc.

It is evident that these magic incantations and terrifying ceremonies found amongst the remnants of the poets' books are really remnants of the pre-Christian teaching of the Druidic schools, which had embodied themselves in the text-books of later times. They show at once the superstitious reverence with which the poets must have been regarded, and the extreme antiquity of their schools and text-books; for it can scarcely be contended that such pieces of obvious Paganism had their origin after Ireland had been Christianized.

The Irish poet was not called a 'bard' but a *file* (*filla*). The bard was, in comparison with him, only a rhymester; and, though both existed side by side, there was the greatest disparity of status. Where the *file* received his three cows for a poem, the bard bore away only a calf. The distinction between the *file* and the bard seems to have come to an end during the long-continued wars with the Norsemen, when much of Ireland's internal policy was thrown into the melting-pot. There were seven orders of *file*, and the highest had something like a twelve years' course before he attained his degree. The bards were divided into 'free' and 'un-free' bards. There were eight classes of each, and each class was allotted by law the metres which it was allowed to make use of. A lower class could not use the metres belonging to a higher

class. Whether the Celts invented rhyme seems open to doubt. Zeuss, the father of Celtic learning, asserts that they did. One thing is certain: we find the Irish as early as the 7th century—that is, long before any other people in Europe made use of it—bringing rhymed poetry to a high pitch of perfection. It is no exaggeration to say that by no people on the globe, at any period of the world's history, was poetry so cultivated and so remunerated as it was in Ireland during the Middle Ages, and even down to the 17th century. In the 16th and following centuries the poets fell under the ban of the English State, because, as Spenser puts it, their poems were 'tending for the most parte to the hurte of the English or [the] mayntenaunce of theyre owne lewde libertye, they being most desirous thereof.' The severest Acts were passed against them, and numbers of them were hanged. The present writer cannot recall a single poet who took the side either of the English invaders or of the Reformation. So thoroughly was all indigenous Irish civilization stamped out under the Penal Laws, that, by the close of the 18th cent., there was probably not a single person living who could compose in any of the 400 metres practised by the ancient schools. A new school of poetry arose among the unlearned, and accentual metres took the place of syllabic poetry, and so it continues to this day.

Outside of its marvellous development of metric, the most interesting feature of Irish poetry is perhaps its appreciation of nature in all its moods, its love of the sea, the forest, and wild scenery, which it seems to have developed long before other European literatures.

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DOUGLAS HYDE.

BARDS (Welsh).—**1. Definition and scope of the term.**—In Welsh the modern form of the term for a poet is *bardd* [*dd* = English soft *th*], but, at an earlier stage in the history of the language, the form was *bard*. In one of the old Welsh glosses (8th or 9th cent.) on Martianus Capella the word 'epica' is glossed as *bardaul* [= mod. Welsh *barddol*]. In the Cornish Vocabulary (Zeuss-Ebel, p. 1070), 'tubicen' is explained as *barth* [*th* = W. *dd*] *hirgorn* ('the bard of the long horn'), while in Breton the corresponding form *barz* is given in the Catholicon as *menestrier* ('a mime'). In Welsh, as in Irish, the term 'bard' preserved the meaning which it had in Gaulish. Posidonius, quoted by Athenæus (vi. 49, p. 246[c-d]), refers to the poets of the Celts as βάρδοι (*bardoi*), and says that these are poets who utter praises with song. The same writer, quoted by Strabo (iv. 4. 4, p. 197), speaks of βάρδοι, οὐάτεις (*vates*), and δρυίδαι (*druidai*) as 'three tribes' (-ρία φῦλα) among the Celts, the bards being 'composers of hymns and poets' (ὑμνηταὶ καὶ ποιηταί). Diodorus, also (v. 31. 2), speaks of the bards of the Gauls as 'composers of songs' (ποιηταὶ μελῶν), while he further states that they sang, accompanied by instruments like lyres, praising some and reviling others. One of these instruments in use among the Britons, as we learn from Venantius Fortunatus, was called *crotta* (Welsh, *crwth*). It will be seen from these references that the bards appear to have had a recognized place in Celtic social life, and one of the most characteristic features of the development of poetry in Wales has been the close association of the bards and their productions with the satisfaction of certain social needs of a literary character.

The existence of the term 'bard' in the same form in both the Goidelic and the Brythonic branches of the Celtic family shows that it was in use before the separation of these two branches. At the same time it can hardly have been used as a professional term in the period of Italo-Celtic unity (to which philological considerations point), since there is no trace of it in the Italic languages, while the term corresponding to οὐάτεις (Lat. *vates*, Irish *fáith*, Welsh *gwawd*, 'song') appears to have been common to Italic and Celtic in that period. It was probably as the official spokesman in song of the feelings of his tribe on important occasions that the Celtic bard gained his name. He would be the recognized composer for his community of elegies and eulogies and, if need were, of satires. His elegies and eulogies may well have included in their scope not only the recently dead, but also the famous heroes of the tribe or family with which he was associated, while hymns in praise of the gods were no doubt from time to time composed by these official interpreters of tribal feeling. Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* VI. xiv. 4) tells us that it was the practice of the Druids to teach their disciples a large body of oral poetry, which they were not allowed to commit to writing, lest thereby their memory should be impaired.

Much of the interest of the evolution of Welsh poetry consists in a study of its correlation with the varying social needs of the Welsh community, and also the gradual growth of a body of poetry which, as in modern countries generally, is an individual rather than a social product. It is of interest, too, to note how the poetry of Wales has been the expression, not only of various literary wants of a social character, but also of the thoughts generated by the beauty of Nature and by the vicissitudes of human life. It contains many poems and lines of true insight and real æsthetic beauty, and shows that the minds of many Welsh poets have been attuned to the signal grandeur and charm of the scenery of Wales.

2. The bards in the Welsh laws.—In the Welsh laws of Howel Dda (10th cent.), the bards have a recognized place in the social order, and have official representatives in the royal household. The three bardic grades appear to have been (1) *Pencerdd* ('chief of song'), or *Bardd Cadeiriog* ('the throned bard'); (2) *Bardd teulu* ('the bard of the house-host or retinue'); and (3) bards of the lowest grade, who were called sometimes *Clerwyr*, sometimes *Oferfeirdd* ('superfluous bards'), and sometimes *Beirdd Yspydeit* ('bards receiving entertainment'). The throned bard sat next below the judge of the court in the upper portion of the hall, while the bard of the household sat on one hand of the chief of the household in the lower portion, the chief of the household being a son of the king, or his nephew, or some other member of the blood-royal. One of the duties of the chief of the household, we are told, was to place the harp in the hands of the bard of the household at the three principal feasts (Easter, Whitsuntide, and Christmas). One of his privileges, too, was that he could have a song from the bard of the household whenever he might desire it. One section of the Welsh laws enumerates the duties and privileges of 'the bard of the household,' and among them the following:—

'He is to have his land free, and his horse in attendance, and his linen clothing from the queen, and his woollen clothing from the king. He is to have the clothes of the steward at the three principal festivals. When a song is desired, the chaired bard is to begin, the first song of God and the second of the king who shall own the palace, or, if there be none, let him

sing of another king. After the chaired bard, the bard of the household, is to sing three songs on various subjects. If the queen desire a song, let the bard of the household go to sing to her without limitation, in a low voice, so that the hall may not be disturbed by him. He is to have a cow, or an ox, from the booty obtained by the household from a border-country, after a third has gone to the king; and he is, when they share the spoil, to sing the "Monarchy of Britain" to them. When he shall go with other bards he is to have the share of two.'

The throned bard, or chief of song, who stood in the highest position of all, has his functions and privileges also described.

'He is to have his land free. He is to begin with a song of the Deity, and next of the king who shall own the palace, or of another. The chief of song only is to solicit, and of the common gains of himself and companions he is to have two shares. He is to have twenty-four pence from every minstrel, when he may have finished his instruction. He is to have twenty-four pence from every woman on marriage, if he have not received it from her before. He is to have the *amobyr* ("marriage-fee") of the daughters of the minstrels. He is to lodge with the *edling* ("heir-apparent")).'

For a bard of unusual skill the term *prydydd* was sometimes employed, and the chieftainship of song was obtained by a bardic contest (*ymrysson*) in the form of a dispute between the two candidates. An *ymrysson* of this kind (probably incomplete) is still extant (see *Myvyrian Archaiology*[2], p. 154*a*). Other terms used in the mediæval period were *Culfardd* (found in the *ymrysson* in question), and *Posfardd*, the earliest instance of which is in the Book of Taliessin (14th cent.), poem i., l. 13, but the precise force of these terms is uncertain.

It is clear from these indications that the professions of the poet and the minstrel were closely linked together, and practised, not infrequently at any rate, by the same person. The chief of song appears to have exercised magisterial functions over those of lower rank, and also to have been the umpire in bardic disputes. Another function which the Welsh bards (even the *pencerdd*) exercised was that of the story-teller (*cyfarwydd*), and the term *Mabinogi*, representing the oldest stratum of Welsh mediæval narrative, appears to be derived from *mabinog*, a term found in some of the triads for an apprentice or disciple bard, possibly because this body of narrative was committed to memory by the bardic beginner. The men who composed the mediæval vaticinations (*daroganau*), such as we find in the Black Book of Carmarthen and the Book of Taliessin, were called *derwyddon*. In the *Collatio Canonum* (Paris, *Bibl. nat.*), 3182 (prior to end of 11th cent.), *dorguid* (or *darguid*=*derwydd*) is a gloss on 'pithonicus,' and means 'a seer.'

3. The oldest remains of Welsh poetry.—The oldest remains of Welsh poetry now extant are contained in the following documents: (1) *A MS of the paraphrase of the Gospels into Latin hexameters, made by C. Vettius Aquilinus Iuvencus*, in the University Library at Cambridge, transcribed in the 9th century.

This MS contains two Welsh poems written in the pre-Norman Welsh script and orthography, which are from all indications contemporary with the Welsh glosses of the 9th century. The first poem is a hymn, not unlike some of those contained in the Black Book of Carmarthen (see below), and the second a personal poem expressive of loneliness and sadness, of the same *genre* as the 'Llywarch Hen' poetry of the Black Book of Carmarthen and the Red Book of Hergest. The subjective strain of this fragment is characteristic of this type of early poetry.

(2) *An 11th cent. MS of St. Augustine's 'de Trinitate,'* now in the Library of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.

In the opinion of the late Mr. Henry Bradshaw, three lines and a word of Welsh verse have been written by Johannes, son of Sulien, Bishop of St. David's (1071–1089). These lines are of interest, because they are undoubtedly taken from a poem of which we have some fragments in the Book of Aneirin (see below).

(3) *The Black Book of Carmarthen* (12th and early 13th cent.).

This MS contains some poems by Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr, which are undoubtedly of the 12th cent.; also certain vaticinations put into the mouth of Myrddin (Merlin), which clearly refer to historical events of the 12th century. These vaticinations are expansions of the legend of Myrddin and the story of the battle of Arderydd (see MERLIN). The first poem in this MS deals with the same topic in the form of a short dialogue between Myrddin and Taliessin. One of the features of the poetry of the Black Book of Carmarthen is the fondness which it shows for the dialogue form. The fragments of old Welsh poetry which it contains consist, in addition to the preceding poems, of hymns, a dialogue between the soul and the body, a series of stanzas commemoratory of Welsh heroes, called 'The Stanzas of the Graves,' a group of poems which are related to the Arthurian legend, and a few other poems referring to legendary characters and episodes. Part of the interest of these poems consists in the indications which they give of the existence of a body of Welsh poetry forming a heroic cycle, parallel to the prose narratives of the Mabinogion and Geoffrey of Monmouth, and to the allusions and summaries of the Triads. The poems of this cycle were not, as a rule, long, and consisted sometimes only of a few *englynion* ('stanzas'). Occasionally, as in the poems attributed to Llywarch Hen, we find a note of genuine poetry, as in the graphic description of the scenes of winter. Some of this poetry doubtless goes back at least to the 9th cent., since it is similar in style to the second Welsh poem of the Codex Juvenci. It is not improbable that subjective soliloquies of this kind were evolved out of more objective heroic poems descriptive of battle and adventure.

(4) *The Book of Aneirin* (early 13th cent.).

This MS contains the poem called 'Y Gododin,' a long poem of 938 lines, together with shorter poems called 'Gorchan Tutvulch,' 'Gorchan Adebon,' 'Gorchan Cynvelyn,' and 'Gorchan Maelderw,' the last-mentioned poem being attributed in the MS to Taliessin. Part of it is written in an orthography akin to that of the glosses, and a close analysis of it shows that it consists in parts of fragments of poems identical with portions of 'the Gododin.' 'The Gododin,' too, when analyzed, reveals signs of being of a composite character; it contains some repetition of stanzas, and series of stanzas have been broken up by intervening matter. 'The Gododin' is best regarded as a corpus of short poems relating mainly to the battle of Catraeth, fought between the Britons of the North and the men of Deira and Bernicia. The family which holds the leading place in this body of verse is that of Cynvarch, to which Cynon ab Clydno Eiddin and Urien Rheged belonged. It is of interest to notice that, in one line of 'Gorchan Maelderw,' Arthur is mentioned in words which imply that he was a leading figure in this cycle.

(5) *The Book of Taliessin* (14th cent.).

This MS contains a collection of poetry that has clear links of connexion with the earlier heroic cycle. Just as in the vaticinations the personality of Myrddin is brought into the foreground and made the mouthpiece of prophecy, so in the Book of Taliessin the legend of Taliessin is taken as a basis, and he is made the mouthpiece of verses narrating events legendary and historical in the past, at which in the course of his transformations he had been present. The poetry that is attributed to him is interspersed with allusions to the monastic studies of the Middle Ages, which suggest that it was composed by a monk (or monks) rather than a professional bard. Much of the interest of this poetry, which is very difficult and obscure, is that it has preserved for us many verse parallels to narratives contained in the Mabinogion and the Triads, and, among them, some very interesting fragments of Welsh Arthurian legend. We here find, too, references to certain of the characters of the Four Branches of the Mabinogi, which enable us to supplement the account given of them in prose. Some of the poems in the book bear evidence of being poems of the heroic type, cognate with 'the Gododin' and the oldest parts of the Black Book of Carmarthen, and it is worthy of note that the interest appears to centre round Urien Rheged.

(6) *The Red Book of Hergest* (14th and 15th cents.).

This MS, which belongs to Jesus College, Oxford, and which is deposited for greater safety in the Bodleian Library, contains a considerable body of poetry belonging to the same strata as the MSS already mentioned. It is especially rich in poetry of the type attributed to Llywarch Hen, as, for instance, the elegies on Cynddylan and Urien Rheged. Doubtless much of this poetry has grown by accretion round an older nucleus, and the topography suggests that Powys (Mid-Wales) was the chief region where it was developed. It is in this body of poetry that much of the charm of early Welsh verse consists, though much that was once thought to be pre-Norman was doubtless composed in the Norman period; and some of the poetry may even owe its origin to the Abbey of Strata Marcella (in Welsh *Ystrad Marchell*), near Welshpool, in Montgomeryshire, where it is probable that the Red Book of Hergest was copied.

(7) In the White Book of Rhydderch and the Red Book of Hergest texts of the Mabinogion there are a few *englynion* embedded in the narrative, as, for example, in Branwen, daughter of Llyr, Math ab Mathonwy, and Kulhwch and Olwen. Possibly these *englynion* may be older than the prose narrative, and may be as old as any portion that is extant of Welsh poetry.

There can be little doubt that the struggle with the English gave rise to a series of poems commemorative of the chief battles and their heroes, but it is difficult to say whether any of these poems

are now extant. The existing body of pre-Norman Welsh poetry shows signs of evolution, due to the emphasizing of the personality of the poets who were connected with the chief heroic figures, and the attribution to them of sentiments and poetry that seemed appropriate to them. For example, Aneirin is made to relate his own visit to the warriors at Catraeth, his imprisonment, and his escape; Taliessin is made to give the story of his transformations and his relations with Maelgwn Gwynedd and Elphin; Llywarch Hen is made to utter lamentations over the past, and Myrddin prophecies as to the future. Behind these developments, however, there lies in each case the older and simpler objective type of Welsh poetry.

4. The historical poetry of the 'Gogynfeirdd.'—This body of poetry is contained in the *Myvyrian Archaiology*, and is undoubtedly contemporaneous with the persons and the events which it describes. It was written by the leading Welsh poets of their day, who were in close touch with the princes whose elegies and eulogies they for the most part sing. It is not improbable that much other poetry was composed in Wales at the time, but it is the work of the court-poets alone that has come down to us. This poetry shows all the traces of professional skill and technique: the language is singularly terse, the vocabulary and grammar are largely archaic and traditional, and there are not a few reminiscences of the older poetry. Bravery and generosity are the qualities most extolled in the princes. Allusions to battles and similar historical events are frequent. War is the dominant theme, though there are occasional glimpses of an interest in nature and even of the poetry of love. The spirit of this historical poetry is clearly akin to that of the earlier heroic poetry, to the characters of which it is full of allusions. There is not a trace within it of colloquialism, or of an effort after the simplicity of prose. Here and there we find lines of signal strength and beauty; but the poet, as a rule, aims far more at vigour and force than at æsthetic charm. The following are the chief representatives of this type of Welsh poetry in the 12th and 13th centuries:—

Meilir (1120–1160), the bard of Gruffydd ab Cynan, prince of Gwynedd. **Gwalchmai**, son of Meilir (1150–1190), the bard of Gruffydd ab Cynan's son, Owain Gwynedd. This poet, as his poem 'Gwalchmai's Delight' shows, had a genuine appreciation of nature. **Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr** (1150–1200), the bard of Madog ab Meredydd, prince of Powys (Mid-Wales). His verse is distinguished by strength and terseness rather than beauty, but he too, in a poem addressed to Eva, daughter of Madog, shows something of that delicate sense of beauty which characterized his contemporary Gwalchmai. **Owain Cyveiliog** (1150–1197), a prince, whose elegy on his dead warriors shows traces of the study of 'The Gododin' and of genuine poetic feeling. In **Hywel ab Owain Gwynedd** (1140–1172) we have a princely bard, whose love-poems have the true ring of Welsh amatory poetry, and show unmistakably that the poetic appreciation of Nature had its representatives in Wales even amid the stress of war. **Llywarch ab Llywelyn** (1160–1220) wrote for the most part in honour of the line of Gwynedd and of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, perhaps the greatest prince of that line. The same tradition was carried on by **Dafydd Benvras** (1190–1240), **Einiawn ab Gwalchmai** (1170–1220), **Einiawn Wann** (1200–1250), **Elidyr Sais, Llywelyn Fardd, Bleddyn Fardd**, and others. Einiawn ab Gwalchmai composed a very striking elegy on Nest, daughter of Hywel. During this period poetry, too, was composed in honour of the Lord Rhys of Deheubarth (S. Wales) and his descendants, by **Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr, Phylip Brydydd** (1200–1250), and by **Prydydd Bychan** (1210–1260). In this body of poetry we find, too, several religious poems, which show that there was no definite cleavage between the ecclesiastical and the secular poetry of Wales. The spirit of this epoch of Welsh poetry may be regarded as culminating in the elegy written by **Gruffydd ab Yr Ynad Coch** (1260–1300) on Llywelyn ab Gruffydd, the last prince of Gwynedd, who was killed in 1282. This elegy is one of the finest in the Welsh language.

5. Welsh poetry from the death of Llywelyn to the Reformation.—It is a striking testimony to the vitality of Welsh poetry that the fall of Llywelyn appears to have made no appreciable difference to its progress. In Gwynedd, as had already been the case in other parts of Wales, some of the leading families became successors to the princes in their support of the poets. Among these families, none was more prominent than that of Tudur ab Goronwy of Penmynydd, Anglesey, the ancestor of Henry VII. In various parts of Wales new zones of poetry grew up, grouped round centres of lay and ecclesiastical patronage; for the great abbeys of Basingwerk, Valle Crucis, Aberconwy, Cymmer, Strata Marcella, Strata Florida, Whitland, Neath, Talley, Margam, and Tintern, together with the priories of Beddgelert, Cardigan, Carmarthen, and Monmouth, were important factors in the encouragement of Welsh literature. Side by side with the composition of original works had gone the translation of secular and religious legends from French, and the works of the poets bear abundant evidence of acquaintance with the names and the atmosphere of romance, both native and foreign. The fall of Llywelyn would appear to have turned the current of the Welsh Muse towards those gentler themes which were never alien to her. The language became simpler and more intelligible, though in formal eulogies and elegies the older style still maintained itself.

Of the newer poetry the chief representatives were **Gruffudd ab Maredydd, Gruffydd ab Dafydd ab Tudur, Hywel ab Einion Lygliw, Llywelyn Goch ab Meurig Hen**, and **Dafydd ab Gwilym**. Of these, **Hywel ab Einion Lygliw** is best known as the author of a poem on Myfanwy of Dinas Bran, **Llywelyn Goch** as the author of a remarkably fine elegy on Lleucu Llwyd of Pennal, while **Dafydd ab Gwilym** is the author of about three hundred poems characterized in many instances by vivid observation of nature, fertility of imagination, a most catholic sympathy, and genuine poetic insight. His exact date cannot be determined with certainty, but he flourished approximately in the first half of the 14th century. It is clear from his poetry that he was in touch with all the leading zones of Welsh poetry in his time, those of Anglesey, North Cardiganshire, Emlyn, Morgannwg, and Gwent. In Anglesey he would appear to have been in his youth associated in some capacity with a monastic institution, but his poetry is animated by a deliberate anti-ascetic tendency and an intense passion for nature. Much of Dafydd ab Gwilym's skill consists in his power of describing the essentials of an object or a scene in a few telling lines. His spirit is that of a refined humanism, and his verse bears the impress of elegant and cultured surroundings. His poems abound in allusions to native and other legends and romances, and the various series, which certain of his poems form, are, as it were, so many romances in verse. His favourite metre is the *Cywydd*, a metre invented either by himself or by one of his contemporaries, by stringing together a series of couplets consisting of the last two lines of an *englyn*; or else this metre, if not then invented, was one which had been kept in the background of the poetry of the earlier period, since no instance of it before the time of Dafydd ab Gwilym appears to be extant. In all his poems, except his formal eulogies and elegies, Dafydd ab Gwilym eschews archaisms, and aims at a simple and lucid, yet original and artistic, style. The singular richness of his genius created a new epoch in Welsh poetry, and he is succeeded by a number of imitators, especially in his love-poetry. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that his was the sole influence current in Welsh poetry at this time. We find in **Sion Cent** (about 1350), for instance, emphasis laid on the ethical rather than the ritual or ascetic side of religion, and a note of poetic realism in a poem expressing sympathy with the toiler.

One of the most characteristic features of Welsh poetry at all periods has been its fidelity to the facts of human life in Wales, a life mainly of toil by land and sea; to the prominence in consciousness of the essential facts of the common lot of man, those of birth, of death, of the uncertainty of life, of disappointment, of failure, of poverty and struggle, relieved by love, by the beauty of Nature, by occasional success, by the kindness and generosity of friends, and by the charm of the muse. Until the accession of Henry VII. we find at intervals the continuance of the older tradition of the poetry of war and political interest, as in the poems of Iolo Goch (late 14th and early 15th cent.), the friend of Owen Glyndwr (Glendower), Gutto'r Glyn (1430–1468), and Lewis Glyn Cothi (1440–1490). The political interests of these periods are reflected also in the *Brudiau*, or 'Vaticinia,' to which they gave rise. In some of its aspects Welsh poetry was closely associated with the highly developed social life of the time, and requests for favours and thanks for favours granted

were not complete without being embodied in verse. This led to the practice of minute descriptions of various objects, animate and inanimate, and at times there is a tendency to have recourse to over-ingenious and far-fetched comparisons.

The chief imitators of Dafydd ab Gwilym are Dafydd Nanmor (1330–1390), Bedo Aerddren (*c.* 1480) and Bedo Brwynllys (*c.* 1450), Bedo Phylip Bach (*c.* 1480), Ieuan Deulwyn (1460–1490), and Dafydd ab Edmwnt (1440–1480).

The intimate connexion of the Welsh poets of this period with the life of their country, and their often high sense of literary art, make their works invaluable for a study of the Welsh mind and of its social and other ideals at this time. Here, again, certain zones of poetry, often flourishing around the home of some powerful patron, rise into prominence, such as the North-East zone, where we have the 'three brothers of Marchwiail' (*c.* 1350), and also Iolo Goch, Meredydd ab Rhys, Gutto'r Glyn, Dafydd ab Edmwnt, and Guttyn Owain (1450–1480); the South-East zone, where Bedo Brwynllys, Hywel Dafi (*c.* 1450), Lewis Glyn Cothi, Iorwerth Fynglwyd, Ieuan Deulwyn, and others flourished; while there were other important zones around Tywyn in South-West Cardiganshire, and Machynlleth in Montgomeryshire. A large portion of the poetry of this period is still extant in MS, and, under the encouragement of the University of Wales, its serious and thorough study is now commencing. As the poets of the period were in close touch with the leading families of Wales, they reflect very faithfully the dominant ideas of the circles wherein they moved, especially during the Wars of the Roses. In these poems, too, we see the contrast between Welsh rural life, which was in harmony with the Welsh tradition, and that of the boroughs, which were practically English garrisons established in Wales.

In some cases the bardic profession was continued from father to son, as in the case of Howel Swrdwal (1370–1420) and Ieuan ap Howel Swrdwal, Tudur Penllyn and Ieuan ap Tudur Penllyn, Dafydd Nanmor the elder, Rhys Nanmor, and Dafydd Nanmor the younger. The poets who most reflect political movements during this period are Iolo Goch, Dafydd Nanmor, Lewis Glyn Cothi, and Gutto'r Glyn. The joy felt by Wales in the accession of Henry VII. is reflected in a poem by Dafydd Llwyd addressed to 'Henry VII. after he had won the kingdom, and to Arthur his son when he was born.' Several of the Welsh bards appear to have regarded the accession of Henry VII. as in some degree a restoration of the prestige of Wales.

One of the most striking features of this period is the interest taken in the language and metre of Welsh poetry, and even in the Red Book of Hergest there is a grammar of the Welsh language and an account of Welsh versification, which appears to have been widely copied and studied. During this period, too, the bardic profession became so popular that its maintenance threatened to become a burden on the country, and means had to be devised to distinguish between the competent and the incompetent. Whatever gatherings of their own the Welsh bards may have had when they met from time to time at the courts of the princes and the houses of their patrons, it is certain that the Carmarthen Eisteddfod of 1451 had a very definite aim and purpose, namely, to serve as a bardic assize for the repression of the wanderings of uncertified bards and minstrels. The leading spirits at this Eisteddfod were Gruffudd ab Nicolas, a prominent Carmarthenshire gentleman; Llawdden, a bard from South Wales; and Dafydd ab Edmwnt, from the zone of North-East Wales. These emphasized the importance of skill in the twenty-four alliterative metres of Welsh poetry, and devised a regular system of bardic graduation. The Glamorganshire bards rebelled against the stringency of this system, and set up a system of their own. There are indications that, coincident with the introduction of English music into Wales, English metres, easier in character than those of the Welsh tradition, came in also. The consequence was that a new impetus was given to poetic composition, and the number of professional bards steadily grew. In 1524 and 1568, Eisteddfodau, or Bardic Assizes, had again to be held to seek once more to classify the bards. It is significant that these two Eisteddfodau were held at Caerwys, in Flintshire, within the North-East zone, where Welsh poetry was at this time most flourishing. The leading bard of the first Caerwys Eisteddfod was **Tudur Aled**, from Llansannan, in Denbighshire, a nephew and pupil of Dafydd ab Edmwnt. This brilliant poet is distinguished by his skill in description and in the composition of striking couplets. His pupil, Gruffudd Hiraethog, was the teacher of some of the leading bards of the Second Caerwys Eisteddfod, such as Simwnt Fychan, William Cynwal, Sion Tudur, and William Llŷn. In North Wales poetry flourished at this time chiefly in the North-East zone, but there was also an important zone in South Carnarvonshire and West Merionethshire and another in Montgomeryshire, with which Dr. John Davies of Mallwyd, a prominent Welsh grammarian and lexicographer of the reigns of Elizabeth and James I., was in contact. The Mostyn family at Gloddaeth, near Llandudno, and Mostyn, in Flintshire, and the family of Salisbury of Rug, near Corwen, were great patrons of Welsh poetry at this time. Some of the most beautiful poetry of the Tudor period is that attributed to **Rhys Goch ab Rhiccert** (see Iolo MSS). It is characterized by intense feeling for Nature and a genuine æsthetic sense. The older social poetry, too, contains, especially in **William Llŷn**, some very striking and graphic lines. The period of the Reformation was one of great activity in the poetic zones, especially of N. Wales.

6. Welsh poetry from the Reformation to the present day.—During the period of the Commonwealth, Welsh poetry received little support or encouragement, owing to the decay of several of the older Welsh families, which were strongly Royalist in sympathy. Moreover, the Welsh gentry had ceased by this time, apart from exceptional cases, to cultivate the Welsh tongue, so that the older social poetry fell into the background. Nevertheless, it was in the period of the Commonwealth that Huw Morus of Pontymeibion in East Denbighshire, a strong Royalist and a brilliant composer of love poems, continued the tradition of the 'Rhys Goch ab Rhiccert' poetry, which was largely the outcome of the newer musical needs of Wales. The brothers Gruffudd, William, and Rhisiart Phylip of Ardudwy carried on the literary tradition of their father, Sion Phylip, and there is extant a poem on the death of Charles I. written by William Phylip. After the Restoration we find this tradition carried on in Merionethshire by Sion Dafydd Laes, who wrote an elegy on Charles II., and in South Carnarvonshire from about 1692–1714 by Owen Griffith of Llanystumdwy. The newer and freer type of poetry was also represented by the hymns, carols, ballads, etc., which began to emerge into prominence and show that Welsh poetry was beginning to appeal to a new Welsh-speaking public. In the middle of the 18th cent. an able family of Welshmen, of whom Lewis Morris (the great-grandfather of the late Sir Lewis Morris) is the best known representative, gave a great impetus to the revival of Welsh poetry by collecting MSS and by encouraging young Welshmen of scholarship and genius to compose and publish poetry of a high order in the Welsh tongue. The antiquarian

movement, chiefly inaugurated by Edward Llwyd (Lhuyd), keeper of the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford, also quickened an interest in the Welsh language in young Welshmen of ability and education; and it is significant that some of the leading Welsh poets of the new movement were Oxford graduates, such as Goronwy Owen, Evan Evans (Ieuan Brydydd Hir), and William Wynn. At the same time the great religious awakening of the 18th cent. bore fruit in Wales in the publication of a large number of hymns by writers of real poetic power, such as William Williams of Pantycelyn in Carmarthenshire (author of the English hymns 'Guide me, O thou great Jehovah,' and 'O'er those gloomy hills of darkness'), Dafydd Jones of Caio, and others. The new Welsh-reading public of the middle and poorer classes, whose vernacular was still Welsh, read the new poetry, both secular and sacred, with avidity, and literary societies for the cultivation of Welsh literature sprang up in the Welsh community of London and in many parts of Wales. Many members of the Welsh aristocracy, too, gave their patronage to the new movement by contributing prizes to successful competitors in the revived Eisteddfodau, the most prominent result of the new interest taken in Welsh poetry being the revival of the Eisteddfod, mainly through the exertions of Owain Jones (Owain Myfyr), Dr. Owen Pughe, and Iolo Morgannwg. The competitions connected with the Eisteddfod and the facilities which the Welsh press now afforded to the publication of poetry led to renewed activity in various poetic zones, as, for instance, that of Carnarvonshire, where **Dafydd Ddu Eryri, Robert ab Gwilym Ddu, Dewi Wyn o Eifion,** and others rose into prominence, and that of Denbighshire, associated with the names of **Robert Davies** of Nantglyn and **Twm o'r Nant,** the latter of whom, by his 'Interludes,' sought to supply the rudiments of a Welsh drama, which had been only meagrely represented in the past by some portions of Biblical plays. The national Eisteddfod was followed by the institution of provincial and local competitions, which have stimulated the composition of a great deal of Welsh poetry in addition to what is spontaneously composed as in other countries. Much of the Welsh poetry of the 19th cent. is of high literary merit, and is a very true and worthy interpretation of the life and aspirations of Wales, both on the religious and on the secular side. Many of the best Welsh poets of the 19th cent. have been ministers of religion, and, with rare exceptions, the poetry of Wales in this important period, which may be truly called the Golden Age of Welsh poetry, has a high and serious purpose, and is not marred by meanness or frivolity. The Welsh language has had for centuries a literary tradition, which is distinct from the spoken dialects, and the literary tongue is the speech of public speaking and of Welsh literature.

The chief poets of the 19th cent., in addition to those already named, have been **Eben Fardd** (1802–1863), **Islwyn** (1832–1878), **Emrys** (1813–1873), **Hiraethog** (1802–1883), **Ceiriog** (1832–1887), and **Hwfa Mon.** Of recent years lyric poetry has been especially cultivated, and the younger generation of poets show in their works clear traces of the study of current English, and in some cases of Continental, poetry. The æsthetic spirit and a conscious striving after beauty of form are very conspicuous in current Welsh poetry, but, apart from certain brilliant exceptions, there is often a lack of naturalness and spontaneous grace. At the same time, Welsh poetry is very living at the present day, and poetic expression is in no sense behind the remarkable evolution of Welsh social life in education, politics, etc. It is no mere antiquarian resuscitation of past ideals, but a living exponent of the mind of the Welsh people.

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E. ANWYL.

BARLAAM AND JOSAPHAT.—See BUDDHA.

BARNABITES.—The Congregation of the Regular Clergy of S. Paul Decollato (commonly called 'Barnabites' from their ancient house of S. Barnabas in Milan, which was opened in 1547) goes back to the beginning of the 16th century. Its founder was Antonio Maria Zaccaria, a nobleman of Cremona, recently canonized by the Church of Rome (May 27, 1897). About the year 1530 Zaccaria united himself with Bartolomeo Ferrari and Giacomo Antonio Morigia (Milanese gentlemen, who after their death gained through their reputation for holiness the title of 'venerable'), for the purpose of founding a Congregation of priests who should employ themselves in arousing the somnolent faith, in removing abuses, in reforming the manners of the clergy and of the people, and in bringing them back to the practice of true Christian piety.

By his Brief dated Bologna, Feb. 18, 1533, which commences, *Vota per quæ in humilitatis spiritu*, Clement VII. granted to Zaccaria and to Ferrari authority to set up the new religious Order. Paul III. by two other Briefs, *Dudum felicis recordationis Clementi*, etc. (July 25, 1535), and *Pastoralis*

officii cura, etc. (Dec. 1, 1543), placed the Order in direct dependence on the Holy See, granting it likewise many rights and privileges; and finally, Julius III. confirmed the Order by his Brief of Feb. 22, 1550, *Rationi congruit et convenit honestati*, etc. (cf. *Litterœ et Constitutiones SS. PP. pro Congregat. Clerr. Regg. S. Pauli Apostoli*, Rome, 1853, p. 3 ff.). In the meantime Zaccaria died prematurely in 1539 at the age of 37, after having set on foot in Milan various pious works, viz. spiritual conferences for ecclesiastics; a pious society of married people; and, in conjunction with the Countess Ludovica Torelli, an Order called the 'Angelicals of S. Paul,' for which he had also obtained the approval of Paul III. in 1535.

But the work of Zaccaria was continued by his two companions who outlived him, Ferrari († Nov. 25, 1544) and Morigia († Oct. 23, 1545), and by their successors. Towards the middle of the 16th cent. we find them scattered in Brescia, Verona, Padua, Vicenza, Venice, Cremona, and Ferrara, intent on preaching with zeal to the people, instituting confraternities of lay persons, and reforming monasteries, regardless of the hatred which they began to excite and of the persecutions which were directed against them. A fierce persecution arose against them where one would least have expected it, viz. in the territory of the free Venetian Republic. They were accused before the Republic of being political revolutionaries, emissaries of the Spaniards to the injury of the Venetian seigniory, and as being infected with heresy; and they were compelled to quit the territory of the Republic within the space of ten days. Nor did the matter end here, for, when Father Gianpietro Besozzi and Father Paolo Melso went to Rome, whither the same accusations had been carried, they were immediately thrown into prison, where they remained until, by the assistance of Ignatius Loyola and others, they were able to make their position clear and to unmask the conspiracy formed against the Congregation (cf. Arist. Sala, *Biografia di S. Carlo Barromeo*, Milan, 1858, Dissert. ii. p. 251).

1. **Colleges.**—Shortly after this time the Barnabites began to establish themselves definitely outside Milan; but, as we need not trace minutely their later vicissitudes, we give here some dates which will serve to afford an idea of their subsequent diffusion and increase in Italy and beyond.

In Italy the first college, or house, of the Barnabites outside Milan was founded at Pavia in 1558, for the purpose of educating their young adherents in literature and sacred learning. Next in chronological order come: in Cremona, the college or house of S. Vincenzo, founded in 1570 and suppressed in 1810, and the house of S. Luca, founded in 1881; in Monza, S. Maria di Carrobiolo, consecrated by the help of S. Carlo Borromeo, opened in 1571, suppressed in 1810, and re-established in 1825; Casale in 1573; Vercelli in 1574; in Rome, S. Biagio in 1575, afterwards S. Carlo ai Catinari in 1611, suppressed in 1810 and re-established in 1814, by the Bull of Alexander VII. the residence of the General Superior of the Congregation from 1660 onwards; in Milan, S. Alessandro, founded in 1589, suppressed in 1810, and re-established in 1825; Zagarolo in 1592; Pisa in 1594; in Bologna, S. Andrea in 1598, the Seminary of S. Peter in 1743, further, the college of S. Luigi in 1774, renewed, after its suppression, in 1816; Novara in 1539; Sanseverino in 1601; in Lodi, S. Giovanni delle Vigne founded in 1605, suppressed in 1810, and re-established at S. Francesco in Lodi in 1833; in Asti (in Piedmont), S. Martino, founded in 1606, suppressed in 1802, and re-established in 1822; in Perugia, S. Ercolano, founded in 1607, suppressed in 1775, and then passing to the House of Jesus, which was likewise suppressed in 1804 and re-established in 1837; Acqui in the same year 1607; in Naples in 1608, S. Caterina della Corona di Spine, in 1610, S. Maria di Portanova, which was suppressed in 1809, S. Giuseppe-in-Pontecorvo after 1818, S. Maria di Caravaggio in 1821, the college Bianchi at Monte Santo from 1860; in Turin, S. Dalmazzo, a parish which was entrusted to the Barnabites in 1609 and taken from them only from 1810 to 1826; in Genoa, S. Paolo il Vecchio in 1609, then in 1650 S. Bartolomeo degli Armeni, in 1895 the Institute Vittorino da Feltre; Aquila, 1610; Foligno, 1612; Tortona, 1618; Chieti and Pescia, 1664; in Florence, S. Carlo from 1627 to 1783, the Institute della Querce from 1867; in Leghorn, S. Sebastiano, founded in 1629, suppressed in 1810, and re-established in 1814; Piacenza, 1632; Reggio, 1664; Alessandria, 1659; Crema, 1664; Parma, 1668; Udine, 1680; Finale Marina and Bergamo, 1711; Porto Maurizio, 1736; Aosta, 1748; in Moncalieri (in Piedmont), the Royal College Carlo Alberto, founded in 1836; S. Felice-a-Cancello (Terra di Lavoro), founded in 1854.

2. **Missions.**—The first mission of the Barnabites outside of Italy was in the island of Malta, whither they went in 1582 at the urgent solicitation of the principal heads of the Order of Malta, Father Paolo Maletta of Milan and Father Antonio Marchesi of Bergamo, and where they remained two years with profit to the inhabitants and to the Order of Malta itself. Later, in 1610, as we gather from a Brief of Paul V., King Henry IV. of France obtained some Barnabites to labour in Béarn in the work of destroying the heresy of Calvin, viz. Fathers Fortuné Colome, Remigio Polidori, Hilaire Martin, etc. Almost at the same time S. Francis de Sales introduced them into Savoy to direct the college of Annecy. The Barnabites were thus able to penetrate from Béarn and Savoy into France. We may cite among the houses of Savoy and of France those of Annecy, Thonon, Montargis, Lescar, Paris, Estampes, Dax, Bonneville, Mont-de-Marsan, Bourg-Saint-Andéol, Loches, Bazas, Guéret, Oléron, Condamines-sur-Arve, and, after the Revolution, the college of Gien (Loiret), opened in 1856 under the auspices of Dupanloup, and the house in Paris, re-opened in 1857, owing to the influence and goodwill of the celebrated Russian count, Gregory Schouvaloff, who had passed from the Orthodox to the Catholic faith, and then had entered the Order of Barnabites. In 1820 the Holy Congregation of the Propaganda sent Fathers Mario Malagnino, Alfonso Caccia, and Cornelio Porzio into Valtellina; but this mission, notwithstanding its fruitfulness, did not lead to the establishment of the Barnabites in that region infested by heretics. In 1625 some Barnabites were sent into Austria by Urban VIII. in consequence of a request made to him by Ferdinand II. for some 'religious' fitted to labour in the conversion of heretics and unbelievers; and these Barnabites were placed in possession of the parish of S. Michael in Vienna, which was the parish of the Imperial court. They afterwards occupied other parishes, as, for instance, that of Mittelbach from 1661, and that of S. Margaret in Uligine from 1774. In 1719 the Barnabites took part in the missions in Asia. Among the first were Fathers Filippo M. Cesati and Sigismondo Calchi (both of Milan), and Onorato Ferrari (of Vercelli), who, as members of an embassage of Clement XI. to the Emperor of China, went to Pekin. The result of the embassage did not correspond to the hopes entertained of it; and, in fact, an Imperial edict forbade the preaching of the gospel. Notwithstanding, it came about that Father Ferrari was able to stay some time in China, where in a few years he converted many adults to the faith, and baptized very many abandoned and dying

children. Father Cesati with a companion repaired to Cochin-China with the title of 'vicar apostolic,' and Father Calchi with some others went into the Indian kingdoms of Ava and Pegu, where they all afterwards concentrated themselves. The mission in these two kingdoms was entirely entrusted to the Barnabites by Benedict XIV. in 1740, and there they maintained missionaries (of whom more than one suffered martyrdom) until the suppression of the religious orders (Sala, *op. cit.* p. 284).

The history of this mission is recorded in the *Description of the Burmese Empire* by the Barnabite missionary Sangermano, who laboured in Burma in 1783–1808 (d. 1819). After Calchi went to Syriam (then the chief port of Pegu) in 1721, a number of other missionaries came about 1728, meeting with such success that Benedict XIV. appointed a vicar apostolic. Many churches were built—at Syriam were a house and church, a college for 40 students, and an orphanage for girls; at Ava a church; at Pegu a church and house; at Monla a church, presbytery, and college, with 6 churches in the environs of the city and 2 churches in Subaroa; at Chiam-sua-rocca 6 churches; at Rangoon a church, a house, an orphan-school, and a convent. In 1745 the Vicar Apostolic Galizia and two priests were treacherously murdered, and the mission languished until 1749, when Fr. Nerini, who had been forced by the disturbances to leave Burma, returned. A second severe blow befell the mission at the capture of Syriam in 1756, when Nerini was killed. The mission soon recovered, however, and continued its activity until 1832, when the religious orders were suppressed by Napoleon III. Among the Barnabite scholars attached to this mission special mention is due Fr. Percoto (d. at Ava, Dec. 12, 1776), who is recorded to have translated some Buddhist works from Burmese into Italian, and also to have made Burmese versions of Genesis, Tobit, Matthew, the Gospels, the Mass, and prayers and catechisms.

At that ill-omened epoch the Congregation counted not a few conspicuous members; and, not to mention Cardinal Gerdil of Savoy (1718–1802), a distinguished philosopher, Fathers Quadrupani (ascetic writer), Paolo Frisi and Francesco de Regi (eminent scientists), and others, who had been dead but a few years, it numbered among its members Father Francesco Fontana (1750–1822), General Superior of the Congregation, companion of Pius VII. in his imprisonment, and afterwards Cardinal; Father Luigi Lambruschini (1776–1854), who was afterwards archbishop of Genoa, Cardinal and Secretary of State; Francesco Saverio Bianchi, who has recently been beatified; Father Antonio Maria Cadolini, afterwards bishop of Ancona and cardinal († 1851); Fathers Stanislao Tomba († 1847) and Carlo Giuseppe Peda († 1843), who were made bishops, the former of Forlì, the latter of Assisi; and Fathers Felice and Gaetano De Vecchi (ascetics), Ermenegildo Pini and Mariano Fontana (scientists), Antonio Grandi (orator and poet), Giuseppe Racagni and Bartolomeo Ferrari (scientists), and others. In the preceding centuries the Congregation had already given to the Church: Alessandro Sauli, bishop of Aleria in Corsica, and afterwards of Pavia, who has recently been canonized († 1592); Carlo Bascapè, bishop of Novara († 1615); Juste Guérin, prince and bishop of Genoa; Francesco Gattinara, bishop of Turin; Giacomo Morigia, archbishop of Florence and afterwards Cardinal; Cristoforo Giarda, bishop of Castro; Giovanni Maria Percoto, bishop of Mosul and vicar apostolic of Ava and Pegu; Pio Manzador, bishop of Segna and Modruss in Croatia; and, in the various branches of learning, Agostino Tornielli (annalist); Redento Baranzano (1590–1622; scientist); the Venerable Bartolomeo Canale (ascetic writer); Bartolomeo Gavanti (writer on ritual); Dominique De la Motte, Maurice Arpaud, Jean Niceron (historians); Remi Montmeslier, Gabriele Valenzuela, Cosme De Champigny, Tommaso Rovere (Rotarius), Salvatore Corticelli (grammarians); Isidore Mirasson, Father Colome, etc.

Commencing with the year 1865, missions were established in Sweden and Norway by Father Paul Stub († 1892 at Bergen), who was afterwards joined by other Fathers (Moro, Tondini, Almerici). In Belgium the Barnabites opened a house in 1886 at Mouscron, and another in Brussels in 1895; while, on the expulsion of all 'religious' from France in 1905, the majority of the Barnabites sought refuge in Great Britain. In 1903 the Order undertook some missions in Brazil. At present the Barnabites, who number almost 300, have about 20 monasteries in Italy, 5 in Austria, and some in Spain, besides those already noted in Belgium.

3. **Constitutions.**—The Constitutions, or Statutes, of the Barnabites, of which the first nucleus is traceable back to the founder Zaccaria, and of which a first body was already formulated and published in 1552, were not definitive until 1579 (*Constitutiones Clerr. Regg. S. Pauli Decollati libris quattuor distinctæ*, Milan, 1579; other editions, Milan, 1617; Naples, 1829; Milan, 1902), when, after the examination made of them by S. Carlo Borromeo and their approval by the General Chapter, they finally had the sanction of Pope Gregory XIII. by his Brief of Nov. 7.

The greater part of these Constitutions have reference either to personal sanctification, of which they urge the attainment by suggesting suitable exercises as an aid to the observance of the three vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty; or they refer to the sanctification of others, to be attained through the ministry of preaching, of confession, of the school, etc. Others have reference to the reception of new members into the Order, mode of dress, etc.; and, finally, others concern the administration of the Order.

With regard to this last the following are some of the rules:—The General Superior of the Congregation is elected by suffrage. His office lasts three years, but he may be re-elected, though not more than once. All the members of the Order owe him obedience, but at the same time every member may have recourse to him, since he is their common Father. His ordinary Council is composed of four Assistants, who are nominated by the General Chapter every time it meets. His usual residence was changed from Milan to Rome during the pontificate of Alexander VIII. (1690). The habit of the members is a coarse black soutane, closely resembling that of the regular clergy. Unlike the Jesuits and Theatines, they recite Office in choir; and their other distinguishing characteristics are thus summed up by Currier (*History of Religious Orders*, p. 363):

'Besides the fast-days of the Church, these Religious fast on every Friday of the year, the two last days of Carnival, and from the first Sunday of Advent until Christmas. They abstain every Wednesday and observe a rigorous silence from the evening examination until after Matins the following day. In the beginning, like the Theatines, they practised extreme poverty, neither possessing revenues nor begging, but at a later period they accepted real estate and revenues. Besides the three vows, they bind themselves by a fourth, never to seek after dignities within or without the Order, and not to accept them outside of the Order without the permission of the Pope. Their lay-brothers are not admitted to the habit until after a trial of five years.'

The Congregation of the Barnabites, like all the other religious Orders, is divided into provinces, which until a few years ago were six, namely, the province of Lombardy; that of Piedmont, which included Liguria; the Roman province, which embraced Lazio, Umbria, and Emilia; and the Neapolitan, the German, and Franco-Belgian-Brazilian provinces. In each province a Father is nominated as Superior of the houses which the province contains. Every house has its own Superior, who, like the General and Provincial Superiors, has a Council which he must consult on the affairs of his own particular administration. All Superiors are nominated for three years only at the most. The local Superiors may be changed at the end of every year, or may be re-elected after the termination of the three years. The General Chapter meets every three years in Rome. Several

of the members who compose it are elected by the local and provincial chapters. The General Chapter examines the affairs of the Order, nominates or confirms the Superiors, and provides for the general well-being by means of monitions and decrees. The Barnabites, like all the great religious Orders, are in immediate subjection to the Supreme Pontiff.

LITERATURE.—Fr. L. Barelli, *Memorie dell' origine fondazione avanzamenti ecc. della Congregaz. de Chierici Regolari di S. Paolo*, 2 vols., Bologna, 1703–1707; Ant. Gabuzio, *Historia Congregat. Clerr. Regg. S. P. ab ejus primordiis ad initium sæc. xvi.*, Rome, 1852; L. Ungarelli, *Bibliotheca Scriptorum e Congreg. Clerr. Regg. S. Pauli*, vol. i. (the only one published), Rome, 1846; Pietro Grazioli, *Præstantium Virorum qui in Congregat. S. Pauli vulgo Barnabitarum memoria nostra floruerunt*, Bologna, 1751; G. Colombo, *Profili biografici di insigni Barnabiti*, Crema, 1870; *Collezione di vite dei più distinti religiosi della Congregazione dei Chier. RR. di S. Paolo detti Barnabiti*, 20 vols., Milan, 1858–1862; Helyot, *Histoire des ordres monastiques*, iv. 100–116, 8 vols., Paris, 1714–19; Currier, *History of Religious Orders*, pp. 360–363, New York, 1894; Heimbucher, *Orden und Kongregationen der katholischen Kirche*[3], iii. 270–274, 3 vols., Paderborn, 1908; Sangermano, *Description of the Burmese Empire, compiled chiefly from native Documents . . . and translated from his MS by William Tandy*, Rome, 1833 (reprinted, Rangoon, 1885); Griffini, *Della Vita di Monsignor Giovanni Maria Percoto*, Udine, 1781. The continuation of the *Bibliotheca* of Ungarelli will shortly be published by the writer of this article.

G. BOFFITO.

BARODA.—1. Name and history.—The original form of the name Baroda is said to be Skr. *Vaṭodara* (*vaṭa*, 'banyan-tree,' *udara*, 'cavity') 'in the heart of a banyan grove'; according to others, it is based on the shape of the city, supposed to resemble a banyan leaf; a local legend (*BG* vii. 829) suggests a cult of this sacred tree. The name is given to an important native State and its capital, situated in the provinces of Gujarāt and Kāṭhiāwār in W. India. Other early names were Chandāvatī, 'city of sandalwood' or 'of the Jain king Chandan'; Vīrāvatī or Vīrakshetra, 'land or field of heroes.' The State consists of various fragments of territory enclosed within the British dominions, this condition being due to the troublous times which followed the Marāthā occupation from A.D. 1705 onwards, and successive annexations and re-distributions in contests with the Marāthā Peshwā and the British Government. The dominions of the Gāikwār ('cowherd'; cf. the ritual tendance of cattle in Central India, *NINQ* i. 154 f.) occupy an area of 8099 square miles. They formed in ancient times part of the kingdom of Anhilvāda, the capital of which is now represented by the ruins of Pāṭan at the extreme N. boundary. This kingdom, weakened by the raids of Mahmūd of Ghaznī, who sacked the temple of Dwārka (wh. see) in 1206, finally succumbed to the attack of Alā-ud-dīn Khiljī in 1298. The present Marāthā dynasty was founded by Pīlājī Gāikwār (1721–32).

2. Statistics of religion.—The total population amounted in 1901 to 1,952,692, including 1,546,992 Hindus (79·22 per cent.); 165,014 Muhammadans (8·54 per cent.); 176,250 Animists (9·02 per cent.); the balance (3·31 per cent.) being made up of Jains, Parsis, Christians, Sikhs, and Jews. Of the Hindus, who form the vast majority of the population, about two-thirds are Vaishṇavas, or followers of Viṣṇu, and the remainder are nearly equally divided between Śaivas, or worshippers of Śiva, and Śāktas, or worshippers of the Mother-goddesses. Among the two last classes there are few sub-sects, the divisions among the Śaivas representing the Orders of ascetics, whose differences are based more upon external observances than upon doctrine; and the Śāktas, as usual, fall into the two classes of 'right-hand' (*Dakshiṇa-mārgī*) and 'left-hand' (*Vāma-mārgī*), the former worshipping their deities in public, the latter following the foul secret Tantrik cultus. The Vaishṇavas have been more fertile in forming sub-sects, of which eleven were recorded at the last enumeration. Of these, five worship Kṛishṇa (Kṛṣṇa) in one or other of his manifestations; four the demi-god Rāma; the Kabīrpanthīs are followers of Kabīr, the saintly founder of the sub-sect (A.D. 1485–1512); and the Gaṇeśapanthi are worshippers of Gaṇeśa or Ganpati, god of luck and remover of obstacles. This enumeration, however, tends to exaggerate the sectarian character of the local Hinduism. According to the latest authority:

'Though thus there are three principal sects in the Hindu religion prevalent in this State, the followers of neither are exclusive; they pay homage to all the deities, but are bound more to the special deity of their cult. It is only the bigoted of any one sect who despise the worshippers of deities other than their own. But only few such are found amongst the extremists' (*Census Report*, 1901, i. 137).

The Marāthā ruling dynasty have brought with them from the Deccan as their family god Khaṇḍobā, 'sword father,' the chief guardian deity of the Kunbī caste, from which the Marāthās have mainly sprung (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 290). Regarding this and similar gods Sir A. Lyall (*Asiatic Studies*[2], i. 30) writes:

'These are now grand incarnations of the Supreme Triad; yet, by examining the legends of their embodiment and appearance upon earth, we obtain fair ground for surmising that all of them must have been notable living men not so very long ago.'

3. Hinduism.—In its public and private worship (*pūjā*) the local form of Hinduism differs little from the standard type. The public service carefully provides for the exclusion of all castes regarded as unclean; and even those of lower rank than the 'twice-born' (*dvija*) are kept at a distance and are not allowed to touch the temple images. Each household, again, has its private deities, and the animistic basis of the faith is shown in the general cult of Śitalā, the goddess of smallpox; the sun and planets; cows, bulls, serpents, and the mongoose (*Herpestes mungo*), the destroyer of noxious snakes; of trees, such as the banyan, *pīpal* (*Ficus religiosa*), and the acacia; of stones representing Śiva, Viṣṇu, and Ganeśa, and the conch-shell; of jewellery and books of account; and of arms carried by the military classes (*Census Rep.* 1901, i. 122 ff.).

Among other observances the chief are fasts; vows (most of which are special to women); pilgrimages; and the domestic rules of ritual (*saṁskāra*) prescribed for each stage of life—conception, birth, marriage, death. The chief holy places within the State are Dwārkā (wh. see), Sidhpur, the place where obsequial rites for the repose of the soul of a mother can most properly be performed, as those for a father are done at Gayā (wh. see) in Bengal; Bechrājī, where a married woman of the Chāran or herald caste has been deified as an incarnation of the Mātā, or Divine Mother, and is worshipped in the form of the *yoni*, or symbol of the female sex (*BG* vii. 609 ff.); and Karnālī on the banks of the sacred river, the Narbadā.

4. Jains.—The Jains, though numerically weak, are important on account of their wealth and their lavish expenditure on temples, many of which are of recent construction and examples of exquisite workmanship and decoration (*Census Rep.* 1901, i. 149).

5. Animists.—The animistic tribes, found in the forest tracts, belong chiefly to the Gāmit, Bhīl (wh. see), Dublā, and Chodhrā tribes. Each of these has its special tribal deity, which is worshipped either in a public service conducted by the *bhagat*, or medicine-man, or in less important cases by the votary himself. One of these, Kavādio Dev, has no image or temple; but he is supposed to live in a gloomy ravine; another, one of the Mother-goddesses, is represented by a huge boulder. Besides these, the tiger, alligator, and various Mothers who repel disease are worshipped, the

ritual being like that common to the other N. Dravidian (wh. see) tribes (*ib.* i. 155 ff.).

6. Parsis.—One of the chief sacred places of the Parsis is Navsāri, which they occupied in A.D. 1142, after leaving their first settlement at Sanjan. Here they have erected numerous fire-temples, and towers of silence for the exposure of the dead. Here burns the sacred fire, which they claim to have brought with them from Persia (*BG* vii. 566 ff.; Dosabhai Framji Karaka, *Hist. of the Parsis*, 1884, i. 37; Modi, *A Few Events in the Early History of the Parsis*, Bombay, 1905).

7. Christians.—The increase in the number of Christians, due to missionary work among the forest tribes and to the establishment of orphanages during the recent famines and plague epidemics, is noteworthy. The community which in 1872 numbered 313 had in 1901 increased to 7691.

LITERATURE.—J. A. Dalal, *Census Report*, 1901, vol. xviii. of *Reports of the Census of India*; F. A. H. Elliott, *Bombay Gazetteer*, vol. vii., 1883; J. Forbes, *Oriental Memoirs*, 1813; A. K Forbes, *Rās Mālā, or Hindoo Annals of the Province of Goozerat*[2], 1878. For the early Muhammadan history see Elliot-Dowson, *Hist. of India*, 1866–77; Sir E. C. Bayley, *Local Muhammadan Dynasties of Gujarat*, 1886; J. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*[3], 1873. W. CROOKE.

BARSOM (Av. *baresman*).—'Barsom' is the name given at the present day to a collection of small metal-wire rods (*tāi*)—used in the chief ceremonies of the Parsis—representing the cut stems of a plant which can no longer be identified. The number of the rods varies, according to the ritual in which they are used; the lowest permissible number seems to have been three, while the numbers five, seven, and nine are also mentioned. The number now varies between five and thirty-three. These small rods, as used to-day, are bound together with a girdle formed of a date leaf or leaves. For the particular ceremonial recitals in which they are used see Haug's *Essays*, p. 396 ff., and Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, i. p. lxxiii. f.; see also there the description of the detailed operations with which their use is accompanied. It may be mentioned that the *barsom* is frequently sprinkled with the holy water (*zaoθra, zōr*), and with the consecrated milk in the *yasna*, or chief ceremony.

The number *thirty-three* shows that the rods represent, even yet, most sacred objects and personified ideas, for that number is especially mentioned in *Yasna* i. 10, ii. 12, as applying to the *ratus* of the *yasna* ceremony. What these special ideas originally were is no longer clearly defined. But, reasoning from the origin of their application, we may readily arrive at their significance. Few doubt that we have in the *barsom* (*baresman*) a form of *bareziś*, Vedic Skr. *barhis*, the 'straw cushion' upon which the gods of the Veda were supposed to sit, as they descended in response to the sacrifice, and upon which also offerings to them were spread—and this at a time when the ancestors of the present Indian deva-worshippers and of the *Ahura-* (*Asura-*) worshippers were one and the same people, and when 'Veda' and 'Avesta' were blended in some now lost name for the one common holy lore. Several points are in favour of this, apart from the etymology: chiefly the word 'spread,' which is used of the *barsom* as of the Vedic *barhis*. The rod-twigs, indeed, are hardly 'spread' now, except upon the *māh-rū* (a sort of rack with two crescents for supports), the moon-faced stand upon which they, for the most part, rest. But the *barhis* was and is 'spread' as 'straw'; compare the passage in Herodotus (i. 132), where he describes, if somewhat loosely, the offering of a Persian Mazda-worshipper: 'He "spreads" [the verb used is ὑποστόρνυσθαι] the softest grass he can get, and places the pieces of flesh upon it.' (This item, by the way, is one of many which show how widely this form of worship was diffused in Persia, and how long it had been implanted there, seeing that the Greeks could speak of it so familiarly as belonging to Persia in general, and not merely to a province of it. See also the Inscriptions of Darius at Behistūn, etc., where *Auramazda* is regularly mentioned as the God of all the Empire 'who made this earth and yon heaven.'*)

The *barsom* is, and was then, a sacred object frequently used in the holiest sacrificial ceremonies, especially in the celebration of the main Sacrificial Service, in the course of which the Gāthas were sung without curtailment. It must therefore be understood by all serious Parsi worshippers to represent something of the most sacred character; and on closer examination it may recall at times the entire throng of personified ideas which we might, with some reason, describe as 'godlets,' whose worship, however, when sincere, did not in any conceivable sense approach idolatry, but was a mere sacrificial reverence. Further, all the symbolic rods were united by the sacred 'girdle,' as if to express the thought of oneness. And when we press our inquiries a little further, we see that the *barsom* with its uses is but the persistence of an original idea which was dear to the Indo-Iranian peoples while as yet they were undivided.

Avesta and Pahlavi literatures add a number of details concerning the barsom, for which some similar plant might be substituted (*Yas.* xxii. 3). In conjunction with the 'libation' (*zaoθra*), it is used in calling Ahura Mazda and all other sacred beings, to whom it, with other holy objects, is duly consecrated (*Yas.* iv.; *Vīsp.* xi. 2), to the sacrifice (*Yas.* ii., which bears the special name of *Barsam Yašt*; cf. *Yas.* xxii.; *Vīsp.* ii.); an important part of the worship of Ahura Mazda is that 'one should offer barsom an *aēša* long, a *yava* (grain?) broad' (*Vend.* xix. 19); and it is also used in the *Šrōš Darūn*, which grants to the soul of the dead the protection of Sraosha on its passage to the future life (*Yas.* iii.). Sraosha was, indeed, 'the first who spread forth the barsom, both of three twigs, and of five twigs, and of seven twigs, and of nine twigs [the Pahlavi commentary on *Nīrangistān* xc. raising the number of twigs to 551], (reaching) both to the knee and to the mid-leg, for both the worship and the prayer and the propitiation and the glorification of the Amesha Spentas' (*Yas.* lvii. 6), and the offering of barsom to the sacred fire is one of the acts which bring the blessing of that element (*Yas.* lxii. 9). The barsom is numbered among the sacred beings and objects to which sacrifice is offered (*Yas.* lxxi. 23) and which are invoked to be present at the sacrifice (*Vīsp.* x. 2), besides having obedience to them solemnly inculcated (*Vīsp.* xii. 3). The barsom is among the offerings to be made by the 'Aryan lands' to Tishtrya (*Yt.* viii. 58); with it Haoma offered sacrifice to Mithra (*Yt.* x. 88), who, if a pious priest sacrifices with barsom, bestows blessings on him who employs the sacerdotal

* [The barsom is also alluded to at least thrice by other Greek writers: Strabo, p. 733, τὰς δ' ἐπῳδὰς ποιοῦνται [*sc.* οἱ Μάγοι] πολὺν χρόνον ῥάβδων μυρικίνων λεπτῶν δέσμην κατέχοντες; Dinon, as quoted by the scholiast on Nicander's *Theriaca*, 613, καὶ τοὺς μάντεις φησὶ Μήδους ῥάβδοις μαντεύεσθαι; and the *Acts of St. Sira, Rom.*, May, iv. 17. 6 (written in the reign of Chosroës II., d. 628), τὰ ξύλα δι' ὧν ἐμάγευσεν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Ζωροάστρου δαιμονιώδη παράδοσιν. It is likewise mentioned by Armenian and Syriac writers (as by Eznik, *Against the Sects*, tr. Schmid, Vienna, 1900, pp. 92, 97; Hoffmann, *Auszüge aus syr. Akten pers. Martyrer*, Leipzig, 1880, pp. 94, 111). It should furthermore be noted that many scholars (*e.g.* Pinches, *DB* iv. 629) see in the words of Ezk 8[17], 'and, lo, they put the branch to their nose,' an allusion to the barsom. Herein they are probably right (for an opposing view see Toy, *EBi* ii. 1463), and it may also be suggested, at least tentatively, that the זְמֹרָה, 'twigs of a strange one (*i.e.* of a foreign god),' of Is 17[10] may likewise refer to the barsom.—L. H. G.]

mediator (*Yt.* x. 137–139); and, in turn, barsom is among the offerings to be made to Haoma (*Yas.* xxv. 3). Even Ahura Mazda, who did sacrifice with it to Vāyu, the Wind (*Yt.* xv. 2), and to Ashi, Righteousness (*Yt.* xvii. 61), comes swiftly to one whose offering includes the barsom (*Yt.* xii. 2–3), and with it the Fravashis (*q.v.*) must be invoked (*Yt.* xiii. 27). In like manner it is used in sacrifice to the sun (*Nyāyiš* i. 16), the fire (*Yas.* lxii. 1), Mithra and Rāma Hvāstra (*Yend.* iii. 1), and Anāhita (*Yt.* v. 98, 126–127), as well as at the Rapithwina, or midday sacrifice (*Āfrīngān* iv. 5–7). So great, indeed, is the virtue of a single offering of barsom, as of a single offering of wood for the sacred fire, that by it the just is exalted and the Druj (the demon of evil) is weakened, Asha (Righteousness) is increased, and all the just are borne to Paradise (*Fragments of Tahmuras*, xxiv.).

Turning to the Avesta ritual concerning the barsom, we observe that the corrupt passage *Yašt* xv. 55 seems to imply that it should be gathered after dawn but before full daylight. He who has carried a corpse alone must remain thirty paces from the barsom (*Vend.* iii. 15–17; cf. *Šāyast lā-Šāyast* ii. 18), and a menstruous woman or one suffering from leucorrhea must keep half that distance (*Vend.* xvi. 4; cf. *Šāyast lā-Šāyast* iii. 10–11, 20, 32–33; *Sad Dar* lxviii. 14), while cuttings of the hair and nails must be buried the latter space away (*Vend.* xvii. 4). The barsom must be removed from a house in which either a human being or a dog (a sacred animal in Zoroastrianism) has died (*Vend.* v. 39–40), though in the purification of a house, after the expiration of the proper period of mourning, which varies according to the degree of kinship, the barsom plays an important rôle (*Vend.* xii. 1 ff.). Barsom may not be carried along a road over which the corpse of a human being or a dog has been borne until the path has been duly purified (*Vend.* xviii. 14–22), and milk drawn from a cow that has eaten of such a corpse may not be used in connexion with the barsom within a year after such an act (*Vend.* vii. 77). Prosperity shuns the place where a heretic (*aŝemaoγa*) dwells, until he is slain and sacrifice is offered to Sraosha for three days and three nights with barsom, fire, and *haoma* (*Vend.* ix. 56–57). Among the penalties for killing an otter (*udra*) are the binding of 10,000 bundles of barsom and the presentation of barsom to 'holy men,' *i.e.* priests (*Vend.* xiv. 4, 8), while 1000 bundles must be tied up by him who has had intercourse with a menstruous woman or one suffering from leucorrhea (*Vend.* xviii. 72). If a libation be poured into the barsom or the sacred fire, it becomes operative 'for the victory of the non-Aryan lands' (*Nīrangistān* lxviii.), and the binding of the barsom is one of the most important parts of the sacrifice (*Nīrang.* lx.). For a variety of ritual prescriptions relating to the barsom, reference may be made to *Nīrang.* (ed. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta* iii., and Darab Dastur Peshotan Sanjana, Bombay, 1894) lxix.–lxx., lxxiv., lxxix., xcvii. ff. (although the greater part of the text of the last passage is so corrupt in its present form as to defy translation); *Šāyast lā-Šāyast* viii. 18; *Dādistān-ī Dīnīk* xliii. 4–5, xlviii. 17; *Epistles of Mānūščihar* iii. 13; Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta* i. 398, 407.

According to Pahlavi literature, the evils of the last times will be such that the barsom may be arranged in the very house of the dead (*Bahrām Yt.* ii. 36), although the righteous man will still strew it, even if he cannot do it 'as in the reign of King Vištāsp' (*Bahrām Yt.* ii. 58; for other eschatological data connected with the barsom see *Bahrām Yt.* iii. 29, 37). The barsom might be consecrated by women (*Šāyast lā-Šāyast* x. 35). Faulty consecration was, however, possible if the barsom had too many twigs, or was cut from an improper plant, or was held toward the north, the region of the demons (*Šāyast lā-Šāyast* xiv. 2), an intentional substitution of such improper barsom being a very serious sin (*Dīnkarṭ* VIII. xliv. 65). The barsom was a powerful agent against all demons, fiends, wizards, and witches (*Dīnā-ī-Māīnōg ī-Khraṭ* lvii. 28); it played a part 'on the day of battle and evil deeds of war' (*Dīnkarṭ* VIII. xxvi. 24); and it is particularly interesting to note that a distinct barsom-ordeal (*baresmōk-varīh*) was known (*Dīnkarṭ* VIII. xix. 38, xx. 12, 66), although no details are given concerning it.

The barsom is also mentioned in the Persian *Šāh-Nāmah*, which records that King Bahrām Gūr and his bride were met by a Zoroastrian priest bearing barsom in his hand, and also that Yazdigird, the last Sasanian king, asked the miller who gave him shelter in flight for a bundle of barsom that he might say grace before eating (Pizzi, *Il Libro dei re*, Turin, 1886–88, vi. 465, viii. 442), a custom to which allusion is also made elsewhere (Rehatsek, *JRASBo* xiii. 88). It is possible that the five-twigged barsom is represented on a coin of Bahrām II. (276–293), which shows two figures on opposite sides of a fire altar, one of the men holding the 'ring of sovereignty' and the other the object in question (Dorn, *Collection de monnaies sassanides de feu le lieutenant-général J. de Bartholomaei*, i., St. Petersburg, 1873, pl. iv. No. 13). In modern times, as has already been noted, the barsom in India is ritually represented by small wire rods; but in Kirman, Anquetil du Perron (*Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1771, ii. 532) records the use of twigs of the pomegranate, tamarind, or date-tree; and at the present time 'in Yezd the tamarisk bush is used to form this bundle, and it is bound with a slender strip of bark from the mulberry tree, probably in exactly the same manner as it was in Zoroaster's day,' brass rods being substituted only in winter or at other times when it is impossible to obtain living branches (Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York, 1906, p. 369 f. and plate). See also YASNA.

LITERATURE.—Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, pp. 31, 342 ff.; Haug, *Essays on the Parsis*[3], London, 1884, p. 396 ff.; Wilson, *Parsi Religion*, Bombay, 1843, p. 231; Windischmann, *Zoroastrische Studien*, Berlin, 1863, pp. 223, 276; and other works mentioned in the article.

L. H. MILLS and LOUIS H. GRAY.

BARTER.—Barter is the name given to the simple and elementary form of traffic in which goods are directly offered in exchange for goods. An article upon barter is from one point of view an essay on the functions of money and the inconvenience of its absence, since barter is that form of exchange in which money is not employed as the intermediary of trading. Barter was the primitive mode of doing business before a measure of value or a common medium of exchange was devised. In such a set of conditions there are manifest difficulties; without a common denominator it is not easy to compare the values of the articles exchanged or to arrive at an economic principle of bargaining. In any particular exchange the two parties must adjust their contract by their respective wants for each other's commodity and the desire of each to part with his own superfluities. Thus the fisherman would need to measure his fish against the potatoes of the gardener at one moment and the bread of the baker at another, and so on round the whole circle of his purchases. It is obvious that a system of exchange so elementary and so casual must belong to a primitive period of society. A very slight advance in the methods of production, in separation of employments, and in traffic would inevitably lead to the use of a medium of exchange which would serve at once as a standard measure and as an accepted go-between;

some substance would be adopted for the double purpose, which all would willingly receive in exchange for their own commodities, and which could in turn be parted with easily for others. The thing selected to serve these utilities in any community would be in the first place something much in common demand for its service or its attractiveness, and such a substance would have certain qualities of durability and approximate stability which would recommend it. The article adopted would vary with the locality. The various stages in this early employment of a primitive money need not be here pursued; by degrees the more essential qualities of good money would emerge, and thus the currency of modern times would be gradually evolved. See art. MONEY.

The term *barter* or *truck* is more usually applied to the exchange of articles for use; the term *purchase* suggests the employment of money and buying for future sale or commerce. The Old Testament supplies a good example of a transaction by payment in kind or barter. In 1 K $5^{10f.}$ we read that Hiram king of Tyre 'gave Solomon cedar trees and fir trees according to all his desire,' and that 'Solomon gave Hiram 20,000 measures of wheat for food to his household and 20 measures of pure oil.'

Many forms of barter still exist in highly civilized communities; the domestic servant barters her services for food, housing, and a sum of money; the farm labourer is often paid partly in *kind*, by the use of a cottage, a garden, supply of milk, butter, etc., and partly by money wages. If we consider *real* wages, *i.e.* what money wages will buy, we see that in reality labour is exchanged for a supply of necessaries and comforts. In modern times we find some publications such as *The Exchange and Mart*, which revive the old form of barter by advertising certain articles for sale and stating the articles desired in exchange for them. Private individuals, like schoolboys, often practise barter; and bits of furniture, old garments, and even plots of land are exchanged for other desirable things.

In uncivilized countries barter is widely prevalent. Stanley in his journeys through Africa took quantities of cloth, brass rods, etc., with which to purchase food; similarly cargoes of old rifles, knives, bottles, powder, etc., have been sent to some places to be exchanged for the natural products of the country.

Under a system of barter there is a difficulty in securing mutuality of wants, or what Jevons called 'the double coincidence of exchange,' viz., that each party shall desire that which the other offers. Again, barter requires each article to be measured in terms of every other article of traffic, necessitating a separate bargain for each, and consequently a large and varied list of the ratios of exchange. A further drawback is the impossibility in some cases of dividing the article or of fractional payments; the pig or the rifle must be exchanged for something which is deemed an exact equivalent.

Competition (*q.v.*) has little play under barter. The mode of exchange is not such as can supply a market and give a market value. It is usually a case of a single exchange in which the values are determined by the individual wants and capacities of the two parties to the exchange.

The evolution of trade was from barter to money purchases. Modern trade tends to revert to a refined form of barter by the employment of paper substitutes for money currency; promises, credit documents, and what is called 'representative money' take the place of coin. The highly organized systems of Banking and the Clearing House have provided a mechanism which in effect reduces much of trade and commerce to barter, while preserving a measure of value and a reserve of the standard for reference and for use in emergency.

And if home trade has been reduced mainly to barter again, much more has foreign commerce. Imports pay for exports; goods and services are the only ultimate means of buying goods and services from other countries. Their values are expressed in terms of money, but the actual exchange is effected almost without the passage of a coin. The foreign trade of Great Britain, amounting to more than £1,000,000,000 a year (or nearly £25 per head of her population), is transacted with the transmission of a very trivial sum in gold.

Imports and exports are balanced against each other by means of bills, and the mechanism of the money market enables the exchange of these instruments of credit representing debts to accomplish the equalization of the debts. The operations become a vast series of barter transactions, reduced to simplicity by the ingenious arrangements of a highly organized commercial system.

Under this refined system of trading no particular parcel of goods is exchanged for any other particular parcel of goods, but each is represented by a bill. These bills are exchanged, *i.e.* bought and sold freely, by the persons doing business in the different countries, so that the equation is ultimately secured. The settlements need not be, nor are they, direct. Each country need not balance its accounts for goods with each of its customer countries so as to equalize their actual imports and exports to one another. But country A may pay its debts to country B by a bill upon C, just as is done by merchants at home. By this system of foreign exchanges bills become an article of commerce; and, following the law of supply and demand, they rise and fall in value, and are a means of regulating commerce and equalizing sales and purchases all over the world.

Thus trade which started with simple exchange by barter has come, under a highly complex civilization and a world-wide commerce, to be once more only barter of a very refined kind, after passing through many stages and degrees of money purchase. Much the greater part of the business of nations is accomplished without the actual employment of money at all, except as a unit of measurement and a reserve force hidden away in the strong rooms of banks.

LITERATURE.—**Jevons**, *Money* (Lond. 1876); **Bastable**, *Theory of International Trade* (Dublin, 1887); **Marshall**, *Principles of Economics*, Note on 'Barter' (Lond. 1907).

G. ARMITAGE-SMITH.

BASIL.—See CAPPADOCIAN THEOLOGY.

BASILIDES, BASILIDIANS.—**1. Sources.**—Basilides was one of the most famous Gnostic teachers in the 2nd century. We are told by Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxiii. 1) that he was a fellow-pupil of Saturnilus in the school of Menander, at Antioch. This statement has been largely accepted, though it is by no means certain that Epiphanius had any trustworthy information on the subject. It is quite as likely to be simply an inference of his own from the fact that Saturnilus and Basilides are coupled by Irenæus (I. xxiv. 1), who, however, says that Saturnilus put forward his system in Syria, but Basilides in Alexandria. Apart from the reference in the *Acts of Archelaus* (c. 55 in Routh, *Rel. Sac.* v. 196) to his preaching among the Persians, to be discussed later, we have no evidence for any activity outside Egypt. Possibly Epiphanius, who visited Egypt, had some warrant for his account of the places outside Alexandria where Basilides worked. The same uncertainty surrounds the date of his activity, but we shall probably be safe in accepting the usual view (cf. Clem. *Strom.* vii. 106) that his work fell mainly

within the reign of Hadrian (A.D. 117–138).* He claimed to have received his doctrine from the Apostle Peter through Glaucias (Clem. *l.c.*). His chief disciple was his son Isidore. According to Hippolytus (*Philos.* vii. 20), they asserted that Matthias communicated to them a doctrine which he had received from Christ. They also appealed apparently to Zoroastrian authorities. Basilides wrote a work entitled *Exegetica*, that is, 'Expositions,' in 24 books (*Strom.* iv. 88; Euseb. *HE* iv. 7. 7). This was apparently an exposition of the Gospels. We learn from Origen (*Hom. 1 in Luc.*) that he wrote a Gospel. It is extremely unlikely that Origen with his facilities for information should be mistaken upon this point. From the fragments which are preserved to us, we may infer that Basilides probably commented on the First, Third, and Fourth Evangelists, possibly also on Mark; and it is by no means unlikely that he based his commentary on his own compilation from the Gospels. He is also said to have written incantations and odes; but these are entirely lost. His son Isidore wrote several works —first, a treatise on Ethics, which, perhaps, is identical with the *Parænetics* mentioned by Epiphanius (xxxii. 3); secondly, a treatise on the Parasitic Soul (*Strom.* ii. 113); and, thirdly, *Expositions of the Prophet Parchor*, which must have contained at least two books, since we have a quotation from the second (*Strom.* vi. 53).

The problems which are presented to us by this school of Gnostics are of an exceptionally perplexing and baffling kind. The accounts given of Basilides' system are hopelessly irreconcilable, and the new evidence which has come to light has made the problem still more difficult. Before the publication of the *Philosophumena* of Hippolytus in 1851, the main sources of information were the account of the system in Irenæus' great work against heresies, and the related accounts in later heresiologists; information given by Eusebius concerning a refutation of Basilides by Agrippa Castor; and some extracts from the works of Basilides and his son Isidore, given by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and the author of the *Acts of Archelaus*. Even these authorities were so difficult to reconcile, that Neander (followed by Gieseler) treated the account of Irenæus as referring to a later development of the sect, and said that, were it not for the fact that Clement of Alexandria referred to the misconduct of later Basilidians in language similar to that employed by Irenæus, we should be tempted to suspect that the Basilidians whom the latter describes had no connexion whatever with the founder. The discovery of the long lost *Philosophumena* or *Refutation of all Heresies*, now unanimously assigned to Hippolytus, introduced a new complication. Hippolytus gives an account of Basilides' system which differs fundamentally from that of Irenæus. The majority of scholars, including Jacobi, Uhlhorn, Baur, Moller, and Hort, accepted the new evidence. The attack on Hippolytus' account was led by Hilgenfeld (see Literature at end of present art.), who received the very influential support of Lipsius, and at a later time of Harnack and other scholars. At present the tendency seems to be to regard the account of Hippolytus as valueless (except in isolated details) for the re-construction of Basilides' own system. But the theory that Hippolytus was duped by a forgery seems to be losing ground, and the opinion prevails that the document he employed was a genuine Gnostic treatise circulated among the later Basilidians. Finally, a new manuscript of the *Acts of Archelaus*, containing the complete Latin translation, was discovered by Traube a few years ago, and made accessible by C. H. Beeson in 1906 ('Hegemonius, Acta Archelai,' in *Die gr. christl. Schriftsteller in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*). The text we previously possessed broke off in the middle of an important extract from Basilides. The newly found manuscript completes the quotation. It should be added that the task of the scholar is rendered more difficult by the fact that the texts are often corrupt, and, even where this is not the case, frequently not very intelligible.

The view that the account of Hippolytus rested on a forgery was first suggested in 1885 by George Salmon in an article in *Hermathena*, entitled 'The Cross References in the Philosophumena.' In reading the work of Hippolytus he had often been struck by the coincidences between the various systems. These had, in fact, drawn the attention of earlier scholars; but Salmon thought them suspicious, and formulated a theory to account for them. This was that Hippolytus became known as a zealous purchaser of Gnostic documents, the demand created a supply, the unscrupulous dealer forged a certain number of treatises purporting to be documents of Gnostic schools, and these were eagerly purchased by the credulous bishop, who in this way included in his work accounts of systems which had never really existed Attention was drawn to Salmon's article by Harnack (*ThLZ* x. [1885] 506 f.), and in his *Gesch. des NT Canons* (1889, i. 765 f.) Zahn signified his adhesion. Salmon's theory was taken up by Stahelin in a special investigation, 'Die gnost. Quellen Hippolyts,' *TU*, 1890. Salmon had said comparatively little about Basilides, but Stahelin sought to show that the theory applied to this part of Hippolytus' account as well as to that of the minor sects. For a time the theory found several supporters, including C. Schmidt (*Gnost. Schriften in kopt. Sprache*, 1892, p. 557) and G. Kruger (*PRE*³, *s.v.*). It has, however, been rejected not only by those who, like J. Drummond (*Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, 1903, pp. 316–331), assert the originality of Hippolytus' account, but by Anz (*Zur Frage nach dem Ursprung des Gnostizismus*, 1897, p. 9) and Bousset (*Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, 1907, p. 128). Bardenhewer in his *Patrology* also judges that 'this hypothesis offers too violent a solution of the problem.' Even Harnack, who in his *Gesch. der altchristl. Literatur* (1893, vol. i. p. 157) spoke of Hippolytus' sources as probably a forgery, expresses himself with greater reserve in his *Chronol. der altchristl. Literatur* (1904, vol. ii. p. 231). The present writer can only repeat the unfavourable judgment he expressed in a notice of Stähelin's work in the *Classical Review*, 1892. In the first place, the coincidences may readily be accounted for by the fact, which Stahelin himself admits, that Gnostic documents circulated freely from one school to another. Secondly, since they were thus in a measure public property, it is difficult to understand how the forger could command prices high enough to reward him for his trouble. Thirdly, it is still more difficult to explain the very striking difference in the level of speculative power which is displayed in the different systems. Few, it may be imagined, would assent to Stähelin's view that the author, in the words he quotes from Basilides on the non-existent God, was trying to turn the whole Gnostic scheme into ridicule, which would surely have been a dangerous game to play if he had wished to palm off his forgeries as genuine. Rather they will recognize in the system a speculative power not inferior to that displayed in Valentinianism,

* E. Schwartz argues that we must take Basilides and Saturnilus at least to the time of Trajan, probably earlier (*Ueber den Tod der Söhne Zebedaei*, 1904, p. 20 f.). He thinks that, while we need not accept the Gnostic claims to possess a tradition from the Apostles, we may well distrust the 'tendency' chronology of their opponents.

and account for the strange language which the author employs by his effort to explain the inexplicable—all the more that his language has parallels in that of other deep thinkers. Moreover, Stahelin assumes rather than proves that Clement is on the side of Irenæus, whereas several scholars who have no preference for Hippolytus' account have recognized that it is very difficult to harmonize Irenæus with the quotations given by Clement. For these reasons we may justifiably reject this theory, which postulates a writer of incredible versatility combined with such strange limitations, and assume that, whether Hippolytus presents us with the genuine system of Basilides or not, he at any rate communicates a system which was really professed in the Basilidian school.

The account of Basilides given by Hegemonius in the *Acts of Archelaus* has also created suspicion. Gieseler argued that the Basilides there mentioned was to be distinguished from the heresiarch of Alexandria, inasmuch as he is said in the *Acts* to have been a preacher among the Persians. Hort considered that his denial had some show of reason, but on the whole regarded the arguments in favour of the identification as preponderating (Smith-Wace, *DCB* i. 277[a]). He should therefore not have been quoted by G. Kruger (*PRE*[3] ii. 431) as agreeing with Gieseler. Usually the assertion that he was a preacher among the Persians is regarded as incredible. Thus Lipsius declares that, if the Disputation of Archelaus makes Basilides a Persian, 'the remark is hardly necessary that this false statement is simply a deduction from the dualism of the Basilidian system' (*Gnosticismus*, 1860, col. 109). It is also rejected by Zahn and Harnack; while Krüger thinks that, although we cannot control the statement, it is not so improbable as Zahn considers it; and Hilgenfeld says that Basilides may quite well have been in Persia and learnt Persian dualism at first hand. The statement should probably be set aside and accounted for as by Lipsius. It is quite another question, however, whether we should reject the author's account of Basilides' beliefs, and, in particular, the extract which he gives from his work. This is said to be taken from the thirteenth book of his treatises, and, inasmuch as it contains an exposition of the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, the work should probably be identified with Basilides' twenty-four books on the Gospels which bore the title *Exegetica*. The real objection felt by those who accept the genuineness of Hippolytus' account is that, while this is monistic in character, the account of Hegemonius seems to pledge Basilides to dualism. There can be no question that the author of the *Acts* understood him to be a dualist, but that, of course, does not settle the question. He may have misunderstood Basilides, especially since his preoccupation with Manichæism made such an interpretation of the Gnostic not unnatural for him. Accordingly we cannot attach decisive weight to his impression, in spite of the fact that he had the complete work before him. If, however, the extract given is genuine, it must rank with those preserved by Clement of Alexandria, and it seems to the present writer that we have no good ground for disputing its authenticity.

2. System of doctrine.—We may now proceed to an exposition of the various systems which have come down to us. Unfortunately it is not possible to re-construct the somewhat desultory references in Clement of Alexandria, treating of ethics rather than metaphysics, into a complete system. It will accordingly be best to begin with the accounts which profess to give us the original system.

(*a*) We take first that of *Irenæus* (I. xxiv. 3–7), which presents points of contact especially with the description he gives of the views of Saturnilus.

According to Irenæus, Basilides began with the unborn Father, and represented Nous as His firstborn. Nous gave birth to Logos, Logos to Phronesis, Phronesis to Sophia and Dynamis. From the last two came the first series of principalities, powers, and angels, who created the first heaven. From these emanated the second angelic series, who created the second heaven; and so on till 365 heavens came into existence. The angels in the lowest heaven created the world, and divided it among themselves. Their chief was the God of the Jews, who aroused hostility by His favouritism to His own people. Thus all other nations were stirred up to be at enmity with the Jews. Hereupon the supreme God interfered to save the world from destruction, and sent His firstborn Nous, *i.e.* Christ, to deliver those that believe in Him from the world-angels. He appeared in human form and taught, but at the crucifixion changed forms with Simon of Cyrene, so that the latter was crucified in the form of Jesus, while Christ Himself stood by and mocked at His enemies in the form of Simon; for, since He was incorporeal, He was essentially invisible, and so He returned to the Father. Hence no one who really knows the truth will confess the Crucified, for, if he does so, he is a slave to the world-angels; but, if he understands what really happened at the crucifixion, he is freed from them. The Basilidians denied the salvation of the body, asserting that it was subject to corruption, and that the soul alone is saved. They had no hesitation in eating meats offered to idols, and regarded every form of immorality as a matter of complete indifference. They also practised all kinds of magical arts, and sought to enumerate the names of the angels in the 365 heavens. The name given to Christ, in which He ascended and descended, was *Caulacau*; and just as Caulacau passed through the various heavens in His descent from the Father and returned to Him and remained invisible and unknown to all, so those who have learnt the doctrines of the system and known the names of the angels may themselves know all, but be known of none. Their mysteries they kept secret, and said that only one out of a thousand, or two out of ten thousand, were capable of knowing them. They had no hesitation in denying their faith under stress of persecution. They adopted the theories of mathematicians, and thus made out the positions of the 365 heavens. The chief of these they asserted to be Abraxas, and on that account the numerical sum of the letters in this word was 365.

It is unnecessary to supplement the account of Irenæus by reference to the other heresiologists who give us an essentially identical system; but there are some features which call for notice at this point. Even those scholars who most warmly vindicate the superiority of Irenæus' exposition generally recognize that he is quite unjustified in the charge of immorality which he brings against Basilides. Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* iii. 508 ff.) rebukes the misconduct of the later members of the sect by reference to the teaching of the founder and his son. The docetic character of the Christology and the denial of the real humanity of Jesus must also be decidedly rejected, in view of Clement's explicit testimony to the effect that from a certain taint of sinfulness Basilides held Jesus, in virtue of His humanity, not to be exempt. The story that Basilides taught the crucifixion of Simon of Cyrene is generally rejected, though Pfleiderer (*Urchristentum*[2], ii. 384) considers that the statement in the Fourth Gospel that Jesus went out bearing the cross for Himself (Jn 19[17]), was intended to repudiate the Synoptic statement that Simon of Cyrene helped Jesus to carry His cross, and was elicited by the turn given to the story by Basilides. It is further noteworthy that in this account only five Æons are interpolated between the supreme God and the angels of the first heaven. Those who re-construct the original system by a fusion of this account with that of Clement of Alexandria, make the five into seven by borrowing two from Clement of Alexandria, and thus attribute to Basilides the usual Heptad. It is very questionable, however, whether they are correct in doing so. In any case nothing can be built on a combination of this kind. Moreover, Bousset has pointed out parallels to the scheme as given by Irenæus. The name *Caulacau* occurs in an unfortunately corrupt sentence,* but it is

* 'Quemadmodum et mundus nomen esse in quo dicunt descendisse et ascendisse saluatorem, esse Caulacau' (Iren. *adv. Hær.* i. 24). The general sense must be that given above, but the text is unintelligible in its present form. Hilgenfeld

sufficiently clear that it is intended to be the mystic name of Christ. It occurs in other Gnostic systems, and was probably derived from Is 28[10]. The statement in Tertullian (*de Præscr. Hær.* 4) that Abraxas was the name given by Basilides to the supreme God is quite incorrect, and is not in harmony even with Irenæus. The fact that a considerable number of gems bear the word *Abrasax*, or more rarely *Abraxas*, on them has caused them to be regarded as Gnostic gems, many of them produced by the Basilidians. An enormous literature has been devoted to them, but it is now generally agreed that if any connexion existed it was of the slightest kind, most of the gems being of pagan origin. Harnack says: 'Not everywhere where Abraxas is mentioned are we to think exclusively of the Basilidians. It is doubtful whether even a single Abraxas gem is Basilidian' (*Altchrist. Lit.* i. 161). Numerous suggestions have been put forward as to the origin and meaning of the term. None of them can be regarded as in any way satisfactory. The word is more probably an artificial formation, which may have originated in some form of speaking with tongues, and been brought into prominence by the fact that, like Μειθράς and Νεῖλος, it was the numerical equivalent of 365.

(*b*) The account given by *Hippolytus*.

This account starts with a very transcendental doctrine of God. A definition is quoted from Basilides, in which language is strained to raise God above all the limitations involved in affirmations about Him. Even to predicate existence would be to limit Him, and thus to negative His absoluteness. Accordingly Basilides starts with the time when there was Nothing—using the term in a sense similar to that in which John Scotus Erigena spoke of God as Pure Nothing. That the author does not intend his words to be taken as a negation of all existence is clear from what follows. If we speak of God as Ineffable, we fall into self-contradiction, for the epithet is in itself a description; but God is not even Ineffable, since He is infinitely above every name that can be named. This non-existent Deity willed to create a world, though we are warned that the term 'willed' is a necessary accommodation to the imperfections of human language. In pursuance of this purpose He deposited a seed, also non-existent, but containing within it the promise and potency of all life. In opposition to the usual Gnostic doctrines, Basilides firmly rejected the conception of emanation from God, who was no spider spinning the world out of Himself. The seed was rather the creative word of which we read in Genesis. Thus, against the gross and material conception of emanation he sets the doctrine of Creation out of Nothing. Just as the seed contains within itself the tree, or the peacock's egg contains the bird with all its rich diversity of colour, so the world-seed holds within itself all that is subsequently to be developed into the manifold forms of being which the universe embraces.

Within this seed there was a threefold Sonship, one part pure and subtle, the second gross, the third needing purification. As soon as the seed was deposited, the pure Sonship burst forth, and by its unaided power rose with the swiftness of thought to the non-existent God. The gross Sonship strove to follow, but was unable to do so since his substance was not light in texture like that of the first. But he escaped from his detention within the seed by providing himself with a wing, identified by Basilides with the Holy Spirit. So helped in his infirmity by the Spirit and giving help to the Spirit in turn, he followed the First Sonship in his flight to the non-existent. But here the Holy Spirit was compelled to leave the Second Sonship; so he dwelt between the supra-cosmic space and the world, and became the firmament, since he had nothing in common with the non-existent God. Yet, as the perfume of an ointment still clings about a vessel even after the ointment has been taken from it, so the Holy Spirit was filled with the fragrance of the Second Sonship.* The Third Sonship, however, still remained in the confused mass of germs within the seed, giving and receiving kindness. Then there burst forth from the seed the Great Archon, better in every way than all beings in the world save the Third Sonship. His upward flight, however, was stayed when he reached the firmament, for this he thought to be the limit of space. And since he was ignorant of what lay beyond the firmament and knew of no power higher than himself, he imagined himself to be the supreme God. Then he formed from the seed a son far wiser than himself, and, wondering at his loveliness, bade him sit at his right hand in the Ogdoad. This son inspired the Archon to create the whole ethereal creation, downwards to the moon. A similar process was repeated with a second Archon, far inferior to the first, who rose to the region below the Ogdoad and dwelt in the Hebdomad. He, too, formed a son far wiser than himself, who inspired his father to form the creation below the Ogdoad. But as to what takes place in the world itself, that is determined by the nature implanted within it at the outset by the non-existent God. But still there remained the Third Sonship, whose true place was with the First and Second Sonships near the non-existent God. To him St. Paul's words refer, where he spoke of the creation groaning and travailing in pain together until now, waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God (Ro 8[19ff.]). And the sons of God are the spiritual, whose task it is to train the souls which are destined to abide within the world. The redemptive process began with the great Archon.

Basilides repudiated the common conception of a descent of a heavenly being from the highest region. He would not admit that the Pure Sonship left his place and came down through the heavens to the regions below. This would have been to contradict his fundamental principle that ascent and not descent is the law of the universe. Accordingly, he represented the son of the great Archon as catching illumination from the pure Sonship. He illustrated this by a reference to naphtha, which takes fire though the flame that kindles it is some distance from it. So the thoughts of the Archon's son aspired till they reached the Sonship, and then the intuition of the truth flashed upon him. Having thus learnt the truth, the great Archon's son revealed it to his father, who, when he learned that he was not, as he had imagined, the supreme God, was converted and filled with fear, as it is written, 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.' The truth was then revealed to all the creatures in the Ogdoad. Similarly, the son of the second Archon learnt the truth from the son of the great Archon, and communicated it to his father. Similarly, the 365 heavens in the Hebdomad, with their ruler Abrasax, learnt the truth.† Thus the Gospel had come down through the Ogdoad and Hebdomad, and now it was fitting that it should reach the seed. And so it came upon Jesus the Son of Mary, and through Him redemption was effected. For within the seed all grades of existence were tangled together in confusion, so that it was necessary not only that the truth should be revealed, but that the various orders of being should be sorted into their proper classes. This was effected by the death of Jesus. The accounts of Jesus in the Gospels were received by Basilides as historical, and he was far from believing that the body of Christ was unreal. So far from that, it was an essential condition of the redemption He achieved that all the grades of existence which had to be sorted should be combined in Him, and then, by their separation in His experience, a similar separation should be effected throughout the seed. Thus, by His death the material element was removed and reverted to formlessness. After His resurrection He ascended through the Hebdomad, leaving His psychical part there; then through the Ogdoad and the Holy Spirit, leaving with each those parts which belonged to them; and finally rose to the region where the blessed Sonship dwells. The Third Sonship followed Jesus and passed through a similar process of purification, and then, refined like the First Sonship, ascended to the non-existent God. The same experience is repeated in the case of spiritual men who ascend to the Father.

When the three Sonships have been thus re-united, and all the spiritual have achieved their task in the world and followed Jesus and the Sonships to the non-existent God, then God will be merciful to creation and bring on all the realms from the Ogdoad downwards the Great Ignorance, so that no rank of being shall know of any rank superior to itself. For it is the nature of all creatures to long for that which is above them, and be tormented because they cannot attain it. But they do not know that the satisfaction of their desire would be fatal to

(*Ketzergeschichte*, p. 197) proposes to strike out *mundus* as a marginal gloss on *Caulacau*, and to read *ejus* for *esse* after *nomen*. This gives a smooth text. Harvey in his note retranslates the Latin as follows: ὃν τρόπον καὶ τὸν Κόσμον ὄνομα εἶναι, ἐν ᾧ, κ.τ.λ. This he then emends: ὃν τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἄκοσμον ὄνομα, ἐν ᾧ, κ.τ.λ., 'as also that the barbarous name in which the Saviour, as they say, descended and ascended, is Caulacau.' Whether we accept this very ingenious suggestion or that of Hilgenfeld makes no difference to the main point, which is that the Saviour in His descent and ascent bore the name *Caulacau*; Irenæus cannot have meant that the world bore this name, since in the following sentence it is clear that the name was that of the Saviour. The term was not confined to the Basilidians, but is said to have been found among the Ophites and Nicolaitans. Epiphanius derives it from קַו־לָקָו, 'line upon line,' in Is 28[10]. This is corroborated by a statement of Hippolytus, in which the names *Saulasau* and *Zeesar* are added. These obviously go back to the Hebrew words in the same passage, meaning 'precept upon precept' and 'here a little.' Bousset hesitates between this, which is the usual explanation, and the view that the term may have been a Gnostic loan-word to which the explanation was subsequently attached.

* The Sethians spoke of the pure Spirit which was between light and darkness as not like a wind, but like an odour of ointment or an incense. It is a mistake to lay any stress on this parallel, as Stahelin does. The point of the metaphor in the two cases is entirely different (see Drummond, *Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 317); and Bousset points out (*Hauptprobleme*, p. 120) that it is quite a common Persian idea that the heavenly worlds are sweet-smelling, but the world of Ahriman is malodorous.

† It has been suggested that this section on 365 heavens, with their ruler Abrasax, does not properly belong to the system (see Uhlhorn, *Das basilid. System*, p. 65 f., and Hort, art. 'Abrasax' in *DCB*).

them, for they can live only in the conditions in which they are placed, and could not breathe the rarer atmospheres of the higher spheres. If, then, they remain content in their place, they will have eternal existence; but if they escape from it, they become corruptible. And thus, with this allocation of all orders of existence to the place fitted for them, and the ignorance of any superior order, and universal contentment, there will come the restitution of all things.

The fundamental difference between this system and that of some other Gnostic leaders, notably Valentinus, lies in its emphatic rejection of the principle of emanation. For this rejection there were two reasons. One was that the theory of emanation is gross and repulsive in its conception of God. The other was that the natural tendency of all being is upwards, not downwards. Since, then, the world at present displays a scene of terrible confusion, we must assume that its development started from a condition of things even worse than that which now prevails; hence the doctrine of the seed, in which everything is huddled together, from the pure Sonship down to the grossest matter, the goal of history being the establishment of all things in their proper rank. Valentinus, on the contrary, starts with the principle that evolution is degeneration. Each pair of Æons is inferior to its parent. The process continues till the catastrophe is possible, and the plunge over the precipice follows. Spirit sinks to psychical forms of existence, thence to the material, and lastly the limit is found in the diabolical. The evolutionary process has then to become revolutionary; but, though the spiritual may return to the pleroma, the psychical and material must remain outside. Thus Basilides leaps the gulf between the infinite and the finite, whereas Valentinus bridges it. It is quite clear that there was a polemical element in Basilides' scheme, and that it was elaborated in conscious antithesis to the popular theory of emanation. It is quite possible, as some consider, that Basilides had the system of Valentinus in mind, since they were probably both teaching at the same time in Alexandria. It is not at all necessary, however, to take this view, since, although Valentinus was probably the junior, he was the more conservative of the two, and was not the first to put forward the theory of emanation.

The doctrine of the triple Sonship is difficult, and we could have wished for fuller information as to its significance. In spite of the fact that the First Sonship is regarded as refined and the Second as gross, they do not stand for different orders of being, for both of them pass to the highest realm of all, and are therefore essentially spiritual in character. And the same is true of the Third Sonship, the parts which he leaves behind him being accretions foreign to his essential nature. Probably Basilides has been influenced by the fondness for triplicity, which is so characteristic of such schemes. He has also been influenced by the first chapter of Genesis. The connexion between the Second Sonship and the Holy Spirit, who is identified with the firmament, reminds one of 'the waters above the firmament' in the story of Creation, in which case we may perhaps identify the First Sonship with the light, which was the first to be created, and in comparison with the fineness of which the waters would seem coarse. But how in plain language the author would have interpreted the waters above the firmament we do not know. The Third Sonship is apparently the spiritual principle which is at present combined with the material universe.

The Ogdoad and Hebdomad, which are astronomical in their origin, are conceptions familiar in other Gnostic schemes. The duplication of the Archons is interesting. It corresponds in a measure to the position of Achamoth and Demiourgos in the system of Valentinus, though there are marked differences in detail. Historically considered, they represent two stages in the world's history. The great Archon reigned from Adam till Moses, the second Archon from the time of Moses onwards, and it was he who revealed himself to Moses and inspired the Hebrew prophets. The kindly and compassionate spirit which pervades the system is very noteworthy. This comes out especially in the doctrine of the Great Ignorance, which is intended to save the creature from fatal aspirations towards a sphere which lies above it. But there are other illustrations of it. The Second Sonship and the Holy Spirit give and receive mutual kindness. The Third Sonship remains within the seed, giving and receiving benefit. The ascent of the spiritual to their true home is delayed by their duty of training those who have to remain within the seed. No evil principle is recognized. There is no hostility on the part of the Archons to the supreme God. They reverently acquiesce in the revelation of their inferiority.

(*c*) If we now inquire as to the relative originality of the system as presented by Irenæus and that given by Hippolytus, the advantage seems to lie on the side of the latter. In the first place, Hippolytus, who often follows Irenæus, and had almost certainly done so in his earlier work on heresies, which is no longer extant, here deliberately abandons Irenæus' account and gives one entirely different. He must have thought that in doing so he had access to better information, and it is hazardous to suppose that he took no precautions to ensure that the new information was superior. Basilides was a famous teacher, his works were extant at the time, and it would have been quite easy to satisfy oneself as to which account should have the preference by going to the fountainhead. In the next place, Irenæus shows himself badly informed in several particulars. Hilgenfeld himself admits this, and infers from the vagueness of Irenæus' language that he knew nothing of the sect or its founder at first hand, and depended simply on his source, which he believes (in harmony with Lipsius' earlier but not his later view) to have been Justin's lost *Syntagma*. Some of the mistakes of Irenæus have already been pointed out, and they must damage the credit of his whole account. Again, the system as presented by Irenæus goes on very conventional lines. It is quite a commonplace presentation of ordinary Gnostic beliefs, and it is not easy to understand why Basilides gained his immense reputation if he was capable of nothing better than this. On the other hand, the system as set forth by Hippolytus is characterized by extraordinary speculative power, to which we must not be blinded by the fantastic elements in the detailed working out. With the account of Hippolytus before us, we can understand the impression Basilides made on the Church, and the vitality of the sect in spite of the fact that, apart from his son Isidore, he seems to have had no distinguished followers, such as adorned the school of Valentinus. We have no right to condemn the system on the ground that it does not follow the ordinary lines. When, for example, C. Schmidt says that the emanation theory is the characteristic mark of all Gnostic systems, the cardinal dogma of all Gnostic teaching, and that the evolutionary theory is incompatible with the nature of Gnosticism, and that on this account the presentation in Hippolytus is utterly untenable (*Gnost. Schriften in kopt. Sprache*, 1892, p. 423), this is simply an illegitimate assumption. There is no reason in the nature of things why Basilides could not have followed the line which Hippolytus ascribes to him. If to do so is to forfeit one's title to be a Gnostic, that is, after all, a matter of

terminology. Questions of this kind cannot be settled by *a priori* considerations.*

(*d*) The evidence supplied by Clement of Alexandria has naturally been claimed both by those who favour the representation in Irenæus and by those who accept that of Hippolytus. Owing to the limitation of the evidence of the *Stromata* to the ethical parts of the system, the metaphysical doctrines of the school are but slightly touched upon, so that Clement is not engaged with the same side of the system as Hippolytus or the speculative portions of Irenæus' account. It must be urged, however, against the latter, that in several points Irenæus is convicted of misstatement by Clement's evidence, whereas there is no actual conflict between Clement and Hippolytus, though it is not easy to unite their representations into a single coherent scheme. There is, however, a very striking parallel in Clement's reference to the Archon's amazement when the glad tidings were announced to him. This amazement was called 'fear,' and Clement tells us that Basilides interpreted it of the passage, 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.' It is very noteworthy that precisely the same interpretation is given by Hippolytus with reference to the great Archon's reception of the Gospel. Clement also attests the view that things must be discriminated into their classes and the various intervals or stages which are to be found in the universe. His description of an original disorder and confusion forcibly reminds us of the doctrine of the seed, though τάραχος is not perhaps the expression we should have thought most appropriate to Hippolytus' description. The points of contact with Irenæus are slight and general, and they are also points of contact with Hippolytus, for both speak of an Ogdoad and of an Archon. Even if Hippolytus were left out of account altogether, it would be very difficult to reconcile Irenæus with Clement. And several modern writers who entirely reject the account of Hippolytus hold that Irenæus does not present us with the pure Basilidian doctrine. We are therefore probably justified in any case in treating Irenæus as a secondary authority who employed a source which described a degenerate development of the school, far removed alike in speculative power and ethical elevation from the founder.

(*e*) We should be warranted in accepting the account of Hippolytus without further hesitation if it were not for the difficulty of harmonizing it with the quotation in the *Acts of Archelaus*. Probably we should not be justified in denying that the quotation is really a genuine extract from Basilides' work. We cannot confidently attach much weight to the author's view of Basilides' doctrine, since the quotation, so far as we have it in the complete work of Hegemonius, does not commit Basilides himself to the dualism it describes. Basilides turns from vain inquiries, apparently into Western opinions, to the views entertained by the barbarians, *i.e.* presumably the Persians. Then he quotes the opinion of some of them to the effect that there were two original self-existent first principles—light and darkness—leading their own life in ignorance of each other. When, however, they came to mutual knowledge, the darkness was seized by desire for the light and sought to mingle with it. The light, however, received nothing from the darkness nor desired it, but was simply affected with the wish to behold it, and did so as in a mirror. All then that the darkness received was not the true light, but a reflexion and semblance of the light. Unfortunately, the text at this point is corrupt, but possibly the meaning may be that the light tried to recover what had been taken by the darkness. In any case, this intermingling accounts for the fact that there is no perfect good in the world, since the good that was received at the beginning was so slight. Nevertheless, in virtue of this slender appearance of light, the creatures have been able to form the creation which we see. It is regrettable that the author considered it unnecessary to quote any further, for we should perhaps have been in a better position to discover how far his accusation of dualism was borne out by Basilides' own expression of opinion on the views which he reports. It is quite possible that the approximately Manichæan theory which is here put forward was quoted by Basilides because it had points of contact with his own system. It would be no easy task to harmonize this dualistic doctrine with the monistic system of the *Philosophumena*. But possibly Basilides may have felt that it illustrated his own view of the original confusion of all things in the seed and the process of disentanglement that was consequently necessary. In spite of the monism that characterizes the system as described by Hippolytus, there is a dualistic strain within it, and Basilides may have recognized an affinity with Persian dualism, even though he constructed his own system along other lines. It is significant, as testifying to such affinity with Persia, that Isidore wrote an exposition of the prophet Parchor, and Basilides is said to have named as his prophets Barcabbas and Barcoph. It is generally agreed that Barcoph is the same as Parchor. Isidore is also said to have accused Pherecydes of borrowing from the prophecy of Ham, *i.e.* probably Zoroaster. The question is difficult to decide, but, in view of the uncertainty which hangs over the passage of Hegemonius, we may perhaps still accept the account of Hippolytus as substantially accurate, though we must allow for misunderstanding and unskilful abridgment where Hippolytus explained the system, not by quotations, but in his own words.

(*f*) It remains to touch upon some of the points that are referred to by *Clement of Alexandria* and *Origen*. Clement tells us that Basilides taught that, in virtue of the original disorder and confusion, the rational soul received as appendages certain passions which are really spirits, and then other natures became attached to these, including animal properties, as well as qualities of plants, and even inanimate objects. Thus man's actions may be to some extent traced to the foreign elements which have adhered to the rational soul, the passions of irrational animals accounting for his lusts, and such a quality as hardness being derived from steel. This doctrine of the parasitic elements which have attached themselves to the soul reminds one to a certain extent of the modern conception of multiple personality, though, of course, there are obvious differences between the two. Clement illustrates this conception of man by the Trojan horse which embraced in one body so considerable a host. Isidore wrote a separate treatise on the parasitic soul. In this treatise he found it necessary to repudiate the inference that a man could rightly lay the blame for his ill deeds upon these foreign appendages. He does not retract the doctrine itself, but asserts that the

* Bousset considers that the *Philosophumena* presents us with a monistic transformation of the original system of Basilides. Accordingly, his remarks on the general thesis that the doctrine of emanation is a specific characteristic of Gnosticism are, quite apart from their intrinsic importance, very pertinent here, since they are not inspired by any prejudice in favour of Hippolytus' version: 'One is usually inclined to regard this thought of emanation as specifically characteristic of the Gnosis. I cannot discover that this is correct. It is found only in a few systems, and in none so pure as in the Basilidian. Everywhere else the stress lies, not on the thought of a gradual emanation and deterioration of the Æons, but on the sudden fall of one of these Æons (Barbelo Gnosis, Valentinianism). Accordingly, the question as to the origin of the idea of emanation is fairly irrelevant for the comprehension of the Gnosis' (*Hauptprobleme*, p. 329).

rational soul ought to be supreme and govern the inferior creation within, and that a man should not excuse his misdeeds by the plea that he was at the mercy of these foreign passions. This doctrine was probably connected with Basilides' theory of transmigration which is attested by Origen. In his *Com. on Romans* (bk. v.), Origen tells us that Basilides explained Ro 7^9, 'I was alive apart from the law once,' to mean that before St. Paul came into the body in which he then lived he had inhabited a form of body which was not under the law, *i.e.* the body of a beast or a bird. We must assume then that, at the first, inferior spirits clustered about the rational soul, but that in the course of transmigration it brought with it elements from the various types of creation in which its successive incarnations had been realized.

Basilides also considered, as we learn from Clement, that suffering invariably presupposes sin, since to affirm the suffering of the righteous would be to indict the morality of God. Even in the case of the martyrs he believed that this held good. They were really suffering for sins which they had committed either in an earlier state or in their present life. But by the mercy of God their punishment was allowed to take the form of martyrdom, so that it might seem to be honourable rather than disgraceful. Even infants suffered on account of the sinfulness of their nature, for sin does not lie in the act so much as in the disposition which prompts it, inasmuch as frequently the difference between one who has committed a sin and one who has not committed it lies simply in the fact that the latter has had no opportunity. Naturally, from the orthodox side the criticism was made that the suffering of Christ would, on Basilides' theory, imply His sinfulness. Such a conclusion Basilides would not evade, though it was obviously distasteful to him. He will say: 'He has not sinned, but was like a child suffering'; but if he were pressed further, he would reply: 'The man you name is man, but God is righteous, for no one is pure from pollution.' To Clement the doctrine that martyrdom was punishment for sin was so repugnant, that he accuses Basilides of deifying the devil. It is a mistake to interpret this in a dualistic sense. He simply means that Basilides attributes to God the torments of the martyrs which were really inflicted by the devil. In any case, one must admire the principle which animated Basilides' whole treatment of this subject, expressed in his great saying, 'I will assert anything rather than call Providence evil.' It may be added that Basilides affirmed that only involuntary sins and sins in ignorance could be forgiven. Clement also criticizes the necessitarian character of Basilides' ethics. A man's destiny was determined by election, according to which each creature was assigned to his proper rank in the scale of being. The election, strictly so called, was regarded as a stranger in this world, since it was hypercosmic by nature. In other words, that portion of mankind which is chosen to rise to the highest sphere cannot properly belong to the world from which it is destined to escape. Faith was held in high esteem by the Basilidians; and in this they were distinguished from the Valentinians, who exalted knowledge in comparison with it. They did not regard it, however, as a grace to be exercised by a man's free will, but as one which he possesses by nature. It was interpreted as the faculty of spiritual insight which penetrates behind the phenomenal and gives assent to the unseen.

3. **Formative influences.**—The uncertainty which hangs over the system of Basilides in general extends also to its sources. Those who accept the account of the *Philosophumena* generally recognize a marked influence from *Greek Philosophy*, but they do not follow Hippolytus in treating the system as substantially Aristotelian. They are divided, nevertheless, on the question whether this influence was derived from Stoicism or Platonism. It is, however, only what we should expect, that at the present day the Oriental affinities of the system should be emphasized. The greatest stress is naturally laid on *Zoroastrianism*, but a few scholars are convinced that *Indian influence* must also be invoked. Pfleiderer, for example, considers that the Basilidian doctrine of the restitution of all things has such surprising resemblances to the Indian doctrine of redemption that we can hardly avoid thinking of direct influence from it. Similar is the case with the doctrine of transmigration; while the doctrine of the parasitic passions finds a parallel in Buddhist psychology. Moreover, the exposition of the so-called will of God, quoted by Clement (*Strom.* iv. 12), that one should love all since all have relation to the whole, that man should desire nothing and that he should hate nothing, what is this, Pfleiderer asks, but the quintessence of Buddhist ethics? Accordingly, he thinks that the later form of Basilides' doctrine, which we learn from Hippolytus, Clement, and Origen, is to be traced back still more to Indian than to Greek influence. He explicitly sets aside the derivation from Stoicism which has found favour with several modern writers. The question of Indian influence can, of course, hardly be settled apart from the wider problem of the diffusion of Indian thought in the nearer East, and on this subject it is safest at present to keep the judgment in suspense.* Perhaps it will be best to recognize that many sources contributed to the philosophy. Basilides was indebted to earlier Gnostic systems, not necessarily to Valentinianism (which would have a dubious claim to priority), but to theories which were subsequently incorporated in it. These stimulated him in the way of antagonism even more than of acceptance. He had been influenced by the NT, though his treatment of it was vitiated by the allegorical method. He appears to have compiled a Gospel which contained portions of Matthew, Luke, and John, and possibly of Mark. He had also been influenced by the Epistle to the Romans. He was naturally indebted to Alexandrian eclecticism. It is by no means improbable that he was influenced by Platonism, though Stoicism seems to have contributed even more important elements. Finally, it is practically certain, for reasons already given, that, whether he had ever been in Persia or not, he owed a good deal to Zoroastrianism.

Apart from his son Isidore, Basilides had no disciples of distinction. His abstruse speculations as to the non-existent God, the universal seed, and the threefold sonship, were too exalted for many of his followers; and the system quickly experienced a moral and speculative degradation, probably under the influence of Valentinianism. We have no evidence for the existence of the sect beyond Egypt, where Epiphanius (xxiv. 1) found it flourishing towards the close of the 4th century. The statement made by Jerome (*Ep.* 75. 3; *ad Vigilant.* 6), that there were Basilidians in Spain in his time, is incorrect. They were Manichæans with Gnostic elements in their doctrine (see C. Schmidt, *Gnost. Schriften*, 562).

LITERATURE.—Much of the literature has already been mentioned. Reference is made to the system of Basilides in the various Church Histories and Histories of Doctrine. It is naturally much more thoroughly discussed in works on Gnosticism and Heresy generally. Of the older literature, special praise is due to Beausobre's discussion in his *Histoire de Manichée et du*

* Cf. what Harnack says as to the blending of religions: 'It is still a moot point of controversy whether India had any share in this, and, if so, to what extent; some connexion with India, however, does seem probable' (*Mission and Expansion*[2], Eng. tr. vol. i. p. 28). The whole subject is discussed by Clemen in his *Religionsgesch. Erklärung*, 1909.

Manichéisme, 1734–39, ii. 1–68. Lardner's discussion in his *History of Heretics*, 1780, rests a good deal on Beausobre.

Of the later literature the following may be mentioned: **Neander**, *Genet. Entwickl. der vornehmst. gnost. Systeme*, 1818, and *Church History*, Eng. tr. 1850–58; **Gieseler**, in *Hall. Allg. Ltztg.* 1824, p. 825 ff., and *SK*, 1830, p. 395 ff.; **Baur**, *Christl. Gnosis*, 1835, *History*, Eng. tr. 1879; **Lipsius**, *Gnosticismus*, 1860; **Möller**, *Gesch. der Kosmologie*, 1860; **Mansel**, *The Gnostic Heresies*, 1875; **Hilgenfeld**, *Ketzergesch. des Urchristentums*, 1884; **King**, *The Gnostics and their Remains*, 1887; **Mead**, *Fragments of a Faith Forgotten*, 1900; **de Faye**, *Introd. à l'étude du Gnosticisme*, Eng. tr. 1903; **Bousset**, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, 1907. The following special monographs have been devoted to the subject: **Jacobi**, *Basilidis Philosophi gnostici Sententias*, 1852; **Uhlhorn**, *Das Basilid. System*, 1855.

The controversy as to the trustworthiness of Hippolytus' account called forth a considerable number of publications, Hilgenfeld being specially active. We may mention among his discussions that in *Theol. Jahrbücher* (1856), his *Jud. Apocalyptik* (1857), and articles in his *Ztschr. d. wissenschaftl. Theol.* for 1862 and 1878. His results are summed up in his *Ketzergeschichte*. On the other side may be mentioned **Baur**'s discussion in the *Theol. Jahrbucher* for 1856, and the article by **Jacobi**, 'Das ursprungl. Basilid. System,' in *Ztschr. f. Kirchengesch.*, 1877. Jacobi also contributed an article to *PRE*[2]. The article in *PRE*[3] by **G. Krüger** rules out the *Philosophumena*, and bases the account of the original system on Clement of Alexandria and the *Acts of Archelaus*, Irenæus being treated as secondary. Bousset takes the *Acts of Archelaus* as his main authority, and weaves in the fragmentary information we get from Clement of Alexandria. Pfleiderer's *Urchristentum*[2] (1902) recognizes two distinct stages in Basilides' theological development: the former, his Syrian stage, represented by Irenæus and Epiphanius; the latter, his Alexandrian stage, represented by Hippolytus, Clement, and Origen. This re-construction is extremely dubious, but it is at least interesting as showing that in Pfleiderer's judgment Clement of Alexandria supports the account of Hippolytus. The question of Indian origin is discussed by **F. Kennedy** in an article entitled 'Buddhist Gnosticisms: the System of Basilides' (*JRAS*, 1902). It should finally be added that English readers are fortunate in possessing the very valuable article by **Hort** in Smith-Wace's *DCB*, with which should be taken his articles on 'Abrasax' and 'Barcabbas and Barcoph' (*ib*.), and the chapter in **J. Drummond**'s *Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, 1903. Works on the History of Philosophy usually contain some account of Basilides. A very interesting recent discussion may be seen in **J. Watson**'s *Philosophical Basis of Religion*, 1907. A. S. PEAKE.

BASKET.—Two kinds of baskets must be considered as belonging to the service of the gods: the κανοῦν (κάνεον, κάναστρον, κάνιστρον, κανίσκιον, Lat. *canistrum*) and the κάλαθος. The κανοῦν is a flat broad basket, originally made of rush or cane (Aristoph. fr. 160 [Kock]; Pollux, vii. 176), and therefore to be derived from κάνα or κάννα (Lat. *canna*, cf. Korais in Heliod. *Æthiopica*, p. 114). At an early date the shape was imitated in metal: in bronze (Hom. *Il.* xi. 630) and in gold (Hom. *Od.* x. 355). The plaiting was clearly indicated in the metal (Athen. vi. 229[d]). Wooden κάνεα are recorded for his own time by Eustath. (*Od.* i. 141). This basket was used as a receptacle for bread and food to be served at meals (cf. Hom. *ll. cc.*). In the same vessel the meals were served to the gods; hence it was used for sacrifice. As an important passage describing a rite of archaic simplicity, compare Hom. *Od.* iv. 761, where Penelope pours οὐλοχύται, 'sacrificial barley' (cf. Ziehen, *Hermes*, xxxvii. 391 ff.; Stengel, *ib.* xxxviii. 38 ff.), into the basket for Athene before making a vow. A less important part is played by the κανοῦν with the οὐλαί in the sacrifice of a victim (Hom. *Od.* iii. 441 f.). On this occasion the sacrificial knife was placed for convenience (not as Ziehen supposes, *op. cit.* 398 f.) in the basket (Eur. *El.* 810 f., 1142; Aristoph. *Peace*, 948 + schol.). As the basket was a flat one, the expression 'to place the knife *on* the basket' was likewise used (Philostr. *Vita Apoll.*, *init.*, cf. Stengel, *Herm.* xliii. 465, 1). The basket was adorned with sacred fillets (στέμματα, Aristoph. *l.c.*), and wreathed with sacred twigs (cf. Ov. *Met.* ii. 713, and, for the Attic Thargelia, Proclus on Hes. *Works and Days*, 767 [p. 419, Gaisford]; see also Dieterich, *ARW* viii. Usenerheft, p. 100, 1). Fillets and twigs are often visible on vase-paintings (cf. Hock, *Griech. Weihegebrauche*, p. 94). In Delphi, the sacrificial basket contained cake and incense (Æl. *Var. Hist.* xi. 5; Heliodor. *Æth.* iii. 2). The ritual of sacrifice was begun by the basket and the water for ablution, which closely belonged to it (Demosth. xxii. 78), being carried round the altar from left to right (Aristoph. *Peace*, 956 f.; Eur. *Her. Fur.* 926 f., cf. also Ziehen's opinion, *op. cit.* p. 400, 1). To get the sacrificial basket ready for the sacred action is expressed by ἐνάρχεσθαι κανοῦν (Eur. *El.* 1142, *Iph. Aul.* 1470; Æschin. *in Ctes.* 120; Menand. *Perik.* 346 f., *Sam.* 7; Poll. viii. 83). Stengel (*Herm.* xliii. 465) has misinterpreted the meaning of the expression by using the term 'to consecrate,' which does not suit here; the correct explanation is found in Abresch, *Animad. ad Æschyl.* i. 505 ff. (cf. also schol. Æschin. *l.c.*). That ἐνάρχεσθαι is not a sacred action is clearly shown in Menand. *Sam.* 7, where it is mentioned with house-cleaning and cake-baking, as preparation for the wedding. The use of more than one sacrificial basket is attested (Eur. *El.* 800). As a chief requisite at sacrifice (Aristoph. *Birds*, 43 + schol., 863; Pherecrates, fr. 137 [Kock]; Dittenberger, *Syll.*[2] 628, 23, from Eleusis), the κανοῦν is often found in temple-inventories. Cf. for the Parthenon, Michaelis, *Parthenon*, p. 259; and, *e.g.*, *IGA* i. p. 73, *a* 6, 10, etc. (two in gilt wood), ii. 668, 3 f. (in gilt bronze), 5 f. (*ib.*); 676, 45 f. (in bronze); 678, B 7 (1 large one, 20 'old' ones); 724, B 3 f. (in silver, dedicated to Asklepios) 5 ff. (silver, dedicated to Athene), ii. 5, 653, 15 (with wooden frame: ὑπόξυλον); 685, 2; 700*b*, B 32 (in bronze); κανᾶ χαλκᾶ τομπικά in the inventory of the Chalkotheke (Michaelis, *op. cit.* p. 307, 29; cf. *IGA* ii. 162, *ab.* 16). A basket dedicated to Demeter and Kore in Eleusis is mentioned in the statement of accounts of the ἐπιστάται Ἐλευσινόθεν of the year 329–8 (Dittenberger, *Syll.*[2] 587, 116; cf. *IGA* ii. 5, 767, *b* 62). A basket is spoken of in an inventory from Oropos (Amphiaraos) (*IGA* vii. 303, 55), from Thebes (*ib.* 2424, 13), from Ægina (Mnia and Auxesia), *IGA* iv. 1588, 5 f. (in bronze), 16 (9 rush-baskets, see above), 33 (small bronze basket), from Delos (Dittenberger, *Syll.*[2] 588, 93 (Apollo), 185 (in silver with silver handles dedicated to the Delian Apollo), 186 (a gilt one of upright shape [?]: ὀρθόν, with same dedication), 205 (the three latter out of the temple of Artemis), from Mitylene, *IGA* xii. 2, 13, 1 (κανήια χρ[ύσια], golden baskets: 'inscriptionum templi Dianæ Thermiæ longe antiquissima'), from Didyma (Apollo) (*CIG*, 2855, 20). The shape of the sacrificial basket can be well observed in the very numerous sacrificial scenes; this, however, requires a special study. A handsome specimen is *Rom. Mitt.* v. 324; more examples are enumerated on p. 326, also in Michaelis, *Parthenon*, p. 259. It must be remarked here that the shape frequently designated as three-pointed is in fact four-pointed. In the present writer's opinion, Gisela Richter wrongly interprets the object held by a woman on a red-figured skyphos as being a sacrificial basket (*Amer. Journ. of Archæol.* xi. 423 ff.; *ib.* six similar examples); more probably the object depicted in *Arch. Zeit.* xxix., pl. 45 (cf. *Rom. Mitt. l.c.* p. 326, 1) belongs to this class. An affinity seems to exist between the sacrificial basket and the object occurring on Mycenæan monuments, and known as 'horns of consecration' (cf. *e.g.* Evans, *Mycenæan Tree and Pillar Cult*, p. 3 (101), fig. 1; p. 44 (142), fig. 25; see Hub. Schmidt, *Berl. philol. Wochenschr.* 1898, p. 945; Hock, *Griech. Weihegebr.* p. 94, 3). A small Mycenæan clay basket with four rows of double axes (therefore sacred) has recently been found on the small island of Pseira near Crete (Pernier, *Ausonia*, i. 110; *Arch. Anz.* 1907, p. 109, cf. Bulle, 'Orchomenos,' *ABAW*, philos.-philol. Kl. xxiv. 2, p. 81, pl. xxviii. 15). The use of the basket during sacrifice led to its being

classed as a sacred thing. Hesych. (*s.v.* ἱστριανίδες) records that the Athenians covered their 'sacred baskets' (cf. *IGA* ii. 420, 10 f.). Perhaps Leacock (*de Pompis Græcis*, Harvard Stud. xi. 23) rightly connects the garment lying on the basket (*IGA* ii. 754, 29 f.) with this custom. As a sacred object the basket is touched by the Geraræ when they swear an oath to the Basilissa in front of the altar ([Demosth.] lix. 78, entirely misinterpreted by Gerhard, *Rhein. Mus.* xiii. 474* ff.).

If a solemn procession preceded the sacrifice, the basket was carried in it by a girl (κανηφόρος). Leacock's opinion (*loc. cit.* p. 12), that in private procession boys also carried the basket, finds no sufficient support in Aristoph. *Birds*, 850, 864. The *canephoros*, who was of good family (Philochorus *ap.* Harpocr. *s.v.*) and of virtuous demeanour (Aristoph. *Ach.* 253 f.; *CIG* 3602 f.; Ov. *Met.* ii. 711; Porphyr. *ad Hor. Serm.* i. 3, 10 f.), was rubbed over with flour (Aristoph. *Ekkl.* 732; Hermipp. fr. 26 [Kock]; Pfuhl, *de Athen. pompis sacris*, 22, 141) and richly adorned (Aristoph. *Ach.* 258, *Lys.* 1188 ff.; [Plut.] *X. Orat. vit.* p. 852^b + *IGA* ii. 162, *c* 10, with Kohler's remarks, cf. ii. 2, p. 98 ff.); behind her follows a *diphrophoros*, 'girl carrying a settle' (Aristoph. *Birds*, 1552, schol. 1551, *Ekkl.* 732 f.; Hesych. *s.v.*). Some of these reports may bear special reference to the Panathenæa (cf., for all, Pfuhl, *op. cit.* 20 ff.; Leacock, *loc. cit.* 9 ff.). As a preparation for the *pompe*, the *canephoros* took a cleansing bath in flowing water ([Plut.] *Amat. narr.* p. 771 f.). According to Menander's *Epitrep.* 221 ff., married women also participated as *canephoroi*, probably of Demeter (τῆς θεοῦ), after having abstained from cohabitation for three days (from Menander is derived Diogenianus, ii. 46; cf. Headlam, *Restorations of Menand.* p. 7). The simplest form of a procession with basket-bearing is shown by the Attic 'Dionysia in the Country' (Aristoph. *Ach* 241 ff.). First comes the *canephoros*, then the *phallos*, and the rear is formed by Dicæopolis, at the same time the priest and the representative of the congregation (cf. *IGA* ii. 844, 15 ff.), while symbols of the gods seem to follow the basket (see Petersen, *Burgtempel d. Athenaia*, p. 81; there is a *canephoros* at the head of the procession on the black-figure vase-painting in Stengel, *Kultusalt.*^{2} pl. i. 4). Basket and *phallos* are found in the same order in the primitive form of the procession in the Great Dionysia, which were formed on the model of the Lesser Dionysia. In front of the basket were borne a jar of wine and a vine-twig, and a he-goat was led ([Plut.] *de Cupid. div.* p. 527^d, cf. Dioscorides, *Anth. Pal.* vii. 410, 3 f.)—the specifically Dionysian addition to the ancient phallic foundation. In the basket, which is carried by a man, there are figs; therefore, the present writer classes among references to the Great Dionysia the passage Aristoph. *Lys.* 646 f., where the basket-bearer wears a chain made of figs. This *canephoros* was more than ten years of age (*ib.* 643 ff.). Golden baskets with ἀπαρχαὶ ἀπάντων are recorded in schol. ad Aristoph. *Ach.* 242 = Suid. *s.v.* κανοῦν. The basket-bearers of the Great Dionysia were elected by the Archon Eponymos (*RA* xxv. 1873, 178; *IGA* ii. 420; for other basket-bearers of Dionysos, see *IGA* ii. 1388*b*, Add. p. 349; ii. 5, 318*b*, 32). At the Panathenæan festival a great number of basket-bearers participated. The orator Lycurgus procured amongst other things golden ornaments for 100 girls (*X. orat. v.* p. 852^b, cf. his speech περὶ κανηφόρων, Harpocrat. *s.v.*). On the frieze of the Parthenon numerous girls with and without implements are represented, who have rightly been recognized as basket-bearers (Pfuhl, *op. cit.* p. 20, 133); but it is not probable that the girls would carry the objects in their hands instead of in baskets on their heads for purely artistic reasons (Pfuhl, *op. cit.* p. 21, 137); we must give preference to Leacock's opinion (*loc. cit.* p. 14) that most of these girls were only basket-bearers *honoris causa*. The κανοῦν is held by the *hieropoios* (49, Michaelis), who has taken it over from the girl standing before him (the object seems to the present writer to be wrongly interpreted as a sacred chest by Frickenhaus, *Ath. Mitt.* xxxiii. 31, 1); the visible boring-holes seem to point to fillets (Michaelis, *op. cit.* p. 259); it is inadmissible to suppose the presence of other baskets (Robert, *GGA* clxi. 533 f.). Other references are the election of the basket-bearers by the Agonothetes (*IGA* ii. 5, 421*c d*, 51 f. [soon after B.C. 308]), and the inscription in honour of a Panathenaic *canephoros* (*IGA* ii. 1388). For the minor Panathenæa a number of basket-bearers is likewise recorded, who participated in the portions of sacrificial meat (Dittenberger, *Syll.*^{2} 634, 14 f.), and there are eleven statuettes of *canephoroi* (κόραι ἀπὸ τῶν κανῶν) in the inventory of the Parthenon (*IGA* ii. 678, B 45 f.). Moreover, basket-bearers are recorded in Athens for the following cults: three permanent *canephoroi* at the Palladion, inscribed on a seat of the Dionysos-theatre (*IGA* iii. 338); *canephoros* of Athene Soteira (?) (*IGA* ii. 1387); of the Pythian Apollo (*IGA* ii. 1388 [catalogues of basket-bearers, who participated in greater number in the Pythian State-embassy, on inscriptions, Colin, *Le Culte d'Apollon Pythien à Athènes*, Paris, 1905, p. 46, 87]); of the Eleusinia (*IGA* iii. 916 [a sunshade for this *pompe* is recorded, schol. Aristoph. *Birds*, 1508 = Suid. *s.v.* σκιάδειον]); of Asklepios (*IGA* iii. 921; cf. the *canephoros* of the Epidauria, *IGA* iii. 916); of Asklepios and Hygieia, used for dating, therefore annual (*IGA* ii. 1204); of the mother of the gods (*IGA* ii. 1388*b*, Add. p. 249); of Serapis (*Ephem. arch.* 1895, 102); of Isis (*IGA* ii. 1355); of Serapis and Isis (*IGA* iii. 923; cf. Rusch, *de Serapide et Iside in Græcia cultis*, p. 16). Basket-bearers of uncertain cults are found in *IGA* iii. 920, 922, 924; 920*a* (Add. p. 508). Basket-bearing of brides to Artemis is recorded in Theocrit. ii. 66 f. + schol., and a *canephoros* in the *pompe* of the Epaulia the day after the wedding, in *Arch. Jahrb.* xv. 151; cf. the κανᾶ ν[υμφικά], *IGA* ii. 678 B, 9, ii. 5, 700*b* B, 25. There were basket-bearers in Bœotia (Lebadeia) of Zeus Basileus ([Plut.] *Amat. narr.* p. 771^b); at Delphi (Heliod. *Æth.* iii. 2); on Delos (cf. Schoeffer, 'de Deli insulæ rebus,' *Berliner Stud.* ix. 1, 240 f.) of Delia and Apollonia (cf. Nilsson, *Griech. Feste*, 145 f.; *BCH* iii. 379), of Apollo (Artemis and Leto) (*ib.* 380 f.), of Artemis (*BCH* xi. 262, 22), of Dionysos (*BCH* vi. 338, 41, 4, xxix. 239), of Serapis (Isis, Anubis, and Harpocrates) (*BCH* vii. 368, 18, 6), a basket-bearer of Isis used for dating (therefore annual, cf. Rusch, *op. cit.* p. 52) (*CIG* 2298), of the Egyptian gods (Rusch, *op. cit.* p. 51 n., 35, 2. 3, and the stones from the sanctuaries of these gods in Dittenberger, *Orientis Gr. Inscr.* 170, 8; *BCH* vi. 348, 74, 8), of the Syrian Aphrodite (and Apollo) (*BCH* vii. 368, 17 [the quotation, *BCH* vi. 346 added by Schoeffer, *op. cit.* p. 241, is not to be found]), of the same goddess used for dating ('Αθηναῖον, iv. 462, 16); in the Troad of the Ilian Athene (*CIG* 3602 f.); in Pisidia (Termessos) of Artemis (*CIG* 4362); in Karia (Kasossos) of Zeus (*SWAW*, phil.-hist. Kl. cxxxii. 24, 4). Ptolemaios Philadelphos transferred the institution of the *canephoros* to the cult of Arsinoë Philadelphos (cf. Walter Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Aegypten*, ii. 266 f.). This *canephoros* is the oldest Alexandrian eponymous Ptolemaic priestess, first recorded B.C. 267–6 (Otto, *op. cit.* i. 157, 3; a list of these basket-bearers, *ib.* 185 ff., ii. 324 f.). The same *canephoros* in Ptolemais is first recorded B.C. 183–2 (*ib.* i. 161 f., list, *ib.* 195, ii. 325 f.). Comedies entitled 'the cane-

phoros' were written by Anaxandrides (Kock, ii. 143) and Menander (iii. 73). Two bronze statues of basket-bearers were made by Polykletos (Cic. *Verr.* iv. 5); a basket-bearer by Skopas (Plin. *HN* xxxvi. 25). Two basket-bearers are depicted on each side of a *thymiaterion* on a terra-cotta relief of the Collection Campana (Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* p. 877, fig. 1101, cf. Reinach, *Rép. de la stat.* i. 217, ii. 425 f.).

The *canistrum* (mostly of willow) was also plaited (cf. Isid. *Or.* xx. 9, 8; *Thesaur. l. l.* iii. 259), was broad and flat (Ov. *Fast.* ii. 650, *Met.* viii. 665), and was used as a receptacle for bread, food, fruit, flowers and liquids (specimens in silver, Serv. *Æn.* i. 706; Symm. *Ep.* ii. 81). The basket is rarely mentioned in Roman cult: at the Terminalia (Ov. *Fast.* ii. 650 [with fruit]), in private worship (Tibullus, i. 10, 27 [wreathed with myrtle-twigs, see above, p. 433[a]])—both poetic passages perhaps under Greek influence. In scenes of sacrifice a kind of basket occasionally appears (Mau, *Pompeji*, p. 100). *Canistrariæ*, corresponding to *canephoroi*, are recorded only in Africa (*CIL* viii. 9321 [Cæsarea: of Ceres Aug. apparently] 9337, [*ib.*] 12919 [Carthage]); the *canistrariæ* of the *dea Cœlestis* in Rome likewise point to Africa (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat. Sel.* 4438). There are nine *canistrarii* of the same goddess (Cœlestis Aug.) at Timgad (*Rev. arch.* x. 1907, 25). No connexion exists between the *canistrarii* and the *cannophori* (=*cannarum gestatores*) of the Great Mother in Milan, Ostia, Locri (cf. the *col(legium) canoforo(rum)* at Sæpinum, *CIL* ix. 2480); see Mommsen, *CIL* viii. p. 974 to n. 9337.

The κάλαθος (καλαθίσκος) originally served practical purposes as did the κανοῦν; it was used in the women's apartment (Aristoph. *Lys.* 579; Poll. x. 125) and as a receptacle for flowers and fruit (cf. *e.g.* Heliod. *Æth.* iii. 2; Eustath. *Od.* iv. 131; Reinach, *Répert. de la stat.* i. 76; Stephani, *Compt. rend. de S. Petersb.* 1865, 24, 1). Its form is that of a lily (Plin. *HN* xxi. 23). As a symbol of plenty the *calathos* is given as an attribute to Demeter and other goddesses in art (cf. Stephani, *l.c.* 25 f.; Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* p. 814). In the same capacity it figures in the cults of Demeter and Artemis. A *calathos* on a cart drawn by four white horses occurs in the Alexandrian Eleusis; the women taking part in the festival submitted to special regulations. It was forbidden to look inside the *calathos* (Callim. *h. Cer.* 1 ff., 120 ff.). This *calathos* is depicted on a bronze coin of Trajan (Daremberg-Saglio, i. p. 1071, fig. 1312). Usener (*Rhein. Mus.* l. 146) explained the procession, perhaps correctly, as a spring-festival, referring to Callim. *op. cit.* v. 121 ff., 136. The sheaf visible on the bronze coin is not necessarily a counter instance (Pringsheim, *Archæol. Beitr. zur Gesch. d. Eleusin. Kults*, p. 13 footnote). According to the schol. *ad loc.*, Ptolemaios Philadelphos took over the *pompe* from Attica. This is probably the case, for a *calathos*-festival of Demeter doubtless forms the basis of the confusion in schol. to Æsch. *in Ctes.* 120. That the *calathos* played a mystic part in the Eleusinian liturgy is shown in the formula cleverly interpreted by Dieterich (*Mithrasliturgie*, p. 125 f.). On the other hand, the basket of Kore must be regarded as a flower basket only (Rohde, *Kl. Schr.* ii. 361 f.). It is inadmissible to consider the seat of the Eleusinian image of Demeter as being a *calathos* in its origin (Nilsson, *Griech. Feste*, p. 350); we do not sit on open baskets. Nor is there any foundation for the derivation of the chest out of the *calathos* (*ib.*). A *calathos*-procession in honour of Demeter in Asia Minor is recorded on an inscription from the valley of the Kayster (*Ath. Mitt.* xx. 242), according to which a priest of Demeter presented a plaited *calathos*, and attended to the ἀναφορά of the *calathos*, which took place every year and was participated in by men chosen by lot. Eustath. (*Od.* ix. 247) records dancing *calathoi* for some festival of Demeter. This leads us to Artemis, for whose sanctuary on the Gygæan lake (not far from Sardis) the same record exists (Strabo, xiii. 626). The present writer considers Nilsson's supposition (*Gr. Feste*, p. 253) correct, that there were men inside the dancing *calathoi*, who thus imitated dæmonic *calathoi*. If really Helena was originally nothing but the mystic rush-basket of the Helenephoria (Poll. x. 191; Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol.* p. 163; his connecting the festival with the Brauronic cult [p. 56] is founded on a reading rejected by Kaibel, *Athen.* vi. 223[a]), then here, too, we have a dæmonic basket. Possibly the sacred dance of the *calathoi* bears a distant affinity to the *calathiscos*-dance (Athen. xi. 267 f.; Poll. iv. 105; Hes. *s.v.*). Under the appellation *calathos* of Artemis (Bendis) a Bithynian spring-festival (Usener, *op. cit.* p. 145 f.) is recorded by Callinicus (*Vita Hypatii*, p. 96, ed. Bonn). For fifty days, while this festival lasted, no journey was undertaken. We must, therefore, suppose a procession of long duration, as in the cult of Liber of Lavinium (Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, vii. 21). The Bithynian metrical inscription of the 1st cent. before or after Christ (*Ath. Mitt.* xxiv. p. 413, 13) is certainly closely connected with this procession. Here women are invited to follow the *calathos* in a special attire. The regulations for attire, whose existence this inscription indicates, point to an affinity to the cult of Demeter, but do not imply a dependence upon it (Nilsson, *op. cit.* p. 352); such regulations were common property (cf. Koerte, *Ath. Mitt. l.c.* 414 f.). The *calathos*-worship of Bithynia and Lydia is probably justly traced back by Nilsson (*op. cit.* p. 254 f.) to the Thraco-Phrygo-Bithynian cult of Bendis. About the Helena basket, which is related to the *calathos* of Artemis, see above. A basket in the worship of Dionysos must also be supposed to have had mystical significance (cf. Stat. *Theb.* iv. 378 and also the Pompeian painting in Daremberg-Saglio, i. 891, fig. 1124, where the basket is almost entirely covered, cf. above, p. 434[a]). The *liknon* does not belong here (Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol.* p. 1172, footnote, erroneous, in the present writer's opinion). The figures bearing real *calathoi* on their heads are very difficult to class (cf. Stephani, *l.c.*, 1865, 27, 1). Significance in worship has thus far not been demonstrated (cf. Stephani, *l.c.* 26 f.). The connexion of the head-gear designated as *calathos* (first by Macrobius, i. 20, 13, and *passim*) with the real basket is equally uncertain. Primary forms can already be observed in the Mycenæan age (Thiersch, *Aegina*, p. 372). Demeter above all receives it as a symbol (also her servants; cf. Stephani, *l.c.* 21 ff., pl. i. 1, iii. 2. 3); then it is transferred to the chthonic deities, especially Serapis, and thence under Severus to the 'great god' of Odessos and the Thracian riding-god (Pick, *Arch. Jahrb.* xiii. 156, 165).

L. DEUBNER.

BASQUES.—The Basques, *Eskualdunac*,* are confined to the Provincias Vascongadas of Spain, part of Navarre, and a smaller section of the French Département des Basses Pyrénées. They number about 450,000 in Spain, and 150,000 in France—600,000 in all—*i.e.* less than the population of a second-rate capital. Thus we have only the fragment of a race, the *debris* of a language.

1. **Language.**—Of the vocabulary of the spoken Basque 70 per cent. is borrowed. The grammatical forms are so worn down that scarcely two grammarians agree in the analysis of them. The toponymy of ancient Spain shows that this race

* Leiçarraga (Pref. to NT, 1571) calls them *Heuscaldunac*, and their language *Heuscara*. Their name means 'Holders of Heuscara.'—[E. S. Dodgson.]

once covered the whole of the Peninsula as well as the Pyrenean slopes of Southern France.* This we consider proved, in spite of the objections of Prof. Vinson. Throughout this region we find inscriptions in characters still partly undeciphered, the so-called Celtiberian, or 'letras desconocidas' of Spain. They exhibit a difference of alphabet in different parts of Spain,† but are probably only dialects of one language spoken on both sides of the Pyrenees.‡ That this language is an earlier form of Basque is not yet thoroughly established, and would be denied by the above-mentioned writer.

2. Religion.—There is a like difficulty with regard to the religion of the ancient inhabitants of Spain. It is almost impossible to distinguish what belongs to each people or tribe. Strabo tells us that the morning star was worshipped under the strange title of 'lucem dubiam.'§ The Basque shepherds still call Venus at a certain time of the year *Art-izarra*,‖ 'the between star,' the star between night and day. Strabo also tells of dances in honour of an anonymous deity during the night of the full moon,¶ and of the immolation of goats, of captives, and of horses to Ares.** Silius Italicus speaks of a hatred of cremation, of corpses being left unburied in order to be eaten by birds and thus carried up to heaven, implying a belief in immortality of some kind.†† Iberian deities were assimilated and adopted into the Roman pantheon, like those of other peoples; the names of strange deities abound in the Latin inscriptions.‡‡ Some are certainly Celtic. The only ones that seem undoubtedly Basque are 'Deo Baicorix,' and 'Heraus-corrtsehe.'§§ Worship of nymphs, fountains, and trees appears to have been common in Basque-speaking countries. Classical authors mention the skill of the Iberians in augury.

3. Pre-historic remains.—The pre-historic remains and megalithic monuments of Spain and Southern France do not differ materially from those common to Western Europe. The exceptions are the so-called *Toros*, 'bulls,' of Guisando; though they are more often boars, sometimes calves, or horses. Some 3500 of them have been noted from fifty different localities. (There is only one of these in Basqueland, namely the pig at Durango, noted by Mr. Dodgson.) Several bear Latin sepulchral inscriptions of the Augustan age.* The synthesis of Oriental and Western religions began early in Spain. At Astorga we find the figure of an open hand, above, and on the palm Εἷς Ζεὺς Σέραπις Ἰαω,† another in Portugal 'Serapi Pantheo.' The remains of the Cerro de los Santos in Murcia have a like character. Celtiberian, Greek, and Latin inscriptions are associated with coins of Constantine and Theodosius.‡

4. Name of God.—The name of God in modern Basque is *Jaungoiko, Jainko, Jcinko, Jinko.* The last three are considered to be dialectic contractions of the first. The meaning would be literally *Jaun*, 'the Lord *or* Master,' *goiko* 'of the Height.' *Jaun* is used in Basque like *Señor* in Spanish—applied to men as well as to God. But in the dialect of la Soule and Roncal *Gaiko* means 'the moon.' Here Basque scholars are again divided. Prince L. L. Bonaparte maintains that *Jaungoiko* is a contraction for *Jaungoikokoa*, 'the Lord of the Moon.'§ Vinson holds that the 'Lord Moon' makes as good sense in mythology as 'the Lord of the Moon.' Both appeal to Strabo, the one to the phrases ἀνωνύμῳ τινὶ θεῷ, and Ἔνιοι δὲ τοὺς Καλλαϊκοὺς ἀθέους φασί, the other to ταῖς πανσελήνοις νύκτωρ.‖ The writings of the early Christian missionaries and Fathers and the *Acta Sanctorum* give us no help; they speak in a vague way of idolatry, but do not tell us what the idols were. Neither folklore, nor the popular drama, the Pastorales, nor the poetry helps us. The tales are all found elsewhere. The only peculiarity of the poetry is a fondness for allegory, which perhaps arises from thinking in a language which has few native abstract or collective terms, but expresses nearly everything in the concrete. We mentioned above the skill of the Iberians in augury. In the 16th and 17th centuries we have full accounts of a strange moral epidemic of witchcraft among the Basques; victims went to the stake confessing perfectly impossible crimes.¶

5. Religious dances and other customs.—Still the attitude of the Basques in ecclesiastical matters is very different from that of ordinary mediæval Christianity. Alone of Western Europeans they have preserved a whole series of manly dances from the time when dancing was an act of the highest ceremonial importance. We can notice only two of the series, the animal dances and the religious dances. The animal dances still preserved are: in la Soule, the *Hartz*, or bear dance, in which the

* Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Prufung der Untersuchungen uber Urbewohner Hispaniens vermittelst der vaskischen Sprache* (Berlin, 1821 [French tr. by A. Marrast, Paris, 1866]); Theodor Mommsen, *Rom. Gesch.*[4] vol. v. cap. ii. p. 72 (Berlin, 1894).

† Puyol y Campo, in *Boletin de la R. A. de la Historia*, vol. xvi. p. 321 (Madrid, 1890); Strabo, lib. iii. (cap. i. vol. i. p. 223, ed. Tauchnitz, 1829).

‡ *Monumenta Linguæ Ibericæ*, ed. Aemilius Hubner, p. cxli (Berlin, 1893)

§ Lib. iii. cap. ii. p. 225 (ἣν καλοῦσι Λουκεμδουβίαν).

‖ *Art-izarra* means the 'morning-star' at any time of the year. It is translated by *lucero, estrella del Norte*, i.e. 'morning-star,' 'day-star,' 'star of the North' in the *Dictionary* of Don Pedro Novia de Salcedo (Tolosa, 1902); and by 'belle étoile qui paraît à l'horizon, à l'est, annonçant l'aurore' in that of M Salaberry (Bayonne, 1857). The syllable *art* here has (probably) nothing to do with *arte* meaning 'middle,' 'between,' but would be derived from *argitu*, 'enlightened,' like *arthatse* (Ac 6[21]) in Leiçarraga's New Testament of 1571, republished, with alterations, by the Trinitarian Bible Society of London in 1903 and 1908. Here *hatse* means 'beginning' and *art* is a contraction of *argitu*, 'brightened,' 'lighted,' or, just possibly, of *argi*, 'light,' with a euphonic *t* interpolated, as in other composite words. Thus the word means 'dawn' or beginning-of-light.'—[E.S.D.]

¶ Lib. iii. cap. iv. (vol. i. p. 263, ed. Tauchnitz, Leipzig, 1829).

** Lib. iii. cap. iii. p. 248.

†† Silius Italicus, *Punicorum*, iii. 340–343.

‡‡ *CIL*, vol. ii. (Berlin, 1869) 2598. IOM, Anderon, 2599. IOM, Candiedoni, so, on this side of the Pyrenees, Marti Lehernni, Minervæ Belisamæ, etc.

§§ Julien Sacaze, *Inscriptions antiques des Pyrénées*, Toulouse, 1892, Nos. 167, 210, 214, 344; I. F. Bladé, *Epigraphie antique de la Gascogne*, No. 166 (Bordeaux, 1885). In the inscription in the chapel of S. Mary Magdalene on the summit of a hill near Atheratze (Tardets), in La Soule, the name occurs thus:

HERAVS
CORR†SE
HE.

The † rises above the other letters. Can it be a double T? Hubner thought it was for IT. *Herauscor* might mean 'inclined to talk ravingly, to trouble, to break, or to pulverize.' *Sehe* may stand for modern Basque *sehi*, 'servant,' possibly a Moorish word, as in *Seixes* at Seville. *Corri*, now *gorri*, when used without a prefix as a compound, means 'naked,' 'bare,' 'stripped,' and, in a secondary sense, 'red,' like the flesh of an animal which has been skinned. The whole inscription is

FANO
HERAUS
CORR†SE
HE SACRVM
O VAL.VALE
RIANVS. [E.S.D.]

* D. Emilio Hubner, *La Arqueologia de España*, p. 254 (Barcelona, 1888).

† *Boletin de la R. A. de la Historia*, tom. x. 242, xiv. 5667; *CIL* ii. No. 46. The Souletin Basques, when they dance on feast days, still cry *Yau*. Is it the Hebrew Jahweh, or is it the root of *yautzi*, meaning 'jump'?—[E.S.D.]

‡ *Discursos leidos ante la Academia de la Historia en la recepcion pública de D. J. de Dios de la Rada y Delgado* (Madrid, 1875); A. Engel, 'Rapport sur une Mission Archéologique en Espagne (1891),' in *Nouvelles Archives des Missions scientifiques et littéraires*, tom. iii. p. 197 (Paris, 1892).

§ A. Hovelacque, É. Picot, and J. Vinson, *Mélanges de Linguistique et d'Anthropologie*, p. 209 (Paris, 1880), and *The Academy*, 3 March 1877.

‖ Lib iii. cap. iv. p. 263. But both are wrong *Gaiko* is the Southern Basque equivalent of *gauko*, 'of the night.' The moon is considered in that part of Basqueland as 'the night-light.'—[E.S.D.]

¶ Pierre de Lancre, *Tableaux de l'inconstance des mauvais anges et démons* (Paris, 1612), D. J. A Lorente, *Hist. Crit. de la Inquisición de España*, cap. xv. (Madrid, 1822); *Litteræ Societatis Jesu, Annorum duorum*, 1613, 1614, reprinted by Prof. Vinson in *Revue de Linguistique*, xxxiii. 209 (Paris, 1900).

lambs (*achouriac*) also appear; the *Zamalzain*, or horse dance, and the *Acheri*, or fox dance, in Guipúzcoa. These may suggest some early form of totem custom or worship.* The dance of the *seixes* at Seville is well known; but the habit of religious dancing was much more widely spread. In Aragon it survived till the end of the 19th century. It is still practised at Jaca, and existed till 1830 at Iholdy in the French Pays Basque.† Religious dances formed a prominent feature in the festivals which took place at Azpeitia on the canonization of Ignatius Loyola in 1622. They were objected to by some, but are warmly defended by the great Basque scholar and preacher, Manuel de Larramendi, who quotes largely from the OT and the Fathers in commendation of the practice.

Another custom which points back to some kind of offerings to or for the dead long survived among the Basques. Travellers in the 15th cent. were struck by the lighted tapers, and prayers said before tombs adorned with flowers.‡ Offerings to the priest at funerals formed the greater part of his income, and were almost incredible in amount. These were made at the tomb, after being offered to the priest in church. Wealthy people gave a pair of oxen, others one, or lambs and fowls. The oxen and sheep were led to the church porch, and there ransomed. The bread and the tapers were taken from the tomb and offered in the church at the reading of the Gospel. At length the civil authorities passed sumptuary laws to restrict these offerings, and they are gradually ceasing, although the Basques still carry candles to church and fix them in elaborate, and often very ancient, carved wooden taper-holders over the tombs of their parents who lie beneath the pavement of the church; the candles are lighted during mass.§ The lavishness of the Basques in offerings was noted by the Pilgrim of the 12th cent., who was otherwise most hostile to them:

'In decimis dandis legitimi, in oblationibus altarium assueti approbantur per unumquemque enim diem, dum ad ecclesiam Navarrus vadit, aut panis aut vini aut tritici aut alicujus substantiæ oblationem Deo facit.'‖

6. Civil laws.—In striking contrast with this generosity to the clergy in religious matters is the conduct of the Basques towards them in merely civil matters. The Basques are the most religious people in Spain.¶ The Englishman who knows their language best says: 'The Basques are fanatically Catholic, almost disagreeably religious, and detest Calvin as much as all loyal monarchists hate Oliver Cromwell, but with less cause.'** A writer not at all suspected of anti-clericalism remarks on this 'double caractère éminemment religieux et démocratique.'†† Bascle de Lagrèze, a decidedly clerical writer, points out that for a long time marriage was a purely civil act among the Basques: 'le For (*i.e.* el Fuero) n'exige aucune intervention du prêtre dans la célébration du mariage, qu'il considère comme un contrat civil.' Gradually the stipulation began to be made that the marriage should be solemnized 'segun el Fuero de la Iglesia' or 'segun la ley de Roma'; finally, marriage before the priest was alone valid.* It was the same with the administration of oaths, of judicial combats, and of ordeals.† The election of the clergy by the parishioners continued in some places down to the beginning of the 19th cent.‡ The rest of Church patronage was in the hands of the king, the nobles, and the municipalities. No bishop had a right to any part of the tithes in Guipúzcoa.§ But the peculiar attitude of the Basques towards the clergy is best seen in the elections to the *Juntas*, or local parliaments. No ecclesiastic could be a deputy, nor could he intervene in any civil or criminal case under any pretext whatever;‖ no priest, except those belonging to the place, might enter into the town where the *Junta* was sitting; in Tolosa any deputy seen talking to a priest before a session lost his vote for that day.¶ When, in 1477, Ferdinand the Catholic made a progress through Biscay, and tried to take with him the Bishop of Pamplona, he was obliged to send him back, and the Basques burnt the soil whereon the bishop had stood, and threw the ashes into the sea.** Later, in 1757, when Ferdinand VI., under the advice of the bishops, sent an order to the Cortes of Navarre to forbid the acting of plays, he was compelled to rescind it; the Cortes refused to obey the mandate of any bishops.†† This attitude towards the clergy in civil matters was persistently maintained down to the Revolution. The position of women was high among the Basques. Along with some other Pyrenean populations, they followed the rule of absolute primogeniture: the firstborn, whether male or female, inherited the ancestral property.‡‡ The marriage of the clergy lingered longer among the Basques than in other parts of Spain.§§ They alone have preserved the ancient order of deaconesses, the *Serorac*, with functions in some respects like those of elders in the Presbyterian Kirk of Scotland.‖‖ Yet, with all this jealousy of the ecclesiastical power in civil matters, it is from the Basques that Jesuitism, the most devoted militia of the Papal power, has sprung. Ignatius de Loyola and Francisco Xavier,¶¶ were typical Basques, the one a Guipúzcoan, the other a Navarrese; both retained some of their Basque habits and customs to the end of their lives, and the influence of these and Basque modes of thought can be traced in their writings. In this way this little people has influenced the course of religious history in the greater part of Europe since the 16th century.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities cited above, see J. M. Pereira de Lima, *Iberos e Bascos*, Paris-Lisbon, 1902; Campbell, *Monumental Evidence of an Iberian Population of the British Islands*, Montreal, 1887.

WENTWORTH WEBSTER.

* Augustin Chaho, *Biarritz, entre les Pyrénées et l'Océan*, vol. ii. caps. xxxviii., xlii. (Bayonne, 1845); D. T. Ignacio de Iztueta, *Guipúzcoaco Dantza*, p. 13, *R. Baroja Donostian*, 1824; Manuel de Larramendi S. J., *Corografía de Guipúzcoa*, pp. 201–245.

† Eskualduna, *Le Manuscrit du vieux curé*, 1 Dec. 1898. It still exists at Deva, in Guipúzcoa, on the feast of San Roque.—[E.S.D.]

‡ J. J. Riaño, *Viajes de Extranjeros por España en el Siglo xv.* (Madrid, 1879).

§ Larramendi, *Corografía*, p. 194: 'No es creible, si no se ve el mucho pan y cera que se ofrece'; D. Pablo de Gorosabel, *Noticias de las cosas memorables de Guipúzcoa*, tom. iv. lib. viii. cap. 4, sec. 4 (Tolosa, 1900).

‖ *Codex de Saint-Jacques-de-Compostelle*, p. 18.

¶ Dom Pierdait, in *Revue du Clergé français*, tom. xxv. p. 625, 15 Feb. 1901.

** E. Spencer Dodgson, *Venoms Antidote, being a reply to Dr. Schuchardt's Criticism*, p. 39 (privately printed, 1901).

†† Ch. Bernadou, *Les Fêtes de la Tradition Basque à St. Jean de Luz*, 1897, p. 44 f. (Bayonne, 1897).

‡‡ G. B. de Lagrèze, *La Navarre française*, vol. ii. p. 210, *Histoire du droit dans les Pyrénées*, p. 182 (Paris, 1867).

§§ Council of Valladolid, 1322; H. C. Lea, *An Historical Sketch of Sacerdotal Celibacy*[2], p. 310 (Boston, 1884).

‖‖ Larramendi, *op. cit.* p. 113 ff.

¶¶ Echeverri = 'house new' = Newhouse, viz. Echaverri, Chaverri, Chaver, Xavier. These variations, and several more, are found in Navarre.

BAṬESAR.—A town situated on the right bank of the river Jumnā, in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, in Northern India, lat. 26° 56′ 6″ N.; long. 78° 35′ 7″ E. It is important as the scene of a popular bathing and trading fair held on the last day of the month Kārttik (October–November). The place takes its name from the worship of Śiva in his form as Vaṭeśvaranātha, 'lord of the sacred banyan tree (*vaṭa*).' The present temple was built by one of the Rājās of Bhadāvar in A.D. 1646. In earlier times the place was known as Sūryapura, 'city of the sun'; the ruins of the old town are still visible near the present site.

LITERATURE.—Cunningham, *Archæological Reports*, iv. 221 ff., vii. 5 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BATH, BATHING.—See PURIFICATION.

BĀWARIYA (probably derived from Hindī *banvar*, Skr. *bhramara*, 'a creeper,' in the sense of a noose made originally from some vegetable fibre, and used in snaring and trapping animals).—A criminal and hunting tribe of Dravidian origin, found in Northern India to the number of 30,321, of whom the great majority inhabit the Panjāb. Here they worship the Mother-goddess under the title of Kālī-Bhavānī, and the local saint Gūgā under the name of Zāhir Dīvān (Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-lore*, i. 211 f.). Farther west they specially worship Dūlhā Deo, the bridegroom-god who is invoked at marriages (*ib.* i. 119 f.). A burnt-offering is made with butter, and water is poured on the floor of the house in his honour. They also worship a deified ascetic named Sīnha Bābā, a member of the Nānakshāhī Sikh sect of Faqīrs. It is possible that they may be a branch of the important Bauri caste, which, to the number of 735,937, is found chiefly in Bengal (Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, i. 78 ff.). The connexion of this tribe with Hinduism is of the slightest kind. Their chief objects of worship are Manasā, the snake-goddess, Mānsingh, a local village-god, and Bar Pahārī, the mountain-deity, which is only another form of Marang Buru, the hill-god of the Santāls and other Dravidian tribes.

'Pigs, fowls, rice, sugar, and ghee are offered to Kudrasinī, on Saturdays and Sundays at the Ākhrā or dancing-place of the village, through a Bauri priest, who abstains from flesh or fish on the day preceding the sacrifice. The priest gets as his fee the fowls that are offered and the head or leg of the pig, the worshippers eat the rest.' They do not employ Brāhmans, their religious duties being performed by a member of the tribe or by the headman. In some places they bury the dead face downwards, the object 'being to prevent the spirit from getting out and giving trouble to the living' (Risley, *ib.* i. 80 f.).

LITERATURE.—For the true Bāwariyas, **J. Wilson**, *Settlement Report of the Sirsa District*, 1886, p. 123; **Crooke**, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 228 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BAXTER.—

1. **Life.**—Richard Baxter was born on 12th November 1615 His father was Richard Baxter of Eaton-Constantine, in Shropshire; and his mother, Beatrice Adeney of Rowton, in the same county. The elder Baxter had been addicted to gambling, but by the time his son was born he had become a changed man, and it was to his father's instruction and example that Baxter was mainly indebted for his earliest religious impressions. His mother died in 1634, and his father married again.

Baxter's early education was entrusted to worthless and incompetent tutors. At length he was placed under the tuition of Mr. John Owen, master of the Free School of Wroxeter, who instructed him in classics and prepared him for the University. To the University, however, he was never sent. He was placed instead under a clergyman at Ludlow, from whom he profited little in learning, but with whom he had the run of a great library, and became a passionate reader of books. He came early under religious impressions. Other books touched his conscience, and awakened in him the sense of Divine things; but *The Bruised Reed*, by Dr. Richard Sibbes, seems first to have shown him, when a lad of fifteen, the greatness of the love of God and the freeness of the redemption of Christ. From his youth in his father's house he was deeply read in the Scriptures. It was within the Church of England that Baxter was baptized, confirmed, and ordained to the ministry. Though he was ejected with two thousand more in 1662, and cast in his lot with the Presbyterians, to the end he regarded his orders as derived from her, and to the very close of his life, like other moderate Presbyterians, he followed the practice of occasional Communion in her churches. What would have been for other men an insuperable barrier to either bodily or mental activity and to a career of usefulness in any calling, was the lack of physical stamina and even of ordinary health all through life. 'Never,' says Sir James Stephen, 'was the alliance of soul and body formed on terms of greater inequality than in Baxter's person. . . . The mournful list of his chronic diseases renders almost miraculous the mental vigour which bore him through exertions resembling those of a disembodied spirit' (*Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography*, p. 361). He nevertheless lived to the age of seventy-six, and his labours as a preacher, a pastor, and an author were herculean.

In 1638 Baxter was offered the headmastership of the Endowed School at Dudley, and took orders to qualify him to hold the appointment. In 1640 he was called to Kidderminster to occupy the place of an incompetent vicar, and with Kidderminster his name was henceforward to be associated as Samuel Rutherford's with Anwoth, or Thomas Boston's with Ettrick. His ministry, however, was seriously interrupted by the Civil Wars, in which he took the side of the Parliament, though he had no sympathy with those who proceeded to put the King to death and to overturn the throne. He laboured incessantly for the good of the soldiers of Cromwell's army, and had interviews and discussions on religious and political questions with the Lord General himself. His labours, however, proved too much for his strength, and it was when suffering from one of his dangerous illnesses about this time that he conceived *The Saints' Everlasting Rest*. Before he had completed this, his first work, he was back to his pastorate in Kidderminster, where he remained till 1660.

His ministry here fell mostly within the period of the Commonwealth, when a state of anarchy prevailed in the Church of England. Cromwell's religious establishment did not deserve the name of a Church; it repudiated Prelacy without enforcing Presbyterianism or recognizing Congregationalism. One object of his government was the purification of the ministry. For this end he set up an Ecclesiastical Commission, called the Committee of Triers, including Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Baptists, who examined presentees and sanctioned appointments to parishes. Baxter had no love for this body any more than he had for Cromwell, but he rejoiced in the growing spirituality of the ministry and the marked spread of vital religion amongst the people in the days of the Commonwealth.

On the death of Cromwell, Baxter joined with the Presbyterians on both sides of the Border in working for the overthrow of the Commonwealth and the restoration of the Monarchy. He had now taken farewell of Kidderminster, and was appointed one of the King's chaplains. The King even offered him through Clarendon, the Lord Chancellor, the See of Hereford, but he declined the honour. He would have been content to return to Kidderminster as a humble curate, but this was denied him, and when the Act of Uniformity, on 24th August (St. Bartholomew's Day) 1662, silenced over two thousand of the most earnest ministers, and deprived them of their livings, Baxter's formal ministry within the Church of England came to an end. He signalized the event by entering into the married state; and his wife, Margaret Charlton, proved a real helpmeet to him.

Meanwhile penal legislation against the Nonconformists became more exacting and severe. It became a crime to attend a dissenting place of worship. Those ministers who would not take the test were prohibited from coming within five miles of any town which was represented in Parliament, or any town where they had resided as ministers. Baxter got into trouble on both counts; and neither the favour of the King nor the friendship of Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice, availed to save him from fine and imprisonment.

In 1681 Baxter lost by death both his wife and his stepmother, who had lived to the age of ninety-six, and troubles thickened around the desolate man. But, as he says, he 'never wanted less what man can give than when men had taken all away,' and so, preaching as often as he found liberty and opportunity, and producing theological treatises one after another without intermission, he survived to experience the dark days of James II. and the brighter days of the Revolution Settlement under William and Mary. In the former reign, when weighed down with age and infirmities, he was brought before the infamous Chief Justice Jeffreys, and under sentence by him would have lain in prison till death had not the King remitted his fine. In the Revolution of 1688 he was too feeble to take any part. At length death, with whose approaches he had been long familiar, came upon him in stern reality, and on 8th December 1691 he passed to the saints' everlasting rest.

2. **Works and influence.**—Baxter was a most prolific author, perhaps the most voluminous theological writer in the English language. From the time when he first discovered his powers and wrote *The Saints' Everlasting Rest*, scarcely a year passed without several works from his pen. Even at Kidderminster, with its many claims, he regarded his labours in the pulpit and congregation as a recreation, and threw his strength into his writings. The reading displayed in them, the

correspondence to which they frequently led, and the diversity of subjects which they embrace, illustrate the extraordinary versatility of the man and the indefatigable diligence with which he toiled. It has been suggested that he never recast a sentence, and never bestowed a thought on its rhythm and the balance of its parts; and his extraordinary productiveness as a writer as well as his own statements make it certain he did not. No fewer than one hundred and sixty-eight treatises came from his hand, many of them filling volumes. Most of them are now forgotten, but some of them are classics of evangelical religion which his countrymen would not willingly let die. When Boswell asked Dr. Samuel Johnson what works of Richard Baxter he should read, he received for answer, 'Read any of them, for they are all good.'

Mr. Orme, the editor of the standard edition of Baxter's works, classifies them under the following heads:—Works on the Evidences of Religion; on the Doctrines of Religion; on Conversion; on Christian Experience; on Christian Ethics; on Catholic Communion; on Nonconformity; on Popery; on Anti-Romanism; on the Baptist, Quaker, and Millenarian Controversies; Historical and Political Works; Devotional, Expository, and Poetical Works. The cast of Baxter's mind was eminently speculative and inquiring, and any question of the Schools which met him in the course of an argument had for him an irresistible fascination, and received instant and perhaps prolonged attention. But such was his satisfaction in the great truths of revealed religion and his conviction of their absolute certitude—won through experience as well as ratiocination—that he shirks no difficulty, shrinks from no combat, and grudges no pains, if only he can place his readers—even though it be through divisions and subdivisions of argument and proof—upon the same rock of assured conviction as himself. Of his numerous works there are at least three which are still in demand, and, after two centuries and a half, seem destined to live on. These are *The Saints' Everlasting Rest*, *The Call to the Unconverted*, and *The Reformed Pastor*.

The first of these, the first considerable work which he produced, is the masterpiece with which his name is associated. It was published in 1650, having been conceived and for the most part written towards the close of the Civil War. The title-page of the original edition bears that it was 'written by the author for his own use, in the time of his languishing, when God took him off from all public employment.' He was at the time the guest of Sir Thomas Rouse in Worcestershire, and away from his books. 'The marginal citations,' he explains, 'I put in after I came home to my books, but almost all the book itself was written when I had no book but a Bible and a Concordance; and I found that the transcript of the heart hath the greatest force on the hearts of others.' It is a work almost of inspiration, certainly of spontaneous birth, like *The Pilgrim's Progress*, or *The Imitation of Christ*; and though the two volumes, comprising in Orme's edition more than a thousand pages, are beyond the powers or the patience of most readers, the popular abridgments leave out much that gives reality and pathos in the complete work. In a volume of St. James's Lectures (1875, Lect. iv.) on *Companions of the Devout Life*, the late Archbishop Trench, a master both in literary taste and in theology, has given a remarkable appreciation of 'Baxter and The Saints' Rest.'

'There reigns in Baxter's writings, and not least in "The Saints' Rest," a robust and masculine eloquence; nor do these want from time to time rare and unsought felicities of language, which once heard can scarcely be forgotten. In regard, indeed, to the choice of words, the book might have been written yesterday. There is hardly one which has become obsolete; hardly one which has drifted away from the meaning which it has in his writings. This may not be a great matter; but it argues a rare insight, conscious or unconscious, into all that was truest, into all which was furthest removed from affectation and untruthfulness in the language that after more than two hundred years so it should be, and we may recognize here an element not to be overlooked, of the abiding popularity of the book' (*Companions of the Devout Life*, p. 88 f.).

In the work itself Baxter first dwells upon the excellence of the 'Rest,' and then characteristically sets himself to prove the infallibility and Divine origin of the Holy Scripture in which it is promised, thus contributing an able treatise on Christian evidences. The ground having been firmly established, he develops the uses of the Doctrine of Rest, and concludes with a directory for the getting and keeping of the heart in heaven. The work abounds in fervent appeals and felicitous phrases and striking similitudes.

The Call to the Unconverted appears to be the substance of a sermon which Baxter had preached from the well-known text in Ezk 33[11] 'Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?' Next to the *Saints' Rest* it was the most successful and most greatly used of all his publications. In his lifetime it had the distinction of being translated by John Eliot into the language of the Massachusetts Indians (1664), and it has passed through editions well-nigh innumerable, and been translated into most of the European languages. It has been compared in its character and influence with Law's *Serious Call* and Joseph Alleine's *Alarm*; but it is simpler in its teaching than the one, and more tender and kindly in spirit than the other. It breathes a spirit of intense earnestness, and, though its language would not now be used in its entirety in pulpit address, the fervour and force of its reasoned appeal to the understanding and the heart are as powerful as ever.

Gildas Salvianus: The Reformed Pastor is one of the classics of pastoral theology. Dr. Shedd, in his *Homiletics and Pastoral Theology*, recommends ministers to read it through once a year; and Principal Oswald Dykes (*The Christian Minister*, p. 49) describes it as one of the most searching and widely helpful books in English literature on its subject. The second chapter, and especially the pages devoted to pastoral oversight (vol. xiv. pp. 96–114), are replete with maxims and counsels of sanctified wisdom and practical good sense, the outcome of long and intimate acquaintance with the duties of the pastor's office. Both in its original and in its abridged forms *The Reformed Pastor* has had a very wide circulation.

No one can read Baxter's writings without perceiving that he has in him the soul of true poetry. His occasional quotations and references to George Herbert reveal sympathies in this direction. But he was too intensely in earnest and too absorbed in his various labours to master the technique of the poet's art, or to take pains with niceties and refinements of versification. A small volume of 'Poetical Fragments' is, however, included among his works, and at least one of his pieces, 'Lord, it belongs not to my care,' has found its way into hymnals for congregational praise.

The influence of Richard Baxter exerted from the pulpit, as well as by his works during his lifetime, must have been great. His power and fervour in the pulpit were unique in an age of great preachers, and he exemplified his own lines in a most literal sense, for

> 'He preached, as never sure to preach again,
> And as a dying man to dying men.'

In a time of ecclesiastical anxiety and strife, he strove to be a peacemaker. Schemes of a comprehensive union of all who truly loved the Lord and held fast by the essentials of Christian truth and experience, like those of John Durie and

Archbishop Ussher, had in him, in season and out of season, a steadfast supporter. If his combative turn of mind and his fondness for precise definition did not allow him to see much success in his unflagging efforts for union among Christians, he laboured long and patiently to earn the blessing of the peacemakers. In one important sphere, not recognized in that age of theological controversy as it is now, he was a pioneer. He was firmly convinced of the Christian obligation to evangelize the world. He was a warm supporter of John Eliot, the Apostle of the Indians, and it is to Baxter more than any other that the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel owes its charter. If we cannot trace the great Evangelical Revival at the close of the 18th cent. directly to Baxter, we know that his works influenced some of the most prominent members of the Clapham sect, and helped to sustain the fervour of many of the leaders of that movement.

LITERATURE.—There is an excellent edition of Baxter's practical works by William Orme in 23 vols, London, 1830, upon which Sir James Stephen's famous essay is based. There is an edition of the 'Poetical Fragments' by Pickering, London, 1829. In the notice in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, and in a volume of *Representative Nonconformists*, A. B. Grosart has dealt fully with Baxter's life and works. In the early chapters of Macaulay's *History of England* there are appreciative notices of Baxter, and also in J. Stoughton's *Religion in England*, 1878, ii. 180–186; see also F. J. Powicke, 'Baxter as a Catholic Christian,' in *Prim. Meth. Quart. Rev.*, April 1909. See also end of § 3. THOMAS NICOL.

3. Distinctive doctrine.—In Baxter's *Confession of Faith* he sets forth three parallel columns; on one side 'Antinomianism,' on the other the doctrine of 'Papists and others in the Contrary Extream,' and in the centre 'Truth,' 'that which I take to be both the Truth and the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches.' This table is significant. The key to Baxter's doctrinal position is to be found in the fact that he always endeavoured to avoid the falsehood of extremes, and to find truth and harmony in the golden mean. He wished to be a son of peace in theology no less than in ecclesiastical affairs. His *Catholic Theology* is entitled 'Plain, Pure, Peaceable, for Pacification of the Dogmatical Word Warriors,' and consists of three books: 'Pacifying Principles,' 'Dialogues,' and 'Disputations.' He waged war to restore peace. *Ex bello pax* was his motto; and even when he attacked opponents with the polemical acrimony of the time, in keen words for which he afterwards expressed regret, it was always with the aim of maintaining some central position which he firmly believed would reconcile the hostile parties. The immediate result was that he was fiercely assailed from both sides, and became 'a butt for every man to shoot at.' The Arminians rejected him as a Calvinist, while the Calvinists denounced him as an Arminian; he was called in turn a Papist, a Quaker, and even a Socinian. But he appealed to posterity for vindication 'when sad experience hath taught men to hate Theological Logical Wars, and to love, and seek, and call for Peace'; and the broader vision of the present age, which has learnt his love of unity and concord, will appreciate his anxiety to do justice to both sides. Dean Stanley ranked Baxter with Anselm as a great Christian thinker, and Dr. Benjamin Jowett in Westminster Abbey called him 'one of the greatest of Englishmen not only of his own time but of any time.' He always sought to draw forth the measure of truth which lay at the heart of an extreme or erroneous doctrine. He tried to harmonize Divine destiny with moral freedom; he granted that the Romanist was right in insisting on the necessity of good works, and the Quaker in maintaining the reality of the Inner Light, and the Socinian in upholding the claims of reason. His own general position was certainly that of a moderate and liberal Calvinist, for he gave unstinted praise to the Shorter Catechism ('the best catechism I ever saw yet'), and he assented to the decisions of the Synod of Dort, but his exact views on controverted questions are often difficult to define. His subtle intellect revelled in fine-spun distinctions; he modified, explained, and made concessions for the sake of conciliation; and his views expanded and mellowed with the advance of time. The following are, however, some of his most characteristic doctrines.

(*a*) On *the Atonement* he held in the main the modern Evangelical view:

'It is not God but man that lost his goodness; nor is it necessary to our reparation that a change be made on Him but on us. Christ came not into the world to make God better, but to make us better. Nor did He die to make God more disposed to do good, but to dispose us to receive it. . . . (Christ's) purpose was not actually to change the mind of God nor to incline Him to have mercy who before was disinclined, but to make the pardon of man's sin a thing convenient for the Righteous and Holy Governor to bestow, without any impeachment of the honour of His wisdom, holiness, and justice, yea, to the more eminent glorifying of them all.' 'Christ came not to possess God with any false opinion of us, nor is He such a physician as to perform but a supposed cure; He came not to persuade His Father to judge us well, because He is well. We must bear His own image and be holy as He is holy, before He can approve us or love us in complacency. This is the work of our blessed Redeemer to make man fit for God's approbation and delight.' 'Christ could not possibly take upon Himself the numerical guilt which lay on us, nor yet a guilt of the same sort' (*Confession of Faith*, Preface).

(*b*) *Extent of Redemption.*—'Christ died for all, but not for all alike or equally: this is, He intended good for all, but not an equal good' (*End of Controversies*). The sacrifice was for the sins of all in the sense that all should have a conditional promise or gift of life by the merits of it.

(*c*) *Justification.*—'Justifying faith is not the reception of the knowledge or sense of our former justification, but it is the true belief of the Gospel and the sincere acceptance of Christ' (*Conf. of Faith*). Baxter held that faith is what is imputed for righteousness, because faith contains the germ of sincere obedience to Christ. He seems to place regeneration in time before justification. 'He regenerates that He may pardon.' He lays the greatest stress on the necessity of repentance for justification, and, indeed, seems to aim at combining the Roman and Reformed doctrines.

(*d*) *Grace.*—Baxter believed in a common grace bestowed on all mankind, which, if improved, would lead on to sufficient and effectual grace, but even sufficient grace might be resisted and rendered ineffectual (Pref. to *Conf. of Faith*).

(*e*) *Election.*—He accepted election, but not reprobation, for God is the cause of grace but not of sin.

(*f*) *Immanence of God.*—Baxter's doctrine is profound and discriminating:

'As all being is originally from God, so there is continual Divine causation of creatures without which they would all cease, or be annihilated, which some call a continued creation, and some an emanation.' 'The beams do not more depend on the sun, or light or heat or motion on the sun; or the branches, fruit and leaves more depend on the tree, than the creation on God. But yet these are not parts of God as the fruit and leaves are of the tree, but they are creatures because God's emanation or causation is creation, causing the whole being of the effect.'

(*g*) *The Trinity.*—In his *Methodus Theologiæ*—his only Latin work—Baxter attempts to find a rational basis by showing the threefold nature of man and all things. Coleridge and others have followed somewhat similar lines, and though Baxter's reasoning is often fantastical, his philosophic power was highly estimated by Mansel.

(*h*) *Inspiration of Scripture.*—There is a passage in the *Saints' Rest*, omitted from some editions because it gave offence, which anticipates the attitude of many modern Christian scholars.

'They that take the Scriptures to be but the writings of godly, honest men, and so to be only a means of making known Christ, having a gradual precedency to the writings of other godly men, and do believe in Christ upon those strong grounds which

are drawn from the doctrine and miracles rather than upon the testimony of the writing as being purely infallible and Divine, may have saving faith. More much those that believe the whole writing to be of Divine inspiration when it handleth the substance, but doubt whether God infallibly guided in every circumstance.'

On this, as on many other questions, his views were far in advance of those of most of his contemporaries, and they often foreshadowed modern positions only slowly reached after two centuries.

In his last large work, *Reliquiæ Baxterianæ* (1696), Baxter wrote down 'the changes God had wrought since the unriper times of youth,' and one of them is that he now sees a gradation of certainty in truths:

'My certainty that I am a man is before my certainty that there is a God: my certainty that there is a God is greater than my certainty that He requireth love and holiness: my certainty of this is greater than my certainty of the life of reward and punishment hereafter: my certainty of the Deity is greater than my certainty of the Christian faith: my certainty of the Christian faith is greater than my certainty of the perfection and infallibility of Holy Scripture: my certainty of this is greater than of the canonicalness of some books.'

Baxter expressed warm admiration for the missionary efforts of John Eliot, the Apostle of the Indians, and yet he is 'not so much inclined to pass a peremptory sentence of damnation upon all who never heard of Christ, having some more reason than I knew of before to think that God's dealings with such are much unknown to us.'

Those who shared Baxter's spirit of broad catholicity were called, often in reproach, 'Baxterians.' They never formed a sect or even a school, but were men of independent minds who struck out paths for themselves, and in accordance with his principles distinguished between the essentials and non-essentials. 'In things necessary, unity; in things doubtful, liberty; in all things, charity.'

LITERATURE.—Baxter's principal doctrinal works are: *Aphorisms of Justification*, 1649; *Confession of Faith*, 1655; *Catholic Theology*, 1675; *Methodus Theologiæ Christianæ*, 1681; *An End of Doctrinal Controversies*, 1691; *Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, 1696; cf. also Dean Boyle, *Richard Baxter*, 1883, chs. viii.-x.; J. Stalker, Lecture on 'Baxter' in *The Evangelical Succession*, 2nd series, 1883, p. 209 ff.; B. Jowett's *Biographical Sermons*, 1899; M'Adam Muir, *Religious Writers of England*, 1901. See also the Literature above, at end of § 2.

MARTIN LEWIS.

BEADLE, BEDELLUS.—The word 'beadle' was in Old English, *bydel*, *budel*, *bidell*, from O.E. *beodan* (from which our word 'bid' is derived), 'to offer, announce, command'; in mediæval Latin, *bidellus* or *bedellus*; Old French, *bedel*, whence the Middle English *bedel*.

The primary meaning of the word appears to be 'herald,' 'one who announces or proclaims something.' So Ælfric (A.D. 1000), translating Ex 32^{5}; Ormulum 632 (A.D. 1200), where John the Baptist is 'Cristess bidell'; and Coverdale (A.D. 1535), when translating Dn 3^{4}. The secondary meaning is 'an executive officer who represents, and acts under, a higher authority.'

Apart from the metaphorical use of the term (*e.g.* in describing a bishop as 'Godes budel,' R. Morris, *O.E. Hom.* i. 117, A.D. 1175), it is applied to:

(1) The officer of a Court, in particular, of a Forest Court, who administers citations, etc. (Manwood, *Lawes of the Forest*, xxi., A.D. 1598).

(2) The agent of the Lord of a Manor (Coke, *Comm. upon Littleton*, 234, A.D. 1628).

(3) An official in Universities, to whom various duties, ceremonial and executive, pertain. In Oxford there is a bedel for each of the Faculties of Divinity, Law, Medicine, and Arts. The bedels, each bearing a mace, walk before the Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor in processions. The Arts bedel is in constant attendance on the Vice-Chancellor. In Cambridge there are two 'Esquire bedells,' Masters of Arts, who supervise academic ceremonials, and attend on the highest official present. In the University of Glasgow there is a 'bedellus' who is mace-bearer and also janitor. In the Laws of Yale College (1837) provision is made for a 'beadle who shall direct the procession and preserve order.'

(4) The officer of a Trades Gild, who acts as messenger of the Corporation (see *English Gilds*, pp. 35, 121, Early English Texts Society).

(5) A parish officer, whose duty is to attend meetings of the Vestry, to give notice of these meetings, and to execute its orders (Stephen, *Laws of England*, ii. 701). In the ancient Statutes of Scottish Burghs, 112 (quoted in Du Cange, *Glossarium*, *s.v.* 'Bedelli'), it is declared that 'any citation made without the bedellus is not valid.' Formerly the functions of the parish bedell or beadle included punishment of petty offences (cf. Shakespeare, *2 Henry VI.*, II. i. 140 ff., where the Mayor is represented as bidding an attendant 'fetch the beadle,' who, when he comes, whips the impostor).

(6) A church-officer, chiefly, although not exclusively, in Scotland. Du Cange quotes, from the *Concilia Hispan.* iv. 667, a reference to the bedellus as an official who in ecclesiastical processions precedes the Sacrist and the Acolytus; and in England the parish beadle has sometimes a certain status in the parish church. In Scotland, the church-beadle (Scoticé, *bederal*, *bedral*, *beddal*, *betheral*) has charge (under kirk-session and heritors) of the fabric of the church, and is responsible for its due preparation for Divine service. He is the minister's attendant in the church, and also, more or less, in the parish. He carries the Bible, Psalter, and Hymn-book up to the pulpit; and he is the messenger of the minister in parochial work. He acts, also, as the officer of the kirk-session at meetings, in citations, etc. With the office of beadle are often, but not necessarily, conjoined, especially in the country, the functions of gravedigger, bell-ringer, manse gardener, etc.

The Scottish beadle has always been regarded, and has regarded himself, as an important official. 'I'm half a minister mysel', now that I am bedel,' said the beadle in the *Bride of Lammermoor*. The present writer has heard a church-officer of long standing speak of the various ministers who had been '*with him*.' The pride of a beadle in his own kirk is notorious. A country official, whose church was of plain architecture, was taken to see and admire Glasgow Cathedral. 'It's sair fashed wi' thae pillars,' was his depreciatory comment. Sense of official responsibility, and in many cases long experience, render the beadle a keen and often shrewd critic of services and sermons. 'Gude coorse (coarse) country wark' was a city church-officer's estimate of a rural minister's pulpit performance: and young licentiates, on entering the vestry after service, have been known to quail before an old beadle's terse criticism or significant and 'dour' silence. 'I allus (always) liked that sermon' was the caustic response received by a minister who had preached an old sermon, and wishing to know if it had been recognized had given his church-officer the opportunity of 'remarking.' The old practice of the beadle being employed to carry some intimation to the entire body of parishioners, along with the notion, which within living memory prevailed widely, that to allow a caller to go on his way without 'tasting' was a breach of hospitality, led to the character of beadles as a class for sobriety being impugned. At the present day, however, when the special temptation just referred to has been removed, the temperance of the order is at least equal to that of other classes of society.

LITERATURE.—Murray, *Oxford English Dictionary*, vol. i. (from which the majority of the references in this article to old writers have been taken); Du Cange, *Glossarium*, *s.v.* 'Bedelli'; Hunter, *Encyclopædic Dict.* vol. ii.; Wright, *English Dialect Dict.* vol. i.; Whitney, *Century Dict.*; Ramsay, *Reminiscences of Scottish Life and Character*[7], Edinburgh, 1860; R. Ford, *Thistledown*, 1891; art. on 'Church Officers' in *Scottish Review*, Sept. 3, 1908.

HENRY COWAN.

BEARD.—The permanence of the structure and colour of the hair makes it an important key to race-classification. As a characteristic of the face, it appears long and flowing as a beard chiefly among the Caucasian group; the Mongolians, Negroes, and American aborigines are usually beardless, exceptions occurring among the Australian natives and the Melanesians. So rare was the beardless face in an age when a race knew little of mankind outside its own borders, that

Herodotus (i. 105) explains how the Scythians 'who had plundered the temple of Aphrodite Urania at Ascalon, and their descendants for ever, were smitten by the divinity with a disease which made them women instead of men,' for women the ancient Greeks assumed them to be. The more rationalistic Hippocrates offers a different explanation. 'For my own part, I think these ailments are from God, and all the other ailments too; and no one of them more divine than another, or more human either, but all alike from God. Each of such things has a process of growth, and nothing comes into being without a process of growth' (J. L. Myres, in *Anthropology and the Classics*, p. 139 f., Oxford, 1908).

It is probably as a distinguishing sign of manhood that importance has been attached to the beard, there following from this many customs and superstitions, reference to which falls within the province of this article. It is still a mark of honour in the East; the well-bearded man is one 'who has never hungered' (Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, i. 250). To pull it is to inflict an indignity; to have it forcibly cut off, or only mutilated, is a symbol of disgrace; to remove it voluntarily is a sign of mourning; to stroke it is the preface to uttering seeming words of weight. 'Let me stroake my beard thrice like a Germin, before I speak a wise word,' says an old writer Pappe W. Hatchet, 1589 (cf. *Oxford Dict. s.v.*), bearded age lending impressiveness to the thing uttered.

It is among Orientals, notably those of Semitic race, or under Semitic influence, that the beard has acquired sanctity. Its place in the old Hebrew ritual is shown in the command not to 'mar the corners of thy beard' (Lv 19^{27}); the degradation or contempt indicated by its mutilation is exemplified in the cutting off one half of the beards of David's servants by the Ammonites (2 S 10^{4}), and its neglect or removal as a symbol of mourning is referred to in Job 1^{20}, 2 S 19^{24}, Ezr 9^{3}, Is 15^{2}, Jer 41^{5}. The vagaries and vanities of custom marking its history find illustration in Herod. ii. 36: 'The priests of the gods in other lands wear long hair, but in Egypt they shave their heads; among other men the custom is that in mourning those whom the matter concerns most nearly have their hair cut short, but the Egyptians, when death occurs, let their hair grow long, both that on the head and that on the chin.' While the lower classes among the Egyptians appear as bearded [Joseph shaves himself before he enters the presence of Pharaoh, Gn 41^{14}], the priests and court officials kept the barbers busy. Sometimes artificial beards were worn as symbols of dignity at solemn festivals, the king's being cut square at the bottom. The beards on the statues of the gods were curled at the end. Among the Assyrians and Babylonians the lower castes were shaven, while kings and others, probably as members of the sacerdotal or military caste, wore beards, frizzled and anointed (cf. Lv 8^{12}). The example of Muhammad in keeping his beard unshorn was followed by the faithful, and it is by the beard of the Prophet and their own that they swear, as in the presence of Allāh. In Muslim custom, perhaps gradually becoming obsolete, there is zealous care of the hairs that fall from the beard, these being preserved by their owner for burial with him, or sometimes deposited in the grave during his lifetime. Tradition says that they were broken 'as a sort of stipulation with some angel who was supposed to be on the watch, and who would look to the safe passage of the consigners of the treasure to paradise' (*EBr*^{9}, *s. v.*). Such a practice is in keeping with the blurred conception of the barbaric mind as to the 'me' and 'not me,' wherein all that pertains to the individual, from the several parts of his body even to his name, is assumed to be integrally bound up with him, and to be media whereby sorcery may be worked upon him. The story goes that Selim I. (1512–20) was the first Khalif to appear beardless, and when the Shaikh ul-Islām remonstrated, the monarch replied, 'I have cut off my beard, that the Vizier may have nothing to lead me by.' A more veracious history records that Alexander the Great commanded his soldiers to cut off their beards, so that the enemy could not lay hold of them. The presence or absence of the beard is one of the distinctive marks between the priests of the Greek and Latin Churches, although the bearded images on the coins of Popes of the 16th and 17th centuries prove that the clean-shaven face has not the antiquity of the tonsure. The Franciscans are at variance as to whether the founder of their order wore a beard, and on this ground are divided into the 'bearded' and the 'shaven.'

It is amusing to notice that James Ward (1769–1859), a painter of some renown, published a *Defence of the Beard* on Scriptural grounds, 'giving eighteen reasons why man was bound to grow a beard, unless he was indifferent as to offending the Creator and good taste,' while in 1860 one Theologos published a book entitled *Shaving a breach of the Sabbath and a hindrance to the spread of the Gospel*, arguing that the beard was a Divinely provided chest-protector, and adding, 'were it in any other position, its benefit and purpose might be doubted.' A more ancient contribution was made by the Emperor Julian in his *Misopogon*, or *Enemy of the Beard*, a satire on the effeminate manners of the citizens of Antioch, who had laughed at him for allowing his 'shaggy and populous beard' (the phrase is Gibbon's) to grow after the fashion of the Greek philosophers. Samuel Butler, in his *Characters and Passages* (ed. A. R. Waller, Cambridge, 1908), thus humorously describes the sage: 'Heretofore his Beard was the Badge of his Profession, and Length of that in all his Polemics was ever accounted the Length of his Weapon; but when the Trade fell, that fell too.' Monumental and other evidence shows that the Greeks wore beards until the time of Alexander the Great [readers of Herodotus will remember his reference to the great beard of the priestess of Athene (i. 175; viii. 104)], about which period the Romans submitted their chins to barbers from Sicily.

How the treatment of a natural feature of the human male was from time to time made a matter of dispute, even to the shedding of blood, finds illustration in the war between Persians and Tartars because the former would not cut off their beards, while the retention or removal of these became the symbol of the dominant or subject races. Among the West Goths and Burgundians the lower classes were beardless, in contrast to their rulers, and under Norman rule some of the English chose to exile themselves rather than lose their beards. But not long after the Conquest the Normans ceased to shave. The part that fashion and sycophancy have played in the history of the beard is not wholly removed from the domain of Ethics, in the changing standards of which 'custom,' as Pindar says (Herod. iii. 38), 'is king of all.' The Spaniards shaved off their beards because Philip V. could not grow one; and the French did the same because Louis XIII. was beardless; while the latter people, a century earlier, wore beards in imitation of Francis I., who grew one to hide the scar of a wound on his chin. It is said that 'three hairs from a French king's beard under the waxen seal stamped on the royal letter or charter

were supposed to add greater security for the fulfilment of all promises made in the document itself' (*EBr*[9], *s. v.*).

Turning to England, we find that, in the reign of Henry VIII., 'the authorities of Lincoln's Inn prohibited wearers of beards from sitting at the great table unless they paid double commons.' Then came (*temp.* Elizabeth) taxation of beards, assessed according to their age or to the social position of their wearers, beards of above a fortnight's growth being subject to a yearly tax of 3s. 4d. But the impost (which Peter the Great copied, under barbarous conditions, in Russia) failed in its object, perhaps finding a substitute in the duty on hair-powder, which was abolished in 1869. In his *Survey of London*, Stow records that in 1563 'Sir Thomas Lodge, being Mayor of London, wore a beard. He was the first that ever ventured thus to deforme his office, and hardly did the city support the shock.' The well-known Vandyke portraits of Charles I. and of the Cavaliers show what mode of trimming the beard was then in vogue, but by the time that Charles II. came to the throne all Europe shaved, only the moustache being worn. It is within the memory of the middle-aged that the wearing of beards rendered the individual liable to assault and insult, and that it met with opposition and prohibition from employers of labour and persons in authority, until such interference with individual liberty on so unimportant a matter was found to be as futile as has been proved in the case of all sumptuary laws.

LITERATURE.—In addition to authorities cited above: **Duckworth**, *Morphology and Anthropology*, Cambridge, 1904, pp. 354-360, and *Social England*, London, 1894, i 480, iii. 573; **Perrot**, *Art. in Chaldea*, ii. 137; art. 'Beard,' in *EBr*[9] iii. 462.

EDWARD CLODD.

BEAST (Apocalyptic).—See ANTICHRIST.

BEATIFICATION.—1. Definition.—Beatification at the present day in the Church of Rome is a formal act by which the Church permits, under Papal authority, that a person who has died in the Catholic faith shall be honoured with a public veneration, and be formally styled *Beatus* or *Beata* ('blessed'). The cult, however, is limited. Veneration is not required or authorized throughout the whole Church; it is permitted in a particular diocese or country, or by a particular religious order or other associated body. Only with this restriction are the picture or relics of the person who has received beatification allowed to be exhibited, or is the recitation of his particular office or mass permitted. Beatification is thus a preparatory act, preliminary to the definitive *canonization* (*q.v.*) by which a servant of God is formally ranked among the saints of the Universal Church.

2. History.—The present custom dates from a Bull of Urban VIII. in 1634 (*Cœlestis Hierusalem cives*, July 5, 1634). It is fully described in the classic authority on the subject, the work of Pope Benedict XIV. (Lambertini), *de Servorum Dei Beatificatione et Beatorum Canonizatione*. It marks the conclusion of a long historical process, which must here be very briefly sketched. The distinction between beatification and canonization arose very gradually, and, even when the distinction was recognized as existing, the dividing line was not exactly drawn; *e.g.* it was long disputed whether the Emperor Charles the Great (Charlemagne) was to be regarded as canonized or only beatified (*de Servorum Dei*, etc., tom. i. cap. ix.). It is thus impossible to trace the history of the one process, from its origin, apart from that of the other.

Local veneration may be traced back to the earliest Christian ages, and, as in the case of Polycarp (Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* iv. 15), often grew into a wider recognition in the Church. At certain periods an association can be traced with the pagan custom of apotheosis, from which, however, it differs essentially in the fact that the Christian saints were never in any way ranked as Divine or semi-Divine, but merely as those whose virtues had been specially rewarded by God (cf. G. Boissier, 'Apothéose' in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines*, t. i. pp. 323–327). But none the less many rites and symbols common to the Christian and pagan cults have been traced, and there was in the Christian hagiology occasional indebtedness to pagan sources as well as inevitable analogy and surviving superstition (cf. Hippolyte Delehaye, *Les Légendes hagiographiques*[2], Brussels, 1906). Bellarmine, on the other hand, traces the Christian custom to the Old Testament and the veneration of the Jewish Church for Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, etc. (*Controv.*, Paris, 1613, t. ii. col. 700). In the Christian Church it originated in the veneration of martyrs (*q.v.*), whose relics were regarded with reverence, and on whose tombs altars were set up (cf. Duchesne, *Origines du culte chrétien*, 1889, Eng. ed. 1904, pp. 283–284, etc.). But no public veneration was allowed except by authority of the bishop. Registers of those who were thus honoured were kept, and their names were recited at the Eucharist. 'From these diptychs came the kalendars, and from the kalendars in later days the martyrologies' (W. H. Hutton, *The Influence of Christianity upon National Character, illustrated by the Lives and Legends of the English Saints*, Bampton Lectures, 1903, London, 1903, p. 21). But veneration was not long restricted to the martyrs; it was extended to 'confessors,' *i.e.* those in whom a peaceful death followed a life of heroic or conspicuous virtue; and it soon spread still more widely. In the recognition of saintliness different usages grew up and were developed, as at Rome (cf. Duchesne, *Liber Pontificalis*, tom. i. pp. c.–ci.) and in Africa (Optatus, *Hist. Donat.* in *PL* t. xi. col. 916–917). The rights of the episcopate to authorize the veneration of departed saints continued at least till the second half of the 12th century. In their own dioceses, and after a formal and semi-judicial process, the bishops exercised their power as part of their authority to regulate all that related to Divine service. There has been a tendency among Roman Catholics in recent years to distinguish thus between beatification and canonization, and to consider that the former alone lay within the power of the episcopate, the latter never having been declared except by the Roman Pontiff (so T. Ortolan, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, Paris, 1905, fasc. xv. col. 1632); but the late survival of the claim on behalf of local bishops, and its exercise (as still in the Eastern Church) by Councils, would seem to conflict with this view. [Thus the Council of Cloveshoo (747) fixed the veneration in England of St. Gregory and St. Augustine of Canterbury; and cf. vindication by St. Martin of Tours of his right in the matter of veneration, in his *Vita*, by Sulpicius Severus, c. xi.] A survival of the rights of the episcopate is still found in the preliminaries which now precede beatification. The bishop of a diocese in which a special reverence is felt for some departed Christian collects evidence by what is known as the 'Informative Process,' and transmits this to Rome. If it is regarded as sufficient, the Pope issues a decree by which the cause of 'the venerable servant of God' is introduced to the Congregation of Sacred Rites. From this moment the title of 'Venerable' is given, and the first step towards beatification is taken.

3. Method. — Beatification is of two kinds—formal and equipollent (or equivalent). The latter is due not to a positive declaration of the Church, but to a tacit acceptance. Veneration of a particular person has begun, and spread, without formal approbation, till an ancient cult and the testimony of historians are accepted as grounds for a general permission. To this class belong the cases of St. Romwald, St. Norbert, St. Margaret of Scotland, Pope Gregory VII., all eventually canonized saints (for comparatively modern evidence of how this grew up, cf. the case of St. Osmund, Malden, *Canonization of S. Osmund*, Wilts Records Society, 1901, pp. 108–110). Formal beatification is regarded by Benedict XIV. as far more weighty than equipollent beatification (*op. cit.* lib. i. cap. lii. n. 10), since the former is the result of a long and careful process of minute examination, whereas the latter originates in popular sympathy, which the Church has come to accept without any such definite testing. Though there has been dispute on the point (see CANONIZATION), it appears that the brief of Alexander IV., *De reliquiis et veneratione sanctorum*, 1170 (in *Corpus juris Canonici*, l. iii. tit. 45), was the first definite reservation of cases of beatification for the decision of the Roman See. From this time the power of beatification was withdrawn from prelates of whatever dignity, and from Councils, and it is now considered not to be within the rights even of General Councils during a vacancy in the Papal See.

For formal beatification, testimony not only of holiness of life but of miracles (which need not necessarily have been wrought during life) is required (cf. L. Ferrari, *Prompta Bibliotheca*, Rome, 1766, tom. vii. f. 276: 'duo copulative requiruntur, scilicet excellentia virtutum in gradu heroico, et miracula, ita ut nec excellentia virtutum sine miraculis nec miracula sine virtutibus sufficiant'). From the time of Alexander VII. the process of beatification has taken place at the Vatican (Benedict XIV., *op. cit.* lib. i. cap. xxiv.). The writings (if there are any), virtues, and miracles are strictly examined by the Sacred Congregation of Rites. 'Postulators' are appointed to plead in favour of the claim: a 'Promoter of the Faith' (popularly known as *Advocatus Diaboli*) has the duty of seeking for flaws in the case. If the claim is regarded as proved, a decree of Beatification is solemnly proclaimed in St. Peter's (a modern process, in the case of the 'English Martyrs,' is described in Camm, *Lives of the English Martyrs*, London, 1904, vol. i. p. 14 ff.). But the decision, though given by the Pope, is not regarded as infallible, because the ultimate decision of the Church is not reached until the process is completed by canonization (cf. Benedict XIV., *op. cit.* lib. i. cap. xlii. n. 10). Before this stage is reached a further examination is held, which may result in the name being struck off the list of *Beati*. The Pope is therefore not considered as infallible in pronouncing a decree of beatification. It is, however, regarded as extremely rash to dispute or criticize such a decree.

Beatification authorizes a cult limited to particular districts and to particular acts, which are defined in the terms of the particular decree or indult. If no special terms are laid down the cult is regulated by a general decree of the Congregation of Rites of September 27, 1659 (Gardellini, *Decreta Authentica*, Rome, 1898, t. i. pp. 231–232), which orders that (1) the name of the *Beatus* shall not be inscribed in Martyrologies, local calendars, or those of religious orders; (2) images, pictures, or statues of him may not be publicly exposed in churches without permission of the Holy See; (3) his relics are not to be carried in procession; (4) he may not be chosen as patron saint of a church; (5) the cult may not be extended from the place allowed to another without indult.

For the customs which regulate beatification in the Orthodox Eastern Church, where it is not distinguished from canonization, see article CANONIZATION.

LITERATURE —Benedict XIV., *de Servorum Dei Beatificatione et Beatorum Canonizatione*, 1st ed., 4 vols., Bologna, 1734–1738, completed in *Benedicti XIV Pont. Opt. Max. Opera Omnia*, Venice, 1767 (the edition used for the purpose of this article is that in 15 vols., Rome, 1787–1792); Ferrari, *Prompta Bibliotheca Canonica*, Rome, 1766, and Paris, 1884; Gardellini *Decreta Authentica Congregationis Sacrorum Rituum*, Rome, 1898–1901; Vacant and Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, fasc. xi., Paris, 1903; Beccari, in *Catholic Encyclopædia*, ii. 364–369, New York, 1908. W. H. HUTTON.

BEATING AND STRIKING.—See STRIKING.

BEATITUDE.—See BLESSEDNESS.

BEAUTY.—It is impossible within the limits of this article to discuss all the theories that have been advanced on the conception of Beauty. No conception, indeed, has received more attention from philosophers. We shall select out of the general history of ideas the most outstanding theories of the Beautiful, with the special aim of tracing their relationship. The subject will be dealt with under the following heads: (i.) in Greek philosophy, (ii.) in the philosophy of the Church Fathers, (iii.) in the philosophy of the Middle Ages, (iv.) in modern philosophy, (v.) in contemporary philosophy, (vi.) conclusion, in which the author will endeavour to point out the principles that arise from this discussion, and the course which, according to him, should be pursued in order to arrive at a true conception of Beauty.

i. *IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.*—The Greek is a born artist, and his education affords him plenty of scope for all the manifestations of the Beautiful. Nevertheless, the appearance of æsthetic theories comes very late in Greece. It is not until the time of **Socrates.** The reason is that nothing comes of the study of Beauty except in an integrally constituted philosophy, and before the age of Pericles Greek thought was unable to attain to true systematization.

One common feature, we believe, characterizes all the æsthetic theories of the Greeks: Beauty is considered as an *attribute of things*. If they think at all of the impression that it makes on one, they do so only in a secondary way, and not in order to see in the impression an *essential* element of Beauty. The result is that Greek speculations on Beauty are closely allied to metaphysics.

There are two principal theories which have successively held favour in the schools: (1) the Platonic-Aristotelian theory, and (2) the Plotinian or Neo-Platonic theory.

1. Platonic-Aristotelian theory. — We do not possess a special treatise on Beauty either from **Plato** or from **Aristotle,** their ideas on the subject being scattered throughout their different works. Plato's chief references to Beauty are in his *Symposium*, *First Hippias*, *Gorgias*, and a few books of the *Republic*. Aristotle informs us, at the end of his *Metaphysics*, that he will deal more fully with Beauty in a special treatise, which, if it was ever written, has not come down to us. In his *Poetics* some general principles are found, although tragedy alone is specially dealt with.

The intellectual relationship between Aristotle and Plato in æsthetics is so close that their doctrines may be summarized together, as follows:

(*a*) *Beauty resides in order*, and in the metaphysical elements included in order, namely, unity and multiplicity (harmony, symmetry, proportion). It is well known that the study of unity and

multiplicity forms one of the favourite problems of Greek speculation; the study of order is the æsthetic aspect of this problem. And Greek art, chiefly the architecture and sculpture of the time of Pericles, provides an eloquent and perfect commentary on the Platonic-Aristotelian formula. The masterpieces of Greek sculpture symbolize in stone and marble the theory of numbers and their attributes.

Measure and proportion, says Plato, are the elements of beauty and of perfection. 'I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but . . . understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane and solid figures which are formed out of them; . . . for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful' (*Philebus*, 51; Jowett's *Dialogues of Plato*[3], 1892, iv. 625). Aristotle likewise writes τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει, 'Beauty consists of order united to magnitude' (*Poetics*, vii. 4). And Plato applies his theory to the elements of the universe—air, water, earth, fire. These he reduces to geometrical figures, which he thinks perfectly beautiful—in the same way as Aristotle applies his theory to the State.

In the case of a body, popular sentiment added to the element of order the charm of colour (*suavitas coloris*), as characteristic of the beautiful. Xenophon, the Stoics, Cicero, and others are upholders of this conception, and we shall see that Plotinus mentions it as a common way of representing beauty among his contemporaries and immediate predecessors.

(*b*) *The beautiful is the good.*—This identity applies chiefly to moral good, or virtue. (Conversely, vice is the deformity of the soul.) It is the philosophical translation of the word καλοκάγαθός. Is not Thersites, in Homer, both ill-favoured in body and evil in heart? 'Beautiful, too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature [the idea of good] as more beautiful than either' (Plato, *Republic*, vi. 508; Jowett, *op. cit.* iii. 210). And when we remember that the central idea of Plato's metaphysics is the Good and not the True, we understand how defective is the saying, erroneously attributed to him, 'The Beautiful is the brightness of the True.' Aristotle tried to establish certain distinctions between the Beautiful and the Good, but these are superficial, and we conclude with Bénard: 'Quand on signale ici un grand progrès dans la science du beau, on se trompe' ('L'Esthétique d'Aristote,' in *Acad. Sc. mor. et polit.* 1887, p. 683).

This short account of the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine requires a few further remarks. (1) Naturally the theories which have just been expounded are influenced by the differences of doctrine in metaphysics that separate these two great Greek minds. For Plato, reality (and, consequently, beauty, order, and harmony) is enthroned in a supra-sensual world, of which things perceived by our senses are only a fleeting shadow; for Aristotle, reality dwells on the earth, and the beautiful is immanent in well-ordered beings, where our intelligence perceives it, through the channel of the senses and its power of imagination. (2) Aristotle agrees with Plato in separating the beautiful from art, the latter having its whole *raison d'être* in the imitation (μίμησις) of nature, as such, without taking into account the æsthetic value of this imitation. And, inasmuch as it is an imitation of the actual, art is somewhat depreciated, the only value recognized in it being the help it gives to the production and diffusion of morality. (3) Plato and Aristotle (especially the latter) imply in certain texts that the beautiful *should make an impression*, and that it gives us pleasure; but neither of them analyzes the nature of this pleasure or the psychical activities that produce it. The *objective* and ontological point of view dominates their æsthetics.

2. Plotinian or Neo-Platonic theory.—In the 3rd cent. of the Christian era there arose in Alexandria, the centre then of civilization and culture, a new æsthetic formula, which was not long in spreading to other Greek centres. **Plotinus** (A.D. 204–270), the most brilliant representative of Neo-Platonism, explained these new ideas in a noble book, full of inspiration and mystical exaltation, the *Enneads*. The first chapter of Book VI. is devoted to 'Beauty.' There are in his doctrines two distinct parts.

(*a*) First, there is a *critical* part, or a prosecuting speech against the Platonic-Aristotelian argument. 'Is it, as everybody holds, the relative proportion of each part to the other and to the whole, with the additional charm of colour, that constitutes beauty, when it addresses itself to sight? In this case, since the beauty of bodies in general consists of the symmetry and just proportion of their parts, it cannot be found in anything *simple*, it can appear only in composites. The whole alone is beautiful; the parts cannot of themselves possess any beauty. They are beautiful only in their relation to the whole. If, however, the whole is beautiful, it seems necessary that the parts also should be beautiful; beauty cannot result from a collection of ugly things' (*Enneads*, i. 6).

(*b*) Secondly, there is a *constructive* part. The new argument may be given thus: Beauty is a transcendental idea, that is, everything is beautiful in the measure of its own reality. 'Everything is beautiful in its own essential being' (*Enneads*, v. 8). It is well known that in the emanative philosophy of Plotinus the universe springs from the unalterable generating power of a primary being, called the One or the Good (Platonic influence), from whom, by a method of loss, is derived a series of principles, produced the one from the other, each less perfect than its predecessor: the intelligence, the soul of the world, and, lastly, matter and the sensible world. Like this descending scale of Being and the Good, there is a descending scale of Beauty, and, in order to make it clearly understood, Plotinus had recourse to a comparison with light and its spatial diffusion—an image borrowed from Plato's *Republic* (bk. vi.). Further, light becomes synonymous with Being, with Goodness, and with Beauty. 'Everything shines in the world of intelligence. . . . In the world of sense the most beautiful thing is fire' (*Enneads*, v. 8, § 10; cf. i. 6, § 3, and *passim*). It is of great importance to notice that the glory of light (ἀγλαία) has, according to Plotinus, a metaphysical value, and is correlative with the conception of being, and that it is not a question of the impression produced, or of a relation between the splendour of the thing and the capacity of the subject who contemplates it.

Another innovation of Plotinus is that art is not excluded from the domain of the Beautiful, his logical argument being as follows:—The artist realizes the Beautiful in the proportion in which his work is *real*. And that is why the artist should not slavishly copy Nature; but, with his eye fixed on the λόγοι, or archetypal ideas, he should endeavour to reach the very source from which all life springs, and in accordance with it correct the imperfections of sensible things.

ii. *IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS.*—Indebted to Neo-Platonism for a great number of their philosophical doctrines, the Church Fathers assumed and even accentuated its æsthetic optimism. They exalted Nature, they sang its beauty, and many (*e.g.* St. John Chrysostom) depreciated art, the work of man, in order to make the beauty of the world, the work of God, more glorious. There is nothing in the Church Fathers' conception of beauty that is not directly due to the Greeks. **St. Augustine**, the most representative, who, in his youth, wrote a treatise *de Pulchro*, inclines somewhat towards the Platonic-Aristotelian theories. 'Omnis corporis pulcritudo est

partium congruentia cum quadam coloris suavitate' (*de Civitate Dei*, xxii. 19). He has bequeathed to us a famous definition of the conception of *order*: 'Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua loca tribuens dispositio' (*ib.* xix. 3). On the other hand, **St. Basil** and **pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite** adopt the Neo-Platonic theories. The latter exercised great influence on the æsthetics of the Middle Ages by means of his treatise *On Divine Names*, for it was the commentary on this treatise that drew forth all the dissertations of Scholasticism on the Beautiful.

iii. *IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES.*—It was principally Scholastic philosophy that developed the ideas of Beauty in the Middle Ages. But these ideas did not appear in a systematic form until the 13th century. And even then no treatises or discussions were written on Beauty as at the beginning of the 18th century. We know only one short work, *de Pulcro*, belonging to this period. It is attributed to **Thomas Aquinas**, but probably belongs to one of his immediate disciples. Among the great Scholastics, ideas on æsthetics appear in an incidental way, intermingled with other subjects and nearly always in the form of commentaries on the text of pseudo-Dionysius. They form a systematic whole, however, if one takes the trouble to connect the texts; and a new thought is evident in them. The Beautiful no longer appears under purely objective aspects, as in the Greek schools, but as a complex notion, which belongs partly to the things and partly to the psychic subject who receives the impression of them: the Beautiful is the result of a close connexion between the two. We shall now sum up the fundamental doctrines of Thomas Aquinas, the prince of Scholastic philosophers.

(1) *Subjective aspect of the Beautiful.*—Æsthetic activity is an activity of perception: 'Pulcrum respicit vim cognoscitivam' (*Summa Theol.* i. quæst. 5, art. 4), or, more precisely, it is a disinterested contemplation by the eye, the ear, and the intelligence. This contemplation begets a specific enjoyment, the pleasure of the Beautiful: 'Unde pulcra dicuntur quæ visa placent' (*ib.*). (Here 'visa' refers not only to sight, but to other perceptive faculties of an æsthetic kind.) And now from this psychological point of view there appears a profound difference between the pleasure of the Beautiful and the pleasure of the Good: we enjoy the Good by taking possession of the object itself, and we enjoy the Beautiful by the simple perception of it. 'Et sic patet quod pulcrum addit supra bonum quemdam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam; ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui, pulcrum autem dicatur id cujus apprehensio placet' (*ib.* 1^a 2^{ae}, quæst. 27, art. 1).

(2) *Objective aspect of the Beautiful.*—It is quite wrong to refer the Scholastic doctrines concerning what constitutes beauty in things to the influence of Neo-Platonism. The theory that was unanimously accepted was the Platonic-Aristotelian, broadened and brought into harmony with other metaphysical theories of Beauty. Order and its elements constitute the Beautiful; *ordo, magnitudo, integritas, debita proportio, æqualitas numerosa, commensuratio partium elegans*, etc. 'Unde pulcrum,' says St. Thomas, 'in debita proportione consistit' (*ib.* i. quæst. 5, art. 4). And æsthetic order is closely connected, on the one hand, with the form of beings (*forma*), that is to say, with the principles of their constitution and of their perfection ('pulcrum congregat omnia et hoc habet ex parte formæ'), and, on the other, with the finality of beings, which dominates the constitution of Scholastic metaphysics: 'Dispositio naturæ conveniens est pulcritudo' (*ib.* 1^a 2^{ae}, quæst. 54, art. 1).

(3) *Relation of the object to the subject*, or the *claritas pulcri.*—The order of the Beautiful is not any order whatever, but such an order as is capable of giving to the subject that perceives it the natural and entire satisfaction which engenders æsthetic pleasure. Order must be bright, it must be luminous to the eyes. The more *form* strikes the spectator (and form is the principle of unity in a work of art or of nature), the more resplendent it is ('resplendentia,' 'supersplendens claritas'), and the more æsthetic will be the value that the impression experienced possesses. Although the Scholastics make use of the theories of pseudo-Dionysius regarding the *light* of the Beautiful, their doctrine rises above his formula, and, therefore, above Neo-Platonism, with which pseudo-Dionysius was inspired. While for Plotinus the theory of *light* has a metaphysical bearing, for Thomas Aquinas and the other great Scholastics it is a pyschological phenomenon, for it has to do with the mysterious connexion between the object and the subject which forms the basis of the complex phenomenon of Beauty. And from the historical point of view this is a noteworthy conquest on the part of the philosophy of the Middle Ages.

iv. *IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.*—From the beginning of the 17th cent., which is usually regarded as the commencement of modern philosophy, the study of Beauty has steadily gained in importance and extent; and from the day on which **Baumgarten**, a disciple of Leibniz, detached it from the domain of philosophy and made it a separate branch of knowledge, the number of treatises devoted *ex professo* to æsthetics has continued to multiply. The great burst of artistic criticism after the Renaissance has often been assigned as the cause of this development. And indeed it is a factor whose incontestable influence we are bound to recognize. Artistic culture, greatly aided by archæological excavations and the analysis of statuary and ancient drama, had prepared the way for the discussion of the great problems of Beauty. But there seems to be a second reason: the progress of psychological research, which is one of the salient characteristics of modern philosophy, naturally stimulated the study of æsthetic phenomena; and this influence is clearly seen when it is remembered that in modern and contemporary philosophy Beauty is usually studied only under its *cognitive* and *emotive* aspect, *i.e.* as a *psychic fact*.

As the development of modern æsthetics has a course parallel to that of philosophy, we shall follow the great historical divisions generally agreed upon: (1) philosophy from Descartes to Kant (17th and 18th cents.), (2) Kantian philosophy (18th cent.), and (3) post-Kantian philosophy (19th cent.).

1. **From Descartes to Kant.**—Just as there are two lines of psychological systems, empiricism and rationalism, originating from Francis Bacon and Descartes respectively, so there are two lines of æsthetic systems.

(1) *Empiricism.*—The Empiricists, reducing all our conscient states to sensation, understand by Beauty an *agreeable sensation*. For **Hume**, the Beautiful exists only in us, not in things, and obeys the general laws of association. This principle was adopted and developed in England by **Hutcheson** (1694–1747), **Home** (1696–1782), and **Burke** (1730–1797); in France by **Batteux** (1713–1780) and **Diderot** (1713–1784); and in Holland by **Hemsterhuys** (1720–1790). Home gives the best expression of the leading ideas of the school in his *Elements of Criticism*, and Burke carries the

sensualistic idea that inspires him to its extreme limits in a work entitled *Inquiry into the Origin of the Sublime and the Beautiful.* Nearly all these philosophers admitted the existence of a special sense, the sense of artistic taste, which was afterwards called the sixth sense, and the object of which was enjoyment of things beautiful.

(2) *Rationalism.*—Among the intellectualists or rationalists (*ratio*, 'reason'), who establish a fundamental distinction between sensation, or the perception of sensible qualities, and the idea, or the general representation, it is in **Leibniz** and his immediate successors that we find the most noteworthy treatments of the Beautiful. It has been truly said that Leibniz is the father of modern æsthetics. It seems as if the intellectualists, inspired by Descartes, had reserved the character of Beauty for the most exalted psychic activities, *i.e.* for *clear and distinct ideas*, which play such a prominent part in the Cartesian doctrine. For some men, indeed, like **Crousaz** (*Traité du Beau*, 1715), the Beautiful is something that may be approved of just like a theory, and **Boileau** expresses this intellectualism when he writes in his *Art Poétique*: 'Mais nous que la raison à ses règles engage.' But Leibniz introduces into æsthetics a tendency contrary to this spirit. And while he relegates the clear perceptions of our psychic life to the domain of *science*, he consigns æsthetic knowledge of things to the dull and less conscient regions of the soul. The æsthetic phenomenon, he says, is a *confused perception* of the order and the harmony of things, and by this doctrine he thought he was explaining that mysterious and indecomposable characteristic which constitutes the charm of Beauty.

In order to understand the whole meaning of this statement, we should have to give a full account of the philosophy of Leibniz, which cannot be undertaken here. It will be sufficient to recall the law of continuity and hierarchy, which arranges all the monads and the monadic activities in a grand order.

Each monad differs in perfection from that which precedes it, and from that immediately following, by infinitely small differences; the activities or the representations of each monad—and, therefore, of the monad that we are—differ in degree by infinitely small differences, so that between our least conscient representations ('obscure ideas') and our most conscient ('distinct ideas') there is room for an indefinite number of stages corresponding to all the degrees of clearness. Now, Beauty is one of those activities which are inferior in quality to the clear and scientific knowledge of things; it is the *confused*, therefore indefinite, perception of all that constitutes order. Whereupon Lotze says that German æsthetics is brought into being by belittling its object.

Baumgarten, who arranges Leibniz's theories, and is the author of the first treatise on Beauty (*Æsthetica et Æstheticorum altera pars*), associates the sentiment of Beauty with obscurity of representation. In the Wolffian classification of the sciences, æsthetics becomes a kind of inferior logic. The same ideas are found in **Eschenburg** (1743–1820), **Sulzer** (1720–1779), and **Mendelssohn** (1729–1786). 'Beauty,' says Mendelssohn, 'vanishes away as soon as we try to analyze it.' And **Meier**, another disciple of Baumgarten (in § 23 of his *Anfangsgründe der schonen Wissenschaften*, 1748–1750) thus expresses himself: 'The cheeks of a beautiful woman are beautiful as long as they are seen with the naked eye. Look at them with a magnifying glass and their beauty departs.'

2. In Kantian philosophy.—The disciples of Leibniz and Baumgarten had considerably furthered the problem of the Beautiful, but all were eclipsed by the gigantic figure of **Kant.** Kant's æsthetics made as profound an impression as his theory of science and his ethics; and just as, in the *Kritik der reinen theoretischen Vernunft*, and the *Kritik der reinen praktischen Vernunft*, he had established human knowledge and human duty in the very *constitution* of our theoretical and practical reason, so he explains opinions on the Beautiful and the Sublime by calling for the *construction* of a third faculty, the source of contemplation and sentiment. This is the subject of a chapter of his third critique, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft.* The subjectivity of the Beautiful is no longer merely a *fact* (Hume), but a *law.* Beauty is an attribute, not of things, but of our representative states. It is the predicate of an æsthetic judgment which unites all men by reason of their nature (synthetic judgment *a priori*) to a subject when that subject calls disinterested contemplation into free play. The object of representation is intended to please me—subjective finality; but at the moment of enjoying it I am unconscious of this finality; to be conscious of it would be to break the charm. 'Schönheit ist Form der Zweckmassigkeit eines Gegenstandes, sofern sie ohne Vorstellung eines Zwecks an ihr wahrgenommen wird' (*Kritik d. Urtheilskraft*, I. i. bk. 1, § 15). Similarly the *sublime* is the result of our subjective powerlessness to grasp an object, mingled with a definite feeling of the superiority of our supra-sensible being. 'Erhaben ist was uns erhebt.'

3. In post-Kantian philosophy.—The chief currents of modern philosophy and æsthetics after Kant are:—

(1) *Post-Kantian criticism in Germany* (first half of 19th cent.).—Powerful in itself, the new theory proposed by Kant (assisted by the brilliant flight of Romanticism in Germany and the æsthetics of the philosophy of Konigsberg, and accepted by such men as Schiller and Schelling—philosophers as well as *littérateurs*) dominates all modern criticism. It is true that a characteristic innovation was introduced into German criticism by those who are called idealistic critics as well as by the realistic critics: the Beautiful remains a creation of our mind (Kant), but this 'mind' becomes a monistic principle, the 'ego absolute' of Fichte, the 'absolute' of Schelling, the 'mind' of Hegel, the 'will' of Schopenhauer. **Schiller** (1759–1805) returns to the theory of *play.* To 'play' is to contemplate phenomena with an utter indifference as to their representative value. And just on this account does æsthetic activity become human activity *par excellence*: 'Man is truly man only when he plays.' It is intimacy with the Beautiful that produces the restfulness of life, that balance of all the faculties which Kantism tries to secure by the exercise of freewill ('Vom Erhabenen,' *Briefe uber die æsthetische Erziehung des Menschengeschlechtes*, 1795). In 1800 and 1801, **Schelling**, in the second form of his philosophy, æsthetic idealism, revived this governing idea, and made æsthetic activity and 'play' the fundamental function of the mind, that which reconciles its opposite tendencies. The work of art is the only perfect production of the Ego. Thus Jena, where Schelling was a professor along with Fichte and then with Hegel, became the centre of the closely allied philosophic criticism and literary romanticism. **Novalis** identified the imagination of the poet with the productive imagination of the Ego; and **von Schlegel**, whose name is connected with the movement called *Ironism*, claimed for the poet the right of not troubling himself either about the contents of his work, or about its representative value, or about the public who make the unjust claim to judge it.

Then **Hegel** appeared (1770–1831), and ruled the German schools for half a century. For Hegel, art is placed at the highest point of the development of the mind. Art is the last step in the dialectic procession of the Logos. When the mind has traversed the numerous stages of its development sketched in the *Phanomenologie des Geistes* (1807), and when, in conformity with the threefold procession (thesis, antithesis, synthesis) that governs it, it becomes conscious of itself, this auto-contemplation is realized by Art, Religion, and Philosophy. Art,

and the Beautiful in which it is realized, are the 'perfect identity of the ideal and the real.'

Schopenhauer (1788–1860), who may be considered the last of this line of pantheists belonging to the first generation of Kantians, reserves for Art and for Beauty this high position in the cycle of psychic activity (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, 1819). Although the thing exists in itself, science is doomed to recognize only its representation ('Vorstellung'). But besides this knowledge of the phenomenal world, which is directed by the *a priori* constitution of our mind, we may have 'the immediate intuition' of the cosmic Ideas, or of the thing-in-itself, and this pure contemplation is the æsthetic contemplation. As such, it is freed from desire and withdrawn from the sufferings that accompany every voluntary action; and this is the secret of the penetrating charm of Beauty. By art, man makes the idea the ruling power—a symbol which nature never realizes in its absolute purity. Art becomes an intoxicating drink, causing the woes of existence to be momentarily forgotten.

(2) *The conflict between Hegelians and Herbartians in Germany* (middle of 19th cent.).—The pantheistic Germans whom we have just mentioned all agreed in making the Beautiful an impersonal manifestation of Being. The Hegelian theory, in spite of the ascendancy in official spheres enjoyed by its promoter, was not long in bringing on a reaction: there was a desire to remove Beauty from the sphere of metaphysical reverie to the ground of psychological observation. In the name of observation, **Herbart** made Beauty consist of the mere perception of *relations* and forms. The æsthetics of content ('Gehaltsästhetik') of the Hegelian school was now opposed by the æsthetics of form ('Formaasthetik'), and the conflict between the two tendencies lasted in Germany until the end of the 19th century. Hegelianism includes among its most zealous defenders **Fr. Th. Vischer**, who published some important works on the Beautiful (e.g. *Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schonen*, 3 vols. 1846–57), while **Zimmermann** carried the reactionary doctrine to an extreme (*Allgemeine Aesthetik als Formwissenschaft*, 1865). The Hegelian party was not defeated in this strife, but we see several of their partisans departing from the rigour of their principles and giving a place to beauty of form. Among these moderates we may mention **Moriz Carrière** (*Aesthetik*, 1859), as well as **Schasler** and **Ed. von Hartmann**, both of whom are authors of works on the history of Æsthetics.

German idealism enjoyed some fame in Italy through **Gioberti**, who favoured Schelling, **de Sanctis** (Professor in the University of Naples after 1870), and **Antonio Tari** (Professor in the University of Naples from 1861 to 1884), who were all affected by the preponderating influence of Hegel.

(3) *Eclectic spiritualism.*—In France, during the first half of the 19th cent., **Cousin** (1792–1867), by his lectures in the Sorbonne, and then through his influential official positions, both academic and political, exercised a dictatorship similar to that enjoyed by Hegel in Germany. He popularized a philosophy, somewhat deficient in originality, which he himself called Eclecticism; and in a well-known book, *Du vrai, du beau et du bien* (1818), gave prominence to an æsthetic made up of fine phrases and pompous homage to the Ideal, which he identified with the Infinite or the perfection of God. While exalted in their aspiration, these thoughts on Beauty have the fault of being remote from reality. They are, moreover, derived from recollections of Hegel and the Scottish school of Reid. The same tendencies are to be seen in **de Lamennais**, although he followed another direction of thought-traditionalism (*De l'Art et du beau*, 1843). On the other hand, **Th. Jouffroy** (1796–1842), the most noteworthy of Cousin's disciples, wrote a *Cours d'esthétique* (1843), in which he insisted on the rights of the psychological method in the study of the Beautiful. And to the same metaphysical tendencies may be traced *La Science du beau* (1861), by **Charles Lévêque**, who returns to Plato in his treatment of the characteristics of Beauty. By the middle of the century only faint traces of Cousin's eclecticism were left in France.

(4) *The æsthetics of Positivism.*—Sensualism, represented at the beginning of the 19th cent. by **Condillac** in France and the Associationists in England, does not leave much room for æsthetic phenomena. But when it reappears with renewed vigour under the form of Positivism, which may be called a sensualism suited to contemporary minds, there is room for new conceptions of Beauty and of Art. These, however, did not appear either in **Comte**, the founder of the new doctrine, or in **Stuart Mill**, its most brilliant logician; but after the system seemed perfectly balanced, and systematized in all its parts, **Herbert Spencer** devoted a chapter of his *Principles of Psychology* to a study of the genesis of æsthetic phenomena, in conformity, however, with the governing ideas of his cosmic evolutionism. The sentiment of Beauty has its origin in 'play,' *i.e.* in the exercise of an excess of activity independent of any function useful to the being. Useful activity becomes beautiful as soon as it ceases to be useful. And as humanity evolves unceasingly 'from the unstable homogeneous to the stable heterogeneous,' art increases with the progress: the more perfect society becomes, the more time will its members have for 'play.'

Hippolyte Taine (1828–1893), in his noteworthy work, *Philosophie de l'art* (1865), studies art as a social fact, and he tries to reduce it, like all other social facts—such as literature and politics—to factors or primordial facts, which are three in number: race, circumstances, time. From this point of view, æsthetics becomes, in the author's words, 'a kind of botany, applied, not to plants, but to human works.' **M. J. Guyau** emphasizes, while exaggerating, the social side of art, and recognizes in it no function except that of developing sympathy and social life (*L'Art au point de vue sociologique*, 1889; *Problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine*, 1884).

(5) *Psycho-æsthetics.*—The increasing progress of physiological sciences and of the application of psycho-physiology to the study of æsthetic states furnished a new element of research during the latter part of the 19th century. **Helmholtz** in Germany, and **Grant Allen** in England, tried to determine the physiological concomitants of certain phenomena of the Beautiful. **Fechner** (*Vorschule der Aesthetik*, 1876) carried on numerous experiments in the same direction.

v. *CONTEMPORARY TENDENCIES.*—During the last ten years the number of works treating of æsthetic questions has been multiplied in all countries. There is not one of our numerous periodical publications that does not devote some attention to them. Moreover, there has been appearing at Stuttgart since 1906 a *Zeitschrift fur Aesthetik und allgemeine Kuntswissenschaft*, under the direction of Max Dessoir, which allows large space to philosophical problems of the Beautiful. Now all these writings, with a few exceptions, show this common characteristic: Beauty is considered only under its subjective aspect as a psychological phenomenon. The salient features of modern æsthetics reappear, exaggerated, in the æsthetics of our own time.

In the first place, Kantism, in this as in other

subjects, is again received into favour—not the idealistic and pantheistic criticism which had been established by the triumvirs of the University of Jena, but psychological Kantism in its primitive form. **Jonas Cohn** (*Allgemeine Aesthetik*, Leipzig, 1901) transfers the results obtained to transcendental ground ('ins Transcendentale umschreiben'). **Stephan Witasek** (*Grundzuge der allgemeinen Aesthetik*, Leipzig, 1904) shows the same tendencies; and a German critic, **A. Tumarkin**, in a criticism of a group of German works on æsthetics, is able to write: 'Jede wissenschaftlich begründete Aesthetik, von welchen Voraussetzungen sie auch ausgehen mag, fuhrt immer auf Kant zuruck' (*Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1905, p. 360). On the other hand, psycho-æsthetic researches are being actively pursued in the psycho-physiological laboratories; pupils of **Wundt**, **Ebbinghaus**, and others have turned their attention to this side of the subject. Some also apply to æsthetics the historical and inductive method which has produced such excellent results in other departments. **E. Grosse** publishes a work on the origin of art (*Die Anfange der Kunst*, Freiburg i. Breisgau, 1894); **J. Volkelt** (*System der Aesthetik*, Munich, 1903) makes æsthetics 'normative and experimental'; while, in another line of observation, we trace the development of the artistic sense in the child, especially in his first attempts at drawing.

The most noteworthy representative of the pure psychological tendency is **Theodore Lipps** (*Aesthetik*, Leipzig, 1903), whose opinion is that the only *raison d'être* of æsthetics is to analyze the sentiment of Beauty, and this in the final analysis rests on the *Einfuhlung* ('innate feeling'). **Karl Groos** (*Der asthetische Genuss*, Giessen, 1902), a disciple of the school of Lipps, follows the same tendency of dealing with the Beautiful only by internal analysis. The same may be said of **Véron's** treatise (*L'Esthétique*, Paris, 1878), and of the discriminating analyses of **Léchalas** (*Études esthétiques*, 1902). Even if these authors do not deny the objectivity of the Beautiful, they neglect it, and regard the phenomena of consciousness as the only object of their investigations. The Italian professor, **Benedetto Croce**, whose treatise on æsthetics (*Estetica come scienza dell' Espressione e Linguistica generale*, Milan, 1902) is translated into several languages, is true to this contemporary attitude of mind when he writes: 'Beauty does not belong to things; it is not a psychic fact, it belongs to man's activity, to spiritual energy'; and he holds that æsthetic activity is the imaginative and concrete intuition, as opposed to the logical and general conception. **Ruskin**, whose ideas are known in France through Robert de la Sizeranne (*Ruskin et la religion de la beauté*), occupies a place apart. It is impossible to assign this great and passionate admirer of Nature to any contemporary system of philosophy.

vi. *CONCLUSION.*—From this rapid survey of the evolution of æsthetical doctrines, we may gather a few principles.

By studying in the Beautiful the psychological impression and all that belongs to it, our contemporaries have established æsthetics on firm and fertile soil—that of observation. Let us observe the origin of art in the child, in primitive societies, as well as in the centres of advanced civilization; let us analyze the works to which we ascribe the character of beautiful, that we may understand the secrets of the enjoyment of art which they produce; let us study the physiological phenomena that accompany this delicious thrill of our conscient being when it perceives the Beautiful; let us, above all, determine by examination of our consciousness the psychical aspects of the Beautiful. Nothing more is required. Beauty resides in the *disinterested contemplation of a representative content* of consciousness, followed by an *enjoyment* or a pleasure which can be compared with no other in the scale of emotions.

But is it sufficient to regard merely the impression produced? Are we in the study of the Beautiful to lose all interest in the æsthetical factors springing from the object? Surely not. Contemporary philosophy is wrong in ostracizing metaphysics and adorning psychology with its spoils. On the question whether the Beautiful possesses an objective reality, we agree with the Greeks: Beauty is an attribute of things. But we complete the Greek point of view by adding the modern: Beauty is not an *absolute*, but a *relative*, conception. It exists neither as a physical fact nor as a psychic fact; it is the result of a close connexion between an object and a subject, for the attributes of the one form the appropriate origin of the perceptive enjoyment of the other. The objective attributes were demonstrated by Plato and Aristotle: Beauty resides in order, but, we add, in *expressed* order. That is to say, if the order realized in a work of nature or of art is to be æsthetic, it must *be manifest*, *evident* to the senses and the intelligence. The more evident and attractive an artist can make the dominant character or principle of the chosen order, the more complete and more penetrating will be the contemplation of the percipient mind: consequently the more beautiful will the work be.

LITERATURE.—**C. Bénard**, *L'Esthétique d'Aristote et de ses successeurs*, Paris, 1887; **E. Vacherot**, *Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1846–51; **M. de Wulf**, *Études historiques sur l'esthétique de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Louvain, 1896. Works on the modern period are very numerous. Only a few general histories of æsthetics can be mentioned: **H. Lotze**, *Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland*, Munich, 1868; **E. von Hartmann**, *Die deutsche Aesthetik seit Kant*, Berlin, 1886; **Max Schasler**, *Kritische Geschichte der Aesthetik*, Berlin, 1872; **Bernard Bosanquet**, *History of Æsthetic*, Lond. and N.Y. 1892; **B. Croce**, *Estetica come scienza dell' Espressione e Linguistica generale*, Milan, 1902; **W. Knight**, *Philosophy of the Beautiful*, 2 vols., London, 1891–93. MAURICE DE WULF.

BEḌIYĀ, BERIYĀ.—A generic name for a number of vagrant, gipsy-like groups, who at the Census of 1901 numbered 57,489, most of whom are found in Bengal and in the United Provinces. In Bengal they practise various disreputable occupations. Some are pedlars and mountebanks, who pretend to be Muhammadans, but exhibit pictures of Hindu gods; others tatu girls, sell simples and quack remedies, and pretend to extract worms from carious teeth; others, again, are acrobats, bird-snarers, or snake-charmers. The Beriyās of the United Provinces are pilferers and petty thieves, and make their living by various kinds of rascality. Their appearance indicates that they are members of the pure Indian gipsy race, allied to Ḍoms (wh. see) and other vagrants of the same kind. Risley makes no reference to their religious beliefs in Bengal; but Rājendralāla Mitra states that the Beḍiyā is a Hindu or a Musalmān according to the prevailing beliefs of the people among whom he dwells. Some are Deists, some Kabīrpanthīs or Sikhs, while some are Pachpiriyas. It is extremely unlikely that people in this stage of culture can have really adopted the faith of Nānak or of Kabīr; but it is quite possible that they may sometimes adopt the Pachpiriyā (wh. see) cult. In the United Provinces, where they are in a much more degraded condition than in Bengal, they worship as their tribal deity the Mother-goddess in the form of Devī, Kālī, or Juālamukhī. Many of them worship a deity called Sayyid, who is probably a Muhammadan saint like him of Amroha, but is identified by the Beriyās with the Prophet Muhammad. They seem, however, to depend more upon the cultus of ancestors than on any other

form of belief, and rarely employ Brāhmans, and those only of the very lowest grade, for their domestic rites.

LITERATURE.—Rājendralāla Mitra, *Memoirs Anthropological Society*, iii. 122 ff.; Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 1891, i. 83; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 242 ff. W. CROOKE.

BEELZEBOUL.—See BAALZEBUB.

BEGGARS, BEGGING.—See CHARITY.

BEHISTŪN.—1. Locality and name.—Behistūn is a mountainous elevation which rises somewhat abruptly from the surrounding country—presenting from one point of view a double aspect—about sixty miles from Hamadan, on the main caravan route between Baghdad and Teheran (the present capital of Persia). At its highest point it reaches about 3800 feet, but it is really the continuation of an otherwise low range of hills rather than an isolated eminence.

The name at present made use of by the neighbouring inhabitants is *Bīsitūn* or *Bisutūn*, which is supposed to have been derived from that of a small village in the immediate vicinity. One is, however, tempted to reverse the relation, as the termination *-sitūn* suggests 'columns' (*sitūn* = Skr *sthūṇā*), and the opening part may be *bazah* or the like (= Skr. *bahu*). Thus the name would mean 'high columns,' referring to the lofty, and often hewn, face of the rock. The name at present most in use among Westerns is *Behistūn*, or *Bahistūn*. This was handed down to us from the Arabic historian Yāqūt, by Sir H Rawlinson. Diodorus Siculus (A.D. 1st cent.) seems to have made the earliest mention of the more ancient title as τὸ Βαγίστανον ὄρος.

2. Inscriptions.—The Inscriptions, which chiefly concern us here, render Behistūn famous, as they are perhaps the most important of their kind which have survived to us. They are chiselled upon its hewn surface at about 500 feet above the level of the plain, or about 200 feet above the base of the particular cliff. They occupy, all included, a space of about 60 feet in breadth and 20 in height.

3. The language in general.—The Inscriptions are written *in three languages*—Old Persian, Susian, and Babylonian—in letters a little over an inch in height, it having been found necessary to economize the space. The last two are more naturally to be regarded as translations of the first; but this is not strictly the fact, as there are several sections in the Persian whose equivalents are wanting in the Susian; while, on the other hand, the Babylonian contains some particulars omitted from the Persian. The Persian Inscription consists of five columns, about 12 feet in height and 6 feet broad, flanked on the left, as one views them, by the three columns of the Susian version. A ledge of narrow dimensions—about 2 feet—runs along the foot of them.

4. The sculptured figures and the position of the Inscriptions.—The sculptured figures of Darius and his captives appear immediately above. The nine figures are roped together in a row at the neck. The tenth, that of Gaumata, pseudo-Smerdes (-Smerdis), or Bardiya, is prostrate under the left foot of Darius, who stands 5 ft. 8 ins. in height, with two attendants behind, who are each 4 ft. 10 ins. tall. The height of each of the nine prisoners is only 3 ft. 10 ins., while Auramazda, under the shadow of whose wings the transactions transpire, flutters above, but 3 ft. 9 ins. by 4 ft. 2 ins. in dimensions. The ninth captive has an enormously tall Scythian cap, and occupies space taken from one of the supplementary texts. Under the first prostrate figure is written his name with his crime: 'This Gaumata, the Magian, lied, saying, "I am Smerdes (-dis), the son of Cyrus."' Similar inscriptions in the three languages appear over the other eight.

The Babylonian version stands over the Susian, on the left of the figures, as the observer regards them, on the right-hand side of the forms themselves. Supplementary, but now obliterated, texts appear also above the Persian, but more to the left of the sculptures, as they face us. The three languages were evidently made use of in order to render the Inscription intelligible to the inhabitants of the main divisions of the Empire. That they were copied in multiplied replicas hardly needed the proof which has actually come to light: for what appear to be really fragments from such a reproduction have been found by Koldewey (see *Bab. Miscellen*, pl. 9, p. 24 ff., quoted by King and Thompson, p. 179).

5. The Old Persian language.—The language in which the Inscriptions were written is, like the Avesta, quite Aryan in all its grammatical forms, though it is rather a younger sister than a direct daughter of the Avesta speech; and it is the direct mother of New Persian so far as it survives in its Aryan elements.*

We have recurring examples of a dialect common to the Avesta and the Daric. The pronoun *dim, dīm*, e.g., is Daric and Avestan, but not Vedic; the word *yānā*, 'a boon,' has no such application in the Veda, but it is familiar in this sense in both Avesta and Inscription; such an expression as 'the right path' in its unmistakably figurative sense is very Gāthic; the proper name *Fravarti* also is Av. *Fravashi*, with no immediate Indian correspondent; and so with the pronoun *ava*, 'yon.' 'This earth and yon heaven' occurs in the Avesta as in the Inscription, while it only remotely lingers in the Sanskrit. So the Daric-inscriptional preserves some of the Avesta-Vedic peculiarities of Avesta, as against those of the *later* Sanskrit. Among the more striking of these is the termination of the nom. plu. masc. of the *a* declension in *-āha*, Av. *-āonhō* (cf. the Vedic *-āsas*, as against the later Indian *-ās*; see also some of the infinitives). It would be an exaggeration to say that the inscriptional was at all at the same stage of 'preservation' or 'deterioration' as the language of the Avesta. Its distance, as a spoken dialect, from the Gāthic speech must have been about two hundred years. It can be easily restored in Avestan or in Sanskrit.

6. Religion of the inscriptions.—The personifications are best considered in their analogy with, and their differences from, those of the Avesta.

(*a*) *Auramazda* is, of course, Ahura Mazda, Vedic *Ásura* (*su-*)*Medhás* (or *Asura Mahádhās*). Notice the fall of the *h* in the inscriptional *Aura* for *Ahura*. Was not this owing here to the strong accent upon *á* in *áura* (cf. Vedic *Ásura*)?† The presence of a God-unity in the Inscriptions must not be denied because of the supremacy ascribed to Ahura in the words 'the greatest of the gods.' There can be but One 'greatest of the gods'—equivalent to the concept of a 'Supreme Being.' The 'other gods' referred to were inferior, ranking with our archangels. This is confirmed conclusively by the fact that the next chiefest of the gods were said to have been created by Ahura—this in the Avesta (these 'other gods' do not therefore negative the idea of One-God-ism)—whereas the *Amesha-spentas* were originally His *attributes*.

As Ahura was one of the most distinctive expressional manifestations of God-unity which the world had till then, or has since then, possessed, so the *name* is most effective; it is the 'Life-Spirit-Lord,' the 'Great-Creator,' or the 'Great-Wise-One'—infinitely more impressive than our English word 'God,' a term possibly of heathen origin.

(*b*) *Other so-called gods.*—Besides Áura there are *Mithra* and *Anāhita*, two of the noblest subdeities of Aryan literature, who seem to have stepped bodily out of the Avesta into the Inscriptions; but with them we appear to have reached our limit as regards analogies between personifications in the Avesta and the Inscriptions. For where are the *Amesha-spentas* upon the Inscrip-

* Take even a few words like *dauštar*, with which cf. the forms from Av. *zuš*, *zaoša*, Indian *juṣ*; see also *dast*, with which cf. Av. *zast*, Indian *hásta*, etc.

† We do not forget the normal disappearance of the expressed *h* throughout the Inscriptions, for the 'rough breathing' may have been left to be understood; and we may recall how very slight a mark expresses it in Greek.

tions (as has often been, perhaps, too thoughtlessly asked), and, above all, where is *Angra Mainyu*?

(*c*) The absence of the *Amesha-spentas* certainly shows that these personified attributes regarded as archangels were not at all prominent in the author's mind when he composed the sentences for the chisellers. Full references to them had long existed in the earlier Gāthas, or perhaps in the pre-Gāthic and other literature of North Iran. But any argument *e silentio* here verges close upon the fatuous, for there are whole masses of Avesta text itself without a trace of any one of them. That the personified attributes were not known in Middle Persia, and at the seat of Government, is out of the question. Ragha with its surrounding province was a very hot-bed of that form of Mazda-worship which revelled in the great names, and every post brought down despatches from the interesting place. Yet the *Amesha-spentas* appear upon the Inscriptions as attributes only, in expressive qualifying words, and in proper names (cf. *Arta-khshatra*, which may be *A(r)sha + khshathra; Vahuka*, which recalls *Vohu* of *Vohu-manah*; and possibly the mutilated name of *Haurvatāt* appears bodily in that of the province *Harauvatī*). The truth appears to be that Darius was lukewarm in the matter of recognizing those superbly personified ideas. Yet, among many sections of the Persians, the *Amesha-spentas* were, and had never ceased to be, grand abstract characteristics, for they actually retained their significance as reported to the Greeks (see the extraordinary citations by Plutarch from Theopompus [the latter only about two centuries after Darius], where the 'six gods' of the Persians retain all their meaning as ideas, so that Windischmann justly pronounces the passage 'unschatzbar'). Darius knew—as he must have known, when he cared to reflect upon it—that the so-called archangels had in reality much to do with those glorious principles of Truth which he was so continuously signalizing upon the tablets, as well as with Benevolence, Sovereign Authority, Energizing Power, Weal and Deathlessness. It is but a tribute to the greatness of his mind that he overlooked their status as mere archangels. Moreover, he may have been influenced by prejudice—a diseased passion which is also universal elsewhere. For it must not be forgotten that Darius was, above all, an anti-Magian,* and that the *Maga* (*Magha*) was probably originally a purely Gāthic concept closely interwoven with the conception of the archangels. Here, then, is an 'omission,' at once most easily accounted for.

(*d*) But how as regards *Angra Mainyu*? Surely, if ever there was occasion for the mention of such a Being, this was the proper place. But let us pause. That Angra Mainyu was a name only too well known in every sub-kingdom of the Empire may be assumed as extremely probable, for evil concepts readily become familiar. As a matter of fact, the main and central activity attributed to Angra Mainyu is constantly the subject of severe denunciation in the Inscriptions. 'He lied' occurs throughout; the *Draugha* is the Avesta *Draogha*, a variant of the *Druj*, 'she-Devil of the Lie,' first child of Angra Mainyu, though the latter is not actually named. Here we have another signal instance of the essential conception being present in the Inscriptions, although the language invests it only in plain words. Do the facts compel us here again to attribute to Darius such a depth and refinement of ideas as would lead him to overlook even the concept of a chief personal Evil Being? In view of the shrewdness and sagacity manifested by him throughout, it is hard, indeed, to resist this simple solution, although we should seldom relax our vigilance against 'seeing too much meaning' anywhere. Darius had beyond doubt heard the Great Devil's name, but he attached little importance to him, being occupied with more serious considerations.

(*e*) *Devá.*—Let us not fail to notice here another marked feature of a negative character pointing to the Daric Mazda-worship as a separate strain from that of Ragha. Strange to say—and, we might almost add, fortunately—the most sacred name *Devá* is not here perverted, as it was in Avestan Ragha, and as it unfortunately became at last universally in Iran. In Ragha it became permanently the designation of the evil Spiritual Hosts. *Baga* (*Bagha*) was the word made use of upon the Inscriptions for the Deity, and this with no evil connotation as regards the character of the being or beings believed in—in fact, 'goodness' is fully implied in the word. It is a strange historical fact that a glorious name should have been dethroned within one vast territory alone, while it has remained undisturbed over all India, Europe, and the European West—as *Devá*, *Deus*, *Zio*, *Dia*, *Dews*. Yet, while the name became so sadly degraded before and after Darius, in (nearly) all the territory included within his Empire and even in that bordering upon his central province, it nowhere appears for good or ill upon his Inscriptions or upon those of his line. It would be daring to risk once more the hypothesis of 'intention' in such an omission. This would be to attribute to Darius too close a mental analysis as to the subjects involved, momentous though they were. It is more likely that the omission was purely accidental. The very form of Mazda-worship which prevailed at the Persian capital was more Vedic, and, shall we say, more original—judging from this negative respect for the Vedic word—than that which was developing with such strides in the northern province, and which was destined to become universal throughout Iran. This fact obtrudes itself, but it is very difficult to explain how an otherwise universal, nay, almost a supreme expression, came to be omitted, and that for either good or evil. The word soon differentiated the two branches of the Asiatic Aryan race as a chief name for 'God.' The highest word in the oldest half-world becomes the lowest in the new. This is a plain and most convincing proof that a Mazda-worship of a *quasi*-pre-Vedic type prevailed not only in Persia proper, but everywhere in Central Asia, at a very early period before any *other* form of worship now known there had appeared, and indeed before future *Rishis* ever invaded the southern peninsula.*

(*f*) *Dualism.*—Close upon this follows the still more vital question as to how far Darius, with his teachers, accepted *dualism*. That this relatively profound doctrine was brought into greater prominence through the animosities of that conflict which induced Zarathushtra, or his predecessors, to turn one of the very names for 'god' into their name for 'demon' seems probable. The fury of the reform movement must at times have become acute; and this all the more decided Zarathushtra to pronounce the one formula of all time for such a doctrine.† He saw, as most people—if dimly—

* As the Avesta has it, a *Moghuṭbish*, 'Magian-hater'; the *o* in *Moghu* taking the place of *a* in *Magha*. This is simply due to epenthesis, anticipating the final *u*, whereby *a + u = o*; while the final *u* in place of *a* is a mere shifting of the suffix. A great many roots exhibit a similar variety of forms. Some might dispute the validity of this comparison with the Gāthic *Maga*, but they will not question that with Av. *Moghu*.

* Attention should be called to the expression recorded of Cyrus in 2 Ch 36^{23}, as in Ezr 1^{2}, where he is cited as speaking of the Almighty as 'the God of heaven.' Was not this *Devá*, 'Heaven-god,' pure and simple? The expression seems undoubtedly exilic.

† See *Yasna* xxx.

saw and see, that the two forces in the Universe tending towards good and evil were the more distinctly severed, since the masses whom he most accused of infamy sang aloud their hymns to *devâs* (beings called their gods). But did Darius share this view?

All the elements of antagonism are more in evidence upon the Inscriptions than in most Iranian writings. Everywhere there is denunciation side by side with adoration (see above); and the question whether Darius had actually accepted the clearly defined formulas of Zarathushtra and his predecessors or not is hardly to be considered of secondary importance. It is simply a question—though a somewhat fine one—of fact. One able writer* speaks broadly and familiarly even of the excessive 'dualism' of the NT with its Satanic and demoniac manifestations, though a definite theoretical dualism is alone in question wherever the discussion reaches to ultimate, or rather primordial, origins. Whether, viewed in this light, some of the Jews of the OT were not actually dualists is also a serious question, which demands a word of attention here in view of the close connexion between it and the case of Darius.

A comparison between Jahweh Elohîm and the gods of the nations is often instituted in the OT, and this involves the *recognition of the existence* of those supposed supernatural beings. It remains for us simply to ask whether the Jews—leaders or laymen—ever really believed that the Supreme *Jahweh* was the responsible creator of those diabolical personal accretions or not. Can we suppose for a moment that they held to such a view, or even believed that these fell creatures unfolded themselves, through a degeneration, under the eye and hand of an Almighty Providence. It is quite clear that they never thought of such a problem; but if they held these evil beings to be of separate origin, this involves at once a theoretical dualism. They may not have held distinctly to the doctrine that there were Two First Spirits, but some of them must have come pretty near it. So also must the religious section of the countrymen of Darius, the priests of Old Persia proper; but where is the trace of a *definitely co-ordinated statement* of it in the Inscriptions?

(*g*) *Eschatology.*—Where, amid all their contents and allusions, is there a trace of any theological eschatology in the Inscriptions? The Avesta is one mass of eschatology, but we are startlingly reminded of pre-exilic Israel when we find upon the Inscriptions rewards held out *for this life only.* Where, as has so often been asked, is the doctrine of immortality to be found in the OT prior to the Exile, although the Avesta and post-exilic Pharisaism are quite full of it? Where is it in the Behistûn Inscriptions? Where is the Avestan and the exilic final judgment in our own pre-exilic theology? The latter conception is equally absent from these Persian panels, which, we should say, were the very place for it. Where is the Heaven of the Avesta, with its golden thrones, upon which sit Justice, Love, and Order, as archangels?† The notion of future reward in Heaven is as foreign to the Behistûn Inscriptions as it is to Moses. And where is there a trace of a *millennium*?

(*h*) *Soteriology.*—We should naturally expect also to find in the Inscriptions some allusion to a coming Restorer, like the one expected in the Avesta and in exilic Israel, all the more so because the texts in question breathe hope as they denounce offences—both on an almost unprecedented scale; but there is no trace of such a concept there any more than there is in the pre-exilic books of the OT. The composer's mind seems wholly possessed with the conviction that a supreme, all-powerful, and good God was watching over every circumstance within His immense dominions. Darius seems to have risen each day with the burden of a new civil war within some twenty-three nationalities, each with its kinglet. His faith, at times somewhat like a fixed idea, at times perhaps affected, convinced him that God's activity extended to a minute administration of compensatory justice, which was, however, to have its effect *now*, and *now only*, in this present life. Perhaps he felt that only a supernatural power could have made his past position possible for so long a time. He prays to Auramazda in terms largely stereotyped by his successors, although in the most striking of these prayers recorded he is not so closely imitated (see the passage cited below). But, fervent as are the prayers of Darius, and signal as is his testimony to the unity of God, and His creative energy and providential omnipotence, the eschatology of the Inscriptions is a blank. The writer seems to have been so full of God—or so engrossed with business—that he could not think of anything further that was supernatural. We may compare the OT book of Ecclesiastes, which urges in touching terms the 'remembrance of the Creator' (12^1, if the passage belong to the original and the tr. be correct), but cares little for objective futurity. Koheleth is not disturbed by the failure of retributive justice in this world; he sees little difference between the treatment of the evil and the good; yet he has no dream of a future judgment, or even of any life at all beyond the grave. The same appears to be the case with Darius. What is true of Behistûn holds also for Persepolis, Naksh-i-Rustam, and the other Inscriptions; for, as was said above, the expressions later become stereotyped. Hence they, too, must have had predecessors of a fixed type, all of which goes to prove that Darius was not the spokesman of an innovating creed. Though he was the first prominent prophet of his theology, that theology was thoroughly Old Persian and *sui generis.* It was in the *North* that detailed eschatology flourished. There it was a concentration of the original elements of the primeval doctrine, and was destined, as said above, to spread over all Iran; whereas in Persia proper (the present *Fârsistân*), which was more specifically Darius's home, the primeval lore of Veda and Avesta had, if anything, rather stagnated. Such are our conclusions from the obvious facts. The Behistûn columns are almost *the* document of the Divine unity, creative energy, and providential omnipotence, as they are also the exemplar of intense spiritual fervour, in view of these doctrines; but they are absolutely silent about the other life, whereas, at the very moment when they were being composed, the Avesta and some of the exilic and post-exilic books of the OT contained the standard records of those doctrines of futurity—a sort of *Christianity before Christ.**

As a valuable specimen of the intense religious fervour of the chief composer of the Inscriptions, we may cite a few lines from the sister inscription of Naksh-i-Rustam at the tomb of Darius, near Persepolis: 'A great God is Auramazda, who made this earth and yon heaven,† who made man and amenity (civilization) for men, who made Darius king—the one king of many, the one commander of many.‡ I am Darius, the great king, the King of Kings,§ the king of the lands of all tribes, the king of

* Erik Stave, *Über den Einfluss des Parsismus*, Haarlem, 1898.

† Cf. the twelve thrones of Mt 19^{28} ‖ Lk 22^{30} (cf. Rev 20^4).

* Common to the Avesta and post-exilic Pharisaism are, in addition to the three doctrines specified above, the doctrines of immortality, resurrection, final personal judgment, millennium, Heaven and Hell, while the Avesta has the prior claim to be termed the document of these views, owing to their long native growth in Iran, centuries before they became the elements of post-exilic Pharisaism.

† This expression occurs about a dozen times within the short Inscriptions; 'yon Heaven' is also very Avestan in its ring.

‡ His authority was effective.

§ Notice that this expression was Aryan, for Darius must have

this great earth for afar,* the son of Vishtāspa, the Achæmenid, a Persian, son of a Persian, an Aryan of Aryan race. Through the grace of Auramazda these are the lands which I captured beyond Persia. . . . I conquered them—beyond Persia. I brought them under my authority. They brought me tribute.† What I said to them that they did.† The law which was promulgated by me, which was mine, was maintained.† [Here follows a list of the provinces or sub-kingdoms]. . . . (Thus) saith Darius, As Auramazda saw this earth . . . in war . . . (?) he delivered it over to me : ‡ he made me (its) king : I am king. Through the gracious will of Auramazda have I settled this earth through my throne § [or 'through my government,' or 'under my throne'; others render 'in place,' 'to rights': but see the same word 'throne' just under]. What I said, that was fulfilled as was my wish.† If thou thus thinkest "How manifold are the lands which Darius the King governed," then look upon this sculpture which bears my throne, that thou mayest know. Then it will be known to thee that the lance of the Persian hero has reached afar; then wilt thou know that the Persian hero has fought battles far from Persia. (Thus) saith Darius, the king, What I have done, I have done all through the gracious will of Auramazda. Auramazda gave me aid ‖ till I had completed this work. May Auramazda protect me, and my clan, and this province against . . . hosts (?). For this I pray ¶ Auramazda—this may Auramazda afford me. O man, may what is the command of Auramazda be to thee acceptable, let that not be obsolete (or repulsive) to thee. Leave not the right way.** Sin not.'††

(*i*) *Darius as a restorer of temples.*—As bearing upon 2 Ch 36[23] and Ezr 1[2ff.] and the marvellous assertions of Is 44 f., we have the valuable statement that Darius restored the *āyadana*, 'places of sacrifice'; so the Susian and Babylonian translations render the word. An activity in the construction, or re-construction, of temples in general is also perhaps later shown in regard to the *apadāna* in the inscription of Artaxerxes Mnemon found at Susa upon one of the ruined columns of an ancient hall. He seems to have re(?)-placed the images of the Daric-Avestan Anāhita and Mithra in the *apadāna*, which, if not actually and exclusively a temple, was obviously an edifice fitted for the reception of figures of those two most prominent Avestan sub-deities. If, then, Darius at once restored the places of worship [note that the *āyadana*, at least, were not necessarily actually 'temples'],‡‡ this recalls the restoration of the gods of Sumer and Akkad to their own homes by Cyrus immediately after his first conquest of Babylon, and shows all the more clearly the general policy of the Achæmenians as regards such acts of courtesy towards the religious feelings of their newly conquered subjects. This makes the decree of Cyrus for the restoration of the Jewish temple all the more credible.

7. Political and military history.—As to the importance of Daric Behistūn, with its companions and successors, for military and political history, little needs to be added here. As is known, Iranian history without the Achæmenian Inscriptions was for a long period a blank, and until they were deciphered by our own eminent Rawlinson, these now leading sources were ridiculously misunderstood and curiously misleading.* We are now assured of those vast political and military movements which took place in Central Asia, upon which the history of the Asiatic, and, indeed, of the whole world, so largely depended. But to us chief among them are those events under whose influence Israel became Persian for two centuries or more, and which determined what we must regard—even if we view them from an anti-Christian standpoint—as stupendous religious circumstances, which, however trivial they may have seemed to the Persian Government, and however relatively insignificant they may really have been in comparison with the other great facts which were then transpiring in province after province of the Achæmenian Empire, must yet force themselves upon us as crucial for all time. Had not Zion become Persian, she would have remained Babylonian, and might never have 'reared her head'; and the dawn of that day might have been hindered when Jesus, the Christ, was to preach within the porches of her temple, and expiate on Calvary the sins of both Jews and Gentiles.

8. The Parthian Inscription at the foot of Behistūn.—This bas-relief contains two distinct compositions. In one of them were sculptured colossal bearded figures, from 8 to 9 ft. in height. Only three of these, however, are still approximately complete. This relatively valuable relief has unfortunately suffered from the vanity and folly of a 'Persian overlord,' one Shaikh 'Alī Khān Zanganah, who, about a hundred years ago, had a large panel cut in the middle of the monument, in the hope of immortalizing (in Arabic) the memory of his own beneficence in building a caravanserai at Bīsitūn and supporting it from the tribute of two villages. This vandalizing abomination extends to 12 ft. in width, and rises to the top of the panel. In the other part of the composition, the figures are in lower relief and on a smaller scale; and, though they are much mutilated, it is possible to make out some details. In the centre is a horseman, and above his head is a winged figure about to crown him with a wreath. He is unhorsing a second horseman. From the mutilated inscription † we learn that the victorious cavalier represents the Parthian king Gotarzes (A.D. 46–50) overcoming his opponent Meherdates, who was also a Parthian. Behind Gotarzes are the remains of another figure with lance in rest.

9. The extensive hewn panel-surface.—Near the middle of the base of the rock and almost opposite the village, a huge bare space attracts the eye. It measures nearly five hundred feet in breadth and over a hundred feet in height.‡ The tool-marks of the stone-cutters are in curved lines, and above the cutting the natural rock in some places projects several feet. In front of it is a terrace or platform, made of earth and rocks heaped up and extending forward for a distance of nearly 300 feet. At the end of this appear the remains of a massive wall. Some writers hold this space to have been prepared for the reception of

adopted it from remotely distant predecessors. A similar form seems to have been adopted in the Scriptures, where, however, it is seldom applied to a human monarch. Its original use in Iran doubtless preceded its occurrence in Ezk 26[7].

* This expression 'for afar' seems thrown in to modify his 'universal' statement. Notice that the terms were doubtless inherited from his ancestors, as was the original of the Scriptural terms cited at the end of 2 Ch. and at the beginning of Ezra as originating from Cyrus: 'All the kingdoms of the earth hath the Lord, the God of heaven (Deva?), delivered over unto me.'

† Notice these emphatic assertions as regards the colossal successes; they are by no means wasted words.

‡ He checked all interior conflicts, and established approximately complete 'guarantees of peace' between some twenty-three otherwise conflicting nationalities. See the note above on p. 451[b], referring to the passage from 2 Chronicles and from Ezra.

§ This is the present writer's suggestion; see the word *gâthum* just below.

‖ This expression, with the most incisive evidence of *some kind* of personal faith in God, recurs about thirty times within the inscriptions, showing perhaps the highest intensity of such a fervour ever recorded, in view of the necessarily limited extent of the inscription when regarded as mere literature. It indicates a fervour surpassed only, if at all, by what we read in the Psalms.

¶ Note his actual prayer in the first person singular present.

** Note the absolute necessity of recognizing this exhortation in the moral sense; and cf. the Gāthic passages where the same expression is used ('the straight paths in which Ahura lives . . . in the paths of the Good Mind [the good man] . . ., the straight paths of welfare . . .,' etc. [*Yasna* 33, 5; 34, 12; 53, 2]).

†† *Naksh-i-Rustam*, 1–22, 31–60.

‡‡ Recall Herodotus' remark (i. 131) that the 'Persians have no temples.'

* Recall among interpretations the truly quaint opinion of Ker Porter, that the nine (?) captive kings, whose names we now read so easily, were the representatives of the ten (?) lost tribes of Israel.

† For the discussion of the text, which, but for the name 'Gotarzes,' has now all but disappeared, see Justi, *GIrP* ii. 504 f.

‡ See A. V. Williams Jackson (*Persia Past and Present*, p. 188), who says he made a special study of the rock-surface and 'paced off' its breadth.

an inscription, in spite of its enormous dimensions (so de Morgan, cited by Jackson). Others, judging from the large platform, suppose that it was meant to be the back-wall of a palace (so King and Thompson). Nothing is written upon it.

10. The site of an ancient building.—From the foot of the cliff the site of an ancient building is to be recognized, with the outlines of its walls. It is called by the natives *Gāh-i Kai Khosru*, 'the seat of Kai Khosru,' the Sasanian king (A.D. 531–578)—possibly with some reason, though there is nothing further to indicate the accuracy of such a tradition.

11. The monolith.—At a quarter of a mile from the mountain or rock, there lies a sort of huge boulder, about 20 ft. in circumference and 10 in height. It is carved on three sides with life-sized figures in low relief. The central figure is described as bearded, with moustache, and wearing a round cap, and a necklace at the throat, some rings of the necklace being still distinctly visible. It has a close-fitting, undecorated upper garment, girdled; the right hand is extended over a low column, which may be a fire-altar, and the left holds some object, possibly a cup. The legs are very thick, and apart as if in walking, while their lower parts are covered with leggings which look like 'those of a cricketer.' Jackson suggests a Magian priest. King and Thompson speak of a king; and a king might be a priest. The second figure is on the right-hand side of the boulder. It is smooth-faced—the effect suggesting the head of a woman or of a boy. There is a necklace about the throat, and a bracelet on the left arm. The third figure on the left side of the boulder is again bearded; the pose is life-like. Jackson thought the figures were Achæmenian, from the absence of flowing trousers and balloon-shaped hats; King and Thompson regard them as Sasanian, mentioning the 'streamers' on the central figure. No writing is recorded as having been discovered upon this monolith.*

LITERATURE.—For the history of the decipherment of the Persian cuneiform Inscriptions, etc., see H. Rawlinson, *JRAS* x. 3 ff.; Spiegel, *Die altpers. Keilinschriften*, Leipzig, 1881, p. 133 ff.; Fleming, *Beitrage zur Assyriologie*, vol. ii. 1894; Weissbach, in *GIrP*, vol. ii. 1896, etc. p. 64 ff.; King, *Assyrian Language*, 1901, p. 18 ff.; Booth, *Decipherment of the Trilingual Cuneiform Inscriptions*, 1902, p. 149 ff.; Williams Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, 1906; Mills, *Zarathushtra, Philo, the Achæmenids, and Israel*, 1906, vol. ii. *passim*; Sayce, *The Archæology of Cuneiform Inscriptions*, 1907. See also art. ACHÆMENIANS.

L. H. MILLS.

BEHMEN.—See BOEHME.

BEING.—The term 'Being' indicates the subject-matter of Metaphysics in general, although it is usually discussed under the particular head of Ontology. As a problem, Being is discussed with the aim of discovering a criterion of reality which shall interpret the phenomena of nature and consciousness, whose objective and subjective data respectively are elaborated in the forms of Cosmology and Psychology.

1. History of the term.—The terminology of the fundamental metaphysical principle shows how Western thought is indebted to the Greeks and the Germans; from the one we receive the expression *ὄν*, from the other the term *Ding*. With the early Greek philosophers are found *κόσμος* (Parmenides, 92; Heraclitus, 20) and *φύσις* (Parm. 133; Herac. 2). Parmenides, who usually speaks of Being as *ἔστιν εἶναι*, also uses the more suggestive term *ἐόν* (59, 91); and, according to some authorities, Melissus uses *περὶ ὄντος* as the title to his work (Erdmann, *Hist. Philos.* § 38. 1). Plato selects *οὐσία* to indicate the subject of Being, and looks upon this as *ἰδέα* (*Rep.* vii. 533–534); at the same time, when he speaks of the reality of the Idea, he indicates it by *ὄντως* (*ib.* ix. 585). Aristotle popularizes *οὐσία* by placing it first among the categories (*Met.* vi. 1), and reduces Eleatic Being to *τὸ ὄν*. The weight of Greek philosophy was turned in favour of *οὐσία* as a concept, and of *ὄν* as a term.

From Latin writers come the terms *essentia* and *substantia*. Seneca uses *substantia* in *Ep.* 113. 4, but seems more inclined towards *essentia* (*Ep.* 58). Quintilian uses *substantia* (viii. 3. 33). Mediæval writers vacillate between these classic terms, but theological motives incline them to *essentia* as a more appropriate characterization of the Divine Being. Among these Augustine was the earliest and most influential, and it is significant that, as a Christian, he unites the idea of God with the antique *οὐσία* and *essentia*. 'Essentiam dico, quæ *οὐσία* Græce dicitur, quam usitatius substantiam vocamus' (*de Trin.* v. 9). When Anselm seeks the most general predicate of things, he follows Augustinian terminology and thus prefers *essentia* to *substantia* (Erdmann, § 156. 3). Aquinas employs both *essentia* and *substantia*. In the strife between Nominalist and Realist, there comes about a change in terminology when *realia* is put as the predicate of *universalia*. The defender of the orthodox, or Realistic, view was called a *realis* (Erdmann, § 158). Abelard introduces *realiter* into the discussion of the problem (Eucken, *Gesch. d. philos. Terminol.* p. 65), while, at a later period, Duns Scotus adds *realitas* (*ib.* p. 68). English thought, as in Locke, was inclined to adopt 'substance' and 'essence' as expressions of Being, while the Germans use the Greek *ὄν* and the Latin *res*. Meister Eckhart uses *Dink* (*Meister Eckhart u. s. Junger*, ed. Jostes, pp. 66, 89, 90, etc.), as also *Ding* (*ib.* pp. 1, 80, etc.). Eckhart further employs *wurklich* (*ib.* p. 86, etc.). Clauberg the Cartesian originated 'ontosophy' (*Metaphysica de ente quæ rectius Ontosophia*, 1660). Kant's preference for *Ding* is well known; Herbart uses *real*.

2. History of the subject.—The 7th cent. B.C. marks the beginning of ontological study. In China, Lao-tse, the founder of Taoism, advanced a metaphysical conception of Being under the head of *Tao*, or 'Nature.' Lao-tse gives the *Tao* a purely negative significance, and from it follows a nihilistic morality of 'doing nothing.' Like the emptiness of a clay vessel, the hollow of an axle, the open space of a door, the *Tao* consists of nothing (*Tao Teh King*, i. 11); yet from it were all things produced (*ib.* ii. 42). Among the ancient Hindus, the development of the philosophic Veda resulted in a more intellectualistic conception of Being. The Upaniṣads advance the idea of world-unity, and in their spiritual monism identify Nature with the Ego. As the juices of plants unite in honey, as rivers mingle in the sea, as salt pervades the ocean, so one element is found in all things. Thus teaches the Veda, whose philosophic formula is found in the following expression: 'That which is that subtle essence—in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the self, and thou art it—*tat tvam asi*' (*Chhāndogya Upan.* vi. 8 ff.). This lofty conception of Being was unknown to the Greeks, for it did not receive recognition in Europe until 1801–1802, when Anquetil du Perron translated the Upaniṣads, whence it was taken up by Schopenhauer in 1819 and related to German philosophy.

Among the Greeks, the preparation for a genuine conception of Being was made by the primitive Ionian philosophers, or physicists, who sought to explain Nature in terms of such physical phenomena as water, air, ether. In a more worthy fashion,

* For other descriptions of this monolith see Oskar Mann, *Globus*, vol. lxxxiii. No. 21, June 1903, p. 328; Williams Jackson *Persia Past and Present*, New York, 1906, p. 210 ff.

Parmenides develops a static monism which is directed against the ideas of both not-Being and Becoming; at the same time, it is sufficiently intellectualistic to identify Thought and Thing. In this spirit, he declares that Thinking and Being are the same—*τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι* (40). It is Being that is truly existent and not not-Being—*ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ εἶναι* (43–44). This rather pointless utterance seems to indicate that, while Being exists as something permanent in thought, not-Being is an appearance which exists only in perception—*δόξα*. In opposition to this static view, Heraclitus urges that Becoming is the highest principle, and points out that, since all things change—*πάντα ῥεῖ*—there is no principle of permanence to be found (see 90–91). Plato's speculative philosophy tends to reconcile the opposed views of Parmenides, who taught him to seek the unchanging as the real, and Heraclitus, from whom he learned that substance could not be found in ever-changing phenomena. Plato's own conception of Being reposes in his theory of Ideas, which latter represent realities in the midst of changing phenomena. The Idea, or Concept, not only includes various things under it, but exercises a certain ontological function among them, giving them of its own reality. On the practical side, the Idea is the perfect type, of which the individual thing is an inferior imitation. This plastic conception of Ideas leads Plato to ascribe objective reality to them. The ground of this profound view seems to be found in the principle of permanence. The Idea possesses Being because it is permanent, while the individual thing is unreal because it constantly changes. In the myth of the *Phædrus* (247), the Idea is looked upon as the 'colourless, formless, and intangible essence,' which becomes visible to the mind as the latter rises to the celestial regions. In the *Parmenides* dialogue, the unity and permanence of the objective Idea are pointed out. In contrast to Plato, Aristotle emphasizes the *dynamic* phase of reality, and develops a view which, with appropriate intellectualistic qualifications, is energistic. In the Aristotelian metaphysics, the principle of Form takes the place of the Platonic Idea. This Form is contrasted with Matter, and both are regarded as causes, in addition to which are two others—Efficient and Final. These four principles constitute the foundation of Aristotle's notion of Being (*Met.* i. 3). Aristotle thus inclines towards a causal conception of Being, where Plato had introduced a substantial one. In general, the results of Greek philosophy were idealistic and static; they inculcated a spirit which was plastic and formal.

While Christianity, which had its root in practical Semitic traditions, had no systematic philosophy to offer, it furnished subsequent speculation with ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God. At the same time, there resulted a new metaphysics which was marked by the methods of *inwardness* and *transcendentalism*. With Plotinus, the classic conception of Reality was superseded by 'that nature which is beyond Being' (*Enneads*, xiv.). And that which is *ultra esse* is also *ultra percipi*, so that it is known only by means of ecstatic contemplation. Augustine is less mystical in his deduction of *sensus interior*, for it is in a more psychological manner that he seeks to prove the existence of the self. His method, which a thousand years later was made famous by Descartes, is the sceptical one, in accordance with which the *dubito* implies a *cogito* (*Beata Vita*, § 7; *Solil.* ii. § 1; *de Trin.* x. § 14). According to the same method, the Being of God is deduced (*Confess.* x. 40). In Scholastic philosophy, the doctrine of Being connects itself with the idea of God and the nature of the Catholic Church. Anselm, following Augustine, endeavours to deduce the Being of God from the idea which we have of Him: for the Being of God which is both *in intellectu et in re* is more perfect as an idea than that which is *in intellectu solo* (*Proslog.* ii.). There is a second way in which the idealism of Plato was united in Scholastic fashion with the Christian religion; that is, in the opposition between Nominalism and Realism, which led to the conflicting metaphysical mottoes 'universalia sunt nomina,' 'universalia sunt realia.' The resulting conception of Being was something more than the plastic one of Plato; it was both internal and universal. For modern thinking, the way was still further prepared by the conflict over the supremacy of intellect (Thomas Aquinas) and will (Duns Scotus). Intellectualistic Thomism re-appeared in Cudworth's *Intellectual System* and Clarke's *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God.* The voluntarism of Scotus ('Quaestiones in secundum librum sententiarum,' Distinc. xlii. [Op. xiii. p. 443]) was unconsciously imitated by Kant and Schopenhauer, and by them related to the modern psychology of the will.

Modernism (which is not quite independent of a mediævalism which, in the instance of Cassiodorus, used the term *modernus* in the 6th cent.) witnessed a continuation of Christian views of Being in Descartes's scepticism. Like Augustine, Descartes connects *cogito* with *dubito*, and to the *cogito* adds *ergo sum.* Doubting is thinking, and thinking is existing. In this fashion, the Cartesian '*Cogito, ergo sum*' (*Medit.* ii.) evinces the *inness* of the Christian conception of Being, while his Anselmic ontology rehabilitates the ideal of *transcendence.* Descartes, whose psychology lacks sufficient content, states the modern problem of Being, and prepares the way for Spinoza, whose mediæval forerunner was Averroës. Spinoza revises Descartes's view of mind and matter by regarding them, not as *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, but as the attributes—*cogitatio* and *extensio*—of the one substance. The result of his teaching is a rationalistic monism which identifies Being with Nature, and sets up a parallelism between mind and body. Leibniz, who makes possible the transition to Kant, takes a pluralistic view of Being, and regards the world as made up of an indefinite number of monads, which still admit of unity in the world-whole, since they, being reflexions of the same world, represent reality in different grades of perception (*Monadology*, § 14) and participate in the one world-plan by means of 'pre-established harmony' (*New System*, 1695).

From dogmatism, Kant led modern metaphysics into criticism. Not only does he oppose his modern forerunners, but he defies the whole Indo-Germanic tendency which in Vedānta, Platonism, and Spinozism had united Being with Thinking. In a certain sense, it was a sort of Semitism which led Kant to affirm the supremacy of practical reason, and to put ethics in the place of logic. Kant creates a dualism between Reason and Reality, between Thinking and Being, and thus declares that we cannot know things-in-themselves. First in order, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which leads to this conception, is the idealization of Time and Space ('Trans. Æsthetic'), both of which Kant regards, not as objective things, but as purely subjective and yet permanent forms of sense. Kant's motive for making Space and Time intuitive does not appear in the 'Æsthetic,' but is confessed later on in the discussion of the 'Antinomies of Cosmology.' Here, in commenting upon the inevitable contradictions of reason, in connexion with which one may with equal cogency argue for the finitude or the infinitude of the world in time and space, Kant points out that these forms of sense are purely subjective, so that our attempt

to find the beginning of the world in time and its limits in space is a regressus of representations, but not ontological progress (*Kritik*, pp. 505–507). Therefore, God as the creator of the world, the soul as eternal, the world as a whole—can never be known by the human mind. The categories of Quantity and Quality, Causality and Substance are deduced transcendentally from the understanding itself (*ib.* p. 77 ff.), but the application of these is determined by the conditions of a possible experience (*ib.* p. 115), and thus relates to the world of phenomena, not to that of noumena (*ib.* p. 236). Mathematics and physics are made possible by a transcendental method which forbids all metaphysical and theological reasoning. Kant's constructive theory of Being appears in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Metaphysic of Morals*, where he seeks to show how God, Freedom, and Immortality, which are not premisses of the speculative understanding, are still involved as 'postulates' of practical reason.

Romantic philosophy in Germany accepted Kant's transcendental *method* of deducing knowledge from the understanding itself, but did not find it necessary to adopt the restrictive *results* of his investigation. Fichte found Being to consist in the self-positing '*Ich*, whose fate it is to oppose itself to the *nicht-Ich* for the sake of achieving moral destiny' (*Wissenschaftslehre*). Schelling's notion of Being recalls the monism of Spinoza; yet, when Schelling seeks in his *Identitatsphilosophie* to reconcile Being and Thinking as opposites, he employs an *æsthetical* method. Hegel accomplishes this same reconciliation by means of the *logical* evolution of Being, through stages of *Sein*, *Dasein*, *Fursichsein*, which correspond to the familiar metaphysical divisions of Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology. Realistic philosophy in Germany found expression, first of all, in Herbart, who notes Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena, and yet believes that appearance is a sure indication of reality—*Wie viel Schein so viel Hindeutung auf Sein* (*Allgemeine Met.* § 307). With this assumption of modern Realism before him, Herbart constructs a static pluralism which seems to unite Parmenides with Leibniz; at the same time, and, after the manner of Aquinas and Descartes, he elaborates an intellectualistic view of the soul as the function of representation. Schopenhauer accepts Kant's doctrine of Time, Space, and Causality, and relates these to the 'world as idea' (*Vorstellung*). Reality is found in the will, which is the true thing-in-itself, known immediately to the mind (*Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, § 1). To be is thus to will, and the various kinds of Being—mineral, vegetable, animal, human—are so many grades of objectification of the will-to-live (*ib.* §§ 21, 23). As another realist, Lotze heeds Kant's warning against the empty thing-in-itself and seeks Being in connexion with its qualities. The origin of Being he puts down as unknowable (*Met.* 5), and turns away from the idea of 'pure Being' as something fictitious (*ib.* §§ 8, 9). Lotze follows Herbart in making Being consist of relation, and formulates the expression, 'A thing is the realized individual law of its behaviour' (*ib.* § 36).

3. The philosophy of Being.—The history thus presents some general principles, and indicates certain points by way of thought and terminology which speculation may fitly use. In contrast with the ancient setting of the problem, which consisted in a conflict between Being and not-Being, modern metaphysics involves the more decisive antithesis between the real and the phenomenal, between thing and appearance. The modern conception is further enriched by a psychological content which enables the thinker to re-cast formal distinctions concerning Being in general upon the basis of consciousness.

From the standpoint of methodology, two considerations seem to guide all metaphysical speculations: on the one side, thought is based upon the principle of *Substance*, on the other it is swayed by that of *Causality*. Behind this distinction between the substantial and the causal categories lies the difference between the laws of the mind—*principium identitatis, principium rationis sufficientis*. The Principle of Identity, which asserts that everything is what it is, persuades speculation to premise an immutable Being which ever maintains its identity in the midst of change. In another way, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which affirms that everything that happens has a cause, makes possible a second method of speculation which is as anxious to account for *change* as the first one was to elucidate Being. As a result, philosophy has witnessed the development of a *static* conception of Being, which, with Parmenides, Plato, and Spinoza, has exalted Substance to the highest station. Parallel to this, a *dynamic* conception of the problem led to a more active formulation of the world-course, and, with Heraclitus, Aristotle, and Leibniz, it tended to raise Causality to a similar eminence. In keeping with this broad and far-reaching distinction, modern philosophy has re-cast this difference between the substantial and the causal so that it assumes the contrast of *intellect* and *will*. The static Principle of Identity led metaphysics to postulate a Substance as the true expression of Being, and it was urged accordingly that a thing cannot *possess* qualities unless it exist as something superior to them; while the dynamic principle felt itself confronted by a series of changes for which a Sufficient Cause must be furnished. Substantial *intellectualism*, as defended by Aquinas, Descartes, Herbart, and Lotze, sought to show how a thing must exist before it can act; while, in opposition to this dogmatic view, the causal *voluntarism* of Scotus, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Wundt found the Being of things to consist in the active principle which ruled their several states of change. Where the substantial view prevailed, it was 'No causality without substance'; the causalist retorted, '*Keine Substantialitat ohne Causalitat*' (Wundt, *Syst. d. Philos.* p. 312). Of these two schools, the static, substantial, intellectual one is the more orthodox; the dynamic, causal, voluntaristic one is more advanced and critical. The perpetual conflict between the two may be seen in Aristotle's criticism of Plato; Scotus's opposition to Aquinas; and Kant's critique of Leibniz's dogmatism. On the purely formal side only two views of Being would thus seem possible.

On behalf of the *substantial view*, it is pointed out that Being has a certain affinity for Substance, and is equally inclined towards the idea of permanence. For this reason the advocate of the substantial view has not found it necessary to defend a notion which consisted in the mere assertion of what seemed obvious. If anything *is*, it must be substantial, and that which is in a state of constant change cannot be real. The inherent weakness of this view of Being became manifest when the metaphysics of substantialism endeavoured to relate the world of concepts to the world of percepts. Plato's all-sufficient idealism is at variance with the notion of creation developed in the *Timæus*. Mediævalism, with its idea of Being as *essentia*, could hardly advance beyond a negative view of reality. Spinoza regards Substance as self-conceived and self-dependent, but cannot justify the attributes which, with the modifications, represent the actual world of minds and

bodies. Kant, who saw the emptiness of the thing as Substance, placed reality beyond the realm of knowledge. The substantial view has the weakness that its 'Being' never reveals its own properties, and is incapable of explaining the existence of things in human experience. On the psychological side, the substantial view looks upon the mind as something intellectual. Since the path to the mind was originally through *cogito*, as with Augustine and Descartes, it was to be expected that the soul should be looked upon as something intellectual—*res cogitans*. Moreover, consciousness seems ever to have a cognitive form, while mentality itself seems hardly separable from thought. With regard to the conscious content, the richness and manifoldness of the cognitive process seem calculated to express the range of mentality, while there appears to be no recess of the mind which is not accessible to self-conscious thinking. This Cartesian confidence has led philosophy to believe that every act of mind is an operation of thought. Where, as a second process, feeling enters in, its determining feature, as Herbart pointed out, is something which by way of arrest happens to the idea; so that feeling is a consciousness, or a cognition, of our mental state. In the same way, volition is explained away as a *cogitatio volitionis* (Descartes), while the whole mind is surveyed in the light of the supremacy or sufficiency of the intellect.

The *causal view* of Being is critical where the substantial one is constructive and dogmatic. Accordingly, it is claimed that the mere existence of Being explains nothing, inasmuch as it does not account for action which takes place in the world. Where the Law of Identity seems to satisfy the mind that a thing is what it is, as 'Gold is gold,' the Law of Sufficient Reason must further enter in to show how a thing relates to its own qualities, as gold and its colour, its fusibility, its solubility, its value, etc. Hence, in Logic, it is said, 'Gold is yellow in the light, fusible in the fire, soluble in *aqua regia*, valuable in the market,' etc. The Principle of Causality is as efficient in relating a thing to its qualities as the notion of Substance is in adjusting it to itself, and metaphysics since Kant has tried to find not so much the thing-in-itself as the thing in its qualities. Iron does not exist apart from hardness, ductility, and other metallic properties; colour is nothing in independence of qualities, from red to violet; mind does not exist except as thinking, feeling, willing. That which unites these several states in so many distinct groups is the Thing, and in the inviolable connexion among metallic, chromatic, and conscious states is found the Being of metal, of colour, of mind. The causal view of Being relates a thing immanently to its qualities and not transcendentally to its self, and thus it is in a position to explain the manifest fact of change which to substantialism is a paradox. Since Being does not consist in one substance which can never abandon its ontological place, but is the causal principle which relates the various states of Being to one another, it is conceivable that, within the circle of its own qualities, a thing may change from one state to another, just as colour may be red or blue, consciousness may be thought or volition, man may be child or adult. In this spirit Lotze, who departs from the substantial view without accepting the causal one, declares that it is the Thing that changes, not its qualities (*Met.* §§ 21, 24). The causal view, which pays attention to a thing's qualities and its changing states, hopes to find the real as the result of causality.

On the psychological side, the causal view of Being is furthered by voluntarism. This school involves a larger view of mind than that of self-conscious thought, just as it extends its borders beyond the human to the animal mind. The origin of mind seems more intelligible when interpreted voluntaristically, for life begins in action rather than in thought (cf. Paulsen, *Introd. to Philos.* bk. i. ch. i.) Further, the goal of life appears to be set by practical interests rather than by speculative ideals, and life is realized in action rather than in thought. Like Fichte, Faust describes the root of life in the will, and begins his translation of St. John by saying, '*Im Anfang war die That.*' In addition to these popular considerations, voluntarism is entitled to some ontological respect when it is observed how simple and self-evident volition really is. Schopenhauer, who has advanced this view most vigorously, affirmed, 'The will is groundless' (*Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, § 20), for which reason he reduced all reality to it. In this way, the simplicity of the will seems to satisfy the philosophical demand for unity as the essence of reality and mentality. On the psychological side, Höffding has declared, 'As Eros was made one of the oldest and at the same time one of the youngest of the gods (as also the child of poverty and wealth), so the will may, according to the point of view, be represented as the most primitive or as the most complex and derivative of mental products' (*Psych.* ch. vii. § 1). Such considerations seem to indicate that the will, while not so characteristic as cognition, is possessed of as much ontological significance. The substantial view is a survival of an antiquity which reposed in the ideas of the plastic and intellectual; causal voluntarism is the typical modern view of those who are Kantians rather than Platonists. The causal view has the advantage of explaining the world of phenomena as seen in modern science, just as it is in harmony with the modern life-ideal of energism.

A more restricted view of Being is discussed in connexion with *monism* and *dualism* (*qq.v.*). These theories are one remove from the central problem of the real, for they concern themselves with the idea of Being in its forms of the mental and material; nevertheless, modern philosophy has laid upon them a certain amount of metaphysical responsibility. In the larger sense, classic speculation was monistic, while Christianity, with its distinction between the natural and the spiritual, emphasized dualism. But in connexion with philosophy, the issue was not raised until the dawn of modernism, when Descartes separated *mens* from *corpus*, and distinguished *res cogitans* from *res extensa*. At a later date, Wolff distinguished 'monist' from 'dualist,' although at an earlier period Thomas Hyde had employed 'dualism' to describe the religion of Zoroaster. These two theories do not attempt to solve the problem of Being, but confine their attention to the relation existing between its two phases, mind and matter. Of the two, dualism has the advantage on the side of *statement*, when it declares that we are confronted by a twofold series of things, between which there is a causal connexion. But, from the standpoint of *solution*, monism seems to be in the ascendancy, inasmuch as it is better calculated to avoid certain metaphysical pitfalls. The devices of dualism appear at once when Descartes, unable to justify the causal connexion between mind and matter, attributes the interaction to the intervention of the Deity. This precipitated Occasionalism, which looked upon the *motive* which arouses bodily motion, as well as on the *stimulus* which produces sensation, as occasional, but not efficient, causes of the interaction. Man is innocent of it, as we know from the lack of causal consciousness, argues

Geulincx; for, just as Descartes had evinced Being by his *Cogito, ergo sum*, so the want of causal efficiency appears in a *Nescio, ergo non facio* (K. Fischer, *Descartes and his School*, tr. Gordy, p. 532 note). Malebranche accounted for the connexion between stimulus and sensation by declaring, 'Nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu' (*Recherches de la vérité*, p. 378). Leibniz sought to explain apparent interaction by means of a pre-established harmony, in accordance with which the phases of mind and body corresponded, like the dials of two mutually adjusted, but disconnected, clocks (*New System*, 1695)—an analogy which Geulincx before him had employed (*Ethica*, p. 124 note). That which stands in the way of dualistic interaction between the mental and corporeal phases of Being is, first, *causality* which, as a category, seems to be limited to the physical world. At the same time, the scepticism of Hume, the criticism of Kant, and the realism of Lotze tend to make all interaction between things impossible, just as they leave the way open to a view of *causa immanens*, as a result of which all things, material and mental alike, interact by virtue of their participation in the one real Being who is the World-Ground. A second difficulty appears in the form of the *conservation of energy* which, as a physical theory, can suffer no addition to or subtraction from the given amount of energy in nature. Certain curious devices to surmount this difficulty are summed up by Naville (*La Liberté et le déterminisme*, 1890).

Monism, which advances a theory of psycho-physical parallelism between the mental and material phases of Being, tends to do away with the sharp difference between mind and body. Spinoza, who founded monism, makes interaction unnecessary by assuming, 'ordo et connexio rerum idem est atque ordo et connexio idearum' (*Ethica*, lib. ii. prop. vii.). The whole problem, which lapsed for a century between Leibniz and the new psychology, is taken up in a Spinozistic fashion by Hoffding, who declares that 'both the parallelism and the proportionality between the activity of consciousness and cerebral activity point to an identity at bottom. The difference which remains in spite of points of agreement compels us to suppose that one and the same principle has found expression in a double form' (*Psych.* ii. 8). But the monist of to-day, who hesitates to characterize this tertiary principle which embraces mind and body, lapses from the pantheism of Spinoza into an agnosticism of his own. The statement of monism is unsatisfactory in still other ways. On the *logical* side, the Law of Identity prevents our saying 'Mens est corpus,' and it is towards such an identification that the monist constantly tends. Secondly, monism is confronted by an *empirical* challenge, when it seeks to treat mind and body as though they were not dissimilar. Both monism and dualism are shortsighted in regarding mind and body as though they were parallel phases of Being which meet upon the same plane; a more satisfactory view escapes the dilemmas of the problem by relegating the body to a place lower than the ontological position of the mind, as is done by Hegel and Schopenhauer.

The result of this survey of Being as an ontological problem has been to show how a static, substantial, and monistic conception of Being was elaborated by the intellectualism of antiquity; while a dynamic, causal, and dualistic notion was the product of voluntaristic modernity. In general, it appears that Being, which does not consist of any particular thing, is best understood in connexion with the idea of *order*, which with the ancients was κόσμος, with moderns *natura*. *To be* thus means to have position in the one world-order, so that a thing receives reality, not by partaking of a certain imaginary world-stuff, but by participating in the world-order. A critical doctrine of Being will not find it necessary to assume a negative attitude towards phenomena which were prized by the ancients because of their æsthetic fitness, by moderns on account of their scientific significance. At the same time, it is unwise to repose all faith in noumena, as though the world were one of mere things and contained no persons. In the totality of the world of Being, phenomena, noumena, and pneumata have their place, and a theory of reality is compelled to examine the phenomena of inner as well as of outer experience. A total view of Being thus includes humanity and nature, just as it is made up of the world of persons and the world of things.

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BEL.—See BAAL.

BELIAL, BELIAR.—These two names, as will be shown below, are but different forms of the same word. Belial is the older; Beliar is a modification of it.

1. **Belial.** — In the AV Belial was usually rendered as a proper name, as, *e.g.*, 'daughter of Belial' (1 S 1^{16}); but RV usually translates such phrases as though Belial were an adjective. Thus 'daughter of Belial' becomes in RVm 'wicked woman.'

Belial occurs in the earliest strata of the narratives of Judges and Samuel, in writing that is coeval with the J document, if not a part of it. From this time on, the word is used in prose narratives and late poetry as a genitive descriptive of certain classes of people. Thus we find 'man (or men) of Belial' (1 S 25^{25} 30^{22}, 2 S 16^{7} 20^{1}, Pr 6^{12}); 'son (or sons) of Belial' (Dt 13^{13}, Jg 19^{22} 20^{13}, 1 S 2^{12} 10^{27} 25^{17}, 2 S 23^{6}, 1 K $21^{10.\,13}$, 2 Ch 13^{7}); 'daughter of Belial' (1 S 1^{16}); 'person of Belial' (Pr 6^{12}); 'witness of Belial' (Pr 19^{28}); 'counsellor of Belial' (Nah 1^{11} [AV, 'a wicked counsellor']); 'thing of Belial' (Dt 15^{9} [RV 'base thought'], Ps $41^{9\,(8)}$ [RV 'an evil disease'] 101^{3} [RV, 'base thing']). In but two instances in the OT is it used differently: in Ps $18^{5.\,6\,(4.\,5)}$ (=2 S 22^{5}) the 'wadys of Belial' (נחלי בליעל) are made synonymous with the 'cords of death,' 'cords of Sheol,' and 'snares of death,' as though Belial, like Sheol, were a proper name for the under world. Again, in Nah 2^{1} (1^{15}) Belial is used as a name for a great evil power. RV translates it here 'the wicked one.'

There are, then, three uses of the word in the OT: (1) as a genitive, designating a worthless, wicked, or disagreeable person or thing; (2) the under world; and (3) a great wicked power.* Of these uses, the first is by far the most common, there being but one example each of the second and third.

The etymology of Belial has long puzzled interpreters. It is explained in the Talmud (*Sanhedrin*, 111*b*) as from בלי (='without') and עול (='yoke')—an explanation which Rashi echoes (see Rashi on Dt 13^{14}). Cheyne (*loc. cit.*) regards it as from בלי יעלה (='one may not ascend'). He compares the Babylonian *matu la tarat*, the 'land without return,' and believes the word to designate 'the depth which lets no man return,' and so 'the watery abyss.' These two are not quite synonymous in Semitic thought. The 'land without return'

* Cheyne, *Expositor*, 1895, 435-439, held the three uses to mean: (1) 'subterranean waters'; (2) 'hopeless ruin'; and (3) 'worthless scoundrel'; but this classification does not seem so accurate.

would suit the meaning in Ps 18^5 (=2 S 22^5) only. Garvie (Hastings' *DB*, *s.v.*) thinks בל may be for בעל, and יעל philologically changed from יער, the whole meaning 'lord of the forest'—an etymology which, so far as the present writer can see, has nothing to commend it. Hommel (*ExpT* viii. 472) regards it as a transliteration of the Babylonian Belili, with which Cheyne had previously compared it—a deity worshipped in early times who afterwards made a journey to the lower world (cf. Jastrow, *Rel. of Bab. and Ass.* pp. 417, 575, 588, 589, and 593). Baudissin (*ExpT* ix. 40 ff.) and *Oxford Heb. Lexicon* (p. 116*a*) hold to the etymology יעל בלי='without worth.' יעל is a good Hebrew root used only in the Hiph. in the sense of 'avail' 'profit.' This etymology suits the great majority of OT passages. Baudissin regards the meaning 'wickedness' as late. Moore remarks ('Judges' [19^{22}] in *Inter. Crit. Com.*) that the etymology is dubious.

This must be said of the comparison of Belial with Belili: Belial is clearly a designation of Sheol in Ps 18^5, while at the end of the Babylonian poem called 'Ishtar's Descent,' Belili is a sister of Tammuz, whose lover Ishtar rescued him from the under world. If Ps 18 contains an early substratum, or if we may look to poetry, even when late, to preserve archaic usage, we might regard Belial as originally a name for Sheol. Since the shades were unsubstantial beings, Belial as a qualitative genitive might easily come to signify 'worthless,' 'disagreeable,' then 'wicked.' Its application to the arch-enemy in Nahum would also be natural. Briggs ('Psalms,' in *ICC*. i. 142, 152) regards 'worthless' as the original meaning, and the application to Sheol as the derived significance. Its real origin is, however, still obscure.

2. **Beliar.**—Beliar is a later form of Belial, the final liquid *l* having been changed into its kindred liquid *r* in accordance with a phonetic law common to many languages. The earliest occurrence of this form of the name is in the *Sibylline Oracles*, ii. 167 and iii. 63 and 72.* In the former of these passages Beliar is the great evil power of the world, or Antichrist; in the latter, he is represented as an emissary proceeding from Rome. In the *Ascension of Isaiah*, Beliar † is mentioned in the following passages: $1^{8.\ 9}$ 2^4 $3^{11.\ 13}$ $4^{2.\ 4.\ 16.\ 18}$ $5^{1.\ 4.\ 15}$. He is invariably regarded as the Antichrist, or great king of this world who has ruled it since it came into being. In this character he practically takes the place of Satan; king Manasseh is, for example, said (2^4) to have 'turned in his heart to serve Beliar.' In the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs* considerable light is shed on the conceptions of Beliar then current. He is the source of impurity; he sends evil spirits against men; but he cannot overcome a chaste man (Reuben, 2, 4, and 6). His works are to God's law as darkness to light, but the Messiah will bind him (Levi, 18 and 19). He is the source of lying, but he flees from the man who avoids wrath and lies, and the Messiah will wrest from him his captives (Daniel, 5).

The conception of Beliar in this apocryphal literature is identical with that of 2 Co 6^{15}, where, according to the best attested reading, Paul asks: 'What concord hath Christ with Beliar?'—Beliar being evidently equivalent to Satan, or Antichrist.

The character of Beliar as Antichrist is a natural outgrowth of the personification of Belial in Nah 1^{15} (2^1).

LITERATURE.—*ExpT* viii. (1897) 423, 472, ix. 40 ff.; Bousset, *Antichrist Legend*, 1895, pp. 26, 171, 172; Charles, *Ascension of Isaiah*, 1900, p. 7; Kautzsch, *Apokryphen*, 1900, ii. 461; Garvie, in Hastings' *DB* i. 268 f.; Cheyne, *EBi*, col. 525–527; Kohler, *JE* ii. 658.

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BELIEF.—1. Definition.—'Belief' is the mental state of assurance or conviction, the attitude of a mind towards its own experiences in which it accepts and endorses them as referring to reality, as having real significance or value. In taking over the term from popular terminology, Psychology has had to encounter the difficulties usually involved in such transference. The vagueness and consequent ambiguity of a term as popularly employed tend to cling to it when it passes into the hands of the scientist, and it is only after considerable controversy that its connotation settles down into the definite and stable form necessary for scientific purposes. This has been the case with the term 'belief.' By certain writers, *e.g.* Sir W. Hamilton, 'belief' has been employed to denote a state of mind specifically differing from that to which the name 'knowledge' is given, namely, that state in which we accept as true a proposition for which rational grounds are not forthcoming. According to Hamilton, we *believe* first principles or axioms, we *know* whatever is logically deduced from such. James Mill, on the other hand, assigns the name to every species of assurance and conviction, the assurance of what is before our eyes as of that which we only remember or expect; of what we know by direct perception, as well as of what we accept on the evidence of testimony or of reasoning. To this Bain and others have objected that, in the case of a present reality, belief has no place; it can be introduced only by a fiction or figure. The believing state relates to representative not to presentative experiences. The judgment 'I see the sun' is full fruition, the judgment 'I can see the sun by going out of doors' affords scope for belief or disbelief. All these differing views could no doubt be supported and illustrated by reference to popular usage. But, as J. S. Mill properly pointed out, the strife between philosophers 'is not likely to terminate until they perceive that the real question is, not what the distinction is, but what it shall be; what one among several differences already known and recognized the word shall be employed to denote' (*Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 1872, p. 78 n.). The contribution of Brentano has assisted materially towards this desired end. By his analysis of judgment (*Urtheil*) he has been largely instrumental in giving to the concept of belief definiteness and fixity of meaning—logical connotation in short. 'Judgment,' as regarded by Brentano (*Psychologie*, p. 266 ff.), is the attitude of mind assumed towards suggested fact, either by affirmation or denial. It is to be distinguished from the mere thinking of, the simple awareness of, the suggestion; inasmuch as in the act of judgment there goes with the presented suggestion acceptance or rejection on the part of the subject. Stout calls this state 'the Yes-No consciousness,' and proposes to use the two terms 'judgment' and 'belief' as equivalent. There are methodological objections to this, but the suggestion is nevertheless significant. It is more accurate to say, as Baldwin does, that belief is the subjective side of judgment. This statement represents what may be called the prevalent view among present-day psychologists. In the act of belief, then, the individual conscious subject orientates himself towards reality in one of two ways. Either he accepts the suggestion as applying to, as qualifying, reality; or he refuses it, puts it away from him. This latter aspect of the act it is customary to call 'disbelief.' But, as is now generally recognized, disbelief is a kind of belief which, with reference to the particular suggestion, takes a negative form. It, as much as the affirmative form, entails a given attitude on the part of the subject towards the real. The opposite of belief is not disbelief but doubt.

(1) *Psychological character.*—When we directly inspect or introspect this state of consciousness, we find that it possesses a character akin to that

* The variant Belias arose from the naturalizing of the word as a Greek noun.

† The Ethiopic form, Berial, is a corruption.

of an emotional experience. There is a pleasurable sense or feeling of repose, of inward stability, such as comes from the resolution of difficulties, the demolition of obstacles, the harmonizing of conflicting elements. Bagehot has called belief the emotion of conviction. From this point of view, belief may be regarded as a primary psychical experience, a state which cannot be reduced to factors more fundamental than itself. It is contributed to and determined by various psychical factors, but in itself it is distinctive, unique, and unmistakable. It is easily distinguishable from doubt, which, in itself and apart from supporting beliefs, is a disagreeable experience, involving a sense of suspense and strain, of instability and baffiement—a state which the subject normally strives to transcend.

(2) *Belief and the feeling of reality.*—Belief ought to be, but is not always, distinguished from another modification of consciousness, namely, the feeling of reality, or 'reality feeling,' as it is termed by Baldwin, to whom the distinction is due. This is also a primitive and unanalyzable mode of conscious experience. It accompanies simple sense-presentations—a colour, a tone, a smell, etc.; these are 'just there,' coming to us with a vividness and indubitability which put all considerations of accepting or rejecting out of the question. There is no thought of competing or conflicting alternatives; each experience exists, so to speak, absolutely in its own moment and in its own right. To give this state the name of primitive credulity, as Bain does, is to identify different experiences. The 'reality feeling' state, no doubt, furnishes the stuff out of which judgments are formed, but as such it has not arrived at that stage. Judgment involves selection, the definite choice of 'this' from 'other' irrelevant or conflicting so-called facts; and belief, in this regard as the subjective side of judgment, may be called a state of resolved doubt. Now, in the 'reality feeling' state doubt cannot appear.

(3) *Belief and apprehension.*—It is worth while also to insist further on the distinction mentioned above between belief and the mere presence of an idea or complex of ideas, or, as Brentano would say, between 'judgment' and 'apprehension.' The distinction is between thinking of something and accepting that thought as applying to reality. It is possible to entertain an idea, to give it for a time mental hospitality, without coming to the point of definitely assenting to it or definitely refusing to assent to it. We may think, *e.g.*, of Macbeth or Bluebeard, without necessarily involving ourselves, at the time of thinking, in the affirmation or denial of the existence of these personages. The non-scientific person may receive statements as to the speed of light or the distance of the moon from the earth, and feel no obligation to pass a judgment on their truth or falsity. It is no doubt true, as Stout has pointed out, that 'the existence of an object means for us that . . . it forms a determination or qualification of reality in general. Unless the thought of this reality, however vague it may be, is at the same time an affirmation of it, no specific thought of a specific object is possible' (*Analytic Psychology*, i. 112). But this remark affects the case only in the event of the distinction between mere apprehension and belief being drawn so that the latter falls out of cognitive consciousness entirely. It is a relative distinction, in the sense that both members of it must be regarded as aspects of the cognitive act. But, as Stout himself allows, it is ultimate from the point of view of analysis, and is a distinction well worthy of being borne in mind.

(4) *Belief and knowledge.*—It is customary to distinguish 'belief' from 'knowledge,' and some philosophical writers, as we have seen, have drawn a sharp line of demarcation between them. There is, on epistemological grounds, undoubtedly warrant for the distinction. But this must not lead to the conclusion that knowledge is intrinsically different from belief when these two are considered psychologically. From this point of view we may rather say that knowledge is belief at its highest power.

'To know' is to have the completest assurance, to recognize that which is 'known' as definitely and firmly fixed within a system of fact. We can assign the ground for it, *i.e.*, we can show how it is related to and consists with the other elements of the system. We hold it fast. The high degree of assurance here leads to wrong distinctions as in 'I do not believe, I know.' The correct, if pedantic, statement in such a case would be, 'I know and therefore I believe.' 'Knowledge' refers to the objective grounds on which the subjective assurance (belief) rests. It is clear, however, at the same time that the two states are not conterminous. While it is impossible to refer to a knowledge-state which is not also a belief-state, it is, of course, manifest that not every case of belief is a case of knowledge. Thus, truly enough, knowledge is sometimes referred to as a species of the genus belief. Beliefs are judged to be either true or false. This in itself indicates the wider denotation of the term as compared with 'knowledge.' Here it may not be unprofitable to remark that the passing of such judgments involves reference to criteria which are beyond the purview of psychology. Beliefs, 'false' as well as 'true,' are facts of mental experience, and from the psychologist's point of view both are of equal interest and worth. The question for him is not how they come to be valued as true or false, but how they come to be beliefs—this special kind of mental existent. The justification or condemnation of a belief is a logical or epistemological task. The explanation of this belief is another matter. Belief does not inevitably wait upon knowledge; it is not always ratification of a clear insight into the truth of things. On the contrary, belief as a rule is antecedent to knowledge; proof is an afterthought. It is not, therefore, sufficient to refer to the rational grounds of a belief, in the attempt to explain it; the causes which bring it about, the sources from which it derives its vitality, are to be sought not merely in the region of the logical understanding.

2. Factors in Belief.—(1) *The cognitive factor.*—Undoubtedly belief must be in relation to some mode of cognitive consciousness: a sense-percept, a memory-image, an idea or train or complex of ideas. These furnish the immediate points of reference for any belief. The question remains as to how far they may be regarded as the effective causes, the important and central determining factors, in any given case of belief. To put it otherwise, are we to consider the development of belief to be governed by purely cognitive or intellectual conditions?

James Mill, following Hume, may be taken as an example of those who have a bias towards an affirmative answer to this question. H. Spencer and Bain (in the amended version of his view on this subject) follow suit. Hume, who speaks (*Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, § v. pt. ii. 1) of belief as a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than that which the imagination alone is ever likely to attain, seeks to show that the superiority of belief in these regards arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or sense. James Mill devotes his elaborate and suggestive chapter on 'Belief' in his *Analysis of the Phenomena*

of the Human Mind to the working out of Hume's hint and to attempting to trace all forms of belief to the 'grand comprehensive law of association.' No instance can be adduced, he boldly says (*op. cit.* p. 367), in which anything besides an indissoluble association can be shown in belief. Thus, for example, the belief that we see extension and figure as well as colour, is referred to the almost invariable and constant conjunction of our visual, tactile, and muscular sensations. So that, when we have the sensation of colour, we cannot avoid having the ideas of extension and figure along with it. There is a certain inner incoherence in this doctrine, as has, indeed, been pointed out by J. S. Mill. The elder Mill, in introducing the illustrations here quoted, states that in these cases it is generally admitted that we receive no sensation but that of modification of light. This at once brings the doctrine of indissoluble association into question, because we have here a case (one of many) in which such an association does not lead to belief. For, those who are interested in these matters, and who follow in Mill's track, do not believe that they see extension and figure, or they declare that they entertain this belief only at times when they are off their guard. There are thus two conflicting attitudes possible with regard to the same fact, and there clearly must be in at least one of the two cases a determining factor other than association. Association cannot be made the key-word with regard to belief any more than it can with regard to knowledge. It should, nevertheless, be recognized here that the operation of association has undoubtedly an influence on many beliefs. It appears, however, that association is effective not so much as a factor in setting up the belief as in conserving and supporting it once it is set up. This is hinted at by Hume (*op. cit.* § v. pt. ii.). When H. Spencer tries to show that association is the central principle, the ultimate mental uniformity here, he is not successful. It is true, as he says, that if certain states of consciousness absolutely cohere in certain ways, we are obliged to think them in those ways. But this proves nothing; it would be equally true and equally unedifying to state that, if we are obliged to think certain facts in certain ways, then they must absolutely cohere in consciousness in these ways. We cannot solve the problem of belief by the mechanical formula 'indissoluble connexion.' To complain, as J. S. Mill has done, that it leaves no distinction between the belief of the wise and the belief of fools, is beside the mark, because it introduces an epistemological point. But the complaint indicates a point worthy of note in this connexion, namely, that a belief rooted in and supported by an association and widely held may be refused and contradicted by a few who have 'thought more' about the facts in question. And, as more and more people are induced to think with or after the pioneers, the new belief begins to overtop the old and finally almost, if not altogether, obscures it. The familiar case of the belief that the sun moves round the earth illustrates this point. To say that the new belief that the earth moves round the sun is due to a counter-association is to play with words. It is due to the fact that this relation has come to be seen as a necessary part of a whole system of ideas with reference to the physical universe. And it is here that we come upon the most important condition of belief so far as cognitive factors are concerned. The perception of a given element of experience as fitting into and harmonizing with the rest of experience, in so far as this has been thought by us, gives it an irresistible claim upon our acceptance. The requirement of system, of ordered connexion, is the profoundest need of the intellect, and according as this need is met will belief be induced. Belief determined on such grounds is equivalent to knowledge, and the further discussion of the conditions here would lead us into the heart of the problems of the theory of knowledge. See EPISTEMOLOGY.

(2) *The emotional factor.*—It is manifest, however, that, as has already been pointed out, human beliefs do not always rest upon such grounds. It is not unusual to find belief determined by other considerations than reference to systematic connexion. It has been widely recognized that emotional elements appear as factors in the incitement and sustenance of beliefs. It has been noted that the state of belief has in itself a certain emotional colouring. Thus Hume says that 'the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling which is annexed to the latter, not to the former' (*op. cit.* § v. pt. ii.). But it is not as an aspect of the resultant that feeling is here to be considered, but rather as a determinant of the process leading to that result. The prevailing emotional disposition, the mood of an hour or of an epoch in life, will materially influence the beliefs of the individual. Such influences act mediately. Religious fervour, social enthusiasm, love, anger, *e.g.*, predispose the subject to select and to accept those ideas which harmonize with and nourish the disposition or mood. In the most general aspect of this consideration it is to be noted that in the sanguine, youthful period of life, when vitality is high, belief as a rule flourishes more abundantly than in the colder and more discriminating period of advanced years. Again, as James has pointed out, theories of a pessimistic type, which tend to darken and chill the life of feeling, are not readily or widely believed, even though they may appear satisfactory to the understanding. They meet with an inarticulate, but none the less stubborn, opposition in the region of the emotions. They run counter to the average mood of humanity. On the one hand, the harmony of a particular belief with the emotional mood intensifies and enriches the feeling with which the idea is suffused; on the other hand, with the decay of a particular mood, related beliefs suffer proportionally. With the dwindling of religious enthusiasm, when 'love grows cold,' belief in the objects round which these feelings cluster becomes more feeble, a tendency to criticism, undreamt of in the intenser emotional hours, makes its appearance, and the beliefs readily disintegrate. Bain, in suggesting that the saying of Jeremy Taylor, 'Believe and you shall love,' should more fitly read, 'Love and you shall believe,' has, at any rate, recognized the efficiency of the emotional factor in belief. We believe with the heart as well as with the head. The search for truth itself is supported by its emotional coefficient—love of truth—which, as has been wittily said, is often utilized in order to prove that that which we love is true.

(3) *The conative factor.*—In the volitional or active aspect of conscious experience we find an even more important determinant of belief. This is not correctly separable from the foregoing. The various factors will be found together, in varying measure, in any act of belief; but, for purposes of clear exposition, the conative factor can be treated as though it were separate. At first sight volition seems to have little, if anything, to do with belief. It has been widely recognized since Hume that there is a certain coerciveness in belief; it 'depends,' he says, 'not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure' (*op. cit.* § v. pt. ii.). The experience of being 'compelled to assent' to a proposition is familiar to most people. It is certain that belief cannot be commanded at pleasure, that it cannot be brought forth by a simple fiat of will, in that abstract sense of will. It is nevertheless

true that will plays a leading rôle in the constitution of our belief. So impressed by this was Bain, that in his main treatment of this phenomenon (*Emotions and Will*[3], p. 371 ff.) he maintains that belief is a growth or development of the will—a phase of our active nature. He does not rule out the cognitive factor, he recognizes it in what he terms the intellectual Association of our Experiences; nor does he deny the influence of feeling, but he argues that these are subsidiary to the volitional or conative factor, and maintains that belief is most vitally related to activity or the will. He bases this judgment principally upon the fact that what we believe we act upon. Action is the test of belief. Thus, if a politician declares Free Trade to be good and yet will not allow it to be acted on (there being no extraneous barriers in the way), people say he does not believe his own assertion. To maintain his thesis, Bain is sometimes driven to somewhat extreme measures. He recognizes that there are cases where the connexion between belief and activity is not obvious, and alludes to them as 'apparent exceptions' where, though not obviously, the connexion still exists. 'Many men that will never cross the Sahara desert believe what is told of its surface, of its burning days and chilling nights.' But the connexion with activity here is, he holds, present, for their attitude may be expressed by saying that, *if* they went to Africa, they would do certain things in consequence of this information. This, as has been suggested (Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, ii. 257), is beside the mark; for where we believe without actual reference to practice, the mental attitude of believing must be actually distinct from the practical attitude. Bain does not show that action is a condition of belief; he only shows that action is an empirical test of belief, and even so he weakens and embroils his position by unnecessarily limiting activity to forms of bodily movement. Granting all that Bain puts forward, we have still to ask with Brentano (*Psychologie*, p. 268) why it is that one idea has an influence upon action and another has not. In short, he shows that action depends upon belief, and not that belief depends upon action. Bain afterwards (*op. cit.*, Appendix, p. 100) briefly recanted this view in favour of a more intellectualistic treatment of belief on associationist lines. In so far as his first position involved the doctrine that belief is wholly volitional in its nature, the recantation was justified. At the same time Bain's discussion did excellent service to the psychology of this subject, in drawing attention to a vital constituent of belief; and his contribution from that point of view has permanent value. It leads us close to the centre of the matter. A brief inspection of the facts of the case brings us to perceive that without beliefs of some kind man cannot maintain himself in the universe at all, and that the fullness of life and the fullness of belief are in a direct ratio. This does not contradict the truth that beliefs are shed as experience advances. They are replaced by deeper and more comprehensive beliefs. We discover certain needs, and in the measure of our satisfaction of them is the measure of our life. This satisfaction is obtained through the establishment of some *rapport* between the subject and the objective world or worlds in which it seeks to maintain itself. Those things which are found to satisfy the need, to fulfil desire, are accepted and clung to. They are, in fact, believed in. Without such belief one would be endeavouring to operate in a vacuum. This is vigorously and rightly insisted upon by the Pragmatists. The question of the organization within a scheme of values of these needs, vitally important though it be, is not one which concerns us here. It may be said in a parenthesis, however, that it is one to which Pragmatists have not as yet in their metaphysical and epistemological discussions devoted sufficient attention. It is enough to point out in this place that there are needs of various kinds—physical, logical, æsthetic, and religious—and that in the experience of finding satisfaction for them we find belief. The belief emerges at that point where the desire which is the expression of the need finds the means of its adequate fulfilment. This applies, *e.g.*, in the sphere of science, where we seek for a continuous and coherent system of objective fact, as in the sphere of religion, where we seek for an adequate support for our moral and spiritual needs (cf. Royce, *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 330 f.). We orientate ourselves in this direction or in that, according to the pressure of the need, by means of the power of attention (*q.v.*), which involves selection, self-determination. In brief, and in a somewhat misunderstood phrase, we 'will to believe.' This, of course, does not involve unchartered freedom or the introduction of sheer caprice. Our needs are not created by whims. They are the expressions of a nature striving to realize itself, and we but recognize their appearance. It is true that they may be regarded as the needs of a particular subject, and that the ends which they adumbrate are posited by that subject. But that does not necessarily involve us in indeterminism. Here, however, we are breaking ground upon the problem of Freedom. Keeping to our proper theme, we have further to observe that, though the end is posited by the subject and without prejudice to what is thereby implied, there is a certain objective limitation in the media through which it is to be realized. The nature of the process by which the end is attained is, so to speak, fixed independently of the subject. The subject finds it and accepts it as leading up to his end. The urgency of the need will no doubt often lead to the over-hasty and uncritical acceptance of means as real which further tests condemn, but the central element in these tests is just the need referred to; that which has been proved fictitious did not really meet the need. What is here said connects itself with the statement regarding the emotional factor, for the emotions are intimately connected with the furtherance or the obstruction of our conative tendences.

(4) *Belief and personality.*—The stream of belief then is fed from various springs. We cannot truly say that it is a cognitive, an emotional, or a conative state, in the sense that it depends solely on any one of these forms of the conscious life. We believe with the whole, many-sided self. Belief expresses the definite attitude of the personality towards its experience. In Baldwin's definition of belief as the 'consciousness of the personal endorsement of reality' the adjective bears unusual fullness of meaning. 'Nulle manifestation de notre personnalité n'exprime plus adéquatement celle-ci que la croyance,' says Jules Payot (*La Croyance*, p. 173), and we may sum up this portion of our statement with his emphatic pronouncement: 'Nous croyons avec tout ce que nous sommes' (*ib.* p. 174).

(5) *The social factor.*—This reference to belief and personality introduces the mention of a factor in the constitution of belief which is of a different order from the above-mentioned, but which deserves special notice because of its import. This may be called the social factor. One of the most vital parts of that environment to which a man must make adjustments, in order to maintain and realize himself, is what we call the social environment, the *milieu* of personalities and their products in which we all find ourselves planted. Our equation to that is one of our great life-tasks. An important part of that environment is the body of

beliefs—including what are called superstitions, traditions, and prejudices—in which the communal life expresses itself. These we acquire for the most part unconsciously, as a portion of inherited experience, through our necessary participation in this life in its various forms—the family, the school, the Church—and in the common interchange of social talk. If and when we arrive at the self-conscious and reflective stage, these may be criticized and modified or abandoned. Their abandonment, even when a substitution is made, is as a rule achieved only after considerable effort. For on the abandonment follows a sense of the loss of something of that solidarity, of participation in the life of our society which is so necessary and precious to us. A barrier is placed between the 'unbeliever' or the 'doubter' and his fellows. Only the very strong or the very headstrong man will dare to erect it. And he will do so only on the assumption that the barrier is a temporary one. The fervour with which a novel idea or doctrine is promulgated is due largely to a desire to regain that sense of social support which for the time being has been lost through departing from generally accepted belief. Even so, the heretics and reformers must be a small minority in any society; to the great majority of its members the social sanction of a belief is so strong as to be practically invincible. The social need is imperative, and orthodoxy appears to them to be a necessary means to its satisfaction. The unfriendly attitude of the community or society towards the heterodox is in this regard intelligible. The insurgence of a small part against the whole threatens, or appears to threaten, the integrity of the whole; and this is, so far rightly, something to be thwarted and put down. In certain extreme cases the community places the heterodox and insurgents under constraint, by committing them to a prison or a lunatic asylum. Society, in any form, is then a great conservator of beliefs; and the social factor is one which cannot be neglected in tracing out the causes of belief.

(6) *Religious belief.*—The detailed discussion of various forms and stages of belief—the beliefs of primitive peoples, the superstitions of civilized man, belief in an objective world, in Nature as uniform and under law, belief in the objects and ideals of æsthetics, morals, and religion—would be a long and an arduous undertaking, and it would add nothing but illustrative material to the general discussion. One of these forms, however, calls for special remark for a special reason. Religious belief has sometimes, particularly, though not exclusively, by Catholic theologians, had a claim to uniqueness put forward on its behalf. It is suggested that it is not determined or built up in the same way as other modes of belief. Thus we find Newman, quoting Dmouski and others in support (*Grammar of Assent*, pp. 186–7), laying it down that there is a marked distinction between human or natural faith and Divine or supernatural faith—the latter being defined by him as 'the assent which follows on a Divine announcement, and is vivified by Divine grace.' This form of belief, it is maintained, differs from 'human' belief not merely in degree but in kind, being intrinsically superior to it. This superiority, it is further somewhat obscurely stated, is not a matter of experience, but is above experience. The distinction is one which depends on a metaphysical theory as to the ultimate source of belief. Dealing with the phenomena by the psychological method, we cannot say that religious belief reveals differences of such a kind as to compel us to isolate it completely from other forms. It undoubtedly differs in content, and this again no doubt affects the intensity or quantitative character of the state, but in a psychological regard there is no deep-lying or fundamental qualitative distinction revealed. In this form of belief the reality referred to and endorsed is of a wider and more comprehensive character than that elsewhere dealt with. The issues involved are of a more tremendous and far-reaching kind. Life, in the light of religious belief, is no more the brief drama of an isolated self acted out against the shifting background of the world of time and space; it becomes part of an all-comprising reality, subsumed in the life of God. The narrow limits of the self are transcended; the personality is enriched and dignified by the sense of this; it acquires a fuller and more permanent value. It is intelligible how with the emergence of belief of this kind there comes the sense that salvation has been found. It is also intelligible how it should come about that such a belief is regarded as given to the subject, not formed by him. For the subject is not always clearly aware of all that is here set forth as contained in it. It does not, as a rule, come as the result of a clearly reasoned process, it usually arises out of a more or less inarticulate sense of great need, and in the measure of the need is the measure of the emotion accompanying the satisfaction of it; it is so powerful that it comes with a certain invasive character, it rushes in upon the subject. The believer has an overwhelming feeling of the reality of his experience. The investigation of the grounds of the belief is a matter for later reflexion; it is the business of the theologian and philosopher, who come in after the act of belief. Indeed, the individual believer may feel averse from any such reflexion or examination, on the ground that it tends to trouble and obscure the purity of the emotional state. Without prejudice to the question as to the rationality of religious belief, and dealing with it simply as it presents itself as a psychological phenomenon, we may say that here the emotional and volitional factors are markedly present, the intellectual factor playing apparently a minor rôle. The volitional factor has already been hinted at. The believer arrives at his belief by seeking, by turning himself in a certain direction, putting himself in a certain mental attitude. This, it may be, does not take place through the formation of a deliberately conceived and clearly conscious resolve, but it is nevertheless volitional. The believer finds because he seeks. There is nothing more constantly urged in the literature of religious belief than this, that the subject must act, he must turn his face in the right direction for the light to fall upon it. There is marked insistence also on the point that it is not by appealing to the reason directly, but in acting upon the will and the emotions, that religious belief is implanted and fostered. This is corroborated by psychological knowledge. It does not follow that this means an appeal to the irrational rather than to the rational in man. And when James speaks (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 73) of 'the inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief,' he is presumably referring to the articulately rational. As to the specific forms which religious belief may take, this obviously depends largely on the social factor, on the influence of the institutions, the forms of instruction, and the like, through which the society in which one lives expresses its religious consciousness, and realizes and satisfies its religious need. See also FAITH.

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A. MAIR.

BELIEF (logical).—Belief, as the mere subjective correlate to reality in general, does not give rise to problems of logical method, though it may not be a 'sapless abstraction' within a system of epistemology, as Hegel considered it to be. Other contexts, however, raise questions as to the validity and tests of belief as compared with knowledge. Our cognitions are to some extent beyond test or challenge, being inevitable under the laws of sense intuition and understanding, or through the conscious sequences of experience; to some extent they can be tested in detail by appeal in each case to the unchallenged part of the cognitive system itself; and to some extent by appeal only to aspects of our complete nature which are over and above cognition itself. It would be convenient in logical discussion to use the term 'belief,' as distinguished from 'knowledge,' only for those cognitions which can be tested by the latter method. In this sense it would follow in general a distinction traceable from Kant, through Beneke, Ulrici, Adamson, James, Ormond (*Foundations of Knowledge*, pt. 3, ch. 1) and others, between objective and subjective 'grounds' of cognition. Belief so defined shares with knowledge the function of 'presenting to us realities, and thus influencing the passions and imagination'; and it may present them as primary or as inferences, and as certain or probable, whether sensible or super-sensible.

Laws of thought regarded as structural forms in the system of our cognitions are absolutely primal. It is only when thought includes expectation as to concrete matters of fact that any challenge is possible. Kant offered as a basis for expectation certain 'Principles of the Understanding'—the permanence of substance, the universality of law, and the inter-connexion of the world. If these Principles could be shown from the structural forms of cognition, they also would be beyond question. But subsequent developments of the Kantian epistemology admit that they cannot.

'We might have the right to say that the laws of space . . . must of necessity hold good of all objects of our experience, for nothing will ever make its way into experience without having been already moulded in that form of space through which alone it becomes an object for us at all. But we cannot attempt to prove in the same way that, unless there was a connection according to law in the real world, the experience which we possess would be impossible' (Lotze, *Logic*, § 349).

Empirical epistemology has come to the same final issue. Mill's attempt to justify logically the principle of the Uniformity of Nature, by appeal to accepted inductions of lower grade, has been repudiated by recent Empirical Logic (Mill, *Logic*, Bk. iii.; Venn, *Emp. Logic*, ch. 5). Expectation, therefore, is grounded in our complete nature, and its most general postulates are primary beliefs.

'A reign of law embracing all reality . . . is only an assumption with which every enlargement of experience is accompanied . . . an immediate confidence or faith . . . as is also the universal tendency of thought to turn the observed facts of co-existence into coherent connection' (Lotze, *Logic*, § 349).

Super-sensible realities also, so far as the plan of our complete nature requires that they shall 'be made present to us . . . and influence the passions and imagination,' are certified in belief. How far they are primary in relation to other contents of belief, how far they can be logically elaborated, and how far corroborated by the independent process of strict knowledge, must be considered in their own special literature. As primary, they are in line with the postulates of scientific expectation.

'We assume, on the one hand, that our perceptions submit to the claims of thought in so far as to allow of their being arranged in a conceptual system and in orderly connection; on the other hand, that all our actions can be subordinated to a single end. These assumptions are postulates, and our acceptance rests in the last instance upon our will' (Sigwart, *Logic*, § 62).

'If we require that the conception of the Universe be that of a whole and an essentially complete unit, and at the same time that it should comprehend all individuals, we follow in this and other requirements . . . the inspiration of a *reason appreciative of worth*' (Lotze, *Microcosmus*, ii. 5, § 2).

'If no better ground for accepting as fact a material world more or less in correspondence with our ordinary judgments of sense perceptions can be alleged than the practical need for doing so, there is nothing irrational in postulating a like harmony between the Universe and other Elements in our nature of a later, a more uncertain, but no ignobler growth' (Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*[8], p. 391 f.).

'That there is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony borne to the truth by the mind itself . . . is a normal but inevitable characteristic of the mental constitution of a being like man on a stage like the world' (Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, ch. ix. § 1).

Such quotations as these are not intended to appeal to an obtrusive 'wish' that becomes 'father to the thought,' or to a purposeful 'ignorance' that may be chosen as 'bliss,' but to a final trend of our spiritual development and to methodical analysis of the complete structure and function implied in it. Historic instances of such analysis are Butler's, for the purpose of 'showing moral obligation,' and Kant's, for establishing, through the primacy of Practical Reason, our judgments as to Freedom, God, and Immortality.

The topic 'belief' comes to be a doctrine of uncertainties, as in Locke, Beneke, Fechner, Ulrici, and James, when, instead of presenting a primary postulate or reality, it supplements knowledge in dealing with some detailed problem of science or life. Sometimes our complete nature guides the interest or interprets the final outcome of scientific inquiry; as in such conceptions as force, organic function, creation (Ulrici), or such principles as indestructibility of matter and conservation of energy (Jevons, *Principles of Science*, ch. 31). Sometimes it sustains scientific methods that are of themselves inconclusive; as in the analogy which attributes consciousness to other organisms than our own, or even to larger systems of Nature (Fechner). Sometimes it decides an option between alternative judgments which otherwise might remain always in problematic form, as between fatalism and personal responsibility (James, *The Will to Believe*). Sometimes it introduces inference to an otherwise alien region of fact, by supplying some mediating principle; as when history and prediction become possible through the postulate of the persistence of natural collocations and the recurrence of causes (Hughes, *Theory of Inference*, chs. 8–11; Sigwart, § 99). Sometimes it

opens empirical facts to explanation by reference to super-sensible realities; as in historical Free-choice or Miracles or Incarnation (Lotze, *Logic*, § 349, *Philos. of Rel.* § 62; Balfour, pt. 4, ch. 3).

Belief, like knowledge, may vary in certainty and influence and take special titles accordingly, without ceasing to be valid for human nature as such.

'In the empirical branches of knowledge,' Kant remarks, 'physics, psychology, and the like . . . we may have "Opinion," an assent which is consciously held as neither objectively nor subjectively adequate' . . . while 'of many cognitions we are conscious only in such a manner as not to be able to judge whether the grounds of our assent are objective or subjective . . . and this is "Persuasion." Both fall short of Conviction, whether logical Conviction, that is, Knowledge, or practical, that is, Belief; because they are not "necessary"' (*Introduction to Logic*).

But belief, unlike knowledge, may be valid for rational nature as such, without being valid for all persons. The individual mind realizes its development under conditions much more special than those for the racial or collective mind, and admits details not admitted into the cognitive system common to all. Among the examples are the following: (1) Our common cognition assumes that objects of thought are not altered by the mere event of their being thought of (Venn, *Empirical Logic*, ch. 2); yet for the individual mind this postulate may be suspended in favour of maxims of expectation that lead to their own fulfilment. Such are the mutual confidence of social co-operation, self-reliance in personal enterprise, hope during illness (James); and, on a higher level, our assumption of moral sufficiency for an occasion, or of personal acceptance with the Divine Being. (2) The option of uncertainties must often be closed for the individual, though remaining still open for science or for common belief. Inferences that are 'informal,' and under the sanction of an 'illative sense' like the insight or 'tact' of an expert, must be substituted for explicit thought. In practical discretion, taste, conscientious scruple, and personal faith we must thus interpret our own personal nature (Newman, chs. 8 and 9; Germar, *Glauben oder Wissen*, 1856). (3) External authority must be accepted in default of personal inference; the spirit of our time, the dogmas of specialists in science, testimony for historical events, moral conventions, creeds of the Churches (Balfour).

As possible principles for constructing a scale of certainty in belief, have been suggested: (*a*) the narrowness of the void in our scheme of reality which is left by strict knowledge; (*b*) the finality, in value for development, of the subjective need which attempts to fill it; (*c*) the intrinsic inaccessibility of the void to knowledge itself (Beneke).

LITERATURE.—See end of preceding article.

J. BROUGH.

BELIEF (theological). — See AGNOSTICISM, ATHEISM, and especially FAITH.

BELLS.—See GONGS AND BELLS.

BENARES.—1. Name and history.—Benares (Banāras), the largest city in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh except Lucknow, is situated in the Benares District (lat. 25° 18′ N., long. 83° 3′ E.), on the left bank of the Ganges, which flows past the city for a distance of nearly 3½ miles. The river bends to the N.E., so that the city stands for the most part on the N.W. bank, which is in places 100 feet high. A census taken in 1803, which gave the population as 582,000, was vitiated by the assumption that twenty persons should be assigned to each house. The true population (1901) is returned as 209,331, comprising: Hindus, 153,821; Musalmāns, 53,566; Christians, about 1200, chiefly in the cantonment, civil station, and mission grounds; with a few adherents of other religions.

At the present day Hindus speak of the city, which is acknowledged to be the religious capital of Hinduism ('the general school of the Gentiles, the Athens of India,' to use Bernier's words), indifferently as either *Kāśī* or *Banāras*, but the latter name, anglicized as *Benares*, is that commonly used by people of other nationalities and in literature.

The name *Kāśi* (*Kāśī*, in Pāli *Kāsī*) was originally the name of a tribe or nation inhabiting the country between the Ganges and Ghāghrā (Gogra), and at times apparently extending its authority over territory to the north of the Ghāghrā and the south of the Ganges. Legends of Kāśi Rājā are current in the Gorakhpur District, north of the Ghāghrā, and the small town of Rūdarpur in that district is said to bear the alternative name of Kāśī (Martin, *Eastern India*, ii. 338). To the south of the Ganges, the Karamnāsā river, now forming part of the boundary between the Mirzāpur and Shāhābād Districts, was recognized traditionally as the frontier between the kingdom of the Kāśis (Benares) and that of the Magadhas (S. Bihār). The waters of that river are regarded by high-caste Hindus from other regions as impure and polluting. We shall presently quote another legend in proof of the aversion felt by orthodox Hindus towards the non-Aryan, Buddhist kingdom of Māgadha. The Rāmāyaṇa (*Uttarakāṇḍa*, lix. 18, 19) describes the 'excellent town' of Pratiṣṭhāna, that is to say Jhūsi opposite Allahābād, as being situated in the 'Kāśi kingdom.' Putting all indications together, we may conclude that the realm of the Kāśis was equivalent to the modern Districts of Benares, Ghāzīpur, Balliā, Azamgaṛh, and Jaunpur, together with portions of the Mirzāpur, Gorakhpur, Allāhābād, Partābgaṛh, Sultānpur, and Fyzābād Districts, all of which are now included in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. The Kāśi people are mentioned by Pānini and other authors in both Sanskrit and Pāli prior to the Christian era. Gradually the name was transferred from the people to their capital city, and the transition is marked in the *Bṛhat Saṁhitā*, an early work, which applies the name *Kāśi* to both people and city. The Kāśis lost their independence at an early date, their kingdom being absorbed by Northern Kosala (Oudh) before the time of Buddha. An ancient Kosalan king, named Kaṁsa, of uncertain date, is described as 'the conqueror of Kāśi.' Nevertheless, the older Buddhist books include Kāsī in the list of the sixteen principal States of India, although it was never independent in historical times. Gradually the name *Kāśi* or *Kāśī* (Pāli *Kāsī*) was transferred from the tribe to the city. The form *Kāśikā* also occurs.

The alternative name *Varāṇasī* (also *Vārāṇasī*, *Varanasī*) appears to be more ancient than *Kāśi* as the designation of the city, and to be really its proper name. The Buddhist Jātakas and early Sanskrit books describe the city of Varāṇasī as being situated in the Kāśi country. Fa-hien, the Chinese pilgrim (A.D. 400), writes the name as *Po-lo-nai*, which seems to correspond with a spoken form *Bārānas*. Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang, A.D. 637) writes *Po-lo-na-se* (= *Vārānasī* or *Bārānasī*). Popular etymology derives the name *Banāras* (by metathesis of *Barānas*), either from an imaginary Rājā *Banār* or from a combination of the names of the rivers *Varaṇā* (*Barnā*) and *Asi* or *Asī*, but neither derivation can be accepted. In the Puraṇas the name *Avimukta* is given to the city, which is mentioned in the Buddhist Jātakas under various fanciful names, *Sudassana*, *Pupphavatī*, etc.

Local tradition restricts the name of *Banāras* to the northern and apparently most ancient part of the city, the central block, also ancient, being

called *Kāśi*, and the south-western section, the most recent, being known as *Kedār*. The attempt made by Muhammad Shāh, Emperor of Delhi (1719–48), to give his own name to the city, which he called *Muhammadābād*, failed so far as general usage is concerned, but on his coins the name frequently occurs as that of a mint, and sometimes is written as *Muhammadābād-Banāras*.

Hindu legend associates the foundation of the city with Rājā Divodāsa, who is the subject of wild mythological stories, and the Buddhist tales constantly mention Rājā Brahmadatta as having been king of Benares 'once upon a time,' but it is impossible to discover any basis of fact for either the names or the stories. Benares, with its surrounding territory, was absorbed, as already stated, by the greater kingdom of Kosala, about B.C. 600, or earlier, and when Kosala in its turn was forced to bow to the growing power of Magadha (wh. see), Benares passed under the rule of the Śaiśunāga lords of that province about B.C. 500. It was included in succession in the dominions of the Maurya, Śunga, and Gupta dynasties. In the 7th cent. the city passed under the rule of Harsha-vardhana, the powerful Vaiśya king of Kanauj, and in the 9th cent. it was included in the dominions of the Parihār kings of Kanauj. In the 12th cent. it was held by the Gaharwārs of Kanauj, of whom the last, Rājā Jaychand (Jayachchand), was killed in A.D. 1193 (A.H. 589) in battle with Muhammad of Ghor (Shihāb-ud-dīn, Muhammad ibn Sām). From that time Benares remained under Musalmān domination until 1775, when it was ceded to the government of Warren Hastings by the Nawāb Vazīr of Oudh. Since that date it has been British territory.

Abū-l-Fazl (*Āīn-i-Akbari*, ii. 28 [Gladwin's tr.]) seems to have been misinformed in stating that Benares was visited twice by Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghaznī in A.H. 410 (A.D. 1019–20) and A.H. 413 (A.D. 1022–23). The contemporary author of the *Tārīkh-i-Sabuktiyīn* expressly states that no Musalmān army had ever visited Benares until Aḥmad Niāltigīn made a hurried raid on the city for a few hours one day in A.D. 1033 (424–25 A.H.). The raiders were not in force sufficient to enable them to do more than plunder the richer shops. Muhammadan influence was not felt seriously by Benares until the city was taken by Muḥammad of Ghor in A.D. 1193. The considerable effect of the long Muhammadan occupation for six centuries is shown by the fact that at the last census in 1901 Musalmāns formed 28 per cent. of the population of this intensely Hindu city. The Madanpura quarter is almost exclusively occupied by Muhammadans, who are largely engaged in weaving the rich brocades (*kīnkhwāb*, vulgo 'kincob') for which the city is famous.

Benares suffered severely from the persecuting policy of Aurangzīb, who went so far as to order 'the governors of provinces to destroy with a willing hand the schools and temples of the infidels; and they were strictly enjoined to put an entire stop to the teaching and practising of idolatrous forms of worship' (W. Hunter, *Aurangzīb*, 1896, p. 135). Complete general execution of such orders was impossible, but in Benares much was done, and multitudes of temples were destroyed. Very few of the existing buildings are earlier than the time of Aurangzīb. The temple beside which stood the Aśoka pillar seen by Hiuen Tsiang was converted into a mosque, although the massive pillar was allowed to remain until 1809, when it was broken to pieces by a furious Muhammadan mob in the course of a fierce riot between the adherents of the rival religions. This riot was still fresh in men's minds when Bishop Heber visited the city in 1824. The pillar, the stump of which is known as *Lāṭ Bhairo*, and considered to be an object of great sanctity, is correctly described by the Chinese pilgrim in A.D. 637 as standing to the N.E. of the city and west of the Barnā river, whose course is due north and south for about a mile. Bernier mentions that the chief of the Benares pundits had been granted by Shahjahān a pension of two thousand rupees, which was withdrawn by Aurangzīb immediately after his accession.

The most conspicuous evidence of Aurangzīb's bigotry is the mosque above Panchgangā Ghāṭ, the minarets of which (147 ft. 2 in. high) are by far the most imposing edifices in Benares. The mosque occupies the site of a large ancient temple dedicated to Śiva under the name of Bisheshar (Viśveśvara), and is largely composed of the materials of the Hindu shrine. The modern temple of Bisheshar, generally called the 'Golden Temple,' close by is small, but notable for its dome and tower covered with plates of gilt copper, the gift of Mahārājā Ranjit Singh, the 'Lion of the Panjāb.' It is the most holy temple in Benares, Bisheshar being regarded as the actual ruler of the city.

2. Sacred places.—During the predominance of the Marāthās in the 18th cent., and still more after the establishment of the British power, temple-building, which had been either forbidden or discouraged by the Muhammadan rulers, received a great impetus, and hundreds of new shrines have been constructed. Sherring estimates that out of 600 temples along the Panch-kosī, or pilgrims' road, round the city, no fewer than 500 date from the British period, and very few are 250 years old. This vigorous modern development of temple-building is the outward and visible sign of the marked revival of Hinduism under British protection, which is still in progress and daily growing in strength. Most of the unrest at present (1909) agitating India is closely connected with the Hindu revival. Forty years ago the number of Hindu temples in Benares, excluding petty niches and shrines, was estimated as 1454, and now it must be considerably greater.

But, as already observed, Musalmāns form 28 per cent. of the population, and they were credited by Sherring with 272 mosques. Notwithstanding the considerable success of the Muslim propaganda indicated by these figures, Benares has always continued to be the most Hindu of cities, and few visitors find occasion to take note of the large Muhammadan population. The mosques, although numerous, are not remarkable for architectural merit, and even the mosque of Aurangzīb offers little worthy of notice beyond the noble minarets which tower above the city.

The most striking feature of Benares, best viewed from the river, is the long series of *ghāṭs*, or stairs leading to the water, which line the bank of the Ganges. They number about forty, and vary much in sanctity and popularity. The five principal ones, visited by all pilgrims, are, as reckoned from the south, Asi Saṅgam (the junction of the Asi rivulet with the Ganges), Daśāśamedh (Daśāśvamedha), Manikarnikā, Panchgangā, and Barnā Saṅgam (the junction of the Barnā river with the Ganges). Hindus always regard the junctions of streams with peculiar reverence. A visit to the five *ghāts* named above is in itself a complete course of pilgrimage, and the merit of bathing at Daśāśamedh Ghāṭ is equal to that of a pilgrimage to Prayāg (Allāhābād), where the Jumna unites its waters with those of the Ganges. The legends invented to explain the sanctity of the Daśāśamedh and Maṇikarṇikā Ghāṭs are too long for quotation, but we may note that five rivers, four being invisible to mortal eyes, are

supposed to meet at Panchgangā ('five-river') Ghāṭ. Their names are given as Dhūtapāpā, Sarasvatī, Kiranā, Jarṇa (*alias* Yamunā = Jumna), and Gangā (Ganges). The belief in invisible subterranean streams is common among Hindus in many localities.

A considerable area round Benares shares in the sanctity of the city and rivers, and is circumambulated by pilgrims travelling along the Panchkosī Road, which does not seem to be ancient in its existing form.

'The Panch-kosī is regarded as an exceedingly sacred road. While even a foot or an inch beyond its precincts is devoid of any special virtue, every inch of soil within the boundary is, in the Hindu's imagination, hallowed. It would seem, too, that every object, animate and inanimate, existing within the enclosed space, participates in the general and all-pervading sanctity. The entire area is called Benares; and the religious privileges of the city are extended to every part of it. Whoever dies in any spot of this enclosure is, the natives think, sure of happiness after death; and so wide is the application of this privilege, that it embraces, they say, even Europeans and Muhammadans, even Pariahs and other outcasts, even liars, murderers, and thieves. That no soul can perish in Benares is thus the charitable superstition of the Hindus' (Sherring, *The Sacred City of the Hindus*).

The road is designed to describe the arc of a radius of five *kōs*, or ten miles, with the Manikarnikā well as a centre, and is therefore called the 'five-kōs road.'

The votary starts from the Maṇikarṇikā Ghāṭ to Asi Sangam, and thence to the village of Kandhawa, where he stays for the night. The second day he marches ten miles to Dhūpchandī; on the third day he has a long walk of fourteen miles to Rāmeśvar; on the fourth day he goes to Sheopur (Śivapur); and on the fifth day he advances to Kapildhārā; the sixth and last stage being from Kapildhārā to Barnā Sangam, and so back to the starting-place at Maṇikarṇikā Ghāṭ. The whole journey is nearly fifty miles in length, and at each stage worship has to be performed and Brahmans must be paid. Liberal payments to Brāhmans are an indispensable element in the programme of a Hindu pilgrimage, and the Benares Brāhmans know how to use their opportunities. The Gangaputras ('sons of the Ganges'), who attend on pilgrims at the *ghāts*, have a sinister reputation for unscrupulous greed.

It is impossible within the limits of an article to give a detailed account of even the principal temples at Benares and of the fantastic mythology associated with them by exuberant Hindu imagination, but some slight notice of a few of the most favoured holy places and their legends is indispensable. We shall take Sherring as our guide.

The *Trilochan temple and ghāṭ* dedicated to 'three-eyed' Śiva have the special merit of securing everlasting happiness to the worshipper there if he should die elsewhere. If a devotee spends a whole day and night in the month of Baisākh (April–May), without sleeping, and uninterruptedly engaged in religious exercises at this temple, he is promised final liberation (*mokṣa*) from the miseries of existence. Kāśī-devī, the tutelary goddess of the city, is housed in a temple in Mahalla (ward) Kāśīpura, which is believed to be the centre of the city.

A shrine close by, called *Vyāseśvar*, is dedicated to Vyāsa, the reputed compiler of the Vedas, who is also honoured at a temple in the palace of the Mahārāja at Rāmnagar on the other side of the river, which is associated with a quaint myth. People who die on the Rāmnagar side are believed to incur imminent danger of being re-born as asses—an unpleasant fate which may be averted by a pilgrimage to the shrine of Vyāsa (*Veda Vyās*) there during the month of Māgh (Jan.–Feb.). Multitudes of people from Benares as well as from Rāmnagar make their pilgrimage during that month, and so doubly assure immunity from re-birth as a despised ass. The Hindus of Patna share the fears of the Rāmnagar people, and for the same reason are cremated on the northern side of the river. The explanation given is that Magadha or S. Bihār, a non-Aryan and Buddhist land, is considered so unholy that if a man die and is burnt within its limits he is sure to be reborn as an ass (*NINQ*, vol. v. [1896], par. 533).

A visit to the very holy tank called *Piśāch-mochan*, or 'deliverance from devils,' situated on the western side of the city, is compulsory on all pilgrims, who find its waters a valuable prophylactic against evil spirits and bad dreams. Pilgrims to Gayā are required to certify that they have bathed in Piśāch-mochan, but if for any reason the essential ceremony has been omitted, the fault may be repaired by ablution in a duplicate tank at Gayā. Sun-worship is practised at the *Sūraj-kund*, or 'sun-pool,' in the south-western quarter, and a temple in the same region is devoted to *Dhruveśvar*, the personified Pole-star. Another temple is dedicated to the moon-god. *Chaukī Ghāt* and *Nāg Kuā* are devoted to serpent-worship. The existence of such shrines illustrates the immense variety of the elements constituting popular Hinduism. Hindu interest in astronomy and its sister lore of astrology is testified by the *Mān-mandir*, the famous observatory with gigantic instruments of masonry constructed by Rājā Jay Singh of Amber or Jaipur in A.D. 1693.

The *Daśāśamedh* (*Daśāśvamedha*) *Ghāṭ*, the reputed scene of the celebration of ten horse-sacrifices (*aśvamedha*) by the god Brahmā, is one of the five principal places of pilgrimage on the bank of the Ganges. The large colony of Bengālīs, including many pensioners who retire to end their days in the holy city, occupies a separate ward, and is perhaps even more devoted to its gods than are the less educated sections of the population. The principal Bengālī temple is dedicated to Śiva as Kedāreśvar, 'the lord of Kedār,' a renowned shrine in the Himālayas.

The holy wells occupy prominent places in the pilgrim's circular tour. One of the most noted is the *Gyān Kūp*, or 'well of knowledge,' situated between the temple of Bisheshar and Aurangzīb's mosque. The god Śiva, who supports Benares on the point of his trident, is believed to reside in this well. The most sacred of all the wells is *Manikarṇikā*, supposed to be filled with the sweat of Viṣnu. No pilgrim fails to smear his head and body with the stinking water.

The *temple of Annpūrnā*, the goddess who is credited with the responsibility of feeding the citizens under the orders of Bisheshar, the divine lord of the city, is much frequented, and is the scene of indiscriminate almsgiving to crowds of beggars. It is known to Europeans as the 'cow temple,' and is the dirtiest in the city. It was built by the Peshwā, Bājī Rao, about 1721. At a little distance stands a temple dedicated to the minor deity, *Ganeśa* or *Vināyakapāla*, under the title of Sakhī, 'the witness.' 'Pilgrims, on completing their journey of the Panchkosī Road, must pay a visit to this shrine in order that the fact of their pilgrimage may be verified. Should they neglect to do this, all their pilgrimage would be without merit or profit' (Sherring, *op. cit.*).

Bisheshar, or Śiva, with the title of Viśveśvara, 'Lord of all,' is held to be, as already observed, the divine ruler of Benares, charged with the duty of controlling all the other innumerable gods and goddesses and keeping the city free from demons. The sacred boundary of the Panch-kosī Road is guarded by the deities of six hundred shrines, and the only demon allowed within the holy precinct is the one who dwells in the Piśāch-mochan tank. Bisheshar's vicegerent, the divine Kotwāl, or

chief of police, is Bhaironāth, whose shrine is situated more than a mile to the north of that of his sovereign, under whose orders he exercises authority over both gods and men. He is bound to keep the city free from all malignant spirits and evil persons, and, should he find any such within its precincts, to expel them forthwith. Bhaironāth is supposed to exercise his authority by means of a huge stone truncheon, *Daṇḍpāṇ*, which has a temple to itself. The stone, about 4 feet in height, is sometimes capped by a silver mask, and is specially worshipped on Sunday and Tuesday. Bhaironāth is believed to ride on a dog, a figure of that animal being painted beside the entrance to his temple, which dogs are permitted to enter. This is but one of many traces of dog-worship—one of the innumerable incongruous factors combined in popular Hinduism. The existing temple is modern. (For dog-worship see Crooke, *PR* ii. 218–221).

So much may suffice to give the reader some notion of the multitude of temples which crowd the narrow streets of Benares. Almost all the holy places which were open to Sherring forty years ago are now closed to Europeans, and it is not now possible for a European writer to give exact descriptions of the Benares shrines from personal knowledge. Every visitor is struck by the swarms of sacred bulls blocking the lanes, and the bands of mischievous monkeys which have licence to pilfer eatables and damage tiled roofs to their hearts' content. These animals are specially numerous around the shrine of Durgā, known to European visitors as the 'monkey temple.'

3. Various religious elements.—No man can tell how the notion of the supreme sanctity of Benares originated, but there is no doubt that the city dates from remote antiquity, and that as far back as tradition can reach the site was always the holy of holies. The fact that about B.C. 500 Buddha selected the neighbourhood of Benares as the scene of his earliest public preaching, the place where he first turned the 'wheel of the Law,' and set it rolling over the world, is good evidence that in his days the city already enjoyed a reputation for pre-eminent sanctity, and was the most suitable place in which to proclaim a new creed.

Buddhism was still a strong force at Sārnāth (wh. see) at the time of Hiuen Tsiang's visit in A.D. 637, and no doubt continued to enjoy a large share of favour under the Pāla kings of Bengal, whose dominions certainly included Benares, at times, at all events. The religion of Gautama probably held its own until the Muhammadan conquest of 1193, when the multitude of images crowding the Buddhist shrines must have excited the fury of the warriors of Islām, as happened in other places. The buildings at Sārnāth bear clear traces of destruction by fire, which may be safely attributed to the date mentioned.

But even while Buddhism enjoyed the patronage of kings, the religion of the Brāhman was always predominant, and Benares proper would seem to have been throughout the ages a Hindu Brāhmanical city rather than a Buddhist one. In Hiuen Tsiang's days the followers of Śiva, the great local deity, far outnumbered the adherents of Buddha, and Śiva, in many forms and under many names, is still the deity whose worship characterizes Benares. Of course other deities have their votaries there, but all are regarded as subordinate to Śiva, the 'Lord of all.' Some Hindus believe that the fifth, or dwarf, incarnation of Viṣṇu was born at Benares (*IA* xxxv. 243), and one of the many *melās*, or religious fairs, is held in honour of that incarnation at Barnā Saṅgam in the month of Bhādon (Aug.–Sept.).

Benares is sacred to the Jains as the reputed birthplace of Supārśvanāth, the seventh Tīrthaṅkara, but at the present day the Jain cult is not very prominent in the city. Bishop Heber (*Narrative*, ch. xii.) gives an interesting account of his visit to a Jain temple which few Europeans have been permitted to see. Several Jain temples stand along the bank of the river between Bachraj Ghāṭ and the Asi confluence, and from regard to Jain feeling the shooting of birds and the capture of fish are forbidden in this section of the stream. The Jains under the name of Nirgranthas are noticed by Hiuen Tsiang. All lists of the Hindu sacred cities, which slightly vary, include Benares. The traditional enumeration quoted by Sherring specifies seven such cities, namely, (1) Kāśī, (2) Kāntī, (3) Māyā (=Hardwār), (4) Ayodhyā, (5) Dvāravatī (=Dvārakā), (6) Mathurā, and (7) Avantikā (=Ujjain).

A 12th cent. grant places Kāśi at the head of a list of four famous places for bathing pilgrimages, the others being Kuśika (prob. = Kanauj), Uttarakosalā (=Ayodhyā), and Indrapura (prob. = Indraprastha near Delhi) (*IA* xviii. 13).

A minor religion largely favoured by the lower classes of Hindus in Benares is the cult of the Pānch (Panj) Pīr, or Five Saints, who are variously enumerated in different lists, but always headed by Ghāzī Miyān, the deified son of the sister of Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghaznī. The cult is a degraded adaptation of the Shī'ah Muhammadans' reverence for the five great saints of Islām, namely, the prophet Muhammad, his son-in-law 'Alī, his daughter Fatima, and Ḥasan and Ḥusain, the sons of 'Alī and Fatima. The subject was investigated exhaustively by R. Greeven, who collected the legends and popular songs of the cult. The ceremonies are invariably performed by Musalmān drummers (*dafālī*), and the Muhammadan origin of the worship is fully recognized by its Hindu votaries. Most probably it originated in the inveterate Hindu habit of venerating any manifestation of power. Ghāzī Miyān, the 'prince of martyrs,' was a specially fierce fanatic, and so made his mark upon the popular imagination. Many examples might be cited of the indiscriminate mixture of the rites of Islām and Hinduism by the common people in various parts of India.

4. A seat of learning.—From time immemorial Benares has been a seat of Hindu learning as well as of worship, and has been the resort of the most famous teachers. The city still holds the highest rank as the centre of the intellectual life of India, and its pundits succeed, although not without difficulty, in keeping alight the torch of the wisdom of their ancestors.

Bernier, writing in 1667, accurately described the Indian method of study. 'The town,' he writes, 'contains no colleges or regular classes, as in our universities, but rather resembles the schools of the ancients, the masters being dispersed over different parts of the town in private houses, and principally in the gardens of the suburbs, which the rich merchants permit them to occupy. Some of these masters have four disciples, others six or seven, and the most eminent may have twelve or fifteen; but this is the largest number. It is usual for the pupils to remain ten or twelve years under their respective preceptors, during which the work of instruction proceeds but slowly,' etc. (*Travels in the Mogul Empire*, ed. Constable, p. 334).

In 1817, the year in which the Marāthā power was broken, Ward obtained the names of the men who taught the *śāstras*, or Hindu scriptures, in Benares. Forty-eight teachers then instructed 893 pupils in the Vedas only, while seventeen initiated 218 disciples in the mysteries of Pāṇini's grammar. The other sections of the scriptures, including law, were little favoured. The Benares school of law—one of the five recognized schools—follows in its main lines the system of Vijñāneśvara, the author

of the *Mitākṣarā*, who lived at Kalyāna in the Deccan in the 12th century.

At the present day the competition of European learning must have reduced the attendance at the Sanskrit schools, and the number of pupils must be far less than it was a century ago, when Marāthā patronage was available. It is an established rule that a teacher of the scriptures should not be paid wages for his work, and must be content to trust to the voluntary benevolence of his patrons. This rule caused the failure of the Sanskrit College established in 1791, which could not easily secure the services of the local savants. The building erected for that college is now the mission house of the Baptists. The Queen's College, dating from 1853, which has been worked on other lines under the direction of eminent European principals and professors, has done much to promote the scientific study of Sanskrit. The Central Hindu College, founded by Mrs. Besant in 1898, with the object of bringing up young men on the best Hindu principles, while giving them free access to European learning, is an interesting experiment, which may or may not survive its founder.

5. Religious teachers, etc.—A full account of all the distinguished religious reformers who have dwelt or sojourned in Benares from the time of Buddha, twenty-four centuries ago, to the present day would almost amount to a history of Indian religions, and particularly of Hinduism (wh. see). The connexion of *Buddha* with Benares will be dealt with in the art. SĀRNĀTH, and it will be sufficient here merely to give the names of some of the leaders of Indian thought who have been more or less closely associated with the sacred city; they will be dealt with in separate articles.

The earliest of such leaders about whom we know anything definite is the renowned *Śaṅkarāchārya*, the Brāhman of Malabar, who lived for a considerable time at Benares, surrounded by a large circle of disciples. The weaver-poet *Kabīr*, founder of the Kabīr Panthī sect, a disciple of Rāmānand, was a native of Benares, and lived there from about 1380 to 1420. *Chaitanya*, the revered Vaiṣṇava apostle of Bengal (1485–1533), resided at Benares for some years. *Vallabhāchārya* (1478–1530), who established the Rādhāballabhī sect, died in the holy city. No name sheds more glory upon Benares than that of *Tulsī Dās* (1532–1624), author of the *Rām-charit-mānas*, the Hindī equivalent of the Rāmāyaṇa, the favourite book and justly loved treasure of the people of Northern India. He spent the greater part of his long life at Benares, and a manuscript of his chief work, written about twenty-four years after his death, is in the possession of the Mahārājā, who is the owner of a fine library and an interesting collection of old Indian paintings. The monastery (*math*) where the poet lived and the ruinous *ghāṭ* called after his name are near the Asi confluence. During the 18th and 19th centuries many Hindu authors of more or less note, whose names have been laboriously collected by Grierson, resided at Benares, the most notable, perhaps, being *Gokul Nāth*, whose Hindī version of the *Mahābhārata* was published at Calcutta in 1829, and *Hariśchandra* (1850–85), the poet, critic, and journalist. Ward notices the remarkable case of Hatī Vidyālaṅkarā, a learned Bengālī lady, who taught the *śāstras* at Benares a few years prior to 1817. The Sanskrit College issues a periodical called *The Pandit*, which deals with Sanskrit texts.

The pundits of the sacred city probably are still the most learned in India, but they are so intensely conservative that most of them will have nothing to do with modern notions, and so are losing influence over the young men of these days, who cannot shut their eyes and ears to the signs of the times. Mrs. Besant's College, already mentioned, has been organized to teach a modernized Hinduism of a broad and liberal kind. In connexion with it there is a Girls' School attended by about 120 high-caste girls.

6. Missions.—The long-continued labours of the European missionaries settled at Benares for nearly a century deserve notice. The Church of England Mission was established in 1817, and in the same year the Baptists of Serampore formed a branch of their organization under charge of an Eurasian agent. The work of the London Missionary Society began four years later. The Wesleyans established a mission about 1880. The chief missionary institutions are in the suburb of Sigra The college founded in the 17th cent. by Rājā Jay Singh, who established the observatory, has passed into the hands of the Church Missionary Society. The missionaries have done much good service in the cause of secular education, especially during the years prior to the foundation of universities in 1857. Since that date their institutions have been overshadowed by those immediately under the Department of Public Instruction. The direct outcome of missionary effort in the way of conversions of adults appears to be very small, and it is obvious that Benares must always present special difficulties to the preacher of Christian doctrines.

LITERATURE.—*North-West Cantonment Survey Map*, 6 inches to mile (Calcutta, 1869); *IGI*, 1908; Thornton, *Gazetteer*, 1858; Hamilton, *Description of Hindostan* (London, 1820); James Prinsep, *Benares Illustrated* (Calcutta and London, three series, folio, with fine plates, 1830–34); M. A. Sherring, *The Sacred City of the Hindus* (London, 1868), and *Handbook for Visitors to Benares* (Calcutta, 1875; an abstract from the larger work); J. Ewen, *Benares: A Handbook for Visitors* (Calcutta, 1886; inaccurate in details); E. B. Havell, *Benares, the Sacred City* (London, 1905; well illustrated); Fa-hien, *A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, tr. Legge (Oxford, 1886); Hiuen Tsiang (or Yuan Chwang), *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, tr. Beal (London, 1885); Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, 629–45 A.D.* (London, 1904); Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire, 1656–68 A.D.*, ed. Constable (London, 1891); Tavernier, *Travels in India*, tr. V. Ball (London, 1889); Bishop Heber, *Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India, 1824–25* (London, 1844); Ward, *The Hindoos*[2] (2 vols. quarto, Serampore, 1818); Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India* (1903); Grierson, *The Modern Vernacular Literature of Hindustan* (special No. of *JASB*, Calcutta, 1889); C. N. K. Aiyar, *Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya* (Madras, n.d., ? 1904); R. Greeven, 'Worship of the *Pānchon Pīr*' (*NINQ*, vol. ii. 1892; republished as *Heroes Five*, Allāhābād, 1895); *9th Annual Rep. of Central Hindu College* (1906–07).

VINCENT A. SMITH.

BENE-ISRAEL (more correctly *B'nei-Israel* = בני־ישראל, *i.e.* 'Children of Israel').—By this name is designated a body of Jews inhabiting the Bombay Presidency of India. The community is important in its numbers, amounting to some ten thousand souls, and remarkable in its character. A number of peculiar religious usages among them reward careful attention.

1. Origin and history.—No historical records of their past are possessed by the Bene-Israel. The legend preserved by them as to their arrival in India is to the effect that in long bygone times seven men and seven women were cast by a shipwreck on the Indian coast at a point some thirty miles south of the island of Bombay. Many of the less fortunate of their company were drowned in the disaster, and their bodies when washed ashore were buried by their comrades in two *tumuli*—those of the men in one, and those of the women in the other. These mounds the Bene-Israel still show in the village of Naugaon (or 'New Village'), near the Collectorate town of Alībāg. The fourteen survivors, as they increased in numbers, are said to have spread themselves throughout the villages of the Konkan, in the neighbourhood of their first Indian home. In these places they practised chiefly the trade of

oil-pressing; and this avocation, coupled with their habit of observing Saturday and giving their oxen rest from the oil-mills on that day, gained for them among their Hindu neighbours the name of *Shanvār Teli*, or 'Saturday Oil-men,' whereby they distinguished them from their own Hindu oil-men, who rested their bullocks on Mondays, and were therefore called *Somvār Teli*. This name is in use to the present day.

It is worthy of note that, in the immediate neighbourhood of the spot which the Bene-Israel claim as the place of their first landing in India, there used to exist an important seaport and emporium of trade, which was frequented by the ancient navigation hailing from the Egyptian, Arabian, Persian, and other ports. It was known by the name of 'Chemul' * (pronounced 'Tsemvul'), and was almost certainly the 'Simulla' or 'Timoula' of Ptolemy the geographer (A.D. 150) and others.† In Buddhist inscriptions it appears in the form 'Chemula.' Chinese travellers have called it 'Tchi-Mo-Lo'; Arabic writers, 'Ṣaimur' and 'Jaimur.' It is represented by the present insignificant village and port of Revadanda, dating from the time of the Portuguese, and situated some two miles from the older site, the sea having receded owing to the silting up of the creek. The caprices of local misrule at one period closed this ancient port to foreign trade, and this perhaps may have been the means of cutting off the Bene-Israel from further opportunities of contact with their people elsewhere; for they present the appearance of a community who, having up to a certain point preserved intercourse with the main body of their nation, were at some stage in their history separated from the same, and left to develop in their own independent way. They differ greatly even from the better known Indian remnant of their people inhabiting the Malabar coast. For example, the latter, owing doubtless to their having preserved the means of communication with their brethren in other parts of the world, have retained their knowledge of Hebrew, whereas the Bene-Israel had, till lately, lost all knowledge of their ancient tongue.

Though ranking among the fairest of the people of the country, the Bene-Israel, as to complexion, share the colour of the inhabitants of India. In most of their habits and modes of life and dress they have also accommodated themselves to the ways of the land they live in, and they speak the Marāthī vernacular. Till lately they have wholly rejected the name of 'Jew,' even to the degree of regarding the title as a stigma if applied to them, and have insisted instead on the appellation 'Bene-Israel.' Some would account for this by supposing that at some time or other the adoption of the latter title may have served to screen them from persecution by Muhammadans; but it is, on the whole, more probable that the origin of the name is to be sought in some more positive source. One's eyes naturally turn to the lands which first received the deportations of the Israelites of both captivities, and which continued for many centuries to be the centre of the life of Israelites both of the ten tribes and of the two tribes last taken captive. J. Brühl ‡ relates that in Persia he found the Jews almost invariably calling themselves 'Israel' instead of 'Yahūdī,' and he believes it very probable that many of the Jews of Persia and of Kurdistan (which is partly under Persian and partly under Turkish rule), as well as numbers of the Nestorian Christians, § are descendants of the ten tribes. There are several cogent reasons for connecting the early Jews of India with those of Persia as to origin. Early navigation made the transit between Persia and India easy. Again, in South India the Jews of Malabar are found located side by side with an historic body of Christians, no less unique in character than themselves, known as the Christians of St. Thomé, and these, if not actually derived originally from Persia, as some would have us believe,* were at any rate in their early history most intimately associated with that country, as is witnessed by the discovery of three ancient Persian stone crosses,† and also by the well-known fact that this community long drew its presiding bishops direct from Persia itself.‡ There is therefore no difficulty in believing that Persia, the depositing ground of the Israelites of both exiles, and the place in which they were long massed together in the greatest numbers, and where, also, in later times they were not infrequently subjected to severe persecutions,§ may have been the country which furnished Indian shores with many a contingent of Israelite immigrants. These would probably have been, after all, but the successors of many earlier Hebrew pioneers who had passed to and fro along the well-known trade routes to India, for purposes of merchandise. It is, however, at the same time right to mention that some have believed the Bene-Israel to be an offshoot of the Jews of Yemen (Arabia Felix).‖ Against this not impossible, or, indeed, altogether unlikely view, may be set the fact that no marks of intimacy or tradition of any common origin survive to the present day; nor is there traceable much that is common to the Yemenite Jews and the Bene-Israel in their distinctive observances.¶ To the unbiased observer the Bene-Israel suggest themselves as the descendants of Hebrews who at their first introduction into India must have made somewhat free alliances with the women of the land (as, according to ancient pre-Talmudic Hebrew practice, there was hardly a bar to their doing**), and thus an infiltration of Indian blood into their community would have taken place at an early stage of their sojourn in India. This was doubtless soon succeeded by a rigid practice of allowing marriage only with members of their own body—a rule which the example and influence of the Hindu caste system around them would have tended to encourage, and to which they have doubtless ever since most strictly adhered.

At the present time no Hindu caste could be more exclusive in regard to this custom of allowing racial intermixture than the Bene-Israel. They outban and stigmatize at once as *Kālā Israel*, or 'Black Israel,' all offspring of mixed unions. Such are not allowed at communal feasts to sit in close proximity to the rest of the community, or to

* See Yule-Burnett, *Hobson-Jobson*, Lond. 1903, 210 f.

† The author of the *Periplus Maris Erythræi* (A.D. 247) refers to it as 'Semulla.'

‡ *The Ten Tribes; Where are They?* London, 1880.

§ For the Israelitish descent of many of the Nestorian Christians of Kurdistan, see, besides Brühl, Rabbi Benjamin II., *Eight Years in Asia and Africa*, pp. 93–96; also, Athelstan Riley, *The Archbp. of Cant. Mission to the Assyrian Christians* (S.P.C.K., London, 1891), p. 5, footnote.

* See G. Milne Rae, *Syrian Church in India* (Edinburgh, 1892), pp. 15–26.

† *Ib.* pp. 114–130.

‡ The Jews of China, whose early connexions were with Persia, entered China by sea, *via* India, if tradition be correct.

§ As in the year A.D. 468, under Firuz (or Peroz), 'The Wicked.'

‖ Wilson, *The Bene-Israel of Bombay: an Appeal*, also *Lands of the Bible*, ii. 668. Rabbi J. Saphir, like Dr. Wilson, considers that the physiognomy of the Bene-Israel resembles that of the Jews of Arabia (see *Eben Saphir*, p. 43).

¶ The Bene-Israel possess a tradition that they came to India from 'the northern provinces.' This, Mr. Haeem S. Kehimkar would interpret of the Galilæan northern parts of Palestine, and he thinks that the Bene-Israel may have come direct to India by way of Ezion-geber and the Red Sea, for Jews settled in Galilee just before the Christian era. See Wyse, *History of the Hebrews' Second Commonwealth*.

** See Dt 21^{10-14}; also Smith's *DB*, *s.v.* 'Marriage.' From Dt 23^{3-8} may be inferred what might be done in regard to foreigners *other* than the Ammonite or Moabite.

intermarry with any except their own class. An analogy would seem to exist between the Bene-Israel and some other more or less unique Jewish communities, such as the Falashas of Abyssinia, the Jews of K'ai-feng-fu in China, the Jews of Yemen, and some among the so-called 'Black Jews' of Malabar, all of whom, while they manifest unmistakably the presence of the Hebrew stamina, reveal no less clearly traces of some intermixture with the people among whom they have sojourned. In the case of the Bene-Israel there is a characteristic type pervading the whole community which bespeaks the genuine Hebrew stock from which they have undoubtedly sprung.*

2. Religious customs.—It would be expected beforehand that a people with the antecedents we have described would exhibit much that was peculiar and interesting in their religious customs, when they again came into notice; and this is certainly the case with the Bene-Israel.

Three characteristic Hebrew observances which never died out among them first claim notice. These are (1) the practice of circumcision, (2) the keeping of the Sabbath, and (3) the retention in memory of at least part of the great Jewish formula, the *Shema' Yisrael* (commencing, 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is One Lord!'). For want of a liturgy they were accustomed to use, in their ignorance, the words of the latter formula on every occasion of their religious gatherings, repeating the sentence several times over. We have noted their acquirement of the title *Shanvār Teli* ('Saturday Oil-men'), on account of their unyoking their oxen on Saturdays in observance of the Jewish Sabbath. A further distinctive habit which has clung to them, though some are dropping it now, is the custom of wearing side-locks of their hair (פאות), in reference to Lv 19^{27} 21^{5}. To this custom the fashion commonly adopted of shaving most or all of the rest of the head is wont to give a peculiarly exaggerated appearance.

(*a*) *Fasts and festivals.*—A regular sequence of religious seasons, fasts, and festivals has been in vogue among the Bene-Israel, and these when examined are found to coincide remarkably with the usual festivals and fasts of the Jews. They were preserved, however, wholly under Indian names, the latter being often connected with some special kind of food partaken of, or abstained from, on the occasion of, or being given on account of the festivity or fast, bearing some resemblance to, or coinciding in point of time with, some Hindu or Muhammadan observance. Thus, the Feast of Tabernacles (kept, however, a fortnight out of time) was known as the 'Feast of partaking of Khir,'† a kind of confection made of new rice, sugar, scraped coco-nut, and spices. The Day of Atonement was termed 'Fast of Door-closing,'‡ because on this day all rigidly shut themselves up in their houses, wearing white clothing even to their very caps, and avoiding converse or contact with others. Purim was called 'Feast of Holi,'§ because the time of keeping it coincided with a Hindu festival of the same name (one of rowdy and debased character), observed at the same time. Passover was known as the 'Festival of Jar-closing,'‖ the jar being one containing a sour mixture or sauce, to which conceivably a suspicion of fermentation or leaven may have been held to attach.* The Fast of Ab (for the destruction of the first Temple) was characterized as 'Fast of [partaking of] Birdya,'† the latter being a sort of pulse put into the curry on this day, a vegetable diet having been adhered to during the eight days previous. The Feast of Weeks had somehow dropped out of use.‡

The festivals and fasts so far mentioned appear to form a class of their own among the Bene-Israel. They are all alike designated by the word *saṇ* (pronounced to rhyme with 'turn'), which is a Marāthī word of Sanskritic origin (a word which can denote both 'fast' and 'festival'). It will be observed that the seasons of observance already described relate uniformly to the chief and oldest Jewish festivals and fasts. There is a further set of festivals and fasts, also in vogue among the Bene-Israel, which have every appearance of being a class by themselves, and which have probably been superinduced in later times upon their older observances, presumably at the instigation of comparatively recent Jewish visitors and reformers from without.§ The festivals and fasts now alluded to, while relating almost entirely to Jewish holidays of later institution, are known among the Bene-Israel by names derived from the Hindustani language only, such as *roza*, of Persian origin, and *'urs*, of Arabic origin. To the latter class belong the ten days of expiation observed by Jews preceding the Day of Atonement, on which special penitential prayers called *selihoth* are used, and which, because of their bearing some resemblance to the long fast of the Muhammadans, were called by the Bene-Israel *Ramzan*.‖ A day after the keeping of *Navyāchā Saṇ*, or 'New Year's Festival,' occurs the *Navyāchā Rozā*, or 'Fast of the New [Year].' It corresponds probably to the Fast of Gedaliah, kept by Jews on the 23rd of Tishri; but if so, precedes it by twenty days. Two fasts occurring at two different seasons of the year are observed under the one name of *Sabābi Rozā*, the one fast apparently corresponding to the Fast of the 10th of Tebeth, commemorating the beginning of the siege of Jerusalem, and the other to the Fast of the 17th of Tammuz, kept in remembrance of the breach made in the wall of Jerusalem. The meaning of the word *Sabābi* is obscure. According to its Hindustani meaning of 'meritorious,' it might denote that the keeping of these additional fasts was considered a work of special merit; or, if referred to the Hebrew root סָבַב (=to surround), an allusion to the investment of the city would be obvious.¶

* A thoroughly good idea of the appearance of the Bene-Israel may be gained from the excellent portraits from photographs given in the *JE* under heading 'Beni-Israel.' Two out of the three synagogues shown there, however, do not belong to the Bene-Israel.

† *Khiricha Saṇ*.

‡ *Dārfalnicha Saṇ*. Rabbi J. Saphir (*Eben Saphir*, p. 45) says that he was puzzled to account for this name till he bethought himself of a prayer entitled תפלת נעילת שערים ('prayer of the shutting of the gates'), forming part of the concluding section of the Service of the Day of Atonement in the Modern Jewish Prayer Book.

§ *Holicha Saṇ*. ‖ *Anasi Dākhāchā Saṇ*

* The rice-bread almost exclusively used by the Bene-Israel is at all times an unleavened bread.

† *Birdyāchā Saṇ*.

‡ The modern Jewish habit of doubling the first and last days of many festivals was not known to the Bene-Israel.

§ Such a reformer may have been David Rahabi, who is said by the Bene-Israel to have visited them long ago, and to have instituted this reform. He may have come from Cochin, where the surname 'Rahabi' (signifying 'Egyptian') still exists in the form of 'Roby.' Such an one would have doubtless communicated with the Bene-Israel through the medium of the Hindustani dialect, only in that case he must have visited them subsequently to about A.D. 1400, before which date Hindustani (or Urdu) was not a spoken language—not, as the Bene-Israel think, 900 years ago.

‖ The Bene-Israel add to these days a special fast during the preceding month of Elul (cf. Leo Modena [Rabbi of Venice, 1637], *History of the Rites, Customs, and Manner of Life of the Present Jews throughout the World* [tr. London, 1650]: 'Therefore do they begin on the first day of Elul, which is the moneth immediately going before, to think of Acts of *Penance*; and in some places, they rise before day, and say Prayers, make Confession of their sins, and rehearse the *Penetentiall Psalms*. And there are many amongst them, that Indict themselves *Fasts*, do *Penance*, and give alms to the Poor, continuing on this course, till the Day of Pardon comes; that is to say, for the space of Fourty daies').

¶ These are the explanations suggested as possible by Mr. Haeem S. Kehimkar. The writer of this article would take the

A very extraordinary festival, and one now hardly observed, was that known as *Eliyah hanabichā 'urs*, or 'the Fair of Elijah the Prophet.' To keep it the Bene-Israel resorted annually to a village-spot in the Konkan, named Khandalla, where, according to a legend, Elijah the prophet had once appeared to them, and thence had ascended to heaven. In date this festival corresponds to a Jewish one known as the 'New Year of the Trees' (ראש השנה לאילנות), in reference to Lv 19[23-25]. The observance of such a festival as this seems indicative of a very prolonged sojourn of the Bene-Israel in India; for such a mixture of knowledge and ignorance in regard to the prophet Elijah, and its incrustation into such a practice as that mentioned, can hardly have sprung up and taken fixed form in a short time.* Hindus are accustomed to keep *melas*, or 'religious fairs,' in honour of their temples, and the Indian Muhammadans have also similar fairs, called by them *'urs*, in honour of the tombs of their *pirs*, or departed saints; and the Bene-Israel, in the strange custom that we have mentioned, must have been adopting the habits of the country.

(*b*) *Nazirite vow.*—Besides these rites and holidays of Judaism in general, the Bene-Israel have several interesting customs not so generally in use among Jews elsewhere, one of which is an apparent survival of the Nazirite vow. A boy in infancy is made the subject of a vow on the part of his parents.† The cause may perhaps be that for long they had no male offspring, or that former children had died. From the time when the vow is made till the time of its redemption no razor is permitted to pass over the head of the child. In consequence, a lad comparatively grown up may often be seen with long hair tressed up behind his head after the manner of a woman. When the time arrives that his parents feel able to redeem their vow, the hair is shaved off and weighed in the scales against gold or silver, or whatever else the parents may have before decided to give, and the equivalent so obtained is devoted to religious purposes. The shaved-off hair, instead of being burnt (Nu 6[18]), is thrown into some tank or river, probably in keeping with the customs of Hindus and Indian Muhammadans, who are much given to letting their religious ceremonies culminate in the immersing of something in the water, the custom probably having its roots in Hindu veneration for the river Ganges, which is commonly credited with the power of re-appearing in all sorts of impossible places.

(*c*) *Burning of frankincense.*—A custom hardly less interesting than the foregoing, and one which prevailed till quite lately among the Bene-Israel, was the burning of frankincense on a number of religious occasions. Quite recently they have been dissuaded from its use by their Jewish co-religionists of other lands, who have represented to them that the practice was a superstitious one, copied from surrounding idolatry. It is by no means certain, however, that this custom had not its own ancient and independent Hebrew origin. It is significant that the Jews in China had a provision for burning incense in their synagogue at K'ai-feng-fu, it being a mark of Imperial favour that the incense for the purpose was provided free of cost by the Emperor himself. As already mentioned, the tradition was that the Jews had entered China by sea, *via* India, in the first instance.*

An indispensable concomitant in a number of the religious ceremonies of the Bene-Israel is a sweet-smelling herb named *sabzā*. Botanically it is the *Ocymum pilosum vel basilicum*, and somewhat resembles mint. It is much used, also, in religious rites by the Indian Muhammadans. A smaller species of the same herb is the *Ocymum sanctum*, or 'holy basil,' the well-known sacred plant of the Hindus, called by them the *tulsī*. The important place which the *sabzā* twig occupies in numerous ceremonies of the Bene-Israel suggests the possible idea of its being used as a substitute for the hyssop of Mosaic ordinances.

(*d*) *Offerings.*—Certain religious offerings are made by the Bene-Israel which invite careful attention. A singular feature in them is the offering of goats' liver or of the gizzards of fowls (whichever animals may have been slain on the occasion). These portions, after being cooked, are brought and offered to the ministrant of a religious ceremony, the rest of the flesh of the animals slain being eaten by the host and guests assembled. It should be observed here that the Bene-Israel rarely, if ever, partake of any other flesh than that of goats (including occasionally sheep) and fowls. Again, a certain confection known as *malīdā* (a Persian word), a kind of cake or pudding, is used ceremonially by them. The impression irresistibly conveyed to the observer by all this is that these are survivals in this community of the ancient meat-offerings of Mosaic times, if not also vestiges of ancient sacrifices themselves. As a typical example of the way in which the various articles mentioned above, including frankincense, *sabzā*, and *malīdā*, were employed by the Bene-Israel in various ceremonies connected with festivals, vows, marriage, burial, etc., we may quote the following description of the ceremony performed at the fulfilment of a vow, as given by Haeem S. Kehimkar, in his *Sketch of the History of the Bene-Israel*:—

'A feast was given in the evening in the following manner:—After the invited party came in, a clean white towel or clean white sheet was spread on the floor, whereon a dish containing *malīdā*, five pieces of unleavened bread made of rice-flour besmeared with sweets, twigs of *sabzā*, and five pieces of the cooked liver of a goat, was placed. Another dish containing cakes of wheaten flour fried in oil, and wafers of unleavened bread also fried in oil, and livers and gizzards of as many fowls as may have been killed on the occasion, was also placed there The dish also contained a glass of wine or other liquor as a drink-offering; and several other plates filled with all sorts of fruits were placed upon the sheet, over which they said the *Kiriyath Shema* about a dozen times. . . . After the ceremony was over, a handful of *malīdā*, together with a twig of *sabzā* and a piece of each of the articles placed in the dish and in the plates, were taken by the man who officiated as priest in his own hands, and before presenting these to the lady who had made the vow, he asked her what had caused her to make the vow. On her giving the reason, she was told that she was free from her vow, and the *malīdā* was given to her. The articles in the dish and plates were distributed among the party, except the pieces of liver and gizzard, as well as the five pieces of cakes and wafers, which were kept by the officiating priest for himself, while the guests were served with the feast.'

(*e*) *Dietary rules.*—With regard to dietary rules, it was customary with the Bene-Israel either to remove the sinew in the leg, in accordance with Gn 32[33], or, if skill sufficient for this somewhat intricate operation did not exist, to reject as food

opportunity of stating here his very great indebtedness to this gentleman's writings for much information embodied in this article. Mr. Haeem's unpretending pamphlet, *A Sketch of the History of the Bene-Israel*, has thrown a flood of light on many an unknown custom among his people. Especially is what is here written as to festivals and fasts largely due to his pamphlet.

* See in *JE*, *s.v.* 'China' the arguments advanced for a very early date of the Jewish settlement in China. It is significant that the tradition was that the earliest introduction of the Jews into China was from the West, by crossing the sea, from India. It is no less worthy of notice that the MSS of the Jews of China show a connexion with the Jews of Persia.

† Or the vow may have been made before birth, contingent upon a son being given. The rite is not confined to lads. The writer was himself present when the subject of it was a girl, whose hair was shaved off as described above. If this be held to show that the vow-ceremony among the Bene-Israel is derived from Hindus (among whom such a practice does exist), it surely only removes the question of the origin of such vows in Eastern lands a stage further back.

* See *JE*, *s.v.* 'China.' Note also what is said there as to certain customs in use among Chinese Jews pointing to a pre-Talmudic origin.

the hindquarters of the animal altogether.* Blood, fat, animals strangled or maimed by beasts of prey, the Bene-Israel shunned altogether as food. In regard to fish, they would eat only those which had both fins and scales.

(*f*) *Kiss of peace.*—In common with the Jews of Cochin, the Bene-Israel preserve the custom of parting at their religious gatherings with the Kiss of Peace. The custom likewise prevails among the Christians of St. Thomé in Malabar, and is found, again, amongst the East Syrian Christians of Kurdistan.† This may be taken as one more indication of the probable link of connexion between the Jews of India and those of Persia in ancient times, especially when it is remembered, as we have already mentioned (see above, p. 470), that the Nestorian Christians of Kurdistan have a tradition of having been originally converts from Judaism. In performing the salutation among the Bene-Israel, the chief minister first bestows it on the most important persons present near to him, by receiving the fingers of the outstretched hand (the palms held vertically) between his own hands, after which the hands of both are simultaneously released, and the tips of the fingers of each person passed to his own lips and kissed. Those already saluted turn to bestow the salutation on others, the younger usually seeking it from the older, and inferiors from their superiors, till all have saluted each other. The procedure continues for some two or three minutes, during which an audible sound of the lips is heard throughout the synagogue.

(*g*) *Cup of blessing.*—At the close of some services in their newly-revived synagogues a ceremony takes place which has been termed by Christians who have observed it, 'the Cup of Blessing.'‡ A cup, containing a juice pressed from raisins for the purpose, is put into the hands of the minister, who, after first pronouncing a blessing over it, partakes of a portion of it. The remainder is then poured by the attendants into a large vessel containing much more of the same mixture. The *shamāsh*, or sexton, then passing round the assembly, with one or more assistants, distributes the contents of the vessel to each member of the assembly by means of pairs of little silver cups, one of which is being filled while the other is being emptied. As to the antiquity of this custom it is difficult to pronounce. In the opinion of some it is merely the performance of the usual Jewish ceremony of the *Habdālāh* (הבדלה) § in the synagogue instead of in the home; and if so, it may be of comparatively recent introduction among the Bene-Israel.

3. Use of Hebrew names.—The Bene-Israel have mostly retained the use of Biblical names, but the latter have commonly assumed an Indianized form, as *Banaji* for Benjamin, *'Abaji* for Abraham, and the like. ‖ Similarly the names of the women receive the Indian affix *baī* (corresponding to our Mrs. and Miss) appended to them, as, for example, *Sarahbai*, *Miriambai*, and the like. Where the names of men and women of the Bene-Israel are purely Indian, they do not appear to be in any case compounded with the name of any Hindu deity, as is largely the case among Hindus. Surnames (which the Bene-Israel are gradually discarding) were formed by the addition of the syllable *kar* (pronounced to rhyme with 'stir,' and equivalent in meaning to 'inhabitant of') to the name of the village with which a man's family had become identified in the earlier days of Israelite settlement, such as *Kihimkar* = 'resident in [the village of] Kihim.' Dr. Wilson has remarked that at the time when he made his investigations the name 'Reuben' was the most common amongst men, and that the favourite Jewish names of *Jehudah* and *Esther* were not found. Both names have come into use among the Bene-Israel now.

4. Hindu customs.—Though preserving their characteristics and religion remarkably in the midst of an unfavourable environment, the Bene-Israel have not survived their long isolation altogether uninfected by the surrounding idolatry. Certain domestic customs and usages, too numerous and intricate to detail at any length, still linger among them, more particularly in rural parts, and specially among the women of the community. These owe their origin purely to Hinduism, though not all of them are of an idolatrous or superstitious character. Such customs are found plentifully connected with marriage ceremonies; also with occasions of birth, puberty, betrothal, sickness, and death.* On an occurrence of small-pox, or even during a performance of vaccination, the goddess of small-pox, *Shītalvādī* by name, is sought to be propitiated by some, and the furtive keeping of Hindu idols has not been unknown. As to the use of charms, and superstitious usages at childbirth, many parallels of a no less debased kind could be drawn from Kabbalistic practices under the sanction of modern rabbinical Judaism (see BIRTH [Jewish]). Rabbi Solomon in his *Travels* mentions that in the year 1846 he saw at Belgaum (a town in the south of the Bombay Presidency) the wives of [Israelite] men in the army stretching forth the fingers of their hands to the fire and kissing them as they lit the lamps.† It is right to say that a great effort has been made in recent years by the Bene-Israel as a body to throw off all this, and that a great change has taken place already.

5. Organization.—As to communal organization, the Bene-Israel, under the older order of things, recognized the authority of a headman, called a *muqaddam*, over each village community where sufficient in numbers, whose powers were considerable. He would assemble the community when necessary, preside over their deliberations, and act as their executive in matters relating to caste-discipline or organization generally. Besides this officer, there was another (not, however, found in every village) named the *qāzī*, meaning properly 'judge.' To him pertained the religious duties of ministrations at religious ceremonies, the performance of circumcision, marriage, rites of burial, and frequently the slaughtering of animals. With the *muqaddam* and *qāzī* were associated certain

* In regard to China, it is observable that this practice, even more than the keeping of Saturday as the Sabbath, attracted the notice of the Chinese, so that the Jews were accorded the title of *Tiao Kiu-Kiao*, 'the sect which extracts the sinew.' The writer of the article on 'China' in *JE* iv. 33 deduces from this appellation a further argument for the great antiquity of the arrival of the Jews in China, for he says, 'Rabbinical Judaism would have suggested more distinctive peculiarities of the Jews to the Chinese.' If so in China, how much more may we suppose great antiquity for the arrival of Israelites in India?

† Note the following from Maclean and Browne, *The Catholicos of the East and His People* (S.P.C.K., London, 1892), p. 255: 'One [deacon] goes to the Bema and says a litany; another gives the Kiss of Peace to the people, somewhat as at the daily services, except that the celebrant first kisses the altar and the deacon takes his hands between his own and kisses them, and then goes to the sanctuary door and gives the peace to the person of highest rank, and then to the next, and so on.'

‡ Wilson, *Lands of the Bible*, ii. 672.

§ A ceremony for placing a distinction or line of demarcation between times secular and sacred, as, for example, between week-day and Sabbath.

‖ A good example is the name of the retired commandant who built the first synagogue of the Bene-Israel in Bombay in 1796. His name was *Samaji* (= Samuel) *Hassaji* (= Haskel, *i.e.* Ezekiel) *Divekar* (= resident of the village of Dive).

* Many of these practices will be found described in *BG* (Bombay, 1885) xviii. i. 515–535.

† *Travels of Solomon* (מסעות שלמה), p. 100: בעיני ראיתי בשנת 1846 כאשר הייתי בעיר בלגים את נשות אנשי הצבא אשר שם כאשר הדליקו את הנרות שלחו את אצבעות ידיהן אל האש ותנשקנה אותם.

chaugale, or 'elders' (properly four in number) who assisted them as counsellors. At communal meetings all adult members had a voice.*

6. Modern conditions.—It is only in quite recent times that the Bene-Israel have emerged into the light of history. It is through the observations and researches of Christians that they have become known, and in fact have been raised to some degree of education and advancement, and provided with their Scriptures and fresh beginnings of a knowledge of Hebrew.

(*a*) *State of transition.*—The long centuries during which they had previously remained hidden from notice can, it may safely be surmised, never have their story told. We now see the Bene-Israel at the parting of the ways, just as they are reaching out towards modern modes of life and culture. Their present tendency and aim is to forsake the ancient landmarks of the past, which it has been the object of this article to try to search out and describe. Their present effort is to conform themselves in all respects to the ways of modern Judaism, choosing as their standard the easier and more liberal principles of the Reformed School of Judaism rather than the more rigid ones of strict Talmudic Judaism, which, indeed, their present ignorance of Hebrew would ill fit them to follow. While they are in this transition state, it is now and then difficult to determine what has been of ancient usage among them and what has been of late, or of comparatively late, introduction. The study is further complicated by the probable occasional engrafting that has taken place, upon their original observances, of some of later date by occasional visitors and reformers at long intervals, in the way we have described. Previously the home of the Bene-Israel was exclusively among the villages of the mainland, extending over a tract running parallel with, and southwards for some fifty miles of, the island of Bombay. But since the establishment of British rule in India the Bene-Israel have commenced to migrate largely into the city of Bombay, where over four thousand of them now reside.

(*b*) *Occupations.*—Formerly, besides following their hereditary occupation of oil-pressing, many became also owners of land, cartmen, carpenters, stone-cutters, and cultivators. Now, in addition to these and similar occupations, they are pressing forward into positions as office-clerks and mechanics, and into the services of government, railways, and the municipalities; and some into the learned professions also. In ancient times they displayed great prowess as soldiers, and under the East India Company rarely failed to rise to the position of non-commissioned and commissioned officers. They proved loyal to a man to the British at the time of the Mutiny. The new system of 'promotion by caste returns,' by which the numerical strength of a particular caste is required, as well as intrinsic merit, to secure advancement, has served greatly to deter a minority like the Bene-Israel from now entering to any large extent on a military profession. Not many are possessed of wealth at present, and it is a regrettable fact that some who at one time were well off have squandered their patrimony and become poor.

(*c*) *Synagogues and worship.*—Originally the Bene-Israel had no synagogues or houses of prayer. The oldest of their synagogues in Bombay (which is also the oldest Jewish synagogue in Western India) bears the date A.D. 1796. In Bombay they have erected, mostly within the last hundred years, four or five synagogues of their own, two of which are of a permanent character, specially built as synagogues, and outside of Bombay eight or nine in different townships. In all of these worship is conducted in the modern Jewish manner,* and they possess the usual staff of synagogue officers, namely, the *ḥazzān*, or reader, the *gubbai*, or treasurer, the *shamāsh*, or sexton, etc.; and use the modern Jewish Prayer-Book of the *Sephardim*. They have now procured rolls of the Law, and read from them in the usual way. They have, however, no *kohanim* (supposed Levitical priests); and therefore the few functions assigned to such in the usual Jewish ritual have to go unperformed. They hardly now maintain their old character for the keeping of the Sabbath, for in Bombay and other centres of trade they attend offices, factories, and workshops in large numbers on that day. Though domiciled for a long course of centuries in India, they have done nothing to convert their Indian neighbours to the faith of the God of Abraham. In this respect their influence appears to have been *nil*.

(*d*) *Chief characteristics.*—The Bene-Israel are as yet but a feeble folk. Nevertheless they possess many sterling qualities, which might readily place them in advance of many around them. Though too ready to be quarrelsome, and displaying too great a fondness for liquor on festive occasions, especially on the part of the rising generation living amongst the temptations of large cities, they have always borne a good character for morality; and for courtesy and hospitality they are unsurpassed. Their women show considerable aptitude as teachers and nurses, when properly trained. In regard to religious inquiry, great indolence and want of earnestness prevail. Keenness as to material progress—and indifference to almost everything else—seems at present a ruling characteristic. A great future in India may be in store for such a people as this, if they will live fully up to their opportunities.

LITERATURE.—John Wilson, *Lands of the Bible* (Edinburgh, 1847, ii. 667–678), and (pamphlet) *The Beni-Israel of Bombay: An Appeal for their Christian Education*[2] (Edinburgh, 1865); Haeem S. Kehimkar, (pamphlet) *Sketch of the History of the Bene-Israel and an Appeal for their Education* (Bombay, about 1885); Sir James Campbell, *BG* (Bombay, 1883–1885) xviii. (on Poona) 506–536, xi. (on Kolaba and Janjira) 85, 86, and 421, 422; C. Buchanan, *Christian Researches* (London, 1819), p. 235; Rabbi David D'Beth Hillel, *Travels* (Madras, 1832), pp. 133–135; Herr J. J. Benjamin II., *Eight Years in Asia and Africa* (Hanover, 1859), pp. 143–147; Solomon Reinman (שלמה ריינמאן), *Travels of Solomon* (מסעות שלמה) [in Hebrew], ed. W. Schur (Vienna, 1884), pp. 99–112; Rabbi Jacob Saphir, *Eben Saphir* [in Hebrew] (Mentz, 1874), ii. 42–50; J. H. Lord, *Jewish Mission Field in the Bombay Diocese* (Bombay, 1894), and in *Church and Synagogue* (London), v. (1903) 100–109, 133–142, vi. (1904) 13–24, 55–65, 117–134, viii. (1906) 6–19 (since re-published in amplified form as *Jews in India and Far East*, Bombay, 1907), and on Jews of Cochin, vii. (1905); J. Wolff, *Travels and Adventures* (London, 1861), p. 468 f.; Ritter, *Erdkunde* (Berlin, 1835–1836), vol. iv. pt. i. 594–601, pt. ii. 1087; W. T. Gidney, *Sites and Scenes* (London, 1898), ii. 224–228. See also the *Bombay Census Reports*, 1891, 1901; the *JE*, *s.v.* 'Beni-Israel' (New York and London, 1902); and the *Jewish Year Book* (London) for 1902–1903, pp. 196–202, for 1903–1904, pp. 228–234.

J. HENRY LORD.

BENEVOLENCE.—I. *AS A QUALITY OF HUMAN CHARACTER.*—1. The New Testament usage.—The NT writers are concerned mainly with practical morality. They make no attempt to frame a system of ethics. In studying one of the NT virtues, accordingly, we need hardly try to reach a scientific definition of it. We ought rather to note the working in it of the ultimate principle of NT morality, viz. love, and to trace

* The most modern religious revival amongst the Bene-Israel is connected with the names of a group of Jews from Cochin in the early part of the last century. Prominent amongst these stands out the name of Hacham Shellomo (Solomon) Salem Shurabbi, who died in 1856, after twenty years spent in endeavours for the religious resuscitation of the Bene-Israel (see Haeem S. Kehimkar, *Sketch*, p. 22).

* Their services are in Hebrew, a language which many can now read, but hardly any can understand. Some creditable efforts have been made of late years to provide service-books having the Hebrew interleaved with Marāthī. The daily service-book thus treated is a handsome volume, produced at some expense.

the phases of character and conduct in which its presence is marked.

In considering the operation of the supreme principle of love, we find one broad distinction. The object of love is man in his twofold aspect as a possessor of sacred rights and as a creature of manifold needs. On the one hand, accordingly, love requires the fulfilment of justice. A man must be protected in all the rights of his humanity, inasmuch as he is no mere thing or chattel, but a being made in the Divine image, and meant for the Divine fellowship. On the other hand, with equal emphasis the NT declares the obligation of benevolence. Our fellow-men are sacred not merely in their rights, but in their needs; and we are bound by the principle of love not merely to defend the former, but to meet and relieve the latter. The needs of men are meant to evoke the virtue which we designate by the term 'benevolence,' and by the other cognate words which in various aspects develop its meaning.

In the NT the following aspects of benevolence are the most clearly marked :—

(1) *χρηστότης*. — This beautiful term may be rendered by our word 'benevolence,' giving us the idea of a disposition in which there is nothing harsh or bitter, because the love of self has been swallowed up in a love larger and more compelling. In such a disposition there is a fountain of goodwill which flows forth freely and spontaneously in emotions of loving-kindness and deeds of helpfulness. Closely parallel is the term 'benignity,' by which, indeed, *χρηστότης* is rendered in the Rheims version of Gal 5^{22}. It suggests a character large in charity, tolerant in judgment, gentle in speech, of ripe wisdom in the affairs of the soul, finding its delight and its reward in the comfort with which it relieves distress. Our familiar word 'kindness,' however, brings us nearest the heart of this very lovely phase of character. It is the very hall-mark of love (1 Co 13^4). It has close affinities with forbearance and long-suffering (Ro 2^4, 2 Co 6^6). It is its very nature to be patient and hopeful, and not to be turned aside by the frowardness and thanklessness of those whom it would help. Its conspicuous contrast is 'severity' (Ro 11^{22}). Not, indeed, as though severity were reprehensible; but only that under the limitations of human insight, kindness ought to prevail, while severity must be kept within the restraints of love. Kindness in thought, word, and deed is the homely yet hard requirement of the NT law of love.

(2) *ἀγαθωσύνη*.—This may best be rendered 'goodness' (Ro 15^{14}, Gal 5^{22}, Eph 5^9, 2 Th 1^{11}), in the sense of active goodness or 'beneficence' (*bonitas*). It emphasizes conduct, while *χρηστότης* emphasizes disposition. '*χρηστότης* is potential *ἀγαθωσύνη*; *ἀγαθωσύνη* is energizing *χρηστότης*' (Lightfoot on Gal 5^{22}). Kindness issues in goodness, and is a characteristic of it. It has often been remarked that *ἀγαθωσύνη* does not occur in classical Greek, and that the virtue it expresses is not to be found in the Greek ideal of character. It has no place, for instance, in Aristotle's famous account of the 'high-minded' man. The *μεγαλόψυχος* will, indeed, confer benefits. He will do so, however, not from the love of man as such, but from a sense of what is suited to the artistic completeness of his character. In the NT, man is looked at under the light of the Divine love, and duty is construed from the point of view of the Divine purpose. The God-like man, accordingly, is the good man, in whom love manifests itself as a ceaseless beneficence, which is a finite reproduction of the infinite goodness of God. The good man, unlike the *μεγαλόψυχος*, thinks not of himself in his beneficence, save as the recipient and the steward of the Divine bountifulness.

(3) *εὐδοκία* and *εὔνοια*.—The former describes the gracious will, which is the source of the benevolent deed (Eph $1^{5.9}$, Ro 10^1, Ph 1^{15} 2^{13}). The latter is applied to the inner spring of conduct, which, viewed from without, might seem mechanical or compulsory. Even slaves may redeem their enforced labour from the taint of servility by performing it with goodwill to their masters as part of a Divine service (Eph 6^7).

(4) *φιλανθρωπία*.—Benevolence has for its object every sentient creature, and thus includes kindness to animals. Its proper object is, however, man, whose greatness, as a being made in the image of God, is combined with the frailties of the 'fleshly' side of his nature; and in this connexion it is described as 'philanthropy.' With singular felicity the NT speaks of the 'philanthropy of God' (Tit 3^4). Ordinarily, the term is applied to the love which man owes to his fellows (Ac 27^3 28^2). These references show that philanthropy has a less distinctively Christian note than goodness. It is exhibited by those who have not known the love of God in Christ. In this virtue Christianity has not made an absolutely new discovery. It has rather recovered and reinforced a native energy of human nature, which, amid terrible defacement of the Divine image, has not lost all trace of its original and prototype.

(5) *ἁπλότης*. — 'It is not exactly liberality . . . it is the quality of a mind which has no *arrière-pensée* in what it does; when it gives, it does so because it sees and feels the need, and for no other reason; this is the sort of mind which *is* liberal, and God assigns a man the function of *μεταδιδόναι* when He bestows this mind on him by His Spirit' (Denney in *Expos. Gr. Test.* on Ro 12^8). Liberality describes benevolence in its absorption in the need which it relieves. It has a finer quality than the corresponding virtue described by Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* bk. iv. ch. i.). A parallel to our Lord's word, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive,' may, indeed, be found in Aristotle's sentence, 'It is more distinctive of virtue to do good to others than to have good done to you.' Yet there is a significant difference. In the one, liberality is a product of a Divine grace, and awakens a Divine gladness. In the other, it is an artistic achievement, and awakens an æsthetic delight. In Aristotle's whole account we do not find 'a word about benevolence, or love to others, as prompting acts of liberality. We find no other motive but the splendour (*καλόν*) of the acts themselves' (Sir A. Grant, *Aristotle's Ethics*, ii. 60).

In the teaching of Jesus benevolence is not discussed, but it is depicted with consummate skill in His parable of the Good Samaritan, in whose action kindness and goodness, goodwill, philanthropy, and liberality are exquisitely blended. In the character of Jesus no aspect of benevolence is wanting. *χρηστότης* is seen in His bearing towards those who were excluded from the respect of men. *ἀγαθωσύνη* is illustrated in the whole ministry of Him who 'went about doing good.' *εὐδοκία* characterizes His attitude towards all men, even those who rejected Him. His *φιλανθρωπία* breaks through all barriers of race or creed or artificial conventionality. His *ἁπλότης* pours forth endless benefits, physical and spiritual; He bestows not merely life, but abundance. This virtue, which Jesus thus portrayed and exemplified, He laid upon His disciples as a sacred obligation. There must be no limit to their liberality (Mt 10^8). Only by ceaseless beneficence can they realize the privilege of sonship toward God, for He is 'kind unto the unthankful and to the evil' (Mt $5^{45.48}$, Lk 6^{35}).

2. Its place in the history of ethics.—Benevolence is not an isolated ethical unit. It is an element in the organism of virtue, and gives tone and quality

to the complex of virtues which constitute the character as a whole. The value of an ethical system, like that of an individual character, may be estimated by the place which benevolence occupies in it. To trace the varying recognition of this virtue in the history of ethics would be to write the moral history of man. A few steps in the great development may here be indicated.

(1) *Greek ethic.*—We have seen that benevolence does not appear in those systems which reflect the life of citizenship in the independent and intensely aristocratic free cities of the Hellenic world. The reason is that man as man has not yet arisen on the view of the Greek moralist. He is thinking of life within the limits of a Greek city. The intellectual and æsthetic interests prevail. There is room for patriotism. Self-interest must yield to the claims of the State. But goodwill to man, the obligation of helpfulness to all the children of need, and the 'enthusiasm of humanity,' have scarcely dawned on the Greek mind in its quest for ethical completeness. When the independent city falls, and the barrier of its walls is levelled, men are able to look abroad, and to discern more clearly the bonds that connect them with their fellows. The age of the great individualistic philosophies marks the entrance of benevolence into the circle of the virtues. Epicureanism (*q.v.*), indeed, might seem to be selfish and destitute of sympathy. It may be urged, however, that its primary impulse was humanitarian, and that its true purpose was to deliver men from the spiritual bondage in which their souls were sunk. Its gospel of ἀταραξία was proclaimed to a despairing world by men who, like Epicurus and Lucretius, were full of sympathy for their fellow-sufferers (see Masson, *Lucretius*, 307, 321). Yet it is in Stoicism (*q.v.*) that we find the first explicit recognition of benevolence. The high ethical rank of Stoicism has been universally recognized. Its description of humanity as an organism,—often in Seneca and Epictetus with striking verbal resemblance to the language of St. Paul,—its ample assertion of the value of man as man, its emphasis on the duty of boundless helpfulness, its beneficent influence on social reform and Roman jurisprudence, indicate a great advance in the moral history of man.

At the same time, the failure of Stoicism is as evident as its triumph. (*a*) Its ideal is empty and unrealizable. Stoic cosmopolitanism is no more than a formal unity of men as beings possessed of reason.

'What is meant by a φιλανθρωπία that is not fertile in special affections to individual human beings, affections which adapt themselves to their special character and the special relations into which they are brought? And what is meant by an organic unity of mankind in a πολιτεία τοῦ κόσμου, if the reason that is to bind them together be taken merely as a common element in the nature of each, which connects them in spite of their differences in other respects?' (Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, ii. 126).

(*b*) It failed to exemplify in the details of life the very virtue which it was the first to introduce into the ethical ideal. It proclaims a universal bond and a world-wide sympathy. It too often exhibits a revolting hardness and inhumanity.

'The framework or theory of benevolence might be there, but the animating spirit was absent. Men who taught that the husband or the father should look with perfect indifference on the death of his wife or his child, and that the philosopher, though he may shed tears of pretended sympathy in order to console his suffering friend, must suffer no real emotion to penetrate his breast, could never found a true or lasting religion of benevolence' (Lecky, *European Morals*, i. 191 f.).

(2) *Christian ethic.*—The requirement of a 'religion of benevolence' is satisfied in Christianity. (*a*) Christianity was the fulfilment of the OT religion, which was marked by an intensely social spirit. No doubt, the limits of this social impulse were fixed by the Jewish nationality. At the same time, the great prophetic ideas of the righteousness and grace of God, and of the supreme worth of morality as compared with ritual, were seed sown in the soil of humanity which could not fail of fruit. They found their glorious harvest in the 'new commandment' of love, set forth by Jesus as the law of the Christian fellowship. (*b*) Christianity is fundamentally the life of Christ. His character made one deep and ineffaceable impression upon His followers. They felt that He loved men. They worshipped Him; and they believed that they could truly honour Him only when they poured forth on others the love of which they had been the recipients. Benevolence in the Christian religion is more than the precept of a teacher, more even than a lovely example. It is the very Spirit of Jesus, breathing upon those who adore Him, and quickening them to a life like His. (*c*) Christianity is the consciousness of redemption. God is in Christ reconciling the world to Himself. The Christian is a citizen in the Israel of God, which includes Gentile as well as Jew. He is a member of the household of which God is Father, and which therefore has room for all the children of men. To accept Jesus as Saviour and Lord is to recognize all men as the objects of the Divine benevolence, and to be pledged to its service in the interests of humanity. The NT abounds in exhortations to benevolence (1 Co 13, Eph 5^2, Col 3^{14}, Gal 5^{14} 6^2, 1 Jn 3^{11} 4^{7-9}). The everyday life of the Christian lies within the concentric circles of φιλαδελφία and φιλανθρωπία. The Christian character presents a new type of virtue; and in it benevolence shines resplendent. The failure of Stoic cosmopolitanism is met by the triumph of Christian benevolence. Instead of being abstract and unreal, Christianity is practical and concrete. Instead of being cold and hard, Christianity has sanctified the emotional side of human nature, and has made love (ἀγάπη not ἔρως) a virtue, nay, the sum of virtue, and the dynamic of all the virtues.

Christianity proved more effective than Stoicism in suppressing or mitigating great social evils, *e.g.* the exposure of infants, the gladiatorial combats, slavery. Above all, Christianity has established the paramount claims of love. In spite of many sins committed by Christians against the spirit of love, the religion of Jesus has succeeded in binding the obligation of benevolence upon the conscience of the race.

After Christianity lost the fervour and freshness of the Apostolic age, it was invaded by the parallel influences of Stoicism and Judaism, and became dominated by a legal spirit. With the entrance of legalism, the virtues tended to lose their character as elements in a living, spiritual whole, and were subjected to a process of definition and classification. Love ceases to be the sum of virtue. It takes its place as one of the three theological virtues; and to these are added the four virtues of the old Greek lists, revised with more or less success by theologians like Origen, Ambrose, and Augustine.

These lists were elaborated throughout the mediæval period not without real ethical insight, and in them benevolence was amply recognized. From the emblazoned ceilings and walls of churches, from the carved pillars and porticoes of palaces and market-places, from the pages of poets like Dante and divines like Aquinas, the appeal for practical goodness went forth. These exhortations were far from ineffective. 'Nothing shows how the Church of the 13th and 14th centuries had instilled the mind of Jesus into the peoples of Europe like the zeal with which they tried to do their duty by the poor, the sick, and the helpless' (Lindsay, *History of the Reformation*, i. 141). It was a grave defect, however, to substitute lists of duties and virtues for the organization of virtue through one controlling principle. There was also the danger of

over-emphasizing one isolated virtue, till it should become a curse rather than a blessing.

In this way benevolence drew to itself an exaggerated devotion, which had the effect of filling Europe with mendicants and sturdy idlers.

The Reformation was a reaction from legalism. It was a return to primitive Christianity, which was not an ecclesiastical system, but a life in fellowship with Christ. Christianity made a new beginning in its Divine task of educating and regenerating humanity. It is not, however, in one crisis that mankind is brought to its goal. The principle of the Reformation—the spiritual fellowship of man with God—had to be applied in all the fields of man's moral activity; and this implied a process of centuries. The recognition of the fact that virtue, as a spiritual reality, cannot be dismembered and articulated into a code makes its practice far harder than under a legal system. This is specially true of such a virtue as benevolence, when it is no longer defined and limited by a series of outward actions, but has regained its place as an organic outcome of love, boundless in scope and infinitely varied in exercise.

The very success of the Reformation, moreover, in breaking the formal unity of mediæval Catholicism and emphasizing the narrower unities of family and society, as well as the sacredness of the individual, made the problem of benevolence the harder. To maintain it against the perennial selfishness of man, and to apply it amid the increasing complexities of modern civilization, remain the tasks of the moralist and the social reformer.

(3) *The ethic of the 18th century.*—It was inevitable that the abandonment of the principle of outward authority should raise in the most acute form the question as to the sanctions of morality. If moral precepts do not rest on the authority of the Church, from what do they derive their obligatory character? Why, in particular, should men be required to surrender their individual preference to further the advantage of others? The moral problem, accordingly, for a hundred years of post-Reformation thought, during which individualism held the field in psychology and ethics, turned mainly upon the question of benevolence. Is it a radical instinct of human nature? If not, how has it come to occupy the place which common opinion assigns it? The controversy was waged, mainly, in England. *Hobbes* states the question. He finds man's primary condition to be that of appetite and desire. All man's natural tendencies are 'self-regarding.' The *jus naturale* 'is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature' (*Leviathan*, ed. 1839, ch. xiv.). A vivid picture is drawn of the evils to which the exercise of this natural right would expose humanity; and a strong appeal is made for the surrender of individual independence to the rule of the sovereign.

Such a cynical estimate of human nature could not but provoke reply. *Shaftesbury* distinguishes two classes of natural tendency, some being directed to the good of others, and some to that of self. Virtue lies in the due proportion of these two sets of natural instincts, a proportion discerned by the special faculty of the moral sense. *Hutcheson* even more forcibly vindicates the reality of benevolence, and resolves all virtue into it. *Butler*, in like manner, argues for the disinterested character of benevolence, and regards it as 'the sum of virtue.' All these thinkers are under the control of individualism; and, from the point of view of 18th cent. individualism, the only possible question was: 'Is benevolence one among the tendencies and impulses which are found in the individual human being?' To this question, the answer could only be a simple 'yes' or 'no.' When, however, individualism began to give way, and an organic view of society to take its place, a fresh study of human nature, and of the 'good' corresponding to it, had to be made. The psychology which enumerates faculties, instincts, etc., has been abandoned. Man is no longer viewed as a mass of tendencies, among which benevolence may be enumerated. He is a living being, a true organism, or 'unity in differences.' His moral nature has been formed by a long process of education and discipline. This historic development has disclosed the deepest fact regarding man's moral nature, viz., that, when man is most 'self-regarding,' he is least himself; that he reaches his true being only when he abandons the point of view of the isolated individual, and goes out to his fellows in self-forgetfulness, and so enriches his own personality through sharing their experience.

Benevolence, therefore, is not an instinct about which it may be disputed whether we do or do not possess it. It is the very energy of the soul, according to its highest excellence, in a perfect life. We come back, accordingly, by another path to the dictum of Hutcheson and Butler that benevolence is 'the sum of virtue,' or rather to the position of the NT that 'love is the fulfilling of the law.' The 20th cent. has begun by accepting the organic principle, and has addressed itself with deep seriousness to the task of its practical application. Amid schemes of social amelioration, however, we need constantly to remember that benevolence cannot be made to order. It is begotten of the sense of membership in a society, which cannot be constructed by any sociological machinery, however ingenious. The message of Christianity is that this society exists. It has descended out of heaven from God. It consists in the fellowship of those who have surrendered themselves to the Divine love in Christ, and are impelled and quickened by a debt whose magnitude grows the more loyally they discharge it. Benevolence, as a social energy, cannot live unless it be revived at the springs of the Divine philanthropy. As the inspiration of the individual life, it must be derived from, indeed it consists in, the constraint of the love of Christ.

II. *AS A DIVINE ATTRIBUTE.*—**1. Its place in the character of God.**—Consideration of the moral attributes of God can be fruitful only if two principles are borne in mind. (*a*) The attributes are not 'things' or 'forces.' It is a profound mistake first to isolate them, and then to endeavour to relate them to one another logically or mechanically. They exist in the unity of the Divine character, and are partial manifestations of its inexhaustible wealth. (*b*) They are not to be viewed as given, in their truth and fullness, in man, and then applied to the Divine character as copies or reflexions of what they are in human nature. The moral attributes of God are to be learned, primarily, from the revelation which Christ has given, in His own person, of the Being whom He, alone among men, perfectly knew. The God whom we know in Christ is love. This is the absolute truth of His nature, in the light of which every aspect of his character is to be viewed. His love is scarcely to be classed among His attributes. It is rather the central principle in which they all meet, the spiritual power from which each derives efficiency.

'Wisdom is its intelligence; might its productivity; the entire natural creation and the entire revelation of righteousness in history are the means by which it attains its teleological aims (Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 99).

In pursuing its teleological aim, which may be defined as the Kingdom of God, the Divine love follows two great lines of action. In the first place, it requires the vindication of righteousness. The

'rights' of every creature must be maintained; that is to say, every creature must be preserved in the fulfilment of its special vocation, and guarded in its realization of its own proper nature. These rights are sacred. The violation of them must be marked, in the administration of the universe, by definite retribution. The harmonious development of the vast and delicate order of the universe, by the subjection of every part to the living Will which animates the whole, is an essential interest of the Divine love. In the second place, the love of God manifests itself as goodness, or benevolence. It is pledged to the task of furthering the good of every creature. God has brought the universe into being as the means of His self-revelation; and it is only by His revelation of Himself to it that it reaches its perfection. His love takes shape in ceaseless goodness, pouring forth benefits in proportion to need; and, in this constant communication, its own glory and blessedness are eternally increased. 'It is the nature of goodness to possess its own fullness only in communication, to have only as it gives' (Martensen, *op. cit.* 98). It is important thus to connect the Divine benevolence with the aim of the Divine love. The Divine benevolence is part of the operation of the Divine love, which, from the beginning of creation, has been preparing a world in and to which God could fully reveal Himself. It signifies His goodwill toward all the creatures of His power, His determination to bless them according to their utmost capacity, and to bring them to the highest perfection of their nature. His love is not altered by the fact that man, the head of the lower creation, has rebelled against Him. Rather it has become stronger and deeper, in view of the unspeakable tragedy of human sin. The goodness, which is marked in all creation and providence, has become the mercy whose crowning manifestation is the Cross of Christ.

The Biblical usage confirms this view of the relation between the benevolence of God and the highest aim of His love. The OT believers are profoundly convinced of the goodness of Jahweh. But they do not mean by the Divine goodness such a sentiment as a pantheistic æstheticism might attribute to God. By goodness they mean a quality of the Divine character which comes into operation as God pursues His great aim of redeeming and blessing His people. Even when physical nature is summoned as evidence of the Divine goodness, it is viewed as the sphere wherein God carries on His redemptive work; and the goodness of God manifest therein is an argument for confiding in His faithfulness to His saving purpose and in His ability to carry it to completion. More commonly, the goodness of God is manifest in the lives of those whom He is preparing for Himself. Often the Divine goodness has high spiritual qualities, and is expressly referred to as an element in redeeming grace (*e.g.* Ps 23^6 25^7 65^4). Verbal references to the goodness of God are much less frequent in the NT. Its main theme is the love manifest in Christ. The goodness of God is an aspect of that gracious working whereby He leads men to the knowledge of His Son (Ro 2^4 11^{22}).

2. Its operation in creation and providence.—Christian apologetic is not bound to construct a complete theodicy. It must make the love of God, proved in Christ, its presupposition and its starting-point. Thence it must review the life of nature and of man, and seek to exhibit the evidence it finds therein of God's wise and benevolent working. If it can show that, in creation and providence, God's goodness has been operative, preparing the way for the triumph of His love, its task is sufficiently performed, even though it cannot produce an intellectual solution of every mystery in the Divine dealing with men. The evidences of the Divine goodness are such as these:—

(1) *The adaptation of the physical universe to the development of man.*—By its resistance to human effort, quite as much as by its fertility, it furthers the physical, intellectual, and moral well-being of man. By its beauty and its wonder, as well as by its pathos and decay, it quickens man's sense of the unseen, deepens his capacity for worship, and gives him intimations of his immortality.

(2) *The competence of human nature for a Divine vocation.*—The powers which man possesses fit him for the service of God, and the blessedness of fellowship with Him. While being, in one aspect, himself a part of physical nature, man is able to live above natural conditions, to penetrate to the significance of the world, and make it the home and the instrument of his spirit. His dependence upon his fellows prepares him for a social good, wider and richer than could be attained by any merely individual achievement. There are traces, growing ever clearer with the progress of humanity, that man is capable of a higher fellowship and a nobler blessedness than that which can be obtained in the most cultured human society.

(3) *The organization of human life for ideal needs.*—The history of the growth of the various forms of organized human life exhibits the powers and destiny of man. In the Family, he learns to be human, and finds in love, trust, reverence, and self-denial the very glory of humanity. In the State, he is called and enabled to serve his fellow-men, and to save his life by losing it. In the Church, he breathes the atmosphere of the love of God, and enters upon the blessedness of a Divine Sonship.

(4) *The direction of human history towards the goal of the Kingdom of God.*—The goodness of God is seen in His education of the race by the long teaching of experience, and by the moral discipline of ages. The slowness of the process may not be wholly explicable; but, at least, it is not inconsistent with the goodness of God, who is not slack, as some men count slackness. The cosmic movement of the great Divine design must, in any case, be slow.

(5) *The training of individual character.*—The necessity of connecting the idea of the Divine benevolence with that of the saving purpose of the Divine love is specially urgent here. The benevolence of God is seen not in a promiscuous bestowal of good things, but in the steadfast pursuit of His gracious purpose, which seeks, by common beneficences of every day, and by significant dealings in judgment and mercy, to bring men into the Kingdom.

Christian experience has learned, in communion with Christ, that God is love. Under the illumination of this thought, it surveys the whole field of nature and of human history, and discovers therein unfailing tokens of the presence and operation of the Divine goodness.

3. Its vindication in view of objections.—Three great facts traverse the argument for the goodness of God: pain and death and sin. Many who do not doubt the Being of God are brought by these terrible realities into grave perplexity and profound spiritual distress. It ought to be admitted that a complete intellectual solution of the problems thus raised is impossible under the conditions of our present experience. In view of them, we ought to occupy the true ground of Christian theology, as that is given in Christian experience. Deeper than the deepest analysis of pessimism, Christianity pierces to the need of man, and finds that need met in Christ. God is love because, in Christ, He saves and perfects men. Here is a fact of experience, which outweighs the facts that seem to impugn the goodness of God. Living in this experience, the mind is able to maintain its con-

fidence in God, even under the strain of ignorance and doubt. Pain and death and sin come within the scope of the Divine purpose, and we have warrant to believe, though no human calculus can adjust every detail, that they subserve the Divine end.

Pain is a terrible reality. It has, however, such noble uses that we can well understand how a good God might include it in the scope of His working. When, moreover, it is not merely borne as an infliction, but taken up as a ministry, the last shadow of inconsistency with the Divine goodwill is removed. 'It not only passes into the category of good things, but it becomes emphatically *the good*' (Hinton, *The Mystery of Pain*, 11 f.).

Death fills the world with sorrow. Yet two facts counterbalance its desolation. In the first place, the ultimate source of its terror, viz. the separation from God, of which, to the sinner, it is the sign and seal, has been removed. For those who have accepted the reconciliation the terror of death no longer exists. In the second place, death, like pain, becomes no longer in any sense an evil, when it is accepted as a service. Interpreted by the death of Christ, death becomes the crowning service of the living, for the deepening and expansion of the life of others. The principle of vicarious suffering runs through the whole universe, and reaches its highest application in the life of man.

Such considerations are not available to heal entirely the hurt of the human heart. Enough of mystery remains to foster a deep humility and a tender and catholic sympathy. In thus binding human beings in the bonds of mutual compassion, Death fulfils one of its most precious functions.

Sin is the most awful fact, the most terrible mystery of the world. To the question, how a benevolent Supreme Being could permit the entrance of Sin into His world, there can be given no complete answer. The fact of sin can be met only by the fact of redemption. Christianity does not solve the speculative question, but it meets the spiritual need with the message that God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself. To enter into the experience of reconciliation is not to be put in possession of a theoretic proof of the consistency of the existence of sin with the Divine benevolence. It is, however, to be enabled to wrest from sin, which seemed utterly incompatible with the existence of goodness in God, the profoundest testimony to the presence and supremacy of love in the Divine character. Without sin, we could not have known the depth of our need, and the uttermost of our dependence upon God. Without sin, we could not have known the exceeding greatness of His love, and the uttermost of His capacity for sacrifice. Without sin, as a fact in the experience of men, we could not come so close to them in sympathy, and could not become partakers of Christ's sufferings.

From all survey of the operations of the Divine goodness, we return to the experience of redemption. The Being who spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, is good, of unerring wisdom and untainted holiness. From the character of God, as it is known in Christ, we pass to a judgment upon the whole universe, and declare, with unclouded assurance, that it confirms the conviction of faith that God is good.

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BENGAL.—1. General description.—The Province of Bengal, or, as it is sometimes designated, Lower Bengal, is that portion of the Indian Empire comprising the lower valleys of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. In its original form the Province occupied the region lying between 19° 18′ and 28° 15′ north latitude, and between 82° and 97° east longitude. Since the British occupation the boundaries have been several times re-arranged. In 1874 Assam (wh. see) was constituted a separate administration; in 1905 the boundaries of Bengal, Assam, and the Central Provinces were re-constructed, the eastern portion of the old province of Bengal, containing the Dacca and Chittagong divisions with the Districts of Rājshāhī, Dinājpur, Jalpaigurī, Rangpur, Bogrā, Pābnā, and Māldā being, with Assam, constituted a new province under the name of Eastern Bengal. The present province of Bengal proper is bounded on the north by Nepāl and Sikkim; on the west by the United and Central Provinces; on the south by the Bay of Bengal and portions of the Madras Presidency; on the east by the new Eastern Bengal-Assam province, from which it is divided by the rivers Ganges and Madhumatī; on the east by Burma and hilly country occupied by independent tribes; on the south by the Bay of Bengal.

The following table shows the area and population of the new provinces as at present constituted:—

Name of Province	Area in Square Miles	Population.	Religions		
			Hindus	Muhammadans.	Others
Bengal Proper	110,054	50,723,318	39,267,301	9,027,069	2,428,948
Eastern Bengal with Assam	101,147	30,788,134	11,519,574	17,823,129	1,445,431

This rearrangement of boundaries came into effect after the completion of the Census of 1901; and as it is now impossible to rearrange the details of the religious statistics to correspond with the present position, it is more convenient to treat the province as it was constituted prior to the partition in 1905. The physical conditions of the region are much diversified. It consists of the alluvial plains forming the valleys of the two great rivers; of the crystalline plateau of Chotā Nāgpur, and the hills extending from the south-east towards the Ganges at Rājmahāl; the narrow strip of alluvium forming the commissionership of Orissa; and, lastly, a portion of sub-Himālayan region including the sanatorium of Dārjīling, and the rough hilly country on the Burma frontier.

2. Name and historical geography.—The name of Bengal, derived from the Skr. *Vaṅga*, does not appear in Muhammadan or Western literature before the latter part of the 13th cent., when it took the place of the earlier title, Lakhnāotī (Yule, *Anglo-Indian Gloss. s.v.*). The name Vaṅga was in early times strictly applied to the country stretching south-east from Bhāgalpur to the sea, in other words, to the Delta formed by the lower reaches of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. The Province is usually divided into four sub-provinces—(*a*) Bihār to the west, including the ancient kingdom of Magadha, which is now represented by the Districts of Patna, Gayā, and Shāhābād, with its capital at Rājagriha, some thirty miles north-east of the present city of Gayā. North of the Ganges was Videha or Mithilā, now included in the Districts of Darbhanga, Sāran, Champāran, and North Muzaffarpur. The south portion of the last-named District constituted the small kingdom of Vaiśālī. To the east lay Aṅga, including the modern Districts of Monghyr, Bhāgalpur, and Puraniya (Purnea). From the religious point of view Bihār is important as the place of origin of both the Buddhist and the Jaina faith. (*b*) Bengal Proper, which occupies the deltaic region. In the time of the *Mahābhārata*, North and East Bengal, with Assam, formed the kingdom of Prāgjyotisha, or, as it was called later, Kāmarūpa. East of Bengal Proper lay Vaṅga, which gave its name to the province, its population living principally in boats, and represented by the modern Chandāls. (*c*)

Orissa, the old name of which was Kaliṅga, stretching from the mouth of the Ganges to that of the Kṛishṇa. In later times the name Kaliṅga was applied only to the Delta of the Godāvarī, while that of the Mahānadī became known as Utkala or Odra, whence the modern name of the sub-province was derived. (*d*) **Chotā Nāgpur** and the Tributary States of Orissa, a region of hill jungle inhabited by tribes of non-Aryan origin, parts of which were known to Muhammadan writers as Jhārkhaṇḍ, 'the jungle region,' which the lords of Northern India never attempted to occupy.

3. Modern geography.—The Province may be described generally as consisting for the most part of the lower valleys of the great rivers, the Ganges which enters it on the west frontier and passes through it diagonally, and the Brahmaputra which, after forcing its way through a break in the Himālayan chain, flows through Assam and the eastern portion of the Province. These alluvial tracts are flanked by a series of highlands—to the north the outlying lower range of the Himālaya; to the south-west the hilly region of Chotā Nāgpur and Orissa; to the east the hilly tract of Tippera, which is the boundary between the Province and Burma.

4. The plain country.—The Province thus displays great diversities of aspect and climate, which have affected the ethnology, social character, and beliefs of the people. Beginning from the west, where the Province marches with the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, we have the sub-province of Bihār, divided into two portions by the Ganges. To the extreme north is the submontane strip, part of which constitutes the Tarāī, or region of fen and forest beneath the lower slopes of the Himālaya; south of this is the Gangetic zone, a country with an ancient civilization, large towns, and a well-developed system of agriculture. This is the finest and most healthy part of the Province, a country producing wheat, sugar, and the other staples characteristic of the upper valley of the Ganges, and supporting a number of indigo factories managed by Europeans, whose industry has in recent years suffered grievously through competition with the artificial dye prepared in Germany. The people here are a fine, manly, sturdy race, many of whom used to enlist in the old sepoy army, but now find occupation as porters and messengers in Calcutta. Bihār south of the Ganges is a less fertile country, which, except in the neighbourhood of Gayā, has only recently come within the influence of Aryan civilization. The physical appearance and beliefs of the people indicate intermixture with the non-Aryan races occupying the adjoining plateau of Chotā Nāgpur. Passing eastward along the valley of the Ganges, we gradually reach the dank steamy Delta, the product of the great rivers which here enter the sea. The compact mud villages of Bihār here give place to little thatched hamlets, each hidden within a plantain clump or grove of shady trees. Rice is the staple crop and the universal food, instead of the wheat, barley, and millet which support the peasant of Bihār. The people, though their intelligence is sharper, have little of the manly vigour and independence of the Bihārīs. They belong, in fact, to different race-types (see below, § 6). Where the Delta advances into the Bay of Bengal is the great forest swamp of the Sundarbans, a network of rivers and estuaries enclosing numerous islands, which are often half swamp. This region has hardly any permanent population save a few fishermen, hunters, and woodcutters, who brave the malaria and wild beasts which its jungles contain. The Orissa Delta farther south is the work of three rivers, the Mahānadī, Brāhmanī, and Baitaranī (which see). These rivers, as they approach the sea, deposit masses of silt which raise their beds above the level of the surrounding country, with the result that it becomes a water-logged swamp, a network of creeks and muddy channels, forming a district pregnant with malaria.

5. The hill tracts.—To the student of ethnology and primitive religion the most interesting portions of the Province are the plateau of Chotā Nāgpur, the hill tracts which rise above the Orissa Delta, and the tangled region of hills which separates the Province from Burma. Chotā or Chūtia Nāgpur consists of a confused mass of hills, plateaux, and ravines interspersed with jungle, which forms the most easterly extension of the hill country of Central India and of the Central Provinces abutting on the Gangetic valley near Bhāgalpur. This and the hill tracts of Orissa to the south-west form the last refuge of the Dravidian and Muṇḍā races, and are occupied by non-Aryan tribes like the Santāls, Hos, Orāons, and Kandhs, who still preserve their original languages and beliefs comparatively unaffected by the Aryan immigrants from the west who colonized the plain country beneath them. Similarly, the Chittagong hill tracts on the eastern frontier are inhabited by Maghs, Chakmās, Tipārās, and Kūkīs, races of Mongoloid stock, who 'build their houses on bamboo platforms raised ten feet from the ground, and cultivate on the *jhūm* system; that is to say, they make clearances in the jungle, and, when the trees and undergrowth which they have cut down become sufficiently dry, they burn them; then, after the ground has been softened by rain, they dibble in seeds of rice, cotton, maize, melons, and yams, all mixed together' (Gait, *Census Rep.* 1901, i. 81). In the Tarāī at the base of the lower Himālaya we find a malarious tract occupied by primitive tribes like the Thārus (wh. see), or immigrants from Nepāl or the hill country.

6. Ethnological character of the people and their languages.—The races inhabiting the Delta of the Ganges and its tributaries from the confines of Bihār to the Bay of Bengal have been included by Risley in the Mongolo-Dravidian or Bengālī division, one of the most distinctive types in India, characterized as regards its Mongoloid element by a high cephalic index, in other words, included within the brachycephalic class, while the breadth of the nose suggests an infusion of Dravidian blood. In Western Bengal the Dravidian element, as might be expected from the fact of this part of the Province abutting on the Dravidian stronghold on the Chotā Nāgpur plateau, is predominant; while to the east the form is modified owing to closer contact with the Mongolian race which probably entered Bengal down the valley of the Brahmaputra. To the west, again, in Bihār, the type assimilates to that of the Aryo-Dravidian prevailing in the upper Gangetic valley. This is characterized by a longer form of head and a narrower and finer moulded nose. In the hill tracts to the south the Dravidian type is predominant, that of a race distinguished by short stature, long form of head, plentiful hair, with the nose very broad and depressed at the root. From the point of view of ethnology, therefore, the population is of very mixed origin. The Dravidian type, which was probably that of the earliest inhabitants of the country, has been overlaid and modified in various degrees by the Aryan type, which worked its way from the west down the valley of the Ganges, and by the Mongoloid races who advanced down that of the Brahmaputra. There is no ethnical frontier, such as impassable rivers or mountain ranges, serving to control the movement of the population

from one end of the Province to another. The Ganges, and in a lesser degree the Karatoyā, the old sacred river which divided Bihār from the rest of Bengal, did in some degree effect this purpose (O'Donnell, *Census Report*, 1891, i. 38); but the divisions thus formed did not remain permanently distinct. The same may be said of the languages, one dialect merging gradually and almost imperceptibly into the next. The vast majority of the people (94 per cent.) now speak one or other of the tongues of the Aryan family, of which the most important are Bengālī to the east, Hindī to the west, and the Oriyā of Orissa to the south. The second group of tongues is that known as the Mundā, spoken by the Santāls, Hos, and cognate tribes. These represent only 3·54 of the total population. Still less numerically important are the languages of the Dravidian group, of which the most numerous speakers belong to the Orāons (wh. see) and allied tribes; and the small Tibeto-Burman element used by tribes on the northern frontier towards Nepāl or eastward in the direction of Burma.

7. Statistics of religion.—The diverse ethnical characteristics of the people are reflected in the variety of the religions which they follow. The population recorded at the last Census is distributed among the chief religious denominations as follows:—

Hindus . .	49,687,362,	being 63·3	% of total.
Muhammadans	25,495,416	,, 32·48	,,
Christians .	278,366	,, ·36	,,
Animists .	2,780,468	,, 3·54	,,
Buddhists .	237,893	,, ·30	,,
Others . .	13,905	,, ·02	,,

8. Animism.—It will be convenient to deal first with Animism, the most primitive form of the religion of Bengal, and the basis of the beliefs which are held by the majority of the people. But, as it appears in the Census returns, the term is used in a sense different from that usually accepted by writers on primitive religion. This form of belief is founded on the conception adopted by primitive man, 'that every object which had activity enough to affect him in any way was animated by a life and will like his own.' It was, however, found impossible to obtain correct returns of an indefinite, amorphous religion like this, for which those who hold it have no special name, and which merges so directly into Hinduism and into Islām in its most debased form that the line dividing it from either of these faiths is uncertain. Hence, in the returns of those who are represented as professing Animism only those persons were included who followed a tribal religion, or worshipped tribal gods quite distinct from those of the orthodox Hindu pantheon. On the other hand, the great majority of the lower classes, whose religion is to a great extent of an animistic type, and even those members of the purely animistic tribes who lived at a distance from their tribal headquarters, were recorded as Hindus. Hence the Animists of the Census really represent only the well-organized non-Aryan or Dravidian or Mongoloid tribes, such as Santāls, Mundās, or Orāons who inhabit the hilly tracts to the south-east or east of the Province; and the lower castes of the plain country, whose beliefs are of an analogous type, appear in the Census returns as Hindus. The returns show Animists, as thus defined, to be most numerous in the Districts of Rānchī and Singhbhūm, where they represent nearly half the total population, and in a smaller proportion in the Santāl Parganas and the other hilly tracts of Chotā Nāgpur and Orissa.

The characteristics of Animism in Bengal, which does not differ to any important extent from that found in other parts of Northern India (see DRAVIDIANS), have been thus summarized by Gait (*Census Report*, 1901, i. 152):

'There is a vague but very general belief in some one omnipotent being, who is well-disposed towards men, and whom, therefore, it is unnecessary to propitiate. Then come a number of evil spirits, who are ill-disposed towards human beings, and to whose malevolent influence are ascribed all the woes which afflict mankind. To them, therefore, sacrifices must be offered. These malevolent spirits are sylvan deities, spirits of the trees, the rocks, and the streams, and sometimes also of the tribal ancestors. There is no regular priesthood, but some persons are supposed to be better endowed with the powers of divination than others. When a calamity occurs, one of these diviners, *shamans*, or soothsayers, is called on to ascertain the particular demon who is offended and who requires to be pacified by a sacrifice. This is done, either by devil-dancing, when the diviner works himself into a paroxysm of drunkenness and excitement, and then holds converse with the unseen spirits around him, or by the examination of omens—eggs, grains of rice, or the entrails of a fowl. There is a profound belief in omens of all sorts; no journey is undertaken unless it is ascertained that the fates are propitious, while persons who have started on a journey will turn back should adverse omens be met with on the way.'

It would perhaps be impossible to find in Bengal a single tribe which is in the purely animistic stage. Most of the people have come more or less under the influence of Hindu missionaries, who have introduced among them the nominal worship and some of the ritual of the orthodox gods, while at the same time the basis of their beliefs is some form of Animism. Thus, in the case of the Tipārās (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 186 f.) we have an instance of a secluded jungle tribe, some of whose deities are of a distinctively primitive type—the *numina* of the forest, which would naturally be regarded as objects of dread by people exposed to the myriad accidents and diseases which accompany the work of clearing the jungle. Thus, Burāsā is their forest-god, who is old, carries a mace, and has his home in the woods. But even here we see some signs of Hindu influence when we find that his son, the god of death, is coming to be identified with the Hindu Yama. Again, among the same tribe we find Maimungmā, the goddess of paddy fields, who, like many of these agricultural deities, has a male consort, Thunāī, and Khulungmā, the goddess of cotton. Deities like these represent a much higher stage of culture, when the community has cleared the forest and settled down to a life of agriculture. In another class of animistic deities these Tipārās worship the *numina* of the powers of Nature—Tuimā, a river-goddess, who is now coming to be identified with the Gangā, or Ganges, of the dwellers in the plains; and Lāmprā or Khabdī, who rules sky and ocean; and Sāngrama, the deity who presides over the Himālaya. Again, by a natural course of evolution, the agricultural goddesses, who are primarily regarded as beneficent, develop on their chthonic or malignant side into seven goddesses who preside over witchcraft.

But this assignment of special functions to a number of distinct deities is not the most primitive form of belief. The earlier conception is rather the belief in a host of ill-defined spirits, mostly malevolent, to whom no departments in the control of human affairs have been assigned. Such is practically the religion of the Mundās and Orāons (wh. see). The Gulgulias, a wandering non-Aryan tribe, worship 'a host of spiritual powers, whose attributes are ill-defined, and who are not conceived as wearing any bodily form. This at least may be inferred from the fact that they make no images, and that Baktāwar, the tutelary deity of the Patnā Gulgulias, is represented by a small mound of hardened clay set up in an earthen plate' (Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, i. 302). The Bhuiyās, again, worship a number of communal ghosts with 'ill-defined functions and general capacity for mischief and malevolence'; and 'the vague shapes of ghosts or demons who haunt the jungle and the rock are the real powers

to whom the average Kurmī looks for the ordering of his moral and physical welfare' (*ib.* i. 115, 534).

9. Worship of forest-spirits and tree-spirits.—Beginning, then, from what is probably the earliest stage, the worship by a tribe of colonists of the vague spirits which people the jungle, we find among the Juāngs, a very primitive tribe, who have only quite recently abandoned the wearing of a dress of leaves, that Barām, a forest-deity, stands at the head of their system and is regarded with great veneration, while, just as might have been expected, in subordination to him are Thānpatī, the patron of the village, and Basumatī, Mother Earth, whose worship marks the adoption of a settled village and agricultural life. At this stage we also naturally find the worship of trees, or rather of the spirits immanent in them, which prevails widely among the non-Aryan tribes, and is well established in the lower grades of Hinduism. Thus, the Cheros and Kharwārs sacrifice every three years a buffalo and other animals in the Sarnā, or sacred grove; each village of the Kisāns has two or more Sā, or sacred groves; the Bhuiyās preserve Deotā Sarā, or sacred groves, which are dedicated to four deities; in the sacred grove of the Mundās, 'if a tree be destroyed, the gods evince their displeasure by withholding seasonable rain'; and 'every village has in its vicinity a grove reputed to be the remains of the primitive forest left intact for the local gods when the clearing was made' (Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology*, 129, 132, 141, 186, 188). Besides the fear that the total destruction of the jungle may rouse the anger of the tree-gods in case a suitable asylum is not provided for them, there is the general belief that all tree-cutting is offensive to them. Of the Maghs of Eastern Bengal we learn that

'nothing but positive orders and the presence of Europeans would induce them to trespass on many of the hilltops, which were inhabited, they said, by these demons. With the Europeans, however, they would advance fearlessly, and did not hesitate to fell the trees, the blame of such sacrilege being laid upon their visitors. On felling any very large tree one of the party at work upon it was always ready prepared with a green twig, which he ran and placed in the centre of the stump the instant the tree fell, as a propitiation to the spirit which had been displaced so roughly, pleading at the same time the orders of the strangers for the work. In clearing one spot an orderly had to take the *dāh* (felling-knife) and fell the first tree himself before a Magh would make a stroke, and was considered to bear all the odium of the work with the dispossessed spirits, till the arrival of the Europeans relieved him of his burden' (*Calcutta Review*, xxvi 512)

We may compare with this superstition the early Brāhmanical rule, based on primitive animistic belief, according to which, when the priest cuts a tree for the preparation of the sacrificial post, he places a blade of the sacred *darbha* grass between the axe and the tree, and says, 'O plant, shield it! O axe, hurt it not!' (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, tr. Eggeling, *SBE* xxvi. 164). The woodcutters in the Sundarbans never enter the jungle without sending their *faqīr* in advance, who takes upon himself the wrath of the woodland spirits (Wise, *Notes*, 13). The same writer remarks (*ib.* 137) that 'it is a curious fact that one of the latest outgrowths of the corrupt Vaishnavism is the veneration of trees. The Dervish *faqīr* will not permit a leaf or twig to be plucked from the trees growing within the *akhārās* ("convents"), although flowers are the ordinary offering at the tomb of a *mahant* ("abbot")'

The non-Aryan tribes have special tree-feasts of their own. Such is the Sarhūl feast of the Orāons (wh. see), when flowers of the Sāl (*shorea robusta*) are collected by the *pahān*, or local priest, from a remnant of the old forest, which is the home of Sarnā Būṛhī, 'the old woman of the grove,' who corresponds to the Jāhir Erā and Desaulī of the Mundās (Dalton, *op. cit.* 261). The Orāons have a similar feast, the Karamā, in which a branch of this sacred tree is cut, and planted in the village assembly-ground, and the youth of both sexes dance round it (*ib.* 259). The same dance and feast in connexion with this tree prevail among the Kharwārs, Mānjhīs, and other allied non-Aryan tribes of the western Vindhyan and Kaimūr ranges (Crooke, *PR* ii. 94 ff.).

Besides this there is the cult of special trees, which marks an advance in the development of popular belief. In some cases it is associated with totemism, the tree being specially worshipped by the tribe or giving a name to some of its sections. The Pīpal (*Ficus religiosa*) is held particularly sacred. Its trunk is the habitation of Brahmā, its twigs of Vishṇu, its leaves of the other gods. The tree is deified under the name of Vasudeva, and water is poured on its roots by pious people after the morning bath, especially in the month of Baisākh (April–May), and when people are in trouble; the Bel (*Ægle marmelos*) is sacred to Śiva, its leaves are used in his worship and in that of the Śaktis, or female powers, and as it is the abode of Śiva none except Brāhmans may use its wood for fuel; but pious Hindus of the Vaishnava sect will not so much as mention its name. The Tulasī (*Ocymum sanctum*) stands in the same relation to Vishṇu as the Bel does to Śiva, and the plant is grown in the courtyards of all who specially make him their object of worship.

'It is watered after the daily bath, and in Baisākh a pot filled with water, which drips through a hole in the bottom, is suspended over the plant. In the evening a lamp is lit at its foot. Hari [Vishṇu] is believed to be present in it. Its leaves are essential for the proper worship of Vishṇu. They are believed to have a certain medicinal effect in the case of malarial affections, and are much used by native practitioners' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 191)

The non-Aryan emigrants to Bogra pay similar veneration to the plantain tree after reaping the rice crop. Goats and pigs are sacrificed to it; it is worshipped before weddings, and after the ceremony the bridal garland is thrown into a bamboo clump. The practice of marrying brides to trees before the regular service is performed is common. It appears to be done either with the intention of transferring to the tree any possible dangers which may result from the marriage; or it is a form of sympathetic, mimetic, or homœopathic magic by which the fertilizing powers of the spirit which animates the tree and revives it after its winter rest are communicated to the girl (*PR* ii. 115 ff.).

10. Mountain-worship.—The worship of the mountain springs from conceptions analogous to those which suggest the cult of trees. The hill, with its thick jungle, its mysterious caves which seem to be entrances to the lower world, the danger of accident from a fall from a precipice, an avalanche or a falling boulder, the risk of attack from wild animals which shelter themselves in its recesses—all promote the idea that it is infested by malignant spirits. Again, as we might expect, hills are favourite sites for the worship of the sun or other heavenly objects. This was the case in Greece, where many of the old hill-shrines of the sun have now been taken over by his successor, St. Elias (Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 364). Mountain-worship is naturally uncommon in the plains, except in those places from which a view of the mighty chain of the Himālayas can be obtained. But it prevails widely among the non-Aryan hill tribes, like the Mundās, Santāls, and other races occupying the plateau of Chotā Nāgpur, who worship a mountain-god known as Marang Burū or Baṛ Pahāṛ, 'the great mountain,' to whom the tribal priest offers a sacrifice of buffaloes or other animals (Dalton, *op. cit.* 135, 187 f., 199, 210, 214, 220 f., 257, 321). In the same way the Kisāns recognize various sacred heights (*pāt*) as devoted to their gods (*ib.* 132). Of the same type is Sārū Pennū, the mountain-god of the Kandhs.

'He is a jealous god, and does not like people to trespass on his domain, and the chief object of the worship which is performed in his honour in April and May is to induce him to protect from the attacks of wild animals people whose business takes them among the forest-clad hills of the Kandhmals, and also to secure a full yield of the jungle products which the Kandhs, like most similar tribes, use so largely for food. The priests of Sārū Pennū are called *dehuri*, and the appropriate offerings are a goat and a fowl with rice and strong drink' (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 403).

11. **Worship of water-spirits.**—The agency which causes water to flow is regarded as that of an indwelling spirit. Hence comes the worship of rivers, rapids, cataracts, wells, and streams. Chief of all, among the people of the plains, is Gangā Mā, or Mother Ganges, who is a beneficent deity. Though in origin an animistic goddess, she is now recognized by many Hindus as the wife of Śiva.

'Low caste Hindus,' writes Gait (*op. cit.* i. 190), 'throw offerings of fruits and sweets into the river when bathing, and its water is believed to be so sacred that to touch it will purify any one. It has special virtue on the occurrence of certain *yogas*, or auspicious conjunctions of the planets, when large crowds assemble on its banks in order to wash and be clean. Goats are sacrificed on these occasions, and in some parts they are thrown alive into the water, whence they are taken and eaten by the Mallāhs. Other offerings are the perquisite of a special class of degraded Brāhmans known as Gangāputra. Sometimes the goddess is represented by a simple earthen jug filled with water and surmounted by a mango twig, and sometimes as a female figure with four hands, riding on a *makar*, or fabulous marine monster like a shark. In this form she is worshipped by the fishing castes of Bengal Proper, who sacrifice white goats to her before starting on a fishing expedition, and also on some special occasion, the date of which varies. Pilgrims at Gayā offer their first *piṇḍa* (rice-cake) to her in the name of their deceased ancestors. In the Santhāl Parganas a woman worships her on the sixth and twelfth days after giving birth to a child. She goes to a river or pond and pours oil on a slab of stone, on which she then draws five perpendicular lines, and prays for entire restoration to health. Certain ascetics perform a special penance in her honour called *jalsāin*, which consists in spending every night in the month of Māgh [January-February] seated stark naked on a small platform erected over the river, engaged in such prayer and meditation as their sufferings from the cold will allow. The town of Tribeni in Hooghly is held to be specially holy because three sacred streams,—the Ganges, the Jamunā, and the Saraswatī,—which meet at Allahābād, here once more separate from each other.'

In Eastern Bengal the observances are of a similar character (Wise, *op. cit.* 138 f.). The Brahmaputra, 'son of Brahmā,' is less sacred, having only a single feast-day on which people assemble to bathe on its banks.

This form of worship seems to have been independently adopted by the non-Aryan tribes, who have sacred rivers of their own, the cult of which is not derived from Hindu influence. Thus the Kharriās of Singhbhūm venerate the river Koil, and the Santāl depends on the piety of his descendants that his ashes will be finally committed to the sacred river, the Damudā, 'to be borne on its swift current into the bosom of the mighty ocean, whence the race first had its being, and where, returning, it fittingly seeks its final rest' (Dalton, *op. cit.* 159; Bradley-Birt, *Story of an Indian Upland*, 285). In these cases the river is little more than a vague personality; but in many cases this spirit is personified, and we thus arrive at the host of water-gods who are specially revered among the large fishing and boating population of the Delta. Thus the deity of the river Tīstā is supposed to be an old woman, Būṛhī Ṭhakurāṇī ('the Old Lady'), and 'is one of the common objects of worship (*Grāmdevatā*) among the simple pagans of the vicinity' (Buchanan, in Martin, *Eastern India*, iii. 361).

'Not satisfied,' writes Wise (*op. cit.* 139), 'with attributing a divine character to the rivers of their native land, the Hindus have peopled the waters themselves with animistic beings, who protect or destroy the unguarded boatmen.'

Such is Zindah Ghāzī, 'the living destroyer of the infidel,' now a Muhammadan saint, but evidently a promoted animistic spirit (*ib.* 13 f.). Like him is Pīr Bhadr, whose home is at Chittagong. According to one legend, he is a deified Portuguese sailor who long ago reached the shore by clinging to a fragment of a wreck. His *dargāh*, or cenotaph, is regarded as the palladium of the city; here lamps are lighted at night, and pilgrims from all parts of Bengal resort to his shrine in obedience to a vow, or to obtain the favour and intercession of the saint; while Hindu fishermen regard him with as much awe as do the Muhammadans (*ib.* 14 f.). The Mallāh boatmen worship a water-god, Koilā Bābā, 'Father Charcoal,' described as an old grey-bearded personage, who as the 'navvy of the Ganges' (*Gangāji kā Beldār*) saps and swallows up whatever opposes the sacred stream.

'Before casting a new net, or starting on a commercial venture, offerings of molasses and seven kinds of grain kneaded into balls, are offered to him; and at the end of the ceremony one of the balls is placed on the edge of the water, another on the bow of the boat' (*ib.* 347).

The Paṭnī boatmen never enter on the work of a ferry without sacrificing a white goat to the river-goddess, Gangājī (*ib.* 358). Another water-goddess is Khālā Kumārī, 'the Creek Maiden,' to whom fishermen offer the first-fruits of their labour (*ib.* 393). The most mysterious of these water-deities of Bengal is Khwājah Khizr, who by one legend is identified with Zu'l-qarnain, 'he of the two horns,' or Alexander the Great, as described in the Qur'ān, *Sūra* xviii. Others connect him with the prophet Elias or Elijah. Whatever may be the real origin of his cultus, Khwājah Khizr is supposed to reside in the Indian rivers and seas, protecting mariners from shipwreck, and visible only to those who perform a forty days' vigil on the river bank. In his honour a raft (*beṛā*) made of paper, ornamented with tinsel, the prow resembling a female face, with the crest and breast of a peacock, is set afloat at sunset on a support made of plantain stems, when its flickering lights give a picturesque aspect to the dark, flooded stream. The person launching the raft deposits on the bank some ginger, rice, and plantains, which are usually appropriated by some wretched beggar (*ib.* 12 f.). The basis of the rite, of which Frazer (*GB*[2] iii. 87) has collected numerous examples, is possibly the expulsion of the spirits of evil by launching a raft or boat in a river or in the sea.

12. **Worship of the powers of nature.**—The personification and adoration of the powers of nature are probably later in origin than the animistic beliefs which have up to this point been considered. The most primitive objects of worship seem to be in Bengal purely local—the spirits of hill or rock, of the animals which attack the wood-cutter, of spring and stream, of all connected with man's immediate wants or occupation. It is only at a later stage that he seems to be able to generalize and direct his attention to more distant powers and energies like those of the planetary bodies.

(*a*) *Sun-worship.*—Among the orthodox Hindus the sun (Sūrya or Grāharājā, 'King of the planets') has fallen from the high estate which he secured in Vedic times, and has now become a mere godling or minor god. He is, however, still worshipped, especially in Bihār and among the non-Aryan tribes of the southern hills. Temples have been erected in his honour, the most important of which are those at Kanārak, near Puri in Orissa, and at Gayā.

'The Gāyatrī, or sacred verse, which each Brāhman must recite daily, is dedicated to him. Sunday is sacred to him, and on that day many abstain from eating fish or flesh, in some districts salt also is abstained from. The Sundays in the month of Kārttik [October-November] are specially set aside for his worship in Bihār and parts of Bengal. The great festival in his honour, known as the Chhaṭ Pūjā, is held on the 6th day of the light half of Kārttik, when the people gather at a river or pool and offer libations to the setting sun, and repeat the ceremony on the following morning. They also make offerings of white flowers, sandal paste, betel-nut, rice, milk, plantains, etc. Brāhman priests are not employed, but an elderly member of the family, usually a female, conducts the worship' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 188). Even Muhammadans join in these ceremonies.

Sun-worship prevails widely among the non-

Aryan tribes. The Orāons (wh. see) identify him with Dharmesh, their supreme deity, as do the Mundās, Bhūmij, and Hos, who worship him with offerings of fowls and spirits, and swear by his name. The Hārīs of Bīrbhūm sacrifice a goat to him on some Sunday in spring, and, strictly in accordance with the animistic conception, he is, in Rājshāhī, provided with a female consort, Chhaṭmātā, 'the mother of the sixth day rite'; that is to say, his festal day, when women make offerings at his shrine.

(*b*) *Moon-worship.*—Though all Hindu ceremonies are regulated by the rising or setting, the waxing or waning of the moon, its worship is much less general than that of the sun. Soma in Bengal is represented by a figure of a white man sitting on a water-lily and drawn by ten horses. With his right hand he gives a blessing, and in the other he holds a club (Ward, *Hindoos*, ii. 72). His cult is common among the non-Aryan tribes. For instance, the Kharwās offer to him a black cock under the name of Jyolo Dubo; the Binjhiās worship him as Nind Bongā; the Mundās as Chando Omal. The Mundā legend tells how on one occasion the moon deceived the sun, her husband, and in his anger he cut her in two; but he afterwards repented of his wrath, and allows her at times to shine forth in full beauty amidst her daughters, the stars (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 468, 136; Dalton, *op. cit.* 186). The curious rite of expulsion of evil by flinging brickbats at the house of the person afflicted by it is in Bihār connected with moon-worship. But it is probable that this is merely a suggestion of periodicity in the observance, and it is rather to be compared with the numerous cases in India and elsewhere, when railing at women, stone-throwing, and mock fights, especially in connexion with spring customs, are regarded as modes of promoting the fertility of the crops by the expulsion of the influences which cause injury to them (Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 266 f.). As in many other places, the moon is regarded as the deity who presides over crops, heals wounds, and cures diseases, especially those of the eye (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 189; Frazer, *GB*[2] ii. 154 ff.). It is a favourite object of worship with women, but in Bengal no fixed dates are appointed for these observances.

(*c*) *Planet-worship.*—Of the planets the most regarded is Śani, or Saturn.

'He is much dreaded and is carefully propitiated, either on Saturdays or on particular occasions when astrological calculations indicate that a visitation from him is to be specially feared. He has no image, but is represented by an earthen pot filled with water. A seat is placed in front of it, and on it are laid five fruits and five flowers. A Brāhman priest officiates at the ceremony, and the *praśād*, or offering, which consists of a sort of pudding made of flour, plantains, sugar, and milk, must be eaten on the spot by the devotees, who must wash their mouths carefully before leaving. If any casual visitor should arrive while the ceremony is in progress, he must wait till it is concluded, and eat a share of the *praśād*, otherwise he will incur the godling's displeasure' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 189 f.).

The rule that the sacrifice is to be consumed at once in the presence, as it were, of the deity, is probably based on the fear that the sacred food might be profaned if it were carried outside the sanctuary (W. R. Smith, 282; Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 240). Every one present is required to share in consuming the offering. In other words, he must seek communion with the deity by eating part of the sacred meal.

Rāhu, 'the looser,' or 'the seizer,' is the demon who causes eclipses by devouring the moon for a time. He must be scared by music or noise, or by bathing at a holy place during the eclipse. Rāhu has now become the special deity of two menial tribes, the Dosādhs and the Ḍhāngars, who worship him by walking through a pit filled with hot cinders. One of the tribal priests, becoming possessed by the god walks through the fire, and, it is said, escapes injury. Connected with this is another function, in which a ladder is made of wood, the rungs shaped in the form of a sword-blade, up which the priest has to climb, and decapitate a white cock tied to the summit of the ladder. A fowl of this colour is the appropriate offering to the sun-god. The object of the rite appears to be, by a form of symbolic or sympathetic magic, to propitiate the deities who control the rain and the harvests (*PR* i. 19 f.).

13. **Earth-worship.**—(*a*) *The benign mother.*—The earth-deity, impersonated as a goddess, has a twofold aspect—on the one hand benignant, on the other malignant. On her benevolent side she is regarded as the mother of all living things and the giver of food. In this province she is known as Bhūdevī, 'earth-goddess'; Dhartī Māī, 'Mother Earth'; or Basundharā, 'wealth-bearer'; Ambabāchī, and Basumatī Ṭhakurāni. Pious Hindus say a prayer to her on waking in the early morning; the dying man and the mother in parturition are laid upon her breast; when a calf is born the herdsman lets the first drop of milk from the cow's udder fall on the ground.

'On the first day of the month Āsāṛh (June–July) she is supposed to menstruate, and there is an entire cessation of all ploughing, sowing, and other agricultural operations, and widows refrain from eating cooked rice. On the fourth day the bathing ceremony is performed, in accordance with the Hindu idea that a woman who menstruates is unclean until she bathes on the fourth day. A stone, taken to represent the goddess, is placed erect on the ground, and the top of it is painted with vermilion. The housewife bathes it with turmeric water, and a betel-nut is placed on a piece of wood close by. The stone is then bedecked with flowers, and offerings of milk, plantains, etc., are made' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 189). The smearing of the stone with vermilion indicates a reminiscence of an older rite of blood-sacrifice.

As will be shown in connexion with the Dravidian religion, the popular idea regarding the Earth is that her fertility periodically diminishes, and must be restored by various methods, the most common of which is blood-sacrifice. Among the Kandhs (wh. see) the victim was a human being, and fragments of the flesh of the victim were scattered or buried in the fields to renew the strength of the earth-spirit. In other places it is supposed that the same result will be attained by the annual symbolic marriage of the earth-goddess, and she is accordingly provided with a male consort, who is often the head of the *grāma-devatā*, or guardian gods of the village. In Western Bengal this god is usually known as Khetrpāl, 'earth-guardian,' or Bhūmiya, 'earth-deity' (see DRAVIDIANS).

(*b*) *The earth-goddess in her malignant form.*—But though the earth-goddess is usually regarded as benevolent, she has a chthonic or malignant side to her character. While she is regarded as the village guardian, and protects the folk and their cattle from disease, yet, with the curious inconsistency which characterizes cults of this amorphous kind, she is believed to be the causer of epidemics, especially those of a sudden, unexpected, or unaccountable kind, such as cholera or smallpox. In this malignant manifestation the universal earth-mother is the prototype, and probably the primitive form of the destructive goddess in her manifold forms—Kālī, Devī, Durgā, and numberless others of the same kind. Her functions, again, as the causer and at the same time the averter of disease, have become divided into departments, and special maladies have been placed in charge of one or other of her various manifestations. We thus reach the beginnings of a pantheon, when each department of human activity is superintended by a special deity. This result may have been reached in Bengal by one of two ways: either the local earth-goddess of a particular locality gains a reputation by remarkable cures being worked at her shrine, and she is accordingly en-

trusted with the healing of a special class of maladies; or it may mark the aggregation of several septs to form a tribe, when, for the sake of convenience, the functions of the deities, once separate but now revered in common, are discriminated.

(*c*) *The small-pox goddess.*—The small-pox deity, Śītalā, 'she that loves coolness,' so called euphemistically in relation to the fever which accompanies the malady, is also known as Basantī Būṛhī ('the old lady of spring'), or Basantī Chaṇḍī ('the cruel spring-goddess'), probably because epidemics are most usual at this season. She, by a further differentiation of function, is now one of seven sisters, the enumeration of whom differs in various parts of the Province. Of those usually named, Kankar Mātā is the most dreaded, but happily her attacks are rare; Phūlmātā and Pānsāhī Mātā attack children under the age of seven, Badī Mātā those between seven and fifteen, Gulsaliā Mātā those of any age. Śītalā and her six sisters are often represented by seven balls of clay placed in a line in a shed erected outside the village site, where sweetmeats and flowers are offered. In times of emergency the higher castes sacrifice goats or pigeons, and the menials pigs.* In cases of severe epidemics even the higher castes offer swine to the seven sisters; but the worshippers, who are usually women, employ men of some low caste to perform the actual sacrifice.

The collective worship of the sisters is usually subordinated to that of Śītalā, their leader, who is often represented as a naked woman, painted red and mounted on an ass, with a bundle of broomsticks in one hand with which she sweeps away the disease, an earthen pot under her left arm, and a winnowing fan upon her head. But her image sometimes assumes more grotesque forms.

'Sometimes the image is a piece of wood or stone with a human face carved on it, besmeared with oil and vermilion and studded with spots or nails of gold, silver, or brass, in imitation of the pustules of the disease. In Jessore and Noākhāli she takes the form assigned to her in the *Purāṇas* of a white figure in a state of perfect nudity, while in Orissa and Champāran she is represented by an earthen pot. In Khulnā she is regarded by the Pods, not merely as the goddess of small-pox, but as their main deity; and if a person is carried off by a tiger, or his crops are destroyed by wild animals, it is thought it is because he has incurred the displeasure of the goddess' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 192).

This appears to show that the limitation of the goddess to superintend disease is a later conception. Elsewhere she is worshipped only when epidemics of small-pox, measles, or cholera break out, or when children are inoculated or vaccinated. Sometimes the image is kept in a temple; sometimes it is in charge of priests drawn from the lowest castes. But when the higher castes worship her they perform the service with the aid of a Brāhman (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 192). Her priest is very often selected from the Mālī, or gardener caste, and his treatment of the disease, which consists in fanning the patient with a branch of the sacred *nīm* tree (*azadirachta indica*), bathing the image of the goddess to alleviate the fever, and mumbling spells of various kinds, has been fully described by Wise (*op. cit.* 343 f.).

(*d*) *The cholera-goddess.*—Akin to Śītalā is the goddess of cholera, Olā Bībī, 'lady of the flux,' or Olā Chaṇḍī, 'the cruel one.' She is, according to Gait (*op. cit.* i. 193), sometimes represented as wearing a gown and mounted on a horse, but usually her emblem is an earthen pot placed under a *nīm* tree. Her priest is generally drawn from the lower castes, and her favourite offering is a goat.

(*e*) *Other deities of disease.*—Besides the deities of disease already enumerated, there are many others, which illustrate the development of Indian polytheism from an animistic substratum. Like the earth-goddess, they are sometimes provided with a male consort. Śītalā herself is attended by her male counterpart, Ghaṇṭākaranā, 'he who has ears as broad as a bell,' or 'he who wears bells in his ears.' In the Himālayas he is supposed to possess great personal attractions, is worshipped under the emblem of a water-jar as the healer of cutaneous disease, and is a gatekeeper, or, in other words, a minor god on his promotion to a seat in the orthodox pantheon (*PR* i. 131). Fever is provided with a special godling, Jwārā Nārāyan, and the cholera-goddess, Olā-Bībī, has kindred deities of the same kind, the Joginī of Orissa, and Dīdī Ṭhakurāṇī of Bardwān. The Rājbansī caste have in Chitan Ṭhakrūn a special deity who removes barrenness in women. Kālī, again, 'the destroyer,' develops in her benignant aspect into Rakshyā Kālī, 'the protectrix,' who, while she brings disease, also repels it.

14. Animal-worship.—It is difficult to determine how far animal-worship in Bengal is connected with totemism, of which there is some evidence (see below, § 28), and how far it is merely a development of Animism. Here it is practically identical with the cult as it prevails throughout Northern India.

(*a*) *Worship of the cow.*—In Eastern Bengal the cow receives divine honours at least twice a year, on the first day of Baisākh (April–May), and on the second day of the moon in Jyeshṭhā (May–June). The custom is similar to that of the Baisākh Bihū, or cattle-feast of Assam, in which on the first day the cattle are rubbed with oil and turmeric, and bathed in rivers and tanks; on the second day the owners prepare a feast, invite their neighbours and friends, and wear new clothes. The remaining five days of the festival, which since the Vaishṇava reformation has become associated with the cult of Kṛṣna, are spent by men and women in dancing, beating of drums, and the singing of amorous and wanton songs (*Calcutta Review*, xxi. 413). The animal, of course, is everywhere protected by a most efficient tabu; and serious penance, such as marching up one bank of the Ganges from the ocean as far as Hardwār, where the river leaves the hills, and returning eastward along the opposite bank, is imposed on any one who slays the sacred beast even by misadventure. But this respect for cows does not prevent neglect, starvation, and wanton cruelty. Among Aryans the regard for the cow is comparatively modern. In the Vedas we find instances of cow-sacrifice and beef-eating (Rājendralāla Mitra, *Indo-Aryans*, i. 354 ff.). It does not extend to the non-Aryan tribes, and it seems to have arisen at a stage of culture higher than that to which most of them have attained, when permanent cultivation finally takes the place of the rude methods of periodically burning down patches of jungle, and sowing the seeds, which is the habit still pursued by the less advanced tribes. Among the half-Hinduized Gonds the sacrifice of a cow is part of the funeral rites, being probably connected with the death-feast which the departed soul is believed to share with the survivors. After the cremation of the corpse the ashes are buried and covered with a large slab of stone, and the tail of the victim is attached to this as a sign that the obsequies of the deceased have been decently performed. The prejudice against the use of milk, which is regarded as a foul secretion, is characteristic of the Indo-Chinese races; but it is also found among the Kols and the Kandhs of Ganjām (Dalton, *op. cit.* 283; Maltby-Leman, *Manual of Ganjam*, 69).

(*b*) *Other sacred animals.*—The monkey is a

* With this pig-sacrifice may be compared the pig of purification at the Greek Thesmophoria (Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 296; J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to Greek Rel.* 152 *f.*). Women in Greece and elsewhere were often specially selected to offer sacrifice (Frazer, *op. cit.* iii. 593, iv. 187).

sacred beast, particularly that variety known as the Langūr (*Semnopithecus entellus*), which is identified with the monkey-god, Hanumān. The common Hindu theory that the beast is worshipped as the representative of the demigod or hero who assisted Rāma in his wars with Rāvaṇa to recover his ravished wife, Sītā, is obviously a late invention. The worship of the human-like animal was more primitive than the legend by which it is now explained, and may have been independently adopted by the Aryan as well as by the non-Aryan races. Among the latter the aboriginal Savaras of Shāhābād make images of him which differ from the orthodox Hindu type; and the Bhuiyās of Keonjhar revere him under the title of Bīr, that is, Vīra or Mahāvīra, 'great hero' (Buchanan, *op. cit.* i. 467; Dalton, *op. cit.* 140, 147). In Western Bengal the first duty of the founder of a hamlet is to erect an image of Hanumān, which is kept duly decorated with daubs of vermilion. He is regarded as typifying the virile element, and thus, as the protector of crops and cattle, is conceived to stand to the Earth-Mother in the relation of consort. Even the *Macacus*, the common monkey, is protected though he is exceedingly mischievous. It is believed that no one can live where a monkey has met his death, and his bones are so unlucky that a special class of exorcists in Bihār find their occupation in ascertaining that such bones do not pollute the ground on which a new house is about to be erected (Buchanan, *op. cit.* ii. 141 f.). According to one tradition, the monkey is known as *Pavan kā pūt*, 'son of the wind,' a belief accepted by the Bhuiyās of Singhbhūm, who revere him and call themselves Pavanbans, 'the wind children,' to the present day. The same belief prevails among the fisher castes of Eastern Bengal, who invoke him in a calm, instead of whistling as the British tar does (Wise, *op. cit.* 137).

The tiger among the forest tribes is naturally supposed to represent the evil spirit of the woods, and the fear which he causes leads to reverence and propitiation. As Banrājā, 'lord of the jungle,' he is the chief object of worship among the Kisāns and Santāls. The former will not kill him, and believe that in return for their devotion he will spare a tribesman (Dalton, *op. cit.* 132). The Santāls, especially those who have suffered loss from his attacks, adore him. When a Santāl is carried off by the beast, the head of the family deems it necessary to propitiate the Bāgh Bhūt, or 'tiger devil.' Samuells gives a curious account of a shamanistic rite among the Gonds, in which two men possessed of the spirit of Bāghīśvar, 'the tiger lord,' fell ravenously upon a bleating kid, and tore it with their teeth till it expired (Dalton, *op. cit.* 280). The *baghaut*, or shrine erected on the spot where a tiger has killed a man, is regarded as a place where offerings of propitiation should be made. Every passer-by adds a stone to the cairn, and wood-cutters light a lamp or make an oblation to appease the angry *bhūt*, or spirit of the man who was slain.

15. The patron deities of the village.—The deities who have been enumerated are those connected with the clearing of the forest and the beginnings of an agricultural life. When the village has been founded and farming becomes well established, another form of worship to a large extent replaces beliefs of this kind. This is the cult of the Grāma-devatā or Grāmya-devatā, the tutelary deities of the village, who preside over the welfare of the community. These deities differ from the jungle godlings inasmuch as, for the most part, they are purely local and attached to a single village. Those whose range is wider than the village boundaries seem usually to be akin to the jungle spirits. Thus, one of this class, Dholāī Chand, inhabits a sacred grove where rags are tied to the branches to secure the birth of children, and people make obeisance whenever they pass her abode. Another, Banā Durgā, in Mymensingh, is worshipped on behalf of children; sacrifices of pigeons or goats are made to her, and the flesh is eaten by people of low caste (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 200). Again, it sometimes happens that one of these village-deities acquires a reputation for curing disease or procuring other benefits for its worshippers. It thus becomes known beyond its own special area; a cult is started; a temple is built; and, finally, the place becomes the resort of pilgrims. This was probably the origin of famous shrines, like that of Kālī at Kālighāṭ, near Calcutta,—the Kalkattēwālī Kālī, as she is called,—a well-known deity throughout Northern India; or, again, the village may develop into a town or city, and the Grāma-devatā becomes its guardian, as has been the case with Patanadevī or Patanīśvarī, the protecting goddess of the city of Patna. The Brāhmans who have taken up her cult no longer recognize her as a Grāma-devatā, and assert that she is one form of the spouse of Śiva (Buchanan, *op. cit.* i. 191).

16. The village shrine.—The shrine of these village-gods is rarely of more pretensions than a pile of stones set up under the village tree, which is often one of the species regarded as sacred. Sometimes there is no visible representation of the deity beyond a stone or mound. Occasionally a bell is provided which the worshipper rings to announce his presence to the god, who may be sleeping or on a journey. In Hooghly an earthen pot filled with water, with a mango twig placed on the top, the whole covered with a piece of white cloth, represents the deity. In some cases the common worship on behalf of the village is done by the headman; sometimes the priest is drawn from one of the lowest castes; and, even in those villages in which persons of high caste reside, the business of controlling and propitiating the local spirits is left in charge of a hedge priest, because he, being regarded as one of the aboriginal inhabitants, is supposed to understand the ways of the village-gods better than any newcomer. For the same reason, the uncanny duty of watching the fields at night is entrusted to the menial castes, who are supposed to understand how to control the spirits which walk in the darkness. The offerings at the village shrine consist usually of the fruits of the earth, milk or spirituous liquor, food cooked or uncooked; but in cases of special emergency, goats or pigeons or pigs are sacrificed. The offerings are generally taken and consumed by the worshipper and his family, except the head, which was probably the god's share, and is appropriated by the officiant after he has let a few drops of blood from it fall upon the altar.

17. Titles of the Grāma-devatā.—Among the jungle tribes, where the cult is in its most primitive phase, the term *Grāma-devatā* has, as we might expect, an uncertain connotation. It is not limited to the actual village-deities, but is extended to the tribal gods of forest or mountain, like Marang Burū of the Santāls, Thānpatī of the Savarās, Juāngs, Baurīs, and Bāgdīs, Sarnā Būṛhī of the Orāons, and Duār Pahār or Durā of the Cheros (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 200). As settled life progresses, these deities gradually merge in the village pantheon. In the plain country the titles of the Grāma-devatā are legion. Buchanan (*op. cit.* ii. 131) gives a long list of those worshipped in the District of Bhāgalpur; but he illustrates the uncertain character of the cult by classing Śiva and Kālī as Grāma-devatās. This, no doubt, was the primitive conception; but these have now become national gods, of much higher rank than the

local village-godlings. In Bhāgalpur, Buchanan states, one of the most common of these deities is Bishaharī, who controls snakes; Siddheśvarī, Chandī, and Mahāmāyā are not very common, while he saw no shrine in honour of Sītalā. He mentions also that a very common village-god was Dūbēbhayharan, the ghost of a Brāhman who, to revenge a wrong which he had sustained, committed suicide (see below, § 25). Wise (*op. cit.* 133 ff.), among the most popular of the Grāma-devatā worshipped in Eastern Bengal, names Būṛhā-Būṛhī, the androgynous form of the Earth-deity; Panchanandā, who preserves children from sickness; Araṇyā or Jamāī Sashṭhī, the favourite goddess of Bengali women, who ensures the health of children, and cures barrenness; Siddheśvarī and Vriddheśvarī, who are now regarded by Brāhmans as 'parts' (*aṁśa*) of Durgā; in other words, these have now taken their place among the greater gods.

18. Promotion of the Grāma-devatā to higher rank.—The mode by which these deities are promoted will be considered in connexion with the Dravidians (wh. see). But a few instances of the fact may be given from Bengal. Ṭhakurāṇī Māī, whom Dalton (*op. cit.* 147, 149) calls 'the blood-thirsty goddess' of the Bhuiyās, has now become a form of Durgā or Kālī, and in Singhbhūm and Lohārdagā is served by a Bhuiyā priest with sacrifices of goats and sheep, the flesh of which he shares with the worshippers. The Birhors now call the piece of wood which they worship Mahāmāyā, who is supposed to be the daughter of the Hindu Devī; and a trident painted red is worshipped as the monkey-god, Hanumān, who is believed to be an officer of Devī (*ib.* 220). The Kādars of Bhāgalpur and the Santāl Parganas worship animistic gods, but,

'if questioned about their religion, will reply that they are Hindus, and will talk vaguely about Parameśwar, Mahādeo, and Vishṇu, as if they lived in the very odour of orthodoxy instead of being, as in fact they are, wholly outside of the Brāhmanical system. To talk about the Hindu gods is usually the first step towards that insensible adoption of the externals of Hinduism which takes the place of the formal and open conversion which sterner and less adaptive creeds demand. The next thing is to set up Brāhmans whose influence, furthered by a variety of social forces, gradually deposes the tribal gods, transforms them into orthodox shapes, and gives them places in the regular Pantheon as local manifestations of this or that well-known principle, or relegates them to a decent and inoffensive obscurity as household or village deities. Last of all, if the tribe is an influential one, and its leading men hold land, they give themselves brevet rank as Rājputs' (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 369).

19. Development of Animism into Hinduism.—In Bengal, perhaps more clearly than in any other part of Northern India, it is possible to trace the stages by which people in the animistic stage of belief are promoted, if this phrase accurately expresses the fact, into Hinduism. It is very difficult, as we have seen, to find a purely animistic tribe in the plains. The degraded Śūdras of Orissa seem to recognize none of the regular Hindu gods. They worship an animistic goddess of their own, Pañcha-khaṇḍā, 'she of the five swords,' with offerings of he-goats, fowls, and rice, which are consumed by the performers of the sacrifice. The headman officiates at all acts of public worship; they have no Brāhmans, and perform no *śrāddha*, or mind-rite, for the dead (Risley, *op. cit.* ii. 267 f.). But even the Ḍoms (wh. see), the lowest menials of the plains, worship, at least in name, the regular Hindu deities, such as Rādhā, Kṛṣṇa, Kālī, and Nārāyan (*ib.* i. 246), the explanation being that they have been for ages helots in the service of Hindu masters, whose religion they naturally imitate. Sometimes, again, it is found that, while one part of a tribe has to some indefinite extent adopted the Hindu religion, another division remains animistic. Among the Bhūmij, while the well-to-do tenants employ Brāhmans as their family priests and worship the Mother-goddess under the forms of Kālī or Mahāmāyā, the mass of the tribe reveres the Sun as Sing-bongā or Dharamā, and worships a host of minor gods of the animistic class (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 124). The same is the case with the Binjhiās, Birhors, and Cheros (*ib.* i. 136, 138, 202). The Koirī and Kurmī tribes furnish examples of people whose religion obviously depends upon their environment. That portion of these tribes which still occupies the animistic area of Chotā Nāgpur continues the worship of the non-Aryan deities, while those who have migrated to the plains in Bihār have come almost completely under Hindu influence (*ib.* i. 503, 534).

20. Development of the tribal priesthood.—This process of evolution is clearly shown by the character of the priesthood. The Korwās, according to Dalton (*op. cit.* 229), have no priests, because, as he asserts, they have no gods, their worship being entirely confined to that of the *manes* of their ancestors—a rite which must necessarily be performed by the head of the family. Elsewhere, however, they employ *baigās*, or tribal priests. The same is the case with the Māl Pahārias, among whom the head of the household performs all religious and ceremonial observances. These people are, however, on the road to promotion, because they hold Brāhmans in some degree of honour, and presents are given to them on festal occasions (Risley, *op. cit.* ii. 71). The Baurīs of Western Bengal appoint as their priests men of their own caste, termed *lavā* or *degharīā*, some of whom hold patches of land rent-free or at a nominal rent as remuneration for their services; but the tribe in Eastern Bengal employs a low class of Brāhmans (*ib.* i. 81). One section of the Ḍoms appoints the son of the dead man's sister or of his female cousin to perform the obsequial rites, and to recite the appropriate sacred verses (*mantra*) at the funeral. For these services he receives a fee when the inheritance comes to be divided. This has been supposed to be a survival of the primitive rule by which kinship is traced through the female. No other indications of an extinct custom of female kinship are now traceable among these people, and the fact that in Western Bengal the eldest son on the division of the inheritance gets an extra share seems to show that kinship through males must have been in force for a long period (*ib.* i. 245). This custom, however, seems to have been at one time widely spread among many of the North Indian tribes. The Khāsīs and Gāros of Assam still trace succession through the female; so do the Hāris, Pāsīs, and Tāntīs of Bihār; forest tribes in the United Provinces, like the Bhuiyārs and the Kols, and even, according to Wise, the Mithilā and Sarvariā groups of Brāhmans, who recognize the sister's son as family priest (Risley, *Census of India Rep.* 1901, i. 448; Wise, *op. cit.* 127; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, ii. 95, iii. 309; Dalton, *op. cit.* 63).

The next stage is reached among those tribes which employ Brāhmans only for special functions, and perform their ordinary religious rites through the agency of their own kinsmen. The Bhandārī, or barber caste of Orissa, perform the service of the orthodox gods through Brāhmans, who are received on equal terms by other members of the sacred order; but the worship of the village goddess, Grām-devatī, is done by the head of the household (Risley, *Tribes*, i. 93 f.). In the same way the Binds and Cheros of Bihār, who have copied with more or less accuracy the external observances of Brāhmanism, employ Brāhmans in the worship of the higher gods, while the household worship of the local deities is done by the men of the family, or by a *baigā*, or hedge priest,

drawn from one of the non-Aryan tribes (*ib.* i. 132, 202). Even a caste like the Kāndūs, or grain-parchers of Bihār and Bengal, who pretend to a high standard of orthodoxy, worship the godling Goraiyā in a fashion which is hardly in keeping with their high social position.

'A lump of clay is set up outside the house to represent the deity, a Dosādh (wh. see) officiates as priest, and the victim is a pig which is bought for a price from the Dosādh, slain by him at the instance of the Kāndū worshippers, and then eaten by the family of the priest' (*ib.* i. 416).

Finally, some tribes who do employ Brāhmans for all religious services and family ceremonies are unable to secure the services of the highest groups of the priestly order, and are forced to content themselves with those of lower rank. Sometimes, as in the case of the Bhakat Orāons,—a branch of the great non-Aryan tribe which is now gradually adopting the Hindu religion and its rites,—Brāhmans deign to offer their services as *gurus*, or spiritual guides, but refuse to officiate as their priests. The sacrifice is accordingly done by any influential member of the tribe who happens to be acquainted with the ritual. In their marriages they try to imitate the Hindu ceremony; the priest, however, is not a Brāhman, but a tribesman (*ib.* i. 91). The Koirīs, a cultivating tribe of Bihār and Chotā Nāgpur, profess to be orthodox Hindus; but their orthodoxy, as we have already seen (above, § 19), seems to vary with locality, and may be estimated by the degree of consideration accorded to their Brāhmans and by the nature of their local gods. In Chotā Nāgpur those Brāhmans who serve them as priests are not received on equal terms by other Brāhmans; and among their minor gods we find non-Aryan deities, like Marang Burū and Bar Pahārī, side by side with Hindu gods, or rather perhaps aboriginal gods invested with Hindu titles, like Parameśvarī and Hanumān. Mounds of dried clay representing these are found in every house; and there is often a larger mound under a sacred tree which is dedicated to the entire group of deities (Dalton, *op. cit.* 321; Risley, *op. cit.* i. 503).

21. Bhūta-worship.—Another form of worship which illustrates the transition from Animism to Brāhmanism is that of Bhūtas, which prevails more or less among all classes of the population of Bengal, from the non-Aryan tribes up to those who have accepted the beliefs of Hinduism. The term *bhūt*, or *bhūta*, meaning in Sanskrit 'formed' or 'created,' is in the earlier sacred literature applied to the powers of Nature, and even to deities. Śiva himself is called Bhūtīśvara, or 'Lord of spirits.' But the name is now popularly applied to a malignant evil spirit, properly the ghost of a man who has died a violent death, either by accident, suicide, or capital punishment. The malignancy of such a spirit is increased if he has been denied proper funeral rites. In Bengal, according to Wise (*op. cit.* 131 f.), such spirits are most numerous in forest tracts where lofty trees afford shade and silence, or in the sombre valleys of hilly districts, where the original clearers of the jungle were exposed to many forms of violent death. Some, again, dwell in ancient trees, others in cities, in ruined temples, graveyards, cremation grounds, or dry wells.

'They are met with on the arid treeless plain, the flooded river, and the lonely forest glade. The timid recognize their cry in the hooting of the owl, the howling of the jackal, the yelp of the village cur, and the whistle of the plover. One kind of demon, sedentary in its habits, attaches itself to a village, another to a household; some inflict plagues, others blight the opening bud, or convulse the newborn babe. The Bengālī sees in every accident the work of evil spirits, and his longing desire is to obtain some means of counteracting their influence. The women are naturally the chief adherents of this superstition, and while engaged in the most commonplace work are ever watchful against the entrance of a devil' (Wise, *op. cit.* 131).

If the rice be mildewed, if wild rice or weeds appear in the paddy fields, or murrain among the herds, if hail strikes the green crops, or the weevil spoils the mangoes—all these are the work of those malignant spirits. Many means are adopted to overcome their dangerous influence. Some Brāhmans, not those of the highest class, supply magical formulæ (*mantra*); Musalmān teachers prepare copper amulets, each containing a sentence from the Qur'ān; the wandering Bairāgī furnishes charms, such as a bone, tooth, or scale of a fish, a seed, or a fragment of wood.

22. The evil eye.—Closely allied to beliefs of this class is the evil eye superstition. To avert this danger the field or garden is protected by a black pot painted with a white cross or the mystic symbol, the *swastika*. See EVIL EYE.

23. Disease exorcism.—Disease, in particular, is seldom supposed to be the result of natural causes; it is almost invariably ascribed to *bhūtas*, or evil spirits.

'Even an educated gentleman, acting under female dictation, calls in the aid of magicians to cast out the devil haunting his house, or tormenting his child. Infants and pregnant women are especially subject to the malign influence of a Bhūta; but all convulsive diseases, the delirium of fever, and raving madness, are referred to possession by an evil spirit' (Wise, *op. cit.* 132).

In such cases, the *ojhā*, or exorcist, takes the place of the *kabirāj*, or physician, and magic the place of medicine. Beliefs of this kind are common throughout the Dravidian area. One form of this belief to which there is no exact parallel in other parts of India—the propitiation of Ghentū, the spirit which presides over itch—may be given as an example. A broken earthenware pot, its bottom blackened by constant use in cooking, daubed white with lime interspersed with a few streaks of turmeric, a branch or two of the *ghenṭū* plant (*Clerodendron infortunatum*) used as a febrifuge and anthelmintic, and, last though not least, a broomstick of palmyra or coco-nut tree, represent the evil spirit. The mistress of the family in whose house the malady appears acts as priestess. A few doggerel verses are recited, the pot is broken into fragments, and these are collected by the children, who sing songs about the itch-god. This rite is believed to be effective in removing the disease (*Calcutta Review*, xviii. 68).

24. Shamanism.—Rites like these, with the object of expelling disease or other evils caused by malignant spirits, are often accompanied by a form of shamanism, in which the officiant becomes possessed by the deity which he has invoked, and, letting his hair loose, falls into a frenzy of religious excitement, in the course of which he pours forth incoherent cries which are believed to be oracular. This form of frenzy often appears among non-Aryan races like the Santāls. Their *baigā*, or priest, assembles the people to assist him in the invocation.

'Musical instruments are produced, dancing commences, and the invocation to the spirits is chanted until one or more of the performers manifest possession by wild rolling of the eyes and involuntary spasmodic action of the muscles. The affection appears contagious, and old women and others who have not been dancing become influenced by it in a manner that is horrible to contemplate. Captain Samuells, who frequently witnessed the incantation, is confident that no deception whatever is practised. . . . "The affection," says Captain Samuells, "comes on like a fit of ague, lasting sometimes for a quarter of an hour, the patient or possessed person writhing and trembling with intense violence, especially at the commencement of the paroxysm. Then he is seen to spring from the ground into the air, and a succession of leaps follows, all executed as though he were shot at by unseen agency. During this stage of the seizure he is supposed to be quite unconscious, and rolls into the fire, if there be one, or under the feet of the dancers, without sustaining injury from the heat or the pressure. This lasts for a few minutes only, and is followed by the spasmodic stage. With hands and knees on the ground and hair loosened, the body is convulsed, and the head shakes violently, while from the mouth issues a hissing or gurgling noise. The patient next evincing an inclination to stand on his legs, the bystanders assist him and place a stick in his hands, with the aid of which he hops about, the spas-

modic action of the body still continuing, and the head performing by jerks a fatiguing circular movement." The Baigā is then supposed to identify the spirit which has possessed the patient. He implores it to desist, and by degrees, after being anointed with butter, the patient becomes calm and conscious, and when restored to his normal state is said to feel no fatigue or other ill effects from the attack' (Dalton, *op. cit.* 232 f.).

In Eastern Bengal the shaman prepares for the performance by fasting * for a whole day, drinking or smoking intoxicating preparations of the hemp-plant, and quaffing the freshly-drawn blood of a goat or other animal sacrificed on the occasion. Practices such as these are found among both Hindus and Muhammadans in that part of the Province (Wise, *op. cit.* 128).

25. Worship of individual bhūtas. — Besides the general worship of evil spirits, some members of this class are worshipped, or rather propitiated, because they are specially feared. Such spirits are usually malignant on account of the tragical circumstances of their death.

(*a*) *Deified Brāhmans.*—Many of this kind of evil spirits are deified Brāhmans. Such is Harśū Pāṇṛē, or Harśū Bābā, the local godling of Chayanpur, near Sasarām, in the Shāhābād district. He is of the class known as Brahm, Barham, or Brāhman ghosts. He was, according to the current legend, one of the Kanaujiyā division of Brāhmans, and family priest of Rājā Sālivāhanā, the ruler of that country. The Rānī disliked the Brāhman, and induced her husband to believe that the priest was conspiring to deprive him of his kingdom. Accordingly the Rājā caused the house of the Brāhman to be demolished, and resumed the lands which he had previously conferred upon him. The enraged Brāhman did *dharṇā*, in other words, fasted till he died of starvation at the gate of the palace. So he became a Brahm, and is now worshipped with the fire-sacrifice (*haoma*) and offerings of Brāhmanical cords. If any one obtains his desire through Harśū's intercession, he makes an offering of a golden cord, and feeds Brāhmans in his honour. Harśū's speciality is, if rightly approached, to cure disease by expelling the evil spirits to which it is due. His worship is rapidly spreading beyond Bengal westward into the adjoining districts of the United Provinces (*PR* i. 191 f.). Deified spirits of this class are very common. They are sometimes represented by a headless trunk, with an eye staring from the breast; they inhabit large trees on the banks of rivers or in some lonely place, whence they throw stones at belated travellers, and lead them astray on dark nights. Woe betide the unfortunate person who gives one of them cause of offence, as, for instance, by unwittingly felling the tree in which the Brahm has taken up his abode, or who has been in any way responsible for his death.

'He can escape the evil consequences only by making the Barham his family deity, and worshipping him regularly. In Bihār he often becomes the *dihwār*, or tutelary deity of the whole village. The worship is usually performed under the tree, usually a banyan, which he is supposed to frequent. The trunk is painted vermilion, and a mound of earth is erected, on which are placed clay figures of horses or elephants, and offerings are made of flowers, betel-nuts, and the like. The worship is conducted by a special priest called the *bhaktā*, who is not necessarily a Brāhman, and occasionally he is inspired by the spirit and utters prophecies, which are implicitly believed in by the devotees' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 198 f.).

The same writer gives a catalogue of numerous deified Brāhmans. In many cases they are ghosts of members of the priestly order who have committed suicide on account of some insult or the deprivation of some privilege (*PR* i. 191 ff.). In one Bengal case a Rājput having no offspring consulted his family priest.

'The latter told him to stand next morning at a certain cross road and to behead the first person whom he might meet. To his horror and surprise, Mahī [the priest] himself appeared. He would have drawn back, but the Brāhman told him not to hesitate to carry out his advice, and merely stipulated that he should be installed as his family god. The Rājput then killed him, and he has ever since been worshipped by the clan' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 199).

(*b*) *Low-caste bhūtas.*—The lower castes have many deified spirits of this kind. The malignant ghost of a sweeper is specially feared, and in many places the higher castes insist that a member of that caste shall be buried face downwards, or that the grave shall be filled with thorns, to prevent the ghost from 'walking.'

26. The Churel.—Another class of evil spirit widely feared is the Churel, or Kichin, the spirit of a woman who dies in childbirth or in a state of ceremonial impurity. She is regarded as specially malignant, because fate has snatched her from this world just at the time when she was about to attain the happiness of becoming a mother, or in a state of impurity which would cling to her in the other world.

This belief is widely spread. We find it in China (*FL* i. 360 f.), in Japan (*ib.* xiii. 276), among the Malays (Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 318, 327), in New Caledonia (*FL* xiv. 258), New Britain (*JAI* xvii. 292), Papuan Gulf (*ib.* xxxii. 423), Borneo (Roth, *Natives of Sarawak*, i. 100, 140, 167, 219), Fiji (*JAI* x. 145). In Central America the spirits of women who died in their first childbirth were supposed to dwell with the dead warriors in the house of the Sun. At certain times they descended to earth, wandering through the pueblos and bringing deadly disease to those women and children who crossed their path (Payne, *Hist. of New World*, ii. 334). If the child lives it is generally believed that the mother returns to seek it. Hence in West Africa when a woman dies in childbirth her child is buried with her (Ellis, *Tshi-Speaking Peoples*, 234). In Melanesia it is supposed that a woman who has died in childbirth cannot go to Panoi, or Deadland, if her child lives, because she cannot leave it behind. They therefore deceive her ghost by packing up a piece of banana trunk in leaves, and laying it on her breast when she is buried. Then, as she departs, she imagines that she is carrying her child with her (Codrington, *Melanesians*, 275). For other instances of the belief in India, see *PR* i. 269 ff. It prevails in Burma (*Report 9th Oriental Congress*, i. 185), in Manipur (*JAI* xvi. 355), among the Nāgas (*ib.* xxvi. 200), and among the Vellalars of Madras Pres. (Thurston, *Bulletin Madras Museum*, ii. ii. 165)

The Churel usually appears as a woman who has no mouth, who haunts filthy places, and whose feet are turned backwards. This last is a characteristic of demons in many parts of the world (Tylor, i. 307). Again, she often assumes the form of a beautiful young woman, and at night seduces youths, especially those who are good-looking. She carries them off to a kingdom of her own, where she kills them by a slow process of emaciation, or keeps them until they lose all their manly vigour, and then sends them back to the world in the shape of grey-haired old men, who find all their friends long dead. The Churel superstition is probably derived from the demonolatry of the non-Aryan races. It is found fully developed among the Orāons, who imagine the Churel to be a woman clad in robes of white, her face fair and lovely, her back black as charcoal, and her feet inverted (*FL* xvii. 131 ff.). She hovers over gravestones, lays hold of passers-by, wrestles with them or tickles them, and he who is thus caught is lucky if he escapes injury. Often he is found next morning senseless, with his neck twisted, and the services of a sorcerer or medicine-man are necessary to set him right again (Dalton, *op. cit.* 258). The methods of getting rid of such a spirit are twofold—either by propitiation or by exorcism. The Bhuiyās of Keonjhar, if a woman should die before delivery, extract the embryo from the corpse and burn the bodies at opposite sides of a hill stream. As no spirit can cross water, and the mother cannot become a witch unless united to her child, this precaution is believed to render her harmless (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 199).

* For fasting and other means of producing ecstasy and other forms of morbid exaltation for religious ends, see Tylor, ii. 410 ff. It prevails widely in modern Lāmaism, which owes much to the Tantrik cultus (Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, 34), and in South India (Burnell, 'Devil Worship of the Tulavas,' *IA*, 1894; Caldwell, *Dravidian Grammar*[2], 579 ff.).

27. Animism the basis of modern Hinduism.—The Hinduism, and much of the Muhammadanism, of modern Bengal is thus in a large measure the result of the fusion of these non-Aryan animistic beliefs with the foreign faiths—first, the Brāhmanism of North-Western India, which gradually worked its way from the Holy Land of the Hindus in the eastern Panjāb, down the valley of the Ganges; and second, Islām, which advanced by the same route at a much later period. These animistic beliefs are to such a large extent the foundation of modern Hinduism in Bengal that it is impossible to draw a line of demarcation between the two, or to say where one ends and the other begins. Hinduism, in fact, is such a vague term as not to admit of definition.

'The term in its modern acceptation denotes neither a creed nor a race, neither a church nor a people, but is a general expression devoid of precision, and embracing alike the most punctilious disciple of pure Vedantism, the Agnostic youth who is the product of Western education, and the semi-barbarous hillman, who eats without scruple anything that he can procure, and is as ignorant of the Hindu theology as the stone which he worships in times of danger or sickness' (Bourdillon, *Census Rep. Bengal*, 1881, i. 71).

28. Totemism.—Totemism, which in other countries seems to have produced important results in moulding the national faith, appears in Bengal rather as a social than as a religious force. Here we find it chiefly in connexion with the exogamous septs of the non-Aryan tribes, each of which bears the name of some animal, tree, plant, or material object, natural or artificial, which the members of that sept are prohibited from killing, eating, cutting, burning, carrying, using, etc. Thus, among the Orāons, we find septs designated by names meaning 'young mice,' 'tortoise,' 'hyæna,' 'eel,' 'squirrel,' 'rat'; and among the Santāls 'wild goose,' 'hawk,' 'betel-palm,' 'conch-shell,' etc. One curious fact about these Orāon 'totems' is that they are not whole animals, but parts of animals, as the head of a tortoise, the stomach of a pig, which special parts the tribesmen are forbidden to eat (Risley, *op. cit.* i., Introd. 43; Dalton, *op. cit.* 189, 254).

The respect for the totem is shown in various ways. The Bāorī totem is the heron, and they are forbidden to eat its flesh (Dalton, *op. cit.* 327). The Kumhārs of Orissa abstain from eating, and go so far as to worship, the *sāl* fish, because the rings on its scales resemble the wheel which is the symbol of their craft. The Khattyā branch of the same tribe have only one section, Kaśyapā, which in Skr. means 'tortoise,' and is also the name of a famous *rishi*, or saint, with whom they claim connexion. But as they venerate the tortoise, Risley suggests (*op. cit.* i., Introd. 48) that the name of the saint has been substituted for the original totemistic name derived from the animal. The Parheyās of Palamāu have a tradition that their tribe formerly held sheep and deer sacred, and used the dung of these animals to plaster the floors of their huts, as they now use cow-dung; the Kharriās do not eat the flesh of sheep, and may not use a woollen rug—tabus the observance of which is now becoming relaxed (Dalton, *op. cit.* 131; Ball, *Jungle Life*, 89; Risley, *op. cit.* i. 466). Some Kandhs refused to carry a basket containing the skin of a young leopard which Ball had shot, because, as far as he could ascertain, 'the animal was the totem, or sacred beast of the tribe' (*op. cit.* 600). Many instances of similar belief have been collected by Dalton and Risley. The Asurās have thirteen totemistic sections; a man may not marry a woman belonging to the same section as himself, nor may he eat, cut, or injure the plant or animal whose name his section bears (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 25). The Koiris have as sections the *nāga*, or snake, and the *kaśyapā*, or tortoise, and will not molest either animal. The Kaśyapā branch carry their reverence for the tortoise to such an extent that, if one be caught, they smear its shell with oil and vermilion, and put it back into the water (*ib.* i. 501). The Mahilī Munḍās regard the pig as their totem, and will not eat pork (*ib.* ii. 40). The Pāns have a host of totems, including among animals the tiger, buffalo, monkey, tortoise, cobra, mongoose, owl, king-crow, peacock, centipede, and among plants the wild fig, wild plum, and many others (*ib.* ii. 156).

Many of the non-Aryan tribes, again, claim descent from animals. The Cheros say that they are descended from the *nāga*, or dragon (Dalton, *op. cit.* 126, 162, 165 f.); the Santāls have as one of their totems the wild goose, from the eggs of which they assert that their ancestors were created (*ib.* 209); the Ho creation-legend seems to connect the various tribes—Kols, Bhūmij, Brāhmans, Kṣatriyas, Śūdras, Bhuiyās—and even the English with animals selected by each after their creation by Otē Borām and Sing Bongā, who were self-created.

Another proof of the existence of totemism in Bengal has been traced in the reluctance to mention animals by their real names, and the preference for a descriptive epithet (Frazer, *Totemism*, 15). Thus, the Kharwārs call the hare 'the four-footed one'; and the Paṭāris call the bear 'the hairy creature,' and the elephant 'he with the tusks' (Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, iii. 249; *PR* ii. 54, 142). But in his later examination of tabus of this kind Frazer seems to have abandoned the idea that they can be traced to totemism.

The evidence for the existence of totemism as a force affecting religious beliefs is thus very dubious, and many of the examples given above can be explained by animal- or plant-worship.

29. Hinduism.—Nearly two-thirds of the present population of the Province are Hindus, and rather less than one-third Muhammadans, the followers of other creeds being in small numbers. The diagrams prepared by Gait (*op. cit.* i. 154, 156) show clearly the geographical distribution of these, the two main religions of the Province. What may be called the most conservative parts of the country, those which were settled at the earliest period, continued to be the seats of an historic civilization, and what were centres of Buddhism are now districts in which Hinduism is predominant. These are the sub-provinces of Bihār and Orissa, and the line of districts along the eastern edge of the Chotā Nāgpur plateau and the western fringe of Bengal Proper, which link these two tracts together. The south-western hill region, the home of the Munḍā or Dravidian tribes, is the domain of pure Animism, which in the plain region is overlaid by Hinduism or Islām. Muhammadanism, again, is predominant to the east, in that portion of the Province which has now been formed into a separate Administration.

30. The sects of Hindus.—No attempt was made at the last Census to obtain a record of the multitudinous sects of Hindus. Of these the two most important are the Śāktas, or followers of the Mother-goddesses, and the Vaishṇavas, or worshippers of Vishṇu.

In Bihār the distinctions of sect are ill-defined, and the more ignorant classes would find it difficult to say to which of the conventional divisions of Hinduism they belong. But in Bengal and Orissa, owing to the great Vaishṇava movement inaugurated by Chaitanyā, the case is otherwise, and there would be but little difficulty in obtaining a fairly accurate record of the sectarian distribution of the population (cf. Gait, *op. cit.* i. 181).

Speaking generally, we may say that the sectarian divisions of the people are not clearly defined. As in other parts of the Indian Empire, the membership of or nominal adherence to the principles of a sect often depends on the question of food; to be a Śākta is very often merely to

be an eater of meat and a drinker of spirituous liquor, both being permitted luxuries; while inclusion in the Vaishṇava sect implies vegetarianism. Hinduism, again, is perhaps more eclectic than most of the great world-religions, freely admitting into its fold the followers of many different sects provided they submit to the social rules of the body in which they accept membership. They are allowed perfect freedom to worship any or all of the sectarian gods, though to suit his own inclinations a man may devote special honour to one of the many forms of the Mother-goddess, to Śiva, or to Vishṇu in one or other of his many incarnations. His private chapel may contain an image of Devī or Durgā side by side with the *śālagrāma*, or ammonite, representing Vishṇu, or the phallic symbol of Śiva. When he visits a holy place he will be careful to pay respect to all the principal shrines, and to worship all the gods or goddesses who are represented by images. He does this because his deities are jealous gods, easily offended if they be neglected, and prone to punish any one who fails to honour them (Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, 364).

Hence, among individual castes we find a remarkable mixture of sectarian beliefs. Thus, among the Bābhans, yeomen of Bihār, representatives of all sects are found in much the same proportion as in the population at large. Vaishṇavism is said to have been only recently introduced among them, and in north Bihār most of them are worshippers of either Śiva or the Śakti. In this, as in many other castes of the same social status, no social consequences result from professing the tenets of any of the regular sects, and intermarriage between their members goes on freely within the limits of the caste (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 33). Passing to castes of a much lower grade, we find that the Bāgdī, cultivators, fishermen, and menials of Central and West Bengal, worship, under the guidance of degraded Brāhmans, Śiva, Vishṇu, and the Śakti, as well as Yama or Dharmarājā, god of Dead-land, and the myriad names of the modern pantheon, besides animistic deities like Guṣāin Ērā, the goddess, and Bar Pahār, the mountain-god of the Santāls; but their favourite object of worship is Manasā, the snake-goddess. The Barui, cultivators of *pān* (*Piper betel*), are mostly Śāktas, and only a few are Vaishṇavas, but with the worship of these great gods they combine the cult of Ushas of the Veda, the Eos or Aurora of the West. The Dhobī, or washerman caste, worship Śiva, Vishṇu, Kārttikeya, god of war, or the Śakti, very much as the personal taste of the worshipper may dictate, and they venerate, besides these, non-Aryan gods such as Bhuiyā, the earth-god, and Barham Ghāsī, the deified ghost of a Brāhman. The Pods, a mixed tribe in the Delta, include Śaivas, Śāktas, and Vaishṇavas, as well as Sauras, or Sun-worshippers, and Gaṇapatyas, or followers of Gaṇapati or Gaṇeśa, god of wisdom and remover of obstacles, the two last sects being very sparingly represented among the higher classes of Hindus (*ib.* i. 41, 72, 235, ii. 177).

We find, again, instances of beliefs held in common by both Hindus and Musalmāns. In Rangpur, Buchanan (*op. cit.* iii. 512) found Hindus worshipping a spirit known as Satya-nārāyan, 'the true Lord,' whom Musalmāns venerated under the title of Satya-pīr, 'the true saint.' Hymns to him were sung by both Brāhmans and Śūdras; and while the Musalmāns used different hymns, the worship was identical.

In Bihār, the same writer remarks (i. 186) that 'when an Hindu is said to belong to such and such a sect, it does not in general absolutely imply that he worships only such and such a god; but that such or such is his family-god (*kula-devatā*) or favourite god (*ishṭa-devatā*). In some parts of India strict men will pray to no god but their favourite and his connexions, such as his spouse, sons, and servants; but in this district it is not usual to be so wedded; and though the daily prayers of the pious Hindu are offered to some one god, he without scruple has recourse to any other of whom he thinks he may be in need; and never approaches any image or holy place without some mark of respect'. The *gurus*, or sages, he adds, who instruct both Śaivas and Śāktas, are identical, and many Hindus are so careless or ignorant 'that they never have taken the trouble to inquire from their instructor whether the secret prayer is addressed to Śiva or Śakti, and they do not understand a word of it.'

It must, therefore, be understood that the Hindu sects of this Province are not in any sense analogous to the divisions found in other religions, as, for example, those of Christianity. Certain classes of the people may be generally described as Śāktas, Vaishnavas, or Śaivas; but the fact of nominal adherence to one of these sects does not exclude the possibility of the worshipper paying reverence to gods other than those which his sect specially honours. It is in Bihār particularly, as we have seen, that the line between Vaishṇavas and Śāktas is not clearly defined. This is not the case in Bengal proper. Here a strict Vaishṇava will not even mention the names of goddesses like Kālī or Durgā, or the Bel tree (*Ægle marmelos*) the leaves of which are used in the worship of the Śakti. The reasons for this peculiarity, Gait suggests, are 'that Bihār was never so deeply infected as Bengal with the worst forms of Śākta worship, and that the Vaishṇava revival of Chaitanya which represented a revulsion from Śāktism never spread thither' (*op. cit.* i. 188).

31. The Śāktas.—Śāktism * was probably a development of the animistic belief in the Mother-goddesses which, as we have seen (above, § 13), is widely spread among the non-Aryan tribes. In the more highly developed form of the cult the functions of the primitive goddess 'of all work' have become divided into departments, and the various forces of Nature are personified under separate personalities, known as the Divine Mothers (*mātriǵǵān*). These female energies are conceived as the Śakti of the primeval male, Puruśa or Śiva, who is the counterpart of non-Aryan gods like Bhūmiya or Khetrapāla, the male consort of the Earth-Mother, by union with whom her fertility is periodically renewed (see § 13).

The Śākta cult is supposed to have originated in East Bengal or Assam about the 5th cent. A.D., and the headquarters of Tāntrik worship are believed to have been Kāmākhya in the latter Province, whence it was introduced into Tibet, Nepāl, and Gujarāt. The cult in this Province takes many forms.

(*a*) *General worship of the Śakti.*—We have, first, the Mātrikā pūjā, the general worship of the Mothers of the universe personified as the wives of the gods, that is to say, Śakti in all her various forms, usually eight in number, and co-ordinated with the different gods—Vaishṇavī and Lakshmī with Vishnu; Brahmā or Brahmānī with Brahmā; Kārttikeyī with Kārttikeya, god of war; Indrānī with Indra; Yamī with Yama, god of death; Vārāhī with Vārāha, the boar incarnation of Vishnu; Devī or Iśānī with Śiva.

(*b*) *Kālī.*—Secondly, there is the worship of Kālī, which, according to Buchanan (*op. cit.* ii. 374, 477), was in his time of comparatively recent introduction into Bihār, 'since the English took possession, some of the wise men of the East having told the wiseacres that she is the deity of the English, to whose favour they entirely owe their great success.' Until the deity was introduced, he

* For a sketch of the development of Śāktism see Gait, *Assam Census Report*, 1891, i. 80 ff.; Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, 407 ff.; Hopkins, *Religions of India*, 489 ff.; Barth, *Religions of India*, Eng. tr. 199 ff. The course of the development of Greek belief is supposed to have been on similar lines, the earliest conception being that of the Mother and the Maid, which may reflect primitive matriarchal customs (J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, 260 ff.).

goes on to say, it was not common to call the female power by any particular name. She was commonly spoken of and worshipped as Devī or Bhavānī, two appellations implying merely 'the goddess,' 'although by the latter term Sītalā is commonly understood.' The original female power, in short, is thus seen undergoing the process of development, a number of special entities being created to whom each department of human action is assigned. The cult of Kālī appears in one of its lowest forms among the Tipārās of the State of Tippera and the Chittagong hill tracts to the east of the Province. This tribe offers to Kālī black goats (her name meaning 'the black one'), rice, plantains, and other fruits of the earth. The goddess has no image; she is represented for sacrificial purposes by a round lump of clay, the edges of which are drawn out into four points or legs, so that the whole, seen from above, bears a rough resemblance to a sea-urchin with four arms (Risley, *op. cit.* ii. 325).

In her temples Kālī is represented as a 'very black female, with four arms, having in one hand a scymitar, and in another the head of a giant which she holds by the hair; another hand is spread open bestowing a blessing; and with the other she is forbidding fear. She wears two dead bodies for earrings, and a necklace of skulls, and her tongue hangs down to her chin. The hands of several giants are hung as a girdle round her loins, and her tresses fall down to her heels Having drunk the blood of the giants she has slain in combat, her eyebrows are bloody, and the blood is falling in a stream down her breast; her eyes are red like those of a drunkard. She stands with one leg on the breast of her husband Shiva, and rests the other on his thigh' (Ward, *op. cit.* ii 117 f.)

At the present time, pigeons, goats, and more rarely buffaloes, are the victims usually offered. The ceremony commences with the adoration of the sacrificial axe. Various spells (*mantra*) are recited, and the animal is decapitated at one stroke. As soon as the head falls to the ground the votaries rush forward and smear their foreheads with the blood. These sacrifices are specially performed during the three days of the Durgā Pūjā (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 182).

Rites such as these represent the goddess in her malevolent aspect. But she is also Rākhyā or Bhadrā Kālī, the guardian of every Bengali village, to whom prayers and sacrifices are offered on the outbreak of pestilence. Wise remarks that, when cholera broke out at the great Vārunī fair in 1874, a subscription was collected for the performance of a special worship of Kālī. Her image was paraded through the fair, after which an operatic entertainment was given, at which crowds of people assembled. 'The cholera, which had been only sporadic, ceased, and the stoppage was attributed to the beneficent Kālī' (*op. cit.* 135 f.).

(*c*) *Devī.*—The cult of Devī is similar to that of Kālī. It sometimes represents her as benignant, but more often in her chthonic or malignant aspect. It is, in fact, practically impossible to distinguish the double manifestation of the goddess. Speaking generally, when kindly she is Umā, 'light,' Gaurī, 'the yellow or brilliant one,' Pārvatī or Haimavatī, 'she that has her birth in the Himālaya,' Jaganmātā, 'mother of the world,' and Bhavānī; while in her terrible form she is called Durgā, 'the inaccessible,' Kālī or Śyāmā, 'the dark one,' Chaṇḍī or Chaṇḍikā, 'the fierce,' Bhairavī, 'the terrible.' But in the popular conception these functions so completely merge and interchange that more precise definition is impossible. In Bihār during the Naurātrī or 'nine nights'' feast of the goddess, held during the fortnight of the waxing moon in the month of Chaitra (March), the rite of infusing by means of spells (*mantra*) the spirit of the goddess into an earthenware jar is performed. A space within the temple is purified by plastering the surface with mud and cow-dung. The jar is filled with water and covered with shoots of the mango tree, and over it is placed an earthenware saucer containing barley and rice, which is covered with a yellow cloth. The priest recites verses, and, sprinkling water on the jar and its contents with a few blades of the sacred *kuśa* grass, he invites the goddess to enter it. As a sign that she has occupied it, the outside of the jar is sprinkled with red powder. During the period occupied in the rite the priest practises abstinence, eating only roots and fruits. The service concludes with a fire-sacrifice (*haoma*), in which barley, sugar, butter, and sesamum are burned before the jar which holds the goddess. The ashes of the sacrifice and portions of the red powder with which the jar was smeared are brought to the houses of his clients by the priest, who smears their foreheads with these substances, thus bringing them into communion with the deity. Here we find fetish rites in their crudest form (*North Indian Notes and Queries*, iv. 19 f.).

(*d*) *Divisions of the Śāktas.*—The Śākta sect is divided into three main sections—first, the Dakshinachārī or Dakshinamārgī, 'the right-hand' section, who are comparatively free from sensuality, and do not offer spirits or flesh to the deity. They follow the Purāṇas as their Veda, and are devoted to either Śiva or Vishnu in his androgynous character, at once male and female. Besides these there are two bodies of extremists—the Vāmachārī or Vāmamārgī, 'the left-hand' sect, who follow the teaching of the Tāntrik literature, and the Kaulas or Kaulikas, following the Kaula Upaniṣad, whence they take their name, whose practices are even more grossly licentious. Their object of veneration is the great Śakti, or power of Nature, Jaganmātā or Jagadambā, 'the mighty mysterious force, whose function is to direct and control two quite distinct operations: namely, first, the working of the natural appetites and passions, whether for the support of the body by eating and drinking or for the propagation of living organisms through sexual cohabitation; secondly, the acquisition of supernatural faculties (*siddhi*), whether for a man's own individual exaltation or for the annihilation of his opponents' (Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], 185 f.). The foul orgies which accompany such celebrations have been described by Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya (*Hindu Castes and Sects*, 411 f.), Ward (*Hindoos*, ii. 295 ff.), and others, and need not be further discussed here. The animistic side of the cultus appears in the Panjāb worship of young girls as Devī, apparently a form of sympathetic magic to induce fertility (Rose, *Census Rep.* 1901, i. 126).

32. The Vaishṇavas.—The revolt against this gross and debasing cultus was led by the reformer Chaitanya,* a Vaidik Brāhman who was born at Nabadwip, in Bengal, A.D. 1484.

'He preached mainly in Central Bengal and Orissa, and his doctrines found ready acceptance amongst large numbers of the people, especially amongst those who were still, or had only recently been, Buddhists. This was due mainly to the fact that he ignored caste and drew his followers from all sources, so much so that even Muhammadans followed him. He preached vehemently against the immolation of animals in sacrifice and the use of animal food and stimulants, and taught that the true road to salvation lay in *bhakti*, or fervent devotion to God. He recommended Rādhā worship, and taught that the love felt by her for Krishṇa was the best form of devotion. The acceptable offerings were flowers, money, and the like; but the great form of worship was that of the *saṇkirtan*, or procession of worshippers playing and singing. A peculiarity of Chaitanya's cult is that the post of spiritual guide, or Gosāin, is not confined to Brāhmans, and several of those best known belong to the Baidyā caste, who practise medicine in Bengal Proper. They are all of them descended from the leading men of Chaitanya's immediate entourage. The holy places of the cult are Nabadvip [or Nadiya], Chaitanya's birthplace, and in a still greater degree, Brindaban [wh. see], the scene of Krishṇa's sports with the milk-maids, which Chaitanya and his disciples reclaimed from jungle, and where he personally identified the various sacred spots, on which great shrines have now been erected' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 182).

* His life and the principles of his sect are fully described by Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya (*Hindu Castes and Sects*, 459 ff.).

Chaitanya, after spending six years in pilgrimage between Mathurā and Jagannāth, finally settled in the latter place, where in A.D. 1527, at the age of forty-three, he disappeared from the world. There is reason to believe that he was drowned in the sea, into which he had walked in an ecstasy, mistaking it for the shallow waters of the Jumna, where he saw in a vision Kṛṣṇa sporting with his Gopīs (Growse, *Mathurā*[3], 1883, 197). After his death his followers split up into two bodies: those who retained, and those who rejected caste. The latter are known as Jāt Baishtam or Bairāgī (*q.v.*), are recruited from all castes, and profess to intermarry freely amongst themselves; but caste distinctions are not entirely obliterated, and the recruits from the higher hold aloof from those drawn from the lower castes.

'Except for the fact that outsiders are still admitted, they form a community very similar to the ordinary Hindu caste. Its reputation at the present day is tarnished by the fact that most of its new recruits have joined owing to love intrigues, or because they have been turned out of their own caste, or for some other sordid motive' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 182).

The other division, those who have retained the system of caste, is in no way connected with the Jāt Baishtams. They practise a cultus much purer than that of the Śāktas, and the stricter members of the body are vegetarians, and abhor the Śākta beliefs. But among those of the lower castes some freely eat animal food, and even join in processions in honour of Durgā, but will not be present when blood sacrifices are offered. The various subdivisions of the Bengal Vaishnavas have been fully described by Wise (*op. cit.* 147 ff.) and by Risley (*op. cit.* ii. 339 ff.).

The Vaishnavism of Bengal is thus strongly opposed to Śākta beliefs, and is probably to a large extent derived from the traditions of Buddhism.

'Apart from metaphysical subtleties, which naturally have but little hold on the minds of the populace, the social tenet of the Bengali Vaishṇavas is the all-sufficiency of faith in the divine Kṛishṇa; such faith being adequately expressed by the mere repetition of his name, without any added prayer or concomitant feeling of genuine devotion. Thus roughly stated, the doctrine appears absurd; and possibly its true bearing is as little regarded by many of the more ignorant of the Vaishṇavas themselves as it is by the majority of superficial outside observers. It is, however, a legitimate deduction from sound principles; for it may be presumed that the formal act of devotion would never have been commenced had it not been prompted at the outset by a devotional intention, which intention is virtually continued so long as the act is in performance' (Growse, *Mathurā*[3], 197).

As a parallel case, Growse, himself a member of the Roman Catholic Church, quotes from one of its manuals the rule: 'It is not necessary that the intention should be actual throughout; it is sufficient if we pray in a human manner, and for this only a virtual intention is required; that is to say, an intention which has been actual and is supposed to continue, although, through inadvertence or distraction, we may have lost sight of it.'

(*a*) *Prevalence of Vaishṇavism.*—The Vaishṇava cultus is one of the most important among the beliefs of the Province. Ward in 1815 stated that six out of ten of the whole Hindu population were worshippers of Kṛṣṇa (*Hindoos*, ii. 158); in 1828 Wilson (*Religious Sects*, i. 152) calculated them at one-fifth; and in 1872 Hunter (*Orissa*, i. 144) at from one-fifth to one-third of the whole number of Hindus. Wise (*op. cit.* 147), from a catalogue of the temples in the Dacca District, found that 74 per cent. belonged to Kṛṣṇa in one or other of his numerous forms, and only 21 per cent. to Kālī, Durgā, and Śiva. The predominance of Kṛṣṇa-worship is largely due to the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* assigned by Wilson (*Vishṇu Purāṇa*, xxxi.) to the 12th cent. of our era. It has, however, been recently established that the Purānic literature goes back to the 6th or 8th cent., and thus the movement which led to the rise of Neo-Brāhmanism must be assigned to an earlier date than that fixed by the older authorities. The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* is now regarded as the chief book among the Vaishṇava scriptures.

'Since his death in 1528, Chaitanya has been identified with Krishṇa, and this deification has been ratified by the *Chaitāmṛta*, written thirty years after his death. The moral and tolerant doctrines of this national teacher penetrated the hearts of the people, and roused an enthusiastic spirit that has, unfortunately, driven many into strange and perilous wanderings. Among the pure Śūdras there is less deviation from the original creed than among the lower mixed classes, who have been always neglected. The religious sentiments of the latter, instead of being properly guided, have been left to develop as fancy or bias disposed them. Whether this be a satisfactory explanation or not, it is certain that the corrupt, often immoral, sects now existing are chiefly patronized by the lower and most ignorant classes of the community. The equality of all men, a doctrine preached by Chaitanya, but repudiated by the Gosāins, has been restored by most of the later offshoots of Vaishṇavism, and with them no distinction conferred by birth, wealth, or prescription is ever recognized' (Wise, *op. cit.* 147).

(*b*) *The erotic Vaishṇavism.*—The development of Vaishṇavism on the erotic side marks the degradation of the cultus. The original doctrine of *bhakti*, or loving faith, was afterwards conceived to appear in five stages, the higher of which, as in the case of the Ṣūfī mystics, could be attained only by a few privileged persons, after prolonged austerities and mortifications: (1) *śānti*, or quietism, 'in which the Vaishṇava enjoys perfect contentment and peace of mind, ever dwelling on the happiness of his lot, and grateful to Hari for his mercy'; (2) *dāsya*, the relation between a master and his purchased slave, of which the keynote is self-denial, the dedication of all the believer's energy and thought to the service of the god; (3) *sakhya*, or friendship, at which stage 'the disciple worships Chaitanya as his bosom friend, and regards his own soul as an emanation from and a particle of the *paramātman*, or supreme spirit'; (4) *vātsalya*, 'affection towards offspring,' in which the deity is regarded 'not as a common Father of all men, but as the parent of the worshipper'; and (5) *mādhurya*, 'sweetness,' 'the efflorescence of *bhakti*,' as it has been called. 'In this, the highest and most exquisite condition, the disciple glows with the same uncontrollable desire that Krishna felt for the absent Rādhā' (Wise, *op. cit.* 155). This last development of erotic Vaishnavism finds its most complete and degrading exposition in the practices of the sect of the Vallabhāchāryas, according to whom body, soul, and property (*tan, man, dhan*) are to be made over to the Mahārājās, or successors and vicars of Kṛṣṇa upon earth, by the rite of self-devotion (*samarpaṇa*); and women are taught that their highest bliss results from the caresses of the representative of the god (Monier Williams, *op. cit.*[4] 134 ff.; Growse, *Mathurā*[3], 199 ff.; [Karsandas Mulji,] *Hist. of the Sect of the Maharajas or Vallabhacharyas of West. India*, 1865).

33. The cult of Śiva.—The cult of Śiva is of less importance than that of either the Śakti or Vishṇu. In Eastern Bengal the Śaiva fraternities, those of the Kanphaṭās, or 'ear-pierced' Yogīs, and the Brahmachārīs, never gained popularity, and their conventual establishments, which are few, would have disappeared long since, but for the charitable endowments of former ages. The Śaiva mendicants or cenobites are, according to Wise (*op. cit.* 174 f.), notorious for their licentious lives and dissipated habits; but, notwithstanding the scandal which they cause, their *ākhāras*, or convents, are thronged by crowds of devotees, chiefly women. In Bengal proper, according to Ward (*op. cit.* ii., Introd. xxi.), few Hindus adopt Śiva as their guardian deity. His temples generally represent him in the form of the *liṅgam*, or as Pañchānana, the figure of the deity with five faces. Further west, in Bihār, the worship of Śiva is more common, and prevails widely among Brāhmans. Here village temples in honour of the deity, with images of the *liṅgam* and of Nandi, the bull 'vehicle' of the god, are common, and the worship is adopted in preference to that of

Vishnu in one or other of his many forms, because the ritual and offerings made to him are much less elaborate and expensive. The Śaiva cultus thus suits the thrifty habits of the yeomen among whom it chiefly prevails.

Among the castes who are specially devoted to this form of belief may be mentioned the Yugīs or Yogīs, now a weaving caste in Eastern Bengal, of whom the great majority worship Śiva or Mahādeva, especially at the Śivarātri or 'night feast' of Śiva, held in the month of Māgh (January–February). The chief religious centres of the Māsya Yugīs are Brindāban, Mathurā, and Gokul, all in the United Provinces; but their chief places of pilgrimage are Benares, Gayā, and Sītākund in Chittagong (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 358). These Yogīs, as they prefer to be called, are supposed by Gait (*op. cit.* i. 381) to be descended from a religious community, not necessarily from the regular Yogī or Jogī ascetics, but possibly from some Buddhist Order. The same writer supposes that their present degraded condition is due to their having remained in the Buddhist faith after the general population had reverted to Hinduism. They call their priests, who belong to their own communion, *Mahātmas* or *Paṇḍits*, both of which terms were formerly in use among Buddhists; they bury their dead in a sitting posture, with the legs crossed in the conventional attitude of Buddha, and with the feet turned to the north-west. The Yogī sects of Northern India freely admit outsiders to their body; and their present occupation in Bengal, weaving, is one often practised by decayed religious communities. Their devotion to Śiva is possibly connected with his manifestation as the typical ascetic and self-mortifier—a conception which perhaps owed much to the influence of Buddhism. The Śaiva mendicants are popularly divided into ten classes, known collectively as the Daśnāmīs, or 'ten names.' Besides that of the more respectable Order, the Sannyāsīs, the cult gives shelter to loathsome ascetics, like the Aghorīs (wh. see), the Urdhvabāhus, who contort their limbs, and the Ākāśamukhins, who keep their necks bent back in a fixed gaze on the sky until the muscles become withered.

34. **Buddhism.**—Buddhism, which had its origin in the western part of the Province, and finally became one of the great religions of the world, is now represented in Bengal by only 237,893 adherents. In so far as they follow the orthodox standard of belief, they are included in the Mahāyāna, or Great Vehicle, which is the basis of Tibetan Lāmaism, and also of the Buddhism of Bengal. The Buddhists of this Province may be divided into at least four groups.

(*a*) *Chinese Buddhists.*—First comes the small body of immigrant Chinese in Calcutta, where they follow many occupations, such as carpentry and shoemaking, boil down pigs' fat into lard, and deal in opium and hemp drugs. Their temples seem to be usually seats of Buddhist as well as of Shinto worship, that at Calcutta being dedicated to Kwan-te, generally called the 'god of war.' In the courtyard is the god's horse, comfortably stabled. Climbing a flight of stairs, one reaches chapels and rooms for attendants, in which animals intended in the first instance as food for the god, and which are afterwards consumed by the worshippers, are being cooked (*Calcutta Review*, xxxi. 368 ff.).

(*b*) *Himālayan Buddhists.*—Secondly come the Buddhists of North Bengal, who are either natives of the Himālayan State of Sikkim, or immigrants from Bhutān, Tibet, and Nepāl. By race they are mostly Tibetans, Lepchas, and Murmīs. In Nepāl itself Buddhism is steadily losing ground under the attacks of the militant form of Hinduism professed by the rulers of that kingdom, who, like all recent converts, are more ardent supporters of the new faith than even their more orthodox brethren in the plains. Nothing, again, has contributed so much to the decline of Buddhism in Nepāl as the adoption of caste by the Buddhist Newārs, and the consequent decay of monastic institutions (Oldfield, *Sketches*, ii. 131 ff.). Besides this, the heterodox Buddhists constitute a large majority of the Buddhist population. They avowedly combine the worship of Śiva and of the other Hindu deities with that of Buddha; they publicly attend the religious services of Hindu temples, and at the more important domestic ceremonies, such as those of marriage and death, they conjoin Hindu forms with those of the Buddhist church, and employ a Brāhman priest to assist their own Buddhist Vajra Āchārya, or 'thunderbolt teacher,' in the performance of his sacred duties.

These classes of Newārs are 'Buddhist only in name; for although they profess to esteem Buddha before all other deities, yet their practices belie their professions, and prove that they are steadily abandoning that faith to which they still nominally belong, and are rapidly adopting the more corrupt and more attractive religion of the Hindus' (Oldfield, *op. cit.* ii. 147).

The same is the case with those Himālayan Buddhists who have migrated into British territory. Thus, among the Lepchas of Sikkim and the adjoining region, Buddhistic usage forms only a thin veil over their primitive shamanistic Animism. Their religion consists mainly in the propitiation of the spirits of forest, hill, or stream which are considered malignant.

'The snow-clad giant Kinchinjanga, chief among the elemental deities of the Lepchas, who vexes men with storm and hail and sends down avalanches and torrents to wreck their fields and sweep away their homes, has been translated to the milder system of Buddhism, where he figures as the tutor of Sakya Muni himself' (Risley, *op. cit.* ii. 10).

Similarly the Limbūs of Dārjīling adapt their religion to their surroundings. Where their environment is Hindu, they call themselves Śaivas, and profess to worship Mahādeva and his consort Gaurī, the favourite deities of the Nepālese.

'In a Buddhist neighbourhood the yoke of conformity is still more easy to bear; the Limbū has only to mutter the pious formula, *Om maṇi padme om* [or, as Waddell transcribes and translates it, '*Om*! The Jewel in the Lotus! *Hūṃ*'—*Om-maṇi pad-me Hūṃ*, the first and last word bearing a mystic meaning (*Buddhism of Tibet*, 148)], and to pay respect and moderate tribute to the Lāmas, in order to be accepted as an average Buddhist. Beneath this veneer of conformity with whatever faith happens to have gained local acceptation, the vague shapes of their original Pantheon have survived in the form of household or forest gods, much in the same way as Dionysus and other of the Greek gods may be traced in the names and attributes of the saints who preside over the vintage, the harvest, and rural festivals of various kinds in remote parts of Greece at the present day' (Risley, *op. cit.* ii. 17).

The degraded condition of the popular Buddhism of the Lower Himālayas is shown by the adoption of rites of blood sacrifice, a relic of the old devil-worship of the country, but absolutely repugnant to the rules of the orthodox faith (Waddell, *Among the Himalayas*, 74).

(*c*) *Buddhists of East Bengal.*—The third group of Bengal Buddhists—that of Chittagong and the hill tracts of Chittagong—consists mainly of Chakmās and Maghs, the latter divided into two classes: first, descendants of Arakanese immigrants who entered the country when Arakan was conquered by the Burmese in A.D. 1785; and, secondly, the mixed race descended from Magh women by Bengali fathers, who are known as Rājbansi or Baruā Maghs, and are less numerous than the first branch. There are also some Tipārās in the hill tracts who described themselves at the last census as Buddhists.

'In the Tippera State the Tipārās now call themselves Hindus; but this country was formerly a great Buddhist centre, and some sacred shrines there were visited by the Tibetan traveller, Buddha Gupta Nāth, who travelled in India in the seventh century A.D.' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 158).

The Chakmās profess to be Buddhists, but their religious practices have been much corrupted by

the gross Hinduism of Eastern Bengal. This change was brought about by the influence of the local Rājā, Dharm Bakhsh Khān, who was a bigoted Hindu, patronized the cult of Kālī, and pretended to be a descendant of the ancient Kṣatriyas. Much of the more primitive Animism still survives under the upper layer of Buddhism (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 172 f.). The same fusion of beliefs appears among the Maghs of Chittagong, who profess to be Buddhists of the Southern school, and regard the followers of the faith in Tibet as unorthodox. The worship of Śiva and Durgā has here been added to the Buddhist observances. While their priests are Buddhist, *phungyis* or *raolis*, Brāhmans are much respected, and are employed to determine auspicious days for particular actions, and to assist in the worship of the Hindu gods (*ib.* ii. 33).

(*d*) *Survivals of Buddhism and Hinduism.*—The last and most interesting group of so-called Buddhists in Bengal is found among the caste known as Sarāks, resident in the Baramba State in Orissa, whose beliefs have been fully investigated by Gait (*op. cit.* i. 427 ff.). Their name appears to be derived from the Skr. *śrāvaka*, 'a hearer,' a term applied among the Jains to indicate the lay brethren affiliated to the community, as distinguished from the Yatis, monks, and ascetics; it still survives in the name Sarāogi or Sarāvagi, applied to a merchant community of Jains which is rapidly becoming a regular caste of the usual type. The centre of the Baramba Sarāk worship is at the celebrated cave-temple of Khandagirī, where they assemble once a year to do homage to the idols there and to confer on religious matters. They worship, under the name of Chaturbhuja, 'the four-armed one,' an idol which usually has only two arms, and is undoubtedly a representation of Buddha. This worship is performed on what is supposed to be the anniversary of Buddha's wedding, a fact which may with some probability be considered to connect the cult with the primitive animistic conception of the union of the male consort with the primeval Mother (see above, § 13). The family rites of the caste are performed by one of their own members, who calls himself Āchārya, or 'teacher,' and Brāhmans are employed only to perform the rites of the *haoma*, or fire sacrifice, at marriage, after which the Āchārya concludes the proceedings by calling upon Buddha to bless the young couple.

The evidence, so far as it has been collected, seems to indicate that the Sarāks have retained many beliefs and practices which have descended to them from the Buddhism which was the creed of a large number of the people of Orissa. Here its place was taken by Brāhmanism, and it is now difficult to say how many of the beliefs of the Sarāks are due to direct inheritance of the Buddhist tradition, and how many have been transmitted to them with a leaven of Vaishṇavism. Too much stress must not be laid upon the worship of images of Buddha by the people of our time. All through Northern India are to be found statues or pillars disinterred from the ruins of *stūpas* or *vihāras*, which have been adopted as images of the village gods, and even of the orthodox Hindu deities. Thus Buchanan (*op. cit.* i. 73) found in a Bihār temple of Tārā Devī (the female power in her most destructive form) an image of the goddess, which was really one of Buddha himself.

Another survival of Buddhism has been traced in the worship of Dharmarāj or Dharma by low-caste tribes like the Pods, Yogīs, Doms, and Bāgdīs. By some he is identified with Yama, by others with the sun; by others, again, he is regarded as a snake-god; or, finally, as an incarnation of Śiva or Vishṇu.

'He is usually worshipped by a low caste priest, a Pod, a Yogi, a Dom, or a Bāgdi. In a few places he has temples, but, as a rule, he is represented by a shapeless stone daubed with vermilion and placed under a tree. In a village in the Arāmbāgh subdivision he is worshipped in the form of a tortoise. His shrines are common all over West Bengal, and also in DināJpur, Murshidābād, and the Twenty-four Parganas. He is frequently believed to possess certain curative powers, and his priests administer medicines as specifics for various diseases. Hogs, fowls, and ducks are sacrificed before him, and offerings are made of rice, flowers, milk, and *pachwāi* ['rice-beer'], but never of cooked food. The worship takes place in the months of Baisākh, Jaishṭa, and Āsārh, on the day of the full moon, and in some places on the last day of Bhādra. All castes, even Brāhmans, make offerings through the medium of the officiating priest' (Gait, *op. cit.* i 201).

The worship of this animistic deity has been adduced as a survival of Buddhism by Mahāmahopādhyāya Hara Prasād Śāstri (*JRASBe*, 1895), and in a further statement given by Gait (i. 201) the writer supplements this by inferring that because Dharma is worshipped in meditation as void (*śūnya mūrti*) the cult represents the philosophical conception of *śūnyatā*—'concerning which neither existence nor non-existence nor a combination of the two can be predicated. It is zero.' Again, the ceremonies and fasts in honour of Dharma all take place on the full-moon day of Baisākh, the birthday of Buddha, and his worshippers are aware that Dharma is respected in Ceylon, that he is not an inferior deity, but superior to Vishnu or Śiva. Finally, he is represented in many places as a tortoise, which is a Buddhist emblem (Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, 395). It is possible that some traditions of the worship of Buddha may survive in that of Dharma; but if so, very little of the original conception remains.

35. **Jainism.**—Jainism, like Buddhism, had its birthplace in Bihār. The origin of this form of belief and its relation to Hinduism and Buddhism will be considered in another article (see JAINISM). Here it is sufficient to say that recent research by Jacobi, Hoernle, and others (Hoernle, 'Presidential Address,' *JRASBe*, 1898; Buhler-Burgess, *The Indian Sect of the Jainas*) has established that Jainism, so far from being an offshoot of Buddhism, was the result of an independent and contemporaneous religious movement under a Kṣatriya prince named Vardhamāna or Mahāvīra, who was born in the neighbourhood of Patna about B.C. 599, and died about B.C. 527. The dates of Buddha's career are still to some extent uncertain; but the most recent investigations place the period of his life between B.C. 588 and 508. It is thus possible that the founders of these two sects, who were both of Kṣatriya descent, may have met in the course of their preaching tours through Western Bengal. Neither sect is a religion in the true sense of the word; both are rather monastic organizations of a type very common in the age when they were founded. Both arose from the circumstance that the Brāhmans were then claiming the monopoly of admission to the monastic Orders. As a protest against this action, many non-Brāhmanical Orders were founded. They were gradually led to discontinue the use of the Vedic ritual, with the natural result that they came to be excluded from the pale of Brāhmanism. Jainism differs from Buddhism in rejecting the doctrine of *nirvāna*, and in asserting instead that, when the soul has gained freedom from the trammels of the successive series of existences, it passes into a state of blessedness which is vague and ill-defined. Those saintly men who have attained the rest of the blessed are known as Tīrthankara; those 'who have created a passage through the circuit of life,' form the body of saints who are worshipped by Jains. From the chief of these, Parśvanātha, the hill of Pārasnāth (wh. see), the centre of Jain pilgrimage in Bengal, takes its name. Jainism, by its more democratic constitution, freely admitting

lay adherents to communion, adopting a less active missionary career than Buddhism, and preferring as its chief centres of worship more secluded sites, like Parasnāth, was able to resist more successfully the stress of the Brāhmanical revival and Muhammadan persecution, under which the Buddhism of Bengal collapsed.

The Bengal Jains, who have their headquarters at Murshīdābād, are found also in Calcutta and the chief towns of the Patna Division. But though they are permanently settled there, they are rarely accompanied by their women-folk. Most of them are temporary visitors from Western and Central India. After making money by shopkeeping in Bengal, the heads of their firms often return to their original homes, their places being taken by younger men. Many of them are Mārwārīs from Mārwār in Central India, and belong to the Agarwāla and Oswāl sub-castes of Baniyās, the former being of the Digambara or 'naked,' and the latter of the Śvetāmbara or 'white-clad' section. These distinctions, as far as questions of dress are concerned, are now obsolete; but the titles represent the contrast between the more primitive naked ascetics of Southern India and those from the North and West. Of these merchant families some follow the Hindu and some the Jain rule; but this does not operate as a bar to intermarriage, because even when some Baniyās adopt the Śaiva or Śākta sect, in deference to the prejudices of the majority of their brethren they do not sacrifice animals or partake of meat and spirits. A large proportion of the Hindu merchant class belongs to the Vaishnava sect, and these are as strict in their regard for animal life as the Jains themselves. When husband and wife belong to different sects, the wife is formally adopted into the sect of her husband, but continues to practise her original religious rites. When, however, she visits the home of her parents, she must have her food cooked separately and eat apart from the other members of her family (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 7, ii. 151).

36. Sikhs and Kabīrpanthīs.—Like the Jains, Sikhs profess to be Hindus, and at each successive enumeration it would seem that their numbers have been underrated, as they have been included in some Hindu sect. They are, as a rule, temporary residents, and their strength depends largely upon the number of Panjābi regiments which happen to be serving in the Province. The only place with which they have any permanent connexion is Patna, where the Har Mandir is said to mark the place where their tenth *guru*, Govind Singh (A.D. 1675–1708), is believed to have been born while his mother halted there during a pilgrimage. In Eastern Bengal the Sikh sects best known are the Suthrashāhī and the Nanakshāhī. Wise (*op. cit.* 181 f.) describes the members of the former sect at Dacca as disreputable, generally drunkards and smokers of hemp drugs. They are often Brāhmans who do not discard the sacred cord on joining the Sikh communion, and continue to eat with Brāhmans of their own tribe, and not with all grades of Sikhs. No Sikh, however, will refuse to partake of the consecrated food (*praśād*) when offered by them. They observe all the great Hindu festivals, and pay special adoration to the *śālagrāma*, or ammonite, which represents Vishnu. The account given of this sect by Maclagan (*Panjāb Census*, 1891, i. 154) is not more favourable. He describes them as importunate beggars whose profligacy is notorious, most of them being spendthrifts who have lost their wealth in gambling, and spend their lives in roving mendicancy. Nānakpanthī is a term of less definite meaning, as it is often applied to Sikhs in general, who are all followers of their *guru*, Nānak (A.D. 1469–1538). They have some connexion with Dacca, which is said to have been visited by Nānak Shāh; but their *ākhāra*, or convent, in that city possesses no endowment, and depends largely on the charity of Armenian or Muhammadan residents (Wise, *op. cit.* 182 ff.).

Kabīr was closely connected with Nānak. The chief note of his teaching was the endeavour to link Hinduism to Islām. 'Alī and Rāma, he said, are only different names for the same god. His teaching seems to be rapidly gaining adherents in Western Bengal and the United Provinces. Differences in rank and religion are all, he taught, but *māyā*, or illusion. Emancipation and peace are to be gained only by recognizing the Divine Spirit under these manifold illusions. The way to union with the Divine is not by means of formula or sacrifice, but by fervent faith (*bhakti*) and meditation on the Godhead. The use of spirituous liquor and the worship of idols were prohibited by the founder of the sect; but, as often happens, in process of time practice lags behind precept, and the successors of the teacher fail to maintain the ideal which he set before them. In the case of the Kabīrpanthīs it is said that there is now a tendency to revert to idolatry, while at the same time they pretend to maintain the teaching of Kabīr.

37. Deistic sects.—(*a*) *The Brahmo Samāj.*—Of the Hindu deistic sects the best known is the Brahmo Samāj, though its numbers are small, and show no tendency to rapid increase. In Bengal it is divided into three sections: the Ādī, or 'original'; the Nababidhān, or 'new dispensation'; and the Sādhāran, or 'common.' All alike believe in the unity of the Godhead, the brotherhood of man, and direct communion with God in spirit without the intervention of any mediator.

'The differences which exist are ritualistic and social rather than religious. The Ādī Samāj, or oldest section, is also the most conservative. While discarding all idolatrous forms, it follows as closely as possible the rites of Hinduism, and draws its inspiration solely from the religious books of the Hindus, especially the Upanishads, and not from the Bible or Qur'ān. It has only once allowed a non-Brāhman to officiate as its minister. Inter-caste marriages are not allowed, and a considerable agitation was raised when one of its Brāhman members recently married the daughter of the Mahārājā of Kūch Bihār. In other respects the restrictions of the caste system sit lightly on the members of the Samāj, but they are particular to style themselves Hindus, and before the Census of 1891 they submitted a memorial intimating their desire to be entered as Theistic Hindus, and not as Brāhmos' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 159).

The second section, known as the Nababidhān Samāj, or Church of the New Dispensation, was founded by the well-known Keshab Chandra Sen. It is more eclectic than the Ādī Samāj in its tendencies, and has assimilated what it considers right not only in the sacred books of Hinduism, but also in the religious teaching of Christianity, Buddhism, and Islām.

The most advanced of these Churches is the Sādhāran, or 'common' Samāj. It rejects all the essentials of what is commonly regarded as Hinduism; disapproves of ritual and set forms of worship; absolutely rejects caste; disapproves of the custom of secluding women, gives them a liberal education, and allows them equal voice in Church government. It freely permits marriage between persons of different castes.

'They are thus,' as Gait remarks, 'gradually becoming a separate caste, recruited from a variety of different sources, but mainly from the ranks of the Brāhmans, Baidyas, and Kāyasths. . . . Most Indian gentlemen who have received an European education join this community, not so much perhaps on account of religious conviction as because of the freedom which it allows to them from the irksome trammels of caste and from the necessity of undergoing a ceremony of purification' (*op. cit.* i. 159 f.).

(*b*) *The Śivanārāyaṇīs.*—The Śivanārāyaṇī or Śrīnārāyaṇī is an interesting sect, founded about two centuries ago by a Rājput named Śiva Nārāyan from Ghāzipur in the United Provinces. It was first described by Buchanan in Patna and Bhāgal-

pur (*op. cit.* i. 214, ii. 137), who notices its adherents under the name of Santā, or 'pious.'

'They believe in one formless (*nirākār*) God, forbid idolatry, and venerate their original Guru, whom they regard as an incarnation of the Almighty. The eating of flesh and drinking of wine were forbidden by the founder of the sect, but this rule has now been relaxed. *Mantras* ['spells'] were composed by the founder, to be uttered from time to time during the day, *e.g.* when bathing. The sacred book of the sect is known as the *Sabda-Sant* or *Guru Granth*. It contains moral precepts, and declares that salvation is to be attained only by unswerving faith in God, control over the passions, and implicit obedience to the teaching of the Guru. The Guru is said to be held in such respect that all his leavings are most scrupulously partaken of by his disciples. Their great annual festival is on the fifth night after the new moon of Māgh [January–February], when they assemble in the house of one of their fraternity, and sing songs and read extracts from the *Guru Granth*. When a man wishes to become a Seo Nārāyaṇi, he selects one of the sect, belonging to a caste not inferior to his own, who imparts to him the *mantra* ['formula'] of initiation. He is then enjoined to have faith in God (*Bhagabān*) and the original Guru, and is given a certificate of admission. This is done in the presence of several members of the sect, whose names and addresses are noted in the certificate. All castes are admitted, but most of the disciples come from the lower grades of society, such as the Tatwā, Chamār, and Dosādh castes. The cult was formerly more popular than it is now, and higher castes are said to have supplied it with recruits. The Seo Nārāyaṇis bury their dead, and one of the great inducements to join the fraternity is said to be the knowledge that they will give a decent burial to their comrades when they die, and will not allow their bodies to be touched by sweepers. Their funeral processions are conducted with some pomp, and are accompanied by songs and music. The ordinary caste restrictions are observed, save only in the case of the extremists who adopt an ascetic life' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 185; cf. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, ii. 185 ff.).

This sect is only one of many which have recently grown up in Northern India, founded on a revolt against idolatry, and the pretensions of the Brāhmanical Order. They have adopted many of the principles of the reformed Vaishnava communities. Movements of this kind in India tend to degenerate, and once the enthusiasm which animated the founder has ceased to inspire later generations of disciples, the new community, having shaken itself free from the restrictions of caste and the control of the tribal council, often surrenders itself to licence. This has been the fate of this sect at Dacca, where the meetings, which occupied several nights in succession, degenerated into drunken orgies.

'The lower Hindu castes, ever willing to repudiate Brāhmanical interference, and assert spiritual independence, have always been notorious for profligacy and intemperate habits. Intoxication is with them an irresistible passion, and no threats or corrections have the slightest effect in weaning them from the vice. Faithful servants, kind parents, and affectionate husbands, they have no conception of a moral religion; and their untutored minds can neither understand nor comply with a faith inculcating morality and the mortification of all worldly lusts and passions' (Wise, *op. cit.* 181).*

38. The Pañchpiriyas.—The important sect of the Pañchpiriyas or Pachpiriyas forms the subject of a special article (wh. see).

39. Muhammadans.—The map prepared by Gait (*op. cit.* i. 156) clearly shows the distribution of Muhammadans in the Province. Prior to the Census of 1872 it was generally believed that they were most numerous in Bihār. That Census established, on the contrary, that the chief seat of Musalmān influence was in Eastern Bengal and to the north, where respectively two-thirds and nearly three-fifths of the people were found to be followers of the Prophet. On the other hand, in North Bihār less than a sixth, and in South Bihār less than a tenth, of the population accept his authority. Orissa, the most backward division, except the hill districts, and the most conservative in matters of religion, is the region where the Muhammadan element is weakest. The area of Musalmān predominance consists of a compact territory lying north of Calcutta and stretching westward from the frontier of Assam, including the Districts of Mymensingh, Pābna, Bogra, and Rājshāhi, and a second tract lying south and west of this and east of Calcutta, including the Districts of Noākhāli, Chittagong, and Backergunge. In these two regions the proportion of Muhammadans to the total population ranges from 82 per cent in Bogra to 71 per cent in Chittagong.

The extraordinary increase in the numbers of the followers of Islām in Bengal, and particularly in its eastern region, is the most remarkable fact in the recent religious history of the Indian Empire. The following table shows in a compact form the relative positions of Hinduism and Islām during the period for which fairly trustworthy statistics of religious belief become available:

Year of Census.	Hindus.	Per cent of Total Population.	Muhammadans.	Per cent of Total Population.
1872	39,996,575	63·76	19,559,252	31·19
1881	45,462,806	65·36	21,704,724	31·21
1891	47,821,468	64·07	23,658,347	31·70
1901	49,687,362	63·30	25,495,416	32·48

It is obvious from these figures that, while during the period of thirty years the proportion of Hindus in the total population has slightly decreased, the increase of Muhammadans has been steady and considerable.

The second remarkable fact in connexion with the spread of Islām is that it has occurred not in those parts of the Province which were centres of Musalmān influence and where their great cities were established. Dacca, for instance, for long the seat of Musalmān government in Eastern Bengal, though it contains 62 per cent of Muhammadans, presents an average much lower than that of the rural districts in its vicinity. Mālda, which contained the great capital city of Gaur, and Murshīdābād, an important seat of government, show no startling increase of Musalmāns; Bihār, Bhāgalpur, and Monghyr were important Muhammadan cities; but in spite of this the Musalmāns furnish barely one-tenth of the total population of the districts in which they are situated. The conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that the increase of Islām was largely due to causes independent of the action of the native government.

40. Origin of the present Muhammadan population.—It was, of course, ultimately due to the occupation of the Province by the Muhammadans that their faith began to spread among the Hindus and Animists whom they found in occupation of the country. The rule of the Muhammadan government lasted from the invasion of Bakhtiyār Khilji in A.D. 1203 until the British acquired the Divānī, or control of the revenue administration, in 1765—a period of more than five and a half centuries. During this time the ruling power occupied the country with a foreign army, and many soldiers after retirement from the service remained as colonists. Grants of land were made to grandees and officers of the empire, as well as to men of learning and piety whom the government encouraged to take up their permanent residence in the land. Bengal also became a place of refuge for many families driven from North-Western India by war and revolution. On these grounds various recent Musalmān writers, in their desire to enhance the social position of their co-religionists, have endeavoured to prove that they are in the main of foreign extraction. This question has been examined at length by Gait (*op. cit.* i. 165 ff.). While not denying that there are certain aristocratic families, like that of the Nawāb of Murshīdābād, who, originally of foreign descent, have

* For the Śivanārāyaṇis see also Risley (*op. cit.* i. 178, ii. 334). The ritual code of the sect is described and some of the songs quoted in *North Indian Notes and Queries*, v. 58 f.

preserved the purity of their blood by refraining from intermarriage with persons of more doubtful ancestry, and also that many families of foreign origin have, owing to the rules of the Muhammadan law of inheritance, gradually lost their estates and become merged in the general mass of the population, he regards it as impossible to suppose that the whole or even a great majority of the Musalmān population can be the descendants of immigrants from North-Western India. Such a theory does not account for the present distribution of the Musalmān population. If they were really descendants of foreign immigrants, they would now be found in occupation of the more healthy tracts in the neighbourhood of the ancient capitals, not in the rice-swamps of Noākhāli, Bogra, and Backergunge. Anthropometry, again, so far as statistics are available, shows that the foreign element among the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal is inconsiderable, and that physically they are akin to the aboriginal or non-Aryan races whom the first Musalmān invaders found in occupation. On the whole, Gait (*op. cit.* i. 169) comes to the conclusion that the foreign element in the Muhammadan population cannot exceed four millions, or one-sixth of the total number of those professing the faith of Islām.

41. Causes of the spread of Islām.—(*a*) *Conversions.*—When we come to consider the causes which led to the spread of Islām, we find that while the Mughals were generally tolerant in matters of religion, the Afghāns who preceded them were often fanatical; local traditions, supplemented by the scanty historical evidence of the character of their rule, describe numerous cases of forcible conversions of Hindus and Animists, while the ranks of the true believers were recruited by slaves and criminals who on conversion were pardoned.

'In spite, however, of the fact that cases of forcible conversion were by no means rare, it seems probable that very many of the ancestors of the Bengal Muhammadans voluntarily gave in their adhesion to Islām. The advantages which that religion offered to persons held in low esteem by the Hindus have already been pointed out, and under Muslim rule there was no lack of pious Pīrs and Fakirs (holy men and religious mendicants) who devoted their lives to gaining converts to the faith. There were special reasons which, during the early years of the Muhammadan supremacy, made conversion comparatively easy. Although the days when Buddhism was a glowing faith had long since passed, the people of Bengal were still to a great extent Buddhistic, and when Bakhtiyār Khiljī conquered Bihār and massacred the Buddhist monks assembled at Odantapurī, the common people, who were already lukewarm, deprived of their priests and teachers, were easily attracted from their old form of belief, some to Hinduism and others to the creed of Muhammad. The higher castes probably found their way back to Hinduism, while the non-Aryan tribes, who had, in all probability, never been Hindus, preferred the greater attractions of Islām' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 171).

(*b*) *Physical causes of the increase of Muhammadanism.*—The faith thus started progressed rapidly, owing to causes which were not so much moral or religious as physical, and due to the environment of the people. These have been carefully examined by O'Donnell and Gait (*Census Report*, 1891, i. 146 f.; 1901, i. 172). It has been established from these investigations that the main explanation of the spread of Islām in Eastern Bengal must be the greater fecundity of its adherents. In the first place, we find among Muhammadans a much larger number of potential mothers than among Hindus. While the higher caste Hindus throughout the Province, and in Bengal proper many of the castes of less importance, rigorously prohibit widow-remarriage, the Muhammadan widow usually finds a second husband. Statistics show that of every 100 Hindu women between the ages of 15 and 40 more than 16 are widows prohibited to re-marry; among Muhammadans the percentage is only 12. O'Donnell, again, remarks that ill-assorted marriages are far more common among Hindus—men well advanced in years being united to girl wives, who in the natural course of human life are left widows, debarred from further maternity, at a comparatively early age. On the other hand, Musalmāns, particularly in Eastern Bengal, are polygamists whenever they have the means to support a second wife, generally a widow, 'married as often as a convenient unpaid domestic drudge as for the sake of the children she usually bears her master.' Lastly, in Eastern Bengal the Musalmān is generally more prosperous and better fed than the Hindu in other parts of the Province. Bihār and Orissa, the headquarters of Hinduism, are fully developed, congested regions, where a large proportion of the people live in a condition of permanent depression. Eastern Bengal, on the contrary, is a land of promise, enriched by a large trade in rice and jute. It is improbable that the enterprise of the Hindu wedded to his hamlet and his local gods would have been sufficient to bring its fertile alluvial soil under the plough. But the Muhammadan has no prejudice against leaving his birthplace, and gladly migrates in search of remunerative work. While the Hindu is very often a vegetarian, and, if he eats meat, does so only when he makes a sacrifice, the Musalmān with his more varied and nutritious dietary is more vigorous and fertile. The conditions thus described sufficiently account for the fact that, while Hinduism barely holds its ground, Islām prospers and increases the number of its adherents.

42. Characteristics of Muhammadanism in Bengal.—Islām throughout Northern India falls far short of the standard of faith laid down by the Prophet and his immediate successors. As might have been expected, this degeneration is specially apparent in Eastern Bengal, where its followers have been to a large extent recruited from an Animistic population. Thus, the Pañchpiriya sect (wh. see) shows obvious signs of the fusion of Musalmān traditions with Animistic beliefs. The Wahhābī movement (see below, § 43) has in some measure checked the corruption of the faith, but before the recent crusade against idolatry it was common for low-class Muhammadans to join in the Durgā Pūjā and other Hindu festivals.

'Although,' writes Gait (*op. cit.* i. 176), 'they have been purged of many superstitions, many still remain. In particular, they are very careful about omens and auspicious days. Dates for weddings are often fixed after consulting a Hindu astrologer; bamboos are not cut, nor the building of new houses commenced, on certain days of the week, and journeys are often undertaken only after referring to the Hindu almanac to see if the proposed day is auspicious. When disease is prevalent, Sitalā and Rākshyā Kālī (see above, § 13) are worshipped. Dharmarāj, Mānasā, and Bishahrī (see above, § 30) are also venerated by many ignorant Muhammadans, who make over goats to Hindus in order that they may perform the sacrifice on their account. Sasthī is worshipped when a child is born. Even now in some parts of Bengal they observe the Durgā Pūjā, and buy new clothes for the festival like the Hindus. In Bihār they join in the worship of the Sun, and when a child is born they light a fire and place cactus and a sword at the door to prevent the demon Jawān from entering and killing the infant. At marriage the bridegroom often follows the Hindu practice of smearing the bride's forehead with vermilion or sandal-wood paste. In the Sonthāl Parganas Muhammadans are often seen to carry sacred water to the shrine of Baidyanāth, and, as they may not enter the shrine, pour it as a libation on the outside verandah. Offerings are made to the Grāmyā-devatā (see above, § 15) before sowing or transplanting rice seedlings, and exorcism is resorted to in case of sickness. Ghosts are propitiated by offerings of black fowls and pigeons before a figure drawn in vermilion on a plantain leaf. These practices are gradually disappearing, but they die hard, and amulets containing a text from the Qur'ān are commonly worn, even by the Mullahs who inveigh against these survivals of Hindu beliefs' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 176).

As is the case throughout Northern India, customs like these are practised especially by women, who are much more conservative in their religious beliefs.

Worship of pīrs and deified men.—In the same category of corruptions of the primitive faith may be placed the adoration of *pīrs*, or saints, and other

deified men, a practice for which no authority can be found in the Qur'ān or in the older commentaries on it. The *pīr* after death is supposed to be present in spirit, and to offer daily prayers of propitiation at Mecca or Medīna. Hence a *dargāh*, or tomb, covers his ashes and becomes a place of pilgrimage, to which people resort for the cure of disease, or the exorcism of evil spirits, to obtain the fulfilment of some cherished wish, such as the birth of a child, or success in pending litigation. Gait (*op. cit.* i. 177) and Wise (*op. cit.* 10 ff.) have given full catalogues of the more famous saints (see SAINTS, [Hindu]). The educated Musalmān denies that he worships the *pir*, he merely prays that he will intercede for him with the Almighty; 'but amongst the lower classes it is very doubtful if this distinction is clearly recognized, even if it actually exists.'

43. Sects of Islām.—The familiar division of Muhammadans into the two sects of Sunni and Shī'a is of less importance in Bengal than that which classes them as 'reformed' or 'unreformed.' The former is the title applied to those who are connected with the movement which resulted in the formation of the Wahhābī sect (wh. see). The sectarian movement in Islām usually follows one of two lines: it is either puritanical or pietistic. The Wahhābī sect is an example of the former, Ṣūfiism of the latter. The Wahhābī movement was started in India by Saiyid Ahmad Shāh, of Rāē Bareli in Oudh, who in 1826 proclaimed a holy war (*jihād*) against the Sikhs. He and his followers finally made Patna their headquarters, whence a propaganda was spread through Northern India. The principles of the sect, as announced by another Bengal teacher, Hājī Shariatu'llah of Farīdpur, prohibited all association with Hindu rites and ceremonies, the preparation of models (*ta'ziya*) of the martyrs Ḥasan and Ḥusain (see Pelly, *Miracle Play of Hasan and Husain*), and the offering of prayers to saints or martyrs. He also announced the principle which brought the sect under the notice of the Indian Government, that India was a 'land of warfare' (*dāru'l-ḥarb*), where the observance of the Friday service is unlawful and resistance to the infidel a religious duty. These principles were to some extent modified by another teacher, Maulāna Karāmat 'Alī of Jaunpur, who made two important alterations in the tenets of the sect. First, he declined to reject altogether, as other teachers had done, the authority of the glosses on the *Ḥadīth*, or traditions, which were assumed to represent the teaching of the Prophet; secondly, he 'withdrew the doctrine that India was *dāru'l-ḥarb*, and thus removed the chief cause which brought the sect into collision with the British Government. These two sects of reformers are known collectively as Farāḍī (Arab. *farīḍa*, pl. *farā'iḍ*, 'the obligatory ordinances of law and religion,' those which are believed to have been established by God Himself, as distinguished from those which are founded on the precept or practice of the Prophet, and called *sunna*). Other titles used are Namāz-i-hāfid, 'those who know the prayers by rote'; Shāre', 'followers of the *shar'*, or divine way of religion,' as opposed to the Sābiqī, 'those who follow the old rule,' 'the conservative party.' The distinctive name of the followers of Karāmat 'Alī and his successors is Ta'aiyunī, 'those who appoint,' from their practice of appointing as their leader a member of their own body, who decides religious questions, and takes the place of a *qāḍī*, thereby making the practice of Friday prayer lawful for true believers. The followers of Dudhu Miyān are known as Wahhābī, from the founder of the sect, Muhammad ibn Abdu'l-Wahhāb; but this name is now held in bad odour, and they prefer to be called Muhammadī, 'followers of the Prophet'; Ahl-i-ḥadīth, 'persons of the tradition'; or Rafi'yādain, the last with reference to their custom of raising their hands to their ears when praying, in opposition to the practice of the Sunnis, who fold their arms in front, and of the Shī'as, who allow them to hang by their sides. Other titles for them are Amīnī, because they pronounce the 'Amen' formula in a loud voice; and Lāmaẕhabī, 'without doctrine,' because they reject all doctrines except those contained in the Qur'ān.

The information regarding the tendency of this reform movement in Islām, so far as it is based on the scanty facts which the Government has permitted to appear in official publications, is insufficient to enable us to appreciate fully its religious and political importance. Risley is of opinion that 'at the present day the fanatical element of the Wahhābī movement seems in many parts to have died out; and the efforts of the reformers are directed mainly to the eradication of superstitious practices not sanctioned by the Qur'ān, and to the inculcation of the true principles of the religion' (*Census Report*, India, 1901, i. 373). At the same time it would be idle to assert that the principle upon which the sect largely depends—that India is a 'land of war'—has quite disappeared; and a movement which, as is the case with the Wāhhābī movement in Bihār, draws its adherents from the lowest and most ignorant classes of the Muhammadans, must always be regarded with watchful suspicion by the ruling power.*

44. Christianity.—The following figures illustrate the remarkable progress of Christianity in the Province during the last thirty years:

Year of Census.	Number of Christians.
1872	91,063
1881	128,134
1891	192,484
1901	278,366

The scope for missionary effort in the future may be estimated by the fact that at present only 36 in 10,000 of the total population belong to the Christian faith. Of the total number of Christians enumerated at the Census of 1901, 27,489 (including 1081 Armenians) or 9·9 per cent belong to European races; 23,114 or 8·3 per cent are Eurasians; and 227,763 or 81·8 per cent are native converts.

'More than three-fifths of the European Christians belong to the Anglican communion, and about one-fifth are Roman Catholics. According to the returns, the Presbyterians number less than one-tenth, but it is believed that the real number is greater, and that some of those who described themselves as belonging to the Church of England were brought up as Presbyterians. Of the Eurasians, more than half are Roman Catholics, and nearly two-fifths belong to the Anglican communion. . . . The proportion of Roman Catholics is swollen by the inclusion of 2221 Feringis, of whom all but 194 belong to this persuasion' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 161).

These Feringis (Pers. *Farangī*, *Firangī*, 'Frank') are a degraded mixed race, largely found in the Backergunge District.

'In the southern quarter [of the Backerganj district] there still exist several original Portuguese colonies, of probably two centuries' duration, which exhibit a melancholy example to what an extreme degree it is possible for Europeans to degenerate They are a meagre, puny, imbecile race, blacker than the natives, who hold them in the utmost contempt, and designate them by the appellation of Caula Ferenghies (Hind. Beng. *kālā*, 'black') or "black Europeans"' (Hamilton, *Description of Hindostan*, 1820, i. 133).

* This account of the Wahhābī movement in Bengal is largely based on Gait's summary (*Census Report*, 1901, i. 173 ff.), which, again, is founded on Wise, 'Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal' in *JRASBe*, 1894. Also see his account in *Notes on the Races, Castes, and Trades of E. Bengal*, 21 ff. The question has been discussed by Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans; are they bound in conscience to rebel?* and the reply by Saiyid Ahmad Khan; Ibbetson, *Punjab Ethnography*, 147 f; Maclagan, *Census Report Punjab*, 1891, i. 189 f. For the Wahhābis of Arabia see Palgrave, *Central and Eastern Arabia*, Lady Ann Blunt, *Pilgrimage to Nejd*; Badger, *Imams and Seyyids of 'Oman*; Blunt, *Future of Islam*.

In recent times there has been little improvement in their industrial, social, or moral condition (Beveridge, *The District of Bakarganj*, 1876, p. 110).

(*a*) *Sectarial divisions of Christians.*—The ignorance of the native converts and the inability of the Census enumerators to understand the European names of the various denominations of Christians have made it very difficult to collect information regarding the sectarial divisions of the native converts.

'So far as the returns go, about two-fifths of the native Christians are members of the Roman Catholic Church; nearly one-third are Lutherans; rather more than a seventh belong to the Anglican communion, and nearly one-eleventh are Baptists. The other denominations combined account for only about one in every nineteen native Christians' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 162).

(*b*) *Roman Catholics.*—The total number of Roman Catholics has increased from 78,000 in 1891 to 90,000 in 1901. Their chief sphere of missionary work is in the Rānchi District of Chotā Nāgpur, where the converts exceed 54,000, or form about three-fifths of the total number in the Province. Their work in this District is shared among the non-Aryan Mundās and Orāons by Anglican and Lutheran missions. Christianity has here made more rapid strides than in any other part of N. India, with the result that the total number of Christians affiliated to the three missions now amounts to 124,958, as compared with 36,263 at the previous decennial enumeration. The Roman Catholics have also important communities at Dacca in Eastern Bengal, Calcutta, the Twenty-four Parganas, Nadiyā, and Champāran.

'Although small in point of numbers, the Roman Catholic Mission in Champāran has an interesting history. There are two main centres, at Bettiah and Chuhri. The former was established about 1740 by Father Joseph Mary, an Italian missionary of the Capuchin Order, who was passing near Bettiah on his way to Nepāl, when he was summoned by Rājā Dhruva Shāh of Bettiah to attend his daughter, who was dangerously ill. He succeeded in curing her, and the grateful Rājā invited him to stay at Bettiah, and gave him a house and about ninety acres of land. The Chuhri Mission owes its origin to some missionaries who left Italy in 1707 for Tibet. Two reached Lhassa, and were followed by others. They built a mission-house and chapel; but as soon as the number of their converts began to increase, they incurred the ill-will of the Grand Lāma, and were forced to leave. They then settled in Nepāl (in 1713) and established missions at Khātmāndū, Pātan, and Bhatgāon. They received grants of land from the Newār kings, and prospered considerably till 1769, when the Newār dynasty was overthrown by the Gorkhas, who were instigated by their priests to exterminate the Christians. Being warned in time, the missionaries, with sixteen families of their converts, fled to Bettiah and were given a small land-grant at Chuhri. Many of the present Christians in Chuhri are the descendants of the original fugitives from Nepāl and still speak their old language, but they have intermarried to a considerable extent with the native Christians of Bettiah' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 162; for these Nepāl Missions see Oldfield, *Sketches from Nepal*, i. 189 f.; Hamilton, *Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, 1819, p. 38).

(*c*) *Lutherans.*—The converts of the Lutheran Mission have increased from 23,000 in 1891 to rather more than 69,000 in 1901. Their operations extend to the non-Aryan tribes of Chotā Nāgpur, in Rānchi, the Santāl Parganas, Singhbhūm, and Manbhūm. The Rānchi Mission, known as that of Gossner, was founded by six German missionaries in 1846; but twenty-three years later an unfortunate disagreement occurred, and the Mission was split into two sections, one enrolling itself under the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, and the other retaining the name of Gossner's Mission.

'The progress made during the decade in the Rānchi District has been phenomenal. Ten years ago the number of converts was less than 19,000, and it is now three times as great. Some years ago the Mundās were greatly agitated by disputes with their landlords; their cause was espoused by the missionaries, and it is thought by some that political reasons may have artificially augmented the number of professed Christians. Unlike the Hindus, the Mundās receive apostates from Christianity back into their community, and it is said that cases of backsliding are by no means rare. We must, therefore, wait for the next Census before we can pronounce how far the wonderful progress made in the past decade is genuine and permanent' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 162 f.).

On the other hand, Bradley-Birt, writing of the Mission to the Hos of Singhbhūm, remarks that the barrier of exclusiveness which the race has always maintained affects the Christian missions established in the District.

'Though without the caste prejudices of the Hindus, they have no mercy on any one who disobeys the traditions of their race. No Ho would take water or food from one of another race; and as such a Christian is practically considered, being outside the pale of the Ho community, and not participating in the rites and festivals of his family. Converts thus fare badly among the Hos, and few adults have broken through the rigid customs of a lifetime and embraced Christianity. It is to the children that the missionaries chiefly turn their attention' (Bradley-Birt, *Chota Nagpore*, 104).

The same writer, when treating of the Santāls and Pahārias, remarks that it is only among people who have not yet come under the spell of Hinduism that missionary efforts have met with success.

'But hopeful as is the progress of Christianity among them, it has exercised as yet no influence beyond a certain radius from the Mission Stations, and it is even now of too recent a growth in their midst to influence whole races, as Hinduism has done, and is still doing, to embrace its tenets and beliefs. Everything to-day points to Hinduism—even the Hinduism that has lost its first faith and is fighting its own battle of doubt and scepticism—as the absorbing force of the future among the aborigines of Bengal' (*Story of an Indian Upland*, 20 f.).

On this question the views of Dalton, one of the best authorities on these races, deserve quotation.

'If we analyze the views of most of the Oraon converts to Christianity, we shall, I think, be able to discern the influence of their pagan doctrines and superstitions in the motives which first led them to become catechumens. The Supreme Being who does not protect them from the spite of malevolent spirits has, they are assured, the Christians under His special care. They consider that, in consequence of this guardianship, the witches and *bhūts* have no power over Christians, and it is therefore good for them to join that body. They are taught that for the salvation of Christians one great sacrifice has been made, and they see that those who are baptized do not in fact reduce their live-stock to propitiate the evil spirits. They grasp at this notion, and long afterwards, when they understand it better, the atonement, the mystical washing away of sin by the blood of Christ, is the doctrine on which their simple minds most dwell' (Dalton, *op. cit.* 257).

(*d*) *Baptist and other Missions.*—Farther east the Baptist Mission is at work in the swamps of Backergunge and Farīdpur, where from the menial castes of Chandāls and Nāmasūdras they have made 19,000 converts. The only other important Mission is that of the Church of Scotland, which is engaged in parts of the Dārjiling and Jalpaigurī Districts. The total number of their converts is about 2000.

(*e*) *Classes among whom Christianity progresses.*—The classes most receptive of Christianity are those outside the Hindu system, as in Chotā Nāgpur and the depressed communities of Backergunge and Farīdpur. It is thus summed up by Gait (*op. cit.* i. 164):

'The influence of Christian teaching is no doubt far-reaching, and there are many whose acts and opinions have been greatly modified thereby, but amongst the higher castes the number who at the present time are moved to make a public profession of their faith in Christ is very small. At one time there seemed a prospect of numerous converts being gained from the ranks of the educated Hindus, but the efforts of Keshab Chandra Sen and other eloquent Brāhmo preachers turned their thoughts and aspirations into another channel.'

LITERATURE.—The best recent authorities are the last three Census Reports—by J. A. Bourdillon, 1881; C. J. O'Donnell, 1891; E. A. Gait, 1901, the last being the most complete and valuable. To it this article is very largely indebted. Among the older authorities may be named: Ward, *A View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindoos*[2], 1815; Francis Buchanan, afterwards Hamilton, *The History, Antiquities, Topography, and Statistics of Eastern India*, edited in 1838 from the author's MSS by Montgomery Martin, who does not name the original author on his title-page; J. Campbell, *A Personal Narrative of Thirteen Years' Service among the Wild Tribes of Khondistan, for the Suppression of Human Sacrifice*, 1864; S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, 1865; E. G. Man, *Sonthalia and the Sonthals*, 1867; Sir W. W. Hunter, *The Annals of Rural Bengal*, 1868, *Orissa*, 1872, *Statistical Account of Bengal*, v.d.; T. H. Lewin, *The Hill Tracts of Chittagong*, 1869, *The Wild Races of South-east India*, 1870; E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of*

Bengal, 1872; J. Wise, *Notes on the Races, Castes, and Trades of Eastern Bengal*, 1883; H. H. Risley, *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 1891; J. F. Hewitt, *The Ruling Races of Prehistoric Times in India, South-west Asia, and South Europe*, 1894–5; M. A. Sherring, *Hindu Tribes and Castes*, 1872–81; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, 1895, *Among the Himalayas*, 1899; Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, 1896; F. B. Bradley-Birt, *Chota Nagpore, a little-known Province of the Empire*, 1903, *The Story of an Indian Upland*, 1905. For the folk-lore and popular beliefs, Lal Behari Day, *Folk-tales of Bengal*, 1883, *Govinda Samanta, or History of a Bengal Raiyat*, 1874, re-published as *Bengal Peasant Life*, 1880; G. A. Grierson, *Bihar Peasant Life*, 1885, *An Introduction to the Maithili Language of North Bihar*, 1882; A. Campbell, *Santal Folk-tales*, 1891.

W. CROOKE.

BEOTHUKS.—The Beothuks were the aboriginal inhabitants of Newfoundland, and the sole representatives, so far as is known, of the Beothukan stock. The race is now extinct, and its history is wrapped in obscurity, although the attention of early voyagers to Newfoundland (or Baccalaos, as it was called from the native name of the codfish caught along its shores) was quickly attracted by the Beothuks who then inhabited the island. Though the allusions of these first explorers regarding this vanished race are scanty and frequently contradictory, they are of special interest as being almost the only sources for a knowledge of one of the most primitive of all North American Indian stocks.

1. Early accounts and culture.—The first allusion to the Beothuks is found in an 'addition' in Stephens' edition of the *Chronicon* of Eusebius (Paris, 1512, f. 172; quoted by Harrisse, *Découverte et évolution cartographique de Terre-Neuve*, London, 1900, p. 162), and is as follows:

'Septem homines sylvestres ex ea insula (quæ terra nova dicitur) Rothomagum [Rouen] adducti sunt cum vestimentis et armis eorum. Fuliginei sunt coloris, grossis labris, stigmata in facie gerentes ab aure ad medium mentum, instar lividæ venulæ per maxillas deducta. Crine nigro et grosso ut equæ iuba. Barba per totam vitam nulla, neque pubes neque ullus in toto corpore pillus præter capillos et supercilia. Baltheum gerunt in quo est bursula quædam ad tegenda verenda Idioma labis formatur, religio nulla, cymba eorum corticea, quam homo una manu evehat in humeros. Arma eorum arcus lati, chordæ ex intestinis aut nervis animalium; sagittæ, cannæ saxo, aut ossæ piscis accuminatæ. Cibus eorum carnes tostæ. Potus aqua. Panis et vini et pecuniarum nullus omnino usus. Nudi incedunt aut vestiti pellibus animalium ursorum, cervorum, vitulorum marinorum et similium.'

Of the personal adornment of the Beothuks, Jacques Cartier, in 1534, gives the following account (quoted by Harrisse, *op. cit.* p. 163):

'Il y a des gens à la dite terre qui sont assez de belle corpulance, mais ilz sont gens effarables et sauuaiges. Ilz ont leurs cheueulz liez sur leurs testes en fazon d'vne pougnye de fain teurcze et vng clou passé par my ou aultre chosse et y lient aulcunes plumes des ouaiseaulx. Ilz se voistent de peaulx de bestes, tant hommes que femmes; mais les femmes sont plus closes et serrées en leurs dites peaux et sçaintes par le corps. Ilz se paingnent de certaines couleurs tannées. Ilz ont des barques en quoy ilz vont par la mer, qui sont faictes d'escorche de bouays de boul, o quoy ilz peschent force loups marins.'

To the list of Beothuk weapons Cabot (in 1542) adds lances, darts, clubs, and slings (Harrisse, *op. cit.* p. 164). The wearing of skins and loincloths ('a small payre of breeches') by both sexes, and the use of leggings and moccasins, are alluded to, in addition to their mode of dressing the hair, by Jehan Alfonse (? in 1543; while the Siennese Mattioli (1547) states that the Beothuks went naked in summer, but were clad in skins in winter. Unlike Stephens, who described the Beothuks as 'sooty,' Alfonse and Mattioli term them 'white' ('très blanche,' 'gente bianca'). According to the former, moreover, the Beothuks were nomadic, while 'touching their victuals, they eate good meate, but all unsalted, but they drye it, and afterward they broyle it, as well fish as flesh. . . . They drinke seale oyle, but this is at their great feasts.' Mattioli, however, affirmed that they ate both fish and flesh raw, and added that 'some of them eat human flesh, yet secretly, that their "caciqui" may not know it.' The latter author also adds a scanty note on the Beothuk religion: 'Sono idolatri, chi adora il sole, e chi la luna, e molte altre sorti de idoli' (see Harrisse, p. 164 ff.; cf. Bonnycastle, *Newfoundland in 1842*, London, 1842, i. 25 f.).

Whitbourne, the first historian of Newfoundland, describes the aborigines in the following terms (Purchas, *His Pilgrimes*, London, 1625, IV. x. 1884):

'The naturall Inhabitants of the Countrie, as they are but few in number, so are they something rude and sauage people. . . . In their habits, customs, and manners they resemble the *Indians* of the Continent . . . they liue altogether in the North and West part of the Country, which is seldome frequented by the English: But the French and Biscaines . . . report them to be an ingenious and tractable people . . . (being well vsed) they are ready to assist them with great labour and patience . . . without expectation of other reward, than a little Bread, or some such small hire.'

In a letter written July 29, 1612, John Guy thus describes the Beothuks at length (Purchas, IV. x. 1881):

'They are of a reasonable stature, of an ordinary middle sise, they goe bare-headed, wearing their haire somewhat long, but round; they haue no Beards; behind they haue a great locke of haire platted with feathers, like a Hawkes Lure, with a feather in it standing vpright by the crowne of the head, and a small locke platted before: a short Gown made of Stags skins, the Furre innermost, that ranne downe to the middle of their legges, with sleeues to the middle of their arme, and a Beuer skin about their necke, was all their apparell, saue that one of them had shooes and Mittens, so that all went bare-legged, and most bare-foote. They are full eyed, of a blacke colour; the colour of their haire was diuers, some blacke, some browne, and some yellow, and their faces something flat and broad, red with Oker, as all their apparell is, and the rest of their body: they are broad brested, and bould, and stand very vpright.'

Like Hayes, the second in command under Sir Humphrey Gilbert (Hakluyt, *Voyages*, London, 1600, iii. 153), Guy found the Beothuks friendly, although inclined to be thievish. He describes their houses as 'nothing but Poles set in round forme meeting altogether aloft, which they couer with Deere skins, they are about ten foote broad, and in the middle they make their fires.' Another variety of dwelling was 'made in a square forme with a small roofe.' Their adornments included 'shell chains' (doubtless wampum), 'chains of leather full of small Periwinckle shels,' and a 'spitting knife.' They likewise possessed spruce bark boiling-baskets, and had hats 'sewed handsomely with narrow bands about them, set round with fine white shels' (Whitbourne, in Purchas, IV. x. 1887). It is also tolerably certain that they used gaming discs of bone similar to those of the Micmacs (Culin, *24 RBEW* p. 97).

The highest art of the Beothuks was evidently attained in their ochre-stained canoes, to which Cartier alludes. These were usually built to hold four persons, and are thus described by de Laet (*Novus orbis*, Leyden, 1633, p. 34):

'Cymbæ ipsis ex corticibus arborum compositæ, viginti ut plurimum pedes longæ, quinque aut circiter latæ et semilunæ in modum, ad proram atque puppim erectæ atque incurvæ, quinque ad summum vectorum capaces; illis utpote levissimis undas summa velocitate secant, easdemque cum opus fuerit humeris gestant.'

The last authentic record of this vanished stock is contained in John Cartwright's *Remarks on the Situation of the Aborigines of Newfoundland*, written in 1788 (printed in his daughter's *Life and Correspondence of Major Cartwright*, London, 1826, ii. 307 ff.). This, however, adds little new, except that the square type of building already noted was relatively rare, and that its roof was a pyramid rising to a hoop tied to the rafters, thus forming a chimney. His most interesting information concerns the canoes, which ran straight from keel to gunwale, being kept apart at the top by a 'spreader,' the removal of which rendered it possible to fold the canoe up like a cocked hat.

The Beothuks lived chiefly by the chase and

by fishing. Their canoes have already received mention, and for their hunting they enclosed large areas with deer fences, 8 to 10 ft. high, made by felling trees in line. These fences, which often extended for miles into the interior, served to bring the deer down to water, where they were taken by the hunters (cf. Jukes, *Excursions in and about Newfoundland*, London, 1842, ii. 132–133). A distinct racial characteristic of the Beothuks, if we may judge from the account of Bonnycastle (*op. cit.* ii. 267 f.), was that they dug within their wigwams small cavities which they lined with moss or the soft twigs of trees, thus forming their beds. Their winter wigwams, moreover, had small store-pits, about four feet deep and usually lined with birch bark; while each village possessed a wigwam for vapour baths. It is also interesting to note that their wigwams of skin are said by Peyton to have been raised on wooden platforms (Jukes, *op. cit.* ii. 126).

The Beothuks also received the name of '*Red* Indians' (a term often applied erroneously to North American Indians in general) from their custom, to which repeated allusion is made from the time of Guy, of painting themselves, as well as their bows, arrows, and canoes, with red ochre. Physically they were of a finer type than the Micmacs, whose bitter enemies they were. The last member of the race, Shawnandithit, a woman who died at St. John's in 1829, is described as having a round face with prominent cheek bones, somewhat sunken eyes, small nose, and black hair (Lloyd, *JAI*, 1875, p. 31; cf. the portrait of the Beothuk woman Demasduit or Waunathoake ['Mary March'], reproduced from Lady Hamilton's drawing, in Prowse, *Hist. of Newfoundland*, London, 1895, p. 384). The Beothuks were monogamous, and the women were chaste (Lloyd, *JAI*, 1876, p. 228).

2. History.—The history of the Beothuks finds its wretched parallel only too readily. The brutal excesses of the English in Tasmania and Australia, of American frontiersmen and cowboys, of the Spaniards in the Antilles, and of the Belgians in the Congo—it is all the same dreary story. It is evident that, when Newfoundland was first discovered, its inhabitants were peaceful, and they long remained on friendly terms with the French and Basque fishermen. With the inability of primitive peoples to recognize property rights of others than their own tribes, however, they, in their excursions to the seacoast in summer for cod and salmon, appropriated European nets, iron, or whatever else they could lay their hands on. The Europeans sought revenge, and, as Cartwright says, 'they were harassed from post to post, from island to island, so that neither sea nor land could afford them shelter.' By the time of the English settlements the Beothuks had fled to the north and north-west of Newfoundland. Thence they carried on such depredations against the whites that by the middle of the 18th cent. the French offered rewards for their heads. To add to their distress, Micmacs emigrated from Nova Scotia in considerable numbers during the 18th cent., and bitter war broke out between the two stocks, culminating in a battle at the eastern end of Grand Pond about 1770. With the Naskapi, or Algonquian Montagnais of Labrador, on the other hand, they remained on terms of friendship, though they despised the Eskimos for their uncleanly habits (Jukes, *op. cit.* ii. 131); and it was even supposed by Bonnycastle (*op. cit.* ii. 251 f.) that the few remnants of the Beothuks migrated in a body to Labrador, since in the Bay of Seven Islands there suddenly appeared a party of Indians who were neither Eskimos nor Montagnais. Though the actual fate of the stock is not certainly known, they probably perished gradually from the hostility of whites and Micmacs, complicated by famine and disease. Their number seems never to have been large. John Mason, writing between 1618 and 1619, records 'few savages in the north, none in the south' (Prowse, *op. cit.* p. 107); Cartwright (1798) estimated them at 450; but about 1825, Shawnandithit said that only fourteen of her tribe were alive (Lloyd, *JAI*, 1876, p. 228). The last Beothuks, except three women, one of whom (Shawnandithit) was brought to St. John's, were seen on the ice in New Bay in the winter of 1823 (Bonnycastle, *op. cit.* ii. 263 f.). In 1827 the Beothic Institution was founded for the civilization of the Beothuks; but the expedition of Cormack, undertaken under its auspices, utterly failed to find even a single member of the tribe, though there was evidence that Beothuks had fled just before his approach (Bonnycastle, *op. cit.* ii. 265–276).

3. Relics.—The relics of the Beothukan stock, of which the Public Museum of St. John's contains important specimens, include mortar-shaped vessels, spear-heads, arrow-heads, gouges, and axes, all of stone. Bone ornaments, used for adorning the hair or dress, and decorated with right-angled triangles, have also been found, as well as carvings on ivory and on the tusks or bones of walrus, seals, and deer, all these objects being dyed a deep sienna. On the skeleton of a man found near Comfort Head in 1888 was a medicine bag containing several charms of carved bone, strips of wampum, a brilliant piece of iron pyrites, and a number of bird skulls, some of these objects obviously being religious in character (Macdougall, in *Trans. Canadian Inst.* ii. 101 f.). In this connexion it should be noted that the Beothuks kindled their fires from the down of the *cyanocitta cristata* (Lloyd, *JAI*, 1876, p. 225). The stock seems, however, to have had no knowledge of pottery, though they possibly made soapstone vessels (*ib.* p. 29), unless these were of Eskimo origin (cf. Prowse, *op. cit.* p. 591), especially as the Eskimos in Labrador manufactured soapstone lamps (Hough, in *Report of U. S. Nat. Museum*, 1896, p. 1041 f.). What is still more extraordinary, they remained ignorant throughout their history of the use not only of firearms, but even of the dog (Bonnycastle, *op. cit.* ii. 259, 277). A point of more than usual interest is the fact that the Beothuks apparently did not practise scalping, but the more primitive American Indian custom of cutting off the head (cf. Friederici, *Skalpieren und ähnliche Kriegsgebräuche in Amerika*, Brunswick, 1906, *passim*). Thus when, in 1810, the Beothuks killed two of the marines of Lieutenant Buchan, the heads of the victims were cut off and carried away (Prowse, *op. cit.* p. 385).

4. Language.—Our knowledge of the Beothuk language, which bears no known relation to any other American Indian tongue, rests on two vocabularies (not altogether free from Micmac loan-words) obtained from the women Shawnandithit and Demasduit ('Mary March'), and containing about 330 words. These are only lexicographical in value, giving no hint of morphology or syntax.

5. Religious beliefs.—Naturally data concerning the religion of the Beothuks are extremely scanty, and must in part be re-constructed cautiously from rather vague implications. According to Broughton (quoted by Anspach, *Hist. of the Island of Newfoundland*, London, 1819, p. 457), 'they had some knowledge of a Supreme Being,' and they believed that men and women were originally created from a certain number of 'arrows stuck fast in the ground, and that the dead went into a far country,

there to make merry with their friends.' The implication of a hostile Micmac, that the Beothuks possessed no religion, is without value, especially as he expressly declared that no Micmac understood the Beothukan dialect (Chappell, *Voyage of H.M.S. Rosamond to Newfoundland*, London, 1818, p. 71). That they had a very keen sense of the future life is shown by their care in the disposal of the dead, and by the objects found interred with them. There were four types of graves. One class of burial-place resembled a hut 10 ft. long, 8–9 ft. broad, and 4–5 ft. high in the centre, with a floor of square poles and a roof covered with bark, the whole being well protected against the weather and the intrusions of wild beasts (cf. the description of the grave of Demasduit ['Mary March'] given by Lloyd, *JAI*, 1875, p. 32). In the second mode of burial the body was wrapped in birch bark, and, with the property of the deceased, was placed on a sort of scaffold about 4½ ft. from the ground. This scaffold was made of four posts, about 7 ft. high, fixed perpendicularly in the ground so as to sustain a kind of crib 5½ ft. long by 4 ft. broad, with a floor, made of small squared beams laid close together horizontally, on which the corpse and its belongings rested. A third method was by bending the body together, wrapping it in birch bark, and enclosing it in a kind of box. This receptacle, which was made of small squared sticks laid on each other horizontally and notched at the corners to fit closely, was laid on the ground. It was about 4 ft. long, 3 ft. broad, and 2½ ft. deep, and was lined with birch bark for protection against the weather. The body usually lay on the right side, though the skeleton of a boy found in 1886 (Macdougall, *op. cit.* ii. 102) had been placed on the left. A fourth, and more common, mode of Beothuk burial was to wrap the body in birch bark, and to lay it, covered with a heap of stones, on the surface of the ground in some retired spot. Occasionally in this last form of burial, the body, thus wrapped up, was put a foot or two underground, the grave then being covered with stones. If, however, the soil was sandy, graves were dug, and no stones were placed above them. The Beothuk cemeteries were located at definite places, to which the dead were brought from long distances (Lloyd, *loc. cit.*).

The Beothukan belief in a future life receives additional testimony from their custom of laying beside or on the grave, bows, arrows, and other implements of warfare. The grave of Demasduit ('Mary March') and her husband, moreover, contained small models of a male and female child and of canoes, in addition to cooking utensils of birch bark; while with the body of the boy already alluded to were buried food (salmon and trout), two pairs of moccasins, and other things. The interment of religious objects with a corpse near Comfort Head has been noted above (§ 3; cf. also Lloyd and Macdougall, *loc. cit.*).

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BERĀR.—1. Position.—Berār, otherwise known as the Hyderābād Assigned Districts, is a province of India, lying between 19° 35′ and 21° 47′ north latitude, and 75° 59′ and 79° 11′ east longitude. It is bounded on the north by the Sātpurā range and the river Tāptī, which separate it from the Central Provinces; on the east its boundary is the river Wardhā, on the south the Penganga; on the west lie portions of the Nizām's Dominions and of the Presidency of Bombay. Its total area is 17,710 square miles; and it is divided into three regions: the Melghāṭ, or hilly tract to the north, the Pāyānghāṭ, or central plain, and the Bālaghāṭ, or upland to the south.

2. History.—The history of the Province is so far relevant to its religion that it illustrates the mixture of races and the disturbing influence of the successive governments.

In the Epic period it formed part of the kingdom of Vidarbha, the first settled Aryan country south of the Vindhyan range (*BG* i. i. 135). Its name survives in that of Bidar in the Hyderābād State, and has been doubtfully connected with that of Berār, the derivation of which is uncertain. Authentic history begins with the occupation by the Āndhra dynasty (B.C. 220–A.D. 236). They were followed by various non-Aryan chieftains, who gave way to the Chālukya, Rāshṭrakūṭa, Hoysala Ballāla, and Yādava dynasties in succession. In A.D. 1294 the Muhammadans appeared on the scene, when Alā-ud-dīn captured the stronghold of Deogirī or Daulatābād—a raid which was repeated by Malik Kāfūr in A.D. 1309. The country subsequently fell to the Bahmanī kings of the Deccan and to those of Ahmadnagar. It was conquered by the Mughals under Akbar in 1596, and remained under them until the fall of the Empire, when, desolated by constant war in the 18th cent., it passed to the Nizām of Hyderābād in 1804. In 1853 the Nizām leased it to the British, and in 1902 a fresh treaty confirming this cession was concluded. In the following year it ceased to be an independent administration, and was incorporated with the Central Provinces.

3. Population.—At the Census of 1901 the population amounted to 2,754,016. In the more fertile parts the predominant caste is the Kunbī, which forms the chief element in the Marāthā people. They are classed by Risley (*Census India*, 1901, i. 503) as Scytho-Dravidian; but there is no evidence that the Śaka or Scythian tribes ever penetrated this region, and the Kunbī are of non-Aryan origin, possibly leavened by some intruding strain from the eastern or western coast. Next in numerical importance are the Mhār and Māng, almost pure non-Aryans, regarded by orthodox Hindus as foul out-castes. The forest tribes principally occupy the Gāwīlgarh hills in the Melghāṭ to the north, those of the greatest numerical importance being the Gond (74,280), Āndh (39,679), Korkū (28,393), and Bhīl (5,704). In the population as a whole the Aryan element is scanty. There is a notable absence of important cities or towns, and the population is largely rural. Naturally their religion is of a primitive type, little influenced by the movements which in the more advanced provinces have so profoundly affected belief.

4. Religious statistics.—According to the Census of 1901, Hindus numbered 2,388,016 (86·7 per cent of the total); Animists, 129,964 (4·7 per cent); Muhammadans, 212,040 (7·6 per cent); Christians, 2,375 (0·08 per cent). Hinduism is thus the chief religion, and here, as is the case in other provinces, it is impossible to draw a clear line of distinction between Hindus and Animists.

5. The higher Hinduism.—(*a*) *Śaivism.*—The beliefs of the higher classes do not materially differ from those prevailing in other provinces. The creed most popular with Brāhmans is that known as Smārta (Skr. *smṛti*, 'authoritative tradition') preached by Śaṅkarāchārya in the beginning of the 8th cent. A.D. It is the highest form of Vedāntic pantheism. From the point of view of sect most Brāhmans rank as Śaivas, the simplicity of the cult of Śiva recommending it in preference to that of the other greater gods. But, as is the case in other parts of India, the mass of the population is

ignorant or careless of the restrictions of sect, and they worship all or any of the recognized deities. Next to the Smārta the most important Śaiva sects are the Lingāyat and the Nāth. The former is described in a special article; the latter are connected with the Gosāīn or Gosāvī of other parts of the country. Most of the Nāth adopt a secular life and are known as Sanyogī, the ascetic minority being called Yogī. The latter are now very rare, and the majority of the Order live by weaving, fortune-telling, and charming, such as making magical passes over the sick with a bunch of peacocks' feathers; others are simple mendicants, leading about a little performing bull, known as *nandi*, the 'vehicle' of Śiva. The regular Gosāvī Order is chiefly made up of youths dedicated by their parents to the god. They act as spiritual advisers (*guru*) to the lower castes, by whom they are found more accommodating than Brāhmans, as they permit the use of meat and spirituous liquor (Kitts, 65). Most of the Śaivas, however, prefer to worship the local manifestations of the deity, such as Khaṇḍobā and Bhairobā or Bhairava, the great guardian-deities of the Deccan. A dog is tied at the shrine of the former when sacrifice is done before his image, and the Haṭkar, a pastoral tribe, flog each other severely at the temples of the latter (Lyall, *Gazetteer*, 190).

(*b*) *Vaiṣṇavism.*—The Vaiṣṇavas of Berār include a few followers of Rāmānuja and of Rāmānand; but many are disciples of Madhavāchārya, some of Vallabhāchārya, and others of the Bengal school of Chaitanya. Their increase in modern times is largely due to immigration from N. and W. India (Kitts, 61). Their favourite deity is Bālājī, the infant Kṛṣṇa, who is regarded as the god of wealth and prosperity, and at Bāsim he has the finest modern temple in the province.

The most interesting modern Vaiṣṇava sect is that of the Mānbhāv (Skr. *mahānubhāva*, 'dignified,' 'virtuous'). It was founded by Chakradhara, a Karhāḍa Brāhman, who is regarded as an incarnation of their deity Dattātreya, and was propagated by his disciple Nāgabhaṭa, who is called the Last Preceptor (A.D. 1236–1302) under the Yādava princes of Mahārāshṭra (R. G. Bhandarkar, *Times of India*, 15th Nov. 1907). They are divided into a celibate section (*Bairāgī*) and one of married householders (*Gharvāsī*). The former include both monks and nuns; the latter are divided into the nominal adherents (*Bholā*), who accept the principles of the Order so far as they do not conflict with the rules of caste, and those who ignore caste distinctions. The celibate monks shave the whole head and face, while the nuns have their hair removed by a male barber. They either live in monasteries or wander from place to place; they eat no meat and drink no water in the presence of an idol; both sexes wear black clothes and ear-rings and rosaries of the black basil wood (*tulasī*) sacred to Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa. They are a quiet, thrifty, orderly people; one of their chief rules is never to take life, and they are careful not to visit or eat at a place where a murder or an accidental death may have occurred. Their gods are Dattātreya, a deified saint worshipped as an incarnation of the triad—Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva—or more especially of Viṣṇu and Kṛṣṇa. Their scripture is the *Bhāgavad-gītā*, and they follow the teaching of a pontiff, known as the Kārañjkar Mahant, whose seat is at Ridhpur in Berār. Their rejection of the manifold saints and orthodox gods has brought them into conflict with Brāhmans; but they are held in much respect by lower caste Hindus. They have no belief in the agency of spirits, holding that the diseases usually attributed to them are the result of sins committed in this or in a former life. The initiation formula is communicated to the female branch by a senior nun. Each sex contains five grades of greater or inferior dignity. The dead are buried, not cremated. When a Mahant, or pontiff, dies, his corpse is washed, placed in a raised seat, worshipped, tied in a litter in a sitting posture, and carried to burial, not in one of the ordinary cemeteries, but in a clean place selected by the brethren, where the grave is spread with salt, the corpse laid on its left side facing the east, and a coconut is broken on the skull as a commutation of a sacrifice (*PR* ii. 106). After burial all traces of the grave are obliterated, and no tomb is raised—to avoid the possibility of the growth of a cult of the dead man. Like many Vaiṣṇava sects, they have been accused of immorality; in former times it is said that marriage between a monk and a nun was symbolized by the pair laying their wallets close together—a practice now denied by the members. Their numbers are decreasing, but this is perhaps due to the fact that in the present day fewer join the celibate section. In 1901 they numbered 2,566 in Berār (Kitts, 62 ff.; *BG* xix. 120 ff. xvii. 181 ff.).

6. **Popular Hinduism.**—The popular faith of the province has been fully described by Sir A. Lyall, whose classification (*Asiatic Studies*[2], i. 9 ff.) is here followed. (1) The worship of mere stocks and stones, and of local configurations, which are unusual or grotesque in size, shape, or position. This includes not only the worship of natural objects connected by legend with some deity or saint, but extends to 'the phallic rites, to the Sāligrām, or fossil, in which Vishnu is manifest, and to all that class of notions which entirely separate the outward image from the power really worshipped. So that at last we emerge into pure symbolism, as when anything appears to be selected arbitrarily to serve as a visible point for spiritual adoration.' (2) The worship of things inanimate, which are gifted with mysterious motion, such as water, fire, the sun, and trees. For instance, in an eddy of the Tāptī, wood, when floated down, sometimes disappears in a subterranean passage, to avoid which the Gonds propitiate the river-deity with the sacrifice of a goat; Mahishobā (Skr. *mahisha*, 'a buffalo') is a buffalo-god which lives under water and demands propitiation. The worship of fire in the form of the Vedic Agni has disappeared, but it is reverenced at the Brāhman fire-sacrifice (*havana*). The sun is the tribal deity of the wild Korkū of the northern hills, and he is also worshipped by all Hindus under different conceptions and doctrines regarding his personality. By the jungle-dweller the tree is feared as possessing sentient existence and mysterious potency, proved by its waving branches and the weird sounds which occasionally proceed from it. At a later stage trees which are fruitful or toxic are honoured, or a certain species is appropriated by one god, or a spirit seems to dwell in a great solitary trunk or in a gloomy grove. In the last case such places are laid under tabu, and no one dares to cut a tree or even to use the fallen branches as firewood. The custom of tying rags on trees, in order to bring the worshipper into communion with the indwelling spirit, is common, and one class of such trees is known as Chindīyā Deo, 'the deity of tatters,' where, if one present a rag in season, one may chance to get good clothes (Lyall, *Gazetteer*, 191; Kitts, 47 f.). (3) The worship of animals which are feared. This is illustrated by the cult of Wāgh Deo (Skr. *vyāghra*, 'tiger'), who is propitiated by those who frequent the jungle; and by the refusal of gardeners to inform sportsmen when a tiger or a leopard has taken up its quarters in their plantations, as they believe that the garden ceases to produce fruit when one of these animals is killed there (Lyall, *Gazetteer*, 61 f., 190 f.). In the same class is the cult of the snake, which is everywhere feared and reverenced, and of the monkey, which has now been appropriated by the Vaiṣnavas in the form of the monkey-god, Hanumān. (4) The worship of visible things, animate or inanimate, which are directly or indirectly useful and profitable, or which possess any incomprehensible function or property. Such is the reverence paid to oxen, and the worship of implements, such as the fisherman's net, the scribe's pen, the banker's account-books (*PR* ii. 185 ff.; cf. MacCulloch, *Childhood of Fiction*, 200 ff.). (5) The worship of a spirit (*deo*), a thing without form and void—the vague impersonation of the uneasy sensations which come upon people in the dark, in forests, or deserts. The site of the manifestation of such spirits is marked by a pile of stones, to which every passer-by contributes, or by rags or charms tied to a cliff or tree; or such beings are supposed to haunt an old banyan-tree or a ruined temple. (6) The worship of dead relatives, and other deceased persons known in life to the worshipper. Such are the worship of ancestors, and the attempt to recall

the spirit in a stone picked up at the grave, which is reverently worshipped for a time and then decently disposed of. (7) The worship at shrines of persons who had a great reputation during life, or who died in some strange or mysterious way. In the worship of Chānd Khān at almost every fort in Berār we have perhaps a survival of the foundation-sacrifice (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[2], i. 104 ff.; MacCulloch, *Childhood of Fiction*, 427). The Banjārā (*q.v.*) tribe worship a notorious bandit, and M. Raymond, the French commander, has been canonized. Besides these there is a host of saints and worthies whose shrines are found in all parts of the Province. (8) In some cases persons of this class rise to the rank of demi-gods or subordinate deities, and are worshipped in temples —a phase of the local beliefs fully illustrated by Lyall (*Asiatic Studies*[2], i. 30 ff.), who has, however, extended too far the ancestor-cult as an assumed origin of the theogony (see ANCESTOR-WORSHIP). The remaining forms of the local beliefs illustrated by the same writer—the worship of manifold local incarnations of the elder deities; of departmental deities; of the supreme gods of Hinduism and of their ancient incarnations and personifications, as recorded in the Brāhmanical scriptures—form part of the general official Hinduism, which is not peculiar to Berār.

7. **Animism.**—The general types of Animism current in the province have been described in the last paragraph. That of the forest-dwellers closely agrees with the beliefs of the cognate tribes (see DRAVIDIANS, BHĪLS, GOṆDS). The religion of the Korkūs, Gonds, and Āndhs has been described by Kitts (p. 77 f.) and C. A. Elliott (*Settlement Rep. Hoshangabad*, 1867, p. 250 ff.). The special class of sorcerers who are believed to control hailstorms and exercise wide influence over the peasantry is noteworthy. At the Dasahra feast the sorcerer (*gārpagārī*) mixes up samples of all kinds of grain grown in the village, and over them sprinkles the blood of the victim offered to Durgā. The grain is then shaken up and divided among a number of small pots, each of which is assigned to a certain period of the season during which hail may be expected. Over these, secret charms are recited. The pots are inspected daily, and, if there be danger of hail during the period represented by any pot, the grain in it is believed to bubble up, in which event Durgā must be propitiated with a victim, whose blood is allowed to drip into the pot—after which the ominous bubbling ceases. Māruti, the monkey-god and village-protector, must also be propitiated; but this is simply done by blowing a horn at his shrine or in some other part of the village (Lyall, *Gazetteer*, 208; Kitts, 60).

Totemism is indicated by the institution of guardians (*devak*), also common to the Deccan and the west Districts of the Bombay Presidency. The guardian is usually some animal or tree; but sometimes natural objects are included, such as one of their trade implements among artisans. Whatever the guardian may be, it is treated with respect. If it be an animal, its flesh is tabu; if it be a material object, it is worshipped at marriage and at the attainment of puberty. The Prabhū caste, when a youth is initiated into the privileges of caste by the binding of the sacred cord, mark their guardian-pot with coloured paint, place various offerings in it, close the lid and tie a string round it, and finally light a stone lamp before it (Campbell, *Notes on the Spirit Basis of Belief and Custom*, 1885, p. 8 ff.). The guardian is regarded as the head of the family, and persons possessing a common guardian cannot intermarry. Totemism is thus at present largely a social institution, and is closely analogous to the customs in Bengal (see BENGAL, p. 490; Frazer, *Totemism*, 58 ff.).

The spirits of the dead are supposed to bring disease upon children. The *mūnjā*, or ghost of a boy invested with the sacred thread who has died before marriage, is believed to be envious of the good fortune of others, and specially malignant. To avoid his ill-will, the child is called by an opprobrious name (see Crooke, *PR* ii. 4); or his father gives a feast at a banyan-tree to the unmarried males of the village; or he employs an exorcist, who propitiates the unmarried male dead of the household, sprinkles water over which sacred texts have been recited over the mouth and eyes of the child, and calls on the evil spirit to state who he is and how he gained entry. Finally, the spirit, by a tap of the wand of the exorcist, is persuaded to depart, whereupon the child takes an old shoe—an article which repels spirits—to a sacred fig-tree, at the foot of which he is supposed to fall senseless, and thus to become freed from the incubus. A nail is then driven into the tree to confine the spirit, or it is induced to enter a bottle which is buried deep underground (*ib.* i. 162, ii. 14). Rites of a similar kind are performed to repel or propitiate the ghost of a married woman (*manwin*) who is specially hostile to her own sex, and that of a child (*jhoting*) who has died before investiture with the sacred thread (Kitts, 53 f.).

The belief in sorcery and witchcraft affecting man and beast is wide-spread. The witch is feared rather than respected, but her power is believed to cease when her teeth fall out. The more Hinduized peasantry worship Gaṇpati or Gaṇeśa, god of luck, before starting on a journey or other enterprise; but the common people trust more to meeting omens. If a ring-dove enters the house, it is abandoned for three days, and purified by leading a cow inside, and giving food and alms to Brāhmans (*ib.* 49).

8. **Sikhs and Jains.**—Besides the orthodox Sikhs —immigrants from the Panjāb—some members of the Banjārā (*q.v.*) tribe recorded themselves as Sikhs at the last Census. Sikhs generally are most numerous on the Hyderābād frontier in the neighbourhood of the tomb of their Guru Govind at Nānder (Chinoy, 57 f.). The early influence of the Jains is shown by numerous temples, such as those at Sirpur, Muktagirī, and Kāranja. The present Jains consist largely of immigrants from Bombay, Rājputāna, and Central India, who are attracted by trade. The cave-temples at Pātūr Shaikh Bābā—a site which, as its name shows, has been since occupied by a Musalmān saint—seem to be Brāhmanical (Fergusson-Burgess, *Cave Temples*, 428).

9. **Muhammadans.**—Islām is increasing its numbers not so much from proselytism as by the greater fecundity of its members, the facts of which have been fully illustrated in the case of Bengal (see BENGAL, § 41). The faith has been much corrupted by the local Animism, as is shown by the prevalence of the cult of hermits and martyrs, to whose shrines, for the sake of their offerings, even Hindus are admitted. Some Muhammadans secretly engage Brāhmans to worship the local gods, retain their Hindu surnames, and employ the village astrologer to select an auspicious day for marriages (Lyall, *Gazetteer*, 194; Chinoy, i. 55 f.).

10. **Christians.**—Christians, now numbering 2375, have increased owing to missionary efforts during recent famines. The vast majority of them are native converts attached to the fourteen mission stations established in the Province. Enumerated by denominations, the largest congregations belong, in order, to the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, and Presbyterian Churches.

LITERATURE.—Sir A. C. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*[2], 1899; *Gazetteer for the Haidarābād Assigned Districts, commonly called Berar*, 1870 [this is under revision at present]; the *Census Reports* by E. J. Kitts, 1882, W. Hastings, 1892, A. D. Chinoy, 1902, of which the first is the most valuable. For the history: V. A. Smith, *Early History of India*[2], 1908; J. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*[3], 1873; articles in the *Provincial Gazetteer* and *Imperial Gazetteer*.

W. CROOKE.

BERBERS AND N. AFRICA.

[RENÉ BASSET.]

i. *PAGANISM.*—Whatever opinion may be held regarding the complex origin of the races which, under the general name of Berbers, inhabited, and still inhabit, all the north of North Africa, from the Mediterranean to the Sudan and from the Atlantic to Egypt, they form a linguistic unity; and it is only by starting from this point of view that we can hope to re-construct their ancient religion. But, at the very outset, we find ourselves faced with a difficulty which is almost insoluble. Although there was unity in their language, this was by no means the case in their religion, *i.e.* their pagan religion. Moreover, the uncertainty which still exists concerning the deciphering of the Libyan inscriptions deprives us of their help, and obliges us to have recourse to the scanty information supplied by foreigners, who have not always distinguished the native from the borrowed elements in the beliefs and ceremonies of which they have handed down accounts.

1. **Mountain-worship.**—It seems that irregularities of the ground—mountains, caves, and rocks—were regarded by the Berbers, if not as deities, at least as seats of divine beings. Therefore, at least in the west, Mount Atlas—'the pillar of Heaven,' as it was called by the people of the country in the time of Herodotus (*Hist.* iv. 184)—must have been the object of their worship. Pliny the Elder (*HN* v. i. 6) writes as follows:

'In the very middle of the sands Mount Atlas rears its head to the skies, rugged and bare on the side facing the ocean to which it gives its name; but, on the side which faces Africa, very shady, covered with woods and watered by gushing springs, fertile in fruits of all kinds, which grow of their own accord . . . and are sufficient to satisfy all desire. During the day not a single inhabitant is seen; everything preserves a deep silence, like the awful silence of the desert. As men approach the mountain, a religious fear seizes their hearts, especially at the sight of the summit raised above the clouds and apparently close to the circle of the moon.'

This information is confirmed by Maximus of Tyre (*Dissertationes*, viii. 57):

'The Western Libyans inhabit a long narrow strip of land surrounded by the sea. The extremity of this peninsula the ocean envelopes with heavy waves and currents. This they regard as the sanctuary and the image of Atlas. Now, Atlas is a hollow mountain, very lofty, opening out towards the sea as a theatre towards the sky. The space which stretches to the middle of the mountain is a narrow fertile valley covered with trees on which fruits are seen. Looking from the summit is like looking into the depths of a well. It is impossible to go down into it because of the steepness of the slope; besides, it is not allowed. The wonderful thing about this place is that, at high tide, the ocean covers the banks and spreads all over the fields; the waves rise up towards Atlas, and the water can be seen standing up against it like a wall, without flowing into the hollow part or falling to the ground; but between the mountain and the water there is a great deal of air and a hollow wood. *For the Libyans it is both a temple and a god*, the object by which they swear, and a statue.'

The Atlas of which he is speaking is evidently the Atlas of Morocco. Its native name, Dyris or Addiris (cf. in the Guanch dialect of Teneriffe, *adar*, 'cliff'; in Awelimmiden Tuareg, *adar*, 'mountain'), has been preserved by Pliny the Elder (*HN* v. i. 13) and Solinus (*Polyhistor*, § 29). But the Greek and Manichæan conception of Atlas supporting the world might be found in the name which, according to Galindo, the Guanches of Teneriffe gave to God, viz. *Atguaychcefunataman*,* 'he who supports the Heavens.' It would naturally have been applied to Mount Teyde in Teneriffe. Guanch mythology, however, assigned another rôle to this mountain. It must be taken for granted that the present Bul Qornin (the ancient Balcaranensis), who rules Tunis, and whose name re-appears in the deity worshipped there (Saturnus Balcaranensis), was venerated in primitive times by the Berbers, before the Phœnicians had installed their Ba'al* there, on whom Saturn was superimposed, sometimes represented as mounted on a lion (*CIL* viii. 20437, 20448) or accompanied by the epithet Sobare(n)sis at Henchir Bu Beker (*ib.* 12390, 12392). The Ba'al Ḳarnaim, who was worshipped there by the Phœnicians, and, undoubtedly in imitation of them, by the natives, was a purely Semitic deity, like the Ba'al of Hermon or the Ba'al of Lebanon,† whose *paredros* was Tanit Pené Ba'al, mentioned in a Punic inscription of Borj Jedid. Probably the same thing happened with the cult of Ba'al Hamān at Dugga.‡ Dedications to Saturn are, however, very frequent in the Latin inscriptions of Africa, and the name of Saturnius is often mentioned. We may cite at Ain Zana (Diana) a dedication, 'Deo frugum Saturno frugifero Augusto' (*CIL* viii. 4581), and at Fontaine-Chaude an inscription, 'Deo Sancto frugifero' (*ib.* 17720). A Latin inscription, found at some distance from Aumale, is addressed to the genius of the mountain, Pastoria(nen)sis, who gives shelter from the violence of the wind (*ib.* 9180); there is also one at Chemtu in Tunisia to the genius of the mountain (*ib.* 14588). Even in our day certain mountains excite among the Tuaregs a religious fear which they cannot overcome. But it is not the terrifying appearance of the mountains that inspires the fear; it is the genii who dwell in them. This belief existed even from the time of Pliny the Elder. Reproducing a passage from the *Periplus* of Hanno, he places in Atlas the Ægipanes and the Satyrs, whom the Carthaginian traveller locates much further south (*Periplus*, § 14); the same passage is also quoted by Solinus (*Polyhistor*, § 29). In the 12th cent. of our era an anonymous Arabian writer mentioned similar beings in a mountain of the Sahara, but his story bears the clear stamp of Musalmān beliefs.§ It tells of the mountain of Felfel, which holds within it the remains of numerous towns abandoned because of the genii; during the night people see their fires there and hear their whistling and singing. Among the Azger Tuaregs the grove of Idinen, 30 kilometres to the north of Ghāt, is the object of a superstitious terror, and no one would dare to penetrate it. Barth, who explored it, almost died of thirst without, however, having found any of the ruins which were said to be there.‖ Among the Ahaggar, Mount Udan is regarded in the same way, and the name given to the mysterious beings who inhabit it, *alhīnan* (from Arab. *al-jinn*), shows clearly that an Arab belief has come to be added to a superstition of Berber origin.¶ The Kudiat, to the north of Temanghaset and to the east of Ilaman, is likewise the object of fears of this kind.** In the Canary Islands, Mount Teyde,

* In this extraordinary and evidently corrupted name, it is impossible to decipher, even approximately, more than the last part *ataman*, which is an erroneous form of *achaman*, 'god.'

* Cf. Toutain, 'Le Sanctuaire de Saturnus Balcaranensis au Djebel Bou Kornin,' in *Mélanges de l'École de Rome*, vol. xii., and *De Saturni dei in Africa romana cultu*, Paris, 1894; Ferrère, *La Situation religieuse de l'Afrique romaine depuis la fin du ive siècle*, Paris, 1897, p. 80.

† Cf. Lagrange, *Études sur les religions sémitiques*, Paris, 1905.

‡ Carton, *Le Sanctuaire de Ba'al Saturne à Dougga*, Paris, 1897.

§ A. de Kremer, *Description de l'Afrique*, Vienna, 1852, p. 69.

‖ Barth, *Reisen u. Entdeck. in Nord- u. Centr.-Afrika*, Gotha, 1856, i. 228–236; Duveyrier, *Les Touaregs du Nord*, Paris, 1864, p. 416.

¶ Duveyrier, *op. cit.* p. 416 f.; Benhazera, *Six mois chez les Touareg du Ahaggar*, Algiers, 1908, p. 60.

** de Motylinski, 'Voyage à Abalessa et à la Koudia,' in *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française*, Oct. 1907, p. 257 ff

where hell (*echeyde*) was supposed to be, was inhabited by a demon of the name of *Guayota* or *Huayota*. The demon of Palma was called *Iruene*.*

2. Rock-worship.—Rock-worship is naturally joined with mountain-worship. Pliny the Elder (*HN* II. ii. 44) and Pomponius Mela (*de Situ Orbis* i. 8) tell of a rock in Cyrenaica consecrated to the South Wind: 'if it is touched by the hand of man, immediately the wind rises violently, tossing the sand like waves, and rages as it does over the billows.' In the Canary Islands, near the crater of Caldera in Palma, there was a rock, formed like an obelisk, which was called Idafe. To prevent it from falling, the people of the tribe of Tanansu, who were settled in the neighbourhood, used to make offerings to it, with processions and singing; they sacrificed entrails, and then ate the animals, and sometimes whole victims were cast down from the heights of the neighbouring mountains.† In the Great Canary Island there were two rocks: the one called Tismar, in the district of Galdar, the other Vimenya, in Telde. In times of distress the inhabitants, accompanied by priests called *magadas* (Viana, p. 22, calls them *harimaguadas*), used to make pilgrimages to these two rocks, carrying in their hands palm-branches and vases filled with milk and butter. This they poured on the rocks, dancing round about them and singing lugubrious airs like funeral chants, which the Spaniards called *endechas*. They then proceeded to the seashore, and beat the waves vigorously with their rods, shouting all the time at the pitch of their voices.‡ It is evident that here we have to do with a kind of worship. Besides, if we can believe to the letter what the Spanish writers have handed down, the Guanches, differing from the other Berbers, seem to have had a settled religion. In any case, we are tempted to connect with this institution of sacrifices the use made of a stone situated near Guertufa, between Tiaret and Relizane, and known by the name of *Ḥajar Gaïd*.

'In one place a recess in the rock leaves a mound between it and the road, and it looks like a huge stone, apparently fallen from the summit and caught on the other rocks. It measures 4 metres at its highest part and 1 m. 70 at its lowest, its upper surface is 10 m. long and at least 6 m. broad at its broadest part. . . . After climbing up this rock, perfectly irregular, but possessing a sort of platform, inclined at 30 degrees, one sees a sort of cascade, formed by three basins of unequal size and depth, into which it is evident that quantities of liquid have poured. To the right are two little round holes; to the left, two little square holes, all being from 10 to 15 cms. wide. There is no doubt that there was a primitive altar there, a table for sacrifices.'§

We may quote the conclusion of this description: 'The *Hajar Gaïd* was a splendidly-chosen place for a bloody religion. The sacrificer, raised up 8 or 10 metres above the crowd, let the blood of the victim flow from one basin into the other. The sacrifice was performed before a vast horizon; all the races of the plain saw it, and the fire that was lit was *undoubtedly* seen from the far-off heights of the mountain of Lalla Krua.'‖

But this is merely a hypothesis. There still exist, however, in the Canary Islands places where libations of milk were made—holes and trenches hollowed out in the hard rock for the purpose of receiving the liquid. There were also sacrifice-trenches—simple cavities surrounded by carefully-arranged heaps of stones.¶ In the *qṣar* of Tamentit in Tuat, there is an aerolite which, even to this day, is the object of general veneration. Legend tells that, when it fell from the sky, near Nun en-Nas, it was gold, but God changed it into silver, and then into iron, to prevent covetousness.** Connected with natural rocks, and rocks wrought by the hands of men, are dolmens, but as these are really tombs, it is unnecessary to speak of them here.†† See art. STONES.

3. Cave-worship.—Caverns seem also to have been worshipped among the ancient Berbers, in agreement with the testimony of Seneca (*ad Lucilium Ep.* xli.): 'Et si quis specus saxis penitus exesis montem suspenderit, non manu factus, sed naturalibus causis in tantam laxitatem excavatus; animum tuum quadam religionis suspicione percutiet.' But nothing has been found as yet to prove the existence of the god of caverns, Ifru or Ifri, affirmed by Masqueray.‡‡ The most celebrated deity who is mentioned is the god Bacax, whose grotto near Annuna (Thibilis) has been discovered and explored. In this cavern 'the apartments are not all situated in one horizontal plane, nor are they connected simply by narrow passages; they are often placed one above the other, and have communication with each other by natural stairs, sometimes even by actual wells. The difference in level between the entry-passage and the bottom of the cavern cannot be less than three or four hundred metres.'§§ The name of the god Bacax, mentioned in a certain number of Latin inscriptions, *CIL* viii. 5504 (18828), 5505 (18829), 5517 (18847), 5518 (18850), 18831, 18838, has as yet defied all attempts at interpretation. It was in front of the entrance to the cave that sacrifices were offered. Perhaps it is to a cult of this kind that we should attribute the Libyan inscriptions which are found in great numbers in the grotto of Ifri n delal. There is still another cave-deity whose name must be recognized in the enigmatical GDAS, with which a certain number of inscriptions begin—the inscriptions found in the cave known as R' ar Zemma, situated on a spur of Jebel Chettaba, in the neighbourhood of Constantine. Opposed though it is by G. Mercier,‖‖ who has given a minute description of the cave, the proposal of Mgr. Toulotte and M. Héron de Villefosse to connect the present name Chettaba with the mountain of Giddaba mentioned by St. Augustine is tempting; and GDAS would stand for 'Giddabæ deo augusto sacrum.'¶¶ In the Great Canary Island, two leagues from Teyde, at the top of a volcanic mountain, there is a large cave in the rock, entered by four openings fourteen feet high, whence arises the popular name, 'Mountain of the four doors.' The openings are separated by pillars varying in diameter from seven to nine feet. In front of each pillar, on a level part cut out of the rock, and serving as a peristyle to the cave, there are several niches, some round and others square. These seem to have been intended to hold the objects of the cult. The niches are more than five feet from the ground.*** In the Isle of Fer in the Canaries, the cave of Asteheyta, in the district of Tacuitunta, served as a refuge for the man who, in times of

* Viana, *Antigüedades de las Islas Afortunadas*, Tubingen, 1883, p. 24; Barker Webb and Sabin Berthelot, *Histoire naturelle des îles Canaries*, Paris, 1842, vol. i. pt. i. p. 173 f.; Verneau, *Cinq années de séjour aux îles Canaries*, Paris, 1890, p. 94.

† Glas, *The History of the Canary Islands*, London, 1764; Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* vol. i. pt. i. p. 172; Verneau, *op. cit.* p. 94.

‡ Glas, *op. cit.* ii. 8, 70; Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* vol. i. pt. i. p. 169.

§ La Blanchère, *Voyage d'études dans une partie de la Maurétanie Césarienne*, Paris, 1892, p. 42.

‖ *Ib.* p. 43.

¶ Verneau, *op. cit.* p. 90 f.

* Rohlfs, *Reise durch Marokko*, Bremen, 1862, p. 145; Laquière, *Les Reconnaissances du général Servière*, Paris, n.d., p. 21 f. (with a photograph of the aerolite); E. F. Gautier, *Le Sahara algérien*, Paris, 1908, i. 253.

† Cf. on the dolmens of Algeria, Gsell, *Les Monuments antiques de l'Algérie*, Paris, 1901, i. 20–30 (with a very full bibliography on the question).

‡ 'Comparaison du vocabulaire des Zénagas,' in *Archives des missions scientifiques*, Paris, 1870, p. 481.

§ Monceaux, *La grotte du dieu Bacax au Djebel Taïa*, Paris, 1887; G. Mercier, *Les divinités libyques*, Constantine, n. d., p. 6 f.

‖ 'La grotte du Chettaba,' in *Recueil archéologique de Constantine*, xxxv. 156–166.

¶ Cf. Gsell, *Chronique africaine*, Rome, 1903, p. 44 f. and note 8.

** Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* vol. i. pt. i. p. 159 f.

drought, went to implore the goddess. She appeared to him and gave him a pig, which he presented to the assembly as a token that his prayers were answered.*

4. **Air-worship.**—We do not know if the Berbers worshipped the air or the wind, but if they did, it was undoubtedly under foreign influence. We have an inscription in Latin verse, found at Naraggara (Sidi Yusuf), in which the air is invoked under the name of Juno (*CIL* viii. 4635); and it is perhaps to a cult of this order that we must attribute an inscription of Ain Mtirchu (*ib.* 17763). These should be compared with a passage of Firmicus Maternus (*de Erroribus Profanarum Religionum*, § 111), according to which the Assyrians and *some of the inhabitants of Africa* placed air in a sort of authority over the other elements. But, as he adds that they consecrated it under the name of Juno or of the virgin Venus, it is clear that we are here dealing with a Punic cult.

5. **River-deities.**—Rivers, or at least the sources of rivers, were consecrated to a particular deity. The only extant inscriptions which mention them give us, as the title of the special deity, the word 'genius,' probably due to Roman influence (*genius*). Thus near the Sig was found a dedication to the genius of the river ('genio fluminis,' *CIL* viii. 9749); at the source of the Bu Merzug, near ancient Sila, an inscription was excavated which mentions the genius of the Amsaga, the former name of the river (*ib.* 5884).† There is one in existence to the deity of the river Alexandriana (*ib.* 2662), to the deity of the waters (*ib.* 2663), to the genius of the fountain ('genio fontis') associated with Juppiter, and to the Fountain of Caid, near Batna (*ib.* 4291).

6. **Town-deities.**—The application of the name 'genius' to towns, frequently found in the inscriptions, seems to be the result of an imitation of the customs of the Romans, who personified towns in some special genius, when it was not actually the work of Roman settlers rather than of the native populations. Thus the genius of a village in Lambessa ('genio vici,' *CIL* viii. 2604 f.); the genius of Lambessa ('genio Lambæsis,' *ib.* 2528, 2596, 2598 f.); the genius of Rusicada ('genio coloniæ Veneriæ Rusicadæ augusto,' *ib.* 7959 f.); the genius of Henchir Masfuna ('genio Lamasbæ augusto'); the genius of a market-town in Sur Juab ('genio pagi augusto,' *ib.* 9196); the genius of the Cirtæan colonies (*ib.* 5693, 10866); the genius of the colony of Milah (*ib.* 7960, 8202 [=19980]); the genius of Mactar (*ib.* 6352); the genius of Subzavar (*ib.* 6001); the genius of Phua (*ib.* 6267–91); the genius of the municipality of Testur (*ib.* 1353 [14891]); the genius of the municipality of Sataf (Ain Kebir, *ib.* 8389); the genius of the 'civitas Celtianensium' among the Beni-Welban (*ib.* 19688); the genius 'populi Cuiculitani' at Jamila (*ib.* 20144); the genius of the colony at Henchir Sidi Alibelqāsem (*ib.* 14687); the genius of the 'oppidum Lamsortense' at Henchir Maf'ūna (*ib.* 18596); the genius of the 'colonia Julia Veneria Chirtæ Novæ' at Henchir Jezza (*ib.* 16367); the genius of the market-town ('genio vici augusto') at Marcūna (*ib.* 424); the genius of Thibar at Henchir Amamet (*ib.* 15345); the genius of the people at Ain Zana (*ib.* 4575), at Constantine (*ib.* 6947 f.); the genius of Novar among the Beni Fūda (*ib.* 20429 f.); and the genius of Gadimefala ([?] *ib.* 18752). We may add to these the invincible deity of Gurai (Qsar Gurai, near Tebessa, *ib.* 1843), and the deity who is mentioned in an inscription of Borj Hamza, 'Auzio deo genio' (*ib.* 9014). The genius is usually a Latin or Punico-Latin deity, as at Qsar al-Ahmar, in the region of Ain Beida. In a dedication to Saturn, of the 3rd cent., this god is qualified as 'genius saltus Sorothensis';* in another addressed to Juppiter, at Uzali, there is 'genius arcae frumentariae' (*ib.* 6639).

7. **Sun-worship.**—Besides mountains, rocks, caves, and rivers, the Berbers worshipped the stars, and, primarily, the sun. This cult existed among the nomadic Berbers between Egypt and Lake Tritonis (Herod. *Hist.* iv. 188), and among the Berbers in general.† We read in the *Life* of St. Samuel of Qalamon that the Berber who had reduced him to slavery wished to make him worship the sun.‡ There are also some Latin inscriptions dedicated to it: 'Soli deo invicto,' in the plain of Batna (*CIL* viii. 2675); 'Soli deo augusto,' at Zarai (*ib.* 4513); 'Soli invicto,' at Suk-Ahras (*ib.* 5143), at Sluguia (*ib.* 1329), at Cherchel (*ib.* 9331), at Affreville (*ib.* 9629); to the sun and the moon, near Sidi Alibelqāsem in Tunisia (*ib.* 14688 f.); but it is doubtful whether it is the ancient Berber deity that is involved when we find the sun assimilated with Mithra at el-Gan (*ib.* 18025) as well as at Ain Tukria (*ib.* 21523). On the other hand, it seems to be the Berber god that is referred to in a Latin inscription at Aumale, of the year 207 of the era of the province, in which there is mention of ceremonies in honour of Tonant, the wearer of horns, and of a Pantheia who was connected with him, was worshipped on the Libyan and Moorish borders, and had her seat between Juppiter Ammon and Dis (*ib.* 9018).

The Guanches of Palma also worshipped the sun, and gave it the name of *Mayec*,§ as well as the name *Amen*, which seems to have meant 'Lord'; in Awelimmiden Tuareg, *Amanai* has the meaning of 'God.' According to Macrobius (*Sat. conviv.* i. 21), the Libyans worshipped the setting sun, which was impersonated by Ammon (Amen). He was represented with ram's horns, in which resided his chief power, as that of the sun in its rays.‖ In the speech of Athanasius against the Gentiles (§ 14) it is said that among the Libyans the sheep was called *amen*, and that it was worshipped as a deity. The opinion, however, has been suggested, with every appearance of reason, that Ammon (Hammon, Amen) was a god of Berber origin. We may compare with this the carving on the rock found at Bu Alem in South Oranais, representing rams with their heads surmounted by an ornamentation in the form of a solar disc, surrounded with a uræus.¶ It would be a mistake, however, to see here the prototype of the Egyptian Amen; the present writer believes, with Gsell, that it is a more or less successful copy of the Egyptian representation, as probably are the rock-drawings discovered by Barth at Telissau, west of Fezzan,** and the bas-relief found in the foundations of the Borj Tasko at Ghadames.††

But there is still another proof of the worship of a ram representing the sun, and one in which we do not see an Egyptian imitation. It is found in a monument, discovered in 1851 at Old Arzeu, representing 'a roughly sculptured head with a very slightly sharpened nose, two little round holes for the eyes and for the ears, and the mouth

* Viara y Clavijo, in Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* vol. i. pt. i. p. 168; Verneau, *op. cit.* p. 92 f.

† Cf. also Cherbonneau, *Excursion dans les ruines de Mila, Sufavar, Sila et Sigus*, Constantine, n.d., p. 30 f.

* Gsell, *op. cit.* p. 40.

† Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, Bulaq, 1284, vi. 89.

‡ R. Basset, *Synaxaire arabe-jacobite*, Paris, i. 331; F. M. Esteves Pereira, *Vida de Abba Samuel*, Lisbon, 1894, pp. 22, 99, 154.

§ Cf. Alvise de Ca' Da Mosto, *Relation des voyages à la côte occidentale d'Afrique*, tr. J. Temporal, Paris, 1895, p. 34; Viana, *op. cit.* p. 24; Glas, *op. cit.* p. 139.

‖ Cf. also Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis Philologiæ*, lib. ii., ed. Eyssenhardt, Leipzig, 1866, p. 44.

¶ Gsell, *Chronique archéologique africaine*, Rome, 1900, p. 83, *Les monuments antiques de l'Algérie*, i. 93.

** *Op. cit.* i. 210–217.

†† Duveyrier, *Les Touaregs du Nord*, pl. x.

represented by a hollowed line; its horns are curved back, the points to the ground, and the arms are fixed to the body with the hands coming and joining above the navel. The under part of the body ends in a terminal.'* It is also an idol of this kind that was found at Tuat, and is designated 'getule idol' (?).† This may be identified with *Gurzil*, whose priest was Terna. He was the son of Juppiter Ammon (Corippus, *Johannidos*, ii. 109 f., v. 494 f., vi. 116) by a heifer (*ib.* ii. 111). This Gurzil is regarded as an Apollo; he was represented by an image of a bull being carried to fight (*ib.* iv. 666–673, v. 22–29). The cult of this deity was maintained for a long time, for in the 11th cent. of our era al-Bakrī mentions a stone idol in Tripoli, set up on a hill and named Gorza, to which the tribes round about—the Howara amongst others—offered sacrifices and addressed prayers in order to recover their riches.‡ Al-Bakrī, unfortunately, gives no information about the shape of this idol. Probably it was also a Berber idol of this kind that the same author calls 'Maghmades' (perhaps the *Macomades* of the ancients), and describes as being set up on the seashore between Egypt and the Maghrib, and surrounded by several others.§ The name 'Gorza' seems to recur as an element of the names of the locality in a town placed by Polybius (*Hist.* i. 74) near Utica, and in a *tessera* of hospitality and patronage in the reign of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (*CIL* viii. 68): 'Senatus populusque civitatium stipendiariarum Pago Gurzenses hospitium fecerunt . . . Faciundum coeraverunt Ammicar Milchatonis f. Cynasyn Boncar Azzrubalis f. *Æthogurzensis* Muthunbal f. . . .' The Punic names of the donors will be noticed.‖ Another brass plate mentions the 'civitas Gurzensis' (*CIL* viii. 69), and perhaps we must recognize *Gurza* in the *Gurra* of the *Pentinger Tables*. In the 11th cent., also, al-Bakrī mentions in Atlas, near the B. Lamās, between Aghmāt and the Sūs, a tribe of idolatrous Berbers who worshipped a ram. Not one of them would dare to come into the markets of the neighbouring tribes except in disguise (*Description de l'Afrique*, p. 161). In this cult of the sun, one single tribe, the Atlantes (or *Atarantes*), was an exception; they had no individual names to distinguish them, and they watched the rising and the setting sun, uttering terrible imprecations all the time, as though against a planet deadly to them and to their fields; they had no dreams like other men. This is what is recorded by Herodotus (*Hist.* iv. 184) and Pliny the Elder (*HN* v. 8). The only imprecations mentioned by Nicolaus of Damascus (frag. 140, ed. Muller) are against the rising sun.

8. Moon-worship.—The moon was also worshipped by the nomadic Berbers between Lake Tritonis and Egypt (Herod. iv. 188), by other Berbers in the West (ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, vi. 89), and by the Guanches. The latter observed all its phases with great accuracy, especially the new moon and the full moon.¶ Had the Berbers assimilated it to the celestial goddess of Dugga and Carthage, the latter title being borne, according to tradition, by Dido, called by the Phœnicians Astro Arkhe, and transported to Rome by Caracalla (Herodian, *Historia Romana*, v. vi. 4)? As is seen from a passage in *Historiae Augustae*, the predictions coming from the temple of Cœlestis in Carthage caused a great number of seditions in Africa—seditions in which the Berbers probably took part, and which Pertinax had to repress during his proconsulship of Africa (Capitolinus, *Vita Pertinacis*, ch. iv.). We find the crescent moon at the top of a great number of inscriptions (cf. *CIL*, *passim*), one of which, among the Beni-Ukden, is in Libyan and Phœnician characters (*CIL* viii. 20186); but it is very probable that this sign, which in primitive times had signified a lunar cult, had become a meaningless ornamentation. There is no occasion for the theory, formed from inaccurate etymology and assimilations, that Tanit, the great Punic goddess, was of Berber provenance.* For, since the name of the moon in Berber is masculine, *Aiur* or *Aggur*, it could not have been represented as a goddess. There is far more probability in the hypothesis of G. Mercier,† which tends to find *Aiur* in the enigmatical *Teru*, mentioned along with the epithet 'augustus' in an inscription discovered on the Guechgach, sixteen kilometres from Constantine (*CIL* viii. 5673).

9. Worship of other planets.—It is very probable that the other celestial bodies were worshipped by the Berbers, although we have no proofs except for a few of them. Alvise de Ca' Da Mosto asserts this for the Guanches of Teneriffe (*Relation*, p. 34). The planet Venus is called *Lemr'er* at the present day in Zuawa. Among the Awelimmiden, when it is an evening star, it has the name of *tatari*, and when a morning star, that of *amawen n chad* or *amawen achimmelech*. Among the Ahaggar, it is called *Tatrit ta n tufat*, which can be exactly translated by 'morning-star.' Following the example of other peoples, the Ahaggar have located a certain number of tales in the sky. We cannot, however, decide whether they correspond to a religious sentiment. Thus the Pleiades are the 'Daughters of Night' (*Chēt Ahadh*). Six of the stars of this constellation have each a name; the seventh is a boy's eye which had been taken out and flew up to the sky. This story is given in the following verses:

'The daughters of the night are seven in number:
Māterejre and Errejāot,
Māteseksek and Esseksāot,
Mātelaghlagh and Elleghāot;
The seventh is the eye of a boy which flew up to Heaven.'‡

We can see that the six stars reduce to three pairs whose names are derived from the same root. The Awelimmiden give them also the name of *Chettahet* (=*Chēt Ahadh*).

Orion (in Tuareg, *Amanar*) has two interpretations. According to the one, he comes out of a muddy well; and Rigel (*Adar Nelaku*, 'the Foot in the Mud') is the foot he brings out of the mud last, *i.e.* the last star when the constellation is rising in the East. According to the other, he is a hunter, with his belt on (in Ahaggar and Awelimmiden *Tajebest en Amanar*, 'Belt of Orion'), who is followed by a dog (*Eidi*, Sirius) and preceded by gazelles (*Ihenkadh*, 'constellation of the Hare').§

The Great Bear and the Little Bear represent a camel and her young one (*Talemet de roris*); the Pole Star is a negress called *Lemkechen* (*i.e.* 'hold') because she has to hold the young camel (*Aura*) to let its mother be milked. But the stars ψ, λ, μ, ν, ξ represent an assembly which deliberates whether the negress is to be killed. She (the Pole Star) stands motionless with fear.‖ According to a legend contaminated by the Musalmān religion, the Great Bear is a camel which belonged to Noah. It was slain by seven nobles, one of them a Tuareg; he was changed into an 'ourane' (*ar'ata*, a kind of large lizard), the others into a jackal, a

* Berbrugger, *Bibliothèque-musée d'Alger*, Algiers, 1860, p. 29 f.
† E. F. Gautier, *op. cit.* p. 253.
‡ Cf. J. Partsch, *Die Berbern in der Dichtung des Corippus*, Breslau, 1896, p. 16.
§ Al-Bakrī, *Description de l'Afrique septentrionale*, Arab text, ed. de Slane, Algiers, 1857, p. 12.
‖ Egger, *Latini sermonis reliquiae*, Paris, 1843, p. 427.
¶ Alvise de Ca' Da Mosto, *Relation*, p. 34; Glas, *The History of the Canary Islands*, p. 139.

* Bertholon, 'Essai sur la religion des Libyens,' in *Revue tunisienne*, Nov. 1908, pp 484–490
† *Les divinités libyques*, pp 12–16.
‡ Duveyrier, *op cit* p 424 f.
§ *Ib.* p. 424. ‖ *Ib.* p. 424.

chameleon, etc. The camel was transported to the sky. Since then, the Tuaregs have never eaten the 'ourane,' which they regard as their maternal uncle.*

The Scorpion is sometimes called *Tagherdamt* ('scorpion'), sometimes *Tazzeit* ('palm-tree'). A young man, *Amrot* (*Antaris*) is going to climb the palm-tree; but when half-way up the tree he notices some pretty girls (*tibaradin*), clothed in red *haulis*, coming from the lake (*Tesahak*); he stops half-way up to watch them.†

Other constellations have names, but no legend attaches to them. In Bougie the Milky Way is called *Ajgu n tignau*, 'beam of the sky,' and among the Tuaregs *Mahellau*. The stars ϵ, δ, η of the Great Dog are called *Ifarakraken*, 'noise of a fan or of a bird,' and β, *Auhem*, 'the young of the gazelle.' θ and o of the Boat are 'Riches' (*Tenafalet*) and 'Poverty' (*Tozzert*). Aldebaran is called *Kokoyyodh* and Canope *Wadit*.‡ In ancient times the Africans (Afri) were considered very skilled in the science of horoscopes, and particularly so was Septimius Severus—as may be seen from a saying attributed to him. Speaking of his son Geta to Juvenal, prefect of the pretorians, he said: 'It is astonishing that my son Geta is to be deified; his constellation had nothing imperial in it to my eyes' (Spartianus, 'Vita Getae,' § 2 in *Historiae Augustae*.)

The name of the rainbow, among certain Berber tribes, has preserved the trace of a myth. Although at Wad Rir' it is called *abechchi* and in Harakta *abeggas* ('girdle'), in Zuawa it is called *thislith b wanzar*, among the Bot'iwa of Rif *thislith n unzar*, among the B. Iznacen *thaslit n unzar*, which means 'bride of the rain,' and among the Beni Menacer *taslith n ujenna*, 'bride of the sky.' The rain (*Anzar*) is then considered a male being. In Jurjura, the Kabyle children, in times of drought, go from house to house singing:

'Anzar! Anzar!
O Lord, water us to the roots.'§

At Mzab, the children sing while transplanting grain:

'Give us, O Lord, the water of Anzar.'‖

In a popular tale of Wargla, Amzar (=Anzar) is personified.¶ The rainbow is consequently regarded as the bride of the rain. This myth is not without parallel in the way in which certain Berber and Arab peoples of the Maghrib provoke rain. At Ain Sefra, at Tlemsen, and at Mazuna, they take a wooden spoon (in Kabyle *aghenja*) and dress it in bits of cloth, so as to make it a sort of doll representing a bride, called *Ghonja*; they take this in solemn procession to the tombs of the local priests, singing couplets which vary according to the locality. For example:

'Ghonja! Ghonja has uncovered her head.
O Lord, thou wilt water her ear-drops,
Her ear is thirsty;
Give her drink, O our Master!'**

At Tit, in the oasis of Tuat, during drought, the people go out of the *qsar*—men, women, boys, and girls. They take a wooden spoon and dress it in female garments. A young girl carries it, and the people keep saying: 'O spoon! O meadow! (*ar'enja—ia merja*) Lord, remove the time of heat! Lord! in the name of the Prophets!' Tertullian (*Apol.* xxiii.) gives the Virgo Cœlestis the title of 'Pluviarum Pollicitatrix.' Among the Guanches the main part of the ceremony for bringing rain was to make men and animals fast, and, in Teneriffe, even the young animals, which were separated from their mothers, and whose cries were expected to move the heavens.* Rain-making was also a gift of certain magicians. An ancient historian tells how among the Berbers a Roman army under the command of Hosidius Geta, successor of Suetonius Paulinus, almost died of thirst in the desert when in pursuit of the rebels and their chief Subulus. A native ally persuaded the general to have recourse to incantations and magic, affirming that often great quantities of water had been got by these means. This time again the process was successful, but we do not know in what it consisted (Dio Cassius, *Hist. Rom.* ix. 9).

10. Native deities.—To these deities we must add those which are made known to us by Latin epigraphy, though we are not sure about their nature and attributes. Thus we have dedications to the Moorish gods at various places in North Africa: at Cherchel (*CIL* viii. 9327), near Wed Marcūna (*ib.* 2639), near Wed Tezzulet (*ib.* 2640); at Lamoricière (*ib.* 21720), at Henchir Ramdan in Tunisia (*ib.* 1442); to the Moorish saviour-gods and to the genius of Satafis at Ain Kebira (*ib.* 20251). Possibly these Moorish gods are the deified kings of whom we are to speak below (pp. 511–512), but there is nothing to prove it. Thus Autaman, associated with Mercury in an inscription at Lambessa (*ib.* 2650), and compared with the Mastiman of Corippus (*Johannidos*, viii. 306 f.), some people used to take for the god of war.† Other Moors saw in him Juppiter Tænarius (which it has been proposed to correct to Juppiter Tartarius, corresponding to Dis Severus in the Latin inscription, *CIL* viii. 9018),‡ to whom human victims were sacrificed in times of plague (*Johannidos*, viii. 307–309). We may compare this passage with the statement of Pliny the Elder (*HN* v. 8) that the Augilæ worshipped none but the infernal gods, or, according to Pomponius Mela, the *manes* (*de Situ Orbis*, i. 8). Aulisva was worshipped in the region of Tlemsen, as is shown by two inscriptions found in Agadir (*CIL* viii. 9906 f.), and one at Ain Khial (*ib.* 21704). It is not necessary to insist on Kantus Pates—a reading which is quite sure in an inscription of Khenchela—any more than on Kaub, mentioned in the Chettaba. An inscription in Henchir Matkidas (*ib.* 16749) seems to point to five gods of the village of Magifa: it is dedicated to Masidenis, Thikikvæ, Sugganis, and Iesdanis, of whom there were statues. Another inscription, at Sidi Yusuf (*ib.* 18809), mentions an Iocolo (*Iocoloni deo patrio*). This epithet, *Deus patrius*, is given to Baliddir or Baldir in the inscriptions that mention his name: at Guela 'at Bu-Sba, between Bōna and Guelma (*ib.* 5279), and at Sigus (*ib.* 19121–19123). Is this the same as the *Genius patrius*, a priest of whom was buried at Zettara (Kef Beziua)? Another *Deus patrius*, who had priests, is located at Henchir el-Bez (*ib.* 12003). Is this name Baliddir, or at least its second part, *iddir*, a Berber word, as G. Mercier§ maintains, translating it by 'the living God'? The chief objection would come from the fact that this would be a hybrid word, compounded of Punic and Berber. It has also been identified (but this is a very improbable theory) with the name of Abbadiri Sancto,‖ mentioned in

* Benhazera, *op. cit.* p. 60 f.
† Duveyrier, *op. cit.* p. 425. ‡ *Ib* pp 424–426.
§ Ben Sedira, *Cours de langue Kabyle*, Algiers, 1885, p. xcviii, note 1.
‖ de Motylinski, *Le Dialecte berbère de R'damès*, Paris, 1907, p. 147.
¶ Biarnay, *Étude sur le dialecte berbère de Ouargla*, Paris, 1908, pp. 247–249.
** Cf. A. Bel, 'Quelques rites pour obtenir de la pluie en temps de sécheresse chez les Musulmans Maghribins,' in *Recueil de Mémoires et de Textes imprimés en l'honneur du xive Congrès des Orientalistes par les Professeurs de l'École des Lettres*, Algiers, 1905, pp. 49–98; Doutté, *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord*, Algiers, 1909, pp. 584–586.

* Viera, according to Espinosa, in Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* i. pt. i. p. 173; Verneau, *op cit.* p. 92 f.
† Cf. G. Mercier, *Les divinités libyques*, p. 7.
‡ Partsch, *op cit.* p 16
§ *Les divinités libyques*, pp. 8–12.
‖ Schmidt, Cagnat, and Dessau, *Inscriptionum Mauretaniae latinarum supplementum*, Berlin, 1904, p. 2028.

an inscription of Miliana (*ib.* 21481), and counted among the Punic deities by St. Augustine (*Ep.* xvii. 2). Priscian (vii. 313) gave the name of Abbadir to the baetyl swallowed by Saturn.

But whatever be the sense given to Iddir, it seems impossible to make him a supreme god of North Africa. Perhaps he was produced under the influence and in imitation of the Romans—a movement which set apart one of the local gods and placed him over the others, at least in Mauretania. This seems to be the indication of two inscriptions, one of which at Bougie is dedicated 'Numini Mauretaniae et Genio Thermarum' (*CIL* viii. 8926), and the other at Ain Kebira, 'Numini Maur. aug.' (*ib.* 20252). Halévy believed that this supreme god is to be found in the Iolaos who is mentioned, he says, in the treaty between Carthage and the Roman Senate, and whom he claims to have found again in a Libyan inscription.* The reading of these latter inscriptions is too uncertain, and, besides, Iol is a Punic god. If we trust the accounts of the Spaniards, the Guanches must have had a supreme god at the time of the conquest of the Canary Islands. Viana† relates that they worshipped one God, infinite, omnipotent, just and merciful, called in their language *Hucanech, Guayaxarax* (named by Viera *Achguoyaxiraxi*, 'saviour of the world'), *Acucanae* (named by Galindo *Achucana*), *Menceito, Acoron, Acaman, Acuhurajan* (called *Achahurahan* and *Achxurahan* by Viera, *Achahuaban* by Galindo)—epithets meaning 'omnipotent,' 'protector and creator of all beings,' 'without beginning and without end,' 'cause of causes.' The sense of these words is not found in Berber, except in *Acoron* and *Acaman*, which mean 'the great' and 'the sky.' The Guanch names handed down by the Spaniards are very much corrupted; this is due to errors in writing and to the authors' ignorance of the language spoken in the Canaries. Thus *Achaman*, given by Viera with the meaning of 'supreme god,' is more correct than *Acaman*, and seems akin to the Awelimmiden Tuareg *aochina*, 'the sky' (cf. the Teneriffe Guanch *achano*, 'year'); it is connected with the root *GN*, which gives in Zuawa *thignuth*, 'cloud,' and *igenni*, 'sky,' and in other dialects *ajenna* and *ijenni* with the same meaning. But we cannot place absolute confidence in Viana, who shows a tendency to see among the Guanches a religion resembling Christianity with a supreme god and a devil. He goes the length of saying that they never believed in or worshipped any idols, and that they worshipped only one God. Chil y Naranjo restricts this assertion to the natives of Lanzarote.‡ The same author has cut out several inexact data of this kind,§ and, besides, the assertion is refuted by the discovery of idols, in the 14th cent., in the Great Canary Island,‖ and the worship of one representing a nude woman in a building called Tirma.¶

According to Viera, the god of men was called *Eraoranhan* (*Eraorangan* according to Galindo) in the Island of Fer; he had his seat with Moreyba, the goddess of women, on the two rocks of Bentayga, called to this day *Santi llos de los antiguos*. After their conversion to Christianity, the natives of Fer worshipped Christ and Mary under the names of Eraoranhan and Moreyba.** The supreme god, Espinosa says, created man from earth and water—an equal number of men and women. Flocks were given them for nourishment. Afterwards he created more men, but did not give them more flocks. When they asked for more, he replied: 'Tend these others and they will give you nourishment.' This last class of beings to be created consisted of *achicaxac*, 'peasants,' while the first class comprised *achimencei*, 'nobles,' and *cichiciquitzo*,* 'knights.'

11. Deities assimilated by the Greeks and Romans.—This list of deities could be lengthened, if we had the native names of those deities mentioned by the Greeks and Romans; the latter have assimilated them to their own names, and sometimes have gone even further, the assimilation becoming simple borrowing on their part. In any case, it seems futile to linger over the mythological romance founded in all its parts on the Amazons, the Atlantes and their kings, Ammon, etc., which finishes the third book of the *Bibliothecae Historicae* of Diodorus Siculus. It has absolutely nothing in common with the religious traditions and customs of the Berbers. Herodotus (*Hist.* ii. 50) tells us that it was the Libyans who revealed Poseidon, whom no one before them had called by name, and whom they had always worshipped as a god. Ampelius (*Liber Memorialis*, ch. ix.) speaks of a fifth Apollo, born in Libya (Gurzil?). But the most celebrated of all these divinities is Athene Tritogenis, born, according to Herodotus (*Hist.* iv. 180), Pomponius Mela (*de Situ Orbis*, i. 7), and Pausanias (*Graeciae Descriptio*, i. 4), from Poseidon and the nymph of Lake Tritonis. It is beyond the scope of this article to study the personage of Triton as represented by Greek monuments,† but Herodotus (iv. 180) mentions customary rites which the maidens of the Auseans performed in honour of a native, and therefore Berber, goddess, who was no other than the goddess called Athene by the Greeks:

ὀρτῇ δὲ ἐνιαυσίῃ Ἀθηναίης αἱ παρθένοι αὐτῶν δίχα διαστᾶσαι μάχονται πρὸς ἀλλήλας λίθοισί τε καὶ ξύλοισι, . . . τὰς δὲ ἀποθνησκούσας τῶν παρθένων ἐκ τῶν τρωμάτων ψευδοπαρθενους καλέουσι· πρὶν δ' ἂν εἶναι αὐτὰς μάχεσθαι τάδε ποιεῦσι· κοινῇ παρθένον τὴν καλλιστεύουσαν ἑκάστοτε κοσμήσαντες κυνεῇ τε Κορινθίῃ καὶ πανοπλίῃ Ἑλληνικῇ, καὶ ἐπ' ἅρμα ἀναβιβάσαντες, περιάγουσι τὴν λίμνην κύκλῳ.

The Greeks explain this custom as a souvenir of the struggle which took place between Athene, who was brought up by Triton, and Pallas, Triton's daughter, in which Pallas was slain (Apollodorus, *Bibliothecae*, iii. 12). This custom must still have existed in the time of Pomponius Mela, unless he simply copied Herodotus. Herodotus thinks that, before the Greek helmet and shield, the maidens used to carry Egyptian arms (*Hist.* iv. 180).‡

A Latin inscription found at Ain Gulea in Tunisia (*CIL* viii. 15247) and another at Henchir el-Matria (*ib.* 15378) mention a dedication to a dragon ('Draconi augusto'). Perhaps this divinity is connected with the serpent of bronze with gilt head, which the pagans worshipped at Tipasa, on the Hill of Temples, and which, in the 5th cent., St. Salsa threw into the sea, and so earned her torture. It is not certain whether this is a relic of the worship of Eshmun§ and the summary of the sufferings of St. Salsa.‖ There is nothing anywhere to show that the cult of the serpent was ever native to the Berbers.

12. Deification of kings.—The pantheon has been enriched, on the other hand, by the apotheosis of the kings, at least during the time of independence.

* *Essai d'épigraphie libyque*, Paris, 1874, p. 157 f.

† *Antigüedades de las Islas Afortunadas*, p. 19; Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* i. pt. i. p. 170.

‡ *Estudios historicos de las Islas Canarias*, vol. i. 'Las Palmas,' 1876–1879, p. 427 f.

§ Chil y Naranjo, *op. cit.* i. 917 f.

‖ Verneau, *op cit.* pp. 88–90.

¶ Bernaldes in Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* vol. i. pt. i. p. 170.

** Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* vol. i. pt. i. p. 168.

* Alonso de Espinosa, *The holy Image of Our Lady of Candelaria*, i. 8 (tr. by Markham), and *The Guanches of Tenerife*, London, 1907.

† Cf. Vater, *Triton und Euphemos*, St. Petersburg, 1849; Tissot, *de Tritonide lacu*, Dijon, 1863, Escher, *Triton und seine Bekampfung durch Heracles*, Leipzig, 1890.

‡ Cf. Escher, *op. cit.* p. 79

§ Cf. Gsell, *Tipasa*, Rome, 1894, p. 310 f.

‖ Gsell, *Recherches archeologiques*, Paris, 1893, pp. 1–3.

The phrase of Minucius Felix is well known: 'Et Juba, Mauris volentibus, Deus est' (*Octavius*, ch. xxiii.). A Latin inscription (*CIL* viii. 17159) is distinctly consecrated to Juba and the genius Vanisnensis at Tassammert.* Tertullian for his part said: 'Unicuique etiam provinciae et civitati deus est . . . et Mauretaniae reguli sui' (*Apol.* ch. xxiv.). There has been found at Bougie a fragment of an inscription dedicated to king Ptolemy, son of Juba (*CIL* viii. 9127), one at Algiers (*ib.* 9257), and another at Cherchel, to the genius of king Ptolemy (*ib.* 9342). Perhaps it was a retrospective worship that caused the inhabitants of Thubursicum Numidarum (Khamissa) to sanctify Hiempsal, son of Gauda, as a god (*ib.* 7* [17159])—a fact which explains the homage rendered to Gulussa, king of Numidia, son of Masinissa (*ib.* 3*), according to two inscriptions. These inscriptions were with extreme levity treated as false by Mommsen, who afterwards had to face the evidence and confess his mistake.† But it is probable that Africa followed the example given by Rome of deifying the Emperors. This may be seen from the comparison made by Lactantius: 'Hac scilicet ratione Romani Caesares suos consecraverunt et Mauri reges suos' . . . and further on: 'Singuli populi . . . summa veneratione coluerunt ut Aegyptii Isidem, Mauri Jubam' (Migne, *PL* vi. col. 194). Pomponius Mela (*de Situ Orbis*, i. 8) had established the fact:

'Orae [Africae] sic habitantur, *ad nostrum maxime ritum moratis cultoribus*, nisi quod quidam linguis differunt, et cultu Deûm, quos patrios servant, ac patrio more venerantur.'

This remark of Pomponius Mela is confirmed by ibn Khaldūn: 'It befell the Berbers from time to time to profess the religion of their conquerors, for powerful nations brought them into subjection' (*Kitāb al-'Ibar*, vi. 106). We must add that Septimius Severus, an African by birth, was regarded as a god by the Africans (*Historiae Augustae*, ch. xiii. 'Vita Septimi Severi'). This explains the large number of inscriptions in honour of deities adopted, without even assimilation, by the Berbers, who took the gods of Rome after those of Carthage: Juppiter, Juno, Pluto, Pallas, Venus, Apollo, Diana, the Nymphs, Neptune, Mercury, Silvanus, Bellona, Ceres, Hercules, Minerva, Mars, Æsculapius, the Dioscuri, Tellus, Hygiea, etc., and even the Eastern deities like Mithra, Malagbel, Mater Magna, Juppiter Dolichenus, Juppiter Heliopolitanus, Isis, Serapis. Bacchus-Liber must also be added, for it was a mistake, a false reading, that gave rise to the belief that the name of Bacchus appeared in the name of *Yakush*, which is of Berber origin, and is the translation of an Arabic epithet which has no connexion with Dionysus. The existence of vines in Africa does not justify in any way the hypotheses into which Lefébure‡ and, after him, Bertholon§ ventured. But it is almost impossible to make a separation among the worshippers, Roman colonists and soldiers, foreign soldiers, inhabitants of Punic origin, mixtures of Berbers and Phœnicians or Romans, and, lastly, pure Berbers.

13. Demi-gods, mythical beings, etc.—Perhaps we may attribute to the Berbers, alongside of the worship of their kings, the worship of beings analogous to the demi-gods of antiquity, whose giant birth and stature form the subject of various legends. The gist of them is that the sister of Ya'la ibn Muhammad al-Ifranī gave birth to a son without having intercourse with man. She was bathing in a warm spring where the wild beasts used to go to drink, and conceived by the effect of a lion's foam. The child was called *Kelmām ibn al-Asad* ('son of the lion'), and extraordinary qualities are attributed to him in stories. Ibn Khaldūn adds that the Berbers tell such a great number of stories of this kind, that if they were put in writing they would fill several volumes.* It is to similar beliefs, adapted from Greek or Jewish traditions, that we must attach the legend of the discovery of the body of Antæus, which measured at least sixty cubits (as, according to Gabinius, Sertorius declared in his *Hist. Rom.*), when the tomb of this giant was opened near Lynx in Mauretania. Juba claimed to be descended from Antæus by his son Sophax (Strabo, *Geographica*, XVII. iii. 8; Plutarch, *Sertorii Vita*, ch. ix.). Perhaps a souvenir of this kind is to be found in Prudentius, *Peristephanon*, hymn viii., where he says that Tingis contains the funeral monuments of the Massilian kings.† At the present day, the inhabitants of Arzilla in Morocco show on a rock the footprint of a gigantic foot—the trace of their ancestor.‡ Another giant, whom the Jewish and Musalmān traditions have appropriated under the name of Sidi Usha' (Joshua), is buried by the sea-shore, in the territory of the Beni Sha'bān, in the region of Nedromah. A row of stones marks the length of the body, which goes beyond the wall of the *qubba* where the grave is, and ends in a sort of *h'awita*.§

Among the mythical beings whose cult was maintained for some time after the conversion to Islām, there must be mentioned a category of genii whom we know only under the Arabic name of *Chamārikh*. In the 11th cent. of our era, among the Benu Ursifan,

'when they wished to undertake a war, they sacrificed a black cow to the Chamārikh who are their devils, and they said: "Behold a sacrifice for the Chamārikh." When they come to the fight in the morning, they watch till they see a whirlwind of dust, and say: "The Chamārikh, your friends, are coming to your aid." Then they charge confident of success. They pretend that this has never failed them, and the majority of them believe in it openly. When offering hospitality to a guest, they put food aside for the Chamārikh, and maintain that the latter eat what is reserved for them. In all this they avoid mentioning the name of God.' ‖

The Arab historians have preserved an account of the familiar genii of the Kāhinah, Dihya, daughter of Tābet (?) of the tribe of the Jerawas, who made a long and successful stand against the Musalmāns, and even drove them from Ifriqyah. It was these familiar demons who foretold to this tribe the final victory of the Moors, and caused it to send its sons to launch against them before the final battle where it succumbed.¶ This prophetic faculty is again spoken of by Procopius (*de Bello Vandalico*, ii. 8). After the expedition of Belisarius against the Vandals, the Moors, afraid that some harm would result to them, had recourse to the prophecies of the women. After a few ceremonies, they foretold the future like the ancient oracles. In the middle of the 10th cent. of our era, among the Ghūmara of Morocco, Tangrit, the aunt of Ha-Mim, and Dajju, his sister, who, as we shall

* Gsell, *Recherches archéologiques*, p. 286 f.

† Cf. Masqueray, 'Les Additamenta ad corporis volumen viii. de M Schmidt,' in *Bulletin de Correspondance africaine*, Algiers, 1885, pp 161–163.

‡ *La politique religieuse des Grecs en Libye*, Algiers, 1902, pp. 22–38.

§ 'Essai sur la religion des Libyens,' in *Revue tunisienne*, Jan. 1909, p. 31 f.

* *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, vi. 106. Cf. on traditions of this kind 'Lucina sine concubitu,' in Van Gennep, *Religions, mœurs et légendes*, Paris, 1908, pp. 14–25.

† Migne, *PL* lx., Paris, 1862, col. 364. The commentary of D. Ruinart, *Acta primorum martyrum sincera*, Amsterdam, 1713, p. 469, note 11, recognizes its uncertainty.

‡ L. de Campou, *Un Empire qui croule*, Paris, 1886, p. 233.

§ Cf. R. Basset, *Nédromah et les Traras*, Paris, 1901, p. 76 f.

‖ Al-Bakrī, *Description de l'Afrique*, p. 188 f.

¶ Ibn 'Azārī, *Histoire de l'Afrique et de l'Espagne*, ed. Dozy, Leyden, 1848–51, i. 22; Ibn Khaldūn, *op. cit.* vi. 109 f., vii. 9; Tijani, *Voyage*, tr. Rousseau, Paris, 1853, p. 65; 'Voyage de Mouley Ahmed,' in Berbrugger, *Voyages dans le sud de l'Algérie*, Paris, 1846, p. 236 f.

see below, founded a special religion, were renowned soothsayers, and belief in the former was part of the Qur'ān of her nephew.* Procopius does not describe the preliminary ceremonies employed by the Moorish women for vaticination, but the following practice takes place among the Tuaregs at el-Esnam, near Ghadames:

'During the absence of the men, the women, dressed in all their finery, go and take their stand near the tombs of the *Zabbār* (from Arabic *Jabbār*, "giant"), whom they [the Tuaregs] believe to be of a race previous to their own, and they invoke the genius who is to give them information. His name is *Idebni* (the tomb itself is called *Adebni*). He appears to them in the shape of a giant, with eyes like a camel, and gives the required information. For this consultation the women must avoid wearing anything whatever of iron or steel about them, even a needle.'†

The same ceremony takes place at Air, but during the night.‡

'On the sides of a ghūr which commands Wed Wujidit, in the North of the Sahara, are found great tombs corresponding to those on the rocky slopes of the Tabelbalet. They are elliptical in shape, with major axis, inclined East and West, varying from 20 to 45 metres. They are surrounded by heaps of moderately-sized stones. The Azger Tuaregs attribute these tombs to a former race. If a woman who has a friend, a relative, or a lover far away for any cause goes to sleep at the middle of the day in one of these enclosures of stones, she is sure to have visions, to meet spirits there, and get news of the absent one. The Tuaregs also claim that there is hidden treasure in these tombs.'§

But, in spite of what Procopius‖ says, the gift of prophecy was accorded to men as well as to women among the Berbers. To quote only two examples: among the Kotama, at the time of their civil wars, the soothsayer Failaq foretold that they would see real war when the man of the East came to them mounted on a white mule. This prediction was recalled by a schoolmaster on the arrival of the *dā'ī* 'Abd Allāh, the Fāṭimid missionary, mounted on a white mule (Ibn 'Aẓārī, i. 120). Similarly, the soothsayers in a tribe of the Maghrib had declared that, when the two superior planets met, a king would rise who would change the form of money. Malik ibn Wahib persuaded the amir of Lemtuna, 'Alī ibn Yūsuf, that it was to Mahdi ibn Tūmert that this prediction referred, as also the popular lines:

'Put fetters on his feet,
Or he will make you hear the drum'
(Ibn Khaldūn, vi. 238).

14. Ogres.—There still remains to be mentioned the belief in ogres, who play an important part in the popular tales of the Berbers. But we must keep in mind the ease with which tales travel, and take care to strip off all that is due to borrowing. Traces of originality may, however, be found in some of these stories. Among the Fadhilah and the Benu-'Aqidān—Berber tribes in the West of Egypt—it was said that often a new-born girl changed form, becoming an ogre (*ghūl*) or a *si'la*, and threw herself on people until she was bound and pinioned (al-Bakrī, p. 4). The Arab author even mentions an eye-witness of such an occurrence. It is given by a modern tale current at Wargla, *Story of a Father and his Daughter the Ogress*,¶ and is the foundation of an accusation brought against the Uled Settut ('the sons of the Megæra'), a tribe of the Rif noted for its *penchant* for brigandage.

'At first, Settut their mother used to be seen running about with her three children in a piece of land which is desert to this day, devouring the people and feeding her children on human flesh. No one knew where she came from; she was known of no male, ogre or human, and this afterwards occasioned the saying that the Uled Settut had no father. After devastating the country for many long years, she suddenly disappeared and was never seen again. But her children remained in the desert of Garet, and were the stock of the present Uled Settut.'*

The names by which the ogres are designated are, for the most part, of Berber origin. Although we find some that have come from Arabic, like *ghūl* or *zellūma*, yet among the Rif of Morocco and the K'sūr at Wargla, we find *amza*; among the Beni-Menacer *amza*, with feminine *thamzat* or *tamzat*, which is derived from the root MZ, 'seize,' 'take'; among the Zuawas *awaghzeniu*. The ogress has also the name of *taghauzant* in the Chelh'a of Tazerwalt, of *tseriel* in Zuawa. But, in the tales, there is a mixture of names from stories relating to the ancient inhabitants of the country, pagans or Christians, designated also by the name of *Juhala* (Arabic for 'ignorant people'), and from stories circling around the ogres, confused to such an extent that these classes of stories are often mistaken for each other.

15. The ceremonies of worship.—Here we are reduced to conjectures, so far, at least, as the purely Berber gods are concerned. Wherever there were borrowing and assimilation, the ceremonies were those of the Phœnicians and Romans, and probably, in some parts, of the Greeks. Protected by their isolation, the Guanches were able to have a religion of their own. The way in which they practised the preservation of the mummies, for example, which was entrusted to a special caste, proves an original development among them, alongside of common traits, even before they had arrived at the idea of the immortality of the soul or of future rewards and punishments.† Viana mentions a female religious caste called *Harimaguadas* (or *Harimaguas*, *Magaas*) who lived in common, vowed virginity for a time, educated the children, and, as has been seen above, took part in certain ceremonies to get rain; the men were forbidden in that case to look at them.‡ The house where they lived was called *tamogantin acoran*, 'house of god' (in Berber, *tigimmi tin amoqran* [?]). In connexion with ceremonies, we may mention consultation by sleep.§ Examples of this have been cited above. We shall add another: in ancient times, the Augiles (of the oasis of Aujila) used to go to sleep on tombstones and take as answers the dreams they had during their sleep (Pomponius Mela, i. 8). This was also the custom of the Nasamonians (Herodotus, *Hist.* iv. 172). Al-Bakrī cites a case where this method of divination had no connexion with tombs or the dead. It was in the Rif, on the borders of Wed Lau (see, further, art. INCUBATION).

16. Feasts.—We must also speak of the feasts, which have been with reason called *saisonnières*, and which have continued among the majority of Berbers to mark the chief changes of the year. There is good ground for seeing in them the traces of a nature-worship with which may be associated some remains of agrarian rites. The feasts seem all the more ancient by being performed without the intervention of special ministrants, by being celebrated, not in the mosques, but near the tombs of popular priests, and by being addressed to invisible powers and not to consecrated persons. The principal feasts are those of *Ennair*, fixed for the whole year; the feast of *'ansera*, which may be called the water-festival; the feast of *'achūra*, etc. But it must be observed that the peculiarities characterizing these feasts, as death or re-birth of

* Al-Bakrī, *op. cit.* p. 100; ibn Abi Zar', *Rauḍ al-Qarṭās*, ed. Tornberg, Upsala, 1843–46, i. 62; ibn Khaldūn, *op. cit.* v. 216.

† Duveyrier, *Les Touaregs du Nord*, p. 415, *Sahara algérien et tunisien*, Paris, 1905, p. 203; Benhazera, *Six mois chez les Touaregs*, p. 63.

‡ E. de Bary, *Ghāt et les Touareg de l'Aïr*, Paris, 1898, p. 187 f.

§ Foureau, *D'Alger au Congo*, Paris, 1902, p. 65 f.

‖ Cf. Doutté, *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord*, pp. 31–33.

¶ Biarnay, *Étude sur le dialecte berbère de Ouargla*, pp. 255–257.

* Mouliéras, *Le Maroc inconnu*, Oran, 1895, i. 183.

† Alonso de Espinosa, *The Guanches of Teneriffe*, vol. i. ch. 9, 'The mode of Interment' p. 40 f.; Glas, *op. cit.* p. 74; Verneau, *op. cit.* pp. 79–84.

‡ Viana, *op. cit.* p. 22 f.; Gomez Escudero in Chil y Naranjo, *Estudios*, i. 520–522, 526; Glas, *op. cit.* p. 69 f.; Verneau, *op. cit.* p. 86.

§ Cf. Doutté, *op. cit.* pp. 410–416, and the authors quoted.

vegetation, or purification by fire and water, are not confined to the Berbers, but have been found among the most widely-differing peoples. It will be enough, therefore, to mention them.*

17. **Traditions, etc.**—It would be difficult to say whether the following tales, although current in Africa, are of Berber origin. Pliny the Elder tells that in this country 'no one begins any undertaking without first uttering the word "Africa," while in other countries affairs are begun by asking the favour of the gods' (*HN* XXVIII. v. 2). Isigonus and Nymphodorus, mentioned by the same author (*HN* VII. ii. 2, reproduced by Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, ix. 4), tell that there were in Africa families of sorcerers, 'who, by means of spells, cause flocks to perish, trees to wither up, and children to die.'†

But we are clearly dealing with Berbers in the following examples. In Tamernā, in the desert, between Sabab and the mountains of Targhīn, a locality inhabited by the Beni-Geldīn and the Fuzānah, when a theft has been committed, the inhabitants trace some writing which they communicate to each other. The thief is immediately seized with a trembling, which does not stop until he has confessed his guilt and restored what he has stolen. He does not recover his calm until the writing is rubbed out (al-Bakrī, *op. cit.* p. 10). In one of the mountains of the Mejeksa of the Rif there lived a magician called Ibn Kosyah. This name, which means 'the son (man) with the little cloak,' was evidently a nickname borrowed from his way of acting. No one dared to contradict him or to disobey his wishes. If any one did, he turned the cloak in which he was wrapped, and then some malady attacked that person or his cattle instantly. No matter how numerous his opponents were, the malady fell on all the same as on one. He even made them believe that a light burned under his clothing. His sons and descendants inherited the same power (al-Bakrī, *op. cit.* p. 101). Similarly in the Rif, among the Ghūmara, a Beni-Shaddād tribe, part of the U-Halawāt, there lived a man who always carried a bag filled with animals' heads, and a cord strung with the teeth of land- and sea-animals. He used this as a chaplet. He passed it round the neck of the person who was consulting him, then shook it and tugged it violently. Next he began to smell each of the pieces separately until his hand stopped on one of them. Then he answered any questions that were put to him, and unerringly foretold illness, death, gain, loss, prosperity, disappointment, etc. (al-Bakrī, *op. cit.* p. 101). Mūsa, son of Sālih, was also a Ghūmara. He is said to have lived before the Hijra; but even in the 14th cent. there still remained his 'prophetic sayings, in the language of the country, containing a great number of predictions relating to the control which the Zenatas were going to exercise in the Maghrib. There is quoted, in proof of the accuracy of his prophecies, the fulfilment of the one that foretold the destruction of Tlemsen. The houses of this town were to become a field tilled by a negro with a one-eyed black bull. This is said to have taken place after the destruction of Tlemsen by the Merinides, between A.H. 760 [A.D. 1358] and 770 [A.D. 1368]. But if some people considered him a prophet, others took him for a magician. In any case all credited him with a supernatural power (ibn Khaldūn, *op. cit.* vi. 106, 276, vii. 51). Further mention will be found among Arab writers of persons who practised magic, such as Muhammad al-Kutamī, or 'Omar and his son 'Abd Allāh, chief of the Seksiwa; but this expression must refer to magic as understood by the Musalmāns—an imported science, not of native origin. The fame of the Berber women as sorceresses was already established in antiquity, as is shown by Virgil's anachronism when he makes a Massilian priestess be consulted by Dido, in order to keep Æneas by her magical arts (*Æneid*, iv. 483–498, 504–521). Even in our day the women of Jurjura practise incantations, for which they use certain plants. We have evidence of this in a popular song which begins thus:

'Greeting to thee, hawthorn (*id'mim*);
Men have called thee hawthorn;
For me, I call thee the *qaid* which commands;
Transform this husband of mine into an ass,*
And I shall have straw brought him.'

The other plants mentioned are the roots of the dwarf-palm (*thagūnsa*), the wild jujube (*thazuggarth*), the fruit of the coniferæ—pine, cedar or fir (*azinba*)—and the green oak (*kerrush*).†

ii. *JUDAISM.*—It has been observed that the Jews of the North of Africa, with the exception of those who at well-known times were driven from Europe by persecution, do not belong to the race of Israel; and they have rightly been regarded as the descendants of Berbers converted to Judaism during the Roman era. In the time of Augustus we find Jewish colonies prospering in Cyrenaica and Libya, and the barbarian insurrection which broke out under Trajan at Cyprus, in Babylonia, Egypt, and Cyrenaica simultaneously, and which was repressed with great harshness, did not hinder the development of the Jewish communities. This may be seen from an inscription in a synagogue discovered at Hamman el-Enf (*CIL* VIII. 12457). These communities acquired such importance that the Catholic Church took precautions to prevent relations between Christians and Jews, which soon became rigorous measures under the Christian Emperors, were suspended only by the triumph of the Vandals, and were revived with the victory of Belisarius and the Byzantines. Proselytism was naturally exercised among the lower classes of the population and even among rich Berber tribes. But we do not know what kind of proselytism it was, or to what extent the practices of the cult and the observance of the prescriptions of the Jewish Law were imposed, and we cannot give credence to a late romance with no more authority than, *e.g.*, the *Fath' Ifriqya*. The Arab writers mention several tribes which were Jewish when the Musalmāns came. But their statements are contradictory. Thus, in one place, ibn Khaldūn mentions among the Jewish tribes the Jerawas who lived in Aurās; the Nefūsa, the Fendelawa, the Mediūna, the Bahlūla, the Ghiatha, and the Fazaz in the Maghrib al-Aqsa (*Kitāb al-'Ibar*, vi. 107). But we have seen that according to tradition, the Kāhinah—a name foreign to the Arabs—had familiar genii. Al-Bakrī (*op. cit.* p. 9 f.) and ibn 'Azārī (*op. cit.* i. 3), both earlier than ibn Khaldūn, mention the Nefūsa as Christians; and traces of churches which have preserved their name in Jebel Nefūsa prove them right. But ibn Khaldūn himself in another place (*op. cit.* iv. 12) says that the tribes of the Fendelawa, the Bahlūla, the Mediūna, and the people of the territory of Fazaz professed, some magic (paganism), some Judaism, and some Christianity. The place where the town of Fas grew up was inhabited by two Zenata tribes: the Zuagha (Benu'l Khair) and the Benu Yarghosh. Some professed Islāmism, others Judaism, and others paganism. These last even had a temple at Shibuba, where later arose

* Cf. for full details on these feasts, Doutté, *op. cit.* pp. 541–584; and among the sources cited, Destaing, *L'Ennaïr chez les Beni-Snous*, Algiers, 1905, *Les fêtes saisonnières chez les Beni Snous*, Algiers, 1907; Said Bulifa, *Textes berbères en dialecte de l'Atlas marocain*, Paris, 1909, pp. 146–167.

† On the evil eye in most recent beliefs, cf. Doutté, *op cit.* pp. 317–328, and the authors there quoted.

* The popular Berber tales include numerous examples of metamorphosis, but they are borrowed.

† Hanoteau, *Poésies populaires de la Kabylie du Jurjura*, Paris, 1867, pp. 308–312.

the Andalusian quarters. Ibn Abi Zar', who has preserved this detail (*Rauḍ al-Qarṭās*, i. 15), designates the pagans by the name of *majus* (magi), and he naturally calls their temple a house of fire. This passage has been reproduced by ibn Khaldūn (*op. cit.* iv. 13).

In the same era, the country of Temsna (the modern Shawia) and the towns of Chella and Tadla were peopled partly by Jews and partly by Christians, who submitted to accepting Islām after the conquest of that region under Idris I. It is not safe, therefore, to try to specify that such and such a tribe was exclusively Jewish or Christian. It seems nearer the truth to say that each tribe included families, or perhaps clans, of Jews, sufficient in number to be able to remain independent, at least in the Maghrib, until the end of the 2nd cent. A.H.—a long time after the conquests of 'Oqba and Mūsa. But the Judaism which is spread at the present day by the descendants of converted Berbers has nothing to distinguish it from the Judaism practised in the other regions of the civilized world; and as regards local superstitions, they are common to Jews and Musalmāns.*

iii. *CHRISTIANITY.*—We do not know how Christianity was brought to the Berbers, but probably we should look for its starting-point in the large towns, and for its first seats, as at Rome, in the Jewish communities. The separation was not long in taking place, and the Church of Africa soon became prosperous. But its history belongs rather to the history of Christianity, and it is impossible to cull from its developments and vicissitudes what refers specially to the Berbers. We may admit, however, that it was from among the latter, at least in the places under the direct control of Rome, that the Donatists were recruited—a sect which was more schismatic than heretical—and the Circumcelliones, whose movement, in spite of its religious colour, was social rather than national. The list of African bishoprics (Proconsular, Byzacene, Numidian, Mauretanian—Sitifian, Cæsarian, and Tingitan—and Tripolitan) contains a host of names of which the great majority are Berber; but it is difficult to identify them all, these names being often simply those of little villages, for the bishop's sphere of control was a very narrow one. Epigraphical evidences have enabled us to recognize some of them, and it seems very likely that the mass of the population, omitting Roman colonists and some foreigners, was composed of Berbers, or at least of a mixed race in which the Berber element was predominant. As for the half-subject or independent tribes among whom Christianity spread, we may suppose that conversion took place, as in so many other parts of the uncivilized world, by means of captives taken in incursions. The domination of the Arian Vandals made no alteration in this state of affairs further than that Catholicism, after having been the persecutor, became in its turn (except at very occasional intervals) the persecuted, and triumphed only by the success of the Byzantines.† We must mention, moreover, as having to do with the history of Christianity among the Berbers of the West of Algeria, the existence of a native dynasty at the beginning of the 5th cent., after the fall of the Vandals and before the Arab invasion. Some distance from Frenda the tombs of these princes are seen. Two names may be recognized: Mephanias, and Massonas, who seems to have been the same man as the Masema, 'rex gentium Maurorum ac Romanorum,' mentioned in a Latin inscription of Hajar el-Rūm (Lamoricière, *CIL* viii. 9835). It was a Christian Berber dynasty, as is shown by the emblems and remains of paintings which have been excavated on the tombstones known by the name of *jedar*, and already mentioned by the Arab historians. These princes probably disappeared with Christianity itself, at the first victories of the Musalmāns.*

In the other places, however, Christianity still survived for a long time: in Tripoli, among the Nefūsa, whose territory still contains a number of ruined churches; in Aurās, among the Beranes; and in the Rif, among the Ghūmara and the Sanhaja. We have seen that at the time of Idris, *i.e.* more than a century after the appearance of Islām in this country, there still existed in the Maghrib al-Aqsa, Christian tribes or parts of tribes. Wherever a treaty was concluded between the invaders and the native population, the latter, conforming to the Musalmān legislation, were able to keep their religion, but isolation and internal division hastened its fall. In the 10th cent. there were still forty bishops; in 1054, under Leo IX., only five remained, and of these two were disputing the presidency. In 1076, we see from the letters of Gregory VII. that there were only two left: Cyriacus, primate of Carthage, and Servandus, in the see of Hippo. There was still a bishop at the Qala'a of the Beni-Hammād; he had the Arabic title of *Khalīf*, and he certainly emigrated with his flock to Bougie under an-Nasīr.† A Christian community existed at the same time in Tlemsen, but we do not know whether it was under the authority of a bishop. In 1068, al-Bakrī‡ mentions a church in this town which was frequented by the remains of a Christian population surviving till that time. But everything was carried away by the current of the Almohads. No trace of Christianity remained, alongside of vague legends, except a few words, among others *Tafaski* (the Passover = Πασχα)—the name given to the fourth month of the year by the Taitaq, to the second by the Ahaggar. *Afasko* and *Tifisko* mean 'spring' among the Awelimmiden, and this word has penetrated even to the Dyolofs of Senegal, *Tabaski dya* corresponding to 'December.'

iv. *MUHAMMADANISM.*—**1. History.**—We have no exact information, nothing beyond the sometimes fanciful accounts of the conquest, about the way in which Islām spread in the North-West of Africa, but it is certain that it met with a lively resistance there. The first expeditions were only cavalry raids, with pillage as their main object, in which the Arabs avoided the strongholds where the natives and the descendants of the Roman colonists were taking refuge. The coast-line itself was respected, guarded as it was by the mountains and the ports which remained in Greek possession. The foundation of Kairwan by 'Oqba gave a character of stability and permanence to the spread of Islāmism, but in no decisive way. The Musalmāns were more than once driven right back to Tripoli; accordingly it is not wrong to suppose that the conversions they had succeeded in making did not last. The Arab historians themselves declare that the Berbers recanted from Islāmism twelve times; and it is probable that, if they had found an ally in a strong and well-organized neighbouring power, they themselves, instead of

* Cf. Cahen, 'Les Juifs dans l'Afrique septentrionale,' in *Notices et mémoires de la société archéologique de Constantine*, vol. xi, 1867, pp. 102–108; Monceaux, 'Les colonies juives dans l'Afrique romaine,' in *Revue des Études juives*, vol. xliv.; R. Basset, *Nédromah et les Traras*, pp. vii–xvii.

† Ferrère, *La situation religieuse de l'Afrique romaine depuis la fin du ive siècle jusqu' à l'invasion des Vandales*, Paris, 1897; Diehl, *L'Afrique byzantine*, Paris, 1896, lib. iii. pt. ii ch. 2, 'L'Eglise d'Afrique sous le règne de Justinian,' pp. 408–449, vol. iv. pt. ii. ch. 2, 'L'Eglise d'Afrique et l'administration byzantine,' pp. 503–517.

* Cf. La Blanchère, *op. cit.* p. 78 f.; Gsell, *op. cit.* ii. 418–427, and the bibliography there given.

† Cf. de Mas Latrie, *Traités de paix et de commerce*, Paris, 1868, pp. 14–17, 18–23.

‡ *Op. cit.* p. 76.

the Byzantine Empire or the kingdom of the Goths, would have triumphantly repelled the Musalmān invasions. But their divisions and isolation, especially after the conquest of Spain by Mūsa, ended in securing the victory for Islām—a victory which was not absolute and decisive until the 12th century.

But if, during the earlier periods at least, they were converted more by force than by persuasion, they did not fail to retain in their new religion the independence and party-spirit which they had already shown in Christianity, by adopting schisms rather than orthodoxy. The history of the Musalmān Berbers is simple to unfold. Originally they were Sunnites, but soon they enthusiastically welcomed the most levelling ideas of Islām, and declared themselves for the various Kharijite sects. On account of a similar feeling—hostility towards the distant Khalīfate of Baghdad, or the nearer Khalīfate of Cordova—they took the side of the Alids, the opposite extreme from Islām, and became the source from which Idris ibn 'Abd Allāh and later 'Ubaid Allāh derived recruits to found their dynasties. Idris founded his in the present-day Morocco—a dynasty hostile to the Umayyads of Spain, and to the Abbāsids of Baghdad. That of 'Ubaid was at Mahadia—a dynasty which drove out the last representatives of the Abbāsids in Ifriqyah, almost succumbed to an offensive retaliation from the Kharijites, but was victorious at the last moment, and once more became mistress of North Africa and conquered Egypt. Then came a Sunnite re-action, taken part in by the Berbers of the South Sahara, the recently-converted Lemtuna—a tribe whose fortune was as brilliant as it was ephemeral. Other Berbers, the Masmūda of Atlas, whose chiefs were struggling against the gross anthropomorphism of the Almoravids (Lemtuna), founded a rival Khalīfate to the Khalīfate of Baghdad (the Khalīfate of Cordova was no longer in existence, and that of Cairo was about to disappear); but, clinging to orthodoxy, they destroyed the last remains of Christianity and all that had survived of Alid Shī'ism, while dealing a blow at the same time at Kharijism, already weakened by its struggle with the Fāṭimids—a blow from which it never recovered, so far, at least, as to be independent.

After this the North of Africa, *i.e.* the Berbers and Arabized Berbers, remained Sunnite except for some stubborn industrial communities which held out in Mzab, Jebel Nefūsa, and Jerba.

2. Sects.—(*a*) *Khariǰites.*—To fill in the sketch just traced would be to give a complete history of North Africa, and would exceed the limits of this article. We shall therefore pass over the orthodox Islāmism of the Berbers and refer only to that part of their Islāmism which was characteristic, viz. the Kharijite doctrines (which, however, they were not alone in spreading), and to the attempts to found a religion which should be to Islām what Islām was to Christianity and Judaism. It must be understood that, apart from these attempts, the Berber revolts, under the name of religious sects, were essentially social; they were not due to differences of opinion or interpretation concerning dogma. As a matter of fact, the Berbers had controversialist theologians, but no great champions of orthodoxy or heterodoxy. They often attached themselves to the strictest parts of the Qur'ān text; the Lemtuna even accepted to the letter all the figurative expressions and became anthropomorphists. Thus, out of the four orthodox sects, the Berbers adopted the narrowest, the most restricted, the one which (after the Ḥanbalites) was most slavish to the letter, viz., that of Mālik ibn Anas.

Hunted down in the East, after the fall of Nahrawan and the victories of Ḥajjāj, which had saved the Khalīfate of Damascus and driven out the Iraq Arabi Kharijites, the latter, divided into two sects, Zubairites and Abadites, emigrated to the West. They found no difficulty in spreading their doctrine among the Berbers, the victims of the greedy Musalmān governors. In the interests of the public and also of their own private treasury, these governors did not exempt converts to Islām from the tax of a fifth—the tax paid by non-Musalmāns. The *Zubairites*, who took their name from 'Abd Allāh ibn Zubair of the Benu Tamim, were furthest advanced in the doctrine of Kharijism: they refused the name of Musalmān to any man guilty of even a venial sin, and even made it lawful to kill him and seize his goods. This doctrine was developed particularly in the north of what is now called Morocco, above all, among the Matghara and the Miknāsa. Led by an old water-carrier of Tangiers, Maisara, who took the title of Khalīf, more than 200,000 Berbers, with shaven heads and carrying the Qur'ān in front of them fastened to their spear-points, annihilated the Khalīf's armies and took possession of Tangiers and Sūs (A.H. 122 = A.D. 739–40). After an indecisive battle, they killed their chief Maisara, and put Khālid ibn Ḥamīd az-Zanātī in his place. In the following year, he destroyed two fresh Arab armies, and thus brought a general alleviation in central Maghrib. The two victories, of el-Qarn and el-Asnam, checked, but did not destroy, the Zubairite Berbers in the West; and their chief, Abu Qorrah, founded a State in the region of the Moluyya. The Idrisids destroyed this centre of strict Kharijism, concerning which we have only scanty information furnished by the orthodox writers. Nothing remained of it but a small State founded at Sijilmasa in the Tafilet. It disappeared in the great Fāṭimid struggle.*

Another group was formed in Jebel Nefūsa, South-East of Tripoli, and it was not long in spreading as far as the oases of Wargla and Wad Righ. This group is better known, because it left historical and religious records. These Kharijites were *Abadites*, dating their rise from 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Abād who lived in the 1st cent. A.H. This sect showed itself relatively more tolerant than the Zubairites, and its founder seems to have had relations with the Umayyad Khalīf Abd al-Malik. Its teaching was brought to the Maghrib by Salma ibn Sa'd, and later by 'Omar ibn Imkaten, Ismā'īl ibn Darrar, Asim as-Sadrati, etc. The most famous of its chiefs, Abu'l Khatt'āb, took the title of *imām*, and founded a centre, which was reduced to a province by his fall and death in A.H. 155 [A.D. 771], but which, nevertheless, has remained down to the present day one of the principal Abadite centres.† One of its officers, a man of Persian birth, 'Abd ar-Raḥmān ibn Rustam, succeeded in founding a religious kingdom at Tahert (modern Tagdemt), which at one time comprised all the South of the modern region of Algeria, part of the region of Oran, the oases of the Constantine region, South Tunisia, and a part of the vilayet of Tripoli. But this kingdom was soon involved in divisions, as usually happened among the Berbers. Schisms arose: the Nukkarites, separated by personal questions, ending in reviving the uncompromising doctrines of the Zubairites;

* Cf. the summary of these events in Dozy, *Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne*, Leyden, 1861, i. 141–156, 192–207, 238–250; Fournel, *Les Berbers*, i., Paris, 1875, 285–301, and the sources given; for the East specially, Wellhausen, *Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz*, Berlin, 1902, pp. 47–125.

† Cf. on the Abadites of Jebel Nefūsa, ash-Shamākhī, *Kitab as-Siar*, Cairo, n. d.; de Motylinski, *Les Livres de la secte abadhite*, Algiers, 1885, pp. 6–20, 28–35, 37–61, *Le Djebel Nefousa*, Paris, 1898–99; R. Basset, *Les Sanctuaires du Djebel Nefousa*, Paris, 1897.

and the Wasilites, with doctrines tending to Mu'tazilitism (liberalism). These dissensions greatly favoured the work of destruction accomplished later by the Fāṭimids.*

(*b*) *Alids.* — Although, on the one hand, the Berbers adopted and intensified the levelling characteristic of Islām, and the Zubairites and Nukkarites succeeded the Circumcelliones among them, on the other hand, some of them adopted an entirely opposite doctrine. These, instead of making the *imām* a chief freely elected by the community and, when necessary, deposed by it, saw in their *imām* not merely the descendant of the Prophet, but the incarnation of all the Prophets and even of the Deity. The Alid doctrine penetrated into the Maghrib, and was adopted twice as a protest against the orthodox Khalīfate. The first time, it was a descendant of 'Alī, Idris ibn Abd Allāh (who had escaped his family's disaster), that founded the dynasty of the Idrisids, and Fas afterwards became their capital. But it seems that the Shī'ite doctrine, professed at this time by the Berbers, meant simply adherence to this dynasty. It even contributed to the consolidation of Islām by converting the few Christians still surviving, and by destroying the Nukkarites settled in Tlemsen. This dynasty is of no importance in the religious history of the country. We need only observe that it had a firm ally in one Berber tribe, namely, the tribe of the Auraba.†

(*c*) *Ismā'ilians.*—The Ismā'ilian doctrine, on the other hand, made great modifications on Islām by reviving, under the mask of Shī'ism, the ancient doctrines of Persia—mixtures of Manichæism and Greek philosophy. It is hardly necessary to remark that the mass of the Berbers who rallied to this teaching always remained in the ranks lower than initiation. Those of the central Maghrib, in modern Great and Little Kabylia, became the chief adherents of the Fāṭimid prophet (*dā'ī*) 'Abd Allāh, and he recruited from them the army that was to destroy the remains of the Abbāsid government in Ifriqyah, the Zubairite-Kharijite kingdom of Sijilmasa, the Abadite-Kharijite kingdom of Tahert, and the ghost of a State which had taken the place of the Idrisid dynasty in Fas. The fall of Tahert scattered the Kharijites who were settled in it. Some of them were brought to Jerba, where one of their communities still exists; the others fled to Wargla, Sedrata, and the region of Wad Righ. Their life there was peaceful, and their prosperity increased steadily until the ravages of ibn Ghanya, and especially the expeditions of the Almohads, which brought the levelling influence of Musalmān orthodoxy over N. Africa, came to drive them from their refuge. Determined to keep their faith, they proceeded to settle in a hilly stretch, called in Arabic *chebka* ('thread'), where the Beni-Mzab-Wasilian nomads, whose name they took, used to wander about. Sheltered in this solitary place, where they made rich oases, the emigrants, like the Mormons on the shores of Great Salt Lake, prospered under the shadow of outside wars, and founded a community, a sort of ecclesiastical State. This community grew rich by commerce and agriculture; but, as usual among the Berbers, it was torn by dissensions, not only between towns (there were seven towns), but even between districts of towns. It required the authority of France, in 1882, to restore peace.

Another group of Nukkarites had remained independent in the Aurās. Abū Yazid, nicknamed 'the Man on the Ass,' brought up by an old schoolmaster who was born in the Sudan and preached the Kharijite doctrines in their utmost strictness, imperilled the existence of the Fāṭimid dynasty under its second prince. The dynasty was at this time reduced to within the walls of its capital, Mahdya. But a supreme effort saved it. The Berbers were first driven back, then utterly crushed, and the Empire of the Ismā'ilians regained all its power, which was increased later by the conquest of Egypt.* It was probably at this time that Kharijism disappeared in the central Maghrib (except in Wargla, Jebel Nefūsa, and Mzab).

As for the dynasties which followed, they were all helped by the Berber tribes from whom they were sprung, the Almoravids by the Lemtuna, the Almohads by the Masmūda, and the Kūmia by the Beni-Merin, the Beni-Zyān and the Beni-Wemannu, who ruled simultaneously. Their religious history, accordingly, offers no characteristic interest. And it is the same with the dynasties which were established in the central Maghrib and Ifriqyah before and after the great Hilālian invasion (in the eleventh century of our era).

3. Present-day Islāmism.—At the present day, orthodox Islāmism reigns alone (associated, of course, with local superstitions) all over North Africa, except, as has already been said, in Mzab, Jerba, and Jebel Nefūsa, where the modified Kharijism of the Abadites holds sway. It is especially in Mzab—the centre of theological studies,—that the traditions are kept up. The *iāzzaben* ('doctors') have retained an influence there which has a control over the conscience in spite of contact with Europeans. But Kharijism has lost its power of spreading, and more converts are being made by the Musalmāns.† We may form an idea of the doctrine at present in vogue from the summary given in an *'Aqidah* reduced to the Berber language, and then translated by a Nefūsi, Abu H'afs 'Omar ibn Jamia, who lived probably in the 11th cent. A.H. Several commentaries‡ have been made on it, and it forms the basis of the *Kitāb Ma'ālim* of Shaikh 'Abd al-Aziz of the Beni-Sgen, author of a treatise no less famous, the *Kitāb an-Nīl*. It is this latter that is now followed in Mzab and Jerba, while at Jebel Nefūsa it is the treatise of Shaikh Abu Tāher Ismā'īl al-Jaitāli, who died at Jerba A.H. 750 (A.D. 1349–1350). From the point of view of dogma, so far as the fundamental principles of Islām are concerned, this doctrine does not differ from orthodoxy. The only difference lies in some points of discipline: the *walāia*, the law imposing friendliness between Musalmāns of the same group, and its opposite, the *beraa* (in Mzab, *tebria*, 'punishment,' 'excommunication'); and, among the 'ways' of religion, besides the 'manifest way'—that of the first Khalīfs—the mention of the 'forbidden way,' the 'way of sacrifice,' and the 'secret way,' which, founded as they are on orthodox example, have justified the

* Cf. on the Rustamites, A. de Motylinski, *Les Livres de la secte abadhite*, pp. 20–28, 33–36; Masqueray, *Chronique d'Abou Zakaria*, Algiers, 1878; al-Barrādi, *Kitab el Djawaher*, Cairo, 1302; de Motylinski, *Chronique d'Ibn Saghir*, Paris, 1907.

† Cf. on the Idrisids, Fournel, *Les Berbers*, i. 396–401, 418 f., 447–450, 455–466, 473–477, 496–506, and the sources there cited, to which we may add Idris ben Ahmed, *Eddorar el bahyah*, Fas, A.H. 1324 [A.D. 1906].

* On the Fāṭimids, their domination in the Maghrib, and the insurrection of Abū Yazid, cf. Fournel, *Les Berbers*, ii., Paris, 1881; Masqueray, *Chronique d'Abou Zakaria*, pp. 205–251; de Goeje, *Mémoires d'histoire et de géographie orientales*, Leyden, 1886, vol. i.

† Cf. on Mzab, Coyne, *Le Mzab*, Algiers, 1879; Robin, *Le Mzab et son annexion*, Algiers, 1884; de Motylinski, *Guerara depuis sa fondation*, Algiers, 1885; Masqueray, *Formation des cités chez les populations sédentaires de l'Algérie*, Paris, 1886, pp. 173–221; Amat, *Le M'Zab et les M'Zabites*, Paris, 1888; Morand, *Les Kanouns du Mzab*, Algiers, 1903.

‡ The commentary and Arabic glosses of 'Omar ath-Tholathi and Daud ath-Tholathi were published at Constantine in A.H. 1323 [A.D. 1905] by M. de Motylinski, to whom also we owe an ed. of the text with a French tr., *L' 'Aqida populaire des Abadhites algériens*, Algiers, 1905. The *Kitāb an-Nīl* was published at Cairo in A.H. 1305 [A.D. 1887].

conduct of the Kharijites ever since their appearance.

4. Attempts to form new religions.—(*a*) *Ha-Mim.*—It remains now to speak of only two attempts to form a religion that should be the complement of Islāmism, as Islāmism claims to be of Judaism and Christianity. The first attempt took place among the Ghūmara of the Rif, in the neighbourhood of Tetūan, in the territory of Mejeksa among the Beni-Ujefūl. There is disagreement concerning the exact date of the appearance of this religion; opinions vary, from A.H. 313 to 325. In any case, it was at the beginning of the fourth century A.H., the tenth century of our era.

A certain Ha-Mim, son of Mann Allāh ('Grace of God'), son of Hariz, son of 'Amr, son of U-Jefūl, son of U-Zerūal, appeared in this tribe and preached a new religion. He cut out three of the canonical prayers, leaving only two—one for sunrise, the other for sunset. In offering these prayers, his followers had to prostrate themselves so as to touch the ground with the palms of both hands. He also dispensed with the Ramadān fast, except for the last three days, or, according to others, for ten days; but he established a fast till mid-day every Wednesday, and for the whole day every Thursday, as well as two days in Shauwāl. Whoever failed to keep these had to pay a fine of five or three oxen. He abolished pilgrimage, purification, and total ablution, allowed the use of pork, but forbade fish that had not had their throats cut (or been gutted), all animals' heads, and the eggs of all kinds of birds. Even to this day, a tribe in the neighbourhood of Tipasa and the Tuaregs abstain from hens' eggs. He composed a Qur'ān in Berber for the use of his partisans; the Arab writers at least call it a Qur'ān. Some fragments have been preserved. One of these began with the formula of the unity of God, then continued: 'Deliver me from my sins, O Thou who hast let Thy gaze rest upon the earth; withdraw me from my sins, as Thou didst withdraw Jonah from the whale's belly and Moses from the waters.' All prostrated themselves and repeated: 'I believe in Tanguit (or Talyah, Teba'ih), aunt of Ha-Mim.' This Tanguit was a sorceress like Dajjū, the sister of the new prophet. Ha-Mim, nicknamed *al-Muftārī* ('the forger'), made numerous converts right on till his death (A.H. 315 according to some, 325 according to others). He fell in a combat against the Masmūda in the territory of Tangiers. His sect did not disappear with him. Later on, a certain 'Asim ibn Jamil offered himself as a new prophet in this tribe.*

(*b*) *Sālih.*—Another attempt was of more importance. In the West of the Maghrib, in Temesna (the modern Shawia, which includes Casablanca, Rabat, and Chella), the Berghūata were settled. One of their chiefs, Tarif, who seems to have been of Jewish origin (son of Simeon, son of Jacob, son of Isaac), had, along with his people, embraced the Zubairi-Kharijite doctrines and struggled against Maisara. After the fall of the Berbers, he retired to Temesna and lived there in independence. He remained faithful to the doctrines of Islām; but his son, distinguished for his learning and virtues, who had also fought in the ranks of the Zubairites, offered himself as Prophet and composed a Berber Qur'ān. But he did not spread his doctrine; he entrusted it to his son Elias, and set out for the East, declaring that he would return when the seventh king of his dynasty was on the throne. The new religion remained in seclusion until the reign of Yūnos, who proclaimed it abroad and compelled the people to adopt it whether they would or not. The doctrine of Ṣālih, who presented himself as the *Sālih al-Mu'minīn* mentioned in the Qur'ān (lxvi. 4), was as follows: to recognize the Divine purpose of all the prophets and of Ṣālih himself, to fast during the month of Rajab instead of Ramadān, and also on a certain day of the week and the same day the following weeks; to pray five times a day and five times every night; to celebrate the feast of sacrifices on the eleventh of Muḥarram (and not on the twelfth of Dhul-ḥijja).

The manner of performing ablutions was equally definite. There was no invocation (*adān*) or introduction to prayers (*iqāma*). Sometimes prayers were offered with prostration, sometimes without; in the first case, the congregation raised their foreheads and hands half a handbreadth from the ground. In proclamation of the greatness of God (*tākbīr*), they placed one hand on the other and said: *A esm en Iakosh* ('to the name of God'), then *Mokkor Iakosh* ('God is great'). The Orientalists are wrong who have thought to recognize the name of Bacchus in this word or in its variant Bakosh, and have drawn such extraordinary conclusions about the extent of Bacchus' worship and mysteries. M. de Motylinski has shown that this name Iakosh is derived from the Berber root UKSH, which means 'to give.' It is an epithet corresponding to the Arab *al-Wahhāb*, 'the generous,' one of the epithets of God.*

Public prayer took place on Thursdays very early in the morning. When making profession of faith, they held their hands open and leaning on the ground; they repeated half (?) of their Qur'ān standing and the rest prostrate. At the end of the prayer they pronounced this formula in their own language: 'God is above us; nothing that is on the earth or in the sky is hid from Him.' Then they repeated in Berber: *Mokkor Iakosh* ('God is great'); or, as often, *Ihan* (*Ian*) *Iakosh* ('God is one') and *Ur d'am Iakosh* ('There is none like God'). The alms required by law were half of all their grain. As in the religion of Ha-Mim, it was forbidden to eat eggs, the head of any animal, or fish that had not had their throats cut. Cock's flesh was forbidden, the cock announcing prayer by its crow. Hens' flesh was allowed only in cases of dire necessity. Liars were driven from the country; thieves, when convicted by evidence or by their own confession, were put to death; fornication was punished by stoning. The blood-price was fixed at a hundred head of beasts. Any man could marry as many wives as his means allowed (cousins to the third degree being forbidden), and repudiate them and take them again as often as he pleased. But the faithful were forbidden to marry Musalmān wives, or to give their daughters to Musalmāns. The saliva of their Prophet brought Divine blessings with it, and was regarded as an infallible remedy; this kind of belief still exists among certain Musalmāns of Algeria with regard to their marabouts.

Lastly, it should be said that they were very far advanced in astronomy and highly skilled in judicial astrology. The Qur'ān which Ṣālih composed in Berber contained eighty *sūras*, most of them having a prophet's name for title. The first was called *Ayyūb* (Job, cf. Qur'ān xxi. 83), the last *Yūnos* (Jonah, the title of *sūra* x. of the Qur'ān). The names show clearly that it is an imitation of the Qur'ān. There were the *sūras*

* Cf. al-Bakrī, *Kitāb al-Masālik*, p. 100 *f.*; ibn Abī Zar', *Rauḍ al-Qarṭās*, ed. Tornberg, i. 62 *f.*; anonymous, *Kitāb al-Istibṣār*, ed. Kremer, p. 80; ibn 'Aẓārī, *Kitāb al-Bayān*, i. 198; ibn Khaldūn, *op. cit.* vi. 216; an-Nuairi, Appendix to *Histoire des Berbères* tr. de Slane, ii. 492 *f.*

* de Motylinski, *Le nom berbère de Dieu chez les Abadhites*, Algiers, 1905; R. Basset, *Le nom berbère de Dieu chez les Abadhites*, Susa, 1906.

of *Fir'aun* (Pharaoh, cf. Qur'ān xliii. 45–55); of *Qārūn* (Korah, Qur'ān xxviii. 79); of *Hāmān* (Aman, cf. Qur'ān xxviii.); of *Yājūj and Mājūj* (Gog and Magog, Qur'ān xviii. 93, xxi. 96); of *ad-Dajjāl* (Antichrist, Qur'ān xxvii. 84); of *al-'Ijl* (the Calf of Gold, cf. Qur'ān ii.); of *Hārūt and Mārūt* (cf. Qur'ān ii. 96); of *Ṭālūt* (Saul, cf. Qur'ān ii. 245 f.); of *Nimrod*; of the *Cock*, the *Partridge*, the *Grasshopper*, the *Camel*, the *Eight-footed Serpent*, and of the *Marvels of the World* which contained the most lofty knowledge. A fragment of the *sūra* of Job has been preserved in an Arab translation: 'In the name of God! He by whom God has sent his Book to men is also he by whom He has told forth His tidings. They say: Iblis has knowledge of destiny. God forbid! Iblis cannot have the knowledge of God. What can triumph over tongues in discourse? God alone can by His decree. By the tongue by which God has sent His truth to men, that truth is established. Look at Mamet [in Berber, *imūni Mamet*, i.e. Muhammad]. During his life, and right on to his death, his followers conducted themselves aright. Then his people grew corrupt. He has lied who said that truth survives where there is no messenger from God.'

The Berghūata offered a long and successful resistance to the various dynasties which followed each other in the Maghrib, and it was only to the Almohads that their sect finally succumbed.*

Must we consider as the provenance of one of these sects or of a sect analogous to them the beliefs of the Zekkara, who live in Morocco not far from the Algerian frontier, between the Beni-Iznacen, the Beni-Bū Zeggū, and the Beni-Ya'la? We have not only been informed (though it would be wise to check the information) of their absolute antagonism to the Musalmāns and their dogmas, but have even got hints of a complete indifference to every kind of belief. Some have even gone the length of regarding them as Positivists, although they claim to believe in the doctrine of the celebrated marabout buried at Miliana, Sidi Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf.† The most daring systems have found acceptance; even Druses have been seen there. Before risking any opinion on this question, we should wait until a seriously conducted inquiry is made. When this has been done, it will probably be found that this is a tribe which, on account of its isolation, has remained in the state in which the greater part of North Africa was during the anarchy of the 15th and 16th centuries, when the Musalmān missionaries succeeded in resuscitating Islāmism from a vague shadowy memory.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully throughout the article. In addition to the works there mentioned, the following may also be consulted:—H. Leclercq, *L'Afrique chrétienne*, 2 vols., Paris, 1904, vol. i. for paganism, and *passim* for Christianity; M. Slouschz, *Hebræo-phéniciens et Judéo-berbères*, Paris, 1908.

RENÉ BASSET.

BEREANS.—The Bereans were a religious sect, originating in Edinburgh in the year 1773, who took their name from the Bereans mentioned in Ac 17[10. 11] ('who received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the Scriptures daily, whether these things were so').

1. Life of founder.—John Barclay, their founder, was the son of a farmer, Ludovic Barclay, in the parish of Muthill. Early designed by his father for the Church, he received a good education, and was sent to the University of St. Andrews. In his theological course he came under the influence of Dr. Archibald Campbell, professor of Church History, author of an *Enquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue*, and *The Necessity of Revelation*. Campbell's views attracted considerable attention in his time, and were deemed sufficiently heretical to bring him to the bar of the General Assembly, though the case was dismissed. The first of four charges was that he held that 'man was unable by the use of his rational powers to find out the Being of a God.' This thesis Barclay was afterwards to take up and amplify.

Meantime Barclay was licensed on 27th September 1759 by the Presbytery of Auchterarder, and shortly afterwards was appointed assistant to the Rev. James Jobson of Errol. From the first he attracted attention by his preaching. He was a man of strong convictions, of great fervency of utterance, with a command of rhetorical language which readily passed into violent invective against those who opposed what he conceived to be the truth. Jobson belonged to the Evangelical party in the Church. He was a 'Marrow man,' with clear views of his own, and it is not surprising to find that after some controversial passages, culminating in a statement from the pulpit of their respective positions, he and Barclay were obliged to part. In 1763, Barclay went to Fettercairn to be assistant to the Rev. Anthony Dow, whose failing health prevented him from fulfilling the duties of his pastorate. Here he found himself in a more congenial atmosphere, as Dow's son, who was minister of Dron, had sat on the same bench with him at college, and sympathized with his opinions. Barclay's ministrations were warmly received by the people. He preached to crowded congregations, many flocking from the surrounding parishes attracted by his eloquence. He was most assiduous in his visitation and catechizing, and exercised a strong moral influence over the people. Barclay had a considerable gift of verse, though his productions scarcely rise into the region of poetry. Many of his verses were afterwards collected into a hymnary which was used in his own church.

In 1766, Barclay came into collision with the Presbytery through the publication of a book entitled *Rejoice Evermore, or Christ All in All*. The book was condemned as heretical, and Barclay received a formal censure. A list of his heresies was also drawn up and read from the pulpit of Fettercairn Church. This, however, only increased his popularity in the parish. When Barclay's connexion with the parish ceased, he asked for the usual Presbyterial certificate, which was refused, nominally on the ground that he was obstructing the peaceable settlement of the presentee. Barclay appealed from this refusal to the Synod and Assembly, but the appeal was dismissed.

On the occurrence of the vacancy at Fettercairn a petition was sent to the Crown (in whose gift the patronage lay) by the whole body of the parishioners, asking for the appointment of Barclay as their minister. The petition was refused, and the Rev. Robert Foote was presented to the living, though only three communicants could be found to sign the call. An appeal to Synod and Assembly met the usual fate. Thereupon the whole body of the congregation, to the number of over a thousand, hived off and built a church at Sauchieburn, in the neighbouring parish of Marykirk.

Meantime Barclay, by appeal in the matter of his certificate, had had an opportunity of stating his views in the General Assembly and also of preaching in various churches in Edinburgh. In the capital he gained a number of adherents, who resolved to secede from the Church, and who presented him with a formal call to be their minister. The church at Sauchieburn also wished to secure his services, but Barclay preferred to stay in Edinburgh, though his adherents there were very few (the call contains sixty signatures), and could

* Cf. on the Berghūata, al-Bakrī, *Kitāb al-Masālik*, pp. 134–141; ibn Abi Zar', *Rauḍ al-Qarṭās*, pp. 82–84; ibn 'Aẓārī, *Kitāb al-Bayān*, pp. 231–236; ibn Khaldūn, *op. cit.* vi. 207–210.

† Mouliéras, *Une tribu Zénète anti-musulmane au Maroc*, Paris, 1905.

do very little for him. It is a characteristic of Scottish dissent which is frequently overlooked that a peculiar High Church tradition has invariably run through it. The call of the people, while indispensable to a valid ministry, has never been deemed sufficient. The minister must be ordained by his brethren in the ministry, who alone can judge of his qualification, and through whom alone can come the necessary authority to administer the ordinances of religion and to dispense the sacraments. Barclay's congregation could not find any presbytery in Scotland that would furnish him with the necessary status, and so he was sent to England with a general letter addressed 'to whatever Presbytery or class of dissenting Brethren this shall be presented.' Armed with this epistle and accompanied by two commissioners from his own congregation, Barclay proceeded to Newcastle, where he was regularly ordained on 12th October 1773. The certificate of ordination is signed by John Blyth, moderator, minister at Thirsley; Robert Green, clerk; and three others. On his return to Edinburgh, the new Church was constituted as the 'Berean Assembly,' so called from 'those noble Bereans who professed to search the Scriptures for the whole counsel of God, and to have a conversation becoming the gospel of Christ.' The church at Fettercairn had meantime found a minister in Mr. James Macrae, and another congregation had been formed at Crieff which, through its proximity to Muthill, had been touched by Barclay's influence.

The internal economy of the Church in Edinburgh was troubled from the first. The congregation was very poor, and Barclay had never more than £18 a year for his services. He was more concerned, however, about the publication of his views than about the straitened means of his domestic life, and the unwillingness of the outlying congregations of Fettercairn and Crieff to subscribe to a complete edition of his works was the occasion of much searching of heart. An epistle, signed by all the managers and overseers of the Church in Edinburgh, was sent to these provincial centres, pointing out the serious detriment it was to the Berean cause, 'which is the only Christian cause on the face of the earth,' that at a time when the Truth of God was being hopelessly perverted, its defence should fail through their negligence to purchase a book containing 'an express and undeniable confutation of all the heresies of men in the power of the devil.' The arguments used by some of Barclay's followers for giving him no encouragement to publish was an inference from his own central thesis. 'Since we know nothing of God and Divine things save from the Bible,' they urged, 'what is the use of publishing theological treatises?' In 1776, however, all difficulties seem to have been got over, and there appeared *The Psalms, paraphrased according to the New Testament Interpretation*, prefaced by a long dissertation in which Barclay expounds his peculiar ideas of Scripture. This is very much a reproduction and expansion of his earlier work, *Rejoice Evermore*. His previous productions had been *Without Faith, without God, or an appeal to God concerning His own Existence*, and a *Tractate on the Eternal Generation of the Son*, called forth by a phase of the Glassite controversy in 1769, *On the Assurance of Faith, On the Observatum of the Lord's Supper*, and *A Letter on Prayer*, in 1774. In 1778 these were re-published along with a *Treatise on the Sin against the Holy Ghost*. In 1783 appeared *The Epistle to the Hebrews paraphrased*, and later, *A Close Examination unto the Truth of several received Publications*. A new edition of part of his works was published in 1852, with funds left for the purpose by Mr. James Carsewell, for many years a deacon of the Berean Church in Glasgow.

Barclay had the zeal of an apostle. Towards the close of 1776 he went to London on the invitation of some friends who had read his books and sympathized with his views. He meant to stay only a few weeks, but he was so warmly received and attracted such crowds of admiring hearers that he was forced to remain in order to consolidate the movement. Meanwhile he was sorely distressed by the importunities of the little flock in Edinburgh, who needed his personal influence to hold them together. He sent, as his substitute, William Nelson, a surgeon, who, before his departure, was ordained to the ministry. Nelson was a man of some gifts. He had been educated for the Church of England, but had embraced the doctrines of Whitefield, and had joined the Calvinistic Methodists. While in England, Barclay visited Bristol, where a Berean Church was founded. There is an interesting passage in the *Autobiography* of Dr. Somerville of Jedburgh which shows conclusively that Barclay made a considerable impression in London. Writing of the year 1785, he says (p. 219):

'Upon the dismission of this little congregation we were met by such an immense crowd pressing at the entrances to the chapel that we could not make an escape without a struggle; and when I enquired who came next, I was answered by one of the female sex which seemed to predominate in this new assemblage, "The Bereans, if you please." The Rev. Dr. Horsely, a few days before, had mentioned the sect (the Bereans) to me, of which I had not heard before. He said it had lately sprung up in the west of Scotland, and he seemed to speak of it as an interesting event and likely to make a figure in the Christian Church. I confess I was rather ashamed to be found ignorant of an event occurring at my own door which seemed to him so important.'

The fact that an intellect so acute as that of Horsely, the great champion of orthodoxy against Socinianism, saw possibilities in Barclay's views is sufficient evidence that they were worthy of more attention than they have since received.

Barclay returned from London in 1778, leaving the church there in charge of two ordained presbyters, James Donaldson and Samuel Bishop. He resumed his ministry in Edinburgh, and Nelson was sent throughout the provinces to strengthen the Berean churches that had sprung up in various places. There is a record of congregations in Glasgow, Crieff, Kirkcaldy, Dundee, Arbroath, Montrose, Brechin, and Fettercairn. Barclay himself took a keen interest in all these churches. His means were narrow. His stipend from his own church was trifling, and, though he had a small income from property belonging to his first wife, it was spent mainly in publishing his books. His apostolic journeys, therefore, were on foot, and were confined to Scotland—which was one reason why the cause in England languished. His exertions gradually impaired his health. He died suddenly, while on his way to church, in a friend's house, on 29th July 1798, and was buried in Calton cemetery, where a monument is erected to his memory. His work was carried on in Edinburgh by Donaldson, one of the London pastors, who had some time previously been transferred to the pastorate at Dundee. Under his charge the church for twenty-five years met with a fair measure of success, but after his death it was split up by internal dissensions and gradually melted away. The Berean churches throughout the country in course of time lost their identity and were merged in the Congregationalists.

2. Doctrine.—John Barclay's theological position is extremely interesting, and ought not to be dismissed with the scant courtesy with which it has hitherto been treated. In this obscure founder of a dead sect we see a man struggling with a theological environment that was inadequate to contain his thought, and endeavouring to express in the theological terminology of his day ideas that in our time have created their own terminology. His leading tenet is that we derive all our knowledge of God from direct revelation—the revelation given us in God's word. Now this is just the position of Ritschl, and Barclay reached it by a process of thought similar to that of the German theologian. Ritschl had Kant to fall back upon in order to find a metaphysical sanction for his system. John Barclay had to create his own metaphysics on a hint supplied to him by Dr. Archibald Campbell. His central thesis he states thus: 'We do not come to the knowledge of God by any foregoing train of reasonings to introduce it, but merely by a sovereign act of God's own power, revealing Himself in our hearts.' In short, reason is totally inadequate to reach the idea of God.

Barclay thus consciously breaks with the Scholastic distinction, held in his day by every section of the Christian Church, between Natural and Revealed Religion. The Scholastic position is that our belief in God is an inference crowning a logical process. Reason convinces us of the existence of God, but all that reason can tell us of God is the bare fact of His existence. We need revelation to supplement reason, to unfold to us the nature of God, to explain His attributes, and to teach us His relation to man. To believe otherwise is to land ourselves in a logical dilemma. To say that we believe in God because we believe the revelation of Himself He has given us in Scripture, and that we believe the Scripture revelation to be true because it comes from God, is simply reasoning in a vicious circle. We must have an antecedent belief in God before revelation becomes even a rational conception. Now John Barclay in Scotland saw as clearly as Kant did in Germany, and rather before him than after, that there is a deeper fallacy than appears underlying this method. In the first place, suppose reason could prove the bare existence of God, all that reason gives us is a mere abstraction—a mere *caput mortuum*. We cannot know God apart from His attributes any more than we can know substance apart from its qualities. The variety of ethnic ideas concerning God shows that there is no unanimity regarding any one of His attributes, or even regarding the moral or immoral consistency of His character. It was admitted by all Christian schools that the attributes of God can be known to us only through revelation. If this be so, then the God of Nature, a Being without attributes, is an impossible conception.

(1) But what of the theistic arguments themselves? Barclay criticizes them with an acumen worthy of Kant. He takes up the *a priori* proof of Dr. Samuel Clarke, which then held the field, stating it thus: 'No being can produce another being or thing before itself exists. But the world exists; therefore the world behoved to be produced by some other being which must have existed before the world, and what can that being which must have existed before the world in order to produce it be but God?' Barclay points out that the original position holds here with regard to God. On this learned divine's own showing there must be something antecedent to God in order to produce Him. In short, you cannot reason from contingency to absolute being. You can but recede through secondary causes till imagination calls a halt, and then arbitrarily posit a self-existent cause. But this is not reasoning, and the result of it is not God. And the same holds true of the argument from design: 'If you were to see a beautiful, convenient, and well-contrived house, would you not conjecture that there behoved to be some artist for the builder, and that he were eminent in his way too; you would not imagine that it came by chance.' Again, Barclay with rare acumen and a truly modern ring says: 'There is no argument here. We know men, and we know houses are their works, from experience and observation; but we have no access for experience or observation in the framing of worlds.' Moreover, he goes on to say, we cannot tell the character of the workman directly from his works, which may be fashioned for either a good or an evil purpose. It is our antecedent knowledge of that character that determines the judgment we form of his works.

No doubt there is much in this reasoning that reminds us of Hume as well as Kant, but it is doubtful whether Barclay was familiar with Hume. He was evidently a good classical scholar and well read in the theology of his day, but the present writer can find no direct reference to Hume in his works, though the analogy of his reasoning with that of the sceptical philosopher was early pointed out by the Rev. D. Thom of Liverpool, one of his disciples. Barclay's interests were purely religious and theological. He did not trouble himself with the problems of epistemology. But undoubtedly his main position is exactly that of Hume, viz., that we cannot carry our ideas of causation beyond the field of experience and observation, that we cannot argue from the finite to the infinite, and that so transcendental a fact as a Divine revelation cannot be reached by argument or established by human testimony. It was rather from Dr. Archibald Campbell that Barclay drew his inspiration. And yet the two men were of essentially different natures, and even their central tenets were by no means identical. Campbell's polemic is directed against the Deists, and all he seeks to prove is that as a matter of fact and history men never have arrived at a true conception of God by means of reason or the light of nature. He does not assert that reason is incapable of discovering God, but only that reason never has discovered God without the aid of revelation. The knowledge of God, therefore, may still be the logical prius of revelation, though it never has been the actual antecedent Barclay's intellect, on the other hand, is metaphysical. His argument is essentially a criticism of the reasoning faculty. There is something in its very nature that prevents reason from grasping the transcendental.

(2) But what is revealed truth, and on what testimony is it to be received? To this the answer is that the objective content of revelation is to be found in the Bible, and the Bible is to be received on the testimony of the Holy Ghost. 'God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ' (2 Co 4[6]). The illumination that enables the soul to see God in the Bible is a direct act of His grace, administered by the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Ghost gives only the illumination. The knowledge of God comes from without. It is seen in the face of Jesus Christ, of whom the whole Scripture testifies. This assent to the truth of the revelation of God given in Scripture is 'faith.' Faith is not a subjective emotion or personal appropriation of Christ. It is an intellectual act. It is belief in the Bible in its totality as the word of God, on *the testimony of the Holy Ghost*, i.e. through the light thrown upon it by the Holy Ghost illumining the soul of the believer, 'without any kind of collateral support, or any other evidence or testimony whatever.' There is no mysterious meaning in the theological term 'belief.' 'Belief is our holding of a thing for truth which is told us by another person, merely on account of that person's credibility or authority.' We believe earthly things on human testimony, heavenly things on Divine. Barclay is here doing what all the great theologians have done. He is simply interpreting his own experience. He saw that all the arguments for the being of God were untenable and inconclusive. And yet he knew that this fact, instead of shaking his faith, seemed only to confirm it. His faith, therefore, came from a deeper source than logical reasoning. It was inevitable. It was the illumination of the Holy Ghost. And if he held by the intellectual nature of faith, and made it grasp an objective reality outside of the soul itself, it was because he also saw the extreme danger of allowing his faith to be merged into a mere subjective emotion which might lure him into all the vagaries of mysticism. He refused to separate between the practical and the pure reason, as Kant did. He held rather, with the later idealists, that the postulates of experience were as much intellectually apprehended and had as genuine an objective validity as the inferences of syllogistic reasoning.

(3) And this conception of the nature of faith led to the distinctive tenet which brought him into most direct collision with the theology of his time, and was the cause of his being repelled as a heretic even from the most evangelical Churches—the assurance of salvation. It was his insistence upon this point as of the very essence of faith that was the cause of the charge of antinomianism to which he was continually subjected. To understand his point of view, we must place ourselves in the theological atmosphere of his day. The 'Moderates' were ex-

treme Calvinists in theory, but moralists in their practical teaching. The distinctive doctrines of Christianity formed simply the background of their prelections, and had little vital relation with the ethical life. The 'Evangelicals,' again, were moderate in their Calvinism, insisting strongly on the universality of Christ's atonement, but they made faith a mystic quality which was inwrought with the very texture of their religious practice. The atonement was sufficient for the whole race of humanity, but the elect alone were saved; for the atonement meant simply a free offer of the gospel, which became efficacious in the soul of the believer only by an 'appropriating act' of which they could give no clear account. When a sinner became awakened to a consciousness of sin, his great endeavour was to obtain 'an interest in Christ.' This he reached through a soul-struggle in which he passed from despair, through doubts and fears and fervent prayers, to a modified assurance which was chequered, even in the case of the greatest saint, with strange misgivings lest after all he was not in a state of grace. The practical test as to whether he was in a state of grace was his good works; for good works, though powerless to secure salvation, yet necessarily flowed from the 'appropriation' of Christ.

Now Barclay opposed both of these parties with a vehemence rendered impressive by his large command of the language of invective. The Moderates, in their eloquent laudations of the beauty of virtue, had no need of faith. But the Evangelicals were even worse, for they made God a liar and blasphemed against the Holy Ghost. To believe was to be saved, and belief meant simply faith in the Scriptural record. This faith was, indeed, a gift of God. It was the illumination of the Holy Ghost making the record luminous, and commending it to the believer's heart and conscience. It came unbidden, and was not to be prayed for, nay, could not be prayed for; for only the prayer of faith was efficacious, and without faith the sinner knew neither what to pray for nor to whom to address his prayer. Barclay repudiated the religion of doubts and fears and misgivings as of the devil. For a believer to doubt of his own salvation was simply to doubt the veracity of the Holy Ghost, and proved that he was no believer. 'Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God' (1 Jn 5[1]). If a man is born of God, then he is spiritually alive, and life is its own evidence. 'He that believeth hath the witness in himself, as he hath consciousness in himself of life and being, while he is alive and awake.' And again, 'Shall I then doubt or deny that I certainly see and exactly distinguish colours and objects with my own eyes, because another man is unhappy enough to be blind, or must needs be so perverse as to shut his eyes and then affirm that he cannot see the objects which I see and confess I do see? Is his blindness or perverseness any argument against my sight and my pleasure therein? I would indeed gladly open the windows of his chamber to let in light. I would set before him all the agreeable objects I myself perceive; but, alas! I cannot open the eyes of the blind or convert the perverse.'

It is plain that Barclay is not taking the word 'belief' in a mere conventional sense. It is not the general belief we give to matters we have never thought over, but accept simply as part of our environment. It is the belief which comes from personal conviction of a truth that enforces a rule of conduct, such as our belief in causation or the uniformity of natural law. And this belief comes only through the supernatural action of the Holy Ghost. It differs from the 'faith' of the Evangelicals in being more an intellectual act than a subjective emotion; for the 'appropriation' of Christ, which to them alone secures salvation, is essentially subjective in its nature. The difference between the two parties is a very real one, and Barclay is much nearer the modern standpoint than they were. In fact, Barclay is here, with Ritschl, making a 'value judgment.' Jesus Christ has to him the value of God, and simply to realize this is salvation. It is to be within the Kingdom. Barclay realizes it, not through any historical evidence as to the truth of the record, nor through any metaphysical reasoning as to the personality of the Son, but because life becomes luminous to him when he accepts it, because the Holy Ghost testifies to his soul and conscience that the fact is so. There is here no room for doubt. He is simply treading the solid rock of experience. He is trusting his own consciousness, and he cannot do otherwise. His assurance is perfect, and it is synonymous with his faith.

(4) And from this position resulted certain other tenets that ran counter to the religious ideas of his age. The sin of unbelief was the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which could not be forgiven either under the old dispensation or under the new. For to doubt the testimony of the Holy Ghost, *i.e.* to obscure the inner illumination, was to be in a state of perdition. So long as that state lasted salvation was impossible, because light was impossible. This was evidently the meaning of his teaching, though Barclay takes the old theological words in the old theological sense. Further, it was impossible for a sinner to pray for his own conversion. Barclay knew that for him the light was shining while others were in darkness. He could account for the fact only on the old lines of predestination. The sinner could but wait and be passive till God of His free grace opened his eyes. Prayer was one of the privileges of the believer, who was to pray for greater sanctity, because that entrance into the Kingdom which was salvation was but the first step in his spiritual progress. Moreover, the Lord's Supper was not a renewal of the covenant with God—a solemn, mystic rite to be approached with fear and trembling, because Christ was present at a Communion Table as He was present nowhere else. Believers were always to be holy, and required no more special preparation to commemorate the death of Christ at a Communion Table than to commemorate His resurrection on the Lord's Day. Barclay held that the idea of covenant-renewal at the Lord's Table, with the mystic sense of a Real Presence hovering around it, led logically to the Romish doctrine of the Sacrifice of the Mass. His views were those associated with the name of Zwingli.

(5) Barclay's conception of Scripture, in which to his opponents he seemed merely to be setting himself up as the only infallible interpreter of Holy Writ, must be taken in the light of his whole system, and will be found to be an inevitable deduction from his central tenet. To Barclay the testimony of the Holy Ghost is to Jesus Christ as the only Revealer of God. 'God . . . hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ' (2 Co 4[6]). But the knowledge of God through Jesus Christ came to him from the word of God. And the word of God was the Holy Scripture. Here, again, the position is exactly like that of Ritschl, but there is this difference: Ritschl approaches a Bible that has been critically examined, dissected, re-constructed. He can no longer maintain the old theory of inspiration, but he is satisfied that the spiritual process which Scripture records remains unimpaired. That process can be read and understood only through Jesus Christ, who is the One Revealer of God, a knowledge of whom is life eternal. Barclay, from the circumstances of his time, had

to accept the Bible uncritically. The Bible was a book dictated by God to inspired penmen, who wrote exactly what God told them, whether they understood it or not. This was the general idea of the age, and Barclay differs from his contemporaries only in holding it more clearly and consistently than they did. The subject of the Bible is Jesus Christ and His salvation, and in a book practically written by God there must be no irrelevancies. The Bible invites a close and prayerful study. There are some parts of it which, to the soul illumined by the Holy Ghost, are clear as crystal. There are others that are dark and obscure. The true principle of interpretation, therefore, is holding fast by Jesus Christ, the main thesis, to interpret the obscure by the clear. The Holy Ghost Himself supplies a clue to the right interpretation in the references made in the Gospels to the fulfilment of prophecy in the Messiah. Many of these passages are from the Psalms, and it was to the Psalms that Barclay specially devoted his remarkable powers of exegesis. It seemed to him that the Evangelists regarded the Psalms as simply prophetic biographies of the coming Messiah, and this idea fell in exactly with his theory of Holy Writ. The Psalms in no wise express the emotions of the penmen. If they did, it is clear that their religion must have been dangerously similar to that religion of doubts and fears which he repudiates. They are the expression either of the sufferings of the Messiah when the whole weight of the world's sin pressed upon Him, or of the sufferings and triumphs of the Church of Christ. There is no verse in the Psalter that is not a reference either to Christ Himself or to His Church. Barclay has his canons of criticism, which are too long to be detailed here, but which show a careful study of the Psalms, and a singular appreciation of those points which, in other hands, have yielded different conclusions. He notices, *e.g.*, that the last two verses of Psalm 51 have not the personal note of what precedes, and uses them to give a Messianic interpretation to the whole. He points out, too, how his method of exegesis gets over the difficulty of the cursing Psalms. It is inconceivable that any of the saints of God could have uttered such curses upon their personal enemies. But when we know that the speaker is He who said, 'Vengeance is mine,' and that those whom He is cursing are the enemies of the gospel, the difficulty disappears. Barclay translated the Psalms into English verse, bringing out in each what he conceived to be its Messianic meaning. The book was intended to be used as a book of praise in the Berean Church, but it is notable that, in 1826, the edition published for this purpose, while it contains his dissertation, falls back upon the familiar version common to all Presbyterian Churches.

Barclay's religious system has fallen into complete oblivion. Of the churches he founded not a single trace remains. He lacked the spiritual magnetism necessary to be a great religious leader, and his theological position is deficient in that mystic element which touches the heart and excites enthusiasm. He was a metaphysician rather than a prophet, an acute reasoner rather than an inspired visionary, though neither was his knowledge of philosophy sufficiently wide nor his mental grasp sufficiently strong to enable him to break from his environments and find his proper sphere. He was intensely assertive in holding his tenets, and his powers of vituperation were extraordinary, necessarily repelling instead of conciliating opponents. But, at the same time, he has his own distinctive place in the history of the development of religious thought, and his ideas have enough permanent vitality in them to entitle them to a better fate than they have received.

LITERATURE.—The account of Barclay's life has been taken from the records of the Presbytery of Fordoun, extracts relating to his case having been made by the Rev. J. Brown of Bervie, presbytery-clerk, and also from the *Memorials of the Berean Assembly*, the official record of the Church in Edinburgh, in the possession of the writer. There is a life of Barclay in **Chambers's** *Biographies of Eminent Scotsmen*, 1835, and the *Dictionary of National Biography*, and short accounts in *Lives* prefixed to various editions of his works. A brief exposition of his doctrines is given in a preface to an edition of *Without Faith, without God*, by **D. Thom** of Liverpool in 1836. See also **Archibald Campbell**, *Necessity of Revelation*, 1739; *Autobiography of Dr. Somerville of Jedburgh*, 1861; **Cameron**, *History of Fettercairn*, 1899.

A. MILLER.

BERENGAR.—Berengar (Bérenger) was born at Tours about 1000 A.D. He was educated at Chartres, and was a pupil of Fulbert, the Bishop of Chartres. In 1031 he became Director of the Cathedral School at Tours. About 1040 he was appointed Archdeacon of Angers, though he continued to live at Tours. Some eight years later it was widely reported that he was advocating an opinion that the consecrated elements in the Holy Eucharist are only figures and likenesses of the body and blood of Christ, and not the body and blood themselves. He does not appear to have made any answer to remonstrances which were addressed to him by his friends, Adelman of Liège and Hugh of Langres. In 1050 he wrote to Lanfranc, the Prior of Bec, who was afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, that he agreed with John the Scot about the Eucharist, probably meaning by 'John the Scot' the treatise of Ratramn, *On the Body and Blood of the Lord*, under the belief that this was the work of John Scotus Erigena. In a Council held at Rome in 1050 under Pope Leo IX. this letter was read, and Berengar was excommunicated. At a Council held at Brionne, near Bec, a little later, he is said to have made some kind of retractation. King Henry I. of France imprisoned him; and in September 1050, while he was in prison, his opinions were condemned at a Council held at Vercelli. A month later there was another condemnation in a Council held at Paris. In 1054 at a Council meeting at Tours under the presidency of Hildebrand, afterwards Pope Gregory VII., as Papal legate, Berengar denied the charges brought against him, and declared that after consecration the bread and wine are really the body and blood of Christ. Five years later, at a Council held at Rome, when Nicholas II. was Pope, Berengar burnt his writings, and either actually signed, or gave some kind of assent to, a paper drawn up by Cardinal Humbert in the following terms:

'I, Berengar, an unworthy deacon of the Church of St. Maurice of Angers, acknowledging the true Catholic and Apostolic faith, anathematize every heresy, especially that concerning which I have hitherto been in ill repute, which attempts to affirm that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar are, after consecration, only a sacrament and not the real body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and that these cannot be held or broken by the hands of the priests or crushed by the teeth of the faithful with the senses but only by way of sacrament. And I assent to the Holy Roman and Apostolic See, and with mouth and heart I profess that concerning the sacrament of the Lord's Table I hold the faith which the Lord and venerable Pope Nicholas and this Holy Synod have by Evangelical and Apostolical authority delivered to be held and have confirmed to me, namely, that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar are, after consecration, not only a sacrament, but also the real body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and that with the senses, not only by way of sacrament but in reality, these are held and broken by the hands of the priests and are crushed by the teeth of the faithful.'*

For some time after this Council any controversy in this matter was confined to theological discussion by means of writings. Further condemnations

* The wording of this document is capable of two interpretations. It is usually thought to be the expression of a wholly natural and carnal view of the Eucharistic presence. On the other hand, it was explained by the mediæval theologians to be a loose way of stating that the consecrated sacrament held in the hand and eaten in the mouth is the body of Christ. It is not unlikely that in a panic such expression as that in the document might be given to this belief.

were passed on the teaching of Berengar at Councils held at Poitiers in 1075, and at Saint Maixent in 1076. In 1078 a Council was held at Rome under Pope Gregory VII., whose policy both before and after he became Pope was aimed at protecting Berengar by endeavouring to find a form of words, in accordance with the ordinary belief, which he could accept. At this Council Berengar assented to a statement of much more general character than that which had been required at Rome in 1059. It was in these terms:

'I profess that the bread of the altar is, after consecration, the real body of Christ, which was born of the Virgin, which suffered on the cross, which sitteth on the right hand of the Father; and that the wine of the altar, after it has been consecrated, is the real blood which flowed from the side of Christ.'

In 1079 another Council was held at Rome, and at this Berengar, after some struggles, subscribed a statement which was more explicit than that of the previous year, but without the special kind of language which had marked the declaration of 1059. This statement was as follows:

'I, Berengar, believe with my heart and confess with my mouth that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar are, by the mystery of the holy prayer and the words of our Redeemer, substantially converted into the real, and true, and life-giving flesh and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and are, after the consecration, the real body of Christ, which was born of the Virgin, and which was offered and hung on the cross for the salvation of the world, and which sitteth on the right hand of the Father; and the real blood of Christ, which was shed from His side, not only by way of sign and sacramental power, but in peculiarity of nature and reality of substance.'

In 1080 a Council was held at Bordeaux, at which Berengar made a statement as to his belief, which appears to have been accepted by the Council as satisfactory. He died in 1088 at St. Cosme, an island in the Loire near Tours.

There is considerable difficulty in forming a judgment as to what the opinions of Berengar really were. There is no doubt of his vacillations under persecution; and it is probable that his mind changed to some extent from time to time. Of contemporary authorities who wrote against him, Lanfranc and Durand of Troarn say that he regarded the consecrated elements as being merely figures of the body and blood of Christ; while Witmund of Aversa records a view that he held an opinion that the body and blood of Christ are united with the elements so that, without the bread and wine being changed, the body and blood are present in the consecrated sacrament. In his own treatise, *On the Holy Supper*, it is quite clear that he denies any destruction or material change or conversion of the bread and wine, and any idea of a carnal or natural presence of the body of Christ; but as to the further question whether he meant that the consecrated elements are the body and blood of Christ in actual spiritual reality or that they are so only figuratively or virtually, there are passages which tell in both directions. It is not impossible that this difficulty in interpreting his language reflects some degree of uncertainty in his own mind; and such uncertainty may afford part of the explanation of his failure to meet opposition and persecution in any steadfast and consistent way. There appear to have been two schools among his followers, one of which maintained that the consecrated elements are merely figures of the body and blood of Christ, while the other asserted a presence of the body and blood united, through the consecration, with the bread and wine, without any change in the bread and wine themselves.

LITERATURE.—*Berengar. Turon. de sacra cœna adv. Lanfrancum*, ed. Vischer, Berlin, 1834; Lanfranc, 'de corp. et sang. Domini adv. Berengar. Turon.,' in *PL* cl.; Durand of Troarn, 'Liber de corp. et sang. Christi c. Berengar. et eius sectatores,' *ib.* cxlix.; Witmund of Aversa, 'de corp. et sang. Christi veritate in Eucharistia,' in *PL* cxlix., and in Hurter, *Sanctorum Patr. Opusc Selecta*, xxxviii.; Adelman of Liège, 'de Eucharist. sacramento ad Berengar. Epistola,' in *PL* cxliii.; Hugh of Langres, 'Tract. de corp. et sang. Christi c. Berengar.,' *ib.* cxlii.; Hardouin, *Concilia*, vi. (1), 1015, 1016, 1017, 1018, 1021, 1022, 1041, 1042, 1064, 1551-1554, 1587, 1588; Mansi, *Supplementum*, ii. 27-30; Vernet, 'Berenger de Tours,' in Vacant-Mangenot's *Dict. de Théol. Cathol.* ii. 722-742; Gore, *Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation*, 1895, pp. 248-264; Robertson, *Hist. of Christian Church*, 1876, iv. 351-369; Bowden, *Life and Pontificate of Gregory the Seventh*, 1840, ii. 240-251; Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma* (Eng. tr. 1894-99), vi. 46-51; Stone, *Hist. of Doct. of Holy Eucharist*, 1909, i. 244-259; Schmitzer, *Berengar von Tours, sein Leben und seine Lehre*, Munich, 1890. DARWELL STONE.

BERIYĀ.—See BEDIYĀ.

BERKELEY.—

1. **Life.**—George Berkeley, bishop and philosopher, was born on 12th March 1685 at Dysert in the county of Kilkenny, Ireland. At the age of 11 he was sent to Kilkenny school, and four years later, in 1700, left for Trinity College, Dublin, where in the various capacities of undergraduate, graduate, fellow, and tutor he remained for the next twelve years. The latter half of this residence at Trinity College is, so far as his philosophy is concerned, the most important period of his life. For it was then that he thought out his leading philosophical ideas and published his chief philosophical works. His later life did not lack opportunities apparently no less favourable for philosophical reflexion; but his interests had by that time been largely diverted to practical work, and, even as regards philosophy itself, his first constructive impulse seems to have yielded to the receptive mood of the meditative scholar.

The next period of Berkeley's life is divided between foreign travel and residence in London, where he speedily became intimate with, and greatly esteemed by, the cultured society of the time, including literary men such as Steele, Addison, Swift, and Pope. At the end of 1713 he went abroad as chaplain to the brilliant but eccentric Lord Peterborough, and spent nearly a year in travel in France and Italy. After an interval of two years, regarding which little is known, we find him again in Italy, this time as travelling tutor; and of this tour, prolonged over some four years, and covering a considerable part of Italy and Sicily, a partial record has survived in the shape of a private *Journal*, which copiously illustrates his impartial curiosity and close observation.

The period of his life which begins with his return to London, at the end of 1720, is marked out by the conception, attempted realization, and enforced abandonment, of his singular project for founding a missionary college at Bermuda. In 1724 he was made Dean of Derry. In the previous year he had received a totally unexpected legacy from a lady to whom, as one of his letters tells us, he was a perfect stranger—Hester Vanhomrigh, better known in connexion with the life of his friend Swift. This improvement in his fortunes enabled Berkeley to devote himself seriously to the realization of his Bermuda scheme. At length his efforts to arouse interest in it were rewarded. He obtained a Parliamentary vote of £20,000. The money, however, was never forthcoming; and in 1728, anxious to convince people that he was in earnest, Berkeley set sail with his wife, whom he had but lately married, and some friends, not directly for Bermuda, but for Rhode Island, where he was to await payment of the grant. After some three years' waiting it became clear, from a broad hint given by the minister Walpole himself, that there was little or no hope that the official assurances of payment would ever be carried out, and Berkeley set sail once more for England.

Some two years after his return he was made Bishop of Cloyne, and, in this retired spot in the county of Cork, Berkeley, whose health was now somewhat broken, spent the next eighteen years of his life, occupied partly with practical work, partly with scholarly study and meditation. In 1752 he left Cloyne to reside at Oxford, where one of his sons was going to be educated; but he did not long survive the change. His death took place on 14th January 1753.

2. **Works.**—As was said above, Berkeley's most important philosophical works were written in early life. The works referred to are the *Essay towards a new Theory of Vision* (1709), *Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710), and *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713). These works will be dealt with below. To this period belongs also a discourse on *Passive Obedience* (1712), which is important as containing a brief statement of his views on the fundamental principles of ethical and political obligation. The content of social and political duty is defined, according to Berkeley, by universal and immutable laws of nature, by which he means rules of action whose constant observance is plainly seen to be necessary to the general well-being of mankind. The sanction of duty lies in the Divine government of the world, and the motive of duty in that reasonable regard for our eternal happiness, which should induce us to obey laws of nature so

sanctioned. In the discourse Berkeley is more particularly concerned to show (against, *e.g.*, Locke) that unlimited passive obedience to the civil ruler is a law of nature.

Upon this early period of productive activity a long interval of almost twenty years ensued, broken only by the publication in 1721 of a Latin treatise, *de Motu*, in which motion and causation are discussed from a philosophical point of view. Continental travel, London society, and his Bermuda project occupied his interests, and, when at length the quieter years of waiting at Rhode Island enabled him to produce a considerable work, he comes before us less as a philosopher than as an apologist of morality and Christian religion. *Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher* (1732), the longest of Berkeley's writings, consists of a series of seven dialogues directed 'against those who are called Free-Thinkers.' Under the somewhat vague designation of 'Free-Thinking,' Berkeley includes practically any tendency of thought which he thinks hostile to the best interests of morality and Christian religion. And the rather undiscriminating zeal which leads him, not merely to condemn the levity of Mandeville, but to assail with somewhat inadequate criticism the genuine convictions of Shaftesbury, must be allowed to deserve the censure of being 'not without a tincture of clerical party spirit.'

The earlier dialogues are admirable examples of that literary form, and are extremely well managed for Berkeley's purpose. Two types of free-thinker are depicted for us. Alciphron, as confident in his philosophical pretensions as he is devoid of real thoroughness, is capable of taking part in reasonable discussion, but can never anticipate the effects of his own admissions, and succumbs helplessly to criticism. His constant recourse to new arguments renders only the more apparent his superficiality of mind. In Lysicles, on the other hand, free-thinking means little more than an absence of moral principle. He is ready to spout the extremest cynical views, but will not trouble himself with sustained argument, and remains quite unaffected by criticisms which he cannot answer. The later dialogues, in which Berkeley defends Christianity with the weapons of a now antiquated apologetics, are undeniably tedious. Considerations of literary art are too often forgotten, and the natural interchange of argument and answer gives place to instruction and learned disquisition.

In 1733 Berkeley was induced by the misconceptions of an anonymous critic to return, with a tract on *The Theory of Vision or Visual Language, Vindicated and Explained*, to the argument of his earliest work, which he had used for apologetic purposes in *Alciphron*. The next two years saw him involved in a mathematical controversy provoked by his attempt to show that mathematicians have no right to enlarge upon the obscurity and defective foundations of religious doctrine, since their own science is in such respects by no means beyond reproach. Berkeley's next published work, *The Querist*, which appeared in three parts (1735–1737), consists of a long series of brief and pointed questions, designed to call his fellow-countrymen's attention to the social and economic condition of Ireland and the means of improving that condition. The queries give ample evidence, not merely of the very genuine and practical character of Berkeley's philanthropy and patriotism, but also, when we consider the time at which he wrote, of a very remarkable grasp of economic truth as to the true sources of real wealth, as to money, credit, and banking, and as to the interaction of moral and economic causes. Finally, in 1744 there appeared an extraordinary work entitled *Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water*, better known by the title of *Siris*, which was prefixed to the second edition. The work was produced primarily to communicate to the world Berkeley's own conviction and experience of the medicinal value of tar-water. But the chain of reflexions which is hung on this medical peg proceeds to connect

'tar with the highest thoughts about things, by links which involve botanical, chemical, physiological, and metaphysical speculations that are subtle and mystical. . . . Its successive links of ascending science are connected by a gradual evolution, first, with ancient and modern literature concerning Fire; and, next, with the meditations of the greatest of the ancients about the substantial and causal dependence of the universe upon active Mind' (Fraser's Preface in *Works*[2], vol. iii. p. 118).

The book is to be regarded rather as an illustration of the learned studies which occupied the leisure of Berkeley's later life than as a document of his own philosophy. The 'hoary maxims' of antiquity 'scattered in this Essay,' he tells us, 'are not proposed as principles, but barely as hints to awaken and exercise the inquisitive reader' (§ 350).

3. Philosophy.—For a statement of Berkeley's substantive philosophy, then, we must depend on the earlier works of 1709–1713, together with the important *Commonplace Book* (first published in Fraser's *Life and Letters of Berkeley*), which was kept by Berkeley in the immediately preceding years of his residence at Trinity College, and in which his philosophy is seen in the making. The three main doctrines set forth in these works are those of Nominalism, Immaterialism, and Acquired Visual Perception, and all three furnish real and important contributions to philosophical thought. 'Among all philosophers, ancient or modern,' says Ferrier (Essay on Berkeley in Ferrier's *Philos. Remains*, 1866, vol. ii.), there is 'none who presents fewer vulnerable points than Bishop Berkeley.' And this is probably true if we are content to criticize Berkeley in respect of the things which he actually said, not in respect of those which he left unsaid. Ferrier goes on to point out the reason of Berkeley's success:

'The peculiar endowment by which Berkeley was distinguished, far beyond his predecessors and contemporaries, and far beyond almost every philosopher who has succeeded him, was the eye he had for *facts*, and the singular pertinacity with which he refused to be dislodged from his hold upon them.' And again, 'he was a speculator in the truest sense of the word, for speculation . . . is the power of seeing true facts, and of *unseeing* false ones.' 'No man ever delighted less to expatiate in the regions of the abstract, the impalpable, the fanciful, and the unknown. His heart and soul clung with inseparable tenacity to the concrete realities of the universe.'

(1) *Nominalism.*—It is this dislike of unreal abstractions, this desire to see concrete facts and to see them as they are, that inspires Berkeley's attack on 'abstract general ideas' in the Introduction to the *Principles of Human Knowledge*. He fastens upon a well-meaning, but not altogether happy, passage in Locke's *Essay*, in which that candid inquirer asks:

'Does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle . . . for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together.'

Berkeley makes short work of this passage:

'Mr. Locke acknowledgeth,' he says (in a later work, *Defence of Free-Thinking in Mathematics*, § 45, where he is referring back to the *Principles*), 'it doth require pains and skill to form his general idea of a triangle. He farther expressly saith it must be neither oblique nor rectangular, neither equilateral nor scalenum, but all and none of these at once. He also saith it is an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. All this looks very like a contradiction. But, to put the matter past dispute, it must be noted that he affirms it to be somewhat imperfect *that cannot exist*; consequently, the idea thereof is impossible or inconsistent.'

And Berkeley makes his well-known appeal to the reader 'to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has or can attain to have' such an idea as Locke describes (Introd. to *Principles*, § 13). Now Berkeley's main contention in this attack is perfectly sound, viz. that a general idea is something *toto cælo* different from a confused image. He does not, it must be observed, deny that there are general ideas, but only that there are *abstract* general ideas, *i.e.* ideas which can be *imaged apart in their generality*. His own

example of generalized thinking makes this point perfectly clear:

'Suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general' (Introd. to *Principles*, § 12).

That is to say, a percept or image may in itself be quite definite and particular, and yet be the vehicle of a general meaning. Berkeley's contention, then, could be expressed by saying that we must distinguish sharply between an image and a meaning, and must place true generality not in images but in meanings. (The recognition by modern psychology of the *generic* image does not affect the question of principle.) Now, the symbols we use to express general meanings are words, and, unfortunately, in his eagerness to avoid unreal abstractions, Berkeley tends to say that generality is simply a matter of the application of names. In the rough draft (first published by Fraser) which Berkeley made of the Introduction to the *Principles* he states this view in a very uncompromising way:

'If a man may be allowed to know his own meaning, I do declare that in my thoughts the word "animal" is neither supposed to stand for an universal nature, nor yet for an abstract idea, which to me is at least as absurd and incomprehensible as the other. Nor does it indeed [in the proposition that Melampus is an animal] stand for any idea at all. All that I intend to signify thereby being only this—that the particular thing I call Melampus has a right to be called by the name "animal"' (*Works*[2], iii. 374).

That this view cannot be maintained is certain. For it is evident (1) that the 'right to be called by the name animal' must be based on certain properties which Melampus possesses in common with other animals; and (2) that these common properties may be made an object of thought. That is to say, there must exist a 'universal nature' (though not an *abstract* universal nature, or platonic εἶδος), and we must be able to think that universal nature by means of a general idea (though not an *abstract* general idea or *general image*).

It is to this same tendency to let the *meaning* fall out between the image and the word, that we must trace Berkeley's algebraic theory of general discourse:

'In reading and discoursing, names [are] for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for' (Introd. to *Principles*, § 19).

The fatal defect of this theory is, that, whereas in Algebra we attend to the symbols themselves, in reading and discoursing we attend, not to the words as such, but to their meanings (cf. Stout's *Analytic Psychology*, vol. i. p. 88).

(2) *Metaphysics of Immaterialism.*—There were two general ideas more especially, in respect of which men seemed to Berkeley to have become the victims of their own unreal abstractions—the ideas of Matter and Existence. Ignoring or forgetting the concrete applications on which the meaning and value of these general ideas depend, men had come to confer in thought *on the mere abstractions* another, and actually more fundamental, sort of reality than that possessed by the concrete experiences from which the abstractions are illegitimately derived. 'Tis on the discovering of the nature and meaning and import of existence that I chiefly insist,' says Berkeley in the *Commonplace Book* (*Works*[2], i. 17). Now, if we are to discover this real meaning of Existence, we must keep continually before our view the actual conditions under which alone this general idea can find particular application. We must not begin, for instance, by making the perfectly gratuitous assumption that there is a real or absolute existence of things, totally distinct from their being perceived or known. By doing so we should obviously be setting up a general idea which is abstract in the bad sense, because in the very nature of the case it can never have any application in experience. Yet this is precisely the assumption which the free and uncritical use of abstract general ideas like Matter and Existence leads men of science and philosophers to make. They wish to assert the reality of things, especially of external or material things, against sceptical doubts. But they choose the very worst possible way of doing so. For they put the real nature of things quite outside perception or knowledge, and thereby remove the only reason we have for asserting their existence or reality at all, viz. that we have actually experienced it. And thus, as a consequence of the misuse of abstractions, we land ourselves in the most absurd contradiction—the supposed real or absolute nature of things is nothing but 'the fiction of our own brain,' and yet we have made it 'inaccessible to all our faculties' (Preface to *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*). We have by our own act delivered ourselves over bound hand and foot to the sceptic. When we are pressed as to what we mean by the absolute existence of things, we have to admit that we have no knowledge of it at all. 'Methought I had some dilute and airy notion of Pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite vanished out of sight.' Pure being is a '*something in general*, which being interpreted proves *nothing*' (*Dialogues* [*Works*[2], i. 437]).

We must return, therefore, Berkeley argues in effect, from these empty and mischievous abstractions to observe the actual conditions under which we predicate existence. And we observe, in the first place, that the things we affirm to exist are things which we know, *i.e.* objects of knowledge—in the case of the material world, objects of perception—and that the existence we affirm of them is their known or perceived existence. We affirm them to exist in that manner in which we know or perceive them as existing. Take first the case of material or sensible things. When we speak of the existence of material things, we mean their existence as we perceive them. Their *esse*, as Berkeley puts it, is *percipi*. Of an existence on their part different in kind from that which they have as objects of perception we know, and in the nature of the case can know, nothing. 'If there were external bodies [so existing], it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now' (*Principles*, § 20).

To express the fact that the only kind of existence which we can intelligibly attribute to material things is that kind of existence which they have for perception, Berkeley describes them as *ideas*, i.e. objects before the mind. In view of Locke's use of the term 'idea,' this mode of expression was the natural one for Berkeley to adopt, but it has exposed him to much misunderstanding. To it, no doubt, is mainly due the constantly repeated, but largely unjust, accusation of subjective idealism. Berkeley was quite aware of the danger of what we may call the *popular* misunderstanding of his terminology. 'It sounds very harsh,' he supposes an objector to urge, 'to say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas' (see his answer and explanation regarding the use of the term 'idea' in *Principles*, §§ 38, 39). He was also aware of the danger of a more subtle or *philosophical* misunderstanding, viz. that of attributing to ideas some other kind of relation to the mind than that simply of being objects

before it. 'It may perhaps be objected that, if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured.' His answer is that 'those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it—that is, not by way of *mode* or *attribute*, but only by way of idea' (*Principles*, § 49, and cf. the important passage in *Dialogues* [*Works*², i. 470]). But the question may be raised whether Berkeley himself was really able to keep himself free from the subtle confusion which he is here trying to obviate. Does not the habit of describing things as ideas tend to make him regard external things as simply modifications, or private possessions, of the individual mind that perceives them? His critics assume as a matter of course that he did so regard them. And certainly he makes statements which can easily be understood in that sense. For instance, 'What are [material things] but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations?' (*Principles*, § 4). Or again, 'Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses, are *only* so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never [as idolaters do] fall down and worship their own *ideas*' (*Principles*, § 94). In passages like these he seems to enunciate subjective idealism in its extremest form. But it must be remembered that everything depends on the prepossessions with which we read these emphatic statements. When the critic, who reads them in the light of his ready-made distinction *between ideas and things*, sees that things are said to be nothing but ideas, he straightway infers that all reality and objectivity are taken out of them. But Berkeley, who entirely denies the distinction *in the sense in which the critic intends it*, infers no such conclusion. On the contrary, he conceives himself, as we have seen, to be vindicating for our perceptions the reality which has been denied to them in order to be attributed to empty abstractions. As he himself protests, he is 'not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things' (*Dialogues* [*Works*², i. 463]). 'Those immediate objects of perception,' says Philonous to Hylas, 'which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves' (*ib.*). From this point of view, then, it is much nearer the truth to speak, with Professor Fraser, of Berkeley's Immediate Sense-Realism (*Life and Letters of Berkeley*, p 386, where see also the illuminating footnote with its well-known illustration of the two concentric circles). What Berkeley's critics, of course, object to is that things and ideas should be identified at all. But unless the distinction between ideas and things is to be asserted in that absolute fashion, which leads, as Berkeley himself pointed out, directly to scepticism, the objection is really irrelevant. For any less extreme distinction between ideas and things is, and must be, from Berkeley's point of view, a distinction *within ideas themselves in his sense of the term*.

For it must be observed that, when we say that, according to Berkeley, the *esse* of material things is *percipi*, we are by no means giving a complete statement of his doctrine as to their reality. He affirms that all material things are ideas, but he does not affirm that all ideas are material things. The remainder of his doctrine, however, is less characteristic, and may be stated quite briefly. The important question is how those ideas or objects which we regard as real are distinguished from those which are *mere* ideas or products of the imagination. The distinction rests, according to Berkeley, on these grounds: (1) that real objects of sense are independent of our will, (2) that they are much stronger and more distinct than ideas of the imagination, (3) that they are connected together according to fixed laws (*Principles*, §§ 29, 30). That fixed connexions of some sort should obtain among our ideas of sense is the condition upon which alone we can 'regulate our actions for the benefit of life; and without this we should be eternally at a loss' (*Principles*, § 31). But why the particular laws of connexion which do obtain should be just those and not others we cannot say; so far as our insight goes, the laws of nature are contingent or, as Berkeley is fond of saying, arbitrary.

So far we have been dealing with the reality of *material* things. But the doctrine of the nature of *their* reality plainly points *beyond them* to realities of another order. To say that material things are ideas is to say that they are objects for mind, and we have therefore to develop our doctrine of existence in reference to mind. Berkeley does not, however, develop his doctrine of existence very far under this head, and we can again afford to be brief. It remains true, of course, here as in the case of material things, that the only kind of existence we can attribute to mind in general is that which we find actual particular minds to possess. In what way, then, do we know minds as existing? In other words, what manner of existence do we experience in ourselves? The answer is that we know ourselves as busied about ideas or objects, viz. (*a*) as perceiving them or thinking about them, (*b*) as willing or acting in reference to them. In both respects the existence of mind is directly contrasted in character with that of ideas. Mind is percipient, ideas are perceived; mind is active, ideas or objects are passive. To exist, then, in the case of mind, *means* to be active, whether in the way of perception or in that of volition: the *esse* of mind is *percipere*, *velle*, *agere*. From this contrast of mind and ideas two consequences follow: (1) that we have, strictly speaking, no *idea* of mind. We do, of course, have knowledge about mind, but to describe this knowledge we must use some other term than 'idea.' Berkeley himself, in the second edition of the *Principles*, suggested the term 'notion' (§§ 27, 89, 142). But the new term does not imply any alteration in his doctrine of mind. Even in the *Commonplace Book* we find him insisting again and again that 'to ask, Have we an idea of will or volition, is nonsense. An idea can resemble nothing but an idea. . . . Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. 'Tis an act' (*Works*², i. 35, 51). (2) Since agency is known to us only as a characteristic of mind or spirit, it follows that any changes which ideas or objects undergo must ultimately be referred to the agency of mind. All that we can observe in ideas is the bare fact of motion or change. For the causal explanation of such motion or change we must invoke the agency of mind or will.

While the foregoing doctrine as to the reality of mind has necessarily been developed in the light of our knowledge of our own finite minds, it cannot stop short at the recognition of finite minds. For (1) we assume the existence of many things, which we do not perceive, or have reason to suppose any other finite mind perceives, and (2) we observe many changes, which we do not produce, or have reason to suppose any other finite mind produces. The only way, then, in which we can render intelligible such existence of things which are not perceived by any finite mind, and such change in things as is not produced by any finite agency, is to assume an Infinite Mind on whose intelligence and agency the whole order of Nature depends. And so obvious does

this assumption appear to Berkeley, that he argues that

'God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of Nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents.'

And among these effects of Nature are the signs by which finite spirits communicate with each other. So that 'He alone it is who, "upholding all things by the word of his power," maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other' (*Principles*, § 147).

Both in the *Principles* and in the supplementary *Dialogues* Berkeley was at great pains to anticipate and reply to such objections as seemed likely to be brought against his Immaterialism. It is hardly necessary to refer to these in detail, because it is evident *a priori* that any function that can be fulfilled by a perfectly unknown 'Matter' can be equally well fulfilled by Berkeley's intelligent Deity. And, on the other hand, as Berkeley himself points out (*Dialogues* [*Works*², i. 468]), it is no use to bring against Immaterialism objections that apply equally against 'Materialism' itself, such as that no two minds, on Berkeley's theory, perceive the same things. For, if this objection holds against Berkeley (a point on which he does not express himself very clearly, *ib.* pp. 466–468), it holds even more obviously against those whose 'same things' are *not* 'ideas,' *i.e.* are not perceived at all.

Subsequent criticism of Berkeley has been inclined to take the line that he has no right to assume the existence of that intelligent Deity which he substitutes for 'Matter,' or even the existence of fellow-men, since logically he is shut up in the circle of his own 'ideas.' The view we take of this criticism will depend, of course, on the view we take of the accusation of subjective idealism. It is a criticism which may be said to come from reading Berkeley too much in the light of Hume's scepticism—a kind of injustice from which Locke too has notoriously suffered. After the manner of Reid—who was frightened out of his original Berkeleyanism by a study of Hume's *Treatise*—the critics construct a logical evolution of thought from Locke (or Descartes) to Hume, in which Berkeley's philosophy must take its appropriate place, however much distortion it undergoes in the process.

The real difficulties of Berkeley's philosophy begin at the point where he himself left off, viz. his inadequately developed doctrines of active mind and of God. Some of the most interesting notes in the *Commonplace Book* are those which show him struggling with the problem of Will. The problem is not followed up in his published works, and yet it is of the utmost importance for his philosophy on its more constructive side, since with him Will, Activity, and Mind coincide. Reflexion soon shows that the eternal volition by which God 'upholds all things' cannot be exercised, as man's finite will is, upon a material given to it from without; and in like manner God's eternal perception of the world is not a perception to which objects are given from without. We have therefore to face this difficulty, By what right do we distinguish God's eternal perception and will from the Order of Nature at all? Berkeley protests (*Principles*, § 150) against Nature being taken for 'some being distinct from God.' He does not realize that, conversely, there is, so far as our mere knowledge of Nature goes, an equal difficulty in taking God as a being distinct from Nature. His blindness to this difficulty is no doubt due to the apparent sharpness of the contrast in finite mind between active thought or will and the ideas upon which these operate. But, even as regards the finite mind, the abstract separation of the activity of thinking and volition from the ideas which alone make thought and will concrete is one which Berkeley could hardly have retained if he had ever come to develop his doctrine of mind for its own sake.

It is noteworthy that Berkeley's negative philosophy or Immaterialism proper is represented in our own day both in science and in philosophy—in science by thinkers like Mach, in philosophy by the Immanent Philosophy of Schuppe and others, which rejects the Kantian thing-in-itself as Berkeley rejected the Lockian substratum or unknown 'Matter,' and adopts a similar identification of things with ideas. Like Berkeley, the Immanent Philosophy is, of course, accused of subjective idealism (see, *e.g.*, the criticism of both in Volkelt's *Erfahrung u. Denken*, 1886, p. 121 ff.). If we take Berkeleyanism in a broad sense as representing some kind of identification of existence with consciousness or experience, the list of recent thinkers who show more or less strong Berkeleyan sympathies might be widely extended.

(3) *Psychological Theory of Visual Perception.*—Berkeley's *New Theory of Vision* is in some ways, perhaps, the most brilliant of all his writings, and is quite unquestionably one of the most brilliant monographs ever written on a psychological subject. It is, moreover, at least as remarkable for its scientific method as for its philosophical power. The general aim of the Essay is to discriminate clearly from each other the specific data of sight and touch, and to show how visual data have acquired a tactual significance. Just as a printed page means far less to an illiterate person than to one who has learned to read, so the patches of colour which are the proper data of sight must have meant far less to us, before experience established a connexion between them and the data of our other senses (especially those of touch and movement), than they do now when that connexion has become firmly fixed. When we look at a picture of a landscape, what is actually before our eyes is a small flat-coloured surface, but this arrangement of colour is significant to us of a great expanse of country. So completely established is this significant character of colour arrangements that it is difficult for any one but a trained artist to eliminate the significance and perceive the mere colour arrangements as such. And in like manner it took the genius of a Berkeley to dissolve that established connexion of visual and tactual data, upon which our adult perception of the actual world depends, and to discover the kind of way in which the connexion must originally have been established. The first problem he deals with is that of the visual perception of distance. He takes it for granted that distance out from the eye is not directly perceived, and that our estimates of *remote* distance are plainly dependent on experience. The part of the problem of which no proper account had as yet been given was the perception of *near* distances; for the mode of treatment adopted in geometrical optics was, as Berkeley showed, quite inappropriate in psychology. The question to be answered was, By what experience is the connexion between near distance as measured by movement and near distance as signified to the eye established? What are the signs of near distance which have brought about the *acquired visual* perception of it? Berkeley discovers three such signs: those which are now known as sensations of convergence and divergence, sensations of accommodation, and diffusion circles. And he shows how, in virtue of the regular connexion of these sensations, on the one hand, with distinct or indistinct vision, and, on the other, with distances as measured by movement, the visual object whose perception brings these sensations is perceived as being at the distance which the sensations signify. *E.g.* if, in order to perceive an

object distinctly, I have to make my eyes converge, I perceive this object as nearer than that at which I was previously looking; if, next, I have also to strain my eyes to keep it distinct, I perceive it as nearer again; and if, finally, it nevertheless becomes blurred, I perceive it as quite close to the eyes. So firmly is the connexion between the specific visual perception of patches of colour and the acquired visual perception of distance now established, that we find the greatest difficulty in discriminating between them; while the sensations whose work it is to establish and maintain the connexion are hardly ever noticed, because our attention is so wholly given to what the sensations mean—viz. differences of distance—that we have none left to bestow on the sensations themselves. Berkeley illustrates his argument from our experience of understanding spoken words:

'No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar language pronounced in our ears but the ideas corresponding thereto present themselves to our minds: in the very same instant the sound and the meaning enter the understanding: so closely are they united that it is not in our power to keep out the one except we exclude the other also. We even act in all respects as if we heard the very thoughts themselves. So likewise the secondary objects, or those which are only suggested by sight, do often more strongly affect us, and are more regarded, than the proper objects of that sense; along with which they enter into the mind, and with which they have a far more strict connexion than ideas have with words' (*New Theory*, § 51).

After dealing with our acquired visual perception of Distance, Berkeley proceeds to investigate in like manner, first, our acquired visual perception of true or tactual (as distinguished from apparent or visual) Magnitude; and, next, our acquired visual perception of Situation. In the latter part of the Essay he urges, in all its breadth, the doctrine, already exemplified in dealing with Distance, Magnitude, and Situation, that the true data of vision and of touch, respectively, are radically distinct, and shows how helpless pure vision would have been if it had been wholly deprived of the aid of touch. The developed sense of vision is extremely rich, but its development depends on what it borrows from touch. It is the experienced connexion of purely visual data with tactual data that makes developed vision what it is. And, according to Berkeley, this experienced connexion is essentially an arbitrary one. *E.g.* it is a fact of experience that, as an object recedes in tactual space, the corresponding visual appearance grows smaller; but the relation might just as well have been precisely reversed, and in that case we should have interpreted decreasing visual magnitude as a sign of approach instead of the opposite. Of course, whichever relation holds must hold consistently. If vision and touch are to correspond at all, their correspondence must be consistent throughout. But that they should correspond at all, and in what manner, is, so far as we can see, an arbitrary or contingent fact (see, *e.g.*, § 143). Throughout the whole Essay Berkeley develops the logical consequences of his general view with great acuteness and thoroughness. But he does not fail, on the other hand, to use such means of verifying his theory as offer themselves. He applies it, for instance, to solve problems in optics, and also such well-known problems as those raised by the larger appearance of the moon at the horizon, and by the inversion of retinal images.

Berkeley's theory has been both developed and criticized It left room for development, partly, of course, because it was only a theory of the one sense of vision, whereas modern psychology gives a generalized theory of space-perception; but partly, also, because it assumed (in accordance with the current philosophy) the atomic distinctness of sensations, and therefore treated the problem of perception as a problem simply of the combination or integration of sensations, whereas in a modern psychology such as Ward's, which has learned from biology to regard mind from the point of view of development, the problem of perception is seen to be one of differentiation as well as of integration. And perception, of course, develops as a whole: we do not, as Berkeley's treatment might suggest, have tactual perception present in its completeness before any connexion with visual perception begins.

Criticism (not unaccompanied by misunderstanding) of Berkeley's theory has fastened mainly upon his account of our acquired visual perception of distance. It has been sought to show that the perception of distance is native to vision itself. But no genetic psychology can really afford to dispense with the experiences of movement of the body and limbs in accounting for the perception of space. We must not forget that, if we consider only adult or fully-developed visual perception, we are begging the question so far as Berkeley is concerned. He fully admits that *acquired* visual perception of distance is, in point of *time*, immediate enough. The look and ocular feel, so to speak, of distance in objects is now so familiar to us that we are, within limits, as immediately aware of distance as of colour itself. A table looks to be at a certain distance just as it looks hard, though mere or uneducated vision could no more inform us of distance than of hardness. Recent experimental physiology has shown, however, that, as regards adult visual perception, the primary factor in the (binocular) perception of the *relative* distances of *near* objects is one of which Berkeley was not aware, viz. (in physiological terminology) the mechanism of corresponding points in the two retinæ. And it has been shown that the perception of relative distance by means of this mechanism precedes, and probably sets up, movements of convergence and divergence, not conversely. The question, what answers *psychologically* to the physiological mechanism, *i.e.* Berkeley's question of the *psychological* signs of distance, is one with which physiology is less concerned. Finally, it should be observed that physiological inheritance of nervous co-ordinations may greatly shorten the process of the education of vision.

For the historical antecedents and reception of Berkeley's theory of vision see Fraser's Editorial Preface; on the history of the theory of visual perception generally, Sully's *Human Mind*, 1892, vol ii. App. B, where reference is also made to the medical evidence; for a full statement of current psychological views, James's *Principles of Psychology*, 1891, ch. xx. in vol. ii.; for the physiology of vision, chap. on 'Vision,' by Rivers, in vol. ii. of *Text-book of Physiology*, ed. Schafer, 1900. On the more philosophical questions of the 'arbitrariness' of visual signs, and the relative importance of vision and touch in our perception of the external world, there are some illuminating remarks in the chapter on the Theory of Vision, bk. i. ch. xii., in Grote's *Exploratio Philosophica*, pt. ii., 1900.

LITERATURE.—Fraser's *Complete Works of Berkeley* is now in its second edition (4 vols., Oxford, 1901); his *Life and Letters of Berkeley* (Oxford, 1871) contains also an important chapter on the Philosophy of Berkeley; it is supplemented by a smaller biography, *Berkeley*[2], 1899, in Philos. Classics, based in part on new materials.

As regards Berkeley's metaphysics, the criticisms of Reid, *Intellectual Powers* (in vol. i of Hamilton's ed. of his works), Essay ii. chs. x. xi., are classical in their way; Green, in the General Introd. to his ed. of Hume (reprinted in Green's *Works*, vol. i., 1885), § 158 ff., treats Berkeley only as preparing the way for Hume's completer empiricism; J. S. Mill's essay in *Dissertations*, vol. iv., 1875, and the chapters on the 'Psychological Theory of the Belief in Matter,' in his *Exam. of Sir W. Hamilton's Philos.* (third, 1867, and later editions), chs. xi. xii. and Appendix, are interesting for their points of difference from, as well as of identity with, Berkeley's theory; a brief review of the English psychology of external perception in Croom-Robertson's *Elements of General Philosophy* (1896), pp. 154–180, is useful; in addition to the histories of philosophy see Lyon's *L'Idéalisme en Angleterre au xviiie siècle* (Paris, 1888), and Adamson's *Development of Modern Philosophy* (1903), vol. i. pp. 124–132 and 250 f.; for other literature see *DPhP*, vol. iii. pt. i. (1905) pp. 120–122, or Ueberweg-Heinze's *Gesch. d. Philos.*[10] iii. (1907) p. 172 f.; Ueberweg's own German tr. of the *Principles* is useful for the running criticism given in the notes.

H. BARKER.

BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX.—1. Life.—Bernard was born at Fontaines, two miles from Dijon, in 1090 (not 1091; see Vacandard, *Vie de S. Bernard*, i. 1). His father, Tescelin († Apr. 1117, at Clairvaux), was a knight of experience, gentle but brave, of high birth; his mother, Alith or Alice of Montbard, was of saintly character (for Bernard's noble descent see the 'diatribe' by P. F. Chifflet, 1660, *PL* clxxxv. 1383–1542). Such was Bernard's commanding will that, when (1112) at the age of 22 he determined to become a monk, he persuaded thirty young noblemen, including his brothers, to enter with him the most austere monastery of Europe, the famous Citeaux (*PL* clxxxv. 237), founded 15 years previously by Robert of Molesme († May 1110), and governed, after Robert had been forced to return to his original monastery (1099), by the real founder, Stephen Harding of Sherborne in Dorset († 28th March 1134; for his life see *DNB*, xxiv. 333). In 1115, as Citeaux had grown too big, Bernard was selected by Stephen as the leader, or abbot, of a third colony of twelve sent out from Citeaux to found a new home. Bernard struck out for the plateau of Langres in Champagne, and there (25th June 1115), in a wild valley called Wormwood, watered by the Aube, he built a rude wooden structure, with chapel, dormitory, and refectory under one roof, long afterwards preserved by the veneration of Cistercians (see Joseph Meglinger's description of a visit to it in May 1667; Meglinger, *Itin. Cist.* in *PL* clxxxv. 1608). To this rude structure Bernard gave the name of Clairvaux (i.e. *Clara Vallis*, 'Brightdale,' *vice* Wormwood, *Vallis Absinthialis*, *PL* clxxxv. 241). Here the discipline and asceticism was of the strictest, and for a time Bernard's health was impaired. But the abbey speedily grew in numbers, so that in 1118 it sent out its first colony to Trois Fontaines near Chalons.

In 1119 Bernard began his correspondence, his first efforts showing abundant vigour but little of the later skill. His activity was indefatigable, and his fame and influence rapidly grew. Miracles were assigned to him, especially the gift of prophecy (for the contemporary evidence on this matter see *PL* clxxxv. 252–7, 262, 333–50; and, above all, the astonishing diary of Hermann, bp. of Constance in 1446, in *PL* clxxxv. 374 ff.). At the Synod of Troyes (Jan. 1128) his powerful advocacy gave the Knights Templars their real start, though the Rule of the Templars, commonly assigned to him (Bouquet, *Recueil*, xiv. 232), is by a later hand, at any rate in parts (Labbé, *Conc.* xxi. 360; Mabillon, *Op. Bern.* ii. 543, in *PL* clxxxii. 919). His *de Laude novæ militiæ ad milites Templi* was written about five years later, between 1132 and 1136. Though short, it is rhetorical and somewhat weak (in *PL* clxxxii. 922 ff.). At the same Synod of Troyes he procured the deposition of the bp. of Verdun. For this he was denounced to Rome as a meddler, and received a bitter letter of rebuke from the Roman chancellor, Cardinal Haimerich (*Ep.* 48).

With the death of Honorius II. (14th Feb. 1130) Bernard's European fame began. In the schism which followed, Bernard's voice at the Council of Etampes (1130; for the date see Vacandard, *op. cit.* i. 291 n.) secured for Innocent II., whose hurried election, though prior to that of his rival the Jewish Pierleoni (Anacletus II.), had been most irregular, the support of the French clergy (Labbé, *Conc.* xxi. 441–4); and a few months later, at Chartres (Jan. 1131; see Vacandard, *op. cit.* i. 303), the allegiance of Henry I. of England, in spite of the fact that the English clergy were leaning to the anti-pope Anacletus (*PL* clxxxv. 271). In consequence, Innocent showered immunities on the Cistercians, to the disgust of Clugny, and on his return to Italy in 1132 (from which he had fled almost immediately after his election) took with him Bernard, to whose exertions and letters (Bern. *Epp.* 128 ff.) he owed no small part of his growing recognition. In 1135 Bernard returned to Clairvaux and set about the re-building of the abbey in a more convenient place (*PL* clxxxv. 283–5). In this year we date also the preaching of the first 23 *Sermones in Cantica* (Bern. *Epp.* 153–4; Vacandard, *op. cit.* i. 471). In 1137, as the schism in Italy, under the lead of the Norman Roger, whom Anacletus had crowned as the first king of Sicily, was still disturbing the Church, Bernard once more journeyed there. The death of Anacletus (25th Jan. 1138), and Innocent's recognition in Rome, left Bernard the virtual pope of Christendom, though not without opposition from the cardinals (see below, *re* Gilbert de la Porrée); and with the election of Eugenius III. (15th Feb. 1145), a Cistercian monk and pupil of Bernard, the ideas of Clairvaux became supreme.

In 1145 Bernard was called upon by Eugenius III. to preach the second Crusade at Vézelay (Easter, 31st March 1146). He was afterwards deputed to preach the same in Germany; and as a result of his meeting with the Emperor Conrad III. at Speyer, the reluctant monarch, overcome by Bernard's eloquence, took the cross (27th Dec. 1146). On the failure of the first expedition, Bernard and Suger planned a second, and at a Council at Chartres (7th May 1150; for the date of this Council, which Mabillon, Baronius, Morison, and others put in 1146, see Vacandard, *op. cit.* ii. 428–33) Bernard was actually elected commander-in-chief—an office which he refused (Bern. *Ep.* 256). In his last years Bernard suffered much pain and disappointment. The misfortunes of the second Crusade were laid at his door. He was saddened by the death of his friend, the abbot Suger (13th Jan. 1152). He died five weeks after Eugenius, on 20th Aug. 1153, and was buried at Clairvaux. He was canonized by Alexander III., 15th Jan. 1174 (*PL* clxxxv. 622), while Dante's references (*Par.* xxxi.) show the regard in which he was universally held. When in 1793 Clairvaux was turned into a glass factory and the tombs broken up, Bernard's bones were distributed as relics to surrounding churches (*PL* clxxxv. 1697).

2. Character and place in history.—The character of St. Bernard has already been sketched in vol. i. p. 16 (*s.v.* ABELARD). His marvellous energy, in spite of bodily weakness (see the list of his journeys in Vacandard, *op. cit.* ii. App. D), and his power as a ruler of men will be apparent from the preceding outlines of his life. His personal magnetism, as we see from the *Life* written by William of St. Thierry (c. 12 in *PL* clxxxv. 258), was extraordinary, and no doubt, in part, gave rise to the innumerable tales of his miraculous gifts (see above). Equally important was his fearlessness. In his personal humility amid all exaltation he proved himself a true saint, as also in the passion and depth of his piety.

The importance of St. Bernard as the virtual pope of his age cannot be exaggerated. For a few years the centre of Christendom was transferred from Rome to Clairvaux. His influence was generally on the side of the angels, though deduction must be made for his passion as a heresy-hunter (see below), and for a certain impatience of contradiction, which leads him at times into arrogant writing and action (*e.g.* his dispute with the gentle Peter the Venerable of Clugny with reference to the bishopric of Langres [Bernard, *Epp.* 166–87, with which cf. Peter of Clugny, *Ep.* i. 29], which resulted in the election of a prior of Clairvaux, a kinsman of Bernard). At times his restless vigilance shows a tendency to lead him into meddling with matters that did not concern him, probably, as in the case of William

Fitzherbert, archbp. of York, through the appeal to him of Cistercians looking to Clairvaux as their head.

St. Bernard was the last great founder of the older forms of monasticism. Through his influence the Cistercian order spread into every land. Within his lifetime no fewer than 160 Cistercian monasteries were founded, chiefly through his prestige and influence; of these 68 were filiations of Clairvaux (see lists in Janauschek, *Orig. Cist.* vol. i., Vienna, 1877; Vacandard, *op. cit.* ii. App. C). In England especially, the influence of the Cistercians was very great. Introduced at Waverley in Surrey in 1128, they soon established their homes in every part of the country, especially in the wilder parts of Yorkshire (*Eng. Hist. Rev.* [1893] pp. 625–76: 'The Settlement of the Cistercians in England,' by Miss Cooke; see also article MONASTICISM for the distinguishing features of the Cistercians).

3. St. Bernard's theological disputes.—The influence of Bernard as a theologian was always thrown against all change or progress. He was the last of the Fathers, as Abelard was the first of the Schoolmen. In his antagonism to all that Abelard represented (on which see ABELARD, vol. i. p. 16; to the authorities there cited add, for R.C. views, Vacandard, *Abélard, sa lutte avec S. Bernard*, Paris, 1881) Bernard was the refuge of a reactionary school destined to be swept away by the rise of Scholasticism. In later years his hatred of heresy became almost a monomania. As his contemporary, Otto of Freising, tells us:

'Bernard was, from the fervour of his Christian religion, as jealous as from his habitual meekness he was in some measure credulous; so that he held in abhorrence those who trusted in the wisdom of this world and were too much attached to human reasonings; and if anything alien to the Christian faith were said to him in reference to them he readily gave ear to it' ('de Gest. Friderici,' i. 47, in Pertz, *MGH* xx. 376).

Hence a want of fairness in dealing not only with Abelard—this perhaps was natural, for the two men were diametrically opposed—but also with Gilbert de la Porrée.

The struggle of Gilbert and Bernard has been told us on Bernard's side by his secretary, Geoffrey of Auxerre in his *Libellus contra Gilbert. Porret.* (*PL* clxxxv. 595 ff.), and in his *Epistola de Condemnatione*, written forty years later to Henry (not 'Albinus,' as Mabillon, Migne, and other editors; see *Hist. Litt. de la France*, xiv. 339 n.), cardinal bp. of Albano. This *Ep.* is in *PL* clxxxv. 587 ff. It is this version that is followed in the *Acta Sanctorum* (Aug. iv. c. 41) by R.C. writers in general, and by Cotter Morison, *op. cit.* But the publication of the *Historia Pontificalis* (written in 1163, first published in 1868 by W. Arndt in *MGH* xx. 517–45) of John of Salisbury († Oct. 1180, for whom see *DNB* xxix. 439), who was present during the trial, has shown us the inaccuracy and bias of Geoffrey. A more impartial statement is given us by Otto of Freising (*de Gest. Friderici*, i. cc. 55–7).

Gilbert, who was born at Poitiers about 1075, was trained under Bernard of Chartres and Anselm of Laon. After lecturing on theology at Paris, he retired, as bishop, to Poitiers (1141), possibly as the result of Abelard's condemnation at Sens (see vol. i. p. 16). He died in 1154. His *de Sex Principiis*, a supplement to the *Categories* of Aristotle (ed. Venice, 1489), was the recognized mediæval text-book on which Albert the Great and other schoolmen wrote extensive commentaries. By his continuation of Anselm of Laon's continuation of Walafrid Strabo's *Glossa Ordinaria* he became a joint-author of the current mediæval notes on the Bible (R. L. Poole, *Illustrations of Hist. of Med. Thought*, 1884, p. 135 n.; for Gilbert's philosophical position, see Ueberweg, i. 399).

Gilbert, who, according to John of Salisbury, 'was a monk of the clearest intellect and of the widest reading, in literary culture surpassed by none' (*Historia Pont.* viii. 522), had published a commentary on the *de Trinitate* (a collection of treatises first printed at Basel in 1570, currently assigned to Boethius, but proved spurious by F. Nitzsch, *Das System des Boethius*, Berlin, 1860). In this *Commentar. in Boeth.*, Gilbert, by distinguishing 'God' from 'Deity,' in which last he found the universal that his realism demanded, had laid such stress on the absolute unity of the Trinity as almost to exclude the existence within it of a Trinity, except as external, non-essential, and merely formal (see Poole, *op. cit.* 179 ff.; or, more fully, Lipsius in Ersch and Gruber's *Allgemeine Encyk.* [1858] lxvii. 209 ff.). His obscure statements led his archdeacons to lodge charges with Eugenius III., and to the attack of Bernard, first in a Synod at Paris (1147), then in an adjourned Council at Rheims (March 1148), where among the advocates for the prosecution we find Theobald, archbp. of Canterbury, and Thomas Becket. On the other side we find the sympathies of the cardinals; the struggle, in fact, in one of its aspects, was a conflict between the prelates of England and France and the cardinals, 'with the object of forcing the Apostolic See to follow Bernard' (John of Salisbury, *op. cit.* ix. 523 ff.; on the complicated politics which led the English to this support of Bernard see K. Norgate, *Angevin Kings*, i. 363 ff.). The issue was a complete failure for Bernard. When Eugenius proposed that Gilbert's commentary should be handed over to him that he might erase whatever was needful, Gilbert claimed that it was his own duty to erase what was amiss—a declaration received with loud applause by the cardinals. The Council ended with the Pope's mysterious ruling 'that the essence of God should not be predicated in the sense of the ablative case only, but also of the nominative' (Otto Freis. *op. cit.* i. 56 f.), and Gilbert returned 'with his honour unabated to his own diocese'; for Geoffrey's statement of Gilbert's recantation (*PL* clxxxv. 597) is, as John of Salisbury shows (*Hist. Pont.* xi. xii. 525 ff.), an exaggeration.

Bernard's other theological controversies may be briefly dismissed. In his attack upon Abelard at Sens (1141, not 1140; see Deutsch, *Die Synode v. Sens*, Berlin, 1880) he came into conflict with Abelard's pupil—'Goliath's armour-bearer,' as Bernard calls him—Arnold of Brescia (see 'Arnoldists,' *s.v.* SECTS [Christian]). But, beyond writing vehement letters demanding his expulsion from Zürich, Bernard had little to do with this twelfth-century Mazzini (Bern. *Epp.* 195 f., 243 f.; Vacandard, *Revue des Quest. Histor.* 1884, 52–114).

St. Bernard also came into conflict with the Henricians, so called from a monk, Henry of Lausanne, of whom we first hear as preaching at Le Mans in 1116. With many of Henry's ascetic and disciplinary views Bernard would, probably, have agreed, but in the South of France the people welcomed the doctrines as an excuse for spoiling the Church. At the instance of the Papal legate Alberic, Bernard (June 1145; for date see Vacandard, *Vie de S. Bern.* ii. 217 n., 223 n.) preached at Albi, the centre of the disorder, with some success, which became complete when his opponent Henry refused St. Bernard's challenge to a disputation. The discredited Henry was captured and brought in chains before his bishop (1146), and, probably, died in prison (Vacandard, *op. cit.* ii. 233 n.).

[For St Bernard and the Henricians see Bern. *Ep.* 241, also *Vitae* in *PL* clxxxv. 311, 427; 'Acta Hildeberti Cenoman.' in Bouquet, *Recueil*, xii. 547–51, 554.]

On the side of tolerance, we must note Bernard's defence of the Jews of the Rhineland in 1146 against the murderous attacks of the priest Rudolph (Bern. *Ep.* 365; Otto Freis. *op. cit.* i. 37; and, for a Jewish contemporary account, the *Chronicle of Joseph ben Meir* [tr. by C. H. F. Bialloblotzky, London, 1835]). His tolerance in this matter is in notable opposition to his contemporaries, *e.g.* Peter the Venerable, *Epp.* iv. 36 (*PL* clxxxix. 366).

4. Writings and place as a thinker and theologian.—Bernard's writings may be classified as follows:—

(i.) *EPISTLES.*—Bernard's *Letters*, of which about 450 appear to be genuine (in *PL* clxxxii.), reveal the width of his influence and the range of his activities. They deal with all the affairs of the times, from the most spiritual matters through all

the tangled diplomacy of Church and State down to a theft of pigs. In their constant interest in current events they are a great contrast to the letters of Anselm (see vol. i. p. 558), and reveal the fundamental differences of the two authors. The eloquence of the letters is, at times, of a very high order, and they are of considerable value for the history of the period, as is his *Vita Malachiæ*, written in 1149 for contemporary Ireland.

(ii.) *DEVOTIONAL AND HORTATORY.*—Of these the most important are :—

(*a*) The *de Consideratione*, in 5 books (*PL* clxxxii. 727 ff.), composed by Bernard in the leisure moments of many years, but published at intervals (book ii. in 1150, book iii. in 1152 ; see the references in iii. c. 5, § 20) in the evil days which followed the return of the second Crusade (*de Consid.* ii. c. 1). The book is dedicated to Pope Eugenius III. 'Consideration' was treated by Bernard under four heads : (1) concerning oneself, (2) concerning the things which are under one, (3) concerning the things around one, (4) concerning the things above. In this last we see his Mysticism. But the work, though full of shrewd moral reflexions, owes its chief interest to its discursive treatment of other topics, especially the matter of Papal appeals (*de Consid.* iii. c. 2) and other abuses. Bernard held that the reformation of the Church must begin with the sanctity of its head. Its plain speaking has made the work a favourite weapon with Protestant controversialists, *e.g.* E. Brown, *Fasciculus rerum Expetendarum et Fugiendarum* (1690). But, in spite of its anti-ultramontanism (cf. iii. 1, 2), it has also formed a manual for Popes. Pius v. had it read aloud to him daily.

(*b*) The *de Moribus et Officio Episcoporum*, written about 1126 to Archbp. Henry of Sens, and the *Sermo de Conversione ad Clericos* (both in *PL* clxxxii.) contain much plain speaking on the vices of the clergy and the need of reform.

(*c*) The *Sermones de tempore* (*PL* clxxxiii. 35–360), *de Sanctis* (*ib.* 359–536), and *de Diversis* (*ib.* 537–748). The oratory of St. Bernard, though not perhaps of the highest order (see a criticism in Vacandard, *op. cit.* i. ch. 16), was remarkable for its effects (*e.g.* crusades), and in its 'converting' power, especially using 'conversion' in the technical monastic sense. [A remarkable instance of this is given in the *Exordium mag. Cisterciense*, ii. 13, in *PL* clxxxv. 423 ; other instances in Cæsar Heisterbach, *Dial. Miraculorum* (ed. Cologne, 1851), bk. i.]

(*d*) The *de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* (*PL* clxxxii. 1001 ff., written before 1128, see *Ep.* 52). Bernard's recognition of prevenient grace as the source of all the good in man had appeared to an auditor to be an eulogium of grace at the expense of human merit and activity. Bernard therefore drew up an account of the relation of grace and freewill. He claims for man after his Fall formal freedom as his distinguishing feature, without which there could be no imputation of guilt, and which must consent to the grace which awakens it. But 'the beginning of our salvation comes from God, neither through us nor with us,' in a constraining influence stimulating voluntary consent. In the union of the two lies 'merit.' But his hard Augustinian doctrine of original sin leads him into the usual difficulties, not lessened by his strong evangelical stress upon God's mercy as our sole 'merit' (*e.g. Serm. in fest. omn. Sanct.* i. 11, *PL* clxxxiii. 459 : 'Sed quid potest esse omnis justitia nostra coram Deo ?' etc., or *in Cantica*, xxii. 11, in *PL*, *ib.* 883), being combined with the usual mediæval and monastic conceptions.

(iii.) *MYSTICAL.*—The most important of Bernard's mystical writings are his Homilies on the Song of Solomon (*Sermones in Cantica Canticorum*, *PL* clxxxiii. 780 ff.). To this we must add the later sections of the *de Consideratione*. Of this series, begun in 1135, 86 had been finished before his death. They were actually preached to the monks of Clairvaux, and still bear the signs of interruptions and other local circumstances (cf. Nos. 26 and 47, § 8). *Cant.* iii. 1, where Bernard left off, was thus a favourite starting-place for later imitators. [The continuation by the Cistercian abbot Gilbert († before 1202) of Swineshead Abbey, Lincolnshire, is in Migne, *PL* clxxxiv. cols. 1–251.]

'The great importance of Bernard in the history of Mysticism does not lie in the speculative side of his teaching, in which he depends almost entirely upon Augustine. His great achievement was to recall devout and loving contemplation to the image of the crucified Christ, and to found that worship of our Saviour as the "Bridegroom of the Soul," which in the next centuries inspired so much fervid devotion and lyrical sacred poetry' (W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism* [1899], 140 n.).

Bernard thus gave to the romantic, not to say erotic, side of Mysticism a great stimulus. It is true that he always speaks of the Church and not the individual as the bride of Christ, but the enforced celibacy of monasticism soon led to the transference to the individual of the luscious language of the *Canticles* (Inge, *op. cit.* App. D). The symbolism and allegorism of Bernard's methods of Scripture interpretation was, of course, no new thing, and in the Christian Church was chiefly due to the influence of Origen (see vol. i. p. 315). In his *Sermones de Diversis*, No. 92 (in *PL* clxxxiii. 714), Bernard gives a threefold interpretation of Scripture—historical, moral or figurative, and mystical. This is further expanded in his *Serm. in Cantica*, No. 23 (*PL*, *ib.* 884 ff.), with a special panegyric of the vision of God which the mystical interpretation gives (*op. cit.* 893). The mysticism of Bernard is really not systematic, but the outcome of his persuasion that faith receives all truth 'wrapped up' (*involutum*). All that reason can do is to add clearness, a certain strictly limited measure of unwrapping ; for the highest knowledge is that which comes neither by *intellectus* nor by *opinio*, but by intuition or spiritual vision. Of this there are three stages—*consideratio dispensativa*, *æstimativa*, and *speculativa*, in which last *consideratio* becomes identical with *contemplatio* (*de Consid.* v. 1–4 ; *Serm. in Cant.* v. 4, lii. 4, 5).

We see the same mystical principles in his *de Diligendo Deo* (*PL* clxxxii. 974 ff.). God is the ground and cause of a love in which there are four stages (*op. cit.* cc. 8, 15). The first stage is carnal love, in which the man loves himself. The second is a love of God which is selfish, inasmuch as it is due to suffering and experience. In the third stage he loves God for God's own sake. In the fourth stage the spirit, 'intoxicated by the Divine love, wholly forgets itself, becoming nothing in itself, and becoming one spirit with Him.' To be thus affected is to be deified ('sic affici deificari est,' *op. cit.* § 28, and cf. *Ep.* 107, 5 [the expression is a favourite with later mystics])—the annihilation of self 'in the immense sea of a luminous eternity' (§ 30).

(iv.) *POETICAL.*—Much doubt has been cast upon the authorship of the hymns usually assigned to Bernard, but by none more than by Mabillon, who pointed out (*Op. Bern.* v. 891) that the Cistercians 'denied themselves the use of metrical forms' (see the statement of Nicholas de Clairvaux, *Ep.* 15, in *Bib. Max. Pat.* xxi.) ; nor is the ascription to Bernard of very early date. That Bernard composed some hymns and had some distinction as a plain chantist is acknowledged, but he tells us himself that he 'neglected metre that he might pay more attention to sense' [Bern. *Ep.* 398, 3 ; the *Tonale* (*PL* clxxxii. 1151 ff.) owes more to his disciples than to himself (Vacandard, *op. cit.* ii. 101–5)]. The arguments of Trench and others, that 'if Bernard did not write them, it is not easy to guess who could,' are therefore of little value, more

especially as Trench owns the 'general ascription to Bernard of any poems of merit, belonging to that period, whereof the authorship was uncertain.' The *Salve, mundi salutare*, an address in 350 lines to the various limbs of Christ on the cross, shows the influence of his erotic mysticism (see above, p. 532[b]). The section *ad faciem*, 'O sacred head once wounded' (*Salve, caput cruentatum*), is in all hymn-books. The *Jubilus rhythmicus de nomine Jesu*, originally in 42 stanzas (earliest MS, 12th cent., in Bodleian; the other stanzas in printed edd. have not been traced earlier than 15th cent.; see J. Mearns, in Julian, *Dict. Hymn.* 586), is beautiful throughout, in spite of a certain lack of progress in the thought. The translations of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th stanzas [*Jesu, dulcis memoria*; E. Caswall († 1828), 'Jesu, the very thought of Thee'; for other versions see Julian, *s.v.*] are in all hymn-books. It is interesting to note that this hymn was specially arranged by the mystic Henry Suso († 1365) as an office for the daily use of the Friends of God. The author, who was probably not St. Bernard, but one of his school, had certainly adopted his style and thought (see Bern. *Serm. de Div.* iv. § 1, 'Bonus es, domine, animæ quærenti te,' etc.).

LITERATURE.—i. *LIFE OF ST. BERNARD*—(*a*) *Sources.*—We gain our best knowledge of Bernard from a study of his voluminous *Letters* [*supra* § 4 (i.)] A critical edition of their order is much needed. Contemporary biographies of value were written by (i) William of St. Thierry about 1145 (in *PL* clxxxv. 226 ff.), and continued after William's death by Arnold of Bonneval († *c.* 1156), near Chartres (*PL ib.* 267 ff.), to whom Bernard had written from his death-bed (*Ep.* 310); (ii) his secretary Geoffrey, who succeeded him as abbot of Clairvaux (*PL* clxxxv. 302 ff.); (iii) Alain († 1182), bp. of Auxerre (*PL* clxxxv. 470 ff.). To the above we must add (iv) *Liber Miraculorum* (in *PL* clxxxv. 1273 ff.) of the Spanish monk Herbert of Clairvaux, much of which is legendary; as is also (v) the *Vita Bernardi* of John the Hermit (in *PL* clxxxv. 533. John the Hermit is unknown, unless he be identical, as Vacandard, *op. cit.* i. xliv, suggests, with the prior of Clairvaux, *c.* 1180); (vi) the *Exordium Magnum Ordinis Cisterciensis* (in *PL* clxxxv. 996 ff.), written between 1206 and 1221 adds little of value.

(*b*) *Modern Lives.*—Of these we may mention the Life in the *Acta Sanctorum* (Aug. iv. d. 20); the general preface by Mabillon to his editions (see *infra*); Aug. Neander, *Der heilige Bernhard*, 1813, 1848, 1868, also 2 vols. ed. S. M. Deutsch, Gotha, 1889, Eng. tr. by M. Wrench, 1843 [Neander has also given a full treatment of the theology in his *Church History*]; G. Huffer, *Der heilige B. von Clairvaux*, Munster, 1886, and 'Die Anfange des zweiten Kreuzzugs,' in *Hist. Jahrb.* 1887; M. T. Ratisbonne, *Hist. de S. Bernard et son siècle*, 1848 (many later edd.). This last uncritical work has been largely used by the somewhat rhetorical but sympathetic R. S. Storrs, *Bernard of Clairvaux*, 1892. Probably the best life in English, though full allowance must be made for its angle of vision, is J. C. Morison, *St. Bernard*, 1868 (many later edd.). The fullest and best life, apart from its ultramontane standpoint, is E. Vacandard, *Vie de S. Bernard*, Paris, 1895. To this add his early studies, *S. Bernard Orateur*, Rouen, 1877, and *Abélard, sa lutte avec S. Bernard*, Paris, 1881. Kugler, *Analekten z. Gesch. des zweit. Kreuzzugs*, Tubingen, 1878 and 1882, and *Neue Analekten*, 1885, should not be overlooked. For a complete bibliography of Bernard, see L. Janauschek, *Bibliographia Bernardina*, Vienna, 1891.

ii. *THEOLOGY.*—To the well-known works of Harnack, Loofs, Seeberg, and W. R. Inge (*Christian Mysticism*, 1899), add Dieckhoff, *Justin, Augustin, Bernhard und Luther*, Leipzig, 1882.

iii. *EDITIONS.*—MSS of Bernard abound (see Potthast, *s.v.*), and testify to his hold on the Middle Ages. Some of his *Sermons* were printed at Strassburg as early as 1472; and his *Epistles* at Brussels, by the Brothers of the Common Life, in 1481. The first fairly complete ed. of his works is by Andrew Bocard, Paris, 1508. This was followed by the more complete Lyons ed. of 1520 and many others (*e.g.* 1515, 1547, 1566, 1572, 1586, 1601, 1609). These were superseded by the able ed. of J. M. Horst, 1641, 1667, on which J. Mabillon based his standard ed. (2 vols., 1667, 1690, 1719, 1839). The ed. of 1719 is that reprinted in Migne, *PL* vols. clxxxii.-v. A new critical ed. of many of the *Sermons* was brought out by Janauschek, *Xenia Bernardina*, Vienna, 1891. A more critical ed. of *Letters* and *Works* is much needed. A complete tr. into French by A. Ravelet, 1865, is in progress; also by Charpentier, Paris, 1873, in 8 vols. Many of the works and all the *Epistles* have been translated into Eng. by S. J. Eales, 4 vols., 1889-96 (with Introduction and Life). Add also M. C. and C. Patmore, *On the Love of God*, 1881. The *de Consideratione* is in Goldast, *Monarchia Rom. Imperii*, Hanover, 1612, ii. 68 ff.

H. B. WORKMAN.

BEROSUS (or **BEROSSOS**).—A Chaldæan priest in the temple of Bel (Marduk) at Babylon, who is said by Eusebius (*Chronicon*, 5. 8) and Tatian (*Oratio ad Græcos*) to have been a contemporary of Alexander the Great, and to have lived into the reign of Antiochus Soter. He compiled in Greek a *History of Babylonia*, which, unfortunately, like the corresponding work of Manetho in Egypt, has perished, and is known to us only by fragmentary quotations from Alexander Polyhistor and Apollodorus, preserved by Eusebius and George the Syncellus. Josephus (*c. Apion.* i. 19 f.) seems to have been acquainted with the original work of Berosus.

According to Alexander Polyhistor (see Cory, *Ancient Fragments*, 1832), he wrote the historical account of fifteen myriads of years, the history of the heavens and of the sea, of kings and their memorable actions, and of the generations of mankind and their civil polity. His *History* professed to begin with creation, and was carried down to his own time. It first described a state of chaos, presided over by the female monster Tiâmat, who was encountered and slain by the god Marduk, and whose overthrow was succeeded by the creation of the heavens and the earth. Berosus then gives a chronology of the Babylonian kingdom. Only a part of this has come down to us, and that in a condition which makes it in parts almost unintelligible. The difficulty of re-constructing his system is increased by the fact that the lists which he copied from the cuneiform originals have been mutilated by his abbreviators, and have suffered still further at the hands of those who copied the abbreviated lists. The most probable reconstruction is that of A. von Gutschmid, which is here given.

10 kings before the Flood, 432,000 years.

Ist Dynasty:	86 Chaldæans . .	34,091 years		
IInd ,,	8 Medes . . .	224 years.	B.C.	2450-2226
IIIrd ,,	11 Chaldæans . .	248 ,,	,,	2225-1977
IVth ,,	49 Chaldæans . .	458 ,,	,,	1977-1519
Vth ,,	9 Arabians. . .	245 ,,	,,	1518-1273
VIth ,,	45 Chaldæans . .	526 ,,	,,	1273- 747
VIIth ,,	8 Assyrians . .	121 ,,	,,	746- 625
VIIIth ,,	6 Chaldæans . .	87 ,,	,,	625- 538

It has been pointed out by Brandis (*Rerum Assyriarum tempora emendata*, p. 17) and Gutschmid (*op. cit. infra*) that the post-diluvian period of 36,000 years has been adjusted to coincide with an astrological period during which the gods had granted glory and independence to the Chaldæans, and which terminated with the capture of Babylon by Cyrus.

The latter part of Berosus's historical statement has not survived except in detached fragments which have been preserved by Josephus, Eusebius, and the Syncellus. One fragment concerning Nabonassar (B.C. 747?) states that the Chaldæans were acquainted with astronomy only from his time onwards, because he destroyed all previous records. There are also fragments concerning the reigns of Nabopolassar and Nebuchadrezzar—the death of Nabopolassar, the succession of Nebuchadrezzar and his adornment of Babylon—and about the succession of Chaldæan kings after Nebuchadrezzar, ending with the capture of Nabonidus by Cyrus.

In comparing his work with the Babylonian and Assyrian inscriptions, it is somewhat difficult to arrive at any definite result on account of the deficiency of exact dates on both sides. In the absence of more satisfactory information, the list of Berosus must be taken as a provisional framework for Babylonian chronology, as the lists of Manetho are taken in Egyptian chronology, but with less confidence in the case of Berosus. Recent discoveries indicate, on the whole, his trustworthiness so far as regards the fact that his work actually represents the sources from which it professes to have been drawn; *e.g.* his account of

the Deluge agrees even in details with the cuneiform text. No confidence, however, can be reposed in the numbers allotted to his dynasties. In his antediluvian dynasty one or two names can be recognized with some difficulty as being possible variants of some of those which occur in the inscriptions, *c.g.* the last two kings—the name of the first of whom, Otiartes, has been suggested by Lenormant to be a corruption of Obartes, who appears in the inscriptions as Ubaratutu; while the name of the second, Xisuthros, may be Khasisatra, or Atrakhasis, the Sîtnapišti of the Gilgamesh legend. His third dynasty, consisting of eleven kings, seems to correspond with that traced by G. Smith, and suspected by Sayce to be of Arabian origin. The most prominent king in it is the famous Hammurabi (B.C. 2130). His Arabian dynasty, according to Sayce, appears to be the Kassite dynasty of the inscriptions; and if so, both the title and the figures of 9 kings and 245 years must be corrupt, since 36 Kassite kings are known, covering a period of 576 years. Minor dynasties seem to have been either run together or omitted altogether from Berosus's lists, as a broken tablet which once contained a complete list of Babylonian monarchs arranged in dynasties introduces a number of very short ones. This arrangement or omission may have been the work of Polyhistor or his copyists.

Apart from the chronological value of his work, the main interest of Berosus's *History* lies in the fragments of the ancient cosmogonic myths of Babylon which he has preserved. The chief of these are the legend of Tiâmat and Marduk (Bel and the Dragon); that of the giving of letters and civilization to mankind by Oannes (*Ê-ghan*—Ê the fish?), a composite being, partly fish and partly man (cf. the giving of letters to Egypt by the composite deity Tehuti); the legend of the great tower and the confusion of tongues; and that of Xisuthros and the Deluge. From the actually existing cuneiform records it is apparent that Berosus's account of these legends practically represents the ancient Chaldæan tradition. In particular, his story of Xisuthros and the Deluge has been found to be a fragment of the great Gilgamesh epic.

LITERATURE.—Maspero, *Histoire ancienne*, Paris, 1886, vol. i. 'Les Origines', Lenormant, *Essai de commentaire de fragments cosmogoniques de Bérose*, Paris, 1872; Cory's 'Ancient Fragments' (*Texts and Translations*), 1832; G. Smith, *TSBA* vol. iii., and art. 'Berosus' in *EBr*, Sayce, *Ancient Empires of the East*, Lond. 1884, also *Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, Lond. 1902, and *Hib. Lect.* on 'Babylonian Religion,' Lond. 1887; A. von Gutschmid, 'Zu den Fragmenten des Berosos und Ktesias,' in *Rheinisches Museum*, viii 256 (1853).

JAMES BAIKIE.

BESTIALITY.—Bestiality, *i.e.* the possession or exhibition of the qualities or nature of a beast, may manifest itself in human life, and so touch the religion or ethics of a people, in three ways: in eating and drinking, in sexual matters, and in the manifestation of wanton cruelty. Apparently among all primitive peoples bestiality is in some degree exhibited. It is eradicated only after a considerable intellectual and moral development. The peculiar conditions of Arabia and North Africa, the primitive Semitic and Hamitic homes, although they compelled an advance, if life was to be maintained at all, to a relatively high degree of barbarism, made the development of a high civilization impossible. Human ingenuity was compelled to extract from the oases the greatest possible nourishment; this urged the races forward; but the hard deserts which intervened between the scattered oases bound the struggling peoples in the fetters of barbarism (see Barton, *Semitic Origins*, ch. ii.). The constant influx of large numbers of immigrants from these desert conditions into the various Semitic countries through the whole course of history tended to keep alive within them all primitive bestial elements.

1. Bestiality in eating and drinking was probably exhibited whenever an opportunity was afforded for the underfed men of the desert to obtain a plentiful supply of meat. The ordinary diet was milk and dates, supplemented occasionally by a little game (see Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*[2], 1888, i. 156 ff.; Palgrave, *Central and Eastern Arabia*, 1865, i. 60; and Barton, *op. cit.* 75 and 77 ff.). The population was always underfed and afflicted with a gnawing hunger. These facts sufficiently explain the origin of the method of sacrificing a camel among the Arabs, described by Nilus, *c.* 400 A.D. While the last words of a chant were still upon the lips of the worshippers, the leader inflicted a wound on the camel and hastily drank his blood. The whole company then fell upon the victim with their swords, hacking off pieces of the quivering flesh and devouring them raw, with such wild haste that in the short interval between the rise of the day-star, at the appearance of which the service began, and the disappearance of its rays before those of the rising sun, the entire camel, body and bones, skin, blood, and entrails, was wholly devoured (cf. W. R. Smith, *Rel. of the Semites*[2], 338 ff.). Even if some allowance is made for exaggeration on the part of Nilus, the method of consuming this sacrifice is not unlike the tearing asunder of a carcass by dogs or wolves. As religious customs preserve ancient ways longer than they survive elsewhere, we have here an exhibition of the bestiality of the primitive Semite in eating.

Some passages in the OT indicate that at the religious festivals excessive eating, or more properly drinking, occurred. Thus Eli (1 S 1^{13}) naturally thought that Hannah had become drunk at the feast which was just concluded. Again, La 2^{7} compares the turmoil in the temple, when Nebuchadrezzar sacked Jerusalem, to the noise 'in the day of a solemn assembly.' This noise could hardly have been all due to the wailing, which originally attended the death of a victim, but must in part at least have been due to revelry. Private feasts were accompanied by music and wine (Is 5^{12}), and were occasions of hilarity (Am 8^{10}); and the same was probably true of all religious feasts down to the Exile.

As the Semites moved into agricultural lands and began to cultivate the vine, their excessive drinking led naturally to some drunkenness. A classic instance of this is embodied in the tradition of Noah's drunkenness in Gn $9^{20ff.}$. That drunkenness existed in all periods of Israel's history is proved by 1 S 25^{36}, Dt 21^{20}, and Pr $23^{21ff.}$. Herodotus (ii. 60) vouches for the fact that large quantities of wine were also consumed at certain Egyptian festivals, where, no doubt, it produced similar results. Apparently, however, drunkenness among the ancients was never so flagrant a vice as it is in modern Anglo-Saxon countries.

2. Among the ancient Semites, as among other peoples at a similar stage of culture, the sexual appetite was strong. The physical conditions, which held them so long in a state of barbarism in their cradle-land, led to the crystallizing of their religious customs about sexual ideas of a primitive character; and as religion perpetuated these customs, certain primitive features bordering on the bestial appear more prominently among the Semites than other peoples of antiquity, though they can be traced to some extent also among the Egyptians, who appear to have originated under similar conditions.

In early times sexual bestiality seems also to have led occasionally to actual connexion with animals. In the Gilgamesh epic, Eabani, the

primitive man, is represented as living a wild life with the animals, and as satisfying his passion with them. He was induced to leave them only after having experienced the superior charms of a woman (cf. *KB* vi. 125–127). Jastrow (*AJSL* xv. 207 ff.) holds that this was the primitive Semitic idea of the relations of men and animals, and that the original form of the second chapter of Genesis contained a similar story. Certain it is that such relations continued to exist sporadically until comparatively late times, for such prohibitions as that in Lv $20^{15f.}$ would never have been made had there been no such practice to eradicate.*

Among the primitive Semites the marriage relations consisted of various forms of polyandry, of which Nair polyandry was the most ancient (cf. W. R. Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, and Barton, *op. cit.* ch. ii.). This type of polyandry was, in reality, the loosest kind of marriage, and was accompanied by a good deal of promiscuity. After settlement in agricultural lands this type of marriage gave way to polygamy. Women who adhered to the older type of marriage lost caste, except where connexion with a temple gave them a certain standing. In Israel they maintained themselves down to the reform of Josiah in the year B.C. 621 (cf. Dt $23^{17.\ 18}$, 2 K 23^{7}). In Babylonia similar conditions existed. The code of Ḫammurabi shows that a class of unmarried women were connected sacredly with the temple. They might have children, who apparently were frequently adopted by other people (see *Code*, §§ 192, 193). In many parts of the Semitic world, male prostitutes, called technically 'dogs,' were also connected with the temples (Barton, *op. cit.* 188 and 251 n. 2). This is the meaning of the term in Dt 23^{18}. In Egypt similar ideas seem to have been kept alive by the ithyphallic god Min, whose festal procession is pictured on the walls of the temple of Deir el-Bahri and elsewhere, and by the god whom Herodotus (ii. 48, 49) identifies with Dionysos. At feasts in Babylonia (Herod. i. 199), in Egypt (*ib.* ii. 64), and in Israel, loose sexual practices were kept alive, protected by the sacred name of religion. This, no doubt, tended to perpetuate low and bestial ideals. The bestial influence of these practices can best be appreciated by those who have seen the objects exhumed at the Ashtart temple of ancient Gezer, but naturally not yet published. Many of these objects are the grossest sexual emblems. They reveal how great were the odds against which the ethical religion of the Hebrew prophets had to contend.

Apart from religion, bestial sexual practices were sometimes indulged in. For example, the treatment accorded by the men of Gibeon to a young woman (Jg 19) was unmitigated bestiality. Similar crimes, however, occur in modern times, especially in countries where, as in the United States, there is a considerable number of backward coloured people.

* [This crime, which still occurs sporadically, so that modern criminal codes provide penalties for its suppression, seems to have prevailed among the Greeks and Romans of the later period, as is proved by an extremely unsavoury adventure described in the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius, so that the *'Abodā Zārā* forbids the stabling of cows in Gentile stalls (*JE* v. 621). Equal degeneracy is recounted in the *Arabian Nights* (tr. Payne, London, 1882–84, iv. 137–143), and in the Hindu Aśvamedha (*q.v.*) there was even a ritual bestiality with the *membrum virile* of the sacrificed sacred horse. In mythology, however, the majority of the amours between human beings and animals, with which every student of the classics and comparative religion is familiar, receive their explanation from totemism, so that, as MacCulloch observes, 'as man's religious conceptions advance, his worshipful spirits and gods assume more and more a human form, but preserve traces of their animal form, and from this such tales take their origin' (cf. his admirable chapter on 'Beast-Marriages,' *CF* pp. 253-278, and the literature there cited).—Louis H. Gray.]

3. Bestiality was also exhibited by some of the ancient Semites in their *warlike practices*. Thus we are told that the Ammonites ripped up women with child (Am 1^{13}). Assyrian kings seem to have practised the greatest cruelty upon their captives taken in war. Thus they boast that they flayed their prisoners alive and spread their skins on city walls (*KB* ii. 165), bored out the eyes of their prisoners (*ib.* i. 113; cf. 2 K 25^{7}), and tore out their tongues (*ib.* ii. 257), and also they impaled their victims on stakes (cf. *ib.* i. 113, ii. 165). Perhaps to future generations the warfare of the present will seem as bestial as these cruelties do to us. See, further, CRIMES.

LITERATURE.—W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], 1894, *passim*; Barton, *Semitic Origins*, 1902, *passim*; Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1894–95, ii. 390 ff.; Driver, art. 'Ashtoreth,' in *HDB*; and Barton, art. 'Ashtoreth,' in *JE*. GEORGE A. BARTON.

BETROTHAL.—See MARRIAGE.

BETTING.—See GAMBLING.

BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ (the 'Song of the Blessed') is the name of the celebrated religious and philosophical poem of India, which is inserted as an episode in the sixth book of the Mahābhārata.

The two nearly related but hostile clans of the Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas, after disputes extending over many years, make ready for open combat, and advance against one another with the forces and allies on either side to the plain of the Kurus, in the neighbourhood of the modern Delhi. The two families, being nearly related, have equal claim to the name of Kurus or Kauravas; but the title is usually limited to that side which was arrayed under the leadership of the blind king Dhṛtarāṣṭra. To him the course of the battle is narrated by his charioteer Sañjaya, who has been endowed by Vyāsa, the reputed author of the Mahābhārata, with supernatural power to discern all the incidents of the fight. Almost the first place in this narrative of Sañjaya is taken by the dialogue between Kṛsna and Arjuna, the full title of which is *Bhagavadgītopaniṣad*, 'the secret doctrine proclaimed by the Blessed One,' usually abbreviated into *Bhagavad-Gītā*, or simply *Gītā*.

At the sight of his near relatives in the hostile army, Arjuna, the famed archer of the race of the Pāṇḍavas, hesitates to begin the fight; and is recalled to a sense of his duty by Kṛṣṇa, who in human form stands by his side as his charioteer. The admonitions and instructions of Kṛṣṇa adopt a more serious and elevated tone as he proceeds, and in the eleventh book he reveals himself to Arjuna as the one only God, the Lord of all worlds, who has assumed the form of the hero of the Yādava race.

This is not the place in which to enter into the full details of the historical development of Kṛṣṇa, who in the Mahābhārata appears at one time as a human hero, at another as semi-divine (a phenomenal form of Viṣnu), or again as the one only God, and who finally is identified with Brahman, the All-Soul. The judgment which the author of this article has formed with regard to the lines which this development has followed may be learned from the Introduction to his translation of the Bhagavad-Gītā, ch. ii. (Leipzig, 1905). The following brief statement must suffice for a due appreciation of the contents of the Gītā.

It may be assumed as probable that Kṛṣṇa was originally the leader of a warrior and pastoral tribe of non-Brāhman race, and that he lived long before the Buddha. He became the eponymous hero of his people, not only because of his prowess in war, but also probably because he was the founder of the religion of his race—a religion independent of the Vedic tradition and monotheistic, in which a special stress was laid on *ethical* requirements. The adherents of this religion were called 'Bhāgavatas,' adopting other names later on. As the form of Kṛṣṇa within the race to which he belonged was advanced from the position of a demi-god to that of a god (identified especially with the god of the Bhāgavatas), Brāhmanism claimed as its own this popular and powerful representation of the Deity, and transformed it into an incarnation of Viṣnu. In this way Brāhmanism

succeeded in gaining over the entire religious community of the Bhāgavatas, and the latter (a still existing sect [see BHAKTI-MARGA]) were merged in Brāhmanism. The Bhagavad-Gītā was originally a text-book of this sect, and in the course of time has won a position of such significance for the whole of Brāhman India that in recent years educated Hindus have put it forward as a rival to the New Testament. No other product of Indian religious literature is worthy to hold a place by the side of the Bhagavad-Gītā, in view of the beauty and elevated character of the thought and expression in many passages. On a metaphysical basis there has been raised in it a structure of lofty ethical teaching, which we miss in the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy.

It has long been known that we do not possess the Bhagavad-Gītā in its original form, but in a form which is the result of essential modifications. The doctrines, which are here put into the mouth of Krsna, present a remarkable combination of pantheistic and monotheistic ideas, of philosophical thoughts, and of pure and deeply religious faith in God.

A personal God, Krsna, manifests himself in the form of a human hero, propounds his doctrines, and demands of his hearer not only the exact fulfilment of duty, but before everything else faith and love and resignation, of which he is himself to be the object. By a special act of grace he then reveals himself in his superhuman but still bodily form, and promises to the faithful, as reward for his love to God, admission after death to His presence, and the prize of fellowship with Him. By the side, however, of this deity, thus conceived in as *personal* a manner as possible, who dominates the entire poem, there is introduced several times as the supreme first principle the neuter *impersonal* Brahman, the Absolute. At one time Krsna says of himself that he is the one sole supreme God, the creator and ruler of the universe and of all things therein; at another he sets forth the Vedāntic doctrine of the Brahman and of *māyā*, the cosmical illusion, and proclaims that the supreme end of man is to transcend this cosmical illusion and become one with Brahman.

These two doctrines, the theistic and the pantheistic, are interwoven with one another, sometimes following one another closely and without a break, sometimes more loosely connected. Yet the one is not announced as the lower exoteric doctrine, and the other as the higher esoteric; nor is it in any way taught that theism is a grade preliminary to knowledge, or a type of the truth, and the pantheism of the Vedānta the truth itself (see art. VEDĀNTA). But the two forms of belief are throughout treated entirely as though there were no distinction at all between them, whether as regards contents or value.

The attempt has been made to explain away the contradictions of the Bhagavad-Gītā, on the theory that no definite system is here intended; that the whole is the work of a poet, who gives utterance and shape to his thoughts as they occur to him, without heeding the anomalies which are involved in detail.

The fundamental contradiction, however, which permeates the Bhagavad-Gītā cannot be set aside by an appeal to its poetical character. It can be explained only on the hypothesis that one or other of the heterogeneous doctrines propounded by Krsna must be a later addition. Adolf Holtzmann therefore maintained the view that the Bhagavad-Gītā was originally a poem of a purely pantheistic nature, which was later modified and adapted in the interests of the Visnu-Krsna cult, and had thus impressed upon it its present form. This theory also, however, is mistaken; precisely the reverse seems to be the fact. The entire character of the poem in design and execution is so overwhelmingly theistic, that we must suppose it to have been from the very beginning of a purely theistic character, and to have been adapted later in a pantheistic sense from the standpoint of the Vedānta philosophy. In the ancient poem Krsna speaks of himself, and Arjuna of Krsna, as of an individual, a person, a conscious deity. In the recension the neuter Brahman appears in the added portions as the final and loftiest conception, and is occasionally identified with Krsna. Briefly stated, then, the real facts are that in the ancient poem *a Krsnaism based upon the Sankhya-Yoga philosophy is set forth, in the additions of the recension the Vedānta philosophy is taught* (see artt. SĀNKHYA, YOGA, VEDĀNTA). It has long been known, indeed, that the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga formed, on the whole, the basis of the philosophical speculations of the Bhagavad-Gītā, and that, as compared with them, the Vedānta holds a quite secondary position. Acting on this conviction, the author of the present article has attempted, in his translation of the Gītā, to determine the original form of the poem, and to separate the additions of the Vedāntic recension.

The doctrines of the true original Bhagavad-Gītā are briefly as follows. They may be defined as the faith of the Bhāgavatas, considerably modified by the introduction of elements from the Sānkhya-Yoga. In the following account it is not proposed to adhere to the line of thought of the poem, which wanders from one to the other, and especially in its practical demands constantly intermingles the different recognized standpoints of religion and philosophy.

We begin with the *systematic* part, and in the first place with the person of God. God is a conscious, eternal, and almighty Being, the 'great Lord of the universe, who is without beginning' (x. 3). He is distinct not only from the perishable world, but also from the imperishable soul of existing beings (xv. 17–19). He is therefore soul in another and higher sense than the souls of all creatures. When it is asserted in vii. 4–6 that God has two natures, one a higher spiritual nature, by which the universe is sustained, and a second, a lower and material nature, consisting of all that, according to the Sānkhya, belongs to *prakrti* or matter, this statement is not to be construed in the sense that a half of the Divine essence is composed of matter; the meaning is rather that matter is not itself independent, following its own blind impulses, but that its evolution is under the control of God; in other words, that God works in matter, and acts through it. This is clearly expressed in other passages of the Bhagavad-Gītā. God deposits in matter the germ from which development takes place (xiv. 3, 4). He is therefore the father of all creatures, while matter may be compared to the mother's womb (xiv. 4). God superintends the rise, development, and decay of the universe (ix. 7, 8, 10), and in this sense He is termed the origin and end of the whole world (vii. 6, x. 8), and is identified with death (xi. 32). The creatures in all their doings and conditions of life have their origin from Him (x. 4, 5); He determines their fate, *i.e.* recompenses them according to their deeds, and in the cycle of life makes the creatures 'revolve like figures in a puppet-show' (xviii. 61). All His acts are solely for the sake of the universe, for He Himself has no wish to fulfil, no end to attain (iii. 22, 24). 'Whenever justice declines and injustice increases,' God, who is yet eternal and imperishable, re-creates Himself, *i.e.* assumes new phenomenal forms 'for the protection of the good and the destruction of the evil, in order to establish the right' (iv. 6–8). Because the action of God is due to the matter of which He is the ruler, and is never due to a selfish motive, He is not fettered by His action (iv. 13, 14, ix. 9), and can never, therefore, be entangled in worldly existence. The imaginary picture of God in Book xii. is a dramatic embellishment, which is intended to touch the fancy, but is of slight importance for the real teaching of the Gītā.

The relation of God to the world of mankind is determined not solely by the stern law of retribution, but by love to those who know Him and are whole-heartedly devoted to Him (vii. 17, xii. 14–20, xviii. 64, 65, 69), and He delivers from all sin those who take refuge in Him alone (xviii. 66). In this passage already, therefore (and also in xviii. 56, 58, 62, 73), is set forth that confidence in the Divine

grace (*prasāda*) which we meet with in some Upaniṣads of the middle period (see art. UPANIṢADS), and which in consequence holds so important a place in the Indian sects.

Although it is God who guides the processes of the world, yet, as we saw above, all acts are to be ascribed to *matter* (iii. 27, v. 14, xiii. 20, 29). Out of primitive matter the universe is evolved, and it returns back again into it (viii. 18, 19). This conception of evolution and re-absorption, like the theory of the world-periods, is therefore derived from the Sānkhya system; and in general all the views of the Bhagavad-Gītā with regard to matter agree with the doctrine of the Sānkhya. The three *guṇas* play here the same part as in that system (see art. GUṆAS); by their influences the soul is enchained (xiv. 5 ff.), and the consequences of their activity make themselves felt throughout the entire life, as is described in detail in Books xvii. and xviii. Even the physiological conceptions with regard to the inner organs and the senses are those of the Sānkhya system (iii. 40, 42, xiii. 5). None of these correspondences, however, is of such importance for the doctrines of the Gītā as the fundamental conception of the nature of matter, derived from the Sānkhya, which forms the basis of the philosophical discussion in Bk. ii. Matter, it is true, is in no sense created by God, but exists from eternity; it is, however, subject to incessant mutation and change. All its products and effects are transitory; its influences, especially those of pleasure and pain, come and go, and they do not therefore deserve that man should regulate his conduct by them (ii. 14).

Over-against this mutability of all the products of matter is set the immutability of the soul. The latter, indeed (the soul, the self), resembles matter, in so far as both are eternal and indestructible; for that which is, ever has been, and ever will be: 'existence cannot be predicated of that which is not, nor non-existence of that which is' (ii. 16). The main contrast, however, between soul and matter consists in this, that the former is never subject to change. In reality the soul dwells within the body absolutely inactive, 'neither acting nor inspiring action' (v. 13-15), and remains unaffected by all the influences and acts of matter. This thought is elaborated in choice language in the 2nd Bk. of the Bhagavad-Gītā. He who knows that the soul is the true I, which abandons the worn-out bodies and enters into new ones, as a man puts off old clothes and puts on new (ii. 22), that the soul can neither be hurt nor destroyed, laments not over human suffering and death, *i.e.* over events which affect merely the perishable body.

All this is pure Sānkhya doctrine. Nevertheless the conception of the spiritual principle in the Gītā is essentially different from that of the Sānkhya system; it is decidedly more religious than philosophical. According to the Gītā as representing the belief of the Bhāgavatas, the individual soul does not lead a separate existence from all eternity, but it has become severed as a part from the Divine soul (xv. 7, cf. also xvi. 18, xvii. 6). Individual souls are therefore of Divine origin. They have entered into a union with matter, which is incapable of effecting any change in the souls themselves, but by which life and consciousness have been brought into the universe. It is the duty of man to behave in such a way that his soul may be able to return again to its origin, to God.

We now come to the *practical* part of the doctrines of the Gītā. Here two ways of salvation are contrasted with one another, one of which consists in withdrawal from the life of the world, and seeking after knowledge, the other in acts conformable to duty and free from desire. Although the second way is repeatedly described as superior (iii. 8, v. 2, xviii. 7), and, to judge from the whole tenor, is to be regarded as the true ethical ideal of the poem, the author has nevertheless not ventured to reject the way of salvation by renunciation of the world, and abstract knowledge. The conception that deliverance from the cycle of existence was to be won by meditation in complete isolation from the world, had been for centuries so deeply rooted in all thoughtful circles among the Indian peoples that it could no longer be seriously assailed. No course remained open but to concede a place to the two ways side by side with each other, and to teach that both right action and the knowledge which implies non-action or abstinence from works lead to salvation. From the fact that in the Gītā now one and now the other standpoint is adopted, and at times the ideal of quietism is placed unreservedly above that of activity (vi. 3), all sorts of inconsistencies and ambiguities have arisen, which a decided rejection of the quietistic standpoint would have avoided. The Bhagavad-Gītā reconciles the two views by explaining that action in fulfilment of duty, which is performed without regard to success and without any personal interest, ceases to produce fruit, and accordingly for the actor does not result in any continuance of worldly existence. Action of this nature, therefore, as far as consequences are concerned, is equivalent to the abstinence from action of the way of knowledge.

The knowledge which is to be attained by the quietistic way of salvation is described in several passages of the Gītā, precisely on the lines of the Sānkhya system (xiii. 23, xiv. 19), as a discrimination of soul and matter; and as a consequence of this discrimination release from the necessity of re-birth is assured to him who knows, without regard to conduct (xiii. 23). This may be looked upon as an isolated recognition of the pure Sānkhya ideal. In general the view of the Bhagavad-Gītā is that saving knowledge is not limited to the discrimination of soul and matter, but this discrimination is to be regarded merely as a condition preliminary to the *knowledge of God*; it is this that first really opens the way to the highest salvation.

The second way of salvation, the unselfish discharge of duty, is incessantly enjoined in the Bhagavad-Gītā in the most varied manner. But the mere discharge of duty would not lead to the goal so long as there is still associated with it any expectation of fruit. What is commanded must be done without passion, with quietness and equanimity, with an even regard for every one, esteeming indifferently the pleasing or displeasing, pleasure or pain, good or evil fortune, with no trace of desire or personal interest. If a man acts in this frame of mind, without vexing himself with regard to transitory material results (ii. 14), solely according to the precepts of duty and the Divine example (iii. 22), leaving to God the outcome of all his works, his works are not subject to the law of retribution (iv. 22, 23, ix. 27, 28, xviii. 12, 17). The requirements here laid down necessitate the rejection of the Vedic conception of the merit of works, and this is expressed in the original Gītā without any limitation. All the ceremonies of the Brāhmanical ritual minister, indeed, throughout to individual desires, and therefore stand in sharp contrast to the ethical ideal of the Gītā. 'Abandon all sacred rites,' it is said in xviii. 66; and similarly, in ii. 42-45, unconcealed contempt is expressed for the promises of the Veda, which take account only of the material world and offer only transitory reward (cf. also ix. 20, 21). Indifference towards the prescriptions of the Vedic ritual is therefore also a preliminary condition for the

attainment of salvation (ii. 52, 53). In this requirement, again, pure Sānkhya doctrine is assumed, as will be plain to every one acquainted with the Indian systems of philosophy.

Whether, however, it is the one or the other way of salvation that is followed, a hindrance that lies in the natural disposition must be overcome. When it is said in iii. 3 that 'the creatures follow their nature,' and when in xvi. 1 ff. a distinction is drawn between men who are born to a godlike existence and those who are born to the existence of demons, this predetermination is to be conceived as an effect of previous merit or guilt. Nothing is said in the Gītā of a real predestination; rather it is apparent that, throughout, moral freedom is taken for granted. It is left to man's option whether he will contend with the hindrances that lie in the path to deliverance or not, whether he will seek to reach a lower or the highest goal. On the way to the latter, natural ignorance hinders the practice of knowledge (v. 15), as natural desire hampers the performance of duty, and is man's real enemy to the observance of duty (iii. 37, 43). But unbelief also and scepticism are fatal (iv. 40). Moderate ascetic (*yoga*) practices are recommended as aids to the successful combating of these hindrances (v. 27, 28, vi. 10 ff., viii. 10, 12 ff.). Even if a man is not successful in mental abstraction, these *yoga* observances are not useless, for such a man will be re-born under favourable conditions, and will ultimately reach the supreme goal (ii. 40, vi. 41 ff.).

We now come, finally, to the most important demand which the Gītā makes upon those men who stand in need of deliverance. As is well known, the poem is the anthem in praise of *bhakti*, or believing and trustful love to God. With unerring certainty love to God leads to the goal alike by the way of knowledge and by that of unselfish performance of duty. The entire poem is full of this thought, and it was composed with a view to its exposition. From love to God knowledge of God arises (xviii. 55), and in consequence the believer refers all his deeds to God and leaves their results to Him. To every one, without distinction of birth or regard to his former conduct, *bhakti* assures deliverance, even to evil-doers, women, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras (ix. 30–32). No transient impulse, however, of love is in question; the whole being of man must be filled with unchanging love to God. When this is the case, a man's thoughts, even in the hour of death, will be directed towards God. Especial importance is attached to this point in the Gītā (viii. 5, 9, 10, 13), because a man enters into that form of existence of which he thinks in the hour of death (viii. 6).

What, then, are we to conceive to be the condition of the soul that has been liberated from earthly existence and has attained unto God? Unconsciousness, in harmony with the doctrine of the Sankhya-Yoga? Does the soul, having been part of the Divine Soul before its separation from it, lose its individuality on its return to its origin? No. Deliverance is conceived as the state of blissful peace of the soul, whose individual life continues in the presence of God. How, indeed, on the assumptions of the Sānkhya-Yoga, the soul can lead a conscious existence without entering into relation with matter the Bhagavad-Gītā does not explain. Evidently a view is set forth here which dates from the most ancient period of the Bhāgavata religion, and which from antiquity has formed a pillar of this faith; in spite, therefore, of the subsequent introduction of elements from the Sānkhya-Yoga, this doctrine maintained its ground against the contrasted teaching of the two philosophical systems. A confident faith helped to remove the methodical difficulties which must have been the result.

On the whole, however, the religious and philosophical doctrines of the *original* Bhagavad-Gītā, as the above account shows, were clear and defined. Their clearness is greatly impaired by the pantheistic redaction. The form of the poem, as it has come down to us, is full of internal contradictions, seeing that in it at one time the personal God (Kṛṣṇa), at another the impersonal world-soul (Brahman), is presented as the supreme first principle—sometimes the two are also identified; and again, at one time conscious continued existence in the presence of God is put forward as the highest goal of human endeavour, and at another absorption into the world-soul.

It is difficult to determine the period of the composition of the work. We shall not, however, go materially wrong if we assign the composition of the original Gītā to the 2nd cent. B.C., its redaction to the 2nd century of our own era.

In conclusion, a few words must be devoted to the question of Buddhist or Christian influence in the Bhagavad-Gītā. Buddhist influence may perhaps be traced in the recommendation of the golden mean in Bk. vi. 16, 17; and this idea may be supported by a reference to the occurrence of the word *nirvāṇa* in the preceding verse. Since, however, the application of the term is not at all limited to the linguistic usage of Buddhism (*brahmanirvāṇa* occurs four times in the recension of the Gītā), and since the conception of a wise moderation is explained on general human considerations, Buddhist influence must be regarded as very doubtful, or may at best be due to very distant and indirect sources.

The question of the influence of Christianity on the Gītā is more important. Such an influence has often been asserted, and as often disputed. In the case of the *original* Bhagavad-Gītā, the date, which on reliable grounds may be assigned to it, is decisive for a negative answer. The historical possibility of the author of the *redaction* being acquainted with the doctrines of Christianity must unquestionably be admitted; but there are no grounds for regarding this view as even probable, much less certain. No thought is found in the Gītā which may not be satisfactorily explained from the rich storehouse of ideas at the disposal of the Indian peoples, or from their characteristic mental disposition.

LITERATURE.—The literature of the Bhagavad-Gītā is of an extent that it is almost impossible to survey A detailed account of the manuscripts, editions, and translations of the Bhag, together with the native commentaries and the expositions of European scholars, is given by **Adolf Holtzmann**, *Das Mahābhārata und seine Teile*, vol. ii., 1893, pp. 121–153. No year has passed since the appearance of this volume in which there have not been issued further Indian contributions to this literature. Of older works special mention should be made of the essay of **W. von Humboldt**, *Ueber die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gītā bekannte Episode des Mahabharata*, Berlin, 1826; of later works, the translations of **K. T. Telang**, *SBE*, vol. viii., 2nd ed., Oxford, 1898; **J. Davies**, 3rd ed., London, 1893; **R. Garbe**, Leipzig, 1905; **L. Barnett**, London, 1905; **C. Johnston**, N.Y. 1908. Cf also **Sir Monier Monier-Williams**, *Indian Wisdom*[2], 1875, p. 136 ff.; **E. W. Hopkins**, *Religions of India*, London, 1896, p. 389 ff.; **R. W. Frazer**, *Literary History of India*, London, 1898, pp. 207, 235 ff.; **M. Winternitz**, *Geschichte der indischen Litteratur*, i. Leipzig, 1908, pp. 365–376. **R. GARBE.**

BHĀGAVATAS.—See BHAKTI-MĀRGA, p. 540[b].

BHAIRAVA.—Bhairava is a name of Śiva, meaning 'fearful.' Originally it was only an epithet of the third member of the Hindu trinity in his 'fear' form. As such the word is found quite early, but the worship of Śiva under the special (separate) form of Bhairava is of recent date. Eight, sometimes twelve, forms of this Bhairava-Śiva are then recognized, those commonly used being 'Bhairava the Black' and 'Bhairava the Dog.' Śvāśva, 'he that has a dog for his horse,' is also a frequent designation of Bhairava. He has a female consort called Bhairavī. All of this side of Bhairava, however, is purely classical,

derived from Śiva's epithet. But Bhairava has another side, which is indeed the popular modern side of his character, having nothing to do with the Brāhmanic god. This is derived from the village-god, Bhairon, a peasant personification of the field-genius, and often confused with the Bhūmiya form of the earth-god. This Bhairon has passed through the usual stages. First a peasant godling, then made by the Brāhman priests an attendant of their god, then representing that higher god, and finally, as at present, the only form of the god (Śiva) recognized by the peasants of several communities, chiefly in northern India. The chance resemblance of name facilitated the identification of the peasant Bhairon with the priestly Bhairava, and the attributes of the great god were transferred by the worshippers of the little god to their own godling. A further identification has already begun with the Brāhmanic hero Bhīm, and he is therefore known as the 'club-god,' having taken over from Bhīm the weapon associated with that hero. At present it is impossible to distinguish fully the characteristics of the Śiva form of Bhairava from those of the Bhairon form. Other forms of the same name are Bhairoba and (in middle India) Vitoba. The worship of Bhairava is found in Benares and Bombay, and throughout the agricultural districts of northern and middle India, as far north as the Panjāb. In the north he is revered chiefly as a black dog. In middle India his favourite image is that of a snake-girded drummer, or simply of a red stone. As a village-deity he is worshipped with milk offerings, in towns, especially in the north, with spirituous liquors; and his exclusive adherents are ignorant peasants in the country and dissolute Yogis of the towns. But as an attendant on Śiva he has a recognized though subordinate place in the respectable temples of the great god.

LITERATURE.—E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872; W. Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-lore of Northern India*, new ed., Lond. 1896.

E. WASHBURN HOPKINS.

BHAKTI-MĀRGA.—1. Introduction.—*Bhakti-Mārga* (the *bhakti*-path) is a general name given to those sects of modern Hinduism which lay stress on the importance of *bhakti*, or devotional faith, as a means of salvation, as opposed to the 'works-path' (*karma-mārga*) and the 'knowledge-path' (*jñāna-mārga*). The doctrine of *bhakti* is the foundation of modern Vishnuite Hinduism, and is professed by at least 150 millions of the inhabitants of India. The only other book-religion of modern India, whose believers are numerically important, is Śaivism. The latter is confined mainly to special localities; and even here, not only are there also many Vaiṣṇavas, but several Śaiva sects teach the doctrine of *bhakti* as directed to Śiva. The stronghold of Śaivism may be taken to be that part of India which lies east of the longitude of Benares. All India west of that line may be taken, so far as Hindus are concerned, as on the whole Vishnuite.

The word *bhakti*, with the allied words *Bhagavat* and *Bhāgavata*, is derived from the Sanskrit root *bhaj*, meaning, in this case, 'to adore.' *Bhakti*, therefore, has the primary meaning of 'adoration,' while *Bhagavat* means 'the Adorable One,' and *Bhāgavata* 'a worshipper of the Adorable One.' As a religious term *bhakti* is defined* as 'an affection fixed upon the Lord'; but the word 'affection' (*anurakti*) itself is further defined as that particular affection (*rakti*) which arises after (*anu*) a knowledge of the attributes of the Adorable One.

The best official account of *bhakti* is contained in the *Aphorisms* of Śāṇḍilya, a work of unknown date, but modern, which, with a commentary, was translated by Cowell in 1878. After defining *bhakti*, as above explained, the writer further states that it is not knowledge, though it may be the result of knowledge. Even those who hate the Adorable may have knowledge of Him. It is not worship, etc. These are merely outward acts, and *bhakti* need not necessarily be present in them. It is simply and solely an affection directed to a person, and not a belief in a system. There is a promise of immortality to him who 'abides' in Him. 'Abiding' means 'having *bhakti*.' *Bhakti* is not a wish. A wish is selfish. Affection is unselfish. It is not a 'work,' and does not depend upon an effort of the will. The fruit of 'works' is transient, that of *bhakti* is eternal life. Works, if they are pure, are a means to *bhakti*. To be pure, they must be surrendered to Him, *i.e.*, the doer must say, 'Whatever I do, with or without my will, being all surrendered to Thee, I do it as impelled by Thee.' Good actions, done for the good results which they produce in a future life, do not produce *bhakti*, but are bondage.

Bhakti, if looked upon as 'faith,' is not 'belief.' That may be merely subsidiary to ceremonial works. Not so *bhakti*. Belief is at best merely a subsidiary preliminary to *bhakti*. We have seen that knowledge may produce *bhakti*. The converse is not true. *Bhakti* is the terminus. We cannot *know* by *bhakti*, we can only *recognize* by it—a term which implies previous knowledge.

It is by its signs or 'fruits' that we know that *bhakti* is thoroughly confirmed. Such fruits are respect and honour paid to the Adorable, sorrow for sin, doubt of every other object but the Adorable, celebration of His praise, continuing to live for His sake, considering everything as His, regarding Him as being in all things, resignation to His will, absence of anger, envy, greed, and impure thoughts.

The highest *bhakti* may be directed not only to the Adorable in His highest form, but also to any of His incarnations, such as Kṛṣṇa, Rāma-chandra, and so on. The object of the Adorable in becoming incarnate was pure compassion in its highest sense. No earthly compassion is purely disinterested. His alone is disinterested. He became incarnate, and descended from His high estate, solely to abolish disinterestedly others' woes.

So far Śāṇḍilya. As a religious technical term, *bhakti* is a most difficult word to translate. Probably 'faith,' in the sense of 'devotional faith,' and not of mere 'belief,' is its best representative in English, but unless 'faith' is taken in this special sense, the word is apt to be misleading. 'Devotion' gives an idea as incomplete as 'faith'; for, though devotion is a necessary element of *bhakti*, it does not imply the *after* sense which is insisted upon by the teachers of the cult. It is devotion arising *after* the acquirement of belief. In the present article, the word 'faith,' understood as above, will be employed as the equivalent.

(a) Signification and Indian origin of the word 'bhakti.'—The use of the word *bhakti* as a religious technical term is comparatively late in Indian literature. This was to be expected, for faith requires a personal deity as its object, and for many centuries after Vedic times all Indian religious literature was confined to one form of thought which was incompatible with belief in the existence of such a God. This was the pantheistic Brahmaism* of the earliest Upaniṣads and of works based upon them (see VEDĀNTA). In the sense of 'love directed to God' the word appears first in Buddhist works of the 4th cent. B.C.; and it was also about the same time quoted in one of his rules (IV. iii. 95), with the same meaning, by the Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini. It is fully established as a religious technical term in the older parts of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (*q.v.*), which belong to the two centuries immediately preceding our era, and was subsequently freely used in all Sanskrit literature, both sacred and profane.

Devotional faith implies not only a personal God, but one God. It is essentially a monotheistic attitude of the religious sense. If, therefore, we assume that the word *bhakti*, as a religious technical term, cannot be traced to a period earlier than the 4th cent. B.C., it is important to inquire how far back we can trace the feeling which it represents. This feeling was very old in India. We occasionally come across what it is difficult to distinguish from *bhakti* even in Vedic hymns, especially those dedicated to Varuna. But this incipient monotheism fell still-born from the singers' lips. The untaught multitude adhered for many centuries to the genial, hearty, polytheistic nature-worship of their Vedic ancestors, while the Brāhmans—in that part of India the sole reposi-

* Śāṇḍilya, 1. 2.

* This is the convenient name given by Hopkins to the unsystematized Brāhmanical teaching of the earliest Upaniṣads before it had developed into the systematized Vedānta of Śaṅkara.

tories of the learning of their time—carried their speculations into the region of pantheism. The origin of the monotheism from which *bhakti* sprang must be sought elsewhere than among the Brāhmans of Northern India.

The migration of the Aryans into India was a long process, extending over many generations. The earlier comers were separated from the later ones by differences of custom, religion, and language. There were internecine quarrels among them, which ultimately resolved themselves into one group of tribes establishing itself as the most powerful. This group, represented in history by the Kuru tribe, had settled in the tract known as the *Madhyadeśa* or 'Midland,' and corresponding to the country near the modern Delhi and to its immediate north. It was the Aryan language spoken in the Midland that in later times developed into Sanskrit. It was in the Midland that the Vedic hymns were collected and compiled, and it was here that the Brāhmans consolidated their priestly power and gained the social supremacy which subsequently extended over the whole of India, and which they have never lost. All the old religious literature which has come down to us had, if not its origin, at least its publishing centre, in the Midland.

(*b*) *Indian monotheism and its probable origin.*—The word 'Midland' suggests an 'Outland,' also inhabited by Aryans, encircling the Midland on the East, South, and West. In those days, besides the Brāhmans, the Aryans had another leading class—that of the *Kṣatriyas*, or warriors. In the earlier times these shared with the Brāhmans the right of sacrifice, which in the Midland was afterwards monopolized by the latter. It has long been recognized that the Aryans of the Outland were not, in later Vedic times, so thoroughly subjected to the religious influence of the Brāhmans as their kindred of the Midland. In the Outland the thinkers belonged rather to the Kṣatriya class, to whose learning and critical acumen witness is borne even in contemporary Brāhmanical writings. It was in the Outland that the old atheistic system of philosophy—the Sāṅkhya—took its birth, patronized and perhaps founded by Kṣatriyas. Here, later on, Śākya Siṁha and Mahāvīra, both Kṣatriyas, founded respectively the Buddhist and the Jain religions; and here, during the thousand years that precede our era, while the Brāhmans of the Midland were developing their pantheistic 'Brahmaism,' the leading spirits of the Kṣatriyas thought out their monotheism.

Śākya Siṁha and Mahāvīra were by no means the only Kṣatriyas of the Outland who were celebrated for their learning. Janaka, the famous king of Mithilā, was not merely intimately connected with the origins of the Bhāgavata religion, but also took a prominent part in philosophical discussions with Brāhmans of many varying views. According to the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (III. xxi. 26), even Kapila, the founder of the Sānkhya system, was descended from a *Rājarṣi*, and was therefore a Kṣatriya. The *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* (II. i. 1 ff.) and the *Kauṣītakī Brāhmaṇa Upaniṣad* (iv. 1 ff.) both tell us how Gārgya, a Brāhman of the Outland, was actually taught by the Kṣatriya Ajātaśatru of Kāśī. To the east and south of the Midland lay the country of the Pāñchālas. Here lived the Kṣatriya Jaivali, who, according to the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (I. viii. 1 and V. iii. ff.) put the Brāhmans to silence and taught the Brāhman Gautama. He even (V. iii. 7) claimed that his system of religious thought belonged to the Kṣatriya class alone. Again, in the same work (V. xi.) we find ourselves in another part of the Outland, the Kaikēya country of the western Panjāb. Five great theologians come to a Brāhman with hard questions, which he cannot answer. So he sends them on to a Kṣatriya, Aśvapati, the king of the land, who solves their difficulties. These Upaniṣads were all Brāhmanical, and their authors had no temptation to extol the learning of the Kṣatriyas. On the contrary, when they got a chance, they ridiculed it. Thus the teaching of an opponent is made short work of by the author of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (VIII. i. 4, 10), who contemptuously compares it to 'the words of a Kṣatriya.'

We have no literary evidence as to the train of reasoning by which this doctrine of monotheism was reached, but to the present writer it appears more than probable that it was a development of the sun-worship which was the common heritage of both branches of the Aryan people—the Iranian and the Indian.

All the legends dealing with the origins of the Bhāgavata religion are connected in some way or other with the sun. According to the *Mahābhārata* (xii. 12983), the Adorable Himself taught the religion to the seer Nārada, who taught it to, amongst others, the sun, who communicated it to mankind. The greatest and most worshipped of all the incarnations of the Adorable—that of Rāma-chandra—was by human origin a descendant of the sun, while Kṛṣṇa, the other great incarnation, was descended from the moon, and with him the branch of the lunar race to which he belonged ceased to exist. Several of the legends connected with Bhāgavata saints are also connected with the sun. Sugrīva, Rāma's ally, had the sun for his father. Many legends are told about Draupadī, the wife of the five Pāṇḍavas, but in the *Acta Sanctorum* of the Bhāgavatas, the *Bhakta-māla*, only one is thought worthy of mention, and that is connected with a miracle performed by Kṛṣṇa with the aid of a marvellous cooking-pot given to Draupadī by the sun. Satrājit, Kṛṣṇa's father-in-law, was a sun-worshipper, and received from the sun a jewel that became the subject of many stories. One of the very earliest heretics recorded in Brāhmanical literature was Yājñavalkya. According to the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (III. v. ff.), he refused to obey his preceptor's command to join in worship with people whom he styled 'miserable and inefficient Brāhmans.' He explained that he acted 'in' or 'for' *bhakti* (the MSS differ), and rejected so much of the Yajur Veda as he had learnt from his teacher. He then departed and worshipped the sun, who imparted to him a new and schismatical Yajur Veda of its own. With this he betook himself to the Janaka referred to above, a famous king of the Outland, and the legendary father-in-law of Rāma-chandra. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (III. i.) tells how he discussed religious matters with Janaka and converted him, and how he disputed with and silenced orthodox Brāhmans. According to Bhāgavata eschatology, the saved soul first of all passes through the sun on its way to the Adorable after death. Nimbārka, the earliest of the Bhāgavata reformers, is traditionally said to have been an incarnation of the sun, and to have started his career by making the sun stand still. Even at the present day the sun is given the title of 'Bhagavat' by the peasants of Northern India. In modern language *Bhagavat Sūrya*, the Adorable Sun, becomes *Sūruj Bhagavān*. Finally, in the later stages of the Bhāgavata religion, the Adorable is identified with Viṣṇu, a deity who, in the oldest Indian literature, was worshipped as a sun-god.

(*c*) *Founder of the monotheistic Bhāgavata religion.*—Under any circumstances, whether this monotheism was a development of sun-worship or not, the following facts may be taken as accepted by most students of the subject:—The founder of the religion was one Kṛṣṇa (Krishna) Vāsudeva, a Kṣatriya. His father's name was Vasudeva (hence the patronymic of Vāsudeva), and his mother's Devakī. He was the pupil of a sage named Ghōra Āṅgirasa, who taught him 'so that he never thirsted again.'* He belonged to the Sātvata sept of the Outland Yādava tribe. In the older parts of the *Mahābhārata* he appears in the twofold character of a mighty warrior and of a religious reformer. He called the object of his worship the *Bhagavat*, or the 'Adorable,' and his followers called themselves Bhāgavatas, or 'Worshippers of the Adorable.' The religion was first adopted by the people of his own tribe, and gradually spread over the greater part of the Outland. Before the 4th cent. B.C., as in the case of the founders of many other religions, he was himself given Divine honours, and under his patronymic of Vāsudeva became identified with the Adorable. In its original form the religion was strongly mono-

* *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, III. xvii. 6.

theistic. Vāsudeva taught that the Supreme Being was infinite, eternal, and full of grace, and that salvation consisted in a life of perpetual bliss near him.*

2. History of Bhāgavata religion.—i. *FIRST STAGE.*—There has always been manifest in India a tendency to combine religion with philosophy, and, this being fostered by the speculative inclinations of the Kṣatriya class, it followed that, as time went on, and as interest in philosophical questions spread amongst the people of India, monotheism, as expressed by the Bhāgavata religion, was given a philosophic basis. The pantheistic Brahmaism of the Midland was altogether opposed to this monotheism, and the Bhāgavatas naturally turned to those systems of philosophy which had sprung up in the freer atmosphere of the less Brāhmanized Outland. There were two of these systems—the ancient Sāṅkhya† (*q.v.*) and its daughter, the Yoga (*q.v.*). These two systems influenced not only Bhāgavatism, but also two other important religions founded by Kṣatriyas—Buddhism and Jainism.

The Sāṅkhya system is based on pure atheism. It categorically denies the existence of any Supreme God. Moreover, it does not concern itself with ethics. The Bhāgavata religion, on the other hand, had a God, and from the first was strongly ethical in character. The bridge between those two opposing conceptions was afforded by the Yoga philosophy. The belief in the power acquired by the practice of *yoga*, or concentration, a kind of shamanism, had existed in India for centuries, and this became a branch of philosophy when the acquired power was intended to be utilized for the obtaining of the knowledge demanded by Sāṅkhya. The Yoga teaching inculcates morality, and the ethical tendency of Bhāgavatism led it to ally itself with this development of Sāṅkhya rather than with the parent system.

A system of philosophy, as distinct from a religion, is a matter for the learned alone, and the doctors of the Yoga system readily accepted an alliance with a religion, such as that of the Bhāgavatas, which brought the popular beliefs to their side. They paid a price for it. They added a God to the Sāṅkhya system, and Yoga became theistic. The God whom they accepted had nothing to do with their philosophy. The idea was added on from outside without organically affecting it. On the other hand, the philosophy supplied the Bhāgavatas with a number of technical terms, not the least important of which was the word *yoga* itself. With them the word gradually changed its meaning from 'concentration of thought' to 'devotion to God.' It thus approached the meaning of *bhakti*, but did not include the idea of love, which is an essential part of the signification connoted by that word. We shall see that in later times the word *yoga* received still further development. Another technical term which the Bhāgavatas borrowed from Sāṅkhya-Yoga was a frequently used title for 'God,' viz. *Puruṣa*, or the 'Male.' This was the word employed by the Sāṅkhyas for the human soul. According to the Yoga system, the shadowy God which it adopted was merely a particular soul possessed of supreme knowledge and power. To Him was given the title of the Puruṣa κατ' ἐξοχήν, and this name was adopted by the Bhāgavatas as an alternative name for the Adorable. As time went on, other names were also applied to Him, such as Nārāyaṇa, a patronymic from *Nara*, the Primal Male, and, as already explained, Vāsudeva. These bring us down to the end of the first stage of the development of the Bhāgavata religion, which we may roughly fix as coinciding with the conclusion of the 4th cent. B.C.

ii. *SECOND STAGE.*—(*a*) *Its absorption by Brahmaism.*—The second stage is marked by the capture and absorption of Bhāgavatism by the Brahmaism of the Midland. It is most probable that the immediate cause of this fusion was, as Prof. Garbe suggests, the life and death struggle between the Brāhmans and the adherents of the other great religion of the Outland, Buddhism. With Buddhism the Bhāgavatas had nothing in common. In Brahmaism there was at least a shadowy Pantheos. The Brāhmans were thus enabled to win over the Bhāgavatas to their side in the contest, but, like the teachers of Yoga, had to pay a price for the alliance. That price was, first, the identification of the Adorable with an ancient Vedic sun-god, Viṣṇu (Vishnu), still a popular object of worship among the polytheistic lower classes of the Midland; and, secondly, the confession of the religious orthodoxy of the Kṣatriya monotheism. The process was an easy one. Legends were discovered of Brāhmans who performed Kṣatriya functions, of Kṣatriya families that became Brāhmans, and even of the great Bhāgavata teacher, Janaka, becoming a Brāhman. It became convenient to remember that Manu, the great lawgiver, was a Kṣatriya, and Manu himself is made by his commentator to say that even a Brāhman can in certain circumstances go to a Kṣatriya teacher.* Finally, the Midland had one incarnation of Viṣṇu, Paraśu-Rāma, a Brāhman by birth, who had become incarnate merely for the destruction of Kṣatriyas. In consequence of the alliance with the Bhāgavatas, the Brāhmans had now to confess that this hero was ultimately defeated by the first Kṣatriya incarnation, that of Rāma-chandra. In the official Brāhman account (*Rāmāyaṇa*, I. lxxv. ff.) the unpleasant fact is slurred over, but it is nevertheless fully admitted.

The incorporation was, in short, carried out in exactly the same way as that in which we see Brahmaism extending its frontiers at the present day. The process is going on now before our eyes. Local or aboriginal deities are discovered to be identical with Śiva or some other member of the Brāhmanical pantheon, and the distinction of caste is conferred upon the converts. Usually they are declared to be Rājputs, or, in other words, of the Ksatriya class. The aboriginal customs and beliefs are at first left untouched, and in a couple of generations no more ardent supporters of the claims of the Brāhmanical priesthood are to be found than those who are still fetish-ridden savages. In much the same way the Bhāgavatas became a sect of Brahmaized anti-Brahmaists. The treaty of peace is found in the older parts of the celebrated *Bhagavad-Gītā* (which see). All the noblest ethical sentiments found herein are clearly of Bhāgavata origin. In it the deified Vāsudeva is fully identified with Viṣṇu, but not yet with the Brahmaist Pantheos; and Kṛṣṇa, the personal name of Vāsudeva the Ksatriya, is also given admission to the circle of Brāhmanical gods as an incarnation of the same deity.

As time went on, that occurred which history has

* In the above, and in what follows, the present writer has freely utilized the researches of Prof. Bhandarkar and of Prof. Garbe, whose conclusions have been amply borne out by his own inquiries. It must, however, be explained that some Sanskrit scholars are not prepared to accept these statements in their entirety. It may be noted that Bhāgavatas are often called 'Pāñcharātras.' This is, properly speaking, the name of one of the sects into which the religion was divided.

† The present writer is unable to follow Prof. Deussen in his theory that Sāṅkhya is a development of Vedāntism.

* See, for instance, *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 2914, 2397; *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, xi. 6. 2, 10 (*tato brahmā Janaka āsa*); *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, iv. iii. 5; Someśvara on *Mīmāṁsa Sūtra*, I. iii. 3; *Matsya Purāṇa*, cxxxii. 115; Manu, ii. 241.

many times since repeated, and Bhāgavatism fell more and more under the sway of the Brāhmans. We see this earliest in the later parts of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, which belong to the first two centuries after our era. In Northern India, where the influence of the Midland was strongest, the Bhāgavatas even admitted the truth of Brahmaism, and identified the Pantheos with the Adorable, although they never made pantheism a vital part of their religion. It never worked itself into the texture of their doctrines, but was added to their belief as loosely as their own monotheism had been added to the Yoga philosophy. In the later Bhāgavata scriptures it is proclaimed and recognized, or silently ignored, according to the passing mood of the writer. At times we come across a misty divinity, personal and gracious it is true, yet of whom they can say in Brahmaist language that He is the great 'WHO?'*, and regarding whom they can only postulate that He is neither being nor not-being.† At another time, within the same work, the Deity is represented as possessing form and substance. At one time He is said never to have been seen by mortal eye, and at another time He reveals Himself in bodily form to some favoured saint. The text-books of this Brahmaized Bhāgavatism are the latter part of the twelfth book of the *Mahābhārata*, known as the *Nārāyaṇīya*, and the famous *Bhāgavata Purāna*.‡

(*b*) *Worship of incarnations.*—This alliance with Brahmaism had one general effect. It removed the Adorable farther from His adorers. He became less definite, and we can well believe that even in those days true believers began the cry which has become the creed of a sect in later years, 'See ye the Unseeable' (see ALAKHNĀMĪS). Bhāgavatism thus began to fail to supply the craving felt in every human heart for a personal object of adoration, and the need was met by a development of the theory of incarnations. The Adorable was represented as becoming incarnate in various forms, on various occasions, and for various purposes. To these incarnations, instead of to the Adorable Himself, the *bhakti* of the Bhāgavatas now became directed.

The idea of a god becoming incarnate is very old in India (see art. INCARNATION). We find legends on the subject in Vedic literature. Here, sometimes one god, sometimes another—Brahmā, Viṣnu, or Indra—becomes incarnate to save the gods or to conquer the world. By the time that Bhāgavatism was received into the Brāhmanical fold, these legends had become detached from other gods, and all centred round the person of the popular sun-god Viṣnu. He it now was who, perhaps as a relic of totem-worship, became incarnate as the Fish, the Tortoise, the Boar, the Man-lion, the Dwarf, and so on. Then heroes, first semi-Divine and next wholly human, were added to the list, such as Rāma-chandra, Kṛṣna, or even the Buddha. The list of incarnations, or 'descents' (*avatāra*), drawn up by Brāhmanical orthodoxy contained ten instances; and two of these, that of the Kṣatriya Rāma-chandra, and that of the Kṣatriya Kṛṣna, were late additions, almost certainly added to the list in obedience to Bhāgavata susceptibilities, just as the name of the Buddha may have been added to draw weak-kneed Buddhists into the Brāhmanical fold. We have already seen how the Kṛṣna of the incarnation bore the personal name of Kṛṣna Vāsudeva. Rāma-chandra, 'the glory of the Solar Race,' was also a famous Kṣatriya hero of the Outland, and was son-in-law of the Janaka previously mentioned. To the Bhāgavatas, Rāma-chandra and Kṛṣna were naturally the favourite incarnations, but in their later books the list became much extended, the Adorable being represented as becoming incarnate no less than twenty-four times. These incarnations became the direct object of worship. As Tulasī-dāsa said to one of those who called upon men to 'see the Unseeable,' 'Why dost thou endeavour to see the Unseeable? Pray thou to Rāma, and all at once is seen.'

(*c*) *Worship of the Śakti.*—About this period there also arose the idea of the *Śakti*, or energic power, of a divinity as a separate personality. The worship of the energic power became a prominent feature in the cult of Śiva, but it is also found among the Bhāgavatas. Among them, as Viṣnu has been identified with the Adorable, so his spouse Lakṣmī is looked upon as the Adorable's energic power. She is one with Him, and yet distinct from Him, 'neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance.' So entirely is she looked upon as one with Him that the text-books are deliberately silent about her; for, say they, 'She has done all that He has done, and when we tell of Him we tell of Her.' And yet, on the other hand, she also appears as the active agent in spreading abroad the true faith, which she learnt from Him. The Bhāgavata monotheistic deity has therefore become a Trinity in Unity, consisting of the Supreme, His incarnations, and His energic power. The resemblance to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is marked, more especially when we remember that, among the Syrian Christians, the Holy Ghost was declared to be a woman, and was identified with the Virgin Mary. It is quite possible that the Bhāgavata trinitarian doctrine developed under early Christian influence (see below).

(*d*) *Relation of Bhāgavatism to popular polytheism.*—Side by side with this Bhāgavata monotheism there had always been the polytheism of the lower orders, with its great gods, Brahmā, Viṣnu, and Śiva, and its millions of godlings. Bhāgavatism did not require any denial of these from its converts. We have seen that it had identified Viṣnu with the Adorable Himself. Brahmā was relegated to a lower place. We shall see later that he was looked upon as a finite being, created by the Adorable to superintend the general carrying out of His orders. The dread god Śiva or Rudra, appeased only by bloody sacrifices, could not be so disposed of. His worshippers were very many, especially in the Outland, where, in early times, under the name of Pāśupatas, they, like the Bhāgavatas, had been strongly influenced by Sānkhya-Yoga. The 344th section of the 12th book of the *Mahābhārata* contains an interesting legend of a terrible fight between Rudra and the Adorable. Brahmā intervenes and pacifies Rudra, who acknowledges the Adorable's superiority. Then the Adorable says to Rudra (13293), 'He who knows Me, knows Thee. He that follows Thee, follows Me. There is no difference between Us two.' According to another legend preserved in the 343rd section of the same book, towards the end of a cycle of time the Adorable becomes subject to wrath (at the wickedness of the world), and therefore Rudra is born from his forehead. The sum of all this is that the Bhāgavatas accepted Śiva as a form of the Adorable, and thus in legends we find the most pious Bhāgavatas, such as, for instance, Chandrahāsa, performing their morning devotions to the Adorable Himself, and continuing them in a temple devoted to Rudra or his bloodthirsty spouse Durgā. The numerous other gods of Hindu polytheism were easily disposed of. They were classed as merely subordinate creatures of the Adorable, given special

* *Ka* (*Nāradīya Bhakti-sūtras*, i. 2).

† *Mahābhārata*, xii 13190.

‡ The *Bhagavata Purāṇa* is a very late work, and perhaps should preferably be classed with post-reformation literature. See below.

powers or functions in order to carry out His will.

All this time the Bhāgavatas, while they were estopped from denying the truth of Brahmaist pantheism, were still nominally professors of Sānkhya-Yoga. The result was a series of attempts to unite the opposing lines of thought—one an unsystematized pantheism founded on the idea that everything is part of the One, the other a systematized dualism based on the essential difference between matter and spirit. The first endeavours are to be found in the latest parts of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. Attempt after attempt, given forth under the authority of highly honoured names, such as that of the Sāṅkhya teacher Pañchaśikha, of the learned Bhāgavata king Janaka, or of a female ascetic named Sulabhā, appears in the twelfth book of the *Mahābhārata*, and these finally settled down into the form in which we find them in the third book (section xxiv ff.) of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. It is impossible to consider this result as a system of philosophy. The two opposing lines of thought, each intelligible in itself, could no more combine than oil and water, and this so-called 'Paurāṇik Sāṅkhya' can be described only as a medley of unrelated and mutually contradictory conceptions.* It has nevertheless exercised the greatest influence on the pious and more uncritical minds of India, and has to be reckoned with in dealing with the religious history of that country. Its influence is most strikingly manifest in the change that it has brought about in the meaning of the word *yoga*. We have already seen that the meaning had changed from 'concentration of thought' to 'devotion.' Even in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* this term became subdivided into *karma-yoga*, or the disinterested practice of duty, and *jñāna-yoga*, the purely theoretical side of religion. Later on, under the influence of the 'Paurāṇik Sāṅkhya,' we meet three kinds of *yoga*. *Karma-yoga* is now no longer the disinterested practice of morality, but has become attendance to religious ceremonial obligations. These give purification, and lead to *jñāna-yoga*, which is now the concentration of the mind on the Adorable, and this finally to *bhakti-yoga*, in which the devotee is full of nothing but faith, and sees nothing but the Deity.†

This brings us down to the end of the millennium after our era. In the early part of the 9th cent. A.D. the celebrated pantheistic philosopher Śaṅkara gave system to the ancient Brahmaism of the Midland, and created the Vedānta (*q.v.*) philosophy. His system, far more rigid than the Brahmaism on which it was founded, compelled him vigorously to attack the Bhāgavata monotheism, hitherto grudgingly recognized as orthodox. His assaults resulted in the Bhāgavatas not only assuming a position of defence, but also taking up two differing lines of counter-attack. On one line they remained faithful to the old alliance with Brahmaism, and contented themselves with combating Śaṅkara's arguments only so far as they were incompatible with their interpretation of Brahmaist teaching. On the other line, the alliance with Brahmaism was finally broken, and a return was made to the old Sānkhya-Yoga doctrines which had been abandoned, or partly abandoned, in favour of Brahmaism. The dispute culminated in the 12th cent., the leading representatives of the two lines of counter-attack being respectively Rāmānuja and Madhva, both inhabitants of Southern India.

iii. *THIRD STAGE. TENETS.*—With the appearance of these two great reformers commences the third stage in the development of the Bhāgavata religion—the modern *Bhakti-mārga*. It will here, therefore, be convenient to consider the tenets of the Bhāgavatas as they were fixed by the reformers at the commencement of this third stage of their development. Our materials are (1) the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, (2) the *Nārāyaṇīya* section of the twelfth book of the *Mahābhārata*, and (3) the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, as the old authorized scriptures, and the *Bhakta-māla* and numerous other works founded on it, as what might be called the 'New Testament' of the Bhāgavata religion. An account of the pre-reformation doctrines will be found in the article BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ.

(1) *Monotheism and a God of grace.*—There is one and only one God, named the Bhagavat, the Adorable; Nārāyaṇa, the Son of the Male; Puruṣa, the Male; or Vāsudeva. He exists from eternity to eternity. He is therefore defined as 'the Endless' (*ananta*), 'the Imperishable' (*achyuta*), and 'the Indestructible' (*avināśin*). He is the Creator of all things out of matter, to which is given the Sāṅkhya-Yoga name of *prakṛti*, *pradhāna*, or 'the indiscrete' (*avyakta*). The original belief about matter seems to have been that He created it out of nothing, but in the mixed philosophy of the sect we sometimes come across statements agreeing with the dualistic Sāṅkhya-Yoga theory that *prakṛti* has existed independently from all eternity. From God issue all souls (*jīva*), which henceforth exist for ever as distinct individuals and are indestructible. He has created Brahmā, Śiva, and the countless subordinate deities to carry out His orders in creating and ruling the world, and to promulgate the true religion. He generally leaves the burden of ruling the world upon their shoulders, but, as occasion demands, from time to time in His infinite grace (*prasāda*)* He Himself becomes incarnate to relieve the world from sin or His followers from trouble. The greatest and most perfect of these incarnations (*avatāra*) are those of Rāma-chandra and Kṛṣṇa; but there have been twenty-three in all, and one is yet to come. *India thus owes the idea of a God of Grace—of the Fatherhood of God—to the Bhāgavatas.*

(2) *Process of creation.*—The principles according to which creation is held to have developed resemble those of Sānkhya-Yoga (see SĀṄKHYA), but, owing to the assumed necessity of connecting the immaterial Vāsudeva with the material world, are more complicated. The Adorable, who in this connexion is usually called Vāsudeva, is represented as passing in succession through three *vyūhas*, or phases of conditioned spirit. Vāsudeva first produces from himself *prakṛti*, the indiscrete primal matter of the Sāṅkhyas, and at the same time passes into the phase of conditioned spirit known as *saṁkarṣaṇa*. From the association of *saṁkarṣaṇa* with *prakṛti* there springs *manas*, corresponding to the Sānkhya *buddhi*, or the intellectual faculty, and at the same time *saṁkarṣaṇa* passes into the phase of conditioned spirit known as *pradyumna*. From the association of *pradyumna* with *manas* springs the Sāṅkhya *ahaṁkāra*, or consciousness, while *pradyumna* passes into a tertiary phase of conditioned spirit known as *aniruddha*. From *ahaṁkāra* and *aniruddha* spring the Sānkhya *mahābhūtas*, or grosser elements, with their respective qualities, and also the deity Brahmā, who from the elements fashions the earth and all that it contains.†

(3) *Bhakti and salvation.*—*Bhakti* directed towards the Adorable is the only means of salvation. It must be directed to Him or to one

* So also Garbe, *Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, 52 ff. The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* probably belongs to the 13th cent. A.D.

† So Nārāyaṇa Parivraj in the *Artha-pañchaka*, quoted by Bhandarkar, *Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts . . . during the year 1883-84*, p. 68.

* The doctrine of *prasāda*, or grace, has formed an essential part of the Bhāgavata religion so far back as literature takes us.

† For further details see Colebrooke, *Essays*, i. 437 ff., and Barnett's translation of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, p. 48 ff.

of His incarnations, and to no other. The religion in this respect is strictly monotheistic. This is partly hidden by our translation of the word *deva* by 'God.' By a Bhāgavata, the word *deva* is used with exactly the same meaning as the Hebrew word *'elōhīm*. The latter sometimes signifies the Supreme God and sometimes His ministering spirits. In our versions of the OT the distinction is shown by translation, but this is not done by English writers on Indian religion, who always translate *deva* by 'God.' The word *deva* is applied not only to the Adorable, but also to His ministering spirits, Brahmā, and so on. These subordinate *devas* may, it is true, be the objects of worship, but this is δουλεία ('veneration'), not λατρεία ('adoration'), which latter is reserved for the Adorable alone. The Bhāgavata scriptures over and over again insist that the true believer must be a unitarian monotheist—an *ekāntin*.

(4) *Works and salvation.*—The question then arises as to how far works (*karma*) are necessary for salvation. This has been as much discussed in India as in Europe. The Bhāgavatas solve the problem by stating that works act only indirectly. Every work, good or bad, has its result, or, as they say, its fruit (*phala*). A good work, done for the sake of its fruits, may result in giving the soul a life of felicity in some other world, but this felicity will be merely temporary. As soon as the fruits have worked themselves out, the soul returns to this world, and to the weary round of birth and re-birth. But if a work is *niṣkāma*, or disinterested, *i.e.*, is not performed for the sake of its fruits, but is simply dedicated to the Adorable and laid before His feet, He accepts it and confers His immortal nature upon its fruits. Then the Adorable Himself enters the heart of the doer and begets therein the virtue of *bhakti*, and it is this *bhakti* that finally gives eternal salvation. *India thus owes the preservation of the doctrine of Faith to the Bhāgavatas.*

(5) *Immortality of the soul.*—We have seen that the individual soul was considered to be a part (*aṁśa*) of the Adorable, emitted by Him to a separate conscious existence. Once so emitted, it exists for ever as a separate conscious entity. Agreeably to the universal Indian belief in the doctrine of transmigration, the soul is chained to its round of births and re-births until it is saved by *bhakti*. A soul, like those of certain Divine beings, may be saved from the first, and is then known as *nitya-mukta*, 'saved from eternity,' but the ordinary human souls are not of this nature, and are classed under four heads. These are (*a*) *baddha*, those who are 'tied' to things of this life, and who are not in the way of salvation; (*b*) *mumukṣu*, those in whom there has been awakened a consciousness of the want of salvation, and who 'desire it,' but are not yet fit for it (we should call these 'awakened sinners'); (*c*) *kevala*, or *bhakta*, the pure in heart, who are 'only devoted' to the Adorable, and who are thus on the way of salvation through possessing *bhakti*; and (*d*) *mukta*, the 'released,' or saved. These last enjoy a perpetual, conscious, independent existence at the feet of the Adorable (*Bhagavat-pada*). Their only joy is serving and waiting upon Him (*kaiṁkārya*). They do not become Him, but become 'like Him' and remain in everlasting bliss. *India thus owes to the Bhāgavatas the belief in the Immortality of the Soul.*

(6) *Eschatology.*—When the soul, thus saved, leaves its earthly body, it first enters the sun as the door.* There its subtle body (*liṅga-śarīra*) is consumed and it becomes an atomic entity (*paramānubhūta*). Thence it enters the God, first in the phase of *aniruddha*, then in that of *pradyumna*, then in that of *saṁkarṣaṇa*, and finally the Supreme Adorable, who, by a confusion with Brahmaism in the passage now quoted from, is called 'The Supreme Self.' As in the rest of their philosophy, there is in their eschatology little that is clear and consistent. Brahmaism and Sānkhya-Yoga are inextricably mixed up, but the continued separate existence of the soul after it has reached the Adorable is certainly a tenet that is held through all their self-contradictory mysticism.

(7) *Sin.*—The root idea of sin is anything which is incompatible with *bhakti*. Every sin is a work (*karma*) and necessarily bears its fruit, just as much as any good work. Sins are classed as involuntary (*ajñāta*) and wilful (*jñāta*). An involuntary sin can be expiated by ceremonial acts. These expiatory works, provided they are disinterested, *i.e.*, not performed merely as counterbalances to the involuntary sins, reach the Adorable and give the everlasting fruit. As for wilful sins, when a man is devoted to disinterested works, or is in the way of *bhakti*, he does not usually commit such; and if perchance he do, then the Adorable, who is the Lord of good works, Himself forgives the sin of the evil works. A favourite comparison is with a paid workman and a slave born in the house. If a paid workman (*i.e.* a doer of interested works) does any damage, he has to make it good to his employer; but if damage is done by a faithful slave, who works not for reward but for love (*i.e.* the doer of disinterested works), the master bears the loss, and none of it falls upon the slave.*

The above doctrines represent the stage to which the Bhāgavata religion had developed by the 15th cent. of our era; but they have remained unchanged, as the doctrines of the *Bhakti-mārga*, to the present day. In their main principles they are the doctrines of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and of the *Nārāyaṇīya*, which are, of course, much older.

3. The four churches of the reformation.—Since the revival of Bhāgavatism in the 12th and following centuries, the *Bhakti-mārga* has been divided into four *Saṁpradāyas*, or churches, viz. the *Śrī-sampradāya* founded by Rāmānuja, the *Brahma-sampradāya* founded by Madhva, the *Rudra-saṁpradāya* founded by Viṣṇusvāmin, and the *Sanakādi-saṁpradāya* founded by Nimbāditya.

(1) *Attitude of each to the Vedānta.*—The essential differences between these churches consist in the attitude which they assume towards the Vedānta philosophy of Śankara. It is specially stated by Bhāgavata writers† that they form really one church, and that the differences are only apparent. Further, each church has become divided into sects, but none of these is opposed to its mother-church. It has been given a name and a separate recognition only on account of the preferences (*ruchi*) of particular teachers in laying emphasis on particular points.

The Vedānta doctrine is fully described elsewhere (see VEDĀNTA), and here it will be sufficient to devote a few lines to the discussion of the particular points objected to by the Bhāgavata reformers. Being purely monistic, it is generally known as the *advaita-mata*, or doctrine of nonduality. Its professors claim to be *smārtas*, *i.e.*, 'holders to tradition,' or 'orthodox.' The Bhāgavatas allow them the title and condemn the tradition. An essential part of its teaching is the doctrine, usually stated to be an invention of Śankara himself, of *māyā*, or illusion. To this the Bhāgavatas raise the strongest objection, and one of their commonest nicknames for a follower of Śaṅkara is that of *māyā-vādin*, or declarer of

* *Mahābhārata*, xii. 13383 ff.

* 'Bhakta-kalpadruma,' in *JRAS*, 1908, p. 347.

† *e.g.* by Hariśchandra in the *Vaiṣṇava-sarvasva*.

illusion. Śankara's Supreme Deity (Bráhma *) is an absolutely impersonal, quality-less being who can obtain an unreal existence only by association with *māyā*. The soul is really a part of Bráhma individualized by association with *māyā*. When released from *māyā*, the soul is again merged in Bráhma and loses its identity.

All Bhāgavatas agree in rejecting the entire doctrine of *māyā*, with all its consequences. The Supreme Deity, the Bhagavat, is personal by nature. The soul, as already said, is also personal and individual by nature, and, once emitted, lives for ever. It is never merged in the Bhagavat.

The Śrī-saṁpradāya is the most important Bhāgavata church which, while rejecting Śaṅkara's Vedāntism, remains faithful to the alliance with the old Brahmaism. The Bhagavat, identified with the Pantheos or Bráhma of the Upaniṣads, is a Pantheos, but a personal Pantheos in whom everything that is exists, and who is endowed with every imaginable auspicious quality. Matter and soul alike proceed from Him, and He pervades all things as their *antaryāmin*, or Inward Restrainer. The doctrine of this church is therefore also monism, but, to distinguish it from Śaṅkara's, it is called a *viśiṣṭādvaita-mata*, or doctrine of qualified non-duality. The teaching of this sect is said to have been communicated by the Adorable to His spouse, or energic power, Lakṣmī, also called Śrī. Hence the name of the Saṁpradāya. She taught a demi-god named Viṣvak-sēna, who taught Śaṭha-kōpa, and eighth in descent from the last named, in succession of master and pupil, came Rāmānuja, who flourished in the 12th cent. A.D. For further particulars see RĀMĀNUJA.

Madhva's Brahma-saṁpradāya represents the other line of defence of the Bhāgavata religion. He broke the alliance with Brahmaism and returned to the old dualism of Sāṅkhya-Yoga. His teaching is therefore said to be a *dvaita-mata*, or doctrine of duality. The sect describes Śaṅkara's Vedānta as disguised Buddhism, and lays particular stress on the five eternal distinctions, viz. (*a*) between God and the soul, (*b*) between God and matter, (*c*) between the soul and matter, (*d*) between one soul and another, and (*e*) between one particle of matter and another. Although in other respects preaching the ordinary Bhāgavata doctrines, Madhva prefers to call the Supreme 'Viṣṇu,' rather than 'Vāsudeva' or 'Bhagavat.' His followers call themselves Mādhvas or Madhvāchārīs (*q.v.*), and claim to have received the doctrine originally from Brahmā, sixth in descent from whom, in succession of teacher and pupil, came Madhva. Hence the name of the Saṁpradāya. As may be expected, the rupture with Brahmaism brought upon them vigorous attacks from the followers of Śaṅkara, and in one work, entitled the *Pāṣaṇḍa-chapetikā*, or 'Slap in the Face of Heretics,' they are all, as a body, genially consigned to the utmost torments of hell.

The Rudra-saṁpradāya is the most modern of all the sects. Viṣnusvāmin lived in the early part of the 15th cent.; but his followers, in order to give the authority of age to his opinions, state that he had previously existed some 4500 years earlier, and that it was then that the doctrines were first promulgated by him. They were originally communicated by the Adorable to Rudra, or Śiva, who passed them on to mankind, Viṣnusvāmin being fifteenth in descent from him in the line of teacher and pupil. His family belonged to the south of India, and his converts were mostly made in Gujrāt. One of his pupils, Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa, migrated to Northern India, where his son Vallabha (or Vallabhāchārya) became an energetic apostle of the church which is now usually called after his name, his disciples being known as Vallabhāchārīs (*q.v.*). The doctrines of this church are known as *śuddhādvaita-mata*, or doctrine of pure non-duality. According to them, the Adorable has three attributes, viz. *sat*, 'existence,' *chit*, 'consciousness,' and *ānanda*, 'bliss.' The soul is the Adorable with the attribute of bliss suppressed (*antarhita*), and inanimate matter is the Adorable with the attributes of consciousness and bliss suppressed. When the soul is 'released,' it regains the attribute of bliss, and thus becomes for ever identical in nature with the Adorable.

The Sanakādi-saṁpradāya (see NIMĀVATS), founded by Nimbārka or Nimbāditya, is certainly the oldest of the Bhāgavata churches.* Its founder is said to have been an incarnation of the sun. The Adorable in His incarnation as a swan (*haṁsa*) taught Sanaka and his brethren, the mind-born sons of Brahmā, who taught Nārada, who taught Nimbārka. The doctrine of this church is called *dvaitādvaita-mata*, or doctrine of dualistic non-duality. While admitting that the soul and matter are distinct from the Adorable, it holds that they are nevertheless intimately connected with Him, as its coils are connected with a serpent, or as its waves are with water. The Adorable is incomprehensible, but is manifest in the book of Nature, in which the natural objects form the letters constituting the words. The letters may be in different alphabets although the sounds are the same, and hence the actual facts of the incarnations, or the truth or falsehood of the accounts concerning them, are of small importance, so long as we read the Divine love that lies behind them. The church has suffered much from persecution. It is said to have been extirpated by the Jains and to have been resuscitated by a certain Nivāsa.†

(2) *Clerical and lay life.*—The members of each of these four Bhāgavata churches are divided into two classes, which we may conveniently call 'clerical' and 'lay.' The latter includes the great mass of the believers, who look to the former for religious guidance. The status of the clerical class varies according to sect. Usually these teachers are unmarried, leading, or professing to lead, an ascetic life; but sometimes, as for instance in the case of most sects of the Rudra-saṁpradāya, the clergy are encouraged to marry, and to live in the world as men of business and family. The ascetic clergy (*bairāgīs* [*q.v.*]) mostly lead a wandering existence, singly or in bodies, subsisting on such alms as they can collect. When old or infirm, they settle down in one of the numerous *maths*, or monasteries, scattered all over India. These monasteries also serve as rallying points for the travelling brethren, where any of them can find food and shelter for a reasonable time. Each is governed by a *Mahant*, or Superior, and is usually endowed with property which is under his management.

(3) *Subsequent history of each church.*—The slight philosophical details which differentiate the churches having been discussed, it will now be convenient to consider the development of each during the past seven centuries.

(*a*) *Śrī-saṁpradāya.*—Rāmānuja, who is said by his followers to have been an incarnation of Śesa, the serpent of eternity, belonged to Southern India, and studied and lived the best part of his life at Conjeeveram near Madras. Although teaching the theoretical equality of all castes, the teachers and leaders of his church were invariably Brāhmans, and persons of low caste were not even admitted as disciples. The mother-church has always been strongest in Southern India, where it took its birth, and where it has still numerous monasteries. It has

* Care should be taken to distinguish between Bráhma (or Bráhman) (neut.) the impersonal Pantheos of the Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara, and Brahmā (or Brahmán) (masc.) the personal member of the well-known Hindu triad (Brahmā, Viṣnu, and Śiva).

* The *dvaitādvaita-mata* is referred to in the *Prabōdha-chandrōdaya*, a work dating from the end of the 11th cent. A.D.

† Hariśchandra, *Vaiṣnava-sarvasva*.

never been very popular in Northern India. Rāmānuja laid down the strictest rules of conduct, even eating and drinking being bound by the most minute regulations. We have seen that in the centuries immediately following our era the faith of the Bhāgavatas was preferably directed not to the Adorable Himself, but to one of His numerous incarnations. Rāmānuja did not confine his followers to any particular one of these, but that of Rāma-chandra was usually preferred. We have also seen that Lakṣmī, Viṣṇu's spouse, looked upon as the Adorable's energic force, was considered as identical with the Adorable Himself. Hence many Rāmānujas preferred to direct their faith to her.

Fourth or fifth in spiritual descent from Rāmānuja there rose, late in the 14th cent., a teacher named Rāmānanda. He was a disciple of Rāghavānanda, the *mahant* of the monastery founded by Rāmānuja at Seringapatam in the later years of his life. Rāmānanda quarrelled with his superior on a question of discipline, and, migrating to Northern India, there founded a sect of his own called the Rāmānandī. Its principal doctrinal peculiarity is the insistence that the Rāma-chandra incarnation is the one which should be the chief object of faith in the present age. Its followers are hence also called *Rāmavats*, or Rāmaites. Rāmānanda, instead of preaching and writing in Sanskrit, as had hitherto been the custom, taught in the vernacular, and thus brought his doctrines within reach of all classes. He also interpreted the Bhāgavata doctrine of the brotherhood of man in its most liberal sense, and admitted all castes, even the lowest, not only as lay members of the sect, but also as teachers. The fact that it was a question of discipline on which he had broken with the Rāmānujas led him to release his followers from the shackles which he had found inconvenient. They observed no particular ordinances in eating or bathing, and were named by him *Avadhūta*, or liberated.

Numerous sub-sects trace their origin to this branch of the Śrī-saṁpradāya, each of which forms the subject of a special article in the present work. See KABĪR-PANTHĪS, KHĀKĪS, MULŪK-DĀSĪS, RAI-DĀSĪS, and SENĀ-PANTHĪS, which are the most important of the sub-sects. The catholicity of Rāmānanda's teaching may be gathered from the fact that he numbered among his twelve chief disciples, or apostles, a Musalmān (Kabīr), a barber (Senā), and a low-caste *chamār*, or leather-worker (Rai-dasa), each of whom founded a sub-sect. Kabīr's teaching was mixed not only with Christianity (see below), but also with Musalmān Ṣūfiism, which led him and his followers to neglect the worship of the incarnate Rāma-chandra, and to identify the name of Rāma not with the incarnation but with the unincarnate Adorable Himself, to whom, under the name of Rāma, *bhakti* was to be directly offered. From his schism, if it can be called a schism, there branched out two other important sub-sects, one of which has left its mark upon the political history of India—the Sikhs and the Dādū-panthīs. The great bulk of the Hindu population of Northern India, however, still adheres to the original Rāmānandī doctrines; and this sect has become the local mother-church, preserving friendly relations with its various sub-sects, although these are divided into two branches by the Kabīr schism. The most important later teacher of the Rāmānandī church was Tulasī-dāsa (end of 16th century), the great poet. He did more towards popularizing the worship of the incarnate Rāma-chandra than any of his predecessors, and his great epic, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, has been truthfully described as 'the one Bible of 100 millions of people.' It is read and studied even by members of the other Bhāgavata Saṁpradāyas.

Another member of the Rāmāvat church also deserves special mention. This is Nābhā-dāsa, or Nārāyaṇa-dāsa, a contemporary of Tulasī-dāsa, and the author of the *Bhakta-māla*. This, with its commentary by Priyā-dāsa, a member of the Brahma-saṁpradāya, may be called the *Acta Sanctorum* of the four churches. It is a storehouse of legends regarding the saints, ancient and modern, of the Bhāgavata religion. The importance of this book for a just comprehension of the religious attitude of modern Hinduism cannot be over-rated, and it is a matter for regret that the great difficulties of the text have deterred European students from its study. In its original form few natives can understand it nowadays, but numerous translations into modern Indian languages have made its contents familiar to every follower of the cult. For Northern India, it and Tulasī-dāsa's *Rāmāyaṇa* are the two text-books of modern Bhāgavatism.

(*b*) *Brahma-saṁpradāya.*—Madhva, or Ānandatīrtha, the founder of this church, was also a native of Southern India (see MADHVĀCHĀRĪS). He was originally a Śaiva, but became converted to Bhāgavatism in his later years. The doctrines of the sect do not single out any particular incarnation of the Adorable for special worship, but in Northern India it has taken Kṛṣṇa as its principal object of adoration. The church is strongest in Southern India, where it has numerous monasteries; it has few votaries in the North, though they are said to have increased of late. The clerical members are Brāhmans, and profess celibacy, but the lay votaries are members of every class of society except the lowest. The church is an attempt at a compromise with Śaivism, and the votaries of the two religions pay adoration to each other's gods.

The Vaiṣṇavas of Bengal, who look upon Chaitanya (*q.v.*) as their founder, are said to be a branch of this church, of which, according to the *Bhakta-kalpadruma*, Chaitanya was himself a member. But the tenets of the Bengal Vaiṣṇavas approach much more nearly those of the Rudra-saṁpradāya.

(*c*) *Rudra-saṁpradāya.*—As already stated, the Rudra-saṁpradāya is now practically represented by the Vallabhā-chāris (*q.v.*). Two or three other and unimportant sects are also referred to it. The incarnation of the Adorable which is specially worshipped by this church is that of Kṛṣṇa. The form of the devotional love of this and other Kṛṣṇa-worshipping sects is not that of a son to a father, as in the case of the Rāmāvats, but the love of a maid for a man; and this has given rise in later times to an erotic and sensual aspect of religion which has sometimes led to the most lamentable excesses. Kṛṣṇa's human spouse, Rādhā, is looked upon as an incarnation of the Adorable's energic power, and sometimes one is the object of worship, sometimes the other, and sometimes both conjointly. The clergy of the church marry and live comfortable lives, and their example is followed by the laity, who may be of any caste, but mainly consist of the opulent and luxurious members of society. Another very widely diffused form of worship, especially amongst women, is that of the *Bāla Gopāla*, or Infant Kṛṣṇa. The cult is widely extended over Northern India and the Bombay Presidency. A sub-sect is that founded in the 16th century by Mīrā Bāī, a famous princess and poetess of Rājputāna. Here the special object of worship is Kṛṣṇa Raṇachhōr (see MIRĀ BĀIS).

The Vaiṣṇavas of Bengal profess much the same tenets as those of the Vallabhāchārīs, and Vallabha himself was Chaitanya's father-in-law (see above under the Brahma-saṁpradāya). The Rādhā-vallabhīs, another sect which worships Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā, are also akin to the Vallabhāchārīs, but they are counted as belonging to the next, or Sanakādi-saṁpradāya.

(*d*) *Sanakādi-saṁpradāya.*—This church is now of small importance. Its few adherents, who are known as Nimāvats, are found in Northern India and in Rājputāna. They are mostly adorers of Kṛṣṇa (for further particulars see NIMĀVATS). One important sect is nominally sprung from this church, that of the Rādhā-vallabhīs. It was founded by one Hari-vaṁśa, surnamed Hita, who was born in 1559 and was a Nimāvat. His teaching was little in accordance with that of his church, being nothing but a development of the tenets of the Vallabhāchāris. The tendency towards erotic mysticism which distinguishes that sect is here carried to an extreme. Rādhā, the representative of the Adorable's energic power, now throws even Kṛṣṇa himself into the shade. He is given a subordinate position under the title of *Rādhā-vallabha*, or 'Rādhā's husband,' and this name has given its title to the sect. The worship is directed almost entirely to Rādhā as the spouse of God. For further particulars see RĀDHĀ-VALLABHĪS, SAKHI-BHĀVAS and CHARAṆ-DĀSĪS.

(4) *The guru.*—A striking characteristic of modern Bhāgavatism is the extravagant respect shown to the spiritual teacher, or *guru*. The first line of the *Bhakta-māla* gives as the essentials of religion *bhakti, bhakta, Bhagavanta, guru* ('faith, a faithful devotee, the Adorable, and the *guru*'); and this aptly illustrates the importance attributed to the last-named. Any one will admit that the first three are essentials, but few Westerns would think of adding the fourth. The rule that respect be shown to a spiritual teacher is very old in India. In ancient times, perfect obedience was required from his pupil. He was the pupil's second father, more to be venerated than even his natural progenitor. Once, however, the state of pupilage was over, the obligation of obedience ceased, and only respect and gratitude were subsequently required. But in modern Hinduism this proper attitude is greatly exaggerated. While some of the sects, and notably the Kabīr-panthīs, inculcate the greatest care in the selection of a guru, once selected he is to be obeyed implicitly throughout life. His voice is declared to be the voice of God, and the fullest devotion in word, act, and deed must be rendered to him. Some sects go further than others. The devotion is carried to incredible extremes among the Vallabhāchārīs. The devotee of this sect offers his body, soul, and substance to God, and, as the Gusāin (properly 'Gosāī'), *i.e.* the guru, is in the later works of the sect identified with the Deity, these are in reality dedicated to him. 'By the act of dedication, a man submits to the pleasure of the Gusāin, as God's representative, not only the fruits of his wealth, but also the virginity of his daughter or of his newly-married wife.'* It is fair to explain that few sects go to this length, and that in most, although the guru is revered as an incarnation of the Deity, his influence extends only to the sphere of morality. This is one more example of the tendency in India, as elsewhere, to deify the founder of a religion. The first Bhāgavatas deified Vāsudeva, and their successors deified, in their turn, the great men who founded their churches and their sects.

* Growse, *Mathurā*, p. 266.

Lastly, they took the further step of deifying their spiritual directors.

(5) *The mantra.*—No Hindu can become a member of a sect without the permission of a guru belonging to the sect. He is at first in the position of an inquirer, and when the guru considers him fit for admission, he whispers into his ear an initiatory formula (*mantra*), corresponding, as Mr. Growse points out, to the *In nomine Patris*, etc., of Christian baptism. These formulas are generally kept secret; but we know that the earliest, dating from pre-reformation times, was the 'twelve-syllabled' *Oṁ namo Bhagavate Vāsudevāya* ('Oṁ! reverence to the Adorable Vāsudeva'). In later times, as sectarian differences increased, the Supreme became differentiated into His incarnations. Thus, the *mantra* of the Rāmānujas is the 'six-syllabled' *Oṁ Rāmāya namaḥ* ('Oṁ! reverence to Rāma), while that of the Vallabhāchārīs is the 'eight-syllabled' *Śrī-Kṛṣṇaḥ śaraṇam mama* ('the holy Kṛṣna is my refuge').

(6) *Sectarian marks.*—Each sect is distinguished by certain marks placed by the more pious members upon the forehead or other part of the body. Thus the Rāmānujas have two perpendicular white lines, with a transverse streak connecting them above the nose. In the centre is a perpendicular streak of red. In the Brahma-sampradāya, a yellow spot is substituted for the red streak, and special marks are also branded on the shoulders and breast. It may be mentioned that worshippers of Śiva also put sectarian marks upon the forehead. As a guide for distinguishing the followers of the two religions, we may say that, as a general rule, while the essential parts of the Bhāgavata marks consist of perpendicular lines, those of the Śaiva sects are horizontal.

(7) *Bhakti and its 'flavours.'*—Later Bhāgavata writers have spent much time over the question of *bhakti* and the various modes in which it reveals itself. These modes are called *rasas*, or flavours, and as it would be difficult to understand the simplest treatise on *bhakti* without being familiar with at least the main principles according to which these flavours are held to be developed, the following brief account will be of service. The writers employ the terminology of the Indian system of poetics, but the categories are different.

Every religious attitude depends upon an objective 'dominant emotion' or *sthāyī bhāva*, considered as an abstract entity, apart from the person experiencing it. There are five of these dominant emotions: (1) resignation (*praśānta bhāva*); (2) obedience (*dāsya bhāva*); (3) friendship (*sākhya bhava*); (4) tender fondness (*vātsalya bhāva*); (5) passionate love (*rati bhāva*). It will be observed that these are arranged in an ascending scale of emotional force.

These 'dominant emotions' may have 'accessory emotions' (*vyabhichārī bhāva*, or *sañchārī bhāva*). These are not essential to the dominant emotions, but may go along with and co-operate with them, either permanently or occasionally. These accessory emotions are thirty-three in number, and are such as 'disgust with worldly things' (*nirveda*), apprehension (*śaṅkā*), painful thoughts (*chintā*), and the like.

Each of these dominant emotions, whether accompanied by an accessory emotion or not, produces a corresponding subjective psychic condition or experience, technically called *rasa*, or flavour, in the person who is subjected to it. These flavours are, in the order of the corresponding underlying dominant emotions: (1) the resigned flavour (*śānti rasa*); (2) the obedient flavour (*dāsya rasa*); (3) the friendly flavour (*sākhya rasa*); (4) the tenderly fond flavour, (*vātsalya rasa*); (5) the passionately loving flavour (*śṛṅgāra rasa*, or *mādhurya rasa*). The last, which is the highest stage, is also called the 'king of flavours' (*rasa-rāja*) or the 'glorious flavour' (*ujjvala rasa*).

Every flavour must have an 'exciting cause' or 'excitant' (*vibhāva*) in order to induce the experience from the underlying dominant emotion, and such excitants may be either 'essential' (*ālambana*) or 'enhancing' (*uddīpana*). The absolutely essential excitant is the object towards which the underlying dominant emotion of resignation, obedience, or the like, is directed, *i.e.* the Supreme Deity. Such an excitant is called 'absolutely essential' (*viṣayālambana*). But an excitant may be 'relatively essential' (*āśrayālambana*). It then excites a flavour, the dominant emotion of which is not immediately directed to the Supreme. Such for instance is Sītā the spouse of Rāma-chandra. She can be the relatively essential excitant of the flavour of passionate love, *i.e.*, she causes the subjective flavour to arise in the heart of the devotee from the corresponding dominant emotion considered as an objective abstract entity. This ultimately leads to the flavour of passionate love directed to her husband, Rāma-chandra, who, being an incarnation of the Supreme Deity Himself, is the absolutely essential excitant.

An enhancing excitant is such an excitant as the qualities, actions, gestures, or beauty of any of the essential excitants. For instance, Rāma-chandra's cherishing of those who take refuge in him, or his love for those who serve him, is an enhancing excitant of the flavour of obedience.

When the psychic condition, or flavour, of a dominant emotion has been thus excited, certain effects occur. These are called 'ensuants' (*anubhāva*). The most important of these are the natural expressions of emotion (*sāttvika bhava*), which are here enumerated in order of usual occurrence: (1) arrest of motion (*stambha*); (2) trembling (*kampa*), (3) disturbance of speech (*svara-bhaṅga*); (4) change of colour (*vaivarṇya*); (5) tears (*aśru*); (6) sweating (*sveda*); (7) thrills (*pulaka*); (8) unconsciousness (*pralaya*). Other ensuants may be spiritual, such as a feeling of devotion, rapture, and so on.

From the above it will be seen that the Hindu love for classification has been carried even into the province of religious emotion. It will also be noticed how closely the Indian religious experiences, and especially the phenomena attendant on what we should call 'conversion,' agree with what we observe in Christian countries.

(8) *The niṣṭhās.*—Every true Bhāgavata from his birth has his vocation allotted to him by the Adorable. For instance, his vocation may be to preach the gospel, or to wait upon saintly men, or to love hearing the scriptures, or to sing psalms, or even merely to lead a moral life. Each of these vocations is called a *niṣṭhā*; and every created being who is faithful to the Adorable must belong to at least one of them. He may belong to two or more, if the Adorable so will. These *niṣṭhās* are twenty-four in number, each being under the special protection of one of the twenty-four incarnations believed in by Bhāgavatas. In the catalogues of saints, each is carefully allotted his *niṣṭhā*, and is classified and grouped accordingly.

4. General aspects of the Bhāgavata reformation.—Nothing is more striking in the history of India than the rapidity and completeness with which the Bhāgavata reformation of the Middle Ages was accomplished. At first sight it almost seems as if a new doctrine, coming from some unknown land, had suddenly been revealed, and had swept with irresistible force in one mighty wave across the peninsula. Great modern scholars, men like Lassen and Weber, were found declaring that the only possible explanation was that the doctrine of *bhakti* arose in India as a more or less direct reflexion of Christianity. The late Professor Cowell himself, when writing in 1878 the preface to his translation of the *Bhakti-sūtras*, confessed that the date and history of the origin of the doctrine were unknown, and, in fact, it is only within the last few years that we have been able to pierce the cloud of mystery that surrounds it. The first to throw light upon the subject was Professor Bhandarkar; and though the conclusions arrived at by him in the year 1887 have been disputed, his labours have been the foundation of all subsequent inquiries. The next important step was not taken till the year 1905, when Prof. Garbe fixed with approximate certainty the date of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. We can now be as sure as we can be of anything in the history of Indian literature, that portions of this poem are pre-Christian; and, as *bhakti* is taught therein, we can safely assert that the doctrine, however Christian may be its appearance, is of indigenous Indian origin.

Nevertheless, although one is based upon the other, a whole world of difference lies between the Bhāgavatism of the reformation and that of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. Like the Brahmaism of the Midland Brāhmans, the pre-reformation Bhāgavatism was the religion of a class—the warriors. It was taught in a learned language, and was practised by learned Kṣatriya kings and men of

note.* It had its ritual and its five solemn sacrifices, and was therefore a religion of the wealthy. As has more than once been remarked,† official Vaiṣnavism is a costly religion, while Śaivism is a cheap one. Bhāgavatism, after the identification of the Bhagavat with Viṣṇu, can hardly have been a religion of the lower castes or of the poor. In other words, it was not a religion of the people. The alliance with Brahmaism still further parted it from the lower orders. The theory of absorption peculiar to that form of belief, but now dallied with by Bhāgavatism, had nothing in common with their hopes or fears. As Hopkins rightly says,‡ 'the ordinary mortal is more averse from the bliss of absorption than from the pleasures of heaven.' At this time, and during the centuries immediately succeeding the Christian era, the needs of the common people were amply supplied by two other religions of the Outland—by Buddhism and, for those who craved for a personal God, by Śaivism. Bhāgavatism in its pure form came to be professed by fewer and fewer, and from the 9th cent., when all thinking India fell under the spell of the genius of Śaṅkara, it practically disappeared. Only at rare intervals do we come across references to it in literature and inscriptions.§ Śaṅkara himself mentions *bhakti* only once in his great philosophical work, and merely to dismiss it with contempt. It was in Southern India that the lamp of Bhāgavatism was kept burning, though with but a feeble light,‖ and it was in the South that it revived through the teaching of the four great leaders whose names have been mentioned. Then arose Rāmānanda, and within half a century Bhāgavatism became the leading religion of India. Yet there is as great a difference between the monotheism of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and that of Rāmānanda as there was between the teaching of Plato and that of St. Paul. It now became as fully the right of the despised classes, of Musalmāns and of unclean leather-workers, as of people of repute. From Rāmānanda's time it was to the poor that the gospel was preached, and that in their own language, not in a form of speech holy but unintelligible. No one who reads the Indian religious literature of the 15th and following centuries can fail to notice the gulf that lies between the old and the new. We find ourselves in the face of the greatest religious revolution that India has ever seen—greater even than that of Buddhism, for its effects have persisted to the present day. Religion is no longer a question of knowledge. It is one of emotion. We visit a land of mysticism and rapture, and meet spirits akin, not to the giant schoolmen of Benares, but to the poets and mystics of mediæval Europe, in sympathy with Bernard of Clairvaux, with Thomas à Kempis, with Eckhart, and with St. Theresa. In the early years of the reformation the converts lived and moved in an atmosphere of the highest spiritual exaltation, while over all there hovered, with healing in its wings, a Divine gospel of love, smoothing down inevitable asperities, restoring breaches, and reconciling conflicting modes of thought. Northern India was filled with wandering devotees vowed to poverty and purity. Visions, trances, raptures, and even reputed miracles were of every-day occurrence. Rich noblemen abandoned all their possessions and gave them to the poor, and even the poorest would lay aside a bundle of sticks to light a fire for some chance wandering saint. Nor were these converts confined to the male sex. Of devout and honourable women there were not a few—Mīrā Bāī, the queen-poet of Udaipur, who gave up her throne rather than join in the bloody worship of Śiva; Bāṅkā, the poor woodcutter's wife, who could not be tempted by a purse of gold; the chaste Surasurī with her tiger guardian; Ganeśa Derānī, the queen of Madhukara Sāhi of Orchha, who hid the wound inflicted by a mad ascetic, lest her husband should take indiscriminating vengeance; the penitent Magdalen of Delhi, who gave her life and the only art that she possessed, her dancing, to the service of the deity in whom she had taken refuge; and many others. Of men, there were Hari-dāsa, the sweet singer, to hear whom Akbar disguised himself as a menial servant and travelled far; Nanda-dāsa, the hymn-writer, whose last words were a prayer that his soul might stand 'very close and near' the Adored; Chaturbhuja, the apostle to the savage Gonds, who taught that right initiation meant 'being born again'; Gopāla, who when smitten on one cheek turned the other to the smiter; Vilvamaṅgala, who looked after a woman to lust after her, and, because his eye offended him, made himself blind; the unnamed king, who for the same reason cut off his right hand and cast it from him; Sūra-dāsa, the blind bard of Agra; and, most famous of all, perhaps the greatest poet that India has produced, Tulasī-dāsa, the teller of the deeds of Rāma.*

The question naturally arises, whence did Rāmānanda receive the inspiration that produced this marvellous change; and an attempt is made to answer it in the following paragraphs.

5. Influence of Christianity.—The question as to how far Christianity has influenced the *Bhakti-mārga* has been much discussed. We have seen that it must now be taken as settled that the idea of *bhakti* is native to India, and that the existence of Bhāgavata monotheism can be traced back to very ancient times. It is still, however, open to us to consider the possibility of post-Christian Bhāgavatism being affected by the cognate teachings of the Western form of belief. The facts appear to be as follows:

Large colonies of Nestorian Christians and Jews migrated to the Malabar Coast in the 1st cent. A.D., and settled in Southern India in the early centuries of our era. The former have been there ever since. They had a bishop at Kalyāna on the Malabar Coast in the 6th cent., and another of their settlements was at the present shrine of St. Thomé, near Madras. There is a respectable tradition that the Apostle Thomas actually preached in North-Western India, and at any rate it is certain that the parts of Asia immediately adjoining had many Christian inhabitants. Not only was there in the early centuries of our era free and regular communication between India and the West, both by sea and overland, but during the same period India was more than once invaded from the North-West. In the year A.D. 639 the famous Indian king Śīlāditya of Kanauj, a patron of the Bhāgavatas, received a party of Syrian Christians, headed by the missionary Alopen, at his court.† The author of the *Dabistān*,

* *Bhagavad-Gītā*, iv. 1, 2, distinctly says that it was a Kṣatriya religion.

† *e.g.* by Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*, 1889, p 62 ff.

‡ *Religions of India*, p. 418.

§ Bopadēva, the reputed author of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, belongs to the post-reformation period (13th cent.).

‖ *e.g.* only one prince of the Valabhī kings, Dhruvasena I (A.D. 526), is called a Bhāgavata. The others were Mahēśvaras, or worshippers of Śiva. Cf., however, the remarks on Śiva **bhakti**, below.

* All these examples are taken from the *Bhakta-māla* (cf. the next section). The early writers were perfectly conscious of the change effected by the reformation. Priyā-dāsa says, 'the tree of *Bhakti* was once but a sapling, that might be stunted by a single kid. . . . Now it hath climbed to the sky, with its glory spread manifest over the earth; for the basin from which its roots drew moisture was the bosom of the Holy. . . . Mark well its growth. Once but a feeble thing; now, shackled to its trunk, contentedly sway the mighty elephants of the passions' (*Bhakti-rasa-bodhinī*, 6).

† Edkins, *Athenæum*, July 3, 1880, p. 8. See also Takakusu,

which was written in 1645, describes (iii. 312 f.) how, when travelling in India, he had 'greatly frequented the meetings of Hindus, Jews, Magians, Nazáreans, and Muselmans'; and speaking of the Vedas, he says (ii. 45) that every one who pleases may derive from them arguments in favour of his particular creed, whether that creed be 'Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, fire-worship, the tenets of the Sonites, or those of the Shîâs, etc.'

Finally, there were the Jesuit missions to India in the latter part of the 16th cent., and their arrival at the court of the Emperor Akbar in the year 1580. They had churches in Agra, Delhi, and Lahore till Shāh Jahān came to the throne in 1628, and the Delhi church survived till the invasion of Nādir Shāh in 1789. We thus see that from the first centuries of our era Christianity has always been present in India, and that, both in the North and in the South, Hindus had every opportunity of becoming acquainted with its tenets.

Although there are many remarkable verbal coincidences, it is improbable that the latest parts of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* contain passages suggested by our Scriptures. As for the earlier portions, chronology renders it impossible. But in one of the latest passages of the *Mahābhārata*, written at least three hundred years after Christ, if not considerably later, there is an account of a visit paid by three saints to a 'White Continent,' where the people were of fair complexion, and endowed with a perfect *bhakti* that did not exist in India. A description is given of their worship which certainly suggests reminiscences of a Christian religious service, and many believe that the passage is based upon the tales of travellers who had come across Christian communities in those parts of Asia which lie north of the Hindu Kush. Besides this, there are other passages in the later parts of the *Mahābhārata* which it is difficult to believe are not borrowed from our Gospels, especially from that of St. John. These have been collected by Hopkins (*India Old and New*, p. 145 ff.). Two of his examples may be cited here. Kṛṣṇa, the incarnate Deity, is described as 'the unborn (*i.e.* the eternal) and ancient one, the only son of God, born of a virgin, very part of God'; and again, it is said of him that 'He, the guardian of his flock, the sinless God, the Lord of the world, consented to the death of (himself and) his race that he might fulfil the words of the seers.' A striking innovation, dating from about the 6th cent. A.D., was the divinity attributed by the Bhāgavatas to the *child* Kṛṣṇa. Hitherto he had been a religious teacher and a warrior, regarding whose childhood, as is usual in such cases, legends not essential to his character had accumulated. But from the 6th cent. onwards the greatest prominence is given to his childish miracles and freaks, and to his adolescent pastoral life in the country round Mathurā. It is the infant god, the *bambino*, brought up among the cowherds of Gokula, who is now a favourite object of worship. His mother Devakī, hitherto hardly mentioned, is now portrayed, like a *Madonna lactans*, suckling the infant Kṛṣṇa. His birth coincides with a massacre of the innocents, and we have other and new legends of 'the restoration to life of a woman's son, the healing of a cripple, and the pouring of a box of ointment over Kṛṣṇa' (Hopkins, *op. cit.* p. 163). Kennedy (*JRAS*, 1907, p. 951 ff.) suggests that all this is a Hindu adaptation of the Christian stories brought into the Gangetic Doāb by Gūjar immigrants from the North-West. Whether these legends have been borrowed or not may possibly be doubted, but all hesitation vanishes when we read the orthodox liturgy of the festival of Kṛṣṇa's birthday. The old legends of the birth and childhood are perfectly well known, but, as long ago shown by Weber, the ritual does not adhere to them. It actually alters the story in material facts to make it agree with the narratives of the nativity as contained in the early chapters of St. Matthew and St. Luke. Vallabha found this child-worship current in Mathurā, and adapted it to the needs of his own *Kṛṣṇa-bhakti*. As Hopkins (p. 167) says:

'So decided is the alteration and so direct is the connexion between this later phase of Krishnaism and the Christianity of the early centuries of our era, that it is no expression of extravagant fancy but a sober historical statement that in all probability the Hindus of this cult of the Madonna and Child have in reality, though unwittingly, been worshipping the Christ-child for fully a thousand years.'

The religion of Rāma presents other aspects of the case. We have seen that the modern worship of the incarnate Rāma commenced with the teaching of Rāmānuja, and was spread over Northern India by Rāmānanda and his followers. In Rāmānuja's time the Christians of St. Thomé had become paganized. They had given up baptism, while they retained the Eucharist; and a kind of mixed, or rather joint, worship, half Christian and half Hindu, had established itself in the ancient shrine. That Rāmānuja and his followers imbibed much of this teaching admits, to the present writer at least, of but little doubt. Owing to the similarity of the ground ideas of 'faith' and *bhakti*, it would indeed be extraordinary if the two religions, once brought into contact, had not influenced each other. That the Hinduism influenced the Christianity has been established as an historical fact, and that alone shows the probability of the converse also being true. According to Indian tradition, Rāmānuja was born, brought up, and spent the best part of his life near St. Thomé. In his early years he was a Vedāntist, and while he was still a young man it was in this neighbourhood that he became converted to Bhāgavatism, thought out his systematized qualified monism, refuted in a famous discussion his old Vedāntist teacher, and suffered much persecution.* Much the same as in the case of early Christianity, it is to Rāmānuja's persecution and flight from Conjeeveram that Bhāgavatism owes its acceptance over the greater part of India. Except the sects founded by Vallabha and Hari-vaṁśa, the conditions of which were altogether peculiar, the other churches have comparatively little influence beyond the localities in which they arose. But the Śrī-saṁpradāya had within it a driving force that carried it all over India from Cape Comorin to the Himālaya. Its special characteristic was the importance given to faith in a personal God, and particularly to Rāmachandra represented as an incarnation of the Adorable, still retaining the same personality in heaven, remembering and sympathizing with the sorrows and trials of humanity. It is true that *bhakti* also plays a prominent rôle in the other churches; but it has not, with the exception of the two sects just mentioned, acquired the supreme importance in them that it has gained in the Śrī-saṁpradāya. That this is owing to the view taken of the personality of Rāma-chandra is self-evident; and though it cannot be said that the attributes with which he has been clothed are strange to the old epic accounts of him, still Christian influence may reasonably be claimed for the stress laid upon them to the comparative exclusion of others. The root conception of the

I-tsing, p. xxviii., note 8. It was at the court of this king that the poet Bāṇa refers to the presence of Bhāgavatas and Pāñcharātras (*Harṣacharita*, tr. Cowell and Thomas, p. 236).

* The similarity of the cases of Rāmānuja and Madhva is worth noting. Both were converts from Vedāntism, and both were within reach of Christian influence. Madhva was a man of Uḍupi, close to Kulyāṇa, where there was an old Christian bishopric

Deity has been profoundly modified. The noble and pious hero has become a God of love (δυνάμενος συμπαθῆσαι ταῖς ἀσθενείαις ἡμῶν). The love, moreover, is that of a father for his children, not that of a man for a maid, as in the ardent *bhakti* of Vallabha and Hari-vaṁśa.

Another point of coincidence is worth noting—the institution of the *mahāprasāda*, or sacramental meal. Such meals are found in many religions, but the procedure of those partaken of by the members of the Śrī-saṁpradāya shows points of agreement with the Christian Eucharist that cannot be mere matters of chance.* The consecrated elements are even reserved for administration to the sick, and the communion, which is shared in only by those who feel themselves worthy, is followed by a love-feast attended by all members of the sect present at the time.

But it is in the literature of the church that we find the most evident reminiscences of Christianity. Kabīr, one of Rāmānanda's twelve apostles, speaks of the Word in language which is but a paraphrase of the opening verses of St. John's Gospel, and quotes sayings of our Lord almost verbatim. The authorized text-book of all believers—the *Bhakta-māla*—also contains numerous parallels to the sayings of our Lord. Attention has been drawn to several of these in the preceding section, and they need not be repeated. Here we may notice another alteration of an old legend—an alteration to make it agree with an occurrence of the most solemn hour of Christian history. In the *Mahābhārata*, Kṛṣṇa is represented as washing the feet of Brāhmans. The story, as altered by the *Bhakta-māla*, makes the incarnate God wash the feet of the disciples. In another story, which is specially mentioned as 'beloved, but hitherto not well-known,' a poor wretch is taken in and honourably entreated because he is a stranger, and therefore equivalent to Rāma. He is then told that if he has faith he can walk on the sea. He has faith, and does so.

It is possible that everything was not necessarily taken from the Nestorian Christians. There was free intercourse by sea between Christian countries and Southern India, and this may account for other coincidences, in which it is not always easy to say which side has borrowed from which. Such is the fact that the word employed in India, both by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, for the personal Deity was *Iśvara*, the exact equivalent of the Greek Κύριος. This may possibly be a pre-Christian coincidence. In early Christianity there was the same remarkable reverence for spiritual teachers that we have observed in Bhāgavatism. According to the *Didache*, such a teacher was to be 'known as the Lord.' In both religions there was the same extravagant belief in the mystic power attached to the *name* of the incarnate God. Thomas à Kempis speaks of the 'holy utterance, short to read, easy to retain, sweet to think upon, strong to protect,' just as Tulasī-dāsa praises 'the two gracious syllables, the eyes as it were of the soul, easy to remember, satisfying every wish, a gain in this world and felicity in the next.'† In both religions there are the same discussions as to the relative efficacy of faith and works, and as to the truth of the opposing doctrines of 'irresistible' and 'co-operative grace.' The change in the Indian idea of sin is also noteworthy. Till Rāmānuja's time, sin was disobedience to the rules of religion laid down in text-books, and was to be avoided as entailing certain consequences in a future life. Since then it has been defined as anything not done in faith. Sin is sin because it is incompatible with the nature of the incarnate God of Love, and, as quoted in the abstract of Śāṇdilya's work given above on p. 539, even good works not done in *bhakti* partake of the nature of sin. Each of these instances of agreement taken singly might be an accident, but their cumulative effect, combined with the whole style and tone of the modern *bhakti* literature, is irresistible.

The political history of India at this period must also be taken into account. Maḥmūd of Ghazni's seventeen invasions commenced in A.D. 1001. He was succeeded by dynasty after dynasty of Musalmān conquerors, broken in 1398 by the terrible suffering entailed by the invasion of Timur. Not till Akbar ascended the throne in 1556 had the Hindus peace, and a century later the oppression was renewed by Aurangzīb (*q.v.*). For more than five centuries, from 1001 to 1556, India lay prostrate and bleeding under the feet of conquerors of alien race and alien religion. This was the period of the reformation.

To sum up the foregoing:—It is certain that in the early centuries of our era Christians visited India, and were received at a royal court. It is extremely probable that the inhabitants of Northern India were acquainted with the early Christianity of Bactria and the neighbouring parts of Central Asia, that they greatly respected it, and that they admitted that its professors possessed *bhakti* to a degree more perfect than that which ever existed in their own country. It is possible, and perhaps probable, that the worship of the infant Kṛṣṇa was a local adaptation of the worship of the infant Christ introduced to India from the North-West, and the ritual of Kṛṣṇa's birth-festival has certainly borrowed from Christian authorities. But it was in Southern India that Christianity, as a doctrine, exercised the greatest influence on Hinduism generally. Although the conceptions of the fatherhood of God and of *bhakti* were indigenous to India, they received an immense impetus owing to the beliefs of Christian communities reacting upon the mediæval Bhāgavata reformers of the South. With this leaven, their teaching swept over Hindustan, bringing balm and healing to a nation gasping in its death-throes amid the horrors of alien invasion. It is not overstating the case to say that in this reformation India re-discovered faith and love; and the fact of this discovery accounts for the passionate enthusiasm of the contemporary religious writings. In them we behold the profoundest depths of the human heart laid bare with a simplicity and freedom from self-consciousness unsurpassed in any literature with which the writer is acquainted.

6. Muhammadan influence.—The syncretism of the Bhāgavata religion has not stopped at Christianity. The later reformers, some of whom were converts from Islām, also imported into it the elements of Ṣūfiism, which will readily be recognized, and are universally acknowledged. It is sometimes difficult to decide whether a particular sectarian doctrine has been borrowed from it or from Christianity. Ṣūfiism itself has been influenced by Christian mysticism, and the doctrine of Divine love which is its distinguishing mark is so akin to the teaching of the reformed *bhakti*-churches that it could hardly fail to influence the teaching of those Bhāgavatas whose youth had been passed in a Musalmān atmosphere. But Ṣūfiism did not influence Bhāgavatism until it had reached Northern India, and, being little known in the South, it never inspired the ground doctrine of any one of the four churches.

7. Bhakti directed to Śiva.—It may be stated as a broad rule that all the followers of the Indian *bhakti-mārga* are Vaiṣṇavas. Śiva, the other

* For the whole procedure see Westcott, *Kabīr and the Kabīr Panth*, 1908, p. 127.

† For further Christian examples see Growse, *Translation of Tulasī-dāsa's Rāmāyaṇa*, i. Do. 24.

great deity of Indian worship, is associated with ideas too terrible to suggest loving devotion. There are, however, in Southern India, Śaiva sects which practise a *bhakti* cult. We have seen how the Vaiṣṇava Bhāgavatism of Northern India became infected with Brahmaism in the first few centuries of our era. In Southern India the stricter Bhāgavatas, who desired to retain their monotheism intact, began to direct their devotion to Śiva in preference to Viṣṇu, who was now, in the North, partly identified with the pantheistic Bráhma.* It is most probable that in this way there arose the Śiva-*bhakti* now sometimes met with in the South. Śiva was even provided with incarnations, such as Vīrabhadra, in imitation of those of Viṣṇu, to whom the love and devotion could be directed.

It may here be mentioned that all Indian sects agree that Śaṅkara, the promulgator of Vedāntism, was an incarnation of Śiva. Bhāgavata doctors get over the difficulty by explaining that, when the world was filled with Buddhism and other heresies, the Bhagavat directed Śiva to become incarnate and to preach a false doctrine invented by himself, so as to turn people from the Bhagavat, and thus manifest his glory by the consequent destruction of unbelievers. In other words, followers of Vedāntism were born to be damned for the greater glory of a gracious and merciful God.

The Sittars (*q.v.*), a Tamil sect, may also be noted in this connexion. Although nominal Śaivas, they are strict monotheists, who teach that 'God and love are the same.' There are other instances in Southern India of attempts to reconcile Śaivism with Bhāgavatism. The most important of these is the Brahma-saṁpradāya, founded by Madhva, already described. Regarding the true Śiva-*bhakti*, which is professedly a cult of Śiva or his incarnations, very little is known, and the subject deserves more study than it has hitherto received.

LITERATURE.—The official Sanskrit text-books of the Bhaktimārga are the Śāṇḍilya *Bhakti-sūtras*, and the Nārada *Bhakti-sūtras*. Both are quite modern works. The text of the former was edited by J. R. Ballantyne in 1861, and translated by E. B. Cowell in 1878, both appearing in the *Bibliotheca Indica* of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Hariśchandra (see below) wrote a Hindī version of the Śāṇḍilya work under the title of the *Bhakti-sūtra-vaijayantī*, and of the Nārada under the title of the *Tadīya-sarvasva*.

There is no European work dealing with the subject as a whole. The earliest account of the doctrines of the Bhāgavatas is that given by Colebrooke, read in 1827, and published in the first volume of the *Transactions* of the *RAS*. Like everything that came from his pen, it is scholarly and accurate, and in some particulars has been the foundation of all subsequent accounts of the Bhāgavata religion. It was re-published in his *Miscellaneous Essays*, 1837 (i. 437 ff.). The history of the origin of this form of belief was first given by R. G. Bhandarkar in his *Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency during the Year 1883–84* (Bombay, 1887) p. 68 ff., and, more fully, in 'The Râmânujîya and the Bhâgavata or Pañcharâtra Systems,' in *Verhandlungen des VI^te internationalen Orientalisten-Congresses* (Arische Section) (Vienna, 1888), p. 101 ff. His views were adopted and developed by R. Garbe in the Introduction to his German tr. of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (Leipzig, 1905). L. Barnett, in the Introduction to his Eng. tr. of the same work, has given an independent and shorter account of the cult of Vāsudeva, in which much valuable information will be found that lay outside the lines of Garbe's thesis. An abstract of the *Nārāyaṇīya*, with an Introduction by G. A. Grierson, will be found in the *IA*, 1908.

For Rāmānuja, see the special article. The best account of his qualified monism will be found in pt. i. of G. Thibaut's tr. of the *Vedānta-sūtras* (*SBE*, xxxiv., Oxford, 1890). For the other three reformers and the churches founded by them, as well as for the various sects, see the special articles. Bhandarkar, already quoted, gives accounts of the teaching of Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Vallabha. The leading work on modern Bhāgavatism is H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, which originally appeared in vols. xvi. and xvii. of the *Asiatic Researches* (1828–32, re-published, London, 1861). Although to a certain extent out of date, Wilson's work must still be the foundation for all inquirers into modern Hinduism. Most of the popular works on the subject are mere réchauffés of what he has written, including most of his mistakes. Of more modern works which contain original research, F. S. Growse's *Mathurā, a District Memoir*[2] (Allahabad, 1880), gives much valuable information which will not be found elsewhere. E. W. Hopkins's *Religions of India* (Boston and London, 1902), is also replete with new material collected from many sources, and illumined by many suggestive remarks. Among works written by natives of India, the *Bhakta-māla* of Nābhā-dāsa, with its commentary by Priyā-dāsa, is all-important. It has often been printed in the original and also translated into modern Indian languages. A convenient Hindī paraphrase is the *Bhakta-kalpadruma* of Pratāpa Siṁha (Lucknow, 1884). It is impossible to understand reformed Bhāgavatism without a familiarity with the contents of the *Bhakta-māla*, but its many difficulties have hitherto deterred most students from the task of studying it. The late Hariśchandra of Benares, who was a devout Bhāgavata, wrote a number of works in Hindī dealing with the history of his religion. The more important are the *Vaiṣṇava-sarvasva*, the *Vallabhīya-sarvasva*, and biographies of Rāmānuja and Vallabha. These, as well as the *Bhakti-sūtra-vaijayantī* and the *Tadīya-sarvasva*, can be found in a collection of his works published at intervals during the closing decade of the 19th cent. at Bānkipur, and entitled the *Hariśchandra-kalā*.

For Early Christianity in India, see A. C. Burnell in *IA* iii. 308, iv. 153, v. 25. A. Weber in his well-known articles on the *Kṛṣṇa-janmāṣṭamī* (Eng. tr. in *IA* iii. 21, etc., vi. 161, etc.) deals with the ritual of the Kṛṣṇa birth-festival; and although all his arguments are not now accepted, his main results are universally admitted to be true. An article by the present writer (who does not adhere to all the details then advanced by him) on 'Modern Hinduism, and its Debt to the Nestorians,' in *JRAS*, 1907, may be read for the sake of the discussion to which it gave rise, and which is printed in the same volume. See also J. Kennedy, 'The Child Kṛṣṇa, Christianity, and the Gujars,' *ib.* p. 951 ff. The most complete and sane summary of the whole question is Hopkins's 'Christ in India,' in *India Old and New* (New York and London, 1902). It is, of course, earlier than the two papers just mentioned. The Bhāgavata doctrine of works is dealt with by G. A. Grierson in *JRAS*, 1908, p. 337 ff.

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

BHANGI.—The sweeper or scavenger caste of Hindustan, who at the Census of 1901 numbered 656,668. The caste probably takes its name, on account of the drunken habits of its members, from Skr. *bhaṅga*, 'hemp.' With the Bhangīs may also be conveniently grouped other scavenger tribes of Northern India—the Chūhrā (probably from Hindī *chūṛā-jhāṛnā*, 'to sweep up rubbish'); the Ḥalālkhor, 'one to whom any kind of food is lawful'; and the Mehtar, or 'prince,' a mock honorific term for this and other menial occupations. This group of castes numbered in all, at the Census of 1901, 2,168,594. As regards distribution, the vast majority of them were found in the Panjāb (1,316,517) and in the United Provinces (461,993). In Bengal they number only 40,971, their duties being performed in this province by still more degraded tribes, such as the Ḍom (*q.v.*) and the Hāṛī (*q.v.*). Classified according to religion, about three-fourths profess to be Hindus and nearly one-fourth Muhammadans, the small balance calling themselves either Sikhs or Animists. But the more respectable Hindus, Muhammadans, and Sikhs utterly refuse communion in worship or in the social observances of life to people whom they regard as out-castes, and believe that their touch, or even their mere presence, involves pollution.

The sweeper castes, as a whole, are the modern representatives of the Chaṇḍāla of Manu (*Institutes*, x. 12, 29, 30), who are regarded by the lawgiver as the offspring of a Śūdra father and a Brāhman woman, thus marking the Aryan abhorrence of marriage relations between women of the ruling race and men of the conquered Dravidian races. They acquired the title of Anta-vāsin or Ante-vāsin, because they were required to dwell outside the limits of the homestead. Their sole wealth must be dogs and asses—both animals which the orthodox Hindu still regards as impure. Their clothes must be made out of the cerecloths of the dead; their dishes must be broken pots, and their ornaments of rusty iron. No one who is careful of his religious duties must hold any intercourse with them, and they must marry among themselves—a rule which probably dates from early Buddhist times, when caste was only in the making. By day

* Cf. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 488.

they may roam about to seek work; they must be distinguished by the badges of the Rājā, and they must carry out the corpses of any who die without kindred. They should always be employed to slay those whom the law sentences to be put to death, and they may appropriate the clothes of the slain, their beds, and their ornaments.

The word Chaṇḍāla, probably a Dravidian term, but sometimes derived from the Skr. *chaṇḍa*, 'evil,' 'cruel,' 'mischievous,' is nowadays used only in a contumelious sense, and the so-called Chaṇḍāla caste of Bengal call themselves Nāmaśūdra; and their higher subdivisions, with characteristic jealousy, apply the title Chaṇḍāla to the lower, who in their turn pass it on to the Dom. In short, the title Chaṇḍāla may have been a generic title for the meaner non-Aryan races, who at an early period were reduced to servitude, and compelled to perform the more odious duties in the Aryan commonwealth. But at the present time the viler duties assigned to the Chaṇḍāla of Manu —the conveyance of corpses and the task of acting as public executioners—have passed to the Doms, and the Bhangīs now owe their social degradation to their performance of the duties of scavengering. The rise of the present Bhangī caste seems, from the names applied to the caste and its subdivisions, to date from the early period of Muhammadan rule, and their appearance indicates that they are a mixture of various races, who for some reason or another have incurred social ostracism.

1. *The cult of Lāl Beg.*—The Bhangī legends and rites of worship centre round the person of their saint, Lāl Beg, about whom many wonderful tales are told. From the mass of folklore connected with him little can be definitely ascertained. He has been connected with the *rākshasa*, or demon, Arunakarat, and as Aruṇa in Skr. is a title of the sun, and *lāl* in Persian means 'red,' some connexion has been traced between his cult and earlier Hindu beliefs. Others would connect Lāl Beg with the *lāl Bhikshū*, or red-clad monk of Buddhist times; and he is also in some inexplicable way mixed up with the cult of Vālmīki, the poet-sage who compiled the epic of the Rāmāyana, and who has also been adopted as their patron deity by low castes like the Aheria (*q.v.*) and Bahelia (*q.v.*). In the names of the tribal sections some vague indications of totemism appear, but these must not be pressed too far.

2. *Other Bhangī deities.*—The Bhangīs, as might be expected from the mixed origin of the caste, follow a combination of different faiths. The basis of their religion is the characteristic Animism of the Dravidians, but to this they have added elements derived from other sources. In the United Provinces a large number of them worship as their patron saint Lāl Beg, and with him is combined or confounded the Pachpiriyā (*q.v.*) cult of the Pañchon Pīr, or five saints. In Central India Lāl Beg has no temple, but is often represented in villages by a flat stone upon which two footprints are carved, and over them a rude mud shelter, marked by a red flag, is often erected. In Rājputāna, when sacrifice is being offered to him, they cut the throat of the fowl victim in Musalmān fashion (*ḥalāl*).

Higher up the Ganges valley their favourite saint is Gūgā, or Zāhir Pīr, who, they believe, possesses the power of healing the blind, lunatics, and lepers, and bestowing offspring upon barren wives. His shrine is a small round building with a courtyard, decorated with flags hung from the neighbouring trees, and provided with poles, one of which is appropriated as a perch for the deity whenever he attends in answer to the prayers of his devotees. The offering to him is a leaf or branch of a sacred tree and some grains of millet. The cenotaph is rubbed with sandalwood, which imbibes the powers of the saint, and is taken away and used as a cure in various maladies. Sometimes a goat is offered, and the meat is consumed by the worshippers. Another favourite Bhangī saint is Ghāzī Miyāṅ, supposed to be a Musalmān hero slain in one of the early invasions of Oudh. His 'marriage' is his most important feast, and there seems some reason to suspect that it is a survival of the rite of symbolic marriage of the earth, the Mother, with her male counterpart, the object of the rite being the promoting of the fertility of the earth, one of the leading features of the Dravidian religion. The Bhangīs venerate besides these a host of deified ghosts or spirits, generally those of the locality in which they happen to reside. Those who are professing Muhammadans add to the monotheistic creed of Islām a number of beliefs derived from the more primitive Animism.

3. *The religion of the Ḥalālkhors.*—The creed of the Ḥalālkhors has less Musalmān admixture, and more closely resembles that of the Ḍom and his kinsman the Bāṅsphoṛ (*q.v.*).

4. *The religion of the Panjāb Chūhrās.*—The religion of the Chūhrās of the Panjāb is equally involved and perplexing, and the researches of Maclagan have done little more than increase the mystery by which it is surrounded. In the Sirsa district, they, like their brethren in the United Provinces, worship Lāl Beg, a god without form or dwelling-place. The worshipper makes a small shrine of earth, and puts over it a stick with a piece of cloth as a flag, offers a little butter or grain as a sacrifice, and prays to be delivered from sickness and other trouble. The Chūhrās are said not to believe in the transmigration of souls; but they say that the good go to heaven after death, where they spend their time bathing and sitting at ease, and enjoy happiness; while the bad go to hell, where they are tormented with wounds and fire until the deity is pleased to release them. How much of these beliefs is original and how much has been derived from Hindu, Musalmān, or even Christian sources, it is impossible to say. By other accounts they seem to believe in a Supreme Being, with whom Lāl Beg is only an intercessor. They are said also to have family-gods (*kuldeo*), whose names they never divulge, and to whom offerings are made on holidays, and at births and deaths in the family. Possibly this is a form of ancestor-worship. In the Jālandhar district Vālmīki is said to be known as Bālā Shāh, and his shrine is surmounted by five small pillars, on which lamps are lighted every Thursday. When the spring harvest is gathered in, the Chūhrās assemble at his shrine, slay a black ram, and prepare a quantity of bread. On these they feast, presenting part of the food to the deity, and making offerings of cloth and small coins, which are taken by the attendant at the shrine.

In the Panjāb, when Chūhrās adopt the Sikh faith, they are known as Maẕhabī, 'the religious.' These Maẕhabī Sikhs form a valuable element in the Indian army. They, like all converts, are particularly scrupulous in religious matters, but most Sikhs of other castes keep them at a distance. When a Chūhrā is circumcised and becomes a Muhammadan, he is ordinarily known by the title of Muṣallī, 'the righteous,' or Kotānā. But the faith of Islām sits lightly upon such people, and their religious fervour largely depends upon the price of grain. When times are good, the Chūhrā adopts Islām, and is admitted to the privilege of smoking with Muhammadans. When times change for the worse, and he is in straits to find a living, he often relapses into his original Chūhrā beliefs, because he thus gains a wider range of diet, being allowed to eat carrion and lizards. If times improve, he again repeats the Musalmān creed (*kalima*), and becomes again a Muṣallī.

LITERATURE.—For Bengal, Wise, *Notes on the Races, Castes, and Trades of Eastern Bengal*, 1883, 338 ff.; for the United Provinces, Greeven, *Heroes Five*, 1898; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, 1896, i. 259; *Popular Religion and Folk-lore*, 1896, i. 205 ff.; for the Panjāb, Maclagan, *Panjāb Census Report*, 1891, i. 200 ff.; Temple, *Legends of the Panjāb*, vol. i., 1884, *passim*; Purser, *Settlement Report of Jālandhar District*, 52 f., quoted in *North*

Indian Notes and Queries, ii. 164 *f.*; *Punjab Notes and Queries*, iv. 203 *f.*; for Western India, *Central India Census Report*, 1901, i. 88; *Rajputana Census Report*, 1901, i. 140.

W. CROOKE.

BHARHUT or **BHARAHUT** (the proper form of the name seems to be Barhut, but some write it Bharaut and Barāhat).—A village situated in Baghelkhand, 95 miles S.W. of Allāhābād, in Northern India, famous as the site of the great Buddhist *stūpa* discovered here by Cunningham in 1873. The *stūpa*, circular in form, was surrounded by a splendid carved railing with four openings towards the four cardinal points. It was thus divided into four quadrants, each of which consisted of sixteen pillars, joined by three crossbars, and covered by a massive stone coping. At each entrance the rail was extended, to form, as Cunningham believed, a gigantic *swastika*, or mystic cross. On each side was a splendid ornamental arch, or *toraṇa*. The medallions of these pillars are filled with most interesting sculptures—compositions of lotus and other flowers, and a number of scenes derived from Buddhist legend and history. Many of these represent scenes taken from the Jātakas, of which some twenty have been identified by Subhūti, Rhys Davids, and Hultzsch. Perhaps the most interesting of all is that of the Jetavana monastery at Srāvastī, recording the purchase of Jeta's garden by Anāthapindika, who covered the surface of the ground with gold pieces (Hardy, *Manual of Budhism*[2], 1880, p. 219; Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, 1884, p. 28). One bas-relief appears to represent a scene in the life of Rāma, which is supposed by Cunningham to be by far the earliest notice which we possess of the great solar hero and his wife. The sculptures, which extend over about a century, are particularly interesting as illustrating the dress and social and domestic life of the people of Northern India in the period after the death of Alexander the Great. They have been discussed by Grunwedel (*Buddhist Art in India*, 1901, 23, 40 ff., 141).

Images of the Buddha are wholly absent from the older sculptures at Sānchī and Bhārhut.

'Even in cases where the presence of the Lord must be presumed, it is indicated by symbols—footprints, a wheel, a seat, or altar, above which is an umbrella with garlands A scene on the sculptures of Bhārhut represents Ajātaśatru kneeling before the footprints of the Lord, whereas the inscription distinctly says: "Ajātaśatru pays his homage to the Lord"' (Kern, *op. cit.* 94).

Among the numerous sculptures, there are no naked figures, as at Sānchī and Mathurā. All, and especially the women, are well clad, and their heads are generally covered with richly figured cloths or brocades. One gateway and a portion of the railing have been removed to the Indian Museum at Calcutta.

Cunningham assigns the *stūpa* to the Aśoka period, somewhere between B.C. 250 and 200. Hultzsch reads an inscription mentioning the Sungas, successors of the Maurya dynasty, on a pillar erected by Vātsī or Vāchhīputra Dhanabhūti, which gives a date in the 2nd or 1st cent. B.C.

LITERATURE.—**Cunningham**, *The Stūpa of Bharhut: a Buddhist Monument Ornamented with Numerous Sculpture Illustrations of Buddhist Legend and History in the Third Century B C*, 1879; **Fergusson**, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, 1899, 84 *f.*; **Hultzsch**, *Indian Antiquary*, xiv. 138 *f.*, xxi. 225; **Hoernle**, *ib.* x. 118 ff., xi. 25 ff.; **Anderson**, *Handbook of the Archæological Collections in the Indian Museum*, pt. i. (1883) 1 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BHĀṬ, CHĀRAṆ (the former from Skr. *bhaṭṭa*, a respectful term applied to a Brāhman or man of high caste, probably connected with *bhartṛ*, 'bearer,' 'master'; the latter, Skr. *chāraṇa*, 'a wanderer,' 'a singer').—The caste of family bards and panegyrists, found throughout Northern India, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 385,993, of whom 52,164 were described as Muhammadans, and the remainder as Hindus, with a small minority professing the Sikh and Jaina faiths. Tod compares them with the Belgic genealogist of Gibbon who 'riots in all the lust of fiction, and spins from his own bowels a lineage of some thousand years.' The Bhāṭs are most numerous in the United Provinces, but they are found in smaller bodies all over Northern India, and a few have penetrated as far south as Hyderābād. The Chāraṇs, again, numbering at the same Census 74,014, are practically all Hindus by religion, and are mostly confined to the Presidency of Bombay and the province of Rājputāna.

Bhāṭs are generally supposed to be descended from a Kṣatriya father and a Brāhman widow. They have been connected by Nesfield with 'those secularized Brāhmans who frequented the courts of princes and the camps of warriors, recited their praises in public, and kept records of their genealogies.' But to this Risley objects that if the Bhāṭs of the present day are descended from a class of degraded Brāhmans, if, in other words, they are a homogeneous offshoot from the priestly class, it is difficult to understand how they come to have a number of sections which are not Brāhmanical and which appear to resemble rather the territorial groups common among Rājputs. There is no exact parallel to this supposed case of Brāhmans, however degraded, shedding their characteristic series of eponymous sections, and adopting those of another type. On the other hand, there is nothing improbable in the conjecture that Rajputs also may have become bards to the chiefs of their tribe, and Risley is inclined to regard them as a heterogeneous group made up of Brāhmans and Rājputs, welded into a single caste by virtue of their exercising identical functions. He grants, however, that the inviolability of the Bhāṭ's person, accepted in Western India towards the end of the 18th cent., tells in favour of their Brāhmanical origin, 'while the theory of Roth and Zimmer, that the first germ of the Brāhman caste is to be sought in the singers of Vedic times, may perhaps be deemed to tell in the same direction.'

1. *Religion of the United Provinces Bhāṭs.*—In the United Provinces those Bhāṭs who profess Hinduism are Hindus of the most orthodox kind, being by sect generally Vaishnavas or worshippers of Vishnu, or Saktas, followers of the Mother-goddesses. But in addition to the god peculiar to their sect they worship other gods—Siva in the form of Gaurīpati, *i.e.* 'lord of Gaurī,' 'the white one' (a title of his consort Pārvatī), Barē Bīr, Mahābīr, and Sārdā. Barē Bīr, 'the great hero,' seems to be the ghost of some deified worthy of the tribe. He is honoured by making a plastered square in the courtyard, and placing within it a lighted lamp. Mahābīr, 'the great hero,' is another name for Hanumān, the monkey-god. He is worshipped by painting a representation of him with red lead upon a brass tray, before which cakes, sweetmeats, and other bloodless offerings are laid. Sārdā is a corruption of the name of the goddess Sarasvatī, the patron of learning and eloquence, who naturally is worshipped by a caste of bards. Side by side with this worship of the orthodox kind they have adopted some of the local Animistic beliefs, as is shown by the cult of Birtiyā, for whose worship they employ a priest from the degraded Chamar or currier caste, who sacrifices a young pig, buries the head in the earth, and carries off the rest of the flesh as his perquisite. In other districts of the same Provinces they worship the Mother-goddess, Bhavānī or Devī, particularly when epidemic disease prevails.

2. *Religion in Bengal.*—In Bihār their religion differs little from that of the average middle-class Hindu, representatives of all the regular sects being found among them; and the caste as a whole cannot be said to favour the tenets of any particular sect. In Eastern Bengal, however, they are said to be mostly Sākti-worshippers. In Bengal, as in the United Provinces, they retain traces of primitive Animism in the worship of minor gods, who are propitiated with sacrifices of he-goats, with offerings of wheat, sweetmeats, coloured cloth, and vermilion, the eatable portions of the offerings being divided among the members of the household.

3. *Inviolability of Bhāṭs and Chāraṇs.*—One peculiarity common to both Bhāṭs and Chāraṇs is their inviolability—a belief based on the combina-

tion in them of the duty of herald with that of bard, a principle as old as the days of Homer, when Odysseus spares Phemius, the bard (ἀοιδός) (*Od.* xxii. 331). It is principally from West India that the stories come of what is called *trāgā*, that is to say, the custom of self-wounding or suicide performed by members of this caste when exposed to attack while in charge of treasure or entrusted with other responsible duties. In almost every part of Kāthiāwār, at the entry of villages, are to be seen the *pāliyā*, or guardian stones, erected in honour of Chāran men and women who killed themselves to prevent the capture of cattle, or to enforce their restoration by the predatory Kāthi tribe. The names of the victims, with the date and circumstances of their death, are recorded on the stones, and a rude sculpture shows the method in which the sacrifice was performed, the man generally killing himself on horseback with sword or spear; the woman transfixing her throat with a dagger. In this part of the country the Chārans have now somewhat fallen from their high estate on account of permitting widow remarriage and worshipping the local Mothers, Khodiyār, 'the mischievous one,' or Āsāpūrā, 'she that accomplishes desires.'

LITERATURE.—For Bengal, see Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, 1891, i. 101; for the United Provinces, Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, ii. 25; for Rājputāna, *Rajputana Census Report*, 1901, i. 141; for Bombay, Wilson, *Indian Caste*, ii. 179 ff., *Gazetteer*, xiii. 135 ff.; for the Muhammadan branch of the caste, *North Indian Notes and Queries*, ii. 67.

W. CROOKE.

BHĪLS.—1. Introduction.—The Bhīls (Skr. *Bhilla*, which Caldwell [*Dravidian Grammar*², 464] believes to represent the Dravidian *Billa*, 'bowman,' from *vil*, *bil*, 'bow') are one of the non-Aryan races of India, usually included under the unsatisfactory name 'Dravidian,' inhabiting the hilly country in the West and Central parts of the Peninsula. They seem to have been the chief of a group of tribes occupying a large portion of the hill country, now included in Mewār, Mālwā, Khāndesh, and Gujarāt. In the early Sanskrit writings they appear to be included under the names Pulinda and Nishāda, general terms applied to the non-Aryan races when they came in contact with the lighter-coloured race from the north. They have been identified with the Phyllitai (Φυλλῖται) of Ptolemy (VII. i. 66; McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, 159 f.), a term which, like the Skr. *Parna-śavara*, seems to have been used to denote the 'leaf-clad' non-Aryan tribes, now represented by the Juāngs of Chotā Nāgpur, in the Vindhyan and Sātpura ranges, which stretch westward from the Gulf of Cambay to the lower Ganges valley. Their predominance during early times in W. India is implied in the fact that in many States in Rājputāna, Mālwā, and Gujarāt, when a Rājput chief succeeds to the throne, his brow is marked with blood drawn from the toe or thumb of a Bhīl, by which he secures blood-covenant with the early lords of the country, and the protection of their priesthood against the local evil spirits. The right of giving the blood is claimed by certain families, and the fact that the person from whose veins the blood flows is believed to die within a year fails to damp their zeal for the maintenance of the custom (*Trans. RAS* i. 69). At the Census of 1901 the Bhīls numbered 1,198,843, of whom 569,842 were found in the Bombay Presidency, 339,786 in Rājputāna, and 206,934 in the States of Central India. These, the three principal groups, differ to some degree in religion, custom, and culture, and may be conveniently treated separately.

2. Legends of origin.—As a whole, the Bhīls seem to have preserved little tribal tradition; and, of course, they possess no tribal literature. Their legendary lore, as we find it, is intended to explain their present degraded condition. The most common account of their origin tells that Mahādeva (Śiva), sick and unhappy, was one day reclining in a shady forest, when a beautiful woman appeared, the first sight of whom effected a complete cure of all his maladies. The intercourse between the god and this stranger resulted in the birth of many children. One of the sons, who was from infancy distinguished alike by his ugliness and vicious habits, slew the favourite bull of his father, for which crime the angry deity cursed him and expelled him from the haunts of men to dwell in the woods and mountains. His descendants have ever since been known as Bhīls and Nishādas—terms that denote outcasts (Malcolm, *Mem. of C. India*², i. 518 f.; A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā* [1878], 78 ff.).

3. Bombay branch.—These clans are found in various parts of Gujarāt, as well as in the wild region of N. Khāndesh and the Dāng forests, where they form one of the most wide-spread and characteristic forest tribes. Their occupation in Gujarāt, which is typical of the tribe in other districts, is that of peasants, labourers, woodmen, and watchmen. When they cultivate, they follow the custom of periodically burning down patches of jungle, and sowing coarse grain crops in the ashes; others collect catechu and similar forest produce, while the women gather fruits and wild berries as food. Many of them still maintain their reputation as thieves and cattle-lifters, which is often noticed by the Muhammadan historians and by the writers of reports in the early period of British rule (*BG* ix. pt. i. 300, iii. 219, vi. 27). It is said that the Bhīl is more truthful than the high-caste Hindu; but this is doubtful. In Gujarāt, when a Bhīl is being sworn as a witness, he is seated with his face towards the sun, with a handful of grain bound in the hem of his garment, and a handful of dust laid on his head; he must then walk twice or thrice round the horse-image of the god Bābā, and swear by the cushion on which the chief of his clan sits (*ib.* ix. pt. i. 300 n.). Their system of agriculture and the dread of witchcraft prevent the establishment of settled villages; and their rude, sometimes round, huts are scattered through the jungle which they occupy. Their dress is extremely scanty; but the women ornament themselves with much rude jewellery. In Khāndesh the hill Bhīls are catholic in their diet, eating various kinds of grain, vegetables, forest fruits and berries, fish, goat's flesh or mutton, carrion, animals that have died by a natural death, and probably in remote places the flesh of the cow (*ib.* xii. 85).

They fall into two main divisions: (1) those who are partly Rājput, inhabit the plains where they have in some cases acquired Rājput status, and adopt Rājput names for their clans; and (2) the more or less pure Bhīls, who occupy the more inaccessible tracts (*ib.* ix. pt. i. 295). This distinction of culture affects their religion, that of the Rājput Bhīls corresponding to the Hindu rule, that of the jungle branch preserving more of the primitive animistic beliefs. Thus, in Khāndesh the wildest clans worship only Vāghdev, the tiger-god, who, under the kindred titles of Bāgheśvar (Skr. *Vyāghra-īśvara*, 'tiger-lord') or Banrājā (Skr. *vana-rāja*, 'lord of the wood'), is worshipped by the allied tribes in the hill ranges west of the Bhīl country (*PR* ii. 213). Some who are more influenced by Hinduism worship Mātā, the Mother-goddess, and Mahādeva or Śiva; while some, again, who are more civilized, worship the ordinary local Hindu deities, such as Khaṇḍoba, Śītalā Mātā, the smallpox Mother-goddess, and

others (*ib.* xii. 93). In Gujarāt the branch of the tribe which claims kinship with Rājputs worships specially Kālikā Mātā, the Mother-goddess, in her more awful form. Here the jungle-dwelling Bhīl worships hardly any of the orthodox deities, except Devī, the impersonation of the female energy. But when he visits her temple, contrary to his usual practice, he releases, after dedication, the victim which he offers to her. According to Enthoven, the Mātā, or Mother-goddesses, are represented by symbols rather than by images—by wooden posts, earthen horses, wicker baskets, and winnowing fans (*Bombay Census Rep.* 1901, i. 63). This appears to be a local development, as the cult of the horse seems elsewhere to be connected with that of ancestors. The jungle Bhīl respects Muhammadan shrines, and makes offerings to Muhammadan saints. Besides this, he retains many of the primitive animistic beliefs. He reverences the moon and swears by it; but he chiefly worships spirits and ghosts. This worship is usually performed in high places, the shrine consisting of a pile of stones on the summit of a hill, where he occasionally makes a blood-offering to appease the spirits of evil. In the forest, near an old tree or spring, often at some spot selected by mere chance, but which he believes to be the haunt of spirits, he offers rude earthenware images of horses, jars, and beehive-shaped vessels. The horse-images seem among the non-Aryan tribes to be intended as steeds on which the spirits of the dead may ride to heaven; and the jars and other vessels are regarded as the abodes of spirits. We thus find a crude ancestor-cult attached to the animistic beliefs. The ritual of the death rites shows that the tribe recognizes, in a vague way, the existence of the soul after death. When the *rāval*, or death priest, comes to preside over the death feast, by which food is conveyed to the souls of the dead, he brings with him two small brass images, one said to represent the horse of the moon, the other a cow and calf. The latter having been placed in a pool of milk, the death chant is sung, after which the cow-image is laid on the ground. The horse-image, which is usually made out of the anklets of the widow, is presented to the *rāval* at the close of the obsequies (*BG* ix. pt. i. 304 f.). The purport of the rite is obscure; but it seems to be intended that the cow and horse, by a process of magic, may be placed at the service of the ghost of the deceased. When the spirits of the forest are being worshipped, beams are raised, poised on two uprights sometimes 12 ft. high, which the officiant mounts to sacrifice a goat or a cock (*ib.* ix. pt. i. 301). This form of 'ladder sacrifice' is found in other parts of India. It is used by the Musahars of Bengal in the worship of the *bīr*, or malignant spirits, and by the Dosādhs of the United Provinces in eclipse observances (Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, ii. 11; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, ii. 355). In Upper Burma, a man who aspires to become a diviner has to climb a ladder and sit on a platform set with sharp spikes; if he receives no injury, his powers are recognized (J. Anderson, *Mandalay to Momien*, 1876, p. 81). In Khāndesh the Bhīls suppose that spirits reside in stones, which are smeared with red lead (a substitute for a blood-offering) and with oil. An animal sacrifice and an oblation of spirits are sometimes made at such stones, portions of which are thrown into fire in the belief that the demons delight in the sweet savour, after which the worshippers and their priest consume the flesh and liquor (*BG* xii. 93). Animal-worship, except the reverence paid to the horse, is not common. Ghoṛā Dev, 'the horse-god,' is a general object of worship. In Gujarāt, if a prayer has been granted, clay images of horses are made, and placed round the shrine-image or in the spirit haunt; and in many of their legends the plot turns on the assistance given by an enchanted horse. Only the clans most under the influence of Hinduism kill neither the cow nor the blue bull (*Portax pictus*); the jungle-dwellers have no reverence for the cow, kill it, and eat its flesh. There are no signs of snake-worship. They have a firm belief in omens of the 'meeting' class, which are usually associated with animals (*JAI* ix. 400; *Asiatic Quart. Rev.* vii. 461 f.).

4. Festivals.—In Gujarāt their festivals are chiefly connected with the ancestor-cult. The only regular Hindu festivals which they observe are those of the spring equinox (Holī, Shimgā), and the autumn equinox (Dasahra), and the feast of lights (Divāli) at the full moon in October–November. The first two, which are in origin forms of sympathetic magic to promote the growth and ripening of the crops, are accompanied with rude merriment and indecency (*GB*[2] iii. 306). At the Holī they celebrate, possibly with the object of expelling evil spirits, a mock fight between men and women—an incident witnessed and described by Bishop Heber among the branch of the tribe in Central India (*Narrative of a Journey*, 1861, ii. 86 f.; *GB*[2] iii. 95 ff.; *PR* ii. 176, 321). At the same feast some clans, as is the case in N. India, practise the rite of walking through a trench filled with burning embers, without, it is said, injury to the performers (*BG* vi. 29, xii. 93 n.; *PR* ii. 317).

At the Divālī, or feast of lights, they make a thanksgiving to the gods near the shed of the cattle, the protection of which is the main object of the feast. The ground near the shed is cleaned and a small circle is made with rice. In this circle seven balls of boiled rice or maize are placed on seven leaves. A fire is lighted and fed with butter. A man, generally the house-master, lays his hands on five chickens, throws water over them, and offers them, saying, 'O Dharma Indra! We offer this sacrifice to thee! During the coming year keep our cattle free from disease, increase them and be kindly!' At the same time another man cuts the throats of the fowls. A third man sprinkles spirituous liquor on the ground, saying, 'O Dharma Indra! we pour this spirit to thee!' The cattle, with their horns painted red, are then let out of the shed, those of the headman leading the way. All are driven over the body of a Bhīl, who lies on the ground face downwards. This is probably a survival of an actual rite of human sacrifice. The invocation of Indra shows the influence of Hinduism; but the rite is part of the primitive Animism.

At the Dasahrā feast they sow barley in a dish full of earth, and keep it watered and tended for nine days, after which it is offered to the goddess Devī—a magical rite found in other parts of the world, which has been described by Frazer under the title of 'the Gardens of Adonis' (*BG* ix. pt. i. 305 ff.; Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*[2], 194 ff.).

When rain holds off and scarcity is feared, the women go with bows and arrows to the shrine of the village-goddess, abuse her, smear her image with filth,* and leap and dance; finally, they raid a neighbouring village, seize a buffalo, the owner seldom offering resistance, and drive it back to their own village, where it is beaten to death with clubs, and the flesh shared among the raiders. They say that the intention is to shame the gods into pity, and to convince them how hard the times must be when the women are compelled to resort to acts of violence (*BG* ix. pt. i. 311). When epidemic disease prevails, asses are made to plough a piece of ground (an unnatural act intended to call the attention of the gods to their troubles), and a small cart is placed before the shrine of the god who is supposed to have been offended at some neglect, and to have brought the pestilence. The cart is then believed to move of its own accord, and accompanied by a scape animal, a goat or buffalo, carries the plague beyond the limits of the village (*ib.* ix. pt. i. 311).

5. Priesthood.—Except among those clans which are subject to Hindu influence, Brāhmans take no part in the public or domestic rites. The exorcist, whose duty it is to propitiate the malignant gods

* For a remarkable case of obscene ritual cursing of a goddess, see the account of the Gangammā festival in Malabar (*Bulletin Madras Museum*, iii. 267 f.).

and spirits, is known as the *bhagat* (Skr. *bhakta*, 'worshipper'). His reputation depends on his occasionally becoming possessed by the Mother-goddess, when he mutters and shakes, foams at the mouth, eats raw flesh or drinks blood, and pretends to know both the past and the future. The Rājā of the Bāriyā State, in the Agency of Rīwākāṇṭha, holds a feast every twelve years in honour of a god known as Bābā Dev, 'divine father,' on the Devgad hill, when a Bhīl *bhagat* becomes possessed by the god, and foretells the condition of the crops and the fortunes of the Rājā's family (*ib.* vi. 29 f.). The duties of the *bhagat* are to consecrate household gods, to perform tribal and family rites, to secure the fertility of the crops, to heal the sick, and to thwart the machinations of enemies. In cases of sickness, he places grains of black gram (*Phaseolus mungo*) or rice on a leaf, which he passes round the head of the patient. By examining the grains, he decides whether the sick man has been attacked by an evil spirit or by one of his offended dead ancestors. The latter usually appear in the form of human beings, but sometimes in that of a bear or other wild beast. When their worship is neglected, they show their anger by throwing stones or sticks at their descendants, or by pinching them at night. They can be appeased by making an offering at their graves. The attack of an evil spirit is treated by means of incantations, and striking the patient gently with the branch of a tree. The *bhagat* is also the witch-finder; and in former times, before the period of British rule, witches were subjected to cruel ordeals, tortured, or even killed (*ib.* ix. pt. i. 302). The second class of priests is the *rāval* (Skr. *rājakula*, 'royal family'), a title, like that of the *bhagat*, obviously of Hindu origin, replacing the name of the original medicine-man. His chief duty is to preside over the funeral feast, and to propitiate the deceased ancestors. The dead are buried in deep graves or under stone cairns, the intention being to prevent the return of the ghost. On the return from the grave a fire is lit in the house of the dead man, and into it some woman's hair is sometimes dropped (cf. Frazer, *Pausanias*, iv. 136 f.). The death tabu is finally removed by the mourners passing their hands and feet through fragrant smoke, and by washing the shoulders of the corpse-bearers with a mixture of oil, milk, cow-dung, and cow-urine (*BG* xii. 91 f.).

'In the case of the decease of a Bhīl of importance, it is not uncommon for the grave in which he has been interred to be opened some two months after burial, the opening being only sufficient to disclose the head of the corpse. The wasted features thus brought to light are anointed with red lead in the same manner as the irregular shaped stones which are common objects of worship among this primitive people.* After anointment the deceased is worshipped, and the grave is then re-closed. Without this ceremony the full rights of ancestorship are not, it is alleged, obtainable. The worshippers are by no means necessarily relations of the deceased' (*Bombay Census Rep.* 1901, i. 63).

6. Central Indian branch.—These inhabit principally the wild hilly tracts which separate Mālwā from Nimār and Gujarāt. According to Malcolm (*Memoir of Central India*[2], ii. 181), their religious rites are confined to 'propitiatory offerings and sacrifices to some of the Hindu infernal deities,' especially Sītalā Mātā, the smallpox Mother; they also pay reverence to Mahādeva, from whom they claim descent. The Barwānī sept, which is one of the most primitive, is said to have a well-defined system of sept totems, each sept reverencing a special tree or animal. If the totem be a tree, they never cut or injure it; men bow when passing it, and women veil their heads. The tribal *tatu*, however, is said never to be a representation of the totem. Luard (*Central India Census Rep.* 1901, i. 197 ff.), who gives this account, adds that, 'as a rule, some spirit is supposed to live in the tree or other object.' It may be suspected that we have here an instance of confusion between totemism and tree- or animal-worship.

7. Rājputāna branch.—The religion of this branch has been fully described by T. H. Hendley (*JRASBe* xliv. [1875] 347 ff.). In the Mewār hills their primitive beliefs have been, to some extent, affected by Brāhmanism. Their shrines are cairns, erected on high hills, and containing clay or pottery images of the horse. Over these, poles adorned with rags are erected. Beside these are platforms of stone, on which are placed upright slabs, generally plain, or merely named after a god, and daubed with red paint or carved in the shape of Hanumān, the monkey-god. Their favourite deities are Śiva, or Mahādeva, and his consort in her various forms as Pārvatī, Devī, or Mātā, of whom Hendley (*op. cit.* p. 349) gives a list. One of them, known as Vājar Mātā, is specially worshipped by women who desire offspring. The tombs of Muhammadan holy men are also respected. Sacrifices consist of goats offered to Devī or Mātā, the flesh, after dedication, being eaten by the worshippers. The influence of Hinduism is shown in the fact that their priests are drawn from the Hindu ascetic Yogī order.

'The Bhīl has a very dim idea of a future state. He believes the soul goes before the gods, and that the spirits of the dead haunt places they lived in during life. He also holds that there is a limited transmigration of souls, especially in spirits becoming evil ones. Eclipses and the motions of the heavenly bodies are deemed to be the play of their gods, and they howl with the Hindu when the moon is eclipsed' (*ib.* 350). No tombs or cenotaphs are constructed; 'but a few days after death a relative of the deceased is said to be informed in a dream that the spirit has taken up its abode on a neighbouring hill, whereupon friends and connexions proceed to the place and erect a platform of stones, and leave there a quantity of food and liquor' (*ib.* 354).

According to Bannerman (*Census Rep.* 1901, i. 142), besides the Kul-devī, or family-goddess, Mahādeva and Hanumān, the monkey-god, are everywhere worshipped. In parts of Mewār, Rishabnāth (*i.e.* Rishabhadeva, the first Jaina Tīrthakara, or perfected saint) is worshipped by the Bhīls—a proof of the widely spread influence of that religion in W. India in mediæval times.

LITERATURE.—i. For Bombay branch: MS report by S. N. Dholakia, Magistrate, Idar State; *BG* ix. pt. i. 294 ff., xii. 80 ff., iii. 218 ff., and numerous other articles detailed in General Index, xxvii. 56; R. E. Enthoven, *Census Rep* 1901, i. 62 ff.; A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā* (1878), 78 ff.; G. Oppert, *Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarśa or India* (1893), 79 ff.; W. H. Sinclair, *IA* iv. 335 f.

ii. For Central Indian branch: Sir J. Malcolm, *Trans. RAS* i. 69 ff., and *Memoir of Central India*[2] (1824), i. 516, 550, ii. 181; Col. Kincaid, 'Bheel Tribes of the Vindhyan Range,' in *JAI* ix. 397 ff.; E. E. Luard, *Cent. Ind. Census Rep.* 1901, i. 197 f.

iii. For Rājputāna: T. H. Hendley, 'An Account of the Marwār Bhīls,' *JRASBe* xliv. (1875) 347 ff.; A. D. Bannerman, *Census Rep.* 1901, i. 142; *Rajputana Gazetteer* (1879), i. 117 ff., iii. 64, 114.

W. CROOKE.

8. Language.—Bhīls are usually credited with possessing a special language of their own, which has been named *Bhīlī*. It is probable that these wild tribes did once speak a language belonging to the Dravidian or to the Muṇḍā family, but they have long since abandoned it. At the present day they speak a mongrel form of the Gujarātī spoken by their more civilized Aryan neighbours to their west. Their speech varies according to locality, and, in the District of Khāndesh, in the Bombay Presidency, has become mixed with Marāthī, the fusion of the two main languages resulting in a well-marked and interesting dialect known as Khāndēśī.

The general Bhīl jargon has some peculiarities of pronunciation which it shares with the dialects of North Gujarāt and, through them, with other languages of the extreme North-West of India, from Sind to the Hindu Kush. These are the pronunciation of *s* as a rough *h*, as in *hōnō* for *sōnḡ*, 'gold'; the tendency to disaspiration and to harden soft

* For similar customs in India see those of the Maravan and Uralī of Madras (*FL* v. 36; Thurston, *Ethnographic Notes*, 202), the Khāsī (*JAI* i. 131), and the people of Nicobar (*ib.* xxxii. 209, 220 f.).

mutes, as in *kōdō* or *khōdō* instead of *ghōdō*, 'a horse,' *līṭō* for *līdhō*, 'taken,' *ṭāhī* or *dāhī*, 'a cow'; and the frequent elision of a medial *r*, as in *kōi* for *kōri* or *kari*, 'having done,' *dūu* for *dūru*, 'far.' These peculiarities, although striking, and possibly giving clues to ethnologists, do not authorize us to class the so-called *Bhīlī* as an independent language.

LITERATURE.—C. S. Thompson, *Rudiments of the Bhili Language* (Ahmedābād, 1895); G. A. Grierson and S. Konow, *Linguistic Survey of India*, vol. ix. pt. iii., *The Bhil Languages and Khandēśī* (Calcutta, 1907).

G. A. GRIERSON.

BHĪLSA.—Bhīlsa is the name of a village in Central India. The name has been applied by Cunningham in the title of his book, *The Bhilsa Topes*, to the whole district, about 24° N. by 77° E., in which the village is situated. It is a hilly, well-watered district of considerable natural beauty. Cunningham, for instance (p. 320), speaking of the Satdhāra Hill, says:

'The hill on which the tope stands forms here a perpendicular cliff, beneath which flows the Besāli river through a deep rocky glen The view up the river is one of the most beautiful I have seen in India.'

He then describes the view; and has similar remarks (p. 342) on the beauty of the view from the Andherī Hill. As the principal summit was called Chetiya-Giri, 'the Shrine Hill' (*Mahāvamsa*, xiii. 5), and Chetiya is used of pre-Buddhistic shrines, it was probably already, before the Buddhist movement, the site of one of those sacred places on the hill-tops where tribal festivals used to be held. If that be so, this may have been one of the reasons which led the Buddhists to choose the peak as the site of their hermitages, and of their religious and educational establishments.

This main summit is now called Sānchī (*q.v.*). Remains have also been found at Sonāri, Satdhāra, Bhojpur, and Andhēr. At Sonāri there are two large square terraces, one on the top of the hill, and one a little lower down, the sides of which are each 240 ft. in length, and one a little lower down, the sides of which are 165 ft. in length. The centre of the larger terrace was occupied by a solid hemispherical dome, or tope, 48 ft. in diameter, rising from a cylindrical plinth 4 ft. in height. At the height of about 30 ft. the top of the dome was level and surrounded by a stone railing now broken away. The remains of it were found by Cunningham at the foot of the dome. Cunningham sank a shaft down the centre of the dome, but found nothing. The original height, including that of the ornamental structure which occupied the centre of the levelled space at the top of the dome, must have been about 50 feet. Outside the S.W. corner of this square terrace on which the dome stood was a solid square pile of masonry, level at the top, from 12 to 15 ft. high according to the undulations of the ground, and measuring 36 ft. along each side. A flight of steps 4½ ft. wide leads from the hillside to the summit. This was evidently the site for a building of some sort, no doubt constructed entirely of wood, as nothing remains to show for what purpose it was intended. Round the foot of the dome ran a paved processional pathway enclosed by a carved stone railing, with gates at the four cardinal points. Both this and the railing round the top were of white stone brought from a distance. The tope itself was built of the claret-coloured stone found on the Sonāri Hill. There are short dedicatory inscriptions on portions of the lower railing, cut in Pāli characters of approximately the 3rd cent. B.C., giving the names of the donors of those portions.

The dome which occupied the lower terrace of 165 ft. square was of a slightly different construction. It was solid like the other, built of stone without mortar, 27½ ft. in diameter, rising from a plinth 4½ ft. in height, the plinth resting on a cylindrical foundation 12 ft. high. The level top of this foundation was reached by a fine double flight of steps, 20 ft. in breadth, leading on to a circular pathway, 6 ft. broad, running all round the dome. The height of the whole had been about 40 ft. from terrace to summit. There was no trace of any stone railing. On a shaft being sunk down the centre of the dome five relic-caskets were found, each inscribed with the name of the person of whose funeral pyre portions were enclosed in the casket. Two of these are names of missionaries who, according to the chronicles (*Dīpavamsa*, viii. 10, and *Mahāvamsa*, xii. 42), were sent to the Himālaya regions after the close of the Council at Patna, held in B.C. 254.

The discovery of these names was of the utmost importance for the criticism of the Buddhist chronicles written in Ceylon They are given in the inscriptions as those of missionaries to the Himālaya. Some centuries afterwards they are found in the chronicles in the list of the missions sent out, as those of the men who were sent to the Himālaya. The inscriptions, buried in Northern India, were, of course, unknown in Ceylon. The traditions handed down in the island were sufficiently well guarded to have preserved these details accurately throughout this long interval of time.

Besides these two great topes, there were on the top of the Sonāri Hill six smaller ones arranged in two rows to the south-east of the larger terrace. These had all been opened before Cunningham's visit in 1852, and he found nothing in them.

On the Satdhara Hill, three miles across the valley from Sonāri, there are seven topes remaining on as many terraces. The largest of these solid domes was no less than 101 ft. in diameter, and its height must have been approximately 75 feet. Nothing was found in it. There were three of the solid basements, such as the one found at Sonāri, on which must have stood other buildings probably made of wood. In a second, much smaller tope, 230 ft. to the N.N.W. of this huge pile, were found two caskets, empty, but inscribed with the names of Sāriputta and Mahā Moggallāna, the two principal disciples of Gautama the Buddha. A third tope had a diameter of 24 ft., and contained relic-caskets, but no inscription. Four smaller ones, all of which had been previously opened, contained nothing.

The topes at Bhojpur, which are very numerous, stand on the southern end of a low range of hills on the opposite side from Sonāri and Satdhāra of a broad valley through which flows the river Betwā. The largest stands in the centre of a levelled terrace, 252 ft. long by 214 ft. broad, and was 61 ft. in diameter. The next in size had a diameter of 39 feet. In a third of only 31 ft. diameter the relic-caskets bore names otherwise unknown. Cunningham examined 33 other topes on the slopes of this range of hills, but they had been previously opened; and nothing of importance, and no inscriptions, were found in them.

The Andherī topes are perched on the northern declivity of a pear-shaped hill facing Bhojpur across another valley. These are on the very edge of the cliff, about 500 ft. above the plain; and the position is a very fine one, commanding a wide outlook over the Bhīlsa district with its dome-surmounted peaks and fertile valleys. The topes are only three in number, respectively 35 ft., 19 ft., and 15 ft. in diameter. At each of them inscriptions were found, some of the names recurring also at Sānchī, and belonging to contemporaries of Aśoka. One of them is Moggali-putta, who may, or may not, be the same as the Moggaliputta Tissa who presided at Aśoka's Council at Patna, and who is the traditional author of the *Kathā Vatthu*, the latest book in the Buddhist Canon, and the only book in it which is ascribed to a particular author.

Aśoka, when on his way to take up the viceroyalty of Ujjain during the last years of his father's life, stayed in the Bhīlsa district, and married a local lady, daughter of a merchant at Vedisa named Deva. Three children were born to them; and then Aśoka succeeded to the throne on the death of his father. As the marriage was a *mésalliance* he left his wife behind, and she brought up the children. Two of them, Mahinda and his sister Saṅgha Mittā, were afterwards the famous missionaries who carried Buddhism to Ceylon. It is recorded how Mahinda, before he departed on the mission, went to Bhīlsa to take leave of his mother, and stayed there at a *vihāra* she had built (*Dīpavaṁsa*, xii. 8–34; *Mahāvaṁsa*, xiii. 1–14; *Samanta Pāsādikā*, p. 318 f.; *Mahābodhivaṁsa*, p. 115 f.).

It is sufficiently clear from these notices that the district was, in the 3rd cent. B.C., and probably earlier, an important centre of Buddhist activity. The massive terraces and solid topes are all that remain of the outward signs of this activity; but its intellectual results are still working in Ceylon, and in a less degree in the Himālaya regions.

LITERATURE. — *Dipavaṁsa*, ed. Oldenberg, London, 1879; *Mahavaṁsa*, ed. Geiger, London, *PTS*, 1908; *Samanta Pāsādikā*, ed. Oldenberg, in vol. iii. of his *Vinaya*; A. Cunningham, *The Bhilsa Topes*, London, 1854; Fergusson, *Hist. of Ind. and East. Architecture*, London, 1876, pp. 60–65; *Mahābodhi-vaṁsa*, ed. Strong, London, *PTS*, 1891; Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, 1903, pp 299 303.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

BHṚIGU.—The word *bhṛígu* occurs twenty-six times in the Rigveda,* always in the plural† except twice, where it is singular; and as each of the two passages in question is identical in purport with some other where the plural is used, it may be assumed that even as a singular the word has a collective force. Indian tradition, however,—to anticipate a little—interprets the sing. *bhṛígu* as denoting the ancestor of an ancient race of seers, and the plur. as denoting his descendants.

In the Rigveda the Bhṛigus are associated mainly with the legend of the acquisition of fire by the human race. The Bhṛigus, having discovered Agni in the bosom of the waters (ii. 4. 2; x. 46. 2), or having received him from Mātariśvan (i. 60. 1,‡ iii. 5. 10, x. 46. 9), introduced him amongst men (i. 58. 6, iii. 2. 4), deposited him in wood (vi. 15. 2), and caused him to become luminous in that substance (iv. 7. 1), bringing him forth either by friction (i. 127. 7, x. 46. 9, i. 143. 4) or by their songs (x. 122. 5).

In two passages (iv. 16. 20 and x. 39. 14) the Bhṛigus are referred to as waggon-builders: 'We have composed a song for Indra (or, for the Aśvins) [as skilfully] as the Bhṛigus [build] a waggon.'§ Roth's conjecture (*Pet. Worterb. s.v.* 'Bhṛigu'), that the word that stood originally in these passages was *ṛibhavo*, finds some support in Sāyaṇa (on x. 39. 14: *karmayogād ṛibhavo bhṛigava uchyante*), but the present writer believes that we have here the primitive nucleus of the legend, *i.e.* that *bhṛígu* was originally merely a name for a 'handicraftsman,' one of those who, working with wood, might quite naturally be the first to discover that that substance could be ignited by friction.

The other Rigveda passages‖ are rather colourless. The Bhṛigus appear as the sacrificers of remote antiquity, and along with the Angirases and Atharvans (x. 14. 6); people invoke Agni in the same manner as did the Bhṛigus,* Angirases, and Manu (viii. 43. 13). Indra is expected to help as he has helped the Bhṛigus and the Yatis (viii. 3. 9,† 6. 18; cf. 3. 16). They stand on an equality with the gods in viii. 35. 3 and x. 92. 10. A more personal aspect is shown in ix. 101. 13, where people are advised to drive away the niggardly dog, as the Bhṛigus [drive away] the Makha, but unfortunately we possess no further information regarding this Makha. We seem to have a historical reference in vii. 18. 6, where the Bhṛigus, along with the Druhyus, are spoken of as vassals‡ of King Sudās.

In the Atharvaveda *bhṛígu* is mentioned four times—once (xviii. 1. 58) in a strophe identical with one in the Rigveda. In iv. 14. 5 it is indefinite, merely saying that sacrificers should go to heaven along with the Bhṛigus. In ii. 5. 3 it is said that Indra clove the Vala asunder as Bhṛigu (nom.) conquered his enemy intoxicated with soma; in the same strophe the Yatis are again referred to (cf. above, Rigv. viii. 3. 9 and 6. 18), but, strange to say, it is stated here that Indra killed Vṛitra like the Yatis (acc.). The fourth passage (v. 19. 1), however, is a most interesting one: Sṛiñjayas, Vaitahavyas perished because they injured Bhṛigu. We shall return to this reference below.

In the later Vedic, as also in the epic literature, Bhṛigu stands forth as the progenitor of a celebrated family of priests; many of his posterity, the Bhṛigus—and Bhārgavas, 'scions of Bhṛigu'—are mentioned individually by name, and for the most part they enjoy a great reputation. Bhṛigu himself was held to be of Divine origin, as is attested by so ancient an authority as the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (cf. iii. 33–34): the seed of Prajāpati was cast into the fire by the gods, in order that it might not be spoilt; from that which first flamed forth arose Āditya (the sun); from the second (flame) came Bhṛigu, who was adopted by Varuṇa, and hence Bhṛigu is a son of Varuṇa; that which the third time flashed brightly forth (*adīdet*) became the Adityas, and that which the coals (*aṅgāra*) were became the Aṅgirases, etc. A similar story is told in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (i. 4. 5. 13) regarding the origin of Atri. Yāska (Nir. 3. 17) combines the two legends, saying that the first to arise from the beam (*archis*) of the fire was Bhṛigu,§ then Angiras from the coals (*aṅgāra*), and thirdly Atri from the same place.‖ The *Bṛihaddevatā* (v. 97–100) gives a similar version. In the *Mahābhārata* (xiii. 85. 96 ff.), Bhṛigu, Aṅgiras, Kavi, Marīchi, Kaśyapa, Atri, etc., are said to have sprung from seed of Brahman which had been cast into the fire.¶ According to the *Mahābhārata* (i. 66. 41), Bhṛigu was generated from the heart of Brahman, while in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (iii. 12. 23) he is said to have issued from Brahman's skin.

That Bhṛigu was adopted by Varuṇa is intimated also in the *Mahābhārata* (xiii. 85. 124; cf. i. 5. 8); and so he appears as Bhṛigu Vāruṇi in a legend (*Śatap.* xi. 6. 1. 1), which we shall narrate presently, in *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, ix. 1,** and in Kātyāyana's

* We leave out of account the word *bhṛigavāṇa*, which is at least cognate, and occurs thrice in the Rigveda, as its meaning is doubtful.

† *Bhṛiguvát* (Rigv. viii. 43. 13) is of course, as such, ambiguous, though Sāyaṇa explains it as *yathā bhṛiguḥ*

‡ *Bhṛigu* in the singular here.

§ The interpretations of x. 92. 10 given by Ludwig (*Der Rigveda*, 1876–88, i. 262, iv. 237): 'Fur Gotter durch Tuchtigkeit gelten allgemein die Bhrigu'; and by Macdonell (*Vedic Mythology*, 140): 'The Bhṛigus showed themselves as gods with their dexterity,' are unfortunately inadmissible, as the verb used here, *sam-chit*, bears a different meaning in other passages.

‖ Cf. Macdonell, *loc cit.*

* *Bhṛiguvát.* † *Bhṛígu* in the singular.

‡ In the opinion of the present writer, as vassals by compulsion.

§ Here derived from *bhṛijjati*, 'to roast': *bhṛijyamāno na dehe.*

‖ *Atraiva tṛitīyam ṛichhatīty ūchus tasmād Atriḥ* (*Śatapatha*, i. 4. 5. 13, *atreva tyad iti*).

¶ Cf. 13. 85. 105 f.: *bhṛig ity eva bhṛiguḥ pūrvam aṅgārebhyo 'ṅgirābhavat | aṅgārasaṁsrayāch chaiva kavir ity aparo 'bhavat | saha jvālābhir utpanno bhṛigus tasmād bhṛiguḥ smṛitaḥ.*

** The story in *Taitt. Brāhmaṇa*, i. 8. 2. 5, according to which Bhṛigu sprang from a third part of Indra's force, is a mere theological speculation, designed to support the idea that a Bhārgava must have been present as Hotṛi at the festival in question.

Anukr. to the Rigveda, which speaks of him, or Jāmadagni, as the composer of Rigveda ix. 65, and of him, or Chyavana, as the composer of x. 19 (both of these individuals being of Bhṛigu's line). Beyond this, the later Vedic texts add relatively very little to our information regarding Bhṛigu. All that is worthy of interest is the legend just alluded to (*Śatap.* xi. 6. 1. 1 ff.).* It is narrated here that Bhṛigu deemed himself wiser than his father Varuṇa, who, observing this, sent him upon a pilgrimage, on the understanding that on his return he should relate what he had seen. By Varuṇa's instructions he journeyed to all the four quarters of the earth. He met with dreadful things on every hand; he saw men cutting their fellow-men in pieces, and then distributing and devouring the fragments. When he asked them why they pursued such a course, he always received the same answer: 'These men dealt thus with us in the other world, and we now deal with them in the same way.' He also inquired if there was no possible reconciliation, and received the reply: 'Certainly; your father knows of it.' He comes at last to the region lying between the East and the South,† where he sees two women, one beautiful, the other passing beautiful,‡ and between them a black man with yellow eyes, and with a stick in his hand. Bhṛigu is terrified, and returns home. From his dejected condition Varuna perceives that he has 'seen,' and then (8 ff.) shows him the meaning of what he has seen. But the explanation is certainly a disappointing one from our point of view, being simply a piece of absurd symbolizing in regard to certain features of the Agnihotra festival.

Amongst other references to Bhṛigu in the Brāhmana literature we ought to mention *Kāuṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*, xxx. 5, where the Aitaśāyanas are spoken of as the worst of the Bhṛigus.§ In the earlier texts the Bhṛigus and the Angirases are closely connected, and *bhṛigvaṅgirasaḥ* indeed is actually used as a title of the Atharvaveda.‖ They are likewise often found together in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*. Apart from these notices, Bhṛigu is mentioned, along with Atri, Angiras, etc., mainly in the list of Brahmarṣis and patriarchs.¶ It is in these texts, of course, that he at length stands forth as in all respects a *Ṛiṣi* of primitive times, while in *Mahābhārata*, iii. 99. 69 and xii. 3. 19 he is even exalted to the Devayuga.

It is recorded, moreover, in the *Mahābhārata* (i. 5-7,** ix. 47. 17-22, xii. 343. 55) that Bhṛigu, incensed because his wife Pulomā had been betrayed into the hands of the Rakṣas Puloman by Agni, cursed the latter, and ordained that he must suffer the penalty of consuming everything, no option being allowed.†† Agni rebels against this, resigns his function,‡‡ and hides himself.§§ Gods and men, however, find him indispensable, institute a search, and discover him at length in his retreat. But Agni resumes his work only after Brahman has intervened with conciliatory words, and given the assurance that he is to be the devourer of all things, not with his whole body, but merely as the fire of digestion and as the consumer of flesh.* Here, therefore, the story of Agni's withdrawal, which is already alluded to in the Rigveda as a well-known fact, is associated, strangely enough, with a curse uttered by Bhṛigu, the Vedic myth regarding the discovery of fire (see above) being thus simply reversed.

The *Mahābhārata* in another passage (xii. 343. 62) also makes mention of a curse spoken by Bhṛigu. Umā, the daughter of Himavat, was loved by Rudra, but Bhṛigu also sought to win her. Himavat, however, had to reject the latter's advances, Rudra being already the accepted suitor.† Bhṛigu, enraged at this refusal, utters against Rudra the malediction that no precious stones shall be found in him, 'and to this day the word of the *Ṛiṣi* holds good.' Another legend tells how Bhṛigu, by means of a curse, rescues Agastya from the tyranny of Nahuṣa (xiii. 99-100).‡

These are all the really important myths relating to Bhṛigu himself, so far as found in the epic literature. There are numerous other legends, however, which relate to individual members of the Bhṛigu family. A special instance is the story of Chyavana, the son of Bhṛigu, which goes back even to the Rigveda;§ while Gṛitsamada, the author of the second *Maṇḍala*, ranks as a descendant of Bhṛigu.‖ As a recital of the various narratives in question, however, would go beyond the scope of this article, we confine ourselves to a congeries of myths which relate to the Bhṛigus in a general way, and which may, perhaps, throw light upon the passage in the Atharvaveda (v. 19. 1) cited above for further notice.

The following narrative is found in *Mahābhārata*, i. 178. 11 ff. (to the end of 180):

King Kārtavirya was lord of the sacrifice to the Bhṛigus, and used to load them with gifts. After his death his successors fell into penury, and began to importune the Bhṛigus for money. Only some of these, however, acceded to the request; others buried their money in the earth, while some, again, handed theirs to Brāhmans. Then the Kṣatriyas sought the money by digging, and, having discovered it, they were so moved with rage that they slew every Bhṛigu they could lay hands upon, not even sparing the child in the mother's womb. One of the women¶ held her yet unborn babe hidden on the haunch.** But the Kṣatriyas heard of the matter, and approached the mother with the design of killing the child. Then the child forced a way through the mother's side, stood forth before the assailants, and blinded them with the splendour of his appearance, thus forcing them to cry for mercy. In order to avenge the sufferings undergone by the Bhṛigus, Aurva resolved to blot the whole world out of existence, but was induced by the entreaties of his ancestors to sink the fire of his wrath in the depths of the ocean.††

Thus the massacre of the Brāhmanas, according to this legend, is followed by no expiation—a circumstance which is out of keeping with the normal scheme of such narratives, and in particular with the characterization of the Bhṛigus as specially revengeful.‡‡ It need not surprise us, therefore, that in other passages of the epic and the *Purānas* a great deal is said regarding the great extinction of the Kṣatriyas by the 'Bhārgava' Paraśurāma.§§

* See A. Weber, 'Eine Legende des Çatapatha-Brâhmaṇa über die strafende Vergeltung nach dem Tode,' *ZDMG* ix. 237-243.

† The passage is not altogether clear.

‡ *Atikalyāṇīm*, according to Sāyaṇa = *aśobhanā*, 'one whose beauty is past.'

§ *Bhṛiguṇāṁ pāpiṣṭhāḥ*.

‖ See Bloomfield, 'Hymns of the Atharva-Veda,' *SBE* xlii. p. xxvi ff.

¶ See the catalogue in Wilson, *Vishṇu-Purāṇa* (ed. Hall), i. 101 ff., iii. 68.

** *Bhṛiguvaṁśa* in the *Paulomā-parvan*.

†† i. 6. 14: *sarvabhakṣo bhaviṣyasi*; ix. 47. 22: *sarvabhakṣaś ca so'bhavat*; xii. 343. 55: *sarvabhakṣatvam upanītaḥ*.

‡‡ i. 7. 12: *chakre saṁhāram ātmanaḥ* (*ib.* 16: *kriyāsaṁhāram*).

§§ His hiding-place, let us note, was the *śamīgarbha*, i.e. an *aśvattha*-tree which grew in a *śamī* (cf. ix. 47. 17)—the tree whose wood was commonly used for producing fire by friction.

* Cf. i. 7. 19-26.

† A different experience was that of Puloman, who had made his suit to Pulomā before Bhṛigu did so. See *Mahābhārata*, i. 5.

‡ Cf. art. AGASTYA, i. 180 f.

§ Cf. Pischel, in Pischel-Geldner's *Vedische Studien*, i. 71 f.

‖ The Anukr. to the Rigveda makes mention of the following Bhārgavas as authors of hymns: Iṭa (x. 171), Kavi (ix. 47-49, 75-79), Kṛitnu (viii. 79), Gṛitsamada (ii. 1-3, 8-43, ix. 86 46-48), Chyavana (x. 19), Jamadagni (iii. 62. 16-18, viii. 101, ix. 62, 65, 67, 16-18, x. 110, 137. 6, 167), Nema (viii. 100), Prayoga (viii. 102), Vena (ix. 85, x. 123), Somāhuti (ii. 4-7), and Syūmaraśmi (x. 77-78).

¶ According to *Mahābhārata*, i. 66 46, this was *Āruṣī*, the daughter of Manu and the wife of Chyavana.

** *ūru*; whence the son received the name Aurva, 'risen from the haunch.'

†† Where it has ever since remained, as hell-fire (*vaḍavāmukha*, *vāḍavānala*, *aurva*; see also Harivaṁśa, 2554 ff.). We have here another case of a Bhṛigu connected with a fire-legend.

‡‡ Cf. also *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 92. 45. *bhṛigavo hy atiroṣaṇāḥ* | *loke mithyāpravādo'yam*.

§§ See especially *Mahābhārata*, iii. 116-117; and for the

It is alleged, however, in these passages that the original cause of the feud was that King Kārtavīrya (or his sons) had stolen a calf of the sacrificial cow of Jamadagni.* Paraśurāma, who happened to be absent at the time, learns of the atrocity on his return, and kills Kārtavīrya with an arrow. The sons of the latter avenge his death by slaying the aged Jamadagni. Then Paraśurāma takes an oath that he will extirpate the entire race of the Kṣatriyas, and 'thrice seven times did he clear the earth of the Kṣatriya caste.'†

Here, once more, the crime perpetrated against the offspring of Bhṛigu is a seizure of their property, and the culprits are again descendants of Kartavīrya. Now the latter are quite distinctly spoken of as kings of the Haihayas.‡ The Haihayas and the posterity of Kārtavīrya, however, include also the Tālajanghas,§ whom the Bhṛigus are reported to have conquered, as the Aṅgirases conquered the Nīpas, as Bhāradvāja the Vaitahavyas.‖ But the narrative in *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 30,¶ says that the Vaitahavyas, too, belonged to the Haihayas. Let us now examine the passage in Atharv. v. 19. 1: *bhṛigum himsitvā sṛñjayā vaitahavyāḥ párābhavan.* The idea at once suggests itself that the incident recorded here should perhaps be connected with the epic legends just referred to. In that case, however, the celebrated song in Atharv. v. 18, immediately preceding the passage before us, appears in an entirely new light. We cannot here discuss the matter in detail, but we may at least quote strophes 10–11:** 'They who ruled over a thousand, and were themselves ten hundred, the Vaitahavyas, when they devoured the cow of the Brāhmana, perished (11). The cow herself, when slaughtered, came down upon the Vaitahavyas, who had roasted for themselves the last she-goat of Kesaraprābandhā.' If this interpretation be correct, then the *bhṛigum* of v. 19. 1 should be regarded as meaning the Bhṛigu-family, while Kesaraprābandhā (v. 18. 11) might perhaps be identified as the wife of Jamadagni.††

As regards the etymological explanation of the word *bhṛigu*, we have already noted that Yāska (Nir. iii. 17) connects it with *bhṛijjati*, 'roast,' while according to *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 85. 105, it is derived from the onomatopœic *bhṛig*, the 'crackling' of fire. Macdonell‡‡ suggests *bhrājati*, 'to shine.' Bergaigne§§ considers the Bhṛigu-myth of the Rigveda to be merely a more developed form of the tradition regarding the descent of fire, and identifies Bhṛigu with Agni. According to A. Kuhn‖‖ and A. Barth,¶¶ the Bhṛigus are personifications of the lightning-flash. Kuhn (*op. cit.*[1] 13 ff., [2] 14 ff.), on the assumption of the linguistic equation *bhṛigu*=φλέγν, tried to harmonize the Greek myth regarding the descent of fire with that of the Veda. A. Weber*** had previously called attention to the affinity of *bhṛigu* and φλέγν, and propounded the theory that the tradition (*Satapatha*, xi. 6. 1) outlined above is a relic of primitive Indo-Germanic mythology. 'The name Bhṛgu,' he says (p. 242), 'corresponds to a nicety with the Greek φλέγν in the name of Φλεγύας and of the Φλεγύαι, who on account of their arrogance were condemned to the harsh penalties of hell, while in this story Bhṛigu for arrogance is sent there to be a looker on.' But Weber must nevertheless admit that relevant passages of the Rigveda will not fit in with the idea of a punishment of the wicked in hell; and, in fact, any one who with unbiased mind compares the entire group of Greek and Roman myths about Phlegyas and the Phlegyæ* with the Indian group connected with Bhṛigu and the Bhṛigus, will be of one mind with the present writer in holding that in these we have two entirely different cycles of myths, and that accordingly the phonetic parallelism between *bhṛigu* and φλέγν† is a mere coincidence.‡

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the article. E. SIEG.

BHUIYĀ, BHUINYĀ ('men of the land,' 'autochthones,' Skr. *bhūmi*, 'the land').—A Dravidian caste found in the western districts of Bengal and in the Mirzapur district of the United Provinces. The term is naturally of rather vague significance. In the Census of 1901 the name includes people from all parts of the Empire. Under the names of Bhuinyā, Bhuinyār, Bhuiyā, Bhumiā, 789,078 persons are recorded, of whom the vast majority are found in Bengal.

1. *Religion in Bengal.*—Dalton, describing them in the Tributary State of Bonai, states that they have their own priests called Deorī and sacred groves known as Deotā Sarā, dedicated to four deities, Dāsum Pāt, Bāmonī Pāt, Koisar Pāt, and Borām. The first three are brethren, but there is some difference of opinion whether Bāmonī is a male or a female deity. This illustrates the vagueness of their conception of her. Borām is the sun,—a title also found among the Orāons (*q.v.*),—and he is also worshipped under the name Dharm Deotā. There is no representation of him, but the other gods are to be found, each in a stone in the sacred grove. Borām, as the Creator, the first and greatest of their gods, is worshipped at the sowing season, with the offering of a white cock. In cases of sickness, goats are offered to Dāsum Pāt and to his brethren. On such occasions the goat is given by the owner of the house in which the sick person resides. At other times the victim is provided at the common cost of the people. The sacrifices are offered at the foot of a sacred tree in the grove; only men partake of the meat, and the Deorī receives the head.

The Bhuiyās of South Lohārdagā are more advanced in the direction of orthodox Hinduism, and the bloodthirsty tutelary goddess, Ṭhakurānī Mātā, to whom less than forty years ago the Hill Bhuiyās of Keonjhar offered the head of the obnoxious minister of their chief, has now become the Hindu Durgā, to whom a Bhuiyā priest makes offerings of goats and sheep, the flesh of which is eaten by the worshippers. Besides this, their chief deity, they have a host of communal ghosts, like the evil spirits which beset the Muṇḍās (*q.v.*) and Orāons (*q.v.*). 'To appease these ghosts,' says Risley, 'by occasional offerings of fowls and rice, and thus to guarantee the community against the consequences of their ill-will, is the special function of the village Pahan, who levies small subscriptions for this sort of spiritual insurance. The tribal deities Rikhmun [probably Skr. Rishi-muni, "holy saint"] and Tulsī-bīr ["Tulsī, the hero"] belong to a different and less primitive type. Rikhmun is believed to be the original ancestor of the tribe; while Tulsī-bīr was a restless and valorous Bhuiyā, who made war upon the gods until they appeased his wrath by admitting him to divine honours. I venture the conjecture that both Rikhmun and Tulsī-bīr are merely transmuted totems.' It seems simpler to suppose that we have here cases of tribal ancestor- and hero-worship. And it is well to note that the names of these deities, which must have come from the Hindus, show that the cult

English translation and parallel passages see Wilson, *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*, 4. 19 ff

* According to *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*, ix. 15. 26, both calf and cow.

† Cf. iii. 117. 9 (Wilson, *op. cit.* 23).

‡ Cf. *e.g.* iii. 115. 9.

§ See, *e.g.*, Hariv. 1893, *Bhag. Pur.* ix. 23. 23 ff.

‖ *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 84. 15 ff.

¶ Here King Vītahavya, by favour of Bhṛigu, becomes a Brāhmaṇa. Hariv. 1893, and *Bhag. Pur.* ix. 23. 29, call Vītihotras the descendants of the Tālajaṅghas and the Haihayas.

** Bloomfield's tr., *SBE* xlii. 170.

†† Who in the epic is called Reṇukā.

‡‡ *Vedic Mythology*, 140: 'Etymologically the word *bhṛigu* means "shining," from the root *bhrāj*, "to shine"' See also his subsequent references to works treating of the interpretation of the Bhṛigu-myth.

§§ *Religion védique*, 1878–83, i. 52–56.

‖‖ *Herabkunft d. Feuers u. d. Göttertranks* (1859), 8 ff. [2 *Mythologische Studien*, i. (1886), 10 ff.].

¶¶ *Les Religions de l'Inde*, Paris, 1885, 8.

*** See article already quoted, *ZDMG* ix. (1855) 242.

* See the exhaustive account by Turk, in Roscher, 2378–83.

† *i.e.* if any such can be established; with reference to *bhṛjjati* = *φρύγω*, *frigo*, and *bhrājate* = φλέγω, φλόξ, *fulgeo*, *flagrare*, cf. Uhlenbeck, *Kurzgef. etymol. Wörterbuch*, 1898, 204 ff.

‡ See also Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, 169 f.

must have arisen, or at least have been re-named, under Hindu influence.

2. *Religion in the United Provinces.*—In the United Provinces the Bhuiyās have advanced further in the direction of Hinduism than their brethren in Bengal. Their chief deity is Kālī, who, as in the case of Ṭhakurānī Mātā, has probably succeeded some aboriginal goddess, such as the Paurī or Pahārī Devī of the Bhuiyās of Singhbhūm. Kālī's shrine is a rude thatched hut, in which a mound of earth raised upon a platform represents the shrine of the goddess. They also worship, by the agency of the *baigā* (wh. see), the *dih*, or village gods, and the Earth-goddess Dhartī Mātā, with a sacrifice of goats, young pigs, and fowls. Among their legendary heroes is Lahang Bīr, who is propitiated by the rite of fire-walking. The worshipper, possessed by the spirit of the hero, is said to sustain no injury by walking over burning coals or by rolling his body among thorns. An instance of tree-worship appears in the rite at the Anant-chaudas festival in the rainy season, when a dance round a branch of the Karama tree (*Anthocephalus cadamba*) is made the occasion for licence and rude debauchery. A man killed by a tiger becomes a dangerous ghost, and is worshipped at the *baghaut*, a shrine erected at the place of his death. The field-deity is Hariyārī Devī, 'the Mother-goddess of greenery,' and to her the *baigā* offers a sacrifice of fowls and an oblation of spirits at the end of the harvest season. They are careful to propitiate the dead by making offerings of food to them. This is done simply through fear lest the ghosts, if neglected, may come back and vex the living. It thus does not amount to ancestor-worship in the true sense of the term.

LITERATURE.—For Bengal: Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology*, 1872, p. 141 f.; Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, 1891, i. 115 f.; Hunter, *Orissa*, 1872, ii. 144. For the United Provinces: Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, new ed. 1896, ii. 80 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BHUTĀN.—Bhutān is a long, narrow mountainous country occupying the southern slopes of the Eastern Himālayas for a length of about 220 miles. Its breadth from the Tibetan border to the Indian plains averages about 90 miles. It is bounded on the north by Tibet, on the west by independent Sikkim and the Darjiling District of Bengal, on the south by the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, and on the east by Tibet and the territory of semi-independent tribes.

This art. will sketch the life and ethics of the Bhutānese. For their religion see next article.

The origin of the people is uncertain. The most likely theory is that the country was originally inhabited by peoples from the South, and was conquered some centuries ago by invaders from Tibet, who drove from the mountains the old dwellers, except those who were made slaves by the conquerors. The present inhabitants bear unmistakable trace of close affinity in appearance with the Tibetans, and this is the more striking the farther north they live. Those who inhabit the more southern parts give evidence of intermingling with the darker peoples of the plains, and of the influence of more unhealthy regions. Comparatively few Bhutānese are to be found on the outer ranges abutting on the plains. These have of late years been largely occupied by Nepāli immigrants, whose habits and customs remain much the same as those of their land of origin (see NEPAL). The country is sparsely populated. No certain information is available as to the population, though an estimate of 110,000—80,000 Bhutānese, 30,000 Nepālis (with a few hundred Lepchas from Sikkim)—is probably over rather than under the mark.

There is no written code of laws in Bhutān. The inhabitants say that they had such a code, but it got lost in the course of their frequent fightings. The poverty and lawlessness of the people are expressed by a Tibetan proverb: 'In Bhutān there are no handles to the pots, and no law in the land.' Might has been right. The Government officers are usually unsalaried, with the inevitable result of extortion and injustice. The country has been priest-ridden in the extreme by the Lāmas, who, it is asserted, give the worst of examples from the moral point of view. The population has declined. The unsettled political state of the country has accounted for this to some extent, but polyandry and other vicious customs have probably had greater influence. Polyandry is more prevalent in the northern parts, where the connexion with Tibet is closer. It is excused on the ground of poverty, and is probably on the decline. A woman who marries the eldest brother often becomes also the wife of the other brothers. Polygamy, too, is practised by some. Government officers sometimes keep wives in different parts of the country, but the practice is being prohibited by the rulers. The marriage tie is loosely held. Chastity has been at a discount, and the proportion of the people suffering from venereal diseases is appallingly large. Woman naturally holds a freer and more independent position than in India, and does more than her share of the work of the house and the field. As a whole, the men are indolent and addicted to strong drink. Physically they are robust and muscular. Their chief amusements are archery and quoits. In character they may be described as plucky, hot-tempered, truculent, avaricious, and unforgiving. While cruel to their enemies, they are kind and charitable towards their friends. The better classes are courteous in manner. Slavery or serfdom is prevalent, and on the Indian frontier is a village largely inhabited by escaped slaves. Punishment for crimes is severe. For continuance in theft the penalty is to lose the right hand and the left foot. Capital punishment is inflicted by drowning in a river. Religious exercises are well attended to. The people are superstitious and ignorant. Education has made little or no progress, and is unknown outside the monasteries. Personal cleanliness is sadly neglected. Judged by present-day Western standards, the Bhutānese are certainly not an attractive people.

There are many indications, however, that a better day is dawning in Bhutān. A few of the boys are showing a desire for Western education. The strong character and higher ideals of the present Mahārājā, and the notable change which has come over a few individuals who have been influenced by contact with European civilization, are hopeful signs. The recent unification of power in the hands of the Mahārājā bodes well for the political future of the land, and its consequent more settled state will beneficially affect its moral condition. The people are a sturdy stock, and once awakened out of their lethargy and exclusiveness, and delivered from the domination of the Lāmas and the evils of polyandry, there is every prospect of their becoming a strong, independent, and forceful race, and of the country entering upon a career of prosperity before unknown. During the late war with Tibet, the rulers eventually threw themselves enthusiastically on the British side, and they are more amenable than ever to the advice of the Political Agent.

LITERATURE.—See the literature referred to at the end of next article.

J. A. GRAHAM.

BHUTĀN, BUDDHISM IN.—Bhutān, or more correctly 'Bhotān' (*i.e.* 'the end of Bhot [or Tibet']), the Sanskritic name by which this country is known to Europeans through the Bengalis of the British Indian province bordering it), is a large independent principality situated in the south-eastern Himālayas, wedged in between Tibet, Sikkim, and Assam. Its wild valleys are sparsely peopled by a semi-savage Mongoloid tribe which calls itself 'Duk-pa' (spelt *hBrug-pa*), a term which is also employed to denote the form of Lāmaism that is professed in

the country. The Duk-pa Buddhism, as found in Bhotān, where it appears to be the sole recognized form of religion therein prevalent, is of the primitive unreformed type of Lāmaism, and is very thickly overlaid by aboriginal animistic cults and the gross worship of malignant devils, so as to be scarcely recognizable as Buddhism at all, save for a few externals in the way of symbolism and a little deeply-embedded ethical teaching of Śākya, the Master.

Buddhism appears to have entered this country for the first time about 300 years ago, when in the beginning of the 17th cent. A.D. a Lāma from the adjoining border of Southern Tibet invaded Bhotān at the head of a band of Tibetan soldiers and forcibly occupied the country. This Lāma, named Z'ab-drung Ñag-dbaṅ rnam-rgyal, established a hierarchy, somewhat on the model of that of the Grand Dalai Lāma of Lhāsa, and it still survives. Nominally, this Bhotānese Grand Lāma, or high priest, is literally a priest-king, who bears the Indian title of *Dharma Rājā*, or 'Religious King,' and combines in his hands both the spiritual and temporal rule, whilst his succession is arranged on the re-incarnation theory, by which, on his decease, his spirit is supposed to transmigrate into the body of a newly-born male child, who is to be searched for and identified by omens and supernatural portents. The regulation of the succession in this way is kept in the hands of the Lhāsa priests, who usually send a 're-incarnation' from Lhāsa or Central Tibet. During the minority of this re-incarnated priest a regent is appointed for the management of the temporal concerns, and is called *Deb-Rājā*, or 'Provincial Regent or Governor'; and he seems usually to be a secular chief. The pretentious and divine nature claimed by the Grand Lāma of Bhotān is evident in his full title as given on his seal: 'Chief of the Realm, Defender of the Faith, Equal to Sarasvatī [the Hindu goddess of learning] in learning, Chief of all the Buddhas, Head Expounder of the Commentaries, Caster out of Devils, Most Learned in the Holy Laws, God incarnate, Absolver of Sins, and Head of the Best of all Religions.'

Technically, the Duk-pa form of Lāmaism is an offshoot of the hermit section of Lāmas called *Kar-gyu-pa*, who follow the practice of the Tibetan saint Milaraspa in laying especial stress on residence in caves as a means of gaining magical powers; though otherwise the doctrines are generally similar to those of the old unreformed Lāmaism (*Nying-ma*). This Duk-pa sect arose on the rocky Tibetan hills which border upon Bhotān, and on its establishment in this latter country it adopted a fictitious so-called inspired 'revelation' alleged to have been unearthed by a Lāma named Saṅ-gyas-glin, by means of which the priests were enabled to relax still further the Buddhist obligations, whilst admitting of the retention *en bloc* of the popular spirit-worship and witchcraft. Amongst the monks only a few profess to be celibate, but it is doubtful whether any even of these are really so. The distinctive hat is of a red colour, and that of the head Lāma bears as a badge a vertical cross formed by two thunderbolts, with reference to a legend of thunder-dragons (*Duk*) which is related in explanation of the etymology of the sectarian title 'Duk-pa.' The Bhotānese laity as well as the priests, unlike the Tibetans, shave their heads.

The monasteries and temples are of the general shape and appearance of those in Tibet, but roofed over with wide wooden eaves to shed off the excessive rain which falls in this climate. The largest monastery is at Tashi-cho', which is the residence of the Dharma Rājā and the capital of the country. It has been visited and described by Manning, Bogle, Turner, and others, and is said to have about 1000 monks, though other accounts place the number at 500. In British Bhotān there are small Duk-pa temples at Kalimpong and Pedong near Darjīling. The total number of Duk-pa priests cannot be stated with certainty, but has been estimated at about 5000, or about 1 to 10 of the population. Only about half reside in cloisters, the remainder being employed as State officials and traders. There are also a considerable number of hermits and a few nuns.

LITERATURE.—Sir A. Eden, *Rept. Mission to Bhotan*, 1873; W. Griffith, *Journals*, 1847; Sir J. D. Hooker, *Himalayan Journals*, 1854, i. 136, 372; Sir C. R. Markham, *Mission of Bogle and Manning*, 1876, pp. lv, 27, etc.; S. Turner, *Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet*, 1806, pp. 313, etc.; L. A. Waddell, *Among the Himalayas*, 1899, pp. 246-249, *Buddhism of Tibet*, 1895, pp. 44, 55, 68, 226, 242, 284, and *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, 1905, pp. 36, 63-66, 284.

L. A. WADDELL.

BIBLE.

[W. SANDAY.]

THE word 'Bible' has come to mean substantially a sacred book. Thus we might say that the Qur'ān is the Bible of Muhammadans. When we speak of '*the* Bible,' we mean the sacred book of Christians. But this is a derived sense. Our English word comes from the Greek through the Latin. The Greek original meant simply 'books' in the plural; τὰ βιβλία was a particular collection of books, or more strictly of rolls. In this sense the use of the word goes back to the prologue to Ecclesiasticus (*c.* 130 B.C.); cf. 1 Mac 12[9]. When the Greek βιβλία was transliterated into Latin, it came to be treated as a singular and a feminine.

The earliest example of this use known to the writer is that given by Sir James Murray, *OED*, *s.v.*; it occurs in a library catalogue of the 9th cent (Becker, *Catal. Biblioth. Antiq* p 42, cf. p. 172) Jerome used the term *bibliotheca* [*sacra*] (du Cange, *s.v.*)—an expressive designation of the 'divine library' compressed into a single volume; and this term occurs frequently in the catalogues of the 9th and 10th cents. (Becker, *op. cit.* pp. 4, 13, 16, 17, 24, 43, 59, 60, etc.). The word characteristic of Cassiodorus (*c.* 487-580) is *pandectes*; we remember that Justinian published his *Pandects* in 533, and Cassiodorus his *Institutes* about 544.

At the time when the books which we call the Bible were written, the usual form for a book to take was the roll. After the invention of writing, the material of books varied somewhat with time and place. The Babylonians wrote with a sharp point on clay. The Hebrew collection that we call the OT was written mainly, if not entirely, on skins. With the natural conservatism which obtains in matters of religion, the Jews to this day make use of leather and of the roll form for the sacred volume. The graphic scene (Jer 36) in which Jehoiakim cuts to pieces and burns the roll that had just been read to him will give an idea of the outward appearance. The Greek books that we call the NT were produced under a different and more advanced civilization, that of the Græco-Roman empire. By this time the material commonly used for books was papyrus (2 Jn[12]); and it is probable that most of the books of NT were originally written on papyrus (though parchment is mentioned in 2 Ti 4[13]). But alike in the case of OT and of NT the form adopted was that of the roll, with the text written in slender vertical columns. The volume was held in both hands, with one or two columns exposed to view at a time, and was rolled up with the left hand and unrolled with the right as it was read.

There was a conventional size for the roll, which determined roughly the length of a book. It was for this reason that the Twelve Minor Prophets were written on a single roll and counted as a single book. In the oldest Hebrew tradition, as given in the Talmud (*Bābā bathrā*, 14) and still observed in German and French MSS, the order of the Prophetical Books is that of length: Jer., Ezek., Is., Min. Proph., corresponding to each other as 24 : 21 : 19 : 17 (Budde). [In like manner in NT the usual order of the Pauline Epistles is roughly that of length.] From the custom of writing more than one shorter book on the same roll has arisen, quite innocently, the attribution of some writings that were originally without name to wrong authors, *e.g.* several anonymous compositions that now go under the name of Isaiah, a similar anonymous composition (or compositions) added to the prophecy of Zechariah, etc.

The Christian Bible then was a double collection of rolls. That is its external description, but only external. It is of more importance that both volumes consisted of *collections*, and that both

these collections were regarded as *sacred*. We shall have to follow the line of inquiry thus suggested for both OT and NT. And when we have done so, we shall have to consider how the Bible is regarded, or ought to be regarded, at the present day. In other words, the main treatment of our subject will naturally be historical, but the final summing up will be rather doctrinal; and the history should take such a form as to explain the doctrine.

It should be explained at the outset that in what follows the broad results of criticism, as at the present time widely accepted, are presupposed. That is to say, the usual literary analysis of the Hexateuch and the Historical Books, and so much of the criticism of the Prophets and other books as is common to the best writers, are taken for granted. It is also taken for granted that a line is practically drawn across the history by the promulgation of the Book of Deuteronomy in B.C. 621; those portions of the literature which assume the single authorized centre of worship and the fully developed hierarchical system of Priests and Levites being placed after that date, and those which do not make these assumptions being placed before it. These fundamental principles of criticism have now been before the world for so long, and they have been so closely and severely tested in the daily work of so many competent and able scholars, that at least in the opinion of the present writer they must be regarded as verified and established. The standard for most English students is substantially that of Driver, *Introd. to the Literature of the OT* (cited as *LOT*; from 1891).

The ablest presentation of the other (more completely conservative) side is Dr. Orr's *Problem of the OT* (from 1906). The present writer has much sympathy with Dr. Orr's view of the religious character and use of OT; indeed, it is part of the purpose of this art. to show that a view not essentially dissimilar emerges naturally from critical study on the lines of Dr. Driver and most at least of his English allies, though it is no doubt true that a different construction is put upon the facts by some in Great Britain and by a greater number on the Continent. It is also probably true that there is still room for considerable correction of critical theories in detail. But as a whole the writer finds it impossible to think that Dr. Orr's position is permanently tenable, or that the main lines of the construction opposed to his have been proved to be untenable. The principle underlying the present art. is that on its literary and historical side the Bible must be studied like any other book (*e.g.* like Livy, or like the mediæval chronicles, which supply a better parallel for some parts of the problem), but that it does not therefore follow that in other respects, and in particular as a religious revelation, the Bible is only on the same level with these. The object is to discover how far the analogies with other books and other religions extend, and what there is in the Bible that detaches itself from, and rises above, the broad phenomena of other religions.

In so wide and intricate a field it is inevitable that experiments should be constantly going on; and the recent incursions of the Assyriologists and students of Comparative Religion have been of this character. It cannot be said that either these experiments or others (like those of Prof. Eerdmans of Leyden) have really brought the question any nearer to the standpoint of Dr. Orr. It would be truer to say that recent years have seen a consolidation and general strengthening of the position criticized.

I. *HISTORY OF OT.*

I. How the Books of OT came to be written. We begin by asking ourselves how, humanly speaking, did the books of OT come to be written? It is just on this side that we find the same kind of influences at work as in other ancient literature. There is a general agreement among scholars that the oldest pieces in OT, and those most nearly contemporary with the earlier events described, are the Songs.

(1) *Fragments of ancient Song.*—There is more analogy than we are apt to suppose between the beginnings of Israel and the beginnings of Greece. The literatures of both peoples began with poetry, and not with prose. Sometimes one sees the generalization broadly laid down that all national literatures began with poetry; and this is doubtless widely true; but it can hardly be proved of the oldest civilizations of all, those of Babylonia and Egypt. We are struck, however, by the resemblance between the bards of the *Odyssey*, Phemius and Demodocus, singing to the lyre in the halls of chieftains, and the fragments of primitive song preserved in the Bible. The difference is due simply to the different conditions and state of society. The scene is not the almost feudal banquet in the hall of the noble, but the tribal gathering round the well (Nu $21^{17.\ 18}$, Jg $5^{11.\ 16}$). And the character of the songs is just what we might expect; they are impassioned utterances of the natural man: laments for the dead (2 Sam $1^{19\text{-}27}$ $3^{33f.}$), exultation over the fallen foe (Gn 4^{23}, 1 Sam 21^{11}), denunciation of the enemy (Nu $21^{27\text{-}30}$ 23^{7}), or of the backward and faithless friend (Jg $5^{17.\ 23}$), and praises no less fervent of the helpful ally (Jg $5^{14.\ 15.\ 18}$) even though stained with treachery (*ib.* vv.$^{24\text{-}27}$). But, along with this, we note a very genuine and enthusiastic devotion to Jahweh as Israel's God: the wars of Israel are His wars (Nu 21^{14} 1 S 18^{17} 25^{28}); Israel cannot prosper without His blessing (Jg $5^{2.\ 3.\ 9.\ 11.\ 13}$). This implies quite definitely, though, of course, in general terms, the great covenant at Sinai (compare the reference in Jg $5^{4.\ 5}$). Some of the songs are quoted expressly from the Book of Jashar, *i.e.* 'of the Upright,' apparently a book in which were sung the deeds of the heroes or worthies of Israel, where the name at least suggests something of that moral standard which began to be enforced as Israel's side of the covenant, just as 'the righteous acts of the Lord' (Jg 5^{11}) were the acts of His covenanted succour.

(2) *Continuous history in Prose.*—The snatches of song to which reference has been made, scattered and fragmentary remains of a larger body, have come down to us embedded in later texts. The latest of the songs, however, must have been little earlier than the narrative in which they are found. By the time of David a prose style must have been fully developed by the side of the poetry. The comparatively settled conditions and rapidly advancing civilization of the reigns of David and Solomon soon gave the impulse to historical composition, of which we have a fine example in the story of David's court and family contained in 2 S 9–20, with which should go 1 K 1. 2. So admirable is this narrative, so fresh and living, so truthful in its general tenor,—recording events as they really happened, without undue preference either for one party or for another,—that more than one leading scholar (*e.g.* Budde after Duhm) has traced it to 'the archives of the house of Abiathar,' the priest who followed the fortunes of David from the time when he was fleeing before Saul, but was involved in the conspiracy of Adonijah, and compelled to retire in disgrace to his home at Anathoth (1 K 2^{26}).

As Thucydides in his exile set himself to write the history of the Peloponnesian War, so Abiathar may have used his retirement to describe the events in which he had borne an active part. Without laying too much stress on the person of Abiathar, his name may well be taken as a symbol of the conditions under which this earliest and best of all the specimens of Hebrew historical writing was composed. In 1 Samuel there are two distinct strains running side by side, and several times leading to duplicate versions of the same event. It is quite possible that the earlier strain may be a continuation backwards of the narrative of 2 S 9–20. It is also possible that in these nearly contemporary chronicles we are to see the beginning of the school which first took in hand to trace back the history of Israel to its origins, and in the pursuit of these carried its researches into the traditions of the race as far back as Creation itself. Such was the work of the so-called Jahwist (known by the symbol J). If both in this case and in other later cases scholars have recourse to what may seem the refinement of distinguishing successive hands as J^1 J^2 etc., all that is meant is that there is reason to suppose that the work was produced not so much by a single author as by a school, in which one writer took up the pen from

another, as the monks did in the *scriptoria* of the Middle Ages. These writers are usually anonymous, for the idea of literary property in such departments as history had not yet arisen; indeed, it never became established among the Hebrews as it did among the Greeks.

When once the example was set on so substantial a scale as by J, it is not surprising that it should have been followed. What J did in the Southern Kingdom, after an interval of time E did in the Northern. There, too, a school of historians seems to have taken root, who, like J, undertook to commit to writing the folklore current among the Northern tribes, especially Ephraim. This Northern school would seem to have been more directly under the influence of the prophets, who by this time had become powerful. We know that the prophets joined together in bands or companies, and it is not impossible that the writing of history may have been one of the forms of their activity (cf. Kautzsch, 'Rel. of Israel,' in *HDB*, vol. v. p. 656b). It is interesting to possess two lines of tradition so clearly and strongly marked as J and E. It would seem that after a period of separate existence, perhaps after the fall of Samaria in B.C. 722, when the spiritual leaders of the Northern Kingdom naturally took refuge with their brethren of the South, the two lines were definitely brought together in a combined narrative, JE.

(3) *The writing Prophets of the earlier period.*—So far we have had to do with literature that was not in its primary purpose moral or religious. The national traditions, as they were first committed to writing, seem to have told an unvarnished story. They reflect the national character, with its undisciplined passions and its traits of cunning deceit and fierce revenge. These features are prominent enough in the somewhat distant and idealized biographies of the patriarchs: they are still more prominent in the wild scenes of the Book of Judges; and they are prominent even in the life of Saul and the family history of David. Throughout all these periods we can see that the religion of Israel was as yet very imperfectly moralized; and it was by no means a pure monotheism. It began, like the religions of the nations around, with the cult of sacred stones and trees; it tolerated the use and worship of images ('teraphim,' Gn $31^{19.\ 30.\ 34}$, Jg 17^5, 1 S 19^{13}; 'ephod' [possibly], Jg 8^{27} 17^5 18^{14-25}; 'strange gods,' Gn 35^4, Jos $24^{2.\ 14.\ 23}$).

These things should not be thought of as idolatry. They did not begin to be idolatry until the revelation contained in the Second Commandment had been clearly given and clearly apprehended. Before that time they were rather helps to worship, enabling the primitive man to realize that he had an object of worship outside himself. It was not to be expected that he should take in all at once so vast an idea as that of a Maker of heaven and earth. He was obliged to use crutches or stepping-stones to higher things.

And yet it was not for nothing that the work of Moses lies in the background. Even the earlier documents show a consciousness that Israel had a special mission among the nations. It was in pursuance of this mission that Abraham had been called from the East, and that the fortunes of his descendants were subject to a Divine guiding, bringing good out of evil (Gn 50^{20}). We might say generally that this side of things comes out in proportion as the prophetical influence makes itself felt, and therefore especially in the later strata of the narrative. Sometimes this is to the detriment of the history as such: contrast, *e.g.*, the treatment of the origin of the monarchy in the earlier version (1 S 9^1–10^{16} $11^{1-11.\ 15}$ $13^{2-7a.\ 15b-18.\ 23}$, 14) and in the later (1 S 7. 8. 10^{17-24} 12. 15).

The literature so far, as we have said, shows indeed to some extent a religious influence and shaping, but not as yet a definite and predominant religious purpose. We come to this first in the works of the so-called 'writing Prophets.' Prophecy had been from the first an essentially religious institution, but in its earlier phases the forms that it assumed were crude and rudimentary (1 S 10^{5-13}). The action of Nathan in the reign of David is a clear advance upon this (2 S 7^{1-17} 12^{1-25}). These activities culminate in the energetic reforms of Elijah and Elisha. But by this time, as we have seen, the prophets had probably begun to put the hand to the pen in the form of history. The impulse to this may have come with the general advance of civilization; in the court of David and Solomon there were already secretaries and perhaps a 'chronicler' (2 S 8^{16}, 1 K 4^3 RVm). But there seems to have been something more than this general tendency at the beginning of written prophecy. There was a higher form of prophecy and a lower. The professional prophets fell into a groove, and contented themselves with repeating the accepted maxims, which were religious in their origin but did not represent the deeper insight of religion. Such a lower truth was the doctrine that had grown up of an impending judgment, a 'day of the Lord,' upon the heathen. It arose out of the genuine, if self-regarding, attachment of Israel to its God, and the confident belief that He would one day avenge His people upon their enemies and oppressors. But it was a startling novelty when the prophet Amos announced that this judgment would be turned against Israel itself, just because it was the chosen people (Am 3^2 $5^{18.\ 20}$ 6^8 7^{7-9} $8^{2.\ 3}$ 9^{1-4}). As this announcement was of the nature of protest, and ran counter to all the popular ideas, it was not unnatural that the prophet should wish to place it permanently on record, so that his words might be verified by the event. We know that they were so verified, and the same kind of motive seems to have been present with the other prophets of judgment and doom. These were the greatest of the prophets, and their scathing and searching addresses were the strongest of all the influences brought to bear in the building up of Israel as a people for God.

It does not, indeed, follow that prophecy could be only in one key, and critics have probably gone too far in eliminating the notes of hope and promise. An Isaiah, when the occasion came, could himself bind up the wounds which he had made. But it is characteristic of the prophets to resist the tendencies of the natural man, and to be always pointing the people upwards to higher things.

The Prophetical Books stand out as the most characteristic and the most truly inspired of the contributions which God made through Israel to the religious education of the world. Written, many of them as with the heart's blood, in danger and suffering (Amos, Jeremiah), or under the sting of bitterest personal experience (Hos 1–3, Ezk 24, and we may surely add Is 53), they were always above the highest level of their surroundings, and the truths brought out in them form a continuous revelation.

(4) *The history of Law as far as the Deuteronomic Reformation.*—The Hebrew tradition certainly was not wrong in ascribing the importance that it did to the work of Moses. We repeatedly find the lines of later development converging backward upon that work. Although the belief to which it gave expression may be more correctly described as Henotheism than as Monotheism—although, that

is, it denoted rather the concentration of Israel's devotion upon one God than the absolute assertion that there was no God but one—it nevertheless contained within itself the seeds of the later Monotheism. The Deuteronomic 'Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God is one Lord,' is only a step beyond what Moses must have taught, or what God taught Moses.

There is also every reason to believe that the Heb. tradition was right in connecting the work of Moses with a great historical crisis and deliverance, though the account both of this and of the religious crisis that followed appears to have come down to us with a certain amount of idealization. What we have is no contemporary record, and not even a record based to any extent upon writings now lost but once more nearly contemporary. Perhaps the only instance in which we can lay the finger on such an ancient authority is the Song of the Well in Nu $21^{17.\ 18}$, with the other songs in the same chapter (vv.$^{14ff.\ 27-30}$), for both Ex 15 and Nu 23. 24 are probably later. The Egyptian plagues and the story of the Exodus are idealized. So, too, is the description of the giving of the Law from Mount Sinai. In other words, from the point of view of strict historical fact the narrative of these events bears to the narrative of the revolt of Absalom the same kind of relation as (let us say) in Livy the narrative of the taking of Rome by the Gauls bears to the narrative of the Hannibalic Wars. In the one case folklore has been at work, in the other case not, or very sparingly. Just as there survived throughout the East the indistinct memory of a great destructive flood of the Euphrates or the Tigris, so also within a narrower circle there must have survived the memory of some portentous volcanic eruption, which the folklore of Israel came to associate with the greatest event in its religious history. Such association was very natural, because it was phenomena of this kind—thunder and lightning, storm and tempest, earthquake and volcano—that brought home to the Hebrew mind, as nothing else did, the presence and the power of God. So it came about that, when the more remote traditions of Israel were being collected in the earlier days of the monarchy, the story of the Wanderings in the Wilderness and the legislation of Sinai assumed their present form.

There is little doubt that a nomadic period, which may have been broken for a time by partial settlement in Egypt, preceded the permanent settlement of Israel in Canaan.* And we may well believe that Moses, taking advantage of the events of which we have spoken,—and indeed specially raised up and inspired by God for this purpose,—may have joined together the tribes in closer confederation, and cemented the bonds between them by a great and impressive religious foundation, which lived in the imagination of the people as the giving of a Law. If we seek to know more clearly the nature of this law-giving, we may find it described in Ex 18 (JE), where Jethro asks Moses:

'What is this thing that thou doest to the people? why sittest thou thyself alone, and all the people stand about thee from morning unto even? And Moses said unto his father-in-law, Because the people come unto me to inquire of God: when they have a matter, they come unto me; and I judge between a man and his neighbour, and I make them know the statutes of God, and his laws.

Or the description becomes still nearer (if we do not suppose too high a degree of organization) in the verses a little further on, where Jethro advises:

'Be thou for the people to God-ward, and bring thou the causes unto God: and thou shalt teach them the statutes and the laws, and shalt show them the way wherein they must walk, and the work that they must do. Moreover thou shalt provide out of all the people able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating unjust gain; and place such over them, to be rulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens: and let them judge the people at all seasons: and it shall be, that every great matter they shall bring unto thee, but every small matter they shall judge themselves: so shall it be easier for thyself, and they shall bear the burden with thee.'

This description, though dating, as it would seem, from the time of the monarchy, preserves to a remarkable extent the true features of the method by which Moses wielded his authority. If we could reproduce the actual facts, it is probable that he made use of the ordinary tribal machinery of *shaikhs*, or 'elders'; but he himself must have held a more commanding position, and the decisions and laws that he gave were doubtless given as oracles from God.

In the light of what we now know about the much older Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, it would not be at all surprising if Moses committed some of his laws to writing. And these laws might well be the nucleus of those that have come down to us in the Pentateuch. Scholars seem to be agreed that the oldest collection that can be marked off as such is the so-called 'Book of the Covenant' (Ex 20^{22}–23^{33}). We may leave it to OT specialists to determine the succession of the different laws. The Pentateuch does not appear to have been complete until the time of Ezra.

For us it is more important to notice the landmark formed by the publication of the main body of the Book of Deuteronomy. This is perhaps the greatest of all the landmarks in the history of Israel; there is none in regard to which there seems to be a clearer division between that which falls on one side of the line and that which falls on the other. There is also a special interest in the Book of Deuteronomy, because its promulgation by king Josiah is a typical event in the process by which the OT acquired its binding authority. This event is thus described in a document that appears to be contemporary:

'And the king sent, and they gathered unto him all the elders of Judah and of Jerusalem. And the king went up to the house of the Lord, and all the men of Judah and all the inhabitants of Jerusalem with him, and the priests, and the prophets, and all the people, both small and great: and he read in their ears all the words of the book of the covenant which was found in the house of the Lord. And the king stood on the platform (RVm), and made a covenant before the Lord, to walk after the Lord, and to keep his commandments, and his testimonies, and his statutes, with all his heart, and all his soul, to confirm the words of this covenant that were written in this book: and all the people stood to the covenant' (2 K 23^{1-3}).

We have here a solemn religious act by which king and people alike—the king in the name, and with the full consent, of the people—accept the book read before them as expressing the Divine will, and take its precepts as binding upon themselves. This is the essential meaning that, as applied to a book, is contained in the epithet 'canonical,' which means 'authoritative,'* and authoritative because in its ultimate origin Divine.

We call this a 'landmark in the history,' but we do so only because the description is so full and explicit. It is not to be supposed that the idea was a new one, or that it was applied to Deut. for the first time. It is anticipated by the description in Ex 24^{3-8} (E) of the no less solemn acceptance of the 'book of the covenant' (Ex 20^{22}–23^{33}, or the nucleus of that section). But, indeed, both descriptions only represent the full acknowledgment by the whole community of that which was contained implicitly from the first in the manner in which we have seen that the legal decisions and statutes were given—as oracular responses from God. The laws given by Moses were not given in his own name but in the name of God, and they were accepted in the same sense by the people as

* This is one of the current views challenged by Prof. Eerdmans (*Exp.* 1908, pp. 118 ff., 193 ff., 345 ff.) and defended by Prof. G. A. Smith (*ib.* p. 254 ff.).

* Cf. esp. Zahn, *Grundriss d. Gesch. d. NT Kanons*^{2}, p. 10.

coming from God. In precisely the same way Hammurabi is represented as 'receiving his laws from the seated sun-god Samaš, the judge of heaven and earth' (Johns, *Oldest Code*, p. ix). It is the common ancient conception, but at the same time a central conception to which all the habits of thought are adapted; and who shall say that it does not express substantial truth?

(5) *The later stages of History, Prophecy, and Law.*—We have seen how the earliest stages of Hebrew literature were an instinctive natural product, growing out of the national life, and receiving a permanent form by being committed to writing. Only the very earliest stages retained their original naive simplicity. Even here (as in the Song of Deborah) the religious interest became more and more dominant. From the modern point of view, which expects that history shall be history written for its own sake and with no ulterior aims, the process is one of deterioration. More and more history comes to be written with a purpose; the prophetic ideal, the legislative ideal, the ideal of worship, get the upper hand. All three have a common root in the conception of communication with God by means of oracles; the statutes of the lawgiver and the priestly regulations for worship are equally invested with an oracular form; they are presented as having a Divine sanction behind them. So the religious interest becomes all-embracing and all-absorbing. Israel becomes the people of religion, and even its instinctive products, which might at first have been described as secular, acquire a definitely religious character.

At each new revision this character is impressed more deeply upon the historical writings. The same school which produced Deuteronomy—a coalition, as it would seem, of priest and prophet, a succession in which prophet wore the garb of priest or priest the garb of prophet—besides its great work in the sphere of law also turned its attention to history. It, too, made its own collection of older historical writings, and, as it did so, it took care to point the moral of the successive stages that the history of Israel had gone through, by hortatory or didactic paragraphs inserted at appropriate places. Thus the historian becomes a preacher, and his narrative is at the same time a sermon. It is from this point of view that we should learn to look at it and judge it. It is no longer in place to expect the disinterestedness of the secular annalist; we should look rather at the earnestness which aims at converting the people from the error of their ways and bringing them to serve the Lord.

Two more periods of literary activity complete the production of canonical history. (i.) The fifth century saw the gradual composition of the last main element in the Pentateuch (the Priests' Code, or P), and its incorporation with the already existing writings (J, E, JE, D) so as to form the Pentateuch as we now have it. It would seem that P was for the most part written in Babylonia, and that it was in fact the 'book of the law' which Ezra brought with him and promulgated in Jerusalem in the year B.C. 444. By the end of the century it had been worked up into our present Hexateuch. (ii.) Ezra and Nehemiah appear to have left behind them memoirs, which after a hundred years or rather more were embodied, along with a continuous and systematic review of the history so far as it related to Judah from David onwards, in our present books 1 and 2 Chron., Ezr., and Nehemiah.

This later historical writing is similar, though not quite identical, in its character. It has not the freshness and living human interest that marked the older narratives, nor yet the moral fervour of the Deuteronomic school. The dominant interest is now antiquarian, expressing itself in the form of lists, inventories, chronological summaries, and genealogies. In P there is a great mass of systematized law; and in Chron. there is a marked tendency to enlarge on details of worship. In both cases the style is, as a rule, dry, formal, and statistical; such warmth as there is in Chron. is thrown mainly into the liturgical descriptions and into such a view of the history as was natural from the standpoint of the priesthood.

In Prophecy, two great figures stand out, both belonging to the period of the Exile: Ezekiel (*c.* 592–570 B.C.), and the so-called 'Second Isaiah' (*c.* 546–536 B.C.), followed by a lingering train of lesser personalities (Hag., Zech., Obad., Mal., Joel, Jonah) and perhaps some fragments (Is 24–27, Zec 8–14) now bound up with larger works. Ezekiel is a significant and characteristic figure, who has a strong message to deliver, and marks with equal boldness the close of one age and the opening of another. Second Isaiah (Is 40–55) reaches perhaps the highest point of spiritual insight in the whole OT. Even the lesser names, although associated with some decline of literary force and originality, are yet all those of men who have some message from God both to their own and to future ages.

We have already spoken of the considerable codifying of law which belongs to this period. It must not be supposed that all the laws which are thus put on record represent actual existing usage. There is a tendency towards symmetry and system; the writers do not hesitate to set down not only what is, but what they think ought to be. A striking example of this may be seen in the ideal picture of the temple and its services in Ezk 40–48. But even in the Pentateuch there is not a little that was probably never actually put into practice.

The narrative of Neh 8–10 illustrates vividly the attitude of mind towards the Law which was by this time becoming common to both leaders and people. The proceedings which accompanied the promulgation of the Priests' Code were evidently modelled upon those with which we have seen that Josiah introduced and enforced the legislation of Deuteronomy. Only the ceremonies are yet more prolonged and yet more solemn, and the effect proved to be more lasting.

(6) *The Hagiographa*: (i.) *Psalms*, (ii.) *Wisdom Literature*, (iii.) *other Books.*—The central force in the history of Israel was the *prophetic spirit*, which we may take in a wide sense as attaining to permanent expression not only in the prophetic writings proper, but also in the laws and institutions which made up the concrete framework of the national life. The prophetic writings embodied great principles both of belief and practice, a high conception—gradually becoming still higher and purer—of the being and character of God, and a growing stringency and elevation in the sense of His moral and spiritual demands upon man. It was essentially the same spirit and the same principles which took effect in the work of the lawgivers, from Moses onwards. The special purpose for which Israel as a nation had been raised up was to serve as a standing example of these higher views of God and of moral duty which were the outcome of the spirit that we have called prophetic, but which was really common to prophets and lawgivers, and expressed itself in the two main branches of Hebrew literature, Prophecy and Law.

In these two branches what we may call the creative forces at work in the nation reached their fullest development; but the consequences were felt over a wider area; indeed the prophetic spirit

(if, for short, we may call it by that single name) gripped hold of the national life as a whole and made itself felt in outlying branches of the literature that did not so obviously receive their stimulus from above as Prophecy and Law. The Jews had a general name for these less central and creative writings—*Kĕthūbīm* or *Hagiographa*. These again fall into three classes: (i.) Psalms of David (so called), with the addition—outside the stricter Canon—of the Psalms of Solomon (so called); (ii.) the Wisdom literature, including Proverbs, Job, and Ecclesiastes, and—outside the narrower Jewish Canon—the Wisdom of Solomon (so called), and the Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach; and (iii.) certain other books, not all of the same description, and more limited in number in the Palestinian Canon than in that of Alexandria. The Jewish tradition does not exactly follow this classification by subject, but marks off the three greater poetical works: Psalms, Proverbs, Job, and the so-called 'Five Rolls'—Cant., Ruth, Lam., Eccl. (*Koheleth*), Esther—which were read respectively at the five church festivals: Passover, Weeks, the fast of 9th Ab, Tabernacles, and Purim. With this division were reckoned three books of which we have in part already spoken, Dan., Chron., Ezra-Nehemiah. For our purpose it may be better to keep to the classification by subject.

(i.) *Psalms.*—Although the Psalms are not creative in the same sense as the Prophets and the Law—in other words, although they do not supply their own principles from within but rather derive them from without—they are hardly of less capital importance in the history of Religion; because they are typical and classical examples of a *genus* which is of the deepest significance in the sphere of the religious life. If Prophecy and Law embody those leading truths which (as of Divine implanting) may be described as the gift of God to man, the Psalms represent the response of man to God. They cover the whole field of devotion: praise and thanksgiving, and prayer—with the preparation for prayer in penitence and confession, the laying before God alike of the joys and difficulties and sorrows of life, whether on the larger scale of the nation or on the smaller scale of the individual.

There are not wanting analogies to the Heb. Psalms, especially in the religious literature of Babylonia; but by common consent the Heb. Psalms take the first place, and indeed many of them are not surpassed even by the ripest productions of Christianity. The Psalms supply the ideal and pattern on which the whole devotional response of man to God has modelled itself throughout every one of those branches of religion which trace back their origin to Israel. To say this is to claim for them—and to claim beyond possibility of dispute or question—an unique place in religious history. In the case of the Psalms it is perhaps not so much the substance that is a new creation as the form and mode of expression, the underlying attitude of the soul, when it approached the presence of its God.

From the beginnings of Heb. religious poetry, there are two distinct strains in which the poet speaks: he speaks in the name of the community or nation collectively, and he speaks for himself as an individual. We may take the Song of Deborah as a specimen of the first of these classes, and the Lament of David over Saul and Jonathan as a specimen of the second. In the earlier ages there can be little doubt that the former style preponderated. It was, of course, inevitable that an individual utterance should from time to time express individual emotion; even when he sang as spokesman for the community, the Heb. poet could not help expressing the collective emotion as it was reflected in his own breast. But this was a different thing from the habit of introspection which must have become much more common after the Exile, when the national existence was broken up and the doctrine of individual responsibility had been clearly and strongly asserted. We shall be safe in referring to a post-exilic date the more introspective portions of the Psalter.

But indeed it is probable that the main body of the Psalter belongs to this later date. There is probably truth in the description of the Psalter as 'the hymn-book of the Jewish Church,' and as belonging to the time when the self-consciousness of the Church was freer and stronger than that of the nation. At the same time it seems to us a mistake to lay down any hard and fast line, or to suppose that few or none of the Psalms go back to the time before the Exile. In particular, we should be inclined to treat as pre-exilic most of the Psalms which are addressed to, or speak of, the king. There may be a greater number of early Psalms than is sometimes supposed, under the disguise of later modifications and adaptations.

(ii.) *Wisdom Literature.*—The history of the so-called 'Wisdom Literature' of the Hebrews is closely parallel to that of the Psalter. The 'wise men' form a class by the side of the priests and prophets (Jer 18^{18}). Practically this class is found in all rising civilizations; there was a natural tendency to look up to those who by age and experience and native shrewdness showed themselves capable of giving good counsel. In the East particularly, this class is clearly marked; it is found in the neighbouring nations as well as in Israel. Edom appears to have had a high reputation in this respect (Jer 49^{7}, Ob ^{8}, cf. Job 2^{11}); and so, too, had Egypt and the 'children of the east' (1 K $4^{30f.}$). In Israel no one equalled King Solomon in fame (1 K 4^{29-34}). This fame led to collections of proverbs being attributed to him (Pr 1^{1} 10^{1} 25^{1}), just as collections of Psalms were attributed to David, though it does not follow that all parts of the collections really go back to this early date. The 'wisdom' of the Hebrews differed from the philosophy of the Greeks, though it held the same kind of place in the national life. With the Greeks, philosophy belonged to a higher stage of intellectual culture; in Israel, wisdom consisted mainly in sagacious maxims bearing upon the conduct of life, though sometimes it was conceived in a higher sense, and personified as a principle guiding the Almighty in His work of creation, and determining appointments of human society (Pr $3^{19f.}$ 8, Job 28).

We observe a gradual progress, in respect both of substance and of form. Proverbs, like poetry, were in the first instance a natural spontaneous product of the soil; it was only by degrees that they came to be artistically treated as a form of literature. As such they became more elaborate and more complex as time went on; they begin with short and pithy sayings, and only gradually expand into connected paragraphs, like the praises of Wisdom in Pr 1–9. In point of elaboration, as in profundity of treatment, the climax is reached in the Book of Job. In this we have the sustained and searching discussion of one of the deepest problems that exercised the Hebrew mind. It is a mark of later date as the themes become more and more religious. The personifications of Divine Wisdom are perhaps due to the influence of the *Diaspora*, and through it of Greek philosophy It is in this direction especially that we see development in the Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach, and in the Alexandrian Book of Wisdom. Ecclesiastes is a Jewish product, also late, of a

frame of mind not much represented in Hebrew literature—the tendency to scepticism and pessimism, which is, however, kept within bounds by the ingrained religious habit of the nation. This book no doubt stands on the extreme verge of the OT Canon, and it was only after a struggle that it maintained its place there. But we may be glad that this type too should have received its consecration. For all men there are times when sorrow is better than laughter, and it is better to go to the house of mourning than to the house of feasting (Ec $7^{2.3}$).

(iii.) *Other Books.*—We have now accounted for nearly all the books included in the Jewish Canon, but a few remain. Of these the most important is the Book of Daniel. This is a continuation of the older Prophecy, with a considerable change of form, which becomes what we now call 'apocalyptic.' It had had some precursors in the older prophetic books (especially Is 24–27 and Joel); but from the time of the Maccabees onwards the new type definitely took the place of the old. It was distinguished from this by throwing its pictures into the more distant future; it is persistently eschatological, supernatural, and, we might say, mythological—in the sense that it makes free use of imagery derived in part from ancient myths that are not confined to Israel.

The Book of Daniel was the first of a series which extended over nearly three centuries. It was the only book of its class which found its way into the Bible, until it received a companion in the Christian Apoc. of St. John. The apocalyptic literature arose in the first instance in a time of distress and trial, and the strongest impulse was given to it in such times. The Book of Daniel was written to cheer the suffering saints in the great persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes. The oldest apocalyptic portion of the Book of Enoch appears to have been produced about the same date. 4 Ezra and Apoc. of Baruch were called forth in like manner by the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. But it does not follow that every apocalyptic writing was a product of the same conditions. Dr. Charles has recently shown good reasons for assigning the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, which are partly apocalyptic, to the comparatively calm and settled time of John Hyrcanus (B.C. 135–105).

Another special *genre*, which we find distributed among different sections of the Canon as the Jews divided it, was the instructive tale—instructive in different ways, and admitted into the Canon for different purposes. Such would be the very pleasing idyllic story of Ruth, the deeper religious message of Jonah (which won for that book a place among the Prophets), the patriotic legend of Esther. Lamentations is really a small collection of a special group of Psalms. The Song of Songs is in like manner a collection of the kind of lyrics that were specially in use at marriage festivities.

2. Formation of the OT Canon.—We have traced the growth of OT as a number of separate books composed along the lines of the different branches of Hebrew literature. We have tried—very roughly—to put the several books into their places in the history of this literature, and to indicate their general relations to similar phenomena among the neighbouring nations. We might call this the 'natural history' of the first part of the Bible. We have indeed, it may be hoped, left room to see that there may be in the origins of this series of books something more than a natural history. But we are as yet some way from having explained how the OT came to be received as a sacred volume. Between the point which we have reached and the further point which marks the completion of OT as a body of canonical writings there intervene two main stages: (i.) the collection of the books into a volume with certain definite subdivisions; and (ii.) the investing of this volume with certain attributes by virtue of which it was regarded as sacred. The first is an external process raising only, or at least primarily, questions of quantity or dimensions—the number of books to be included in the volume. The second process relates rather to quality—the growth of a fuller and more consciously realized conception of the attributes belonging to the volume.

For both purposes it may be well to take our start from a point which happens to stand out distinctly, neither at the beginning nor at the end, but in the middle of the process. This point is supplied by the Prologue of the Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach, commonly known as Ecclesiasticus. The Prologue is the work of the grandson of the original author of the book, which he translated into Greek about the year B.C. 130. The younger writer refers several times to the religious literature of his nation. He speaks of it always under three heads: 'whereas many and great things have been delivered unto us by the law and the prophets, and by the others that have followed in their steps'; 'my grandfather Jesus, having much given himself to the reading of the law, and the prophets, and the other books of our fathers'; 'not only these, but the law itself, and the prophecies, and the rest of the books.'

(1) *Contents of the OT Canon.*—The threefold division, as we have just seen, corresponds to a triple collection of books embraced within a larger unity. The three collections appear to have succeeded each other in order of time, and the order of time was also, from the Jews' point of view, that of relative importance.

The five books of the Law were brought together first, as it would seem, about B.C. 400, at the end of the period of active and concentrated study that we associate with the names of Ezra and Nehemiah. The final collection and codification of the legal material inherited from the more distant past or produced to give roundness and completeness were the first-fruits of the labours of the new class of scribes. The marking off of the legal books proper (Pentateuch) was an innovation. The older documents extended further than this, J supplying in addition parts of the Book of Joshua (Hexateuch), and E perhaps running on into Samuel. From the point of view of Ezra and Nehemiah the main object was political and religious re-organization, the re-establishment of the people under stable conditions; for them, history as such was subordinate. They had a high conception—the very highest—of the obligation of law, the origin of which they believed to be in the fullest sense Divine. This deep sense of the obligation of law comes out in the narrative of Neh 8–10. The five books of the Law thus became the nucleus of the Jewish Bible. Even the Prophets, when they came to be added, did not attain to the same absolute and unqualified authority. A writer like Philo (*ob.* after 40 A.D.) builds his whole system really on the Law, and treats the rest of the OT as a kind of appendix to it.

For the completion of the collection, or Canon, of the Prophets we go down about two centuries to *c.* 200 B.C. The number of the prophetical books, according to the Jews' reckoning, was eight. The Historical Books were counted with the Prophets, as having for the most part prophets for their authors. Among the Jews, 1 and 2 Sam. and 1 and 2 Kings were contained in single rolls and were not divided; so that there were four

'Former Prophets,' as they were called (Josh., Judges, Sam., Kings), and four 'Latter Prophets' (Is., Jer., Ezek., XII.), what are now known as the Twelve Minor Prophets being all contained in a single roll. The proof that the second division of the Canon was complete by B.C. 200 is supplied by the enumeration of 'the Twelve Prophets' in Sir 49[10] (the original work of the son of Sirach dating from about B.C. 180). This marks the end of a period which begins with the interest shown by the prophets of the Exile in the works of their predecessors (Ezk 38[17], Is 44[7] 46[10] 48[3], Zec 1[4f.] 7[2-7]). The actual collection of the Prophetical Books was doubtless a further work of the scribes. It is to be noted that Jonah was included in the volume of the Twelve, though this book was not exactly a prophecy in the same sense as the others (it might seem to come rather under the head of the edifying tale); but the teaching of the book is thoroughly prophetic, a practical exemplification of Jer 18[7. 8].

When the grandson of the son of Sirach introduced his grandfather's work to his countrymen and others in Egypt, a third division of the Canon was in process of formation, but not as yet so closed as to be beyond receiving additions. We may infer this, partly from the vagueness of the title ('other books,' 'rest of the books'), partly from the fact that the Book of Daniel and certain Psalms composed in this period (for at least Pss. 44. 74. 79. 83 may probably be set down as Maccabæan) were admitted into it. It would appear that this division must have been closed, roughly speaking, about B.C. 100, as the Psalms of Solomon (composed B.C. 70–40) could no longer be included, but form a separate collection outside.

(2) *Palestinian and Alexandrian Canon.*—It was in the course of the 1st cent. B.C. that the process of adding books to the OT was checked and came to an end. Edifying books went on being composed in Palestine as well as among the *Diaspora*, but by degrees there grew up a reluctance to place them on the same footing with the older Scriptures. It can only have been quite gradually that this reluctance gained strength sufficient to lead to the drawing of a definite line that was no longer to be passed. We have seen how the little collection of Psalms composed about B.C. 70–40 was marked off from the Psalter of David and inscribed with the name of Solomon. This shows that the authorities—in other words, the Rabbinical schools, which were by this time in full swing—were giving attention to the matter and trying to lay down a definite rule. But in spite of their efforts they were not at once completely successful. We may see this from the freedom with which books afterwards set aside as apocryphal were still quoted in NT. The real conclusion of the OT belongs to the sixty years or so between the fall of Jerusalem and the rising under Bar Cochba (A.D. 132–135). It was part of the general settlement brought about by the commanding influence of the group of Rabbis headed by R. Akiba. The settlement in the case of the Canon was based upon existing usage, which was at last formally sanctioned and defined by the religious leaders of the nation. The work by which this was done was necessarily retrospective; it was a process of reflexion based on reasoning and issuing in a decision that had the force of a dogma. The reasoning comes out clearly for the first time in a well-known passage of Josephus (*c. Apion.* i. 8), where the prophetic inspiration is traced down to the time of Artaxerxes (B.C. 465–424; but Jos. appears to mean Ahasuerus or Xerxes; cf. Ryle, *Canon*, p. 161 n.); books written before this date were inspired, but not those written beyond it. There were differences of opinion as to the limit, and there was a good deal of faulty criticism abroad, the real date of many books being forgotten; but the principle of authority co-extensive with inspiration was definitely affirmed. In the same passage we have the first enumeration of the sacred books, which are equal in number with the (22) letters of the Hebrew alphabet. Here again we may see at work the speculations of the Rabbis. According to another reckoning which prevails in the Talmud, the number of the books was twenty-four, Ruth being separated from Judges, and Lam. from Jeremiah. According to yet another, there were twenty-seven in all, which were still equal to the Heb. alphabet, the five final letters being added for the double books. Such learned trifling was characteristic of the time; it was the way in which the Jewish mind sought to give expression to its idea of permanence and law inherent in the nature of things.

In the meantime the close connexion between Jerusalem and Alexandria, which had continued so long as Palestine remained a province of Egypt (to about B.C. 198), though it did not entirely cease, was loosened, and the Greek-speaking or Hellenistic Jews, whose greatest strength was in Egypt, went on a way of their own, not regulated by the schools of the Rabbis. In the copies of the Greek OT an arrangement of the books, differing somewhat from that of the Heb. and more according to subject, was adopted; and other edifying books were added more freely to the older collection. Thus arose the fuller Alexandrian Canon, which was taken over in the main by the Christian Church when it broke with Judaism.

An additional proof that, even when the list of books was provisionally formed, it was not so fixed as it afterwards became, is supplied by the state of the text. In the older books, Sam., Kings, Jer., Job, a comparison of the LXX with the Heb. shows many marked variations; and in some that belong to the later stratum, such as Dan., Esther, Ezra, Tobit, the differences are so great as to amount to another form of the book. This condition of things, without invoking deeper considerations, would be enough to prove that the idea of the Canon was still fluid. And it is in full agreement with these phenomena that the final determination of the Canon at the beginning of the 2nd cent A.D. appears to have gone along with an authoritative revision of the text. It has been demonstrated, especially by Lagarde, that all existing copies of the so-called Massoretic Text are traceable to a single copy of the time of Hadrian, of which not only the trivial peculiarities but even the blunders are faithfully reproduced. And a late story current in Arabic expressly stated that the extant MSS were all copied from a single original that was rescued from Bither, where R. Akiba met his death.

(3) *The idea of the Canon.*—Thus it appears that the full conception of the OT Canon as a strictly circumscribed collection of sacred books was the ultimate result of a process spread over a long period. The strict circumscription was in the first instance peculiar to the Jews, from whom it was taken over (though in a qualified sense) by St. Jerome, and it was revived by the divines of the Reformed Church in the sixteenth century.

How far does this sharp division correspond to the real facts of the case? What substantial grounds are there for setting apart the Canonical Books of OT as in a special sense the Word of God? Our next step must be to try to indicate these grounds and to show how what was at first an instinctive deference came by degrees to be a reasoned belief and an accepted doctrine.

(*a*) *Ground of the idea.*—When we speak of the Bible as the Word of God, we are using language that arose in prophetic circles and was at first used to describe the prophetic message. The prophet was regarded as God's spokesman, one who communicated to his fellows a message put into his mouth by God, shaped in his mind by direct Divine influence, and accepted by those to whom it was delivered as expressing the Divine will. When the prophet spoke, he spoke as God's mouthpiece; his own personality dropped out of sight;

he prefaced what he had to say by the formula, 'Thus saith the Lord.'

This conception was wide-spread through antiquity. It lay behind the belief in the oracles, *e.g.* of Delphi or Dodona. But nowhere else was the belief so strong as it was in Israel. In the case of the classical nations we seem to be in the presence of something tentative and limited. There was the belief that a reply might be given to definite questions, and such replies were given, and for whole periods together (*e.g.* especially in the era of colonization in the 8th and 7th cents. B.C.) exercised a beneficent influence over the fortunes of the Hellenic race. But at other periods (*e.g.* the Persian Wars) the oracle took the wrong side, and its utterances were often halting, obscure, and ambiguous. There is a great interval between phenomena like these and the confident burning faith of the Heb. prophets and their unflinching enthusiasm in the cause of God and of morality. And although the interval is to some extent bridged over by the many steps and degrees between the lower and the higher forms of Heb. prophecy, it is only right to remember that the higher forms triumphed so completely that they entirely dominate the prophetic literature, and it is only through incidental allusions and the narrative of the historical books that the existence of the lower forms can be at all adequately realized.

The prophet was a man with a message from God; and at first this message was delivered by word of mouth, and it was only occasionally that it was preserved by tradition and so came to be embodied in writing (*e.g.* 2 S 12^{1-6}, 1 K 11^{29-39}). But a time came when (as we have seen) the prophet himself began to write down his own prophecies; and it is in this way that the *corpus* of prophetic writings has survived and confronts us with permanent witness to their greatness. It is hardly necessary to add that the essential qualities of prophecy belonged to the spoken word, and the written word did but add to this the property of permanence. But in the history of religion that one addition was of first-rate importance. It fixed the supernatural or providential element in the history of a single race, and converted it into a possession of all humanity for all time.

It is natural to seize upon these phenomena of prophecy as the most typical and central of those which made of the OT a sacred book. But they are more typical and central in the impression which they make upon us than they were in the actual course of history. The prophetic writings have been preserved, and we can see in them the psychological process out of which they arose. The whole activity of the prophets is laid bare before us to a degree that hardly obtains for any other product of Israel's religion. The pre-prophetic period is also to a large extent pre-historic. Such knowledge as we have of it has come down to us through folklore, or imperfectly controlled oral tradition. In order to form a realistic conception of the earlier period, we have to eke out the historical data with inferences backwards from later but more contemporary descriptions. It is in this way that we have to reconstruct our conception of the work of Moses. But we can succeed in this sufficiently to verify the impression which the whole subsequent history of Israel forces upon us as to the epoch-making character of that work. We have already hinted (p. 564 f.) at the general conception that we are led to form of the work of Moses. We should perhaps think of it most adequately as a combination of the priestly and prophetic functions, or as a form of prophecy which was not only the continuation of a work already begun, but the foundation of a long line of subsequent development. In any case the figure of Moses must exceed those of even the greatest of the later prophets in magnitude. By this it is not meant that the sum-total of the Mosaic revelation, so far as it can be reconstructed, is richer in contents than later stages of the revelation built upon it. The very fact that it is earlier and foundation-laying would exclude this. But the laying of foundations must always as such possess a significance that can never belong to any part, even the finest part, of the superstructure.

The Heb. people were therefore essentially right in their estimate of Moses; and if, on the score of criticism, we are compelled to make considerable deductions from the direct historical value of the narrative of the Pentateuch as it has come down to us, there are none to be made from the proportions of the dim but grand figure which looms behind it, or from the work which God accomplished through this in many ways most colossal of His human ministers. It is therefore not without reason that the Law lies at the base of the Jewish Canon, and that all the rest is subordinate to it.

There is a sense in which it is really subordinate, and another sense in which it is not. We may understand this from the way in which OT is treated in NT. We can see from many allusions, both in the Gospels and in the Epistles, that the historical importance of Moses was abundantly recognized both by our Lord and by His Apostles. It is not explicitly discussed and defined, because there was no necessity for such discussion. It was simply taken for granted as the axiom of every pious Jew. But the time had come, after all those centuries, for a new advance in the religious education of the world. And therefore it was that a greater even than Moses gave a new law from the hillside behind Capernaum. And it is not surprising that in this new law there should be elements that have their roots in the Prophets and Psalms even more distinctly than in the Books of Moses. Isaiah is the 'evangelical prophet' in a sense in which such a name could not be given to Moses; and yet the Greater Prophet of the future was to be like Moses, and not like Isaiah.

It must be allowed that, as compared with these two great divisions, the Law and the Prophets, the rest of the OT stands in a subordinate and supplemental relation. But, here again, the very idea of 'supplement' should save us from undue depreciation. A structure that admits of being supplemented is incomplete without its supplement. What a gap would be left in OT if we were to strike out the Psalms! The sense of what that gap would mean may bring home to us the value of the Psalter in the scheme of Revelation. And, in like manner, although the loss of the Wisdom Books might not be so acutely felt, it is one that we should be very loath to incur. And even the Song of Songs brings in a touch of human nature, like the flowering of a lily or a rose, that could ill be spared.

These outlying books may be described as examples of 'applied religion.' Some are higher in the species, and some are lower; some are nearer the great generative centres, and some are more remote; some are simpler and more rudimentary, and others more advanced. But they are all alike symptoms or outlets of those eruptive spiritual forces which lay at the heart of Israel as a nation, and were at once the evidence and the expression of its special mission from God.

(*b*) *Extension of the idea.*—So far we have spoken of the actual course of the growth of the Hebrew literature and of the special qualities inherent in it. These qualities are not identical

with those implied in the doctrinal conception of the Canon, but they are the ultimate facts which led up to that conception. They belong to the process of growth which, like such processes generally, is apt to be unequal in its different parts. The doctrinal conception of the Canon implies a completed process, and takes the shape of reflexion upon an accomplished fact.

We have been trying to analyze those elements in the original Scriptures which caused them to be regarded as sacred books. But the idea of sacredness in itself is not in the first instance cut and dried; it is progressive, and admits of degrees. It is this, and we see that it is this, so long as we regard it as an attribute of the living product. But when once the process of living growth has ceased, when the mind turns back upon the finished and stationary result, and sums up its reflexions in logical form, the closer touch with fact is apt to be lost, and the propositions which take its place become dogmatic and artificial. From the time that there were religious writings in Israel at all, they were regarded as sacred; but there is a certain amount of interval and inference between this instinctive reverence and the formulated definition of sanctity which by the time of Christ had won its way to general acceptance, at least in those Pharisaic circles which held control of the future. The inferences seemed to lie very near at hand; they were easy and natural: a book is sacred; it is the Word of God; does it not follow that it must be also perfect, incapable of error, absolutely binding in all its parts, a finished whole from which nothing could be subtracted and to which nothing could be added? These consequences did not really follow, but we cannot be surprised that they should have seemed to do so.

It is just here that the difference between older and newer views of the Bible comes in. The older view was in effect identical with that formulated by the Rabbis in the first century of our era. The newer view is not traditional, but aims at being scientific; it aims at correcting the current conception by a renewed comparison with the original facts. And the main effect of this renewed comparison is to make us stand by the old ideas of sacredness and inspiration, but at the same time disengage them from inferences wrongly though naturally deduced from them. To say that the Bible is sacred, and that the Spirit of God breathed in the men who wrote it, is not the same thing as to say that it is infallible, especially on points remote from its purpose as revelation. The one set of attributes can be verified, the other cannot.

(*c*) *Canonical and Apocryphal.*—The technical term used by the Rabbis, where we say that a book 'is canonical,' is that it 'defiles the hands.' That is only another way of saying that it is sacred; the person using it must be ceremonially purified before he can come in contact with other things. Until he has done this he is 'under a tabu,' and the contact with a sacred thing compels him to undergo a ceremony of purification. Our word 'canonical' is less expressive; it only means that the book is 'on the list,' *i.e.* the authorized list of the sacred volumes. That, at least, was the earliest Greek use; in Latin the word acquired a more active sense of authority.

The correlative term to 'canonical' is 'apocryphal,' which means, properly, 'hidden, or withdrawn from public use.' But this idea of 'hidden books' is ambiguous, and might be used in opposite senses according to the purpose of the hiding. A book might be 'hidden' because its contents were esoteric, or beyond the understanding of the vulgar; or it might be hidden because its contents were harmful. We can see that the two senses might meet, inasmuch as what was harmful for one might be helpful to another. But we may say broadly that the two senses succeeded each other. A number of books were composed which by their authors and in certain circles were highly valued because of their mysterious contents, intended only for the select few. But in course of time and in other circles they fell out of favour and were suppressed or withdrawn, for the converse reason, because they were thought to be pernicious for the many. The standard of judgment was that of Judaism; and the writings in question were in the first instance more particularly the Jewish Apocalypses (like the Book of Enoch, 4 Ezra, Apoc. of Baruch). In the century before, and in the century after, the Christian era, many works of this kind were composed, and at first they exercised considerable attraction. It is a mistake to suppose that in principle and from the outset there was any direct opposition to them on the part of the Rabbinical authorities. But at the time when the Jewish Canon was being definitely formed, they began to go out of favour, and in the 2nd cent. A.D. Judaism more and more turned its back upon them. The most scholarly among the Christian writers (Origen and Jerome), whose opinions in the end carried the day, were in touch with Judaism; and so it came about that what the Jews rejected the Christian Church ended by also rejecting, at least in the circles that had the greatest influence with the Reformers. And the word 'apocryphal,' which began by being used in a good sense, came to be used first in a neutral, and then in a bad one; esoteric writings were first prized, then tolerated, then excluded; the name which marked them as esoteric came to mark them as excluded; and all the excluded works were lumped together under the same title.

In the early ages of the Church the exclusion was only relative, and confined to a few learned men. Meantime the great body of the Church went on using freely the wider Alexandrian Canon, which admitted practically everything that was found edifying. The two standards went on side by side, with a certain amount of influence from the stricter upon that which was more lax. At the Reformation itself different shades of opinion prevailed in different quarters. The Reformed Churches were the most thoroughgoing; the Anglicans and Lutherans took up the intermediate position of Jerome; the Church of Rome does not endorse this, but permits a guarded use of the term 'deutero-canonical'—an invention of Sixtus Senensis in 1566.

LITERATURE.—Among the most recent and instructive works on the subject of this article are: Budde, *Gesch. d. althebr. Litteratur*, with Appendix on the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha by Bertholet (Leipzig, 1908) [Budde's *Kanon d. AT* (1900) is more restricted in scope]; Gunkel, 'Die isr. Literatur' (in *Kultur d. Gegenwart*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1906); Cornill, *Einleit. in d. AT* (from 1891; 6th ed., 1908); Holscher, *Kanonisch u. Apokryph* (Leipzig, 1905). The comprehensive work ed. by Kautzsch, with the help of other scholars, *Die Heilige Schrift d. AT* (1894; 2nd ed. begun in 1908), and his *Apokryphen u. Pseudepigraphen* (1900), are of much utility. In English, we have a standard work in Driver's *Introd. to the Literature of OT* (from 1891); for the formation of the Canon, Ryle, *Canon of the OT* (1892); and a translation (by B. W. Bacon) of Wildeboer, *Origin of the Canon of the OT* (1895). Excellent editions of the Apocalyptic writings have been supplied by Charles; and Swete's *Introd. to the OT in Greek* (1900) is full of exact information as to the relation of the Heb. and Gr. Bibles. The present writer's Bampton Lectures on *Inspiration* (from 1893) may perhaps still be referred to. The reader will also naturally consult the Bible Dictionaries and Commentaries upon particular books (in the International series, the Westminster series, the Century Bible, etc.)

II. *HISTORY OF NT.*

In two points the history of NT resembles that of OT. Both proceeded in the first instance, directly or indirectly, from 'pneumatic' or inspired men, and yet both were written without any idea of founding a sacred book. These characteristics they have in common. In a single

instance (Apoc. of St. John) the attitude of the writer of the NT work is very like that of an OT prophet or apocalyptist; and he describes his book by the old name as a 'prophecy.' But in other respects the conditions under which the NT arose were different and peculiar. And before going further we must try to explain them.

How the Books of NT came to be written.—(1) *The Epistles.*—(i.) *Of St. Paul.*—The Life of Christ had been lived and ended. The fundamental *events* of the Christian Religion were all past and over. The Christian Church was launched on its career; the late comer Paul had joined the original Apostles, and had begun his new and adventurous work of planting churches in Gentile as well as in Jewish lands. This work had been going on for some years. A whole journey, taken up with preaching and church-founding, is recorded in the Acts (13^4–14^{26}), but has not left behind it any literature that is now extant. Another journey had begun and was some way advanced—it would be about the year A.D. 51—when a letter was written, followed by a second, which are both in our possession (1 and 2 Thess.). These two Epistles are the first beginnings of NT. It is highly probable that other letters had been written by St. Paul before them; occasions for letters would be as plentiful on the first journey as on the second, and St. Paul was evidently in the habit of using these occasions in a perfectly easy and natural way. But really the wonder is, not that such letters should have perished, but that the two of which we have just spoken and so many others after them should have survived. That they have done so is a measure of the strength of the impression which the personality of St. Paul made upon his contemporaries. It must have been felt from a very early date in his career by those among whom he moved, that these letters of his were no ordinary compositions, but that they well deserved to be prized and treasured. As correspondence, they began in the way natural to correspondence: the Apostle received news of his converts after he had left them; or he bethought himself of something that he wished to say but had not said; or his converts wrote to him, asking for guidance in the new relations upon which they had entered. These were just common incidents of daily life, though daily life involved in higher issues than those which occupy the mass of mankind. And St. Paul himself was no common man. It was not for nothing that his previous career should have been so eventful; it was not for nothing that he had first persecuted the faith which he came to preach; it was not for nothing that he had undergone the shock of his conversion, and that after it he had spent a prolonged time in solitude and reflexion; it was not for nothing that at Damascus, Jerusalem, and Antioch he had been at close quarters and in active discussion with leading spirits of the Christian society, apostles and prophets and teachers who were full of the Holy Ghost. He himself in marked degree was full of the Holy Ghost and of power (1 Co 2^4), and the effect of this was felt not only in the crises of action and life, but in the quieter moments in which he took the pen in hand. The consequence was that, even when the occasions which led to his writings were, or might seem to be, comparatively trivial, he never treated trivial things in a trivial way. Behind all that St. Paul wrote there was a vast momentum of character and spiritual experience and insight; and all this momentum came into play as soon as he put pen to paper. Small questions were settled on large principles; and these principles were laid down with exceptional clearness and force. And behind St. Paul's writing there was always the whole man; not intellect alone, or character alone, or spiritual experience alone, but the three things blended and fused together in an unique personality.

And then it has to be remembered that, when we speak of spiritual experience in the case of St. Paul, we are not speaking merely of subjective psychological processes; we are speaking of real and mighty influences proceeding from the living God. This opens out to us another side of the life of the Primitive Church. It is of course only in a very relative sense that we speak of even St. Paul as 'unique.' He in no sense created the extraordinary enthusiasm which, we can see, animated his churches. We can be sure that he did not let them fall below the level that prevailed elsewhere; the Epistles make it clear to us that they in no way fell below this level. But the movement that we find at work in St. Paul's Churches did not originate with them. It originated on what we call the Day of Pentecost, *i.e.* in near proximity to, and under the immediate influence of, the Resurrection. The fires were kindled in the Mother Church at Jerusalem, and in the first great colonies at Antioch and Damascus, before they spread to the sphere of the missionary labours of St. Paul. It was a contagion, like the effect of leaven, that passed from one individual Christian to another. The life of the Churches was as far as possible removed from a dead and humdrum existence. A great wave of enthusiasm, which was something more than enthusiasm, swept through them all; or rather, not a single wave but a succession of waves, a succession so sustained that it seemed to be continuous. St. Paul himself did but share in this. He knew perfectly well that whatever endowment he himself possessed was not self-generated; it was not at all that he lashed himself up into a state of excitement which required extraordinary expression. It was a force outside him that seized upon him and would not let him go. As in the case of the old prophets, the call when it once came to him was irresistible; it was useless to fight against it; as he himself says, a necessity was laid upon him (1 Co 9^{16}). The necessity came from the Spirit of Christ. We cannot do better than study the Epistles of St. Paul if we wish to understand what the working of the Spirit of Christ was. It is true that this working took some forms that to us at the present day are apt to seem uncouth (1 Co 12. 14); they were attended by physical phenomena that are apt to seem abnormal. It was to be expected that a great movement affecting masses of men should affect them in ways corresponding to the ideas current at the time. Many modern writers speak as though this were the sum of the whole matter, and as though we from the lofty platform of the discipline of science could afford to look down upon these humble phenomena. Humble they may be in themselves, but they cannot be taken by themselves; they are so far from being the sum of the whole matter that they are only as it were the rippling upon the surface of the real movement. Look, again we may say, at St. Paul's Epistles. How much is there in them of the speaking with tongues, or even of the working of miracles, such as the healing of the sick? These things certainly are implied, but they are behind the scenes; and the Epistles of St. Paul have enough to occupy us that is not behind the scenes. He himself put these phenomena into their right place, though he did not under-value them. They were just a single, and very partial, expression of that mighty force which possessed his whole soul and being. If we look at the Epistles with insight and discrimination and with a sense of the true proportions of things, we shall have no difficulty

in seeing where this force really breaks out in the main stream of its volcanic working. There are certain Epistles that we instinctively call the 'Great Epistles'; we call them so because the inspiration of which we are speaking is so visibly and unmistakably strong in them. But to form an adequate estimate, we must not confine ourselves to just so much as we see; we must take the evidence which they supply as to that which we do not see. It is to some extent a matter of accident—of Divinely-guided accident perhaps, but of that which we are in the habit of calling accident—what kind of subject-matter the inspiration has to deal with; but the same moving force is at work in small things as well as great. For instance, it would be natural enough to say that there was less of inspiration in 1 Co 5–8. 12. 14. 16, or even in 9–11, than there is in chs. 1–4. 13. 15; but it is not exactly that there is less inspiration; it is the same inspiration at work all the time; but it is this same inspiration dealing with lower things.

It is convenient to use the old-fashioned word 'inspiration.' It may well be questioned whether there is any other that better expresses the facts. We mean by it the evidence of indwelling Deity in man. We no longer suppose that this indwelling Deity imparts infallibility to every chance utterance relating to external nature or man. Really, from the modern point of view, it is hardly infallibility of any sort for which we are looking. The Divine impulse and the human expression are so inextricably mixed together that we can rarely, if ever, arrive at that which could be called infallible in the strict sense. But, after all, the idea of infallibility is only a notion of the head; and these head-notions have come to be at a discount. So, although the search for infallibility is weaker than it was, we should by no means say the same of the search for the Divine. It is the presence of this that we look for in the Epistles of St. Paul, and that we find in such abundant measure. And even the modern man, when he has found it, goes on his way rejoicing, like one that findeth goodly pearls.

It may be objected that this view of inspiration is vague in comparison with the old idea. That is just its merit. The old idea was definite enough, but it did not correspond with the facts. The new idea leaves room for a width and depth of meaning that is not, all of it, expressible in language. We can see something of the working of inspiration, and we can see something of its results. In the case of St. Paul these appear in his singular wisdom in the management of men, in his strong and clear grasp of a new type of character, in his deep insight into the attributes and will of God and His providential dealings with mankind.

The letters of St. Paul, as we have seen, from an early date made a great impression on those to whom they were addressed; and this impression soon spread to enemies as well as friends (2 Co 10^{10}). This encouraged the Apostle to make a more extended use of the letter form as a vehicle for instruction. Some of his letters, like the Epp. to Romans and Ephesians, expand into regular treatises. They cover a large area of the wide field of Christian teaching. And yet they are still at bottom essentially letters (Deissmann, *Licht vom Osten*, pp. 165–167); in each case the Apostle has definite recipients before his mind. If this is less marked in the case of Eph. than elsewhere, the reason is that it was in the first instance a circular letter addressed to several Churches at once.

Of late years attention has been called (especially by Deissmann) to the fact that there existed in antiquity, and especially about the Christian era, two distinct types of letters: the ordinary letter, arising naturally out of given conditions and addressed to definite persons, and the 'epistle,' which was a more formal composition intended for a wider public, though for literary reasons couched in the form of an open letter. The consciousness of the existence of this species of composition may have had some slight influence upon St. Paul, and still more perhaps upon some other Christian leaders; but the weightier contents of some of the Epp. grew spontaneously out of the circumstances of the case, and were a natural development of his own work by an original and unconventional mind.

We have assumed above the genuineness of all the Epistles that bear the name of St. Paul. This is in accordance with the deliberate opinion of the present writer. At the same time, it would not be right to disguise the fact that the genuineness of some at least of the Epistles is questioned, and that it does in fact stand upon a different footing in some cases and in others. We may really mark off descending grades of clearness and certainty. Putting aside the extravagant views of certain Swiss and Dutch critics, who would reject the whole body of Pauline Epp., but whose doubts have met with no support from the best authorities, and may now be regarded as definitely silenced, there would be a first class of seven Epp. which may be set aside as practically certain (1 Thess., Rom., Gal., 1 and 2 Cor., Phil., Philem.). To these may safely be added 2 Thess. and Col., which are indeed questioned, but on very insufficient grounds. There is more reason, but still (as it seems to us) insufficient reason, for hesitation as to Eph.; and perhaps a little more again as to the three so-called Pastoral Epp., 1 and 2 Tim., Titus.

(ii.) *Other Epistles.*—The Epistles of St. Paul are the typical and primary example of the epistolary literature of NT. But a further group of writings of a similar character has come down to us: Ep. to Hebrews as an outlying member of the Pauline collection, not by St. Paul himself, but by a writer of a kindred spirit, a near ally or (less probably) a direct disciple; and besides this the seven so-called 'Catholic Epistles.' All these writings follow as it were in the wake of St. Paul. He gave the impulse which led to their composition, and to a considerable extent determined their form. It is possible enough that, even though St. Paul had never lived or had never written, the force of circumstances would have brought into being a *genus scribendi* corresponding more or less to our present Epistles; but the dominating personality of the Apostle of the Gentiles, and the reputation which his letters so quickly gained (2 Co 10^{10}), gave both a stimulus and a model for imitation. The Ep. to Hebrews is indeed a letter (13^{22-25}), but it partakes more of the character of another class of writing that we have not yet mentioned, the philosophical *diatribe* (Deissmann, *op. cit.* p. 171). This is rightly described as the first work of Christian literature in the technical sense. St. Paul was not naturally a writer, but a man of thought and action who was driven into writing; the author of Ep. to Hebrews was a practised stylist, we may believe with some literary experience behind him, who instinctively cast his ideas and exhortations into a rhetorical form. Something of the same kind, though with less highly developed rhetoric, attaches to the greater Catholic Epistles—1 Pet., 1 Jn., James. We may see this at once from the wide and vague address of the two that have addresses: 1 Pet. is destined for 'the elect who are sojourners of the Dispersion' in the more northerly provinces of Asia Minor; James 'to the twelve tribes which are of the Dispersion.' Perhaps in the first case a few copies may have been sent to some of the leading churches, but in the second case the address would amount to little more than a formula for publication; we may suppose that copies would be given to strangers who happened to be in the neighbourhood of the Apostle, and that would be all. 1 Jn. has no

epistolary matter or any indication that it is intended for a particular class of readers, beyond the use of the second pers. plur.; and so it comes nearer still to the *diatribe*. When this is said, it is not intended that the writer deliberately adopted the *diatribe* form, but only that the existence of this class of literature helped unconsciously to shape the expression of his ideas. 2 and 3 Jn. are genuine letters on a small scale. 2 Pet. and Jude are both rather artificial compositions, which appear to have taken shape at no great distance from each other.

1 Pet. is not only modelled in general outline upon the Pauline Epp., but it also borrows directly from some of these (*e.g.* Rom., Eph.) in parts of its substance; and James may be said to have been produced by echoes of the Pauline teaching. But it by no means follows that this amount of derivativeness prevents the Epp. from possessing a high spiritual value. James supplies a judicious corrective for exaggerations of Pauline doctrine, and its moral teaching is at once elevated, simple, and sincere. 1 Pet. deals with profounder problems in a profounder spirit, and is at the same time a good example of the principles on which the Church was administered by its leaders. We must reckon with the possibility that something of the form of this Epistle is due to Silvanus, whom the Apostle used as his amanuensis (cf. Milligan, *Thess.* p. 125 f.). 1 Jn. in like manner is a fit pendant to the Fourth Gospel, and comes with all the impressive weight of the personality of its author. The two smaller Epp., while they reflect definite local conditions, are also evidently the work of one accustomed to wield power, and accustomed to take thought for the spiritual welfare of those whom he governs.

Ep. to Heb. is anonymous: the question both as to its authorship and as to the community to which it was addressed is intricate and difficult to bring to a clear conclusion; there is no agreement, and hardly even a tendency to agreement, at the present time. Yet the attestation of the Ep is very early (Clem. Rom.); and its value and interpretation are not much affected by the points in dispute. There is equally early proof of the existence of Ep. of James; and 1 Pet. and 1 Jn. are also very well attested. 2 and 3 Jn. really do not need attestation any more than Philem., and they go with 1 Jn. as Philem. goes with Col. 2 Pet. appears to belong to the group of pseudepigraphic writings that bear the name of St. Peter (along with Gosp., Apoc., and Preaching of Pet.). But that does not prevent it from having some good matter (esp. ch. 1 and 3[8-18]). Beyond some impressiveness of common Christian background there is not much that is distinctive in Jude, and the circumstances of its origin must remain vague. There are no better candidates than the traditional authors for the ownership of 1 Pet., Ja., 1, 2, 3 Jn. The last group at least may be ascribed with confidence to the Ephesian Presbyter John, whether or not he is to be identified with the Apostle the son of Zebedee. There are, however, some few questions which arise as to 1 Pet. and Ja. which with our present knowledge we are not in a position to answer.

Literature.—As to Hebrews, the main bifurcation of views is between Barnabas (Tert. and perhaps Roman tradition) as author and some limited congregation in Rome as address, and authorship mediately Pauline (through Lk. or Clement [Clem. Alex., Orig.]) and some community in Palestine. Apollos was a guess of Luther's. Novel and interesting suggestions have been made by Harnack, *ZNTW* (1900), and Ramsay, *Luke the Physician* (1908), p. 301 ff. The most thorough and satisfactory discussion of 1 and 2 Pet. is by F. H. Chase in Hastings' *DB* iii. 779; but for the possible share of Silvanus in the composition of the first Ep., see G. Milligan, *Thess.* (1908) p. 125 f.

(2) *The Gospels and Acts.*—We have seen in what an incidental and spontaneous manner the epistolary portion of NT arose and grew to considerable dimensions. The Gospels are a class of writings peculiar to Christianity. To understand them we must consider how they too arose. For the first years after the Lord's Resurrection there was no need or demand for writings of any kind. All this time the Church was living in the expectation of its Master's speedy return. It was an attitude of hope, looking upwards for the sign of the Son of Man in the heavens. Only by degrees did the intenser hope begin to subside. Meantime there can be little doubt that individual Christians, the disciples in Galilee and Jerusalem with the women and the relatives of the Lord, would compare notes with each other, with greater or less activity of intercourse according to the degree in which they were thrown together. But very few of the disciples will have had any sort of literary habits, and there would still be no idea of writing. If we go, not by any external chronology, but by the quality and character of what was written, we should probably not be wrong if we were to say that the first two chapters of St. Luke are the oldest evangelical fragment or document of NT. They are in any case the most archaic thing in the whole volume. In these chapters it might be said that Christianity was not yet out of its Jewish swaddling-clothes; the *Benedictus*, for example, is composed entirely from the standpoint of the Jewish expectation and not of the Christian fulfilment. But whoever first set them down in writing,—and this very archaic character compels us to believe that they were written,—they were in any case not at once published. They were written to satisfy the interest of a small and private circle; and they must for a number of years have been confined to that circle. Not until St. Luke came across them were they in the way towards anything like publication.

The first two chapters of St. Matthew's Gospel seem to have been in a similar position. They too appear to represent the tradition of a small circle, for a considerable time kept to itself. It is natural to think of this tradition as further removed from the facts than in the case of St. Luke. There are not the same guarantees of early date, and there is more reason to suspect the influence on the narrative of parallel situations in OT. At the same time we must not fail to notice the convergence of these two traditions, otherwise so independent, upon the Virgin Birth and the Birth at Bethlehem.

And yet these opening chapters of the two Gospels stand very much by themselves. They are altogether apart from the main stream of tradition current in the Churches. This was concerned, as we might naturally expect it to be concerned, with that part of our Lord's career which was lived directly under the public eye, and of which there were a number of living witnesses. Yet these witnesses, for reasons which have been explained, did not at first begin by setting down their recollections in writing. They doubtless made use of them in their own preaching, and they also handed them on to others who would utilize them in the same way. But the motive at work at first was not what we should call historical or biographical. It was exactly expressed by the peculiar word 'Gospel.' This was practically a coinage of the first Christians, sanctioned by, or even perhaps originating with, our Lord Himself, to express the message of hope and salvation addressed to a disheartened and despairing world. The ground of hope and salvation centred mainly in the Life and Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ Himself. And therefore the earliest preaching was in its main contents a preaching of these things, in part a narration and description of them as facts, and in part an enlarging upon their profound significance in the spiritual sphere. This second aspect of 'the Gospel' is what meets us most frequently in the Epistles of St. Paul. But the other aspect is there implied if not expressed. We have specimens of it in important passages like 1 Co 11[23-26] 15[1-8]. Such narratives must have entered largely into the παραδόσεις of which we have repeated mention (1 Co 11[2. 23] 2 Th 2[15] 3[6]). But in its urgent expectation of the Second Coming the Church did not at first

lay great stress on these historical facts. It presupposed them always, and it was fully assured of them as facts; but it was so well assured of them that it did not find it necessary to be constantly reminding itself about them. Its treasure was, where its heart was, in the heavens; it was more intent upon the future than upon the past, even such a past.

The impulse to the setting forth of the historical side of the Gospel came through the work of missions. On this side it soon proved necessary to supplement the oral teaching of St. Paul and the other missionaries. Especially was this the case in the newly-founded Gentile communities. These, we must remember, had to be built up from the very first. They had a great many elementary lessons to learn. Even the Jews, with the OT in their hands, had much to learn. They had to take in and to assimilate all the new teaching by which Christianity was distinguished from Judaism. The earliest Evangelical document of which we have any trace (except perhaps Lk 1. 2)—the earliest Evangelical document that was in any strict sense a possession of the whole Church—was the little book, corresponding to the common matter of Mt., Lk. (see p. 576 below), which scholars are now in the habit of calling Q, and which used (as the present writer believes, rightly) to be identified with the Matthæan *Logia* mentioned by Papias (Eus. *HE* iii. 39). We describe this work as intended for the whole Church, because there was certainly no circumscribing line beyond which it was not intended to travel, though the writer probably had in his mind Palestine and the Nearer East, *i.e.* that part of the East that was nearer to himself. The leading purpose of this little book appears to have been to set before its readers (the new converts in the different Churches) some account of the Christian ideal, the character and mode of life expected of them as Christians. It was felt that this could be best done by collecting together a number of typical sayings and discourses—*i.e.* shorter and longer sayings—of Christ. There was no idea of writing a biography, and not even in this case of composing a 'Gospel' (or full statement of the redeeming acts of Christ), but only a brief exemplar to set before the eyes and minds of converts.

Valuable as this was, it was sure not to satisfy for long the needs of Christians. It contained only a small part of the Gospel, and what they wanted was the whole Gospel. As time went on, and the expectation of Christ's Second Coming became weaker, Christians were thrown back upon themselves. They felt that they had time to reflect, and they began to reflect, upon the grounds of the faith that was in them. They had had these grounds 'placarded before their eyes' (Gal 3^{1}) by a number of preachers, including the greatest. But they were, so to speak, 'written on water.' They made their impression, but they were soon forgotten, and there was no guarantee of their permanence. It was the consideration of this state of things which impelled the Christians at Rome who surrounded St. Peter in the last days before his death to apply to his secretary, St. Mark, to rescue from oblivion the substance of the teaching they had had from him. St. Mark complied with their request, taking this teaching of St. Peter's as the nucleus of his work, but expanding it from materials which came to his knowledge in other ways. So arose the first complete Gospel.

When once this Gospel was given to the world, nothing could be more natural than that it should supply a pattern for others. It met (as we say) 'a felt want'; and from that time onwards St. Mark's Gospel was taken as at once a pattern and a basis of similar compositions. The Gospel that we know as St. Matthew's was just a combination of the substance of St. Mark's Gospel with Q and not a large amount of other material added by the editor. The portion derived from Q was so important—extending probably some way beyond the common matter of Mt. and Lk.—that it soon came quite to supersede the separate circulation of Q; the smaller work died out, and the larger took over its name; it passed as the work of St. Matthew (*a potiori parte*), though the framework of it was derived from St. Mark. In like manner, our present Gospel of St. Luke is also a combination of St. Mark with Q, but with a larger proportion of added matter from some further source, or sources, to which St. Luke alone had access, and to which he seems to have attached a special value.

The Second Gospel, which was the first of the three in order of time, was a sketch that we may call biographical (though it did not aim, and could not have aimed, because of the scantiness of the material, at the completeness of a modern biography). Still it took a narrative form; and its leading motive was reverence for the historical Person of Christ, and the desire to promote a like feeling of reverence and faith in others. Like St. Mark's Gospel, St. Matthew's (with the qualification mentioned above) was addressed to the Church at large. St. Luke's, on the other hand, was written at least in the first instance for the use of a particular individual, who appears to have stood to the writer in what we should call the relation of a 'patron' (Lk $1^{3f.}$). The success of this first volume, in the accomplishment of its purpose, encouraged the Evangelist to add to it another, which lies before us under the title of 'The Acts of the Apostles.' It is still addressed to the same Theophilus, and is written on the same historical lines as the Gospel. The Acts, however, can hardly have been included in the writer's original plan; because its opening paragraph differs so considerably from the conclusion of the Gospel (contrast, *e.g.*, Ac 1^{3} with Lk 24^{50}) that it seems safe to infer that the second volume was of the nature of an afterthought. Whether, by the time that he came to the end of this second volume, the author had conceived the idea of producing a complete 'trilogy' is perhaps slightly suggested by the way in which the volume closes, but must remain an open question.

The Fourth Gospel is generally held to stand rather by itself. It is without doubt the latest of the Gospels, and is written with a knowledge of the other three. At the same time it is not, like the First and Third, a compilation from materials already existing. On the view taken in this article, it is a retrospect by a writer of commanding position and authority, presupposing what has been already done, but adding to it from the stores of his own experience and reflexion. In some points—none of a fundamental character—it corrects the work of predecessors; on other points it supplements their statements; but, most of all, it reinforces and deepens the impression which they had left on the most central topic of Christian teaching. It is a mistake to suppose that the Fourth Gospel is essentially different in character and purpose from the other three. When St. Mark heads his work, 'The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God,' he is virtually saying the same thing as when St. John says, 'These things (or signs) are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye may have life in his name' (Jn 20^{31}). This declaration of his purpose by St. John is only an emphatic expansion of the claim that his work too is a 'Gospel,' *i.e.* a message and assurance from above of life and salvation through Jesus Christ. It is not a mere biography, like the

ordinary secular biographies; it does not aim at any completeness as a record of events or teaching. More than any of his fellows, the Fourth Evangelist concentrates himself upon the proof that Jesus Christ was all that Christians supposed Him to be. Incidentally he sets right some few things that had been 'forgotten or misdelivered'; he fills up some gaps, like the great gap which omitted all or nearly all that had been done in Judæa. But the great thing that the Fourth Evangelist did and aimed at doing was to re-affirm, with the consciousness of first-hand knowledge and conviction, the faith of the Church in its Lord and Master.

In asserting thus much of the Fourth Gospel, we do not assert that its author was raised above all possibilities of human error; we do not even assert that this very concentration of aim may not have had some prejudicial effect upon his narrative, considered simply as a narrative. What we do contend for is that the conviction to which he gives expression is the honest and first-hand conviction of one who had unique opportunities of basing his belief on fact.

The views implied above as to the origin and character of the first three or 'Synoptic' Gospels are substantially those which are held at the present time by a majority of scholars. It is very generally agreed that our present First and Third Gospels rest upon previously existing documents. One of these documents is neither more nor less than our present Gospel of St. Mark. A second may be approximately reconstructed from the common matter of St. Matthew and St. Luke which is not found in St. Mark, with the addition perhaps of some portions of St. Matthew to which there are no parallels in St. Luke, the latter writer having been compelled by lack of space to omit them. It is conceivable, though less probable, that there may be a few sections peculiar to St. Luke which also originally belonged to this document. But, in our opinion, this peculiar matter is better referred to some special source or sources to which St. Luke alone had access. The present writer fully believes that the two important extracts from the work of Papias preserved by Eusebius relate, the one to our extant Gospel of St. Mark, and the other to the second document disclosed by criticism which in the extract is referred to the Apostle St. Matthew. He believes that the authority quoted for these statements is none other than the writer of the Fourth Gospel, the John who played such a leading part at Ephesus towards the end of the 1st century A.D. He would observe that the statements made bear a great stamp of verisimilitude, just because they are so little obvious and not at all such as could be inferred from a superficial study of the Gospels The statement about St. Mark in particular points to criticisms upon that Gospel (especially as to its want of completeness and chronological order) that we can understand being made at an early stage in the history of the Gospel, and by no means so well later. It is interesting to note the calm matter-of-fact way in which the Fourth Evangelist (if it were really he) speaks of his predecessors' work, and we believe that it throws a welcome light upon the composition of his own Gospel The tradition, for which we are ultimately indebted to Clement of Alexandria (Eus. *HE* vi. 14), that the Fourth Evangelist, while he was satisfied with the treatment of the more external facts in the other Gospels, himself sat down to compose a 'spiritual gospel,' seems to us to describe the real course of things better than any of the conjectures of modern scholars. It is to us rather an open question whether John of Ephesus is to be identified with John the son of Zebedee, though we lean to the probability that he was. In any case we have little doubt that he had been a personal disciple and follower of our Lord, though a youthful one.

(3) *The Apocalypse of St. John and other Writings.*—Only one more work remains to be considered of those included in our present Canon. This is the Apocalypse of St. John, which holds a similar place in NT to that which the Book of Daniel holds in OT. We have already pointed out that the author throughout describes his own book as 'a prophecy,' in the same sense in which that word is used in OT. It corresponds, however, rather to the later type of prophecy as it is seen in the apocalypses, than to that of the older prophets. The writer is not less certain than any of the older prophets that what he writes was put into his mind by God. We shall try to estimate the significance of this later; but in the meantime it should be noted that, in spite of this confident claim, it was not until the fourth century that this book definitely secured its place in the Canon.

The formation of the Canon, and discrimination of the books which were, or were not, to be included in it belong rather to the next article It will be seen there how, first, the Epistles of St. Paul, and then the Gospels, came to be collected; how they were then read for edification in the churches, and how by degrees they acquired a character for sanctity which ended by placing them upon the same footing with OT. There was not at first a clear dividing line at which the books belonging to the NT were complete, and beyond which no others could be admitted. The fixing of any such line was a retrospective act of the Church, reflecting upon the books which lay before it. And the process by which it did this was spread over a long time, and was hardly matured until the end of the 4th century—if it can even then be said to have been matured, when the process by which the ultimate decision was arrived at was rather one of ripening instinct and the natural gravitation of events than anything like the application of exhaustive criticism.

A sharp line does not separate the writers who fall just within the Canon from those who fall just outside it. As the writer of Wisdom and the son of Sirach, while they draw a distinction between their own writings and the older Scriptures, yet appear to claim for themselves a lower degree of inspiration (see the writer's *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 259–262), so also can we trace in Clement of Rome and Ignatius something at once of the same kind of distinction and the same kind of claim. And just as we found the MSS of the LXX adding freely to the Canonical Books whatever seemed to them to make for edification, so also do the oldest MSS of NT add works that properly belong to the sub-Apostolic age to those which are products of the Apostolic. And yet, as we have seen the consciousness grow up that the prophetic inspiration gradually exhausted itself, so also we observe a tendency to locate the higher activity of the Holy Spirit within a definite period, which is more and more identified with that of the Apostles. And the very claim on the part of the Montanists to possess within their own body a continued operation of the old gifts only led, by way of reaction, to a stronger delimitation of the privileged area and a clearer rejection of all that fell outside it. It took something like a century of gradual but imperceptible development to harden the conception of the NT Canon: and then it took about two centuries more to determine finally the number of books that were to be included in it.

III. *THE PERMANENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CANON OF OT AND NT.*

By the end of the 4th cent., broadly speaking, the Christian Church was in possession of a complete Bible. Even then we must not speak too absolutely, because the Syriac Canon was not yet quite made up. For an œcumenical sanction of the existing list we must wait for the Quinisextine Council of A.D. 692. But for by far the greater part of Christendom the formation of the Canon was practically finished by about A.D. 400. From that time until the present generation the traditional conception of the Canon has been in possession of the field. It is only as part of the movement that is now commonly called Modernism that it has been seriously called in question. We shall give a typical example of the way in which it is now being challenged.

1. **The Modernist challenge.**—An able member of the advanced school, now deceased, in a pamphlet on the *Work and Method of so-called New Testament Theology*, cut at the root of the current conception in the following uncompromising terms:—

'If the New Testament writings arose in the course of a particular history and are the witnesses and documents of that history, then the question at once presents itself to us: Why should our science (*i.e.* the science of NT Theology) deal

precisely with these writings and only with these? The answer is: because they alone belong to the Canon. But that answer is not satisfactory. When once we strike out the doctrine of inspiration, the dogmatic conception of the Canon can no longer be maintained.

No New Testament writing was born with the predicate "canonical." The proposition "A writing is canonical" only means in the first instance that *after the fact* it was *declared* to be by the leading authorities of the Church between the second and fourth centuries—perhaps after all kinds of vacillation in their decision. On this subject the history of the Canon is sufficiently instructive.

Whoever then still regards the conception of the Canon as valid thereby submits to the authority of the bishops and theologians of those centuries. Whoever does not acknowledge that authority in other matters—and no evangelical theologian does acknowledge it—is only acting logically when he also calls it in question here.'

It is fair to the writer to add a slight concession which he goes on to make:

'No one is therefore called upon to deny that the ancient Church, in its New Testament, brought together *on the whole* that which was from a religious point of view the most valuable, and *on the whole* that which was also the oldest and therefore in a documentary sense the most important not only of the literature that is known to us, but of all that was in circulation at the time, and that it formed a collection that is deserving of all praise. But this verdict includes the admission that the boundary lines between the canonical and the nearest extra-canonical literature are at all points altogether fluctuating.'

In order to follow up the consequences drawn from these premisses, it is worth while to quote one more paragraph:

'If, then, we are not to embrace the New Testament writings under the point of view of "an experience after the fact," which has nothing to do with their original character, they must not be considered as canonical, but only as writings that appertain to primitive Christianity. . . . The boundary line for the subject-matter of our science should be drawn at the point where a real break begins to appear in the literature. The standard for this is naturally not to be sought in religious value.'*

This is trenchant and clear enough in all conscience. The writer is certainly right in basing his argument upon the abandonment of the idea of Inspiration. If that idea is thrown over, the consequences as he states them really follow. But ought we to throw over that idea?

Here again it is fair to observe that, when the writer speaks of 'striking out the idea of inspiration,' he probably means the full dogmatic conception of verbal inerrancy as it was asserted or reasserted in the 16th century. But we have already tried to show (p. 571[a]) that this was from the first an extension, and an undue extension, of the original idea. The Christian is not called upon to go beyond this idea; and, by adhering to it, he keeps within the range of what is strictly verifiable.

2. The reply.—It is true that no book either of the New Testament or of the Old 'was born with the predicate "canonical."' But we are prepared to maintain that all the books both of OT and NT, though no doubt with very considerable differences of degree, were born with the qualities which caused them to be labelled 'canonical'; in other words, with the marks that are summed up under the name of Inspiration. In sketching the history of the two Testaments, we have tried to indicate what those marks are. We have tried to show how at each point in the history there was a certain character impressed upon the literature which in due course came to be recognized as justifying its inclusion within the conception of a Sacred Book. It may be well for us to go back upon this character, and to consider it no longer—or, no longer primarily—in connexion with its place in the history, but with reference to its permanent validity among the body of Christian ideas and Christian doctrines.

(1) *The human aspect of Inspiration.* — If we were to try to sum up in a single word the common property which runs through the whole Bible, and which, broadly speaking, may be said to distinguish it from other literature of the kind, we might say that it consists in the peculiar energy and intensity of the *God-consciousness* apparent in the writers. A general term like this will perhaps best embrace the different modes and degrees in which this consciousness manifests itself. It is true that in some of the books there is such a shading-away of degree that it may be questioned whether those particular books are rightly included in the Canon, just as there are so many analogous phenomena in some books outside the Canon as to raise a doubt whether they are rightly excluded from it. It cannot be claimed that the judgment of the Jewish and Christian Churches is infallible. All we can say is that it is sufficiently near for practical purposes. On the whole, posterity has confirmed the original verdict within those limits of approximation which usually obtain in human affairs. For the purpose of our inquiry we may take the Canon as it stands.

From the question of degree we pass to the question of different kinds or modes. We may distinguish the inspiration, or God-consciousness, of the prophet, of the lawgiver, of the psalmist, of the wise man, of the apostle or prophet of NT. Of all these, as we have said, that of the prophet is perhaps the most characteristic. We call it so, not because it is essentially higher than other kinds, but chiefly because it is more easily recognized and described. The God-consciousness of a lawgiver like Moses must have been quite as strong and quite as penetrating as that of an Isaiah; but the difference is that, whereas in the case of Isaiah we can see the mind of the prophet at work behind the word in which the influence of the Holy Spirit has found enduring expression, in the case of Moses anything so clear and definite as this eludes our search, and we have to be content with inferences backwards from analogies for which we have more contemporary attestation. We are more fortunately situated again in the case of the NT apostles. There once more we can see the mind of the writer at work, and form some conception of the intensity with which it works. The chief drawback in the case of Psalms or Wisdom Books is the anonymity of the writers, which makes the evidence they supply comparatively fragmentary and limited. And yet some of the Psalms can hardly be surpassed for depth and intimacy of communion with God.

The characteristic feature in the writing prophets is the unwavering confidence with which they assume their own commission from God. When they speak, the language they use is as though God Himself were speaking through them. We repeat that even this language does not proceed from a higher level of spiritual experience than that of St. Paul. No words either of OT or of NT enter into competition with those which we call 'words of the Lord.' We only treat the prophetic utterances as typical and as lending themselves more easily to analysis and comparison.

Looking at them in this sense, we observe that they do in fact stand alone in religious literature. For the assurance with which they are spoken, for the coherence and continuity which they present spread over a succession of centuries, for beneficence of effect upon the religious history of a people, for the impressiveness which they still retain as we look back upon them, they are practically unique.

To put all this at its lowest term, to say only that the Prophetic Books of OT were books composed under these psychological conditions, is still to claim that they are *sui generis*. The Christian looks back upon them still as he looks back on no other books besides.

Doubtless the view which the prophets took of their own calling has in it an element belonging to

* W. Wrede, *Über Aufgabe u. Methode d. sog. neutest. Theologie* (Göttingen, 1897), p. 11 f.

the time at which they spoke and wrote. Even so, that element does in some ways only strengthen their claim. It is very doubtful whether the experience of modern times will ever supply anew examples of such complete concentration of thought and aim upon the things of religion. We must allow for this utter concentration as an advantage which they possessed and which is not likely to be possessed again.

Of all the books which have attempted a psychological analysis of the prophetic consciousness, the present writer does not know one that grapples with the ultimate problem more directly than A. B. Davidson's *Old Testament Prophecy* (Edinburgh, 1903). Dr. Davidson asks some searching questions:

'When God spake to a prophet, was the latter conscious of two things, namely, of the fact that God was speaking, and also of what He spake? When the word of God came to him, did its being the word of God manifest itself to him in some distinctive manner, apart altogether from the contents? Or rather, was not the feeling of the prophet in all probability something like our own,—that double kind of feeling which we express by saying that any opinion we have is *God's truth*? . . . The same question would arise as to the kind of pressure under which the prophet felt himself to be. Did the kind of feeling he had of impulse to speak differ from the feeling men still have of impulse to utter any pressing truth that lies upon them, such men as fervent, religious teachers, or lofty, earnest statesmen? And when truth suddenly dawned upon the prophet's mind, which formerly he strove unsuccessfully to reach by means of reflexion, did the feeling he had at such a moment differ from the feeling men still have when, oftentimes in peculiarly spontaneous frames of mind, difficulties are broken up, and problems solved almost involuntarily, which before resisted all conscious and direct efforts of the mind?' (*op. cit.* p. 111 f.).

We may pause for a moment to remark that, when a modern writer or speaker in order to strengthen an asseveration describes it as 'God's truth,' he is probably influenced by the traditional estimate of the Bible, and means that what he is saying is as true as if it were written in the Bible; in other words, it corresponds to the highest conception that he has of truth.

There is no reason to deprecate these modern analogies. In the effort to enter into the mental state of the prophets, we can but start from the nearest experience of our own; and the cases described are the nearest to which we have access. They bear the same kind of relation to our modern habits of thought as the language used by the prophets bears to theirs. We have seen that there was an element in their presuppositions which is wanting or much feebler in our own. That element really fits into their place in history; it is part and parcel of their whole conception of God and the world, and in particular of the relation of the Divine call to themselves. The main question that we have still to ask is, how far this conception of theirs was in agreement with the facts. But that carries us on to the next subject of our inquiry, the estimate of the prophetic message (as typical of the whole Biblical revelation) when it is seen from the side of God rather than of man.

(2) *The Divine aspect of Inspiration.*—The question that we now proceed to ask amounts to saying, Were the prophets, and the other Biblical writers represented by them, justified in the claim they make to speak for God, to use the kind of language that naturally issues from special communion with Him? Granting that this language was from their point of view wholly sincere, does it appear to be warranted when it is regarded from the other side—the side of God's providential ordering of the world and of history? We shall apply two criteria: (*a*) Is it a credible mode of statement that God has held this kind of communication with man? and (*b*) Does the Bible in particular commend itself as embodying such communication? Taking as a concise expression of the Biblical theory the famous passage He 1[1]. 'God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in his Son,' can that still be accepted as a reasonable description from the double point of view that has just been stated?

(*a*) The question is whether, allowing for the naive and simple language of primitive times, the idea of God speaking to man and through man still expresses a substantial truth. Given a spiritual interpretation of the universe, assuming that behind the world of phenomena there is a supreme Spirit which has brought it into being, there has been a wide-spread belief that this Spirit desires to be known, and has caused itself to be known, by the most intelligent of its own creatures. It is a modern expression of this belief when the poet says:

'Speak to Him thou for He hears, and Spirit with spirit can meet—
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.'

The whole idea of Spirit 'speaking to' spirit is, of course, metaphor; the operations of spirit cannot be described otherwise. But if we think of the spirit of man as personal, and if we are obliged to invest the Spirit of God with personal attributes, then it must be allowed that the wide-spread belief to which we have referred harmonizes with the rest of our conception of the relation of God to man.

But if we are to suppose that God has 'spoken to' man, how should He speak? How should Spirit speak to spirit? Surely it is very credible that the method of communication chosen might well be through the influence of the higher Spirit upon the lower, not in equal degree upon all individuals but pre-eminently upon some. That is the way in which the Bible appears to describe the relation of God to man; and, simple as the language is, it seems very difficult to improve upon it. Science does not as yet seem capable of describing the facts of the case in more appropriate terms.

(*b*) But then we have also to ask whether the Biblical revelation, as we call it, is of such a kind as to approve itself to us as rational beings. As the course of it is now unrolled before us according to critical views (so far as they can be justified) of OT and NT history, there certainly does seem to be a broad correspondence between this department and other departments of God's dealings with His creatures. The history of the inorganic universe presents what we call a process of evolution; the history of life on the earth up to the advent of man is also expressed in terms of evolution; man himself as a social being has developed in accordance with ascertainable laws; and when we come to consider him as a religious being, we find again that his career has been on the whole one of gradual and progressive advance. At the present stage of our knowledge and apprehension all this appears to be homogeneous and consistent. The different parts of the Divine economy tell the same kind of story. The Christian faith, as its data lie before us in the Bible, seems, naturally and without forcing, so to fall into its place in relation to the rest of the development as to furnish it with its fitting completion or crown. Everything may not as yet have been worked out to our full satisfaction; but it seems in a fair way to be, and there are at least no valid grounds for supposing that any other mode of statement of the culminating stages of religious history will be established in preference to it. This seems to be as good verification as we can expect to have.

If we look steadily at the contents of the Bible from this point of view of 'an increasing purpose,' they seem quite worthy to have come from God. If we take them as a revelation of what God Himself is and of the method of His dealings with mankind, and if we bear in mind that this revelation has

been gradual and progressive, it is difficult to conceive one that could have been better or more completely congruous with the expansion of human thought as a whole. There is impressed upon the writings which make up the Bible a breadth and variety, an intensity and purity of religious life, that are without parallel in any other literature in the world. That is the fact which we seek to express in the doctrine of Inspiration. We know no other explanation for it than a special action of the Spirit of God. That may well be a way of speaking that is relative and imperfect. The Holy Spirit is not bound. It is not confined to any one channel. It permeates all forms of life, one after this manner and another after that. It is the same Spirit, though there are diversities of working. These diversities, or the names that we give them, are relative to our human apprehension, which cannot help classifying and defining. It cannot help observing what it calls 'degrees' and 'kinds' of operation. And this particular kind of operation that we see in the Bible is at once the highest and the most powerful that we know. It is a movement of the Divine Spirit through a long succession of human spirits, a movement which the poetic imagination of the Biblical writers themselves compared to the *wind*. And for us too that old illustration has acquired a new point. We understand more now of the nature of wind, and the analogy becomes all the more forcible. We think of a current of air, drawing in from the wide seas, charged with fresh supplies of ozone and all the other chemical constituents that vitalize and strengthen the activities of heart and brain. Such a vitalizing, such a strengthening, was that gift of God which we call Inspiration. We see the results; we can only imagine the process, and express it in the tongue of the children of men.

3. Correction of older views.—The progress of knowledge is progress in accuracy of description and definition. There are certain fundamental thoughts, wide-spread in space and time, going back to remote antiquity, and common to many races of men. The idea of an inspired and sacred Book is one of these thoughts. The common name 'inspiration' covers all its varied meaning; just as the common name 'God' covers a whole gamut of conceptions from lowest to highest. As time has gone on, the conception of God has been sifted and purified, and a like process must take place with the idea of Inspiration. It is certainly not to be denied or rejected; but it must be brought into closer correspondence with the facts.

Necessarily at first the idea was vague, figurative, and (if we must call it so) crude. To the prophet Ezekiel there is given a roll of a book which he is commanded to eat (Ezk 2^9–3^3). This is a very concrete and symbolic way of saying that he must absorb into himself a message which he is charged to deliver. In that period 'between the Testaments,' when the idea of an inspired book definitely crystallized, the attributes that most stood out were those of authority and infallibility. A book that came from God must needs be in all respects authoritative and infallible. It was an instinctive rather than a reasoned idea; but so instinctive and so natural that it held sway more or less completely for about twenty centuries. But in the course of last century it came gradually to be seen that this conception does not hold good. There are certainly some ways—many ways—in which the Bible is not infallible, and therefore not in the strict sense authoritative. More and more the authority of the Bible has come to be restricted to the spheres of ethics and religion. But more and more it is coming to be seen that, even within these spheres, allowance must be made for difference of times. All expression, even the most perfect in its kind, is necessarily conditioned by the sum-total of the body of thought of the period to which it belongs; and it has to be *translated* into the corresponding language of each succeeding period. It is impossible simply to transfer, in crude blocks without change, the thought of one age into another. From this point of view we do not so naturally look at things under the category of *authority*. It might be said that, in place of the category of authority, we think rather of the process of *assimilation*. The main question for us in these days is how much we can assimilate of the Bible. And when we speak of assimilation, we mean an act of the whole man, intellect, emotions, and will. That is the great problem before us. The working out of it is for us as the breath of life. And the material that the Bible supplies to us is as rich and as abundant as ever it was in the ages of most implicit and unquestioning faith. Our questions are not—or at least ought not to be—the questions of doubt, but only the throes and efforts of a more scientific, *i.e.* of a more accurate, apprehension.

LITERATURE.—The books of which the writer has made most use in the second half of this article are Deissmann, *Licht vom Osten* (Tübingen, 1908); Heinrici, *Der litter Charakter d. neutest. Schriften* (Leipzig, 1908). A. B. Davidson's posthumous *OT Prophecy* (Edinburgh, 1903), from which some interesting extracts have been made, suffers as a whole from the fact that it consists of lectures spread over a considerable period of time, and all parts of it are not equally critical. Many other books might have been used: *e.g.* the *Einleitungen* of Julicher, Weiss, Zahn, and Barth, Julicher's 'Religion Jesu' (in *Kultur d. Gegenwart*, i. Abt. 4), and tracts on *Die Entstehung d. NT*, by H. J. Holtzmann (1904), C. Clemen (1906), W. Wrede (1907). But the subject is one that the writer has had before his mind ever since he wrote his *Oracles of God* (1889) and Bampton Lectures on *Inspiration* (1893), and he thought it better to state independently the views at which he has himself arrived.

W. SANDAY.

BIBLE IN THE CHURCH.

[E. VON DOBSCHÜTZ.]

Introduction.
- I. Origin of the Bible.
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Introduction.—Libraries might be filled with the literature to which the little book which we call the Bible or 'the Book' has given rise, and every day witnesses some new contribution to it. But no one as yet has made a comprehensive investigation of the influence which it has exerted upon the Christian Church and the life of Christian peoples

as a whole. For a long time no such question was felt to arise. Attention was confined to the theological teaching on the Bible in the Church, and then to the history of exposition, the Text and the Versions. One or two special problems were also discussed. Strictly speaking, the only comprehensive treatment of the subject is M. Kähler's *Gesch. der Bibel in ihrer Wirkung auf die Kirche, ein Vorschlag*, 1902, further developed as a contribution towards the establishing of the authority of Holy Scripture in *Dogmatische Zeitfragen*[2] (i. *Zur Bibelfrage*, 1907, pp. 266-435). What Kähler sets forth in a general way, and with the definite theological purpose of showing the significance of the Bible for the Church ('testimonium Spiritus Sancti in ecclesia'), needs to be worked out in detail and from a purely historical standpoint. The author of this article hopes to do this; but there is much preliminary work to be done, and the following sketch may induce some one to take it in hand.

The best method would be to trace the Bible in the Christian Church down through the centuries and give an account of its history. But in the narrow limits to which this article must be confined, the manifold effects produced by the Bible will come to light more clearly if we deal with each sphere separately. It must be added that the ordinary division of Church History into ancient (to 600), mediæval (to the Reformation), and modern does not by any means correspond to the separate lines which we have to follow. It is true that the Reformation is an important factor in all that is concerned with the effect of the Bible on piety, and perhaps also on public life. But it was not till the time of the 'Enlightenment' (about 1750) that the learned investigation of the Bible altered the methods which it had followed from the first. While our divisions, therefore, must be determined by the subject-matter, we shall endeavour to treat every topic in its historical development.

LITERATURE.—Apart from Kahler, reference can be made only to popular literature, mostly from Bible Societies: A. Ostertag, *Die Bibel und ihre Gesch.*, Basel, 1853, [3] 1857, [5] 1892, tr. into Fr. by Dufour with pref by Guizot, 1857; L. N. R. (Mrs. Ellen Ranyard), *The Book and its Story*, Lond. 1853, tr. into Germ. by G. T. Phillips, with pref. by Krummacher, Elberfeld, 1858, also into Fr., 1861; H. von der Goltz, *Die universale Bedeutung der Bibel*, 1865; B F. Westcott, *The Bible in the Church*, 1889; M. Kahler, *Die Bibel das Buch der Menschheit*, 1904; O. Zöckler, *Die Bibel in der Gesch. des Glaubens*, 1900; H. Vollmer, *Vom Lesen und Deuten heiliger Schriften*, 1907. L. Diestel's masterly *Gesch. des AT in der Christlichen Kirche*, 1869, and Ed. Reuss's *Gesch. der heil. Schriften des NT*[6], 1885, are standard works of German scholarship; they deal, however, only with parts of the subject. Reference should here be made also to *Die Bibel, Ursprache u. Übersetzungen* (from Hauck's *PRE*[3] ii., iii.), Leipzig, 1900, and art. 'Bible' in Hastings' *DB*. The *Catalogue of the Brit. Mus* is very valuable for its bibliography on this subject: *Bible*, 1892, Appendix, 1899; also the *Hist. Cat. of the Br and For. Bib. Soc.*, vol. i. (Eng.) 1903.

I. *ORIGIN OF THE BIBLE.*—**1. Church and Synagogue; the Old Testament.**—Christianity came from the lap of Judaism. It received from its mother a sacred book with definite ideas about it and a complete system of exposition.

The sacred writings of the Synagogue existed in twofold form. The foundation was formed by the Torah, or Law of Moses, the highest authority for faith and morals, worship and questions of law, since the proclamation under Josiah in B.C. 621. It reached its final form in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah (*c.* 430). About the year B.C. 200 there were added to this the Prophets, consisting of the four earlier—Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings—and the four later—Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Isaiah, the twelve Minor Prophets; and some time later a collection of writings of various content, *Kethubim* or *Hagiographa*. Designations like 'the Law,' 'the Law and the Prophets,' 'the Law and the Prophets and the other books of our fathers' (prol. to Sir.), to denote the whole Bible, show the gradual stages of its development, and also certain differences of value within the unity. At the time of Christ this stage was already reached by the Rabbis of Palestine. The discussions in the 2nd cent. A.D. about the canonicity of Ezekiel and the Song of Solomon have to do with the question of exclusion, and show that the formation of the Canon was not a matter of collection but of selection. The aim of the Canon was to winnow the materials to hand, and the motive was doctrine, not devotion. In the Greek Diaspora the development was not quite the same. As can be clearly learned from Philo, strict canonicity was accorded only to the Torah, which was translated as early as the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus (B.C. 285–247). Alongside of it, however, there was in use a much larger range of writings, mostly translated from the Hebrew, though a few of them were written in Greek, and all possessed of a *quasi*-canonical value. These were classified upon a different principle—historical, poetical, prophetic. It is an older stage of development that is represented in the sole authority of the Torah with the addition of an unsifted mass of other writings; but development went on here also, and the idea of canonical value passed from the Torah to the rest.

This twofold form of the Jewish Bible was full of significance for Christianity. Jesus, His first disciples, and the Jewish Christians of Palestine, understood by the Bible the Hebrew form of it used by the Rabbis. What Paul and Gentile Christians possessed was the Greek Bible in the Alexandrian form, including, *e.g.*, the Wisdom of Solomon.* But the knowledge that there was another form of the Bible never disappeared in the Gentile Church. In the year 170, Melito, bishop of Sardis, brought home with him from a journey to Palestine a list of the OT books which alone were recognized there (Eusebius, *HE* iv. 26. 14). Origen gives a similar list in comments on Ps 1 (*ib.* vi. 25. 2). Eusebius himself owed his knowledge to Josephus (*HE* iii. 10). But neither he, nor Athanasius (*Epist. fest.* 39, A.D. 367), nor any other Greek Father made any practical use of his knowledge. To them the Holy Scripture was the Greek Bible. It was otherwise in the case of Jerome. As he went back upon the Hebrew original, he took over the canon of his Hebrew teachers. His influence in the Western Church served to keep the knowledge of this difference between the Hebrew and the Greek Bibles alive, and more and more taste inclined to the Hebrew *veritas*. The Reformation brought the crisis. Luther followed Jerome in making a sharp separation between the canonical books and the 'Apocrypha,' but nevertheless incorporated the latter in the Bible as 'useful to read.' On the other hand, at the Council of Trent (Sess. iv., 8th Apr. 1546), Catholicism took the last step in the line of tradition, and did away with every shade of difference between the various books of the wider Canon. The Calvinists proceeded on a different line, and, breaking away from tradition, simply removed the Apocrypha from the Bible altogether. Thus they became victims of a vague and wrong use of the word 'Apocrypha,' which they owed to Jerome. To-day the British and Foreign Bible Society prints the Bible without the Apocrypha. The Bibles which the Continental societies distribute contain it, as did also the Bible upon which King Edward VII. took the oath at his accession; and the Anglican Church appoints regular lessons from the Apocrypha. In these diverging practices we see reflected the difference between the Canon of the Palestinian Rabbis and that of the Diaspora.

* On the extent to which the Wisdom of Solomon influenced St. Paul see Ed. Grafe, *Theol. Abhandlungen*, dedicated to C. v. Weizsäcker, 1892.

The idea of the Canon of the Holy Scripture involves its unconditional authority as the regulative principle of all thought and action. The ground of this authority is always found in its Divine origin—a phrase which can be understood in very different ways. Neither in Judaism nor in Christianity is it ever claimed for the Bible that it 'fell complete from heaven,' as it is among the Elkesaites, though at a later date Christianity knew something of 'letters from heaven.' Its historical origin was too clearly seen in the book itself. Moses, no doubt, is said to have received from God the tables on which the commandments were inscribed, but elsewhere he names himself as the author of the Torah; and so it was also with the prophets and the books which go by their names. No distinction was made between prophetic inspiration and literary activity. The latter was conceived as following mechanically upon the Divine dictation, so that Moses was able to describe his own death. But this was not enough. Even the minimum of human and historical that was involved in the recognition of different authors was stripped off by the growth of legend, which affirmed that by the help of Divine inspiration Ezra restored the whole body of writings lost at the destruction of Jerusalem. This brought the unity of the Canon into relief even in its origin. The Diaspora did not tarry behind this rabbinical development of the idea of inspiration. The story of the 72 (70) translators, which was originally applied only to the Pentateuch, was extended to the whole OT, and had added to it these further features: that the 70 translators did their work separated from one another, that they all finished at the same moment with a loud Amen, and that the 70 copies were found to be in entire agreement.* This is a conception of inspiration quite in line with that which we find in the legend of Ezra. The young Gentile Church viewed the Greek Bible, the so-called Septuagint, as immediately inspired, and not merely as derived from an inspired original.

The third point is that this high estimation of the Bible decided the course which its exposition was to take. It was not a matter of arriving at the historical meaning and import of the author's words, but of making the Divine thoughts and demands conveyed by them fruitful in lessons for the present. The exposition of the Rabbis was composed in the main of *halakha*, that is to say, of practical interpretation of the Law, the purpose being to arrive at stricter rules, and so to erect a fence round the Torah. The great aim of Biblical scholarship was to hang mountains of *halakha* upon every tittle of the Law. This was done by combining the most various passages and by paying attention to the most external coincidences and haphazard details, and was bound to lead directly away from the original purport of the Law. Another kind of exposition was the so-called *haggada*. It was similar in method but different in aim, not legal, but doctrinal or theological. It sought to explain away all expressions in the Bible which offended current theological views and practices, *e.g.* anthropomorphisms, anthropopathisms, departures from ordinary custom, and other features which belonged often to an older stage of development. Over and above that which lay to hand in the Bible, it wove with bold fancy an entirely legendary history. The two methods agree in treating the single verse or even the single word as sufficient in itself, and in allowing themselves to be guided by any arbitrary combination. The so-called 7 Rules of Hermeneutics, which are said to be given by Hillel, and enlarged to 13 by R. Ishmael, to 32 by R. Eliezer, are only an attempt to form this arbitrary method into a system.

Here, too, the Greek Diaspora took a way of its own. The Greek philosophical schools, and the Stoics in particular, had developed a system of allegorizing the venerable texts of antiquity so as to impart to them a modern sense. Besides the meaning which appeared on the surface, the words of Homer were credited with a second significance—the really important one. Zeus stood for the world, or the soul, or immaterial existence. From his head sprang Athene or Gnosis.* The fights and love-adventures of the gods were to be treated as symbolic of cosmological and psychological facts. Homer would be guilty of impiety if he did not mean this to be done (*πάντως γὰρ ἠσέβησεν, εἰ μηδὲν ἀλληγόρησεν*, pseudo-Heraclit. *Alleg. Homer*, 1). It was easy to transfer this method to the Bible, and with the help of allegory it was possible to demonstrate in Moses the Platonic or the Stoic system, or a system which borrowed from both. Such is the course taken by Philo—just as arbitrary as the Rabbinical method, but yet different, and, if we may say so, more systematic, because Greek in spirit. The Rabbis started from the text and made this or that of it as chance directed. In the case of Philo, what he had to unfold from the text was fixed from the beginning, or rather what he had to read into it in order that he might find it there. Primitive Christian exegesis followed these two paths. The method of Jesus, despite all His originality, and also the Pauline method, remind us of the Rabbis. In the Ep. to the Hebrews and in the Ep. of Barnabas we see the Alexandrian method clearly. And yet there does exist a difference, not so much of method as of aim. While the aim of the Rabbis is always a *halakha* or a *haggada*, and while Philo leans towards the ideas of his own eclectic philosophy, Christian exegesis takes its direction from the person of Christ. The whole OT is a witness to Him. Jesus treats it thus, and so do His disciples. Through the influence of this notion, it happened that Jesus was Himself conceived as the originator of this witness, and identified with the inspiring Spirit of God; *οἱ προφῆται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἔχοντες τὴν χάριν εἰς αὐτὸν ἐπροφήτευσαν* (Barn. v. 6). Notwithstanding the unhistorical nature of the exegesis, it thus contains a historical element. There is a reciprocal effect of prophecy and fulfilment which gives rise to typology. It is true that this method shares the defects of allegory: the words are given another sense than that which really belongs to them. But, as distinguished from allegory, it makes good its claim to existence, because, proceeding upon a pre-established harmony between the two, it gives to history a real as well as a typological value. Philo finds in Abraham only the idea of wisdom and piety, while Paul sees in him the father of the faithful, with a faith which was in principle the same as that of Christians. It is allegorizing when Paul simply dispenses in 1 Co 9^9 with the literal sense of Dt 25^4, and when Barnabas interprets the commandments respecting food in the same moral fashion as the Neo-Pythagoreans. It is typology, however, when in 1 Co $10^{1\text{-}11}$ Paul treats the history of the Exodus as actual but at the same time typical. We find the same thing in the Epistle to the Hebrews, with its doctrine of the provisional but widely significant character of the OT expiatory sacrifices. It is neither rabbinical nor Philonic.

The method of using the Holy Scripture in Divine service was developed also in the Synagogue. There were the readings from the Law (*Parashiyôth*)

* For the various forms of this legend see the passages collected in P. Wendland's *Aristeæ Epistula*, 1900, p. 85 ff.

* Cornutus, *Theologiæ Græcæ Compendium*, ed. C. Lange, 1881; *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, coll. by von Arnim; H. Vollmer, *Vom Lesen u. Deuten heil. Schriften*, 7-11.

and the Prophets (*Haphtarôth*), the Targum, or translation in the popular tongue, and the Midrash, or devotional exposition. The Synagogue practised the singing of psalms, and its liturgy had a Biblical form. All these the primitive Christian Church took over and enriched with additions of its own.

Already, too, there were to be found in Judaism the private study of the Law, the regulation of the whole life by *halakha*, and the misuse of the Bible for magical ends which its deification made inevitable. This was the case in other religions possessed of sacred books—Islām, Buddhism, and Parsiism—and cannot be regarded as brought over straight from Judaism. Similar ideas give rise to similar customs.

LITERATURE.—W. Robertson Smith, *The OT in the Jewish Church*[2], 1892 (Germ. tr. by J. W. Rothstein, 1894); Fr. Buhl, *Kanon und Text des AT*, 1891; B. Duhm, *Die Entstehung des AT*, 1897, K. Budde, *Der Kanon des AT*, 1900, H. B. Swete, *An Introd. to the OT in Greek*[2], 1902; W. Riedel, *AT Untersuch.* i., 1902, p. 90 ff., 'Einteilungen des AT Kanons'; H. E. Ryle, *The Canon of the OT*, 1902.

ON RABBINIC INTERPRETATION. F. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*[2], 1897, 109 ff.; W. Bacher, *Agada der Tannaiten*[2], 1903, *Exeget. Terminologie der jüd. Traditionslitt.*, 1905, C. Siegfried, *Philo von Alex. als Ausleger des AT*, 1875; H. E. Ryle, *Philo on Holy Scripture*, 1895, *JE* iii. 162–174.

2. The New Testament.—Christianity added a New Testament to the Old. Like most great founders of religion, Jesus left nothing written behind Him, nor did He give His disciples any commission to write. Mt 28[20], Mk 14[9], 1 Co 1[17] have reference to oral teaching. The pen first became necessary to correspond with distant Churches and to record memories of Jesus as the number of eye-witnesses decreased. Neither Paul nor the Evangelists think of placing their writings on a level with those of the OT. That distinction might rather be claimed for the Revelation of St. John, which, as the work of a Christian prophet, contains a revelation of God like the OT (cf. Rev 22[18f.] with Dt 4[2]). To be sure, inspiration is also claimed by a Christian community for its epistle of exhortation addressed to a sister Church (Rome to Corinth, 1 Clem. lix. 1, lxiii. 2). The Pauline Epistles as well as those of the martyr Ignatius were perhaps collected in the lifetime of their authors, and the four Gospels were put together soon after the appearance of the fourth. At meetings for Divine service these were read like the OT. But so also were new letters as they came to hand, and prophetic writings like Hermas (see p. 602). This was not yet the same thing as a NT alongside of the Old. That did not come about until a sharp distinction was drawn between canonical and uncanonical, authoritative and unauthoritative compositions. The deciding consideration was not liturgical use, but dogmatic authority. A holy book of revelation was required as the foundation of ecclesiastical doctrine. Marcion, who rejected the OT, made a Bible for his reformed Christian Church out of 'the Gospel' and 'the Apostle.' In opposition to this, the Catholic Church formed a NT consisting of the four Gospels, the Pauline Epistles (including the Pastoral Epistles), the Catholic Epistles, the Acts of the Apostles, and the Revelation of St. John, and placed it alongside of the OT. This NT grew to form a unity with the OT, shared the dogmatic value placed upon it, and was subjected to the same expository system. In this sense the Bible was complete by the time of the old Catholic Fathers—Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement. The notion of a Canon in this sense is first found in Origen. Here, too, it can be observed that the formation of the Canon was more a matter of choosing than of collecting. The Muratorian Fragment, where the first actual list of Canonical books is found, excludes the Apocalypse of Hermas, and mentions that the Apocalypse of Peter is already rejected by some people. Down to the 5th cent. the question was whether single books were not to be expunged. Learned interests and ecclesiastical practice were often found to be in opposition, and the result was a compromise like the Canon of Eusebius (*HE* iii. 25). In the case of Athanasius (*Epist. fest.* 39) and in the West, ecclesiastical considerations had the preponderance. In spite of the Church's adherence to the idea of the Canon, there was no lack of patience shown towards local differences in its composition. The Syrian Church acknowledged two, at most three, of the seven Catholic Epistles. The Alexandrian Church would have nothing to do with the Revelation of St. John, which was so highly prized in the West. The result of this was scholarly disputation, but no disturbance of the Church's unity. Finally, as in the case of the Calendar, a compromise between the chief Churches, Rome and Alexandria, was almost universally accepted.

LITERATURE.—B. F. Westcott, *Canon of the NT*, 1855 (61889), out of date; Th. Zahn, *Gesch. des NT Kanons*, 1888–92, *Grundriss*[2], 1904; A. Harnack, *Das NT um das Jahr 200*, 1889, H. Holtzmann, *Die Entstehung des NT*, 1904; H. Lietzmann, *Wie wurden die Bücher des NT h. Schrift?* 1907; J. Leipoldt, *Gesch. des NT Kanons*, 1907; C. R. Gregory, *Canon and Text*, 1907; W. Bauer, *Der Apostolos der Syrer*, 1903.

3. Old and New Testament.—Thus from about A.D. 180 the Christian Church possessed a Bible composed of two parts of different origin, one taken over and one formed by itself. What this meant is best shown by a comparison with the Muhammadan Qur'ān. There an entirely new book of purely native origin, and containing the revelation of the prophet Muhammad himself, takes the place of the religious books of the Jews and the Christians.

Christianity has strongly opposed every attempt to remove the OT, and will oppose, too, the modern Marcionitism. It lays stress upon the close relationship of the two parts (see III. 3), and rightly so. The OT is the pledge of historical continuity, and without it Jesus and primitive Christianity cannot be understood. It is a safeguard against such arbitrary interpretations of the NT as are inspired by Greek philosophy, syncretic mysteriosophy, and modern speculation or mysticism.

It has to be admitted that the union of the two involves a great danger, into which from time to time the Church has fallen. When, instead of their close relationship, their unity or identity is maintained, Christian worship is bound to sink to the level of the pre-Christian and inferior religion of the OT. The legal or formal conception of religion, so natural to mankind, and believed in the OT to be the object of Divine desire, can easily obscure the elevation and purity of the gospel ideal.

LITERATURE.—E. Kautzsch, *Die bleibende Bedeutung des AT*, 1901 (21902); Ed. Grafe, *Das Urchristentum u. das AT*, 1907; M. Kahler, *Dogmat. Zeitfragen*[2], i. 279 ff.; R. L. Ottley, *Some Aspects of the OT*, 1897.

II. *SPREAD OF THE BIBLE.*—In the OT the Church received a book which existed in many and often very different copies. The Gospels and the Apocalypses were probably published in numerous copies to begin with. The Epistles were originally intended neither to be preserved nor to be multiplied, but it was not long before they came to be looked upon as Holy Scripture. The Church had the great task laid upon it of preserving and circulating all these various writings which, outwardly separate, were one in spirit.

1. Transmission.—For the multiplication of Bibles the Christians, like the Jews of earlier times probably, were at the outset entirely dependent upon voluntary labour. Any one who wished to possess a copy of the Scriptures had to make it himself or ask some brother to do so for him. It was only later, when well-to-do people associated themselves with the Church, that the

Bible came to be dealt in by booksellers in the ordinary way of business. A number of slaves, trained for the purpose in tachygraphy and calligraphy, were placed by a friend at Origen's disposal. His friend Pamphilus got copies of many books made, and then he corrected the copies himself.* It was his custom to carry Bibles about with him, and present them to people. Reference is also made to the purchase of Bibles or parts of the Bible (pseudo-Justin, *Quæst. ad Orth.* 134). The copying of Scripture soon came to be considered a peculiarly pious labour, and was largely undertaken by ascetics, *e.g.* the younger Melania.† Next to episcopal seats the monasteries were the great homes of Bible-copying, and before long of all kinds of literary work. So it was in the East at Constantinople in the monastery of Studium, and in the North in Russia, where, in the grotto-monasteries at Kiev, Hilarion made copies of books, while Theodosius devoted himself to prayer or span wool for the binding;‡ and even as far away as Sicily and Calabria, where the transmission of the Bible was marked by special characteristics of writing and text. So it was also in the West, where we are coming to discover with increasing clearness the differences which distinguished the various monastic schools. In the more ancient monastic foundations writing was confined to the younger men, the elders giving themselves entirely to prayer. Later on, and not with any advantage to the work, copying was often made a penance. Charlemagne showed his greatness by attending to even this small matter, and decreed that the Holy Scriptures should be copied only by grown-up men, and not by schoolboys (capit. A.D. 789, 72; 805, 3). With the rise of the universities in the 13th cent. the booksellers pushed the now profitable industry of Bible-production. It is to a bookseller's enterprise that we owe the so-called Paris Bible, whose appearance, with its divisions into chapters and other apparatus, was epoch-making in the West.§ Besides this, the Brothers of the Common Life (*q.v.*), a community founded by Gerard Groot († 1384), were very industrious as copyists.

Naturally it made a great difference whether a copy was made for one's own use or as a business order, for a private or for an ecclesiastical purpose. The MSS which have been preserved exhibit every grade from the crudest to the costliest. Two significant stages are to be noted. There was, in the first place, the change from papyrus, which was employed in the first three centuries for the Bible, to parchment. This involved the further change from roll to book form, books of papyrus being exceptional. The Church's multiplication of Bibles seems to have been largely responsible for the change. In the second place, there was the transition from parchment to paper, which had been making its way from the East since the 9th cent., but was only at a late date adopted for the Bible. There are no Greek paper MSS before the 13th cent., and no Latin ones before the 14th, while parchment codices remain in the majority up to the 15th century. Like the material, the style of writing also undergoes alteration. The flowing current hand of daily life is hardly met with in copies of the Bible. It is possible that the originals were written thus, but copies intended for reading in public all exhibit the somewhat more dignified style proper to books. First, there is the uncial, which after the 9th cent. yielded slowly and with peculiar transitional forms to the minuscule. Several MSS are known which are partly minuscule and partly majuscule (*e.g.* 566 and Λ of the Gospels; in the Gospel MS X the text is majuscule, the commentary minuscule; in other cases the marginal scholia added to the minuscule text are often written in very fine majuscule). In the West we have, at the transition from capitals and majuscule to minuscule, the national writing—Lombardic, Visigothic, and Irish.

The oldest papyrus MSS, of which only a few fragments are preserved [*e.g.* Genesis, *Brit. Mus. Pap.* 212; Psalms, *ib.* 230, Berlin, Leipzig (ed. Heinrici, 1903); the Prophets, Oxford, *Bodl. Gr. bibl. d.* 4 (pap.), Heidelberg (ed. Deissmann, 1904), etc.], were extremely simple. A single book or one or two together made a complete roll. The greater unity was indicated only by the leather covering in which several rolls were contained. In the 4th cent., however, no sooner had the Church formed its compact with the State than traces of luxury began to creep in. The oldest parchment Codices which we possess, viz. the Vatican and the Sinaitic, are huge Bibles, made evidently in response to an Imperial order, and intended for the churches of capitals. In this connexion Constantine's order to Eusebius (*Vita Const.* iv. 36) and the order of Constans mentioned in Athanasius (*Apol.* i. 297) have been thought of. These embrace the whole Old and New Testaments, but in the East this is extremely seldom the case. Not only the two Testaments, but also their separate parts, were usually handed down separately. In the West it was otherwise. There at an early date the so-called *bibliotheca* (very rarely in 1 vol., usually in 8, but up to as many as 14), or the παυδέκτης, made its appearance. It was not only their bulk, but also the manner in which they were executed, that made the oldest Bibles imposing. The wonderfully fine snow-white parchment of the Sinaitic MS seems to be of antelope skin. Both Chrysostom (*Hom. on Joh.* 32) and Jerome (*Pref. to Job*) complain of the luxury which even private people indulge in Bible MSS. Sometimes specially fine white parchment was taken; sometimes it was purple-coloured. Such MSS were not inscribed with ordinary, but with gold and silver ink: *e.g.* the Codices of Rossano, Patmos, Sinope (now Paris), and the Codex Argenteus at Upsala. We still possess an array of such precious Bibles, and, as a rule, they are associated by legendary tradition with the names of princes and princesses. The titles, initial lines, etc., are usually done in red, and initial letters beautifully ornamented. One instance is known where the text is in four different colours: the words of the narrator being in green ink, those of Jesus in red, those of His Apostles in blue, and those of His enemies in black (*Ev.* 16 = *Par. Gr.* 54, sc. xiv.). From the 5th cent. onwards we find the addition of pictures (cf. VII. 4). In some cases these were placed under the text, as in the Vienna Genesis and the Sinope Matthew; sometimes they were separated from the text altogether, as in Cod. Rossanensis; in other cases they are found opposite the text, and arranged in a kind of table (*e.g.* the Itala fragments of Quedlinburg). In the East they often took the form of light marginal drawings; in the West they were often introduced into the text or set into the large initial letters. The range of these illustrations is wide. From the 24 pp. with 48 pictures that remain of the Vienna Genesis, it has been reckoned that there were 120 illustrations for Genesis and 510 for the whole Hexateuch (Wickhoff, p. 144). Such a wealth of illustration, however, is not common. The Sinope Matthew has only 5 pictures on 43 pages (out of a total of about 144), and the Syriac Gospels at

* J. A. Robinson, 'Euthaliana' (*TS* iii. 3, 1895), p. 34.
† Card. Rampolla, *S. Melania*, 1905, p. 150.
‡ L. K. Goetz, *Das Kiever Höhlenkloster*, 1904, p. 150.
§ S. Berger, *RThPh*, 1883, pp. 40–66.

Florence, written A.D. 586 by Rabbûla, have only 4 scenes from Gospel history apart from the tables of the Canon and the dedicatory engraving. In the Middle Ages there were occasionally more illustrations, but one cannot speak of increase or decrease in their number. They were plentiful or sparse according to the wish of the person ordering, or the capability of the artist. The time of Justinian was distinguished for the fine nature of its MSS; so afterwards the Renaissance of the 10th cent. in the East, and the periods of Charlemagne and Otto in the West. As in the Synagogue the Karaites set themselves against all ornamentation of the Holy Scripture, so in the Christian Church opposition to these luxurious MSS was not lacking. The complaints of individual Fathers have already been mentioned. It is still more important that the Cistercians, as opposed to the pomp-loving monks of Clugny, forbade all artistic decoration of books. The Paris Bibles, executed in the ordinary way of business (see above), exhibit quite a special style of simple red and blue. The Brothers of the Common Life write well but plainly, while at the beginning of the Renaissance great wealth of illustration again becomes a prominent feature.

The new art of printing with movable type came at once to the aid of the Scriptures, and the first printed book was a Bible. In the years 1453–56 Gutenberg's 42-line Bible made its appearance, and was shortly afterwards followed by the 36-line one. Externally these oldest printed Bibles resembled MSS. Printing sealed the victory of paper over parchment, but some examples of the oldest printing on parchment still exist. The movement for simplicity of finish, started by Paris booksellers, was maintained, although the first Bibles printed are not only masterpieces of printing, but are in some cases also beautifully illuminated. In place of illumination and pictures there soon appeared engravings on wood. These were either marginal or embodied in the text, and in the older Bibles they are often very numerous. The German Cologne Bible (1480) contains 110; the Italian Malermi Bible (1490) 383. Luther's NT of 1522 has woodcuts by Lucas Cranach. Later on these became fewer. At last they were omitted altogether, and the Bible acquired its present sober appearance. Never, however, has there been an entire absence of picture-Bibles, though it must be said that the addition of pictures serves less for ornamentation than for instruction. Speaking generally, the effort now is to make Bibles as cheap and as easy to handle as possible, and to increase their number. In the Middle Ages almost the only complete Bible was the *bibliotheca* of 8 folio vols., and the first printed Bibles were of gigantic proportions. The size, however, has always become less and the price always lower, till we have now reached the pocket Bible and the penny NT. Attempts have lately been made to secure something finer. The 19th cent. produced a series of beautiful picture-Bibles. Some of these are completely illustrated by the same artist, as, *e.g.*, Schnorr von Carolsfeld (1852 ff.), Doré (1865), and Tissot (1896). In others we find reproductions of the famous old masters, *e.g.*, R. Pfleiderer (1896). The aim of these is to assist the eye by bringing vividly before it what has been read. The historical character of modern exegesis, however, makes use of archæological and geographical illustration to explain the Bible (Pfeilstücker, 1887; Müller-Benzinger, 1900).

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2. Translation.—Besides the preservation of the Bible, its circulation was also necessary, and this involved the task of translation. The gospel soon left the soil of Palestine and the Aramaic speech. As a world-religion Christianity employed the universal language, Greek, even in Rome. The Church used the OT in the Greek translation or LXX. The other translations by Theodotion, Symmachus, and Aquila seem also to have been possessed of importance, especially at the outset, in controversies with the Jews. Their use, however, which was facilitated by Origen's giant work, the *Hexapla*,* sank to mere scholarly ornamentation. Almost all the books of the NT were composed in Greek. The Hebrew Gospel of Matthew, of which report had spoken since the time of Papias, was really a lost work. The Hebrew original of the Epistle to the Hebrews originated in an unlucky guess of an Alexandrian scholar. The Latin originals of the Gospel of Mark and the Epistle to the Romans are inventions of the Middle Ages. As late as the year 200 the Roman Hippolytus wrote in Greek, though in Africa Tertullian already composed in Latin. Whether he employed a Latin Bible in his work, or translated from the Greek Bible, is not yet beyond the range of doubt. From that point onwards, however, Greek visibly declined. About 250, at the time of Novatian, the language in Rome, as also in Gaul and Spain, was Latin. Celtic and Iberian, like Punic, do not seem to have reached a Christian literature though they continued to be spoken by country people. In the East, Aramaic-Syriac again gained strength; in Egypt the native language (Coptic) assumed a new Hellenized form. This was a movement that the Church could not think of opposing. She had to share in it if she was to bring her Bible to the people. As yet there was no idea that the sacredness of the Bible was to be sought in its incomprehensibility. Thus at the beginning of the 3rd cent. certainly, if not about the end of the 2nd, there appeared Latin, Syriac, and perhaps Coptic translations. The origin and early history of these versions are still very obscure. What is certain is that in the OT the LXX formed the basis (the Hebrew text being employed nowhere except in Syria), and in the NT remarkably free texts differing much from those otherwise known to us. It is possible that different translations came into being independently of one another; perhaps the first translation was much edited and gradually approximated in language to various Greek texts. Generally at the outset translations are exceedingly free. One can trace the joy which was felt in the new treasure, the difficulty of finding adequate expressions, the attempt to express the thought in the form most familiar. There is to be observed an inward assimilation of the gospel, a transference of it into the common thought and speech. Not till afterwards did philological accuracy make its appearance, with the high valuation of the letter characteristic of theology. So it is always: first Luther, then Weizsäcker; first AV, then RV.

* Fragments were collected by Field in 1875; new finds have been made by Mercati in the Ambrosian Library at Milan, and by Schechter and Taylor in the Genizah at Cairo.

Almost simultaneously there came the revisions which established themselves throughout the Church—the Latin revision in 378 ff. by Jerome, and the Syrian by Rabbûla about 410. The Vulgate established itself only after a keen struggle with the Vetus Latina; but before the Peshiṭṭā the Vetus Syra disappeared, leaving almost no trace. The Latin tradition approached the Syrian also in the fact that Jerome made a new translation of the OT direct from the Hebrew. In the case of the Copts, according to present research, it was less a gradual process than a conjoining of various dialects. Yet here, too, further investigation will likely show a succession of Akhmîmic, Sahidic, and Bohairic, representing not only dialectic but also textual differences, and corresponding in some measure to the African, European, and Italian of the Vetus Latina.

To these oldest and constantly developing translations which reveal the spread of Christianity in the first three centuries, there have to be added in the 4th and 5th cents. the Gothic and the Armenian together with the Georgian and the Ethiopic. These not only indicate the further spread of Christianity, but also bring to light its power as a civilizing agent. As so often in the later history of missions, the translation of the Bible is the first literary work in these tongues, the first monument of a system of writing developed for the purpose from the Greek. The Gothic Bible survived the rapid overthrow of that proud people only as a literary relic. The Codex Argenteus (now at Upsala), one of the most beautiful Bibles of the ancient Church, is a worthy witness to their former splendour. At the same time the translation, which was evidently executed from the Greek text in the Balkan peninsula, and afterwards brought into conformity with the Latin in Italy, shows the wanderings of the people and the different civilizing influences under which they came, just as we can observe in the Armenian Bible the displacement of the originally predominant Syriac by Byzantine influences. The Georgian Bible lived till the 19th cent., when it died through the Russianizing of this ancient Christian Church. The Armenian Bible, which in the time of the Crusades had points of contact with the Latin, was threatened by the same fate, but still exists. The general view that after this period Oriental Christianity was paralyzed is disproved by the missionary labours which were carried on by Greeks, and especially by Syrians, to the very farthest East. We have, indeed, no traces of ancient Indian and Chinese translations of the Bible (about 781, however, according to the Nestorian inscription of Singan-fu [J. Legge, 1888], 27 books of Jesus, *i.e.* the NT, were known in China), the reason being that the Syriac Bible was everywhere used even among the Thomas-Christians in India. Among the Syrians themselves, however, there arose new translations more learned than popular in character. Following the Greek very closely, Paul of Tella translated the OT (616–617), and Philoxenus of Mabûg the NT (508), the latter being revised by Thomas of Harkel (616). There does not seem to have been any Persian Bible before the 14th century.* On the other hand, the domination of the Arabs after the 7th cent. in Syria and Egypt brought a whole series of translations into existence, and these to some extent displaced the older Coptic and Syriac versions. Subsequently, when Spain was overrun, the same thing happened there, though the translation in that case was from the Latin. The 9th cent., which gave the Slavs a Bible of their own as the first written work in their language, saw also the beginning of Anglo-Saxon and German translations. Like Charlemagne, King Alfred was intensely patriotic, and favoured the popular tongue both in Divine service and in literature. But Latin, having the support of the Church, kept the lead, and the national language suddenly disappeared. In the time following, the oldest translations were forgotten.

Apart from poetical renderings of the Bible, only fragments were preserved till the end of the 12th cent. brought new motives of another kind. On the one hand, there was the popular religious movement associated with the name of Peter Waldes, which spread from South France towards the S. and E. as far as Bohemia. On the other hand, there was the sudden outburst of nationalism, suggesting to us in many ways our own time, which can be traced simultaneously in France, England, and Germany, and, however paradoxical it may seem, found its centre in the *studium generale* of Paris University. Thus there came to be two series of Bible translations in the popular tongue. From Paris University, which gave to the Latin Bible the form that was to obtain in the later Middle Ages, there came, through the use of an old Norman Psalter and Apocalypse, the French Bible. To us it is known chiefly in connexion with the *histoire écolâtre* of Guyard des Moulins as the 'Bible historiale.' With it there stand in more or less clear connexion some Dutch Bibles. Of more importance was the set belonging to S. France. It influenced the whole S. of Europe as far as Bohemia until Albigensian and Waldensian tendencies spread widely. The Italian as well as the Catalonian Bibles come originally, not from the Vulgate direct, but from the Provençal translation. It was only afterwards that they were conformed to the Vulgate and polished in language. Distinct from these there is only the Castilian Bible, which was translated in 1422 at the instance of Luis de Guzman by Jewish and Christian scholars in common on the basis of the original text, and was a forerunner of the great Polyglot Bible of Cardinal Ximenes. A side-piece to this is formed by the so-called Græcus Venetus (ed. by O. von Gebhardt, 1875), a new translation of the OT, which was probably a private work of the 14th cent. and never attained to any considerable influence. In the 14th cent., in England, Bohemia, and Germany simultaneously, the work of translation was again revived under Waldensian influence. John Wyclif (†1384) gave his people the first complete translation of the Bible. It is known in about 170 MSS, including the revision by John Purvey. Hus and his friends revised the somewhat older Czech Bible, and thus fashioned the pattern that was to regulate the future. In Germany no such great name appeared before Luther. There we find a great number of independent translations which have been carefully classified in Walther's thorough work on the subject. He mentions 34 Branches and 24 Psalteries, also 6 Branches and 8 Psalteries in the dialect of Lower Germany; altogether over 200 MSS and over 50 printed works. The most important Branch, to which the 14 pre-Lutheran printed Bibles belong, points in its origin to Bohemia and the time of Charles IV. Not till the 15th cent. did the northern lands receive translations of their own.

With the single exception of the Castilian, all these go back directly or indirectly to the Vulgate,

* It should, however, be borne in mind that the Pahlavi *Šikand-gûmânig Vijâr* (late 9th cent.) contains a number of fragments of both the OT and the NT, cited in anti-Christian polemics and apparently derived from a Syriac version, with possible traces of the Targum of the pseudo-Jonathan (Gray, in *Actes du xiv. congrès international des orientalistes*, i. 182–186, Paris, 1905); and other fragments in an Iranian dialect (probably Sogdian) have recently been discovered by the expedition of Grünwedel and Le Coq to Chinese Turkestan (F. W. K. Müller, *ABAW*, 1904, Appendix, pp. 34–37 and *SBAW*, 1907, pp. 260–270).

whose influence is also traceable in the later forms of the South Slavonic Bible which was originally inspired from the East. Its influence was first broken by Humanism, which made the original text generally accessible, and also sought to replace the Vulgate of the monks by Latin translations of its own: Santes Pagninus, Erasmus, Seb. Münster, Castellio, etc. The first really effective factor, however, was the German Reformation. The importance of Luther's translation is shown by a twofold consideration. In the first place, in spite of many attempts in Germany, no other translation has been able to secure a position alongside of it. In especial the numerous attempts of the Catholics prior to the Council of Trent to oust Luther's by another translation show the great importance of his work, and all the more so since he was able to show that they systematically stole from him. The later Protestant attempts are not, as a rule, intended to enter into competition with Luther's Bible, but are meant for scholars. In the second place, even outside of Germany, the popular translations of the Reformation period are nearly all influenced more or less by it. Christian III. of Denmark gave an express order that the Danish Bible was to resemble Luther's as nearly as possible. There are further to be named as modelled on Luther's work—apart from the Zurich and Low German Bibles mentioned above—the Swedish, Finnic, Lithuanian, Lettic, Slavonic, Croatian, and Hungarian Bibles. From the time of Tindale the English Bible has contained a strong stream of Lutheran influence, which the Authorized Version still preserves, in spite of the opposing influence of the Douai Bible, which goes back to the Vulgate, and of the Genevan Bible of the Calvinists, which follows Beza. There is a remarkable difference between the evolution of the English Bible and that of the German. Luther's work was the first and the best, while in England the first work did not prove at once the matchless masterpiece, but the Bible finally established itself as the product of a century's labour. This enables us to understand how it was that England decided upon a thorough revision sooner than Germany, where the revision (1863–1892) was executed with the greatest caution.

Properly speaking, the Romanic translations are the only ones belonging to the Reformation that are entirely independent of Luther. In these, Humanism (Castellio, Calvin, Beza) won a greater influence, but when they were not killed altogether by the counter-Reformation they underwent constant alteration.

In most lands the following centuries have seen all sorts of attempts at improvement and also new and scholarly translations. These, however, cannot cope with the work of the fundamental creative Reform period. Notice must be taken, however, of the isolated attempts which were made from time to time by Catholics when a warmer Christian piety inspired the effort to find relief from Jesuitical oppression. In the 19th cent. an entirely new element appears. The work of Bible-translation has been greatly stimulated by the B. and F. B. Soc. in the interests of flourishing missionary enterprise. What we saw in the early Christian centuries, viz. that the effort to make the Bible available gave to peoples a written language and literature, is being widely repeated nowadays. In the year 600 the Bible (or parts of it) existed in about 8 languages; by 1500 it had been translated into 24; in 1600 the number had risen to quite 30 (the older translations being now replaced by new). During the last 100 years the number has advanced to nearly 400, and there is hardly a tongue in the world into which at least portions of the Bible have not been translated.

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3. **Circulation.**—How great the number of MS Bibles once in existence was we can no longer reckon accurately. Probably we are inclined to under-estimate them. The Diocletian persecution made away altogether with those of the first three centuries which did not perish naturally through the frailty of papyrus. The storms of natural migration in the W., the inundation of Arabs in the E. and S., and the outbreaks of iconoclasm in Byzantium, were responsible for great destruction. There were times when parchment was so scarce that Bible MSS (contrary to the command of the Church) were used as palimpsests. Later on they were employed for binding. Remembering all this, we shall draw no false conclusion from the small number still to hand. While the circulation in ancient times was great, and in Byzantium even enormous, in regard to the W. at the beginning of the Middle Ages we must indulge very modest notions. According to the old book-catalogues (see G. Becker, *Catalogi bibliothecarum antiqui*, 1885), a royal foundation like St. Vaudrille about the year 800 did not possess a complete Bible, and Boniface had to be satisfied with parts. But from century to century the circulation increased. When we find the Bible altogether wanting in the later catalogues of the 13th cent., the explanation must be that it was not inventoried with other books. The number of MSS grew steadily with the increase of wealth, culture, and religious interest. Of Greek MSS we possess still the two complete Bibles of the 4th cent. and the two belonging to the 5th cent. (ℵ, B, A, C). There are also 7 portions of the OT, and 14 of the NT, besides fragments on papyrus, the number of which increases every year. Belonging to the 6th cent. we have 5 OT and 28 NT MSS, and belonging to the period between the 7th and the 10th cents. there are 18 of the OT, and about 80 of the NT, all these being uncial MSS. To these have to be added about 2000 Gr. minuscule MSS of the NT which date from the 9th to the 16th cent., while the number of OT MSS preserved cannot as yet be accurately determined. The Latin MSS which we still possess go back to the 4th cent., as do also the Syriac and the Coptic. We are acquainted with 400 Latin and 100 Syriac MSS of the NT dating from the 4th to the 10th cent., and 3000 Latin MSS in all. So far as the OT is concerned, no classification has been made. When it is remembered what a labour it was to make a fair copy even of one Gospel, it is possible to estimate the pains that were devoted to the multiplication of the Bible. But when we think of the millions of Christians who have lived since the 4th cent., those numbers will seem rather

small. For the later part of the Middle Ages about 170 MSS of Wyclif's Bible, and over 200 German MSS enumerated by Walther (see § 2), give some idea of the spread of the Bible.

The invention of printing altered the conditions. Every setting up of type meant a great number of copies. Till this time every copy was a thing by itself, with its own faults and its own excellences, but these were now extended to the whole edition, which might run to any number desired. In the first stages of printing the editions were not large. Gutenberg and Schöffer cannot have made more than from 100 to 200 impressions from every setting, and the prices were so high that it still paid to copy a printed pattern by hand (see the Greek NT copied by Zwingli from Erasmus's ed. at the Stadtbibliothek of Zürich, C. 163). Even when an edition mounted to 1000 copies, its circulation remained within narrow bounds, as is proved by the numberless reprints. Up to 1500 there have been counted 109 Latin printings, and from 1500–1520 the number is 56. In German there were 17, in Italian 10, in French 4, and so on. Even when these figures are multiplied by 100, or even 1000, we reach no great total. In the first two centuries of the Reformation the Bibles reached what according to our present ideas is a very small circulation, however large it may seem as compared with past ages.

Improvements in the process of printing made larger editions possible. Freiherr von Canstein could boast that in his establishment at Halle, between the years 1710 and 1719 he had made 100,000 copies of the NT in 28 editions, and 40,000 Bibles in 16 editions (8 in 8vo, and 8 in 12mo). Now the B. and F. Bible Soc. prints in one year almost 1,000,000 Bibles, more than 1,000,000 NT's, and 3,000,000 parts of the Bible; in all 5,000,000. We must remember, too, that the oldest printers earned their living by their work, that the Bible was an article of commerce, and that, although Luther took no pay for his services, yet the printers made a large enough charge. It was the voluntary support of friends of the Bible like the Baron von Canstein (†1719), the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (since 1698), and the Christentumsgesellschaft of Basel, extended by Urlsperger (since 1780), that made it possible to aim at a real circulation of the Bible among the people. This was finally realized by the Bible Societies which after the foundation of the B. and F. B. Soc. in 1804 established themselves everywhere (Basel, 1806; Stuttgart, 1812; Berlin and Dresden, 1814; America, 1816; Paris, 1818, etc.).

In many places in our own day every married couple is presented with a Bible as a marriage gift. Every schoolboy possesses one. Among soldiers the Bible is diligently circulated, and in the mission field it is spread with great zeal. Often it is given for nothing, and usually the price is astonishingly small. Never has the Bible been so easy to acquire. What one cannot but regret is that this extensive circulation does not go hand in hand with a high estimation of the Book of books among the great mass of men. The colporteur was right when he gave it as the result of his 20 years' experience, that to make a present of the Bible is easy but not effective.

LITERATURE.—P. Schaff, *A Companion to the Gr. Test. and the Eng. Version*, 1883.

For Lists of MSS: H. B. Swete, *Introd. to the OT in Gr.*[2] 1902; C. R. Gregory, *Proleg. zu Tischendorfs NT*, ed. viii crit. major, 1884–94 (=*Textkritik des NT*, 1900), and *Versuche u. Entwurfe*[2], 1908; F. H. A. Scrivener, *Introd. to the Crit. of the NT*[4] (by E. Miller), 1894; Eb. Nestle, *Einfuhrung in das griech. NT*[2], 1899; H. von Soden, *Die Schriften des NT*, i. 1902.

For lists of Printed Bibles: Copinger, *Incunabula biblica, or The first half-century of the Lat. Bible* (1450–1500), 1890; Falk, *Die Bibel am Ausgange des Mittelalters*, 1905, p. 91 ff.; Le Long, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1709, ed. Mash, 1778; Ed. Reuss, *Bibliotheca NT Græci*, 1872. For Luther's German Bible: Palm, 1772; Panzer, 1783; Hopf, 1847; cf. the *Catalogues of the Brit. Mus.* 1892 ff., and of the B. and F. B. Soc., by T. H. Darlow and H. F. Moule, 1907.

For number of copies: P. Schwenke, 'Untersuch. zur Gesch des ersten Buchdrucks,' *Festschrift der Kgl. Bibliothek zu Berlin zur Gutenbergfeier*, 1900 (he computes 200 copies of the 42-line Bible and from 80–120 of the 36-line Bible).

For Bible Societies: J. Owen, *Hist. of the Orig. and the First Ten Years of the B. and F.B. Soc.*, 1816; Wm. Canton, *History of the B. and F.B. Soc.*, 1904; E. Breest, *Die Entwicklung der preuss. Hauptbibelgesells.*, 1864–91; O. Bertram, *Gesch. der von Canstein'schen Bibelanstalt*, 1863; O. Douen, *Hist. de la soc. biblique de Paris (1818–1868)*, Paris, 1868.

III. *AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE.*—1. **Titles and citations.**—That the Bible was authoritative was an axiom taken over by the Church from the Synagogue (see above, I. 1). The words which the first Christians used to make reference to the OT, 'The Scripture saith,' were extended by their successors to the whole Bible—OT and NT alike. 'Scripture saith,' or 'It says,' was synonymous with 'God saith.'* Soon the Scripture came to be known as *ἡ ἁγία γραφή, sacra* or *divina scriptura*, or, to commemorate its formation out of single books, *αἱ θεῖαι γραφαί, divini libri*. From the 3rd to the 5th cent. the Latins gave the name of *lex Dei* to the whole. Vincent of Lerinum used the designation *sanctæ legis volumina*. The Greeks described it as *τὰ ἱερὰ λόγια* (='oracles'). *τὰ βιβλία* is the favourite expression in Chrysostom. From *biblia*(*-orum*) was derived in late Latin the feminine form *biblia-æ* (cf. *gaudia*), and this form was carried over into all other tongues. *Sacra pagina* and *sacra elogia* were used by mediæval scholars, and at the time of the Reformation the usual designation was *literæ divinæ* or *sacræ*. The expression *veritas dicit* (='Scripture saith'), as distinguished from *auctoritas* (='ecclesiastical doctrine'), was taken by the scholastics from Augustine, who, however, employed it specially of the words of Jesus.

A single verse from the Bible was always considered the word of God. In the Middle Ages occasionally, and frequently by Carlstadt and Zwingli, *verbum Dei* is used to describe the whole Bible. Luther employs 'Word of God' in a sense different from the Bible or Holy Scripture (='verbum prædicatum'), but the terms are interchangeable even with him. In later Protestant theology the phrase is common. It is a favourite expression of Pietism, which also introduced hymns on the Bible, *e.g.* 'Teures Wort aus Gottes Munde' (Benj. Schmolck, †1737).

Often the whole Bible is designated by its parts. As the Jews used the phrase 'Moses and the Prophets' (Lk $16^{29ff.}$, Jn 1^{45}) or 'the Law and the Prophets' (Mt 5^{17} 7^{12} 22^{40}, Lk 16^{16}, Ac 24^{14} 28^{23}), so we find 'the Lord and the Apostles' or, more seldom, 'the Gospel and the Apostles.' In Hippolytus this fourfold division is the usual one, while Hegesippus says, 'the Law and the Prophets and the Lord,' and Clem. Al. 'the Prophets, the Gospel, and the words of the Apostles' The whole Bible is also referred to as 'the Prophets and the Apostles' (*e.g.* Murat. Canon, 79 f.). This corresponds to the *Vetus et Novum Testamentum* or Tertullian's *Instrumentum*. 'The Lord' was used specially to indicate the Gospels, so much so that the Marcionites claimed the Lord as the author of their Gospel, just as they claimed Paul as the author of their Apostolos (Adamantius, *Dial.* ii. 13, p. 84). As the Prophets and the Apostles also acquired their authority from Him, it was possible to say, 'the Lord in His Prophets and Apostles.'

With the growth of scientific accuracy, the formula of citation became more adequate. The deliberate indefiniteness of Philo (*εἴρηται γάρ που καλῶς*) is still found in a Gnostic like Valentinus (*ὥσπερ εἶπέ τις*), but the growth of Biblicism does not favour it. Paul mentions the prophets by

* B. B. Warfield, *PRR*, 1899, pp 472-510.

name (*e.g.* Ro $9^{25.27}$), and it becomes general to name the specific books: Μωϋσῆς ἐν Ἐξόδῳ, ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Βασιλέων, Παῦλος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ πρὸς Κορινθίους. Tertullian says, 'Habes Genesim, habes Danielum.' In one instance Origen defines the passage more exactly by the στίχος number. The Eusebian sections of the Gospels, arranged in ten canons for purposes of comparison, served the whole Middle Ages as a handy concordance. After the 4th cent. we meet with chapter-divisions, which differed among the Greeks and the Latins. Citations were made by the titles or the first words of the chapter. It was not till the Middle Ages that they were made by the number of the chapter. This became common in the 13th cent., when the Paris Bible established itself everywhere (see above, II. 1). There we have the chapter-divisions of Stephen Langton, with 8 subdivisions of each chapter (A–H), serving the purpose of the *concordantia biblica* of the Paris doctors. Not till modern times did the easy method of verse-enumeration come in, and with it the practice of exact citation. The germ of this was found in a concordance which R. Isaac Nathan formed in 1447 (printed Venice, 1523; taken over in Santes Pagninus's Lat. Bible, 1528). The NT was divided into verses by Robt. Stephen in 1551, on a journey from Paris to Lyons. The fact that it was done 'inter equitandum' is, unfortunately, only too evident. Moreover, in different editions there are variations. Above all, the bad habit of setting the number of the verse in the text, or printing each verse separately, destroyed the connexions, and deepened the impression that every verse was complete in itself. As the result of Bengel's initiative, the custom has recently become more general of making larger paragraphs. On the other hand, the minuteness characteristic of recent critical exegesis has made an advance upon the division into verses, and such citations as Ro 1^{16a} or Rev 1^{1d} are now used.

LITERATURE.—C. R. Gregory, *Prolegomena*, 140–182; Scrivener, *Introd.* i. 56–71; O. Schmid, *Über verschiedene Einteilungen der h. Schrift*, 1892; E. von Dobschütz, *Vulgatastudien*, 1895; J. Chapman, *History of the Vulgate Gospels*, 1908.

Formulas of citation have another side. Veneration of the Holy Scripture and its authors finds increasing fullness of expression in them. Soon what we meet with is not 'Isaiah says,' 'Peter (or Paul) writes,' but 'The Holy Prophet Isaiah says,' 'The Holy Apostle Peter writes,' and 'According to the Blessed Paul.' In this connexion, the otherwise almost valueless epithet of martyrs, μακάριος (*beatus*), continued long in use. Even this, however, is not enough. Peter must be called ὁ κορυφαῖος τῶν ἀποστόλων, *princeps apostolorum*, John ὁ ἐπιστήθιος, Paul ὁ τρισμακάριος. The ordinary title is οἱ θεηγόροι. In the Byzantine Renaissance δαυιδικῶς or ψαλμικῶς εἰπεῖν, Σολομώντεια ἔπη, are favourite phrases to introduce quotations from the Psalms or Proverbs, and a citation from the Gospels is hardly ever introduced without words like τὸ ἅγιον εὐαγγέλιον διαπρυσίως βοᾷ. As compared with such Eastern verbosity, Western formulas always appear simple. But *sanctus apostolus dicit* has really the same significance. It is an expression of unconditional veneration, and emphasizes Scriptural authority. It makes no difference here that in the Middle Ages prophets and apostles shared this epithet with the doctors of the Church. These also possessed the weight of authority. The Reformation retained 'St.' Matt., 'St.' Mark, etc., and in Romance lands and England 'St.' Paul is still usual. It was the period of 'Enlightenment,' with its purely human handling of Scripture, that first stripped off, even in the form, all such symbols of authority, returning thus to the simplicity of the early Church. With a false conception of accuracy, the Gospel 'according to' Matthew, Mark, Luke, or John was spoken of, the ancient Church desiring to express by εὐαγγέλιον κατὰ . . . nothing more than the unity of the Gospel amidst the variety of its literary forms.

However various these formulas may appear, they nevertheless establish the one important fact of the unconditional authority of every word in the Bible. The mention of the various authors is due to a conscious or unconscious instinct for accuracy. It is not upon them, but upon the Bible itself, that authority rests. In every century we find numerous instances of wrong sources given for quotations (*e.g.* Mt 27^{9}). This only shows how little depended upon any personal authority. The prophetic name is a guarantee of Scripture; prophets and apostles are possessed of authority because they are 'holy Scripture,' and all that stands in Scripture is authoritative, even when it is neither a prophet nor an apostle who speaks, but a very unholy mortal. Mt 19^{5} quotes a word of Adam as God's word. Jn $11^{50f.}$, spoken by Caiaphas, contains a Divine prophecy. The Bible as a whole and in every word of it is authoritative.

LITERATURE.—On the names of the Bible, see Suicer, *Thesaurus*, 1682, *s.v.* βιβλίον, γραφή; du Cange, *Glossarium*, *s.v.* 'Biblia.' On citations, see Harnack, *Dogmengesch.*[3] i. 337 ff. Formulas are collected, *e.g.*, from the *Didascalia* by Achelis, p. 333; from Didymus by Leipoldt, 38; from Diodorus by Harnack, 56.

2. Inspiration of the Scriptures.—Like the authority of the Bible, the idea of its inspiration was taken over from Judaism (cf. I. 1). No distinction was made between the Divine revelation accorded to the prophets and its preservation in writing (cf. Ro 1^{2}, He 1^{1}). We have the statement in 2 P 1^{21} that 'holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost'; but, besides this, the Scripture itself is said to be θεόπνευστος in 2 Ti 3^{16} (whence 'inspiration'). Descriptions like those of Ezk $1^{3f.}$, Zec $1^{8ff.}$, Rev $1^{10ff.}$ point to an ecstatic origin, and this idea, helped by the influence of Plato and Philo, was extended to writings that were not apocalyptic (Justin). At the same time, there is another view, according to which God speaks to men without any extraordinary ecstatic operation. Paul does not think that his Epistles are due to any supernatural inspiration. He draws a clear line between his own opinions and the absolutely authoritative words of the Lord, yet he claims the possession of the Spirit, and therefore authority for what he writes (1 Co $7^{10.25.40}$); so also Clement of Rome (i. 59), and even Origen (*de Orat.* 18). The pseudo Clementine Homilies (xvi. 18) formulate a theory to the effect that the revelations which are not due to ecstasies (ἄνευ ὁπτασίας καὶ ὀνείρων) are preferable to those which are, and the Church adopted this view. She dismissed books like the *Shepherd* of Hermas, and repudiated the Montanistic prophets and similar phases; but she claimed inspiration for her bishops. And if Ignatius and even Cyprian still think of visions and ecstasies in this connexion, the inspiration of Synods, which Constantine solemnly proclaimed so early as the First Ecumenical Council of Nicæa, had little in common with ecstasies. The θεοφόροι πατέρες, or inspired Fathers, contended with arguments drawn from the Bible and logic, sometimes even with the fists, and the result depended upon the decision of the majority, while ecstatic revelation rests on the authority of a single inspired person. At the Council of Trent it was a standing joke that the Spirit came from Rome in fetters; and with regard to the infallibility of Papal utterances, no one ever dreamed of ecstasy. Naturally the idea of the Bible's inspiration corresponded with this. The Alexandrians were critical of style. Eusebius and Augustine talked harmlessly of the literary methods of Biblical authors—that was in line with their ideas of inspiration. When, however, exegetical science weakened, and the popular monastic ideas of visions

and ecstasies spread, we find these notions appearing more frequently, and in popular literature they found vivid expression. Prochorus' picture in the Acts of John of how the Gospel of John came into existence (ed. Zahn, p. 154 ff.) shows that its origin was conceived as quite ecstatic. This influenced art, and the task of investigating the way in which inspiration is represented would repay labour. As the Muse appeared to the poet Aratus, so the Divine Wisdom appeared to the Evangelist Mark (Cod. Rossan.). A hand beckons out of heaven; a dove whispers in the ear; we hear also of inspiration following the drinking of a cup (2 Es $14^{37ff.}$). The idea of a book-roll which the seer had to swallow (Ezk 3^1, Rev 10^9) has its artistic analogy in the so-called *traditio legis*, 'giving over of the law,' to Peter. So far as is known, the notion of a book fallen direct from heaven, like that which Oriental Gnosticism developed in regard to the book of Elxai, and to which ecclesiastical piety gave some colour in the so-called 'letters from heaven,' was never applied to the Bible as such. Athenagoras (*Leg.* 9) illustrates the operation of the Holy Ghost by the picture of the flute-player who blows into the instrument and makes it sound. Ps.-Justin (*Coh.* 8) and Chrysostom speak of the lyre upon which the Holy Ghost plays; there are different strings, but they give forth a harmony. The conception is quite spiritual. Much more realistic is the picture of the pencil (*stylus*) of the Holy Spirit which we find in Gregory I. In the Middle Ages the representation gradually took a more popular form, and single individuals like Agobard of Lyons and Abelard protested against it in vain. It was never thoroughly developed in theory. Luther's lively piety, like the oldest Christianity, combines faith in Divine inspiration with quite human ideas as to the method: he gives a vivid picture of the way in which one prophet uses the writings of the others. In his hands the ancient traditions which mediævalism brought down alongside of its theory of inspiration became of importance again. But orthodoxy did not follow him here. It ranged itself on the side of the strictly supernatural idea of inspiration, and carried the view to its extremest consequences. The Biblical authors are only the hands and pens of the Holy Spirit. They are perhaps *notarii et actuarii*, but never can they be called *auctores*. That epithet belongs to God or to the Holy Ghost alone. From Him proceeds not only the impulse to write, but also the matter and the method (*suggestio rerum et verborum*). In the end all human participation in the composition of Scripture is denied. Men wrote, but did not understand or know what. This inspiration of the letter, applied to the Textus Receptus of the NT and to the Textus Massoreticus of the OT, is at last extended to the mere accessories; above all, to the punctuation of the Hebrew (John Gerhard, †1637; John Buxtorf, father, †1629, and son, †1664). The theory was embodied in an ecclesiastical confession (*Formula Consensus Helvetici*, 1675), but as a theological system it was soon overturned by actual facts. Mill's multitudes of variants destroyed the theory of textual inspiration. Deism and 'Enlightenment' sought out every little contradiction and absurdity. Biblical philology renewed the criticism of style. Soon rationalistic theology spoke of a purely human Scripture.

The attempt of 19th cent. theology to revive the old orthodox doctrine has been vain (Kölling, *Theopneustie*, 1891). Even in the milder form, which added to the personal inspiration of prophets and apostles (Schleiermacher) a particular guidance only *in actu scribendi* ('kanonische Inspiration,' Luthardt), it was not able to secure a hold. The newest phase of religious-historical inquiry gives wide scope to ecstasy again, but Protestant theology tends always more and more to the conviction that the old conception of *θεοπνευστία* is not the one best suited in our time to express the actual significance and authority of the Scripture. Inspiration applies to men, not to written words.

LITERATURE.—J. Delitzsch, *de Inspiratione script. s. quid statuerint patres apostolici et apologetæ sec. sæculi*, 1872; Ed. Rabaud, *Hist. de la doctrine de l'inspiration des saintes écritures*, 1883; W. Sanday, *Inspiration*, 1893; H. Cremer, in *PRE*[3] ix. 183-203; Kahler, *Zur Bibelfrage*, 1907; A. Houtin, *La Question biblique au xxe siècle*, 1906, 27 ff.; F. Watson, *Inspiration*, 1906; M. Dods, *The Bible, its Origin and Nature*, 1905.

3. **Doctrine.**—Of course it is not enough to see in the books of the Bible only historically interesting monuments of old Israelite and old Christian literature. They were and are more than this to Christendom. From the beginning they were held to be immediately binding upon the present.

One of the first tasks of Christianity was to put the OT in the same position of authority as the NT. Primitive Christianity, filled with the living power of the Spirit, strongly emphasized the newness of the Divine revelation given in Christ as compared with the OT stage of religion. Paul did away with the Law which was the kernel of the OT in Judaism, and yet he argued with words of 'the Law.' He cast aside the nomistic system, and yet held the Law to be Holy Scripture. That could not continue. The Gnostics and Marcion rejected the authority of the OT altogether; the Church sought to discover a more positive relationship to the OT Law. In the ceremonial rules of the OT the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews found the type and prophecy of the saving work of Christ. Barnabas considered that he had only to transmute the Ceremonial Law by allegorical interpretation into moral commandments to show that it was constantly obligatory, and that the verbal understanding of it by the Jews was a mistake into which the devil had brought them. I Clem. comes very near to deducing the principles of Christian worship from the ceremonial system of the OT, and the 3rd cent. actually did so. Tertullian (*de Monog.* 7) extracts laws for the Christian life from the OT. Later authors like Cyril of Alexandria make the sacerdotal and sacrificial law somewhat spiritualized, the basis of Christian ecclesiastical order.

When the difficulties which arose in the controversy about legalism were removed, the value of OT prophecy caused the OT to be claimed as the sacred book of Christendom, in opposition to the Jews, who made it their own special possession, and it was declared to be inseparably associated with the NT. The same Christ, the same Spirit, spoke in prophets and apostles. Marcion's criticism only served to make the Church all the more zealous in maintaining the complete unity of the two Testaments. They were the two breasts of the Church (Hippolytus on Canticles, i. 344). Very soon all sense of difference, all thought of any gradation in time, disappeared. Out of the unity of the Spirit there was evolved a mechanical uniformity, a complete equality of the contents of all parts. Even the first verses of Genesis were made to witness to the deepest mysteries of the Christian faith, the high dogmas of the Trinity, and the participation of the Son in Creation. *ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν = ἐν τῷ υἱῷ* (cf. Harnack, *TU* i. 3, 130 ff.). Protestant orthodoxy went even further than this in the discovery that בְּרֵאשִׁית בָּרָא contained the initial letters of the Trinity, אָב, בֵּן, רוּחַ, twice over.

In spite of this purely dogmatizing method, it was never altogether forgotten that revelation underwent an historical development. It is this feature that constitutes the peculiar charm of the Antiochene school for us, and raises the Dutch federal theologians above their own orthodox pre-

decessors. In the new orthodoxy of the 19th cent. the Erlangen school (Hofmann) laboured this thought at great length. These, however, are only individual instances, and hardly affect the doctrine of Biblical authority. They did not attain to a recognition of any differences of value in the books of the Bible. Whatever was found in the Bible was canonical and authoritative.

The dogmatic elaboration of this theory began with Origen's *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, and his results were adopted by his pupil Theognostus. As the Synagogue never dealt systematically with questions of the kind, the Greek theology had quite a new field here. In the West, Augustine's *de Doctrina Christiana* laid the foundation. Augustine declares repeatedly and strongly that only the canonical Scriptures are unconditionally binding (*de Nat. et Grat.* lxi. 71; *Epist.* lxxxii. 3. 24). But we find none the less that he sets ecclesiastical authority alongside of, or rather above, the authority of the Bible more markedly than the Alexandrians. The often-quoted remark is well known (*c. Epist. Manich.* 6): 'ego vero evangelio non crederem nisi me catholicæ ecclesiæ commoveret auctoritas.' This supplied the Middle Ages with a standard. The authority of the Bible was the very highest: it was absolutely infallible; everything that was found in it had to be believed whether understood or not. All this, however, was due to the living authority of the Church, and that because of two considerations: (1) it was the Church that formed the Bible as such; the Church decided which books were canonical and which were not; and (2) the Church alone had to say what was contained in the Bible, in other words, how it was to be interpreted. Even heretics appealed to the Bible, and often with a great show of right. That made a superior authority necessary—the Church. Tertullian declares that in combating heresy the Scriptures should not be referred to for proof (*de Præscr.* 19). Similarly Salvian (*de Gub. Dei*) complains that the Arians drew their proofs from the Bible, while the Catholics employed force. Naturally it was always maintained that the authority of the Bible lay in itself, came from its Divine origin. The Church could never invest with canonical authority a book that was not Divine. But—and this is the important point in the mediæval Catholic conception—the Church took over the guarantee of canonicity. Hence came the fixing of the Canon by Councils, from the Synods under Damasus and Augustine down to the Councils of Trent and the Vatican. The correct interpretation, however, was obtained from the 'unanimous consent of the Fathers,' and in this way the Fathers, who were credited to a certain extent with the same inspiration as the Scripture, came to be equally valuable authorities. Employed in the first place to interpret, they were afterwards called in to supplement Scripture. Thus there arose the idea of the double tradition, *ἐγγράφως* and *ἀγράφως* as the Greeks said, *in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus* as the Council of Trent expressed it. The question whether the revelation given in Scripture was sufficient to answer every religious inquiry received different replies within the Catholic system. The really correct answer was in the affirmative, and allegory supplied a means of drawing anything out of Scripture that was wanted. In mystic circles, however, the view was always maintained that God supplemented what He had given to the Church by immediate revelations to chosen individuals. Montanism, which brought a new and extensive revelation, the Church repudiated, just as at a later date she did also the *evangelium æternum* of the Spiritualists and the visions of many fanatics. But the visions of Saint Birgitta and similar phenomena she acknowledged; and at the present time the question is being vigorously discussed in Catholicism, how far the visions of Catherine of Emmerich can be safely reckoned credible supplements to the Gospel story in regard to the life of Jesus and the Virgin Mary. From the time of Anastasius of Sinai until the present day there have not been wanting pious men who believed that they could cajole or wrest from evil spirits some light upon the mysteries of the other world.

In this domain the Reformation brought the crisis. The 'reformers before the Reformation,' as Wyclif, Hus, etc., were called, were representatives of Augustinianism, and as such of a Biblicism within Catholic ecclesiastical bounds. Zwingli and Calvin represent a Biblicism that overran these bounds but finally took its stand upon the same formal principles. Creeds of the Zwinglian and Calvinistic type nearly all contain decisions in regard to the Canon of the Bible. It was quite unobserved that this only continued ecclesiastical or synagogue tradition in opposition to the decisions of the Roman Church and the Council of Trent. It is quite otherwise with Luther. Not only did he shatter the authority of the Pope, the Councils, and the Fathers, but also from the idea of the dominating authority of Scripture he stripped off everything formal. Not because something was found in Scripture but because it witnessed to Christ, because he traced God's word in it, was it authoritative in his view. 'The right principle to follow in the criticism of all the books is to ask whether they show Christ or not, for all that is Scripture points to Christ (Ro 3^{21}), and St. Paul wants to know nothing save Christ (1 Co 2^{2}). What does not teach Christ is not apostolic even though St. Peter or St. Paul teaches it; what preaches Christ is apostolic even though it comes from Judas, Annas, Pilate, or Herod' (Pref. to Ep. of James, 1522, Erlangen ed. 63, 157). This valuation according to content, harmonizing as it does with personal experience, gave Luther the opportunity not only of criticizing the ecclesiastical Canon (he makes the NT end with 3 John and calls Hebrews, James, Jude, and Revelation an appendix like the OT Apocrypha), but also of claiming value for other writings like the *loci* of Melanchthon, and investing them with the same value as the Bible. It is true that Luther did not carry this principle to its logical conclusion. His contests with fanatics who trusted entirely to the inner light compelled the Reformer, who was at heart conservative, to lay all the importance on the historically given revelation, *i.e.* the Scripture. However much he distinguished in theory between the word of God and the Scripture, yet he found it easy to identify them, and he could then (as in the Lord's Supper) insist stubbornly upon the letter of the Scripture. The Lutheran Church has inherited both these views from him. Lutherans always speak of the *verbum Dei*, but they do not imply any formal limitation to certain books (no Lutheran confession contains a catalogue of the Canon). The phrase has reference only to the content of the Bible, the revelation of God's grace in the Law and the Gospels. On the other hand, the Lutheran Church developed the doctrine of the authority of the Bible in scholastic fashion, so that it became possible to speak of Bibliology as well as Theology and Christology. And Bellarmine had a certain amount of right on his side when he spoke of the 'paper Pope of the Protestants.' Nevertheless the distinction between a formal and a material principle in Protestantism belongs to the Calvinistic theology, and first became a feature of Lutheran dogmatics in the 19th century (Ritschl, *Zeitschr. f. Kirchengesch.*, 1876, 397 ff.).

In opposition to the mediæval conception which,

under the influence of the Neo-Platonic idea of God and in the interests of ecclesiastical authority, emphasized the mysterious, difficult, or unintelligible elements and the insufficiency of the Bible, Protestant dogmatics laid all the stress on its clearness and sufficiency (*perspicuitas et sufficientia*), and emphasized, along with its authority, its *efficacia* as a means of salvation. This made its authority—in the true Reformation spirit—altogether dependent on the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*. But this witness, in consequence of the mechanical way in which inspiration was conceived, was extended to things which had nothing to do with the inward experience of a pious Christian. Pietism, having no great scientific interests, was very well satisfied; honest Rationalism admitted that it had never perceived any trace of this witness of the Holy Spirit. The scholastic system was broken up, and no artificial reconstruction was possible. Under Schleiermacher's lead the theology of the 19th cent. worked zealously and honestly to solve the problem of how the authority of the Bible should really be conceived and be impressively founded. There was plenty of fierce controversy. In opposition to the overthrow of all authority by the liberal theology, conservative circles sought support for the authority of the Bible elsewhere. Grundtvig seizes, as Lessing did, upon the Apostles' Creed as the living word of God. Calixtus's *Consensus patrum quinquesecularis* (1629) finds a powerful echo in the Oxford Movement in England. Between the two extremes numerous endeavours of a mediating character assert now the religious interests attaching to the absolute authority of the Scripture and now the scientific aspects of its historical limitations. It has to be said that a satisfactory solution will be found only when the Bible is felt to speak to the human heart with the authority of God. This experience must be expressed in clear theological terms. In religious matters the authority of the Bible is absolute, but only in religious matters. Its authority is internal, not external.

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4. Practical significance.—From the very first the authority of the Bible was concerned with dogma, that is to say, it was used to prove the articles of faith. It was in this way that the Messiahship of Jesus was demonstrated by primitive Christians and afterwards by apologists in the controversy with Jewish Christians. Cyprian brings together *testimonia adversus Judæos, i.e.* proof passages, and he thus provides the pattern of Scriptural proof for many centuries. Soon this method came to be employed in the dogmatic disputes arising within the Church. Athanasius collects proof from Scripture of the unity of the Son with the Father—a course that was all the more necessary since the Arian party pointed out the un-Biblical character of the word ὁμοούσιος. The Cappadocian Fathers gathered proof passages in support of the Trinity. In the Monophysite and Monothelite discussions the practice was extended, with the difference that citations from the Fathers were now added to those of the Scripture; and in the disputes regarding iconoclasm John of Damascus and the patriarch Nicephorus as well as the hostile party made collections of the same kind from Scripture and tradition. Augustine begins his work *de Trinitate* with a very detailed Scripture proof (i.–vii.), and then (viii.–xiii.) adds a dogmatic elaboration. This example was followed by all scholastic theologians, and the practice attained to still greater importance after the removal of all other authorities by the orthodox theology of Protestantism. For every single topic of the system all *loci probantes* in the Scripture were carefully gathered, and their interpretation became more and more a subordinate discipline to scientific dogmatics, viz. the so-called *theologia biblica*, out of which, after a long process in which it underwent complete transformation, there arose at last the independent discipline which is now called 'Biblical Theology.' Modern theology has long seen that an enumeration of Scripture passages torn from their context is not only a forcing of the Bible but also no real proof of the dogma in question. Dogmatic theology, however, emancipates itself but slowly from the old method of Scriptural proof. It is bound to do so more and more, because with the grossly supernatural idea of inspiration the proof which rests upon it vanishes also. How different is Hofmann's attempt to reach a new kind of Scripture proof, in which everything is made to turn upon the context—upon the general view of Scripture. At the present day even this is considered by most to be too external a method, especially as Hofmann's attempt to show the organic unity of the whole content of Scripture cannot be described as happy. It is somewhat different when P. Lobstein sets the organic method of proof from Scripture over-against the atomistic. It is only a real harmony with the fundamental ideas of the Bible that can be legitimized by dogmatics. Wendt departs from the normative significance of Scripture, and has recourse to the teaching of Jesus as the only norm.

The old theology took pride in ranging itself under the authority of the Bible, in making its infallible statements the basis of its findings. As a matter of fact, what it did was to make the Bible subservient to its system. It put its views into the Bible only to drag them out again in emphasized form. That is perhaps made most evident by the numerous works on the *Hexaemeron* (the 'six days' in Gn 1). What was there that the short account of creation was not made responsible for? All the knowledge which the cosmological speculation of Greece and late Judaism thought it had discovered was held to be already contained in Gn 1. This was the case everywhere—an entirely mechanical idea of revelation, as if God had torn asunder the details of His revelation and strewn them over the whole sacred book, in order that men might painfully gather them together again, as if He had purposely kept things mysterious in order that theologians might sharpen their wits on them.

But the Bible returned good for evil. It admitted of continual glimpses into the true nature of revelation, into the actual course of history, and provided facts which necessitated the correction of the dogmatic system. If the theoretical recognition of the right relationship between Scripture and doctrine is an achievement of recent times, yet it is possible to arrange the whole history of theology and dogma in particular under the point of view of a gradual process of biblicizing. In ancient as in modern times, there were instances of theologians who did not make the Scripture a cover for their own ideas, but propounded and solved their problems from the Bible. To these belong the Antiochene theologians, and above all Calvin, whose *Institutio* deals with much whose only claim was that it seemed to him to be required by the Bible. In later times, Bengel and J. T. Beck, with the Wurttemberg Biblicists as a whole, proceed on the same lines. The history of salvation which is contained in the Bible con-

tinually reacts against the attempts of dogmatics to do violence to it. As we learn from the apocryphal Acts of John, the Greeks made out their Saviour to be a docetic appearance only, and the Cross an idea; but the doctrine of Cerinthus is already a compromise with actual history: Jesus, a true man, for a time bearer of the æon Christ. Our Fourth Gospel goes further in the direction of actuality: Jesus Christ, wholly man and at the same time the full revelation of God. Alongside of the Synoptic representation of the human life of Jesus, this might appear in the nature of a theological supplement. In combination the effect was more potent. Not the Arian but the Nestorian Christology indicates a reaction of Bible history against dogmatic speculation. In Monophysitism Docetism takes a new lease of life. Alongside of the Gospels stood Paul. His influence was hardly felt for centuries, and the Greek dogmatics can be understood almost without him, but when Augustine was captured by him, Paulinism kept Christendom busy until in Luther a herald of Divine grace still more congenial to the Apostle of Justification by Faith arose. As in the ancient Church, so also was it in the modern. The theological labours of orthodox scholarship always moved further away from the facts of history. Each party endeavoured to establish the truth of its own doctrine of the Bible. Hence Werenfels of Basel (†1740) said of it:

> 'Hic liber est in quo quærit sua dogmata quisque,
> invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.'

But the proof from Scripture, however perverted and coerced, necessitated the continual study of the Bible, until in the time of 'Enlightenment' it shook off the chains of dogmatic tradition and established its claim to existence again. This becomes even clearer when we follow up the history of piety (see below, VII. 2, p. 612).

Though the authority of the Bible is concerned chiefly with dogma, it is not exclusively so. The Bible regulates the whole Christian life, and especially the life of the Church. Here more than anywhere the OT foundation comes to light with its legal conception (cf. p. 589). It is sufficient to recall how large a space the Decalogue occupies in Christian instruction. Along with the *precepta Dei* there appear the *consilia evangelica*, the latter often not less strictly handled than the former. In Catholicism the Bible is the foundation of ecclesiastical organization as well as of ecclesiastical law. Here, indeed, the proof from Scripture is as arbitrary as in dogmatics. All Christian festivals and the hours of prayer were grounded on the Bible; also the legal rights of the clergy. Such an un-evangelical theory as the union of all spiritual and material power in the hand of the Pope had to take refuge in the figure of the two swords (Lk 22^{38}). The Papal bull in which Leo X. banned Luther's doctrine (15th June, 1520) begins with references to Ps 74^{22} 80^{13}. Protestantism carried this method of founding all its theories upon Holy Scripture much further. In Calvinism the strictest legalism regulated not only the ecclesiastical but also the whole public life (see VII. 3), until, with the secularizing of culture on the one hand, and the altered historical conception of the Bible on the other, the fact established itself more and more that in the records of long past ages ideals might be found for the individual and social life, but never again an immediate legal system.

So in the most recent times the idea of any external authority pertaining to the Bible is everywhere losing ground. This will not be to the injury of Christianity, if only at the same time the untold inner value of the Bible as the unparalleled religious guide-book and the inexhaustible fountain of religious inspiration gains wider recognition.

LITERATURE.—On the proof from Scripture: Harnack, *Dogmengesch.*[3] ii. 68-82; Th. Schermann, 'Die Gesch. der dogmat. Florilegien vom v.-viii. Jahrh.' in *TU*, new ser. xiii. 1, 1904; F. Kropatschek, *Das Schriftprincip in der luther. Kirche*, i. 1905; C. Stange, *Was ist Schriftgemass?* 1904; H. H. Wendt, *System der christl. Lehre*, 1907, pp. 25-58; P. Lobstein, *Études sur la doctrine chrét. de Dieu*, i. 1907; W. Newton Clarke, *The Use of the Scriptures in Theology*, 1905; E. Haupt, *Die Bedeut. der h. Schrift für den evangelischen Christen*, 1891; J. H. Thayer, *The Change of Attitude towards the Bible*, 1891; Er. Stave, *Der Einfluss der Bibelkritik auf das christl. Glaubensleben*, 1903; J. Wordsworth, *The Devotional Study of Holy Script. in reference to the Higher Crit. of the NT*, 1902; M Reischle, *Was kann und soll uns die Bibel sein?* Wartburg, 1904, p. 93 ff.; U. Muhs, *Die Kritik und die Stellung zur h Schrift* (1905); W. B. Carpenter (Bishop of Ripon), *My Bible*, 1884, Germ. tr. by L. Pfeiffer, 1902. Cf. art. APOLOGETICS, vol. i. p. 621.

IV. *BIBLICAL STUDIES.*—1. **Methods.**—Much against the original intention of the Bible, the Church looked upon it as a book for theologians, a book which as the source of all dogmatic and theological knowledge called for thorough study. The Gnostics were the first to handle it in this scientific way, and the Alexandrians adopted the method. It is true that the Catechetical school was interested more in philosophy than in history. Great as were the services which Origen rendered as a Biblical scholar, he was not a Biblical theologian, and in his school philosophy always maintained the upper hand. Even his admirer and successor, the blind Didymus of Alexandria, whose interest in exegesis was greater than that of others, gave the chief place to dogmatics. In the strict sense of the term we hear of exegetical lectures only in the school of Antioch. Such lectures were delivered by Lucian, Diodorus, and Theodore, and later by Paul the Persian after the flight to Nisibis. Here among the Nestorians outside the Empire there was established a regular school for the scientific study of the Bible. Among the Greeks and Latins it was sometimes by means of commentary and sometimes by 'answers to correspondents' (*Erotapokriseis, Quæstiones*) that Bible instruction was carried on. The services of the monasteries in this connexion were of more value to the ascetic view of the Bible than to its scientific study (see VI. 3). At the same time, both in East and West, the monasteries were for long the only places where the study of the Bible was fostered. In their libraries lay the old commentaries of the Fathers. From them excerpts were taken for handier use (*e.g.* from Gregory the Great by Paterius, Odo of Clugny, etc.), and these were made into new compilations. Pupils were taught the Bible. It was all very elementary, but it nevertheless supplied the means by which, to some degree, the continuity of scientific study was maintained. The credit here is due to the Rule of St. Basil and its renewal by Theodore of Studium, and in the West to Cassiodorus and the later Benedictines. The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 required that in every cathedral-school at least one theologian should be appointed who would instruct priests and others in the Bible (*in sacra pagina*). In the Academy of Constantinople, founded by Bardas about 860, no theology of any kind was taught. Even in the oldest high schools of the West—the legal school of Bologna and the medical school at Salerno—it was the same. In the case of Paris the studies were entirely scholastic to start with, and not Biblical at all. The Bible first received recognition at the universities when the mendicant friars—the Franciscans first and then the Dominicans—joined their monastic schools to them. Even then the *lectiones biblicæ* were delivered in the monasteries before a mainly monastic audience—as a practical preparation for the cure of souls. It is true that a course of Bible instruction was part of the ordinary curriculum. In Paris there was a fixed course for the scholars extending over four years. The bachelor had to lecture

cursorie on the Bible for two years. But in both cases the Bible was hurried over with all possible speed as a stepping-stone to the 'sentences.' Roger Bacon (*Opus min.* 328) complains of the excessive value laid upon the sentences of the Lombard which the influence of Alexander of Hales caused people to prefer to the Bible itself.

All this was changed at the Reformation. Luther, himself a monk, attached supreme importance to exegetical lectures, as did Melanchthon and Calvin. In Zürich there was established the so-called 'Prophecy,' *i.e.* the public discussion of Scripture among theological students in the form of debate. This was taken up by Pietism in its *collegia biblica* again after Protestant orthodoxy had almost fallen back into the old mistake of the scholastic method. What Spener established in Frankfort was more of the nature of a prayer-meeting. A. H. Francke and his friends in Leipzig desired real lectures in the form of Bible-exposition. Their success proved the need of them. Since that time the study of the Bible has won a leading place within the Protestant teaching of all denominations. It is a fixed feature of the work of the German universities, and specialization becomes commoner every day. Even in the Roman Church more value is beginning to be laid upon it, as is shown by the Encyclica 'Providentissimus Deus' of Leo XIII. (18th Nov. 1893) and the formation of a Bible Commission in 1901, as well as by a series of works which these called into being. Attempts are frequently made to show that the Roman Church has always zealously furthered the study of the Bible, but the arguments which have been gathered (by Falk *e.g.*) only prove the opposite.

LITERATURE.—Denifle, *Die Universitaten des Mittelalters*, 1885; G. Kaufmann, *Gesch. der deutschen Universitaten*, 1888-96; Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, 1895; Saul, *Das Bibelstudium im Predigerorden*, 1902; Felder, *Gesch. der wissenschaftl. Studien im Franciscanerorden*, 1904; F. Falk, *Die Mainzer Hochschule 1477 und ihr Lehrstuhl fur Bibelkunde*, 1899, *Bibelstudien, Bibelhandschriften und Bibeldrucke in Mainz*, 1901, and *Die Bibel am Ausgange des Mittelalters, ihre Kenntniss und ihre Verbreitung*, 1905; N. Peters, *Papst Pius X und das Bibelstudium*, 1906; A. S. Peake, *A Guide to Biblical Study*, 1897; W. F. Adeney, *How to read the Bible*, 1896; M. L. G. Petrie, *Clews to Holy Writ*, 1892.

2. **Textual criticism.**—When we consider the Bible as the object of scientific study, one of the first things to demand our attention is the critical labour bestowed upon its text. The earliest Christians had no idea of anything of the kind. We learn this from the freedom of the citations from the OT which are contained in the NT. It must be admitted that the Jewish complaints about Christian interpolations in the LXX text were not without foundation (see, *e.g.* Ex 17^{14} in Barn. 12^{9}; Justin's citation of Ps 96^{10} in *Dial.* 72-73; Ps 37^{14} and 50^{9} in the Leipzig papyrus, edited by Heinrici, *Beitr.* iv. 1903). In the first two centuries nearly all the various readings of the NT came into existence, the majority of them by deliberate alteration of the text, many for the sake of style, and several in the interests of dogma (Jn 1^{18}, 1 Ti 3^{16}, He 2^{9} etc.). The most noticeable instances of this are provided by the heads of schools and churches, like Marcion and Tatian. The beginning of theology in the Church, however, gave rise to a systematic criticism of the text, such as we find in Irenæus's fine treatment of the variant 616 for 666 in Rev 13^{18} (*adv. Haer.* v. 29, 30). We know very little of the textual criticism by the Artemonites in Rome. All the more brightly, however, shines the star of the master Origen, though his great work in the OT province, the *Hexapla*, where the original text and the various versions are set side by side with the avowed intention of purifying the LXX text, led, it must be owned, to greater confusion (E. Schwartz, 'Zur Geschichte der Hexapla,' in *GGN*, 1903, 693 ff.). There is no evidence of a similar work for the NT, or, indeed, of any recension of the text at all, but in the numerous commentaries there is rich material for it. Even Origen could not establish his work everywhere. Different places developed different texts spontaneously. When the ecclesiastical authorities began to pay attention to this fact, revisions by the particular Churches came into existence in the various provinces. We know from Jerome (*Præf. in Paralip.*) that in Egypt the recension in use was that of Hesychius, in Syria that of Lucian, and in Palestine that of Pamphilus, the pupil of Origen. Lagarde, Bousset, Rahlfs, and others have begun to detect traces of these recensions in the still existing MSS, which, however, mostly give a mixed text. Hesychius is fond of choosing the shortest of competing readings, Lucian makes a broad text by comparing and combining, and Pamphilus admires a good Greek style. Everywhere in these ancient exegetical works we find notes on textual criticism, drawn usually, either directly or indirectly, from Origen's *Hexapla* in the OT and from various MSS in the NT. The deciding factor of criticism was sometimes dogma and sometimes the authority of individual scholars (cf. the scholion to Jn 7^{53} in A). Often readings were rejected as the falsifications of heretics, but often the heretics were right in their counter-complaint. For examples of Trinitarian interpolation, see 1 Co 8^{6} in the Cappadocian Fathers and 1 Jn 5^{7} in the Latin Church. We possess a wonderful instance of the careful tradition of a text in the Peshiṭṭā, which is almost devoid of variant readings. In the case of the Copts the numerous scholia testify to continual comparison with the Greek text on the one hand and with the Arabic on the other. In Constantinople the influence of Chrysostom established the later Antiochene text, without, however, ousting the others entirely. The Athos-Codex, discovered by von der Goltz, and the labours of an Arethas, show how much interest was taken in criticism at Constantinople even in the 10th century. The continual revisions of the old versions, of which we have spoken above, are also evidence of textual criticism, whether they are concerned only with deciding between various translations or go back to the original. In the West, Cassiodorus in the 6th cent., and Theodulf and Alcuin in the 9th, did excellent work in the critical revision of the Vulgate; but none of them gained a hold. Every province, every order, every monastery, had a tradition of its own, which was based in some cases upon the work of some great individual Greek or even Hebrew scholar. In the *correctoria biblica* these traditions were laid down for guidance in the correcting of copies of the Bible. The Cistercians employed as their norm a copy by Abbot Stephen Harding; the Franciscans adopted the corrections of William of Mara; the Dominicans followed Hugo of St. Caro; the Augustinians had as their pattern a Windesheim Bible. The keen criticism of Roger Bacon proves that the success of the Paris text was due more to the renown of the *studium generale* than to its inherent excellence.

Even the introduction of printing made no difference at first. The oldest Latin prints are reproductions of a single MS. So far as the LXX is concerned, the Complutensian, the Aldine, and the Sixtine, with their reprints, represent three classes of texts. Erasmus formed the text of his NT out of very few and very late MSS. The next editors, especially Stephen and Beza, made use of others. Humanism did not rise beyond a dilettante textual criticism, and employed few materials. Still, printing brought about that which up till now was impossible, viz. the supremacy of a single

text (apart from the small errors that are unavoidable in a reprint). This was done for the Vulgate by the (Sixtine) Clementine text of (1590) 1592, which owed its origin to the carrying out of a decree of the Council of Trent. So far as the Greek text was concerned, the high esteem attached to the *textus jam ab omnibus receptus* was due to a bookseller's advertisement, the text itself being Stephen's text of 1550 in the Elzevir reprint of (1624) 1633, which was itself influenced by Beza's editions. In the year 1707, John Mill shattered all faith in the infallibility of this text by the 30,000 various readings which he found in about 80 MSS. The task of gathering together various readings, to which this Englishman devoted himself, was continued by Johann Jakob Wetstein, a Swiss who had settled in Holland (1751–52); the Saxon Chr. Fr. Matthæi, who collected and stole in Russia (1782–88, 1803–07);* the Viennese F. C. Alter (1786–87); the Dane Andr. Birch (1788); and the Catholic professor of theology at Bonn, J. M. A. Scholz (1823). The climax was reached in the editions of the Englishman S. Pr. Tregelles (1844, 1857–72), and above all in the diligent and fortunate work of G. Fr. Const. Tischendorf in Leipzig (1841, viii. crit. maj. 1869). Tischendorf used in his work 15 majuscule codices which he discovered, among them the Sinaitic (ℵ) found in 1844 and 1859. He made new editions of 21 MSS,† and collected testimonies from the Versions and the Fathers as no one before him had done. Since that time some extremely valuable finds have been made. Von Soden has made the attempt to work through all the minuscules catalogued by Gregory and Scrivener. An enormous amount of industry is employed upon the investigation of texts, especially by German and English scholars. But this is not the last word in textual criticism. What is of the utmost importance is that the right method of passing judgment upon tradition should be followed. The Württemberg theologian Joh. Alb. Bengel (1734), with his method of distinguishing between different families of texts, here took the first step. His motive was love for God's word, in which even the slightest particular was golden in value. The rationalist, Johann Salomon Semler of Halle, carried this on, and introduced to German science the labours of the Dutch Arminians and the French Catholic Oratorian Richard Simon. He was joined by Johann Jakob Griesbach of Jena (1774–77) and Hug of Freiburg (1808), the former a Protestant, the latter a Catholic, who laboured more fully the scheme of the text-recensions which sprang from the ancient Church—a course continued in our own time most successfully by W. Bousset in his *Textkrit. Studien zum NT* (1894). While these all started from the textus receptus, improving, shortening, and transposing it, C. Lachmann, the Berlin philologist, took up Richard Bentley's suggestion (1742), and established the principle that the start should be made, not from the late printed text, but from the ancient MSS: it was possible to give the text of the 4th cent. with certainty instead of that of the 16th. Further progress is due to the two Cambridge friends, B. F. Westcott and F. J. A. Hort, whose great service was that they overcame the scruples of conservative English theology in spite of Dean Burgon's violent attacks. Their carefully elaborated method was considered by many to represent all that was attainable. C. R. Gregory, O. von Gebhardt, and E. Nestle were content to compare Tischendorf and WH. The great agreement of the newer text-critics from Lachmann to WH in their opposition to the textus receptus is shown very clearly by the editions of F. H. A. Scrivener (1859, revised by E. Nestle, 1906), though that was far from the intention of the strongly conservative author. A new textus receptus, however, was and must be an impossibility. With fine instinct Hort himself called special attention to a series of Western readings which he did not consider genuine, but which for the history of the text were well worthy of note. The more thorough investigation of the history of the oldest translations, especially the Vet. Lat. and the Vet. Syr., with which latter Mrs. Lewis's find at Sinai first made us acquainted, has led to more and more attention being attached to them. Now it is clear that not only all the important variants were in existence before the 4th cent., but also that it was just the so-called Western text that was most widely circulated in the 2nd century. In opposition to WH, a great number of English scholars, in particular F. C. Burkitt and J. R. Harris, with the Germans F. Blass, E. Nestle, etc., give this text, which was current from Carthage to Edessa, the highest place, while others, like Jülicher and Wellhausen, advocate an eclectic method. And, indeed, the history of the text can be of service now only in making clear the later developments of the text. In most cases, what it does is to bring us to a stop before the fact that two readings, equally witnessed and equally wide-spread, reach back to the earliest time. If we are not satisfied with a choice of two readings, or assume, like Blass, two editions by the Biblical author himself, then it is to exegetical considerations that we must look for finality. Thus, the method which B. Weiss has always advocated and practised has to be combined with the other one, based on the history of the text.

In the matter of the OT, lower criticism was not so active. Here the tradition of the Synagogue was the guide. So early as the 2nd cent. this had fixed the consonantal text and its pronunciation (by oral traditions in the first instance) so firmly that it never altered. The so-called Massorah, which was committed to writing in the 8th to 10th cents. made an effort to attain an almost faultless multiplication and tradition of the text. Although the oldest Hebrew MSS do not go beyond the 9th cent. A.D., it is yet possible to maintain that we possess the text of the 2nd cent., and that it is to hand in print (Soncino, 1488, Brescia, 1494 [Gerson]; Complutensian Polyglot, 1514–17; *Biblia Rabbinica Bombergiana*, ii., Ven. 1525–26). Even the collections of numerous variants which B. Kennicott (1776–80) and de Rossi (1784–88) have brought together do not go beyond this Massoretic revision. On the other hand, the old translations, especially the LXX, the Samaritan text, and several papyri of recent discovery, show that there was a pre-Massoretic text. While editors down to Delitzsch-Baer and Ginsburg (1894) conceived their task to be the reproduction in the most exact form of the Massoretic text with all its delicacies of punctuation, the newest editions (Haupt, *SBOT*, 1893 ff.; Kittel, *Bibl. Heb.*, 1905–06) make it their aim, with the help of the versions and of conjecture, to reach an older text. How far that has been successful, and what value is to be attached to the LXX traditions, are still open questions.

In the investigation of the ancient versions of the Bible, whose value for textual criticism is increasing from day to day, excellent work has been done, especially by English scholars. There are, *e.g.*, the new Oxford editions: the Vulgate by J. Wordsworth and H. J. White (1889 ff.), the Peshiṭṭā by G. H. Gwilliam (1901), the Northern Coptic (Bohairic) NT by G. Horner (1898 ff.); while Cambridge provides us with the Septuagint by A. E. Brooke and N. McLean (1906 ff.), the Old Syriac Gospels by F. C. Burkitt (1904), the Peshiṭṭā Psalter by W. E. Barnes (1904), etc.

* O. von Gebhardt, *Centralbl. f. Bibliothekswesen*, xv., 1898.
† C. R. Gregory, *Prolegomena*, 25 ff.

The main point, however, is that the claim of the Biblical text-critic is now recognized on all hands, and that criticism has almost entirely freed itself from the dogmatic prejudices which so long met it with opposition. It carries on its work by a scientific method. Naturally in this particular case, with the rich and complex nature of its materials, the method receives special application. It is to be regretted that this is often forgotten by philologists who labour upon the Bible. Yet the method remains entirely scientific, and in principle could be applied in any similar field of study.

LITERATURE.—Gregory, Scrivener, Nestle, von Soden (see II. 3); Hammond, *Textual Criticism*, 1894; M. R. Vincent, *A History of the Textual Criticism of the NT*, 1899; Kenyon, *Handb. of Text. Crit. of the NT*, 1901; E. Rüegg, *Die NTliche Textkritik seit Lachmann*, 1892; B. Weiss, *Textkritik der Apocalypse*, 1891, *Kath. Briefe*, 1892, *Paul. Briefe*, 1896, and *Evangelien*, 1899; H. Strack, art. 'Massorah' in *PRE*[3] xii. 393; Chr. D. Ginsburg, *Introd. to the Massoretico-critical ed. of the Heb. Bible*, 1897; R. Kittel, *Über die Notwendigkeit und Moglichkeit einer neuen Ausgabe der hebr. Bibel*, 1901; Paul de Lagarde, *Ankundigung einer neuen Ausgabe der griech. Übersetzung des AT*, 1886; H. B. Swete, *The OT in Gr.*, 1887 ff., and *Introd.*[2], 1902; A. Rahlfs, *Septuaginta-Studien*, 1904, 1907; W. Bousset, *Textkritische Studien zum NT*, 1894; E. von der Goltz, 'Eine textkritische Arbeit des 10. bezw. 6. Jahrh.,' *TU*, new ser. ii. 4, 1899; S. Berger, *Hist. de la Vulgate*, 1893; P. Denifle, 'Die Handschriften der Bibelkorrektorien des 13 Jahrh.,' *Arch. f. Litt. u. Kirchengesch. des Mittelalters*, iv., 1888.

3. Higher criticism.—Along with the criticism of the text, and often hand in hand with it, there has always gone the literary and material criticism. It is not a modern discovery; only the methods have changed here also. The relation between the higher and what is called the lower criticism is characteristic of the different periods. The awakening scientific consciousness attaches chief importance to the criticism of the text, while higher criticism comes afterwards. So long as science is bound by tradition and the dogma of the Church, it confines itself as much as possible to the former, and even tries to find in it the solution of higher literary problems. Modern instances may be cited in A. Klostermann, Ed. König, and Fr. Blass. As soon, however, as it becomes free, it lays the stress upon the latter, without, however, neglecting those questions which arise in connexion with the text.

Literary criticism finds its starting-point in the formation of the Canon itself. If the pre-condition of any book's canonicity is its prophetic or apostolic origin, then the book itself and the tradition concerning it must be examined to discover whether such origin can be claimed for it or not. The Muratorian Fragment, *e.g.*, denies canonicity to the *Shepherd* of Hermas, because it is neither of prophetic nor of apostolic origin. The Epistle to the Hebrews, which Roman tradition rejected as anonymous, must come from Barnabas (Africa) or Paul himself (Alexandria) to secure recognition. This was the motive which prompted the gathering of literary information regarding the individual books of the Bible, such as Eusebius of Cæsarea in particular collected with great diligence. In some cases this information found its way into the Bible MSS in the shape of prologues, titles, and subscriptions, and in a certain measure it kept alive all through the Middle Ages the knowledge of the origin of the books of the Bible. Its collection into the Bibliotheca Sancta of Sixtus of Siena († 1599) was done in this mediæval spirit. It was with the same material that the Protestant theology of the 16th and 17th centuries worked, and even modern critical investigators cannot dispense with tradition, however much they may subject it to examination.

The criticism of the ancient Church proceeded in the first place not upon literary and historical, but upon dogmatic considerations. It was from dogmatic motives that in Asia Minor the so-called 'Alogi' rejected all Johannine writings, that the Roman presbyter Gaius declared the Apocalypse to have come from the hand of Cerinthus, and that Dionysius of Alexandria reached the fine conclusion—adopted among the very latest scholars—that there were two Johns working in Ephesus simultaneously. We have the clearest evidence of this in the casting aside of everything which came from the Twelve Apostles by Marcion, who combined with this the hypothesis of an interpolation of the Gospel (Luke) and the Epistles of Paul. The repudiation of the OT also by Marcion and many Gnostics has a dogmatic basis in the dualism between the creating and the redeeming God, this being the shape which the Pauline antithesis—law and grace—took among pagan Christians. Along with this we find all manner of stages, from partial to complete recognition of the OT, often with very fine differentiation of the contents according to their significance and value (Ptolemæus, *Ep. to Flora*; Harnack, *SBAW*, 1902).

Criticism, however, became more minute. Just as Marcion in his antitheses called attention to a great number of contradictions between the OT and the NT (*e.g.* Is 45[7], Lk 6[43]; Ex 3[21], Lk 10[4]; 2 K 2[23f.], Lk 18[15f.]), so inconsistencies in the NT itself soon came to be observed. The Muratorian Canon and the Monarchian Prologues deal with the differences which mark the beginning and the end of the Gospels. The disparity between the two genealogies forms the subject-matter of a correspondence between Julius Africanus and Aristides (Euseb. *HE* i. 72 ff., cf. F. Spitta, 1877). Eusebius deals with the various accounts of the appearances of the risen Lord. It was the opponents of Christianity who called attention to these difficulties. The Jews questioned the Christian proof from prophecy and the credibility of the Gospel tradition. There were also heathen philosophers like Celsus, and very notably Porphyry, who declared the OT to be incredible and full of myths, and pointed out inconsistencies in the Gospels themselves. It is against Porphyry or Hierocles that the *Apokritikos* of Macarius Magnes is directed. Ecclesiastical theologians, who were as little capable of a real literary and historical survey as their opponents, were driven in this combat to a method of harmonizing, which at all costs had to explain away those inconsistencies; and they prided themselves that they successfully accomplished this task, by means of a mental ingenuity that was often surprising. One has the impression, it is true, that they did not feel any great certainty themselves, for instead of one explanation they often offer a choice, or they smother the question at issue by abusing the malevolence of unbelief and doubt. This was the course taken by Augustine himself, whose *de Consensu Evangelistarum* is probably the best work which the ancient Church produced in this field (see iii. 40–50: the harmonizing of Jn 19[14], 'the sixth hour,' and Mk 15[25], 'the third hour'). But Christian readers also observed difficulties—often very subtle ones—in reading their Bibles, and they demanded the explanation of them from their spiritual advisers. This is shown very clearly by Jerome's correspondence with his lady friend in Rome, and later by Alcuin's interchange of letters. In this way there arose the rich literature of Biblical *Erotapokriseis*, or *Quaestiones*. So long as these critical questions were put in the faith that the inspired Scriptures were infallible and free from inconsistency, and in the blind trust that the theologians of the Church were able to solve every problem of the kind that could arise, they were welcomed as a means of exercising and displaying the mental acumen of ecclesiastical theologians.

But whenever these inconsistencies were seriously entertained they were at once condemned as heresy. The Manichæans, who continued the critical tradition of the Marcionites, gave the Church most trouble in this matter, and they were followed by Paulicians, Albigenses, and all the tendencies which were gathered together under the name of Catharists. Even within the Church itself rationalistic views were to be found. In the 9th cent. Abbot Hucbert of St. Maurice made fun of our Lord's saying in Mt 11^{29}—a piece of unparalleled levity. In 1376 the Parisian students declared that the Gospel, like other books, contained what was fabulous and false, but their thesis was immediately condemned by the bishop. Such frivolous criticism as this could not possess any lasting effect.

The Humanists introduced a new feature into criticism. They were no longer content only to hand down Patristic references, but they also—especially Laurentius Valla and Desiderius Erasmus (*Annotationes* and *Paraphrases*)—attached real importance to them. It is this that enables us to understand Carlstadt's criticism of the Canon (1520; K. A. Credner, *Zur Gesch. des Kanons*, 1847, p. 291 ff.) and the later treatment of the question by the Lutheran dogmatists from Chemnitz to Gerhard. Their distinction between canonical and deutero-canonical books corresponds generally to Eusebius's *homologumena* and *antilegomena*. Quite different was Luther's position (see III. 3). In his case literary and historical considerations were entirely secondary. It was his personal faith that was the decisive element. The books which did not bear clear testimony to Christ he considered non-apostolic. His principle was a purely religious, we may say dogmatic, valuation without any literary or historical considerations. Even in the same book one verse might be apostolic in this sense and another not. According to this view, the old idea of the Canon as representing the united authority of the Apostles was lost sight of. It was the last step in what may be called the dissolution of the Canon. Luther himself, however, did not admit this result, but identified the principle upon which he proceeded with the literary method of the Fathers and the Humanists. His own opinion was that Hebrews, James, Jude, and the Apocalypse should be excluded from the NT. There he drew a clear line. But he was far too conservative and cautious to wish to press such a personal judgment upon others. He felt that he possessed the power and the right to make an alteration upon the Canon, but he left it as it was. Gradually the line which he drew disappeared, and the consciousness of any difference of value within the Canon faded away. Later dogmatists were unaware of it. Only the order which Luther's Bible follows bears witness, in its variation from tradition, to the critical experiment of the reformer.

The new period of Biblical criticism began about the middle of the 18th cent., at the time of 'Enlightenment.' The way was prepared for it on the one hand by the pains which Catholics expended to destroy faith in the infallibility of the Bible, the Protestants' paper Pope, and on the other hand by the strictly scientific method of investigation which was adopted by the Arminians. The new feature was that it was no longer the traditions about the separate books that were made to speak, but the books themselves. Richard Simon attacked the trustworthiness of the Bible text; Astruc, Louis XIV.'s physician, by his discovery of the two strata distinguished by separate Divine names in the Pentateuch, assailed the ordinary view of the origin of the books of the Bible. The hypothesis of the two sources was taken over later by the Protestants, and further developed and extended. Ilgen and Hupfeld (1853) discovered the 2nd Elohist. Deuteronomy was disentangled, and finally J E P and Dt were found to have undergone a series of redactions. In spite of its great significance for the understanding of Israel's religious development, the dispute as to the age of these sources between the school of Ewald and that of Reuss, Graf, and Wellhausen, in which the latter emerged victorious, is quite a secondary matter compared with the fact that the gradual growth of the Pentateuch from different sources and strata ranging over centuries is acknowledged generally. Even such conservative theologians in Germany as the late Franz Delitzsch, Ed. Konig, and H. Strack no longer refuse to admit this fact. In Scotland, Robertson Smith was the pioneer. So much progress has now been made that not only does Haupt's 'Rainbow Bible' (1893 ff.) bring the various sources before the eyes of all who are versed in Hebrew, but learned and popular new translations like those of Kautzsch (1894), Kuenen, Hooykaas, Kosters, and Oort (1897 ff.) exhibit them also to the laity. Upholders of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch are almost entirely dumb, while books like Schlatter's *Einleitung in die Bibel* (Calw, 1889, 3rd ed. 1901), which come from and are intended for evangelical circles, set forth the principles of this criticism as the result of the latest investigation.

Naturally this did not stop at the Pentateuch. The method spread automatically to the other historical books of the OT. Those same sources of which we have spoken include Joshua also, while in the case of Judges, Samuel, and Kings the conditions are largely similar. The prophetical books, especially Isaiah, but also some of the Minor Prophets, bear evidence that they are not unities; so, too, the poetical books, Job, Ecclesiastes (Siegfried), Proverbs. The 'Psalms of David' themselves confess that they do not all come from his pen, and the fact was always recognized. Theodore of Mopsuestia in his day connected some of them with princes of the Maccabæan dynasty. The systematic investigation of different collections, strata, and dates led to the conclusion that there was as little of David in the Psalms as there was of Moses in the Pentateuch. The results of OT criticism are in matters of detail quite fluctuating. The revision of ideas about the development of Israel's religion, which we owe to the comparative history of religion, will lead to many modifications (Br. Baentsch, *Altoriental. u. israelit. Monotheismus*, 1906). But the necessity for criticism and the method which is to be followed are established (E. Kautzsch, *Abriss der Gesch. des AT Schriftums* [a supplement to his translation], 1894).

In the field of the NT, which has been separating itself from the OT more and more for a century, the topic which has received most investigation since 1750 has been the Synoptic problem. So far as any literary relationship between the Gospels was thought of in former times, the view most widely taken was that of St. Augustine, that the order observed in the Canon was also the historical order. With astonishing rapidity, however, various possibilities were now put to the test: (1) the use of the oldest Gospel by more recent ones, (2) a common source, and (3) independent use of oral tradition. Gradually a combination of these various hypotheses emerged as the only possible solution, viz. the use of Mark by Matthew and Luke, with the addition of a common source, and much drawn from oral tradition. In matters of detail this leaves room for any number of suggestions, and science can hardly come to any

definite conclusion, because no explanation can be found to clear up the whole question. But the principle has been found, and will never again be lost sight of. In regard to the rest of the NT books, it was questions of genuineness that exercised critics until the middle of the 19th century. What had to be proved, in the first place, was the claim of the various books to canonicity, *i.e.* their genuineness, integrity, and trustworthiness. Rationalistic critics confined their attention to single and often very external points. Schleiermacher and his school made a real advance in the literary method. But it was Baur that first achieved a general conception of the significance of each book from a consideration of the place which it filled in the general development of primitive Christianity. Subsequent examination proved Baur's conception to be false, resting, as it did, upon Hegel's philosophical scheme of the movement of ideas through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The conception of the separate books as having been written with the express intention of making them effective factors in the contest between the Church parties is now given up. What is left, however, is the necessity for dealing with each individual book as a whole, and finding out the part which it played in a great development. The method which was followed by Baur (and still by Holtzmann), of starting from the criticism of the Canon, has yielded more and more to the literary method (Reuss, Jülicher, Krüger, von Soden). The great advance from the scientific point of view consists in the fact that Biblical criticism has attained the greatest possible freedom from all dogmatic prepossessions. Externally this is shown in the fact that the question of genuineness is now discussed quite calmly, conservative theologians occasionally denying it, while critical theologians often maintain it or pronounce a *non liquet*. Recent criticism also speaks freely of different sources, and propounds theories of interpolation or some similar literary attempt at solution. Baur held only the four chief Pauline epistles to be genuine, but now the majority of them (eight to ten) are recognized. It has to be admitted that the integrity of 2 Cor. is still keenly disputed. The radical criticism of the Dutch school, which repudiates all the apostolic epistles, finds as little support as that of the few who desire at any price to maintain the genuineness of all. The Acts of the Apostles is everywhere handled upon the theory of different sources, though the methods differ much in detail. How much vigour used to be spent on the discussion of the genuineness, the Johannine origin of the Fourth Gospel, and the Revelation *pro et contra!* At the present time we have an increasing number of attempts to show that neither is a unity. Undoubtedly this search for rents or joinings, these outvying theories of sources and interpolations, may become to some extent unnatural. But in the meantime they form the most valuable instrument we have —an instrument which is not yet by any means worn out.

LITERATURE.—The Ancient Church: K. J. Neumann, *Hippolytus von Rom*, 1902, p. 144 ff.

The Middle Ages: H. Reuter, *Gesch. der relig. Aufklarung im Mittelalter*, 1875–77.

Recent times: T. K. Cheyne, *The Founders of OT Criticism*, 1893; W. Robertson Smith, see I. 1; H. Holzinger, *Einleit. in den Hexateuch*, 1893; C. A. Briggs, *The Higher Crit. of the Hexateuch*, 1893 (3rd ed. 1897); Baron Fr. von Hügel (Cath.), *The Hist. Method and the Documents of the Hexateuch*, 1898; J. Orr, *The Problem of the OT*, 1907; W. G. Jordan, *Bibl. Criticism and Modern Thought*, 1909; H. S. Nash, *The Hist. of the Higher Crit. of the NT*, New York, 1900; L. Pullan, *NT Criticism*, 1907; H. Holtzmann, *Lehrb. der Einleit. in das NT*[3], 1897; A. Jülicher, *An Introd. to the NT*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1904; B. Weiss, *Manual of Introd. to the NT*, Eng. tr., Edin. 1887–88; Th. Zahn, *Introd. to NT*, Eng. tr., Edin. 1909.

4. **Exegesis.**—All criticism, higher and lower, is ultimately only a means to the correct understanding of the text. It is a serious mistake to suppose, as has sometimes been done, that criticism is an end in itself. Literary criticism is a part, a very important part, of exegesis as it is now understood, just as allegory was its most important feature in former times.

We have already learned that the Christian Church found elaborate exegetical methods to hand, and have seen how she provided these with new aims. The allegorical method, which the Stoics developed and the Jews of Alexandria applied to the OT, discovered a hidden and profound meaning, such as was alone worthy of the old conception of God and His Spirit, and this meaning, often with the utmost disregard for the plain sense of the words, it tried to establish by all kinds of artifices. In contra-distinction to philosophical speculations which disregarded history, Christianity was by its whole nature bound up in history. The notion of prophecy and fulfilment took the place of the Platonic *noumenon* and *phainomenon*. Thus it comes about that the history of Christian exegesis is a continual conflict between a historical interpretation and the old allegorical method. The Gnostics, who were the first real exegetes and wrote commentaries to the OT and the NT, fell under the influence of this latter method in its most marked form. The Gospel dealt not with the earthly life of Jesus, but with events in the supramundane world. Heracleon understood the saying that Jesus went down to Capernaum (Jn 2^{12}) as referring to the descent of the æon Christus from the region of light into this material world. Among the twelve apostles the traitor Judas was the lowest of the twelve æons, and his fall brought the world of sense into being. At the same time, the Apologists adopted a method of interpretation which reminds us of the exegesis of Palestinian Rabbinism and early Christianity, mainly in the form of fulfilment of prophecy. It was reserved for the theologians of Alexandria to remove this contradiction by maintaining the rightfulness of both methods, considering them, however, to represent two separate stages. In especial there was Origen's brilliant formula that, as man contains body, soul, and spirit, so exegesis shows the strictly verbal, the moral, and the mystical senses, challenging, supplementing, and qualifying one another. This theory of the greatest thinker and Biblical scholar in the ancient Church continued to dominate exegesis. He himself, however, did not always put it into practice, and there were very few of his followers who had the capacity to do so. The majority of them made his allegorical method a means of coaxing from the text things which it did not contain at all. The interpretation of the parables provides an instance. No regard was had for the simple hortatory lesson of the parable of the Good Samaritan. The parable was the representation of Christ's own work of salvation from the Fall to the Judgment-Day. There were some who went further in this direction than others. Origen's school contained a Pamphilus and a Eusebius as well as the great Cappadocians. The Alexandrians were the keenest allegorizers. At the same time they were spiritualists in regard to the eschatology of the ancient Church, while a section of Christian theologians (Nepos, Methodius) accepted it literally. More important was the exegesis of Lucian's school. These Antiochenes wrote Greek, but there was evidently a Semitic element in them. They understood Syriac and Hebrew and had sympathy with Rabbinical exegesis. Thus in the case of Diodorus of Tarsus and his greater pupil Theodore of Mopsuestia, exegesis is much less allegorical than typological (though the two are always inter-

woven), and occasionally it becomes almost wholly historical in method.

As this Antiochene school acquired much influence in the Greek Church through the great preacher Chrysostom, whose expositions were quite unfettered by school tradition, so through Theodore, the interpreter κατ' ἐξοχήν, it assumed quite supreme influence among the Syrian Nestorians. We are astonished to find among these in the late Middle Ages excellent commentators like Išodad and others, while the Monophysites followed the Alexandrian traditions. Bar-Hebræus, in exegesis as in politics, approximates to both. The school of Antioch gained influence also in the West. The much used *Instituta regularia divinae legis* of Junilius are reproductions of the lectures of Paul of Nisibis.* Ambrose was a faithful follower of Origen; and Augustine, in spite of his more practical Latin nature, which made him akin to the Syrians, resembled him greatly. He has laid down the principles which he followed in *de Doctrina Christiana*. Tychonius and Eucherius wrote text-books on the allegorical method. But it was Jerome who, under the direct influence of Rabbinical exegesis and a verbal understanding of the original, brought about the change from the method of Origen and the Cappadocians to an exegesis that fixed the verbal or grammatical sense and made interpretation historical. In practice, it must be admitted, he himself fell short; but the effect of his influence is to be seen in the fact that the West has never quite ceased to be alive to the significance of a verbal and historical exegesis. In general, in the Middle Ages there was a much more active exegetical movement among the Latins than among the Greeks. In the 6th cent. there began the period of *catenae*, that is to say, exegetical compilations from various authors. At first the authors were named; then the names were omitted; the excerpts were connected by some suitable phrases, and then the Byzantine compiler placed his name before the result. It may be said without fear of contradiction, that since the time of Justinian hardly a new exegetical thought has found expression—at least in the way of sound interpretation. The same conditions prevailed in the West until the 12th century. The Carlovingian commentators give nothing of their own, and make a formal excuse when, once in a way, they venture to add something to the authority of the Fathers. These commentaries, destitute of any spark of individuality, differ from one another only in the way in which they combine Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Pelagius, etc. Ultimately, however, the speculations of scholasticism infused new life even into exegesis. The Patristic exegesis was displaced by a dialectic method. The theory of the fourfold sense of scripture became developed:

> 'litera gesta docet; quid credas allegoria;
> moralis quid agas; quo tendas anagogia;

and it was carried into practice with almost painful consequences. For example, Lk 2^{21} means (1) verbally, that Jesus was circumcised on the 8th day (the best time for the operation), (2) allegorically, the eight parts of Holy Scripture, (3) morally, the eight stages of repentance, (4) anagogically, the octave of the Resurrection, the eight ages of the world, the eight blessings of future salvation (*Leg. aur.* 13). This method, like that of the Rabbis, thinks nothing of placing the most varied and often contradictory interpretations side by side. They are gathered in from all quarters, and the more the better, provided only that by a good *partitio* the appearance of some system is maintained. At the same time there is preserved a certain philological element fostered by Jerome's works, especially his *Interpretatio nominum hebraicorum*, and Isidore's *Etymologica*, though now and again by an independent acquaintance with the language. As a great many of the monasteries taught Greek, so we find an occasional Hebrew scholar, controversies with the Jews making a knowledge of Hebrew necessary (Sam. Berger, *Quam notitiam linguae Hebraicae habuerint Christiani medii ævi temporibus in Gallia*, 1893). Roger Bacon († *c.* 1292) was an excellent philologist. He found fault with the scholastic exegesis of his time, because it confined itself to *divisiones per membra varia*, after the manner of artists, forced concordances after the manner of jurists, and rhythmic consonances after the manner of the grammarians (*Opus min.* 323). It resulted probably from the controversy with the Rabbinical exegesis that Nicolaus of Lyra († 1340), the Minorite, first set up the principle of literalism in complete clearness, though, indeed, his acceptance of a *duplex sensus literalis* became a side-door to allegorical interpretation. Knowledge of the Rabbinical exposition increased through Jewish converts like Paul of Burgos, and therewith also the doubt as to the sole accuracy of the Patristic exegesis.

Here, now, we meet with the Reformation exegesis, whose principle was that the literal sense was the only right one. The new religious principle of confidence in the revealed God overcame the Neo-Platonic delight in mystery. The new interest which Humanism awakened in the original languages also helped (Reuchlin, Erasmus). Its effect is seen in Melanchthon and Calvin more than in Luther, to whom the religious motive was always the deciding one. It has to be said that exegesis did not by any means free itself at once from the custom of centuries. The example of the Fathers produced an after-effect, and all the more so since exegesis continued to be preponderatingly interested in dogma or edification. However diligently exegetes laboured, systematic interests held the first place in the orthodox period, and the exposition of Pietism aimed always at practical edification. Rationalism, which read the Bible no longer as God's word, but as the product of human composition, arrived, in theory at least, at a purely historical exegesis, whose aim was to establish clearly what the author really meant by his words. In the working out of this, however, it came to grief, and indeed fell into the mistake of modernizing. It could not think of the Biblical authors as less enlightened than it prided itself on being. It was only last century that historical exegesis came to be practised; and at the close of the century it was practised to excess in the effort to exhibit the views of the Biblical writers with archaic realism, and to render as clear as possible the difference between the ideas of then and now. Exegesis received a tremendous impulse. Everywhere great enterprises were called into life, chiefly by the collaboration of several exegetes.

Exegesis still exhibits the greatest possible differences in dealing with the text, but the principle that the meaning is to be reached by means of a grammatico-historical exegesis is being more firmly established. It cannot fail to become more widely recognized, moreover, that such an exegesis needs no supplementing to become theological. To explain the Bible historically means to grasp and expound it in its spirit, and the spirit of the Bible is religious. It is matter of rejoicing that this idea is gaining ground among exegetes, and we may rejoice too in the fact that more attention is given now than formerly to form, and that, following Herder's successful start, æsthetic questions receive consideration. At the same time the beauty of the Bible will never

* Kihn, *Theodor von Mopsuestia und Junilius Africanus als Exegeten*, 1880.

reveal its chief aspect. Theological exegesis has rather to learn from the general investigation of the history of religions. When the old conception of inspiration is given up, it follows that in the domain of exegesis the isolating of the Bible in regard to language and subject-matter must cease. As the OT cannot be understood without the study of Babylonian texts, so in the NT regard must be had not only to the OT, but also to profane sources. Religious ideas are to be followed up in their general development in the history of humanity and not only of Israel. What we find peculiar to the Bible has to be observed as carefully as what it possesses in common with other sources. Exegesis is not to be dissolved into isolated studies in religious history; it must make its aim the understanding of the religious personalities which speak to us in these writings as bearers of Divine revelation.

It would take us too far to add to this sketch of exegesis a detailed survey of individual exegetes and their services. Much of the Patristic work is lost. A beginning has just been made in the task of recovering these older works from excerpts made by succeeding ages (*e.g.* Apollinaris of Laodicea, H. Lietzmann, 1904; Petrus of Laodicea, G. Heinrici, 1908; Titus of Bostra, J. Sickenberger, 1901, cf. C. H. Turner in *HDB*, ext. vol. 484 ff.) in connexion with the investigation of mediæval compilations (Heinrici, art. 'Catenen' in *PRE*[3], iii. 754 ff.; H. Lietzmann, *Catenen*, 1897; Karo-Lietzmann, *Catenarum Græc. Catalogus*, 1902; M. Faulhaber, *Die Prophetenkatenen*, 1899; J. Sickenberger, 'Die Lukaskatene des Niketas von Herakleia,' *TU*, new ser., vii. 4, 1902; A. E. Schönbach, *Über einige Evangelienkommentare des Mittelalters*, 1903 [*SWAW*, cxlvi.]; Ed. Riggenbach, 'Die ältesten latein. Kommentare zum Hebräerbrief,' in Zahn's *Forschungen*, viii. 1, 1907; J. Haussleiter, *Victorin von Pettau*, 1900; A. Souter, 'The Commentary of Pelagius on the Epp. of Paul,' 1907 [*Proceedings of the Brit. Acad.* ii.]; H. L. Ramsay, 'Le Commentaire de l'apocalypse par Beatus de Liebana,' in *RHLR*, 1902). Notwithstanding all investigation, the greatest part will remain lost. On the *Glossa ordinaria* of Walafrid Strabo, the authoritative text-book of mediæval exegesis, and the commentaries of Nicolaus of Lyra, which were often printed together with the *Glossa*, see Ed. Reuss and R. Schmid in *PRE*[3] xx. 790, xii. 28. A bibliography of modern exegetical literature would need a volume to itself.

In place of the old collections of *Critici sacri* (1660) and the Synopses of M. Polus (1669) and Starke (1733 ff.), we have in Germany, for the OT, specially the Biblical commentary of Keil and Delitzsch (1861 ff.) and the short commentary of Strack and Zöckler (1884 ff.), both conservative. From the critical standpoint we have Hitzig's short text-book (Knobel, Dillmann, etc., 1841 ff.), now superseded by the commentaries of Nowack (1892 ff.) and of Marti (1897 ff.). For the NT we have Meyer's critical and exegetical commentary (1832), still a standard work in its new editions (by B. Weiss, Wendt, Heinrici, and others), and de Wette's short exegetical handbook (1836 ff.), superseded by Holtzmann's short commentary (1889), which has itself been supplemented by Lietzmann's essentially philological text-book (1906). A more conservative commentary began to be published by Zahn in 1903 ff. Of a more practical nature are the Bible-works of Josias Bunsen (1858 ff.) and J. P. Lange (1857 ff.); recently J. Weiss (1906). England has the *Speaker's Commentary* (1871 ff.), the *Pulpit Commentary*, by Dean Spence and J. S. Exell (1880 ff.), the *International Critical Commentary*, edited by Driver, Plummer, Briggs (1895 ff.), and Robertson Nicoll's *Expositor's Bible* (1895 ff.). France has the fine unified work of Ed. Reuss, *La Bible* (1874–81). Catholicism has to add to the *Cursus Scripturae Sanctae*, by the Jesuits Cornely, Knabenbauer, and Hummelauer (1886 ff.), something a little more modern in the *Manuel Biblique* by Vigouroux (1881 ff.).

LITERATURE.—Ed. Reuss, *Gesch. der h. Schriften des NT*[6], 1887, pp. 574–679; L. Diestel, *Gesch. des AT in der christl. Kirche*, 1869; H. Holtzmann, 'Das Problem der Gesch. der Auslegung' (*Heidelberger Festschrift*, 1886); G. Heinrici, art. 'Hermeneutik,' in *PRE*[3] vii. 718–750; F. W. Farrar, *Hist. of Interpretation* (*BL*, 1885), 1886; G. H. Gilbert, *Interpretation of the Bible*, 1908; H. Dechent, *Herder und die aesthet. Betrachtung der h. Schrift*, 1904; Eb. Schrader, *Die Keilinschriften und das AT*, 3rd ed. by H. Zimmern and H. Winckler, 1903; A. Jeremias, *Das AT im Lichte des alten Orients*[2], 1906, *Babylonisches im NT*, 1905; H. Gunkel, *Zum religionsgeschichtl. Verstandnis des NT*, 1903; E. von Dobschütz, *Der gegenwartige Stand der NT Exegese*, 1906; J. Weiss, *Die Aufgaben der NT Wissenschaft*, 1908.

5. Biblical sciences.—Exegesis presupposes the subsidiary sciences of philology and archæology, and includes the general, historical, and systematic study of the Bible's contents. In this sense the Biblical sciences have always existed, although the strictly scientific method is a modern achievement.

It is easy to undervalue the scientific labours of the early Church upon the Bible. It is true that these were often of an elementary character, and not devoid of the element of fancy. We possess an instance of this in the explanation of Biblical names in the *OS* (ed. Lagarde, 1870, [2]1887), which, though ultimately traceable to Philo, is probably rightly considered the work of Origen. It is preserved only in Gr. excerpts, and in the Lat. revision by Jerome. Eusebius's Biblical topography, also translated by Jerome, is of the same kind (*Eusebius' Works*, vol. iii., by Klostermann, 1904). Here, alongside of monstrosities like the Hebrew derivation of Latin proper names (Pilatus = פה לטש), we find excellent geographical notes. All through the Middle Ages these explanations of names were considered such valuable aids to allegorizing, that the two translations by Jerome were usually bound up with the Bible. Many of the homilies presuppose the use of alphabetically arranged collections of texts such as we find in concordances. The concordance which was organized in the 13th cent. (*c.* 1243) by Paris theologians under the lead of Hugo of St. Caro, and afterwards revised and improved by Franc. Luca, Hub. Phalesius, Balth. Tournaire, Dutripon, etc., was certainly not the first attempt of the kind. Fragments of even a Coptic work of this kind are preserved (Pleyte and Boeser, *Manuscrits Coptes du Musée . . . à Leyde*, 1897; O. von Lemm, *Kopt. Misc.* lii. 4–7).

Aids of a mnemonic kind to the understanding of the Bible were sought with special diligence. This purpose was served by the *Synopsis Script. Sacrae*, which may perhaps have come from Chrysostom himself, and by many of the *capitulationes*. The *Hypomnesticon* of the so-called Josephus Christianus contains all that was considered worthy of remark (*PG* cvi.). The most curious work of this kind is the *Caena Cypriani*, probably a Gallic product of the 5th cent., revised by Rabanus Maurus about 840 (ed. Harnack, *TU*, new ser., iv. 3, 1899). The Middle Ages made both Gr. and Lat. *versus memoriales*, in which the contents of the different books and various Biblical questions were contained. In the 15th cent. what was called the *Ars Memorandi* appeared in the form of a block-print. This whole material requires to be thoroughly collected and investigated.

We have already dealt with the literary material and its tradition. On the one hand, there were the *Church History* of Eusebius (tr. by Rufinus) and Jerome's *de Viris illustribus*, to which must be added the pseudo-Athanasian *Synopsis Scr. S.*, and also Isidore of Seville's *Proœmiorum liber* and

de Ortu et Obitu Patrum. On the other hand, there were the *Prologues* (*ὑποθέσεις, argumenta, praefationes*). In this way there was produced a work similar to the Jewish Massorah, equally anonymous, indefinite in date, growing with time, and fluctuating in tradition. Under the name of 'Euthalius,' the portion referring to Paul, the Acts, and the Cath. Epp. has received special attention and investigation, though without as yet quite definite results. What the ancients called *εἰσαγωγὴ εἰς τὰς θείας γραφάς* (*e.g.* Adrianos, *c.* 430) does not correspond to what we understand by Biblical introduction. It was what we should now find in some handbook on Biblical hermeneutic. It belonged to the same class as the *Instituta regularia divinae legis* of Junilius Africanus, who lived in Constantinople and took them from the lectures of Paul of Nisibis (551), the *Liber de VII regulis* of the Donatist Tychonius Afer, Augustine's *de Doctrina Christiana*, bk. iii., the *Formulæ Spiritalis Intellegentiae* of Eucherius of Lyons, and similar interpretative works.

Biblical history, in spite of its importance for teaching (see V. 3), did not receive scientific treatment in the older period. Mingled with general history, it appears in the form of *chronicles* by Hippolytus, Junilius Africanus, Eusebius, Hieronymus, and many others. For the purpose of apologetics, Augustine put sacred and profane history side by side in his great work, *de Civitate Dei*. The unified presentation of tradition, with some additions from universal history, and here and there a critical note upon various attempts at harmonizing, was best found in the *Historia scholastica* of the Paris teacher, Petrus Comestor († 1179), and the *Speculum historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais (*c.* 1264). The *Lives* of Jesus, which increased so much in number towards the end of the Middle Ages, belong entirely to the literature of devotion. The most widely circulated of such Lives was the *Vita Jesu Christi*, by the Carthusian Ludolf of Saxony (*c.* 1330). The Biblical theology which Roger Bacon demanded, in contrast to the scholastic sentences, remained a pious wish.

It was not till within modern times that Biblical sciences actually appeared. Their cradle was found in Holland among the Arminians. It was there that the great foundation compilations were made both in classical and in Biblical philology and archæology. For the study of the Hebrew language Reuchlin's labours provided the start (1506), and his work was extended mainly by the elder Buxtorf († 1629; *Thesaurus Grammaticus* and *Lexicon*). From the Dutchman, Alb. Schultens († 1750), Johann Dav. Michaelis († 1791) took over the comparative method. In the work of Gesenius († 1842) this combined with the statistical to produce a system which was considered a pattern for long. Then J. Olshausen († 1882) and, above all, B. Stade († 1907) applied the historical method developed by Germanic philology to the study of Hebrew with the greatest success. In the case of the NT the Biblical philology of Georg Pasor († 1637, Franecker), Sal. Glassius († 1656, Jena), and Joh. Jakob Wetstein († 1754, Amsterdam) was again taken up by Ernesti's school at Leipzig, and reached in the *Grammar* of J. B. Winer (1822) and Grimm's *Lexicon* (1867) a position which it maintained till the knowledge of Hellenistic popular speech, made possible by the new papyrus discoveries, widened the horizon (A. Deissmann, *Bibelstudien*, 1895, *Neue Bibelstudien*, 1897, *Licht vom Osten*, 1908). In the 19th cent. the Erlangen school and H. Cremer renewed the attempt to isolate the language of the Bible as much as possible, but this newest turn made the idea of *philologia sacra* impossible. Classical philologists now work in competition with theologians in this field (F. Blass, *Grammatik*, 1896; E. Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa*, 1898; Thumb, *Die griech. Sprache im Zeitalter des Hellenismus*, 1901). In regard to *physica sacra*, the course has been the same. The *Hierozoicon* of Sam. Bochart († 1667) and similar compilations still show us the transition from the manual of science based upon revelation to the modern archæological method which we find in our newer Bible dictionaries. Biblical archæology has won its way from a collection of scholarly observations to a unified presentation of the subject, made possible by the idea of evolution, to which we owe the fact that archæology has become a fruitful subject of study for the history of religion.

It is owing to the activity of the Palestine Exploration Fund and the Deutscher Palästina-Verein that Biblical geography, formerly a mere collection of travel-notes, is coming to form a systematic and complete discipline, showing how to appraise the witnesses of tradition by reference to local conditions (Fr. Buhl, 1896). Geography is thus becoming an important aid to Bible history, which is no longer content merely to repeat tradition or even to criticize tradition, but is gradually winning its way to a general view of the actual historical development, with its motive powers, including persons as well as ideas. In this process naturally the unity of the Biblical point of view is more and more lost sight of. We have the History of the People of Israel (Ewald, Renan), or, more accurately, Israelitish and Jewish History (Wellhausen). Distinct from that, there are the History or the Life of Jesus (Keim, P. W. Schmidt, B. Weiss, and many others), and the History of Apostolic and post-Apostolic Times (Weizsäcker, Knopf, McGiffert, Vernon Bartlet). The Middle Ages did not altogether reject secular evidence, and now the bringing of Biblical history into the frame of general history is a principle. The background acquires increasing significance through the Egyptian and Assyro-Babylonian discoveries and the clearer knowledge which we possess of Judaism and Hellenism in NT times, and threatens, under the influence of the modern positive treatment of history, almost to overshadow the really important features. By way of reaction, we have the treatment of the 'history of salvation' by itself.

A greater degree of advance than in those Biblical subsidiary sciences is to be observed in the two comprehensive disciplines which in the academic studies of our time bear the traditional names of 'Biblical Introduction' and 'Biblical Theology.' It was the 18th cent. that first transformed these into the independent sciences which they now are, through an entire re-arrangement, in the spirit of historical criticism, of the material received from the Middle Ages and orthodox theology. From scattered traditions concerning the Biblical books and their authors there arose the historico-critical introduction to the OT and the NT by the subjection of the material to external and internal criticism. The Scriptures themselves were carefully examined to discover how far they corresponded with traditional views about them. This negative procedure, which was due to the dogmatic consideration of canonicity, was superseded by the literary method (see above, 3), which acknowledges the Scriptures to be part of a great development. In this field the distinction between canonical and uncanonical books remains more and more outside consideration (see the collections of the apocryphal and pseudepigraphic books of the OT by Kautzsch, 1900, and of the NT Apocrypha by Hennecke, 1904; the splendid editions of R. H. Charles and M. R. James; Budde's *History of Hebrew Literature*, 1907; the Histories of old Christian Literature by A. Harnack, 1893, and G. Krüger, 1895). Con-

trariwise on the philological side, the Jewish-Christian literature is given a place in the general literature of the Orient and Greece (von Wilamowitz, in *Kultur der Gegenwart*, i. 8², 1907; Gunkel, *ib.* i. 7).

The so-called Biblical theology, which originated in the collection of passages to prove dogma, first became an independent study as a system of Biblical dogma urged by Pietism, in opposition to the scholastic dogma of orthodoxy. Soon it began to draw historical distinctions (OT and NT and then their various parts), and developed into a representation of the various Biblical systems of doctrine. Hegel's philosophy taught us to see therein a complete development. Thus we arrive at the modern study of the religious history of Israel and Judah and early Christianity, the doctrinal element being more and more consciously subordinated to the study of pious feeling and its effects in the life and thought of men. In place of the Divine story of revelation, we find a history of human piety and pious ideas. In view of the current conception of science, this is unavoidable. But faith is always at liberty to recognize in such human piety and its continual advance the effect of Divine revelation. In this distinction of methods of treatment (scientific and devotional) there lies the guarantee of sound development.

Altogether, the present position of Bible study is quite remarkable. No age has seen such intense study; no age has spent such a wealth of mental energy in Bible investigation; no age has produced such a rich literature on the Bible. The field is so enlarged and the labour so minute, that individuals can hardly keep the whole field in view. Therein lies a danger, and each individual discipline must always remember the common aim. Above all, the study of the OT must never lose sight of its goal in the NT, and the study of the NT never lose sight of its foundation in the OT. Otherwise the living nerve will be snapped; and, however necessary scientifically a clear view of the external relations of the Bible is, on the one hand, it must be remembered, on the other, that the Christian interest which confines itself to the Bible is equally justified. The methods which theology employs in its Biblical sciences are the same as those of all other sciences, but the standpoint is different. The interest with which it handles the material is the interest of Christian piety.

LITERATURE.—G. Hoberg, *Überblick über die Entwickl. u. den Fortschritt der bibl. Wissenschaften auf christl. Boden von ihrem Anfang an bis zur Jetztzeit*, 1902: C. A. Briggs, *The Study of Holy Scripture*, 1899.

History of Biblical Introduction: H. Holtzmann, *Lehrb. der hist.-krit. Einleit. in das NT*³, 1892, 1-16; Julicher, *Einleit. in das NT*⁶, 1906, pp. 7-21.

History of Biblical Theology: B. Stade, *Bibl. Theol. des AT*, 1905, i. 6-11; H. Holtzmann, *Lehrb. der NT Theol.*, 1897, i. 5-22.

History of Biblical Archæology: W. Nowack, *Lehrb. der hebraischen Archäol.*, 1894, pp. 15-24.

History of Biblical Philology: Winer's *Grammatik*⁸, revised by P. W. Schmiedel, 1894, pp. 4-15

There is as yet no history of Biblical History, but see H. Vollmer, *Vom Lesen und Deuten h. Schriften*, 1907.

History of Research in the Life of Jesus: C. Hase, *Gesch. Jesu*, 1876, pp. 150-174, more objective than A. Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, 1906, which is dominated by its eschatological point of view.

The best information as to the enormous growth of Biblical literature in the last decades is to be found in the *Theologische Jahresbericht*, founded in 1881 by Pünjer, continued by Lipsius, H. Holtzmann, and now ed. by Krüger (OT reviewed by Siegfried, Baentsch, Beer, Gressmann, Volz; NT reviewed by H. Holtzmann, A. Meyer, Knopf, J. Weiss, etc.). In addition there is the *Theologische Rundschau*, ed. by W. Bousset and W. Heitmüller—since 1897.

In place of the *Jahrbucher für Biblische Wissenschaft*, by H. Ewald (1849-1865), and similar publications, such as Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr. fur wissenschaftl. Theologie*, 1858-1907, we now have the *Zeitschr. für AT Wissenschaft*, by B. Stade (now K. Marti), 1881, and the *Zeitschr. für die NT Wissenschaft und die Kunde des Urchristentums*, by E. Preuschen, 1900—a testimony to the progress of specialization. In America there are devoted to Biblical studies in especial the *Journ. of Bibl. Lit.* (1880 ff.) and the *Bibl. World* (1893 ff.), and in Britain the *Expositor*, 1875 ff., the *Expository Times*, 1899 ff., and the *Interpreter*, 1905 ff. For scientific Biblical research by the Catholics of France the central point is the *Revue Biblique*, by Lagrange, 1892; in Germany, the *Biblische Studien* of Bardenhewer, 1895 ff., and the *Biblische Zeitschrift* of Göttsberger and J. Sickenberger, 1903.

In encyclopædic form the whole material is offered at an earlier stage by G. B. Winer, *Biblisches Realworterb.*³, 1847 f.; D. Schenkel, *Bibellexicon*, 1869-73; E. Riehm, *Handworterb. des bibl. Altertums*, 1884, 2nd ed 1893-94; Wm Smith, *Dictionary of the Bible*, 1863 (Amer. ed. Smith-Hackett, 1892; 2nd Eng. of vol. i., ed. Smith-Fuller, 1893); J. P. Migne, *Scripturae Sacrae Cursus Completus*, 1861-63; Hamburger, *Real-encyclopadie fur Bibel und Talmud*, 1883 ff.

All these, however valuable they were in their own time, are now superseded by recent works. Now we have the exhaustive articles of Hauck's *Realencyc. fur Prot. Theol*³, 1896-1908. There are also the *Kalw. Bibellexicon*, by P. Zeller², 1893; H. Guthe, *Kurzes Bibelwörterbuch*, 1903; J. Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, 1898-1904, *Dict of Christ and the Gospels*, 1906 08, and *Dict. of the Bible*, in one vol., 1909; T. K. Cheyne-J. S. Black, *Encyc. Bibl.* 1899-1903; F. Vigouroux, *Dict. de la Bible*, 1895 ff.; *Jewish Encyc.* 1901 ff.—an imposing array, in itself a proof of the high standard to which Biblical science has attained in our time.

V. *THE BIBLE IN DIVINE SERVICE.*—The Bible was not only the authoritative standard of Church doctrine in the hands of the learned theologian; it was also the book from which the Church drew instruction and exhortation, consolation and inspiration. It was a book to be used in Divine service, just as it had been in the Synagogue. Here we come upon the great distinction between Christian and all other forms of worship. The object elsewhere is to produce some theurgic effect. The idea is to operate upon the Deity through sacrifice and prayer, and by effective symbolism to attain to some connexion, some union, with the god. This is the case in the heathen world generally, and also in the temple-worship of Judaism. Only in the Synagogue and in the Christian form of service is the central place given to God's word, as it speaks to the assembled congregation out of the sacred book with voice of instruction, edification, and exhortation.

LITERATURE.—A. C. A. Hall, *The Use of Holy Scripture in the Public Worship of the Church*, 1903.

1. **Reading.**—The use of the Bible in the services of the Church has been rich and varied. In the forefront stands reading. In the Synagogue the practice followed was the continuous reading of whole books. In the course of three years, *e.g.*, the Law with 154 *parashiyôth* was read through. The young Christian Church adhered to the same plan. It is to be regretted that we know nothing very definite about the reading of the Bible in the first three centuries. But from the acquaintance with the books of the Bible which is taken for granted, and which in many cases could have been gained only through the services of the Church, we may conclude that it was extensive. It is certain that the Law and the Prophets, and afterwards the Gospels and the Epistles, came to be read *seriatim*. In his description of the Christian service about 150, Justin speaks of the reading of the ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων (*i.e.* the Gospels) and the συγγράμματα τῶν προφητῶν (*i.e.* the OT—or is it the writings of Christian prophets, in other words, Apocalypses, that he means?) μέχρις ἐγχωρεῖ (*Apol.* i. 67). These last much-disputed words seem to lead to the conclusion that there was no special division of the Scripture into portions for reading, and that the time allotted to it was not definitely fixed. Justin's statement is perhaps best understood by comparison with the custom which the present writer found in some outlying Swiss churches. At the beginning of the service, and while the congregation was still gathering ('donec totus populus congregetur,' *Can. Hipp.* xxxvii. 203), instead of the organ playing, which is customary in other places, the teacher read from the Bible, and after going through several chapters in succession suddenly broke off at the entrance of the clergyman. Naturally there

was more read than the OT books and the Gospels. The Divine service for which the congregation assembled afforded opportunity for bringing newly-received letters from other churches to the knowledge of the congregation (1 Th 5^{27}, Col 4^{16}), and also written addresses from distant teachers and prophets (He 13^{22}; II Clem. 19), particularly the records of revelations (Rev 1^{3} 22^{18}; Herm. *Vis.* ii. 4. 3). In the beginning probably some distinction was drawn between the reading of the sacred Scripture and the reading of these new letters. But the custom of reading these over and over again (see Dionysius of Corinth *ap.* Euseb. *HE* iv. 23. 11, on I Clem. and the letter from Rome by Soter) was itself enough to give them a place alongside of Holy Scripture. The effect of this was twofold. On the one hand, the extent of Scripture read in this way was increased. There are 4th and 5th cent. MSS which contain the Epistles of Clement (*Cod. Alex.*; cf. the *Syr. Codex*, dated 1170, at Cambridge and *Can. Apost.* 86), the *Shepherd* of Hermas, and the Epistle of Barnabas (*Codex Sin.*), and Athanasius makes Wis., Sir., Est., Jth., Tob., *Didache*, and Hermas into a special class of ἀναγινωσκόμενα (*Epist.* 39, A.D. 367). On the other hand, the Church insisted on having everything uncanonical excluded from the reading of the Bible in public worship (Synod of Laodicea, 363 [?], Can. 59; Carthage, 397, Can. 39; Westcott, p. 540)—a step specially directed against the introduction of the Apocryphal literature fostered by Montanists, Marcionites, Manichæans, and Priscillianists. The limitation to what was canonical was never quite adhered to in the mediæval Church. So early as the 4th cent. the custom was adopted of reading Martyrdoms of Saints on the days dedicated to their memory (Carthage, 397, Can. 39: 'liceat autem legi passiones martyrum cum anniversarii eorum dies celebrantur'; Liturg. Gall. *PL* lxxii., xc.). The Roman Church, always specially cautious—as, *e.g.*, in the matter of the Epistle to the Hebrews (Euseb. *HE* iii. 3. 5)—refused for a long period to read them in the services of the Church, on the ground of uncertainty of authorship and suspicion of heretical falsification (*Decr. Gelas.* v. 16, Preuschen, 151). Very soon there thus came about the reading not only of the passions of the martyrs, but also of other sacred legends (Augustine allowed miracles of healing to be read [*de Civ. Dei* xxii. 8]). All through the Middle Ages the Bible shared the honour of being read in church with these books of legends and passions. The Reformation really established the principle of reading only the Bible.

In the matter of the choice of passages for reading, the various national churches developed various practices. The Aquitanian pilgrim (Silvia, or Etheria) presents us with a picture of the extremely rich supply of readings on Easter Friday in Jerusalem (*Itin. Hieros.*, ed. Geyer, p. 89). The Syrian practice, laid down in the *Apost. Const.* ii. 57, viii. 5, seems to prescribe two lessons from the OT, one from the Epistles and one from the Gospels. Tertullian bears witness that the Roman Church and the African Church of his time followed the same custom: 'legem et prophetas cum evangelicis et apostolicis litteris miscet' (*Praescr. Haer.* 36). OT lessons are also presupposed in *Praes. Hær.* 51, *Monog.* 12, *adv. Gentes*, 22. At the time of Cyprian these seem to have been wanting in the African Church (*Epist.* xxxiv. 4, xxv.). Three readings—Prophetic, Epistolary, and Gospel—are known in the Asia Minor Church (Basil, *PG* xxxi. 425), as also in Gaul (Germanus of Paris, *PL* lxxii. 90, Liturg. Gall. *ib.* 171 ff.) and in Spain (*Liber Comicus*, ed. Morin; *Anecdota Maredsolana*, i., *Liturg. Mozarab.* ed. Cabrol-Leclerq I.). But here, too, the OT lesson was often wanting.

Later on, the number of readings was everywhere reduced to two—Epistle and Gospel. This was the case in Rome, perhaps from the time of Damasus (if it was really Jerome who compiled the first *comes*), and certainly from the time of the *Sacramentarium Gregorianum* (*PL* lxxviii. 25). The order followed—Prophets, Epistles, Gospels—is evidently everywhere considered an ascending one. That is shown in the special treatment of the Gospel. While the other lections were left to the *anagnostes* (placed in the beginning almost on the same level as the prophets as being a pneumatic, but later on taking a place among the lower clergy [Harnack, 'Über den Ursprung des Lektorats,' in *TU* ii. 4 (1886), 57 ff.]), the reading of the Gospel was reserved for a deacon or a presbyter (*Canon. Apost.* ii. 57; Sozom. vii. 19, 6). At Easter the bishop himself read (*Peregr. Silviae*, p. 73, Geyer; Sozom. *loc. cit.*). Candles were first lit for the Gospel-reading (Jerome, *adv. Vigil.* 7, *PL* xxiii. 361; Isidore, *de Offic. eccl.* ii. 14, *PL* lxxxiii. 793) [cf. Bellarmine, *de Reliquiis Sanctorum* ii. 3 (Rome, 1613, ii. 775)]. The *laudes* ('hymns') were to follow the lesson from the Gospel and not that from the Epistles (*Syn. Toledo*, 633, Can. 12, Mansi, x. 622).

Gradually the habit of reading certain books at certain periods of the Church year became fixed (*Lectiones annuæ*, Augustine, *PL* xxxv. 1977). In Lent, Genesis was read (Chrysostom, *PG* liii. 22); in Easter week, Job (pseudo-Origen on Job, *PG* xii. 103; Ambrosius, *PL* xvi. 1040); on Maundy Thursday, Jonah (Ambr. *l.c.* 1044); on Good Friday, in many churches of Palestine, the Apocalypse of Peter (Sozom. vii. 19); on the four Easter days, the reports of the Resurrection according to Matthew, Luke, Mark, John (Augustine, *PL* xxxviii. 1156; Fulgentius, *PL* lxv. 903 f.). Between Easter and Whitsuntide, the Gospel according to John and Acts (Chrys. *PG* li. 97; Augustine, *PL* xxxv. 1433, xxxviii. 1426) were read; in Spain during this season the Apoc. of John (*Syn. Toledo* 633, Can. 17, Mansi x. 624), and in Gaul the Acts and the Apocalypse (Germ. Par. *PL* lxxii. 90). On Victor of Capua see *ZNTW*, 1909, pp. 90 ff., 175 ff.

The Euthalian apparatus contains a system of *lectio continua* for the Epistles of the NT in 57 ἀναγνώσεις (see G. Rietschel, *Lehrb. der Liturgik* i. 1, 225). Chrysostom (*Joh. Hom.* 57, 1, *PG* lix. 311) clearly implies the *lectio continua*.

Soon, however, it came to be that special lessons were taken for every day, the reason probably being that the lessons had to be suited to the commemoration of the particular saint for the day. Gennadius (*Vir. ill.* 80) mentions the presbyter Musæus of Marseilles († 460) as the compiler of a pericope system of this kind. It is certain, however, that at the same time various systems of the kind came into existence, *e.g.* that of Claudian of Arverni (Clermont), referred to by Apollin. Sidonius (*Ep.* iv. 11). These were frequently combined with the older system. The Armenian Church broke through its *lectio continua* only on the great feast-days when it had special lessons. The Greek Church had a peculiar system of *sabbato-kyriaka*: besides the *lectio continua* for the days of the week, there was also a special system of pericopes for Saturday and Sunday (so in a great many Gr. MSS; cf. C. R. Gregory, *Textkritik*, i. 327 ff.). Excellent service has been done by E. Ranke in investigating the very confused history of the various pericope systems. In the Middle Ages Charlemagne was the first to give attention to this matter. Improvements were essayed in all countries, usually in the vain endeavour to bring about uniformity. The Roman practice established itself more and more generally. It was this *usus Romanus* that the Reformers found

to hand, and there were many attempts at improvement. These have not ceased even in modern times, nor has any unanimity been reached even in the churches of Germany. In 1898, *e.g.*, in Prussia, besides the usual lessons from the Epistles and the Gospels, others were introduced, in which OT passages were included. The lectionary put together for Rhineland by Nitzsch, and the Bavarian system revised by Thomasius, contain a series of OT lessons extending over a year, while in the Palatinate the system in use extends to a four years' course.

There is great uncertainty as to the motives which induced the choice of the different pericopes. Many of them owed their existence to chance, and were afterwards justified by ingenious theories.

In the ancient Church the principle was always strictly adhered to that the reading of Scripture was for the congregation, and must therefore be intelligible. When this was not immediately possible for everybody, the reading was accompanied by translation, just as formerly in the Targums of the Synagogue. In the whole of the Western half of the Empire Greek was almost everywhere read and understood. In many parts of Syria and Egypt recourse was had to oral explanation, until translations in the respective tongues were made. In the case of Jerusalem we know that the Greek lessons and also the Greek sermon were immediately translated into Syriac for the people, and when there were pilgrims present from the West a translation was made for them into Latin (*Peregr. Silviae*, p. 99, Geyer). In the same way in the West, translations of the Latin were given in the Celtic, Punic, and Iberian tongues.

In any case it was understood that the whole congregation could follow the reading. Attention to the reading of Scripture is mentioned in an episcopal letter of the 4th cent. (Petrus Alex. [?], C. Schmidt, *TU*, new ser. ii. 4[b], 5) as the most important part of the Sunday regulations. The reading of Scripture was also expected to produce a direct effect upon the hearers. In a great number of records of conversion the crisis was reached suddenly while some passage of Scripture was being read in Divine service. Athanasius relates that the conversion of St. Anthony (*Vita*, ch. 2, *PG* xxvi. 841) was due to his chance hearing of Mt 19[21]. Augustine remembered this at his own conversion, when, hearing a voice say 'Tolle, lege,' he took the Scripture and read Ro 13[13] (*Confess.* viii. 12, 29). It was hearing Mt 19[29] read that induced Hypatius, a youth of 18 years, to leave his home, though the biographer states naively enough that his father had previously thrashed him (*Vita*, by Callinicus, p. 9, ed. Bonn). Similar stories are related of Babylas the actor (Moschos, *PG* lxxxvi. 2880), and of Simeon Stylites (Lietzmann, *TU*, 3rd ser., i. pp. 2, 20, 81, *Synaxarium Constantinopolitanum*, 1 Sept).

Not until the Middle Ages did it happen that in almost all churches, both Oriental and Latin, the Holy Scripture was read in a tongue unintelligible to the people. Even Charlemagne would have none of this, and demanded that wherever necessary there should be an interpreter. This practice, however, entirely ceased, until in the 13th cent. some attempt was again made to have the sermon delivered in the language of the country. Thus a custom which arose only through tenacity of ecclesiastical practice and clerical remissness was afterwards justified by the theory that a holy speech was seemly for the Holy Scripture. The abandonment of intelligibility was connected with the development of the Catholic service to a business of the priests, before and for the passively interested congregation. The Reformation broke away from this idea of worship and from the view of sacred unintelligibility, and returned to the principle of the ancient Church.

LITERATURE.—P. Glaue, *Die Vorlesung heil. Schriften im Gottesdienst*, 1906; E. Ranke, *Perikopensystem*, 1847; Scrivener, art. 'Lectionary' in Smith-Cheetham, *DCA* ii. 550 ff.; G. Rietschel, *Lehrb. der Liturgik*, i. 1900), 223 ff.: W. Caspari, art. 'Perikopen,' in *PRE*[3] xv. 131–159; artt. in *ExpT* from Oct. 1905 to May 1907.

2. Preaching.—The reading of the Scripture was not all. An attempt was made to come still more to the congregation's aid. To the reading there was nearly always added an exposition, with a hortatory, explanatory, and devotional application (cf. Lk 4[17ff.]). According to Justin (*Apol.* i. 67), the reading was followed by an admonitory and inspiring address by the presiding presbyter. The second Epistle of Clement seems to be a homily on Is 54–56 (Knopf, *Preuschens ZNTW* iii. 206 ff.; cf. *Acta Petri c. Simone*, 20; Augustine, *de Civ. Dei* xxii. 8, p. 611, 9, 10; *CSEL* xl. 2).

Often the preachers refer in the introduction of the sermon to the passage of Scripture read. This is the practice of Augustine, Cæsarius of Arles, Petrus Chrysologus of Ravenna, Chrysostom, and even Theophanes Kerameus. Bede often begins, 'Lectio sancti evangelii quam modo, fratres, audivimus . . .' At a later date the words used were, 'Post illa verba s. scripturae,' and hence from the 14th cent. the name *postilla*, 'postil,' was applied to collections of sermons (Nicolaus of Lyra, Geiler of Kaysersberg, Luther, etc.).

In many cases these sermons are nothing more than the devotional exposition of the Scripture. This is the nature of the homilies of Origen, who, besides his commentaries and scholia, expounded almost the whole of the sacred Scripture. We are acquainted with 17 homilies on Gen., 13 on Exod., 16 on Levit., 28 on Numbers, 13 on Deut., 26 on Joshua, 9 on Judges, 4 on 1 Sam. and 1 on 2 Sam., 1 on 2 Chron., 2 on Ezra, 22 on Job, more than 100 on Psalms, 2 on Proverbs, 8 on Eccles., 2 on Song of Sol., 32 on Isaiah, 45 on Jeremiah, 14 on Ezekiel. There are 25 homilies on Matt., 39 on Luke, 27 on Acts, 11 on 2 Cor., 7 on Gal., 2 on Thess., 1 on Titus, 18 on Heb.—altogether close on 500. In the same way we possess continuous expositions of whole books of the Bible in the form of sermons by Ambrose, Augustine, Chrysostom, etc. In Lent there was a sermon every day, and on Sundays there were two. The peculiar method followed by Chrysostom is worthy of remark. First he gives a complete practical exposition of the passage, and then in a second part he deals with some theme that has often very little connexion with it.

A special kind of such exposition is represented by the discourses which Jerome delivered in the monastery (ed. Morin, in *Anecd. Mareds.* ii.). These have not been preserved in their complete form, but only as they were written down freely afterwards from shorthand notes. Occasionally he expounds a Psalm, and immediately afterwards a passage from the Gospels (*Rev. Ben.* xix. 30). The so-called little catecheses of Theodore of Studium originated in the same way (ed. Auvray and Tougard, 1891; cf. A. Gardner, *Theodore*, p. 82 ff.).

But even where sermons do not deal with continuous passages in this way, as in those of Petrus Chrysologus of Ravenna and Maximus of Turin (both about 450), the majority of them have texts from the Bible as their foundation. Even occasional addresses are joined to a definite text, and the sermons are so full of Scripture references, that, despite their elevated rhetoric, they amount to centos made from passages of the Bible, as, *e.g.*, the opening sermon delivered by Gregory of Nazianzus at the Council in 381 (Mansi, iii. 529 ff.).

Gennadius (*Vir. ill.* 100) boasts of the extraordinary facility which his countryman, Bishop Honoratus of Marseilles, showed in extempore preaching, and accounts for it mainly by his rare acquaintance with Scripture.

It is true that in the matter of preaching, too, the Bible had to compete with the legends of the saints. Chrysostom and Augustine preach a great deal about the glorious deeds of the martyrs and the miracles of the saints. In the collections of sermons which are characteristic of the later Middle Ages, such as the *Homiliarium* of Paulus Warnefrid * made to the order of Charlemagne, or the *Homiliae Toletanae*,† sermons of both classes are found side by side. Later on a distinction was drawn between the *sermones de tempore* (on the Biblical pericopes of the Church year) and *de sanctis* (on the legends of the saints), *e.g.* by Hildebert of Tours († 1134), Bonaventura († 1274), Heinrich of Frimar (about 1340), Pelbart of Temesvar (about 1500), and many more.

Generally speaking, in the Middle Ages the sermon fell more and more into the background or assumed a barren form. In many Oriental churches it almost ceased. Among the Copts the only preacher was the Patriarch, and he preached only once a year. The Byzantine liturgy has scarcely a proper place for the sermon. The Western mass can not only do without it, but is then much more of a unity. Hence it is that the sermon is often a feature of supplementary services. But even where we find it in ordinary connexion with the reading of the Bible in the later Middle Ages, it has wandered far from its original purpose. It has become dogmatic, and is Biblical only so far as scholasticism operates with the authority of the Bible for its own purposes. It was otherwise in popular preaching, and especially preaching in the languages of the country, such as the exhortations of the Franciscans like Berthold of Regensburg († 1272); the German preaching of the mystics and popular men like Tauler († 1361) and Geiler of Kaysersberg († 1510); and in England Richard Rolle of Hampole († 1349).

Nevertheless it must be acknowledged that it was not till the Reformation that preaching again returned to its task of expounding the Bible. Apart from exceptional cases like Mathesius's sermons on Luther's life, Sermons on the Catechism or the Hymn-book, or even the modern experiment of preaching upon Schiller, the Holy Scripture is acknowledged in all Protestant Churches as the exclusive foundation of the sermon. It cannot be denied that, partly through the coercion of the pericope system, but chiefly in consequence of the scholastic tendency of thought in the orthodox period, its connexion with the text often became very loose. In Pietism, however, the connexion again gained strength, and to-day it may be laid down as the general requisite of Protestant preaching that it should be in keeping with the text, or, in other words, Biblical. In Luther we meet again with the exposition of whole books in a series of sermons — a form that has lately gained much vogue (*e.g.* the four Gospels in 'Predigten und Homilien,' ed. by Kögel, in association with Dryander, Frommel, and Pank, 1889 ff.).

Even where, in opposition to the style of homily which follows the text step by step (developed with special success by Menken), the so-called thematic sermon is preferred, not only is the theme drawn out of the text or chosen because of its close connexion with the text, but also in its elaboration the effort is made to exhaust the text as far as may be.

* F. Wiegand, in Bonwetsch-Seeberg, *Studien zur Gesch. der Theol. u. Kirche*, i. 2.

† G. Morin, *Anecd. Mareds.* i. 1893.

In addition to this, we have within recent times the Bible-class by way of supplement to the sermon. It was introduced by Pietism (Collegium biblicum directed by Spener and A. H. Francke), and is becoming more and more common. In entire freedom from the compulsion of the pericope, which is still followed in some churches, it supplies a connected system of Scriptural exposition.

LITERATURE.—Hering, *Gesch. der Predigt*, 1897; Schian, in *PRE*[3] xv. 623–747; *Altdeutsche Predigten*, ed. A. E. Schönbach, 3 vols. 1886–91; G. Cruel, *Gesch. der deutschen Predigt im Mittelalter*, 1879; F. R. Albert, *Die Gesch. der Predigt in Deutschland bis Luther*, 1892–96; F. Landmann, 'Das Predigtwesen in Westphalen in der letzten Zeit des Mittelalters' (*Vorreformationsgeschichtl. Forschungen*, i.), 1900; L. Pfleger, *Geschichte des Predigtwesens in Strassburg*, 1907; P. Drews, *Die Predigt im 19 Jahrhundert*, 1903; C. Clemen, *Predigt und biblischer Text*, 1906; E. Bindemann, *Die Bedeutung des AT für die Christl. Predigt*, 1886; A. Meinhof, *Die Wichtigkeit der Bibelstunde für das Gemeindeleben und ihre zweckmässige Gestaltung*, 1903; E. C. Dargan, *A History of Preaching*, 1905; J. Ker, *Lectures on the History of Preaching*, 1888.

3. Catechetics.—Besides the sermon as a means of explaining the Holy Scripture, we must not forget the instruction given in catechetics. In the classic form which it bore in the ancient Church this began with a survey of Bible-history, having regard to its typological and allegorical significance. A splendid instance is given in the newly-discovered work of Irenæus entitled εἰς ἐπίδειξιν τοῦ ἀποστολικοῦ κηρύγματος (*TU* xxxi. 1, 1907). In Jerusalem during the Lent season three hours daily were given to this instruction (*Peregr. Silviae*, p. 97; cf. Augustine, *de Catechiz. rudibus*).

With regard to the catechumens, the teacher could take for granted their wide acquaintance with the Holy Scriptures. The reading of Scripture took place during the first part of the service, to which catechumens were admitted (*missa catechumenorum*); they, indeed, were the 'hearers' (ἀκροώμενοι). Over and above this, Cyril of Jerusalem exhorted his catechumens to diligent reading in private of the Scriptures recognized by the Church (*Cat.* iv. 33 ff., *PG* xxxiii. 493). In the West, indeed, the creed (*symbolum*) was more emphasized than the sacred Scriptures, and so it happened that, as time went on, instruction in the Bible received less attention. The age of Charlemagne was content with the Decalogue and the Paternoster.

This catechetical tradition influenced even Luther, although, so far as was possible, he strove for the widening and deepening of Bible knowledge. When the practice of catechetics received a fresh lease of life in connexion with confirmation under pietistic influence, Biblical material came to be more handled again, and nowadays the catechism most favoured is that which adduces many Bible-texts as proofs or is altogether couched in Biblical phraseology. Bible-history forms a main subject of popular education. Where this is not the case, or the religious aspect is neglected, the attempt is made to make up, for what has been missed, by Sunday Schools and Children's Services. The modern tendency of the Herbart-Ziller school to make the Biblical history yield to other narratives (*Marchen*, Robinson Crusoe) undervalues the religious and moral, and therefore the pædagogic, value of the Scriptures. Modern theology of the historico-critical school, too, has raised many objections to the old method of treating Bible-history. It is not, however, merely a matter of history, but of the spirit in which it is handled. Bible-history is not now what it was in the Middle Ages, the history of humanity. For us it is but a history of faith. The important feature is not the knowledge of history, but the perception of faith. The aim must be to get the child to reach beyond the history into the spirit of the prophets and the perfection of Christ. This being so, the newer critical Biblical science sets religious instruction

the difficult task of making the Bible a cherished and beloved book to the child, of investing it with honour and authority in his eyes, and at the same time of making him adopt such an attitude towards it as the knowledge of defects and mistakes in its record of history and natural history will not disturb. See art. CATECHISMS AND CATECHIZATION.

LITERATURE.—H. Vollmer, 'Beitr. zur Gesch. des bibl. Unterrichts,' in *Mittheil. der Gesellsch. f. deutsche Erziehungs- und Schulgesch.* 1904, *Monatschrift f. d. kirchl. Praxis*, 1904, and *Evangelische Religionslehre*, 1906; Caspari, art. 'Gesch. biblische,' in *PRE*[3], vi. 619–22; J. Hoffmann, *Die h. Schrift, ein Volks- und Schulbuch in der Vergangenheit*, 1902; E. Chr. Achelis, *Der Dekalog als katechet. Lehrstuck*, 1905; E. Kautzsch, *Bibelwissensch. u. Religionsunterricht*, 1900.

4. Prayer and praise.—To the direct devotional value of the Bible in reading and exposition there have to be added yet other elements of Biblical origin. Nearly all the liturgical formulæ—Amen, Alleluia, Hosanna, Kyrie Eleison, Gloria, and Pax—find a place here. The single exception to this in the ancient Christian liturgy is the *Sursum Corda*, whose origin still remains uncertain. The Lord's Prayer, which is to be heard at every Christian service, is Biblical, and so also are the different forms of the Benedictions. The Reformed Churches have also the Decalogue as a part of the service, while—the difference is significant—the Lutherans adhere to the Credo of the Catholic mass, usually in the form of a hymn of faith. The foundation and the language of most prayers are Biblical. Often whole Psalms are taken over, or single passages from the Psalms are worked in. The Psalter as the prayer-book of personal devotion is dealt with in VI. 1 and 3.

Then also there is the singing of psalms. In the ritual of the Temple this formed a most important part of the service, almost all the spoken part. In meetings of the Synagogue also it had a part to play. So it was immediately adopted by the Christians and diligently cultivated. It is disputed whether by ψαλμοί, ὕμνοι, ᾠδαὶ πνευματικαί (Col 3[16], Eph 5[19]) we are to understand the Psalms of the OT or specially Christian poems (or both together). The canonical Psalter was of course completed, but the poetry of the Synagogue was not yet exhausted, as is witnessed by the eighteen 'Psalms of Solomon' from the period subsequent to B.C. 63. The exalted mood of the early Christians, the wonderful experience of the new salvation, must have fostered poetry. 1 Co 14[15. 26] as well as Pliny's statement 'Christo quasi deo carmen dicere' suggest new Christian poems. We find samples of these in 1 Ti 3[16], Rev 11[15. 17f.] 12[10ff.] 15[3f.] 19[1f. 5. 6ff.]. But these fragments, like the hymns in Luke's Gospel (*Magnificat* 1[46ff.], *Benedictus* 1[68ff.], *Nunc Dimittis* 2[29ff.], *Gloria* 2[14] [cf. 19[38]]) show clear dependence upon the OT patterns. In their form, too, they follow the Semitic rhythm and not the Greek prosody. The same may be said of the eleven psalms of repentance in the *Pistis Sophia* which are modelled on the Biblical psalms. The Greek form was first brought into Christianity by the heads of Gnostic schools who were possessed of literary culture. The Muratorian Fragment mentions Marcionite and Basilidian psalms. The Naassene hymn in Hippolytus, v. 10, already possesses the Greek form, as does also the hymn to Christ in Clemens Alex. (*Paed.* iii. 12 fin.). The hymns of the Syrian Bardesanes and his son Harmonius were famous, and it was to repress them that Ephraim wrote others. At the same time, Ambrose in the West laid the foundation of Latin hymnology. The poems of Gregory of Nazianzus and Synesius are not much concerned with congregational worship. At this time, however, a tendency made itself felt in the Church to have the congregational praise restricted to the Canonical Psalter (which included, in addition to the 150 [151] Psalms, the 9 [10] ᾠδαί, *cantica*: Ex 15, Dt 32, 1 S 2, Hab 3, Jon 2, Dn 3 [Apoc], Lk 1, 2, as they are gathered together in Codex A and in a great number of subsequent MSS and liturgies) in order to counteract the attempts of heretics (Arians, Apollinarists, etc.) to misuse the Church hymns for their own special ends (see Conc. Laod. 363 [?], Can. 59: ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἰδιωτικοὺς ψαλμοὺς λέγεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ οὐδὲ ἀκανόνιστα βιβλία; cf. Theodoret, *HE* ii. 24 [19], iii. 10 [6], iv. 22 [19]). The *Apost. Constit.* (ii. 57) require the singing of the Davidic psalms between the readings from Scripture. Two tendencies thus run through the whole history of Church praise. The more severe of these adheres to the Biblical psalms. They formed the basis of mediæval worship, and still hold the chief place with Roman Catholics and Anglicans. In the strictly Calvinistic Churches they were in invariable use, though in paraphrastic versions. On the other hand, the Church has never ceased to produce poetry. Influenced by the Syrians, Romanus brought hymns to the Greeks in the 6th century. John of Damascus put in place of such free compositions the more correct and formal Canon, which is still used by all the Oriental Churches, Greek and Slavonic. In the West, from the time of Ambrose down to the end of the Middle Ages, there was an unbroken line of hymn-writers, and soon alongside of the Latin hymns of the Church others in the popular speech were abundant. In Germany these were specially numerous, and the Reformation introduced a new and powerful stimulus. By their paraphrases of what was ancient and their new compositions, Luther, Paul Gerhardt, and many others have supplied us with the highest that is possible in the strong and fervent expression of Christian faith and pious feeling. Here the Biblical psalm is found usually in the form of the motet, which is sung by the choir as an addition to the congregational praise. From the very beginning the Lutheran Churches have devoted special attention to praise, and thereby not only has the Roman Catholic Church been roused to new activity, but the later Calvinistic Church has been induced to permit, alongside of the Psalms, hymns which in the meantime displace the old psalms more and more. In view of what has been said about the ancient Church, it is certainly not mere chance that in Dissenting circles hymns play such an important part. A pious Moravian legitimizes his opinions by declaring them to 'conform to Scripture and the hymns.'

It has to be said that the distinction between Biblical psalms and Church hymns is in the main a formal one. Often the hymn is nothing but a free poetic rendering of the psalm; cf. *e.g.* Luther's 'Ein feste Burg' with Ps 46 and 'Aus tiefer Not' with Ps 130. The congregation is rightly kept in mind of this by the quotation of the text in the hymn-books. The best and most effective hymns are of this nature, and they show to great advantage when compared with the martyrolatry of Greek and Roman hymns and the sweet emptiness of the hymns belonging to modern sects. Instead of any opposition between Biblical psalms and Church hymns, it is, in fact, more correct to speak of the direct and indirect effect of Biblical hymns upon Christian worship, and it will be found impossible to rate either too highly.

LITERATURE.—P. Drews, art. 'Liturgische Formeln,' in *PRE*[3] xi. 545–557; F. H. Chase, 'The Lord's Prayer in the Early Church,' *TS* i. 3, 1891; Ed. von der Goltz, *Das Gebet in der alt. Christenheit*, 1901; P. Wagner, 'Über Psalmen und Psalmengesang im christl. Altertum,' in *Rom. Quartalschr.* xii. 1898, 245–279; G. Rietschel, P. Drews, H. Hering, R. Wolkan, R. Buddensieg, Fr Nielsen, art. 'Kirchenlied,' in *PRE*[3] x. 399–443; Daniel, *Thesaurus hymnologicus*, 1841 ff.; Christ and Paranikas, *Anthologia graeca carminum christianorum*, 1871; G. M. Dreves, *Analecta hymnica medii aevi*, 1886 ff.; Ph. Wackernagel, *Das deutsche Kirchenlied*, 1864 ff.;

A. Fischer and W. Tümpel, *Das deutsche evangelische Kirchenlied des 17ten Jahrh.* 1904 ff.; Fr. Spitta, 'Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott,' *Die Lieder Luthers*, 1905; Julian, *Dict. of Hymnology*, 1892, 2nd ed. (enlarged), 1907.

5. **Biblical symbolism.**—It was not only the spoken word that was Biblical. The whole service was intended to bear a Biblical stamp. This, it is true, involved a great danger. The NT has little to say on the subject of worship; the OT has a great deal. This being so, it soon happened that in the Christian service analogies were discovered with the OT priestly and sacrificial system, and the service was thus lowered to a pre- and sub-Christian level. We find the fullest expression of this in Cyril of Alexandria, whose work on worship in spirit and in truth is just an allegorical transference to Christianity of the OT sacrificial laws. The later Greek Mystagogy (Theodore of Andida, 11th cent.) made an endeavour to carry through the idea of a parallelism between the history of salvation (especially the life of Jesus) and the liturgy. In the West, Isidore of Seville (†636), in his *de Officiis ecclesiasticis*, set the precedent of justifying all Church usages by the Bible (cf. Rabanus Maurus, *de Clericorum institutione, de Ecclesiastica disciplina*; Walafrid Strabo, *de Exordiis et incrementis rerum eccles.*; Wilh. Durandus, *Rationale divinorum officiorum*; Honorius of Autun, *Sacramentarium*).

We do not know how far these interpretations of Divine service, written for the instruction of the clergy, found their way among the people, but from the walls of the church the Bible stories and ideas shone down even upon the unlearned, in beautiful pictures. The large wall-spaces of the ancient Christian basilicas (*e.g.* Santa Maria Maggiore) formed early picture-books of this kind. In the East an extremely complicated system of decorating church-interiors was established, partly in brilliant mosaic (Hagia Sophia, San Marco, Capella Palatina at Palermo), partly in varied colours (cave-churches of Cappadocia, the monasteries on Athos). The Roman churches of the West were also, as a rule, richly decorated. Gothic art resolved those picture-cycles into a system of statues, into groups of sculpture. The Renaissance baroco and rococo returned to coloured decorations, though the original educative purpose now disappeared behind the artistic idea of ornamentation. The Biblical stories had occasionally to yield to the accessory of lovely landscape (as in Poussin's pictures in S. Pietro ai Monti in Rome). According to the principles of the newer art, the understanding of the pious beholder can no longer be helped, as was formerly the case, by inscriptions. So far as Lutheran Protestantism is concerned, the pictures which decorate the panels of the galleries in churches are only by way of ornament. They are far too small to be effective. Lately, Ed. von Gebhardt has endeavoured with great success to decorate the Friedenskirche at Dusseldorf with large and effective Gospel designs. Calvinism rejects entirely, or rather forbids, every kind of pictorial ornamentation. Instead, it makes some Biblical text in large letters speak from the wall to the assembled congregation. In the 17th cent., when the Graf von Dohna, till then a Lutheran, turned Calvinist, the family tombstone at the church of Mohrungen (Prussia), which was ornamented with a representation of the Holy Trinity, was whitened and inscribed with verses from the Bible. Calvinism has also in some cases made the reading of the Bible take the place of organ music. The liturgy begins with the recitation of the Decalogue. In this domain it is the Bible—in somewhat legal fashion indeed—that rules the whole Divine service.

LITERATURE.—On Greek Mystagogy: F. Kattenbusch, in *PRE*[3] xiii. 612-622; P. Drews, *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1900, p. 481 ff.; E. von Dobschütz, *Byz. Zeitschr.* xii., 1903, p. 559 ff.; F. E. Brightman, *JThSt* ix., 1908; J. Sauer, *Symbolik des Kirchengebäudes u. seiner Ausstattung in der Auffassung des Mittelalters*, 1903; F. X. Krauss, *Gesch. der kirchl. Kunst*, 1896-97, i. 383 ff., ii. 22, 52 ff.; H. Brockhaus, *Die Kunst in den Athos-Klostern*, 1891; H. Rott and K. Michel, 'Kleinasiat. Denkmaler' in Ficker's *Studien über christl. Denkmäler*, vi., 1908.

VI. *THE BIBLE IN PRIVATE USE.*—1. **The Bible in the Christian home.**—The Bible was not only a book to be used by learned theologians or for liturgical purposes. From the first and always it aimed at being the devotional book of every Christian. That was its special end and value. At the time of Jesus the Jews had the OT, and, as Wellhausen says, 'Die Bibel war die Fibel,' 'The Bible was the first reading-book.' Timothy knew the Holy Scriptures 'from a child' (2 Ti 3^{15}). Some of the books of the NT were written as aids to private devotion (Lk 1^{1-4}). The passage 2 Ti 3^{16} applies not only to the public but also to the private use of the Bible. It is probable that in the early period many Christians were limited to the public reading of the Bible, as they possessed no books of their own. In the opinion of the present writer, however, the number of Bibles to be found in private houses in the first three centuries has been under-estimated by Prof. C. Bigg (*The Church's Task under the Roman Empire*, 1905, p. 28). Paul presupposes quite a remarkable acquaintance with the OT among the members of his Churches. Polycarp writes to the Church at Philippi (12^{1}): 'Confido enim vos bene exercitatos esse in sacris litteris.' We learn from Tertullian that the reading of the Bible in common was one of the practices of the Christian home, and he urges this fact as an argument against 'mixed' marriages, because in such a case the custom becomes impracticable (*ad Uxorem*, ii. 8). In the *Didascalia of the Apostles* (ch. ii.) Christians are exhorted in the following terms: 'Sit at home and read in the Law, in the Book of Kings and in the Prophets and in the Gospel which is their fulfilment,' while in ch. xxii. the rod of discipline (Pr 13^{24} 19^{18} 23^{13}) is interpreted as the word of God, in which youth must be diligently instructed. Family prayers, as well as those of the Church, are Biblical in character. The morning-prayer makes reference to Lk 2^{14}, the evening-prayer to Ps 113 and Lk $2^{29 ff.}$. The grace before meat, preserved in *Const. Apost.* (vii. 49), is drawn from Gn 48^{15}, Ps 136^{25}, 2 Co 9^{8}. The real prayer-book is the Psalter; Christian maidens sit at the distaff and sing about the Divine revelation (Tatian, *Orat.* 33); husband and wife entertain one another with psalms and hymns, and vie with one another as to who shall best sing to God's praise (Tertullian, *ad Uxorem*, ii. 8). On the occasion of Monica's death, when Augustine and his son Adeodatus were overcome by grief, Euodius took the Psalter and intoned the 100th Ps., all present making response (Augustine, *Confess.* ix. 31). All the teachers of the first centuries counted upon this private use of the Scripture, and encouraged it (Justin, *Apol.* 44; Cyprian, *Ep.* i. *ad Donatum*). Pamphilus is said always to have kept copies ready to give to Christians who desired them (Hieronymus, *ad Ruf.* i. 9). The Acts of the Diocletian persecution indicate the extent to which the Christians honoured and defended the Bible as their sacred possession and their dearest treasure. More than one martyr was discovered while reading the Scripture, and brought to account for it, *e.g.*, Euplius of Catana, who read Mt 5^{10} 10^{28} before the judge, and, when asked why he had not obeyed the Emperor's injunction (dated 24th Feb. 303) to deliver up all Bibles, quietly answered: 'Quia Christianus sum et tradere non licebat magisque expedit mori quam tradere' (cf. *Mart. s. Irenae*, and Eusebius, *Mart. Pal.* 8. 4). The reproach which

was made against the Catholics by the Donatists, 'velut traditores in persecutione divinarum scripturarum,' was keenly felt by the former as an attack upon their Christianity. No difference was made later on when the time of Constantine began to see the masses streaming into the Christian Churches, except that exhortations to use the Bible at home were rendered more frequent by the neglect of the custom. Chrysostom assumes that his hearers possess a Bible, in which they can read the text at home; if they do not, he urges them to buy one. In many places a Bible was probably laid out for public use. The lending of sacred books was considered to be pleasing to God. The diligent reading of the Bible took a specially high place among the virtues and merits of holy men and women. The acquaintance which these people had with the Bible was really astonishing. The sermons of the great preachers of the time were composed of Biblical quotations, and preachers counted upon their hearers to take note of and understand them. Pilgrimages to the scenes of sacred story, which at this time were becoming more and more common, added to the knowledge of the Bible a certain knowledge of localities, however superficial and superstitious it may have been. The Aquitanian pilgrim (Silvia or Etheria?) informs us that at each place the pertinent passage of Scripture was read to the pilgrims.

With the collapse of the ancient civilization and the decay of learning, the following centuries, naturally enough, brought a decline in the reading of the Bible. There came times when it was rare to find the art of reading outside the monasteries. Perhaps in the boudoir of a great lady there was still opportunity for the study of the Bible and Virgil. The laity, whether prince or peasant, and even the secular priests, were illiterate. We hear complaints about the meagre acquaintance with the Bible to be found even in the ranks of the clergy. Charlemagne had to insist upon every priest knowing at least the Catechism. Petrus Damiani († 1072) and Æneas Silvio (Pius II., † 1464) complained similarly of the small knowledge which priests possessed as compared with heretics. The Bible exerted only an indirect influence through the medium of preaching, poetry, and pictures, and even that was shared with much other material. It was not till the 12th cent. that the people again began to show a wide interest in the Bible as such. This movement, though viewed with suspicion by the Church, and occasionally violently opposed, continued and increased in intensity and extent in proportion as ecclesiastic theology and piety became dissociated from the Bible. There were circles where Biblicism went so far as to remove from the Bible everything that was not strictly Biblical, as, *e.g.*, the prefaces—a purism to which sometimes even the prologue to the Gospel of Luke (1^{1-4}) was sacrificed. But though the Bible was really the devotional book of these circles (Thomas à Kempis, Geiler of Kaysersberg on *Right Reading of the Bible*), the circles themselves were limited. Only few possessed a Bible, and the attempts to make it accessible to all in the adjoining rooms of churches benefited only individuals, and helped study rather than devotion.

With the aid of the new art of printing the Reformation first made the Bible in reality the people's book. From that point onward one can speak of daily Bible-reading as a Christian duty. Along with the hymn-book and the Catechism, it is the only book that many evangelical Christians know. It is their manual of devotion, and still more their reading-book. The wider circulation of the Bible, which followed the improvements effected upon printing, made its acquirement increasingly easy. At the same time, however, competition increased. Thus we find that, simultaneously with the widest circulation of the Bible which has ever been reached, there is a decline in the pious use of it. Here, however, there is this comfort to be laid to heart, that where it is read a really pious desire is the motive. Many German Bibles are wisely prefaced by A. H. Francke's fine 'Kurzer Unterricht, wie man die h. Schrift zu seiner wahren Erbauung lesen solle.' Then also the emphasizing of the supreme verses of Scripture by special type, which we find in many Bibles, is significant. These are the utterances in which the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum* ever reveals itself in experience, in which the troubled soul finds richest consolation, inspiration, and strength. We find this illustrated in an old family Bible mentioned by Hesselbacher. It was underlined in the 18th cent. by his great-grandfather in four different colours. 'What touched the sin of my heart:—Black. What inspired me to good:—Blue. What comforted me in sorrow:—Red. What promised me the grace of God in eternity:—Gold' (cf. with this the Gospels mentioned above, p. 583[b], belonging to the 14th cent. and written in four colours of ink, in order to see the difference between the objective treatment of the Bible by the Catholics and its subjective treatment by the Evangelicals, who always kept in view the thirst of their own sinful hearts for comfort). Naturally, we have no documentary evidence of the reading of the Bible in families or in retirement. An unusually favourable opportunity is afforded in the letters of Bismarck to his wife, from which we learn that the Bible was read daily by one of the greatest statesmen, one, too, who was certainly no pietist. Naturally, in biographies and memoirs there is little said of the devotional reading of the Bible in the quiet closet or in the small family-circle; it is taken for granted or considered immaterial. All true effect of Bible-reading takes place in secret. So far as it is possible to observe, it would seem that the desire for God's word and the eternal truth which the Bible contains is again on the increase (A. W. Robinson, *Co-operation with God*, 1908, 114).

LITERATURE.—Bartlett and Peters, *The Bible for Home and School*, 1898; C. G. Montefiore, *The Bible for Home Reading*, 1896, 1899.

2. Bible-reading by the laity.—In the ancient Church every Christian could obtain access to the Bible, and exhortations to read it were general. The idea characteristic of late Judaism, that certain Scriptures were to be confined to a select circle, is to be found only in the pseudo-Clementine Homilies—a fact which is to be connected with the sectarianisms of Jewish Christianity and esoteric literature. Elsewhere the warning is limited to the reading of heretical works (Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* iv. 33). The sacred Scriptures included those which were for use in church and those which were for private devotional use (cf. Murat. Canon. on the *Shepherd* of Hermas). But the canonical Scriptures were to be within everybody's reach. Athanasius reproaches heretics with preventing people from reading the Bible. Chrysostom combats the idea prevalent among the laity that the reading of the Bible was a thing for the clergy and monks. Later on this giving up of the Bible on the part of the laity led to its being withdrawn altogether, exactly as in the case of the communion cup. There came a time when laymen could not read, and when they had again learned the art they were not allowed to read the Bible. This was part of the mediæval system of keeping the laity in dependence upon ecclesiastical authority, and was based upon the idea of the unfathomableness of the mysteries which the Scripture contained. The traditional exegesis of the Church was the only means of reaching these, and the laity, left to themselves, always

wandered from the track. As a matter of fact, where Bible study was fostered in lay circles, there was to be found, as a rule, an anti-hierarchical, anti-clerical, sectarian tendency. It was believed that, in the Bible-reading conventicles of South France and Lorraine, Albigensian and Catharist tendencies were to be observed. Thus Innocent III. wrote to the Bishop of Metz that conventicles of the laity for the purpose of reading the Bible were to be suppressed. The study of the Bible was to be encouraged, but theological training was necessary: the *profunditas* of the sacred Scripture was so great that even scholars could not quite understand it; the *arcana fidei* were not for every man. Ex 19^{13} was the passage which was founded upon in this connexion: the beast that touched Mount Sinai was to be stoned. Of course this did not amount to a general prohibition of the reading of Scripture by the laity, but it bore a close resemblance to it, and without doubt the tendency gained ground. Against the Bible in the popular tongue especially, a continual, though sometimes veiled, and certainly unsuccessful war was waged. Where the Church had no patience with these conventicles, people were driven into the arms of the sectaries, because it was these—especially Albigensians, Waldensians, Wyclifites, and Hussites—who gave the laity free access to the Bible and a free field for its exegesis, which developed in increasingly acute form upon anti-papal, anti-ecclesiastical lines. This made the Church all the more anxious to keep its members apart from the movement. Soon it came to be that the reading of the Bible brought people under the suspicion of heresy. The decrees passed by Councils of the 13th and 14th centuries against the reading of the Bible by Waldensians, Wyclifites, Beghards, and Beguines were followed by occasional local prohibitions like that of Archbishop Berthold of Mainz (1485). This caused printers of the Bible not perhaps to suspend operations, but to omit their names from their work. In the period prior to the Council of Trent, therefore, we cannot speak of any general prohibition of the Bible. It was a time of unreadiness and confusion, when mystic piety contended with ecclesiasticism for the supremacy.

The crisis was brought about even in Catholicism by the Reformation, which successfully established the unconditional right of every layman to the Bible. It rested upon the *perspicuitas*, that is to say, the intelligibility of the Scripture to the ordinary pious mind—the victory of the devotional use of the Bible over the theological—and compelled Catholicism to take up a more definite attitude to the whole question. In England the first endeavour to spread the gospel brought about a persecution which recalled the time of Diocletian. The Council of Trent (Sess. iv. *Decr. de editione et usu sacrorum librorum*) decreed, *ad coercenda petulantia ingenia*, that the exposition of Holy Scripture was to be guided by ecclesiastical tradition or the *unanimis consensus patrum* (cf. Conc. Vatic., Sess. iii. *Const. de fide*, c. 2). Resting on this decree, the Pope announced that only Bibles containing annotations approved by the Church could be published, and their use was dependent upon the special permission of the *parochus*, or the bishop of the diocese. Practically this was almost the withdrawal of the Bible. The Protestant Bibles were assailed, especially by the Jesuits, as falsified and dangerous to the soul. The same treatment was meted out to the Jansenists, especially in connexion with the translation and exposition of du Quesnell (Clement IX., *Const. Unigenitus*, 1713, *prop.* 79–82). In 1794 Pius VI. condemned *prop.* 67 of the Synod of Pistoja, which stated that the neglect of Bible-reading was innocent only in the case of inability to read, and that this neglect was responsible for the great ignorance in matters of faith. Hardly had the Jesuit order again attained influence when the Bible Societies in Catholic spheres were everywhere suppressed. Leo XII. published an encyclical against them in 1824, and Pius IX., in the syllabus of 1864, § 4, condemned them along with Socialism, Communism, and Secret Societies (*e.g.*, Freemasons) as *ejusmodi pestes*. It is one of the most remarkable indications of an internal change of system that there is at present in Italy a 'Società di San Girolamo' for the spreading of the Gospels among the people, which has a cardinal for its protector, and whose patron Pius X. is said to have been, before he took his place upon the Papal throne.

Within all Protestant Churches the Bible is the assured possession of the laity, and any isolated opposition to it is hopeless. The great necessity now is to emphasize, along with the right to the Bible, the duty of a true use of it in opposition to the contempt in which it is now widely held.

LITERATURE.—C. W. Fr. Walch, *Krit. Untersuch. vom Gebrauch der h. Schrift unter den alten Christen*, 1779; T. G. Hegelmaier, *Gesch. des Bibelverbots*, 1783; Leander van Ess, *Über das notwendige und nützliche Bibellesen*, 1808–24; Malon, *La Lect. de la sainte Bible*, 1846; F. H. Reusch, *Der Index der verbotenen Bücher*, 1883–85; G. Rietschel, art. 'Bibellesen,' in *PRE*[3] ii. 700; O. Schmidt in Wetzer und Welte, *Kirchenlex*[2] ii. 679 ff.; R. C. Moulton, *The Modern Reader's Bible*, 1907.

3. The Bible in monasteries and reading-circles.—From the moment when the masses entered the Church, and a distinction came to be drawn between half-Christians and whole-Christians, that is to say, between the secular world on the one hand, and monks, ascetics, and conventuals on the other, Bible-reading among Christians as such decayed, while in ascetic circles, where religion was taken seriously, it increased. Chrysostom was aware of the opinion popularly entertained that the Bible was for priests and monks. As a matter of fact, it was in ascetic circles like those which gathered round Jerome and Rufinus that Bible-reading was most diligently fostered. Melania, *e.g.*, a noble Roman lady who renounced the world entirely, read the whole Bible four times every year, and knew large portions of it by heart. Jerome was quite pestered by the puzzles which his admirers put him from Scripture. Marcella showed intelligence in her queries, and suggested real difficulties; the less gifted Paula adopted more the style of the modern Biblical riddle. The same thing was repeated in the court of Charlemagne, where Alcuin was looked upon as an oracle for the solution of all difficulties. We possess the correspondence of two nuns of the 6th cent., and find it to be entirely composed of passages from Scripture.

In these pious circles the Psalter, as the daily prayer-book, played the chief part. The Egyptian anchorites passed days and nights in reciting psalms which they learned by heart. This was held to be the surest weapon against the temptations of Satan. In the monasteries the *Psalmodia* (chanting of psalms) was regulated (at Studium and St. Maurice chanting never ceased, one choir relieving the other [Acœmetæ]). At the same time, a free field was left to the piety of the individual. It was in the monasteries, too, that the reading of Scripture was most practised. Not only were several services held every day (or were provided for by the regulations), but at meal-times, etc., some book was read aloud. Sometimes it was the Scriptures, sometimes it was legends of the martyrs or lives of the monks. In the early period of the Middle Ages the monasteries were the only places where the Scriptures were to be found. Only there was it known how to use them and communicate them in some degree to the people. The monasteries

were the homes of writing, reading, meditation, and study. In the schools of the various orders we have already seen that Biblical sciences were fostered.

This condition of things was altered by the Reformation, in so far as the distinction between whole- and half-Christian was now done away with. It was impossible, however, to remove the distinction between those who desired with their whole soul to be Christians and those who were Christian only in appearance. With all the emphasis which it laid upon the right and the duty of all Christians to read the Bible, Protestantism also possessed small circles of particularly zealous friends of the Bible. Just as these circles occur here and there in modern Catholicism, often in connexion with some monastery, *e.g.* Port Royal, so in Protestantism the influence of Pietism made itself felt. The necessary impulse was given by the *pia desideria* of Spener, who thus came into line with the work of his opponent, Carpzow, in Leipzig. Thus there originated 'Collegia Philobiblica.' At the outset these combined the features of the exegetical lecture and the devotional meeting, as was also the case with the Zürich 'Prophecy'; but afterwards the strictly scientific lecture of the university became more and more separated from the devotional meeting of the Church. The latter frequently stood in a sort of opposition to the Church service, as in the case of the Lay-preachers of Württemberg and the Stundists of Russia; but it found acceptance outside the strictly pietistic circles, and came to be a regular part of Church life in the shape of a week-day service. The more strongly pietistic circles possess reading-circles of their own, as well as Bible-classes for students and schoolboys. It is here that extraordinary achievements in the way of continuous Bible-reading are accomplished. It reminds us of what we are told about ascetics in the ancient Church, when we hear that the whole Bible from Gn 1^1 to Rev 22^{21} was read through several times in one year (A. H. Francke is said to have read the Hebrew OT seven times in one year). The tables of lessons which are published by many societies (*e.g.*, the Prussian Bible Society) distribute the material of the Bible over a year, not in continuous portions, but in selected passages.

LITERATURE.—**Falk**, *Bibel am Ausgange des Mittelalters*, 56 ff.

4. Substitutes and favourite passages.—It was not always in its complete form that the Bible was in use. The substitutes which existed alongside of it were of great importance, and in the Middle Ages exerted a greater influence than the immediate use of the Bible. There were the select passages for Sunday in the so-called Plenaries, Postils, and Books of the Gospels and the Epistles. These were intended to be used not only in the services of the Church, but also, as is shown by the MSS and copies printed in the popular tongue, in private devotions, partly at least to explain the reading of the Bible in the Church service. There were also excerpts from the Bible in the form of Bible histories (*Bible historiale*, 'History-Bible'). These were characterized by the almost complete absence of the more important Didactic Books, the Prophets, and the Apostolical Epistles. Then also there were rhymed Bibles, containing the same material, but in verse, which, though not by any means good, was easy to remember. To these must be added the picture-Bibles, with their short descriptive paragraphs, including the so-called *Biblia Pauperum* ('Bible of the Poor'), which contained from 24 to 48 woodcuts illustrating the most important events in the OT and the NT in harmony. Lastly, there was the *Ars Memorandi*, where the contents of the four Gospels were suggested in rebus fashion. Towards the end of the Middle Ages these were widely circulated instead of the Bible, not only because the great majority of the people were still too ignorant to read the Bible, and because the Church did not wish them to do so, but also because the piety of the age took more delight in the marvellous stories which the Bible contained than in the hard fare of the Prophets and the Epistles of Paul. Even for the Psalms a substitute existed in the *Psalterium Puerorum*, a collection of certain Psalms much employed in Divine service, and of other important features in Christian instruction, *e.g.* the Lord's Prayer and the Creed.

The Reformation demanded that the whole Bible should be given to the people and made free to everybody. Some difference of attitude, however, can be observed in the two Protestant Confessions. In Lutheranism the Catechism, with Biblical notes, took the place of the Bible to a large extent both in private use and in ecclesiastical teaching, while Calvinism adhered to the Bible itself. At the same time, the mediæval substitutes continued in use, especially in schools, where Bible-history formed the foundation of the entire education, as it will probably do for long, in spite of recent attacks. The efforts which are now made to give a due place to the Prophets and the Apostles, as well as the Historical Books, are significant and deserving of success. On the other hand, the desire for a school- and home-Bible that shall be intermediate between Bible and Bible-history is to be looked on with suspicion, both from the educational and from the ecclesiastical point of view.

The pious Bible-reader of the old school read the whole Bible as the word of God. But it may be observed that various parts of the Bible produce various effects, according to the period and the people. In the ancient Church and the Middle Ages, Paul is little understood and valued, and yet Pauline reactions mark the critical epochs both in theology and in the Church. Mysticism adheres either to the Song of Songs or to John. The Spiritualists who broke with the Church, the fanatics of the Reformation period, and many sects of modern Protestantism, build almost entirely upon the Revelation of John. In the later Middle Ages there were wide circles where the historical parts of the Bible were the only parts known, and even these only indirectly, through the so-called history-Bibles—that is to say, Scripture excerpts, with many legendary additions from extra-Biblical sources. The Didactic portions, the Prophets and the Apostolic Epistles, had to be re-discovered. The 'Enlightenment' laid supreme value upon the moralizing Wisdom-literature. As has been recently noted, Frederick the Great's favourite book was Ecclesiastes. Of the Gospels, Luke's edifying narrative has enjoyed the greatest vogue among pious readers, while speculative theology (*e.g.*, Schleiermacher's school) prefers John, and the historical school abides by Mark. Modern socialistic tendencies, again, do honour to the Epistle of James, which Luther once very wrongly threw into the fire as an 'epistle of straw.' Speaking generally, interest in the Bible, which under the influence of materialism and naturalism was reduced to a very low ebb at the close of the 19th cent., has again happily revived. The chief motive is the æsthetic one. Pearls of Biblical poetry are selected for books of wisdom and beauty (Freiherr von Grotthus). Works on the beauty of the Bible (A. Wünsche, 1906) and on the poetry of Christ's gospel (O. Frommel, 1906) find a grateful public. Modern investigation and criticism of the Bible are beginning to create interest (Schiele's *Religionsgeschichtl. Volksbucher*, and the more conservative *Biblische Zeit- und Streitfragen*, by Kropatschek). More and more space is being given to Biblical

material in popular collections, which are meant to provide a general culture (Goeschen's *Sammlung*, Teubner's *Aus Natur und Geisteswelt*, etc.). As the inevitable result of this, the religious interest in the Bible must receive a powerful stimulus, and Christian consciousness become re-awakened.

LITERATURE.—Alzog, *Die deutschen Plenarien im 15. und zu Anfang des 16. Jahrh.*, 1874; E. Reuss (S. Berger), art. 'Historienbibel,' in *PRE*[3], viii. 152-157; J. Kell, *Die Schulbibel*, 1845; Enders, *Die Schulbibelfrage*, 1896; F. M. Schiele, *Die Bibel und ihre Surrogate in der Volksschule*, 1900; *The Child's Bible*, 1883; Rogers, *School and Children's Bible*, 1873; J. G. Frazer, *Passages of the Bible chosen for their Literary Beauty and Interest*, 1895; J. W. Mackail, *Biblia Innocentium*, 1893, 1901.

On the influence of Paulinism: C. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alex.*, 1886, pp. 53, 283 f.; A. Harnack, *Dogmengesch*[3], i. 129; E. Serfass, *Essai sur l'influence du paulinisme dans les réveils religieux*, 1900; E. Langlade, *Le Rôle des psaumes dans la vie religieuse*, Cahors, 1905.

5. **The Bible and the Classics.**—The Bible satisfies Christian piety, but it nevertheless has its place in history as a link in a long process of civilization. This fact explains the speedy development of two tendencies. On the one hand, there were those who placed the Bible, the book of Christian devotion, side by side with universal literature. In their opinion, both were possessed of rights, and the Bible was in alliance with culture. On the other hand, there were Biblicists pure and simple. These condemned all reading of profane (*i.e.* heathen) literature as un-Christian, and put on a level with the Bible only the devotional Christian literature of a distinct ascetic colour. This was the view entertained in ascetic and monastic circles. Even in the ancient Church we meet with it in Syria, the home of ascetic tendencies. The *Didascalia* of the Apostles, *e.g.*, ch. ii., contains the following exhortation:

'Keep away from the books of the heathen. What hast thou to do with the strange words, the laws, and the lying prophecies which tempt young people from the faith? What fault hast thou to find with the word of God that thou stayest thyself upon heathen fables? Wilt thou read history? thou hast the Book of Kings; wise men and philosophers? then thou hast the Prophets, in whom thou wilt find more wisdom and knowledge than in the wise men and philosophers, because theirs are the words of God, who alone is wise; dost thou wish songs? then thou hast the Psalms of David; an explanation of the world? then thou hast Genesis, by the great Moses; laws and commandments? thou hast the Divine law in Exodus. Keep entirely away from all strange things which are in opposition to these.'

Later we find the same way of thinking in the monastic circles of Syria and Egypt, although it is to the everlasting credit of Syrian Nestorians that they communicated the Greek philosophy—Aristotle and his commentators—to the Arabs, from whom they were taken over again by Christians in the West. There is a typical presentation of this sentiment in the famous dream of Jerome. This master of rhetoric, who prided himself on his classical knowledge, wants the pious Eustochium to believe that he had been thoroughly chastised in the night-time for his admiration of Plautus and Cicero, and compelled to give up the Classics (*Ep.* 22)—a delicate little piece of rhetoric that quite gives its author the lie. This renunciation on the part of Jerome was not to be taken seriously. Later he insisted strongly that in education there should be a union of Christian and general culture, of the Bible and the Classics. But his fiction produced its effect, and in many a cloister-cell during the Middle Ages the dream was actualized.

It is true that the Greek theologians, and also the monastics, among whom were Basil and Theodore of Studium, etc., never quite gave up the idea of a union of classic beauty of form with Biblical content. Thus the Alexandrian Clement and Origen were steeped in Greek philosophy. Clement quotes the Bible with remarkable freedom, adopting a Greek style unawares. The same thing can be observed in the whole school of Origen (cf. the thanksgiving speech of Gregory Thaumaturgus). But his opponent Methodius, the Biblical realist, also writes a Christian symposium. Specially noteworthy, because they regulated the succeeding age, were the great orators of the 4th cent., Basil and the two Gregorys, who as young men at Athens had, along with their heathen comrades, familiarized themselves with the whole profane culture. Chrysostom, the pupil of Libanius, believed it his duty to apologize for the rusticity of Biblical Greek: the Apostles were uncultured fishermen, but that only made the miracle which the Holy Ghost effected by them the greater. At the same time, Chrysostom felt the peculiar strength of the Biblical language. He adorned his brilliant orations with Scripture quotations, and so gave them the impressiveness which lifts them above the contemporary speeches of heathen orators, with their hollow phrases. The monastic tendency in the 6th cent. sought to introduce the popular Greek, which resembled more closely the Semitic element in the Bible (John Malalas of Antioch). It would be a valuable service to investigate the influence which the language of the Bible exercised upon the popular legendary literature and Christian revisions of older material like the *Romance* of Alexander. But although monastic circles prided themselves no less on their modesty than on their simplicity of language, classicism, or the union of Christian and Greek culture, was always maintained in Byzantium, and after short periods of decline it never failed to revive. This was the case after the iconoclastic struggle in the 9th cent., chiefly through the instrumentality of Photius, and also, after the Latin invasion of the 13th cent., through the Palæologi. Arethas, the Archbishop of Cæsarea († *c.* 932), wrote a commentary on the Apocalypse, and studied Plato and Lucian diligently. Eustathius, the Homeric commentator, who was afterwards Archbishop of Thessalonica († *c.* 1192), complained bitterly of the want of culture on the part of the monks, who could not appreciate the treasures of the monastic libraries. This classicism was specifically Greek in character, and it was not transmitted by the Byzantines to the Slavonic peoples converted by them.

In the West the development took a somewhat different course. There Jerome and Augustine provided a model of the noble union of Biblical and secular culture. But, just as Jerome sometimes felt that the latter was forbidden fruit, so in the case of Augustine, from the moment when he entered the service of the Church, an increasing Biblical element is found to colour his views and language. Cassiodorus and Boethius were still familiar with pagan culture, but such familiarity soon ceased. What little culture survived the migration of the peoples is monastic and Biblical. At the Court of Charlemagne the first revival of learning occurred. Along with the Bible, Virgil was studied. The Emperor himself was liberal enough to appreciate the value of the German epics. But so early as the time of the monk-emperor, Ludwig the Pious, this disappeared. As a matter of fact, Plautus and Terence were still read even by pious nuns, but Hroswitha of Gandersheim endeavoured to suppress these heathen writers by her Biblical imitations. In the time of the Swabian dynasty there occurred another revival, and after the fall of the Empire (from middle of 13th cent. onwards) the foundation was everywhere laid of a real national secular culture, in opposition to ecclesiastical Latin. This spread from France to England and the German Imperial cities, and in an entirely independent manner it united Biblical and extra-Biblical material. Much more dangerous was the classicism of the Renaissance. In their admiration of the ancient form the Humanists made sport of the ancient religion as they understood it, and

some of them were ashamed of the Biblical element. This led to a strong Biblical reaction, especially in Calvinistic countries, while Lutheranism tried to reach a combination of both tendencies. The 'Enlightenment' confined strict Biblicism to a narrow pietistic circle, while general culture, characterized in some cases by tendencies hostile to religion and the Bible, spread more widely. Here, too, a wholesome reaction can be hoped for only from the perception that the Bible, in its true nature as the supreme book of devotion, can never come into collision with any other means of culture.

LITERATURE.—C. Neumann, *Byzant. Kultur und Renaissancekultur*, 1903; J. E. Sandys, *Hist. of Class. Scholarship*, 3 vols., 1906–08; G. Kaufmann, 'Rhetorenschulen und Klosterschulen, oder histor. und christl. Kultur in Gallien wahrend des 5. und 6. Jahrh.,' in Raumer's *Hist. Taschenbuch*, 1869; Zappert, *Virgils Fortleben im Mittelalter*, 1851; Comparetti, *Vergilio nel medio evo*, 1872.

6. Misuse of the Bible.—Our sketch would be incomplete without some mention of the abuse of the Bible by misguided Christian piety. Although the idea that the Bible had fallen from heaven was never entertained, yet the conception of its sanctity had become so strong among the Jews that the roll of the Law was held to be inviolable. A Roman soldier who had seized one of these rolls was executed by the Procurator Cumanus to please the Jews (Josephus, *Ant.* XX. v. 4, *BJ* II. xii. 2). Copies which had grown useless had to be carefully preserved in sacred burying-places made for the purpose (the Genizah at Cairo has yielded a rich harvest of extremely valuable ancient copies of the Bible). This material notion of sacredness, which was familiar both to heathenism and Judaism, was at first quite foreign to Christianity. It soon found its way into the Christian masses, however, and made the Bible, like other sacred things, tabu. Especially was this the case with the book of the Gospels which, along with the Host and the likeness of Christ, speedily came to be one of the most effective guarantees of the presence of Christ Himself and His miraculous power. This was the origin of kissing the book—still an important feature of the liturgies of the East—and also of the double procession, first with the Gospels and afterwards with the Communion elements. The official valuation by the Councils gave to the Gospels, as representative of Christ, the place of honour. In the consecration of a bishop the Gospels were laid upon his head as the means of communicating the Spirit and Christ's indwelling, whereas they were placed in the reader's hand only as the symbol of his ecclesiastical function. They played a similar part in the consecration of the highest grade of Catharists. From the 4th cent. it became the custom to take the oath upon the Gospels, and on these occasions it was usual to turn up the beginning of John. In the Middle Ages we find, along with or in place of the Gospels which represented Christ, relics as representing the saints. The idea here is no higher than that which is embodied in the monastic legend that a Christian who was sorely beset by fleshly lust was enabled to resist temptation by having the Gospels hung upon his neck by a cord. One must beware of spiritualizing this to the extent of making it the psychological effect of reflexion upon the content of the book. It was to the book itself that talismanic virtue was ascribed. The explanation of inserting a finger or 'dipping' in the Bible is similar. The method which the Romans followed with Virgil and other authors whose works were considered inspired and sacred was taken over by Christians and applied to their sacred book (*sortes legere*), and, in spite of the opposition which it met at the beginning from ecclesiastical authority, this method of consulting the oracle about the future was long maintained among the people. We can observe the material view which was entertained of the magical qualities resident in the book, from the practice of writing the answers to the most usual questions on its margin. Such queries could also be answered by means of slips of paper or threads, but when the answers were read out of the Gospels they possessed a greater guarantee of being Divine oracles.

The magical effect of the Bible reached still further into the dark regions of human superstition. There were certain passages of Scripture which were considered specially effective in defence and attack. The Lord's Prayer, inscribed upon a disc of clay found at Megara, was certainly possessed of this significance, just as in ancient and modern times Jesus' letter to Abgar was attached to the doors in order to keep all evil and hurtful influences far away from the house and its members. A sheet of lead inscribed with the 80th Psalm, which Hiller von Gärtringen found in a vineyard on the island of Rhodes, belongs rather to the ancient formulas of malediction, by which evil was supposed to be brought upon some definite person. Chrysostom complained of the superstitious abuse of sayings from the Gospels (δελτία, εὐαγγέλια) which women and children wore round the neck. Augustine relates how the Gospel of John was laid upon the head of those who were ill with fever. Gregory M. sanctioned by word and example what the Church till then contended against as abuse. In the later Middle Ages the only reason why this superstition in regard to the Bible decayed was the keen competition which it had to face in the superstitious valuation of saintly relics.

The Reformation destroyed the material notion of sacredness which lay at the basis of all this error. The bibliolatry which Lessing and others opposed in the time of 'Enlightenment' had nothing in common with this Biblical magic. It was the dogmatic valuation of the Bible as possessed of infallible authority. Evangelical Christians have in the Bible not a book that is to be handled with timidity and awe, but one which is for the intimacy of home and private devotion. Where searching with the finger or 'dipping' in the Bible still exists as a practice in Protestant circles (Pietists and Moravian brethren), it has acquired an inward and spiritual significance. At the same time it has to be said that the practice in Evangelical circles of making the Bible serve for pastimes (*e.g.* Biblical riddles) amounts to excessive familiarity and abuse; the Bible is to be handled not indeed with timidity, but with all due reverence.

LITERATURE.—For the ecclesiastical use of the Gospels see St. Beissel, *Gesch. der Evangelienbucher*, 1906, pp. 1–10, who tries to dissociate this use from every element of superstition; Kayser, 'Gebrauch von Psalmen zur Zauberei,' *ZDMG* xlii., 1888, 456; Hiller von Gärtringen, *SBAW*, 1898, p. 582; N. Wilcken, *APF* i. 430 ff.; Knopf, *Mitt. d. deutsch. archaol. Inst. zu Athen*, xxv., 1900, pp. 313–324; Joh. Ficker, *PRE*[3] i 469; E. von Dobschütz, *PRE*[3] xviii. 537; E. Nestle, *ZNTW* vii. 96. See also art. BIBLIOLATRY.

VII. *THE BIBLE IN THE LIFE OF THE PEOPLE.*—The Bible is pre-eminently the book of religious devotion, but its operations are not limited thereto. They embrace the whole life of Christendom.

1. Bible and language.—The Bible has exercised great influence on the development of language. Not only have translations of the Bible made literature possible to a whole array of peoples by giving them a written language in the same way as missionary enterprise still does, but in other ways language has been powerfully influenced by the Bible. The Biblical vocabulary supplied Latin, and thence the Romance and German languages, with the terms 'manna,' 'Passover,' 'Sabbath,' 'angel,' 'devil,' 'Paradise,' etc. The Biblical structure

of sentences—loose co-ordination of clauses and *parallelismus membrorum*—has been largely adopted as a model. It may be noted that here three methods are to be distinguished: (1) The conscious imitation of the solemn music of the Prophets, which hardly exists in the ancient period, but of which Lamennais is a modern instance. (2) The allegorical use of Biblical names and expressions—a method specially favoured among the Greeks, who applied the typical names of the Bible to the men of the times (πάλιν Ἡρωδιὰς μαίνεται, Chrysostom). Speaking of the bull of Canonization dated 1228, which is composed in this style, Sabatier rightly remarks that one can learn the history of the Philistines, of Samson, and also of Jacob from it better than that of St. Francis. In later times the 'speech of Canaan' has been much adopted in pietistic circles, while it has been abhorred in others. (3) The unconscious absorption of familiar Biblical phrases—the normal and most widely spread form. Not only do the great preachers of the ancient Church and moderns like Bossuet, Schleiermacher, and Spurgeon employ the language of their Bible, but the masters of literature do so also. If Dante is the creator of modern Italian, Luther deserves the same title in regard to modern German, and it was through his translation of the Bible chiefly that his influence was felt. In reading Goethe, one becomes aware of his life-long familiarity with the Bible. The style of many Catholic authors shows that they do not have the same familiarity with it. It is an obvious mistake when Janssen's school attempts to transfer the credit which belongs to Luther to an obscure chronicler of the 13th cent., Eike of Repkow. In English-speaking countries the Authorized Version possessed the same importance. It came too late for Shakespeare, but even he could not have written as he did without the older translations. The best age of French literature has more than a temporal connexion with the Biblical activity of Port Royal. The influence which the Bible has exerted upon literature deserves to receive more attention than it has done in the past. That, however, would require a wider acquaintance with the Bible than most moderns possess. More than any other book, the Bible has contributed to the familiar phrases used by numberless people who know nothing of their origin. It is to be regretted that these phrases are often used in a sense quite false and entirely opposed to their original meaning.

LITERATURE.—R. v. Raumer, *Die Einwirkung des Christentums auf die althochdeutsche Sprache*, 1845; E. Stein von Nordenstein, *Über den Einfluss der Bibel auf deut. Sprache und Litt.* 1856; P. Frédéricq, 'Les Conséquences de l'évangélisation par Rome et par Byzance sur le développement de la langue maternelle des peuples convertis,' in *Bull. de l'acad. roy. de Belg.* 1903; A. S. Cook, *Bibl. Quotations in old Eng. Prose Writers*, 2 vols., 1898 and 1903; C. Wordsworth, *Shakespeare's Knowledge and Use of the Bible*, 1864; C. von Kügelgen, *Die Bibel bei Kant*, 1904; E. Hohne, *Umfang und Art der Bibelbenutzung in Goethe's Faust*, 1906; L. Rosenthal, *Schiller und die Bibel*, 1905; R. de la Broise, *Bossuet et la Bible*, 1890; J. Trénel, *L'ancien test. et la langue française du moyen âge*, 1904; G. Büchmann, *Geflügelte Worte*[21], 1903.

2. Bible and views of the world and human life.—To the language of the Bible must be added the general view which it takes of the world and human life; speech and thought are intimately related. The Bible contains no conception of the universe peculiar to itself. What we find in it is the view entertained by the ancient world, and especially the ancient East. To the early Christians there was nothing strange in this, because their own view resembled it, and where there were differences it was easy to harmonize them. The Scriptures themselves, covering as they did a space of 1000 years, were not at one in this regard. The transition from the Semitic to the Greek method of thought was effected as easily as in the domain of language. Plato and Aristotle were read into the Bible involuntarily. This is shown very clearly by the abundant literature on the *Hexaëmeron*. The Middle Ages looked upon this mixture of old Oriental Biblical ideas and Greek philosophy as authoritative ecclesiastical doctrine. It was surrounded by the nimbus of revelation, and was therefore infallibly true. Every consideration against it and every attempt to account for the world empirically (as Bacon, *e.g.*, demanded) was authoritatively suppressed. The effect of this was felt till within recent times. Luther was so far from seeing how little of the Bible there was in this ecclesiastical theory of the world, that he called Copernicus a fool (*Table-Talk*, Förstemann-Bindseil, iv. 575); the Roman Inquisition compelled Galileo to retract; Kepler encountered great internal and external difficulties in accepting the credibility of the Bible as it was conceived in his time; while Newton combined with the exactitude of his physical theories a Biblicism which we find it difficult to understand. The 'Enlightenment' completed what the Renaissance had begun. It secularized science and emancipated views of the world from all Biblical ecclesiastical authority.

The great discoveries of the 15th cent., the transition from the speculative methods of scholasticism to empirical research, not only in the domain of natural science but also in that of history, brought about an entire change of opinion. The confidence of the 'Enlightenment' and the modern love of truth have brought this clearly to light, and with it the immense gulf between the ordinary and the Biblical view of the world. Here we come upon the leading problem of the Bible for moderns. Can the Bible still possess value when it contains views about the world and man belonging to a stage of human thought now outgrown? That heaven (or the 3 to 7 heavens) arches over this earth, that the stars encircle it, that the earth is surrounded by the great ocean (only the parts bordering on the Mediterranean being then known), that its central point is Jerusalem, that all the peoples on the earth are descended from the three sons of Noah, who was rescued from the Flood, that their languages can be traced back to one single confusion—all these ideas represent only the primitive thought which the Biblical authors shared with their contemporaries in Babylon and Egypt. It cannot be denied that we have ceased to entertain these notions nowadays. But this admission does not by any means overthrow all Biblical authority. What the theology of the last decade has toiled to show and has succeeded in showing is gaining increasing recognition, viz., that the Bible is not a revealed text-book of nature and history, but that God speaks in it to men about the salvation of their souls. To every pious conception of the world and its course as a whole and in detail, the Bible will always be possessed of validity because of the way in which it sees God's hand in everything and teaches people to see God's saving intention in fortune and misfortune, the way in which it places the whole history of mankind under the point of view of an education to the stature of manhood and independence in Christ. In a word, the Bible will always remain the book of pious devotion, and such pious devotion will always be easily able to surmount any difficulties which arise from different conceptions of creation. As in language, a kind of translation is possible. What apologetics must learn, however, is to abandon the desire to justify every Biblical utterance, and after every discovery in natural science and history to begin at once to search about for some statement in the Bible which it confirms. That only leads to confusion where what is needed is clearness. It is true that, so long as men read the Bible, the

Biblical view of the world and human life will remain popular. Without regard to the millions of stars, men will speak of heaven as the Divine dwelling-place and the goal of pious desire, and of the earth as the central point of the Divine plan of salvation with man as its special object. In their thoughts about love and hate, joy and sadness, good and evil, they will speak of the heart and not the brain. But what there must be no doubt about is that these are only poetical forms of speech, which, though fully justified in ordinary life, ought not to be put on the same platform as what is strictly scientific.

LITERATURE.—Van Eicken, *Gesch. und System der mittelalterl. Weltanschauung*, 1887 (with little attention to the Biblical element); E. F. Apelt, *Die Reformation der Sternkunde*, 1852; A. Deissmann, *Joh. Kepler und die Bibel*, 1895; L. Günther, *Kepler u. d. Theol.* 1904; L. Keller, 'Bibel, Winkelmass und Zirkel,' *Monatshefte der Comeniusgesellschaft*, 1908.

3. **Bible and law.**—Of greater practical significance is the influence of the Bible upon the life of the people. The adoption of Christianity by the State made it necessary that the revealed book of Divine law should regulate constitutional law. As early as 400 a *Collatio legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum* was prepared (ed. Th. Mommsen, 1890; *Collectio librorum iuris anteiustinianei*, iii.). In most ancient Christian legislations this principle finds expression in the preface. The so-called Syriac-Roman statute-book (ed. by Bruns and Sachau, 1880) affirms that the law of Moses is older than that of all other nations, but declares that, since the time of Christ, the only obligatory law is the law of Christ given through the Christian emperors, Constantine, Theodosius, and Leo. As a matter of fact, this was etiquette more than anything else; for the legislation is drawn almost wholly from Græco-Roman law. The same thing may be observed in the case of German law. Alfred the Great placed the Decalogue in front of his *Laws of England*. The ancient Bavarian and Frisian codes, as well as those of the Swabians and ancient Saxons, contain introductions full of ecclesiastical Biblical ideas. The law itself, however, is national. There are only a few traces of any Christian Biblical influence to be observed. These may perhaps be made out, however, as early as Constantine's legislation. The abolition of branding the face is based upon the Biblical doctrine of the Divine likeness (*C. Th.* ix. 40. 2); the second marriage of a divorced person is punished except when in the first marriage the other partner was guilty of adultery (*C. Th.* iii. 16. 1, cf. Mt $5^{31f.}$); two witnesses are required (*C. Th.* xi. 39. 3, cf. Dt 19^{15}). The influence of Christianity becomes commoner under Theodosius, Leo, and Justinian, whose 'novels' (*i.e.* supplementary laws) refer directly to the *sacrae scripturae* (e.g. *Nov.* clx. 1). The severe language of the OT is echoed in the legislation of Charlemagne; the continually recurring *morte moriatur* of the pitiless Saxon law is Hebraic. Justification was found for the bloody persecution of heretics in the OT condemnations of the disobedient. Demands which were originally made by the Church to safeguard Christian morals were all incorporated in constitutional law under Charlemagne: keeping the Sabbath-day holy, the prohibition of interest, etc. What is still more important for Charlemagne's conception, however, is that the whole theocratic idea was considered to possess immediate significance for the present. He felt himself a modern David, Solomon, Hezekiah, Josiah. This state of things, however, soon gave way under the pressure of the ecclesiastical idea that the State was opposed to God and was to receive recognition only in the service of the Church. The conflict gave birth to the modern State, which takes no interest in ecclesiastical or Bible authority. In Biblicist circles the obligation of the OT, and especially of the commandments of the Gospel, is more and more emphasized. This gave rise to the refusal to take an oath (Mt 5^{34}, Ja 5^{12}) among many sects down even to the Mennonites, while the Church sought to Christianize the oath by furnishing it with the Trinitarian formula and causing it to be sworn on the Gospels, and in the Middle Ages on the relics of saints. It was from the OT that ecclesiastical law derived the prohibition of marriage with a sister-in-law, and from it also Joseph Smith drew the Mormon commandment of polygamy. In a purely legal way the Baptists of the Reformation endeavoured to realize the theocratic idea, as Calvin aimed at training Geneva to be a city of God. The Sabbath commandment still calls for Sunday rest in Calvinistic countries. These genuinely Biblical influences are to be distinguished from those which are due to the century-long effect of Christianity upon the life, the customs, and the legislation of the nations. It is to this latter influence, *e.g.*, that we owe the abolition of slavery—not in the 1st or in the 4th, but in the 13th cent. for N. Europe, and in the 19th for the S. and the New World. With this the Bible had no direct connexion, for in the American Civil War both sides took their stand upon Biblical authority. Here too, however, there was an indirect and educative influence exerted by the Bible upon the moral sympathy and social thought of mankind.

LITERATURE.—Troplong, *De l'influence du christianisme sur le droit civil des Romains*, 1844; C. Schmid, *Die burgerliche Gesells. in der altrom. Welt und ihre Umgestaltung durch das Christentum*, 1857 (Fr. and Germ.); C. Bigg, *The Church's Task under the Roman Empire*, 1905; C. Loring Brace, *Gesta Christi, or A Hist. of Human Progress under Christianity*, 1882; L. Seuffert, *Konstantins Gesetze u. das Christentum*, 1891; W. Ohr, *Der Carolingische Gottesstaat*, Leipzig, 1902; W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals*[12], 1899.

4. **Bible and art.**—Specially interesting is the powerful effect which Biblical *motifs* exercised upon art and through it upon the national consciousness. The Christians of the first centuries adorned with Biblical symbols not only the graves of their dead in the Catacombs, but also the articles which they employed in daily life—lamps, tumblers, etc. Noah in the ark with the dove, Jonah swallowed by the whale or lying under the gourd, Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, etc., were favourite subjects. At first these scenes were of a purely symbolic nature. The 4th cent. began to show interest in the story, and continuous Bible illustrations are then found in MSS (cf. above, p. 583). But the picture became separated from the text; the illustrations suppressed and took the place of the text. In the famous Joshua-roll in the Vatican, supposed to be a 9th cent. copy of an ancient Christian original, there is a series of scenes with small inscriptions like those upon the Trajan and Marc. Aurelian pillar. Towards the close of the Middle Ages the history-Bible shrank more and more to a picture-book. Great favour was accorded to the *Biblia Pauperum*, a pictorial representation of the Gospel story with its OT types, and occasionally with explanatory notes. Picture-Bibles of this kind without any text, or with at most brief explanations like those which were made by Hans Beham (1537) and Mich. Graff (1536–53), were known occasionally also in the 17th and 18th cents., while the 19th returned again to the complete Bible and illustrated it.

Besides Bible illustration, however, there was the art of painting in general. The long walls of the basilicas were picture-books of Bible-history, and continued so until the end of the Romanesque period (cf. above, p. 606). Gothic art changed the telling of a story into the sculpture of individual figures, and preferred the multitude of ecclesiastical saints to the Biblical characters. Then the Renaissance went back again to Bible-story, and at

this stage it was ancient mythology instead of the legends of the saints that entered into serious competition with the Bible. The Churches were ornamented with stories from the Bible (Giotto's cycle in Padua, Madonna dell' Arena, indicates the beginning; and the culmination is found in the twelve scenes on the walls of the Sistine Chapel by Tintoretto, Botticelli, etc.). Private rooms also contained similar ornamentation, and it was in the *loggie* that Rafael executed his famous Bible in fifty-two pictures. So far as altar-pictures, stained windows, and other ornamentations are fostered in the modern Lutheran Church, the subjects are always drawn from the Bible instead of from favourite stories of the saints, as was the custom earlier.

Besides the sculpture of sarcophagi in the 4th and 5th cents., there is also the stone- and wood-work of the doors of churches (S. Sabina in Rome, S. Ambroggio in Milan). At a later date bronze-castings became usual (baptistery at Florence). The art of weaving was also employed in Bible-illustration. We hear of Biblical scenes not only upon hangings for churches (*vela*), but also upon private draperies (Asterius of Amaseia). In the Middle Ages, besides the rich ecclesiastical vestments, there were embroideries for household use. From the 15th cent. onward the crafts received a stimulus and showed a preference for Biblical material. Painted and inlaid cupboards and presses of the 16th and 17th cents. show whole rows of Biblical pictures, and even the easy-going Rococo period ornamented the toilet tables of its ladies with pictures from sacred history. Nor did this custom, in itself a profanation of the Scripture, cease until the art of the 'empire' began to look for themes in the Classics. The following period made extreme simplicity its goal, while to the eyes of modern naturalism Biblical themes present no attractions. This, however, is not to be deplored, for Biblical art must always be of a pious character.

The number of passages employed for illustration naturally varied very much. In certain branches of art a strict tradition came to be formed. Walls provided scope for more scenes than sarcophagi, and book-illustration made more detail possible. It would be a useful task to investigate systematically the differences which mark the various series of illustrations. Great interest attaches to the scenes which were preferred by individual periods and artists. To some extent it is possible in this way to discover what acquaintance with the Bible different periods possessed, not only in regard to the artists who were dependent frequently upon a pattern, but also in regard to the beholders upon whom the pictures—usually explained by notes—produced their effect.

It must not be overlooked here that the subjects were often drawn not directly from the Bible but from some intermediate source or other. The peculiar choice of scenes which the early period of Christianity made has been connected with their employment in sermons or in prayer. In the Middle Ages, St Augustine's *de Civitate Dei*, the *Historia scholastica* of Peter Comestor, and the *Speculum historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais provided artists with their Biblical material. This explains the Apocryphal features, the story of Christ ranging from the birth of the Virgin Mary to her ascension and coronation. Not till the advent of Protestantism did the immediate influence of the Bible again assert itself strongly. Then there was a different choice of scenes and a different arrangement of them. Much legendary material was dispensed with, and in its place much that had long been unobserved was utilized. The finest service was here rendered by Rembrandt. As a good Calvinist, he was so familiar with his Bible that he could always find new and unused subjects for his etchings. He could always count, moreover, upon their being understood at once by the public. See ART (Christian), vol. i. p. 855.

Besides the graphic arts, the art of language and tone is also naturally concerned with the word of Scripture. Poetry has found its highest impulses in the Bible. In this field there is much bad rhyming to be met with, and literary recreations like the turning of the Gospels into Homeric and Virgilian centos are common (4th and 5th cent.). There are also the rhymed Bibles of the Middle Ages, and in the later period, influenced by humanism, we find the Christiades and Christeis. But there are also masterpieces to be included here—the old Anglo-Saxon poetry, the *Heliand*, Milton's *Paradise Lost*, and Klopstock's *Messias*. This is to take no account of the inspiration, the images, and the expressions for which the greatest poets, Walther von der Vogelweide, Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe, are indebted to the Bible. As a rule, Biblical poetry is epic, but occasionally, and especially in imitations of the Psalms, it is lyrical. The small dramatic element is specially interesting. Not the clumsy Byzantine Χριστὸς πάσχων (about 1100), which lays hands upon the verses of Euripides but despises all stage-craft and probably was never produced, not even the Biblical and legendary compositions with which the pious Hroswitha of Gandersheim († 1001) tried to suppress the comedies of Plautus among the nuns, but the ecclesiastical dramas of the end of the Middle Ages, which, with a gradually increasing and finally almost exclusive participation of the laity, brought the Bible-history to the popular eye and ear simultaneously in the most effective manner possible. Adam's fall, the stories of the patriarchs, and above all the life and bitter sufferings of Jesus, were lived over again by actors and audience, sometimes with the most emotional realism. Mediævalism was naïve enough simply to transfer the story to its own time in matters of costume and background. There was besides, however, a reciprocal action between the ecclesiastical drama and the reports which pilgrims brought about the holy places of Jerusalem.* Here, too, there was an admixture of the Apocryphal element. A complete play (four days) begins with the creation and goes on to the judgment day, following the Church practice rather than the Bible. Only a single instance, the Oberammergau Passion Play, has survived, in a greatly altered form, to our own time. Humanism and the Reformation opposed those plays equally, though from different motives, and when modern dramatic art makes an attempt to bring Biblical material upon the boards, cultivated Christian taste rightly feels it to be a profanation.

Protestantism possesses something which the more ancient period entirely lacked—the Biblical musical composition. The 'Bible sonatas' of Joh. Kuhnau († 1722) may be considered trifling, but the oratorios of Heinr. Schütz († 1672), J. Seb. Bach († 1750), and G. Fr. Handel († 1759) have attained to the most perfect artistic rendering of Biblical material. A distinction is marked by the fact that while a Palestrina felt his task to be the creation of Masses and Requiems, they devoted their attention to Cantatas (Psalms) and Oratorios. And if the Catholics Joseph Haydn († 1809) and H. von Herzogenberg († 1900) joined them, they did it under Protestant influence. When a Passion by Bach, with its moving arias between the recitatives, is compared with the mediæval Passion Play, the same difference meets us which we found in our comparison of the two coloured Bibles (see above, p. 607). In the one

* E. von Dobschutz, *Christusbilder*, 253 ff., 334*.

case, what we find is the objective presentation of history, in the other, the adoption of a subjective relation to it.

LITERATURE.—E. Hennecke, *Altchristl. Malerei und altkirchl. Lit.* 1896; L. von Sybel, *Die christl. Antike*, i. 1906; F. X. Krauss, *Gesch. der christl. Kunst*, 1896 ff.; E. Mâle, *L'Art relig. du xiiie siècle en France*, 1898; Pokrowski, *The Gospel in iconographic Monuments* (Russ.); A. Wünsche, *Schonheit der Bibel*, i. 1906, p. 330 ff.; H. Grimm, 'Raffael und das NT' in *Preuss. Jahrb.* lx. 1883; *The Gospels in Art: Life of Christ by Great Painters*, Lond. 1904; Petit de Julleville, *Les Mystères*, 1880; A. W. Ward, *Hist. of Eng. Dramatic Lit.*[2], 1899; A. Hohlfeld, 'Die Altengl. Kollektivmysterien,' *Anglia*, xi. 1889; K. Lange, *Passionspiele*, 1887; Ph. Spitta, *J. S. Bach*, 1873–80; F. Spitta, *Die Passionen von Heinr. Schutz*, 1886, and *Händel und Bach*, 1885; A. W. Pollard, *Eng. Miracle Plays*, 1904.

5. Bible and hostile influences.—The picture would be incomplete were we not to mention, along with the operations of the Bible, the counteractions which proceed from an impious spirit. We are not thinking here of the attacks upon the Bible by the heathen State under Diocletian (see above, VI. 1) or by the ecclesiastical and political hierarchy of the Middle Ages (see VI. 3), but of the opposition to the Bible which characterizes modern 'Enlightenment,' materialism, and socialism. The clever ridicule of a Voltaire, the absurd attacks of a Haeckel, and the vulgar insults of social-democratic literature, it must be said, are not really directed against the Bible as such, but against a false doctrine of the Bible. What has Balaam's ass that spake, or Joshua's sun that stood still—to mention two things most widely assailed—to do with the Sermon on the Mount or the great hymn on love (1 Co 13)? They show that the Bible is not inspired in the old mechanical sense, but that is not maintained any longer by any competent judges. They will not cause any pious reader who heeds God's voice to have any doubt in regard to the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*, which he is always tracing. For the unfortunate antithesis between the Bible and Science, ecclesiastical theology is itself most to blame, for it made the Bible something that it was never meant to be.

The chief enemy of the Bible is ignorance of it. Doubts and suspicions do not arise from Bible-reading, but they are communicated from outside to those who are not acquainted with the Bible. Of the whole book these people know only those passages which are attacked by the modern 'Enlightenment.' Consequently they hold it in contempt and even detest it as a hindrance to education and culture. Had they ever experienced any of the comfort and gladness which the pious reader can draw from its pages, they would be of a different opinion. The history of the Bible is an objective proof of its beneficent operation.

LITERATURE.—H. Köhler, *Socialist. Irrlehren von der Entstehung des Christentums*, 1899; H. Meinhof, *Bibl. Schutz- und Trutzbüchlein*, 1895.

In order to rob the Bible of its value, it has been pointed out that other religions make the same claim for their sacred books. That is true only to a limited extent. But the Bible does not need to dispute its position with the book of any other religion. 'This portion of universal literature is the most influential book that ever existed,' says Jülicher (*Introd.* p. 2); and Harnack (*Reden und Aufsatze*, ii. 168) speaks as follows: 'It is enough to reflect upon the Bible as the book of the ancient world, the book of the Middle Ages, and—though not perhaps in the market-place—the book of modern times. Where does Homer stand compared with the Bible? Where the Vedas or the Qur'ān? The Bible is inexhaustible. Each succeeding period has revealed some new aspect of it. The Doctor of Divinity is rightly called Doctor of the Sacred Scriptures. It is upon and round the Bible that all the studies of the theological faculties ultimately concentrate and group themselves. Whenever a single individual—layman or theologian—has been enabled to draw fresh and full out of the Bible and present to others what he has thus obtained, the inward life of Christendom has been raised to a higher level.'

E. VON DOBSCHÜTZ.

BIBLE CHRISTIANS.—See METHODISM.

BIBLIOLATRY.—This term usually means the excessive veneration of a book regarded as being Divinely inspired. The phenomenon is a religious one, and is found in the faiths known as 'book-religions.' It is to be noted, however, that our view of the merits of any given book-religion or sacred book will deeply affect our judgment as to the presence or absence of bibliolatry in that particular case. One who rejects the infallible authority of a certain book will see bibliolatry where another sees no more than a legitimate reverence. Hence, if we would accurately define the term, we must lay down the limits of its exact usage, seeking to determine not merely the qualities that give it a relative and variable applicability, but rather its essential characteristics. For this purpose a preliminary historical survey will be of service; after which we shall seek a more precise definition, and then proceed to a discussion of the causes and consequences of the phenomenon.

1. Historical survey.—Nearly all the higher religions are book-religions, *i.e.* their teaching is deposited in a sacred book, which ranks as a Divine revelation. These religions usually have a *clerus*, who regards himself as the official interpreter of the book, and bases his authority upon it, and whose concern it therefore is to have the book recognized as of Divine character. So true is this, indeed, that even where the book is of set purpose given to the people for their private instruction and edification, the *clerus* still remains its accredited interpreter. This is precisely what we might expect, since the homage paid to the book rests upon the authority of the community and of their representative, the *clerus*. This authority, however, commonly involves a perfectly definite doctrine as to the sacred volume—a doctrine which sets forth its unique position in the most express form. In fine, the *clerus* supports the authority of the book, and the book that of the *clerus*; and there are few exceptions to this general rule.

We must, however, bear in mind that no such sacred book is ever a complete whole from the outset, and that the several parts which go to the formation of the Canon are never appraised as absolutely Divine from the first. The truth is, indeed, that the deification of the work is always a later process, as will be shown by the following examples:—

(*a*) The *Vedas* (which, be it remembered, were not committed to writing till long after they had been collected, but were handed down orally from one generation to another by precise and highly elaborate methods) were not regarded by their writers as they are now regarded by the Brāhmans. The Vedic poets compare their work to that of the weaver or the carpenter. Their hymns are 'shapen in the heart, brought forth by the mouth,' or they are inspired by the Soma-cup. But at a later period they are looked upon as of Divine origin; the gods themselves are the authors. The poems are collected, and form a sacred code, declared to be infallible. Their authority, in the period of the Sūtras, is pitted against all gainsaying. Only the systems which recognize their authority are reckoned orthodox. The infallibility, the divinity, the eternity of the Vedas become dogmas. 'The immortal Veda embraces all created things'; so speaks the Law-book of Manu. The Brahmans base their own authority upon the eternal Veda, and such support can be dispensed with only by those who, in virtue of a direct intuition, have become one with Brahma. This development is all the more striking in view of the fact that Brahmanism looks upon no historical personality as its founder, around whom or whose apostles a sacred literature might have gathered.

(*b*) In *Buddhism* also there has grown up a sacred literature, though Buddha himself left behind him no legacy of written words. The sayings of Buddha, however, have been garnered in one division of the Tripiṭaka, though, of course, the authenticity of these cannot be vouched for in detail. But reverence

for a sacred book holds no such place in Buddhism as it does in Brāhmanism. In point of fact, it is admitted that Buddha did not reveal everything to his disciples: the Mahāyāna doctrine is said to have been taken from the breasts of the serpents which listened to his discourses; while, again, verses flash upon the minds of his disciples, notably Vangisa, by inner illumination. Hence it is maintained that that alone which is at one with reason can be the teaching of Buddha. Did Buddha himself not say that he had turned the wheel of doctrine in various ways, now rightly and now wrongly? Buddhism, in fact, lays too much stress on individual knowledge to be susceptible of a genuine bibliolatry; every man must for himself tread the path which Buddha trod. But the reverence subsequently accorded to Buddha as a deity doubtless opened the way to a species of bibliolatry, particularly when his followers became bent upon tracing back to him every detail of ordinance and doctrine; and the fact that the sacred writings of Buddhism became a nucleus for the accretion of endless commentaries shows again the importance of these writings for *clerus* and community alike.

(*c*) In *Parsiism* the law of Zarathushtra plays a great rôle. This religion, being of a more pragmatic type than the foregoing, bears a markedly authoritative character. He who would champion the cause of Ahura Mazda must stringently keep the law of Zarathushtra This quite accords with the fact that the sacred word is regarded as the soul of the holy spirit, the holy *fravashi* of Ahura Mazda; that this word expresses itself in sacred formulas, that, in particular, such a formula is found in the *Ahuna-Vairya*, a prayer corresponding to the Buddhist's *Oh mani padme oh;* that generally the ceremonies are considered as of the utmost importance; and, above all, that the sacred book, the Avesta, is still acknowledged as a Divine revelation, even by the reforming party in Parsiism, though its language is now scarcely understood. The guardians of the tradition and of the authority of the revealed word are the priests, while the dogma of the Divine character of the sacred writings vested with authority the Atharvans, or priests of the later Avesta, as being the interpreters thereof.

(*d*, *e*) The two great Semitic religions, Judaism and Muhammadanism, have developed a bibliolatry in keeping with their authoritative character. The prophets of *Judaism* regarded their utterances as Divine oracles—a view which, however, did not exclude a certain elaboration of what they had experienced in the ecstatic state. The various writings show extensive traces of redaction. The Canon was of gradual formation. A beginning was made by the people pledging themselves upon oath to the acceptance of Deuteronomy; a further step was the obligation to observe the Torah of Ezra. The lower limit for the production of canonical books was the period of Ezra, although the collection of these works was made in three stages, viz. first, the Torah, in Ezra's own day; then the Prophets, about the middle of the 3rd cent. B.C.; finally, the Hagiographa, the strictures upon which, however, had not been silenced even at the beginning of the Christian era. At length, after the doubts regarding certain antilegomena had been set at rest by the Synod of Jamnia (A.D. 90) and Rabbi 'Akiba, all the books of the Canon were recognized by the Mishna (*c.* 200 A.D.). The traditional Heb. text is the Massoretic, as it existed in the reign of Hadrian, and its vocalization represents the pronunciation current at that time, while the actual vowel signs date from cents. 7–9 A.D. The Alexandrian version of the LXX had come by the time of Christ to enjoy such a repute that the OT quotations in the NT, as well as in Josephus and Philo, are taken from it. After the destruction of Jerusalem, however, the Jews in their growing exclusiveness began to rank the LXX as no better than Aaron's golden calf, mainly because the Church appealed to it in controversies with the Synagogue. In fact, the Jewish Canon of 'Akiba stood in such favour that arguments were founded upon its letters, and the minutiæ of its text were reckoned all-important. This reverence for the text was on all-fours with the theory of inspiration of which Philo is the most outstanding representative, viz., that the OT scriptures are the immediate product of the Spirit of God. Readers will not need to be reminded that in the Christian Church, particularly in Protestant orthodoxy, the Massoretic text, embracing even the vocalization, was regarded as plenarily inspired. Nevertheless, a corrective was furnished by Philo himself in his use of the allegorical method of interpretation, by means of which he could make a patchwork of Greek and Jewish materials without the risk of infringing the Canon—a practice which also found its way into the Church (St. Paul, Origen), while, again, Protestant orthodoxy controlled its exegesis by its Confessions. The first, within the pale of Judaism, to impugn this bibliolatry was Spinoza, in his *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, but it was of course impossible that such a theory of inspiration, extending even to the OT, could be permanently maintained by Protestantism.

In *Muhammadanism* we find an analogous reverence for the Qur'ān. Again, however, this does not represent the original state of things. Muhammad, of course, as a prophet, claimed to have received revelations, which he dictated, and even subjected to later revision. But he set no great store by the form of the revelations, altering it as he thought fit, and holding that the substance should live in men's hearts. Various scattered memoranda were extant at his death. Obbai had begun to gather the fragments together during the prophet's lifetime; Zaid subsequently arranged his literary remains in a corpus which became the basis of the definitive collection made under Othman. Under Abd al-Malik the text was fixed by means of vowel signs. By this time Muhammad's widow, 'A'isha, had announced that the prophet himself, with the assistance of the archangel Gabriel, had collated the Qur'ān with the original text in heaven. The doctrinal theory regarding the book was also a gradual growth. Under the Sasanians it became a civic dogma that the Qur'ān was a thing of time, neither supreme nor final. In opposition to the Mu'tazilites, however, the Mutakallim brought the doctrine of the non-created character of the Qur'ān to the front, while Ash'ari adopted a characteristic mediating position, holding that the heavenly original was from eternity, but distinguishing from it the earthly exemplar as the work of human hands. The Arabian philosophers Avicenna and Averroes differentiate also between the religion of the people and that of the scholar, asserting that it is the task of philosophy to furnish proofs for the faith which speaks in popular metaphor, and that a distinction must be drawn between the external word, which is for the masses, and the inner interpretation, which is for learned men. The doctrine of the Mutakallim eventually prevailed, and the Qur'ān was accepted as Divinely inspired, even to letter and sound, with punctuation and vocalization to boot. One sect of Muhammadans makes tradition co-ordinate with the Qur'ān. Muhammad had explained that in matters regarding which he had given no instructions men must act according to their own judgment. But after his death the need for an authority became clamant, precepts being desired for every detail of life. Accordingly there grew up the *Sunna*, or Tradition, which is said to have embraced the biography and utterances of the prophet. It was compiled by Abu Hurayra, but was received by only one sect, the Sunnis. In any case, it is certain that there arose such a reverence for the written word, the Qur'ān, as extinguished all liberty of thought.

(*f*) Finally, bibliolatry also appears at certain stages in the development of *Christianity*. At first Christianity had no Canon of its own, but simply appropriated that of the OT, which, however, it set in a new light. There sprang up, however, a distinctively Christian literature, which presently came to be used in worship. The story of Jesus, the Gospels, and the lessons read at the Church services formed the beginnings of the Canon. The selection of approved writings, which did not exist before the middle of the 2nd cent., is traditionally said to have been made at the *sedes apostolicæ*. The criterion was that the writings should be of Apostolic authorship, and conform to the Rule of Faith. The common substratum was the Rule of Faith itself, which grew around the Baptismal Formula, and at length appeared as the Apostolicum. How vague as yet were the limits of the Canon, appears from the fact that both Origen and Eusebius still speak of Antilegomena (Rev., James, Jude, 1 Peter, 2 Peter, 2 Jn., 3 Jn.) and accept the *Shepherd* of Hermas. Only at the Council of Laodicea (A.D. 360) was it decreed that none but canonical writings should be read in churches; and Augustine, at the Councils of Carthage (A.D. 393 and 397), was the first to determine the Canon for the Western Church, taking in the OT Apocrypha and Rev., while for the Eastern Church the Canon was fixed by the Trullan Council of A.D. 692, the *Apostolic Canons* being still attached to the NT. It is thus evident that the Canon is a group of writings which was ratified by the Church, and which, moreover, still required to be expounded by tradition, even as tradition had been a factor in the process of compilation. It was the Church that invested the Canon with authority, since it was the Church that laid down the conditions of canonicity. Though inspiration and sufficiency were ascribed to the Scriptures, thus giving them pre-eminence over all other literature, as containing a Divine revelation, yet they were read with the Church's eyes, and the doctrine held regarding them was an ecclesiastical doctrine, a dogma of the Church. Whoever appealed to the authority of Holy Writ, and at the same time took a course of his own, had to avail himself of the allegorical method of interpretation and the theory of the 'manifold sense' of Scripture. But, such courses notwithstanding, the fact remains that, when controversy arose, the word was interpreted on traditional lines, *i.e.* according to the *regula fidei* and the decisions of the Councils, which were now becoming recognized as infallible—a belief necessarily engendered by the sense of incompatibility between a fixed interpretation and the doctrine of the 'manifold sense.' In reality an infallible Scripture without an infallible interpretation would have been destitute of value. Only with the rise of the Churches of the *Reformation*, however, was the doctrine of Scriptural authority pushed to its final consequences, as the Reformers, following the example of outstanding personalities who lived at the close of the Middle Ages (Wyclif, Hus), and in view of the frequent errors of the Church tradition, and of the fallibility of the Church and its representatives, believed it possible to fall back upon the authority of Scripture alone. In this course they really proceeded upon their personal experience of faith; as we know, Luther himself criticized the Canon with faith as his criterion. But the Lutheran orthodoxy recognized the Canon as something given, and appealed to Scripture as the sole *norma et judex* in all matters of belief, thus surrendering the independent testimony of a living faith and the certitude which springs therefrom. Scripture must now be the basis of religion; man must now find God in it, since the theory of direct intercourse with God has been repudiated. Scripture has become the depository of the Holy Spirit; the *vis intrinseca et efficacia verbi* is the *ultima ratio* of our belief. Whereas, on the Roman Catholic view, the Church, as being in possession of the Holy Spirit, was the trustee of infallibility, in the Reformed Churches, this prerogative is accorded to Scripture. The written word is no less than God incarnate. It is *aliquid Dei; formaliter consideratum*, its place is not among created things at all; so Hollaz: '*male creaturis accensetur.*' Thus there grew around Scripture a group of attributes designed to signify that it was its own guarantee, e.g., *sufficientia, perspicuitas, facultas semet ipsam interpretandi, efficacia.* It is the sole arbiter

in matters of faith. Philo's doctrine of inspiration is thus again to the front. Inspiration was held to be verbal. The authors of Scripture were simply the pens (*calami*) of the Holy Spirit It implied great naiveness to suppose that Scripture was self-interpreting, whereas, as a matter of fact, in this instance too it was interpreted in the sense of the Confessions.

The theory of the 'manifold sense' had now been abandoned, and the demand was all for grammatico-historical interpretation. But it is obvious that an absolutely infallible Scripture could be of no service without an infallible interpreter, which, according to the theory, should have been found in Scripture itself, but which was in fact sought in dogma. This view still survives, though only in less important communities. Those who desire to possess the Divine in a finite form, immediately present to the senses, who in their religion waive all claim to self-reliance, *i.e.* to personal experience of the indwelling Deity, will always hold with a community that proffers guarantees of salvation, in virtue either of its alleged possession of the Holy Spirit, or of its actual possession of objects which embody the Divine, such as the Host or a sacred book. When the early Protestant dogmatists took their stand upon Scripture alone, they forgot that the corpus of Scripture, the Canon, was a product of the Church, and that only an infallible interpretation of the Canon could make the infallible book infallibly intelligible. As a matter of fact, the logical outcome of the situation was the institution of a *ministerium verbi divini*, an office of the means of grace, the function of which was the proper exposition of the word—the work of the *clerus*.

The Reformed Church also maintained the view of verbal inspiration, but its pre-eminent and distinguishing feature was its doctrine of predestination. Hence the Scripture was for this Church but the infallible document from which men could ascertain the will of God, and in which the will of God was enshrined in all its purity. In this case it is the need of an authority which makes an infallible word necessary. But as the means of grace was not put in place of God, or, more generally, as the distinction between creature and Creator was still upheld, the Scripture was not deified. The Reformed Church was satisfied to see in Scripture the absolutely inerrant revelation of the Divine will, as something to be personally appropriated; but it likewise recognized that Scripture gave no information regarding the election of any particular person. Men must win the conviction of their own election from other sources; such certainty was in fact given by the Holy Spirit. But the claim for the unconditional recognition of Scripture as the expression of the Divine will was still held to be valid. The word is, so to speak, the Divine will *in persona*, in which man must acquiesce. Again, indeed, we see that the absolute infallibility and plenary inspiration of Scripture consort but ill with the principle of inner certainty. If such certainty be a fact, infallibility is superfluous. But if infallibility be necessary, then salvation is unconditionally dependent upon Scripture as the depository of the Divine will, and inner certainty is a chimera. Besides, that the community fixes the Canon is corroborated by the fact that the Reformed Confessions expressly enumerate the several books contained therein; and that scholars interpret in the sense of these Confessions is beyond the need of proof.

Bibliolatry, then, as the foregoing survey shows, is found in book-religions generally. Its essential character consists in the belief that a group of sacred writings is the plenary depository of the Divine Spirit, and that, as such, it is of eternal duration and of superhuman origin; that it transcends all created things, or that, at all events, it possesses the quality of absolute infallibility, being, in fact, the perfect channel of Divine revelation. In the eyes of those who so estimate it, such a book proscribes all criticism, and ranks as the one all-sufficient standard of appeal in questions of belief. We are thus dealing with a conception which is to be defined not quantitatively but qualitatively, *i.e.* which marks out the particular sacred book as possessing qualities absent from all other literature, namely, exclusively Divine authorship, absolute infallibility, immunity from all natural influences in its origin; and hence also its recognition as of unconditional authority, and its supremacy in comparison with all individual judgment. Absolute submission to this sacred book is the obligation of the bibliolater. Outside it there exists no final tribunal in matters of faith. It is all-sufficient, and shares in the sovereign prerogative of God.

2. Causes of bibliolatry.—We would first of all observe that bibliolatry never exists where religion has the character of spontaneity, or where the religious consciousness finds free and natural utterance. But whenever religion loses this spontaneous enthusiastic character, when the Deity is no longer supposed to manifest Himself directly, then, in place of such immediate intercourse with the Divine, there comes into operation the mediating function of the community and of its recognized sacred book. Men begin to feel the need of a guarantee of salvation, of a sacred authority, and this they find in Scripture only when they regard themselves as being, so to speak, yet in their nonage, *i.e.* at that stage of consciousness when man assumes his entire incapacity of making judgments regarding the Divine, and when the individual makes full surrender of his private judgment. The necessary condition for the acceptance of any new revelation is that it must move the souls of men. But it is only after a society has been constituted upon the basis of an accepted revelation that means are employed, in the succeeding generations, to preserve the original message. Accordingly the message is committed to writing, and in its written form is looked upon as the authentic source of the revelation. Now, the less capable people are of personally experiencing the truths thus won, the more eager are they to find guarantees thereof, and such they believe to exist in the inspiration and Divine character of the written word, and not in the actual message, which they could of course verify for themselves. In fact, even when the sacred writings contain such a maxim as 'Prove all things: hold fast that which is good' (1 Th 5^{21}), men still prefer not to 'prove,' but rather to give a blind adherence to the authority of the Divine book. But now, such a course can be justified only upon the assumption that this book is free from all human elements, and thus arises the theory of unconditional inspiration and the act of deification. Wherever we find men holding to a revelation in external and perfect form, we find also the need of infallibly preserving the revelation to all time, *i.e.* of a Scripture whose inspiration is absolute, pure, and Divine.

The origin of bibliolatry is therefore in part subjective; it presupposes the complete religious nonage of man, and his need of an absolute authority, as also his lack of such genuine religious emotion as might furnish a personal experience of the Deity. But bibliolatry has likewise an objective source, viz. the belief in an external revelation supposed to be infallibly and unchangeably embodied in Holy Writ.

This explanation, however, does not cover the whole case. Since the seal of sacredness is stamped upon the Scripture not by the individual but by the community, bibliolatry in the event leads the former to recognize his dependence upon the latter; and when the individual assumes his entire incompetence in religious things, he will pin his faith, not to his own understanding, but to that of the expert, *i.e.* the *clerus*. Thus bibliolatry brings us back to the infallibility of the Church, upon which it originally rests, since it is the Church that determines the Canon. Such has been the process in the religions of India as in Muhammadanism, in Judaism as in Christianity. And if the same cannot be said of all, as, *e.g.*, Protestantism, which puts the Bible freely into the people's hands, the exception is but apparent, particularly in professedly orthodox circles, since, for one thing, the sacred book owes its prestige to the Church, which brought its contents together; and for another, the laity are dependent upon the translator; while, finally, orthodoxy holds to the necessity of a *ministerium verbi divini*, an office of the means of grace, by which Scripture shall be interpreted in the sense of the Confessions. The moment, however, that the Bible-worshipping laity casts about for an interpretation of its own, bibliolatry begins to wane, and is seen to be a mere transition stage; the unmethodical exegesis of non-experts reveals

such diversity as convinces even the unprejudiced observer that these interpreters are the victims of a subjectivity which but ill accords with their assumption of the purely Divine nature of Scripture. It thus becomes obvious that bibliolatry either issues in the recognition of an infallible Church, which delimits and interprets the Canon, or, in other words, in the supremacy of the *clerus*, of whose authority the Scripture provides the grand support; or else it disintegrates itself by subjective exegesis, thus losing whatever significance it may have had—a result ever the more certain the more religion is required to meet the needs of the age.

Not only, however, is bibliolatry indicative of a lower stage of the religious consciousness, and in itself untenable, but the very conception of revelation which underlies it is unsound. Were the Deity revealed in a manner which excludes the co-operation of the soul, such revelation would of course be purely objective, free from every human element, especially in the case of its authoritative document being unconditionally inspired. But in religion the chief thing is ever the intercourse of man with God, and a revelation that is truly such must always be some delineation of this intercourse. The conception of the individual soul as entirely outside the current of revelation, leading, as it does, to a belief in verbal inspiration and to bibliolatry, is radically unethical.

3. Consequences of bibliolatry. — The consequence of bibliolatry is that the people upon whom it is laid as an obligation become bound hand and foot to a fixed point of view—a result specially disastrous when the sacred book not only prescribes religious or ceremonial ordinances, but also enacts laws for social and political affairs. Muhammadanism wrecks itself upon the Qur'ān. The Christianity which is tied to a stereotyped interpretation of a supposed infallible book becomes ossified; and the same may be said of a Christianity which would make the Bible the standard for life as a whole, or which in particular cases uses random passages as oracles, thus assuming the individual's incapacity for moral freedom. The existence of innumerable commentaries to the sacred books of all religions is at least partly explained by the desire to find an interpretation which shall be of service to the contemporary generation, or to harmonize the writings with some private point of view. Men have often tried the experiment of combining their recognition of the absolute authority of Scripture with the germs of spiritual freedom; by the device of virtually emancipating themselves from the burden of the book, while preserving their nominal adherence to it by exegetic methods, they have striven to satisfy the demands of progress. Such methods, of course, do scant justice to the requirements of historical veracity. Then the ossification resulting from bibliolatry is sometimes kept in abeyance by dint of associating tradition, especially a *traditio constitutiva*, with Scripture. But in truth both interpretation and tradition are mere palliatives. Only on condition that religion be a living fact, and that the personal element therein be given its full due, and not suppressed, is the escape from bibliolatry sure. For then the venerable documents become but incitations to the personal experience of religion, and are by no means to be accepted without examination. It is impossible that a genuine piety should curb the spontaneity of the individual soul; it should rather animate the same in its various manifestations. Accordingly it is the privilege of the individual to assimilate whatever in the sacred volume answers to his own experience, and at the same time to subject the documents themselves to a continuous process of criticism, in order to separate between what is merely temporary therein and their permanent eternal truth.

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A. DORNER.

BIGOTRY.—A term of disputed etymology, denoting the moral characteristic which combines strong will with narrow intelligence in its direction. It appears sometimes in that lack of moral perspective which distinguishes the stickler for trifles, exalting trivial and variable forms into equal rank with the immutable principles of moral and religious life. Sometimes a strong will may grasp tenaciously even a doctrine or line of conduct that is wrong, and then we may have the cruel intolerance of an inquisitor or of the leaders in the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. When a strong will is supported by religious enthusiasm, bigotry is well described as 'a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge' (Ro 10[2]).

J. CLARK MURRAY.

BIJĀPUR (Skr. *vijayapura*, 'city of victory'). —The capital of the District of the same name in the Bombay Presidency, lat. 16° 49′ 45″ N.; long. 75° 46′ 5″ E. The present city was founded on an ancient site which was already the site of Hindu and Jaina worship. It became the seat of the famous Adil Shāhi dynasty, the existence of which terminated on its capture by Aurangzīb in A.D. 1686. In recent years the British Government has taken steps to conserve the splendid series of buildings which were erected by this Musalmān dynasty. Among those of a religious character may be noticed the Jāmi' Masjid, or Cathedral Mosque, commenced by 'Alī Adil Shāh (A.D. 1557-1579), but never completely finished, which Fergusson calls 'one of the finest mosques in India.' Equally remarkable are the splendid tombs of 'Alī Adil Shāh, and his successors, Ibrahīm and Maḥmūd, the last remarkable for its wonderful dome, supported by a method much less clumsy than that employed in the Pantheon and in most of the domes of Europe.

LITERATURE.—**Meadows Taylor and Fergusson**, *Architecture at Bijapur* (1866); **Fergusson**, *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture* (1876), 558 ff.; *Bombay Gazetteer*, xxiii. 601 ff. For the old Hindu and Jaina remains, *IA* vii. 121 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BINDING AND LOOSING.—In Mt 16[19] and 18[18] Christ bestows the power of binding and loosing upon St. Peter and all the Apostles respectively, with the promise that what they bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and what they loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. For a right understanding of the nature of the power involved in this gift, it is necessary to consider what must have been the meaning conveyed to the minds of the Apostles, typical Jews of their time, by these words of Jesus. First, we notice that the power to bind and loose is granted in connexion with *things*, not with persons, which concurs with the common use of the terms in the Talmuds. In them the phrases are applied to such questions as the sending of letters by the

hands of a Gentile on the eve of the Sabbath (Jerus. *Shabb.* fol. 4. 1), the beginning of voyages, or the gathering of wood (Jerus. *Jom. Tobh.* fol. 61. 1). They are used, in doctrinal and judicial matters, of things allowed or not allowed in the Law; in particular, there is the recurrent formula, 'The House of Shammai binds . . . the House of Hillel looses.' Interpreting the former passage in Mt. by the normal usage of the time, we shall conclude that our Lord declared St. Peter to be a competent Rabbi, whose decisions in the matter of conduct (*halakha*) would be ratified by the Heavenly Tribunal. In the exercise of his authority, he would forbid (bind) certain things, and permit (loose) others. In view of the close connexion in Mt 16[18. 19] between the keys and the power of binding and loosing, we may note that the power of the keys (*q.v.*), equally with that of binding and loosing, belonged to the office of scribe or teacher; the scribe, when admitted to office, received 'the key of knowledge' (Lk 11[52]). Thus St. Peter was qualified to be a scribe fully instructed unto the Kingdom of Heaven, endowed with legislative power concerning things, not judicial power concerning persons. In Mt 18[18] the sense of 'bind' and 'loose' has developed in view of the context, and its positive content has become greater: the power to exclude from the society in view of a stubbornly maintained refusal to rectify an offence is involved; vv.[19. 20] as well as vv.[15-17] show that the new society is regarded as possessing powers of self-government from God, and that its decisions will be ratified by God.

Mt 16[19] and 18[18] cannot legitimately be connected with Jn 20[23] ('whose soever sins ye forgive, they are forgiven unto them; whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained'), though, as we shall see, the identification began very soon and became normal. δέειν corresponds to Heb. אָסַר and Aram. אסר; λύειν to Heb. התיר and Aram. שְׁרָא. The most that we can say is that in Mt 18[18] the context seems to show that the power of binding and loosing implies, among other things, the power of treating sin as pardonable or the reverse, with reference to admission into, or exclusion from, the community. And this conception can be obtained only from the context; it must not be read into the words, for whereas such a phrase as λύειν ἁμαρτίας might be allowed, the corresponding δέειν ἁμαρτίας would be impossible. Dalman (*Words of Jesus*, 216) partially supports the Patristic connexion of Mt 16[19] and 18[18] with Jn 20[23]. He thinks it doubtful whether Matthew understood Jesus as merely bestowing on His disciples power to give authoritative decisions in matters of conduct, and points to the exclusion from the community, which, admittedly, is involved in the context of Mt 18[18]. Therefore, with the inclusion of the conception of St. Peter as the steward of God's house on earth, who possesses the keys, and has power to open or shut, he allows that the sense of Jn 20[23] is latent in the passages of Mt., since 'exclusion from the community on account of some offence includes the "retaining" of the sins; the re-admission of the sinner includes the "remission" of his sins.' Yet, while the natural connexion in thought between the passages in Mt. and Jn. is not to be denied, we ought not to interpret the Matthæan passages by the later passage in Jn.; nor can we say that the gift of the power to open and shut, to bind and loose, was only promised in Mt 16[18. 19], and not actually conferred till Jn 20[22]—a position adopted in *The Pulpit Commentary*.

The power to remit and to retain sins is not without analogy with the power to bind and loose; but it was a distinct and additional power. The interpretation of 'bind' and 'loose' in accordance with the practice of the Rabbinic schools is the natural and obvious one. Neither Lange's objection, in his commentary on St. Matthew's Gospel, that Christ would not have spoken merely after the Rabbinic pattern, nor Dalman's inference that Mt. can hardly have understood Christ in that sense, since δέειν and λύειν do not in his Greek mean 'forbid' and 'permit,' is really a serious objection to this view. Lange does not give adequate weight to the fact that our Lord and His disciples must be interpreted as far as possible in accordance with the Jewish usages of the time, while Dalman's objection loses its force when we remember that the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus, if they can be obtained, are of more importance for the interpreter than the Greek translation given in Mt. It is agreed that the Aramaic words used by Jesus were the same as those so constantly found in the Talmuds in the sense indicated above. Moreover, there is no need to suppose that Mt. found in the passage some force other than 'forbid,' 'permit'; he used δέειν and λύειν as being the nearest Greek equivalents in literal meaning to אסר and שְׁרָא.

We may regard as instances of loosing and binding in the Apostolic Church, the action of St. Peter in having intercourse with Gentiles (Ac 10), and the letter of the Church of Jerusalem with reference to abstention from things offered to idols, blood, and fornication (15[29]). The same assembly refused to bind distinctively Jewish customs upon Gentile Christians. St. Paul's action with regard to the incestuous person (1 Co 5), which was ratified by the community, and led to the excommunication of the offender, at least for a time, may also, in view of Mt 18[15-18], be regarded as a case of binding.

An account of the various ways in which discipline has been exercised in the Christian Church, based largely on the two passages in Mt., would hardly be in place in the present article; but it is possible to gather from the Fathers considerable information as to the influence of these texts, and the manner in which they were utilized in the interests of disciplinary authority. In the *Clementine Homilies, ad Jac.* ii., St. Peter is represented as communicating to Clement the power of binding and loosing, 'so that with respect to everything which he shall ordain in the earth, it shall be decreed in the heavens. For he shall bind what ought to be bound, and loose what ought to be loosed, as knowing the rule of the Church.' The natural, Rabbinic meaning of the words is clearly kept here, though the sentences which immediately follow seem to point to a power extended over persons as well as things. Tertullian deals with the question in *de Pudicitia*, xxi. His strictness in his Montanist days led him to combat the notion of discipline and forgiveness generally prevalent in the Church. In the chapter referred to he distinguishes between the doctrine of the Apostles and their power, and argues that, even if they had forgiven any sin committed against God, the prerogative to pardon which, in accordance with Mk 2[7], belonged to God alone, they did so in the exercise of power, not of discipline; such power was akin to their power of performing miracles, both of healing and destruction. Tertullian demands an equal display of power before he will recognize in the Catholic clergy the power to remit sin; since the mere fact that the functions of discipline had been entrusted to them carried with it no such capacity. As to the argument that, in view of Mt 16[18] (it is interesting to note that he does not deal with Jn 20[23]), the Church has the power to bind and loose, Tertullian answers that this gift was conferred personally upon St. Peter, who made use of it by bringing men to Christian baptism, and so into the Kingdom, 'in which are loosed the sins beforetime bound, and those which have not been loosed are bound in accordance with true salvation.' The same power was exhibited in the death of Ananias and the healing of the impotent man, while both operations were seen in St. Peter's speech, recorded in Ac 15, when certain parts of the law were loosed and others bound. Tertullian does not give any proper weight to the fact that the letter of the Jerusalem assembly was the work of the whole local Church, and not the mere outcome of a number of individual opinions, of which St. Peter's was the first. In any case,

if we accept Tertullian's distinction between the doctrine (*i.e.* discipline) of the Apostles and their power, it can hardly be denied that the 'binding and loosing' letter falls under the former head. But Tertullian's chief anxiety in his discussion is to show that nowhere has authority to *remit sins against God*—the only point round which controversy could rage—been granted to the Apostles, much less to the Church.

Questions with regard to binding and loosing naturally arose in connexion with the controversies in which Cyprian was involved, on the one hand with the Novatians concerning the lapsed, on the other with Stephen in the matter of the re-baptism of heretics. While he urged with ever-increasing force against the Novatians that the power of loosing from even the gravest sins existed in the Church, Cyprian maintained against Stephen that outside the Church there was no one to bind and loose, to baptize and give remission of sins (*Ep.* 73. 7, *ad Jub.*). In the same letter he shows that he completely identifies the power given to St. Peter in Mt 16 with the power given to all the Apostles in Jn 20. To 'loose' is for him the same as to 'remit sins'; and as in *Ep. ad Magnum* 11 he seems to make of 'baptizare et remissum peccatorum dare' one idea, it is likely that 'loosing' was in his mind specially connected with baptism. The same identification of Mt 16[19] with Jn 20[23] is seen in the letter of Firmilian to Cyprian (Migne, *PL* iii. 1201); he insists on the power of forgiveness having been given to the Apostles, from whom it descended to the bishops ordained by them, and so on in continual succession. We see from this how the use of the power to bind and loose was being regularized in the interests of Church order and a ministry that was becoming increasingly sacerdotal. Ambrose, as well as Cyprian, attacked the Novatian restrictions on the Church's power to loose. Novatian and his followers had denied that the Church could extend forgiveness to the lapsed or to those who had fallen into any of the graver sins. Ambrose (*de Pœn.* i. 2), relying on Jn 20[23], replied that the Church had power both to bind and to loose, and turned the attack upon the Novatians by arguing that, as they rejected the power of loosing, clearly they had not the power of binding.

Origen, in his treatment of Mt 16[19] (*Com. in Mt.*, tom. xii.) is more careful to insist on the spiritual character of the gift. According to his interpretation, St. Peter was entrusted with the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, to open to *those who* were loosed on earth, that they might be loosed and free in heaven. While allowing that bishops also had the right to pronounce *things* bound on earth, which would then be bound in heaven, Origen insists on two qualifications for them, before they can exercise such power. (i.) They must possess that ἔργον in virtue of which it was said to St. Peter, 'Thou art Peter.' (ii.) Their character must be such that the Church can be built upon them: a bishop 'tied by ropes of his own sins' would bind and loose in vain. It is clear that Origen is maintaining the necessity for soundness of faith and life, if the bishop is to be able to bind and loose—a doctrine of the worthiness of the minister which not unnaturally alarmed the annotator of Jerome's exposition of the same passage (*PL* xxvi. 131). In another place, Origen shows the same tendency to urge spirituality rather than office as the essential thing for one seeking to forgive sins. In *de Orat.* 28 he says that, while we can all forgive sins against ourselves, he on whom Jesus has breathed as on the Apostles, and who can be recognized as made spiritual through the gift of the Holy Spirit, forgives what God would forgive, and, on the other hand, retains sins which cannot be healed. Of other Eastern teachers we may notice Chrysostom and Cyril of Alexandria. Chrysostom (*in Mt.*, Hom. liv.), while interpreting binding and loosing as the power to retain and remit sins, which belongs to God alone, in which he agrees with Tertullian, differs from the African theologian in seeing in Christ's words a specific promise to bestow this very power on St. Peter. Cyril Alex. (*Com. in Mt.* lv.), commenting on Mt 16[19], postpones the actual delivery of the power of the keys till after the Resurrection, as recorded in Jn.; on Mt 18[18] he writes that Christ gives to those who have obtained the office of teaching the power to bind and loose, which suggests a possible appreciation of the original force of the words, and their connexion with Jewish custom.

The *Apostolic Constitutions* (ii. 11) connects binding and loosing with the bishop's authority to judge offenders, and interprets Mt 18[18] as specially addressed to the bishops. The great Fathers of the West came to connect binding and loosing more and more strictly with penance and priestly absolution. Thus Augustine (*Sermo* lxvii. 2) makes 'loose' equivalent to letting go free, and makes use of the words of Jesus to Lazarus in Jn 11[44], Λύσατε αὐτὸν καὶ ἄφετε αὐτὸν ὑπάγειν, to enforce his meaning. As Lazarus was awakened to life, and came forth at the word of Christ, so does the sinner spiritually revive when he penitently confesses his sins; but, as all had not been done for Lazarus till the disciples loosed him and let him go free, so the penitent needs the Church's absolution. Hilary interprets binding on earth as leaving entangled in the noose of sin, and loosing as receiving into the safety of pardon (*PL* xi. 1021). Jerome, commenting on Mt 18[18] (*Comment. in Ev. Mt.* iii. cap. 18), says that priests and bishops have no power to bind and loose of themselves, but can only decide who is pure and who is not, who is to be bound and who loosed, and compares Lv 14[2-4]: elsewhere (*in Ev. Mt.* iii. cap. 16) he says that the Church has judicial power to declare those freed whom God's grace has freed within; those bound who are not so loosed. Gregory the Great (Hom. 26 *in Evangelia*) says that the bishops have the power of binding and loosing, but that it is lost by those who use it for their own ends, and not for the advantage of their penitents. He also makes use of the raising of Lazarus to show that the Church has power to absolve those whose hearts God has touched and revived by His grace. Gregory warns against unjust binding; yet, at the same time, bids the penitent ever fear, lest, even if he be unjustly bound in connexion with the particular matter which he confesses, the binding may be merited, and therefore valid, owing to some other fault. Gregory connects the official sentence most closely with the sinner's inner feeling, which, in fact, the loosing and binding of the bishop regularizes. Rabanus (*Com. in Mt.* lib. v.), differentiating between the gift to St. Peter and the gift to all the Apostles, points out that, while the power of binding and loosing was given to all, as is clear from Jn 20[23], St. Peter had it conferred upon him in a special way, so that no one separated from the unity of faith and communion with him could be loosed, *i.e.* absolved. Paschasius Radbertus distinguishes between the power of binding and loosing given to St. Peter in Mt 16[19] and that given to all the Apostles in Mt 18[18]. The latter, he says, are urged to argue three times with the offender before binding him, while St. Peter has the keys of all heavens, not merely the power of binding in heaven (*Exp. in Mt.* lib. viii. cap. 16). Bernard, Abbot Fontis Calidi, interprets 1 Co 5[5] as a possible instance of binding by excommunication. In Thomas Aquinas the power of the keys and the

power of binding and loosing are identical, and he distinguishes, in binding and loosing, between the power of authority, which belongs to God alone, the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ, and the power of ministering, which belongs to the priests (*Summa Theol.* 3ª s. Qu. xvii.-xx.).

Of the Reformers, Luther makes the power to bind and loose equivalent to the power of the keys, and interprets it of absolving or retaining sins. Mt 18[18] was addressed to all Christians, and may apply to any one who confesses his sins privately before a brother. He does not distinguish the passages in Mt. from Jn 20[23]. These words are intended to call forth the faith of penitents, so that the word of the Divine promise may free them. A Christian should know that, if he believes and is absolved, he will be truly absolved in heaven. For Luther the power of the keys belongs to the Church, not to the Pope, and the Church's judgment, if the Church be truly spiritual, is God's judgment. Binding and loosing could be exercised both in preaching and in private absolution. The Church, which possesses the power, allows particular individuals to exercise it ('Babylonish Captivity of the Church,' in Luther's *Primary Works*, ed. Wace-Buchheim; also 'Of the Keys'). Melanchthon (*Loci Comm.*, 'de Confess.') interprets Mt 18[18] of the giving of the power of absolution—a power operative in dealing with the lapsed and excommunicate. Calvin distinguishes Mt 16[19] and Jn 20[23] from Mt 18[18]: the former passages have to do with the ministry of the word by preaching, the latter with the spiritual jurisdiction and discipline of the Church. Of Mt 16[18, 19] he says that the keys apply to teaching, and he compares Lk 11[52]. Loosing is directly connected with the forgiveness of sins; the doctrine of the gospel is applied to the loosing of our bonds—that being loosed on earth through man's testimony we may be loosed in heaven also; binding, on the other hand, is accidental to the gospel. In Mt 18[18] the discipline exercised by the Church is in question, and Calvin understands by the Church's sentence on the offenders, which God ratifies, the sentence presided over by Christ through His word (*Works*, 'Harmony of Matthew, Mark, and Luke,' ii. 292).

The Council of Trent (sess. 14, vi.), in opposition to the teachers of the Reformation, insisted on the application of Mt 18[18] strictly to bishops and priests, and to them alone. Bellarmine (*Disput. de cleric.* 5) argues that by the keys delivered to St. Peter the supreme power is intended, as may be seen from Mt 16[19], since in the Scriptures he is said to bind who gives orders and punishes. Cornelius a Lapide (*Commentarius*, tom. 15) goes with some fullness into the question. He argues that in Mt 16[19] 'quodcumque' (ὃ ἐὰν δήσῃς) is equivalent to 'quemcumque,' but that the neuter is used as more universal, since the Pope binds and looses sins, vows, etc., as well as men. Binding is exercised in (1) retaining sins and denying absolution, (2) enjoining penance, (3) excommunication and other censures, (4) laws and councils, (5) binding Christians to a confession of faith; while loosing is to release from these obligations. By a curious piece of exegesis he refers 'super terram' (ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς) to St. Peter, not to the thing bound.

Hooker (*Eccl. Pol.* vi. 4) discusses the question. He argues that the office of regiment over God's Church consists of functions both of doctrine and of discipline, contained in the name of the keys: there is in the Church power to excommunicate, and make sinners as heathens and publicans. God has promised to ratify what is done by His Church, first by the Apostles, then by their successors. The custom of binding by ecclesiastical censure and retaining till repentance leads to loosing has been adopted as the most expedient method for the cure of sin.

Modern commentaries on Mt., while slightly differing among themselves as to the exact force of the words, agree in dissociating the passages in Mt. from Jn 20[23]. For a point of view which denies that the power conferred has reference to any discipline in the visible Church, admission to or exclusion from the Kingdom of Heaven, or specific authority of the Apostles over the Jewish law, see Lyman Abbot's *New Testament with Notes and Comments*. He interprets the promised power as power in the spiritual life: whatever Christians permit themselves, God will permit; whatever they prohibit, God will prohibit; the passage is therefore the spiritual Magna Charta of Christ's disciples. But such an interpretation is too individualistic, and does not do justice to the historic situation, or to the obviously present idea of a community in Mt 18[17]. The idea of the power of self-government in the Church is the nearest modern parallel to the idea conveyed in Mt 16[19] and 18[18].

LITERATURE.—J. Lightfoot, *Hor. Heb. et Talmud.* (ed. Pitman, London, 1823, vol. xi. pp. 226-231); Dalman, *Worte Jesu* (Eng. tr., *Words of Jesus*, 1902, p. 213 f.); *PRE*[3], *s.v.* 'Schlüsselgewalt, 1906; *HDB*, *s.v.* 'Power of the Keys'; of modern commentaries (in addition to those cited in the article), esp. Th. Zahn (*Kom. z. NT*) and W. C. Allen (in *ICC*) on Matthew, and B Weiss (*Die vier Evangelien*, Leipzig, 1900; also in Meyer's *Kommentar*[8], 1893) on John; Ahrem, *Das Amt der Schlussel*, 1864; Steitz, 'Ueber den neutest. Begriff der Schlusselgewalt,' in *SK*, 1866, pp. 435-483; Cremer, *Lex. der neutest. Gracitat*[9], 1902, *s.v.* λύειν; and other authorities cited in the article.

J. K. MOZLEY.

BIOGENESIS.—Biogenesis is a term used to express a fact of observation in regard to the present-day beginning of living organisms, that they arise from parents approximately like themselves, and in no other way. It is perhaps possible that they may arise in some other way, *e.g.* from not-living matter, or from parents quite different from themselves—both of these hypotheses have their supporters, but as yet no exception to the fact of biogenesis has been proved. The fact is often expressed in the aphorism *omne vivum e vivo*, which in most cases may read *omne vivum ex ovo*. It is unnecessary to speak of this as 'the law of biogenesis,' for the biologist who states that he does not know of any form of life arising except from a parent form of the same kind is not thereby denying the possibility of abiogenesis in the past, the present, or the future. See ABIOGENESIS.

The term 'biogenesis' is sometimes used to mean individual development—a usage which should not be encouraged. Thus Haeckel's 'fundamental law of biogenesis' states that individual development (ontogeny) tends to recapitulate racial evolution (phylogeny). See RECAPITULATION.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

BIOLOGY (βίος, 'life'; λόγος, 'discourse') is the science of life in the widest acceptation of that term. It deals with the general conclusions relating to life that may be drawn as the result of study of the structure and activities of all living things. As such it is as intimately connected with the activities of the human organism as with those of the malarial parasite that passes a stage of its existence in man's blood; it concerns itself with every feature in the apparently passive manifestation of the oak tree's vitality, as in that of the active gall-fly, whose developing eggs stimulate the gall-formations upon its leaves. In popular thought, life displays itself in two great, apparently unrelated, fashions corresponding to the animal and vegetable kingdoms respectively—types which undoubtedly are sufficiently distinctive and apart in their most highly developed representatives, but which, as they are studied in a descending series, are found to become ever more

simple until forms are reached which, from the point of view of morphology, are practically alike in the two instances, although still differentiable physiologically; while eventually, certain forms are reached when the last *differentia* ceases to hold, and no unequivocal judgment can be passed upon their animal or vegetable nature. Yet let it not be imagined that to study life in these simpler forms does anything more than eliminate certain secondary constituent elements. 'Livingness' in itself is not more intelligible in the amœba than in the elephant.

At the same time it is convenient to think of the subject-matter of Biology as comprising, in the first instance, the two great realms of animal and vegetable life, corresponding to the sciences of Zoology and Botany. Any individual in either of these realms may be studied from the point of view of its gross build and form (Anatomy = Morphology, in the strictest sense of that term), or minute structure (Histology); from the point of view of general functional and adaptive relation to the external environment (Ecology), or particular ability to do work, associated with definite organs (Physiology proper). Morphology and Physiology suffer, however, more than any other two aspects, from separate consideration, for in life they are most intimately connected, inasmuch as form is conditioned by the function to be performed; in fact, they are the dynamical and statical aspects of one and the same thing. Further, the living organism may be studied stage by stage as a developing organism (Ontogeny), or the historical treatment may be extended to its racial ancestry (Phylogeny, expressed in some classes by Palæontology); it may be regarded in connexion with its various *habitats* on the earth's surface (Geographical Distribution), or its place in a scheme of classification (Taxonomy); investigation may further be directed into the causes that have combined to make it what we find it to be (Ætiology). Finally, in each of these subdivisions the individual may be studied in relation to other individuals more or less like it, which will give us, as in the first instance, Comparative Anatomy and Comparative Histology. Nor should it ever be forgotten in what intimate and often conditioning relation these different aspects stand to one another, so that biological interpretation is incomplete to the extent in which it fails to realize this co-ordination.

The importance of biological study, not merely as a discipline, but from the bearing of its varied subject-matter upon human life in general, can hardly be exaggerated. To recognize the truths of Biology, and appreciate them aright, is a great aid to living; the life of the spirit is grounded in them. In connexion with questions of human health and food supply, and the various other economic aspects of living forms that stand in desirable and undesirable relations to man, a knowledge of Biology should be part of the equipment of every educated man; Psychology and Sociology are torso-like studies in so far as they are not recognized as grounded on Biology. In the same way Biology rests in great measure on Physics and Chemistry, while the relations to and influence on Philosophy, Sociology, and Theology of such an integral component of biological construction as Evolution are a leading element in modern thought.

The initial question of Biology is the nature and characteristics of living matter—the determination of that wherein 'livingness' consists. Conceivably, this may be best attempted by consideration of the simplest forms of life; yet to solve the problem of their 'greatest common measure' does not necessarily mean that we have determined the unit of life. Wherein, then, does 'livingness' consist? Possibly we should instinctively reply, movement—movement, either purely locomotive, or such as is involved in the maintenance of the functions of nutrition and reproduction. Yet in the case of any seed or egg, life is somehow there, but we see no movement. We can ask about either the seed or the egg, Is it alive? or, Is it capable of living? but these are obviously two very different questions. It is known that if dry seeds be kept for a long period in hermetically sealed jars they cease to respire, failing to manifest any chemical production of CO_2, one of the great signs of life. Hence their chemical answer to the question, Are you alive? is No. But does this answer necessarily imply that they are dead? And again the answer is No; for, if released from their prison and placed in suitable conditions, they will germinate and produce new plants. 'So that a seed, in so far as it does not manifest chemical change, is not proved to be living; and, inasmuch as it germinates, is proved not to be dead' (Waller, *The Signs of Life*, p. 5). Of course, the usual escape from this dilemma is to say that the seed is in a state of latent life, during which there is a complete suspension of all the chemical changes that are characteristic of the living state. But a more correct statement is that we have no means of chemical investigation sufficiently refined to reveal to us the infinitesimal changes that are probably going on in the apparently dry and perfectly dormant seed; and it is further possible that chemical change may be completely arrested for a time (*e.g.* by low temperature) without that arrest being of necessity final and definitive. The reason for believing that infinitesimal changes, which our methods are too crude to detect, are going on in the seeds, simply is the experience in the first place that seeds that are kept for a long time do wear out, and that the percentage of seeds that germinate and grow gets smaller and smaller the longer they are kept. The deterioration is more or less rapid according to the nature of the seed and its coats, but in every known instance there is deterioration sooner or later—deterioration, *i.e.* change, chemical change. We do not know, but it is not unreasonable to suppose, that the change is of the nature of a tendency towards stability on the part of the seed molecules because of the lack of stimulation. A stage is reached when no response is offered. Similarly, in the contrary direction, the process of growth when once begun cannot be arrested; it must proceed, or the organism will disintegrate immediately. Life is a process rather than a condition. When once, as in the case of the developing egg, a certain temperature has disturbed its statically arranged molecules, proper energy must be furnished for continuing the process, or the whole structure comes tumbling down, and we say that the thing is dead.

Hence, with Waller, we ought probably to specify the character of the seed or the egg in this way: Matter—Not living—Formerly living—Capable of living again. They are physico-chemical structures whose life may begin, rather than living things themselves. Further, it has been shown that the vitality of seeds can be tested by the electromotive method (electrical changes being taken as the token of chemical changes, which are in turn a sign of life); so that in addition to the question, Are you alive? we can put the question, How much are you alive? to the seed, and learn its answer in terms of electric units. Plants are obviously not as alive as animals, and in the case of the seed, different degrees of vitality will be shown corresponding with its age. At the same time we have made little advance in our inquiry as to wherein livingness consists. For the simple truth is that we cannot tell what life is. Yet if we cannot tell what life is, we can state what living things do. It is possible to make a series of statements descriptive, if not definitive, of living things.

(1) All living things consist of a colloidal substance called **Protoplasm.** As seen in the simplest plants and animals, it is viscid and translucent,

generally colourless, immiscible in water, and yet composed of it sometimes to the extent of 90 per cent. Chemically analyzed, after treatment by re-agents, which rob it of its essential character, it is found to consist of carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, and sulphur, together with traces of various salts; but this complex of proteids ($C_{72}H_{112}N_{18}O_{22}S$ = possible minimal composition of a molecule of egg albumen) exhibits such a variety of qualities that the mere chemical synthesis of protoplasm is no longer a useful conception. Whether these proteids should be thought of as the actual constituents of protoplasm or its first decomposition products is difficult to decide.

Chief amongst these characteristic qualities is the fact of its organization. Careful examination shows that under the morphological aspect two main constituents are present, one of which, the more liquid ground-substance, is continuously distributed throughout the meshes of the more active and, at the same time, firmer spongioplasm or *reticulum*, as the second constituent is called. But it is just here that the greatest divergence of opinion occurs, possibly because each of the two views that are most in favour expresses a part of the truth. Bütschli, and with him a considerable and latterly increasing number of biologists, look upon protoplasm as essentially liquid, or rather a mixture of liquids showing a foam-like structure in which the firmer portion forms the walls of separate chambers that are filled with minute, closely crowded drops of the more fluid portion. Any reticular appearance is therefore an illusion, being simply the sectional aspect of the alveolar structure. With singular skill that investigator has succeeded in preparing artificial emulsions which show a striking resemblance to actual protoplasm. The majority of the earlier observers, together with a large modern school, hold to the view that asserts the presence of extremely delicate, though coherent, threads which extend through the more liquid ground-substance, either forming an uneven but continuous meshwork like the fibres of a sponge (Klein, van Beneden), or consisting of disconnected threads and their branches (Flemming). Now, although it is undoubtedly true that in many instances protoplasm does present a vacuolar or foam-like structure, to admit this does not necessarily commit us to Bütschli's special theory of its intimate structure. On the other hand, the fibrillar network so often and so widely demonstrated, especially during cell-division, seems to be a general, perhaps the more typical structure. Hence we come with Oscar Hertwig to the conclusion that 'the protoplasm of different organisms varies in its material, composition and structure. Apparently, however, these important differences are due to variations in molecular structure.' There is no universal mode in its structure; protoplasm is polymorphic, and it is just possible that the different types represent different phases.

In virtue of this organization, the attempt is continually made to offer a complete explanation of the living thing in terms of mechanics. The living organism is certainly more of a mechanism than of a chemical compound, and its activities will find a better explanation along these lines than in the mere consideration of its chemical nature. Doubtless the properties of the living cell may in the end be traced to chemical forces, just as in the case of the activities of the steam engine; yet no one will maintain that chemical forces explain the motion of the steam engine. The action of the living cell will be better explained in terms of its mechanism than of its chemistry, yet even here imperfectly. Superficial resemblances disclose themselves, that in their greater or less completeness simply serve to hide the critical points of difference. Thus it is obvious that in either case suitable fuel or food requires to be more or less continuously supplied, that this fuel or food is subjected to definite changes in the interior of the mechanism, in the course of which heat is evolved, and that waste products are formed. Yet the living organism is unlike a mechanism in various respects. (*a*) The organism is itself continually being changed in the course of its automatic developmental activity. The engine may be said to consume the fuel supplied to it, but it does not incorporate it with its own substance. The food, self-procured, of an organism is in a sense its fuel, but it becomes directly transformed into the machinery that is at work. (*b*) The organism has a power of self-adjustment and regulation amounting to self-preservation, which has not been added to it from the outside, nor is a necessary property of the substance of which it is composed; the activity of a machine, on the other hand, is of no use to it in the line of preserving its integrity. (*c*) The organism has a certain regenerative power; in its case that which is consumed is the actual machinery, and food repairs both the gaps left in the mechanism and any damage within definite limits, self- or otherwise inflicted. The coal supplied to an engine does nothing to repair its tear and wear, nor can the engine execute its own repairs. (*d*) A machine is constructed to execute a certain function or limited number of functions, and these it perpetually performs in the same way; the organism's range of activity is as wide and varied as its methods of operation (*e*) The organism can completely reproduce itself by means of parts thrown off from itself; there is nothing analogous to sexual reproduction in the inorganic kingdom. (*f*) The activity of a machine is usually the sum of the activities of its constituent parts, but in the case of the organism it is something more, for its living unity is not merely represented by the sum of its organs, but involves a certain subtle interplay and mutual influence of its constituent activities. In fact, the differences are so great that unless they are steadily held in view, the analogy becomes positively misleading. To attempt, then, to explain the living organism and its activities in physico-chemical terminology, is permissible as a scientific ideal. Even in that most difficult of all realms, the study of nervous process, Professor Gotch is perfectly entitled to claim that nervous activity 'does not owe its physiological mystery to a new form of energy, but to the circumstance that a mode of energy displayed in the non-living world occurs in colloidal electrolytic substances of great chemical complexity' (*Brit. Assoc. Report*, 1906, p. 716). On the other hand, to pretend that even an approximation has already been reached in general or in detail is mere myopia.

Further, protoplasm has no other mode of origin than from pre-existing protoplasm (see art. Abiogenesis).

The above discussion may be considered as having indicated the relation of life to matter. The mere fact that the first touch of the chemical re-agent in the analysis of protoplasm robs it of its distinctive character shows that life is not material; we know life only in association with matter, yet it is not matter. A cat weighs no more or no less after the loss of its proverbial nine lives than it did in life. If life were material, then *ex hypothesi* it ought to weigh more in life than in death. On the contrary, an equally false impression that dead things weigh more, instead of less, than living things is preserved in the popular expression, 'a dead weight.' Life, then, is not matter, nor is it exhausted by the concept of matter. In itself it occupies no space; it has no weight as we know gravity. It may be figured as the flow of something—a procession.

(2) All living things exhibit a directive control over energy which leads to its further availability. They are able *to transform energy* in their own interests, for their self-maintenance.

These statements deal with the relation of life to energy—in some ways the most complicated of all the problems that fall to be considered in this connexion. In comparing what we know of life with all other forms of energy, we realize in the first place that the origin of the latter is under command in a way that is not predicable of the origin of life. Numerous experiments prove the transformation of energy and the ease of this transformation; but as yet there has been no hint of the direct transformation of any known form of energy into life.

Nevertheless, living matter is able to effect such transformations; it is, in fact, the seat of continuous transformation of energy. Now, in these transformations there is nothing that goes contrary to the fundamental laws of the conservation of matter and of energy: the potential energy in any food can be calculated, and the value found unimpaired in some type of equivalent work done or heat evolved. But this does not mean that there is nothing distinctive in connexion with these

transformations. Certain physical and chemical characteristics abide with the organism in death as in life; but when the typical energy phenomena are no longer in evidence, we say that the thing is dead. Life, then, has to do with energy, but is not itself energy, not even a specific kind of energy; its characteristic is seen in the way in which that energy is directed and controlled. Every living thing is not merely a centre at which energy is being constantly transformed—a mechanical energy-transformer—a centre, further, at which the tendency to degradation of energy is resisted, but it also acts as a directive channel along which energy can flow to accomplish specific work: as long as the organism is alive it is continually disturbing the equilibrium which should otherwise arise between itself and the environment. Life is unceasing, directive, and selective * control of energy; but it is also accumulation of energy, *e.g.* in specific tissues, and a transformation of it leading to further availability. The organism up to a certain stage appears to be continually gaining energy at the expense of the environment, and in reproduction the process is perpetuated.

There are, however, other controls of energy: temperature, *e.g.*, controls its passage in the form of heat from the hotter to the colder body. But this passage involves not merely degradation in that particular form. Hibbert brings out very clearly that the difference in temperature is a determining factor, and that in any calculation of the work done it will find a place; whereas it is impossible to show that life is a factorial element in any calculation of the work done by a living organism. The nearest parallel, yet hardly a parallel, would be in the unique characteristic of reproduction, when, owing to the accumulation of energy, it may reasonably be conceived that the control or potential factor exhibits itself in the process of division. This control is superlatively seen in the development of the segmenting egg to its predestined goal in the typical adult form. Accordingly we conclude that after the methods borrowed from the analysis of inorganic nature are exhausted, there is a residuum of fact which is untouched by them, viz. the directive control and co-ordinated adaptation of every element of its activity by the organism to its own end. The biological whole is greater than the sum of its physical or chemical parts. And it is no objection to urge that we are not objectively aware of this peculiar control, for the same is true of all physical actions, as, *e.g.*, gravitational attraction. Life is known to us as control and guidance of energy, interacting with matter in ways that, if not yet wholly intelligible to us, are clearly not covered by what we know of its physico-chemical properties.

(3) All living things are characterized by *cellular structure*. Life, that is to say, so far as we know it, appears only in one form—that of the cell. The further apart living forms are from the point of view of classification, the deeper is it necessary to go to find community. In extreme cases this may be found only in their cell-structure and protoplasm; hence the fundamental importance of these aspects. Briefly, the cell-theory amounts to the statement that the bodies of every form of life, plant or animal, are composed of one or more minute structural units known as cells, out of which, in the case of higher forms, directly or indirectly, every part is built; all organisms consist of cells and of cell-products. The body is a mosaic rather than an asphalt, but the cells are in communication, unisolated by cement. From the view-point of this cell-theory, the animal kingdom (as likewise the plant kingdom) may be regarded as an ascending series, at the bottom of



FIG. 1.—General view of cells in the growing root-tip of the onion, from a longitudinal section (×300). (*a*) Non-dividing cells with chromatin-network and deeply-stained nucleoli; (*b*) nuclei preparing for division (chromatin in form of continuous thread); (*c*) dividing cells showing mitotic figures; (*e*) pair of daughter-cells shortly after division. (From Wilson's *The Cell*, by kind permission of the publishers.)

which may be put those forms that are unicellular—the Protozoa; next above them, although essentially of them, come forms that are mere balls or colonies of cells, *e.g. Volvox globator*; thereafter we reach the sponges, where tissues, *i.e.* aggregates of similar cells performing a single function in common, are, as it were, in the making; next come the simpler members of the Cœlenterata—mere two-layered sacs of cells, with hints of organs, *i.e.* higher complexes of tissues devoted to one or more specific functions—and so we arrive at those higher forms, the substance of whose skin, bone, or muscle is not homogeneous according to the naked-eye impression, but with the help of the microscope is resolved into aggregates of those countless minute units called cells. And it may be here remarked that Ontogeny discloses the remarkable fact that every one of these higher forms, in its individual life-history, passes through a broadly corresponding series, of which the first stage is likewise a single cell, the fertilized ovum. Palæontology, as interpreted by Evolution, teaches the further striking fact that what is thus true of the individual history holds likewise for the history of the race, which began in the farthest æons with the simplest forms, and progressed through ever higher forms, till it culminated, mentally and spiritually, in man.

But in addition to thus furnishing us with a valuable point of view from which to regard the organic world in relation to structure (Morphology), the cell-theory performs a similar service from the point of view of function or activity (Physiology). The cell is not merely the unit of organization; it is the unit of function. In every Protozoon the vital functions—locomotion, respiration (or whatever corresponds to it), absorption of food, digestion, excretion, which in the higher forms are distributed amongst different groups of cells or organs devoted to the discharge of these specific functions—are all performed by the single cell.

The theory that organisms are composed of cells was first suggested by the study of plant-structure. As long ago as 1665 Hook discovered 'the chambered structure of plants,' but nearly 200 years passed before anything comparable to the modern understanding of the fact was attained. By the middle of the 18th cent. Caspar Wolff and others had in a measure got on to modern lines in their study of development, endeavouring to show that the various ducts and vessels of the plant are all derived from cells; and by the beginning of last century it was already recognized that in the cell we have the structural and physiological unit of the plant. If the nature of botanical material kept the early investigators' attention fixed on the cell-wall, the softer tissues—the skeleton apart—that constitute animal substances first incited study of the nature of living

* In the sense that it selects this or that mode of attaining an end.

matter. Already in 1835 Dujardin gave the name of 'sarcode' to the substance composing the bodies of the ciliate protozoa he was examining. But it is not till we reach the names of Schleiden and Schwann (1837–1839) that we have before us the foundation upon which all the more recent work upon the cell has been built. The former first drew attention to the significance of the nucleus in the life-history of the cell; the latter, by carefully demonstrating a corresponding development from cells in the case of the tissues of the animal body, arrived at a theory of the essential correspondence in structure of both plant and animal. Much error, however, was combined with the brilliant work of these investigators. Although they partially perceived the importance of the nucleus, they still imagined that the membrane was the most essential part of the cell, and it remained for Max Schultze (1861) to dethrone the cell-membrane from the high place it had hitherto held in the biological world, by showing that certain cells were apparently on occasion able to do without it, whilst in other cases it did not exist: he also maintained the primary importance, on the other hand, of the nucleus and protoplasm. It was likewise through the labours of Schultze, Cohn, and De Bary that the identity of plant and of animal protoplasm was completely established. The word 'protoplasm' was first used in its specific sense, however, in 1846 by Hugo von Mohl, who, perhaps, first clearly recognized the importance of the formative substance of the cell.



FIG. 2.—Semi-diagrammatic representation of a cell. (*a*) Nuclear membrane; (*b*) linin reticulum, (*c*) chromatin masses contained in envelopes of linin (chromatin nucleoli); (*d*) true nucleolus; (*e*) vacuole; (*f*) plastids; (*g*) centrosomes; (*h*) archoplasm, from which attraction-sphere, astral rays etc., are developed; (*i*) food particles. (From Walker's *Essentials of Cytology*, by kind permission of the publishers.)

Next to protoplasm—the fundamental constituent of the cell—the second most important element is the nucleus: indeed, its significance is hardly less than that of protoplasm itself. The nucleus, with few exceptions, is a characteristic of every cell. Modern theories of heredity are theories of the cell-nucleus.

In any ordinary nucleus, the following structural elements may commonly be recognized:

(*a*) The nuclear membrane, which is probably a condensation of the general protoplasmic reticulum, although its existence has not been demonstrated in every case. It has a variable staining capacity.

(*b*) The nuclear reticulum, which is composed of two distinct substances—chromatin and linin. The former is the nuclear substance *par excellence*, in that it is restricted to the nucleus, and is generally seen as irregular granules and masses, deposited, as it were, on the threads of linin; sometimes the relation is of a more intimate character, and the chromatin seems embedded in the linin, giving the impression of a very intimate relation between the two substances. Some of the most recent work, in fact, suggests that the chromatin, on which hitherto such stress has been laid in connexion with theories of inheritance, is nothing more than a secretion of the linin, and that it is really with the latter that the ideas of permanence and individuality should be associated. The most striking support for this view is found in the way in which during certain critical phases of the nuclear history the chromatin decreases in amount, sometimes even to the vanishing point, and is supposed to have been employed in nourishing the cell during the stage in question. The linin likewise after treatment shows a granular structure, and seems similar in composition to the cytoplasmic reticulum. The quantity of chromatin in a cell is not constant, but in the processes connected with cell division and fertilization the granules form into little rod-like bodies known as chromosomes, which are now regarded by many as the vehicles of inheritance. The number of chromosomes is constant for each species. It is still, however, 'an open question whether the chromatin-granules of the reticulum are individually identical with those forming the chromosomes' (Wilson, *The Cell*, p. 37). At certain stages the chromosomes appear perfectly homogeneous, and the same is sometimes true of the entire nucleus.

The evidence then goes to show that in the great majority of cases the chromatin thread is built up of a series of minute, deeply-staining granules (chromomeres) that are embedded, as it were, in the linin, sometimes irregularly, sometimes with such regularity that the meshwork seems entirely composed of them, and that these aggregate to form the typical chromosomes. The splitting of the chromosome involves actual splitting of these granules. As the living cells of an organism are capable of assimilation, growth, and division, so likewise are we compelled to think of the rôle the chromatin granule plays in its relation to the chromosome. But are these chromatin granules ultimate units, and can we assign to them the value of individuals?

The problem only becomes the more arresting when we further inquire into the relation of chromatin granules to the linin network of the nucleus and cytoplasm. Recent research tends to confirm van Beneden's conclusion, reached already in 1883, that the chromatin network of the nucleus, the cytoplasmic reticulum, and even the nuclear membrane, are all alike built up out of microsomes united by connective substance, and that even the chromatic granules may be transformed into achromatic, and *vice versa*. The sole limitation appears to be the restriction of the chromatic microsomes to the nucleus, while, on the other hand, the linin network of the nucleus appears to have the same granular structure as the cytoplasmic reticulum, and the nuclear membrane appears to originate in a condensation of the same substance. Are these microsomes, then, the ultimate units of life? Yes and no! Yes, in the sense that they are the ultimate units that we know capable of growth and division in their particular environment—incapable, however, of an independent existence. No, in the double sense that we can hardly suppose that the ultimate units of living matter happen to coincide with the revelations of the most powerful microscope of the 20th cent.; and that if we insist on independent existence in an ordinary environment they fail to respond to the criterion. We must obviously, therefore, look to our terminology. Possibly in a more restricted sense some of these elements of protoplasm might be spoken of as 'living.' 'In its fullest meaning, however,' says Wilson (*op. cit.* p. 29), 'the word "living" implies the existence of a group of co-operating activities more complex than those manifested by any one substance or structural element.' Life, perhaps, should only properly be regarded as a property of the cell-system as a whole, and we do better to designate the separate elements as 'active' and 'passive' rather than as 'living' and 'lifeless.' The enucleated cell cannot reproduce: strictly, therefore, it is not living, although for a short time it may still show a characteristic of life.

The demonstration of these microsomes—intra-cellular units of a lower order—has an interesting bearing upon biological theory. Altmann's granular theory of the constitution of protoplasm, ill-founded as it apparently was in relation to his own investigations, regarded protoplasm as a colony of more elementary, extremely minute units which he called bioblasts. In a real measure, these microsomes, evidencing assimilation, growth, and division, correspond to Altmann's theoretical units, and invite consideration as more elementary individuals than the cell, standing between the latter and the ultimate molecule of living matter. Herbert Spencer's 'physiological units,' Darwin's 'gemmules,' and Weismann's 'biophors,' all hitherto hypothetical units, playing the principal part in the theories of regeneration, development, and heredity associated with these great names, would thus appear to correspond to a reality.

As to the ultimate independent unit of living matter—the smallest mass that exhibits to the biologist the phenomena of independent life—it is, perhaps, neither necessary nor possible to make any precise statement. Everything depends upon the criterion that we use. If we demand that living matter show the phenomena of independent growth and assimilation, then the unit will need to consist of protoplasm plus nuclear substance: in the absence of nuclear material all synthetic metabolism is at an end. This has been experimentally proved on a very extended scale by merotomy and numerous investigations in regeneration. On the other hand, if irritability is all that is required, then the unit might well be smaller and simpler: for that particular manifestation within a certain limit, cytoplasm alone would be sufficient. Destructive metabolism may continue without the nucleus, where constructive metabolism is at an end. That is to say, if the question is viewed in the form 'how far the divisibility of living matter can be carried without interfering with its function,' the answer, as we have seen, is not difficult to find, and can be experimentally verified, depending as it does upon the physical structure of the cell, and varying for different cells.

(*c*) The nucleoli, rounded irregular bodies composed of a proteid substance markedly different from chromatin. They are, however, very varied both in structure and character, and in some instances, at any rate, are possibly a source of chromatin supply for the nucleus. They stain deeply, giving reactions similar to those presented by the fibrillar network.

(*d*) The nuclear sap or ground substance occupying the interstices of the network, and apparently unaffected by many of the stains that act on the chromatin. It is clear and essentially liquid.

A third element of the cell is the peculiar little centrosome first definitely discovered by van Beneden in 1885, which as the special organ of cell division is often regarded as the dynamic centre of the cell. It commonly lies outside the nucleus, although close to it; sometimes, however, inside (*Ascaris univalens*). It is generally surrounded either by a radiating area of the cytoreticulum, termed the attraction-sphere or centrosphere; or by an area of protoplasm denser

than the rest of the cytoplasm (archoplasm): sometimes in the vegetative stage it lies unattended by any differentiated matter, and is then often very difficult to demonstrate. Typically the centrosome, which stains deeply, is a single organ; but, as a rule, dividing cells show a double centrosome due to anticipation of the succeeding division in which each of the daughter-cells receives one of them. The failure to substantiate its presence in the case of the cells of many of the higher plants, and the fact that in some instances at the close of cell division, or during fertilization in animals, it disappears entirely to appear again *de novo*, rather militate against the earlier view of its indispensable and dominant function, and tend to relegate it to a less important position. At the same time as an organ that assimilates, grows, divides, and is in many cases passed on from cell to cell, it also answers to the conception of an intra-cellular unit of independent existence: it is essentially a centre of determining activity, and it seems finally to disappear with the loss of the power of reproduction.

With regard to the cell-membrane, we have already seen that its importance is now perceived to be secondary. It is more characteristic of plant than of animal tissues. In the former case it has a more or less firm consistency, and is often of considerable thickness; on the other hand, many animal cells, *e.g.* rhizopods and leucocytes, are 'naked,' although even here some difference in consistency can be established between the outermost layer of the cytoplasm and that immediately beneath it. Where a definite membrane occurs, it usually arises as a secretion product, although cases are known where it seems to be a direct physical and chemical transformation of the peripheral layer of protoplasm. Cellulose is the name applied to the carbo-hydrate that forms the basis of the plant membrane ($C_6H_{10}O_5$): it is, however, impregnated with, or transformed into, other substances such as lignine, cork, etc.

Hitherto we have regarded the cell as an independent organism, as an organic unit. Actually, however, it is such only in the case of unicellular organisms and the germ-cells of multicellular forms. When we consider other cells, *e.g.* the tissue-cells of the higher creatures, we see that in point of origin and structure, *i.e.* morphologically, they are equivalent to a collection of unicellular organisms, but physiologically the tissue-cell can hardly be regarded as independent, inasmuch as its activity is part and parcel of that of the organism—'its autonomy,' to use Wilson's phrase, 'is merged in a greater or less degree into the general life of the organism' (*op. cit.* p. 58).

What, then, is this organic unity of the body, and how is it maintained? The problem is very much the problem of the cell and its enzymes repeated on a larger scale. There, as we shall see, the question is how the cell links together and co-ordinates the activities of various substances within it, each of them with its specific industry, so to speak. In the higher animals and plants the different tissues retain in varying capacities vestiges of the primitive power of altering their function: under normal conditions they behave according to their specific character. But evidently there is some restraining influence that limits and regulates the activity of any particular cell, or group of cells, in relation to the other cells of the organism. The older workers thought of the organism as a composite, a mosaic, whose life was simply the sum of the life of its independent, yet reciprocating parts. But it becomes increasingly clear that, so far as growth and development are concerned, cells can be regarded as co-operative units in a limited degree only. 'They are rather,' says Wilson, 'local centres of a formative power pervading the growing mass as a whole, and the physiological autonomy of the individual cell falls into the background' (*op. cit.* p. 59). No true conception of the life of a multi-cellular organism is gained except in so far as that life is conceived of as a whole, untrammelled by cell boundaries. Doubtless it expresses itself in many ways, particularly in the form of the cell, thereby giving to itself an apparently composite character. But in reality this mosaic-like character is due to the secondary distribution of the organism's energy among local centres of action. This does not, however, as already stated, prevent tissues from occasionally asserting their primitive independence and functioning in an unusual way under certain special conditions: such, at any rate, is one modern explanation of cancerous growth.

(4) A further characteristic of living things is *irritability*, by which is understood the capacity for response or reaction to stimulus. Life, in fact, resolves itself into the science of response,—response to various external and internal stimuli,—simple at first in the case of the lower forms, but infinitely complex, embracing in the last instance all that is implied in the word 'education' in the higher forms; the unresponsive is the dead, that peculiar condition in which the capacity for response is gone.

Now, in all applications of stimuli to living matter, what we see as a direct consequence is a series of very complex phenomena due to the fact that these stimuli have affected an exceedingly complex object in the organism upon which they act. When we analyze these phenomena of irritability, as exemplified in a Protozoon, we find a series of specific capacities for response which we may call the various tactisms. *Paramecium* is sensitive to light in that it moves towards it; it is positively phototactic. Irritability, then, usually expresses itself in some form of movement of the organic mass, which has often led to this feature being set down as a characteristic of living matter: but while every response need not necessarily be in the form of obvious movement (the energy liberated may take some other form, *e.g.* heat), on the other hand, in many cases of apparently spontaneous movement, the cause is to be found in internal changes rather than in the external environment. It is essentially a liberation of energy,—the transformation of potential into kinetic energy, and this commonly shows itself in movement.

In the case of the higher animals and plants, the distinctive elements of irritability, studied singly as tactisms in the case of unicellular forms, may function in a specific way in the parts of a multicellular organism, giving rise to those movements that are known as the various tropisms: thus a characteristic turning towards the sun gives its name to the flower heliotrope. It is found that many movements of animals and attitudes of plants depend upon mechanisms that are 'a function of the symmetrical structure and symmetrical distribution of irritability on the surface of the body of the organisms' (Loeb, *Dynamics of Living Matter*, p. 5). Now, if lines of force (*e.g.* light rays, gravitation lines, lines of diffusion) strike an organism with greater profusion on one side than on another, the tension of the contractile elements is unequal, and if the animal moves, it tends to turn in such a direction that the lines of force impinge with equal density at symmetrical points, and at the same angle on both sides, and will continue to move in that direction, or away from it, according as it is apparently attracted or repelled. Such automatic orientation is known as a tropism.

The external stimuli which act upon the world of life are manifold: but we may consider five important groups—(*a*) thermal stimuli, (*b*) light stimuli, (*c*) electrical stimuli, (*d*) gravitational stimuli, and (*e*) chemical stimuli. The reaction of an organism is, then, simply its response to the particular stimulus applied to it. The experience of everyday life is sufficient to show us that, under the same stimulus, the reaction will vary considerably with different individuals. In fact, the same stimulus may produce totally different effects on differently constituted objects: a kick elicits a different response in the case of a stone, a bulldog, and a Skye terrier; under electrical stimulation the salivary gland yields its saliva, the liver its bile. On the other hand, it does not strike one as quite so obvious at first sight that very different stimuli will but produce identical effects upon the same protoplasmic body. Apply to a muscle cell electrical, chemical, in short any possible form of stimulus; it has but one answer,—it contracts. The same holds true for many Protozoa: they have but a single characteristic response to all kinds of stimuli. We have thought of the stimulus as exciting, or even producing, an increase of the specific activity in various forms of living substance: its action may, however, also result in a diminution of that characteristic activity. Irritability is considered to be a fundamental property of living protoplasm, but it expresses itself in specific actions, according to the specific structure of the organism, under the influence of the external world.

(*a*) With regard to thermo-tactism, it may be noted that the temperature of the environment is of vital importance to every organism. There is a limit above and below which life ceases; this limit varies with the organism, and indeed with the stage of its development. The maximum temperature for plants

and animals is generally about 45° Centigrade. The minimum temperature is not so easily determined; temperatures below zero are, on the whole, less injurious than high ones. As a rule, however, the power that plants, for example, have of resistance to cold or heat is inversely proportional to the amount of water that they contain. Accordingly, we find that spores and bacilli can resist great extremes of high and of low temperature, there being instances on record in which they have not lost their power of development after exposure to −110° C., while in practical bacteriology the assumption is never made that life is destroyed in any particular instance before the germ has been subjected to a dry heat of 140° C. for at least three hours.

We may also note the exceedingly small range on the scale of temperature that is occupied by life. On the surface of the earth the extreme variations may be roughly placed within the scale of from 60° C. above, to about 60° C. below the freezing point, so that life, as existing for the most part between −15° C. and 45° C., occupies about half of the range that is due to the earth's climatic conditions. In fact, the restricted scale within which life ordinarily manifests itself corresponds roughly to the temperature scale of liquid water, which is an indispensable conjunct of life and an important constituent of protoplasm. Further, if we estimate the internal heat of the earth at 5500° C., we find that life has a place on not more than a $\frac{1}{110}$th part of the scale of terrestrial temperature.

(*b*) Light, also, acts as a stimulus to plants and animals. Some love it; others seem to hate and shun it; they are positively or negatively phototactic. As heliotropism, this tendency to turn towards the light is very marked in the stems of many plants, and in sessile and free-moving animals is most distinctive. Experiments with coloured screens have shown that in the case of plants and sessile animals 'the more refractive green, blue, and violet rays of the spectrum are more effective heliotropically than the less refractive red and yellow rays' (Loeb, *op. cit.* p. 118). That is to say, there is a sort of division of labour—the longer light waves (reds and yellows) accelerate assimilation; the shorter waves (blue and violet) hasten heliotropism. In cases of ordinary curvature, such as in a twining tendril, the explanation is found in an excess of growth on the outer side; but in heliotropism, if growth is associated, it is but accidentally, and the explanation is found rather in a certain protoplasmic *contractility* of the cells that are directly affected by the light. 'The essential feature of the heliotropic reaction consists in the fact that the light automatically puts the plant or the animal into such a position that the axis of symmetry of the body, or organ, falls into the direction of the rays of light' (*ib.* p. 124). Loeb has shown that in the case of free-moving animals the explanation may be given in identically the same terms. He has correlated the tendency of animals, particularly insects, to fly or creep towards the flame, with the heliotropic curvature of plants, maintaining 'that the essential effect of the light upon these animals might consist in a compulsory automatic turning of the head toward the source of light, corresponding to the turning of the head, or the tip, of a plant stem toward the light; and that the process of moving toward the source of light was only a secondary phenomenon' (*ib.* p. 125). That is to say, it is not curiosity, or love of light, that makes the moth fly to the candle flame, but the compelling power of the light in turning the creature's head towards it. Other animals (e.g. *Gammarus pulex*, a fresh-water crustacean, and the larvæ of the house-fly) are found to be negatively heliotropic, *i.e.* their heads bend automatically away from the source of light, while most creatures are probably not heliotropic at all. Further, in the case of some forms it is found that they are heliotropic at different periods in their life history, *e.g.* ants at the time of sexual maturity are markedly heliotropic, while the workers are not—a difference probably correlated with definite chemical changes in the creatures; in fact, by the addition of certain chemical substances to the media in which some forms were kept, Loeb found that he could make them negatively or positively heliotropic at will. Heliotropism plays a great part in determining the behaviour of animals, and there are some forms whose life at certain periods of their existence may almost be said to be a function of light.

(*c*) Light rays are, however, not the only lines of force that bring about an automatic orientation of animals. Definite responses to galvanic currents produce the phenomena of galvanotropism. When animals are exposed to a galvanic current, there may result compulsory reactions very similar to those produced by light, except that we substitute the current curves for the light rays. As the current not merely influences the superficial layers of an organism, as in the case of the light rays, but permeates the whole body, the responses in galvanotropic orientation are not so ideal as in the case of heliotropism.

(*d*) The orientation seen in plants and animals, due to gravitation, is known as geotropism. Geotropism expresses the fact that, whilst the tips of the roots of plants show a tendency to grow vertically downwards, the tip of the main stem seems constrained to grow in the opposite direction; the same holds true with limitations in the case of sessile animals, and it is probable that the attempts of free-moving creatures to keep the axis of their eyes as much as possible in the normal position when their bodies are maintained in an abnormal position is also due to the stimulus of gravitation. Although the problem is still far from solution, Loeb (*op. cit.* p. 152) considers it probable that the really geotropic reactions of higher animals are determined in certain cells of the inner ear, or in certain cells of the brain, 'through an influence upon the reaction velocity of certain chemical processes.'

(*e*) Chemotropism is the name applied to the reply made by organisms to the stimulus from particles of substances emanating from a centre of diffusion: the organism is found to bend or move itself in the direction of the lines of diffusion. The orientation is, however, rarely as perfect as in that of the other tropisms, inasmuch as the 'lines of diffusion are commonly disturbed by currents due to changes and variations in temperature' (*ib.* p. 153). Thus oxygen is known to exercise a great attractive power over freely moving cells. Experiments can be arranged by which that gas can be introduced into water crowded with unicellular organisms, when they will be seen to rush for the point from which the gas is liberated. Engelmann put small algæ into a fluid containing certain bacteria, and observed that very quickly they surrounded the weed, for the sake of the oxygen that it liberated by means of its chlorophyll. It then occurred to him that several species of bacteria might be used as a delicate test for minute quantities of oxygen.

The whole question of the chemical irritability of cells has a very human interest when we investigate it in relation to the colourless blood corpuscles known as leucocytes. The modern germ-theory as applied to most diseases holds that inflammation is set up by micro-organisms and their metabolic products (*i.e.* the products due to chemical change in the micro-organisms themselves); these various toxines are carried in the circulatory system to all parts of the body. Now Metchnikoff has shown how certain of these colourless corpuscles, by their power of absorbing the injurious elements, constitute themselves the very guardians of the organism. He has shown that, *e.g.*, the cocci of erysipelas, the spirilla of relapsing fever, and the bacilli of anthrax are eaten up, or their toxines neutralized, by the antidotes elaborated by these wandering amœboid cells, and thus rendered harmless. Hence, between these foreign micro-organisms and the leucocytes continual war is waged, and the life or death of the organism depends upon the result of the struggle. Now, if, as is practically certain, the leucocytes are initially stimulated by means of chemical substances produced by the micro-organisms, such stimulation can occur only in accordance with laws similar to those that are known to hold in the case of free cells. Recently, Wright and Douglas have shown that in the blood serum there is something that makes the bacteria more acceptable to the leucocytes: this substance they have termed generically opsonin (ὀψωνέω, 'I cater'). Its action is to sensitize the bacteria so that they more readily stimulate the leucocytes to absorb them. The opsonic value of the serum in any specific case can be heightened by the injection of suitable substances.

(5) All living things are further characterized by *continual change*, physical and chemical, of the material composing the body in every part. Certain parts are being continually used up, and fresh material is brought in and built up into its place. This ceaseless internal cycle of supply and waste, waste and supply, is designated by the term metabolism. The living organism is as a flame that, fed with oil, preserves its outward form, yet all the while the substance by which the flame is fed is being decomposed into its constituent elements and passes off transformed. Biology, apart from Morphology, knows no statics. Nutrition and digestion, respiration and circulation, secretion and excretion, are various phases of this comprehensive activity. In order to live, the cell must absorb nutrient substances which it proceeds to elaborate, retaining some portions within its body, and rejecting others. Continually, in the living cell, substances of complex molecular, and in that measure unstable, structure are being built up from substances less complex and more stable, with the absorption of energy; concurrently, other substances—food reserves, or the protoplasm itself—are being broken down in order to provide the energy required. The more intense the life, the more comprehensive are those parallel processes of construction and destruction. And yet, if parallel, they are hardly equal. In the period of youth the constructive is in excess of the destructive, and we say the organism grows.

Now, all living things grow in a sense that is not predicable of other objects to which the word may be applied. For in the saturated solution of salt or alum the crystal grows by accretion—particles are added on the outside, layer by layer; living things grow by taking up particles of matter in between already existing particles at every point—interstitial growth. Further, the crystal grows by adding to itself particles of the same matter as itself—particles that it takes up, already existing, out of the fluid around it; whereas the living thing

makes the materials of its growth, manufacturing particles like itself out of material different from itself, which it then uses for growth—by assimilation. The ciliate protozoon, *Paramecium caud.*, if kept in a hay infusion at a definite temperature, will grow and reproduce by binary fission at a definite rate. This growth and reproduction are accomplished at the expense of elements in the medium which are transformed into Paramecium; at the same time other substances appear in the medium which are the waste from the growth process. If we call these last *b*, and let *a* represent the material that goes to form new Paramecium, then $P + a = nP + b$. This growth formula may be constructively compared with that of any purely chemical equation, with the result that a striking difference is noticeable. In the case of an effective chemical reaction between different compounds, the result will be found to be of the general character $A + B = C + D$; *i.e.* different substances are found in the two terms (*e.g.* $Zn + H_2SO_4 = ZnSO_4 + H_2$). In the former equation the fact that P appears on either side constitutes a veiled expression of a characteristic of life: that it occurs in a greatly increased quantity indicates the amount of growth. As a matter of fact, however, this formula represents but half of what is actually in progress; for at the same time other processes of a contrary or destructive character are in operation, and the organism is alive only so long as they do not gain the ascendancy over the assimilative activities.

From the work of destruction, which may involve the breaking up of complex substances into simpler ones, or their combination with oxygen, various end products arise, some useful to the organism, *e.g.* bile, others not so useful, or positively harmful, as urea, carbon dioxide, and mineral salts. In the case of animals the whole of their energy is derived from waste; in plants only a small part is thus derived, the rest being obtained from sunlight. The metabolic processes that are going on in any higher organism, plant or animal, are manifold in the extreme, and even in the case of unicellular forms our understanding of them is far from complete. At the same time the unity of the entire organic kingdom is well illustrated in a restricted series of fundamental metabolic processes which are common to every living creature.

(*a*) Every plant and animal respires, *i.e.* it takes up oxygen from its environment, whereby it oxidizes the carbo-hydrates and albuminous substances of its own body, producing as final products carbon dioxide and water.

(*b*) The food materials of all living organisms, plant and animal alike, are originally prepared from the inorganic world through the instrumentality of chloroplasts. Further, while it is true that growing plants are able to live on simpler compounds than animals, yet a study of the development of the embryo in the seed (also the growing cells in a young stem or root) shows it to be without the adult capacity, and dependent on manufactured carbo-hydrates, proteids, and fats, as in the case of animals. The differences relating to the mode of supply in the case of the two kingdoms are ultimately referable to differences in the cell structure. The exaggerated development of the vegetable cell-wall prevents the ingestion of solid material.

(*c*) In both animal and vegetable kingdoms, characteristic corresponding substances make their appearance during metabolism, such as ptyalin in animals, and diastase in plants. These substances are known as ferments or enzymes, and particularly in the constructive process, as it occurs in plants and animals, they play a very important part. In many cases of breaking up of reserves, *i.e.* in destructive processes, it is also found that the cell produces an enzyme for this end. So fundamental is the action of these enzymes that there is a very true, but limited sense, in which it may be said that life is a series of fermentations. The evidence goes to show that a soluble enzyme is at the basis of every functional activity. Digestion is due in part to the action of pepsin which breaks up proteids. Respiration is achieved only through the presence of oxidase, which seizes the oxygen in the lungs, and hands it over to the red corpuscles of the blood. Under certain conditions—commonly greater condensation of the solution—the action of some enzymes is reversible, *i.e.* they can put together again what they have taken apart, and there are others that devote themselves solely to this aspect of the matter. What the enzyme is in its inner nature is still unknown. It appears to be colloidal, and, in several cases, is certainly not proteid; still, as a rule, in elementary structure it is more like a proteid than anything else. Possibly it is produced through a partial breakdown of the protoplasm. Its activity seems to be bound up with the peculiarities of its atomic structure rather than with any mysteries of ingredients, which are quite simple. The action of the enzymes appears, however, in large measure to be a hydrolysis: the substance acted upon is made to take up water and then undergo decomposition.

(*d*) As the result of these metabolic processes, corresponding products are organized in the plant and animal kingdoms, *e.g.* starch in plants and glycogen in animals, oxidases and trypsins in both.

We have spoken of the point of view that likens life to a series of fermentations. Investigation into the nature of these enzymes proceeds apace, and marvellous success has been achieved in the separation of them and the instigation of them to work apart from the living environment (*e.g.* rennet). Nevertheless it should not be forgotten that this does not in the least help our ultimate account of life, because no account of enzyme-action, however complete, gives us any clue to the characteristic achievement of the cell in co-ordinating and regulating these various activities that take place within it. Each enzyme is usually able to act in its specific way only upon one definite type of molecular arrangement; but the cell as an energy transformer is distinguished by the way in which it connects the varied complex reactions effected by these enzymes which it has itself produced. Accordingly, to consider the cell activity as simply the sum of its varied enzyme activity, is to make the same mistake as to suppose that an organism is the sum of its organs. It is to offer only a partial account of cell life. If regard were had only to the action of the enzymes, the interpretation would be purely katabolic, and there could be no account of the building up of compounds with higher chemical potential, which is so distinctive a feature of life. The study of enzymes is the study of isolated, yet highly selective, activities—each enzyme must fit its substratum like lock and key, or the reaction does not occur; but the characteristic of the living cell is seen in the connecting of one reaction with another, and in the using of the free energy of one reaction to carry on another. The cell directs and co-ordinates the enzymic activities, but in the more difficult cases of metabolic change, as in the conversion of carbo-hydrates into fats, or of CO_2 and H_2O into organic compounds, energy is taken up from other sources, and this the cell alone can do. 'This is the part taken up by the living cell, which in one oxidizing action obtains free energy, and in an accompanying reducing action stores this energy up, at least in part, in a new synthesized body at a higher potential of chemical energy than that from which it came. In this process, enzymes may freely be used by the cell, but they are co-ordinated and regulated in the process' (Moore, *Recent Advances in Physiology and Biochemistry*, p. 138). All this fundamental metabolic activity then is in some way controlled for the good of the individual, and in this directed control we have the distinctive character of life.

In metabolism there are three great stages which may each be characterized by a single word—Absorption (of new material); Transformation (in the interior of the protoplasm); leading to Retention and Excretion. Protoplasm is found capable of absorbing or excreting matter in either a gaseous, a fluid, or a solid condition.

The differences between Metazoa and Metaphyta are based on broad lines, physiological rather than morphological. From the food point of view we have seen that all the organic substance in the world is ultimately created by plants under the influence of sunlight. Animals, so far from creating, are continually destroying organic matter and resolving it again into its original components. The food of plants exists in a gaseous state in the atmosphere, or as salts in solution in water; it requires therefore no preparation, and can be directly absorbed by the surface of the roots and leaves. But the food of animals, being organic matter, is usually in a more or less solid condition, which necessitates the presence of an internal reservoir in which the food can be stored until it is reduced to a more or less liquid absorbable condition. That is to say, almost all animals require a stomach, and in the case of the Protozoa the whole creature functions as such for the time being.

Again, the food of plants is everywhere present. Every wind that blows brings food to the leaves: rain-water with salts in solution bathes the roots. Their food-taking is essentially passive. Animals have to seek their food—it does not usually come to them. Hence the nature of animal food requires that they shall have a definite mouth, a digestive tract, organs to carry the body in search of food, organs to seize it when found, and definite ex-

cretory organs to get rid of the waste. Free locomotion in the case of plants, apart from the Protophyta, is confined temporarily to the male cells, and, with the absence of movement, the function of sensation is at a minimum. Plants and animals thus differ in the nature of their food, yet both are dependent on the environment for supply, and that food, when elaborated into 'the physical basis of life' by contact with the living body, shows little chemical difference as animal or vegetable protoplasm.

(6) All living things exhibit *cyclical phases of activity* known collectively as a life history, in which they manifest various degrees of vitality, sometimes with accompanying change of form. Every living creature, unicellular and multicellular alike, passes through a regular cycle of changes mainly determined by forces within itself, to which there is nothing comparable in the inorganic realm. Reference has been made to a period of youth characterized in both cases by active cell-proliferation; the constructive (anabolic) phase of metabolism is then in excess of the destructive (katabolic), and the creature grows. This is followed by a period of adolescence, in which, although at first the two phases practically balance, yet the energy of division sooner or later diminishes, and is accompanied by certain morphological changes in the cells previous to fertilization—that process whereby the energy for division is renewed. This in turn—particularly in the case of unicellular forms, when fertilization is not effected—is succeeded by the period of old age, in which destruction slowly overtakes construction, and eventually the organism dies. The unicellular organism dies from protoplasmic senile degeneration just as surely as does the multicellular form. Now this 'capacity for death' is in a sense a distinguishing feature of living things. In a very real way, moreover, death is the servant of life, holding the balance between unlimited reproduction and limited feeding area. To it is due the circumstance that life is periodic in appearance; the recurrence of the living individual is a phenomenon unique in the realm of nature. This intermittent character of life is, however, seeming only. The death of the individual that has reproduced by means of a germ cell divided from off its body involves no break in that series of continuous cell divisions which thus extends backwards to the dawn of life.

To this cyclical movement there are apparent exceptions. Weismann long ago suggested the immortality of the protozoa, but it is incapable of verification, and experience is against it. In some cases of parthenogenesis that procedure is apparently strictly followed throughout the specific history, but again there is always, ultimately, death of the individual. In some of the higher plants and trees, construction appears to be continually in excess of destruction, and the tree may be said to grow as long as it lives: nevertheless the individual eventually dies, even although, *e.g.* by grafting, we have perpetuation of the race without fertilization.

Further, we remark that not merely during those internal changes of every part which comprise metabolism, but in those changes of the whole which are involved in the conception of its life history, the living organism maintains its individuality and its integrity. In spite of the constant metabolic change, in spite of growth and decay, the living organism possesses a more or less constant form which serves as the arena in which those changes are displayed. We are aware of the persistence of a state of dynamic equivalence between the organism and its environment which has no parallel in the inorganic realm. Continuously it is alive, and yet its material identity does not depend upon identity of matter. The matter changes, but the form remains more or less constant, the individuality usually even more so. These forms, with their similarities and dissimilarities, serve as the basis of classification; Morphology in its account of the internal structures that give rise to forms is the basis of classification. We may speak of life in general, but we never know it except as the special phenomena of a particular organism. Life clearly has unity or individuality at the core of its meaning, and in the scheme of nature, one of whose dominant features is a tendency towards ever higher individuation, the supreme example is found in man, with his characteristic awareness of individuality.

(7) All living things are *capable of reproduction.* Having a definite term of existence, they must reproduce themselves; otherwise the organic kingdom would soon pass out of existence. The individual dies—life is intermittent in form—not, however, before having, in most cases, by a kind of discontinuous growth, given rise to forms more or less like itself, which in their turn grow and reproduce their kind. No non-living thing reproduces itself in this way.

(*a*) *Cell-division.*—The simplest form of reproduction is by cell-division. The need for this arises directly out of assimilation. For the due interchanges (*e.g.* respiration) between a cell and its environment, a certain ratio is necessary between surface and bulk. But this ratio is disturbed by growth in the case of an organism that retains its shape, inasmuch as, while the bulk varies as the cube of the diameter, the surface grows but with the square. Further, as we have learned, the nucleus which is so intimately concerned with assimilation, is limited in the area of cytoplasm which it affects through the continual intercourse between the two. Accordingly the requisite surface is gained through division of the mass, and the mother cell loses her identity in that of the two daughter cells. Such reproduction accordingly takes the form of discontinuous growth. Growth, then, is primarily assimilation, secondarily cell-division—the multiplication of cells.

Since 1846 it has been clearly recognized that new plant cells arise only from previously existing cells by the division of a mother cell into two daughter cells (Biogenesis): it was not till many years later that enough was known about the genesis of cells in the animal kingdom to overthrow for ever the doctrine of spontaneous generation.

To-day, then, we maintain that the cell has no other mode of origin than by division of a pre-existing cell; and knowing something of the importance and permanence of the nucleus, we are prepared to believe that it plays a leading part in this process of multiplication by division. Fifty years ago Remak very naturally thought that division must commence in the very centre of the cell and work gradually outwards. Accordingly he pictured the process as beginning by division of the nucleolus, followed by constriction and division of the nucleus, and completed by division of the cell-body and membrane. Now, if we do not press the point about the nucleolus, this description holds good for several cases of cell-division in both animal and vegetable kingdoms. It is termed Direct Division (Amitotic Division).

Such a method of division seems very natural, and, if it were conducted with regularity, it would obviously result in a fair division of the total mass of nuclear substance. But so delicate is the balance of nature that this method is found to be in operation with comparative rarity; nay more, evidence is gradually accumulating to show that direct division, which is a division of the mass of the nuclear substance without formation of chromatic thread or chromosomes, rarely occurs in embryonic cells or such as are in the course of rapid multiplication; while, on the contrary, it is often characteristic of such cells as are on the way towards degeneration, of tumours and various other pathological formations. Direct division seems often to be associated with highly specialized cells whose nuclei are commonly of unusually large size; here it has proved again and again to be the forerunner of destruction. Germ-cells and fundamental tissues do not usually divide by amitosis, although certain exceptions only make the whole process more difficult to understand. The other method typically known as Indirect Division, or Mitosis (μιτος, 'a thread'), is complicated, and involves the arrangement of the linin and chromatin in a continuous thread, the breaking up of this thread into the characteristic number of chromosomes, their arrangement by the aid of the centrosomes on the equator of a spindle formed of linin, their exact longitudinal halving, regression towards the polar centrosomes, and re-construction as the nuclei of the daughter cells that are thus formed as the result of a division of the cytoplasm of the mother cell in the region of that same equator.

Biologists speak glibly of the separation of the chromosomes

by contraction of the spindle fibres, but it is certain that other factors, *e.g.* chemical and physical changes going on in the centrosphere and nucleus, must be taken into account before any satisfactory explanation of these marvellous phenomena is attempted. Possibly the persistent centrosome is the vehicle of ferments, which in their activity produce the characteristic cell-division phenomena. Further, it is possible that, while only the outer fibres attached to the chromosomes contract, the central fibres of the spindle actually elongate, and push the spindle poles apart: certainly the chromosomes themselves play a passive rôle at this particular stage. Boveri regards the splitting of the chromosomes 'as an independent vital manifestation, an act of reproduction' on their part. The splitting of the chromosomes is now known to involve the splitting of the actual chromatin granules, which possibly alone have the value of individuals (inasmuch as in the case of the Protozoa chromosomes are in many instances not formed), and which are found in the fashion of granules firstly to allow of their uniform growth, and secondly to admit of their precisely equal quantitative and qualitative division; for it is the end of mitosis to divide every particle of the chromatin of the mother cell equally between the daughter nuclei. Further, this splitting seems in some cases to take place independently of the centrosome, making the relation between the two more doubtful than was formerly supposed.

(*b*) *Fertilization.*—Cell division, however, is only one aspect of reproduction. With the possible exception of a few extremely low organisms, there comes a time in the life history of all unicellular forms when, after a greater or less number of ordinary divisions, it appears as if the cells were becoming worn out, were gradually shrinking in size after every such division, and showing signs of nuclear degeneration, so that a prospect of final extinction looms in the future, unless they are able to fuse together in pairs with cells of different origin, thus producing an elementary organism that becomes the starting-point for a new series of multiplications by division. Accordingly, amongst the Protozoa, the life history resolves itself into a cycle, the starting-point being furnished by any two cells which, after fusion, either separate and divide, or commence to divide as a single organism when fused, and continue so to multiply a-sexually, sometimes to the number of thousands, till what has been described as senile degeneration sets in. At this stage union of these cells with others of different origin is absolutely necessary for the perpetuation of the species. This process of cell union, of which, in those instances where the organisms latterly separate, the fundamental characteristic is a reciprocal exchange and fusion of nuclear substance —an exchange of experiences—between the uniting or conjugating elements, illustrates the simplest type of that second aspect of cell reproduction which we know as fertilization.

The number of divisions that may occur before the a-sexual cycle of reproduction closes, varies considerably with different species. Maupas in certain classical studies (*Archives de Zoologie expérimentale*, 2nd series, tome vi. pp. 165–273; *Recherches expérimentales sur la Multiplication des Infusoires ciliés*, tome vii. pp. 149–517; *Le Rajeunissement karyogamique chez les Ciliés*) shows that in the case of *Stylonichia pust.* the ability to conjugate is reached after 128–130 fissions, that at the 175th degeneration sets in if conjugation has not been effected, and that the creature dies by the 316th fission. In the case of *Paramecium caudatum*, maturity is often reached much sooner, and degeneration commences after 170 divisions. Maupas' statements have been subjected to re-examination by experiment and careful criticism, most particularly by G. Calkins, who succeeded in keeping cultures of Paramecium for 742 generations, by feeding the infusorians with various kinds of stimulating food (brain extract, beef, pancreas), and thus tiding them over three depression periods corresponding to the need for conjugation, and so prolonging their life without that process. Any argument, however, for the immortality of the Protozoa based on such artificial experimentation cannot be said to rest on a very secure basis.

In the higher forms of life, instances of parthenogenesis apart, we have a similar process—a fusion of cells of different origin; here, however, the fusing cells never separate, so that the element of exchange drops quite out of sight. The essential feature of fertilization is the union of a nucleus of paternal origin, with a nucleus of maternal origin, to form the primary nucleus of the next generation. In multicellular organisms the cells which result from the division of the fertilized egg remain associated together, thus forming a complex colony of cells, an organic individual, however, of a higher order than the *Volvox* community. In a sense this multicellular organism is morphologically comparable with the sum of the cells produced by a-sexual division from two unicellular ex-conjugates. The cycle closes in the higher forms when the sexual cells have become mature, and separate from the parent to unite in the process of fertilization, which forms the starting-point for the new generation of dividing cells. All this, of course, is a very complicated process in the case of the vertebrates and invertebrates, but in the lower multicellular Algæ it is simple enough. The capacity which every cell, *e.g.* of *Pandorina*, exhibits of helping to reproduce the whole multicellular organism is not seen when the organism is somewhat more highly developed. For in that case the cells of the body sooner or later become differentiated into two great classes, the members of which Weismann has termed somatic and germ cells respectively. The former are of prime importance for the individual life, being differentiated into those various tissues which collectively form the 'body.' The germ cells, on the other hand, are of less significance for the individual life, but in eventually giving rise to new creatures are intimately concerned with the interests of the species. This differentiation is already noticeable so far down in the animal scale as *Volvox globator*. Amongst the very numerous cells that constitute this colonial form some remain vegetative and others are transformed into reproductive cells. The eggs are large, and are fertilized by minute biflagellate male spores which are produced in dozens by the division of a mother sperm-cell. Indeed, we may consider that in the plant world egg- and sperm-cells are derived from reproductive cells which initially are similar in size, appearance, and origin, but have become differentiated through developing in different directions. The evolution can particularly well be traced in the group of the Algæ. At the same time it is right to bear in mind that the distinction, even in the case of the higher animals, is only relative, since both sets of cells ultimately have a common origin in the parent germ-cell.

Associated with fertilization in some of these higher forms is at least one interesting phenomenon complicating the life history. We have seen, *e.g.* in the case of *Paramecium*, that between two acts of conjugation a great deal occurs in the way and as the result of cell division. Now, there is an analogous state of affairs amongst higher forms. Sometimes the individual proceeding from the fertilized egg is unable itself to form reproductive cells. It can multiply only by means of buds, spores, or parthenogenetic eggs. These, or their a-sexually produced descendants, become sexually mature and produce eggs and sperms. Such a cycle is known as an alternation of generations. It occurs in the life history of some worms, as also particularly in the case of some members of the Cœlenterata.

There is, then, a stage in the development of every multicellular organism at which the progenitors of the germ-cells are apparently alike in the two sexes, and for that matter indistinguishable from the surrounding somatic cells. Then in the course of development follows their differentiation from these somatic cells, and eventually a divergence in themselves corresponding to the different functions that they will have to perform later. The female germ-cell, ovum, or egg supplies most of the substance for the body of the embryo, and stores the food whereby it is nourished. Accordingly not only is it large, but its cytoplasm is laden with yolk or food-matter, and it is usually

surrounded by one or more membranes for the protection of the developing individual. All its activities are, therefore, anabolic or constructive on the whole; for the early life of the egg consists in the accumulation of cytoplasm and the storage of potential energy. On the other hand, the metabolism of the male germ-cell or spermatozoon is destructive or katabolic. To the mass of the embryo it contributes merely a nucleus, centrosome, and a minimum of cytoplasm. Its early life is not spent in the accumulation of food material; it has about it no more protoplasm than is sufficient to form the typically single flagellum by whose active, rapid movements it seeks the ovum. Hence in their final mature state the ovum and spermatozoon have no external similarity. What we find is a physiological division of labour between the cells which are to join in the act of fertilization, in virtue of which one of them becomes active and a fertilizer, while the other remains passive and capable of being fertilized. In fact, we are forced to the conclusion that all the arrangements and adaptations connected with sex have the same two-fold object, namely, to facilitate the meeting of the sexual cells and to arrange for the nourishment and protection of the egg. The organization that effects the one part of the scheme we call male; the organization that carries out the other we term female. These relationships are secondary and have nothing whatever to do with the process of fertilization itself, which consists of the union of two equivalent and apparently similar nuclear substances derived from different cells. This means, in its turn, that the original morphological equivalence of the germ-cells (seen, *e.g.*, in the Protozoa) is lost; what is left is an equivalence of nuclei. Hence the essential fact of fertilization and sexual reproduction comes to be a union of equivalent nuclei; and to this all other processes are tributary. Although the cell character of the ovum was perhaps recognized by Schwann, yet it is not so many years ago (*c.* 1878) since the fact that the spermatozoon is likewise a cell was universally admitted.

With regard to the growth and origin of the germ-cells, it may be stated that both ova and spermatozoa take their rise from primordial germ-cells which are at first identical in appearance in the two sexes. These identical primordial germ-cells in turn arise in the case of sponges, in a jelly-like mesoglœa that separates ectoderm and endoderm. In the Cœlenterata they arise in a germinal epithelium which may be either ecto-dermal or endodermal, but in the higher groups is mesodermal. What exactly determines the subsequent differentiation is not yet clearly made out. External conditions play an important, a determining part in some instances. Yung, experimenting upon tadpoles, found that by increasing the richness of the nutrition in which he kept the early undifferentiated (?) forms, he could raise the percentage of females. Maupas seemed to show with regard to rotifers that a high temperature results in the production of males. A truer reading of the facts shows that the higher temperature induced greater activity, resulting in a speedier exhaustion of the food, and, in consequence, a tendency to the production of males. It is doubtful, however, how far these experiments correspond to real facts. The decisive factor in the determination of sex is still unknown: indeed, there is evidence to show that it probably is determined previous to fertilization, which simply in that case provides the egg with the necessary stimulus to development.

The prior history of these primordial germ-cells has been very carefully investigated by different workers (Hertwig, Hacker, Boveri). They have been tracked very far back in the developing egg, and identified at their earliest appearance. In the case of the roundworm *Ascaris*, Boveri already recognizes the progenitor of the germ-cells at the two-cell stage. Further, it has been shown that this progenitor of the germ-cells differs from the somatic cells, not only in its greater size and richness in chromatin of the nucleus, but also in the manner of the subsequent distribution of this chromatin. It has been observed that only the germ-cells proper receive the sum-total of the egg-chromatin handed down from the parent, since the germ-cells in the early (5 or 6) divisions cast out a portion of that substance in the case of one of the daughter cells into the surrounding cytoplasm, where it degenerates, so forming somatic cells with less chromatin.

Fertilization we can now state to be a process by which the energy lost in a continuous cycle of divisions is restored by the admixture of living matter from another cell. It consequently entails



FIG. 8.—Fertilized ovum of Ascaris; male and female germ-nuclei, with chromatin at continuous thread stage; the centrosomes are separating. To the right are the extruded polar bodies. (From Walker's *Essentials of Cytology*, by kind permission of the publishers.)

the blending of two independent lines of descent. But when we ask—What then is the *ultimate* end of fertilization? an answer cannot be given with certainty. The mere asking of the question involves that introduction of teleological considerations which is the bane of Science, according to some of her foremost exponents; yet every one has attempted his rationale of the phenomenon.

Fertilization may be, as Maupas and others believe, rejuvenescence of the conjugating individuals: in the case of the Protozoa it certainly has this effect, for it is always the commencement of a new series of divisions—in fact, strictly it means the formation of a new individual in protozoon and metazoon alike. Further, the usual assumption in the case of *Paramecium* has been that the two ex-conjugates were equally stimulated to divide; but the more recent work of Calkins shows that in the majority of cases, 'while one individual of the original pair is markedly vigorous after conjugation, the other one either forms a weak strain or dies off at an early period' (*Biol. Bull.* vol. xi. p. 242). Now, if this is the case, it suggests in these apparently isogamous conjugants a hint of that differentiation that results in a spermatozoon losing its identity in the egg which it has fertilized. Nevertheless, experiments have shown that Ciliata can be induced to continue dividing long after the usual term has passed, and parthenogenetic eggs develop without the stimulus of fertilization. Weismann sees in it a means of mixing germ-plasms whereby variations are produced and multiplied; these variations are the material upon which natural selection is supposed to work in the production of new species. This, then, is the purpose of fertilization for him. But considerable variation has been shown to exist in the case of forms reproducing by binary fission and by parthenogenesis, contrary to the older view, which considered the forms so resulting to be mere duplicates. Consequently it is not permissible for him to say more than that fertilization is a source of variation, or is accompanied by it. But it is also possible to regard fertilization, with Darwin, Spencer, Hatschek, and others, as a means of checking variations, and so, on the contrary, of keeping the species true to the specific type. The offspring of sexual reproduction, instead of being more variable than either parent, is, so to speak, half-way between them, and so departs less widely from the mean than either of them. Which of these statements represents the truest and most complete interpretation of fertilization it is not yet possible to decide. No one of them can well be applied universally in face of the groups that show no such gametic unions, and those numerous cases in which the uniting cells are very closely related.

Previous to fertilization, a ripening process takes place in both ovum and spermatozoon, which is usually termed maturation. With this phenomenon is intimately connected a reduction in the number of the chromosomes to one-half the number characteristic of the species; in this way a progressive summation of the chromosomes throughout succeeding generations is prevented. The procedure is very complicated, and still imperfectly understood; but it is probable that, previous to the penultimate of the two final divisions by which the definitive germ-cells are formed, the peculiar condensation of the chromatin thread (synapsis), and its appearance ultimately in a number of bodies corresponding to half the typical number of chromosomes, really represent in each case a conjugation of the paternal and maternal chromosomes which have hitherto remained distinct, followed by a division in which these double chromosomes divide longi-

tudinally, succeeded in turn by a reducing division in which they divide transversely, so bringing the number to half that which is characteristic of the species, but really also segregating the paternal and maternal chromosomes into separate cells. Accordingly, the life cycle of the organism is after this fashion—conjugation of maternal and paternal cells, somatic divisions, and conjugation of maternal and paternal chromosomes.



FIG. 4.—Later stage in fertilization (Ascaris). The membranes of the germ-nuclei have disappeared, and the two chromosomes derived from each, four in all, have become attached to the spindle fibres. (From Walker's *Essentials of Cytology*, by kind permission of the publishers.)

Boveri has summarized the process of fertilization in the following words: 'The ripe egg possesses all of the organs and qualities necessary for division excepting the centrosome, by which division is initiated. The spermatozoon, on the other hand, is provided with a centrosome, but lacks the substance in which this organ of division may exert its activity. Through the union of the two cells in fertilization, all of the essential organs necessary for division are brought together; the egg now contains a centrosome which by its own division leads the way in the embryonic development' (*Sitz.-Ber. Ges. Morph. Phys.*, Munich, iii. p. 155). If this were an exact account, we should be further warranted in saying that during segmentation the blastomeres, or earliest cells of the embyro, derive their cytoplasm from that of the egg, their centrosomes from the spermatozoon, and their nuclei, *i.e.* their chromatin, in equal amounts from both germ-cells. In general terms the statement is true, but it is doubtful whether the actual centrosome of the spermatozoon identically persists as the organ around which the dividing aster directing the division of the egg is formed, or whether it is simply a locus, *e.g.* of enzymes, under whose influence a new centrosome is formed in the egg cytoplasm. Further, it has been questioned whether the sperm centrosomes are actually identical with the segmentation centrosomes, for there are cases where the former seem to disappear for a time, although this may be due to variation in staining capacity at a critical period. Still the general fact remains, that something certainly is introduced into the egg by the middle piece of the fertilizing sperm which either is the original centrosome, or has the power to stimulate the formation of one out of the egg cytoplasm—something that can divide and produce division of the cell-mass independently even of fusion of the nuclei, something that is in some way directly connected with the corresponding apparatus of the succeeding division. What it is, however, that actually starts the segmentation cannot be definitely determined; but it need not necessarily be the spermatozoon or even its centrosome. Artificially fertilization has been induced in sea-urchin eggs by exposing them to sea water whose concentration has been increased some 50 per cent. by the addition of Na Cl; development takes place right up to the larval stage (Loeb). Nathansohn has caused the parthenogenetic development of the eggs of a fern (*Marsilia*) by simply keeping them at a sufficiently high temperature, thus suggesting that the mechanism of development is in the egg, and that all it requires is a certain stimulus to set it in motion; such a stimulus in this case is the difference in metabolic activity induced by the high temperature. Accordingly we conclude generally that while the stimulus to development is normally connected with the sperm centrosome, yet this is not the only way of supplying the conditions requisite to initiate the process. While undoubtedly in some forms (*e.g.* the sea-urchin *Toxopneustes*) a real fusion of the sperm- and egg-nuclei takes place, and out of the mixed chromatins chromosomes arise, yet in other and probably the majority of animals the two nuclei simply lie closely side by side, and in that position give rise each to its own group of chromosomes preparatory to the first division. Thus the paternal and maternal chromatin may remain distinct and separate in the later stages of development, possibly throughout life. Accordingly the possibility arises that 'every cell in the body of the child may receive from each parent not only half of its chromatin-substance, but one half of its chromosomes, as distinct and individual descendants of those of the parents' (Wilson, *op. cit.* p. 208).

Every nucleus, then, arising by the segmentation of a fertilized egg-cell contains a double set of chromosomes, nuclear substance derived from both parents. As a matter of experimental fact, however, it has been ascertained in certain instances that either set is sufficient for complete development, at least as far as the larval stages. The egg may be caused to develop without the presence of paternal chromosomes, while, conversely, development has been induced in a sperm-fertilized egg from which the maternal nucleus was removed. For these and other reasons the chromosomes are now regarded as the vehicles of inheritance.

The question of the individuality of the chromosomes has lately received very close attention. From a theoretical point of view the denial of their individuality seems to make mitosis meaningless. Why this careful and accurate division of the chromosomes, if after every such division the substances of the different chromosomes are jumbled up in a common mass at nuclear re-construction? The assumption of their stability likewise gives us the better explanation of their constant number. From the practical side Rabl, so long ago as 1885, maintained, as the result of study of mitosis in the epithelial cells in the salamander, that the chromosomes do not lose their individuality between succeeding divisions, but persist in the chromatic reticulum of the resting nucleus His idea was that the reticulum arose as the result of a transformation of the chromosomes, which gave off anastomosing branches, causing the temporary appearance of a network that was again lost as the reticulum contracted at various definite points to form the typical number of original chromosomes. Boveri, in particular, and others have further shown that, whatever be the number of chromosomes entering into the composition of a nuclear reticulum, the same number issues from it at a later stage, and in very much the same position. This is particularly striking in certain abnormal cases of fertilization, where it was noticed that the irregular number of chromosomes persisted from one cell generation to another, so suggesting that 'the number of chromosomes appearing in a nucleus during mitosis is the same as the number of chromosomes from which it was originally formed' (Walker, *The Essentials of Cytology*, p. 92) In certain species the chromosomes can be distinguished during the resting stage of the nucleus; and even if in most cases it looks as if the identity of the chromosomes was lost at this stage, yet this does not prove, of course, that it is so lost. In other species the chromosomes appear to show constant differences of size and shape, so suggesting that they may possess specific individual characters. Finally, Hacker, Herla, and Zoja have shown that, in several cases (*Ascaris*, *Cyclops*), not merely do the germ-nuclei not fuse, but they give rise to two separate yet parallel series of paternal and maternal chromosomes that remain perfectly distinct, as far, at any rate (in *Ascaris*), as the twelve-cell stage, and probably throughout life. Indeed, as the result of the later researches of Montgomery, we consider that in synapsis there is a conjugation of homologous chromosomes which are later separated in the reduction division; as a final result we have the separation of whole somatic chromosomes. Here then, in general, is an important—if it can be absolutely demonstrated—an epoch-making discovery. With Harvey's name we associate the discovery *Omne vivum e vivo*. To

Virchow we owe the induction *Omnis cellula e cellula*. Strasburger first clearly established the truth *Omnis nucleus e nucleo*. And with Boveri's name it is just possible that we shall have to establish the further truth that there are chromosome generations corresponding to cell generations, that the chromosomes of one generation arise endogenously in the chromosomes of a previous generation, that growth and reproduction, characteristic features of living things, are predicable of these intracellular units—in short, *Omne chromosoma e chromosomate*.

Boveri has further shown experimentally that qualitative physiological differences exist amongst the chromosomes; complete development is apparently possible only in presence of a particular combination of them. This suggests that some definite relation exists between individual chromosomes (or possibly the chromomeres composing them) and the development of definite characters or groups of characters. What interaction takes place during the conjugation of chromosomes we do not know. If we assume that the hereditary characters are distributed amongst different chromosomes, then their segregation is achieved at the reduction division, the results are in accordance with the Mendelian view-point (see art. HEREDITY), and the individuality of the chromosomes is fairly established. But in any case it is difficult to banish the idea of some more or less persistent morphological organization corresponding to what we at present roughly include within the conception of the chromosomes.



FIG 5.—Cleavage of the ovum of the sea-urchin Toxopneustes (×330). The successive divisions up to the 16-cell stage (*II*) occupy about two hours. *I* is a section of the embryo of three hours, consisting of approximately 128 cells surrounding a central cavity. (From Wilson's *The Cell*, by kind permission of the publishers.)

As a result of some form of stimulus consequent on fertilization, the egg commences to segment. These cleavage divisions are similar to what has been described in connexion with mitosis, except that very early they are accompanied by differentiation. Differentiation in the higher forms of life is expressed in the establishment of tissues and later of organs, in connexion with that physiological division of labour which usually means so much greater capacity for doing work. The more complex the organic structure, the more detailed is this subdivision of labour; the greater the degree of co-ordination and unification of these activities, the higher the creature stands, as a general rule, in the scale of life. How all the different stages have arisen with their genetic continuity is the story of evolution, most interesting, if most difficult, in the lower grades of life, where, however, modern study, *e.g.*, of the Protozoa, sheds floods of light upon the question. In the course of this differentiation considerable change is often noticed in the functions of organs—what at one stage played one particular rôle is found at a later stage to function in a different manner.

Again, the cleavage divisions of the developing egg are often effected in planes that show some definite relation to the structural axes of the adult body. Typically the cells tend rhythmically to divide into exactly equal parts, and any new plane of division tends to intersect the preceding one at right angles. Variations, however, occur not merely in the rhythm, but in the quantitative character of the divisions, as also in the direction of the cleavage planes; these variations are often of regular occurrence. Not merely do the cells divide in accordance with the requirements of definite mechanical conditions, but also, and more distinctively, with reference to the future cell-orientation and structure of the animal: of this forward look, as of the unequal division that sometimes sets in as early as the first segmentation, and in every case appears sooner or later, no sufficient account has been offered. In fact, as Wilson puts it (*op. cit.* p. 377), 'we cannot comprehend the forms of cleavage without reference to the end-result.' Study of all purely mechanical factors, such as pressure, form, etc., only makes it more obvious that the work is subordinated to that of some superior controlling law of growth.

How far the later structure of the developmental form is already determined in the structure of the egg is one of the root problems of Embryology. In many cases a definite relationship appears to exist between early blastomeres and the later adult areas to which they give rise; in other cases, again, it becomes evident, particularly as the result of experiment, that there can be no definite, unalterable, pre-localization of parts of the egg. In several cases the egg axis is not established until after fertilization, and is even then experimentally alterable. But no general consideration holds in any number of cases. Cell-formation and localization of areas seem, ultimately, alike subordinate to some controlling formative process that expresses itself in growth. Development takes the form of an orderly correlated progress towards a definite end. The egg in each case in a remarkably short time evolves into a type about which certain general statements can be prophetically hazarded, but of the inwardness of this process no account can yet be given. To speak of developmental capacities as being involved in the organization of the egg is, perhaps, effective, but not informing; at the most an accurate descriptive account of the stages is within our power.

The idea of pre-determination or pre-localization of embryonic parts in the fertilized (possibly even in the unfertilized) egg cytoplasm has fascinated many workers; not, of course, in the crude sense of the early evolutionists, who maintained the existence of a pre-formed though invisible embryo, or even in some cases a miniature of the adult, in the egg, but in the more general sense that definite areas, perhaps definite substances, in the apparently homogeneous cytoplasm, correspond to definite parts which will later be built up out of them. Segmentation would then simply reveal what is already pre-determined. On the other hand, the identification of the physical basis of hereditary with nuclear material shows that such cytoplasmic pre-localization—if it exists—must be determined and controlled from the nucleus; and the attempt has been made, notably by De Vries and Weismann in their respective theories, to transfer the assumed germinal localization from the cytoplasm to the nucleus. The differentiation corresponding to later embryonic regions, which is early noticeable in the cytoplasm, is induced secondarily through the influence of the ultimate nuclear units that migrate into the cytoplasm and direct its development. In Weismann's theory, development resolves itself into the gradual qualitative distribution of these units from their massed

condition in the early cells, until at last in each cell there is simply left that particular determinant which controls it. But of these qualitative divisions, save in the reduction division in maturation, there is no evidence whatever; and facts like regeneration, and the ability of a single cell of the two- or four-cell stage to reproduce the whole embryo (*Amphioxus*), although on a reduced scale, seem to negative it; while in the cases where, as in the frog, the right cell of the two-cell stage appears to contain the material for the right half of the body, that cell if isolated can yet in great measure supply the deficiency by a peculiar kind of regeneration.

If, then, there be no qualitative distribution of the chromatin (idioplasm), if, on the contrary, it be equally distributed at every cell division, how is differentiation accomplished? Driesch has suggested that the answer lies in part in the relation of a blastomere to the remainder of the embryo. 'The relative position of a blastomere in the whole determines in general what develops from it; if its position be changed, it gives rise to something different; in other words, its prospective value is a function of its position' (*Studien*, iv. 39). The suggestion bears a true relation to what does occur in many instances; but it is evident that not merely the position of a blastomere to its neighbours, but the position of its own constituents has to be considered, for Morgan has shown that even in the case of the two-cell frog the single isolated cell may give rise to a half embryo or to a whole embryo of half size, as in *Amphioxus*, according as the isolated cell is left in its normal position, or turned upside down. This seems to indicate that all the material for a complete, if half-sized, embryo exists in the single cell of the two-cell stage, and that at this stage, as in *Amphioxus*, the blastomere is not so firmly set that it can only develop into the half of the creature that normally it would. In fact, embryology discloses a whole series of forms in which this equivalence of the cells at the early stages is greater or less, some easily overcoming the tendency to develop only (as normally) into a part, others doing so with greater difficulty, and even failing, with the result that a monster (defective larva or adult) is formed. Accordingly it would seem as if primarily the egg cytoplasm is equipotential, in the sense that the various regions do not stand in any fixed relation to parts which may develop out of them, but that sooner or later differentiation of these regions, resulting in a mosaic-like development, does take place from causes that we do not understand—sooner, as in the case of the mollusc *Dentalium*, whose single cells when separated cannot completely overcome the tendency to form a part and develop into monsters resembling pieces of a single embryo (and the same result is achieved by artificially cutting off pieces of the egg); later, as in the case of *Amphioxus*, where a cell of the two-cell stage or the four-cell stage may develop into a complete dwarf adult, either half or quarter size. A suggested solution of this phenomenon consists in assuming the various protoplasmic constituents as arranged in bands or zones (cf. Wilson, *Science*, vol. xxi., No. 530). In *Amphioxus* the first division would separate these symmetrically and equally. In *Dentalium* the division may be apparently symmetrical but really qualitative, so that all of one band or zone passes into one of the cells.

Further, it is difficult to avoid believing that differentiation of a kind, slight perhaps but still effective, has not occurred much earlier, even previous to fertilization, for the egg has a developmental history previous to that experience. These axial differentiations are probably due to the nucleus, and form the scaffolding, as it were, within which the development after fertilization goes on. The ability to re-adjust displayed by the isolated blastomeres largely depends on the degree to which this scaffolding has been effectively reared.

At the same time it must not be forgotten that this ability of the cells of an embryo to reproduce the whole organism is confined merely to the earliest stages of the developing form. Cells do become differentiated, and this seems to imply nuclear differentiation of some sort, even if not after the manner of qualitative division. It is possible that part of the chromatin may be cast out of the nucleus, or dissolved, or be transformed into something else. The former circumstance has been indeed observed by Boveri in the early somatic cells of the developing *Ascaris*. Driesch's conception of the nucleus as a 'storehouse of ferments which pass out into the cytoplasm and there set up specific activities,' is at least interesting. Certain it is that 'specific protoplasmic stuffs' are distributed to the cells in a definite way during division; and since they have a definite arrangement in the egg, to this extent development is mechanical, and the cleavage mosaic is an actual mosaic. If it could be shown that initially protoplasm contains only a few of these specific stuffs, that, as development proceeds, new stuffs are progressively formed and distributed, and finally that their number decreases and that they weaken as differentiation progresses, we should have an interpretation of development that is essentially epigenetic — progressive in the sense that new additional parts not already there are formed; and in this combination of the two older and contrasted view-points of pre-formation and epigenesis the truth is probably to be found.

Finally, we are unable to forget the dominating rôle of the environment in all development; without its stimuli the inherited organization of the living creature would not work itself out. The living form is at any moment the resultant of external stimuli acting upon its inherited organization. This has been experimentally proved time and again: a normal development is the response to normal conditions. The development is thus educed, and it may be modified by the environment; but the fundamental character and cause of it lie in the inherited organization. The developing organism and its environment react the one upon the other independently; yet in virtue of its adaptiveness the organism continually sets itself free from the control of the environment and proves itself the more constant of the two. Separation of the two is practically impossible; we are almost compelled to consider the organism and its environment as a single system undergoing change.

In conclusion, we re-affirm that of that marvellous co-ordinating power which guides development rhythmically and orderly to its predestined goal we have no explanation. As Wilson puts it, 'we no more know how the organization of the germ-cell involves the properties of the adult body than we know how the properties of hydrogen and oxygen involve those of water' (*op. cit.* 433). Of the origin of that 'co-ordinated fitness, that power of active adjustment between internal and external relations,' that capacity of the idioplasm of the germ-cell to respond to the influence of the environment so as to call forth an adaptive variation, we are in complete ignorance. This directive control, as we already saw, is a distinctive characteristic of life. See also artt. DEVELOPMENT, EVOLUTION, HEREDITY.

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BIRDS.—See ANIMALS.

BIRTH.

Introduction (E. S. HARTLAND), p. 635.
Assyro-Babylonian (T. G. PINCHES), p. 643.
Celtic (L. H. GRAY), p. 645.
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Teutonic (E. MOGK), p. 662.

BIRTH (Introduction).—In the lowest stages of civilization the observances connected with pregnancy and child-birth are relatively simple, though the germs, and frequently something more than germs, are found of ceremonies which undergo elaboration as civilization advances. Such rites and observances may be considered under six heads:

1. The condition of tabu entailed by gestation and birth.
2. The dangers from evil spirits and from witchcraft.
3. The attempt to secure an easy delivery.
4. The attempt to secure good fortune for the child.

5 and 6. The admission of the child, and the re-admission of the parents, into society.

1. **The condition of tabu.**—It is rare to find an express statement like that made by an experienced missionary in reference to the Murray Islands, that 'the woman was not considered unclean after child-birth, nor was any ceremony necessary for her re-admission into society' (*JAI* xxviii. 11). On the other hand, this condition of tabu is sometimes, as among many Bantu peoples, emphasized by the separation of husband and wife at an early stage of the pregnancy. It is continued right into the higher civilizations, in which, even at the present day, it is perpetuated in various ecclesiastical and traditional observances. The husband and sometimes all the household are also affected by the condition of tabu, according to the well-known law of its contagiousness. A condition of tabu is conceived of as a material infection communicated by contact with the person or with anything used by him, or even by relations of kinship or neighbourhood. Women are, during the whole of their reproductive life, specially subject to it. From the attainment of puberty, at every recurrence of menstruation, as well as at every pregnancy and parturition, they are under its ban. It is a condition associated with the mysterious, the awful, and the relations of beings more than human with mankind. The processes of generation and reproduction, so mysterious even to us, are in lower stages of culture the object of emotions that we can hardly understand. Blood, too, is regarded with horror. The slaughter even of an enemy is enough to place a man under tabu: hence warriors returning from even a successful raid are required to be purified. But of all the blood that inspires horror, that which proceeds from the female organs of sex is the most effective, perhaps because its normal cause is unknown. A menstruating woman is set apart; her touch defiles; her ordinary ministrations to husband and household are suspended. It is therefore not wonderful that pregnancy and child-birth are conditions of tabu, and that others than the woman, especially her husband, are involved.

(*a*) *Couvade.*—It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that all the prohibitions imposed on husband and wife during pregnancy and at child-birth have reference to the considerations just mentioned. Many of them concern the welfare, present and future, of the child. Such, it is now well recognized, is the intention of the couvade. This custom, which has been in modern times the subject of innumerable jests at the expense of the savage husband, is very wide-spread. It is practised by a considerable number of peoples in the lower culture, but is not strictly a primitive rite. A fairly-developed example is given by Sir Everard im Thurn. Speaking of the native tribes of British Guiana, he says:

'Even before the child is born, the father abstains for a time from certain kinds of animal food. The woman works as usual up to a few hours before the birth of the child. At last she retires alone, or accompanied only by some other women, to the forest, where she ties up her hammock; and then the child is born. Then in a few hours—often less than a day—the woman, who, like all women living in a very unartificial condition, suffers but little, gets up and resumes her ordinary work. . . . In any case, no sooner is the child born than the father takes to his hammock, and, abstaining from every sort of work, from meat and all other food, except weak gruel of cassava meal, from smoking, from washing himself, and, above all, from touching weapons of any sort, is nursed and cared for by all the women of the place. One other regulation, mentioned by Schomburgk, is certainly quaint: the interesting father may not scratch himself with his finger-nails, but he may use for this purpose a splinter, specially provided, from the mid-rib of a cokerite palm. This continues for many days, and sometimes even weeks' (im Thurn, *Indians of Guiana*, p. 217).

The name *couvade* as applied to this custom, also known as the 'man-childbed,' is traceable to a misunderstanding of a phrase used by Rochefort, a French writer of the 17th cent., in his *Histoire Naturelle et Morale des Antilles*. But the 'man-childbed' is only one of a large number of observances by the husband intended for the protection and advantage of the child and of the child's mother. The close relationship between husband and wife engenders a mystic sympathy between them, so that the acts of the one are reflected in the physical condition and success or failure in enterprises of the other: each becomes, so long as the relationship endures, as it were an outlying portion of the other. Thus, when the great national hunt, held every year by the Santals of Rājmahāl, is organized, the master of the hunt leaves his wife at home lightly bound and facing a bowl of water in the centre of the room. She must remain exactly as her husband left her and continue to gaze into the bowl until she sees its contents turn to blood. If she move or divert her gaze before this occurrence, which, of course, always takes place, the success of the hunt will be imperilled. Once the change is accomplished, she is free to go about her ordinary avocations (Bradley-Birt, *Story of an Indian Upland*, 1905, p. 273). Among the tribes about Lake Nyasa, while a woman's husband is absent on a journey, she must not anoint her head or wash her face, she must neither bathe nor cut her hair, she may hardly wash her arms; her oil-vessel is kept full of oil hung up in the house or at her bedside. Any indiscretion may not merely mar the husband's domestic peace, but even cause his death (Macdonald, *Africana*, 1882, i. 80). Conversely, her absent husband will eat no salt, lest, if his wife misconduct herself, the salt may act as a potent poison (*Archivio*, xiii. 489). A married man of Timor-Laut may not cut his

hair, otherwise his wife will speedily die (Riedel, *Sluik- en kroesharige rassen*, p. 292).

This mystic sympathy extends to parent and child. Many peoples are still at the stage in which relationship is not reckoned between father and offspring; and it is probable that the purely matrilineal reckoning of kinship generally preceded that which recognizes the father's relationship. The custom of couvade proper does not appear to exist among purely matrilineal peoples,* for the sufficient reason that they do not recognize the tie of kinship on which it depends. As the result of inquiries by Prof. Tylor and Mr. Ling Roth, it is found in the greatest force among those peoples in which matrilineal is in process of transition to patrilineal kinship, and its frequency and elaboration diminish with the gathering strength and prevalence of paternal kinship, although, even in the higher civilizations, where kinship is reckoned through both parents, observances linger which are based upon the same idea of mystic sympathy (*JAI* xviii. 255; xxii. 204). Whether its gradual disappearance is due to this idea having fallen into the background with the advance in civilization has not finally been determined. Another cause has been suggested. Bachofen (*Mutterrecht*[2], 1897, pp. 17, 255) saw in the couvade the assertion of the father's relation to his child, the mode by which he claimed it for his stock rather than the mother's. Prof. Tylor, after hesitation, gave the great weight of his authority to this opinion, which is supported by some of the cases. But it is clear that the *quasi*-legal fiction which would be thus created must be founded on the pre-existing idea of mystic sympathy and the practices connected therewith. When patrilineal reckoning became fully established, the stage of legal fiction was past. The couvade became unnecessary as an assertion of paternity, and therefore would in time be dropped. (In addition to the works cited above, discussions on the couvade will be found in Tylor, *Early Hist. of Mankind*[3], 1878, p. 291; Hartland, *Legend of Perseus*, 1894–96, ii. 400; Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 1902, p. 416.)

(*b*) *Delivery in seclusion.*—It follows from the condition of tabu imposed on a parturient that child-birth must almost always take place in seclusion. Among many peoples, where the climate permits, the event takes place in the open air. The Herero woman in South Africa is delivered behind her mother's hut; and after the birth she is placed in a small hut, where she remains until the navel-string drops from the child (Dannert, *Zum Rechte der Herero*, Berlin, 1906, p. 19; *S. Afr. F. L. Journ.* i. 41, ii. 61). In British Columbia the Kwakiutl woman is delivered out of doors; the Sk'qomic woman retires to the woods, unless it be winter or retirement to the woods be for any other reason inconvenient, in which case she is delivered behind a screen of reed-mats in the general dwelling, which is of considerable size (Boas, *Brit. Ass. Rep.*, 1896, p. 573; 1900, p. 479). Among some of the tribes of New South Wales it is said that the spot to which the parturient withdraws is fixed upon by the elders of the band (Mathews, *Ethnol. Notes*, Sydney, 1905, p. 15). In tropical countries delivery frequently takes place in the forest; in the Babar Archipelago, on the seashore (Riedel, p. 354). The Indians of Rio de la Plata are delivered on the shore of a lagoon or river, where immediately afterwards they wash themselves and the infant (Granada, *Superst. del Rio de la Plata*, Montevideo, 1896, p. 56). Where parturition does not take place in the open air, a special hut is commonly provided for the purpose. In Japan this hut used to be a mere shed without a door (Aston, *Shinto*, 1907, p. 113). Where a separate dwelling is provided for menstruant women, as is often the case, the parturient retires thither to be delivered; the other occupants also being under tabu, no harm can be inflicted on them by her presence. This is the practice, for example, of the Kotas of the Nīlgiri Hills and other tribes in the south of India. In comparatively civilized countries like Russia, among the peasants of the Government of Smolensk, the woman is placed for delivery in a barn or a hut at a distance from the house (*L'Anthropologie*, xiv. 716). The Votiak woman gives birth in the family dwelling, but behind a curtain, for it would be a bad omen for any one but the woman in attendance as midwife to see the birth (*Rev. Trad. Pop.* xiii. 254). This clearly means that it is not a desire for privacy on the part of the patient that leads to the seclusion, so much as a ban on the part of the other members of the household.

Where the seclusion cannot be carried out by delivery in the open air away from the community, or where by custom or special circumstances delivery takes place in the hut usually occupied, the tabu is none the less strict. In the west of Victoria the Australian woman remains in her husband's *wiurn*, or shelter, but he is required to live elsewhere; the neighbouring shelters are temporarily deserted, and every one is sent away from the vicinity except two married women, who stay with her (Dawson, *Austr. Aborigines*, p. 38). Among the Koragars of the western coast of India the hut is deserted by the other inmates for five days (*JAI* iv. 375). The Visayans of the Philippine Islands remove the fishing-nets and the fighting cocks from the house, just as when a person is dying there, else they would be unlucky (*JAFL* xix. 209). When a birth takes place in the house, the Indians of the Uaupes Valley in Brazil take everything out of the house, even the pans and pots and bows and arrows, until the next day (Wallace, *Trav. on the Amazon*, p. 345). All these objects would be affected by the uncleanness of child-birth if allowed to remain, and probably would have to be destroyed, as is done, among some of the tribes of New South Wales, with every vessel used by the parturient during her seclusion (*JAI* ii. 268). So contagious is the tabu, that, if the men do not avoid the neighbourhood of the hut, they, it is widely believed, will be unlucky in their own occupations, as in the New Hebrides, where the yams they cultivate will be spoiled (*ARW* x. 515).

(*c*) *Absence of the father at birth.*—As a rule the husband, in common with all other men, is required to be absent on the occasion of child-birth. The reason of this requirement has been supposed to be the condition of tabu under which the parturient woman lies—a condition that would be communicated to every one present. But the explanation will not fit the facts everywhere. Thus among the Opatas of Mexico a parturient is attended by her nearest relatives; but so little is seclusion deemed necessary, that men, and even children, may be present (*Amer. Anthr.* [N.S.] vi. 80). In the Loyalty Islands, again, the act of birth is a spectacle that everybody—men, women, and children—flocks to enjoy, except the husband, who alone must be absent. During the whole of the woman's subsequent seclusion, which lasts until the child is big enough to crawl, her husband never pays her a visit, though he occasionally sends her food (*JAI* xix. 503). He is under a special ban. On the other hand, some tribes require the husband to be present and act as midwife, while all other

* The present writer is aware of only one case, that of the Arawak of British Guiana (Brett, *Ind. Tribes of Guiana*, 1868, p. 101). A reference to Mr. Ling Roth's table (*JAI* xxii. 232), and to his authority (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, 1891), shows that in the other alleged case mother-right, though still the rule, has begun to give way. More information is desirable on the Arawak and their surroundings.

men must keep away. This is the custom of some of the wild tribes in the Malay Peninsula (Skeat and Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, 1906, ii. 20, 22, 25). Among the Yaroinga of Queensland the parturient is attended by an old woman as midwife, but the husband is at liberty to be present and witness the process of delivery, contrary to the practice of the neighbouring Kalkadoon, who allow only a very old man or two to be present (Roth, *Ethnol. Studies*, pp. 182, 183). The active assistance of the husband is expected in the Andaman Islands (*JAI* xii. 86) and the Babar Archipelago (Riedel, *op. cit.* 354), as well as among the Basques (*ZE* xxxi. Verhandl. 292); while among the Bontoc Igorot of Luzon he is at least present (Jenks, *Ethnol. Survey, Philippine Islands*, i. 59). In the Marquesas Islands he is not only at hand, but must have conjugal relations with his wife almost immediately after the birth when she goes to bathe (*L'Anthrop.* vii. 546).

Moreover, presence at the birth is not necessary to render the husband unclean, or, in other words, to place him in the condition of tabu. He is already subjected to it by the mere fact of his relationship to the parturient. In many cases his uncleanness is expressly affirmed; in others it is to be inferred from some of the tabus by which he is bound, and which are not to be explained by mystic sympathy with the newborn child. Indeed, the tabu extends more or less to the whole household, or sometimes even to the whole community. The Kafirs of South Africa seem to regard all the members of the kraal as unclean, for they 'eat medicine,' as on the occasion of a death (Leslie, *Among the Zulus*, p. 197). The Sulkas of New Pomerania are similarly affected; and not only the men, but their weapons and the cuttings of plants they are about to put in the ground, require to be purified (*AA* [N.F.] i. 209). To the same origin we may probably attribute the stories, framed as they now stand at a period when the custom was no longer understood, of the famous couvade of the Ulstermen, when all the male population was annually laid up as a penalty for an act of cruelty to a woman about to be delivered.

Without dogmatizing on the matter, an alternative conjecture may be hazarded that the husband's enforced absence is to be regarded as a relic of earlier social conditions, when the wife dwelt at her mother's house, and descent was counted only through women. In such a case the identity of the father of the child would be of small importance, and might even be unknown, and the occurrence would be one in which he had small concern. The conjecture is supported by the frequent, if not ordinary, presence and assistance of the parturient woman's mother when alive and within reach. This might be supposed to be merely natural, were it not that the large divergences of custom and feeling between the lower culture and our own hinder any cautious anthropologist from laying down a general rule as to what is natural and what is not. It is further supported by the custom of sundry African and Indian peoples, whereby a woman, particularly at her first confinement, returns to her maternal home, and is there delivered and remains in seclusion for a ritual period, apart from her husband and unvisited by him. Among one of these peoples at least (the Basuto) the first child belongs to, and remains with, the mother's parents (*FL* xv. 250).

(*d*) *Tabu of the child.*—The condition of tabu thus affecting father and mother extends, it need not be said, to the newborn child. It is unclean, and must be cleansed by a rite of purification which assumes various forms among different peoples; and this purification, as in Christian baptism (*q.v.*), is the rite of introduction to, and incorporation in, the community. Sometimes father, mother, and child are all purified together in one and the same rite. Among certain Indians in the north-west of Brazil both parents and child remain in seclusion for five days. The parents neither work nor wash, and their diet is strictly limited. Any transgression of these rules will be injurious to the child. At the end of the five days the husband's father gives them permission to bathe and resume their ordinary food, and a common bath by the young parents and their little one brings to a close the period of seclusion. It may be noted in reference to what has been said above, that though the father shares the mother's seclusion and abstinence, *all* men are expressly stated to be absent at parturition (*Globus*, xc. 351). The Swahili of East Africa, who are nominally Muhammadan, have a similar rite for putting an end to the forty days' seclusion and dieting of the mother. At the end of that period she and the father are required to resume cohabitation. After the first occasion of cohabitation, the father, mother, and child bathe one after the other in the same water. This ceremony is called *Kurinja Miko*, 'diet-breaking,' and it is held necessary for the child's health. Ordinary life is then resumed (*ZE* xxxi. 61). It was perhaps some rite incidental to the tabu and purification of the infant among the ancient Trausi of Thrace which was misunderstood by Herodotus (v. 4) when he described the kinsmen as sitting round the child and lamenting the ills to which it was heir. That the Trausi, in opposition to the general sentiment and practice of mankind, were pessimistic philosophers of the type implied by the historian is hardly credible.

2. **Dangers attendant on child-birth.**—That very serious dangers, however, attend the entrance upon human existence is widely, if not universally, believed. These dangers (which can be but briefly alluded to here) affect the mother as well as the child, and in some cases the father also. They arise from two sources—evil spirits and witchcraft. Against them a pregnant woman provides by means of ceremonies (often with the co-operation of priests and shamans), abstinence, and amulets. Ceremonies and amulets are also used for the protection of the newborn child. In Christian countries baptism is of all protective ceremonies the most effectual. It is probably due as much to the belief that the devil and other evil spirits have special powers for inflicting physical evil on an unbaptized child, and often for snatching it away, as to the theological doctrine of original sin, that baptism has been hastened so eagerly and widely. At Gossensass in the Tirol the devil is believed to have power over both mother and babe. Until the one is churched and the other christened, something may befall them. They must not be left in the house alone; and the nurse in attendance must not sleep, but pray without ceasing. It would be useless to make the sign of the cross by way of prophylactic over the child before it is baptized, for it is not yet a Christian, and the mother is no longer a real Christian until she is churched, for she has been despoiled of her Christianity by the child in the act of birth (*ZVK* vi. 309). By many peoples one of the kinds of spirit most to be dreaded on these occasions is that of a woman who has died in childbed. Special ceremonies are performed over the corpse of such a woman to prevent her returning for mischief (cf. *PR* ii. 269–274). To evil spirits are ascribed difficulty of parturition, the death of the parturient or of the child, the infliction of disease on the child, the carrying off of a child or its exchange (see CHANGELINGS). Witchcraft is often practised by means of the evil eye (*q.v.*). Where the exclusion of all strangers, as such, is rigid, the reason,

express or implied, very often, if not always, is the danger from this source. For the same reason precautions are observed, as in Macedonia (Abbott, *Maced. Folkl.* p. 123), in summoning the midwife. On the island of Kythnos, in the Greek Archipelago, all the mirrors are covered during labour, no one is allowed to enter the birth-chamber after sundown, and, during the first three nights, to turn away the evil eye and conciliate the Fates, all the mother's trinkets (such as ear-rings, brooches, rings, and so forth) are laid out on the bed with a pot of jam (Hauttecœur, *Folkl. Kythnos*, 7). On the island of Karpathos the child is washed and swaddled in public, and no one is allowed to enter or leave the house until this ceremony is over and the priest has blessed the babe (Bent, *Macmillan's Mag.*, July 1886, p. 201). But witchcraft may also be practised by ceremonies, as in Ovid's account of the birth of Hercules retarded by Lucina sitting before the door muttering charms, her knees pressed together, and her fingers interlocked about them, until the yellow-haired Galanthis, one of Alcmene's attendants, induced her by a false report of her mistress' delivery to spring up in surprise, and thus undo the spell (*Metam.* ix. 295). Difficult delivery may also be caused by the acts, even unintentional, of the husband. Among the fisher-folk of Lower Brittany delivery is harder when the husband is away at sea following his occupation of fisherman (Sébillot, *Folkl. des Pêcheurs*, p. 3).

3. Attempt to obtain easy delivery.—Against the agony thus inflicted and the disasters which may ensue, various countervailing means are employed. It is not an unreasonable conjecture that this is the reason why delivery is often required among savage and barbarous peoples to be effected in the open air. Probably not merely the convenience of washing but the sympathetic influence of the free waves causes the seashore to be selected in some of the Moluccas as the proper place for parturition. In the Philippines the husband strips stark naked, and stands on guard either inside the house or on the roof, flourishing his sword incessantly to drive away the evil spirits until the child is born. The recitation of charms is common. Offerings and prayers are made to benevolent gods and spirits, wherever the development of religious belief sanctions them; and these are sometimes combined with a banning of the malevolent spirits. Thus, among the Chingpaw of Upper Burma sacrifices are offered to the house-spirit, and ceremonies are performed to drive away the Jungle-*Nât* and the *swawn* or *munla*, the ghost of a woman who has died in child-birth (*Internat. Arch.* xvi., Suppl. 59). In extreme cases obscene performances take place by a band of young men in the presence of the patient, when it is believed that the evil spirits for very shame take to flight (Stoll, *Geschlechtsleben*, p. 681); though it may be doubted whether the original intention of the ceremony was not rather to overcome sterility and sterilizing influence by the exhibition of generative acts. A common spell against difficult labour is the opening of all doors and cupboards, the untying of all knots, the loosening of garments, or even stripping by all present. The Arunta husband in Central Australia, though not present at the birth, takes off all his personal adornments, and empties his wallet of knick-knacks on the ground; and his hair-girdle is taken to the woman and tied tightly round her body just under her breast, apparently with the object of driving out the child. If this be ineffectual, the husband walks slowly up and down, quite unadorned, in front of the women's camp, where his wife lies about fifty yards away, with a view to inducing the child to follow him (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 466). In Malta a specimen of the dried flower known as the Rose of Jericho is procured and put into water in the parturient's chamber. It is believed that when it opens the child will be born. Analogous to this piece of sympathetic magic is the custom in the Mark of Brandenburg of boiling peas to bring about the birth (*ZVK* i. 183); in Karpathos the patient holds an olive branch in her hand. Then, again, care must be taken to avoid doing certain acts in the house. Nobody, for instance, in Bavaria may step over a broom—a prohibition current also in India. Nor, by a widely-diffused superstition, may anything be lent out of the house; especially fire must not be given, for fear of witchcraft. Adultery among many peoples is held to be a cause retarding delivery. In cases of difficult labour the unhappy woman is closely questioned and made to confess. It is believed that, until she does so, the child cannot be born. In Europe various saints are invoked to aid delivery. They are often successors of pagan divinities; or rather they are pagan divinities under the thin disguise of a slight change of name. In continental and insular Greece, for example, St. Eleutherios has taken the place of the goddess Eileithyia.

Amulets are intended to provide against dangers to the mother both before and after delivery, and also to the child. They are hung on the person of the mother and on that of the child, or about the house, either inside or out; or they are laid or hung in or upon the bed of the lying-in woman, or the cradle of the child. When a population has passed into the age of metals, metallic objects are held to be of special value as amulets. But such various objects as parts of sundry animals and plants, stones of remarkable shape or rarity, egg-shells, bread, besoms, salt, pitch, the husband's clothes, mirrors, crosses, consecrated girdles, magical or sacred texts, Bibles—anything, in short, that may be supposed, though for reasons often obscure to us, to cause difficulty or be repugnant to malignant spirits or evil influences—are employed; and they avail not only for assisting delivery but for protecting the mother and babe during the perilous time preceding and following birth. The use of fire and lights is almost universal. The rule that, where a mother and new-born child are lying, fire and light must never be allowed to go out, is equally binding in the Highlands of Scotland, in Korea, and in Basutoland; it was observed by the ancient Romans; and the sacred books of the Parsis enjoin it as a religious duty; for the evil powers hate and fear nothing so much as fire and light.

4. Attempt to secure good fortune for the child.—The child's future must be divined and provided for. Before birth, means are frequently taken to divine the sex of the infant, or even to ensure the sex desired. There are lucky and unlucky times for birth. The qualities and fate of a child born on one day of the week or of the month differ from those of a child born on another day—a superstition not quite extinct in England. In Greece the three Fates are believed to visit the child three days after birth, at midnight, and decide its destiny—another relic of pagan belief. To welcome and propitiate them a feast is provided. In Karpathos the ceremony is very elaborate. The child is placed, stark naked, on a pile of its father's clothes in the wooden bowl from which the family eat on feast-days. This stands in the middle of the room, and around it seven jars containing honey. In every one stands a long candle specially made for the occasion. The priest blesses the candles, and they are named after various saints. They are then lighted, and the extinction of one of them is awaited in silence.

The first to go out indicates the saint who is to be the child's protector. In the evening, guests assemble round the bowl to eat from it a confection of flour, water, honey, and butter. When they disperse, the bowl is again filled with the same mixture and left all night for the enjoyment of the Fates, who are invoked to come and bless the child (Bent, *loc. cit.* p. 203). The child's destiny is supposed to be written by the Fates on its nose or forehead, and any little mark or abrasion of the skin is called 'the fating of the Fates' (τὸ μοίρωμα τῶν Μοιρῶν). But they never spin the lot of a wholly happy life (Rodd, *Customs and Lore of Modern Greece*, 1892, p. 111). Elsewhere, ceremonies are performed to ascertain the child's fate and to provide, according to its sex, that it shall grow up with all the qualities necessary for its after-life. First, however, where exposure of children or infanticide is practised, a decision must be taken whether it is to live or die. Where the lineage is reckoned through the father, the child's life is usually in his hands, as among the ancient Romans and Scandinavians. In other cases the mother often decides, and herself puts the child to death. If the mother die in child-birth, savage peoples as a rule bury the child with her, on account of the difficulty in rearing it; or sometimes because they fear that she will not rest without it.

Afterbirth, etc.—A point of great importance is the disposal of the afterbirth and navel-cord, and of the caul when there is one. The Swahili inter the placenta on the spot where the delivery took place, in order that the child, through a mystic power, even after it has grown up, may feel itself continually drawn to its parents' house. The cord is worn round the child's neck for some years, and afterwards is buried in the same place. By this proceeding it is believed that the child's growth is promoted (*ZE* xxxi. 62). The Australian natives on the Pennefather River in Queensland hold that part of the *cho-i* ('vital principle,' 'soul') of the child remains in the afterbirth. The latter, as soon as it comes away from the mother, is buried in the sand, and a number of twigs are stuck in the ground to mark the place, and bound together at the top in a conical form. It is believed that Anjea—a supernatural being whose business is the making of babies out of mud and their insertion in the womb—recognizes the spot, takes out the *cho-i*, carries it to one of his haunts, and keeps it for years, until it is wanted for the completion of another baby. When he has formed a baby, he puts into it, if a boy, a portion of the father's *cho-i*, or, if a girl, a portion of the father's sister's *cho-i*. He takes an opportunity of secretly placing the baby, thus completed, in the womb of the mother for whom it is intended (Roth, *Bull. North Queensland Ethnog.* v. 68). The Toba-bataks call the placenta the younger brother of the child. They hold that every man has seven souls. One of these abides with the placenta, which is buried, but can leave it to warn the child to whom it belongs, or, if he be acting rightly, to encourage him and thus play the part of conscience. The Javanese believe that the souls of their forefathers are housed in crocodiles. In the interior of the island, after the birth of a child, the women are accustomed to take the placenta, surrounded with fruits and flowers, and lighted by little lamps, in the dusk of the evening to the river, and commit it to the waters as a gift for the crocodiles, or rather by way of dedication to the forefathers whose souls inhabit them (Kruyt, *Animisme in den Ind. Archipel*, pp. 25, 189). In Europe, on the other hand, what is most dreaded is that the afterbirth and cord should be eaten by an animal, or exposed to the evil offices of fairies or sorcerers. In Spain, for example, if the least part of the placenta were eaten by an animal, the infant would be possessed of all the bad qualities of the animal in question (Sébillot, *Paganisme*, p. 30); for the placenta and cord are regarded as being an essential part of the child. Moved by the same belief, the Kwakiutl of British Columbia take precisely the opposite course of exposing a boy's placenta where it will be eaten by ravens: he will then have the gift of foreseeing the future. The same tribe bury a girl's placenta at high-water mark, in order that she may grow up an expert clam-digger (Boas, *Rep. Brit. Ass.*, 1896, p. 574). The Swahili practice, already mentioned, of wearing the cord is wide-spread. Even in Europe the cord is preserved and often worn as a talisman, or given to the child at different crises of life to suck.

The custom of planting a tree at a birth is common among sedentary nations. Such a tree is regarded as having a mystic relationship with the child. It is an index of the child's condition and fate: it grows, prospers, and decays with the child. Very often the placenta and cord are buried beneath it, as in countries so far apart as New Zealand and Old Calabar. In Pomerania the afterbirth is buried at the foot of a young tree. The Hupa of California split a small Douglas spruce, place the umbilical cord in the opening, and tie the tree together again. 'The fate of the tree is watched, and the future of the child is judged accordingly' (Goddard, *Life and Culture of the Hupa*, p. 52). Elsewhere, as in the Moluccas, the afterbirth is hidden in a tree. If we are not always told that the tree is in these various ways united with the child's fate, we may suspect that very generally a mystic connexion with the child is established.

Similar superstitions attach to the *caul*. A child born with a caul is endowed with extraordinary powers. Among the Negroes of the West Indies and North America, and among the Dutch, he can see ghosts. In England it is believed that he cannot be drowned, perhaps because (as the Icelanders believe) the caul contains the child's guardian spirit (*fylgia*) or a part of its soul. The Icelandic midwife therefore is careful not to injure the caul. She buries it beneath the threshold over which the mother has to pass (Grimm, *Teut. Myth.*, 1880–88, ii. 874). It is probable that this proceeding is adopted in order that in the event of the child's death the soul may re-enter the mother and so the child may be born again—a belief frequently implicit, and sometimes more than implicit, in the like burial of dead and still-born babes. However that may be, the caul is everywhere prized. In many places it is sewed up in a bag and hung round the child's neck, or preserved elsewhere. In Königsberg it is carried to baptism with the child (Ploss, *Kind*, i. 13). It is also regarded as a talisman valuable in itself, and is sold and bought as a preservative against shipwreck and for other luck-bringing purposes. In England, a century ago, or even less, advertisements of such objects for sale were not very rare in the newspapers.

5. Admission of the child into the community.—The moment comes at length when the most imperious tabus relating to the child are put an end to and the child is introduced into the community. He cannot, as a rule, become a full-fledged member of the community until he has, years later, passed through the puberty ceremonies; but he may be recognized as a portion, however imperfect, of the family or clan on emerging from the seclusion which follows his birth. The ceremony of reception and that of release from tabu (or purification) are, as already pointed out, the same. The giving of a name in many cases forms part of it, though the name so given is not neces-

sarily that which the child will bear throughout life. These three objects are effected in Christianity by baptism; and there can be little doubt that Christianity has in infant baptism taken up and modified, to suit its own teaching, certain pre-existing ideas and rites (see BAPTISM).

(*a*) *Visit of friends.*—Prior to the ceremony of reception, however, the relatives, and especially the female friends of the mother, despite her tabu, often pay her a formal visit to offer their congratulations and inspect the baby. It is an occasion for rejoicing, on which the visitors either bring or receive presents. It is not, however, without danger for mother or child. The evil eye is particularly dreaded, and the guests are expected to put themselves above suspicion by their expressions and conduct. They must, as is usual at other times for this purpose, either salute the child in the name of God, or speak of it as a nasty, ugly little thing, or use some such offensive expression. This is the only way open to them of praising it: direct praise is dangerous. A very common rite is to spit on it—a rite known equally well in Eastern Uganda and in Western Ireland, indeed, throughout Europe (see EVIL EYE, SALIVA). In Austria, visitors are sprinkled with holy water. Among some peoples the neighbouring children are invited to see the child, and take part in a ceremony, and are feasted—a custom practised by the Continental Jews, the Watubela Islanders, the ancient natives of Mexico, and others. It is perhaps a rite of sympathetic magic.

(*b*) *Recognition by the father.*—Formal recognition of the child as his by the husband is among various peoples a preliminary to the actual reception into the community, though it is sometimes combined with that ceremony. Occasionally it is preceded by a test of legitimacy, as among the Baganda (*JAI* xxxii. 31), where the rite is performed not by the husband, but by his father. Recognition is effected in various ways. The Santal father murmurs the name of his ancestral deity, and puts his hand on the child's head (Hunter, *Annals of Rural Bengal*, p. 203). The Fijian father makes a gift of food (*JAI*, xiv. 23). Among the ancient Norse the child was laid on the earth when born, and not lifted up until the father gave permission. This permission decided the child's fate, for otherwise it would have been exposed or put to death; but doubtless it involved also an acknowledgment of paternity. Recognition by the father involves reception into the immediate kin. Among the Amaxosa a feast is given on the occasion; the father goes to the kraal and chooses a cow from whose tail he pulls a tuft of hair and hands it to the mother. She fastens it round the child's neck. Neither the cow nor any of her posterity may be sold or disposed of in any way to strangers; but if the child be a girl, they are handed over with her on her marriage (Fritsch, *Eingeb. Sud-Afr.* p. 108). Among the ancient Welsh it would seem that there was no binding recognition by the father until the mother had first taken a solemn oath upon the altar and the relics that he and none other was the father. If the father then did not deny the child by an equally solemn ceremony within a year and a day, he could not afterwards deny him. The mode of reception into the kin was by a kiss; for a kiss, says the code of Gwynedd, is a sign of affinity. If the father were dead, the ceremony was performed by the chief of the kindred with six of the best men of the kindred; if there were no chief of the kindred, then by twenty-one of the best men of the kindred; and once performed it was conclusive (*Anc. Laws of Wales*, Venedotian Code, ii. 31).

(*c*) *Presentation to the god.*—Sometimes the child is presented to the divinity. The Chingpaw of Upper Burma formally announce the birth to the house-spirit, and place the infant under its protection (*Internat. Arch.* xvi., Suppl. 60). In Mexico the Tarahumara mother on the fourth day after delivery goes to bathe, and lays the child down naked and exposed to the sun for an hour, that Father Sun may see and know his new child (Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, i. 273). The Wichita present the child to the moon, praying for its growth and other blessings (Dorsey, *Myth. Wichita*, pp. 11, 19, 29). A somewhat similar ceremony is performed by the Ronga mother in South Africa; but, since the Baronga do not worship the moon, the words used are rather an incantation than a prayer: 'Grow, grow, grow; there is thy moon!' (Junod, *Baronga*, p. 17). Among the Basuto, in the second month after birth, the child is made to look at the moon, which is called his wife if a boy, or her playmate if a girl (*Bull. Soc. Neuchat. Géog.* ix. 121). On the island of Kythnos, if the child suffers from any complaint, it is presented to the new moon with the prayer: 'O new moon, I shall be very grateful if thou wilt cure my child' (Hautte-cœur, 9). In direct contrast to these practices is the Albanian forbidding of children to look at the moon. The Euahlayi of New South Wales also forbid them to look at the full moon. Among the Hupa of California a curious method of presentation to the divinities is practised. Parturition takes place in the house set apart for women in a state of tabu. The first ten days are a period of great danger to the child; and they are spent in rites to ward off the evil spirits. At the end of the period a little of the child's hair is cut off and put in the fire. 'It was thought that the divinities on smelling the burning hair became cognizant for the first time of the child's existence.' The ceremonies culminating in the burning of the hair are thus, it would seem, not merely intended to ward off evil spirits: we are justified in thinking that they are ceremonies of purification. After they are over, the mother and child leave the parturition-house, though the mother is under tabu for some time longer (Goddard, *Hupa*, Berkeley, Cal. 1903–4, p. 51. The author states elsewhere that the mother remains in the parturition-house for a longer period [p. 18]).

(*d*) *Ceremonies of admission.*—The community into which the child in lower stages of civilization is more or less formally introduced is primarily that of the kin; and, wherever ancestor-worship or the cult of a divinity in the more accurate acceptation of that term is practised, reception into the community and presentation to the divinity are, as a rule, only two aspects of the same ceremony. Thus, among the Chukchi, on the fifth day after birth the mother and child are drawn in a sledge round the tent, sunwise, to the place of sacrifice. The reindeer employed to draw the sledge is then slaughtered; the mother and child, at least two other members of the family, the sacred amulets, and the three central poles of the tent-frame are painted with the blood. The mother then proceeds to divine which of the deceased relatives has returned; and, on this being ascertained, the name of the relative in question is imposed upon the child by acclamation of the people present (*Jesup Exped.* vii. 511). The painting with blood of the sacrificed reindeer has placed the mother and child under the protection of the divinities, and has also united them with the kin represented by those members who have been painted and by the other persons present. And this is completed by the identification of the ancestor who has returned in the person of the child. The Herero of German South-West Africa perform an elaborate ceremony when the mother is released from her seclusion. She takes the

child to the sacred fire, which burns on the hearth in the open air at the eastern side of the hut where the chief of the *werft* lives. She is sprinkled with water by the chief's eldest unmarried daughter, whose duty it is to keep the fire always burning. She seats herself on the outspread hide of an ox, and the chief spurts a mouthful of water over her and the child, afterwards addressing his ancestors: 'To you is a child born in your village; may this [village] never come to an end!' Then he rubs mother and child with fat and water, taking the child upon his knees in doing so. He takes the child in his arms, and, touching its forehead with his own, he gives it a name. The other men present repeat this action on the child, uttering the name already given by the chief of the *werft* or the father, or, if they please, each giving a new name (*S. Afr. F. L. Journ.* ii. 66). Here both the mother and child are purified, and the child is presented to the ancestral spirits and received into the kin. Where, as, for instance, among the ancient Mexicans, the worship of gods had been evolved, the ceremony took place at the temple. There the child was presented to the god, and there it received the gifts which were a recognition of its membership of the kin (Payne, *Hist. of New World*, 1899, ii. 479). Among the Santals of Bengal the child is admitted into the family by a secret rite which includes the recognition by the father of his paternity. Admission into the clan is more public; it takes place three days after the birth of a girl, or five days after the birth of a boy. The child's head is shaven. The clansmen stand round and sip water mingled with a bitter vegetable juice. The father solemnly names the child, and the midwife thereupon sprinkles rice-water over each of the visitors, pronouncing, as she does so, the child's name. The family, which up to this moment has been unclean, is by the ceremony re-admitted with the newborn babe into the clan, and the kinsmen on both sides sit down to huge earthen pitchers of beer previously provided. Admission into the wider circle of the race takes place some four or five years later. It consists in marking the child's right arm with the spots indicating his Santal nationality, and the drinking of beer by the friends of the family, who, irrespective of clan, have been invited (Hunter, *Rural Bengal*[7], 1897, p. 203). The bestowal of a name among the Kayans and Kenyahs of Borneo is accompanied with great formalities. It is the starting-point of the child's life in its social aspects; before it is named, the child would not be enumerated as one of the family, and would not be mourned for any more than if it had been still-born—it is, in fact, non-existent (Furness, *Born. Head-hunters*, p. 18).

(*e*) *Admission in the higher religions: baptism.*—In the higher religions, as in Muhammadanism and Christianity, the dedication of the child to God effects its entrance into a wider society than that of the kin, and the importance of the ecclesiastical rite tends to efface its social meaning. The ecclesiastical rite insists on the relation between the child and the Deity, and the effect on the child as a social being falls into the background. But outside the ecclesiastical rite the occasion is often made one of social interest. The Swahili, a Bantu people of East Africa, have accepted Islām, which they practise diluted with much of the ancient paganism. Forty days after its birth, all friends of the house assemble for the baptism of the child. The whole night is occupied with ritual readings from a sacred book, repeated after the reader by all present. At four o'clock in the morning (the hour when the Prophet was born) the actual baptism and naming take place. The celebration is then closed with a feast (*ZE* xxxi. 67).

Throughout Europe the most curious ceremonies and superstitions attend the baptism of a child. The utmost importance is attached to the choice of godparents, for the child inherits their qualities. They must therefore be morally and physically in a state of purity and without any bodily defect. In the Sollinger Wald, for example, they must take care to rinse their mouths with water before going to the ceremony, and abstain from spirituous liquors until it is over (*Am Urquell*, ii. 198). In Provence, if one of them were one-eyed, a stammerer, bandy-legged, or a hunchback, the child would be afflicted in the same way (Bérenger-Féraud, *Trad. de la Provence*, p. 171). The invitation to become godparents is frequently of the most formal and deferential character, by special messenger or the father in person, or else by letter. It is sometimes, as in the south-west of France, given before the birth. This is a practical necessity where baptism follows speedily on birth. The number of godparents varies: in one German family as many as twenty-three are recorded on one occasion—a luxury in which only wealth could indulge. The child's future depends on the conduct and even the dress of the godparents. On the way to the church they must not look round, or stand about, or perform any bodily needs. Their thoughts must not wander during the ceremony. Above all, they must make no mistake in repeating the Creed; nor must the clergyman stutter or make a mistake in the service. On the way back from church the same care is necessary; but now they are expected to give alms, especially to children. There are also rules as to the manner in which the children are held at the font, as to the order in which they are to be presented if more than one child be baptized on the same day, and so forth, on which much of the child's luck depends. The parents themselves do not attend the baptism. They are (at least the mother is) still under the ban, being as yet unchurched. But where this is the case, their occupations during the absence of the little one do not affect it any the less. The Esthonian father runs rapidly round the church during the service, that his child may be endowed with fleetness of foot (Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* iv. 1845). The mother, in some parts of Germany, must read her Bible and hymn-book, that the child may be able to learn easily. Elsewhere she has to perform nine kinds of work, that the child may be active. The child's conduct at the font, too, is much regarded. If it cries, in most parts of England the devil has gone out of it. But this is not the universal belief. In Auvergne, if it does not cry, it will be good; at Liège, if it cries, it will become a bad character. At Marseilles, to cry is a sign of a good constitution; but it is also the sign of an arbitrary and choleric temper. In Germany, the child who cries will not live to grow old; in Portugal and elsewhere, on the other hand, the child who does not cry will hardly live. On leaving and returning to the house a special ritual has frequently to be followed. Among the Masurs about Gilgenburg the midwife carries out the child, stepping over an axe on which three glowing charcoal brands are laid: this is held to be the best preservative against everything evil. A piece of steel is elsewhere among the same people packed in the child's swaddling clothes, or laid from time to time upon its eyes. The midwife says three times as she goes: 'I take away a heathen and bring you back a Christian' (Töppen, *Abergl. aus Masuren*[2], 1867, p. 81)—a sentiment of very common provenance. The child, on returning, is carried thrice round the table. These and other ceremonies, too numerous to be detailed here, intended to affect the child's after-life, are found

in some form or other all over Europe. When they are at an end, the feast begins, sometimes in the inn, sometimes in the parental dwelling, at which the child is now qualified to be, and frequently is, present. The godparents, the clergyman and sacrist, and the midwife are joined by the relatives and neighbours. Christening cakes are everywhere a special feature of the meal. The godparents must taste of every dish, in order that the child may speedily learn to eat and may thrive accordingly. The occasion is one for merriment, games, practical jokes, and dancing. It need not be said that the godparents are expected to present gifts to the child and to the midwife. So far as the child is concerned, that is only the beginning of their duties. He will expect gifts and help from them whenever in the course of his life he needs them. In some places, as in the Tyrol, the godparents of the first child of a family fulfil the same office for the subsequent children: it would be an insult to them to ask any others. In Greece the unbaptized child is called *drakos*, or dragon. It is not yet a fellow-Christian. The epithet, moreover, is probably deemed to have an influence on its future development by promoting its strength. At baptism the priest and godparents dance round the font. In Karpathos, on its return home the mother meets the little procession on the threshold with a ploughshare, the hollow of which is filled with embers. She waves this before the child to secure for it strength and skill in agriculture. The child is then solemnly delivered by the godfather into her hands, no longer a *drakos* but a Christian; and sweets and raki conclude the rites (Bent, *loc. cit.* p. 204).

The christening feast is the analogue of the merry-making which very generally in the lower culture follows a birth. Thus is celebrated the accession of a new member to the community. Children are the greatest asset of a people; they are a pledge of its continuance; and in a barbarous society they are often a source of wealth rather than a drain and an encumbrance. The ideas of barbarism persist in the peasant classes of Europe, among whom the various and complicated ceremonies roughly enumerated above are observed. The actual rite of reception into the community has taken an ecclesiastical form, that of baptism; and round it these other ceremonies cluster. They present, it is true, the appearance of regarding only the child. But this is delusive. It is to the interest of the entire community that the new member should grow up well-conducted, strong, and prosperous. The auguries, the omens, the provision for securing the child's future luck, are an index of the importance which the community, first in the narrower sense of the family, and in a less degree, but still really in the wider sense of the village and neighbourhood, feels to attach to the moral and mental qualities and the material prosperity of the neophyte.

6. Re-admission of the parents into the community.—The tabu of the mother is in the lowest stages of civilization often comparatively light. Among the Arunta of Central Australia the mother leaves her husband's camp and goes to that of the unmarried girls, where she is delivered; and there she remains for three or four weeks. She then resumes her ordinary life, so far as appears, without any special ceremony of purification. When among the Uaupes of Brazil birth takes place in the hut, everything, as we have already seen, is taken out of the house until the next day. The mother then washes herself and her child in the river, and returns to her hut, where she remains without doing any work for four or five days (Wallace, *Trav. Amazon*, 1853, p. 345). She is perhaps not yet completely pure, but the traveller's account does not enable us to say whether any further ceremony is performed. In the west of India the hut in which a Koragar mother is delivered is deserted by the other inmates for five days. On the sixth day the mother and child are restored to purity by a tepid bath, and the child is named. Rice and vegetables are presented to the mother; several coco-nuts are split, and given, one half to her, the other half to her husband (*JAI* iv. 375). When the mother is returning to ordinary life, in some of the tribes of New South Wales part of her hair is burnt off: this is doubtless a ceremony of purification (*JAI* ii. 268). The Maori have two alternative ceremonies to deliver the mother and child from *tapu* and make them *noa* (common). The one consists in the cooking on new fire (made by friction) of fern-root, which is waved over the child and brought into contact with it, and then offered to the *atua* (gods or ancestral spirits). In the other, mother and child are sprinkled with water by means of a branch, food is offered to the *atua*, and the branch is planted in the ground; if it grows, the child will become a warrior (*JAI* xix. 98).

Much more complex rites, elsewhere repeated, are required to restore the new mother to purity. The Hopi mother must not see the sun or put on her moccasins until the fifth day. She then bathes her head and her baby's with amole, and is at liberty to go out of doors and to resume the charge of household affairs. She is not, however, fully cleansed. She cannot yet eat meat or salt, and may drink only warm water or juniper-tea. The bathing must be repeated on the tenth and fifteenth days. On the twentieth day a much more elaborate rite takes place, including a vapour-bath administered to the mother, usually by her husband's mother or sister. The house is thoroughly cleansed. The child is formally bathed and rubbed with corn-meal, named, and presented by the mother to the sun at the moment it rises above the horizon. In the house a feast is prepared, and presents are made to the guests in return for those which the mother has received from them during her confinement (*Journ. Am. Ethn. and Arch.* ii. 165). Here it will be observed that the unbroken series of ceremonies culminating on the twentieth day effects the restoration of the mother to purity, and at the same time the purification and naming of the child. Mother and child are thus admitted together into the community. In some cases, as we have already observed (§ 1 (*d*)), father, mother, and child are simultaneously thus purified and admitted.

But while it may be possible in many stages of society for a mother to remain for a length of time under the ban, this would be very inconvenient, not to say impossible, for the father, upon whom lies the duty of providing for the wants of his family. As a rule, therefore, his tabu is light and easily got rid of, while that of the mother may extend over a lengthened period and be only progressively removed. Suckling often goes on for a lengthened period—two, three, or even four years. Among many peoples the mother is in some degree unclean until the child is weaned: she may not eat certain food or have matrimonial relations with her husband. This rule is general, for example, among the Bantu and negro tribes of Africa, and is the excuse given for the polygyny so largely practised by those peoples. The same rule applies to the Sakalava of Madagascar; but it is said that, although the Southern Sakalava woman is tabu at this time to her husband, she may admit to her bed any other man, subject to a fine payable to the husband if he discover the infidelity (van Gennep, *Tabou et Totémisme*, 1904, p. 168).

The tabu on the mother is practised also in Europe. The rule is very general that she must not go outside her home until she goes to be churched. Before that ceremony she is distinctly regarded as impure. Special precautions must be taken to drive away the powers of evil. She must eat apart; she must not work; she must not enter another house lest she bring ill-luck. When she goes to be churched (usually on the fortieth day), she steps over a hatchet or a knife fixed in the threshold of the house; a flaming brand or a packet of salt is thrown after her. On her return a feast is provided to celebrate her re-entry into ordinary life. In Karpathos the mother takes her child and a jug of water to church. The water is blessed after the churching ceremony. She then visits her neighbours, sprinkling water from the jug at each house, 'that your jugs may not break.' As she crosses the threshold she puts the handle of the door-key into her mouth, 'to make the plates as strong as the iron of the key' (Bent, *loc. cit.* p. 205). Newly fortified and cleansed by the rites she has undergone, she is no longer *tabu*, a centre of infection, but, with her child in her arms, a fountain of beneficent and in particular of prolific influence; and the interpretations of her proceedings just quoted must not be taken literally.

The foregoing general account of the rites and superstitions connected with birth is, of course, the merest sketch. But it is believed that it will suffice to give a notion of the meaning of, at all events, the most important and wide-spread customs, and of the ideas attached to them. See also BAPTISM, CHANGELINGS, CHARMS AND AMULETS, DIVINATION, EVIL EYE, FAMILY, INFANTICIDE, NAMES, PURIFICATION, TABU, TWINS.

LITERATURE.—The best general accounts of birth customs and superstitions are to be found in *Das Kind in Brauch und Sitte der Volker*, by H. Ploss, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Leipzig, 1884, and *Das Weib in der Natur- und Volkerkunde*, by the same author, 3rd ed., edited by Max Bartels, 2 vols, Leipzig, 1891, and subsequent editions. For the customs and superstitions of particular peoples, reference may be made to the various works cited above, and to others too numerous to mention here. In this, as in other departments of anthropology, there is now a large accumulation of materials in monographs, works of scientific explorers and missionaries, the journals of anthropological (including folklore) and geographical societies, and the publications of American and European museums and universities, and of the Bureau of Ethnology at Washington.

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

BIRTH (Assyro-Babylonian).—With the Assyro-Babylonians, as with other nationalities, especially the Semites, the birth of a child was an event of importance, and all the more so if the newborn happened to be a male. It is true that records of births are rare, but the attention paid to such events may be judged from the reference to the 'geometrical number' in Plato's *Republic*, viii. 546 B–D.* Even the ideal city, it is there stated, will come to decay, the cause thereof not being in the city itself, but from without. This degeneration was brought about by wrong or inopportune marriages and births. Plato then constructs a 'geometrical number' out of the elements which express the shortest period of gestation in man (216 days), the number in question being 12,960,000, which he calls 'the lord of better and worse births.' The connexion of 216 with 12,960,000 is rather complicated, but the former may be obtained by cubing 3, 4, and 5, and adding together the results. These numbers are also the elements of the Bab. sexagesimal unit (60), which, multiplied three times by itself, produces the 'geometrical number' referred to. As that high number, and numerous others connected with it, are found in the Assyr.-Bab. mathematical texts, there would seem to be no doubt that both that and the idea connected with it originated with the older of the nations which have handed down to us the tablets. It is natural that parents should desire to have fine and healthy offspring, but, in addition to this, the Assyro-Babylonians seem to have sought the improvement of the race by trying to arrange that births should take place at the proper time—with them, the periods when the moon had reached certain positions, either in its phases or in its course, probably the former. The numbers expressing these positions are contained in the British Museum fragment 80-7-19, 273, and are all fractions of the 'geometrical number.' They show the progress of the phases of the moon, culminating on the 15th (the moon's 'Sabbath'*), and decreasing afterwards.†

Naturally, there is at present much doubt as to how these numbers were used in deciding the times for propitious births, but certain celestial forecasts referring to the moon will give an idea of the method employed. Thus, if on the 16th of the month Tammuz an eclipse of the moon, or on the 16th of Chislev an eclipse of the sun, take place, pregnant women, it is said, will not have their offspring prosper (a variant has 'their offspring will fall').‡ This is the day after the moon was regarded as reaching its maximum fullness; and as that date would be an unexpected time for an eclipse, it seems to have been regarded as an evil omen. Independently, however, of the lunar numbers and dates influencing births, the moon was supposed to affect the offspring in other ways; for, when a halo surrounded our satellite, women, it was believed, would bring forth male children. Also, if the star Lugala or Sarru, 'the king' (*Regulus*, Merodach), stood in its place, women would likewise bring forth male offspring.§

Notwithstanding the moon's importance in its influence over births, it seems to have been less regarded than Istar or Venus, and that goddess less than Zēr-panîtum, the spouse of Merodach, as is indicated by the name *Eru'a*, 'conception,' or the like, which she bore. It is on this account that, in the bi-lingual legend of the Creation, she appears under the name of *Aruru*, as the one who formed, with Merodach, the creator of all things, the seed of mankind.‖ Among the names of Istar-Zēr-panîtum bearing on this subject were *Ama-du-bat* = *ummu pitât burki*, 'the mother who openeth the loins'; *Nagar-šaga*, 'the framer of the fetus'; *Šasuru*, 'the goddess of the fetus'; *Nin-tur*, 'the lady of the womb'; *Nin-zizna* = *bêlit binti*, 'the lady of birth (?)'; *Nin-dim*, 'the lady of procreation'; *Ani*, *Ama*, *Mama*, and *Mami*,¶ all, apparently, meaning 'mother.' It will thus be seen that the Assyr.-Bab. name of Zēr-panîtum (for Zēr-banîtum, 'seed-creatress'), which she bore (often transformed by Assyriologists into *Šarpanitum*, 'the bright one'), is more than justified.

In addition to his spouse, however, Merodach himself appears as a deity of generation, or god of birth—whether by reflexion, as it were, of his spouse Zēr-panîtum, or because he was regarded as 'begetter of the gods,' is uncertain; though the theory of reflected power is possibly the right one, since Merodach was the creator of the gods only because identified with them—an identification due to the theory by which, after the rise of Babylon (the city of which he was patron), the

* See Hilprecht's excellent exposition of the connexion of Plato's and Pythagoras' numbers in *The Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania*, 1893 ff., vol. xx. pl. 1, p. 29 ff.

* See *PSBA*, 1904, p. 55.

† See *JRAS*, April 1909, p. 537, footnote.

‡ See *WAI* iii. 60. 28 (*a*); and for the same day of the 5th month, 114 (*b*). The same omen is given for the 20th of Tishri in 57 (*a*).

§ Pinches, *Texts*, pl. 2, K 178, lines 5–6.

‖ *JRAS*, 1891, p. 395, line 21. See also pp. 397, 399, 400 405.

¶ *PSBA*, vol xxxi, 1909, p. 21 and pl. 3; cf. *Cuneiform Texts from Bab. Tablets*, xxv. pl. 30, K. 2109, lines 9–12.

other gods, including the older ones, became merely his manifestations. The name which he bore in this connexion was Tutu,* which is rendered *mûllid ilâni, mûddiš ilâni*, 'begetter of the gods, renewer of the gods.'†

Children being naturally desired, it is not to be wondered at that a letter should exist congratulating a woman that she was likely to become a mother. In this text Arad-Bêl writes to Epirtum, whom he calls his sister,‡ 'My heart hath rejoiced that thou art *enceinte* (*libbûa ilši* (?) *kî târi*).'§ Notwithstanding this natural desire, however, the Babylonians believed in the existence of certain stones and plants, of which they presumably made use, which furthered or prevented not only love, but also conception and bearing—*âban êri, âban lâ êri*, 'stone of conception, stone of non-conception'; *âban âlâdi, âban lâ âlâdi*, 'stone of bearing, stone of not-bearing'; *šammi êri, šammi lâ êri*, 'plant of conception, plant of non-conception'; *šammi âlâdi, šammi lâ âlâdi*, 'plant of bearing, plant of not-bearing.'‖ The 'plant of bearing' is referred to in the Etana-legend, in which the hero says to the sun-god Šamaš: 'Give me then the herb of bearing—show me then the herb of bearing! Bring forth my offspring and shape for me a name.' Whether this implies that a glance at the plant was sufficient is uncertain; in all probability a potion was made from the herb which one or both of the prospective parents had to drink. The sun-god tells Etana how to acquire the plant, and he goes and asks the eagle, which is one of the personages in the legend. It was probably in search of this plant that Etana, on the eagle's back, mounted up to heaven, and apparently appealed to the goddess Ištar; but the mutilation of the record deprives us of the sequel.¶

References to birth-rites in the Assyr.-Bab. inscriptions are rare, but there is every probability that the present material will be greatly augmented by the discovery of further stores of inscribed tablets. In the account of the birth and exposure of the infant Sargon of Agadé by his mother, there is no reference to any ceremonies or incantations which she may have made on his behalf. In all probability, however, the mother of a newly-born infant was regarded as being incapable of initiating any prayers or ceremonies herself, and another person, possibly a priest, would seem to have been employed to perform the duty. The British Museum fragment K 879 has apparently part of a prayer, or incantation, recited on behalf of a pregnant woman and her prospective offspring:

'The woman . . . . . .
Her binding, which is before thy divinity, may it be relieved;
. . . . . safely may she bring forth—
May she bring forth, and may she live; may what is there prosper.
Into the presence of thy divinity safely may she go,
Safe[ly may she bring forth, and] may she perform thy service.'

This fragment, which has neither beginning nor end, is bi-lingual, having been used by the Sumero-Akkadians as well as by the Semitic Babylonians.

A rather remarkable reference to creation and birth occurs in the 4th column of the legend of Atarpi, or, as Jensen* reads the name, Atar-ḫasis (the Chaldæan Noah, if this be correct). Apparently the mother-goddess, Maḫ or Mami (Zêr-panîtum, the spouse of Merodach), after uttering her incantation, threw down clay, and detached therefrom 14 pieces, laying 7 to the right and 7 to the left, placing a brick or tile between. Then, seemingly, she called out, 'Women, husbands!' There were 7 and 7 fetus (representatives of future living things)—7 were made male, and 7 female—fate formed (each) fetus. 'Forms of human beings Mami shaped them.' In the house of the undelivered woman about to bear, a brick was to be placed for 7 days, for the protectress (?) of the house, Maḫ, the spouse Mami. They (apparently the fetus) were to become swarms (?), and there was to be joy in the house of the undelivered woman. When the woman about to bear brought forth, the mother of the child was expected to withhold (?) (her)self. Two mutilated lines follow containing the words *zikaru*, 'male,' and *elli-. .*, probably part of *êllitu* (*-ti, -ta*), 'pure,' suggesting that she was to keep from men, and purify herself. This text being exceedingly difficult, there is much therein which is doubtful, but the words which are certain make it a valuable contribution to the subject of the ritual attending births in Babylonia. It is not implied in this inscription that images of children were made when the birth of a child was expected, but the brick, which is referred to, was probably regarded as sufficient. It would seem to have typified the building up of the house or family.

Tablets of late date show that the hour of birth was carefully noted, and celestial observations were made for the purpose of casting the horoscope, if the child was a male; and, probably, other ceremonies followed. If a conclusion may be drawn from the tablet K 1285, it would seem that, at least in the case of the children of people of note, certain ceremonies took place in the temple of Ištar, and also, perhaps, at the fanes of other deities:

'Young wast thou, Aššur-bani-âpli, whom I (Nebo) left unto the Queen of Nineveh:
A suckling wast thou, Aššur-bani-âpli, whom I satisfied on the lap of the Queen of Nineveh;
The fullness of the teats which are placed in thy mouth, twain thou suckest, twain thou pressest to thy face.'†

The expression, 'Queen of Nineveh,' has the determinative for divinity before it, showing that the personage intended is none other than Ištar, the patron of that city. The third line of the extract has the verbs in the present tense, probably to give the phrase greater vividness.

Naturally certain days of the month, and probably certain months of the year, were regarded as especially lucky for births. At the time of the dynasty of Babylon (about 2000 years B.C.), such names as 'the son of the 20th day' (*Mâr-ûmi-êsrâ*) are met with; and from a student's exercise-tablet of late date, we learn that the 20th was the festival of the sun-god, not because, according to the Calendar in the British Museum,‡ eclipses could then take place (the days quoted are the 20th of Sivan, the 20th of Tishri, and the 20th of Chislev, the common expression, *antalu ilu Šamaš*, 'eclipse of the sun,' being used), but probably because, after the eclipse, the sun was regarded as shining victoriously. *Ululâa* (*Elulâa*=*Êlulæus*), 'he of the month Elul,' and *Ṭebetâa*, 'he of the month Tebet,' are also found; but though this, to all appearance, records the month of the

* The word for 'bring forth,' 'beget,' in Sumero-Akkadian, was *utu*, of which *Tutu* is evidently a reduplicate form.

† In what way Merodach was regarded as the renewer of the gods is uncertain; the phrase may refer simply to the 'captive-gods,' who had been Tiamat's helpers in the fight with her. He is said to have visited them in prison and comforted them, apparently with the promise of ultimate release.

‡ Probably a term of affection for a beloved wife, as in Heb. (cf. Ca 4⁹ ‖ כַּלָּה, 'bride'), etc.

§ Campbell Thompson, *Late Babylonian Letters*, 1906, No. 40. The text is not certain in some places.

‖ *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets*, xvi., plates 26 and 31. See also pl. 36: *šami sinništi lâ âlâdi*, 'the plant of a woman who is not to bear'; and pl. 27: *šam muš ša-tur* (or, *ša-sur*), 'the plant of the serpent of conception,' or 'of the fetus.'

¶ See Jensen, 'Mythen und Epen' (*Assyr. Bibliothek*, vol. vi.), p. 108 ff.

* Jensen, 'Mythen und Epen,' p. 287; notes thereon, pp. 543-548.

† S. A. Strong in the *Transactions of the 9th International Congress of Orientalists*, London, 1893, vol. ii. pp. 203, 205, 206. (His translation differs somewhat from the above, but not on essential points.)

‡ *WAI*, vol. v. plates 48 and 49.

bearer's birth, it is doubtful whether any lucky omen was attached thereto.

As may be gathered from the reference to fate forming each fetus, the Babylonians seem to have believed that the sexes were foreordained by the gods, who were the 'makers of fate.' A disturbing element probably existed in the influence of Tiamat, the spirit of confusion, and on this account they believed also that there was nothing absolutely constant in nature, and that the species could change, so that a woman, or a sheep, might bring forth a lion, etc., and infants might have parts of the body like those of animals, such as the eye of a boar, the ear of a lion, etc. To all these departures from the normal, omens were attached; and in all probability they were regarded as being sent by the gods for the information or the warning of men. The following will give some idea of the nature of these forecasts:

'If a woman has brought forth, and there is the ear of a lion, there will be a powerful king in the land.
If a woman has brought forth, and its right ear does not exist, the life of the prince will be long.*
If a woman has brought forth, and its right ear is small, the house of the man will be destroyed
If a woman has brought forth, and from the first his head is filled with grey hairs, the life of the prince will be long.*
If a woman has brought forth 2 males, there will be hardship in the land, etc.
If a woman has brought forth twins for the second time, that country will be destroyed.
If a cow has brought forth 3, and (they are) 2 male and 1 female, hardship of a year—the harvest will not prosper.'†

These omens are exceedingly numerous, and often very difficult to translate.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in the foot-notes.

T. G. PINCHES.

BIRTH (Celtic).—The data concerning the birth-rites of the pagan Celts are lamentably scanty. Aristotle (*Politica*, VII. xv. [xvii.] 2) records that 'many of the barbarians have the custom either of plunging their newborn children (ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γιγνόμενα) into a cold river, or of putting on them scanty covering, as among the Celts.' The Emperor Julian states (*Orationes*, ii.) that with the Celts (though with him this may mean the Germans) the father placed his newborn child on a shield, which was put in the Rhine. If the child was legitimate, the shield would float, but otherwise it would sink, thus affording a test of the fidelity of the mother to her husband. The only other passage which seems to bear upon the birth-rites of the Continental Celts is the curious statement of Strabo (p. 165), that among the Celts, as among the Thracians and Scythians, 'the women themselves, after giving birth, go on with agriculture and also tend their husbands, putting them to bed in their own steads.' This implies the couvade (above, p. 635ᵃ); but this custom is reported in Europe only of the Corsicans (Diodorus Siculus, v. 14)—a fact which would seem to imply a confusion on the part of Strabo between the Celts and the Iberians, a race entirely different ethnologically (cf. Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogerm. Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 347 f.; Hirt, *Indogermanen*, Strassburg, 1905–7, p. 717 f.; in favour of the Celtic explanation, Jullian, *Recherches sur la religion gauloise*, Bordeaux, 1903, p. 64 f.). At the same time, it should be noted that, whatever its racial origin, the couvade existed, at least in clear reminiscence, to a late period in Provence, as is shown by the Picard romance of *Aucassin et Nicolette* (probably early 13th cent.), ch. 39. Another apparent survival of ancient custom is recorded from a 14th cent. source by Ploss (*Das Weib*, Leipzig, 1885, ii. 70), to the effect that no woman was allowed to give birth to a child on certain islands in the mouth of the Loire, but when her time approached was sent to the mainland or placed in a boat in the river until the child was born. Herein, as Ploss notes, we may have a reminiscence of an island, sacred to 'Dionysus,' at the mouth of the Loire (described by Strabo, p. 198), where only women dwelt, all sexual intercourse (which, like birth, would thus be ceremonially impure in Celtic religion) being held on the mainland (but cf. below, p. 692 f.).

The pagan Irish material on birth-rites is still more meagre. According to Stowe MS, No. 992 (ed. and tr. Meyer, *RCel* vi. 173 ff.), Ness, when about to become the mother of Concobar, 'went to the meadow that was on the bank of the river Concobar. There she sat her down on a flagstone (*nos fuirim iarum for in licc cloichthi*) that was on the brink of the river. So there came the pangs of childbirth upon her.' Too much must not, however, be drawn from this, for the *Cóir Anmann*, 213 (ed. and tr. Stokes, in Stokes and Windisch, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1880–1905, iii.), states that a band of girls (*inghenraidh*) kept watch round a prospective mother. After the birth had taken place, the mother 'waited for a lucky hour for the child' (*ib.* 273), *i.e.* probably for the casting of the horoscope, etc. Thus the Druid Cathfaidh observed omens from the stars, the clouds, and the age of the moon immediately after the birth of Déirdre (Hyde, in *Zeit. f. kelt. Philologie*, ii. 143). In the case of the infant who afterwards became the hero Conall Cernach, 'Druids came to baptize the child into heathen baptism, and they sang the heathen baptism (*chansat an mbaithis ngeintlidhe*) over the little child' (*Cóir Anmann*, 251).

LITERATURE.—Jullian, *Recherches sur la religion gauloise*, Bordeaux, 1903, p. 64 f.; Dottin, *Manuel pour servir à l'étude de l'antiquité celtique*, Paris, 1906, pp. 141, 143 f.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

BIRTH (Chinese).—The customs which are observed in China, in connexion with child-birth, differ widely in the various portions of the Empire, and it would be almost as difficult to describe them in general terms as to include in one article 'Birth customs in Europe.'

Many of these customs are significant of religious preconceptions, though it is not always possible to trace the connexion, owing to the gradual deflexion from the ancient usage; and modern explanations tend to emphasize the physical benefits which are supposed to accrue from these observances.

It should be remembered that the elaborate preparations which are made previous to birth are intended to secure not only a happy issue to the anxious crisis—the safety of the child and mother—but their first and primary purpose is to prevent the awful contingency of death before delivery, which would involve the mother in endless torments in the 'Lake of Blood,' which is the special department of the under-world reserved for such unfortunates. From this point of view, therefore, the anxious care which surrounds the birth-chamber may be said to be replete with religious significance.

A month previous to the expected date of birth, the bride's mother, or other near relative on that side of the house, is expected to arrive with the accustomed gifts, and perform the office known as 'undoing the fastening.' The gifts include eatables, various articles of clothing required by the expected arrival (in the South, it seems, no provision of this kind is made), and tonics for the mother with a view to producing a quiet and successful parturition. Charms from the neighbouring temple are sometimes procured to fasten on the baby's body as soon as born, for the event is supposed to be attended by hosts of

* Lit. 'the days of the prince will be old.'
† From *WAI* ii. pl. 65, No. 1, obv. lines 1, 2, 4, rev. line 7; Boissier, *Documents relatifs aux présages*, Paris, 1894–99, p. 115, verso 11, p. 116, 19; and B M. tablet K 78, ll. 2–3.

spirits with malicious designs upon both mother and child.

As soon as the birth-pangs begin to be felt, the female members of the family hasten to light candles and burn incense before the ancestral tablets, in the little shrine over the main partition of the entrance hall, and also in front of the 'god of wealth' and the 'kitchen god,' offering extempore prayers, as no settled form is provided for the occasion, and taking vows of future deeds of merit in the event of a favourable response—and all with a view to securing the assistance of the 'birth-speeding goddess,' who is supposed to have the ordering of such affairs. The midwife is at the same time summoned, together with other assistants, whose office it is to 'clasp the waist' of the expectant mother, who is maintained in a sitting posture throughout the ordeal, and is encouraged to drink a brew of dried 'longan' fruit and thin gruel to sustain her, together with certain medical potions which are held to be very efficacious. Red candles are lighted in the chamber, as for a wedding, and all words of ill-omen are carefully omitted—the idea being the ostentation of a cheerful confidence, and the avoidance of any suggestion of ill or fear.

As soon as the child is born, a messenger is despatched to the nearest lake or pond to procure a small quantity of water, which is then heated for the baby's first bath. (The bath is in some places postponed till the 3rd day; in the farther North it is generally omitted, and a little oil dabbed on the body instead.) The use of such water is said to ensure that the child, when he grows up, will become an expert fisherman. After the bath the child's body is rubbed dry with alum (in some places a raw egg is applied). A pad of fresh cotton-wool is placed over the navel, and the umbilical cord, which is cut at about a foot's length from the body, is rolled up and tightly bound, the long end sloughing away in about a week. The infant's clothes are then put on, in shape like the robes of a Buddhist *bonze*, or monk, probably with a view to deceiving the malignant spirits. (In the South, old garments warm from the wearer's body are put round the child in lieu of baby-clothes.) The male and female 'guardians of the bed' are then respectfully 'worshipped.' The placenta and its attachment are placed in a bottle, hermetically sealed, and put under the bedstead, or sometimes disposed of for the manufacture of pills.

No food is given to the infant during the first twenty-four hours, but at the end of this period three tea-spoonfuls of a liquid compounded of materials representing the five flavours—salt, sour, bitter, pungent, and sweet—are administered before the first drop of milk is allowed. The infant is not supposed to sample its own mother's milk until it has first been supplied from another household, where a baby of the opposite sex is being reared. A bowlful of this milk is obtained, and artificially warmed before being given to the child. A second bath is sometimes administered on the 3rd day, and a great number of articles are presented to neighbours and friends, each symbolical of some good wish, and duck-eggs dyed red are also sent, with the idea of advertising the fact of birth.

At the end of the first month the elaborate ceremonial of head-shaving takes place, and the various gods are 'invited,' *i.e.* by offerings of food, lighted candles, fireworks, etc. The baby-hair is shaved off with the exception of a little spot over the fontanel, which is allowed to grow and is called the 'filial lock.' In the afternoon the ancestors are 'worshipped,' and then follows a feast to which the neighbours and others are invited, each guest arriving armed with some gift, generally some object of superstitious use, such as silver necklets or bangles, which are supposed to moor the infant in the harbour of life, in view of the terrible mortality which prevails amongst young children in China. The child is sometimes taken out for an airing on this day, dressed in all the finery which can be imposed upon him, with amulets and charms to protect him from evil influences—a row of silver-gilt genii upon his bonnet, or perhaps a bright mirror to ward off the evil eye. In some of the country districts he is placed in a boat and subjected to violent rocking, to accustom him to the motion, or he is carried over a bridge in the hope that he may have a 'rise in life,' and also be able to keep his head when high promotion comes.

On the fortieth day the mother goes to the temple to offer incense (in some places, in the case of a boy being born, she goes on the 30th day), and to acknowledge the good hand of the gods in her safe delivery and happy fortune.

LITERATURE.—Dyer Ball, *Things Chinese*[3], Lond. 1900; Women's Conference in China on *Home Life of Chinese Women*.

W. GILBERT WALSHE.

BIRTH (Egyptian).—A tale dating from the end of the Middle Kingdom relates how the wife of the priest of Rē in a local temple gave birth to three sons destined to be kings of Egypt. Four goddesses, Isis, Nephthys, Hôki (*Ḥq·t*, the frog-goddess, consort of Khnum), and Meskhôni (see below), officiated as midwives, having disguised themselves as strolling dancers, while Khnum accompanied them as baggage-carrier. They accepted a bushel of barley for their services; and the mother, we are told, was purified for 14 days ('Le roi Khoufoui et les magiciens,' in Maspero's *Contes popul. de l'Egypte ancienne*[3], 1882, pp. 36–40; Petrie, *Egyp. Tales*, 1895, i. 33ff.). At Deir el-Bahari is pictured the divine birth of Queen Hatshepsut amidst a crowd of deities of birth, food, fortune, etc. (Naville, *Deir el Bahari*, 1898–1901, iii., plates xlvii.–lv.), and at Luxor that of Amenhotep III. (Champollion, *Monumens*, 1825, pl. cccxl.–xli.; Gayet, *Temple de Louxor*, pl. lxv.).

The name of Meskhôni, the goddess perhaps of female functions, is generally characterized by a brick, referring to that which supported the mother, or on which the child was laid. In Ex 1[16], where late Egyptian customs may be reflected, the Hebrew women are represented as delivered on 'stones,' *i.e.* bricks (?) (cf. Spiegelberg, *Randglossen z. AT*, p. 19); and the Coptic *Apocalypse of Elias* (4th cent. A.D., ed. Steindorff) still refers to the 'birth-stool' as 'the brick.' A wooden couch is also figured early as the 'determinative' of Meskhôni as well as in the birth scenes, and probably among the wealthy the brick had only ceremonial importance. The word *tôbi*, 'brick,' is feminine, and the birth-brick, figured with the head of a goddess, is present in detailed illustrations of the Psychostasia; in the Papyrus of Ani (Brit. Mus., ed. Budge) it is accompanied by Shai the god of Fate and the goddesses Meskhôni and Ermûti (*Rnn·t*, 'the Nurse'); in that of Anhai (Brit. Mus., ed. Budge) two bricks with female heads are named Shai (masc.) and Ermûti respectively. In a funerary papyrus at Edinburgh of the year 11–10 B.C. the deceased is stated to have completed the years which Thoth wrote upon his birth-brick (Brugsch, *Rhind's Zwei bilingue Papyri*, 1865); and in the Westcar Papyrus, quoted above, it is Meskhôni who approaches each child laid on its brick-cradle and pronounces its destiny.

In stories dating from the New Kingdom, the Hathors, seven in number in one text, pronounce the destiny; these may include the birth-goddesses already mentioned (Maspero, *l.c.* p. 51). Horoscopes have not been traced with certainty in

Egypt before the Roman age; but some traditions assigned to Egypt the invention of the art, and there are star-tables in two of the royal tombs of the New Kingdom at Thebes which may have been horoscopes (Petrie, *History*, vol. iii.). The day of birth was a day of rejoicing, but nothing is known of ceremonies for it. Circumcision of the child was not performed before puberty. A collection of gynæcological prescriptions for medical, not surgical, treatment dates from the XIIth Dyn. (Griffith, *Kahun Papyri*); and receipts for ascertaining conception and determining the sex or the vitality of the infant to be born are found in the Ebers Papyrus, in a Berlin text published by Brugsch, and in the London and Leyden Magical Papyrus of the 3rd cent. A.D. (Griffith and Thompson). Erman has published a collection of spells for the nursery (*Zauberspruche fur Mutter und Kind*, Berlin, 1901). The word *misi*, 'to bear,' is written , properly three jackals' tails or skins made into a fly-flap, the name of which had this sound; but possibly it was a birth amulet, for in modern Nubia dead jackals laid above the door of the house are considered to protect women from miscarriage, etc. (Blackman, in *Man*, 1909, p. 10).

LITERATURE.—See the references throughout the article.

F. LL. GRIFFITH.

BIRTH (Finns and Lapps).—The only important rites connected with birth among the Finns and Lapps are those purificatory ceremonies which belong to what may be called a form of baptism (see also BAPTISM, p. 372[a]). The existence of a non-ecclesiastical form of infant baptism among the Lapps is witnessed to by Norwegian missionaries of the 18th century. The fullest description of this ceremony is found in E. J. Jessen's 'Afhandling om de norske Finners og Lappers Hedenske Religion,' pp. 33–42 (printed as an Appendix to Knud Leem's *Beskrivelse over Finmarkens Lapper*, 1767; cf. also *ib.* pp. 495–497). After the child was brought home from the official baptism in church, where it had received a Norwegian name, it could not be washed or brought into contact in any way with water until it was baptized anew with a Lapp name (*same-nabma*). The pregnant mother, who had placed herself under the protection of the *sarakka* ('creator woman'), had had the name revealed to her by a deceased person in a dream, or she had been informed, by means of the magic drum, which of the deceased meant to come to life again in the child. The baptism was not administered by the magician but by a woman, usually the mother herself. The so-called *risem-edne* ('twig-mother'), who must not have acted as Christian godmother (*Christ-edne*), presented the child with a ring or plate of brass (*nabma-skiello*), which was thrown into the baptismal water. After the ceremony this piece of brass was placed upon the child to be worn as a talisman—in the case of a son, under the arm; in the case of a daughter, upon the breast. Before the baptism both the child and the water were dedicated to the *sarakka*. Baptism with the Lapp name was regarded as one of the two sacraments of the *sarakka*.

This baptism, which was resorted to in order to secure happiness and good health for the child, often proved insufficient. If the child fell sick or cried a great deal, it was once more re-baptized and received a new name, the so-called *udde-* or *adde-nabma*, or *saivo-nabma* ('under-world name'). This fresh bestowal of baptismal names might be repeated again and again in case of sickness, even in later years. It, too, was administered by a woman, the *laugo-edne* ('wash-mother'), with almost the same ceremonies as the other.

Warm water was poured into a trough, and two birch twigs—one in its natural condition, the other bent into a ring—were laid in it. At the same time the child was thus addressed: 'Thou shalt be as fertile, sound, and strong as the birch from which this twig was taken.' Then the copper (or silver) talisman was cast into the water, with the words: 'I cast the *nabma-skiello* into the water, to wash thee; be as melodious and fair as this brass (or silver).' Then came the formula: 'I baptize thee with a new name, N.N. Thou shalt thrive better from this water, of which we make thee a partaker, than from the water wherewith the priest baptized thee. I call thee up by baptism, deceased N.N. Thou shalt now rise again to life and health, and receive new limbs. Thou, child, shalt have the same happiness and joy which the deceased enjoyed in this world.' As she uttered these words, the baptizer poured water three times on the head of the child, and then washed its whole body. Finally she said: 'Now art thou baptized *adde-nabma*, with the name of the deceased, and I will see that with this name thou wilt enjoy good health.'

In the so-called Naro MS of J. Randulf, published by J. Qvigstad (*Det Kgl. norske Videnskabers Selskabs Skrifter*, 1903, No. 1, pp. 53–55), there is mention only of a species of Lapp baptism which was administered immediately after the church baptism, or at latest within half a year, in cases where the child fell sick. In this baptism the child received a new name, *ude-nemo*. The ceremony was performed on a Thursday, in the name of the three chief Lapp gods, borrowed from the Scandinavians, namely, *Hora-Galles* (Thor), *Waralden-Olmay* (Freyr), and *Bieka-Galles* (Njordr). There was a thrice repeated pouring of water on the child. According to a supplementary note by J. Kildal, the child was baptized in the name of the *Maylmen Radien* ('world-ruler'). It is stated by S. Kildal (*Det skandinaviske Litteraturselskabs Skrifter*, vi. 458 f.) that the name selected was that of the father or grandfather.

Outside the sphere of Norwegian Lapps, our only information concerns a formerly Lapp district in N. Finland, and is to the effect that among the Finn new settlers on the rivers Kemi and Ji, about the year 1750, a re-baptism with a new name (*uusi nimi-kaste*) was not unknown. As late as the year 1803, a peasant, Erik Lampela of Tervola, who had long been an invalid, is said to have caused himself to be re-baptized at Izak, and to have recovered (J. Fellman, *Anteckningar under min vistelse i Lappmarken*, ii. 51–52).

That Lapp infant baptism is an imitation of the Christian ordinance is sufficiently proved by the existence among the Norwegian Lapps of a second sacrament of the *sarakka*, which is an imitation of the Eucharist. A similar 'nature-woman,' 'creatrix,' in magic songs of the Finns is a metamorphosed form of the Virgin Mary; and in like manner the *Radien* (father, wife, child) on the magic drums of the Lapps stand for the Trinity in its popular-Catholic form. Another Christian feature of the ceremony is the thrice repeated pouring of water. The use of a talisman of brass does not point to an original stage of Lapp civilization; it is a case of borrowing from the neighbouring Scandinavians—a conclusion that is confirmed by the mention of the three principal Scandinavian deities. The latter still survived in the popular faith of the Lapps, and their presence is in no way inconsistent with a borrowing of infant baptism during the Catholic period of Scandinavia. It is possible, however, that Lapp infant baptism had already been introduced by half-pagan Scandinavians.

The baptism in question must be distinguished from the bestowal upon the child of the name of an ancestor who was supposed to come to life again in the child's person. The determination of the

name by a revelation in a dream or by the oracle of the magical drum is no doubt a primitive Lapp custom. As late as 1534 the Finns under the dominion of Novgorod (the Chudes) had oracle-men whom they summoned to give a newborn child its name—a ceremony which they performed 'in their own peculiar way.' The magician of the Finn-Ugrian Mountain Cheremisses adopts the following method in bestowing the name. Taking the child in his arms, as it is on the point of screaming, he begins a list of names, swaying the child to and fro as he speaks; and that name which he happens to be uttering when the crying ceases is the one selected. The magician of the adjacent Chuvasses—a Finn-Turkish hybrid race—is called to the child, and is received with tokens of the greatest respect by the domestics and the assembled guests, who with one voice express the desire that he will give the child a name of good omen. He takes a bowl of water in his hand, mutters certain words over it, and gives both the mother and the child to drink. Then he works himself into an ecstasy, and at last bestows upon the child a name which he professes to have received by Divine revelation (see Julius Krohn, *Suomen suvun pakanallinen jumalanpalvelus*, pp. 104, 109).

LITERATURE.—See the references throughout the article.

KAARLE KROHN.

BIRTH (Greek and Roman).—**1. Greek.**—Amongst the goddesses to whom the Greek matron prayed in her throes, Eileithyia, Hera, and Artemis are the foremost (Preller-Robert, *Gr. Mythol.* i. 511 ff.). After these come a number of others, *e.g.* the Hekate-like Eilioneia of Argos, to whom a dog was sacrificed to ensure an easy delivery (Plut. *Qu. Rom.* 52); Genetyllis, who received a like sacrifice (Hesych. *s.v.*; cf. Roscher, ii. 1270; Rohde, *Psyche*, ii.[2], 1898, p. 81, 1); the Nymphs (Eur. *El.* 625 f., cf. F. G. Ballentine, *Harvard Stud.* xv. [1904] p. 74 ff.). Superstitious ceremonies, originating from the idea of binding and unbinding, whose purpose was to ease the birth, and whose age and origin cannot be fixed, are mentioned by Pliny (*HN* xxviii. 33, 34, 42; cf. 59; see also Philologus, lvii. [1898] p. 131). When the birth had ended happily, the women brought their clothes to Artemis as an offering (*Anth. Pal.* vi. 271; schol. *ad Call. Hymn.* i. 77); Artemis Brauronia also received the clothes of women who had died in childbed (Eur. *Iph. Taur.* 1465 ff.). When a child was born in Attica, if it was a boy, an olive-wreath was hung on the outer door; if a girl, a woollen fillet was used, 'because of the spinning of wool' (Hesych. *s.v.* στέφανον ἐκφέρειν). This rationalistic explanation must, of course, be discarded; the underlying artificial differentiation is to be regarded as comparatively late, if, indeed, Hesychius' words correspond to facts. At any rate, a wreath with a woollen fillet attached must be considered as the primary form. The fillet enhances the effect of the wreath. The purpose of the wreath, which still hangs on the door at the *amphidromia* (see below; cf. Ephippos in Athen. p. 370 C), is not, as Rohde (*op. cit.* 72, 1) and Samter (*Familienfeste der Gr. und Rom.* 87) suppose, to lustrate the house, *i.e.* to cleanse it from impurity; it is apotropæic: the luck which it brings drives away ill luck. The woman who is lying-in and the newborn babe require such protection, for they are weak. The numerous amulets, with which it is the custom everywhere to deck small children, have the same purpose. And an olive-wreath is expressly mentioned as one of the protectives given to Ion by his mother when she exposed him (Eur. *Ion*, 1433, Kirchhoff). According to the belief of the Cora Indians, 'the dead would come and harm the (newborn) babe if (the father) did not fix branches of the zapote-tree into the door (Preuss, *ARW* ix. [1906] p. 466). Photius lays stress upon the apotropæic character of a similar rite (*Lex. s.v.* δάμνος), when he relates that, while a child was being born, the house was painted with pitch from thorn-bushes, in order to drive away the evil spirits.* A custom in modern Greece may serve as an analogy: newborn children are rubbed with sacred oil in order to protect them (Wachsmuth, *D. alte Griechenland im Neuen*, 79).

On the fifth day after the birth, the so-called *amphidromia* were celebrated (Plat. *Theæt.* 160 E + schol.; Harpocr., Suid., Hesych. *s.v.*; *Paræmiogr.* ii. 278). Some one, probably the father (the false reading τρέχουσαι in schol. Plat. *l.c.* is explained by the preceding words; cf. Preuner, *Hestia-Vesta*, 54 n.), ran round the hearth with the child in his arms. Friends and relatives came, bringing presents, especially polypi and cuttle-fish. The women who had assisted at the birth and had thereby become unclean (cf. Stengel, *Kultusalt.*[2] 148) cleansed their hands on this day. Banquets were held (Ephippos in Athen. 370 D; Eubulos, *ib.* 65 C); a special kind of bread was baked, if we can trust the incoherent record in the *Etym. Mag. s.v.*; a sacrifice was probably among the celebrations (Plaut. *Truc.* 423 f.). Perhaps the father decided on this day whether he wished to keep the child or to expose it (Plat. *Theæt. l.c.*). Hesychius records an important trait (*s.v.* δρομιάμφιον ἦμαρ); according to him the rite of running round the hearth was performed naked. This, too, is a case of ritual nakedness (cf. *e.g.* Deubner, *de Incub.* 24; Abt, 'Die Apologie des Apulejus,' *Religionsgesch. Vers. und Vorarb.* iv. 246, 1).

Opinions regarding the meaning of running round the hearth are most divergent. The idea of the cleansing influence of the fire must probably be eliminated (Rohde, 72, 1); the interpretation as an ordeal (quoting Plato, *l.c.*, whose simile can, however, not be urged, in view of the decisive data of antiquarian literature), according to which the child originally lay in the fire during the *amphidromia*, is improbable (Gruppe, *Berl. philol. Wochenschr.* 1906, p. 1138).† According to some others, Samter has given the correct explanation (*Familienfeste*, 61), that we find here an initiative rite, which places the child under the protection of the domestic hearth. But this gives no reason for the running. Yet with this rite we seem to reach the lowest stratum of the rites celebrated on this day. By a comparison with folklore parallels, S. Reinach (*Cultes, mythes et religions*[2], 1908, i. 137 ff.) has rendered it very probable that this running round is to ensure fleet-footedness for the child.

In Esthonia the father of the child runs round the church, while the child is being baptized inside, so that it may learn to run quickly. With this compare the custom noted by Wuttke (*D. deutsche Volksabergl.*[3] 1900, p 390), in accordance with which, when returning from the christening, the young godfather takes the child when they arrive at the front door, and quickly runs with it into the room to its mother. This is supposed to ensure that the child will become swift (Brandenburg), or will learn walking early (East-Prussia) In Melanesia, magic formulæ promote the child's walking and talking (*ARW* x. [1907] p. 306). The ancient Mexican festival of ear-piercing gives an interesting analogy. During this festival the children born within the last three years are led round a fire, and also lifted up high, so that they may grow tall. The feast is celebrated with a sacrifice, a banquet and dance (Stoll, *Geschlechtsleben in d. Volkerpsychologie*, 118).

Reinach's explanation is very suitable to a people which gave its favourite hero the epithet ποδώκης ('swift-footed'). The derisive answer of Vürtheim (*Mnemos.* xxxiv. [1906] p. 73 ff.) is not to the point. Scenes illustrating the *amphidromia* do not exist in Greek art.

On the tenth day after its birth the child received its name. This day, too, was a festive one, celebrated with sacrifices and banquets for friends

* A very artificial explanation is given by Rohde, *l.c.*, because he understands it to be a lustrative rite.

† Cf. Glotz, *L'ordalie*, 1904, p. 105.

(Eur. *El.* 1126, fr. 2 Nauck²; Aristoph. *Birds*, 494 and 922 f. + scholl.; Isæus, iii. 30. 70; Demosth. xxxix. 20, 22 [according to whom this festival signified the official recognition of the child], 24, xl. 28, lviii. 40; Harpokr. *s.v.* ἑβδομενομένου and ἐνδεκάζοντας; Hesych. *s.v.* δεκάτην θύομεν; Suidas, *s.v.* ἀμφιδρόμια, δεκάτην ἑστιᾶσαι and δεκατεύειν; Bekker, *Anecd. Gr.* i. 237, 26). A cake called χαρίσιος was baked, and was given, among other things, as a prize for a women's dance that was performed on this day (Eubulos in Athen. 668 D). Besides the tenth day the seventh was used for giving the name ([Aristot.] *Hist. An.* vii. 12; Harpokr. *s.v.* ἑβδομενομένου; Hesych. *s.v.* ἑβδομαι, cf. the ἑβδόμη as a children's festival in Lucian, *Pseudolog.* 16). The day fixed for this festival has varied in different epochs and districts, whereas the *amphidromia* were more important as being a specifically religious custom, and therefore held to their fixed day. For, whenever these are said to have been celebrated on the 7th (Hesych. *s.v.* δρομιάμφιον ἦμαρ) or 10th (schol. Aristoph. *Lysistr.* 757) day, or are brought into connexion with the name-giving (schol. Aristoph. *l.c.*; schol. Plat. *Theæt.* 160 E; Hesych. *s.v.* ἀμφιδρόμια), this is doubtless due to a blunder (cf. also Gruppe, *Berl. philol. Wochenschr.* 1906, p. 1137). The schol. to Aristoph. *l.c.* even commits the error of supposing a running *round the child.* (Similar mistakes occur elsewhere in our records; cf. *e.g.* the form τρέχουσαι above, schol. Plat. *l.c.*) It is not warrantable to infer a coincidence of *amphidromia* and δεκάτη from Eur. *El.* 654 and 1126 (Preuner, *Hestia-Vesta*, 54, 1), for l. 654 cannot be forced into closer concord with l. 1126. The uncertain notice about a sacrificial feast shortly after birth (Bekker, *Anecd. Gr.* i. 207, 13) probably refers to the δεκάτη.

Besides the presents brought at the *amphidromia*, there were also so-called ὀπτήρια, gifts presented to the child by those to whom it was shown for the first time (cf. Spanheim and Schneider, *ad Call. Hymn.* iii. 74). Slaves also gave the newborn babe a present (Terence, *Phorm.* 47). Censorinus (*de Die Nat.* 11, 7) mentions the celebration of the 40th day after the birth as a Greek custom. Even in our time the 40th day is still celebrated (cf. Wachsmuth, *op. cit.* 73 f.). But this would seem traceable to Jewish influence (Wachsmuth, *op. cit.* 74, 7). The rocking of the child in the λίκνον, which is explained as symbolical by Mannhardt (*Mythol. Forsch.*, 1884, p. 369 f.) and Dieterich (*Mutter Erde*, 101 ff.), must be eliminated from the birth-rites. Not only is the sense of the action not clearly thought out, but for such an explanation the rocking must form part of some *rite*, which it does not. On the other hand, the fact that the babe was put into the λίκνον is easily explained, for it was the natural object to use as a small child's cot in a primitive household.

2. Roman.—Roman women made offerings to the Nymph Egeria (cf. the Greek custom) during pregnancy (Festus, p. 77, 10), to ensure an easy birth. While the child was being born, Lucina and Diana (Tertull. *de An.* 39; August. *Civ. Dei*, iv. 11) or Numeria (Varro, *ap.* Non. 352, 34) were called upon. A candle was lit (Tertull. *ad Nat.* ii. 11), as also in Greece in our day a candle burning in the lying-in room has the power of repelling evil (Wachsmuth, *op. cit.* 79; cf. M. Vassitz, 'Die Fackel in Kultus und Kunst der Griechen,' *Munchener Diss.*, Belgrad, 1900, p. 75 f.). The bands with which the women were bandaged were made near the image of some god, therefore probably in a sanctuary (Tertull. *de An.* 39).

When the woman had brought forth a child, three men had to stand round (*circumire*) the threshold, beat it with a hatchet, then with the pestle of a mortar, and then sweep it (August. *Civ. Dei*, vi. 9). This is a cleansing ceremony, which originally was intended to beat the impurity caused by the birth (here felt as a concrete matter) out of the threshold, and to sweep it away. At a later period the ceremony was explained (Aug. *l.c.*) as a protection against Silvanus, who, as a goblin or nightmare, might trouble the woman in childbed. In addition, there were three special deities who were regarded as protectors of mother and newborn babe: Intercidona (from *intercidere*), Pilumnus (from *pilum*), Deverra (from *deverrere*) (*ib.*)—an excellent example of the way in which gods grow out of rites. Pilumnus (together with Picumnus) even receives a sacrificial meal (*lectus*) in the house, in order to protect the woman in childbed (Varro, *ap.* Serv. *Verg. Aen.* x. 76, and *ap.* Non. 528, 15; cf. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Romer*, 357, 1). In the same way Juno was given a *lectus*, and Hercules a *mensa*, after the birth of a boy (Serv. *Verg. Ecl.* iv. 62); for a whole week a table was spread for Juno, according to Tertull. (*de An.* 39). On the last day of the week the *Fata Scribunda* were invoked (cf. Wissowa, *op. cit.* 214). It is Dieterich's merit to have drawn our attention to the custom described by Augustine (*Civ. Dei*, iv. 11), according to which the newborn babe was placed upon the ground and then picked up again (*Mutter Erde*, 6 ff.)—a custom which may be identical with the *tollere* or *suscipere* by the father (Samter, *op. cit.* 62, 3. 4). Only, the signification of this wide-spread custom cannot be that the child is placed under the protection of the earth as a goddess, but that the strength of the earth is to penetrate into the child and make it strong (*e.g.* Marcell. Empir. 32, 20). A rite which bears some affinity to this consists in placing the child erect on the ground, thereby ensuring its upright growth (Varro, *ap.* Non. 528, 12; Tertull. *de An.* 39, cf. *ad Nat.* ii. 11; Varro, *ap.* Non. 532, 18; August. *Civ. Dei*, iv. 21). As in Greece, so also in Rome, wreaths were hung outside the door (Juvenal, ix. 85).

When the first week was over, the child was given its name on the *dies lustricus*: boys on the 9th, girls on the 8th day (Festus, p. 120, 19; Plut. *Qu. Rom.* 102; Macrob. *Sat.* i. 16, 36; see, further, Marquardt-Mau, *Privatleben d. Romer*, 1879, p. 83, 6). We have no information as to the lustrative ceremonies indicated in the name of the day. A sacrificial offering is recorded by Tertull. (*de Idol.* 16), who also uses the appellation 'Nominalia' for this day (*l.c.*). The difference in the treatment of boys and of girls is perhaps originally due to the difference of length of the ancient week, which varied between seven and eight days (Mommsen, *Rom. Chronolog.*² 229).

LITERATURE.—Chr. Petersen, 'Über die Geburtstagsfeier bei den Griechen,' *Jahrb. f. klass. Philol.*, Suppl. B. II. [1856] 285 ff.; Preuner, *Hestia-Vesta* (1864), 52 ff.; Becker-Goll, *Charikles* (1877–78), ii. 20 ff.; Hermann-Blumner, *Privatalterthumer* (1882), 278 ff.; Ussing, *Erziehung und Unterricht bei d. Griech. und Rom.* (1885), 26 ff.; Iwan Müller, *Privatalterthumer*² (1893), 160 ff.; Samter, *Familienfeste d. Griech. und Rom.* (1901) 59 ff.; Schömann-Lipsius, *Alterthumer*, ii. (1902) 590 f.; Daremberg-Saglio, *Dict. des antiquités*, i. 238 f.; Pauly-Wissowa, i. 1901 f.; W. R. Paton, in *CR* xvi. 290; Marquardt, *Rom. Staatsverwaltung*, iii.²(1885) 11 ff.; cf. Riess in Pauly-Wissowa, i. 91 f.

L. DEUBNER.

BIRTH (Hindu, literary).—Birth, marriage, and death are the three most important events of the natural life; and popular belief has surrounded them with a number of ceremonies, which are designed to secure the accomplishment of good wishes and to avert evil influences. The great advantage which students of Indian philology possess, as compared with those of other philologies, consists in the abundance of the materials at their disposal affording precise and detailed information on all the different branches of Indian culture.

The acts which accompany the events of the domestic life are described especially in the *Gṛhya-sūtras*, partly in the Law-Books, or, as circumstances require, in medical works. These books possess all the greater interest for the history of civilization, in that the ceremonies which they describe go back in large part to a pre-historic epoch, and are related to customs which are found in a most primitive stage of human development, and, on the other hand, have been partially preserved in India down to the present day. Into all the details of these texts it is impossible to enter. The facts which seem to be most noteworthy may here be summarized.

The *garbhādhāna*, 'the second marriage,' the ceremony of consummation, which corresponds to the *putriya vidhi* of the medical texts (Jolly, *op. cit. inf.* p. 50), marks in all cases the initial step. Although not usually referred to in the *Gṛhya-sūtras*, it is known to the Law-Books, and may be regarded as a universal practice. The appropriate time is *ṛtu*, the days or rather the nights (for the daytime is excluded) from the beginning of menstruation until the 16th day, with the exception of the first four, the 11th and 13th, and certain dates especially named, *e.g.* the time of new and full moon. Peculiar importance is attached to the selection of the *nakṣatras*. Yājñavalkya, for example (i. 80), directs that Maghā and Mūla are to be avoided. Other texts, especially the astronomical, go still further, and distinguish between constellations, the choice of which will be attended by complete or partial success, or, on the other hand, followed by failure. Manu (iii. 46 ff.), and to the same effect other texts (*e.g.* Yājñavalkya, i. 79), prescribe cohabitation on the even nights for the man who desires a son; daughters are born as a consequence of cohabitation on the uneven nights. The same texts, clearly under the influence of certain ancient teachers of physiology (Jolly, § 39, p. 51), represent the view that if the seminal fluid preponderates, a boy will be born; if the blood of menstruation is in excess, a female embryo is formed; if there is an equipoise of power, the issue will be twins or even a 'not-man,' 'impotent' (Manu, iii. 49). Bṛhaspati shows how it is possible to assist nature, and by the use of oily foods to increase the male seed. If other days than those named are chosen, *e.g.* the period *after* the *ṛtu* or the actual days of menstruation, a penalty is incurred.

The woman is impure during the first three days of the *menses*; she must avoid excessive food, laughter, or the sight of other men. Several texts, however, allow, on the appearance of the first *ṛtu*, the use of garlands, scents, and betel-nuts. On the fourth day she takes a bath, puts on clean clothes, and at his call appears adorned in the presence of her husband. Cohabitation is effected in an enclosed spot, and is subject, as regards the choice of place, to certain limitations. The *Viṣṇupurāna*, for example (iii. 11, 17 ff.), excludes sacred places and cross-roads. According to some authorities, a lamp should be kept burning, which is kindled by the woman at another light with the help of a small piece of wood, and may be extinguished only by her. The husband recites the text, 'May Viṣṇu prepare thy womb,' lays aside the gold ring that he may be wearing on his forefinger, and cohabitation is completed while he repeats various sacred texts on the subject, for the details of which reference is made by the *Saṁskāraratnamālā* to the *Pañchasāyaka* and other works of the *Kāmaśāstra*. The medical texts are still more precise in details than are those that describe the ritual.

If this ceremony proves unsuccessful, recourse is had, according to the statement of the *Gṛhyapariśiṣṭa* (a collection supplementary to the *Gṛhyasūtras*), to an act that serves the purpose of driving off the obstructing *pretas*, or spirits. This is the so-called *nārāyaṇabali*, a kind of offering to the departed spirits or demons, by which Viṣṇu is to 'purify' the *preta*; or the *preta* that is supposed to have assumed the form of Viṣṇu is propitiated. A *nāgabali*, or offering to snakes, is also to be made, which atones for sins committed against snakes in the present or former births (a deadly blow, etc.), and which is merely a second offering to the dead for those who conceived of the dead as existing in the form of snakes. The *putriyā-iṣṭi*, which Daśaratha, for example, causes to be offered (*Raghuvaṁśa*, x. 4), is different, and is designed to secure a son. It consists, according to the *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā*, in the presentation of cakes to Agni Putravat and to Indra Putrin.

The Purāṇas and other texts prescribe for *the time of pregnancy* a large number of directions for both husband and wife, which are partly of a dietetic and partly of a superstitious nature. Thus, for example, the woman must not bathe in water, or allow her hair to be loose, or lie with the head high or low, or speak without adding an auspicious word, etc. The Law-Books also, such as Yājñavalkya (iii. 79), interpose with various regulations, making it a duty, for instance, to fulfil the wishes of the woman during this period, since otherwise the embryo would be exposed to injury.

Of other observances which follow on conception, the best known is the *puṁsavana*, the generating of a male, which takes place in the second, third, or even fourth month—as Pāraskara says, 'before the child stirs'—and is to assure the birth of a son. Here also, as elsewhere, the selection of the constellation exercises an influence on the rite. But a magical character is most clearly stamped on those usages which give external expression to the wish, and seek to modify the course of events by means of spells. The Hiraṇyakeśins recite the text, 'Thou art a bull,' and place in the hand of the woman a barley-corn, with two grains of mustard-seed,—in obvious imitation of the male generative organ,—add a drop of sour milk, and cause the whole to be drunk as the 'generating of a male.' Or a shoot of a Nyagrodha tree, hung on both sides with fruit, a blade of Kuśa grass, or a twig of the same plant, are pulverized and placed by the husband or other near relative in the right nostril of the woman. Even entirely different objects may be employed for the same purpose, as a silk-worm or a chip from that side of the north-eastern sacrificial post which is turned towards the fire. The inhaling also of the smoke from the fire kindled with the fire-sticks (*araṇis*) is enjoined *Saṁskāraratnamālā*, p. 815).

A further ceremony, which precedes or follows the *puṁsavana*, is the *sīmantonnayana*, the parting of the hair of the head, which is performed on the woman when she bears her first child. Various utensils (in due order or at option) are necessary for the purpose; the quill of a porcupine furnished with three white spots, and a branch of the Udumbara tree or *Ficus indica*, bearing an even number of unripe fruits, are prescribed by all texts. The former served to trace the parting, the latter was as a rule tied afterwards to the woman. Players on the lute concluded the ceremony with songs; and among these, according to the statement of some texts (cf. Hillebrandt, *Ritualliteratur*, pp. 43, 44), was to be found a verse giving the name of the native stream. The customs were clearly very different in the different families. Gobhila, for example, makes no mention of the lute-players, but represents Brahman women as sitting with the young wife, and addressing to her auspicious words, such as 'mother of heroes,' 'mother of living sons.'

He enjoins also the cooking of rice and sesamum, upon which the woman has to look. She is asked, 'What do you see?' and answers, 'Descendants.' Many of these customs have not as yet received any ethnological illustration, and need to be explained by comparison with the similar practices of other peoples.

The actual *delivery* takes place in a separate house or room, into which the male members of the family have no right of entrance. At the door a fire is lighted to provide for ordinary purposes as well as to keep off evil spirits. Hiraṇyakeśin (ii. 2, 8) directs that at the time of delivery a bowl of water should be placed at the woman's head and a Tūryantī plant at her feet; and enjoins the performance of various ceremonies with the recitation of texts, one of which is actually found in the Rigveda (v. 78, 79), to relieve and expedite the birth. Whether the several acts are due to a superstitious or to a medical motive is often difficult to determine, owing to the close relation between medicine and magic. Different plants are employed as embrocations or internal remedies; others are merely hung up, or given to the woman for good luck; and fruits with a name of masculine gender are put into her hand. One text (cf. *Saṁskāraratnamālā*, p. 827) prescribes a definite amount of sesamum oil to be stirred from left to right with blades of Dūrvā grass, a part given to the woman to drink, the rest poured on the *yoni*, and the blades placed in her hair. The *Yantraprakāśa* ordains for the time of delivery a diagram of nine compartments, in which are entered from the N.E., N., N.W., etc., in succession the numbers 8, 3, 4, etc.

If the *fœtus is obstructed*, a medical prescription (cf. Jolly, *l.c.*) lays it down that the vagina is to be fumigated by means of the skin of a black snake or with certain plants, or a particular plant given into the woman's hand. Various embrocations facilitate the coming away of the after-birth, and the same purpose is served also by a decoction in which has been steeped, as the most curious medicine, the right ear torn from a living male ass. Continual fumigations with offerings of sesamum and rice serve to drive away the evil spirits which at that time imperil the life of the woman and her newborn child. Whenever the attendants enter they must throw fresh fuel on the fire. The climax of danger is reached on *the sixth day*, which up to the present time in India is dedicated to the Goddess of the Sixth. This day is especially perilous, because on it, or shortly after, the child is exposed to tetanus through unskilful severing of the navel-cord (Jolly). The *Bālatantra* (quoted in the *Saṁskāraratnamālā*, p. 846) knows of more detailed regulations, intended to ward off or conciliate this *Ṣaṣṭī* and other hostile goddesses. It is prescribed that men with swords in their hands shall keep watch, women sing, lamps be kept burning, weapons and clubs laid in the house of the woman, while the father repeats *om* and the *vyāhṛtis*, etc.

For the *newborn* child ceremonies of 'animation,' 'endowment with understanding,' 'tendering of the breast,' and 'naming' are observed. At the first the father must thrice exhale and inhale over the child, or whisper into his navel or right ear some texts relating to a long life. Brahmans are stationed towards the five directions of the heavens, and have to say in order *prāṇa*, *vyāna*, etc. Before this act the boy is fed with a food compounded of butter, honey, and certain other materials. This last as well as the former 'animation' are ceremonies which go back to a remote time, and, as Weber (*Indische Streifen*, 1868, iii. 170) and Speijer (*Jātakarma*, p. 103) have shown, are found also among other peoples. Hiraṇyakeśin's instructions are to take gold, an axe and a stone, to hold the boy over them, and give expression to good wishes for his life. Further ceremonies are recognized by the medical texts (Jolly, 'Medicin,' *GIAP*, § 43, p. 58).

The *endowment with understanding* consists in thrice whispering into the ear of the child the words, 'May the god Savitṛ grant wisdom,' or another text, or the word *vāch*; or in placing butter in his mouth with a golden vessel, while reciting the text, 'May Mitra-Varuṇa grant thee understanding.'

The third ceremony is the first formal *tendering of the breast*, when the father lays the boy on the breast of the mother. The fourth is the important *nāmakaraṇa*. On the giving of the name many peoples have laid great stress (Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, 1897, p. 93 ff.; cf. also Kroll, *ARW*, viii. Suppl. p. 49 ff.); and this is no less true of the Indians, who give explicit directions in the ritual and astronomical texts. The ceremony takes place usually on the tenth day. The phonetic value of the chief name is of great importance, and all minutiæ demand attention. The second name is an astronomical name, which may be formed by derivation by means of a suffix, or by simple masculine inflexion of the name of the constellation (Phalguna, from Phalgunī; Hillebrandt, *Rituallitteratur*, § 15). See NAMES.

Immediately after the giving of the name, the woman rises up, and this may therefore be regarded as the closing ceremony of the birth-rites.

LITERATURE.—S. C. Bose, *The Hindoos as They are*[2], Calcutta, 1883, p. 22 ff.; W. Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India*, new ed., 2 vols., London, 1896, i. 264, 277, the Bibliography in vol. ii. 327 ff.; A. Hillebrandt, 'Rituallitteratur Indische Opfer und Zauber,' Strassburg, 1897 [*Grundriss der indoarischen Philologie und Altertumskunde*, iii. 2]; J. Jolly, 'Recht und Sitte,' Strassburg, 1896 [*ib.* ii. 8], and 'Medicin,' Strassburg, 1901 [*ib.* iii. 10]; Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], London, 1891; F. S. Speijer, *de Ceremoniis apud Indos, quæ vocatur jātakarma*, Lugdun. Batav., 1872; 'Saṁskāraratnamālā,' in *Ānandāśramasaṁskṛta-granthāvali*, Poona, 1899, 2 vols., which contain a collection of data from earlier and later sources, which have been largely drawn upon in the present article. The original texts are translated in *SBE*, vols. xxix. xxx., 'Gṛhya-Sūtras,' tr. by H. Oldenberg and F. Max Muller; vols. ii. xiv. 'Sacred Laws of the Aryas,' tr. by G. Buhler; vol. vii. 'Institutes of Vishnu,' tr. by J. Jolly; vol. xxv. 'Manu,' tr. by G. Buhler; vol. xxxiii. 'Minor Law-Books,' tr. by J. Jolly.

A. HILLEBRANDT.

BIRTH (Hindu, popular).—A Hindu woman, when the time of her delivery is at hand, lies in a room on the ground floor, on a cot which must be strung with hempen cord, and not with the cotton tape which is used for ordinary beds. In the room is placed some iron article (iron being a powerful averter of evil), and the woman lies with her head to the north or east, as do all Hindus, for the other cardinal points are dangerous. Should the delivery be delayed, it is believed that, in spite of the precautions taken, the powers of evil are in the ascendant, and, with a view to bringing their working to nought, the lying-in woman is advised: (*a*) to sell that part of the floor on which her cot stands, so that the evil spirits may be led to believe that they have to do with the purchaser (the midwife), who on account of her very low caste is immune from evil; (*b*) to call upon the name of the household god, or the family *guru* (spiritual guide), or of some *satī* (woman who has immolated herself on the pyre of her husband) who is famous on account of her act of wifely devotion; (*c*) to drink the water with which a charm, written by a Brahman, has been washed off, or that in which the feet of her husband, her mother-in-law, or a young virgin have been washed; (*d*) in regions in which rice forms the staple diet of the people, to step seven times over the rice-pounder, this being supposed to hasten labour.

In many cases there is bound on the belly of the lying-in woman a charm, written by a 'skilful man.' This may be a double equilateral triangle, or a collection of magic words such as this:

hrôm hrôm hrôm	hrôm	hrôm hrôm
hrôm	Name of the woman is written here.	klôm klôm
klôm	hrôm	kôm kôm

The above charm is so powerful, that, were it bound on the woman's loins, instead of on her belly, she would never be delivered; so the present writer was assured.

As soon as the child is born, it is placed in a grain-sifting tray, in which have been put cow-dung, ashes, turmeric, and a few coins, and is sprinkled with water. If it be a man-child that has been born, a brass tray is beaten to scare away evil spirits; and as this is never done on the birth of a girl, whose sex protects her against evil, the men of the family know when a boy is born, and fire guns to show their joy. Until the placenta is expelled, every one in the lying-in room must keep silence, lest the placenta again ascend into the womb. As soon as the after-birth is expelled, the child is washed with warm water, dried, and laid on the cot beside the mother, after the midwife has passed her little finger into its nostrils and anus, to widen these apertures so that the child may not suffer from shortness of breath or constipation. The umbilical cord is tied in two places, about 4 cm. from the navel, and cut between these with an iron knife, or a strip of the outer skin of the bamboo, as soon as the placenta is expelled. The placenta is then put into a hole which has been dug in a corner of the room, and a fire is lighted on the spot and kept burning for four or five days. While the placenta is being disposed of, the head of the lying-in woman is bound up, and she is fumigated with the smoke of the burning seeds of *Carum copticum*, which have been thrown on a brazier. This is placed under her cot, and is kept there, however hot the season of the year, for ten days. The doors and windows of the room are kept shut, and light is given by an oil-dip lamp, which is kept alight night and day. As the clothes soiled by the discharges incidental to delivery are not removed till the fourth or fifth day, the state of the atmosphere of the lying-in room, when the shade temperature is 41° C., may be guessed. The woman may drink only of a decoction of ginger, cloves, and the seeds of *Carum copticum* and *Helicteres isora*, in which have been boiled some copper coins. The pot in which the decoction is prepared is touched by seven boys if the infant be a boy, and by seven unmarried girls if it be a girl; these children receive sweetmeats for their services.

When the astrologer, to whom news of the birth has been conveyed, comes to the house, he takes the data on which the calculation of the child's horoscope is to be based, and fixes the time at which the infant is to be put to the breast for the first time, and that at which the mother may be fed: for four days if she have borne a boy, and for five if she have borne a girl, she will be allowed only sweetmeat balls made of coarse sugar, long pepper, ginger, coco-nut, saffron, gum acacia, etc. Her ordinary food she may not have, because during this period the low-caste midwife stays in the room with her.

On the fourth or fifth day the soiled clothes are removed from the room and given to the washerman to be washed. The mother and child are then bathed by the midwife in water in which the leaves of the Nim (*Azadirachta indica*) have been boiled, after which she takes some of the water in the hollow of her right hand, and waves it seven times, with the sun, round the head of the mother, in whose lap the child lies, and then throws the water away in the direction of the door of the room. In some castes this water-waving, which is designed to avert evil, is done only three times. Afterwards the mother sits on the cot, from which the soiled bedding has been removed, with the child in her lap, and dries her hair in the smoke of the seeds of *Carum copticum*, which have been thrown on the brazier: the hair is believed to be a favourite point of entrance of evil into the body. On this day all the earthen pots that are in the house are thrown away, and a feast is given, to which men of low caste are invited, as on the tenth day after a death (see DEATH [Hindu]). Of the food prepared for this feast the mother is given a small quantity, and on the following day she returns to her ordinary diet, the midwife being dismissed and her place taken by the barber's wife, who does not live in the lying-in room, as the midwife did during her term of office; but the mother may not eat after sunset, the time at which the influence of evil is most to be feared, until thirty days have elapsed from the date of her delivery.

On the tenth day the astrologer brings the horoscope of the child, and on it are put some blades of grass, on which are sprinkled a few drops of water, and then water with which turmeric has been mixed; then a few grains of uncooked rice are scattered on the horoscope, and the name of the child is chosen by the father from a few names, appropriate to the time of birth, which the astrologer reads out. This name becomes the ceremonial name of the child, whose ordinary name is that given to it by a certain woman-member of the family, whose relationship varies in different castes.

After the tenth day the family barber is sent round to announce the birth to friends and relatives at a distance. He presents to those to whom he bears the news sweetmeats made of coarse sugar, clarified butter, almonds, raisins, coco-nut, etc., which have been prepared at the house in which the birth took place; and it is taken to be a grave insult to omit to send these sweetmeats to any one who can claim the right to receive them.

From the fourth or fifth day till the thirtieth day after the birth of the child, it may be bathed only on Wednesday or Sunday; on the other days of the week its body is anointed with sesamum oil, with which some castes mix turmeric, which from its colour is an averter of evil.

LITERATURE.—H. A. Rose, 'Hindu Birth Observances in the Punjab,' in *JAI* xxxvii. (1907) p. 220; W. D. Sutherland, in *Munchener med. Wochenschrift*, 1906; and the literature appended to the previous article.

W. D. SUTHERLAND.

BIRTH (Jewish).—1. Biblical.—(1) *Notions and practices surrounding childbirth.*—The mystery of birth and procreation is euphemistically expressed in the Bible by 'knowing.' 'And Adam knew Eve his wife; and she conceived, and bare Cain' (Gn 4^{1}), is the first statement in the Bible regarding conception and birth, though a little earlier the condition is laid down, 'I will greatly increase thy pain and thy conception; in pain thou shalt bring forth children' (Gn 3^{16}). Nothing further is found in the Bible as to the first stages of human life, before it enters the world in a concrete form. Many speculations were rife at a later period about these stages, and legends have been handed down concerning the life of the child in the mother's womb. The pains and pangs of travail are often referred to by the prophets, and used in a figurative sense to express the throes of a new birth of nations and of the heavens. According to Ex $1^{15ff.}$, specially trained women assisted in childbirth, which took

place on the birth-stool, on which the midwives had to look, in order to ascertain whether the newborn babe was a male or a female. Moreover, we learn that the 'Hebrew women are not as the Egyptian women; for they are lively, and are delivered ere the midwife come unto them' (Ex $1^{15\text{-}19}$). Cases of difficult and dangerous births are, however, also recorded in the Bible, in some of which the issue was fatal to the mother. Such was the case with Rachel (Gn 35^{17}), and with the wife of Phinehas, who died in giving birth to a son; for she heard, whilst in the throes of delivery, of the untimely death of her husband (1 S $4^{19ff.}$). While still in the womb, children, according to Biblical tradition, were believed to be fully conscious: Jacob and Esau 'struggled together within her' (Gn 25^{22}); and, when Tamar was delivered of twins, the children came out, not like Jacob holding the heel of Esau in his hand, but one put out his hand first, and then drew it back, and then the brother came forth first (Gn $38^{28f.}$). Other cases of irregular birth and their treatment will be dealt with later on. For it is necessary to follow up the references, as much as possible, in some historical order, treating the Biblical period practically as one for our purpose.

(2) *Fruitfulness a blessing.*—To have a large family was (and is still) considered a great blessing. The very first blessing mentioned in connexion with the creation of man is: 'Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth' (Gn 1^{28}); and the references throughout the Bible to this blessing of a large family and to the reverse—the misfortune of childlessness—are numerous. That woman is praised in the gates who has a large family, especially of sons (Pr 31^{28}), and the barren sits as a mourner in the midst of the festive gathering (1 S 1^{7}). Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah, Hannah and Peninnah, and others are cases in point. Barrenness and widowhood stand on the same plane; both are objects of pity and commiseration. No wonder, therefore, that from the very beginning means were sought to remove this reproach and to get children. The *dûdā'îm* of Gn $30^{14ff.}$ have been identified with mandragora, a fruit credited with specific qualities for fruitfulness. But in the Bible the belief is more prominent that, by means of prayer and intercession, barren women could obtain children. Isaac entreated the Lord on behalf of Rebecca, because she was barren (Gn 25^{21}). When Rachel was angry with Jacob, he replied: 'Am I in God's stead, who hath withheld from thee the fruit of the womb?' (Gn 30^{2}); and later on (30^{22}): 'And God remembered Rachel, and God hearkened unto her, and opened her womb.' Similarly in the case of Hannah (1 S 1). The same agency could work also in the opposite direction, and close the womb of the once fruitful, and render them barren. So, when Abraham prayed to God, 'God healed Abimelech, and his wife, and his maidservants; and they bare children. For the Lord had fast closed up all the wombs of the house of Abimelech' (Gn $20^{17f.}$).

No other means are mentioned in the Bible for assisting women in obtaining children. Nor do we find remedies or precautions mentioned, or aught else, preceding the birth. The children were, no doubt, born on the floor of the house. The child lay first on the ground. Then it was washed in water, rubbed with salt, swathed in swaddling clothes, and given to the mother to be suckled (Ezk 16^{4}). Occasionally a wet nurse is mentioned in the Bible, like Deborah the nurse of Rebecca (Gn 35^{8}), or the mother of Moses, who was taken by the daughter of Pharaoh to suckle the child found in the river (Ex $2^{7\text{-}9}$).

(3) *Uncleanness of the mother.*—The birth of a child made the mother unclean, in the first place, for seven days; and then, if it was a son, thirty-three days; and if a daughter, sixty-six days. At the end of that period lustration or purification took place, and the woman brought an offering to the Temple (Lv $12^{2ff.}$).

(4) *Primogeniture.*—Although the mother is unclean after giving birth, none of that uncleanness attaches to the newborn child. On the contrary, the firstborn, that which 'openeth the womb,' is consecrated to God, be it human, be it animal. The firstborn enjoyed special privileges, and already, in the patriarchal time, had the right of leader. He probably had also preference in inheritance above the other members of the family (cf. Jacob and Esau). In the last dispositions of Jacob (Gn 49), Reuben is deprived of his privileges of primogeniture; and, although not expressly stated, the double portion, which, according to the Mosaic legislation, was given to the firstborn, is there given to Joseph. This is made evident in 1 Ch 5^{1}. The firstborn at a certain time was invested with sacramental rights; later on, his place was taken by the Levites. The male firstborn was originally the family priest. The dedication, as in the case of Samuel, was evidently to the service in the Temple. Traces of sacrifice of the firstborn male, practised by the nations living in Palestine, are found in the Bible, but were condemned by the Law. Since the Levites took the place of the firstborn, these were 'redeemed' at the completion of thirty days after birth (see art. REDEMPTION). The succession to the throne and to the office of high priest went to the firstborn, with the exception of Solomon, who took the place of Adonijah (1 K $1^{11f.}$), and of Eleazar through the death of his elder brothers (Lv $10^{1ff.}$). The priestly character of the firstborn has to a certain extent been retained in the service of the Synagogue, where, in the absence of Levites, a firstborn present washes the hands of the *Kohanim* (descendants of Aaron) before they ascend the rostrum in front of the Ark to bless the congregation.

(5) *Naming the child.*—After an indefinite period, ranging from one to three years, the child was weaned, and the occasion was celebrated by some public festivities (Gn 21^{8}, Ex $2^{9f.}$). From the time of Abraham onwards the male child was circumcised on the eighth day, but it is not clear from the Biblical account whether the name was given on that occasion. In many instances the name was settled before the birth of the child, and had a symbolical meaning; and on other occasions it had a commemorative character, being connected with events at the birth. Examples of the former are Isaac (Gn 21^{6}), Immanuel (Is 7^{14}), or Jezreel (Hos 1^{4}); of the latter, the twelve sons of Jacob—nay, his own name and that of Esau, etc. Nowhere is a definite date mentioned for the giving of the name. Nor do we find, except in rare cases, a change of name; *e.g.* when a king ascends the throne, his name is sometimes slightly or altogether changed. In the case of girls, names of animals are often taken as prototypes: thus *Rachel*, *Tamar*, *Zipporah* ('lamb,' 'palm tree,' 'bird'), in addition to other symbolical names. In later times, but still within the period covered by the Bible, the grandson often gets the name of the grandfather, such as (2 S 8^{17}) Ahimelech, son of Abiathar, son of Ahimelech.

A few more details concerning birth and early infancy could be gleaned from the Bible, but they would not carry our knowledge much further. The above brief sketch was absolutely necessary for the understanding of the development which took place in the course of subsequent centuries. The Biblical data form the starting-points or the justification for legends, beliefs, and practices which cluster round the birth of children. Each of their stages is governed entirely by the details found in the

Bible. Some have been greatly expanded; others have been interpreted in a peculiar manner; and for a number of practices borrowed, no doubt, from other nations, or survivals of popular habits and moods, a support has been sought in the verses, and precedents found in, or read into, the Bible. The people did not study the Scriptures with any critical intent, and what is found written down therein was the hallowed example. The way in which we may feel inclined to interpret those facts did not obtain with the people. It is now for us to follow that tradition in the spirit in which it was understood and accepted by the people, and upon the lines along which it developed.

2. Post-Biblical.—The second period, stretching from the 1st cent. down to modern times, embraces a variety of practices, of which few may claim universal acceptance. Some may have belonged to one country only or to one period; others were perhaps more widely spread. A good many of these practices are now known only from books, and are little followed in modern life. Others have not yet been sufficiently sifted and verified as to the extent to which they are followed. They cover a large area—Western Asia, North Africa, and the whole of Europe. In some instances it can be proved that a more modern author has simply copied older texts, and embodied these in his collection. An endeavour will here be made to present the data in some chronological order, taking first the references found in the Mishna and the Talmud and other older Rabbinical writings from the 1st to the 5th cent., and then proceeding to works from the 6th to the 18th, finishing with a few quite modern practices, following, as far as possible, the order of the Biblical data.

(1) *Beliefs connected with the pre-natal period of the child's existence.*—The mystery of birth is now no longer veiled. In Talmudical times the notion emerges that a special angel, 'Lailah,' presides at the very beginning of conception, and through his intermediation the embryo is brought before the Divine throne, where his future is decided upon, his station in life is determined, and also whom he is going to marry. At the bidding of God, a spirit enters the sperm, and then it is returned to the womb of the mother. There the child lies folded up with its head between its knees. Two angels watch over it. A light burns over its head, by which it sees from one end of the world to the other. In the morning an angel carries it into Paradise, and shows it all the righteous who had lived a good life in this world; and in the evening he takes it to hell, and shows it the torments of the wicked. Finally, he orders the child to come forth, and he strikes it, thereby extinguishing the light, and causing it to forget whatever it had seen whilst in the womb of the mother (cf. *Chronicle of Jerahmeel*, ed. Gaster, ch. ix. pp. 19 ff. and lxiii ff.). A later legend adds that the indenture on the upper lip under the nose is the place struck by the angel; hence that indenture. Whatever the child hereafter learns is merely a remembrance of the knowledge acquired during its life as an embryo. Another equally ancient treatise contains an anatomical description of the gradual formation of the body of the child and the changes during gestation. But, in spite of the direct Divine influence assumed here on the shape of the child, other traditions say that external influences, especially at the monthly lustration, had a decided effect upon the shape and the mentality of the offspring. An ancient legend, preserved in many versions, tells how the superhuman beauty of the high priest Ishmael was due to the fact that his mother had returned to the bath, time after time, after meeting first a pig, then a dog, and then an ass. Each time after such an animal which would have had an evil influence had met her, she returned, until at last Meṭaṭron, the Angel of the Face, came and met her on the way home, and she then conceived and bare a son as beautiful as the countenance of that angel. The meeting with a dog has the effect of making the child's face like a dog's; that with an ass would make the child stupid; and that with a pig would cause the child to have unclean habits. For that reason, R. Johanan placed himself at the gate of the bath-house, so that the women returning home should look at him, who was renowned for his beauty. As a proof of such influence is adduced the experiment of Jacob with the sheep (Gn 30^{39}). The black wife of an Ethiopian king was delivered of a white child; the father suspected the mother, but, having been asked by R. 'Aḳiba whether there were white images in his bed-chamber, he answered in the affirmative. This, then, said R. 'Aḳiba, was the reason why she had given birth to a white child. The same motive appears in the *Ethiopica* of Heliodorus. Other ailments in children are also due to the carelessness or callousness of the parents during the period of impurity. Leprosy is one of the results, and dumbness and deafness, as well as other infirmities. A woman may not cut her nails during the period of her impurity and drop them on the ground, lest a man tread on them and be stricken with boils. The children may also be so affected during gestation as to be changed into animals or birds, or even locusts; whereupon the woman miscarries, and her ritual status is determined by the degree of human form which the thing born has (Mishn. *Niddah*, iii. 2; cf. Ch. M. Horowitz, *Uralte Toseftas . . . aus dem 2–5 Jahrhundert*, Krakau, 1890, *passim*).

(2) *Fruitfulness.*—Means are mentioned to prevent barrenness. The women, we are told, mocked the wife of Manoah (Jg 13), and said to her: 'If you wish to get children, take the skin of a fox, burn it in fire, take the ashes and mix them with water, and drink of that water three days, three times each day, and you will get a child' (Horowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 19). 'If a man is bewitched, and cannot bathe (ritual or lustration bath?), a recipe is given, consisting of garlic and onions and the root of *kala* and the tail of *remusa* fried on the fire; leek is boiled, and the other ingredients are mixed with the leek-water; the patient drinks of this mixture for three days, and is cured' (*ib.* p. 22 f.). A pregnant woman, in order to avoid miscarriage, must not take hot baths. She must not eat green vegetables, as they affect the heart of the baby; nor may she eat salt food or fat substances, or the child will be dull; but she must eat small fish and mustard (*ib.* p. 28).

(3) *Assistants at childbirth*, etc.—In addition to midwives, medical practitioners are now mentioned as assisting in the delivery of women. We hear also of operations which took place when the child was in a dangerous position or was dead: incision for the extraction of the child, or dismemberment of the fœtus. The physician was exempt from many legal obligations when attending women in childbirth. He could break the Sabbath, and all other ordinances were considered abolished in the case of a woman in labour. The primary function of the physician was to place the woman on the birth-stool, and to make all the preparations necessary for a safe delivery. In case of twins, his word decided which was first born. Very little is mentioned in the writings of the period of means for easing difficulties of labour; but, being of a more popular nature, they have, no doubt, been preserved in later writings in which the popular element predominates. The newborn babe was treated as in olden times; but we learn now, from the 1st cent. onwards, of the existence of cradles. The name of the cradle is suggestive, for it is identical with

'trough'; and it is customary to this very day in the East to use troughs for cradles. It is mentioned only in writings of Palestinian origin (Mishna and Tosefta), and in one instance a glass cradle is mentioned (Tos. *Kelim*; *Baba bathra*, vii. 12, ed. Zuckermandel, p. 598).

(4) *Danger from demons*, etc.—Dangers not mentioned in the Bible now surround the baby and the mother immediately after the birth of the child. The notion of demons possessing the mother and then affecting the health of the child appears for the first time in the literature of that period, and the terror of these demons and the desire to drive them away or to counteract their evil influence grows steadily. In Tobit the demon Asmodæus possesses the damsel and prevents her from becoming the wife of any mortal. Every bridegroom wedded to her is killed on the night of the marriage, and only Tobit succeeds in driving the demon away by fumigating the bride with the liver of a fish. By this fumigation the charm is broken. This is then an example to be followed in later times on every occasion of difficult labour, as well as on breaking charms, or on driving away those evil spirits which haunt the chamber and bring ills on the mother and the child.

Prayers, which now assume a mystical character and become in time talismans and amulets, are also efficacious in laying the power of the evil spirit, and, according to a Talmudical legend, the Sanhedrin succeeded in capturing the demon of lust or amorous passion, the 'evil inclination' as it is termed. The consequence was that three days afterwards not an egg could be found in the whole of Palestine to feed a woman in childbed. Whereupon they merely blinded the demon in one eye and released him (*Sanh.* f. 64*a*). They resorted also to prayer, we are told, to avert the terrible ill of croup or other like disease of the throat. The cause of many of these diseases was ascribed to the influence of evil spirits. Lilith is the head of the female demons, and is mentioned as the chief cause of all the ills that befall children. Originally identified with the Incubus and with a demoniac first wife of Adam, she became in the course of time the demon who bewitched, stole, changed, and killed the children as well as the mother in childbirth. Another demon mentioned is Agrath, the daughter of Mahlath. (In both cases the etymologies are transparent. Lilith is the 'night demon' and Agrath the 'roof demon,' daughter of 'illness.') A child that is born in the likeness of Lilith is described as being like a human being, but with wings on its back (*Niddah*, 24*b*). No mention is made of the means of protecting mother and child, although no doubt they must have resorted to some magical amulets and also to other conjurations and mystical operations. Another demon Shimdon (or Ashmadon, 'Destruction') is mentioned, who, according to a legend, was met by a child of the giants that lived before the Flood, whom the mother had sent to bring her a knife for cutting the navel. The demon then said to the newborn giant baby: 'Go and tell your mother that the cock has crowed, otherwise I would have struck and killed thee'; to which the baby replied: 'Go and tell your mother that my navel has not yet been cut, otherwise I would have struck and killed thee' (*Genes. Rabb.* ch. 36, § 1). Various demons lay in wait for the newborn child. There was none, however, so dangerous as the above-mentioned Lilith. This demon plays an important rôle in the subsequent development of superstitious practices. If one might infer from the practice mentioned in the Mishna (*Hullin*, iv. 7), the *secundines*, or after-birth, must have been used for some superstitious purpose, very likely to prevent miscarriage. It is forbidden to bury at cross-roads or to hang up on a tree the after-birth of the miscarried first-born of an animal, for that would be of the 'ways of the Amorites' (*i.e.* superstitious practices of the heathen). We shall see later on the use made of it. It was also preserved as a remedy for some unnamed illness of children (*Shab.* f. 129*b*).

With the material at our disposal it is difficult to trace the influence of these evil demons (Lilith, Agrath, Shiddin, etc.) further back than the 1st cent., although some of them are found in the Apocryphal literature of the preceding centuries, and the legends are so widely spread among Jews and non-Jews that the roots may lie much further back than the known literary monuments. Lilith is, as stated before, also the demon Incubus, and men are warned not to sleep in ruins lest they fall a prey to lascivious demons and engender children, for female demons are anxious to join human beings and to obtain children from them. Lilith was originally the first wife of Adam, or, according to a different tradition in the *Zohar*, the woman that came up from the deep of the water (Tiamat?) and together with her innumerable company hovered round the body of the newly-created Adam, until the real wife (Havvah) was created, when she was driven away by an angel and sent back to the surging sea. According to a third version, she was the real wife of Adam for a hundred years during the time when he was living in disgrace, and then brought forth demons and evil spirits. Being afterwards driven away, she retained a hatred for man, and lies constantly in wait for man, either to join him in wedlock or to destroy his offspring. In order to frustrate her evil designs, a man must utter the following conjuration before he joins his wife: 'Thy garment has become rent, it is loosened, it is loosened. Thou mayest neither come in nor go out, nothing for thee and no share for thee. Return, return, the sea is stormy, its waves are calling for thee. I lay hold of the share of God, I wrap (cover) myself with the holy king.' And the man has to cover his face and that of his wife whilst speaking thus; and after finishing the conjuration he has to pour clear water round the bed and he will be safe from attacks from Lilith (*Zohar*, Leviticus, fol. 19*a*). Another conjuration which has become the basis and prototype of all other conjurations of Lilith and evil child-stealing demons and witches is that found in the story of ben Sira, in which we have also a version of the virgin birth, for the mother of ben Sira is reported to be the virgin daughter of the prophet Jeremiah. In this story the son of the king was dying without any apparent reason, and he then wrote out an amulet with the names of certain angels upon it, which he explained as follows: Together with Adam, a wife was created from the earth. Considering herself his equal, she refused to obey Adam, and in a moment of rage uttered the ineffable name of God and flew away to the borders of the ocean. At the request of Adam the Lord sent three angels after her to bring her back, and, if she refused to obey, to threaten her with the death of a hundred of her children each day. The angels went after her, and found her at the waters through which the Israelites were to pass when going out of Egypt. They threatened to drown her in the waters of the sea. She implored them to spare her, and in return, as she had the power to hurt male children up to the eighth day of their birth, and female up to the twentieth, she swore unto them that she would not go near the house or hurt the child or the mother where she should see the names of these angels written up. They released her after she had taken that oath; and it was for this reason that ben Sira wrote the names Sinoi, Sinsinoi, Semangelaf, on an amulet and hung it up in the room where the child was, thus driving Lilith away and preventing her from further molesting it (*Alphab. Ps-Sirœ*, etc., Steinschneider, f. 23$^{a\,b}$; M. Gaster, 'The Child-stealing Witch,' *Folklore*, xi., 1900, pp. 129-162)

(5) *Amulets, charms*, etc.—The amulet is no doubt a later stage. It is preceded, as a rule, by the very act of conjuration in which the conjurer utters those words, and through a process common to all magical operations identifies himself with those angels, and drives away the evil spirit by the account of another operation in which the demon had been vanquished by those powers. From the spoken recital we descend to the written amulet, in which the writing is considered sufficient to terrify away the demon. All the other amulets, like those used in the cases of bewitching or for protection, have gone through the same process, whether they be connected with sterility or birth, or with the protection of mother and child from evil eye and evil spirits, whether it be to facilitate the labour or to increase the difficulty, to prevent man from joining his wife or to untie the magical knots. For we are proceeding now to the third period, or the second section of the second period, from the 6th to the 18th century. Sympathetic remedies, together with medical and magical recipes, appear now in the writings of the 6th century and onwards. Ancient Greek medical

practices and recipes, popular superstitions and customs, were then gathered up and introduced into the medical science of the Arabs, together with all the popular beliefs and practices of the East, and to a certain extent also those of some of the nations of the West, with whom they came into contact. Translated into Greek (Byzantine) and into Latin, these magical, sympathetical, and medical compilations spread among the nations of Europe. Books of recipes and amulets, *Iatrosophiai*, as well as manuals of leechcraft, abound also in mediæval Jewish literature. Most of them are still preserved in manuscripts. What has been printed from the second half of the 17th cent. onwards is mere reprint, and often very faulty, from older MSS. By the aid of manuscripts (mostly in the present writer's possession) we can go back at least to the 12th or 13th cent., but no doubt they contain materials which are far older and may be of extreme antiquity. We are not concerned here with purely medical prescriptions, though it is often difficult to draw the line between the dispensary proper and magical or sympathetical recipes. Nor can we pay any attention here to the astrological horoscopes and nativities, or to prognostications from the influence of the astral bodies, as to the importance ascribed to days and months. Though intimately connected with *births*, these prognostications and nativities have remained the domain of the astrologer, and have seldom if ever formed part of popular practices. A selection of the latter culled from writings ranging from the 6th to the 18th cent. may now follow. Only such have been selected as have enjoyed great popularity and have been found repeated in MSS of diverse origin. Some hail from Spain, others from Italy and Turkey; some from Damascus and Yemen, and not a few from Germany. In all twenty-five MS compilations have been used.

The bewitching of bride and bridegroom may start from the day of marriage. 'Tie three knots during the ceremony, and the bride will be forbidden to her husband so long as those knots remain untied'; or, 'Make a thread of wool on a live sheep and say, while twisting the cord:

"Shurah, Shura, Shabrur; I tie N. against the woman N. with the knot with which God tied night and day, and I tie him in every language and with every word by which a tie can be made under heaven and earth which cannot be loosened. And so long as I do not untie it, N. shall not be able to approach the woman N. I seal these knots with the seal of King Solomon, with which he sealed the demons in the copper vessel and cast them into the sea. And similarly shall no man be able to untie these knots but me."

If he afterwards wishes to break the charm, he must kill a hen, drop the blood upon the knots, and untie them, and the charm will be broken.' Or, 'Three knots made by the woman in her girdle, when with her husband and he not knowing, it will affect him so long as the knots remain tied,' etc. More numerous are the recipes for breaking this tying. 'On both sides of a new-laid egg the verse from 2 S 22[37] "Thou enlargest my footsteps," etc., is written. Cut it in two with a knife or a dagger with which a man has been killed, give each one a half to eat, draw the picture of a small tree on uterine vellum, tie it on his left arm, put some quicksilver into a nutshell and tie it on his right arm, then tear a hole in the woman's shirt, etc., and the charm will be broken.' Or, 'Take flour from a "living" mill, mix it with the mud of the river (or rain-water), make a cake of it, (write on it v.[2] of Ps 2,) bake it on a new fire, and eat it.' Or, 'Pass a stick through a hole made in the door, burn it on coals and fumigate self and wife.' Or, 'Let the tied man go to the field, loosen an ass tied by its foot, take the rope with the knot and burn it, and drink of the ashes mixed with water or wine.' Or, 'Tie the right-foot sandal of the bridegroom to the left-foot sandal of the bride, fumigate with sulphur, pour water into them, shake the water from one to the other, and let both drink of it, and the charm will be broken.' The symbolical meaning of all these recipes requires no explanation. On the other hand, some practices like throwing the shoe after bride and bridegroom may find here an unexpected explanation.

The wearing of a dead man's tooth, or the fumigation three times with the tooth or bone of a dead man, seems to have been a universally acknowledged remedy against the 'tie.' Rubbing with raven's brains or with ox-gall is also recommended, the latter mixed with sesame oil. All these recipes and more are found in MSS of the 14th cent., and in some cases are ascribed to authors of the 11th or 12th, *e.g.* Aben Ezra, and even to Asaf of the ninth!

The remedies for removing barrenness and for furthering conception may be divided into two groups: one, the use of amulets and charms; the other, sympathetic magic and medicine. The mediæval and ancient pharmacopœia shrinks from nothing, and in superstitious practices there is no room for æsthetical considerations. The women were so anxious to get children that they would use anything that they thought would further generation. Objectionable and nauseating decoctions and sublimations abound in all these collections, and fumigation, mentioned in the Book of Tobit and practised no doubt long before his time, is resorted to on a large scale. Animal dung and droppings are often recommended by Galen and other ancient writers, and adopted by practitioners down to the time of Quincy's dispensatory. They are found in Arabic and Jewish 'dispensaries' also. But less objectionable ingredients are found which would further conception or remove sterility:

'Take the bone found in a stag's heart, put it into a leather bag sewn up with red silk, fasten on it red silk strings, and tie it round the neck of the woman on a Monday or Thursday before sunrise, and arrange it so that the bag may hang from the strings down to the navel, and take care that the knot is on the back of her neck. A man must hang that amulet on the woman, and she will bear children.' Or, 'Take a big spider, put it into a small wooden case of equal size, stop the opening with the bark of the same tree or with the shell of a nut, and carry it round the neck.' Or, 'Take the first milk of a goat before the kid had touched the udder, make a small cheese of it, put it into a new linen cloth, and tie it upon the left arm; it must never be taken off, and the woman will then bear children.' Or, 'The dried stomach of a hare, bear-gall, ammonica and myrrh, pounded and mixed with butter, taken for two days in broth, will help in getting children.' Or, 'Dip a paper in menses' blood, tie it round a fruit-bearing tree, and say: "I give thee my illness and my infirmity, give thou me thy power of bearing fruit."' Or, 'Make a decoction of bear's or wolf's meat as much as a bean. If the animal is male the child will be male, and if it is female the woman will give birth to a daughter.'

A favourite remedy next to the hare's stomach was the plant 'ox-tongue,' later on confused with the real tongue of an ox, and a decoction of either is recommended. Or, 'Ashes of burnt fox-skin, drunk twice a day in water for nine consecutive days, promote generation.' Or, 'A fish found within a fish, dried and pounded, has the same effect if taken for three nights in wine.' 'Two wings of a raven worn by a woman when with her husband will cause her to conceive.' 'If a woman is anxious to get sons, she must ask a shepherd to get the after-birth of a cow, dry it, and pound it, and drink the powder in wine.' Another remedy is 'to obtain the navel of another woman's child, to burn it, and drink the ashes in wine.' To ascertain whether a woman will always be barren, put an unopened gall in a soft linen rag for three days over her womb, and if afterwards a worm is found in the gall, it is a sign that she is by nature sterile; if the worm be red, then there is no help for her sterility.

If a woman wishes to procure barrenness or to stop bearing children, then 'let the scissors with which the navel of her child has been cut be stuck

in the ground. So long as the scissors remain in the ground, she will have no children.'

Or, 'If the plate out of which a woman has taken her first meal after delivery is placed face downward under her bed, it will prevent her from conceiving until it be turned face upward.' Or, 'Pick up a grain that has dropped from the mouth of an ant, and tie it on the left thigh, and it will prevent child-bearing.' Or, 'The first tooth dropped by a child picked up before it touches the ground, and fastened round the neck, set in silver or gold, will have the same effect.' 'The wearing of a cat's paw cut off from the live animal stops fertility.' Carrying of a hare's heart (or hare's droppings) will have the same result. Or, 'Sew into the hem of her shirt, in the front, the ashes of a wolf's heart.' Or, 'Extinguish three live coals in her menstruation blood, and bury them. If this charm is to be broken, the coals must be taken out and thrown into a burning fire.'

Great care is then taken to prevent the mother from mishap caused by various agencies. Of the diverse methods employed, a few may now be mentioned.

'Mare's milk, boiled with virgin wax and then kneaded and put in a bag of buckskin, or of pure linen, and placed on the navel, will prevent miscarriage.' Or, 'Wearing of an eagle-stone' (*aetites*) (*Shab.* f. 66*b*). Or, 'Drink three days in the morning and in the evening milk of a pregnant ass.' Or, 'Wear a ring made of the stag's bone.' Or, 'The heart of a hare taken out alive.' Or, 'White and red corals pounded and drunk in wine or taken with egg for three consecutive days.' Or, 'A ruby hung round the neck.' Or, 'A dead scorpion tied up in crocus-green cloth, and fastened on to the skirt.' Or, 'A ring with the image of a scorpion engraved on it, worn by the woman, will prevent miscarriage.' Or, 'A girdle made of snake's skin or of that of a she-ass, worn round the waist.' Or, 'An eggshell of a hatched chicken, burnt and powdered and drunk, prevents miscarriage.' Invaluable in preventing miscarriage is declared to be the stone 'enkuntra,' which is found in the field, looks like glass, has a hole in the middle, and is of the size of an egg. If worn, it is infallible in its effect.

All these are mere prophylactic measures. The real crisis begins with the travail of delivery. Here also the danger of the evil spirits is greater, and amulets and incantations are far more numerous than in the previous stages of conception and gestation. Some of the incantations may now be mentioned:

'When a woman is in difficult labour, whisper in her ear: "The angel Michael walking on Mount Sinai heard loud screaming and weeping. He said: O Lord, what is the reason for that screaming and weeping which I hear? And the Lord replied: A doe in the pangs of labour is weeping and screaming; go and tell her. Come forth, come forth, come forth, the earth is seeking thee."' Or, 'Write certain letters on a potsherd, put it on the woman, and say: "In the name of Anael, who hears women in labour, hearken also to this woman, and let the child come forth in peace and in life. Amen."' Or, 'Write on the four corners of a piece of linen (or, take a basin of still water and say over it) in the presence of the woman: "The gate of heaven was opened, and down came three (seven) angels with three (two) rods in their hands—one was white, the other was red, and the third black. The white one struck the heavens, and the rain came down; the red one struck the sea, and it parted; the third, the black one, struck the woman and brought forth safely child and after-birth." And (give the woman to drink of the water),' or, 'Wash the cloth in sweet water, give her the water to drink, and put the cloth on her head until she is safely delivered.'

Of general use has been another set of amulets and incantations with the verse Ex 11^8 written on pure parchment, beginning and ending with, 'Go forth' and 'I will go forth,' etc. Or, an amulet is prepared with letters in nine squares, which, in whichever way read, have the numerical value of 15, probably = one of the names of God, 'Jah.' Also the words 'Kur, kur, kur' are either written or repeated to the woman in labour; or, permutations of the Aramaic word *puk*, which also means 'go forth.' Permutations of the Tetragrammaton are also found in some amulets, and even the names 'Immanuel,' 'Soter,' and 'Salvator,' often mutilated beyond recognition, are used as sacred names, written on pure parchment, and placed beside the woman in labour; or, variations of 'Sator arepo,' etc. As a supreme remedy in very difficult cases, the scroll of the Law or an ancient copy of the Pentateuch is brought from the Synagogue, and taken into the room where the woman is in pains of delivery. In addition to amulets and conjurations, other means were employed for easing the labour and ejecting the child or the after-birth.

'The woman must drink water gathered at cross-roads.' Or, 'Another woman's milk lapped from the palm of her hand; in some cases, oil.' Or, 'a decoction made of the scrapings or the grime off the sheath of the butcher's knife.' Or, 'Soak the *afikomin* (*i.e.* the piece of Passover cake reserved for the end of the meal), and put it into her mouth. She must be careful not to eat it, and it will ease difficulties of labour.' Or, 'Tie the herb *Vives* under the sole of her left foot.' (No doubt the plant mentioned here is *Vitex*, 'chaste tree.') 'A magnet tied to the left thigh; or sea sponge or red alum has the same effect, when tied on the left thigh.'

Of all herbs and plants none rivals in efficacy the mythical *Eisenkraut*, or *Eisenhart*, as it is called in German. It is akin to the mythical 'Mandragora,' and has great powers to destroy charms and to prevent every evil occurrence. In modern German botany the name stands for 'Verbena' (vervain). Another plant used is the Artemisia, or mugwort, on the stomach or on the thigh. Similarly, 'Dust from under the threshold of the room, wrapped in a piece of cloth and put on the womb.' Or, 'The woman is to keep between her teeth the right horn of a goat or hart.' Or, ashes of silkworms. Or, scraped ivory in wine or water eases difficult labour. We shall pass over the numerous ingredients recommended for fumigation; they belong mostly to the unsavoury class of remedies already referred to. The same are prescribed also in cases where the child dies unborn, and the mother is in grave danger. Drinking of such nostrums, as well as fumigation, was resorted to.

'If a child born appears to be dead, pass a sieve over its face to and fro and it will revive.' Or, 'Cover it with the after-birth' (*Shab.* f. 134*a*). 'If the mother wishes to satisfy herself as to whether the child is alive or dead, she must look into a basin filled with oil, and if it is alive she will see her face in it; if not, she is to put her five fingers into a plate filled with honey, and lick them one after the other, and then drink the honey dissolved in warm water, and the dead child will be ejected with ease.' 'If the woman drinks a decoction of "Sharlei," i.e. *Salvia horminun* (common sage), it will assist in the ejection of the after-birth.' Or, 'The eating of garlic and doves' brains mixed with honey and boiled together in water.'

But the difficulties of labour may be due also to evil influences, for 'the burying of a pomegranate in the room of the woman will prolong the labour and prevent the birth of the child. The only remedy is to remove the pomegranate.' 'The stone found in a viper's head hung on a woman will prolong labour and prevent birth.'

As soon as the child is born, both mother and child are exposed to the evil demons, who are anxious to injure the child and to obtain possession of it, sometimes even bodily, and substitute for it a changeling. Every possible precaution is then taken to frustrate the action of the demons, and to grant as much protection as possible to the newborn babe. Lilith is the chief demon, but hosts of other witches prowl about, and must be kept at a distance. Conjurations play the principal part. A circle is drawn round the walls of the chamber and on the floor, and in it the names of the three dreaded angels, 'Sinoi, Sinsinoi, and Semangelaf,' are written. These were the angels mentioned above who were sent to punish Lilith, and to whom she promised not to come near the house, or the woman and child, wherever these names should be found. A long conjuration is also written on the parchment or paper containing the names of these angels, and hung round the four posts of the bed in which the woman lies, or fastened to the curtains. The conjuration, a modification of the ancient charm against the demon Aveziha, occurs in almost every collection of Oriental and Eastern European charms.

'This child-stealing or -killing witch, then,' so the conjuration runs, 'is met by the prophet Elijah, who stops her in her roamings, and asks her whither she is going. She answers that she is going to a certain house where a baby has been born, to eat its flesh, to drink its blood, to crush its bones, and to destroy it. Threatened by the prophet, she promises not to

go near that or any house where her names are known, written down, or hung up; and she gives to the prophet the list of her 18 or more mysterious names.'

In ancient variants she is known as the demon Lilith, 'Striga' or 'Strigla'; the name is next changed into 'Estrelia,' or 'Strelia Margarita,' and then to the 'Star Margarita.' But Lilith is the more common and the more prominent name. This amulet, once universally used, is still used throughout the east of Europe (Austria, Russia, Rumania, Turkey) and almost everywhere in the East (India, Syria, Arabia, etc.) as quite a common practice among the Jews. The book *Raziel*, containing the description of the holy circle and the pictures of those angels, is in some parts of Poland and Russia placed in addition under the pillow of the woman. But it is not the mother the demons are after; it is the baby. And the effect of the bewitching is seen in the crying of the child for no apparent reason, in its wasting away, and in its untimely death.

'If the mother sees a woman whom she suspects of being a child-eating witch, she must put her left fist into her mouth, and say: "Thou and thy head are of a swine, thou art unto me a dead bitch, the after-birth of thy mother be in thy mouth,"' and she must repeat it three times, and that woman will have no power to hurt her. 'King Solomon asked the demon Ashmedai what should be done to a child that was constantly crying, and the demon said: "Cut a strip of the saddle of an ass first met in the morning, and place it under the child's pillow."' Another remedy against bewitching: 'Buy a new pot from the maker, and pay the price he asks; buy also an open lock. Take still water, wash the baby in it, and pour it into the pot, which must be placed under the bed of the mother, and the open lock in her bed. At the slightest suspicion of an attack on the part of an evil spirit, the mother locks the lock, and puts it upon the child, then some of the water is sprinkled over the child's face, and, without speaking, the water is poured out at the crossing of roads, and the pot replaced under the bed.' Vervain and 'ruta' are the plants which, if put upon the child, are sure to drive evil spirits away. Or, 'The eye of an old black cock put on the right side of the child, the cock's comb under its pillow, and close to the child the white stones found in a hen's stomach.' Or, 'Hang round its neck a bone which a dog has dropped from its mouth.' Or, 'Take some of the earth upon which the child has fallen immediately upon its birth, before either father or mother has seen it, and tie it round its waist for thirty days, and the child will always be safe from trouble and accidents.' Or, 'Take dust from under the threshold (or, over the door), and mix it with the mother's milk, and put it on the baby's head, and it will sleep peacefully.' 'To break the charm of a bewitched child, take a little raven from its nest before it can fly, burn it on the fire, pound the ashes, mix them with milk, and give it to the child before it has started sucking, and it will be safe.' Or, 'Hang a crystal or emerald over the child, and it will be safe.'

As late as the year 1707 the *secundines* burnt, and the ashes given in milk, were believed to destroy the charm of a wasting child. Or, a bag made of it, with snapdragon, St. John's wort, and other flowers put in it and hung round the child's neck, was considered a powerful amulet against bewitching. It must be understood that the 'evil eye' is also considered as a form of bewitching; but *no* reference is made to the 'evil eye' in *any* of *all* the ancient MSS. This notion and name appear for the first time in the 18th century. In modern times, to which we are turning now, most of these latter practices seem to have disappeared. A gold coin is hung in the cap, against the evil eye or any other evil spirit (Turkey and Rumania), or a satchel with blue beads and 'ruta' over the bed. Regarding changelings, a story is told of a famous Rabbi of the 18th cent., who was invited to be present on the occasion of a circumcision. (All the attacks of the demons are concentrated upon the period from the birth of the boy to the eighth day—the day of the circumcision.) Driving from his place to the house, he met on the road a large number of demons and witches, feasting and dancing round that very baby. He ordered his servant to bring him there, and then seven knives, seven saws, two loaves of bread, and seven slippers. He stuck a knife in each slipper, took his own off, washed his hands, and uttered the great Name. The witches and demons melted away and left the baby behind, which he took and brought back to its parents. There he uttered another holy Name, and lo! the baby which the mother had been keeping with her in bed turned into a bundle of straw. 'When a child laughs in its sleep it is a sign that Lilith or some other evil spirit is playing with it,' and it must be awakened by snubbing the nose. In Rumania it is believed that an angel is playing with the child. The child's clothes must not be left outside over night; an owl drops its spittle or a feather on them, and it changes into a long hairlike worm, which enters the body and tortures the child (Egypt). By conjuring it, it comes out of the body in the form of black points, which must be carefully removed (Egypt). Neither mother nor baby is left alone all the eight days. On the eve of the eighth day children come with their teacher and read certain portions of the Law (the Shema', Dt 6^4), and they are regaled with sweets and with bags of peas salted and peppered (Rumania and Poland). The baby is not put into the cradle before the sixth day (the naming day), and is kept all that day on the knees of an assistant woman (Turkey, India, etc.). Before the baby is laid in the cradle, almonds and raisins are put in, and the cradle is gently rocked. The almonds, etc., are then given to other children. Under the pillow the book of Psalms is laid, and under the mattress a sword or horse-shoe (India). A lying-in woman must not see any one all the week (Turkey). Over the bed a satchel is hung, containing a blue bead, some garlic, and a piece of broken glass (Salonica and Palestine). On the Friday before the circumcision similar practices are observed to those on the eve of the circumcision, and visitors are entertained.

If it should happen that a woman is losing her children, then 'she is to go to a bitch, and put her foot on a puppy, and say three times: "Take the dead and give me the living." Then she is to take the puppy and carry it close to her body, with its head to her right and its feet to her left side, and go to the water and loosen her clothes, and let the puppy drop into the water and say three times: "Give me the living and take the dead." This must be done when the woman is in the ninth month.' Or, 'Go to a dried-up nut-tree and bore a hole just over the head, and put into that hole some of the cuttings of the nails of fingers and toes and some hair, and ram a peg into that hole, and say: "I conjure thee, evil spirit, to remain for ever locked up in this tree, and no longer to be able to hurt me"' Or, 'Make a ring from the silver got from nine young maids under age, and put it on the ear of the child immediately after birth before it has been picked up from the ground, and it will live.'

The rocking of an empty cradle causes the premature death of the child, and the walking over a child or its crawling between the legs of another person causes its growth to be stunted (Rumania and Russia). Very few lullabies, if any, have been preserved. As a rule, the mother rocks the child to sleep to some popular tune. Within thirty days the chances of bewitching and changing diminish, or are considered to have entirely disappeared.

(6) *Primogeniture, naming.*—The firstborn must be redeemed within thirty days. He is believed to have some curative powers. If he treads on the back of a person suffering from lumbago or other joint-diseases, he drives the illness away (Rumania). Some of the duties and privileges of the firstborn prescribed by the Bible are still maintained, and on the eve of Passover he is expected to fast in remembrance of the death of the firstborn of the Egyptians. In some marriage settlements the male offspring is the object of an important clause regulating matters of inheritance and succession.

Among the Ashkenazic (German) Jews a child often takes the name of the grandparent, or of a dead relative. Among the Sephardic (Spanish and Eastern) Jews the parent's name is often given to the child. The former believe that it is an evil omen to name a child after a living person. In cases

of dangerous illness the name is often changed, thereby suggesting a re-birth or change in the destiny of the patient.

LITERATURE.—i. *MANUSCRIPTS.*—Most of the material is taken from the medical and magical MSS in the writer's possession, chiefly from the oldest and the fullest. The following is a list of those used, arranged according to antiquity and importance: Cod. 1055 (probably of the 14th cent., North Italy); Cod. 315 (Oriental Spanish hand, 17th cent.; contains also the work attributed to Aben Ezra); Cod. 444 (Ital., 17th cent., 2 vols., i. with 1231 recipes, and ii. with more than 500); Cod. 676 (Germany, 14th or 15th cent., medical treatises, etc.); Cod. 443 (Tunis, 1775, upwards of 400 recipes copied from older MSS); Cod. 177 (Syria, 15th–16th cent., with very ancient Babylonian material); Cod. 118 (Germany, 16th–17th cent., with old German conjurations; upwards of 400 recipes); Cod. 700 (Germany, 17th cent., many hundreds of recipes); Cod. 932 (Germany, hundreds of recipes—some German and the conjuration of the 'Eisenkraut'); Cod. 358 (Morocco, 19th cent., very full); Cod. 466 (Spanish origin, written in Bulgaria 16th cent., more than 400 recipes); Cod. 464 (Italy, 18th cent., with 308 recipes, many from Aben Ezra and other ancient authorities); Cod. 462 (Italy, 17th cent., with 200 recipes); Cod. 128 (Yemen, 18th–19th cent., some Arabic, others Hebrew, very full); Cod. 603 (Turkey, 19th cent., Hebrew, and some in Spanish). Codd. 40, 194, 438, 451, 677, 702, might be mentioned, for they also contain medical, magical, and sympathetical recipes and a number of amulets referring to birth, etc.; also Cod. 134 (Montefiore College, Ramsgate, of the 14th cent.).

ii. *PRINTED LITERATURE.*—For Bible: **Winer**, *RWB*, *s.v.* 'Kinder.' For Talmudic period: **I. Lamperonti**, *Paḥad Yitshaḳ*, *passim*; **J. Hamburger**, *RE* ii., Leipzig, 1883, *s.v.* 'Geburt,' p. 254 ff.; **Gideon Brecher**, *Das Transcendentale . . . im Talmud*, Vienna, 1850, p. 207 ff.—For modern times: **J. Buxtorff**, *Synagoga Judaica*, Germ. ed. 1738, p. 81 ff.; **M. Grunwald**, *MGJV*, Hamburg, i., 1898, p. 90 ff., v., 1900, p. 63 ff. And the following Hebrew works, partly reprints from ancient MSS: Anonym., *Toledoth Adam*, last ed., Lemberg, 1875; **B. Benas**, *Amtaḥath Binyamin*, Wilmersdorf, 1716, Anonym., *Mif'alot Eloḳim*, Lemberg, 1865; **David Tevele**, *Beth David*, Wilmersdorf, 1733; Anonym., at end of *Urim Ve-Tumim*, Dyhrenfurt (s.a.); **S. Pelungian**, *Sefer ha-Zechirah*, Hamburg, 1709; **H. Palache**, *Refuah ve-ḥayim*, Smyrna, 1874, **Reuben b. Abraham**, *Seguloth*, Jerusalem, 1865; **Moses b. Israel Benjamin**, *Ya'lkut Moshe*, Munkacy, 1894; and one of the most curious collections in Jewish-German of a certain **Jeh. Hentchin**, *Matsil Nefashoth*, Prag 1651 (Amsterdam, 1651), agreeing in many points with Cod. 118. M. GASTER.

BIRTH (Muhammadan). — Among Muslim peoples the birth of a child, or at least of a male child, is an event of the first importance. It is especially so to the mother, because a barren wife is held in no regard by husband or relatives. Women therefore resort or resorted to various charms and superstitious rites, even to stepping across the corpse of a decapitated criminal and anointing their persons with his blood, in the hope of becoming fertile; and the intentional avoidance of children by husband or wife is practically unknown, though at the time of Muḥammad such avoidance was permitted to men who did not desire offspring from slave concubines (*Mishkāt al-Maṣābīḥ*, tr. Matthews, 1810, vol. ii. pp. 96–98). The ceremonies attending a birth are numerous, but it is not always easy to distinguish those which are essentially Muslim, *i.e.* handed down from the days of the Prophet, from those which are exotic and are derived from local customs and foreign superstitions. The birth-ceremonies of Muslims vary in different countries, and scarcely any of them, except the *'aqīqah*, rest upon the recorded precepts of Muḥammad; but there is a general agreement in the chief observances, which shows that they are to be ascribed to the usual practice of the Arabs at the time of the promulgation of Islām. Two or three days before the expected date of the birth, the midwife (*dāyah*) brings to the house of the woman to be confined the groaning-chair or 'birth-throne' (*kursī al-wilādah*), upon which the birth is to take place, for Muslim women are delivered sitting. The chair, which belongs to the midwife, is covered with a shawl or embroidery, and *ḥinnā* flowers or roses are tied with an embroidered handkerchief to each of the top corners of the back. As soon as the delivery is safely accomplished, the bystanders trill the *zagharīt*, or lulliloo (as in the tale of King 'Umar b. al-Nu'man in the *Alf Lāylah wa Lāylah*; cf. Burton, ed. Smithers, 1893, i. 401). The child is at once wrapped in white linen, or linen of any colour but yellow, and the father or, in his absence, some other man (but never a woman) repeats the call to prayer (*adhān*) in the infant's ear, or the *adhān* in its right ear and the nearly identical *iqāmah* in its left ear. This is done in imitation of Muḥammad himself, who is related to have acted thus on the birth of his grandson Ḥasan (*Mishkāt*, *ut sup.* ii. 316). Another custom, based upon the same authority, is for some learned man to suck a date or some sweetmeat and put it into the baby's mouth and rub it on its palate, whereby the sucker's wisdom is hoped to be communicated (*Mishkāt*, ii. 315; Herklots, *Qanoon-e-Islam*, 1822, p. 6). Among the well-to-do the mother retires to her bed for from three to six days; but poor women scarcely rest at all after their delivery. Meanwhile rejoicings begin at once; but these are much more festive for the birth of a son than of a daughter. The men recite the *fātiḥah* (Qur. ch. i.) and receive presents. Dancing men and girls assemble and perform before the house, and sometimes the father entertains his friends on each day of the week succeeding the happy event; but usually the seventh day (*yaum al-subū'*) is that chosen for the chief festivities. Lane (*Mod. Egyptians*[5], 1860, ch. xxvii. p. 504 f.) has described the ceremonies of the seventh day as practised in Cairo about 1835:

'On the . . . seventh day after the birth of a child the female friends of its mother pay her a visit. In the families of the higher classes 'Awalim ['Almahs] are hired to sing in the *ḥarim*, or *Ālāṭiyah* perform, or *fuḳis* recite a *ḥatmah* [of the Qur'ān] below. The mother, attended by the *dayah*, sits on the *kursī al-wilādah* [birth-chair], in the hope that she may soon have occasion for it again, for her doing this is considered propitious. The child is brought, wrapped in a handsome coloured shawl or something costly; and, to accustom it to noise that it may not be afterwards frightened by the music and other sounds of mirth, one of the women takes a brass mortar [*ḥaun*] and strikes it repeatedly with the pestle, as if pounding. After this the child is put into a sieve and shaken, it being supposed that this operation is beneficial to its stomach. Next it is carried through all the apartments of the *ḥarim*, accompanied by several women or girls, each of whom bears a number of wax candles, sometimes of various colours, cut in two, lighted, and stuck into small lumps of paste of *ḥinnā* upon a small round tray. At the same time the *dāyah* or another female sprinkles upon the floor of each room a mixture of salt and seed of the fennel-flower, or salt alone, which has been placed during the preceding night at the infant's head, saying, as she does this, "The salt be in the eye of the person who does not bless the Prophet," or "The foul salt be in the eye of the envier." This ceremony of the sprinkling of salt [*rashsh al-milh*] is considered a preservative for the child and mother from the evil eye; and each person present should say, "O God, bless our lord Muḥammad!" The child, wrapped up and placed on a fine mattress, which is sometimes laid on a silver tray, is shown to each of the women present, who looks at its face, says, "O God, bless our lord Muḥammad! God give thee long life," etc., and usually puts an embroidered handkerchief, with a gold coin (if pretty or old, the more esteemed) tied up in one of the corners, on the child's head or by its side. This giving of handkerchiefs is considered as imposing a debt, to be repaid by the mother, if the donor should give her the same occasion; or as the discharge of a debt for a similar offering. The coins are generally used for some years to decorate the head-dress of the child. After these *nuḳūṭ* [wedding presents] for the child, others are given for the *dayah*. During the night before the *subū'*, a water-bottle full of water (a *dauraq* in the case of a boy, or a *ḳullah* in that of a girl), with an embroidered handkerchief tied round its neck, is placed at the child's head while it sleeps. This, with the water it contains, the *dāyah* takes and puts upon a tray and presents to each of the women, who put their *nuḳūṭ* for her (merely money) into the tray. In the evening the husband generally entertains a party of his friends.'

On the same seventh day (or on the 14th, 21st, 28th, or 35th day after birth) the child is named, though this is often done a few hours after its birth, without any special ceremony; and the rite of *'aqīqah* is to be observed, together with the shaving of the child's head, though both are commonly neglected at the present day. The *'aqīqah* is enjoined by a tradition of Muḥammad,

who said, 'An *'aqīqah* must be observed at the birth of a child; then slay a goat on its behalf and shave its head'; and again, 'The *'aqīqah* for a son is two goats, and for a daughter one, either male or female'; and Buraydah related: 'We used, in times of Ignorance, when children were born to us, to slay goats and rub their heads with the blood. Then, when the religion of Islām came, we slew a goat on the seventh day, and shaved the child's head, and rubbed saffron upon it' (*Mishkāt, ut sup.* ii. 315, 316; Abū-Dā'ūd, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Arab. text, ii. 36). The *'aqīqah* is properly the hair of the newborn infant, but the term is applied by metonymy to the sacrifice made on its shaving (Lane, *Arabic Lexicon, s.v.* "Aqīqah"). It may be a ram or a goat, or two for a son and one for a daughter. The animal must be a male yearling and without blemish, according to Abū-Dā'ūd (Hughes, *Dict. of Islām*, art. 'Children'). The rite is held obligatory by Ibn Ḥanbal, but the founders of the three other orthodox schools regard it as unimportant, in spite of Muhammad's example and the tradition prescribing the *'aqīqah* (or, as he preferred to call it, *nasīkah*). The person sacrificing should say, 'O God, verily this *'aqīqah* is a ransom for my son such a one; its blood for his blood, and its flesh for his flesh, and its bone for his bone, and its skin for his skin, and its hair for his hair. O God, make it a ransom for my son from hell-fire.' A bone of the victim should not be broken. A leg should be given to the midwife, but the *'aqīqah* should first be cooked with water and salt without any part being cut off, and part should be given to the poor (Lane, *loc. cit.*, and *Thousand and One Nights*, note 24 to ch. iv. [1859 ed., vol. i. p. 277]). 'It is a sunneh ordinance, incumbent on the father, to shave, or cause to be shaved, the head of his child, and to give, in alms to the poor, the weight of the hair in gold or silver' (Lane, *Thousand and One Nights, ib.*). Circumcision is also specially approved when performed on the seventh day; but in practice it is usually postponed to the fifth or sixth year, or even much later.

On the fortieth day, as a general rule (not universally observed, however), the purification of the mother is completed, and she goes to the bath; and on the same day the infant is introduced to its rocking cradle, and *ḥarīm* festivities take place. The various additional ceremonies, many of them common to Hindus as well as Muslims, observed in India, may be read in Herklots (*op. cit.*); those commonly witnessed in Turkey in Europe are very fully described by a Consul's wife in *The People of Turkey*, edited by the present writer, 1878, vol. ii. pp. 1–10; but most of these are merely amplifications or variations of the customs described above.

With regard to evidence of birth, the testimony of one woman, be she the midwife or another, in addition to that of the mother, is required, according to Ḥanafī law, to prove that the child is the offspring of the mother; but the father's sole testimony is accepted for his paternity. Further evidence is required, however, when the mother is passing her term of *'iddah* after a complete divorce (Hamilton's *Hidāya*, 1791, iii. 134; Hughes, *Dict. of Islām*, art. 'Birth').

LITERATURE.—The literature has been sufficiently cited in the article. STANLEY LANE-POOLE.

BIRTH (Parsi).—**1.** The birth of a child is a very auspicious event in a Parsi house. It was so also in ancient Persia. According to the *Vendīdād* (iv. 47), Ahura Mazda says: 'I prefer a person with children (*puthrānē*) to one without children (*aputhrāi*).' Even the very ground where a man lives with his children is allegorically described as feeling happy (*Vend.* iii. 2). Cultivation and a good supply of food to people are recommended, because they make mankind healthy and able to produce healthy progeny (*Vend.* iii. 33). To be the father of good children was a blessing from the Yazatas like Tishtrya (*Yasht* viii. [*Tīr*] 15), Mithra (*Yasht* x. [*Mihir*] 65), Haoma (*Yasna* ix. 4, 7, 10, 13, 22), and Ātar (*Yasna* lxii. 10; *Vend.* xviii. 27), and from the Fravashis (*Yasht* x. [*Mihir*] 3; *Yasht* xiii. 134). To be childless was a curse* (*Yasna* xi. 1, 3). Domestic animals, when ill-fed and ill-treated, cursed their masters that they might be childless (*Yasna* xi. 1). Childlessness was something like a punishment from heaven (*Yasna* xi. 3; *Yasht* x. [*Mihir*] 38, 108, 110). Kingly splendour (*kavaēm khvarēnō*) was associated with those who were blessed with children (*Yasht* xix. [*Zamyād*] 75). A Zoroastrian woman often prayed for a good, healthy child (*Yasna* ix. 22). A Zoroastrian man and woman prayed before their sacred fire for a good, virtuous child (*Yasna* lxii. 5; cf. *Vend.* iii. 33). A woman without a child was as sorry as a fertile piece of land that is not cultivated (*Vend.* iii. 24). She prayed for a husband who could make her a mother of children (*Yasht* v. [*Ābān*] 87; *Yasht* xv. 40).

Among the Achæmenians, a wife who gave birth to many children was a favourite with her husband, who did not like to displease her in any way (Herodotus, ix. 111). Children being the choicest gift of God, their lives were, as it were, pledged by parents for the solemn performance of an act (Herodotus, vii. 10). We read in Herodotus (i. 136) that 'next to prowess in arms, it is regarded as the greatest proof of manly excellence to be the father of many sons. Every year the king sends rich gifts to the men who can show the largest number, for they hold that number is strength.' Strabo also says a similar thing (xv. 11). We learn from the writings of the Christian martyrs of Persia that, for the above reasons, the ancient Persians did not like the prohibition against marriage among the Christians in the case of holy young Christian girls.

2. Thus we see that an ancient Zoroastrian considered the birth of a child a great event in his life. The modern Parsis have, to a great extent, inherited the desire. When the wife has conceived, it is considered to be an event of joy in the family. According to the Avesta, the women, on finding themselves enceinte, prayed for a safe delivery and for healthy children (*Yasna* ix. 22). They mostly prayed before Ardvī Sūra for an easy delivery (*Yasht* v. [*Ābān*] 87), and then for a copious supply of milk at their breast for their children (*Ardvī Sūra Nyāyish*, 3). The allusion to these prayers suggests that there must have been some formal ceremonies accompanying them, but we do not know what they were.

Coming to later Pahlavi Parsi books, we find that the *Shāyast lā-Shāyast* (x. 4, xii. 11) directs that, when it is known that a woman has become pregnant, a fire should be maintained most carefully in the house.† The house or family that does not keep the fire of the house properly has less pregnancy of women in it (*Shāyast la-Shāyast* xii. 3). The *Sad-dar* (xvi. 1) also gives this direction.‡ We have the remnant of this injunction in the present custom that, among the modern Parsis, on the occasion of the completion of the fifth and seventh months of pregnancy, a lamp of clarified butter is lighted in the house by some families. The reason assigned for this is that the fire so kindled in the house keeps out *daēvas*, i.e. evil influences, from the house. A fire or a lamp

* Cf. the blessings and the curse of Cambyses (Herodotus, iii 65). Cf. also those of Darius (*Behistun Inscriptions*, iv. 10, 11).

† *SBE* v. (1880) pp. 316, 343.

‡ *Ib.* xxiv. 277.

is even now taken to be symbolical of the continuation of a line of offspring. For example, it is not rare to hear, even now, words like these: *Tamārō cherāg roshan rahē*, i.e. 'May your lamp be always burning.' This benediction means, 'May your son live long, and may your line of descent continue.'

3. According to the Avesta (*Vend.* xv. 8), a woman in the state of pregnancy is to be looked after very carefully. It is wrong for the husband to have sexual intercourse with her in her advanced state of pregnancy, which, according to the Rivāyats, commences with the fifth month.* She must abstain from coming into contact with any dead or decomposing matter, even with a thing like a tooth-pick, which may contain germs of disease (*Shāyast lā-Shāyast* x. 20, xii. 13; *Sad-dar* xvii. 2; *SBE* v. 323, 344, xxiv. 278).

At times, some families direct the priests to say certain prayers, and generally to recite one or two of the *Yashts*, during the whole or a part of the period of pregnancy.

4. The modern Parsis have no religious ceremonies or rites during the pregnancy of the women. On the completion of the fifth month of pregnancy, a day is celebrated and known as *panchmāsiun*, i.e. 'the day of the fifth month.' Similarly, a day is observed on the completion of the seventh month, and is known as *agharni*. These days are observed only in the case of the first pregnancy. They are not observed in accordance with any religious injunction or with any religious ceremonies or rites. The expectancy of a child being a joyful event, as said above, these days, especially the seventh-month day, are observed as joyous occasions, when the woman who is enceinte is presented with suits of clothes by her parents, relatives, and friends, and especially by the family of her husband. The husband is in turn presented with a suit of clothes by the wife's family. Sweets are sent out as presents by the husband's family to the bride's house and to near relatives and friends. Among these sweets, one prepared in the form of a coco-nut has a prominent place. A coco-nut signifies a man's head, and so it is a symbol of fecundity. Some of the customs observed on these occasions are more Indian in their origin and signification than originally Persian or Zoroastrian.

5. The first delivery generally takes place in the house of the wife's parents. A room, or a part of the room, generally on the ground-floor, is set apart for the purpose. As the *Vendīdād* (v. 46) says, the place for delivery must be very clean, dry, and least frequented by others. It appears that in ancient times such places were specially provided in Parsi houses on the ground-floor. Parsi houses in those times had generally spacious ground-floors that were used for all purposes. The upper floors were low, and were rather like lofts than storeys. So the ground-floors provided proper places for delivery as enjoined in the *Vendīdād*. But, as with changed circumstances, Parsi houses of to-day are not what they were before, and as, at present, in storeyed-houses, the ground-floor in big towns is generally the worst part of the house, it is properly condemned as a place unfit for delivery.

6. In the case of a house or a place where no delivery has taken place before, religious-minded persons generally take care that a religious ceremony takes place in it before the delivery. In other words, they get it consecrated. A priest or two say and perform the *Āfrīngān* prayer and ceremony in the place. At times even the *Bāj* prayer is recited (cf. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, 1893, ii. 723 ff., 686 ff.).

* Cf. Anquetil du Perron, *Zend-Avesta*, 1771, ii. 563

7. On the birth of a child, a lamp is lighted and kept burning for at least three days in the room where the woman is confined. The *Sad-dar* (ch. xvi. 2) speaks of three days. It says: 'When the child becomes separate from the mother, it is necessary to burn a lamp for three nights and days—if they burn a fire it would be better.'* Some people keep the lamp burning for ten days, and some for forty days, which is generally observed as the period of confinement. The *Shāyast lā-Shāyast* directs that the lamp must be placed in such a position that no one can pass between it and the newborn child (ch. x. 15). It further says that ten women may be in attendance at the time of delivery, five of them to wait upon the mother and five upon the newborn child to look after its cradle. The child is directed to be besmeared with a mixture of sulphur and the juice of a plant (ch. x. 16). The day-time is preferred to the night-time for child-birth (*Shāyast lā-Shāyast* xii. 7).

8. On delivery the mother is enjoined to remain apart from others. She must not come into contact with fire, water, or any of the furniture of the house (*Vend.* v. 45–49).

The *Sad-dar* (ch. lxxvi. 1–5) † enjoins that 'she should not wash her head for twenty-one days, nor put her hand again on anything. . . . After the twenty-one days, if she sees herself in such a state that she is able to wash her head, she washes her head. And, after that, until the coming on of the fortieth day, it is requisite to abstain from the vicinity of a fire and anything that is wooden or earthen; it is also requisite to abstain from everything of her cooking and pot-boiling. Afterwards, when it is forty days, she is to wash her head, and it is proper for her to do every kind of work. Till the lapse of a second forty days it is not proper for her husband to make an approach to her, for it is a great sin, and it is possible that she may become pregnant a second time, as within a period of forty days women become very quickly pregnant.'

In the case of those who give birth to still-born children it is enjoined in the *Vendīdād* (v. 55 f.) that they must remain separate for twelve days. This period has been latterly extended, as directed in the later Pahlavi and Persian books, to forty days in all cases of delivery. Nowadays a Parsi woman has generally forty days of seclusion after her delivery. The *Sad-dar* (ch. xvi. 4) says, 'During forty days it is not proper that they should leave the child alone; and it is also not proper that the mother of the infant should put her foot over a threshold in the dwelling' ‡ (*i.e.* leave the house).

9. Some families observe the fifth day after birth, known as *patchori* ('the fifth day'), and the tenth day, known as *dasori* ('the tenth day'), as gala days; but these days have no religious signification whatever.

10. During these forty days the woman must remain in a state of isolation. She must not come into contact with anybody or with any part of the ordinary furniture of the house, especially wooden furniture and linen articles. Her food is to be served to her on her plate by others. Those who have to come into contact with her have to bathe before they mix with others. Formerly, even the medical attendant had to do so, but nowadays the salutary rule is more honoured in the breach than in the observance. The original injunction seems to have been intended to observe 'purity' in order to prevent the spread of puerperal fever and other such diseases to which women in this state are subject.§

* *SBE* xxiv. 277. † *Ib.* xxiv. 339 f. ‡ *Ib.* xxiv. 277.

§ See the chapter on 'Maternity and its Perils,' in Mr. Havelock Ellis's *The Nationalisation of Health*, 1891, pp. 23–143. It says that in England and Wales, where 4500 women die every year in child-birth, 'about 70 per cent. of this mortality is due

11. At the end of the forty days, the period of confinement, the woman has to purify herself by a bath before mixing with others. At first she takes an ordinary bath, and then goes through what is called *nān* * (a contraction of the Sanskrit word *snān*), which is a sacred bath. A priest, generally the family priest, administers this bath with consecrated water. Even those who have come into contact with the woman during the days of her accouchement have to go through a ceremonial purificatory bath.

12. All the bedding and clothes of the woman used during the forty days of her seclusion after delivery are rejected from ordinary use. They are enjoined to be destroyed, lest they carry and spread germs of disease among others. But nowadays that injunction is not strictly followed. They are now given away to non-Zoroastrian poor people of the sweepers class.

13. Formerly a mother in child-birth first drank a few drops of the sacred Haoma (*q.v.*) juice, squeezed and consecrated in a Fire-temple. The new-born child also was made to drink a few drops of this juice (*Shāyast-lā-Shāyast* x. 16). Anquetil du Perron refers to this religious custom as prevalent in his time (*Zend-Avesta*, ii. 564). In the *Haoma Yasht* (*Yasna* ix. 22) Haoma is said to give fine healthy children to women who give delivery. Haoma was emblematical of immortality; hence this custom. Now, however, the custom is rarely observed, and, in place of the Haoma juice, a sweet drink made of molasses or sugar is given to the child as the first auspicious drink.

LITERATURE.—*SBE* v. 316 ff., 343 f., xxiv 277, 339 f.; A. V. Williams Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, 1906, p. 378; Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, 1893, ii. 686 ff., 723 ff.; Anquetil du Perron, *Zend-Avesta*, 1771, ii. 563, W. Geiger, *Civilization of the Eastern Iranians*, Eng. tr. 1885, i. 53; *BG* vol ix. pt. ii. p. 183 ff.

JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI.

BIRTH (Teutonic).—All the Teutonic peoples made a rigorous distinction between legitimate and illegitimate birth. They granted the full rights of consanguinity and tribal membership only to the children of legitimate unions, that is, to the offspring of a free father and a free mother joined in lawful wedlock. Whenever a child was born, it was laid upon the ground by the midwife in attendance upon the mother, and this practice is reflected to this day in the Scandinavian terms for midwife, *jordgumma*, *jordemoder*, 'earth-mother.' This rite has maintained its ground in many branches of the Teutonic stock (cf. A. Dieterich, *ARW* viii. 7 ff.); it originated in the old belief that the soul, and therefore the life, of the child issues from 'mother earth,' and that the child derives its vitality therefrom. The next step on the midwife's part was to lift the child up—hence the German term for 'midwife' *Hebamme*, O.H.G. *hevanna*—and hand it to the father. If the latter wished to acknowledge and maintain the infant, he took it in his arms, but he retained the right to condemn it to exposure. This right could be exercised in cases where the child was feeble or deformed, or when the father was in doubt as to its legitimacy—a situation which often arose at the birth of twins, the popular belief being that such an event implied the mother's unfaithfulness; or, again, if it had been predicted that the child's existence threatened the father with danger or misfortune, or even if he felt himself unable to maintain the child. The father's prerogative, however, was annulled by law after the introduction of Christianity, though various fairy-tales assume its survival down to the present day. But even in heathen times the father's decision had to be made within a few hours after the birth, for once the child had taken nourishment, milk or honey, in however small quantities, or had been laved with water, it was regarded as belonging to the family, and shared equal rights with every other individual within the same. Traces of this primitive heathen ordinance are still found in the Christian period; thus, the child's capacity to inherit sometimes dated only from its baptism, while the *wergeld* of an unbaptized child was sometimes reckoned at half the usual amount. Exposure was likewise illegal if the child had received its name. The name was usually given by the father, and at the ceremony (Icel. *nafnfestr*) a presentation was made to the child, while occasionally the blood-relations held a feast (*barnsol*). The child was generally named after some deceased member of the family, preferably the grandfather on the mother's side, as it was believed that the name carried with it the personal qualities of its original bearer (cf. G. Storm, *Arkiv for nordisk filologi*, ix. 199 ff.). If the father, upon whom these various legal functions devolved, died before the child was born, his place was taken, according to the most ancient usage, by the entire group of his blood relations, frequently augmented by some relations from the mother's side, and these chose one of their number to act as guardian and discharge all legal obligations in regard to the child. The same procedure was observed when the father had been proclaimed an outlaw; in the eye of the law the mother was then a widow and the child an orphan. If the father was unable to be present at the birth, the mother had to decide whether the child should be acknowledged or exposed.

A somewhat different course was adopted in the case of illegitimate birth. The children of slaves were themselves slaves from birth, and belonged to the owner of the mother. In primitive times, distinctions were made amongst the illegitimate children of free parents, and the Old Norse language had special designations for the different classes: thus *hornungr* signified the son of a free mother (*frilla*) with whom the father cohabited, though not in wedlock; *hrísungr*, the son of a free mother with whom the father's relations were clandestine; *þýborinn*, the son of a free father by a slave. These distinctions, however, were gradually done away, and disappeared first of all in Iceland. In regard to the illegitimate, the first step was to find out who the father was; and when this point had been decided, the child, even in early times, acquired the right of inheritance—though in a limited degree—and a claim to the father's protection. Moreover, it frequently happened that the child was received into the family bond (Icel. *œttleiðing*), and this transaction, especially when there were no children of lawful birth and capable of inheriting, was celebrated with feasting and high ceremonial. In all cases it was the duty of the father, or his family, to maintain the child till maturity was reached.

The event of birth became the nucleus of many curious practices and superstitions. In many districts of Germany, Britain, and Scandinavia, there prevails to this day the custom of lighting fires or candles round about the newly-born (cf. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, 31), in order to prevent

to puerperal fever,' and that 'almost the whole of this mortality might be avoided.' It is the careless medical practitioners and midwives that are responsible for this mortality, because they do not preserve 'purity,' and carry germs from one woman in confinement to another. The midwifery writers of old said to their disciples: 'Thine is a high and holy calling; see that thou exercise it with purity.' In the enjoined isolation of the Parsi women during their confinement, the original intention seems to be that of observing 'purity.' Some of the later Pazend and Persian writers have not properly understood the original good intention of the early writers, and so have carried the rigour of isolation too far. But, anyhow, the original intention of isolation is intended for the purity' referred to by old midwifery writers.

* See art. PURIFICATION (Parsi).

their falling under the power of evil spirits. The same purpose was served by piercing the door or the door-post with a knife, placing some article of steel—a pair of scissors, a key, a horse-shoe, etc.—in the cradle, hanging amulets round the child's neck, stopping the keyholes, or keeping out cats or any old woman who was suspected of having the 'evil eye.' In some places it was the custom to put salt under the child's tongue to prevent its being bewitched. These prophylactic expedients were deemed necessary till the time of baptism, as it was during this period that the demons directed their practices against the child, and tried to put a changeling, a babe of their own, in its place. The immediate surroundings of the child were meanwhile tabu. On the other hand, every possible effort was made to secure good fortune for the newly-born. Special importance was ascribed to the umbilical cord, and to the bladder-like membrane or 'caul' with which some children are born, such children being regarded as the favourites of fortune. The caul was carefully preserved and sewn into the child's clothing, thus ensuring success in all its future undertakings. From this, indeed, developed the Old Norse belief in an attendant spirit, the *fylgja*, which accompanied the person wherever he went. The dried umbilical cord was in course of time given to the child with a meal of eggs, in the expectation that the child would thereby become shrewd and intelligent; or it was sewn into the clothing, as a means of making its possessor clever and capable. Amongst the Teutons, as amongst many other races, great emphasis was laid upon the young tree which was planted on the day of the child's birth, and was thenceforward regarded as his tree of life. The fortunes of the tree ran parallel with those of the child, and from this notion arose the belief in a person's tutelary tree (Swed. *vård-trad*). When it chanced that an animal was born in the homestead on the same day as the child, it was believed that the former, during its whole life, stood in the closest relationship to the latter. The animal was named after the child, and became his constant associate.

Widely diffused throughout the entire Teutonic area are the mythical stories regarding the goddesses of destiny, who appear at the birth of a child and determine his future. Their function is indicated by their names: thus, in Old Norse they are called *urðir*, 'the powers of destiny'; in English, 'the weird sisters'; Anglo-Saxon, *mettena*, 'those who measure out'; Middle High German, *Gaschepfen*, 'the makers.' From early times the sisters were reckoned as three in number, but sometimes also as seven or thirteen, and frequently the part assigned to one of them is to deal out misfortune to the infant. Norse poetry speaks of them as *nornir*—a word of doubtful etymology. They are represented as spinning maidens, who at the child's birth wind his thread of life—his fate; and accordingly, possessing as they do a foreknowledge of the destiny of men, they acquired at length a prophetic character.

The birth of a child was an occasion upon which a part of special importance was played by the myths regarding the origin of children. The thought underlying nearly all these myths was the belief that children come from 'mother earth.' One proof of this is supplied by the primitive heathen practice, already referred to, of laying the child upon the ground immediately after birth. In many parts of Germany and the Norse countries children were supposed to come forth from hollow trees, as these, according to popular notions, were connected with the interior of the earth. Similar ideas were also held about lakes, ponds, and wells. In South Germany various lakes and fish-ponds are known as *Kinderseen*, 'children's lakes'; while, more particularly in Central Germany, there are many *Kinderbrunnen*, 'children's wells,' in which the goddess Frau Holle was believed to keep in charge the souls of children before their birth. Other places of origin were marshes and fens. The prevailing belief in many districts was that children are drawn out of the water and carried to their mothers by water-fowl, especially the stork and the swan, while in other parts they were supposed to issue from caverns or mountains. In Pomerania, for example, we find 'swan-stones' and *Adebarsteine*, 'stork-stones,' and children obtained from these were called 'swan-children' (Jahn, *Volkssagen aus Pommern*, 390). From heathen times comes the belief that children are the men of a former day, re-born into the world. They had passed their intermediate period in an animal form. According to a popular superstition in South Germany, they had been flying around as butterflies. We thus see that these various notions regarding the origin of children are related in the closest way to the primitive Teutonic belief regarding the soul.

LITERATURE.—Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*[2] (Leipzig, 1906), i. 101 ff; von Amira, *Grundriss der germ. Philol.*[2] (Strassburg, 1900), ii. 164 ff.; Maurer, *Über die Wasserweihe des germ. Heidenthums* (Munich, 1880); 'Die unachte Geburt nach altnordischem Rechte,' in *SBAW*, philos.-hist Klasse (1883), pt. i.; 'de Expositione infantum apud veteres Septentrionales,' in *Saga af Gunnlaugi Ormstungu*, ed. A. M. Hafniæ (1775), 194–219; Rochholz, *Alemannisches Kinderlied und Kinderspiel* (Leipzig, 1857), 279 ff.; Wuttke, *Der deutsche Volksaberglaube der Gegenwart*[2] (Berlin, 1869), § 579 ff.; Mannhardt, *Der Baumkultus der Germanen und ihrer Nachbarstamme* (Berlin, 1875), 45 ff.; Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 391 ff.; J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[4] (Gottingen, 1875–78), i. 335 ff., and *Rechtsaltertumer*[4] (Leipzig, 1899), i. 627 ff.; F. Panzer, *Beitrage zur deutschen Mythologie* (Munich, 1855), ii. 119 ff.

E. MOGK.

BIRTH-DAYS.—The custom of commemorating the day of birth is connected, in its form, with the reckoning of time, and, in its content, with certain primitive religious principles. It is the most conspicuous example of commemorative ritual. Its essence is the repetition of the event commemorated. As culture develops, this primary meaning is obscured by various accidents.

In the lower culture, what is reported of the Congo tribes applies generally: 'no record is kept of birth or age.'* The Hupas of California take no account of the lapse of time, and consider it a ridiculous superfluity to keep a reckoning of age. They guess at a man's years by examination of the teeth. One will say, 'I have good teeth yet.' The only epochs noted are those of babyhood, boyhood or girlhood, youth, manhood or womanhood, and the state of married man or woman, old man or old woman.† The Omahas have a superstitious objection to counting, and therefore never note a person's age.‡

The earliest lunar reckoning produced the seven-day week, the lunar month, and the lunar year, thus providing machinery for the expression of any ideas involving repetition of events. Parallel with these dates, and of earlier origin, are seasonal epochs, marked by changes in vegetation, and also the epochs of human growth, as noted above.

The day of birth itself may be first considered. At an early stage of chronology the influence of ideas of luck is brought to bear upon dates. Every people has its own list of ominous objects and circumstances. In highly developed popular religions the result is a dualism affecting the whole life of man. Of the Cambodians we read that the idea of luck dominates their entire existence.§

* H. Ward in *JAI* xxiv. 291
† S. Powers, *Tribes of California*, 76 f.
‡ Long and James, *Expedition to the Rocky Mountains*, 1823, i. 214, 235.
§ E. Aymonier, *Le Cambodge*, 1900–04, i. 53.

The religion of the Baganda is described as a religion of luck.* Among the Tshi people of West Africa each person has his lucky and unlucky days.† In the week of the Asabas of the Niger the days for marketing, for work, and for rest vary for each individual according to the particular *ju-ju* decided for him by the medicine-man.‡

As the circumstances attending the moment of birth are auspicious or inauspicious, so are those attending the day. Any object or circumstance distinguishing it may affect the destiny of the child. When days are marked, they acquire permanent or varying characteristics which automatically influence the event. The Malagasy, who possess an elaborate doctrine of fatalism (*vintana*), mark a certain number of days in each month as lucky or unlucky. The *vava*, or first days, of some months are especially disastrous to children then born, in some cases to the offspring of the people generally, in others to those of the royal family. A child born on an unlucky day, and dying young, is said to have 'too strong a *vintana*.' Formerly, children born on unlucky days were put to death by being buried alive. In modern times this infanticide is commuted to an ordeal, offering, or 'expiatory bath,' the water being buried instead of the child. In one clan of the Sakalavas all children born on a Tuesday were put to death. In the Bara tribe a child was put to death if born on a day which was unlucky to both father and mother; if the day was unlucky for one parent only, the child's life was spared. In the Tanale tribe one particular month was peculiarly unlucky for birth.§

With the rise of astrology comes the development of the horoscope and similar forms of augury. In origin such practices are a species of sympathetic magic; the intention is to influence events, or to assist nature, and the method employed is the rehearsal or artificial previous reproduction of the desired result. The Central Americans possessed an elaborate code of 'signs of the day,' applying to each day of each cycle of twenty days, the *cempohualli*, of which the year was a multiple. Horoscopes were prepared from these signs for the day and hour of birth. Every Mexican bore through life, as a species of personal name, the sign of his birth-day.‖ The Burmese predict a man's character and destiny according to the day of the week on which he is born and the constellation which rules it. The name of the child must begin with one of the letters belonging to the birth-day.¶ The Asabas of the Niger often name a child after the day of its birth.** In China the hour and the day of birth are regarded as being very important. A child born between the hours of 9 and 11 will have a hard lot at first, but finally great riches.†† The Hindus possess an elaborate astrological system of nativities connected with lucky and unlucky days.‡‡ In Madagascar nativities are drawn up from the position not of the stars, but of the moon. This method is earlier; later cultures prefer the star of nativity. The Tshi peoples name children after the day of the week.§§ The Muhammadanized Swahili consider it lucky to be born on Friday, the Muhammadan festival. Children then born are named 'son' or 'daughter of Friday.'* In German folklore Sunday is lucky as a birth-day, particularly the Sunday of the new moon. This idea is connected with growth. 'Sunday children' are supposed to be able to see spirits, or to see in the dark.†

The principle of repeating an event after its occurrence is an inversion of sympathetic magic. Whereas in the ordinary form of magic the coming event is influenced and ensured by previous rehearsal, in this inverted form it is reproduced in order to repeat the original advantages and to effect their continuance. The idea is naturally suggested by the recurrence of the same external or chronological conditions. These were closely bound up with the original event, and are therefore supposed to influence it: they are further supposed to carry it with them, and therefore require its repetition. The intention varies as the event. In the case of the repetition of birth the intention is a renewal of the life acquired by the original birth. Such ideas are illustrated by the general custom of celebrating the renewal of the year. The ritual is designed to renew not only the life of nature, but also the life of men, and at the same time to discard the old life, now regarded as decay and death. The seasonal changes of growth, connected early with the phases of the moon and the path of the sun, naturally fostered such ideas. As individualism developed they were applied to the life of each man. But the important point for the earlier periods is that these annual renewals of nature and life in general practically amounted to universal or social birth-days.

To illustrate the first of these points, we may instance the Hindu festival *samvatsarādi*, which celebrates the beginning of the year.

'The chief features of the day are the reading of the new almanac and hearing the forecast of the events of the New Year. New clothes also are worn when procurable, and the food partaken of during the day is, as far as possible, composed of new materials, i.e. new grain, pulses and such like, for this is a feast of ingathering. One dish, which must be partaken of by all who wish for good luck during the year, is a conserve composed of sugar, tamarind, and the flowers of the *neem* or *margosa* tree (*Melia Azadirachta*), which is then in full flower. The bitter taste of this is not much relished as a rule, but it is necessary that at least a small portion of the dish should be eaten. This seems to be analogous to the English idea that it is necessary to eat mince-pie at Christmas or at the New Year.'‡

In the next place, such festivals, surviving as they do into the highest stages of evolution, are in the early stages universal birth-days. The Malagasy custom is significant. In the lunar year of Madagascar, time is popularly reckoned by the annual great feast *fandroana*. Remarkable longevity is denoted by the phrase that a man has seen three *fandroanas* at the same season of the year. Thus he might see it in spring at the age of 7, again when 40, and again when 73. We are expressly informed that a man's age is reckoned not by his years, but by the *fandroana*.§

The Japanese supply an instructive case of compromise between the social and the individual birth-day. The first of January, the commencement of the New Year,

'may be considered the universal birth-day, for they do not wait till the actual anniversary of birth has come round to call a person a year older, but date the addition to his age from the New Year. The 61st birth-day is the only one about which much fuss is made. This is because the old man or woman having lived through one revolution of the sexagenary cycle then begins a second round, which is in itself an extraordinary event, for the Japanese reckon youth to last from birth to the age of 32, middle age from 32 to 40, and old age from 40 to 60. A child is born in December 1901. By January 1902 they talk of the child as being 2 years old, because it has lived through a part of two separate years.'‖

* Roscoe in *JAI* xxxii. 72.
† A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 1887, p. 220.
‡ J. Parkinson in *JAI* xxxvi. 317.
§ L. Dahle in *Antananarivo Annual*, xii. 460; J. Sibree, *Madagascar*, 279 ff.
‖ Sahagun, *Historia general*, 239 ff.; E. J. Payne, *History of the New World called America*, 1892, ii. 325 ff.; H. H. Bancroft, *NR* ii. 271.
¶ Shway Yoe (J. G. Scott), *The Burman*, 1882, i. 4, 6.
** Parkinson, *loc. cit.*
†† Dennys, *Folklore of China*, 1876, p. 8.
‡‡ Dubois (ed. Beauchamp), ii. 382 ff.; Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*, 372 ff.
§§ Ellis, *loc. cit.*

* Velten, *Sitten und Gebräuche der Suaheli*, 13; Sibree, *loc. cit.*
† Ploss, *Das Kind*, ii. 88, 89.
‡ J. E. Padfield, *The Hindu at Home*[2], 165.
§ W. Ellis, *History of Madagascar*, 1838, i. 447, 448.
‖ B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[4], 1902, p. 62.

In the Chinese religion of piety we find a remarkably explicit illustration of the principle of the renewal of life on the anniversary of birth. 'The birth-day celebration is a peculiar institution,' though not attended with much éclat till after the age of 15. Each person has an annual festival, and every tenth year after reaching 50 an extraordinary celebration. Especially honoured is the 61st birth-day. The Emperor on his birth-day is supposed to acquire 10,000 'longevities.' The courts of justice are closed, and a general amnesty is proclaimed. The ordinary person on his birth-day receives 'longevity presents,' and his friends wish him long life. With the express purpose of prolonging life, a dish of vermicelli in remarkably long strips is eaten. Of particular importance is the 'longevity garment.' This is a handsome robe, embroidered in gold characters with the word 'longevity.' It serves at death as the man's shroud. It is generally a present from the children, and is given to the parent on his birth-day. He wears it then, and on all festive occasions, in order to acquire long life, 'it being generally acknowledged among the Chinese that it is extremely useful and necessary on the birth-day to absorb a good amount of vital energy in order to remain hale and healthy during the ensuing year.' *

The Coreans celebrate the 61st birth-day in the Chinese fashion. On ordinary birth-days new clothes are worn, and a feast is prepared for friends of the family.†

The Burmese offer on their birth-days, celebrated weekly, candles representing the animals connected with the day of the week. The offering is an act of worship at the pagoda.‡

The Central Americans celebrated birth-days with a feast given to the friends of the family. Presents were offered them on their departure.§

Among the Tshi natives of West Africa, a man's birth-day is sacred to his *kra*, or 'indwelling spirit.' If a man is rich, he kills a sheep, if poor, a fowl, and prepares a feast. In the morning, when he washes, he provides himself with an egg, and some new fibre of the kind used as a sponge. He then stands before the calabash containing the water, and addresses his *kra*, asking for its protection and assistance during the coming year, as he is about to worship it, and keep that day sacred to it. He then breaks the egg into the calabash, and washes himself with the fluid; after this he puts white clay on his face, and puts on a white cloth. Members of the higher classes, kings and chiefs, keep sacred to the *kra* the day of the week on which they were born. Thus Kwofli Kari Kari, having been born on a Friday, made it a law that no blood should be shed on that day.‖

The ancient Persians celebrated birth-days.¶

In ancient Egypt the birth-days of the kings 'were celebrated with great pomp. They were looked upon as holy; no business was done upon them, and all classes indulged in the festivities suitable to the occasion. Every Egyptian attached much importance to the day, and even to the hour, of his birth; and it is probable that, as in Persia, each individual kept his birth-day with great rejoicings; welcoming his friends with all the amusements of society and a more than usual profusion of the delicacies of the table.'**

In modern Persia the birth-days of Muhammad and 'Alī, as in Islām generally, are duly honoured. For ordinary persons, however, the New Year's feast is the only real festival.††

Among the modern Jews, the 13th birth-day of a boy is celebrated as a family feast, this date being his religious majority.*

The preceding accounts introduce some secondary principles. The idea, inseparable from festivals, of holiday or rest, combines with the wish to avoid consuming energy and vitality, and to assimilate the same by means of food and drink. A further principle is that of a propitious commencement of an epoch as influencing the whole. At a late stage such ideas are obscured, and an ethical principle arises. This is, in Western culture, faintly suggested by the phrase, 'turning over a new leaf' at the New Year or on the birth-day. In Catholicism, it is more marked in combination with the birth-day of the individual's patron saint. In early Christianity each anniversary was a step towards the new life commencing at death.

The idea of renewal, as we saw, is in the early stages emphasized by the weekly phases of the moon. Thus we get the principle of the octave. One of its earliest applications is the celebration of the seventh day after birth, on which, among various peoples, the name is given or some ritual operation is performed.

The principle of the octave is actually applied at times to produce a weekly birth-day. This has been instanced in West Africa and Burma. A good many recorded birth-days are probably not annual, but weekly or monthly. The ancient Syrians celebrated a monthly birth-day.†

These considerations lead up to some peculiarities of reckoning or commemoration which have influenced the custom. The Apache father makes a note of each moon that follows the birth of a child. A large mark is made for the 10th month.‡ The Mayas celebrated as the birthdays of their children the first step taken, the first word spoken, and the first thing made.§ The Ovaherero reckon a man's age from the time of his circumcision, not counting the previous period. A man is called after the *otyiondo* of his circumcision. Those circumcised at the same time are *omakura*, 'persons of the same age.'‖ Such methods of reckoning age are convenient for the savage, who has little use for any more accurate reckoning. Other such epochs, which at a certain stage are the only 'birth-days,' are weaning, initiation, and marriage. The Baganda reckon a man's age by the reigns of the chiefs. 'It was in the reign of so and so that I was born.'¶

In the lower cultures names are curiously parallel and interchangeable, so to say, with dates. The Central Australians have each a name denoting age in relation to others, but have no annual reckoning. The Maori had one name given at birth, a second at puberty, a third on his father's death, and others whenever he performed some achievement.** An Aht will change his name perhaps ten times in ten years, and celebrate the event each time with a feast.†† In connexion with change of name there is the idea of renewal.

An early application of the principle of commemoration is 'the feast of the dead.' All the ideas connected with the spirits of the departed find expression here. In early religion these celebrations are as frequent and as important as any annual festival. In Oajaca great ceremonial attended the anniversary of the birth of great lords after their death. The belief was that the soul wandered about for many years before entering bliss, and visited its friends on earth once a year.‡‡

* J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, 1866, ii. 217 ff.; J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, i. 61, 62.
† Griffis, *Corea*, 1882, p. 295.
‡ Shway Yoe (J. G. Scott), *The Burman*, i. 6.
§ Bancroft, *op. cit.* ii. 283.
‖ A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 156.
¶ Herodotus, i. 133, ix. 110.
** Wilkinson, *Ancient Egyptians*, iii. 368.
†† Polak, *Persien*, 1865, i. 338.

* Roubin in *JE*, *s.v.* † 2 Mac 6⁷.
‡ Hrdlička in *American Anthropologist*, vii. 490.
§ Bancroft, *op. cit.* ii. 662.
‖ *South African Folklore Journal*, i. 43.
¶ Roscoe in *JAI* xxxii. 72.
** R. Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui*², 1870, p. 156.
†† G. M. Sproat, *Savage Life*, 1868, p. 264.
‡‡ Bancroft, *op. cit.* ii. 623.

The Hindus observe the new moon of the month, *Bhādrapada* (September–October), in honour of the dead. On this day the head of a family must perform prescribed ceremonies for the preceding three generations.' The celebration is for such of the dead as may not have received the usual rites of sepulture. The fact shows, by negation, that the commemoration is the repetition of the event. The annual *Śrāddhas* are well known. Their object is to 'assist the departed spirit in the various experiences it will have to pass through. At the same time, the one who duly performs these rites and ceremonies thereby lays up merit for himself and his family, which merit will be duly carried to the credit of his account hereafter.' One *śrāddha* is to provide the spirit with an 'intermediate body.' Another indicates the union of the dead with his immediate ancestors. The monthly *śrāddhas* commence on the 30th day after death. An annual ceremony is performed on the anniversary of the death.*

A slight shifting of the point of view will show the parallelism between such practices as the Hindu and the early Christian principle that the birth-day of the martyr was the day on which he died. The death-day of the faithful was regarded as their birth into a new life. The 'natale' *par excellence* was the day of death. It was a nativity to a glorious crown in the kingdom of heaven. Tertullian observes that St. Paul was born again by a new nativity at Rome because he suffered martyrdom there. Such *natalia* were contrasted with 'natural birth-days,' as spiritual in opposition to worldly. The 'birth-days' of martyrs, celebrated at the grave or monument, had a profound influence on the development of ecclesiastical institutions. The celebration was a service, at which the Communion was received. The ethical principle involved was imitation of the martyr, repetition in others of his life and death. The *fasti* of martyrs were gradually compiled, and churches were erected over their bones, the bones sometimes being replaced under the altar.†

The festivals of gods are frequently their birth-days. Thus the Hindu festival *Śrīrāmajayantī* celebrates the birth-day of Rāma, the seventh incarnation of Vishnu. The image of the god is adorned and carried in procession. Pilgrimage is made to the temple. *Kṛṣnajayantī* is the birth-day of Krishna, and is one of the most popular of the annual festivals. The *Bhāgavata* describing the life of the god is read on that day. *Vināyakachaturthī* is the birth-day festival of Ganeśa. Every house sets up an image of the god, before which lights are placed. A *mantra* of consecration, *pratiṣṭā*, is pronounced, on which the spirit of the god enters the image.

In such acts we see a ritual re-creation of the divinity, a repetition of his birth.

At this feast, artizans worship their tools, and students their books, placing them before the image. Ganeśa is the god who is invoked in all undertakings, and who helps man on his way.‡

In Christianity the birth-day of Christ is only less important than the Passion and the Resurrection. Even here the social aspect of religion is prominent, and, by a coincidence, the date finally decided upon is that celebrated in paganism as the annual birth-day of the Sun, just as the weekly day of the sun, the Christian Sunday, was the weekly birth-day of the Solar Deity, and in Hebrew mythology the first day of Creation.

LITERATURE.—*HDB* and *EBi*, *s.v.* 'Birthday'; Bingham, *Christian Antiquities*, 1840; J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, 1892 ff.; A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 1887; J. E. Padfield, *The Hindu at Home*[2], 1908; B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[4], 1902.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

BIRTH-DAYS (Greek and Roman).—Birth-day celebrations are to be met with in antiquity from a very early date. Æschylus presupposes them when he makes Apollo receive on his birth-day his oracle as a present from Phœbe (*Eumenides*, 6–8). Birth-days were celebrated with prayers, sacrifices, and banquets, and it was also the custom to offer presents to the person whose birth-day it was (*e.g.* a book, *Anthol. Pal.* ix. 93). Sometimes those who were born on the same day of the month formed a society, and called themselves τετραδισταί, εἰκαδισταί, etc. Later, it was frequently the custom for such societies to celebrate the birth-days of members of distinction, or these members themselves left an endowment to enable their associates to celebrate their birth-day even after their death. Such a posthumous celebration was called γενέσια, whereas the celebration during a man's lifetime was termed γενέθλια (schol. Plato, *Alcibiades*, 121 C). Plato's birth-day was celebrated by the Academy on the 7th of Thargelion, because Apollo was supposed to have been born on that day; and in other cases as well the celebrations of birth-days were fixed for sacred days (Plut. *Thesecus*, 36; the Athenians mention the 8th of a month as the birthday of Theseus, ἐκ Ποσειδῶνος γεγονέναι λεγομένῳ· καὶ γὰρ Ποσειδῶνα ταῖς ὀγδόαις τιμῶσιν). From the time of the Diadochi we often hear of the celebration of the birth-days of kings, and from the time of Cæsar, of those of emperors (there is an important inscription which indicates that in Asia Minor the year began with the birth-day of Augustus [*Athen. Mitt.* xxiv. 288]), when festivities, games, etc., took place. The same honour was also extended to empresses and princes.

These honours passed from persons to cities: thus in Rome the *Palilia* was celebrated as the *natalis urbis*. More especially were such honours transferred to the gods: Athene was supposed to have been born on the 3rd of a month, Hermes on the 4th, Apollo on the 7th, and so on. In these cases the festival must always have been the *prius*, the birth-day the *posterius*. It often happens that the birthday of the god and the *natalis templi* coincide (Cic. *ad Att.* IV. i. 4, *CIL* XII. 3058).

LITERATURE.—Chr. Petersen, 'Ueber die Geburtstagsfeier bei den Griechen,' in *Jahrb f. klass. Philol.*, Suppl II., 1857; W. Schmidt, *Geburtstag im Altertum*, Giessen, 1908.

W. KROLL.

BIRTHRIGHT.—See INHERITANCE.

BISHOP.—See MINISTRY.

BISMILLĀH.—1. Meaning and early usage.—*Bismillāh*(*i*), an Arabic expression signifying 'in the name of Allah,' was borrowed by Muḥammad from the religious phraseology of Jews and Christians,* and was formulated by him in full as follows: *bismillāhi-r-raḥmāni-r-raḥīmi*, 'in the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful.' Muḥammad employed the phrase both in its shorter and in its complete form as an introductory formula, designed to connect the beginnings of action with the devout remembrance of God, and it is probable that, while still resident at Mecca, he recommended his adherents to use it in a similar way. In the Qur'ān he represents Noah as summoning the faithful to enter the ark with the words, 'Bismillāh ("in the name of Allah") be its voyage and its landing' (xi. 43); and, similarly, a letter purporting to have been written by King Solomon to the Queen of Sheba opens thus: '*Bismillāhi-r-raḥmāni-r-raḥīmi*' (xxvii. 30). Probably, too, he began his own ceremonial discourses, as collected in the Qur'ān,

* Padfield, *op. cit.* 165, 217, 225.
† Bingham, vii 340 ff., 350 f., 422.
‡ Padfield, *op. cit.* 178 ff., 181, 183.

* Noldeke, *Gesch. d. Qorâns* (Gottingen, 1860), p. 88 [[2] (published by F. Schwally) 116 f.].

with the phrase, and the redactors of the sacred volume, in prefixing it (in plenary form) to the various *sūras*, evidently regarded it as a prefatory formula having Muḥammad's own sanction. We cannot divine the reason of its omission from the 9th *sūra*, although the Muslim exegetes show no perplexity in the matter, and provide several explanations, as may be found in commentaries to the Qur'ān. The earlier theologians of Islām were at variance with each other regarding the question whether the *bismillāhi*-formula at the beginning of the *sūras* was to be considered an article of revelation, *i.e.* an utterance of God, or an item proceeding from the Prophet himself; but eventually the former alternative carried the day, and it came to be held that everything between the two covers (*bāina-l-daffatain*) of the book, including, of course, the prefatory formula of the *sūras*, was the word of God.

It is recorded that, before Muḥammad arose, the heathen Quraish made use of the sacred formula *bismika Allahumma* ('in thy name, O God') for a similar purpose—a statement which is certainly credible, though we have no evidence to test it by. According to Arabic tradition, which delights to associate every particular custom with the name of an individual founder, the person who introduced the use of this phrase into Mecca was Umayya b. Abi-l-Ṣalt, the reputed author of many apocryphal poems which promulgated monotheistic and Biblical ideas before the time of Muḥammad. Umayya is said to have learned the formula, as a potent talisman against the evil influence of demonic powers, from the lips of a Christian hermit, and to have made personal trial of it.* But as he was an older contemporary of Muḥammad, and survived the latter's entrance upon his public career, the older formula cannot, agreeably to the above tradition, have been in use long before the Prophet's day. It is even said, indeed, that Muḥammad himself had employed it, but that the revelation of certain verses in the Qur'ān (xi. 93, xxvii. 30) induced him to substitute for it, first the shorter, and then the longer, form of the *bismillah*.† Nevertheless he would appear, according to Muslim tradition, to have sometimes resorted to the earlier Meccan formula even at a later period;‡ thus in a treaty which he made with the people of Mecca near Ḥudaibiyah in A.H 6, he deferred to the vigorous opposition they offered to the new formula introduced by him, and quite readily sanctioned the use of the Quraish '*bismika Allahumma*' as a heading to the document.§ '*Allahumma*' is also approved as an invocation of God in Muslim petitions.

We may regard it as historically established that rescripts drawn up by Muḥammad's instructions, contracts concluded between him and tribes which yielded him their allegiance,‖ and even records of a more private character,¶ were usually prefaced by the plenary form of the *bismillāh*.** Thereafter its insertion in similar documents as a prefatory formula became part of the religious practice of the adherents of Islām.†† Official records from the early age of Islām, preserved either as transcriptions in historical works, or, more authentically still, as originals on papyrus sheets, always begin with the *bismillāh*. It is also found on textile fabrics and other products of industrial art.‡‡ In bilingual (Arabic-Greek) documents, which were common, especially in the Egyptian province, till far on in the Umayyad period, the Greek portion contains a translation of the formula, the shorter appearing as ἐν ὀνόματι τοῦ θεοῦ, while the plenary form expands this with the words τοῦ ἐλεήμονος φιλανθρώπου.§§

In accordance with the common Arabic practice of giving a convenient name to formulas by the device of omitting some of their constituent letters (as, *e.g.*, *ḥamdala* for '*al-ḥamdu lillāhi*,' *ḥay'ala* for *ḥayya 'alā-ṣ-ṣalāti*, etc.), the *bismillāh* is contracted to *basmala*, which is also a verb meaning 'to utter the *bismillah*'; and the use of the formula is also referred to as *tasmiya*, the invocation of the name (*ism*) of God.

2. Ceremonial use.—The *bismillāh* acquires a special ceremonial significance as the formula of benediction pronounced before slaughtering animals for food—a usage which, without doubt, was suggested by the Jewish law enjoining the utterance of the *b'rākhā* before killing and eating. The relevant injunction in the Qur'ān is found in vi. 118, 121: 'Eat of that over which the name of Allah hath been pronounced if ye believe in His signs' . . . 'Eat not therefore of that on which the name of Allah hath not been named, for that were certainly sin.' From this passage was argued the obligatory use of the *tasmiya** before slaughter; and, similarly, it was required that the benediction in Allah's name should precede the eating of the flesh of animals prescribed for that purpose. Even in the chase (v. 6) it was imperative to utter the name of Allah before releasing the falcon or the hound, and only on this condition could the quarry be afterwards used as food.† In pursuance of a hermeneutic practice of later Muḥammadan theologians, certain theological schools attenuated the character of this absolutely binding ordinance to that of a mere wish, and in this way the omission of the actual utterance of Allah's name before the act of killing did not necessarily proscribe the use of the animal for food. If, for example, the observance of the regulation had been inadvertently neglected, the food might still be partaken of without misgiving—for, of course, the thought of Allah is never absent from the devout heart. But it is obvious that these interpretations and practical accommodations are at variance with the actual language of the injunction as given in the Qur'ān—a fact emphatically insisted upon in the teaching of the more rigid and literalistic interpreters of the book.‡

Another question of ceremonial relating to the use of the *bismillāh* arises in connexion with the Muḥammadan ritual of prayer (*ṣalāt*). The latter, as is well known, begins with the recitation of the 'opening' *sūra* of the Qur'ān (*al-fātiḥa*), whose first sentence is the *bismillāh* in its complete form. It has been from early times a subject of debate in the schools of the law whether this introductory phrase should be spoken aloud (*jahran*) or in an inaudible whisper—a controversy connected in its origin with the disputed question already referred to, viz. whether the *bismillāh* is to rank as Divine revelation or not. Most of the orthodox schools decided that the formula might be uttered in an undertone,§ but the Shāfi'ites, and especially the Shī'ites, demand that it be spoken in an audible voice.‖

3. Everyday use.—Having dealt with the use of the *bismillāh* in ceremonial functions and in im-

* *Aghānī*, in. 189; Mas'ūdi, *Prairies d'or*, i. 142; cf. Schulthess in the *Noldeke-Festschrift*, 74, n 5

† Ibn Sa'd in Wellhausen, *Skizzen u. Vorarbeiten*, iv. (Berlin, 1899), 6, 9 (text), 104 (tr.).

‡ Leone Caetani, *Annali dell' Islam*, ii. (Milan, 1907) 222.

§ Ibn Hishām, ed. Wustenfeld, 747.

‖ Examples in Nöldeke-Schwally, *op. cit.* 117, n. 1.

¶ *e g.* a note regarding the distribution of the wheat brought as booty from Khaibar (Ibn Hisham, 776, 778 ff).

** L. Caetani (*op. cit.* i. 395, ii. 793) doubts the authenticity of this prefatory formula in documents given by Muslim historians

†† *e.g.* in the *Testament of 'Abdallah b. Mas ud*, in Ibn Sa'd, Ṭabaqāt, III. i. 112, 113.

‡‡ Karabacek, 'Zur arabischen Alterthumskunde, ii. Die arabischen Papyrusprotokolle,' in *SWAW* clxi (Vienna, 1908) 35 ff.

§§ *e.g.*, in the bilingual documents in Karabacek, *op. cit.* 63-67; C. H. Becker, *Papyri Schott-Reinhardt*, i. (Heidelberg, 1906), 109 ff.; *ZA* xxii 150, 170-178.

* But without *al raḥman al-raḥīm*, as it was not thought right, when taking away life, to name 'the Compassionate Merciful' (*ZDMG* xlvm. 95, n 1).

† *Muwaṭṭa*, n 356

‡ Cf. the present writer's *Die Zahiriten* (Leipzig, 1884), 75 ff.

§ It is expressly recorded of 'Omar II that, when leading in prayer, he did not pronounce the *bismillah* of the *fatiḥa* audibly (*lā yajharu*) (Ibn Sa'd, v. 246, 25). The khalif al-Musta'in was accused by his opponents of double-dealing, because he spoke the *bismillah* of the *fatiḥa* inaudibly when in Sāmarra, but elsewhere hypocritically uttered it aloud (Ṭabari, *Annales*, III. 1083, 3 ff).

‖ On this question see the present writer's 'Beitrage zur Litteraturgesch der Schi'a u. d. sunnitischen Polemik,' *SWAW* (1874), 15 ff., 86.

portant affairs of public and private life, we proceed to speak of a view which sprang up in Islām at a very early period, and soon established itself in everyday practice—the view, namely, which finds expression in a proverb commonly regarded as a saying (*ḥadīth*) of the Prophet: *Kullu amrin dhī bālin lā yubtada'u bi-dhikri*-llāhi fahuwa abtaru*, i.e. 'every matter of importance which is begun without mention of God is maimed.' This maxim was taken by devout adherents of Islām as their warrant for the practice of inaugurating every action† by ejaculating a *bismillāh*. The prophet is traditionally reported to have said that Satan sits behind every one who mounts an animal without first having uttered the formula.‡ Its use as a blessing before meals is regarded as of special importance, and on social occasions the saying of the *bismillāh* by the head of the household intimates to the guests that the repast is to begin.§ Nor must the *tasmiya* be omitted when a person enters or leaves a house, or puts on his clothes.‖ The practice is felt to be in accordance with the thought of Qur'ān xxxiii. 41: 'Remember Allah with frequent remembrance'—a maxim highly approved in Islām. The idea that the utterance of God's holy name involves an impiety never found a footing among the Muslims, who are wont to say, rather, that if we love a person we often mention his name (*man aḥabba shay'an akthara dhikrahu*).¶

4. Superstitious ideas and use.—The deep significance and the sacred character with which Islām invested the *bismillāh* led at length to its being pressed into the service of folk-lore, mysticism, and even magic. It was said that God had inscribed it upon the breast of Adam, the wing of the angel Gabriel, the seal of Solomon, and the tongue of Jesus.** The Creator has written the sacred words upon His works. The imaginative eye can sometimes trace the formula in the veins of the leaf or the varied colourings of the butterfly's wing, where nature has imprinted it in mystic (Syriac) characters. The written and oral application of the *bismillāh* possesses talismanic virtues.‡ When the soul in its death-struggle is striving to escape from the body, the angel of death brings from paradise an apple upon which is inscribed the formula, or the angel himself writes it upon the palm of the dying man, whose agony is alleviated by the sight of it, and whose soul then yields itself to the angel.†† The *bismillāh* serves also as a means of defence against the baneful effects of the evil eye, and other malign influences of occult forces. It is a popular notion amongst Muḥammadans that the *jinn* are easily offended, as, for instance, by human encroachment upon their haunts, by pouring out hot water, etc.; but if a man feels that he has provoked their resentment, he may drive them away by uttering the *bismillāh*.‡‡ Similarly, in order to render his goods proof against the *jinn*, he uses the phrase as a charm when he shuts the door, or stores articles of food in their appropriate receptacles, or lays down his clothes at night. An article protected in this way is called *musammā* (commonly pronounced *musemmī*), *i.e.* 'something over which has been named (the name of Allah).'*

The *bismillāh*, by reason of its prophylactic virtues, is deemed specially serviceable as an inscription for amulets, and, in general, as an accessory of practical magic.† Copious illustrations of this are to be found in the *Shams al-ma'ārif* of al-Būnī (†A.H. 622, A.D. 1225) and works of a similar nature. The Muslims also construct magic squares, and distribute the words of the *basmala* in magical combinations amongst the various compartments.‡ Al-Būnī is also the author of a monograph dealing specially with the use of the formula for magical purposes (*Faḍā'il al-basmala*).§

5. Calligraphic usage.—Mention ought finally to be made of a certain convention in the method of transcribing the *bismillāh*. When the Muslim calligraphist writes the formula for a ceremonial purpose, he imparts a peculiar form to its first word by way of signalizing, as it were, the exceptional character of the phrase as a whole. The vertical stroke of the initial letter *bā* (ب) is considerably prolonged in an upward direction, and slightly curved; then, the *'alif* (of *'ism*) being omitted altogether,‖ the *sīn* (س) is placed immediately after the *bā*, while the final letter *mīm* (م) is connected with the *sīn* by a line drawn far beyond the usual length (بســـــــم). The Muḥammadan scribes would appear at a very early date to have introduced yet another alteration in the written form of the *bismillāh*—a peculiarity of common occurrence in MSS. Here the tips of the third letter *sīn* (س) disappear entirely, as well as the *'alif*, and the initial *bā* (ب) is joined to the final *mīm* (م) by a long horizontal line thus: بـــــم. The antiquity of this usage is indicated by an incident recorded in Ibn Sa'd, viz. that 'the Khalīf 'Omar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz dismissed a certain scribe (*kātib*) from his office because he wrote *bism* without inserting the *sīn* distinctly' (*walam yaj'al al-sīn*).¶

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in the footnotes.

I. GOLDZIHER.

BLACKMAIL.—The word 'mail' is derived from the Norman-French *maille*, which is used in the Act of 1335, 9 Edward III. c. 3 in the sense of 'half-penny.' We find three meanings assigned to this term.

1. Legally, blackmail refers to rents reserved in labour, cattle, or produce. In mediæval times rent was uniformly paid in kind—a custom that persisted in France down to the days of the great French Revolution. The Black Death and the Peasants' Revolt gave a powerful impetus to the transformation of English agricultural life, and among the results was the substitution of payment in money for payment in kind. In Scotland and Ireland, and indeed in the rest of Europe, this substitution was not effected till a comparatively late date. For rent in kind were substituted 'white rents,' which were reserved in 'white money,' or silver. In the Middle Ages there was a great scarcity of the precious metals, and this doubtless assisted in prolonging the existence of the old method of payment. The discovery of silver in

* Originally *bi-ḥamdi*, with reference to the glorifying of God by formulas beginning with *al-ḥamdu lillāhi*.

† Including that mentioned by Buchārī, *K. al-wuḍū*, No. 8.

‡ Damīrī (Būlāq, A.H. 1284), *s.v.* 'Al-dābba,' i. 399.

§ Lane, *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*[5] (London, 1871), i. 183.

‖ Traditional sayings in Nawawī, *Kitāb al-Adhkār* (Cairo, A.H. 1312), 11-12.

¶ *RHR* xvi. 164; *ZDMG* li. 265.

** E. Doutté, *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord* (Algiers, 1909), 211.

†† Al-Suyūṭi, *al-Durar al-ḥisān fi-l-ba'th wa-na'īm al-jinān* (Cairo, A.H. 1324).

‡‡ In North Africa, A. Bel, *La Population musulmane de Tlemcen* (Paris, 1908), 28 (from the *Revue des études ethnographiques et sociologiques*).

* Lane, *op. cit.* i. 287; *Arabian Society in the Middle Ages* (London, 1883), 41.

† Reinaud, *Monumens musulmans du cabinet de M. le duc de Blacas* (Paris, 1828), ii. 3–6.

‡ Doutté, *op. cit.* 212.

§ Brockelmann, *Gesch. d. arab. Litteratur*, i. (Weimar, 1898) 497

‖ This is a Massoretic practice.

¶ Ibn Sa'd, v. 270, 14.

South America helped forward the movement from status to contract, with the result that white rent paid in current coin or white money (*mailles blanches*) began to replace the black rent. In Scots law the rents of an estate were called 'mails' or 'maills,' while 'Blanch Holding' and 'Mail' for rent are somewhat similar terms for this old custom. Camden (*Rem.* 205), explaining black money, says, 'What that was I know not, if it were not of Copper, as *Maill* and *Black-maill*.' Coke refers to 'Work-days, rent cummin, rent corn, etc. . . . called *Redditus nigri*, black maile, that is, black rents.' Blackstone supports Coke's explanation of *redditus nigri* (cf. Camden, (*Rem.* 1605, p. 205; Coke, *Inst.*, 1642, ii. 19; Blackstone, *Com.*, 1768, ii. 43; Burn, *Justice*[29], 1845, iii. 214). In this sense the term 'blackmail' is obsolete.

2. Historically, it is the tribute in corn, cattle, other kind, or money—here we are coming to the newer form—levied from the farmers and small owners in the border counties of England and Scotland, and along the Highland border, by free-booting chiefs in return for immunity from pillage. The border counties chiefly affected were Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmoreland, and the bishopric of Durham. Sir Walter Scott in *Waverley* (i. 222) represents one of the better aspects of this custom when one of his characters remarks, 'The boldest of them (*i.e.* the freebooters) will never steal a hoof from any one that pays blackmail to Vich Ian Vohr.' It is somewhat remarkable to find how wide-spread is the use of the word 'mail' with the meaning of 'rent' or 'tribute.' In Irish *mal* signifies a rent or tax. In Armoric *mal* signifies such wealth as is acquired by the strong hand; while in Afghanistan the contributory levy on a village is called *mallia*. Blackmail sometimes denotes the money taken by the harbingers or servants, with their master's knowledge, for abstaining from enforcing exactions like coin and livery. They made up for the abstinence in these places by plundering in others. Curiously enough, we find that in Ireland in the 14th cent. black money or blackmail indicates certain coins of an inferior kind authorized to pass current.

In 1552 Archbishop Hamilton (*Catech.*, 1884, 98), in reference to the forays of the border chieftains, mentions, 'Quhay takis ouer sair mail, ouer mekle ferme, or ony blake maillis, fra thair tennands'; while about 1561 R. Maitland, in *Thievis Liddesd.* vi., describes the 'commoun taking of blak maill.' On both sides of the Border severe Acts were passed to put an end to these depredations. Under the Scots king, James VI., the measure of 1597 describes how 'diuers subjects of the Inland, takis and sittis vnder their assurance, payand them black-maill, and permittand them to reif, herrie, and oppresse their Nichtbouris.' In 1601—a memorable year in economic legislation—an English Act of Parliament also notes that 'sundry of her Maiesties louing subjects within the sayed (*i.e.* the four northern) Counties . . . have been inforced to pay a certaine rate of money, corne, cattell, or other consideration, commonly there called by the name of Blacke maile.' The 43 Eliz. c. 13, s. 1, made the levying or paying of this blackmail a felony without benefit of the clergy. The *Termes de la Ley* informs us that 'Blackmail is a word used in 43 Eliz. c. 13, and it signifies a certainty of money, corn, cattell, or other consideration, given by the poore people in the north parts of England, unto men of great name and aliance in those parts, to be by them protected from such as usually robbe and steal there.' Cowell in his famous Law Dictionary, *The Interpreter*, notes that 'these robbers are of late years called Moss-troopers.' The depredations of the Border chieftains, in spite of these repressive measures, did not cease till towards the end of the 17th century. In 1707 an 'Address from Cumberland' in the *London Gazette* points out that 'there is, now, no Debatable Land to contend for; no Black Mail to be paid to the Leaders of the Robbers, as a Ransom' (cf. Blackstone, *Comm.* iv. 263).

3. The term is now usually applied to offences called in French *chantage*, that is, the extortion of money, or other valuable consideration, by intimidation, by the unscrupulous use of official or social position, or of political influence or vote, by persons upon those whom they have it in their power to help or injure. In one sense the Border robbers have passed away, but in another sense they are with us still. For the organized forms of the Camorra of Naples, the Mafia of Sicily, the Black Hand of the United States, and the Highbinders of China are largely blackmailing bodies. Their methods and rules of procedure are much the same as those of the outlaws of old. Like them, the Black Hand, for example, levy blackmail, kidnap men or their children and hold them to ransom, murder their victims in cold blood if the ransom be not forthcoming, and terrorize the surrounding population into tacit complicity. In private life the only hope of resisting the blackmailer is to refuse to pay the first time he makes his demand. Mr. W. E. Gladstone was accosted late at night by an unfortunate woman to whom he gave alms. A man, who saw him speaking to her, stopped the statesman and attempted to levy blackmail. Mr. Gladstone kept him in conversation till a policeman came in sight, when he at once gave the blackmailer in charge. In English common law it is a misdemeanour to threaten to publish any libel upon any other person, directly or indirectly, if the act is done with the intent to extort any money or other valuable thing. The punishment is imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for three years. It is a felony to demand of any person, with menaces and without any reasonable cause, any property, and the punishment thereof ranges from penal servitude for life to a period not less than three years. The truth or falsehood of a threatening accusation, whether of crime or misconduct, is absolutely immaterial: the accused cannot set up truth as a justification of his conduct. The French and German codes deal with blackmailing in an equally stern manner. The latter states that, if the extortion is committed by violence against a person, or with the application of threats, the author is to be punished like a robber.

LITERATURE.—The authorities are quoted in the article.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

BLASPHEMY (Gr. *βλασφημία* = (1) an ill-omened or profane utterance, a light or rash prayer; (2) a slander, or any defamation; (3) impious speech against God. Oppos. *εὐφημία*).—**1. Blasphemy as a sin.**—Blasphemy as a sin and an ecclesiastical offence is peculiar to the Jewish and the Christian religion and to allied monotheistic cults. For, though the religions of Greece and Rome, and indeed of most countries, were far from viewing with equanimity the utterance of words which might offend any of their gods, yet the abhorrence caused by such utterances was due mainly to a fear of the disasters which the offended god might be expected to inflict on the whole tribe of which the offender was a member. The trial of Socrates would illustrate this, since he was accused of 'teaching men not to receive the gods whom the city acknowledged, and of having new gods' (Plato, *Apol.* 24 B). Under English common law this offence would have been the subject of an indictment for blasphemy, but the freer Greek spirit treated it as an offence against the welfare of the State. Similarly, in the charge brought by Pythonicus against Alcibiades (Thucydides, vi. 53),

that he had divulged the mysteries of Eleusis, the gravamen was not so much that the act was an offence against the gods as that it was dangerous to the community. The Roman criminal law appears to have had no provision against blasphemy, apparently because, 'in spite of the intensity of Roman religious feeling, the religion of the State was always absolutely subject to the political authority' (Hunter, *Roman Law*, 1880, p. 10), and hence an offence against religion was once more not so much a sin as a crime. Persons who introduced new kinds of worship, unknown to custom or reason, disturbing weaker minds, were to be punished—if persons of rank, with deportation; if not of rank, with death.

2. **In the Old Testament.**—It is to the Jewish and Christian law (with their off-shoots), then, that we have to look for the creation of the offence of blasphemy. We omit the 'contempt' for God referred to in Mal 1[6], the dishonour done Him by withholding the offerings due to Him in Mal 3[8. 9], the swearing falsely by His name in Lv 19[12], the sin 'with a high hand' of Nu 15[30] (cf. 2 K 19[22]), the reviling (or murmuring against) the Elohim of Ex 22[28], since, though these all are directed against God, they do not rise to the height of the specific sin of blasphemy. A record, however, of this sin is found in Lv 24[11], where a man of mixed breed 'blasphemes the Name.' In this case doubt seems to have been felt about the prescribed penalty, for the offender was put back until 'the mind of the Lord' could be ascertained. This was found to fix the penalty of death by stoning, and the law was then promulgated: 'He that blasphemeth the Name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death, and all the congregation shall certainly stone him' (v.[16]). This was the only kind of reproach against God which was punishable with death at the hand of man, lower kinds (such as those referred to above) being left to the judgment of God. For post-Biblical Jewish usages see next article.

3. **In the New Testament.**—The offence of blasphemy is referred to frequently in the NT: in the case of the sin against the Holy Ghost (Mk 3[28ff.]); in the case of the man whose sins were pronounced by Jesus forgiven (Mt 9[3], Lk 5[21]), when the scribes accused Him of blasphemy; when the Jews declared the saying 'I and my Father are one' to be blasphemous (Jn 10[33. 36]); when Jesus declared Himself at His judgment (Mk 14[64]); St. Stephen was accused of speaking 'blasphemous words against Moses and God' (Ac 6[11]); in Ac 13[45] and 18[6] and Ro 2[24] the Jews in their turn are accused of blasphemy; in Ac 26[11] St. Paul accuses himself of making the Christians blaspheme. The word occurs five times in the Pastoral Epp. (1 Ti 1[20] 6[1. 4] and Tit 2[5] 3[2]), once in James (2[7]), and nine times in the Apocalypse (2[9] 13[1. 5. 6 bis] 16[9. 11. 21] 17[3]). From these passages it appears that any expression was considered blasphemous which was wrathfully, despitefully, or contemptuously directed against God, His being, or goodness, which arrogated His attributes for a creature, which opposed a truth revealed by Him, or opposed an institution of which He was the author.

4. **In Church history.**—The feeling and the judgment expressed in these passages were taken over by Christianity, and enforced, after its union with the civil power, by temporal pains and penalties. The *Novellae* of Justinian (lxxvii. 1) relate that some

'used blasphemous expressions and swore by God, and so provoked Him to anger, and that it was enjoined on such men therefore to abstain from such blasphemies, and from swearing by the hair, or by the head, and similar expressions; for, seeing that blasphemies against men went not unpunished, far less would blasphemies against God. If, in spite of this admonition, any one committed the offence of blasphemy, he was to suffer the extreme penalty of the law' (*Corp. Jur. Civ.*, ed. Scholl, 1895, vol. iii. p. 382).

In the Middle Ages the ecclesiastical court was the principal authority for the punishment of blasphemy, the temporal power being called in, when required, to enforce the judgment of the court ecclesiastical. Thus in a decree of Gregory IX. it is laid down that, if any one shall have presumed to loose in public a blasphemous tongue against God, or any one of His saints, or, in special, against the Blessed Virgin, he shall be condemned by the bishop to public penance at the church door for seven Sundays, being on the last Sunday deprived of his shoes and outer clothing, to fast and give alms. In default he might be excommunicated and deprived of Christian burial, and be subjected to a fine by the temporal power (*Decret. Greg. IX.*, lib. v. tit. 27, c. 2; *Corp. Jur. Canon.*, ed. Richter-Friedberg, ii. 830).

Charlemagne had already incorporated in the law of the Empire the Christian law against blasphemy, and given his sanction to the principle that God Himself was injured by blasphemy, and that He would visit the offence on all the people, thus ingeniously uniting in one the older pagan and the newer Christian sentiment. Louis le Débonnaire followed him with laws against blasphemy which inflicted the death penalty. Philip Augustus fulminated against those who swore: 'Tête bleue!' 'Corbleu!' 'Ventrebleu!' 'Sang bleu!' Offenders, if noble, were to be fined; if *roturiers*, they were to be put into a sack and drowned. St. Louis ordered that offenders should be branded on the forehead, and if they repeated the offence, should have their tongue and lips pierced. With this agrees the ordinance of Henry III., which enacted that, for the first four offences, a blasphemer should be committed to prison on bread and water; for the fifth offence, he should have the under lip slit; for the sixth, he should have it so slit that his teeth were to be seen; for the seventh, his tongue should be bored; and for the eighth, he was to be put to death. It was, indeed, about the end of the 15th cent. that blasphemy was most severely punished; but from that date onwards the feeling has gradually gained ground that God is not a Being who can be injured by man's insults, and that, when blasphemy is punishable, it is as an offence against society.

The Scholastic treatment of blasphemy calls for a short notice. Defining blasphemy, with Gury, as *locutio Deo injuriosa*, or, with Suarez, as *verbum maledictionis, convicii seu contumeliae in Deum*, it divides it into 'immediate' when directed against God Himself, and 'mediate' when it attacks Him through His Word, His Church, His officers, sacraments, or saints. It is in its form threefold, 'heretical' when it involves a false doctrine, 'imprecative' when in the form of a curse, or merely 'abusive' (*probrosa*). Materially, it is threefold: (1) when it attributes to God what is not His; (2) when it deprives Him of what is His; and (3) when it assigns to the creature what belongs to the Creator—the first two of which St. Thomas declares to be but the affirmative and negative sides of the same truth, and the last to be a subdivision of the first. Blasphemy is a mortal sin, as being contradictory to charity; nay, it is the greatest of all sins, seeing that it adds to a denial of the faith a detestation in the will, and is aggravated by its outburst into words, as, on the other hand, faith is augmented by love and confession.

5. **As a crime.**—It has been already stated that a milder judgment on blasphemy has during the last four or five centuries gradually been ousting the feeling which finds expression in Lv 24[16]. The change, however, has been of slow growth. So

late as A.D. 1656 we find, for instance, a poor mad Quaker, James Nayler, for allowing himself to be honoured as Jesus Christ, sentenced by the House of Commons to be put in the pillory, whipped from Westminster to the Old Exchange, again placed in the pillory, to have his tongue bored, his forehead branded with 'B,' then taken to Bristol, there again whipped, and then sent to Bridewell to remain until Parliament should release him. Again, in 1812 an unhappy bookseller, Daniel Isaac Eaton, of Ave Maria Lane, London, was sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment and to the pillory for publishing criticisms on the Bible story, after the manner of Thomas Paine. It is noticeable that Lord Ellenborough, in sentencing Eaton, did so on the express ground that 'the Christian religion is the law of the land, and must be protected as the law.' It was held blasphemy in the Court of Exchequer in 1729 to maintain publicly that the character of Christ is defective, and His teaching misleading, and that the Bible is no more inspired than any other book. In 1868, George Jacob Holyoake was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for oral blasphemy—for saying after a lecture in reply to a challenge: 'I do not believe there is such a thing as a God.' The law of England is still sufficiently severe against blasphemy. 'It is, indeed, still blasphemy,' according to Mr. Justice Erskine, 'punishable at common law, scoffingly or irreverently to ridicule or impugn the doctrines of the Christian faith.' On the other hand, 'if the decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked without a person being guilty of blasphemous libel' (Lord Chief Justice Coleridge).

The net result of the slow process of change which has been going on for centuries in men's minds on this, as on all kindred subjects, is that blasphemy has become the technical name for a particular offence against the State. It is a crime against the peace and good order of society; it is an outrage on men's religious feelings, tending to a breach of the peace. As an indictable offence it is described by Blackstone to be 'denying the being or providence of God, contumelious reproaches of our Saviour Christ, profane scoffing at the Holy Scripture, or exposing it to contempt or ridicule' (Stephen's *Commentaries*[15], iv. 185). But though the existing law of England still embodies the tradition which regards blasphemy as a sin, and upholds the Christian religion, in practice it treats it as an offence against the peace and good order of society. It is open to anybody to call in question any article of religion, provided that his method of expression is not obnoxious to the authorities. In France the same practical state of things prevails; for, though its Code does not prohibit blasphemy as such, it yet prohibits it as an offence against good order. In Germany public blasphemy is punishable with one to three days' imprisonment; but the blasphemy must be public, coarsely expressed, and offence must actually have been caused (*Deutsches Reichsstrafgesetzbuch*, § 166). The Austrian law is stricter, and the offender may suffer imprisonment for a term ranging from six months to ten years (*ib.* §§ 122, 123, 124). In the United States the law of blasphemy is essentially the same as in England, being based on English common law and early statutes.

Thus Christian Europe and America have brought the wheel full circle round to where it was in Seneca's day, when that distinguished pagan could write:

'We are far from what we ought to be if we do not think of God as possessing all things, bestowing freely all things. Why do the gods bestow on us their bounty? It is their nature to do so. The man who thinks that they do no harm because they are unwilling errs. They cannot. They can neither inflict injury nor receive it. For to harm and to be harmed go together' (*Ep.* 95, ed Haase, 1873, iii. 307).

To this it is only necessary to add the remark that, while the legal definition of blasphemy as an indictable and statutory offence is precise, the word itself has in literature and common parlance, as is natural, a wider and looser meaning. Thus, Jefferies (*The Story of my Heart*[2], 1891, p. 125) writes: 'I believe all manner of asceticism to be the vilest blasphemy—blasphemy towards the whole of the human race.' Ruskin (*Stones of Venice*, I. i. 37) speaks of 'representations of Christian subjects which had become blasphemous under the treatment of men like the Caracci'; and Bacon in his *Advancement of Learning* has the phrase 'blasphemy against learning.'

LITERATURE.—In addition to authorities quoted, cf. art. 'Blasphemy' in *HDB*, *EBi*, *JE*, and Wetzer-Welte's *Kirch. Lex.*; G. M. Mackie, 'Blasphemy,' in *ExpT* xx. (1909) 439; van Espen, *Ius eccl. univ.* ii. 256 ff.; Jarcke, *Hdbch. des gem. deutsch. Strafrechts*, ii. 27-46; for abnormal temptations to blasphemy, Alfonso M. de Liguori, *Theol. Mor.*, 1840, i. 4, n. 121 ff.; A. Koch, *Moraltheol.*, 1905, p. 362 ff.; Mishna, *Sanh.* 7. 5 and 56*a*; Odgers, *Libel and Slander*[4], 1905, pp. 446-455; Stephen, *Digest of Criminal Law*, 1883, p. 125 f; Cobbett, *State Trials*, 1809 ff., v. 821 ff., xxxi. 931; St. Thom. Aq., *Summa theolog.* II. ii. qu. 13, 14. W. F. COBB.

BLASPHEMY (Jewish).—All subsequent Jewish notions on the subject of blasphemy were derived, in their main principles, from the incident narrated in Lv 24[10-23]. In the course of that passage the general rule is enunciated (v.[16]): 'And he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death; all the congregation shall certainly stone him: as well the stranger as the home born *when he blasphemeth the name* shall be put to death.' Rabbinic tradition (already represented in the Targum) interpreted these italicized words to mean that, to render blasphemy a capital crime, the offender must actually pronounce the name of God, accompanied with disrespect, the nature of which is not defined. The reverential reluctance to *name* God even in worship grew up early, and, as is well known, is already exemplified in Psalms, Chron., and the LXX. The blasphemer who used the prevalent substitutes for the name of God was subjected to flagellation (*Sanh.* 56*a*). The writer of Pentateuchal scrolls was required to place his mind in a devotional attitude when writing the name of God, and in certain cases when he made an error in writing the name, the mistake was irremediable, and the whole column on which the error occurred was withdrawn from use (*Soferim*, ch. iv.). The name itself could not be obliterated. The only individuals who lawfully uttered the name were the priests. The priestly benediction (Nu 6[22-27]) is introduced by the words, '*Thus* shall ye bless the children of Israel,' and closes with the phrase, 'And they shall put *my name* on the children of Israel.' These commands, it was held, compelled the priests to utter the name as written, and made a substitute unlawful (*Soṭa*, 37*b*; *Sifri* on Nu 6[22]). It is recorded that sages communicated the pronunciation of the name to their disciples once in seven years (*Ḳiddushin*, 71*a*). Again, it is reported in a tradition that the priests themselves, after the death of Simon the Just, discontinued the pronunciation of the Tetragrammaton in the blessing (*Yoma*, 39*b*; *Menaḥoth*, 109*b*). The high priest, however, continued to pronounce the name on the Day of Atonement, amid the prostrations of the people (Mishn. *Yoma* iii. 8, etc. According to the Tosefta *Yoma* ii., the high priest uttered the name ten times on the fast).

This reluctance to utter the name of God was paralleled by a similar objection to hearing the name uttered. In the blasphemy trial, as described in the Mishna (*Sanh.* vii. 5), the witnesses were not allowed to repeat the actual blasphemy in their evidence against the accused; but when on a *prima*

facie case the capital charge was proved, then before sentence of death was promulgated one of the witnesses was required to utter the actual blasphemy with which the accused was charged. The judges rose to their feet and rent their garments—the statement of the Mishna thus fully confirms the report in Mt 26[65]. According to Josephus (*Ant.* IV. viii. 10), a Jew was forbidden to blaspheme a heathen deity. Besides incurring the death penalty, the blasphemer was, in the Rabbinic view, regarded as excluded from Paradise (*'Abodā zārā*, 18*a*; Mishn. *Sanh.* xi. 1. In the latter passage this deprivation is, according to Abba Saul, incurred by any one who utters the Tetragrammaton). The Talmud asserts that the offence of blasphemy greatly increased when the death penalty for blasphemy was abolished with the loss of Jewish jurisdiction (see vol. i. p. 130[b]. It may be interesting to add that Eleazar ben Zadok, a contemporary of Josephus, relates that as a child he saw the unchaste daughter of a priest burnt on bundles of grape-vines [Mishn. *Sanh.* vii. 2; Talm. fol. 52 *a–b*]. This the Talmud regards as having been the act of a Sadducean, not of a Pharisaic, court). Yet, despite this supposed increase in the prevalence of blasphemy, we find a strong abhorrence of everything which showed disrespect to the Deity. Rabbinic theology actually included blasphemy among the offences prohibited by natural law; this is the meaning of its inclusion in the seven Noachian prohibitions (with adultery, murder, idolatry, and so forth [*Sanh.* 56*a*]). Moreover, the stern moral denunciation of *profaning the name* (חלול השם) was the outcome of this range of ideas. To *profane the name* came to imply all forms of irreverence, of private insincerity, and of public disrespect for morality and religion. 'For him who has committed this sin there is no power in repentance to suspend the punishment, nor in the Day of Atonement to atone, nor in suffering to purify' (*Yoma*, 86*a*)—full forgiveness was attained only when the sinner died (cf. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, p. 329). Profaning the name was thus something more than mere blasphemy, for of blasphemy we are emphatically told that repentance suffices to atone (*Pesikta Kahana*, 163*b*).

In the Middle Ages the blasphemer, it was held, ought to be excommunicated (*Responsa of Geonim*, ed. Muller, 103). The current Jewish Code requires the auditor of a blasphemy to show his feeling of revulsion by rending his garment (*Shulhan 'Arukh*, *Yoreh Deah*, 340, 37). Naturally, however, as public opinion has tended to weaken the efficiency of excommunication, so it has become less and less usual to take any practical notice of the offence of blasphemy. Blasphemy in the older view had been an act of rebellion, parallel to Korah's; it was a 'stretching out of the hand to the root' of religion. But such acts of rebellion are no longer punishable, and the Synagogue has shown itself as disinclined as any other organization to attempt the punishment. See HERESY.

I. ABRAHAMS.

BLASPHEMY (Muhammadan).—Blasphemy is regarded by Muslim jurists as one of the most convincing proofs of unbelief. If a Muslim has been guilty of this heinous sin, he is to be put to death as an apostate unless he is willing to repent (cf. art. APOSTASY [Muhammadan]). All utterances expressive of contempt for Allāh Himself, for His names, attributes, laws, commands, or prohibitions, are to be considered as blasphemy. Such is the case, for instance, if a Muslim declares that it is impossible for Allāh to see and to hear everything, or that Allāh cannot endure to all eternity, or that He is not one (*wāhid*), but only 'one of three,' etc. All scoffing at Muhammad or any of the other prophets or apostles of Allāh is also to be regarded in Islām as blasphemy.

Unbelievers who have obtained permission to reside within the domain of Islām (the so-called *dzimmīs*) are in like manner forbidden to use, in the presence of Muslims, disrespectful expressions about Allāh or His apostles, or about the dogmas and institutions of Islām. For instance, they may not testify publicly that Jesus was the Son of God. The unbeliever who is guilty of blasphemy in the eye of Muslim law is not, however, put to death, but expiates his offence by *ta'zīr* (a penalty determined by the judge, according to circumstances).

TH. W. JUYNBOLL.

BLESSEDNESS.

Buddhist.—See ARHAT, NIRVANA.
Chinese (E. H. PARKER), p. 672.
Christian (J. C. LAMBERT), p. 675.
Greek and Roman.—See CHIEF GOOD.
Hindu.—See BRĀHMANISM.
Muhammadan (D. B. MACDONALD), p. 677.

BLESSEDNESS (Chinese).—**1.** Perhaps the best way of arriving at some preliminary notion of the conceptions of blessedness cherished by the Chinese is to examine in the first instance their methods of ordinary speech, which can easily be traced back in spirit to the utterings of antiquity. When a Chinaman asks an acquaintance how he fares, the stereotyped reply is: 'I depend upon your happiness,' or 'Thanks to you.' In matters of greater gravity, the Emperor or any other of his subjects, official or otherwise, will say: 'Thanks to the shade of my ancestors' happiness, I am,' etc. When two or more persons are thrown together in pursuit of a common interest, whether it be marriage, partnership, political sympathy, or what not, it is the practice to say and to assume that the individuals, or the families to which the individuals immediately concerned belong, 'have a predestination,' *i.e.* have some spiritual affinity which is continued from the anterior existence into the present existence. The word *yuan*, here translated 'predestination,' was extended in later times to signify spiritual sympathy or connexion in the present life, and even in the future life: its original meaning is a 'hem,' 'collar,' 'connecting thread'; hence a 'reason,' 'to follow up,' 'to climb up.' After the advent of Buddhism in the first century of our era, the old term *yin-yuan*, or 'because clue,' was adapted to the *nidāna*, or 'causes and effects' connecting past existences with present (Eitel, *Handbook of Chinese Buddhism*[2], 1888, p. 84); and so now in popular usage the Buddhist idea is usually connoted in the mind of the speaker or writer. But, none the less, the basic notion really takes its origin in the ancient ancestor-worship of the Chinese, one of the most elementary principles of which was that no happiness could exist in this life unless the spirits of the dead were conciliated by living representatives through sacrifice, prayer, and duty. In other words, blessedness can exist securely on earth only under the shadow or protection of the Spiritual Abode above. When a man enters into conversation with a stranger, and the interview develops sympathetic interests on both sides, one will say to the other: 'We two have a *yuan*'—meaning, 'it was already planned out before our birth that we should meet,' even if only to buy and

sell a horse, though the expression belongs rather to matrimonial arrangements. One friend will often write to or hail another as 'old generation elder brother,' the more ordinary term being 'old brother' simply. The addition of the word *shï*, meaning 'generation,' 'world,' or 'hereditary,' (for it signifies all three), delicately suggests for the past a subtle spiritual connexion running, it may be, through more than one world.

Like other nations, the Chinese have never been able to conceive conscious Deity otherwise than in the shape of man. Man has ever conceived of himself as a being above all animals, and thus he cannot but imagine the Deity in the highest conceivable shape. Hence it is scarcely to be wondered at that the Chinese have always conceived the Spiritual Abode to be a mere reproduction of the present earthly abode; its denizens being subject to the same feelings and passions, and divided into the same ranks and classes as here on earth.

One of the most ancient Chinese documents we possess, the *Hung-fan** (B.C. 1100), or 'Great Plan,' thus enumerates the 'Five Blessednesses': Long Life, Wealth, Serenity, Love of Virtue, and Object achieved at Death. This idea of blessedness in the present world is still found, after running an unbroken course of 3000 years, in the popular speech of to-day. Thus, if a Chinese wishes 'a happy New Year,' the reply is: 'May you be promoted; may you have sons; may you live rich and distinguished days!' On almost every door-post or lintel in the empire, at least when the New Year comes in, if not at most other festive times, may be seen the two words 'happiness' and '(old) age.' These two undoubtedly take premier rank among the Five Blessednesses in the Chinese mind: the love of virtue (which in China has nothing whatever to do with sobriety and continence) decidedly takes second rank; but still it is there, and most respectable Chinese, after the immediate necessities of life have been obtained, take a keen pleasure in doing what we should call 'kind acts.' The 'object achieved at death' may reasonably be held to include a proper provision of sons and grandsons for the adequate continuation of the family chain, or 'dying at the zenith of success,' *i.e.* dying with ambition or desires fully achieved—a stock Imperial phrase in reference to deceased statesmen. The ideal picture of Chinese happiness has been best given in many shapes by G. E. Simon (once French Consul at Foochow) in his pretty and sympathetic little work, *La Cité chinoise*, published in the year 1890: such pictures as he draws may be daily seen by any one who travels extensively over the more primitive districts of China, whither 'progress' has not penetrated. The grandest ideal of all blessedness is 'five generations in one hall,' *i.e.* great-grandfather, grandfather, father, son, and grandson—if possible, each with his wife still living—all in the same homestead; the old people calmly smoking their long metal pipes, giving advice, and sipping tea in the comfortable protected corners; the younger generations exposing themselves to the elements and doing the hard work; all the males assembling in the hall (or threshing-floor, according to season) for common meals; all the females decorously confining themselves to the 'inner apartments' (often merely a curtained-off space) or secluded gardens; each generation tenderly caring for the seniors' wants; each venerable man mildly but confidently authoritative to those below him, as he individually is perfectly deferential to his own parent or parents. In the field hard by is the ancestral cemetery; perhaps only the graves of an off-branch are there; possibly those of ten or twenty ancestors, ranged right and left of the 'first (migrating) ascendant.' In any case the book of genealogy for remote ancestors can be found, when needed, somewhere in China. There is little luxury in the ideal Chinese life: no boarded floors; no ceilings or papered walls; no glass or linen; no expensive wines or smart reception rooms. As a rule, the life, no matter how high the retired official may be, is what may be termed 'farm life.' Plain cotton clothes; plenty of rice, pork, and vegetables; good plain cookery; fine clothes for ceremonial occasions stowed away in chests; bedizenments for the women; pigs, poultry, ploughing cattle (seldom carts or horses); manure in heaps (or even plastered to the walls); fish and hams, or pemmican, drying and being smoked in the rafters; stiff chairs or benches; easy demeanour to servants and slaves; and, above all, perfect democracy and entire absence of snobbery: age is the only 'quality'; money counts not. Of late years newspapers have been added to the modest store of 'good books'; and (too often, alas!) so has opium been added to the mild tobacco, rice spirit, and tea of antiquity. (Tobacco, by the way, only dates from about A.D. 1500, and tea from A.D. 600.) Comfortable, healthy griminess may be said to represent well-to-do Chinese country life: baths and sanitary arrangements are, of course, entirely absent, and no one seems one penny the worse.

Here clearly we have long life, wealth, peace, and death with honour. But where does love of virtue come in? Well, a good family is neighbourly, hospitable, and friendly; even foreigners are courteously received as equals, so long as they behave themselves prudently, and so long as evil rumours have not preceded them. Kindness to slaves (who in any case are usually indistinguishable by strangers from free men) is a great Chinese characteristic. A mandarin of rank does not mind a slave lighting his pipe for him; he will sleep on the same mattress with that slave in a travelling boat; he is courteous to him in speech—so long as there is no fault to check. Kindness to animals is another Chinese trait: perhaps negative rather than positive—not fussy solicitude, but negligent easy-going tolerance, subordinate, however, to practical human needs. A country squire of the above described type will associate with equals and inferiors at the temple—he does not mind much whether it be a Buddhist, Taoist, or other temple. He has his own ancestral buildings for the settlement of family disputes; sometimes the whole village or town belongs to one single family-name, or two family-names; the village temple consequently suffices for more general interests. Mandarins are not by any means all bad: the local squireen endeavours none the less to avoid official friction, and to keep his village free of tax-collectors' exactions and the police harpies, who are unpaid, and 'live on their warrants.' Local self-government is universal; so long as the land-tax is paid, order and decency are maintained along the roads, and (latterly) so long as a reasonable tax, or, at all events, the customary tax, on commercial movement is not evaded. The virtuous paterfamilias promotes schools, maternity establishments, charities generally, and favours 'arbitration' in lieu of law. The elders may, as a rule, in council compound or hush up any crime but treason and parricide, so long as they agree, and so long as the mandarin has not the case officially brought before him. Religion in China is ignored rather than cultivated, and the priests (Buddhist and Taoist), though treated politely, especially if they are fairly educated men, are regarded as quite an inferior caste; yet their services are conventionally sought even

* See *SBE*, vol. xvi. p. 420 ff.; and Chavannes, *Mémoires Historiques*, vol. iv. pp. 230–231; also Mayers, *Chinese Readers' Manual*, p. 312.

by orthodox Confucianists when there is death in the house. If unprovoked religious observance is indulged in at all, it usually takes the form of a play at the village temple, when both sexes assemble for the combined purposes of consulting the oracles, praying for rain or children, and hearing historical dramas, and also for formal social intercourse generally. Admittance is free to all, and the local rich man pays the itinerant company.

2. Having now examined the question as to how far the idea of earthly blessedness is discernible from the ordinary conversation of social life, we come to more general, if undefined, principles, one of which is that a happy existence on earth involves no spiritual comfort derived from supernatural considerations, but takes into account solely human desires, passions, dislikes, and fears, as they are born in us, and as they are and ought to be regulated by *li*. What this *li*—usually translated 'rites' or 'propriety'—is, it is not so easy to define verbally as to realize mentally; but it may be called the Law of Nature and Right as seen by the collective wisdom of the highest human types, as understood by tradition, and as laid down by the Emperor (and his lieutenants) as Vicegerent of Heaven. The past life and the future life are the same thing; that is to say, life in heaven is exactly the same as life on earth, except that what the Chinese poets call the 'stinking bag,' or body that contains the human soul or spirit, must be considered as midway between the two. Every individual, though begotten of his father, really comes spiritually from the past life, where the souls of his ancestors are, and returns to the future life, whence his own soul contemplates his descendants on earth: the link is an unbroken one. The duty to ascendants and descendants is the same, though in a different set of phases, as is the duty to one's self; the past, the present, and the future are thus merged in one; the idea of 'time' does not come in at all. The intense anxiety to possess a male heir (by adoption of agnates, or, if none, of cognates, failing a natural heir) is now made intelligible, as also is the extreme punishment of 'cutting off posterity,' which leaves 'uneasy ghosts' to wander about for ever without dutiful attention. What heaven is, of course, no one knows, ever did know, or (in our present state of knowledge) ever can know; but such as it is, it is in the Chinese mind a place where sentient individuals in the shape of human beings conduct affairs, whether as emperors, officials, freemen, or slaves; and, as we have already shown, nothing higher than a human being, or a sentient being with human feelings, has ever or could ever have been conceived of. It is often even uncertain whether heaven is viewed as a place or as a person; or say, rather, 'Heaven forbid' and 'who art in heaven' are Chinese as well as Christian. The 'Spirit of Heaven' and the 'Emperor Above' are often convertible terms. There is but one life. The ancestor in the past is miserable unless he be tended; the mortal in the present is, or ought to be, miserable unless he tends, and unless he secures legitimate born or unborn links to tend himself when he is dead.

Hence the ancestor must always be kept informed, with due fasting and purification, of the successes and failures of the representative individual, be he ruler or ruled; and the ancestor's spirit clings to his special wooden name-tablet standing in the family temple; nor will he accept the sacrificial offerings, or evince his approval of what is done, unless things are conducted in accordance with *li*. Failure to render ghostly service to the spirits is liable to bring on mundane disaster in the shape of inundations or other irregularities of nature. But the spirits of any given family will accept sacrifice only from the legitimate representatives of that family; hence the enormity of cutting off for ever the only persons or links able to continue the family chain of life. Then only it is that Heaven steps in, finds that the virtue has gone out of its former *protégé* or nominee, and confers the vicegerency upon another ruling house: the same thing, *mutatis mutandis*, for private persons. This position is well illustrated in the year 516 B.C., when the ruler of Confucius' State took to flight in consequence of internal revolts (see *Tso Chwan*, ch. 42, p. 2). One of his ministers said: 'I do not know whether it be that Heaven has abandoned the country, or whether the country has committed some great offence against the ghosts and spirits.' It was necessary for a ruler—were he Emperor, king, vassal-prince, or what not—to have a domain before he could sacrifice to the spirits of his ancestors; and thus in ancient China the fiefs were at first subdivided indefinitely, and the domain gave a name which grew into a family name, or, as we say, a surname. Hence we find sacrifices to the gods of the land, the harvests, the rivers, mountains, and the frontiers, all concurrent with the personal sacrifice to ancestors. Dispossessed princes of previous dynasties were rarely cut off without mercy. Not only were their persons spared, but an estate, however insignificant, was conferred upon their lineal representatives by the ruling power favoured by Heaven's new choice, and these representatives were received as guests and peers by the Emperor when they presented themselves to do homage for their holdings. Except under circumstances of great provocation, it was considered impious to cause the extinction of a family, and thus to put a stop to the ancestral sacrifices. That sacrifice to ghosts and spirits can be viewed as distinct from and inferior to the sacrifices to the Emperor Above is instanced by a case in the year B.C. 482 (*Tso Chwan*, ch. 48, p. 20), when an official of Confucius' vassal-State was detained in captivity by the semi-barbarous State lying to its south. Though the State in question was ruled by the same family as the then Imperial family of China, and also the same family as that ruling over Confucius' State, the aboriginal population was still half savage, and even the Chinese rulers had become corrupted by popular spirit-worship and local superstitions. The captive orthodox minister accordingly said, well knowing this superstitious weakness: 'You had better let me go to take part in the sacrifices to the Emperor Above, which my master, the ruling duke, has to render at this season; otherwise the priest of the temple will hurl imprecations against your king!' The device succeeded.

3. It was manifestly considered doubtful whether the dead really had any exact knowledge of what was transpiring on earth; for in B.C. 502 a royal maiden of North China, who found herself dying in the above-named semi-barbarous kingdom, said: 'If the dead really possess any knowledge, please bury me where I can at least see my own native land.' A year before that, a semi-barbarous general, who was about to set fire to the enemy's camp, in which the bodies of many of his own slain also lay, asked, when remonstrated with: 'What does it matter if I burn their bones? If the dead really possess knowledge of what goes on here, then we can sacrifice to them afterwards, and thus give them satisfaction.' As is well known, Confucius himself, whilst adopting a respectful attitude towards the traditional 'nether' world (as we and they still popularly call it), declined to discuss spiritual beings, saying: 'We know little enough of man in this life, without troubling ourselves with theories about the other.' It cannot be too often repeated that in ancient China there

was no word of any kind for 'religion'; none for a public 'church'; none for 'temple' or 'priest,' as distinct from ancestral halls and precentors for Imperial worship; always except and in so far as the doctrine of continuity, through ancestors and descendants, with the past and future spiritual states may have left an inference in the mind. The nearest approach to religion was *li*, the written character expressing which idea is made up of the two separate signs signifying 'spiritual being' or '*themis*' as a radical notion, and 'a sacrificial vessel' as supplementary idea. Consequently, in figuring out for themselves an ideal for blessedness in this life, no idea of collective worship; no notion of a single jealous God; no need for praise, self-denial, confession and pardon of sin; no yearning for holiness as evinced by continence, abstinence, humility, joy in everlasting salvation or Divine grace, etc., ever even remotely entered the Chinese mind. Blessedness in the flesh was purely human, and spiritual blessedness in the past or future was—and this only doubtfully or agnostically—supposed to be the same thing.

4. It was reserved for the philosopher Lao-tse, an archivist at the Imperial Court, who lived during the 6th cent. B.C., a generation before Confucius, and who took the democratic and simple view of a life ushered in by civil strife and commercial activity, in contrast to Confucius' conservative and courtly definitions of *li*, to define for the first time in what ideal blessedness consisted. Like his rival Confucius, he worked entirely on old texts. Both philosophers ignored spiritualist views, and attempted to restore social order in the Chinese federation by interpreting exactly the same ancient texts, each in his own 'advanced' way. Even the word 'teaching,' which since the arrival of Buddhism in China, early in the first century of our era, has come to signify 'religion' or 'faith,' was not yet applied to these diverging interpretations, which were simply styled 'craft,' 'scheme,' or 'plan,' *i.e.* the plan of life, the plan of government, the plan of ancestral continuity. The old *Tao*, or 'way,' which now for the first time began to substitute in men's minds individual blessedness for collective blessedness, or, to use Sir Henry Maine's words, to substitute contract for status, took quite a new form in Lao-tse's hands. The old *Ju* (still meaning 'Confucianists') were the intellectuals of China, according to the *li* theories as developed by the then reigning Imperial dynasty (B.C. 1122–B.C. 255), whose statutes combined in one indivisible idea law, religion, life, government, social decency, war, and punishment. This was *Tao*. Just as *Tao* took a narrower meaning when Lao-tse defined it, so *Ju* took a narrower meaning when Confucius specialized it.

Lao-tse's summing up, literally translated, is as follows:

'My ideal is a series of small States with small populations. Let them possess an army machine of moderate size, but not be too ready to use it. Let them place a proper value on their lives, and refrain from distant migrations. Then, though they will be possessed of boats and carts, there will be no one to ride in them; though they will be possessed of arms and cuirasses, there will be no need for arraying them. Let the people revert to the old *quipo* system of records, enjoy their food, take a pride in their clothes, dwell in peace, and rejoice in their local customs. Each State would be within easy sight of the other; the sound of each other's hens cackling and dogs barking would be heard across. The people of each State would live to a good old age, and would have no movement of intercourse with neighbouring States.

'True words are apt to be not liked; pleasant words are apt to be untrue. Good or beneficent men do not wrangle, and wranglers are apt not to be good men. Those who know best do not range over many subjects, and those who range most widely do not know best. The highest form of man cares not to accumulate: so far as he uses his resources for others, he increases his own store; so far as he gives them to others, he has the more for himself. The Providence of Heaven benefits and does not injure; the Providence of the highest form of man takes action without self-assertive effort.'

Since the importation into China of Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Manichæism, Muhammadanism, Nestorianism, Catholicism, and Protestantism, respectively, the doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future life has naturally entered more and more into the Chinese imagination; and, of course, to a certain extent the ideas of holiness and blessedness in this life have become correspondingly modified. But the intellectual classes are still largely swayed by the more materialistic philosophy of Lao-tse and Confucius, and it is very doubtful whether the religious enthusiasm which once revolutionized Europe has ever touched, or will ever touch, the trained Chinese intellect; *a fortiori* is it doubtful whether blessedness on earth will ever become less human than it is now, or more of a temporary preparation for supposed everlasting blessedness in eternity.

LITERATURE.—Confucius's *Ch'unts'u*, or 'Springs and Autumns,' enlarged ed known as *Tso Chwan*; *Shû King*, or 'Book of History'; *Shih King*, or 'Book of Ballads'; *Li Ki*, or 'Book of Rites'; and *Tâo Teh King*, the Taoist classic of Lao-tse—all translated in the *SBE*.

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BLESSEDNESS (Christian). — As distinguished from happiness (*q.v.*), blessedness denotes a state of fruition that is purer and deeper, and free from the accidents of time and circumstance to which happiness is exposed. In modern literature the distinction is familiar; Carlyle recognizes it when he writes, 'There is in man a Higher than Love of Happiness: he can do without Happiness, and instead thereof find Blessedness!' (*Sartor Resartus*, 132). But it is one that goes back to pre-Christian ages; one that, whether verbally expressed or not, has always been discerned more or less clearly from the time when men began to analyze the data of the ethical life or to reflect upon the realities of religious experience. What specially concerns us, seeing that the word 'blessedness' in Christian usage is an inheritance from the employment of the word 'blessed' in the NT, and that 'blessed' in the EV of the NT is a rendering of the Gr. μακάριος, is to notice that in Greek poetry and philosophy a distinction was made between εὐδαίμων as 'happy' and μάκαρ or μακάριος as 'blessed.' The gods of Olympus were the μάκαρες θεοί as raised above the storms and tumults of the earth (Homer, *Odys.* vi. 46); the dead were the μάκαρες θνητοί as delivered now from its griefs and cares (Hesiod, *Op.* 14); the abodes of departed heroes were the μακάρων νῆσοι, the 'islands of the blest' (*ib.* 171). εὐδαίμων, on the other hand, was applied to those who experience the ordinary well-being and happiness that are open to mortals in a world of change and chance; and sometimes it is expressly distinguished from the higher term μακάριος (Aristotle, *Eth.* I. x. 14).

For the Christian point of view it is significant that, while μακάριος is a word of frequent employment in the NT, εὐδαίμων is never found. This may be partly explained by the fact that to a Jewish mind εὐδαίμων had come to be burdened with a sinister connotation. A 'demon' was not the good and friendly 'genius' of the Greek imagination, but an evil spirit by whom men were tormented or urged on to their destruction. But the full explanation lies deeper, and must be sought in the fact that Jesus Christ introduced into the world a new and higher conception of felicity for which 'blessedness' alone is the appropriate term.

To understand Christ's doctrine of blessedness genetically, we must compare it not with Greek ideas upon the subject, but with those which we find in the OT and in contemporary Jewish thought. To a pious Israelite of the earlier history, length of days and earthly prosperity were the con-

stituents of blessedness, which was saved from degenerating into a mere equivalence with pagan notions of happiness, by the fact that these outward blessings were regarded as tokens of the Divine favour, the rewards bestowed upon righteousness, and so were associated with feelings of religious gratitude and trust. A larger knowledge of the ways of God with men (Job, Pss 37. 73), and reflexion, above all, upon the experiences of the Exile, shattered those naive conceptions, and drove the best minds in Israel to look for blessedness elsewhere than in present prosperity. There were some pious hearts which, in the midst of trouble, were able to grasp by the sheer energy of faith the profound idea of a blessedness which consists in committing one's way to Jahweh, in loving His Law, and humbly accepting His will (Ps $1^{1.2}$ 2^{12} 40^{4} $84^{5.12}$ 112^{1}, Hab $3^{17ff.}$). But for the vast majority the powers of faith needed the reinforcement, which came gradually through the prophetic teaching, of the great Messianic hope of a coming Kingdom of righteousness and peace, in which the faithful should be abundantly rewarded and Israel attain to a blessedness of outward power and glory corresponding to that of inward trust and joy.

Once lighted up in the Jewish heart, this hope of a Messianic blessedness never ceased to burn. But by the time of Christ the pure radiance with which it glows in the writings of the great prophets had changed into a duskier flame, for men had come to think far less of spiritual benefits and obligations than of outward glory and material privilege. It was against this Jewish background that Christ appeared with His new doctrine of blessedness, which must be determinative for all Christian ideas upon the subject. The *locus classicus* here is His proclamation of the Beatitudes (Mt 5^{3-12}, Lk 6^{20-23}); but His teaching elsewhere serves to illuminate the principles there laid down, which are further illustrated by the Apostolic elucidation and enforcement of His words.

1. In its fundamental nature Christian blessedness appears as *an inward spiritual experience.* In setting forth His doctrine regarding it, Jesus vindicated the high idealism of those poet-saints of the OT who had risen to the point of understanding the blessedness of the man who makes Jahweh his trust, while at the same time He repudiated the prevailing popular conceptions as to the blessings of the Messianic Kingdom. In Mt. the list of the Beatitudes begins and ends with a declaration of the blessedness that lies in possessing the Kingdom of heaven ($5^{3.12}$); and that Divine Kingdom, Jesus affirms elsewhere, is to be sought within the heart (Lk $17^{20f.}$): it is a kingdom, St. Paul explains, of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost (Ro 14^{17}). In the Fourth Gospel we have further light upon the true essence of the Christian *summum bonum*, when 'eternal life' appears as the constant equivalent for the Synoptic 'kingdom of God,' and when this eternal life is described as the result of knowing the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom He hath sent (Jn 17^{3}), *i.e.* of knowing the Father through the Son ($14^{8f.}$). It is in the richness and intimacy of its peculiar spiritual content that Christ's doctrine of blessedness rises far above the thoughts of the most spiritual of OT saints. Those holy men of old had discovered the blessedness of trusting in the God of Jeshurun, of realizing that the eternal God was their refuge, and that underneath were the everlasting arms (Dt $33^{26f.}$); but they did not know God as Christ revealed Him, they did not know Him as the Father. It is in those experiences of filial trust and love and fellowship, which result from knowing God through Jesus Christ as our God and Father, that the essence of Christian blessedness lies.

2. But, while spirituality is the inmost quality of Christian blessedness, *natural blessings are not excluded from its scope and content.* There was nothing ascetic or dualistic in Christ's teaching upon this subject, though traces of a leaning in that direction appear in the writings of St. Paul, *e.g.* in some of his utterances regarding marriage (1 Co $7^{1.8.9}$; but cf. Eph $5^{25ff.}$). Unquestionably Jesus put spiritual goods above everything else, and taught that to these all natural desires and affections and all concern for earthly benefits must be subordinated, even, when necessary, to the point of utter sacrifice (Mt $5^{29f.}$ 16^{26}, Lk 14^{26}). But He freely recognized the intrinsic worth of the things that are naturally desirable, and their right to a place in any ideal of blessedness. He did not frown upon those familiar enjoyments and activities that belong to the ordinary conception of happiness, but showed again and again His own appreciation and approval of them. He loved the beautiful in nature (Mt $6^{28ff.}$), He gave the sanction of His presence to the joys of social intercourse (Mt 11^{19}, Lk $5^{29ff.}$, Jn 2^{2} 12^{2}), He saw in the work of field and house and market fitting types of the things of the Kingdom of heaven (Mt $25^{14ff.}$, Mk $4^{3ff.}$, Lk 13^{21}), He set forth marriage as the ideal relationship between the sexes (Mt $19^{4ff.}$), and delighted in the charms of little children ($18^{2ff.}$ $19^{13ff.}$). So also He taught His disciples to pray for their bread (Mt 6^{11}, Lk 11^{3}), and forbade them to be anxious about food and raiment, not because these things are unworthy of their concern, but because their own faith in the Divine Fatherhood ought to assure them that their Father in heaven knows that they have need of all these things (Mt $6^{31ff.}$). St. Paul, who in his larger and more inspired moods breaks away from the limitations of his lingering asceticism, puts into a sentence the whole matter of the harmony in Christian experience between the earthly and the heavenly blessings, as having their common source in the Divine love, when he exclaims, 'For all things are yours . . . and ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's' (1 Co $3^{21ff.}$; cf. Ro 8^{32}).

3. Christian blessedness is *a present reality.* To the seers and prophets of the OT the day of Messianic gladness had been a far-off vision. To the men of Christ's own time it was a prospect near at hand. But to both, the Kingdom with all its blessings still lay in the future—a hope and a promise, but not an actual experience. Jesus declared that the Kingdom of God was come, that its blessedness was already present. 'Theirs is the kingdom of heaven' was the first word and the last in that great charter of beatitude which He announced to His disciples (Mt $5^{3.10}$). And the Kingdom being come, its blessedness is come, for the substance of that blessedness, as follows from its spiritual nature already referred to, does not need to be postponed till the arrival of a millennium on earth or the entrance into a Paradise of bliss in the future world. At the heart of it there lies the present and immediate assurance of God's Fatherly love, blessing us with all spiritual blessings and daily loading us with earthly benefits as well (Mt 6^{33}). And if some much-desired blessings are withheld, as oftentimes they are, God's children know that it is He who withholds them, and that nothing can separate them from His love. The best gifts, at least those in which the very soul of blessedness lies, are not withheld from those who seek first the Kingdom of God. The Heavenly Father comforts all such in their sorrows (Mt 5^{4}), satisfies their hunger for righteousness (v.^{6}), crowns them with His mercy (v.^{7}), grants them the vision of His face (v.^{8}), calls them His children (v.^{9}). And when men know and realize that God is their Father and that they are His children, the light of the eternal strikes with a redeeming and transforming power upon all the

things of time, and even on earth the days of heaven begin.

4. But Christian blessedness has its eschatological aspect also, and *looks to the future world for its perfect consummation.* 'Great,' said Jesus in the last Beatitude, 'is your reward in heaven' (Mt 5^{12}, Lk 6^{23}); and probably the eschatological idea is the uppermost, though not the only one, in the second of the series, where future comfort is promised to those who mourn (Mt 5^{4}). We have seen that Jesus did not ignore earthly goods, or treat them as if they were not to be desired, and that He found place for them accordingly in His doctrine of blessedness. Similarly, He did not ignore earthly ills, or ask His followers to face them with a Stoical apathy or to profess that they were agreeable things. On the contrary, pain was always painful to Jesus and sorrow sorrowful, and His presentation of blessedness includes the promise of a state from which they shall at length be utterly excluded. They are to be borne, it is true, with a kind of solemn gladness for Christ's sake and for righteousness' sake (Mt 5^{12}), and their fruitful effects upon the development of character under earthly conditions are not to be lost sight of (Jn $15^{2.8}$). But the full and rounded idea of Christian blessedness implies a condition of existence from which they have disappeared. Bacon expressed a half-truth only when he named prosperity as the blessing of the Old Testament and adversity as the blessing of the New (*Essays*, v.). Adversity is not presented in the NT as a blessing in itself, but only as a means to an end—the end being a blessedness from which every element of adversity has been taken away. The joy which a Christian can feel in pain is a joy not in the pain itself, but in the experience of the Divine love working through it, and in the assurance of a heavenly compensation (cf. Ro 8^{18}, 2 Co 4^{17}, He 4^{9} $12^{22.23}$ 13^{14}). Aristotle found a more exact name for happiness in a certain unimpeded energy of the soul, and admits that this requires a perfect life as its condition (*Eth.* I. vi. 15, 16), and that calamities become disqualifications for that blessedness which constitutes happiness of the highest kind (I. xi. 14). Christianity assures us of true blessedness even here and now in a world of sorrow and pain; but it also has the promise of a 'perfect life' when no disturbing or depressing influences shall impede the energies of the soul, and when God 'shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away' (Rev 21^{4}).

LITERATURE.—Titius, *Die NT Lehre von der Seligkeit* (1895 f.); Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus* (1892), i. 184-256; Massie, in *Expositor*, 1st ser. ix. 345 ff., 459 ff., x. 48 ff. (1879); Newman Smyth, *Chr. Ethics*[2] (1893), ch. ii.; Votaw, in *HDB*, Ext. Vol. 14 ff.; Kähler, art. 'Seligkeit,' in *PRE*[3]; Fairbairn, *City of God*[3] (1889), 317 ff.; Oehler, *Theol. of OT* (Eng. tr. 1883), § 246; H. Schultz, *AT Theol.*[5] 1869, p. 370 f.; B. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of NT* (Eng. tr. 1882-83), §§ 144, 149*c*, 157*d*; Bousset, *Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judentum* (1892).

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BLESSEDNESS (Muḥammadan).—In Islām, even more than in Christianity, theology and the religious attitude have become specifically mystical. Besides the knowledge of Divine things traditionally handed down (*naql*) from the teachings of the prophets, and revealed to them by inspiration (*waḥy*), there is also an almost universally accepted minor inspiration (*ilhām*) open to all mankind, and especially found in the *walīs*, the 'saints' (lit. 'friends, associates, of Allah'). It is called, broadly, 'unveiling' (*kashf*), and is a direct, individual perception of the unseen in ecstasy, the culmination of a series of psychological conditions arising in the soul without apparent effort or cause. These immediate, unreasoned, and underived states of consciousness are called, in Muslim theology, *aḥwāl*, 'states,' 'conditions,' and pass from mere feelings of joy or sorrow, elation or depression, through auditory and visual hallucinations to absolute ecstasy, where language fails and there comes a 'passing away' (*fanā*) from the self and a union with Allah, which some, but wrongly unless only a metaphor is meant, have called 'fusion of being' (*ḥulūl*), 'identification' (*ittiḥād*), and 'union' (*wuṣūl*). If these terms be used literally, they indicate a pantheistic position, but they can also be used carelessly as mere approximations to a description of the feeling of the moment, and, at most, as equivalent to *tawḥīd*, 'unifying,' *i.e.* perception of Allah's absolute unity.

The most general term for this ecstasy or state of religious emotion and bliss is *wajd*, which means literally a finding, perceiving, experiencing, either by the physical senses or by the intellect. Thus it can be applied to the reaching and perceiving of the Divine by the direct operation of the inner spiritual being. But *wajd* and words cognate to it have also derived meanings which greatly complicate the terminology and lead to various plays on their different senses, and even to theological positions based on these plays. Thus *wajd* means also 'loving' and 'grieving,' because these are fundamental emotions which are 'experienced.'

Further, from the idea of 'finding' has been developed the vocabulary of 'existence.' *Mawjūd* means 'that which is found,' and thence has become the normal word in Arabic for the existent, whether absolute or contingent; and *wujūd*, which, in the first instance, meant simply 'finding,' has become the abstract 'existence.'

Such double- and triple-meaninged sentences as the following thus became possible:—'*Wajd* [finding or ecstasy or love] is losing of *wujūd* [existence or finding] in the *mawjūd* [the existent or the found].' 'He is rested by means of his *wajd*, not by means of the *mawjūd* in his *wajd*.' 'He who in his *wajd* is in the presence of the *mawjūd* is absent through the *wujūd* of the *mawjūd* from his *wajd*, and his *wajd* becomes a case of *wujūd*.' 'Sometimes my *wajd* would move my emotion; then he who is *mawjūd* in my *wajd* would cause me to lose the sight of my *wajd*.' '*Wajd* moves to emotion him whose rest is in *wajd*; but *wajd* is lost in the presence of the Real' (*al-ḥaqq*; see *Dictionary of Technical Terms used in the Sciences of the Musulmans*, p. 1454 f.). The reality and nature, for the Muslims, of this religious ecstasy, and the bliss therein experienced, will be made far more clear by the narrations and descriptions in Macdonald's 'Emotional Religion in Islam,' in *JRAS* for 1901, pp. 195-252, 705-748, and for 1902, pp. 1-28, and his *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam* (Chicago, 1909), ch. vi. to end.

For the place and handling of these ideas in the system of Muslim theology the following brief abstract of the 6th Book of the 4th Division of al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyā* will probably suffice. (The Division is that of 'Saving Matters,' and the Book 'The Book of Love and Longing and Friendliness and being Well Pleased,' in vol. ix. p. 544 to end, ed. of the *Iḥyā* with the commentary of the Sayyid Murtaḍà, Cairo, 1311.)

After a preface explaining how Allah keeps the minds of His saints from the tinsel of this world, and, uncovering His glories to them at one time, and veiling them at another, keeps them between ecstasy and despair, acceptance and rejection, plunged in the sea of the knowledge of Him, and consumed in the fire of the love of Him, love of Allah is stated to be the last and loftiest of the stages of the spiritual life. There is nothing beyond it except what is its fruit, or before it except what is an introduction to it. Yet some divines, because it, as they assert, occurs so seldom, deny its existence, and say that it means only perseverance in obedience to God, and that love in itself is impossible except between beings of the same kind or likeness. These deny also all the companions and sequents of love.

But the whole Muslim community believes that the love of Allah is an absolute duty (*farḍ*). How, then, can it be non-existent or explained away

as meaning obedience? Obedience rather follows love. Further, the Qur'ān (ii. 60, v. 59) speaks of love of and by Allah, and in tradition the Prophet defines faith as loving Allah and His apostle more than aught else. Many other traditions and sayings of the saints follow to the same effect. He who loves Allah has no thought for heaven or hell. At the Last Day, when the peoples are summoned, each in the name of its prophet, the lovers of Allah will be summoned thus: 'Hither unto Allah, O ye Saints of His!' They will not be delayed for any judgment. 'When the believer knows his Lord, he loves Him, and when he loves Him he turns to Him; he looks not on the world with the eye of lust, nor on the world to come with the eye of carelessness; that sweetness occupies him in this world, and soothes him in that to come.'

But what is the essence of love, and what are its causes and conditions? Especially, what is the meaning of the love of the creature for Allah? Love is a natural turning to an object which gives pleasure. It springs from perceptions and varies with them, being either from sense-perception, or, in man alone, from that spiritual perception whose seat is in the heart. The pleasure through it is the most complete and absolute. Some have held that it is unthinkable that any one should love another than himself for the sake of that other, and without any happiness accruing to the lover apart from the perception of the beloved. That, however, is an error; it is both thinkable and takes place. A man loves by nature, first, himself for the continuance and perfection of his self; then he loves another than himself, because that other serves the same purpose and benefits him. Thirdly, he loves a thing for its own sake, not for any happiness that it brings; but the thing itself is his happiness, like the love of beauty, simply for itself. So, if it stands fast that Allah is beautiful, He must certainly be loved by him to whom His beauty is revealed. Beauty is of different kinds, and is not sensuous only: beauty of mental and moral qualities can be loved. But, lastly, there is often a secret relationship of souls between the lover and the beloved, and it suffices. It follows, then, that the Being worthy of love, in the absolute sense, is Allah only. If any one loves another than Allah, and does not do so because of a relationship of that beloved to Allah, his love can only imply defective knowledge of Allah on his part. When the Prophet is loved, or the pious, that is because these are beloved and lovers of Allah. The previously stated causes of love all meet in Allah, and are not joined in other than Him. As to the soul-relationship, the Prophet said: 'Souls are armies divided into bands: those which know one another agree, and those which do not, disagree.' Such an inner kinship of ideas exists between the soul and Allah. Part of this relationship can be expressed in words and learned from books, and consists in travelling on the path, and making the self over in the Divine likeness and imitating the Divine qualities. But another part, peculiar to mankind, cannot be so taught, and is only hinted at in various phrases in the Qur'ān and traditions. Thus in Qur'ān xvii. 87, 'They will ask thee about the spirit (*rūḥ*), say, "The spirit is my Lord's affair."' Also (xv. 29, xxxviii. 72), 'Then when I had formed him and blown into him of my spirit . . .'; therefore the angels worshipped Adam. Also (xxxviii. 25), 'We have made thee [David] a representative (*ḫalīfa*) in the earth.' So, too, in a tradition from the Prophet, 'Allah created Adam in his own form (*ṣūra*),' which certainly does not mean external form. So, too, in another tradition Allah says to Moses, 'I was sick, and thou didst not visit me'; to which Moses, 'O my Lord, how was that?' And Allah replies, 'My creature, so and so, was sick, and thou didst not visit him: hadst thou done so, thou wouldst have found me with him.' This kinship comes to the surface only through supererogatory acts of devotion (*nawāfil*). Allah has said in a tradition: 'When a creature does not cease drawing near to me through supererogatory acts of devotion, I love him; and when I love him, I become his hearing by which he hears, and his seeing by which he sees, and his tongue by which he speaks.' But here it is time to draw the rein of the pen. At this point men divide, and some see only an external resemblance, while others speak of 'identification' (*ittiḥād*) and 'fusion of being' (*ḥulūl*)—both views being false. The kinship is real, not metaphorical, but can be known only by experience.

In the human heart there is a property of apprehension, named variously 'the Divine light,' 'reason,' 'the inner insight,' 'the light of faith.' Its nature impels it to apprehend the essences of all things; and in that is its delight, even as the other human apprehensions have their delight in exercising their functions. But, as the things apprehended rise in the scale,—the external senses, the inner apprehension, etc.,—so does the delight in them. Of necessity, then, the knowledge of Allah is the greatest delight of all. How great it is can be known only by experience, although the stories are many of the ecstasies of His saints. It pre-occupies them so that neither the fear of the Fire nor the hope of Paradise has any weight. Their entire desire is to know Him in this world, and to behold His face in that to come, which is the great felicity. Yet, even in this world, some have so purified their hearts that they have become partakers, in the flesh, of these unspeakable joys. Such are called by men mad and unbelieving, for their speech passes the limit of reason.

Two things strengthen this love of Allah. First, that the ties of the world be cut from the heart, and the love of any other thing be taken out of it; and, secondly, that the knowledge of Allah and the spread of that knowledge in the heart, and its rule over the heart, be strengthened. Thus can men differ in the love of Allah and the consequent felicity.

But though Allah is the most conspicuous and manifest of beings, and though knowledge of Him might be expected before any other knowledge, yet we find that exactly the opposite is the case. There are two reasons for this: first, His invisibility, and, secondly, His too great conspicuousness. His is the case of the sun and its light; men are confused by it like bats. If the sun never set, and darkness never covered the earth, we should never know that light is. So man is, as it were, confused by all creation crying out with Allah. In a homely parallel, he is like the dullard who was riding upon his ass and looking for it at the same time.

Again, that men have a longing (*shauq*) for Allah is a proof that there is love of Allah. Love goes before longing. Longing is seeking for that which is loved, and which is thus perceived in one way but not in another. In the case of human beings, this may be because the beloved is remembered in absence, or, being present, is incompletely perceived. Both these reasons hold of Allah. Even by the most experienced saint the veil can never be entirely removed in this world, and even in the world to come Allah can never be entirely known. The stories in the lives of saints about this love-longing and its joys and sorrows are very many.

But what is meant by the love of Allah for His creatures? That He does love them is plain from divers passages in the Qur'ān (*e.g.* ii. 160, 222, v. 21, 59, lxi. 4) and many traditions. 'Love' is a word applied first to human relationships, and

secondly to Allah. But when words are so transformed, the meaning is always changed. They can never mean the same thing in man and in Allah. In man, love is an inclination of the soul to something that suits it, that is lacking in it, and from the gaining of which it expects profit and pleasure. All that is impossible in Allah, the Perfect, the Unchanging, who can contemplate nothing but Himself and His own acts, as there is nothing else in existence. Love, then, in Allah means: (1) the removal of the veil from the heart of the creature that he may see Allah; (2) the giving of power to the creature to draw near to Allah; and (3) Allah's willing this from all eternity. For Allah's love of a creature is from eternity, inasmuch as it is related to His eternal will, which requires that the creature in question should be given the power to follow the path that brings him near to Allah. But His love is, in time, in relation to the action which draws away the veil. So there is no change in Allah, or drawing near by Allah, or supplying of a lack in Allah. These terms apply only to the creature. And the signs of Allah's love are the trials which come upon creatures. If any one loves Allah and is sorely tried, he may know that Allah loves him, and is drawing him near through these trials.

And whether a creature, on the other hand, really loves Allah can be told by the fruits of love, which show themselves in his heart, and on his tongue, and in his limbs. He should be in love with death, for the lover does not shrink from the journey to the beloved. He should joy to be killed in the path of Allah. Yet, sometimes, love of family and children brings dislike of death, although there is also in one's heart some love of Allah. Or he may desire to remain longer in the world, in order to prepare himself to meet Allah. There is no weakness of love in that. Even with moral weaknesses there may be love of Allah in the heart. But sure signs of that love are delight in the thought (*dhikr*) of Allah, in prayer, and in the Qur'ān. So the lover loves everything connected with the beloved, even to the dogs of her tribe. And a sign of weakness in such love is delight in companionship with others than Allah.

'So friendliness (*ins*), fear (*ḫauf*), and longing (*shauq*) are among the effects of love; only, these effects differ in the lover according to his contemplation, and according to what is predominant in him at the time. Whenever gazing at the Extreme Beauty from behind the veil of the Unseen predominates, and the lover fears that he may fall short of reaching the Pinnacle of Majesty, then his heart is aroused to search, and is disquieted and hastens. That state of disquietude is called "longing," and is related to a thing which is absent. But when there predominates in the lover joy in nearness and witnessing of things present, through what has resulted from unveiling, and his contemplation is limited to examining the beauty thus present and unveiled, not turning to what he does not perceive, thereafter his heart rejoices in what it observes, and its rejoicing is called "friendliness." But if his contemplation be of the Divine qualities of might and self-sufficing and lack of solicitude, and if the possibility of discontinuance and distance present itself, then his heart is pained with this apprehension, and his pain is called "fear." So these states follow these observations, and the observations are due to causes which necessitate them, and they cannot be prevented.'

'Friendliness,' then, is this rejoicing of the heart in the contemplation of Divine beauty. It sometimes reaches the point of delight where there is no trace left of longing or of fear of change. The lover, then, is intimate with Allah, but strange with all others. He is alone when in company, and accompanied when alone. Yet some have denied all these things, and have said that they would involve that Allah is like to man (*tashbīh*). They have even said that there could be no approval (*riḍā*) of Allah on the part of man; there could only be patience. All which is mere ignorance and a taking of the shell for the kernel.

When this friendly intercourse is unclouded by absence or fear, it sometimes produces a confidentiality which reaches so far that the lover makes merry and plays with Allah (*inbisāṭ, idlāl*). Yet if the unworthy attempt this, it leads them straight to destruction.

A story is added of a certain unknown negro saint, Barḫ, in the time of Moses. When rain failed the children of Israel for seven years and no one could move Allah to send it, he—discovered to Moses by inspiration—procured it at once by a prayer full of familiarity and daring. Allah then explained to Moses 'He makes me laugh thrice every day.' It all depends upon who does a thing, and how and in what mind he does it.

Next, being well pleased (*riḍā*) with Allah's decrees is the loftiest of the stages of the spiritual life. Yet to most it is obscure, and to him only who is taught of Allah is the veil removed from it. Some have denied that there can be *riḍā* in anything which opposes the sensual inclination, or in the different trials of the soul. There man cannot pass beyond patience. Others contended that *riḍā* should apply to everything, even to crimes, sins, and unbelief, for everything was the action of Allah. Others, again, contended that perfect *riḍā* meant to abandon prayer and to keep silent as to sins, not exposing them or rebuking them.

But many passages in the Qur'ān (v. 19, ix. 73, 101, lv. 60, lviii. 22, xcviii. 8) speak of Allah as being well pleased with His creatures, and His creatures with Him; and the blessedness of His creatures in His being well pleased with them is reckoned better than Paradise itself. So, too, there are many traditions of the blessedness of those who are well pleased with Allah. The meaning of Allah's being well pleased with His creatures is somewhat like the meaning of Allah's loving His creatures; but created things cannot comprehend its real essence.

That this state of being well pleased with Allah enables men to overcome trials is because the state is a result of love, and the blow of the beloved does not hurt. Or the pain may be felt, but recognized as necessary, and to be welcomed and accepted, like the wound inflicted by a surgeon, or the toil of a merchant who travels in search of gain. And even as mortal love enables the lover to bear and rejoice and have pleasure in anything, however painful, so with the love of Allah.

One said: 'If He were to make me a bridge over Hell, that the creatures might pass over me into Paradise, and if He were then to fill Hell with me in expiation of His oath* and in exchange for the creation, I would love that as proceeding from His judgment and be well pleased with it as coming from His oath. That is the stage I have reached of being well pleased with Him.' Of such stories and expressions there are many.

Nor does prayer (*du'ā*) to Allah mean that the creature is not well pleased with what His Lord does. Prayer, although petition, is an act of devotion and an assumption of an attitude of need and dependence before Allah. He has praised it in the Qur'ān, *e.g.* xxi. 90. Similarly, it is right to blame evil deeds, those who commit them, and the causers of them. Those who are well pleased with such things are blamed in the Qur'ān (ix. 88, 94, x. 7). Indeed, believers are expressly warned not to take as friends evil-doers and unbelievers, Jews and Christians (Qur. iii. 27, iv. 143, v. 56, ix. 23, lx. 1). Allah has covenanted with the believer that he should hate the hypocrite (*munāfiq*), and with the hypocrite that he should hate the believer; and whom a man loves and accompanies, with them will he be raised at the Last Day.

The confusion on this point has arisen entirely from not distinguishing between the part in actions which belongs to Allah and the part which belongs to man. There are these two aspects in every action. The action is of Allah, but the man who is the agent accepts it and makes it his own. Thus we can view it with favour and with dislike at once. When one who is our enemy and the enemy of our enemy dies, our feeling is similarly

* An allusion to several passages in the Qur'ān (vii. 17, xi. 120, xxxii. 13, xxxviii. 85) in which Allah threatens to fill Hell with His creatures.

mixed. This is al-Ash'arī's doctrine of *iktisāb*, 'acceptance.' Al-Ghazālī then attempts to clarify this hopeless problem with a long illustration which need not be reproduced here. It belongs only very indirectly to this rubric. His final point is that when the Prophet forbade to leave a town in which the plague had appeared, that did not mean that a believer, in fleeing from a place of gross sin, was showing lack of pleasure in and acceptance of the will of Allah. Such was not the point of the Prophet's prohibition. It was meant rather to prevent all the healthy people from leaving the sick to perish. And flight from the possibility of sin is not away from Allah's will, but proceeds from it. It is a moot point among the learned as to who is the most excellent—the man who loves death that he may go to Allah, or the man who would rather live that he may serve his Master, or the man who says that he has no choice, but will be well pleased with that which Allah chooses for him.

LITERATURE.—All books on Ṣūfiism contain some material for this subject. Scattered through *The 1001 Nights* are stories of Saints, etc., also to the purpose. The following are more special references (but the only satisfactory materials are still in Arabic alone): Asin, *La Psicología según Mohidín Aben-arabi*, Paris, 1906 (extract from vol. iii. of *Actes du xive Cong. Intern. d. Orient.*); also 'Psicología del éxtasis en dos grandes místicos musulmanes,' in *Cultura Española*, Feb. 1906; Carra de Vaux, *Gazali*, Paris, 1902, p. 218 ff.; *DI* under 'Love' and 'Sufi'; Margoliouth, 'Contributions to the Biography of Abd al-Kadir of Jilan,' in *JRAS*, for April, 1907, p. 267 ff.; Merx, *Idee u. Grundlinien einer allgemeinen Gesch. der Mystik*, Heidelberg, 1893; Nicholson, 'Historical Enquiry concerning. . . . Sūfiism,' in *JRAS* for April, 1906, p. 303 ff.; Palmer, *Oriental Mysticism*, Cambridge, 1867; Weir, *Shaikhs of Morocco*, Edinburgh, 1904; also the two treatises of the present writer referred to above.

D. B. MACDONALD.

BLESSING.—See CURSING AND BLESSING.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE.

Primitive and Savage (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 680.
Buddhist (LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN), p. 687.
Celtic (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 689.
Christian.—See CHILIASM and STATE OF THE DEAD (Christian).
Egyptian.—See SOUL-HOUSE.
Greek and Roman (F. W. HALL), p. 696.
Hindu (H. JACOBI), p. 698.
Japanese (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 700.
Muslim.—See MUHAMMADANISM.
Persian (L. H. GRAY), p. 702.
Semitic (G. A. BARTON), p. 704.
Slavonic (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 706.
Teutonic (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 707.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage).—**1. Introduction.**—The idea of the future life entertained by many peoples is frequently a complex one; in other words, various conceptions are held simultaneously. Thus among one people it may be thought that the spirit lingers round or re-visits its old haunts, that it passes to another region, and that it transmigrates into an animal or is re-born. This, while due in part to the fluidity of primitive belief and the apparent lack of any perception of contradictory ideas, may also result from the fact that it is often thought that a man possesses several souls, to each of which a different *rôle* is assigned after death. Sometimes, however, these concurrent ideas are less contradictory. The soul leaves the other world to return for a time to the grave or the village, while transmigration occurs only after a sojourn, longer or shorter, in the spirit-world. The conception of the future state will be discussed in a separate article (see STATE OF THE DEAD); here we shall confine ourselves to the idea of it as a blissful region, or to the conception of a region of happiness open to a few favoured mortals. Such ideas have not been universal; while, again, when the belief in a future life is lacking or is vague, the Elysium idea naturally is also vague or lacking. The simplest idea of the life of the spirit in another region after death is that of a mere continuance of the earthly life without change. This conception prevails among several peoples. It is to such a continuance theory that we must trace the idea of life beyond the grave as fuller and ampler than life on earth or of an Elysium state. Such a fuller life is, of course, generally expressed among savages in terms of savage life—there will be better hunting and fishing, and plenty of food; the huts will be larger, and all bodily desires will be amply fulfilled. What caused this transition can only be suggested. Since, in the continuance theory, the chief was still a chief, the slave a slave, and all who possessed wealth or power or tribal lore still retained these, this would naturally lead to the idea that for some at least—the chief, the medicine-man or priest, the wealthy—things would be better than on earth. Again, it may have been thought that the gods would be kinder to those who had observed their cult and ritual more carefully, or that those who had distinguished themselves on earth as warriors or by great bravery would be rewarded. Here we approach the dawn of more strictly retributive ideas. Such qualities as are approved among savages—bravery as opposed to cowardice, observance of tribal laws, and the like—have an ethical tinge; while even among savages, though morality may be lax from our point of view, certain moral ideas are inculcated, and they who observe them are said to be approved by the gods. This does not necessarily mean that the 'good' man, from the savage point of view, is always rewarded after death, but in many cases this belief is entertained, while the 'bad' are supposed to be punished. Hence, though in some cases the influence of a higher religion with a retributive system may have affected savage eschatology, there are others in which the development of such a system has proceeded spontaneously and apart from outside influence. When we add to all this the fact that greater powers are generally attributed to the spirit after death, it will easily be seen that men might readily come to believe that the spirit's opportunities of exercising them would be greater, and its surroundings, along with its capacity of enjoyment, would be more ample. While, then, the continuance state is often deemed a better one than earthly life, one in which different lots are assigned to different classes of men, there arises the idea of different states or places of existence, some perfectly happy, some no better than on earth or even more miserable.

Other ideas may quite well have produced the conception that life after death was blissful. Man's experience of the miseries of this world and his instinctive desire for happiness may have suggested a blissful other-world as an offset to this earth. The same experience led him to form myths of a Golden Age in the past, in which we occasionally meet with the idea that gods and men lived together or had free intercourse with each other. These may have suggested the idea that such a state still existed, and that it would be restored to man after death. Here the belief is sometimes expressed, that men will be with the gods after death, or will return to the region, subterranean

or heavenly, whence they originally came. There is also the belief (expressed in many myths of the origin of death) that man is naturally immortal, and that pain, unhappiness, hunger, and thirst are unnatural. Hence they will no longer exist beyond the grave (see AGES OF THE WORLD, FALL). But such a state of the blest, especially when it is the abode of gods or immortals, is often reserved only for a few, while these sometimes pass thither without dying. It may also be believed in as a state apart from the ordinary abode of the dead, whether that is blissful or otherwise, though occasionally it is a mere region of the other world.

The continuance theory does not always develop in these directions, and sometimes it is held that life after death is for all a tame copy of earthly life, a dim, poor, shadowy replica of the present. This is common among West African tribes, and is found also among the Greeks and Semites, though with all these there is usually the idea of a blissful abode of divine beings.

The locality of the blissful region varies. Sometimes, probably as a result of inhumation or cave-burial, it is an underground region. Or, again, it is simply another distant part of the earth—frequently the east or west—or an island, perhaps because men believe that after death they will go to the region whence their ancestors migrated, or because the sun is supposed to pass through the place of the dead. Or it is on a mountain, probably because mountains are thought to support the sky, above which, in turn, the blissful abode is also located. Hence men are sometimes buried on mountains, while the custom of cremation may mark the change to the conception of a heavenly world whither the spirit floated when set free by the fire. Or, again, the planets, sun, moon, and stars, are held to be the abode of the blest, while many primitive folk believe that stars are the dead transformed.

In many cases the blissful region, like the world of the dead generally, is reached only after a long and toilsome journey, over mountains and rivers, over the bridge of death, while many obstacles and dangers are met with, and various supernatural enemies are encountered. Occasionally these dangers and obstacles are intended to try the worth of the spirit, and if it fails to surmount them, it cannot reach the blissful abode. Possibly, however, these trials and dangers are reminiscences of similar experiences in the old migrations of a tribe, traditionally handed down and made part of the experience of the dead where they were supposed to return to some former dwelling-place of the tribe.

Whatever ideas are held concerning the abode of the dead are strengthened and amplified by dreams, in which the soul is thought to have visited it; or when the medicine-man claims the power of going thither, and returns with a vivid description of its character; or by myths telling of visits of the living to that land, their sojourn there, and their return (see § 7).

2. The lowest peoples.—We know nothing of the exact nature of the eschatology of pre-historic man. But from the funeral *mobilier* of interments in the Stone Age, and from the elaborate customs of sepulture in its later periods, we may be certain that some continuance theory existed, whether of the body or of the spirit, in the grave or in another region. Whether it was blissful or not cannot now be known (see MacCulloch, *ExpT* xvii. [1906] 489). On the beliefs of the lowest peoples surviving now or within recent times, our information is more extensive, and, though it has been surmised that some of their eschatological ideas have been assimilated from Christian sources, there is little reason to doubt that on the whole they are original. The belief of the **Tasmanians** was vague, yet they looked forward to a happier life in which they would untiredly and with constant success pursue the chase, and for ever enjoy the pleasures which they coveted on earth. Contact with the white man suggested to them that they would 'jump up white men' on an island in the Straits (H. Ling Roth, *Abor. of Tas.* 1890, p. 69). The religious ideas of the **Australian** tribes have sometimes been exaggerated by uncritical observers, but there is no doubt that among many of them a belief in a happy other-world was found. Of the tribes of West Australia little is known, while among the central and northern tribes a belief in perpetual re-incarnation existed universally (Spencer-Gillen[b], 491); but among those scattered over the south-east region the belief in a future happy life 'beyond the great water' or in the sky is generally found (Howitt, 438).

This is a land like the earth, and is sometimes called 'the gum-tree country,' but is more fertile, well watered, and abundantly supplied with game, while everything is better than in this world; and the spirits live there as they did on earth. Considerable freedom is ascribed to them, and they can also wander freely about the earth. Sometimes, as the Ngarigo and Wolgal believe, the spirit is met by the *quasi*-divinity Daramulun, who lives with the ghosts. The path to sky-land is by the rays of the setting sun or by the Milky Way, sometimes itself the dwelling of the ghosts (tribes on the Herbert River) and regarded as a water-course with fruit-groves and all desirable things; and there are many legends regarding its former accessibility by a tree or other means (Howitt, 434 ff., 474; *JAI* ii. 269, xiii. 187 ff., 194). The tribes around the Gulf region believe in a happy life in *Yalairy*, and a spirit above who looks after them there. Yalairy is reached by the Milky Way and is 'a good land, a nice place, full of beautiful, shady trees,' with plenty of water and abundance of game. It is usually thought of vaguely as beyond the stars, and the natives have no dread of going there (Palmer, *JAI* xiii. 291).

Something corresponding to the division caused elsewhere by rank, ritual observances, etc., is found among a few tribes. The Wakelbura thought that right-handed men went to the sky, left-handed men underground, while the island paradise of certain tribes round Maryborough is reached only by the 'good,' and those who show excellence in hunting, fishing, etc. (Howitt, 473, 498). Among the Gulf tribes the custom of knocking out two front teeth is connected with their entry to the sky-world. Those who have submitted to this custom will have bright, clear water to drink, others will have dirty or muddy water (*JAI* xiii. 291). Such beliefs may explain the retributive ideas ascribed to some of the tribes, though the fact that the great Being believed in by all these groups is supposed to be a kind of moral governor may have occasionally led to a retributive eschatology (see ABORIGINES, § 1; Howitt, 504; *JAI* ii. 268–9). Thus the Baiame of certain tribes lives in Bullemah, the land of rest, a floral paradise of beauty and of plenty, where good spirits go, and can save from Eleanbah-wundah, the abode of the wicked (Parker, *More Aust. Legendary Tales*, London, 1898, 96, and cf. Lang's *Introd.* p. xxi).

The **Andaman Islanders** believe that beneath the earth is a jungle world (*chaitan*), where the *spirits* of the dead dwell and hunt the spirits of animals and birds. Between earth and sky is a cane bridge, over which the *souls* of the dead go to paradise, while the souls of those who have committed such sins as murder go to a cold region called *jereglar-mugu*. But all souls will finally be re-united with their spirits, and will live permanently on a new earth in the prime of life. Sickness and death will be unknown (Man, *JAI* xii. 161–2; but cf. Temple, *Census of India*, Calcutta, 1903, iii. 62).

Among the primitive pagan tribes of the Malay peninsula, **Semang, Sakai,** and **Jakun**, there is a considerable belief in retribution; the wicked, often identified with those who fear to meet the terrible beings of the soul-bridge, are condemned to a wretched existence, though sometimes they are submitted to a process of purification and permitted to enter Paradise. Paradise is a place for all others; it is situated in the firmament, and entered from the west. It is 'a glorified "Avilion," an "Island of Fruits," from which all that was noxious and distressing to man had been eliminated' (Skeat and Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, 1906, i. 13).

The Semang and Jakun divide the firmament into three tiers; the two upper tiers are the Paradise of the blest, filled with wild fruit-trees. Some of the tribes make the moon the 'Island of Fruits,' which, in some songs, is preceded by a 'Garden of Flowers.' The choicest heaven is reserved for the old and wise.

Among the western Semang the island of fruit-trees is reserved for souls of *B'lians* ('medicine-men'); all others, save the wicked, go across the sea to a land of screw-pines and thatch-palms (*ib.* 186–7, 207–8). All souls, according to the Sakai, are purified in the infernal regions by 'Granny Langut,' after which they cross a great chopper over boiling water. The wicked fall in; the good finally proceed to the island of fruit-trees (*ib.* 239 ff.). Among the Jakun, the Blandas think that in the Island of Fruits souls of the old become young; there is no pain or sickness there, and plenty of well-water. The Besisi locate it in the moon; it contains every kind of fruit-tree; there is perpetual feasting, and souls lie in idleness, or play musical instruments. The good alone are admitted to it. According to the Mantra, souls pass to Fruit Island in the west and live in harmony and enjoyment, feasting on its delicious fruits, marrying and having children. Pain, disease, and death are unknown. Souls of men who have died a bloody death go to Red Land, a desolate region, but obtain food from Fruit Island (*ib.* 293, 298, 321; *Jour. Ind. Archip.* i. 325).

The burial rites, especially of chiefs, among the **Bushmen** of S. Africa show a belief in the continuance of life; but their ideas are scantily recorded. Of the tribes living on the banks of the Gariep there is a myth of a paradise called *Too'ga* whither all go after death, and a safe journey is ensured by cutting off a finger-joint (Clow, *Nat. Races of S.A.*, 1905, i. 129). Equally vague are the notions of the **Hottentots**, who believe that there is a land above the sky-vault where things go on as on earth. Their divinity Tsui-goam lives in a beautiful heaven. Spirits of the dead exercise power over men and have a better insight into all matters; but whether they live in the land beyond the sky does not appear, though stars are the souls or eyes of the dead. The rites of interment also show a strong belief in the soul's continuance (Hahn, *Tsuni-goam*, 1881, pp. 23, 85, 105, 112 ff.; Fritsch, *Eingeborenen Sud-Afrikas*, Breslau, 1872, p. 338).

Among the **Eskimos** of Greenland the general belief was that there were two regions: (1) in a cold sky or over-world, with hills and valleys and a heaven; the souls dwelt in tents on the shore of a lake with plenty of fish and fowl, though it is also said to have been a place of cold and famine; (2) in an underground domain of the god Torngarsuk, a blissful place with sunshine and perpetual summer, with water, fish, and fowl in plenty, while seals and reindeer were caught without trouble or found boiling alive in a great kettle.

Various accounts ascribe different causes for the presence of souls in either region. Thus the upper region is said to be for witches and the wicked, or again for all souls except those of great and heroic men, of those who had suffered much on earth, perished at sea, or died in childbirth. On the other hand, the destiny of the soul depended on the treatment of the body. If it was laid on the ground before death, it went downwards; if not, upwards. A terrible journey to the underground region had to be undertaken, and some souls perished on the way (Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, 1893, p. 233 ff.; Crantz, *Gronland*, 1765, p. 258; Rink, *Tales and Trad. of the Eskimo*, 1875, pp. 37, 42).

3. Polynesia.—In Polynesia, while occasionally an abode of bliss for all is met with, as in the Mitchell Group, Niutao, and Nanumanga, in the heavens, or in Nukupetau, underground (Tia [Turner, *Samoa*, 1884, pp. 281, 286, 288]), in general there were different states allotted according to conditions of rank or class, while some were retributive, depending, however, upon ritual obedience rather than upon moral considerations. A subterranean other-world is frequently met with, while at the same time an abode in the heavens, the moon, in the west, or on an island is allotted to certain persons. In Samoa, Pulotu was under the sea, where the spirits bathed in 'the water of life' and became lively and bright, with no trace of infirmity, while the aged became young. This region was a replica of earth, but chiefs became pillars in the house of Saveasiuleo, its lord—an honour proudly anticipated by them before death. There was also a belief that chiefs and grandees went to the heavens, which opened to receive them (Turner, 257 ff.; Gill, *Myths and Songs of S. Pacific*, 1876, p. 168). In the Hervey Group Avaiki was a hollow underground region whither all who died a natural death went to be eaten and annihilated by Miru. Warriors, after being swallowed by Rongo, climbed a mountain and thence went to a cheerful abode in the heavens, where, dowered with immortality and decked with flowers, they danced and enjoyed themselves, looking down with contempt on the wretches in Avaiki. This Elysium of the brave consisted of 10 successive heavens, and was the home of Tangaroa, the god of day. But in Raratonga warriors lived with Tiki underground, in a beautiful region with shrubs and flowers of undying fragrance, eating, drinking, dancing, and sleeping. Their admission here depended on their having brought a suitable offering (Gill, 18, 152 ff., 170). In the Society Islands, while the people descended to Po, members of the Areoi society, chiefs, and those whose families could afford sufficient offerings, went to the aerial paradise of perfumed Rohutu, where, amid beautiful scenes, every sensuous enjoyment was open to them. Neglect of certain rites and offerings might, however, debar them from it (Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], 1832, i. 245, 352, 397, 403). The Sandwich Islanders thought that souls went to Po, the place of night, where they were eaten, though some became immortal spirits by this process. A few went to the underground paradise of Miru and Akea, while chiefs were led by a god to the heavens. This underground paradise was level and beautiful, and everything grew of itself. In Miru's part, souls amused themselves with noisy games; in Akea's there reigned a solemn peace (Ratzel, *Hist. of Mankind*, 1897, i. 315; Ellis, i. 366; Jones, *Sandwich Is.*, Boston, 1843, p. 42). For the spirits of the dead in Savage Island there was an underground region called Maui, but their favourite place was the land of Sina in the skies (Turner, 306). Another account says that the virtuous passed to *Ahonoa*, Everlasting Light, the virtues being chastity, theft from another tribe, and slaughter of enemies (Thomson, *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 139). In Bowditch Island the common people went to a distant region of delights full of fruits and flowers, where they enjoyed feasting and dancing. Kings, priests, and their families went to the moon and enjoyed all sorts of pleasures, the moon itself being their food (*JAI* xxi. [1891–2] 51; Turner, 273). *Bolotu* was the Elysium of the Tonga Islanders, an island of gods and spirits of chiefs and men of rank. Flowers and fruits when plucked were immediately replaced; and dogs, when killed, came to life again. This exquisite region was not open to the people, whose souls died with their bodies. The Maori subterranean Hades, *Po* or the *Reinga*, is variously described. Sometimes it is regarded as a gloomy state with disgusting food, again as an excellent land like earth, visited by the sun, with rivers, good food, and many villages and people. It was also thought to be divided into several compartments, the lowest being the worst. Thither went all of lesser rank. Po was personified as a goddess, and in it was the living fountain in which the sun and moon bathed and were renewed. Great chiefs and heroes went to one of the heavens after death, or became stars. There was, however, some uncertainty as to whether the spirit went up or down, or remained near the body. *Karakias*, or prayers, aided its ascent. Reinga is described by one writer, probably confusing it with the sky-abode of chiefs, as a beautiful heaven where all things were abundant, with constant calm, perpetual sunshine and gladness (Nicholls, *JAI* xv. [1885], 200; see also Shortland, *Traditions of N.Z.*, 1854, ch. 7, *Maori Rel. and Myth*, 1882, pp. 45, 52; *JAI* xix. [1890] 118–9; Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui*, 1855, pp. 103, 186, and *passim*).

Retribution was not strictly ethical, but ritual and ceremonial, as some of the above cases have shown. When the friend of a dead man in Nanumea gave a great funeral feast, the deceased was admitted to a heavenly land of light and clear waters; if not, he was sent to darkness and mud (Turner, 292). Entrance to *Mane*, the western paradise of Tamana, with its clear streams and abundant food, depended on an even number resulting when pebbles were thrown by the dead man's relatives. An odd number caused the spirit to be annihilated (*ib.* 294). In Pukapuka of the Hervey Group, Vaerua ate spirits which had committed ceremonial offences; all others went westwards to the house of Reva, where they passed a blissful existence. In Aitutaki, spirits which were provided with a coco-nut escaped by a ruse from being eaten by Miru, and went to the pleasant abode of Iva, where they feasted on the richest food and the finest sugar-cane (Gill, 171, 175). In Netherland Island, however, 'souls of the honest, kind, and gentle went and lived in light in Heaven. The thief, the cruel, and the ill-tongued went to a prison of darkness under the earth' (Turner, 301).

4. Dayaks, Papuans, and Melanesians.—The Dayaks exhibit a great diversity of beliefs, and the general disposition towards a retributive view, as well as the minute divisions of the future state, may owe something to Hindu or Muhammadan influences. More purely native beliefs are seen in the occasional idea that the other-world is a copy of this, or is open to all, or that a better fate awaits those who die a violent death or women dying in childbirth.

The Sea Dayaks of Sarawak believe in simple continuance. The dead build houses and make paddy fields; they are subject to the same inequalities as the living. But they can bestow on the living amulets and medicines of magical power (Ling Roth, *Natives of Sarawak and Borneo*, 1896, i. 213). Others, like the Sibuyows, think that six states are passed through, the wicked—thieves and great criminals—being punished in the first. Eventually the final heavenly state—beautiful, peaceful, and happy—is reached. The streets are clean and regular, the houses perfectly formed. There are lakes and rivers, gardens with fruit-trees and flowers, and the people are happy and rich. This place is enclosed by a great wall, while at a distance the souls of Malays have a *Kampong* (Brooke, *Ten Years in Sarawak*, 1866, i. 55). The Dusuns, the Idaans, and other tribes place paradise at or near the top of a mountain which all souls ascend, and which is guarded by a fiery dog or some other monster. The wicked try unsuccessfully to ascend it (Pryer, *JAI* xvi. [1886] 283; Ling Roth, i. 220). The tribes of the Barito, Kapuas, and Kahaian river-basins have a similar belief. The entrance to the other-world is on a mountain peak. It has rivers rich in fish; in its midst is a sea surrounding an island on which grows a tree with pearls for fruit, golden blossoms, and fine cloth for leaves. It also furnishes the Water of Life, which the souls drink to become youthful (this is also effected by bathing in the sea). While the souls retain the positions of this world, all are free from care, every desire is followed by abundant fulfilment, and there are all kinds of enjoyments and rich gems and gold. Souls, however, eventually die, returning to the earth and entering a fruit or leaf, etc. Thieves, unjust chiefs, and those who turned a good into a bad cause are excluded from these enjoyments (Grabowsky, *Inter. AE*, ii. 184 ff.; Ling Roth, citing Schwaner, ii. pp clxx ff., cc). The Malanaus made the other-world resemble this, with seas, rivers, and sago plantations; but those who had died a violent death had a separate paradise from those who had died a natural death. Souls finally died, to reappear as worms, etc. (de Crespigny, *JAI* v. 35). Various places were allotted to the souls in the belief of the Kayans, according to the manner of their death. Those who died a violent death and women dying in childbed mated in *Long Julan*, where they had all their wants supplied, did no work, and all became rich. Those who were drowned went to *Ling Yang*, a land of plenty below the rivers, where all property lost in the waters became theirs. A place of wretchedness was reserved for suicides (Hose, in Ling Roth, i. 220).

Among the Papuans of New Guinea and the adjacent islands there is a general belief in a future state, shown by the elaborate funeral ceremonies and by explicit beliefs. But these beliefs vary in different regions, and the other-world is located now on an island, now in the sky, now underground. Sometimes it is open to all, sometimes to those only who comply with various ritual observances; or, again, there are various places according to the manner of death. It is conceived as a region of light and happiness; friends are reunited; hunger is unknown, and the souls enjoy an existence of hunting, fishing, and feasting.

In the Woodlarks all souls whose bodies have been tatued go to the island of *Watum* by way of a serpent bridge, and enjoy to the full all the pleasures of life, the women cultivating and cooking food for their idle lords (Thomson, *British N.G.*, 1892, p. 184; Haddon, *FL*, 1894, p. 318). In the western islands of Torres Straits the abode of the dead was in a mythic island called *Kibu*, where ghosts sat twittering on the tree-tops; but those of the best men, greatest warriors and skull-hunters, were better off (Haddon, *JAI* xix. [1890] 318). In the eastern islands the spirit went under the sea to *Beg*, and eventually to the island of *Boigu*, being conducted thither by Terer, the first man from whose body the skin was scraped off. Here every one was happy and bright, had plenty of food, and did no work. The death ceremonies comforted the mourners, and gave them assurance of immortality (Hunt, *JAI* xxviii. [1899] 8; *Rep. Cambridge Exp. to Torres St.*, Cambridge, vi. [1908] 45, 128, 252–3). The Elema tribes of the Papuan Gulf, New Guinea, thought that those who died fighting went to the sky-land of the god of war, and could also roam about and annoy their enemies. Various localities were assigned to those dying a natural death, while those who were murdered or killed by crocodiles or snakes became wandering spirits (Holmes, *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 428). Other tribes entertain different ideas. Some think that all spirits live in *Tauru*, a glorious place where the souls welcome the newcomer, and where hunger is unknown. A similar western paradise called *Raka*, the place of plenty, is believed in by the Motu-motu people; but here only those whose noses are pierced enter it (Chalmers, *Pioneering in N.G.*, 1883, p 169). In other districts the soul, or *mòhs*, goes underground, and must cross a great water by a ladder. Here it meets a spirit which demands its earring and armband. If the soul has not these the ladder is tripped up, and the *mòhs* falls into the water, whence there is no return. Otherwise it is met by two *mohs*, which conduct it to the subterranean villages where the ghosts dwell. They can re-visit their former home and bring good or ill luck (*Inter. AE*, xiii. 47).

Throughout Melanesia, while future life is a reflexion of life on earth, there is a general disposition to ascribe greater happiness to chiefs and warriors, and a greater amount of power to the disembodied spirits. But here also attention to ritual obtains a special reward, and there is an approximation to retribution. The place of the dead is an island (Solomon and Loyalty Islands) or underground (New Britain, Santa Cruz, New Hebrides, Fiji). Sometimes there are different places for different classes, or according to the manner of life or death, and in general all these regions of the dead are reached with difficulty.

The people in the north of New Britain believe that souls which have enough shell-money to offer to the god can enter a desirable paradise called *Tingenalabaran*, but those which have not are sent to a bleak region. The Sulkas of the south coast have a subterranean paradise, *Mlol*, to which those only who can prove their life to have been satisfactory are admitted (Pullen-Burry, *Trans. 3rd Cong. Hist. Rel.* i. 84).

In the Solomon Islands the island of the dead is easily reached by ghosts which have their noses pierced (Florida), or have their hands marked with a conventional design, lacking which they are annihilated (Ysabel). There are houses, gardens, and canoes in these island abodes; the ghosts bathe, and their laughter is heard. In some cases the common ghosts turn into white ants' nests and are eaten by more vigorous ghosts, who also at last undergo the same transformation (Codrington, *Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, 256 ff.). Similar beliefs are held in other islands of the group.

An underground world is believed in from the Torres Group to Fiji: and its usual name from Torres Islands to New Hebrides is *Panoi*. The Banks Islanders think there are divisions in *Panoi* for different classes of ghosts, *e.g.* youths dying in the flower of their age inhabit a more pleasant region with flowers and scented plants in abundance; or, according to the manner of death, there are places set apart for the souls. Sometimes murderers, sorcerers, and adulterers are excluded from the better *Panoi*, a good place where ghosts enjoy life and live in harmony. *Panoi* contains villages, houses, and trees with red leaves, and is a beautiful place. A great and bright feast on earth is compared to the ordinary life there. Men dance, sing, and talk, but there is no fighting. Life is happy if empty; there is no pain, sickness, or work. In some islands ritual observances determine the nature of existence there—a man with unpierced ears cannot drink water, the untatued cannot eat good food (Codrington, 273–288). In Aneiteum (New Hebrides), the place of spirits, Umatmas, has two divisions, 'for good and for bad,' the bad being thieves, murderers, and liars. The former division is characterized by plenty of good food (Turner, 326).

In Fiji the way to the place of souls, *Mbulu*, was long and dangerous, and ritual and ceremonial observances decided the lot of the dead. Ghosts of bachelors were annihilated; all other ghosts had to be approved by Ndengei, great warriors especially gaining his favour. In *Mbulu* punishments were

awarded to those who displeased the gods, those who had not their ears bored or were not tatued, or had not slain an enemy. Those who lied about themselves were struck down; some were eaten by the gods. Hence there were divisions in *Mbulu*, and of these *Mburotu* was the most Elysian. Here scented groves and pleasant glades and an unclouded sky were found, and an abundance of all that was most desirable to a native. Its delights were such that the word was commonly used to describe any great joy. A native song says, 'Death is easy . . . death is rest' (Williams, *Fiji*, 1858, i. 243 ff.). Mention is also made of a paradise of the gods, to which certain mortals were admitted by privilege (*ib.* i. 114).

5. **Africa.**—An Elysium conception is but slightly developed among the peoples of Africa, partly because some tribes have a vague idea of a future life, some, like the Dinka and Bari, believing in utter extinction (Hollis, *The Masai*, Oxford, 1905, p. 307), partly because with many others the belief in transmigration and re-incarnation is very strong. The cult of ancestors is, however, general, and shows that some kind of future existence is commonly believed in, though it is not definitely outlined, and many profess ignorance of its nature. But as the spirits of the dead are so often the gods of the living, and are adored as great spirits, this must argue that their lot, or that of the more important of them, is better than on earth, though expression of this is rare. Where a future state is described, it is most usually a heavenly or subterranean place where all go, and where the distinctions of rank, etc., still continue.

Thus, among the Nilotic Negroes, the Ja-luo hold that the spirits go up to the sky (Johnston, *Uganda*, 1902, ii. 779). Among the Nandi it is held that all, good and bad, go underground (Hollis, *Trans. 3rd Cong. Hist. Rel.*, Oxford, 1908, i. 87). With the Gallas, wood that has been burning a little is put on the grave, and if it grows, this denotes that the spirit is happy in the other-world (Macdonald, *Africana*, 1882, i. 229). The general belief of the West African Negroes is in an underground shadow world where the king is still king, the slave a slave, and the conditions and occupations of earth are continued in a ghostly form. The sun shines there when it sets here, and there are mountains, forests, rivers, plants, animals, villages, etc. There are pleasures and pains, but every one there grows backward or forward into the prime of life, and there is no diminution of strength or bodily waste. Among the Yoruba-speaking peoples it is called *Ipo-oku*, 'The Land of the Dead'; among the Tshi, *Srahmandazi*, 'The Land of Ghosts'; and the general opinion of it is summed up in the proverb, 'One day in this world is worth a year in *Srahmandazi*' (Kingsley, *Travels in W.A.*, 1897, pp. 488, 578; Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 1887, p. 157 f., *Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, 1894, p. 127; Burton, *Dahome*, 1864, ii. 156). These ideas are also found among the Bantu tribes of W. Africa, though their notion of the locality of the spirit-world is vaguer—it is underground or all around. It is free from certain bodily limitations, and the rich or persons of rank form a special class of spirits, the *awiri*. Probably since contact with white men a belief has arisen in 'white man's land' beneath the sea, whither some of the dead go and find a happy future, becoming white (Nassau, *Fetichism in W.A.*, 1904, pp. 56 ff., 237; Kingsley, 519; *JAI* xiii. [1884] 475). Much the same may be said of the Eastern Bantus. All spirits live, but how employed or where no one knows (*JAI*, 1892–3, xxii. 116). The spirit-world is peopled in much the same way as this, but we hear in some tribes of Mulungu assigning their places to the dead, though there is no idea of retribution (but cf. Waitz, *Anthrop.*, Leipzig, 1860, ii. 425 [souls of good men go to Mulungu, among the Ba-Ngindo]), and that the spirits 'go on high.' Among the Bondei the souls go to Mlinga, a divine mountain, entering by a brass door. There is recognition beyond the grave, and the spirit lives with its dead relatives. Spirits are worshipped as gods, and have great influence on earthly affairs, while sometimes the ghost of a dead chief will have a mountain as his residence (Macdonald, i. 60, 67–9, 108, 297; Dale, *JAI* xxv. 232). A more definite Elysium conception appears with the Kimbunda of S.W. Africa, in whose *Kalunga*, or world of the dead, there are feasting, plenty of women, hunting and dancing, while life goes better than in this world (Magyar, cited by Tylor[3], ii. 77). The conceptions of the southern Bantus are also vague, though some hold that the spirit ascends to heaven or 'goes home' (Macdonald, *JAI* xx. [1891] 120–1). With the Zulus, while there is much doubt as to the position of the spirit-world, there are clear references to an underground region of spirits where Unkulunkulu is. Stories tell of visits paid by the living there, and of its landscapes like those of this world, its villages, cattle, etc. This belief is now much mingled with the idea that the *amatongo*, or spirits, appear on earth as snakes. Even in this the differences of rank are continued, chiefs appearing as poisonous, common people as harmless, snakes (Callaway, *Rel. of the Amazulu*, 1884, *passim*, *Nursery Tales . . . of the Zulus*, 1868, i. 316 ff.). The Basutos also locate the spirit-world underground. Some say that it has green valleys and immortal speckled cattle—an Elysium idea—but generally it is thought that the shades wander calmly and silently, without joy and without grief. There is no idea of retribution, though this may have existed formerly (Casalis, *Les Bassoutos*, Paris, 1859, pp. 261, 268)

The idea of rank, etc., determining the state of spirits is curiously held among the Masai. Souls of common people are annihilated, but those of the rich or medicine-men become sacred snakes, while spirits of certain great people go to heaven (Johnston, *op. cit.* ii. 832; Hollis, 307–8). Merker, however, states that the good are admitted to a paradise full of all beautiful and glorious things. Luxuriant grazing-grounds with cattle, alternate with seas, rivers, and cool groves, whose trees are hung with the rarest fruits. Souls live without trouble, pain, or labour, re-united to their departed relatives. Evil-doers are sent to a waterless waste (*ZE* xxxv. [1903] 735).

Retributive ideas are said to exist among some Negro tribes, though the evidence must be received with caution. Souls of good men ascend to heaven, sometimes by the Milky Way, the path of the ghosts, in the belief of the Krus, Scherbros, and Odschi, the evil being punished (Waitz, ii. 191). But Bosman's account of the beliefs of the Guinea Negroes on this subject shows what 'goodness' means here. There is a judgment of souls after death: the good, viz. those who have strictly observed ceremonial and religious laws, and thus have not offended the gods, are sent to a happy and pleasant Paradise; offending souls are slain or drowned (Pinkerton, *Voyages*, xvi. 401). Among the Agni also, souls of the good begin a new life analogous to this after death (*L'Anthropologie*, Paris, iv. [1893] 434), and this is said to be true of some of the tribes on the Upper Congo, who think that *Longa*, the nether world, is tenanted by souls of the good (Weeks, *FL* xii. [1901] 184). It is not improbable that a belief in a future judgment is taught in the Secret Societies of W. Africa.

6. **North American Indians.**—While the tribes of North America occasionally represented the future life as a mere copy of this, *e.g.* the Maricopas, the more general conception was that it opened out a richer, fuller, and happier state to all, or to warriors, men of rank, the rich, etc., or to the good; for more than among other savage races the American tribes had developed the idea of future retribution on ethical grounds. In some cases the division between good and bad shows a Christian colouring, and the native belief may simply have been that certain souls alone could enter the happy state, others being debarred, *i.e.* those who died a violent death, those who were too feeble to encounter the dangers of the soul-journey, cowards, or those for whom sufficient offerings had not been made at their tomb. But in other cases those who are debarred or are sent to a gloomy region are wicked, they have committed offences against tribal law, and are a plague to society, as among the Delawares, Blackfeet, and Ojibwas.

Where a state common to all was believed in, it was thought to continue all the pursuits of earthly life under absolutely untrammelled conditions. Hunting and fishing were pursued without difficulty, and always with success. There would be neither want nor sorrow. The woods, lakes, streams, and plains would not only be more beautiful, but would swarm with every desirable creature. The 'happy hunting grounds' were the natural paradise of hunting tribes, and there they dwelt with the chief divinity or 'great spirit' in supreme felicity. Many poetical and sensuous descriptions of this land are to be found in the myths of various tribes, but all things in it were as incorporeal as the spirit itself, 'the hunter and the deer a shade.' Generally it was thought to be in heaven, the Milky Way forming the way thither, as with the Clallams, some N. Californian tribes, the Iroquois, and the Winnibagoes (*NR* iii. 522; Macfie, *Vancouver Island*, 1865, p. 448; Morgan, *League of the Iroquois*, 1851, p. 176; Schoolcraft, *Ind. Tribes*, Philad., 1853–6, iv. 240). Or it was in the region of the rising sun, or on a mountain (the Mojaves, *NR* iii. 526). The Navahos thought it was below the earth, whence men had once come forth. There all things grew luxuriously, and the spirits enjoyed peace and plenty (*NR* iii. 528).

Among many tribes bravery in war as well as rank earned for men the abode of bliss, while the medicine-men taught that it was a recompense for success in life (Copeway, *Ojibwa Nation*, 1847, p. 32). Cowards and common people were debarred or might enter Elysium only after a long period of

suffering. With the Ahts, chiefs and warriors went to the beautiful heaven of Quawteaht, untroubled by storms and frost, revelling in sunshine and abundance of game. All others went to the subterranean kingdom of Chayher (Sproat, 209). The western paradise of the Ojibwas and the southern of the Chinooks were open only to brave hunters and warriors. The Ojibwas thought of it as a great village in a fine country, with continual amusements and dances, and plenty of food. War was unknown; the hunter obtained his prey without the fatigue of pursuit (Jones, *Ojebway Inds.*, 1861, p. 104). Chiefs and medicine-men among the Virginian tribes went to a western paradise of perpetual happiness, where they smoked, danced, and sang with their forefathers; all others were annihilated (Pinkerton, *Voyages*, xiii. 14, 41). The Natchez, the Tensas, and the Apalaches held that chiefs and warriors went to reside in the glorious land of the sun (Muller, *Amer. Urreligionen*, Basel, 1855, p. 66 ff.). Far more elaborate in such divisions was the eschatology of the ancient Mexicans, who assigned the dead to three regions. The emperor, nobles, and fallen warriors were borne eastwards to the paradise of Huitzilopochtli, where honeyed flowers and luscious fruits abounded in shady groves, and rich hunting parks awaited the happy spirit. They accompanied the sun daily in triumph to the zenith, and then returned to their blissful Elysium. Finally, they were transformed into birds with golden plumage. Women dying in childbed were also admitted to this paradise, and, dressed as warriors, escorted the sun from the zenith. An earthly paradise free from sorrow, and abounding in every kind of fruit and vegetable, was open to those dying of certain diseases, to the drowned, and to sacrificial victims. This was the perpetual summer land of Tlalocan. Mictlan, a gloomy underground or northern region, was assigned to all who died from any other cause (Reville, *Rel. of Mexico and Peru*, 1884; Sahagun, *Hist. Gen.*, *passim*).

In some of these instances bravery and cowardice determine the fate of the soul. This approaches to an ethical distinction according to the native moral standard, and doubtless underlies many of the instances usually cited of more strictly retributive justice. Thus, with the Nez Percés and some Haidah tribes, the wicked and those who had not died the warrior's death were sent for a time to a desolate region before being admitted to the land of light, the paradise of slain warriors in the heavens, with its gift of perpetual youth, its cedar and shell houses, its delicious fruits, its repose (*JAI* xxi. [1891] 17; Macfie, *Vancouver Is.* 457). Again, ritual goodness rather than ethical must often be understood, as among the Nicaraguans, whose paradise of slain warriors, the blissful abode of the gods in the East, was open also to those who had obeyed the gods (*NR* iii. 543). But sometimes offences against morality are particularly mentioned as debarring men from bliss. Women guilty of infanticide and murderers of a fellow-tribesman were excluded from the Blackfeet paradise (Richardson in Franklin, *Second Expedition*, London, 1828), while the thief and murderer among the Okinagans, cowards, adulterers, thieves, the greedy, the idle, and liars among the Ojibwas, liars and thieves among the Delawares, were excluded from the abode of bliss (*NR* iii. 519; Jones, 102–3; Brainerd, *Life and Journal*, Edin. 1908, p. 503). We hear also among the Chippewas of the soul being examined, those with whom good predominated being borne to the enchanted island paradise, while others sank for ever in the waters (Dunn, *Oregon*, 1844, p. 104). Such a discrimination between good and bad is found among the Eurocs, Yumas, Choctaws, Pawnees, New England tribes, and Mayas, and the character of their Elysium is described with much monotony of language.

To the Eurocs it is a region of bright rivers, sunny slopes, and green forests, beyond the earth, the chasm being crossed by a pole from which the wicked fall (*NR* iii. 524). The Yumas placed it in a happy valley hidden in the Colorado (*ib.* 527). The beautiful paradise of the Choctaws lay behind a dark river in the west (Catlin, *N. Am. Ind.* 1842, ii. 127). More unique was the Mayan paradise, where the good lay in tranquil repose under the beautiful *yaxche* tree, eating and drinking voluptuously (*NR* iii. 541). But most typical of the Indian paradise is the description found in an Algonquin myth of a hunter who went to the land of souls in the south to recover his bride. The path became ever more beautiful as he went on. He reached a lodge, where he had to leave his body; his soul bounded through the shadow-world and crossed the lake where the spirits of the wicked met their fate. Now he reached the happy island of souls where there was never cold or tempest, or any need to labour, for the air itself nourished the souls, and where, amid eternal sunshine, they wandered through the blissful fields (Schoolcraft, i. 321). See also AMERICA.

7. South American Indians.—Of the numerous tribes of S. America, taken as a whole, it is difficult to generalize concerning their ideas of a happy other-world. The earlier beliefs of some of the Christianized tribes have not been recorded. Certain tribes simply believed in the soul hovering round the grave, others in transmigration; others, like the Abipones, were ignorant of the soul's status after death (Dobrizhoffer, *Abipones*, 1822, ii. 75, 269). We can speak only of a number of tribes concerning whom information is not lacking. Of these it may be said that, while the other-world life continued the conditions and circumstances of life here, and though it may occasionally have been regarded as disagreeable (Muller, 286), yet it was more frequently looked forward to as being happier and pleasanter (Spilsbury, *Trans. 3rd Cong. Hist. of Rel.* i. 91). Some tribes believed in a general place for all the dead; others in a separate place for chiefs, men of rank, or brave warriors. Retributive conceptions had scarcely arisen even in the higher tribes, or, where they have been alleged, they may be traced to missionary influence. The journey to the other-world was one of great danger and difficulty; its situation lay in the sky, in the west, or on the earth's surface, or was underground.

Among the tribes for whom the future life was one of bare continuance of the present for all alike, in a region where they hunted, fished, and rejoined their forefathers, may be mentioned the Matacos and Muyscas (in a region underground [Baldrich, *Las Camarcos Virgenes*, Buenos Ayres, 1890, p. 12; Reclus, *Univ. Geog.* xviii. 173]), the Bakairi, Calino, Yaguas, Ucuapes, Mbocobi, and Arawaks (Koch, *Inter. AE*, xiii. [Supp.] 120, 121, 122; D'Orbigny, *Voy. dans l'Amer. mérid*, Paris, 1839, iv. pt. 1 ['L'Homme Américain'], 233; Reclus, xix. 112).

The other-world was conceived of by numerous tribes as a happy Elysium. In Hayti the Indians thought that the spirits had as their place of sojourn the valleys of the western part of the island, dwelling in the clefts of the rocks by day, and coming out at night to enjoy the delightful fruits of the *mamey* trees. They rejoiced in the shady and flowery arbours of these beautiful valleys (Muller, 174). The Puri Indians placed Paradise in a pleasant wood full of *sapucaja* trees and game, where the soul was happy in company of all the deceased (Spix and Martius, *Travels in Brazil*, 1824, ii. 250). Many of the tribes of Chili placed their paradise across the sea towards the setting sun, and mythically described it in terms of their ideas of the highest bliss (Poppig, *Reise in Chili*, Leipzig, 1835, p. 393). The Patagonians located it in vast underground caverns, where their deities dwelt, and whither they went to live with them. Abundance of cattle and liquor was found there, and the dead enjoyed an eternity of drunkenness (Falkner, *Patagonia*, Hereford, 1774, pp. 142–3). More usually a heavenly or a western paradise awaited the Indian.

In this place of all sensuous delights enjoyed to the full, they would take pleasure in everything which they had desired or possessed on earth. It was endowed with glorious hunting grounds and fishing streams and rich forests. Or they fed on rich fruits, which required no toil or labour of cultivation. Life there was restful and peaceful, without suffering or grief, and with the added delights of drinking, feasting, and dancing. There they met all their dead relatives, and their wives existed in beauty and youthfulness. Such were the beliefs of the Guarayos, Guaranis, Chiriguanos, Araucanians, Yuracaris, Ottomaken, Apiaca, Warraus, Bahairi, Guajiro, Pampas tribes, and others (D'Orbigny, 109–110, 164, 337, 342, 347; Molina, *Chili*, Leipzig, 1791, p. 72; Castelnau, *Expédition dans les parties centrales de l'Amér.*, Paris, 1850, ii. 314; Schomburgk, *Reisen*, Leipzig, 1847, ii. 446; *Ausland*, 1865, p. 338). The Saliva Indians placed their paradise in the moon, and thought of it as a place without mosquitoes (Tylor[3], ii. 70).

A division according to rank is met with among the Guaycuras, who thought that chiefs and medicine-men hovered round the moon and went to regions of pleasure and enjoyment (Martius, *Zur Ethnog. Amer.*, Leipzig, 1867, i. 233). More usually bravery, as opposed to cowardice, merited the abode of bliss. Among the Chiriguanos, brave warriors and good fathers went to an earthly paradise full of delight and feasting, with abundance of women and *chicha*, where they devoted themselves to singing and dancing (Koch, *op. cit.* 119). The Caribs of the Antilles believed that spirits of brave warriors dwelt in pleasant islands like those of their own land, abounding in delicious fruits. There all their wishes were fulfilled; they feasted and danced, and had their enemies as their slaves. Cowards, on the other hand, would become slaves to the Arawaks. It was also believed that warriors went to the sun or became stars. Im Thurn says that the present Caribs of the mainland think of the spirits as remaining near their present dwellings, while some hope to become white men or go to Sky-land, a copy of this world, whence their ancestors came (*Indians of Guiana*, 1883, p. 359 ff.; Rochefort, *Isles Antilles*, Rotterdam, 1681, p. 430). Some of the Pampas tribes believed that in the heavenly abode of Pillau warriors enjoyed eternal drunkenness, broken only by great hunts, in which they slew so many ostriches that their feathers, falling down, formed the clouds (Reclus, *Prim. Folk*, n.d., 105). Goodness and virtue are sometimes expressly mentioned as meriting paradise, but on examination this proves to mean savage bravery. Thus the Tupinamba thought that after death those who had lived virtuously, *i.e.* who had avenged themselves on and eaten many enemies, would go behind high mountains, where they would dance in beautiful gardens with their ancestors (Lery, *Voyage fait en la Terre du Bresil*, La Rochelle, 1578, p. 262). So, too, among the Chibchas, good men were those who fell in war, and they, with women dying in childbed, enjoyed a blissful future (Koch, 128). In the same way may be interpreted the respective beliefs of the Yaier, that those who 'lived well' went to heaven; of the Yaruros, that the good went to a place where they enjoyed divine food; and of the Wazanos, that, while the souls of common people went to heaven, the good attained to a superior region, where they found beautiful women, rich hunting grounds, and continuous feasts, and did no work, but spent the night in merry dances (Koch, 127). Among the ancient Peruvians there was no distinction between good and evil beyond the grave. While the bulk of the people went to a dreary underground region, a heavenly paradise was the lot of the higher classes. The Incas went to the dwelling of the Sun, their father; nobles and great warriors were received in the heavenly world of Haman Pacta, where their happiness consisted in perfect freedom from evil, in repose and peace, and they were waited on by the wives and slaves who had been put to death with them (Müller, 402–3; Prescott, *Peru*, 1890, p. 42).

8. **Sky-land.**—Among most of the peoples whose conceptions of an abode of the blest have been discussed, there is also frequently found a belief in a happy world of other beings, often divine, above the sky. Man peopled the upper region, of which the sky seemed to be the floor, with the creatures of his imagination. Especially was this the case when his world of the dead was situated elsewhere. Thus the Zulus, believing in an under world of spirits, thought that above the blue sky, conceived as a rock, was a heavenly country, the abode of a remote powerful being and of a nation of heavenly men (Callaway, *op. cit.* 63, 117 ff., 393 ff., *Nursery Tales*, i. 152, 316). Again, as the sky seemed to rest on earth at the horizon, or on lofty mountains, or even on high trees, so in many myths all these form means by which Sky-land can be reached. Or it rests on pillars, or may be reached by a bridge, a ladder, a rope, etc. There is little doubt that these ideas survive in tales of the Jack and the Beanstalk cycle (see *CF* 432; BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Slavonic]; BRIDGE). Medicine-men often claim to visit that land, either by some of these means or by a bodily or spirit flight, just as they also claim the power of visiting the world of the dead. This is a very common belief in Australia (Spencer-Gillen[b], 629; Howitt, 388, 391). In one case, when the flowers withered because Baiamai left the earth, the *wircenuns* ascended a mountain and were carried to the sky, where they were allowed to carry off the fadeless flowers of the heaven-land (Parker, *More Aust. Legend. Tales*, 84).

Legends of culture-heroes ascending to the sky-land, and returning thence with the elements of civilization or performing other feats, are of frequent occurrence in the lower culture.

In a Melanesian instance, the hero reaches the upper world and teaches the Sun's children to make fire and cook (Codrington, 366). An earthly son of Tui Langa, king of the sky, went thither by a magic tree, according to a Fiji legend, and learnt there how to slay the local gods (*FLJ* v. 256). In a Polynesian story, Losi ascends to the sky and compels its people to give him shoots of *taro*, *'ava*, and the coco-tree, hitherto unknown on earth (Turner, 105). *Si Jura*, in a Dayak myth, climbs to the Pleiades by a magic tree, and learns the secret of rice cultivation (Ling Roth, *op. cit.* i. 307). In other cases, of which there are many variants, the hero ascends above the sky and captures the sun, compelling it to go more slowly in its course (*CF* 439 ff.; Turner, 200). There are also many American Indian tales of visits paid to the land of the Sun above the solid rocky vault of heaven (*19 RBEW* 252, 436, 440).

Other heroes visit Sky-land to obtain a wife, or to regain her, or to dwell with her there.

In Samoa, Lu ascended to Tangaloa's beautiful place of rest in the sky, and was given his daughter as wife (Turner, 13). In many tales, when a mortal has captured a daughter of the sky who has descended to earth, she sometimes returns thither; but he follows her and regains her, sometimes remaining there. Of this there are Maori and other Polynesian, Melanesian, and Malay versions (Grey, *Polynes. Myth.*, 1908, p. 42, Codrington, 397; Tylor, *Early Hist. of Mankind*,[2] 1875, 346), while the idea recurs in European and other variants of the Swan-maiden cycle. There are also several versions of the story of a hero going to the sky to dwell with his immortal wife, or with some other relative, usually then becoming immortal (Grey, *op. cit.* 58; Farrer, *Primitive Manners and Customs*, 1879, p. 256 [Algonquin]; Cole, *IA*, 1875 [Santal]; Brett, *Legends . . . of British Guiana*, n.d., 29).

These stories may be compared with another large group in which visits to the world of the dead are paid to obtain a boon, to regain a lost wife, etc., or to a vague under world or fairy region (*CF* 45, 438).

Other myths tell of an earlier Golden Age when gods and men dwelt together on earth or in heaven, or how the ascent to the sky was easily accomplished by some of the means already mentioned. But this at last came to an end, and the means of intercourse was broken off (see FALL, § ii. 3 and 18).

Thus the Eskimos, the Voguls, and the Hurons have myths of the peopling of the earth by a pair from heaven (Nansen, *op. cit.*

259 ff.; Lang[2], i. 181). Many myths of the Algonquin tribes tell of a woman cast out of heaven, from whom men are descended (Brinton, *American Hero-Myths*, Philad. 1882, p. 54). In other cases those who come to earth from the sky lose their immortality (*Tongan* [Mariner, ii. 115] *Cingalese* [Forbes-Leslie, *Early Races*, Edin. 1866, i. 177]; *Uganda* [Johnston, ii. 704]; *Fanti* [Smith, *Nouveau Voyage de Guinée*, 1744, ii. 176]), or can never return thither because of some accident (*Negroes* [Ratzel, ii. 354]; *Caribs*, etc. [Im Thurn, 377; Brett, 103, 107]). These are akin to another group, mainly S. African and American Indian, in which men ascend to earth from an under world (Casalis, 254, 261; *M* i. 225; Knortz, *Aus dem Wigwam*; *CF*, p. 447; *9 RBEW*, p. 16). This upper or under world is occasionally the paradise where men hope to go after death. Intercourse with the sky-land being broken off through the destruction of the means of ascent or descent is exemplified in myths from Australia, Polynesia, and Fernando Po (Spencer-Gillen[b], 628; Turner, 199; Kingsley, *op. cit.* 507). Cf. also a Kirghiz legend of former intercourse with the people of a mountain, where fruit trees bear all the year round, flowers never wither, women are always beautiful and young, death, cold, and darkness are unknown, and all are happy, whereas men on earth are now miserable (Sven Hedin, *Through Asia*, 1898, i. 221). A funeral chant among the Basutos suggests the existence of a bright and happy sky-land, whither men cannot go (Casalis, 256).

9. Reviewing these primitive notions of a state of the blest, we see that, even where they suggest a reward for goodness, the delights of Paradise are mainly sensual, or at least sensuous. A suggestion of more spiritual conceptions may be seen, perhaps, in the thought that the blest now dwell with a god or gods, or in the poetical descriptions of the beauty of the land. But any true spiritual outlook is generally wanting, and the ethical conception of this Elysium as a reward for righteousness is not found in such religions as those of Mexico and Peru, where the belief in sin as an offence against the gods was comparatively well developed.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works cited, see Tylor[3], chs. 12, 13; R. M. Dorman, *Origin of Primitive Superstitions*, Philadelphia, 1881: Koch, *Inter. AE*, Supplement, Leyden, xiii. [1900], 'Zum Animismus der Südamerikanischen Indianer'; E. L. Moon Conard, *RIIR* xlii. [1900] 244 ff., 'Idées des Indiens Algonquins relatives à la vie d'outre-tombe.'

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Buddhist).—From an orthodox Buddhist point of view * it must be said that the only 'blessed' are the saints who have entered absolute nirvāṇa. Owing to their approximation to this goal, the epithet may be applied, by anticipation or metaphor, (1) to the saints who are to enter nirvāna at the end of this present life (*i.e.* who possess nirvāna-on-earth [see artt. ARHAT † and JIVANMUKTA])—this is Little Vehicle; (2) to those who have taken the 'vow' of becoming Buddhas, and meantime enjoy the joy of 'giving' and of saving creatures—a joy more pleasing than is the savour of nirvāna itself (see art. BODHISATTVA)—that is Great Vehicle. Nevertheless, there is place in both Vehicles for categories or abodes of the Blessed.

I. **Little Vehicle.**—The 'heavens' of the Little Vehicle have been, for the greater part, adopted and adapted from Brāhmanic or Hindu belief. To understand the exact position of the Buddhist thinkers, the following is of importance.

The fundamental characteristic of the True Law, its historical and dogmatic ground and root, is the conviction (intuition or belief) that no 'existence' whatever can be *absolutely* happy. Such, it appears to the present writer, is the real significance of the Buddhist pessimism—a topic open from every side to serious mistakes (see art. PESSIMISM).

Like Aupanishadic Brahmans, Buddhists (*i.e.* Buddhist monks, *bhikṣus*, not laymen, *upāsakas*) aim at perfect and eternal happiness; they feel, or profess to feel, disgust for any sort of transitory happiness, and without consideration for sensual joys, here or hereafter, they press on the road (*mārga*, *pratipad*) that leads to nirvāna, to eternal refreshment. But there is certainly some sort of happiness in the world of becoming, in the 'wheel of transmigrations' (*bhavachakra*). The brute creation itself is not devoid of agreeable sensations; men are sometimes at ease; gods are by definition the possessors of bliss.

No adherent of the Buddhist teaching ventures to doubt the happiness and the power of the gods. Monks (*bhikṣus*) think that they have to strive for something far better than paradises (*svarga*); nevertheless, as is clear from Aśoka's lapidary sermons, as well as from many passages of the Pāli canon of Scriptures, Buddha and Buddhists (monks and laymen) lay great stress on the retribution of deeds in a further life. The Master commended the doing of good actions (in order to be re-born as a happy man or as a god), avoiding bad actions (in order to avoid unhappy human existences, animal births, or hell); and, for the wise, the avoiding of both good and bad actions: abstinence from desire and from action (the latter for producing and securing the former) being necessary to holiness, to nirvāna. Birth in heaven often appears as a progress towards emancipation, although, as will be seen, men alone, not gods, can enter the path of release.

It must be borne in mind that (1) human happiness is always mixed with suffering (as human birth is produced by mixed actions, 'black' and 'white'); (2) sensual pleasures always turn to suffering; (3) every pleasure is an obstacle to supreme beatitude, as it enforces clinging to existence. Therefore no one who has seen the truths (*i.e.* who has entered the stream of release, *srotaāpanna*) can strive after transitory and ambiguous rewards.

1. Amongst men, two categories are worth noticing: (*a*) the inhabitants of the Northern continent (Uttarakurudvīpa, Auttarakaurava [see art. HYPERBOREANS]);* (*b*) the 'wheel-kings,'† or universal monarchs (*Chakravartin*), who embody the Indian ideal of earthly sovereignty. Men indeed, —as it is forcibly said by the scholiasts,—but possessing supernatural faculties and powers, although they live on earth, they feel themselves at home in the atmospheric or heavenly regions. Their body is characterized by the 'marks' (*lakṣaṇa*) of the 'great beings' (*mahāpuruṣa*, 'great man,' 'great male'—a name of Viṣnu); they conquer one, two, three, or the four continents,‡ have successful wars with goblins of all kinds and even with gods, enjoy the possession of the 'seven treasures' (elephant-treasure, wife-treasure, etc.); they reign with justice, but not without kingly pride. Nevertheless, like ordinary men, they are susceptible of becoming disgusted with transitory life (although they live for centuries!) and of

* The reader is aware that this expression always involves subjective appreciation.

† Arhats are styled *visuddhideva*, 'purity-gods'; contrasted with kings, *sammutideva*, 'opinion-gods,' and gods, *upapattideva*, 'born gods' (*Vibhaṅga*, p. 422).

* The analogy between the Hyperboreans and the 'men of the Northern continent' has been pointed out by Sp. Hardy (*Manual of Buddhism*, p. 14), who gives a brief description of this continent. We may observe that, amongst many characteristics (longevity, everlasting youth, no premature death, no death in embryonic state, living from the Desire-Tree, re-birth as god or as man, etc.), the Auttarakauravas are 'moral by nature' (*prakṛtiśīla*); they 'have all things in common, and have no private rights'; they do not commit bad actions (*akuśalakarmapatha*), but do not free themselves from 'thirst relative to agreeable objects' (*kāmāvacharī tṛṣṇā*); there is no 'restraint' (*saṃvara*), because there is no 'rule' (*śāsana*). Therefore there is no entrance on the Path of release; and Bodhisattvas are not born there (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, *Āṭānāṭiya suttanta* [Grimblot, p. 335]; *Mahāvastu*, i. 103; Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, p. 248).

† On the Chakravartins see *Mahāsudassanasutta*, tr. by Rhys Davids, *SBE* xi. 238; Senart, *Essai sur la légende du Buddha*; *Divyāvadāna*, pp. 210-224: the standard text (Chinese sources) is named by Takakusu, *JPTS*, 1905, p. 117. The Chakravartins have a place in the scholastic theory of the 'stages of a Bodhisattva' (see art. BODHISATTVA) [the *Śikṣāsamuchchaya* states that they 'save the beings' (p. 175, 10)]. W. Hopkins, like Ed. Hardy and others, believes that the idea of an universal monarch is post-Aśokan (*Great Epic of India*, New York, 1901, p. 396, n. 2).

‡ But, like Buddhas, two Chakravartins cannot coexist. Like Bodhisattvas, they enter their mother's womb with full consciousness.

entering the path of salvation.* Such is not the case with the Hyperboreans and the gods.

2. The various schools differ, however, on this last point,—conflicts of scholastic views are the crux of Buddhist dogma,—but the common opinion is that there is no *brahmacharya* ('chastity,' 'life of holiness') amongst gods.† Heavenly beings do not forget that they owe their actual 'promotion to godship' to former good deeds, and their 'morality' is therefore strongly established against sinful delusions.‡ But, being re-born for joy, they cannot, as it seems, fully or profitably realize the truth of suffering—which is the root of the Buddhist holiness. Gods, we say, are possessors of bliss, but (it is not an easy task to reconcile these contradictions) they know that their happiness will come to an end when the treasure of merits shall be exhausted; and they are therefore troubled by anxiety (*pariṇāmaduḥkhatā*) §—the more so that, owing to the mysterious law of retribution, a god may be re-born as a beast or as an inhabitant of hell (see art. KARMA).

Gods are of different kinds. Without attempting a general survey of the matter, we must distinguish: (1) Sensual heavens (*kāmadhātu*), where sexual pleasure exists. But sexual union, in the celestial spheres, is not what Buddhists call *grāmadharma*, 'rural practice,' 'secular practice.' Gods enjoy pleasure and beget by simple contact, touching the hands, looking or smiling at one another, etc.‖ On the cosmical disposition of these blissful realms, see art. COSMOLOGY (Buddhist). (2) Material heavens (*rūpadhātu*), inhabited by gods liberated from sexual enjoyment; sensations of taste and smell are also absent, sometimes consciousness too. (3) Non-material heavens (*arūpyadhātu*), with four stages of perfection; it is difficult to say if they ought to be understood as 'abodes' (since there is no matter) or 'subjective states' (since they are depicted as successive storeys). Their common characteristic seems to be the gradual loss of consciousness. Like the 'material heavens,' they are truly Buddhist combinations or fancies, being inhabited by saints who have not realized in the inferior stages the absolute freedom from thought and desire necessary to release, and who must wait for some centuries in the happy and transitory unconsciousness of the 'non-material' worlds, before merging into the happier and definitive freedom of nirvāna. Heavens above sensual realms—which have only been 'Buddhized' a little—are no more than prolonged trances, analogous, but for their limits, to the trances of the holy life (see art. DHYĀNA).

II. **Great Vehicle.**—The piety of the so-called 'new' Buddhism has evolved paradises very like the Christian or the Vaiṣṇavite abodes¶ of the Blessed. The happiness is now of a purely spiritual nature (in contrast with the *svargas*, inhabited by sensual gods and nymphs), and essentially devotional (in contrast with the self-culture and unconscious blissfulness which are the chief elements of the 'orthodox' Buddhist meditations). Such a paradise is the *Tuṣita*-heaven (the realm inhabited by the gods *Tuṣitas*, 'the satisfied ones'), the regular abode of the future Buddhas of our world during their last existence but one. There reigned Śākyamuni, then named Śvetaketu, before his last birth; there now reigns and preaches Maitreya, the future saviour.* But, as a rule, 'paradises' are not a part of our world (*lokadhātu*), as is the *Tuṣita*, but special realms, ruled by excellent Buddhas who have at last realized their 'vow' of creating worlds free from suffering. Their number is, of course, infinite (see art. COSMOGONY [Buddhist]),† but in the 'compound of cosmos' which we inhabit (*sahālokadhātu*) the most celebrated are: (1) the paradise of the East, under the rule of the Buddha Bhaiṣajyaguru (the 'Master of remedies,' the 'Healing Teacher');‡ and especially (2) the 'Happy [universe],' *Sukhāvatī* [*lokadhātu*], of the West, where, from every quarter of the worlds, blissful creatures are born from lotuses before the Buddha Amitābha and the Bodhisattvas Mahāsthāmaprāpta and Avalokiteśvara (see art. AVALOKITEŚVARA). To be accurate, the 'Happy universe' is not an everlasting paradise. The Blessed who there enjoy the privilege of seeing the radiant body of the Buddha, and of hearing his preaching, are candidates for Buddhahood; Amitābha's heaven is a blissful purgatory and a school, not only a place of retribution. But, from a practical and historical point of view, the *Sukhāvatī*, as said before, is the exact counterpart of the Vaiṣṇavite paradise.§

We have few Indian documents dealing with the devotional practices arising from such a conception of everlasting life in Amitābha's presence. But Chinese and Japanese sources, ancient and modern,

* See *Mahāsudassanasutta*.

† See *Kathāvatthu*, i. 3, iii. 10; Rockhill, *Life of Buddha*, p. 191; Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, pp. 247, 255; *Abhidharmakośa*; cf. *Milinda*, tr. by Rhys Davids, *SBE* xxxv. p. 31. A future Buddha is never re-born in one of the highest heavens (*Majjhima*, i. 82), as their inhabitants are 'fixed' (*niyata*) for the 'nirvāṇa of Arhats.' On the salvation of gods, cf. 'Vedānta,' *SBE* xxxviii. 457.

‡ Literally: 'The roots of merit cannot be broken, as it happens, for men,' because they are firm believers in *kārma*.

§ On the 'suffering' peculiar to gods, see, for instance, Nāgārjuna's *Friendly Epistle*, tr. by Wenzel, *JPTS*, 1886, p. 27, and *Karuṇāpuṇḍarika* (*BTS*), p. 24 ff.

‖ A good summary will be found in Sp. Hardy, *Manual*; Beal, *Catena*, p. 68. It is worth observing that such gods as the Thirty-three (a category of sensual gods inherited from Vedic times) have now for sovereign the mother of Śākyamuni, re-born as a male deity. It would be impious to suppose that his retinue indulge in sensual pleasures!

¶ Amongst Vaiṣṇavite paradises, the Cow-world (*goloka*) and the *Vaikuṇṭha*—a kingdom in the Northern Ocean (compare the Hyperboreans) or on the eastern peak of mount Meru (compare the heaven of Indra and the Thirty-three)—are more celebrated in later times than the *Śvetadvipa*, 'the white island'—'a sort of Atlantis situated in the extreme North, beyond the Sea of Milk' (Barth, *Religions*, p. 193), well known from the *Mahābhārata*, inhabited by monotheistic saints very like the future Bodhisattvas of Amitābha's paradise. In all these peaceful abodes the Blessed enjoy the vision and the actual presence of their god, and the successive degrees or savours (*rasa*) of devotion, friendship, filial affection, ecstatic susceptibility (Barth, *op. cit.* p. 225). It is not difficult to be re-born there (see Barth, p. 228, and cf. artt. AVALOKITEŚVARA and MAHAYANA).

* Mention of Maitreya as the next Buddha, the Buddha to come, who will make many converts, whereas Śākyamuni had only a small retinue, occurs in the Pāli Canon of Scriptures (see Oldenberg's *Buddha*, 5th Germ. ed., p. 164)—a fact hitherto ignored. It is quite natural that Buddhists, *i.e.* 'orthodox Buddhists,' aspire to be born in his kingdom, before having the good fortune to hear his forthcoming announcement of the Law (5000 *Anno Buddhæ*). Both forms of Maitreya's worship are frequent in Chinese sources (Pilgrims; the later is canonic in ecclesiastical professions: 'to hear the preaching under the Dragon-Flower-Tree,' Chavannes, *JA*, 1908, i. 505), and, together with iconographic evidences (images of Maitreya; see Grunwedel-Burgess, *Buddhist Art*), show that special regard was paid to the Tuṣita heaven. See Julien, *Vie et voyages de Hiouen-Thsang*, p. 345 (wanting in Beal's *Records*, but see his *Buddhism in China*, p. 112, London, S.P.C.K. 1884); I-Tsing, *Religieux éminents*, tr. Chavannes, p. 72, Paris, 1894; Foucher, *Art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhāra*, i. 285 (tuṣitakāya = varabhavana = 'the best abode'), Paris, 1905.

† Every future Buddha aims at possessing (*i.e.* creating by his exertion) a Happy Universe, 'free from bad destinies,' *i.e.* inhabited by saints, gods, and men; see *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, p. 382 (*apāyaparisuddhi*).

‡ See Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism*, p. 235 (London, 1880).

§ The earliest documents are the *Sukhāvativyūha*, the *Sūtra of Amitāyus* (*SBE*, vol. xlix.), and the *Saddharmapuṇḍarika* (see art. AVALOKITEŚVARA, p. 258b note * and note ‡‡; also Beal, *Catena*, p. 378). Nāgārjuna (Nanjio, 1180, and Watters, *On Yuan Chwang*, ii. p. 205) and Aśvaghoṣa (Suzuki, *Awakening of Faith*, Chicago, 1900, p. 146) teach re-birth in Sukhāvatī. There is no reference to this paradise in the books of the Little Vehicle: the mention in *Mahāvastu*, iii. 462, 10, is from the colophon; see Rhys Davids, *JRAS*, 1898, p. 423. A Japanese picture is found in Grünwedel-Burgess, *Buddhist Art*, p. 176; see p. 195, l. 4, and Grunwedel, *Mythologie der Buddhismus* (Leipzig, 1900), p. 118. Sukhāvatī (also Sukhākara [*Lotus*, *SBE*, vol. xxi. ch. xxiv. 30]) has been compared with the Western paradises of the Brahmanic literature (Sukhā, Nimlocani), by Max Muller (*SBE*, vol. xlix. p. xxii), and with the *Insulæ Fortunatæ* and the Gardens of the Hesperides, by Kern (*Lotus*, *loc. cit.*).

have much to say about Amitābha's sects, monks and laymen; the pious death of the adepts, led to the West by angels or Bodhisattvas; the prayers for the dead, etc.*

LITERATURE.—The literature is contained in the article.

LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Celtic).—The Celtic doctrine of the future life is discussed elsewhere (see CELTS, § xvi.). This article deals with the Celtic belief in a happy Other-world, or Elysium, which, as will be seen, was not necessarily the abode of the dead.

1. Names of the Celtic Elysium.—These names are sometimes of a general character, sometimes they particularize the situation of this happy land. Of the former are Mag Mor, 'the Great Plain'; Mag Mell, 'the Pleasant Plain'; Tír n' Aill, 'the Other World'; Tír na nÓg, 'the Land of Youth'; Tír Sorcha, 'the Shining Land'; Tír na mBeo, 'the Land of the Living'; Tír Tairngiri, 'the Land of Promise' (perhaps a Christian derivative). Of the latter are Tír fa Tonn, 'Land under Waves,' I-Bresail, 'the Land of Bresal,' and 'the Isle of the Men of Falga,' which denote Elysium as an isle beyond the sea. Falga is an old name for the Isle of Man ('Rennes Dindsenchas,' *RCel* xv. 449), which was connected with the god Manannan, who appears as lord of the over-sea Elysium. If the Goidels occupied Britain before passing to Ireland, they may have regarded Man as '*par excellence* the Western Isle, the home of the Lord of the Other-world' (Meyer and Nutt, *Voyage of Bran*, London, 1895, i. 213). To this period may belong the tales of Cúchulainn's raid upon Falga (considered as the Other-world), which were afterwards carried to Ireland (see § 6*f*).

2. Various aspects of the Irish Celtic Elysium.—Some of these titles show that Elysium was regarded from different points of view; it was beyond the seas, or it was under the waves. But an examination of the tales which refer to it shows that there were at least two other aspects: it might be located in the *síd* or the hollow hills, or it might be a mysterious land revealing itself suddenly on the earth's surface and entered through a mist. Reserving a consideration of these different localities till later, we shall here summarize the more important tales in which the Other-world appears. These tales mainly describe the visit of mortals to that land. Some of them belong to the Mythological, some to the Cúchulainn, some to the Ossianic cycle. The MSS in which they are found are frequently among the earliest known to Irish palæography, but there is no doubt that many of the tales are of a greater antiquity, and that all of them, if not actually composed in pagan times, are based upon pagan ideas, upon story-germs current before the rise of Christianity.

(*a*) The *Island Elysium* conception is found in several tales, and is also current in existing folk-lore. The story of the 'Voyage of Bran' (found fragmentarily in the 11th cent. *Book of the Dun Cow* [=*LU*], and complete in 14th–16th cent. MSS [Meyer and Nutt, *Voy. of Bran*]) tells how Bran hears mysterious music and falls asleep. On waking he finds a silver branch with white blossoms. Next day, as he is sitting with his men, a mysterious woman appears singing the glory of the land over seas, its beauty, its freedom from pain and death, its music, its wonderful tree. It is one of thrice fifty islands to the west of Erin, and there she dwells with thousands of 'motley women.' Before she disappears, the branch leaps into her hand. The poem then describes Bran's sailing with his comrades, his meeting with Manannan mac Lir, crossing the sea in a chariot, his arrival at the Island of Joy where one of his men remained, his coming to the Land of Women, the welcome they received, the dreamlike lapse of time, the food and drink which had for each the taste he desired. Finally, it recounts their homesickness, the warning from the queen not to set foot on Erin, how one of them leapt ashore there and became a heap of ashes, how Bran from his boat told of his wanderings, and then disappeared for ever (the tale of 'Oisin in Tír na nÓg' [see FEINN CYCLE, § 5] has several points of resemblance to 'Bran,' especially in the fate which overtook Oisin when he set foot on Erin).

In the Cúchulainn cycle the story of 'Cúchulainn's Sickness' (found in *LU*) relates the temporary union of the hero with the goddess Fand, deserted by her consort Manannan. She will become his mistress if he will help her sister's husband Labraid against his enemies in Mag Mell. Cúchulainn's charioteer Laeg visits the place, and it is from his report that we learn the nature of the Other-world, where Labraid lives in an island frequented by troops of women, its different trees with marvellously nourishing fruits, its inexhaustible vat of mead. It is reached with magic speed in a boat of bronze. Thither goes Cúchulainn, vanquishes Labraid's enemies, and remains a month with Fand. Then he returns without hurt to Ireland, where he has arranged a meeting with Fand. At that meeting his wife Emer is present, and mortal and goddess strive to retain his love. The difficulty is solved by the sudden appearance of Manannan, for whom Fand's love returns (*LU* 43 ff.; Windisch, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1880, i. 205 ff.; Leahy, *Heroic Romances*, London, 1905, i.; D'Arbois, *Cours de Litt. Celt.*, Paris, 1892, v. 170 f.). Here Labraid, Liban, and Fand, though dwellers in an island Elysium, are called *síd*-folk, *i.e.* they are of the *síd*, or Underworld. The two regions are partially confused, but not wholly, since Manannan is described as coming from his own land (*i.e.* the true island Elysium) to woo Fand. Apparently Labraid (who, though called chief of the *síde*, is described in terms which leave little doubt that he is a war-god) is at enmity with Manannan's hosts, who suffer defeat at Cúchulainn's hands.

In the Ossianic cycle, besides the story of Oisin (see above), there is a description of the Land of Promise over sea, where Diarmaid had been nurtured by Manannan himself, in the story of the 'Gilla Dacker' (see Joyce, *Old Celt. Romances*, London, 1894, 222).

Of greater importance is the tale called 'Echtra Condla' (*LU* 120*; Windisch, *Irische Gram.*, Leipzig, 1879, 120; D'Arbois, v. 384). Connla, son of Conn, king of Ireland (A.D. 122–157), is visited by a goddess from the immortal land of Mag Mell. Her people dwell in a *síd*, or mound, and are called *Aes síde*, 'men of the mound.' Thither she invites him to come, and departs leaving him an apple which supports him for a month without growing less. In a month she returns and tells Connla, who has been filled with desire of her, that the Immortals invite him to join them. She bids him step into her crystal boat and come with her to the Land of Joy where dwell only women. He does so, and in a moment disappears for ever from the sight of his father and his druid who has vainly tried to exercise his spells against the woman. Here again, we note a confusion between the Underground and the Over-sea Elysium.

(*b*) *Tír fa Tonn*, 'Land under Waves,' occurs with greatest distinctness in the tale of Laegaire mac Crimthainn (*Book of Lismore*, 15th cent., O'Grady, *Silva Gadelica*, 290). Fiachra of the

* See J. J. M. de Groot, *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China* (Amsterdam, 1904). The *Kāraṇḍavyūha* has some fine theories on the death of the pious (see art. ĀDIBUDDHA).

men of the *sid* appears among the men of Connaught assembled at Loch Naneane, and implores their help against his enemies, whose chief Goll has abducted his wife. Laegaire and 50 men dive into the Loch with him, and reach a wonderful land, with marvellous music, and where the rain is ale. They and the *sid*-folk attack the fort of Mag Mell, and defeat Goll. As reward they each obtain a woman of the *side*, and remain in the land for a year. Then they yearn to return, but are warned not to descend from horseback on Erin. Arrived among their own people, they describe the wonders of Tír fa Tonn, and in spite of being implored to remain, they return thither, and are seen no more. Here, too, the Underworld and Tír fa Tonn are scarcely distinguished, and its divine hosts, as in the tale of Cúchulainn, are at war (see for another account of Tír fa Tonn, entered from a well on an island over-sea, the 'Gilla Dacker' in Joyce, 253).

(*c*) *The sid world* pure and simple is described in the Story of Mider and Etain, found in the 11th cent. MS *LU*. Mider, having discovered his divine consort Etain in her re-birth as a mortal, married to king Eochaid, appears to her and tries to regain her by describing Mag Mór, the great plain, the immortal land, its music, its beauty, its heady ale, its deathless folk, its eternal youth. Ultimately Etain, who has no recollection of this land, flies away with Mider, both in the form of birds. Eochaid's druid finally discovers Mider's underground *sid*. Eochaid captures it, and takes away his wife (*LU* 129; *Ir. Texte*, i. 113 ff.). This tale amply illustrates the belief that the gods, the Tuatha Dé Danann, were living in underground *sid*, in which they finally became the fairies of popular lore, to whose mounds, exactly like Mider's *sid*, mortals often paid visits. These *sid* were simply Elysium localized in definite places on Irish soil.

(*d*) 'The Adventures of Cormac mac Airt' (found in 14th and 15th cent. MSS, but probably connected with a tale of the same title mentioned in the old epic list) well describes the fourth conception of the Other-world. A divine visitant, with a branch bearing nine apples of gold which, when shaken, made sweetest music, appeared to Cormac. He at once asked for this branch whose music dispelled all sorrow, but for it he had to give up wife, son, and daughter. In a year he desired to see them, and set out to seek them. As he journeyed he found himself enveloped in a mist, through which he came to a house where a strange pair offered him hospitality. These proved to be Manannan and his consort. The god then brought in a pig, each quarter of which was cooked in the telling of a true tale. While the third quarter was cooking, Cormac told of the loss of his wife and children; whereupon Manannan, after sending Cormac to sleep, opened a door and they appeared. Finally he produced a cup which broke in pieces when a lie was told, but became whole again when a true word was spoken. To prove this, Manannan said that Cormac's wife had now a new husband. The cup fell in pieces. Then the goddess declared that Manannan had lied, and it was restored. Next morning all had disappeared, and Cormac and his family found themselves in his own palace with cup and branch by his side (D'Arbois, ii. 326; Windisch, *Ir. Texte*, iii. 1, 183). Cf. also 'Baile an Scail' (O'Curry, *MS Mat.*, Dublin, 1861, p. 388), where out of a mist a mysterious horseman appears to Conn and leads him to a palace in a plain where he reveals himself as the god Lug, and where appears also a woman called 'the Sovereignty of Erin.' Beside the palace is a golden tree. This magic mist, from which appears a supernatural being or which encloses a supernatural dwelling, recurs in many other tales, and it was in a mist that the Tuatha Dé Danann first appeared in Ireland.

3. Various aspects of the Brythonic Elysium.—A certain correspondence to these Goidelic beliefs is found in Brythonic story, but here the Elysium conception has been considerably influenced by later Christian ideas. The name given to Elysium is *Annwfn*, which means 'an abyss,' 'the state of the dead,' 'hell,' etc. (Silvan Evans, *Welsh Dict. s.v.*). But in the texts relating to Elysium, *Annwfn* does not bear any likeness to these meanings of the word, save in so far as it has been confused by redactors of the tales with the Christian hell, *uffern*. In these tales it appears as a region on the earth's surface or an over- or under-sea world, in which several of the characteristics of the Irish Elysium are found—a cauldron, a well of drink sweeter than wine, animals greatly desired by mortals, which they steal (see § 7), while it is of great beauty, and its people are not subject to death or disease. Hence the name *Annwfn* has probably taken the place of some earlier pagan name of Elysium.

(*a*) Annwfn in the tale of Pwyll, which forms the earliest reference to it in Welsh literature (Loth, *Mabinog.*, Paris, 1889, i. 27), is ruled by a king, Arawn, who is at war with his rival Hafgan, and obtains the assistance of Pwyll, who defeats Hafgan, by exchanging kingdoms with him for a year. It is a delightful land, where merriment and feasting on the choicest food and drink go on continually, and it has no subterranean character, but appears to be conceived of as a province adjoining Pwyll's kingdom.

(*b*) Annwfn is also the name of a Land under Waves or Over Sea, called also *Caer Sidi* ('the revolving castle,' cf. the *Ille Tournoiont* of the Graal romances, and the revolving house in Celtic saga and *Marchen*), about which are 'ocean's streams,' and which is reached by a long voyage. It is 'known to Manawydan (Manannan) and Pryderi,' just as the Irish Elysium was ruled by Manannan (Skene, *Four Ancient Books of Wales*, Edin. 1868, i. 276). Another 'Caer of Defence' is beneath 'the ocean's wave' (Skene, i. 285). Hence the two ideas were probably interchangeable. The people of this land are free from death and sickness, and in it is 'an abundant well, sweeter than white wine the drink in it' (Skene, i. 276). There also is a cauldron, 'the cauldron of the chief of Annwfn,' that is, of the lord of Elysium, like that of the Dagda, which is stolen away by Arthur and his men. A similar cauldron is the property of the people of a water-world in the *Mabinogion* (see § 6*f*).

(*c*) Finally, the description of the mysterious island of Avallon, even though this was later identified with Glastonbury, whither Arthur was carried to be healed of his wounds, completes the identification with the Goidelic Elysium. No tempest, no excess of heat or cold, no noxious animal troubles it; it is blessed with eternal spring, and with fruit and flowers which require no husbandman's labour; it is the land of eternal youth unvisited by death or disease. It possesses a *regia virgo*, more beautiful than her beautiful maiden attendants; she cured Arthur of his wounds, hence she may be identified with the Morgen of other tales, while she and her maidens resemble the divine women of the Irish isle of women (Chrétien, *Erec*, 1933–1939; Geoffrey, *Vita Merlini*, 41; San Marte, *Geoffrey*, 425).

The identification of Avallon with Glastonbury is probably post-pagan (Loth, ii. 215, 264, 360), while the names applied to Glastonbury—Avallon, *Insula Pomonum*, *Insula vitrea*—may be primitive names of the island Elysium. William of Malmesbury (*de Ant. Glaston. Eccl.*) says that *Insula Pomonum* is a translation of a native name, *Insula Avalloniae*, which he connects with the Brythonic *avalla*, 'apples,' because Glastenig

found an apple tree there. The name might therefore have been connected with marvellous apple trees, similar to those of the Irish Elysium. But he also suggests that it may have been derived from a certain Avalloc, who lived there with his daughters. This Avalloc is evidently the same as the Rex Avallon (Avallach) to whose palace Arthur was brought and healed by the *regia virgo* (San Marte, 425). He may therefore have been a mythical lord of the Other-world, and his daughters would correspond to the maidens of the isle (see Rhys, *Arth. Legend*, 335). He also derives Glastonbury from an eponymous founder Glastenig, or from its native name Ynesuultron ('Glass-island'). This name re-appears in the passage cited from Chrétien, in the form, 'l'isle de voirre.' Giraldus (*Spec. Eccles.* ii. 9) explains the name from the glassy waters which surrounded Glastonbury, but we may see in it an early name of Elysium (cf. Merlin's glass house, *Triads*, iii. 10; the glass fortress attacked by Arthur, *Merlin*, 680, and by the Milesians, Nennius, § 13; the glass bower of Etain (CELTS, § 5), and the glass mountains of Teutonicmy thology and folk-tale).

4. Origin of the Celtic Elysium conception.—Most mythologies tell of a Golden Age in the remote past, when men were happy and when the gods lived with them (see AGES OF THE WORLD, FALL). Man's imaginative faculties as well as his acute sense of the misery of his earthly existence may have led him to believe that this happy state still existed somewhere in distant space as did the Golden Age in distant time. Wherever it was, it held endless joys; it was in a special sense the land of the gods or of some gods; thither some favoured mortals might penetrate. This was the germ of the Elysium conception as we find it in many mythologies as well as the Celtic; but with the Celtic people, poetic, imaginative, sensuous, yet spiritual, it took forms of great beauty. In some mythologies this Elysium is simply the world of the dead; but it is extremely doubtful whether it is so in Celtic mythology. Perhaps the Celtic myth of man's early intercourse with the gods may have taken a twofold development. In the one instance the land to which he hoped to go after death was that lost land, conceived as a subterranean region. In the other it was no more recoverable; men would not go there after death; but favoured mortals might be invited thither during life. It was thus clearly distinguished from the land of the dead, however joyful that might be. But this question requires separate consideration (see § 5). In Ireland it was held that after the conquest of the Tuatha Dé Danann, the gods, by the Milesians, they had retired within the hills or mounds (*sídh*). But it agrees with the more primitive aspects of Celtic religion, as an agricultural cult, to suppose that some at least of the divinities, the fruitful Earth-divinities, had their abode beneath the earth, which, as the home of the gods, would be conceived in the loftiest terms. Thence man had perhaps originally come, and thither he would return after death. To this extent, therefore, the Underworld of the Earth-divinities was also the place of the dead. The later association of the gods with hollow hills and mounds was but a continuation of the belief in this divine Underworld, only it seems obvious from the tales that these hollow hills, or *sídh*, had become simply an Elysium state, not a state of the dead. These were, on the whole, still conceived as going to some region under the earth. There are no data to show when the conception of a distant Elysium arose among the Celts. It may have been first suggested to them, while still on the Continent, by the setting sun: far off there was also a divine land where the sun-god sank to a blissful rest. On reaching the coast it was inevitable that they should imagine this divine land to be over seas, in some happy island such as they saw on the horizon. That island might be still associated with the sun-god, but it was more naturally connected with the god of the sea. Hence the position of Manannan in these Elysium tales. The under-world Elysium and the over-sea Elysium were conceived in identical terms, and the same set of names applied indifferently to either. Perhaps the locating of Elysium in the *sídh* may simply be due to the tendency to give a local habitation and a name to every mysterious region as time goes on. To this identity also may be assigned the mingling of the *sídh*-folk with the over-sea Elysium in certain tales already noted.

The idea of a world beneath the waters is common to many mythologies, and, generally speaking, it owes its origin to the animistic belief that every part of nature has its indwelling spirits. Hence the spirits or gods of the waters were thought of as dwelling far below the surface under a divine king or chief. Tales of supernatural beings appearing out of the waters, the custom of throwing sacrifices therein, the belief that human beings were inveigled into the waters or could live with these beings beneath the waves, all are connected with this primitive animistic idea. Among the Celts, however, that water-world assumed the aspects of Elysium; it was a divine land like the over-sea Elysium. Hence in later story it became a fairy world. It is visited by mortals, who find there precisely the same sensuous joys as in the island paradise; it also has names in common with it. Tír fa Tonn is also Mag Mell. Hence in many popular tales it is hardly differentiated from the island Elysium; over-sea and under-waves have become practically synonymous. Hence, too, the belief that such water-worlds as the Irish I Bresail, or the Welsh fairy-lands, or sunken cities off the Breton coast, rise periodically to the surface and would remain there permanently, like an island Elysium, if some mortal could fulfil certain conditions (Girald. Camb. ii. 12; Hardiman, *Irish Min.*, London, 1831, i. 367; Rhys, *Celt. Folklore*, Oxford, 1901, i. 170; Sébillot, *Folk-lore de France*, Paris, 1904, ii. 56 ff.).

The Celtic belief in Tír fa Tonn is closely connected with the current belief in submerged towns or countries, which is perhaps found with greatest detail on the Breton coast. Here there are legends of several such towns, but most prominent are those which tell of the city of Is, which was submerged with all its people and still exists beneath the sea, where (or occasionally on the surface of the waves) it may still be seen. It was submerged as a punishment, because of the wickedness of its people or of Dahut, its king's daughter, who sometimes still seeks the love of mortals (Sébillot, ii. 41 ff.). Elsewhere in Celtic regions precisely similar legends are found, and the submersion is the result of a curse, or of the breaking of a tabu, or of neglect to cover a sacred well. The best example is that of the town covered by the waters of Lough Neagh (see Girald. Camb. *Top. Hib.* ii. 9; Rhys, *Celt. Folk-lore*; Kennedy, *Legend. Fictions*, London, 1866, 282). There is little doubt that one important fact lies behind these various legends, viz. the tradition of actual cataclysms or inroads of the sea, such as the Celts encountered on the coast of Holland. Once formed, it was inevitable that these legends should intermingle with those of the divine water-world.

The idea that the Other-world is on the same plane as this world, or temporarily locates itself there, and is hidden in a mist, is probably due to the belief in the magic power of the gods. One of the commonest pieces of druidic magic was the causing of a mist to effect concealment, and it was natural to believe that the gods could do the same. Behind that mist, for some definite purpose, the divine Elysium was temporarily located, with all its marvellous properties, as in the story of Cormac (and also in folk-tales where fairyland is thus revealed to mortals; see *RCel* vii. 289; Kennedy, 108, 179), or from such a mist supernatural beings frequently emerged to meet mortals. In such

cases the mist may simply have concealed the *sid* of the gods, from which the messenger emerged, or to which the mortal, misled by the mist, was introduced. Such appearances from a mist often occurred on a hill (Loth, *Mab.* i. 38; Campbell, *West Highland Tales*, Edin. 1890, Nos. 38, 52; *Scott. Celt. Rev.*, Paisley, 1885, i. 70). On the other hand, there may have been an existing belief that the divine world was invisibly co-extensive with this world, since in recent Welsh and Irish belief fairyland is on the same plane as this earth and interpenetrates it; men may interfere unwittingly with it, or have it suddenly revealed to them, or be carried into it and made invisible (Rhys, i. 230; Curtin, *Tales of the Fairies*, 158).

5. Was the Celtic Elysium the land of the dead?—In most of the tales Elysium is a land where there is neither grief nor death, a land of immortal youth and peace, filled with every kind of sensuous delight. In a few tales, however (the Mabinogi of Pwyll, Sick-bed of Cúchulainn, Laegaire mac Crimthainn, Doel Diarmaid, Diarmaid in Tír fa Tonn), while the sensuous delights are still the same, the inhabitants are at war with each other, invite the help of mortals, and are sometimes slain in battle. But in both these groups Elysium is the land of the gods, of supernatural beings, a land to which a few favoured mortals are admitted while still in life. It is never described as the world of the dead, nor do its people ever appear to be the dead. These two conceptions of Elysium, (1) a land of peace and deathlessness, (2) a land where war and death occur, may be both equally primitive. The second may simply have been formed by transferring to the divine world the actions of the world of mortals, as a direct result of anthropomorphism. It would also be on a parallel with the conception of the world of the dead, which was likewise a replica of the life of mortals in this world. But men may early have felt that the gods were not as themselves, that their land was a state of peace and immortality. Hence the creation of the legend of the peaceful Elysium. The two conceptions may have existed side by side, but apparently the more peaceful one found most favour with the people. Mr. Nutt (*Bran*, i. 159) thinks that the other conception may be due to Scandinavian influence acting on existing tales of the peaceful, deathless Elysium; but from the fact that the wars of divine beings occupy a prominent part in the mythological and Ossianic cycles of the Irish Celts, this is doubtful. Or again, the peaceful Elysium may have been the product of the Celts as an agricultural people, since it is 'a familiar, cultivated land,' where the fruits of the earth are produced without men's labour, where there are no violent storms or excess of heat or cold—precisely the fancies which would appeal to a toiling, agricultural people, while the more warlike Elysium may have been produced among the Celts as a warlike people, appealing to their warrior instincts. What is certain is that the inhabitants of Elysium are supernatural beings; chief among them are the well-known figures of Celtic mythology, but the others have every trace of divinity. D'Arbois, Rhys, and others, however, maintain that the Celtic Elysium is the world of the dead. Elsewhere will be found reasons for the belief that the *orbis alius* (Lucan, *Phar.* i. 457), whither the dead went, was not necessarily an island, but a subterranean region. Or, if it was an island, it was not the island Elysium (see CELTS, § xvi.).

D'Arbois' theory of Elysium as the state of the dead rests mainly upon a difficult passage in *Echtra Condla*, which is interpreted by him in a way which seems somewhat wide of its true meaning. The sense of the passage seems to be: 'The Ever Living Ones claim thee. Thou art a champion to Tethra's people. They see thee every day in the assemblies of thy fatherland, among thy familiar loved ones.' D'Arbois assumes that Tethra, the Fomorian king, is ruler of Elysium, and that after his defeat by the Tuatha Dea, he, like Cronus, took refuge in Elysium, where he now reigns as god of the dead; while by translating *ar-dot-chiat* ('they see thee,' 3rd plur. pres. ind.) 'On t'y verra,' he maintains that Connla, by going to Elysium, will be seen among the gatherings of his dead kinsfolk (D'Arbois, *Cours de Litt. Celt.* ii. 119, 192, vi. 197, 219, *Les Druides*, Paris, 1906, 121; *RCel* xxvi. 173). But it is impossible to take 'Thou art a champion to Tethra's people' as meaning that Tethra is a god of the dead. It appears to mean simply that Connla is a mighty warrior, one of those whom Tethra, a Fomorian war-god (*LU* 50*a*; Cormac, *Gloss. s.v.* 'Tethra'), would have approved, while 'Tethra's mighty men' used elsewhere ('Dialogue of the Sages,' *RCel* xxvi. 27 ff.) seems to be a conventional phrase for warriors. The rest of the goddess's words imply either that the immortals from afar, or Tethra's mighty men, see Connla in the assemblies of his fatherland in Erin, among his familiar friends. Dread death awaits them, she has just said, but the Immortals desire Connla to escape that by coming to Elysium. Her words do not imply that Connla will meet his dead ancestors there; moreover, if the dead went to Elysium, there would be little reason for inviting a mortal there while still alive. Thus this tale, like all other Elysium tales, gives no ground for the contention that Elysium is the place of the dead. Moreover, the rulers of Elysium are the Tuatha Dea or the *sid*-folk, never a Fomorian like Tethra. ('Tethra' is glossed as *muir*, 'sea,' by O'Cleary [Stokes' *Cormac*, *s.v.* 'Tethra'], and Cúchulainn speaks of the sea as 'the plain of Tethra' [*Arch. Rev.* i. 152], but we cannot infer from these that he was ruler of an over-sea Elysium, and the passages are probably derived from the association of the Fomorians with hostile sea-powers (see under CELTS, § v.).

D'Arbois' assumption that 'Spain' in Nennius' account of the invasions of Ireland (*Hist. Brit.* § 13), and in the Irish texts generally, means the land of the dead, and that it was introduced in place of some such title as Mag Mór or Mag Mell by 'the euhemerizing process of the Irish Christians' (ii. 85, 134, 231) is equally groundless. In other documents which have been subject to euhemerization these titles remain unchanged; nor is there any proof that a document, now lost according to D'Arbois, said that the invader came from or returned to Mag Mór. Once, indeed, Tailtiu is called daughter of Mag Mór, king of Spain (*Book of Leinster* [= *LL*] 8. 2), but here a person is intended. It is much more probable that there was a connexion between Ireland and Spain from early times, both racial and commercial (Reinach, *RCel* xxi. 18; Siret, *Les Premiers Ages du Metal dans le Sud-Est de l'Espagne*, Antwerp, 1887), while perhaps some of the Goidelic invaders reached Ireland from Spain or Gaul. This connexion, traditionally remembered, would be sufficient to account for these references to Spain. It was further supported by the fact that early maps and geographers made Ireland and Spain contiguous (Orosius, i 2. 71); hence in an Irish tale Ireland is visible from a tower in Spain (*LL* 11. 2). The word 'Spain' was used vaguely, but it does not appear to have meant Elysium or the land of the dead.

6. Characteristics of the Celtic Elysium.—(*a*) Nothing can exceed the romantic beauty of this land as described in the tales, and in nearly every one this is insisted on by the messengers who come from it to mortals. The beauty of its landscapes, —hills, cliffs, valleys, sea and shore, lakes and rivers,—of its trees, of its inhabitants, of its birds, is obviously the product of the imagination of a people keenly alive to natural beauty. And borrowed from the delight which the Celt took in music is the recurring reference to the marvellous music which everywhere swells in Elysium. It sounds from birds on every tree, from the branches of the trees which lull to forgetfulness the favoured mortals invited thither, from marvellous stones, from the harps of divine musicians. In Elysium, as the visitant says to Bran, 'there is nothing rough or harsh, but sweet music striking on the ear.' Probably no other race than the Celtic has, in describing the joys of the other world, so spiritualized the sensuous joys of sight and hearing, or imagined anything so exquisitely beautiful.

(*b*) Certain of the tales which deal with an island Elysium make it evident that it was composed not of one but of several islands, 'thrice fifty' in number, according to the *Voyage of Bran*, though this may be a later conception. One of these is frequently described as 'the island of women' or 'of ever-living women,' though in some instances there appear to be other inhabitants also. These women give their favours to Bran and his men, or to Maelduin and his company ('Voyage of Maelduin,' *RCel* x. 63), and in both these cases the number of women exactly equals that of the mortal visitors. Similar 'islands of women' occur in *Marchen* still

current among Celtic peoples, and actual islands were or are still called by that name—Eigg in the W. Highlands (Martin, *West Isles*, London, 1716, 277), Groagez off the Breton coast (Sébillot, ii. 76). Similar islands of women are known to Chinese, Japanese, and Ainu folklore (Burton, *Thousand Nights*, Benares, 1885 ff., x. 239; Chamberlain, *Aino Folk Tales*, London, 1888, 38), to Greek mythology (Circe's and Calypso's islands, cf. the land of the Amazons), and to ancient Egyptian conceptions of the future life (Maspero, *Hist. anc. des peuples de l'Orient*, Paris, 1895, i. 183). They were also known elsewhere, and we may therefore assume that in making such an island a part of their Elysium, the Celts were simply making use of something common to universal folk-belief. It may, however, owe something to the memory of a time when women performed their rites in seclusion, a seclusion which is perhaps hinted at in the references to the mysterious nature of the island, its inaccessibility, and its disappearance once the mortals leave it; to these rites men may have been admitted by favour. We know that Celtic women performed such rites on islands (Strabo, IV. iv. 6; cf. Ploss, *Das Weib*, Leipzig, 1885, ii. 70, artt. BIRTH [Celtic]), and CELTS, xiii. 1).

This may have originated the idea of an island of divine women as part of the Elysium belief, while it would also heighten the sensuous aspects of that Elysium. Love-making, in effect, had a considerable place in the Elysium tales. Its divine inhabitants sought the love of mortals, goddesses of men, gods of women (cf. the tales of Bran, Connla, Oisin, etc., of Manannan seeking the love of Tuag [*RCel* xvi. 152]; Mider, that of Etain). The mortal desired to visit Elysium because of the enticements of the divine visitant, regarded by later Christian redactors of the tales as a demon (see 'Cúchulainn's Sick-bed,' D'Arbois, v. 216). On the other hand, the love-making which goes on among the people of Elysium, even in documents edited by Christian scribes, is said to be 'without sin, without crime' (*Bran*, § 41).

(*c*) Besides their beauty, the characteristic of the inhabitants of Elysium which is emphasized in most of the tales is that they are immortal, or ever-living. Elysium is *Tír na mBéo*, 'the land of the living'; its people 'look for neither decay nor death'; they are eternally youthful. The general belief among primitive races is that death is an accident befalling men who were naturally immortal; hence freedom from that accident naturally characterizes the people of the divine world. But, as in many mythologies that immortality is more or less dependent on the eating or drinking of some food or drink of immortality, so it is in certain Celtic tales. Manannan, in the tale of Cormac, had immortal swine, which, killed one day, came to life the next; and with the flesh of these he is said to have conferred immortality on the Tuatha Dé Danann. This was also conferred by the drinking of Goibnui's ale, which either by itself or with the flesh of swine formed his immortal feast (O'Grady, *Silva Gadel.* ii. 385; O'Curry, *Atlantis*, iii. 389). Besides conferring immortality, the food of the Other-world was inexhaustible, and whoever ate it found it to have precisely that taste which he preferred. The fruit of certain trees of Elysium was also believed to confer immortality and other qualities. Cúchulainn's servant, Laeg, tells of 150 trees which he saw growing in Mag Mell; their nuts fed 300 people (D'Arbois, v. 170 ff.). The apple given by the goddess to Connla was inexhaustible, and he was still eating it with her when another favoured mortal visited Elysium—Teigue, son of Cian. 'When once they had partaken of it, nor age nor dimness could affect them' (D'Arbois, v. 384; O'Grady, ii. 385). Apples, crimson nuts, and rowan berries are specifically said to be the food of the gods in the 'Pursuit of Diarmaid and Grainne' (Joyce, 314). Through carelessness one of the berries was dropped on earth, and from it grew a tree, three of whose berries eaten by a man of a hundred years made him a young man. To keep mortals from touching it they set a Fomorian giant to guard it. With this may be compared the dragon-guarded rowan tree in the tale of Fraoch (Leahy, *Heroic Romances*, i. 36, with many variants elsewhere); its berries had the virtue of nine meals, added a year to a man's life, and healed the sick. At the source of all Irish rivers were supposed to grow hazel trees with crimson nuts, which fell into the water and were eaten by salmon. If these salmon were caught and eaten, the eater would obtain knowledge and wisdom (O'Curry, *Manners and Customs*, ii. 143). But the stories in which these hazels are mentioned show that they grew in Elysium, and their berries were the food of the gods, which a mortal might not eat without incurring danger (*RCel* xv. 457; Windisch, *Irische Texte*, iii. 213). In other cases the trees of Elysium are much more marvellous; they have silver branches (*Bran*); they have golden apples (*Cormac*); they produce wonderful music, which sometimes causes sleep and oblivion.

(*d*) As these various nuts and fruits were prized in Ireland as food, and in some cases, perhaps, were used to produce an intoxicant, it is obvious that they were, primarily, a magnified form of earthly trees. But all such trees were doubtless objects of a cult before their produce was generally eaten; they may have been totem trees, and their fruit eaten only occasionally and sacramentally. If so, this would explain why they grew in the Other-world, and why their fruit was the food of the gods. Whatever man eats or drinks is generally supposed to have been first used by the gods, like the Hindu *soma*. Miss Hull points out that, in some tales, the branch of a divine tree becomes a talisman leading the mortal to Elysium; in this resembling the golden bough plucked by Æneas before descending to the under world (*FL* xii. 931). But this is not the primary function of the tree. On the other hand, Mr. A. B. Cook is of opinion that the branch is derived from the branch borne by early Celtic kings of the wood or representatives of the Sun-god, while the tree is an imaginative form of the trees which incarnated a vegetation spirit (*FL* xvii. 158). But, again, it is the fruit of the trees as the food of the gods on which the greatest stress is laid in all the tales. When mortals eat it, it has the effect of conferring immortality upon them; in other words, it makes them of like nature with the gods, and this is doubtless derived from the primitive idea that the eating of food given by a stranger produces kinship with him. Hence to eat the food of gods, of ghosts, of fairies, binds the mortal to them, and he cannot leave their land. When Connla ate the apple, he desired to go to the Other-world, and could not leave it once he was there: he had become akin to its people. In the stories of Bran and Oisin, they are not said to have eaten the divine food, but the primitive form of the tales may have contained this incident, and it would explain why they could not set foot on earth unscathed.

(*e*) The inhabitants of Elysium are also invisible at will—a true mark of their divinity. They make themselves visible to one person only out of many present with him. Thus Connla alone sees the goddess, his father and the druid with him do not see her; and, when Manannan comes to recall Fand, he is invisible to Cúchulainn and those with him. This agrees with what Mider says to Etain:

'We behold, and are not beheld' (Windisch, i. 133).

(*f*) In most of the tales of Elysium, and in other stories about the gods, a magical cauldron has a prominent place, as it also has in tales of semi-historical personages. Such a vessel was the inexhaustible cauldron of the god Dagda, which came from Murias, probably some over-sea world (*RCel* xii. 57), or the vat of inexhaustible mead described in 'Cúchulainn's Sick-bed.' Whatever was put into such vessels satisfied every one, no matter how numerous the company might be (O'Donovan, *Battle of Mag Rath*, Dublin, 1892, 50). Such a cauldron was stolen by Cúchulainn from Mider, lord of the isle of Falga (the over-sea Elysium), along with several cows (*LL* 169*b*); and in what is perhaps another version of this tale he obtains an inexhaustible cauldron from the daughter of the king of Scath (Hull, *Cuch. Saga*, 284). Similarly, in the Welsh poem called 'The Spoils of Annwfn,' Arthur steals a cauldron from Annwfn; its rim was encrusted with pearls, voices issued from it, it was kept boiling by the breath of nine maidens, it would not boil a coward's food (Skene, *Four Ancient Books of Wales*, i. 265). In the Welsh story of Taliessin we learn how Tegid Voel and Cerridwen lived in the midst of lake Tegid (*i.e.* 'the Land under Waves'). Their son was so ugly that Cerridwen resolved to boil a cauldron of science and inspiration for him. For a year and a day it must boil till 'three drops of the grace of inspiration' were yielded by it. Gwion was set to stir it, and by accident obtained the inspiration himself (Guest's *Mabinogion*, London, 1838, iii. 321 f.). Finally, in the story of Branwen, daughter of Llyr, her brother Bran gave to the king of Ireland a cauldron into which if any slain man were thrown, he would be restored to life the next day. The cauldron had been given to Bran by two beings, a man and woman, who came out of a lake ('Land under Waves') (Loth's *Mabin.* i. 65). The three properties of the cauldron—inexhaustibility, inspiration, regeneration—may be summed up in one word, fertility; and it is significant that the god with whom such a cauldron is expressly associated, Dagda, should be a god of fertility (see, further, CELTS, § v.). But we have just seen it associated, directly or indirectly, with goddesses,—Cerridwen, Branwen, the woman of the lake,—and perhaps this may point to an earlier cult of fertility associated with goddesses, and later transferred to a god. The cauldron as a regenerator would be significantly connected with a goddess, since woman as the fruitful mother early suggested to man the idea of the fruitful Earth-mother, who was also frequently a goddess of love. Elton had already concluded that Branwen was a goddess of love (*Origins of English History*, London, 1882, p. 291). The cult of fertility was usually associated with orgiastic and indiscriminate love-making, and it is not impossible that the cauldron may have symbolized fertility, like the Hindu *yoni*. Again, the slaughter and cooking of animals were usually regarded as sacred acts in primitive life. The animals were cooked in enormous cauldrons, which were found as an invariable part of the furniture of every large Celtic house (Athen. iv. 34; Diod. Sic. v. 28; Joyce, *Soc. Hist.*, London, 1903, ii. 124). The quantities of meat which they contained may have suggested magical inexhaustibility to people to whom the cauldron was already a symbol of fertility. Thus the symbolic cauldron of a fertility cult was merged with the cauldron used in the religious slaughter and cooking of animal food. The cauldron was used in other ritual acts, sacrifice, divination, etc. (Strabo, vii. 2. 1, referring to the Cimri, but this may also have been a Celtic usage; *Brehon Laws*, i. 195; Jullian, *Recherches sur la rel. gaul.*, Bordeaux, 1903, 44). Like the food of men which became the food of the gods, the cauldron of this world became the marvellous cauldron of the other world; and, as it then became necessary to explain the presence of such cauldrons on earth, myths arose, telling of how they had been stolen from the divine land by mortals. In other cases, however, its place is taken by an equally magic vessel or cup stolen from supernatural beings by the heroes of the Feinn saga or the heroes of *Marchen*. Here, too, it may be noted that the Graal of Arthurian romance has affinities with the Celtic cauldron. In the 'Conte du Graal' of pseudo-Chrétien, a cup comes in of itself and serves all present with food. This is a simple conception of the Graal; in other poems its sacrosanct character is heightened, until at last it became the chalice in which Christ instituted the Holy Sacrament. But in certain of its qualities it presents an unmistakable likeness to the Celtic cauldron—it supplies the food which the eater prefers, it gives perpetual youth. There is little doubt that the Graal is simply a fusion of the pagan Celtic cauldron and the chalice of our Lord's blood (see Villemarqué, *Contes populaires des anciens Bretons*, Paris, 1842; Nutt, *Legend of the Holy Grail*, London, 1888).

(*g*) Sensuous as are many of these characteristics, they yet have a spiritual aspect which must not be overlooked. Thus the emphasis placed on the beauty of the land, its music, its rest, its peace, its oblivion, is more spiritual than sensual, while the dwelling of favoured mortals there with divine beings is suggestive of that union with the divine which is of the essence of all religion. Though some who are lured there seek to leave it, others do not return, while Cúchulainn's charioteer Laeg says that he would prefer it to the kingship of all Ireland (Windisch, i. 219), and his words are elsewhere re-echoed by Laegaire mac Crimthainn. On the whole, then, it may be said that, of whatever elements it was composed, the conception of the Celtic Elysium was the imaginative shaping of man's instinctive longing for peace and rest. He hardly expected to obtain these beyond the grave, for there life went on as here, although that future state was one which had no terrors for him. A few great personages might reach Elysium after death, as an obscure passage in Plutarch (*de Defectu Orac.* 18) may hint (see under CELTS, § xvi. 5), but it was shut to all save a few favoured mortals who might be carried there in life. And possibly the hope that he might be so favoured of the gods buoyed up the Celt as he dreamed over this distant Elysium.

7. The Celtic Elysium and the gifts of civilization.—In the opinion of the Celts, as of many other peoples, wisdom and culture belonged first of all to the gods, by whom they were given to, or from whom they were stolen by, man. Examples of this have already been found in the tales in which a mysterious cauldron is stolen from the Otherworld (§ 6). It is also hinted at in the tales of divine trees guarded from mortals, and in the belief in the hazels of wisdom which endowed mortals with supernatural wisdom and knowledge. But when men came to domesticate animals, it was believed in course of time that the knowledge of domestication or, more usually, the animals themselves had come from the gods; only, in this case, the animals were of a magical, supernatural character. Such a belief underlies the stories, already referred to, in which cows are stolen from their divine owners by Cúchulainn. In the tale of 'Nera's Adventures in the Other-world' (*RCel* x. 226), Nera obtains a wife and several kine from the *sid* of Cruachan; and similarly Tulchine, who took a wife from the Land of Promise, obtained

her favourite calf also by interceding with the goddess Morrigan (Stokes, *RCel* xvi. 62). In the *Mabinogion* (Loth, i. 122 ff.) the swine given to Pryderi by Arawn, king of Annwfn, and hitherto unknown to man, are stolen from him by Gwydion, Pryderi being the son of Pwyll, a temporary king of Annwfn (§ 3), and therefore, perhaps, originally one of the lords of Elysium. But though this raid was successful, the poem of 'The Spoils of Annwfn' says, 'Stout was the prison of Gweir in Caer Sidi, Through the spite of Pwyll and Pryderi, No one before him went into it.' Gweir is probably identical with Gwydion (Rhys, *Hib. Lect.* 250), and this poem may then refer to another version of the myth in which the hero was unsuccessful, and was detained a prisoner in Elysium, to which imprisonment the later blending of Annwfn with Hades gave a doleful character. In the *Triads* (Loth, ii. 215), Gweir is one of the three paramount prisoners of Britain. There is also reference in a late Welsh MS to a white roebuck and a puppy (in the *Triads* [Loth, ii. 259] a bitch, a roebuck, and a lapwing), which were stolen by Amathaon from Annwfn, and which led to the battle of Godeu between Arawn and Gwydion. In this battle Bran, fighting on the side of Arawn, could not be vanquished until Gwydion had guessed his name (*Myvyrian Arch.*, London, 1801, i. 167). The introduction of the name-tabu proves the story to be archaic. In some of these tales the animals are transferred to earth by a divine or semi-divine being, in whom we may see an early Celtic culture-hero. The tales themselves are attenuated forms of an earlier series of myths, which probably showed how all domestic animals were at first the property of the gods. An echo of these is still preserved in *Marchen* describing the theft of magical cattle from fairies. In the most primitive form of the myths the theft was doubtless from the under world of the gods of fertility, which was also connected with the place whither the dead went. But when the gods were also located in a distant Elysium, it was inevitable that some tales should tell how the theft was connected with that far-off land rather than with the land of under-earth divinities. But in neither case was the theft from gods of death, but from gods of life and fertility with whom all man's blessings were. So far as the Irish and Welsh tales are concerned, the thefts seem to be mainly from Elysium.

8. The lords of Elysium.—In Irish accounts of the *sid* world, the god Dagda appears to have the supremacy, which was wrested from him later by the Mac Oc. But in a probably later version we learn that, Dagda being dead, Bodb Dearg divided the *sid* among the gods, and Manannan gave them the gift of immortality (see CELTS). But in tales of the *sid* world, each owner of a *sid* is accounted lord of that particular *sid*, which for the time being eclipses all others. The one great under world of gods of fertility has now become a world of many underground *sid*. In Welsh tradition the lord of Annwfn, wherever it is situated, is Arawn, but his claims are contested by a rival. In Irish tradition Manannan mac Lir is associated with the over-sea world or with the 'Land of Promise,' while Elysium itself is called 'the land of Manannan' in the *Voyage of Bran*. Manannan was probably a god of the sea, and it was easy to associate the over-sea world, 'around which sea-horses (*i.e.* the waves, the god's mythic steeds) glisten,' with him. But, again, as this land lay towards the setting sun, and in some of its aspects may have been suggested by the glories of the sunset, the sun-god Lug was also associated with it. But he hardly takes the place of Manannan; he comes from Manannan's land, with Manannan's sons and ramed with his weapons, to aid the gods, but Manannan still remains lord of Elysium (Joyce, *Old Celt. Romances*, 37).

9. Elysium and Paradise. — While the tales already dealt with are mainly re-mouldings of earlier pagan originals, which may have been handed down orally, or are based upon the materials of pagan belief, they have in many ways been influenced by Christian ideas, although their main incidents are purely pagan. But in another class of tales, which may have had pagan originals, the Elysium conception recurs, and finally ends in becoming the Christian paradise or Heaven. These are the *Imrama*, or 'Voyages,' of which that of Maelduin, found partly in the 11th cent. *Lebor na hUidre*, and in complete form in 14th to 16th cent. MSS, still moves in a pagan atmosphere. Here the voyage is undertaken for the purpose of revenge; but the travellers reach a number of strange islands unpeopled, or peopled by men and women, by animals, or by monsters. One island closely resembles the Isle of Women in the pagan Elysium. Besides the Isle of Laughter, found also in *Bran*, there is an Isle of Weeping, and in this we approach the idea of a place of penitence. Another island, guarded by a fiery rampart, is peopled by beautiful human beings feasting and singing—an approach to the Christian paradise. The Isles of Weeping and Laughter are also found in the *Imram hua Corra*, where also is the island of the Miller of Hell, mentioned simply as a miller in *Maelduin*. Thus, even in *Maelduin* the use of the pagan materials is indeterminate, and the Elysium conceptions have become vague. Elsewhere, as in the *Voyage of Snedgus and Mac Riagla*, the journey is undertaken as a pilgrimage, and the Christian atmosphere is more pronounced. One island has become a kind of intermediate state, and in it dwell Elijah and Enoch and a multitude of others 'without sin, without wickedness,' waiting for the day of judgment. Another island is nothing less than the Christian Heaven viewed from an ecclesiastical standpoint. Finally, in the *Voyage of Brandan* the pagan elements have practically disappeared: there is an island of Hell and an island which is the Christian paradise or Heaven. In these *Imrama*, the number of islands visited may be compared to the thrice fifty islands of *Bran*, whether this be a later conception of the pagan Elysium or not; the old idea of a mortal lured thither by a goddess has disappeared, and the voyage is undertaken for a specific purpose—revenge or a pilgrimage. Another series of tales, in which a visit is paid to Hell and Heaven in a vision (*Adamnan's Vision, The Tidings of Doomsday*, etc.), are purely Christian products, but it is remarkable that the joys of heaven are described in terms of the pagan Elysium. There is unimaginable beauty, music, absence of sickness, of pain, of death; there is no age, decay, or labour. The whole description of heaven has a sensuous, material aspect which reflects that of the old pagan stories. In the latter text there are two hells; besides heaven there is a place for the *boni non valde* which corresponds to the island where dwell Enoch and Elijah in the *Voyage of Snedgus*. The conception of this island, which is not heaven, may be borrowed directly from the pagan paradise. The connexion of the pagan Elysium with the Christian paradise is also seen in the title of *Tír Tairngiri*, 'the Land of Promise,' which is applied to the heavenly kingdom or to the land flowing with milk and honey, as in glosses (7th or 8th cent.) on He 6^{15}, where *regnum coelorum* is explained as *tír tairngiri*, or He 4^{4}, where Canaan is so called, and notably on 1 Co 10^{4}, where the heavenly land is called *tír tairngiri inna mbéo*, 'the land of promise of the living ones': thus apparently equalling it with the *tír na mbéo* of

'Connla's Voyage.' If *tír tairngiri* was not already a title of the pagan Elysium, it was now applied to it in several instances through the influence of this identification.

See Zimmer, 'Brendan's Meerfahrt,' *ZDA* xxxiii. The *Imrama* of Snedgus, Maelduin, and Ua Corra are edited and translated by Stokes in *RCel* ix., x., xiv. *Adamnan's Vision* is edited and translated by Stokes, Calcutta, 1866; cf. C. S. Boswell, *Irish Precursor of Dante*, London, 1908; the *Tidings of Doomsday* is in *RCel* iv. 243. Cf. also chs. 4 and 8 of Nutt's *Bran*.

10. **Elysium in later folklore.**—Most of the aspects of the pagan Elysium re-appear in folk belief almost unchanged. The under or *síd* world is now fairyland; mounds, forts, and raths are fairy-dwellings into which mortals are sometimes inveigled, and where all the characteristics of the earlier divine world are found—magic lapse of time, marvellous beauty, magical properties. Similarly a marvellous over-sea land is still a commonplace of Celtic *Marchen* and Celtic belief. Tír na nÓg is still a living reality to the Celt. Within that fabled land are the mystic and magic things of folk-tale—the fountain of youth, healing balsams, life-giving fruits. It is peopled by marvellously beautiful women, or it is connected with fairy folk. Sometimes it is visible only to favoured persons, or it is sunk beneath the waves, and comes to the surface only at intervals. But in whatever form it is found, it is obviously linked on to the actual Elysium of the pagan Celtic world.

In the 11th cent. Irish documents, from which our knowledge of Elysium is mainly drawn, and which, of course, imply a remote antiquity for the material of the tales, the *síd* world is still the world of divine beings, though these are beginning to assume the traits of fairy folk. But probably among the people themselves the change had already been made, and the *síd* world was simply fairyland. In Wales the same change had early taken place, as is witnessed by the story of Elidorus enticed by two small people into a subterranean fairyland. This is fully told by Giraldus Cambrensis (*Itin. Camb.* i. 8). For the over-sea fairyland see J. F. Campbell, *Popular Tales of the West Highlands*, London, 1860-62; MacDougall, *Folk and Hero Tales*, London, 1891; Howells, *Cambrian Superstitions*, Tipton, 1831; Sébillot, *Folk-Lore de France*, Paris, 1904, ii.; Kennedy, *Legendary Fictions*, London, 1866; or any collection of Celtic *Marchen*.

LITERATURE.—Translations or epitomes of most of the texts relating to the Other-world will be found in Windisch and Stokes, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1880-1900; D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Cours de Littérature Celt.* ii., Paris, 1884; S. H. O'Grady, *Silva Gadelica*, 1892; Joyce, *Old Celtic Romances*², London, 1894; A. Nutt and K. Meyer, *Voyage of Bran*, London, 1895; Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, London, 1888, *Arthurian Legend*, Oxford, 1891; A. H. Leahy, *Heroic Romances of Ireland*, London, 1905; E. Hull, 'The Idea of Hades in Irish Literature,' *FL* xviii. 1907.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Greek and Roman).—**i. Greek.**—In the Homeric poems the gods alone are immortal. Nowhere in the older strata of the poems is immortality an attribute of man. Complete life for him exists only on earth and in the light of the sun, and only with the complete union of soul and body. When separated from the body, the soul passes out of this world into a shadowy, powerless existence, which is nowhere expressly stated to be eternal. The idea of an earthly paradise, *i.e.* an abode of bliss upon earth, where life is continued in full vigour without the sharp severance between soul and body which death requires, is an attempt to find a more comforting solution of the problem of an after-life. A solution so naive does not long remain an article of belief in Greece except among the ignorant vulgar. In the history of religion the idea is absorbed by the belief in immortality, which was soon fostered in Greece under the influence of imported mystical tenets and of philosophic systems founded upon them. The earthly bliss, which at best could be attained only by the favoured few, is transmuted into the heavenly bliss, which is promised after death to all who have lived uprightly. In the history of literature the idea survives as a beautiful fancy which is cherished by poets and often serves in later times as a basis for the romantic reconstructions of human society in which the Greeks found a melancholy consolation for some of the darkest periods in their national life.

1. *Homer, Hesiod, and the Epic cycle.*—In Homer, as the gods alone are immortal, so they alone can confer immortality. Their favourite heroes, always of divine descent, have such immortality conferred upon them by the drinking of nectar or the eating of ambrosia, and are thereupon translated either to heaven or to an earthly paradise such as the Elysian plain. The most striking instance of such an earthly translation is to be seen in *Od.* iv. 561, where Proteus prophesies to Menelaus:

'But it is not thy destiny, O Menelaus, *child of Zeus*, to die and meet thy fate in horse-pasturing Argos. The immortal gods will send thee to the Elysian plain and the verge of the world where fair-haired Rhadamanthys dwells, where life is easiest for man. No snow falls there, nor any violent storm, nor rain at any time; but Ocean ever sends forth the clear, shrill blast of the West wind to refresh mankind; *because thou hast Helen to wife and they count thee to be son-in-law to Zeus.*' (Cf. Eur. *Hel.* 1676 ff.).

Here it should be noted that Elysium is on earth and not in Hades. It is the counterpart of Olympus, the mountain-home of the gods, described in almost the same words in *Od.* vi. 43-45. Further, Menelaus is not beatified as a reward for his merits. Like Rhadamanthys, he is of kin to Zeus. The blissful existence in Elysium which is conferred by the gods upon their kin is an exceptional privilege, exactly parallel to the eternity of pain which they inflict upon their enemies in Erebos (*Od.* xi. 576 ff.). The conception of Elysium in Homer is poetical rather than religious. The heroes who have passed thither exert no influence upon the world of men that they have left behind. The gods transfer to them none of their own prerogatives save immortality. The conception is an extension of the other ideals of blissful, though mortal, existence that are found in Homer—chiefly in the *Odyssey*, which is permeated by a peaceful spirit characteristic of men who have enjoyed undisturbed quiet long enough to value it, and foreign to the martial temper of the *Iliad*. Of such ideals the most noteworthy are the idyllic lands of Phæacia (*Od.* vii. 81), of the island of Syrie, the home of Eumæus (*Od.* xv. 403), and idyllic peoples such as the Abioi (*Il.* xiii. 6) and Ethiopians (*Il.* i. 423).

This enchanting fancy of an earthly paradise became an integral part of Greek thought once it had been incorporated in the Homeric poems. The common people of Greece were accustomed to the idea of 'translation' in the worships of such heroes as Amphiaraos and Trophonios, who had passed, while yet alive, to a life below the earth. The 'translation' of heroes, so rare in Homer, is of common occurrence in the post-Homeric Epic. In the *Cypria*, Iphigeneia is rescued by Artemis, carried to the land of the Tauri and rendered immortal (Proclus in *Epicorum Graec. Frag.*, ed. Kinkel, p. 19). In the *Æthiopis*, Memnon is translated by his mother Eos to her home in the East and made immortal by Zeus at her request (*ib.* p. 33). In the same poem, Achilles is saved from death by Thetis and conveyed to the magic island of Leuke (*ib.* p. 34). In the *Telegoneia*, the latest of such Epics, Telegonus, the son of Odysseus and Circe, brings the bodies of Penelope, Odysseus, and Telemachus to his mother, who confers immortality upon them in her home in Ææa (*ib.* p. 58).

Thus far the idea of an earthly paradise is developed at the will of each particular poet. The fortunate heroes have no common home, but are transferred to magic lands which are alike in nothing else save that they are beyond mortal ken. The various strands of fancy are woven together into a consistent whole by Hesiod, in whose poems we meet with the expression 'The Isles of the Blest' for the first time. In *Op. et Di.* 170 ff., after

the description of the three races of Gold, of Silver, and of Bronze, follows a fourth race better than the race of Bronze—the heroes or demigods who fought at Thebes and at Troy. Of these, some died, others were settled by Zeus at the world's end in the Islands of the Blest, 'where the earth produces sweet fruit for them thrice in the year.' As in Homer, they are completely severed from the world of men, and have no influence upon it. In Hesiod, further, they are heroes of the past, their tale is numbered, and no accessions to their ranks can come from the fifth degenerate race that is now on earth.

2. Pindar is far removed from the simple theological standpoint of Homer and Hesiod, but he is far too great a poet and prophet to reject a beautiful religious idea. He renders it wider and deeper. Whether from personal convictions, which had grown upon him during his repeated visits to Sicily since 477, or from a desire to satisfy his Sicilian patrons such as Gelo, Hiero, and Theron, who were hierophants of chthonic worships, he accepts a number of the dogmas of Orphic and Pythagorean mysticism, among which he finds a place for the popular belief in the Islands of the Blest. Pindar, on the one hand, represents the traditional belief that a full immortality can come only from the continued union of soul with body, a union to be secured only by Divine intervention (*e.g.* Ganymede, *Ol.* i. 44, x. 104; Amphiaraos, *Ol.* vi. 14, *Nem.* ix. 24 ff.); but he has also absorbed the belief that the soul is no mere *Doppelganger* of the body but is Divine in origin (frag. 131, 'the likeness of eternity is left: for that alone comes from Heaven'). It is immortal, but confined in a mortal body, owing to the 'ancient sin' (frag. 133, *παλαιὸν πένθος*). After the death of the body it is judged in Hades for its deeds on earth. The wicked are condemned to Tartarus; the good pass to the home of the pious (*χῶρος εὐσεβῶν*). Only after three lives of purity have been completed on earth (*Ol.* ii. 68 ff.) is the ancient sin atoned for. Thereupon, in the ninth year after its last arrival in Hades (see Rohde, *Psyche*[2], ii. 211), the soul ascends to the world above for the last time, to become incorporate in kings, heroes, and wise men. Such souls are then freed from the trammels of the earth and find a home in the Island of the Blest, where under the rule of Kronos they live in communion with the earlier heroes, such as Peleus, Cadmus, and Achilles (*Ol.* ii. 86; frag. 133). Here the life of bliss is no longer an earthly paradise in the earlier sense. The Island is in Ocean, it is true, but can be reached only through death and through lives of purity lived upon earth.

3. There are scattered references to the belief in its original form found in later writers. Cadmus and Harmonia are transferred to the Land of the Blest (*μακάρων ἐς αἶαν*), in Eur. *Bacch.* 1339 ff.; Achilles and Diomedes live in the Island of the Blest, according to the scholion on Harmodios (Bergk, *Carm. pop. fr.* 10). According to Plato (*Symp.* 179 E), Achilles is in the Isles of the Blest. Others find his home on the Elysian plain (Apoll. Rhod. *Arg.* iv. 811) or in Leuke (see below), where he has Medea to wife, according to Ibycus the melic poet of the 6th cent. (*schol.* Apoll. Rhod. iv. 814), or, according to others, Iphigeneia (Antoninus Liberalis, 37) or Helen (Pausanias, iii. 19. 11–13). For further references see Rohde, *Psyche*[2], ii. 369, note 2.

A naive belief that it was possible to discover these fortunate lands long continued. The most striking instance is the resolve of Sertorius to sail for the Atlantic isles in the search for happiness (Plut. *Sert.* 8. 9; Sallust, *Hist.* i. frag. 102, Maurenbrecher). Geographers often placed them in the unknown, and therefore mysterious, West, where (akin to them in idea) was the garden of the Hesperides, with its golden apples of immortality (cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Herakles*[1], ii. 129; Eur. *Hippol.* 732 ff.). They are in West Africa, according to Strabo, i. 3, iii. 150, and Plin. *HN* vi. 202 ff. Others placed them in the centre of Libya (Herod. iii. 26) or in the Antipodes (cf. Serv. *Æn.* vi. 532). The home of Diomedes was found in the Tremiti islands in the Adriatic (Strabo, vi. 283, 284). Leuke, the isle of Achilles, was placed in the Euxine (Alcæus, *Fr.* 48[b]; Pind. *Nem.* iv. 49; Eur. *Andr.* 1232 ff., *Iph. T.* 420), at the mouth of the Danube (Paus. iii. 19. 11), and was counted as one of the Isles of the Blest (cf. Plin. *HN* iv. 93, 'Insula Achillea, eadem Leuce et Macaron dicta'). Similar legendary lands are placed near the Indian Ocean (cf. Aristophanes, *Av.* 144; Æsch. frag. 192, Nauck). For further attempts see Hesychius *s.v.* 'Lesbos,' and Suidas *s.v.* 'Rhodos.' A parody of the belief will be found in Lucian's *Vera Historia*, ii. 6 ff. The inscriptions containing references to the Elysian plain and the Isles of the Blest may be consulted most conveniently in G. Kaibel's *Epigrammata Graeca, ex lapidibus collecta*, Berlin, 1878. But here it is no question of earthly bliss. The Blessed Isles (*Ep.* 649. 2), the Elysian plain (*Ep.* 414. 8), the *χῶρος εὐσεβέων* (*Ins. Gr. mar. Æg.* i. 141), are not of this world, but only testify to a life beyond the grave to which the righteous can aspire. The Epigram on Regilla, the wife of Herodes Atticus (1046. 8), *μεθ' ἡρῴνῃσι νέναται ἐν μακάρων νήσοισιν ἵνα Κρόνος ἐνβασιλεύει*, is merely a literary adaptation of the older belief.

4. *The Romance writers.*—The best account of these will be found in Rohde's *Griechische Roman*[2], pp. 178–260). The political downfall of Greece, which began in the 4th cent. B.C., and the widespread disasters which accompanied it, led men to seek relief from the hopelessness of present affairs in the freedom of fanciful speculations. Social reformers, whether politicians or philosophers, embodied their ideas in sentimental romances—a branch of literature which developed naturally out of the old sagas (*e.g.* the tale of the Argonauts) and the stories of fabulous adventure and ethnographical curiosities which had long been popular in Greece. As early as Solon we find a comic description of a land of good things (Bergk, *Poetae Lyrici*[4], frag. 38). But the first serious philosophical romance comes from Plato, who portrays his ideal of earthly perfection in the State of 'Atlantis.' The ground-plan of this is sketched in the *Timaeus* (cf. esp. 20 D–25 E), and was to be completed in the *Critias*. Theopompus (*c.* 333 B.C.) made a similar attempt. In the eighth book of his *Philippica* he introduced a description of an ideal country called 'Meropis' with its cities *Machimos* and *Eusebes*—the first a town of warriors, the second the abode of peace and justice. A more philosophic work was 'The Hyperboreans' of Hecataeus of Abdera, a philosopher at the court of Ptolemy I., and a pupil of the sceptic Pyrrho. Pyrrho's philosophy was less a theory of doubt than a conviction that the whole world of things was unworkable, and that a calm indifference was the only feasible rule of conduct. His pupil's romance on the Hyperboreans, who live in the island of Helixoia, in the Northern Ocean, seems to have been prompted by similar views. Amometus, a contemporary of the first and second Ptolemys, travelled outside the range of native mythology, and based his romance of the Attacori (Plin. *HN* vi. 17, § 55) upon the Indian legend of the happy land of Uttarakuru, north of the Himalayas (cf. Lassen, *WZKM* ii. 63, 64). Euhemerus of Messana, the friend of king Cassander (*c.* 306 B.C.), finds his Utopia in the island of Panchaia in the Indian Ocean. Iambulus (of uncertain date, but earlier than the age of Augustus) finds an Island

of the Blest near the equator. The popularity of such romances is sufficiently shown by the travesty of them given by Lucian in his *Vera Historia*. Their influence extended beyond Greece, since the description of the Essenes in Josephus (*BJ* II. viii. 11) is held to show traces of Greek colour.

ii. **Roman.**—The idea of an earthly paradise was never native to Roman thought. A belief in immortality was always an integral part of the Roman religion. With the assurance of an after-life in the world of spirits, colourless though it might be, the practical Roman had no need of such a conception. Such references to the belief as are found in Latin literature are importations from the Greek: *e.g.* Plautus, *Trin.* 549: 'Fortunatorum memorant insulas, Quo cuncti qui aetatem egerint caste suam, Conveniant.' The beautiful description in Horace, *Epodes*, xvi. 39 ff., is suggested in all probability by the story of Sertorius mentioned above. See also STATE OF THE DEAD (Greek and Roman).

LITERATURE.—E. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], 2 vols., Freiburg, 1898, and *Der Griechische Roman*[2], Leipzig, 1900; L. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*[4], ed. C. Robert, Berlin, 1887-94; Dieterich, *Nekyia*, Leipzig, 1893. F. W. HALL.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Hindu).—The Hindus believe that there was, and is still, a place of bliss on earth, a kind of earthly paradise, inaccessible to men, and far far away from our part of the earth. But the idea, frequent among many savage tribes and some civilized peoples, that the brave and the virtuous go to such a place on their decease, seems not to have been current in ancient India. For already in the Rigveda the abode of the dead who in life have done pious deeds is said to be in heaven above, and, according to the Atharvaveda, the wicked receive their punishment in the hell below.* And in later Sanskrit literature heavens were multiplied to such an extent that the souls of the deceased were amply provided for, and required no dwelling place on earth such as the Islands of the Blessed of the ancients. The Indian belief in a place of bliss cannot therefore have developed from an earlier one in a heaven on earth; but we shall postpone our inquiry into the probable origin of this belief till we have described it in all its details. We must, however, define this place of bliss more accurately as one believed to be still in existence, in order to distinguish it from the state of bliss which obtained in the Golden Age, when the whole earth, newly come into existence, was, as it were, all one abode of the Blessed.† In the Sanskrit epics, the Purāṇas, and the classical literature the *Uttarakurus* are regarded as the Blessed, and their land as an earthly paradise which is localized in the far North.

1. **Site of Uttarakuru.**—It will be convenient first to set forth the Pauranic opinion on the site of Uttarakuru, since it is the most explicit one. According to the Purāṇas, the earth, of which India forms part, is a circular island, or rather insular continent, of enormous dimensions, called Jambūdvīpa. There are six more such islands, Śākadvīpa etc., which, however, are not connected with our present subject. In the centre of Jambūdvīpa rises Mount Meru, 84,000 *yojanas* above the surface of the earth. The whole continent is divided by six parallel mountain ranges, running due east and west, three south of Meru and three north of it. The southernmost range is the Himālaya, and the segment of the disc of the earth lying to the south of it is Bharatavarṣa, or India, and some countries known to the Indians. The counterpart of Bharatavarṣa, *i.e.* the segment to the north of the northernmost range, Śṛṅgin, is Uttarakuru. It may be mentioned that the other *varṣas*, or strips of land between the several mountain ranges, are also inhabited by fabulous people; the model of them all seems to have been the Uttarakurus. From the position of the country of the latter it is clear that they were regarded as the antipodes of men, if it be allowed to apply this term to an earth figured as a disc.

In the *Bhīṣma Parvan*, adhy. v. and vi., in a part of the *Mahābhārata* of a decidedly Pauranic character, we meet with a somewhat different description of the earth, called here Sudarśana instead of Jambūdvīpa. The number, arrangement, and names of the mountain ranges is the same as in the Purāṇas, but the names of some of the *varṣas* are different, and those of the two most northern ones are omitted. In viii. 10, however, the most northern segment is called Airāvata, not Uttarakuru, which, by the way, is also the case with the Jains; yet the excellence of the country and the happiness of the inhabitants of Airāvata are exactly like those of the Uttarakurus as described in a preceding chapter. In this account (vi. 13) the land of the Uttarakurus is stated to lie at the northern side of Meru, or near the centre of the disc of the earth. Round Meru, we are told, are grouped four *dvīpas*, lit. 'islands,' but, according to the commentary, countries surrounded by a broad river; these islands are Uttarakuru N., Bhadrāśva E., Jambūdvīpa S., Ketumāla W. Here we must distinguish, it seems, two accounts: the Pauranic account, which is made the basis of the description of the earth; and, combined with it, an older one, which places Meru in the ocean, and the four insular continents round it.* Here, too, Jambūdvīpa is the abode of men, and Uttarakuru that of the Siddhas.

What the present writer considers the earlier of these two accounts is actually the idea underlying the Buddhist system of geography. There Meru rises from the ocean, round it are seven concentric circular mountain ranges separated from each other by ring-shaped seas, and beyond them, in the vast ocean known to men, are four insular continents—Jambūdvīpa S., Pūrvavideha E., Uttarakuru N., and Aparagodāna W. Jambūdvīpa, the abode of men, is of a triangular shape, and Uttarakuru, the abode of the Blessed who live 1000 years, forms a square.†

The Jains, whose geography has been developed on the same lines as that of the Purāṇas,‡ also place the Uttarakurus near the centre of the Jambūdvīpa, between Gandhamādana and Mālyavat, two spurs of Mount Meru running N.W. and N.E.§

In such parts of the epics as do not yet exhibit the fully established system of Pauranic geography, the Uttarakurus are placed in the extreme North, in the borderland of the inhabited or known earth. In the *Digvijayaparvan* of the *Sabhāparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* (ii. 28), Arjuna's conquest of the northern countries is related. After having passed the Himālaya and the fabulous mountains Niṣkuṭa and Śvetaparvata, and having vanquished many mythical people, Arjuna reaches the north of the country Harivarṣa. There he is warned not to proceed further, because the region beyond

* A. Macdonell, 'Vedic Mythology' (in *Grundriss der Indo-ariechen Philol. und Altertumskunde*), Strassburg, 1897, p. 167 ff.

† See art. AGES OF THE WORLD (Indian) in vol. i. p. 200 ff.

* The Purāṇas also mention those four countries, substituting, however, Bhārata for Jambūdvīpa, and likening them to the petals of a lotus whose pericarp is Mount Meru. Sometimes they seem to be regarded as countries in Ilāvṛta or the middle *varṣa*, sometimes as islands lying off the coast of Jambūdvīpa in the great ocean. The efforts of the Purāṇas to explain result in worse confusion.

† C. F. Koppen, *Die Religion des Buddha und ihre Entstehung*, Berlin, 1857, vol. i. p. 232 f.

‡ *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, by Umāsvāti, ch. iii., tr. in *ZDMG*, vol. lx.

§ *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, ed. *Bibliotheca Indica*, Calcutta, 1903, Appendix, p. 28 f.

is that of the Uttarakurus: 'he that entereth it, if human, is sure to perish.' In the *Rāmāyaṇa* (iv. 43) we meet with a description of the North where the monkeys are despatched in search of Sītā. There many fabulous mountains and places, which do not form part of the Pauranic system of geography, are mentioned. In the North sun and moon cease to shed light, and even farther north live the Uttarakurus.* Their country is bounded by the Northern Ocean, in which rises Mount Somagiri, scarcely accessible even to gods.

Notwithstanding the prevalence of Pauranic geography during the classical period and some centuries before it, some faint knowledge of an actual tribe of Uttarakurus, somewhere on the slopes of the Himālayas, seems to have continued even then. Lassen † has drawn attention to some notices in the Epics and classical writers where the Uttarakurus are not regarded as a fabulous people. Important in this regard seems to be a passage in the *Vanaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*, iii. 145, where the Uttarakurus are placed south of Kailāsa. Mr. Pargiter, commenting on a passage in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* ‡ where the (Uttara) Kurus are mentioned among the people 'who rest against the Mountains,' has the following note which sums up the whole question under discussion:

'They seem to have been the stock from which the Kurus of Madhyadeśa separated off, for the period when Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Paṇḍu were born is described as a Golden Age, in which both branches of the Kurus engaged in happy rivalry (Ādi-P. cix. 4337-46); but the wistful recollections of their ancient home idealized it afterwards into a blissful land, where fancy gave itself free scope (Rāmāy., Kiṣk. xliv. 82-115). They seem to have occupied the uppermost valley of the Indus near its sources, with Kailāsa lying beyond (Vana-P. cxlv. 71025-35); and fervid imagination also placed them close to Mount Meru on its north side (Bhiṣma-P. vi. 207-8, and vii. 254), or in the region Harivarṣa, and declared men could not enter their sacred land (Sabhā-P. xxvii. 1054-8). They are described as living in primitive happiness, and women had the utmost freedom there (722, 4719-28; and Rāmāy. *loc. cit.*).'

The first mention of the Uttarakurus is contained in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*. In viii. 14 we read: 'hence all people living in northern countries, such as the Uttarakurus, Uttaramadras, are inaugurated for living without a king (*vairājyam*), and called Virāj, *i.e.* "without king."' § Here the Uttarakurus seem to be a real people, *i.e.* one with which the Indians, at the time of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, were actually acquainted, or, at least, of which they had some kind of positive knowledge; for the very name *Northern Kurus*, and the fact that they are mentioned jointly with the Northern Madras, proves that these peoples of the North were regarded as related by kinship to the well-known Indian tribes of the Kurus and Madras. But the Uttarakurus were already looked upon as superior beings, for in the same *Brāhmaṇa* (viii. 23) it is declared that Uttarakuru 'is the land of the gods, no mortal can conquer it.' ‖

It must be added that Ptolemy (vi. 16) mentions a mountain, people, and town of the name of *Ottorokorra*, which obviously stands for Uttarakuru; but he places Ottorokorra in Serica or China. Whatever may have been his reason for doing so, he apparently regarded them as a real, not a mythical people. And so did Pliny (vi. 20), who mentions them under the name of *Attacori*, and places them near the Phruri and Tochari. On the other hand, many fables seem to have been told of them. For Pliny says: 'de iis privatim condidit volumen Amometus, sicut Hecataeus de Hyperboreis.' Megasthenes seems to intend the Uttarakurus by his Hyperborei * who live 1000 years, for this is the length of life of the Uttarakurus according to the Buddhists.

2. Description of Uttarakuru.—The classical passages about the land and the inhabitants of Uttarakuru are *Rāmāyaṇa* iv. 43 and *Mahābhārata* vi. 7, of which we subjoin a translation:

In *Rāmāyaṇa* iv. 43 it is said that in the farthest North sun and moon at last cease to shine; and if you still proceed you come to the river Śailodā, whose water, according to the Bengal redaction of the text, turns into stone the man who touches it. 'On either bank of that river grow reeds, called *kichaka*, which carry the Blessed (*Siddhas*) to the opposite bank and back. There is Uttarakuru, the abode of the pious, watered by lakes with golden lotuses. There are rivers by thousands, full of leaves of the colour of sapphire and lapis lazuli, and the lakes, resplendent like the morning sun, are adorned by golden beds of red lotus. The country all round is covered with costly jewels and precious stones, with gay beds of blue lotuses of golden petals. Instead of sand, round pearls, costly jewels, and gold form the banks of the rivers, which are covered with trees of precious stones, trees of gold shining like fire. The trees always bear flowers and fruits, they swarm with birds, they are of a heavenly smell and touch, and yield all desires; other trees bring forth clothes of various shapes. [Here we omit four verses pronounced spurious by the Commentator.] All the inhabitants do pious deeds, all are given to love, all, dwelling together with their wives, have their desires fulfilled. There one always hears the sound of song and music mixed with gay laughter, pleasant to all creatures. There is none who does not rejoice, none whose desires are not fulfilled; and every day those pleasant qualities grow brighter.' The text of the Bengal redaction is much more detailed, and contains some additions which are out of place there, but on the whole it is in the same strain. Besides the items given above, there are mentioned rivers flowing with milk which form a deposit of boiled rice, and trees on which grow beautiful maidens hanging down from their branches.

The description of Uttarakuru in *Mahābhārata* vi. 7 runs thus in Protap Chandra Roy's translation: 'On the south of the Nīla mountain and the northern side of Meru are the sacred Northern Kurus, which are the residence of the Siddhas. The trees there bear sweet fruits, and are always covered with fruits and flowers. All the flowers (there) are fragrant, and the fruits of excellent taste. Some of the trees, again, yield fruits according to the will (of the plucker). There are, again, some other trees that are called milk-yielding. These always yield milk and six different kinds of food of the taste of Amṛta itself. Those trees also yield clothes, and in their fruits are ornaments (for the use of man). The entire land abounds with fine golden sands. A portion of the region there, extremely delightful, is seen to be possessed of the radiance of the ruby, or of the lapis lazuli, or other jewels and gems. All the seasons there are agreeable, and nowhere does the land become miry. The tanks are charming, delicious, and full of crystal water. The men born there are dropped from the world of the celestials. All are of pure birth, and all are handsome in appearance. There twins (of opposite sexes) are born, and the women resemble Apsaras in beauty. They drink the milk, sweet as *amṛta*, of those milk-yielding trees (already mentioned). And the twins born there (of opposite sexes) grow up equally. Both possessed of equal beauty, both endued with similar virtues, and both equally dressed, both grow up in love like a couple of *chakravākas*. The people of that country are free from illness, and are always cheerful. Ten thousand and ten hundred years they live, and never abandon one another. A class of birds called *bhāruṇḍa*, furnished with sharp beaks and possessed of great strength, take them up when dead and throw them into mountain caves. One more item must be added. In the following chapter it is narrated that on the south of Mount Meru there grows the gigantic Jambū tree Sudarśana, from which the name of *Jambūdvipa* is derived. It touches the very skies, and bears fruits of 1115 cubits circumference. 'In falling upon the earth these fruits make a loud noise, and then pour out a silvery juice on the ground. That juice of the Jambū, becoming a river, and passing circuitously round Mount Meru, cometh to (the region of) the Northern Kurus. If the juice of that fruit is quaffed, it conduces to peace of mind. No thirst is felt ever after; decrepitude never weakens them.'

Most Purāṇas give no detailed descriptions of the Uttarakurus, for the number of fabulous peoples inhabiting the other *varṣas* beyond the Himālaya is very great in the Purāṇas, and all these peoples live in a state of happiness denied to the human race.† They were in some degree the equals of the Uttarakurus who, though still regarded as the blessed race, lost something of the interest originally attached to them. There is, however, a description of Uttarakuru in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* ‡ which is apparently based

* Even in later Pauraṇic myths we meet with the belief that the sun does not shine in the land of the Uttarakurus; *e.g.* Saṁjñā, the wife of the Sun, escaped in the shape of a mare in order that her husband might not discover her (*Harivaṁśa*, 561 ff.; *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, ch. 77).

† *Zeitschr. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vol. ii. p. 65 ff.

‡ See his translation of that Purāṇa in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, Calcutta, 1904, p. 345.

§ M. Haug, *The Aitareya Brahmana*, Bombay, 1863, vol. ii. p. 518.

‖ *Ib.* p. 527.

* Schwanbeck, *Megasthenis Indica*, Bonn, 1846, p. 117.

† See *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, tr. p. 282. ‡ Tr. p. 389.

on that contained in the passage of the *Mahābhārata* given above; some details added to it are of no importance.

The principal points in the above accounts of the Uttarakurus seem to be the following. They are a race of superior beings, called *Siddhas*, neither gods nor men. Exempt from suffering, caused by illness or old age, through the juice of the miraculous Jambū tree, they lead a long life of happiness and sensual pleasures, and after death their corpses are removed by miraculous birds to mountain caves. Their country is situated far north, at the border of the known world, and it is made inaccessible to man either by its own virtues or by the petrifying river Śailodā which encircles it. To this picture the *Mahābhārata* adds some traits borrowed from the description of the Golden Age given in the Purānas.* For the Uttarakurus are said to feed on the juice of milk-yielding trees, and to be born as twins, of opposite sexes, who form a couple, just as was the case with primitive men in the first *kṛtayuga*. A similar tendency to ascribe to the Uttarakurus the condition of primitive mankind may be discovered in another passage of the *Mahābhārata*,† where it is stated that originally all women had sexual intercourse with whomsoever they pleased, and that this state of things still prevails in Uttarakuru.

Now assuming, as we are entitled to do, that there was in early times a race of Kurus, related to their famous namesakes in Madhyadeśa, but living outside the limits of India proper, it is easy to imagine how they came to be regarded as the Blessed and their country as a place of bliss. For people look with a kind of awe on neighbouring tribes of whom they have but slight knowledge, and they are wont to ascribe to them superior magical powers, as the Finns do to the Lapps; hence the Uttarakurus, probably, have come to be regarded as *Siddhas*, which term originally denotes one who has acquired *siddhi*, i.e. perfection or magical power, by means of *yoga*. But there was also another factor at work: almost everything connected with the Himālaya seems to partake, in some degree, of the sanctity and even divine character which the Hindus attribute to that gigantic mountain range. When, therefore, the Uttarakurus, whose memory was kept alive and heightened by the fame of their powerful relations, the Kurus of Madhyadeśa, came to be looked upon as superior to common men, their country, situated in the sacred Himālaya and hallowed by it, naturally was imagined as a kind of earthly paradise, full of wonders and free from ills, where the happiness of primitive mankind lingered on to the present day.

This theory of the origin of the belief discussed in this article appears to the present writer preferable to the older opinion, viz. that Uttarakuru was the original home of the Kurus of Madhyadeśa, and that 'the wistful recollections of it idealized it afterwards into a blissful land, where fancy gave itself free scope.' For the belief in question was not restricted to the Kurus, but was common to all Indians; and, besides, such recollections of their ancient home presuppose an intense love of their country, which seems inconsistent with the nature of half-nomadic tribes. At least no such recollections can be instanced from any other of the numerous Indian tribes who all, in some remote past, migrated to India from beyond its borders. See also STATE OF THE DEAD (Hindu).

LITERATURE.—Besides the works quoted in the notes, see Lassen, *Indische Altertumskunde*, vol. i. p. 516 ff. (2nd ed. p. 612 ff.), 1847–61, and *Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, ii. 59 ff.; Scherman, *Materialien zur Gesch. der ind. Visionslitteratur*, 1893.

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* See art. AGES OF THE WORLD (Indian) in vol. i. p. 200 ff.

† *Ādiparvan*, cxxii.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Japanese).—**1.** The ancient native religion of Japan, Shinto, had little to say regarding a future life, and the old records or sacred books are practically silent on the subject. The clearest reference to the state of the dead occurs in the *Nihongi* (*Trans. Jap. Soc.* Supp. I. i. 296, London, 1896), where the dead Tamichi appears from his tomb as a serpent and kills his enemies. 'Therefore the men of that time said, "Although dead, Tamichi at last had his revenge. How can it be said that the dead have no knowledge?"' Shinto, in its later developments, has been influenced by Buddhism regarding the future state of the dead. The earlier texts frequently refer to an under world called *Yomi* ('darkness'), the Root-country (*Ne no kuni*), or Bottom-land (*Soko no kuni*). This neutral-tinted Hades is called 'a hideous and polluted land' (*Nihongi*, i. 24), and one prayer invokes protection against 'the unfriendly and savage beings of the Root-country' (Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, p. 187). But, though it is not stated to be the region of the dead, the word *yomi* appears to have been used metaphorically for the grave or the state of the dead. There are gods in Yomi, and some of them descended there after death, like Izanami, whom her husband, Izanagi, tried to rescue, according to a myth resembling that of Orpheus and Eurydice (Chamberlain, *Ko-ji-ki*, Yokohama, 1883, p. 36; *Nihongi*, i. 24; for other tales of descents to Yomi, see Aston, 106, 181; Joly, *Legend in Japanese Art*, London, 1908, p. 11). This myth may simply be a reflexion of the belief that mortals, when they died, went to Yomi. Native writers on Shinto have identified Yomi with the state or place of the dead (Dazai Jun [1680–1747], *Trans. Third Inter. Cong. Hist. Rel.*, Oxford, 1908, i. 163; Motoöri [1730–1801]; Aston, 55), but the question is obscure. Generally the gods of Yomi are divinities of death, disease, pestilence, and poverty, and in a *Norito*, or Ritual, offences are described as sent to Yomi by the god Ibuki-do nushi (Aston, 302). In later times, Yomi is regarded as a place of punishment, and is identified with the Buddhist Jigoku, or hell (Joly, 117; Aston, 54, 367).

2. Heaven.—As in most primitive forms of eschatology a difference is made between the future state of men of rank, power, and wealth, and that of the masses of the people, so it was probably in Japan. Izanagi, who was not immortal, after his futile attempt to regain Izanami, died, and went, according to one account, to an island; but, according to another, to heaven, and dwelt in the palace of the Sun. The 'plain of high heaven' is also the place where great men, heroes, mikados, and the like are said to go, there to dwell with the gods. This is in accordance with the later deification of men, whether living or dead (mikados, wise, virtuous, and heroic men), who would then be associated with the heavenly deities, as a class of lesser gods. Later Shintoism, adopting Chinese views of the soul, maintains that, at death, the *kon*, the positive spirit or *yang*, goes to heaven (Aston, 52). *Ame*, or heaven, where the gods dwell, is minutely described in the early records. It lay just over the earth, and was connected with it by the 'floating bridge of heaven' (perhaps the rainbow), and supported by a pillar, though the wind-gods are also described as the pillars of heaven. The tranquil river of heaven is the milky way, where the gods assemble. It has mountains, caves, valleys, streams, groves, fields, trees, and flowers, and all kinds of grain. The rock-cave of heaven, whither the sun-goddess on one occasion retired, is particularly referred to, as well as the rare jewels, the marvellous mirror, and the splendid robes hung on the sacred *sakaki*

tree to tempt her forth. The scenery of the 'plain of high heaven' is that of earth on a more beautiful and extensive scale. (For these details, see *Ko-ji-ki* and *Nihongi*.) Tales of mortals ascending to the sky and remaining there, either through magical powers or by divine favour, are common (Joly, 163, 295).

3. The Eternal Land.—*Toko-yo no kuni*, the Eternal Land, is sometimes spoken of as the place whither certain persons go after death, *e.g.* the god Sukunabikona and a brother of Jimmu, the first Mikado (Aston, 54, 117). This Eternal Land is sometimes identified with Korea or China. From it Tajima Mori brought a fragrant fruit, the orange. The land lay across the sea and took ten years to reach, and on his return he said, 'This Eternal Land is no other than the mysterious realm of gods and genii, to which mortals cannot attain' (*Nihongi*, i. 186–7). In a well-known popular tale the Eternal Land is identified with the palace beneath the waves of the Dragon King of the Sea.

Urashima, having rescued the king's daughter, went thither with her and remained for three years. At the end of that time he left, promising to return, and was given a box which his wife forbade him to open. Having reached his home, he found that over 300 years had elapsed and he was thought to be dead. Forgetting the injunction he opened the box, when a light puff of smoke came from it. This was his soul, and he fell dead (Joly, 382; Aston, 52).

The Eternal Land is also identified with Hōraisan, an island paradise of which Japanese legend and art have much to tell. Hōraisan is the land of everlasting life, where stands Fusan, the mountain of immortality. On it grows a wonderful tree with roots of silver, a trunk of gold, and fruits of rare jewels. The finest flowers and fruits, all unfading, grow there; eternal spring reigns; the air is always sweet, the sky always blue. The place is rarely found by mortals, though many have sought it, for it is visible only for a moment afar off.

One favourite story tells how Wasobiowe reached it after long voyaging and was met there by Jofuku, another mortal visitor, who had fled from a tyrannical emperor under pretence of seeking the herb of immortality, and had found life so pleasant in Hōraisan that he had no wish to return. Wasobiowe also remained there for two hundred years, which lapsed away as in a dream. All things remained as in a perpetual present; there was neither birth, sickness, decay, nor death. The island was peopled by wise men and beautiful women, the elect of the gods, and with them he passed the years with laughter, music, and song. But he tired of this unvarying sweetness and calm, and longed for death or escape. Finding no means of dying, for death was impossible there, he trained a giant stork to carry him, and at last fled away on its back. After many other wanderings he returned to Japan to tell of the wonders of Hōraisan (Brauns, *Jap. Marchen*, Leipzig, 1885, 146; Rinder, *Old-World Japan*, London, 1895, 79; Joly, 126, 239, 386).

4. Western Paradise of Japanese Buddhists.—Several influential sects of Buddhism in Japan, though their teaching is rejected by many other Japanese Buddhists, owe their popularity to their doctrine of the Western Paradise of Amida. This doctrine of Northern Buddhism was first introduced into Japan in definite form by the Jō-dō Shu, or 'Sect of the Pure Land,' and it is plainly expressed in one of the books of the Northern Buddhist canon, honoured and widely read by these sects, the *Hok-ké-kiō*, the Japanese name for the *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka*, an extremely rhetorical and imaginative work. The founder of the Jō-dō sect in Japan was the Buddhist saint, Hōnen (1133–1211), the fundamental tenet of his teaching being belief in the power of the saviour Amida, Lord of Sukhāvatī, the land of purity and bliss in the West. This teaching was based on that of the Chinese founder of the sect, Zendō. Entrance to the pure land of Amida after death was made to depend upon belief in, and repetition of, prayer to Amida; and this simple doctrine, easily understood, at once became popular. According to Hōnen,

'Perfect bliss Amita would not have till he knew that all who would invoke him might be saved. This is his primal vow. Every sentient being has the chance of being saved, since he is living in enlightenment. Whoever calls earnestly upon his name, will enter that realm of purity. Amita Buddha, as in a vision, he shall see coming to him, and at death he shall welcome him with all his saints; nor shall obstacles nor demons keep him back' (Anesaki, 'Hōnen, the Pietist Saint,' *Trans. Third Inter. Cong. Hist. of Rel.*, Oxford, 1908, i. 124 f.).

Even more emphatically is faith in Amida alone taught by the Shin-shiu, or 'True Sect,' which also holds out the reward of the Western Paradise, painting its delights in more attractive colours, while it teaches that not merely at death does Amida take the believer under his protection to conduct him to paradise, but even now, immediately upon his profession of belief. The Nichiren Sect, on the other hand, teaches that a man must work out his own salvation. Amida dwells in this blissful Western Paradise or Pure Land, called Sukhāvatī, as ruler of the blessed dead. In it, said Hōnen,

'There shall be no distinction, no regard to male or female, good or bad, exalted or lowly; none shall fail to have Pure Life, after having called, with complete desire, on Amita. Just as a great stone, if on a ship, may complete a voyage of myriads of miles over the great waters, and yet not sink; so we, though our sins are heavy as giant boulders, are borne to the other shore by Amita's primal vows, not sinking in the sea of birth and death' (Anesaki, i. 125).

The Pure Land is open to all who wish to be re-born there, and this blissful existence is thus made easy for all to whom the necessary discipline for the final attainment of Nirvāṇa presents endless difficulties, while it has taken the place of Nirvāṇa in practical thought. The Pure Land is thus described in the *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka*:

'There no women are to be found; there sexual intercourse is absolutely unknown; there the sons of Gina, on springing into existence by apparitional birth, are sitting in the undefiled cups of lotuses. And the Chief Amitābha himself is seated on a throne in the pure and nice cup of a lotus, and shines as the Sāla-king' (Kern, *SBE* xxi. 417).

The same work also states that any female, after reading and learning its twenty-second chapter ('Ancient Devotion')

'will, after disappearing from earth, be re-born in the world Sukhāvatī, where the Lord Amitāyas, the Tathāgata dwells, exists, lives, surrounded by a host of Bodhisattvas. There will he (who formerly was a female) appear seated on a throne consisting of the interior of a lotus; no affection, no hatred, no infatuation, no pride, no envy, no wrath, no malignity will vex him.' He becomes a Bodhisattva, his equal is not to be found in the world, including the gods, with the only exception of the Tathāgata (*ib* 389 ff.; cf. 251–254).

Again, those who write and keep this Sutra

'shall, when they disappear from this world, be re-born in the company of the gods of paradise, and at that birth shall eighty-four thousand heavenly nymphs immediately come near them. Adorned with a high crown, they shall as angels dwell amongst those nymphs' (*ib.* 435).

Vivid descriptions of the Western Paradise abound in the larger and smaller *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, works which are of authority to the Pure Land and Shin-shiu sects (*SBE* xlix. pt. ii., Oxford, 1894). In the smaller work, birth in the Land of Bliss occurs if the name of Buddha Amitābha is merely repeated for a few nights before death; and it asserts that birth there is not a reward and result of good works in earthly life (*op. cit.* 98 f.). But in the larger work the doctrine of merit is not thus neglected. According to both works, the Happy or Blissful Land is a state where there is neither mental nor bodily pain, for pleasure is universal; the name of hell is unknown, and the length of life there is immeasurable. It is adorned with terraces, and enclosed on every side with the four gems, gold, silver, beryl, and crystal. It contains lotus lakes adorned with gems, on their banks grow trees of gems, in their waters float lotus flowers of various colours. There are great rivers of different kinds, with waters of different sweet odours, bearing up flowers of different perfumes and adorned with different gems. The dwellers there bathe in the waters, which rise exactly to the height they desire, and are exactly of the temperature they prefer. Exquisite music is

caused by the flowing of the rivers, by the trees and bells, by innumerable birds singing in concert. Every one born in that land is endowed with strength, dominion, and accumulation of virtue, and obtains dress, ornaments, gardens, palaces, and every enjoyment of touch, taste, smell, and sound. Whatever food they desire they enjoy without even tasting it. Or if they desire musical instruments, or ornaments, or a palace, these appear before them; and in such palaces they dwell and enjoy themselves, surrounded by myriads of Apsarases. Language and metaphor are exhausted in these two works to set forth the bliss of this glorious, fertile, and beautiful Paradise. Probably the original source of the conception of the Land of Bliss was the Brāhmanic teaching regarding the city of Varuna in the west, sometimes called *Sukhā*, or 'the Happy' (Max Müller, introd. *SBE* xlix. pt. ii. p. xxii). Many Japanese works have been composed on the Western Paradise of Amitābha.

See, further, Buddhist section of this article, p. 687[a].

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J. A. MACCULLOCH.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Persian).—The Persian tradition concerning an abode of the blest on earth has given rise to much confusion through its wide-spread interpretation as a Flood legend, an additional element of complication being the divergent theories regarding the original character of its hero, the Indo-Iranian Yama-Yima. In view of this confusion it seems best to give first, without comment, the data of the Avesta and Pahlavi literatures, then the spread of the belief to other religious systems and its possible parallel in Norse mythology, and finally to discuss the meaning of the legend.

1. **Data of the Avesta, etc.**—The earliest source for the Iranian legend of the abode of the blest on earth is the second part of *Vendīdād* ii., which falls into two parts, 1–20 treating of Yima and his Golden Age, and 21–43 devoted to Yima's *vara*, or enclosure, which will here be considered as constituting the abode of the blest.

This chapter may be summarized as follows (cf. also the analysis on the basis of textual criticism and the tr. by Geldner in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, xxv. 179–192). Yima was the first of mortals, excepting Zoroaster, to whom Ahura Mazda taught his religion (1–2); but on his confession that he was 'neither formed nor learned to remember and to sustain the faith,' Ahura Mazda urged him 'to further creatures, to increase creatures, and be the protector, guardian, and overseer of creatures,' to all of which Yima agreed, declaring that 'in my kingdom there shall be neither cold wind nor hot, neither disease nor death' (3–6). In the first 300 years of Yima's reign 'the earth was full of cattle small and great, of men, and dogs, and birds, and fires red and blazing,' so that he was compelled to go further south and enlarge the earth by a third (8–11). In 600 years he was forced to enlarge the earth by two-thirds, and in 900 years by three-thirds, still proceeding southward (12–20). Here ends the first section of the chapter. In the second part, which here concerns us more immediately, Ahura Mazda and the 'spiritual angels' meet Yima and the 'best men' in the holy region of Airyanam Vaējō, which may perhaps be identified with Azarbaijan (Jackson, *Zoroaster*, New York, 1899, pp. 193–197),* and here the Deity warns Yima (21–24) of the coming of terrible winters (on the translation of this difficult passage see Bartholomae, *Zum altiran. Wörterb.*, Strassburg, 1906, p. 98 *f.*). Yima is accordingly commanded to make a *vara* a *čaretu* (according to the tradition, 2 miles) square, which should serve as an abode for men and cattle, and in which should be running water in a course a *hāðra* (according to the tradition, 1 mile) long, with birds along its banks. To this *vara*, moreover, should be taken the germs of cattle, human beings, dogs, birds, fires, all animals, all plants, and all foods, and these germs should be in pairs (*miθwairs*) and undecaying 'all the time that these men shall be in the *varas*' (*varəšva*, possibly, however, only a *plurale majestatis*); while no sort of deformity, disease, or iniquity should here be found (25–29). In the upper part of the *vara* were to be nine streets (*pereθwō*), in the middle six, and in the lower three, the first containing 1000 germs of human beings, the second 600, and the lower 300; and the *vara* was also to have 'a shining door, having its own light on the inner side' (30) as well as 'houses, and a cellar, and a forecourt, and a bastian, and a circumvallation' (26). This *vara*, which was to be constructed by being 'stamped apart with the heels and dug asunder with the hands' (31), was accordingly made by Yima (32–38). The illumination of the *vara* was from 'lights self-determined and world-determined (*i.e.* eternal and transitory). Only once (each year) does one behold the setting and the rising stars, and moon, and sun; and they think that what is a year is (but) a day. When 40 years have elapsed, from two human beings are born two human beings, twins, both male and female; so (also) of them that are of animal kind. And these human beings, who are in the *vara* that Yima made, live with most happy life' (40–41). The religion of Ahura Mazda was brought to the *vara* by the bird Karshiptar (the spiritual lord of all birds and acquainted with speech; cf. *Būndahišn* xix. 16, xxiv. 11), and the temporal and spiritual lords are Urvataṭ-nara (one of the three earthly sons of Zoroaster and the head of the agricultural class; cf. *Būndahišn* xxix. 5, xxxii. 5) and Zoroaster himself (42–43).

The remaining Avesta material of relevance in the present connexion adds little to the main source just summarized. Airyanam Vaējō is described as the first country created by Ahura Mazda (*Vendīdād* i. 2), and in it, as a region pre-eminently holy, sacrifice was offered by Zoroaster (*Yašt* v. 104–106, ix. 25–27, xvii. 45–47; see also Jackson, *loc. cit.*), and even by Ahura Mazda (*Yašt* v. 17–19, xv. 2–4); and there are a number of allusions to the Golden Age of Yima's reign, though the first section of *Vendīdād* ii. shows that this Golden Age is a tradition separate originally from that of the *vara*, to which it forms a *quasi*-prelude (see *Yasna* ix. 4–5; *Yašt* ix. 8–11, xv. 15–16, xvii. 28–31, xix. 32–33; *Aogemadaēčā*, 94–95; cf. also the Pahlavi *Jāmāspjī-Nāmak*, ed. and tr. Modi, Bombay, 1903, p. 113 f.).

The Pahlavi literature adds considerable information to our knowledge of the Persian abode of the blest on earth. The account given in *Vendīdād* ii. is summed up briefly in *Dīnkarṭ* VII. i. 20–24. *Būndahišn* xxix. 14, states that '[the enclosure] formed by Yim is in the middle of Pārs, in Sruvā; thus, they say that what Yim formed is below Mount Yimakān' (see West, *SBE* v. 120, note 5, and Justi, *Bundehesh*, Leipzig, 1868, p. 143); but *Dīnā-ī Māīnōg-ī Khraṭ* lxvi. 15–19, says that 'the enclosure formed by Yim is constructed in Aīrān-vējō, below the earth'* (so also *Būndahišn* xxxii. 5, and the Persian *Rivāyat*, ed. and tr. Sachau, *JRAS*, 1868, p. 229 ff., esp. p. 253), adding that there men lived 300 years. The same treatise describes the blessedness of Airyanam Vaējō (xxiv. 17–35), where, despite the evils of many serpents and ten months of winter, men live 300 years, with one child every 40 years, keeping the primitive faith, and virtuous.

The real *crux* in the interpretation of the *vara* is constituted by the passages *Dātistān-ī Dēnīk* xxxvii. 94–95; *Dīnā-ī Māīnōg-ī Khraṭ* xxxvii. 27–31; *Bahman Yašt* iii. 55 (and its Persian paraphrase; cf. West, *SBE* v. p. lix); *Dīnkarṭ* VII. ix. 1–4, and *Jāmāspjī-Nāmak*, tr. Modi, p. 118.

The most complete of these passages, with which all the rest agree, is *Dātistān-ī Dēnīk* xxxvii. 94–95 (tr. West, *SBE* xviii. 109 *f.*): 'One (of the proofs of the ultimate triumph of Ahura Mazda over Ahriman) is this, that is, even that prodigious devastation of which it is declared that it happens through the rain of Malkōsh, when, through snow, immoderate cold, and the unproductiveness of the world, most mortals die; and even

* Airyanam Vaējō is also identified by Darmesteter (*Le Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1892–93, ii. 5–6) with Arrān, the modern Karabagh in Trans-Caucasia, and by Marquart (*Ērānšahr*, Berlin, 1901, p. 155) with Chorasmia; but, as Bartholomae very pertinently remarks (*Altiran. Wörterb.*, Strassburg, 1904, col. 1314), 'es ist nicht zu bestimmen, wohin man es verlegt hat.'

* West (*SBE* xxiv. 109, note 8) takes this to imply 'that its position could no longer be discovered on earth.' The passage *Vendīdād* ii. 31–32 should, however, be considered in this connexion.

the things attainable by mortals are attended with threatenings of scarcity. Afterwards—as among the all-wise, preconcerted remedies of the beneficent spirit such a remedy was established that there is one of the species of lands that is called "the enclosure formed by Yim," through which, by orders issued by Yim, the splendid and rich in flocks, the son of Vîvangha, the world is again filled—men of the best races, animals of good breeds, the loftiest trees, and most savoury foods, in that manner came back miraculously for the restoration of the world; which new men are substituted for the former created beings, which is an upraising of the dead.'

The tables of Zoroastrian chronology drawn up by West *SBE* xlvii. 28–31) show that the accession of Yima took place *anno ante religionem* 2717=3847 B.C., that he was slain *anno ante religionem* 2000=2630 B.C., and that the winter of Malkôsh (Avesta Mahrkûša) was to take place in the century *anno religionis* 1400–1500=A.D. 770–870, so that the *vara* of Yima would have lasted over 3500 years.

2. **In other religious systems.**—The legend of Yima's *vara* was borrowed by Mandæanism, and has also been claimed to exist in Judæo-Christian apocalyptic literature. In the former system, according to oral traditions collected by Petermann and Siouffi (Brandt, *Mandäische Religion*, Leipzig, 1889, p. 154), the earth, after the depopulating catastrophes of the end of the world, will be re-peopled from משונית כושמא, a mysterious and invisible, but transitory, locality upon the earth, where dwell perfectly righteous, religious, and happy men who die without pain. Other sources locate this mystic world either beyond the northern mountain range, or, as in the scanty and late allusions in the *Genzā* (r. 29, 18; 302, 18; 338 ult. –339, 5), regard it as floating in the clouds (Brandt, *op. cit.* pp. 37 f., 53, 60 f.). In this Mandæan משונית כושמא Brandt (*op. cit.* p. 154) sees, probably rightly, a reminiscence of Yima's *vara*. As regards the Judæo-Christian borrowing, it will be sufficient to refer to Boklen, *Verwandtschaft der jüd.-christl. mit der pars. Eschatologie*, Göttingen, 1902, pp. 136–144, who mentions Commodian's *Instructiones*, II. i. 20 ff., and *Carmen apologeticum*, 941 ff., the *Narratio Zosimi*, ch. 10, as well as the *Ethiopic Conflicts of the Holy Apostles*, even though it seems to the present writer that the resemblances here noted by Boklen are too general in character, and too near akin to what would naturally occur to one describing a place of ideal bliss, to be positively claimed as borrowed from Iranian belief. An analogue to the legend of Yima's *vara* has been sought, as common property of the Indo-Germanic peoples, by Rydberg (*Teutonic Mythology*, Eng. tr., London, 1906, pp. 306–390, esp. pp. 379-388) in Norse mythology. With the *vara* he compares the Norse *Jörð lifanda manna* ('earth of living men'), or *Ódáinsakr* ('acre of the not-dead'), a land either subterranean or on the surface of the earth, but in either case almost impossible for living men to reach. In this realm, which was ruled by Gudmund (Mimir) and enclosed by bulwarks that no disease, death, or age could surmount, and where none could die, men lived many generations (cf. also Meyer, *German. Mythol.*, Berlin, 1891, pp. 126 f., 134 f.). Furthermore, the final cataclysm will be preceded by the *fimbolvetr*, a three years' winter with no summer, during which Líf and Lífthrasir ('Life' and 'Immortality') conceal themselves in Hoddmimer's grove, whence, after all the rest of mankind have been destroyed, they will emerge and re-people the earth (Söderblom, *La Vie future d'après le mazdéisme*, Paris, 1901, pp. 204–221; de la Saussaye, *Religion of the Teutons*, 1902, p. 351 f.; see also below, p. 709 f.). While Christian elements have almost certainly been incorporated in this Norse account (de la Saussaye, *loc. cit.*; Meyer, *op. cit.* p. 163), and though it would be, in the present writer's opinion, a scarcely warranted assumption to suppose that the Norse and Iranian traditions form part of an Indo-Germanic religion, it may be, nevertheless, that the two legends of an earthly abode of the blest serve to illustrate each other. Arising independently and under different conditions, they might yet be parallel in their psychological development.

The most important question of parallelism, however, is with India. Yima, as is well known, is an Indo-Iranian figure, finding his counterpart in the Indian Yama (cf. Spiegel, *Arische Periode*, Leipzig, 1887, pp. 243–256). The original nature of Yama has been the subject of much speculation (cf. the data and references in Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, Strassburg, 1897, pp. 171–174); but, in the writer's opinion, it may be regarded as admitting of little doubt that, whatever theosophical and even astro-mythological attributes were given him, he was, primarily, as the *Atharvaveda* (XVIII. iii. 13) says, 'he who of mortals was the first to die' (*yo manuṣīra prathamo mārtyānām*). He is thus the king of the dead (*Rigveda*, IX. cxiii. 7 ff., x. 14), for whom 'may Yama there mete out abodes' (*'trā yamaḥ sādanā te minotu*, X. xviii. 13), 'there' obviously being his realm in 'the inmost recess of the sky' (*avarodhanaṁ divaḥ*, IX. xiii. 8). But this realm of 'King Yama' is not the *vara* of Yima, the one being celestial, and the other, as we have seen, terrestrial. The two have in common only the one point, that Yama-Yima is their king, the nexus evidently being that, to the Indian, Yama, as the first mortal, is king of all who later die; while, to the Iranian, Yima, as the primeval man, fittingly was king in the Golden Age, and so ruler of the abode of the blest as well.

The *vara* of Yima has, however, been brought into direct connexion with Indian legend by Reinaud (*Mémoire sur l'Inde*, Paris, 1849, pp. 346–350), who identifies it with the mythical city of Yamakoṭi ('Yama's Castle'), mentioned in late Sanskrit astronomical works. This material is summarized by al-Birûnî (*India*, tr. Sachau, London, 1888, i. 267 f.), who states, on the basis of the Hindu astronomers, that 'in the four cardinal directions with relation to this line [which divides the earth into dry and wet halves] there are four great cities: Yamakoṭi in the east, Romaka [Rûm, Byzantium] in the west, Laṅkâ [usually identified with Ceylon] in the south, Siddhapura [a mythical "City of the Blest"] in the north. . . . When the sun rises over the line which passes both through Meru and Laṅkâ, that moment is noon to Yamakoṭi, midnight to the Greeks, and evening to Siddhapura. . . . A man in Yamakoṭi observes one identical star rising above the western horizon, whilst a man in Rûm at the same time observes it rising above the eastern horizon.' Yamakoṭi is the antipodal point to Rûm (*ib.* pp. 272, 303), and 'is,' according to Ya'qub and al-Fazârî, 'the country where is the city Târa [Reinaud would read Bârah (=Vâra) for Târaḥ, *i.e.* بارح for تارح] within a sea. . . As *koṭi* means "castle" and Yama is the angel of death, the word reminds me of Kangdiz, which, according to the Persians, had been built by Kai Kâ'ûs or Jam [Yima] in the most remote east, behind the sea, . . . for *diz* means in Persian "castle," as *koṭi* in the Indian language' (*ib.*, p. 303 f.). Kangdiz (the Kanha of *Yašt* v. 54) is, however, distinctly described as separate from Airân-vêj, so closely associated with the *vara* (*Bûndahišn* xxix. 4 f., xxxii. 5; *Dînâ-i Mâînôg-i Khraṭ* lxii. 12–15; *Sad Dar* x. 7), and as 'in the direction of the east, at many leagues from the bed of the wide-formed ocean towards that side' (*Bûndahišn* xxix. 10). Hyde (*Hist. religionis veterum Persarum*, Oxford, 1700, p. 173) records, from a manuscript of the *Almagest*, a mythical city of Jamgard ('City of Yama=Yima') on the equator to the extreme east; and Abul Fidâ describes Jamkût, or, as the Persians called it, Jamgard, as on the equator, to the extreme east, and antipodal to the (classical) Islands of the Blest (Reinaud, p. 350). Yamakoṭi seems to the present writer to be a specifically Indian development. At all events, the data do not appear to him to warrant any real connexion or kinship between Yamakoṭi and Yima's *vara*—the location is too different, the chronological difficulties in any hypothesis of connexion are too great, and the development of Yama and Yima in India and Iran is too divergent from the Indo-Iranian period onward to render plausible the theory of actual relationship of the two mythical places, which, after all, can no more be localized than can the 'seacoast of Bohemia.'

3. **Meaning of the legend.**—The view is widely current that the story of Yima and his *vara* is a legend of the Deluge—a theory defended with much learning by Kohut (*ZDMG* xxv. 61–68), Usener (*Die Sintflutsagen*, Bonn, 1899, pp. 208–212), Geldner (Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, *loc. cit.*), Winternitz, ('Flutsagen des Alterthums und der Naturvölker,' in *Mittheilungen der anthropol. Gesellschaft in*

Wien, xxxi. 328 f.), Darmesteter (*op. cit.* ii. 19 f., iii. pp. lviii–lx), and Lindner ('Die iran. Flutsage,' in *Festgruss an Rudolf von Roth*, Stuttgart, 1893, pp. 213–216). This hypothesis is untenable, as has been shown by Bishop Casartelli (*Philosophy of the Mazdayasnian Religion under the Sassanids*, Eng. tr., Bombay, 1889, p. 198 f.), and especially by Söderblom (*op. cit.* pp. 167–222, where will be found a rich collection of parallels and full citation of authorities on both sides). Not only is the *vara* of Yima eschatological in purpose, and existing for centuries, but certain other chosen heroes, as Windischmann observes (*Zoroastr. Studien*, Berlin, 1863, pp. 244–249), are also immortal on this earth (*Bûndahišn* xxix. 5 f.), though their domains do not constitute, merely because of their personal immortality, any abode of the blest.

The Iranian legend of Yima, who is far more real than his Indian counterpart, is, in the present writer's opinion, more primitive than the Vedic view itself, even though the Iranian records are, in their present form, of a late period, probably a round millennium posterior to those portions of the *Rigveda* which deal with the apotheosized Yama. The Iranian tradition may also be of more than eschatological significance, for it would seem to be a blending of two *motifs*, the Golden Age and the Abode of the Blest, plus a migration tradition of distinct value. The first two *motifs* have already been sufficiently discussed, but a brief note may be appended on the story as a migration legend. Airyanam Vaējō, the scene of the Golden Age of Yima (see above, p. 702[b]), was, despite its sanctity and beauty, a land where, as the *Vendîdâd* states (i. 3), 'there are ten winter months, two summer months. . . . There is the centre of winter, there the heart of winter.' From this region, according to *Vendîdâd* ii., Yima, after 600 years, was forced by increase of population to go southward, and to repeat the process after 900 years. This can be explained only as the southward migration of the Iranians (very probably, indeed, of the Indo-Iranians), and it would seem as though the tradition which locates the *vara* in 'the middle of Pārs' marks this place as the centre of the Iranian peoples when they ceased their wandering. At the same time Airyanam Vaējō was retained in memory as the realm of the Golden Age, and in it, by a transfer of thought which would not be unnatural, was localized the *vara*, the abode of the blest. The migration thus suggested would serve to confirm the theory, now so generally held, of the wandering of the Indo-Iranian stock from the early home of the Indo-Germanic races in Europe through Armenia into north-western Persia, and so south through the mountain passes leading to the Panjāb. This wandering, too, accounts for the fame of Yima as a builder of cities, among them Sārū or Hāmadān, Ctesiphon, and the ruin still known as the Taḫt-i Jamšīd, or 'Throne of Jamshīd,' at Persepolis (Justi, *Iran. Namenbuch*, Marburg, 1895, p. 144; Windischmann, *op. cit.* p. 36; Mirkhond, *Hist. of the Early Kings of Persia*, tr. Shea, London, 1832, p. 104 f.; Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York, 1906, p. 310).

LITERATURE.—This has been given in detail in the article.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Semitic).—In the earliest period known to us the dead were all thought to go irrevocably into the under world, and to remain there perpetually. The life of the under world was most gloomy and unattractive, and it was shared alike by all, regardless of their conduct in this life. Among the Semites this view prevailed until within a century or two of the Christian era. While this conception was entertained, the 'blest' were believed to be those happy primitive men who had lived in the Golden Age, when there was no sin or misery, and when the gods had been on familiar terms with men. Men had then dwelt in the abode of the gods.

The earliest literary expression of this view is found in Gn 2 and 3, a part of the J document (9th cent. B.C.). Some of the material of this document is, however, far older, and reflects as its still recognizable original the picture of a primitive Semitic oasis in Arabia. The garden is the oasis. It is known to be the dwelling of deity by the striking contrast between its luxurious vegetable life and the surrounding desert. The tree of knowledge and of life grows in its midst. This is the palm.* God comes and walks there as in a park; there man and woman dwell without labour or suffering. God, men, and animals form one primitive community, and each talks with the others. Men have not yet begun to beget children or to wear clothing. In other words, the state of blessedness here pictured is thought to be anterior to the dawn of civilization. There are many reasons for believing that this conception is a half-distorted recollection from primitive Semitic days. It corresponds with the main features of that primitive Semitic civilization in which a cult peculiarly Semitic was evolved. Traces of this cult are found in every Semitic nation.† Some of the conceptions of this primitive paradise are also traceable in widely separated Semitic sources. The conceptions just described are found in the earlier stratum of the Biblical story (for there are two strata, one by J^1 and the other by J^2). This older stratum consists of Gn $2^{4b-9.\ 15-25}$ $3^{1-19.\ 21.\ 23}$. In this form of the narrative there was but one tree, and the only indication in this portion that the story had anything to do with Babylonia is the fact that the garden is called 'Eden,' a word evidently identical with *edennu*, the Bab. word for alluvial plain. In the portion afterward added by J^2 (Gn 2^{10-14} $3^{22.\ 24}$), the garden is definitely located in the region of Babylonia by the mention of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.‡

Although the Babylonian literature thus far recovered contains no complete story parallel to this one, many of the elements of this narrative are found in Bab. poetry and art. Thus in the Gilgamesh epic there is a story of a primitive man, Eabani, who was made, like Adam, of a bit of earth or clay, and who lived a primitive life, without clothing, among the animals until he was enticed away by a woman (cf. *KB* vi. 121–129). The palm as the sacred tree appears in various forms, sometimes naturally drawn, and sometimes greatly conventionalized, in all periods of Bab. and Assyr. art, from archaic seals to late palace decorations. From Eridu, where there was a sacred palm tree, comes the story of Adapa, who was defrauded of food which would have made him like a god (cf. *KB* vi. 93–101). The cherubim, which in Genesis guard the entrance to Eden, have their counterpart in the winged lion and bull deities which in Mesopotamia guarded the entrance to palaces and temples. It is clear, therefore, that the elements of this primitive story were known in Babylonia. Perhaps the original story reached the Hebrews by way of that country,

* See Barton, *Semitic Origins*, 93–96.

† See Barton, *op. cit.* chs. iii.–vii.

‡ As to the identity of Gihon and Pison, views diverge. Delitzsch (*Wo lag das Paradies?*) identified these with two canals, one of which was near Babylon, holding that Cush was the Kassite country to the east of the Persian Gulf. Haupt (*Ueber Land und Meer*, 1894–1895, No. 15) identified the Pison with the Red Sea and the Gihon with the Nile, regarding Cush as Nubia. Hommel (*Aufsätze und Abhandlungen*, 326–340) identifies all the rivers except the Euphrates with wadys in Arabia. Gunkel holds all the rivers to be heavenly rivers suggested by the Milky Way (*Genesis*, p. 33).

for the primitive oasis is changed into a garden, the name of which is Babylonian.

It seems that a form of this story was naturalized at Tyre—a form in which Tyre, or the temple there, was regarded as Paradise. Our witness to this is the prophet Ezekiel ($28^{13\text{-}17}$ $31^{8.\ 9}$). As the story was preserved in Tyre, or at least as Ezekiel conceived it, Paradise was a garden, but it was situated on a mountain. Its tree was no longer a palm, but a cedar. In this garden were many precious stones, and, if we may connect with it Ezekiel's description of a holy mountain in ch. 47, a river flowed out of it. Ezekiel's picture modifies the primitive conception of the oasis still more than does the account in Genesis. It corresponds strikingly to the description of the sacred abode of Humbaba, the god of Elam, in the fifth tablet of the Gilgamesh epic. In connexion with that was a grove of sacred cedars. Out of the mountain on which it was situated a sacred river ran, and here divine voices were heard (cf. *KB* vi. 437, 441, 573). Cuneiform inscriptions recovered at Susa in recent years show that the sign for cedar tree was there a part of their deity's name. Probably this portion of the epic, or the story which lies behind it, had influenced the Tyrian conception of Paradise. This primitive paradise was thought by both Babylonians and Hebrews to have been lost by the dawn of civilization. In Genesis a serpent tempted woman to eat the fruit of the sacred tree, and she effectually tempted man. The motive is that they may become like gods, knowing good and evil. 'Knowing good and evil' in Dt 1^{39} is equivalent to having reached the age of puberty. The result of the sinful act of Adam and Eve is that they perceive that they are naked, *i.e.* become conscious of sex. Clothing is invented, and child-bearing begins.* It is clear, therefore, that this story connected the loss of the Golden Age with the dawning of the consciousness of sex. The Midrash Rabba, *Genesis*, § 20, holds that the serpent was an emblem of the sexual passion. Their sacred tree, the palm, was also bi-sexual, and its fertilization was a sacred act.† Whether the serpent and the tree were or were not consciously used because of symbolic significance, one element in the Biblical story—and it is the most important element—was the idea that primitive paradise was lost by the union of man and woman.‡ The story of Eabani, quoted above, shows that this conception was present in Babylonia also. Probably, therefore, this was the primitive Semitic view.

In Babylonia there was also another conception of the abode of the blest. It is found in a document much older than the J narrative, but it is culturally of a later origin than the story of Paradise. According to this conception the abode of the gods is an island in the sea. On this island Par-napishtim, the hero of the Bab. deluge, and his wife had been admitted to dwell, and thither Gilgamesh was permitted to make a journey, from which he returned. The road to this island was a long journey, in the course of which one came to a great pass in the mountains of *Mashu*. This was guarded by scorpion-men. After this pass came a long road of midnight darkness. At last one came out to a 'park of precious stones,' after which a bitter river had to be crossed. Next came the 'waters of death,' beyond which the divine island lay (*KB* vi. 211-229). It was formerly thought that the *Mashu* mountains were to be looked for in Arabia, as was the 'park of precious stones,' that the 'bitter river' was the Persian Gulf, that the 'waters of death' were the Arabian sea, and that the happy isle lay to the south-east of Babylonia (cf. *KB* vi. 467, 469. 473). Jensen, however, has proposed a different view. He now holds that the mountains of *Mashu* were the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges; that the 'park of precious stones' was on the Phœnician coast; the Mediterranean was the 'bitter river'; the 'waters of death' lay to the westward of the Straits of Gibraltar; and the abode of the gods was in the Atlantic Ocean (cf. *KB* vi. 575 ff. and *Gilgamesch-Epos in der Weltliteratur*, i. 24, 34, and Map ii.). This view has been accepted by Zimmern (*KAT*^{3} 573 ff.). One strong reason in Jensen's mind for this view is his belief that the Gilgamesh epic is based on a sun myth, and the sun travels from east to west. Gilgamesh was told, it is true, when he was desirous of crossing the dreadful waters, that only Shamash (the sun) crossed them. In favour of Jensen's view, too, is the fact that Ezekiel speaks of a garden in which are precious stones at Tyre. This would correspond to Jensen's location of the 'park of precious stones.' The conception of the abode of the blest just outlined is intermediate between that embodied in the story of the Garden of Eden and that which is described below. The story of primitive Paradise held that man once had a blest abode with the gods on earth, but had lost it. The Par-napishtim and Gilgamesh stories hold that it is still possible that one or two ancient heroes may have attained the happy isle, and found a blest abode with the gods.

A third view as to the abode of the blest on earth developed among the Jews in the two centuries before Christ, in connexion with the Messianic hope. It was believed that the Messianic kingdom would be established, but the living Israelites to enjoy it were but few in comparison with the great host that had died. The author of Is 26, therefore, writing about B.C. 334, declared that departed Israelites should be raised from Sheol (Is 26^{19}) to share in this kingdom. This reversed the time-honoured conception with reference to the dead, and was by no means universally accepted, as Ps 88^{10} and 115^{17} show. It was, however, accepted by the author of Enoch 1–36, who wrote B.C. 200–170, and who thought that dead Israelites would be raised to enjoy a Messianic kingdom of peace and justice. This kingdom on the earth would in itself be an abode of the blest. Its capital was to be at Jerusalem (25^5). Those who attained it would enjoy lives like the patriarchs (25^6), or everlasting lives (5^9), though 'everlasting' is elsewhere defined as five hundred years (10^{10}). (For later conceptions of the Messianic kingdom as an abode of the blest on earth, see MESSIAH and KINGDOM OF GOD.)

When the Messianic kingdom would come, however, was uncertain, and this writer accordingly conceived of another earthly abode for the blest until the resurrection should occur. In ch. 22 he gives an extended description of the under world. This he pictures as divided into four parts. One of these is for the very wicked, another for the less wicked, another for the good, and the last for the supremely good. There are thus thought to be two subterranean abodes of the blest in Sheol. All these dead, except the very wicked, are to be raised. Sheol is but a temporary abode for all except the most desperate; but while there the good enter in some degree upon their delights, and the wicked upon their torments. Although this elaborate

* See Jastrow, 'Adam and Eve in Babylonian Literature,' *AJSL* xv. 193-214; Barton, *Semitic Origins*, 93 ff.; and Whatham, 'The Outward Form of the Original Sin,' *Amer. Jour. of Rel. Psychology*, i. 268-287.

† Barton, *op. cit.* 78 ff., 92 ff.

‡ The word 'Paradise,' by which Eden is frequently called, is of Iranian origin. In Avesta it is *pairi-daêza*, 'encircling wall' (Vend. iii. 18). It passed into Neo-Babylonian, Aramaic, post-Exilic Hebrew, Neo-Hebrew, Armenian, Persian, Kurdish, Greek, and Arabic as a word for a park or splendid garden. In the OT it is found in Neh 2^8, Ca 4^{13}, Ec 2^5.

division of the under world into four parts is found in no later writer, the conception that the righteous, while waiting there, entered upon their anticipated enjoyments, appears in at least one later apocalypse (cf. 4 Ezr $7^{75\text{-}121}$).* This abode of the blest was, however, temporary; they occupied it only while awaiting the resurrection. In later Judaism, the abode of the blest is thought to be in a Messianic kingdom of so supernatural a character that it can hardly be called earthly, and it is often thought to be in heaven, while in the Qur'ān Paradise has become altogether heavenly. The conceptions of the Jewish heavenly abode combine elements from the earthly Garden of Eden with elements taken from the sacred city, Jerusalem, while the Muhammadan Paradise is a transfigured oasis.

Amid the tangle of conceptions met with in Egypt, where myths from the different nomes mingled inextricably after having kept their separate existence for many centuries, four conceptions as to the abode of the blest can be traced. None of these preserves, like the primitive Semitic story of Paradise, the memory of a far-off oasis. The people of each nome seem to have thought that their god created the world and mankind, and all thought of man as having always lived by the Nile (cf. Maspero, *Dawn of Civilization*, 156 ff., and Steindorff, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, 35 ff.). In Egypt, however, there was thought to have been a Golden Age, when the gods lived on familiar terms with men, and men were happy and blest. This age of gods and demi-gods corresponds in general to the Semitic traditions of Paradise. Two other conceptions place that abode of the blest on earth, while the third puts it in the heavens. We are concerned here only with the earthly abodes.

According to the earliest of these, the dead lived in the cemeteries, which were for the most part on the edge of the desert to the west of the Nile, and were veritable cities of the dead. There they formed communities by themselves, each ruled over by a special spirit or deity. Life here was lived under the same conditions and the same form as life in the land of the living. Each needed his body, which was preserved by mummifying, and each needed food, drink, and the various utensils which had been of use in life. Death had, however, petrified all—the child remained a child; the man, a man; the greybeard, a greybeard. The same organization existed there which existed among the living—the man ruled the wife, was served by servants, performed the same duties and engaged in the same recreations as when alive. For the most part the dead remained in the narrow confines of their own city, but by day they might leave their narrow house to roam over the earth. They were then subject to the same dangers of attack from enemies, poisonous snakes, scorpions, and crocodiles as when alive. The dead grudged the living their happiness, and at times came back to interfere with them. Their great opportunity was sickness, when special charms were needed to ward off their influence.†

This conception made no distinction between the good and the wicked dead. It regarded all as going to one place. It corresponds with the non-ethical conception of the early Semites, except that the abode of the dead was placed in the western desert instead of in the under world. Another Egyptian conception, also non-ethical, regarded the abode of the dead as in the under world. Beneath the flat earth lay another region called *Duat*. By day this region was dark and gloomy; but at night, when the sun had set upon the earth, this nether land was illuminated by its rays. Like Egypt, it was characterized by the flowing of a long river through its midst, on either bank of which were deep caverns in which the dead dwelt. When the sun arrived in this land at night, there was thought to be great rejoicing. 'The departed who are in their halls, in their caverns, praise the sun; their eyes are opened, their heart is full of felicity when they behold the sun; they shout for joy when his body is over them.'* It was only as the Osiris myth transformed early Egyptian ideas of eschatology that an ethical element was introduced, and an abode of the blest, as distinguished from the wicked, was conceived. The idea of its location was, however, indistinct. It was sometimes placed vaguely in the West, but was more often thought to be in heaven.

See also STATE OF THE DEAD (Egyptian).

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GEORGE A. BARTON.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Slavonic).—The ideas of the pagan Slavs concerning the state of the dead are known to us only from indirect testimony and from the evidence of surviving folk-belief. While some mediæval chroniclers deny that the Slavs had any conception of a future life (which is unlikely), others freely assert it, and there is no reason to doubt the existence of definite beliefs on the subject (see Schafarik, *Slav. Alterthumer*, Leipzig, 1843, i. 538; ANCESTOR-WORSHIP [Slavonic]). Three existing words denote the abode of the dead—*Nav*, *Raj*, and *Peklo*. The two last now denote heaven and hell respectively, but *Raj* evidently denoted originally a pagan paradise. *Nav* denotes the place of the dead in one chronicler, who says that 'Krok went into the *Nav*,' while the god of the dead, or Pluto, is called *Nya* by the Polish chronicler Dlugosz, who says that the people ask him to carry them after death 'in meliores inferni sedes.' *Nav* may have denoted the abode of the dead in its general aspect. *Peklo*, though it now means hell, seems originally to have denoted a subterranean place of warmth. *Raj* is still known as the eastern home of the sun beyond the ocean, perhaps an island, where the souls of little children dwell, playing among the trees and gathering golden fruits. Spirits not yet embodied and spirits after their disembodiment also live there. It is the place where birds and insects go in autumn, and there are stored the types and seeds of all things on earth. No winter or cold winds are known there. These are the reflexion of earlier pagan ideas of paradise. Folk-belief also speaks of the Isle *Buyán*, itself synonymous with *Raj*. It also is the home of the sun, as well as of the mythological personifications of nature powers, of mythical animals, *e.g.* the snake older than all snakes, and of the divine maiden Zaryā, who sits under a dripping oak. Here is also the magic stone Alatuir, referred to in many charms, from beneath which flow mystic rivers with healing powers. A

* See also R. H. Charles, *Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish, and Christian*, p. 295.

† See Steindorff, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, p. 116 ff.

* See Steindorff, *op. cit.* p. 126 ff.

sacred city hidden beneath deep waters, reached by 'Baty's road,' and inhabited by the Holy Elders (the dead), is spoken of.

But there must also have existed ideas of a mountain abode of the dead or a heavenly paradise reached by a mountain of glass or iron, difficult to climb. The nail-clippings of the dead man, or bear's claws, were buried with him to enable him to climb it. Among the Poles exists the belief that lost souls must climb it as a punishment; when they have reached the summit, they slip down again (Grimm, ii. 836). According to some forms of this myth, the glass mountain crowned with a golden palace stands in the midst of a great orchard in the paradise of souls, and they ascend it by means of the bear's claws (Mannhardt, *Germ. Mythen*, Berlin, 1858, p. 330). The mountain recurs in Slavonic and other European folk-tales, in which the hero rescues a princess, or gains the hand of a fair being from its summit (*CF*, p. 442).

Certain folk-tales, peculiar to the Slavs, speak of a mysterious land above the sky, wherein dwell beings or animals of supernatural character and magic power, while in this land are great wealth, many magical objects, and abundance of food. Thus one story describes it as possessing a mill which gives out pie, cake, and a pot of stewed grain; another, a hut with walls of pancakes, benches of white bread, and a stove of buttered curds. In another the stove is garnished with sucking pigs, geese, and pies, and everything which the soul can desire. This sky-land is visited by mortals who climb up a magical bean- or pea-stalk, or a great oak, as in our Jack and the Bean-stalk tales, and generally the visit is resented (Ralston, *Russ. Folk-Tales*, London, 1873, p. 291 ff.; *CF*, p. 435). This upper world of riches and plenty is not said to be an abode of the dead, but the tales may have been derived from pagan conceptions of an Elysium in the sky, where the gods and the blessed dwelt. This is also suggested by the belief, still current, that the soul must make a journey after death, across the sea, on foot, or by the rainbow or the Milky Way, to the region of the dead. The two last are obvious survivals from pagan beliefs regarding a journey to a heavenly paradise.

Rites in honour of the dead, still in use, include chants of a purely pagan character, in which the souls, having eaten and drunk, are begged to return to heaven. In pagan times the burial rites were all-important, as, until they were completed, the dead could not start on their long journey. Existing funeral songs and tales show that the beliefs regarding the state of the dead were of different character, or were perhaps held simultaneously. The dead continue to dwell in the grave (an idea which passes over into the vampire belief [see VAMPIRE]), or wander round their old home, or exist in a separate region. But, whatever beliefs were held, the state of the dead was apparently of a sensuous character. Married people continued to dwell together, and to a dead bachelor a maiden was allotted to be his wife in the other world. In such a case she was formerly put to death (cf. Schrader, *Totenhochzeit*, Jena, 1904, and see above, p. 22 f.).

The belief in a happy eastern region of perpetual warmth and light beyond the ocean in the place whence the sun came was widely current among the Slavs. Such a belief is still found; and this region is sometimes thought to be tenanted by the Rakhmane, who abstained from flesh, and led a holy life. The Rakhmane are obviously the Brāhmans, and the traditions may be derived from apocryphal writings.

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J. A. MACCULLOCH.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Teutonic).—**1. Introduction.**—The hints supplied by myth, folk-belief, and occasional passages of existing texts, suggest that, in earlier times and probably for a long period, the state of the dead was not definitely formulated in Teutonic belief. The funeral *mobilier* as well as statements in the texts regarding burial shows that life after death continued the life on earth. The dead may have been supposed to dwell in the tomb, and the soul to flit in the air or to frequent the grave, while souls of warriors continued to fight in the air. Conceptions of a more permanent sort may, however, have arisen quite early and ultimately gained ground. When the dead were committed to the waves, this suggests that their abode was over-sea, and the passage in Procopius (*de Bello Goth.* iv. 20) about fishermen, subject to the Franks, rowing souls over by night to Brittia, may be a reminiscence of such a belief. But we find also a more general belief in the dead living in their barrows or burial-mounds, or in hills—they 'die into the hills.' There they feast in happiness, and occupy themselves with the good of their surviving kindred, and their presence in these howes, or hills, is a source of blessing to the neighbourhood (Vigfusson and Powell, *Corpus Poet. Boreale* [=*CPB*], Oxford, 1883, i. 415 ff.). Nor is it unlikely that some of the gods, *e.g.* Odin, had also their abode at first there, several mountains being sacred to Odin (Grimm, i. 152). Odin was especially the god of dead warriors, and their abode may at first have been with him in hills, since later tradition represents great heroes as slumbering in hills, sometimes, as in the case of King Charles, in the Odenberg, with Odin (Grimm, iii. 953 ff.). These heroes may represent the dead warriors of pagan belief, or the gods themselves considered as mountain-dwellers. Again, the souls of dead warriors are seen issuing from and returning to a mountain (*ib.* 954). Thus the warrior host in the mountain may be an earlier form of the warrior host in the heavenly Valhalla (Simrock, *Handb.* 189).

In the Elder and Younger Eddas the conceptions of Hel, the under world of the dead, and Valhalla, the warriors' heavenly abode, are met with. Both may have been developed from the belief that the dead lived a subterranean existence in the barrow or in hills. Hel, 'the hollow place,' would be an extension of the hollow hill or barrow, and a similar development of the under world from the grave is met with in Celtic belief (see CELTS), while the transition from a hill as the abode of warriors to a sky-Valhalla would easily be made, the sky being frequently supposed to rest on hills.

Vigfusson and Powell consider that the idea of Hel as the abode of the dead cannot be clearly reconciled with the early belief in the dead living in their barrows (*CPB* i. 420). Rydberg (*Teut. Mythol.*, London, 1889, p 505) reconciles the two views by showing that, in Teutonic belief, man did not consist simply of body and soul, but of 'a combination of factors, which in death could be separated,' so that the dead could at the same time descend to Hel and inhabit the grave-mound. This is in accordance with primitive and even Egyptian ideas of man's personality, and of various regions or states for the different parts of his being after death. At the same time, the ideas of the barrow and of Hel seem rather to represent different strata of belief.

The subterranean region of Hel may at first have been considered as the abode of all the dead, not excluding warriors, even Balder going there when he was slain, and, as late as Widukind of Corvei, the poet exclaims after a battle, 'Where might there be a Hel so great as to contain such a multitude of the slain?' (Grimm, ii. 801). But side by side with this we find the idea, whether of later Viking origin or not, that warriors have a separate abode. They it was, perhaps, rather than all the dead, who were conceived as dwelling with Odin in the hill, or, as in the Edda, in the heavenly Valhalla.

2. Was Hel an abode of the blest?—Hel is usually

regarded as a dismal and gloomy abode; but it is only in the Younger Edda that this is definitely stated, and it is not improbable that the influence of Christian beliefs may be traced here. The references in this Edda are three in number, and they vary each from the other. All-father has given to man a soul which will live and never perish. Right-minded men will live with him in Vingólf; wicked men fare to Hel, and thence into Niflhel which is beneath in the ninth world (*Gylfaginning*, § 3). Vingólf is later described as the fair hall of goddesses, and it may be synonymous with Valhalla (§ 14; Grimm, ii. 820). Here the distinction is an ethical one, and Niflhel rather than Hel is the abode of the wicked. This corresponds, on the whole, with the description of the fate of men after the final catastrophe:

'Many abodes are there then good, and many bad: best is it to be in Gimlé in heaven with Surtr; and great store of good drink is there for them who drink with joy in the hall called Brimir; it stands also in heaven. That is also a good hall which stands on Nitha-fells wrought of red gold; it is called Sindri; in this hall shall abide good men and well-minded.' The wicked—murderers and perjurers—suffer fearful torments in Ná-strand (*Gylf.* § 52).

This description is borrowed from the Vòluspa, where it is not clear whether it refers to a state of things after the catastrophe which two mysterious beings alone survive. The sibyl sings:

'I see a hall, brighter than the sun, shingled with gold, standing on Gimlé. The righteous shall dwell therein and live in bliss for ever. Northward on Nidavollir stands a hall of gold for Sindri's people. On Okolnir stands another called Brimir, the giants' drinking-hall.' Na-strand is here also the abode of the wicked (*CPB* i. 201, cf. ii. 627).

The third reference describes the goddess Hel as cast into Niflheim, with power over the nine worlds, and sharing those abodes of gloom and hunger with those who die of sickness or old age. Warriors, on the other hand, go to the blissful Valhalla (*Gylf.* § 34, 36 ff.). Here there is no ethical distinction.

The eschatological system set forth in Voluspa depends for its value on the views taken regarding that poem. Bugge's hypothesis of its dependence on Christian and classical sources is hardly tenable (*Studier over de nordiske Gude- og Heltesagns oprindelse*, tr. by Brenner, Munich, 1889). More probable is the view taken by Jónsson (*Den oldnorske og oldislandske Litteraturs Historie*, Copenhagen, 1894, 1901), that it is the product of a pagan poet using pagan myths, but, while combating Christianity, unconsciously writing under Christian influences. The better minds among the pagan Norse may already have felt their way to such eschatological ideas as he sets forth.

In the Elder Edda, *Vafthrúdnis-mál* and *Grímnis-mál* (*CPB* i. 67, 70) describe Valhalla, and the former says of Niflhel: 'hither die the men from Hel (a second death).' Thus Hel is not a place of punishment, though Niflhel may be. Nor is Hel definitely stated in the Elder Edda to be a place of gloom. Ná-strand and Niflhel, places of punishment, may thus be identical, and it is not impossible that the Younger Edda has confused Hel and Niflhel, while here and in the Voluspa Gimlé and the other halls of the righteous may be identical either with Valhalla or with Hel, considered as a place of bliss. In *Balder's Doom*, Odin rides through the under world along a road through grass-grown plains to the mighty hall of Hel, and finds there the walls decked with shields, the benches strewn with mail-coats, and the mead standing ready brewed for the hero (*CPB* i. 182). Nothing is said of the gloom of Hel here, or in the story of Hermódhr's visit there to rescue Balder, where he crosses a river over a golden bridge (*Gylf.* § 49). Again, since men die from Hel to Niflhel, it is obvious that the former is a better place than the latter. Niflhel is the Hel which is surrounded by fog and gloom; Hel itself therefore cannot be so surrounded. In *Skírnirs-mál*, Gerda is told that she will suffer misery within the Na-gates (corpse-gates), and will sit on Are's perch looking longingly Hel-wards (*CPB* i. 114)—a passage suggestive of Hel as a place of bliss. In *Sonatorrek* the poet describes his dead son as having entered 'the path of Bliss' and gone to 'the City of the Bees-ship' (*CPB* i. 278–9), or to 'the world of the gods' (God-heim). The references are obscure, but may point to the usual abode of the dead or Hel.

An examination of the passages referring to the Ash Yggdrasil and its roots is significant. In *Grímnis-mál* it is said that under one root dwells Hel, under a second the Frost-giants, under a third 'mennzkir menn' (mortal men, *CPB* i. 73). But in *Gylfaginning*, § 15, one root is with the Asa, and there is Urd's fountain; one is over where Ginunnga-gap was, and there is Mimir's spring; the third is over Niflheim, and under it is the fountain Hvergelmir. By an obvious misunderstanding, one root is placed with the Asa, *i.e.* in Heaven (cf. Simrock, 36). But, as all the roots are in the under world, this root may correspond to that which *Grímnis.* places in Hel, and here in consequence is Urd's fountain, guarded by the Norni, who sprinkle the tree with its holy water (*Gylf.* § 16; cf. *Voluspa*, *CPB* i. 195), so that it may not wither or rot. Urd is possibly the equivalent of the goddess Hel (Rydberg, 308; Simrock, 340). The third root is in Niflheim, the place of punishment; the second, in Ginunnga-gap, must be midway between the others. Beneath it is Mimir's spring of mead, giving inspiration, wisdom, and poetry. Mimir drinks it every day; from it Odin obtained wisdom; and with it the root is watered (*Gylf.* § 15, *CPB* ii. 623). Here, too, must be placed Mimir's or Hoddmimer's Grove, where two human beings, Líf and Lífthrasir, are hidden away during the Monster-winter which precedes Ragnarok. They are fed on the dews which drip from Yggdrasil, produced from its being watered by Urd's fountain. They alone survive the final catastrophe, and from them a new generation will spring to re-people the renewed earth (*Vafthr.*, *CPB* i. 67; *Gylf.* § 53). Hence these, rather than men on the surface of the earth, may be the 'mennzkir menn' dwelling under a root of the tree. Líf and Lífthrasir, progenitors of the new race which is to people the new earth, 'green and fair, whose fields increase with sowing,' while 'all sorrows shall be healed,' must be pure and sinless. But that forest-clad earth rising out of the deep may simply be Mimir's grove, the hidden and sinless paradise hitherto in the under world.

Hel may thus mean the whole under world, exclusive of Niflhel, and in this sense it appears by no means as a place of gloom. This is already suggested by the passages cited from the poems; but when we add to this the facts that in the under world are Mimir's fountain of immortal mead, his grove of sinless beings, afterwards to be the glorious renewed earth, Urd's fountain beneath the ever-green branches of the ash, its waters 'so holy that everything which comes into this spring becomes as white as the skin which lieth within and cleaveth to the egg-shell' (*Gylf.* 16), and that the hall of Hel is decked for Balder's coming and furnished with mead, the suggestion becomes well-nigh a certainty.

To Urd's well the gods ride over Bifröst bridge to a daily judgment (*Gylf.* § 15; cf. *Grímnis.*, *CPB* i. 73). According to *Gylf.* they ride upwards from Asgard to Heaven; but as Asgard is in Heaven, and, as we have seen, Urd's well is situated in the under world, they must ride downwards. This Thingstead is not that held in Asgard, and Rydberg (p. 330 ff.) has shown that the gods come down daily to judge the dead who arrive there daily, and appoint them their places in Valhalla, in Hel, or in Niflhel. From definite statements, we know what crimes were punished in the other world—offences against the gods and against kinsmen, murder, adultery, perjury. Thus among those who did not pass to Valhalla—those dying a natural or straw death, practisers of the

peaceful arts of life, women and children, all who had pleased the gods, all who had been true to the claims of kindred, all who had kept themselves free from those gross sins—must have been awarded the bliss of the under world. All such could, 'with a good will and without fear, await death,' knowing that their course of life would 'do them good when they are dead' (*Sonatorrek*, *CPB* i. 280; cf. i. 42, 279, ii. 628; *Gylf.* [Loke] § 50, 52). To them were allotted the blissful regions of the under world—the 'green realms of the gods' (*Hakonar-mál*, *CPB* i. 264; cf. Rydberg, 319), with their hidden grove, their holy fountains, their 'paths of bliss.' Probably, too, they were given a draught which made them forget sorrows and gave them strength, composed of the liquids of those fountains, and drunk from the horn whence Mimir quaffed the mead of his well (*CPB* i. 197; cf. the mead which awaits Balder, and the 'costly draughts' which the dead Helgi drinks, i. 143). The mysteriously engraved horn from which Grimhild makes Gudrun drink and forget her wrongs, may be a late reminiscence of this draught of oblivion. The draught was composed from Urd's strength, ice-cold sea water, and the liquor of the Son, and on the horn are engraved unreaped corn ears from 'the land of Hadding,' the under world (*CPB* i. 34). See, for this section, Rydberg, 218 ff.

3. **Valhalla.**—Though Valhalla may be 'simply a Wicking faith, lasting some three generations at most,' and opposed to the strong family affection of the Northern heathen (*CPB* i. Introd. ci, 421), yet it is also noted in old Teutonic belief, in the conception of dead warriors dwelling in Odin's mountain. Valhalla was one of the dwellings of Asgard, the heaven of the gods, situated in Gladsheimr 'where the gold-bright Valhalla towers' (*Grímnis.*, *CPB* i. 70). To it all brave warriors hoped to go, though later tradition suggests that warriors who had committed 'nithing' actions or lived wickedly were excluded (Rydberg, 349). They were conducted thither by the Valkyries, who also waited upon them there. Valhalla was entirely a warrior's paradise; its beatitude was not that of peace, but of war. There the dead warriors dwelt with Odin, who welcomed them, ordering the benches to be got ready, the goblets prepared, and the wine brought by the Valkyries (*Eiriks-mál*, *CPB* i. 260). Descriptions of Valhalla are found in *Grímnis-mál* and in the Younger Edda. It is raftered with spears, it is decked with shields, its benches are strewn with coats of mail. A wolf hangs before the western door, an eagle hovers over it. The goat Heiðrun bites at the branches of the tree Learad (perhaps Yggdrasil), and from her teats runs mead which fills a vat every day, enough to satisfy all the warriors. The hart Eikthirnir bites at the branches, and from her horns fall drops which form the rivers on earth. So great was Valhalla that it possessed five hundred and forty doors. Every day the warriors, fully armed, issued from the gates to amuse themselves in combat with each other, returning to feast and drink heavenly mead from the cups presented to them by the Valkyries. They ate the flesh of the boar Sæhrimni, which was sodden every day and became whole again at even. Beside Valhalla stood Vingólf, the Hall of Friends, the abode of the goddesses. Grimm (ii. 820) points out that Vingólf is, in one poem, used synonymously with Valhalla, while it is also the name given in the Younger Edda (*Gylf.* § 3) to the place where the good and right-minded shall dwell after death. With Odin is associated Freyja, whose dwelling is called Folk-vangr, and who chooses one half of the slain, Odin the other. Elsewhere, however, it is dead women who expect to join Freyja (*Egils saga*, ch. 78). With the goddess Gefjon, who resembles Freyja, dwelt all who died virgins (*Gylf.* § 35; for Valhalla, cf. § 36, 38 ff.; *Grímnis-mál*, *Eiriks-mál*, and *Hakonar-mál*, *CPB* i. 70 ff., 260, 262).

4. **Elysium in folk-belief and saga.**—The Glasberg, or glass mountain, of *Marchen* and poetry, which in Slavonic belief represents an earlier conception of a mountain paradise, may be derived from Slavonic sources, or may be a misunderstanding of *Gladsheim*, but it may also be a purely Teutonic belief, since the Norse *glêrhiminn*, 'glass heaven,' is a paradise to which heroes ride (Grimm, ii. 820), and the mountain abode of the dead has already been met with. Beautiful subterranean meadows, reached through a well where Frau Holle dwells, also occur in *Marchen*, and are associated mainly with elves and kindred beings. Popular belief describes souls of the dying fluttering as butterflies or birds in these meadows (Grimm, ii. 829). These are doubtless reminiscences of the under world place of the dead, and with them may be compared the Rosengarten of mediæval poetry, now churchyards, now a kind of paradise. A series of more elaborate tales, analyzed by Rydberg, are certainly reminiscent of earlier pagan belief, and preserve many of the aspects of the under world already met with. In these travellers set out to seek *Ódáinsakr* or *Jorð lifanda manna*, the Land of Living Men, situated in one tale in the east, but more usually in the north, and apparently underground.

These tales in their present form belong to the period between the 12th and 14th cent., and are mainly found in Saxo and in the sagas. Gudmund is ruler of the Glittering Plains, situated in the north or Jötunheim; he and his men are heathen, and of a vast age. After his death he was worshipped by his people as a god. Ódáinsakr is situated in his land, and is 'so healthy that sickness and age depart, and no one ever dies there' (*Hervararsaga*, Rydberg, 210–11).

(*a*) In the Flatey-book (14th cent.) Helge Thoreson is described as journeying to the north, where, lost in a forest, he met twelve maidens, one of them being Gudmund's daughter, Ingeborg. With them he stayed three days, and on leaving was given chests of gold and silver. Next Yule night he was carried from his home by two men, re-appearing a year later with them. The strangers gave king Olaf two golden horns as a gift from Gudmund. They were filled with wine and given to the strangers to drink, the wine having been previously blessed by a bishop. The heathen messengers cast the horns away, and disappeared with Helge amidst great confusion. One year later Helge re-appeared with his eyes plucked out. He had spent many days happily in Gudmund's realm, but king Olaf's prayers had made it impossible for Gudmund and Ingeborg to keep him. The latter plucked his eyes out, lest any mortal maiden should fall in love with him (Saxo Grammaticus, *Danish History*, London, 1894, Introd. lxviii; Rydberg, 210).

(*b*) Saxo relates that king Gorm set out to seek a mysterious treasure land in the north ruled by king Geirrod in the under world. After passing through many dangers, they were met by Geirrod's brother Gudmund, who led them along a river till they reached a golden bridge. This he warned them not to cross, as the region beyond was not open to mortals. Continuing up the river, they reached Gudmund's hall, where, warned by their pilot Thorkill, they refused to touch food or drink lest their memory should be lost, and they should have to remain with Gudmund's people for ever. Gorm also refused Gudmund's daughter in marriage. But four of his men fell victims to the charms of the women of this land, and became imbeciles. Gorm also refused the delicious fruits of Gudmund's garden. The party were now conducted across the river, and reached Geirrod's realm, a foul and evil place, full of miserable folk, some of them punished by Thor. Finally, they reached a place where they saw cisterns of mead, a vast decorated horn, and other treasures. Some of the party seized these treasures, which changed to swords and serpents and slew them. In another place, other treasures, including a rich mantle, were seen. Thorkill himself seized the mantle, when the place rang with shrieks, and the party was attacked by its inhabitants. Only twenty of them returned to the river and to Gudmund, who vainly tempted them to remain with him. They finally returned home in safety (Saxo, 344 ff.; Rydberg, 212).

(*c*) Saxo has also preserved the story of king Hadding. One winter's day he saw a woman rise out of the ground, with fresh herbs in her lap. Hadding desired to know where such plants could grow in winter. Wrapping him in her mantle, she drew him underground, through a region of fog and darkness, till they reached a river where spears and weapons were tossed about. On one side of it they met some noble beings, clad in rich robes.

Passing them, they reached a sunny region (the Glittering Plains), whence the woman had obtained the flowers. On the other side of the river, which was crossed by a bridge, were seen the souls of dead warriors playing at battle. Finally, they came to a mysterious place, surrounded by an impassable wall. This was the land of life. The woman wrung the neck of a bird and threw it over the wall, when it was at once restored to life (Saxo, 37; Rydberg, 216).

(*d*) A saga in Flatey-book tells of king Erik, who with a large company set out to seek Ódáinsakr in the far east. They finally reached a river, with a bridge guarded by a dragon. Erik and one of his men rushed at the dragon, and were swallowed by it. But they found themselves in a beautiful flowery plain, with rivers of honey, and full of sunlight. They travelled through, finding no inhabitants, and reached a tower suspended in the air, with a ladder leading up to it. They entered the tower, and found in it a room carpeted with velvet, a table with rich food in gold and silver dishes, and two beds. Convinced that they had reached Ódáinsakr, they ate and drank and slept. During his sleep Erik was visited by his guardian angel, who told him this was Ódáinsakr, or Jörð lifanda manna. This region lay near the Christian paradise which was so glorious that, compared with it, Ódáinsakr seemed a desert. Here they were permitted to remain six days, and then they returned home.

Late as these stories are, they are yet so near to the pagan age of the north that, in spite of possible classical literary and Christian influences, they preserve much of the earlier eschatology. Ódáinsakr is clearly differentiated from the Christian paradise, while Gudmund and his people are pagan. The river with its golden bridge has already been met with in the pagan descriptions of the under world, and in these tales its further side seems to be tenanted by the souls of the dead, while in the Hadding story the dead warriors fighting suggest a reminiscence of Valhalla. The evil region in the story of Gorm may reflect the tortures of Niflhel, while the place with its cisterns of mead, the richly decorated horn, and the treasures, are reminiscent of the Eddaic descriptions of the blissful under world. Rydberg (228 ff.) also identifies Gudmund with Mimir, and shows reasons for believing that Ódáinsakr, within the Glittering Plains, the mysterious walled place in the Hadding story, and the tower in the Erik saga with its two beds, are the equivalents of Mimir's grove, where Líf and Lífthasir, progenitors of the new race of men, are preserved. To them would appropriately belong the title 'living men,' and to their hidden grove that of *Jörð lifanda manna*. 'In Gudmund's domain there is a splendid grove, an enclosed place, from which weaknesses, age, and death are banished—a Paradise of the peculiar kind that is not intended for the souls of the dead, but for certain *lifandi menn*, yet is inaccessible to people in general. In the myth concerning Mimir we also find such a grove' (Rydberg, 231). Thus, while this Elysian land of Gudmund's, with its deathless Ódáinsakr, is one of beauty and joy, to which daring mortals may penetrate and receive a welcome, it is closely connected with the realms of the dead—Hel, Valhalla, and Niflhel,—unlike the Celtic Elysium. Unlike the latter, too, it is not a land of the gods, but of a giant race, and is associated with Jötunheim; it is not an island Elysium, but a northern and subterranean one (cf. Nutt and Meyer, *Voyage of Bran*, 1895, i. 308; BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Celtic]). The idea that the food of this region is dangerous to mortals corresponds with the universal belief that to eat the food of the dead or of fairies is dangerous.

5. The divine Elysium.—In the Golden Age of the gods, before they lost their happy state through the Titan maids from Jötunheim, they dwelt in Iðavöllr, where they raised high places and temples, setting forges, fashioning treasures, shaping tongs, and making tools. 'They played at tables in the court and were happy, they lacked not gold' (*Vǫluspa*, *CPB* i. 194). But after the restoration they dwell in Iðavöllr once more, and it is said to be 'where Asgard was before' (*Völuspa*, *ib.* i. 201; *Gylf.* § 53).

See also STATE OF THE DEAD (Teutonic).

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BLINDNESS. — **1. Definitions.** — 'Blindness' signifies inability to see, or absence of the sense of sight; hence, figuratively, want of discernment, or defective intellectual, moral, or spiritual sight. 'Word-blindness' is an acquired condition in which a person loses the power of reading written or printed words, although he can see objects; thus the letters on a printed page can be seen but are not recognized. 'Mind-blindness' is an acquired condition in which objects can be seen, but fail to be recognized by the sense of sight. 'Half-blindness' is a condition in which there is loss of one-half of the field of vision of one eye, or more commonly of both eyes.

2. Causes of blindness.—Blindness may be due to lesions of the eye, of the conducting path from the retina to the brain, or of the brain itself.

(1) *The eyes.*—Blindness may result from a loss of transparency of the cornea (nebula, leucoma), of the lens (cataract), of the vitreous humour; from effusion of blood or pus into the anterior or posterior chambers; from occlusion of the pupil; from various affections of the choroid and retina; from changes following increased intra-ocular tension (glaucoma). Destructive inflammation of one eye, such as often follows injury, is apt to be followed by a similar inflammation of the other eye (sympathetic inflammation). Ophthalmia neonatorum, an infectious inflammation contracted during birth, is the chief cause of blindness in early childhood.

(2) *The conducting paths.*—Inflammation of the optic nerve (optic neuritis) is an important cause of blindness. It commonly ends in atrophy (white atrophy) of the optic disc or beginning of the nerve within the eye. Grey atrophy of the disc, also a cause of blindness, is a primary degenerative condition, not resulting from inflammation.

The optic nerves pass back from the eyes and meet at the optic chiasma, at the base of the brain, where a re-arrangement of their fibres takes place in such a way that the fibres from the outer half of each retina pass into the optic tract of the same side, while the fibres from the inner half of each retina pass into the optic tract of the opposite side. The result of this is that, while a lesion destroying the continuity of one optic nerve causes total blindness of the corresponding eye, a lesion of one optic tract results in blindness of the corresponding half of each retina. Thus destruction of the right optic tract causes blindness of the outer (right) half of the right retina, and of the inner (right) half of the left retina. Blindness of the right half of each retina results in blindness of the left half of the field of vision, and this condition is called left-sided half-blindness or hemianopsia.

(3) *The brain.*—The fibres of the optic tract pass into the occipital lobe of the brain, and destruction of the visual centre in either occipital lobe produces hemianopsia just as in the case of the optic tract. Destruction of both visual centres would cause double hemianopsia, that is to say, complete blindness. Lesions of the left occipital lobe, but not of the right, may also be attended, according to their extent, by 'word-blindness,' or 'mind-blindness'—conditions which have already been defined. This difference between the effect of lesions of the left and of the right side of the brain is simply an example of the general fact that all the speech functions (speaking, reading, writing) have their special centres in the left side of the brain only. Apart from affections of the special centres for vision, gross lesions in any part of the brain may cause blindness by setting up optic neuritis.

3. Statistics of blindness.—The proportion of blind among the general population is much greater in tropical than in temperate regions. In temper-

ate regions generally the proportion is about 1 in 1000. In civilized countries the proportion of blind shows a steady decrease in recent years. Thus in the United Kingdom in 1851, 1 person was blind in every 979. The proportion has now fallen to 1 in 1285. Owing to occupation there are more males than females afflicted with blindness.

The following statistics are taken from the census tables of 1901, and refer to England and Wales:

		Males.	Females.
Persons	32,507,843	15,728,613	16,779,230
Blind	25,317	13,136	12,181
„ (1891)	23,467	12,281	11,186
Blind from childhood	4,621	2,468	2,153
„ (1891)	4,005	2,194	1,811
Blind, Deaf and Dumb	58	36	22
Blind and Dumb	23	14	9
Blind and Deaf	389	144	245

4. Psychology of the blind.—In comparing the blind with normal individuals, it must be remembered that the great majority of the blind lost their sight in adult life. In such persons we are not likely to find any special mental peculiarities, beyond their personal reactions to their misfortune. It is quite different when sight is lost in early childhood. The whole course of mental development must be profoundly modified in cases where the acquisition of knowledge, the training of the intellect, and the formation of tastes and habits must proceed without the faculty of vision playing any part in the process.

Perhaps one of the earliest peculiarities to be noticed in blind children is a tendency to bodily inaction. The blind child is often content to sit quite still for considerable periods of time, at an age when a normal child would not be still for an instant. The games of blind children are often lacking in animation. Of course there are many individual exceptions to this statement, but a tendency to inaction is general, and seems to be most marked in those whose blindness is total, so that the sense even of light is lacking. This sluggishness of body is usually ascribed to the absence of the stimulating effect of light. There is no doubt that light is a very powerful stimulus to the nervous system, and children who spend much time in imperfectly-lighted rooms are usually languid and feeble. Another factor in the case, however, may be the natural tendency of the guardians of a blind child to restrict its movements and anticipate its wants in case of its meeting with some injury if left to itself.

This tendency to muscular repose doubtless reacts upon the mental state. As an anonymous writer on this subject expresses it, the blind, as a class, are 'seldom characterized by that rapidity and intensity of mental action, that keenness of penetration, which pierces at once to the very heart of a matter,—that *vivida vis animi* which is the characteristic of the highest genius. Their intellects are in general cautious, calm, deliberative, slow, distinguished rather by soundness than by brilliancy. . . . The fact that their attachments are generally of a calm and equable kind, formed on judgment and "right reason" rather than upon those inexplicable attractions which so often bind others together; the infrequency with which they seem to give way to strong impulses of affection, and a certain want of geniality and expansiveness which has often been noted in them,—may also, no doubt, in fact be attributed to the same cause' (*National Review*, 1860, p. 92).

The blind depend upon the sense of touch to so large an extent for their knowledge of the outer world, that tactile sensibility becomes developed by constant practice to a very high degree of acuteness, and many astonishing things are related of the discriminative ability of some blind folks. Blind people have been able to play cards by means of small marks upon the cards which they were able to distinguish, but which escaped the eye and touch of those who saw. The sensibility of the fingers is greatly improved by practice, and blind people often take special care to keep the epidermis of the finger tips soft in order that their delicate susceptibility may be preserved. The lips and tip of the tongue, naturally more sensitive than the fingers, are often made use of by blind persons in cases where the fingers are unable to perceive sufficiently clearly. The skin of the face often becomes very sensitive to the proximity of solid bodies, and the tympanic membranes are credited with the power of rendering perceptible vibrations of the atmosphere too slight to be recognized as sound.

Mr. W. Hanks Levy, a blind writer, gives an interesting account of his own power of recognizing neighbouring objects. 'Whether within a house or in the open air,' he says, 'whether walking or standing still, I can tell, although quite blind, whether I am opposite an object, and can perceive whether it be tall or short, slender or bulky. I can also detect whether it be a solitary object or a continuous fence; whether it be a close fence or composed of open rails; and often whether it be a wooden fence, a brick or stone wall, or a quick-set hedge. I cannot usually perceive objects if much lower than my shoulder, but sometimes very low objects can be detected. . . . The only part of my body possessing this power is my face; this I have ascertained by suitable experiments. Stopping my ears does not interfere with it, but covering my face with a thick veil destroys it altogether' (*Blindness and the Blind*, London, 1872).

Some writers on the blind make the curious assertion that they have no sense of space, that they live only in time, that their little world is circumscribed by the narrow circle which they can span with their own arms. This assertion, however, seems to be altogether preposterous, and is sufficiently refuted by the facts quoted above from Mr. Levy. The delight blind people often take in travelling, especially with a companion who can describe the scenery passed by, is also opposed to the idea. Blind men may even enjoy mountaineering, and a blind man who had been to the top of Mont Blanc wrote to the papers recently stating that no one could have enjoyed the view more than he had done. There is no doubt, of course, that a blind man's conception of space must differ greatly from our own, but a conception of space derived from touch, from movement, and from sound, he certainly has.

Sounds, also, cannot fail to play an important part in giving to the blind a sense of the beyond; and where we think of an object getting smaller as it recedes in the distance, a blind man would think of the modification produced by distance in the sound. When a blind man is out walking, the variations and mutations of familiar sounds constitute a source of interest and pleasure. The distance of objects can often be gauged with wonderful accuracy, and a case is quoted of a blind gentleman who could practise archery with considerable expertness, his aim being directed by a bell placed behind the target.

Conversation is naturally a source of great pleasure to the blind, and, indeed, it means even more to them than to us, because they rely upon their auditory impressions to furnish that commentary upon the speaker's words which we find in the play of expression. It is a curious trait in the blind that they seem to take a special pleasure in descriptions of the visual appearance of things. In their conversation they make much use of visual imagery, and always speak of going to see places and things. No doubt the impressions from which they are necessarily for ever shut out have for that very reason a special attraction. A well-known teacher of the blind tells the writer that there is no subject in which his pupils manifest greater interest than the study of optics.

The general characteristic of the mind of the blind is rather curiously described as synthetical

by some writers, and as analytical by others. W. James, *e.g.*, writes (*Princ. of Psych.* ii. 203):

'The blind man's construction of real space differs from that of the seeing man most obviously in the larger part which synthesis plays in it, and the relative subordination of analysis. The seeing baby's eyes take in the whole room at once, and discriminative attention must arise in him before single objects are visually discerned. The blind child, on the contrary, must form his mental image of the room by the addition, piece to piece, of parts which he learns to know successively.'

On the other hand, M. Dufau speaks of the mind of the blind as characteristically analytical. If we compare the manner in which the seeing and the blind acquire a knowledge of some object, for example, a plant, we find that the former 'casts a glance upon it, envelops it with a look, and his task is done; he has a general idea of it with which he generally contents himself, because it is sufficient to enable him to recognize and to name the object. The blind man, on the contrary, is obliged to examine, to touch with the utmost care, the stalk, the branches, the leaves; to acquire, in short, a complete and detailed idea of the plant, without which it would be impossible for him to distinguish it from others. Thus it is that necessity makes analysis a habit to him, which retards his acquisition of knowledge, but at the same time renders it more positive and more certain' (Dufau, *Des Aveugles*, 1850, p. 43).

Although these two descriptions at first appear somewhat opposed to each other, it is obvious enough on consideration that both are true so far as they go. In building up his conception of the world about him, the blind man must analyze, and, having analyzed, he must put together. The two processes are carried out by him much more carefully and systematically than by the seeing, and the results are carefully pondered. It is doubtless owing to this natural tendency to analysis and re-construction that the blind owe their wonderful power of observation, and to the same tendency we may trace the fact that science seems to attract the educated blind much more strongly than imaginative literature or poetry.

Cases of blind persons recovering their sight in adult life are not numerous, and such as are known have naturally attracted a good deal of interest. This interest has to a great extent centred around what is known as Molyneux' problem. This was as follows:

'Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere, . . . so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see; query, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?' (see Locke, *Essay*, II. ix. 8).

To this query Molyneux himself answered in the negative, and Locke agreed with him. A contrary opinion was expressed by Dr. Franz and Sir W. Hamilton, and the former had an opportunity not long afterwards of testing the soundness of his views. His patient when operated on was seventeen years of age, and he was familiar with geometrical figures. When some of the early confusion following the operation had passed off, he was shown a vertical and a horizontal line, and these he was able to name correctly; but on being asked to point out which was the horizontal line, he indicated the wrong one, afterwards correcting himself. This error evidently means that no association had yet been found between the senses of sight and touch. He was next shown an outline of a square, 6 inches in diameter, within which was a circle, and within this a triangle. He was asked to describe these figures, and after careful examination, he succeeded in doing so correctly.

A recent case of the same kind has been described by Dr. A. Maitland Ramsay of Glasgow. This was a young man of thirty, totally blind from birth, but able to distinguish day from night. For some days after the operation of removal of the lenses the patient appeared quite dazed, and could not realize that he was seeing. The size of everything in the ward seemed very much exaggerated, and on that account he had great difficulty in interpreting what he saw. When asked to distinguish between a ball and a brick, he looked at them attentively for a considerable time, his hands meanwhile moving nervously, as if he were trying to translate what he saw, by comparing it with an imaginary tactile impression, and then he named both correctly. He explained that he was so much in the habit of handling objects that he had come to have a 'notion in his mind' regarding the form of things.

5. The education and care of the blind.—The Jewish code contains special beneficent enactments regarding blind persons; such as, 'Thou shalt not . . . put a stumblingblock before the blind, but thou shalt fear thy God' (Lv 19^{14}). The idea, however, of making the care of the blind a public charge is quite modern, although as long ago as 1265 one institution for the blind was founded, the Hospice des Quinze Vingts, wherein St. Louis IX. provided for the needs of three hundred knights who had lost their eyesight in the Crusades.

The first idea of educating the blind by means of the sense of touch appears to have originated with Valentein Hauy, a native of Picardy, about the year 1783. Haüy's first pupil was a blind beggar, whom he paid to receive instruction. The practicability of teaching the blind to read from raised characters having been proved, public interest was aroused, and Haüy was able in 1785 to found the first 'School for the Young Blind.' Haüy afterwards visited St. Petersburg, at the invitation of the Government, to superintend the establishment in that city of a similar institution. The Liverpool School for the Blind was founded in 1791, and was followed two years later by the Edinburgh Blind Asylum, which became one of the most successful schools of the kind in the world. The success of these schools has led to the multiplication of such institutions all over the civilized world. The instruction given in most of them is of a mixed character, the pupils being taught to read from raised characters, and receiving lessons in the usual school subjects, while their future is kept in view, and instruction is provided in different trades, whereby they may maintain themselves in after life. A few schools provide an education of a more special kind, such as the Normal College and Academy for Music.

The method of teaching the blind to read has had an interesting evolution. Haüy originally made use of the script form of the Roman letter. Subsequently quite a number of forms of embossed type were introduced. The first of these was brought forward by James Gall, of Edinburgh, in 1827. He made use of the Roman letter, but for ease of recognition, all the curves were changed to angles. In this type there was published in 1834 the Gospel of St. John. The first Gospel was printed in raised type for the blind. Other modifications of the Roman letter were introduced by Howe, Alston, and Fry. Various stenographic and phonetic systems were also brought forward, but were discarded on the ground that they did not teach correct spelling.

To get over the difficulty sometimes experienced in passing from one line to the next, Frere introduced his ingenious return line. The finger travels along one line from left to right and is then guided by an embossed curve to the line below, which is read from right to left. On this lower line the characters are printed in the reverse way, in order that the finger, moving in the reverse direction, may meet them in the same order as when reading from left to right.

Moon's type, which became very popular, is a modification of the Roman character, but arbitrary signs are also made use of. Frere's return line is adopted, but the characters are not reversed in the return lines. Moon's type is still made use of to some extent, and the Gospel which blind men may be seen reading in the streets is commonly printed in it. It has, however, two great drawbacks. Books printed in this type are very expensive; and they are very bulky. A single Gospel, for example, fills a large volume.

This multiplicity of types was naturally attended by many inconveniences. A blind man who learned to read one type could not read books published in another, and a book printed in any of the embossed types could obtain a circulation only among the blind who were acquainted with that type. Accordingly, a number of gentlemen founded The British and Foreign Blind Association, and set themselves to find and bring into general use the type best adapted to the needs of the blind. This

they found in none of the varieties to which we have referred. Their researches resulted in the introduction into England in 1868 of a type which had been invented by a blind Frenchman forty years before. This type, which is now in general use, is called the Braille, after Louis Braille, its inventor. The advantages claimed for it are: that the letters are easily recognized; that they can be written by the blind themselves in such a way as to be legible to themselves or other people who know the characters; that books can be printed in much smaller bulk and at a much smaller cost than in the case of other types for the blind.

The principle of the Braille system is very simple. The letters are formed of raised dots of which the maximum number is six, arranged in three pairs placed one above another— ⠿ Any of these dots may be omitted, the letters of the alphabet, punctuation marks, and a number of other signs being formed by one, two, three or more of the dots variously arranged, as may be seen in the alphabet printed below. It will be noticed that neither of the two dots constituting the lowest pair is present in any of the characters of the upper line; each of the characters of the second line resembles the character immediately above it, plus one of the lowest dots; while the characters of the third line differ from those above only in the presence of both dots of the lowest pair. This arrangement obviously greatly reduces the difficulty of learning the symbols.

The Braille Alphabet and some Contractions.

(The large dots represent the raised points of the Braille letters).

1st line	A	B but	C Christ	D	E every	F from	G God	H have	I	J Jesus
2nd line	K	L Lord	M	N not	O	P people	Q quite	R right	S some	T that
3rd line	U unto	V very	X	Y you	Z	&	for	of	the	with
4th line	ch child	gh	sh shall	th this	wh which	ed	er	on	ow	w will

The Braille characters have also been adopted for the printing of music, so that a blind musician can learn a new piece of music by following the score with one hand while he plays the keys with the other.

A large number of standard works have now been published in the Braille type, and are sold at a moderate price. At the Edinburgh School for the Blind, a monthly magazine, *Hora Jucunda*, has been published since 1893. It was started and edited by Mr. W. H. Illingworth, a former headmaster of the school. Each number contains sixty large pages of interesting and amusing matter, and a piece of music; and the price is one shilling. The British and Foreign Blind Association also publishes magazines in Braille.

Mr. J. W. M'Laren, of Edinburgh, recently invented a method whereby the printing of books in Braille type is greatly simplified, and the cost vastly reduced. The Braille Printing and Publishing Co., St. Giles Street, Edinburgh, was founded to print books by this new method, and for some time a magazine for the blind, the *Braille Weekly*, was published every Saturday at the price of one penny. Dr. John Brown's famous story, *Rab and his Friends*, printed by the new method, was issued at the price of sixpence. The story occupies fifty-two quarto pages. As books of this class naturally depend upon a very limited public for circulation, it would be a good thing if some central publishing company could not only stock all the books printed by this method, but control the class of books to be published, and prevent overlapping and the same book being printed by different people.

Writing in Braille characters is carried out by means of a writing frame. The paper is covered with a piece of brass containing a double row of oblong perforations. By means of a stylus, each letter is impressed upon the paper through one of the perforations. To read the writing the paper must be reversed, when the depressions produced by the stylus will be felt by the finger as raised dots.

When the blind wish to write so as to be read by the seeing, they may use a pencil and a guiding frame. Some blind persons who lost their sight in adult life have become very expert at this kind of writing, but for those who have been blind from childhood there is no doubt that the best plan is to use a typewriter. Here the expense may be an objection, but this has been got over by Mr. Illingworth, who recommends for the purpose a cheap form of typewriter which costs only a few shillings. In this instrument the rubber type projects from the under surface of a revolving disc, and, by placing on the upper surface above each letter the corresponding character in Braille, the blind pupil can easily find the letter he needs, bring it into place, and print it on the paper. It will be noticed that, by using a typewriter, the blind scribe actually writes in a character with which he may not be acquainted, and is thus saved the trouble of learning two totally distinct alphabets. It is curious to recall the fact that the Braille type was violently opposed on the ground that the letters were entirely arbitrary symbols, as if the characters of the Roman or Greek alphabets were anything else. Obviously, it is no more confusing for the blind to call a couple of dots the letter *b* than it is for the French to call a cabbage a *chou*.

Arithmetic is taught to the blind by means of a

tablet containing rows of octagonal holes. A peg can be placed in any of these holes, in eight possible positions representing the numbers 1 to 8; to obtain 9 and 0, the peg is inverted and placed in positions 1 and 2. The two ends of the peg, of course, differ so as to be readily recognizable by touch.

A somewhat similar device is made use of for teaching algebra. Raised maps are used for geography, and models and natural objects are freely used for class purposes.

6. The care of young blind children.—When sight is lost in early childhood, a good deal can be done by judicious foresight to assist the teacher, when the child is old enough to go to school. Teachers of the blind complain that, when children come to them, they do not know how to use their hands; that they are lacking in confidence, and can do nothing for themselves; that their muscles are soft and weak; and that, in short, a great deal of time has to be given to exercises and gymnastics intended to train the muscles and the sense of touch before education, in the school sense, can be started. These faults depend very largely on the fact that the child's relatives, not unnaturally, have done everything for him. They have dressed him, washed him, and fed him. They have led him from place to place. They have perhaps never thought of giving him toys to play with. They have prevented him from going about by himself, for fear of accidents. In some cases they have even kept the child in bed for years, or taken him about only in a perambulator, in case he might hurt himself. Such treatment, although kindly meant, is really cruel to the child. The proper course of procedure is quite the opposite. The proper method of dealing with a young child who is blind may be expressed in a sentence: *Treat him exactly as if he could see.* The child should have toys to play with as soon as he can grasp. When he can creep about, he should be allowed to do so. He should be expected and encouraged to walk as soon as other infants. As soon as he can move about, he should be allowed to explore the room for himself, and discover the properties of the furniture it contains. While care should, of course, be taken to prevent any serious accidents (dangerous places such as stairs or fires being guarded), obstacles should not be taken out of the child's way, nor should he be warned if he is going to walk against something. No doubt, it is very difficult for any kindly person to see a blind child in the act of walking against a chair, without quickly stopping him or snatching the chair out of his way; but if the child is ever to gain confidence, and to be able to walk about freely without fear of running into walls and lamp-posts, he must learn by hard experience in his nursery days. So, also, as the child gets older, he should be encouraged to feed himself; to undress, and later to dress himself; to fold his clothes, and put them away; to put his toys away when he has finished playing with them, and to fetch them for himself when he wants them. He should be taught to use his hands in every possible way. Many of the kindergarten occupations are useful for this purpose, and the sorting and threading of beads is valuable as affording a training in sensitiveness to the finger tips. The handling of small beads is a useful preparation for the later study of Braille.

7. Advice to those likely to lose their sight.—When blindness occurs from disease in later years, the loss of sight is usually gradual, and, after it is known that ultimate blindness is inevitable, months, or even years, may elapse during which some sight remains. Persons so affected should be advised to set about training their other senses, and especially the sense of touch, without delay. The Braille alphabet can soon be learned, and, in practising reading, the sight which remains will be of great assistance. Braille writing should also be systematically practised. Various everyday tasks, such as dressing and undressing, should be practised with the eyes closed. When any real difficulty presents itself, of course, the eyes may be opened for a moment, but, as far as possible, the sufferer should try to accustom himself by degrees to the life he will before long have to live, so that, when the day of total darkness does come, it will not find him wholly unprepared.

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BLISS.—See BLESSEDNESS and BLEST (ABODE).

BLOOD. — 1. Physiological and Psychological.—Blood consists of a fluid portion, known as plasma, and of corpuscles (white, red, and 'platelets'), the latter forming its nutritive element. 'Average blood may be regarded as consisting of ⅔ plasma and ⅓ corpuscles' (Huxley, *Physiology*, p. 105). The inner function of the blood has been compared by physiologists with the outer function of the air and food supply. 'It is absolutely essential to the life of every part of the body that it should be in such relation with a current of blood that matters can pass freely from the blood to it, and from it to the blood, by transudation through the walls of the vessels in which the blood is contained' (*ib.* p. 116). Thus, the blood is literally the vehicle of life throughout the organism, and this function is discharged by means of its constant circulation from the left lower cavity of the heart through the arteries, and back through the veins to its right upper cavity. The nourishment of the blood itself is derived by absorption from the food which enters the intestines; the venous blood is changed into arterial blood by absorption of oxygen through the lungs, this second or pulmonary circulation being maintained from the right lower cavity of the heart to its left upper cavity. It is evident that the true function of the blood could not be understood until its circulation was demonstrated, as was done by Harvey in his *Exercitatio*, published in 1628 (Foster, *History of Physiology*, 1901, p. 42). Of this circulation the ancient world was ignorant, and consequently of the precise ministry of the blood to life. Aristotle (B.C. 384–322) 'knew only of its direct passage from the heart to the extremities, and of its movement to the brain and return. . . . The brain, being the coldest organ of the body, performed the function, Aristotle supposed, of reducing and regulating the temperature of the blood' (Hammond, *Aristotle's Psychology*, p. 227 n.). Galen (A.D. 130–*c.* 210) taught that the liver converts food into crude blood, giving it the 'natural spirits.' In the heart, some of this blood is mixed with air drawn from the lungs, and by the innate heat of the heart is laden with 'vital spirits' (Foster, *op. cit.* p. 12 f.). This was the accepted doctrine for thirteen centuries, until the dawn of modern physiology. The pulmonary circulation was described by Servetus in 1546, and, probably in dependence on him, by Realdus Columbus in 1559 (*ib.* p. 30 f.); whilst Cæsalpinus, a little later, 'recognized that the

flow of blood to the tissues took place by the arteries and by the arteries alone, and that the return of the blood from the tissues took place by the veins and not by the arteries (*ib.* p. 35). Fabricius described the valves of the veins in 1574 (*ib.* p. 36). But his pupil, William Harvey, was 'the first to demonstrate the circulation of the blood. . . . The essential feature of Harvey's new view was that the blood through the body was the same blood, coursing again and again through the body, passing from arteries to veins in the tissues, and from veins to arteries through the lungs, heart, suffering changes in the substance and pores of the tissues, changes in the substance and pores of the lungs' (*ib.* p. 47). Thus, the long-established doctrine of 'spirits' was discredited, and the study of physiology separated from that of pseudo-psychology.

But primitive man did not need to wait for Harvey in order to be taught the significance of blood in relation to life. However ignorant he might be of the precise relation, common observation showed the dependence of life on the blood within the body of man or animal. Loss of blood meant loss of strength, and a man's life seemed to drain away with the blood from a mortal wound. Thus Homer can speak either of the soul (ψυχή, *Il.* xiv. 518) or of the blood (αἷμα, xvii. 86) as passing away through the inflicted wound (cf. Robinsohn, *Psychol. der Naturvölker*, p. 18; Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol. und Religionsgesch.* p. 728); the identity is affirmed explicitly, *e.g.*, amongst the Hebrews, in the phrase 'the blood is the life' (Dt 12^{23}, where 'life' is literally 'soul'); and even a thinker like Empedocles could regard blood as the seat of thought or perception (Rohde, *Psyche*[2], 1898, ii. 176; Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[2], 1908, p. 288). For us, however, to repeat 'the blood is the life' means something quite different from the early usage, and the difference is of fundamental importance for the subject before us. By such a phrase we should imply that blood is essential to the living activity of the organism, and that life is not possible without blood. But primitive thought meant to assert that the life *is* the blood, and *vice versa*: when the blood left the body, *it carried the life with it*. Thus, in the Qur'ān, xcvi. 2, God is said to have created man from clotted blood; in Burma this is kept and eaten on special occasions (Elworthy, *Evil Eye*, 1895, p. 112). This is the explanation of the numerous customs that illustrate the perils and powers of blood for the ancient mind; this is the key to many important institutions. To the modern mind, blood which has left its organism is no more than any other fluid, except for a certain amount of sentiment, which may be itself an inheritance from the past; but for the ancient mind, blood, even when shed, was still perilous and potent, full of latent life, and capable of working on persons or things in contact with it. The illustration of these ideas belongs to the following sections; here it remains to show, by instances selected from a very large material, the nature of the idea of a blood-soul. The Arabs used the word for 'soul,' *nafs*, cognate with the Heb. *nephesh*, in the sense of blood. 'When a man dies a natural death, his life departs through the nostrils . . . but when he is slain in battle "his life flows on the spear point"' (Robertson Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2] p. 40 n.). Belief in the blood-soul explains their custom of not washing the slain, and of burying the Muslim 'martyrs' in their blood, according to Muhammad's commands at Uhud (Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*[2], p. 178, n. 3). Robinsohn quotes a remarkable story of an Arab newly-married man attacked, when with his wife, by an overpowering force. He thereupon killed her, smeared himself with her blood, and fought till he fell, by this means uniting her soul with his own (*op. cit.* p. 25). Similarly, we may read of the Australian initiation custom, after circumcision: 'The boy was lifted up, and standing above the two Thungallum men, allowed some of the blood to drip down on to their backs, thus establishing a special friendly relationship between himself and them' (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 372; further examples collected by Frazer, *GB*[3] i. 356). Or we find that the Caribs 'sprinkle a male infant with its father's blood to give him his father's courage' (H. Spencer, *Sociology*, i. 116). We even find that amongst the West African natives the skeletons of Ashanti kings are washed with the blood of human victims (Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples*, p. 168)—doubtless to impart soul-life to the dead. Another group of examples shows us the use of blood as a substitute for life (Tylor, ii. 402), and the wide-spread avoidance of blood as food is by some peoples explicitly traced to the identity of the soul and the blood (examples collected in Frazer, *op. cit.* i. 353). So natural, indeed, is it among primitive people for death to come by blood-shedding that 'it is always held uncanny in Africa if a person dies without shedding blood' (Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa*, p. 524); in other words, the blood is the normal and visible soul. What may be the precise relation of this blood-soul to other ideas of soul, such as its identification with breath or shadow, is probably left quite indeterminate in most cases. Skeat cites a curious Malay belief which connects the blood-soul with the shadow-soul through a small snail. 'Among the grass in the shadow of a grazing animal these creatures are to be discovered, and if one of them is crushed, it will be found to be full of blood, which has been drawn in a mysterious way from the veins of the animal through its shadow' (*Malay Magic*, p. 306).

2. The perils of blood are a natural result of that idea of the blood-soul which has just been indicated —'the almost universal belief that blood is a fluid in which inheres mysterious potency, no less dangerous when misused than efficacious when properly employed' (Moore, *EBi*, art. 'Sacrifice,' § 43). It is with the former aspect that we are first concerned, and its most obvious example is that tabu on blood as food with which the OT makes us familiar; cf. 1 S 14^{32-35}, where we see that the blood, which is too perilous and mysterious to be man's food (Smend, *AT. Rel.-gesch.*[2] p. 142), must be offered on the sacred stone to Jahweh before man can eat the flesh with impunity. The prohibition of blood as food meets us, as a definite law, in Dt $12^{16.\ 23-25}$ 15^{23}; here it is not offered in sacrifice, but when animals are slain for ordinary food it is to be poured out on the ground; for the same prohibition in the Priestly Code, cf. Gn 9^{4}, Lv 3^{17} $7^{26.\ 27}$ 17 *passim*, 19^{26}. Frazer cites examples of the same tabu from the customs of Esthonians, American Indians, Romans, Arabs, and Papuans (i. 353). Further, the perils of blood are well illustrated in the precautions taken by many peoples in killing men or animals. It is not the actual killing, but the literal shedding of blood which constitutes the danger, since blood actually shed means mysterious soul-power let loose. Consequently, the actual shedding of blood in killing is to be avoided, if possible; this is probably the explanation of many curious methods of judicial execution (Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa*, p. 525; Frazer, i. 354 f.; Jevons, *Introd. Hist. Rel.* p. 73 f.) which in themselves might seem simply refinements of cruelty. To remind us that the peril is in the actual blood shed, not in any moral element of guilt incurred, we find the same unwillingness to shed blood in the case of animals amongst the Wanika and Damaras of Africa (Frazer, i. 357),

with the result that cattle are stoned to death or suffocated. Where blood is actually shed, various means are used to draw the charge of the shell, so to speak, before it can explode. One has been indicated above in the practice of putting the blood on a sacred stone or altar, and reference will be made to it again when the place of blood in sacrifice is considered (p. 719[a]). Another plan is to cover the blood with earth or dust; Doughty met with an example of this, interesting because the blood was the man's own: 'Thâhir, cupped in the head, neck, and back, felt lightened; he covered the blood with a little heap of dust, and one who came in asking, "What is this heap?" he answered, "Blood which I have buried"' (*Arabia Deserta*, i. 492) Or the blood may be sucked, or else deposited in some special place; both are illustrated by one of the Australian rites of sub-incision, in which the boy is made to suck the blood on the knife, whilst the blood from the wound falls on a piece of paper bark. 'The blood was taken in the paper bark to the boy's mother, who buried it in the bank of a water pool so as once more to ensure the growth of the lilies' (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 368). In other circumstances, the blood that has been shed may require expiation (cf. Dt 21[1-9]), and the blood-stain may be cleansed away by the use of other blood (Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, i. 275). Finally, the perils of blood, already seen in the prohibition of blood as food, and in avoidance of or precautions in blood-shedding, find a third group of illustrations in the elaborate rules affecting the blood of menstruation and childbirth. The fear of women's blood in these cases, no doubt because regarded as specially mysterious and potent, is wide-spread amongst primitive peoples (examples in Frazer, i. 361). Elaborate care is taken by the Arunta and Ilpirra tribes of Australia, for example, to dispose of the blood of the first menstruation (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 460). Crawley (*The Mystic Rose*, p. 212), whilst admitting that the obvious vehicle of contagion in such cases is blood, questions the truth of making this central in the tabu of women; and it is frequently true that various ideas operate and concentrate in one primitive custom. But none can doubt that the perils of blood are illustrated by the wide-spread tabu on women at certain times.

3. The powers of blood have been implied already in its perils. But the same ideas which make men ordinarily shrink from contact with blood may evidently cause them to resort to it on extraordinary occasions, as a specially potent means of influence. They are willing to accept the risk for the sake of the end in view. Only a few representative cases can be given here: further illustrations may be found in the chief works on anthropology, or in Strack's *Das Blut*, which gives many examples and copious references. One of the most obvious ways in which the psychical energy of blood can be assimilated is by drinking it. 'Blood may be given by young men to old men of any degree of relationship and at any time with a view to strengthening the latter' (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 461). Amongst the same Australian peoples, blood may be given also to the members of an avenging expedition; to secure unity of purpose and to exclude treachery, it may even be forcibly administered to an outsider (p. 462); special meetings of reconciliation are also accompanied by blood-drinking (*ib.*). Many primitive peoples drink the blood of enemies in order to secure their strength (Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, p. 102; Robertson Smith, *Kinship*[1], p. 284 [ed. S. A. Cook, p. 296]; Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, pp. 126-134). Sometimes the special purpose of blood-drinking is religious inspiration (Trumbull, *op. cit.* pp. 139-142), especially in connexion with a sacrifice, when the fresh blood of the victim is drunk (Frazer, *op. cit.* i. 133 f.). The result is frequently seen in the usual phenomena of possession. The religious idea underlying this practice will be discussed when blood-covenants (see § 4) in general have been considered; here it is sufficient to name this wide-spread practice in illustration of the powers of blood. Another way of imparting these powers is by external application of the blood. 'It is a very common thing for a young man to open a vein in his arm and allow the blood to sprinkle over the body of an older man, the idea being to strengthen the latter' (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 598). Among some primitive peoples, the blood of relatives is allowed to fall on a corpse, probably with the idea of reviving it or imparting life to it (cf. Howitt, p. 451). From such use of blood to promote physical or psychical strength, it is an easy transition to the use of blood as medicine. For example, amongst the people just named, 'it is a very common practice to give both men and women blood to drink when they are ill' (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 599). From the time of the Romans down to our own time, there has been a wide-spread belief that epilepsy could be cured by drinking blood (Robinsohn, *op. cit.* p. 27). An established cure for leprosy, from ancient Egypt down into the Middle Ages, was the blood-bath (Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, p. 116 f.). Many curious examples are collected by Strack (pp. 27 f. and 36-40) of these and similar customs. The patient may even be given his own blood to drink (*op. cit.* pp. 40-43). We find also cases approximating to the use of charms, like the Chinese custom, in times of pestilence, of writing sentences in human blood to be fastened on the door-posts for protection against disease (Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant*, p. 71). Not only human but also animal blood occurs frequently in the primitive pharmacopœia (Strack, pp. 55-57). It is, of course, difficult to separate ancient medicine from ancient magic. In regard to the magical uses of blood, some belong to it in common with hair, nail-parings, etc., as having been in close connexion with the body: thus 'ancient Peruvian sorcerers destroyed their victims by acting on blood taken from them' (H. Spencer, *Sociology*, i. 264). The use of blood at the various totem ceremonies of Australia is midway between the magical and religious uses. But special mention must be made of the use made of the blood of menstruation for both medicinal and magical purposes (Strack, pp. 28-32)—a use we might expect in view of the perils specially attaching to this blood. The further powers of blood are illustrated throughout this article, in regard both to human and to superhuman relationships, and underlie innumerable blood-rites and blood-sacrifices. One of the most striking of these is the blood-baptism of Mithraism (*q.v.*). Here it remains only to point out the extension of the powers of blood to many blood-like things. The tabu on blood extends to many blood-coloured objects (Jevons, p. 67: 'The savage believes that the same terrible consequences—whatever they may be—which ensue on contact with blood, do actually and really follow on contact with things which by their colour... remind him thereof'). So, amongst West African natives, 'every spot where the earth is of a red colour is believed to be, or to have been, the place of abode of a Sasabonsum; and the red colour is supposed to be caused by the blood of the victims destroyed by him' (Ellis, *op. cit.* p. 35; cf. Tylor, i. 406). We may trace the same range of thought in the ideas attaching to the red heifer (Nu 19[2ff.]) or to the robin redbreast; and in the practice of smearing the body with red earth (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 464). This last is probably a substitute for blood. For other

customs, especially the natural and frequent use of wine as the blood of the grape, cf. Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, p. 191 f.; Frazer, i. 359.

4. Blood-covenants. — The previous sections illustrate that primitive conception of blood on which all later ideas and institutions rest. We have now to notice some of the more important of these ethical and religious developments of the primitive idea. In the first place, there is the wide-spread practice of the blood-covenant between man and man. In its direct and primitive form, this is essentially the union of one life with another by actual exchange of blood, the exchange being made either by drinking or by transfusion. Many instances of this practice are collected by Trumbull in his elaborate monograph, *The Blood Covenant*; he draws examples from Africa, Asia, America, Europe, and Oceania, and claims that it is fundamental in all primitive life (p. 96). Certainly the practice is a natural development of the idea that blood is life. On its physical side, the practice is still retained in civilized communities in the medical operation of transfusion: 'men or dogs, bled to apparent death, may be at once and effectually revived by filling their veins with blood taken from another man or dog' (Huxley, *Physiol.* p. 117). The difference is that the primitive man did this, and still does it, not for physical only, but also for psychical ends, which he does not separate from the former. 'The inter-commingling of the blood of two organisms is, therefore, according to this view, equivalent to the inter-commingling of the lives, of the personalities, of the natures, thus brought together' (Trumbull, *op. cit.* p. 38). Both the primitive practice and the primitive idea may be modified in various directions. On the one hand, some substitute for blood, such as wine, may be introduced; on the other, the idea of life-union may appear in the weaker form of union in a particular oath or pledge (cf. Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, ii. 41: 'sheykhly persons at Aneyza have told me that "el-Kahtân in el-Yémen do confirm their solemn swearing together by drinking human gore").' For a collection of such blood-oaths, cf. Strack, *Das Blut*, pp. 21–25. See, further, BROTHERHOOD (artificial).

5. Kinship. — It has seemed to many that the idea of union by blood through the blood-covenant is simply a particular case of the idea of union by blood as underlying kinship in general, the only difference being the substitution of artificial means for natural. Jevons, referring to the fact that Muslim women do not veil themselves in the presence of 'blood-brothers' any more than before other blood-relations, remarks: 'it faithfully preserves the primitive view that the blood-brotherhood thus established is not a relationship personal to the two parties alone, but extends to the whole of each clan: my brother is, or becomes, the brother of all my brethren; the blood which flows in the veins of either party to the blood-covenant flows in the veins of all his kin' (*op. cit.* p. 99; cf., however, p. 170). Benzinger, also referring to Semitic races, which so richly illustrate the ideas of blood, remarks: 'Relationship is participation in the common blood which flows with equal fulness in the veins of every member of that circle; on this idea rest all the rights and obligations between the individual and his clansmen' (*EBi*, col. 2672). Such an identity of kinship with blood-relationship is to us self-evident: the terms are convertible, for the life of the father and the life of the mother are combined in the child born from their physical union. But it is by no means so certain as is frequently assumed that the fundamental idea of kinship is blood-relationship. The whole range of birth ideas amongst primitive peoples often differs widely from our own. By various Australian tribes we find 'the idea firmly held that the child is not the direct result of intercourse, that it may come without this, which merely, as it were, prepares the mother for the reception and birth also of an already-formed spirit child who inhabits one of the local totem centres' (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 265). In another part of the same country, a different view is held: 'The child comes from the man, and the woman only takes care of it' (Howitt, p. 255). Amongst the West Africans, 'the Awunas, an Eastern Ewe tribe, say that the lower jaw is the only part of the body which a child derives from its mother, all the rest being derived from the ancestral *luwoo* (the Tshi *kra*). The father furnishes nothing' (Ellis, *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, p. 131 n.). Westermarck (*Hum. Mar.* p. 106) cites from Carver the case of a North American tribe who ascribed the soul to the father and the body to the mother. These ideas, in their many varieties, at least remind us that the idea of blood-relationship has far less physiological support in the primitive mind than in our own. Further, we may ask whether the analysis of the idea of kinship into one of identity of blood is itself natural to the primitive mind, and does not belong to a somewhat later stage of development. Crawley argues that 'habitual proximity and contact is the strongest and most ordinary tie, and is earlier in thought than the tie of blood' (*The Mystic Rose*, p. 452); he further contends that 'the theory that the "blood covenant" and the similar marriage ceremony are intended to cause the blood of the tribe to flow in the veins of the new member is based on late legal fictions' (*ib.* p. 376). Westermarck, criticizing the hypothesis of an original promiscuity, shows reason to doubt that 'the denomination of children and the rules of succession really were in the first place dependent on ideas of consanguinity' (*op. cit.* p. 107). Even where blood-relationship is emphasized, as in Arabia, it may be significantly linked with parallel ideas, such as meal-communion. 'The Arabic community rests on a natural basis . . . those who belong together are connected in the first place through blood; in the second place, however, through the fact that they eat and drink, live and travel together; without this, blood would soon lose its power' (Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*[2], p. 193). On the whole, it seems in accordance with primitive habits of thought to regard the idea of blood-relationship as a specialization of the general theory and practice of early kinship. See, further, BROTHERHOOD (artificial).

6. Blood-revenge.—At first sight it may seem difficult to explain the universal practice of blood-revenge, except from the standpoint of a primitive sense of the blood-tie underlying kinship. When the blood of a kinsman has been shed, it seems most natural to assume that the tie of blood impels his nearest relative to slay the slayer. But, in the light of what has been said, we may regard the motive which animates the avenger of blood as complex. There is, first, the fact that presents itself from the powers and perils of blood. Blood has been shed, perilous power has been liberated, and something has to be done if those in the vicinity are to escape the consequences. 'The principle that blood must be atoned for by blood has inspired in every part of the earth the endeavour to avenge a murdered kinsman' (Bastian, *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*, iii. 1; he collects many examples in pp. 2–36). There are, further, the natural obligations and feelings of those whose lives have been closely linked, which make a kinsman the most likely person to desire the 'wild justice' of revenge. The union of these two

motives, the psychical and the personal, as they may be called, issues in the familiar features of blood-responsibility, as presented in early forms of society. For example, amongst West African tribes, 'revenge, especially for bloodshed, is everywhere practised. It is a duty belonging first to the "ijawe" (blood-relative), next to the "ikaka" (family), next to the "etomba" (tribe). . . . Formerly it was indifferent who was killed in revenge, provided it was some member of the murderer's tribe. Naturally that tribe sought to retaliate, and the feud was carried back and forth, and would be finally settled only when an equal number had been killed on each side. . . . At present, blood is not always required, but formerly no money would have been accepted as a sufficient penalty' (Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, pp. 19, 20). This example may be taken as the normal type. In course of time various modifications arose, tending to take vengeance out of the hands of the individual, and to put it in charge of the whole community, whilst various plans were adopted, such as the well-known 'cities of refuge' among the Hebrews, to differentiate the cases of wilful and accidental manslaughter (cf. Dt 19^6). The original entire lack of distinction between the two is significant of the attitude of the primitive mind to the whole matter; it is the actual shedding of blood that is in question, not the modern idea of abstract justice. The same attitude comes out even more significantly in the ideas held about blood-shedding in the case of animals. 'The primitive hunter who slays an animal believes himself exposed to the vengeance either of its disembodied spirit, or of all the other animals of the same species, whom he considers as knit together, like men, by the ties of kin and the obligations of the blood feud' (Frazer, ii. 389, where examples are given). Finally, we may see the whole principle which underlies blood-revenge well illustrated in some modern survivals. The following account is given by Curtiss from native information (*Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, p. 191): 'In the neighbourhood of Nablus it is customary, when a reconciliation has been made between the murderer and the avenger of blood, for the murderer to kill a goat or a sheep. He then kneels before the avenger with a red handkerchief tied about his neck. Some of the blood of the animal slain is put on the palms of his hands. The avenger draws his sword and intimates that he could take his life from him, but that he gives it back to him.' See also BLOOD-FEUD.

7. **Blood and the spirit-world.**—In tracing the developments of the ideas of the powers and perils attaching to blood, as they are seen in blood-covenants, blood-relationship, and blood-revenge, we have considered those ideas as affecting the relation between man and man only. But it is evident, from the fact that the spirit-world is generally conceived on anthropomorphic lines, that this important group of ideas would be applied to the unseen world, and that blood would come to occupy an important place in religious as well as in social life. The remainder of this article is therefore concerned with the place of blood in religion. The natural starting-point is afforded by the thirst of departed souls for blood, of which the visit of Odysseus to Hades supplies the classical example (*Od.* xi. 34 f.): 'But when I had besought the tribes of the dead with vows and prayers, I took the sheep and cut their throats over the trench, and the dark blood flowed forth, and, lo, the spirits of the dead that be departed gathered them from out of Erebus. . . . I drew the sharp sword from my thigh and sat there, suffering not the strengthless heads of the dead to draw nigh the blood, ere I had word of Teiresias' (Butcher-Lang's tr., p. 173). This eagerness of the dead to revive their strength by drinking that blood which is life is the best explanation of the frequent practice of pouring blood into the grave or tomb by means of a tube or funnel (examples in Jevons, p. 51 f.), or of the various forms of blood-offering to the dead (p. 52 f.), which may take the form of more or less serious mutilations on the part of the mourners (p. 191). But other spirits than those of departed men are eager for blood on similar grounds. So we meet with belief in the vampire. 'Inasmuch as certain patients are seen becoming day by day, without apparent cause, thin, weak, and bloodless, savage animism is called upon to produce a satisfactory explanation, and does so in the doctrine that there exist certain demons which eat out the souls or hearts or suck the blood of their victims' (Tylor, ii. 191; he cites various examples, pp. 191–194; for some modern cases, cf. Strack, *Das Blut*, p. 65). As a particular example may be mentioned the Malay vampire known as the *Penanggalan*, 'which is believed to resemble a trunkless human head with the sac of the stomach attached to it, and which flies about seeking for an opportunity of sucking the blood of infants' (Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 320, cf. p. 328). But other temporarily or permanently disembodied spirits have the same tastes and powers. So the West African natives believe that witches live almost entirely on the blood which they suck from children at night (Kingsley, *Travels*, p. 490). It need hardly be said that the difficulty we feel in connecting an immaterial spirit with material blood does not exist for the primitive mind, which knows no such antithesis; indeed, spirits are sometimes thought to yield blood (Robinsohn, *op. cit.* p. 167).

From such general beliefs we may pass to the various practices by which the spirit-world is approached through blood. Perhaps the best and simplest example of contact with the spirit-world made by blood is afforded by its use in Australian totemistic ceremonies. In connexion with the Unjiamba flower-totem, the blood of one of the young men is sprinkled freely on a stone, which is supposed to represent a mass of Unjiamba flowers, after chants have been sung, 'the burden of which is a reiterated invitation to the Unjiamba tree to flower much, and to the blossoms to be full of honey' (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 184). In connexion with the Okira or kangaroo-totem, a similar ceremony is performed to increase the number of kangaroos, after which the young men at once go out to hunt them (*ib.* p. 201). In this case, the stone 'represents the spot where a celebrated kangaroo of the Alcheringa (*q.v.*) went down into the earth, its spirit part remaining in the stone which arose to mark the place' (*ib.* p. 462). These blood ceremonies are specially instructive, because they show the potency of blood in making a vital connexion with the 'supernatural' world, quite apart from any of the theories of sacrifice developed at a later stage of religious thought. It is of importance to emphasize this, lest we misread primitive forms of 'sacrifice' such as that offered to the Yoruba god, Ogun, when a human victim is slain; 'the entrails are exposed before the image, and the body suspended from a tree. The victim is slain by having his head struck off upon the stool of Ogun, over which the blood is made to gush' (Ellis, *Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, p. 68). The relation of the blood to the god may be regarded as an extension of its relation to the departed spirit of a man; it is summed up in the address to one of the gods in the Egyptian pantheon: 'Hail, thou who dost consume blood' (*Book of the Dead*, cxxv. 13). In other cases, however, we meet with a less direct presentation of the blood to the deity. Thus Ellis

writes: 'In 1881 a slight earthquake shock threw down a portion of the wall of the king's residence in Coomassie. The king, Mensah, consulted the priests as to what should be done, and the latter declared that the damage was the act of Sasabonsum, and that the ruined portion must be rebuilt of mud (*swish*) moistened with the blood of virgins. Fifty young girls were accordingly slaughtered, and the wall was rebuilt with *swish* kneaded in their blood' (*The Tshi-speaking Peoples*, p. 36). This instance serves as a transitional case to a very large number of what may be called blood-beginnings. These are far too numerous to be noticed in any detail, but in general it may be said that primitive peoples begin anything new, a new work or building, a new relation, such as marriage, by the shedding of blood (cf. Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant*, *passim*; Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 143, 232; and many books of travel, etc.). For example, to take the case of a single people, Doughty found such customs amongst the Arabs in connexion with new building, and the breaking of new soil: 'Malignity of the soil is . . . ascribed by the people of Arabia to the ground-demons, *jan*, *ahl el-ard*, or earth-folk. Therefore husbandmen in these parts use to sprinkle new break-land with the blood of a peace-offering: the like, when they build, they sprinkle upon the stones, lest by any evil accidents the workmen's lives should be endangered' (*Arabia Deserta*, i. 136; cf. ii. 100, of a new building; ii. 198, of a new well; i. 452, of new booty). It is of interest to find the old custom surviving even in modern Palestine. 'When the ground was broken for the railroad from Beirut to Damascus, ten sheep were placed in a row, their throats were cut, their blood flowed down upon the ground, and the flesh was given to the poor' (Curtiss, *Prim. Sem. Rel.* p. 184).

8. Sacrifice.—The important place of blood in man's connexion with the spiritual world is paralleled by its position in the sacrificial ritual of organized religion. The disposition of blood in the most primitive forms of sacrifice shows clearly its central significance, and no theory of sacrifice can be regarded as satisfactory which places blood at the circumference rather than at the centre. Moore, in his valuable article on 'Sacrifice' (*EBi*, col. 4217) summarizes his detailed survey of the OT system by saying: 'From first to last the utmost importance attaches to the disposition of the victim's blood. Indeed, it may be said that this is the one universal and indispensable constituent of sacrifice. . . . This use of sacrificial blood is older than the offering of part of the victim by fire, and is the necessary antecedent of the feast, its religious consecration. The offering or application of the blood cannot very well be regarded as a gift to God, or as a mere incident in the preparation for a communion meal.' It does not fall within the scope of the present article to offer a discussion of the rival theories of sacrifice (*q.v.*); but it may be pointed out that the argument of the previous sections, drawn from a wider field of anthropological evidence, fully supports the above statement. According to Tylor (ii. 375–410), 'sacrifice is a gift made to a deity as if he were a man. . . . The ruder conception that the deity takes and values the offering for itself, gives place on the one hand to the idea of mere homage expressed by a gift, and on the other to the negative view that the virtue lies in the worshipper depriving himself of something prized' (p. 376). That such views do arise in the history of sacrifice is, of course, undoubted, but there is grave reason to doubt whether they can be called in any sense a part of primitive culture. The gift-theory of sacrifice is criticized by Jevons on other grounds, as being of comparatively late application (*Introd. Hist. Rel.* pp. 223–225). Here we may note that the conception of blood as a gift itself involves some explanation of its selection, and forces us back to a more primitive standpoint. Amongst the Arabs, the chief form of sacrifice was the slaughtered animal (Wellhausen, *op. cit.* p. 114); and the genuine Arab ritual consists in pouring out the blood, or else smearing it on the sacred stone (p. 116). This special appropriation of the blood to the deity can be paralleled from many peoples. Thus the West Africans 'eat the meat of the sacrifice, that having nothing to do with the sacrifice to the spirits, which is the blood, for the blood is the life' (Kingsley, *Travels*, p. 451). 'In an expected great evil the gateway is sometimes sprinkled with the blood of a sacrificed goat or sheep. The flesh is not wasted; it is eaten by the villagers' (Nassau, *op. cit.* p. 93). The reason for this appropriation has been suggested in the previous sections of this article; it springs from the powers and perils of blood. On the one hand, we have already seen that blood is used as a vital link between man and the spirit-world—a usage with which various views of its precise potency might be connected; on the other hand, the very perils of blood, which so often cause its prohibition as food, and its tabu in other ways, suggest that the sacred stone will serve as a lightning-conductor does, by drawing off the latent peril. This view is practically that held by Moore in the article referred to: 'The common root of these diverse uses and restrictions is the almost universal belief that blood is a fluid in which inheres mysterious potency, no less dangerous when misused than efficacious when properly employed. In the outpouring of the blood at the sacrificial stone we may perhaps recognize the feeling that this is the safest disposition of it, as well as the belief of a somewhat more developed theology, that it belongs to the deity of right' (*EBi*, col. 4218). Such disposal of the blood, starting from a genuine and deep-rooted primitive motive, would form a nucleus round which the later usages and ideas would easily cluster. Ancient psychology draws no hard and fast line between the blood-soul of the animal and that of the man; totemistic ideas confirmed the identity of the man with the animal he offered, and the communion with the deity obtained by the blood which was the life would be a very real thing to the primitive worshipper. The later ideas of substitution depend on a deepening ethical experience; and they, too, equally with the idea of homage, can find a basis in the offered blood. All these are natural developments, interpreting the primitive rite anew to the needs of each age; nor do the perils and powers of blood become inoperative on human thought till men learn that the only perfect communion with God belongs to the perfectly obedient will, and that they who would worship the Father must worship in spirit and in truth. See, further, art. ANTI-SEMITISM, BLOOD-FEUD, BROTHERHOOD (artificial), EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT, INITIATION, SACRIFICE.

LITERATURE.—P. Cassel, *Die Symbolik des Blutes*, 1882 (Berlin); Strack, *Das Blut im Glauben und Aberglauben der Menschheit*, 1900 (Munchen); Procksch, *Über die Blutrache bei den vorislamischen Arabern*, 1899 (Leipzig); Clay Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant*, 1896 (Edinburgh), also *The Blood Covenant*, 1887 (London); Robinsohn, *Psychologie der Naturvölker*, esp. 18–28 pp. (no date, Leipzig), Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2] (Index, *s.v.* 'Blood'), 1894 (London); Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day* (criticism of theory that the sacrificial meal is the oldest form of sacrifice, p. 218 f.), 1902 (London); Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (Index, *s.v.* 'Blood'), vol. i. 1906, vol. ii. 1908 (London).

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BLOOD-BROTHERHOOD.—See BROTHERHOOD (artificial).

BLOOD-COVENANT.—See BLOOD, p. 717.

BLOOD-FEUD.

Primitive (L. H Gray), p. 720.
Aryan (O. Schrader), p. 724.
Celtic (J. L. Gerig), p. 725.
Greek (I. F. Burns), p. 727.
Hindu (J. Jolly), p. 729.
Muslim (Gaudefroy-Demombynes), p. 730.
Roman (I. F. Burns), p. 731.
Semitic (A. H. Harley), p. 731.
Slavonic (O. Schrader) p. 733.
Teutonic (E. Mogk), p. 735.

BLOOD-FEUD (Primitive).—One of the most wide-spread phenomena of primitive, and even of comparatively advanced, jurisprudence is the blood-feud. This, while subject to the most manifold gradations, may be defined, in its typical aspect, as that principle of ethnological jurisprudence whereby an entire family (more rarely clan or tribe) is made liable to retaliation and reprisals in kind by another family (or clan or tribe) against which a member of the former family (or clan or tribe) has committed a deadly offence (generally murder, less commonly rape or abduction). It is, in other words, the *lex talionis* exercised between families (more rarely clans or tribes), often including those connected with them by any form of blood-covenant; it is communal vengeance, as distinguished from individual revenge. Its ultimate foundation is, indeed, personal retaliation; but, in proportion as the family develops, the principle of the blood-feud grows in importance, until it reaches its climax in the modern tenet that an entire government is bound to require punishment for injury done to one of its citizens by another nation or by a member or members thereof. On the other hand, just as in the latter case concessions or pecuniary compensation normally take the place of demanding life for life, so in relatively primitive jurisprudence, murder, rape, and other grave offences may frequently be commuted in various ways; the blood-feud is replaced by the *wergeld* (see below).

The essentially communal nature of the blood-feud carries with it the corollary that, among many peoples, one unprotected by ties of family, clan, or tribe may be injured in person or possessions without risk of blood-vengeance, unless he has received artificial kinship by some form of blood-covenant or enjoys the status of guest, which in itself constitutes in great measure a temporary *quasi*-adoption into the family (very rarely into the clan or tribe) of his host. This explains the fact that many peoples rob or kill strangers with impunity and without any sense of wrong-doing, although among themselves they may have the highest regard for the possessions and lives of their fellows, as among the Polynesians, where the property of strangers was held to belong to the gods of the land, so that it could be seized and the owners killed with impunity by those among whom the strangers in question had come (Mariner, *Tonga Islands*, London, 1818, i. 308; Mathias G . . ., *Lettres sur les îles Marquises*, Paris, 1843, p. 106).

The blood-feud is, among many peoples, a sacred obligation, to which the kinsmen of the murdered man are in duty bound, as among the African Bakawiri (Leuschner, in Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Volkern in Afrika und Ozeanien*, Berlin, 1903, p. 23). To such a degree is this concept carried that it is often believed that the soul of the murdered man finds no rest until blood-vengeance has been exacted, as among the Australians and Papuans (Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 363, 376), and the African Banaka, Bapuku, Diakite Sarrakolese, and Washambala (Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 51; Nicole, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 132; Lang, *ib.* p. 257). He who does not perform blood-vengeance when he should is despised, not as a coward, but as a recreant to the demands of religion and duty, as among the Negro Akka (Monrad, *Gemälde von der Küste von Guinea*, Weimar, 1824, p. 90 f.) and Felups (Park, *Reise in das Innere von Afrika*, Hamburg, 1779, p. 20), the South American Arawaks (Schomburgk, *Reise in Britsch Guiana*, Leipzig, 1847, i. 157), in Australia and New Guinea (Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 364, 376; Grey, *Journal of Two Expeditions in North-West and West Australia*, London, 1841, ii. 240), and in the Indonesian islands of Leti, Moa, and Lakor (Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, p. 370). In at least some cases the object of the blood-feud appears to have been sacrifice of the murderer or his kin to the *manes* of the victim, thus explaining the rule of the South American Tupi that the relatives of the murdered man should strangle the slayer on the very spot of his crime (Featherman, *Social History of the Races of Mankind*, London, 1887–90, iii. pt. 2, p. 340). This usage finds its antithetical parallel in the North American Indian adoption of the murderer in his victim's stead (see below, p. 722[b]). The women are often described as especially assiduous in demanding the inauguration of the blood-feud, as among the Iroquois, Florida Indians, Caribs, and Brazilians (Lafitau, *Mœurs des sauvages amériquains*, 16mo ed., Paris, 1724, iii. 149–151).

The degree of kinship involved in the duty of satisfying blood-vengeance varies widely. In its greatest extent any member of the family, clan, or tribe to which the murdered man belonged may kill any member of the family, clan, or tribe of the murderer, as in New Guinea, where the murderer himself is not killed (von Hasselt, in *ZE* viii. 193; cf. the Australian Dieri custom of killing the eldest brother of the offender rather than the offender himself [Howitt, p. 327]), and among the African Somali and Bakawiri (Haggenmacher, in *Petermann's Mittheilungen*, Erg. x. No. 47, p. 31; Leuschner, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 23). Elsewhere the feud may be restricted to totem-families, as among some Australians and the South American Goajiros (Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 364, 382). In its extremest form the blood-feud prevailed generally in Polynesia, especially in New Zealand (Angas, *Savage Life in Australia and New Zealand*, London, 1847, ii. 171; Thompson, *The Story of New Zealand*, London, 1859, i. 98). In Polynesia, if the offender escaped, his whole family paid the penalty in his stead (Wakefield, *Adventure in New Zealand*, London, 1845, ii. 108); in Tonga and Samoa, where wergeld was accepted only rarely, all kinsmen of the offender were killed if they could be found (Shortland, *Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders*, London, 1854, p. 224); and in New Zealand the kinsmen of a murdered man often killed in revenge the first man on whom they chanced, whether friend or foe (Dieffenbach, *Travels in New Zealand*, London, 1843, ii. 127).

The blood-feud may, however, be restricted to certain members of the households of the murderer and the murdered—a system widely prevalent in Africa. Where the matriarchate is in force, only those related on the mother's side are involved, and where the patriarchal system has been developed, only those on the father's side. Accordingly, among the African Barea and Kunáma the son

avenges the death of a mother or uterine sister, the nephew his maternal uncle or aunt, and the maternal uncle his nephew or niece; but the son does not avenge his father, or the father his son. Among the Felups, on the other hand, as in Akkra, on the Gold Coast, the eldest son is the avenger of his father (Post, *Afrikan. Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1887, i. 61 f.). Similar rules prevail for the maternal side among the Goajiros and Australians (Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 382, 364; Bastian, in *ZE* vi. 305). If, however, the matriarchal and patriarchal systems are confused, these differentiations no longer hold, as among certain Brazilian tribes (Post, *Anfange des Staats- und Rechstlebens*, Oldenburg, 1878, p. 182). An interesting sidelight on the primitive legal status of the wife is afforded by some of the laws of the blood-feud, which show whether she is regarded as having become the property of her husband or is held still to belong to her original family (cf. the twofold theory of the status of the individual in more highly developed polity, p. 723[b]). From the latter point of view she is avenged, among the Bakawiri and Washambala, by her own blood-kinsmen, not by her husband (Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 23; Lang, *ib.* p. 257), this being the reverse of Banaka, Bapuku, and pagan Bambara practice (*ib.* pp. 49, 89); while among the Diakite Sarrakolese of the French Sudan the husband may avenge his wife when duly authorized by the *kādi*, whereas if he does not request this privilege the duty devolves upon her kinsmen (Nicole, *ib.* p. 132). In West Africa the blood-feud 'is a duty belonging, first, to the "ijawe" (blood-relative), next to the "ikaka" (family), next to the "etomba" (tribe). The murdered man's own family takes the lead,—in case of a wife, her husband and his family, and the wife's family; sometimes the whole "ikaka"; finally, the "etomba"' (Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, New York, 1904, p. 19). In the African Sansanding States the right of blood-revenge belongs to the agnates of the murdered man in the order of their inheritance (Fama Mademba, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 89). Among the African Washambala, the blood-feud, which they exact only for murder, is directed against the offender and his wife, while his children are enslaved and his property is plundered (Lang, *ib.* p. 256 f.); and among the American Shawnee, in case wergeld was refused and the murderer could not be seized, his nearest kinsman was slain in his stead by the kinsmen of the murdered man (Featherman, *op. cit.* iii. pt. 1, p. 183), this being a *quasi*-analogue to the Dieri practice of substitution, to which attention has already been drawn (for the very different principle of substituting the murderer for the victim, see below, p. 722).

An interesting example of what may be called a ceremonial blood-feud is afforded by the Australian *pinya* (the *atninga* of the Central Australians), a sort of *posse comitatus*, which may hunt down the murderer or (as already noted) his eldest brother. In lieu of actually killing a victim, however, the *pinya* may subject the murderer to a milder penalty. Thus, among the Mukjarawaint, in a case of blood-feud, a headman 'appointed a spot near at hand where the expiatory encounter should take place that afternoon, it being agreed that so soon as the offender had been struck by a spear the combat should cease. Then the offenders stood out, armed with shields, and received the spears thrown at them by the dead man's kindred, until at length one of them was wounded. The Headman of the Garchukas then threw a lighted piece of bark, which he held, into the air, and the fight ceased If it had been continued there would have been a general fight between the two totems' (Howitt, p. 335). This practice is wide-spread in Australia (Howitt, p. 335 ff.).

Artificial kinship, as noted above (p. 720), is also frequently reckoned in satisfaction of the blood-feud. Thus, among the Polynesians, brothers artificially created by blood-covenant were bound to require blood-revenge if one was killed, even though he fell in battle, which normally abrogates the necessity of such vengeance (Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1832, i. 290); and similar principles were observed among the Araucanian Pehuenche of South America (Post, *Grundlagen des Rechts*, Oldenburg, 1884, p. 69). The relation between host and guest often carries similar obligations with it, as among the African Barea and Kunáma (Munzinger, *Ostafr. Studien*, Schaffhausen, 1864, p. 477), as does that between patron and client, as among the Barea and Bogo (Munzinger, *op. cit.* p. 243, and *Ueber die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos*, Winterthur, 1859, p. 43); so that among the African Takue wergeld is readily accepted for a murdered kinsman, but blood-revenge is exacted for the killing of a guest or client (Munzinger, *Ostafr. Stud.* p. 208).

Certain limits are, however, normally observed in the blood-feud. Men in full vigour are usually alone concerned. Women are, for the most part, exempt, as are children and aged men, among the Indians of Brazil (Post, *Anfange*, p. 175), although some peoples, as the Sudanese, spare children only until they are old enough to bear arms (Marno, *Reisen im Gebiete des blauen und weissen Nil*, Vienna, 1874, p. 200), the same practice prevailing among the Nissan Islanders of the Bismarck Archipelago (Sorge, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 418) and the Marshall Islanders (Senfft, *ib.* p. 449). Other tribes, as the Nuforese of New Guinea and the African Banaka and Bapuku, render even women and children liable (von Hasselt, in *ZE* viii. 93; Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 376; Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 49). In like fashion the Caribs mercilessly slaughtered children (Labat, *Voyage aux isles d'Amérique*, The Hague, 1724, ii. 109), and the South American Tupinimba even extended the blood-feud to the child begotten by a prisoner of war, who, before being killed, was made to consort for this very purpose with a woman of his captors' tribe, the offspring being brought up expressly for slaughter (Schmidt, in *ZVRW* xiii. 297, 317). Some peoples, as the Makassars, forbid blood-feud between those of different rank, the inferior being entitled only to blood-money (Wilken, *Het strafrecht bij de volken van het maleische ras*, The Hague, 1883, p. 7); while in the Sansanding States one superior in rank is not liable to blood-feud for the murder of his inferior, unless robbery was the motive for the offence (Fama Mademba, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 88 f.).

Within the family the blood-feud has no existence, punishment here being meted out by the authority of the head of the family—a principle also observed in the clan and tribe; although, as the sense of blood-kinship decays in the last two divisions, it naturally becomes increasingly difficult for an interclanal or intertribal blood-feud to arise.

The blood-feud is most generally begun, as has been noted, by murder, which may be entirely unintentional, as among the Australians, the Marshall Islanders, and in the Egyptian Sudan (Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 363, xiv. 443 f.; Marno, *op. cit.* p. 200), or committed in self-defence, as among the Bedawīn (Kohler, in *ZVRW* viii. 254), or committed even by a person irresponsible for his acts, as among the African Ondonga and the Nissan Islanders of the Bismarck Archipelago (Rautanan, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 341; Sorge, *ib.* p. 418). The wide-spread belief in magic as the cause of death frequently leads to inquiry of the sorcerer as to the identity of the murderer and the consequent object of the blood-feud, as in Africa (Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 145 ff.), among the Nissan Islanders (Sorge, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 418), and the Dieri of South-East Australia (Howitt, p. 326), and in Central Australia generally (Spencer-Gillen[2], p. 490). The Bagobo of South Mindanao even made the medicine-man liable to the blood-feud on the ground that he had failed to avert death from the murdered man

(Schadenberg, in *ZE* xvii. 12). But, as the feeling of blood-kinship diminishes, a distinction is drawn between murder and manslaughter, the former still requiring blood-vengeance, while atonement may be made for the latter by a lesser penalty, or the offence may be commuted by wergeld, as in the Sansanding States and among the Diakite Sarrakolese of the French Sudan, the Washambala (Fama Mademba, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 89; Nicole, *ib.* p. 132; Lang, *ib.* p. 257), the Narrinyeri of South-East Australia (Howitt, p. 341), and the Papuans (Kohler, in *ZVRW* xiv. 380 f.). In case of offences other than murder, primitive jurisprudence varies extremely. Among the African Barea and Kunáma, and in Akkra, mere bodily injury does not render the offender liable to the blood-feud (Munzinger, *Ostafr. Stud.* p. 502; Monrad, *op. cit.* p. 98), as it does, for instance, in Montenegro (Wesnitsch, in *ZVRW* ix. 54; Miklosich, *Blutrache bei den Slaven*, Vienna, 1887, p. 21), while the African Bogo regard such injury as shedding half the blood of the injured part, so that half the price of blood-revenge is required (Munzinger, *Bogos*, p. 81). Sexual offences, as infringing property rights (see art. ADULTERY), are sometimes subject to the blood-feud, notably adultery (Post, *Studien zur Entwicklungsgesch. des Familienrechts*, Oldenburg, 1889, pp. 355–359), fornication (the African Takue, Marea, and Beni-Amer [Munzinger, *Ostafr. Stud.* pp. 208, 245, 322]), and abduction (New Caledonians and Samoans [Post, *Anfange*, p. 214]).

Since a true blood-feud is a family, clanal, or tribal affair, it can, properly speaking, be ended only by a solemn agreement between the families, clans, or tribes concerned; so that, if these will not consent to peace, the feud may persist for generations until one of the parties to it is annihilated, as among the Bagobo (Schadenberg, in *ZE* xvii. 28), the Manyuema and Balégga (Post, *Afr. Jur.* i. 84; cf. *Anfange*, p. 175f., *Geschlechtsgenossenschaft der Urzeit*, Oldenburg, 1875, pp. 159 ff.), and the Malagasy islands of Nossi-Bé and Mayotte (Walter, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 391). A war of fourteen years' duration was waged between the North American Indian Passamaquoddies and Micmacs because, while the two tribes were visiting each other, the son of the Passamaquoddy chief became enraged and killed the son of the Micmac chief, who refused every offer of reconciliation, even the life of the boy murderer (Leland and Prince, *Kulóskap the Master*, New York, 1902, p. 25 f.). Sometimes, however, as among the Australians, a blood-feud is satisfied if the offender be merely wounded (cf. above, p. 721[a]; Howitt, pp. 336, 342; Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 365).

For a typical example of the termination of the blood-feud the ceremonies of the African Barea and Kunáma may be cited (Post, *Afr. Jur.* i. 67, his account being based on Munzinger, *Ostafr. Stud* pp. 501 ff.). When a day has been fixed for the settlement of the feud, the murderer chooses a protector in the hostile village, to whom he sends durra to make beer. On the day appointed, all the villagers, except the family of the murdered man, go out to meet the murderer, whom they safeguard in their midst until he reaches the house of his victim. He enters the house and slaughters a barren cow to the *manes* of the murdered man, whose brother meanwhile grasps the cow's head. The murderer and his victim's brother then drink beer out of the same horn and eat meat from the same platter; each gouges out an eye of the slaughtered cow; and they exchange clothing so long as they sit together. The blood-price is then paid, and the murderer is escorted to his protector's house, while the family of his victim gives half the slaughtered cow as a feast to the village. The murderer must still shun the village for a year, but at the expiration of this time he again visits the kinsfolk of his victim, and is henceforth their closest kinsman and friend. In computing the blood-price, the number of those slain on each side is reckoned, and equality is secured by the payment of any difference in money or its equivalent, as among the Bogo and Somali of Africa (Munzinger, *Bogos*, p. 79; von der Decken, *Reisen in Ost-Afrika*, Leipzig, 1869–71, ii. 330) and the Bauro of the Solomon Islands (Post, *Anfange*, p. 182), while under such circumstances the Maori returned the heads and booty which they had taken (*ib.* p. 183). The treaty is often still further strengthened by marriages between the two parties, as among the Bogo and Beni-Amer (Munzinger, *Bogos*, p. 82 f., *Ostafr. Stud.* p. 322). Among the Banaka and Bapuku the blood-feud can cease only when an equal number have been killed on each side (Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 49).

The true blood-feud in its primitive form excludes all possibility of commutation by money or its equivalent. This extreme form is, however, comparatively rare, even the African Ondonga, who kill man for man, woman for woman, and child for child, having a fully developed system of wergeld (Rautanan, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 341). With the decline of the sense of blood-kinship and the concomitant decay of early family law, commutation of blood-revenge becomes increasingly easy. Many peoples, like the Ondonga just mentioned, hold that murder may be punished either by blood-feud or by wergeld, at the option of the injured party, as among the Haidah of the Pacific coast (*NR* i. 168), the Papuans and Marshall Islanders (Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 376, xiv. 446), the Malays (*Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie*, 1851, ii. 15), and the African Bogo, Tuareg, Galla, Bakawiri, and Diakite Sarrakolese (Munzinger, *Bogos*, p. 80; Duveyrier, *Les Touaregs du nord*, Paris, 1864, p. 428; Cecchi, *Funf Jahre in Ostafrika*, Leipzig, 1888, p. 79; Leuschner, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 23; Nicole, *ib.* p. 132). In the Sansanding States in Africa the murderer, who may not be harmed by any but the avenger of blood, is alone exposed to the blood-feud, although both he and his agnates are liable for wergeld (Fama Mademba, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 89). Among the Nissan Islanders of the Bismarck Archipelago the somewhat curious rule is observed that, after blood-revenge has been exacted, the party executing it pays the other party a wergeld to secure final settlement of the feud, thus obviating a series of reprisals on both sides (Sorge, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 418). Elsewhere, as among the Bantu (Kohler, in *ZVRW* xv. 56), acceptance of proffered wergeld is compulsory.

The supersession of the blood-feud by the wergeld is lucidly exemplified by the usage prevailing among the American Iroquois and Algonquins, which may be summarized as follows from Lafitau (*op. cit.* ii. 185–193). The people of each 'cabin' (i.e. *hodensote*, or 'long house') exercised jurisdiction over their own members, so that, if one killed another belonging to the same 'long house,' the village assumed that the deed had been done for good and sufficient reasons, and that in any case it was none of their business. If, on the other hand, the murder was committed by a member of another 'long house,' village, tribe, or stock, all those who had been connected with the slain man united to 're-make the spirit' [*refaire l'esprit (c'est leur expression)*] for the kinsmen of the deceased, while at the same time every effort was exerted to save the murderer's life and to protect his kin against the vengeance of the kin of the murdered man. One of the chiefs now offered 60 presents [cf. the similar Huron custom recorded in 1636 by Lejeune (*Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, Cincinnati, 1896–1901, x. 215–223, cf. also xxxiii. 239–249), 'the least of which,' according to Lejeune, 'must be of the value of a new beaver robe']. The first nine of these, which were for the immediate kinsmen of the deceased, were the most costly, each often being 1000 beads of wampum; and the remainder, which were displayed on a pole, represented all that the dead man had used while alive. If blood-vengeance had been executed before this wergeld had been proffered, it was the avengers who were bound to offer these presents, while the kinsmen of the murderer were released from all liability. At an earlier time the Huron had not only exacted the giving of presents, but had also required the murderer to remain beneath the putrefying corpse of his victim (which was elevated on poles) as long as the kinsmen of the murdered man desired. If the presents were not acceptable, the murderer himself was given, in addition to the wergeld, to the kinsmen of his victim, whose place he was to take. Although he was occasionally rejected, he usually came to be regarded exactly as the man whom he had slain; and Lafitau also adds, though without vouching for the statement, that further south the murderer was required to marry the wife and adopt the children of the slain man, thus clearly showing the substitution-motive in lieu of the sacrifice-motive (cf. p. 720[b]) in blood-revenge—a principle occasionally observed by the Algonquin Abenaki (Featherman, *op. cit.* iii. pt. 1, p. 96). Sometimes a murderer was even adopted as a son by the mother of his victim (Tanner, *Mémoirs*, Paris, 1835, ii. 227).

Where the parties concerned have their own option as to whether the blood-feud shall be terminated by wergeld or some other means, outside authorities may not interfere, as among the

Araucanians and Greenland Eskimos (Post, *Anfange*, p. 174), and the African Bogo, Barea, Kunáma, and Marea (Munzinger, *Bogos*, p. 79, *Ostafr. Stud.* pp. 499, 242), and Msalala (Desoignies, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 280); but, if reconciliation proves impossible, the blood-feud remains in force. The offender often flees, a certain amount of start frequently being allowed him, this being 3½ days among the Bedawīn (Post, *Studien*, p. 125; Kohler, in *ZVRW* viii. 253). He must then remain in exile, either until reconciliation has been effected, as among the Barea, Kunáma, and Teda (Munzinger, *Ostafr. Stud.* p. 501; Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan*, Berlin, 1879–89, i. 448), or until his offence has been outlawed by the lapse of a definite period of time, this being 5 years among the Felups (Bérenger-Féraud, *Les Peuples de la Sénégambie*, Paris, 1879, p. 293) and 1 year among the Californian Nishinam (Kohler, in *ZVRW* xii. 409). Here the blood-feud comes into immediate connexion with the jurisprudence governing the right of asylum (*q.v.*), but among some peoples, as many American Indian tribes, murder was the one and only offence that could never be outlawed (Loskiel, *Gesch. der Mission der evangel. Brüder unter den Indianern in Nord-Amerika*, Barby, 1789, p. 20; Morse, *Report to the Secretary of War on Indian Affairs*, New Haven, 1822, appendix, p. 99; Featherman, *op. cit.* iii. pt. 1, p. 440), so that the Creek harvest-festival in July or August brought amnesty for all offences except murder (Kohler, in *ZVRW* xii. 409).

By degrees the acceptance of proffered wergeld becomes compulsory, but if the offending party be unable to pay this, the blood-feud may, as primitive kinship-feeling decays, still be commuted in a variety of ways. Thus the offender may become the slave of the family, clan, or tribe that he has injured, as in Makassar, Saranglao, and Gorong (Wilken, *op. cit.* p. 24 f.; Riedel, *op. cit.* p. 156), and among the African Diagara (Hecquard, *Reise an der Kuste und in das Innere von Westafrika*, Leipzig, 1854, p. 104); or he may become the slave of the chief of the tribe in question, as among the Malays of Menangkabau (Wilken, *op. cit.* p. 22); or of him who paid the blood-money, as in West Timor (Riedel, in *Deutsche geograph. Blatter*, x. 234). This form of punishment is also the penalty for many other offences (see SLAVERY). In Akkra, on the other hand, he who could not pay the wergeld was exposed to the extreme consequences of the blood-feud (Bosman, *Viaggio in Guinea*, Venice, 1752, ii. 91; Muller, *Die afr. auf der Goldkuste gelegene Landschaft Fetu*, Hamburg, 1676, p. 116).

As soon as any mode of reconciliation or commutation becomes permissible between a murderer and the family, clan, or tribe of his victim, the decay of the blood-feud begins. It has already been seen that the commonest method of such reconciliation is by the payment of certain sums to the kinsfolk of the murdered man. Potent as is such wergeld in diminishing the scope and frequency of the blood-feud, other factors are still more powerful. With increasing civilization the predominance of the family and clan becomes less and less, while that of the tribe (and ultimately of the nation and State) becomes greater and greater. The blood-feud, which is at first absolutely essential if family is to be prevented from encroaching on family, is seen to be detrimental to the larger development of the embryo State, and measures of ever-increasing severity are taken to check and suppress the blood-feud, until at last it wholly disappears as a recognized institution. The struggle is, however, long and stubborn. The primitive State may hand the offender over to the kinsmen of his victim, that they may either execute blood-revenge or obtain reconciliation in any way they please, as among the Iroquois, Batak, Malays of Menangkabau, Pogghi Islanders, and African Bornu, Wadai, and Unyoro (Post, *Studien*, p. 128, *Anfange*, p. 184); or the nearest kin of the murdered man may be appointed the official executioner of the murderer, as among the Galla (Cecchi, *op. cit.* p. 79) and Malays (Post, *Bausteine fur eine allgemeine Rechtswissenschaft*, Oldenburg, 1880–81, i. 157), any anticipation of official sanction on the part of the avenger of blood being a punishable offence in the Sansanding States (Fama Mademba, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 89). In this way the place of the primitive avenger of blood is ultimately taken by a regular State executioner, as among the Malays of Nias (Wilken, *op. cit.* p. 22). Even in ancient Greece the State took cognizance of murder only when duly qualified kinsmen of the murdered man had lodged a formal complaint against the murderer.

Often there is a double system of punishment for murder and other grave offences—execution by officers of the State or blood-feud, as among the African Washambala (Lang, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 256); while, in case the system of commutation has come into effect, a certain amount of the wergeld may belong to the State, the remainder appertaining as damages to the kinsmen of the murdered man. On the other hand, the non-Muhammadans in the Sansanding States give the entire amount to the king, whereas Islāmitic law awards the whole wergeld to the injured family (Fama Mademba, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 89), thus showing in epitome the antithetical status of the individual as belonging, in the one case, to the State, and, in the other, to the family (cf. the twofold theory of the status of the wife, above, p. 721). A murderer may often escape the blood-feud by voluntarily surrendering himself to the State; but if he will not do this, the blood-feud is officially sanctioned. Increasing limitations are, however, imposed by the State. The blood-feud is restricted to a brief period: three days in Johor (Wilken, *op. cit.* p. 7), or *in flagrante delicto* among the Arabs of the Red Sea coast (Klemm, *Kulturgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1843–52, iv. 149); while, in Makassar, if a murderer succeeded in reaching the judge, he was safe from blood-feud, and had only to pay the wergeld (Wilken, *op. cit.* p. 6). Elsewhere, as in Johor, the avenger of blood must make formal declaration of his intention before the judge (Post, *Bausteine*, i. 150). An especially potent restriction on the blood-feud is found, as already noted, in the system of asylum; and finally, with the more perfect development of the State, aided by a higher concept of religion (though, as a matter of fact, Christianity alone has contributed to this end), the blood-feud itself becomes murder and a crime, instead of a sacred and praiseworthy duty, and so is suppressed and disappears, surviving only in such stagnant phases of civilization as are still revealed from time to time by Sicilian *vendettas* or the feuds of the 'mountain whites' of Kentucky and Tennessee.

LITERATURE.—Frauenstädt, *Blutrache und Totschlagsühne*, Leipzig, 1881; Kohler, *Zur Lehre von der Blutrache*, Würzburg, 1885; Steinmetz, *Ethnol. Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe*, Leyden, 1894, i. 361–406, and *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien*, Berlin, 1903; Post, *Geschlechtsgenossenschaft der Urzeit*, Oldenburg, 1875, p. 155 ff., *Ursprung des Rechts*, Oldenburg, 1879, p. 87 ff., *Anfange des Staats- und Rechtslebens*, Oldenburg, 1878, p. 172 ff., *Bausteine fur eine allgemeine Rechtswissenschaft auf vergleichend-ethnol. Basis*, Oldenburg, 1880–81, i. 142 ff., *Afr. Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1887, i. 57 ff., *Studien zur Entwicklungsgesch. des Familienrechts*, Oldenburg, 1889, pp. 133 ff., and *Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1894–95, i. 226 ff., ii. 246 ff. On the last-named work the present art. is largely based. A large amount of source-material is contained in *ZVRW* (cf. the index to i.–xx., *s.v.* 'Blutrache,' and such artt. as Kohler's summary of the North American Indian blood-feud, xii. 405–411, and Schmidt's summary for South America, xiii. 315–318). Much

may also be gleaned from travels and such general works as Waitz-Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvolker*, 6 vols., Leipzig, 1860–77. LOUIS H. GRAY.

BLOOD-FEUD (Aryan).—*Introduction.*—The institution of the blood-feud may still be traced among all Aryan peoples: first, as it exists up to the present day among the Afghans and the Albanians, in Corsica and Sardinia, and among the Southern Slavs; secondly, at least in the older tradition, where it is clearly preserved, among the Greeks, Teutons, Celts, and the Western and Eastern Slavs; thirdly, with only scanty traces, among the Indians of the Veda, the Iranians of the Avesta, and the Romans. Its primitive Aryan signification lies in the etymological correspondence of Av. *kaêna*, 'punishment,' 'revenge' (New Pers. *kîn*, 'enmity,' 'hate,' 'anger')=Gr. ποινή, 'blood-revenge' and '*wergeld*.' Probably it may also be connected with Ir. *cáin* (from **coini-**)='emenda,' *i.e.* 'damni reparatio,' 'satisfactio de iure læso vel de iniuria illata.' The verb which underlies these substantives is Skr. *chi*, *cháyate*, 'punish,' 'avenge'; Av. *či*; Gr. τίνομαι, τίνυμαι, τίνω, 'obtain compensation,' 'punish,' 'give compensation.' Compare also τίω, 'estimate a value,' 'honour.' The following characteristic features of the primitive Aryan period may be established from the identity of customs among individual tribes.

1. The obligation of blood-revenge is always attached to definite circles of relationship, which may be designated family or clan. Within this circle the blood-feud descends first of all from father to son.

For the Celts, cf. Giraldus, *Cambriae Descriptio*, cap. 17: 'Genus super omnia diligunt, et damna sanguinis atque decoris acriter ulciscuntur: vindicis enim animi sunt et irae cruentae, nec solum novas et recentes iniurias, verum etiam veteres et antiquas velut instantes vindicare parati'; and Walter Map, *De nugis curialium*, Dist. ii. cap. 22, § 96 (*ap.* Walter, *Das alte Wales*, p. 135, note 1): 'Ut moris est, vadem se offert pro iuvene tota cognatio, et cavere iudicio sisti.'—For the Teutons, see Tac. *German.* cap. 21: 'Suscipere tam inimicitias seu patris seu propinqui quam amicitias necesse est: nec implacabiles durant. Luitur enim etiam homicidium certo armentorum ac pecorum numero, recipitque satisfactionem universa domus, utiliter in publicum, quia periculosiores sunt inimicitiae iuxta libertatem.'—For the Russians, cf. *Russkaja Pravda of Jaroslav Volodimêrič* (1013–1054): *Judicium Jaroslavi, filii Vladimêri*: 'Si interfecerit vir virum, ulciscatur frater fratrem, vel pater vel filius vel fratris filius vel sororis filius. Si vero nemo est, qui eum ulciscatur, solvendae sunt pro capite octoginta grivnae, si est principis vir,' etc. See below, p. 734[a].

In Homer the sons and grandsons, father, brothers, and brothers' sons (ἀνεψιός) and the ἕται (ἑταί) are mentioned as avengers of blood: the last-named is an expression which probably belongs to the pronoun-stem *sve-*, *svo-*, and so means much the same as the Latin *sui*. Once we find in place of ἕται the word ἀοσσητῆρες (*Odyss.* xxiii. 119), from ἀοσσέω, 'help.' This in turn is derived from a word corresponding with the Latin *socius* (**svekjo-s*), namely, ἀ-σϝοκ-jo-ς=*α-οσσο- (ἀ as in ἄ-λοχος, 'bedfellow'), which is perhaps connected with *sve-*, *svo-*, *suus*, but is also capable of another derivation (cf. Walde, *Lat. Etymol. Worterbuch*, p. 579).

2. As a result of this obligation to blood-revenge, we find a state of feeling between two families or clans which among West Teutons is technically called in Old High German *fêhida*, Anglo-Sax. *fœhð*, Mid. Lat. *faida* (O.H.G. *fêch*, Anglo-Sax. *fáh*, from **poiko-s*=Ir. *oech*, 'enemy'); in the Slavonic languages, Old Slav. *vražida* (Old Slav. *vragŭ*, 'enemy,' Old Pruss. *wargs*, 'bad'). The opposite conception to this in the Germanic languages is O.H.G. *fridu*, Anglo-Sax. *friðu*, Old Nor. *friðr*, **pritu-* (Skr. *priyá-*, 'dear,' Goth. *frijôn*, 'love'); in the Slavonic, Russ. *mirŭ*, 'peace' (Skr. *mi-trá-*, 'friend,' Lith. *mýlimas*, 'beloved,' Russ. *mi-lyj*, 'dear'). Fundamentally, therefore, peace and friendship (*i.e.* on the old view, relationship; cf. Schrader, *Reallex. s.v.* 'Freund und Feind') are identical conceptions. The Goth. *gafripôn* and the Russ. *primiriti* both mean 'to restore to a state of peace' (O.H.G. *fridu*, Russ. *mirŭ*), 'to reconcile.' It is characteristic that *mirŭ* had already in Old Russ. acquired the meaning of 'community,' for the community (the tribe) composed of various clans is, in normal conditions, a sphere of peace and friendship which can only for a longer or shorter period be interrupted or broken by the *faida* or *vražida*. Conversely, it may be suggested that the Greek εἰρήνη, 'peace,' is to be derived from εἶρη, 'assembly,' 'place of assembly,' and that this word (from **vervâ*) is to be connected with Old Russ. *vervĭ*, 'community.' It is the community so designated that, according to the *Russkaja Pravda* of the 13th cent., is liable in certain cases for the payment of the *wergeld*, and thus perpetuates the solidarity of the old clan. The Greek εἰρήνη would thus be the (normal) condition of peace reigning in the community.

According to this explanation of εἰρήνη, it must be admitted that the supposed initial *F* has not as yet been traced either in Homer or in the Greek dialects; but the latter are clearly influenced strongly by the Attic form of the word, which lacks the digamma. Moreover, **vervâ* (with prothetic vowel) may have become first **ἐ-FερFη* and then εἰρη.

Hence the present writer is inclined to believe that the conception of peace among the Aryan peoples originated primarily in view of the internal condition of the community (the tribe), and not with reference to external foes, with whom, indeed, in olden times there was no regular peace, but merely a cessation of hostilities (cf. Schrader, *Reallex.*, *s.v.* 'Krieg und Frieden'). On Latin *pax* and Goth. *gawaírpi*, 'peace,' see below (4). On the punishment of offences occurring *within* the family or clan see ARYAN RELIGION, above, p. 50.

3. The blood-feud was especially occasioned by the murder of an individual belonging to another clan, and, in a secondary degree, by bodily injury or insult. It is noteworthy in numerous old Aryan codes of law that the killing of a thief caught red-handed or of an adulterer detected *in flagrando* was exempt from punishment, *i.e.* in the language of primitive times it did not occasion a blood-feud (cf. Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, ii.[3] 406, and ARYAN RELIGION, above, p. 50).

4. There existed among all Aryan peoples the possibility of buying off the blood-feud by means of a *wergeld*, and thereby bringing it to a peaceful conclusion.

For the Greeks, *e.g.*, cf. Homer, *Il.* ix. 631:

καὶ μέν τίς τε κασιγνήτοιο φονῆος
ποινὴν ἢ οὗ παιδὸς ἐδέξατο τεθνηῶτος·
καί ῥ' ὁ μὲν ἐν δήμῳ μένει αὐτοῦ, πόλλ' ἀποτίσας,
τοῦ δέ τ' ἐρητύεται κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ,
ποινὴν δεξαμένου.

For the Teutons see the passage from Tacitus, *Germania*, quoted above, 'nec implacabiles durant,' etc.

Proof that this possibility existed even in the most primitive Aryan period is to be found in the identity between the Old Indian term for the *wergeld*, namely, *vâira-*, *vâira-dêya-*, *vâirayâtana-*, and the Anglo-Sax. *were*, Mid.H.G. *were* (*weragelt*) —both being related to Skr. *vîrá-*, Lat. *vir*, Goth. *wair*, 'man.' Here the Old Russ. *vira*, 'wergeld,' must be mentioned, though the views of philologists waver as to whether it was originally related to the Indian and German words or borrowed from the latter (cf. L. von Schröder, 'Indogerman. Wergeld,' *Festgruss an Roth*, p. 49). The most probable supposition is that the Skr. *vâira-*, Anglo-Sax. *were*, and Old Russ. *vira*, exhibit various stages of change of the radical vowel of the original Aryan term for 'wergeld.' Moreover, the above cited equation, Av. *kaêna*=Gr. ποινή, no doubt indicates that in the primitive period, as among the Greeks, the custom existed of buying off blood-revenge by payment of a *wergeld*. Similarly, we find in Slavonic languages the above-mentioned *vražida*, 'hostility,' 'revenge,' used also to mean the compensation by which homicide was expiated. Cf. also Cymr. *galanas*,

* A star before a word signifies that the form does not occur but is inferred.

originally 'hostility' (*gâl*, 'foe'), and then 'wergeld'; and the Mid. Gr. *φόνος*, properly 'murder.' Lat. *pœna*, 'compensation,' and then 'punishment,' probably exhibits a borrowing from the Gr. *ποινή*.

At an early date prices or rates of *wergeld*, more or less fixed, must have been evolved. So in Old Indian sources (cf. Schrader, *Reallex.* p. 102) we find a hundred cows mentioned as the rate of compensation for a man (*vâiram*); and Tacitus also, in the passage already cited, says: 'luitur homicidium *certo* armentorum ac pecorum numero.' 'From the rates stated, the general underlying principle emerges that the *wergeld* of bondsman, freeman, and noble were in the following proportion of ½ : 1 : 2; that is, 75 – 150 – 300 shillings or oxen' (Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, iv. 327). For the rates among the Slavs see below, p. 734. What was demanded for the murdered, wounded, or insulted man by the clan, or by himself, constituted his 'value' or 'price,' and the recovery of this price by his friends and the recognition of the same by his foes constituted his 'honour.' This evolution of ideas is clearly stamped upon the languages that concern us. The Gr. *τιμή*, derived from *τίνω* mentioned above, signifies primarily 'revenge' (*ἔβη Ἀγαμέμνονος εἵνεκα τιμῆς Ἴλιον εἰς εὔπωλον*, Hom. *Od.* xiv. 70, 117); then 'indemnity for injury,' 'compensation' (*ἄτιμος*, like *νήποινος*, denotes a person who may be slain without need for compensation); then 'honour.' Precisely similar is the development in the meaning of *cěna*, a word common to the Slavonic languages. The word corresponds exactly to the Gr. *ποινή* (**qoinâ*), and thus signifies in the first instance 'revenge' and 'wergeld.' Then it takes over the meaning of 'price' and 'honour' (Old Slav. *cěniti* exactly answers to the Gr. *τιμάω*; so Schrader's *Reallex.* p. 835 f., and now Berneker, *Slav. Etym. Worterbuch*, p. 124). In this connexion we find also the explanation of the hitherto unintelligible Gothic word *gawairpi*, 'peace,' mentioned above. The word has nothing to do with *wairpan* (Germ. *werden*), but is connected with *wairpi*, 'value,' 'worth.' Consequently its proper meaning is 'general agreement about the worth or value of a person,' the union and the resulting state of peace between two clans. It is noteworthy also that the first instance of the word *paciscor*, which underlies the Lat. *pax*, 'peace,' occurs in that passage of the XII Tables (viii. 2) which is the clearest survival in Roman tradition of the system of blood-revenge which once prevailed in that quarter as well: 'Si membrum rupit, ni cum eo pacit (agree about the value), talio esto.'

Thus we see that two of the most important conceptions of civilization—peace and honour—are at least in part rooted in the ideas that centre in blood-revenge and its buying off by the *wergeld*.

5. Among most Aryan peoples we find it the custom for the murderer, after his bloody deed, to flee from the country for a longer or shorter period, presumably in order that in the interval the anger of the hostile clan might abate and the terms of reconciliation become easier. It still remains uncertain whether this custom is to be assumed as existing even in primitive times, when renunciation of tribal connexion was almost a matter of life and death (cf. Schrader's *Reallex.* p. 835).

6. The fighting out or the amicable settlement of the blood-feud is, as we have seen, from the beginning exclusively the affair of the two hostile clans. Notwithstanding, perhaps the realization of the danger incurred by the whole clan owing to feuds of long duration (cf. above, Tacitus, *Germ.* cap. 21: 'periculosiores sunt inimicitiae iuxta libertatem') may have at an early period ensured efforts upon the part of the race, in their assemblies under the direction of the king (Skr. *râj-* = Lat. *rex*, Ir. *rí*), towards the amicable settlement of clan feuds. A settlement of this description would naturally, even in primitive times, be accompanied by a long succession of solemn ceremonies. We have ample information on this point as regards especially the Slavonic world (see below, p. 734 f.). Everywhere in Europe two factors tended towards the restriction and ultimate eradication of the blood-feud: first, the *State*, that is, the absorption of the old clan and race-constitutions into the political composition of a State based on the principle of territory and no longer of consanguinity; and, secondly, the *Christian Church*, which offered sanctuary even to murderers. See art. ASYLUM.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in the article.

O. SCHRADER.

BLOOD-FEUD (Celtic).—**1. Terminology.**—The usual word in Old Irish is *fích* ('feud,' 'fight'), *fichim* ('I fight'), cognate with Lat. *vinco*, etc. In the *Acallam na Senórach* (Windisch, *Ir. Texte*, Leipzig, 1880–1905, iv. pt. i. p. 47), we learn that at the feast of Tara, which lasted six weeks, *nech fala ná frithfala do thabairt* ('neither feud nor cross-feud to be given'). The Irish *fala* is for *fola*, gen. of *fuil* ('blood'), perhaps connected with Welsh *gweli*, Cornish *goly*, Breton *gouli* ('wound'); but cf. Henry, *Lex. bret.*, Rennes, 1900, p. 139. For 'vengeance,' 'revenge,' we have the Irish *díguil*, Welsh *dial* ('vindicta,' 'ultio'), Cornish *dial*. The Irish *éric* ('composition') is probably for **er-icca*, **per-yecca* ('full payment,' 'perfect cure' [d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Études sur le droit celtique* = *Cours de litt. celt.* vii., Paris, 1895, p. 88]). Finally, the Irish *díre* ('duty'), in *coirp-díre*, is the same as the Welsh *dirwy*, *dirui* ('mulcta'), *dir* ('necessary'), Irish *dír* ('just,' 'due,' etc.) [Stokes, *Urkelt. Sprachschatz*, Göttingen, 1894, p. 148].

2. History of the blood-feud among the Celts.—That the institution of the blood-feud was in existence among the early Celts is obvious from the numerous references to it in ancient Irish literature. One of the best known instances is found in the *Fotha Catha Cnucha* ('Cause of the Battle of Cnucha').

Cumall, the royal warrior of Ireland, carried off Murni, daughter of the druid Tadg, because her father had refused him permission to marry her. Tadg complains to Cond, supreme king of Ireland, who, according to the *Annals of Ireland by the Four Masters* (ed. O'Donovan, Dublin, 1848–51, i. 102–121), reigned from 122 to 157 A.D. Cond, furious at the insulting words of Tadg, sends soldiers to take possession of the girl. Cumall refuses to surrender Murni, and is killed by Goll, son of Morna. In attempting to avenge Cumall, Luchet succeeds only in wounding Goll in the eye. Goll kills Luchet; and, to quote the Irish, *is desin robói fích bunaid eter macou Morna ocus Find*, 'it is from that, then, that there was an hereditary feud between the sons of Morna (descendants of Goll) and Find (the son of Cumall).' Furthermore, after the death of Cumall, Tadg not only refuses to receive his daughter Murni, but orders her to be burned because she is pregnant. Accordingly she invokes the protection of Cond, and gives birth to a son, Find. When this son arrives at a suitable age, he offers to his grandfather, Tadg, the following: *cath no comrac oenfir . . . no lanéraic a athar do thabairt dó*, 'a battle or a duel or full *eric* (for the murder) of his father to be given to him.' Tadg accepts the last, and is obliged to give the castle and grounds in Almu to Find (*RCel* ii. 86, etc.).

Again, in the *Longes mac n-Usnig*, Conchobar, the great king of the first epic cycle—*i.e.* about the beginning of the Christian era (Hyde, *Lit. Hist. of Ireland*, London, 1899, p. 243)—has the three sons of Usnech treacherously murdered after having promised them protection. The three heroes, Fergus, Dubthach, and Cormac, who had guaranteed their safety, set to work to avenge their murder. First they murdered four of the immediate relatives of Conchobar, and, later, when attacked by him, killed three hundred of his men and their wives, and burned the royal palace at Emain. With 3000 men they sought refuge at the court of Ailill and Medb, king and queen of Connaught, and continued their feud against Conchobar for sixteen years (Windisch, *op. cit.* i. 75–77). Cinaeth hua Artacain, who died in 975 ('Annals of Tigernach,' *RCel* xvii. 259) had a more complete account of this story, which stated that Conchobar, in retaliation for the murder of his relatives, killed Gergenn, the son of Illad (Windisch, *op. cit.* ii. 2, p. 119). Numerous other

examples could be cited, such as *Aided Conroi*, in which the murder of Conroi is avenged by his sons (d'Arbois, *Epopée celtique en Irlande = Cours de litt. celt.* v., Paris, 1892, p. 327 f.); the death of Conchobar, where Mesgegra, king of Leinster, is avenged (O'Curry, *Lectures on the Manuscript Materials of Ancient Irish History*, Dublin, 1878, p. 637 f.); *The Voyage of Mail Duin*, in which the hero is taunted for not avenging his father's death (Stokes, *RCel* ix. 459, etc.), etc.

In the *Ancient Laws of Ireland*, some of which, such as the *Senchus Mór*, date as early as the 7th century (Hyde, *op. cit.* p. 589), we find murder classed under two heads—necessary murder (*marbad dethbire*), and unnecessary murder (*marbad indethbire*). Necessary murder is unpremeditated, or, if premeditated, is accomplished through duty of vengeance. Unnecessary murder is for motives of gain (*Anc. Laws*, iii. 68, ll. 12–14; iv. 248, ll. 25–26). In the case of the first, no composition, or *éric*, was required if the murder was the result of vengeance. According to the *Ancient Laws* (iv. 252–4), 'when the murder of a member of the *derbfine* (*i.e.* of any relative of the *geilfine* or *derbfine*) is to be avenged by the death of the murderer, the family of the murdered has a right to the *coirp-díre* ("body-price") and the *enech-lann* ("honour-price"); if, however, it has received this *éric* before exercising vengeance, it must, after taking vengeance, make full restitution of this price.' The duty of vengeance was imposed upon the nearest relatives of the victim—upon the *geilfine* and *derbfine* (d'Arbois, *Droit celtique*, p. 186). To understand these terms, we must remember that the Irish family was divided into four groups, consisting of seventeen persons in all: *geilfine*, *derbfine*, *iarfine*, and *indfine* (*Anc. Laws*, i. 282, ll. 23, 27; p. 272, l. 23). To the *geilfine* belonged the father, son, grandson, and brother of the murdered; while to the *derbfine*, besides the above five, were added the grandfather, paternal uncle, nephew (son of the brother), and cousin-german (cousin to the fourth degree in the paternal line). In addition to the above eight persons, three others could take vengeance on the murderer. These three were the foster-father, whose *dalta*, or pupil, was murdered; the adoptive father, whose *mac faosma*, or adopted son, was killed; and the (maternal) uncle, when the son of his sister (*mic mna*) was the victim of the murderer (*Anc. Laws*, iv. 244, ll. 20–22). So, in ancient Ireland, the blood-feud was fostered by the duty of vengeance. We have indications of its existence as late as the 16th cent., in the celebrated feuds between the chief Manus O'Donell and his son, between the Earl of Thomond and his uncles, etc. (Moore, *Hist. of Ireland*, London, 1835–46, ii. 367). As in Scotland, the most usual causes and consequences of the later feuds were the destruction of crops and the driving-away or houghing of cattle belonging to persons occupying lands to which others alleged a claim. One of the most celebrated cattle-raids in Irish literature is the *Táin Bó Cualnge*, or the Cattle-Raid of Cooley (ed. Windisch, Leipzig, 1905). Sir Walter Scott in his *Waverley* (ch. xv.) describes a similar expedition undertaken by twelve Highlanders.

In Wales, where, as the testimony of Giraldus of Cambray and Walter Map shows (see above, p. 724[a]), the blood-feud once flourished, the Roman conquest brought about the suppression of both the duty of vengeance and the payment of *éric* for murder. The *Lex Cornelia de sicariis* of Sulla (B.C. 81) and the laws of Cæsar and Augustus (*Lex Julia de vi publica* and *de vi privata*) imposed severe penalties upon those who went about bearing arms with the intention to kill (Rein, *Das Criminalrecht der Römer*, Leipzig, 1844, pp. 409–14, 752, etc.). On this account, no doubt, the Welsh *dirui* or *dirwy* changed its meaning from *éric* ('composition') to '*mulcta*' ('fine paid to the State'). After the departure of the Romans, while the *éric* was re-established, the duty of vengeance failed to assume its former force. This was in part due to the fact that the *cenedl*, or clan, was already to some extent disintegrated as early as the 10th cent. (Rhys and Brynmor-Jones, *The Welsh People*, London, 1900, p. 196). The feuds between the clans were largely superseded by the warfare between the petty kingdoms. But that the duty of vengeance was not looked upon unfavourably is manifest from several statements in the Dimetian Code, which was probably redacted under Howel in the 10th cent. (Rhys, *op. cit.* p. 181).

According to this code, 'if there is in a *cenedl* an ecclesiastic or an idiot, he is neither to pay nor to receive any part of the *galanas* ("body-price")'; and 'no vengeance is to be exercised against any one of these for *galanas*, neither are they to avenge a relation that is killed.' Furthermore, if a *cenedl* 'commences paying the *galanas* of a person killed, and the whole be not paid, and if on that account one of such kindred stock (*cenedl*) be murdered, the *galanas* for that individual is not to be paid; neither is anything to be restored of what had been paid on account of the first.' Finally, if 'an innocent person is accused of murder and neglects to seek justice, and if he be killed on account of it, nothing is to be paid for him' (*Anc. Laws of Wales*, London, 1841, i. ch. i. p. 199 f.; cf. also ii. ch. viii. p. 214, etc., for cases in which the law 'exonerates the avenging').

But it was especially among the Scots that the blood-feud raged with ferocity. From the 12th cent., when the *sept* or clan first appears as a distinct feature in the social organization of Scotland (Skene, *Celtic Scotland*[2], Edinburgh, 1890, ii. 303), until the 17th cent., there was no cessation of clan-feuds. When there were no sweeping feuds involving the most prominent families, such as Huntly against Argyll, or Stewart against Hamilton, the minor chiefs were fighting among themselves (Lang, *Hist. of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1902, ii. 541, etc.). The usual method was for a laird or yeoman to gather his henchmen and make a raid on some estate to which he alleged a claim, or for other reasons sometimes very insignificant. They would trample down the crops, hough the cattle, and drag the women about by their hair, killing all who might resist (Lang, *loc. cit.*). Such cases were most frequent. In fact, the volume of the Privy Council Register for 1613 contains no fewer than 42 feuds then running, not including those in the Highlands and Islands. Even ministers of the gospel were sometimes so swayed by their passions that they took part in these ferocities.

One of the most noted of these feuds was that of the Colquhouns and the Macgregors, which culminated in the battle of Glenfruin in 1602. According to Birrell's diary (2nd Oct. 1603), sixty widows of the slain Colquhouns rode on white horses before the king at Stirling, each bearing in her hand a pike upon which was displayed the bloody shirt of her dead husband. A long and deadly feud was that between the Scotts and Kerrs, of which Sir Walter Scott speaks in his *Lay of the Last Minstrel*. This feud began with the battle of Melrose in 1526. As a consequence, Sir Walter Scott was assassinated in the streets of Edinburgh in 1552. In order to staunch this feud, which was sapping the life-blood of these two great families, a bond or contract was made between them in Edinburgh on 23rd March 1564, in which they agreed to cease hostilities (Pitcairn, *Criminal Trials in Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1833, iii. 390, etc.). But it accomplished nothing, for the feud was still raging in 1596 (cf. also Campbell, *Clan Traditions*, London, 1895).

3. **'Éric,' or composition.**—Cæsar attests the fact that the payment of *éric* was an established custom among the primitive Gauls. In speaking of the importance of the druids in ancient Gaul, he says: 'Nam fere de omnibus controversiis, publicis privatisque, constituunt; et, si quod est admissum facinus, si caedes facta, si de hereditate, si de finibus controversia est, iidem decernunt; praemia poenasque constituunt (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 13). The earliest mention of this institution in Ireland is found in the *Confessio* of St. Patrick, where he says: 'censeo enim non minus quam pretium quindecim hominum distribui illis.' Tirechan, writing in the 7th cent., explains this statement of Patrick by adding 'animarum' after 'quindecim' (Stokes, *Tripartite Life*, London, 1887, ii. 310, 372). Furthermore, an Irish council of about the 7th

cent. decided that, in default of the family, the king himself might be held responsible for the payment of the *éric* (Wasserschleben, *Ir. Kanonen-versammlung*[2], Leipzig, 1885, p. 170).

In Ireland, the *éric* was divided into two classes: the *coirp-díre*, or 'body-price,' and the *enech-lann*, or 'honour-price' (or *log-eneich*, lit. 'face-price,' Breton, *enep-uuert*; cf. Ernault, *Gloss. moyen-bret.*, Paris, 1895, p. 794). The *coirp-díre* was exacted in the case of unnecessary murder, or in necessary murder when not prompted by vengeance. The *enech-lann* was exacted in the case of bodily injury, insult, etc., and would, therefore, be necessarily included in the *coirp-díre*. In regard to the latter, the family had the choice of surrendering the criminal as property (*in féronn*) to the family of the murdered, or of giving land for his crime (*Anc. Laws of Ireland*, iv. 246, ll. 25–26). But, continue the *Ancient Laws*, 'each one dies for his premeditated crimes when he has not found the *éric*' (iv. 250, ll. 16–17). Thus, in the case of unnecessary murder the criminal was the sole debtor. But in necessary murder the criminal and his *geilfine* were held responsible for the payment of the *éric*. In default of the *geilfine*, the other three groups of the family found themselves involved (*ib.* i. 260, ll. 1–3; p. 274, ll. 12–13). The *coirp-díre* was fixed, consisting of *secht cumula*, 'seven female slaves' (iii. 70, ll. 7–8). The criminal was obliged to pay the *aithgin* ('slave of restitution'), and his share both of the six other slaves and of the *enech-lann*. If his *geilfine* could not supply the rest, the *derbfine* would pay three-fourths, and the *iarfine* and *indfine*, one fourth, *i.e.* three-fourths of a fourth by the *iarfine* and one-fourth of a fourth by the *indfine* (*ib.* iii. 330, l. 710; p. 68, ll. 15–18). In the later history of Ireland, the *éric* for murder became more variable, and was paid in cattle or other property. It was continued as late as the beginning of the 17th cent., notwithstanding the efforts of the English to stamp it out (Hayne, 'Observation on the State of Ireland in 1600,' in the *Irish Eccles. Record*, Dec. 1887; for a more complete study of the *éric*, cf. d'Arbois, *Droit celtique*).

As the *coirp-díre* required the *enech-lann* in Ireland, so, in Wales, the murderer was obliged to pay both the *galanas* ('body-price') and the *saraad* ('disgrace- or honour-price'). The *galanas* varied according to the rank of the person killed. Thus the *penkenedl*, or clan-chief, was valued at 189 cows; an *uchelwr*, or high man, noble, at 126 cows; a *penteulu*, 'man with a family without office,' at 84 cows; and so on down to the *caeth*, 'slave of the island,' at 1 lb. of silver and 4 cows. The *galanas* of a woman was always one half of that of a man (Rhys, *op. cit.* p. 228 f.). In regard to the payment of the *galanas*, one-third fell upon the murderer and his father and mother, he paying twice as much as his parents. Furthermore, if he had children liable to pay, he paid two-thirds of his own share, and his children one-third. The remaining two-thirds of the whole *galanas* was paid by the relatives on the father's and mother's side, the father's kinsmen paying two-thirds and the mother's one-third. In regard to receiving the *galanas*, one-third fell to the lord for exacting it; one-third to the father and mother and their children and the children of the murdered; and one-third to the other kinsmen in the proportion as described above (*Anc. Laws of Wales*, i. 227, ii. 199–200, etc.).

In Scotland, according to the *Leges inter Brettos et Scottos*, which were codified under David I. (1124–53), the worth of the king's person is valued at 1000 cows; of the king's son or earl, 150 cows; of the earl's son or thane, 100 cows; of the thane's son, 66⅔ cows; of the thane's grandson or *ogtiern*, 44 cows and 21⅓ pence; while the *carle* or *villein* was valued at 16 cows (Robertson, *Hist. of Scotland*, 3 vols., London, 1831, App. ii.; Lang, *op. cit.* i. 81; Skene, *op. cit.* iii. 218, etc.).

4. **Duel.**—The duel was often the means of obtaining justice among the Celts. The canonical collection referred to above attributes to St. Patrick two decisions prohibiting the debtor from resorting to arms to prevent a creditor from levying a distress (d'Arbois, *Droit celtique*, p. 45 f.). But the individual could engage in a duel only with the knowledge and consent of his family and his chief. If he fought without their consent and was killed, the victor would be obliged to pay full *éric* to his family, unless he could prove that the murdered man had provoked him to fight (*Anc. Laws*, iii. 302, ll. 1–3; p. 296, ll. 19–21). So, on the Border of Scotland, trial by combat served often as a proof of guilt or innocence; and Sir Walter Scott notes a feud between Thomas Musgrave and Lancelot Carleton which was settled in this manner in 1603 (*Lay of Last Minstrel*, Note x.).

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully in the course of the article.

JOHN LAWRENCE GERIG.

BLOOD-FEUD (Greek).—Blood-feud, or blood-revenge, is a widely diffused custom of primitive society, of which some instances still survive, as in the Corsican vendetta, and of which numerous traces are to be found in history and literature. It arises, as a rule, through a violation of rights practised by a member of one family against a member of another (A. H. Post, *Familienrecht*, p. 134). The breach of rights may take widely different forms, but its normal instance is that of murder, or at any rate homicide, and to this attention is confined in the present article. The parties primarily involved in such a feud are, on the one hand, the nearest kinsman of the slain man, and, on the other, the slayer; but the responsibility extends beyond these to the circle sometimes of their families, in a wider or narrower sense, sometimes of their entire respective clans (cf. *e.g. EBi*, *s.v.* 'Goel,' col. 1745). In many cases revenge can be satisfied only with the death of the slayer, or of one of his kin, but in others reconciliation is effected on the basis of compensation in money or kind. In every case vengeance is felt as a sacred duty. Its aim is largely, no doubt, to maintain the honour and integrity of the family or clan, and so far it has an ethical rather than a religious significance. But it is probable that blood-revenge has in every case, at least originally, been regarded also as a duty towards the spirit of the slain, and, as the tendance of the dead implies the recognition of spiritual beings and readily passes into worship, the blood-feud has to this extent a religious basis. By the Greeks certainly, in historic no less than in pre-historic times, vengeance on the murderer was regarded as a duty to the slain, and one of a religious kind. And probably the chief interest of the subject before us is the clear light which it sheds upon a whole world of thought and feeling which is in marked contrast with generally current conceptions about Greek religion.

1. **Homer.**—In Homer there are abundant traces of the custom. We read of Orestes avenging his father (*Od.* iii. 306), though this is the less usual case of blood-feud *within* the family, and of the understood right and duty of any man to avenge a brother or a son (*Il.* ix. 632; *Od.* xxiv. 434). In one instance (*Od.* xv. 273) the responsibility for vengeance falls also on the slain man's ἕται, who are usually understood to be his clansmen. This view is supported by the facts that ἕται are distinguished from cousins (ἀνεψιοί) in *Il.* ix. 464, and that in Attic law the duty of prosecuting a

murderer passed in case of need to any member of the murdered man's phratry (Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 260–261 n.). When an act of homicide has been committed, under whatever circumstances,—for these do not seem to have affected the issue in the society which Homer depicts,—its author is sometimes represented as fleeing into a strange land, where he seeks the protection of a man of influence. So Patroclus finds refuge in the house of Peleus, and Lycophron in that of Ajax (*Il.* xxiii. 85, xv. 431). In other cases the feud is ended by means of a recompense, or ποινή, mutually agreed on by the two parties. That this often happened is shown by the passage (*Il.* ix. 632 ff.) where Ajax, after trying in vain to disarm the resentment of Achilles against Agamemnon, continues, 'Why, even from the murderer of a brother, or for his own dead son, a man accepts, it may be, a ransom, and so he (the murderer) stays in his own town, after paying a large fine' (Paley's tr.). Of what took place on such occasions we have a vivid picture in *Il.* xviii. 498 ff. There, in a scene upon Achilles' shield, the two parties to a blood-feud first engage in a wrangle as to whether the amount agreed on has actually been paid, and afterwards bring their quarrel before a council of elders, while in the midst are placed two golden talents, which, at least on one interpretation, represent the ποινή, or fine claimed.

Among all these references to the blood-feud in Homer, nothing, it will be seen, is said about the spirit of the slain man, while the settlement by means of a fine is obviously treated as a matter in which the living only are concerned. And this is in harmony with the general view, which the Homeric poems present to us, of the state of the dead. Where the blood-feud is animated by a desire to appease the dead man's spirit, the latter is conceived as a powerful being bent on revenge, able and also ready to wreak his vengeance on the kinsman who neglects his interests. But the faith described in Homer is of a different order. Its dead are strengthless beings, ineffectual shadows of the living. There is, however, good reason to believe that this was not the oldest Greek faith. Even in Homer we meet once and again with what seem to be outcrops from an earlier stratum of belief. Thus at the funeral of Patroclus (*Il.* xxiii. 138 ff.), the hair which Achilles lays in his dead friend's hand, the jars of honey and oil, the slaughter of beasts and captives, and the burning of these together with the corpse, the night-long pouring of wine upon the earth, and the oft-repeated call to Patroclus, together with many other features of the story, all point to a vivid belief in the reality and nearness of the departed spirit which contrasts sharply with the usual Homeric representation; while, as Rohde observes (*Psyche*[2], p. 17), the whole series of offerings belongs entirely to the class which we may regard as oldest, and which meets us later in numerous instances of Greek ritual observed in the worship of under-world powers. The offerings which, in *Od.* xi. 49 ff. (the 'Nekuia'), Odysseus promises to the departed spirits point in the same direction. But, if such was the earliest Greek conception, the deepest motive of the blood-feud, in the Homeric age weakened or lost sight of, may well have been the slain man's demand for vengeance. And that this was actually the case is indirectly proved by the fact that in Homer the consequences seem to be the same for unintentional as for intentional homicide. The equalization of these two, says J. H. Lipsius (*Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren*, Introduction, p. 7), affords clear proof that the fundamental aim of the blood-feud was not punitive justice, but satisfaction to the slain.

2. Classic age.—When now we turn to the classic age, this aspect of the blood-feud occupies the forefront of the picture. Vengeance on the homicide is primarily reparation offered to the dead, and as such it is a religious act.

(1) *Poetry.*—In Æschylus' *Eumenides*, Orestes is pursued by no earthly avenger of blood, but by the Erinyes, who are representatives at once of the dead and of the old religious order. At first, in all probability, they were nothing but offended ghosts, the angry spirits of the slain, and hints of this original character are to be found in Æschylus (cf. *e.g.* J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, p. 223 ff.). In the main, however, as seen in his pages, they are rather the personified curses that attend the shedding of kindred blood. The personality of the slain is merged in that of the malignant demons who act as the ministers of his revenge. The same natural shifting of ideas, and the same fundamental conception of the slain man's enmity, are seen in the use of the word προστρόπαιος, which in the sense of an avenging power is applied by the orator Antiphon at one time to the dead man's spirit, at another to his ghostly champion, as in the phrase ὁ προστρόπαιος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος (*Tetr.* 3, β, 8). Sometimes, as in Sophocles (*Trach.* 1202) or Euripides (*Iphig. in T.* 778), the outraged spirit is described by the epithet ἀραῖος, a dealer of curses.

(2) *History.*—So far we have been dealing chiefly with the fancies of poets. But the same view of a slain man's enmity, and of his satisfaction as a religious act, is met with when we turn to the practice of the law courts and examine the developments of the blood-feud in historic times. When the clan develops into the State, the blood-feud inevitably passes under its control and is regulated in accordance with its interests. Greece was no exception to this rule, and we have evidence of laws relating to homicide in various Greek States. But while in the case of other States our information is only fragmentary, the procedure at Athens, though obscure in some points, is illustrated by copious references, especially in Plato, Aristotle, and the Attic orators. To enter at all fully into the Attic process would carry us beyond the limits of this article. But it will be sufficient to note its salient points. In the first place, the legal process meant a mitigation of the unreasoning vengeance of the primitive blood-feud. We have seen that originally the circumstances which led to homicide were immaterial. Its law is sufficiently expressed in what the chorus in Æschylus (*Choeph.* 310 ff.) characterize as 'a thrice hoary saying': 'Blood-stroke for blood-stroke must be paid. Doer of wrong must suffer.' But from time immemorial Athens had separate courts for the trial of wilful murder, of accidental, and of justifiable homicide. The tribunal for the trial of murder in the strict sense was the Council of the Areopagus, which exercised that function right onwards from the time of Solon, or, according to others (*e.g.* C. W. C. Oman, *Hist. of Greece*, p. 111), from the dawn of the Athenian constitution. Furthermore, a law of Draco (*c.* 620 B.C.) enacted that vengeance in certain cases, including adultery, should not be followed by a legal penalty (Pausan. IX. xxxvi. 8). But if from one point of view the law mitigated, from another it restored, the rigour of the ancient blood-feud. It did so by forbidding the ποινή, or money settlement, of which we have seen examples in the laxer practice of the Homeric age (cf. *e.g.* Demosth. *Aristocrat.* 28). This is by no means always the case when blood-revenge passes out of the hands of private persons (cf. *e.g.* Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, i. 484). It might, indeed, be thought that this strictness in the Attic law was due to the supposed interest of the State, but the true explanation is doubtless to be found in the view

advanced by Rohde, among others, that the State regulated the murder suits on the basis of the old family blood-feud, and that its chief object was the satisfaction, not of the State, but of the invisible powers. These positions we shall now proceed to illustrate.

That the State process grew out of the blood-feud is first of all indicated by the fact that it was the nearest relatives of the murdered man, and only in special cases more distant kinsmen, on whom devolved both the right and the obligation to prosecute. It was a duty for whose neglect in the case of wilful murder a man might be himself arraigned by a fellow-citizen (G. F. Schömann, *Antiq. of Greece*, p. 471, Eng. tr.). And this naturally arose from the fact that the duty to prosecute was regarded as also a duty to the dead, and thus as a religious duty, the neglect of which brought pollution upon the State and involved the risk of dearths and other calamities. For we have in the next place to note that the thought of the murdered man's vengeful spirit, and of other ghostly powers who jealously watched over his interest, was a living force in Athens even in historical times, shaping the course of justice, and moving the ordinary man to superstitious fear. To take the latter point first, the thought of the dead spirit's claim was a force to which the orator knew how to appeal in capital trials. So the relatives are said by Antiphon *βοηθεῖν τῷ τεθνεῶτι*, 'to succour the dead' (*Or.* i. 31; *Tetr.* 1, *β*, 13), and sentence on the murderer is described by him as *τιμωρία τῷ ἀδικηθέντι*, 'vengeance to the wronged' (*Or.* v. 58, vi. 6). In one of his speeches, composed for a fictitious case, he makes his clients address the jury: *ἀντὶ τοῦ παθόντος ἐπισκήπτομεν ὑμῖν*, 'we implore you on behalf of the dead' (*Tetr.* 3, *γ*, 7). In the next place the sense of a religious duty to the dead is apparent in the several steps of the judicial procedure. It is the archon-basileus who presides at the trial for homicide, the magistrate who inherited the peculiarly religious duties of the kingship; again, at the outset of the process, both parties have to swear by the Erinyes and other under-world powers to the justice of their cause. And lastly, we may note the procedure enjoined by law in the case of one condemned to temporary exile for an act of unpremeditated homicide. When the period of his exile had elapsed, and when he had been formally reconciled to the relatives of the slain, he had still to undergo a ritual purification from the stain of bloodshed ere he could share in the worship either of the State or of the family, and he had to make expiatory offerings to the spirit of the dead.

It will be seen that the conceptions here regarded as underlying the blood-feud, which have been attributed to the earliest Greek age and which are clearly reflected in classic times, contrast sharply with the picture of the Homeric age which lies between. The problem presented by this contrast can scarcely be ignored in dealing with the blood-feud, but it is one on which we can here only touch. It can probably be best explained by the composite racial elements that went to the making of the Greek nation. It is, of course, to be supposed that the feebler conception of the spirit-world reflected in Homer's pages, and the more untroubled gladness in life, were an actual feature of the age in which he lived. But they were the characteristics of a conquering Achæan stock, and not of the earlier population. The latter, who had no great poets to express the spirit of their religion, still clung to their local cults, and thought of the dead as mysterious powers, able to bless or curse the living. Even Homer, as already seen, is not without trace of this earlier belief. A similar hint may be found in Hesiod, whose 'daemons' are the souls of the men who lived in the earliest or golden age (*Works and Days*, 121). And Porphyry (*de Abstin.* 4. 22) records how Draco enjoined the Athenians to honour the dead heroes of their country *according to the custom of their fathers*. The old faith never died, and at last, owing especially to the teaching of the Delphic oracle, its gloomier views about the under world became, as we have seen, a dominant force in religion, and helped to shape judicial procedure.

There was, indeed, in Greek religion another and very different world from this, a realm of serene piety, radiant with images of the Olympian gods. But beneath it, in an opposition which paganism could not fully overcome, was a world of gloom and misgiving, haunted by the thought of evil, and of powers whose law was justice untempered with mercy. Of that world the study of the blood-feud, and of its reflexion in the thought and practice of the classic age, affords us impressive examples.

LITERATURE.—W. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in early Arabia*[2], 1903, pp. 25 ff., 55 f.; art. 'Goel' in *HDB* and *EBi*; A. H. Post, *Familienrecht*, 1890, pp. 118–136; K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch d. griech. Antiquitaten*[6], 1889, vol. i. §§ 64, 65; G. F. Schömann, *Griech. Alterthümer*[4] (by J. H. Lipsius, 1897, p. 508 ff.); Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, cf. vols. i. ii. iv.; Meier-Schömann-Lipsius, *Der attische Process*, 1887, p. 376 ff.; J. H. Lipsius, *Das attische Recht u. Rechtsverfahren*, 1905, Introduction; G. Glotz, *La Solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce*, 1904; P. Wilutzky, *Vorgesch. d. Rechts. Prahist. Recht*, 1903, pt. iii. ch. vi. 'Blutrache, Anfänge des Strafrechts u. des Prozesses'; J. Kohler, *Zur Lehre von d. Blutrache*, 1885; S. Herrlich, *Die Verbrechen gegen d. Leben nach attisch. Rechte*, 1883; Thonissen, *Le Droit pénal de la république athénienne*, 1876; E. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], 1898; Eichhoff, *Über die Blutrache bei d. Griechen*, 1873; K. O. Müller, *Aesch. Eum.* pp. 64 ff., 139 ff.; Jane E. Harrison, *Proleg. to the Study of Greek Religion*[2], 1908; Greek literature, esp. Homer, the Tragedians, Plato (*Laws*), Aristotle (*Politics*), and the Attic orators.

I. F. BURNS.

BLOOD-FEUD (Hindu).—Indian legislation had early reached the stage in which the right of private war, and the obligations arising from the blood tie everywhere recognized among the Teutonic tribes, had been superseded by the view that repression of murder and violence was a function of the State. The peace-preserving power of the king had become predominant, and we have to go back to Vedic literature if we would meet with some slight traces of the *wergeld*, or composition, once paid as a compensation for manslaughter to the relatives of the victim. It appears that a hundred cows were considered in Vedic times the ordinary amount of the *wergeld* to be paid for killing a man. The somewhat obscure hints in the Vedic *Saṁhitās* may be supplemented by the more explicit statements contained in the *Dharmasūtras* of Baudhāyana and Āpastamba, where the fines to be paid for manslaughter are declared to have the removal of hostility for their object. Cows and other cattle were, no doubt, the earliest kind of money in India, and the payment of a hundred cows for manslaughter corresponds to the bride-price, which likewise consists of a hundred cows. Gradually, as the priestly influence made itself more felt, the compensation to be paid to the family came to be converted into a money present to the Brāhmans. This is the standpoint of the more recent lawbooks of Manu, Yājñavalkya, and others. At the same time, the kings took cognizance of all crimes committed in their kingdoms. Punishment was personified as the protector of all creatures, formed of Brahman's glory (Manu, vii. 14), and that king only was said to attain to paradise in whose dominion there existed neither murderer nor thief nor other offender (*Viṣṇu*, v. 196). Nevertheless, the ancient custom of blood-revenge did not become entirely extinct, and various instances of it are recorded down to comparatively

recent times. Thus in Kolhapur, before it came under British superintendence, murderers were sometimes compelled to make compensation to the family of the victim. Land thus given in compensation was called *khunkat*. In Kāthiāwār, various forms of blood-revenge were known to occur even in the 19th cent.; *e.g.* the avenger abandoned the village and acted in a hostile manner against the whole community (*baharvatia*). In Rājputāna, Prince Jait Sing received 26 *bīghās* of land as a compensation, called *moond-kati* (blood-money), for the murder of some of his Rājputs. A landed proprietor in Mewār, whose father had been murdered, was given five villages belonging to the murderer. The inhabitants of certain border Districts in Gujarāt, between whom and their neighbours in Rājputāna an unceasing feud raged, used to have from time to time peaceable meetings with the latter, when the number of persons killed, women kidnapped, and cattle lifted on both sides, was ascertained, and a compensation in money paid for the surplus by the other party.

LITERATURE.—Roth, 'Wergeld im Veda,' in *ZDMG* xli. 672–679; Buhler, 'Das Wergeld in Indien,' in *Festgruss an R. v. Roth*, Stuttgart, 1893; *Bombay Gazetteer*, viii. 325, 329, xxiv. 267; Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, Strassburg, 1896, § 44; Sir R. West, 'The Criminal Law and Procedure of the Ancient Hindus,' in *Ind. Magazine*, Westminster, 1893. J. JOLLY.

BLOOD-FEUD (Muslim).—Among the Arabs, as among the other Semitic races, the blood-feud (*qawad*), retaliation (*qiṣāṣ*), vengeance (*thār*), is a general institution. Attested by pre-Islāmic documents, confirmed by the Qur'ān (ii. 173 and iv. 94), and codified by the jurists, it is a living custom among the Bedawīn, and is practised in its primitive form. We get this information from the observations collected in Syria by several authors, especially Burckhardt and Jaussen; and it is to them that we must go to study our subject. In the written Muslim law the blood-feud is only a chapter of criminal law.

A man is killed; he must be avenged. At first, it seems to be for religious reasons: a human being who has died without having accomplished, in peace or war, certain rites of passage, could never find peace in the grave; the dead man's blood 'cries,' in the form of an owl which disturbs the repose of his family, and which cannot be appeased except by another's blood. Then it seems also for economic reasons: the family and tribe of the dead man are weakened in comparison with the family and tribe of the murderer; the injured social group demands compensation.

Sometimes vengeance is immediate: a murder is committed in an encampment; it is known who the murderer is; the men rush on his tents, kill everybody they meet, slaughter the animals, and burn or break everything belonging to the murderer. But these immediate reprisals are often impossible, and then, it appears, some rites which are not very definitely stated take place. The nearest relative of the victim dips his shirt-sleeve (*reden*) in the spilt blood and hoists it up at the top of a lance. During a space of three days the avenger has no communication with anybody. The pre-Islāmic heroes used to subject themselves to various tabus at this time: Imru'l Qais took an oath to drink no wine, to eat no food, neither to wash nor to anoint his head, and to have nothing to do with women, until the day when his vengeance would be complete. It seems very probable that this was not altogether a voluntary tabu, because Duraid ibn as-Sama acted in the very same way.

Vengeance is taken, as a rule, by the nearest relative of the victim; but all the male members of his family to the fifth generation have the right of vengeance on the murderer and his relatives to the fifth generation.

The murderer, however, obtains the protection of his tribe or of an influential *shaikh*; and if the family of the victim, supported by their tribe, follow up their vengeance, they become involved in an everlasting war, made up of isolated murders and renewed vengeance. It is not often that a murderer is left alone at the mercy of his enemies. Sometimes, however, a *shaikh* will refuse to protect a man whose repeated assassinations are an annoyance to the tribe, or who has committed a murder in dishonourable circumstances. In such cases, the *shaikh* makes proclamation through the whole tribe that he 'shakes his mantle' (*infiraṣ 'abatih*) against him. The outlaw may then be slain with impunity by any one, even by a member of his own tribe. Sometimes a Bedawī proclaims the *infiraṣ 'abatih* on himself. He makes a tour through the whole tribe with a stick in his hand and a white flag flying from the top of it. Determined to avenge himself for a personal injury by a murder, he is trying in this way to take measures beforehand to restrict the consequences of his action to his own head.

As a rule, the murderer, being protected by his tribe, escapes the immediate vengeance of the family of his victim; but he remains none the less under a constant dread of it, which disturbs the life of his tribe as well as his own. After a few weeks, he sends a representative to the victim's family to make proposals. These are rejected, because the family are in honour bound to get the blood that is to satisfy the dead. Some months pass. The two tribes are tired of a situation that trammels all their social relations. An interview is arranged in the *shaikh's* tent, at which the representative (*wakīl*) of the murderer appears in supplication before the principal family-chiefs. On his knees, he avows three times that he has the victim 'at his house.' Then the victim's nearest relative declares himself ready to make peace, but only on condition of receiving an enormous ransom (*diya*) of young girls, camels, mares, sheep, money, arms, etc. The *wakil* consents to everything, no matter how exaggerated and impossible of fulfilment the conditions enumerated by the avenger may be. Then the *shaikh* intervenes, and, calling on the names of various intercessors, asks for the reduction of the different elements of the *diya* in succession; the avenger consents to this more or less generously, and peace is concluded. Pardon (*'afu*) is, so to speak, exchanged for the *diya*. In certain tribes the *diya* always includes two young girls of the murderer's family or tribe; the avenger keeps them to himself, or gets them married at will. Lastly, peace is guaranteed by the nomination of two hostages (*kafil*) for each side, and a white flag is hoisted on a stick. Sometimes they proceed to a final ceremony of burying the blood. When the family of the murderer are unable to pay the *diya*, they go into voluntary exile.

The amount of the *diya* is not usually the object of discussion except between tribes who live in close relations of kinship, or, at least, neighbourhood; for others there is a fixed amount (*mudda*). In ancient Arabia, the *diya* of a free man was a hundred camels, and that is the figure adopted by the *sunna*; the legal writings determine the lists of beasts to be chosen, in accordance with the ancient customs. For this *mudda*, which, in practice, can be applied only among nomads, has been substituted a sum of 1000 or 1200 drachmas, according to the country. Some people have preserved customary *muddas* which do not agree with the price fixed by the *sunna*: one allows fifty sheep and fifty *mejidi*; others, a thousand piastres along with the murderer's weapon and some sheep, two or three hundred *mejidi*, forty camels, etc.

The prescriptions of the Qur'ān (ii. 173), the

meaning of which, however, is difficult to settle, sanctioned a scale of values in accordance with the social importance of the victims—freemen, slaves, or infidels. Is it possible that Imru'l Qais, when claiming a hundred human lives for his father's blood, was conforming to an old *mudda* binding on chiefs? The *mudda* for a woman was fixed by the *sunna* at half of what was due for a man of the same social status. The Bedawī tribes of Syria, on the contrary, fix the *mudda* for a woman at four times that for a man: eight girls or their dowry, or sixty camels. For a pregnant woman, they add to her own *diya* the *diya* of the child.

The governments and jurists have set themselves to give a character of public right to private vengeance. The penalties are pronounced by a magistrate, according to written rules, in solemn forms of procedure in which the witnessing plays a preponderating part. Sentences are executed by public authority.

The modes of action are the same in the retaliation for wounds. This consists in inflicting a wound on the criminal identical with the wound he gave his victim. But here again the *diya* comes in; and the application by competent authority of the physical penalty or the money-fine is one of the most important matters of Arab criminal law.

LITERATURE.—Jaussen, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, Paris, 1908, pp. 220-232; G. Jacob, *Altarabisches Beduinenleben*[2], Berlin, 1897; J. L. Burckhardt, *Notes on Bedouins and Wahabys*, London, 1830, ii. 148-157.

GAUDEFROY-DEMOMBYNES.

BLOOD-FEUD (Roman).—That blood-feud existed in primitive times in Italy as elsewhere is certain both from analogy and from actual traces, but the latter are scanty compared with those found amongst the Greeks. The reason lies in the comparatively modern character of Roman civilization when it emerges into the light of history. Roman history is illustrated by no such authentic picture of a primitive age as is contained in Homer. And when we turn to the arrangements of Roman law, we find little or no such reflexion of primitive ideas relating to the blood-feud as in the law-courts of Athens. But both in law and tradition the traces, if not very abundant, are clear.

The legend recorded by Plutarch (*Rom.* 23, 24) about Titus Tatius and the envoys from Laurentum points unmistakably to the usage in question. Friends and kinsmen of Tatius slew the envoys when on their way to the king; and, on his refusing to deliver up the culprits, he was himself killed by the relatives of the murdered men. Soon afterwards the gods punished both Rome and Laurentum with a plague, which was stayed only when the murderers on both sides were surrendered and punished. The last statement suggests a public, indeed a legal execution, so that we may agree with the verdict of Mommsen (*Rom. Hist.* i. 158): 'This story looks very like a historical version of the abolition of blood-revenge.'

Another echo of the blood-feud comes to us in the tradition that Numa enjoined the offering of a ram (doubtless through the kinsmen to the *manes* of the slain) in cases of involuntary homicide. What Prof. Muirhead (*EBr*[9] xx. 680*b*) calls 'a re-enactment in illustrative language' of the same law appears in the words which, according to Cicero, occurred in the XII. Tables, 'si telum manu fugit magis quam jecit, arietem subicito.' In this case the object clearly is to stay a legal prosecution; but the original object of such a law, and that as late perhaps as the time of Numa, must have been to impose a limit on the blood-feud in the case of accidental homicide, while still in the case of wilful murder suffering it to proceed unchecked (*EBr*[9], *loc. cit.*). But a more direct reminiscence of the blood-feud is to be found in the part which the kinsman of a slain man was expected to take in the prosecution of the murderer. So stringent was the obligation to institute the trial, that failure to do so disqualified a man from inheriting any of the property of the deceased. Thus in Rome as in Athens, the judicial procedure reflects the family aspect of the original blood-feud. On the other hand, the legal treatment of homicide showed how completely among the Romans the claim of the State superseded that of the family to execute justice on the criminal. For homicide was dealt with, and that even earlier than the XII. Tables, as a breach of what the jurists called the public law, which dealt with offences against the State, while the private law dealt with matters directly affecting the interest of individuals.

A word may be added as to the earliest meaning of the word *poena*. It corresponds to the Greek ποινή, and occurs in a similar sense in the XII. Tables in the sentence 'si iniuriam faxit alteri, viginti quinque aeris poenae sunto.' *Poena* is here the equivalent in money of the revenge sought for, and it might be supposed to indicate the existence in earlier times of a manner of settling the blood-feud such as was customary in the Homeric age. That such a custom was also familiar to the Italians is from the nature of the case probable, but is not supported by the use of the word *poena*, which is simply borrowed from the Greek in the general sense of compensation. Moreover, the passage in the XII. Tables refers to compensation for personal injury, and has therefore no connexion with the blood-feud (for an interesting account of the relation between *poena* and ποινή see Karlowa, *Rom. Rechtsgeschichte*, ii. 790).

LITERATURE.—J. Muirhead, art 'Roman Law,' in *EBr*[9] xx. 669; Th. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, 1868-75, esp. vol. i., *Rom. Strafrecht*, 1899, and *Zum altesten Strafrecht der Kulturvolker*, 1905; Clark, *Early Roman Law: Regal Period*, 1872; O. Karlowa, *Rom. Rechtsgesch.* 1901, ii. 790.

I. F. BURNS.

BLOOD-FEUD (Semitic).—The feeling of kinship is the basis of the tribal system of primitive Semitic societies; kinsmen are really 'brothers' through their participation in a common blood, and this social bond is enforced by the law of blood-revenge. Tribal blood has fallen to the earth with the killing of a member of the group. The necessity for revenge arises when any member has perished at the hand of one of another group; the sanctity of its blood has been invaded thereby. On the other hand, if one kinsman has slain another, it is not cause for blood-revenge; either he is outlawed, as Cain (Gn 4[10ff.]) from his kin (though here by Jahweh), or is put to death, originally without shedding of blood, by the whole kin, that it may rid itself of an impious member.

The custom was doubtless of a religious character. Its persistence may be taken to support this. The members are one kin with their god; they are of his blood. His rights are violated therefore by the murder of one of their number, and he requires of them that they seek vengeance, on pain of his displeasure and consequent withdrawal from communion with them, as signs of which they would interpret any physical calamities that might befall them. It is a sacred duty a man may not renounce. The voice of blood, too, cries out from the ground for vengeance. There is a familiar idea in Arab poetry that his spirit in the shape of a bird rises from the head of the unavenged and cries, 'Give me to drink' (viz. blood).

Only tribal life offers the necessary conditions for blood-revenge: (1) the solidarity of the tribe or family (a larger group than with us, which is explained later), in which each individual is answerable for the other; and (2) the autonomy of the tribe.

The religious motive is not always present, but

esprit de corps is so real that tribal honour is always alert in pursuit of vengeance. In many instances the slain man's kin retaliated till a manifold vengeance was obtained. The Song of Lamech (Gn $4^{23f.}$), that if Cain be avenged seven times Lamech shall be avenged seventy-seven times, may be taken as showing that the vendetta did not always stop at the person of the murderer. But the principle of blood-feud is 'a life for a life.'

A person who has shed other than kin-blood is not at all regarded as impious, for only the blood of kin is sacred. He has involved all his kinsmen in the consequences; but they, if possessed of true tribal instinct, will not yield him up to the avenger. Any member of the aggrieved group may retaliate upon any member of the other, and satisfaction be obtained. But such summary justice does not always conclude the matter, and retaliation may follow retaliation indefinitely.

1. **Responsibility within a narrower circle.**—The family, not in the minor dimensions that obtain with us, but embracing all the descendants of a great-great-grandfather, early began to enter as a unit into the reckoning, and family feeling, which eventually affected the structure of Semitic society, and gave it a set towards disintegration, assumed a first importance. Blood-revenge now becomes primarily the concern of the family, so that the nearest relative is he who should undertake it: the *gō'ēl*, therefore, in Israel. Among the Arabs the brother and the son in almost equal measure were obliged to avenge. The tribe (*ḥayy*) usually, however, in its narrower sense of an aggregate of families that move *en bloc* from place to place and bear the same name, assumes the duty only when the family cannot from its weakness obtain vengeance. This intention of asserting the honour of the tribe may draw into the field of battle the manslayer's tribe, and war may demand a heavy toll of lives. The passive solidarity of the tribe also weakened before this narrower principle of relationship; the avenger preferred to retaliate upon some person within the fifth degree of consanguinity—a usage still in force among the Bedawīn. Another consequence of this growth of the family-idea may be noted. Certain of these smaller social units, by reason of bravery or for other such cause, became a kind of aristocracy, and from this was chosen the chief of the tribe. Not every life was held to be compensation for one of this class; in early Arabia 'a nobleman for a nobleman' was the rule.

2. **Modifications.**—(1) *Protection.*—A man in fear of an avenger might flee for protection to a member or the chief of another tribe. Moses, *e.g.*, found refuge with Jethro (Ex $2^{15ff.}$). In Arabia, by taking food or drink with a tribesman, or even by pitching his tent so that 'tent-rope touches tent-rope,' the fugitive secures for himself his protection, and, especially in earlier times, that of the whole tribe. In pre-Islāmic times this relationship between protector and protected varied: it might be temporary or permanent and hereditary, or promise might be made to protect against a definite enemy, or all his enemies, or against death itself, *i.e.*, if the stranger were slain while under his protection, the host would undertake to pay blood-money to the next-of-kin. The *jār*, or protégé, ceases to be under any obligation to his own tribe, and enjoys the same rights as any member of that to which he is now attached. It is the proud boast of a tribe that it is always able to defend its refugees; a weaker, however, under fear of attack from a stronger, may refuse to admit one to protection, or may refer him elsewhere. Sometimes the protector claimed the right to dismiss a *jār* at will.

(2) *Asylum.*—In Arabia a manslayer was unmolested by his pursuer within certain sacred areas, pre-eminently the *ḥaram* of Mecca, within the tent, or if he pitched his tent over the grave of an ancestor. In ancient Israel the altar afforded shelter to any one who had shed blood, but by the later time of the Book of the Covenant it availed only the unintentional homicide. Certain cities of refuge were provided for in the later law-codes, and these also are further distinguished from the asylums of the Arabs in that they secured from violence only, and not from justice. See ASYLUM.

(3) *Holy Seasons.*—During the four holy months blood-revenge and war were prohibited by the Arabs.

(4) *Oracle.*—The authority of the oracle, communicated through the lot, may originally have had considerable influence. That of Hubal in Mecca was famous; questions requiring 'yes' or 'no' might be settled, and it might also decide who was to undertake vengeance.

(5) *Oath.*—Through the *qasāma*, or 'oath of purgation,' among the Arabs proof was supplied where otherwise none could be offered. Helpers, usually fifty in number, in the oath must swear to the innocence of one accused of murder, or to his blood-guiltiness. The helpers need not have been eye-witnesses. The proper application of the *qasāma*, however, was when a man was found slain. The nearest community had to swear they were not the murderers. In Israel the nearest community professed its innocence through its elders, and made atonement for the blood which had been shed by laying the guilt upon an animal (Dt 21^{1-9}), for it was a fearful thought to the Hebrew that blood should go unavenged (Job 16^{18}).

(6) *Blood-wit.*—The principle of commuting the right of blood-revenge by a fine, which has been recognized by many peoples (Greek ποινή, Saxon *wergeld*), has not been universal among the Semites. The acceptance of a surrogate was forbidden to the Hebrews (Nu 35^{31})—a fact which is evidence of the increasing sense of personal worth under the growing social order. Arabs, with a fine instinct of tribal honour, reckoned it dishonourable to compromise in any degree the blood of a kinsman, but the consciousness of weakness might recommend such a course to a tribe. The material advantages to be gained by its acceptance also exercised some influence. Many tribes required, as a condition of such compromise, that the offender or a near relative should enter the tent of the avenger and place his life at his disposal, thus acknowledging the latter's ability to avenge if he wished. A person of repute, either an outsider or a member of one of the two tribes seeking a settlement, may be called in to arbitrate, but his authority is only moral. Certain tribes had a fixed tariff: that of a hundred female camels was common, is still in force among some Bedawīn, and was renewed by the Wahhābīs. But haggling is frequent. The *wergeld* may be paid by the manslayer; but often it exceeds his resources, and his near relatives or his friends may contribute, or an assessment may be levied on the whole tribe, or the chief may be called on; for, whereas in early time the booty was divided equally, a fourth came to be set aside later into a kind of State-treasury under him for the entertainment of guests, the support of widows and orphans, and the payment of blood-money. The recipients were the nearest relatives of the murdered man—the brother and the son, therefore, whose duty it had been to avenge him. If a *jār* were killed, his relatives, and not his protector, received the *wergeld*.

With the passage from nomadic to agricultural, settled life, local connexion begins to oust genea-

logical, the regional grouping gradually weakens the feeling of blood-community, and revenge for the slaying of kin, which is opposed to nomad custom, becomes possible (Gn 27^{42}, 2 S 14^{7}). Laws of social justice arise, and impartial tribunals of State-life are instituted which remove the infliction of penalties out of the individual's hands, and distinguish between murder and homicide. In Babylonia, courts for the punishment of offences were early set up; the *jus talionis*, but not blood-revenge, was admitted. The code of Ḥammurabi makes exception in favour of unintentional homicide (§ 207 f.). In course of time, after their settlement in Canaan, the Israelites lost their tribal organization, and during their subsequent history the laws of vengeance passed beyond the primitive state of blood-feud and acquired an ethical character. Their law-codes represent an intermediate stage between the nomadic custom of direct vengeance and the criminal proceedings of developed State-life. All three make the distinction (not found in Homer, though made later when the community took into its hands the right of the avenger), between murder and homicide, and provide for the unintentional homicide lest he should fall a victim to the avenger's hasty passion; he is secure from the *gō'ēl* at any altar of Jahweh (Ex $21^{13ff.}$), or at the Cities of Refuge (Dt $19^{2ff.}$, Nu $35^{14ff.}$). Ancient custom is preserved in this, that the avenger, and not the State, must take the initiative in protecting the interests of the aggrieved by bringing the case before the elders (Deut.), or the congregation (P), and must carry out the death penalty. The Deuteronomic code indicates the growth of individual responsibility in stating that the criminal alone is responsible for his misdeeds (Dt 24^{16}). The *gō'ēl* was known in Israel certainly down to the time of David (2 S 14^{11}). To Jahwism is due much of the credit for modifying this custom, though it did not abolish it. Jahweh came to be regarded as the *gō'ēl* who had redeemed Israel from bondage, to whom blood cried out, and who avenged it through His representatives with the people, viz. elders, kings, and priests.

In Syria the Syro-Roman law-book of the 5th cent. A.D. (§ 74, Paris Manuscript) forbids the avenger to kill the manslayer, and requires that the accuser hand over the guilty person to the authorities.

Muḥammad found the principles of blood-revenge too deeply rooted to be overthrown, and it gained recognition under his theocratic régime (*Qur.* xvii. 35). The religious community had both active and passive solidarity, being obliged to avenge one of its members slain and to protect a Muslim manslayer against the unbeliever. Further, he made the manslayer alone responsible for his deed, and distinguished between murder, fatal assault, and unintentional homicide. In the case of the first the *talio* was allowed, but blood-money could be accepted; in the others it must be accepted (Ibn Hišām, pp. 341–343, 821, ed. Wüstenfeld; al-Wāqidī, 338, ed. Wellhausen). But the modern Bedawî has preserved the nomadic institutions of the tribal system and the blood-feud from the transforming influence Islām would otherwise have exercised. With him the laws of vengeance for murder and homicide are the same. There is no need to regard the blood-feud as an altogether barbarous practice with nothing beneficent. Travellers in the peninsula claim that it is a salutary institution which has prevented tribes from exterminating each other, that it stays the plunderer's hand from shedding blood, and permits the traveller to risk himself in the desert. It is likely to remain as long as nomad life is regulated by custom.

LITERATURE.—Kohler, *Zur Lehre von der Blutrache*, 1885; artt. 'Goel' in *HDB*, *EBi*, and *JE*, and 'Gericht' in *PRE*^{3}; A. P. Bissell, *The Law of Asylum in Israel*, 1886; A. H. Post, *Entwicklungsgesch. des Familienrechts*, 1890, pp. 113–137; Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*^{2}, 1903, 22–24, cf. 36–39 [2 25–27, 41–56], *Rel. of the Semites*^{2}, 1894, *passim*; Procksch, *Über die Blutrache bei den vorislam. Arab.*, 1899; Patton, *AJTh*, Oct. 1901; S. A. Cook, *The Laws of Moses and the Code of Ḥammurabi*, 1903; *PEFSt*, 1897, p. 128 ff.; Burckhardt, *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys*, 1830; Jaussen, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, 1908.

A. H. HARLEY.

BLOOD-FEUD (Slavonic).—Among Slavonic peoples the institution of the blood-feud may still be traced in good authorities, throughout all its history, alike when it was in full force and in the varying stages of its gradual decay.

1. Slavonic terminology.—The art. BLOOD-FEUD (Aryan) has already discussed the three expressions—Old Slav. *vražida*, not only 'enmity,' 'blood-revenge,' but also 'compensation,' 'fine'; Old Russ. *vira*, 'wergeld,' then 'State-compensation'; and *mirŭ*, 'peace.' Here should be added Old Slav. *glava*, properly 'head,' and *krŭvĭ*, properly 'blood'—words which are used in numerous Slavonic tongues to signify the manslaughter (deed of blood) which is to be avenged by the blood-feud. The Russian expression for 'revenge' is *mĭstĭ*, *mestĭ*, *mĭstitĭ*, *mstitĭ*, which may be assigned to the same category as Latin *mūto*, from **moito*,* 'change' (cf. in Sicilian Gr. μοῖτος, 'retaliation'), or perhaps also may be compared with Gr. μῖσος, 'hatred' (μισεῖν, 'hate,' **mits*-). An interesting designation of inter-tribal conflict is to be found in the Polish word *walka* (Czech *válka*, 'war,' White Russ. *valka*, 'struggle'). It is perhaps possible that the Lat. *ulciscor*, 'I avenge,' hitherto unexplained, should be connected with it (cf. Walde, *Lat. Etymol. Worterbuch*). Finally, mention should be made of the Servian *vjera* (Old Slav. *vĕra*, cf. Lat. *vērus*), 'truce,' properly the pledge given to the hostile clan to undertake no hostile action against them during a specified period (Mid. Lat. *treuga*).

2. Instances of the blood-feud among particular Slavonic peoples (principally based on Miklosich, *loc. cit. infra*).—The latest survival of the blood-feud in full vigour was among the *Southern Slavs*, where it persisted longest in *Dalmatia* and *Montenegro*. In the last named it was not till the year 1855 that it was rooted out by the stringent measures taken by Prince Danilo. Till that date the blood-feud was looked on as the sole means of preserving order and justice. Its characteristics may be described as follows: Blood-revenge is resorted to in cases of murder, wounding, and insult, and is considered a religious and sacred duty to the murdered man. It is especially the women who give the stimulus to vengeance. The mother lays the infant in the cradle to sleep upon the blood-stained shirt of the murdered father, and, as the boy grows up, she ever and anon presents this ghastly object to his view. Every male member of the clan is under the obligation to avenge (*bratstvo*, properly 'brotherhood,' cf. Gr. φρήτρη, φρατρία, φράτηρ, 'brother'): first the eldest son; if there are no sons, the brother. If the man to be hunted down by the blood-feud dies, his liability is inherited by his nearest relative, so that sometimes it is the sons and grandsons who finally fight out the quarrels of their fathers and grandfathers. The chief object is to slay the murderer, or, if this is not possible, his next-of-kin—his brother, father, son, and so forth. Blood-feud also occurs inside the clan—a later and degenerate type of revenge. The woman, and, strangely enough, the man who has been taken under protection by a woman, are inviolable. In the earliest times the man flees after the murder to another district, or at least avoids meeting the hostile clan in the church or elsewhere. During the peril of war the clan-feud is allowed to rest; but, according to Rovinskij

* A star before a word signifies that the form does not occur, but is inferred.

(*op. cit. infra*, 63), it may happen that a clan living in deadly enmity with another clan forms an alliance with a national foe (the Turks or Arnaut): '*pleme* ("tribe" composed of several *bratstva*) and *rod* ("relationship") in this instance are rated higher than nationality and religious faith.' It is only by an expiation which includes the payment of the price of blood and a humiliating ceremony on the part of the guilty man (see below) that the blood-feud comes to a bloodless end. The duty of revenge extends to the whole clan; it is only the clan and not individual members of it that can conclude peace. In the assemblies of the people (*sbor*, *skupština*) a question often discussed is that of the settlement of feuds of many years' standing which threaten the general peace. On the expiation of the offence hostility is forgotten, and a man's honour is not wounded by virtue of his act of expiation. On the other hand, the law of Prince Danilo, mentioned above, decrees that the murderer cannot buy his pardon by any blood-payment, but is to be shot; if he flees, his property is to be confiscated; he is banished from the country, and, if in spite of this he returns, he may be killed with impunity by any Montenegrin.

When we turn to the *West Slavs*, it is in *Poland* that we find the longest persistence of the institutions of the blood-feud in full vigour. Even in the 14th cent. the Polish nobility (*šljachta*) was divided into a vast number of family-societies and brotherhoods for war which made use of an escutcheon common to all, and had a common battle-cry (*proclama*). These societies were based on an actual or symbolical relationship. The cohesion between members with one and the same escutcheon was exemplified: (1) in the right of the relatives of a murdered man to enforce the blood-payment from the murderer; (2) in the right to redeem patrimonial estates belonging to the family if they had been sold to a stranger without the express consent of the relatives of the seller (cf. Rovinskij, p. 141 note). But there is historical evidence of the existence of these family feuds (*walka*, see above) not only among the noble families, but also among the peasant classes subject to them.

Finally, in the case of the *East Slavs*, the *Russians*, we have at our disposal evidence very old and weighty, but, it must be admitted, very obscure in details.

The oldest and weightiest authorities are as follows: (1) *Chronica Nestoris*, ed. Fr. Miklosich, cap. xlv.: 'vivebat Vladimêrus (980–1015) in timore dei. Et multiplicata sunt homicidia, et dixerunt episcopi Vladimêro: ecce, multiplicati sunt homicidae, cur non punis (*kazniti*, used of the State penalty) eos? Ille vero dixit eis: timeo peccatum (*grěchŭ*, "sin": Vlad., like the people of Montenegro, holds the blood-feud to be a religious obligation). Illi vero dixerunt ei. tu constitutus es a deo ut punias malos et ut diligas bonos, oportet te punire homicidam, sed cum inquisitione (*sŭ ispytomi*, "by investigation"). Vladimêrus vero sublatis compositionibus (*otŭmerjŭ viry*, "abolished the wergeld") coepit punire homicidas. Et dixerunt episcopi et seniores: bella multa, at si compositio (*vira*) permansura est, in armis et in equis fiat. Et dixit Vladimêrus ita fiat. Et vivebat Vladimêrus secundum institutionem (*po ustrojenniu*, "according to the constitution") patris et avi.'—(2) *Russkaja Pravda of Jaroslav Volodimêrič* (1018–1054), cf. p. 724ᵃ, above. *Judicium Jaroslavi, filii Vladimêri*: 'Si interfecerit vir virum, ulciscatur (*mstiti*) frater fratrem vel pater vel filius vel fratris filius vel sororis filius. Si vero nemo est, qui eum ulciscatur, solvendae sunt pro capite octoginta grivnae, si est principis vel tiunus principis ("official"): si vero est russus vel satelles principis vel mercator vel *jabeshnikŭ* (also an official) vel *tiunus bojari* (*boyar* official) vel *mečnikŭ* ("sword-wearer") vel *izgoj* (a man attached to no class or rank) vel *slovennikŭ*, quadraginta grivnae solvendae sunt.'—(3) The *Pravda* of the 13th cent. (*ap.* Ewers, *Das alteste Recht der Russen*, p. 314): 'After Jaroslav, his sons Isjaslav, Swjatoslav, Wsewolod, and their men, namely, Kosnjatschko, Perenjeg, Nikifor, now came to an agreement and did away with the custom of head for head (*oshložiša ubijenie za golovu*; for the meaning of *golova* see above), replacing it by permission to buy off the penalty by martens (*kunami*, i.e. with marten-skins): but every other ordinance of Jaroslav was confirmed by his sons.' 'If any one kills a prince's man in an assault with violence, and the manslayer (*golovnikŭ*) is not discovered, then a *wergeld* of 80 *grivnae* is to be paid by the district (*verví*) in which the head of the murdered man is lying: on the other hand, if the victim is one of the (common) people (*ljudinŭ*), then 40 *grivnae*.'

The development of the custom, apart from special points, is on the whole clear. Until Vladimir's time there undoubtedly reigned a system of unrestricted blood-revenge in Russia, just as there did in Montenegro down to the time of Prince Danilo. Under the pressure of the clergy, Vladimir attempted to proceed against the murderer by means of State penalties (*kazna*), but he soon returned to the customs of his ancestors. The later chronicler did not see clearly the almost unmistakable meaning of this. Jaroslav was the first to impose a restriction upon blood-revenge by limiting it to certain spheres of kinship; and, if these could not produce an avenger, a compensation (*vira*, the old term for the *wergeld*, though the expression does not actually occur in this passage) of 80 or 40 *grivnae* was exacted — no doubt to the advantage of the princely exchequer. The sons of Jaroslav completed their father's work by enacting that every deed of blood might be redeemed by the payment of marten-skins, though it is not clear who received the skins — the Prince, the injured man, or both. If the murderer was unknown, the district (*verví*, see above) in which the head of the murdered man was found was responsible for the *virnoje* (formed from *vira*)—an arrangement which still clearly recalls the joint liability of the clan with regard to the *wergeld* (see above). From the various rates of penalty mentioned in the above and other passages of the *Russkaja Pravda*, the calculation has been held to be justified (cf. L. von Schroder, *Festgruss an Roth*, p. 50) that the *wergeld* for the murder of a free Russian (*ognišČaninŭ*, 'householder') would come to about the value of a hundred cows, and that in this respect, too, the customs of ancient India (see above, pp. 725, 729) and of ancient Russia coincided. But it must be admitted that the ground on which such a calculation is based is very insecure. (For the most ancient evidence for the existence of blood-revenge on Slavonic soil, see Mauricius, *Strateg.* xi. 5; cf. ARYAN RELIGION, above, p. 51ᵃ.)

3. Expiatory usages at the amicable settlement of a blood-feud.—When the hostility between two clans was to be terminated by payment of the *wergeld*, there was also a long series of solemn ceremonies of expiation, about which we have ample information for the Slavonic and especially the South Slavonic world (cf. Miklosich, *op. cit.* 176 f.). The *Archiv f. slav. Philologie*, xiv. 141 ff., contains a detailed account (not yet embodied in the work of Miklosich) of a ceremony of expiation among the South Dalmatian Slavs. Its characteristic features are as follows:

The two clans of the Bojkovići and Tujkovići in the extreme south of Dalmatia, where the blood-feud remains a living force down to the present day, have been on hostile terms for years, because in the year 1877 Ivo Bojković in a quarrel shot Stoj, a member of the Zeci family (of the clan of the Tujkovići). The murderer has long been dead, but there are two sons, Jovo Bojković and Jovo Zec, who now (in the year 1890) are sufficiently grown up to be able to fight out their fathers' quarrel. Matters, however, do not come to that pass. After long protracted negotiations the Bojkovići are induced to admit themselves to be in the wrong and to allow Jovo Zec the right of choosing twenty-four arbitrators (*Dobri-ljudi*, 'good people'). These lay down the following conditions of peace: Jovo Bojković is to pay Jovo Zec and his brother Niko a little over a hundred sequins as the price of blood for the murdered man. Here we must add (according to Jovanović, 'Montenegrinische Rechtsgeschichte,' in *Ztschr. f. vergleich. Rechtswissenchaft*, xv. 134) that the price of the victim is decided by the number of 'bleedings,' and that twelve 'bleedings' (estimated, as a rule, at twelve sequins) constitute a deathblow. Further, the arbitrators stipulate that Jovo Bojković shall provide a meal for Jovo Zec and his party up to the number of three hundred and offer him twelve 'sponsorships,' *i.e.* send him twelve children, to whom Zec and his people are to stand as godfathers or sponsors. Moreover, twelve great and twelve small 'brotherhoods' (*pobratimstvo*, 'artificial relationship') are to be established

between the two parties; and, lastly, the instrument of death is to be surrendered to Jovo Zec according to the established customs. The twenty-seventh of August is the day appointed for the fulfilment of all these provisions. The ceremonies to be performed on this day take place partly in front of the house of Zec, but chiefly in the common place of assembly. Above all, it is before or in the house of Zec that the matter of the twelve sponsorships is concluded. The women of the Bojkovići, conducted by two of the arbitrators, appear with cradles on their heads containing the children, and now twelve men of the family of Zec take up the position of godfather to these. A secondary object of the presence of the women may have been (see Jovanović, *op. cit.*) to touch the heart of the chieftain of the hostile clan by their weeping and wailing. The programme of that part of the expiation which is carried out in the common place of assembly is far more extensive. First, both parties take their stand, like two hostile armies, at a distance of about a hundred metres from each other. 'After a short, silent pause, a small group appears on the side of the Bojkovići. The son of the murderer, dressed in a white shirt, barefooted and without a cap, creeps forward on all fours, carrying across his neck a long musket, the instrument of death, which two arbitrators, also without head-covering, hold by its two ends. Thereupon Zec runs quickly to meet them in order to cut the humiliating spectacle short. He approaches Bojković rapidly to raise him to his feet, while at the same time the latter kisses his feet, chest, and arms.'

The formation of the stipulated twenty-four brotherhoods is followed by the banquet, with the guests seated in a strictly regulated order; but Jovo Zec and the twelve men who have assumed the duties of sponsor touch neither food nor drink—to show that the reconciliation is not yet quite complete. It is not until the end of the meal that the payment of the debt is made in coins carefully wrapped in paper and laid on a dish. But still the arbitrators declare that the payment is not yet complete, and, amid the deep wails of the women, the Bojkovići must gradually place all their costly weapons on a large metal dish in front of Zec. At length Zec summons his new kinsman, and says: 'I give back to thee everything (in the first instance the weapons are meant): may the death of my father be pardoned to thee, and all that has happened be forgotten; in future may there be between us brotherhood, peace, and love! I will not retain thy blood-money, nor will I take from the table the white rags (the money wrapped in paper), I return to thee this also.' In this instance, then (though of course not in all), the whole material side of the blood-expiation evinces itself as only a symbolic action. Especially with regard to the weapons there was no doubt a certainty from the first that they would be given back. At the close of the proceedings one of the arbitrators mounts the table and reads the decision of the twenty-four judges aloud; he then hands it over to Zec, who in turn gives it to Bojković.

LITERATURE.—F. Miklosich, 'Die Blutrache bei den Slaven,' *Denkschriften der kais. Ak. der Wissensch.* philos.-hist. Kl. xxxvi. 1, Vienna, 1887 (with copious bibliography); cf. also Rovinskij (Russ.), 'Montenegro Past and Present,' ii., *Sbornik of the St. Petersburg Acad. of Sciences*, 1897, vol. lxiii. (cf. esp. chs. 1 and 2, *passim*). Rovinskij is also our authority for the foregoing description of the South Dalmatian expiation, of which he was an eye-witness. See, further, S. Ciszewski (Polish), *Wroz'da i Pojednanie* ('Blood-feud and Duel'), Warsaw, 1900 (also contains an extensive bibliography).

O. SCHRADER.

BLOOD-FEUD (Teutonic).—Early Teutonic law made no provision for punishment in the modern sense of the word. The function of avenging crime belonged to the kindred of the person wronged, or else the tribe expelled the criminal from their league of peace, and declared him an outlaw, thereby depriving him of the common right of protection in life and property. 'Feud' is the name given to the hostile relations between two individuals, families, or tribes. The special case of the blood-feud emerged when any member of the social group was culpably slain or robbed of his honour. Here the cult of the dead came into play. It was a common superstition among the Teutons that the murdered man would find no rest, and would appear as a *genganger*, 'one who walks again,'* so long as his death was not avenged. If the slayer was caught red-handed, he might be put to death forthwith; but if he escaped for the time, it was frequently required that the sentence of outlawry should be pronounced in name of the tribe before the aggrieved family set forth to track the culprit. But, just as the kindred of the person killed held together for a common purpose, so did that of the criminal; and accordingly cases of individual blood-revenge often developed into family feuds, of which numerous instances are furnished by the Norwegian-Icelandic sources. Not infrequently these feuds ended in an act of combined incendiarism and massacre. The slayer was surprised in his own house by a night attack; his enemies surrounded the building with combustible materials, and set the whole on fire, so that he and his entire household perished in the flames. The extent to which the blood-feud might become a conflict between families is shown by the fact that sometimes one of the near relatives of the actual slayer was forced to fill the place of the latter as the object of retribution. As a rule, indeed, the policy of vengeance was not only carried out, but actually planned, by the tribe as a whole. The tribe also chose the leader or champion of the feud, and this step was at once followed by the public proclamation of the vendetta. The blood-feud was at length superseded by the imposition of a fine upon the guilty party, and in a case of killing this was known as the *wergeld*, or 'man-money,' by which the slayer redeemed himself from the sentence of outlawry. The completion of this expiatory compact was followed by the reconciliation of the warring groups, and the proclamation of the oath of peace which closed the feud. Many of the Teutonic peoples, however, and especially the Norse and North German tribes, maintained the practice of the blood-feud for certain crimes even after the principle of compensation had been introduced, and, indeed, till far on in the Middle Ages. This was particularly the case where the honour of a female of the tribe had been violated by adultery or rape. It was the introduction of the Roman penal code which in the end dislodged popular belief in the policy of the feud.

* 'The spirits o' the dead may walk again' (Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, III. iii. 16 f.).

LITERATURE.—Wilda, *Strafrecht der Germanen* (Halle, 1842); Geib, *Lehrbuch des deutschen Strafrechts*, i. (Leipzig, 1861); Schroder, *Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgesch.*[4] i. (Leipzig, 1903); Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgesch.*[2] i. (Leipzig, 1906) 221; v. Amira, in *Grundriss der germ. Phil.*[2] iii. 191 ff.; v. Bar, *Gesch. der deutschen Strafrechts u. der Strafrechtstheorien* (Berlin, 1882); F. Dahn, *Bausteine*, 2nd ser., 'Fehdegang u. Rechtsgang d. Germanen' (Berlin, 1880), 76 ff.; Frauenstadt, *Blutrache u. Totschlagsühne im deutschen Mittelalter* (Leipzig, 1881); Telting, *Over de Sporen van oudgermaansch Strafrecht in de* 'Germania' *van Tacitus* (The Hague, 1887); Cannaert, *Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het oude Strafrecht in Vlaenderen* (1835); His, *Das Strafrecht der Friesen im Mittelalter* (Leipzig, 1901); Brandt, *Forelaesninger over den norske Retshistorie*, 2 vols. (Christiania, 1883); v. Amira, *Das altnorwegische Vollstreckungsverfahren* (Munich, 1874); Bring, *De judicio homicidii sec. jura Suigothiæ vetusta* (Lund, 1820); Taranger, *Udsigt over den norske Retshistorie*, i. (Christiania, 1899); Binding, *Die Entstehung d. öffentlichen Strafe im germanisch-deutschen Recht* (Leipzig, 1908); Kohler, *Zur Lehre von der Blutrache* (Wurzburg, 1885).

E. MOGK.

BOASTING.—Boasting is too extended and assertive a human failing to require defining. In quality it is simple, and appears even to require simplicity of character, of the type set forth in Proverbs, in which to flourish. Nevertheless, it has a history and a literature of its own; it is an interesting and instructive psychological phenomenon; it has grave moral aspects and extensive moral ramifications; it has a bearing on religion strangely subtle for a defect of character which is apparently so direct and blatant.

1. **Historical.**—That boasting began early, continued late, and drew attention to itself among all races in all times, language alone would suffice to prove. Few languages are satisfied with terms merely descriptive, unless—like Lat. *glorior*, Ger. *prahlen*, or Eng. 'self-glorification'—they be large-sounding, resonant words. Most languages are more concrete and figurative. Loudness of speech produces the Heb. הדר, Gr. καυχάομαι, and probably our 'brag'; and spaciousness of speech the Gr. μεγαλαυχέω, and our 'tall-talk.' To good lungs is added the noisiest of musical instruments, 'to blow one's own trumpet,' and Fr. *fanfaronnade*. The idea

of scattering words at large seems to have produced the Lat. *jacto*, as well as our slang expression 'throwing the hatchet.' The names of persons with special gifts in this direction have been annexed, as Gr. ἀλαζών, a 'landlouper,' and Fr. *gasconnade*. Most of these words suggest that, at some period of their history, they have passed through the stage of being slang, and it is still slang which is busy coining words to express new gifts and new developments in boasting. John Bull, judging by his reputation in Europe, had small need of assistance; yet, as an artist both in the thing itself and the power to describe it, he is thought to have been outstripped by his cousin Jonathan. As the result of their partnership, no language is richer than English, so that we have almost as many terms for a boaster as Arabic for a lion. 'Spread-eagle,' 'bounder,' 'cock-a-hoop,' and others equally forcible and picturesque, show that boasting still exists and flourishes, and still attracts attention.

Nor is language the only record of boasting. There may be few matters of our civilization in which it had no hand, but on *dress* in particular its influence is perennial. The motives of comfort and decency are still only superinduced upon the primitive motive of display. That is only a visual boast—an assertion of our own superiority and the resources we can command, though, when the display was in war-paint, the braggadocio was less diluted. The boast which clothes itself in satin is more complex than that which wears only scalps, but at bottom it may be still the old naked assertion of power to subject other people, and it may be at the same sacrifice of better things. This more subtle combination of boasting with other elements constitutes its whole subsequent history.

A still greater triumph than dress boasting can claim. Without undue use of its own gifts, it may claim to have created *literature*. One of the most ancient jewels embedded in the OT is the Song of Lamech (Gn $4^{23f.}$), which is nothing but sheer, blatant bragging. Lamech, by the skill of his son Tubal-cain, is the first of men equipped with a slaughtering tool. He brandishes his weapon and calls on his womenkind to attend to him—a fundamental and primitive element in self-glorification:

> 'Adah and Zillah, hear my voice;
> Ye wives of Lamech, hearken unto my speech:
> For I slay a man for wounding me,
> And a young man for bruising me.
> If Cain shall be avenged sevenfold,
> Truly Lamech seventy and sevenfold.'

This is the beginning of songs, and it contains all the primitive elements of boasting—arming of the male, bluffing of one's foes, joy in seeing oneself reflected in the mirror of one's own praise. Then what are the Babylonian and Assyrian, and in scarcely a less degree the Egyptian, monuments, if not boasting? A devout ascription to the god does not hinder it from being very human bragging, even to the extent of developing into what much boasting has been since—namely, lies. When it is truth, it is carefully edited truth. The same primitive motives for boasting as appear in the war-paint of the savage and the Song of Lamech, unblushingly and loudly proclaim themselves on the monuments. The refrain is always, 'I am an irresistible, death-dealing person, good to follow, terrible to oppose.'

Perhaps all conquest is simply a boast in this power to destroy. Hence the justification of Pascal's saying, that Alexander might be excused for swaggering about the world conquering, on account of his youth, but a middle-aged person like Cæsar ought to have had more sense. In any case the ancient motives are still modern, for they never were stronger than in Napoleon, some of whose despatches have scarce more reserve than an Assyrian monument.

Yet in matters of taste, if not of modesty, the progress of time has effected some change. A speech by Cicero to-day would still not ignore the speaker, but its self-praise would not be quite so direct and open-hearted. Boasting is no longer what Montaigne calls 'an inconsiderate affection with which we flatter ourselves.' The restraint upon it by ceremony of which he complains still prevails. 'We are nothing but ceremony: ceremony carries us away, and we leave the substance of things: we hold by the branches and quit the trunk. Ceremony forbids us to do things that are lawful and natural, and we obey it: reason forbids us to do things unlawful and ill, and nobody obeys it. I find myself here fettered by the laws of ceremony; for it neither permits a man to speak well of himself nor ill.' As he proposes to speak of himself, in spite of ceremony, he says, 'We will leave her here for this time.' And with that view of the case many still agree, whensoever they find it expedient to be their own trumpeter. Self-praise may be no honour, but it may be great profit, if effectively done. Many will agree with Tristram Shandy that it is a very unpleasant thing to have to praise oneself, but it is better than doing a good deed and getting no praise for it at all. As the Assyrian added Ashshur to his name and then was free to boast of his prowess as he chose, so the modern adds '& Co.,' after which it is quite correct to proclaim his integrity, his possessions, his pre-eminence in his own department of things above all his fellow-mortals. And the same is sometimes true when, in partnership, he vends his wisdom or his religion. This boasting in company and boasting in the name of Ashshur are less different than might at first be supposed. Ashshur was the tribal god, and tribal boasting in every age has had special licence and esteem. The predatory instinct, or at least the instinct of self-defence, showing itself in the sense that, if other people brandish their weapons, we must do it still better, is manifest in both. With this may be taken the most extended and calamitous of all modern forms of boasting—social rivalry. It is the supreme attempt to gain the kingdom of heaven by commercial boasting in partnership, the usual result being, as Peabody expresses it, to supply 'the soil in which the malaria of domestic infelicity most easily spreads' (*Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, 1901, p. 178 f.).

2. Psychological.—Boasting, being an exaggerating and placarding of one's own worth, is a very simple outcome of vainglory. Nevertheless, the vainglory does not always work in the same way, and is by no means always the same psychological phenomenon. Shakespeare has put two finished braggarts into Henry IV.,—Falstaff and Glendower,—but, except in the mere fact that both boast loudly, they have no real kinship even in their boasting. Falstaff's boasts are 'like the father that begets them: gross as a mountain, open, palpable.' Partly his boasting is the habit of a loud, ungirt nature, disguising its consciousness of unworth by inflated self-praise, and partly it is sheer love of the art of exaggeration and decoration. When he describes himself in the character of the ideal counsellor as 'a goodly portly man i' faith,' he is not greatly disturbed or perhaps astonished to have it turned into 'a devil haunts thee in the likeness of an old fat man.' Glendower, on the other hand, takes himself with utter seriousness:

> 'These signs have marked me extraordinary,
> And all the courses of my life do show
> I am not in the roll of common men.'

Falstaff delights to blow his own trumpet, not out of any respect for himself, but because he is on the

easiest terms with himself. Glendower's ego, on the other hand, lives in state, and suffers no familiarities even with himself. His boasting, therefore, is not so much an enjoyment as a duty. This difference in boasting shows that we are no more all on the same terms with ourselves than we are with other people, which separation of ourselves from ourselves, even in the very act of sounding our own praise, deserves more consideration than psychology has yet given it.

Another psychological difference indicated by Falstaff and Glendower is that some men turn in upon themselves to boast, while others go as far afield as possible. Glendower illustrates the former. Nothing interests him which does not touch himself directly, and a thing is great simply because it is his. He is the sort of person who in modern life thinks that what he does not know is not knowledge. Falstaff, on the other hand, is ready to associate himself with anything with which he can invent the most shadowy association. While Glendower sheds his glory upon the outward world, Falstaff is ready to shed all the glory of the outward world upon himself. Here, then, are two amazing qualities in human nature —one the power to boast without requiring anything but ourselves to boast about, and the other the power to drag everything into some relation to ourselves which will glorify us. Prof. James (*Psychology*, i. 329) puts vainglory in the middle of the manifestations of social self-estimation which belong to the empirical self. That is to say, it has to do with the 'fame which in broad rumour lies,' and with the self which has things and does things, and transacts its business in the eyes of men. The phenomenon of boasting reminds us how this ego can withdraw itself or expand itself, —how it can be all the circumference or the mere centre. A man may scorn all worthy things, and boast in the rest simply because they are his; or he may, though the puniest citizen, feel himself embodied in the skill and daring of his general. The person who claimed an interest in Germany because his cousin played the German concertina is scarcely an exaggeration of what goes on in sober earnest every day. Both types of boasting are caricatures of the genuine power of the ego, of that which ought to create in us wonder and reverence —its presence in all experience, its possession of all experience, its power to isolate itself from what does not interest it, its value to itself above all it possesses and knows. Boasting is only a misuse and perversion of the true greatness and range of the soul. Egotism, after all, must not be neglected when we study the ego. Hume complains that he never can catch himself without a perception (*Treatise on Human Nature*, ed. Green and Grose, vol. i. p. 534); he never, that is, can catch himself unoccupied and alone. Had he attended to the inflating of all experience in the might of the ego, he might have discovered the still more wonderful fact that he never could catch a perception without himself, and he might have been led to see, as Kant did, that it manifests itself to us by a more direct interest than if it allowed itself to be seen keeping house at home and quite solitary.

Finally, boasting is a phenomenon which sheds light on the relation of our personality to other personalities. It is a curiously mixed relationship. Every boaster would shrivel if he did not think his boast woke some response in the minds of other people. He will boast of anything if only he thinks some one will admire him for it. Moreover, it shows a curious trust that minds around him are like his own, and yet that they are not like. If the boaster thought others quite like himself, he would not expect them to be interested in him, but in themselves; yet, being prepossessed by himself, he is unable to allow for this change of perspective. Thus boasting is curiously social and anti-social, curiously interested in one's neighbour while ignoring him for himself.

The relation of a man to his own mind and to his neighbour's is still more curiously illustrated by a third type of boasting. Though the most vainglorious of all, its motive is not vainglory or any form of vanity, but simply fear. According to Prof. James's classification of the self, it would belong, not to social self-estimation or even to personal vanity, but to another order of things altogether—to material self-seeking. No motive is simpler or more self-regarding than fear. Nevertheless, the boasting which springs from it illuminates in a singular way the complex relations, both with a man's own self and with his neighbour, which may accompany the simplest and most selfish motives. In relation to oneself it is a form of auto-suggestion, and nothing shows better what that form of legerdemain can and what it can not do. It is crowing to keep one's courage up, and, so long as it can crow without feeling danger at its windpipe, it succeeds. After that it exaggerates the danger, not the courage. In relation to one's neighbour it is bluff. The hypothesis it goes on is that other people are as easily terrified as the braggart himself. The hypothesis, when applied to the proper cases, works efficiently; but when, as frequently happens, it is applied to the wrong cases, boasting, like cursing, comes home to roost. All this Shakespeare has embodied in ancient Pistol, in whom the very boy observes 'a killing tongue and a quiet sword.' When his courage is lowest his boast is loudest. If Fortune allows him to meet another coward, he brags a ransom into his pocket; but if she cheats him with the appearance of simplicity and he foolishly encounters a lion, boasting only brings cudgels on his back and raw leeks into his stomach.

3. **Moral.**—That boasting is a perversion of what is great in human nature becomes plainer when we estimate it in relation to moral values. By way of caricature, boasting is a sort of double of the moral personality. Boasting may, of course, be of mere prowess, as when the Assyrian king boasts of the number of his fellow-men he has impaled, or the German student of the rapidity with which he can empty glasses of beer. Even so, however, it proceeds in some way on the belief that worth lies in the will. Just because a due estimate of ourselves ought to be moral, and boasting can turn the attention from the use of the powers to the mere possession of them, it has always been confusing to the moral judgment. Nay, boasting may be a direct attempt to surprise and corrupt the moral judgment into a false verdict. Hence it has in all ages been one of the greatest defences of a debased and impenitent conscience. Could the Assyrian kings have continued to be so cruel if they had never gloried in it on stone? Would the Restoration have been so corrupt if licentiousness had never been a matter to boast of? Would the French Revolution have lost so readily its hope of peace and brotherhood had Napoleon possessed less genius for military swaggering?

No man who boasts much can well hearken to duty at all. Words of boasting, above all other words, do 'give too cold a breath to action.' Why should one toil to cover himself with the painful garment of virtue if he can do it easily and far more spaciously with the garment of self-praise? Moreover, when one has boasted much, it is usual to perform little, and, when the real battle begins, to be, like Falstaff, 'a coward on instinct.'

That is the rule, yet there are many and great exceptions, as the example of Napoleon may remind us. There are men who, like the great showman,

'advertise well, and come up to their advertisement.' This raises the question where boasting ends and right self-trust begins. Would great swelling words not be boasting if afterwards they were turned into deed? Is there no boasting till our self-praise is baseless? Is it only immoral when it is empty? Is Montaigne right when he says: If a man be Cæsar, let him boldly think himself the greatest captain in the world? Is he also to proclaim it as well as think it? Napoleon did so, and we cannot deny that even his saying what he thought of himself may have contributed to his success. Are we to regard valid boasting as simply part of Emerson's advice: 'Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string'?

The ancient Greek ethics would probably have said, Yes. The 'magnanimous man' of Aristotle's *Ethics* is not quite free from a certain moral swagger as he walks about among his less fortunate fellows. Moreover, much of our modern ethic has returned in theory, as it has long done in practice, nearer to the Greek ideal than to the Christian. Is not the essence of the new ethic to glory in our nature and carry our head high on our shoulders?

The question is whether this attitude shows knowledge either of morality or of human nature. Cæsar's case may be doubtful; but if a man were Shakespeare, would he proclaim himself the greatest poet in the world? Instead, we find him desiring

> 'this man's style and that man's scope,
> With what I most enjoy contented least.'

He knows well enough his powers, but his imagination ranges so far beyond them that he never dreams of making them a boast. Is he not the greater that his greatness reacts thus upon his opinion of himself? Boasting indicates a shrivelled imagination as well as a shrivelled conscience. Hence only the destroyer can boast largely. Did Napoleon ever boast of himself as a great legislator, as he did of being a great conqueror? The creative mind must ever be too conscious of the limitation of its powers in comparison with the greatness of its aim. Were it only because of his knowledge of human nature, therefore, we cannot think of Shakespeare boasting. Moreover, the man who knows the human mind will know too well the bias of one's good opinion of oneself to put even his modest thoughts of himself into words. This self-restraint in expression is no hypocrisy, but a very important part of the task of seeking a just judgment of ourselves—one which shall make due allowance, as it were, for the adjustment of our compasses. As a matter of experience, until a man has made this adjustment, there is small likelihood that he will find his true sphere and walk steadfastly and bravely in it. Boasting is in too great haste to succeed; its confidence lacks reality; as social pretence it is destructive of all real geniality. It is, in short, a poor inflated, deceptive, and, at bottom, terror-stricken pursuit of things which are of no real and abiding value, to the detriment of all that is most sacred and most blessed in life.

Just as the claim of self-assertion in the name of genius only requires sufficient genius to set it at nought, so its claim in the name of morality only requires sufficient morality to exclude boasting. Imitation, Kant says, has no place in morals. Conscience, in Emerson's words, should be no conformist, no sycophant. It must be autonomous, or it is corrupt. But, like the greatest of poets, the true moral man withdraws, by that very obedience to the Divine within him, into a sanctuary where loud words of boasting would be mere desecration, and where he can only bow his head and adore. Not till self is taken up into this higher reverence does it begin to be admirable, and then it has other things to admire besides itself. The moral law thus takes the place of the poet's imagination, and shows man such high demands that he who contemplates it can see himself only as an unprofitable servant.

4. **Religious.**—Boasting, like other elements in human nature, may be studied in relation either to man's primitive struggle or to his ultimate goal. Seen from the latter point of view, it would appear to be simply a confusion of spiritual values, and, as such, an enemy of all true religion. Yet it is a foe which is often of religion's own household. It may be an attempt by auto-suggestion to create for us an image of ourselves which shall serve us in place of God. By that device it enables us to ignore the fundamental problems of religion—our utter feebleness and our utter dependence. Religion is also a self-valuation, but it is a valuation in face of the things which boasting is a device to ignore. Yet there is sufficient kinship between the two to have developed in all religions a self-satisfied Pharisaism, which thinks its own self-esteem must be the measure of God's approval; and boasting would not be so irreligious, were it not for this kinship with the elements in man which religion meets.

According to Ritschl, the very essence of religion is a transcendent estimate of spirit as measurable by no extent and no duration. Faith in God lives by the experience that a thing so weak as the human spirit can be made mighty against time and chance and the bigness of the world. And there is something in the humblest religious man which corresponds to that estimate. Sainte-Beuve (*Port Royal*) says something like this:—There is a hope and a self-esteem in the humility of the Christian which makes pale the pride and ambition of Alexander. But the point is that they are held in humility, in remembrance of God, in the knowledge that we have nothing we have not received, that by the grace of God we are what we are. Thus, and thus only, can men say with the Apostle, 'Where is boasting then? It is excluded' (Ro 3^{27}). The task of all true religion is to effect this exclusion. If, however, it should fail, man turns God Himself into the long shadow of his own self-praise, and that is the culmination and acme of all boasting.

The strange element in genius which Goethe has called 'the demonic' stands in a suggestive way between the trust of humility and the trust of vainglory. Take as examples: 'You carry Cæsar and his fortunes,' and Napoleon's saying, 'The world still turns for us.' They are too self-reliant to be religious, too reliant upon destiny to be boastful. A change in the proportion, and they would be the sayings of braggarts or of saints. Yet Cæsar's and Napoleon's confidence, in face of success and backed by armies, is a small thing compared with the confidence of the humblest of the prophets, faced by disaster and backed by nothing but the Unseen. 'See, I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms, to pluck up, and to break down, and to destroy, and to overthrow; to build, and to plant' (Jer 1^{10}). All that religion seeks is this change of proportion. Boasting is excluded, and yet the world still turns for us, for all things work together for good to them that love God (Ro 8^{28}); the frailest vessel carries us and our fortunes, for neither life, nor death, nor any created thing can separate us from the love of God; we can trust ourselves and be neither 'mendicant nor sycophantic,' for he that is spiritual judgeth all things (1 Co 2^{15}). Above all, the end of Christianity is to make goodness the goal of all ambition and the measure of all worth, and yet to save men from degrading merit into a boast, or giving it any place at all as merit between us and God.

LITERATURE.—In the OT boasting is regarded as the fruit of ignorance of God and of one's own soul. In 1 K 20^{11}, 2 Ch 25^{19}, Ps 49^{6} 52^{1} 94^{4} 977, Pr 25^{14} 27^{1} its folly, danger, and impiety are set forth. In James the OT way of treating the evil re-appears, esp. in 4^{6}; but in the rest of the NT, and especially by St. Paul, it is opposed on religious rather than on moral grounds, as the opposite of that humble trust in God's grace which is the only assurance of safety and peace. The Greeks were almost as much alive as the Hebrews to the danger and impiety of boasting. Perhaps it belonged to the Greek temperament that, under the temptation of prosperity, *hybris*, 'insolence,' readily appeared and speedily expressed itself in vaunting. In *The Makers of Hellas*, by E. E. G., 1903, this point is touched on in various connexions, most fully under 'Pindar,' pp. 349–353. On the advertising element in Greek rhetoric, see Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas on the Christian Church*[5], 1895. Besides the essay of Montaigne referred to in the text, and more important, is Bacon's essay, *Of Vainglory*, wherein with much worldly wisdom the advantages of boasting have full justice done them. 'Glorious men are the scorn of wise men, the admiration of fools, the idols of parasites, and the slaves of their own vaunts.' Modern writers, for the most part, deal with vanity and self-exaltation as an inward feeling only, either not seeing that every feeling is changed by passing into utterance or taking it for granted that, in this age of publicity and education, good taste and the fear of man would prevent it. The boaster has therefore been left almost exclusively to the novelist, who has made free use of the picturesque braggart. Those who occur to the mind most readily are Scott's creations, nearly all of whom display their art on a background of rather hypocritical religion. All Psychologies attend to the phenomenon of self-assertion, but rarely realize its tendency to display itself in speech. In the *Principles of Psychology*, by William James (2 vols., London, 1891), self-satisfaction as a primitive emotion is discussed in the section on 'Self-feeling,' i. 305. Paulsen (*A System of Ethics*, London, 1899) distinguishes between pride, which wishes to be somebody, and vanity, which wishes only to appear somebody. In several books, *e.g. A Manual of Psychology*, by G. F. Stout (1899), the relation of boasting to the pathology of the mind is recognized, but nothing is made of it, and the matter ends purely physiologically. The older Evangelical preachers dealt frequently with such subjects as salvation without boasting; *e.g.* in Simeon's *Works* (1832) there are three such sermons: iii. 423, xvi. 603, xvii. 297. Modern sermons tend to deal more with motives, but F. W. Robertson's Sermon (iii. 1) on 'The Tongue' is interesting, because it indicates the relation of boasting to slander and persecution. Cf. also *Cathedral and University Sermons*, by R. W. Church (1892) [in Serm. 4, a discussion of the modern equivalent of the Greek *hybris*]; and suggestions in Newman's *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, 1868 (i. 152: 'Profession without Ostentation,' and viii. 17: 'Vanity of Human Glory'). J. W. OMAN.

BOAT.—See SHIPS AND BOATS.

BODHISATTVA (in Sanskrit literature).—
Introduction: (1) Etymology, (2) Little Vehicle.
I. Principles conducive to Buddhahood
II. Controversy (Little Vehicle): Is a Bodhisattva a supernatural being?
III. Stages in the career of a Bodhisattva.
IV. Spiritual life of a candidate for Buddhahood.

INTRODUCTION.—(1) *Etymology.*—*Bodhisattva* is usually translated 'one whose essence is perfect knowledge' (*sattva* = 'essence,' 'own nature,' *svabhāva*). It is very possible that this was the original meaning of the word; historically, however, *bodhisattva* = 'one who is on the way to the attainment of perfect knowledge' (Monier-Williams, *Dict. s.v.*), *i.e.* 'a future Buddha.' As a matter of fact, according to the native Lexx., *sattva* = *chitta*, 'thought,' *vyavasāya*, 'decision,' 'determination'; and a Buddhist commentator explains it as an equivalent of *abhiprāya*, 'intention,' 'purpose'; thus we should have *bodhisattva* = 'one whose intentions (or wishes) are fixed on perfect knowledge.'*

This last translation is correct so far as (1) the Bodhisattvas of the Little Vehicle, and (2) the inferior Bodhisattvas of the Great Vehicle are concerned. But we shall see that there are also Bodhisattvas 'whose essence is perfect knowledge.' The *Prajñāpāramitā* in 2500 articles supports this view, and furnishes us with the curious equation: *rjes-su rtogs-pai sems-dpa* = *anubuddhasattva*, contrasted with *skye-bai sems-dpa* = *utpannasattva* and *abhisaṁskārasattva* (see *Madhyamakāvat.* xiv. 10).

There are a few analogous formations, but they seem to be exclusively Buddhist: (a) *Jñānasattva*, 'one whose essence is knowledge' or 'intelligence'—an epithet of Mañjuśrī, and in Mysticism a common appellation of very great magicians or ascetics; (b) *Vajrasattva*, 'one whose essence is diamond' or 'thunderbolt' (see vol. i. p. 99, and art. TANTRAS); (c) *Śrībodhisattvas*, 'holy' or 'sacred Bodhisattvas,' the honorific prefix being added to make a distinction between the Bodhisattvas of certain mystical categories; (d) *Vajrabodhisattvas*, with the same significance (see art. TANTRAS); (e) although the usual Tibetan translation is *byaṅ-chub sems-dpa*, the reading *rdzogspai byaṅ-chub sems-dpa* (*Madhyamakāvat.* p. 79. 8) is sometimes found, which points to an original *sambodhisattva*.

(2) *Little Vehicle.*—According to the doctrines of the Little Vehicle, there have been only a few Buddhas. The Pāli sources enumerate thirty-four previous to Śākyamuni, but the last six names alone occur in the Nikāyas and agree with the Sanskrit lists. Although plurality of Buddhas is certainly an ancient dogma, attested not only by this coincidence of both traditions, but also by epigraphic evidence (Bhārhut [*q.v.*]), there is no indication in the oldest literature that Śākyamuni or his immediate disciples called upon the faithful to follow in the steps of former Buddhas, and themselves to become Buddhas. Śākyamuni is the Master or the god; he is not, properly speaking, a model. The faithful ought to become *arhats*, i.e. to quench the passions by abstinence, to subdue the fire of thought by the exercise of the four ecstasies (*dhyānas*), and thus to destroy the seed of re-birth (see art. ARHAT). Thenceforward speculation on the character and career of the future Buddhas has no very marked practical interest; its value for religion consists only in the light which it throws on the transcendent virtues of the Buddha.

Let us recall the essential characteristics of the most ancient theory. It is found almost complete in the biography of Śākyamuni.* Four *asaṅkhyeyas* (incalculable periods, see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Bud.]) and a hundred thousand ages (*kalpas*) have passed since the future Śākyamuni, who then bore the name of Sumedha, discovered the way to nirvāna through the attainment of arhat-ship; but at the sight of the Buddha Dīpaṅkara, then 'reigning,' he renounced immediate nirvāna in order to become a Buddha, and thenceforward he was a Bodhisattva. This is his vow (*praṇidhāna*) or supplication (*prārthanā, abhinirhāra*). Dīpaṅkara proceeds to ascertain whether the vow will be fulfilled, and announces that in the distant future Sumedha will be the perfect Buddha Śākyamuni. This is the prophecy (*vyākaraṇa*).† Sumedha now knows that he is a seed of Buddha (*buddhabīja*), a young shoot of Buddha (*buddhāṅkura*), and with firm resolution he seeks and practises the ten virtues (*pāramitā*)‡ that make a Buddha. His 'career' or 'course' (*charyā*) continues through numerous re-births, animal, human, and divine. At last the future Śākyamuni is re-born in a high heaven, as king of the Tuṣita gods; and it is there that, a hundred thousand years before the attainment of the Bodhi, an acclamation (*halāhala*) of the gods arises foretelling the sure success of the future Buddha.§ Leaving the throne of the Tuṣitas,

* The chief source is very late. It is the *Introduction to the Jātaka* (5th cent. A.D., ed. Fausböll, tr. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories*, 1880, and Chalmers, 1895). See Rockhill, *JAOS* 18, i. 1; Spence Hardy, *Manual*, p. 88; and Kern, *Manual*, p. 65.

† *i.e.* the *Dīpaṅkarajātaka*, so famous in the literature, the Chinese records, and the sculptures. See Foucher, *Art gréco-bouddhique*, i. 273. In the *Mahāvastu*, the future Śākyamuni is called Megha; in the *Divyāvadāna*, Sumati. When the future Buddha has been *vyākṛta*, he cannot turn backward; he is *niyata*, 'definitely assured of becoming Buddha.' In the Great Vehicle, mention is made of the 'appointment,' 'qualification' to Buddhahood given to the candidate by the Buddhas. Such a 'qualified' man possesses 'causes of success' (*pūrvajinakṛtādhikara* = *hetusaṁpanna bodhisattva*); and such 'qualification' can be styled 'benediction' (*adhiṣṭhāna*). There is a second *vyākaraṇa*, styled 'great,' in the eighth stage (see *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, xix. 35).

‡ See below, p. 740.

§ There are therefore three stages: the vow (*abhinirhāra*), the prophecy (*vyākaraṇa*), and the acclamation (*halāhala*). According to Sp. Hardy (*apud* Kern), the stages are: intention (*manas*), vow (*praṇidhāna*), pronouncing that vow (*vākpraṇidhāna*), revelation (*vivaraṇa*). On the systems of the *Mahāvastu* and the Great Vehicle, see p. 744 ff.

* See *Bodhicharyāvatārap.* p. 421, 15 (*tatra* [*bodhau*] *sattvam abhiprāyo'syeti bodhisattvaḥ*); *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 182, 18 f., *bodhisattva* = *bodhiniyatasattva*; other etymologies, *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, xix. 76 f.

he is born in the womb of Māyādevī,* and lives, in human form, his last existence; under the Tree he attains to Bodhi; at Bodh Gayā he enters nirvāṇa.

We must not, however, overlook the important fact that the schools of the Little Vehicle, not only in Ceylon but also in India proper (Sautrāntikas, Vaibhāṣikas, etc.), have survived the rise of the Great Vehicle, and naturally they have profited by the advance of speculation. The *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (MS of the Asiatic Society, fol. 263) expresses itself as follows, concerning Arhats as compared with Bodhisattvas: 'Having expelled self-love from the series of *saṁskāras* that constitutes their pseudo-individuality, they develop an interest in the affairs of others, an interest born of compassion, and thet destroy all pain. The ordinary man (*madhya*), i.e. the Pratyekabuddha, and the Śrāvaka (candidate for arhat ship) desire merely deliverance, that is to say, an end of suffering, and not happiness during the existences of the *saṁsāra*; because this temporal happiness is an abode of suffering. The superior man (*śreṣṭha*), i.e. the Bodhisattva, wishes, at the cost of personal sufferings, temporal happiness (*ābhyudayika*) for others, and the definite end of suffering, which is supreme happiness (*niḥśreyasasvabhāva*); or he desires for others supreme and temporal happiness (*sukham ābhyudayikanaiḥśreyasikam*), and for himself the definite end of suffering, *i.e.* Buddhahood, as a means of realizing this service of others.'

The modifications or improvements introduced into the above doctrines either by different schools of the Little Vehicle or by the Great Vehicle are of several kinds. They may be grouped under four heads, the discussion of which will complete the present article: (1) accurate determination of the elements of Buddhahood, *i.e.* principles conducive to Buddhahood (*buddhakāraka dharma*); (2) determination of the character of the Bodhisattva—is he a 'hyperphysical' being? can he retrace his course?; (3) determination of the successive stages in the career of the future Buddha; and (4) practical organization of the life of a disciple regarded as a candidate for Buddhahood.

I. PRINCIPLES CONDUCIVE TO BUDDHAHOOD.—The Bodhi,† Enlightenment, Perfect Knowledge, is not the exclusive possession of Buddhas.‡ All beings who achieve deliverance, whether as Pratyekabuddhas or as Arhats, can accomplish their aim only if the 'sight of the truth' has destroyed in them the conception of the ego, the idea of existence and non-existence, the desire for existence and for non-existence, etc. But the *bodhi* of the Buddhas, or *samyaksambodhi*, includes not only the possession of the truth indispensable to salvation, but also omniscience (*sarvajñatva*), universal knowledge (*sarvākārajñatva*), and consequently omnipotence. The Perfect Buddha owes these unique prerogatives to his prolonged meditations (which have given him insight into the principles of everything, with power to subject them to his will), and to his infinite merits of charity, patience, etc.

In ancient Buddhism, the Buddha seems to differ from the Arhats especially in that he has discovered the true way of salvation, while the Arhats learn it from his lips; and from the Pratyekabuddhas in that he undertakes to teach this truth. The difference, however, is more fundamental, as will be seen below in the study of the *lokottara* doctrines (see below, p. 741). The ten virtues ascribed to the future Buddha, or perfect virtues, are in the Little Vehicle: (1) almsgiving, (2) morality, (3) renunciation of the world (*nekkhamma*), (4) wisdom or knowledge, (5) energy, (6) forbearance or patience, (7) truthfulness (*sachcha*), (8) resolution (*adhiṭṭhāna*), (9) charity or benevolence (*mettā*), (10) indifference, equanimity (*upekkhā*).* That there is nothing systematic here is evident. It is different in the Great Vehicle.

The Bodhisattva, or future Buddha, who would attain Bodhi, must therefore practise the six 'transcendent' virtues or *pāramitās*.† By this word is to be understood, properly speaking, *prajñā*, 'knowledge,' or 'wisdom.' *Pāramitā*, taken as an adjective, means 'arrived at the other side' of transmigration, *i.e.* at nirvāṇa. Knowledge alone, however, or insight into the truth, allows the destruction of the germ of existence. The other *pāramitās*, or the virtues of charity (*dāna*), morality (*śīla*), and patience (*kṣānti*) deserve the name only as their merit is applied to the attainment of Buddhahood. They are called natural (*laukika*) when they are not illuminated by knowledge, for example, when the charitable man believes in the substantial reality 'of the mendicant, the alms, and the donor'; they are said to be supernatural (*lokottara*) when knowledge becomes their guide, 'just as a man possessed of sight leads a group of the blind to the desired place.' It is essential, for instance, that charity be practised without any idea of the substantial reality of the three elements of almsgiving (giver, alms, mendicant), or rather, without even admitting the momentary reality of these three elements (*trikoṭipariśuddhā maitrī*).

There is another classification given: *karuṇā* (pity) or *maitrī* benevolence) directed towards (1) creatures (*sattvālambana*), or (2) the 'dharmas' (*dharmālambana*), or (3) without object (*anālambana*) [*Śikṣās*. 212. 12]. It may be assumed that, etymologically at least, the second stage is practised by a man who has recognized the nothingness of the ego (*pudgalanairātmya*), but still believes in the reality of the elements constituting this apparent ego (*dharmasvabhāva*). The books of the Prajñā draw a distinction between the Bodhisattva 'who perceives things' (*aupalambika*) and the Bodhisattva who does not perceive them, thus discarding the second stage (see art. MAHĀYĀNA).

The virtues of charity, morality, and patience constitute the equipment of merit (*puṇyasambhāra*) of the future Buddha. They are sustained by the virtue of energy (*vīrya*). They bear fruit, more and more excellent in the course of time, and at last realize what is called the 'material body' (*rūpakāya*) of a Buddha, whether it be the body adorned with the thirty-two signs, etc., exhibited by Śākyamuni (see below, p. 742[b]), or rather the so-called beatific body (*sambhogakāya*, 'body of enjoyment') which the Buddhas exhibit in paradises to the hosts of Bodhisattvas worshipping them.

The virtue of knowledge (*prajñā*) is sustained by energy and nourished by the virtue of meditation or contemplation (*dhyāna*, *samādhi*). We have seen that it illuminates and guides the so-called virtues of merit (*puṇya*). On the other hand, it cannot exist without these virtues. In fact, not only does knowledge require a pure 'field' wherein to be born and develop, but it also requires practical exercise. The abstract theoretical view of the nothingness of the ego (*pudgala*) and of the nothingness of things (*dharmas*) cannot destroy the illusion which makes us believe in the ego and things, unless the growing exercise of charity teaches us to sacrifice our goods, our bodies, and our lives. Science constitutes the equipment of knowledge (*jñānasambhāra*), which is the real cause of what is called the 'body of law of a Buddha' (*dharmakāya*; see artt. ĀDIBUDDHA, MAHĀYĀNA), that is to say, 'a series of perfectly pure principles' (*anāsravadharmasantāna*), 'empti-

* On this descent and the miracles of the uterine life, see Windisch, *Buddhas Geburt*, p. 110 f.

† Authorities: *Madhyamakāvatāra*, *Bodhisattvacharyāvatāra*, *Lalitavistara* [list of the 100 *dharmālokamukhas*, p. 31 ff., tr. by Kern, *Gesch.* i. 405; this will probably be thought less systematic than the arrangement in the texts cited above. It will be observed (35. 2) that the four *sambhāras* were later reduced to two]. The scholastic explanation of the problem would lead us too far. A summary of it will be found in Kern, *Manual*, pp. 62 and 67. On the development of the theory of the Bodhipakkhiyas within the Little Vehicle from the ancient sūtras to Buddhaghoṣa, see C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Vibhaṅga*, p. xiv f.

‡ See, Kern, *Manual*, 61, n 4; Oldenberg, *Buddha*[2], 321. In the art. MAHĀYĀNA the question will be discussed whether it is possible to arrive at deliverance by way of arhat-ship, and, incidentally, whether all beings are destined to become Buddhas.

* See Kern, *Manual*, p. 66; Childers, p. 335. Each of these ten virtues has three degrees: *upapāramitā*, *pāramitā*, *paramatthapāramitā*, e.g. with regard to almsgiving: (1) giving of external goods, (2) sacrifice of limbs, (3) sacrifice of life. One of the canonical books (*Chariyāpiṭaka*), not one of the oldest, 'containing thirty-four short Jātakas turned into verse' (Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, p. 176), gives examples showing how Śākyamuni practised all these virtues.

† See F. W. Thomas, *JRAS*, 1904, p. 547; *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 30; and *Muséon*, 1907, p. 278. A cognate form is *pāramī*; and there is also *paramatā*, 'excellence,' which forms a sort of play upon words. On the system of the ten *pāramitās* in the Great Vehicle, see below, p. 748.

ness devoid of support' (*nirālambā śūnyatā*), in other words, empty aimless thought, the quiescence of intelligence which is nirvāṇa.*

Each of the *pāramitās* bears fruits relative to the Bodhisattva and to creatures. Giving endues the Bodhisattva with a Buddha body and 'causes to ripen' (=converts) avaricious beings; morality causes him to escape evil destinies and converts immoral beings; patience suppresses all wickedness, all selfishness, all pride, and converts wicked creatures, etc. (*Lal.* 34 ff.).

The *pāramitās*, however, are often regarded as having for chief, nay for only, aim to 'mature the qualities of a Buddha' in the Bodhisattva who practises them. But we must not overlook the important fact that a future Buddha acquires the quality of Buddha not for himself but solely for the good of creatures. If he accumulates so much merit, knowledge, and sovereignty, it is in order to put them at the service of beings, as much in a direct way, by his own activity when he is a 'Bodhisattva become Tathāgata,' as in an indirect way, by the efficacy of his 'vows' after he has entered nirvāṇa. It is expedient, however, that henceforth the future Buddha should labour in the service of beings, that he should be engaged in 'maturing beings,' anticipating the task which later on he will perfectly accomplish. This is the part played by the four *saṅgrahavastus*, or 'topics leading to the sympathy of creatures'; which are: giving, kindly address (*priyavāditā*), putting into practice rules of altruism (*arthacaryā*), practising ourselves the virtues we recommend to our neighbours (*samānārthatā*).† This charitable activity is so important that the Bodhisattva is worthy of the name for the simple reason that he devotes himself to it.

From the preceding definitions there follows, as we shall see, the whole system of the career of the Bodhisattva (*bodhisattvacharyā*). The thought of illumination, or *bodhichitta*, that is to say, 'the thought of becoming Buddha for the salvation of creatures,' is its primary cause and basis. This thought has, of course, antecedents: in the first place, the practice of good from selfish motives, either for the sake of temporal rewards (*i.e.* in celestial re-births, etc.) or with a view to nirvāṇa; and then, the desire of the good of others for their own sake, which already distinguishes the future Bodhisattva (however great his faults otherwise) from the future Arhats.

This thought is essentially born of compassion (*karuṇā*) and emptiness (*śūnyatā*). If there were no compassion, as in the Little Vehicle, we should have to do merely with an egotistical saint. If there were no recognition of emptiness, the compassion would be much more shallow and liable to change, for where belief in the 'ego' exists, how can any one prefer his neighbour to himself? He may perhaps in a moment of exaltation, but not permanently. But the teaching of the Buddhas is there placed providentially within reach of the 'good' (*sādhu*), and they produce thoughts of compassion, however imperfect these may be. This teaching then purifies and enlarges the compassion by giving it an aim, viz. the acquirement of the Bodhi, and a support, viz. the recognition of emptiness and the explanation of the world which it implies.

The Bodhisattva studies, cultivates, conquers, ripens, takes hold of the highest 'concentrations' of Voidness, of Wisdom, but he does not 'realize' them (*na sākṣātkaroti*); otherwise he would obtain nirvāṇa as a Śrāvaka or as a Pratyekabuddha (see *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, ch. xx.).

II. CONTROVERSY OF THE LOKOTTARAVĀDA.—The controversy on the metaphysical character of the Bodhisattva certainly goes back to one of the most ancient periods of Buddhist speculation. We are acquainted with it only in so far as we are informed concerning this speculation itself at its beginning, that is to say, our knowledge is very imperfect. One of the most ancient schisms (*bheda*, as the Buddhists call it) was connected, according to unanimous tradition, with the question whether the Buddha is *lokottara*, *i.e.* 'superior to the world,' 'supernatural,' 'hyperphysical.'

* It is in this way that the Buddhists have endeavoured to assure the stability of their system, and to reconcile the serious antinomy of the two dogmas: 'Nothing exists,' and 'We must work, labour, suffer for our neighbour.' It is certain, says a Mādhyamika philosopher, that our neighbour does not exist; but the Bodhisattva cherishes within himself this illusion (*moha*) that he must become Buddha for the salvation of creatures; if not the only way, yet it is the best way to destroy the illusion of the ego and of suffering (see artt. MAHĀYĀNA, MĀDHYAMIKAS, VIJÑĀNAVĀDINS).

† This explanation of these words is borrowed from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*; for variations in the wording and definitions, see Kern, *Manual*, p. 67, n. 6; Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 405; Minayeff, *Recherches*, p. 278, and below, p. 750[a].

The meaning of the word *lokottara* (Pāli *lokuttara*) in this connexion can be ascertained. As a rule, in the current language of theology, 'superior to the world' in contrast to *laukika*, 'worldly,' refers to what leads to nirvāṇa, what belongs to the Buddhist saints as such; it is a question of meditation, ecstasies, merit, etc. [The Bodhisattva is said to enter the *lokottara gati* when he reaches his first 'stage.'] It is most probable that the word has a distinct signification here, susceptible of shades of meaning, not admitting of definite determination, but which would certainly be unfairly pressed, if, in harmony with certain views of the Great Vehicle, we were to understand it to mean 'superior to the triple world of concupiscence, of material beings without concupiscence, of beings free from matter,' 'superior to the world of becoming,' escaped from the *saṁsāra*, or entering therein only by celestial magic, as the Kṛṣṇa of the *Bhagavadgītā* (see below). But it would be a much more serious mistake to give to the word *lokottara* the meaning attributed to it by Pāli scholars, that the Buddha is 'superior to the world' because, although of this world, he is not defiled by the vices of the world. The schools which are heretical from the orthodox Pāli standpoint meant quite a different thing by *lokottara*, otherwise the question of its significance would never have been raised, and it would be incomprehensible that a school should be characterized, or should describe itself, as 'affirming the Buddha's superiority to the world' (*lokottaravādin*).*

We ought to be cautious not to introduce too much exactness into the ancient views of the Order, and, to say the least of it, not to outrun the development of Buddhist doctrine. We may say that the traditional data and the earliest views regarding Śākyamuni, before as well as after the conquest of the Bodhi, were capable of being arranged, if not in two systems, yet on the lines of two opposing movements or tendencies. According to one of these, which we may call *rationalist*, and which manifests itself in the Vaibhajyavādin Schools, Pāli or Sanskrit, etc., Śākyamuni, born after the manner of men, became an Arhat by the conquest of truth, and his sole superiority consists in this conquest effected by his own power. Given the philosophical and atheistic antecedents of Buddhism, 'no metaphysical superiority over other beings could belong to the Buddha by virtue of his birth; only as being greater, more strenuous in his efforts, was it reserved to him to trace out that path wherein others have nothing to do but to follow. In a certain sense we may say that every disciple who is pressing on to holiness is also a Buddha equally with his Master.'† In reality this standpoint is not strictly maintained by any sect, and the Pāli canon, which otherwise represents rationalist doctrines, is far from exhibiting perfect euhemerism. But by the comparison of features scattered throughout this canon as well as elsewhere, we find traces of a very violent reaction against the tendency which we shall call *mythological* and *theological*.

One text says that the conception of Śākyamuni was not independent of the intercourse of his father and mother—a fact which contradicts a universally accepted doctrine.‡ There are set forth, as characteristic of the Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravādin School, the doctrines (1) of the Bodhisattva's descent into the maternal womb in the form of an elephant, (2) of the miracles of the uterine life (the Bodhisattva does not pass through the ordinary forms of the embryo, etc.), (3) of the birth through his mother's side: three doctrines which are admitted in the Pāli books (the first with certain modi-

* Buddhists naturally maintain that the doctrine was originally one, and that the 'heretical' views arose much later in the course of the centuries. This opinion, on other grounds, is far from being altogether mistaken (see artt. MAHĀYĀNA, SECTS [Bud.]). In the present case, we may reasonably hold that the conflicting doctrines are both very old, or, if we prefer, primitive. See the definition of *lokottara*, *Atthasālinī*, pp. 213–4; and on the confusion of Bodhisattva and Bhagavat, see Oldenberg, *Buddh. Stud.* 642.

† See Oldenberg, *Buddha*[5], 381.

‡ The only canonical Pāli texts that treat, with any detail, of the conception, the uterine life, and the birth of the Bodhisattva, are, if the writer is not mistaken, *Majjhima*, iii. 118, and *Digha*, ii. 12; see also *Aṅguttara*, ii. 130 (Kern, *Man.* 13, n. 2). In all the texts the Bodhisattva is *aupapāduka*, that is to say, he becomes incarnate by his own wish, and without regard to the ordinary laws of conception (to deny the existence of such beings is a great heresy, *Digha*, i. 55). The only exceptions are (1) the Tibetan *Abhiniṣkramaṇasūtra*, where the Bodhisattva *seems* to choose the moment of the loves of Śuddhodana and Māyādevī to study the country, the caste, and the woman in whom he is to become incarnate [see Foucaux, tr. of *Lalita.*, 1848, p. xxi; references to *Dulva*, iii. 449, where Rockhill's interpretation (*Life*, p. 15) seems less correct; see also *Milinda*, p. 75, which is not so explicit]; (2) *Lalita*, p. 87, where unbelievers are condemned; and (3) such texts as collected by Windisch, *Buddhas Geburt*, p. 142. The Bodhisattva chooses Śuddhodana as his father, let us say as his 'putative' father, because Sumitra 'is too old, not able to beget children, and he already has too many sons.' That such statements prove nothing is evident from the fact that they occur in the *Lalitavistara*. On the other hand, it is only in the *Mahāvastu* that the virginity of the mother of Buddha is asserted.

fications),* but which must have been disputed, or the Mahāsāṅghikas would not have given them such an important place. We are told elsewhere that it is a great mistake 'not to give Buddha the highest praise, to teach that the perfect Buddhas have nothing that differentiates them from the world, and not to proclaim that the perfect Buddhas are superior to the world.'†

To these negative evidences must be added the well-known biographical facts that the future Buddha left his home only under the pressure of external influences, that he gave himself up to the guidance of ignorant teachers, and became addicted to useless austerities; further, that, after having become Buddha, he did not resolve to preach the Law until he was entreated by Brahmā, that he was, in part at least, under the influence of former sin,‡ that at first he wished to preach the Law to some friends who were already dead, and that he died at last from the abuse he had made of pork.§ Some venture to say that his premature death is the punishment of an ancient murder (according to the *Suvarnaprabhāsa*). But, on the other hand, we have express declarations of the Master, showing that he is superior to the world: 'I am not a man, a god. . . . Know, O Brāhman, that I am a Buddha'; and again: 'Born in the world, brought up in the world, I have risen, and I dwell above the world.' Whence it follows that Śākyamuni, born as a man, has, by the conquest of the Bodhi, obtained a transformation of his nature; he is no longer a man, he is not an Arhat, he is a Buddha.

Neither of these texts—the second (*Saṁyutta*, iii. 140 and elsewhere) is quoted by the Vetulyakas to support their docetic views (*Kathāvatthu*, xviii. 1, see below, p. 743[a]), the first (*Aṅguttara*, ii. 38) is mentioned by Kern (*Manual*, p. 64)—is, of course, altogether conclusive. Neither the author of the *Kathāvatthu* nor Prof. Oldenberg would admit the *lokottara* interpretation. Oldenberg says in so many words that Kern has misunderstood the meaning of the saying, 'I am not a man . . . I am a Buddha.' The present writer believes that, whatever may be its genuine meaning, it could lead to the conclusion that Buddha's humanity is apparent only. It is a dogma of the Little Vehicle that Śākyamuni, since he became a Buddha, possesses 'nirvāṇa-with-residue' (*sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*); he is *parinirvṛta*, that is to say, altogether passionless, *ergo* not a man. Such is the interpretation of Buddhaghoṣa (Oldenberg). But a Buddha is not only free from passion, he is free from thought, the Bodhi being, as well said by M. Oltramare, 'hyperconsciousness' or 'non-consciousness' (*prajñāpāramitā*). Therefore the visible frame, the audible words, the whole of the personality that we call a Buddha, is only a show contrived by the compassionate resolution formed by the future Buddha We shall not say that the author of the saying, 'I am not a man . . .' foresaw such a development of the *lokottara* Buddhology; but he opened the door to it, and, in any case, his testimony destroys the hypothesis of a primitive Buddhism altogether euhemerist.

Reference may be made (1) to the faculty that Śākyamuni possesses of living for many centuries down to the end of the age of the world (*Dīgha*, ii. 118); (2) to his 'transfiguration' (*ib.* p. 134); and especially (3) to his power of assuming the aspect of his auditors: 'When I used to enter into an assembly of many hundred nobles [or *brahmans*, householders, gods, Māra-gods, Brahma-gods], before I had seated myself there . . . I used to become in colour like unto their colour, and in voice like unto their voice. . . . But they knew me not when I spoke, and would say, "Who may this be who thus speaks? a man or a god?" Then having instructed them, . . . I would vanish away. But they knew me not even when I vanished away; and would say, "... a man or a god?"' (*ib* p. 109, Rhys Davids, *SBE* xi. 48). The Buddha Śākyamuni is neither a man nor a god; he *appears* as a man or as a god; he is a Buddha; he is above and outside of existence.

Śākyamuni, then, was born as a man. It is, in fact, an ancient belief that every future Buddha, in his last existence (*charamabhavika bodhisattva*) must assume human form, at one time as a Kṣatriya, at another as a Brāhman.* He is, however, a very extraordinary man. And the question arises, To what extent has he taken possession of the exceptional prerogatives of the Buddhas, before the conquest of the Bodhi?

From the time of his birth Śākyamuni possesses the thirty-two marks (*lakṣaṇa, lakkhana*) of the 'great man' (*mahāpuruṣa*), and the eighty secondary signs (*anuvyañjana*). [Sanskrit authorities in *Dharmasaṅgraha*, p. 53 f.; *Mahāvastu*, ii. 29, 213 f.; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, iii. v.; Pāli authorities in *Majjhima*, ii. 136; *Digha*, ii. 17.] These marks, to which E. Senart has devoted very careful study (*Légende du Buddha*), whatever may be their historical, mythological, or dogmatic explanation, establish mysterious relations between the Buddha and Viṣṇu. Although the name *mahāpuruṣa*, which is the current designation of Viṣṇu, is applied, in Buddhism, to the eight classes of Āryas (*srotaāpattiphalapratipannaka*, etc., *Madhyamakavṛtti*, xxiv.; cf. *Chullavagga*, xii. 2, 5), the marks are ascribed only to universal sovereigns (*chakravartins*), and to Bodhisattvas in their last existence. To an experienced eye, however, the marks of the former are quite distinct from those of the latter (see *Lalitavistara*, ed. Lefmann, 106, 6; *Rgya-cher-rol-pa*, 98, l. 19, and the emendation proposed, mistakenly, in the present writer's opinion, by E. Senart, *Légende*, 88 n.).

[It must be added that, if Buddhas alone possess the 'marks' in their perfection, the future Buddhas possess the same in germ-state and 'ripen' them for centuries; see *Lotus*, viii. 18; *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, vii. 44; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, iii. v.; *Abhidharmakośa*, Soc. As. 219*b*.]

But if Śākyamuni, before the Bodhi, is a very extraordinary man, universal sovereigns, and especially those who reign over the four continents (*chāturdvīpaka*), are no less superhuman; they are nevertheless men. It remains to be seen whether the body that Śākyamuni showed to gods and men on this earth was a real body or an illusion. This question now demands an answer so far as possible.

One of the schools, the Lokottaravādin Mahāsāṅghikas of the Madhyadeśa† (a half-Sanskritizing sect of the Little Vehicle), teaches not only that the Buddhas have nothing in common with the world (*lokena samam*), that everything about them is supernatural (*lokottaram*), that, if they seem to think, speak, act, and suffer like us, it is merely by condescension, in order to conform outwardly to our weakness (*lokānuvartana*),‡ but also that the Bodhisattvas are in no way born from father and mother, that they are produced by their own powers (*svaguṇanirvṛtta*), that their mothers (and their wives also) are virgins, and that, if they come forth from their mothers' right side without injuring her, it is because their form (*rūpa*), i.e. their body, is entirely spiritual (*manomaya*, 'made of mind'), *i.e. quasi*-immaterial. And a sect, the Ekavyavahārikas, closely connected with the Lokottaravādins of the *Mahāvastu*, maintain that there is no matter (*rūpa*) in the Buddha.§

It is evident, therefore, that the manifestation in this world of the marvellous being who reigned among the Tuṣita gods was not in reality what it seemed to be. The Bodhisattva, after all, assumed merely an empty appearance of humanity in condescension to the ways of the world (*lokānuvar-*

* It is generally said that the mother of Buddha *dreamt* that a white elephant with six tusks entered her womb (*Jātaka*, p. 50; Rockhill, *Life*, p. 15; also *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, fol. 219); in the *Lalita*, p. 55, the Bodhisattva is transformed into an elephant. On the Bhārhut medallion representing the 'descent of Bhagavat' (Plate xxviii.), see Minayeff, *Recherches*, p. 146; Oldenberg, *Buddh. Studien*, p. 642; Foucher, *Art gréco-bouddhique*, i. 291.

† *Mahāvastu*, i. 96.

‡ On this point, which is open to dispute, see *Milinda*, 134; Rhys Davids, i. 190; cf. *Mahāvastu*, i. 169, 6. It is certain that the 'Pāli' Buddha is not free from suffering.

§ With regard to this obscure subject see Fleet, *JRAS*, 1906, p. 881.

* *Lalita* (p. 88) explains that, if the Wheel of the Law were to be moved by a god, *i.e.* if Buddha were to appear as a god, men would feel discouragement.

† This sect, which we shall discuss presently (see below, p. 744), is comparatively well known to us through the *Mahāvastu*, one of its canonical books, edited by E. Senart (see A. Barth, *Journal des Savants*, Aug.–Oct. 1899, from which we borrow freely), and also through the *Kathāvatthu* and the works of Vasumitra and Bhavya on the sects (see Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*; Rockhill, *Life*).

The Buddhist *Madhyadeśa*, 'central region,' lies to the East of the Madhyadeśa properly so called. It is in reality the *Prāgdeśa*. For the boundaries see *Mahāvagga*, v. 13, 12 (in Kern, *Man.* 13, n. 3).

‡ *Mahāvastu*, i. 167, 15 ff. The same formula (*eṣā lokānuvartanā*) is familiar to the Pūrvaśailas who apply it to the contradictory doctrines taught by the Buddha. It is in order to put himself into touch with the faithful that he preaches doctrines serviceable (*pudgala, skandha*, etc.), but in reality false (see *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 314).

§ Rockhill, *Life*, p. 188. On the mind-made body, see the discussion in Poussin, *Opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique bouddhique*, Paris, 1909, p. 258.

tana). The body which he shows to men and gods conceals its true nature from the 'worldly' mind. One may go further, and say that this body is only an illusion. Certain heretics of the *Kathāvatthu* (xvii. 1),* forerunning the Great Vehicle, say that it is not true that Śākyamuni descended in person into the womb of Māyā; he merely sent down to this world a double of his person, or, rather, a phantom. According to the *Daśabhūmika*, and also (a fact which has not been sufficiently noted) the *Lalitavistara* (p. 36) the Bodhisattva does not come down to the earth; he does no more than 'show' (*sandarśayati*) his descent, his sojourn in the womb of Māyā, his conquest of the Bodhi, and nirvāṇa.† In the *Lotus of the True Law* and in later systems the Buddha thus manifests himself on several occasions, appearing as a 'Bodhisattva in his last birth' (see artt. LOTUS OF THE TRUE LAW, ĀDIBUDDHA, etc.). This theory of the apparent descents, *avatāras* of the *quasi*-eternal Tathāgata, is the last phase of the *lokottaravāda*. According to *Sutrālaṅkāra*, Śākyamuni, even in the Tuṣita-heaven, is a phantom, a 'contrived body' (*nirmāṇa*).

According to another theory, less categorical, the Law has been preached by Ānanda (*Kathāvatthu*, xviii. 1). This means that Śākyamuni, although he was a real man, flesh and bones, nevertheless remained, since the Enlightenment, in a definite state of concentration or trance (*samādhi, dhyāna*); and can a being in *dhyāna*-state speak? We know from *Kathāvatthu* and from Bhavya that schools were at a loss to settle this question. Doctors who deny the power of speaking to the 'concentrated' saints assume that Buddha caused Ānanda or even the walls of the preaching-room to preach the Law (Kumārila in *Tantravārttika* has good jokes on this strange hypothesis; according to the Great Vehicle such wall-preaching is a case of *nairmāṇikī ṛddhi*). Elsewhere the organ of preaching is the smile of Śākyamuni, or the light that arises from his *ūrṇā* (white hair between the eyebrows). Elsewhere Śākyamuni is credited with having uttered a few words: each disciple heard them with the developments his own disposition allowed.

Together with the problem whose various solutions have just been expounded, and which centres round the Buddha and the Bodhisattva 'arrived at his last existence' (*sannikṛṣṭa bodhisattva*), there is another, almost as important, concerning the Bodhisattva during the course of his long career. Is he a 'saint' or an 'ordinary man'? Legend supplies contradictory and confused answers.

According to the Introduction to the *Jātaka*, it is only after having acquired arhat-ship, *i.e.* the right of entering nirvāṇa at his next death, that Sumedha (the future Śākyamuni) conceives the idea of becoming Buddha. The quality of Bodhisattva is in his case somehow grafted on to the quality of Arhat. Without examining how far this is compatible with the conquest of arhat-ship which Śākyamuni, born as an ordinary mortal, will once more make under the Bodhi tree, we see that Buddhists inquired if all the accounts concerning the previous existences of Śākyamuni are compatible with the possession of sainthood. Assuming that the concept of Bodhisattva ought to be brought within the framework of the doctrine of the path to sainthood, Buddhists further asked whether a Bodhisattva is necessarily a saint (*ārya*), or whether he remains, at least at the beginning of his career, an ordinary man (*pṛthagjana*), what grade he occupies in sainthood, *srotaāpatti*, the first, or arhat-ship, the fourth grade, and at what time he attains to those grades.

The Great Vehicle has answers to these questions, and to many others subsidiary to them (see III.). The Little Vehicle, besides the evidence of the Mahāsāṅghikas (see *ib.*) supplies only a few documents sufficiently detailed on the nature of the future Buddhas, but they are late. All the Bodhisattvas who have taken the vow to become Buddhas 'are exempt from births in the *avīchi*, with the ghosts (*pretas*), among the lower animals; in their human births they possess all the organs of the senses; they are neither women nor eunuchs; they are never guilty of mortal sin; they do not lose sight of the doctrine of action and its fruits; in their divine births they are never insentient gods, etc.; bent upon renunciation, with no attachment to existence or non-existence, they walk as acting for the world's welfare, fulfilling all the perfect virtues.'‡

This passage denies that the Bodhisattvas who have taken the vow can be guilty of mortal sin,* or that they can deny the law of the retribution of actions, and thus destroy their 'root of merit'; but it admits that they can be guilty of sins entailing evil destinies, *e.g.* re-birth into the wombs of higher animals, and probably into certain kinds of hells.† The same impression is given us by the short and contradictory notices which we possess concerning the Haimavatas.‡ They hold that the Bodhisattvas are *pṛthagjanas* whose most notable characteristic is freedom from the spirit of malice or wickedness (*abhidhyāchitta*); but are not exempt from error (*moha*) or desire (*rāga*). The Sautrāntikas were undoubtedly of the same opinion (Wass 276, *ad finem*). Tradition, in fact, was very clear about the animal existences of the Bodhisattva and the various sins he had committed during the course of his existences.§ These, it is true, may be explained without admitting the idea of any imperfection. This is undoubtedly what is done by the Mahāsāṅghikas. 'The Bodhisattvas,' they say, 'are free from desire and malice (*vyāpāda, vihetḥana*); whenever they choose, they are born in lower forms of existence for the benefit of creatures' (Wass. 237 [260]; cf. Rockhill, 188). The climax of this method of interpretation with a religious tendency is found in the Mahāyāna literature. There we see the Bodhisattvas 'rushing into the Avīchi like swans into a lotus pond.'‖ And why? To save creatures; because the future Buddhas in the fervour of their compassion have taken upon themselves 'the whole burden of the suffering of all creatures'; because they have declared, 'I am taking upon my body the heap of sorrows which their deeds have accumulated, in order to bear it in the regions of hell. Would that all creatures who dwell there might escape.'¶

It is not difficult, however, to reconcile these antinomies. All that is needed is the recognition of two kinds of Bodhisattvas. The legends in which the future Buddha appears in an animal form, etc., belong to the initial stage of his career. The lofty deeds of generosity, the sacrifice of life, etc., belong to a period during which he heroically practised the virtues. Finally, when Bodhisattvas are described as playing the part of a universal providence, and reigning in Paradise, like Avalokita (see art. AVALOKITEŚVARA), the reference is to future Buddhas who have almost attained Bodhi and have gained very high 'spheres' or 'stages.'

III. BHŪMIS, OR STAGES IN THE CAREER OF THE BODHISATTVA.**—The scheme of the Bodhisattva's career is modelled on that of the career of the *śrāvaka*, or disciple of the Little Vehicle.

We are expressly informed about this in various sources.†† The Śrāvaka, after receiving instruction from the Buddha, labours long before attaining, after sixteen successive victories over the passions, the first stage or first 'storey' (*bhūmi*)‡‡ of the way (*mārga*), namely, the position of *srotaāpanna* (=he who has entered the course). Thence he ascends to the states of *sakṛdāgāmin, anāgāmin*, and lastly *arhat*. According to another account, there are eight stages: the *srotaāpanna* who possesses the 'fruit' of entrance into the course is distinguished from the *pratipannaka*, or candidate qualified for this fruit,

* These heretics are, according to the commentary, the Vetulyakas. Minayeff has noticed that this sect is much later than the traditional but disputable date of the *Kathāvatthu* (B.C. 246). On Vetulyakas and the Great Vehicle, see *JRAS*, 1907, p. 482.

† See p. 745ᵃ.

‡ *Jātaka*, Introd. vv. 252-258, quoted by Kern, *Man.* 67, n. 9.

* The Mahāsāṅghikas assert the same thing of the *srotaāpanna*, Wassilieff, 240 (264).

† See *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 39, 7, on animal births, births in hell, etc., of persons who practise charity but violate the 'Pentalogue.' Cf. below, p. 744ᵇ.

‡ According to Vasumitra (Wass. 278); Bhavya ascribes different doctrines to them (Rockhill, 190).

§ On the animal births of the Bodhisattva, from the dogmatic point of view, see *Kathāvatthu*, xxiii. 3, *Jātakamālā*, xxxiii. 3, and sources quoted by Hopkins, *JAOS*, 1906, p. 464; Wassilieff, p. 168. According to *Sūtrālaṅkara*, as long as the future Buddha has not acquired a 'stage' (see below, p. 746ᵃ), his re-births are fixed by his acts, good or bad (*kammavasena*). Afterwards he is re-born according to his 'vows' (*praṇidhāna*) for the welfare of beings. At the end, his re-births are only apparent (*vibhutvādhipatyena . . . upapatti*). In Grunwedel, *Myth.* p. 199, statistics will be found of the various re-births of the Bodhisattva Śākyamuni according to the *Jātakas*. He was three times a Chaṇḍāla, once a dice-player, once a jackal, etc. A Bodhisattva cannot be a woman: 'At the same instant . . . the female sex of the daughter of Sāgara disappeared; the male sex appeared and she manifested herself as a Bodhisattva' (*Lotus*, Kern, p. 253; but see p. 257; *Si-do-in-dzou*, p. 123, etc.). In the Pāli Jātaka, the Bodhisattva is never a female; but that this rule is modern is proved by the sculptures of Bhārhut (see Foucher, *Les représentations des Jātakas*, p. 38).

‖ *Bodhicharyāvatārapañjikā*, p. 340, 13 (viii. 107), *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 360, 8.

¶ *Śikṣās.* p. 280.

** *Bhūmi*='stage,' or 'storey' (of a house), or 'category' (for instance, *Divyāvadāna*, p. 230. 28). The *Lotus* has once *dhāraṇi* =*bhūmi*, xvi. 3, see Kern, *ad loc.*, and the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, *dhātu, avinivartanīyadhātu*.

†† *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 13, 6; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, II. iv.

‡‡ The term *bhūmi* is used in the Pāli *Abhidhamma* (see C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 82) as equivalent to *magga*, 'way.'

and so on. Consequently there are eight noble individuals (*āryapudgalas* or *mahāpuruṣapudgalas*). Moreover, scholastics regard the future *śrāvakas*, who are not yet qualified for the possession of fruit (let us style them *pratipannakas* to *srotaāpattipratipannakatva*, 'candidates for the first candidateship'), as belonging to a preliminary stage or *gotrabhūmi*. Although the Schools disagree on this point, the general opinion is that not only the *arhat* but also the *srotaāpanna* cannot fall from the stage which he occupies.*

The most ancient systematic doctrines concerning the career of the Bodhisattva seem to have been the following:—

There is a preliminary stage, during which he still, properly speaking, is only a 'future Bodhisattva,' and this is succeeded by three other stages.

(1) The preliminary stage is called *Prakṛticharyā*,† 'the period during which the innate qualities show themselves,' and which begins when the future Bodhisattva plants the roots of merit which later he will apply to the conquest of the Bodhi.

(2) The second stage is that of the Bodhisattva who for the first time conceives the thought of Bodhi (*prathamachittotpādika*), or 'who merely steps into the Vehicle' (of the Bodhisattvas; *prathamayānasamprasthita*), or again 'the beginner' (*ādikarmika*), 'who is eager to start on his journey' (*gantukāma*), but who has not yet set out.‡

(3) The Bodhisattva 'who follows out the practice or career of the Bodhisattvas' (*bodhisattvacharyāñ charan*), who adopts a career 'in conformity with the vow' (*anulomacharyā*), 'who is on the march' (*gantṛ*), 'who is endowed with practice' (*charyāpratipanna*).

(4) The Bodhisattva who dwells 'in the stage from which there is no return'§ (*avinivartanīyā bhūmi*). It was at the beginning of this period (*anivartanacharyā*) that the future Śākyamuni received the prediction (*vyākaraṇa*) from Dīpaṅkara (*Mahāvastu*).‖

These and similar divisions, although they are known chiefly through the works of the Great Vehicle, contain nothing that is opposed to ancient ideas; they constitute merely an advance upon the views expounded by the commentator of the *Jātaka* (see above, p. 739). It seems to be otherwise with the 'stages of the Bodhisattva' as understood afterwards.¶ On the one hand, the teachers of the Great Vehicle sometimes regarded the doctrine of the *bhūmis* as their special right (*Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 23); on the other, the Hīnayānists reproached their opponents with having invented the ten *bhūmis*. The latter, a Tibetan writer tells us, replied that a sect of the Little Vehicle, the Mahāsāṅghikas, possessed a book, the *Mahāvastu*, in which was set forth a theory of the ten *bhūmis* (Wass. 262 f.). On this point, as on several others, the School 'of the Great Assembly' seems to have become separated from the ancient sects and to mark the transition between the two Vehicles. Its *bhūmis*, however, are not the same as those of the Mahāyāna [all of which, being exempt from return, should be put under (4) of the above enumeration]. So far as we can judge, they present this characteristic, that the first seven are only a subdivision of '*charyās*' (2) and (3) of the preceding enumeration, the last three alone being exempt from 'return.'

The account of the *bhūmis* in the *Mahāvastu** seems to be independent of the authorities of the Great Vehicle, although it has some points of contact with the *Daśabhūmaka* and the *Lalitavistara*. Unfortunately, this account is confused, fragmentary, and perhaps contradictory. We possess on this point information supplied by Chandrakīrti, who, as we shall see, complicates rather than illuminates the problem. Reference should be made to E. Senart's analysis, from which we sometimes venture to differ.

The [future] Bodhisattva, who has not yet conceived the thought of the vow of Bodhi (*praṇidhichitta*), possesses the privilege that his sins are punished only during seven births, pain in the end being reduced to headache [*śirṣaparitāpa*; cf. *Bodhicharyāv.* i. 21] (i. 104, 5). The first *bhūmi* is produced by the thought of Bodhi: 'May we become perfect Buddhas' (80, 5). This thought immediately destroys previous sins, literally, 'covers' them (104, 8; cf. *Bodhicharyāv.* i. 13). Nevertheless, the Bodhisattva of this stage and of the six following is an 'ordinary man' (102, 13 and 78, 11). He is regarded as an Ārya (*prāptaphala*), because his vow is not that of ordinary men (*prākṛtapuruṣa* = *pṛthagjana*, 80, 15);† but his works are mixed with good and evil (102, 9). In theory he does not encounter evil destinies; murder, theft, etc., do not lead him to hell. Nevertheless, should he deny the existence of the Āryas (*āryāpavāda*;‡ here it is chiefly Buddhas and Bodhisattvas that are concerned), he will be re-born in a 'particular hell' (*pratyekanaraka*) instead of being re-born in the Avīchi, in a Preta with a small body (as opposed to the Pretas with large bodies, who accordingly suffer more from hunger), or among the higher animals (as opposed to the *kṣudratiryagyoni*).§ He will never be an asura, or a woman, or a eunuch. But if he commits a mortal sin, the murder of a Bodhisattva, of a Śrāvaka (= Arhat), of a Srotaāpanna, or of a Pratyekabuddha, he will go to hell (102, 12–104, 3).

It is said that, for scholastically expounded reasons, such and such a Bodhisattva will never be able to pass from one *bhūmi* to the next. The Bodhisattvas destined to proceed uninterruptedly (*avaivartikadharma*) seem to be distinguished from the others, and perhaps the above-mentioned privileges are reserved for them.

From the beginning, however, of the eighth *bhūmi*,‖ the works of the Bodhisattvas are perfectly pure. 'They must be honoured with the worship rendered to the perfect Buddhas, they must be regarded as perfect Buddhas' (105, 13), for from this moment they cannot fall (*anivartiya*). They are Chakravartin kings; they teach the Law (107, 8). It is a curious fact that, whereas the names of the first seven *bhūmis* remain without any point of connexion in the literature, for the eighth we find *janmanideśa* (?), which recalls the *janmabhūmi*, 'birth-stage' of the *Daśabhūmaka* (*i.e.* where one chooses his birth-place); then, *yauvarājyabhūmi* (stage of the prince associated with the reigning sovereign), which is attested by the

* This is the most complicated problem of Buddhist scholasticism (see *Saṁyutta*, v. 360). Here it may be mentioned that the *Lotus* states that some Bodhisattvas will obtain Buddhahood after four, three, two births, or after one birth (xvi. 5 *f.*, and Kern, *ad loc.*; there is confusion of the Bodhisattvas with the Śrāvakas).

† A term, derived from the *Mahāvastu*, corresponding to *gotrabhūmi* (see below, 745).

‡ According to the texts of the Great Vehicle quoted in *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, 212, 12 and 313, 19; this stage corresponds to the *praṇidhānacharyā* of the *Mahāvastu*, and to the *adhimuktichāryābhūmi* of *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Sūtrālaṅkāra*.

§ See especially *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*, ch. xxii.

‖ Instead of 'career,' or 'stage without return,' the text, *Śikṣās.* 212, 12, has 'Bodhisattva possessing the *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*.' We shall see that it is necessary to attain the eighth *bhūmi* in order to possess this *kṣānti*, while all the *bhūmis* (including the first) are 'without return,' at least according to modern authorities (see below, 745[a] and 747).

¶ The idea which is contradictory to the Little Vehicle is not the subdivision of the Bodhisattva's career into several periods, but (1) the practical meaning of this teaching: everybody has to become a Bodhisattva; and (2) the nature attributed to the Bodhisattva 'dwelling in the *bhūmis*,' a kind of God-Providence, multiplying his various manifestations of form in all the universes, etc. The Bodhisattvas of the *Mahāvastu* do not appear to have this nature, even in the higher worlds (see next col., n. †, and p. 748[a]).

* See E. Senart's Introduction to the edition of the text (i. xxv f.), and A. Barth, *Journal des Savants*, 1899.

† The sentence, i. 78, 11, is very complicated: *prathamāyāṁ bhūmāu bodhisattvāḥ pṛthagjanā iti prāptaphalā bhavanti iti dakṣiṇīyāś cha lokānāṁ virochenti*. E. Senart translates (p. 437): 'The Bodhisattvas who are in the first *bhūmi*, ordinary men though they were, secure the acquisition of fruits, and on that account become the object of the reverence of all people . . .' But he sums up (p. xxvii): 'The Bodhisattvas at this stage are still ordinary men.' And, with regard to the Bodhisattvas of the seventh *bhūmi*, we have (p. 102, 8) *sāmanta pṛthagjanatāye*, which the present writer, like E. Senart (p. 457), understands to mean 'in consequence of their position as *pṛthagjanas*.' It would be necessary, therefore, to interpret the first passage (78, 11) thus: 'The Bodhisattvas are ordinary men, but they are worthy of the world's respect as if they were saints.' Unfortunately, Chandrakīrti (*Madhyamakavṛtti*, xxiv. 5) informs us that 'the scholars of the Madhyadeśa, following the arrangement of stages taught in the *Mahāvastu*, claim that the Bodhisattva dwelling in the first stage possesses the *darśanamārga*,' that is to say, has obtained the fruit of the *srotaāpatti*.

‡ The formula of the *Abhidharmakośa* is as follows: 'There are no Arhats in this world.' It implies a rejection of the True Law (*saddharmapratikṣepa*), and seems inseparable from the denial of the morality of actions and of their fruit: *nāsti dattam* . . . etc. See *Digha*, i. 55.

§ Cf above, p. 743[a].

‖ We are told (i. 105, 4) that the Jātakas, and the heroic charities too, refer to the eighth and following *bhūmis*. This is very strange.

Madhyamakāvatāra; and, finally, *abhiṣekabhūmi* (royal unction), examples of which are very numerous.*

The final attainment (*paripūraṇa*) of the tenth *bhūmi* results in the descent of the Bodhisattva, who now desires to become man (which will open to him the way to Buddhahood), into his mother's womb, and the prosecution of the well-known human career.

The close parallelism should be noticed between *Mahāvastu*, i. 142, and *Lalitavistara*, 36, 1–4. The remarkable difference is that, according to the latter text, the anointing allows the saint to 'show'† (*sandarśanatā*) his descent, birth, entrance into religion, . . . and the great nirvāṇa; whereas these nine exploits of the Buddha are regarded as real, and not apparent in the *Mahāvastu*, however *lokottaravādin* it claims to be.

In the system of the Mahāyāna or of the Pāramitās (*pāramitānaya*)‡ there is a very clear distinction between the first seven stages and the last three, but this distinction does not seem to be based on the same principle as that of the *Mahāvastu*. From the first '*bhūmi* of the Bodhisattvas' the future Buddha is assured of final success.§ Yet it seems almost certain that the Mahāyāna began with the conception of the *Mahāvastu* or one similar, for the eighth world in it bears the name of *Achalā* (immovable), 'because it cannot be removed,' or again (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*) that of *Niyatabhūmi*, 'world in which the faithful will surely (attain the state of Buddha).' Various notices lead us to believe that the possession of the *anutpattikakṣānti*,‖ which is the essence of the eighth stage, and produces the 'prediction' (*vyākaraṇa*), is not separable from the *avaivartikabhūmi* or *avinivartanīya*°, the 'stage without return.'¶

We are now able to follow the 'stages' in detail, as understood by the teachers of the Great Vehicle. The material may be subdivided into three heads: the future Bodhisattva, the first seven stages, and the last three stages.**

1. **First Period:** *The future Bodhisattva.*—We have seen that, according to the Introduction to the *Jātaka*, the future Śākyamuni was almost ripe for arhat-ship, when the sight of the Buddha Dīpaṅkara caused the thought of becoming Buddha to arise within him. It is after taking the vow of Bodhi that he examines the virtues necessary to a Buddha. All this is rather poor psychology; for nothing is more opposed to the career of the Bodhisattva than the state of mind of an Arhat, isolated from everything, from his neighbour as from himself. The future Buddhas, let us rather say, are recruited from men who have not entered the path of the Arhats, and whose spiritual temperament is not yet determined (*aniyatagotra*).††

These men do not, however, immediately decide, for the sake of the welfare of creatures, for their temporal happiness and their salvation in nirvāṇa, to make the very great sacrifices that the career of a Bodhisattva entails. Therefore, before taking the vow of Bodhi, a period unduly called a '*bhūmi*' passes, which is preparatory (*parikarma*°, *upacārabhūmi*) to the Bodhisattvabhūmis, and is subdivided into *gotrabhūmi* and *adhimuktichāryābhūmi*.*

(1) *Gotrabhūmi*† is a stage of preparation (*Laṅkāv.* 68, 6). Just as, even in the egg, the embryo which is to become the wonderful bird Garuḍa differs from all other birds in the embryonic state, so the future Bodhisattva (*bhaviṣyad*°) belongs, even before his spiritual birth, to the family (*gotra*) of the Bodhisattvas. He possesses a certain 'disposition' which predisposes him to the vow of Bodhi. He possesses certain innate (*i.e.* acquired during the course of former existences) qualities (*prakṛti*°) which incline him to compassion; for compassion is the essential element in the vow of Bodhi. He is kind and good (*bhadra*). Incapable of committing a mortal sin (for these are, above all, sins of hatred),‡ he avoids also the heresies which would condemn him for eternity;§ but he commits sins of love (*rāga*). Everyday experience, in fact, shows numerous examples of good and generous men forgetting themselves, *e g.* in passion. These men, although ignorant and guilty, belong to the race of Bodhisattvas.

(2) *Adhimuktichāryābhūmi.*—The dispositions of which we have been speaking bear their natural fruits in the Buddhist disciple. His enthusiasm is not for the egotistical calm of the Arhat, but for the generous goodness of the Buddha. In him are born 'aspirations' (*adhimukti*) towards the state of Buddha. In him, if we prefer to put it thus, is born the thought of Bodhi (*bodhichittotpāda*); but this thought is only in germ, in the state of seed, of cause (*hetubhūta*); there is nothing to show that it will ripen. Among a thousand persons who possess it at this state, says the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* (61, 9), are there two, is there even a single one, who will carry it to maturity? A person thinks of becoming Buddha (*a*) because some preacher invites him, or (*b*) because he hears Buddhahood praised, or (*c*) because he thinks of the miraculous body of Buddha, or (*d*) because he has compassion for creatures (*Śikṣās.* 8, 8). This last motive alone is pure; but, even when it is predominant, it is one thing to begin the vow of Bodhi, another to carry it out (*ārabdha, pratilabdha*). The good thoughts (*adhimukti, adhimokṣa, aṅhyāśaya*) of the disciple are like arrows shot forth in the darkness, which have very little chance of hitting the mark. His good works are few in number (*parittakarin*), full of omissions and imperfections (*chhidrakarin*), casual and unregulated (*aniyatakarin*). He has to reflect and wish (*pratisaṅkhyāna*) in order to do good. He is called 'Bodhisattva mounted on a chariot drawn by oxen' (*paśurathagatika*), to indicate the slowness and uncertainty of his success (*Śikṣās.* 7, 1). His unconstrained love is given to himself; it is only by reflexion that he cares for the welfare of others. His nature leaves him at the mercy of his inclinations. His knowledge of truth (*prajñā*) is slight, and derived entirely from listening to the Law and from reflexion: the direct penetrating sight of meditation (*bhāvanā*) is entirely wanting in him. Nevertheless, by the repetition of 'aspirations,' and by more and more studious practice of the good works which they involve, the disciple, during three periods, succeeds in purifying these very aspirations (which will henceforth be called *adhyāśayas*), and, when they are pure, he rises from the *adhimuktichāryā* stage to enter the stage 'where aspirations are pure' (*śuddhādhyāśaya*).‖ See, however, p. 747ᵃ.

2. **Second Period:** *The first seven stages of the Bodhisattvas.*—The stage called *śuddhāśayabhūmi* (or *śuddhādhyāśaya*°), and more commonly the 'Joyful' (*pramuditā*), is, properly speaking, the first *bhūmi* of the Bodhisattvas. (Until now the disciple was only a future Bodhisattva.) It is also the first in the classical list of the ten *bhūmis*. We shall see that it does not

* This consecration evidently takes place in the Tuṣita heaven, for there are certain qualities which the Bodhisattva does not possess until 'after the Tuṣita' (see *Mahāvastu*, i. p. xxxvi).

† See above, p. 743ᵃ, and below, p. 747ᵃ, n. ‡.

‡ Also in the Tantras (*mantranaya* in contrast to *pāramitanaya*).

§ The Bodhisattva 'who has attained a stage' is contrasted with the one who is tossed about in the *saṃsāra*, lifted up by the thought of Bodhi, held down by his sins (*Bodhicharyāv.* iv. 11). Nevertheless Chandrakīrti (*Madhyamakāvatāra*, 51) seems to foresee that a predestined Bodhisattva (*niyata*, see p. 739ᵇ, n. †) may indulge in an angry thought. In the present writer's opinion the passage should be interpreted thus: 'And if, *to suppose what is against all probability*, a predestined bodhisattva should happen to produce an angry thought.'

‖ See p. 744ᵃ, n. ‖.

¶ *Lalitavistara*, 85, l. 21, and *Śikṣās.* 313, 19, compared with *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, 60.

** Authorities.—(1) *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*, xvii ff. (2) *Daśabhūmaka*, or *Dasabhūmika sūtra*, of which there exists a recension, augmented by Prākrit verses, called the *Daśabhūmīśvara*, one of the nine Dharmas of the Nepālese literature. Numerous quotations by Śāntideva (*Śikṣās.*), Prajñākaramati, etc., show the importance of this book, which seems to have been translated into Chinese A.D. 205–316. [See Nanjio, 105, 110.] It is utilized by (3) the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, a text-book of the Yogāchāra (or Vijñānavādin) school, (4) the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, a work of Chandrakīrti the Mādhyamika teacher (see p. 748), (5) the *Sūtrālaṅkāra* of Maitreya-Asaṅga.

†† See *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*, p. 33, 17, *ye tv avakrāntāḥ samyaktvaniyāmaṁ na te bhavyā anuttarāyāṁ samyaksambodhau chittam utpādayitum*, 'Persons who have entered "ascertainment to arhat-ship" [more accurately "the state undoubtedly leading to *srotaāpatti*"] cannot produce the thought of becoming Buddhas; . . . nevertheless I joyfully approve them if they come to produce such thought.' It is noteworthy that the *Prajñāpāramitā* uses the phrase *samyaktvaniyāma* just as the Nikāyas do (see *Saṁyutta*, Index, p. 54), and contrasts it with *bodhisattvaniyāma* (p. 322, 5). On *niyāma*, see p. 746ᵃ, n. *, p. 747ᵇ, n. *, and Woghara on Bodhisattvabhūmi.

* This is the account of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, but there is no doubt that the Mādhyamikas recognized these distinctions. See *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, VII. 8, VIII. 8; *Madhyamakāvatara*, 13. 12.

† The Little Vehicle also knows of a *śrāvakagotra*, 'having the disposition of a future arhat.' Here *gotrabhūmi* = *bodhisattva-gotrabhūmi*.

‡ Cf. below, p. 751ᵇ. The *Mahāvastu* seems to admit mortal sin in the Bodhisattva; see p. 744ᵇ.

§ Heresy which destroys the root of merit, the denial of the fruit of actions (see art. KARMA). See p. 744ᵇ, n. ‡.

‖ To complete this description it would be necessary to interpret and comment *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 32.

differ from the *anivartanīyabhūmi*, 'the stage from which there is no "return,"' which was discussed above. It is in the 'Joyful stage,' according to a prediction of Buddha, that Ānanda is to be re-born under the name of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Great Vehicle.

The 'Joyful stage' corresponds to what is called in the Little Vehicle the 'first fruit': the disciple is now no longer an 'ordinary man' (*pṛthagjana, prākṛtapuruṣa*) but a saint (*ārya*), one of the elect (*niyāmāvakrānta*);* for, having brought 'worldly' (*laukika*) meditations (*dhyāna*) to their perfection, he has entered the 'supernatural' career (*lokottaragati*). He is a 'graded Bodhisattva' (*bhūmisthita*), or, more correctly, he is a true Bodhisattva (*paramārthabodhisattva*), and he will certainly become a Buddha. He already possesses in a high degree all the qualities which will develop in the subsequent periods.

The description of this first stage, borrowed by the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* from the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, is developed according to a scheme which recurs in all the succeeding stages. We give it in detail so that its scholastic character may be noted.

(1) The 'stage' is produced, in a soul whose intentions or aspirations are pure, by the 'formation of the thought of Bodhi' (*chittotpāda*)—a thought which is the pure expression of charity (*dānapāramitā*) or of compassion (*karuṇā*). The thought of Bodhi is here 'absolutely fixed,' and is thus distinguished from the thought as it exists in the preparatory stage. Entirely personal and sincere, the result of meditation (*bhāvanā*), *i.e.* resting on an intuitive view of truth, it consists of the vow of the Bodhisattvas in all the fullness of disinterested generosity—a vow which will never be abandoned or altered under any circumstances, and which will have Bodhi as its end, embracing as it does all the intellectual qualities of the Perfect Buddhas and all the works which they are to accomplish.

Destined to Buddhahood (*sambodhiparāyaṇa*),† the disciple realizes that he is 'born into the family of the Buddha,' and his joy knows no bounds; joy of affection for the Buddhas who have begotten him to this spiritual birth, joy in the feeling that he is devoting himself to the realization of the task of the future Buddhas, and joy in his goodwill towards all creatures.

For him the five terrors (*bhaya*)—terror relative to the necessities of life, to an evil reputation, to death, to unhappy re-births, and to the 'assemblies'—disappear. As he has 'produced' the vow that the sins of all creatures should 'ripen' in him (*ātmavaipākya*), *i.e.* wishing to bear the burden of the sins of others in the hells and elsewhere, he is henceforward free from all evil re-birth. Knowing that there is no one better than he in this world, no one who is even his equal, why should he be afraid of meeting any 'assembly' whatever?

(2) He binds himself by the 'great resolves,' which are independent of limitations of time or space (*mahāpraṇidhāna*),‡ and purifies them: to render homage to the Buddhas; to preserve and preach their Law; to ascend to the 'great nirvāṇa,' after having performed all the works of a Buddha since his descent from the Tuṣita; to produce thoughts for the purification of all the 'stages' and the fulfilment of all the perfect virtues in order to that end; to ripen all creatures for Buddhahood; to pass through all the universes for the purpose of listening to the Buddhas there; to purify all the 'fields of Buddha' (that is to say, to make of them so many Sukhāvatīs); to enter the Great Vehicle; to act and preach for the salvation of beings with full success and without error; without abandoning for an instant his own path, to exhibit the birth as a *pṛthagjana*, the entrance into the religious life, the miracles, the conquest of Bodhi, the putting of the law into motion, and the great complete nirvāṇa.*

(3)-(4) The disciple possesses ten qualities 'which purify the stage in which he dwells,' and 'which purify the ten stages.' Becoming more and more perfect, they enable him to ascend from stage to stage: faith, compassion, affection or goodwill, generosity or disinterestedness, indefatigability, acquaintance with the doctrinal books (worldly and Buddhist), knowledge of the world (or of men), modesty in a two-fold form (reverence for self and reverence for others), power and endurance, and the worship of the Buddhas.

(5) Enjoying the sight of the Buddhas described in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* (see MAHĀYĀNA), and, in general, of all the Buddhas of every region,—this because of (*a*) the strength of his loving faith, and (*b*) the resolution, made by these Buddhas when they were Bodhisattvas, that they would be visible—he worships these Buddhas, listens to the Law, practises the Law, applies his merits to the acquisition of Buddhahood, and 'ripens' creatures for Bodhi by means of the 'elements of popularity' (*saṅgrahavastu*, see pp. 741[a], 750[a]). All his actions are called 'purifiers of the roots of merit.'

(6) While he dwells in this stage the Bodhisattva is, in all his births, a 'sovereign king of a continent.' Deprived of all egoism, he frees all creatures from egoism.†

(7) Power.‡—Whatever act he undertakes, it is in order to reconcile creatures to himself, and always with thoughts connected with the Buddha, his Law, and his Order; it is always with the thought: 'May I become the first of beings (*i.e.* a Buddha), in order that every creature may have recourse to me for every good.' And all his undertakings succeed. He has the energy required § to leave wife and belongings, to enter on the religious path, and, having entered,§ to conquer a hundred Bodhisattva-trances every second, to perceive a

* The murder of a *niyāmāvakrānta* is a capital sin (*ānantarya*); see *Mahāvyutpatti*, 123. 3: *niyatabhūmisthitasya bodhisattvasya māraṇam*, and cf. on the same topic *Abhidharmakośav.* which has *niyatipatita bodhisattva* (MS As. Soc. fol. 331*a*). As observed on p. 745[a], the eighth stage is sometimes called *niyatabhūmi*; but, according to the gloss, the reference is to the third *niyati* (see p. 747[b], n. *). Discrepancies in sacred books as to the stage which confers *niyāma* (*niyati*), 'predestination to Buddhahood,' led the scholastics to specify different kinds of 'assured psychological progresses.' The *niyāma* of the 8th stage confers assurance of obtaining and never losing *anābhogatā* and *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* (see below, p. 747[b]); it is the 6th *niyatipāta* of *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, xix. 38.

† This phrase occurs in the Nikāyas (see *Saṃyutta*, Index) and in Aśoka's edicts (see Senart, i. 182, 186, ii. 223). Here, as observed by Prof. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, i. 190, *sambodhi* = arhat-ship, and nothing more. On the *vyākaraṇa*, 'prediction,' that the future Arhat gives to himself, see *Saṃyutta*, v. 359.

‡ The *praṇidhānas* are innumerable. They are summed up in the ten great ones (*mahā°*), which are all included in the *samantabhadra°*, 'universally propitious resolve.' On the *praṇidhāna*, its subdivisions and its virtues, see *Dharmasaṅgraha* cxii., *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, ix. 36.

* This somewhat incoherent list of 'resolves' is cited in *Śikṣās*. 291, 11 *f.*, and summed up in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. The last 'resolve' shows that the Mahāyānists did not believe in the *reality* of the 'Bodhisattvas in their last existence.' If the present writer's interpretation of the text *Śikṣās*. 295, 5 is correct, it shows also that Śākyamuni was believed to have been born as a *bāla*, 'an ignorant person,' 'a fool.'

† In the subsequent stages the Bodhisattva is successively sovereign king of the four continents, Śakra, Suyāma, Santuṣita (a variant of the word Tuṣita, common in the ancient literature), Sunirmitavaśavartin. . . . To each stage corresponds a certain virtue which the Bodhisattva makes prevalent in the more and more wide-spread kingdom in which he reigns. These virtues are successively the *pāramitās* (see below, p. 748).

‡ The description of the *prabhāva*, or 'power,' of the Bodhisattva is the same in the succeeding worlds, except that the numbers increase. In the *Daśabhūmaka* we find the series 100, 1000, 100,000, 100 koṭis (koṭi = 10,000,000), 1000 koṭis, 100,000 koṭis, 100,000 nayutas of koṭis (nayuta = 100,000 koṭis of koṭis), the number of the atoms in a hundred thousand times ten great universes, etc. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* is more moderate, but it gives numbers only for the first seven worlds, 100, 1000, 100,000, 10,000,000, or a koṭi, 100 koṭis, 1000 koṭis, 100,000 koṭis.

§ This clause is wanting in the description of the higher *bhūmis*

hundred Buddhas, to know the magical beings that these Buddhas animate and the blessing they shower on the Bodhisattvas, to make a hundred universes tremble, to go to these in his bodily form or to enlighten them by his brilliance, to display them to creatures, to ripen a hundred creatures for Bodhi (by means of a hundred magical beings),* to live for 100 *kalpas*, or ages of the world (if he chooses),* to know a hundred *kalpas* in the past and the future, to comprehend (or accumulate, *pravichinoti*) a 'hundred mouths of the Law' (*dharmamukha*),† and to show a hundred bodies ‡ (magical bodies of Buddhas), each of them surrounded by a hundred Bodhisattvas.

This last description, which the technical literature of the Yogâchâras (*Bodhisattvabhûmi*) borrows from the *Daśabhûmaka*, is represented in the *Madhyamakâvatâra* (a Mâdhyamika book) only by a single sentence: 'The Bodhisattva, in the first stage, can make a hundred universes tremble'; but this sentence implies the rest. According to the two schools of the Great Vehicle, every 'graded' Bodhisattva is a very great magician.

The passage from one *bhûmi* to the following (*bhûmer bhûmyantarasaṅkramaṇa*; see *Lalita*, 35, 22) takes place in accordance with a scheme which is always the same. Each 'stage' consists essentially in the development of ten certain qualities—the perfection, the complete realization (*paripûrṇatva, prakarṣagamana*) of which constitutes the beginning of the next stage, and gives rise to ten new qualities, at first very weak, whose perfect maturity will constitute a third stage, and so on.

For this reason, there are ten 'right dispositions' (*samyagâśayas*) in the first stage (1. not contradicting the teachers, *gurus*, etc., 2. living on good terms with the Bodhisattvas who are experiencing the same stage, 3. remaining master of one's thought by subduing passions and temptations, etc.) which, being infinitely pure, enable him to pass into the second stage, or rather constitute the second stage. The latter is termed 'the world of the Bodhisattvas whose dispositions are pure' (*śuddhâdhyâśaya*).

There are ten 'applications of the mind to the intellectual dispositions' (*chittaśayamanaskâra*) which realize the third world, ten 'entrances into the sight of *dharma*' (*dharmâlokapraveśa*; cf. the *dharmâlokamukha* of the *Lalita*) for the fourth, ten 'equalities of pure dispositions' (*viśuddhâśayasamatâ*) for the fifth, ten 'equalities of the Law' (*dharmasamatâ*) for the sixth, ten 'excellent beginnings of a new way nourished by learning and skill in the means' (*upâyaprajñâbhinirhṛtamârgântarârambhaviśeṣa*) which cause him to pass into the seventh, which consists in the culture of ten 'sciences introductory to the real truth' (*paramârthavatârajñâna*).

But although these *bhûmis* are more and more rich in qualities and knowledge, they are all essentially the thought of Bodhi.

The first seven stages together constitute the 'active' career of the Bodhisattva, during which he exercises himself, and his acts imply movement and intellectual work (*prâyogikacharyâ, sâbhoga°, sâbhisaṁskâra°*). § The seventh marks the completion of this career, and the preparation for passing into the career which is free from movement and 'intellectuation,' the so-called career of knowledge and supernatural virtues (*jñânâbhijñâcharyâ*; cf. *Lalita*, 35, 5).

The *Bodhisattvabhûmi*, utilizing in other respects the data of the *Daśabhûmaka*, but organizing them according to a well-known scheme of the Little Vehicle (cf. the *Visuddhimagga*), establishes the following distribution: Stages i.–vii. constitute the *charyâpratipattibhûmi*, 'stage of exercise.'

Second stage. The Immaculate (*vimalâ*). Practice of Morality (*adhiśîla*).

Third stage. The Illuminating (*prabhâkarî*). Reflexion (*adhichitta*).

Fourth stage. The Radiant (*archiṣmatî*). Knowledge (*adhiprajñâ*), first part: cultivation (*i.e.* meditation) of the *bodhipakṣya dharmas*.

Fifth stage. The Invincible (*sudurjayâ*). Knowledge, second part: cultivation of the noble truths (*satya*).

Sixth stage. The Turned towards (*abhimukhî*). Knowledge, third part: cultivation of dependent origination (*pratîtyasamutpâda*).

Seventh stage. The Far-going (*dûraṅgamâ*), which sums up the six preceding stages, and includes especially the fruits of the sixth, the full development of the intelligence of the Bodhisattvas (*bodhisattvabuddhivichâra*), the complete absence of regard for the particular (*nirnimitta*), and the constant possession of meditation of annihilation (*nirodhasamâpatti*). Now the Bodhisattva dwells at the apex of existence (*bhûtakoṭivihâra*), but he does not realize annihilation (*nirodhaṁ sâkṣâtkaroti*). And yet, just as a Chakravartin king, although unsoiled by humanity, is nevertheless a man and not a god (Brahmâ), so he has not yet escaped from the domain of passion (*kleśa*). Desire, in connexion with the consciousness he has of his actions (*abhisaṁskâra*), and with 'the act of turning oneself' (*âbhoga*) towards an object, has not yet passed away. He is not subject to passion (*na saklešaḥ*) in the sense that any passion whatsoever would work in him; he is not free from passion (*na niḥkleśaḥ*) because he desires the knowledge of a Buddha, and because his intentions (of universal salvation) are not fulfilled.

Nevertheless, being in possession of the perfect qualities of Bodhisattvas, he is superior to the Arhats and the Pratyekabuddhas. Above him there are only the Bodhisattvas of higher worlds and the Perfect Buddhas.

The intentions or aspirations (*adhimukti*) of the Bodhisattva, even when he is only on the threshold of his course (*âdikarmika*), are pregnant with the Bodhi and the salvation of all beings. Therefore he is very much superior to the Arhats and the Pratyekabuddhas. These, however, are in enjoyment not only of freedom from desire (*vîtarâgatva*), but also of lofty intellectual attainments. Therefore, during the first six *bhûmis*, the Bodhisattva is inferior to them. From this point of view, he surpasses them only on entering the seventh stage. Such is the teaching of the *Maitreyavimokṣa* and the *Daśabhûmaka* (*Madhyamakâvatâra*, 18–20).

3. Third Period: *The last three stages of the Bodhisattvas.*—The eighth 'stage' is called the Steadfast, or rather the Immovable (*achalâ*).* Its characteristic is the possession of that supreme virtue called the *anutpattikadharmakṣânti* ('upholding the doctrine of the non-production of things'). †

The Bodhisattva is free not only from all *nimittagrahaṇa* ('particular and eager act of attention'), but also from all *âbhoga* ('turning towards, taking into consideration'). He is immovable. His actions, of body and of voice as much as of mind, are infinitely numerous, merciful, and fruitful, but are in a sense foreign to him, for the idea of duality, of being and non-being, of self and non-self, has perished for him; as also all movement (*samudâchâra*) connected with or belonging to the Buddhas, the Bodhisattvas, nirvâṇa, or the Arhats.

The Buddhas must also intervene to prevent such a Bodhisattva from entering nirvâṇa. They do so by virtue of the vow which they made formerly when they were Bodhisattvas, for since they have become Buddhas all activity has ceased for them. They remind the Bodhisattva of the eighth stage that his task is not accomplished, that he still needs many things in order to be a Buddha: 'Your "patience in the real truth" (*paramârthakṣânti*) in order to become Buddha is excellent; but you possess neither the ten powers

* The words in parentheses are wanting in the *Daśabhûmaka*.

† The same as the well-known *dharmâlokamukha* (*Lalita*, p. 31, Kern, i. 405). See next note.

‡ 'To show a hundred bodies,' the phrase of the *Daśabhûmaka*, is replaced in the *Bodhisattvabhûmi* by the words: *skandhadhâtvâyatanâdikânâm dharmamukhânâm kâyaśatam darśayati* (?).

§ The phrase *avabhâsabhûmi* (*Lankâvatâra*, 68. 6) possibly refers to the first seven stages.

* Other names are: stage of the royal prince (*kumâra°*), stage without return (*anivartya*), stage of nirvâṇa, 'settled' stage (*niyatabhûmi*: *tasyâm tṛtîyanîyatipâtapatito bhavati*; see p. 745ª, and p. 746ª, n. *). In iconography, Bodhisattvas always appear with royal ornaments. The title of Mañjuśrî, *Kumâra*, is well known.

† On this *kṣânti*, also called *paramârthakṣânti*, see below, p. 751.

nor the four abilities. . . . See how infinite are our bodies, our knowledge (*jñāna*), our kingdoms, our glory. You must acquire the same; you must appease those who are not appeased, convert those who are not converted,' etc.

It is for this reason that the Bodhisattva remains in existence. Without activity of body, voice, or mind, enjoying the ripe fruits of all his previous conduct, he develops marvellously. Formerly it was in his single body that he pursued the career of a Bodhisattva; now he multiplies (or divides) his body infinitely (*apramāṇakāyavibhakti*); he knows and surveys the whole universe.* He possesses the sovereignties (*vaśitā*), and ripens and blesses the creatures, etc.

The ninth stage, 'stage of the Good Ones' (*sādhumatī*), 'of the prince imperial' (*yauvarājya*),† is produced by the enthusiasm of the Bodhisattva, who is not content with the 'tranquil deliverances' (*śāntavimokṣāsantuṣṭi*), and who acquires the knowledge called *pratisaṁvid* (cf. *paṭisambhidā*), especially all that concerns the teaching of the Law (*pratibhāna*, see *Lalita*, 35, 19).

The tenth stage, 'Cloud of the Law,' is called also the 'stage of Consecration' (*abhiṣekabhūmi*) or 'stage of the Arrival at the End' (*niṣṭhāgamanabhūmi*). The Bodhisattva becomes worthy of the royalty of the Law, which will make him equal, or almost equal, with the Buddhas. He realizes the last of the *samādhis* ('contemplations'), that of 'the excellent consecration in omniscience' (*sarvajñānaviśeṣābhiṣeka*). The Buddhas consecrate him.‡ He acquires innumerable 'deliverances,' 'magical formulas,' or 'contemplations' (*dhāraṇīs*), supernatural powers. He receives the excellent rain of the True Law, and, having himself become a 'cloud of the Law,' he is sending upon creatures the good rain which lays the dust of passions and causes the growth of the harvest of merits; he is still a Bodhisattva, and renders homage to the Buddhas, as we see in the *Lotus of the True Law*; but, to use the strong expression of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, he is a Bodhisattva who has become Tathāgata (*tathāgatās tathāgatabhūtāś cha bodhisattvāḥ . . . dharmam deśayanti*).

A word must be said in conclusion with regard to the stage of the Buddhas (*buddhabhūmi*) or 'the universal splendour' (*samantaprabhā*), or 'stage of non-appearance' (*nirābhāsa*°, *Laṅkāv.* 49), as opposed to the stages in which something is shown to the mind (*avabhāsa*°). It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the Buddhology of the Great Vehicle (see art. MAHĀYĀNA), but the question may be asked what is the difference between a Buddha and a Bodhisattva who has arrived at the end (*niṣṭhāgata*) We are assured that this difference is very great, but it is capable only of metaphorical expression. The knowledge of each of them is infinite in its aim and its methods, but the Buddha excels the Bodhisattva as a lamp of superlative brightness (*suviśuddha*) excels a bright lamp, as sight in broad daylight excels sight in semi-darkness, or even (and this seems to go further) as the newly-born child excels the embryo, etc. (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, III. vi.).

The *Madhyamakāvatāra* of Candrakīrti, the greatest Mādhyamika authority known to the present writer on this subject, gives a slightly different idea of the stages of the Bodhisattvas. Without claiming that the difference is a fundamental one—it is difficult to pass judgment upon such literature—we recapitulate here the information it contains, by way both of complement to, and of rectification of, the foregoing statement:

Chandrakīrti establishes an intimate connexion § between the *bhūmis* and the perfect virtues (*pāramitās*), which exist in all the 'stages,' but which assume predominance in turn.

(1) The Joyful stage (*pramuditā*) is the domain of charity (*dāna*)—charity, which, as we have seen, is not perfect until it is fertilized by knowledge of the void.

(2) The Immaculate stage (*vimalā*) is the domain of morality (*śīla*). The saint accumulates the 'ten good paths of action' infinitely pure—which is not the case in the preceding period. This purity consists especially in the absence of the conception of the ego. Belief in the ego, considering as real the abstention from murder, the person who abstains and the person who is not murdered, is the 'want of morality of those who practise morality.'

(3) In the Shining stage (*prabhākarī*) the Bodhisattva 'shines' by patience. Anger is the only evil that can in a moment destroy the merits accumulated during centuries. The saint acquires the four trances (*dhyāna*), the four 'immeasurables' (*apramāṇya*), and the five supernatural powers (*abhijñā*). He diminishes and reduces to nothing desire, hatred, and error, and triumphs over them in the world.

(4) The Radiant stage (*archiṣmatī*) is the domain of energy (*vīrya*) which helps towards the perfecting of good works, intellectual and moral, and especially towards application to the thirty-seven virtues connected with the Bodhi (*bodhipakṣikadharma*), and also the complete surrender of the idea of 'mine.'

(5) In the Invincible stage (*sudurjayā*) meditation or ecstasy (*samādhi*, *dhyāna*) predominates. The Bodhisattva, safe from demons, meditates on and understands the four noble truths (*ānulomikī kṣānti*), or, what comes to the same thing, relative truth and real truth (*saṁvṛti* and *paramārthasatya*) (see p. 751).

(6) The 'Turned towards' stage (*abhimukhī*), the domain in which *prajñā* (or knowledge) reigns, is thus named because the Bodhisattva, understanding 'dependent origination,' is turned towards the principles of the Perfect Buddhas. The *prajñā* predominates in him. He obtains the *nirodhasamāpatti* ('destruction-trance'), which was not possible before, on account of the non-predominance of the *prajñā* and the pre eminence of charity, etc. Who then may be taught the profound doctrine of dependent origination, *i.e.* vacuity (*śūnyatā*), which alone gives a meaning to all other teaching? Those who, though they are 'ordinary men,' show sincere and profound enthusiasm on hearing of vacuity. In them there dwells in germ the intelligence of the Perfect Buddhas, and the love, which they will develop for this teaching that satisfies the mind so well, will be a pledge and a reason for morality, charity, patience, etc. The teaching will be imparted by a Bodhisattva arrived at the first stage, the Joyful world, or, more correctly, the teacher, in his interpretation of the Scripture, will be governed by the exegesis of Nāgārjuna, a Bodhisattva in the first stage.

(7) In the Far-going stage (*dūraṅgamā*), together with the perpetual 'ecstasy of annihilation,' there prevails the perfection of skill in the means (i.e. *upāyakauśalapāramitā*),* these means leading towards (i.) the acquisition of the Bodhi, (*a*) compassion, (*b*) knowledge of the elements of existence, (*c*) desire for Bodhi, (*d*) non-surrender of existence, (*e*) immaculate sojourn in existence, (*f*) burning energy; and (ii.) the 'ripening' of creatures, (*a*) making their insignificant roots of merit bear great fruit, (*b*) implanting in them great roots of merit, (*c*) removing all obstacles to the law of the Buddha, (*d*) enabling them to enter the Great Vehicle, (*e*) causing them to ripen in the Great Vehicle, and (*f*) leading them to deliverance.

(8) In the Immovable stage (*achalā*) predominates the virtue of resolves (*praṇidhānapāramitā*).† The Bodhisattva is no longer in the world of becoming (*saṁsāra*), but, by virtue of his sovereignty over things (*praṇidhānavaśitā*), he appears in the universe in various aspects. His resolves are perfectly pure, that is to say, the resolves which he has formed during the course of his active career all bear their fruit, as if he were really acting.

(9) In the Sādhumatī the Bodhisattva is called 'good' (*sādhu*). Development of the *balapāramitā* takes place, *i.e.* of the ten powers of a Buddha.

(10) In the 'Cloud of the Law' there is *jñānapāramitā*, excellence and predominance of the knowledge of a Buddha.

The *Sūtrālaṅkāra* (xviii. 47, see also xx. 10 f.) gives the following scheme:

(1) *Adhimuktichāryābhūmi.—Saṁbhāra* (equipment, exertion, preparation) in order to enter a true *bhūmi*, to become a Bodhisattva.

(2) *Bhūmis* i.-vi.—*Saṁbhāra* towards *animittatva* (absence of particularized and eager attention), which is obtained in the

(3) viith *bhūmi*. There is *saṁbhāra* towards *anābhogatā* (absence of turning oneself), which is obtained in the

(4) viiith and ixth *bhūmis*. There is *saṁbhāra* towards *abhiṣeka* (consecration), which is obtained in the

(5) xth *bhūmi*. There is *saṁbhāra* to

(6) *Buddhabhūmi*, or *niṣṭhāgamana*, 'arriving at the goal.'

IV. SPIRITUAL LIFE OF THE BODHISATTVA, A FOLLOWER OF THE GREAT VEHICLE.—The question now presents itself: What is the connexion between the follower of the Great Vehicle who aspires to Buddhahood, but who is, properly speaking, only a future Bodhisattva residing in the *gotra* or *adhimuktichāryā bhūmi*, and the real Bodhisattva in possession of one of the ten stages, and to what extent does the former participate in the 'perfect virtues'? The disciple, however humble he may be, must apply himself to the double task of merit

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* Cf. the *adhikāriṇas* in *Vedānta*.

† And also *niyatachāryābhūmi*. *Yuvarāja*, 'heir-apparent associated with the reigning sovereign in the government' (Monier Williams).

‡ See vol. i. p. 96b. *Lalita* has *sarvajñajñānābhiṣeka*.

§ This connexion is pointed out in the *Daśabhūmaka*, but almost entirely neglected in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

* The description is borrowed from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

† See above, p. 743b, n. §.

and knowledge, in which are included all the virtues that make a Buddha. He participates directly and practically in the first seven 'stages,' being generous, moral, patient, energetic, meditative, studious of the doctrine, and skilled in the means to be employed in saving others. If the 'sovereignties' (*vaśitā*), the powers, and the knowledge of a Buddha are beyond his reach, he can always make a sort of imperfect imitation.

Śāntideva, a 7th century theologian, who is at the same time a writer of merit, has left a work entitled *Introduction to the Career of the Bodhi*, or *Introduction to the Practice of the Bodhisattvas*, in which, summing up some traditional doctrines and the speculations of his own time, he gives no place to ambitious theories, scholastic and mythological, regarding the 'stages.' Bodhisattvas in possession of stages, great Bodhisattvas (*bodhisattva mahāsattva* or *mahābodhisattva* or *daśabhūmīśvara bodhisattva*) intervene only as protecting and helpful saints. Grouped round the Buddha, they constitute the third 'jewel' (*ratna*), *i.e.* the Order (*saṅgha*) which, in the Little Vehicle, includes the whole of the monks. They are, therefore, closely associated with the Buddha and the Law, which are the first two 'jewels' in the formulas of homage and refuge. They fulfil an even more important part than the Buddha, being regarded as more merciful and more active. But, the more exalted they are, the less eager for the moment is the disciple to take his place beside them in the *bhūmis*. He is only a beginner (*ādikarmika*), subject to falls, uncertain of success, relying far more on the favour of the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas than on his own powers and merits.

1. Initiation or conception of the thought of Bodhi.—Every disciple of the Mahāyāna aspires, by charity, to become a Buddha. He has to take the vow of Bodhi and assume the obligations and rule of life of the future Buddhas (*bodhisattvasaṁvara*). As if to mark more clearly the difference between the two Vehicles, he is not obliged, as are the followers of the Little Vehicle who are candidates for arhat-ship (*śrāvakayāna*), to enter monastic life. Legend informs us that the future Śākyamuni was often called 'householder' (*gṛhapati*), and Śākyamuni was in fact married. But there are Bodhisattvas who leave home (*pravrajita*) and add to the obligations of the Bodhisattvas the obligations of monks. These constitute a rule (*vinaya*), framed after the pattern of the Vinayas of the Little Vehicle, and will be discussed in art. MAHĀYĀNA (*bodhisattvaprātimokṣa*). Monks are more fit than the laity to practise certain virtues, less fit to practise certain others. Consequently the entrance into religion will depend upon the temperament and the merit acquired by the disciple. He must in some way have the 'vocation' in order to have the right to become a monk.

The disciple (1) reflects, either by himself or under the direction of a teacher, on the advantages of the vow of Bodhi, (2) performs pious works with a view to purifying his soul, and (3) undertakes the vow of Bodhi.

(1) 'The sin accumulated in my former existences, accumulated in all creatures, is infinite and omnipotent. By what power can it be conquered if not by the thought of Bodhi, by the desire to become Buddha for the salvation of men? This totally disinterested desire is infinitely sacred. It covers a multitude of sins. It assures happiness during the round of existences. It is a pledge of the supreme happiness of the Buddhas for one's self and one's neighbour. All honour to the Buddhas whom everybody quite naturally loves, and who have as their sole aim the salvation of men!'

(2) 'I worship the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas in view of undertaking the vow of Bodhi (*vandanā*). Possessing nothing, by reason of my sins, how can I render unto them the worship (*pūjā*) which is their due? I beg them to accept this whole universe which I offer them in thought. But I am wrong, I do possess something, I give myself unreservedly, by pure affection, to the Buddhas and to their sons, the divine Bodhisattvas. I am their slave and, as such, have no more danger to fear. Of all dangers, the greatest is that which comes from my sins. I know how harmful these sins are, I deplore them, I acknowledge them (*pāpadeśanā*). I see and you see them as they are, pardon them!'

(3) 'But enough of myself. Let me belong entirely to the Buddhas and to creatures. I rejoice in the good actions which, among ordinary men, for a time prevent evil re-births. I rejoice in the deliverance gained by the arhats. I delight in the state of Buddha and Bodhisattva, possessed by the Protectors of the world (*puṇyānumodanā*). I entreat the Buddhas to preach the Law for the salvation of the world (*adhyeṣaṇā*). I entreat them to delay their entrance into nirvāṇa (*yāchanā*). All the merit acquired by my worship of the Buddhas, my taking of refuge, my confession of sins, etc., I apply to the good of creatures and to the attainment of the Bodhi. I wish to be bread for those who are hungry, drink for those who are thirsty (*pariṇāmanā*). I give myself, all that I am and shall be in my future existences, to creatures (*ātmabhāvapariṭyāga*). In the same dispositions as those in which the former Buddhas were when they undertook the vow of Bodhi, and just as they carried out the obligations of future Buddhas, practising in their order the perfect virtues, in these dispositions I conceive the thought of Bodhi for the salvation of the world, so also I shall practise in their order my obligations (*chittotpāda*, or vow, *praṇidhi*).'*

This, together with the necessary preliminaries, constitutes what is called the 'production of the thought' (*chittotpāda*, a shortened form of *bodhichittotpāda*). The *guru* solemnly declares, in presence of all the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, that N. . . . has produced the thought and taken the vow. Now the disciple is a beginner (*ādikarmika*), a neophyte, 'a seed of Buddha,' 'a young shoot of Buddha' (*buddhabīja*, *buddhāṅkura*). Of course the 'production of thought' in question belongs to the domain of the *adhimukticharyā* (see above, p. 745[b]), and is only an imitation or a reduction of the all-pure 'production of thought' which constitutes the so-called 'Joyous stage.'

The series of pious deeds (*bhadracharyā* = 'auspicious practice') just mentioned (from 'adoration,' *vandanā*, to 'prayer,' *yāchanā*) forms not only 'the introduction to the path of the Bodhisattvas,' the entrance into the Vehicle which leads to Buddhahood, but also a daily ritual (*vidhi*), the daily food of the spiritual life, and, to express it technically, the triple element (*triskandha*)† which must be set in motion three times a day and three times a night: (1) confession of sins, with its preliminaries of adoration and worship, (2) acquiescence or rejoicing in good, and (3) prayer with a view to securing the preaching of the Law and delaying the entrance of the saints into nirvāṇa. The application of merits (*pariṇāmanā*) and the vow (*praṇidhi*) complete the ritual of worship (*pūjāvidhi*) which is called 'supreme worship' (*anuttarapūjā*), and is termed quintuple, sextuple, or decuple, according to the elements into which it is broken up.

2. Protection, growth, and purification of the thought of Bodhi.—The disciple has undertaken the thought of Bodhi; he must not lose it, but he must purify and increase it by exercise. He must add the practice (*charyā*) to the vow (*praṇidhi*). There is therefore a double duty which may be traced to a single principle: (*a*) vigilance on the thought of Bodhi (*bodhichittāpramāda*), and (*b*)

* These formulas of Śāntideva (*Bodhicharyāvatāra*) are well known. They recur in a more or less changed or abridged form in the *Dharmasaṅgraha* (see p. 3, note), in the *Svayambhūpurāṇa*, p. 117 f. (with some alterations in a monotheistic direction; see ĀDIBUDDHA), in some Tantras, e.g. *Chaṇḍamahāroṣaṇa*, iv. 5, in Nepalese manuals and anthologies like the *Ādikarmapradīpa* and the *Kriyāsamuchchaya* (MS Dev. 110, fol. 35; Foucher, *Iconographie*, ii. 8; see Poussin, *Études et Matériaux*, 106 and 226; and, on the Chinese authorities, Chavannes, 'Les Inscriptions chinoises de Bodh-Gayā,' *RHR* xxxvi. 1).

In the *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 280 f., Śāntideva gives information about his authorities, the most important being the *Bhadracharyā*, 'propitious practice,' a work in Gāthā dialect, which exists in the original, in Tibetan, and in Chinese (Nanjio, 1142; translated A.D. 746–771), then the *Akṣayamatisūtra* (Nanjio, 74; trans. A.D. 265–316), the *Ratnamegha* (A.D. 503), etc. It would be useful to trace in the literature of the Little Vehicle, at least the commentaries of Buddhaghoṣa on the 'taking of refuge' (*Sumaṅgalavil.* p. 231 f.), the first allurements of the Bhadracharyā. Apart from the thought of becoming Buddha, we find there what forms the essence of our ritual, viz. the offering of oneself to the Buddhas (*attasaṁnyyātana*). As regards confession of sins, the part it plays in ancient Buddhism is well known. In art. KARMA will be found an account of the part it takes in the remission of sins, according to the doctrines of the Great Vehicle.

† There are several works entitled *Triskandhaka*, 'work on the three elements.' One of them is devoted to the present subject (see Nanjio, 1090, trans. A.D. 590, *Bodhicharyāv.* v. 98–99, *Śikṣās.* 290, 1; Takakusu, *I-Tsing*, p. 75, note). Another treats of morality, devotion, and wisdom (cf. *Itivuttaka*, § 59, *Kandj. Mdo*, xxiii. 17). It is difficult to identify *Mahāvyut.* 65, 59.

continued watchfulness over mind and body (*saṃprajanya*).

(*a*) The Bodhisattva has bound himself by a formal promise in presence of the Buddhas and of all creatures. If he breaks this promise, he will lose himself, or, if he is saved, it is solely through the goodness of the Buddhas. Tossed about by the power of sin and by the thought of Bodhi, dragged downwards by the one, exalted by the other, he will require a long period before attaining to a Bodhisattva stage. Now is the time when he must make an effort, must avail himself of his birth as man, privileged, as by a miracle, to hear the preaching of the Law (which takes place in this world only at long intervals), endued with faith (*śraddhā*) which makes him able to exercise himself in well-doing, and possessed of a 'day of health' to enable him to avoid incurable diseases, *i.e.* sin. For the hells retain their prey a long time. If any one falls into them, as one continues to sin there, it is a miracle if he ever escapes. It is necessary, therefore, to fear hell (*saṃvega*), to wage a desperate warfare with the passions, and to observe the rules (*śikṣā*) of morality.

(*b*) But how can he keep the rules, if he does not keep watch over his fictile thought? Thought, like an elephant in rut, must be bound to the post of the Law by the memory of the Law (*smṛti*) and constant and careful watching (*saṃprajanya*). And the benefit of this mastery, of this taming of thought 'which goes where it is wished, and stops when it is wished,' is two-fold: not only will faults against morality be avoided, but power will be obtained to practise the perfect virtues, which are only thought, beginning with charity: the desire to give outweighs everything, even when no gift is actually possible, etc.

The disciple, being master of his thought, will be able to practise the perfect virtues (*pāramitā*), that is to say, the first six. Śāntideva does not concern himself with the virtues of *pranidhāna*, *bala*, and *jñāna*, which belong actively only to the Bodhisattvas of the superior stages; his examination is restricted to generosity, morality, patience, energy, meditation, and knowledge.

The means or resource (*upāyakauśalya*) is nothing else than generosity, which aids the disciple to understand vacuity (*prajñā*), and the understanding of vacuity which helps him in the practice of giving, and enables him to conquer his passions. When he knows that nothing exists, he knows that sins are not sins. When he has the good of others in view, all sins are permissible (see *Śikṣās.*, 164, 16).

3. **Virtue of giving** (*dāna*) or compassion (*karuṇā*, *kṛpā*), or, if the term be preferred, of charity, is, as we have seen, the cardinal principle in the career of the Bodhisattva. If any one aspires to Buddhahood, and not to arhat-ship, it is because he thinks: 'My neighbour suffers his pain just as I suffer mine; why should I be anxious about myself, and not about him?'* The result is that the *dāna* whose highest expression is found in the 'production of the thought of Bodhi,' although it is the humblest of virtues,† is nevertheless the most important.‡

'The merciful man may commit sin, when, by the eye of knowledge, he perceives some advantage therein for his neighbour.' Not only ought meditation and the pious deeds of a meditative kind to be abandoned in order to practise charity; even the vow of chastity binding on monks, it is said, was violated by a certain Bodhisattva in his compassion for a woman. Compassion is therefore the great resource (*upāya*) in the sense that, every consideration whatever being laid aside, it saves the Bodhisattva from all dangers, and atones for all the faults of which he may be guilty.§ It is also the supreme means (*upāya*) of conciliating creatures (*saṅgrahavastu*), expressing itself in liberality, almsgiving, affability, and obligingness, and sharing the joy and the sorrow of others.‖ It is because he possesses this benevolence (*maitrī*), because he makes use of it to convert the creatures, that the Bodhisattva deserves to be called by that name (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I. viii.). But whatever the virtue of generosity may be, it must not stand in the way of its aim, must not be unreasonable or excessive (*atityāga*). It is especially after he has conquered a stage that the Bodhisattva is able to be useful to creatures, and his charities must not form an obstacle to his spiritual career, unless it be to help some Bodhisattva more capable of benefiting beings than he is himself. Moreover, there is a gradation among gifts: to give one's flesh is good, but to give spiritual food, to preach the Law (*dharmadāna*), is certainly better. It is not necessary to follow Śākyamuni's example and allow one's self to be devoured by a tigress, when safety (*abhayadāna*) can be otherwise won for men, and they may be ripened for Bodhi.*

4. **Morality or virtue** (*śīla*).—The essence of *śīla* is self-preservation (*ātmabhāvarakṣā*) for the sole purpose of benefiting creatures. Neither a *preta* nor one condemned to re-birth in hell can be of service to others. It is necessary, therefore, to make sure of good re-births, in order to undertake the career of a Bodhisattva. For this purpose, morality must be practised. It is no less necessary to avoid scandal. Every future Buddha, however great his sins, must be revered by men: if they despise him, as a fire covered with ashes, they run the risk of hell. By inquiring after the preachers of the Law, by never forsaking 'spiritual friends,' by keeping constant watch over the state of soul and body, he succeeds in avoiding all harmful actions (*anarthavivarjana*) and fruitless motion (*niṣphalaspandana*), and in preserving good deeds (*punyarakṣā*).

The Great Vehicle, however, distinguishes the virtue of abstention (*nivṛttiśīla*), which was the whole *śīla* of ancient Buddhism, from positive virtue (*pravṛtti°*); and it does not set apart the *pāramitās*, which have no practical existence the one without the other. The following account, which is offered as a specimen (according to *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I. ix.), ignoring a host of scholastic details, will give an idea of moral theology, as the Yogāchāras understood it. It will be noticed that all the 'perfect virtues' are examined according to the same subdivision.

i. What is morality or virtue (*śīlasvabhāva*)? Not to violate the rule. It has four elements: (1) shame (*apatrāpya*) with regard to others, (2) purity of intention and modesty (*hrī*) with regard to one's self, (3) reformation after transgression, and (4) regard for the Law (*ādara*), which keeps the Law ever present in the mind (*smṛti*).

ii. Morality in general (*sarvaśīla*) has two aspects: as regards householders (*gṛhipakṣagata*) and monks (*pravrajitapakṣagata*). It has three elements: (1) observance of the rules of life (*prātimokṣasaṃvara*), which apply to seven categories of persons, monks, nuns, catechumens (*śikṣamāṇa*), novices (*śrāmaṇera*), and the laity of both sexes; showing disregard for the pains and pleasures of the world, like a king undismayed by the loss of his kingdom (as a monk, the Bodhisattva does not take delight even in honours duly conferred on him; he loves solitude even in the midst of the clergy, is severe towards his own faults, lenient towards others, etc.); (2) accumulation of salutary principles (*kuśaladharmasaṅgraha*) with a view to enlightenment, devotion to study, reflexion and meditation, respect for the teacher, ministry to the sick, confession in presence of the Buddhas, the Bodhisattvas and the brethren (*sahadharmika*), patience, etc.; (3) morality applied to the conquest and consequently to the conversion of one's neighbour; association with neighbours in their good and useful undertakings, and in their troubles and sicknesses, giving them right teaching, advice, and exhortation concerning worldly and supernatural things, gratitude and requital for help received, deliverance from fear, soothing the pain that results from want of enjoyments, bestowing the necessaries of life on the destitute, gathering dis-

* See *Bodhicharyāv.* vii. 90 f.

† Because, in principle at least, it is tainted with error and passion. It presupposes the belief in the existence of the person who has pity, of the person to whom something is given, and, lastly, of alms (see above, p. 740[b]). It also includes emotion and desire. From another point of view, generosity does not save a man from hell, as morality does, but it 'qualifies' re-birth. A 'moral' miser will be re-born as a man, but as a man miserable indeed; a generous sinner will be re-born as an animal, but as a noble animal, as an infernal being, but in a special and tolerable hell, etc.

‡ Pity is the only virtue to which he must apply himself. The others will follow of themselves. See *Āryadharmasaṅgīti*, quoted *ad Bodhicharyāv.* ix. 76.

§ See the important texts cited in *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, 164, 8 f.

‖ See Kern, *Manual*, p. 67, and above, p. 741[a] and n. †.

* For some interesting details see *Bodhicharyāv.* v. 83–87. On the giving of flesh, cf. *Mahāvagga*, vi. 23, and Takakusu, *I-Tsing*, p. 198. The gift of the Bodhisattva is thus defined in *Abhidharmakośa*: *samyak sambodhyarthaṁ sarvasattvārthaṁ cha*, in opposition to the gift of gratitude, of hope, to the gift made with a view to heaven, to reputation, to the 'ornament of thought,' etc. On the legends of the charity of the Bodhisattva see *Jātakamālā*, ix. and *passim*.

ciples by generosity, etc., behaving according to the rules laid down (on drinking, etc.) when there is no trouble, compliance with the thoughts of men who need conversion (*chittānuvartanā*), having recourse when necessary to punishments, by mystical wonders giving them visions of hell, causing Vajrapāṇi or some other mighty Yakṣa to appear when some listener ventures to doubt his word, or showing portents, multiplying his personality, passing through walls, rocks, etc.

Casuistry offers some curious details, logically deduced from the definition of the Bodhisattva. There are certain acts, wicked in themselves (*prakṛtisāvadya*), which, committed with good intention by a Bodhisattva 'skilled in the means,' not only are not culpable, but are even highly meritorious. When he sees a robber given to murder, and not shrinking even from the murder of Śrāvakas or Bodhisattvas, the saint will kill him, thinking at the same time: 'It matters little if I am condemned to hell, but may this sinner avoid hell.' [In the same way, wicked kings may be dethroned; those who take the property of the Buddhist church or violate *stūpas* may be deprived of the fruit of their robberies, lest in their pride of possession they increase their sin still more. Directors also (*vaiyāpṛtyakara, ārāmika*) who waste the property of the Order must be set aside.] For the same reason unchastity is permissible when due to compassion, in order to prevent a woman conceiving hatred—but not in the case of a married woman; nor does this rule apply to monks. Similar exceptions are allowed on all the other commandments of morality.*

iii. Difficult virtue (*duṣkara*) is practised (1) when a man leaves high estate, sovereignty, or pleasures, to take the vows of a Bodhisattva; (2) when he is in poverty and distress, and yet takes them; and (3) when he practises such a high degree of watchfulness and care that he hardly ever commits even a small sin.

iv. All-round virtue (*sarvatomukha*). From this point of view morality is quadruple: (1) acquired (*samātta*), in so far as the vows taken are of three kinds (ii. 1-3); (2) natural (*prakṛtiº*), in virtue of which the Bodhisattva, by the very excellence of his character, acts purely in thought, word, and deed; (3) practised; the virtue practised in former births endows him with the power to resist evil and to love good; (4) associated with the expedients, *i.e.* with the four 'elements of popularity.'

v. Virtue of a good man (*satpuruṣaº*): (1) he is virtuous, (2) he inspires others with virtue, (3) he praises virtue, (4) he shows sympathy for those like-minded, (5) when he falls into sin he makes due restitution.

vi. Omni-form virtue (*sarvākāra*) is of thirteen classes, divided into two groups of six and seven respectively. (1) turned towards enlightenment, (2) clear through assuming all the precepts, (3) placed in sinless joy because free from the two extremes of luxury and asceticism, (4) perpetual, (5) firm, (6) possessed of virtue's ornament and itself the ornament of virtue; and (1) negative virtue (*nivṛttiº*) in abstaining from murder, etc., (2) positive (*pravṛtti*), by the accumulation of merits with a compassionate aim, (3) watchfulness in guarding both the negative and the positive, (4) 'ripening' the marks of a Great Man (*i.e.* of a Buddha), (5) reflexion (*adhichitta*), (6) fortunate re-births, (7) the welfare of others.

vii. Abstaining from all action hurtful to others, having regard to the principle, 'Do not to others what you would not have others do to you' (*vighātārthikaśīla*).

viii. Virtue as pleasant in this world as in the next. It includes four kinds of pure actions: (1) forbidding to men what ought to be forbidden them, (2) allowing what ought to be allowed, (3) gaining the sympathy of others, and (4) reproving them—the virtue of morality associated with generosity, patience, energy, contemplation, and knowledge.

ix. Purified virtue is ten-fold; it is especially 'well-taken,' for the monastic vow is taken in order to obtain the Bodhi and not to secure sustenance; it is attentive, surrounded by good aspirations (for there is no question of meriting heaven), orthodox (conforming to Buddhist rules), free from exaggeration, looseness, or asceticism, and leads to nirvāṇa. It confers various blessings, grace and acceptance by the Buddhas (*Buddhaiḥ samanvāhriyate*), death in serene joy, re-birth among Bodhisattvas equal or superior in merit, still more perfect morality in the future, etc.

5. **Patience** (*kṣānti*).—Patience is three-fold: endurance of suffering (*duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti*), of injuries (*parāpakāramarṣaṇaº*), of insight into the law (*dharmanidhyānaº*; cf. *Majjh.* ii. 175). This last heading (=*dharmeṣu samyakṣantīraṇaº*, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I. vi.) is divided in the books of the Great Vehicle into three stages: *ghoṣānugā, ānulomikī, anutpattikadharmākṣānti.*

The Pāli *Abhidharma* (*Vibhaṅga*, 325 and 328) shows (1) that *kṣānti*† is equivalent to *diṭṭhi* (*θεωρία*), *ruchi* ('pleasant adhesion'), *muti* ('understanding'); (2) that *dharmanidhyānakṣānti* is the same as [*satya*] *anulomikakṣānti*, that is, regarding all things as fragile, grievous, and insubstantial, in conformity with the four noble truths; and (3) that this *kṣānti* is produced either by teaching (which corresponds to the *ghoṣānugā kṣānti*), or by reflexion (which is, properly speaking, the *ānulomikī kṣānti* of the Skr. texts). There remains the *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*,* of which no trace is to be found in the Pāli *Abhidharma*, and which consists in supporting the view that 'things are not produced,' that they not only have no substantial reality, but that even their production by causes is only an illusion.†

The name of patience applied to 'insight into the law' is justified from a double point of view: (1) resistance and resignation of mind are necessary to the acceptance of the doctrine of the non-existence of things · those who do not 'uphold the profound teaching' (*gambhīradharmakṣānti*) are numerous; (2) this estimate of the reality of things is an essential element of patience in the ordinary sense.

Śāntideva, however, pays little heed to scholastic distinctions. He summarizes, in an eloquent but hardly systematic account, the reasons that justify patience from the philosophical point of view, and make it an essential element of the spiritual life.

Impatience or anger is the greatest of sins, especially for a Bodhisattva, who, by definition, is a 'being of goodness.' It destroys all merits. Even during the earthly life it causes great unhappiness. Anger must be destroyed, and the discontent, born of desire or of dislike, that nourishes it. What is the use of discontent?

Suffering is the common lot of men; there is plenty of occasion to get accustomed to it, and it loses, by custom, all its bitterness; it is very useful, as it arouses pious fear of sin, pity for sufferers, love for Buddhas who deliver from it, disgust for existence, both perishable and penible.

Anger, again, is not aroused by physical suffering, because we know that it is caused by the trouble of the bodily humours (cf. the medical theory of the Greeks). It is also foolish to be angry with men who injure us, for (1) they are acting merely under the influence of causes, and (2) in the first rank of these causes are the wicked deeds of our previous existences. 'My enemy takes a stick to beat me, and I have assumed this body, liable to be wounded, and destined to be beaten. Far from being angry with my enemy, I ought to consider him almost as beneficial as the Buddhas, for he affords me the opportunity of practising patience, and forgiveness of wrongs, which blots out my sins. Am I to make this principle of salvation the cause of my condemnation? Let us rather pity our enemies who ruin themselves by their anger, and let us think of means of saving them in spite of themselves, as the Buddhas do. As for anger provoked by slander, loss of property, etc., it is particularly absurd; so also is anger against the enemies of our religion, iconoclasts,' etc.‡

Envy requires special attention, for the envious man makes use of clever artifices to throw a veil of honesty over his selfish feelings. We must also get rid of the gross illusion that inspires the words, 'My enemy is an obstacle to my good works.' Is there a more meritorious work than patience? What does it matter if my enemy tries to injure me? He is none the less my benefactor. How can we have our sins pardoned by the Buddhas, how can we please the Buddhas, except by loving the creatures, and by doing good to our most cruel enemies? So long as creatures are suffering there is no joy for the compassionate Buddhas. They identify themselves with creatures. It is the Buddhas themselves who appear to us in human form.

6. **Energy** (*vīrya*).—The virtue of energy or 'effort for good' (*kuśalotsāha*) is necessary for the acquirement of merit and knowledge. Its enemies are (1) weakness (or incapacity of body or thought), (2) attachment to the pleasures of this world, and (3) discouragement (or want of resolution) and its result, self-contempt.

To conquer these enemies it is necessary (1) to meditate on the dangers to which we are exposed. 'I am in the

* See art. MAHĀYĀNA on the *Prātimokṣa* of the Bodhisattvas, which is entirely devoted to these regulations.

† It would be going beyond the limits of this article to detail the various *kṣāntis* in the path of the *srotaāpannas*, and of the *kṣāntis* regarded as high states of abstraction belonging to 'worldly' (*laukika*) meditation.

* See p. 744ª, n. ‖, and p. 747ᵇ.

† See artt. MĀDHYAMIKAS and MAHĀYĀNA.

‡ Cf. de Groot, *Code du Mahāyāna*, p. 109, which commands men to defend with arms the Buddhas, the Church, and the State; and preceding column.

power of the passions, like a fish in the hands of the fisherman, for I am in the net of re-births, threatened by death and by the guardians of the hells. Thou hast boarded this vessel, which is the human state; cross the river of suffering; thou fool, this is no time to sleep; when and at what cost wilt thou find this vessel again?' (2) To despise pleasures, which come to fruition in suffering, and to taste the excellent joy of good works. (3) To remember what Śākyamuni said: 'These supreme Buddhas, Śākyamuni, Dipaṅkara, etc., were insects, flies, and little worms; it was by exerting themselves that they acquired the illumination of a Buddha, so difficult to obtain.' 'Now I have already gained the human estate; the most difficult part is accomplished! The task of the Bodhisattvas is distressful, but the hells are far more distressful. After all, however, is it really distressful? The Buddha is a clever physician; by degrees he accustoms us to making the greatest sacrifices with ease, and besides "the future Buddha is free from all bodily pain, for he has cast sin aside, and he is free from sorrow, for he realizes the truth of the nothingness of the ego."* By his good works the Bodhisattva tastes ever-increasing joys, superior to those of the Buddha entering nirvāṇa. He arrives at nirvāṇa more quickly than the future arhats (*śrāvakas*)'†

To increase his 'energy' (*viryavardhana*) the Bodhisattva manœuvres his 'armies,' which are:

(1) Desire (*chhanda* or *śubhachhanda*), the root of all merit: 'What a sublime task I have undertaken in the destruction of all my vices, all the vices of the world, and the endowment of myself and my neighbour with every good quality! . . . Those whose works are all good are re-born in the Paradise of Amitābha.' (2) Pride (*māna*), (*a*) the pride of work, 'it is upon me that all difficult and mean works devolve; let every creature cast his burden of work upon me'; (*b*) pride against the passions: 'Son of the Lion of Conquerors, shall I be the slave of the passions (*upakleśa*)? The most humiliating and most exacting of the passions is pride'; (*c*) pride of power or endurance (*śakti*): the Bodhisattva is inaccessible to the passions (*saṅkleśa*).‡ (3) Joy (*rati*), by virtue of which, when he has finished one task, he plunges into another, like the elephant, under the midday sun, into the lake. 'He whose happiness is in action itself' seeks in action nothing but action. (4) Abandonment (*mukti*): he must measure his powers before undertaking a task, and stop when his powers fail. (5) Exclusive application (*tātparya*), especially in all that concerns the means of avoiding the blows of those clever adversaries, the passions. It is a duel, in which the Bodhisattva is armed with the memory of the law of Buddha. If he happens to get wounded (for what fight is without wounds?) he grieves, and reflects: 'What shall I do to prevent this occurring again?' (6) Self-mastery (*ātmavidheyatā*): 'Never does he forget the Buddha's sermon on attention (*apramāda*). He keeps his mind and his body alert and easily managed, so that he may be ready at any time and for any thing even before it is necessary to begin. As the seed of the cotton-plant obeys the wind, coming and going under its impulse, so, in body and thought, the Bodhisattva directs himself according to his will. It is thus that magical powers are obtained, and all happiness.'

7. **Contemplation (*samādhi*) or meditation (*dhyāna*).**—Contemplation or concentration of thought, which, as we shall see, is indispensable to merit and knowledge, presupposes the simultaneous action of two factors: isolation of the body (*kāyaviveka*), *i.e.* life in retirement; § and isolation of thought (*chittaviveka*), *i.e.* indifference to all worldly desires.

These are theories very favourable to literary development, and have always prevailed widely among Buddhists. Śāntideva deserves great praise for treating them with much eloquence, and especially for being satisfied with sixteen verses to describe the dangers and penalties of a worldly life 'in the midst of fools,' ten verses to exalt the life in the forest 'with the trees which are good naturally, and whose sympathies are easily gained'; but he requires thirty-eight to deter us from love, the source of so much shame and sin, which can be explained only by an aberration of mind, a sickly passion for impurity.

All the meditations here recommended to the Bodhisattva are merely the putting into action of the meditations on impurity (*aśubhabhāvanā*, *kāyasmṛtyupasthāna*), on cemeteries, etc., which belong to the Little Vehicle. But the Great Vehicle adds a note which is peculiar to it: 'What painful efforts have been needed from the beginning of time for this body, ordained to an inevitable re-death, so mean in comparison with the spiritual body of the Bodhisattvas, and doomed to tortures in hell! Not the millionth part of these efforts and sufferings are necessary to attain Buddhahood. The sufferings of those who are subject to desire are immeasurable and barren.'

The mind is therefore absorbed in contemplation, being detached (*vivikta*). It is able to penetrate the ideas to which it is about to be applied, and to be deeply penetrated by them. This is, properly speaking, *dhyāna* ('meditation,' 'ecstasy'). The Buddhists have constructed a very large number of systems of meditation, which all aim at leading to the possession of knowledge or wisdom (*prajñā*). None of them is foreign to the rule of the Bodhisattvas. By 'perfection of contemplation' may be meant (1) practice of the *dhyānas* and the *samāpattis* of ancient Buddhism; (2) study of the four truths, and of the two truths (relative and absolute); this is the theory of Chandrakīrti in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*; (3) meditation on impurity in order to destroy the vice of passion, on kindness to destroy hatred, on dependent origination to destroy error, or, further, on four 'subjects of mindful reflexion' (*smṛtyupasthāna*), or, in general, on all the doctrines of the *prajñā*, that is to say, which relate to the true nature of things.*

In the *Bodhicharyāvatāra* Śāntideva adopts the very original plan of subordinating the virtue of meditation to the active virtues of charity, humility, and patience. On this subject, usually so dry and wearisome to Europeans, he displays all the heat and emotion appropriate to a homily. There was, however, no better way of introduction into the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas. Although meditation on the nothingness of the ego, etc., seems to result, and in the Little Vehicle really does result, in apathy and nirvāṇa, by destroying the activity of the mind bent on the objects of knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), Śāntideva maintains that it begins by putting itself at the disposal of the active virtues which destroy passion (*kleśāvaraṇa*). The nothingness of the ego does not warrant us in remaining inactive; we find in it a reason for sacrificing ourselves for our neighbour. And soon, by a just compensation, this practice of abnegation, destructive of attachment and hatred (*rāga*, *dveṣa*), results, much more surely than selfish meditation pursued for its own sake, in purging the mind of error (*moha*); that is to say, since every idea, as such, is erroneous, abnegation 'purifies' the mind by emptying it (*moha=jñeyāvaraṇa*, *śuddha=śūnya*).

Śāntideva's plan is so 'orthodox,' and at the same time, so far as can be judged, so original, that it will be well to give a detailed analysis of this part of his book, in which there is much to be commended.

The disciple must practise (1) the *parātmasamatā*, the equality of self and neighbour; (2) the *parātmaparivartana*, the substitution of neighbour for self. Each includes a clear insight into the real nature of things, and, if the energy (*virya*) is strong enough to ensure their perfect practice, they include, in addition, all the merits of a Bodhisattva.

(1) *Parātmasamatā*, making no difference between self and neighbour, is the essence of the obligations of a future Buddha (*bodhisattvasaṁvara*). (*a*) As the body is composed of different parts united together so that the hand takes care to protect the foot, in the same way, in this manifold world of living beings, joy and sorrow are common to all. What joy means for me, it means the same for others. It is the same with suffering. I must do for others what I do for myself. I must destroy my neighbour's sorrow, just because it is sorrow like my own. I must serve my neighbour, because he is a living being as I am. (*b*) If any one should object, 'My neighbour's sorrow is his sorrow, not mine,' the reply is, 'What you call *your* sorrow is such only by an illusion; there is no permanent ego in you, but a series of intellectual phenomena (which series does not exist in itself, any more than a row of ants), or an aggregate of phenomena with no individual unit. There is

* Properly speaking, the saint is free from suffering only when he has attained the 'suppression of all attachment' (*vītarāgatva*). The consequences of sin make themselves felt in two ways: (1) grief (*vipākaphala*), which produces increase of compassion for others; (2) tendency to sin (*niṣyandaphala*), which is destroyed by patience (see *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 29, 10 and 50, 1).

† See MAHĀYĀNA.

‡ Pride, *māna*, *mananā*, *manyanā*, *abhimāna* (to believe wrongly that one is destined to Buddhahood, to rely on ascetic practices and despise others) is a capital sin, worse than murder, etc. Māra endeavours by all means to produce such delusion in the 'beginning' Bodhisattva (*achirayānasamprasthita*).

§ It must be borne in mind that the 'isolation of the body' is not the true 'isolation'; that solitary life involves many spiritual dangers, namely, pride, absence of 'spiritual friends' (*kalyāṇamitra*); that living in the village is more fit for the charitable Bodhisattva than the forest, the natural abode of the *Pratyekabuddha* (*Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, p. 391, 11).

* See Śāntideva, *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, xii–xiv.

therefore no existing being to whom we can attribute sorrow, of whom we can say "*his* sorrow," or who can say "*my* sorrow." Why then contend with suffering, if there is no sufferer? Because all the schools agree on this point. If it is necessary to contend with it, contend with it, whatever its nature; if it is not necessary, do not make distinction, and occupy yourself exclusively with your own. (c) But why undertake the painful duty of a future Buddha? This duty is not painful, but if it were, yet, should the suffering of one individual put an end to the suffering of several, it is a duty to undertake. It is for this reason that the future Buddhas, whose spirits are fortified in the 'equivalence of the self and the neighbour,' and for whom personal joy is nothing but sadness when their neighbours are suffering, plunge into the Avīchi hell to take the place of the condemned there. The deliverance of creatures causes the river of their thoughts to overflow into an ocean of joy. Their cup of happiness is full. Nirvāṇa, in comparison with this, is insipid. If, therefore, you do good to your neighbour, do not boast about it, or admire yourself, or expect a reward; you are only doing what is quite natural.

(2) *Parātmaparivartana.*—It is owing to the influence of false judgments, repeated during the course of existences, that we attach the illusory notion of self to this product of heterogeneous elements called the body. Why not rather consider our neighbour as our 'self,' and, as far as the body is concerned, regard it as foreign to ourselves? It is really very simple. The disciple treats his neighbour as people of the world treat their 'self'; he treats his 'self' as they are accustomed to treat their neighbours. Śāntideva develops this argument with real eloquence and sincere humility. He says: 'I shall regard myself as a stranger, and I shall find my real self first among the most humble. Then I shall practise pride, for the sake of others, and I shall envy without shortcoming or hesitation. How honoured, I shall say, is this self, and I am not; he is rich, praised, happy; I am poor, despised, unhappy; it is evidently because he is great in this world, and I am small, destitute of good qualities. But have I really no good qualities? If I have not, should not he toil to cure me of my vices? If he is unable to cure me, why does he despise me? Because of his excellent virtues? What matters it to me if he is holy only for his own sake? Has he compassion only for the unfortunates who are about to be overcome by evil destinies? And yet, in the pride of his virtues, he claims to excel among the saints.' In this way the Bodhisattva energetically voices the complaints of the sinful and wretched poor whom a monk is only too apt to despise; and, while excusing his neighbour, he eagerly seeks every occasion to humble himself. Thus our only enemy is our selfish 'ego'; 'Renounce, O my thought, the foolish hope that I have still a special interest in you. I have given you to my neighbour, thinking nothing of your sufferings. For if I were so foolish as not to give you over to the creatures, there is no doubt that you would deliver me to the demons, the guardians of hell. How often, indeed, have you not handed me over to those wretches, and for what long tortures! I remember your long enmity, and I crush you, O self, the slave of your own interests. If I really love myself, I must not love myself. If I wish to preserve myself, I must not preserve myself.'*

8. **Knowledge**, or *wisdom*, as it is usually called by Europeans (*prajñāpāramitā*),† is the supreme virtue. It is the application of the mind to the knowledge of the truth, to the knowledge of what is (*tattva*). By a direct effort it destroys false views concerning self and nature, and its complete possession is identical with nirvāṇa. Only Buddhas possess it at the state of fruit (*phalabhūtā*); Bodhisattvas cultivate its germ (*hetubhūtā prajñā, bījabhūtā*). As the *prajñā* of the Mahāyāna is strongly contrasted with the *prajñā* of the Little Vehicle, and as, on the other hand, it is differently understood by the two great Mahāyānist schools, it will be more conveniently examined in detail in artt. DEPENDENT ORIGINATION, MAHĀYĀNA, MĀDHYAMIKAS, VIJÑANAVĀDINS. For Bodhisattva in Pāli literature, see JĀTAKA.

* The *parātmasamatā* and the *parātmaparivartana*, which are practically no more than a translation of the doctrines of the *prajñā*, purify, according to the author referred to, the virtue of energy. They also purify generosity, morality, and patience.

† The definitions of the word *prajñāpāramitā* appear contradictory. The *prajñā*, being in a general way the exact knowledge of all things (*sarvadharmeṣu yathāvadvyavasthānajñāna*), is called *prajñāpāramitā* in so far as it bears on the real nature (*paramārthagrahaṇapravṛtta*), and *jñānapāramitā* in so far as it comprehends the world of appearances in its relative truth (*saṁvṛtigrahaṇa*). (See *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, III. iv.). [The Bodhisattvas acquire first *lokottara jñāna*, i.e. *prajñā* (which assures them of final nirvāṇa), then *laukika jñāna*, i.e. *jñāna* (which endows them with all the privileges of a Buddha in order to help fellow-beings); see *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, xiv. 42.] But our authors do not feel satisfied with this definition, and we find, *inter alia*, the following commentary: *prajñā* is (1) Buddhist philosophy (*adhyātmavidyā*), (2) dialectics (*hetuvidyā*), (3) medical art, (4) grammar, (5) technical arts (*śilpakarma*). (See *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I. xiv.)

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully throughout the article. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

BODOS.—1. Name and language.—The generic term 'Bodo' is now, for convenience, applied to all peoples speaking the Tibeto-Burman group of languages. Ethnologically, the true Bodo race exists, in a more or less pure state, all over Assam proper (the Brahmaputra Valley), in Koch Bihār and Northern Bengal, and in the valley of the Surmā river, now part of Eastern Bengal. It is probable that the low semi-Hinduized caste of Chandāls or Nāmasūdras (now recognized as Hindus) are in fact of Bodo origin; but this cannot be settled till further ethnographical inquiries have been made. In the plains the Bodos have become largely Hinduized, and have intermarried freely with Āhoms (*q.v.*) and other races. But even in the plains, and mingled with Hinduized neighbours, there are large communities of Bodo people, still speaking their Tibeto-Burman language and preserving the simple animistic superstitions of their race. Those of them who live among the Bengalis of North Bengal are by them styled 'Mech' or 'Mleccha,' that is, 'Welsh' or 'barbarian.' But the name has long lost its contemptuous signification, and is placidly accepted by the people themselves as their tribal title. Their Mongolian type of feature and dark-blue clothes, not less than their language and religion, mark them off from their white-clad Hindu neighbours. Adjoining them are the Koch, now mostly Hinduized, and justly proud that, in the person of H.H. the Mahārājā of Koch Bihār, they are ruled over by a dynasty which once conquered nearly the whole of the ancient kingdom of Prāgjyotiṣpur (see ASSAM). Beyond the Koch tribe, eastwards, come the true Bodos or 'plains Kachārīs' (as the English call them), who dwell in the *terai*, or submontane tract, under the hills of Bhutān, known as the Kachārī Dwārs or passes. It was from these people that B. H. Hodgson took the title of Bodo, for they call themselves Boṛo-nī-fisā, 'sons of Boṛo,'* or 'sons of the Man.' (It should be noticed that most of the aboriginal tribes of the N.E. frontier of India have no specific name for themselves. They are 'men.' Other races are Bengali-men, English-men, China-men, etc.) There are about 300,000 of these people still unabsorbed by Hinduism. Mixed with the true Bodos on the borders of Assam and Bengal are some 30,000 Rābhās, speaking a similar language, but holding themselves superior, apparently owing to a somewhat larger infusion of Western blood. These are a finer and stronger race, and at one time supplied recruits to the regiments formerly raised in Assam. In the central mountainous mass of Assam, between the Nāgās on the East and the Khāsis on the West, are about 16,000 people speaking a form of the Bodo language. This branch call themselves Dī-mā-sā.† They are now totally separated from the lowland Bodos; and Endle, the recognized authority, says that their speech now differs from that of the Boṛo-nī-fisā as widely as Italian differs from Spanish. This branch of the family once founded a powerful kingdom, first at Dimāpur in the Brahmaputra Valley, and, when driven thence

* The o in Boṛo is short, something like that in English 'hot,' or rather like that in 'dog.' The central ṛ is sometimes pronounced ḍ.

† The ancient appellation of the hills inhabited by the Dīmāsā in Sanskrit authors is *Hiḍimbā*; and it is probable that *Dimā* is the name of the former capital Dimā-pur and in Dīmāsā is derived from (Hi)ḍimbā. 'Kachār' is properly the name of this hilly region. The portion of the valley of the Surmā now called Kachār did not form part of the dominions of the Kachārī Rājā till the 17th cent., when it was acquired by him as the dowry of a Tippera princess whom he married.—C. J. Lyall.

by the invading Ahoms (see ASSAM), at Maibang in the centre of the Hills, and afterwards at Khāspur in what is now the British District of Kachār.*

In the district of Nowgong and the adjoining hills are some 3000 Hojais whose name is probably derived from the Bodo word Hā-jō (*i.e.* 'earth-high,' 'mountain'), and means 'hill-folk.' They are very similar to their neighbours the Lālangs, about 40,000 in number, on the southern slope of the Gāro hills; and in the adjacent parts of the plains district of Mymensingh are about 8000 Haijongs—another name evidently derived from the word Hā-jō. Finally, there are two great isolated highland groups of Bodo people in the hills respectively called after them—those known to us as the Gāros and Tipperas. The former now constitute the British District known as the Gāro Hills, while the Tipperas are inhabitants of a semi-independent mediatized State ruled over by a Hinduized dynasty which intermarries with the royal family of the similar State of Manipur, which lies between Eastern Bengal and Upper Burma. The Gāros are 150,000 and the Tipperas about 105,000 in number. In Upper Assam are a few communities, small in numbers, such as the Chutiyas, Morāns, etc., whose speech, so far as they have not adopted Hinduism and Assamese, is of the Bodo type, that is, an agglutinative language which has learned inflexion from contact with the Indo-European Assamese. The verb is still modified by agglutinated infixes, but in other respects the language resembles Western languages in having acquired even such linguistic luxuries as adverbs, relative clauses, and a (rarely used) passive voice.

2. **Origins.**—Of all these peoples and their origins there is no written record. They totally lack the historical instinct so characteristic of their Āhom conquerors. Their physical aspect renders it likely that they came from beyond the mountains to the N.E. of the Assam Valley. The Morāns, the most easterly branch of the race, and perhaps the latest settlers in Assam, have indeed a tradition that they came from Maingkaing in the Hukong Valley on the upper reaches of the Chindwin river.

The story goes that there once dwelt there three brothers named Moylāng, Morān, and Moyrān. Moylāng, the oldest, remained in Upper Burma; Moyrān, the youngest, migrated into Nepal, and was there lost; whilst Morān, the second brother, is said to have crossed the Pātkai pass, the route of many subsequent invasions, and to have settled on the Tiphuk or Diphuk river, where he became the ancestor of the tribe which bears his name.

Linguistic and ethnographical inquiries may some day trace some connexion between the Bodo-speaking peoples and one or other of the races in Upper Burma, but the link is still missing. It is certain, however, that some 2000 years ago or more, Bodo peoples must have covered the whole of the Assam Valley, the greater part of Northern Bengal, and the Surmā Valley. The most significant sign of their presence in this area is the Bodo element in the names of the rivers, such as Dikho, Diphlu, Dipru, Dibong, etc., also traceable in such names as the Tista, or Dista, near Darjiling, the Tiphuk in Upper Assam, and the Tipai, or Dipai, in Kachār. (The word *di* or *dūi* in Bodo means 'water' or 'river.') Those of them who settled in the rich, soft, malarious plains underwent the degeneration which seems to have been the fate of all settlers in Eastern India, and were conquered by successive invasions from East and West. Those who took refuge in the mountains, such as the Dīmāsā, Gāros, and Tipperas, became a scattered and half-savage race. The Gāros alone, so far as we know at present, adopted or carried with them the practices, common among the Nāgās, of internecine warfare and head-hunting. Under British rule, however (within the last forty years, that is), they have settled down to agriculture and commerce; and, owing to the efforts of American Baptist missionaries, a great part of the Gāro tribe is already converted to Christianity.

3. **Religion.**—There is but little that can be said of the religious ideas of the Bodos as a whole, except that they are of the animistic type. All the branches of the Bodo family follow a religion of fear, and are haunted by many gods or spirits, who have to be propitiated by offerings of food, etc. Within historical times the Chutiyas of Upper Assam were wont to offer human sacrifices at their famous copper-roofed temple at Sadiya; but this habit may have been due to imitation of the sacrificial habits of Śāktist Hindus. The majority of the Bodos of the plains are singularly mild and inoffensive people; and though they are much given to making offerings of fowls and goats to various deities, especially, it is significant to note, on the occasion of harvest and other festivals, these are apparently excuses for feasting and merrymaking, occasions on which there is much consumption of boiled pork and rice-beer. There are indications of a now decaying belief in totems, and among the Bodos of Northern Assam there are septs, for instance, calling themselves Mosā-ārūi, 'sons of the tiger,' who go into mourning for a whole day, fasting the while, if a tiger happens to be killed in their vicinity. So also there are those who belong to the clan of the sacred cactus, the Siju (the *Euphorbia*), and are proud to call themselves Siju-ārūi. And there are many others. There seems to be no belief in a supreme deity or creator. Among the Western Bodos, gods are freely borrowed from the Hindu pantheon, one of the most popular of these being Kuvēra, the god of wealth. The plains Bodos are a simple, agricultural, and far from avaricious race, and the extent to which Kuvēra figures in their folk-tales and legends is certainly curious.

The matriarchate is unknown, and the father is an extremely good-natured and easy-going head of a contented and simple family. The tribes are mostly endogamous, if the expression can be used of people who marry very much as European peasants do. There is no child-marriage, and pre-nuptial chastity is the rule rather than the exception. There are signs to show that marriage by capture was once the rule; but nowadays marriages are the result of an elopement, followed by the payment of a fine to the girl's relatives, or of a definite arrangement between the parents of the young people, which results in a present offered to the bride's parents, or else a term of service on the bridegroom's part in his father-in-law's house.

Running rivers and water-courses are held in high respect and honour; and the dead are either buried or cremated (if their relatives can afford the necessary fuel) near streams. A woman is laid on seven layers of fuel, and has seven such layers placed over her. A man has only five such layers. So, when a male child is born, the umbilical cord is severed with five cuts with five separate bamboo knives. A female child is separated from its mother by seven cuts. Not enough is known of the superstitions of the people to enable us to offer any explanation of these mystical numbers. Like other animistic peoples, the Bodos are great believers in amulets, divination, and omens; and though they have no professional priests, they employ wise women, who work themselves into a frenzy, and when in that state are able to tell what gods ought to be propitiated in order to ward off or heal pestilence or failure of crops.

There is a crude belief in a future life. When a body is buried, a reed or bamboo tube is led from

* The name Kachāri now generally given to the Bodos and Dimāsā by Hindus is derived from this kingdom of Kachār (see previous footnote).

the corpse's mouth to the outer air, so as to enable the spirit to breathe if he will, and the dead man's favourite food is placed for a time near his grave. Grown-up people will not touch these offerings, but children take them without scruple. Spirits, as in the case of many tribes in Eastern India, cannot cross water without help; and if a funeral party has to cross a river, a string is suspended across it to enable the spirit to follow the body or return if it desires to do so.

In short, the Bodos of the plains are a very simple and guileless race. They live on a soil which yields them rich reward for comparatively easy toil, and, as their wants are few, they lead a joyous and childish existence. Like other human children, they are occasionally given to fits of sulks, are very clannish, very obstinate, and somewhat suspicious of more intellectual and ingenious races. But they readily make friends with kindly and sympathetic Europeans; and, with the sole exception of the Gāros (now also rapidly coming under gentler influences), they have long ago lost the martial tendencies the race must once have possessed. They have much of the genial joviality of the Burmese, and are extremely addicted to feasts, junketings, and all manner of merrymaking. Their language has now been investigated with much thoroughness, but a systematic inquiry into their ethnographical position and their beliefs and customs still remains to be made.

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J. D. ANDERSON.

BODY.

Introductory (H. WHEELER ROBINSON), p. 755.
Buddhist (J. H. BATESON), p. 758.
Christian (J. C. LAMBERT), p. 760.
Egyptian (G. FOUCART), p. 763.
Greek and Roman (W. CAPELLE), p. 768.
Hebrew (I. ABRAHAMS), p. 772.
Hindu (J. JOLLY), p. 773.

BODY.—1. Primitive ideas.—Primitive ideas about the human body have an importance far greater than that which belongs to most other groups of anthropological data. They do not simply illustrate the attitude of the primitive thinker to the natural world and its invisible powers; they show us what he thought of himself. For the sharp distinction which modern thought, at least in its unreflective forms, is accustomed to draw between body and mind was quite foreign to his way of thinking. He did not think of body as the 'organ' of mind; his body was himself, possessing attributes of various kinds, which we have learnt to analyze into physical and mental groups, but which he learnt to class and explain from a different standpoint. All the mental states and physical activities of which he was conscious were part of himself, that is, the products of his body; even the soul, when it emerges as a distinct idea, is frequently identified with the breath or blood. This 'physiological psychology' is, of course, a special case of the general inability of the primitive thinker to reach abstractions, and of a general tendency to find concrete support for his thinking. But the tendency was developed and accentuated by that ignorance of anatomy and physiology which prevailed until the last few centuries. Not only primitive but ancient thought in general had no adequate knowledge of the nervous system and the psychical function of the brain; whilst ignorance of the function of the heart in the circulation of the blood (till 1628) made natural the ascription to it of such psychical attributes as its central and obviously important place might suggest. In fact, there can be few organs of the body which have not received at some time, and among some social group or other, credit for psychical activities.

The proof of these statements is cumulative, and can be gained only from the study of such collections of anthropological material as Tylor's *Primitive Culture* and Frazer's *Golden Bough* afford. Reference may be made, however, to the following groups of facts, as types of the evidence to be expected.

(1) *The custom of eating particular organs of animals, or of other men, in order that the special qualities supposed to be connected with these organs may pass into the eater.* Thus among certain African tribes: 'Whenever an enemy who has behaved with conspicuous bravery is killed, his liver, which is considered the seat of valour; his ears, which are supposed to be the seat of intelligence; the skin of his forehead, which is regarded as the seat of perseverance; his testicles, which are held to be the seat of strength; and other members, which are viewed as the seat of other virtues, are cut from his body and baked to cinders. The ashes are carefully kept in the horn of a bull, and, during the ceremonies observed at circumcision, are mixed with other ingredients into a kind of paste, which is administered by the tribal priest to the youths' (Frazer, *GB*[2] ii. 357, where a large number of similar cases is given).

(2) *The nature of certain ordeals and penalties, chosen in relation to the supposed hidden psychical qualities of certain parts of the body.* The history of witchcraft abounds in examples, but the field is much wider. Thus, Lady Anne Blunt reports concerning an Arab dispute as to the parentage of a child: 'The matter, as all such matters are in the desert, was referred to arbitration, and the mother's assertion was put to the test by a live coal being placed upon her tongue' (*A Pilgrimage to Nejd*, i. 10). A probable Biblical example is found in the jealousy ordeal of Nu 5, on which see Gray's 'Numbers' (in *ICC*), p. 48, for a note contributed by the present writer. As an example of the same principle applied to punishment, we may take Law 218 from the Code of Hammurabi: 'If the doctor has treated a gentleman for a severe wound with a lancet of bronze and has caused the gentleman to die, or has opened an abscess of the eye for a gentleman with the bronze lancet and has caused the loss of the gentleman's eye, one shall cut off his hands' (Johns' tr. p. 46). This is clearly not a case of *lex talionis*, or the doctor's eye would have been extracted; penalty is exacted from the hands whose inherent vice led them astray.

(3) *The physical qualifications for special offices and activities, especially when these consist in mutilations.* Thus, amongst certain tribes of Central Australia, the essential mark of the medicine-man is a perforation in his tongue, mysteriously caused in the ceremony of his initiation. If the hole closes up during his year of probation, he loses his professional status (Spencer-Gillen[3], pp. 523, 525). Since such perforation can serve no practical end, we must assume that the object is to set free, in some way deemed efficacious by primitive thought, the member which the medicine-man will need most for professional incantations. This is probably one out of many cases of mutilation which are to be explained as the partial dedication of certain organs to those invisible powers capable of resenting their use. Thus, circumcision admits of no explanation, *valid for primitive thought*, which does not apply to the closely related rite of sub-incision, both being connected with the period of puberty (*ib.* p. 251 f.); but both receive adequate explanation, *for primitive thought*, as a propitiatory preparation for the safe use of the organ. A parallel mutilation to that of the medicine-man is recorded by Howitt (p. 747): 'A mother amputates the little finger of the right hand of one of her female children as soon as it is born, in token of its appointment to the office of fisherwoman to the family.'

(4) *Beliefs of superstition and magic about particular organs.* One of the best known cases is that of the evil eye. How physical the influence was conceived to be is shown by the superstition reported as fact by Aristotle: 'When women look into a very clear mirror after their menstrual flow, the mirrors

surface becomes covered with a bloody cloud; and if the mirror is new the stain is hard to remove, but if it is old, the removal is easier' (*On Dreams*, p. 237 of Hammond's tr.). It is significant, also, for the present argument, that early medicine discusses the treatment of the separate parts of the body as though they were so many isolated units; see, for example, the Anglo-Saxon 'Leech-Book of Bald,' of which a summary is given by Payne (*English Medicine in the Anglo-Saxon Times*, p. 40). This corresponded to the popular idea of disease. Euting writes of present-day Bedawin: 'Every disease is located in a particular part of the body, and for every part of the body there is a special medicine, which the doctor requires only to take out of his chest and dispense. A special diagnosis of the disease, or the personal production of the patient, is not considered necessary' (*Tagbuch einer Reise in Inner-Arabien*). In this connexion should be named the well-known Babylonian belief in demonic influences, which is in accordance with the localization of psychical function in various physical organs (cf. also the theory of mutilations as outlined above). 'Almost every part of the body is threatened by an evil demon; the ashakku brings fever to the head, the namtar threatens the life with pestilence, the utukku affects the neck, the alu the breast, the ekimmu the hips, the gallu the hand, the rabissu the skin' (Jeremias, *Hölle und Paradies bei den Babyloniern*, p. 18).

Such illustrations, which might be multiplied to almost any extent, sufficiently prove the identity, for the primitive thinker, of the sciences we clearly distinguish as physiology and psychology. This confusion is of fundamental importance for the study of primitive and ancient ideas of personality, and is frequently neglected by those who undertake to interpret ancient thought, particularly by interpreters of the Old Testament. Its further examination belongs to the subject of ancient psychology. Here, we are concerned with the evolution of a distinct science of the body, and with its present problems for psychology and religion.

2. Evolution of physiology.—It is plain that a sound knowledge of anatomy was necessary before an accurate physiology could be reached; yet of this Sir William Turner remarks: 'Amidst the general obscurity in which the early history of anatomy is involved, only two leading facts may be admitted with certainty. The first is that previous to the time of Aristotle there was no accurate knowledge of anatomy; and the second, that all that was known was derived from the dissection of the lower animals only' (*EBr*[9], *s.v.* 'Anatomy'). The most notable name before Aristotle is that of Hippocrates (B.C. 460–377), who does not distinguish vein from artery, and nerve from sinew; 'he represents the brain as a gland, from which exudes a viscid fluid; that the heart is muscular and of pyramidal shape, and has two ventricles separated by a partition, the fountains of life—and two auricles, receptacles of air; that the lungs consist of five ash-coloured lobes, the substance of which is cellular and spongy, naturally dry, but refreshed by the air; and that the kidneys are glands, but possess an attractive faculty, by virtue of which the moisture of the drink is separated, and descends into the bladder. He distinguishes the bowels into colon and rectum' (*l.c.*). Aristotle (b. B.C. 384) has confused notions of the nerves, and, though he connects the blood-vessels with the heart, he has no idea of the circulation of the blood. He regards the brain as the organ of cooling (*On Sleep*, ch. iii.). 'The heart is at once the physiological and psychical centre of man. . . . To Aristotle the brain is merely a regulator for the temperature of the heart; the brain is bloodless and cool, and the blood and warm vapours from the heart rising to this are lowered in temperature' (*Psychology*, Hammond's tr., p. xxiv; for the reasons which led Aristotle astray, see Ogle, *On the Parts of Animals*, p. 168 n.). Galen (b. A.D. 130) is the first certain user of vivisection, and his writings are 'the common depository of the anatomical knowledge of the day' (an account of his physiology is given by Foster, *History of Physiology*, p. 12 f.). No work of great importance in physiology was done between Galen's time and the 16th cent., when the *Fabrica Humani Corporis* of Vesalius was 'the beginning not only of modern anatomy, but of modern physiology' (Foster, *op. cit.* p. 10, who traces the development of physiology through the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries). In the 19th cent. that knowledge of the nervous system was elaborated from which the problems of the modern psychologist take their rise.

3. Body and Mind.—The problem of the relation of body to mind is of fundamental importance to a large group of sciences. 'Since the dawn of modern philosophy in the *Meditations* of Descartes, the question of the relation of body and mind has been continuously under discussion' (Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. 4). The chief difference between ourselves and the primitive thinker is that we have narrowed the problem to the relation between the nervous system (more especially the cerebral cortex) and consciousness. The full discussion of this problem, however, belongs more properly to the articles on BRAIN AND MIND, MIND, and PSYCHOLOGY.

A summary review of the positions taken by some typical thinkers will serve to introduce the modern aspect of the problem. Descartes (1596–1650), starting from the existence of the self as the thinking thing, and arguing to the existence of body (in general) as the extended thing, maintained, though in marked contradiction to the general principles of his system and to his treatment of animal consciousness, the interaction of mind and body in man. He assigned their point of contact to the pineal gland—a small body about the size of a cherry-stone, which lies between the upper quadrigeminal bodies of the brain, and is connected with the optic thalami—since some such single organ seemed necessary in order to combine impressions from the double sense-organs (*Les Passions de l'âme*, art. xxxi. f.). Here, as the chief seat of the soul, he supposed mind to influence body, and body mind. Geulincx (1625–1669)—cf. Malebranche (1638–1715)—abandoned the theory of interaction for that of 'occasionalism,' which asserts that God causes the changes in the body corresponding with those in the mind, and *vice versa*. Leibniz (1646–1716) introduced the conception of 'pre-established harmony,' which rejects both interaction and occasionalism in favour of a Divinely created correspondence of mind and body, like that of two clocks keeping perfect time. Spinoza (1632–1677) made the problem more distinctly metaphysical by his treatment of thought and extension as simply different attributes of the one substance, God. This metaphysical monism asserts that 'mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived at one time under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension' (*Ethica*, pt. iii. prop. ii. Schol.). Hume (1711–1776) emphasized the mystery of the union of mind and body (*Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding*, vii. pt. i.), and argued against the alleged causality of mind in relation to body. Huxley (1825–1895) extended the hypothesis of Descartes as to animals into the realm of human consciousness. Whilst holding that 'all states of consciousness in us as in them are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain-substance,' he considered that 'in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism'; the consequence is that 'our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism' (*Collected Essays*, i. 244).

Huxley's theory forms one of the various modern solutions of the problem; but a theory which reduces

conscious experience (including activity) to a series of epiphenomena or 'by-products' is not adequate to explain that experience; whilst the denial of mental causality is founded on the unproved assumption that the universe is mechanical. This is shown most ably by Ward (*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Lects. xi. xii.), who in the same context discusses Clifford's 'mind-stuff' theory, and the Neo-Spinozism of the 'double-aspect' theory. The chief modern lines of explanation of the relation of mind and body are those of interactionism, automatism, and parallelism: 'interactionism, asserting that the causal influence runs in both directions—in sensation from the body to the mind, in volition from the mind to the body; automatism, maintaining that it runs in one direction only—always from the body to the mind; and parallelism, denying all causal influence and holding the relation to be of a different nature.'* It should be noted that psycho-physical parallelism is frequently a purely descriptive term, to denote the correlation of the phenomena of consciousness with physiological (nervous and cerebral) processes, together with the real distinction between the two series. In this sense, it is doubtless true to say that 'this is the most generally accepted view of the relation between mind and body at the present day' (Baldwin, ii. 258). The much larger metaphysical problem of the relation of mind and matter cannot be discussed on the narrow stage of the present article (see artt. on MIND and PHILOSOPHY). However completely we might show the dependence of consciousness on the mechanism of the cerebral cortex and the nervous system generally, there would remain the apparent fact that psychical and physical processes are disparate. We must not hastily assume that the laws of the one can be applied without question to the other. The principle of the conservation of energy, however important as a working formula in the physical sciences, has mathematical validity but not philosophical application. On the other hand, we are not at liberty to interpret the causality of mind as though it were the interference of a new *quasi*-physical force with the working of that particular part of the physical system which forms the human body. The problem is in miniature, therefore that of the relation of God to the universe, where we have also to reconcile the existence of natural law with real causality; its further consideration belongs to this larger arena. See, further, art. BODY AND MIND.

4. Problems for religion.—There remains to be noticed, however briefly, the group of problems, arising in connexion with the human body, for the student of religion, which receive fuller discussion in special articles. (1) The controversy as to man's place in nature (see art. ANTHROPOLOGY) is now chiefly of historical interest, so far, at least, as *the relation of man's body to the animal world* is concerned. The modern theologian is usually ready to accept the clear verdict of the scientist that, 'judged by his structure, Man is undoubtedly a vertebrate animal of the class Mammalia' (Duckworth, *Morphology and Anthropology*, p. 12). In exact zoological classification he forms the Family Hominidæ in the Sub-Order Anthropoidea in the Order Primates in the Section Eutheria of the Sub-Class Theria of the Class Mammalia. In point of structure, that is, his nearest relatives are the Gibbons, Orang-utans, Chimpanzees, and Gorillas. This does not mean that these animals actually belong to man's ancestry. 'It is practically certain that the modern Simiidæ did not themselves figure in the ancestry of Man, and that they are themselves specialized in a high degree, more specialized in many ways than the Hominidæ and more specialized than their own ancestors' (Duckworth, *op. cit.* p. 543). On Man, 'specialization of the cerebrum has conferred an altogether exceptional development of self-consciousness (*op. cit.* p. 545) . . . the future modification of the cerebrum will be largely dependent on its blood-supply, which in turn is related to the quality of the cardiac muscle and various physiological factors . . . on what may, in the widest sense, be termed hygienic conditions' (*op. cit.* p. 546). If we grant, however, this physical relationship of man with the lower animals, it seems hardly possible to deny the psychological. The close correlation of the extent to which brain and nerve are elaborated in them with the observed degree of their intelligence is found to continue upwards to man himself; if the series is more or less continuous on the anatomical and physiological side, it is natural to expect that the corresponding psychical series knows no hard and fast line. This expectation is confirmed by the study of comparative psychology: 'Throughout the range of the sense-experience, common to men and animals, their emotional states are of like nature with ours. . . . It is the framing of ideals, not merely as products of conceptual thought, but also as objects of appetence and desire ever beckoning him onwards and upwards towards their realization, that is distinctive of man as man' (Lloyd Morgan, *Introd. to Compar. Psychology*, pp. 365, 379). The practical bearing of this may be seen from the standpoint of biology. The balance of power between the activity of any organism and its control by the environment is continually altering in favour of the former. 'Increasingly we find the organism—be it bird or mammal or man—much more master of its fate, able to select its own environment in some measure, able to modify its surroundings as well as be modified by them' (J. A. Thomson, *Heredity*, p. 517). In the case of man, this fact has been strikingly expressed by a leading biologist, who calls him 'nature's insurgent son' (Ray Lankester, *The Kingdom of Man*, ch. i.). 'If we may for the purpose of analysis, as it were, extract man from the rest of Nature of which he is truly a product and part, then we may say that Man is Nature's rebel' (*op. cit.* p. 26). Such a conception of man, given, it should be noticed, from the purely scientific point of view, is an implicit recognition of the right of the psychologist and of the theologian to consider man apart from nature, and to claim for him that unique place in the universe which the higher religions, and especially Christianity, demand. We need hardly hesitate, then, to agree with what Huxley wrote in 1863:

> 'I have endeavoured to show that no absolute structural line of demarcation, wider than that between the animals which immediately succeed us in the scale, can be drawn between the animal world and ourselves; and I may add the expression of my belief that the attempt to draw a psychical distinction is equally futile, and that even the highest faculties of feeling and of intellect begin to germinate in lower forms of life' (*Man's Place in Nature*, ed. of 1894, p. 152).

(2) *The relation of the body to the conception of personality* obviously requires some re-statement in the light of the general acceptance of an evolutionary view of man. Hebrew thought in its earlier form was unable to conceive any continuance of personality apart from the body; even in the theology of the later Judaism the same idea survives in the characteristic insistence on the resurrection of the body as essential to life beyond death. Over against this stands the Platonic emphasis on the immortality of the soul, which assigns to the body a quite subordinate part. The attitude of St. Paul differs from both: while

* Strong, *Why the Mind has a Body*, p. 2 (an elaborate discussion of the problem from the standpoint of 'panpsychism'). In regard to the view that thought is a function of the brain, see below, 4 (2).

he conceives a body to be necessary to personality, he awaits deliverance from this present body in which sin and death reign, and the development of a spiritual or 'pneumatic' body, more suited to regenerated human personality (1 Co 15^{44}, 2 Co $5^{1ff.}$). In the early Christian Church, we gain light on the relation of 'soul' and body from the various doctrines as to the origin of the soul (see art. SOUL), viz. pre-existence (Origen), traducianism (Tertullian), which taught that the soul was begotten with the body, and creationism, which may be regarded as the final normal doctrine, holding that each soul was created by God at birth without any mediation. The second of these, viz. traducianism, has clearly the most contact with the conceptions of modern biology (though its naive distinction of soul and body is no longer possible). The subsequent nature of the individual man, physical and psychical, is now known to be conditioned by the chromosomes contributed by spermatozoon and ovum respectively in the process of fertilization. When we ask what this conditioning may imply, this genetic problem, like the purely psychological one noted above, brings us face to face with ultimate questions. It is useless to ask what the fertilized ovum may 'contain'; all we can say is that from this source, or through this channel, flows the whole life of man (see art. LIFE). The subsequent emergence of self-consciousness in the infant, with all that this implies, lifts the whole problem into a realm beyond the physical. This is the consideration with which we ought to approach the problem as it meets us in the outgoing of man's life. That his personality depends on the body for its present development and expression cannot carry with it any prejudice against the continuance of personality when the body has been resolved into its chemical elements—unless we have silently begged the whole question of the relation of mind and body. As James has urged so forcibly (*Human Immortality*, p. 24 f.), even though we say 'thought is a function of the brain,' it still remains open to us to maintain that the function is not productive, but permissive or transmissive; in other words, that consciousness finds an organ for its expression in the brain, and is limited rather than produced by its present physical conditions. In this connexion, it is attractive to follow St. Paul's line of thought, and to think of some other 'spiritual' body, which may express more adequately man's personality in that life beyond death, which the highest spiritual life here itself demands (see art. IMMORTALITY).

(3) *The conception of the human body in ethical thought and its treatment in practical morals* have given rise to a third important group of problems. It is easy for a dualistic conception of man's nature to carry the philosophic opposition of spirit and matter, soul and body, into the ethical sphere; so we may trace the transition from the Platonic view of the body as the prison-house of the soul* to Philo's conception of all matter as evil (cf. Pfleiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, iv. 5), and to the well-known dualism of the Gnostics and the Manichæans. Such a view is brought home to the practical consciousness of men by the fact that the most intense moral conflicts, especially at the threshold of manhood, are often those between the natural passions of the body and the higher claims of reason and conscience. An evolutionary view of man would explain this conflict as part of the process of man's upward development from a purely animal life; but a dualistic philosophy also provides an explanation. As a practical consequence we have the principle of asceticism (*q.v.*), prominent in Oriental religions generally, especially in Buddhism, though not belonging to Judaism, except in the peculiar and late developments of the Essenes and the Therapeutæ. In certain forms of Greek philosophy, notably Pythagoreanism, and the later Neo-Platonism, asceticism was made the condition of deeper philosophic and religious meditation. In Christianity, its special developments are connected with Monasticism (*q.v.*). For the general doctrinal view of the body in relation to evil, see BODY (Christian), 3 (*a*), and SIN. In contrast with these applications of dualism, it may be urged that the scientific view of the body is also the truest from a religious standpoint: 'Our body is an integral part of our human personality' (Illingworth, *Christian Character*, p. 146).

* In practice, Plato insists on the proper cultivation of the body 'for the sake of the soul' (*Rep.* bk. iii. 410).

LITERATURE.—*ANTHROPOLOGY*: see list under article of that name, which should itself be consulted in regard to man's place in nature. *PHYSIOLOGY* (early history of): Turner, art. 'Anatomy,' in *EBr*[9]; Foster, *History of Physiology* (Cambridge, 1901). *PSYCHOLOGY*: the relation of mind and body is discussed in most of the general literature of the subject (see list under art. PSYCHOLOGY), but the following in particular may be named: Bain, *Mind and Body* (1873, London); Huxley, *Animal Automatism* (1874, in *Collected Essays*, Eversley series, 1904, London); Le Conte, *Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought*[2], ch. iv. (1891, London); James, *Principles of Psychology*, chs. v. and vi. vol. i. (1891, London); Münsterberg, *Grundzuge der Psychologie* (1900, Leipzig); Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. ii. Lect. v. (1901, New York and London), Baldwin, art. 'Mind and Body,' in *Dict. of Philos. and Psychol.* vol. ii. (1902, New York and London); Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, ch. iii. (Eng. tr. by Manacorda, 1903, London); Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*[2], vol. ii. (1903, London); Strong, *Why the Mind has a Body* (1903, New York and London); Stout, *Manual of Psychology*[2], Introd. ch. iii. (1901, London); Calkins, *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy* (1907, New York and London).

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BODY (Buddhist).—The Buddhist attitude towards the body has been summed up as follows: (1) the body, whether of men or of higher beings, can never be the abode of anything but evil; (2) final deliverance from all bodily life, present and to come, is the greatest of all blessings, the highest of all boons, and the loftiest of all aims.[1]

The body is regarded as an 'impure thing and foul.' It is likened to a wound, a sore. It has to be borne about, but, because of its character, there must be no clinging to it. It is thus borne about 'for the sake of righteousness.'[2] The body is the 'old worn-out skin of a snake.'[3] It is a 'dressed-up lump, covered with wounds . . . wasted . . . full of sickness . . . a heap of corruption.'[4] All evil passions proceed from the body.[5] There is no pain like the body; hunger is the worst of diseases, the body the greatest of pains.[6] The weakness of the body is sometimes emphasized—it is fragile, like a jar; in death it will 'lie on the earth, despised, without understanding, like a useless log.'[7]

It is 'disgust' (*nibbidâ*) for the body that is the motive for *pabbajja*—that is, the 'going forth' from house life into religious life—and also for the layman to sit loose to the things of the world. Gautama was led to 'go forth' for this reason.[8] He used to consider with himself the facts of age, disease, etc., until he determined to escape them. A later amplification of the same idea is the story of Gautama's driving through the town, and seeing an old man, a sick man, and a corpse. According to Buddhist teaching, the object most calculated to produce this 'disgust' is the human body itself, living as well as dead. The *Vijaya Sutta* is 'a reflection on the worthlessness of the human body'; a follower of Buddha sees the body only as it really is, and consequently goes to

1 Monier Williams, *Buddhism*, 1889.
2 *Questions of King Milinda*, bk. iii. ch. 6, § 1 (*SBE* xxxv.).
3 *Sutta Nipâta*, 17 (*SBE* x.).
4 *Dhammapada*, ch. xi. p. 147 f. (*SBE* x.).
5 *Sutta Nipâta*, 269.
6 *Dhammapada*, ch. xv. p. 202 f.
7 *Ib.* ch. iii. p. 40 f.
8 Copleston, *Buddhism*, 1892, p. 133 *et passim*.

nirvāṇa.[1] The noble Yasa left his house because he saw the female musicians asleep—'one would think it was a cemetery one had fallen into.'[2] Mental exercise of this description is frequently given as a specimen of right meditation. The idea of a 'corpse eaten up by worms,' etc., is to be kept before the mind when a good point of meditation occurs.[3] Yet bodily deformity, physical infirmity, or a maimed limb disqualified for *pabbajja* ordination.[4]

The idea of 'disgust' with the body is set forth in Gautama's 'burning' fire-sermon, delivered on a hill, Gayāsīsa, near Gaya:

'Everything, O monks, is burning. The eye is burning; visible things are burning. The sensation produced by contact with visible things is burning—burning with the fire of lust (desire), enmity, and delusion, with birth, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, dejection, and despair. The ear is burning, sounds are burning; the nose is burning, odours are burning; the tongue is burning, tastes are burning; the body is burning, objects of sense are burning. The mind is burning, thoughts are burning. All are burning with the fire of passions and lusts. Observing this, O monks, a wise and noble disciple becomes weary of (or disgusted with) the eye, weary of visible things, weary of the ear, weary of sounds, weary of odours, weary of tastes, weary of the body, weary of the mind. Becoming weary, he frees himself from passions and lusts. When free he realizes that his object is accomplished, that he has lived a life of restraint and chastity, that re-birth is ended.'[5]

One of the difficulties in the way of right thinking, without which nirvāṇa cannot be attained, is lack of training in the 'management of the body,' which, with lust, ill-will, delusion, wrong-doing, and lack of training in conduct, or thought, or wisdom, causes the thinking powers to be brought into play with difficulty, or to act slowly.[6] It is the 'eye of flesh' which prevents perfect insight, and only by its removal can the desired end be obtained.[7]

The body is the sphere of suffering:

'Now, this, O Bhikkus, is the noble truth concerning suffering: birth is attended with pain, decay is painful, disease is painful, death is painful. Union with the unpleasant is painful, painful is separation from the pleasant, and any craving that is unsatisfied, that, too, is painful.'

It is also the body which is the origin of suffering. The 'noble truth' on this subject has been summed up by Professor Rhys Davids as 'the lust of the flesh, the lust of life, and the love of the present world.'[8]

According to the teaching of Buddha, suffering, subjectively, is desire, in all its varied forms. But desire originates from the body.

'Buddha said: "Passion and hatred have their origin from this (body); disgust, delight, and horror arise from this body; arising from this body, doubts vex the mind as boys vex a crow."[9] "For him whose greediness for name and form is wholly gone, O Brâhmana, for him there are no passions by which he might fall into the power of death."'[10]

Objectively, suffering lies in embodiment, or matter, and consequently the human body is looked upon as a contemptible thing.[11]

Complete release from suffering is possible only by emancipation from body and matter. Therefore the 'elements of existence' (*upadhî*) must be destroyed.

'Knowing the step (of the four truths), understanding the Dhamma, seeing clearly the abandonment of the passions, destroying all the elements of existence (*upadhi*), such an one will wander rightly in the world.'[12] 'The elements of existence (*upadhi*) are overcome by thee (Buddha).'[13] 'He who, being ignorant, creates *upadhi*, that fool again undergoes pain; therefore let not the wise man create *upadhi*, considering (that this is) the birth and origin of pain.'[14] 'Mettagû says: "I delight in these words of the great Isi; well expounded, O Gautama, is (by thee) freedom from *upadhi*."'[15]

Emancipation from bodily form is therefore the *summum bonum* of Buddhism, the ultimate goal of all aim and effort.

'Seeing others afflicted by the body, O Piṅgiya,' so said Bhagavat, '(seeing) heedless people suffer in their bodies, therefore, O Piṅgiya, shalt thou be heedful and leave the body behind, that thou mayest never come to exist again.'[1] 'Seeing men seized with desire, O Piṅgiya,' so said Bhagavat, 'tormented and overcome by decay, therefore thou, O Piṅgiya, shalt be heedful and leave desire behind, that thou mayest never come to exist again.'[2] 'As a flame blown about by violence of the wind, O Upasiva,' so said Bhagavat, 'goes out, cannot be reckoned (as existing), even so a Muni, delivered from name and body, disappears, and cannot be reckoned as existing.'[3] 'For him who has disappeared there is no form, O Upasiva,' so said Bhagavat, 'that by which they say he is, exists for him no longer; when all things (*dhamma*) have been cut off, all (kinds of) dispute are also cut off.'[4] 'By the noble the cessation of the existing body is regarded as pleasure.'[5] 'Through countless births have I wandered,' said Gautama, 'seeking but not discovering the maker of this my mortal dwelling-house, and still, again and again, have birth and life and pain returned. But now, at length, art thou discovered, thou builder of this house (of flesh). No longer shalt thou rear a house for me. Rafters and beams are shattered, and, with destruction of desire (*tanhâ*=thirst), deliverance from repeated life is gained at last.'[6]

Though the constant endeavour and ultimate hope of the Buddhist is to escape from corporeal existence, Gautama clearly teaches that the body is to be cared for. Desire for the pleasures, and the formation of good habits, which minister to the real self, are inculcated; and pursuit and conduct which contribute to this end are to be cultivated.

(1) Suicide is forbidden;[7] food is to be used in moderation;[8] the use of intoxicating liquors is prohibited;[9] no wrong has to be done with the body;[10] health is the greatest of gifts;[11] food is to be enjoyed;[12] the eating of flesh is no defilement;[13] every bodily act has to be carefully watched over, words measured, manner gentle, thought collected, rejoicing in heart.[14]

(2) Stress is continually laid upon self-control; the 'forest of lust' has to be cut down;[15] bodily anger and sins of the body have to be forsaken;[16] sensual pleasures must not be clung to;[17] they who 'suffer loss' are they who are fond of society, the lazy;[18] sloth is 'the taint of the body';[19] earnestness is the path of immortality;[20] sins of the body will work out their bitter fruit even in this life.[21]

(3) No living thing is to be killed; weapons and sticks must be laid down; no hurt is to be done to another;[22] neither the feeble nor any other being is to be despised;[23] there must not even be the wish to harm another;[24] the great law of love must influence the Buddhist in every relationship of life.[25] Even *pabbajja* is prohibited unless the permission of father and mother is obtained, for 'the love for a son cuts into the skin; having cut into the skin, it cuts into the hide; having cut into the hide, it cuts into the flesh; having cut into the flesh, it cuts into the ligaments, having cut into the ligaments, it cuts into the bones; having cut into the bones, it reaches the marrow, and abides in the marrow.'[26]

In the *Sutta Nipâta*, the *Âmagandha Sutta* contains an account of what defiles a man. It bears comparison with Mt 15[11, 17-20]. It is not the eating of flesh which defiles, but destroying living beings, stealing, falsehood, worthless reading, adultery, unrestrained enjoyment of sensual pleasures, mercilessness, illiberality, intimacy with the un-

1 *Sutta Nipâta*, ii.; *Vijaya Sutta*, p. 32 (*SBE* x.).
2 *Mahâvagga*, i. 7. 2 (*SBE* xiii. 103).
3 *Angut.* iv. 14 *et passim*.
4 *Mahâvagga*, i. 71 (*SBE* xiii. 224 f.).
5 *Ib.* i. 21.
6 *Questions of King Milinda*, iv. 1. 20.
7 *Ib.* iv. 1. 48.
8 *Dhamma-Kakka-ppavattana-Sutta*, § 5 (*SBE*, vol. xi. p. 148).
9 *Sutta Nipâta*, p. 270.
10 *Ib.* p. 1099.
11 *Vijaya Sutta*, p. 32.
12 *Sutta Nipâta*, p. 373.
13 *Ib.* p. 546.
14 *Ib.* p. 1050.
15 *Ib.* p. 1056.

1 *Sutta Nipâta*, p. 1120.
2 *Ib.* p. 1122.
3 *Ib.* p. 1073.
4 *Ib.* p. 1075.
5 *Ib.* p. 761.
6 *Dhammapada*, ch. xi. p. 153 f.
7 *Questions of King Milinda*, iv. 4. 13.
8 *Dhammapada*, i. 8.
9 *Ib.* xviii. 247; *Sutta Nipâta*, pp. 244, 263.
10 *Dhammapada*, xx. 281.
11 *Ib.* xv. 204.
12 *Sutta Nipâta*, pp. 238-251.
13 *Ib.* p. 241.
14 *Questions of King Milinda*, iv. 1. 2.
15 *Dhammapada*, xx. 283.
16 *Ib.* 231.
17 *Sutta Nipâta*, p. 175.
18 *Ib.* pp. 90-114.
19 *Dhammapada*, xviii. 241.
20 *Ib.* ii. 21.
21 *Questions of King Milinda*, ii. 1. 1.
22 *Sutta Nipâta*, p. 393; *Questions of King Milinda*, iv. 3. 35.
23 *Sutta Nipâta*, 145-7.
24 *Ib.* p. 147.
25 *Questions of King Milinda*, iv. 4. 16.
26 *Mahâvagga*, i. 54-5 (*SBE* xiii. 210).

just, etc. If this long category of sins against the body, and against others, characterizes the life,

'neither the flesh of fish, nor fasting, nor nakedness, nor tonsure, nor matted hair, nor dirt, nor rough skins, nor the worshipping of fire, nor the many penances in the world, nor hymns, nor oblations, nor sacrifice, nor observance of seasons, purify a mortal who has not overcome desire.'*

LITERATURE.—See the references in the footnotes.

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BODY (Christian).—**1. The New Testament generally.**—The New Testament ideas on the subject of the body are rooted firmly in the soil of Old Testament teaching (see Gn 2^7, Ps 63^1, Ezk $44^{7.9}$, Mic 6^7). From the minds of the writers anything like a dualistic antithesis, such as we find in Greek philosophy, between body and soul, matter and spirit, is far removed. As in the older Scriptures, the unity of the human personality is the fundamental feature in the conception of man. At the same time this unity is recognized as resting upon an underlying duality; man is conceived of as a complex being with a lower and a higher part, by one of which he is linked to the life of nature, and by the other to the Spirit of God.

In the Hebrew psychology 'flesh' (בָּשָׂר) was the prevailing name for man's earthly part, and 'spirit' (רוּחַ) for his heavenly part, while 'soul' (נֶפֶשׁ) was the union of the two in the living creature (see esp. Gn 2^7). There was no proper Heb. term for 'body,' precisely because the Hebrews, with their psycho-physical ideas of personality, did not feel the need for a special word to denote the bodily organism considered by itself. When we come to the NT we find a somewhat different order of terminology, which has come in through familiarity with the LXX version, and is thus indirectly due to Greek influences. 'Soul' (ψυχή) and 'spirit' (πνεῦμα) are now frequently used in senses that can hardly be distinguished, to express the whole inward or spiritual nature (*e.g.* Lk $1^{46\,47}$, Ph 1^{27} (RV)). The term 'body' (σῶμα), again, has now come into general use, and is employed in connexions which make it practically synonymous with 'flesh' (σάρξ; cf. 1 Co 5^3 with Col 2^5, 2 Co 4^{10} with v.11). But, even so, body and soul, flesh and spirit, are not used in the sharply antithetic fashion of the Greek philosophic dualism. If the terms are Greek, the ideas are still Hebrew. In the NT a soul ordinarily means an embodied soul, and a living body is always conceived of as an ensouled body. The emphasis within the idea of personality, it is true, now falls more emphatically on the inner and spiritual side; existence, and even a blessed existence, is consistent with separation from the body—St. Paul thinks of an absence from the body which is yet a presence with the Lord (2 Co 5^8). But the old Hebrew view of the essentiality of the body to human nature in its completeness is asserted afresh in the doctrine of the resurrection, which had become familiar to later Jewish thought, and asserted now more emphatically than before, through being carried over from the present world of things seen and temporal into the unseen and eternal realities of the world to come.

2. Christ and the Gospels.—When we descend to particulars, it may be said that there are two great lines of evidence which are of paramount importance for the NT doctrine of the body. The first comes from Christ and the Gospels. And here, as everywhere in the NT, the evidence points in two directions, one part of it serving to exalt more than heretofore the worth and dignity of man's physical nature, the other to show the subordination of that nature to the claims and uses of his spiritual being.

(1) In the first place, we find in the revelation of Christ and in the records of His teaching *a wonderful exaltation of the body*.—(*a*) The fundamental fact here is found in the Incarnation itself, in the Word made flesh (Jn 1^{14}), in the Son of God becoming the man Christ Jesus (Mt 11^{27} etc.). In the OT the flesh is dignified as being brought into a living unity with the spirit, the dust of the earth with the breath of life that comes from God (Gn 2^7). In the NT the flesh is raised to a dignity unspeakably higher, by the habitation in it and incorporation with it of the very Word of life (1 Jn $1^{1.2}$).—(*b*) The sinless life of Jesus is another illuminating truth. For this life without fault or stain, lived in the body, disposes at once and utterly of any idea that there is something essentially evil and degrading in the possession of a physical nature as such. It shows that body is not hostile to spirit, but that, on the contrary, the two may be joined together in a solidarity so true and harmonious as to become a perfect instrument for doing God's will upon earth.—(*c*) Very significant, too, is the fact of Christ's joy in living, and His freedom from that ascetic temper which is nothing else than dualism in one of its practical forms. He 'came eating and drinking,' and was so far removed from a false spiritualism, with its one-sided otherworldliness, that His enemies even accused Him of sensuality (Mt 11^{19}). He loved the scenes and shows of nature as they spread themselves before His eyes, and, so far from treating them, like some good men, as cunning traps for the unwary soul, saw in them tokens of God's presence and foreshadowings of the things of the Kingdom of heaven (Mt $6^{26ff.}$ 13 etc.).—(*d*) Parallel with this was His constant recognition in other men of the value and claims of the physical nature. He never sought to ignore or disparage what belongs to man's natural life; He came, as we read in the Fourth Gospel, not to kill or steal or destroy, but that we might have life, and might have it abundantly (Jn 10^{10}). The works of healing, which formed so large an element in His public ministry, are the standing proof of this attitude of Jesus to the physical life of man. Here, too, must be considered—as contradicting ideas which afterwards took possession of the mind of the Church—His vindication of marriage as forming a part of the Divinely appointed order of human society (Mt $19^{4ff.}$; cf. Jn $2^{1ff.}$); and further, as flowing from His approval of marriage and parenthood, His loving recognition of little children, and the place He assigned to them in the Kingdom of God (Mt $18^{1ff.}$ $19^{13ff.}$).—(*e*) The resurrection of Jesus Christ and His ascension to glory are the culminating proofs offered by the NT of the value and dignity of the human body. He not only partook on earth of our human frame, but, when He re-appeared on the further side of death, resumed a life of physical conditions (Mt 28^9 etc.), and carried the human body with Him to the right hand of God (Lk 24^{51}, Ac 1^9). For the Christian doctrine of the body this is the truth of highest significance—making the doctrine one that applies to both worlds—that, as on earth so also in heaven, as in His humiliation so also in His exaltation, Jesus Christ continues to live the life of the body as well as the life of the spirit.

(2) But, side by side with this exaltation of the body, the evidence which comes to us from Christ and the Gospels points always to (*a*) *the subordination of the body to the soul*. Although by word and deed, by the facts of His history and the very constitution of His Person, Christ asserted the worth of man's physical nature, it was a fundamental part of His teaching that what is highest in our personality must be sought in the inner nature, and that the body must be kept in a due subjection to the authority of the spirit. 'Fear not them,' He said, 'which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul' (Mt 10^{28}; cf. Lk 12^4). And in some of His most solemn utterances He taught that the outward world, which makes so strong an appeal to our physical senses, is worth nothing whatever in comparison with those spiritual interests and possessions on which our truest life depends (Mt 16^{26}, Mk $8^{36f.}$, Lk 12^{15-21}). He was no teacher of asceticism, as has been said, but He declared, nevertheless, that God's Kingdom and righteousness were the first things which His disciples must seek (Mt 6^{33}), and that those who are engaged in this high quest may sometimes find it needful to pluck out the right eye or to cut off the right hand ($5^{29f.}$). And whatever further meaning lies enfolded in His agony in Gethsemane and His death upon the cross, they were at all events an affirmation

* *Sutta Nipâta*, pp. 288–248.

for all time of the truth that the life of the body must be freely yielded up whenever this becomes necessary to the fulfilment of the Divine purpose, and that the spirit must be willing even though the flesh is weak (Mt 26[39ff.]).—(*b*) Again, the evidence points to *the provisional character of the earthly body*. Christ sanctioned marriage, as we have seen, and declared it to be an ordinance of God's appointment; but when the Sadducees endeavoured to discredit the doctrine of the resurrection of the body by pointing out a perplexing situation to which it might lead under the Jewish marriage law, He declared that, 'when they shall rise from the dead, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as angels in heaven' (Mk 12[25]). Clearly this was an announcement of a resurrection life very different from the present life in flesh and blood. It implies the possession of a body more spiritualized than the present one, and adapted to conditions far removed from those of our earthly life. And what was thus foreshadowed by Christ's words was ocularly proved to His disciples by His post-resurrection appearances. It was the same body they had laid in the tomb which now presented itself to them in living form, so that they could not fail to recognize their Lord (Ac 1[3] 2[32]). And yet it was a different body—freed from the familiar earthly limitations and possessed of new and higher capacities and powers (Lk 24[31. 36. 51], Jn 20[26]). The spiritual had so interpenetrated the natural and subdued it to its own uses, that the natural body of Jesus had become a spiritual body. The invisible world was now its proper home, and it was only when He chose to 'materialize' Himself (as a student of psychical research would say), to 'manifest Himself' (as the author of the Fourth Gospel expresses it, Jn 21[1. 14]), that His disciples were able to perceive Him by their natural senses. It was in this spiritual body that the risen Christ ascended to His Father. And it is this spiritual body of the risen and ascended Christ that becomes for His disciples the type of that glorious body which, in their case also, is to take the place of the present body of humiliation (Ph 3[21]).

3. The Pauline anthropology.—The second great line of evidence comes from the Pauline anthropology. It is here that we find the great bulk of the direct NT teaching on which the Christian doctrine of the body is based. Now, in regard to St. Paul it has often been assumed that his anthropological ideas were determined by Hellenistic influences, and that he sets up a hard dualism between matter and spirit, between body and soul (cf. Holtzmann, *NT Theol.* ii. 14 f.). But so far is this from being a correct statement of his position, that it might rather be affirmed that the Apostle is nowhere more closely in line with the OT psychology than in his teaching on this very subject. For him, too, as for the other writers of the NT, human nature is not an irreconcilable antithesis of matter and spirit, but a psycho-physical unity of soul and body, in which, however, the body, as the part that links man to nature, takes a lower position than the soul or spirit, by which he comes into relation with heaven and God. St. Paul's doctrine will become apparent if we consider his utterances on the relation of the body to sin, to death, to holiness, and to the future life.

(*a*) *The body and sin.*—It is at this point that the argument for a positive dualism in the Pauline teaching, due to Greek influences, appears most plausible. There can be no question that the Apostle often speaks of the body and its members, not only as instruments of sin, but as a seat and fortress of its power (*e.g.* Ro 6[12. 19] 7[5. 23f.])—a way of speaking, however, which is neither Greek nor dualistic, but has its roots in OT teaching, and is the direct result of an acute ethical experience. But it has been further alleged that St. Paul recognizes in the body the very source and principle of sin (Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, 53 ff.). The argument depends on the interpretation given to the word 'flesh' (σάρξ) in those passages where the Apostle, passing beyond the ordinary non-ethical use of the word (Ro 2[28], 2 Co 4[11]), employs it in an ethical sense in contrast with 'spirit' (πνεῦμα). According to this argument, σάρξ in such cases simply denotes the physical or sensuous part of man, in which St. Paul finds a substance utterly antagonistic to the life of the spirit, and one whose working makes sin inevitable. But the objections to this view are overwhelming. When St. Paul in Gal 5[19ff.] gives a category of the 'works of the flesh,' the majority of the sins he enumerates—for instance, idolatry, hatred, heresies, envying—are spiritual, not physical or animal, in their nature. When he charges the Corinthians with being 'carnal' (σαρκικοί, 1 Co 3[3]), it is not sensuality that he is condemning, but 'jealousy and strife.' His doctrine with regard to the sanctification of the body, as a member of Christ and the temple of the Holy Ghost (6[15. 19]), would have been impossible if he had regarded the principle of sin as lying in man's corporeal nature; and equally impossible his belief in the absolute sinlessness (2 Co 5[21]) of one who was born of a woman (Gal 4[4]). Nor could he have given so high and constant a place, in his doctrine of the future life, to the hope of the resurrection, if he had conceived of the body as the *fons et origo* of evil in man. He would rather have been driven to long for its utter dissolution, and to centre his hopes for the eternal future in a bare doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

The Pauline antithesis of flesh and spirit, then, cannot be interpreted as amounting to a dualistic opposition between man's body and his soul, his material and his immaterial elements. Here, as everywhere else in Scripture, the real antithesis is between the earthly and the heavenly, the natural and the supernatural. The Apostle uses 'flesh' to denote man's sinful nature generally; and his reason for doing so, doubtless, lies in the fact that by the law of ordinary generation it is through his flesh that the individual is linked on to the life of a fallen and sinful race, and so comes to inherit a corrupt nature. St. Paul's teaching at this point is in line with the great saying of Jn 3[6], 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit' (cf. Laidlaw, *Bible Doctrine of Man*, 119). St. Paul's 'carnal' man is the same as his 'natural' man who receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, and is thus distinguished from the 'spiritual' man in whom a supernatural and Divine principle has begun to operate (1 Co 2[13ff.]; cf. 3[1. 3]).

But while St. Paul does not find in the body the very principle of sin, he does regard it as in a special sense the lurking-place and instrument of evil. When he speaks of the old man being crucified with Christ that 'the body of sin' might be done away (Ro 6[6]), when he longs for deliverance from the 'body of death' (7[24]), when he refers to 'the law in our members' which wars against 'the law of our mind' (v.[23]), it seems evident that he recognizes an abnormal development of the sensuous in fallen man, and regards sin as having in a special manner entrenched itself in the body, which becomes liable to death on this very account (Ro 6[23] 7[24]), and throughout man's earthly life is a constant source of weakness and liability to fall. Hence his determination to buffet his body and bring it into subjection (1 Co 9[27]); his summons to Christ's people to mortify the deeds of the body (Ro 8[13]; cf. Col

3[5]); his appeal to them not to allow sin to reign in their mortal bodies, but to present their members as instruments of righteousness unto God (Ro 6[12ff.]).

(*b*) *The body and death.*—It is in accordance with those dualistic conceptions which by and by entered into the Church through the influence of heathen philosophy, and which still colour Christian thought as well as Christian language, that death should be spoken of as if it were a liberation of the soul from its bondage to corporeal conditions, whereby it escapes into its natural element of pure spirituality. St. Paul, at all events, never speaks thus about death. His strong sense of the weakness of the flesh and its subjection to the powers of evil leads him, it is true, to describe the body as a tabernacle in which we groan, being burdened. But he immediately hastens to explain, 'not for that we would be unclothed, but that we would be clothed upon, that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life' (2 Co 5[4]). It is not deliverance from the body that he longs for, but the deliverance of the body from the constraint of evil, its complete redemption and transformation, and perfect adaptation in consequence to the life of the spirit. To the Apostle that separation of soul and body which we call death was not something natural, but something profoundly unnatural. According to his original nature, man was not made to die. It was not part of the Divine purpose in his creation that the solidarity of body and soul should ever be dissolved. But the entrance of sin into the world changed every human prospect; and death is the wages of sin (Ro 6[23]). But just as Christ, by His Spirit dwelling in us, can subdue the power of sin, so also can He gain the victory over death—the culminating demonstration of sin's power, and man's last enemy (1 Co 15[26]). In Christ we have the promise of a body not only raised from the grave, but redeemed from the power of evil, and thus capable of the great transfiguration from a natural body into a spiritual body (v.[44]), from 'the body of our humiliation' into a conformity to the body of Christ's glory (Ph 3[21]).

(*c*) *The body and holiness.*—St. Paul's view of the body as an essential part of the human personality is seen further in connexion with his teaching on the subject of holiness. In the Church at Corinth, whose members breathed an atmosphere saturated with heathen influences, there had sprung up the strange, perverted doctrine that, as the body is not a part of man's true personality, all bodily acts are of the nature of *adiaphora*, or things morally indifferent. Fornication stood on the same level as eating and drinking; it was a mere physical act, natural to man as an animal creature, but having no real bearing on the independent and higher life of the soul (1 Co 6[13ff.]). The idea is one that has appeared again and again in Christian history, for dualistic notions regarding the body tend almost as readily to sensualism on the one hand as to asceticism on the other (cf. the Ranters in the days of the Puritan revival; see R. M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion* [1909], 477). The Apostle's answer to all such degrading views was to set up his doctrine of the bodily holiness of a Christian man. The body, he said, is for the Lord, and the Lord for the body (v.[13]); your bodies are the members of Christ (v.[15]); your body is a sanctuary of the Holy Spirit (v.[19]). In his view, the life of the human spirit, by which we are linked on to Christ Himself and to the Spirit of God, is joined indissolubly to that physical life which finds its manifestation in the bodily members. And so, when the Spirit of God takes up His abode in a man, the body of that man, as well as his spiritual nature, undergoes a process of sanctification, as day by day there pass

> 'Through all this fleshly dress
> Bright shoots of everlastingness.'

And yet this exalted view of the communion and fellowship of the body in the spiritual life of man, and its sensitiveness to the powers of sanctification, did not blind the Apostle to the fact, taught him by his own ethical experience, that in the fallen nature even of a Christian man the body is weak and tainted, and ready to become the instrument of temptation and an occasion of stumbling. In this temple of the Holy Ghost there are dark corners where evil spirits linger, and from which they can never be utterly expelled until in death the wages of sin have been paid. If ever there was a spiritually-minded man, St. Paul was one, but even he was deeply conscious of the infirmity of the flesh (Ro 6[19]), and felt the need of subduing his own body, lest, after all, he should become a castaway (1 Co 9[27]). And so, side by side with the truth that the body is a Divine sanctuary, he sets forth in his doctrine of holiness the demand that sin should not be allowed to reign in our mortal bodies that we should obey it in the lusts thereof (Ro 6[12]).

(*d*) *The body and the future life.*—Here, again, two lines of thought emerge in St. Paul's teaching—an overwhelming sense, on the one hand, of the worth of the body for the human personality; and, on the other, a clear recognition of its present limitations and unfitness in its earthly form to be a perfect spiritual organ. The proof of the first is seen in his faith in the resurrection of the body. The Pharisaic Judaism in which he was brought up had come to hold the hope of the resurrection of the dead (Ac 23[6ff.]), but that was a dim and pallid hope compared with the living and shining assurance which Jesus Christ had begotten in his heart. To him the resurrection of Christ was a fact of the most absolute certainty (Ro 1[4], 1 Co 15[3ff.]). And that fact carried with it the knowledge that the dead are raised (v.[15ff.]). When he writes of immortality (1 Co 15[35f.]), he does not mean, like Plato, the immortality of the soul (*Phædo*, liv. ff.), but the immortality of the whole man. He believed, no doubt, that the soul, as the centre of the personality, could survive the shock of separation from the body (2 Co 5[8]). But he thought of it as existing then in a condition of deprivation and incompleteness, for which he uses the figure of being 'unclothed'; and he does not regard it as attaining to the fullness of the life and blessedness of the future world until its 'nakedness' has been 'clothed upon' (v.[2ff.]). But, while he believed in the resurrection of the body, St. Paul did not believe in the resurrection of the present body of flesh and blood (1 Co 15[50]). He looked for a body in which corruption had given place to incorruption (v.[42]), in which weakness had been succeeded by power (v.[43]), in which what is mortal had been swallowed up of life (2 Co 5[4]), and humiliation had been changed into glory (Ph 3[21]). He was fully alive to the disabilities which the spirit has to suffer from its union with a body that is weak, earthy, and perishable, and his doctrine of the resurrection includes the assurance that when the dead in Christ are raised—of the physical resurrection of others he has little to tell us—it will not be in the old bodies of their earthly experience, but in new ones adapted to a heavenly condition of existence (1 Co 15[47ff.]), bodies that are no longer *psychical* merely, *i.e.* moving on the lines of man's natural experience in the world, but *pneumatical* (v.[44ff.]), because redeemed from every taint of evil and fitted to be the perfect organs of a spiritual and heavenly life.

4. The Christian doctrine of the body.—Taking

the NT as our source and norm, we thus find that the Christian doctrine of the body follows two main lines. (1) There is a recognition of the body as *an essential component of a complete human personality*. In the fullness of his being, man is conceived of not as a purely spiritual entity, but as an embodied spirit. This is the evidence of the Bible from beginning to end—from the story of the Creation in Genesis (2^7) to the Apocalyptic vision of the sea giving up its dead that they may stand before God to be judged according to their works (Rev 20^{13}). It is a doctrine that finds confirmation in the teachings of modern science, alike from the psychical and from the physiological side. For, if physiology has been compelled to admit the presence in man of a spiritual essence which lies beyond the range of its processes and tests, psychology has no less had to admit that the psychical, as we know it, stands in a close and constant relation to the physical. It is in keeping, therefore, with both Biblical and scientific truth that the Christian doctrine of the body should recognize and maintain the rights and dignities of man's physical being for the life we are now living, and should proclaim the great hope of the body for another life which is to come. The body is recognized as having its rights. Its natural instincts are to be treated, not as if they were implanted in us only that they might be suppressed and crushed, but as designed to lawful fulfilments on the lines of that great affirmation, 'All are yours; and ye are Christ's; and Christ is God's' (1 Co $3^{22f.}$). The world belongs to the Christian; and the joy of living in it and opening the heart through the senses to all its pure delights is part of his inheritance. Those natural relationships which lie at the foundation of our social existence, and which depend fundamentally upon our physical constitution—the love of husband and wife, of parent and child, of brother and sister—find a firm sanction in the Christian gospel of the body. And as the rights of the body are recognized, so also are its dignities. Even the present body of our humiliation, with all its weakness, its bias towards evil, its mortality, is sacred—sacred as being an essential part of that humanity which found in Jesus of Nazareth its pure and perfect expression, sacred in a more personal sense because the living Christ enters into it by His Spirit, makes it His temple, quickens it with His own life, and begins the work of subduing it to His own likeness. And the Christian doctrine of the body has also its promise for the future life. For, in the Christian view of the matter, the separation of body and soul at death is an unnatural condition. Without the body, the human soul is deprived of something that belongs to its true constitution, and is incapable of the highest activity and blessedness. From this limitation of his capacities and powers man is to be delivered by the 'redemption of the body' (Ro 8^{23})—not its resurrection merely, but its complete redemption from all the defects of its earthly condition, involving a transformation and exaltation of its very substance.

There is no place in the Christian doctrine of the resurrection for those crude materialistic ideas, which were once so general, of a restoration of the selfsame particles of which the earthly body was composed. The spiritual body is to differ widely from the natural body (1 Co 15^{37}). An inherent identity, it is true, must connect them, or we could not speak of a resurrection at all; but the identity will be one of vital principle and organic form, not of material substance, as St. Paul seeks to show by his figure of the grain of wheat which dies and springs up again to more abundant life (v.^{36ff}). The body of the risen and exalted Jesus is at once the promise and the type of the spiritual body in the case of His people (vv.$^{23.\ 49}$, Ph 3^{21}).

(2) But with all its emphasis on the rights and dignities and glorious prospects of the body, the Christian doctrine fully recognizes that *man's physical nature is his lower part*, that it is subject to evil tendencies, that it needs to be steadily subordinated to that higher life of the spirit by which we are brought into conscious relation with God. The world, which appeals so mightily to man's senses, is of much less value to him than the life of his own soul. His natural relationships, however dear, the very life of the body itself, however precious to the self-preserving instinct—all must be surrendered to the higher claims of the Divine Kingdom. Of these great truths Jesus Christ was the solemn prophet; by these He shaped the steps of His own earthly career; His body nailed to the Cross of Calvary was the tremendous example of their reality. The body, in short, has its duties as well as its rights; and it is always its duty to be the servant of the spirit. In the interests of the body, Christianity has sometimes had to raise its testimony against the exaggerations of a one-sided spiritualism, but it is much more frequently called on to protest, in the interests of the soul, against a materialistic way of envisaging our life in the world. There was a time when monastic asceticism, with its contempt for the body, became a positive danger to the Church. The danger now lies rather in a cult of the body which threatens the very life of the soul, whether that takes the form of a craze for athleticism and games which leaves little room for the growth of intellectual and spiritual interests, or of an æstheticism absorbed in the culture of the finer senses and in a pursuit of 'art for art's sake,' or of that mere vulgar love of pleasure by which, in all ages, the heart has been drawn away from the love of God. The Christian doctrine never fails to remind us that the body needs to be watched and curbed, and sometimes to be subdued. It warns us that, even in the case of those in whom the work of bodily sanctification has begun, the day of bodily redemption still lies in the future. It is hardly so optimistic in its view of the present relation to each other of the two parts of human nature as to say with Browning, in 'Rabbi Ben Ezra': 'Nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul.' On the contrary, it recognizes the truth to ethical reality that lies in the teaching of Jesus Christ and of His great Apostle as to the soul's perpetual primacy, and the need for a constant and vigilant superintendence of the body's promptings. But it looks for a day of perfect reconciliation, when the two elements of human nature, now so often at variance, shall at last perfectly accord, and the redeemed body shall be the ready organ and the exact expression of the informing soul.

LITERATURE.—Relevant sections in Laidlaw, *Bible Doct. of Man*, 1879; Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology* [Eng. tr. 1867]; and the *NT Theologies* of Holtzmann, Weiss, and Beyschlag. See, further, Dickson, *Flesh and Spirit*, 1883; Muller, *Christian Doct. of Sin* [Eng. tr. 1877], i. 295–333; Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, 1893, 160ff., 228ff.; H. W. Robinson, 'Heb. Psychology in relation to Pauline Anthropology,' in *Mansfield College Essays*, 1909; Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus* [Eng. tr. 1892], i. 156; Paget, 'Sacraments' in *Lux Mundi*, and *Spirit of Discipline*, 1891, 80ff.

J. C. LAMBERT.

BODY (Egyptian).—**i. Man.—1.** What we understand by 'body' was to the Egyptians simply the last and heaviest of the material coverings which together form a human being. The flesh, *aufu* ('flesh' in the sense of the sum of the physical elements that compose the human body), was neither of a different nature nor of a different texture from the other elements contained within and completing the person. All the elements possessed weight and were perceptible, though in varying degrees; and if on ordinary occasions they were not all visible or palpable, that was simply a circumstantial detail and not due to any essential difference. Magic often enabled men to see and handle these elements.

The *ka*, or 'double,' for example, was only a second body enclosed within the *jat*, lighter, more subtle or more airy, but composed, piece by piece, of the same elements as the body proper. The texts that refer to the future life (see DEATH, etc. [Egyptian]) prove conclusively that the *ka* in the other world was constituted, in every detail, like the body of flesh which it had occupied on earth.

The *ḫaibit*, or 'shadow,' was also only a third kind of body, still more airy, still more subtle, yet of the very same structure as the first two elements of the series.

The *khu*, or 'ghost,' long misled Egyptologists, through their relying upon hymns or over-refining texts of the Theban period. Books of pure magic or of funeral magic show us that the *khu* was originally only a kind of body, still more agile perhaps than the other three, and practically similar to the body attributed to *jinn* and fairies in the wonderful literature of the Arabs, or to the body that the modern Bantus suppose to exist inside the body of flesh.

The list is not exhausted by these four names: the primitive Egyptians, like a number of modern uncivilized peoples, had a very complicated idea of the human body. A striving after simplicity came only as the slow result of very long periods of effort; and the point at which we first gain clear impressions of the notions cherished by the Egyptians is still, in spite of the antiquity of the texts concerned, far removed from the starting-point. Glimpses of the primitive notions are caught and they have been re-constructed, but there is no direct contact with them. By the time of the historical period several of the multiple bodies composing a single being had been eliminated by speculation or by experience; and it is hard to conjecture, for example, what the *sâhu* can have been. It is to no purpose that the theology of the Thebans (and with it several Egyptologists of our day) thinks to find in it a designation of the 'spiritual body,' opposed in eschatology to the double, the shadow, or the soul. There are also very distinct traces in the ancient texts of an earlier time when the *ḥaat* and the *sokhim* were two of the bodies of the living man. But as yet we do not know clearly what was their exact nature.

The conjunction of all these bodies made a human being. What we call death was only the sunderance of them, and was always ascribed, as among primitive peoples, to some violent cause, arising from the personal act of an evil being (see art. DEATH). What kept all these bodies together in a unity during life was something more subtle, lighter, more active than any of them, something which constituted, at least approximately, the *personality* or the *self*. There is no race that has not tried to penetrate more or less into the definition of the latter; and there is no inquiry that has given rise, in primitive religions, to speculations so strange and, sometimes, so painfully complicated. As for the Egyptian, he thought to find its nature and power in what he called the *ran*, which we translate so unsatisfactorily by the word 'name.' The 'name'—we must be content to use this very ambiguous equivalent—is quite different from the body, since the whole series given above is only, as has been said, a sort of 'gamut' of increasingly fluid bodies.

The nature of the 'name' in itself is too important to receive due treatment here incidentally. The theory of the 'name' is in reality the fundamental basis of more than half of the religious ideas of Egypt. It will be discussed fully under art. NAMES (Egyptian). Here we shall merely say as much regarding it as is necessary in order to understand the Egyptian 'body.'

As far at least as we can gather, 'names' were originally what we may call 'kernels' of energy, vibrating, perhaps luminous (of course, material), distinct from and incapable of dissolving into one another. They had their own peculiar vitality, in the midst of the great chaotic mass of primordial things. The solar theologies, such as that of Heliopolis, revised and corrected by that of Hermopolis and Amarna, regarded them as originally emanations, vital waves proceeding from the rising sun. These entities, distinct and irreducible, then 'clothed' themselves, so to speak, in more or less visible or weighty coverings, which are these bodies of which we have spoken, the heaviest and most material of the latter being what we moderns mean by the 'body.' How was this 'clothing' brought about? Was it by a kind of solidification of the cosmic dust which somehow condensed the materials of physiological life round the 'names'? If Egypt seems to have had a confused idea of some answer of this kind, she naturally could formulate it only haltingly, with incoherences and *lacunae*, like so many strange systems of primitive or uncivilized peoples in other parts of the world. The historical period tried to introduce some appearance of cohesion into the existing system. It got hold of the early legends about the cosmogonies and, amongst them, of the legend of the god Thôth. Thôth (= *Ṭahuti*, 'the Speaker') had 'proclaimed' the world. The sounds of his voice had attracted round about their groups of syllables coverings of flesh and bone, of wood, of stone, or of other substances; and the whole together had constituted the creation. Thus revised by theology, the nature of the 'name' became something less fantastically barbarous; on closer examination, the *ran*, or 'name,' was something like a bundle of energetic waves, 'rhythmic' waves, with their special characteristics—and particularly 'numbers,' which the voice can reproduce if there is 'attunement.' One cannot help remembering that, many centuries later, Pythagoras made 'numbers' the basis of his system, and it is only reasonable to wonder what part ancient Egypt played in this.

The theology of Hermopolis claimed that, after the creation organized by the 'names,' the world of bodies and beings thus set in progress continued and reproduced itself by its own activity. This theology is too indefinite for our taste. Perhaps this is due mainly to the fact that nine-tenths of the Egyptian religious writings that we possess to-day treat only of gods or of the other world. The information we get from such texts is enough, however, to let us see that the vital principle of the body, this *ran*, which constitutes the inmost essence and the personality, *pre-existed* before the body and its physiological elaboration by the parents of the new being. We do not know very well where it came from according to the idea of the Egyptians, or what it was before the existence of a body for it to inhabit. But we gradually arrive at an understanding, by studying the birth-ceremonies (or the ceremonies of the coronation of kings, which give them a new soul), and we get a glimpse of the combination of vital and celestial energies from which it apparently arose. Horoscopes, or the supposed relations between the condition of the world at the birth of an individual and his 'name'; the care taken to determine the pronunciation of the name conferred on a newborn child according to the natural phenomena in evidence at his appearance; the anxiety to connect the syllables, whose pronunciation thus makes his 'self,' with divine persons, with 'names' of gods—these things all enable us, if not to re-construct Egyptian thought as a whole, at least to imagine almost exactly what it was. At the birth of a child the Egyptian sought by every means to discover to which group of higher forces the 'name' belonged which had just formed the person of the new being. He aimed at reproducing with his voice its vibrations and pronunciation, so as to join it again, in incantations or prayers, to the higher beings whose protection must be obtained or whose destiny must be pursued.

And as the Egyptian tried to do this for his own children, so he also tried to get to know the 'names' of the gods or of formidable beings. The hermetical books, or the books connected with the treatment of the dead, taught these names; and those who knew them exercised indisputable power over those who bore them (see art. NAMES [Egyptian]).

The 'name' and the series of 'bodies' (the body of flesh, the double, the shadow, the ghost, and the *sâhu*) together constituted a complete being. These were not, however, enough to form a *living* being. As yet there was only a being capable of living, only the *possibility* of life. In these religious systems, what we shall call, for want of a better name, the 'exercise of life' does not result *ipso facto* from the junction of the body or bodies with the soul or what takes its place. It is the product of forces peculiar to the being to be animated, and it is enough if the being that these powers are going to animate is completely fitted to receive them. This is shown very clearly, moreover, by reference to the statues—those artificial bodies—fashioned by the hand of man, which are nevertheless treated in Egyptian religion precisely like real bodies. The most ancient rituals show us that it was usual to perform a series of magical operations to enable the eyes of a statue to see, its ears to

hear, its nose to breathe, its mouth to eat, and the other organs to fulfil their functions. And if the historical period has preserved only traces—though certain traces—of many of these old rituals, it has at least kept intact the long ceremonial of 'the opening of the mouth' (*uap-ro*). We need not study these rituals here, since they deal only with artificial bodies created by religion for the service of its gods, its kings, or its dead, or with bodies made by the magicians for the service of their 'magic spells': dolls or images of men and animals in wax, wood, earth, etc., made into 'living bodies' by the sorcerers, the thaumaturgists (cf. Rollin, Harris, Leyden, and Turin Papyri). But the way in which the Egyptians conceived the necessity of enabling a statue to use its organs, after making a soul enter into it, is nevertheless a proof of what it is of interest to keep in mind for our present study, viz. that the union of the animist principle, *ran*, with its coverings was not enough to initiate life.

Life itself (*aonkhu*) was the result of the entrance into the body of those vital breaths which exist in all Nature, and which the air carries and the breeze (*nifu*) wafts to the faces of beings. They enter by the nostrils, not by the mouth. Like the majority of African races at the present day, the Egyptians breathed through the nose; and in their language the breath of the nostrils was synonymous with life. It is always to the nose, and never to the lips, that the gods or kings in iconography hang the chains or bundles of 'handled crosses,' which are intended to signify, by a play of pictorial words, the breaths of life. Thus they penetrated within the coverings which constitute the body. It was supposed that there they mixed with the blood, in the form of a kind of gas or bubbles, and circulated by the blood-vessels through the whole human system. Under their beneficent influence, the 'vessels swelled up and worked regularly.' Life accordingly served to maintain the conjunction of the various bodies adjusted within each other and the 'name.' It was, therefore, as necessary to the 'name' as to the series of bodies.

We usually translate the Egyptian phrase *sonkhu ran* by 'give life to the name of. . . .' The translation is somewhat poetical and seems to be connected with ideas familiar to us. But it is only an approximation. The literal sense is 'make the *self* breathe the breaths,' and this leads us to conceptions far removed from ours.

2. Once we leave the medical point of view, Egypt has preserved very few details as to her ideas of the body during its existence on earth. For although we have from the point of view of medicine a veritable superfluity of documents (we need only note among others the Berlin, Ebers, and Amherst Papyri, and those found by Petrie in the Fayyūm), the other Egyptian writings have little to do with the *living* body. All the moral and religious literature is exclusively occupied with what happens to the body at its physical death, with whatever has a bearing on burial, funerals, or fate after death. The popular tales or the writings of pure magic remain as a relative source of information on the subject.

It could hardly be otherwise with a religious civilization which evolved the above-mentioned conception of life and of individuals. Bodies composed in the way described cannot, either in rituals or in treatises, be brought into connexion with subjects that bear on ethics, morals, or the respective values or opposition of the soul and the body. Theories like asceticism, for example, or systems of the type of metempsychosis, avoid by their very definition the Egyptian thought of the classical period. Hence the information as to the living body that we derive from the monuments and the religious texts of Egypt will be confined to specifications as to how the body may be affected by disease or cured (and this belongs to the domain of medicine); or how the body is to be adorned, clothed, or tatued (and this is almost exclusively a matter of archæology); or incidentally we shall find detailed information about such and such a part of the body, and about such and such a group of religious ideas or pure superstitions attached to a specified organ. Thus, in connexion with a special literary episode or magical operation, the texts tell us in passing what the Egyptian ideas were in regard to the various specified organs of the body; and these are the only particulars that are of any interest in our present study.

We need not attempt to give a full account here. Certain elements of the body are scarcely mentioned by the Egyptians outside of medical treatises. In the latter, on the other hand, we find long lists of 'the twenty-two vessels of the head, the two vessels of the breast,' etc. As regards the rest of the writings, when it is said of the *heart* (*ḥāti*, lit. 'the beater') that it is opposed in the economy to the *liver* (*nashmit*, lit. 'the motionless'), the entire subject is exhausted, or nearly so. Of other members or organs we know a little more. Thus, the *eyes* have a special magical power; they fascinate and overpower by the fluid they dart forth; they repel harm or evil spirits if they fix on them first; magic by philtres and spells can increase their keenness exceedingly—even to the extent of enabling its favoured ones to see what the eyes of mortals do not in ordinary circumstances distinguish: invisible spirits, characters written inside a sealed roll, and innumerable other things. The *mouth* is an ever possible entrance for demons, phantoms, and spirits, who are always prowling round people and trying to get into their bodies. The magic or cognate writings carefully note this constant danger, and it is undoubtedly one of the strongest reasons that led the Egyptian to breathe by the nose. It is well known that, amongst many uncivilized peoples, kings and chiefs have a great aversion to being seen during meals. A long time ago the true explanation was offered—an explanation based on primitive ideas, namely, the dread lest spirits and malignant influences might enter by the mouth. It is very probable that the Egyptians shared this fear; and if conjecture is right, although it cannot be proved formally for the kings, the idea is clearly seen in the anxiety displayed in the meal served almost secretly in the interior of the *naos* to the living bodies which are the statues of the gods.

Other parts of the system are the seats of more distinct manifestations or principles. The integrity and healthy state of the *bones* are apparently one of the conditions essential to the harmonious working of the vital functions. The Egyptians seem to have had a strange idea that the disorganization of the system attacked by illness or death began in the bony structure, the marrow of which constituted somehow or other a vital reserve of special force. But this special point has received little attention as yet, and what has just been said is suggested with the greatest reserve, pending more minute study of the ancient religious texts.

We are a little more certain, on the other hand, of the Egyptian idea that the *top of the vertebral column* was the precise point at which certain magic fluids or certain energies could penetrate into the body. The bestowal of the vital or healing fluid (*sā*) by the gods or their representatives laying their hands on this point of the neck, is a scene reproduced in thousands of examples in the Egyptian monuments; it is enough to mention it here. The *inside of the skull* is the chief *habitat*

of that sort of agile principle which the Egyptian calls *bâ*, and which is represented sometimes in the form of a lapwing or a wading-bird, sometimes in the likeness of a bird with a human head; it was thought sometimes to show itself in the form of a bee. We translate it by 'soul' (*q.v.*); but that is only a rough approximation, given only because it is necessary to have a translation. The *bâ* is neither one of man's bodies nor a kind of radio-active substance like the *ran*; we can hardly compare it to anything but those little genii or 'spirits,' sometimes one, sometimes several, that so many savage peoples locate in the nape of the neck of the human being. The primitive Egyptian believed also—and the texts have preserved the trace of it—that a man had several *bâ* (plur. *biu*) as he had several *ka*. At the historical period, this complicated privilege was reserved for the gods and their heirs. This 'soul,' moreover, was so material that dread gods could sometimes catch it and feed upon it.

All this is only approximate translation, and necessarily so, when we attempt to reproduce in our precise modern terminology material distinctions and ideas conceived according to information and initial data so different from ours. Thus it is usual to translate the Egyptian word *ab* by 'heart,' although the *ab* of the human body is quite a different thing. 'Inside' is a word with a distinctly less dignified sound; but it has the merit of being a more faithful rendering. The *ab* is something not well analyzed, but with exact enough limitations. It is, in short, the belly—meaning by that the stomach and the intestinal apparatus, and to a certain extent the heart, considered from the point of view of shocks which the emotions may cause in it. This 'inside' is the seat of another special kind of 'soul,' distinct from the *bâ* soul. It is an obscure soul, connected specially with all the manifestations of feeling and passions—impulsive, the generator of movements and of good or bad actions. What is certain is that it is a soul with its own peculiar existence and activity. Originally, at least, it existed on its own account—until the time when the progress of Egyptian thought and its striving after psychological unity made it a sort of appendix to the true 'self' (for more detail, see art. HEART). If the Egyptians had precise ideas on its origin, it would appear that the soul of the *ab* was believed to come from the vital substance of the mother (cf. *Book of the Dead*, ch. xxxvi.). The ancient texts published at the present time are not of sufficient number to give us an exact appreciation of the ideas attached to the *jasu* (vertebræ ?), the *bakasu* (kidneys ?), and the *samiu seiu* (viscera ?). We can only guess that some vital reserve force was located in these parts. It was chiefly conceived under the form of 'powers,' 'knowledge of magic names,' and other sensitive or mental manifestations, as material emanations and, to a certain extent, as a kind of special soul.

The rest of the individual is not marked by anything of special interest. The superstitions attaching to the hair, the ears, the teeth, the hands and feet, are only details, and do not bear so much upon the fundamental magic of the religious ideas as upon popular superstition, the contents of which are dissolved and re-fashioned at all periods. We should note only the continual care to protect the various parts of the body, as with magic armour, against the possible attacks of evil spirits: hence the customs relating to amulets, talismans, tatuing, etc., some of which are combined, in the period of civilization, with the taste for physical adornment, and give rise to the greater part of jewellery (necklaces, bracelets, rings, etc.) and perfumery (pastes, paints, unguents, etc.). Circumcision is connected with this group of ruling ideas, but it will be treated in a special article because of its importance (see art. CIRCUMCISION).

To complete our survey of ideas relating to the human body, we note the following: (*a*) The link between the various material bodies may be temporarily broken during the earthly life, under the influence of certain forces voluntarily employed or involuntarily submitted to by man. A magician, for example, can by means of set formulas send his 'ghost' or his 'double' far away to perform some deed or other. Or it may happen to an ordinary mortal—usually during his sleep—that his 'double' leaves his body and shows itself in some other place, in the form of a body of flesh and bones more or less visible and tangible. As among all peoples, dreams and apparitions are the pseudo-experimental proofs of these ideas, and the Egyptian notions about sleep, lethargy, and syncope differ very little from those found almost universally.

(*b*) During the whole of its terrestrial life the body is subject to whatever astral or natural influences prevailed on the day when it made its appearance in the world—and this independently of the influences to which the 'name' is submitted, and of which we have spoken. The calendar, the horoscopes, the thousand particulars noticed at the moment of birth, may serve to determine this influence and, to a certain extent, may make it possible to charm away ill-luck (cf. Sallier Papyrus). The study of them determines what precautions must be taken when the conjunction of evil influences proper to such and such a body shows itself anew.

(*c*) Both during the terrestrial life of the body of flesh and after it, the fragments taken from its substance, its perspiration or its excretions, retain to a certain degree the force of the vital fluid of the whole individual. In Egypt, therefore, as in so many nations, we find those beliefs in the virtues of nail-parings, hair- or beard-clippings, and of the cloth soaked in the perspiration of some individual, which played such an important part in magic and necromancy. The fluid emanation of the living body may even communicate something of the life and powers of an individual to the clothing he has worn, and especially to ornaments, arms or badges that he has had in his hands. This idea, which can be found among several African peoples, appears even more clearly in regard to objects connected with the king's attire. He communicates to them a sort of divine power similar, *e.g.*, to the power given by the king of Dahomey to his cane or his sceptre.

3. A last remark is necessary in connexion with these characteristics of the body among the ancient Egyptians. When investigating the idea cherished by any one of the non-civilized races as to the body, we are able to determine its characteristics accurately enough, because we have under our eyes a population in most cases restricted in number or area, and because, as a rule, we know it only at the very time when we are examining it. But we must not forget that, in the case of Egypt, we are dealing with a civilization which has, in time and space, had several different religions, each with its own evolution. These ideas of the body are distributed throughout a historically ascertained series of thirty-eight centuries, having behind it, according to the traditional texts, a pre-historic mass of documents impossible to evaluate, but certainly the product of a considerable number of centuries. Further, these ideas have never at any one period been the same in the whole of Egypt. The Heliopolitan did not form the same conception of the body as the Theban, the Hermopolitan, or the Mendesian. Consequently it is not the absolute

theory of the Egyptian ideas on the body that is given in this article. It is rather a general view, in which it is possible to shade off or accentuate details, according as one is trying to picture the ideas concerning the body of an Egyptian of the Ptolemaic period, a Saite, a Theban, a Memphite, a Thinite, or a man of the pre-Thinite period of some province in the Nile valley. But if we desire to gather from the whole the essential physiognomy, and to look for the distinct characteristics of the primary notions, we shall come very near an exact expression of the early Egyptian ideas on the body if we say that it is a confused conglomeration of substances similar in nature, but of different qualities, defined as independent of each other, but in fact continually united by the 'name.' The whole is set in motion by a multiplicity of 'spirits,' with no fixed mutual cohesion, and originally peculiar to a certain part or physical manifestation of the individual. Upon the whole, it is a body very similar to what is revealed to us by scientific inquiry (if not alike in every point, at least identical in the main) among the least civilized peoples of our times, such as some specimens of the non-Aryans of India, the Battaks, the Caribs, the most backward of the Bantu group, etc.

ii. **Animate creatures or inanimate objects.**—It would appear that, in a general way, without entering into exact details, the rest of the *bodies* in the sensible world were considered as having the same texture as the human body. This applies not only to animals, but also to vegetables, and even to such things as a stone, a rock, an expanse of water, or any object made by man. The religious, magic, and popular literatures present sure examples with reference to the 'double' or the 'name' of a tree, a pillar, or a staff—to mention only these cases. The only restriction that must be noted is that, since it was dealing with objects of less interest than men, theological speculation took less trouble to describe their nature accurately, and to reconcile the contradictory data of their origin. One thing is certain, viz. that there was no essential difference in the structure of all things in the material world—from the inanimate object to man. All are, *a priori*, of the same organization, down almost to the degrees of their qualities.

iii. **Gods.**—1. In a country like Egypt this same unity naturally applies to divine beings. In fact, there is no dogmatic definition marking off the deity. The gods originate, not owing to the possession of characteristics different from the rest of beings and things, but simply owing to more remarkable manifestations of the actions and forces common to them and these others.

The body of the gods was quite the same as that of men, both in its economy and in its peculiar characteristics. It might be larger, more resistant, more rapid in its movement, more durable, less vulnerable, and more difficult to catch sight of. It was not said to be imperishable, or endowed with ubiquity, or proof against sickness, pain, and wounds. Its substance had the same advantages and defects as the human substance. Its specific characteristics of weight, dimensions, colour, qualities of flesh and bone, do not form the subject of a group of formal theories in any of the Egyptian texts. But the literature and ritual mention innumerable particulars in passing, and these are ample compensation for the omission. The Pyramid texts, for example, or the hymns of the historical period, provide abundant stores of the material in question. On the other hand, contrary to the generally accepted idea, neither the popular tales nor the legendary lore merit any more confidence in this respect, as sources of information on the religious ideas, than would be inspired among us by the more or less entertaining tales that bring in the devil, the saints, or God the Father.

The 'Tale of the Two Brothers' does not clear up the Ennead; the statement of a magic papyrus, that Osiris was more than seven cubits in height, is not an article of faith; and upon the strength of the 'Story of the Old-age of Ra' we are not to believe that the body of the aged sun was made of precious metals, or that the sun-god 'shivered with cold and slobbered.' In the same way, the symbolism of the iconography is not to be taken literally, and gods like Osiris or Amon of Amentit, with black, blue, or green flesh, do not stand for a fact accepted by theology, but simply represent a means of expressing an idea. But this idea, it must be granted, was not always the same. Thus Osiris with the green flesh might, according to the period in view, stand for re-birth, re-verdure, or even for the decomposition of the flesh of dead gods. With this same symbolism, possessed of no absolute value, we may connect also the body of flesh (*aufu*) attributed to the Evening Sun, or the complex body of Osiris of Dendereh.

If we leave out of account all these appended or artificial elements, the body of the Egyptian gods seems, on the whole, to have been exactly the same as we have found the body of men to be. The gods have a body of flesh, and they have a shadow, though there is little mention of the latter in the texts (chiefly the shadow of Ra or of Aten). Above all, they have several 'doubles' (*kau*) and several 'bird-souls' (*biu*). It was even held, at a certain time, that they had seven 'bird-souls' and fourteen 'doubles'—this, from all accounts, because of the magic and mystical virtue of these numbers. Their manner of nourishment and of movement, and in general all the functions of their body, are just the same as those we know of for men (leaving out of count, of course, all that has to do with their artificial bodies or 'supports of the double'—their statues). Their extreme swiftness, the keenness of their senses, their absolute dimensions, and their resistance to death are differences of fact, as has just been said, but not of organization. Their longevity was, *de facto*, indefinite, but it was not held theoretically that they were eternal (see DEATH). It was generally thought, at least in Heliopolis, that they drew from 'the basin of the fluid *sâ*' one of the secrets of their resistance to death.

2. There remains, however, a problem ill solved, or, rather, ill stated. The human being necessarily possesses only one body of flesh—one single combination of bodies. But we see that the Egyptian god possessed several bodies simultaneously, each one of them animated by some of his 'souls,' and by a part, or rather an emanation, of his 'name.' On the other hand, other texts or pictorial representations seem to imply that the divine beings have only one single combination of bodies. This is an important matter, touching as it does upon questions like the original formation of the gods and totemism.

Historical examination of the religions of Egypt fails to discover any indication that the personality of such and such a god was originally distributed among several bodies. Still less was it distributed throughout the entire species of some animal or vegetable under the characteristics of which this god was represented. On the other hand, it follows from the initial data as to the nature of beings, that the possession of several bodies animated by one and the same 'self' is not at all impossible. The 'name' (*q.v.*), while still remaining *one and entire* in each specimen of a being, may locate itself in several bodies, and in each of them may be one of the momentary subjective 'aspects' of one and the same entity. This is confirmed, in the religious monuments of Egypt, by the various epithets added to the principal name of the god. Each one expresses the detailed, local energy or quality of a distinct body belonging to one and the same god.

Stated in this way, the question becomes above all a question of fact, to which it is not possible to

give one single reply, because the Egyptians themselves have given more than one. We must make distinctions according to the importance of each god, and according to the period in view. Thus the humblest and most ancient gods, restricted to a single manifestation of energy or charged with a single definite and limited act, have no need of more than one body. Such deities as Selkit the Scorpion and Marit-Soghru the Serpent, so far as we know, had only one body. On the other hand, when similar attributes fused two or more deities originally geographically independent into a single god, the new deity thus formed kept as many bodies as it had formerly for the separate gods of whom it was composed. A tree-goddess like Nuit, for example, had as many bodies as there had been tree-goddesses with the same character and same rôle, before the one single Nuit developed.

More important gods originally incarnated in separate persons led to the formation of a deity single in 'name,' but necessarily provided with several bodies. Thus Thôth, at once monkey and ibis, was able to live in several bodies. *A fortiori*, the gods with important national functions or with a cosmogonic rôle, being the product of syncretism, and being the combination of a great number of original gods, animated a sometimes very considerable number of bodies at the same time. An Amon-Ra, conceived as possessing simultaneously the attributes of the demiurge sun Minu, the hawk Harmakhis of Heliopolis, the ram and the gander of Thebes, could not but live a complete unity in each of these varieties of material body.

The series extends then, by previous definition, from the simple single body to the multiplicity that has no limitations. But it is a *historical* fact, and not the outcome of any religious theory. As a rule, there was at first only one body for every divine 'name.' Then the attributes ascribed to certain beings among those regarded as more specially divine grew in importance and brought about fusions. In cases where by elimination (or subordination of the secondary characteristics of the beings originally distinct) the new god completely annihilated the personality of those whom he absorbed, he continued to have only one body (*e.g.* Mihit Oirit). Where, on the other hand, it was impossible to fuse the characteristics of the original gods into a perfect amalgamation (as in the case of Hathor), the composite deity retained as many bodies as it preserved distinct aspects. To enumerate all the possible combinations, it would be necessary to re-construct the whole history of Egyptian mythology. All that it is possible or necessary to explain here is the mechanism; we need not go into all its practical applications.

There is a sort of counter-evidence that the above is the case, and that the possession of a plurality of bodies by the god is only a result of fact, and does not mark a superiority of nature attributed to them dogmatically. We refer to the series of ideal gods imagined by theology. When the latter created deities by systematic deduction or by personification of functions—deities conceived in human form, like Maat or, later, Imhotep—it gave them only one body. Created in a homogeneous manner, they do not require other bodies, no matter how complex or lofty their attributes. The cult of Aten at Amarna and that of Hapi the Nile-god, with apparent divergencies chiefly of a literary kind, belong to this scheme of formation.

In conclusion, the case of the divine animals worshipped in the temples does not conflict with the above view. On the contrary, it indirectly confirms it. It is known that the 'sacred' animals, which, by the way, are a relatively late introduction into Egypt, are not the bodies of the gods, but beings sharing by simple veneration the regard due to the gods. The animal-god worshipped in the sanctuary (*e.g.* Apis, Mnevis, Knumu of Elephantine, Sukhos [Crocodile] of Ombos, the Ram of Mendes) is the only copy, the only true body of the local god on earth—to the exclusion of similar animals. This does not mean that the Egyptians thought they had in the sanctuary the one and only body of the god, but that they had the one and only *duplicatum* of it. In fact, the world was supposed to be divided into two great halves, symmetrical in every part. Each of the great national gods (we need not take the trouble to reconcile so many contradictory data for the lesser gods) had his kingdom in the other world, and in this world possessed a part of Egypt that corresponded to that kingdom. His body dwelt in the other world; but his 'name' animated an exact replica of this body in this human world—a perishable temporary representation, which is the divine animal worshipped in the sanctuary. To the divine cow of Dendereh, to the ram of Elephantine, to the hawk of Ermonthis, *e.g.*, there corresponded in the kingdoms of the other world a cow, a ram, and a hawk really alive, really divine, with bodies fashioned alike, perhaps gigantic, though Egypt has given no precise information on this point. One thing is certain, viz., that they sometimes showed themselves to the eyes of mortals. As to the exact sojourn of the one body of the gods in the other world, it should be said that here again there has been a succession of beliefs. The most ancient of them show us the gods living sometimes in the other world, after the fashion of the world of men, sometimes in the celestial world. The assimilation of earlier and later beliefs in homogeneous groups has gone far in developing the multiplicity of bodies belonging to one and the same god; and the solar theories of Heliopolis, with the course of Ra in his bark, have given far greater importance to the stellar bodies of the divine beings.

LITERATURE.—If we exclude what belongs to medicine, eschatology, and the disposal of the dead, the data as to the Egyptian body are scattered all over the field of Egyptological literature, the *living* body never having been the object of a special monograph. Only a few parts of it have been studied separately, but without synthesis. We may mention specially: **Amélineau**, *Prolégomènes, à l'étude de la religion égyptienne*, Paris, 1908, p. 403 ff.; Birch, 'On the Shade or Shadow,' in *TSBA* viii. 386; **Budge**, *Gods of the Egyptians*, London, 1904; **Le Page Renouf**, 'On the true Sense,' etc., in *TSBA* vi. 494; and esp. **Maspero**, *Histoire* [tr. 1894–1900] i. 108, 112, 146, 212, 215, 217 (where there are notes giving the principal references); also the first two volumes of his 'Études de Mythologie et d'Archéologie,' in the *Bibliothèque égyptologique*, Paris, 1893

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BODY (Greek and Roman).—**1. Anthropological.**—(1) *Body and soul.*—Among the Greeks, as among most other races, the distinction between body and soul—the natural dualism of mankind—can be traced to a very remote antiquity. This distinction took shape in the primitive mind as a result of its experience of certain peculiar facts. It is maintained by H. Siebeck,* who on this point differs from such scholars as Rohde and Gomperz, that the most potent factor in the development of this dualism is that succession of inner and outer experience undergone by primitive man—as by the child of to-day—in connexion with his own body. To the undeveloped consciousness the body is at first simply a thing among things, precisely like a stone or a tree. It is only by degrees that the growing mind, in consequence of internal and external sensations, as, for instance, bodily pain or hunger, acquires the idea of the body as the medium between self-consciousness and the outer world. An important constituent of naive dualism, no

* *Gesch. d. Psychologie*, 1880, i. 61., with reference to the facts of empirical psychology as discussed by Volkmann, *Lehrbuch d. Psychologie*, 1876, ii. § 106.

doubt, lies here; and so far Siebeck is right. But a number of other factors, which, to be sure, Siebeck does not ignore, must also be taken into account; as, for example, the ofttimes rapid transition from life to death, the experience of dreaming, or of fainting, 'possession,' sudden emotions and their resultant involuntary actions, and, finally, the ecstatic trance. These were also the facts which in the dawn of Greek history generated the idea of a possible *separation between body and soul*; thus the soul might well seem to be temporarily withdrawn from the body in the case of dreaming, swooning, or ecstasy, and permanently so in the case of death, when the body returns to its original elements.*

The distinction between the visible and corporeal man and his invisible indwelling *Doppelganger*, the ψυχή, is presupposed also in the Homeric poems. Here, however, the ideas of body and soul have assumed a special complexion. All the activities, mental or other, of the human personality, such as feeling, thought, volition, exertion, are regarded as being possible only so long as body and soul are united; in fact, they are in the strictest sense functions of the body. *μένος*, *νόος*, *μῆτις*, *βουλή*, and *θυμός* also, are bodily faculties or powers, and although they can assert themselves only while the *psyche*, at once the 'second ego' of man and the principle of his animal life, remains within him, yet they are in no sense evolved from the inherent capacities of the soul as such, which has absolutely no share in the waking activities of man.† The spiritual and psychical faculties which are localized in the various organs, and especially in the diaphragm (*φρένες*) of the living person, appertain entirely to the body. The idea of a life apart from the body, *i.e.* independent of the union of body and soul, simply lay outside the range of Homeric thought. Here it is the body rather than the soul around which the supreme interest circles—a phenomenon quite intelligible in a naive and frankly sensuous age, free as yet from all reflexion about a possible closer relation between body and soul in a living and waking man. Hence even the lifeless body is repeatedly spoken of as the true self (*αὐτός*), and set in contrast with the *psyche*.‡ A well-known passage is *Iliad*, i. 3 f.: πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄιδι προΐαψεν ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἑλώρια τεῦχε κυνέσσιν οἰωνοῖσί τε δαῖτα (cf. also xxiii. 65 f., 105 ff.). (Now and then, it is true, the *psyche* that is speeding towards Hades, or already dwelling there, is distinguished by the name of its erewhile living possessor, or, it may be, is even spoken of as if it were himself in person (cf. Rohde, i. 5 f.); but the latter idea is largely evanescent in the mind of the poet.)

(2) *The dead body.* — Of the cult of the dead which at one time prevailed throughout the Hellenic world, as elsewhere, the Homeric poems show isolated traces only; and it is one of the enduring triumphs of Rohde to have discovered these and set them in their proper light. The ideas underlying this cult, which, though but faintly recognizable in Homer, was universally diffused among the Greeks in the post-Homeric age, and in fact down to the end of the ancient period, invested even the *dead body* with a certain interest. The soul of the departed was supposed to be fettered to the resting-place of its former bodily integument. The worship of ancestor or hero had its seat in the place where his bones had been laid. There alone — with some special exceptions — did the soul continue in an active state.

According to Homer, however, whose notices regarding the cult of the dead are sporadic and imperfectly understood even by himself, the soul of the departed finds no rest (in Hades) till the corpse is burned. So long as this act is neglected, the soul still retains a consciousness of events upon the earth; while, once the body has been cremated, the soul is banished to the depths of Erebus. The original purpose of the practice of cremation, in fact, was to guard against the return of the released soul to the land of the living—an idea, however, which has become quite obscured in Homer. The paramount interests of the poet, indeed, lie with those who still enjoy the light of the sun, and not with the dead at all. In his unsophisticated mode of thought, he regards — all unconsciously — the living and waking man with his bodily and mental attributes as a single whole, and similarly all the spiritual and psychical activities of man are evolved from the *body*. So far, therefore, the Homeric point of view, as contrasted with that of the philosophers and theologians of a later age, may be called an unreflective monism.

2. Religious and ethical. — (1) *Orphism.* — Homeric views regarding body and soul, and their relation to each other, find their sharpest possible contrast in the ideas which, germinating in the ecstasy of the Dionysan cult and the psychical experiences evoked there, or, again, in the principles of *katharsis*, received their definitive form among the Orphic sects. According to the latter, there obtained not only an irreconcilable dualism between body and soul, but also a profound difference in value. The soul was no longer, as in Homer, the phantom counterpart of the man, making its influence felt in the acts of dreaming, swooning, or dying; it was now regarded as intrinsically of Divine origin, uncreated and imperishable, and as having been immured within the body in expiation of its guilt.

See Plato, *Cratyl.* 400 B C (Diels, *Frag* [2] ii. 473, No. 3; cf. Abel, *Orphica*, frag. 221): καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τινές φασιν αὐτὸ (the body) εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι· καὶ διότι αὖ τοὔτῳ σημαίνει, ἃ ἂν σημαίνῃ ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ταύτῃ σῆμα ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι· δοκοῦσι μέντοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοὔτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δικην διδουσης τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα διδωσιν, τοῦτον δὲ τὸν περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σῴζηται δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα. Cf. *Phædo*, 62 B, and Diels, in reference to Philolaos, frag. 14 and 15. The body is accordingly the grave or prison-house of the soul, which in its present life is in a state analogous to death. It is therefore the aim of the Orphics χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι (*Phædo*, 67 C; cf. Diels on Herachtus, frag. 115).

(2) *Pythagoreanism.*—In regard to the process by which such ideas, so alien, apparently, to the natural temperament of the Greeks, as of mankind in general, gained a footing in Greek thought, the reader may consult the art. ASCETICISM (Greek). It will be sufficient here to emphasize the fact that the ideas in question, wholly un-Hellenic as they may appear, exerted a profound influence upon many Greek philosophers, and even, as we may infer from what has been said (above, p. 81), upon early thinkers like Pythagoras and his disciples. Definite evidence of this influence, it is true, first emerges in the case of Philolaos (*c.* 440 B.C.), who, in referring to the Orphics, writes as follows: μαρτυρέονται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τε καὶ μάντιες ὡς διά τινος τιμωρίας ἁ ψυχὰ τῷ σώματι συνέζευκται καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σώματι τούτῳ τέθαπται (frag. 14; cf. the passages given by Diels in connexion with frags. 14 and 15). We need not be surprised, therefore, to find Archytas (*c.* 400–350 B.C.) making allusion to the battle against sensual pleasure (ἡδονή, the *voluptas corporis* of Cicero) (cf. Diels, *Frag.*[2] i. 252, 30 ff.), which the early Pythagoreans

* *Iliad*, vii. 99, xxiv. 54.

† Taken purely by itself, the soul has at best a shadowy existence, not worthy of the name of 'life' at all, and destitute even of the attribute of self-consciousness.

‡ It is a significant circumstance that Homer has no proper term for the *living* body. His usual word for it is δέμας, which, however, connotes only the figure, the outward visible form; cf. δέμας πυρός. In Homer σῶμα always denotes the *dead* body.

regarded as the worst of plagues, impeding the soul in its endeavours to reach its celestial home, and causing it to forget its high descent.*

That Empedocles likewise held a similar theory of the relation between body and soul may be inferred from what is said in ASCETICISM (Greek) (above, pp. 81[b], 82[a]) regarding his indebtedness to Orphism and Pythagoreanism. Direct reference to the point, however, is found only in a single fragment of his writings (126, cf. Diels): *σαρκῶν ἀλλόγνωτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι.* We may well suppose that similar views were cherished by several other thinkers and poets who were more or less influenced by Orphic or Pythagorean doctrines. This was certainly the case with Pherecydes of Syros.† In Heraclitus also (frag. 4. 96) we may trace a certain disparagement of the body, though he does not, like the 'theologians,' regard body and soul as antagonistic to each other, but rather as subsisting in a state of constant interchange (frag. 36; cf. 76, 77). Adumbrations of this idea are also found in Pindar (frag. 131, Böckh).

(3) *Plato.*—It was a matter of vast significance, however, that the cardinal ideas of the Orphic-Pythagorean schools should have been assimilated by Plato, and wrought into the fabric of his philosophy. The way in which the founder of Western idealism interpreted the relation of the human body to the imperishable soul is known to every reader of the *Phædo.* As we have already given, in the art. ASCETICISM (Greek), a brief exposition of the leading ideas in Plato's system of philosophical and theological thought, we confine ourselves here to the most indispensable points.

The human soul occupies a peculiar position between the sensible and the supersensible world. Though itself uncreated, *i.e.* of Divine origin, it is drawn into the vortex of becoming. It does not rank as an Idea, but is at best 'most like' one, participating in the Idea of life. In the pre-mundane existence of the soul, while dwelling amongst gods and spirits like itself, it has beheld the 'super-celestial realm,' and the world of real being, but in consequence of a decline in its cognitive faculty, and an ascendancy in its impulses of desire, it has been drawn down to the earth, and has fallen into corporeality.‡ Particulars will be found in the famous allegory in *Phædrus*, 246 B ff. But although body and soul are fundamentally disparate in character, the body and its impulses exert a strong and persistent pressure upon the immortal sojourner within. By the time when the soul enters upon its earthly life, it has completely forgotten its pre-existence and the world of Ideas in which it formerly lived. Its knowledge of truth is now impeded by the illusory impressions of sense-perception, while the body, by means of its impulses, and the desires and affections to which they give rise, wields a most dangerous influence over the soul, deranging its capacity for thought, and wholly perverting its judgment regarding the true good.

Cf. *Phædo*, e.g. 64 ff., especially 66 B-D: . . . . ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ᾖ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δὲ ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν· ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν· καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ, κ.τ.λ. Cf. 83 B-D.

Irrationality, fierce passions, grave disorders of the soul, may in fact proceed from the body or from the conditions that at any time prevail therein (cf. especially *Timæus*, 86 B ff.). In sober truth, the body is the source of all that harms the soul. For although evil may be the soul's own act, she would have no promptings to evil-doing were she not imprisoned in the body (cf. Zeller, II. i. 871). Every misfortune, every guilty deed in human life, emanates in the last resort from the latter. As a result of her union with the body, the soul herself becomes polluted, and, in fact, unless she resists the propensities of the flesh, she may even assume a *quasi*-bodily character (*σωματοειδές*, cf. *Phædo*, 83 D), just as the sea-god Glaucus was deformed by wrack and shells to the point of unrecognizability. In this way the majority of mankind are drawn aside from their true end in life. For the fall into the corporeal state lays upon the soul the task—in reality her only task—of purging herself as effectually as possible, even in this life, from the contamination induced by her connexion with the body (*Phædo*, 67 C D), by overcoming and keeping permanently in subjection not alone the impulses of sense, but all appetites and affections whatever: she must, in a word, strive after an inward deliverance from the world of the flesh and the senses. Only so does she become free to apply herself to those imperishable treasures beside which the visible world dwindles to nothingness; only so can the soul yield herself to that philosophy which, by means of dialectic and in virtue of her 'reminiscence' of things aforetime seen, develops her faculty of cognizing the sphere of true being, of the Ideas, so leading her into the right way towards her proper home and at last to God Himself.

Such in outline is the doctrine of Plato—a harsh and rigid dualism: here, the world of illusion and illusive values, beneath which nothing permanent exists; and there, the goods which never fade away, and which constitute the whole aim and object of philosophy. This dualism was, it is true, somewhat mitigated in Plato's later life (see above, p. 83[a]), but again and again in innumerable passages of his works, even in the *Timæus*, where its presence involves a flagrant inconsistency, it breaks forth in triumph.

The speculations of Plato, aided as they were by the incomparable literary craftsmanship with which he gave them expression, had an enormous influence on subsequent thought. His dualism, and in particular his view of the body as the ultimate root of all, or at least of innumerable, evils in human life, as an enemy against which the soul must fight, and as an unclean and defiling thing from which she must rid herself as soon and as thoroughly as possible, produced a profound effect even upon such of the ancient thinkers as did not accept the Orphic-Pythagorean-Platonic

* Cf. Diels, *Frag*[2] i. 252, 30 ff., 280, 44 ff., 288, 12 ff.—Sensual pleasure, by later writers frequently spoken of as *ἡδονὴ σωματική*, to distinguish it from spiritual pleasures, was vehemently repudiated, not only by the adherents of a rigidly dualistic anthropology, but also by the Cynics and the Stoics. The body being the source of pleasure, we find Xenophon (*Memorab.* i. 2. 23) insisting upon the necessity of constant exercise in *σωφροσύνη*. On the other hand, Aristippus the founder of the Cyrenaic school, declared sensual pleasure to be a good, though with certain qualifications (Diog. Laert. ii. 90; Zeller, II. i. 356 ff.). The high value ascribed by Epicurus not merely to pleasure in general, but even—in spite of all his saving clauses—to bodily gratification, as the source of happiness, is tellingly shown in frags. 67, 70, 409 (Usener). His standpoint is far removed from that of Plato, and we need not wonder that Posidonius in particular so vigorously assailed his doctrine.

† Diels, *Frag.*[2] II. i. 505 f. No. 5; see also Gomperz, i. 71 f.

‡ Its entrance into the body is the result of an 'intellectual fall'; for, according to Plato's original view (in the *Phædrus*), the soul, even in its pre-mundane state, had three *εἴδη*, *i e*, not only the *λογιστικόν*, but also the *θυμοειδές* and the *ἐπιθυμητικόν*, of which the last two cramp the first, and, still clinging to the soul after death, are the cause of its attachment to the world of sense and its tendency to further incarnation (*Phædo*). On the other hand, according to the *Timæus*—a much later work—the entrance of the soul into the material realm takes place in pursuance of the Divine order, being designed to animate the world of the visible. On this interpretation the two inferior capacities of the soul arise out of its union with the body, just as again they pass away with the latter at death.

doctrine of the soul. We may also venture to assume, notwithstanding the absence of positive testimony, that a theory regarding body and soul akin to that of Plato prevailed in the Old Academy. It is at all events certain that such a view was held by Xenocrates (frag. 20 H), as well as by Philip of Opus and Heracleides Ponticus, and probably even by Aristotle in his earlier years.

(4) *Aristotle.*—With riper experience, however, Aristotle abandoned his master's dualistic standpoint, save in regard to one important feature, and advanced to an entirely different conception of the relation between body and soul, a conception which stands in the closest connexion with his metaphysical teaching about the relations of matter (ὕλη) and form (εἶδος), of potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια). Here we come upon the pregnant idea of the 'organic,' which Aristotle was the first to formulate. An object is said to be organic when its parts are 'instruments' (ὄργανα) for the realization of the end for which the nature of the object as a whole is designed. A whole of this character, however, is manifestly framed with a view to life or animation, and accordingly the organic and the animate are but different designations for the same thing. The human body, as indeed the body of any ζῷον, attains its realization only in virtue of the soul. The soul is the εἶδος (the principle of form working from within outwards) σώματος φυσικοῦ ζωὴν ἔχοντος δυνάμει (*de Anima*, ii. 1. 412 A, 20 ff.). The 'end' of the body is the soul, which realizes itself, and at the same time realizes life, in the body and its organs (*de Partibus Animalium*, i. 5. 645 B, 14 ff.). Apart from the soul the body is but a corpse. It is therefore the entelechy of the body . . . οὐ τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' αὕτη σώματός τινος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἷς δοκεῖ μὴτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά τι ἡ ψυχή (*de An.* ii. 2. 414 A, 14 ff.); cf. ii. 4. 415 B, 7, ἔστι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή. Body and soul in a living man may well be distinguished as concepts, but they cannot be dissociated in actual fact. The two form an inseparable synthesis, like the material and the form of a ball of wax, or like the eye and the sense of sight. In the words of Eucken, 'the soul forms with the body a single life-process.' When man dies, his body is deprived of its function as a purposive organism.*

The idea of a dissonance between body and soul, as propounded by the theologians and Plato, is therefore quite foreign to the philosophy of Aristotle. It is true that the latter regards the νοῦς, the thinking spirit, as coming from without (θύραθεν) to the 'soul,' to that life-giving power which controls and conditions the organism, and combines within itself the physical and the psychical; and here no doubt we come upon an inconsistency in the Aristotelian psychology, a residue of theological and Platonic speculation. Nevertheless there is for Aristotle no opposition between the νοῦς and the living body, so that the presence of the former constitutes no end in human life relative to the body.†

(5) *Stoicism.*—Among the earlier Stoics, notwithstanding their monism, we find a certain leaning towards the dualistic theory of body and soul. A characteristic utterance is that of Cleanthes (*Stoicor. Veter. Fr.* i. fr. 529 [Arnim]), who speaks of man as a frail and fleeting thing, needing help at every turn

καθάπερ τροφῆς καὶ σκεπασμάτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμελείας, πικροῦ τινος τυράννου τρόπον ἐφεστῶτος ἡμῖν καὶ τὸν πρὸς ἡμέραν δασμὸν ἀπαιτοῦντος καὶ εἰ μὴ παρεχοιμεν ὥστε λούειν αὐτὸ καὶ ἀλείφειν καὶ περιβάλλειν καὶ τρέφειν νόσους καὶ θάνατον ἀπειργοῦντος.

The truly decisive step, however, was first taken by Posidonius (first half of the 1st cent. B.C.), the second leader of Middle Stoicism, upon whom the influence of Plato is once more clearly marked (cf. p. 85[a]). He holds that the body, that *inutilis caro** *et fluida, receptandis tantum cibis habilis*, is an impediment to the heaven-born soul, pining in her prison-house for her ethereal home. To deliver the soul as far as possible from the body even in this life, to shun as the pestilence the lusts and appetites that originate in the body—this is the paramount task of mankind. The body acts as a clog upon the Divine capacity of knowledge possessed by the spirit, which, however, escapes its bonds and wins an ampler insight in dreams, when the body lies asleep as if dead, as also in ecstasy, when the soul forsakes the body, but fully and finally in death itself. At death the soul of the wise, no longer in thrall to the sensuous, will soar to the celestial sphere, and will gain a profound knowledge of the ultimate causes of all existence. On the other hand, the soul of one who has given a loose rein to the lusts of the body must after death long pursue a wandering course, and must undergo manifold pains and purgings. But the soul's conflict with 'this flesh' is protracted and sore, and calls for unflagging effort.†

The Platonic mysticism of Posidonius wrought with great effect upon Cicero, and with greater still upon Seneca. But although the writings of Seneca frequently reflect the dualistic theory of Posidonius, from whom in fact he borrows freely in numberless passages, his own view differs in some degree from that of the Greek thinker. Seneca's theory probably finds its best expression at the beginning of the 14th letter to Lucilius:

'Fateor insitam esse nobis corporis nostri caritatem. Fateor nos huius gerere tutelam. Non nego indulgendum illi: serviendum nego. Multis enim serviet qui corpori servit, qui pro illo nimium timet, qui ad illud omnia refert. Sic gerere nos debemus non tamquam propter corpus vivere debeamus, sed tamquam non possimus sine corpore. Huius nos nimius amor timoribus inquietat, sollicitudinibus onerat, contumelis obicit. Honestum ei vile est, cui corpus nimis carum est. Agatur eius diligentissime cura, ita tamen, ut cum exiget ratio, cum dignitas, cum fides, mittendum in ignes sit.' Cf. *Ep.* 78. 10; 120. 14–18.

There is something very peculiar in the depreciation and contempt with which the human body is regarded by Epictetus, whose views of mankind in general, notwithstanding his Stoic principles, reveal a strong tinge of dualism. Over and over again the *Dissertations* reveal a curious scorn of the body, and, in fact, as we might expect, from the influence of Cynicism upon Epictetus, he often gives a crudely Cynic expression to the ideas promulgated by Plato and Posidonius. A telling instance of this is found in frag. 23. The body is by nature dead, mere clay and filth; irretrievably abandoned to innumerable vicissitudes, to all, indeed, that happens to be 'stronger'; it is a hindrance to our independence of the external; it does not belong to us, but is an ἀλλότριον. Man is

* The teleological point of view was first applied to the human body by Diogenes of Apollonia, through the influence of Anaxagoras. It is set forth in popular form by Socrates in Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 4. 5 ff., and in a truly scientific style by Aristotle, *e.g.* in *de Partibus Animalium*, iv. 10. 686 A, 25 ff., 687 A, 7 ff. Popular views regarding it re-appear after the middle period of Stoicism; cf. Cicero, *Nat. Deorum*, ii. 134–146.

† As regards Aristotle's physiology, which we cannot deal with here, it may be noted that he regarded the activity of the soul as being connected with the natural heat of the body, this heat being combined with the blood as the animating breath or πνεῦμα. Aristotle placed the central organ of psychical life in the heart, while Alcmæon, Democritus, and Diogenes of Apollonia, like Plato, had identified it with the brain. The influence of Aristotle long prevailed to keep the earlier and correct view in the background

* So Seneca (*Ep.* 92, 110) renders the Greek σάρξ, a word which seems to have been applied to the body in a disparaging sense first of all by the Orphics (cf. Empedocles, frag. 126, Wilamowitz on Euripid. *Herakl.* 1269). This usage is next found sporadically among the Tragedians; also in Plato and Platonizing thinkers.

† Cicero, *Tusc. Quæst* i. 38, 44, 110, *de Leg.* i. 60, *de Div.* i., *de Rep.* vi.; Virgil, *Aen.* vi. 724 ff. (on this see Norden); Seneca, *Ep.* 65. 16 ff.; 92. 110; 102. 28 ff., *Quæst. Nat.* i. 3 f., iii. 18, *ad Marc.* 23 ff., Galen, *de Plac. Hipp. et Plat.* v. 448 f. (Muller).

'a soul carrying a corpse.' To the wise man, indeed, his body is of no concern.* Above all, the body is a permanent obstacle to happiness, since it stands in the way of virtue, which is in reality the only good. Something more than the influence of Plato or Posidonius, or of the Stoa, is required to explain such hatred of, and disdain for, the body as we find in Epictetus; and it is possible that his experiences with his own decrepit frame may have given some bitterness to his sentiments.

To the high-souled Marcus Aurelius likewise, though, like Epictetus, he was a professed adherent of Stoicism, there exists a keen antagonism between body and soul, and he too speaks repeatedly of the body in tones of passionate scorn. He reprobates it especially as the source of carnal appetite, and as tending to inveigle the soul. He welcomes death because, among other reasons, the soul, whether she then 'is dispersed,' or becomes extinct, or is re-absorbed into the universal soul, is at least released from the body (Stich, 71, 4 ff.). A markedly dualistic tendency appears also in his general views regarding man, though he rejects the belief in a continued personal existence after death.

(6) *Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism.*—Another evidence of the persistent influence of Posidonius, and through him of Plato, upon a later age is to be seen in Neo-Pythagoreanism, which became widely diffused throughout the ancient world, especially in the first three centuries of our era. It has already been shown (above, p. 86) how in this school the Orphic-Pythagorean-Platonic conception of the body as the prison of the soul, conjoined with the notion of matter as the cause of all evil, was resuscitated in intensified form. Similarly, as regards Neo-Platonism (Plotinus), we would refer the reader to the account given on former pages (86ᵇ, 87ᵃ), merely supplementing it here with an instructive passage regarding mankind from *Enneads*, 47. 10 K:

. . . διττὸν οὖν τὸ ἡμεῖς, ἢ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ θηρίου ἢ τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἤδη· θηρίον δὲ ζωωθὲν τὸ σῶμα· ὁ δ' ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος ὁ καθαρὸς τούτου τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχων τὰς ἐν νοήσει, αἳ δὴ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χωριζομένῃ ψυχῇ ἵδρυνται, χωριζομένῃ δὲ καὶ χωριστῇ ἔτι ἐνταῦθα οὔσῃ, κ.τ.λ

(7) *Popular ideas.*—Popular notions about the relations of body and soul, and about the nature and functions of both — such ideas, namely, as actually took shape among classes of Greek and Roman society outside the influence of philosophy and theology—were practically identical with those of Homer, according to whose simple and unschooled thought the living man forms an undivided unity of matter and spirit. It was only in a later age that, among the Romans in particular, wider circles of society, especially in the large towns, came to be infected with Epicurean and materialistic views, holding that the soul, being but a more subtle matter diffused through the body, and forming the incorporating principle of life, perishes with the material frame. The harshly dualistic theory of human life, however, allied with the conviction that the body is a thing impure and obnoxious,—as enunciated by Plato and Posidonius, by Seneca and Plotinus,—had a potent influence upon ancient, and thence upon mediæval, Christianity, and indeed its effects persist even to the present day.

LITERATURE.—For 1: **Nägelsbach**, *Homer Theol.* (Nuremberg 1840); **Siebeck**, *Gesch. d. Psychol.* (Gotha, 1880), i. 15 ff.; **Zeller**, *Phil. d. Griech.* i.⁵ (Leipzig, 1892); **Rohde**, *Psyche*² (Freiburg i. B., 1898), i.; **Gomperz**, *Gr. Denker*² (Leipzig, 1903) i. 1 ff.

For 2: **Rohde**, *op. cit.* ii.; **Gomperz**, *op. cit.* i. 71 f., 103 f.; **Zeller**, *op. cit.* i. 450 ff., ii. 1⁴ (1889), ii. 2³ (1879), iii. 2⁴ (1903); **Windelband**, *Gesch. d. alten Philos.*² (Munich, 1894), 164 ff., *Gesch. d. Philos.*³ (Tubingen, 1903) 121 f., 188, *Platon*⁴ (Stuttgart, 1905) 124 ff.; **Eucken**, *Lebensanschauungen d. grossen Denker*⁶ (Leipzig, 1904), 31 ff., 54; **Heinze**, *Xenokrates* (Leipzig, 1892), 150 ff.; **Ritter-Preller**, *Hist. Phil. Græcæ*⁷ (Gotha, 1888), **Siebeck**, *Aristoteles* (Stuttgart, 1899); **Schmekel**, *Philos. d. mittl. Stoa* (Berlin, 1892) 248, 276, 400 ff.; **Wendland**, *Die hellen.-rom. Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum u. Christentum* (Tubingen, 1907), 84 ff.; **Corssen**, *de Posidonio Rhodio*, (Bonn, 1878); **Diels**, *Herakleitos von Ephesos* (Berlin, 1901), *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*, i.² (Berlin, 1906), ii. 1² (1907); **Abel**, *Orphica* (Leipzig, 1885); **Hicks**, *Aristotle's 'de Anima'* (Camb. 1907); *Epicteti Dissertationes*, ed. H. Schenkl (Leipzig, 1898); *Epictets Handbuchlein der Moral*, ed. W. Capelle (Jena, 1906); *Mark Aurel.*, ed. Stich² (Leipzig, 1903); *Plotini Opera*, ed. A. Kirchhoff (Leipzig, 1856).

W. CAPELLE.

BODY (Hebrew).—To the Hebrew, man was a unity. 'Man's body was of the dust, whilst the breath of God was the principle of life within him; but man himself was the single product of these two factors' (F. C. Porter, 'The Yeçer Hara' in *Yale Bibl. and Sem. Studies*, 1901, pp. 91–156). Jewish theology never seriously admitted a dualism. Even when it adopted the doctrine of the 'two impulses,' the good and the evil *yetser* (יצר), the good impulse did not inhere in the soul, the bad in the body. 'The parallel between St. Paul's contrast of spirit and flesh, and the Rabbinic contrast of the good and evil impulses, is remote and insignificant' (*ib.*).

The same conception of unity is expressed in many ways. 'Three partners there are in the formation of man: God, father, mother' (Bab. *Niddah*, 31*a*). Even more significant is the well-known parable of the Blind and Lame:

'A human king had a beautiful garden, in which were some fine early figs. He set in it two watchmen, one lame and the other blind. Said the lame man to the blind, "I see some fine figs, carry me on your shoulders and we will get the fruit and eat it." After a time the owner of the garden came and asked after his figs. The lame man protested that he could not walk, the blind that he could not see. So the master put the lame man on the blind man's back and judged them together. So God brings the soul and casts it in the body [after death] and judges them together' (*Sanh.* 91*a–b*).

Body and soul thus form one whole, and the persistence in later Jewish thought of the belief in the bodily resurrection was in part, at least, due to the impossibility of separating body and soul, even in the aspect of immortality.

The wonderful structure of the body, its delicate adaptations to ends, was the subject of admiration as an expression of the Divine wisdom. This finds its analogue in the liturgy of the Synagogue in a remarkable benediction, which is recited daily in the morning prayers, and is repeated after the normal functions of the body:

'Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who hast formed man in wisdom, and created in him many orifices and vessels. It is revealed and known before the throne of thy glory, that if one of these be opened, or one of those be closed, it would be impossible to exist and to stand before thee. Blessed art thou, O Lord, who healest all flesh and dost wondrously' (Singer, *Authorized Daily Prayer-Book*, p. 4. The benediction is Talmudic: *Berak.* 60*b*).

Though the Jews, especially from the Maccabæan period, were strongly opposed to the Greek games and culture of the body, and felt an especial aversion to nude exposure, they had a keen appreciation of physical beauty, not only in women, but in men. The stature of Judas Maccabæus was glorified, and the beauty of various Rabbis is specially recorded (especially Johanan b. Nappaha, *Berak.* 20*a*; cf. Emil G. Hirsch's remarks in *JE* ii. 617). In the mediæval Heb. poetry (imitating the language of the Song of Songs) there is at once a thorough-going eulogy of female beauty and an application of sensuous phraseology to the mystic relations between man and God.

The body was in the Rabbinic view originally a shapeless mass (*golem*); it was a-sexual, or rather bi-sexual, and only later became differentiated (see the early chapters of the Midrash, *Genesis Rabba*). The number of the limbs (or bones) was calculated as 248, and of nerves (including sinews and even blood-vessels) 365, corresponding to the affirmative and negative precepts of the Law (which were enumerated as 613). Adam's dust was taken from all quarters of the globe (*Sanh.* 38*a*), to express the unity of human nature.

* For the sake of one's fellow-men, however, and on grounds of good taste, bodily cleanliness, in contrast to the slovenliness of the Cynic, is urgently insisted upon (iv. 11. 9 ff.).

The provision of food, drink, and attire was regarded as a religious duty (Maimonides, *Mischne Tora*, '*Deôth*' v.). Bodily cleanliness was similarly regarded; and as part of the 'Law of Holiness,' dietary restrictions and ablutions were prescribed. From the middle of the 2nd cent. A.D. hand-washing before meals became general. Washing in the early morning was older. During ablutions pietists would avert their eyes from their own bodies. The bodily secretions were not unclean until they separated from the body; in the latter case ablution was rigidly enforced. Special communal baths have always been provided in Jewish settlements. The Biblical conceptions as to the defilement caused by dead bodies were continued in later Judaism. But the great bulk of the early Rabbinic laws as to ritual purity applied only to priests or to Israelites about to participate in Temple rites. Maimonides sums up the Rabbinic rulings as follows (*ib.* '*Tumath Okhelim*' xvi. 9):

'It is permitted to every one to touch an unclean thing, and thereby to become unclean. For Scripture only forbids priests and Nazirites from becoming unclean by touching a dead body: hence it is inferred that everybody else may become unclean. And even the priests and Nazirites are only forbidden to become unclean through a *human* corpse. Every Israelite is enjoined to be clean at the time of the festivals, in order that he may be able to enter the temple, and eat holy food' (Montefiore, *Hibbert Lectures*, 1892, p. 476, note 4; Buchler, *Der Galiläische 'Amha'arez*, chs. i.-v.).

Some exalted ideas in relation to the body and its stature and proportion were derived from an anthropomorphic interpretation of the text that man was made in the image of God (Gn 1^{27}). The bodily sign of the covenant is discussed under CIRCUMCISION.

LITERATURE.—Besides sources already noted, see L. Löw, *Die Lebensalter in der jud. Literatur*, 1875; M. Joseph, *Judaism as Creed and Life*, 1903, p 364; art. 'Body in Jewish Theology,' in *JE* iii. 283.

I. ABRAHAMS.

BODY (Hindu).—The Sanskrit terms denoting the various parts of the body agree remarkably with those of the other Aryan languages—a circumstance which renders it probable that a certain knowledge of anatomy may have been part of the common heritage of Aryan nations. Their acquaintance with anatomy would seem to have extended to the internal organs, such as the heart, liver, lungs, bile, kidneys, etc. The ancient Hindu sages have improved and extended this traditional knowledge. Thus, in a hymn of the Atharvaveda (x. 2) on the creation of man, which is supposed to belong to the most ancient portion of that venerable collection, we have a careful and orderly enumeration of the several parts of the skeleton. The hymn consists of a series of questions, such as these:

By whom were fixed the two heels of man? By whom was the flesh constructed? By whom the two ankle-bones; by whom the slender digits; by whom the apertures; by whom the two sets of long bones in the middle? How did they (the *devas*, or gods) make the two ankle-bones of man below, and the two knee-caps above? How many *devas*, and who among them, contributed to build up the bones of the breast and the cartilages of the windpipe of man? How many disposed the ribs of the two breasts; who, the shoulder-blades? Who pierced the seven apertures in the head: the two ears, two nostrils, two eyes, the mouth? Whoever first constructed that brain of his, the brow, the facial bone, the cranium, and the structure of the jaws, and, having done so, ascended to heaven—who, of the many *devas*, was he?

The composition of this hymn is ascribed to a certain sage called Nārāyaṇa, the same to whom the famous Rigvedic hymn (x. 90) on the sacrifice of man (*puruṣasūkta*) is attributed, in which the four classes of priests, nobles, husbandmen, and serfs are declared to have sprung from the mouth, arms, thighs, and feet of the Primeval Male, or original source of the universe. Some ancient medical formulæ, which occur in some of the earliest Sanskrit tracts on medicine, are also supposed to have been proclaimed by this Nārāyaṇa.

Descending from the Vedas to those early pantheistic compositions, the Upaniṣads, we meet, in the *Garbha* (or *Embryo*) *Upaniṣad* with an interesting description of the constitution and growth of the human body, which is said to consist of the five elements—earth, water, fire, air, and space or ether. From cohabitation, a small compact mass is produced, which, within a month, becomes a solid lump of flesh. The head is formed after two months; the feet are developed after three months; the ankles, belly, and thighs, after four months; the spine, after five; mouth, nose, and eyes, after six months; the soul (*jīva*) enters the fœtus in the seventh month; it becomes altogether complete in the eighth month.

The later systems of philosophy assign to each person two bodies—an exterior or gross body (*sthūla-śarīra*), and an interior or subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*, or *liṅga-śarīra*)—much as Pythagoras claimed a subtle ethereal clothing for the soul, apart from its grosser clothing when united with the body. Indian philosophers had to admit the existence of a subtle body, in order to make the process of migration after death intelligible, according to the Indian doctrine of metempsychosis. The subtle body is that which cleaves to the soul in its migration from existence to existence. According to the Vedānta system, this subtle body arises from the so-called *upādhis* ('conditions'), and consists of the senses of the body (*dehendriyas*), both perceptive (*buddhīndriyas*) and active (*karmendriyas*), and of mind (*manas*), intellect (*buddhi*), sensation (*vedanā*), implying beyond itself the *viṣayas*, or objects required for sensation. Its physical life is said to be dependent on the vital spirit (*mukhya prāṇa*), and on the five *prāṇas*, or specialized spirits. According to the Sāṅkhya system, the subtle or inner body, which is, of course, invisible, is formed of eighteen elements. The coarse material body consists either of the earth only, or of the four or five coarse elements, and is made up of six coverings—hair, blood, flesh, sinews, bones, and marrow. In some systems, each organ is connected with its own peculiar element, the nose with the earth, the tongue with water, etc.

The whole subject of anatomy is treated at great length in the vast medical literature of ancient India. The Indian theory of the skeleton, in particular, has been transmitted to us in three different systems, one of which, the anatomical system attributed to the mythical sage Ātreya, while agreeing in the main with the statements quoted above from the Atharvaveda, is also found in several later non-medical Sanskrit works, notably in the celebrated law-book of Yājñavalkya. In its original shape, as restored by the researches of Dr. Hoernle, this enumeration of human bones seems to have been made up of the following thirty items:—(1) 32 teeth (*danta*); (2) 32 sockets (*ulūkhala*) of the teeth; (3) 20 nails (*nakha*); (4) 60 phalanges (*aṅgulī*); (5) 20 long bones; (6) 4 bases of the long bones; (7) 2 heels; (8) 4 ankle-bones; (9) 4 wrist-bones; (10) 4 bones of the fore-arms; (11) 4 bones of the legs; (12) 2 knee-caps; (13) 2 elbow-pans; (14) 2 hollow bones of the thighs; (15) 2 hollow bones of the arms; (16) 2 shoulder-blades; (17) 2 collar-bones; (18) 2 hip-blades; (19) 1 pubic bone; (20) 45 back-bones; (21) 14 bones of the breast; (22*a*) 24 ribs; (22*b*) 24 sockets of the ribs; (22*c*) 24 tubercles fitting into the sockets; (23) 15 bones of the neck; (24) 1 windpipe; (25) 2 palatal cavities; (26) 1 lower jaw-bone or chin; (27) 2 basal tie-bones of the jaw; (28) 1 bone constituting nose, prominences of the cheeks, and brows; (29) 2 temples; (30) 4 cranial pan-shaped bones:—total, 360. The large excess of this number over the some 200 bones in the adult human skeleton, which are distinguished by modern anatomy, is principally due to the fact that, besides including

the teeth, nails, and cartilages in the category of bones, the Indian sages counted prominent parts of bones, such as are now known as processes or protuberances, as if they were separate bones. Allowing for these modifying causes, the views of the early Indian anatomists are surprisingly accurate, which seems to be due to the fact that they were acquainted with the practice of human dissection, allowing bodies to decompose in a river, and taking them out after decomposition had set in, when they were very slowly scrubbed with a whisk made of grass-roots, or hair, or bamboo, or bast, and every part of the body examined, as it became disclosed in the process of scrubbing.

Besides the bones, there are 210 joints (*sandhi*) in the body. The joints of the extremities, jaw, and vertebræ are movable (*chala*); all the rest are immovable (*sthira*). There are 900 ligaments (*snāyu*), *i.e.* sinews and nerves; 500 muscles (*peśī*); 700 veins (*sirā*). Besides the veins, there are other vessels or canals called *dhamani* and *srotas*, all of which proceed from the navel, which resembles the root of a water-lily, and is the root of the vessels of all living animals. This notion seems to have been derived from the appearance of the vessels in their fœtal state. There are six principal limbs: the two arms, the two thighs, the head with the neck, and the trunk or middle portion. Attached to these are 56 minor limbs. The trunk contains 15 organs, such as the heart, the liver, the lungs, the spleen, the two breast-glands, the bladder, the smaller intestines, the larger and grosser intestines, the adeps-bearing duct, etc. There are in the body 10 *añjalis* (a certain measure consisting of two handfuls) of water, 9 *añjalis* of juice (*rasa*), 8 *añjalis* of blood, 7 *añjalis* of stools, 6 *añjalis* of phlegm, 5 *añjalis* of bile, 4 *añjalis* of urine, 3 *añjalis* of adeps, 2 *añjalis* of fat, 1 *añjali* of marrow, ½ *añjali* of brain, ½ *añjali* of the essence of phlegm, ½ *añjali* of semen. Of weak or sensitive parts (*marman*) in the body, which have to be avoided in operations, there are 107, which are accurately described. In some varieties of these, instant death ensues on their being wounded; in others, the person when wounded dies after a few days, or when the external substance has been extracted; in other varieties, lameness, or only pain, is produced. The seven essential parts or elements of the body (*dhātu*) are: chyle or juice (*rasa*), blood (*rakta*), flesh (*māṁsa*), fat (*medas*), bone (*asthi*), marrow (*majjā*), and semen (*śukra*). When there is inequality of proportions between these constituent elements of the body, the person becomes subject to pain or destruction. Hence that has to be regarded as the proper medicine which restores the elements simultaneously to their normal condition by diminishing the increased and increasing the diminished ones. For keeping up the harmony of the elements of a person in health, food is prescribed in various forms, endued with proper attributes. The three humours of the body—air (*vāyu*), bile (*pitta*), and phlegm (*kapha*)—are more important even than the seven elements for the preservation of a healthy and normal condition of the body. Of these humours (*doṣa*), air or wind is dry, cool, light, soft, and always flowing more or less quickly, so as to convey the elements or essential parts over the body; bile, which is situated principally in the stomach, is a hot, bitter, oily fluid, of a blue colour, and sour, and produces animal heat; phlegm is white, heavy, oleaginous, cooling, moist, sweet, and is conveyed by air through the vessels. Most diseases are due to an abnormal increase or decrease of one of the humours. There exists an unmistakable similarity between this Indian theory and the ancient Occidental theory of four humours in the human body. Blood (*rakta*) is sometimes mentioned as a fourth humour in India, as it is in Western medicine.

The supposed parallelism between the microcosm and the macrocosm is also to be found in Indian thought. Thus, as the universe consists of earth, water, heat, air, ether, and Brahman, which is unmanifest, even so Puruṣa, or the male, is said to be made up of six ingredients: the form is earth; the liquid secretions are water; the animal heat is heat; the life-breaths are air; the hollow places are ether; the inner self is Brahman. The self or soul is an emanation from God or the Universal Soul, from which it springs in the same manner as sparks do from a red-hot ball of iron.

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BODY AND MIND.—**1.** The problem of the relation between body and mind has occupied philosophers and scientists since the dawn of thought, and to many it appears no nearer to solution now than then. It has been named the central problem of all philosophy, fundamental alike in the theory of knowledge, in ethics, and in religion. Not less fundamental, however, is it for psychology and for physical science; for the point of view from which we regard mental development, the changing forms of nature, animal life and evolution, will be radically different according as we do, or do not, attribute to mind a controlling or directing part in the process of change and growth. The question of the *relation* between body and mind cannot be discussed apart from the question as to the *nature* of the two factors, and the difference between them. Both are really metaphysical questions; that is to say, the solution put forward will necessarily be incapable of scientific verification; but it should be such as to give a rational account of the possibilities of knowledge, of individual and race progress, of ethical and religious life.

2. Whether we are dealing with the special relation between the individual mind and the individual body, or with the general relation of finite mind to matter, there are three possible solutions of the problem:—(1) That matter or body is the 'real' or 'substantial' thing, while mind is its product, or in some way dependent upon it both for its existence and for its qualities—the solution of Materialism. (2) That mind alone is real or substantial, and that matter or body is its appearance, its manifestation, or in some other way dependent upon it for existence and quality—the solution of Idealism, and of Spiritualism. (3) That mind and matter are equally *real*, and independent entities; or equally *unreal*, as the two 'aspects,' 'appearances,' 'sides' of one and the same reality. The former is Dualism, the latter 'Scientific Monism' or the Philosophy of Identity. There are of course many shades of difference and many overlappings in the different views that have actually been held. The divergencies are especially apparent when a given principle is applied to the relation between the finite body and the finite mind. Thus, even when we regard body as unreal, it is clear that 'my' body is not the manifestation of 'my' mind, but is to a large extent at least independent of it; therefore one may quite well speak of 'my' body—meaning the mind of which the body is a manifestation,—as acting upon 'my' mind, and yet remain a spiritualist or idealist. Here then we have a second basis of division, the lines crossing

the former ones: the relation between finite mind and finite body may be either (*a*) that of *complete dependence*, as when the mind is regarded as the 'secretion of the brain,' or as an 'epiphenomenon,' a by-product of physical process; (*b*) that of *parallelism*, the two series, mental and bodily, corresponding step for step, element for element, with each other, but never acting upon each other; or (*c*) that of *reciprocity* or *interaction*, mental processes being the condition of bodily, bodily of mental processes. The last is the 'natural' standpoint. We regard ourselves as causing bodily movements by our will, and as receiving sensations and perceptions from physical objects which act upon our bodily organs. It is also the standpoint of Dualism on the one hand, and of several forms of Spiritualism or Idealism on the other.

3. It is necessary here to refer only to one of the many forms of Materialism, that in which the mental is regarded as an *effect* of physical processes, although in itself immaterial; or again as not strictly an effect, but as a by-result, an accidental accompaniment, of material processes. Matter—the physical universe—is upheld on this theory as the permanent, eternal, unchanging, over against which mind is as one of the changing and temporary phenomena, adding nothing to the whole, forming no essential part of it, existing merely, as it were, for the delectation of some imaginary spectator. (1) What is fatal to any such reduction of mind to a secondary place is the first principle of Epistemology, viz. that matter or body is given only as *idea* or *content of consciousness*; it cannot be the *source* of that which is a presupposition of its own existence. It is an actual inversion of the true order of things, therefore, to place matter first and mind second. Not only is it not a justifiable inference that matter may be the source of mind; it is not even a possible thought; it is a form of words without meaning. (2) The second difficulty the view has to face is that of the incomparability of mind and matter; they contain no common characteristic except that of change in time; in other respects, as the Cartesians pointed out, every attribute of mind may be denied of body, and *vice versa*. Thus matter occupies space, has form, resistance, etc., while mind is wholly non-spatial in itself, has neither place nor any other spatial determination. Applied to our present question, the disparateness of mind and body means that the one could not be a cause of the other, in the sense of its source or origin. It does not necessarily mean, however, that the one could not *act* upon the other. The objection applies on the materialist assumption that nothing is real but matter; if so, then the psychical must be a quality, or other determination, of body. It is this consequence that is inconsistent with the accepted disparity of bodily and mental processes.* (3) The view is also inconsistent, however, with a third characteristic of mental life, the 'unity of consciousness': no possible *physical* process or combination of processes can be pointed to which is an adequate explanation or ground for this fact. The Ego or Subject of mental states, as conscious of its impressions, and of the relations (of succession, etc.) between its impressions, is a presupposition of all knowledge, all perception, and even of all sensation. There is nothing in the nervous system, for example, to which so weighty a rôle can be attributed; there is not even a real unity in the organism at all. In itself, on the materialist's own theory, matter consists of infinite atoms (or other elements) in endless flux, and all unity or combination exists only (*a*) as a physical resultant of the movements of several atoms or groups of atoms acting together upon a single point, or (*b*) as a teleological conception in the mind of an observer. Even the animal organism is not in itself a unity as a physical congeries; it is a unity only by virtue of its sum of physical forces, or by virtue of its (ideal) tendency towards a purpose or end, the mere conception of which implies a mind. Hence there is no unity except for a mind; and any attempt to reduce mind to matter or to a mere effect of matter is self-contradictory.

4. The doctrine of Psycho-physical Parallelism is liable to the same objections. This view implies, as the idea underlying all its forms, that (1) the two series of events, mental and physical, run alongside of, but in independence of each other; there is no cross action from the one upon the other; (2) each moment or state of consciousness has a physical moment which 'corresponds to it'—its correlate in the bodily sphere. The theories of parallelism diverge, however, from this point. (*a*) To some *every* physical event or state has its mental correlate (universal animism), while to others the mental 'corresponds' only to certain specialized physical structures and processes, viz. those of a nervous system, and in particular those occurring in the cortical centres of the brain of the higher animals. The parallelism is to some limited, to others unlimited. (*b*) To some again, not every mode and characteristic of consciousness has its physical correlate, but only the elementary states—the sensations, feelings, etc.; while the syntheses, activities, and above all the *values*, norms, ideals, 'meanings' of mental life have no physical correlate. To others the parallelism is universal on this side also. (*c*) To some there is causal activity within each series, bodily producing or effecting bodily process, and mental mental, but body not affecting mind, nor mind body; while to others there is no causality in the *mental* series at all, changes of mind depending on the changes of body, with which they directly correspond.

5. A number of scientists and psychologists, including Wundt and Jodl, would limit the *extent* of parallelism. Mind is correlated with body, but only under certain conditions, or where a certain complexity of organic structure—a central nervous system like that of man—has been achieved in the course of evolution and development. Others, among whom are Fechner, Spencer, Haeckel, Hoffding, and Paulsen, make the parallelism universal: mental life is the correlate of bodily life, mental change of bodily change, that is, of movement. Hence, wherever there is motion there is also mind, and wherever there is mind there is also physical motion. The two series, as Spinoza taught, are parallel throughout the whole extent of each; for every mental there exists a physical correlate, for every physical a mental; the motion of the atom or other physical element has, as its 'inner' side, a phase of feeling, of sensation, of will. The complexity of the human mental life is in direct correspondence with the complexity of the physical substratum, the nerve and brain organs and the processes that occur in them. There is unbroken continuity first of all in the 'evolution' of inorganic forms, next in that of plant and animal forms, and finally in the development of the individual organism; and this holds both of body and of mind. Thus in mind we pass from the simplest 'feeling,' the correlate of the atom-movement, to the highest thought or act of intelligence, the correlate of a process in the cortex of the hemispheres of man, without a change of kind. Causal relations nowhere exist, however, between the one series and the other.

6. There can be little doubt that for a parallelist theory the larger scheme is the more consistent. In *partial* parallelism we have continuity in the

* Dr. Ward and Professor Binet, from different points of view, have criticized the principle of the disparateness of mind and matter. See reference below.

physical series, where every event depends upon a previous physical event out of which it arises; on the mental side there is no such continuity, but while the psychical processes are occasionally connected with each other in continuous trains of thought, etc., there are on the other hand constant breaks or gaps in the series. In sleep or other forms of unconsciousness, in the animal life prior to the growth of the higher brain centres, in the transitions from one line of thought to another—in all these cases, there are stages of unconsciousness between, or prior to, the conscious moments. How, if we keep only to the mental series, are these gaps bridged—through what causal agency are the transitions made? The answer must be, either through the body, or through some constant supernatural agency or 'pre-established harmony.' The latter alternative will not readily be accepted by scientists, and as a matter of fact the former is frequently adopted, as by Huxley, for example, although it is inconsistent with the principle of parallelism. Wundt, on the other hand, although partial parallelism is put forward as a 'working hypothesis,' finds himself compelled, when in his Philosophy he attempts a *rationale* of mental life as a whole, to postulate continuity between the successive states of the individual mind, to postulate sensation, feeling, and will, not only in the lower organisms, but even in the inorganic world itself. If there is complete continuity on the one side, as Biology and Geology assume there is on the physical, there must be complete continuity also on the other side, the psychical.

7. We have seen that the question of *causality* on the psychical side is also a subject of difference between parallelists. It is admitted that there is relation of cause and effect between successive states of a material system, such as the bodily organism is. Is the same true of the mental series? It would seem that it must be, if parallelism is to hold, but there are heavy penalties to face for the admission. The chain of causes and effects on the physical side is a mechanical one, each link following its predecessor by a blind necessity which is quite regardless of the ideals, desires, or judgments of the mind connected with the body. If causality on the mental side holds, and if each link is attached to its corresponding link on the physical side, then the time-order must be the same in both; therefore the mental life, the course of development, the history of the soul must also be the subject of a blind mechanism; or, *per contra*, if the mind is self-determining, if it has spontaneity and originality of action, freedom to choose and to act according to norms or ideals of value, then the physical organism cannot be subject to the blind necessity that science assumes. Its laws are not inexorable, and the most confident expectations based on centuries of past experience may be suddenly disappointed. In other words, either mental life is wholly determined by an influence which governs it from the beginning of its history, or the attainment of scientific truth about the physical world is impossible.

8. From this dilemma some have sought to escape by denying that there is any causal link between mental states; there is 'transversal' causation, from body to mind, as well as 'longitudinal' causation from body to body, but there is neither longitudinal nor transversal causation in the other two directions, viz. from mind to mind, or from mind to body. In order to justify the very subordinate rôle attributed to the mind, it is argued that the principle of causation demands the experience of a uniform and invariable sequence between cause and effect, and that no such experience is possible with regard to the sequence of bodily upon mental states, or of mental upon mental. In reply it may be said (1) that the origin of the idea of causality is to be found in our direct experience of mental activity, and especially in activity directed outwards upon the body. The first idea of causality (and it remains at the root of the ideas of causality in modern science) is that causation is spiritual or mental; body, on the other hand, is dead inert matter, and has no spontaneity, no source of movement in itself. Accordingly some modern theories of science seek to dispense altogether with the idea of causation. But (2) 'transverse' causality, from body to mind, is inconsistent with parallelism, and means a return to Materialism; it makes mind a function of body.

9. Probably the most consistent form of parallelism is Monistic Parallelism, which regards the physical and the mental as two sides or aspects of one and the same reality. It is not always clear, either in Spinoza, its originator, or in his modern followers, whether by the one reality is meant an unknown x behind both body and mind, of which they are the diverse 'appearances' or 'manifestations,' or whether the reality is simply their identity, the same being which appears *to itself* as a conscious unity—a mind—appearing *to others* as an extended manifold—the body. In either case, as is almost inevitable, the primacy is found to be given to mind. Thus the unknown x becomes a conscious mind. After all we are conscious *both* of our 'own' minds, *and* (through sense-perception) of our 'own' bodies. But our cognition of the body is a mental process, and we become aware of the body only in and through such a process: the mind therefore is a presupposition of the body; the body is a mode or manifestation of mind. Similar reasoning applies to the second standpoint. The body stands in a two-fold relation to the mind: (1) it is the *object* of knowledge, or of a particular kind of knowledge, and (2) it is the accompaniment, the *condition*, apparently, of every case or instance of knowing, or of any other mental process. A given sense-perception has (*a*) its object in the physical world—say the flight of a bird through the air—and it has (*b*) a physiological process in the brain of the individual as its accompaniment and apparent condition. With which of the two is the mental process 'identical'? If with the brain process, then the possibility of knowledge remains wholly unaccountable. The 'knowing' of an external object by the mind is a mental act to which no physical parallel can be given, and therefore mind has a much wider reach than body. It has rarely been suggested that the mental process is identical with the perceived object, in this case the flight of the bird. Schuppe, indeed, attempts to combine both object and brain process with the mental process in an ingenious way: 'I see, because my eye sees, or because I am this seeing eye, so my motor nerve wills, because I will, because I am this motor nerve' (*Das Grundproblem der Psychologie*, p. 60). That is, both sensation and volition, being mental, are also bodily processes, the Ego or mind being identical with the body. I am therefore the same thing as the content of my perceptions, and the same thing as the object of my volitions. But if the connexion between eye and brain is cut, I no longer see, however healthy the eye itself remains; and, again, what I see almost always differs widely from the picture in the retina or in both retinæ. It is not the eye, but eye plus optic fibres plus optical brain centre, that is the 'organ' of sight. Now, whatever similarity there is between the picture on the retina and the seen object, there is none between the brain process and the seen object; hence the dualism between physical *object* of knowledge and physical *basis* of knowledge re-emerges; a mind

stands always in this double relation to body, and therefore cannot be regarded *simpliciter* as identical with the individual organism to which it 'belongs.'

10. Parallelism leads almost of necessity to an atomistic conception of consciousness. The apparent function of consciousness as the uniting and unifying bond of successive mental states or processes has no physical correlate, and therefore must be rejected as unreal. Neither the body nor the nervous system is a unity in itself; each consists of an aggregate of cells, molecules, atoms or other elements. Still less possible is a physical correlate for the freedom, spontaneity, originality, which the individual mind claims for itself; this also, therefore, must be denied. But psychological atomism — 'psychology without a subject' — and psychological mechanism alike fail to do justice to the most fundamental facts of consciousness. Consciousness appears neither as a *sum* nor as a *series* of states (cf. James, *Principles of Psychol.* i. 159 ff.; and Lotze, *Microcosmus*, i. 2. 1), but as the unity of such a sum or series—a unity also which is *in* each of the parts, and without which none of the parts or elements could exist. A series which is conscious of itself *as* a series is an absurdity (cf. T. H. Green's polemic against Mill and Hume). It is not necessary to go back to the old view of the Ego as the *source*, the principle or cause, of its own states: but even as the *subject of experience*, every conscious mind is something more than any or all of the 'states' or 'processes' of which it is conscious. In particular, the advance from 'lower' to 'higher' mental achievements, from simple to more complex mental life, as from sensation to perception and from perception to thought, is possible only on the assumption of a directive activity of the mind, an activity which cannot possibly inhere in, or belong to, the elementary states or simple processes themselves, out of which the higher forms are derived.

11. The chief advantage of Parallelism as a hypothesis is undoubtedly the same as that of the 'Twofold Truth' of an earlier philosophy; it enables its adherents to side with the materialists from one point of view, with the spiritualists from another. Both systems, it is held, may be true; each at least may present one aspect of the 'ultimate' or 'absolute' truth. On the one hand, all actions—the evolution, the growth, the adaptations of organisms to their environment—are determined by a blind mechanism, each phase succeeding each by a necessity which is absolute; that is to say, from each situation there is one and only one development possible, and that is the development which actually occurs. An action — a form of behaviour—is explained only in terms of physiological, that is, ultimately, physical and chemical processes. Design, selection, choice, feeling, desire, emotion play no part in the world's activity—*from this point of view*. On the other hand, seen from the inner side, this necessity becomes freedom and spontaneity; the mechanism of the atoms, the movement of the molecules, become desire and judgment, feeling and will: the organism is a personality, and determines its own ends, its own life. To the Cæsar of science are rendered the things which are Cæsar's—the conservation of energy, the reduction of the whole life of the universe to chemical, electrical, and mechanical processes; and to God the things that are God's—the spiritual life with its struggles and falls, its ideals and its redemptions. The question is not, however, whether there is any advantage in this theory; there certainly would be, if it were true: but is it even thinkable? Are we not using bare terms, without any meaning behind them, when we speak of the *same* reality as being at once determined from without, and self-determining? A man has an alternative of going abroad for a holiday or remaining at home for his work; he 'decides' for the latter. Now it has a perfectly clear meaning if we say that the man's 'choice' and action are really determined by his structure, as it has come to be through physical heredity and environment. It has also a perfectly good meaning to say that his choice is free, is an expression of his mental character, of the ideals by which he is attracted; but it has no meaning whatever to say that it is *both* determined *and* free. Whichever form of parallelism is adopted, a given bodily action has its mental correlate, which is either the same *in reality* as the bodily action, or is at least its necessary correspondent. Whatever laws govern the existence of the one must also govern the existence of the other: if a physical process c is a necessary sequent of a and b, then its corresponding mental process C must also be a necessary sequent, not merely of mental A and B, but *also* of the physical series a b.

The use of the term 'appearances' or 'aspects' is misleading. Aspects or appearances presuppose an observer; who is the observer in the case of body and mind? He must be some being who is neither mind nor body; yet, as a knowing being, he must be mind. Thus we come back to our starting-point: mind has priority over body; body is the appearance of mind. This, however, is *not* parallelism.

12. The alternative is *interaction*—the assumption that body acts upon mind, and mind upon body. Unfortunately, such a theory is subject to objections of great force from the points of view both of the physicist and of the spiritualist.

(1) If action of any kind takes place from the mental upon the physical world, or *vice versa*, then the principle of conservation of energy cannot be maintained. No means exists by which the amount of energy lost by the brain in effecting a sensation, or added to the brain in a volition, may be measured. *Some* energy must presumably be lost, however, when a physical process is the condition of a mental impression: there cannot remain the same quantity in the body, since, in fact, the action of the body is found to be different, according as there has or has not intervened a conscious process. Again, the same stimulus does or does not give rise to consciousness, according to its intensity, *i.e.* according to the force with which it acts upon the nerve-centres; in the case of subliminal stimuli we can only assume that the energy expended is not sufficient to effect the change in consciousness. The principle of conservation has two sides (cf. Wundt, *System der Philos.*[2] p. 483)—(α) that the total amount of energy in the physical universe remains always the same, and (β) that, when work is done by any *physical* system, the amount of energy lost must be fully compensated for (however different the form it takes—heat, electricity, light, motion, etc.) by the gain of the other physical systems affected by the work. The second part of the principle may be accepted apart from the first; it has, however, no bearing on the relation between mind and body. The first part is more purely hypothetical, and need not be admitted by psychology, if inconsistent with the facts of that science. It has been suggested (α) that the mind may alter or affect only the *direction* of energy or of its transformation, not its amount (von Hartmann, etc.). But in matters of energy and force the two things, quantity and direction, cannot be separated from each other. Again, (β) the balance may always be maintained between the amount taken away and the amount added in the various operations between mind and body. This, however, is again a recourse to miracle, or to some

mystical pre-established harmony. The only defence possible is to admit the charge, but to deny that the action complained of is a crime. The principle of conservation is a hypothesis formed to explain certain phenomena of the inorganic world, verified as far as experience has gone (although now being called in question) for these only; not verified at all for organic processes, such as growth and reproduction, still less for those physical actions which we ascribe to mental influence. It has also been suggested (by Stumpf, for example, and from another standpoint by Fechner) that we may regard mental activity as itself a form of *energy*; that the physical energy expended in the central nervous system is transformed into an equal quantity of mental energy, and *vice versa*. What we call mental energy certainly increases with physical health, and especially with the health of the brain; it decreases with the degeneration or decay of the brain. It is questionable, however, whether the term 'energy' in the two cases is really being used in the same sense, as it must if there is to be equivalence between the two kinds.*

(2) It may be said that the action of body upon mind is inconceivable; that the only forms of action given to us in experience are either (*a*) of body upon body, or (*b*) of the mind upon itself. The first we have from external, the second from internal perception. Berkeley and Hume, however, long ago disposed of the view that we ever directly experience the action of body upon body; and Hume also questioned the assumption that we are conscious of, or have any direct knowledge of our own mental activity. Causality may be a presupposition of experience; it is certainly not given *in* experience. On the other hand, the 'uniform succession' which we regard as the cue for the application of this category is found far more frequently between mental and bodily processes than between mental and mental, or between bodily and bodily. If causation is a mystery, it is as mysterious in the action of two bodies upon each other as in the action of the mind upon the body; if it is a 'fundamental principle' of thought, it may be applied in the latter case with more assurance than in the former.

(3) But how, it may be said, is mind to set about its action upon body. A 'voluntary' movement starts, let us say, in certain brain cells, and proceeds outwards to the muscles. How does the mind, an immaterial substance or subject, set this process going? Somewhere the push must be given, or the spark applied. How is it done? Here the difficulty of the disparity of mind and body presents itself with great, and for many, it appears, with overwhelming force. It is not, however, in principle any more curious or incomprehensible than that body should 'correspond' to mind, whatever may be taken as the meaning of that mysterious word; not more so than that one reality should appear as two totally disparate entities, as Monism assumes. Somewhere or other we must arrive at an unexplained and, perhaps, inexplicable fact of experience; and for interaction, this local action of mind upon body, with the converse qualitative action of body upon mind (as when a given, definitely localized, nerve process gives rise to a sensation of red, while another, differently localized, gives rise to a sensation of cold or of bitter), marks that point.

Body may 'ultimately' prove to be mind, and yet the relation between a finite body and 'its' mind be one of interaction. A system of this nature is contained in Professor Busse's critical and thorough study of the subject. We have seen that our own and all other bodies are given to us, and are known by us, only as contents of consciousness, as actual or possible sensation, perception or thought, while various social experiences forbid us to regard them as 'merely' our *individual* or *subjective* impressions. We may conclude, then, that our own body and other bodies, which we only gradually learn to distinguish from our own, are appearances to us of mental or spiritual realities—realities distinct from and independent of ourselves, yet akin to us; that these realities differ widely from each other, and from us, in the degree of mental development at which they have arrived, and of which they are capable; that they affect or influence us only through that entity or system of entities which appears to us as 'our' body, and that they in turn are influenced by us only through the same intermediary. Thus our body is not the 'manifestation' or 'outer aspect' of our mind, but is relatively independent of it, being the 'manifestation' of another, or other minds. On the other hand, our mind's development is bound up with that of the body, which is so intimately connected with it. What we may regard as in a special sense the growing-point of the body throughout life, namely, the brain, has its structure, its organization, in large part determined by the actions of our mind, by which it becomes a more and more perfect instrument for the realization of our desires and our ideals, whether high or low. It may be held also that the gradual failure of powers with old age or the temporary failure with illness or fatigue—failure which, though primarily physical, seems to reach to the very core of the mind's being—is defect not of the player, but of the instrument on which he plays, and through which alone his genius can find fitting expression. See BRAIN AND MIND, MIND, SOUL.

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BOEHME.—I. *LIFE.*—Jacob Boehme (sometimes spelt Behmen), called the 'Teutonic Theosopher,' was born in November 1575, in the village of Old Seidenburg, near Gorlitz, in Upper Lusatia, which in his time seems to have belonged to Bohemia, though in 1635 it was transferred to Saxony, the Elector of which was Boehme's protector during the later part of his life. The parents of Boehme

* On the whole question of the validity of the principle of Conservation of Energy, and of its bearing on the problem of Mental Causality, see Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, especially Lect. vi.

were poor pious folk, who trained up their son in their own (the Lutheran) faith and in a knowledge of the Scriptures. The only education he got was of the most elementary character. At an early age he was put to tend cattle, with other children of the village, and, while thus employed, had his first remarkable experience. Having climbed (says Martensen) to the top of a mountain called the 'Land's Crown,' he saw 'a vaulted entrance composed of four red stones, and leading into a cavern. When he had toiled through the brushwood that surrounded the entrance, he beheld in the depths of the cave a vessel filled with money. He was seized with an inward panic, as at something diabolical, and ran away from the spot in alarm. Subsequently he often returned to the spot, accompanied by other boys. But entrance and cavern had vanished.'

After this, he was apprenticed to a shoemaker in Görlitz, and had another strange experience. While he was in charge of the shop during his master's absence, a stranger entered and priced a pair of boots. The lad, thinking he had no authority to sell, tried to get out of the difficulty by naming a prohibitive price; but the stranger paid it, and, after having gone out into the street, turned and called in a loud voice, 'Jacob, come forth!' Surprised that his name should be known, Jacob went out to him; when the stranger, fixing on him a penetrative gaze, said, 'Jacob, thou art yet little, but thou shalt become great, and the world shall wonder at thee. Therefore be pious and fear God, and especially read diligently the Holy Scriptures; for thou must endure much misery and poverty and persecution; but God loves and is gracious unto thee.' After this Jacob became still more serious and devout. Unable to endure the ribald and profane language of his mates in the shop, he felt obliged to reprove them, whereupon his master turned him out, saying he would have no 'house-preacher' to stir up strife. Jacob now entered upon his *Wanderjahr*. In the course of his travels he discovered into how many warring sects the Protestant party was split up, and how fierce and uncharitable were their contentions. They seemed to him as Babel, and he has much to say about this Babel in his writings.

At the end of his wanderings, he returned to Görlitz, and in 1599 married the daughter of a tradesman, with whom he lived happily for twenty years, and by whom he had four children. Now further visions came. When he was sitting one day in his room, his eye caught the reflexion of the sun's rays in a bright pewter dish. This threw him into an inward ecstasy, and it seemed to him that he beheld the inward properties of all things in nature opened to him. It was one of his ideas that the quality of everything is expressed by its shape, colour, scent (which he calls its 'signature') to such as have eyes to see. Ten years later, he had another 'opening' which went much further, and showed him the inwardness of all manifestation, how it arose, and its meaning and end. He felt an inward impulse to write down what had thus been revealed, not for publication—for he felt himself too simple to teach others—but (as he says) for a memorial to himself, so that, should the power of interior vision fail, he might have a record of what he had seen, and thus hold it permanently. The book he now wrote was the *Aurora, or Morning Redness*, and was the cause of the commencement of that persecution which for so many years embittered his life. The work was, of course, in manuscript. The written copy chanced to be seen by a nobleman, Carl von Endern, who had called on him. Being greatly pleased with it, the nobleman begged permission to borrow it for a short time, and then, without Boehme's consent, had some copies of it made. One of these happened to fall into the hands of the Pastor Primarius of Gorlitz, Gregorius Richter, a violent man and inflated with the dignity of his office. He attacked Boehme in a sermon on 'False Prophets.' Boehme, who was in church, went to him afterwards and most meekly begged to know in what he was wrong. But Richter would not hear a word, and the next day went to the Town Council and demanded Boehme's expulsion, threatening them with the vengeance of God if they refused. A decree of banishment was passed, and no time was allowed him to wind up his affairs and make arrangements. Boehme meekly submitted, saying, 'Yes, dear Sirs, since it cannot be otherwise, it shall be done.' There is some difference of statement as to what happened after this. Martensen says that the next morning the Council sent to recall him, and told him he might continue to live in Gorlitz if he would give up writing books and stick to his trade. This he undertook to do, and for five years abstained from writing, though much troubled in conscience as to whether he ought not to obey God rather than man. At the end of this time, conscience and the entreaties of friends triumphed, and he again began to write, and was then finally banished. Others say that the Council offered to revoke the sentence of banishment, but implored him—for the sake of the peace of the town—to remove away of his own accord, and that he did this.

It is certain that, when banished finally, he went, on a citation for heresy, to Dresden. Here the Elector appointed six learned doctors to examine him and report as to whether he ought to be protected or punished. His answers seem to have produced a striking effect on these men. One is reported to have said, 'I would not take the whole world, and condemn this man.' Another replied, 'How can we judge what we have not understood?' He seems to have returned to Gorlitz, after this examination, under the protection of the Elector, against which even the rancour of Richter could do nothing. His fame as a man of interior wisdom drew to him many learned men and noblemen.

At the house of one of his noble friends, in Silesia, he fell into a fever which developed into gastric disease. He felt a premonition of his end, and asked to be carried back to Gorlitz. Here he was attended by his old friend, Dr. Kober. After an illness of a fortnight he asked for the last Sacrament. Richter was dead, but the new minister held similar opinions, and refused to administer it unless Boehme would subscribe the Lutheran Confession of Faith. This he immediately did, and the Sacrament was administered. On the night of Sunday, Nov. 21st, 1624, he called his son, Tobias, and asked him whether he heard the sweet music. Tobias said he did not, and his father bade him open the door, when he must surely hear it. He asked the hour, and, being told it was after two o'clock, he said, 'My time is not yet: three hours hence is my time.' At six in the morning he bade them all farewell; and saying, 'Now I go hence to Paradise,' he quietly departed.

II. *BOEHME'S SYSTEM.*—1. **His doctrine of origins.** — Boehme's system goes back to the beginning, to the time when the Divine Being first proceeded to manifestation. To attempt to go behind this, he says (*Three Principles*, xiv. 84), confuses the mind. He also says (*ib.* v. 19) that the origin of things ought not to be inquired into at all: yet since sin has now arisen, and we find ourselves fallen from the glory of God, we *must* know how sin arose, or we cannot know the remedy for it. And we cannot know how sin arose without opening the mystery of the process to manifestation, and the arising of the second, or contrary,

Will, and the seven Forms of Nature, and how the two eternal Principles—darkness and wrath of the first, and light and love of the second—arose, and this present world of the third Principle which stands between the two, and is qualified in good and evil. The ability to open this mystery is ours only when we are led by the guidance of the Holy Spirit; but as we are (in our deepest spirit) out of the Divine, we are able (in this spirit) to penetrate so far; for every spirit can see back into 'its own Mother,' but no further (*ib.* ii. 1).

Of the state before manifestation, all we can say is the following. The Supreme Spirit (whom we call 'God') was in a state which Boehme calls the 'Still Rest.' In Him was active one only Will, which, being one, did nothing but only BE, in one state and without any happening. All that afterwards came into manifestation through the process about to be described was in Him in a state inchoate and purely subjective. There was yet no creature to know Him and rejoice in the knowledge, and find the highest delight in the recognition of His Power and Goodness. All was yet pure potentiality; all were in Him as undifferentiated elements in the content of His Being, and knew not themselves or each other. In short, all was Essence in the simple Being of the Deity as a One Will, and there was no *existence*.

It is clear that such a statement as the above is derived as an impression from abstract considerations (arising in the nature of the case) as they must appear to our highest metaphysical perception. Boehme does not claim that such a presentation is a full and complete account of so stupendous and mysterious a matter, but only that it is the best we can yet see. To him it was probably presented in mystic vision; but we, lacking this, can only follow him with our best thought. It cannot really be as described, for we are obliged to think and speak in terms of time and space, and in God these are not. Boehme saw this fact clearly, and often warns us that, though he is compelled to speak in these terms, we must remember that the transcendent Fact is otherwise. If we think at all, we must think in these terms, and there is no harm in so doing so long as we bear in mind that the transcendent Fact is only feebly apprehended, and never in any way comprehended, by our thought. Therefore, while we have to speak of a time before manifestation, we must remember that this is only by a logical necessity, arising from our present limitation, and not a full presentment of the Fact.

When manifestation was to take place, the first necessity, says Boehme, was that a second and contrary Will should arise. This Will is not a new thing in God, for, as to His content, He changes not. It is again a logical necessity, because out of a one Will no 'manifoldness' can come, no conflict or strife or dramatic interest. So we must say that a second Will arose, and the immediate result of its arising was a darkening of the primal and, till now, universal light. Even light cannot be known consciously as such if there is nowhere any darkness. And as we know and appreciate only through experience of a contrary, and God has made us thus, the presumption may very well be that there is something in Him which answers (though in a far-off and exalted way) to this law of our minds to which we know no exception.

Immediately upon the darkening there arose the first Form of Nature, which Boehme calls *Harshness*.* This is the principle of hardness, close holding of itself to itself, and resistance to modification—a strongly conservative principle. The second Will must produce the contrary of the first—darkness, overshadowing, drawing together, hardening. Spiritually it is the power of self-centredness, self-satisfaction; of that inertia which resists conviction of sin, submission to the will of God, and love of the brethren.

Immediately on the arising of this Form, the first Will, disliking the darkness, seeks to turn back again to the light. But this it cannot do without reversing the Will to manifestation, which is impossible. Thereupon arises the second Form of Nature, *Attraction*. It is the reverse of the first. It seeks change and new combinations, and will let nothing alone—the principle of dissatisfaction and unrest. Spiritually, it is that which forces us into ceaseless activity, whereby we enter into experiences, and so (in the end) work out our *reductio ad absurdum*.

Out of the conflict of the first two Forms arises the third, *Bitterness*. It may be easier to catch the ideas of these first three Forms if we call them (in modern terminology) *Homogeneity*, *Heterogeneity*, and *Strain*. The Strain, or tension, arises from the contrariety and opposition of the first two. It is the bitterness of dissatisfaction which, as to the darkness, expresses itself in discontent and complaining, but, as to the light, becomes discontent with our own sin, sorrow for it, and tears of penitence.

Out of the Strain, as it increases in intensity, there arises the fourth Form, *Fire*. At this point, the operation being carried on reaches the degree at which a self-consciousness arises, with a sense of own will and choice. At this point also the evolution divides into two contrary directions, and it is within the power of the consciousness to decide which of the two it will take. The Fire at first is a cold, dark fire which can burn and hurt, but cannot purify—like an iron heated to just below redness. As it burns and the Strain increases, it grows in heat till it reaches redness, which is a light of low illuminating power, and shows things very dimly. Such is the light of the external man, and the light is the quality of the self-consciousness, which in this case is full of greed, wrath, and pride.

But if the evolution goes on in the right way, then the dull glow of the Fire grows stronger and stronger, until it passes into the fifth Form, *Light*. This is the true Divine Light, and 'makes manifest' things as they really are. When this Light arises, the Fire sinks down from its horrible raging, and becomes only a meek and pleasant warmth, giving all its power to the Light. Thereupon the first three Forms also change their character and become gentle and soft and harmonious. It is as though in the Light they first *see* their true function and purpose in the great work, and are content to fulfil it, and cease to express themselves as they are in themselves (in own self-will) without regard to the end they are there to produce. It is the change which (in modern terms) would be called the passing from self-consciousness to cosmic consciousness; when, instead of thinking of the universe as made for our self, we think of our self as made for the universe. Thus we rise to a higher grade of being and a truer joy than the self-fulfilment of our own small wishes and loves could ever give us.

The sixth Form of Nature Boehme calls *Sound*. The quality—first fixed towards good by the arising of the Light—now begins to express itself to perception. The manifold ways in which this expression is effected — by speech, cries, colours, scents, tastes, feeling, lightness, heaviness, and so on—are what he means by Sound.

The seventh and last Form of Nature he calls *Figure*. Here the whole 'thing,' thus having attained its being in Essence, now puts on a shape, a body, fit to be its full and perfect expression, and a mansion of the six Forms. Hence, as the evolution has gone on in rightful order, arise all forms of beauty, all fair colours and sweet

* One of the difficulties in following Boehme arises from the fact that, in different passages, he calls these Forms of Nature by different names, according to different points of view. Thus he sometimes calls the first a *hard attracting*, though he calls the second *attraction*. He means that the first attracts so hard itself to itself that it attracts nothing else, while the second seeks to attract other things to itself, but does not attract itself to itself. The essential idea of the Forms will soon become clear upon patient study

scents and pleasing sounds; and the creature stands marked with the 'signature' of God, a being to His honour and glory and its own indescribable delight.

But should the evolution proceed from the fourth Form in the false direction, that is, should the will elect to stand in self-will, and prefer might, power, anger, to meekness, humility, and love, then its light is but the dull, red glow of the fire; its sound is discordant and harsh, and its figure repulsive and monstrous. For the first three Forms are the real *bases* of Becoming, and originate the Essence which becomes substantial in the sixth, and embodied in the seventh. If these first three are not modified by the arising of the divine Light in the fifth, they must remain expressed in their own self-quality of fierce rage and fury, and the creature of which they form the basis will be of like nature and signature. It is in the fourth Form that the great choice has to be made whether the Fire shall be the fire of 'self,' which consumes, or the fire of 'love,' which illuminates.

It is absolutely necessary, says Boehme, that the first three Forms shall be there; without their presence no creature can come to being. They are the power to 'being' in every mineral, plant, and animal. But they should never be allowed so to be known or manifested as that their essential 'own self quality' should have any influence in determining the quality manifested. We know that Love is strong, the very strongest of all things; but in Love this strength is never on the surface. As soon as Love strives to 'force,' it ceases to be Love; when it keeps the strength in a hiddenness, and shows as its seen quality only meekness and gentleness, then the unseen base makes the meekness and gentleness strong. But should the creature despise the meekness, and resolve to compel and force others to love it, then the force, being shown, can no longer act as a base, and the supposed force becomes the weakest of all things, because devoid of its basal strength.

Nevertheless, it is in the power of all creatures, from human upwards, to open the first three Forms, and make this quality their quality. This Lucifer did. He was created a Throne-Angel, but allowed the might of the Fire to become dominant in him, and despised the meekness and self-surrender of the light of love. Hereupon his light went out, not, as afterwards happened to Adam, into a hiddenness, but into absolute extinction. The meek love of God, which alone could re-kindle it, *that* he has despised, and now stands in eternal rejection from the Light, shut up to the Fire he has chosen, and in which alone he is capable of finding joy. He is now God manifested as to the first Principle, as Jesus Christ is God manifested as to the second; for Christ is the true Light, and the Devil is the apparent Darkness. Each abides eternally in his own Principle.

Of these Principles, it is now time to speak. There are three: two eternal, and the third temporal. The first Principle is the dark world of the Anger, in which the first three Forms stand open and operative in giving quality, and the last three are hidden. The second Principle is the light world in the Love, where the first three Forms are not allowed to give quality, but remain practically hidden, while the last three alone qualify. Between these two stands the third Principle, this Present World—which had a beginning and will have an end. The first Principle is all evil; the second is all good; the third stands in good and evil. While man is in it, both the two eternal Principles seek to press into him; the dark world strives to draw him down into it, and the light world strives to lift him up into it. He stands between the two, and to whichever of them he here inclines his imagination, to that he will hereafter belong (Boehme says eternally). For there is no open way from the first Principle to the second save through the third, which stands open to both; and when this temporary world of the third Principle has passed away, no passage will remain, and the two will be so absolutely shut off from each other that each will seem *all that is* to itself, and be unconscious of any other.

2. Doctrine of Sin and of the Fall.—Sin, in Boehme's system, is really a false imagination. But, as our imagination defines the real for us, the concept is much stronger than it might sound. If the false imagination lasts eternally, we are eternally in Hell. If a true imagination lasts eternally, we are eternally in Heaven. For nothing short of the power of God, co-operating with the consenting will of man, can enable man to alter his imagination; that is, his consciousness of his state and surroundings, of what is real and of what is not.

The problem of the origin of Evil has long perplexed students of Divine wisdom. Boehme seems scarcely to be conscious of those aspects of the problem which press upon many hearts and minds at the present day. He simply throws the whole blame and responsibility on the perverted will of a creature (Lucifer), and this only removes the difficulty one step further back. Nevertheless, his system contains a remarkable suggestion of a solution.

He is careful to assure us that God (as He truly is, as He appears to an imagination formed in, and by, the Light) is never angry and never punishes. Seen by such an imagination, what looks to its opposite like punishment appears as loving warning and guidance. But the false imagination cannot but think of God as like itself; therefore it takes God's mercy for His wrath, and His guidance for revenge. All the six Forms of Nature have come out from God, and so the first three (which, when manifested, appear as wrath, anger, jealousy) are in Him, only in Him they are *never* manifested. Boehme commonly needs careful interpreting. He calls the first Principle the Principle of the Father, and the second that of the Son. But he adds that in reality the Father is never apart from the Son. We see, therefore, that what he really means is that, *if* the Father should (by a false imagination) be thought of as existing alone, and apart from the Son, He must (by such an imagination) be known as wrathful, angry, jealous. And, as such an imagination exists, He must speak to it in the terms of its own apprehension. But in Himself, as known by a true (because Divinely illuminated) imagination, He is all Love and Goodness.

Sin arises when the first three Forms are brought out of the hiddenness, not merely to look at (as will be explained further on), but to be tasted and *known*, and their own self-quality accepted as our quality. But as to the transcendent reality, they *are never thus brought out*. The transcendent reality is known to man only through his imagination. When illuminated by the Light, his imagination rightly pictures to him the reality; but when not so illuminated, the reality is wrongly pictured, and what he imagines to be the fact is the reverse of the fact. Therefore sin is possible only if a false imagination be possible; and can take on an appearance of reality only in such a false imagination. Thus at once sin is, and is not. When it is said, 'God cannot look upon sin,' the expression is more profoundly true than we suspect. He sees it, not as a positive thing Himself has made, but as the imagination of the thought of the heart of a creature who is unaware that the light in him is darkness. The fact is not

as the false imagination pictures it, and the thing pictured exists nowhere save in the false imagination. That gives it reality to the man whose imagination it is, but cannot make it actually real.

But however unreal the *content* of the false imagination may be, the false imagination itself is real. It was real to Boehme because he believed that, if not rectified in this life, it would eternally abide; for there is no better test of the real than the fact that it abides. If we might eliminate this idea of its eternity, the problem would be solved, for sin would then be but as a passing madness, and Hell and Earth but an episode in the eternity of Heaven.

Boehme lays down this clear principle (*Myst. Mag.* I. vi. 12), 'that the fullness of joy might know itself, the keen tartness of the Source [that is, of the first three Forms] must be a cause to the Joy; and the darkness, a manifestation of the Light; that so the Light might be manifestly known, which could not be in the One.' But how can this be, if the first three Forms are never to be explored? Here again Boehme offers us a key.

'The outward spirit and body was unto the inward as a *Wonder* of Divine manifestation, according to the Fire-dark and Light world, a mirror of the great Omnipotence and Omniscience of God, and the inward was given to it for a ruler and guide. As God plays with the time of this outward world, so likewise the inward, Divine man should play with the outward in the manifested wonders of God in this world, and open the Divine wisdom in all creatures, each according to his property; so likewise in the earth, in stones and metals, in which also there is a twofold Essence, viz one from the original of the Fire-dark world, and one of the original of the holy Light world. All this was given him for his play' (*Myst. Mag.* I. xvi. 9–11).

Through the clumsy (and, to some, repellent) wording,* it is not hard to catch the suggestion here contained. The first three Forms are the sole causes of variety in the manifestations. As the first or second or third predominates—which is possible in an infinitely varying series of grades or degrees—so the variation arises. Thus out of these Forms arise the *wonders*. These may be looked into—by a will so set in the Will of God that it is in no danger of wanting to do more than look, never to taste or *know*—with perfect safety and propriety. We should *play* with them, as little children play at 'shop,' without ever dreaming of making it the serious business of the whole life. They play for the time, and then let it go, and so shut it up again. The harm is where the will is so unstable that from looking it passes to longing after, and from this to tasting and proving; so that the might of the Fire-world gains a hold, and moves the being to put his whole imagination into this 'play,' whereby from play it passes to earnest, and surrounds the whole life, and becomes its one desire. Then the true imagination becomes as dead, the spiritual perception closes, and the being lives henceforth in the world of its false imagination, and knows no other.

The consequence of sin, in Boehme's teaching, is a disturbance of the relations of the parts to the All. Man should be to the lower creatures what God should be to him. Over him God should have sole dominion, and over them he should have sole dominion. Thus, through all the infinite multiplicity of the external expressions of the Divine properties, one Will should be dominant—the will of man in whom God's Will is dominant. Thus God would be (virtually) *All in All*. All the creation would then be in true harmony and temperature, each would love and serve the rest, and no antagonistic will would arise to introduce strife and discord. The elements whence strife arises, and the strife itself, might be known as a *speculation* (in the old sense of 'looking into'), but never as an actualization. Such was the first world of the Temperature, before Lucifer's and Adam's fall.

The outer process whereby the Fall was effected was, as the first and initiatory step, the sin of Lucifer, who was pleased with the might of the Fire in the fourth Form, and rejected the meekness of the submission in the Divine Light, which would otherwise have qualified the might. Secondly and directly, it was the act of our first parents in eating of the forbidden fruit.

Only a hasty, general sketch of Boehme's teaching as to this can be given here. Adam was created out of the two Principles—he had an external out of the Ens of the Fire-source, and an internal from the Ens of the Light-source. The former is the masculine element, the latter the feminine. The two sex-elements were united in one form, which was that of a masculine Virgin. The Fall had a preparation and a culmination. The preparation was that the bi-une being, Adam, felt 'alone.' He should have 'propagated magically' through the union of the two elements in himself, for he was a two-in-one (*i.e.* both 'him' and 'them,' as he is called in Gn 1^{27}). He would thus have 'multiplied' and found companionship. But this he proved unable to do. The true 'help meet for him' was *in* him, but he looked around instead of within. Therefore the woman-element must be externalized that he might become conscious of it. But this could not be done in the true, Divine imagination which was in full rapport with the transcendent Fact. He is therefore caused to fall into a 'deep sleep,' and in this lower grade of imagination finds the internal externalized. They are still in Paradise, but now in danger, and are warned of it. They are not to inquire into the nature of good and evil; for now, their imagination being in a degree false, they are likely to wish to do more than *speculate*; they may want to *know*. God alone may *know* good and evil (see Gn 3^{22}). Thus the Tree of Life to the bi-une Adam becomes the Tree of Temptation to the divided Adam and Eve. The danger now was that they should desire after a *good* which they could understand from and in themselves and not from and in God, a *pleasure* which in this same way they could feel to be such, and a *wisdom* which would make them not submissive to the One Will but possessed of a will of their own, and an imagination arising from the sight of their own eyes. This false imagination instantly became operative, but not as they had hoped. The Divine perception went into a hiddenness and virtually died in them; and as they had known themselves only in this imagination, *they* virtually died and arose to *newness* of life, but as the change was downwards, it would be newness of *death* rather than of life. The body of the heavenly One Pure Element disappeared (if, indeed, it had not done so before in the falling into a deep sleep), and they have now a body of four elemental, corruptible matters, made (as science tells us) 'bone for bone, muscle for muscle, and nerve for nerve' like the beasts that perish. Instantly also the result reacts through nature. The Divine element, which before had budded through the earth and produced fruits wholly good, now withdraws into the hiddenness, and the earth bears 'thorns and thistles,' and only such grains and fruits as contain—with the good of nutriment for the animal body—the evil which through digestion and excretion has to be separated and cast out, the like of which could never be in heaven where no corruption can enter. Disease and sickness manifest themselves, poison manifests itself in certain plants, and a fierce and savage nature in some of the animals. Thus the Fall of man infected the whole 'dominion' he should have ruled as God's vicegerent; so that now 'the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together,' in an own self-will which manifests *as it* will, and not in submission to the will of God.

3. **Doctrine of Regeneration.**—St. Paul declares that the creation was thus subjected to 'vanity' in hope that it should 'be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God' (Ro 8^{21}). Lucifer's fall was beyond remedy, says Boehme; Adam's was not. Lucifer imagined into the first Principle (which is eternal); Adam only into the third. He desired to know good and evil; Lucifer had said, 'Evil, be thou my good.' Thus Adam introduced into his mind a false knowledge which yet did not entirely obliterate, but only obscured, the true, so that he yet can know evil as evil; while Lucifer knows evil as good. Therefore Adam died, not to the entire ability to know good, but only to the true, Divine perception which knows *only* good. But though he died to this, it did not die to him: it went into a hiddenness, but is still there as a latent potentiality in him, though at first he is so completely unaware of it that it is as if it were not in him at all. His state is rather a logical than an absolute death; it is practically absolute as far as his consciousness goes, but his consciousness does not embrace the whole content of reality.

* Boehme was an uneducated man, and often bemoans the fact, saying that he could have expressed himself better had he been better educated

His natural life is a life in death, and if the dead life is to come to real life, it can only be through that whereby we come to this life—a birth; therefore (as our Lord said to Nicodemus) 'ye *must* be born anew' (*δεῖ ὑμᾶς γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν*).

The power to this New Birth is the power of God through the life and death of Christ who came down into our false imagination (but not into its dominance) to 're-tincture' the disappeared Divine nature that stood as dead, that it might again spring forth to newness of life. He brought the true imagination into the false, and showed it to us visibly in His life and character; whereby we may catch the idea that ours is not the true, and so come to desire the true. Then He leads us in the one way to the recovery of the true, by leading us to the Cross, whereon we must (in and with Him) crucify the false which lies over and obscures the true; then the true arises necessarily and becomes our new imagination, that is, our new 'self' and life.

The promise given to our first parents of the Treader on the Serpent, though not immediately fulfilled—not, indeed, till many centuries afterwards—availed to preserve the Divine nature in man from doing more than disappear, from actually abandoning him. It remained hidden and uncognized, but it was there; till the fullness of time, when Christ was born of a pure Virgin. The necessity for the Virgin-birth lies in this, that the male seed is from the Fire-source, and the female from the Light-source; so the special nature of the Fire—a hard-set selfhood—is less present in the female than in the male (*Myst. Mag.* I. xxiii. 43). Thus our Lord was born, not of 'bloods' (*i.e.* a divided parentage) nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God; that is, of the heavenly Water and of the Spirit; and thus must we again be 'born anew.' All through His life He re-acted the part of Adam, only He stood where Adam fell. He stood in the forty days' fast, and refused to eat of the earthly substantiality (though it looked 'good for food'); refused to long after earthly adulation and worship (though it seemed 'pleasant to the eyes'); refused to act from the outer wisdom of the serpent (though it would have given Him the external dominion and glory of this world).

Thus He gained the power required. But, to avail ourselves of His salvation, we must enter into His death by utterly refusing the threefold temptations of the world, the flesh, and the Devil; that is, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life. Through His power we can now put the self-will again into the hiddenness, and so bring out of the hiddenness, and live in, the meekness in which He ever lived. Thus we regain what Adam lost—the high glory of being so one with God that He dwells in us as our will, and what He wills seems to be what we will. When this central Will is inoperative, myriads of conflicting wills arise, for men and all creatures do then 'what is right in their own eyes,' and all peace and harmony is destroyed. The world is plunged in conflict, everything is 'out of joint'; and all this for the sake of a false idea of *freedom*, the glamour of which seduces us, but which proves a more horrible bondage than 'His service,' which alone is 'perfect freedom.'

A powerful aid to the regeneration is found in 'Christ's Testaments,' Baptism and Holy Communion. In each it is not the outward element that profits, but the inward. If the new life has arisen in the soul, then it perceives the inward in the outward element, and it is the inward water which cleanses, and the inward sustenance which feeds, the inward man. In all earthly matter of the four elements the inward One Pure Element lies hidden from the outer man, but open to the inward, first through faith, afterwards actually.

Many other points in Boehme's system might be noticed, but enough has been said to give an idea of the general trend of his theosophy. His terminology constitutes the greatest difficulty in understanding him. Many of his learned friends were students of Alchemy, and one of them induced him to read the works of Paracelsus. He thus became acquainted with the terms of Alchemy, and uses them constantly, to the perplexity of his readers. For he saw in them a meaning beyond the outward, and no one will catch his real purport who cannot detect the spiritual allusion underlying the terms used. To him the *Magnum Opus* seemed a magnificent symbol of the 'maximum opus' of regeneration. The transmutation of the base metal into the perfect stands for the transmutation of the fallen, external nature into the unfallen internal in which man was originally created in the image and likeness of God. And the process through solution, purification, and re-fixation marvellously exemplifies the spiritual process, through putting the false imagination to death, purification through the Spirit, and the re-creation of the 'new man.'

III. *BOEHME'S IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE.*—The philosophical value of Boehme lies in his suggestion that in all 'things' as cognized by human apprehension there must exist a hidden and a manifested element. If both are explored, they can appear only as absolute contraries, evil and good. Yet what is required is not to annihilate one that the other may exist alone, but to unite the strength (without the quality) of the evil (which, without its quality, is not evil but strength) to the quality of the good, making the former the unseen, unmanifested, basal power of the latter. For, while evil is manifested as such, good lacks the basal might which would make it irresistible (as the very presence of the evil proves). What is wanted, therefore, is not the destruction of one of the two terms, but such a change of relation between the two as shall virtually reduce them to one. This is the Hegelian triad of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis; and absolutely on all fours with this is Professor G. Boole's formula (*Laws of Thought*), 'Universe of thought equals Unity,' most graphically represented by his suggested expression, $x + \text{not } x = 1$.

The religious value of Boehme lies in his clear and unmistakable teaching as to the nature of true regeneration and the true Christian life. Many who will fail to understand his cosmology will find him lucid and most helpful here.

In England, Sir Isaac Newton, William Law, William Blake, and others have been students of Boehme; in France, Louis Claude de Saint-Martin; in Germany, Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, J. G. Gichtel, and many others.

LITERATURE.—The principal edition in English of Boehme's works is a translation in 4 large quarto vols., of dates 1763, 1763, 1772, 1781. The chief works are: *The Aurora, or Morning Redness* (1612), *The Three Principles of the Divine Essence* (1619), *The Threefold Life of Man* (1620), *Answer to Forty Questions concerning the Soul* (1620), *Signatura Rerum* (1621), *Mysterium Magnum* (1623). Of these the last is, perhaps, the most important. There are a number of shorter writings, *e.g.* Apologies and Epistles. Of editions of Boehme's works in the original, the first issued is said to have been by the son of his old opponent Richter, in 8 vols. A more complete edition was published in 1675, and another by J. G. Gichtel, in 10 vols., in 1682. *Jacob Boehmes sammtliche Werke, herausgegeben von K. W. Schiebler*, 6 vols., was issued at Leipzig in 1831–46, and another edition in 7 vols. in 1840–47. Of importance are also Hamberger's *Die Lehre des deutschen Philosophen Jacob Bohmen* (Munich, 1844); Claassen's *Jakob Bohme, sein Leben und seine theosophische Werke* (3 vols., Stuttgart, 1883–86). A new edition of Boehme's works, ed. C. J. Barker, has begun to appear (London, 1909)

Of modern works on Boehme's system may be noted: F. C Baur, 'Zur Gesch. der prot. Mystik,' in *Theol. Jahrbb.* 1848 49; Peip, *Jakob Bohme* (Leipzig, 1860); von Harless, *Jakob*

Boehme und die Alchymisten (Berlin, 1870); Martensen, *J. Boehme: Theosophische Studien* (1882); Fuchs, 'Beitrage zu einer richtigen Wurdigung J. B.'s,' in *Beweis des Glaubens* (1883); Schönwälder, *Lebensbeschreibung Jakob Bohme*, (Gorlitz, 1897), A. J. Penny, *Introd. to the Study of J. B.'s Writings* (New York, 1901); A. Whyte, *Jacob Behmen: An Appreciation* (Edinburgh, 1895); 'Excerpts from Boehme,' with interpretative comments, in the present writer's magazine, *The Seeker. passim* (London). G. W. ALLEN.

BOGOMILS.—The Bogomils were a sect of dualistic heretics whose doctrines clearly declare their kinship with the Paulicians and Euchites or Messalians (*q.v.*). Mainly to the former may be ascribed their peculiar form of Dualism, and to the latter their specifically ascetic element. Both these earlier movements took root in Thrace during the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries—exotics from their native soil in the Eastern Byzantine provinces (Armenia, Mesopotamia, and N. Syria). They flourished most among the people of Slavic race, particularly the Bulgarians. Here they passed through a process of intermingling and local modification which issued in a system relatively new and strange,[1]—whose adherents increased rapidly though secretly, and are known to have been called Bogomils in the beginning of the 12th cent., if not from the middle of the 10th.

The origin of the name has been usually found in the frequent use by them of the two Slavic words *Bog milui*, 'Lord, have mercy.'[2] A more likely explanation derives it from *Bogumil*, 'Beloved of God,' in which case it may be taken to denote the idea of a pious community analogous to the (later) 'Friends of God' (*q.v.*) in Germany.[3] But not less probable is its derivation from a personal name. Two early Bulgarian MSS have been discovered which are confirmatory of each other in the common point that a 'pope' Bogomile was the first to promulgate the 'heresy' in the vulgar tongue under the Bulgarian Tsar Peter, who ruled from 927 to 968. This would seem to afford a surer clue to the name, and (if correct) puts back the active emergence of the movement to the middle of the 10th century.[4]

Euthymius Zigabenus (died after 1118) is the main source of what is known about the Bogomils. His account is given in titulus, or chapter, xxvii. of the work Πανοπλία Δογματική[5] which he devoted to the refutation of twenty-four different heresies. He was a favourite of the reigning Emperor Alexius Comnenus; and a story told[6] by Anna, daughter of the latter, shows how he came by his information. Alexius, having invited the physician Basilius, chief apostle of the sect, to Constantinople, induced him, under an affectation of sympathetic interest, to make a free statement of his doctrines; meanwhile a stenographer, hidden behind a curtain in the room, took down a verbatim report of the conversation, and at the end of the interview the curtain was raised. In this way Basilius found himself ensnared and self-accused. His doctrine thus craftily obtained is set out by Euthymius (*PG*, vol. cxxx.) under 52 heads, of which the main are as follows:—

(1) The Bogomils rejected all the Mosaic books of the OT, but accepted as canonical the Psalms and the Prophets. In addition, they accepted the four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, the Epistles, and the Apocalypse,[1] assigning a peculiar sacredness and authority to the Gospel of John. So far as Moses was used, it was as allegory to support their own views. A favourite book was the apocryphal 'Visio *or* Ascensio Isaiae.'

(2) While accepting the Gospel-history, they did so not altogether in its literal sense—Christ's history, *e.g.*, was regarded as a symbolical clothing of higher facts—and they held, moreover, that its meaning had been falsified by the Church. Chrysostom, in particular, seemed to them a falsifier.[2] Nor would they have anything to do with the 'grammarians,' whom they classed as scribes and Pharisees.

(3) They taught a Sabellian conception of the Trinity, saying that all three names—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—apply to the Father; and that in the end, when Son and Spirit have done their work, they will flow back into the Father. God was represented as human in form, though not corporeal. They pictured the Father as the ancient of days (*ὡς γέροντα βαθυγένειον*), the Son as an adolescent youth (*ὡς ὑπηνήτην ἄνδρα*), and the Spirit as a beardless youth (*ὡς λειοπρόσωπον νεανίαν*).[3]

(4) God's first-born son was Satanael (the Satan of the NT), the highest of the spiritual beings, his Father's universal vicegerent. Tempted by his pride, however, he sought to set up an Empire of his own, and drew after him a great company of the angels. Cast down from heaven on this account, but not yet deprived of creative power, he made a new heaven and a new earth.[4] They held that Satanael also made man, but could not do more than fashion his body. For life or spirit he had to fall back upon God, whose help he besought and obtained on condition that from the human race the places of the fallen angels in heaven should be refilled. So God breathed into man's body the breath of life. But Satanael, moved by envy of man's glorious destiny, repented of his promise. He seduced Eve; and Cain, their offspring, became the principle of evil in humanity. This principle prevailed over the good principle represented by Abel, the child of Adam and Eve.[5] By its aid he imposed himself upon the Jews as the Supreme God. Moses unwittingly acted as his instrument, and the Law—which begat sin—was his fatal gift. Thus all men, save a few,[6] were led astray. Then the good God intervened. In the 5500th year after the creation of the world, a spirit called the Son of God, the Logos, the Archangel Michael, the angel of the Great Council (Is 9[6]), came forth from Him, entered the world in an ethereal body by the channel of Mary,[7] and proceeded to overturn his evil brother's kingdom. Satanael plotted and brought to pass his death—unaware that, being bodily in appearance merely, he could not be affected by any physical pains. When, therefore, Jesus showed himself after the resurrection in his true heavenly form, Satanael

[1] For a good analysis of the elements, traditional and original, which made up the system, see article by Zockler on 'Die Neu-Manichaer,' in *PRE*[3], and Karl Muller of Giessen's review of Dollinger's *Beitrage zur Sectengeschichte des Mittelalters* in *ThLZ* (1890), No. 14

[2] This is the Greek interpretation, and is given by Euthymius Zigabenus (titulus xxvii. of his Πανοπλία δογματική).

[3] Zockler favours this, and says it is thus a 'wohl Spezialbezeichnung der Perfecti der Secte, die sich wohl gern "Freunde Gottes" (*θεόφιλοι*) nannten.' With this, too, would agree their own self-description as Χριστιανοί, Χριστοπολῖται (Euthymius Zigabenus, *contra Phundagiatas* [in Migne, *PG* cxxxi. col. 48]; Anna Comnena, *Alexias*, lib. xv. [*ib.* vol. cxxxi. col. 1177]).

[4] See 'L'hérésie des Bogomiles en Bosnie et en Bulgarie au moyen âge,' in *Revue des Questions historiques* (1870), essay by Louis Leger, pp. 479–517. Bogomile = Theophilus, and was (thinks M. Leger) the 'pope's' second (assumed), name, his first perhaps being Jeremiah. They were also spoken of as *Fundaitae* (*φουνδαΐται*), *i. e.* purse-bearers, from *funda*, 'purse' or 'bag,' with reference apparently to a habit of begging their way from place to place like the Friars (see Euthymius Zigabenus, *c. Phundagiatas* (in *PG*, vol. cxxxi. col. 47).

[5] *PG*, vol. cxxx

[6] Anna Comnena, lib. xv. § 487 (*PG*, vol. cxxxi.).

[1] § 1. 'Sapientia enim, inquiunt, aedificavit sibi domum, septemque columnas substituit, *i.e.* (1) Psalterium, (2) sexdecim Prophetae, (3–6) quattuor Evangelia, (7) res ab Apostolis gestae, omnes epistolae, Apocalypsus.'

[2] Eth. Zig. *c. Phundagiatas* (*PG*, vol. cxxxi. col. 53).

[3] §§ 2, 3, 23.

[4] § 7. *εἶπε, Γενηθήτω στερέωμα, καὶ ἐγένετο. Γενηθήτω τάδε καὶ τάδε, καὶ γεγόνασιν ἅπαντα.*

[5] §§ 6–10.

[6] § 8. 'Eos nimirum, qui in genealogiis Evangelii secundum Matthaeum et secundum Lucam recensentur.'

[7] § 8. 'per aurem Virginis dexteram.'

had to acknowledge defeat. His divine power departed from him. He lost the angelic syllable (*El*) in his name, and became Satan only. Christ then ascended into heaven and took the seat of power once held by Satanael. His own place among men was hereupon taken by the Holy Spirit—produced by the Son as the Son by the Father.[1]

(5) The twelve Apostles were in a spiritual sense the first creation of the Spirit; and the true successors of these, in whom alone He continues to dwell, are the Bogomils and their converts. As habitations of the Spirit they spoke of themselves as parents of God.[2]

(6) People of the true faith cannot die, but may be said 'tanquam in somno transmutari.'[3]

(7) Their own place of assembly (*synagogam*) they called Bethlehem, because there Christ, or the Word of God, is truly born and the true faith preached.[4] All other so-called sacred temples are the home of demons.[5]

(8) Accordingly their attitude to the 'Church' was hostile throughout. Quoting Mt 4[13] ('and leaving Nazareth, he came and dwelt in Capernaum'), they applied the term 'Nazareth' to the 'Church,' reserving 'Capernaum' to themselves.[6] All the Beatitudes were spoken concerning them, not the 'Church';[7] and not to the latter has been given the power to cast out demons or do any wonderful work.[8] As to the Sacraments of the Church, its Baptism is that of John, not Jesus, of the water, not the Spirit; and those who come to it are Pharisees and Sadducees.[9] For John the Baptist was a servant of the Jewish God, Satanael. They despised also the Church's doctrine and practice of the Lord's Supper.[10] It seemed to them a sacrifice to evil spirits. Their own conception made the Supper merely symbolical of communion with Christ as the bread of life come down from heaven—a consistent outcome of their Docetism. Equally consistent was their protest against the worship of the Virgin Mary, of the Saints, and of images.[11] When the Church attempted to rebut the protest by appeal to the miracle-working virtue of relics, they did not deny the miracles, but ascribed them to the evil spirits which attended the so-called Saints in life,[12] and were permitted to go on working after their death. Similarly the power of the crucifix over the demoniacal world was not denied in some cases, but was set down to the fact that the crucifix is a symbol welcome to evil spirits, inasmuch as it was the cross by which they were fain to have compassed the death of Christ.[13]

(9) On the ground that the demons, under Satanael, possess a certain power for an appointed time,[14] and that it is permissible to secure safety from unjust treatment by doing them outward honour, they took part in Church worship.[15] But they had their own secret 'conventicles' and a definite mode of initiation. After the candidate had made ready by confession of sins, fasting and prayer, the president laid the Gospel of John on his head, and together with the brethren invoked the Holy Spirit and repeated the Lord's Prayer.[16] A probationary period of strict abstinence followed. Then, if approved, he came a second time into the assembly, when, with his face toward the east, the Gospel of John was again laid on his head, the brethren touched his head with their hands, and sang together a hymn of thanksgiving. It is admitted by their enemies that the moral ideal set before the candidates was a high one. They were to keep the precepts of the Gospel, and fast[1] and pray, and be pure in life and compassionate and humble and truthful and loving to one another, and without covetousness.[2] Nor is there any evidence that the charge of hypocrisy and secret vice had any foundation in fact. The Bogomil practice, as well as standard, seems to have been far above the average level, and to have had no small effect in attracting those whom the corruptions of the Church repelled.

(10) The monk and physician Basilius seems to have been the first martyr of the sect. He did not recant the confession obtained from him in the manner already described, and was led away to prison. This was about 1111, at which time he had governed the community of the Bogomils for 40 years. In 1119 he died at the stake.[3] Many others were 'ferreted out' by the combined zeal of Alexius the Emperor and Nicholas the Patriarch—especially (it is said) from among the laity and clergy of Constantinople. Some abjured their 'errors' under threat of punishment or promise of reward; some remained firm and went to lifelong imprisonment.[4] But the heresy lived on for centuries—the same in substance everywhere, though modified in detail here and there. A strong influence on its side was the monk Constantine Chrysomalus, whose writings were condemned by a synod at Constantinople in 1140. Another synod at Constantinople in 1143 deposed two Cappadocian bishops as Bogomils—a sign that the heresy had spread to Asia Minor. About 1230 the Patriarch Germanus complained of its wide-spread activity in the capital, and of the success with which its emissaries wormed themselves into private houses and made converts. In Bulgaria, most of all, it held its ground, and did so in the form of an organized Church-community. Distinct traces of this are met with as late as the second half of the 14th cent., and the smaller societies into which it separated are traceable to a much later time.

LITERATURE.—**Michaelis Psellus**, *Dialogus de Daemonum energia seu operatione contra Manetum et Euchitas seu Enthusiastas*, chs. ii.–v. (Migne, *PG*, vol. cxxii.); **Euthymius Zigabenus**, Πανοπλία Δογματική, ch. xxvii. (*PG*, vol. cxxx.), and *contra Phundagiatas* (*PG*, vol. cxxxi. coll. 47–57); **Anna Comnena Alexias**, lib. xv §§ 486–494 (*PG*, vol. cxxxi.); **Louis Leger**, 'L'hérésie des Bogomiles en Bosnie et en Bulgarie au Moyen âge,' pp. 479–517, in *Revue des Questions historiques*, vol. viii. (1870); **Neander**, *Church Hist.* viii. 351; **Zöckler**, art. 'Neu-Manichaer,' in *PRE*[3], vol. xiii.

FRED. J. POWICKE.

BOHEMIAN BRETHREN. — See HUS, HUSSITES.

BOLDNESS (Christian).—'Boldness' (παρρησία) is used in the NT to describe the perfect confidence which the Christian, depending upon Christ and His work, has in his approach to, and in all his dealings with, God. Three passages may be cited as illustrating the idea: (i.) Heb. 4[16] 'Let us therefore draw near with boldness unto the throne of grace'; cf. Heb. 10[19], Eph. 3[12]. (ii.) Heb. 10[35] 'Cast not away therefore your boldness, which hath great recompense of reward'; cf. Heb. 3[6]. (iii.) 1 John 4[17] 'Herein is love made

1 § 5. Neander (*Church Hist.* viii. 355) makes them say that the Holy Spirit was an emanation from the Father.
2 § 22. 'Aiunt suos omnes in quibus Spiritus sanctus habitat, Dei parentes et esse (πάντας θεοτόκους καὶ εἶναι).'
3 § 23. 4 § 28. 5 § 18. 6 § 34.
7 § 35. 8 § 13. 9 §§ 16 and 31.
10 § 17. 'Mysticum, venerandum sacrificium contemnunt atque despiciunt.'
11 § 11. 12 § 12. 13 § 14.
14 Until the end of the 7000th year (the seventh Æon).
15 § 20–21. (*a*) *The Lord said* (in one of their Apocryphal Gospels): 'Daemonia colite, non ut vobis prosint, sed ne obsint'; (*b*) 'omni ratione saluti vestrae consulite'; cf. § 25.
16 The 'Pater Noster' was the only prayer they thought it right to use (§ 19). They recited it 7 times daily and 5 times nightly.

1 The Bogomils fasted three times weekly—'secunda et quarta et sexta die' (§ 25).
2 § 26.
3 In the Hippodrome at Constantinople (see Anna Comnena, lib. xv. [*PG* cxxxi. coll. 1181–6]).
4 *Ib.*

perfect with us, that we may have boldness in the day of judgment'; cf. 1 John 3^{21}. In (i.) the 'boldness' denotes the perfect confidence with which the Christian approaches God in this present world; in (ii.) the confident expectation, or joyful and hopeful assurance, which he has with regard to his future relationship with God; in (iii.) the boldness, conceived as existing in the future, denotes the absence of fear, or the simple confidence, which the Christian will experience in the day of judgment. Of this boldness certain important facts require to be stated.

1. It was a new ingredient put into the religious consciousness by Christianity, and is a distinctive feature of the Christian faith. To come *boldly* to the throne of grace is a new and living way (Heb. 10^{19}). This can be seen by a comparison between the way in which man approaches God under the OT dispensation, and the way in which the Christian approaches Him under the new covenant. In the OT man approaches God with fear and trembling; he stands afar off 'at the nether part of the mount' (Ex 19^{17}); even 'Moses said, I exceedingly fear and quake' (Heb. 12^{21}); in the NT man approaches with boldness 'the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem,' 'God the judge of all,' and 'Jesus the Mediator of a new covenant, and the blood of sprinkling' (Heb. $12^{22\text{-}24}$).* It will be found, too, that in this matter of boldness the Christian religion is distinct, not only from the Hebrew, but from all other religions. Fear and shrinking rather than boldness and confidence are, universally, the concomitants of the natural man's approach to the Unseen and Eternal. The Christian alone has boldness of access to the throne of God.

2. The ground of Christian boldness is Christ, and especially His atoning work; it is not any virtue or grace which the Christian may have in himself or of himself; the virtue and grace of Christ constitute the sole ground of boldness. In Christ the Christian has a great High Priest with whom alone he can boldly approach the throne of grace (Heb. $4^{14\text{-}16}$, Eph. 3^{12}; cf. Rom. $5^{1.\ 2}$); in Christ's blood he has a sacrifice for sin with which he can boldly enter the Holy Place (Heb. 10^{19}). In 1 John $4^{17.\ 18}$ the love of God is perfected in the Christian's boldness, and perfect love casts out all fear; but the perfect love of God is, according to this Epistle, embodied in Christ and His propitiatory work (1 John 4^{10}), so that 1 John falls into line with Hebrews and Paul in making Christ and His work the ground of Christian boldness. Whether the Christian had in Christ and Christ's work valid grounds for his spiritual confidence is a question whose discussion does not lie within the scope of this article, but it is a simple historical fact that on the ground of Christ and His work, and united to Christ and Christ's work by faith, the Christian found a new standing—one of confidence and joyful assurance—before God, and exhibited it to the world.

3. Christian boldness is not inconsistent with humility and reverence before God. The Christian is bold when he realizes the perfect and sufficient right which he has in Christ to approach God, but humble when he realizes that this right is not in himself at all but in Another. And for the grace which has given him such boldness and freedom of access he can feel nothing but grateful reverence. In the Christian consciousness, boldness and humility are met together, confidence and reverence have kissed each other.

4. Christian boldness must be distinguished from certain other forms of courage or audacity. (i.) From the audacity which defies all authority, which fears neither God nor man, and which leads a man to be and to do whatsoever he will. Such audacity is not boldness towards God (1 Jn 3^{21}); it leads away from God. It is irreligious and immoral in its tendency, and exercises itself in the sphere directly opposite and opposed to the sphere of Christian boldness. (ii.) From the courage or confidence which is due to an imperfect or incomplete conception of God. Where God is conceived as pure clemency or simple kindness, and as having a forgiveness so easy to grant that it amounts to an indifference to sin, He can be approached with a certain boldness, which, however, is but the courage of a moral ignorance and spiritual blindness as to the true character of God, and is very different in religious quality from the boldness of the man who holds God to be so holy that, apart from a perfect High Priest and a sufficient sacrifice, he dare not approach Him. (iii.) From courage in the face of difficulty, or danger or opposition in the world. From such natural courage the spiritual boldness of the Christian differs in several respects. The spheres of their exercise are different. Natural courage exercises itself in the world of phenomena, Christian boldness is towards God and exercises itself in the world of spiritual realities. Then natural courage requires for its exercise danger or difficulty, Christian boldness has no difficulty or danger to face, for all difficulty of approach to God has been removed by Christ. Natural courage takes risk, Christian boldness feels no risk; it has 'full assurance.'

5. But, while Christian boldness is in itself distinct from natural courage, it was doubtless the secret and source of the marvellous bravery which was shown by members of the Apostolic community in face of danger and death.* Perfect love casts out all fear, first the fear of God, and then of everything in God's world.

6. This article would not be complete without a reference to the boldness of Jesus. In the Fourth Gospel boldness is mentioned seven times as characteristic of the bearing and speech of Jesus (cf. Mk 8^{32}). Then it need only be mentioned that confidence and assurance were supremely evident in the attitude of Christ towards God. Notice His attitude at the grave of Lazarus, or as He draws near to the Cross.

For boldness in general sense, see COURAGE.

LITERATURE.—The lexx. *s. vv.* παρρησία, and παρρησιάζεσθαι; E. A. Abbott, *Johannine Gram.* 1917; the Comm., esp. A. B. Davidson and Westcott on *Hebrews* and Westcott on *1 John*; also art. ACCESS in the present work and in *HDB.*

D. RUSSELL SCOTT.

BOMBAY.—The Presidency of Bombay, the most western of the provinces of India, takes its name from that of its capital city, which is believed to be derived from the title of the local goddess, Mumbā or Mambā Devī, interpreted to mean Mahā-Ambā, the great Mother-goddess of the non-Aryan population. Her shrine, which once stood on the site now occupied by the Esplanade at Bombay, was removed to the Bhendī Bāzār in the native city, where she still receives the offerings of her worshippers. The Presidency, as now constituted, consists of scattered groups of districts lying along the W. coast of the Peninsula, from lat. 13° 53′ to 28° 29′ N., and includes an area of 188,745 square miles, and a total population of 25,424,235.

The religious conditions of a great Indian province have been discussed in some detail in the case of Bengal (wh. see); and separate articles dealing with the more important divisions, sacred places, and castes in the Bombay Presidency illustrate so many phases of the local religious

* The passage He $12^{18\text{-}24}$ powerfully presents the contrast between the old (OT) and the new (NT) way of approach to God, though the actual word 'boldness' does not occur.

* παρρησία is used of the boldness which the Apostles showed in bearing and speech (Ac 4^{13}); παρρησιάζεσθαι is used frequently in the Acts of the fearless preaching of the gospel.

beliefs that it is unnecessary to discuss them in detail (see, for instance, AMARNĀTH, BARODA, DWĀRKA, ELEPHANTA, ELLORA, GIRNĀR, GODĀVARĪ, GOKARN, KISTNĀ, NARBADĀ, PALITĀNA, SOMNĀTH; and, for castes and tribes, BAIRĀGI, BANJĀRA, BHĪLS, DRAVIDIANS (North), MAHĀR, RĀJPUT, RĀMOSHI, YOGI). In this article, therefore, it is proposed merely to give a general sketch, historical and descriptive.

1. Environment and its influence upon religion.—In the case of Bombay, perhaps more clearly than in other provinces, the varied environment of the people has influenced their religion. The Presidency consists of several regions widely differing in climate, fertility, and accessibility to external influences, as well as in the ethnical origin, history, and character of their population.

(*a*) *Sind.*—Thus, beginning from the extreme west, we have the valley of the Indus, the climate of which, owing to its prevalent aridity and the absence of the monsoons—a condition relieved only by a great system of artificial irrigation—ranks among the hottest and most variable in India. By its situation it was specially exposed to the attacks of the Arabs from the west, which began early in the 8th cent. A.D., and rapidly reduced the delta to submission. The original population consisted of an Aryan race with a non-Aryan substratum, leavened by an important element derived from foreigners, including the Ephthalites or White Huns, whose incursions ceased not long before the armies of Islām appeared upon the scene. The permanent result of the Arab invasions has been that, at the present time, rather more than three-fourths of the population are Musalmāns.

(*b*) *Cutch, Kāthiāwār, and Gujarāt.*—Farther east come Cutch (Kachchh), Kāthiāwār, and Gujarāt: the first almost an island, severed from the mainland by the Rann, half desert, half morass; the second a peninsula, stretching westward to the Arabian Sea; the third a fertile plain, watered by the rivers Narbadā and Tāptī—the Garden of India, as it used to be called before its recent devastation by famine. This region was from the earliest times exposed to invasion from the north of India. The inscription of the Satrap Rudradāman, engraved on the rock of Girnār in Kāthiāwār, records the establishment, in A.D. 150, of the Śaka or Scythian dynasty, known as that of the Western Satraps. Kāthiāwār and Gujarāt seem to have been the most southerly tracts which came under the rule of these foreigners, and the theory advanced by Sir H. Risley (*Census Rep.* 1901, i. 514), that a well-marked Scythian element can be identified in the population of the Deccan, will not bear examination.

(*c*) *The Konkans.*—The remaining seaboard districts of the Presidency, included under the general name of the Konkans, are separated from the central region by the barrier of the western Ghāt range, which, until it was pierced by British road and railway engineers, formed a permanent obstacle to communication between the coast and the interior. This portion of the western seaboard was from the most ancient times the seat of a flourishing trade, and formed the centre of commercial and intellectual intercourse between India and the nations of the West. Perhaps as early as 1000 B.C. trade routes were established between its ports and those of the Red Sea. Communication with the Gulf of Persia and the cities in the Tigris-Euphrates valley certainly started not later than 750 B.C., and probably dates from a much earlier period. About the beginning of the Christian era, commerce was opened between Gujarāt and Rome; a colony of Jews from Yemen is believed to have reached Kolāba in the 6th cent. A.D.; the Parsis, driven from Persia by the advancing armies of Islām, landed at Sanjan in the Thāna district in A.D. 775. The long line of Christian missionaries to W. India begins with Pantænus (189–90);* and the seed planted by him and his successors continued to grow until the Portuguese, established in Goa in 1510, steadily undertook the conversion of the native races which fell under their control. This continuous intercourse between this part of India and the West must have profoundly affected the religious beliefs of the people. To it, with some measure of probability, has been attributed the growth of the conception of lively faith in a personal Godhead, which is a leading tenet of the Vaiṣṇava sect. This, however, is strenuously denied by Hindu writers (see BHAKTI-MĀRGA).

(*d*) *The Deccan.*—In direct contrast to the seaboard is the scantily watered, comparatively unfertile, plateau known as the Deccan (Dakkhin, Skr. *Dakshina*, 'that on the right hand,' 'southern'). While the barrier of the W. Ghāts divides it from the coast region, it is separated from N. India by the Vindhyan and Mahādeo ranges, and in ancient times was specially isolated by the tract of forest country known to the ancient Hindus as Dandakāraṇya, which has been identified with Mahārāshṭra, the region now occupied by the Marhaṭa (Marāthā) people. This in early Hindu legends is said to have been occupied by fierce demons (Rākshasa), in other words, the non-Aryan tribes who resisted the pressure of the new civilization from the north, and were closely akin to races like the Kunbī, the predominant element in the present population. In the Deccan the sturdy peasantry were much less accessible to priestly control than the less manly races of the seaboard. In Gujarāt the preservation of the original Hindu beliefs was due chiefly to the Rājput aristocracy, largely recruited from Huns and Scythians admitted to Hinduism; the wealthy trading classes devoted themselves to the building and endowment of temples; even at present among the laity there is found a sectarian fervour absent in other parts of the Presidency. The condition of religious thought in the Deccan was and is very different. Here there is a lower general average of wealth, culture, and religious devotion. The population is more scattered, and is absorbed in the care of the precarious crops which alone the soil produces. Consequently, like the practically minded Jāṭ of Upper India, the Deccan Kunbī or Marhaṭa, *parcus deorum cultor et infrequens*, cares little for the Brāhman, whom 'the wider political education of the Deccan and the freedom from the competition of other literate classes have led to prefer the occupation of the layman to the segregation of his own fraternity in religious institutions' (Baines, *Census Rep.* 1881, i. 128). The Marhaṭas are of opinion that the spiritually-minded Brāhman should not interfere in secular affairs; and those 'who devote their lives to the study of what Hindoos conceive the divine ordinances are held in great esteem; but otherwise, in the Mahratta country, there is no veneration for the Bramin character' (Grant Duff, *Hist. of the Mahrattas*, 5). Sivājī, the founder of the Marhaṭa State, steadily pursued the policy of appointing Brāhmans to the highest civil posts in the administration; and the Peshwa, or Marhaṭa Mayor of the Palace, was always a Brāhman. Thus the modern Marhaṭa

* It is possible, however, that the 'India' of Pantænus was really S. Arabia (*PRE*[3] xiv. 627); cf. Servius, *ad Georg.* ii. 116: 'sed Indiam omnem plagam Aethiopiae accipiamus,' and see Lipsius, *Apokryphe Apostelgeschichten und Apostellegenden*, II. ii. 63–65, 132–135, Moller, *Lehrb. der Kirchengesch.* i. 108. On the other hand, it is tolerably certain that Christianity entered India before 200; cf. Lassen, *Ind. Alterthumskunde*, ii.[2] 1118–1128; Aiken, *The Dhamma of Gotama the Buddha and the Gospel of Jesus the Christ*, 288–297; Hopkins, *India Old and New*, 140 f., 167; Bergh van Eysinga, *Ind. Invloeden op oude Christelijke Verhalen*, 118–120.

Brāhman is reared to cherish the tradition that his forefathers directed the policy of the last independent Hindu State in the Peninsula; and looks with jealousy on the Government which has replaced it. Poona has become a centre of restless intrigue, to which much of the recent disloyalty in Bengal, and in particular the modern deification and cult of Sivājī, can be clearly traced. Next to the Kāśmīrī, the Marhaṭa Brāhmans are perhaps the most capable Hindus in the Empire (T. C. Arthur [A. T. Crawford], *Our Troubles in Poona and the Deccan*, 1897, *Reminiscences of an Indian Police Official*, 1894).

2. Lingāyats.—The independence of Brāhman authority, which is characteristic of the Marhaṭa, was possibly one of the main causes of the growth of the remarkable Lingāyat sect, which will form the subject of a separate article. They have their own priests, and have long severed all connexion with the Brāhmans. But the old leaven is still working, and they now exhibit a tendency to revert to Brāhmanical Hinduism, with which they claim their creed to be coeval, and are attempting to apply the fourfold caste organization of Manu to their social divisions (Enthoven, *Census Rep.* 1901, i. 387).

3. Extension of Brāhman influence into S. India.—The process of bringing that portion of the Peninsula which lies S. of the Narbadā within the Brāhmanical fold probably began with the peaceful settlement of Brāhmans on the eastern and western coasts. This may have occurred at an early period, when the Aryans had worked their way into the Sind delta and Gujarāt on the one side, and down the lower Ganges valley on the other. In Bombay the movement further south was effected either by the sea route or along the western coast districts, where the mountain ranges diminish in altitude and melt into the alluvial plains of Gujarāt, the valleys of the Narbadā and the Tāptī. The advance into the Deccan was checked by the natural obstacles already referred to, and probably occurred at a period long subsequent to the movement along the coasts. Prof. Bhandarkar, by an examination of the early grammarians, has shown some reason for believing that the Aryans had acquired no knowledge of Southern India before the 7th cent. B.C.; that up to this time their advance had been along the coast districts; but that by B.C. 350 they had become acquainted with the country as far south as Tanjore and Madura (*BG* i. pt. ii. 141). These conclusions cannot be regarded as definitely established, and the view that the Brāhmanism of S. India is of comparatively recent origin has been disputed by Hindu writers. But the theory of a comparatively late introduction of Aryan culture fits in well with the existing facts, and it involved important consequences. Not only have the local Dravidian languages held their ground, but art and general culture have developed on original lines. Still more is this the case in the domains of religion and politics. The new-comers found well-organized communities and ancient kingdoms in occupation of the country. The forms of belief characteristic of the non-Aryan races retained their influence over the minds of the people. The early Tamil literature shows that the evolution of religion in the south took a shape very different from that which is, in the case of the northern races, more familiar to students of the development of Hinduism (V. Kanakasabhai, *The Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years Ago*, 1904, p. 227 ff.).

4. Buddhism.—The extension of Buddhism into the region south of the Vindhyan range was the work of Aśoka (*c.* B.C. 272–231; see AŚOKA). Two copies of his fourteen edicts have been found on the W. coast; one, fragmentary, at Sopāra or Sūrpāraka in the Thāna District, N. of Bombay; the second, nearly complete, on the Girnār hill, E. of the town of Junāgarh in Kāthiāwār (Smith, *Asoka*, 103). The discovery of three copies of the minor Rock edicts in the Chitaldrūg District of Mysore shows that his authority extended as far south as that kingdom (Rice, *Mysore*[2], ii. 499).

The progress of the three rival faiths, Buddhism, Jainism, and Brāhmanism, is recorded in a series of monuments, the rock-cut halls and temples of W. India, of the greatest historical and religious importance.

'When their story is carefully examined, it appears that they are spread pretty evenly over more than a thousand years of the darkest, though most interesting, period of Indian history; and throw a light upon it as great or greater than can be derived from any other source. In addition to these claims to attention, the western caves afford the most vivid illustration of the rise and progress of the three great religions that prevailed in India in the early centuries of our era and before it. They show clearly how the Buddhist religion rose and spread, and how its form became afterwards corrupt and idolatrous. They explain how it consequently came to be superseded by the nearly cognate forms of Jainism and the antagonistic development of the revived religion of the Brāhmans. All this, too, is done in a manner more vivid and more authentic than can be obtained from any other mode of illustration now available' (Fergusson-Burgess, *Cave Temples*, 166).

More than nine-tenths of the caves at present known are found within the limits of the Bombay Presidency. The view once held, that they are in some way connected with the monuments of Egypt, is now rejected; and their abundance on the W. coast is due simply to the fact that the geological formation of that region, with horizontal strata of amygdaloid and other cognate trap-formations, generally of considerable thickness and uniformity of structure, and with their edges exposed in perpendicular cliffs, favoured the construction of such excavations to serve as halls, temples, or monasteries (Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian Arch.*, 1876, 107).

Many of these caves are described in separate articles (see AJANTA, KĀNHERI, ELLORA, NĀSIK); and therefore it is only necessary to say that, as a whole, they fall into two groups, though naturally the same site was occupied by successive builders, and accordingly the distinction of schools of Buddhist belief is not always rigidly observed. The first group represents the Hīnayāna school, the earlier form of Buddhism. This includes the caves at Junāgarh and other sites in Kāthiāwār, dating from B.C. 250 to the Christian era; those of the Konkans and Deccan, all S. of Bombay, dated between about B.C. 200 and A.D. 50; those E. of Bombay, in the range of the W. Ghāts, dated between B.C. 250 and A.D. 100; those at Junnar, Nāsik (wh. see), and the earliest of the Ajanta (wh. see) group, which are of various ages, ranging from B.C. 100, and including examples of the Mahāyāna, or later school, as late as the 7th cent. A.D.; those at Mārol and Kānheri (wh. see) near Bombay, between B.C. 100 and A.D. 150. The second group, that of the Mahāyāna school, extends from the 4th nearly to the 8th cent. A.D., and includes the hall at Junāgarh, the later specimens of the Ajanta series, and those at Aurangābād and Nāsik.

These monuments bear eloquent testimony to the religious fervour, generosity, and taste of the rulers, nobility, and merchant princes who provided funds for their excavation and decoration. Their endowments must have supported a large number of monks. The Buddhist pilgrim, Fa-hien, who began his travels in A.D. 399, gives a lively account of the monastery at Kānheri, and describes the magnificence of the festal decorations, the beauty of the relic-shrines, the nightly illuminations, the rich endowments of the community (Beal, *Fah-hian*, 55, 76, 178). Hiuen Tsiang, a later pilgrim, who in A.D. 641 visited the capital (probably Nāsik) of the great king Pulakeśin II.,

who came to the throne about A.D. 608, found some hundred religious establishments (*saṅgharāma*), containing about 5000 monks (Beal, *Si-yu-ki*, ii. 257). But even at this time Buddhism was in a stage of decay. Possibly the picture which the same writer gives of the famous establishment at Amarāvatī (wh. see) is true of other foundations of the same kind. 'For the last hundred years there have been no priests (*dwelling here*) in consequence of the spirit of the mountain changing his shape, and appearing sometimes as a wolf, sometimes as a monkey, and frightening the disciples; for this reason the place has become deserted and wild, with no priests to dwell there' (*ib.* ii. 223)—a metaphor possibly referring to the hostility to the faith which was then growing up among the forest tribes. Inscriptions of the Rāshṭrakūṭa period at Mālkhed show that in the 9th cent. A.D. Buddhism was still a living religion, favoured by the authorities in W. India; but that at that time its chief rival, Jainism, was contributing to that change of feeling which ultimately caused its downfall (Fleet, *BG* i. pt. ii. 406). It certainly existed in a weakened form in the Deccan as late as the first half of the 12th century.

5. Jainism.—The history of the rise of Jainism—a faith contemporary with the rise of, and resulting from the same causes that gave birth to, Buddhism—is comparatively obscure; and very little is known concerning the process by which it attained a high position in W. and S. India for several centuries. The Jains of the Bombay Presidency are at present represented by two classes: the first, comprising the merchants of Gujarāt, who are remarkable chiefly for their extreme tenderness to animal life, as is shown by the hospitals (*pinjrapol*) established in the chief cities for all sorts of creatures; and the Mārwārī Banyās of Mārwār in Rājputāna, who are generally money-lenders and immigrants into the Deccan. The second group includes a class of cultivators found chiefly in the Belgaum and Dhārwār districts of the Karṇāṭa or S. Marhaṭa country. The first division is connected with the northern centres of the faith, in Rājputāna and Gujarāt, such as Mount Ābū (wh. see) and Palitāna (wh. see). The second group, that of the southern Jains, represents the relics of a belief which was once the State religion of a large part of S. India. In Mysore, according to Rice (some of his conclusions have been disputed by Hultzsch), it seems to have preceded the teaching of Buddhism by the missionaries of Aśoka, and here it continued to be the official religion of certain dynasties and kings throughout the first ten centuries of the Christian era. Here the three rival faiths, Buddhism, Jainism, Brāhmanism, appear to have existed side by side. In the 8th and 9th centuries A.D. an active revival of Brāhmanism in the form of Liṅga-worship resulted from the missionary labours of Kumārila and Śaṅkarāchārya, which raised Śaivism to a position of superiority over its rivals. In like manner, in the 12th cent. the Vaiṣṇava sectarianism gained ground, and, through the teaching of the reformer Rāmānujāchārya, dealt a deathblow to Jainism. After this the adherents of the Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva doctrines seem to have effected some kind of compromise, of which the form Harihara, uniting the cult of Hari (Viṣṇu) and Hara (Śiva), was the outer symbol. The almost contemporaneous growth of the Liṅgāyat sect, which popularized the Śaiva cultus, led to the final decay of Jainism as a leading faith in this region, while the later forms of Vaiṣṇavism absorbed all that remained of Buddhism (Rice, *Mysore*[2], i. 459 f.).

6. Development of Brāhmanism.—It would be an error to suppose that Brāhmanism suffered a complete collapse during the ascendancy of Buddhism and Jainism. The excavators of many of the Buddhist caves bear names derived from Śaivism, and in the great cave at Bādāmī a Vaiṣṇava temple of the 6th cent. A.D. still survives. Some of the Śaiva caves go back to the 2nd century. But it is only in the 4th cent. that they become common, and nearly all the Hindu caves of later date belong to that sect. The work of Brāhmanical cave-excavation seems to have almost ceased in the 8th century. The methods by which the original Buddhist models were adapted to the Brāhmanical cultus are described by Fergusson-Burgess (*Cave Temples*, 399 f.). The next important architectural development was due to influence from S. India, and resulted in the construction of the remarkable Kailāsa rock-temple in the reign of the Rāshtrakūṭa king Kṛishna (Kṛṣna) I. about A.D. 760 at Ellora (wh. see; Smith, *Early Hist.*[2] 386 f.). The Jains also undertook the excavation of cave-temples, but at a later date than those of the Buddhists or Brāhmans, none of these Jain works being apparently dated earlier than the 7th century. The most important are at Ellora (Fergusson-Burgess, 490 ff.).

7. Modern Hinduism.—At the Census of 1901 the Hindus numbered 19,916,438 (78·4 per cent of the total population). Here, as in other parts of India, the line between Animists and Hindus cannot be clearly drawn. The faith of the higher classes of Hindus shows the prevailing characteristics of Hinduism: a polytheism replaced by an enlightened pantheism, and that absence of dogma which is the best asset of Hinduism. This, however, applies only to the more intelligent classes. Apart from the forest tribes, whose creed is pure Animism, the lower stratum of the people still preserves its primitive animistic beliefs, obscured, and to some extent modified, by the veneer of Brāhmanism. Bathing in holy rivers and pilgrimages to the tombs of deified heroes and saints are the chief modes by which purification from tabu and spiritual advancement are believed to be attained. The sacred stone haunted by some spirit, the holy tree or other natural object, the abnormal shape of which indicates that it is occupied by a spirit, the ecstatic possession of the village seer or medicine-man, the various devices by which the spirits of the household dead are brought into communion with the living, or the malignant ghosts of the murderer or his victim, and of the man killed by a tiger or snake, are repelled or controlled—these are the chief elements of the popular cultus. The forces of evil are ever in conflict with those of good, and there is little or no trust in a benign, fatherly Providence.

Sectarianism is imperfectly recognized in the statistics. So far as the Census returns go, the Śaivas or Smārtas, with the kindred Pāśupati, Śaṅkarāchārya, and similar sects, number about 3 millions; while the Vaiṣnava sects, such as those of the Rāmānuja, Vallabhāchārya, Mādhavāchārya, and Vīravaiṣṇava, number only half a million. In addition to these, affiliated to the Śaivas, come the Liṅgāyats, numbering 800,000. Many influences may have affected the accuracy of the returns; but, at any rate, the vast majority of the Hindu population were ignorant of the sect to which they belonged, or did not care to record it.

The most important and interesting development is that of the Vallabhāchārya sect of the Vaiṣnava group, to which Krishna (Kṛṣna) is the chief object of worship. The immorality of the Mahārājās or heads of this community has attracted much attention since the notorious case decided by the High Court of Bombay ([Karsandas Mulji], *History of the Sect of the Maharajas*, 1865).

8 **Jains.**—Jains, who number 535,950 (2·1 per cent. of the total population) are here, as usual, divided into Digambaras, who worship naked idols and their spiritual preceptors (*gurus*); Śvetāmbaras, who dress and adorn their images; and Dhūndhiyas, who are opposed to the worship of idols, venerate their preceptors, and dress in white, wearing a linen mouth-band to prevent possible injury to animal life. In Gujarāt, the headquarters of the Jains, the Śvetāmbaras are in excess of the other sects.

9. **Animists.** — As has been already remarked (§ 7), the enumeration of Animists, who in 1901 numbered 94,845 (0·4 per cent. of the total population), is incomplete, and merely includes those members of some forest tribes who are most completely, in beliefs and cultus, separate from Hindus. Of these tribes the most numerically important are the Kolī, Bhīl, Varlī, Ṭhākur, Dublā, and Kāṭhkarī. They are most numerous in the Districts of Pānch Mahāls, Thar and Pārkar, Thāna, Surat, and Khāndesh. A full account of the Bhīl beliefs will be found in a separate article, and that on the Northern Dravidians gives a general sketch of the forms of Animism which prevail among these tribes.

10. **Muhammadans.** — Muhammadans in the whole Presidency number 4,567,295 (17·9 per cent. of the total population). Their numbers show a tendency to increase, not so much as the result of any special propaganda, but rather because they have been less exposed than Hindus to the stress of plague and famine. For the interesting class of Bohorās or Bolīrās, see SECTS (Muhammadan). The Khojas (Pers. *Khwājah*, 'honourable') are remarkable as tracing their origin to Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ, who in the beginning of the 11th cent. A.D. founded the Order of the Fidawī or Fidāī, 'the devoted ones,' known to Europeans as the Assassins (Arab. *ḥasshāshīn*, 'eaters or smokers of the intoxicating hemp drug'), of whom and of their leader, known as Shaikh-ul-Jabal, 'The Old Man of the Mountain,' many marvellous tales are told (Marco Polo, ed. Yule[1], i. 132 ff.; *EBr*[9] ii. 722 ff.; art. ASSASSINS). Their spiritual leader is the Aghā Khān, the descendant of a refugee from Persia, who commands great influence among his followers. Except in Gujarāt and Sind the Shī'ite element is small, and in many districts is confined to the Bohorās and Khojas (for a full account of the origin, customs, and beliefs of the Khojas, see *BG* ix. pt. ii. 36 ff.). A more recent development is that of the Aḥmadīyah sect, followers of Mīrzā Ghulām 'Alī of Kadiān in the Gurdāspur district of the Panjāb. The founder repudiates the necessity of *jihād*, or war against the infidel; traces a parallel between himself, as Messiah or Imām, and the Founder of the Christian faith; claims that his advent was foretold, and that he is charged with the duty of laying the foundations of general goodwill and peace upon earth. On the whole, this sect supplies an interesting example of the influence of Christianity upon Islām (Enthoven, *Census Rep.* i. 69; Rose, *Census Rep. Panjāb*, i. 143).

11. **Jews.**—The Jewish colony in the Presidency numbers 10,860. Like those further south in Cochin, they are divided into a 'white' and a 'black' section. The former claim to be the descendants of the original colonists, whom Dr. J. Wilson, on the ground that none of their names is later than the Captivity, and that all their Scriptures are of early date, believed to represent the Lost Tribes. It is now generally supposed that they came from Yemen in the 6th cent. of our era. Their own traditions fix their exodus in the 2nd cent., while other accounts place it as late as the 15th. The 'white' Jews do not eat, drink, or intermarry with the 'black' section, who are believed to be later converts from Hinduism. The Bombay Jews call themselves Banū-Isrāīl, 'children of Israel,' in preference to Yahūdī, which is the general designation of the race in N. India. In their houses, on the upper part of the right door-post, is placed a box containing a parchment scroll inscribed with a verse from the OT, so fixed that through a hole the word 'The Almighty' (*El Shaddai*) can be read from the outside. Their synagogues contain parchment copies of the Pentateuch (*BG* xi. 85 f., xiii. 273 f.). See art. BENE-ISRAEL.

12. **Christians.**—Christians number 204,961 (1·11 per cent. of the total population). They fall into several groups. The most numerous are the Roman Catholic inhabitants of the old Portuguese settlements now included within British territory, who were originally converted from Hinduism by missionaries from Goa. Those of good birth were admitted to *connubium* by the Portuguese. Though the names of all the Christians of this description are Portuguese, it is only among the upper classes that there is any trace of foreign blood, and here, even, it is now rare. The name of Indo-Portuguese, which is sometimes given to them, is scarcely acknowledged among themselves; and though the higher families speak Portuguese as the home-language, the rest habitually use either Konkanī-Marāṭhī or English. The lower classes continue to follow the hereditary occupations of the castes to which their Hindu ancestors belonged, while the upper have taken to the learned and clerical professions.

'In spite of rumours that have occasionally been heard within the last half century, those who have lived amongst these classes give evidence of the reality of their adherence to the faith of their adoption. There is a very prevalent confusion between Christians of this description and those of Goa. Both are Roman Catholics by persuasion, and both bear Portuguese names, and are under the supervision of priests of that nation. Beyond this the likeness ceases. The Native Christians that come from Goa are mostly domestic servants, an occupation never undertaken by Christians from other districts' (Baines, *Census Rep* i. 51).

Including recent converts, the Roman Catholics in 1901 numbered 106,655—not far short of half the total Christian population. The remainder are more recent adherents, whose adoption of the faith is the work of various missionary societies, those attached to the Anglican communion numbering 35,614. While the Roman Catholics have slightly fallen in numbers between the last two decennial enumerations, the total number of Christians has increased from 158,765 to 204,961, the rise being greatest in those districts where the pressure of famine has been most severe, an indication that their numbers have been largely recruited from famine waifs supported in missionary orphanages.

LITERATURE. — The best authorities are Sir J. Campbell, *Bombay Gazetteer*, 27 vols. (1873–1904), of which the most useful are those dealing with the general history (vol. i. pts. i. ii.) and those describing the population of Gujarāt (ix. pts. i. ii.); and the *Census Reports*: J. A. Baines, 1882; W. W. Drew, 1892; R. E. Enthoven, 1902. The following also deserve attention: J. Wilson, *Indian Caste* (1877), useful but fragmentary; Major E. J. Gunthorpe, *Notes on the Criminal Tribes of the Bombay Presidency* (1882); A. W. Hughes, *Gazetteer of Sind*[2] (1876); J. Forbes, *Oriental Memoirs* (1813, 2nd ed. 1834); A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā, or Hindoo Annals of the Province of Goozerat*[2] (1878); Dosabhai Framji Karaka, *History of the Parsis* (1884); [Karsandas Mulji], *History of the Sect of the Maharajas* (1865). For the political history, see V. A. Smith, *Early History of India*[2] (1908); J. Grant Duff, *History of Mahrattas*[3] (1873). For the religious architecture, J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India* (1880), and numerous memoirs by the latter writer in collaboration with H. Cousens in the *Progress Reports of the Archæological Survey of W. India*. These *Progress Reports*, vols. i. to ix. in the Imperial Series, numbered i.-v., xxiii., xxiv., xxxii., xxxiii., extending to 1905, have practically superseded the older books, such as Sir T. C. Hope, *Surat, Bharoch, and other Cities of Gujarat* (1866); J. Fergusson and P. Meadows Taylor, *Architecture at Beejapoor; Architecture in Dharwar and Mysore* (1866). Among the early travellers, the following, published in the Hakluyt Society series, may be referred to (the dates are

those of publication, not of the voyages): D. Barbosa, *Coasts of E. Africa and Malabar in 16th cent.* (1866); P. della Valle, *Travels in India* (1892); J. H. van Linschoten, *Voyage to the E. Indies* (1885); *India in the XVth Cent.* (1857); F. Pyrard de Laval, *Voyage to the E. Indies*, (1887-90); L. Varthema, *Travels in Egypt, Syria, Persia, India, Ethiopia*, etc. (1863). Other useful travels are: J. Ovington, *Voyage to Suratt* (1696); J. Fryer, *New Account of E. India and Persia* (1698).

W. CROOKE.

BON CHOS.—See TIBET.

BONES.—It may help us to understand the important place occupied by bones in primitive psychology and religion if we recall the nature of their development. 'Osseous tissue . . . consists essentially of an animal matter impregnated with calcium salts' (Huxley, *Physiology*[5], p. 307). 'At a certain period of embryonic life there is no bone in any part of the body. . . . Microscopic examination shows that the calcareous salts are deposited in the intercellular substance' (*ib.* p. 557). Minute passages in a bone allow of its permeation by nutritive fluid, so that 'throughout life, or at all events in early life, its tissue is the seat of an extremely active vital process' (*ib.* p. 311). These facts were, of course, unknown to primitive thought, but they are in some measure paralleled by the early ascription to bones of special psychical significance. Thus we find the words for 'soul' and 'bone' etymologically connected among the Iroquois (*esken*, 'bone,' *atisken*, 'soul'), and the Athapascans (*yani*, 'bone,' *iyune*, 'soul') (Arnett in *Amer. Jour. Psychol.* 1904, xv. 149). Every one is familiar with the frequent references to bones in the OT, where the ascription of sensation to them is not a mere figure, but springs from the definite idea of their inherent vitality, and of the *quasi*-consciousness diffused through them and the whole body (*e.g.* Job 4[14], Jer 23[9], Ps 35[10]). The story of Eve's origin, and the phrase 'bone and flesh,' used of relationship,* are also significant. Many popular beliefs witness to the same idea; 'the bones of a murdered man are said to have given out fresh blood when handled by a murderer as long as twenty years, or even fifty, after the murder' (Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, 1887, p. 146). Conversely, the life supposed to be still resident in bones can be renewed by anointing them with blood (Jevons, *Introd. Hist. Rel.*, 1896, p. 52). Tylor collects examples of the way in which bones of dead relatives are cared for, and talked to, as though still conscious (ii. 150 f.); he gives them as cases of the fetish-theory, but they are ultimately to be explained as products of primitive psychology.

Funeral customs in general usually yield illustrations, even though more or less obscure, of the same standpoint. A good example out of the great multitude available is afforded by the elaborate burial rites of certain Australian tribes (Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 530–546). The body is left on a tree-platform until the flesh has disappeared from the bones.† The skeleton, except an arm-bone, is then buried, without being actually touched. The arm-bone, in which the spirit of the dead is supposed to be present, is wrapped up in paper-bark, and figures in various complicated ceremonies. These conclude with the breaking and burial of the arm-bone. 'When once this ceremony of breaking the bone, which they call *anbiringa-tjinta*, has been performed, and the bone deposited in its last resting-place, the spirit of the dead person, which they describe as being of about the size of a grain of sand, goes back to its camping-place in the Wingara, and remains there in company with the spirit parts of other members of its totem until such time as it undergoes reincarnation' (*ib.* p. 542). Here the elaborate ceremonial is performed in order that the bone may be broken and the spirit released, without injury to the living or the dead. With this we should compare such a custom as prevails in an African tribe of the Ogowe. 'With a very material idea of a spirit, they seek to disable it by beating the corpse until every bone is broken. The mangled mass is hung in a bag at the foot of a tree in the forest. Thus mutilated, the spirit is supposed to be unable to return to the village, to entice into its fellowship of death any of the survivors' (Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, 1904, p. 234). We may trace a parallel belief in the title 'Crusher of bones,' applied to a member of the Egyptian pantheon (*Book of the Dead*, ch. cxxv.), though here we meet the idea that the bones must be preserved intact in order to ensure resurrection, and the crushing of the bones is conceived as a penalty for falsehood. An ordinary mummy is no more than 'skin and bones.' The preservation of the bones is the dominant practice,* we may say the universal one, where the relations with the dead include more than fear and shrinking. Thus the Carrier Indians (*q.v.*) obtain their name from the practice of their widows, 'who carry the charred bones of their dead husbands about with them in bundles' (Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 227 n.[3]).† The practice may survive in a modified form, disguising itself as a simple desire to possess some memorial of the dead. Thus 'the Japanese, after taking a lock of hair, a finger-nail, or the *inkobo* (a bone in the throat), which they send back to relatives, burn their dead' (Fox, *Following the Sun-Flag*, 1905, p. 87). A further development is seen in the addition of the skeleton, or part of it, to the family fetish, where the fetish practices prevail (Nassau, p. 325). Bones so kept, and imagined to retain the psychical powers of the dead in a form available for use, claim a natural place in primitive medicine and magic. Australian aborigines use bones in working a magic spell on an enemy (Howitt, p. 359). The Tasmanians attached human bones to the parts of the body affected by disease (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 1902, p. 108). The miracle described as following the contact of a dead man with the bones of Elisha (2 K 13[21]) shows the same belief. Robertson Smith (*Rel. Sem.*[2], 1894, p. 448) refers to the custom of the heathen Arabs, which consisted in fastening unclean things, dead men's bones and menstruous rags, upon children, to avert the *jinn* and the evil eye; he remarks that 'when we find bones, and especially dead men's bones, used as charms, we must think primarily of the bones of sacrifices' (p. 382). Such bones would, of course, possess a special virtue for their users; but their sacrificial character is not essential to such a use, which is amply explained by the psychical theories of primitive thought.

A continuation of the magical theory of bones is seen in the veneration of relics of the saints. One of the earliest and best known examples is that

* The Tungusian word for 'family' is *sŏk*='bones' (Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, ii. 32).

† For an African method of obtaining the bones rapidly, see Ellis, *Tshi-Speaking Peoples*, 1887, p. 268: 'The chief who falls in battle is lightly buried, and water is poured on his grave many times a day, for some weeks. The bones, thus becoming clean, are taken out and deposited in a chest.'

* On the other hand, Ashurbanipal enumerates the bones of an enemy among his spoil (Jastrow, *Bab.-Assyr. Rel.* p. 602); cf. Am 2[1].

† Bones play an important part in many folk-tales dealing with the renewal of life in the dismembered dead (*CF*, pp. 91–95, 100 f.), doubtless because, as MacCulloch says, 'the bones, as less subject to decay than the flesh, may have seemed to early men the basis of a renewed life.' While some of these tales declare that, if a single bone be lacking, the person revived will be correspondingly deficient, others express the belief that only a portion of the skeleton (especially the spine; cf. the Roman beliefs concerning the *os sacrum*) will be sufficient to restore the entire person to life. As early as the palæolithic age skeletons were carefully preserved in Gaul, where they were frequently coloured, either in whole or in part (especially the skull), with red pigment—a usage still observed by the Alfurus of Ceram, and by certain South American, Papuan, and Australian tribes (Renel, *Les Religions de la Gaule avant le Christianisme*, 1907, pp. 49–51, 53 f.).

of Lucilla of Carthage, who habitually kissed a martyr's bone before partaking of the Eucharist (cf. *DCB*, *s.v.* 'Lucilla'). Newman quotes Theodoret, with apparent approval of his theory of the virtue of the bodies of martyrs: 'And though each body be divided, the grace remains indivisible; and that small, that tiny particle is equal in power with the Martyr that hath never been dispersed about' (*Development of Chr. Doctrine*, p. 374). This may be accepted as a true statement of primitive theory, especially in regard to the bones, as being the parts most easy to preserve; it is paralleled in the devotion of Greek cities to the supposed bones of their respective heroes (Rohde, *Psyche*, i. 162). Primitive thought, however, applied the theory on a wider scale, and included animal as well as human bones. 'Among the Kalang of Java, whose totem is the red dog, bride and bridegroom before marriage are rubbed with the ashes of a red dog's bones' (Frazer, *Totemism*, p. 33). We frequently meet with the belief that the bones of animals slain in the chase must be carefully dealt with, to secure their resurrection and the future supply (Frazer, *GB*[2] ii. 415 f.). Sometimes the soul of the dead animal is thought to be aware of the fate of its bones, and the future success of the hunter depends on its proper propitiation (*ib.* p. 405).

From various customs in regard to bones, Frazer infers that 'it is a rule with savages not to let women handle the bones of animals during their monthly seclusions' (note on p. 221, vol. iii., where various customs are collected). On the other hand, among certain Indian tribes we find girls at puberty carrying bone implements, with which to scratch themselves, and with which to drink. The girl then drinks water through a tube made of the leg of a crane, a swan, or a goose (*ib.* p. 213). Here the virtue of the bone, no doubt, protects the supply of water from the perilous influence of her condition.

Amongst the many other usages in which bones figure may be mentioned the bonfire (originally 'bone-fire,' cf. Jevons, p. 150, and Skeat's *Dict. s.v.*), the practice of fastening the bone of a murdered man on to the spear that is to avenge him (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 554), and even the use of a cleft bone as a token, noticed by Doughty (*Arabia Deserta*, 1888, ii. 360).

LITERATURE.—This has been given in the article. See also under art. PSYCHOLOGY. H. WHEELER ROBINSON.

BONFIRE.—See FIRE.

BONI HOMINES (corrupted into Bononii or Bonosii).—See PERFECTI.

BOOK OF LIFE.—The science of the Semitic East was based upon the axiom that the constitution of this lower world corresponds to that of the heavens above, as seen in the cosmos and its cycle. The whole course of events upon the earth, it was believed, was prefigured in the cyclical phenomena of the higher spheres. On its mythological side, therefore, the doctrine could postulate the existence of celestial tablets on which were inscribed both the wisdom of heaven and the history of earth.

1. The books (tablets) of wisdom.—(1) *Babylonia.*—According to Babylonian science, the process of the world realizes itself in æons, which arise out of the primal sea; and this world-ocean, accordingly, is regarded as the seat of Divine creative wisdom. The mythical representative of the primal sea was, in the previous æon, Mummu (Damascius: Μουμις = νοητὸς κόσμος; cf. *bît mummu*, 'the house of wisdom' [Rawl. 5, 33*a*]); in the present æon he is called 'Lord of Water' (*i.e.* of the ocean, which was regarded as ZU-AB, 'house of wisdom'). He is therefore 'father of the gods,' 'creator of Adapa, the first man' (*zer amelûti*, 'seed of the human race'), who, as the 'sagacious one' (*Atraḫasis*), receives from his creator wisdom, but not eternal life. The tutelary deity of all who are endowed with wisdom and art is Ea. He is 'the god of wisdom, of potters, smiths, singers, priests, of Kalû-mariners, jewellers, stone-cutters, metal-workers.' A Bab. text (*Cuneiform Texts*, xv. 50) speaks of the *šipru* (= Heb. סֵפֶר, 'book') of the god Ea, the duty of studying which falls specially upon the king. Ea is also the source of the wisdom of the priests, *e.g.* the 'secret of heaven and earth' which was acquired by Enmeduranki, the progenitor of the prophetic priests of Babylon; the 'secret of Ea' and the 'word from the ocean' are mentioned in the Bab. ritual-tablets (cf. also the table of commandments below, p. 793).

The myth of Ea has come down to us in legendary form from the χαλδαικὴ ἀρχαιολογία of Berosus, the priest of Marduk (*Fragm.*, ed. Lenormant, No. 1 from Alexander Polyhistor = *FHG*, ed. Muller, ii. 496, frag. 1, 3; Euseb. *Chron.* i., ed. Schoene, 13 f.). The present writer has reproduced the legend in Roscher, iii. 577 ff., as follows:

'It is recorded that a great multitude of the people of different races who inhabited Chaldæa were gathered together in Babylon, living the unruly life of beasts. In the first year there came forth from the Erythræan Sea, at the place where it touches Babylonia, a being endowed with reason and having the name Oannes. Its body was in all respects like that of a fish, but from beneath its fish's head protruded a second head, of human shape. It had also the feet of a man, these having been formed from its tail, and it had a human voice. An image of it had survived till that time. This creature, he continues, lived by day amongst human beings without taking food, and conveyed to them the knowledge of written characters, the sciences (μαθημάτων), and sundry arts; it taught them regarding the peopling of cities and the erection of temples, the introduction of laws and the measuring of land; it instructed them in the sowing and the ingathering of crops, and, in a word, in all that pertains to the satisfaction of men's daily needs (ἡμέρωσις). No further discovery in such matters has been made since that time. At sunset the creature sank once more in the sea, and spent the night in the water, for it was amphibious. Other beings of similar nature appeared at a later time (coming forth likewise from the Erythræan Sea, as is added by Syncellus in another report), regarding which Berosus purposes to write in his history of the kings. Oannes, however, also wrote a book (λόγος) dealing with origins and the formation of States, and this he delivered to mankind.'

The idea of such a book presents itself once more in the passage treating of the destruction of the world by the Flood, *i.e.* the return of things to their original condition in the primeval ocean, and the restoration of the world. Berosus narrates that Kronos commanded Xisuthros to frame a record, in written characters, of all things in their beginning, middle, and end, and to deposit this in Sippar, *i.e.* the 'book-city.' After the Flood the children and kinsmen of Xisuthros migrated to Babylonia, carried away the writings from Sippar, and at the command of their head disseminated them amongst mankind.

(2) *Egypt.*—The notion of a primordial Divine wisdom inscribed in books is found generally amongst the peoples of antiquity. In Egypt, as in Babylonia, the first age of the world was supposed to have been in a special sense the era of wisdom. The representative of the Divine wisdom, according to the Egyptians, was Thoth (corresponding to the Bab. Nabû [= Nebo], the Divine scribe of Marduk, who received wisdom from his father Ea), the amanuensis of the gods, and it was he who conferred the arts of speech and writing upon mankind. The texts of the Book of the Dead were regarded as the 'Books of Thoth.' In ch. 64 the text is traced back to a discovery in On (Heliopolis), where it had been transcribed 'in the very handwriting of the god' during the reign of King Menkara (Brugsch, *Rel. der Ägypter*, 20 f.). A Leyden papyrus (see Lange, *Berl. Akad. d. Wissensch.* [1903] 602 ff.), containing a prediction of a time of blessing and a time of curse, says that the latter will be ushered in by 'the opening of

the secret places, and the purloining of the books of the sanctuary.' The priests, as bearers of revelation, are called 'scribes of the book of God.' A memorial-stone in Abydos preserves a record of what Rameses IV. had learned in the house of life (cf. the Bab. name of a temple *E-ti-la*, 'the house of life') from his constant study of the books. The text of this contains the mystical teachings regarding Osiris. Here it is said that the majesty of Thoth stands beside Rê and Osiris for the purpose of executing their Divine commands (Erman, *Egyptian Religion*, p. 80; A. Jeremias, *Im Kampfe um den alten Orient*, i. 67). With this agree the statements of classical writers, who represent Thoth as the founder of theology and political economy, of the sciences and the arts. Clement of Alexandria enumerates forty-two 'Books of Thoth,' of which the first ten, or those of the prophet, treat of the law and of the gods, the following ten contain regulations regarding sacrifices and feasts, and the third ten the mystical cosmography; the next four embrace astronomy and the science of the calendar, two contain hymns about the gods and the kings of primeval times, while the last six deal with the science of medicine. Brugsch (*op. cit.* 449 f.) is of opinion that he can trace in part the titles of these books in a hieroglyphic text of the temple of Edfu.

(3) *Persia.*—The books of the Avesta also claim to constitute a Divine book, and it appears to the present writer that they may be brought under our present category. According to Haug, Avesta means 'knowledge,' *i.e.* Divine knowledge; its root, like that of Veda, being *vid*. Ahura Mazda together with Asha formed 'the word of bliss' by the agency of Vohu Manô (i.e. *logos*, corresponding to Marduk, the son of Ea), and revealed it to Zarathushtra, who diffused the Divine teaching amongst men (cf. *Gâthâ*, *Yasna* xxix.). According to *Vendîdâd* II., Yima, the first man, was chosen for the task of preserving the celestial truth upon the earth. The religious system of Zarathushtra purports to be an attack upon error, and a return to the truth and knowledge issuing from the original wisdom revealed by Ahura Mazda (cf. *Gâthâ*, *Yasna* li. 13, xlii. 3, liii. 2, xxxi. 2). In *Gâthâ*, *Yasna* xlviii., he who knows the secret doctrine is praised as a true teacher; possessing the power of Vohu Manô he is equal to Mazda himself in intelligence.

(4) *India.*—The early Aryan religion of India and the Indian systems of religion allied thereto consider the Veda ('knowledge') as the primal wisdom. True, such a statement merely expresses a theory, for the hymns of the Veda are partly of a secular character, and first acquired their religious significance from their association with sacrificial worship. It is an article of belief that the Vedas were composed by the ten *ṛṣis*, or wise men of the world's first age. Even the Upaniṣads ('secret doctrines'), the spirit of which is altogether characteristic of India, lay claim to a direct connexion with the primordial wisdom of the Vedas; while the Law-book of Manu (*Mânava Dharmaśâstra*) professes to be a revelation which the first man Manu received from the Deity. The doctrine of the ages of the world (*q.v.*) given in the *Mahâbhârata* and in the Law-book of Manu asserts that in the Golden Age the Veda existed in a perfect form, and that in each of the three succeeding ages one quarter of the Veda, and therewith one quarter of perfect righteousness, has been lost.

(5) *China.*—The State-religion of Confucius, as established by the Han dynasty (B.C. 206–A.D. 220) is based upon nine canonical works (five *king*, or 'webs' of wisdom, and four *shu*, 'books'), in which the primordial wisdom, from the period of the mythical emperors of the remote past, is believed to be codified. This is quite in accordance with the attitude of Kung-tse, the great reformer Confucius, who professed to be no more than 'the wooden clapper whom Heaven had made use of' to redeem the people from their degeneracy by resuscitating the institutions of ancient days.

(6) *Islâm.*—In Islâm, Muhammad is regarded as the 'Seal of the Prophets' (Qur'ân, xxxiii. 40), the last infallible messenger of Divine revelation. In the Muhammadan faith, therefore, the Qur'ân ranks as the book of heaven. The Mahdism prevalent among the sects looks to the coming Mahdis as prophets who will cleanse the truth of the original revelation from all error. Only in a few sects has the prophet lost the distinction of being 'the Seal of the Prophets,' and sunk to the level of a mere forerunner.

With this Oriental conception of the book of the primeval revelation of God is closely connected the tendency of the Jewish Synagogue towards the theory of the verbal inspiration of Scripture.

2. The book of destinies.—In Oriental science the analogue of the cosmos is the cycle. The conception of space is equivalent to that of time (cf. *'olâm*, 'æon'; Talmudic *'olâm*, 'world'). The revelation of the Deity in the cosmos and the cycle is seen in the starry sphere, and especially in the movement of the heavenly bodies. A Bab. name for these bodies is *šitir šamê*, *šitirtu šamê*, 'the writing of heaven.'

According to Seneca (*FHG* i. 510), Berosus says that in Chaldæan science 'all things take place in harmony with the movements of the stars.' Cf. Job 38[33] 'Knowest thou the *huḳḳôth* of the heavens?': the parallel clause, on the principle that the earthly is a reflex of the heavenly, reads, 'Or canst thou set their dominion upon the earth?' See also Qur'ân, xlv. 1–4: 'The revelation of the *Book* is from God . . . for in the heavens and on the earth are the signs for believers. Likewise in your own nature, and in all manner of beasts in every place . . . and in the succession of night and day, and in the supplies which God sends from heaven and with which He gives life to the earth when dead, and in the change of winds'; cf. xvi. 16: 'For by the stars are they guided.' Jewish literature, *e.g.*, *Mo'ed Qâṭon*, 28*a*, has it that 'long life, children, and food depend not upon merit, but upon the stars.'

In the teaching emanating from Babylon the heavenly bodies (sun, moon, and five planets) that move in the zodiac are in a special sense the interpreters of the Divine will. The zodiac forms the book of revelation proper, while the fixed stars, grouped in constellations which are regarded as 'correspondences' to the phenomena of the zodiac, are, so to speak, the commentary on the margin.

Cf. H. Winckler, *Forschungen*, iii. 198. In Arabic the constellations lying outside the zodiac are called *bayaniyyât*, *bayan* meaning a 'commentary' on the margin of a book. According to Qur'ân xv. 5 ff. the *mysteries of the Divine will* lie in the *zodiac*. With reference to the 'interpreters' (ἑρμηνεῖς), cf. Diodor. Sic. ii. 30, who reproduces the 'Chaldæan doctrine.' The name of the temple-tower *E-ur-imin-an-ki* would seem to signify 'House of the messengers of the commands of heaven and earth,' and in that case may apply to the planets; cf. A. Jeremias, 'Das Alter der babylonischen Astronomie' (*Im Kampf um den Alten Orient*, iii.[2]).

In the cosmic mythology of Babylon the revelation of heaven, which is made manifest in the cycle of the world, is known as *tup šimâti*, 'tables of destiny.' These are borne upon the breast of the ruler of the world's destiny. Hence we should probably assume the existence of *two* heavenly tablets; not only 'the commands of the gods,' but also 'the *life* of men' is written thereon. In the myths concerning the war against the chaos-dragon

and the restoration of the world, the victor and demiurge receives the tablets as his reward (see below, 'the book with seven seals' [Rev 4 f.], which the *ἀρνίον*, having won the battle, has power to open). In the Bab. Creation Epic they were, during a previous æon, in the possession of Kingu, the partner of Tiâmat. The narrative relates how Tiâmat delivers them to him with the words: 'Let not thy decree be changed; the word of the mouth stands firm.' Then Marduk receives them as the reward of conflict and victory. Elsewhere it is En-lil, the cosmic representative of the zodiac, who appears as the holder of the tablets of destiny. Or they are sometimes held by Nebo, the Divine recorder of destiny. In an exorcism-text (King, *Assyrian Magic*, No. 22) he is called 'the bearer of the tablets of fate,' and in other passages 'the writer of the All, who holds the style of the tablet of fate' (Rawl. 52). The day for the determination of destiny is New Year's Day. On this day is reconstituted the cycle of the year, which represents in miniature, as was believed, the cycle of the æons. The conqueror of the power of darkness is, as 'the one who determines destiny,' the possessor of the tablets of fate. In the *parak šimâti*, the chamber of destiny, from the 8th to the 11th of Nisan, the destinies of the year are determined with the assistance of the gods, whose statues are conveyed in wheel-barges to the sanctuary of Marduk. This mythical conception seems to have become matter of fact within historic times, in the act of casting lots by the king (the Assyrian king says: *puru akrur*, 'I cast the lot'), *i.e.* in a ceremonial inquiry regarding destiny.

The same notion survives in the practice of inquiring after one's destiny on New Year's eve, and also in that of taking the twelve holy nights (one for each month) as times for dreaming of one's destiny. The Bab. spirit of the idea is particularly preserved in the Talmudic conception (discussed in next col.) of the New Year's festival as the occasion on which the Divine determination of destiny is made.

In applying the doctrine of the celestial tablets of destiny to individuals, Bab. texts make mention of one particular tablet on which is inscribed the duration of life, the happiness of mankind (and on the other hand the curse, or shortening, of life). The construction of tablets of this kind is specially ascribed to Nabû, the Divine recorder in the chamber of destiny. Thus Ashurbanipal in a hymn (cf. Jeremias, art. 'Nebo,' in Roscher) says to Nebo: 'My life is written before thee.' His brother Šameššamukîn speaks thus: 'May Nabû, the tablet-writer of E-sagil, write upon his tablet the days of the life of him [who honours my inscription] for long duration.' Nebuchadrezzar says: 'O Nabû, declare upon thy tablet, which fixes the *pulukku* of heaven and earth, the long duration of my days; write it for my posterity.' Antiochus Soter expresses himself thus: 'O Nabû, by thine august stylus, which establishes the *pulukku* of heaven and earth, may my salvation be made sure, through thy holy decree.'

The same conception has doubtless given rise to the 'tables of good works,' in which, according to IV R, 1118*b*, entries are made; also to the 'tables of sins' mentioned in ritual texts from Babylon, which are to be 'broken in pieces'; and to 'the tables of transgressions, misdeeds, anathemas and imprecations, which are to be cast into the water' (cf. H. Zimmern, *Beitrage zur Kenntnis der bab. Religion*, pp. 23, 125). We may also mention here a table (*Cun. Texts*, xiii. 29 f.) which contains injunctions regarding sacrifice, prayer, and friendship, though it perhaps belongs rather to the group of tablets of Divine wisdom dealt with above:

'In thy learning (?) look at the table:
The fear of God brings forth grace,
Sacrifice gives increase of life
And prayer [cancels] sin.'

The idea of a celestial process of reckoning in connexion with the most important festival of the calendar, viz., New Year's Day, which, as the inception of a new cycle, exhibits the renewal of the world on a small scale, had an influence upon Jewish religion after the Exile. Thus, in the tractate *'Arākhîn*, 10, it is written:

'The ministering angels inquired thus of God, "Lord of the world, why do the Israelites, on New Year's Day and the Day of Atonement, utter no song of praise (הלל) before Thee?" God answered them, "When the king sits upon the throne and passes judgment, and the *Books of Life* and *of Death* are set open before Him, then may the Israelites feel themselves disposed to sing a song of praise before Me—at a time when it shall appear fitting for them to give themselves to repentance."'

In the New Year's tractate *Rōsh Hashshānā*, 16*a*, it is said, 'Everything is decided on New Year's day, and the judgment is sealed on the Day of atonement.' In this case the 'judgment' signifies the fortunes of the year, as the context refers, amongst other things, to the fruits of the field.

Allied with the above in idea, though of a different character, is the conception of a reckoning kept in heaven of men's good and evil deeds, and of their lot in life and death. This may have been suggested by the public lists on which the names of citizens were enrolled. But we must not summarily dismiss the theory of a link with the book of destiny, for even the drawing up of such lists was brought into connexion with New Year's Day, the feast of destiny. According to Jerus. *Rōsh Hashshānā*, Rabbi Johanan (*c.* 260 A.D.) knows of three registers—of the good, the bad, and the undecided, respectively—which are unrolled at New Year. Jubil. xxx. 20 (cf. xxx. 22) speaks thus: 'He is enrolled in the tables of heaven as a friend and a just man.' In the Book of Enoch the central figure appears as a 'heavenly recorder,' and shows to a nicety the very characteristics of the Nabû, the heavenly scribe of the Babylonians. He holds possession of the celestial tables, and reads what is written therein of the deeds of man. Cf. Enoch 47^3 104^1 'Your names are written down before the majesty of the exalted one'; 108^3 'the Book of Life and the Books of the Saints.'* The same thought is adopted in those Christian Apocalyptic writings which have been influenced by Judaism. According to the *Apocalypse of Sophonia*, the angels sit at the gate of heaven and write the deeds of men upon the rolls of a book; while *Apocal. Pauli*, 10, says that at the evening hour in heaven all things that men have done during the day are written down by the angels.

Within the canon of Scripture we find mention of the heavenly book, as the book of destiny, in the two outstanding apocalyptic writings, viz. Daniel and Revelation. In Dn $7^{9ff.}$ the seer beholds *the books opened* before the great council in heaven presided over by the Ancient of Days. In face of the assembly is fought out the battle against the beast which utters great words—a characteristic feature of the conflict with the dragon. The warrior and victor is the heavenly man. After his victory he is brought before the Ancient of Days, 'and there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all peoples, nations, and languages should serve him: his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed.' The conqueror receives as his reward the sovereignty of the world in the new æon, and the power of determining destiny.† Here too, therefore, the books are books of destiny.

* Again, however, in ch. 89 f., Enoch appears as the recorder of the doings of the seventy shepherds of the people; and, in the *Ascensio Jesaiae*, of the registers of the heavenly Jerusalem.

† Such is the connexion to which the present writer desires once more to draw special attention (cf. his *Der AT im Lichte des alten Orients*, on this passage). The connexion with the

This comes out still more clearly in the companion picture of Revelation, where the conflict with and the victory over the power of darkness are transferred to the historical appearance of the crucified and risen Christ. It is He who has conquered the dragon, and who therefore sways the destinies of the world, and His *parousia* will bring about the final victory over the dragon, and usher in the new and glorified era of the world.

Rev $4^{1ff.}$ introduces us once more to the council in heaven.* God sits upon the throne, and to right and left, in two semicircles, sit the twenty-four elders, in priestly robes and with crowns on their heads. He that sits on the throne holds in His hand a *book-roll* having seven (pendent) seals, which indicate the seven sections of the roll.† 'Who is worthy to open the book, and to loose the seals thereof?' This simply means: 'Who is worthy to sway the destinies?' The Christ who is to be glorified comes forward. In this vision His victory and exaltation (Mt 28^{18} 11^{27} 2^{9}) are portrayed with the imagery and colouring of the ancient Oriental myth of the conflict and victory of the year-god, who as the reward of his success receives the book of destiny, *i.e.* the command of the world, and who is therefore loudly praised in the council of heaven (for details see Jeremias, *Babylonisches im NT*, 13 ff.): 'Worthy art thou to open the book, and to loose the seals thereof.' A similar signification attaches to Rev 21^{27}, where the *Book of Life* is in the possession of the Lamb. In $5^{9f.}$ we have the song of praise sung by the heavenly council. In its form the song resembles that accorded to Marduk, who after his victory over Tiamat received fifty names of honour (cf. 'the name above every name,' Ph 2^{9}), as also that given in the Egyptian myth to Horus in the hall of the gods after his victory over Set, the representative of the power of darkness: 'Welcome, Horus, son of Osiris, the courageous, the justified, son of Isis and heir of Osiris.'

Mention of a book of destiny in which are written the fortunes of the individual is made in Ps 139^{16} 'Thine eyes saw me when I was yet unformed, and there was written in thy book all the days that were still to be'; cf. also Ex 32^{32} 'Blot me out of the book which thou hast written'; and Ps 69^{28} 'Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, that they be not written with the righteous.' The last-mentioned passage might also come under a different heading, that, namely, of the heavenly list-making already touched upon (p. 794b); and it is this group to which we must refer Is 4^{3}, which speaks of those who in Jerusalem are 'written unto life,' as also Mal 3^{16} with its mention of a 'book of remembrance' before Jahweh, in which are written those that fear Jahweh and have respect to His name.

The two ideas of a heavenly book of life and a heavenly register of names find expression also in the NT. The book of life in which the destinies of men are inscribed is referred to, not only in Rev 5 and 21^{27}, as already noted, but also in Rev 13^{8} and 17^{8} 'the book of life' in which names are 'written from the foundation of the world'; cf. 3^{5} 'I will in no wise blot his name out of the book of life' (one of the seven variants of the promise given at the close of the messages to the Churches, to assure him that overcometh in the strife that he shall be saved in the transformation of the world).

The book of destinies, in miniature form, so to speak, is spoken of also in Ezk $3^{1ff.}$ and Rev $10^{8ff.}$ The two passages are essentially the same in character. Ezekiel must eat the roll of a book, and it was in his mouth as honey for sweetness. The roll contained the intimation of God's will, which the prophet is required to convey to the captives in Babylon, and the Spirit carries him thither through the air. In Rev $10^{8ff.}$ John is made to eat up the little book which the angel carried in his hand. It is to taste like honey in his mouth, but to cause pain within. In it are written the destinies 'concerning many peoples and nations and tongues and kings' which he is to proclaim.

The heavenly registers are suggested by Lk 10^{20} 'Rejoice that your names are written in heaven'; Ph 4^{3} 'the rest of my fellow-workers, whose names are in the book of life'; and He 12^{23} 'the general assembly and Church of the first-born who are enrolled in heaven.'

ALFRED JEREMIAS.

BORNEO.—See INDONESIA.

BOUNDARY.—See LANDMARK.

BOURIGNIANISM.—See SECTS (Christian).

BOY.—See CHILDREN, INITIATION, PUBERTY.

BOYCOTTING.—This is a modern name for a practice as ancient as civilization itself. The name is derived from the experience of one Captain Boycott, a land agent in the employment of Lord Erne, an Irish landlord who in 1880 came into conflict with the agrarian societies in the district in which he lived, in County Mayo, Ireland. It is a method of social ostracism, informally applied by public opinion, and may be carried to almost any length. The term, which has been adopted in a wide sense into French (*boycotter*) and German (*boykottiren*), is used as implying any measure of avoidance of or holding aloof from those judged, by organized or unorganized public opinion, unworthy of social intercourse. It may vary from the schoolboy's 'sending to Coventry' to the extreme measures adopted in Ireland during the days of the land agitation. In so far as boycotting is the expression of individual aversion, the law can take no cognizance of it; but when it is decreed by an association, or organized body of men, it becomes a criminal offence under the law of conspiracy, and in Ireland has been treated as such. A boycotted person in Ireland was cut off from all intercourse with his fellows: no one could work for him, or rent land from him, or supply goods to him, associate with him, or help or assist him in any way, under penalty of being subjected to the same treatment; and this treatment was decreed for landlords and their agents who, in the opinion of the local agrarian association, had treated their tenants harshly.

The boycott, as has been said, is as ancient as civilization itself. The outcast or the outlaw from primitive social communities was simply subjected to the extreme form of boycotting, and had neither security of life nor chance of justice. *Ostracism* in the Greek world was a survival of primitive tribal law dressed up in a constitutional form. *Excommunication* by the Church in the Middle Ages, since it affected civil as well as ecclesiastical privileges, was a tremendously powerful weapon in the hands of the Church; but in modern times, with the separation of Church and State or the subordination of the Church to the State, ecclesiastical excommunication has been deprived of much of its terror, because it no longer affects civil rights. Excommunication, however, is the privilege of every society or association, which may expel or discipline those of its members it considers unworthy; and conflict with the State can arise only when civil rights are affected or the

myth underlying the representation shows this quite clearly: the conqueror of the dragon receives power over the destinies and the dominion of the world.

* Cf. *Shemoth Rabbâ* on Ex 4^{28}, with a reference to Is 24^{23}: 'One day shall God assemble the elders of Israel as on a threshing-floor; He will sit at the head of them all as the president of the court, and administer justice to the peoples.'

† Cf. the seven tablets in the *Dionysiaca* of Nonnus, each of which bears the name of one of the seven planets.

victim is deprived of contract privileges. The State, which has uniformly set its face against all authorities which intervene between it and its subjects, has always regarded boycotting with suspicion; but in a modified form the right to boycott is inherent in the social nature of man. It is one of the forms in which public opinion expresses itself, and is liable to all the excesses and lack of uniformity to which public opinion itself is liable. Organized boycott alone is of sufficient importance to require State interference; or at least is alone sufficiently definite to permit of responsibility being brought home to individuals.

In the economic world the boycott has been extensively used by Trade Unionists (cf. the *Economic Journal*, vol. i. 'The Boycott as an Element in Trade Disputes'). When accompanied by violence, the boycott is a criminal offence at common law in the United States; and even where there is no violence or intimidation, many States hold that the boycott is criminal; and at the present time (1909) a case which will decide this question is pending in the United States Supreme Court. Efforts have been made by Consumers' Leagues in America and similar associations elsewhere to apply a partial boycott to the products of sweated industries, and to the establishments in the retail trade where the employer does not show sufficient consideration for the welfare of his hands.

LITERATURE.—G. L. Bolen, *Getting a Living*, 1903, ch. ix.; J. Mitchell, *Organized Labor*, 1903, ch. xxxiii.; *U.S. Industrial Commission Report*, xvii.; W. M'Donald, in *Irish Theological Quarterly*, i. (1906) 333; P. Marshall, *ib.* i. 435; J. Kelleher, *ib.* ii. (1907) 72; T. Slater, *ib.* ii. 242.

JOHN DAVIDSON.

BOYS' BRIGADES.—Organizations of boys, military in form, moral in purpose. Their ultimate origin is remote. Boys have played at soldiers ever since fighting began, and have been moulded by their play. For many years, up to 1880, Mr. John Hope, an Edinburgh lawyer, carried on a corps of 'Cadets,' which regularly numbered some hundreds of boys. They had uniforms, arms, and a band. Mr. Hope's purpose was to enforce Protestant principles and abstinence from drink and tobacco, and generally to cultivate manliness. This pioneer corps deeply influenced many generations of boys.

The Boys' Brigade proper was instituted in Glasgow by Lieut.-Col. Sir W. A. Smith, of the Volunteer force there. He was a teacher in a mission school, where discipline was difficult, and hooliganism incipient. He adopted the military metaphor, as did General Booth, with some differences. In 1883 the first Company of thirty boys was formed, and drilled in martial exercises, and in the Bible. A red rosette was the first uniform, but caps, belts, haversacks, etc., were soon introduced, and dummy arms. So successful was the movement that before the end of 1908 there were, in the United Kingdom, between 1300 and 1400 such Companies, with 6,000 officers, and 60,000 boys. The world-figures, at the same time, were 2,300 Companies, including over 10,000 officers, and 100,000 boys. There are, besides, Episcopal, Roman Catholic, and Jewish adaptations of the idea, whose figures are not included here. The objects of the brigade are: 'the advancement of Christ's Kingdom among boys, and the promotion of habits of obedience, reverence, discipline, self-respect, and all that tends towards true manliness.' The Bible-class is central. Every boy must attend it, or lose membership in the Brigade. In many companies there is development in the direction of ambulance work, gymnastics, music, etc. The more fully organized corps have become many-sided Clubs for boys.

The Boy Scouts is a kindred organization. Lieut.-General Baden Powell, C.B., is its founder. Its beginning was practical, in 1889, in Mafeking, S. Africa. The town was under siege, General Baden Powell commanding the defence. That men might be released to strengthen the firing line, a corps of boys was enrolled. They kept look-out, acted as orderlies, and carried messages, often under fire. Very good reports are given of their usefulness and courage. The plan was acclimatized in Great Britain, for purposes of moral training. But it is 'peace-scouting' that is taught. Mr. E. Seton Thompson has floated successfully a similar organization in the United States, especially among the Indians. Now there may be seen in and around most towns groups of Scouts, marching, signalling, camping. Statistics are estimates; for the movement is elastic. When a 'patrol,' a squad of five or seven, is trained to efficiency, its members are encouraged to enlist patrols of their own. These are usually linked into 'troops,' but are sometimes independent. They may be connected with Churches or Boys' Brigades. The ideals held up are: 'to be loyal to God, and to the King; and to help other people at all times.' Observation of Nature, self-reliance, and chivalry are inculcated. The manual of the movement is *Scouting for Boys*, by the General. Its sub-title is 'A Handbook for Instruction in Good Citizenship,' which sufficiently describes its scope. The Scouts are put upon their honour to be clean and kind in language and in habits. Clubrooms in winter and camps in summer are used for the ends in view.

The Life Brigade is, in idea, an offshoot of the Boys' Brigade. Its aims are identical, and so are some of its modes. But it strongly opposes the militarism of the earlier body. It organizes girls as well as boys, but without the martial element. Like the other, it uses ambulance work, gymnastics, music, etc., to attach its members to itself, and for training in Christian principles and character. It thus provides bright, healthy nucleus-centres of good citizenship. It is extending, especially under those who hold strong views on the subject of peace. Its watchword is 'Life-saving.' Its president is Rev. Principal J. B. Paton, D.D., Nottingham.

The answer of the promoters of the earlier work to their critics is that the military element is formal, not essential; that there is less and less of it proportionally as the corps grow in the Club direction; and that what there is of it is 'in defence, not defiance.'

LITERATURE.—*The Boys' Brigade Manual*, Glasgow, 1908; Baden Powell, *Scouting for Boys*, London, 1909; *Boys' Life-Brigade-Code*, London, 1909.

THOMAS TEMPLETON.

BRAHMĀ.—See BRĀHMANISM, p. 810.

BRAHMAN.—The philosophical system of the Vedānta adopts as its aim the search after Brahman, and makes this the central point of its teaching. The loftiest conception of Brāhman speculation is there set forth, and handed down from generation to generation. It is, however, only the climax of a long intellectual development, the beginning of which may be traced in the Rigveda, the most ancient poetry of early India. And for the religious and philosophical history of that country the word *brahman* possesses at least an equal significance with that of the term λόγος for Christianity. There is contained in it, as Roth says, the religious development of India during thirty centuries.

It is difficult to grasp the original meaning of the word; for as early as the Rigveda it appears endowed with various meanings, and cannot be identified precisely with any of our conceptions.

The Indian thought is hardly adequately expressed either in the definition of Roth, 'the devotion which manifests itself as longing and satisfaction of the soul, and reaches forth to the gods,' or in general, 'every pious utterance in the service of God'; or in that of Deussen, 'aspirations and cravings after the Divine.' It is Haug's merit to have made it clear that everything which recalls the Christian ideas of 'devotion' or 'prayer' is wholly foreign to the Indian *brahman*, and that the entire sacrificial act was no more than a kind of magic, which compelled the gods to gratify the wishes of their worshippers.

The word *brahman*, from which *brāhmaṇa* is etymologically derived, meets us as early as the time of the Rigveda. Accented on the first syllable (*bráhman*), it is neuter; oxytone, *i.e.* with an accented ultima (*brahmán*), it is masculine. The neuter denotes the object or the thing; the masculine the person who is endowed with or possesses the *bráhman*. With no little probability research inclines now to the view that the fundamental meaning of the word is neither 'devotion' nor 'prayer,' but 'magic'; and that its origin is to be sought in a primitive and rude stratum of human thought, from which it was gradually developed into an expression for the loftiest conception formulated by Hinduism. On the assumption that the word denotes 'magic,' 'witchcraft,' Osthoff has compared it, in his very able work, with the ancient Irish *bricht*, 'magic,' 'magical spell,' and has endeavoured to find the real fundamental idea in the meaning 'formula,' 'fixed mode of expression.' To these words the ancient Icelandic and ancient Norwegian *bragr*, 'poetry,' 'art of poetry,' is akin; and thus the Indian *bráhman*, or the Celtic *bricht*, may be the 'ceremonially conceived' word on which Jacob Grimm lays stress as the essential requisite of the magic, if it is to be effective.

The etymology of *brahman* is obscure. Besides the uncertain possibility of a derivation from the rare root *brh*, 'to speak,' earlier writers referred to the root *bṛh*, 'to grow,' from which *barhis* is taken, and thus connected *brahman* with the Iranian *baresma* (see BARSOM). But, as Osthoff shows, this combination is improbable, since words derived from the root *barh* on the European side exhibit an *l* (*e.g.* Prussian *po-balso*), and *brahman*, if derived from *barh*, could not be related to *bragr*.

Haug has collected the numerous explanations of Sayaṇa. The latter interprets *brahman* as meaning: (*a*) food, food-offering; (*b*) the chant of the Sāma singer; (*c*) magical formula or text, mantra; (*d*) duly completed ceremonies; (*e*) the chant and sacrificial gift together; (*f*) the recitation of the *hotṛ* priest; (*g*) great. The first of these interpretations is not confirmed by the numerous verses of the Rigveda in which *bráhman* occurs, and must be abandoned as erroneous; while in favour of the others various arguments may be advanced.

As early as the Rigveda, *bráhman* appears not as a possession common to all men, but as the religious property of a narrow circle. It is still far from being exalted to a position of superiority over gods and priests. Rather it is to gods,* and to the chanters and *ṛṣis* of the ritual† that it owes its rise. It is 'new,' had 'hitherto not yet' existed, or comes into being from the fathers. It originates from the seat of the *ṛta*,‡ springs forth at the sound of the music of the sacrifice,§ begins really to exist when the Soma juice is pressed and the hymns are recited,‖ at the *savana* rite at the sacrifice, bearing the name *kṛta-brahman*,* and endures with the help of the gods even in battle;† Soma is its guardian.‡ Haug is therefore justified in his conjecture that 'in the Rigveda it denotes a mysterious power which can be called forth by various ceremonies,' and in the definition which he gives of it as 'the magical force which is derived from the orderly co-operation of the hymns, the chants, and the sacrificial gifts.' The pious *brahmakṛt* is contrasted with the *brahmadviṣ*, who has only blame for the performance of the *brahman*.§ It is a purely spiritual force, as may be inferred also from such verses as Rigv. viii. 3. 9: *tat tvā yāmi suvīryaṁ tad brahma pūrvachittaye*, 'I entreat thee for that power, for that brahman, in order that thereby I may discern beforehand'; ii. 2. 10: *brahmaṇā vā chitayemā janāṅ ati*, 34. 7; vi. 75. 19, etc. It is exalted over *vāch*, 'speech,' which reaches as far as the *bráhman*.‖

It is altogether probable that in many individual instances *bráhman* denotes the hymns, religious formulæ, or chants themselves, which are the source of this magical power. But the present writer has found it impossible to establish this meaning with certainty in the particular verses. The verbs which are associated with the word *bráhman* are numerous: *arch*, 'to praise'; *īr*, 'to incite,' 'raise'; *takṣ*, 'to cut'; *kṛ*, 'to make'; *jinv*, 'to incite'; *pra bhar*, 'to deliver'; *ud yam*, 'to raise'; *yuj*, 'to yoke'; *śaṁs*, 'to recite'; *stu*, 'to praise'; *hu*, 'to sacrifice.' These describe the activity of *different* priests; while on the other hand *bráhman* in many instances is co-ordinated with *uktha*, *gir*, *dhī*, *mati*, *manman*, *stoma*, and other words. It is said in Rigv. vii. 43. 1, that 'the unequal *brāhmāṇi* of the pious spread abroad on all sides at the sacrifice like the branches of a tree.'

But even if *bráhman* should be found to be a frequent synonym for hymn, formula, and other products of the mental life, its application is from early times not limited to these. The Taittirīya Saṁhitā says that the hymns and the texts are limited, but the *bráhman* has no limits;¶ and it is therefore intelligible how, as early as the Upaniṣads, the word assumes a profound philosophical meaning in direct opposition to the purely liturgical part of Brāhmanism. *The bráhman frees itself* again from the mere externalities of the ritual, which have gradually gathered around the centre of magical power, and, released from all these fetters of the sacrifice, is developed into the loftiest conception of Hinduism, the central point of all thought, into *the* Brahman, which is essentially pure, unchangeable, and eternal, and in which all things have their issue and their end.

Vedic times conceived of a 'lord of *brahman*,' the god *Bṛhaspati* or *Brahmaṇaspati*. In opposition to the older view, which saw in the latter a form of Agni, modern authorities, following Roth and Haug, prefer to regard him as a pure abstraction. In Haug's belief, Brhaspati is a 'paramount priest of the Brāhman theology'; Oldenberg describes him as 'the domestic priest (*purohita*) of the gods, the heavenly personification of the priesthood, in so far as the latter has the power and function of influencing the course of events by prayer and magical incantation.'** Pischel, again, has placed him by the side of Indra, who has in him his *purohita*, as in ancient India the earthly king had by his side his *brahman-purohita*, the domestic priest skilled in magical art.†† These views, so far as they are based upon a pure abstraction, are

* *devatta*, Rigv. i. 37. 4; *brāhmā kṛṇoti Varuṇaḥ*, Rigv. i. 105. 15; x. 61. 7, etc.
† Rigv. i. 165. 14, 177. 5; vii. 22. 9, 28. 2, 31. 11; x. 89. 16, etc.
‡ *pra brahmaitu sadanād ṛtasya*, Rigv. vii. 86. 1.
§ viii. 69. 9. ‖ vi. 23. 5.
* i. 47. 2; vii. 22. 9, 29. 2, 43. 1, 70. 6.
† i. 129. 4, 152. 5, 7; viii. 37 1.
‡ vi. 52. 3. § vi. 52. 2.
‖ *yāvad brahma viṣṭhitaṁ tāvatī vāk*, x. 114. 8.
¶ Taitt. Saṁh. vii. 3. 1. 4. ** *Religion des Veda*, p. 66.
†† *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, 1894, p. 420 ff.

mistaken, inasmuch as they are opposed to an important passage of the Rigveda, — *bṛhaspatiṁ sadane sādayadhvaṁ . . . dama ā dīdivāṁsaṁ hiraṇyavarṇaṁ sapema*,*—which treats unmistakably of the establishment of a sacrificial fire on the hearth; and in the light of this passage, which in itself is entirely unexceptionable, and cannot be regarded as late, the question whether Bṛhaspati in the Rigveda is an abstraction or not must be answered in the negative. If Bṛhaspati is a name for the fire, the reference in every case into which magic enters can only be to the ancestral fire on the south of the place of sacrifice where the Brahmán sits. Sometimes, it is true, Indra and Bṛhaspati are brought into close connexion, the former as the king the latter as his *purohita*, but the inference is clearly that we are as little compelled to regard Bṛhaspati as an abstraction as Indra. Indra-Sūrya corresponds to the Kṣatra, the moon to the Brāhman. It is asserted in Rigv. x. 90. 13 that 'the moon is born from the *manas*,' and statements to the same effect are found in the Aitareya and Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣads.† We meet with the comparison in Dhammapada, No. 387, where *ādiçço* corresponds to the *saṁnaddho khattiyo*, and *candimā* to the *jhāyī brāhmaṇo*, and similarly in Raghuvaṁśa, xi. 64. When, therefore, ethnography points to 'the dread wizard moon, pursuing its work in the darkness, continually changing its aspect,'‡ it is quite natural for the southern fire, which witnesses magical art and is usually represented as a half-moon, to receive the name of Bṛhaspati, and for the moon also as lord and divine patron of all magic. Haug's view that Bṛhaspati was 'a precursor of the god Ganeśa' cannot be established. In later times Brhaspati lost his original significance and became a name of the planet Juppiter, just as the name of the Aśvins, when their original meaning was forgotten, was transferred to a constellation.

Brhaspati is the heavenly *brahmán*, the prototype of the earthly. He arouses the gods by means of the sacrifice, and, according to one passage of the Satapatha Brāhmana, bears the sacrifice to men who had become faithless. An examination of all the passages in which the masculine *brahmán* is found shows that it denotes in general a distinct class, if not a caste, with their dependents, and is frequently used in direct contrast with the king. And the masculine also, like the neuter *bráhman*, is brought into close connexion with *vāch*.§ As early as the Rigveda those who undertake one or other of the priestly offices are termed Brāhmans, and only in a few instances are we to understand by *brahmán* a definite *class* of priests, co-ordinated with the hotr, adhvaryu, or udgātr.‖ In one passage only, where Agni is addressed as Brahman, who takes his seat on the seat of men, does the latter appear to rank higher than the hotṛ.¶ With these exceptions, however, no special statement is found in the Rigveda which would assign to the *brahmán* duties distinct from those of the hotṛ or adhvaryu. We read nothing either of a special priest of magic or of the *brahmán* of the later ritual, whose function it was to apply his superior knowledge to the superintendence of the sacrifice as a whole, and to make atonement for the mistakes of the individual priests. Thrice the word *vad* is used of his action. But just as the general practice of magic is older than the particular forms of sacrifice known to us, so the magician also is older than the other officials of the Indian ritual, which was raised above the sphere of ordinary magic without ever losing its association with it. There is no ground for supposing that the *brahmán* named in the few passages referred to, and co-ordinated with the hotṛ, adhvaryu, etc., is other than the precursor of the *brahmán* of later times. 'There is no doubt,' writes V. Henry (*La Magie*, p. 37), 'that the earliest brahma of India was nothing more than the sorcerer and medicine-man, the retailer of the remedies and charms of the Atharvaveda or Brahmaveda.' Here again, also, the conservative character of Indian development shows itself: it does not break with the past, but retains it even under changed conditions. Although the hotṛ, adhvaryu, and udgātṛ, with their higher literary or musical accomplishments, were placed in the forefront, and the artificial and dramatic routine of the sacrifice overshadowed the primitive magical rules of the *brahmán*, the ancient *pūjārī* of India was nevertheless not banished from the sacrificial ground, but retained his place as 'physician of the sacrifice,'* lingering in the neighbourhood in order to make good all its defects by virtue of his secret magical art. His mere presence, more than the hymns of the hotṛ or the chants of the udgātṛ, by means of the magical fluid with which he is endowed, preserves for the sacred rite the character of mystery, and maintains the sacrifice in effective order.

A later age credited him also with wider literary knowledge. There was provided for him a special book of ritual, and the Atharvaveda, the magical practices of which harmonized closely with his character, was devoted especially to him. It was even required that he should be acquainted with all the Vedas.† His position, moreover, south of the place of sacrifice,‡ near to the southern fire which was dedicated to the fathers and the demons and employed for magical practices, is a further indication of the original character of the pūjārī; and it was only gradually that there came to be assigned to him a higher literary rank.

All members of the Brāhman caste, according to their qualifications, were, as it seems, eligible to undertake the duties of a hotṛ, udgātṛ, adhvaryu, brahman, or purohita. Apparently, however, one or the other office was held by preference by certain families. We know that the office of the brahman was claimed in the most ancient times by the Vasiṣṭhas, and later by the Atharvans. It is said in the Satapatha Brāhmana, xii. 6. 1. 41, and Taitt. Saṁh. iii. 5. 2. 1 ff., that the Vasiṣṭhas were originally in sole possession of certain formulæ which were essential for the performance of the duty.§ It is worthy of notice that to the god Varuna, who is closely associated with the bráhman,‖ more numerous hymns are dedicated by the Vasiṣṭhas in their maṇḍala than by other poets. The pre-eminent efficiency of their bráhman is emphasized by the hymn Rigv. vii. 34, while in iii. 53. 12 the Viśvāmitras praise their bráhman as protecting the Bharatas. Bloomfield has attempted to show how the Atharvans came to put forward their especial claim to the office.¶

We recur now to the abstract form of the word. The attempt to find a unity behind the multiplicity of the Vedic gods, to discover an all-comprehending first principle, makes its appearance as early as the hymns of the Rigveda, and is there linked with the names of Prajāpati, Viśvakarman, and Puruṣa. It is first in the Satapatha

* Rigv. v. 43. 12.
† Cf. Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads*, Index, *s.v.* 'Mond.'
‡ Oldenberg, *Vedaforschung*, p. 72.
§ *brahmāyam vāchaḥ paramaṁ vyoma*, Rigv. i. 164. 35.
‖ Rigv. ii. 1. 2; iv. 9. 3; vii. 7. 5, 33. 11; and esp. x. 71. 11.
¶ Rigv. vii. 7. 5.

* Aitar. Brāhm. v. 34.
† *brahmā sarvavidyaḥ sarvaṁ veditum arhati*, Yāska, i. 8.
‡ See Caland, *Wiener Zeitschrift f. K. M.* xiv. 120, 124.
§ Weber, *Ind. Studien*, x. 34; Hillebrandt, *Ved. Myth.* i. 262. 111.
‖ *brahmā kṛnoti varuṇaḥ*, Rigv. i. 105, 15.
¶ *Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie*, ii. B. §§ 33, 34.

Brāhmaṇa that we find the neuter brâhman exalted to the position of the supreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods. 'The thirty-three gods,' it is said in Śatap. Brāhm. xii. 8. 3. 29, 'have Bṛhaspati as Purohita, but Bṛhaspati is Brahman, therefore the meaning is, They have the Brahman as their Purohita.' Brahman is identified at one time with the wind, at another with the prāṇas (see BREATH), and at another with the sun. In a hymn, which has been preserved only in fragments, the epithet of 'born first in the east' is applied to him, and he is described at its close as creator and first principle of the universe, who brings the gods and the universe into being. Here, however, he is only the firstborn of creatures (*prathamaja*), not yet 'self-existent' (*svayambhu*). We recognize still the connexion with the view of the Rigveda in passages like Śatap. Brāhm. x. 2. 4. 6, which represents yonder sun as resting upon the seven-syllabled Brahman, and adds: 'the Brahman is seven-syllabled, ṛc is one syllable, yajus two syllables, sāman two syllables, and what is left over and above subsisting in Brahman that is two-syllabled; therefore this is the entire seven-syllabled Brahman.' And in another passage Brahman is identified with the syllable *om*, which is the essence of the whole Veda. In some parts of the Brāhmaṇa literature we still see clearly, as Deussen shows, Prajāpati holding a position above the Brahman of which he is creator, while in others Prajāpati, as 'Brahma Svayambhu,' creates this universe, and in a third series the mind (*manas*) which creates Prajāpati originates 'from the non-existent,' and is itself identified with Brahman. In the cosmogony of the later books of the Śatap. Brāhm., Brahman has been exalted to the position of the supreme first principle, which, itself without beginning, creates the universe: 'Brahman in truth was this universe at the beginning; it created these gods.'*

This thought was taken up by the Upaniṣads, which made it their aim to search out the Brahman, and to impart the knowledge of it. Here religion passes into the wide arena of that philosophy which, in the Vedānta system devoted to the *Brahmavidyā*, has consistently and fully expounded the doctrine of Brahman, and has taught the unity of Brahman and the universe.

By the side of the all-comprehending Brahman, which in its philosophically refined and abstract form became the central point of Indian thought, later times conceived of a personal Divine creator Brahmā. At the present day he appears to be a god of very secondary or theoretical importance, and plays no part in the popular life. Crooke points out that only one temple, that in Puskara, is sacred to him. His image has four faces,† and he holds a drinking-vessel in his hand, he is usually represented also with four arms. His wife is Sarasvati, a logical result of the ancient connexion of *brâhman* and *vâch*. But though his personality is now obscured behind the more vividly conceived Viṣnu and Śiva, the form of Brahmā is of great antiquity. Belief in him pervades the entire Mahābhārata, as Holtzmann shows, in its later as well as in its earlier portions. Brahmā is omniscient; he is acquainted with the past, present, and future, and with his counsel supports the gods, who turn to him in perplexity. He is creator, sustainer, and destroyer of the universe, which is by him continually produced anew. From him proceed the castes, the regular orders; and he is usually exalted above the gods, although there are not wanting passages which subordinate him to Viṣnu or Śiva. He is a popular figure also in the Pāli texts. He appears, for example, before the Buddha in order to move him not to withhold from the world the knowledge he has won. He accompanies the latter's entrance into Nirvāṇa with moral reflexions, and occupies the position of a ministering attendant who, for example, holds the white sunshade over the Buddha. We meet, however, not seldom with more serious traits, which afford evident proof of his connexion with the conception of the Brāhmans. The history of this connexion has not hitherto been investigated; and little therefore on the subject can here be advanced. In the Kevaddhasutta of the Dīgha Nikāya,‡ Brahmā is referred to as 'the great Brahman, the unsurpassed, the observer of all things, the lord of all, the father of all beings past and future,' etc., and he is described as the one who can answer the question as to the ultimate fate of the four elements Brahmā draws near, and a bright light goes before him, announcing his approach. He is, however, obliged to explain to Kevaddha that the gods are mistaken in regarding him as omniscient, and that only the Buddha can answer that question. Here Buddhist assumptions necessitate his subordination to the Tathāgata; but in other passages, as in the Brahmajālasutta,* this subordination is not apparent, but the relation of the *nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo brahmā* to the Brāhmanical conception is still more immediate. It would be worth while to examine these relations more closely, and to endeavour from the elaborate creations of Buddhism, with its numerous Brahma heavens and Brahma gods, to extract the ancient kernel which its wealth of fancy has thus luxuriantly overlaid and concealed from view

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BRÂHMANISM.—I. *DEFINITION AND DIVISIONS.*—The word 'Brâhmanism' seems originally to have been used, and popularly still to be understood, to denote the religion of those inhabitants of India who adored Brahmā as their Supreme God, in contradistinction to those who professed Buddhism, and, in more recent times, Muhammadanism. But this is founded upon a misconception. Brahmā was never universally worshipped (cf. preceding col.); and his acknowledgment as the supreme God is not even a true, still less a prominent, characteristic of Brâhmanical religions and sects. The characteristic mark of Brâhmanism is the acknowledgment of the Veda as the Divine revelation.

In Brâhmanism thus defined we may distinguish two forms of religious development. The earlier one is the religion taught in the *Brâhmaṇas* (the ritualistic books forming the greater part of Vedic literature); it is, strictly speaking, a part of Vedic religion. The later forms of Brâhmanism are a new departure, and are only to a small extent developed from the religion of the *Brâhmanas*; they appeal to the Vedic Scriptures, more especially the *Upaniṣads* (perhaps even forging new ones), in order to build up a theosophy of their own, while in their cult they worship partly Vedic deities,—changed, however, in character,—partly deities of post-Vedic origin or growth. In these forms of Brâhmanism there is an important non-Vedic element, which, however, cannot be said to be non-Brâhmanical; for the beliefs and practices of which this new religion is made up were shared by Brâhmans and, to some extent at least, modelled by them. This element may be called 'Hinduistic.' When it became all-important, and when the influence of the Brâhmans on its formation grew less and less, Brâhmanism merged into Hinduism—by which term it has become customary to denote the modern phase of the religious development of India.

The religion of the *Brâhmaṇas* is but a continuation of that of the *Yajurveda Saṁhitâ*, and thus comes under the head of Vedic religion (*q.v.*). We must take cognizance of it here, in so far as it influenced the growth and development of later

* Śatap. Brâhm. xi. 2. 3. † Bṛhatsaṁhitâ, § 58.
‡ Digh. Nik. xi. 6. 7.
* Digh. Nik. i. 2. 3, p. 13.

Brāhmanism The *Brāhmaṇas* are almost entirely concerned with sacrifice. Indeed, the most orthodox school of Vedic theologians, the Mīmāṁsakas, go the length of maintaining that the sole aim of revelation is to teach the doctrine of sacrifice (*karman*). The Mimāṁsakas are the representatives of the *Karma-mārga* ('way of works'), the doctrine which declares that the highest end of man is to be realized by works, *i.e.* by sacrifices and other observances taught in the Veda. Theirs is an extreme view which, however, fairly well presents the meaning of the *Brāhmaṇas* themselves, or, to be more accurate, of the greater part of every *Brāhmaṇa*. But this does not apply to the last chapters of, or appendixes to, some *Brāhmaṇas* called *Āranyakas*, or to certain independent treatises with similar contents, called *Upaniṣads*, which are the latest works of Vedic literature. For these texts contain philosophical speculations which for the most part are entirely unconnected with sacrifice; and on these texts another school of Vedic theologians, the Vedāntins, have based their theosophical systems. The Vedāntins are the oldest representatives of the *Jñāna-mārga* ('way of knowledge'), or the doctrine which declares that the *summum bonum* is to be obtained through knowledge. There is a third 'way,' the *Bhakti-mārga* (*q.v.*), which declares that love of, or devotion to, God leads to the highest goal. This doctrine was developed later than the 'way of works' and the 'way of knowledge,' but it became the most important one for practical religion, especially in more recent times.

The Hindus themselves have divided their religions into these three classes, according to the three 'ways' explained above; it is therefore necessary that we too should take cognizance of their classification, which, on the whole, well presents the facts and the historical development of religious thought in India.

II. *RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS.*—1. The first form of Brāhmanism, as already stated, is mainly a religion of ceremonies and observances; it is chiefly concerned with **sacrifice**, compared with which devotion and moral duties are of so little importance to the authors of the ritualistic books that they scarcely ever mention them. Of course, the religion of the priests belonged, strictly speaking, to that exclusive class only; it was not the religion of the people at large, or even that of the upper classes, though it was admitted by the latter, in theory at least (and is so generally down to recent times), to be the most sacred, the revealed religion. Its influence on the religious development in India should not be underrated; in order rightly to understand the latter, we must have a clear notion of the nature of the Vedic sacrifice. It is not offered to a god with the view of propitiating him or obtaining from him welfare on earth or bliss in heaven; these rewards are directly produced by the sacrifice itself, *i.e.* through the correct performance of complicated and interconnected ceremonies which constitute the sacrifice, and which are more of the nature of magic than of worship. Though in each sacrifice certain gods are invoked and receive offerings, the gods themselves are but instrumental in bringing about the sacrifice or in completing the course of mystical ceremonies composing it. Sacrifice is regarded as possessing a mystical potency, superior even to the gods, who, it is sometimes stated, attained to their Divine rank by means of sacrifice. In the *Brahmaṇas* there are scattered many statements about this mystical potency—sacrifice in the abstract. The general notions contained in them have been combined by Martin Haug in a description of sacrifice which we shall transcribe from the introduction to his edition of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (Bombay, 1863), p. 73 f.:

'The sacrifice is regarded as the means for obtaining power over this and the other world, over visible as well as invisible beings, animate as well as inanimate creatures. He who knows its proper application, and has it duly performed, is in fact looked upon as the real master of the world; for any desire he may entertain, if it be even the most ambitious, can be gratified; any object he has in view can be obtained by means of it. The *yajña* (sacrifice) taken as a whole is conceived to be a kind of machinery, in which every piece must tally with the other, or a sort of great chain, in which no link is allowed to be wanting; or a staircase, by which one may ascend to heaven; or as a personage, endowed with all the characteristics of a human body. It exists from eternity, and proceeded from the Supreme Being (Prajāpati or Brahmā) along with the *Traividyā*, i.e. the three-fold sacred science (the *Ṛik* verses, the *Sāmans*, or chants, and the *Yajus*, or sacrificial formulas). The creation of the world itself was even regarded as the fruit of a sacrifice performed by the Supreme Being. The *Yajña* exists as an invisible thing at all times; it is like the latent power of electricity in an electric machine, requiring only the operation of a suitable apparatus in order to be elicited. It is supposed to extend, when unrolled, from the *Ahavanīya*, or sacrificial fire, into which all oblations are thrown, to heaven, forming thus a bridge or ladder, by means of which the sacrificer can communicate with the world of gods and spirits, and even ascend when alive to their abodes. The term for beginning the sacrificial operations is "to spread the sacrifice"; this means that the invisible thing, representing the ideal sacrifice which was lying dormant, as it were, is set in motion, in consequence of which its several parts or limbs unfold themselves, and thus the whole becomes extended. This ideal sacrifice stands in the closest relationship with all the sacrificial implements, the sacrificial place, and all the sacred verses and words spoken during its actual performance. The sacrifice being often represented as a kind of being with a body like that of men, certain ceremonies form his head, others his neck, others his eyes, etc. The most important element in a sacrifice is that all its several parts should tally, and that consequently there should be nothing in excess, and nothing deficient in it. This harmony of the several parts of the sacrifice constitutes its *rūpa*, i.e. form. The proper form is obtained, when the *mantras* which are repeated are in strictest accordance with the ceremony for which they are repeated, or (if the sacrifice lasts for several or many days) when they have the characteristics of the respective days. If the form be vitiated, the whole sacrifice is lost. Mistakes being unavoidable on account of the extremely complicated ritual, the sacrificer was to be attended by a physician in the person of the Brahma priest. Each mistake must be made good by a *prāyaśchitta*, i.e. penance, or propitiatory offering'

It is obvious that the dignity of the gods could not but be lowered in the opinion of those who had such exaggerated notions about the nature and importance of sacrifice. And, as a matter of fact, the gods descended from the high position they once had held in the esteem of the Vedic poets, and came to occupy quite a subordinate rank. The degradation of the once popular gods is a marked feature of later Brāhmanism, and we can trace its effect on the development of Indian religion in many important facts, as will be explained in the sequel.

The religion of the period of the Rigveda did not lack germs which, duly developed, would have raised the conception of the Deity to a higher level. Not only, during its last stage, had a Father-god, Prajāpati, become the object of speculation and adoration, but even before that time it had become a habit of the poet-priest to ascribe the attributes, functions, and powers of several gods to that particular one whom he was for the time invoking. This tendency to identify many gods with one has been called by Max Muller 'henotheism' or 'kathenotheism.' It is conceivable that henotheism might, in the end, have led to monotheism, or at least to a purer form of religion than the old Vedic polytheism. But in the *Brāhmaṇa* period the priests cared less to exalt the personal gods than to emphasize the momentous dignity of the impersonal sacrifice. The conception of the Deity as embodied in the Vedic gods was first debased by the ritualistic preoccupation of the priests; and the degradation of the gods was consummated by the superstition of the vulgar. But the same cause which diminished the dignity of the ancient gods gave rise to a new idea of God as Controller and Lord of man and the universe. The constant occupation of the priests with sacrifice and the symbolical interpretation of the meaning of the rites and ceremonies produced those ideas,

described by Haug, about sacrifice as a paramount power, the essence, as it were, of the whole world; and such ideas prepared the Indian mind to admit a First Cause, a kind of impersonal God. This movement appears in full vigour in the *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads*; in these works we behold a spectacle unique in the history of religion, viz. the search for a Supreme God after the popular gods had proved to be false.

During the *Brāhmaṇa* period the theologians had always been searching for those cosmical, physical, and psychical phenomena and forces which, as they thought, were symbolized in the rites and appurtenances of sacrifice. Thus they arrived at a crude and unsystematical knowledge of these potencies, and a rough kind of estimate of their importance. The earliest parts of the *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads* contain several attempts at a systematic arrangement of the physical and psychical forces, first in connexion with some part of the ritual, and then in various other allegorical directions. There is a gradual advance in these fanciful attempts at classification; the several items are arranged according to their dependence upon one another, till that one is reached from which all others are believed to be derived.

It is impossible to sketch, even in outline, these attempts, which frequently contradict one another; but it may be remarked that the series of cosmical or physical phenomena and the psychical are often treated apart, and afterwards placed in parallelism. Thus we frequently meet with such symbolic equations as the following: body = earth, speech = fire (*agni*), eye = sun (*aditya*), breath (*i.e.* the principle of life, *prāṇa*) = wind (*vāyu*), ear = quarters of the heavens, mind = moon, etc. At the head of either series is placed that element or power which is regarded as the most subtle, the most sublime. Before the end of these speculations was definitely reached, 'breath' was usually placed at the top of the psychical series, while the same position in the cosmical series was occupied sometimes by 'wind,' sometimes by 'space.'

2. But speculation did not rest satisfied with such results; it postulated something more subtle still than anything we are cognizant of—the Real (*sat*), the Immortal, which is beyond the sun, where the Blessed go who no more return to the earth. The name given to this mysterious power is **Brahman** (*q.v.*), which originally may have meant 'prayer' [but see above, p. 797[a], near top], but already in the Atharva Veda and other Vedic texts (see Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, iii. 378 ff.) it denotes the primitive deity, who is identified with the Supreme God, the Upholder of the world. Brahman is the infinite, the unchangeable, the eternal, the absolute; it is pure Being, on which all that exists depends, and from which it derives its reality. Brahman cannot be defined; it is expressly and repeatedly stated that all known attributes of things must be denied of Brahman, which therefore can be described only by negations (*neti neti*, 'no no'). In Brahman is reached the ultimate end of the series of cosmical and physical powers—its First Cause.

This advance in speculation seems to have proceeded step by step with another, concerning the series of psychical phenomena and powers, the ultimate member of which came to be designated as **Ātman** (*q.v.*). *Ātman* originally meant 'body' or 'person.' Being used also as a reflexive pronoun, it came to denote the Self, as the principle which constitutes the identity of an individual, that on which the whole of the physical and psychical functions of an individual depend, and from which they derive their reality. *Ātman* is therefore the transcendent Self or Soul. Frequently it is identified with the space within the heart. *Brahman* and *Ātman* mark the greatest heights which speculation reached; the one in the cosmical order of things, the other in the psychical. To comprehend their nature, and to investigate the relation subsisting between them, is the chief object, the ever-recurring theme, of the fully developed speculation of the *Upaniṣads*. Brahman is declared to be the innermost essence of all things, animate and inanimate; it abides in them unknown to them, and controls them from within; hence it is called *antaryāmin* ('controller from within'). Brahman, as immanent in us, is declared not to be different from our *ātman*. The *Upaniṣads* insist on the non-difference of the Brahman and Ātman; but it may be doubted whether thereby absolute identity is meant, so that the *ātman* would cease to exist individually when it has been joined to Brahman. On this point there is great diversity of opinion among the interpreters of the *Upaniṣads*—the Aupaniṣadas or Vedāntins.

These philosophers endeavoured to deduce from the *Upaniṣads* their true teachings, and to show that they formed a self-consistent system. The older view seems to have been that followed by Rāmānuja, viz., that souls, though essentially one with Brahman, still retain some kind of individuality of their own when joined to him, and that the world has the same relation to Brahman as the soul has to the body. The younger view expounded by Śaṅkara has, however, become the prevailing one among philosophers, it maintains that Brahman alone is real and everything else is an illusion (*maya*), and that the souls on reaching Brahman are completely merged in him and cease to exist individually. The advocates of both views adduce passages in their favour from the *Upaniṣads* themselves. The truth seems to be that the authors of the *Upaniṣads* held various opinions on the points which form the basis of the different schools of Vedanta.

However this may be, the great achievement of the *Upaniṣads* is to have established the firm belief in a transcendent Cause of the world, an impersonal and un-moral God mysteriously identical with our Self. This new idea of a pantheistical Deity has nothing in common with, and cannot therefore have been developed from, the popular notions of the Divine nature as represented by the old Vedic gods. Brahman, in particular, is outside the category of good and bad; it is an unmoral deity as it is an impersonal one.

The theosophical movement, which found expression in the *Upaniṣads*, was not restricted to a school of philosophers, though one great sage, Yājñavalkya, had a great share in establishing the final doctrine of Brahman. Nor were these speculations the exclusive property of priests or Brāhmans; for kings are mentioned who 'knew the Brahman' and taught their knowledge to Brāhmans; and even women took part in the discussions about the nature of Brahman. It cannot be doubted that the ideas of Brahman and Ātman formed the principal interest of intellectual and religious life in India during the period of the *Upaniṣads*; they became one of the chief factors which brought about the new phase of Brāhmanical religion, for 'Brahmanism,' if we may adopt this term to denote the theosophical ideas taught in the *Upaniṣads*, has been made, by most founders of sects and religions in India, the philosophical basis of their teachings.

3. Another factor which greatly influenced religious life in India, and contributed in a high degree to give it its peculiar character, was **asceticism** (*q.v.*). The religion of the priests, being concerned chiefly with sacrifice and sacraments, cannot have satisfied the religious wants of the people, especially of men of strong religious feelings, who have always formed a numerous class in India. In sacrifice, hired priests played the active part, and the sacrificer but a passive one; but a religious man will always desire to exert himself for the attainment of perfection according to the light that is given him. There was a way open, a means of satisfying religious wants, known by the name of *tapas* and practised from time immemorial; for ascetic practices form already an important part of primitive religion, and are imposed as a duty on the shamans and medicine-men of uncivilized peoples. Already in the Rig Veda (x. 136) ascetics (*munis*) are mentioned who boast of their magical powers. And later, in the *Brāhmaṇas*, we meet with them under the name of *śramaṇas*, who are mentioned in conjunction with Brāhmans as their rivals (cf. Patañjali, *ad Pāṇini*, ii. 412. 2). We get a distinct view of these ascetics in much later times, when the ascetic practices had been refined and reduced to a kind of system. The principal methods were the following: silence, various postures of the body and of the limbs, fasting,

regulation of the breathing, self-mortification, and contemplation. By such means, which are denoted by the word *yoga* (*q.v.*), the ascetic (or *yogin*) strove to propitiate a god and to induce him to grant the boon he solicited (*varada*), or he attempted to gain superhuman powers. At all events he acquired merit by his *tapas*, and was looked upon by all as a saint. It deserves to be noted that in the Epics the *Ṛṣis* of old are generally regarded as holy men, not so much on account of their offering sacrifices as on account of their severe penance; they are superhuman *yogins*, not deified priests. We see thereby that the religious ideal of the Epics was no longer that of the *Brāhmaṇas*.

This change will also become evident, if we consider the four *āśramas* (*q.v.*), or stages into which the religious career of the Hindus was divided about the end of the Vedic period. The first stage is that of the *brahmachārin*, or disciple, who learns the Veda; the second, that of the *gṛhastha*, or married householder; the third, that of the *vānaprastha*, or old man, who retires to the woods and lives there the life of a hermit; the last, that of the *bhikṣu* (*yati*, *sannyāsin*), or religious mendicant. Now the *bhikṣu* is an ascetic by profession, who is never to return to common life, but most of his ascetic practices he has in common with the *yogin*. The high value set on asceticism is acknowledged in principle when ascetic life is made the last stage of the religious career. During the period of the *Brāhmanas*, 'religious' men seem to have passed the last part of their life as hermits in the woods; for their use were destined, as the name indicates, the *Āranyakas* (*q.v.*), which formed the last chapters of, or were appendixes to, the *Brāhmanas*. In later times, however, the *āśrama* of the hermit fell into disuse, and now it is practically abolished; while at the same time the *āśrama* of the ascetic gained in importance, and was chosen by all those who adopted a religious life. This changed relation between the *āśramas* indicates that the ascetic ideal finally supplanted the older ideal represented by sacrifice.

There have always been two kinds of *yoga*. The one, now called *hathayoga*, is practised in order to obtain magical powers; the other, *rājayoga*, for the attainment of spiritual perfection. In the latter, the higher *yoga*, *dhyāna* ('contemplation') is regarded as the most effective means for attaining the desired ends, while the other ascetic practices are enjoined as a preparatory course only. By *dhyāna* is produced a kind of superhuman knowledge, intuition, we may call it, on the strength of which the wildest fancies have been accepted as truths. The Jaina Umāsvāti lays it down in his *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, ix. 37, that by means of *dhyāna* the structure of the universe becomes known. But the chief use to which *dhyāna* was put was the discovery and comprehension of religious truths, and it is therefore regarded by orthodox as well as by heretical teachers as the noblest of all religious exercises.

The refined *yoga* gave rise to the first systematical philosophy, the *Sānkhya* of Kapila—a theory, if not invented for the purpose, at least well adapted to account for the efficacy of *yoga* in general, and of contemplation in particular. We might call it a system of natural religion; for it was regarded as a *Smṛti*—a title which is given to works of an authority inferior only to that of the Veda. Hence the *Sāṅkhya* theory of evolution, combined with the doctrine of the *Upaniṣads* on Brahman, has, ever since the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*, been put in requisition to solve religious problems and to explain the relation between God and the world; it has thus exercised the greatest influence on later Brāhmanical theology.

In conclusion, the bearing of asceticism on ethics must be pointed out. In India, ethics is not regarded as an independent branch of philosophy or of religion, but as preparatory to the exercise of the highest religious practice, *dhyāna*, which leads to emancipation. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the fundamental moral precepts should have first been formulated in ascetic circles; for they are set forth as the five great vows binding on all *bhikṣus*. Four of these five vows, viz., not to kill, not to steal, not to lie, and not to commit adultery, are common to all orders of ascetics, orthodox as well as heretical. Whatever may have been the actual state of morality in India at the time under consideration, it is evident that the principal moral laws had been clearly grasped, notwithstanding the indifference of the priests to ethics.

The *summum bonum* is defined as emancipation (*mokṣa*, *mukti*, *nirvṛti*). In the *Upaniṣads*, emancipation, union with Brahman, is frequently mentioned and praised as the end to be desired; but it does not yet appear in the same light as in later times, as the only real good. In the *Upaniṣads* there is scarcely a trace of that pessimism which henceforward becomes the most characteristic and dominant feature of Indian philosophy and religion. Theoretical pessimism was first taught in Brāhmanical philosophy by Sāṅkhya-Yoga; it is also the keynote of Jainism and Buddhism—religions which have largely borrowed from Yoga. The logical outcome of pessimism, always associated with it, is the doctrine of liberation as the *summum bonum*. If mundane existence, this phenomenal world, the Saṁsāra, in which the soul is born again and again, is essentially bad, and if the soul fettered to the Saṁsāra experiences infinite pain and no happiness that is not vitiated with and inseparable from suffering, then indeed the true aim must be the definite release from the Saṁsāra, *i.e.* the reaching of a state subject to no change and suffering. This absolute state is reached in *mokṣa*, *mukti*, *nirvṛti*, or *nirvāṇa*. To teach the way to *mukti* is the aim of most of the philosophical and religious systems of India after the Vedic period; they profess to open a way to salvation for those who are wearied with the continual suffering produced by mundane existence.

III. *MYTHOLOGY*.—The religious and philosophical ideas, the rise of which has been sketched in the preceding part of this article, were at the same time so many factors in the forming of the mythology of the Brāhmanical period. This mythology is not the exclusive property of the priests or of the Brāhmans; it may be described as the sum of those myths and legends which were current among the Indians of higher culture, and which found expression in general Sanskrit literature, chiefly in the Epics and the *Purāṇas*. It inherited, from the preceding period of the Veda, the principal gods. Theoretically they remained what they had been believed to be before, but practically there was a marked change. Some of the deities invoked in the hymns of the Rig Veda were forgotten, and those who were retained generally lost much of their pristine dignity, owing to the exclusively sacrificial interests of the priest as explained above; only a few were promoted to a higher position. Besides these, some new gods were received into the Hindu pantheon. The majority of the Vedic gods lost their share in popular worship without ceasing to be considered powerful deities. This brought about a changed conception of these gods in two ways: (1) The anthropomorphic element in their character was greatly developed, since it was not to the priests, but to poets and legend-mongers that the care of mythology was now entrusted. (2) The gods generally became departmental divinities to a

much greater extent than before. This fact is most striking in some cases where gods have attributed to them definite functions with which in the Rig Veda they had but a very slight, if any, connexion. Thus Varuṇa became the ocean-god, while in the Rig Veda his connexion with water seems to be more of an accident. The Vedic Savitṛ is not a proper sun-god; in later mythology he is identical with Sūrya, and represents the heavenly luminary. Soma, whose character as moon-god in the Rig Veda is still controverted, is acknowledged as such in Brāhmanical mythology, and Yama in like manner appears as the ruler of the nether world. This tendency to distribute the departments of nature among the gods, clearly discernible in most cases, prevented the gods from becoming little more than holy names after they had ceased to be worshipped by the people.

The Vedic gods who continue to be generally acknowledged in the Brāhmanical period are Agni, Indra, Savitṛ, Soma, Vayu, Varuṇa, Yama, and the Aśvins; and, in addition to them, Prajāpati, Viṣṇu, and Rudra. The three last named, who became the Supreme Gods, will be considered towards the end of this article; we shall treat first of the other gods borrowed from the Veda, and next of the principal new gods who originated or came to the front in post-Vedic times.

1. **Vedic gods.—Agni** is, in the Rig Veda, the personification of the sacrificial fire; he, therefore, was the god of the priests and the priest of the gods. The Vedic conceptions of Agni are partly retained and occasionally revive in later mythology. Thus he represents Brahmanhood just as Indra represents the *kṣatriya*, or warrior-class; he is the leader of the gods, who are therefore *agni-purogama*. The common synonyms of *agni*, 'fire,' in classical Sanskrit, viz. *vahni*, *hutavāhana*, *hutāśana*, are derived from Vedic conceptions of Agni. But, on the whole, the later Agni is simply a personification of the element fire. Therefore he is spoken of as having wind for his charioteer (*vātasārathi*), and smoke as a banner (*dhūmaketu*). The various aspects of fire occasionally appear as traits of Agni's character, as will be seen in the legends related of him. Some forms of fire, especially as the terrible and destructive element, seem to have been worshipped under other names. According to the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, Agni was called Bhava by the Vāhīkas, Śarva by the Eastern people. He was also called Paśūnām pati ('lord of beasts') and Rudra. This seems to indicate that the *popular* worship of Agni was early transferred to deities of the Rudra type. It may be questioned whether there were any temples of Agni, and whether he received worship except in Vedic sacrifices.

Agni is present in every fire; therefore it was possible to relate legends of many Agnis and to make out genealogies of them (*Mahābhārata*, iii. 219–222, and differently *Vāyu Purāṇa*, i. 29). This accounts also for the fact that contracts were made in the presence of fire; for thus Agni, the omniscient god, was a witness to the contract. Fire, in a mysterious way, resides in all creatures; it is recognized as the cause of digestion. Therefore Agni is an omniscient god. The following legends will give an idea of Agni's position in later mythology:

Agni was created by Brahmā, and invested by him with his functions. But Aṅgiras was, on account of his austerities, considered superior to Agni. Therefore the god wanted to lay down his office, but Aṅgiras dissuaded him from retiring, and was therefore adopted by him as his son (*Mahābhārata*, iii. 217). Aṅgiras' son was Bṛhaspati, from whom the race of Agnis, mentioned above, is derived.

In the Rig Veda, Bhṛgu, or the race of Bhṛgus, is said to have kindled Agni for the establishment and diffusion of fire on earth; but in the *Mahābhārata* the relation between Agni and Bhṛgu is strangely changed. Bhṛgu had been created by Brahmā from the fire at Varuṇa's sacrifice. His wife was Pulomā. While she was pregnant, the Rākṣasa Puloman visited her during her husband's absence, and falling in love with her wanted to carry her off. He asserted that he had been betrothed to her before she married Bhṛgu, and he called Agni to witness. The god declared that the Rākṣasa had, indeed, first chosen her, but that she had been bestowed by her father on Bhṛgu, who with Vedic rites made her his wife. Then the Rākṣasa, in the shape of a boar, carried her off. But during the flight Pulomā miscarried, and the child dropped from her womb; wherefore, he was called *Chyavana*. At the same time the Rākṣasa was reduced to ashes. Upon learning that Agni had made Pulomā known to the Rākṣasa, Bhṛgu pronounced on Agni as a curse that he should devour all things (become 'the all-eater,' *sarvabhakṣa*). Agni, out of resentment, now withdrew from all sacrifices, but was at last induced by the entreaties of the gods and Ṛsis to make Bhṛgu's curse come true, and again to receive the offerings for the gods (*Mahābhārata*, i. 5 ff.; see, further, art. BHRIGU).

The retirement of Agni from the world, his hiding in the ocean, in the earth, in plants, especially the Śamī (used in fire-rubbing), is more than once spoken of in the *Mahābhārata*. Some animal always betrayed Agni to those who sought him, and he laid as a curse upon the betrayer some defect which characterizes the animal in question. But it may be doubted whether these speculations formed part of a general belief. The same may be said about his parentage, or rather origin, which is variously stated according to particular Vedic ideas. He is one of the eight Vasus, their leader, just as in later Vedic texts.

Agni's wife is Svāhā, daughter of Dakṣa. He jointly with Śiva was father of Skanda, as will be related below. We hear occasionally of other offspring of Agni, among which the best known name is that of the sage Agniveśa. In one case, however, he became connected with epic history through his relation to the dynasty of Māhiṣmatī on the Narmadā.

Duryodhana, king of Māhiṣmatī, had by Narmadā a beautiful daughter called Sudarśanā, with whom Agni fell in love. In the guise of a poor Brāhman he asked her in marriage. But, her father not consenting, he withdrew from the sacrificial fire. He then made himself known, and received the maiden on condition that he should always be near the king. Agni's son by Sudarśanā was Sudarśana, who as a householder vanquished Death (*Mahābhārata*, xiii. 2). In another place (*ib.* ii. 31) this story is told differently. Nīla, king of Māhiṣmati, had a beautiful daughter who used to stand near the sacrificial fire and fan it. Thus Agni became enamoured of the damsel, and the fire would not burn unless agitated by the breath from her lips. One day the god, in the guise of a Brāhman, visited the girl, but he was discovered by the king and ordered to be executed. Then Agni revealed himself to him, and Nīla gave him his daughter in marriage. The god henceforth aided the king in battle, so that his troops became invincible. So it happened that Sahadeva the Pāṇḍava on his *digvijaya*, or conquest of the world, could not overcome Nīla till Agni allowed the king to submit.

Another local legend in which Agni plays the principal part is the burning of the Khāṇḍava forest. It is connected with the main story of the *Mahabhārata*, and is there (i 222 ff.) told thus. Agni had feasted twelve years, during king Śvetaki's sacrifice, on butter, and he afterwards refused to eat the offerings of other men; he accordingly grew feeble, and complained about it to Brahmā, who advised him to burn the Khāṇḍava forest and to feed on the creatures dwelling in it, who were enemies of the gods. Agni in the guise of a Brāhman accosted Arjuna, who together with Kṛṣṇa was sitting on the bank of the Yamunā, and asked his permission to devour the Khāṇḍava forest, which was protected by Indra. He procured for Arjuna the bow *gāṇḍiva*, and gave Kṛṣṇa his discus. He then set the wood on fire, while Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, posted at either end of the forest, hindered the animals from escaping and the gods from injuring Agni. Thus the whole forest was burned down, the fire lasting a fortnight. It is twice stated that Agni had once before burned down this forest. Probably this story has no mythological bearing; it seems to be a legendary account of the clearing of the forest when the city Khāṇḍavaprastha, which was selected as their capital by the Pāṇḍavas, was founded.

It may be mentioned that, in the *Mahābhārata*, Dhṛṣṭadyumna is regarded as an incarnation of Agni; as is Nīla, the monkey, in the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

Agni is one of the eight *lokapālas*, or guardians of the four cardinal and the four intermediate points of the compass, and presides over the south-east, which is accordingly called *Āgneyī diś*. He is usually represented in pictures as riding on a ram, but his epithets *chhāgaratha* and *chhāgavāhana* point to the he-goat instead of the ram. There seems to have been no definite idea about his figure except that he had seven tongues, the names of which are already given in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, i. 2, 4. He has a great many names; indeed, all words for 'fire' may be used to designate Agni; the more common ones are *Hutabhuj*, *Hutavāhana*, *Vahni*,

Anala, Pāvaka, Kṛśānu, Yibhāvasu, Jātavedas, Hiraṇyaretas, etc. (*Amarakośa*, I. i. 1. 48 ff.). See, further, Adolf Holtzmann, *Agni nach den Vorstellungen des Mahābhārata*, 1878.

Indra (Śakra) in Brāhmanical mythology is the ruler of heaven, and represents the *kṣatriya*, or warrior-class. He is supposed in a passage of the *Nalopākhyāna* to receive visits from kings, his colleagues on earth. In another passage (*Mahābhārata*, i. 197) the office of Indra is stated not to be permanent; there were other Indras before him, and there will be after him. In Buddhist works he is frequently called *Sakko devānam indo*, 'Śakra, the Indra of the gods,' just as in classical Sanskrit *indra* at the end of a compound denotes a superior individual of its class. Indra is always in terror lest some saint should by severe austerities wrest his power from him; and when there is a danger of this kind, he sends one of the *apsaras*, or heavenly nymphs, to seduce the saint from his ascetic exercises. Still he is regarded as the powerful lord of heaven and the chief of the gods; but, in comparison with the Supreme Gods—Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva—he, like the remaining gods, occupies but a second rank. We may therefore assume that, before the rise of the Supreme Gods, Indra held the first rank in popular belief. There was a popular festival held in his honour—the erection of Indra's pole (*indradhvaja*)—which is described in the *Kauśikasūtra* and at a late period by Varāhamihira (*Bṛhatsaṁhitā*, ch. 43). Though there are no temples of Indra, at least in more modern times, his images and niches dedicated to him are met with in temples of other gods, and so he may be said to receive a kind of indirect worship. The same remark applies to other gods to whom no temples are dedicated.

Indra's weapon is the thunderbolt (*vajra*); the rainbow is called 'Indra's bow.' He rides on the elephant Airāvata, or in a heavenly car driven by his charioteer Mātali. His capital is Amarāvatī, his palace Vaijayanta; his park, situated on the north of Mount Meru, is Nandana; in it grows the Pārijāta tree (which was torn from it by Kṛṣṇa and planted in Satyabhāmā's garden). He is the regent of the East. Indra's wife is Indrāṇī, usually called Śachī or Paulomī, daughter of the Asura Puloman, whom he slew. His son is Jayanta.

Indra has a thousand eyes, which may be interpreted as the stars of the firmament; but in legendary mythology they are explained differently. Indra seduced Gautama's wife Ahalyā, and therefore the saint laid upon him the curse that his body should be covered with a thousand marks resembling the female organ; when Gautama relented, he changed these marks into eyes. According to another story, the thousand eyes originated when Indra was gazing on the heavenly nymph Tilottamā (*Mahābhārata*, i. 211).

Many stories are told of Indra, some of which have developed from Vedic myths His most famous deed, the slaying of Vṛtra, is variously told. According to one version of the story (*Mahābhārata*, xii 342), Viśvarūpa or Triśiras, Tvaṣṭṛ's son, was *purohita* of the gods, but he favoured also the Asuras, to whom he was related through his mother. Hiraṇyakaśipu, the leader of the Asuras, brought him over to his party, and dismissed his *hotṛ* Vasiṣṭha, who thereupon cursed him to the effect that he should be killed by a being hitherto not existing (Viṣnu in the shape of a man-lion). Triśiras, in order to aggrandize the Asuras, practised severe penance; but heavenly nymphs sent by Indra succeeded in seducing him from his austerities This aroused him to great wrath, and he began to utter powerful spells, by virtue of which his size increased immensely. With one of his mouths he drank all the soma, with the second he devoured all the offerings, and with the third he drank up the energy of Indra and the gods. Reduced to weakness, the gods asked, on the advice of Brahmā, the Ṛṣi Dadhichi for his bones, from which the thunderbolt was produced. With this weapon, which was pervaded by Viṣṇu's energy, Indra slew Triśiras From the corpse rose a mighty Asura, named Vṛtra, who became Indra's enemy, but was at last killed by him with the thunderbolt (cf. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, v. 230 ff.).

According to another version of the same story (*Mahābhārata*, v. 10), Indra killed Vṛtra in the twilight with the froth of the sea. For the Brāhmans had conferred upon Vṛtra the boon that he might not be killed by any weapon, either by what was dry or what was wet, either in the daytime or at night. According to a third version (*ib.* iii. 100), Vṛtra is not connected with Tvaṣṭṛ; he is a mighty Asura who leads the Kāleyas against the gods. It is in this emergency that Dadhichi yields up his bones, from which Tvaṣṭṛ forges the thunderbolt. According to a fourth version (*ib.* xii. 281 f.), the cause of Vṛtra's defeat was a dreadful fever, Śiva's energy, which entered the demon and weakened him.

By the killing of Vṛtra, Indra was polluted with the heinous sin of Brahmanicide (*brahmahatyā*), and he fled in great terror to the end of the world. There he entered water, and concealed himself in the fibre of a lotus. The gods then placed Nahuṣa, Āyus' son, on the throne of Indra. But Nahuṣa at last came to ruin through his inordinate desire of Śachī (see AGASTYA). The gods discovered Indra's retreat, and Bṛhaspati cleansed him by a horse-sacrifice from the *brahmahatyā*, which was distributed amongst women, plants, etc. Indra was then reinstated as ruler of the heavens (*Mahābhārata*, v. 11 ff.).

Indra slew many demons besides Vṛtra, such as Bala, Namuchi, Jambha, Pāka, etc. From the victory over these he derives some of his names—Balasūdana, Pākaśāsana, etc. An instance of his hostility to the Daityas is supplied by the following myth: When many sons of Diti had been slain, she asked her husband Kaśyapa for a son who should kill Indra, and Kaśyapa granted her request on condition that she should strictly preserve purity for a thousand years. Once, however, she slept in an impure position, with her feet upwards. Indra availed himself of this opportunity, and, entering Diti's womb, cut into seven pieces the child with which she was pregnant. Thus originated the seven Mārutas, or regents of the winds (*Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 46 f.).

A curious myth frequently alluded to in classical literature, but found already in the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā* (i. 10, 13), relates that Indra cut the wings of the mountains, which originally flew about like birds, but then were forced to settle down for ever. Only Maināka, son of Himālaya and Menā, escaped this fate; he concealed himself in the ocean, and was protected by Sāgara.

In some legends Indra appears as the opponent of other gods. When the Ṛṣi Chyavana was giving the Aśvins a share of the soma-libation as a reward for having made him young again, Indra tried to prevent him. But Chyavana paralyzed his arm and created a huge monster Mada (intoxication). In great fright Indra then yielded, and *mada* was distributed over women, wine, dice, and the chase. In the story of Mada a trait of the Vedic Indra survives, viz. his habit of getting drunk; in classical mythology the god who is given to drunkenness is Baladeva, brother of Kṛṣṇa. On Indra's rivalry with Kṛṣṇa turns the story of his deluging the land of the Vrajas. But Kṛṣṇa kept off the rain and protected the land by holding up on his finger Mount Govardhana. On another occasion Kṛṣṇa carried off the Pārijāta tree, which belonged to Śachī, and defeated Indra, who with his forces had come to hinder him. Indra, who is also called Meghavāhana, was defeated in battle by Rāvaṇa's son Meghanāda, who from this victory came to be named *Indrajit*.

Here we must make a remark of more general application. When the ancient gods ceased to appeal to the masses of the people in that form in which they were represented in the Veda, the same god under a particular aspect became in some cases popular, and was hence regarded as a separate god, demigod, or as a hero connected somehow with the original god. A popular godling, with functions similar to those of an ancient god, grew up as a kind of duplicate of the latter; or, if he was not accepted as a god proper, he came, by the anthropomorphic influence of epic poetry, to be regarded as a hero, whose resemblance to the ancient god was explained by the assumption that he was an incarnation of that deity. Such a process, inferred from the result, is assumed in a number of cases, which will be adverted to below.

Thus Arjuna is, according to the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (II. i 2. 11), a mystical name of Indra; and he was, according to Pāṇini (iv. 3. 98), worshipped just as Vāsudeva was. But Arjuna is one of the principal heroes of the *Mahābhārata*, and is intimately connected with Indra; he stays five years in Indra's heaven, and there learns the use of the magical weapons (*Mahābhārata*, iii. 41 ff.). He is, however, not regarded as an incarnation of Indra, as his name *Aindri* would lead us to expect, but of Nara, a somewhat ill-defined deity. Arjuna is the enemy of Karṇa, a son of the Sun, and kills him. Similarly, in the story of the *Rāmayaṇa*, Vālin, Indra's son, is the enemy of Sugrīva, son of the Sun; but here he is killed by the latter (iv. 16 ff.). In popular belief there seems to have been a hostility between Indra and the sun-god: a trace of such a belief, though a very faint one, may perhaps be found in the Vedic reference to a conflict of Indra with Uṣas, the goddess of dawn (*Rigv.* iv. xxx. 8–11).

The sun-god (Āditya, Savitṛ, Sūrya, etc.).—In Vedic times there were several sun-gods; in later

times they are all merged in one, who is called indiscriminately by their names—Sūrya, Savitṛ, Mitra, Aryaman, Pūṣan,—besides bearing such names as Āditya, Vivasvat, Vikartana, etc. He continued to be a popular god even after the rise of the supreme gods: temples were dedicated to him, sects acknowledged him as the highest deity, and hymns were composed in his honour, of which the *Sūryaśataka* by Mayūra, Bāṇa's son-in-law, is a deservedly admired poem of classical Sanskrit literature. The enumeration of his 108 names in *Mahābhārata*, iii. 3, proves his popularity in the period of the great epic.

The sun originated in the beginning from the Veda; he contains the Veda, is the glory of the Veda, and is called the Supreme Soul. Mythologically he is the son of Aditi, Kaśyapa's wife. Aditi invoked the sun for a son who should vanquish the Asuras, and became pregnant through a ray of the sun. She brought forth, in due course, an egg which became the sun Mārtaṇḍa.

Viśvakarman, who is regarded as a Prajāpati, gave his daughter Saṅjñā to the Sun for wife. She bore him two sons, Manu Vaivasvata and Yama, and one daughter, Yamī or Yamunā, the river of that name. Now, the splendour of the sun was so great that Saṅjñā could not bear to look on him. She therefore substituted for herself Chhāyā, her shadow, and, thus deceiving her husband, she went to her father's; but, as Viśvakarman was determined to send her back to her husband, she fled in the shape of a mare to the Uttarakurus. Meanwhile Chhāyā bore to the Sun two sons, Savarṇi and the planet Saturn, and a daughter, the river-goddess Tapatī, afterwards mother of Kuru. Chhāyā preferred her own children to those of Saṅjñā, and thus the Sun detected the fraud committed by his wife. He went to Viśvakarman and asked him to reduce his splendour, so that Saṅjñā might bear his light. Viśvakarman therefore put him on his lathe and pared down the body of the sun by a sixteenth part. From the parings were formed Viṣṇu's disc, Śiva's trident, and other weapons of the gods. The Sun, learning from Viśvakarman the retreat of his wife, went in the shape of a horse to the land of the Uttarakurus. There he met Saṅjñā, who, not allowing him to approach her from behind, turned her head towards him. From the breath of their nostrils were produced the two Aśvins, hence called *Nāsatyas*, and from the semen of the horse was born Revanta, chief of the Guhyakas.

A well-known myth explains the eclipses of sun and moon. When, by the churning of the ocean, the *amṛta*, the drink of immortality, had been produced and was being drunk by the gods, an Asura named Rāhu, in the guise of a god, got hold of it. The sun and the moon perceiving it, informed Viṣṇu, who at once cut off the head of Rāhu before the *amṛta* had gone down his throat. Therefore the head only of Rāhu became immortal. Since that time Rāhu hates and pursues the sun and moon, and when he gets hold of them swallows them.

The sun-god plays an important part in epic history. His son Manu Vaivasvata became the progenitor of mankind, and his grandson Ikṣvāku was the founder of the Sūryavaṁśa or the solar race of kings, to which Rāma belongs, and which forms the subject of Kālidasa's poem *Raghuvaṁśa*. Karṇa, the leader of the Kauravas and the antagonist of Arjuna in the *Mahābhārata*, is his son. For Kuntī before her marriage with Pāndu invoked the sun-god and bore him a son, Karṇa, who was born with a golden coat of mail and golden earrings. Afterwards, Indra in the guise of a Brāhman induced him to exchange this miraculous armour for the never-erring spear with which he killed Ghaṭotkacha. At last he was killed by Arjuna. Karṇa was probably a local variety of Sūrya (perhaps as the sun doomed to die), and from a god became an epic hero. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* the monkey-king Sugrīva is a son of Sūrya; he was first exiled by his brother Vālin, son of Indra, but afterwards he vanquished Vālin, with the help of Rāma, who from an ambush pierced him with an arrow. This story also seems to be based on a myth in which Indra and Sūrya were presented as rivals. Sūrya rides in a car drawn by seven horses (*harit*); his charioteer is Aruṇa, the dawn, who tempers the excessive splendour of the god.

An ancient variant of the sun-god is **Garuḍa**, the divine king of birds, on whom Viṣṇu rides. The myth which relates the birth of Garuḍa is perhaps the most perspicuous of Indian nature-myths. It is thus related in the *Mahābhārata*, i. 16 ff.:

Kadrū and Vinatā (representing dark night and waning night), daughters of Dakṣa, were both married to Kaśyapa. Kadrū laid a thousand eggs, Vinatā two. After 500 years the eggs of Kadru burst, and out came a thousand snakes (Nāgas). Then Vinatā grew impatient, and opened one of her eggs; it contained a bird whose upper part only was developed—*Aruṇa*, the dawn. He became the charioteer of Sūrya. After another 500 years the second egg of Vinatā burst, and yielded an enormous bird—*Garuḍa*, the devourer of snakes (*i.e.* darkness). He at once took to his wings to seek for the food assigned him by the ordainer of all. By this time Vinatā had become the slave of her sister Kadrū. For the sisters had wagered as to whether the divine horse Uchchaiḥśravas was white or black, and Kadrū by fraud had won the bet, which stipulated that the loser should become slave to the winner. Thus Garuḍa, too, became the servant of the snakes, and had to obey their commands. They promised, however, to set him free, if he brought them the *amṛta* (which in this account is confounded with the soma). After many adventures Garuḍa came to the place where the *amṛta* was kept, vanquished the guardian-gods, extinguished the fire which was burning round the *amṛta*, overcame all obstacles, and succeeded at last in carrying off the *amṛta*-soma. In vain Indra hurled his thunderbolt at him; it brought down only one feather of the bird. Indra then entered into friendship with him. Garuḍa placed the *amṛta* on the ground strewn with *kuśa* grass, and invited the snakes to partake of it. While they bathed, as is the custom to do before meals, Indra carried off the *amṛta*. Garuḍa was rewarded for his deed by Viṣṇu, who chose him for his service as the bird on which he rides, and assigned him his standard to rest upon.

This myth, the latter part of which can be traced back to the Rig Veda, leaves no doubt that the sun is meant by Garuda, and consequently darkness by the snakes, his food. Apparently Garuḍa was never regarded as the equal of Sūrya, who therefore engrossed the whole sun-worship; still Garuda's claim to worship was recognized by making him the servant and companion of Viṣṇu, who from being a solar deity had been promoted to the rank of a Supreme God. Garuda is also called *Suparṇa*, and it may be remarked that there is a class of Suparnas, or bird-genii, who frequently figure on ancient sculptures. He is also identified with *Tārkṣya*, originally a distinct mythical being, figured either as a bird or as a horse, and apparently representing the sun. Garuḍa seems, therefore, to be a combination of different divine forms of the sun represented as a winged being.

Soma, the moon-god.—As a departmental god, Soma represents the moon; but since he is identified with the Vedic god Soma, who especially represents the sacred soma-juice, the functions of the latter are also ascribed to the moon-god. Hence he is the sovereign of the stars as well as of the plants and of the Brāhmans; and in poetry his rays are said to consist of *amṛta*. Though he was a deity of great holiness, he seems scarcely to have received popular worship as a separate god; at least no temples seem to have been dedicated to him. (The famous shrine at Somanātha was sacred to Śiva, and so was Somatīrtha in Śrīnagara; see Stein, *Kalhaṇa's Chronicle of Kaśmīr*, ii. 450.) The moon is said to have been produced either from the eye of Atri, son of Brahmā, or, together with other precious things, at the churning of the ocean. He married the 27 Nakṣatras, daughters of Dakṣa, *i.e.* the 27 mansions of the moon. But he preferred the beautiful Rohiṇī (Aldebaran), and neglected his remaining wives. Dakṣa fruitlessly blamed him for his neglect of duty towards them, and at last he cursed him to the effect that he should die of consumption. So the moon began to wane, and at the same time all creatures grew weaker and weaker. Then Dakṣa mitigated his curse to the effect that the moon should alternately wane and wax every month. At full moon only a trace of his illness remains; it is the dark spot on his disc in the shape of a hare. His cure was brought

about by bathing at Prabhāsa, where the Sarasvatī falls into the western ocean.

From Soma sprang the Somavaṁśa, or lunar race of kings. Soma carried off Tārā, the wife of Bṛhaspati, though Brahmā bade him restore her to her husband. Uśanas, the teacher of the Asuras and the enemy of Bṛhaspati, together with the Asuras sided with Soma in the conflict between them and the gods. At last Soma was compelled to give up Tārā. After some time she gave birth to a boy whose parentage was doubtful; and she declared, when coerced, that he was the son of Soma. The boy was named Budha (the planet Mercury), who afterwards married Ilā, daughter of Manu. Their son was Purūravas, with whom the lineage of lunar kings begins.

The moon plays an important part in the ancient belief about the life after death. The souls of the deceased are supposed to go to the moon, and assembling there cause her waxing. At full moon, the moon sends some spirits on to the world of Brahmā (*devayāna*), and sends the rest as rain down to the earth to be born again (*pitṛyāna*). Their stations on both paths are variously stated (see Deussen, *System der Vedānta*, 1883, pp. 392, 409, 475).

Vāyu (Vāta Māruta) is the divine personification of wind, the fourth element of the Indians, which, it should be noted, constitutes as breath the principle of life; Vāyu has therefore power also over the animal world. He presides over the North-west. Since the invisible element of wind does not easily lend itself to anthropomorphism, scarcely any myths are told of Vāyu; nor did the god receive popular worship. He was too much of an abstraction to appeal to the religious feelings of the people. But there were *popular* wind-gods, variants of Vāyu as it were, who in epic language were therefore styled sons of Vāyu or Māruta. One of them is Hanumat, the valorous monkey of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, who jumped the ocean and brought Rāma tidings from his bride Sītā; he is now the tutelary god of all village settlements. The writer of the present article believes that he is connected with the monsoon (Jacobi, *Rāmāyaṇa*, p. 132). Another son of Vāyu is Bhīma of the *Mahābhārata*, the second of the five Pāṇḍava brothers. There are traces in his character which seem to indicate a demonic origin. He is frequently brought into relation with the Rākṣasas; he not only fights them, but he marries the Rākṣasī Hiḍimbā, by whom he has a son, the famous Ghaṭotkacha. He is a ravenous eater (*vṛkodara*), and is of great fierceness; he tears open the breast of his enemy Duḥśāsana and drinks his blood. He may have been a godling, a personification of the destructive power of the storm, before he became an epic hero.

There is a plurality of wind-gods—the Maruts, who formed seven tribes descended from the seven parts into which the embryo of Diti was split by Indra (see above), or into which the semen of the sage Mankanaka was divided (*Mahābhārata*, ix. 38). In the Rig Veda the Maruts are the companions of Indra, in later mythology of Vāyu; the word, however, may lose its special meaning and denote gods in general.

Varuṇa in Brāhmanical mythology is the ruler of the waters and the god of the ocean. He still carries the noose, and is called Prachetas, as in the hymns of the Rig Veda; but his Vedic characteristics, except those relating to water, are forgotten or only occasionally remembered. For instance, his association with Mitra comes out only in a legend relating the origin of Vasiṣṭha (Maitrāvaruṇa; see *Rāmāyaṇa*, vii. 56 f.). He resides in the ocean. But there is also a world of Varuna, the Varuṇaloka, situated somewhere below the earth; it is full of wonders, and in it reside Varuṇa, his son Puṣkara, and all his progeny. This Varuṇaloka would seem to suit the Vedic Varuṇa better than the later ocean-god. To the latter belongs the miraculous umbrella (*Mahābhārata*, v. 98). Mention is made of a bow of Varuna, from which originated the *gāṇḍiva*, the bow he gave to Arjuna. Wine (*surā*) is called *vāruṇī*, i.e. 'belonging to Varuṇa'; and the goddess of wine, Vāruṇī, who appeared at the churning of the ocean, is regarded as Varuṇa's daughter or his wife.*

There is, however, another god of the sea, **Sāgara**, distinct from Varuṇa. It was Sāgara, not Varuṇa, who appeared to Rāma when he wanted to force his passage through the sea; and in romantic tales of the Middle Ages the god of the sea is called Sāgara, not Varuṇa.

Yama, in the Rig Veda a deified hero, has become in Brāhmanical mythology the dreaded god of the nether world, the sovereign of the damned, and the regent of the South. He is the son of the sun-god Vivasvat, brother of Manu and Yamunā. His messengers fetch the souls of dying men and lead them to Yama's hall, where Chitragupta the recorder reads the account of their deeds, and the god sits in judgment upon them. Yama is called also Mṛtyu, Kāla ('death'), Antaka, Kṛtānta ('maker of an end'), Pretarājā ('king of ghosts'), Pitṛpati ('lord of the manes'). He carries a rod (*daṇḍa*) or a noose (*pāśa*), and rides on a buffalo. Yama is frequently introduced in epic stories. The best known instance is his meeting with Sāvitrī, to whom he granted the restoration of her husband to life; the episode of the *Mahābhārata* which relates this event is reckoned one of the gems of the great Epic.

In a less awful aspect Yama appears as *Dharmarājā*, 'king of law.' As such he seems occasionally to have been confounded with the god Dharma, the personification of justice, the father of Yudhiṣṭhira.

The **Aśvins** have lost, in Brāhmanical mythology, whatever cosmical element they had in the hymns of the Rig Veda. They continue to be regarded as beautiful youths and physicians. Their names are now given as Nāsatya and Dasra—originally epithets applying to either of them. Their origin from the breath of Saṁjñā and Sūrya has been mentioned above (under 'sun-god').

The best known story related of them is their cure of Chyavana, the old husband of Sukanyā, the beautiful daughter of king Śaryāta. They wanted to seduce Sukanyā, but she would not consent, and as a boon they consented to make her husband young again. The Aśvins were rewarded for this by being admitted to a share of the soma. The details of this legend differ in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and the *Mahabhārata* (see Muir, *op. cit.* v. 250 ff.). Another cure wrought by the Aśvins is told in *Mahabharata*, i 3. they restored eyesight to Upamanyu, who had fallen into a well and there invoked them in an interesting hymn.

With epic history the Aśvins are connected in the *Mahābhārata* as the fathers of Sahadeva and Nakula, the twin sons of Mādrī; and in the *Rāmāyaṇa* they are the fathers of the monkeys Dvivida and Maiṇda.

Finally, we must mention **Bṛhaspati**, who, in the hymns of the Rig Veda, is invoked as a god, the impersonation of the power of devotion; in Brāhmanical mythology he is not a god in the proper sense of the word, but rather a divine sage. He is the teacher (*guru*) and household priest (*purohita*) of the gods; he is identified with Vāchaspati ('lord of speech'), and with the planet Juppiter. According to *Mahābhārata*, iii. 217 ff., he is the son of Aṅgiras, and from him is descended the family of Agnis. His wife is Tārā (see above under 'Soma'). Bṛhaspati's rival is Kāvya **Uśanas** or Śukra, teacher of the Asuras, who is identified with the planet Venus.

* An incident which is thought to show some resemblance between Neptune and Varuṇa is related in *Mahābhārata*, iii. 115. Varuṇa gave to the sage Richika a thousand white horses, which Gādhi demanded of him as the price for his daughter Satyavatī.

Most of the gods treated of hitherto have this in common, that, though fully recognized in mythology, they lost more or less of their importance as popular gods. It was different with two old gods, *Viṣṇu* and *Rudra*, and with the youngest of Vedic deities, *Prajāpati*. They advanced to the position of Supreme Gods, and the first two became the highest objects of worship. Before we treat of the rise of these three gods, we must complete our description of the Indian pantheon. First we shall treat of the post-Vedic gods of similar rank to those inherited from the Vedic period, then of minor divine beings, and of saints.

2. Post-Vedic gods.—(*A*) *Those of high rank.*—To the post-Vedic period must be assigned **Kumāra**, the war-god (called also Skanda, Kārttikeya, Guha, Mahāsena, etc.). He is first mentioned in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, vii. 26. 2, where he seems to be identified with the sage Sanatkumāra. His origin, however, must be looked for in popular belief, which seems to have varied a good deal in details respecting the war-god, as will be seen in the sequel. Kumāra is regarded as the general (*senāpati*) of the gods. His introduction as a new god was probably due to a change in the government of Indian States. Originally the king was both ruler in peace and leader in war, but afterwards the office of general became distinct. When this institution had become generally recognized, it was thought necessary, as we may assume, that there should be in heaven too a *senāpati* as well as a king. And since the *senāpati* frequently succeeded in supplanting the king, and the latter was often justified in being jealous of the former, it is but natural that Indra should at first try to suppress Kumāra, as is told in the narrative of the latter's birth.

The myth of the birth of Kumāra is variously related (*Mahābhārata*, iii. 225 ff., ix. 44 f., xiii. 84 ff.; *Rāmāyana*, i. 36 f.), his father being given both as Śiva and as Agni, his mother as Umā, Gaṅgā, and quite a number of minor deities. These rival claims to his parentage had to be settled, and this was effected by the assumption of a sort of joint parentage, and by making some of the female deities his nurses or adoptive mothers.

The most generally adopted account of Kumāra's birth is as follows: The gods were afraid that from the embrace of Śiva and Pārvatī a being would be produced whom the world would be unable to bear, and therefore they entreated Śiva not to discharge his vital seed. However, part of it had already come forth, and this was taken by Agni and thrown into the Gaṅgā. But the latter could not retain it, and threw it on the slope of the Himālaya into a thicket of reeds (*śaravaṇa*). There it was transformed into a fine boy, who was found by the six Kṛttikās (the Pleiades). As each of them desired him to be her own son, he assumed six faces, and sucked their breasts simultaneously. Hence he is called Kārttikeya and Ṣaṇmukha. [In point of fact, the name Kārttikeya seems to be derived from Kārttika, the first month of autumn, when, on the cessation of the monsoon, the roads became practicable, and kings were wont to set out on war expeditions.] According to another version, the Kṛttikās were formerly the wives of the seven Ṛṣis (for the Indians knew that there was a seventh star in the Pleiades, though they usually counted but six). Agni fell in love with the wives of the Ṛṣis, and Svāhā, his own wife, becoming aware of it, assumed the form of one of these ladies, approached Agni, and cohabited with him; she then brought Agni's semen to a golden lake, and threw it therein. This she repeated five times, for she was unable to assume the form of Arundhatī, the faithful wife of Vasiṣṭha. The remaining six Ṛṣis forsook their wives, who were transferred to the sky as the Kṛttikās.

The feats of Kumāra which are most generally known are the killing of the Asura Tāraka, and the splitting of Mount Krauñcha in the Himālaya. When Tāraka had vanquished the gods and was oppressing them, they asked Brahmā for a leader, and were told by him that only from the seed of Śiva would be produced the future conqueror of the mighty Asura. Śiva, however, was still an anchorite, practising severe austerities in the Himālaya. Kāma, the god of love, was now called upon to cause Śiva to fall in love with Umā (or Pārvatī), the beautiful daughter of Himālaya. He succeeded in his undertaking, but was reduced to ashes by the fire issuing from the eye on the forehead of Śiva, who was in great wrath when he became aware that Kāma had dared to disturb him in his ascetic exercise. Śiva was, however, won by the graces and merits of Pārvatī, and finally married her. These incidents form the subject of Kālidasa's famous poem, *Kumārasambhava*. The rest of the story, telling how Kumāra was born, has been given above. The new-born Kumāra was installed general of the gods, engaged in battle with Tāraka, and killed him.

On another occasion, the Daitya Bāṇa, son of Bali, attacked the gods from the mountain Krauñcha, but he took shelter in the mountain when Kumāra assailed him. The latter pierced the mountain with his javelin, split it in twain, and killed the demon. Thus an opening was effected for the geese and other birds on their passage to the north. The same incident is variously stated by different authorities (see Wilson, *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, 1865, ii. 118 note).

The wife of Kumāra is Devasenā, a daughter of Brahmā. Her desire to get a husband superior in strength to the rest of the gods was, according to one account (*Mahabharata*, iii. 224), the original cause of the birth of the war-god. Kumāra rides on the peacock, the son of Suparṇa.

The strange myth about the birth of Kumāra appears to be best interpreted on the assumption that in different parts of India there were several popular godlings of the war-god type, and that these have been combined into the one Kumāra, the war-god common to all Indians. But this process of amalgamation has left traces, which cannot be mistaken, elsewhere than in the strange myths related above. For there are three variants or alter-egos of Kumāra, viz. *Viśākha*, *Śākha*, and *Naigameya*. The first of these is known to have received popular worship (Patañjali, *ad Pāṇini*, v. 3. 99); he originated from a wound which Indra inflicted upon Kumāra, the new-born. From the same wound issued a great number of *kumāras*, and *kumārīs*, goblins, who spirit away little children (*Mahābhārata*, iii. 228, where two more brothers, Śiśu and the goat-faced Bhadraśākha, seem to be assigned to Kumāra). The war-god has a great retinue of monstrous followers, male and female, of whom long lists are given in *Mahābhārata*, ix. 45 f. He was probably in the beginning conceived as the representative of a whole class of uncanny spirits somehow connected with fire, and was afterwards promoted to the position of a war-god, equal in rank with the ancient gods. His worship seems once to have been fairly general; at present he is worshipped chiefly in the south, where he is known under the name of Subrahmaṇya.

Another son of Śiva, or rather of Pārvatī, is **Gaṇeśa**. Originally he seems to have been conceived as the 'remover of obstacles,' as his names *Vināyaka* and *Vighneśa* indicate. As such he is figured with an elephantine head; he carries in one of his hands (*paraśupāni*) an axe, or one of his tusks, which has been broken off; he rides on, or is attended by, the rat, the animal which finds its way to every place. As 'remover of obstacles,' he is invoked at the beginning of all books, and thus in a secondary way he became the god of learning, especially of pandits and clerks. He is the latest of all Brāhmanical gods, for he is not mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and some of the older *Purānas*; and he was absent from the original *Mahābhārata*. He is first mentioned in Yājñavalkya, i. 270, 289, 293, as a demon taking possession of men, and thus hindering their success, but furthering them when propitiated. The name *Gaṇeśa* or *Gaṇādhipa* designates him as the leader of the Gaṇas, or followers in the retinue of Śiva. Yet he is not, as a rule, represented as leading the Gaṇas, whose actual leader is Nandi. But there is a class of demons, Vināyakas (see *Petersburg Dict.*, *s.v.*), who probably were represented by the new god Gaṇeśa. It deserves to be noted in this connexion, that, in the Rig Veda (ii. xxiii. 1), Bṛhaspati is addressed as *gaṇānāṁ ganapati*; and Bṛhaspati, who is identified with Vāchaspati, is something like a Vedic counterpart of Gaṇeśa as a god of learning.

Gaṇeśa is the son of Śiva and Pārvatī, or rather of the latter, for he was produced from the unguents with which the goddess

had anointed herself. With the water of her bath they were conveyed to the mouth of the Ganges, and were there imbibed by Mālinī, a goddess with the head of an elephant. She gave birth to a boy who had four arms and five heads of an elephant. Gaṅgā chose him for her son, but Śiva declared him to be the son of Pārvatī. He reduced his five heads to one, and enthroned him on Añjanagiri as the 'remover of obstacles.' These details are given in the 18th canto of the *Haracharita* by Jayadratha, a native of Kashmīr, in the 13th cent., who professes to have composed his work from older sources. In the *Brahma Vaivarta Purāṇa*, the third book of which contains an account of Gaṇeśa, it is narrated that Gaṇeśa's head fell off when Pārvatī in the pride of her heart invited the planet Saturn to look at her baby, and that Viṣṇu afterwards substituted for it the head of an elephant. Gaṇeśa is figured with one tusk only (*ekadanta*). The loss of the other is variously accounted for. It was cut off, according to the *Śiśupālavadha*, i 60, by Rāvaṇa; according to the *Brahma Vaivarta Purāṇa*, iii. 40, by Paraśurāma; and he lost it, according to the *Haracharita*, xvii 23, through a bet with Kumāra as to who should go most quickly round the earth. Besides the particulars of his figure mentioned already, he has an exceedingly big belly. In his four hands he carries, according to Jayadratha, a tusk, a rosary, an axe, and a sweetmeat; in some pictures he carries a manuscript in one hand.

Kubera or Vaiśravaṇa, the 'lord of treasures' (*vitteśa*), 'king of the Yakṣas,' and 'regent of the north,' is already mentioned in the Atharva Veda as chief of the 'good people' (*puṇyajana*), or 'other people' (*itarajana*), and as concerned with 'concealment' (through hidden treasures).*

In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and in later Vedic texts he is mentioned as king of the Rakṣas, and in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, i. 316, as lord of wishes and as possessor of a wonderful car (apparently the later Puṣpaka).

In later mythology he is the king of the Yakṣas as well as of the Kinnaras and Guhyakas, while the Rākṣasas are the subjects of his half-brother, Rāvaṇa. According to the *Rāmāyaṇa* (vii. 3 ff.), he is the son of Viśravas, and grandson of Pulastya, Prajāpati's son.

Viśravas had two wives, Devavarṇinī, daughter of Bharadvāja, and Kaikasī, daughter of Sumāli. By the former he had one son, Kubera; by the latter Rāvaṇa, Kumbhakarṇa, Vibhīṣaṇa, and Śūrpaṇakhā †. Viśravas gave Kubera for his residence the town Laṅkā, built by Viśvakarman on Mount Trikūṭa in the southern ocean. But Rāvaṇa expelled him from Laṅkā, and made it his own capital. Kubera then, by the advice of Viśravas, took up his residence on Mount Kailāsa, and became the regent of the north. But his connexion with the south, to which the above legend refers, was perhaps suggested by the name of the southernmost river of India, the Kāveri; for *Kāveraka* or *Kuberaka* occurs already in the Atharva Veda as a patronymic derived from Kubera. In support of this conjecture it may be mentioned that the name of the town Trichinopoly is popularly explained as *Triśirahpalli*, according to Lassen (*Ind. Alterthumskunde*, 1873, i. 160) = 'town of Kubera,' for *Triśiras* is also a name of Kubera.

Kubera's town is Alakā, his park Chaitraratha; he has nine treasures (*nidhi*). He rides on a man (*naravāhana*); this curious item seems to indicate some near relation to men, and the same is suggested by his epithet or name *Nṛdharman*, which probably refers to his quality as bestower of riches (*śrīda*). His son is Nalakūbara, whose wife Rambhā was ravished by Rāvaṇa (*Rāmāyaṇa*, vii. 26). Kubera, as we have seen, was believed from very early times to preside over the guardians of treasures, who, it would seem, were originally called *rakṣas*, and later—to distinguish them from the devilish *rakṣas*, the disturbers of sacrifices—had been named *yakṣas*. As chief of the Yakṣas, he was supplanted, as far as popular worship is concerned, by Maṇibhadra, who is already mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (vii. 15), but who occurs chiefly in popular tales.

A god who is very frequently referred to in classical Sanskrit literature is the god of love, **Kāma** (Manmatha, Madana, Kandarpa, Smara, Ananga, etc.). Originally Kāma is 'desire,'—not of sexual enjoyment only, but of good things in general,—and as a personification of desire he is invoked in Atharva Veda ix. 2; but in another hymn of the same Veda (iii. 25) he is already conceived as the god of sexual love, in which function only he is known to later mythology. His parentage is variously stated, but usually he is regarded as the son of Dharma and Lakṣmī. His wife is Rati, the impersonation of sexual enjoyment; his friend and companion, Madhu, the first month of spring. Two sons of Kāma are occasionally mentioned, Harṣa and Yaśas.

The ideas entertained about Kāma may be gathered from his emblems and attributes. He carries a bow formed of flowers (*puṣpachāpa*); the string of this bow consists of bees, and the arrows of flowers (*kusumaśara*). There are five such arrows (*pañchabāṇa*), allegorically representing the infatuating powers of love (*śoṣaṇa*, *mohana*, etc.). He has on his banner the dolphin or a fish, denoting procreative power (*makara* or *matsya-ketu*); or he carries a flower in his hand (*puṣpaketana*). He is often spoken of as *ātmabhū* or *chittajanman*, 'born of the mind,' and was therefore called *ananga*, 'bodiless.' This latter quality is accounted for by a well-known myth mentioned above in connexion with the birth of the war-god.

Śiva reduced Kāma to ashes; he will get a new body, according to *Kumārasambhava*, 4, 42, at the wedding of Śiva and Pārvatī. But, according to the *Harivaṁśa* (9263 ff.), Kāma was re-born as Pradyumna, Kṛṣṇa's son. The baby had been stolen by Śambara, whose wife Māyāvatī brought him up. The latter, however, was Ratī, who had assumed the form of Māyāvatī in order to deceive the Asura, and thus to cause his destruction by Pradyumna (*ib* 9475 ff.). Apparently Pradyumna is but a variant of Kāma, or, to be more accurate, a god of love popular in those tracts of India where the worship of Kṛṣṇa prevailed. Kāma has also been identified with Mara, the tempter and devil of Buddhist legend: hence, in later Sanskrit, Māra becomes a synonym of Kāma.

Some of the *goddesses* of Brāhmanical mythology have already been mentioned in connexion with the gods whose consorts they are: Svāhā, wife of Agni, Śachī, wife of Indra, Sañjñā, wife of Sūrya. The most important goddess, Pārvatī, will be considered when we come to treat of Rudra. **Lakṣmī** or **Śrī** is the consort of Viṣṇu; but she seems originally to have been an independent deity impersonating beauty and wealth. She rose from the ocean when the gods and demons churned it for the production of *amṛta*, and then she was made over to Viṣṇu. But we meet also with different statements: she is the daughter of Bhṛgu and Khyāti, or has been produced from the lotus which grew out of Viṣṇu's forehead; she is the wife of Prajāpati, or of Dattātreya, or of the sun-god, or of Dharma to whom she bore a son Kāma. As the goddess of beauty, she is intimately connected with the lotus, the most beautiful flower of India; she is called after it Padmā or Kamalā; she is enthroned on a lotus, and holds one in her hand. As Fortuna, she is the fickle goddess, who stays nowhere long; according to *Mahābhārata*, xii. 225, 228, she lived once with the Dānavas, then with the gods, and with Indra. From an abstraction Śrī seems to have become a deity, just as occasionally abstract nouns are used as names of gods or goddesses representing the abstract idea in question, *e.g.* Hrī, Dhṛti, Kīrti, etc.

The origin of **Sarasvatī** was different. From being a river-goddess in the Rig Veda she became the goddess of wisdom and eloquence, and as such she is most frequently invoked by the poets of classical Sanskrit literature. She has been identified with Vāch, 'speech,' and as such she is the wife of Brahmā; she is further identified with **Bhāratī**, a separate goddess invoked in Vedic hymns. She is also called **Śāradā**, whom the inhabitants of Kashmīr regard as the guardian of their country, hence called Śāradāmandala (Stein, *Kalhaṇa's Chronicle of Kaśmīr*, ii. p. 286). Poets speak of the hostility of Lakṣmī to Sarasvatī; for wealth and learning seldom go together.

The principal river-goddess of India is the **Gaṅgā**, who has lent her sanctity, as it were, to

* *Puṇyajana* in classical Sanskrit is synonymous with *yakṣa* and *rākṣasa* (Hemachandra's *Abhidhānakośa*, 187 and 194).

† The genealogy is stated somewhat differently in *Mahābhārata*, iii. 274 f.

many smaller rivers which are fabled to be miraculously connected or identical with her. The Gaṅgā flows in heaven as Viyadgaṅgā or Mandākinī (the milky way), on earth as the most sacred river, and in the lower world as the Pātālagangā; she is therefore called *Tripathagā*, 'going in the three worlds.'

King Bhagīratha, the great-grandson of Sagara, induced the celestial Gaṅgā to come down from heaven to earth and from the earth to the lower regions, in order to purify the ashes of the 60,000 sons of Sagara burnt by Kapila; hence she is called *Bhāgīrathī*. Śiva caught the river up in his matted hair in order to check the impetus of her fall. The river then entered Jahnu's sacrificial enclosure and was drunk up by him; but at last he discharged her from his ear, wherefore she is regarded as his daughter and called *Jāhnavī*. These legends are told at length in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 38–44; another account of her descent is given in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, ch. 55. Gaṅgā is also said to come forth from the toe of Viṣṇu. In the *Mahābhārata* (i. 98 ff.) she is the first wife of King Śantanu and the mother of Bhīṣma. It has been said above that Kumāra is considered to be her son. Mythologically she is the eldest daughter of Himālaya and Mena.

In conclusion, it may be added that there are several other sacred rivers or river-goddesses; *e.g.* Yamunā (Kālindī) is the daughter of Sūrya, and so is the Tapatī (a younger sister of the goddess Sāvitrī); Narmadā (Revā) is a daughter of the moon.

The *enemies* of the gods are the **Asuras, Daityas,** and **Dānavas.** In the Rig Veda, *Asura* is an epithet of Varuṇa and other gods, which has been rendered 'mysterious being.' But in later times *asura* denotes the enemies of the gods (*sura*), and the word is derived from *sura* with *a* privative, while in point of fact the word *sura* is artificial, and has been abstracted from *asura*. The Asuras are the elder brothers of the gods, both being sons of Prajāpati. They continually waged war with the gods, and frequently got the better of them; some of them even acquired the sovereignty over the whole world, till at last they were slain by Indra, Viṣṇu (hence called *Daityārī*), or some other god. They dwell in the nether world, in magnificent palaces. As enemies of the gods, they are regarded as wicked demons; but, as mere rivals of the gods, they are not necessarily bad. So they have for their teacher and spiritual guide a great saint, Śukra, the son of Bhṛgu, who has been mentioned above in connexion with his antagonist Bṛhaspati, the teacher of the gods. The Asuras occasionally appear in a better light in epic stories, and still more frequently in popular tales. In popular belief they seem to have come to be looked upon simply as superhuman beings, very much like the Vidyādharas; *e.g.* there is a small romantic epic in the *Kathāsaritsāgara* (eighth book), in which they side with the hero of the story. In classical mythology there is no difference between Asuras, Daityas, and Dānavas, and these words are usually synonyms; but originally the Daityas and Dānavas are subdivisions of the Asuras, the former being the sons of Diti, the latter of Danu.

(*B*) We must now speak of *the different groups of divine beings who rank below the gods.* Some of them are, on the whole, not unfriendly to men, others are decidedly wicked, demons or devils. We shall treat first of the former. The most popular class seems to have been the **Nāgas** (Sarpas, Uragas), dragons or snake-gods; and snake-worship prevailed in India from the beginning of the classical period downwards. Nāgas are figured on numberless sculptures all over India, and in popular tales they and their beautiful daughters play an important part. They are, however, almost absent from Vedic literature. In epic and classical literature they are said to dwell in Pātāla, the nether world, which is imagined to be full of marvels; there is situated their city Bhogavatī. At the beginning of the *Mahābhārata* we have what may be called a snake-epos, which relates the destruction of the snakes through the sacrifice of Janamejaya; there are introduced Airāvata, Vāsuki, Takṣaka, Śeṣa and others well known in Sanskrit literature. Śeṣa (Ananta) has been promoted to a higher rank; he is represented as supporting the earth on his expanded hoods, and he has become a servant of Viṣṇu, who rests on him while sleeping on the ocean. Baladeva, the brother of Kṛṣṇa, is believed to be an incarnation of Śeṣa. The snakes are the sons of Kadrū, or of Surasā, one of the divine mothers. It has been related above (under 'sun-god') that Garuḍa is their enemy and devours them, whence it has been concluded that the Nāgas represent darkness which is dispelled by the sun. But there is another aspect of the Nāgas which was more important for the imagination of the people; they were probably regarded as guarding or possessing treasures, and assuming the shape of snakes. The Nāgas were held in awe and reverence, but they were not regarded as demons.

Older than the Nāgas are the **Gandharvas.** They are already known in the Rig Veda, where, however, usually but one Gandharva is mentioned. They are a class of superhuman beings fond of women, and possessing a mysterious power over them. In the *Mahābhārata* they frequently appear very much like the Yakṣas, and their king Aṅgāraparna or Chitraratha is a friend of Kubera (whose park is called *Chaitraratha*). But usually they are represented as divine musicians and as living in Indra's heaven; from them the Sanskrit name for 'music,' *gāndharva*, is derived. It may be mentioned that the *fata morgana* is called 'town of the Gandharvas' (*gandharvanagara*).

The mistresses of the Gandharvas are the **Apsarases,** heavenly nymphs of wonderful beauty. They too belong to the court of Indra, and they are employed by him to seduce saints when they become a danger to his sovereignty through their severe penance. The effect of their successful interference is usually the birth of some great man or woman; *e.g.* Menakā seduced Viśvāmitra and became mother of Śakuntalā. In other stories some Apsaras incurs the displeasure of some god, and by his curse is born on, or banished to, the earth, where she marries some great man. Thus Urvaśī became the wife of king Purūravas; their adventures form the story of Kālidāsa's play *Vikramorvaśī*. The most famous Apsarases are Tilottamā, Rambhā, Urvaśī, Ghṛtāchī, Menakā, and others, but there are millions of them, and they are held out as a reward to warriors who fall in battle.

The **Yakṣas,** as a class of superhuman beings, are of post-Vedic origin, though the word *yakṣá* as a neuter occurs in the Rig Veda (on its meaning see *Vedische Studien*, iii. 126 ff.). As *yakṣan* means 'magical power,' *yakṣá* probably means etymologically 'being possessed of magical power'; and this was without doubt the meaning of the feminine *yakṣiṇī*. The original conception of the Yakṣas would therefore be much the same as that of the later Vidyādharas—a word which etymologically and actually means 'possessing spells or witchcraft.' The Yakṣas are brought into close connexion with the Rākṣasas, as stated above under 'Kubera,' though the Yakṣas are generally not unfriendly to men, and the Rākṣasas are. (Still there are instances of wicked Yakṣas and of kind Rākṣasas.) Both Yakṣas and Rākṣasas are also called *puṇyajana*—a name of the subjects of Kubera in the Atharva Veda. It has been assumed above that there were originally two sorts of Rakṣas; the one, guardians of treasures, were identified with the Yakṣas, and the other are the well-known disturbers of sacrifice usually called Rākṣasas; thus the apparent confusion between Yakṣas and Rākṣasas would become intelligible.

Very much like the Yakṣas are the **Guhyakas.** They too are followers of Kubera; they guard treasures and live in mountain caves. Mythical beings of similar character are the **Kinnaras,** divine songsters, who have a human body and the head of a horse, while the **Kimpuruṣas** have the body of a horse and a human head. Both Kinnaras and Kimpuruṣas are followers of Kubera, and they are frequently identified with one another. The Kinnaras are occasionally confounded with the Gandharvas.

Other classes of mythical beings who are frequently mentioned, but not described in detail, are the **Chāraṇas,** divine panegyrists; the **Siddhas,** beneficent ghosts; and the **Sādhyas.**

The **Vidyādharas** deserve a fuller notice. In the older popular tales, especially in Pāli literature, the Yakṣas are the principal superhuman beings; in the younger popular literature (represented by the *Bṛhatkathā*) they are supplanted by the Vidyādharas, the most human-like of all inferior divine beings. They live under kings and emperors (*chakravartins*) of their own, in towns on the northern mountains, just like men, with whom they have much intercourse and even intermarry. Men can also be received into their community and acquire sovereignty over them. They possess superhuman powers, especially the faculty of moving through the air, and of assuming by their *vidyā*, or witchcraft, any shape at will (whence they are also called *Khechara*, and *Kāmarūpin*). The Vidyādharas seem to have been at the height of popularity during the early centuries of our era; there is a Prakrit poem by Vimalasūri, the *Padmacharita*, which belongs to that time; in it the Rākṣasas, the Yakṣas, the Monkeys, etc., of the *Rāmāyaṇa* are declared to be different tribes of Vidyādharas.

Among the malicious superhuman beings the **Rākṣasas** are the most prominent. In the Rig Veda they are mentioned in the neuter form *rakṣas* as fiends who disturb the sacrifice and injure the pious. They are possessed of enormous power, especially at night, when they prowl about (*rātriñchara*) and devour their victims (*kravyāda*, *kaunapa*); they are of hideous appearance, but are able to assume different shapes. The Rig Veda seems to distinguish *rakṣas* ('evil spirits') and *yātudhānas* ('ghosts'), but in later language *Yātudhāna* is synonymous with *Rākṣasa*. Originally equal in rank to the Yakṣas, the Rākṣasas have become more conspicuous than in ancient mythology, apparently through the influence of epic poetry. For in the *Rāmāyaṇa* Rāvaṇa, the king of the Rākṣasas, his brothers, etc., are the powerful enemies of Rāma; thus the Rākṣasas were invested with a new personality which they retained in the imagination of the Hindus. In the *Mahābhārata*, Bhīma's son Ghaṭotkacha is a Rākṣasa who fights on the side of the Pāṇḍavas. He and Vibhīṣaṇa, the virtuous brother of Rāvana, and his successor on the throne of Lankā, are instances which prove that the Rākṣasas, like the Asuras, were not always looked upon with unmitigated horror.

Piśāchas are not unlike, and occasionally are confounded with, the Rākṣasas; they are hideous and bloodthirsty monsters who haunt wild and desert places. In the Rig Veda there is once (I. cxxxiii. 5) mention of a Piśāchi, a spirit supposed to be connected with the will o' the wisp; the Piśāchas as wicked spirits frequently occur from the Atharva Veda downwards. It may be remarked that a Prakrit dialect, in which the original *Bṛhatkathā* was written, has been named after them Paiśāchī.*

Bhūta is the most general term for sprites; thus *Bhūtabhāṣa*, the 'language of the Bhūtas,' is synonymous with *Paiśāchī*. But frequently they are mentioned as a separate class, in juxtaposition with other classes of wicked spirits. **Pretas** are the ghosts of the deceased, who are not received among the *manes*. They play a more important part in Buddhist literature than in the Brāhmanical Sanskrit literature. In later times, especially in popular works, they seem to have been supplanted by the **Vetālas,** wicked goblins who haunt cemeteries and animate dead bodies; they belong to the last phase of the development of demonology, inaugurated by the *Bṛhatkathā*, in which the Vidyādharas are the leading figures.

(*C*) We shall now speak of *heroic men*. Most important figures in Brāhmanical mythology are the famous **Ṛṣis** of old, the traditional authors of the Vedic hymns, and ancestral founders of the Brāhmanical *gotras* or gentes. These holy men, saints or sages, were looked upon as possessing superhuman powers which made them almost equal, and in some cases even superior, to the gods. We may distinguish three classes of Ṛṣis: *devarṣis*, i.e. Ṛṣis of the gods or living among them, *e.g.* Nārada; *brahmarṣis*, i.e. priestly Ṛṣis, *e.g.* Vasiṣṭha, and indeed the greatest number of them; and *rājarṣis*, i.e. Ṛṣis of royal origin, *e.g.* Viśvāmitra. Besides, the Ṛṣis belong to different periods: some lived in the beginning of the world and took an active part in creation, as Dakṣa, Kaśyapa, Marīchi; others belong to a more recent period, as Manu, Vyāsa, Vālmīki, etc. An ancient group are the seven Ṛṣis (identified with the seven bright stars of Ursa major); but the names are differently given. The oldest list is: Gautama, Bharadvāja, Viśvāmitra, Jamadagni, Vasiṣṭha, Kaśyapa, and Atri. A common one is: Bhṛgu, Angiras, Viśvāmitra, Vasiṣṭha, Kaśyapa, Atri, and Agastya. From the *Mahābhārata* we get a different list: Marīchi, Atri, Angiras, Pulaha, Kratu, Pulastya, and Vasiṣṭha. The stories and legends of which the Ṛṣis are the heroes, or in which they play an important part, are very numerous, especially in the Epics and the *Purāṇas*, far outnumbering the myths told of the gods.

The ideas entertained about the Ṛṣis have changed considerably in the course of time in correspondence with the change of the religious ideal. Originally they owed their exalted position to the fact that they were believed to have revealed the sacred lore, the whole of Vedic religion, which, it will be remembered, is concerned chiefly with sacrifice. But in the epic period the sacrifice was no longer the religious ideal; it had been supplanted by *tapas* or *yoga*, 'asceticism,' in the opinion of the people at large. Therefore the Ṛṣis began to be regarded less as experts in the sacrificial art than as great ascetics, who by means of severe austerities and deep meditation had acquired superhuman power and such sanctity that their utterances were infallible and their curses must take effect. In popular opinion they are *yogins* rather than priests; they are saints and sorcerers at the same time; but, of course, elevated to the highest rank.

3. **The three Supreme Gods**—Brahmā, Viṣnu, and Śiva—occupy a peculiar position in the Hindu pantheon, highly exalted above the rest of gods and divine beings. A detailed description of them would be out of place in the present article. In a sketch of Brāhmanical mythology only the causes and processes by which they were promoted to the highest rank can be dealt with.

Brahmā, the creator of the world, is the Prajāpati, Pitāmaha, Hiranyagarbha of the Vedas and *Brāhmaṇas*. He had his origin and basis in speculation rather than in popular cult, and therefore he did not appeal, in spite of his sublime character, to

* Pischel, 'Grammatik der Prakrit Sprachen,' *GIAP* i. 8, p. 27 f.; Lacôte, *Essai sur Guṇâḍhya et la Bṛhatkathâ*, pp. 40-59.

the religious feelings of the masses. Hence the worship of Brahmā has become all but extinct, and the worshippers of Śiva or Viṣṇu, in whatever form they adore their favourite deity, form the overwhelming majority of the Hindus. Notwithstanding these sectarian tendencies, the three Supreme Gods are regarded, in principle, as of equal dignity and forming as such a kind of triad, which in the doctrine of the *Trimūrti* has been acknowledged since about the 5th cent. A.D. There were contradictory elements already in the conception of the Prajāpati of the *Brāhmaṇas*. For sometimes he is identified with the universe, and described as the source out of which creation evolved; sometimes he is regarded as a secondary deity subordinate to Brahman (Muir, *op. cit.* v. 391 ff.). The same holds good with the Brahmā of later mythology: Brahmā proceeded from Brahman, the First Cause; and, on the other hand, he is, in a vague way, identified with it, whence he is called *svayambhū* ('self-born') or *aja* ('unborn'). The generally received opinion, as given in Manu i. 5 ff., comes to this: Svayambhū rose from primeval darkness, created the waters, and deposited in them a seed; this became a golden egg, in which he himself was born as Brahmā or Hiraṇyagarbha. But, according to another opinion, contained already in the famous *Puruṣasūkta* of the Rig Veda (x. 90), the Puruṣa was in the beginning, and from him the world originated. The deity rising from this Puruṣa is called *Nārāyaṇa* (*i.e.* 'descended from Nara,' the primeval male)—a name which is also coupled with Puruṣa in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. Thus Nārāyaṇa is identified with Brahmā (in the above quoted passage of Manu). But usually Nārāyaṇa is identified with Viṣṇu, and thereby Brahmā's claim to paramount superiority was contested. There was still another cause which detracted from Brahmā's significance as creator. For part of the creation, notably of men, gods, and divine beings, was transferred to secondary Prajāpatis: Dakṣa, Marīchi, Atri, and other Ṛṣis whose progeny is detailed in cosmogonic myths and legends of the Epics and the *Purāṇas*. Thus many causes were at work to reduce the importance and dignity of Brahmā and to deprive him of active devotion. The reason which the Hindus allege in explanation of this fact is Brahmā's incest with his daughter Vāch ('speech'), by which the creation was brought about. Still the idea of creation and of fate is personified in Brahmā, and in this character he is universally acknowledged by all classical writers down to modern times.

While Brahmā-Prajāpati retires step by step from the superiority over all gods accorded to him in the *Brāhmaṇas*, the reverse development obtains in the case of Viṣṇu. In the Rig Veda he is not one of the prominent gods; there he is chiefly extolled for the three steps with which he encompassed the universe. But it should be remarked that in the Rig Veda he is intimately associated with Indra as his friend and companion, while in classical mythology he is styled Indra's younger brother (*Indrānuja*). As this kind of relationship is little in keeping with Viṣṇu's paramount rank, it must be regarded as a relic of the preceding period, when Indra was still greatly superior to Viṣṇu; and, at the same time, it seems to indicate a dim consciousness of the fact that a part of Indra's character or functions had been transferred to Viṣṇu. For Viṣṇu becomes in classical mythology what Indra had been before, namely, the slayer of demons, the *Daityāri*. On the whole, however, Viṣṇu's position in the *Brāhmaṇas* is the same as before; he is regarded as the equal of the other gods, not yet their superior. But the *Brāhmaṇas* record only the views of the priests; popular opinion may have differed from theirs, although ignored by them as not worthy of notice (cf. Muir, *op. cit.* iv. 156 ff.). It should, however, be observed that in the *Brāhmaṇas* Viṣṇu is repeatedly identified with the sacrifice—an honour which he shares with Prajāpati. He seems gradually to have usurped some positions formerly occupied by Prajāpati, and thus to have arrogated to himself the superiority which Vedic speculation had assigned to his rival. Thus Nārāyaṇa is, according to Manu, identical with Brahmā, but afterwards Viṣṇu is Nārāyaṇa. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* it is said that, 'having assumed the form of a tortoise, Prajāpati created offspring'; and, according to the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, Prajāpati in the form of a boar raised the earth from the bottom of the ocean (Muir, *op. cit.* pp. 27, 39, 52 f.). But common opinion ascribes these feats to Viṣṇu in his tortoise and boar *avatāras*.

Here we meet for the first time with the theory of incarnations, which in the course of time passed into a generally adopted doctrine, and enabled Vaiṣṇavism to absorb popular cults by declaring the objects of their worship to be *avatāras* of Viṣṇu. Probably the tortoise and the boar were originally popular theriomorphic deities worshipped by the masses (including Brāhmanic families), and were afterwards elevated by the same Brāhmans to a higher rank by assuming them to be forms of some recognized god. Traces of this process seem to be recognizable in the case of the boar and tortoise *avatāras* of Prajāpati. For in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, as we have seen, Prajāpati assumed the form of a boar and raised the earth; but, in a passage of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, it was the boar Emūṣa who raised the earth, and was then favoured by Prajāpati for his deed. Here we have two different attempts to connect a god worshipped under the shape of a boar with Prajāpati. Something similar occurs in the case of his tortoise *avatāra*; for it is first said that Prajāpati took the form of a tortoise, and then this tortoise *kachchhapa* is identified with Kaśyapa, one of the secondary creators. We observe in both cases a certain indecision: the theriomorphic god was at first *hesitatingly* identified by members of the priestly class with one of their great gods. Afterwards, when the theory of *avatāras* was firmly established, it furnished a ready means of legitimizing popular godlings and heroes. Thus the fish *avatāra* of Viṣṇu and that of the man-lion may be accounted for by the assumption that idols of such shapes had been the objects of popular worship.

The fifth *avatāra* of Viṣṇu as a dwarf (*Vāmana*) is of peculiar interest. For in this incarnation Viṣṇu conquered the world by three steps, for which feat he is chiefly extolled in the hymns of the Rig Veda, although neither there nor in the *Brāhmaṇas* is he said to have done this in the shape of a dwarf. That notion may have developed from the myth itself, for, compared with such *giant* steps, the body of the god may well have appeared *dwarfish*; or there may have been some popular god figured as a dwarf, with whom it was thought convenient to identify Viṣṇu. At any rate, the fact that the principal feat of Viṣṇu was not ascribed to the god himself in his own person, but to an incarnation of him, proves that at the time when this opinion became current Viṣṇu had been promoted to a much higher rank than belonged to the Vedic Viṣṇu who, strange to say, was then regarded as an incarnation (viz. the dwarf) of the Supreme Viṣṇu who was radically not different from him.

The next *avatāras*—Rāma Jāmadagnya, Rāma Dāśarathi, Kṛṣṇa, and Buddha—are of a different kind, and belong to the time when Vaiṣṇavism had become a dominant form of Indian religion, and when the universally received doctrine of incarnation made it possible to imprint on independent cults a Vaiṣṇavite stamp. Rāma Jāmadagnya is the hero of legendary story, the other Rāma of epic history. But it is a well-known fact that in the original part of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, i.e. in Books ii.–vi., Rāma is not yet conceived as connected in any way with Viṣṇu; but after he had become, through epic poetry, the favourite of the people, he was made the object of devotion and worship by being declared to be the incarnated Viṣṇu. In Kṛṣṇa, a Rājput hero has coalesced with a shepherd-god (Govinda) into a new deity; he appears first in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (iii. 17, 6)

as a human teacher who knew the Brahman; in the *Mahābhārata* he is already acknowledged as Viṣṇu in a human form, though frequently he is still described as a human hero. The worship of Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva must have been highly popular about the beginning of our era, for it gave rise to the curious Jaina doctrine of the 9 Vāsudevas, 9 Baladevas, and 9 Prativāsudevas, who play such an important part in the hagiology of the Jainas, even as early as some of their canonical books. And in later times the worship of Kṛṣṇa and that of Rāma are the two prevailing forms of Vaiṣṇavism. The recognition of Buddha as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu is a proof of the popularity of Vaiṣṇavism and its assimilating energy even with regard to a hostile sect.

Most of the creeds which have been merged into Vaiṣṇavism were of un-Brāhmanical origin; *i.e.* they did not grow out of Brāhmanism, but were in the end brahmanized. The gods, godlings, or heroes, whose cult was the object of those creeds, were probably *gṛhadevatās*, or *iṣṭadevatās*, worshipped by families belonging to various castes and classes, inclusive of Brāhmans; their identification with Viṣṇu, which probably was due chiefly to Brāhmans, elevated them to a higher sphere and ennobled their cult. But what principally legitimized these Vaiṣṇavite forms of religion as Brāhmanical, or as in harmony with the Veda, was the adoption of Brāhmanical theosophy as their theological foundation. Viṣṇu (Nārāyaṇa, Vāsudeva) was declared to be one with the Supreme Spirit, the Brahman of the *Upaniṣads*; the creation and destruction of the world were explained in accordance with the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya philosophies. The ascetic ideal is still acknowledged, and knowledge continues to be regarded as an important means of reaching emancipation; but a new way of salvation is now proclaimed, the 'way of love' (*bhaktimārga* [*q.v.*]): love of, devotion and entire submission to, God is the shortest and surest way to union with Him. One of the earliest and most perfect products of this movement is the famous *Bhagavad-Gītā* (*q.v.*), which forms part of the *Mahābhārata*; it has become a canonical text for all Vaiṣṇavite sects. A later authority for them is the *Vedānta Sūtra*, which almost every founder of Brāhmanical sects feels obliged to interpret in such a way that its teachings shall be in perfect harmony with his own doctrines.

Rudra-Śiva became in the Brāhmanical period a Supreme God, the highest god according to the Śaivites as Viṣṇu is the highest god according to the Vaiṣṇavites. In the Rig Veda, Rudra (the Howler) is the father of the Maruts or Rudras (wind- or storm-gods), but no distinct cosmical function is ascribed to him; he is principally regarded as a malevolent deity who by his shafts brings disease and death on men and cattle. A plurality of Rudras, the host of Rudras, is frequently mentioned in the following period, and has never been forgotten; in classical mythology the number of Rudras is eleven, but in addition to them Rudra is surrounded by hosts of spirits, called his *gaṇas* and *pramathas*. He thus appears as the leader of troops of beings greatly inferior, yet similar, to himself; it may therefore be assumed that from the beginning he was the representative of a class, or rather classes, of evil spirits, and that the many Rudras whom the *Śatarudrīya* mentions have all been blended in the conception of the one Rudra, who is present in woods, streams, desert places, etc. A similar process seems to have gone on in the later Vedas and the *Brāhmaṇas*; for other terrific gods, notably various forms of Agni, conceived not as the sacrificial fire but as the destructive element, have been combined with the original Rudra. As mentioned above, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* states that Agni was called *Śarva* by the Prāchyas, and *Bhava* by the Vāhīkas; but in the Atharva Veda, Bhava and Śarva are distinct gods, similar to Rudra, while, as early as the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā*, Bhava and Śarva occur as names of Rudra, and in classical literature they are common synonyms of Śiva. It is therefore a plausible conjecture that other names or epithets of Śiva, besides *Bhava* and *Śarva*, originally denoted distinct deities who were blended with him into one great god, Mahādeva. Thus his epithets Nīlagrīva, Śitikaṇṭha, Nīlalohita, of which the two first names occur already in the *Śatarudrīya* of the *Vājasaneyī* and *Taittirīya Saṁhitās*, belong to fire (as first pointed out by Weber, *Indische Studien*, 1850–98, ii. 20), and designate some forms of a fire-god merged in Rudra.

Giriśa and similar epithets of Rudra in the *Śatarudrīya*, which have become names of Śiva in later mythology, seem to indicate that he was identified with the mountain-sprite, or that he absorbed, as it were, into his character the anonymous mountain-goblins born of the imagination of hill tribes in India and other parts of the world. Rudra-Śiva is therefore intimately connected with the mountains, especially with the Himālaya; indeed Megasthenes remarks that Dionysos (Śiva) is worshipped in the hills, and Herakles (Kṛṣṇa) in the plains. His character as god of the mountains may have made him the favourite god of the people of Southern India; but a more potent cause was probably the 'devil-worship' common to all Dravidians, which prepared them for the adoration of Bhūteśa. For he is also the *Bhūteśvara*, the lord of ghosts in general (*bhūtas*), and especially of those who haunt cemeteries. Connected with the latter are the sorcerers, *yogins*, who practise their awful rites in places haunted by such spirits, and were imagined thus to acquire power over them. Śiva is also the master of the yogins as *Yogīśvara*, and hence is believed to practise *yoga*. The garland of skulls which Śiva wears, the corpse on which he is seated, the terrific shape in which he is adored as Mahākāla, the destructive god of time, death as well as the vanquisher of death (*Mṛtyuñjaya*)—all these items are so many indications that Śiva was regarded first as the ruler, and then as the representative of the vast and various classes of demonic beings who were created in the imagination of the superstitious by the fear and awe inspired by everything relating to death and the dead.

Though the concept of Rudra-Śiva seems to have had an almost unlimited power of assimilating, and thereby absorbing, kindred spirits and godlings of the popular creed, still gods of a well-defined personality or of distinct functions were not subject to this process of assimilation, however like they might be to Śiva in character and perhaps even in origin. Thus Kumāra and Gaṇeśa, notwithstanding their striking affinity with Śiva, have not been merged in Mahādeva.

It will have been remarked that most of the elements which coalesced with Rudra were malicious spirits; still Śiva is not an exclusively malignant deity. Probably it was thought that as leader and king of those spirits he might be appeased, and thus the harm apprehended from his subjects be averted, just as a chief of robbers is bought off by blackmail (Rudra is called 'lord of robbers' in the *Śatarudrīya*). Therefore he is given auspicious names as *Mṛḍa* (cf. Pāṇini, iv. 1, 49) and *Śiva*, 'the Gracious'; the latter has become the most usual name in classical mythology.

Finally, mention must be made of a prominent feature of the Śiva-cult, viz. that he is worshipped under the form of the *liṅga* or *phallus*. It can hardly be doubted that phallic worship was once a wide-spread popular cult in India, but how it came

to be connected with Śiva we are at a loss to understand. But a curious mythological parallel may be noticed in this connexion. Śiva impersonates death as *Mahākāla*, but he is also the vanquisher of death as *Mṛtyuñjaya*; similarly he impersonates the generating power worshipped in the *liṅga*, but he also destroys the god of sexual love, Kāma.

Śiva's consort, Rudrāṇī or Mṛḍānī, is known by many names, as **Devī**, Umā, Gaurī, Pārvatī, Durgā, Bhavānī, Kālī, Kapālinī, Chāmuṇḍā. Unlike the wives of other gods, she is a very prominent figure in classical mythology, and may be said to be scarcely inferior to Śiva himself. Her equality of rank with her husband is naively expressed in the dual form of this divinity, the *Ardhanārīśvara*, of which one half is male and the other female, representing the right side of Śiva and the left of Devī. The great number of names of this goddess and the diversity of her character (benignant, awful, cruel, horrible) render it probable that, like Śiva, she is a combination of many deities. One of her names, *Kumārī* (Kanyakumārī in *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, 10, 1, 7),—after which the southernmost point of India, Cape Comorin, is supposed to have been called since the time of the Periplus,—seems to be given her as a female counterpart or equivalent of Kumāra, probably as the representative of the Kumārīs who ensnare little children. Malignant spirits are of both sexes; the representative of female sprites must be a goddess, as they could not well coalesce with a male deity. Therefore, if Kumāra be the representative of the Kumāras, Kumārī may be assumed to be the representative of the Kumārīs. Similar may have been the origin of **Ambikā**, who in the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* is called the sister of Rudra, but in later mythology is Śiva's wife; for *Ambikā* means 'little mother'; and there are superhuman beings, both benignant and malignant, called 'mothers' (*mātaras*), who are connected with Kumāra; therefore Ambikā may be assumed to be the representative of the mothers, just as Kumārī is that of the Kumārīs.

As Śiva is Lord of the Mountains (*Giriśa*), so is his spouse Lady of the Hills (*Pārvatī*). According to classical mythology, Śiva married Umā, daughter of Himālaya; but in the *Kena Upaniṣad*, where she is first mentioned (iii. 25), Umā Haimavatī appears as a heavenly woman, conversant with Brahman. Apparently she was originally an independent goddess, or at least a kind of divine being, perhaps a female mountain-ghost haunting the Himālayas, and was later identified with Rudra's wife. A similar mountain-goddess had her home in the Vindhyas; she was of a cruel character, as might be expected from a goddess of the savage tribes living in those hills. Her name is **Vindhyavāsinī**, and she too is identified with Śiva's wife. Other names of the latter indicate some connexion with Agni (as was first pointed out by Weber, *Indische Studien*, i. 237, ii. 188 f.), for **Kālī** and **Karālī** are names of two of the seven tongues of Agni (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, i. 2, 4); and these seven tongues of Agni may be assumed, with some probability, to have been originally female demons representing fire as the destructive and voracious element, since they are also names of **Durgā** as the object of a bloody sacrificial worship. Finally, a plausible guess of Weber with regard to Durgā may be mentioned. He is of opinion that this goddess is connected somehow with Nirṛti, the Vedic goddess of all evil, by which assumption the terrific character of Durgā would be accounted for. At any rate, it can scarcely be doubted that several goddesses or female demons from different parts of India, and worshipped by different classes of people, have in the course of time been combined into one great goddess, the spouse of Śiva, who was adored as his *śakti*, or 'energy.' In the case of Śiva and Devī the syncretistic tendency of mythology as a most powerful factor in the formation of Indian gods is beyond question; but the same factor has also been at work, as we saw above, in the case of the sun-god, of Kumāra, and perhaps of Gaṇeśa.

The cult of Rudra-Śiva and of his consort, originally, perhaps, chiefly the property of tribes loosely or not at all connected with Brāhmanical society, has in course of time been fully brahmanized, in the same way as the cult of Viṣṇu and his *avatāras*, by being based partly on the doctrines of the Upaniṣads, partly, however, on independent systems of Śaiva philosophy. Thus the worship of the two Supreme Gods, Viṣṇu and Śiva, under a great variety of shapes, represents the highest form of religion of Brāhmanical India; but at the same time some sects claiming to worship the same Supreme Gods are addicted to debauchery and gross immorality, and thus exhibit religion in its most degraded form.

In conclusion, it may be remarked that we have left out of sight the great un-Brāhmanical religions, Buddhism and Jainism, which must be treated in separate articles; yet it cannot be doubted that they have in many ways influenced Brāhmanism. Buddhistic ideas, especially, have been adopted and adapted by Brāhmanical thinkers and religious men, and they survived in their systems and creeds long after Buddhism itself declined and decayed in India.

Besides the elements of religious life described in this article, there were other social forces at work which had a great influence upon the development of Brāhmanism, viz. the system of caste and the organization of the family. But as these subjects have an interest of their own, distinct from their religious aspect, they must be treated in separate articles.

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BRĀHMA SAMĀJ.—1. **Introduction.**—The Brāhma Samāj (*Brāhma Samāja*) is a theistic reforming movement, springing from Hinduism, which appeared in Calcutta about eighty years ago, and has had rather a changeful and eventful history, in the course of which it has exercised a large influence in Bengal and slighter influence in other parts of India. The name, 'Brāhma Samāj,' is a Bengali phrase which may be translated 'Society of Brahman,' *Brāhma* being an adjective formed from *Brahman*, a neuter substantive used in Hindu philosophical language for 'God,' whether conceived as the impersonal Divine Being of the stricter Vedānta or the personal God of Rāmānuja's system. *Samāj* usually means a society that is an organism rather than a mere association. The name shows that the movement has close connexions with the religious past of India. This is true, first, in the sense that much that has been taught in the Samāj has come straight out of ancient Hinduism; and, secondly, in the sense that it is but one of the latest of a very long series of attempts to produce a pure spiritual religion which mark Hindu history almost from the beginning.

The Upaniṣads themselves are the deposit of the first great movement in the direction of pure spirituality. The Vedānta and Yōga systems and the theistic sects known as Bhāgavatas, Pāśupatas, and Pāncharātras followed; and the *Bhagavad-Gītā* is the expression of a similar movement in Kṛṣṇa-worship. The modern *Bhakti* movements both in North and in South India, with their literature in the various vernaculars, had similar ends in view. But the impact of Europe, and especially of Christianity, started new currents of religious thought of great force during the 19th century. Of these the earliest is the Brāhma Samāj. Later came the Ārya Samāj (*q.v.*) and other movements of less importance. Towards the close of the century there came a great revival of orthodox Hinduism. The Brāhma Samāj is not only the earliest of the group, but is also a much more direct and legitimate result of Christian influence than the others.

2. History of the movement: antecedents.—Ram Mohan Ray (*Rāmamōhana Rāi*) (1772–1833), who founded the Brāhma Samāj, was the son of a Bengali Brāhman landowner, and received, in addition to the ordinary school education in Bengali, a thorough training in Persian and Arabic, which brought him into contact with Muhammadan thought. Consequently, when he was only fifteen years of age, his outspoken condemnation of idolatry led to his having to leave his father's house. He travelled in Tibet learning Buddhism, settled at Benares to master Hinduism, and, finally, through the study of English and intimacy with an Indian civilian named Digby, became acquainted with Christianity. Thereafter, in 1804, he gave expression to his religious convictions in a pamphlet in Persian, *Tuhfatul Muwahhiddin*, 'a Gift to Deists.' It is a brief and arid argument against all formal religions, and in favour of deism. For some ten years after this he held a financial position under Government, and gave most of his energy to his duties, amassing a fortune for himself the while; yet he continued his religious inquiries and discussions in his leisure, and suffered a good deal of persecution in consequence.

In 1814, now a man of forty-two, he left the service of the Company and settled in Calcutta. Fourteen years of varying experimental effort followed—effort spent in the study of Hindu philosophy and Christianity, in the publication of pamphlets and books, and in struggles for social reform. Shortly after settling in Calcutta, he established (in 1815) the *Ātmīya Sabhā*, or Spiritual Association. Meetings were held weekly, at which texts from the Hindu Scriptures were recited, and hymns composed by Ram Mohan and his friends were chanted; but the society did not last long. He published translations of the *Vedānta-sūtras* and of certain Upaniṣads, in Bengali and English. Then followed, in 1820, *The Precepts of Jesus, the Guide to Peace and Happiness*, being a catena of passages from the teaching of Jesus. It is as deplorable as it was inevitable that Christian missionaries should have condemned this most remarkable work, pregnant as it was with prophecy for the religious future of the Hindu people.

Ram Mohan early made the acquaintance of the Serampore missionaries, and indeed gave them both advice and help in the translation of the New Testament into Bengali. Questions arose as to the meaning of certain passages, and collaboration ceased; but one of the missionaries, the Rev. W. Adam, sided with Ram Mohan, and finally became a Unitarian. In consequence of this a Unitarian Committee was formed in Calcutta, consisting of four Indians and six Europeans; and Adam became the pastor and missionary of the society. A house was rented, and Unitarian services were conducted in it in English. A press was founded, and a good deal of literature was put into circulation. Educational methods were also used. Ram Mohan found most of the money required for the work. These efforts were carried on for several years, but with little success. The attendance at the services dwindled to almost nothing; and in the other parts of the work Ram Mohan's autocracy rendered Adam's position practically impossible. The Mission collapsed.

3. First period, 1828–1841: Ram Mohan Ray: Deism.—The failure of the Mission was the occasion of the birth of the Samāj. At the suggestion of two friends, Ram Mohan decided to start an Indian service. A house was rented in Chitpore Road, and the first meeting was held on 20th August 1828. The name at first was *Brāhma Sabhā*, but it was soon altered to *Brāhma Samāj*. Besides Ram Mohan himself, the leading spirits were, first the wealthy triumvirate, Prince Dwarka Nath Tagore (*Dvārakanātha Thākur*), Kali Nath Ray of Taki, Jessore (*Kālinātha Rāi*), and Mathura Nath Mullick of Howrah (*Mathuranātha Mullick*), and then Prasanna Kumār Tagore (*Prasannakumāra Thākur*), Chandra Sekhar Deb (*Chandrasekhara Deva*), and Ram Chandra Bidyabagish (*Rāmachandra Vidyāvāgīśa*). The society met every Saturday evening from 7 to 9. The service was divided into four parts: the recitation of texts from the Vedic hymns, the reading and translating into Bengali of passages from the Upaniṣads, the delivery of a sermon in Bengali, and the singing of hymns accompanied with instrumental music. Only Brāhmans were allowed to lead in the service. Two Telugu Brāhmans were set apart for reciting the hymns, while Utsabananda Bidyabagish (*Utsavānanda Vidyāvāgīśa*) was appointed to read from the Upaniṣads, and Ram Chandra Bidyabagish to translate them into Bengali.

The attendance from the outset proved satisfactory, there being usually sixty or seventy persons present. Ram Mohan insisted that the worshippers should wear suitable dress, and went so far as to prescribe a definite costume. The utmost care was taken to keep the whole proceedings within the bounds of Hinduism. The Vedas were chanted from a sort of ante-chamber, so that they might not be polluted by contact with the vulgar. This was not merely a diplomatic move. The leader was deeply impressed with the need of making the movement genuinely national, and he believed he was restoring Hindu worship to its pristine purity. Yet now, as before, his advocacy of spiritual religion brought him much opposition and persecution. The new society had a very loose organization: there were the four reciters and a secretary, but there were no conditions of membership. The finances were found partly by subscription, the rest being supplied by Ram Mohan himself and the Prince.

It is plain on the very surface that the movement was largely inspired by Christianity. The weekly congregational worship (now first introduced into Hinduism), consisting of the reading of the Scriptures, a sermon, and the singing of hymns, is quite sufficient proof. Prayer seems to have had a very subordinate place, if it had any place at all, in the service; but that is sufficiently explained by Ram Mohan's deistical turn of mind, and by the absence of prayer from the Hindu philosophical systems.

Already the forces of reaction were organizing themselves against Ram Mohan. To fight the *Brāhma Sabhā* and Ram Mohan's social crusade, the *Dharma Sabhā*, or Religion Association, was formed, and a newspaper was published to support the orthodox cause.

Very soon after the founding of the society a site was bought in Chitpore Road, and a building, specially designed for the use of the Samāj, was erected. It was opened on the 23rd of January 1830, a date which has ever since then been celebrated annually by all Brāhmas with great enthusiasm. The Trust Deed of the building is rather a remarkable document. The following extract will be read with interest:

'To be used . . . as a place of public meeting of all sorts and descriptions of people without distinction as shall behave and conduct themselves in an orderly sober religious and devout manner for the worship and adoration of the Eternal Unsearchable and Immutable Being who is the Author and Preserver of the Universe but not under or by any other name designation or title peculiarly used for and applied to any particular Being or Beings by any man or set of men whatsoever and that no graven image statue or sculpture carving painting picture portrait or the likeness of anything shall be admitted within the said building . . . and that no sacrifice . . . shall ever be permitted therein and that no animal or living creature shall within or on the said premises be deprived of life . . . and that in conducting the said worship and adoration no object animate or inanimate that has been or is . . . recognized as an object of worship by any man or set of men shall be reviled or slightingly or contemptuously spoken of . . . and that no sermon preaching discourse prayer or hymn be delivered made or used in such worship but such as have a tendency to the promotion of the contemplation of the Author and Preserver of the Universe to the promotion of charity morality piety benevolence virtue and the strengthening the bonds of union between men of all religious persuasions and creeds.'

Religion was the chief, but by no means the only, interest of Ram Mohan's active mind. He was an eager social reformer, and worked hard against polygamy, and in favour of the marriage of Hindu widows. But no social question stirred him so much as *satī*, the burning of Hindu widows. For the abolition of this inhuman custom he wrote and spoke and toiled for many years, and finally had the joy of seeing it put down by Lord Bentinck on the 4th of December 1829, six weeks before the opening of the Brāhma building.

Now that the battle against *satī* was won, and the Brāhma Samāj not only established but comfortably housed in a building of its own, Ram Mohan thought he might safely carry out his long meditated plan of a voyage to England. He had written to his friend Digby about this project as early as 1817. Many reasons would unite to urge him to go. Realizing to the full the meaning of the introduction of Christianity and of European thought and method into India, he was naturally most eager to see with his own eyes the land and the people which were destined to help so largely in the rejuvenation of his own. There were also a number of questions on which he hoped to influence the Government at home, notably the great problem of the renewal of the Charter of the East India Company. The old Emperor of Delhi, now a pensioner of the Company, wished him to plead his cause with the home authorities, and with this in view gave him the title of *Rājā*. Ram Mohan undertook the task.

Before sailing for England in November 1830, Ram Mohan appointed three trustees to look after the Samāj: Mahārājā Ram Nath Tagore, Kali Nath Munshi, and his own son, Radha Prasad. Visambar Das became secretary. The services were conducted as before; only the day of meeting was changed from Saturday to Wednesday; and this rule obtains in the old building to this day. In arranging to cross the ocean, Ram Mohan took great care to preserve his caste. He took two Hindu servants with him, one of them being required to cook his food in accordance with caste regulations.

Ram Mohan, now Rājā Ram Mohan Ray, was received in England with the greatest warmth and honour by the public generally, by leading Unitarians and other religious men, and by the chief statesmen of the day. He exercised a much greater influence than he could have ever hoped to do; and at the same time came into such close living touch with the best in English life as to be deeply influenced himself. But, to the great sorrow of his friends, he was taken ill, and died at Bristol on the 27th of September 1833.

He was a man of unusually wide sympathies and of large judgment. He realized, as very few men did in his day, the immeasurable results that were destined to flow from the association of England with India, and believed that India would reap very great good therefrom. He also looked forward to India's becoming a Christian country: the exact meaning of this prophecy is discussed below. On the other hand, he realized to the full that no real blessing could come to India by the mere adoption of Western things unchanged. India, he said, would inevitably remain Indian. No gift from the outside could be of any real value except in so far as it was naturalized. His long bold struggle, on the one hand, for religious and social purity, for educational progress and journalistic freedom, and his brilliant literary work and unchanging fidelity to Indian ideals, on the other, had made him not only the most prominent of all Indians, but the one man able to stand between Indians and Englishmen as interpreter and friend.

His death caused dismay in the infant Society which he had left behind in Calcutta, and many of those who at first took part in its work fell away. Prince Dwarka Nath remained a staunch friend, but the chief stay of the whole work was Ram Chandra Bidyabagish, who took charge of the services. Yet the cause steadily decayed. Had it not been for the liberality of the Prince, the current expenses could not have been met.

In 1838, however, five years after the great leader's death, Prince Dwarka Nath's youthful son, Debendra Nath Tagore (*Devendranātha Thākur*) passed through a very decided spiritual change, which made him a consecrated man for the rest of his life. He was then twenty years of age. Next year he gathered a few serious-minded young men round him and formed the *Tattvabōdhini Sabhā*, the 'Truth-learning Association.' They met once a week in his house for the discussion of religious questions, and once a month for worship.

4. **Second period, 1841–1865: Debendra Nath Tagore: Indian theism.**—In 1841, Debendra and his friends joined the Brāhma Samāj, and the young man was soon recognized as leader. Then the tide turned, and a new period of growth and fruitful labour opened for the Samāj. The *Tattvabōdhini Sabhā*, however, was not merged in the Samāj, but continued to do most valuable work as its auxiliary for many years. A Vedic school, the *Tattvabōdhini Pāthsāla*, was opened, to train young men as Brāhma missionaries, but also with a view to arrest the progress of Christianity, now making considerable headway in Calcutta under Duff's leadership. From beginning to end Debendra wished to be a Hindu, and, unlike Ram Mohan, believed that India had no need of Christ. In 1843 the society's monthly paper, the *Tattvabōdhini Patrikā*, the 'Truth-learning Journal,' began to appear. It was edited by a friend of Debendra, Akshay Kumār Dutt (*Akshāyakumāra Datta*), one of the greatest of Bengali prose-writers, and soon became a very influential paper, leading many thinking men towards the main ideas of theism.

Debendra saw that the Samāj required to be more carefully organized; that, if it was to be a permanent and growing influence, it must have a regularly appointed ministry and definite rules of membership. By the end of 1843 he had drawn up what is known as the Brāhma Covenant, a short series of solemn vows to be taken by all who

wished to become members of the Samāj. The most important of these vows were promises to abstain from idolatry and to worship God by loving Him and by doing such deeds as He loves. The old reciter, Ram Chandra Bidyabagish, was now formally set apart as *āchārya*, i.e. 'minister'; and Debendra and twenty of his friends solemnly took the vows of the Covenant before him. The conscientious observance of these vows involved a good deal of trouble and difficulty. Debendra himself had to leave the paternal mansion and wander in the fields when any of the domestic ceremonies were being performed, as they were full of idolatry. At the same time a brief form of prayer and adoration, known as *Brahmōpāsana*, *i.e.* 'worship of Brahman,' was compiled, and became the norm for the services. This introduction of prayer is a most noteworthy point.

The work of the Vedic school began to bear fruit. By 1844, Debendra was able to send out a number of young missionaries, and *samājes* began to appear outside Calcutta. From time to time Debendra himself also travelled and preached in the chief towns of the north, from East Bengal to the Panjāb. By the year 1847 the number of covenanted Brāhmas had grown to 647.

The Samāj tended to become a Vedic sect. In 1845 the *Tattvabōdhini Patrikā* declared that the Vedas were the sole foundation of their belief; and in 1846, Debendra said: 'We consider the Vedas, and the Vedas alone, as the standard of our faith.' But many serious questions arose about the text, the interpretation, and the inspiration of the Vedic hymns and the Upaniṣads. Duff had twitted Brāhmas with believing in the infallibility of the Vedas. Consequently four scholars were deputed to go to Benares so that each might study and copy one of the four Vedas and might return to Calcutta with the fruit of his labours.

Debendra steeped himself in the Upaniṣads, and compiled from them in 1850 a volume of extracts for use in the services of the Samāj. This volume, named *Brāhma Dharma*, 'Religion of Brahman,' contains what is known as the *bīja*, or 'seed,' a brief outline of Brāhma doctrine in four statements; the *Brahmōpāsana*, or order of service; and then a selection of passages from the Upanisads, followed by passages from other Hindu books. Later an exposition of Brāhma doctrine was added by Debendra.

Meanwhile the results of the labours of the four Vedic students had become available. After much discussion the doctrine of the infallibility of the Vedic literature was abandoned, and it was decided that only those parts were to be accepted as true which harmonized with pure theism. As Keshab Chandra Sen afterwards said, 'The Vedas were thrown overboard by Babu Debendra Nath Tagore, and the Brāhma Samāj bade farewell to Vedāntism.' This happened in 1850. The Samāj thus found itself without an authoritative sacred standard, and was thrown back on natural religion. This raised the whole problem of religious knowledge. At first no definite theory was advanced, but within a few years the leaders found it possible to express themselves; and the Brāhma doctrine came to be this, that our knowledge of God has two sources, *Nature* and *Intuition*.

The faith of the Samāj at this time may be summed up in the following six propositions:

(1) God is a personal being with sublime moral attributes.
(2) God has never become incarnate.
(3) God hears and answers prayer
(4) God is to be worshipped only in spiritual ways. Hindu asceticism, temples, and fixed forms of worship are unnecessary Men of all castes and races may worship God acceptably.
(5) Repentance and cessation from sin is the only way to forgiveness and salvation.
(6) Nature and Intuition are the sources of knowledge of God. No book is authoritative.

It is noticeable that the doctrines of the Fatherhood of God and the immortality of the human soul had not as yet found their way into the creed.

The Samāj had proved itself a progressive movement; but circumstances were now approaching which were destined to accelerate the rate of progress for a time. In 1857 a young man named Keshab Chandra Sen (*Keśavachandra Sena*) joined the Samāj. He was not a Brāhman, but belonged to an influential and well-to-do family of the Baidyā caste and of the Vaiṣnava sect of Hinduism, and he had received a good modern education. He had suffered from religious melancholy, but through prayer had found peace. For two years he took no active part in the work, but from 1859 he threw himself into it with great energy. Keshab Chandra Sen had to endure serious persecution for the sake of his faith. Debendra took a great liking to this gifted young man, while Keshab looked up to Debendra with love and reverence. From this time they enjoyed five years of strenuous, yet happy and harmonious, work together.

The Brāhma Vidyālaya, or School, was opened—a sort of informal Theological College. Keshab lectured in English on the philosophy of Theism, while Debendra discussed in Bengali the theology of the Brāhma Samāj, with the double result that Brāhma doctrine was more clearly formulated, and a number of young men received a very useful theological training. Keshab's capacity as a lecturer in English became known, so that he frequently addressed audiences both of Brāhmas and of others in Calcutta, in English, and occasionally took a tour in the country.

The year 1860 produced large results in social reform. Keshab formed the *Sangat Sabhā*, or 'Friendly Association,' the meetings of which were now devotional, now given up to the discussion of pressing questions both religious and social. The findings of this enthusiastic group of young men greatly influenced Debendra himself. As a result of the reasons urged by them, he gave up wearing the sacred Brāhmanical thread. He also took up the whole question of domestic ceremonies. Every noticeable event in Hindu family life is marked by the careful performance of ancient traditional rites, all of which are tainted with references to the gods of Hinduism and with idolatrous practices. Debendra set to work to purge his own family of idolatry; and also worked out, for the use of the Samāj, new or modified rites whence everything heathen and idolatrous had been eliminated. These are known as Brāhma rites; the manual is the *Anushṭhān Paddhati*; and Brāhmas who use them in their families are known as 'Anushṭhānic Brāhmas.' At Keshab's suggestion the Samāj also began to follow the example of Christian philanthropy, and gathered money and food for the famine-stricken.

After leaving college, Keshab had obtained a post in the Bank of Bengal. In 1861 he gave this up in order to devote his whole time and energy to the work of the Samāj. Several of his followers belonging to the *Sangat Sabhā* followed the example of his self-sacrifice, among them his life-long friend and biographer, Pratāp Chandra Mozoomdār (*Pratāpachandra Majumdār*). The *Indian Mirror* was started, that the movement might have an English journal for the expression of its views; and the Calcutta College was founded—the earliest attempt made by a native of India to found a college for English education.

Next year (1862) Debendra resolved to honour his brilliant young friend by giving him the place in the Samāj which his great capacities deserved. Hitherto only Brāhmans had been

allowed to lead in the services; and while Debendra himself was the *āchārya*, or 'minister,' the other two who took part in the services were called *upāchāryas*, or 'under-ministers.' Debendra decided to ordain Keshab, non-Brāhman though he was, and to give him the full title *āchārya*. It was also arranged that henceforward no 'minister' should be allowed to wear the sacred thread. The steady pressure of rational principles, urged largely in the *Sangat Sabhā*, had brought Debendra to this notable advance. Keshab had to struggle and to dare before he succeeded in being allowed to bring his young wife, in defiance of all Hindu custom, to the solemn service in which he was set apart as *āchārya*; but his courage produced fruit, for from this time Brāhmas began to give their wives more liberty, and the uplifting of the women of India was thus helped onward. From this time Debendra was known as the *pradhān āchārya*, or 'chief minister.'

Two years later, Keshab took a more extended tour. Among other places he visited Bombay and Madras, and was received with so much honour and enthusiasm that he was able to draw men out who afterwards founded *samājes* in these great cities. His brilliant success on this tour, and the wide outlook which the journey gave him, first suggested to his mind the idea of a Society representing the whole of India—a Brāhma Samāj of India.

But the pace at which affairs were moving was too fast for some of the older members, and Debendra himself began to be afraid that Keshab and the other progressives would lose spiritual religion in their zeal for change. As we have seen, Debendra had gone a long way in the matter of reform; yet there were several points on which his Hindu prejudices had not given way. He disliked inter-caste marriages, and he could not endure the marriage of widows. Then the two men looked at the whole matter from different points of view. Debendra regarded social questions as secondary in comparison with religion, and wished to initiate no change unless it was absolutely necessary. This explains his unwillingness to drive men by regulation to give up the sacred thread.* Keshab, on the other hand, saw clearly that the social health of the people demanded radical change. There were also religious differences. Debendra's was a deeply devotional nature, but he was still Hindu in temperament, and the great facts of sin and repentance did not obtrude themselves much in his prayers or his teaching; while Keshab was keenly alive to the ethical side of religious experience, and was daily coming more under the influence of Christ.

During Keshab's absence on his long tour, the more conservative spirits gained an increasing hold of Debendra; two parties began to appear more distinctly in the Samāj, and suspicion was soon rife between them. Attempts were made to heal the breach, but without result. Debendra was determined to resist Keshab. The cyclone of 5th Oct. 1864 so damaged the building that it became necessary to hold the services in Debendra's house, and he took the opportunity to allow *upāchāryas* wearing the sacred thread to officiate.† Keshab and his party protested, but received no satisfaction. Finally, they sent Debendra what was really an ultimatum. It contained three points, but only one had any significance, viz. the old demand that no man wearing the sacred thread should be allowed to lead the devotions of the Samāj. Debendra felt it to be his duty to refuse; and Keshab and his party withdrew, leaving all the property of the Samāj behind them. The date was Feb. 1865. Keshab was only twenty-seven years of age, and Debendra, who had already been a religious leader for twenty-four years, was only forty-seven. He had still forty years of life before him. At this time there were only a few *samājes* in existence outside Calcutta.

5. **Third period, 1865–1878: Keshab Chandra Sen: universal theism: the two Samājes.**—Keshab did not organize a new Samāj at once, but spent some eighteen months in seeking to rally sympathy and supporters to his cause. He had carried the *Indian Mirror* with him. He started a vernacular paper called *Dharma Tattva*, 'the Truth of Religion,' in opposition to Debendra's paper, the *Tattvabōdhini Patrikā*. Both were used vigorously in favour of his party. He toured in East Bengal and lectured in Calcutta. Early in 1866 a copy of Seeley's *Ecce Homo* fell into his hands, and greatly stimulated his thought. He was already deeply impressed by Christ; this made his heart overflow. He delivered a lecture on 5th May in the theatre of the Medical College on 'Jesus Christ: Europe and Asia.' It is no theological discourse, but a manly appeal to his fellow-countrymen and to Europeans to listen to the teaching of Christ and to imitate Him. The most notable point in the address was the calling of attention to the fact that Jesus was an Asiatic. Keshab got at the heart of his audience by the appeal founded on that telling fact. He speaks of Christ's 'extraordinary greatness,' His 'supernatural moral heroism'; but nowhere does he depart from the strictest theistic position. Yet the enthusiasm for the character of Christ and the very high estimate of His influence which the lecture expressed led many to believe that Keshab was about to become a Christian. At least one young man was won by this lecture to the spiritual life, and afterwards to the position of a Brāhma missionary—Pyari Mohan Chundhuri.

On 11th Nov. 1866 a meeting was held to form the new society. It was opened with a rather startling religious service. Besides the usual prayer and hymns, it included the reading of passages from the Hindu, Christian, Muhammadan, Zoroastrian, and Confucian Scriptures. Keshab's distinctive ideal, the rising above the limitations of the Hindu system to a rational faith which should give complete social and intellectual freedom, was thus set forth in a way which no one could misunderstand. His immediate object, however, was to receive the adhesion of all Brāhmas in every part of India to the organization which he proposed to form. Hence the following resolutions, which were put to the meeting and carried unanimously:

(1) That the Brāhma Samāj of India be established for the admission of all Brāhmas, and for the wide propagation of the religion.
(2) That this association be bound to preserve the purity and universality of its religion.
(3) That people of both sexes, believing in the fundamental principles of Brahmaism, shall be admissible as members.
(4) That mottoes and maxims agreeing with the principles of Brahmaism be gleaned and published from the religious writings of all nations.
(5) That a vote of thanks be given to Debendra Nath Tagore for the unflagging zeal he has ever exhibited, and the indefatigable labour he has undergone for promoting the progress of the religion.

Keshab was appointed the secretary of the Samāj, and the further organization was left altogether in his hands. From this date onward, then, we have two societies—Debendra's organization, hereafter known as the *Ādi Brāhma Samāj*, or original society, and Keshab's new body, the *Bhāratvarshiya Brāhma Samāj*, or Brāhma Samāj of India.

* The equivocal position of Debendra's family makes his defence of caste practice the more piquant. They have Brāhman birth, wealth, and high character; yet they are known as *Pirali* Brāhmans, for the family was outcasted long ago on account of some contact with Muhammadanism.

† Pratap puts this event in 1865, Lemard's chronology would put it in 1863, but the cyclone gives us the true date.

As to the balance of the two parties, Mr. P. C. Mozoomdar writes: 'The Pradhān Āchārya had a number of elderly adherents, and his accomplished sons, some of whom were of the same age as Keshab, helped his cause energetically. But there is no doubt that Keshab's enthusiasm and genius drew all the youth and intelligence of the community, and his important reforms attracted the sympathy of influential outsiders.' The new organization won to itself many earnest men hitherto unattached to the Samāj, including a number of outstanding personalities whom Keshab had influenced during his tour in Bombay and Madras.

In accordance with the fourth resolution as given above, a selection of texts from the Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Christian, Muhammadan, and Chinese Scriptures was made and published, in 1866, under the title *Slōkasangraha*, i.e. 'A Collection of Verses,' for use in the service of the Samaj.

As Keshab's party did not yet possess a building of its own, weekly services were held in his house in Colutola Street. The closer relation which the new body sustained to Christianity was indicated in these services being now regularly held on *Sunday*; while, to show their continued sympathy with the old Samāj, the leaders still attended the weekly service there on Wednesday.

One of Keshab's chief cares was to form *the Mission Department*. His young comrades, who had been members of the *Sangat Sabhā* (see above), became the missionaries. Including himself, there were at this time seven or eight, the chief others being Pratap Chandra Mozoomdar, Gaur Gabinda Ray, Mahendra Nath Bose, Bejay Krishna Goswami, and Aghar Nath Gupta. They were each and all of them attached by the closest personal ties to Keshab, for he had been the means through which they had entered into the joy of the new life. His enthusiasm and self-sacrifice laid hold of them. They gave up all worldly prospects, and accepted a life of poverty, strenuous work, and persecution. But there was practically no organization. Consequently, while each man's relation to the leader was all that could be desired, their relations with each other were governed neither by regular rule nor by personal attachment. In spite of this, however, things went fairly well at first. The missionaries went preaching and teaching in the city and the country, and many individuals were won for the cause, while here and there a new Samāj was formed. But there were frequent quarrels among the missionaries, personal animosities, divisions on principle and on method; and their leader was powerless to overcome them. He pleaded and waited patiently for peace and bound each man to himself, but could not compose differences.

The great breach with the original Samāj depressed Keshab. He was very lonely in his separation from his friend and benefactor, Debendra. This sadness and loneliness threw him back on God. In prayer and fervent adoration he found new strength. He drew the missionaries and many others into his devotions, and with them held long daily services in his house. Here the heart of the new Samāj was formed; here the members were united by common prayer and consecration into a working body. Keshab himself passed into an experience of religious feeling such as he had never had before—not even at his conversion. He had always prayed, but prayer now became to him one of his chief joys and necessities. In this new experience Keshab freely drew from the Vaisnavism which was traditional in his family, and also from Christianity. The old Hindu word *bhakti*, which includes both love to God and faith in Him, became one of the watchwords of the movement. Vaiṣnava modes of worship were also introduced, musical instruments, originally used in Chaitanya's propaganda, being employed to accompany the singing of hymns. The Vaiṣnava *nagarkirtan* (i.e. 'town-praise'), or procession through the streets with flags flying and drums beating, with chorus-singing and dancing, was taken over and used with success. In the midst of this tempest of devotion, Keshab drew up a *Liturgy* for the services of the Samāj, which is still very widely used. Another most useful feature, first elaborated at this time, is the holding of annual festivals, when the whole day is spent in fervid prayer and worship. The *Brahmotsava* ('Feast of Brahman'), the day of rejoicing in the Lord, was first held on 2nd Nov. 1867. So the anniversary of the opening of Ram Mohan's building, which is regularly celebrated by all Brāhmas, became the *Māghotsava* (festival of the month *Māgha*); and the opening of Keshab's building later led to the keeping of a third annual day in August, the *Bhādrōtsava* (festival of the month *Bhādra*). Nor did this satisfy Keshab's longing for fellowship with God: a little house was found about twelve miles from the city, where he and the missionaries were accustomed to retire periodically to spend the time in reading, prayer, and meditation, under rigorous rules of self-denial.

In 1867, Keshab delivered a lecture in Calcutta on 'Great Men.' It seems to have been meant partly to correct the misapprehensions created by his lecture on 'Jesus Christ: Europe and Asia,' partly to give expression to his latest convictions on the subjects of Inspiration and Revelation. His utterances on this occasion again caused a great deal of questioning and excitement. Debendra recognized two sources of knowledge of God—Nature and Intuition; Keshab added a third—God in history, speaking through great men. It was surmised that he regarded himself as one of the great men he had spoken of, one sent by God on a special mission, and therefore to be followed, honoured, and obeyed. Early in 1868 he left Calcutta on a wide tour, accompanied by a number of his young helpers. The first place visited was Monghyr. His eloquence, his fervid piety, and his new Vaisnava methods took the place by storm, and there was a great outburst of religious emotion. Here some of his followers began, in accordance with the supposed ideas of his lecture on 'Great Men,' to prostrate themselves before him and treat him with special honour. Others protested vigorously against this '*guru*-worship'; and a serious division began to show itself in Keshab's Samāj. The leader said he did not wish for these demonstrations; yet he did not rebuke those who practised them. As a result two of the missionaries left him. From Monghyr he passed on to Simla, where Lord Lawrence, drawn to him by his lecture on Jesus Christ, received him with great kindness, and discussed with him the details of a law which he proposed to pass with regard to Brāhma marriages. On the 22nd of August 1869, Keshab's building, styled the *Mandir* (Temple), in Machua Bazaar Street, was opened for public worship with great rejoicings. Several noteworthy men, destined to be leaders, joined the Samāj at this time.

Shortly after the opening of the Mandir, suddenly, without any warning, Keshab announced that he intended to proceed to England. His friends were considerably astonished at his proposal, for, as there was no organization, the whole work of the Samāj depended on him personally, and no one knew how things would get on without him. Keshab arranged in general how the work was to be distributed, the duty of editing the *Indian Mirror* being laid upon Pratap. The visit to England won him many new friends, and greatly extended both his experience and his influence.

He was received with the utmost cordiality, and addressed large audiences all over the country. The Queen gave him an audience. What impressed him most of all that he saw in Britain was the Christian home.

On his return to Calcutta in Nov. 1870, Keshab set himself to advance social reform in several directions. A new society was started, 'The Indian Reform Association,' and five departments of effort were resolved on: Cheap Literature, Charity, Female Improvement, Education, Temperance. Work along several of these lines was started under the Samāj, especially a Normal School for girls, the Victoria Institution for women, an Industrial School for boys, and the *Bhārat Āśram* (Indian Refuge), a sort of club-home, in which family life was cultivated, and women and children educated. A Bengali paper, the *Sulabh Samāchār* ('Cheap News'), was published weekly at one farthing, and did a great deal to stimulate native journalism. In connexion with all this social activity, we must note the passing of the Brāhma Marriage Act in 1872, largely as a result of Keshab's advice and agitation.

Pratap Chandra Mozoomdar had meanwhile been steadily growing in experience and strength. In 1873 he published his most noteworthy book, *The Oriental Christ*, which shows great spiritual insight, and also demonstrates how completely the author's own religious life depended on Christ. The following year he paid his first visit to England, and was very well received.

In 1873, Keshab further defined his position with regard to Revelation and his own place in the Samāj by a public lecture on Inspiration. Inspiration, he declared, is the other side of prayer. Man asks; God gives. Inspiration is not God speaking by fits and starts, but a perpetual breathing of His spirit.

He felt very distinctly that opposition was developing against him within the Samāj. There were three main causes: his autocracy, his doctrine of *adesh* (*ādeśa*), and his attitude towards the emancipation of women. He ruled the whole Samāj as sole authority, and many believed that his lecture on 'Great Men' was meant to suggest that he had a right to demand obedience; the party opposed to him was democratic, and wished to establish a constitutional government in the Samaj. By *adesh* Keshab meant the direct command of God laid upon him by special revelation at certain definite moments in his career. To his opponents these special revelations were both blasphemous and dangerous. They were also eager to give their women more liberty, and to allow them to participate in university education; while Keshab was opposed to both ideas. He feared that such freedom as is enjoyed in Europe would be most dangerous in India, and desired to secure for young girls a very quiet training, to fit them for the life of the home, rather than the same education as their brothers were receiving

Keshab was only too conscious of all that was going on, and in consequence fell once more, in 1875, into his old melancholy. Once again, however, he fought his way to light through prayer and consecration. He called his followers around him, and, declaring that the Samāj was becoming immersed in the world, called for *vairāgya*. This is an old Vaiṣṇava word meaning 'separation,' separation from the world. He called for new asceticism, for fresh vows of poverty, and himself led the way. The daily services in his house now became longer than ever, and a settled habit in Keshab's life. His followers responded to his leadership as loyally as ever, ready to do all that he was ready to lead them into. A little later he arranged them in four groups, calling them devotees of *yōga*, *bhakti*, *jñāna*, *seva*, according as their chief method of devotion was mystic union with God, love, knowledge, or service. The first three are genuine Hindu ideas; the last he took from Christianity.

But the self-consecration of the central party failed to draw the opposition back to allegiance; and soon an act of Keshab not only convinced them that all their surmises were justified, but led to an open schism. The young Mahārājā of Kuch Bihār, a Native State in North Bengal, had been carefully trained as a minor under English officials. These men were most anxious that he should marry a girl who would be a help and not a hindrance to him; and the proposal was made that he should marry Keshab's daughter. The Mahārājā and the girl were both under age, and the Mahārājā and his family were Hindus. Now Keshab had been fighting against child-marriage and heathen-marriage, and had even seen his convictions worked into the Brāhma Marriage Act of 1872. Consequently, as soon as the proposal was made public, Brāhma opinion made itself very distinctly heard against it. But Keshab believed that God had told him to go on with the wedding; and having, as he believed, received satisfactory guarantees that the wedding would really be only a betrothal, so that the parties would not live together until they came of age, and that the marriage ceremonial would contain nothing idolatrous, he gave his consent. But whether through misunderstanding or through deceit, what Keshab expected was not carried out. He allowed himself to be hustled in the matter, and idolatrous ceremonies were introduced in defiance of his wishes. Keshab returned to Calcutta covered with shame. There could be only one result. He had flouted public opinion and had dishonoured his own principles. The opposition now became insistent that he should be deposed from his position in the Samāj. A meeting was held, but no business could be transacted. Attempts were made to seize the Mandir, but failed. So the protesters, a large body of intelligent influential men, left the Samaj

The Ādi Samāj from 1865 to 1878.—There is very little to say with regard to the Ādi Samāj; for it was left with only a small group of supporters at the time of the secession, and the lost ground was never recovered. Just about the time when Keshab left, ladies were present for the first time at the Anniversary, and they have since attended the services. In 1872, Debendra gave up the active management of the Samāj, and betook himself to religious retirement, his son Dvijendra (*Devendranātha Thākur*) being appointed *ācharya* in his place; yet until the day of his death he kept in close touch with the work of the Samāj.

Statistics.—In 1878 there were already 124 *samājes* in existence, most of them connected with the Brahma Samāj of India. When the second schism took place, a majority of the provincial *samājes* sympathized with the protesters.

6. Fourth period, 1878-1884: three Samājes: Keshab's ritualistic theism.—Those who left Keshab in 1878 were, as we have seen, a numerous body of men, most of them men of character and influence. Nearly all the missionaries, a number of the other leaders, and a section of the rank and file remained with him; but a large part of the church went out. It was decided to establish a new Samāj. All the provincial *samājes* were consulted; and, with the approval of the majority, a meeting was held in the Town Hall, and the following resolution was passed:

'That this meeting deeply deplores the want of a constitutional organization in the Brāhma Samaj, and does hereby

establish a Samāj to be called the *Sādhāran Brāhma Samāj*, with a view to remove the serious and manifold evils resulting from this state of things, and to secure the representation of the views and the harmonious co-operation of the general Brāhma community, in all that affects the progress and well-being of the Theistic cause and Theistic work in India.'

An organization was sketched, consisting of four officers and a committee containing representatives of the provincial *samājes* as well as of the Calcutta society. Services were begun in temporary rooms, and arrangements were soon commenced for the erection of a building. The name *sādhāran* means 'general,' and is clearly meant to suggest the catholic and democratic nature of the new Samāj. An English and a Bengali magazine were started to represent the views of the society. Only those who were willing to sever themselves so definitely from idolatry as to give up caste and adopt Brāhma rites at their domestic ceremonies were counted as members of the Samāj.

One fact of great importance remains to be noted. The Samāj had many able men, but no single man of religious genius like Ram Mohan, Debendra, or Keshab. Pandit Siva Nath Sāstrī was their most prominent man, but he did not dwarf the others. While the Samāj may not have grown so rapidly as it would have done had it been under a great leader, this circumstance has made the evolution of a workable free government a much simpler problem. Four missionaries, Pandit Siva Nath Sāstrī being the leader, were set apart for the work of the Samāj; and a large number of educational and religious activities were commenced. A great deal of attention was given to female education. On 22nd Jan. 1881 the new Mandir in Cornwallis Street was opened.

The creed of the Sādhāran Samāj is the same as the creed of the original Samāj (given above under 4), with the addition of the three following articles:

(7) God is the Father of men, and all men are brothers.
(8) The soul is immortal and its progress eternal.
(9) God rewards virtue and punishes sin. His punishments are remedial and not eternal.

Keshab's Samāj.—During the first two years after the division there is not much to note in the history of Keshab's church except his lectures. He first of all discussed publicly the question, 'Am I an inspired prophet?' and gave a negative answer, but declared himself in the same breath to be 'a singular man,' with special relations with heaven. 'The Lord said I was to have no doctrine, no creed, but a perennial and perpetual inspiration from heaven.' In another lecture he dealt again with Christ, definitely saying, 'There is such a thing as divinity in Christ,' but explaining his words by the doctrine of Divine humanity. The most important pronouncement, however, of this time was a proclamation, issued as a direct message from India's Mother. He thus announced for the first time his adhesion to the doctrine of the Motherhood of God. It was that most eccentric yet most interesting ascetic, Ram Krishna Paramhansa, who brought Keshab to believe the doctrine.

But if these first two years were quiet and uneventful, 1881 opened in a different way. At the Anniversary in January, Keshab appeared, with twelve of his missionaries around him, under a new red banner, on which were inscribed the words, *Naba Bidhan* (*Nava Vidhāna*, 'New Dispensation'). On a table lay the four great Scriptures of the world: the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Christian, and the Muhammadan. He proclaimed the Brāhma Samāj to be God's latest dispensation, His new gospel sent to complete and to harmonize all existing religions, and himself and the twelve around him to be the God-appointed apostles of the movement. Henceforth Keshab's Samāj was known as the Church of the New Dispensation.

At a later meeting the Twelve were solemnly ordained for their duties. They were now Keshab's twelve apostles; and they met regularly under his presidency as the Apostolic Durbar. Strict vows were laid upon them. Four of the apostles were selected, to each of whom was entrusted the study of the Scriptures of one of the four great religions. Orders were also arranged for women and girls, for men and for boys. Each Order was a consecrated Brotherhood or Sisterhood, and was under strict vows.

But the most striking innovation was the introduction of a number of picturesque ceremonies from Hinduism and Christianity. The purpose was to adapt theism to the comprehension and imagination of the common people. Several well-known Hindu sacrifices were performed in the Mandir, and by means of mystic explanation were harmonized with Brāhma belief. Baptism and the Lord's Supper were introduced, and became integral parts of New Dispensation ritual, their symbolism being explained in accordance with Keshab's ideas. Fantastic pilgrimages to various prophets and leaders were imagined and acted, and belief in the possibility of communion with these saints of former days was encouraged. A sort of Calendar of the Saints was arranged, so that at fixed times all the faithful might concentrate their thoughts on the same individuals. Next year a Mystic Dance was introduced; and, a little later still, Keshab appeared before his people as a juggler, performing magical feats with tree-leaves, beads, stones, with the Cross, the Crescent, the Trident, and other symbols, illustrating the equally marvellous jugglery of New Dispensation theology. All this eclecticism and ritualistic show naturally widened and deepened the gulf between Keshab and the large party who had left his church.

In 1882 his doctrine underwent a further extension, or at least an unfolding. Christ had been declared 'divine' in his lecture on 'India asks, Who is Christ?' He now taught the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, declaring that the one God existed as the Father, the Son, and the Blessed Spirit.

'In this plane figure of three lines you have the solution of a vast problem. The Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost; the Creator, the Exemplar, the Sanctifier; I am, I love, I save; the Still God, the Journeying God, the Returning God; Force, Wisdom, Holiness; the True, the Good, the Beautiful; *Sat*, *Chit*, *Ānanda*; Truth, Intelligence, Joy.'

He similarly adapted Hindu polytheism to Brāhma belief, speaking of the analytic process by which the idolater selects an attribute or attributes of the Eternal for his particular use, and the synthetic process whereby the theist reaches the One God of the whole earth.

The great leader passed away on 8th Jan. 1884. He was a man of great natural gifts. He had imagination, intellect, eloquence; and he had in a very high degree the electric personality, the piercing speech, and the dramatic action which make the brilliant leader. But it was not these things that most impressed his followers. What conquered them was his devotional life, his religious fire, the depth and sincerity of his moral and religious nature. It was this that made them follow him through everything, despite all his faults. For Keshab, having won them by moral forces, led them by the passion and strength of his religious feeling, not by any intelligible movement of reason. He had enough insight and imagination to enable him to present a case with great force; but he was no quiet, convincing thinker, far less a system-builder. His teaching, especially during the last period, is a collection of powerful but disjointed ideas, a heap of sparkling stones instead of a building. He had singularly

little organizing power. In all the work he controlled, every activity depended upon his personal relationship to the worker. Hence, as soon as the personality was withdrawn, the whole combination fell in pieces. In spite of the simplicity and generosity of his nature, there was a strain of deep reserve, not to say concealment, in his character, which caused him trouble with those who loved him most: he did not realize the wisdom of sharing his mind with his colleagues. This trait partly explains the confidence with which he uttered some of his later declarations of belief, and the amazement with which they were received. They had probably been a long time in his mind before he gave utterance to them.

The late Registrar of Calcutta University, Mr. K. C. Banurji, always maintained that Keshab died a Christian, that in the last few months of his life his mind changed. Mr. Banurji was very intimate with Keshab, and he was not the man to speak without serious evidence; his confident affirmation must therefore not be abruptly dismissed as untrue. On the other hand, Keshab maintained such a consistent attitude to Christ throughout his life, and, despite his reserve, was so little likely to change on a point of such importance and not tell his friends, that it is difficult to believe that Mr. Banurji was not mistaken.

Pratap Chandra Mozoomdar was absent on his second tour in the West, visiting Europe and America, when Keshab died—a circumstance which complicated the situation in Calcutta seriously.

In order to complete the creed of the New Dispensation Church, three articles require to be added to the nine of the Sādhāran Samāj:

(10) God is a Trinity in Unity—Father, Son, and Spirit. God is Mother as well as Father.

(11) Brāhmaism is not a new religion, but the essence of all religions, the one universal faith; the Brāhma Samāj is God's latest Dispensation; and the missionaries are the God-appointed apostles of the new gospel.

(12) Knowledge of God comes through *Inspired Men* as well as through *Nature* and *Intuition*. He reveals His will on occasion to His servants by command, *Adesh*.

Statistics.—When Keshab passed away, the number of *samājes* all told was 173. There were said to be about 1500 covenanted members, and about 8000 adherents.

7. Fifth period, 1884-1909: progress of the Sādhāran Samāj.—During this period both the Ādi Samāj and the New Dispensation Church have declined. Indeed, the old Samāj is now almost a family affair. Keshab's apostles still hold bravely on, but they have a comparatively small following in Calcutta, and their relationships with *samājes* outside are not very definite. With Keshab's death the New Dispensation at once became a staid body with an unchanging theology, like the other two branches: the contrast between this period and Keshab's last quinquennium is very marked. When he passed away, the development of Brāhma doctrine ceased. Indeed, a blight seems to have fallen on all three Societies; for during the last quarter of a century no theological work of any importance has appeared, although hymn-writing still flourishes.

The Sādhāran Samāj.—This has gone forward, not changing much in matters of faith or of practice, but slowly growing in numbers and in influence. The absence of a great leader robs their annals of great events; and we need not linger over the various difficulties they have had to encounter in working out and maintaining a constitutional government. We shall therefore merely sketch the position of the Samāj of to-day.

The affairs of the Samāj are controlled by the General Committee, which consists of 63 members, representing Calcutta and the rest of India in about equal proportions. The officers are a president, a secretary, three assistant secretaries, and a treasurer. These, with 13 others, chosen by the General Committee, form the Executive. The general work of the Samāj throughout India as well as in Calcutta is conducted by the missionaries, with their two auxiliaries, the Sadhan Asram (*Sādhana Aśrama*) and the Sebak Mandali (*Sevaka Mandali*). Pandit Siva Nath Sāstrī, though now well advanced in years, is still [1909] their chief missionary. He represents the Hindu side of the Samāj. Beside him there stands a young man of considerable promise, Hem Chandra Sircar, who was trained in Manchester New College, Oxford, and represents the Christian element. There are nine other missionaries. Sita Nath Tattvabhushan, a well known Vedāntist, is their chief educationalist and philosopher. The *Brāhma Vidyālaya*, or Brāhma School, is a Theological Institution for training young missionaries. The Sadhan Asram, or 'Work Refuge,' is a hostel attached to the Mandir; but the phrase is now more frequently used of the group of students and other workers residing in the Asram who form a society for practical service. Their work ranks next in importance after that of the missionaries. Similar societies have been formed in a few places outside Calcutta. Several notable laymen render the Samāj large assistance in the Sebak Mandali, or 'Lay-workers' Union.' The Samāj possesses a press in which its publications are printed, the *Indian Messenger* and the *Tattva Kaumudi*, i.e. 'Moonlight of Truth,' being the two journals. There are 43 provincial *samājes* formally affiliated with the central organization, and as many more in fellowship, although not affiliated. There are 1044 initiated members in all; but large numbers of men and women are practically members, though they have not been initiated. The activities of the Calcutta congregation, besides the Sunday services, are the Sunday School; the Sangat Sabhā, which meets weekly and discusses religious questions; the Theological Society; the Students' Weekly Service, which, though not organically connected with the Samāj, is conducted in the Mandir every Saturday evening, and draws many students to theism; the Brāhma Girls' School; and the City College.

The New Dispensation Samāj.—After Keshab's death, those members of the Apostolic Durbar who were in Calcutta met and declared that Keshab was still their leader, and that no one could ever take his place in the Mandir. But other members of the missionary body who happened to be absent, notably Pratap Chandra Mozoomdar, seriously objected to this decision, and the mass of the members stood with them. Keshab's family, on the other hand, wished to treat the Mandir and Keshab's pulpit as a sort of family preserve. Pratap, who was by far the best known of the missionaries, and the only one at all fitted for being the leader of the Samāj, wished to be elected to take Keshab's place. But the Apostolic Durbar would not agree to do that or anything else. On the one side, then, stood the quarrelling missionaries; on the other, the members, begging them to be reconciled and to make arrangements for the work and the worship of the Samāj; and so affairs have continued ever since. The old personal quarrels which Keshab was unable to put down, and which were prevented from breaking up the Samāj only by his personal influence, came uppermost, and ruined everything. For a time the laity took the Mandir into their own care, and conducted the services, excluding the missionaries from control, because they would not agree. There have been many attempts at reorganization and as many failures. Once at least the police had to be called in. There has been no open schism, but there has been constant dis-

union; and to-day three competing services are conducted under the name of the New Dispensation every Sunday; and even so there are some members who refuse to attend any one of the three.

The active work of the Samāj was thus brought almost to a complete standstill, and growth became impossible. The New Dispensation counts for less and less in the life of India.

Pratap Chandra Mozoomdar, who was often spoken of as the leader of the Brāhma Samāj, never became the acknowledged leader even of the New Dispensation Church. His name and influence were far greater in England and America than they ever were in Calcutta and India. Failing to obtain Keshab's position, he went into semi-retirement, editing his paper, *The Interpreter*, and writing elsewhere occasionally, but seldom doing any missionary work for the Samāj except when he appeared to deliver the annual address in the Town Hall. His appearance at the Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 still further widened his reputation, and he was always a welcome speaker on Calcutta platforms, but he was scarcely a religious force in the city. He passed away in 1905. His funeral demonstrated in a very remarkable manner, to one observer at least, what a large number of fine intellectual men were still connected with the New Dispensation Church. Every one seemed fit to be a leader.

Since Keshab's death the fantastic elements of his later teaching and practice have not been obtruded on the public. The tendency is towards simplicity except on one point: the death of Keshab is celebrated annually as the day of the 'Ascension of the Master.'

To-day there are still a number of the old missionaries connected with the Samāj, notably Gaur Gabinda Ray, Mahendra Nath Bose, Pyari Mohan Chaudhury, but they do not pull together. Christ is one of several causes of division among them. Then there are a number of younger men who take a prominent place, especially Prof. Benoyendra Nath Sen, who is a very finished speaker, and Pramatha Lal Sen, who is an acceptable preacher, and does a good deal of work among young men.

Besides the Sunday services, the publishing work of the Samāj and the educational activities are still kept up. There is a hostel for students. The missionaries do a good deal of visiting, keeping the flame burning in families.

The Ādi Samāj.—The history of the original Samāj during the last quarter of a century is very little more than the doings of Debendra Nath Tagore and his phalanx of gifted sons. Yet there are a few societies outside Calcutta which retain their connexion with the Ādi Samāj. The theology of the Samāj has remained stationary since the schism of 1865. Debendra gave up his position after more than thirty years of service. For thirty-three years more he lived the life of a religious recluse; for he survived until 1905. He was almost exclusively under Hindu influence, his master being Rāmānuja. To him ancient India was the cradle of all that was pure in morals and religion. So powerful was Hindu thought in his life, that up to the very end he never definitely told his disciples that he had given up the doctrine of transmigration, as practically all Brāhmas have done. He was never known to quote the Bible, and in his printed sermons no reference to the teaching of Christ is to be found. The direct communion of the human soul with the Supreme Spirit was the most salient point in his teaching. His public life proved him to be a man not only of religious genius and intellectual capacity, but of a peculiarly noble and generous character. His long retirement added to the spell he had thrown over the minds of his fellow-townsmen. By common consent he was called the *Maharshi*, i.e. the great *rsi*, or saintly seer. The bleached complexion and massive architecture of his face still revealed, a few months before his death at the age of eighty-seven, the lofty spiritual nature and the sensitive heart which had done so much in the far-away years.

The provincial samājes.—These continue to grow slowly in number and influence. A few are still in closer sympathy with the Ādi Samāj than with the more progressive bodies; a number belong in doctrine and worship to the New Dispensation order, but a great and increasing majority have their closest connexion with the Sādhāran Samāj. These distinctions, however, count for far less in the country than they do in the metropolis; and a missionary is certain to receive a warm welcome almost anywhere, no matter to which of the branches he belongs. The Prārthanā *samājes* in Western India, though not organically connected with the Brāhma Samaj, are on terms of close friendship and fellowship.

These societies vary largely both in size and vitality. A number have a considerable membership, own their own building, and do a good deal of work. Their activities follow the lines laid down in the older bodies. They have their weekly religious service, usually on Sunday, and sometimes a prayer-meeting besides. Keshab's original *Sangat Sabhā* ('Friendly Society') was copied in the Sadhāran Samāj in Calcutta, and the example has been very generally followed elsewhere. It is a sort of Wesleyan class-meeting. The annual festivals are celebrated with enthusiasm. A library and some simple missionary work complete their religious activities. But they consider their work incomplete, if they do not advance education, especially for girls. Some form of philanthropic work is usually attempted also.

It will probably conduce to clearness if we represent the theological affinities of the three *samājes* graphically:



8. Characteristics of the movement.—(*a*) *Width of diffused influence, narrowness of effective range.*—The Brāhma Samāj, while claiming to be a world-wide movement, and actually making its voice heard in Europe and America, has not succeeded in extending its effective service beyond India, has made no deep impression outside the province of its birth, and even where it is strongest has touched only the educated class. There is a Brāhma Mission to hill tribes in Bengal, and a Prārthanā Samāj Mission to the depressed classes in Bombay, but nowhere has the movement taken a serious hold of the common people. It is a remarkable fact that in 1901, when the Samāj was already seventy-three years old, only 4050 inhabitants of India were returned as Brāhmas in the Census papers. This, in the case of a really indigenous movement, which has had three men of high religious genius amongst its leaders, is very noteworthy.

(*b*) *Influence on India.*—The Samāj has exercised a very great influence on religious opinion all over India. The work of the Samāj has also had a good deal of weight, especially in Bengal, in the matter of social reform. But the number of those who have been induced to become real theists by the Brāhma propaganda is certainly disappointingly small. The great success of the revival within Hinduism has operated powerfully to check the drift to Brāhmaism; for men are now inclined to believe that they can get as much spiritual religion in Hinduism as in Brāhmaism, and that social reform is almost as possible within as without the camp.

(*c*) *Debt to Christianity.*—Brāhmaism owes a large debt to Christianity. The primal impulse came largely from Christianity; Brahma methods are almost without exception Christian; Brahma criticism of Hindu social wrongs is simply Christian criticism; and large masses of Keshab's religious and moral teaching were taken direct from Christ, and still fertilize Brāhma thought and conduct in the Sādharan as well as in the New Dispensation Samāj.

But the Church in India also owes a considerable debt to Brāhmaism. The latter has done much to open the Hindu mind to serious monotheism; has helped to break down prejudice against Christ; like John the Baptist, has prepared the way for Christianity in more than one centre; and has drawn out of Hinduism into spiritual religion many an individual who has finally found peace in the Christian Church.

(*d*) *Relation to Hinduism and Christianity.*—The official doctrine of the Samāj puts Hinduism and Christianity in the general catalogue of particular religions as opposed to Brāhmaism, which is regarded as the absolute and universal religion. But in actual fact these two religions hold an altogether different position. They are the sources of Brāhmaism. A careful survey of the doctrines that have been professed in the Samāj will show that there is not one which has not been drawn either from Hinduism or from Christianity. The frequently repeated assertion that Brāhmaism is the essence of all religions is without any basis in fact. The Brāhma system is drawn from Hinduism and Christianity.

The next point to note is how these twin sources are related to each other in the product. The most cursory glance will convince any one that the Hindu and the Christian elements stand side by side, neither controlling the other. Indeed, the controlling principle throughout has not been revelation, whether Hindu or Christian, but rationalism;* and the elements taken from Hinduism and Christianity have been selected as being in harmony with the dominant rationalistic idea. The only complicating circumstance is this, that the rationalism has not remained constant, but has altered in the course of the history; under Ram Mohan taking its colour from Deism, under Debendra from Rāmānuja, under Keshab from Unitarianism in the earlier period, from Christianity in the later. Hence the clear distinctions between the *samājes* to-day.

The way in which all this came about is also clear. There were two points on which Ram Mohan and Keshab, the two creative leaders, were thoroughly convinced: (1) that Christ would yet be supreme in India;* (2) that the future religion of India would be Indian and loyal to Hinduism. On both these points, we may be certain, history will justify them. It was in the inference they drew that they went wrong. Believing that the future religion of India would be loyal both to Christ and to Hinduism, they imagined that they had only to bring the two together and the result would be the future religion of India. They both failed to see that essential Hinduism and essential Christianity can no more mingle than oil and water. Had they lived later, they would not have made the mistake; for they were men of open mind; and the science of religions would have revealed the truth to them.

Hinduism is ancient not only in age, but in character. It enshrines a very early conception of the universe—a conception which men's minds have now outgrown This is to the effect that time and matter and souls are as eternal as God; the world is a never-ending series of meaningless, self-repeating changes; matter is the seat of all evil, and nature does not reveal God; men in the world are spirits in prison, and their only hope is release from its toils.

Christianity, on the other hand, brings us a conception of the universe which modern men can believe, and which stimulates and invigorates man's life in every direction: God is the loving Father; men are His children; the world is God's good world, prepared for the disciplining of His children; progress, not repetition, is the inner secret of the world-process.

These two conceptions cannot be reconciled or brought to act in harmony; the one excludes the other. The history of the Samāj supplies a clear illustration of the truth. Ram Mohan and Debendra endeavoured to keep the Samāj within the limits of the old religion, but the outcome of the history has been to drive Brahmas to stand outside the caste system altogether and to avoid most scrupulously the touch of Hindu sacerdotalism and worship. In no other way can the health and strength of the community be secured. The Ādi Samāj has withered, because it has attempted to remain within the caste system—has attempted to graft Brāhmaism upon Hinduism. The Christian elements in the Brahma faith are hopelessly antagonistic to the Hindu system. So Brāhmas to-day are as completely outside Hinduism as Christians are.

Thus Ram Mohan and Keshab were wrong in thinking that a new, vigorous, modern religion could be created merely by placing a few of the leading ideas of Christianity alongside of a few of the leading ideas of Hinduism and allowing the two to come together on equal terms. In order to reach the end in view, two things are indispensably necessary: (1) The supremacy of Christ must be frankly and ungrudgingly accepted. Only

* This became explicit in 1850, when the authority of the Vedas was abandoned.

* Cf. Ram Mohan Ray's *Precepts of Jesus*; the last chapter of Miss Collet's *Life and Letters of Raja Ram Mohan Roy*; and Keshab's two lectures on 'Jesus Christ' Pratap's position was precisely the same; see *The Interpreter*, *passim*.

in this way can a system be secured which modern men can accept, and which will produce a healthy modern nation. Rationalism is sterile in India as elsewhere. (2) Christ must be set forth as coming not to destroy Hinduism, but to fulfil it; not as the enemy, but as the consummator of the religion. For, while the basal conceptions of the Hindu system are utterly opposed to Christianity, all the highest and holiest things in it—all that the modern thinking Hindu feels he cannot turn his back on, all that Ram Mohan, Debendra, and Keshab wished to conserve, everything that has vitality and growth in it—all this arose in reforming movements, eager spiritual struggles to transcend the traditional Hindu system. Within the pale of Hinduism these lofty spiritual aims have never had a chance to realize themselves. It is only in Christianity that a free open field for their development is found. Hinduism must die into Christianity, in order that the best that her philosophers, saints, and ascetics have longed and prayed for may live. Thus the truth with regard to the long controversy between Brāhmaism and Christianity is that the missionaries were right in insisting on the supremacy of Christ, and the Brāhmas were right in insisting that Hinduism should not be treated as a weed.

LITERATURE.—The best brief outline of Brāhma history is found in Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[3], London, 1887, pp. 475–528. There are four longer narratives: Leonard, *A History of the Brāhma Samāj*, Calcutta, 1879; Mozoomdar, *The Faith and Progress of the Brahmo Somaj*, Calcutta, 1882; F. Lillingston, *The Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj*, London, 1901; and Slater, *Keshab Chandra Sen and the Brāhma Samāj*, Madras, 1884 [the first two interesting but inaccurate, the last two reliable, and the last containing numerous extracts from the writings of Keshab Chandra Sen]. For further detail consult the following biographies: Collet, *The Life and Letters of Raja Ram Mohan Roy*, London, 1900; *The Autobiography of Maharsi Devendranath Tagore*, translated from the original Bengali, with an introduction by Satyendranath Tagore, Calcutta, 1909; Mozoomdar, *The Life and Teachings of Keshub Chunder Sen*, Calcutta, 1887; and *Heart-Beats by P. C. Mozoomdar with a Biographical Sketch* by S. J. Barrows, Boston, 1894; the monograph, Sastri, *The New Dispensation and the Sadharan Brahma Samaj*, Madras, 1881; the works of the leaders: *The English Works of Raja Ram Moham Ray*, edited by J. C. Ghose, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1885–87; *The Complete Works of Raja Ram Mohun Roy, Sanskrit and Bengali*, Calcutta, 1880; Keshab Chandra Sen, *Lectures in India*, 2 vols., London, 1901; *The Brahmo Somaj: Keshab Chandra Sen in England*, Calcutta, 1881; Mozoomdar, *The Oriental Christ*, Boston, 1883; the collections of texts, *Brāhmadharma*, Calcutta, 1850, and many editions later; *Ślokasaṅgraha*, Calcutta, 1866, and many editions later; the Year Books, the Annual Reports, and the Periodicals.

J. N. FARQUHAR.

BRAHŪIS.—See BALUCHISTĀN.

BRAIN AND MIND.—1. Historical.—That the brain of man is that part of his bodily organism which is in immediate connexion with his mind—whatever the intimate nature of that connexion may be—is to-day an accepted fact. That it has not always been so may be seen from the number of words in our own and in other languages which appear to connect mental and moral qualities with the heart, with the stomach, and even with the kidneys and bowels. In early Greek speculation, Alcmæon of Crotona (beginning of 5th cent. B.C.), a reputed pupil of Pythagoras, is referred to as holding that sense-impressions are combined together in the brain, which receives them through certain avenues (the nerves), and constructs out of them 'memory, opinion, and science'; and that the controlling centre (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) of the body resides in the brain (Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[2], i. 101 f.). Hippocrates also and Democritus were credited with a similar belief. It was partially adopted by Plato, who placed the reasoning portion of the soul in the head, passion in the heart, and desire in the lower part of the body (*Timæus*, 69–72). According to Aristotle, the soul, as the *entelechy* of the body, was correlated with its every part; while the brain was an inert mass, the function of which was to cool the blood for the heart (*de Part. An.* ii. 7).* Galen (2nd cent. A.D.) recognized the dominant part played by the brain as the centre of the nervous system, by which the 'vital spirits' were distributed over the body; but it was in the ventricles or spaces rather than in the substance of the brain that he placed the 'seat of the soul' (*de Usu Partium*, lib. 8). These or similar views prevailed until the beginning of the 17th cent., when the anatomy of the brain began to be more clearly understood through the work of Varolius and others. From this date the tendency was to subdivide the brain, and to ascribe to separate centres the different mental functions; the most comprehensive attempt of this kind being the phrenological system of Gall and Spurzheim (1810). Their system was deficient, however, both in psychological analysis and in scientific proof: they referred different moral and intellectual characters to different areas of the surface—and underlying parts—of the brain, and assumed that the skull with its 'bumps' followed closely the outline of the brain. Causality, Combativeness, Philoprogenitiveness, the Sense of Language, and Calculation are a few out of their thirty-eight promiscuously grouped 'faculties.' A reaction followed with Flourens, who taught (in his *Recherches expérimentales*†) that the whole brain is the organ of mind, that loss of or injury to any part of it weakens its general function, *i.e.* lessens the degree of mental activity, but does not remove any *special* function. It was not until 1861, when Broca published his paper *Sur le Siège de la Faculté du Langage articulé*, that the theory of special localization began to take a new and more adequate form. The researches of Hitzig, Munk, Meynert, Flechsig, and many others in Germany, and of Ferrier, Horsley, Schäfer, etc., in England (see Literature at end of this art.), have, since 1870, gone far to establish the doctrine on a sound basis, although its interpretation is still disputed.

2. General relationship.—The general correlation between brain and mind is established partly by comparative, partly by pathological, data. (*a*) In closely allied animal species, it is found that the relative weight of the brain or corresponding ganglia increases with the complexity of the life of the animal, with its adaptability to new surroundings—in short, with all that is summed up in the vague term 'intelligence.' A striking instance is the ant's brain (the *corpora pedunculata*), which in the worker ant is very large, in the queen ant much smaller, and in the male ant almost absent; while activity and 'intelligence' are proportionately distributed (Forel). The correlation is closer still if, instead of weight, the surface-area of the brain is taken. In higher animals the nerve-elements are massed in the grey matter, the *cortex*, of the brain; and by means of *fissures* and *sulci*—dippings and foldings of this outer 'bark' into the substance of the brain—the surface may be enormously extended without a proportional increase in volume or weight. In the main, also, if animals of different species, but of approximately the same size and of similar *habitat*, are compared, the brain increases in relative weight (or surface-area) as the rank of the animal in the scale of evolution is higher. Nearest (but *longo intervallo*) to man in this respect come the anthropoid apes.

In the development of the brain with *age* in the human individual a similar comparison is found to hold. As the mental capacities improve, the brain

* ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐγκέφαλος εὔκρατον ποιεῖ τὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ θερμότητα καὶ ζέσιν (Berlin ed. 652 a. 24).

† *Recherches expér. sur les propriétés et les fonctions du système nerveux*, 1824, [2]1842. Cf. his *Phrenology Examined*[2], 1845, tr. Meigs, 1846.

grows in volume until about the age of fifteen, when it reaches a certain maximum relative weight; after this *development* takes the place of *growth*, the brain-elements entering into more and more complex relation with each other, but without much increase in size or number. From the age of fifteen there is a gradual decline in relative weight. In general, also, a lower value has been found for the *average female* than for the *average male* brain, alike in weight, in surface-area, and in thickness of cortex. This is true even when allowance is made for the differences in relative size of body. Various interpretations of the fact may, however, be given. Lower races also show, on the average, lower standards of brain-weight. Individual men of markedly superior intellectual powers have in many cases been found to possess brains in which there was more than average development of the brain surface, the *sulci* being cut deeper, and having more numerous ramifications than in the normal man. The brains of Gauss and Helmholtz are well-known examples. On the average, 'eminent men' tend to have higher than the normal brain-weight; at the same time some great personalities have had skulls of relatively small brain-capacity for their race; and *vice versa*, it has been remarked, many persons of large skull capacity have been inmates of our poorhouses and prisons. The factors making for development, more especially the all-important one of *opportunity for exercise*, are, of course, co-determining elements with the initial growth-capacity itself. The actual development attained in adult life is a resultant of many diverse factors. It is to be noted especially that, apart from its correlation with mind, the brain has important functions that are purely physiological; it regulates the movements of the body and of its different members, and especially it regulates the nutrition, and other processes of metabolism, which take place in the particular organs of the body. Accordingly, such factors as body-weight, stature, mobility, rate of metabolism or vitality, and plasticity stand in intimate relation to the brain-capacity of the organism. Biologically considered, intelligence falls under 'plasticity'; it is a function by which the organism adapts itself readily to new surroundings or situations, and by which it carries over the experience of the past into the present, to the advantage of itself or of its species.

(*b*) The argument from the pathology of mind and of brain points in the same general direction, viz. to the conclusion that mental capacity on the one hand, mental vivacity on the other, are correlated with the development and with the functioning—healthy or the reverse—of the brain. No responsible physician now regards mental perturbations as anything but *symptoms*, that is, as consequences or effects, of which the immediate cause, whatever the primary or ultimate cause may be, is a defect or disease of *the brain*. The disease may be (1) *developmental*, the result of a defective start-off in life, owing to which the brain does not reach its full growth, or grows disproportionately, or is more sluggish in its working than the normal or average brain (as in imbecility), or is more unstable, and therefore unfit to cope with a great crisis in life such as the onset of puberty, for example, constitutes. The disease may be (2) *adventitious*, the result of any one of the innumerable strains and stresses to which the brain is liable from bodily disease, accidental injury, excessive use, the abuse of stimulants, etc.; or (3) *degenerative*, an accompaniment of *decay*—the wearing out of the brain or of part of the brain in old age, while the body as a whole remains relatively healthy. Again the diseases are recognized as falling into two broad divisions, according as they derive from organic, structural defects or changes of the brain, or from merely functional changes — changes depending on the nutritive or other chemical processes in the brain or in any part of it. But mental pathology has by no means advanced so far as to be able to foretell the changes that will be found at death in any given form of insanity: there may be no visible degeneracy at all, and, *per contra*, the brain of a person dying in perfect sanity, according to the judgment of his neighbours, may show marked signs of organic defect. Numerous cases are recorded in which very extensive degenerations of the brain, even to the whole of one of the hemispheres, have been found without any mental defect having been remarked during the subject's lifetime. While this is admitted, however, it only alters our interpretation of the correlation between mind and brain; it does not throw any doubt upon the existence of a correlation.

3. **Elements of the central nervous system.**—The morphological element in the cortex or grey outer layer of the brain is the *neurone*. It consists of (1) the cell-body, (2) the *dendrites* or short branching outgrowths, (3) the long axis-cylinder. There are numerous different forms of cell. Thus, as many as eight different layers may be distinguished in some parts of the cortex from without inwards, each marked by the presence of a characteristic form of cell. The largest are the pyramidal cells, which are most numerous in the motor-zone, and measure from 50 to 120 μ.* In the body of the cell is a nucleus, and often within this can be distinguished a nucleolus. The nucleus undergoes marked changes under exhaustion, as does also the form of the cell. From the cell branch out, usually in several directions, a number of protoplasmic fibres, giving off collaterals at right angles, and ending (as do the collaterals also) in basket- or bush-like masses of fine terminal fibrils: hence the name *dendrites*. One of the prolongations of the cell is, however, of a different nature. It is the axis-cylinder, or axone, issuing usually in a direction different from that of the dendrites. The axones form the white fibres of the brain and spinal cord; each is protected or isolated by a sheath of connective tissue, and a layer of myeline—a fatty substance—between the fibre and the sheath. It is this myeline that gives the white appearance to the nerve-fibres, and it has been shown that it is formed only with the actual functioning of the nerve-cell. Thus Flechsig has determined, through this fact, the successive dates at which in life the different 'brain-centres' become active. The axis-cylinder or axone is the true nerve-process, *i.e.* that by which the excitation is conveyed to the brain from a sense-organ, or to the muscle from a brain-centre, or between two such brain-centres themselves. Some of the fibres are of great length, running in some cases from the cortex down to the foot of the spinal cord. The dendrites, with their shorter processes and basket-work endings, may be regarded as the receptors, the means through which the excitation of one element is transmitted to another.† There is no continuity, according to the prevailing view, between the endings of one cell and those of another, the fibres in all cases ending freely, but usually in the close neighbourhood of, or perhaps in contact with, those of another cell or group of cells. On the other hand, it has been shown that the fibrils of the axone are continuous, passing *through* the nerve-cells to the various dendrites or branches.

The function of the cell-body seems to be mainly either (*a*) that of a nutritive centre, or (*b*) that of a store-house of energy. Distributed between and among the nerve-cells are cells of the *neuroglia*, or supporting tissue.‡ The axones, as has been said, become medullated fibres, passing either vertically downwards to the lower brain and spinal cord (projection-fibres), or horizontally along to the neighbouring centres, or across by way of the *corpus callosum*—the central commissure of the brain—to the other hemisphere. The nerve-fibres are either afferent (centripetal) or efferent (centrifugal), the former leading *to* the cortex from the lower brain or spinal cord, and being ultimately connected through other neurones with the sense-organs, the latter leading *from* the cortex to the lower brain and spinal cord, and finally, through connecting links, to the muscles, the glands, the viscera, or other organs of the body. Experiments show that the direction in which the current of excitation will flow is not dependent upon the *nerve-fibre* itself, but upon the *connexions* at either end. Thus an afferent fibre may be transformed into an efferent fibre. The law of the Specific Energy of Nerve-fibres (Johannes Muller) was interpreted as implying that a given nerve-fibre, no matter by what means or at what point in its course it was stimulated,

* μ=1/1000th millimetre.

† Energy is transmitted *to* the cells through the dendrites, and *from* the cells through the axis-cylinder (v. Gehuchten); Golgi regards the function of the dendrites as that of taking up food from the blood-vessels.

‡ Various other functions have been suggested for the neuroglia. Cajal regards the expansions and contractions of its cell as conditions of sleep and of waking respectively.

would give rise to its proper sensation, or would contract its given group of muscles, or cause secretion in its given gland, whatever its particular function might be, and that this specificity was inherent in the fibre itself. Later it was thought to depend upon the brain centre in which the fibre ended; but there can be little doubt that Wundt is right in his view that it is the peripheral organ, sensory or muscular, that determines in the first instance the character of the reaction, and that the peripheral organ in its turn has been gradually developed in adaptation to the physical stimuli acting upon the organism, which in their sum make up its environment. This is true at least of the *origin* of such paths. Thus, when an electric current sent through any part of the optic nerve gives rise to a sensation of light, this is because the excitation first runs backward to the eye, and there sets up in the retina the changes which are normal conditions of visual sensation.

The neurone, like all other living substance, is subject to conditions of growth and decay: its growth and development are determined by moderate use, its decay and degeneration by excessive use or by disuse. Stimulation causes first of all an increase in volume, and a change of internal structure; later the cell branches out in various directions, until a fairly active cell may have innumerable ramifications—prolongations, collaterals, and brush-like terminals: in this development may be found the physical basis of *practice*, of *memory*, of *mental growth* generally. The effect of drugs or poisons (with which *fatigue* must be classed) is to cause a diminution of volume, and withdrawal of the processes, followed, if prolonged, by other more radical changes. Activity seems to determine reflexly an increased flow of blood to the parts involved,—processes of waste and repair take place more rapidly; if there is excessive activity, however, the continued flow of blood may cause permanent injury of various kinds according to the tissue affected. On the other hand, impaired activity, as in fatigue, reflexly produces diminished flow of blood to the parts involved: the neurones contract in volume and withdraw their pseudopod-like expansions. This is probably the condition of which sleep is the expression. It is noticeable that unconsciousness appears to arise alike from excessive *loss* of blood from the brain (anæmia), and from excessive *flow* of blood to the brain (hyperæmia), the result of which is probably a check to the pulse of the blood (*stasis*). The immediate cause of many mental diseases also is said to be the morbid accumulation of blood in special parts of the brain (Luys, after Forbes Winslow).

4. The special centres: localization of functions.—The complexity of the grey matter of the brain, its numberless cells, the endless tracery of interlacing fibres being understood, the question arises: What is the precise relation of the neurone to mental function? Does the activity of the neurone determine consciousness, and have different neurones different parts to play in giving rise to different mental contents or ideas?

Since 1861, as has been said above, a mass of evidence has been collected which goes to show that not merely does the *general* health and capacity of the mind depend upon the integrity and healthy functioning of the brain, but that also *special* mental functions or capacities are dependent upon certain localized areas or regions of the upper brain. In particular, it has been shown that the capacities to receive and co-ordinate 'impressions' from the different sense-organs—the impressions which are the physical correlates of sensations and perceptions—are connected with definite brain 'centres,' as are also the powers of effecting or voluntarily carrying out movements of the different parts of the body. In the year mentioned, Broca published the paper whose title is given above (p. 824[b]); he claimed to have found that in cases of aphasia—a disease symptomatized, in its pure form, by loss of the power of articulate speech, without any defect in the general intelligence, or any paralysis of the vocal muscles—a small portion of the third frontal convolution of the *left* hemisphere is almost always affected. It was afterwards added that in *left-handed* persons, if aphasia occurs, the injury will be found in the corresponding part of the *right* hemisphere. Since then, many other forms of partial loss of mental powers have been studied both as to their symptoms during life, and as to the state of the brain at death. Again, evidence has been collected since 1870 (Hitzig) from various experiments upon animals. The methods have been (1) the extirpation of smaller or larger portions of the brain, with observation of the animal's behaviour after recovery; (2) the stimulation of the naked brain at different points, with observation of the movements made; and (3) the study of the degeneration of tracts running between the brain and the sense-organs or muscles, after a given portion of the brain has been excised. More recently, our knowledge of the connexion of the nervous elements in the different parts of the brain and spinal cord has been greatly extended by newer methods of section-making and of staining. As a result we obtain a scheme like the following:—

The centres for consciousness, intelligence, and will, as distinct from the centres for reflex and automatic movements and co-ordinations, are located in the cortex or outer grey mantle of the hemispheres; they are usually classified as (1) *sensory centres*, (2) *motor centres*, and (3) *association centres*.

(1) Of the *sensory* centres, that for Sight is placed in the occipital or hindmost *lobe*, more especially in the parts lying about the *calcarine fissure*; that for Hearing in the first and second convolutions of the *temporo-sphenoidal* lobe; that for Smell in some part or all of the so-called *limbic lobe*,* seen on the internal and inferior aspects of the hemisphere; that for Taste perhaps in the lower part of the *temporal lobe* (but on this there is no agreement among anatomists); that for Cutaneous Sensations—including under this title what is called common or general sensibility, organic sensibility, muscular sensibility, sensibility to touch, to temperature, to pain, etc.—is, as might be expected, the most extensive and least definable of all the centres: the tentative conclusion of Bianchi is that its centre is the wide area lying about (and below) the *Rolandic zone*, but that within this there are various centres of 'greater functional intensity'; these vary greatly, both in position and in development, in different individuals (*Text-Book of Psychiatry*, 57).

(2) The so-called *motor* centres, the stimulation of which gives rise to limited movements of different limbs according to the part stimulated, and injury or disease of which is in man connected with limited paralysis of different parts of the body, lie within the area described above as that of common sensibility; but there are also one or two smaller 'centres' in other parts of the cortex. The principal motor zone is that which lies close to the fissure of Rolando; according to most recent views (Sherrington, etc.), just *in front of* and *in* the fissure itself, but not passing behind it, *i.e.* in the ascending frontal convolution, and parts of the first, second, and third frontal convolutions; also, on the inner side of the hemisphere, parts of the marginal convolution, and of the *Gyrus fornicatus*. It is from these parts of the cortex that the great band of white pyramidal fibres issues, passing inwards and downwards between the grey masses of the mid brain (the *Optic Thalamus* and the *Lenticular Nucleus*) to the lower brain, where the greater part of those fibres which 'serve' the limbs of the body cross over ('decussation of the pyramidal fibres') to the side opposite to that from which they set out. Probably all the true motor or efferent fibres, except possibly those of the trunk of the body, cross over at some point in their course, whether through the various commissures or connecting bands between the hemispheres themselves, or in the *Pons* and *Medulla Oblongata* of the lower brain, or in the spinal cord. Thus injury to the motor zone of the right hemisphere is followed by total or partial paralysis of some of the muscle-groups on the left side of the body, and *vice versa*. The motor zone, like the band of pyramidal fibres passing through the internal capsule, has been subdivided into smaller centres. From the front of the brain backwards to the fissure of Rolando, lie

* *Gyrus fornicatus* and *G. hippocampi*.

the centres for movements of head, trunk, and leg, in that order; from the top, downwards towards the fissure of Sylvius, the centres for movements of trunk and leg, of shoulder, arm, hand, and face. In a cross-section of the internal capsule the efferent fibres lie in a similar order—those for the head in front; next, those for the arm; and, finally, those for thigh, knee, foot, and toes.

In what sense are these 'psychical' centres, *i.e.* points at which physical stimulation gives rise to mental impression, or at which mental activity initiates physical action? The first scientific view, held to some extent by Munk, was that the *individual* cell was the *seat* of the sensation or mental image; images were, so to speak, stored up in the cells, much as electric energy may be stored up in an accumulator, and were touched off by stimulation coming either from the periphery (sensation proper) or from other centres of the brain (the memory-image). The destruction of the cell wholly removed the power alike of sensation, of recognition, and of recall in memory; the cutting of the path from the sense-organ to the cell removed the power of sensation, but left the memory intact; and the disconnecting of the cell with other regions of the brain made the memory-recall (recall by association of ideas) impossible, although the power of sensation remained. Some cells were sensory, *i.e.* end-points at which nerve-process was transformed into conscious sensation; others were motor, *i.e.* starting-points at which conscious volition was transformed into nerve-process. This simple 'corpuscular' theory has no longer many supporters.

(i.) The distinction between sensory and motor centres is questioned. The motor centres were held to be those at which movement might be initiated voluntarily or spontaneously, their destruction involving the loss of such power, while the movements could still be reflexly excited, through the lower brain or spinal cord centres. To the idea of such special motor centres objections are urged, both from the physiological and from the psychological sides. It is now known that innumerable sensory fibres lead from the muscles and joints to the brain, and that the muscular sensations derived from these—sensations of the extent, duration, complexity, resistance, etc., of the movements carried out, or being carried out—play a very important part in the formation and development of our ideas of space, of objective reality, and even of our consciousness of personal identity. If from any cause we cease to feel a movement that is in course of completion, the co-ordination becomes imperfect, and indeed absolute paralysis may occur. Quick, emotional speakers frequently show this in a slight degree; both the 'thick' speech and the imperfect control of the limbs in drunkenness must be largely attributed to the same cause. *Locomotor ataxia* springs mainly from disease of the posterior columns of the spinal cord, *i.e.* the sensory nerve-columns; the patient can stand and walk correctly so long as his eyes are open, but collapses when he closes them; he has no longer any sensory consciousness of the position of his limbs, and therefore his movements are paralyzed. The paralysis that occurs in dreams, the failure of actual movement during them, is largely due to a similar cause; not being conscious of the position of our limbs, we have no basis for movement. Accordingly, the motor zone may be really a *sensory* zone, as Goltz, Schiff, Munk, and others hold; or a *senso-motor* zone, as Luys, Luciani, and Horsley maintain. The paralysis that appears after injury may spring not from inability to *innervate* the muscles, *i.e.* to originate and co-ordinate the various contractions or extensions required, but from inability to *feel* the muscles in play, or to form an image of their position—a necessary antecedent to their voluntary control. It may be said, then, that the whole of the cortex is sensory in its functions; there is no doubt that in development it is closely connected with the *posterior*, i.e. the *sensory*, portion of the spinal cord; the strictly motor centres for the co-ordination of movements would then lie in the cerebellum and lower brain.* On the other hand, neither psychology nor histology offers grounds for any fundamental division between sensory and motor processes. (*a*) Every sensation is at the same time a feeling and an effort, every idea is an emotion and a desire. Consciousness is invariably accompanied by changes occurring in the muscular system, in the glands or viscera, as well as in the external muscular system. Every change of consciousness reverberates through the body, and issues outwards in action, *i.e.* every idea is *ideo-motor*. (*b*) There is no break or change apparent in the structure or prolongation of the cells as we pass from a 'motor' to a 'sensory' zone: the large pyramidal cells may be more frequent in the former, but they are not absent in the latter; the fibres are alike throughout, and it is even possible, as Apathy and Bethe hold, that the fine fibrils which make up the fibres are continuous throughout their course in the whole central system. If so, there is no real centre anywhere—no seat either of the soul generally, or of any special faculty or function of it. There is no end-point at which *nerve-process* comes to a stop and *sensation* begins; no starting-point at which volition is transformed into motion. Consciousness must be a correlate not of the functioning of this or of that part of the brain, but of its functioning as a whole. The action of the brain is equivalent to that of a higher and more complex reflex-centre, like the centres of the spinal cord. It performs similar functions also, viz. (*a*) it isolates the excitations, rendering them both more rapid and more effective; (*b*) it co-ordinates movements with greater delicacy of adjustment to different sense-impressions; (*c*) it co-ordinates movements with more effective adjustment (*α*) to the condition of the organism as a whole (fatigue, hunger, satiety, etc.); and (*β*) to the results of the immediate or of the past experience of the individual and of the race. This is the view which, though in a less extreme and materialistic form, is becoming generally accepted. The 'centre,' on this theory, would merely be an important *junction*, not a *terminus*, in the cerebral system. Its injury disorganizes the system, and does so in a definite way for each centre, just as the break-up of the railway lines at Perth would cause a different kind of disturbance and affect different systems from the break-up of the lines at Carstairs.

(ii.) A second point of dispute is whether there are different 'centres' for *sensation* and for *imagery*, respectively, within the same field of experience. Certain facts of mental pathology, and results of experiments on animals, suggest that the sensory cell or group of cells is distinct from that which underlies the memory-image.† In the case of vision, for example, two forms of blindness arise from disease or injury to the visual zone: in the one the subject is completely blind (cortical blindness); in the other he is able to see, but fails to recognize the most familiar objects (psychic- or soul-blindness): thus a dog no longer recognizes its master, its food-dish, or its kennel, except by smell. The failure to recognize might arise from one of two causes, either (*a*) the connexion had been cut between the visual region and the regions correlated with other sensations and memories, hence the sense-impression could not

* Cf. Donaldson, p. 260.

† See Ward's 'Assimilation and Association,' *Mind* [N.S.], vols. ii. and iii.

arouse its associate ideas—in other words, it could not be understood; or (*b*) the memory-image cells of the given objects had been destroyed, and hence the earlier experiences were no longer capable of revival; or, finally, both might have occurred. In man, the failure to *recognize* scenes and persons formerly familiar (psychic blindness) has occasionally occurred, while the power to *recall* visual images and other memories was unaffected. Hence three *pure* forms of mental defect may occur in connexion with injury to the occipital lobe: (*α*) sensory or cortical blindness, (*β*) perceptual or psychic blindness, and (*γ*) visual amnesia, loss of memory for visual images (while the power of recognition remains intact). Corresponding defects are found in connexion with hearing also, and with touch and muscular impressions.* Finally, either of the two last forms may be *partial* or limited; the most important case of such limited blindness is that called verbal blindness—loss of the power to recognize, *i.e.* to read and understand, written or printed words in one's own language. The part of the brain usually affected in such cases is the *angular gyrus*, and the *supramarginal convolution*. This, accordingly, is described as the visual word-centre. There are four such centres, two 'sensory,' and two 'motor.' Of the former, the second is the auditory word-area (called Wernicke's area), in the first temporal convolution; with it is connected the recognition and understanding of heard speech, of spoken words. The two others are the *articulo-motor* area (Broca's centre, referred to above), at the foot of the third frontal convolution; and the *graphomotor* area in the second frontal convolution. Injury to these centres gives rise, in the one case, to loss of the power to utter speech, in the other, to loss of the power to write, in one who has already acquired it. All four centres are located on one side of the brain only—the left side (except, it is said, in left-handed people, with whom the speech-centres are on the right side of the brain). Pure or unmixed forms of any of the mental diseases referred to as aphasia rarely occur, but when they do they are sufficiently striking. Thus a patient may be able to speak, to write and to read, intelligently, and to hear sounds of all kinds, but cannot understand words spoken to him in his own language. This is pure acoustic (sensory) aphasia. It is obvious that persons, blind deaf-mutes, for example, who have learned to read by touch, and to speak with the fingers only, will have different centres from the normal ones, viz., a sensory centre for *tactual* word-images, and a 'digito-motor' centre for gesture and word-making. The language-centres, as is clear from their position, are merely extensions of the ordinary centres for (*a*) visual, auditory and tactual impressions; and (*b*) the kinæsthetic impressions of mouth and throat or hand movements.

It has been supposed, however, that the different *horizontal* layers of the cortex may have diverse functions corresponding to sensation, percept, and image. Both the psychological analysis and pathological evidence prove that the image is not simply a fainter copy of the sensation; it is not even a 'composite' picture derived from a number of successive sensations of the same kind. Thus, the idea that the image corresponds to a weaker excitation of the same nerve-cell or group of nerve-cells as that with which the sensory-impression was connected is no longer seriously held. There is, and can be, no memory of a pure sensation: memory is of a percept, and therefore of a sensation only so far as it forms part of a percept, that is, part of a complex total group or series of impressions. Again, the simplest perception involves elements belonging to more than one sense-region, taste *plus* odour sensations, visual *plus* muscular impressions, and the like; on the other hand, the same sensation enters into innumerable combinations with others, both of its own and of other kinds. A memory image differs from its corresponding percept not only in *content*, i.e. in containing fewer of the characters of the real objects than were perceived in the direct experience, but also in its *accompaniments*—in the absence of those factors which give 'reality' to the percept, the bodily sensations from the accommodating muscles of the sense-organs, and from the limbs, which have reflex tendencies to action in the presence of every 'real' experience. It is true that what is 'real' to me may not be real to my neighbours, in which case my supposed perception is in fact an imagination: it is for me, however, indistinguishable from a perception, and is acted upon as one, simply because it has all the marks of one.

Thus, the differences in brain structure and function which might be supposed to correspond to the differences of sensation, perception, and memory are the following:—(*α*) *Complexity*: the sensation is correlated with the smallest group of cortical elements, confined to a small more or less definitely localized area; the perception with a larger number, belonging to different areas; the memory-image with a still larger number. The connexions with motor centres in the lower brain are probably equally diverse, and have the same rising scale of complexity. (*β*) A result of these factors is the *functional* difference, that sensation, perception, memory correspond to cortical processes which are increasingly difficult to excite, which offer a *greater resistance*, therefore require an increasingly strong stimulus, unless where habituation has weakened their resistance-force; which are more unstable, more dependent upon the condition of the body, or of the brain, as a whole, therefore more uncertain; the reaction or response taking a longer time, being more complex and modifiable according to a wider range of conditions, as we pass from sensation to perception, and from perception to imagery. Being the most unstable, the physical basis of the memory-image is also the most likely to suffer, both from chemical deterioration of the blood supply to the brain (as in fatigue, illness, senile decay, etc.), and also from any physical shock to the cerebral system. So in an electrical system, the more numerous the 'connexions' the more likely is a derangement to occur, and the more serious is it when it does occur.

(3) Some writers have gone farther still in their localization, and have determined centres of *association* (Flechsig), of *attention*, of *intelligence*, or of *apperception* (Wundt). Certain regions of the cortex lying between the various sensory centres, and especially the greater part of the frontal lobes, have no special functions that are determinable either by stimulation or by excision in animals, or by the comparison in man of mental symptoms during life with *post-mortem* examination of the brain after death. If defect is obvious at all, it appears to be general: the animal is stupid, irresponsive, mentally sluggish; it lacks spontaneity, and liveliness in its actions. In man, the onset of dementia in old age, or after some severe shock, is frequently found to have been conjoined with extensive degeneration of the frontal lobes. Again, it is here in the main that the wide difference between the human and the lower animal brain is most marked, while Flechsig has shown that in a child's brain the connexions of the sensory areas

* Thus in Heubner's case the subject could repeat any word spoken to him, but could not understand its meaning. It was a mere blur of sound. His 'hearing centre' was found to have been isolated by a lesion, *i.e.* its connexion with other centres had been destroyed.

with the sense-organs and with the lower motor centres are complete a considerable time before the connexions between the frontal lobe cortex and other parts of the brain are perfectly formed. Microscopic examination also shows that these areas have innumerable connexions with the different sensory areas, as well as with the opposite hemisphere and with the lower centres; the former connexions are the so-called 'association fibres.'

The power of abstraction or generalizing, which is the basis of *intelligence*, consists in (*a*) the summarizing of similar experiences, (*b*) the combination of diverse experiences, (*c*) the bringing of these results to bear upon new experiences (adaptation). The main process by which this is achieved is the formation of a type-idea, a representative idea of some kind, of which the *name* is the concrete symbol or counter. Whether the name be a spoken, written, or printed word, or a mere gesture, is immaterial: its relation to the type-idea, and to the many experiences from which the type-idea has been derived, is the same. The name may not be essential to the type-idea, but it is necessary to its communication and to its development: it gives it the necessary fixity and stability. The simplest assumption, accordingly, for the physical basis of intelligence appears to be that of a hierarchy of cell-groups; group V (visual, in the occipital lobe) is connected with group A (auditory, in the temporal lobe) through an intermediate group I (in the intervening or some other area): the excitation of the whole system, V-I-A, gives a combination of the visual and auditory images. Thus, when I see a bell, the excitation of the cortical area V, on which the perception directly depends, passes on to I and A, and thus gives rise to the thought of the *sound* of the bell. There can be no doubt that the great difference between human and animal intelligence depends upon the greater readiness with which these 'associations' are formed, and the rapidity with which they can be called up. It may readily be granted that in the synthesis of diverse sensations and memories into ideas and thoughts, an increasing number of connexions are laid down between different groups of neurones; and central stations will come into existence between the different regions, uniting them with each other and with remoter parts. In this sense, and in this sense only, the frontal lobes may be regarded as the centre for intelligence; they form the largest or most extensive of these intermediary regions.

Diseases and defects of the frontal lobes are frequently accompanied by defective power of attention or concentration (cf. Ribot, *Psych. de l'Attention*), suggesting that this region is the 'centre of Attention.' It is said, however (Schäfer, *Text-Book of Physiology*), that only 20 per cent. in a large collection of cases of injuries, involving the frontal lobes alone, showed evidence of intellectual deficiency accompanying the physical defect. In Goltz's dogs, loss of intelligence was apparent whether the *front* or the *hind* parts of both hemispheres were removed. In the former case, however, the animal became savage and ill-tempered; in the latter, it became gentle and good-natured. What is lost, according to Flechsig (1896), by degeneration of the frontal lobes, is the idea of the self as capable of action—personal interest in outer or inner events, the power of volition, of directing the attention upon this or that. In other words, the frontal lobes, as Wundt implies in calling them the apperception-centres, represent central stations by which new connexions, connexions based on individual experience, are formed between the various particular centres, by which impressions are grouped and correlated, not according to their kind, but according to their bearing on the purposes and aims of the individual. An animal deprived of the frontal lobes can no longer make use of its acquired skill or experience; it falls back to the level of instinctive action and perceptual consciousness. A human being in whom the frontal lobes are undeveloped remains at the level of the infant in intelligence, although he may, should he live, show the instincts and passions of the man.

We may conclude: (i.) that so far as consciousness is concerned the brain areas are *primitively indifferent*. In the nature of things there is nothing to prevent cases occurring in which the so-called visual area is found to be in the service of the auditive consciousness; as a matter of fact, relatively wide variations do occur in the positions of the different centres.

(ii.) In the course of development, a centre is formed not as a *terminus a quo* or as a *terminus ad quem*, but as a connecting station, by which, *e.g.* afferent and efferent fibres may be brought into relation with each other, according to the needs of the organism.* The evolution of the brain as the great *locus* of these connecting points has brought it about that the principal stations are mainly within the same neighbourhood in different individuals. Organic selection also has determined that the right side of the body should be 'served' by the left side of the brain, perhaps because a right limb is more frequently and extensively exercised than a left limb, while the blood is more rapidly and effectively circulated through the left hemisphere (as Wundt suggests): the right *limb* requires more frequent renewal of its material, etc., which the left *brain* is more able to supply. Hence functions which are not bilaterally developed, such as those involved in speech, the appreciation and production of music, mathematical calculation, etc., are also relegated to the left side of the brain. (Language was primitively gesture, involving chiefly actions of the *right* hand.)

(iii.) The localization is not fixed, however, even for the individual. (*a*) Some peculiarity of training may lead to the adoption of the right hemisphere as the field with which the functions of speech, etc., are correlated, or may cause a dislocation of particular centres.† (*b*) After injury to a centre, and the loss of any particular mental ability, the loss may be made good by practice, by re-learning or the like, and thus a new centre becomes trained for the functions which the defective centre performed. This *compensation*, or *vicarious functioning*, may take place either through neighbouring areas or through the symmetrically opposite region in the other hemisphere taking over the function. (*c*) It must be added that in man this compensation is limited in range: if a sensation area is completely destroyed, no recovery of the corresponding sensibility takes place; but the patient may learn to use other sensations to replace those he has lost, as guides for action. Thus a person who has become blind in one half of the field of vision (hemianopsia) cannot after a short time be distinguished in his actions from a normal individual. In the case of higher functions, as thought and speech, the patient may re-build his knowledge upon new material: a 'visualist,' whose visual imagery has been taken from him, and who accordingly has lost the ability to read, may re-acquire it

* Cf. Foster, p. 1060, on the cortical motor area and pyramidal tract: 'We are driven to regard them rather as links, important links, it is true, but still links, in a complex chain.'

† Cf. Bateman, p. 350, on the variations in the 'centre' for language; Foster, p. 1065: 'The passage of nervous impulses . . . is not rigidly and unalterably fixed by the anatomical distribution of tracts of fibres.'

by using the sensations of movement as his materials, and correlating these with the optical impressions. (*d*) In comparing different animals in regard to the effect of excising portions of the brain, it is found that the lower the animal stands in development, the more complete is the recovery from loss of any particular brain-organ likely to be; in other words, the remaining parts more rapidly take up the functions of those removed, and in this case the lower brain-centres appear to act as vicarious organs as well as the neighbouring and symmetrically opposite centres. Even the apparently complete loss of the cerebral lobes from both hemispheres may not permanently destroy the sensibility or general capacity of the dog. Substitution and compensation are rarer in the monkey than in the dog, rarer and less complete in the dog than in the rabbit, in the rabbit than in the pigeon, etc.

(iv.) When new impressions are received, or new ideas formed, it may be supposed that some new portion of the cerebral cortex becomes functionally active: this probably occurs through its entering into contact with other cell-groups. The undeveloped portions of a child's or of an uncultured person's brain cannot, of course, be wholly *in*active, but they remain simple in structure and form; with use they put out prolongations, and enter into touch with others, while at the same time they become more highly differentiated within themselves; with deficient exercise of a developed cell, the opposite processes of contraction and degeneration set in. It may be added that exercise appears to increase the vitality of the brain, and hence the vitality of the body as a whole (Donaldson, chs. 16 and 17). Capacity for work or exercise depends in its turn on interest, and finally on the will of the subject. Hence the remarkable freshness and vigour of intellect which some men have shown even in extreme old age (Thomson, p. 274).

This leads to the final question, *Which is primary, the brain or the mind?* Does the brain with which he is born determine the character and capacity of each individual, or do his character and capacity, *plus* the environment in which he is set, mould and form the brain into an efficient instrument for themselves? There can be no doubt that, as in all such cases, *both* questions may be answered in the affirmative. A child born with an imperfect brain can never achieve a rational mind, and the man with the most perfect brain will *tend* to be foremost in his occupation (which may be that of a philanthropist or that of a 'sharp') and neighbourhood. But the greatest weight in individual life, and the *whole weight* in evolution, must be laid on the two factors of opportunity and use. That is to say, the mind itself and the environment determine between them the structure of their intermediary—the brain. Consciousness is correlated not with any limited section of the brain, but with the whole brain, indeed with the whole nervous system. We may go further and say that consciousness is a response to the functioning of the whole living organism; and that the mind, through the feelings and the will, is '*dynamic*' to the whole organism; in other words, that the action and reaction we have postulated between body and mind are between body *as a living whole* and mind as a *unity*, as an unextended system of qualitative determinations and tendencies. As de Sanctis has said, 'an idea cannot be the uniform and invariable product of a pyramidal cell (the *psychic* cell of Cajal): it exists only at the moment of its appearance, and for the appearance there is required the synergic concurrence of almost all the elementary activities of the brain, *i.e.* the functioning of manifold systems of all kinds of neurones' (*Fenomeni del Contrasto*, pp. 75, 76 note). Cf. Loeb, ch. 17: 'The cerebral hemispheres act as a whole and not as a mosaic of a number of independent parts.' The anatomical localization of fibres is not a 'psychic localization of functions.' This is especially true of the higher ideas, abstract and general ideas, ideas of relations, etc. The formation, the use and the adaptation of a general idea involve not a single group of cells in the frontal lobes or elsewhere; but systems in different parts of the cortex, some acting with greater intensity, some with less, and so in a gradually decreasing scale, all parts of the nervous organism being more or less affected. The localization of functions means that certain parts of the cortex have by their primitive connexions with sense-organs or muscles or both, and by their use in the life of the individual, become centres more readily excitable by particular forms of stimulation. The destruction of such a centre renders the corresponding process impossible until a new area has been educated, *i.e.* has been brought into connexion with the same sensory or muscular organs as the original area. In many cases this may no longer be possible. A large part of the brain may, however, be destroyed without any gap in the mental field, or any serious defect in the mental capacity being observable. A case is reported in which the whole of the right hemisphere was affected, the front portion being entirely void of grey matter, and the remainder degenerate; yet the only symptom manifesting itself was a paralysis of the left side; this had begun ten years before death (Bailey, 1889 [reported by Thomson, p. 63 f.]).

In general, the *degree* of consciousness appears to be correlated with the amount of resistance which is overcome. Learning new ways is always accompanied by intense consciousness, as shown by the concentrated attention it involves, while it also involves a large expenditure of energy, as shown by the readiness with which fatigue occurs. The more familiar the action becomes, the less the intensity of consciousness, until the latter may be wholly latent, as in many of the automatic actions the civilized man goes through in the course of a day. This does not mean that the nerve-process has been 'short-circuited,' that it takes place through lower, reflex centres, and therefore by shorter paths; it means rather that with the same path the resistance is less, and therefore the current flows more rapidly. On the other hand, whatever increases the resistance increases the intensity of consciousness involved in the action. Many poisons, whether of external or internal origin, have this effect. In some forms of insanity, the simplest actions—speaking, walking, or dressing—are accompanied by vivid and painful consciousness, and at the same time by such extreme physical exhaustion that the patient soon becomes quite unable to carry them out. In such cases a very strong stimulus may occasionally overcome the great resistance, and the normal reaction takes place. Thus an overwhelming emotion has been known to do so.

In verbal amnesia, a parallel instance is that known as Wolff's case (cf. Loeb, p. 281).* The patient in this case could not tell the names of objects or their qualities except when some actual sensation was given him: thus he could not say whether sugar was sweet unless he *tasted* it, or whether snow was white or black, unless he *saw* it. Mainly it was the visual sensation that was most effective; but in general the most vivid or most striking sensation was that which was required to arouse the idea or memory. An umbrella, for example, could be named only when it was seen *open*.

We may conclude, then, that the brain-connexions vary in the greater or less resistance they offer to excitation; that consciousness is a correlate of

* For another case see Bateman, p. 103.

high resistance; habituation, automatic action, of low resistance: and the higher the resistance, the stronger the impression that is required to 'touch off' the conscious process as a whole in any given case. In amnesia of all kinds, the most *complex* mental achievements or the most *recent* memories are the first to fail: thus a Bohemian peasant learnt German when he entered the army; after some time, at sword practice, his brain was accidentally pierced; his German failed him, but he retained the power of speech in his native tongue (Adamkiewicz; for other cases see Bateman p. 188). In such cases the brain-associations which are least firmly fixed (either because of their recentness or because of their complexity), *i.e.* those which offer greatest resistance to excitation, are those which first fail in their functions; and in recovery from the disease or injury the order is the reverse, the last memories to return being those of the events immediately preceding the illness, etc. These are only a few of the phenomena which make it certain that the relation between mind and brain is functional, not structural, except so far as structure follows and is determined by function; that the general function served by the upper brain is to correlate the results of past individual experience, as the lower brain correlates those of race-experience, with present and immediate needs and situations, *i.e.* retention and co-ordination; but that individual mental activity is the essential condition both of retention and of co-ordination; that, accordingly, the brain is mainly the instrument, the means, rather than the cause or condition, of mental development.

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BRANCHES AND TWIGS.—Branches and twigs are used in a variety of rites and ceremonies, and their use is generally conditioned by the sacred nature of the trees from which they are taken, though this is not always the case.

1. **Ritual.**—In the ritual of primitive peoples, other ceremonial articles being few in number, branches and twigs have a prominent place. Thus, among the Australian tribes, they are used in a great variety of rites. In the fire ceremony of the Warramunga tribe, huge torches are prepared, made of saplings 15 feet long, thickly encased in a mass of gum-tree twigs; while another part of the ceremony consists in the erection of a long pole to which gum-tree twigs are attached. The men of the tribe at this rite enter a *wurley* made of boughs, and sing there for hours. Bunches of similar twigs are also attached to different parts of the body (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 380 ff.). At mourning ceremonies, widows of the dead man mourn under the shelter of a bough *wurley* (*ib.* p. 521). In these tribes the dead are often left on a platform of boughs erected on a tree (*ib.* p. 517). Further, at the totem ceremonies of the Kingilli tribe, each performer wears on either thigh what is known as a *tjintilli*. This consists of a central stick, about a yard long, to which are attached a number of leafy green gum-twigs (*ib.* p. 198). A bamboo, to which is tied a leaf of the sago-palm, is used by some tribes in New Guinea to indicate tabued articles (Haddon, *Head-Hunters*, London, 1901, p. 270 f.). But at higher levels, branches and twigs are variously employed. Thus in Japan, at the festival of first-fruits, a place for the *inami-dono*, or rice fruit hall, is chosen by divination and marked out at the four corners by twigs of the sacred evergreen tree, hung with tree fibre. In the setting apart of a portion of rice field, two *sakaki* twigs are planted (Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, p. 269). In the Hindu village ritual-marriage of Śiva and Pārvatī, clay images of the divinities are attached to the ends of forked branches, the prongs of which are stuck into heaps of grass and flowers (*IA* xi., 1882, p. 297 ff.). The pious Hindu also uses for the ceremony of teeth-cleaning a twig or small stick, which is cut fresh every day (Monier Williams, *Rel. Thought and Life in India*, London, 1883, pt. i. p. 376). Again, Pliny says of the Celts that they used oak branches in nearly all their ceremonies (*HN* xvi. 44). At the Greek Olympic games the victors' crowns were made of branches of sacred olive, cut with a golden sickle by a boy whose parents were both alive (schol. on Pindar, *Olymp.* iii. 60). The Jews, during the feast of Tabernacles, connected with the ingathering of the fruits of the land, dwelt in booths made of branches of olive, pine, myrtle, willow, palm, and of 'thick trees' (Lv $23^{40ff.}$, Neh $8^{14ff.}$). It is probable that this custom arose out of the practices of an earlier cult of vegetation (see § 5).

2. **Lustration.**—In lustration, branches and twigs form a natural, and therefore a primitive, form of asperger for sprinkling water or blood over the worshippers, or over sacred objects. In such a ceremony their use is doubtless wider than can now be ascertained, as the method of sprinkling is not always clearly reported. At the native baptismal ceremony in Polynesia, the priest asperged the child with a green branch or twig dipped in water, to the accompaniment of archaic prayers (Tylor[3], ii. 430; BAPTISM [Ethnic], § 7). Lustration ceremonies among the Romans were frequently performed by means of branches of laurel or olive. Ovid speaks of the moistened laurel bough sending forth the sprinkled water at the *Palilia* (*Fasti*, iv. 721 ff.), and describes the rites at the fountain of Mercury, where traders sprinkled themselves and their goods with a dripping laurel branch dipped in its waters (*ib.* v. 663 ff.). Among the Semites, branches and other parts of sacred trees were used for lustrations (W. R. Smith, p. 178). Certain of the sprinklings in the rites of purification used by the Hebrews were performed by a bunch of hyssop. Thus, water was sprinkled with hyssop by a ceremonially clean person over the persons and things which had come in contact with a corpse (Nu 19^{18}). Hyssop and cedar wood, the latter probably in the form of a twig, were also used in the ritual of cleansing the leper or the leprous house (Lv 14); and, in the account of the origin of the Passover, a bunch of hyssop is ordered to be dipped in the blood of the lamb, and used to strike the lintel and doorposts (Ex 12^{22}; cf. also He 9^{19}, Ps 51^{7}). In Scandinavia the blood of sacrificed animals was collected in bowls and sprinkled over the altar, temple walls, and people by means of *blautteinar*, or sortilege twigs (Vigfusson and Powell, *Corpus Poet. Borcale*, Oxford, 1883, i. 403 f.; Simrock, *Handb. der deutschen Myth.*, Bonn, 1887, p. 509; de la Saussaye, *Rel. of*

the Teutons, Boston, 1902, p. 376). Sometimes sacred twigs were placed in water which was to be used ritually, as in the Lapp ceremony of baptism, in which sacred alder twigs were used in this way (Tylor[3], ii. 437; cf. BAPTISM [Ethnic], § 7 [5] and [8]). In other cases, a branch is used by itself as a means of purification. In the New Hebrides, it suffices to draw a branch down the body to remove the contagion or defilement (*JAI* xxiii. 12), or, as in Japan, at the new moon ceremonies a branch of *sakaki* is waved in token of the purification of sins (Aston, p. 292). Scourging or beating with branches, whose sacred or magical virtues are supposed to drive away evil influences, is not uncommon (see AUSTERITIES, § 5; de la Saussaye, p. 376; Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 98, 126–133, 217 ff.).

3. **Sacrifice.**—In sacrifice, branches and twigs are frequently used. In the more primitive forms of sacrifice by fire, the fire is naturally fed with branches. But occasionally branches and twigs of some sacred tree are thrown upon the fire or are burned for purposes of purification or to bring good luck. Instances are found in the burning of cedar and hyssop in the Hebrew sacrifice of the red heifer (Nu 19[6]), the Roman custom of throwing laurel on the sacrificial fire or on the hearth (Granger, *Worship of the Romans*, London, 1895, p. 305; Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 741), the Hindu feeding of the sacred hearth fire every morning with pieces of consecrated wood generally taken from the *Palāśa-tree* (Monier Williams, pt. i. p. 366), etc. Reference may also be made to the images, made of osiers, within which human victims were consumed by fire among the Gauls (Cæsar, *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 16). For probable late survivals of this custom, see Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 320 ff. Branches or twigs of sacred trees sometimes accompany offerings; thus, in Scandinavia, twigs were cut from special kinds of trees, and these, interwoven with flowers, were afterwards fastened to the tails of animals intended for sacrifice (de la Saussaye, p. 376). A Hindu instance is that of the balls of rice used in the funeral ceremonies, in which sprigs of the *Tulasī* plant are inserted (Williams, p. 302). Or, again, they are offered as sacrifice, as in the case of the Japanese *kedzurikake*, wands of elder or willow, whittled at the top into a mass of shavings, which are also symbols of deity and fetishes (Aston, p. 191 ff.). Among the Ainus similar wands of willow or lilac, called *inao*, are both sacrifices and fetishes (Batchelor, *The Ainu of Japan*, London, 1892, p. 87 ff., *The Ainu and their Folklore*, London, 1901, p. 92 ff.; see also AINUS, § 23 ff.).

4. **Divination.**—In certain processes of divination the use of branches and twigs occurs. Tacitus says of the ancient Germans that, in order to consult lots, they cut off the twig of a fruit-bearing tree and made it into little wands. Upon these they put distinguishing marks and scattered them at random upon a white garment (*Germania*, ch. 10). These twigs, whether or not the marks on them were runes, are probably connected with the Norse sortilege twigs, or consecrated chips used in divination, and the Frisian *tein*, or twigs, used for casting lots in judicial procedure (de la Saussaye, p. 394; Vigfusson and Powell, p. 411; Simrock, p. 531). For a similar Celtic instance see CELTS, § xiii. (4). Here, too, may be noted the widespread use of the divining rod, a forked twig, usually of hazel. The forks of the twig are held, one in each hand of the seeker, and the twig twists in his grasp when he arrives at the spot under which what he seeks is concealed (Barrett, 'The so-called Divining Rod,' in *Proc. Soc. Psych. Research*, 1897; Lang, *Making of Religion*, London, 1898, p. 164 ff.; Baring Gould, *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*, London, 1868, p. 55 ff.; see also DIVINATION).

5. **Vegetation-cults.**—Many folk survivals show the uses of branches and twigs in connexion with vegetation-cults. Under various names (Jack-in-the-Green, etc.) and at various times puppets are made of green stuff, twigs, and branches; or selected persons are clad in green boughs, leaves, and flowers, and undergo various ceremonies. These represent the old tree-spirit, or spirit of vegetation, though now no longer regarded in that light by the folk. At such times, also, especially after the ceremony of 'carrying out death,' boughs are cut and brought home to the village, and these have also some connexion with the spirit of vegetation. Many instances of these are collected by Frazer (*GB*[2] i. 214 ff., ii. 82 ff.), and by Grimm (*Teut. Myth.* pp. 769, 772, 775, 784 ff.). The power of the tree-spirit is communicated also to the fields by placing a branch in the furrow, or by carrying branches round the fields, and it is also conveyed to houses which are decked with branches at the times of the old pagan festivals, May-day and Midsummer, and, under Christian influences, at Christmas—probably a survival of the practice at the festival which began the winter season (Elworthy, *The Evil Eye*, London, 1895, p. 103; Brand, *Popular Antiquities*, London, 1870, i. 71, 121, 125, 173, 174, 246 f., 288 ff.; Grimm, pp. 778, 786; *GB*[2] iii. 276 f.; for decking houses at weddings and funerals, and for Palm Sunday customs, see Brand, i. 71, ii. 71 ff., 175). The connexion of the branch with the vegetation- or fertility-spirit is seen in an Irish instance when a bough set up on the house on May-day is supposed to produce plenty of milk during the summer (Brand, i. 131). Branches or twigs from trees regarded as sacred, the rowan, the elder, etc., were placed on houses, stables, sheepfolds, and barns as a protection against evil spirits, witches, and other evil influences. They were also placed in boats, or carried on the person as a talisman. These practices occur very widely in modern European folk custom (*GB*[2] iii. 132, 261, 265; Elworthy, p. 347; Brand, i. 151; MacCulloch, *The Misty Isle of Skye*, Edinburgh, 1905, p. 237). But that it is derived from ancient paganism is shown by similar practices among pagan peoples (Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 721 ff., vi. 151 ff.; de la Saussaye, p. 376 f. [Scandinavians]; Monier Williams, p. 296 [Hindus]; for the Parsi custom see BARSOM). The Midsummer and other bonfires, as well as the need fire, were fed by branches, twigs, and leaves of oak, especially in Celtic and Teutonic districts (Grimm, p. 605); in the case of need fires, nine sorts of wood were used in Sweden and elsewhere (Grimm, p. 607; *GB*[2] iii. 270, and *passim*). Through these fires cattle were driven, and burning brands or branches were carried through the fields or villages, and set up in the fields (*GB*[2] iii. 313; Brand, i. 215; Grimm, p. 621; de la Saussaye, p. 375 ff.). New fires were lit on the hearth with blazing brands from these fires or with branches lit at their flames (*GB*[2] iii. 245). Brands were also taken from the bonfires and kept in houses or in cattle-sheds, as preservatives against thunder and lightning, fire, and other evils, or were carried about for luck (*ib.* p. 254 ff.). In some cases walnut-branches are carried by the people in procession round the fire or passed over it, and then placed on the cattle-sheds, or the backs of cattle are singed with a hazel-twig lit at the fire, or birch boughs are thrown into the fire, in Russia, to cause the flax to grow to the height of the bough (*ib.* pp. 275, 284, 291). The fires are sun-charms, and the brands have the virtues of the fire and the sun, which they impart to field, house, or hearth, promoting growth of crops, warding off evils, bringing luck, etc.

Connected with the cult of sacred trees was the practice of hanging sacrificial offerings upon their

branches. This practice has occurred wherever tree-worship is found, or where worship took place in sacred groves (see art. TREES; and, for particular instances from South America, New Zealand, and among the Dayaks, cf. Tylor[3], ii. 223 f.; for the Semites, cf. W. R. Smith, p. 169; for the Scandinavians, cf. de la Saussaye, p. 356; and for the Celts, Jullian, *Recherches sur la Religion gauloise*, Bordeaux, 1903, p. 55). Among the Japanese, presents to a superior were delivered attached to the branch of a tree (Aston, p. 215).

In the ritual of healing at sacred wells, a rag which has been in contact with the patient, or part of his clothing, is hung on the branches of a sacred tree near the well, either as an offering or as a magical means of conveying the disease to the tree or of bringing the sufferer within the healing influence of the tree-spirit (see Tylor[3], ii. 150; Brand, iii. 10). Sacred wells are also decked with green boughs on certain occasions, *e.g.* Holy Thursday and the day of the saint to whom the well is dedicated (Brand, iii. 9).

Where sacred trees are venerated, either in actual cult or in late folk-survivals, it is considered sacrilegious to break even a twig from them. To do so will be followed by a punishment, misfortune, or ill-luck. The same is true of trees growing on graves (Tylor[3], ii. 115 [Malagasy]; W. R. Smith, p. 169 [Semites]; Elworthy, p. 99 [Livonians]; Brand, iii. 13 [Celts]; Mackenzie, *Ten Years North of the Orange River*, Edinburgh, 1871 [Bechuanas]).

Branches are also used in rain magic in a variety of ways, probably because the tree-spirit was originally believed to have influence over the weather. Thus, among the Congo people, mounds are covered with branches of trees and fetish-ornaments. Round these mounds a priest walks, muttering incantations (Reade, *Savage Africa*, London, 1863, p. 363). Pausanias mentions a temple on Mt. Lycæum, whose priest had power to produce rain by throwing an oak branch into a fountain (viii. 38). In Gaul, a naked virgin standing up to her knees in the river was asperged by her companions with branches dipped in the water, as a charm to produce rain (Grimm, p. 593).

The ceremonial cutting of the mistletoe from the oak by the druids, and its use in magico-medical rites, are described by Pliny (*HN* xvi. 44). Frazer connects this rite with the Scandinavian myth of Balder, slain by the mistletoe, and with the plucking of the bough from a tree in the sacred grove by the slayer and successor of the priest of Nemi. The mistletoe was regarded as the soul of the oak, and had to be plucked before the tree, in which dwelt the spirit of vegetation, could be destroyed, or the human representative of the same spirit could be slain (*GB*[2] iii. 446 ff.; FESTIVALS [Celtic]). Mistletoe is also ceremonially plucked in modern folk-custom in Scandinavia, and elsewhere in Europe (*ib.* p. 343). For the bough which had to be plucked by Æneas, before his descent to the under world, see Virgil, *Æneid*, vi. 203 ff.; and for the magic silver boughs of Celtic myth with their precious fruits, see BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Celtic).

See also BARSOM.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully throughout the article.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

BRAWLING.—The word 'brawling' is technically used in English Law for the offence of quarrelling or creating a disturbance in a place of worship, churchyard, or burial-ground. The word is derived from the French *brailler*, 'to be noisy,' which gives the main idea of the term, viz. the disturbing of people at their devotions.

1. **Legal.**—Brawling is a branch of sacrilege, though the latter term is now usually confined to the robbery of churches. The punishment for sacrilege in most countries up to the date of the French Revolution, and later, was death. In England, sacrilege involving the taking of goods from a church or chapel remained a capital offence till 1835, being abolished by statute 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 81. Brawling, however, had always been treated more leniently. The most vindictive of the English 'brawling' statutes requires merely that the offender shall be adjudged to have one of his ears cut off, or (what a comment on the customs of the period!), if he have no ears, to be marked and burned in the cheek with a hot iron having the letter F, whereby he may be known and taken for a fray-maker and fighter; in addition, of course, to the usual excommunication.

With reference to this law, it must be said that the Act was passed in 1552, a time of great religious disturbance, when the change of religion was taking place in England, and that there had been a good deal of open fighting with weapons, even in churches; so that strong measures were necessary. It must also be said that these barbarous penalties applied only to persons who actually smote with a weapon or drew a weapon with intent to smite. Those who merely 'smote' without weapons, or only 'chided,' received much lighter punishment.

This Act (5 & 6 Edw. VI. c. 4) remained on the statute-book till 1829, in company with many other statutes of our Draconian code. The principle, however, still exists that disturbances in sacred places deserve greater punishment than those occurring elsewhere; in fact, some acts of disturbance which are commendable if done in another place are criminal if performed in church; for example, arrests by virtue of legal process. This principle seems to be recognized in all countries, and in France during the Revolution protection was extended to religious services of all kinds.

In England, at present, brawling by a layman, which by the Act of 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 32) is defined as being riotous, violent, or indecent behaviour in a place of worship (as also molestation of a minister while celebrating any divine service in church), is no longer punishable by the ecclesiastical courts, but as a civil offence it is a misdemeanour under several statutes. The penalty under 52 Geo. III. c. 155 is £40; under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 32, £5. The statute 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100 § 36 enacts as follows:

'Whosoever shall, by threats or force, obstruct or prevent, or endeavour to obstruct or prevent, any clergyman or other minister in or from celebrating divine service or otherwise officiating in any church, chapel, meeting-house, or other place of divine worship, or in or from the performance of his duty in the lawful burial of the dead in any churchyard or other burial-place, or shall strike or offer any violence to, or shall, upon any civil process, or under the pretence of executing any civil process, arrest any clergyman or other minister who is engaged in, or to the knowledge of the offender is about to engage in, any of the rites or duties aforesaid, or who, to the knowledge of the offender, shall be going to perform the same or returning from the performance thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanour, and, being convicted thereof, is liable to two years' imprisonment with or without hard labour.'

The offender may also be fined and required to give sureties (*ib.* § 71).

Also, by the Burial Law Amendment Act, 1880, provision is made to prevent improper conduct at burials.

Under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 32, any constable or churchwarden of the parish has power to apprehend the offender and take him before a justice. There is an appeal to Quarter Sessions from a conviction under this Act.

A man may be convicted for brawling, although acting in the *bona fide* assertion of a claim of right, and that independently of the question whether the claim is a good one or not (*Asher* v. *Calcraft* [1887], 18 Q.B.D. 607).

It was held, by London Quarter Sessions, that under this Act the behaviour must be really riotous, violent, or indecent; mere protests in words are not sufficient.

In a case where in a Church of England church a crucifix was placed on the altar steps and the congregation crawled up, two by two, to kiss it, and a person present took up the crucifix and said (holding it above his head) in a loud voice: 'In the name of God I protest against this idolatry,' it was held that violent conduct or brawling was not proved (*Kensit* v. *Rose* [1898], 62 J.P. 489).

But, on the other hand, in a case which went to the Divisional Court, where, in answer to the invitation in the ordination service a statement was read in a perfectly orderly manner, this

was nevertheless held to be brawling (*Kensit* v. *St. Paul's Chapter* [1905], 2 K.B. 249).

A minister of religion can commit the offence of brawling as well as a layman (*Vallancey* v. *Fletcher* [1897], 1 Q.B. 265), and may, if a minister of the Church of England, be punished in the ecclesiastical instead of in the civil court (*Girt* v. *Fillingham* [1901], P. 176). This is obvious if he indulges in an open quarrel or wordy warfare in the sacred place; but he also commits the offence if he uses violent language, unsuitable to public worship, either in the course of his sermon or at any other part of the service, or 'improves the occasion' against individual members of the congregation in a violent or scolding manner.

Instances of this have come before the courts in the case of clergymen of the Church of England, who are strictly bound (during prayers), by the Acts of Uniformity, to the words prescribed for use. Thus in one case a clergyman interpolated, when reading the lesson, the following: 'I have been accused by some ill-natured neighbour of making alterations in the service; I have done so now and shall do so again, so mark.' In another case the clergyman paused in the service to deliver a long address in a chiding, quarrelsome, and brawling manner, in which passages like the following appeared: 'You were perhaps surprised at the pause I made at the end of the prayer [in the Litany], but it reminded me of my enemies.' 'Some one in the congregation has had the audacity to write to the archdeacon.' 'Who has had the audacity to do this?' 'Some one has committed perjury against me.' 'Another of my enemies has written a letter to the bishop full of falsehoods.' Such conduct is punishable.

The object of the laws of England is well put by Sir John Nicholl in the case of *Palmer* v. *Roffey*, 2 Addams 144. It is to protect the sanctity of those places and their appurtenances set apart for the worship of the Supreme Being and for the repose of the dead, in which nothing but religious awe and Christian goodwill between men should prevail, and to prevent them from being converted with impunity into scenes of human passion and malice, of disturbance and violence. The sacredness of the place being thus the object of this protecting law, it is no part of a legal inquiry, when more than one person is implicated in the transaction, which of the two persons so implicated is more to blame or which of them began the quarrel. Each who engages in it violates the law; each is bound to abstain from quarrelling, chiding, or brawling in the sacred place. Therefore, as Blackstone (*Commentaries*, iv. 145) says, 'mere quarrelsome words, which are neither an affray nor an offence in any other place, are penal here.'

Churchwardens, however, and also constables may, for the purpose of maintaining order during Divine service, eject disturbers; and churchwardens may take off a person's hat if, on being asked, he refuses to remove it; and, it has been said, may whip boys who play in church during or immediately before service. But such action might be attended with awkward consequences in these days (*Burton* v. *Henson* [1842], 10 M. & W. 108; *Worth* v. *Terrington* [1845], 13 M. & W. 781; the Church of England canons of 1604, Nos. 19, 85, and 111 may also be consulted). It has, however, been decided that a churchwarden has no right forcibly to prevent an inhabitant from entering the church for the purpose of attending service, on the ground that in his opinion there is no room (*Taylor* v. *Timson* [1888], 20 Q.B.D. 671).

2. **Ethical.**—From the ethical point of view there may be considerable difference of opinion on the question, Is brawling, that is, the disturbance of other people's worship, under any circumstances justifiable? The answer will depend largely on the view taken of the ethical standard of right and wrong. Those who think that the law of the particular country is the only standard, and must be obeyed, can easily answer this question. The laws of many civilized countries now protect all public worship from disturbance and all ministers of religion from molestation, and the answer in those countries would be—No.

Those who find the will of the Deity expressed in the Bible, and regard this as the ultimate standard, have a more difficult task. It is undoubted that many instances of 'brawling' are commended in Holy Writ. For example, there is the case of Moses, who at a 'feast to the Lord' (Ex. 32^5) took the golden calf which the Israelites had made, and burnt it in the fire, and ground it to powder and strewed it upon the water, and made the children of Israel to drink of it (v.^{20}). Further OT examples are numerous—the destruction of the high places and the altars of the priests of Baal at various times; and of the brazen serpent by king Hezekiah. It is true these cases raise points as to the rights of heads of States. But from the abstract point of view they involve questions of sacrilege and brawling.

To come to the NT, we may mention (with all reverence) the action of Jesus Christ, who went into the temple of God and cast out all them that sold and bought there, overthrowing the tables of the money-changers and of them that sold doves. These people were in the house of God by lawful authority; the doves were no doubt required for sacrifice. Our Lord's reason was founded on the law: 'It is written,' He said, 'my house shall be called the house of prayer; but ye have made it a den of thieves.' Such a plea would not be admitted in a modern court of justice. It is a clear case of 'brawling' according to modern ideas.

The third point of view is that of people who think that the law of their particular Church or sect is the ultimate test. The Church of Rome has undoubtedly taught, and its adherents have acted on the opinion, that it is proper not only to disturb devotions which are contrary to its tenets, but also to molest and even to put to death ministers of religion and others who teach doctrines inconsistent with theirs. Members of religious bodies of this type would undoubtedly hold that 'brawling' at the command of their religious superiors is not only justifiable, but virtuous. Their sense of duty is of that kind which would burn the body to save the soul.

Lastly, there is the point of view of those who think that the ethical standard is a certain fitness, suitability, or propriety in actions as determined by our understanding or reason (Bain, *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 430) or, in Kant's words, that people should act in such a way that their conduct might be a law to all beings. It is conceived that all those who hold this view would approve of the laws of England practically as they now stand; that is, that, although a person may be constrained by an overpowering sense of duty to put down false religion, illegality, and wrong, he must not take the law into his own hands, and act so as to disturb, annoy, or injure his fellow-men. *Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.*

LITERATURE.—Most of the law-books deal with brawling, but not completely: amongst others, B. Whitehead, *Church Law*[2], London 1899, and Lord Halsbury, Laws of England, 1909. Stephens' *Laws relating to the Clergy*, London, 1848 (*s.v.* 'Brawling and Smiting'), is the fullest, but its date precludes the new statutes and cases. Archbold, *Criminal Law*, 1905, gives statutes and cases to that date. The encyclopædias also have short articles, the best being Larousse, *Grand Dict. Univ.* Paris, 1875, *s.v.* 'Sacrilège.' The ethical view is almost always ignored.

BENJAMIN WHITEHEAD.

BRAZIL.—The area enclosed by the confines of the present Republic of Brazil contains four principal ethnological stocks—the Arawak, the Carib, the Tupi-Guarani, and the Tapuya. But many of the sub-sections of these races overlap into territory outside the boundaries of Brazil proper, so that the information in this article must be taken as referring to the religious con-

ceptions of those four families as a whole, and not to those of them who are strictly confined to the territories of the Republic.

The status of religious conception among the native tribes of Brazil is not very far advanced in the scale of belief. It consists mainly of a crude anthropomorphism. Indeed, it may be said that the distinction between the natural and supernatural has not yet been realized by them. Many of the agencies by which they believe the universe to be ordered are of a human or *quasi*-human character. They appear to be, for the most part, incapable of the abstract thought required to conceive of an eternal spirit, and their ideas of a Supreme Being are of the faintest. The general theogony of the Tupi, for example, though extremely hazy, appears to consist in the primal idea of a universal maternal agent. Fetish and animistic beliefs are also widely prevalent; and, as in nearly every religion of the lower cultus, the explicit (or comparatively explicit) belief is accompanied by an extraneous and confused body of semi-legendary superstition, such as a belief in demons and evil spirits of the forest, river, and mountain. These last vary in their characteristics according to locality, and in the course of generations several may have attained the distinction of godhead, if the name may be applied to entities few of whose attributes appear to be truly supernatural. It may be said that the religious conceptions of all four families mentioned above are on a similar level, and that certain beliefs are common to all.

1. **The Arawaks.** — The Arawak tribes are widely distributed over an area extending from the River Paraguay to the extreme north of the South American continent, and they have contributed largely to the formation of the existing stocks inhabiting the Antilles and Bahamas groups. It is generally admitted that they originated in the northern part of the continent; but their nomadic traits, and the ready manner in which they have intermingled with other stocks, have caused marked differentiation between the various tribes belonging to the family. At the present day most of them have ceased to be nomads, and are engaged mainly in hunting and fishing; certain of them, however, exist on an agricultural basis. Their principal divisions are: *Northern group*—Maypures, Atorais, Wapisianas, and other insignificant confederacies; *Southern and Western Groups*—Piris of the Uccayali River, Minanhas of the Jurua River, Canamaris of the Purus River, Manaos of the Rio Negro, Custenaús, Vaurás, Mehinakus, Yualapiti (all of the River Xingu territory), and Guanas, dwelling on the left bank of the Upper Paraguay.

(1) *Cosmogony.*—The Creation and Flood myths of the various Arawak tribes bear a close resemblance to those generally current throughout the South American continent; that is, they assume a twofold destruction of the world prior to its present condition. Thus the Arawaks of Guiana believe that Aimon Kondi scourged the world with fire, from which the survivors sought refuge in subterranean dwellings. Then a great flood followed, from which Marerewana and his followers saved themselves in a canoe. Such a Flood-myth is practically identical with that of the Quichés of Guatemala, as found in the *Popol Vuh*, the sacred book of that people, and in the mythologies of many other American races. That man originated in a subterranean world is a belief widely disseminated among the Arawaks. There death was unknown, but the ruler of mankind chanced to discover the upper world, and, returning, warned his people that, though sunlight was there, so was death. Many, despite the warning, sought the upper air; but multitudes are still believed to exist in bliss far below. Another Arawak version of the Creation asserts that the Great Spirit, having completed the heavens and earth, seated Himself on a huge silk-cotton tree by a river side, and cut off pieces of its bark, which He cast all around. Those which touched the water became fish, those which touched the air, birds; and those which alighted upon the earth became animals and men. The Arawaks of Guiana are almost wholly in a condition of totemism.

(2) *Theogony and ritual.*—The theogony of many of the Brazilian tribes clusters round the cult of the god Jurupari, which is best exemplified by that phase of it practised by the Uapes. This cult is invested with the utmost secrecy, but has been fully examined by Coudreau and Stradelli. The name Jurupari (*Juru-para-i*) signifies 'Issue from the mouth of a river,' and the myth of his birth states that he was born of a virgin who possessed no sexual parts. She, however, conceived through swallowing a draught of *cachiri*, or fermented liquor, but could not be relieved of her offspring until, when bathing, she was bitten severely by a fish called 'Tarire,' when Jurupari was born. He grew speedily to manhood, and one day invited the men of the tribe to partake of a great bowl of *cachiri*; but the women refused their assistance in its manufacture, and thus gained his ill-will. Their children likewise incurred his enmity through eating the fruit of the *uacu* tree, which was sacred to him; and for this offence he devoured them. Enraged at the loss of their children, the men of the tribe surrounded him, and cast him into a fire, from the cinders of which sprang the *paxiuba* palm, which the Uapes believe to be his bones. Whilst it was still night, the men cut down this tree, and fashioned it into sacred instruments, which it is ordained the women of the tribe must never see. Should a woman of the Uapes set eyes upon any of the sacred symbols of Jurupari, she is at once poisoned.

This exclusion of women from the secret rites of the worship of Jurupari seems to point to some remote totemic origin of which all but the mere remembrance has been lost. There would appear to have been an ancient apprehension among the Uapes that Jurupari, who was regarded by them as more of a demiurge than a god proper, might exercise upon the women of the tribe 'le droit d'un dieu.' Indeed, a myth exists which relates how one woman who had in her possession the sacred symbols was violated by Jurupari, and that the exclusion of the women from his worship dates from that event.

On the days upon which the worship of Jurupari is to be celebrated, the men proceed from the place of his adoration on a tour of the surrounding district, playing loudly upon pipes and flutes. Upon hearing the 'Jurupari music' the women shut themselves up in their houses, and do not emerge again until they are certain that all risk of their beholding the procession is over. The men then return to the headquarters of the priests, where the sacred symbols are exposed to view. These are the *macacaraua* and the *paxiuba*. The former is a black cloak without arms, descending to the middle of the body, and made of monkeys' hair interwoven with hair cut from the heads of virgins immediately after their arrival at puberty. The *paxiuba* is a portion of the palm-tree of that species, about the height of a man, and some ten centimetres in diameter. By a device consisting of holes bored in the part of the tree beneath the foliage, its leaves are made to tremble by the breath of the priest who evokes it.

The principal religious ceremony in the worship of Jurupari is the *Dabucuri*, or initiation of the young men. This occurs six times in the year, as follows: the *assaby* on Jan. 1; the *ucuqui* on Feb. 2; the *miritz* on March 3; the *patauá* on May 4; the *umari* on July 5; and the *uiga* on Nov. 6. Of all these indigenous fruits the Indians make intoxicating beverages. These are freely

partaken of in the accompanying revels, which are of the most riotous description. On the day of the festival those who have arrived at manhood are painted in black and red. They chant mournful melodies, whilst the *pagés*, or priests, join them in marriage to women of the tribe, who are then sent into the forest. Three men in barbaric costumes then carry in the *paxiuba*, and several Indians disguised as Jurupari dress in the *macacaraua* and symbolize the god's myth. The *paxiuba* horn is then sounded, and the women return. Mutual flagellations commence, and the proceedings degenerate into a saturnalia. Jurupari is invited, but replies through the mouth of the *pagés* that he dare not be present, as, if he were to have relations with a woman, he would 'be changed into a serpent.'

The demiurgic nature of Jurupari is indicated by his relative position to Tupan, a primitive deity common to many Brazilian tribes. The Tupan of the Indians of the period immediately subsequent to the discovery of Brazil was by no means a beneficent deity, but typified the thunder, or any agency terrible or majestic. The first missionaries in the southern part of Brazil identified Tupan with God the Father, and the Christian reminiscences which we discover in the Jurupari cult doubtless had their origin in the old missionary idea of Tupan. The *pagés* differ regarding the identity of Tupan. Some regard him as a species of All-father, whilst others construct a vague hierarchy from Jurupari the Terrible, the Tupan of the Indians ('the Good'), and the Tupan of the Whites ('the Mighty'). Jurupari is not at strife with Tupan, but rather supplementary to him; for whereas the former has a local and precise significance, that of Tupan is vague and general. Tupan, it is said, created Jurupari 'for evil.' When he visits the earth, Jurupari is always his guide. Jurupari dwells with Tupan in heaven; and if in life the men of the Uapes have honoured the cult of Jurupari, they go to dwell with him after death. If they have not done so, they perish on the long road from earth to heaven. The women who behold the sacred symbols go to Bichiu, a place inhabited by inferior spirits—a species of purgatory; but if they have not thus offended, they go to the heaven of Jurupari. Tribes akin to the Uapes believe that those women who see the symbols are changed at death into serpents or crocodiles. In the heaven of Jurupari the dead hunt, fish, drink *cachiri*, and make sacred symbols. Grief and ennui are unknown. Those men who are lost on the route finally arrive at a hell, a badly-defined, shadowy extension of earth, where they continue the terrestrial life.

The Arawaks have a wholesome dread of evil spirits and forest-giants, which they designate *canchemar*. They have also a Jurupari of the Forest, an evil and malignant being, who, however, appears to bear no relation to the demiurge of the same name.

(3) *Priesthood.*—Among the Uapes the sacerdotal caste of the *pagés*, or priests, is strongly organized in a hierarchy, and is subdivided into the *uarassu*, or adepts, the *assu*, or arch-priests, and the *mirim*, or neophytes, who are very numerous. The secret of their organization is little known and well guarded. It is, in fact, a species of freemasonry, and candidates are initiated into the several degrees by similar processes. The *pagés* are also doctors, but, above all, exorcists. They possess magical formulæ, which vary with each tribe. Certain *pagés* act as mediums to demons whom they profess to have in their service, and others undertake invocation of the dead. The thoroughness with which they carry out their purely religious duties is remarkable. Even the children are examined and interrogated by them in secret regarding the cult of Jurupari. In fact, the initiation of the layman into that cult lasts during the entire period of his life. Although the *pagés* resort to symbolism, they are not fetish-worshippers, and distinguish strongly between the symbol and the being it symbolizes. The *macácaraua* is not Jurupari, they say. It is his 'figure' (*rangaua*). The Guaycurús of Paraguay possess a similar religious order, whom they call *Yunageneto*, and who act principally as exorcists of the evil in man, which they designate *nanigo gigó*. They believe that the goat-sucker bird and the screaming vulture act as messengers from the dead to the priest, between whom and the deceased persons of the tribe there is frequent communication. They also practise exorcism by fumigation. The dualism which the *pagés* of the Puris profess was in all probability communicated to them by European missionaries (Spix and Martius).

2. The Caribs.—The Caribs, one of the first American races to come under the notice of the European discoverers, were until recently supposed to be confined to Venezuela, Guiana, and the Antilles; but von den Steinen met with tribes cognate to them in speech and physiological characteristics in the very heart of Brazil—the Bakairi and Nahuquas of the Upper Xingu, which he regarded as the Carib cradle-land. They were, *par excellence*, the maritime race of America, and in their great sea-canoes extended their piratical voyages to Cuba and Haiti, and permanently occupied some of the Lesser Antilles. On the mainland they were in possession of the shore west of the mouth of the Orinoco, nearly to the Cordilleras. From their name is derived that of 'cannibal,' owing to their custom of eating human flesh. Most of the present-day Caribs are nominally Christians.

(1) *Mythology.* — The Caribs of the Antilles regarded the earth, which they called Mama Nono, as 'the good mother from which all things come.' Their mythological ideas corresponded with their degree of civilization, which was extremely primitive. The first ancestor of the Caribs created his offspring by sowing the soil with stones, or with the fruit of the Mauritius palm, which sprouted forth into men and women. They believed that a multiplicity of souls inhabited one body, and that, wherever they might detect a pulsation, a soul was present. All these, however, were subordinate to one principal spirit enthroned in the heart, which alone would be transported to the skies at death (anon. *Voyage à la Louisiane fait en 1720*). The seat of the deceased was named by them *Hueyu Ku*, the Mansion of the Sun, where, as in the Mexican paradise, the barbaric idea of bliss was to be attained. With the Caribs of the mainland, some shadowy belief in resurrection seems to have obtained, as they were most punctilious in preserving the bones of their ancestors, which, after having cleaned, bleached, and painted them, they kept in a wicker basket full of spices suspended from the doors of their dwellings.

They possessed a culture-hero, Tamu (Grandfather), who was also known as 'Old Man of the Sky.' He appears to have been almost identical with the Nahuatlac Quetzalcoatl, the Quiché Gucumatz, and the Mayan Cuculcan, in that he was of light complexion, came from the east, and, after having instructed the Caribs in agriculture and the primitive arts, disappeared in the direction whence he came. Brinton believed him to be identical with the Zumé of the Guarani of Paraguay, and Ehrenreich with the Kamu of the Arawaks (a culture-hero), and the Kaboi of the Karayas. In the legend of the latter he dwelt

with their ancestors in the under world until a bird, the *Dicholophos cristatus*, by its call, led them to life and light in the upper world. With the Caribs the sun and moon shared sovereignty with the earth as the supreme beings of the Universe. It is almost certain that the god Hurakan (from whose name is derived our word 'hurricane'), who figures in the Quiché *Popol Vuh* as 'the Heart of Heaven,' the supreme god, was of Carib origin, although it is possible that he may have been borrowed by the Caribs from the indigenous tribes of the Antilles; but von den Steinen gives the Carib form as *ye'lo*, 'thunder,' whence Island-Carib *ioualloú*.

(2) *Priesthood.*—Although the Carib religion was of an extremely primitive type, it was well organized by a hereditary class of shamans called *piayes*, similar to the *pagés* of the Arawaks, to whom the Caribs were probably ethnologically related. This class exercised unlimited power, and, besides performing the very elaborate religious rites appertaining to their worship, were, as with the Arawaks, exorcists.

3. The Tupi-Guarani.—This stock, so called to show the ethnic affinity existing between the Tupi of Brazil and the Guarani of Paraguay, originally advanced in a northerly direction from the River Plate region, and drove the Tapuyas from the coast lands, which it thenceforth occupied as a maritime people. It is now represented by tribes occupying various belts of country in a territory so vast as that between the rivers Maroni in French Guiana, to the north, and the Plate, to the south. In Guiana the principal divisions are the Oyampi and the Émerillons, in Brazil proper the various tribes of the Central Plateau, and in Paraguay the Guarani. These various tribes were at one time addicted to cannibalism, but large numbers have become converted to Christianity, although many still retain their ancient beliefs. They speak a dialect of the ancient Tupi language, called the Lingoa Geral, which was standardized by the early Portuguese missionaries for their own uses, and gradually became the general tongue of the Amazonian tribes. Tupi branches are also found in Argentina and Uruguay.

(1) *Cosmogony.*—A certain magician, Irin Magé, is credited by the Eastern Tupi with the creation of seas and rivers, and at his intervention Monan, the Maker or Begetter, withdrew the *tata*, or Divine fire, with which he had resolved to destroy the world. An early account (Hans Staden, 1550) states their belief in a destruction of their ancestors by a powerful supernatural enemy called Mair, who sent upon them an inundation, from which only a few were saved, by climbing trees and hiding in caves—a variant of the *Popol Vuh* legend. The same authority gives the names of three brothers—Krimen, Hermittan, and Coem—from whom they claimed descent; and the Guarani speak of four brothers, and give two of their names as Tupi and Guarani, parents of the tribes called after them respectively. These four brothers are identical with similar quartettes in other American mythologies, and typify the cardinal points of the compass.

(2) *Theogony.*—The theogony of the Tupi is a simple nature-worship, although much confusion exists among authorities as to its constituents. The Vicomte d'Itabayana sees in Tupi belief the quality of dualism (a rare occurrence in American religions), and gives it as his opinion that Toru-shom-pek, the sun, stands for their principle of good, and Toru-guenket, the moon, for their evil principle. The latter is supposed to fall periodically and wreck the earth; and all baneful influences, such as thunders and floods, proceed from her. Magalhães (*O Selvagem*) is of opinion that Tupi theogony rests on the primal idea that all created things have a mother or maker, who is responsible for the general scheme of animate and inanimate matter. There are, further, three superior deities, to whom are apportioned the making of the various natural families. These are Guaracy, the sun, creator of all animals; Jacy, the moon, creator of plants; and Perudá or Rudá, the god of love, who promotes the reproduction of human beings. Each of these is assisted by inferior beings. Subordinate to the sun are Guirapuru, who has charge of the birds; Anhanga, who protects the field game; Caá-póra, who protects the forest game; Uayará, who guards the fishes. Under Jacy are Saci Ceréré (in South Brazil) Mhoitatá, the fire-snake, who protects the country from fire; Urutaú, the phantom-bird; and Curupira, the guardian of the forests. Subject to Rudá are Cairé, the full moon, and Catití, the new moon. Each of these, in turn, has as many inferior assistants as the Indians admit classes; and these are served by as many beings as the Indians admit species, and so on, until every lake and river and kind of animal or plant has its protective genius or 'mother.' Brinton describes this polytheism as 'simple animistic nature-worship.' Though this may be said to apply to the Tupi race in general, its standards undoubtedly vary with locality; and this fact accounts for the seemingly widely differing accounts of Tupi theogony furnished by its several investigators.

With the Guarani, the southern branch of the Tupi, belief and worship appear largely to cluster round the figure of the god Zumé, a culture-hero, probably identical with the Carib Tamu. He, like other American culture-heroes, 'came from the East'; but the Guarani, according to the myth, grew so tired of his sententious advice and constant patronage, that they tried to drive him away with arrows. These, however, he caught, and hurled back upon his tormentors, and, dividing the waters of a neighbouring river by his Divine power, he walked to the other bank dryshod, and disappeared from view. He indicated to the Guarani his intention of returning in order to gather them into towns, and rule them in peace. Zumé is, of course, like the Mexican Quetzalcoatl, the Man of the Sun, the civilizing agent. He has been identified with Cemi, an Antillean deity, and his worship is found under various guises throughout South America.

A less mild personage is Tupa or Tupan,* the god-in-chief of the Tupi proper of Brazil. The earliest notice of this god is that of the missionary Père d'Evreux, who directly compares him with God the Father. He alone of the four brothers survived the Flood, and became the highest divinity of the Tupi, ruler of the lightning and the storm, whose voice is the thunder. He is, indeed, the Tupan of the Uapes, who, although of Arawak stock, have been deeply influenced by Tupi and Carib beliefs. Anhanga, the protector of field game, is sometimes opposed to him as an evil principle; but it is vain to affect to discern dualism where the notion of divinity is so slight, and that of anthropomorphism so strong. In any case, it cannot be an ethical dualism, but merely the opportunist invention of the priestly caste (see remarks on American dualism in Brinton's *Myths of the New World* and Spence's *Popol Vuh*). There is not wanting evidence, however, that Tupa was also a 'culture-hero,' who latterly attained godhead. He is credited with teaching the Tupi the use of fire, the *pisang*, and the cane, as well as with instructing them in agriculture.

(3) *Inferior spirits.*—Many of the Amazonian

* The name is derived by Tatevin (*Anthropos* ii. 269 f.) from *tuba upayn*, 'Father of All.'

arouse its associate ideas—in other words, it could not be understood; or (*b*) the memory-image cells of the given objects had been destroyed, and hence the earlier experiences were no longer capable of revival; or, finally, both might have occurred. In man, the failure to *recognize* scenes and persons formerly familiar (psychic blindness) has occasionally occurred, while the power to *recall* visual images and other memories was unaffected. Hence three *pure* forms of mental defect may occur in connexion with injury to the occipital lobe: (*α*) sensory or cortical blindness, (*β*) perceptual or psychic blindness, and (*γ*) visual amnesia, loss of memory for visual images (while the power of recognition remains intact). Corresponding defects are found in connexion with hearing also, and with touch and muscular impressions.* Finally, either of the two last forms may be *partial* or limited; the most important case of such limited blindness is that called verbal blindness—loss of the power to recognize, *i.e.* to read and understand, written or printed words in one's own language. The part of the brain usually affected in such cases is the *angular gyrus*, and the *supramarginal convolution*. This, accordingly, is described as the visual word-centre. There are four such centres, two 'sensory,' and two 'motor.' Of the former, the second is the auditory word-area (called Wernicke's area), in the first temporal convolution; with it is connected the recognition and understanding of heard speech, of spoken words. The two others are the *articulo-motor* area (Broca's centre, referred to above), at the foot of the third frontal convolution; and the *graphomotor* area in the second frontal convolution. Injury to these centres gives rise, in the one case, to loss of the power to utter speech, in the other, to loss of the power to write, in one who has already acquired it. All four centres are located on one side of the brain only—the left side (except, it is said, in left-handed people, with whom the speech-centres are on the right side of the brain). Pure or unmixed forms of any of the mental diseases referred to as aphasia rarely occur, but when they do they are sufficiently striking. Thus a patient may be able to speak, to write and to read, intelligently, and to hear sounds of all kinds, but cannot understand words spoken to him in his own language. This is pure acoustic (sensory) aphasia. It is obvious that persons, blind deaf-mutes, for example, who have learned to read by touch, and to speak with the fingers only, will have different centres from the normal ones, viz., a sensory centre for *tactual* word-images, and a 'digito-motor' centre for gesture and word-making. The language-centres, as is clear from their position, are merely extensions of the ordinary centres for (*a*) visual, auditory and tactual impressions; and (*b*) the kinæsthetic impressions of mouth and throat or hand movements.

It has been supposed, however, that the different *horizontal* layers of the cortex may have diverse functions corresponding to sensation, percept, and image. Both the psychological analysis and pathological evidence prove that the image is not simply a fainter copy of the sensation; it is not even a 'composite' picture derived from a number of successive sensations of the same kind. Thus, the idea that the image corresponds to a weaker excitation of the same nerve-cell or group of nerve-cells as that with which the sensory-impression was connected is no longer seriously held. There is, and can be, no memory of a pure sensation: memory is of a percept, and therefore of a sensation only so far as it forms part of a percept, that is, part of a complex total group or series of impressions. Again, the simplest perception involves elements belonging to more than one sense-region, taste *plus* odour sensations, visual *plus* muscular impressions, and the like; on the other hand, the same sensation enters into innumerable combinations with others, both of its own and of other kinds. A memory image differs from its corresponding percept not only in *content*, i.e. in containing fewer of the characters of the real objects than were perceived in the direct experience, but also in its *accompaniments*—in the absence of those factors which give 'reality' to the percept, the bodily sensations from the accommodating muscles of the sense-organs, and from the limbs, which have reflex tendencies to action in the presence of every 'real' experience. It is true that what is 'real' to me may not be real to my neighbours, in which case my supposed perception is in fact an imagination: it is for me, however, indistinguishable from a perception, and is acted upon as one, simply because it has all the marks of one.

Thus, the differences in brain structure and function which might be supposed to correspond to the differences of sensation, perception, and memory are the following:—(*α*) *Complexity*: the sensation is correlated with the smallest group of cortical elements, confined to a small more or less definitely localized area; the perception with a larger number, belonging to different areas; the memory-image with a still larger number. The connexions with motor centres in the lower brain are probably equally diverse, and have the same rising scale of complexity. (*β*) A result of these factors is the *functional* difference, that sensation, perception, memory correspond to cortical processes which are increasingly difficult to excite, which offer a *greater resistance*, therefore require an increasingly strong stimulus, unless where habituation has weakened their resistance-force; which are more unstable, more dependent upon the condition of the body, or of the brain, as a whole, therefore more uncertain; the reaction or response taking a longer time, being more complex and modifiable according to a wider range of conditions, as we pass from sensation to perception, and from perception to imagery. Being the most unstable, the physical basis of the memory-image is also the most likely to suffer, both from chemical deterioration of the blood supply to the brain (as in fatigue, illness, senile decay, etc.), and also from any physical shock to the cerebral system. So in an electrical system, the more numerous the 'connexions' the more likely is a derangement to occur, and the more serious is it when it does occur.

(3) Some writers have gone farther still in their localization, and have determined centres of *association* (Flechsig), of *attention*, of *intelligence*, or of *apperception* (Wundt). Certain regions of the cortex lying between the various sensory centres, and especially the greater part of the frontal lobes, have no special functions that are determinable either by stimulation or by excision in animals, or by the comparison in man of mental symptoms during life with *post-mortem* examination of the brain after death. If defect is obvious at all, it appears to be general: the animal is stupid, irresponsive, mentally sluggish; it lacks spontaneity, and liveliness in its actions. In man, the onset of dementia in old age, or after some severe shock, is frequently found to have been conjoined with extensive degeneration of the frontal lobes. Again, it is here in the main that the wide difference between the human and the lower animal brain is most marked, while Flechsig has shown that in a child's brain the connexions of the sensory areas

* Thus in Heubner's case the subject could repeat any word spoken to him, but could not understand its meaning. It was a mere blur of sound. His 'hearing centre' was found to have been isolated by a lesion, *i.e.* its connexion with other centres had been destroyed.

with the sense-organs and with the lower motor centres are complete a considerable time before the connexions between the frontal lobe cortex and other parts of the brain are perfectly formed. Microscopic examination also shows that these areas have innumerable connexions with the different sensory areas, as well as with the opposite hemisphere and with the lower centres; the former connexions are the so-called 'association fibres.'

The power of abstraction or generalizing, which is the basis of *intelligence*, consists in (*a*) the summarizing of similar experiences, (*b*) the combination of diverse experiences, (*c*) the bringing of these results to bear upon new experiences (adaptation). The main process by which this is achieved is the formation of a type-idea, a representative idea of some kind, of which the *name* is the concrete symbol or counter. Whether the name be a spoken, written, or printed word, or a mere gesture, is immaterial: its relation to the type-idea, and to the many experiences from which the type-idea has been derived, is the same. The name may not be essential to the type-idea, but it is necessary to its communication and to its development: it gives it the necessary fixity and stability. The simplest assumption, accordingly, for the physical basis of intelligence appears to be that of a hierarchy of cell-groups; group V (visual, in the occipital lobe) is connected with group A (auditory, in the temporal lobe) through an intermediate group I (in the intervening or some other area): the excitation of the whole system, V-I-A, gives a combination of the visual and auditory images. Thus, when I see a bell, the excitation of the cortical area V, on which the perception directly depends, passes on to I and A, and thus gives rise to the thought of the *sound* of the bell. There can be no doubt that the great difference between human and animal intelligence depends upon the greater readiness with which these 'associations' are formed, and the rapidity with which they can be called up. It may readily be granted that in the synthesis of diverse sensations and memories into ideas and thoughts, an increasing number of connexions are laid down between different groups of neurones; and central stations will come into existence between the different regions, uniting them with each other and with remoter parts. In this sense, and in this sense only, the frontal lobes may be regarded as the centre for intelligence; they form the largest or most extensive of these intermediary regions.

Diseases and defects of the frontal lobes are frequently accompanied by defective power of attention or concentration (cf. Ribot, *Psych. de l'Attention*), suggesting that this region is the 'centre of Attention.' It is said, however (Schäfer, *Text-Book of Physiology*), that only 20 per cent. in a large collection of cases of injuries, involving the frontal lobes alone, showed evidence of intellectual deficiency accompanying the physical defect. In Goltz's dogs, loss of intelligence was apparent whether the *front* or the *hind* parts of both hemispheres were removed. In the former case, however, the animal became savage and ill-tempered; in the latter, it became gentle and good-natured. What is lost, according to Flechsig (1896), by degeneration of the frontal lobes, is the idea of the self as capable of action—personal interest in outer or inner events, the power of volition, of directing the attention upon this or that. In other words, the frontal lobes, as Wundt implies in calling them the apperception-centres, represent central stations by which new connexions, connexions based on individual experience, are formed between the various particular centres, by which impressions are grouped and correlated, not according to their kind, but according to their bearing on the purposes and aims of the individual. An animal deprived of the frontal lobes can no longer make use of its acquired skill or experience; it falls back to the level of instinctive action and perceptual consciousness. A human being in whom the frontal lobes are undeveloped remains at the level of the infant in intelligence, although he may, should he live, show the instincts and passions of the man.

We may conclude: (i.) that so far as consciousness is concerned the brain areas are *primitively indifferent*. In the nature of things there is nothing to prevent cases occurring in which the so-called visual area is found to be in the service of the auditive consciousness; as a matter of fact, relatively wide variations do occur in the positions of the different centres.

(ii.) In the course of development, a centre is formed not as a *terminus a quo* or as a *terminus ad quem*, but as a connecting station, by which, *e.g.* afferent and efferent fibres may be brought into relation with each other, according to the needs of the organism.* The evolution of the brain as the great *locus* of these connecting points has brought it about that the principal stations are mainly within the same neighbourhood in different individuals. Organic selection also has determined that the right side of the body should be 'served' by the left side of the brain, perhaps because a right limb is more frequently and extensively exercised than a left limb, while the blood is more rapidly and effectively circulated through the left hemisphere (as Wundt suggests): the right *limb* requires more frequent renewal of its material, etc., which the left *brain* is more able to supply. Hence functions which are not bilaterally developed, such as those involved in speech, the appreciation and production of music, mathematical calculation, etc., are also relegated to the left side of the brain. (Language was primitively gesture, involving chiefly actions of the *right* hand.)

(iii.) The localization is not fixed, however, even for the individual. (*a*) Some peculiarity of training may lead to the adoption of the right hemisphere as the field with which the functions of speech, etc., are correlated, or may cause a dislocation of particular centres.† (*b*) After injury to a centre, and the loss of any particular mental ability, the loss may be made good by practice, by re-learning or the like, and thus a new centre becomes trained for the functions which the defective centre performed. This *compensation*, or *vicarious functioning*, may take place either through neighbouring areas or through the symmetrically opposite region in the other hemisphere taking over the function. (*c*) It must be added that in man this compensation is limited in range: if a sensation area is completely destroyed, no recovery of the corresponding sensibility takes place; but the patient may learn to use other sensations to replace those he has lost, as guides for action. Thus a person who has become blind in one half of the field of vision (hemianopsia) cannot after a short time be distinguished in his actions from a normal individual. In the case of higher functions, as thought and speech, the patient may re-build his knowledge upon new material: a 'visualist,' whose visual imagery has been taken from him, and who accordingly has lost the ability to read, may re-acquire it

* Cf. Foster, p. 1060, on the cortical motor area and pyramidal tract: 'We are driven to regard them rather as links, important links, it is true, but still links, in a complex chain.'

† Cf. Bateman, p. 350, on the variations in the 'centre' for language; Foster, p. 1065: 'The passage of nervous impulses . . . is not rigidly and unalterably fixed by the anatomical distribution of tracts of fibres.'

by using the sensations of movement as his materials, and correlating these with the optical impressions. (*d*) In comparing different animals in regard to the effect of excising portions of the brain, it is found that the lower the animal stands in development, the more complete is the recovery from loss of any particular brain-organ likely to be; in other words, the remaining parts more rapidly take up the functions of those removed, and in this case the lower brain-centres appear to act as vicarious organs as well as the neighbouring and symmetrically opposite centres. Even the apparently complete loss of the cerebral lobes from both hemispheres may not permanently destroy the sensibility or general capacity of the dog. Substitution and compensation are rarer in the monkey than in the dog, rarer and less complete in the dog than in the rabbit, in the rabbit than in the pigeon, etc.

(iv.) When new impressions are received, or new ideas formed, it may be supposed that some new portion of the cerebral cortex becomes functionally active: this probably occurs through its entering into contact with other cell-groups. The undeveloped portions of a child's or of an uncultured person's brain cannot, of course, be wholly *in*active, but they remain simple in structure and form; with use they put out prolongations, and enter into touch with others, while at the same time they become more highly differentiated within themselves; with deficient exercise of a developed cell, the opposite processes of contraction and degeneration set in. It may be added that exercise appears to increase the vitality of the brain, and hence the vitality of the body as a whole (Donaldson, chs. 16 and 17). Capacity for work or exercise depends in its turn on interest, and finally on the will of the subject. Hence the remarkable freshness and vigour of intellect which some men have shown even in extreme old age (Thomson, p. 274).

This leads to the final question, *Which is primary, the brain or the mind?* Does the brain with which he is born determine the character and capacity of each individual, or do his character and capacity, *plus* the environment in which he is set, mould and form the brain into an efficient instrument for themselves? There can be no doubt that, as in all such cases, *both* questions may be answered in the affirmative. A child born with an imperfect brain can never achieve a rational mind, and the man with the most perfect brain will *tend* to be foremost in his occupation (which may be that of a philanthropist or that of a 'sharp') and neighbourhood. But the greatest weight in individual life, and the *whole weight* in evolution, must be laid on the two factors of opportunity and use. That is to say, the mind itself and the environment determine between them the structure of their intermediary—the brain. Consciousness is correlated not with any limited section of the brain, but with the whole brain, indeed with the whole nervous system. We may go further and say that consciousness is a response to the functioning of the whole living organism; and that the mind, through the feelings and the will, is '*dynamic*' to the whole organism; in other words, that the action and reaction we have postulated between body and mind are between body *as a living whole* and mind as a *unity*, as an unextended system of qualitative determinations and tendencies. As de Sanctis has said, 'an idea cannot be the uniform and invariable product of a pyramidal cell (the *psychic* cell of Cajal): it exists only at the moment of its appearance, and for the appearance there is required the synergic concurrence of almost all the elementary activities of the brain, *i.e.* the functioning of manifold systems of all kinds of neurones' (*Fenomeni del Contrasto*, pp. 75, 76 note). Cf. Loeb, ch. 17: 'The cerebral hemispheres act as a whole and not as a mosaic of a number of independent parts.' The anatomical localization of fibres is not a 'psychic localization of functions.' This is especially true of the higher ideas, abstract and general ideas, ideas of relations, etc. The formation, the use and the adaptation of a general idea involve not a single group of cells in the frontal lobes or elsewhere; but systems in different parts of the cortex, some acting with greater intensity, some with less, and so in a gradually decreasing scale, all parts of the nervous organism being more or less affected. The localization of functions means that certain parts of the cortex have by their primitive connexions with sense-organs or muscles or both, and by their use in the life of the individual, become centres more readily excitable by particular forms of stimulation. The destruction of such a centre renders the corresponding process impossible until a new area has been educated, *i.e.* has been brought into connexion with the same sensory or muscular organs as the original area. In many cases this may no longer be possible. A large part of the brain may, however, be destroyed without any gap in the mental field, or any serious defect in the mental capacity being observable. A case is reported in which the whole of the right hemisphere was affected, the front portion being entirely void of grey matter, and the remainder degenerate; yet the only symptom manifesting itself was a paralysis of the left side; this had begun ten years before death (Bailey, 1889 [reported by Thomson, p. 63 f.]).

In general, the *degree* of consciousness appears to be correlated with the amount of resistance which is overcome. Learning new ways is always accompanied by intense consciousness, as shown by the concentrated attention it involves, while it also involves a large expenditure of energy, as shown by the readiness with which fatigue occurs. The more familiar the action becomes, the less the intensity of consciousness, until the latter may be wholly latent, as in many of the automatic actions the civilized man goes through in the course of a day. This does not mean that the nerve-process has been 'short-circuited,' that it takes place through lower, reflex centres, and therefore by shorter paths; it means rather that with the same path the resistance is less, and therefore the current flows more rapidly. On the other hand, whatever increases the resistance increases the intensity of consciousness involved in the action. Many poisons, whether of external or internal origin, have this effect. In some forms of insanity, the simplest actions—speaking, walking, or dressing—are accompanied by vivid and painful consciousness, and at the same time by such extreme physical exhaustion that the patient soon becomes quite unable to carry them out. In such cases a very strong stimulus may occasionally overcome the great resistance, and the normal reaction takes place. Thus an overwhelming emotion has been known to do so.

In verbal amnesia, a parallel instance is that known as Wolff's case (cf. Loeb, p. 281).* The patient in this case could not tell the names of objects or their qualities except when some actual sensation was given him: thus he could not say whether sugar was sweet unless he *tasted* it, or whether snow was white or black, unless he *saw* it. Mainly it was the visual sensation that was most effective; but in general the most vivid or most striking sensation was that which was required to arouse the idea or memory. An umbrella, for example, could be named only when it was seen *open*.

We may conclude, then, that the brain-connexions vary in the greater or less resistance they offer to excitation; that consciousness is a correlate of

* For another case see Bateman, p. 103.

high resistance; habituation, automatic action, of low resistance: and the higher the resistance, the stronger the impression that is required to 'touch off' the conscious process as a whole in any given case. In amnesia of all kinds, the most *complex* mental achievements or the most *recent* memories are the first to fail: thus a Bohemian peasant learnt German when he entered the army; after some time, at sword practice, his brain was accidentally pierced; his German failed him, but he retained the power of speech in his native tongue (Adamkiewicz; for other cases see Bateman p. 188). In such cases the brain-associations which are least firmly fixed (either because of their recentness or because of their complexity), *i.e.* those which offer greatest resistance to excitation, are those which first fail in their functions; and in recovery from the disease or injury the order is the reverse, the last memories to return being those of the events immediately preceding the illness, etc. These are only a few of the phenomena which make it certain that the relation between mind and brain is functional, not structural, except so far as structure follows and is determined by function; that the general function served by the upper brain is to correlate the results of past individual experience, as the lower brain correlates those of race-experience, with present and immediate needs and situations, *i.e.* retention and co-ordination; but that individual mental activity is the essential condition both of retention and of co-ordination; that, accordingly, the brain is mainly the instrument, the means, rather than the cause or condition, of mental development.

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J. L. M'INTYRE.

BRANCHES AND TWIGS.—Branches and twigs are used in a variety of rites and ceremonies, and their use is generally conditioned by the sacred nature of the trees from which they are taken, though this is not always the case.

1. **Ritual.**—In the ritual of primitive peoples, other ceremonial articles being few in number, branches and twigs have a prominent place. Thus, among the Australian tribes, they are used in a great variety of rites. In the fire ceremony of the Warramunga tribe, huge torches are prepared, made of saplings 15 feet long, thickly encased in a mass of gum-tree twigs; while another part of the ceremony consists in the erection of a long pole to which gum-tree twigs are attached. The men of the tribe at this rite enter a *wurley* made of boughs, and sing there for hours. Bunches of similar twigs are also attached to different parts of the body (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 380 ff.). At mourning ceremonies, widows of the dead man mourn under the shelter of a bough *wurley* (*ib.* p. 521). In these tribes the dead are often left on a platform of boughs erected on a tree (*ib.* p. 517). Further, at the totem ceremonies of the Kingilli tribe, each performer wears on either thigh what is known as a *tjintilli*. This consists of a central stick, about a yard long, to which are attached a number of leafy green gum-twigs (*ib.* p. 198). A bamboo, to which is tied a leaf of the sago-palm, is used by some tribes in New Guinea to indicate tabued articles (Haddon, *Head-Hunters*, London, 1901, p. 270 f.). But at higher levels, branches and twigs are variously employed. Thus in Japan, at the festival of first-fruits, a place for the *inami-dono*, or rice fruit hall, is chosen by divination and marked out at the four corners by twigs of the sacred evergreen tree, hung with tree fibre. In the setting apart of a portion of rice field, two *sakaki* twigs are planted (Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, p. 269). In the Hindu village ritual-marriage of Śiva and Pārvatī, clay images of the divinities are attached to the ends of forked branches, the prongs of which are stuck into heaps of grass and flowers (*IA* xi., 1882, p. 297 ff.). The pious Hindu also uses for the ceremony of teeth-cleaning a twig or small stick, which is cut fresh every day (Monier Williams, *Rel. Thought and Life in India*, London, 1883, pt. i. p. 376). Again, Pliny says of the Celts that they used oak branches in nearly all their ceremonies (*HN* xvi. 44). At the Greek Olympic games the victors' crowns were made of branches of sacred olive, cut with a golden sickle by a boy whose parents were both alive (schol. on Pindar, *Olymp.* iii. 60). The Jews, during the feast of Tabernacles, connected with the ingathering of the fruits of the land, dwelt in booths made of branches of olive, pine, myrtle, willow, palm, and of 'thick trees' (Lv $23^{40ff.}$, Neh $8^{14ff.}$). It is probable that this custom arose out of the practices of an earlier cult of vegetation (see § 5).

2. **Lustration.**—In lustration, branches and twigs form a natural, and therefore a primitive, form of asperger for sprinkling water or blood over the worshippers, or over sacred objects. In such a ceremony their use is doubtless wider than can now be ascertained, as the method of sprinkling is not always clearly reported. At the native baptismal ceremony in Polynesia, the priest asperged the child with a green branch or twig dipped in water, to the accompaniment of archaic prayers (Tylor[3], ii. 430; BAPTISM [Ethnic], § 7). Lustration ceremonies among the Romans were frequently performed by means of branches of laurel or olive. Ovid speaks of the moistened laurel bough sending forth the sprinkled water at the *Palilia* (*Fasti*, iv. 721 ff.), and describes the rites at the fountain of Mercury, where traders sprinkled themselves and their goods with a dripping laurel branch dipped in its waters (*ib.* v. 663 ff.). Among the Semites, branches and other parts of sacred trees were used for lustrations (W. R. Smith, p. 178). Certain of the sprinklings in the rites of purification used by the Hebrews were performed by a bunch of hyssop. Thus, water was sprinkled with hyssop by a ceremonially clean person over the persons and things which had come in contact with a corpse (Nu 19^{18}). Hyssop and cedar wood, the latter probably in the form of a twig, were also used in the ritual of cleansing the leper or the leprous house (Lv 14); and, in the account of the origin of the Passover, a bunch of hyssop is ordered to be dipped in the blood of the lamb, and used to strike the lintel and doorposts (Ex 12^{22}; cf. also He 9^{19}, Ps 51^{7}). In Scandinavia the blood of sacrificed animals was collected in bowls and sprinkled over the altar, temple walls, and people by means of *blautteinar*, or sortilege twigs (Vigfusson and Powell, *Corpus Poet. Boreale*, Oxford 1883, i. 403 f.; Simrock, *Handb. der deutschen Myth.*, Bonn, 1887, p. 509; de la Saussaye, *Rel. of*

the Teutons, Boston, 1902, p. 376). Sometimes sacred twigs were placed in water which was to be used ritually, as in the Lapp ceremony of baptism, in which sacred alder twigs were used in this way (Tylor[3], ii. 437; cf. BAPTISM [Ethnic], § 7 [5] and [8]). In other cases, a branch is used by itself as a means of purification. In the New Hebrides, it suffices to draw a branch down the body to remove the contagion or defilement (*JAI* xxiii. 12), or, as in Japan, at the new moon ceremonies a branch of *sakaki* is waved in token of the purification of sins (Aston, p. 292). Scourging or beating with branches, whose sacred or magical virtues are supposed to drive away evil influences, is not uncommon (see AUSTERITIES, § 5; de la Saussaye, p. 376; Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 98, 126–133, 217 ff.).

3. **Sacrifice.**—In sacrifice, branches and twigs are frequently used. In the more primitive forms of sacrifice by fire, the fire is naturally fed with branches. But occasionally branches and twigs of some sacred tree are thrown upon the fire or are burned for purposes of purification or to bring good luck. Instances are found in the burning of cedar and hyssop in the Hebrew sacrifice of the red heifer (Nu 19[6]), the Roman custom of throwing laurel on the sacrificial fire or on the hearth (Granger, *Worship of the Romans*, London, 1895, p. 305; Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 741), the Hindu feeding of the sacred hearth fire every morning with pieces of consecrated wood generally taken from the *Palāśa-tree* (Monier Williams, pt. i. p. 366), etc. Reference may also be made to the images, made of osiers, within which human victims were consumed by fire among the Gauls (Cæsar, *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 16). For probable late survivals of this custom, see Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 320 ff. Branches or twigs of sacred trees sometimes accompany offerings; thus, in Scandinavia, twigs were cut from special kinds of trees, and these, interwoven with flowers, were afterwards fastened to the tails of animals intended for sacrifice (de la Saussaye, p. 376). A Hindu instance is that of the balls of rice used in the funeral ceremonies, in which sprigs of the *Tulasī* plant are inserted (Williams, p. 302). Or, again, they are offered as sacrifice, as in the case of the Japanese *kedzurikake*, wands of elder or willow, whittled at the top into a mass of shavings, which are also symbols of deity and fetishes (Aston, p. 191 ff.). Among the Ainus similar wands of willow or lilac, called *inao*, are both sacrifices and fetishes (Batchelor, *The Ainu of Japan*, London, 1892, p. 87 ff., *The Ainu and their Folklore*, London, 1901, p. 92 ff.; see also AINUS, § 23 ff.).

4. **Divination.**—In certain processes of divination the use of branches and twigs occurs. Tacitus says of the ancient Germans that, in order to consult lots, they cut off the twig of a fruit-bearing tree and made it into little wands. Upon these they put distinguishing marks and scattered them at random upon a white garment (*Germania*, ch. 10). These twigs, whether or not the marks on them were runes, are probably connected with the Norse sortilege twigs, or consecrated chips used in divination, and the Frisian *tein*, or twigs, used for casting lots in judicial procedure (de la Saussaye, p. 394; Vigfusson and Powell, p. 411; Simrock, p. 531). For a similar Celtic instance see CELTS, § xiii. (4). Here, too, may be noted the widespread use of the divining rod, a forked twig, usually of hazel. The forks of the twig are held, one in each hand of the seeker, and the twig twists in his grasp when he arrives at the spot under which what he seeks is concealed (Barrett, 'The so-called Divining Rod,' in *Proc. Soc. Psych. Research*, 1897; Lang, *Making of Religion*, London, 1898, p. 164 ff.; Baring Gould, *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*, London, 1868, p. 55 ff.; see also DIVINATION).

5. **Vegetation-cults.**—Many folk survivals show the uses of branches and twigs in connexion with vegetation-cults. Under various names (Jack-in-the-Green, etc.) and at various times puppets are made of green stuff, twigs, and branches; or selected persons are clad in green boughs, leaves, and flowers, and undergo various ceremonies. These represent the old tree-spirit, or spirit of vegetation, though now no longer regarded in that light by the folk. At such times, also, especially after the ceremony of 'carrying out death,' boughs are cut and brought home to the village, and these have also some connexion with the spirit of vegetation. Many instances of these are collected by Frazer (*GB*[2] i. 214 ff., ii. 82 ff.), and by Grimm (*Teut. Myth.* pp. 769, 772, 775, 784 ff.). The power of the tree-spirit is communicated also to the fields by placing a branch in the furrow, or by carrying branches round the fields, and it is also conveyed to houses which are decked with branches at the times of the old pagan festivals, May-day and Midsummer, and, under Christian influences, at Christmas—probably a survival of the practice at the festival which began the winter season (Elworthy, *The Evil Eye*, London, 1895, p. 103; Brand, *Popular Antiquities*, London, 1870, i. 71, 121, 125, 173, 174, 246 f., 288 ff.; Grimm, pp. 778, 786; *GB*[2] iii. 276 f.; for decking houses at weddings and funerals, and for Palm Sunday customs, see Brand, i. 71, ii. 71 ff., 175). The connexion of the branch with the vegetation- or fertility-spirit is seen in an Irish instance when a bough set up on the house on May-day is supposed to produce plenty of milk during the summer (Brand, i. 131). Branches or twigs from trees regarded as sacred, the rowan, the elder, etc., were placed on houses, stables, sheepfolds, and barns as a protection against evil spirits, witches, and other evil influences. They were also placed in boats, or carried on the person as a talisman. These practices occur very widely in modern European folk custom (*GB*[2] iii. 132, 261, 265; Elworthy, p. 347; Brand, i. 151; MacCulloch, *The Misty Isle of Skye*, Edinburgh, 1905, p. 237). But that it is derived from ancient paganism is shown by similar practices among pagan peoples (Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 721 ff., vi. 151 ff.; de la Saussaye, p. 376 f. [Scandinavians]; Monier Williams, p. 296 [Hindus]; for the Parsi custom see BARSOM). The Midsummer and other bonfires, as well as the need fire, were fed by branches, twigs, and leaves of oak, especially in Celtic and Teutonic districts (Grimm, p. 605); in the case of need fires, nine sorts of wood were used in Sweden and elsewhere (Grimm, p. 607; *GB*[2] iii. 270, and *passim*). Through these fires cattle were driven, and burning brands or branches were carried through the fields or villages, and set up in the fields (*GB*[2] iii. 313; Brand, i. 215; Grimm, p. 621; de la Saussaye, p. 375 ff.). New fires were lit on the hearth with blazing brands from these fires or with branches lit at their flames (*GB*[2] iii. 245). Brands were also taken from the bonfires and kept in houses or in cattle-sheds, as preservatives against thunder and lightning, fire, and other evils, or were carried about for luck (*ib.* p. 254 ff.). In some cases walnut-branches are carried by the people in procession round the fire or passed over it, and then placed on the cattle-sheds, or the backs of cattle are singed with a hazel-twig lit at the fire, or birch boughs are thrown into the fire, in Russia, to cause the flax to grow to the height of the boughs (*ib.* pp. 275, 284, 291). The fires are sun-charms, and the brands have the virtues of the fire and the sun, which they impart to field, house, or hearth, promoting growth of crops, warding off evils, bringing luck, etc.

Connected with the cult of sacred trees was the practice of hanging sacrificial offerings upon their

branches. This practice has occurred wherever tree-worship is found, or where worship took place in sacred groves (see art. TREES; and, for particular instances from South America, New Zealand, and among the Dayaks, cf. Tylor[3], ii. 223 f.; for the Semites, cf. W. R. Smith, p. 169; for the Scandinavians, cf. de la Saussaye, p. 356; and for the Celts, Jullian, *Recherches sur la Religion gauloise*, Bordeaux, 1903, p. 55). Among the Japanese, presents to a superior were delivered attached to the branch of a tree (Aston, p. 215).

In the ritual of healing at sacred wells, a rag which has been in contact with the patient, or part of his clothing, is hung on the branches of a sacred tree near the well, either as an offering or as a magical means of conveying the disease to the tree or of bringing the sufferer within the healing influence of the tree-spirit (see Tylor[3], ii. 150; Brand, iii. 10). Sacred wells are also decked with green boughs on certain occasions, *e.g.* Holy Thursday and the day of the saint to whom the well is dedicated (Brand, iii. 9).

Where sacred trees are venerated, either in actual cult or in late folk-survivals, it is considered sacrilegious to break even a twig from them. To do so will be followed by a punishment, misfortune, or ill-luck. The same is true of trees growing on graves (Tylor[3], ii. 115 [Malagasy]; W. R. Smith, p. 169 [Semites]; Elworthy, p. 99 [Livonians]; Brand, iii. 13 [Celts]; Mackenzie, *Ten Years North of the Orange River*, Edinburgh, 1871 [Bechuanas]).

Branches are also used in rain magic in a variety of ways, probably because the tree-spirit was originally believed to have influence over the weather. Thus, among the Congo people, mounds are covered with branches of trees and fetish-ornaments. Round these mounds a priest walks, muttering incantations (Reade, *Savage Africa*, London, 1863, p. 363). Pausanias mentions a temple on Mt. Lycæum, whose priest had power to produce rain by throwing an oak branch into a fountain (viii. 38). In Gaul, a naked virgin standing up to her knees in the river was asperged by her companions with branches dipped in the water, as a charm to produce rain (Grimm, p. 593).

The ceremonial cutting of the mistletoe from the oak by the druids, and its use in magico-medical rites, are described by Pliny (*HN* xvi. 44). Frazer connects this rite with the Scandinavian myth of Balder, slain by the mistletoe, and with the plucking of the bough from a tree in the sacred grove by the slayer and successor of the priest of Nemi. The mistletoe was regarded as the soul of the oak, and had to be plucked before the tree, in which dwelt the spirit of vegetation, could be destroyed, or the human representative of the same spirit could be slain (*GB*[2] iii. 446 ff.; FESTIVALS [Celtic]). Mistletoe is also ceremonially plucked in modern folk-custom in Scandinavia, and elsewhere in Europe (*ib.* p. 343). For the bough which had to be plucked by Æneas, before his descent to the under world, see Virgil, *Æneid*, vi. 203 ff.; and for the magic silver boughs of Celtic myth with their precious fruits, see BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Celtic).

See also BARSOM.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully throughout the article. J. A. MACCULLOCH.

BRAWLING.—The word 'brawling' is technically used in English Law for the offence of quarrelling or creating a disturbance in a place of worship, churchyard, or burial-ground. The word is derived from the French *brailler*, 'to be noisy,' which gives the main idea of the term, viz. the disturbing of people at their devotions.

1. **Legal.**—Brawling is a branch of sacrilege, though the latter term is now usually confined to the robbery of churches. The punishment for sacrilege in most countries up to the date of the French Revolution, and later, was death. In England, sacrilege involving the taking of goods from a church or chapel remained a capital offence till 1835, being abolished by statute 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 81. Brawling, however, had always been treated more leniently. The most vindictive of the English 'brawling' statutes requires merely that the offender shall be adjudged to have one of his ears cut off, or (what a comment on the customs of the period!), if he have no ears, to be marked and burned in the cheek with a hot iron having the letter F, whereby he may be known and taken for a fray-maker and fighter; in addition, of course, to the usual excommunication.

With reference to this law, it must be said that the Act was passed in 1552, a time of great religious disturbance, when the change of religion was taking place in England, and that there had been a good deal of open fighting with weapons, even in churches; so that strong measures were necessary. It must also be said that these barbarous penalties applied only to persons who actually smote with a weapon or drew a weapon with intent to smite. Those who merely 'smote' without weapons, or only 'chided,' received much lighter punishment.

This Act (5 & 6 Edw. VI. c. 4) remained on the statute-book till 1829, in company with many other statutes of our Draconian code. The principle, however, still exists that disturbances in sacred places deserve greater punishment than those occurring elsewhere; in fact, some acts of disturbance which are commendable if done in another place are criminal if performed in church; for example, arrests by virtue of legal process. This principle seems to be recognized in all countries, and in France during the Revolution protection was extended to religious services of all kinds.

In England, at present, brawling by a layman, which by the Act of 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 32) is defined as being riotous, violent, or indecent behaviour in a place of worship (as also molestation of a minister while celebrating any divine service in church), is no longer punishable by the ecclesiastical courts, but as a civil offence it is a misdemeanour under several statutes. The penalty under 52 Geo. III. c. 155 is £40; under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 32, £5. The statute 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100 § 36 enacts as follows:

'Whosoever shall, by threats or force, obstruct or prevent, or endeavour to obstruct or prevent, any clergyman or other minister in or from celebrating divine service or otherwise officiating in any church, chapel, meeting-house, or other place of divine worship, or in or from the performance of his duty in the lawful burial of the dead in any churchyard or other burial-place, or shall strike or offer any violence to, or shall, upon any civil process, or under the pretence of executing any civil process, arrest any clergyman or other minister who is engaged in, or to the knowledge of the offender is about to engage in, any of the rites or duties aforesaid, or who, to the knowledge of the offender, shall be going to perform the same or returning from the performance thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanour, and, being convicted thereof, is liable to two years' imprisonment with or without hard labour.'

The offender may also be fined and required to give sureties (*ib.* § 71).

Also, by the Burial Law Amendment Act, 1880, provision is made to prevent improper conduct at burials.

Under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 32, any constable or churchwarden of the parish has power to apprehend the offender and take him before a justice. There is an appeal to Quarter Sessions from a conviction under this Act.

A man may be convicted for brawling, although acting in the *bona fide* assertion of a claim of right, and that independently of the question whether the claim is a good one or not (*Asher* v. *Calcraft* [1887], 18 Q.B.D. 607).

It was held, by London Quarter Sessions, that under this Act the behaviour must be really riotous, violent, or indecent; mere protests in words are not sufficient.

In a case where in a Church of England church a crucifix was placed on the altar steps and the congregation crawled up, two by two, to kiss it, and a person present took up the crucifix and said (holding it above his head) in a loud voice: 'In the name of God I protest against this idolatry,' it was held that violent conduct or brawling was not proved (*Kensit* v. *Rose* [1898], 62 J.P. 489).

But, on the other hand, in a case which went to the Divisional Court, where, in answer to the invitation in the ordination service a statement was read in a perfectly orderly manner, this

was nevertheless held to be brawling (*Kensit* v. *St. Paul's Chapter* [1905], 2 K.B. 249).

A minister of religion can commit the offence of brawling as well as a layman (*Vallancey* v. *Fletcher* [1897], 1 Q.B. 265), and may, if a minister of the Church of England, be punished in the ecclesiastical instead of in the civil court (*Girt* v. *Fillingham* [1901], P. 176). This is obvious if he indulges in an open quarrel or wordy warfare in the sacred place; but he also commits the offence if he uses violent language, unsuitable to public worship, either in the course of his sermon or at any other part of the service, or 'improves the occasion' against individual members of the congregation in a violent or scolding manner.

Instances of this have come before the courts in the case of clergymen of the Church of England, who are strictly bound (during prayers), by the Acts of Uniformity, to the words prescribed for use. Thus in one case a clergyman interpolated, when reading the lesson, the following: 'I have been accused by some ill-natured neighbour of making alterations in the service; I have done so now and shall do so again, so mark.' In another case the clergyman paused in the service to deliver a long address in a chiding, quarrelsome, and brawling manner, in which passages like the following appeared: 'You were perhaps surprised at the pause I made at the end of the prayer [in the Litany], but it reminded me of my enemies.' 'Some one in the congregation has had the audacity to write to the archdeacon.' 'Who has had the audacity to do this?' 'Some one has committed perjury against me.' 'Another of my enemies has written a letter to the bishop full of falsehoods.' Such conduct is punishable.

The object of the laws of England is well put by Sir John Nicholl in the case of *Palmer* v. *Roffey*, 2 Addams 144. It is to protect the sanctity of those places and their appurtenances set apart for the worship of the Supreme Being and for the repose of the dead, in which nothing but religious awe and Christian goodwill between men should prevail, and to prevent them from being converted with impunity into scenes of human passion and malice, of disturbance and violence. The sacredness of the place being thus the object of this protecting law, it is no part of a legal inquiry, when more than one person is implicated in the transaction, which of the two persons so implicated is more to blame or which of them began the quarrel. Each who engages in it violates the law; each is bound to abstain from quarrelling, chiding, or brawling in the sacred place. Therefore, as Blackstone (*Commentaries*, iv. 145) says, 'mere quarrelsome words, which are neither an affray nor an offence in any other place, are penal here.'

Churchwardens, however, and also constables may, for the purpose of maintaining order during Divine service, eject disturbers; and churchwardens may take off a person's hat if, on being asked, he refuses to remove it; and, it has been said, may whip boys who play in church during or immediately before service. But such action might be attended with awkward consequences in these days (*Burton* v. *Henson* [1842], 10 M. & W. 108; *Worth* v. *Terrington* [1845], 13 M. & W. 781; the Church of England canons of 1604, Nos. 19, 85, and 111 may also be consulted). It has, however, been decided that a churchwarden has no right forcibly to prevent an inhabitant from entering the church for the purpose of attending service, on the ground that in his opinion there is no room (*Taylor* v. *Timson* [1888], 20 Q.B.D. 671).

2. **Ethical.**—From the ethical point of view there may be considerable difference of opinion on the question, Is brawling, that is, the disturbance of other people's worship, under any circumstances justifiable? The answer will depend largely on the view taken of the ethical standard of right and wrong. Those who think that the law of the particular country is the only standard, and must be obeyed, can easily answer this question. The laws of many civilized countries now protect all public worship from disturbance and all ministers of religion from molestation, and the answer in those countries would be—No.

Those who find the will of the Deity expressed in the Bible, and regard this as the ultimate standard, have a more difficult task. It is undoubted that many instances of 'brawling' are commended in Holy Writ. For example, there is the case of Moses, who at a 'feast to the Lord' (Ex. 32^5) took the golden calf which the Israelites had made, and burnt it in the fire, and ground it to powder and strewed it upon the water, and made the children of Israel to drink of it (v.^{20}). Further OT examples are numerous—the destruction of the high places and the altars of the priests of Baal at various times; and of the brazen serpent by king Hezekiah. It is true these cases raise points as to the rights of heads of States. But from the abstract point of view they involve questions of sacrilege and brawling.

To come to the NT, we may mention (with all reverence) the action of Jesus Christ, who went into the temple of God and cast out all them that sold and bought there, overthrowing the tables of the money-changers and of them that sold doves. These people were in the house of God by lawful authority; the doves were no doubt required for sacrifice. Our Lord's reason was founded on the law: 'It is written,' He said, 'my house shall be called the house of prayer; but ye have made it a den of thieves.' Such a plea would not be admitted in a modern court of justice. It is a clear case of 'brawling' according to modern ideas.

The third point of view is that of people who think that the law of their particular Church or sect is the ultimate test. The Church of Rome has undoubtedly taught, and its adherents have acted on the opinion, that it is proper not only to disturb devotions which are contrary to its tenets, but also to molest and even to put to death ministers of religion and others who teach doctrines inconsistent with theirs. Members of religious bodies of this type would undoubtedly hold that 'brawling' at the command of their religious superiors is not only justifiable, but virtuous. Their sense of duty is of that kind which would burn the body to save the soul.

Lastly, there is the point of view of those who think that the ethical standard is a certain fitness, suitability, or propriety in actions as determined by our understanding or reason (Bain, *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 430) or, in Kant's words, that people should act in such a way that their conduct might be a law to all beings. It is conceived that all those who hold this view would approve of the laws of England practically as they now stand; that is, that, although a person may be constrained by an overpowering sense of duty to put down false religion, illegality, and wrong, he must not take the law into his own hands, and act so as to disturb, annoy, or injure his fellow-men. *Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.*

LITERATURE.—Most of the law-books deal with brawling, but not completely: amongst others, B. Whitehead, *Church Law*[2], London 1899, and Lord Halsbury, Laws of England, 1909. Stephens' *Laws relating to the Clergy*, London, 1848 (*s.v.* 'Brawling and Smiting'), is the fullest, but its date precludes the new statutes and cases. Archbold, *Criminal Law*, 1905, gives statutes and cases to that date. The encyclopædias also have short articles, the best being Larousse, *Grand Dict. Univ.* Paris, 1875, *s.v.* 'Sacrilège.' The ethical view is almost always ignored.

BENJAMIN WHITEHEAD.

BRAZIL.—The area enclosed by the confines of the present Republic of Brazil contains four principal ethnological stocks—the Arawak, the Carib, the Tupi-Guarani, and the Tapuya. But many of the sub-sections of these races overlap into territory outside the boundaries of Brazil proper, so that the information in this article must be taken as referring to the religious con-

ceptions of those four families as a whole, and not to those of them who are strictly confined to the territories of the Republic.

The status of religious conception among the native tribes of Brazil is not very far advanced in the scale of belief. It consists mainly of a crude anthropomorphism. Indeed, it may be said that the distinction between the natural and supernatural has not yet been realized by them. Many of the agencies by which they believe the universe to be ordered are of a human or *quasi*-human character. They appear to be, for the most part, incapable of the abstract thought required to conceive of an eternal spirit, and their ideas of a Supreme Being are of the faintest. The general theogony of the Tupi, for example, though extremely hazy, appears to consist in the primal idea of a universal maternal agent. Fetish and animistic beliefs are also widely prevalent; and, as in nearly every religion of the lower cultus, the explicit (or comparatively explicit) belief is accompanied by an extraneous and confused body of semi-legendary superstition, such as a belief in demons and evil spirits of the forest, river, and mountain. These last vary in their characteristics according to locality, and in the course of generations several may have attained the distinction of godhead, if the name may be applied to entities few of whose attributes appear to be truly supernatural. It may be said that the religious conceptions of all four families mentioned above are on a similar level, and that certain beliefs are common to all.

1. The Arawaks. — The Arawak tribes are widely distributed over an area extending from the River Paraguay to the extreme north of the South American continent, and they have contributed largely to the formation of the existing stocks inhabiting the Antilles and Bahamas groups. It is generally admitted that they originated in the northern part of the continent; but their nomadic traits, and the ready manner in which they have intermingled with other stocks, have caused marked differentiation between the various tribes belonging to the family. At the present day most of them have ceased to be nomads, and are engaged mainly in hunting and fishing; certain of them, however, exist on an agricultural basis. Their principal divisions are: *Northern group*—Maypures, Atorais, Wapisianas, and other insignificant confederacies; *Southern and Western Groups*—Piris of the Uccayali River, Minanhas of the Jurua River, Canamaris of the Purus River, Manaos of the Rio Negro, Custenaús, Vaurás, Mehinakus, Yualapiti (all of the River Xingu territory), and Guanas, dwelling on the left bank of the Upper Paraguay.

(1) *Cosmogony.*—The Creation and Flood myths of the various Arawak tribes bear a close resemblance to those generally current throughout the South American continent; that is, they assume a twofold destruction of the world prior to its present condition. Thus the Arawaks of Guiana believe that Aimon Kondi scourged the world with fire, from which the survivors sought refuge in subterranean dwellings. Then a great flood followed, from which Marerewana and his followers saved themselves in a canoe. Such a Flood-myth is practically identical with that of the Quichés of Guatemala, as found in the *Popol Vuh*, the sacred book of that people, and in the mythologies of many other American races. That man originated in a subterranean world is a belief widely disseminated among the Arawaks. There death was unknown, but the ruler of mankind chanced to discover the upper world, and, returning, warned his people that, though sunlight was there, so was death. Many, despite the warning, sought the upper air; but multitudes are still believed to exist in bliss far below. Another Arawak version of the Creation asserts that the Great Spirit, having completed the heavens and earth, seated Himself on a huge silk-cotton tree by a river side, and cut off pieces of its bark, which He cast all around. Those which touched the water became fish, those which touched the air, birds; and those which alighted upon the earth became animals and men. The Arawaks of Guiana are almost wholly in a condition of totemism.

(2) *Theogony and ritual.*—The theogony of many of the Brazilian tribes clusters round the cult of the god Jurupari, which is best exemplified by that phase of it practised by the Uapes. This cult is invested with the utmost secrecy, but has been fully examined by Coudreau and Stradelli. The name Jurupari (*Juru-para-i*) signifies 'Issue from the mouth of a river,' and the myth of his birth states that he was born of a virgin who possessed no sexual parts. She, however, conceived through swallowing a draught of *cachiri*, or fermented liquor, but could not be relieved of her offspring until, when bathing, she was bitten severely by a fish called 'Tarire,' when Jurupari was born. He grew speedily to manhood, and one day invited the men of the tribe to partake of a great bowl of *cachiri*; but the women refused their assistance in its manufacture, and thus gained his ill-will. Their children likewise incurred his enmity through eating the fruit of the *uacu* tree, which was sacred to him; and for this offence he devoured them. Enraged at the loss of their children, the men of the tribe surrounded him, and cast him into a fire, from the cinders of which sprang the *paxiuba* palm, which the Uapes believe to be his bones. Whilst it was still night, the men cut down this tree, and fashioned it into sacred instruments, which it is ordained the women of the tribe must never see. Should a woman of the Uapes set eyes upon any of the sacred symbols of Jurupari, she is at once poisoned.

This exclusion of women from the secret rites of the worship of Jurupari seems to point to some remote totemic origin of which all but the mere remembrance has been lost. There would appear to have been an ancient apprehension among the Uapes that Jurupari, who was regarded by them as more of a demiurge than a god proper, might exercise upon the women of the tribe 'le droit d'un dieu.' Indeed, a myth exists which relates how one woman who had in her possession the sacred symbols was violated by Jurupari, and that the exclusion of the women from his worship dates from that event.

On the days upon which the worship of Jurupari is to be celebrated, the men proceed from the place of his adoration on a tour of the surrounding district, playing loudly upon pipes and flutes. Upon hearing the 'Jurupari music' the women shut themselves up in their houses, and do not emerge again until they are certain that all risk of their beholding the procession is over. The men then return to the headquarters of the priests, where the sacred symbols are exposed to view. These are the *macacaraua* and the *paxiuba*. The former is a black cloak without arms, descending to the middle of the body, and made of monkeys' hair interwoven with hair cut from the heads of virgins immediately after their arrival at puberty. The *paxiuba* is a portion of the palm-tree of that species, about the height of a man, and some ten centimetres in diameter. By a device consisting of holes bored in the part of the tree beneath the foliage, its leaves are made to tremble by the breath of the priest who evokes it.

The principal religious ceremony in the worship of Jurupari is the *Dabucuri*, or initiation of the young men. This occurs six times in the year, as follows: the *assaby* on Jan. 1; the *ucuqui* on Feb. 2; the *miritz* on March 3; the *pataud* on May 4; the *umari* on July 5; and the *uiga* on Nov. 6. Of all these indigenous fruits the Indians make intoxicating beverages. These are freely

partaken of in the accompanying revels, which are of the most riotous description. On the day of the festival those who have arrived at manhood are painted in black and red. They chant mournful melodies, whilst the *pagés*, or priests, join them in marriage to women of the tribe, who are then sent into the forest. Three men in barbaric costumes then carry in the *paxiuba*, and several Indians disguised as Jurupari dress in the *macacaraua* and symbolize the god's myth. The *paxiuba* horn is then sounded, and the women return. Mutual flagellations commence, and the proceedings degenerate into a saturnalia. Jurupari is invited, but replies through the mouth of the *pagés* that he dare not be present, as, if he were to have relations with a woman, he would 'be changed into a serpent.'

The demiurgic nature of Jurupari is indicated by his relative position to Tupan, a primitive deity common to many Brazilian tribes. The Tupan of the Indians of the period immediately subsequent to the discovery of Brazil was by no means a beneficent deity, but typified the thunder, or any agency terrible or majestic. The first missionaries in the southern part of Brazil identified Tupan with God the Father, and the Christian reminiscences which we discover in the Jurupari cult doubtless had their origin in the old missionary idea of Tupan. The *pagés* differ regarding the identity of Tupan. Some regard him as a species of All-father, whilst others construct a vague hierarchy from Jurupari the Terrible, the Tupan of the Indians ('the Good'), and the Tupan of the Whites ('the Mighty'). Jurupari is not at strife with Tupan, but rather supplementary to him; for whereas the former has a local and precise significance, that of Tupan is vague and general. Tupan, it is said, created Jurupari 'for evil.' When he visits the earth, Jurupari is always his guide. Jurupari dwells with Tupan in heaven; and if in life the men of the Uapes have honoured the cult of Jurupari, they go to dwell with him after death. If they have not done so, they perish on the long road from earth to heaven. The women who behold the sacred symbols go to Bichiu, a place inhabited by inferior spirits—a species of purgatory; but if they have not thus offended, they go to the heaven of Jurupari. Tribes akin to the Uapes believe that those women who see the symbols are changed at death into serpents or crocodiles. In the heaven of Jurupari the dead hunt, fish, drink *cachiri*, and make sacred symbols. Grief and ennui are unknown. Those men who are lost on the route finally arrive at a hell, a badly-defined, shadowy extension of earth, where they continue the terrestrial life.

The Arawaks have a wholesome dread of evil spirits and forest-giants, which they designate *canchemar*. They have also a Jurupari of the Forest, an evil and malignant being, who, however, appears to bear no relation to the demiurge of the same name.

(3) *Priesthood.*—Among the Uapes the sacerdotal caste of the *pagés*, or priests, is strongly organized in a hierarchy, and is subdivided into the *uarassu*, or adepts, the *assu*, or arch-priests, and the *mirim*, or neophytes, who are very numerous. The secret of their organization is little known and well guarded. It is, in fact, a species of freemasonry, and candidates are initiated into the several degrees by similar processes. The *pagés* are also doctors, but, above all, exorcists. They possess magical formulæ, which vary with each tribe. Certain *pagés* act as mediums to demons whom they profess to have in their service, and others undertake invocation of the dead. The thoroughness with which they carry out their purely religious duties is remarkable. Even the children are examined and interrogated by them in secret regarding the cult of Jurupari. In fact, the initiation of the layman into that cult lasts during the entire period of his life. Although the *pagés* resort to symbolism, they are not fetish-worshippers, and distinguish strongly between the symbol and the being it symbolizes. The *macacaraua* is not Jurupari, they say. It is his 'figure' (*rangaua*). The Guaycurús of Paraguay possess a similar religious order, whom they call *Yunageneto*, and who act principally as exorcists of the evil in man, which they designate *nanigo gigó*. They believe that the goat-sucker bird and the screaming vulture act as messengers from the dead to the priest, between whom and the deceased persons of the tribe there is frequent communication. They also practise exorcism by fumigation. The dualism which the *pagés* of the Puris profess was in all probability communicated to them by European missionaries (Spix and Martius).

2. The Caribs.—The Caribs, one of the first American races to come under the notice of the European discoverers, were until recently supposed to be confined to Venezuela, Guiana, and the Antilles; but von den Steinen met with tribes cognate to them in speech and physiological characteristics in the very heart of Brazil—the Bakairi and Nahuquas of the Upper Xingu, which he regarded as the Carib cradle-land. They were, *par excellence*, the maritime race of America, and in their great sea-canoes extended their piratical voyages to Cuba and Haiti, and permanently occupied some of the Lesser Antilles. On the mainland they were in possession of the shore west of the mouth of the Orinoco, nearly to the Cordilleras. From their name is derived that of 'cannibal,' owing to their custom of eating human flesh. Most of the present-day Caribs are nominally Christians.

(1) *Mythology.* — The Caribs of the Antilles regarded the earth, which they called Mama Nono, as 'the good mother from which all things come.' Their mythological ideas corresponded with their degree of civilization, which was extremely primitive. The first ancestor of the Caribs created his offspring by sowing the soil with stones, or with the fruit of the Mauritius palm, which sprouted forth into men and women. They believed that a multiplicity of souls inhabited one body, and that, wherever they might detect a pulsation, a soul was present. All these, however, were subordinate to one principal spirit enthroned in the heart, which alone would be transported to the skies at death (anon. *Voyage à la Louisiane fait en 1720*). The seat of the deceased was named by them *Hueyu Ku*, the Mansion of the Sun, where, as in the Mexican paradise, the barbaric idea of bliss was to be attained. With the Caribs of the mainland, some shadowy belief in resurrection seems to have obtained, as they were most punctilious in preserving the bones of their ancestors, which, after having cleaned, bleached, and painted them, they kept in a wicker basket full of spices suspended from the doors of their dwellings.

They possessed a culture-hero, Tamu (Grandfather), who was also known as 'Old Man of the Sky.' He appears to have been almost identical with the Nahuatlac Quetzalcoatl, the Quiché Gucumatz, and the Mayan Cuculcan, in that he was of light complexion, came from the east, and, after having instructed the Caribs in agriculture and the primitive arts, disappeared in the direction whence he came. Brinton believed him to be identical with the Zumé of the Guarani of Paraguay, and Ehrenreich with the Kamu of the Arawaks (a culture-hero), and the Kaboi of the Karayas. In the legend of the latter he dwelt

with their ancestors in the under world until a bird, the *Dicholophos cristatus*, by its call, led them to life and light in the upper world. With the Caribs the sun and moon shared sovereignty with the earth as the supreme beings of the Universe. It is almost certain that the god Hurakan (from whose name is derived our word 'hurricane'), who figures in the Quiché *Popol Vuh* as 'the Heart of Heaven,' the supreme god, was of Carib origin, although it is possible that he may have been borrowed by the Caribs from the indigenous tribes of the Antilles; but von den Steinen gives the Carib form as *ye'lo*, 'thunder,' whence Island-Carib *ioualloú*.

(2) *Priesthood.*—Although the Carib religion was of an extremely primitive type, it was well organized by a hereditary class of shamans called *piayes*, similar to the *pagés* of the Arawaks, to whom the Caribs were probably ethnologically related. This class exercised unlimited power, and, besides performing the very elaborate religious rites appertaining to their worship, were, as with the Arawaks, exorcists.

3. The Tupi-Guarani.—This stock, so called to show the ethnic affinity existing between the Tupi of Brazil and the Guarani of Paraguay, originally advanced in a northerly direction from the River Plate region, and drove the Tapuyas from the coast lands, which it thenceforth occupied as a maritime people. It is now represented by tribes occupying various belts of country in a territory so vast as that between the rivers Maroni in French Guiana, to the north, and the Plate, to the south. In Guiana the principal divisions are the Oyampi and the Émerillons, in Brazil proper the various tribes of the Central Plateau, and in Paraguay the Guarani. These various tribes were at one time addicted to cannibalism, but large numbers have become converted to Christianity, although many still retain their ancient beliefs. They speak a dialect of the ancient Tupi language, called the Lingoa Geral, which was standardized by the early Portuguese missionaries for their own uses, and gradually became the general tongue of the Amazonian tribes. Tupi branches are also found in Argentina and Uruguay.

(1) *Cosmogony.*—A certain magician, Irin Magé, is credited by the Eastern Tupi with the creation of seas and rivers, and at his intervention Monan, the Maker or Begetter, withdrew the *tata*, or Divine fire, with which he had resolved to destroy the world. An early account (Hans Staden, 1550) states their belief in a destruction of their ancestors by a powerful supernatural enemy called Mair, who sent upon them an inundation, from which only a few were saved, by climbing trees and hiding in caves—a variant of the *Popol Vuh* legend. The same authority gives the names of three brothers—Krimen, Hermittan, and Coem—from whom they claimed descent; and the Guarani speak of four brothers, and give two of their names as Tupi and Guarani, parents of the tribes called after them respectively. These four brothers are identical with similar quartettes in other American mythologies, and typify the cardinal points of the compass.

(2) *Theogony.*—The theogony of the Tupi is a simple nature-worship, although much confusion exists among authorities as to its constituents. The Vicomte d'Itabayana sees in Tupi belief the quality of dualism (a rare occurrence in American religions), and gives it as his opinion that Toru-shom-pek, the sun, stands for their principle of good, and Toru-guenket, the moon, for their evil principle. The latter is supposed to fall periodically and wreck the earth; and all baneful influences, such as thunders and floods, proceed from her. Magalhães (*O Selvagem*) is of opinion that Tupi theogony rests on the primal idea that all created things have a mother or maker, who is responsible for the general scheme of animate and inanimate matter. There are, further, three superior deities, to whom are apportioned the making of the various natural families. These are Guaracy, the sun, creator of all animals; Jacy, the moon, creator of plants; and Perudá or Rudá, the god of love, who promotes the reproduction of human beings. Each of these is assisted by inferior beings. Subordinate to the sun are Guirapuru, who has charge of the birds; Anhanga, who protects the field game; Caá-póra, who protects the forest game; Uayará, who guards the fishes. Under Jacy are Saci Ceréré (in South Brazil) Mhoitatá, the fire-snake, who protects the country from fire; Urutaú, the phantom-bird; and Curupira, the guardian of the forests. Subject to Rudá are Cairé, the full moon, and Catití, the new moon. Each of these, in turn, has as many inferior assistants as the Indians admit classes; and these are served by as many beings as the Indians admit species, and so on, until every lake and river and kind of animal or plant has its protective genius or 'mother.' Brinton describes this polytheism as 'simple animistic nature-worship.' Though this may be said to apply to the Tupi race in general, its standards undoubtedly vary with locality; and this fact accounts for the seemingly widely differing accounts of Tupi theogony furnished by its several investigators.

With the Guarani, the southern branch of the Tupi, belief and worship appear largely to cluster round the figure of the god Zumé, a culture-hero, probably identical with the Carib Tamu. He, like other American culture-heroes, 'came from the East'; but the Guarani, according to the myth, grew so tired of his sententious advice and constant patronage, that they tried to drive him away with arrows. These, however, he caught, and hurled back upon his tormentors, and, dividing the waters of a neighbouring river by his Divine power, he walked to the other bank dryshod, and disappeared from view. He indicated to the Guarani his intention of returning in order to gather them into towns, and rule them in peace. Zumé is, of course, like the Mexican Quetzalcoatl, the Man of the Sun, the civilizing agent. He has been identified with Cemi, an Antillean deity, and his worship is found under various guises throughout South America.

A less mild personage is Tupa or Tupan,* the god-in-chief of the Tupi proper of Brazil. The earliest notice of this god is that of the missionary Père d'Evreux, who directly compares him with God the Father. He alone of the four brothers survived the Flood, and became the highest divinity of the Tupi, ruler of the lightning and the storm, whose voice is the thunder. He is, indeed, the Tupan of the Uapes, who, although of Arawak stock, have been deeply influenced by Tupi and Carib beliefs. Anhanga, the protector of field game, is sometimes opposed to him as an evil principle; but it is vain to affect to discern dualism where the notion of divinity is so slight, and that of anthropomorphism so strong. In any case, it cannot be an ethical dualism, but merely the opportunist invention of the priestly caste (see remarks on American dualism in Brinton's *Myths of the New World* and Spence's *Popol Vuh*). There is not wanting evidence, however, that Tupa was also a 'culture-hero,' who latterly attained godhead. He is credited with teaching the Tupi the use of fire, the *pisang*, and the cane, as well as with instructing them in agriculture.

(3) *Inferior spirits.*—Many of the Amazonian

* The name is derived by Tatevin (*Anthropos* ii. 269 f.) from *tuba upayn*, 'Father of All.'

tribes of the Tupi have an elaborate system of myths clustering round the tortoise—a favourite figure in South American folklore. In these many inferior spirits are the principal actors, the most important of them being Kurupira, the wood-demon, and Oiara, the water-sprite. Paituna, 'the wonder-monkey,' is no simian, but the son of a woman belonging to a tribe of females with only one husband. He possesses miraculous powers, which he uses to discomfit his enemies in an amusing manner.

4. The Tapuyas.—The Tapuyas or Ges tribe are the oldest of the Brazilian races. They are best known perhaps by their name of Botocudos, from a lip-peg (*botoque*) which they wear. They are found on the eastern slopes of the Cordilleras, from the peninsula of Goajira in the north to the borders of Chili, and in large numbers in Eastern Bolivia. Their principal divisions are the Karayas, the Kayapos, and the Suyas of the rivers Xingu and Araguaya. They have not as yet realized the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. The universe is kept together or disturbed, as the case may be, by human or *quasi*-human agencies. The Karaya Flood-myth relates that the hostile demon Anatiwa originated the Deluge, and sent fish to pull down those who had taken flight to the hill Topirapé. The Ges attributed the re-building of the earth to the water-hen Saracura, which fetched earth to the hills, where those saved from the Flood congregated, so that the area of safety might be enlarged. The Karaya ancestral god, Kaboi, led his people from the under to the upper world by the cry of a bird. All these myths, though in circulation among the various tribes of the Tapuya family, have their counterparts in many other American mythologies. It cannot be discovered, however, whether or no the Tapuya tribes worship those 'deities' to whom they give the credit of creating the cosmos. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that they do not. 'They have,' says Brinton, 'no definite religious rites, but are careful to bury the dead, and have a belief that the spirit of the departed survives and wanders about at night (*Amer. Race*, p. 144). They are firm believers in metempsychosis, and the appeasement by mimicry of those vague powers who cause natural phenomena. Thus they shake a burning brand and shoot arrows at the sky to appease the powers of the storm. Semi-religious dances are common among them. They are, in fact, on the borderland between totemic practice and the anthropomorphism which generally succeeds it, as is proved by the circumstance that a sub-stock, the Tucanos, take their name from the toucan bird which they adopted as the totem of their tribe.

LITERATURE.—1. *THE ARAWAKS*: E. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana* (1883); Coudreau, *Études sur les Guyane et l'Amazonie* (1886); Stradelli, 'La leggenda dell' Iurupari' (*Bol. de la soc. geogr. Ital.*), 1890, pp. 659 ff., 798 ff; Brett, *Legends and Myths of the Aboriginal Indians of British Guiana* (1868).—2 *THE CARIBS*: Karl von den Steinen, *Die Bakairi Sprache* (1892), *Unter den Naturvolkern Zentral-Brasiliens* (1894), Müller, *Amer. Urreligionen* (1855); de la Borde, *Religion des Caraïbes* (Paris, 1674).—3. *THE TUPI-GUARANI*: Barboza Rodriguez, *Exploração do Rio Jamundá* (1875); 'Poranduba amazonense' (*Ann. d. Bibl nac.* xiv., Rio, 1890); Couto de Magalhães, *O Selvagem* (1874); Guevara, *Hist. del Paraguay, Rio de la Plata y Tucuman* (1836); d'Orbigny, *L'Homme américain* (1850).—4. *THE TAPUYAS*: Ehrenreich, 'Über die Botocudos' in *ZE*, 1887, 1 ff.; Keane, *On the Botocudos* (1883).

General works are Ehrenreich, 'Beitrage zur Volkerkunde Brasiliens' (*Veroff. des Mus. fur Volkerkunde*, Bd. ii. Heft 1/2), 'Die Mythen und Legenden der Sud-Amer. Urvolker' (Suppl. to *ZE*, 1905); and the several interesting but rather out of date works of C. F. P. von Martius. LEWIS SPENCE.

BREAD.—See FOOD.

BREATH.—Breath consists of air alternately drawn in and expelled from the lungs, and constitutes a vital element in man's spiritual as well as in his physical being. As a manifestation of existence, breath is frequently used, among many peoples, as synonymous with 'life,' 'spirit,' and 'soul.' The force of these several meanings becomes clear, for example, from such passages in the Bible as Gn 2^{7}, 1 Co 15^{45}, and from the various designations for 'breath,' 'spirit,' 'soul' in Hebrew (*ruaḥ, nephesh, nĕshāmāh*), Greek (πνεῦμα, ψυχή), Latin (*animus, anima, spiritus*), and Old Church Slavic (*duchŭ*, 'breath,' 'spirit,' *dušа*, 'soul'; cf. Lithuanian *dausos*, 'air'). This is equally true of the kindred designations in other languages, even in savage tongues (see Tylor,[3] i. 433). The natural association, moreover, of the breath and breathing with the spiritual phenomenon of inspiration is seen in such a passage as Jn 20^{22}, where Jesus breathed upon the disciples when imparting to them the gift of the Holy Spirit. Cf. also Job 4^{9} 33^{4}, Is 11^{4}, Ezk $37^{9f.}$, and artt. SOUL, SPIRIT.

In classic times, among the Greeks and Romans, there were current a number of well-recognized ideas (all of them perfectly natural) which show the wide-spread and normal association of breath and air as the vital principle. Philosophers started with the postulate that the soul was drawn into the body with the first breath at birth, and they sometimes made the kindred element, wind, a vital factor in generation (*e.g.* Chrysippus, cited by Plutarch, *de Stoic. Repugn.* xli. 391; also Dio Chrysos. *Borysth. Orat.* xii. 387; cf. also the αὖραι ζωογόνοι of *Anth. Pal.* x. lxxv. 4, the πνοαὶ ψυχοτρόφοι of *Hymn. Orph.* xxxviii. 22, and, in general, Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, i. 753–764). In connexion with death, moreover, the Romans regarded it as a religious duty that the nearest relative should catch the last breath of the dying, at the moment when the vital spark was leaving the body, in order to ensure the continued existence of the spirit (see Vergil, *Aen.* iv. 684; Cic. *Verr.* ii. 5. 45; Ovid, *Metam.* xii. 424). A somewhat similar custom formerly existed among the Seminole Indians of Florida; and the fancy of the Tyrolese peasants saw the soul out-breathed like a little white cloud at death (cf. Tylor, *l.c.*). This receives still stronger exemplification among the Athapascan Tahkali, who bring breath into direct connexion with transmigration. When one is either dead or dying, the medicine-man lays his hands on the breast of the individual in question, and then places them on the head of a kinsman of the dead or moribund. The medicine-man now breathes through the hands thus imposed, and the next child born to the kinsman of the dead man is held to have received the soul of the deceased, whose rank and name he assumes (Waitz, *Anthropologie*, iii. 195). Among some of the Tupi-Guarani tribes of South America, medicine-men frequently endeavour to effect cures by breathing on the diseased or injured part, and at certain ceremonies they blow tobacco smoke on the warriors, saying, 'Receive the spirit of bravery, wherewith ye conquer your foes' (*ib.* p. 419).

None of the nations of the world, however, paid so marked attention both to the physical side of breathing and to the psychical phenomena connected with it as did the early Hindus. By them breathing was regarded as one of the sciences, and the regulation of respiration in connexion with ascetic and ritual practices was of paramount importance; nor has the art disappeared in India to-day. In early times, as shown by the philosophic treatises of the Upaniṣads, careful observers, who were imbued with the idea of the importance of controlling the vital breath, had faithfully counted the normal number of respirations *per diem*, and found the average to be 22,636 inhalations and exhalations (*Amṛtabindu Upaniṣad*, 33), or 21,606 (*Haṁsa Upaniṣad*, 4), a round 21,600

(*Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, p. 175, 4), or again 21,000 (Rāmatīrtha in his notes on *Maitrāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, vi. 1); see Deussen, *Sechszig Upaniṣads*, pp. 356 n. 4, 675 n. 2; Ewing, 'Hindu Conception of the Functions of Breath,' in *JAOS*, xxii. 264. This calculation (about 15.9 respirations per minute) answers well to the modern computations made by Western scientists, who estimate the normal breath of the healthy adult to be between 16 and 20 respirations a minute. The meditative calm and the unsurpassed self-control of the Hindu ascetic, it must be remembered, would tend to reduce the frequency of respiration, and thus justify the lower figure as claimed.

Hindu devotees and philosophers not only made these statistical observations of respiration in connexion with their religious practices and their recluse life of self-abnegation, but they also distinguished various phases of the breath-element, and assigned a particular function to each. The spiritual and religious aspect of breath is to be recognized as early as the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas, but it reaches its full development in the Upaniṣads, where it assumes a paramount place.

In Sanskrit the cardinal words relating to breath and breathing are all derivatives of the root *an*, 'breathe,' 'respire' (cognate with Gr. ἄνεμος, Lat. *animus*, Goth. *us-anan*). The principal word for 'breath' in general is the derivative *prāṇa* (from *an* with prefix *pra*). This word heads the fivefold list (sometimes known as the *prāṇa*-series), consisting of *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, and *samāna*, under which the early Hindu physiological and psychological views grouped breath in its various functions.

Much attention has been devoted to studying this fivefold series of *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, *samāna*. The most thorough of the Western investigations of the subject are those by Deussen and especially Ewing, in the works alluded to already, and quoted with full titles at the end of this article. So painstaking and exhaustive an examination as that made by Ewing (*op. cit.* 250–275, 305) proves that the first member of the series, *prāṇa*, breath in general, designates either the double process of respiration or, more particularly, 'in-breathing,' 'inhalation,' as contrasted with 'out-breathing,' which is designated more especially by *apāna*, 'exhalation,' 'exspiration.' These two words, *prāṇa* and *apāna*, occur very often together (frequently united in a *dvandva*-compound), and are used to denote the composite act of respiration. This very frequency of occurrence has caused their common long *a* (which is etymologically correct in composition of the vocalic prefixes *pra*, *apa*, with *an*) to be assumed analogically by the other three members of the group (in which the long *a* is not authorized by composition of the consonantal prefixes *vy*, *ud*, *sam*, with *an*). As to the meanings assigned, it should be noted, however, that Deussen maintains that *prāṇa* sometimes signifies 'exspiration' (*Aushauch*), and *apāna*, 'inspiration' (*Einhauch*); see his *Allgem. Gesch. d. Philos.* I. i. 294–305, I. ii. 248–252, I. iii. 69–72, 441, 492, 605, 627, 649, and his *Das System des Vedânta*, 359–364. Ewing (*op. cit.* 292) strongly combats the point. His own investigations, moreover (*op. cit.* 275–276), tend to show that *apāna* denotes not only 'out-breathing,' but also the physiological breath-functions of that part of the body below the navel.

The term *vyāna*, lit. 'breathing apart,' appears to denote a permeating or abiding breath-factor which forms a sort of connecting link between *prāṇa* and *apāna*, though separate from them, and occupies also the interval between respirations (see Ewing, *op. cit.* 277–303). Deussen's rendering of the word is 'interspiration' (*Zwischenhauch*). The other two terms, *udāna* and *samāna*, are less frequent in occurrence and more obscure in significance. They seem to have to do with the function of breath in connexion with digestion. Deussen's renderings are 'up-breathing' (*Aufhauch*) and 'all-breathing' (*Allhauch*); see his *Philos. of the Upanishads*, 279–280. Ewing's various allusions to these last two breath-elements of the *prāṇa*-series (*op. cit.* 260–287) should be compared.

In modern times the Hindu *yogi*-ascetics and certain of the advanced native thinkers of India still look upon breathing as a science to be cultivated under competent teachers. The practice of appropriately regulated breathing, they maintain, affects not only the vital activity, but also the mental activity, and produces corresponding psychic results. The complete control of the vital breaths, even to suspending the breath for a considerable length of time, brings with it a mastery over all the forces that govern both mind and body. For some of the claims still made by living exponents of these views, reference may be made to the writings of Rāma Prasād and the Swāmi Abhedānanda, cited below.

LITERATURE.—The full titles of the chief works alluded to in this art. are: **Ewing**, 'The Hindu Conception of the Functions of Breath—a Study in Early Hindu Psycho-physics,' in *JAOS*, xxii. 249–308, New Haven, 1901; **Deussen**, *Allgem. Gesch. der Philos.* i. (3 parts), Leipzig, 1894–1908, his *Sechszig Upanishads des Veda*, Leipzig, 1897, also *Das System des Vedânta*, 359–364, Leipzig, 1883, and *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* [Eng. tr. by Geden, pp. 274–280, Edinburgh, 1906]; **Tylor**, *Primitive Culture*[3], i. 431–433, London, 1871 [[4]1903]; **Lobeck**, *Aglaophamus*, Konigsberg, 1829; **Waitz**, *Anthropologie der Naturvolker*, iii., Leipzig, 1862; **Rāma Prasād**, *Nature's Finer Forces* (Science of Breath), Bombay, 1890; **Abhedānanda**, *How to be a Yogi* (Science of Breathing), pp. 125–160, New York, 1902.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

BRETHREN OF THE COMMON LIFE.—**1. Founders.**—The Brethren of the Common Life represent one of the most successful of the many efforts made during the Middle Ages for the revival of piety. Some of their external arrangements were similar to those of the Beghards and Beguines, but their organization was more closely connected with the system and discipline of the Church, as was intended by their founders, Gerard Groot and his chief disciple, Florentius. Gerard (1340–1384) was the son of Werner Groot, a wealthy citizen and magistrate of Deventer. He took his degree at the University of Paris, acquiring a considerable reputation for talent and attainments, and then settled at Cologne, which had long been a celebrated seat of learning, and subsequently became a university town. Here he combined the pursuit of study with worldly amusements, and became very popular among his associates. Converted by the efforts and prayers of a former friend, named Henry Kalkar, the prior of a Carthusian monastery, he completely changed his mode of life. Throwing off his elegant clothes, he assumed the simplest and humblest dress, while for his inward improvement he withdrew for three years into a Carthusian monastery, where he spent his time in meditation and self-discipline. He also visited the saintly Ruysbroeck, prior of the monastery of Grünthal, to whose spiritual influence he owed much of the progress of his soul. After five years he came forth as an evangelizing preacher of great force and persuasiveness, full of zeal for the revival of truly spiritual religion among the people at large, and anxious for the reform of the monks and clergy. He was ordained deacon, but never regarded himself as worthy of the priesthood. For three years and a half he went about preaching in Holland and the Netherlands, with the result that he drew many souls out of worldliness and sin and led them to holiness of life. His success, and his severe condemnation of the laxity of the clergy, however deserved, led to opposition to his preaching; and the Bishop of Utrecht was persuaded to

silence him, by withdrawing licences to preach from deacons. An appeal was made to the Pope, but it is uncertain whether this was successful, for Groot died soon after, in his 44th year. He was prematurely cut off by the plague, caught while visiting a sick friend. But he had had time, with the help of his foremost disciple, Florentius, to plan arrangements for confirming his converts in Christian ways. These two good men sought to establish Brotherhoods and Sisterhoods, in which those who had been rescued from worldliness might find refuge, and they decided on the foundation of some monasteries which might serve as a support and means of guidance to the inmates of the Houses, and might also offer a model of monastic reformation. The movement received the name of the 'moderna devotio.' Groot had some years before his death given over his own spacious house to the town authorities of Deventer as an abode for widows and maidens who should live together in piety and good works. The Brotherhoods were also begun at Deventer, while the first monastery was established at Windesheim. It was Augustinian, and became the centre of several new and many reformed monasteries. The next was founded on Mount St. Agnes, near Zwolle. A brother of Thomas à Kempis was the first prior of the latter, and Thomas himself, after his education at Deventer, spent his life in it as a monk.

2. **Regulations.** — In common with all pious persons in the mediæval Church, Groot regarded the career of the monastic regulars as the highest; but his societies were intended as a link between the monks and the people, and his Brotherhoods and Sisterhoods formed a kind of modified monasticism without any vows. Their members, living a common life in their respective houses, were to work for their maintenance, to give what they could save to the poor and sick, and to interest themselves in the religious teaching of the young. The members of a Brotherhood were drawn from various classes. The educated copied books, as was done in monasteries, and, later on, attended to printing them, while those who had been brought up to handicrafts practised these for the benefit of the House. The hours of prayer and of attendance at Mass were diligently observed. There were several priests in each house, besides the lay members. The head of the community was called 'rector,' and implicit obedience to him was required. Under him was the 'procurator,' who was general manager. Various offices, such as those of librarian, sacristan, warden of the infirmary, down to the humbler ones of tailor, baker, and cook, were distributed among the Brethren. Besides being called *Fratres vitæ communis*, the brothers acquired several other appellations, such as *Fratres bonæ voluntatis*, from their benevolence, and *Fratres cucullati* from their cap or head-dress, and they were often called Lollards by their enemies, though they had no real connexion with that sect. Owing to their educational labours, they also acquired the designation of *Fratres Hieronymi*, 'Brothers of St. Jerome,' who was regarded as a patron of learning. The dress of the Brothers was black or grey; for priests and clerics it went down to the feet, for lay brethren to the knee; and a black cap was worn on the head. The under garment was washed every month in summer, every two months in winter. On entrance into the society each man could deal with his property as he liked; but if he once gave it over to the House, he could not withdraw it in the event of his leaving. The Brothers rose at half-past three in the morning, and went to bed at nine in the evening. During the day an interval was allowed for repose. Dinner was at ten o'clock, supper at five. At meals the Scriptures or the *Lives* of the Saints were read, the Brothers taking a week each, from the seniors downwards. Meat might be eaten on Sundays, and other days except Fridays and fast days. Their drink was one little mug of beer of the small size out of which wine was usually drunk (Dumbar, *Analecta*, i. 14). Many members of the society injured themselves by excessive fasting, in a degree not required by the rules. Constant industry, according to the previous training of each man, was inculcated; and where there was a farm or garden, outdoor labour was required. All these activities of the Brothers contrasted favourably with the begging habits of the friars, who were mostly living in idleness, and became in consequence the bitter enemies of the Brothers; while the domestic work of the Sisterhoods and their instruction of girls made them appear to great advantage as compared with the degenerate nuns. It might well be supposed that these hard-working and devout societies would have been commended of all men, but the friars succeeded in raising much opposition against them, while among the people at large the reverence which was felt for the regular and long-established monastic orders, bound by lifelong vows, was not bestowed upon the more secular system of the new society, till eventually they were known by their fruits and became respected for their good deeds. It was doubtless better for them not to be thought much of, at any rate at first, as they were thereby guarded from the temptation to pride which beset the old religious orders. The opposition, however, was carried to the verge of persecution, for at the Council of Constance a Dominican named Grabow accused the Brethren of the Common Life, and maintained that it was a mortal sin to form a community without the vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity. They were, however, defended by their friends and supporters, the Windesheim monks, and also by Gerson. The Council condemned Grabow, and offered him the choice of retractation or the stake. Several Popes also had the good sense to support the Brotherhoods and Sisterhoods by their rescripts.

3. **Influence on education.**—The eventual estimation of the Brothers among the people at large was mainly promoted by their devoted efforts on behalf of the religious education of boys. At their first centre, Deventer, they boarded many of the scholars who attended the noted school already existing there, or obtained hospitality for them among devout widows or benevolent burghers. Their religious teaching was mainly given in their Houses, but some of their scholars rose to be assistant teachers, or 'lectors,' in the school, and thus their work and influence became blended with the secular parts of education. Similar arrangements were made in the many other towns to which the educational work of the Brotherhoods rapidly extended. There was no opposition in those days to the religious side of education. On the contrary, the authorities of towns in Holland and Germany frequently invited the help of the Brothers, and induced members of their Society to settle in their midst, providing houses for them. In some places they were entrusted with the reorganization of the schools. Distinguished and pious schoolmasters, such as Hegius at Deventer and John Cele at Zwolle, were in close touch with the Brothers, and there can be no doubt that not a few of the latter became teachers of classics as well as of religion. When the culture brought in by the Renaissance, with its revived study of Greek, extended to Germany, through the energy of Rudolph Agricola and others, it gradually won over members of the Brotherhoods, and added thereby to the effectiveness of their educational labours. In some of the schools there were more

than a thousand scholars, and the spectacle of devoted men giving their best energies to bringing up the rising generation in true religion and sound learning gave new hope to all who had the good of their country at heart. At the same time it must be admitted that it was the aim of the Brothers not only to produce good laymen and priests, but also to recruit the monasteries with more earnest novices; and Erasmus complains that they unduly pressed their youths to enter monastic life. This was certainly not the case with Florentius, but it may have been so later on; and we must remember that Erasmus was induced by the desire of his guardians to become a monk, because they had wasted his patrimony, so that he was somewhat prejudiced.

It has been sometimes stated that the Brothers founded schools of their own, but this is a mistake; for instance, Erasmus was not educated in schools belonging to them, as has been usually alleged. He attended the public schools, while boarding with the Brothers and receiving religious teaching from them. Their educational labours continued for about a hundred and fifty years, when most of the schools in which they had taught came under the influence of the Jesuits. The Lutheran Reformation occasioned the Roman Catholic movement that has been called the Counter-Reformation. This was led mainly by the Jesuits, and their pushing and aggressive methods eventually superseded the more modest and quiet work that the societies founded by Groot and Florentius had carried on.

In connexion with the name of Florentius Radewin (1350–1400), we have to notice the boyhood of Thomas à Kempis (1380–1471) before his entrance upon the life of a monk in the Augustinian monastery of Mount St. Agnes. Very early in life Thomas was sent to the school of Deventer, and was brought into connexion with the saintly Florentius, who had, for the sake of being near Gerard Groot, given up higher ecclesiastical emoluments to become one of the Vicars of the collegiate Church of St. Lebuin. He was, after Groot's death, the recognized leader of the societies that Groot and he were establishing, but he did not become at first the Rector of the House at Deventer. He had accepted that office by the time à Kempis applied for admission, and his winning and gracious manners and a natural dignity of bearing had given him a predominant influence for good. He befriended the youthful à Kempis and placed him with a devout widow, receiving him for a part of the time into his own house. It is not too much to say that we owe the spiritual meditations written by à Kempis to the effect on his after life of the saintly character of Florentius. Among many such writings the *Imitatio Christi* is usually included; and if, as we fully believe, the authorship of that well-known book of devotion is rightly ascribed to him, the debt we owe to the revered teacher of his early days can hardly be over-rated. Thomas himself has commemorated Groot and Florentius and some of the early Brethren in a remarkable work, which has long been bound up with his other writings in the edition of Sommalius. In this he gives most interesting details of his spiritual Father and Rector, as well as of other members of the House. A short sketch of a youth of his own age, named Arnold of Schoonhoven, who was his model of piety, closes these valuable memoirs. They are also interesting as affording one among many evidences of the *Imitatio* having been composed by à Kempis. Dr. Hirsche, in his *Kritisch-exegetische Einleitung*, brings forward a number of quotations to show the similarity of many expressions in these biographies to those in the *Imitatio*. And it may be added that the lives of the founders and brothers so recorded afford an impressive realization of the precepts of that manual of devotion, and exhibit a spirit of piety which belongs to the same lines of religious thought. It is scarcely too much to say that the *Imitatio* cannot be fully understood without a perusal of these records.

4. Doctrines.—The remarks just made bring us to the question as to the doctrinal limitations of the Brothers and their kindred monks. Groot was a firm adherent of all the dogmas of the Roman Church, and had even been called *malleus hæreticorum*,[•] 'the hammer of heretics.' When the saintly Ruysbroeck expressed himself, as Groot thought, with too great freedom in the direction of mysticism, he opposed his sentiments. Yet if we take the word 'mysticism,' which may be used in many senses, as meaning the personal and inward realization of spiritual truth imparted by the Holy Ghost as contrasted with a mere outward and formal religion, we shall find it present in the teaching of Groot and Florentius and in that of à Kempis; and some of the Windesheim monks were even more definitely mystics. Yet none of the earlier Brothers would have allowed himself to question any belief that was a part of the Papal system. And those writers are wrong who have maintained that the Brethren of the Common Life were 'Reformers before the Reformation.' In one respect, indeed, they were reformers, but they never intended to be so in the sense that we associate with Protestantism. This point was their advocacy of encouraging the laity to read the Scriptures in the vulgar tongue; but they did so without any doubt occurring to them as to the Bible being fully consonant with Roman doctrine. They wished laymen to study Holy Scripture for their personal improvement, and frequently gave informal addresses to them in their houses on passages of the Bible, and especially on those that bore on practical duty. Among the Brothers at Deventer, Gerard Zerbolt, one of the librarians, was the strongest advocate of translations of Holy Writ and of prayers being supplied to the lay-folk in the vernacular; and his arguments are well worthy of study in the treatises that he put forth, and which still exist.

When, later on, the Lutheran Reformation began to make progress, the Brethren of the Common Life were found, as was natural, on the side of the Papacy; yet in time the new doctrines made their way into some of the Houses, and individual members were won over by them. After a while several of the Brother-houses went over entirely to the Reformed faith, and that at Wesel received the warm approbation of Luther himself.

The welcome given in many towns to the greater freedom of doctrine promised by the Reformers damaged the continuance of Brother-houses in which the Roman teaching was still maintained; but a few here and there survived for a long time; and while the educational work passed either to the Protestants or to the Jesuits, some Brother-houses lingered on till suppressed by Napoleon Bonaparte. The Sister-houses, begun in the first instance by Groot himself at Deventer, became widely extended, and accomplished good work in the training of girls, as well as in copying books, in miniature painting, and in the humbler offices of household duty. The Superior was usually called 'Martha,' and one of the most impressive of the treatises of Thomas à Kempis is an encomium on the duties and influence of a woman who thus cares in practical matters for the welfare of the devout. There was usually a priest attached to the Sister-houses who acted as ruler and confessor. Among the most remarkable of the latter was Brinckerinck, who ruled Groot's house for women at Deventer. Some of his addresses to the Sisters still exist, and are full of helpful words of encouragement for the spiritual life. A good many of the Sisters eventually joined Augustinian nunneries.

It has been stated that the monasteries of Windesheim and St. Agnes, and others afterwards established, were a part of Groot's scheme, and remained in close sympathy with the Brothers. A *Chronicle of Windesheim*, by Busch, a contemporary of à Kempis, contains many references to Groot and Florentius, and extracts from their letters, which show that the spiritual teaching in both these parts of Groot's system was identical, and that Florentius, when Rector of the House at Deventer, exercised the greatest care as to recommending Brothers to take the vows at Windesheim, or elsewhere, fully knowing the danger it had been to monasteries to receive persons who had no adequate vocation for lifelong devotion. The *Chronicle of Mount St. Agnes* was written during

his life by à Kempis, and a touching notice of his death is added at the close by another hand.

LITERATURE.—I. *ORIGINAL SOURCES*—The most readily available of these are the lives of Gerard, Florentius, and others, by Thomas à Kempis, in the editions by Sommalius, in the 17th cent., of the works of à Kempis (earlier editions: *Opera et libri vitæ*, Nuremberg, 1494, and *à Kempis opera*, Antwerp, 1574; Eng. tr. *The Founders of the New Devotion*, by J. P. Arthur, Lond. 1905); also Thomas à Kempis, *Chronicon canonicorum regularium Montis S. Agnetis* (Eng. tr. *Chronicle of Mount St. Agnes*, by J. P. Arthur, Lond. 1905-1906); J. Buschius, *Chronicon Windeshemense*, Antwerp, 1621, re-edited by Karl Grube, with the *Liber de reformatione monasteriorum*, Halle, 1886 (an indispensable source for the study of Gerard Groot, and the Brothers and monks influenced by him); and a tr. of Gerald Zerbolt's *Beatus vir* and *Homo quidam*, by J. P. Arthur, London, 1908.

II. *MODERN LITERATURE*—Delprat, *Verhandeling over de Broederschap van G. Groote en over ten invloed der Fraterhuizen*, Utrecht, 1830 (revised ed Arnheim, 1856); Acquoy, *Het Klooster te Windesheim en zijn invloed*, 1875-1880; Hirsche, *Kritisch-exegetische Einleitung in die Werke des Thomas von Kempen*, Berlin, 1873, artt. on 'Gerard,' 'Florentius,' and others in *PRE* (3 editions); artt on 'Bruder des gemeinsamen Lebens' in *PRE*[1] (Ullmann), in *PRE*[2] (Hirsche), and in *PRE*[3] (Schulze). Of these, the article by Hirsche goes the deepest, Schulze treating chiefly of the outward development See also K. Grube, *Groot und seine Stiftungen*, Cologne, 1883 One of the most valuable treatises on the characteristics and work of the Brotherhood is that by E. Mobius, Leipzig, 1887. Bonet-Maury, *Gérard de Groote*, Paris, 1878, contains a useful list of Gerardic writings, and extracts from them. Kettlewell, *Thomas à Kempis and the Brothers of the Common Life*[2] (abridged), Lond. 1885, will be found useful, but does not contain the more recent criticism and information. An interesting sketch of the Brethren of the Common Life is contained in Neale's *History of the Jansenist Church of Holland*, Oxford, 1858. Sir Francis Cruise, *Thomas à Kempis: a Visit to the Scenes in which his Life was spent*, Lond 1887, contains a very valuable list of the bibliography and literature of the whole subject. A further list of original sources is given in S. Harvey Gem, *Hidden Saints: the Brothers of the Common Life*, London, 1907.

S. HARVEY GEM.

BRETHREN OF THE FREE SPIRIT.—This name has been given to mystic-pantheists who emerged in the 13th cent., were associated with different sects such as the Beghards, and continued generation after generation down to the 16th century. Mosheim found, as he thought, their characteristic doctrines in writings of the 11th cent.; but it is safer to connect the origin of the Brethren with a speculative movement of the 13th century. At the beginning of that century there was a philosophical revival, which was quickened by Aristotelianism mixed with Neo-Platonism and introduced to the West in an Arabic dress. Under its influence David of Dinant indulged in speculations tending to pantheism; and at the same time Almaric of Bena, also affected by the Oriental Aristotelianism, set forth mystic doctrines which were accounted pantheistic and therefore dangerous to religion. At Paris in 1204, Almaric was charged with teaching 'quod quilibet Christianus teneatur credere, se esse membrum Christi, nec aliquem posse salvari, qui hoc non crederet.' On an appeal to Rome he was condemned; and it is evident, therefore, that his teaching must have had some meaning other than the mystical union of the believer with Christ, since it was judged to be heretical.

Thomas Aquinas, enumerating three errors regarding the being of God, distinguished between David of Dinant and Almaric:

'Alii autem dixerunt deum esse principium formale omnium rerum, et haec dicitur fuisse opinio Almaricanorum. Sed tertius error fuit David de Dinando, qui stultissime posuit deum esse materiam primam' (*Summa*, I. iii. 8)

Though the men were both dead, a Council of Paris in 1209 condemned their works; and it was asserted that Almaric had inspired the dangerous doctrines of the Almaricians, as they were called. Among these doctrines this was set forth:

'Pater in Abraham incarnatus, Filius in Maria, Spiritus Sanctus in nobis quotidie incarnatur—omnia unum, quia quidquid est, est deus.'

Further, the Almaricians were accused of teaching that now, in the time of the Spirit, salvation in no way depends on the sacraments of the Church, and that what are accounted sins of the flesh are not sins if done through love. It was not likely that these men would escape the censure and punishment of the Church, and a persecution directed against heretics was begun in Paris in 1210, and in 1212 was raging in Strassburg. Among those who perished at Strassburg were *Ortliebenses*, a name derived from Ortlieb, whose teaching marked him as a follower of Almaric.

These men were hardly entitled to be considered speculative thinkers, but none the less there were elements of pantheism and mysticism in their principles. They maintained that the uncreated universe is eternal, and that, while there is no resurrection of the body, immortality is for all. The Trinity was represented in some mystic fashion by three members of their community. They were not charged with carnal practices, but they roused ecclesiastical opposition by repudiating the sacraments and ordinances of the Church as unnecessary for men united with God. In 1215, at the fourth Lateran Council, the theories of Almaric were once more condemned, and condemned with the full authority of the Church. The mystic-pantheistic doctrines set forth by the Almaricians were not crushed, however, by the persecution of 1210, by the Lateran decree, or by a persecution which took place in 1216, as they were wide-spread, and had reached even the Waldenses, in the middle of the century, when they were attacked by Albertus Magnus. The opposition of Albertus did not stay the progress of these doctrines, and they began to affect the Beguines and Beghards, who, though they had long enjoyed the blessing of the Church, were exciting suspicion by their fanatical laudation of poverty. In these communities, prophets or teachers appeared who taught that God could best be served in freedom of spirit, and they and their converts were known as 'Brethren of the Free Spirit.' The orthodox Beghards and Beguines suffered from the evil reputation of the heretics, and the Franciscan spirituals, often confused with the Beghards, suffered in the same way.

It is difficult to determine the circumstances under which the name of 'Brethren of the Free Spirit' was adopted or applied, and also to discover the author of the phrase. Lea in his *History of the Inquisition* (ii. 321) says:

'Even the orthodox Cæsarius of Heisterbach [died *c.* 1240] argues that much is permitted to the saints which is forbidden to sinners; where is the Spirit of God, there is liberty—have charity and do what thou pleasest. When the fatal word had once been spoken, it could not be hushed to silence.'

In an episcopal letter of 1317, quoted by Gieseler (*Lehrbuch*, III. vii. 90), the writer enumerated the errors of those

'quos vulgus Beghardos et Schwestrones nominant, ipsi vero et ipsae se de secta liberi spiritus et voluntariae paupertatis parvos fratres vel sorores vocant.'

The name, whatever its origin, was directly associated neither with pantheism nor mysticism, but with the liberty of which Cæsarius of Heisterbach wrote, and for which Pauline authority was claimed. Yet this liberty was asserted not as mere licence, but as the natural right of men with the Divine Spirit.

The logic of the doctrines of the Brethren is intelligible. God is what is, and men, being of Him, come from and return to Him. There is therefore neither purgatory nor hell, and the sacraments and ordinances of the Church are unneeded. As man is essentially Divine and is able through contemplation and withdrawal from things of sense to know himself united with God, he can in his freedom do what God does, and must act as God works in him. There is therefore for the free man neither virtue nor vice. God is all, and all is God, and all is His; and men are therefore free to take or beg their bread, so that they

may not be entangled through labour in the things of sense. Intelligible though the logic may be, the doctrines contradicted the dogmas, and led to a violation of the practices, of the Church, with the destruction of morality. The same Cæsarius of Heisterbach who had a plea for liberty condemned the men who indulged in it (*de Miraculis*, v. 22):

'Maximam etiam blasphemiam ausi sunt dicere in Spiritum Sanctum, a quo omnis munditia est et sanctitas. Si aliquis est in Spiritu Sancto, aiebant, et faciat fornicationem, aut aliqua alia pollutione polluatur, non est ei peccatum, quia ille spiritus qui est Deus, est in eo, ille operatur omnia in omnibus.'

Mosheim (*Instit.* II. v. 11) quotes the following from *de Novem Rupibus*, a private book of the Brethren:

'Moreover, the godlike man operates and begets the same that God operates and begets. For in God he worked and created heaven and earth. He is also the generator of the eternal word. Nor can God do anything without this man. The godlike man should, therefore, make his will conformable to God's will, so that he should will all that God wills. If, therefore, God wills that I should sin, I ought by no means to will that I may not have sinned. This is true contrition. And if a man have committed a thousand mortal sins, and the man is well regulated and united to God, he ought not to wish that he had not done those sins; and he ought to prefer suffering a thousand deaths rather than to have omitted one of those mortal sins.'

An indictment of a Beghard in 1367 is recorded by Dollinger in his *Sektengesch. des Mittelalters* (ii. 386). The charges may have been exaggerated, but they show at least what could be urged against the Brethren. The accused had declared, it was alleged,

'quod talis homo liber redditur impeccabilis et potest agere quidquid vult et sibi placet, et si natura inclinaret ad actum venereum, potest licite ipsum perficere cum sorore sua vel matre et in quocumque loco sicut in altari; et dixit quod magis naturale est talem actum venereum exercere cum uxore sua carnali quam cum alia muliere propter affinitatem naturae; et subjunxit quod perfectus liber a se licentiat virtutes sub tali distinctione, quod homo liber non est sub lege quocunque, nec tenetur ad statuta ecclesiae nec praecepta qualiacunque, quod talis est liber spiritu id est *ein fry Geist*, quod idem est quam homo liber, et statuta et praecepta ecclesiae debent saltem tenere grossi homines, id est homines sub lege existentes, quos ipse grossos homines appellat.'

The ecclesiastical councils of the 14th cent. condemned from time to time the doctrines of the Brethren, and the Inquisition added many of them to the number of its victims. One of those who suffered death (in 1310) was Marguerite de Hainault, described as *béguine clergesse*. She was charged with teaching that the soul absorbed in Divine love could yield without sin or remorse to all demands of the flesh. At the end of the century (in 1397), Nicholas of Basel, the most noted of the Brethren of his time, was burned, along with two of his disciples, at Vienna by the Inquisition. The famous Eckhart, the founder of the German Mystics, was harassed by the Inquisition, and, but for his natural death, might have perished as a heretic. John XXII. condemned twenty-eight articles said to be founded on Eckhart's teaching, and among these were the assertions of the common divinity of God and man, and of sin and virtue as the same in the sight of God. The accused, however, was not alive to defend himself. The famous company of the Friends of God sprang from the Brethren, Lea asserts (*op. cit.* ii. 365); but he admits that they 'avoided the deplorable moral extravagances of the parent sect.' Tauler was careful in his sermons to mark the difference between his doctrines and those of the Brethren, and the author of the *Deutsche Theologie* condemned theories which were those of the Brethren.

In the 15th cent. the Brethren, thanks to the Inquisition, were less active than they had been in the 14th; but amidst the Hussite troubles there was evidence of them in Bohemia, where the name of *Beghard* was modified to *Picard*. In 1453, Pope Nicholas V. ordered the wandering Beghards to ally themselves to the Tertiaries of the Mendicant Orders, and thus many of the Brethren, or those professing the doctrines of the Free Spirit, were brought under rule. Even then, however, the doctrines were not altogether suppressed, for in 1492, Friar John of Moravia was crushing Hussites and Beghards; and in the Libertines of the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Switzerland who flourished in the 16th cent., and even in some of the Anabaptists, were found doctrines and practices associating them with the Brethren of the Free Spirit.

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J. HERKLESS.

BRETHREN (Plymouth).—In the 2nd quarter of the 19th century the State Churches in Great Britain were worldly and dead; the Dissenters were orthodox and cold; the great Evangelical Revival was on the wane. Edward Irving had translated Ben Ezra's book, *The Coming of Messiah in Glory and Majesty*. He had been greatly moved by it, and was preaching that the Lord was coming. This had stirred people of all classes, and it seemed like the midnight cry: 'Behold the Bridegroom cometh.' It was in the midst of this state of things that the movement of Brethrenism originated (1827). The first 'Brother' was Edward Cronin, a doctor, who felt that true Christians, being one body in Christ, ought to be welcomed to the Lord's Table, wherever His Table was spread. But the movement received its impulse and direction from men far excelling Cronin in gifts and power. Anthony Norris Groves, a missionary to Syria and India, suggested to John Gifford Bellett, a lawyer: 'This, I doubt not, is the mind of God concerning us, that we should come together in all simplicity as disciples, not waiting on any pulpit or ministry, but trusting the Lord will edify us together by ministering to us, as He sees good, from ourselves.' This idea got hold of Bellett's mind, and was the germ of the movement. With Francis Hutchinson, John V. Parnell (afterwards Lord Congleton), and others, he organized a meeting in Hutchinson's house, to which Cronin came. In 1830, at Parnell's suggestion, they removed to a large room in Aungier Street, Dublin, so that they might be more of a testimony. Another eminent man associated himself with them, John Nelson Darby. Born at Westminster, London, November 18th, 1800, he graduated with honours at Trinity College, was trained for the law, but forsook it for a clerical career, and became a curate in Co. Wicklow, where he was reputed a saint on account of his holy life. He was now in the prime of life; his intellectual abilities were of the highest order; his piety was sincere and deep, while his power to hold men under his influence was the wonder of his foes and the admiration of his friends. The way in which he controlled the Brethren for fifty years exemplifies this.

Groves asserted that ordination to preach was not needed by a spirit-gifted minister; Cronin, that there was only one church-membership, viz. the body of Christ; while Darby, in a pamphlet written in 1828 (while he was a clergyman in the Irish Church), entitled 'The Nature and Unity of the Church of Christ,' set forth the principles of gathering to the Lord's name and the Church's union with Christ. Thus, Cronin, Groves, Bellett, Parnell, and Darby were the founders of the movement. It would be difficult to determine the relative influence of the first four, but, undoubtedly, Darby was the great leader and teacher.

To the company in Aungier Street many were

added between 1830 and 1832. At first they did not think of separating from the Churches around. This came as the result of their principles and practice, and when they increased in power and numbers. Darby visited Oxford in July 1830, where he met, amongst others, B. W. Newton and G. V. Wigram, both of whom came under his influence and power. A meeting was formed at Plymouth. Newton and other able men ministered there for years. From it the name 'Plymouth Brethren' was derived, while from Darby the name 'Darbyites' was received. Newton had a speculative mind, was grave and earnest, and became the most prominent leader at Plymouth. George Müller, brother-in-law to Groves, was the co-pastor with Henry Craik at Bethesda Chapel, Bristol. Both these and their congregation, in a measure, adopted the principles of the Brethren. A few brethren joined them, and one meeting was formed, but most Brethren now think this was a mistake. A gathering was formed at Rawstorne Street, London, and meetings sprang up both in England and Ireland. Between 1832 and 1838 meetings to study prophecy were held in Lady Powercourt's mansion, Co. Wicklow. They were attended by eminent clergymen, and Darby, Bellett, and Wigram went to them, and took part in them.

From 1830 to 1835 the movement swept on. J. L. Harris, a clergyman, joined the ranks of the Brethren. He edited their first magazine, *The Christian Witness*, to which Darby, Bellett, Newton, S. P. Tregelles and other writers contributed. It set forth the doctrines of Brethrenism with vigour and freshness (1834–40). A tract depôt was begun, from which issued a steady stream of tracts. The clergy became alarmed as several of their order joined the movement, which was at first, undoubtedly, a 'better-class' movement, containing lords, ladies, and officers not a few. The people were evangelized with great zeal; lay preaching was held to be the duty of all who had received grace and gift, and in the open air and in meeting-rooms the doctrines of Brethrenism were expounded. Separateness from the world was necessary; for the Lord was at hand, and every one must be ready to meet Him.

Groves went on a mission to Baghdad, and then laboured in India, with the result that many Anglo-Indians became disciples of the new faith. On returning to England, however, he found a stricter system of fellowship existing than when he left. He wrote to Darby protesting against this, but it was too late, for his own words to Bellett had raised a force which he could not now control.

Darby evangelized in Ireland, and visited Switzerland, where his success was phenomenal. The Evangelical Revival had taken place. He preached the Atonement of Christ, His Resurrection, Intercession, and Second Coming. He engaged in controversies with the Wesleyans and with Church leaders. Seventy companies of Brethren were gathered in Switzerland. He also visited France and Germany, where he gained many disciples. His labours extended, with intervals of visitations to England, several years. A reference to the first vol. of his *Letters* will show his great activity. Later, he devoted his attention to Germany, and translated the New Testament, and afterwards the Old, into German. G. Müller visited Germany in 1843. Ministering amongst the Baptists, he spread the tenets of the Brethren in the Fatherland.

Meanwhile, Newton remained at Plymouth, but, unlike Darby and others, never heartily adopted the doctrine of the Spirit's presence in the assembly, but set up what Tregelles called 'a modified Presbyterianism,' which was self-elected, and confined the services of prayer, praise, teaching, and rule to himself and those associated with him at Plymouth.

This was to be the model for all meetings, and an effort was made to carry it out. He denied the immediate return of the Lord, teaching that certain events must take place before He did come. He discouraged brethren who held opposite views from ministering. His lectures, copied in manuscript, were circulated widely amongst a select few. J. L. Harris and others, helpless to combat this state of things, left Plymouth. It was at this time (1845) that Darby returned. He had borne with Newton's views on the Second Coming, but would not tolerate the setting aside of the Spirit's presence in the Church, for that Darby viewed as the re-establishment of the clerical system that the Brethren had left in the Churches around. Darby maintained that by Newton's clerical control the Spirit was displaced in the assembly. He protested against this, but Newton and his supporters would not yield. Darby and many others withdrew from communion, and, after waiting from March till December, they broke bread apart from the Newton party at Raleigh Street, Plymouth. Indignation against Darby was intense. He had broken the unity of the Brethren, and they, who had testified to unity, were now in disunion. Darby's contention was that he 'could not maintain union to support evil,' and that 'truth was more to him than friends, religious reputation, or unity.' Two years' controversy followed, in which the leaders took part. Charges against Newton's writings and his rule in the Plymouth assembly were interwoven with the main issue, viz. the 'Spirit's freedom to use whomsoever He pleased in the assembly while gathered to the Lord's name for worship and ministry.' This was what Darby and his followers contended for, and it was this that Newton and his associates resisted. Round this same question of clericalism many later disputes arose and caused divisions.

In 1847, Newton's opinions on the sufferings of Christ came to light. He had taught, amongst a select body of disciples, that our Lord, being a man and an Israelite, was born relatively under the curse of God, which rested on the human race generally, and on Israel specially, on account of their having broken the Law and rejected their Messiah; and that, from childhood to His baptism in Jordan, Christ was obnoxious to the wrath of God, but escaped much on account of His prayer and piety. When Newton's views became known, they were rejected by the mass of the Brethren, and many of his former supporters, such as Soltau, Batten, Dyer, and Clulow, abjured their errors, and confessed they had been under the delusion of Satan as to their doctrines, and in supporting Newton. Newton made a confession, which was considered insufficient, and withdrew his tracts, which he never re-issued, for re-consideration. He admitted that in expressions he was wrong, and that in one particular he had erred, viz. in contending that our Lord was under Adam's federal headship. The meeting at Ebrington Street, Plymouth, was broken up. Newton removed to London, modified his views considerably, and formed a church of which he became minister, having no fellowship with any other religious body. He wrote largely on Prophecy, and in his writings there are passages of great literary beauty. He died in 1899, aged 92, having outlived all his compeers.

It was Newton's teachings that caused the first division amongst Brethren, which took place at Bethesda in 1849. Müller and Craik refused to allow a congregational judgment on Newton's

tracts. Several who had sympathized with Newton's views, and two Brethren who had imbibed his teachings, were received by the Bethesda congregation. It is a moot point whether Muller and Craik knew of the views of those disciples of Newton who did not openly promulgate them. Their reception called forth from G. Alexander and sixty others a vigorous protest. Müller and Craik would not allow the congregation to judge and condemn Newton's tracts until it adopted a paper called 'The Letter of the Ten,' signed by themselves and eight other leaders, and to which some of Newton's sympathizers adhibited their names. This paper committed the Church to a neutral position, and defined for years the ecclesiastical position of those afterwards called 'Open' Brethren. It became a document of discord, and a barrier to fellowship between the two great sections of the Brethren. Bethesda assembly adopted the paper, and retained the ministry of their pastors, who had threatened to resign unless this were done. To Darby, Wigram, Dorman, and others the position thus taken up was wrong, and they would not tolerate it. Darby was branded as a schismatic, and severely attacked. The result was that the dispute affected all the meetings throughout the land. Bethesda assembly, with its pastors, now took up the question. Seven meetings were held before the end of the year, as a result of which some of those who had supported Newton withdrew from fellowship, in order to relieve the Church from its dilemma. Two of these, on retiring, in a paper read to the congregation, declared that Newton was fundamentally sound. With some others they attempted to form a congregation, but failed, and were afterwards re-admitted to Bethesda on their confessing that they had erred in leaving. By Darby and those who agreed with him this was not considered a proper judgment of the evil doctrines. Muller and Craik both condemned Newton's doctrines, and declared that, if Newton's teachings were right, then Christ would require a Saviour Himself. But their judgment came too late, as what might have prevented a schism in July could not heal the division in December.

When Bethesda had judged the question in this fashion, Darby called on Müller with a view to reconciliation; but the accounts of the interview differ essentially, as can be seen by comparing Darby's letter to J. S. Oliphant with Muller's letter to an unknown correspondent in 1883. Darby issued a letter to all the Brethren condemning Bethesda, and calling upon all assemblies to reject her principles. He denounced as evil 'The Letter of the Ten,' which, he said, permitted association with a heretical congregation by allowing persons coming from it to have fellowship, provided they had not imbibed the evil doctrines. And this the Exclusive Brethren hold with inflexible strictness to this day. Fellowship with meetings where evil doctrines are held is repudiated, and no one is allowed fellowship unless he is sound doctrinally, and leads a godly life.

Henceforward Muller devoted himself to evangelical and philanthropic labours. He continued to be co-pastor at Bethesda. During the later years of his life he went on evangelical tours, and died on 10th March 1898, greatly honoured.

Müller and his followers took a definite stand against Darby, and the division became permanent. The Müller party was in the majority at first. J. L. Harris, W. H. Soltau, Lord Congleton, and other leaders sided with Müller, and stood for 'Open' principles, declaring them to be the original views of the Brethren. The Open Brethren devoted themselves to gospel work. Spurgeon called them a 'simple evangelical race.' They made converts in large numbers. They have had a number of earnest teachers and evangelists. Their books and tracts have been circulated in millions during the past fifty years.

Several attempts have been made to effect reconciliation with their Exclusive friends, one especially by Henry Bewley in 1870–71, but all have been unsuccessful. As late as 1892, the Exclusive Brethren in Grant's fellowship in America were approached with a view to reunion. In 1906, however, Bethesda adopted a declaration which had been drawn up in 1894 by fourteen leaders on their own responsibility, and was now signed on behalf of the Assembly by eleven Brethren. It explained and modified some of the objectionable statements in 'The Letter of the Ten,' and had as its object a union with G. W. Heath and his associates who sought the re-union of all sections of Brethren. This movement is still in progress.

Amongst the Open Brethren disputes have been few. Their principal dispute, which took place in 1892, was over what is called the 'Needed Truth' question. The majority rejected the 'Needed Truth' principles, which were: (1) complete separation from all Christians not in their own fellowship; (2) only those baptized after conversion to be allowed to break bread; (3) elders in the oversight to be recognized in the place of rule over the assemblies. The movement has not been a success, as many of the 'Needed Truth' party have returned to the 'Open' fold, and in 1904 a dispute arose causing division amongst that party. The 'Open' Brethren are active and earnest, fraternize freely with other Christians, and do not evoke the same opposition as the 'Exclusives.' Their meetings are numerous, being established in nearly all large towns. It is generally admitted that in writers they are poorer than the Exclusives; still they have had some able writers, such as Thomas Newbery, editor of a valuable edition of the Bible, J. Denham Smith, W. Lincoln, Arthur Pridham, W. H. Soltau, etc.

From 1849 to 1879 the Exclusive Brethren had a period of prosperity. In 1849, G. V. Wigram commenced their chief organ, which extended to 18 vols. (1849–81), the *Present Testimony*. To it Darby contributed his 'Synopsis of the Books of the Bible,' and other writers gave of their best. It was in 1845 that William Kelly, the son of an Ulster squire, and a graduate with highest honours in Classics at Dublin, joined the movement. After having edited *The Prospect* (1848–50), he, in 1856, took up the editorship of the *Bible Treasury*, which he conducted for fifty years. To it Darby, Stoney, Mackintosh, Denny, Grant, Bellett, and others contributed, and, though its editor has passed away, it is still issued, and is the oldest organ of the Brethren. All their chief doctrines and controversies have been discussed in its pages. It was in it that Kelly's 'Commentaries' first appeared. W. H. Dorman edited the *Girdle of Truth*, 10 vols. (1855–66); J. B. Stoney conducted *A Voice to the Faithful* for thirty years; and C. H. Mackintosh, who had been engaged in scholastic work, and had given it up (1853), wrote *Notes on the Pentateuch*, which has had a wide circulation, and has greatly popularized Darby's views. There were many other publications during this period of great activity, which strengthened the Exclusive movement; and a ceaseless circulation of books and tracts went on. The Revivals of 1857–60 and 1870 got a considerable impetus and colouring from the Brethren, and, ultimately, many of the converts joined their assemblies. A band of young officers resigned their commissions, devoting themselves to evangelizing and teaching. England, Ireland, Scotland, Canada, and the

United States came under their labours, and to this day some of these continue teaching the tenets of the Brethren, such as E. Cross and J. W. Smith.

Darby and Wigram visited foreign parts again and again. Though small at first, Darby's success in America was considerable. He influenced two men, viz. F. W. Grant and Dwight L. Moody. Grant joined the Exclusive Brethren's fellowship, and became their foremost author and leader in America, and meetings were established in most of the great American centres. In 1864, Dr. W. Wolston came to Scotland. Then there were meetings only in Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen, but, chiefly through his labours and those of others, gatherings sprang up all round, though many have died out since. Another man, William Reid, a Scottish clergyman, helped the movement greatly. He edited the *British Herald*, which had a wide circulation, and in it were inserted the choicest writings of the Brethren. In 1864, Bellett died. His piety and writings (which have been called prose-poems) left a deep impression on the Brethren, and greatly moulded their theology. It is worthy of note that, amid all the bitter controversies of those days, he was beloved by all parties. In 1872, Wigram visited Australia, where he gained many converts, and where, to this day, the tenets of the Brethren are taught and believed in

From 1849–79 might be termed the flowing tide of the Exclusive movement. Though attacked and assailed on all hands, they steadily increased in numbers. Between 1858–66 controversy arose regarding some articles on the 'Sufferings of Christ' contributed by Darby to the *Bible Treasury*. W. H. Dorman and P. H. Hall charged him with holding views similar to Newton's. He offered to retire from fellowship, but the mass of the Brethren refused to regard him as a heretic. The controversy was bitter. Dorman, Hall, and others retired from communion, but formed no party. A host of writers attacked the Brethren. Darby, Kelly, and others replied vigorously. Darby's views were eventually adopted, and the controversy died down. Two other small disputes of no consequence occurred, one at Jersey, the other at Sheffield. Then in 1876, at Ryde, Isle of Wight, a dispute arose regarding marriage within the prohibited degrees. A clergyman, named Finch, who had left the English Church, and had broken bread in London, would not, on his return to Ryde, identify himself with the Ryde meeting because of its state, but, with some others, broke bread apart. In 1879 the aged Dr. Cronin, while on a visit to Ryde, broke bread with the Finch party. This brought the matter to a climax. On returning to London, Cronin was challenged for his action. As he affirmed that he was right, his act became a question for judgment. The Kennington meeting, though slow to judge, condemned his act, and on 31st August 1879 he was excluded from fellowship. It is generally conceded that serious blunders were committed during this dispute, with which the question of baptism mingled; and, as a result of it, the Ramsgate meeting divided into two parties, called after the names of the places at which they met, viz. Guildford Hall and Abbotshill. Finally, a letter commending a person from Guildford Hall was presented at Park Street, London. That meeting, after considering the case, decided to receive that person. This entailed the rejection of Abbotshill. Kelly, with others, maintained that this judgment was wrong, and would not accept it, even though his old leader Darby was the adviser. The result was that Blackheath, where Kelly resided, with other meetings, rejected the Park Street judgment, upon the plea that it was not the voice of all the London meetings, which hitherto had always acted in unison. A new section of Brethren was formed, led by Kelly, and marked by very exclusive principles. They have not increased in numbers, and in 1899 a revolt, led by W. W. Fereday, took place on the question of freedom in preaching the gospel; but he has since joined the Open communion, and the movement is dissolved.

Kelly died at Exeter on 27th March 1906. Next to Darby he was perhaps the greatest amongst the Brethren. As a scholar, an expositor, and a controversialist, he stood high, and had a clear and convincing style of expression. When he died, the *Times* and many religious magazines proclaimed him the 'Nestor' of the Brethren. His works are highly spoken of by such scholars as Ewald, Westcott, and Sanday. In the British Museum catalogue his works fill ten pages. On the suggestion of the Archbishop of York, he presented his unique library, weighing 17 tons, to the town of Middlesborough.

Darby died on 29th April 1882. He felt keenly the Kelly division, as can be seen from one of his last letters to the Brethren, in which he requested them not to attack Kelly. His writings extend to 50 vols., and he translated the Bible into English, German, and French.

A small division, occasioned by S. O'Malley Cluff, took place in 1881, but the party is now nearly extinct.

In 1882, after fifty-five years spent amongst the Brethren, the aged Dr. Cronin died. He was marked for his piety and fervour. Previously (in 1879) Darby's trusted friend, G. V. Wigram, had passed away. He was the editor of the *Englishman's Hebrew and Greek Concordances to the Old and New Testaments*, a work of accuracy and scholarship on which he spent a fortune, and in the production of which he received invaluable help from the learned Tregelles, who had been identified with the Brethren in their early days, but had disagreed with their judgment in the Newton case.

When Darby died, J. B. Stoney, whose religious ideas and teaching were said to be High Church, became leader in Britain; while, in America, F. W. Grant, who had put forth, while Darby was alive, some views on the 'Old Testament Saints having life in the Son,' and had affirmed that 'the man in the seventh of Romans was sealed by the Holy Spirit,' became leader. Darby had borne with Grant's views, but now that Darby was gone, fault was found with them, especially by Lord A. P. Cecil. Grant published his views in a pamphlet, which was severely criticized by W. J. Lowe and A. C. Ord. In 1884, Cecil and Alfred Mace, the evangelist, visited Montreal, where they condemned Grant's views, and, with a majority of the Montreal meeting, pronounced him a heretic, and excluded him from communion. This action affected only America and the few followers of C. E. Stuart in England. Most of the American meetings sided with Grant, and the Grant company prospered greatly. Mace in 1905 tendered a confession to the Grant Brethren for his rash act, lamenting that the man he had chiefly wronged was dead. Grant's death in 1903 prevented his completing his *Numerical Bible*, a work of considerable merit. He was beloved and honoured by those amongst whom he had laboured for forty years.

In 1885 a dispute took place at Reading. C. E. Stuart, a learned Brother, published a pamphlet on 'Christian Standing and Condition.' This provoked a controversy mingled with a petty local quarrel, and brought about the separation of

Stuart, with a small body of followers in England and some in the north of Scotland. The party has not grown, and Stuart died in January 1902. It is now generally thought that, if the pamphlet had been left alone, it would have passed into oblivion, and this division would have been averted. The Grant section in America and the followers of Stuart are now joined in fellowship.

During the last ten years of Stoney's leadership there was associated with him F. E. Raven, who went even beyond Stoney in pressing the subjective side of truth. About 1890, Raven expressed views such as that 'eternal life is not imparted to the saint; it is a sphere in which he lives in the love of God,' and is distinct from the new birth; Christ did not manifest eternal life to the world, but only to His own; 'Eternal Life' is not a title of Christ prior to incarnation, and the righteousness of God in 2 Co 5^{21} is future. Irreverent expressions concerning Christ's infancy were used by some of Raven's followers. These were condemned, but, nevertheless, a separation took place at Bexhill. This assembly refused to receive from Greenwich a person commended in the usual way, and cut off Raven and his meeting from fellowship. The Bexhill decision was upheld by W. L. Lowe, H. H. MacArthy, C. Stanley, and others in England, and by A. H. Rule and others in America; while, on the Continent, C. Brockhaus and many Dutch, French, and Swiss Brethren refused Raven's views. In England the division was serious. In France, Germany, and Switzerland the Brethren practically as a whole rejected Raven's doctrines.

At a conference in 1895, Raven questioned the ancient formula, 'the unity of His Person,' when applied to Christ's being God and man in one Person. His definition of Christ's Person was 'a Divine Person in human condition.' He affirmed that the Incarnation did not change or add to the Person of the Son. These and other assertions caused trouble. W. T. Turpin, a gifted Brother, who had long been in fellowship, retired from the Brethren; and many of their best men, though still remaining in communion, did so with much misgiving. Raven's teaching was severely criticized by Brethren outside his own communion, such as E. A. Thomas (Australia), F. W. Grant (America), and W. Kelly (England). Raven did not press his views, but his followers did. His visit to America in 1898 caused a division at Minneapolis. The extremists pressed his views too much, and some English Brethren supported E. Acomb, who opposed Raven; but most of the London leaders upheld Acomb's opponents. A small number were recognized as being in fellowship by the London Brethren in July 1905. These had all accepted Raven's views. J. S. Oliphant and Mace protested against the reception of this party, and would not withdraw their protest; so they were excluded from fellowship by the London leaders. It was at this time that Mace joined G. W. Heath in his attempt to amalgamate the different companies of Open and Exclusive Brethren.

Another storm burst after Raven's death. Several evangelists were preaching with considerable freedom, claiming the right to act on their own responsibility in their work. This was pronounced 'looseness and independency.' J. Taylor, of New York, set forth the view that 'we are saved by Christ and what He has established down here, viz. the Church or House of God.' A brother named James Boyd visited Taylor, and thereafter judged Taylor's views to be semi-Romanism. He wrote criticizing Taylor's errors. A controversy ensued. Boyd was called upon to withdraw his tract, or retire from fellowship. He would do neither, and in this he was supported by a great many Brethren in the north of England.

In 1905–7 a local dispute arose at Alnwick, Northumberland. That meeting was 'broken to pieces,' it was said, 'by its own folly.' Efforts were made to effect a reconciliation. At the end of two years (1907), Glanton and the neighbouring assemblies, with the concurrence of most Brethren in the district, decided to receive any person who had judged himself and sought reconciliation with his Brethren at Alnwick. This had been the practice of Brethren hitherto; but those who opposed Glanton's action in so doing pronounced this an infringement of the principle of 'local responsibility' and an interference with the Lord's rights. A few withdrew from fellowship at Newcastle and South Shields, and so forced on a crisis. An effort was made to suspend fellowship with the Northumberland meetings, as they were said to be 'in confusion.' This principle of 'suspending fellowship' was resented in many places; and, finally, when a sister from Whitley Bay presented a letter of commendation at George Street, Edinburgh, the Brethren there refused this principle of 'suspended fellowship,' and received her. There was a secession in consequence, and those opposed to Glanton formed a new meeting. The London Brethren were called upon to consider the rival claims of the two companies in Edinburgh, when a sister presented a letter to a London meeting, and most of the London meetings decided that Glanton infringed the principle of 'local responsibility,' extinguished the Alnwick assembly, and 'usurped the Lord's functions' in so doing. This decision, carried into effect 31st August 1908, cut off Glanton, Edinburgh, and all other meetings associated with them. W. T. P. Wolston's pamphlet, 'Hear the Right,' gives the history of this last division, and deals in detail with all the contributory causes that led to it.

Such is a very brief outline of the history of the Brethren. Forty years ago their early dissolution was prophesied; but they are still, though divided, a living force. Their religion is a simple one. The Bible to them is an infallible and living book; Christ is an all-sufficient and living Saviour; God is a loving Father revealed in the Son of His bosom; salvation is a reality, and can be known now; Heaven with its glories, and the everlasting Kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, are proclaimed, and believed in; the Lord's Coming is the great object of hope; the world is under the judgment of the Cross, and men must be saved from impending doom; Hell and eternal punishment are realities; the world's politics, philosophy, and mere social reform advocated for the betterment of the world are but the whitewashing of a house built on sand, or the attempted renovation of a system morally corrupt; their mission is not to save the world but to save people out of it, and while passing through it the Christian is to live soberly, righteously, and godly; his business is to get right and keep right in his soul with God; it is his duty to obey the powers that be, save only when the civil government interferes with his conscience in obedience to God's command. The Brethren all take the place of the Christian priesthood, and gather to the Lord's name. They look for His Holy Spirit to guide some brother to break the bread, pray, or minister, in subjection to the Lord in the midst. Women are not allowed to speak in the assembly. Their teachers minister by lecture or Bible-reading; their pastors care for and tend the flock, while their evangelists preach the gospel. In the present condition of the Church they do not believe in appointing elders, seeing that their meeting is but a fragment of the body of true

Christians resident in their own locality, and some who might be elders are in the churches around. If, however, in their meetings there be men possessing the requisite qualifications, these are thankfully owned and honoured, though not officially appointed. Statistics of Brethren cannot be ascertained, but they form a good proportion of the Christian community in Britain and America and on the Continent.

LITERATURE.—The clearest statement of the general views of the Brethren is found in Darby's *What I Learn from Scripture*, which was revised by Wm. Kelly in his *Bible Treasury*, and is published by Morrish, London, as a tract. The following is a select Bibliography from hundreds of books and pamphlets, and gives both sides of their disputes, and what is written against them:—For the general history of the Brethren: W. B. Neatby, *A History of the Plymouth Brethren*, 1901; J. S. Teulon, *History and Teaching of the Plymouth Brethren*, 1883; A. Miller, *The Brethren. their Rise, Progress, and Testimony*, c. 1877. For the Plymouth Question: J. N. Darby, *Narrative of Facts, Proceedings at Rawstorne Street*; Lord Congleton, *Reasons for Leaving Rawstorne Street*. On the Sufferings of Christ: Wm. Trotter, *The Whole Case of Plymouth and Bethesda*, 1898. On Bethesda: G. V. Wigram, *The Present Question*, 1848-9; H. Groves, *Darbyism, its Rise and Development: A Review of the Bethesda Question*, 1867; J. N. D., *The Sufferings of Christ*; W. H. Dorman, *The Close of Twenty-eight Years of Association with J. N. D.*, 1886. On the Law and the Righteousness of God: J. N. D., *Brethren and Their Reviewers*; S. P. Tregelles, *Five Letters of the Recent Denials of Our Lord's Vicarious Life*, 1864. On the Ramsgate Question: J. H., *A Fresh Testimony . . . Ecclesiastical Error . . . an Epitome of the Ramsgate Sorrow*, 1882. On Grant and Montreal: *Narrative of the Facts at Montreal*, 1884; E. C. L. and E. Crain, *Statement of Separation*; F. W. Grant, *Letter on the Montreal Division*. On Reading: C. B., *The Reading Question, the History and Review*; F. H. B., *A Concise Statement of the Reading Question*. On F. E. Raven, or the Bexhill Division: F. E. R., *Papers on Eternal Life*, etc.; H. A. Hammond, *Record of Some Correspondence, Documents, and Facts*, 1890-1. On the attempted union of Open Brethren with Grant: F. W. Grant, *What is the Present Position of Open Brethren?* 1888. On the second Raven trouble: F. E. R., *Readings and Lectures in United States and Canada*, 1898-1902, Wm. Kelly, *F. E. R.'s Heterodox on Eternal Life and other Divine Truths*; F. W. Grant, *Retracings of Truth*; E. A. Thomas, *Refutation of False Doctrine, being Truth for the Time* (No. 3). On the American and English troubles: J. S. Oliphant, *Minneapolis*, 1905; J. Taylor, J. Pillatt, and others, *Readings at Chicago, Dec. 1904 and Jan. 1905; Letters from J. Boyd on American Teaching*, 1908, 1909; W. T. P. Wolston, *Hear the Right; Two Letters by H. Vinal on the Glanton Question*. On 'Needed Truth' and Open Brethren Dispute: *Brief Statement of the Doctrines of Holy Scripture* (views of the 'Needed Truth' party). For attacks on the Brethren generally (of these there are many, but the following are the strongest): W. Reid, *Plymouth Brethrenism Unveiled and Refuted*, 1880; *The Plymouth Brethren, their Rise, Progress, Practice, and Doctrines*, a lecture by Edward Dennett, 1871. To this, Dennet himself replied later when he became a Brother, in his *The Step I have taken*, 1876. See also J. C. L. Carson, *The Heresies of the Plymouth Brethren*, 1870; Thomas Croskery, *Plymouth Brethrenism*, 1879.

JOHN M'CULLOCH.

BREVIARY.—See LITURGIES.

BRIBERY.—See CORRUPTION.

BRIDE, BRIDEGROOM.—See MARRIAGE.

BRIDGE.—To the awe with which primitive man regarded the flowing of a wide, deep river, effectually barring his access to the opposite side, may be traced an extensive series of superstitious and religious practices current in former ages, and still observed in modified forms to-day. The subject may be approached under the following three postulates: (i.) To all early races, rivers were part of a Divine scheme for delimiting frontiers, for apportioning territories to the different races of mankind, and for obstructing the interference of district with district. Rivers accordingly acquired a semi-sacred character, and each stream had its tutelary divinity. The torrent that foamed across man's path was the vomit of a local demon. (ii.) To interfere with what the gods had laid down as a natural boundary, to bridge the stream which had been intended to act as a barrier to the insatiable and the restless curiosity of man, was a daring, nay, a sacrilegious act. In the event of a bridge being built, therefore, the local river-spirit must be appeased by some compensating sacrifice. (iii.) Once this sacrifice has been made, and the river-spirit been placated, the bridge becomes in a sense sacred. It is the aim of this article to trace out the ramifications of these three fundamental ideas.

i. THE PRIMITIVE CONCEPTION THAT EACH STREAM HAD ITS RESIDENT DIVINITY OR RIVER-SPIRIT.—It is beyond the scope of this article to marshal the evidence in support of this first notion. The conception that each stream had its protecting divinity, whose majesty must not be trifled with, was a very common one in Greek and Roman mythology. The customary emblematic representation of the idea in Greek art was that of a figure of an old man with a long beard, clothed in blue garments, and crowned with a chaplet of reeds. He is usually depicted reclining upon an urn from which water continually flows, and, as the river-god, he was supposed to dwell by preference in the caverns and deepest recesses of the river's bed. His care of the river extended to its pollution, and Homer (*Iliad*, xxi. 136 ff.) has described the resentment of the two rivers of Troy, the Scamander and Simois, against Achilles, when he presumptuously profaned their waters. (For further illustration of the hostility of a river-spirit if his majesty be insulted and his quiet disturbed, see J. Rhys, *Celtic Folklore*, ii. 425–430; W. Gregor, *Folklore of the North-East of Scotland*, pp. 66, 67; *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan* for Ainu river-gods and goddesses; J. Abercromby, 'Beliefs and Religious Ceremonies of the Mordvins,' in *FLJ* vii. 72; also *Annales Archéol.* tom. ix. pp. 107–108; and for the idea of the impiety of disturbing natural boundaries, cf. Horace, *Carm.* i. 3. 21: 'Nequicquam deus abscidit Prudens Oceano dissociabili Terras, si tamen impiae Non tangenda rates transiliunt vada').

ii. THE APPEASING OF THE OFFENDED RIVER-SPIRIT.—1. **Was this observed in connexion with the Pons Sublicius?**—The necessity of some expiatory sacrifice to the river-god, when a bridge was built across the stream, defying his supremacy, seems to have been recognized at a very early period. The early history of Rome shows traces of it. Probably not more than three bridges were erected over the Tiber before the end of the Republic. Of these the most ancient and by far the most famous was the *Pons Sublicius.** Erected by Ancus Martius to unite Rome to his new fortification on the Janiculum, it was probably situated at the Forum Boarium, not far from the broken arches of the Ponte de Rotto (Livy, i. 33; Dionys. iii. 45, ix. 68; Plut. *Numa*, 9). Down to its latest days, the entire structure, including every bolt and fastening, was constructed of timber [for the reason for this see p. 855]. On the Ides of May (Ovid says the day before), an annual procession of Pontifices, Prætors, and Vestal Virgins marched to this bridge. On the way they visited the so-called 24 *Sacella Argeorum* (chapels), and from them carried away a corresponding† number of *Argei*. These *Argei* were puppets or effigies made of bulrushes, and stuffed so as to represent bodies of old men bound hand and foot. The Flaminica Dialis, the priestess of Juppiter, was present, dressed, not in her customary bridal attire, but in mourning garb. To the accompaniment of the chanting of appropriate hymns and prayers, the puppets were lifted by the Vestal Virgins and flung into the river from the parapet of the bridge (Dionys. i. 38; Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 621 ff.; Plutarch, *Quæst. Rom.* 32 and 86). Of a custom so peculiar,

* From the *sublicæ*, or piles, on which it was built
† Dionysius gives 30 as the number.

the Roman antiquarians suggested various explanations:—

(*a*) The *Sacella* were reported to be the graves of the Greeks who came to Italy with Hercules, and the *Argei* were his followers. Though settled in fair Italy, they entertained tender memories of sweet Argos; and, as each hero died, he bequeathed to his friends the sacred duty of throwing his body into the Tiber that it might be transported by the waves to the far-off shore of his fatherland. The rush-made image was the later substitute for the dead body of the early Greek (Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 656). The ancient etymology of *Argei* from Ἀργεῖοι is supported by Mommsen (*Staatsrecht*, iii. 123).

(*b*) The second explanation of the practice was that it was the harmless survival of an earlier and ruder epoch, when old men, above the age of sixty, being considered useless for military service, were cast into the stream and drowned. Though Ovid acknowledges that this traditional explanation was an old one, he nevertheless indignantly repudiates it as a slander on the humanity of his ancestors. Such practices, however, were not unknown in the ancient world. That those past their prime, and afflicted with the increasing infirmities of age, should thus be put to death, was not considered incompatible with filial piety, but rather in the line of kindness, and even of patriotic duty to the State (Cæsar, *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 16; Tac. *Germ.* 9 and 39; cf. also art. OLD AGE).

In later days there arose a belief that the *pons* from which these old men were flung was a more innocuous structure than the Pons Sublicius. On the day of the Comitia, a number of polling-booths were erected in the forum, or wherever the voting was to take place. These booths, or *septa*, were entered by a narrow passage or plank termed *pons* or *pontículus*, and, when the voter had received his *tabella*, or voting-ticket, out of one of the large vases called *sistæ* or *cistellæ*, he passed along the *pons*, and emerged from the booth by a corresponding 'bridge' on the other side (Cicero, *in Pison.* 15. 40, *pro Plancio*, 6, *pro Harusp. resp.* 20). Festus (p. 334, *s.v.* 'Sexagenarii') argues that, though the aged men were free from the burden of active service for the State, they jealously retained their right to vote. The younger men accordingly were annoyed, and, as their seniors went up the *pons* to record their vote, they raised the cry, which became proverbial, that the old men should be thrown from the bridge ('sexagenarios de ponte'). Ovid (*Fasti*, v. 634) states that the youths actually threw the old men from the bridge (see Cic. *pro Roscio Amerino*, 35. 100; Varro, *apud* Lactant. *Inst.* i. 21. 6). But as these voting *pontes* were comparatively late institutions, and the proverb is a very old one, it would seem after all that the bridge referred to was not the plank of the Comitia polling-booth, but the more fatal Pons Sublicius. The fact, however, remains that parricide was always looked on with horror by the Romans, and it is hard to see how the practice should have passed into a yearly ceremony.

(*c*) By others the rite was regarded as a relic of the time when human sacrifices were general. Ovid states that it was believed by some that Hercules was the first to throw into the stream as sacrifices to the river-god, not living citizens, but fictitious bundles of straw. That human sacrifices were not infrequent in the early days of the Republic is shown by the evidence collected by Merivale (*Hist.* iii. 35). O. Müller (*Etrusker*, ii. 20) believes that the practice was introduced into the Roman cultus from Etruria. It continued down to A.U.C. 657, when Cn. Corn. Lentulus and P. Licin. Crassus, as consuls for the year, made a law which, for the future, prohibited any such human sacrifices. There is, therefore, nothing inherently impossible in the notion that the Pons Sublicius was the scene of primitive human immolation. J. G. Frazer points out (*JPh* xiv. [1885] p. 156, note) that, in early Rome bridges, being novelties, were viewed with suspicion. They were an insult to the river-god, inasmuch as 'they robbed him of his food by carrying dry-shod over his head the people who, in the course of nature, would have been drowned at the ford.' Thus arose the practice of yielding to Father Tiber a yearly compensation, at first of living citizens who were flung into the river, but later of substitutes in the form of stuffed effigies of old men.

On the other hand, W. Warde Fowler (*Roman Festivals*, p. 112 ff.), in an elaborate analysis of the ancient rite, arrives at the conclusion that the ceremony was dramatic rather than sacrificial, and had primarily to do with the annual purification of the land. He dwells upon the presence at the rite of the Pontifices, and especially of the Vestals, on whom lay the duty of throwing the puppets into the stream, the idea being that the food and nourishment of the State depended on an accurate performance of their duties. He points to the presence and the dress of the Flaminica Dialis, who appeared in this garb only on those great occasions of purification that marked the conclusion of one season, and the beginning of a new season which must be entered on with great care. It was something akin to Adonis-worship, which in Egypt was observed in the same method by the immersion in water of a puppet accompanied by wailings. Mannhardt (*Ant. Wald- und Feldkulte*, p. 276) mentions a Russian practice in which figures of straw, dressed in female clothing, are laid on a bier, carried to a lake or river, torn up, and thrown in, while the spectators hide their faces and wail; and again, in another district, on the same day (June 29th), an old man is carried out of the town, as a symbol that spring has gone, and is followed by *women* singing mournful songs, and indulging in gestures of grief.* Mannhardt (*Baumkultus*, chs. iii. iv. v.) gives many instances from mediæval and modern times of the practice of similar rites, showing that the place of the puppet is sometimes taken by a sheaf, a small tree, or a man or boy dressed up in foliage or fastened in a sheaf. In almost every case the puppet is ducked in water or sprinkled, though sometimes it is burned or buried. The Bavarian *Wasservogel* was an effigy which was carried round the fields at Whitsuntide and then thrown from a bridge into a stream. There is still extant a law passed in A.D. 1351 forbidding the ducking of persons at Erfurt at the Easter or Whitsuntide festivals. Warde Fowler follows Mannhardt in maintaining that all this is a symbol of the departure of winter, and the arrival of the fruitful season. In support of this theory he points out that, while the old Roman practice was to throw in 'old men,' it is a curious coincidence that the name of the puppet thrown in at Whitsuntide at Halle is 'der Alte.' The German puppet, again, is *white*, and the Roman effigy bore a name Ἀργεῖοι, which is probably derived from a root *arg* (seen in *argentum*), meaning the *white* ones (=the old ones). This explanation, however, though it explains some things very aptly, and fits in with some otherwise obscure details, fails to give any satisfactory reason why *a bridge over a river* should be the scene of the purification of the *land*, or why in each case there should be *water*, and the casting of a puppet into a *stream*. We come back, therefore, to the view, supported by a multitude of corroborative facts, that the casting into the stream in early times of a live victim, and the substitution in later ages of effigies, were due to a belief in the necessity of placating the river-spirit, whose majesty was offended by a structure spanning his waters, the very object of which was to rob him of his toll in human victims.

2. **This root-idea of the necessity of a sacrifice traced to modern times.**—The wide-spread nature of this custom will be recognized from the following instances. Herodotus (ii. 90) states that the priests of the Nile-god claimed the right to bury with high honours all bodies drowned in the river, 'as being something more than human.' The god had claimed them, and they were his property. Maspero (*Dawn of Civilization*, p. 39) describes the sacrifices to the river at Silsileh on the rising of the Nile. See also Lane (*Mod. Egyptians*, ch. xxvi.) for the *'arooseh* (bride)—the virgin thrown into the river as a sacrifice to obtain a plentiful inundation. Picart (*Cerem. and Relig. Cust. of the World*, 1733, iii. 87) refers to the practice of the savages on the Mississippi of sacrificing prisoners to the genii who preside over the waters. Compare also the yearly sacrifice of a girl to the spirit of Niagara. When a man is drowning in a river, it is a common saying in Germany that 'the spirit of the stream is getting his yearly victim' (Grimm, *Deutsche Mythol.* p. 409). There is a legend that the spirit of the river Ribble, in York-

* In Silesia, as late as the 16th cent., according to Guagnini (*Sarmatiae Europeae descriptio*, fol. 106), on March 17 of each year, being the anniversary of the destruction of the pagan idols by Mieczyslaw I. (962-992), 'pueri in villis et oppidis ex more recepto simulacrum quoddam ad similitudinem mulieris conficiunt, oppidoque turmatim egressi quandam cantionem ingeminantes simulacrum illud de ponte in flumen praecipitant.' This would seem, however, to be merely a sort of Guy Fawkes celebration of the destruction of paganism. In this general connexion it should be noted that Gruppe (*Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, p. 821) holds that such ceremonies as those associated with the *Argei* were originally rain-charms.

shire (known as Peg o' Nell), demanded a victim every seven years (W. Henderson, *Folklore of the Northern Counties*, p. 265); and the American Indians have a tradition that the Falls of Niagara must have two human victims annually. The notion, however, is very prominently brought out in the following connexions:—

(*a*) *Sacrifices necessary at the foundation of bridges.*—A legend is current about London Bridge that, in order to render the structure secure, the stones were besprinkled with the blood of little children. When the broken dam of the Nogat was repaired in A.D. 1463, the peasants were advised to throw in a living man. They seized a beggar, made him drunk, and buried him (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], i. 104). In 1843, on the erection of a new bridge at Halle, it was widely believed that the structure ought to have had a child built into it (Grimm, *op. cit.* p. 956). The builder of the 'Loh-Family Bridge' at Shanghai experienced some difficulty in laying the foundation. He vowed to Heaven 2000 children if the river-spirit would allow the stones to be laid properly. The divinity (she was a goddess on this occasion) replied that she would not require their lives, but that the number named would be attacked by smallpox. The epidemic actually broke out, and half the number died. It is a Chinese belief that a bridge built without attention to these religious observances will bring about a visitation of smallpox. In Tibet, when smallpox is raging, the inhabitants of the villages as yet untouched by the disease try to stay its progress by placing thorns on the bridges to terrify away the evil spirits who bring the plague. Those who die of the disease are thrown into the rivers (Annie W. Marston, *The Great Closed Land* [Tibet], p. 41). At Hang-Chow, a tea-merchant cast himself into the river Tsien-tang as a sacrifice to the spirit of the dykes which were constantly being washed away (Moncure D. Conway, *Demonology and Devil-lore*, 1879, i. 204). In 1872 there was a scare at Calcutta when the Hooghly Bridge was built. The Hindus imagined that the spirit of the river would consent to have its majesty invaded only on condition that each pier of the structure was founded on a layer of children's heads (A. B. Gomme, *Traditional Games of England, Scotland, and Ireland*, i. 346 ff.; G. L. Gomme, *Folklore Relics of Early Village Life*, p. 29). In 1890 the *Pall Mall Gazette* reported that heads of unwary travellers in China were being cut off, and £10 was being paid for each head by the Department of Public Works in order that they might be built into the foundations of the piers of a number of new bridges that were in course of erection. It was stated that such was the terror of the coolies that for no money could they be induced to carry fares to the suburbs at night. (For a similar story see *Nature*, April 30, 1896, under title 'Megalithic Folklore,' by S. E. Peal, Sibsagar, Assam, March 27.) Among the popular traditions of Albania, there is one to the effect that human beings were formerly buried under the foundations of important bridges. Throughout the Greek East there is a current belief that every building has a resident spirit, and every stream a resident genie, which goes by the name of the στοιχεῖον. It is believed that the man whose shadow falls on the first-laid stone of a house will die within the year, and his shadow, remaining in the building, becomes its στοιχεῖον; hence the practice of sacrificing fowls and sheep at the beginning of any important construction to avert danger from the workmen. 'But sometimes, instead of killing an animal, the builder entices a man to the foundation-stone, secretly measures his body, or a part of it, or his shadow, and buries the measure under the foundation-stone; or he lays the foundation-stone upon the man's shadow. It is believed that the man will die within the year' (B. Schmidt, *Das Volksleben der Neugriechen*, p. 196 f., quoted by J. G. Frazer, *Golden Bough*[2], i. 291). Until a sacrifice has been offered to this spirit, no bridge will be allowed to stand secure. A bridge so secured is termed 'stoicheion-built' (στοιχειοθεμελιώμενα), and legends regarding such bridges are everywhere met with. Some of the Greek folk-songs are famous, *e.g. The Bridge of Adana in Kappadocia*: 'All day long they built the piers: by night they fell in ruins.' The builders are at their wits' end. They know that the bridge will never stand until a living spirit is given to it in sacrifice. But who is willing to be thus offered? The engineer entices his wife to the edge of the excavation for one of the piers. He drops his ring into it, and induces his wife to fetch it up:

> 'Then down goes she, and down goes she, steps forty-two descends she,
> And fall upon her as she goes of stones a thousand litras,
> And throw they down upon her, too, of earth a thousand spadefuls.'

As she dies, she calls out:

> 'Hear thou my words, Yiannáki mine, let not the world rejoice thee,
> Three only sisters once were we, we were three sisters only;
> The one did build the Danube's bridge, the second the Euphrates,
> And I, I too, the murdered one, the bridge build of Adana'

(Lucy M. J. Garnett and J. S. Stuart-Glennie, *Greek Folk Poesy*, 1896, p. 71).

The same legend is current in Italy as regards the Bridge of Arta, which collapsed till the master-builder walled in his wife. With her dying curse, however, she prophesied that the bridge would always tremble (*ib.* p. 81). The same story is told of the 'Lady's Bridge' in Peloponnesus (*ib.* p. 70) and the 'Trembling Bridge' near Canea in Crete. So engrained is the belief in the necessity of such sacrifices, that it is alleged that in Zacynthus the inhabitants would still kill a human victim if they were not deterred by fear of the law's vengeance (B. Schmidt, *op. cit.* p. 197 ff.). The idea that underlay the old Roman substitution of rush-men for human victims is still observable occasionally in different parts of the world; and to this day sacrifices of a less dreadful character than that of human beings continue to be offered to the water-spirits of Austria and Germany (Th. Vernaleken, *Mythen u. Brauche des Volkes in Oesterreich*, 1859, p. 168; A. D. Wuttke, *Deutscher Volksaberglaube*[3], 1900, § 429).

(*b*) *The 'bridge-sacrifice' a part of the widespread belief in the necessity of a 'foundation-sacrifice' for all structures.*—This placating of the river-spirit is thus in strict harmony with the almost universal belief in the necessity of a sacrifice as a rite preliminary to the erection of all buildings. Thus the Picts are said to have bathed their pre-historic foundation-stones with human blood to propitiate the spirit of the soil (Forbes Leslie, *Early Races of Scotland*, i. 149). Mackinnon (*Culture in Early Scotland*, p. 53) asserts that 'even after the humanizing doctrines of Jesus had become the popular creed, the power of this grim rite occasionally asserted itself in the practice of slaying or burying a victim, before or during the erection of a building, in the belief that only thus could it be made secure' (see also Gaidoz, *Mélusine*, iv. 16). A Thuringian legend is extant that, to make the castle of Liebenstein secure and impregnable, a child was bought from its mother for hard cash, and walled into the foundations. The wall of Copenhagen sank during its erection as fast as it was built. The workmen took an innocent little girl, set her on a chair at a table with toys and eatables, and then twelve master-

masons closed a vault over her. The wall thereupon was completed and stood firm (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], i. 104 f.). There is a Servian legend that three brothers combined to build the fortress of Scutari, but were baffled by the demons, who razed by night what it had taken 300 masons to erect by day. At last the fiends were appeased by the immolation of the wife of the youngest of the three, who happened to be the first to come with food for the workmen (*ib.*). When Vortigern was erecting a strong fort in Snowdon, what the workmen built in one day was always swallowed up in earth the next night. The king consulted Merlin, who advised that the stones and mortar should be sprinkled with the blood of a child born of a mother without a father (Nennius, *Mon. Hist. Brit.* p. 67; also Selden's note to Drayton's *Polyolbion*, p. 158). In Adamnan's *Life of St. Columba* (Reeve's tr. 1857, p. 203) there is the following naive yet significant statement:

'Columkille said then to his people, "It would be well for us that our roots should pass into the earth here." And he said to them, "It is permitted to you that some of you go under the earth of this island to consecrate it." Odhran arose quickly, and then spake. "If you accept me," he said, "I am ready for that." "O Odhran," said Columkille, "you shall receive the reward of this: no request shall be granted to any one at my tomb unless he first ask of thee." Odhran then went to heaven. He (Columkille) then founded the church of Hy.'

Thus the spirits of the soil of Iona were propitiated, whereas till then they had overthrown by night what had been erected by day (see Scott's *Minstrelsy of the Scott. Border*, note to the 'Court of Keeldar' and 'Glenfinlas'; Innes, *Eccles. Hist.*; Pennant, *Voyage to Scotland*, i. 286 ff.; Joyce, *Social History of Ancient Ireland*, i. 284 ff.).

Human skeletons have been found under foundations of the round towers in Ireland (*FLJ* i. 23). A Highland tradition relates that, when the workmen had assembled to lay the foundation of Tigh-an-Torr, in Western Ross-shire, they caught the first person who chanced to pass, and buried him under the foundation-stone. At the laying of the foundation of Redcastle, a red-haired girl was buried alive under the stone (Haddon, *The Study of Man*, 1898, p. 354; see also MacBain, *Celtic Mythology and Religion*, pp. 45, 46; Stokes, *Revue Celtique*, ii. 200, 201; Windisch, *Irish Grammar*, p. 139). Fitzstephen, in his account of London in the 12th cent., mentions that, when the Tower was built, the mortar was tempered with the blood of beasts (A. B. Gomme, *Tradit. Games*, p. 346 f.). Formerly in Siam, when a new city gate was being erected, it was customary for a number of officers to lie in wait and seize the first four or eight persons who happened to pass by. These were then buried alive under the gate-posts to serve as guardian-angels. The *Ceylon Observer* of Jan. 27th, 1887, had a paragraph in which it was stated that the schools in Colombo were empty, many children were missing, and parents were afraid to let their offspring venture out of doors, because the report had got abroad that 350 boys under the age of 12 were required as sacrifices to propitiate the deity who was responsible for the crack in the great Maligakanda reservoir (*FLJ* v. 260). For further illustrations of this 'foundation-sacrifice' idea see Gerard, *The Land beyond the Forest* (Transylvania), ii. 17; H. Clay Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant*, p. 47; Macalister in *PEFSt*, 1904, p. 16, where a plate shows a skeleton of a woman discovered at Gezer as a foundation-sacrifice in a pre-Israelitic Palestine town; Rodd, *Customs and Lore of Modern Greece*, p. 168; *FLR*, vol. iii. pp. 282–283, vol. iv. pp. 124, 186; *FLJ*, vol. i. pp. 23–24, 92; Bowring, *Servian Popular Poetry*, p. 64; Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, pp. 972, 1095; St. John, *Far East*, i. 46. See also art. FOUNDATION.

(c) *The primitive heathen 'river-spirit' becomes the 'devil' of Christian times.*—In the Christian centuries the heathen idea of a water-spirit, or genius of the river, gave place to the conception that the devil assumes guardianship over all streams. And yet there was a wide-spread belief that the jurisdiction of the devil extended no further than the middle of a running stream (cf. Burns, *Tam o' Shanter*). He has accordingly a special antipathy to bridges, as was the case with his ancient prototype. Numerous, therefore, are the legends to be found over all Europe attached to so-called 'Devils' Bridges,' narrating how the Evil One would not allow the bridge to be erected until he had received payment of an offering like that of Iphigenia. In Herzegovina the Muslims regard the office of a civil engineer with pious horror, and curse a new bridge when they pass it. It is to them the symbol of the devil's presence, and the token of an unholy compact between the Evil One and the architect (A. J. Evans, *Through Bosnia and Herzegovina*, p. 314). Like his predecessor the river-spirit, the devil, however, was sometimes cheated of his due. Many of the more ancient bridges of Germany and Switzerland have legends attached to them narrating how the hard conditions laid down by the great enemy (whose tale of victims by drowning was cut short by the erection of a bridge) were successfully evaded.

The Montafon bridge in the Tyrol and the bridge at Ratisbon are illustrations. In the case of the latter, the architect was apprenticed to a master who was building the Cathedral. He laid a wager that he would bridge the Danube before his superior laid the cope-stone of the church. After many failures, the apprentice entered into a compact with the devil, who appeared to him in the garb of a friar. The devil undertook to build fifteen arches of the bridge, on the understanding that he would get the first three living creatures that crossed the bridge. The work was completed in time. The wily apprentice sent across the bridge a dog, a cock, and a hen. The devil in wrath tore the animals to pieces and disappeared. A procession of holy monks passed over the bridge and rendered it safe, and in proof of the reality of the story the figures of the three animals are still triumphantly shown, carved upon the bridge (Moncure D. Conway, *op. cit.* vol. i. p. 204; Tylor, *op. cit.* i. 106, for other instances in Germany, see Grimm, *op. cit.* p. 853). Goethe (*Faust*, ii. 4, Hayward's tr.) makes Mephistopheles say:

'My wanderer on faith's crutches hobbles on
Towards the Devil's Bridge and Devil's Stone.'

A French legend of another 'Pont du diable' describes how an apple was thrown along a newly-finished bridge, and a cat allowed to go in chase of it. The devil was again thus cheated. Principal Rhys has kindly favoured the writer with a similar legend from Wales. 'The devil bargains with an old woman who wants the bridge built, to have as his pay the first creature that crosses the bridge, and expects thus to get the old woman herself. But she takes her dog with her, and throws a piece of bread before her. The dog rushes after it over the bridge, and the devil does not score in the end.' Cf. Longfellow (*The Golden Legend*, Canto v.), who describes the Devil's Bridge at Pilatus, near Lucerne:

'And the Devil promised to let it stand,
Under compact and condition
That the first living thing which crossed
Should be surrendered into his hand,
And be beyond redemption lost.
At length the bridge being all completed,
The Abbot, standing at its head,
Threw across it a loaf of bread,
Which a hungry dog sprang after,
And the rocks re-echoed with peals of laughter
To see the Devil thus defeated!'

It is the same idea which appears in the practice of building *empty* coffins into walls in Germany; in the walling of a *lamb* instead of a child under an altar in Denmark to ensure the stability of the church, in the killing of 12 *sheep*, and placing their heads under the foundations of the pillars of a new bridge over the Arcen in Albania (J. G. von Hahn, *Albanesische Studien*, 1854, i. 161); in the sacrifice of a *chicken* in place of a girl as a foundation-sacrifice in Borneo (Haddon, *op. cit.* p. 355). For further illustrations see Garnett, *Women of Turkey*, ii. 286; Alexandri, *Ballades de la Roumanie*, 1855, under 'The Monastery of Argis'; Tylor, *op. cit.* i. 106 f., with references to the custom in Galam in Africa, in Polynesia, in South Asia, in Japan, and in Tenasserim.

It is clear from these myths that the idea of regarding the devil as the actual architect of the bridge is a later development. The early conception that the devil merely allowed the erection of the structure on payment of a solatium passed into the idea that the devil himself was the builder,

and must have his payment accordingly. A still more developed form of the notion of diabolical or infernal power being invoked in the rearing of a bridge is seen in Froissart (*Chron.* i. 391), who tells how, in A.D. 1381, when the Duke of Anjou was besieging a strong castle on the coast of Naples, a necromancer (doubtless with the help of the devil) built a bridge which carried ten soldiers abreast, until one that passed over the bridge 'made the signe of the crosse on hym, then all went to nought, and they that were on the bridge fell into the sea.' A companion tale is told of the rearing and the destruction of the 'Kelpie's Bridge,' or Drochaid-na-Vouha, at the mouth of the Dornoch Firth (see Miss Dempster's 'Folklore of Sutherlandshire' in *FLJ* vi. 172 [1888]), where the exclamation of an admiring countryman, 'God bless the workmen and the work,' caused the infernal labourers to vanish, and the magnificent golden bridge to sink into the waves.

(*d*) *Survival of the idea of sacrifice to the river-spirit in modern children's games.*—One of the most curious survivals of the ancient custom is seen in many modern children's games. The singing game known as 'London Bridge' has many variants in the different localities where it is played, but fundamentally the theme is the same:

'London Bridge is broken down,
London Bridge is broken down,
London Bridge is broken down,
My fair lady.'

Mrs. Gomme, in her *Traditional Games of England, Scotland, and Ireland*, has analyzed this rhyme very thoroughly. She shows that the song describes the difficulty encountered in building the bridge by *ordinary* means, and that it asks many questions how the structure is to be reared. At last the children seize a 'poor prisoner,' to whom they say, 'Off to prison you must go.' The prisoner in the game is actually 'caught,' and 'released' on payment of a forfeit. The game is thus a curious survival of the old-world notion that a bridge could stand secure only by the death of a 'prisoner,' or, if need be, of his substitute. It is thus allied to the στοιχεῖον folksongs of the Greek Orient. Prof. Léon Pineau has suggested in regard to another children's game, a very popular French '*ronde*,' which commences:

'Sur le pont de Nantes,
Sur le pont de Nantes
Un bal est affiché . . .'

that this game relates to 'a ritual dance on the occasion of a human sacrifice to the divinities of the water' (quoted in Haddon, *op. cit.* p. 356).

(*e*) *Transference of the dread associations of bridges to the 'Bridge of Judgment' in the under world of spirits.*—So firmly lodged in men's minds was the conviction that the erection of a bridge implied some kind of preliminary transaction with supernatural powers by way of satisfying their animosity, that, in view of the life beyond the grave, similar conceptions were held regarding the river of death. In the lower world of Shades will there not be a bridge to be crossed, a bridge spanning the dark stream of death, nay, it may be, the very mouth of hell itself? The idea became a fixed belief in nations far sundered geographically. The river-spirit, who in the upper world demanded an adequate satisfaction in the event of his stream being crossed by a bridge, was represented in the lower regions sometimes by the devil, sometimes by stern guardian-angels. The primitive conception of human sacrifices as an offering to the river-god developed in later ages into the belief that the devil received as his prize all who could not successfully pass the ordeal of crossing the narrow bridge.

Sale (*Koran*[2], 1825, Prel. Disc. § iv. p. 121) describes how integral a part of Muhammadan theology this is. The Muslims hold that those who are to be admitted into Paradise will take the right hand way, and those who are destined to hell-fire will take the left; but both of them must first pass the bridge (called in Arabic *al-Ṣirāt*) which is laid over the midst of hell, and is finer than a hair, and sharper than the edge of a sword. It seems very difficult to conceive how any one can stand upon it. The bridge, moreover, is beset on each side with briars and hooked thorns, which will, however, be no impediment to the good, who will pass with wonderful ease and swiftness, like lightning on the wind, Muhammad and the Muslims leading the way. The wicked, what with the slipperiness and extreme narrowness of the path, the entangling of the thorns, and the extinction of the light which directed the faithful to Paradise, will soon miss their footing, and fall down headlong into hell, which is gaping beneath them (Pocock, *Specim. Hist. Arab.*, pp. 282–289). Other Muhammadan legends affirm that this awful bridge stretches between the Temple of Jerusalem on the W. and the Mount of Olives on the E., while between lies the Valley of Hell (the Valley of Jehoshaphat). The pious will be upheld, as they cross, by an angel who will hold them by a single lock of the head ('Shasheh'), but the wicked will fall into the Valley el-Jehennam beneath. Although the bridge of *al-Ṣirāt* is not mentioned in the *Qur'ān*, it is much elaborated in later Muhammadan eschatology, where it is described, in addition to the details already given, as in length a journey of 3000 years, 1000 ascending, 1000 level, and 1000 descending, while fire shoots up about it a journey of 40 years. While, as already noted, the righteous pass over it like a flash of lightning, less perfect Muslims take longer periods in proportion to their guilt, some requiring 25,000 years to complete the journey. Yet other sources make the bridge to consist of seven arches, each a journey of 3000 years, and during the passage all but the most righteous suffer agonies from the fire of hell (cf. Wolff, *Muhammedanische Eschatologie*, pp. 109, 114 f., 148 f.; al-Ghazālī, *Perle précieuse*, ed. and tr. Gautier, pp. 43, 69–70, 72–73; Rühling, *Beitrage zur Eschatologie des Islam*, pp. 27, 58, 63).

The Muhammadan bridge of al-Ṣirāt was borrowed from the Parsi *Chinvatperetu*, or 'Bridge of the Decider,' mentioned repeatedly both in the Avesta and in Pahlavi literature (Bartholomae, *Altiran. Worterbuch*, col. 596 f.; Gray, *Muséon*, new series, iii. 160 f., 163–165; Modi, *JRASBo* xxi. 49–65; Scherman, *Materialien zur Geschichte der indischen Visionslitteratur*, p. 105 f.; Söderblom, *Vie future d'après le mazdéisme*, pp. 92–96). This bridge, which stretches from the 'Peak of Judgment' (*Chakāṭ-ī Dāitīh*), in Airān-Vēj, to Alburz, is described as follows (*Dāṭistān-ī Dēnīg*, xxi. 1–7): 'As it were, that bridge is like a beam of many sides, of whose edges there are some which are broad, and there are some which are thin and sharp; its broad edges are so large that its width is twenty-seven reeds, and its sharp sides are so contracted that in thinness it is just like the edge of a razor. And when the souls of the righteous and wicked arrive, it turns to that side which is suitable to their necessities, through the great glory of the creator and the command of him who takes the just account.' The Parsi concept of the 'Bridge of the Decider' has also been borrowed not only in Mandaism (Brandt, *Mandäische Religion*, p. 195), but also in the *Yalqut* to Isaiah, § 359 (Kohut, *Judische Angelologie und Damonologie in ihrer Abhängigkeit vom Parsismus*, 1866, p. 70), and perhaps, as Böklen (*Verwandtschaft der jüdisch-christlichen mit der parsischen Eschatologie*, 1902, p. 37 f.) suggests, in 2 Es 7[88].

It is not impossible that the bridge of the dead is found in Indian literature as early as the

Upaniṣads (Scherman, pp. 117–119), and it is certain that the belief in such a bridge occurs in Chinese Buddhism, and among the Jews of the Caucasus, the Transylvanian Gypsies, the modern Greeks, the Badaga of the Nīlgirī Hills, the Solomon Islanders, the Gold Coast Negroes, etc. (*ib.* pp. 99, 102–110), as well as in New Caledonia (cf. above, vol. i. p. 493[a]). The belief thus found in Zoroastrian, Jewish, Muhammadan, and Indian circles, as well as in other parts of the world (see also below), would seem to be a later and modified analogue of that primitive conception of the trial of the soul after death, which is seen in many early religions. We recognize the same underlying features in the Egyptian myth of the weighing of the scales before the bar of Osiris, and in the Greek fable of the judgment of the soul by Minos, Æacus, and Rhadamanthus in the under world. Cf. Dante, *Hell*, Canto v. 4 ff. (Cary's tr.):

> 'There Minos stands,
> Grinning with ghastly feature: he, of all
> Who enter strict examining the crimes,
> Gives sentence, and dismisses them beneath,
> According as he foldeth him around:
> . . . . in his turn
> Each one to judgment passing, speaks, and hears
> His fate, thence downward to his dwelling hurl'd.'

In Tooke's *Pantheon* (Edin. 1791, p. 242) there is a curious and grotesque plate of the Hades of the Greek imagination, with Charon ferrying his fares across the Styx, Cerberus the three-headed dog guarding the passage, while in the distance there is a *bridge* with three individuals on it, who pass thereby from the flames of hell to the pleasant woods of Elysium. So also in ancient Celtic mythology there was cast over hell a bridge of exceeding narrowness (sometimes a mere cord), which souls were obliged to traverse if they hoped to reach the mansion of light beyond. This was 'The Brig o' Dread, na brader than a thread' (Baring-Gould, *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*, p. 248; Rhys, Hibbert Lect. on *Celtic Heathendom*, p. 450).

There is a Hindu analogue to this belief in the Indian Baitaraṇī (*q.v.*), or swift River of Hell, flowing with blood and filth, which can be crossed only by holding a cow's tail. Aynsley (*Indian Antiq.*, May 1886) learned that the Hindus of Chamba, in the Panjāb, have a bridge over which every corpse must pass on its way to the burning *ghât* beside the river. Though there is a safe road by which the procession may travel, the corpse is invariably carried over a perilous causeway, only 18 inches wide, without a protecting balustrade. In the Solomon Islands there is a kindred belief. At Bogotu, in Ysabel, is a little island called Laulau. On the top of the island is a pool of water, Kolapapauro, and hither all departed spirits of men and women must at death repair. Across the pool lies a narrow tree-trunk, and along this bridge all souls must advance. Bolafagina, the Master-Spirit, examines their hands to see if they have the mark cut upon them (a conventional outline of the frigate bird) which admits them to his company. Those who cannot pass the ordeal are hurled from the bridge into the gulf beneath and perish (R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 257). A similar idea is prevalent among the Chinese in Formosa. With them the good pass over a narrow bamboo bridge to a paradise of sensual enjoyment; the wicked fall from the bridge into a bottomless pit of torment (Forlong, *Faiths of Man*, i. 340). One of the beliefs of the New Zealanders is to the effect that at death the soul on its way to Reinga (= Hades) has to pass a river called Wairotane, the keeper of which places a plank for him to go over. Sometimes the guardian spirit will not permit him to cross, but with friendly violence drives him back to the world he has quitted, in order that he may take care of the family he has left behind (Taylor, *New Zealand and its Inhabitants*, p. 103). In another legend of the same race, a tree has its top pulled down by ropes, so that, when released, it rebounds to the sky, and forms a swinging bridge. The soul that is ready for translation mounts the perilous structure, clings to it, and is swung up into heaven (K. M. Clark, *Maori Tales and Legends*, 1896).

The same ideas of a dread river, and a still more dreadful bridge, are to be found in Scandinavian mythology. In the romance of Hermód, the hero rides nine nights and days through dark and deep valleys, and sees nothing till he comes to the river Gjöll (='the sounding one'), when he steps on to the Gjallar Bridge, which is plated with shining gold. Its guardian maid, Modgud, who asks him his name, says that the day before five arrays of dead men had passed over the bridge, 'but the bridge sounds not less under thee alone, and thou hast not the colour of dead men; why ridest thou here on the way of Hel,' which 'lies downward and northward?' (du Chaillu, *The Viking Age*, 1889, i. 34; Mallet, *North. Antiq.*, 1859, p. 448). Here, as in Vedic India, we find the belief that this bridge of the dead can be crossed in safety by one who, having given a cow to the poor whilst on earth, will find himself provided with a cow at this dread passage, which will carry his soul in comfort across the gulf. In Friesland, the name given to the Milky Way, which was reckoned the Way of Souls, was the Cowpath ('Kaupat') (see Mannhardt, *Die Götterwelt der Deutschen u. Nordischen Volker*, 1860, p. 51). Hence of yore the funeral custom arose in Sweden, Denmark, Upper and Lower Germany, and England, that a cow should follow the coffin to the graveyard. Till recent times this custom was continued on the Continent, being accounted for on the ground that the cow was a gift to the priest for saying masses for the dead man's soul, or for preaching his funeral sermon (Kelly, *Curiosities of Indo-Europ. Tradition and Folklore*, 1863, p. 320). In England, when pagan sacrifices had been abolished, the cow was similarly devoted to pious uses, under the name '*saul-sceat*' (=soul-shot), or mortuary payment.

But, having passed Gjallar Bridge, and entered Hel (one of the nine Scandinavian under worlds which stood under Ygdrasil, the mystic ash), there was no way to heaven but by a still more precarious bridge. This was the famous *Bifrost*, or the Bridge of the Asar, connecting earth with Asgard, the home of the gods (Bifröst, from Icelandic *bifa*= tremble, and *rost*=path, the tremulous or aerial bridge, the rainbow; Mallet, *op. cit.* p. 548; Brewer, *Dict. of Phrase and Fable*, p. 133). According to the Eddas (§ 27), by this rainbow bridge from heaven to earth the gods daily descended, passing on horseback over it to sit in judgment in the under world on the souls of men brought before them. The red of the rainbow is the burning fire which keeps back the frost and mountain giants from entering Asgard. But, lest other giants should attempt to scale the heights of heaven by this bridge, at the foot, on Himinsbjörg ('heaven-mountain'), sits Heimdall, the watchman of the gods, with his terrible dog Garm. (Cf. the 'Great Dog' of the North Amer. Ind. legends, and the fact that the baying of a dog is currently held throughout northern lands to be coincident with, or prophetic of, death.) Heimdall needs less sleep than a bird; he can see equally well by night and by day 100 leagues away; he hears the grass growing and the wool on the sheep's back. But there will come a day when all his watchfulness will be in vain. Strong though the bridge be, and 'constructed with more art than any other work,' it will be stormed and destroyed by the sons of Muspell. These giants, led by Surtur (the 'black'), with a sword brighter than flame, will advance against heaven with irresistible might. In vain will Heimdall blow his Gjallar-

horn, the sound of which will be heard throughout all worlds. The wild horde will swarm up Bifröst on horseback, and attempt to break into Asgard. In the awful onslaught the tremulous bridge will break into a thousand pieces, and the end of the world will have come (Mallet, *op. cit.* pp. 95, 408–452; Crichton and Wheaton, *Scandinavia Ancient and Modern*, 1838, i. 91–95).

The conception of the rainbow as a bridge between earth and heaven, over which the gods descend and ascend, is found also among the South Sea Islands (see the adventures of Oro in Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, 1829, i. 313). Perhaps also the 'Floating Bridge of Heaven' in Japanese legends is derived from the same conception (see W. G. Aston, *Shinto, the Way of the Gods*, 1905, p. 87; and Sir E. J. Reed, *Japan: its History, Traditions, and Religions*, 1880, i. 30).

This notion of a bridge in the unseen world over which the soul at death must pass was imported into mediæval Christianity from paganism, and became an essential part of its stock of beliefs. In *St. Patrick's Purgatory* (Wright's ed. 1844, ch. iii.) it is told how the pilgrim made a tour through hell in person, how he crossed the narrow bridge that spans the river of death, how he turned about on a great wheel of fire, how he passed the devil's mouth over the awful bridge, and thus at last reached Paradise (Tylor, *op. cit.* ii. 55; Baring-Gould, *op. cit.* p. 237). A bridge is likewise a prominent feature in the mediæval Visions of Alberic, St. Paul, Tundale, and Thurcill; and the same idea is met with in the 'Lyke-Wake Dirge' (a dirge which continued to be sung in Yorkshire till A.D. 1624), the funeral chant of the North Country, which tells of the passage over the dreadful bridge of death:

> 'From Whinny-moore when thou may passe,
> Every night and alle,
> To Brig o' Dread thou comes at laste,
> And Christe receive thy saule.
> From Brig o' Death when thou art paste,
> Every night and alle;
> To Purgatory fire thou comes at laste,
> And Christe receive thy saule.'

(J. C. Atkinson, *Glossary of Cleveland Dialect*, p. 595; cf. Scott, *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border*, ii. 367; Tylor, *op. cit.* i. 495; Kelly, *Indo-European Folklore*, p. 115, who quotes the dirge in full; Becker, *Contribution to the Comparative Study of the Mediæval Visions of Heaven and Hell*, pp. 44, 76, 83, 90, 97.)

The conception is found even amongst North American Indians, either as one of their primitive myths or as a distorted belief derived from their early intercourse with Roman Catholic peoples. The Hurons and Iroquois tell of some whose spirits, travelling in dreams, have returned to earth to tell what they have encountered in the world of ghosts —the river of the dead with its snake-bridge, or swinging log, at the far end of the bridge the Great Dog, and in the distance the villages of the dead (Tylor, *op. cit.* ii. 50). Brebeuf, an early Jesuit missionary, tells of the Indian belief in the tree-trunk which bridges the river of death, and how some of the dead, as they cross it, are attacked by the Dog that guards it, and made to fall into the abyss (*ib.* p. 94). Yet the myth underwent the same natural modification as it had experienced in the Old World. The passage of the bridge came to signify the ordeal whereby the good and the evil were sifted. Catlin (*North Amer. Ind.* ii. 127) refers to the Choctaw idea that souls at death travel far westwards to where the long, slippery, barkless, pine-log, stretching from hill to hill, bridges over the deep and dreadful river: the good pass safely to a beauteous Indian Paradise; the wicked fall into the abyss of waters, and go to dwell in a dark, hungry, wretched land (for further American Indian data, see above, vol. i. p. 435; for similar beliefs among the Ojibwas and the Minnetarees of North America, see Tylor, *Early Hist. of Mankind*, p. 360; and on the ideas of the Aztecs and the Euroks of N. California, as well as the Indians of South America, see Brinton, *Myths of the New World*, 1876, pp. 108, 247 ff.).

In presence, therefore, of a belief, wide-spread and deeply rooted in the mediæval mind, that there existed a bridge in the under world over which every soul must pass, it is not surprising that men should have formed the theory that at this bridge there takes place a conflict between the devils on the one hand and the good angels on the other for the possession of each man's soul. This was an integral part of the Parsi faith. When a soul arrives at Chinvat Bridge the gods and the unclean spirits fight for possession of it. If it be one of the righteous, it is defended by other pure souls, and by the dogs that guard the bridge (*Fargard* vii. 52). A curious reminiscence of this is seen in a children's game, which is played all over Europe and America, and is everywhere fundamentally the same. Newell has described it as it is played in America (*Games and Songs of American Children*, New York, 1884, p. 204), and shows how it is a variant of the game described above (p. 852) as 'London Bridge.' Haddon (*op. cit.* p. 357) points out that in Swabia the two keepers of the 'Golden Bridge' are called respectively the 'Devil' and the 'Angel'; in France the game is known as 'Heaven and Hell'; in Italy the name of the sport is 'Open the Gates.' The gates are those of the Inferno and Paradiso. St. Peter is the keeper of the one, St. Paul of the other. 'When the destiny of the last child is decided, the two girls who represent the keepers of the bridge break their arch of lifted hands and move in different directions, followed by their subjects, while the cries and shrieks of the players condemned to the Inferno contrast with the pathetic songs and sweet cadences of those destined to the happiness of Paradise.' He further points out that the game is mentioned by Rabelais (*c.* A.D. 1533) under the name of the 'Fallen Bridge.' In German versions the keepers are called 'Devil and Angel,' 'King and Emperor,' or 'Sun and Moon.' In this latter form the game has been one of the few kept up by the Germans of Pennsylvania, who call it 'The Bridge of Holland' (*Die hollandische Brucke*). An Irish version of it obliges the little girls to dress as angels, while one personates the devil. The bridge, which is actually constructed of sticks and boards, is made to fall repeatedly, and this is ascribed to the devil. At last a victim is caught, and is made to undergo a test whether he will be the devil's captive or not, by being obliged to walk on a straight line drawn on the ground. And thus we find the idea of the necessity of a tribute to the river-spirit in the case of the erection of a bridge—an idea current in the very earliest ages of the world—perpetuated to-day amongst ourselves in the games which our children play.

iii. THE SEMI-SACRED CHARACTER OF THE BRIDGE, SUBSEQUENT TO THE PLACATING OF THE RIVER-SPIRIT. —This is the third stage in the growth of opinion. Once the sacrifice has been offered, and the river-spirit or devil been placated, the bridge itself takes on an air of sanctity. Can it be some kindred idea which lies at the root of the Japanese custom of bridge-divination (*hashi-ura*)? The end-post of a bridge is a *wo-bashira*, *i.e.* a male pillar or phallus, and, as persons pass over the bridge and engage in conversation, stray words overheard from their talk are interpreted by the inquirer, who sits beside the post, as an indication from the gods of what is desired to be learned. The bridge is a place where it is believed 'sacred' influences are felt (see W. G. Aston, *Shinto, the Way of the Gods*, p. 341).

It is probably from this sacrosanctity of bridges that we may find:—

1. The origin of the name 'pontifex' as the primitive 'priest-engineer.'—It stands to reason that the appeasing of an offended river-spirit could be accomplished only by one who was cognizant of the right method of propitiating the divinity. The rites must be conducted by him who was most deeply instructed on these profound subjects, in other words, by the priest. He alone could interpret to his fellow-men the demands of the river-god, and he alone could prescribe the proper ritual for appeasing him. But in primitive times not only religious but also almost all technical and scientific knowledge was the exclusive possession of the priestly cult. Public works requiring skill in mathematics, engineering, and mechanical contrivances, were therefore nearly all the product of priestly brains and priestly hands. What more natural, then, than that the name 'pontifex,' 'bridge-builder' (from *pons* and *facio*; see Smith's *Gr. and Rom. Ant.* 939 f.), should arise, suggesting in itself the twin functions of a servant of religion and a civil engineer? This simple explanation of a word round which much mystery has gathered is probably the true one. The priest whose business it was to placate the river-divinity was originally also the architect of the bridge; and in later years, when the two functions were separated, and there came to be civil engineers who were not priests, the name still clung to the original possessor of the word, and hence we have 'pontifex,' 'pontifical,' 'pontiff,' all of priestly significance (cf. Milton for the old connotation of the word:

> 'Now had they brought the work by wondrous art
> *Pontifical*, a ridge of pendent rock
> Over the vexed abyss'
>
> [*Paradise Lost*, x. 312 ff.]).

2. This furnishes a reason why the Pons Sublicius was always of wood.—The priestly mind is essentially conservative, and the first form of the bridge was jealously preserved through all succeeding ages. We have every reason to believe that this bridge was the first which spanned the Tiber. It was the erection of this wooden structure by some priest-engineer in pre-historic times (tradition assigns it to the reign of Ancus Martius [Livy, i. 33]), who defied and appeased the river-spirit, which originated the title 'pontifex.' But no sooner was the bridge successfully reared, and Father Tiber placated by some sacrifice, than the structure acquired a semi-sacred character, and was ever afterwards regarded as holy (see Dionys. ii. 73, iii. 45; Plut. *Numa*, 9; Serv. *ad Virg. Æn.* ii. 166). The idea of its holiness was perpetuated through succeeding centuries by the fact that its upkeep and repair were undertaken solely by the College of Pontifices, of whom the head was the Pontifex Maximus; while its sanctity is further attested in that neither bolt nor bar nor nail of iron entered into its construction, which was entirely of oak (see the passages quoted in Jordan's *Topographie der Stadt Rom im Alterthum*, 1885, I. i. 396; Varro, *Ling. Lat.* v. 83; Pliny, *HN* xxxvi. 15; Tac. *Hist.* i. 86; Seneca, *de Vita Beata*, 25). The conservative priestly mind could tolerate no change. 'In the history of man iron is a modern innovation as compared to bronze and still more to wood and stone; therefore, like every innovation, it is offensive to the gods' (so Frazer, *JPh* xiv. [1885] p. 157 note, who adduces many examples of the prejudice and hatred with which iron is regarded by the old deities in countries as far sundered as Scotland and Korea, Cappadocia and Morocco; he refers also to the Hebrew practice, Dt 27[5]). It was therefore a religious notion, traceable to the innate conservatism of the priestly mind, which maintained the practice of allowing no iron to invade the virgin purity of this old wooden bridge.

If this way of accounting for the sacred character of the Pons Sublicius be the correct one, a number of competing theories are ruled out of court. Mommsen supposes that it was owing to the political exigencies of the Roman commonwealth that the bridge was always kept in its primitive wooden condition—that the bridge might be the more easily broken down at the approach of an enemy. Undoubtedly the legend of how Rome was saved by Horatius Cocles keeping back the Etruscan enemy under Lars Porsena, while the Romans hewed down the wooden structure behind him, lends countenance to this view (Livy, ii. 10; a fine bronze medallion of Cocles and the Sublician bridge of the time of Antoninus Pius is figured in Frohner's *Méd. de l'Empire Rom.* 1878, p. 60). J. H. Middleton (*Ancient Rome in 1888*, 1888, p. 484) and Dennis (*Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria*, i. 14) adopt similar views, the latter asserting that, as the Tiber was the natural rampart of Rome, the Pons Sublicius was kept as a wooden drawbridge until all fear of invasion was removed by the conquest of Etruria and by the downfall of Hannibal. Thereafter, stone bridges were erected, as the principle of the arch had been known for centuries before, and had been applied in the construction of the Cloaca Maxima (see also Marion Crawford, *Ave Roma Immortalis*, i. 6, ii. 127). But this theory fails to account for the perpetuation of the practice of retaining the bridge in its primitive wooden form and avoiding the use of iron. It is therefore the religious, rather than the political, reason, to which we are confined, as the true explanation.

3. Transference of the name 'Pontifex' to the pagan and Christian Emperors and latterly to the Popes.—With the passing of the Republic into the Empire, the office of Pontifex Maximus was conferred on Augustus (13 B.C.) by the vote of the Senate; and thus the supreme sanction of religion lay in the grasp of him who wielded the Imperial sword. It was held that under no circumstances could there be more than one Pontifex Maximus, and this rule was never violated until Pupienus Maximus and Balbinus were named joint-Emperors by the Senate (A.D. 238). The rule having been broken, it was never afterwards observed. Frequently the junior colleague of an Emperor was styled Pontifex Maximus equally with his senior, and the legend occurs on their medals and coins. When Christianity became the official religion of the Roman State, the Christian Emperors carried over the title into their adopted religion. Seven Christian Emperors assumed the name, ensigns, and prerogatives of Sovereign Pontiff, until finally Gratian refused to wear the Pontifical robe (see Gibbon, ii. 394 [Bury's ed.], and note on the testimony of Zosimus).

The next step was the transference of the title to him who claimed to be spiritual head of the Christian Church, though the exact date at which the name was first applied to the Bishop of Rome cannot now be traced. (There is a very doubtful affirmation in Tuker and Malleson, *Handbook to Christian and Eccles. Rome*, iv. 334, that the title was first given to Pope Leo I. [A.D. 440–461].) The first prominent application of the title is from the pen of Tertullian (*de Pudicitia*, c. i.) in an ironical sentence addressed to the Roman Pontiff: 'Audio etiam edictum esse propositum, et quidem peremptorium. Pontifex scilicet Maximus, quod est episcopus episcoporum, edicit.' The correspondence of Cyprian shows no trace of the recognition by the African Church of the exclusive right of the Bishop of Rome to the title. Indeed, in a petition to Boniface, Bishop of Carthage, A.D. 525, the monks there address him as 'Christi venerandus Pontifex' (*Thomassin*, ed. Bourassé, ii. 366). Similarly Hilary of Arles was styled 'summus Pontifex' by Eucherius, Bishop of Lyons (Migne, *Patr. Lat.* l. 773). The term is first applied directly to a bishop of Rome, when Anastasius, on the ordination of Pelagius I. to that dignity, wrote (A.D. 555): 'et ordinaverunt eum pontificem' (Migne, *op. cit.* cxxviii. 611). There is abundant evidence (adduced in Smith's *Dict. Christ. Ant.* ii. art. 'Pontifex') to show that in all the succeeding centuries down to the 11th, many prelates in different countries of Europe

were styled 'Pontifex,' and that 'Maximus' was added where the see was more important and distinguished. But gradually, with the growth of the Papacy in power and worldliness, the title was centred in the Pope; and from the 11th cent. to the present day the name which was originated, perhaps by Ancus Martius in the early ages of the world's history, to designate the engineer-theologian who bridged the Tiber and placated the offended river-spirit, has been limited to the Pontiff who to-day sits in the Vatican, and overlooks the spot where the Pons Sublicius once stood.

4. The Church assuming control of bridges.—Bridges finally became sacred objects. The Church took bridges into her sacred keeping, and they became surrounded with many religious associations. The German Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire had to reiterate thrice a royal oath to maintain the liberties of Rome, 'at *the bridge*, the gate, and on the stairs of the Vatican' (Gibbon, vii. 211 [Bury's ed.]; Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter* [Eng. tr.], iv. 59). Bridge-building became a part of religion, a pious and meritorious work before God. In 1189 a regular Order of Hospitallers was founded in Southern France, under Pope Clement III., by St. Benezet, under the name of the 'Bridge-Builders' (*Frères Pontifes, Fratres Pontifices*). The object of the Order was the building of hospices and bridges at points where pilgrims crossed the large rivers, and for the ferrying of pilgrims over the streams. A hospital of this Order at Avignon at an early period built the celebrated bridge of which four arches still survive. As a badge they wore a pick upon their breast. Their constitution was modelled upon that of the Knights of St. John; and as the association gradually dissolved in the 13th cent., most of their number found their way into that Order (Kurtz, *Church Hist.* [Eng. tr.] ii. 76; Grégoire, *Recherches historiques sur les congrégations hospitalières des frères pontifes*, Paris, 1818).

To leave money to build a bridge came to be reckoned an act of great piety. In many cases the funds bequeathed were administered by priest-engineers, whose names have been permanently associated with the structures which they erected (cf. the origin of London Bridge built by the priests of St. Mary Overie from money dedicated by the daughter of a ferryman [Allen, *Hist. and Ant. of London*, ii. 454 ff.]). Sometimes, however, the bridges of the Middle Ages were erected from the sale of indulgences. Hutchinson (*Hist. of Cumberland*, i. 283) records: 'In the year 1360 a bridge at Great Salkeld was taken away by floods; for the repairing and re-edifying of which Bishop Welton published an indulgence of 40 days.' The Bishop of Durham (1311–1316) was fond of this practice, as the registry of his episcopal chancery shows. There are frequent entries such as the following: 'His lordship grants 40 days' indulgence to all who will draw from the treasure that God has given them valuable and charitable aid towards the building and repair of Botyton Bridge' (*Registrum Palatinum Dunelmense*, ed. Hardy, in *Rolls Series*, 1875, i. 615, 641 [quoted in Jusserand, *English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages*, p. 41]). Similar cases might be cited from Devonshire and other records (see Walford, 'Bridges, their Hist. and Literary Associations' in *TRHS* [new series], 1884, p. 364). Prof. Hume Brown gives the facts for Scotland (*Scotland in the Time of Queen Mary*, 1904, p. 60).

Most of the bridges erected by priests had a chapel attached, built as part of the structure. Nearly all the early bridges on the Continent and in Britain were adorned with these chapels, *e.g.* that at Wakefield over the Calder in the time of Edward III.; that over the Wye at Monmouth, still extant; that over the Avon at Bath; and the first stone London Bridge erected in 1205, on which the chapel was dedicated to St. Thomas à Becket (see Walford and Jusserand, *opp. citt.*). As a curious perpetuation of the ancient Roman idea that the duty of keeping the bridge intact was a religious obligation resting on the sacerdotal orders, the priests attached to these mediæval chapels were enjoined, as an indispensable part of their office, to keep the bridge in repair (Allen, *London*, ii. 458 note; see also Ritson, *Gammer Gurton's Garland*). Perhaps the most remarkable of all these mediæval chapels is that at Droitwich, in Cheshire, where the high road passes through the chapel, and divides the congregation from the reading-desk and pulpit (Fosbrooke, *Cyc. of Ant.* p. 147; Nash, *Worcestershire*, i. 329). These bridge-chapels were not used exclusively for devotional purposes. The chapel of the old Norman bridge over the Aire at Leeds was utilized till the middle of the 18th cent. as a cloth market, and the traders were summoned to the spot by the ringing of the chapel bell. In 1276 an ordinance of the Common Council of the City of London forbade the holding of a market on London Bridge. But, on the other hand, Philip the Fair of France in 1304 ordained that the Public Exchange of Paris should be held on the Great Bridge there, as it was anciently accustomed to be (see *Gephyrologia* [1751], the basis of Rees' *Cyclopædia; of Arts, Sciences, and Lit.* 1819). As a still further development of this sacredness attaching to bridges, the ancient Danes are said to have erected bridges as a pious memorial of their deceased friends. Olaus Wormius in his *Monumentorum Danicorum*, 848 (A.D. 1643), states that two or three persons built a bridge on the island of Foesoe in Denmark, not only to preserve their own names to posterity, but also to commemorate that of Jotheimnt, who had converted them to Christianity. Others have erected bridges to express their gratitude for rescue from drowning.

Thus with the placating of the river-spirit, the defeat of the devil, and the hallowing of their structure by their association with the monastic orders, mediæval bridges eventually became shrines, and with the erection of chapels on them, the process of rehabilitation was complete. The ill-omened structure of antiquity grew into the holy and sacred sanctuary of the Middle Ages, and memories of their religious character have lingered to the present day. Bridges are no longer objects of censure, hated of God and devil alike, but holy spots, across which even material blessings may pass. It is over a golden *bridge* at Bingen that German tradition asserts that the spirit of Charlemagne annually crosses the Rhine, whenever a season of unusual plenty betokens that the vineyards and cornfields of Germany have been supernaturally benefited. Thus Longfellow sings (*Sonnet on Autumn*): 'Thou standest, like Imperial Charlemagne, upon thy Bridge of Gold'; and again (*The Golden Legend*, Canto v.):

'God's blessing on the architects who built
The bridges o'er swift rivers and abysses,
Before impassable to human feet,
No less than on the builders of cathedrals,
Whose massive walls are bridges thrown across
The dark and terrible abyss of Death.
Well has the name of Pontifex been given
Unto the Church's head, as the chief builder
And architect of the invisible bridge
That leads from earth to heaven.'

LITERATURE.—The writer is acquainted with no work which deals with the whole subject. He has to express his indebtedness to Dr. J. G. Frazer for kind references to other literature bearing on certain aspects of the question, besides the excellent note referred to above in his article in *JPh* xiv. [1885]

p. 156. W. Warde Fowler's *Roman Festivals of the Period of the Republic*, 1899, well repays very careful study, though the writer of this article has felt obliged to dissent from his verdict on the ceremonies at the Pons Sublicius. Much valuable information will be found in Mannhardt's *Baumkultus*, 1875; Grimm's *Deutsche Mythologie*[2], 1844; and Tylor's *Primitive Culture*[3], 1891. The literature on 'foundation-sacrifices' is cited in the text. Mrs. Gomme's work on *Traditional Games*, 1894–98, is full of suggestive material, which has been worked over by Haddon, *Study of Man*, 1898. Many references to other literature are given in Scherman, *Materialien zur Geschichte der indischen Visionslitteratur*, Leipzig, 1893, pp. 102–119.

G. A. FRANK KNIGHT.

BRIEFS.—See BULLS AND BRIEFS.

BRINDĀBAN (Skr. *vṛindāvana*, 'grove of the sacred basil tree,' *ocymum sanctum*).—A town situated on the right bank of the river Jumnā, in the Mathurā District of the United Provinces, lat. 27° 33′ 20″ N.; long. 77° 42′ 10″ E. The place is held sacred as the scene of many adventures in the life of Kṛishna. It has been computed that there are as many as one thousand temples within the limits of the town, of which four are of special interest—those of Govinda Deva and Gopīnātha, dedicated to Kṛishṇa, as a god of cattle and companion of the Gopī milkmaids; Madan Mohan and Jugal Kishor, representing him in his youthful and erotic character. The temple dedicated to Govinda Deva, built about A.D. 1590, is the most impressive building that Hindu religious art has ever produced, at least in Northern India. 'The body of the building,' says Growse (p. 241), 'is in the form of a Greek cross, the nave being 100 ft. in length and the breadth across the transepts the same. The central compartment is surmounted by a dome of singularly graceful proportions; and the four arms of the cross are roofed by a waggon vault of pointed form, not, as is usual in Hindu architecture, composed of overlapping brackets, but constructed of true radiating arches as in our Gothic cathedrals.' The design has suggested to some authorities the influence of the Jesuit missionaries which was considerable in the court of the Emperor Akbar. If this were really the case, 'the temple would be one of the most eclectic buildings in the world, having a Christian ground-plan, a Hindu elevation, and a roof of modified Saracenic character.' But it is most improbable that Jesuit missionaries assisted in planning a Hindu temple, and, as Growse remarks, there are earlier Hindu temples which display a similar design. Fergusson regards this as 'one of the most interesting and elegant temples in India, and the only one, perhaps, from which an European might borrow a few hints.' The temple of Madan Mohan is in a ruinous condition, and the idol has been removed to Karaulī in Rājputāna. That in honour of Jugal Kishor was built in the reign of the Emperor Jahāngīr, about A.D. 1627. Among the modern temples, that erected by the Seth bankers of Mathurā is one of the most remarkable. It follows the Madras style, with the lofty *gopuras*, or gate-towers, characteristic of the great fanes of Southern India. It was built during the years 1845–1851. It contains a *rath*, or processional car, of the god, an enormous wooden tower in several stages, with monstrous effigies in the corners, in which he is taken once a year in procession from his temple to a neighbouring garden, where a pavilion is erected for his reception (Growse, 260 f.). Every event in the life of Kṛishṇa is the occasion of a local festival, of which Growse (*ib.* 267) enumerates forty-six.

LITERATURE.—Growse, *Mathurā, a District Memoir*[3] (1883), ch. viii., where illustrations of the more important sacred buildings will be found. The Govinda Deva temple has been described by Fergusson, *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture* (1899), p. 462 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BROTHERHOOD (Artificial).

[P. J. HAMILTON-GRIERSON.]

1. 'Relationship' in ordinary acceptation means connexion by birth or marriage. Accordingly, it is usual to describe blood-brotherhood, adoption, and the ties formed by sponsorship, fosterage, and the like as 'artificial relationships.' Nor, indeed, is this description open to serious objection, provided that we do not leave two facts out of sight—the fact that, in the process of their evolution, artificial relationships do not always follow the same course as natural relationships, and the fact that what seems artificial to us may, and often does, seem perfectly natural to uncivilized man.

We propose to treat the subject under the following heads:

i. *The ceremony establishing brotherhood.*
  (*a*) *Where blood is employed* (§§ 2–17).
  (*b*) *Where blood is not employed* (§§ 18–29).
ii. *Where the relation is due to force of circumstances* (§§ 30–31).
iii. *The institution among the Southern Slavs* (§§ 32–43).
iv. *The institution in Roman and Byzantine law and in modern Greece* (§ 44).
v. *Where the compact is entered into with women, dead persons, supernatural beings, or animals* (§§ 45–46).
vi. *What persons are bound by the compact* (§§ 47–48).
vii. *What purposes are served by the compact* (§§ 49–50).
viii. *What legal consequences flow from the compact* (§§ 51–52).
ix. *General observations on the nature and history of the institution* (§§ 53–56).

i. The ceremony.—(*a*) *Where blood is employed.*

2. Livingstone (*Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa*, London, 1857, p. 488) describes the rite as practised by the Balonda and shows us its most usual characteristics. 'The hands of the parties are joined . . .; small incisions are made on the clasped hands, on the pits of the stomach of each, and on the right cheeks and foreheads. A small quantity of blood is taken off from these points in both parties by means of a stalk of grass. The blood from one person is put into one pot of beer, and that of the second into another; each then drinks the other's blood, and they are supposed to become perpetual friends or relations. During the drinking of the beer, some of the party continue beating the ground with short clubs, and utter sentences by way of ratifying the treaty. The men belonging to each then finish the beer. The principals in the performance of "*Kasendi*" are henceforth considered blood-relations, and are bound to disclose to each other any impending evil.' In some cases the parties drink one another's blood undiluted. Thus, among the people of Rubunga, the 'brothers' bent their heads, and sucked the blood from each other's arms (Henry M. Stanley, *Through the Dark Continent*, London, 1878, ii. 286); and a like practice prevails among the Rokka of Flores (A. Bastian, *Indonesien oder d. Inseln d. malayischen Archipel.* pt. iv.: 'Borneo u. Celebes,' Berlin, 1889, p. 65), in Syria (H. C. Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, London, 1887, p. 5) and Madagascar (W. Ellis, *History of Madagascar*, London, 1838, i. 187–188), among the Karens of Burma (R. M. Luther *ap.* Trumbull, *op. cit.* p. 313), the Wanyoro (J. A. Grant, *A Walk across Africa*, London, 1864, p. 271), and the people of Comana (Jean sire de Joinville, *Histoire de S. Louys . . . enrichie de nouvelles observations et dissertations historiques . . . par Charles du Fresne, sieur du Cange*, Paris, 1668, p. 94). Baldwin, Count of Flanders, reproached the Greeks with so far accommodating themselves to the manners of the barbarians, with whom they made alliances, as to drink their blood (*ib.* Diss. xxi.); and Tacitus (*Ann.* xii. 47 [Church and Brodribb's tr.]) says of the Iberians and Armenians that it was the custom for their princes, whenever they joined alliance, to unite their right hands and bind the thumbs together in a tight knot; then, when

the blood had flowed into the extremities, they let it escape by a slight puncture and sucked it in turn. Further, Herodotus (i. 74 [Rawlinson's tr.]) tells us that, when they took oath, the Medes and Lydians made a slight flesh wound in their arms from which each sucked a portion of the other's blood. Among some of the Australian tribes 'the drawing and also the drinking of blood on certain special occasions is associated with the idea that those who take part in the ceremony are thereby bound together in friendship and obliged to assist one another' (Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, London, 1904, p. 598; *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, London, 1899, p. 461). The parties to the rite drink one another's blood, or sprinkle one another with their blood (see below, § 49). So, too, in ancient Ireland, parties to a league are said to have ratified it by drinking each other's blood—a custom derived from the heathen, who were wont to seal their treaties with blood (Giraldus Cambrensis, *Typogr. Hib.* iii. 22).

3. Sometimes the blood of the 'brothers' is mixed with some other liquid—water, wine, beer, or spirits; and of this practice instances are supplied by the natives of Timor (H. O. Forbes, *A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago, 1878–1883*, London, 1885, p. 452) and of Bohol (M. de Zuñiga, *An Historical View of the Philippine Islands* [tr. by Maver], London, 1814, i. 67; see also *Relation by Loarca*: 'The Philippine Islands,' ed. by Blair and Robertson, Cleveland, Ohio, 1903, v. 161–163), of Amboina, of Leti, Moa, and Lakor, of the Babar Archipelago, of Wetar, of Ceram, and of Tanembar and Timorlaut (J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige Rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, pp. 41, 396, 342, 446, 128–129, 284), by the Bali of North Cameroon (Hutter, 'Der Abschluss von Blutverwandtschaft u. Vertragen bei d. Negern d. Graslands in Nordkamerun' in *Globus*, 1889, lxxv. 1), the Balonda (D. Livingstone, *op. cit.* p. 488; H. Wissman, etc., *Im Innern Afrikas*, Leipzig, 1888, p. 151), the Wanyamwesi (J. Kohler, 'Das Bantu-recht in Ostafrika' in *Zeits. f. vergl. Rechtsw.* xv. 41), the Kimbunda (L. Magyar, *Reisen in Sud-Afrika in d. Jahren 1849 bis 1857*, tr. from the Hungarian by J. Hunfalvy, Budapest and Leipzig, 1859, i. 201–202), the Kayans (S. St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*[2], London, 1863, i. 116), and the Scythians (Herod. iv. 70).

4. The 'brothers' do not always drink each other's blood. Sometimes they sprinkle it over one another (Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes*, pp. 598, 372; see below, § 49). It is smeared by the Karens over their lips (Luther, *op. cit.* p. 313), while the Wachaga wipe it on a piece of flesh, which each of the parties thrusts several times into the mouth of the other (Kohler, *op. cit.* p. 40). A somewhat similar practice is found in Uhehe (J. Thomson, *To the Central African Lakes and Back*, London, 1881, i. 243–244). In Uganda and Bukoba each of the 'brothers' dips a coffee-bean from a pod containing two in his blood, and presents it on the palm of his hand to the other, who must take it up with his lips (J. Roscoe, 'Further Notes on the Manners and Customs of the Baganda' in *JAI*, 1902, xxxii. 68; Kohler, *op. cit.* pp. 40–41). And, among the Kayans of Borneo, the blood of the parties is either mixed with some other liquid and drunk, or is rolled up with a cigarette and inhaled with the smoke (S. St. John, *op. cit.* i. 116).

5. At Mruli, a coffee bean (C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin, *Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan*, London, 1882, ii. 41); among the Swahili, a hen's liver (R. Niese, 'Die Personen- u. Familienrecht d. Suaheli' in *Zeits. f. vergl. Rechtsw.* xvi. 240); and among the Wazaramo, Wazeguro, Wasagara (R. F. Burton, *The Lake Regions of Central Africa*, London, 1860, i. 114), and Masai (M. Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904, p. 101), a piece of flesh, are eaten, smeared with the 'brother's' blood. Among some of the tribes to the south of the Welle, a piece of sugar-cane, with which the blood of the parties has been wiped off, is chewed and the fibres are blown over the wound. At the same time each 'brother' declares the motives which induce him to enter into the compact, and the obligations which he binds himself to perform, and imprecates evil on the breaker of the bond (W. Junker, *Travels in Africa during the Years 1879–1883*, London, 1891, p. 405; see below, § 56).

6. This last instance introduces us to the performance of the rite by way of inoculation, which in many cases takes the place of blood-drinking. Grant (*op. cit.* p. 108 f.) gives the following description of this form as practised by the Wanyamwesi:

'The process between Bombay and the Sultan's son, Keerenga, may be mentioned. My consent having been given, a mat is spread, and a confidential party or surgeon attends on each. All four squat, as if to have a game at whist; before them are two clean leaves, a little grease, and a spear-head; a cut is made under the ribs of the left side of each party, a drop of blood put on a leaf and exchanged by the surgeons, who rub it with butter twice into the wound with the leaf, which is now torn in pieces and strewn over the "brothers'" heads. A solemn address is made by the older of the attendants, and they conclude the ceremony by rubbing their own sides with butter, shaking hands, and wishing each other success. Ten rounds of ammunition are then fired off, a compliment from each of the four drums is sounded, and they parade the village all the afternoon. . . . An Uganda lad, the magician of the Sultan, made brotherhood with Rehan, the cook, by cutting marks on his chest and rubbing in the fat of lions.'

Similar usages are said to prevail among the Wajiji (Burton, *op. cit.* i. 114), on the Congo, and in other parts of Africa (H. M. Stanley, *The Congo*, London, 1885, i. 385, ii. 24, 29, *Through the Dark Continent*, i. 493; H. Ward, *Ethnographical Notes relating to the Congo Tribes*, 1895; *JAI* xxiv. 291; V. L. Cameron, *Across Africa*, London, 1877, i. 333).

7. In Scandinavia, men made brotherhood by letting their blood flow together in a footprint and mingle where it fell ('The Long Lay of Brunhild,' in *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, G. Vigfusson and F. York Powell, Oxford, 1883, i. 308), or by 'going under the turf,' a ceremony of which an account is given in *The Story of Gisli the Outlaw* (from the Icelandic by G. W. Dasent, Edinburgh, 1896, p. 23). We are told that Gisli and the three men who were to make oath along with him

'cut up a sod of turf in such wise that both its ends were still fast to the earth, and propped it up by a spear, scored with runes, so tall that a man might lay his head on the socket of the spear-head. Under this yoke they were all four to pass. . . . Now they bleed each a vein, and let their blood fall together on the mould whence the turf had been cut up, and all touch it; and all afterwards fell on their knees, and were to take hands, and swear to avenge each the other as though he were his brother, and to call all the gods to witness.'

Several explanations of this curious ceremony have been suggested. In Jacob Grimm's opinion (*Deutsche Rechtsalterthumer*[3], Göttingen, 1881, p. 119), the 'brothers,' by placing themselves underneath the turf and falling on their knees, appear to indicate their abasement before the Higher Powers, and their solemn purification from the world. Konrad Maurer (*Die Bekehrung d. norwegischen Stammes zum Christenthum*, Munich, 1855–1856, ii. 170–171, 229) regards the rite as an ordeal of which the purpose was to secure the performance of the promises made. And this view seems to receive some support from the following passage:

'This was then the ordeal at that time, that men should pass under the earth-collar; that is, a turf was carven out of a field. The ends of the turf shall be fast in the field, and that man who was to undergo the ordeal should pass thereunder. . . . So was he cleansed who went under the earth-collar, if the turf fell not

upon him' (*The Story of the Laxdalers*, done into English by R. Proctor, London, 1903, ch. xviii.).

M. Pappenheim(*Die altdanischen Schutzgilden*, Breslau, 1885, p. 18 ff.), however, points out that this ceremony was used not only in making brothers and in ordeals, but in cases where an offence had been committed and the offender was required to humble himself by going under the turf, as a condition precedent to the acceptance of a composition. He holds that one explanation will not suffice for all three cases, and he explains the use of the ceremony in making brothers—the mixing of the blood with the earth—as symbolical of the common origin of the brothers. They are children of one womb—born of one mother, the earth (see also Vigfusson and Powell, *op. cit.* i. 423).

8. Muir (*Life of Mahomet*, London, 1858, i. p. ccxlvi) tells us that, in a dispute among the Koraish, the men of one party solemnized their compact by dipping their hands in blood, while their opponents dipped their hands in perfume and rubbed them upon the Ka'ba. Robertson Smith (*Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, new ed. London, 1903, pp. 57–59) says that at Mecca in historical times a life and death covenant was solemnized by an oath, each of the parties to which dipped his hands in a pan of blood and tasted its contents; and he expresses the view that these forms are variations of one and the same rite—the rite in which the contracting parties drank or tasted one another's blood. He shows (*op. cit.* p. 59, note 1) that in some instances water or fruit-juice was substituted for blood; and in this connexion it is interesting to notice Herodotus' (iv. 172 [Rawlinson's tr.]) statement regarding the Nasamonians that, 'when they pledge their faith to one another, each gives the other to drink out of his hand; if there be no liquid to be had, they take up dust from the ground, and put their tongues to it' (cf. W. Crooke, 'The Hill Tribes of the Central Indian Hills,' in *JAI* xxviii. 241). It may be that the practice of ratifying an agreement to take part in a common undertaking by shaking hands dipped in blood (Hector Boethius, *Scotorum Historiæ*, Paris, 1526, lib. ii. fol. xviii *b*; cf. § 15 below), and that of drinking human blood, attributed to conspirators at Rome (Sall. *de Conj. Cat.* 22; Plut. *Vit. Publicolæ* iv. [both statements are regarded as unreliable by T. Mommsen, *Romische Forschungen*, Berlin, 1864, i. 332, n. 1]), and in China (Trumbull, *op. cit.* p. 43), are truly adaptations of the primitive institution of 'making brothers' (see below, § 15).

9. With the form of the rite in which the hands are dipped in blood Jacob Grimm (*op. cit.* p. 194) compares the dipping of weapons in blood, mentioned by Herodotus (iv. 70 [Rawlinson's tr.]) in the following passage:

'Oaths among the Scyths are accompanied with the following ceremonies: a large earthen bowl is filled with wine, and the parties to the oath, wounding themselves slightly with a knife or an awl, drop some of their blood into the wine; then they plunge into the mixture a scymitar, some arrows, a battle-axe, and a javelin, all the while repeating prayers; lastly the two contracting parties drink each a draught from the bowl, as do also the chief men among their followers.'

So, too, the Benuas, in making alliances or in taking solemn vows, 'dip their weapons into a mixture of which blood forms the principal ingredient' (T. G. Newbold, *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*, London, 1839, ii. 395). Lucian (*Toxaris*, 37), in his account of the Scythian form, gives the additional fact that the parties, having dipped the points of their swords in the blood, held them together. It would seem that this touching of swords signified the union of the parties; and this view is corroborated by the curious practice of scraping the spear-shafts and musket-stocks of the 'brothers' on a banana-leaf, and dropping these scrapings, with a pinch of salt and a little dust from a pod, upon the wounds (Stanley, *The Congo*, ii. 24, 89; cf. Hutter, *op. cit.* p. 1 ff. as to the Bali of North Cameroon, and see § 13 below). It seems that scrapings of wood from the stool of a chief add strength to an oath (A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast of West Africa*, London, 1887, p. 198). A similar explanation appears to apply to the ceremony of sword-biting practised by the Kanowit Dayaks. According to St. John (*op. cit.* i. 55),

'a pig was placed between representatives of two tribes, who, after calling down the vengeance of the spirits on those who broke the treaty, plunged their spears into the animal, and then exchanged weapons. Drawing their knives, they each bit the blade of the others, and so completed the affair.'

So, too, the Garos swear to observe peace by biting each other's sword, and seal the compact by putting food into each other's mouth and pouring beer down each other's throat (E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, London, 1872, p. 62). It is of interest to note in this connexion that the Norman lawyers explained the word 'wapentake' in reference 'to the formal recognition of the local magistrate by touching his arms' (W. Stubbs, *The Constitutional History of England*[2], Oxford, 1885, i. 96). This ceremony is described in a law of Edward the Confessor (c. 33) as follows:

'Ipse vero erecta lancea sua ab omnibus secundum morem fœdus accipiebat; omnes enim quotquot venissent cum lanceis suis ipsius hastam tangebant et ita confirmabant per contactum armorum, pace palam concessa.'

Du Cange (*Glossarium mediæ et infimæ Latinitatis*, ed. L. Favre, Niort, 1883, *s.v.* 'Arma' [Arma mutare]) understands that it was thus that the subjects of the early kings of England made themselves 'fratres conjurati,' bound to cherish and protect one another and to join in preserving the kingdom from its enemies. G. Tamassia (*L'Affratellamento*, Turin, 1886, p. 32, note 2), however, cites authority to show that what is described is not an *armorum conjunctio*, but a *modus per strepitum concussorum armorum plebiscita condendi* (see Grimm, *op. cit.* p. 770 f.; Tac. *Germ.* xi., *Hist.* v. 15).

10. Sometimes the parties to the compact hold the ends of a forked branch, while one of them cuts it in two, or while a medicine-man draws their blood (Stanley, *The Congo*, ii. 88, 104). It is observed by C. A. L. M. Schwaner (*Borneo, Beschrijving van het Stroomgebied van d. Berito*, Amsterdam, 1853, i. 214–215) that, in the district of Borneo with which he deals, a third party hacks through the branch held by the 'brothers,' and at the same time pronounces imprecations upon the oath-breaker. In view of the whole circumstances, it seems not improbable that the act of holding had a twofold significance. In the first place, it symbolized the union of the parties (it had the same meaning as the contact of swords in the Scythian ceremonial), and, in the second place, it was a ritual act similar to the act of holding an animal while it is being slaughtered for sacrifice. An instance of this sacrificial ceremony is supplied by the Kumi of Chittagong. Among them, the parties to the covenant hold the ropes by which a goat is secured. One of their number stands over it, holding a fighting *dâo*. He takes a mouthful of liquor from a cup and blows it over the parties and the victim. Then he raises his *dâo* and invokes the river-spirit, while he pulls some hairs from the goat and scatters them to the winds. With one stroke the head is severed from the body, and the blood is smeared on the foreheads and feet of the 'brothers' (T. H. Lewin, *Wild Races of South-Eastern India*, London, 1870, p. 228). Among the Bali and the Dusuns, and in Shira (see below, §§ 13, 17, 21), the act of holding or touching the victim forms part of the ceremony.

11. Trumbull tells us of a curious Syrian form of the rite. The parties publicly announce their reasons for entering into the compact. These declarations are written down in duplicate; and each 'brother,' having smeared his copy with the other's blood, and having uttered the wish that the deceiver may be deceived by God, wears it suspended from his neck or bound to his arm 'in token of the indissoluble relation' (*op. cit.* p. 5 f.; see below, § 21).

12. Probably Grimm (*op. cit.* p. 194; cf. Livy, i. 32) is justified in referring to the notion of union brought about by an exchange of blood both the 'hasta sanguinea praeusta' of the Romans—the symbol of the declaration of war by a united people—and the 'Fiery Cross' of the Scottish Highlanders—the half-burnt stake dipped in blood which called the clans to arms against a common foe.

13. A group of observances in which the introduction of weapons forms a prominent feature seems to be susceptible of a different interpretation. Forbes (*op. cit.* p. 452) tells us that at Timor the contracting parties slash their arms, and collect the blood in a bamboo, into which *kanipa* (coarse gin) or *laru* (palm-wine) is poured. Having provided themselves with a small fig-tree, they adjourn to some retired spot, taking with them the sword and spear from the *Luli* chamber of their own houses, or from the *Uma-Luli* of their *suku*, if between large companies. Planting there the fig-tree, flanked by the sacred sword and spear, they hang on it a bamboo receptacle, into which—after pledging each other in the mixed blood and gin—the remainder is poured. Then each swears, 'If I be false, and be not a true friend, may my blood issue from my mouth, ears, nose, as it does from the bamboo!', the bottom of the receptacle being pricked at the same moment to allow the blood and gin to escape. The tree remains and grows as a witness to the contract. With this tree of witness Trumbull (*op. cit.* p. 316 ff.) connects—erroneously, we venture to think—the blood-stained 'Fiery Cross' and a similar symbol made use of in Southern Arabia (see A. von Wrede, *Reise in Hadhramaut*, Brunswick, 1870, p. 197 ff.; see above, § 12). It is not uninteresting to note that the planting of a tree, which, at Timor, is an accessory only, is, among the Karens of Burma, in itself constitutive of the bond of brotherhood (Luther, *op. cit.* p. 313). Trumbull (*op. cit.* pp. 266 ff., 316) refers in this connexion to the planting of trees in ancient Israel; but the Israelitish practice seems to be susceptible of an altogether different explanation (see Robertson Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2], London, 1894, p. 185 ff.). What then was the purpose served by the introduction of weapons? It may be that it was the same as that of planting the tree; and, in support of this view, an instance from Madagascar may be cited. W. Ellis (*Hist. of Madag.* p. 188 ff.), in describing the ceremony of the *fatidrá* (a form of the blood-rite), says that

'to obtain the blood, a slight incision is made in the skin covering the centre of the bosom, significantly called *ambavafo*, "the mouth of the heart" . . . Some gunpowder and a ball are brought, together with a small quantity of ginger, a spear, and two particular kinds of grass. A fowl also is procured; its head is nearly cut off; and it is left in this state to continue bleeding during the ceremony.' The parties then join in pronouncing a long imprecation upon the oath-breaker, in which occur the following invocations: 'Oh the mouth of the heart! Oh the ball! Oh the powder! Oh the ginger! Oh this miserable fowl weltering in its blood!' And then follows the statement: 'If we keep and observe this covenant, let those things bear witness'

Take again Hutter's (*op. cit.* p. 1 ff.) account of the ceremony among the Bali of North Cameroon:

It seems to consist of two parts—the making of 'brothers' and the making oath to keep the covenant. The parties, holding kola and pepper in their open hands, interchanged promises of mutual friendship and assistance. The kola and pepper were chewed and eaten, and the blood of the 'brothers' was mixed with palm-wine and drunk by each. Then followed the second part of the rite. Bullets were produced, and, while imprecations were being pronounced upon the oath-breaker, a trench was dug. Each 'brother' pricked his arm, and the bullets, some scrapings of redwood, together with several fetish articles, human bones, and two bleeding human ears were thrown into the trench. It was filled up and a flat stone was placed upon it. Upon this stone a ram was slaughtered by one of the 'brothers,' while the others held it fast, its blood falling on the stone and trench. Some of the blood was mixed with wine in a calabash into which bullets were dropped; and the contents of the calabash were emptied out on the trench. Then the 'brothers' poured wine on the trench, and, having set a jar containing redwood on the stone, they rubbed one another's arms and breasts with the wood, while words of magic were being said. Lastly, kola and pepper and horns of wine were distributed among the followers and attendants.

The view that the articles thrown into the trench and the stone placed upon it serve as 'witness' of the compact, derives support from the practice of the Chinhwans in making oath. They dig a hole in the ground, place a stone on it, throw earth at one another with loud cries, and cover the stone with earth; and by these acts they signify that, like the stone in the ground, their word or oath remains unalterable (Kisak Tamai, 'Die Erforschung d. Tschinwan-Gebietes auf Formosa durch die Japaner' in *Globus*, 1896, lxx. 93 ff.). A very similar form of oath is found among the Bendowen Dusuns. According to F. Hatton's account (*North Borneo*, London, 1885, p. 201 f., cf. pp. 203, 207), the whole tribe assembled, and, the ground having been cleared for a space of about twelve yards, a hole was dug, a foot in depth, a large water-jar was placed in it, the earth dug out of the hole was thrown into the jar, and the old men called upon their god. A stone was then placed near the jar, and the old men declared by fire, represented by a burning stick, by water, which had been poured into the jar, and by earth, that they would be true to all white men. The divinity was then summoned by shooting an arrow into the air; and the guns of the Europeans were placed upon the jar, out of which each man took a little earth.

14. But weapons are not infrequently introduced into the ceremony for a different purpose; they are 'invoked,' that is to say, 'to punish treachery' (D. M. Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma*, London, 1887, p. 169). When two villages in Ceram wish to make friendship after a war, the inhabitants of one come into the other bringing gifts, and are entertained with food and drink. While they are eating, a large bowl of liquor is prepared. The elders add some drops of pigs' or chickens' blood; and the chiefs wound each other and let their blood flow into the liquor. The elders stir the potion with a sword, a spear, arrows, and, in later times, with the muzzle of a musket. Then one of them comes forward and imprecates evil upon the oath-breaker, the other feasters show their concurrence by signs, the chiefs of the two parties begin to drink the liquid, and the rest of the company drink after them. On a set day a feast is given in the other village, and the bond is then regarded as inviolable. This solemnity is called *pela* (Riedel, *op. cit.* p. 128 f.). Riedel does not give the terms of the imprecation, nor does he state the purpose for which the weapons are introduced. It is, however, instructive to observe that, in the Ceramese procedure, by way of oath for the discovery of crime, a *parang* and a little arrow-rust are introduced along with other symbols, and that an imprecation is pronounced upon the guilty person to the effect, *inter alia*, that his throat shall be cut with a *parang* and his body pierced with arrows (*ib.* p. 116). Further, in the Tanembar and Timor-Laut Islands, in making brothers, sea-water, palm-wine, and other ingredients, together with a small stone, or tooth, are poured into a bowl and mixed with the blood of the contracting parties. Dudilaa is invoked as witness to the covenant, and evils are imprecated upon the breaker of the bond. He shall be unstable as the sea, weak as a man drunk with palm-wine, and the like. Then the parties drink the liquor, and the stone or tooth is broken in two and preserved as a memorial or 'witness' (*ib.* p. 284). It is thought that these practices throw some light upon the symbolical meaning of weapons in the *pela* ceremony (see also Riedel, *op. cit.* p. 396, as to brother-making at Leti), and that a similar explanation applies to the two instances which

follow. Among the Wazaramo, Wazeguro, and Wasagara, the candidates for brotherhood seat themselves opposite to one another, their bows and arrows being placed across their thighs, 'whilst a third person waving a sword over their heads vociferates curses against any that may break the brotherhood' (Burton, *op. cit.* i. 114); and to the westward of Lake Tanganyika, after the transfusion of blood by inoculation had been completed, one of the proxies held a sword resting on his shoulder, while the other went through the motions of sharpening a knife upon it, both joining in pronouncing imprecations upon the oath-breaker (Cameron, *op. cit.* i. 333). A somewhat similar act formed part of the ritual among the Wakikuju, and was followed by imprecations (v. Höhnel, *Zum Rudolph-See und Stephanie-See*, Vienna, 1891, p. 341 f.; A. Arkell-Hardwick, *An Ivory Trader in North Kenia*, London, 1903, p. 147).

15. It is, of course, plain, from some of the examples of the ceremony with which we have been dealing, that the blood employed is not always that of the contracting parties (see C. Hose and W. McDougall, 'The Relations between Men and Animals in Sarawak,' in *JAI*, 1901, xxxi. 209; cf. p. 185). In very many cases it is that of their proxies (Livingstone, *op. cit.* p. 488; J. Thomson, *Through Masai Land*, new ed. London, 1887, p. 88; Cameron, *op. cit.* i. 333; Stanley, *Through the Dark Continent*, ii. 146, 332). Sometimes the 'brothers' shake hands, after having dipped them in the blood of a slaughtered animal (J. M. Schuver, *Reisen im oberen Nilgebiet*, Ergänzungsheft, No. 72, to *Peterm. Mitth.* p. 50), or they are marked with its blood—the blood of a pig among the Kiniahs (St. John, *op. cit.* i. 117, 75), of a goat among the Kumi of Chittagong (Lewin, *op. cit.* p. 228), of a goat or a heifer among the Shendoos (*ib.* pp. 315, 322). Sometimes they smear their lips with blood drawn from a bullock's ear (*Le Tcheou-Li, ou Rites des Tcheou*, tr. from the Chinese by E. Biot, Paris, 1851, i. 126, ii. 247 f.). Or the blood may be that of a human victim, either stupefied with drink, as among the wild tribes of Mexico (H. H. Bancroft, *The Native Races of the Pacific States of N. America*, London, 1875, i. 636, 637; see below, § 48), or slain, as among the Danoms of Borneo (Schwaner, *op. cit.* ii. 77).

16. Some of these ceremonies are plainly sacrificial, and recall to us Herodotus' account of the formation of blood-brotherhood among the Arabs (iii. 8 [Rawlinson's tr.]). He tells us that,

'when two men would swear a friendship, they stand on each side of a third: he with a sharp stone makes a cut on the inside of the hand of each near the middle finger, and, taking a piece from their dress, dips it in the blood of each, and moistens therewith seven stones lying in the midst, calling the while on Bacchus and Urania.'

Robertson Smith identifies these divinities with Orotal and Alilat (*Rel. Sem.*[2] p. 316), and observes that at Mecca, within historical times,

'the form of the oath was that each party dipped their hands in a pan of blood and tasted the contents. . . . The later Arabs had substituted the blood of a victim for human blood, but they retained a feature which Herodotus had missed, they licked the blood as well as smeared it on the sacred stones. . . . The seven stones in Herodotus are, of course, sacred stones, the Arabic *anṣāb*, Hebrew *maṣṣēbōth*, which, like the sacred stones at the Ka'ba, were originally Bætylia, Bethels or god-boxes.' He adds that the essence of the rite was that the parties 'commingled their blood, at the same time applying the blood to the god or fetish so as to make him a party to the covenant also' (*Kinship*, etc., pp. 57, 59, 60).

17. In some of these sacrificial rites an exchange of garments or weapons or gifts forms a part. Thus St. John (*op. cit.* i. 117), in speaking of the Kayans, says that

'they sometimes vary the ceremony, though the variation may be confined to the Kiniahs, who live farther up the river, and are intermarried with the Kayans. There a pig is brought and placed between the two who are to be joined in brotherhood. A chief addresses an invocation to the gods, and marks with a lighted brand the pig's shoulder. The beast is then killed, and, after an exchange of jackets, a sword is thrust into the wound and the two are marked with the blood of the pig.'

So, too, among the Wachaga, an exchange and re-exchange of clothing enter into the rite (Kohler, *Das Banturecht*, p. 40). Among the Kanowit Dayaks, 'a pig was placed between the representatives of the two tribes, who, after calling down the vengeance of the Spirits on those who broke the treaty, plunged their spears into the animal and then exchanged weapons' (St. John, *op. cit.* i. 55). Again, among the Dusuns, an exchange of weapons followed the ceremony, in which, having invoked his god, the chief and the traveller held the head and legs of a fowl, while a third person almost severed its head. The movements of the dying fowl were taken to indicate the intentions of the parties. Lastly, guns were fired and presents were given (Hatton, *op. cit.* p. 195; see below, § 20).

(*b*) *Where blood is not employed.*

18. We shall now proceed to consider the cases in which the use of blood does not enter into the ceremony; and, first of all, we shall deal with instances where the exchange of food forms an essential element in the ritual. Thus, among the Mapuches the compact is made by an exchange of names, one of the parties at the same time presenting a lamb to the other to be eaten by him (E. R. Smith, *The Araucanians*, New York, 1855, pp. 261, 262; see also E. Poppig, *Reise in Chile, Peru, u. auf die Amazonenstrome wahrend d. Jahre 1827–1832*, Leipzig, 1835, i. 384 f., as to the Pehuenches). The Reschiât of Lake Rudolph make 'brothers' with strangers by eating pieces of the liver of a sheep together (A. Donaldson Smith, *Through Unknown African Countries*, London, 1897, p. 297; according to v. Hohnel, *op. cit.* p. 657, 660, they spit upon the sheep and pour milk upon it; see below, § 21); and of the Abors it is said that they 'hold as inviolate any engagement cemented by an interchange of meat as food. This is called *sengmung*. Each party to the engagement must give to the other some animal to be killed and eaten; it is not necessary that they should eat together, or that the feast be held at the same time' (Dalton, *op. cit.* p. 25). The latter part of this statement recalls the account of the Mapuches, given above, and that of the *magus* ceremony among the Khoi-Khoin. The parties to the rite last mentioned must be relatives. A man, for example, may enter into it with his sister's son or daughter. On a day fixed, the nephew sends a ewe or a cow to his uncle's house, where it is slaughtered. The ceremony itself is called *gao nais* ('navel-cutting'). The animal is divided between uncle and nephew, each of whom eats his share apart from the other—generally in his own house. The blood boiled with the kidney-fat forms the ceremonial food (cf. A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-east Australia*, London, 1904, p. 751), and of it only the parties and their nearest relatives partake, the rest of the flesh being eaten apart by strangers. After the meal the uncle gives the nephew his hand, promises to be a father to him, and asks him not to injure him in any way. Some days afterwards the uncle gives a feast in return. He slaughters an animal in the house of his sister—the mother of the man with whom he is entering into the *magus*—and afterwards gives him the best of his cows. The covenant draws the ties of relationship more closely together, but does not form a new bond (C. Wandrer, 'Die Khoi-Khoin oder Naman,' in H. S. Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhaltnisse von eingeborenen Volkern in Afrika u. Ozeanien*, Berlin, 1903, p. 315 f.). The Beni take the oath of friendship by 'chopping juju.' A kola nut is placed on a brass tray with water poured on it. One of the parties touches himself with the

water and nut and eats part of it. Then the other party eats the remainder of it (R. H. Bacon, *Benin, the City of Blood*, London, 1897, p. 100). Again, among the Karens of Burma, brotherhood is made by eating together, or by planting a tree, or by exchanging blood. Of those methods, the first is said to be of but little binding force, being a mere agreement to abstain from hostilities for a certain time (Luther, *op. cit.* p. 313). The Bauris, Bagdis, and Mahilis admit into their caste men of any caste ranking higher than their own, on the candidate paying a small sum of money to the headman and giving a feast. He must taste a portion of the food left by each of the guests (H. H. Risley, *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal: Ethnographic Glossary*, Calcutta, 1891, ii. 41). Among the Māls, he must give a feast, and drink water into which the headman has dipped his toes (*ib.* p. 49). When a man of the Murmi—a Mongolian caste in Nepāl—desires to make another man his brother, he intimates his feelings; and if these are reciprocated, presents are exchanged. A day is fixed for the ceremony, at which a Brāhman officiates. The men face one another, each with a rupee at his feet. They exchange the rupees, and each daubs the other's face with the mixture of rice and curds used in the marriage rite. The proceedings end with a feast. The tie thus formed is regarded as equivalent to that of actual kinship. 'The adopted brothers may not address or speak of one another by name, nor may they talk to each other's wives, even though these may have taken part in the ceremony. Their descendants, again, are supposed not to intermarry till seven generations have passed' (*ib.* p. 111). A somewhat similar account is given of the Limbus (*ib.* p. 16).

19. With the usages as to eating may be compared what Herodotus (iv. 172 [already quoted]) says of the Nasamonians: 'When they pledge their faith to one another, each gives the other to drink out of his hand; if there be no liquid to be had, they take up dust from the ground, and put their tongues to it.' In making friendship with the Wakikuju, the two parties threw water on their heads and caught and drank it as it fell (v. Hohnel, *op. cit.* p. 315 f.); and it is said of the wild tribes of the Naga Hills that, when peace is concluded between the villages after a war, the chiefs meet face to face on opposite sides of a table raised on the roadside about eight feet from the ground, and approached on either side by a broad ascent, and exchange bamboo mugs of wine (R. G. Woodthorpe, 'Notes on the Wild Tribes inhabiting the so-called Naga Hills,' *JAI* xi. 211).

20. Not infrequently the bond is constituted by an exchange of garments or weapons. Thus, in Tahiti, the natives made friends by taking off a great part of their own clothes and putting them upon the voyagers (J. Cook in J. Hawkesworth, *An Account of Voyages in the Southern Hemisphere*, London, 1773, ii. 251). It is said of the villagers of the Gangotri valley in the country of the Teri Rājā, that with them an exchange of caps is as certain a mark of friendship as an exchange of turbans between two chiefs in the plains (F. Markham, *Shooting in the Himalayas*, London, 1854, p. 108); and a similar statement is made regarding the Khamtis (H. B. Rowney, *The Wild Tribes of India*, London, 1882, pp. 162, 163); while the Masai are said to conclude peace by an exchange of clothing (Merker, *op. cit.* p. 101). Edmund of England entered into an intimate alliance with king Cnut by exchanging clothing and arms (du Cange, *Glossarium, ut cit. supr.*); and, according to the same authority (Diss. xxi. in Jean sire de Joinville (*ut cit. supra*), where many other instances will be found), it was the practice of the Saracens to make friendships by an exchange of arms. The case of Glaucus and Diomede (Hom. *Il.* vi. 235; see Tamassia, *op. cit.* p. 6 ff.) is, of course, familiar. Again, it is said of the Khamtis that 'by an exchange of weapons even the most deadly enemies become fast friends, and if one falls in fight, it is the duty of the other to avenge him' (Rowney, *op. cit.*); and Dalton (*op. cit.* p. 20) gives a like account of the Mishmis.

21. Sometimes the compact is formed by exchanging pieces of a slaughtered animal. Thus the Reschiât (see Donaldson Smith, *op. cit.* p. 297, referred to above, § 18) hang strips of its paunch on the necks of those with whom they are making friendship (P. Paulitschke, *Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas, Die materielle Cultur d. Danâkil, Galla, u. Somâl*, Berlin, 1893, pp. 249, 250), while the headman spits and whispers (v. Hohnel, *op. cit.* p. 660). Joseph Thomson gives an interesting account of a somewhat similar practice in Shira:

'A goat was brought, and, taking it by one ear, I was required to state where I was going, to declare that I meant no harm, and did not work in *uchawi* (black magic), and, finally, to promise that I would do no harm to the country. The other ear was then taken by the Sultan's ambassador, and he made promise on his part that no harm would be done to us, that food would be given, and all articles stolen returned. The goat was then killed, and a strip of skin cut off the forehead, in which two slits were made.' The Sultan's representative 'taking hold of this, pushed it on my finger by the lower slit five times, finally pushing it over the joint. I had next to take the strip, still keeping it on my own finger, and to do the same for' him 'through the upper slit. This operation finished, the strips had to be cut in two, leaving the respective portions on our fingers' (*op. cit.* p. 88).

The missionary Rebmann, who received this token of friendship from the king of Kilema, calls it 'kishogno' (J. L. Krapf, *Travels in Eastern Africa*, London, 1860, p. 238). Thomson's description of the rite explains what is said of the Wakamba—that the 'brothers' exchange rings made of the skin of a sacrificial victim, which they have eaten together (J. M. Hildebrandt, 'Ethnographische Notizen uber Wakamba und ihre Nachbaren' in *ZE* x. 386). Further, Trumbull (*op. cit.* p. 66) quotes an Indian authority ('Tod's Travels,' *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, Singapore, 1851, No. 32) to the effect that among the Rājput races of India women adopt a brother by the gift of a bracelet; and with this custom may be compared the Slavonic practice of tying the 'brothers' together (see below, § 37).

22. Sometimes the ceremony consists in the application of saliva (see above, §§ 18, 21). The Southern Somali spits on his right hand and rubs it on the forehead of his friend to indicate that he is a fellow-tribesman; and among the Oromó, a like ceremony seems to entitle the guest to tribal rights (Paulitschke, *op. cit.* p. 246). In the old days, the Masai spat at the man with whom they swore eternal friendship (S. L. and H. Hinde, *The Last of the Masai*, London, 1901, p. 47); and, among the Dyoor, 'spitting betokens the most affectionate good-will; it was a pledge of attachment, an oath of fidelity; it was to their mind the proper way of giving solemnity to a league of friendship' (G. Schweinfurth, *The Heart of Africa*, tr. by E. E. Frewer, London, 1873, i. 205). A similar practice is said to prevail in Guiana (Lawrence Keymis, *Second Voyage to Guiana in the year 1596*; R. Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations . . . of the English Nation*[2] . . . London, 1598–1600, iii. 677), and in the Bissagos Archipelago, off Senegambia (E. S. Hartland, *The Legend of Perseus*, London, 1894–1896, ii. 264); and Grimm (*op. cit.* p. 194) observes that the old northern symbol of concluding peace was not blood but saliva (see Hartland, *op. cit.* ii. 258 ff., where many instances in which saliva is employed are collected).

23. A remarkable form of the practice is spoken to by Taplin (in J. D. Wood's *Native Tribes of*

South Australia, Adelaide, 1879, p. 32 ff.). He says in his account of the Narrinyeri that

'there appears to have existed a sort of traffic between the tribes on the Murray and those near the sea, and a curious sort of provision is made for it, the object of which may be the securing of perfectly trustworthy agents to transact the business of the tribes—agents who will not by collusion cheat their employers and enrich themselves. . . . When a man has a child born to him, he preserves its umbilical cord by tying it up in the middle of a bunch of feathers. This is called a kalduke. He then gives this to the father of child or children belonging to another tribe, and those children are thereafter ngia-ngiampe to the child from whom the kalduke was procured, and that child is ngia-ngiampe to them. From that time none of the children of the man to whom the kalduke was given may speak to their ngia-ngiampe or even touch or go near him; neither must he speak to them.'

We learn from the same authority (Taplin, in E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, London, 1886, ii. 254) that, 'if one ngia-ngiampe sees another in need of anything, he or she must send a supply of it if possible; but yet there must never be any direct personal intercourse between the two.' Sometimes the relation is entered into for a time only by dividing the kalduke and giving a part to each. When these parts are returned to the original owner, the relation ceases (Taplin, in J. D. Woods, *op. cit.* p. 33).

24. Many instances may be cited in which the compact is made by an exchange of names. This is the form observed by the Mapuches, one of the parties to the exchange at the same time presenting a lamb to the other, to be eaten by him.

'The giving of a name establishes between the namesakes a species of relationship which is considered almost as sacred as that of blood, and obliges them to render to each other certain services and that consideration which naturally belongs to relatives' (E. R. Smith, *op. cit.* p. 262; see also Popping, *op cit.* i. 384 f. as to the Pehuenches).

At Shupanga, on the Zambesi, the exchange of names with men of other tribes is not uncommon. The parties to the transaction regard themselves as close comrades, owing special duties to each other ever after; and each is entitled, if he visits the other, to food, lodging, and other friendly offices (D. and C. Livingstone, *Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and its Tributaries, 1858-1864*, London, 1865, p. 149). In Ugogo names are exchanged as a pledge of friendship (C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin, *op. cit.* i. 60), and the practice is common in Polynesia (Hawaii [J. Cook and King, *A Voyage of Discovery to the Pacific Ocean in the years of 1777-1780*, London, 1784, iii. 17], Huahine [J. Cook, in Hawkesworth, *op. cit.* ii. 251]). It is said to be in use in the Marshall Islands (C. E. Meinicke, *Die Inseln d. stillen Oceans*, Leipzig, 1875-1876, ii. 342; A. von Chamisso, in O. von Kotzebue, *A Voyage of Discovery into the Southern Sea and Beering's Straits*, London, 1821, iii. p. 172, affirms that the friend is obliged to give his wife to his friend, but is not bound to avenge him); and it is found in the islands of Torres Straits (see *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, 1904, v. 125, 131 f.; see also J. B. Jukes, *Narrative of the Surveying Voyage of H.M.S. 'Fly,'* London, 1847, i. 209 f., where it seems that the exchange forms a bar to marriage between one of the parties and the sisters of the other), and among the Caribs (*Histoire naturelle et morale des Iles Antilles de l'Amérique*[2], Rotterdam, 1681, p. 513), the Chopunnish (M. Lewis and W. Clarke, *Travels to the Source of the Missouri River . . . in the years 1804-1806*, new ed., London, 1815, iii. 254), the Spokanes (Bancroft, *op. cit.* i. 285, note), the Shastika Indians (S. Powers, *Tribes of California: Contributions to N. American Ethnology*, Washington, 1877, iii. 247), and the Chugachigmiut of Alaska (N. Porlock, *A Voyage round the World . . . in 1785-1788*, London, 1789, p. 254; J. Meares, *Voyages made in the years 1788 and 1789, from China to the N.W. Coast of America*, London, 1790, p. 365). It was at one time in use on the Lower Murray (G. F. Angas, *Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand*, London, 1847, i. 59) and in New Zealand (J. S. Polack, *Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders*, London, 1840, ii. 131). Of the natives at Wide Bay, Queensland, it is said (H. S. Russell, 'Exploring Excursion in Australia' in *JRGS*, 1845, xv. 314) that 'they rub their noses with their finger and mention their name, and you are then expected to follow the example by rubbing your nose and mentioning your name; then rub noses again with names exchanged.' The Kingsmill Islanders make friendship by rubbing noses and exchanging names (C. Wilkes, *Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition during the years 1838-1842*, London, 1845, iv. 51); and de Sainson gives a very similar account of the ceremony at Tonga (J. Dumont d'Urville, *Voyage de la Corvette 'L'Astrolabe': Histoire du Voyage*, Paris, 1830-1833, iv. 349). The Vanikoros exchange names and presents (*ib.* v. 329); and the same usage prevails in some parts of New Guinea (W. W. Gill, *Life in the Southern Isles*, London, 1876, p. 233; J. Chalmers and W. W. Gill, *Work and Adventures in New Guinea, 1877-1885*, London, 1885, pp. 42, 99). As to making 'brothers' with animals by exchange of names, see below, § 46.

25. Among the Yahgans of Cape Horn, artificial ties of friendship are constituted by an exchange of gifts, and by painting the face and body in a distinctive fashion. The friends assume the names of blood-relationship—uncle, brother, cousin, or nephew—and behave themselves as if they were really akin (T. Bridges, 'Mœurs et Coutumes des Fuégiens,' tr. by P. Hyades, *Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthrop. de Paris*, 1884, ser. iii. vol. vii. p. 182). And this practice is not confined to males; for women, unconnected by blood, often call themselves sisters, and act as such in all the conduct of life (P. Hyades and J. Deniker, *Mission du Cap Horn, 1882-1883*, Paris, 1891, vii. 238). So, too, among the Ovaherero, persons of the same sex are frequently united in a formal association (*omapanga* or *oupanga*). The men have their wives in common, and are entitled to use each other's property in time of need; while married as well as unmarried women join the sisterhood (G. Fritsch, *Die Eingeborenen Sud-Afrikas*, Breslau, 1872, p. 227; G. Viehe, 'Die Ovaherero,' in S. R. Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 304; see also J. Kohler, 'Recht d. Herero' in *Zeits. f. vergl. Rechtsw.* xiv. 298-299). An interesting parallel to these female associations is furnished by the Orāons. 'When two girls feel a particular penchant for each other, they swear eternal friendship and exchange necklaces, and the compact is witnessed by common friends. They do not name one another after this ratification of goodwill, but are "my flower" or "my giu" or "my meet to smile" to each other to the end of their lives' (Dalton, *op. cit.* p. 253). A like custom exists among some of the Papuan tribes on the north coast of New Guinea (J. Kohler, 'Recht der Papuas' in *Zeits. f. vergl. Rechtsw.* xiv. p. 366), and in certain districts of the Abruzzi (E. S. Hartland, *op. cit.* ii. 218 f.). As to similar usages among the Southern Slavs see below, § 34.

26. Among the North American Indians, we find many examples of companionships in arms. Thus, of the Kongas and Omahas it is said that 'the young men are generally coupled out as friends; the tie is very permanent, and continues oftentimes through life' (Edwin James, *Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains . . . in the years 1819-1820 . . . compiled from the notes of Major Long . . .* London, 1823, i. 117, 235; see also W. J. McGee, 'The Siouan Indians,' in *Fifteenth Annual Report of the Bur-*

eau of Ethnology to the . . . Smithsonian Inst. 1893–1894, Washington, 1897, p. 178); the existence of a similar institution has been noted among the Wyandot (*First Annual Report . . . 1879–1880*, Washington, 1881, p. 68), and the Iroquois (P. F. X. de Charlevoix, *Histoire de la Nouvelle France*, Paris, 1744, vi. 14); and J. Adair (*The History of the American Indians*, London, 1775, p. 190) says that the Cherokees 'reckon a friend in the same rank with a brother both with regard to marriage and any other affair of social life.' In Fiji,

'instances of persons devoting themselves specially to arms are not uncommon. The manner in which they do this is singular, and wears the appearance of a marriage contract: and the two men entering into it are spoken of as man and wife, to indicate the closeness of their military union. By this mutual bond the two men pledge themselves to oneness of purpose and effort, to stand by each other in every danger, defending each other to the death, and, if needful, to die together. In the case of one of the parties wishing to become married in the ordinary style to one of the other sex, the former contract is duly declared void' (T. Williams and J. Calvert, *Fiji and the Fijians*, ed. G. S. Rowe[2], London, 1860, i. 45–46).

Further, the custom of joining in companionships for mutual defence prevails among many of the Afghan tribes:

'Individuals enter into engagements to support each other in specific enterprises, or in all cases that may arise. These alliances are called Goondees, and they may include any number of persons. The connexion between two persons in the same Goondee is reckoned stronger than that of blood. They are bound to give up all they have, and even their lives, for each other. A Goondee between two chiefs is not dissolved even by a war between their tribes; they may even join in the battle, but as soon as the contest is over their friendship is renewed. Goondees also take place between tribes' (M. Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul . . .* new ed. London, 1839, ii. 4).

With these brothers in arms we may compare the Celtic 'Soldurii' and 'Ambacti,' whom Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* iii. 22, vi. 15) mentions.

27. Throughout all Circassia there exist fraternities and extensive associations, the members of which 'are bound mutually to protect each other, and assist in paying the fine of individuals who may commit manslaughter or other crimes.' In travelling, the members enter one another's houses 'as freely as if they were brothers in reality' (J. S. Bell, *Journal of a Residence in Circassia during the years 1837–1839*, London, 1840, i. 84). All the members of a fraternity are regarded as springing from the same stock; and not only they, but their serfs, are precluded from intermarriage (*ib.* p. 347).

28. J. Macgillivray (*Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Rattlesnake*, London, 1852, i. 310) noted at Evans Bay, Cape York, the existence of an association between certain whites and certain natives, by which the latter appeared to be bound to assist the former and care for their safety. The native was said to be the white man's *kotaiga*—the term being derived from the Kowrarega word for 'younger brother.' The Kowrarega is an Australian tribe, altered by contact with the Papuans of the adjacent islands so as to resemble the latter in most of their physical, intellectual, and moral characteristics (Howitt, *op. cit.* pp. 3, 11). We are not told how this relation was entered into, or whether it subsisted between natives, as well as between natives and whites. It may be that it is to be classed not with blood-brotherhood, but rather with those associations for the purpose of mutual assistance in trade of which an example is furnished by the Klaarwater Hottentots in their intercourse with some of the Bechuana tribes (W. J. Burchell, *Travels in the Interior of South Africa*, London, 1824, ii. 555; cf. R. F. Burton, *op. cit.* ii. 55; and J. Chapman, *Travels in the Interior of S. Africa*, London, 1868, i. 97, note).

29. In this connexion a curious belief of the Algonquins may be mentioned. They regarded the mingling of the bones of deceased relatives and friends as constituting a bond of friendship between their descendants (S. de Champlain, *Œuvres*, ed. by C. H. Laverdière, Quebec, 1870, v. 305), and Adair (*op. cit.* pp. 183–184) seems to indicate that the same notion prevailed among the Choctaws. He adds that they reckoned it irreligious to mix the bones of a relative with those of an enemy or even of a stranger (cf. Robertson Smith, *Kinship*, pp. 314, 315).

ii. **Where the relation is due to force of circumstances.**

30. Hitherto we have been considering artificial relations into which the parties enter by choice. We now turn to relations which are brought about by force of circumstances, and not by the volition of the 'brothers.' Livingstone (*Missionary Travels and Researches*, p. 526) tells us that he became blood-relation to a young woman by accident. As he was removing a tumour from her arm, he was spattered with blood from one of the small arteries. 'You were a friend before,' she exclaimed, 'now you are a blood-relation.' Some of the Papuan tribes on the north coast of New Guinea recognize the existence of a friendly bond between those who have been circumcised at the same time, especially between two youths who have occupied the spirit-house together. After the ceremony, they address one another no longer by name, but as 'my man' (J. Kohler, 'Recht d. Papuas' in *Zeits. f. vergl. Rechtsw.* xiv. 366; cf. Brooke, *op. cit.* ii. 224). Again, the rite of circumcision (*boguera*) is observed by the Bechuanas and all the Kāfirs, south of the Zambesi. All the boys between ten and fourteen or fifteen are made the life-companions of one of the sons of the chief. The members of the band (*mopato*) recognize 'a sort of equality and partial communism ever afterwards, and address each other by the title of *molekane*, or 'comrade.' When a fugitive comes to a tribe he is directed to the *mopato* analogous to that to which in his own tribe he belongs and does duty as a member' (Livingstone, *op. cit.* pp. 147–148; see E. Casalis, *Études sur la langue séchuana*, Paris, 1841, p. 70, as to the Basutos). Again, among the Kurnai, all the youths who have been initiated at the same time are brothers, and ever afterwards address each other's wife as 'wife,' and each other's children as 'child.' The tie thus formed is one of great strength, binding together all the contemporaries of the various clans (L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, Melbourne, etc., 1880, pp. 198–199). With this tie may be compared the relation between lads and those who operate on them in the initiation ceremonies (Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 248, 260). In some of the islands of Torres Straits, boys who are mates in the initiation ceremony may not marry each other's sisters (*Rep. of Camb. Anthr. Exp. to Torres Straits*, v. 211). It may be noted that at Nukahiva, professional tatuers were bound, under sanction of a tabu, to support those of their fellows who came to be in need (G. H. von Langsdorff, *Voyages and Travels in various parts of the World during the years 1803–1807*, London, 1813, i. 121).

31. Among the Wakamba, the relation of protector and protégé is one of extraordinary intimacy. The fugitive who touches the penis of his enemy becomes thenceforth entitled to his protection and to that of his tribe; and so strong is the bond between them, that the protégé is made free of the house and the wife of his protector (Hildebrandt, *loc. cit.* p. 386 f.). A form of oath in use in ancient Israel (Gn $24^{21.}$ 47^{29}; H. Ewald, *Die Alterthümer d. Volkes Israel*[3], Göttingen, 1866, p. 26) and the Kāfir mode of making a vow (H. Somerset, *Adventures in Caffraria*, London, 1858, p. 180) may be recalled in this connexion, as well as a practice of some Australian tribes in swearing

friendship (G. Grey, *Journals of Two Expeditions of Discovery in North-West and Western Australia*, London, 1841, ii. 342; cf. Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 556, 560; but see R. Brough Smith, *Aborigines of Victoria*, London, 1878, i. 514). Hildebrandt says further, that if a fugitive can succeed in putting his lips to a woman's breast, he thereby creates an indissoluble bond between himself and her tribe, which is thenceforth bound to protect him (*loc. cit. supra*).

iii. **The institution among the Southern Slavs.**

32. We now propose to turn to a centre of the institution—to the countries of the Southern Slavs, where it is a living force admitted within the walls of the sanctuary by the recognition of the Christian Church. Here we shall meet with many forms, of which some are familiar and some are novel; and we shall commence with an instance in which blood-drinking plays a part. According to a Bosnian authority quoted by F. S. Krauss (*Sitte und Brauch d. Sudslaven*, Vienna, 1885, p. 628), the priest offers up a prayer in which he dwells upon the reciprocal duties of the 'brothers.' He makes them kiss one another, and repeat after him the words of a solemn oath. Then the younger brother scratches his arm so as to draw a few drops of blood, which he mixes with wine. The brothers drink the liquid and the compact is sealed. Krauss doubts the accuracy of this account, but S. Ciszewski (*Kunstliche Verwandtschaft bei den Sudslaven*, Leipzig, 1897, pp. 60–68) accepts it as reliable, and adduces corroborative evidence from many other quarters. (See § 40 below.)

33. We are told (M. Chopin et A. Ubicini, *Provinces danubiennes et roumaines*, Paris, 1856, i. 197, cited by Ciszewski, *op. cit.* p. 32) of a brotherhood 'per arma,' known to Montenegro and Bulgaria. The two men who wish to enter into the compact go to a church, accompanied by several friends as witnesses. They lay their arms crosswise on the floor, and, after swearing that now they are united in life and death, take them up and exchange them. If one dies, his weapons pass to the survivor.

34. According to Medacović (cited by Ciszewski, *op. cit.* p. 33), the bond in Montenegro is one not of friendship only but of relationship—the parties to it are looked upon as actual brothers. He distinguishes three grades, of which the first is called the 'little brotherhood.' It is constituted by a kiss thrice repeated. The 'brothers' exchange gifts; and he who first expressed the wish to perform the rite entertains the other. 'Brothers' of this first degree may determine to form a still more intimate relation, and in such a case the ceremony is one of greater solemnity. They call a priest to say a prayer while they stand under the stola, and, having drunk wine from the chalice to which they set their lips at the same time, they eat a crumb of the bread, receiving the Eucharist in both kinds according to the observance of the Eastern Church. Having kissed the cross, the evangels, and the holy pictures, they kiss one another thrice; and he who proposed the union entertains the other. Presents are exchanged, and the men are brothers until death. So, too, women, married as well as single, enter into similar friendships by drinking wine together, kissing one another, and exchanging gifts. A. Fortis (*Viaggio in Dalmazia*, Venice, 1774, i. 58 ff.) tells us that he was present in the church of Perušić when a union between two young Morlak girls was solemnized on the steps of the altar. He observes that in his day friendships of this sort between persons of different sexes were less common than they had been in the past. According to Krauss (*op. cit.* p. 641), the 'sisters' are always together—in church, at work, and in amusement. They wear similar clothes and ornaments, and address one another as 'little sister,' 'my gold,' 'my little fawn.' No relationship could be more intimate or more affectionate (see § 25 above, where parallel instances are noted).

35. In some parts of Croatia the bond seems to be formed without wine-drinking or witnesses; while, in Northern Bulgaria, the rite exhibits the characteristics of a family gathering, without the intervention of the Church. In some districts the ceremony resembles that of a marriage (Ciszewski, *op. cit.* pp. 35–36).

36. All the old ritual books prescribe the same, or nearly the same, formalities. The parties stand before the altar, the elder on the right, the younger on the left. The priest hands a candle to each. Each lays his right hand on the Gospels, and holds a cross in his left. According to another form, they stand before the altar with crosses and candles in their hands. The priest utters a prayer, in which the importance of the act is emphasized, the reciprocal duties of the brothers are laid down, and God's blessing is invoked upon them. Then the priest exchanges the crosses and candles which the brothers are holding in their hands, and reads to them certain passages of Holy Writ; and the brothers kiss the Gospels and embrace each other. It is only in Bulgaria that the exchange of candles and crosses takes place (*ib.* p. 37).

37. It is customary in one of the districts of Bulgaria for the priest to tie the men together with a small cord which he uses in saying Mass. He then takes off his vestments, and lays them on their heads; and, after having said a prayer suitable to the occasion, he sprinkles them with holy water, and, untying the cord, bids them kiss hands, telling them that they are henceforth brothers in spirit. This ceremony takes place at the end of Divine service, when the church is empty (*ib.* p. 38; see § 21 above, where parallel instances are noted).

38. Among the Bulgarians of Prilep, after the ceremony in church is over, one of the brothers entertains his relatives, with the other brother and his relatives, gifts being distributed among all who are present. A few days afterwards a similar meal is provided in the house of the other brother, and gifts are again distributed. All those who have received these gifts are henceforward regarded as relatives, and may not intermarry; and this kind of union may be contracted by men with men, by men with women, or by women with women (*ib.* p. 39).

39. In Little Russia, brotherhoods and sisterhoods are formed by swearing eternal friendship upon a holy picture, by drinking wine, and by exchanging gifts. In some parts of Russia a meal, to which the whole company is invited, completes the ceremony; and the brothers make it the occasion of an exchange of presents—very often of their baptismal crosses. Their children may not intermarry (*ib.* pp. 54–59).

40. From Servia, Croatia, and Bulgaria we are supplied with notices of ceremonies by which temporary bonds of brotherhood and sisterhood are constituted. These bonds continue from year to year, and form an actual relationship and a bar to intermarriage (*ib.* pp. 41–47). Parallel instances have been observed in Italy and among the Poles and Czechs (*ib.* pp. 48–50). In Servia and Croatia these unions are formed on St. John Baptist's day by the exchange of willow crowns and gifts and kisses. In Southern Bulgaria, on the same holy day, the brothers exchange bunches of twigs, with needles like the pine, in presence of their invited guests, and, having pricked themselves, suck each other's blood in order to show the intimacy of their union. Thenceforward they treat one another as if they were blood-relations. After this exchange of blood they approach the hearth and place their

feet upon it, the guests at the same time beginning the feast. Then the brothers embrace one another, kiss hands, and, exchanging the bunches of twigs, drink out of the same bowl. They give one another presents, and visit their friends and relatives. Upon the corresponding day of the next year the compact is renewed—the elder brother, who on the previous occasion was the younger brother's guest, being now his host (*ib.* p. 44 f., and see § 32 above).

41. In Bulgaria, a bond of brotherhood subsists between children who have been christened in the same water. Brothers or sisters born in the corresponding month in different years, and also twin children, are regarded as so intimately connected that the death of one involves that of the other. A ceremony is therefore necessary to break this connexion, and the person who performs it becomes, in consequence of his act, the brother or sister of the child saved from death. On similar grounds there is said to be a like tie between the person who rescues another from death by drowning, or on the battlefield, and the person rescued; between pilgrims who exchange certain kindly offices; between foster-brothers; and between those who attend upon a bride and bridegroom on the occasion of their marriage (Ciszewski, *op. cit.* pp. 4–22, 101 ff.).

42. Ciszewski (*op. cit.* p. 84 ff.) supplies two instances in which the relation was entered into in obedience to a Divine command; and Krauss (*op. cit.* p. 633) states that, if a man dream that he has made brotherhood with another, he will deem the latter's refusal to form the union as the bitterest of insults. In the ordinary case the dream becomes a reality, and the parties shake hands, kiss one another, and exchange gifts (see below, § 46).

43. Another form of brotherhood mentioned by Ciszewski (*op. cit.* p. 72 ff.) and Krauss (*op. cit.* p. 632) is that made between a man who is in extreme danger and another to whom he appeals for help in the name of God and St. John, at the same time taking him solemnly for his brother. An interesting example of this variety of the relation is given by Krauss (*op. cit.* p. 638). A girl who has to go over the mountains alone may invite the first man she meets to be her brother. He is bound to guard her as if she were his own sister; and, were he to illtreat her, he would be regarded as a criminal against Heaven.

iv. **The institution in Roman and Byzantine law and in modern Greece.**

44. It is interesting to notice the attitude which the Roman lawgivers assumed towards this institution. A rescript of the emperors Diocletian and Maximian (§ 7 c. *de Hered. Instit.* 6. 24) is in the following terms:

'Nec apud peregrinos fratrem sibi quisquam per adoptionem facere poterat. Cum igitur quod patrem tuum voluisse facere dicis irritum sit, portionem hereditatis, quam is adversus quem supplicas velut adoptatus frater heres institutus tenet, restitui tibi curae habebit praeses provinciae.'

It seems clear that this rescript proceeds upon a confusion of the institution of brotherhood with that of adoption, and that the former, which was completely foreign to Roman ideas, was treated as if it were a monstrous form of the latter and declared to be of no force. The same view received effect in a collection of Syro-Roman laws (*Syrisch-romisches Rechtsbuch*, revised and edited by K. G. Bruns and E. Sachau, Leipzig, 1880), which belongs to the 5th cent. of our era. One of its provisions declares that, if a man wishes to write a compact of brotherhood with another so that they shall hold in common all that they possess or shall acquire, the law forbids it, and annuls the written compact. For their wives are not common, and their children cannot be common. So, too, the Byzantine lawyers of the 11th cent. refused to recognize ἀδελφοποιία, or ἀδελφοποίησις, or ἀδελφοποιησία as binding. It was forbidden by the Church, especially to her monks; and the argument against it which found most favour was that of an archbishop of Bulgaria in the 13th century: ἡ θέσις μιμεῖ τὴν φύσιν, ἡ φύσις δὲ υἱὸν ἐπιγιγνώσκει διὰ γεννήσεως, ἀδελφοποιΐαν δὲ οὐδαμῶς. Still, the ceremony was practised frequently and in many places; and although the Church forbade it, it was always celebrated with the Church's rites. Like sponsorship, it constituted a πνευματικὴ ἀδελφότης, and created a marriage bar between the parties to it, and, according to some authorities, between their children (Bruns and Sachau, *op. cit.* pp. 255–256; Tamassia, *op. cit.* p. 63 ff.; Robertson Smith, *Kinship*, p. 160). It played an important part in the Greek war of independence, and is said even now to survive in certain districts of Greece (J. Kohler, 'Studien über die künstliche Verwandtschaft' in *Zeits. f. vergl. Rechtsw.* v. 438; Ciszewski, *op. cit.* p. 69).

v. **Where the compact is entered into with women, dead persons, supernatural beings, or animals.**

45. We have seen that the compact is not confined to males. Thus, among the Southern Slavs, men enter into it with women (Krauss, *op. cit.* pp. 619, 624, 638, 640), and women with women (*ib.* p. 641); and female associations are likewise found among the Yahgans, the Orāons, in certain districts of the Abruzzi, among the Papuans on the north coast of New Guinea, the Ovaherero (see above, § 25), and the Swahili (Niese, *op. cit.* p. 240). Nor are these compacts always confined to mortals, if we may rely on the evidence of Bulgarian folk-tales and of the modes of address used by the fishermen of Ragusa to those whom they regard as witches (Ciszewski, *op. cit.* pp. 69–71; cf. Frazer, *Golden Bough*[2], London, 1900, iii. 380, note). In some cases the bond seems to be formed with a dead enemy. Thus, among the sea Dayaks, his head is brought on shore with much ceremony. For months after its arrival

'it is treated with the greatest consideration, and all the names and terms of endearment of which their language is capable are abundantly lavished on it; the most dainty morsels are thrust into its mouth, and it is instructed to hate its former friends, and that, having been adopted into the tribe of its captors, its spirit must be always with them; sirih leaves and betelnuts are given to it,—and, finally, a cigar is frequently placed between its ghastly and pallid lips. None of this disgusting mockery is performed with the intention of ridicule, but all to propitiate the spirit by kindness' (H. Low, *Sarawak*, London, 1848, p. 207).

46. This curious ceremony recalls to us the treatment of the dead bear by some of the Canadian Indians. According to Charlevoix (*op. cit.* v. 173), as soon as he has killed a bear, the hunter puts the mouthpiece of his lighted pipe between its teeth, blows into the bowl, and, having filled the animal's jaws with smoke, adjures its spirit not to resent what has happened nor thwart him in his hunting expeditions. With this account that of the festival of the bear among the Ainus may be compared (I. L. Bird, *Unbeaten Tracks in Japan*, London, 1880, ii. 97–98), and also that of Macrae ('Account of the Kookies or Lunctas' in *Asiatic Researches*, London, 1803, vii. 189) as to the revenge which the tribesmen take on the tiger, and even on the tree by which a relative has met his death (cf. E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[4], London, 1903, i. 286). In a Malagasy folk-tale we read of a bad man who was blood-brother of certain beasts (*FLJ*, London, 1883, i. 309); and in Sarawak a man sometimes dreams that he has become blood-brother of a crocodile by going through the regular ceremony and exchanging names. Thereafter he is quite safe from crocodiles (C. Hose and W. McDougall, *op. cit.* p. 190 f.; see above, § 42).

vi. **What persons are bound by the compact.**

47. In some cases the compact is obligatory only

upon those who have personally become parties to it. In Timor and Borneo, and among the Wachaga, a chief may represent his tribe, but a simple tribesman binds himself only (Forbes, *op. cit.* p. 452; Schwaner, *op. cit.* i. 214–215; Kohler, 'Das Banturecht,' *loc. cit.* xv. 40). Nor does the bond reach further in the *fatidrá* of Madagascar, in the old Northern ceremony of 'going under the turf,' in the companionships in arms of the American Indians, the Fijians and the Afghans, in the brotherhoods of the Syrians of the Lebanon (see above, §§ 13, 7, 26, 11) and of the Swahili (Niese, *op. cit.* p. 240), in the friendships of the Polynesians, Yahgans, Orāons, and the natives of the Abruzzi, and the Celts (see §§ 52, 25, 2, 8).

48. In many instances the participants in the rite bind not themselves only, but other persons on behalf of whom they act. Thus, among the Karens of Burma, 'the chief stands as the representative of the tribe, if it be a tribal agreement; or the father as the representative of the family, if it be a more limited covenant' (Luther, *op. cit.* p. 313); and in Timor, the parties may be the representatives of families or tribes or kingdoms (Forbes, *op. cit.* p. 452). Chiefs bind their tribes amongst the wild peoples of the Naga hills (Woodthorpe, *op. cit.* p. 211), the natives of the Bismarck Archipelago (E. Sorge, 'Nissan-Inseln in Bismarck-Archipel.' in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 405), in Borneo (Schwaner, *op. cit.* i. 214), and among the Wachaga (Kohler 'Das Banturecht,' *loc. cit.* xv. 40). Sometimes the chiefs take the principal parts in the ceremony, while their followers join only in its later stages; as, for example, by drinking what remains of the diluted blood, by participating in a common feast, or by receiving gifts from the 'brothers'; so with the Scythians (Herodotus, iv. 70), Balonda (Livingstone, *Missionary Travels and Researches*, p. 488 f.), Ceramese (Riedel, *op. cit.* pp. 128–129), and Bulgarians (see above, § 38). In other cases the tribe is represented by a certain number of tribesmen (Garos and Kanowit Dayaks [see above, § 9], Bali of N. Cameroon [Hutter, *loc. cit.* p. 1]). A very curious instance of the representation of a tribe by a single tribesman is given by Bancroft (*op. cit.* i. 636–637). He says of certain Mexican tribes, that if one of them wished to make 'a close connexion, friendship, alliance, family or blood relationship' with another, its members seized a man of the latter tribe, and, having made him intoxicated, pierced his ears with awls and smeared themselves with his blood.

It is, of course, sufficiently obvious that the blood-brother of a chief may, in the general case, at all events, rely upon the good offices of the subjects of his protector, *e.g.* among the Kimbunda (Magyar, *op. cit.* i. 445). Among the Arabs, 'the compact is primarily between two individuals, but the obligation contracted by the single clansman is binding on all his "friends," *i.e.* on the other members of the kin' (*Rel. Sem.*[2] p. 315; see Herod. iii. 8, quoted above, § 16). By the Southern Slavs each participant is recognized as a near relative by the kinsmen of his chosen brother, the brotherhood being regarded as a true relationship (Krauss, *op. cit.* p. 624; Ciszewski, *op. cit.* pp. 99–101); and, among the Somali and Oromó, a stranger admitted to friendship becomes entitled to all the rights of a tribesman (Paulitschke, *op. cit.* p. 246).

vii. **What purposes are served by the compact.**

49. It is clear from what has already been said that the rights and duties which spring from this relation are not the same in all cases. In some the bond amounts to little more than a formal declaration of mutual goodwill. Thus the friendships between girls among the Orāons and in certain districts of the Abruzzi are strong and intimate, but they create no new tie (see above, § 25). The *magus* ceremony is confined to relatives; it strengthens the natural bond, but does not form a fresh one (see above, § 18); while, among the Swahili, the sole effect of the relation is to establish an obligation between the members to help one another in time of danger (Niese, *op. cit.* p. 240). In other cases the brotherhood seems to effect a complete identification of interests, as, for instance, in the case of the Polynesian *taio* (see below, § 52). It may, however, be affirmed that it is of the essence of the obligation imposed upon the parties to act towards one another faithfully and helpfully as true friends and loyal brothers. Thus we find, among some of the Australian tribes, that

'the drawing and also the drinking of blood on certain special occasions is associated with the idea that those who take part in the ceremony are thereby bound together in friendship and obliged to assist one another. At the same time it renders treachery impossible' (see above, § 2).

The same authorities add that the men taking part in the *atninga* avenging expedition of the Arunta tribe

'assembled together, and, after each one had been touched with the girdle made from the hair of the man whose death they were going out to avenge, they drew blood from their urethras and sprinkled it over one another' (Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes*, p. 598, cf. p. 556 ff.). 'Sometimes, for the same purpose, blood is drawn from the arm and drunk, and on rare occasions a man, declining thus to pledge himself, will have his mouth forced open and the blood poured into it' (*ib.* p. 598).

Among the Hungarians of the 9th cent. the chief men, in taking the oath of fealty to the chief, signified, by shedding their blood into a single bowl, that the blood of the oath-breaker should be shed as theirs had been (J. G. Schwandtner, *Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum*, Vienna, 1746, i. 6). Again, it is said of the Karens that, when individuals, villages, or clans unite in confederacies,

'the contracting parties bind themselves by drinking spirits in which the blood of both has been mixed, and in which a number of weapons have been dipped. The blood of each is supposed to live as an agent or ambassador in the blood of the other, and thus to prevent treachery. The weapons are likewise invoked to prevent treachery' (Smeaton, *op. cit.* pp. 168–169).

The same notion underlies the brotherhood between the king of Unyoro and his servants, especially his cooks (*Emin Pasha in Central Africa*, ed. G. Schweinfurth, Eng. tr., London, 1888, p. 78), the oaths of those making a league or conspiracy, and the *ngia-ngiampe* relation of South Australia (see above, §§ 2, 8, 23). So, too, among the Melangkaps, the object of making brothers by exchange of gifts was to ensure that the Europeans should not cease to be friendly and injure the natives when at a distance from them (J. Whitehead, *Explor. of M. Kina Bahu, N. Borneo*, London, 1893, p. 123).

50. The members of the companionships of the old Norsemen were bound to avenge one another as if they were truly brothers (see above, § 7), and a like obligation is imposed on those who have entered into brotherhood in Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Bosnia (Ciszewski, *op. cit.* p. 89). Among the Wyandot, the youthful braves 'agree to be perpetual friends to each other, or more than brothers. Each reveals to the other the secrets of his life, and counsels with him on matters of importance, and defends him from wrong and violence, and at his death is chief mourner' (*1 RBEW*, p. 68; see § 26 above, where references to similar statements regarding other tribes will be found). So, too, the Afghan tribesmen who join in 'goondees' for mutual defence and support are regarded as more than natural brothers (see above, § 26); and the Fijian brotherhood in arms wears the appearance of a marriage contract (*ib.*)—a characteristic which may be compared with that of the bond of the 'nazil,' which can be dissolved only by the formula of triple divorce (R. F. Burton, *First Footsteps in East Africa*, London, 1856, p. 124). The parties to the blood-rite among the Balonda become 'perpetual friends and relations' (Livingstone, *Missionary*

Travels and Researches, p. 488); and it has been observed (Wilson and Felkin, *op. cit.* ii. 41; cf. Grant, *op. cit.* p. 271; F. L. James, *The Wild Tribes of the Soudan*[2], p. 91) that, if an African be your blood-brother, you may really trust him. 'This contract is never broken.' Among the Somali and Oromó, the saliva ceremony secures to the stranger a tribesman's rights (Paulitschke, *op. cit.* p. 246), while, among the Karens, the blood-covenant

'is of the utmost force. It covers not merely an agreement of peace or truce, but also a promise of mutual assistance in peace and war. It also conveys to the covenanting parties mutual tribal rights. If they are chiefs, the covenant embraces the entire tribes. If one is a private individual, the immediate family and direct descendants are included in the agreement. I never heard of the blood-covenant being broken. The blood-covenant gives even a foreigner every right which he would have if born a member of the tribe' (Luther, *op. cit.* p. 314).

viii. **What legal consequences flow from the compact.**

51. In certain cases the relation of brotherhood operates as a bar to marriage. Thus it is said of the Cherokees (see above, § 26) that they 'reckon a friend in the same rank with a brother, both with regard to marriage and any other affair of social life.' So, too, Lery ('Historia navigationis in Bresiliam,' cap. 16, in De Bry, *Americae tertia pars*, Frankfort, 1592) says that among certain Brazilian tribes

'nemo eorum matrem, sororem, vel filiam in uxorem ducit; reliquorum ratio nulla habetur; patruus neptem ducit; atque ita deinceps Tamen . . . nemo filiam aut sororem sui *Atourassap* matrimonio sibi jungere potest. Is autem *Atourassap* dicitur cujus tanta est cum quodam necessitudo ut bona inter utrumque sint communia.'

In some of the islands of Torres Straits a man may not marry the sister either of his particular friend or of his comrade in the ceremony of initiation (Haddon, *JAI* xix. 411–412, 315, 356); nor may those intermarry who take part in the *pela* ceremony of Ceram, or in the friendly associations of individuals or villages at Wetar (Riedel, *op. cit.* pp. 128–129, 446–447; see above, § 14). Among the Murmi a similar bar subsists between the brothers (see above, § 18); it is said of the Kanakas of the Bismarck Archipelago, that if two chiefs enter into an artificial relationship, their peoples are precluded by the closeness of the connexion from intermarriage (Joachim Graf Pfeil, *Studien u. Beobachtungen aus der Südsee*, Brunswick, 1899, p. 26); and a like prohibition affects those who are *ngia-ngiampe* to one another, and the brothers and even the serfs of a Circassian fraternity (see above, §§ 23, 27). Ciszewski, to whose work reference must be made for details, observes that, among the Southern Slavs, the institution of brotherhood is giving way to the influence of modern ideas; and that, if we were to gather from the different districts the various notions held regarding its legal and social consequences, we should be able to construct a complete scheme of the stages through which it has passed. Thus, in some cases, the relationship does not constitute a bar to marriage; in some, it makes a marriage impossible not only between the parties to the rite, but between their children; while, in Prilep, it precludes marriage not only between the parties and between their children, but between those of their relatives who participated in the distribution of gifts at the time of the ceremony (Ciszewski, *op. cit.* pp. 86, 94, 99–100; see above, § 38). We have in the last case, as Ciszewski observes, an interesting example of a collective brotherhood. The rite is performed by the representatives of the two kindreds; but that the relatives are also included in the association by accepting presents from the principals is shown by the fact that they may not intermarry.

52. According to Forbes, if one of the members of a Timorese brotherhood comes to the other brother's house, he 'is in every respect regarded as free, and as much at home as its owner. Nothing is withheld from him; even his friend's wife is not denied him, and a child born of such a union would be regarded by the husband as *his*' (*op. cit.* p. 452). By the terms of the compact of the *fatidrá* the brothers enjoyed community of wives and property; although, in later times, and in the case of Europeans, those obligations may not have been treated as literally binding (Ellis, *History of Madagascar*, i. 190). So, too, the members of the *omapanga* of the Ovaherero, and, according to A. von Chamisso, 'brothers' in the Marshall Islands have their wives in common (see above, §§ 25, 24); and in the countries of the Kimbunda, and among the Wakamba, the brothers exercised mutual privileges over wives and property (Magyar, *op. cit.* i. 201–202; Hildebrandt, *op. cit.* p. 387). Ellis (*Polynesian Researches*, London, 1831, iii. 124) observes that the wife of every individual is the wife also of his *taio*, or friend; and an earlier authority (W. Wilson, *A Missionary Voyage to the S. Pacific Ocean in 1796–1798, in the ship 'Duff,' commanded by Capt. James Wilson*, London, 1799, p. 359), in making a similar statement, adds that a *taio* 'must indulge in no liberties with the sisters or the daughters, because they are considered as his own sisters, and incest is held in abhorrence by them; nor will any temptation engage them to violate this bond of purity.' Further, it is said, on the testimony of Lieut. Corner, a previous observer, that the relation of *taio* formed between persons of different sexes operated as an absolute bar to all personal liberties. The later missionaries, however, doubted the accuracy of Corner's evidence, at all events in regard to the Tahitians of their time (*ib.* cf. § 43 above). Lastly, the provisions of the Syro-Roman law (see above, § 44) point to a compact, the parties to which held their wives and children in common.

ix. **General observations on the nature and history of the institution.**

53. We have seen in the preceding pages that the form of the rite by which the bond is constituted is not always one and the same. In some cases the use of blood is the only requisite; in some it is an essential element; in some it is a mere accessory; and in some it does not enter into the ceremony. And the question presents itself—Is the blood-rite the original type of which other forms are variations, or is it itself but one of the forms in which the need of man for union with, and security against, his fellow found expression? It is, no doubt, true that, in many instances, the use of the blood, while it is of the essence of the solemnity, is accompanied or followed by some other ritual act or acts, such as an exchange of food or weapons or garments or other gifts; and it has been argued that a form in which the performance of such act or acts is sufficient without the use of blood for the completion of the rite is a maimed form, which has lost what was originally essential and retained only what was originally of secondary importance. Such an explanation, however, hardly meets the case: for it does not account for those modes of entering into the compact with which the blood-rite is never found in connexion. It suggests, of course, that even in those cases the use of blood at one time formed part of the ceremony; but there is no evidence to that effect. Now, in the instances which we have adduced, we have found that the parties to the compact are brought together in a great number of different ways. They exchange blood or wine or food or names or garments or weapons or rings of the skins of sacrificial victims or gifts of some sort or kind. Or they dip their hands or their weapons in one another's blood or in the blood of the sacrifice, or shake hands smeared with blood, or let the blood mingle as it falls to the ground. Or they join in holding the victim during the sacrifice, or hold branches while an imprecation is being pronounced or blood

is being let. Or one of them rubs the other with his saliva; or a father makes his child *ngia-ngiampe* to another's child. Or, lastly, the union may be due to community of aim and interest, as in the case of companions in arms; or to circumstances beyond the control of the parties, as in the case of those who are initiated together, or associated as operator and patient in the performance of the initiatory rite; or to the pressure of an overwhelming necessity, as in the case of the fugitive and his protector. It is to be observed that it is quite in accordance with primitive ideas to regard 'the nature of anything as inhering in all its parts' (H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, London, 1879, ii. § 346), even when the parts are separated from it (cf. E. Durkheim, 'La Prohibition de l'inceste et ses origines,' *L'année sociologique*, i. 51); and to treat as parts of a man's substance not only his blood, saliva, umbilical cord, sweat, and other *excreta*, hair, nail parings, and the like, but also his garments, weapons, and name. To our thinking, blood is, weapons are not, vitally connected with the man himself; but, to the mind of the savage, the connexion is of the same quality in either case.

As an illustration of this mode of thought, it may not be out of place to indicate here a feature of primitive 'giving' which sharply distinguishes it from its modern counterpart. It is hardly an exaggeration to say generally of uncivilized man what has been said of the Western Eskimo—that 'a free and disinterested gift is wholly unknown to him.' The gift is regarded as an investment, and a return is expected (see P. J. H. Grierson, *The Silent Trade*, Edin., 1903, p. 18). But it seems probable that this conception has its origin elsewhere than in the desire to lose nothing by the transaction. It is rooted rather in the notion that, unless a return be made, the recipient obtains a power over the donor which he may use to the latter's injury. 'Payment,' says Hartland (*op. cit.* ii. 75; cf. Crawley, *op. cit.* pp. 236–245, 256–257), 'is always held to neutralise a witch's power over a person through something received from him'; and instances are not wanting in which savages have refused to touch the articles set out by traders for their acceptance, until the latter have taken what was offered to them (see GIFTS). Accordingly, an exchange of weapons no less than of blood is regarded as an exchange of very substance, and as establishing between the parties 'an actual community of nature' (H. Spencer, *loc. cit.*; see Hartland, *op. cit.* ii. 55–116, 442 and *passim*). This community is brought about not only by an interchange of externals, but by the devotion of the parties to a course of conduct which demands an absolute identity of aims and interests, or by outward circumstances which force them into an intimate contact. In other words, they enter voluntarily or involuntarily into a relation in which each is regarded not by way of metaphor or fiction, but in very truth, as the *alter ego* of the other. Now, it has been said that, according to primitive notions, blood-brotherhood 'is not a relationship personal to the two parties alone, but extends to the whole of each clan: my brother is, or becomes, the brother of all my brethren; the blood which flows in the veins of either party to the blood-covenant flows in the veins of all his kin' (F. B. Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*[2], London, 1902, p. 99; cf. W. R. Smith, p. 315).

We seem, at first sight, at all events, to be in the presence of two conflicting theories. First of all, we have what we may call the 'identity-theory,' which regards the bond as personal to the parties to it, and explains the blood-rite not as the typical form, but as one of many forms; and, secondly, we have what we may call the 'kinship-theory,' which regards the bond as a union of kins, and explains all forms, other than that of the blood-rite, as variations, or modifications, or deteriorations of it (see Hartland, *op. cit.* ii. p. 248 ff.; esp. p. 257). It must be admitted that the evidence which bears upon the claims of those rival views is, in some respects, very imperfect. Not infrequently we are supplied with full details of the ceremonies performed, while we are left wholly in the dark as to the legal incidents of the bond. In other cases, we are told what is its operation, but not a word is said as to the ritual accompanying its formation. For example, we have no facts before us to show how the compact was constituted in the case of the Brazilian *Atourassap*, or in that of the Ovaherero *omapanga* (see above, §§ 51, 25). At the same time, facts are reported which seem to be hardly reconcilable with the 'kinship-theory' as stated. It is, for instance, clear that in many cases the obligations undertaken bind only those persons who are parties to the compact. Thus, the Yahgans of Cape Horn enter into formal friendships by exchanging gifts, by painting themselves in a distinctive fashion, and by assuming one or other of the titles of blood-relationship (see above, § 25). There is no evidence to show that the reciprocal rights and duties of the friends extend to persons other than themselves, or that, by assuming such titles, they mean to do more than emphasize the intimacy of the relation between them. And that this is their meaning is made the more probable by a somewhat analogous instance from Fiji, where comrades in war 'are spoken of as man and wife, to indicate the closeness of their military union.' So, too, the compact which subsists between those who are companions in arms, or who have exchanged names, or who are *ngia-ngiampe* to each other, seems to be strictly personal, even where they are regarded as subject to certain marriage prohibitions, as among the Cherokees, some of the islanders of Torres Straits, the natives of Tahiti, and the Narrinyeri (see §§ 26, 24, 51, 23). The effect of the *lacu*-relationship will be noted below.

In the cases already mentioned, blood is not used in the ceremony; but there are cases in which it is used, and in which only the parties to the bond are affected. We have, for example, the temporary blood-bond, such as that which unites the members of a league, or of an Arunta punitive expedition (see above, § 2). In either instance, its purpose is to prevent treachery; in neither is it productive of a union of kins; and the same observations apply to those who join in 'going under the turf' (see above, § 7). In Timor and Borneo, and among the Wachaga, while a chief may represent his tribe, a simple tribesman binds himself only; and other examples of a like limitation have already been given (see above, § 47). In some of these cases the parties are entitled to share in one another's most sacred rights (see above, § 52); and that these privileges are not necessarily connected with the use of blood in the constitution of the bond, appears from the instance of the Polynesian *taio* and that of the Wakamba fugitive (see above, §§ 52, 31). At the same time it is quite true that sometimes they are found as consequents of a paction solemnized with blood, as in the cases of the Kimbunda and of the natives of Timor and Madagascar (see above, §§ 3, 13, 52). Thus friend is identified with friend; each is entitled to share the other's wife and property; each must regard and treat the other's sisters and daughters as if they were his own. At the same time, the relation is, in its inception at all events, a union of individuals and not a union of kins. The case of the Wakamba is peculiar. The fugitive, by a solemn act, acquires a right of participation in his pro-

tector's wife and house, and a claim on the support and assistance of his protector's tribe (see above, § 31). Here the relation extends beyond the parties to it, and is at the same time accompanied by privileges which are strictly personal to them. It may be thought that this instance presents to us the two theories in combination—the theory that the parties are made one, with the result that they, and they alone, enjoy certain intimate rights; and the theory that they are made kinsmen, with the result that the fugitive can rely upon the assistance of the tribe to which his protector belongs. This view receives some confirmation from a curious mode of peace-making practised by the Masai. One of their women proceeds with her infant to the border of the tribe with whom peace is to be concluded—the Kahe, for example—and meets there a Kahe woman with her infant. The women exchange their children in the presence of witnesses, and each puts the stranger child for a moment to her breast. Then each takes back her child, and each, having been cut by one of the witnesses, smears the blood from her wound on a piece of a bullock's heart and thrusts it into the other's mouth. During these proceedings the Masai representative and the Kahe headman make protestations of mutual goodwill, and imprecate evil upon the breaker of the compact (Merker, *op. cit.* p. 101). Here we have a rite compounded of an adoption ceremony and a brotherhood ceremony; and this instance suggests an explanation of the fact that among the Mapuches, a father, by making a stranger his son's *lacu*, or namesake, adopts him into his family (E. R. Smith, *op. cit.* pp. 260–262; see above, § 24). The parties become relatives by virtue of an exchange of names, and of giving food and eating what is given; and it may be that, in this case, the first of the theories above mentioned has yielded to the second—that the 'kinship-theory' has displaced the 'identity-theory.' Further, it is not without significance that, so far as we know, the blood-rite, as productive of a relationship which extends to the whole clan, is not to be found among the rudest peoples, such as the Yahgans of Cape Horn, the Botocudos, the Andaman Islanders, the Semangs, and Aetas, the Kubus of Sumatra, the Veddas of Ceylon, the dwarf races of Central and Western Africa, the Hottentots and Bushmen, and the natives of Australia, while the use of blood and other *media* is found among some of them in the formation of compacts creative of rights and duties which affect only the persons immediately concerned.

54. Plainly it is matter of no small difficulty to determine what is the relation of these two theories to one another; and, accordingly, we shall content ourselves with an attempt to indicate the direction in which the evidence points. Now, it seems to show that the relation with which we are dealing was not primarily and essentially a relation of kins. We are not concerned to affirm or deny that the tie which held men together in the earliest times known to us was the tie of blood. What we do assert is that primarily and essentially this relation was strictly personal to the parties to it. They might be forced into it by the pressure of external circumstances, or they might enter into it of their own free will. They might be kinsmen, as we count kinship, or they might be strangers in blood. But, whether akin or not, they were somehow brought into a contact so intimate that they became, in the eyes of their fellows, possessed of a common nature. The logical result of this community was that each of the parties became entitled to the rights and subject to the disabilities of the other. Each had a right to share the other's wife and property; each was precluded, wherever marriage of a sister by a brother or of a daughter by a father was prohibited, from marrying the other's sisters or daughters. These marriage bars, even if they did not owe their origin to a recognition of the principle of blood-relationship, were plainly susceptible of being referred to it, and accounted for by it, when it came to be recognized; and this explanation would appear most natural when the use of blood entered into the formation of the bond. Accordingly it would hardly be matter of surprise that, where circumstances favoured the change, the 'kinship-theory' gradually encroached upon the 'identity-theory' and finally usurped its place.

55. What, it may be asked, is the nature of the sanction which supports the compact? It cannot have escaped observation that, in many instances at all events, the institution with which we are dealing closely resembles an oath or an ordeal (see above, § 7). An oath consists in general of two parts—of an asseveration that what is said is true, or that what is undertaken will be performed, and an imprecation of evil by the person taking the oath upon himself, if he prove forsworn. Sometimes a divinity is invoked not merely to bear witness to the oath, but to punish the oath-breaker. Sometimes mere things, such as weapons, are introduced into the ceremony to symbolize the evil which will fall upon the perjured person—he will be cut down with a sword, or pierced with an arrow, or run through with a spear. What Polybius (iii. 25) says of the oath with which the treaties between Rome and Carthage were solemnized is very instructive. The Carthaginians swore by the gods of their country. The Romans swore 'in accordance with ancient custom' and in addition by Mars and Quirinus. He who made oath 'according to ancient custom' took a stone in his hand and said—'If I keep faith, may I fare well; but if I knowingly deceive, then may I, while all other men are assured of their right to their country, their laws, their gods, and their sepulchres, be alone cast out as I now cast out this stone'; and, with these words, he cast the stone away. It seems plain that we have here an account of two forms. In the later form the gods are invoked to be witnesses to the oath, and to punish the oath-breaker. In the earlier form the gods are not invoked, and the stone is thrown away to signify the fate of the false swearer (see H. A. A. Danz, *Der sacrale Schutz*, Jena, 1857, p. 13 ff.; O. Schrader, *Reallexikon d. indogerm. Alterthumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 168; cf. Grimm, *op. cit.* p. 897; B. W. Leist, *Græco-italische Rechtsgeschichte*, Jena, 1884, pp. 226 f., 703 f.). In many instances an act of touching is an essential part of the ceremony. Thus, in the Indian form, the man who took the oath by touching himself drew down the powers of evil upon his head (Schrader, *op. cit.* p. 167); and, in old Germany, he must touch some object which brought him into relation either with the gods whom he invoked, or with the punishment which followed upon perjury. In Scandinavia the oath-breaker touched a ring smeared with blood and consecrated to a divinity; and it was in accordance with a very ancient German practice that a man swore by his sword; while Christians swore by the cross, by relics, and by book and bell (Grimm, *op. cit.* p. 895 f., where many other forms will be found). Sometimes an animal was slaughtered to show how the perjurer would be dealt with—'Juppiter populum Romanum sic ferito, ut ego hunc porcum hic hodie feriam; tantoque magis ferito, quanto magis potes pollesque' (Livy, i. 24. 8). See on oaths A. H. Post, *Grundriss d. ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1895, ii. 478 ff., and art. OATHS.

56. When we turn to the bond of friendship, and

examine the cases in which blood is employed in its constitution, we find varieties in form, remarkably similar to those which we have been discussing. Sometimes the gods are adjured to punish those who break the compact (see above, §§ 10, 11), or simply to be witnesses to it (see above, §§ 7, 13, 14, 16). Sometimes they are made parties to it (see above, §§ 8, 16), or are invoked while an animal is being slaughtered (see above, §§ 10, 17). In other cases, the parties touch the blood (see above, §§ 7, 8), or dip their weapons in it (see above, §§ 9, 14), or touch or hold an animal while one of them slays it (see above, §§ 10, 13). Weapons or other articles are often introduced into the ceremony either as a 'witness' of the compact (see above, § 13) or as a symbol of the punishment which awaits the breaker of it (see above, § 14, and cf. § 33); and imprecations are frequently pronounced without any direct appeal to a supernatural power (see above, §§ 9, 10, 13, 14, 53). In some cases, as among the Bali, the rite consists of two parts,—of a blood-rite effecting the formation of the bond, and of a blood-rite with the operation of an oath,—while, in other cases, as among the Bendowen Dusuns, the oath stands alone (see above, § 13). There are instances, however, in which the ceremony consists of drinking or sprinkling blood without invocations or imprecations (see above, §§ 2, 49). In this connexion, Junker's (*op. cit.* p. 405; see above, § 5) account of the rite as practised by certain tribes south of the Welle is very instructive. The parties sit opposite to one another. A scratch is made on the chest of each, and a drop of blood is squeezed out. Each wipes the blood off the other with a piece of sugar-cane, which he chews, and the fibres of which he afterwards blows over his wound. At the same time, he repeats the points which have induced him to enter into the compact, and which are to be kept sacred; and at the end of each clause he adds the solemn words: 'If thou dost not hold to this, may my blood destroy thee' (cf. § 49). Here, then, we have an instance of a relation in which blood is the medium not only of formation, but of punishment (see Westermarck, *MI*, London, 1908, ii. 206 ff., 566 ff.). We have, in other words, an example of the operation of the principle which underlies the oath and the ordeal. That the same principle operates in cases in which the blood of the parties is not employed appears from such instances as that of the Beni, where the parties make friendship by eating portions of the same fruit or vegetable, and touching themselves ceremoniously with it before they eat (see above, § 18); or as that of the natives of Shira, where the 'brothers' hold a goat while it is being slaughtered, and fit rings of its skin upon one another's fingers (see above, § 21). A further confirmation is furnished by the cases in which the formation of the compact is due not to the volition of the parties, but to the force of external circumstances. The bond between them is of so intimate a character—the union between them is so complete—that its rupture cannot fail to be productive of evil consequences to the man who breaks it; and thus the sanction has its origin not in the intention of the parties, but in the essential character of the relation. It may well be that, in many instances, the sole punishment which awaits the false 'brother' is that which follows a breach of tribal custom or an outrage on public opinion. Still, it appears to be not improbable that, even in these instances, tribal custom and public opinion owe their force to a sanction of the nature indicated above.

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BROTHERHOODS.—Brotherhood, in its literal sense, is the condition in which a male person is descended from the same father or mother as one or more other persons; full brotherhood, that in which he is descended from the same father and the same mother as one or more other persons. Thus the sons of Jacob by his two wives and by their two handmaids together address their unknown brother Joseph: 'Thy servants are twelve brethren, the sons of one man in the land of Canaan' (Gn 42[13]). In theology, the term is metaphorically applied in two senses: the general sense in which all men are brethren, sometimes limited to those who are of the same faith, as when St. Peter says, 'Honour all men; love the brotherhood' (1 P 2[17]); and the particular sense in which it signifies persons living together in artificial communities as natural brothers live together in families before they leave the family home to establish families of their own. The ideal of brotherhood is one of the closest of all human relations—the only one that implies equality—there being no difference between brothers other than that arising from age.

The system of living in cloistral communities with a religious object belongs to the Brâhman religion, and was adapted by Śākyamuni to the Buddhist religion, and has been largely imported into Christianity. Under it, men have retired from the world by hundreds and by thousands. The grand Buddhist monastery of Nālanda, consisting of six convents, had ten thousand monks. They employed themselves chiefly in the study of the books of their religion and of science, especially medicine and arithmetic. In Ceylon, the monks take upon them vows not to kill, not to rob, to observe celibacy, not to lie, not to drink strong liquors, not to take food after noonday, not to dance or sing or make music; to use no perfumes, unguents, or ornaments; to have no luxurious bed or chair, and never to possess gold or silver. The general idea involved in these communities or brotherhoods is that of a simple and studious life, devoted mainly to the contemplation of religious subjects, and existing in circumstances of self-denial and asceticism—an ideal which has rarely been maintained for long in its original vigour.

The Buddhist monastic system has been practised from ancient times in Tibet. The monastery is there termed *gompa*, or 'solitary place.' Lhasa, the centre of religion in Tibet, was till recently inaccessible to Europeans, although it had been visited by Sarat Chandra Das and other Hindus. One of the most ancient and famous of the monasteries in the neighbourhood is that of Samye, visited by Chandra Das in 1882. It contains a chief temple, Wu-tse, four minor temples, and eight lesser shrines, the dwellings of the monks being in a two-storeyed building near the chief temple. The grand monastery of Tashi-Lhumpo is another, and a sketch of it has been published by the Royal Geographical Society. Here the monks are summoned by a trumpet to the great hall for prayers at 3 a.m. At the lamasery of Yarlung Shetag live 40 monks and as many nuns, whose children are brought up to succeed them. This is allowed because of the loneliness of the situation of the lamasery. In the *gompas* at Lhasa there are said to be 15,000 lamas, and in the province of Amdo nearly 30,000 in 24 lamaseries; and it is estimated that one-seventh of the entire population belong to the priesthood. The lamasery of Kumbum has a

temple covered in with tiles of gold, in commemoration of Tsongkapa, a Tibetan saint.

In the British provinces of Little Tibet, monasteries exist, which are thus described: The monastery at Kee in Spiti has the appearance of a hill-fort crowning an eminence. That at Kyelang in Lāhul stands on the projecting spur of a mountain side, distant from all other habitations, at an elevation of more than 12,000 feet above the level of the sea, and is approached by a steep and difficult path, which at some seasons is dangerous. In the spring of 1874 a monk and a nun were buried in an avalanche while walking up this path. In the richer monasteries in Tibet proper are extensive wardrobes of great value. Along the walls of the galleries are arranged numerous praying wheels. On one side of the hall is a wheel 5 feet in diameter, on each revolution of which a bell is struck. Outside the main building are the cells of the brethren. Col Paske witnessed the performance by the monks of Kyelang of what is termed by him a spirit dance. The abbot took his position, attended by a band of musicians, who played loudly, when a party of 30 or 40 monks entered attired in grotesque costumes and wearing masks; after an excited and noisy dance, they retired to change these costumes.

The Tibetans take off their hats when they pass a monastery and shuffle past it on their knees. In these circumstances, it is easy to understand that the monks have acquired great political power.

In Siam, the monasteries are recruited from every class of society, especially the higher classes, and every son of a respectable family spends a year in one of them—a system which reminds one of that of the lay brethren in several English orders.

The account given by Herodotus (ii. 37) of the Egyptian priests implies that they lived in communities. He says: 'They are of all men the most excessively attentive to the worship of the gods, and observe the following ceremonies. They drink from cups of brass, which they scour every day; nor is this custom practised by some and neglected by others, but all do it. They wear linen garments, constantly fresh washed, and they pay particular attention to this. They are circumcised for the sake of cleanliness, thinking it better to be clean than handsome. The priests shave their whole body every third day, that neither lice nor any other impurity may be found upon them when engaged in the service of the gods. The priests wear linen only, and shoes of *byblus*, and are not permitted to wear any other garments or other shoes. They wash themselves in cold water twice every day and twice every night; and, in a word, they use a number of ceremonies. On the other hand, they enjoy no slight advantages, for they do not consume or expend any of their private property; but sacred food is cooked for them, and a great quantity of beef and geese is allowed each of them every day, and wine from the grape is given them; but they may not taste of fish. . . . The service of each god is performed, not by one, but by many priests, of whom one is chief priest; and when any one of them dies, his son is put in his place.'

It was in Egypt that the monastic movement in Christianity commenced. It is alleged that Frontonius established the first 'laura' in the year 151 at Nitria. In the early part of the 4th cent. the movement had taken root. It is said that the sanctity of St. Anthony attracted so many monks to his neighbourhood that he had to undertake the direction of them. St. Pachomius also, who died in 348, was head of a community; and that under Apollonius consisted of 500 individuals. The name *Dêr el-Bahari* signifies 'the convent of the North.'

From Egypt the practice speedily spread to Rome and to Gaul; and, when Augustine came to England, he found Celtic monks established there. Abbot Gasquet enumerates not fewer than 21 different orders.

They are distinguished into five classes as follows:—(1) Four orders of monks: the Benedictines, established at Monte Cassino early in the 6th cent. A.D.; the Cluniacs, dating from the 10th cent.; the Cistercians and the Carthusians, from the 11th. (2) Three orders of Canons Regular: the Augustinian, the Premonstratensian, and the Gilbertine. [The last is the only order originating in England, and was established in 1148.] (3) Two military orders: those of the Knights of St. John and the Knights Templar. (4) Four orders of Friars: the Dominicans, or Black Friars; the Franciscans, or Grey Friars; the Carmelites, or White Friars; and the Austin Friars. [These were all introduced into England in the 13th cent., and are commemorated in London by the names of places where their houses formerly stood.] (5) Eight lesser orders of Friars: the Brethren de Penitentia; the Pied Friars at Norwich; the Brethren of St. Mary de Arens at Westminster; the Brethren de Domine; the Trinitarian Friars; the Crutched Friars; the Bethlehemite Friars; the Boni homines. [These all date from the middle of the 13th century.]

The expression 'brotherhood' was also anciently applied to Gilds. The popular assemblies in the Cinque Ports are styled Court of Brotherhood and Guestling. Before the passing of the Judicature Act in 1873, the judges and serjeants-at-law together constituted the Society of Serjeants Inn, and the serjeants were always addressed by the judges in court as 'brother.'

See COMMUNISTIC SOCIETIES, MONASTICISM.

LITERATURE.—F. A. Gasquet, *English Monastic Life*, 1904; Lady Amherst of Hackney, *Sketch of Egyptian History*, 1904; S. C. Rijnhart, *With the Tibetans in Tent and Temple*, 1901; Sarat Chandra Das, *Journey to Lhasa*, new ed. 1904; L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, 1895, and *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, 1905; A. Jessopp, *Coming of the Friars*, 1889.

E. W. BRABROOK.

BROTHERLY LOVE (Buddhist).—See LOVE (Buddhist).

BROTHERLY LOVE (Christian).—The principle of brotherly love was not first enunciated by Christianity. Exponents of earlier systems had given it notable expression, both among Gentiles and among Jews (see, *e.g.*, Ex 23[4], Lv 19[18], Dt 22[1-4] 24[10-15], To 4, etc.; cf. art. 'Brotherly Love' in *JE*). Even the 'Golden Rule' had been anticipated, at least in a negative form (see Allen on Mt 7[12]), and the association of the Christian with the Jewish doctrine is openly declared both by our Lord (Mt 7[12] 22[40]) and by His Apostles (Ro 13[8-10], Ja 2[8]). In the earlier dispensation, however, the conception was narrowed by racial prejudice. For the practical realization of what was there implicit we must turn at once to the words of Jesus Himself.

1. **The teaching of Jesus.**—(*a*) The teaching of Jesus not only inculcates the duty of brotherly love (Mt 5[21-24. 38-48] 7[12], Mk 10[43], Lk 10[37] etc.), but assigns to it the utmost emphasis. From His doctrine of the Divine Fatherhood He leads us to infer the doctrine of human brotherhood (see the use of ἀδελφός in Mt 5[22. 23] 7[3] 18[15. 35] etc., and cf. 23[8]). The love of our neighbour is placed side by side with our love of God as the supreme obligation of religion (22[34-40]); and so inseparable are the two, that in Christ's portrayal the heavenly love finds in the earthly love alike its truest expression and its unerring criterion (25[40], Mk 9[36. 37], Lk 6[43ff.]; cf. Jn 13[35] 15[10. 12]). No formal devotion grants

exemption from the claims of justice and mercy (Mt 23^{23} 15^{6}). To be wrong in one's relations with a brother is no less than to be wrong in one's relations with God ($5^{23.\ 24}$ 25^{45}).

(*b*) There is a noble universalism in the love thus enjoined by our Lord. In His thought the term 'neighbour' loses all such limitations as in the earlier Jewish interpretation were imposed by national or personal animosity. It embraces all men (7^{12}) irrespective of race (Lk 10^{25-37}), of social status ($14^{12.\ 13}$), of character (Mt 5^{43-48}), and even of personal relationships (5^{44}, Lk 6^{27}). While the wider human brotherhood itself includes an inner brotherhood of discipleship (Mk 3^{35}, Jn 13^{34} 15^{12}), all children of the common Father have a place in the one great fraternity of love.

2. **The Apostolic writings.**—(*a*) The prominence assigned to brotherly love in our Lord's own teaching is re-asserted in that of His Apostles. Frequent exhortations are found in the Epistles reminding the early Christians of the obligations it involves (see, *e.g.*, Ro 12^{10}, He 13^{1-3}, 1 P 1^{22}, 1 Jn 3^{11} 4^{21}). So well known, indeed, are those obligations, that in one place there is almost an apology for allusion to them (1 Th 4^{9}). Whether viewed from the standpoint of worship (*θρησκεία*) or from that of piety (*εὐσέβεια*), love is to be the inevitable outcome of religion (see Ja 1^{27}, 2 P 1^{7}), and all that is implicit in it St. Paul sets himself carefully to expound (1 Co 13). Its practical influence in the life of the Church is to be seen in its power to place master and slave upon equal terms (Philem ^{16}), and in the adoption of 'brother' as an acknowledged term both of address (see 1 Th 1^{4} etc.) and of reference (1 Co 8^{13}, Ja 1^{9}, 1 Jn 2^{9}). Even so specific an expression as 'the brotherhood' appears to have been recognized before A.D. 64 to signify the body of Christian believers (1 P 2^{17} 5^{9}).

(*b*) The brotherly love thus required or assumed is regarded as essential to the Christian life. Its obligation is 'the royal law' (Ja 2^{8}). Its absence nullifies all other virtues (1 Co 13^{1-3}); its presence implies fulfilment of all duty (Ro 13^{8-10}, Gal 5^{14}). It is, in fact, the pledge of a live faith (Ja 2^{14-18}), and the criterion of true sonship (1 Jn 2^{9-11} $3^{10.\ 14}$ 4^{7} 5^{1}). In all this the servants' doctrine is as their Lord's.

(*c*) It has been disputed, however, to what extent the Apostles are also at one with Christ in their conception of the scope within which this law of love holds sway. In favour of a distinction between the two points of view, it may be argued: (*α*) that the prevalent sense of *ἀδελφός* in the NT is that of 'fellow-Christian'—a restricted meaning which is sometimes markedly imposed by the immediate context (see, *e.g.*, 1 Co 5^{11} 6^{6}); (*β*) that the love required frequently refers to the brotherhood of believers only (Ro 12^{10}, 1 Th 4^{9}, He 13^{1}, 1 P 1^{22} 2^{17} 3^{8}); and (*γ*) that, even in the report of our Lord's own teaching, the universalism of the Synoptic Gospels has, in the Fourth Gospel, been merged in the more limited conception (see Jn 13^{34}, 15^{12}). On the other hand, it is quite clear, from such injunctions as are found in Gal 6^{10} and 1 Th 5^{15}, that the Apostolic law of love towards men possessed an application as broad as humanity itself, and the specific reference of Ro 12^{20} shows that not even enemies were excluded from its operation. The teaching of Jesus, therefore, has not really been limited by His followers. The utmost that can be maintained is that the Apostles thought of two separate circles of brotherhood—the inner circle, which comprised their fellow-believers, and the outer circle, in which all mankind were allowed a place. They themselves specifically distinguish these two degrees of fellowship (see Gal 6^{10}, 2 P 1^{7}). Yet, though there may be special stress upon the more limited love, the wider love is recognized as its natural outgrowth and its perfect fulfilment (see 2 P 1^{7}).

3. **The practice of the Early Church.**—Certain special forms, in which the brotherly love of the first Christians found expression, call for particular mention at this point. (*a*) *The Love-feast and the Lord's Supper.*—The early disciples used to share in a common meal, which was intended not only as a means of assisting the poorer brethren, but also as a manifestation of the Church's unity of spirit (see Ac $2^{42.\ 46}$ 6^{2} 20^{7}, and Tertullian's famous passage, *Apol.* 39). At first these love-feasts were connected with the Lord's Supper (see 1 Co $11^{20ff.}$, and Ign. *Smyr.* 8; and cf. art. AGAPE). But it was not long before the association of the two meals led to serious abuse (1 Co $11^{20ff.}$, Jude ^{12}, 2 P 2^{13})—a fact which, along with the Roman government's suspicion of all secret societies, led, in the 2nd cent., to their ultimate separation (see Pliny's Letter to Trajan, 96). Even after the separation, however, the Lord's Supper, as well as the Agape, would constitute an expression of the disciples' common brotherhood (see 1 Co 10^{17}). In the 18th cent. John Wesley made an interesting attempt to revive the love-feast in his own societies, and in an attenuated form it still survives among them.

(*b*) *Hospitality.*—The circumstances of the age in which Christianity had its birth rendered hospitality a practical necessity. It is not surprising, therefore, that the early Christian literature lays stress on this particular application of brotherly love. The entertainment of strangers was the duty not merely of the 'bishop' (1 Ti 3^{2}, Tit 1^{8}), but also of the ordinary disciple. In certain Scriptural injunctions its exercise is confined to the case of fellow-Christians (1 P 4^{9}, 3 Jn $^{5-8}$); but the absence of restriction in other places shows that the broader conception of the duty was also appreciated (Ro 12^{13b}, He $13^{1.\ 2}$, 1 Ti 5^{10}; Clem. Rom. 1). See HOSPITALITY.

(*c*) *Charity.*—The practice of liberality towards the poor was another expression of the Church's brotherhood. As was natural, this was directed mainly to relieving the necessities of fellow-disciples (Ro 12^{13a}, He 6^{10}, 1 Jn $3^{17.\ 18}$, and probably Ac 9^{36}), although the limitation is not always named (see He 13^{16}). A signal illustration of such charity is found in St. Paul's collection for the saints at Jerusalem (Ro 15^{25}, 2 Co 8^{1-15} etc.). See CHARITY.

(*d*) *The 'communism' of the Early Church.*—It was in connexion with such care for the poorer brethren that an experiment was undertaken which has sometimes been described as the 'communism' of the Early Church. 'And all that believed were together, and had all things common; and they sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all, according as any man had need' (Ac $2^{44f.}$; cf. also 4^{32}). We must be careful, however, not to exaggerate the significance of this beautiful manifestation of brotherly love.

'There is,' in the words of Peabody (*Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, p. 24), 'no evidence that what is reported of the little company at Jerusalem became in any degree a general practice, as though enjoined by the teaching of Jesus. No other instance of communal ownership is cited in the Book of Acts; but, on the other hand, the mother of Mark continues to own her home in Jerusalem (Ac 12^{12}), and voluntary relief is sent from Antioch by "every man according to his ability" (11^{29}). The Apostle Paul knows nothing of such communistic regulations (2 Co 9, 1 Co 16^{2}). . . . In short, the communism of the day of Pentecost, like the gift of tongues described in the same chapter, was a spontaneous, unique, and unrepeated manifestation of that elevation and unity of spirit which possessed the little company in the first glow of their new faith. Still further, this sharing of each other's possessions, which was thus for the moment a sign of their perfect brotherhood, was even then no formal or compulsory system.' (See Ac 5^{4}; cf., further, art. COMMUNITY OF GOODS.)

It is probable that the disappointment of the hope of a speedy Parousia, the rapid growth of the Church, and the presence of unworthy members in the Christian community, prevented the repetition or the expansion of this experiment (see J. H.

Moulton's essay in *The Social Teaching of the Bible*, pp. 214-216).

4. Later development.—The history of the world's social progress, since the days of the Apostles, has been largely that of the leavening of human life with the principles of brotherly love inherent in the Christian gospel. It is to its spirit that we owe the abolition of slavery, the cleansing of the prisons, the care of the sick poor, the suppression of infanticide, the exaltation of womanhood, the improvement in conditions of labour, and, in general, the birth of our modern concern for the down-trodden masses dwelling in our great cities. And, as men look forward to future progress, working towards a reformed society securely based upon truth, justice, and mercy, it is in the gospel of Christian brotherhood that the adequate motive-power is to be sought. Only when the universal brotherhood of man is acknowledged as an inevitable inference from the universal Fatherhood of God, only when the world's law of greed and hate is vanquished by the Christian law of service and love, will the principle of love have received its perfect fulfilment, and the City of God at length have been built upon earth.

LITERATURE.—**Harnack** and **Hermann**, *The Social Gospel* (1907), **Peabody**, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question* (1901); **Westcott**, *Social Aspects of Christianity* (1887); **Findlay**, *Fellowship in the Life Eternal* (1909); **Keeble** (ed.), *The Social Teaching of the Bible* (1909); artt. 'Brotherly Love' and 'Love' in *HDB*, and 'Brotherhood' and 'Love' in *DCG*.

H. BISSEKER.

BROTHERS AND SISTERS.—See FAMILY.

BROTHERS OF THE COMMON LIFE, etc.—See BRETHREN OF THE COMMON LIFE, etc.

BROWNING.—See POETRY (Christian).

BROWNISM.—1. Life of founder.—Brownism derives its name from Robert Browne, third son of Anthony Browne of Tolethorpe,* Rutlandshire. Born about 1550,† of his earlier years nothing is known, but he appears to have entered Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, in 1570, and to have graduated in 1572.‡ The college at that time was noted rather for licence than for learning or seriousness.§ The university, however, as a whole was a centre of Puritan influence; and Browne, yielding to this, became one of those 'known and counted forward in religion.'‖ In other words, he was concerned about 'the woeful and lamentable state of the Church,' and its need of a further reformation. He 'debated' those things 'in himself and with others,' and 'suffered some trouble about them'¶ from opponents. Then, at some indefinite time after 1572, he taught 'schollers' for the space of three years**—having a 'special care to teach religion,' and keeping them 'in such awe and good order as all the townsmen where he taught gave him witness.' Moreover, he still 'bent himself to search and find out the matters of the Church'; he 'laboured to put in practice all he found, both in his school and the town'; †† in consequence, 'he got himself much enmity of the preacher,' and was 'presently discharged.' For a time, however, he continued to teach 'with great good will and favour of the townsmen‡‡ till' an outbreak of the plague occasioned his recall home to Tolethorpe. Next, with his father's leave, he returned to Cambridge, not for study so much as with the hope of staying 'his care' about the absorbing Church question. To this end he resorted to Mr. Richard Greenham, rector of Dry Drayton, 'whom of all others he heard say was most forward.'* Mr. Greenham allowed him—'with others'—to expound in his house 'that part of Scripture which was used to be read after meals'; and, contrary to law, did not forbid him to teach 'openly in the parish.' This led to his being 'moved' by 'certain in Cambridge,' 'and also with consent of the Mayor and Vice-Chancellor,' to his preaching in Cambridge. He was not unwilling, but was checked by his objection to receiving the Bishop's 'license and authority.' He could go so far as to be 'tried' (*i.e.* examined) by the Bishops, and to 'suffer their power, though unlawful, if in anything it did not hinder the Truth.'† But he would not admit their right to authorize or ordain him; and when Archbishop Grindall's 'seals were gotten him by his brother'‡—apparently three times over—he lost the first, burned the second, and, though he kept the third by him,§ openly declared that they meant nothing to him. He preached to his Cambridge congregation for 'about half a year,' but refused to take charge of them, because 'he saw the parishioners in such spiritual bondage that whosoever would take charge of them must also come into that bondage with them.' This confirmed him in the principle which had gradually been growing clear to his mind, that 'the Kingdom of God was not to be begun by whole parishes, but rather of the worthiest were they never so few';‖ and, failing to convert the people to a like view, he 'sent back' the 'stipend' they had 'gathered' for him, 'and gave warning of his departure.'¶ His next sphere was in Norfolk—where some very forward** were said to be. He lodged with Robert Harrison,†† master of an hospital in Norwich; but went out from that city on preaching tours which roused the whole neighbourhood, and soon embroiled him with the Bishop.‡‡ Another result, however, was the gathering of a 'company' who agreed to join

* The family is described as 'ancient and worshipful.' For full accounts of it, see *Transactions of the Congregational Historical Society*, vol. ii. no. 3.

† An inference from the fact that he was over 80 at the time of his death in 1633.

‡ Masters, *History of Corpus Christi College*, p. 9. There is some uncertainty, as two others of the same name entered—the one in 1557, the other in 1565.

§ See Strype's *Parker*, 1821, bk. iii. (sub. 1548).

‖ See his own *True and Short Declaration* (unpaged). A copy is in the *Congregationalist* for 1882; the original is in the Lambeth Library.

¶ *Ib.* ** *Ib.* †† Perhaps Stamford.

‡‡ Tradition says Islington, but his residence there was some time after he 'conformed' in 1585. The statement (Strype's *Parker*, bk. iv., sub. 1571) that he became chaplain to the Duke of Norfolk before 1571 is due to the confounding of him with another Robert Browne, the Duke's messenger, often mentioned in the State Papers and Acts of Privy Council between 1571 and 1591. Nor is there any proof of his identity with the Browne cited in connexion with 'Undertree's Plot' (*ib.* bk. iv., sub. 1574), nor yet with the Brown (of Trinity College) 'convented' before the Vice-Chancellor for Puritan leanings in 1572 (*ib.* bk. iv.).

* Rev. Richard Greenham, 'a man renowned for his care, pietie and paines; and for his singular dexteritie in comforting afflicted consciences' (see dedication of works to James I. [1612]).

† *True and Short Declaration.*

‡ Most likely his eldest brother Philip, made incumbent of Little Casterton in 1591 (a family living), and deprived in 1604 for conformity. Two seals were issued—on 6th and 7th June 1579 respectively—one a Dismissory Letter, and one a Licence to preach (Burrage, *The True Story of Robert Browne*, 1906, p. 5).

§ Later he parted with it (*i.e.* the Bishop's licence) to a Justice of the Peace, who delivered it to the Bishop of Norwich. But apparently he was not ordained.

‖ *True and Short Declaration.* This shows that Browne did not borrow his conception of a Church, but worked it out for himself.

¶ About the same time he 'fell sick,' and during his illness was served by an 'officer named Bancroft' (Richard, future Archbishop) with the Bishop's letter forbidding him to preach.

** Immigrants from the Low Countries were numerous in and near Norwich—including some Anabaptists (Blomefield, *Norfolk*, 1805-10, vol. ii. pp. 282, 292-3). Lollard influence was also strong (see, *e.g.*, map in Trevelyan's *England in the Age of Wyclif*, 1899, p. 352).

†† A Cambridge associate whom he converted to his views. They went to Middelburg together, and there disagreed. He died before 1588 (Bredwell, *Rasing the Foundations*; see also Strype's *Parker*, bk. iv. cap. 35).

‡‡ See his (*i.e.* Freke, Bishop of Norwich) letters to Burghley, April 19 and August 2, 1581 (Lansdowne MSS, xxxiii. 13, 20). Burghley was a *distant* kinsman to Browne.

together, on the basis of his teaching, for Church fellowship, by means of a solemn covenant to the following effect: *

(1) That they would 'keep and seek agreement' one with another under Christ's laws.
(2) That they did choose, and would obey, certain to 'teach them and watch for the salvation of their souls,'—having had due 'trial and testimony' of their fitness.†
(3) That they would hold regular meetings for 'prayer, thanksgiving, reading of the Scriptures, exhorting, and edifying—either by all *men* which had the gift, or by those who had the special charge before others.'
(4) That they would allow any member of the Church to 'protest, appeal, complain, exhort, dispute, reprove, etc., as he had occasion, but yet in due order.'
(5) That they would 'further the Kingdom of God in themselves, and especially in their charge and household, if they had any; or in their friends and companions, and whosoever was worthy.'
(6) That they would observe the rules agreed upon 'for gathering and testifying voices in debating matters'; 'for an order of choosing teachers, guides, and relievers'; 'for separating clean from unclean'; 'for receiving any into the fellowship'; 'for presenting the daily success of the Church and the wants thereof'; 'for seeking to other Churches to have their help bring better reformed, or to bring *them* to reformation'; 'for taking an order that none contend openly, nor persecute, nor trouble (the Church) disorderly, nor bring false doctrine nor evil cause (into it)—after once or twice warning or rebuke.'

This took place at Norwich,‡ probably early in the spring of 1581, and marks the formation of the first Church of its kind in England.§ The 'covenant' here described presents a rough outline of Brownism on its positive or constructive side; its negative or aggressive side may be illustrated by Browne's own report‖ of a conversation which he had with his colleague Harrison some time before. From this it appears that Browne (showing himself more extreme in some points than Harrison) maintained that 'preachers who submit themselves to the popish power of the Bishops, or any way justify or tolerate it,' cannot 'do duty as lawful pastors and preachers'; that 'Parishes guided either by such preachers or by the Bishops' and their 'officers' cannot 'be lawful and the Churches of God'; that such preachers cannot really 'beget faith by their preaching,' neither can they really 'call or win men to goodness,' nor can any profit be got from their 'blind reading of chapters and the (Church) service.' With these convictions fierce invectives against the preachers came naturally. Here, *e.g.*, is a specimen: 'Therefore say no more ye wicked preachers that ye hold the foundation, or that ye preach. For what is it worth to say unto Christ, "Hail, King of the Jews," and bow the knee before Him, when you cast your filthy disorders and popish government as dung on His face. You have not yet gathered the people from the popish parishes and wicked fellowship, neither have planted the Church by laying the foundation thereof . . .' Declamation in this strain made a sensation. The common people of Bury St. Edmunds and thereabout heard him gladly, and 'assembled themselves to the number of a hundred at a time in private houses and conventicles to hear him.'¶ But it also led to his imprisonment by the Bishop 'upon complaint made by many godly preachers for delivering unto the people corrupt and contentious doctrine.'¶ Released at the instance of his kinsman Burghley,** and straightway resuming what he considered his mission, he presently found himself 'a prisoner at London.'* Harrison, too, was imprisoned† with others of the Church. So 'at last, when divers of them were again imprisoned, and the rest in great trouble and bondage out of prison, they all agreed and were fully persuaded that the Lord did call them out of England.'‡ The place selected (possibly because of Thomas Cartwright's congregation there) was Middelburg;§ and thither the greater portion‖ of the Norwich 'company,' including Browne and Harrison, transferred themselves—near the end of 1581. In Middelburg Browne's ideal seems to have encountered little or no outward hindrance, but it broke down woefully under the stress of inward disabilities.¶ Two years later, Browne, sore at heart but keeping a bold front, was on his way to Scotland—accompanied by just four or five men and their families. The rest of his career need not be dwelt upon. Landing at Dundee, he reached Edinburgh by way of St. Andrews on Thursday, 9th January 1583–4, and was soon in trouble. On three successive Tuesdays he appeared before the Edinburgh Presbytery—maintaining (on the 14th) that 'witnesses at baptism were not a thing indifferent, but simply evil'; alleging (on the 21st) that 'the whole discipline of Scotland was amiss'; and acknowledging (on the 28th) the authorship of certain books exhibited. Out of these Mr. James Lawson and Mr. John Davidson were deputed to gather the articles deemed erroneous for presentation to the King—Browne, meanwhile, being, it would seem, held in custody. But His Majesty, assuredly rather to spite the Presbytery than to befriend Browne, let him go free.**

After some months he appears to have returned to Stamford; then to have gone abroad, leaving his wife behind; and then again to have come back to Stamford. This was about March 1585; and in the autumn of the same year, October 7th, he betrayed the crushing effect upon him of several months' imprisonment by a promise of 'conformity' to the Established Church.†† Next day he set out for Tolethorpe, bearing a letter of intercession from Burghley to his father. Here he lived, under paternal surveillance, till February 1585–6, when his father, not having found him sufficiently docile, asked and obtained leave to remove him 'to Stamford or some other place.' Whether Browne actually removed is doubtful—since there is proof that later in the year (April 19th, May 5th, June 25th) both he and his wife were three times cited—on a charge of non-attendance at church—in the Bishop of Peterborough's Court by the churchwardens of Little Casterton, the parish in which Tolethorpe Hall is situated.‡‡ The next certain fact is his appointment on November 21st as schoolmaster in St. Olave's Grammar School, Southwark§§—an uneasy situation, which he had vacated before June 20, 1589, when Burghley solicited Howland, Bishop of Peterborough, for his re-admission 'into the ministry' and 'some ecclesiastical preferment,' on the ground that he 'hath now a good time' been an obedient son of the Church.‖‖ Two years later, 'on the

* See *True and Short Declaration*, pt. ii.
† This implies that Browne (as pastor) and Harrison (probably as teacher), etc., were then chosen.
‡ Browne speaks of his 'coming to Norwich, and how the company *there* joined together.'
§ The Independent Church of Richard Fitz (1571) hardly (perhaps) deserves the name, and the next was not formed till 1592, in Nicholas Lane, London.
‖ *True and Short Declaration.*
¶ Freke's letter to Burghley (April 19, 1581), Lansdowne MSS, xxxiii. 13.
** Letter to Freke (April 21, 1581). See Fuller, *Church History*, vol. v. p. 63 (Brown's ed.).

* *True and Short Declaration.*
† Harrison, *A little Treatise upon the first verse of the 122nd Psalm . . .*, 1583, Introduction (Lambeth Library).
‡ *True and Short Declaration.*
§ After Scotland and 'Jersey or Guernsey' had been proproposed and waived aside by Browne (*ib.*).
‖ Some remained behind and still continued as a Church called the 'Elder Sister' (see George Johnson, *Discourse of some Troubles*, 1603).
¶ *True and Short Declaration*, pt iii
** Calderwood, *History of the Kirk of Scotland*, iv. 1–3.
†† See Burrage, *op. cit.* pp. 29–31, 37–39. The 'five points' to which he subscribed practically cover the whole ground of 'conformity'; and imply a thoroughly broken spirit at the time.
‡‡ Burrage, *op. cit.* p. 41.
§§ An exact transcription of the (drastic) terms of his engagement is printed by Burrage, *op. cit.* pp. 44, 45.
‖‖ Lansdowne MSS, cxii. 60.

30th June 1591, Robert Browne, clerk, was admitted and instituted to the rectory of the ecclesiastical parish of Little Casterton in the county of Rutland and diocese of Peterborough'—of which parish his eldest brother, Francis Browne, then occupant of Tolethorpe Hall, was the patron.* Finally, on September 2, 1591, he became 'rector' of the parish of Achurch-cum-Thorpe, Waterville, in Northamptonshire; 'was admitted to the holy orders of deacon and priest' on the 30th of the month;† and here (perhaps excepting one obscure period of ten years) he lived out the remaining forty-two years of his existence. He died in Northampton gaol, and was buried at St. Giles' Church of that town on October 8th, 1633.‡

2. Principles.—Though Browne had receded from some of his extreme views and taken office in the Church he had so bitterly condemned, there is proof§ that he still held to the essentials of his Church theory; and if this be taken as evidence of conscious insincerity, it may be remembered at least, by way of extenuation, that, to quote his own words, he was 'broken . . . much with former troubles,'‖ that the influences brought to bear upon him in his weakness were of exceptional force,¶ and that the limited extent of his 'conformity' seems to have been generally understood.**

Some indication of the principles connoted by the term Brownism has already been given. But a more systematic statement is desirable.

(1) First, then, it should be said that Brownism concerned itself merely with a doctrine of the Church. Theologically, Browne was even severely orthodox†† in the current Calvinistic sense. Equally so were his successors.‡‡

(2) With Protestants generally, of the consistent sort, he accepted the Scriptures as the sole rule of Christian faith and practice—unaffected by the traditions of men, including those of the Early Fathers.

(3) Starting from this basis, he came to the conclusion that the Protestant Churches (particularly the English Church), while Scriptural as to their faith, were far from Scriptural as to their practice. Reformed up to a certain point, the English Church had stopped short of the full Reformation which was demanded if it would correspond to the NT model of a Church. Many even of the more 'forward' Puritans stopped short of this—pleading as a sufficient excuse that the needed reforms were not to be had without concurrence of the civil power, and that till such concurrence was forthcoming they could only 'tarry.' Here Browne took his stand. He thought the evils arising from an imperfect Reformation of the Church so great and pressing, that the very existence of Christianity called for the instant removal of them. Since, too, the will of Christ—made clear in the NT—necessitated their removal, to plead for delay on the ground of a 'Prince's' unwillingness was intolerable disloyalty to Christ. The Prince is supreme in his own sphere, but his sphere is not the Church. He is 'to rule the commonwealth in all outward justice, to maintain the high welfare and honour thereof with outward power, bodily punishment, and civil forcing of men.' He is also to 'look to' the Church so far as 'outward provision and outward justice' are concerned: for it is of his 'charge' 'because it is *in* a commonwealth.' But the Prince has no manner of right to compel the Church to be, or to remain, what Christ forbids. Nay, he has no right directly to 'compel religion' at all, *i.e.* 'to plant churches by power, and to force a submission to ecclesiastical government by laws and penalties.' If a true Church is already established, the Prince either is or is not a member of it. If he is, then—as God is no respecter of persons—he is, like every other member, subject to its discipline. If he is not, and has no mind to further or favour its establishment, then those who are Christ's freemen must proceed without him; and even though he should oppose them to the uttermost, they must go on just the same. Thus it appears that separation from a false Church, or from one persistently corrupt, in order to set up and realize the pure and true, is a right which the Prince dare not withhold, and a duty which the 'faithful' dare not decline.

Such is the pith of Browne's *Treatise of Reformation without tarying for anie*, which he wrote and printed at Middelburg in 1582. Not without reason has it been called* the first plea in English for the Church's independence of the State and essential autocracy. But on the Continent he had been more than anticipated by the Anabaptists;† for, in one respect at least, his plea, as compared with theirs, presents a remarkable limitation, viz. that he seems to permit, if not to oblige, the Prince—after the example of 'the good kings of Juda'—not indeed to 'force the people by laws or by power to receive the (true) Church government,' but yet, when once they had received it, to keep them to it, and even to 'put them to death' if 'then they fall away.' How entirely subversive this might become of his whole position—supposing him serious—Browne did not pause to reflect.

(4) Published at the same date and place, and (in some copies) bound up with the *Treatise*, was a *Catechism* to which the *Treatise* was meant to serve as an introduction. Its title began, 'A booke which sheweth the life and manners of all true Christians . . .,' and if the *Treatise* urged the instant need of proceeding to establish the true Church, this sets forth the character of the Church to be established. In some points it obviously agrees with the Presbyterian ideal, as expounded, *e.g.*, by his contemporary Cartwright. The conception of the sacrament is the same; its permanent officers are the same—Pastor, Teacher, Elders, Deacons, Widows—and also its description of their functions; and it makes the same demand for 'discipline.' But there are notable divergences. Thus the definition‡ of a Church is much more strict—'a companie or number of beleevers which by a willing covenaunt made with their God as under the governement of God and Christ, and keepe his lawes in one holy communion.' Again, it was more democratic. From first to last the people of the Church, as just described, are accounted supreme. This appears (*a*) in the

* Burrage, *op. cit.* p. 65 f. † *Ib.* ‡ *Ib.* p. 72.

§ In a MS of his recently found in the British Museum by Mr. Champlin Burrage, and edited by him for the Congregational Historical Society. It is in the form of a letter to his uncle Mr. Flower, is dated 31st December 1588, and contains the passages quoted by Dr. Bancroft in his famous 'St. Paul's Cross' sermon of the following February.

‖ See the aforesaid MS, where he speaks of having been imprisoned 23 times.

¶ *e.g.* the breakdown of his Church experiment at Middelburg, his bad state of health, his loneliness, the pressure brought to bear upon him at home and by Burghley, etc.

** Bredwell, *e.g.*, assumes this in his *Rasing of the Foundations of Brownism*, 1588.

†† Cf. Questions 2-34 of his *Booke which sheweth the life and manners of all true Christians*, 1582.

‡‡ Cf., *e.g.*, their *Confession of Faith*, 1596.

* See, *e.g.*, Walker, *Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism* (New York, 1893), p. 12.

† *Ib.* for the Anabaptist position; see § 35 of the (Mennonite) Confession quoted by Walker (p. 5). The latter's date is 1609, but it expresses their earliest views. See also pp. 15-17 for possible influence of Anabaptists on Browne. Dexter's opinion seems nearest the truth 'that Browne owed nothing to Anabaptist influences, and that he was a disciple of no one' (*Congregationalism as seen in its Literature*, p. 103).

‡ The first words are—'Christians are a companie. . . .' Browne did not believe that Christians could be such and live apart from Church fellowship.

declared equality of all the members as regards spiritual privilege: 'Everie one of the church is made a Kinge, a Priest, and a Prophet under Christ, to upholde and further the kingdom of God, and to breake and destroie the kingdome of Antichrist and Satan.' (*b*) In the mode of appointing and ordaining officers. These must first be tried by the whole Church as to their 'guiftes and godlines.' If, indeed, a man has already given proof of his 'gifts and godliness' by the right gathering of a church, then those composing that church, or those who afterwards join it, must tacitly receive him 'by obedience' as their 'guide and teacher.' But if a church already planted is in need of any officer, then the free and clear 'consent of the people' 'gathered by the elders or guides' must precede his appointment. (*c*) In the power of the Church as a whole to discipline and even depose unworthy officers. (*d*) In the right of the Church, through its own 'elders or forwardest,' to recognize its officers by ordination 'as called and authorized of God.' Usually this is done 'with prayer and imposition of handes'—but as to the latter it 'is no essential pointe of their calling,' and ought to be left, when it is 'turned into pomp or superstition.' (*e*) In the fact that, while the holding of 'synodes or meetings of sundrie churches' may be expedient, it is voluntary. Their use is to enable the stronger churches to help the weaker in 'deciding or redressing of matters' when such help is sought or when it is evidently needed.*

(5) Brownism, as thus outlined, became the accepted platform of all the early Separatists. Younger leaders like Henry Barrow, John Greenwood, Francis Johnson, and Henry Ainsworth may have varied the emphasis, cleared away ambiguities, or given to this or that principle a more rigorous and detailed application; but, notwithstanding their vehement desire to repudiate† all connexion with Browne or his name, it could not reasonably be denied that he was 'the shop of their store and the steel of their strength.'‡ Proof of this lies to hand in their writings, particularly in a series of authoritative documents which they issued for the chief Separatist Church during the first twenty years of its existence. § Only on one point of importance has there seemed room for doubt, and here the difference between Browne's teaching and that of Barrow seemed great enough to warrant a description of the latter as 'Barrowism.' This point is the eldership and its relation to the Church. According to Dexter, the teaching of Barrow presents the Church as having power to elect the elders, but not to control them or 'seriously limit their action' or remove them from office for any cause whatever. Thus he practically destroyed the Church's self-government, and erected the eldership into 'a ruling oligarchy,' whereas Browne made it a pure democracy.‖ But against this view may be set Barrow's explicit statement of the contrary. 'I never thought,' he says in one place, 'that the practice of Christ's government belonged only to those officers. I rather thought it had been their duty and office to have seen this government faithfully and orderly practised by all the members of the Church, . . . so that if these officers or any of them transgress, *the Church reserveth power to every member freely (according to the quality of the offence and the rules of the word) to admonish and reprove the whole, to censure and excommunicate such officers so offending.*' No less conclusive is the evidence of a document published in 1596 under the title, *A true confession of the faith and humble acknowledgment of the alegeance which wee hir Majesties subjects falsely called Brownists doo hould towards God and yeild to hir Majestie.*' It emanated from the Separatist Church formed in London, 1592, and soon afterwards exiled to Amsterdam. This Church had Francis Johnson for pastor, and Henry Ainsworth for teacher—joint authors of the Confession, and both disciples of Barrow. Thus its words on the point in question may be taken as Barrow's own. But these say decidedly:

'That as every Christian Congregation hath powre and commandement to elect and ordeine their own ministerie according to the rules prescribed, and whilest they shal faithfully execute their office to have them in superaboundant love for their worke sake—to provide for them, to honour them and reverence them, according to the dignitie of the office they execute: so have they also powre and commandement when anie such defalt, either in their lyfe, doctrine or administration breaketh out, as by the rule of the word debarreth them from, or depriveth them of their ministerie, by due order to depose them from the ministerie they exercised; yea, if the case so require and they remayne obstinate and impenitent orderly to cut them off by excommunication.'†

Johnson, it is true, drew off from this position and split the Church by urging a strictly Presbyterian view of the eldership.‡ But a majority of the people adhered to Ainsworth in his strenuous defence of the confessional view—which he calls the Church's 'ancient faith'—and he had also the warm support of John Robinson § with his church at Leyden. A more plausible case of difference between Browne and Barrow seems to lie in their respective ways of speaking about the relation of the Civil Power to the Church. For, while Barrow declares it to be 'the office and duty of Princes and Rulers . . . to suppress and root out of their dominions all religions, worship, and ministries'‖ other than the true, Browne's language is certainly more restrained. But here also the contrast is less in reality than in appearance. One drastic assumption of his has already been noted. And the following from his reply to Mr. Cartwright¶ is not so very far short of Barrow's position:

'If the commonwealth (as it ought) had long ago taken from the ministry those tenths and popish livings, then Jericho being once destroyed (I mean the antichristian churches put down) had not so soon been built again. . . .'

Nor did he show himself (previous to his conformity) less extreme in a third point—his practical attitude towards the establishment. Barrow's attitude is perfectly explicit in the *Confession* of 1596 (Art. 32), which calls upon all who 'will be saved' to come forth with speed from this antichristian estate; upon all its ministers 'to give over and leave' their unlawful offices; and upon all people of what sort or condition soever to withhold their goods, lands, money or money worth

* *Catechism*, questions 55, 118–119, 55–58, 119, 51.

† Cf., *e.g.*, Barrow and Greenwood's outburst during the 'conferences' with London ministers (April 1590). The one says: 'We are no Brownists. We hold not our faith in respect of any mortal man, neither were we instructed by him, or baptized into his name, until by such as you were so termed.' The other says: 'Browne is an apostate, now one of your Church.' Yet it is probable that Greenwood at least had been influenced by Browne (see the writer's *Henry Barrow*, p. 13), and both must have read his writings.

‡ Bredwell, *Rasing the Foundations*, Introd.

§ See end of article.

‖ See Walker, *Creeds and Platforms*, p. 31 f.

* See the present writer's *Henry Barrow* (p. 106) for this and other references. The only argument alleged to the contrary seems to be one drawn from the 'silence' of what is called the London Confession of 1589: 'A true description out of the Word of God of the visible Church.' But the absence of specific reference to the point may be explained by the ideal character of this document. It is a declaration rather than a Confession.

† §§ 23, 24.

‡ He defends it in his latest book, *A Christian Plea . . .* (1617), pp. 306–16. But he had been advocating it since 1609 (see present writer's *Henry Barrow*, pp. 254 ff., 268 ff.).

§ See his *Justification of Separation . . . against Mr. Richard Barnard his invective . . .* (1610), where, *re* the 6th error alleged by Mr. Barnard, he goes into the question with great thoroughness. Johnson replied in his *Answer touching the Division* (1611), p. 27; and Robinson rejoined—at Ainsworth's instance (see the latter's *Animadversion to Mr. Clifton's Advertisement* [1613], pp. 111–117).

‖ Henry Barrow, *Platform*, 1590 (unpaged).

¶ *An answer to Mr. Cartwright his letter . . .*, p. 20.

from the maintenance of its false ministry and worship. Browne's was the same. It is, *e.g.*, the burden of his letter to Mr. Cartwright that you cannot communicate with a false Church without partaking in its pollution; and so neither the true Church as a whole nor any 'part' or 'member' of it ought to communicate.* Perhaps the utmost which can be conceded to him is that he may not have forbidden absolutely a casual 'hearing' even of prelatic ministers or attendance at their services, as did the authors of the *Confession*.†

Brownism of the strictest type — that which pushed its differences‡ from the Church of England to the forefront—found a temporary asylum in Amsterdam and turned out unequal to the test of experience. In Leyden—under the leadership of John Robinson, who at first was as thoroughgoing§ as Barrow or Ainsworth, but became with time increasingly tolerant—it learnt to lay the greater stress on constructive elements;‖ and to develop these in a form of church-life which could bear translation to the shores of New England, and there plant the germs of a vigorous democratic Church-State. In England it ran a somewhat similar course. Stripped of its harshest features, it was accepted from the hands of John Robinson by Henry Jacob (1563?-1624), who 'gathered' at least some of the scattered 'remnants' of the London congregation of 1592 and organized (on a semi-Separatist basis)¶ what has been called the first distinctively Independent Church in England. But the name 'Brownism' did not die out. It lived on as a descriptive or abusive epithet of 'all and sundry' who, for whatever cause, broke away from the National Church. Nor did the extreme views originally suggested by the name cease to win vehement and consistent advocates.** These appear from time to time far down the 17th century.†† Indeed, such advocates have never been absent altogether from the ranks of English Nonconformity. But, on the whole, it may be said that Brownism has survived only on its nobler side; and that its essential witness has been continued and fulfilled in the principles which give life and power to modern Congregationalism.

See also art. CONGREGATIONALISM.

* P. 70 Cf p. 52: 'For the reading ministry is abominable wickedness,' etc., and in *Treatise upon 23 Matt.* § 'against Parish Preacher.'

† And he would not have thought of going Barrow's length in his argument for the total destruction of 'church buildings' which called forth Hooker's stately protest in *Eccles. Polity*, bk. v. ch. 3, pp. 12-17.

‡ See *The Points of Difference*, under 14 heads, published in 1603 (reprinted in Walker, *Creeds and Platforms*, pp. 77-80)

§ The stages are indicated by (*a*) *A Justification of Separation*, 1610, (*b*) *Religious Communion Public and Private*, 1614, (*c*) *A Just and Necessary Apology*, 1625, and (*d*) *A Treatise of the Lawfulness of Hearing Ministers in the Church of England*—printed in 1634 but written some years before.

‖ Cf. the curiously Erastian and studiously negative 'Seven Articles' prepared for submission to the Privy Council in 1618 and signed by Robinson and William Brewster (reprinted by Arber, *Story of the Pilgrim Fathers*, pp. 280-81).

¶ See *A Confession and Protestation of the Faith of Certain Christians in England*, 1616, reprinted in Hanbury, *Historical Memorials relating to Independents*, i. 293 ff.

** See *A Necessitated Appeal Humbly tendered to the High Court of Parliament, by such as are commonly (but unjustly) called Brownists.* Its date is May 1645, and its subscription runs: 'The meanest and unworthiest servants of God the free Churches of Christ resident in and about this city' [London] (Manchester New College Library, Tract No. 55*a*). In the Lambeth Library (40.2.24) is a pamphlet of 1640 entitled 'Information for the Ignorant. . . . Containing a few observations upon 1 Cor. 10, which do strongly prove it to be absolutely sinful to hear the word preached in any false estate or assembly whatsoever.' To which is added (in a P S.) a 'Public challenge made by N.E. to all the Nonconformists or Reformists in Old and New England and Holland in the behalf of the total Separation.'

†† See *More Work for the Dean* (1681), by Thomas Wall, an answer to Stillingfleet's *History, Nature, and Pleas of the Present Separation from the Church of England*, strongly defensive of Barrow, Greenwood, and Peury, whose cause is said to be still that of 'many thousand Protestants' in England.

LITERATURE.—i. *BROWNE'S WRITINGS.*—A list of these so far as known up to April 1906 is printed in Champlin Burrage, *The True Story of Robert Browne* (1906), p. 74 f. The most important are those numbered: (3) *A Booke which sheweth the life and manners of all true Christians*, Middelburg, 1582; (4) *A Treatise of Reformation without tarying for anie*, Middelburg, 1582, reprinted by Congregational Historical Society, 1903; (5) *A Treatise upon the 23 of Matt.*, Middelburg, 1582 or early in 1583 (a satisfactory account of these, with full titles, is given by Burrage, pp. 17-25); (8) *A True and Short Declaration both of the gathering and joyning together of certaine persons: and also of the lamentable breach and division which fell amongst them*, Middelburg, ?1, 1583?; (18) *An Answer to Mr. Cartwright's Letter for joyning with the English Churches*, 1584-85 (?) (MS printed and published at London, before Oct. 7, 1585); (19) *A Reproofe of certaine schismatical persons and their doctrine touching the hearing and preaching of the Word of God* (MS of 31 folio pages, 1588[?], discovered by Burrage at the Lambeth Library in 1905 and since published [London, 1907] as the *Retractation of Robert Browne, Father of Congregationalism*). The schismatical persons are taken to be Henry Barrow, John Greenwood, and their congregation. No doubt is expressed on this point—or any as to its authenticity. But the present writer is not convinced of the latter, at least. (22) *A Letter written to Mr. Flower*, Dec. 31, 1588-89 (MS in the B.M., published at London [Memorial Hall], 1904, under the title *A New Year's Guift*; the printed copy contains a narrative of the finding of the MS by Burrage in 1901).

ii. *BROWNE'S LIFE.*—All previous biographies are superseded by Champlin Burrage, *The True Story of Robert Browne*, Oxford, 1906, together with two papers in *Transactions of the Congregational Historical Society*—'Robert Browne's Ancestors and Descendants' (vol. ii. No. 3) and 'New Facts Relating to Robert Browne' (vol. ii. No. 4)—both by F. Ivas Cater. Dexter's study of Browne, however, in his *Congregationalism of the last three hundred Years, as seen in its Literature* (1879), pp. 61-128, is still valuable.

iii. *EARLY BROWNIST LITERATURE.*—The words of Robert Harrison (d. 1585?), Henry Barrow (1550-1593), John Greenwood (d. 1593), John Peury (1559-1593), Henry Ainsworth (1571-1622), Francis Johnson (1562-1618), John Robinson (1576?-1625), Henry Jacob (1563-1624), for which see Dexter, *Congregationalism of the last three hundred Years* (Bibliography, pp. 8-32), and T. G. Crippen, 'Early Nonconformist Bibliography' in *Transactions of Congregational Historical Society*, vol. i. Nos. 1, 2, 3.

iv. *MODERN LITERATURE.*—Histories of Congregationalism, *passim*, particularly Dexter, *op. cit.*; R. W. Dale, *Hist. of Eng. Congregationalism*, 1907; E. Arber, *Story of the Pilgrim Fathers*, 1897; J. Brown, *Pilgrim Fathers of New England*, 1895; F. J. Powicke, *Henry Barrow*, 1900; W. Walker, *Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism*, 1893; A. Mackennal, *Story of the English Separatists*, 1893, and *Sketches in the Evolution of English Congregationalism*, 1901.

FRED. J. POWICKE.

BRUNO.—1. Life.—Giordano Bruno was born in 1548 in the ancient township of Nola, not far from Naples. At the latter town he studied, and in 1563 he entered the monastery of the Dominican order there as novice. It was at this time that he took the name of Giordano, his original name having been Filippo. In 1572 he became priest. Early in his monastic career charges of heresy had been brought against him, and these were renewed in 1576. Bruno escaped to Rome, and thence, hearing of his excommunication, made his way to North Italy. Earning a livelihood by various means and in various cities, he finally crossed the Alps, and in 1579 reached Geneva. There he attended the Protestant services held by an Italian pastor, and thus became formally a member of the Protestant community, although he does not seem to have entered into full communion or to have adopted the Calvinist confession of faith. A violent dispute with a Professor of Philosophy at the Genevan Academy led to his departure from the city in the autumn of the same year. He passed to Lyons and thence to Toulouse, where for two years he lectured on Aristotle and other subjects, being elected (by vote of the students) to a chair at the University. We next find him at Paris, in one of the Colleges of which he lectured (as extraordinary professor). Here he published two works on the Art of Memory (a subject concerning which he had been interviewed by the king, Henry III.), and a curious comedy, *Il Candelaio*. Apparently he fell into disfavour at the University, and in 1583 he crossed the Channel and came to London. There, after a three months' stay in Oxford, where his reception was the re-

verse of cordial, he took up his abode in the house of the French Ambassador, Mauvissière, probably as a secretary, and remained till 1585, when the Ambassador returned to Paris. During his stay in London, Bruno had some acquaintance with Sir Philip Sidney (to whom he dedicated a number of his writings), Fulke Greville, Florio, and others of the literary men and courtiers of the time. Seven of his most important works, six being written in Italian, were published in London at this period, although false names are usually given on the title-page for the place of publication. These works included the dialogues *La Cena de le Ceneri* (1584), *De la Causa* (1584), *De l'Infinito* (1584), *Spaccio de la Bestia Trionfante* (1584), and *De gli Eroici furori* (1585). At the same time he had already begun the Latin works which were completed in Germany, so that his stay in England represents a period of extraordinary productiveness. With Mauvissière he returned to Paris in October 1585, but was compelled to leave it again in the following summer.

At this time he made an attempt at reconciliation with the Church, his hope being that he might be allowed to return without renewing his monastic obligations. The negotiations were broken off, however, and he made his way to Protestant Germany, settling for another brief period at Luther's city of Wittenberg. Here he associated with the then dominant Lutheran or Reformed Church party, was welcomed by the University, lectured on such subjects as the *Organon* of Aristotle and Lullism—avoiding dangerous topics—and continued his philosophical writings. With the overthrow of the Lutheran by the Calvinist party in 1588 he was compelled once more 'to take to the road.' With varying fortunes he visited Prague, Helmstadt, Frankfort, Zürich, and again Frankfort, where he remained from March 1591 till a fatal chance led him to Italy in the autumn of the same year. During this period he published various works: the *120 Theses adv. Peripateticos* (Paris, and also Wittenberg), the *Oratio Valedictoria* at Wittenberg, the *Oratio Consolatoria*, or Funeral Address on Duke Julius, at Helmstadt, and two mathematical writings at Prague. The Latin poems (with prose commentaries), which contain the sum and final statement of his philosophy, the *De Minimo*, *De Monade*, and the *De Immenso*, were published at Frankfort along with a mnemonic work, the *De Imaginum Compositione*, in 1591. In response to an invitation of the patrician Mocenigo, who wished to learn his art of memory and his supposed magical powers, Bruno re-entered Italy in August 1591.

He was again anxious to be reconciled to the Roman Church, and to be allowed to live and write at peace as a layman, being curiously unconscious of the reputation his writings had built up for him. No doubt he trusted also to Mocenigo's influence for protection. In May 1592, Mocenigo, who had not obtained the secret knowledge he expected, denounced him to the Inquisition at Venice. In the process that followed Bruno at one point made solemn abjuration of all errors and heresies of which he had been guilty, and later made entire submission, throwing himself on the mercy of the court. Meantime, however, Rome had intervened, demanding that the heretic be sent to the Papal court. For political reasons Venice yielded, after considerable dispute and under strong pressure; and in February of 1593, Bruno entered the prison of the Inquisition at Rome. For some unknown reason no further steps were taken till January 1599—a most unusual delay. The process was then renewed and carried on to December of that year; but the unfortunate man, refusing to recant any of his philosophical opinions, or to acknowledge the right of the Church to dictate in matters of philosophy, was condemned to death in the usual cynical formula, and, on 17th Feb. 1600, was publicly burnt alive in the Campo dei Fiori, where the statue by Ferrari now stands. Bruno suffered not for the Protestant religion or indeed for any form of religion, but for Science, and for the freedom of the scientific spirit from the Church.

2. Works.—Apart from the comedy of *Il Candelaio*, and one or two occasional works such as the Orations at Wittenberg and at Helmstadt, Bruno's works fall into three groups, viz. (1) commentaries and summaries; (2) works on the Art of Memory and the Art of Knowledge; (3) philosophical works.

(1) The first group includes expository and critical accounts of Aristotle's *Physics*, the posthumous collections *De Magia*, the *Medicina Lulliana*, and perhaps a number of the accounts of the Lullian Art of Knowing. (2) Such works as the *De Compendiosa Architectura* (1582), the *Lampas Combinatoria* (1587), and the posthumous *Lampas Triginta Statuarum* present in various forms a scheme, based on the writings of Raymond Lully (13th cent.), for the analysis of thought, and its reduction to a few elementary concepts, from which, with their combinations, all possible knowledge might be discovered, retained, and imparted. Leibniz also, and others after him, devoted some attention to this idea of a Universal Art of knowing or discovering truth by thought alone, or, more strictly, by the manipulation of words. Along with these works may be placed the *De Umbris Idearum* (1582), *Cantus Circaeus*, *Sigillus Sigillorum* (1583), and other works on the Psychology and supposed Art of Memory, upon which Bruno laid great stress, but to which the familiar criticism applies, that what is good is old, and what is new is worthless. (3) The main philosophical works, Italian and Latin, have been enumerated above under their short titles; there remains to be added only the *Summa Terminorum Metaphysicorum* (1609, the first part having been previously published by itself in 1595). The *Cena* introduces us to the Copernican theory of the universe, and Bruno's extension of it; the *Causa* gives the metaphysical basis; the *Infinito* places the new cosmology in a fuller light, and criticizes the prevailing theory and its Aristotelian origins; the *Spaccio* and *Cabala* (1584) deal with the ethics and religion of the common man; while the *Eroici furori* give those of the speculative philosopher, imbued with the true *amor Dei intellectualis*. Finally, in the Latin poems the system receives unity and finish; its relations with, and its advantages over, previous theories are expressed in clear and dignified, if not inspired, verse. There is no doubt also that in these later works Bruno comes nearer to a spiritual Monadism such as that of Leibniz, while in the earlier writings he teaches rather a Pantheism of a Neo-Platonic type.

Bruno has been called the Philosopher of Astronomy (Riehl, p. 28). What is new in his teaching is his whole-souled adoption of the theory of the universe foreshadowed by Copernicus, and already in Bruno's time being established by the astronomical discoveries and calculations of Tycho Brahe, Kepler, Galileo, and others. Early in his studies he became dissatisfied with the prevailing philosophy of the Church,—Aristotelianism,—and turned with fresh interest to the cosmic speculations of the pre-Aristotelian thinkers, and to the mystical imaginations of the Neo-Platonists. These, with the Scholastics, orthodox and unorthodox, the alchemists, the astrologers, and finally Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa, last of the

Mediævals and first of the Moderns, were the chief influences that determined Bruno's thought, and gave his philosophy its strange confusion of old and new, of crass superstition and daring speculation, of dull pedantry and vivacious originality, of ignorant folly and supreme insight.

(*a*) *The physical universe.*—The universe is infinite, without bounds, everywhere the same in nature or kind, everywhere diverse in its individual forms or modes. Its centre is at once everywhere and nowhere; it is all centre or all circumference; or again its centre is relative to the spectator; thus to us the earth appears the pivot about which the universe revolves, but in precisely the same way, said Bruno, the inhabitant of the moon would regard the moon, and the inhabitant of the sun the sun, as the centre of his world. Each sun, each star, each planet is a world like our earth, with living beings in its air, on its soil, in its fire and its waters; but the worlds are of two kinds, each complementary to each, each necessary to the other's existence; the two kinds are the suns, including the fixed stars, and the earths or planets, including the comets. The latter revolve about the former, as the earth about the sun, but the suns themselves are also in motion. Nowhere is there any permanence or fixity in Nature; all these worlds are alive, are living beings, and the condition of life is change. Permeating the whole universe is the ether, which Bruno thought of as a formless fluid, a passive, yielding, yet unchangeable, medium through which light, heat, and bodies pass without loss of force. Underlying all movement, small or great, is spirit or soul; all things have soul; the ether itself Bruno sometimes identifies with the Soul of the Universe. Again, since Nature is everywhere the same, everything is implicitly or potentially the whole universe; and what it is implicitly it strives to become explicitly or in actuality. Thus every *element* passes, in the course of its history, through every portion of the universe, and every *composite being* becomes, by gradual change, every other nature or thing. Thus suns and earths, like all other beings, have had a beginning in time and will decay and perish in time. Nature never repeats herself; that is, there are never at a given moment of time two forms or things exactly alike, and nothing is ever for two successive moments the same: nowhere is there a perfectly straight line or a perfect circle or arc of a circle. There are three kinds of monads, *i.e.* of simple substances or elements, according to Bruno: (1) God, the Supreme Unity, Monad of Monads; (2) the soul, the substance or spirit of the composite body; and (3) the atom, the simple element of body or matter. All are immortal, each soul passing, as has been said, through every type of body the universe contains. In this metempsychosis there is, however, a possibility of progress; the soul has it in its power to rise gradually to higher and higher types of being, until it approaches unity with God and is absorbed into the eternal life of the Divine being.

(*b*) *God and Nature.*—Relatively to us God has two modes of existence and two ways of access. As a transcendent Being, outside of and prior to the universe, its Creator and Source, He is accessible only to faith through revelation; He cannot be approached by reason or by thought. As an immanent Being, the soul, spirit, or inner nature of the universe, which is His image or expression, He is knowable by sense, understanding, and reason in gradual approximation. As the soul of the universe He is in all and every part; all things are one, and the one is God. Indeed, in the earlier phase of Bruno's Pantheism the individual or finite being has no real existence at all; it is not a part or a division or even a special mode or expression of the Divine or world-soul; it is simply the world-soul itself in a particular aspect. Again, in the infinite (*sub specie aeternitatis*, in Spinoza's phrase), there is neither less nor greater; a man is no higher, no nearer God than an ant, a star than a man; all values are relative to the finite standpoint. In the Infinite, as Nicolaus of Cusa taught, all opposites, including good and evil, coincide; liberty and necessity, the possible and the actual, power and will, will and thought or idea, all these in God are one. Hence the universe that exists is the *only possible* universe, and because it exists it is also a *perfect* universe. But again Bruno's maturer thought compelled him to recognize gradations in value, in spite of himself. In law, natural and moral, in the beauty and order of Nature, God is more fully, more adequately, expressed than in any single being or individual thing (*Op. Lat.* i. 2, p. 316).

(*c*) *Ethics and religion.*—The end and aim of a Church is the same as that of a State; it is social and practical—the security of the community, the prosperity and well-doing of its members. Dissension and strife are dangerous to the State, hence the need of an authoritative doctrine, and the enforcement of its acceptance and of outward conformity with it; but the Church has no right to go further, to interfere with the pursuit of knowledge, of truth, which is the object of philosophy or science. Thus the Bible teaches not science but morality, an ideal of conduct. No discovery therefore may be condemned because it conflicts with a supposed statement of fact in the Bible. God does not need the worship of men, He cares nothing for what they say or think of Himself, but only for what they do to each other, *i.e.* for their happiness. Thus all worship, all religion has a purely practical and human end. The ordinary man must be governed by authority, by fear of punishment, whether in this life or in the next; ignorance and bodily pleasures are his paradise. He must live by faith. But the wise or heroic soul is able to attain, through reason, and through the love with which it is inspired, to the knowledge of and to eternal union with the Divine. Thus Bruno comes in the end to the same conception as that with which Spinoza concluded his Ethics—the *amor Dei intellectualis*. His philosophy of religion is a rationalism, but limited always by a belief in the Transcendence of God, by which the sphere of faith is separated from that of reason, and indeed remains, as Bruno sometimes saw, above it.

3. Influence.—Although his writings were placed upon the Index in 1603 and became very scarce, and although in his lifetime he aroused antagonism wherever he went, Bruno nevertheless had many followers in England, in France, and in Germany. No doubt his Lullian works formed the first attraction, but through them his philosophical ideas received an entrance into current thought. The influence was general rather than special; the courage, independence, and enthusiasm with which he defended the new and lofty conception of the universe and of Nature in its relation to God made themselves felt and were imitated. Traces of his teaching may be found in Bacon, in Descartes, and above all in Spinoza and Leibniz, with both of whom he has many doctrines in common. Except, however, for the somewhat mistaken admiration of the English Deists, he was generally neglected until the German idealists re-discovered him in the first half of the 19th century. Ample amends has now been made by his countrymen in the study of his writings, their careful editing, and complete publication; and a multitude of monographs upon his life and phil-

osophy have appeared during the last thirty years in various languages.

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J. L. M'INTYRE.

BRYANITES.—See METHODISM.

BUDDHA, LIFE OF THE.—Gautama, the Buddha (Pāli *Gotama*), the founder of the Buddhist faith, which at one time numbered in all probability more adherents than any other form of religious belief, was born in or about the year 560 B.C., in the Lumbini Grove, near the ancient town of Kapilavastu, the ruins of which lie hidden beyond the British border in the dense *tarai* region of south Nepāl, a few miles north of the Basti District of the United Provinces. The place of his birth, unknown and unidentified before, was determined by the discovery, in the year 1895, of a pillar erected there by the Buddhist Emperor Aśoka (*q.v.*) during a pilgrimage which he undertook for the purpose of visiting and worshipping at the chief sites made sacred by the presence and acts of the Buddha while he lived upon earth. The route which he followed led him from his capital city of Pāṭaliputra (Patna [*q.v.*]) to the Lumbini Grove and Kapilavastu, Bodh Gayā, Sārnāth, near Benares, Śrāvasti, Kuśanagara, and other sacred sites, the exact position of some of which is still uncertain; and at each place he appears to have set up a pillar or built a *stūpa* commemorative of his visit and of the incident in the Buddha's life of which it had been the scene. The inscription on the Lumbini Grove pillar is perfect, and the letters as clear and legible as on the day they were inscribed; of a few words, however, the meaning is uncertain:

'The king Devānampiya-Piyadassi, when he was twenty-years-anointed, did [*this place*] the honour of coming [*here*] in person. Because Buddha was born here, the Sakya saint, he caused a stone surrounding and screening wall to be made, and a stone pillar to be set up. Because the Blessed One was born here, he made the village Lummini free of rent and entitled to the [*king's*] eighth share [*of the grain*].'*

The name *Gautama*, by which the future Buddha was known, is perhaps derived from that of Gotama, the ancient *ṛṣi*, or seer, to whom are ascribed some of the hymns of the Rigveda. He becomes *buddha*, or *the Buddha*, the 'enlightened' or 'wise,' only after his attainment of perfect wisdom under the Bo-tree. Other titles given to him are *Śākyamuni*, 'the sage of the Śākyas'; *Siddhārtha*, 'he who has accomplished his aim'; and *Tathāgata*, 'he who has arrived at the truth.' His father was named Śuddhodana, the chieftain or prince of a Śākya clan, who ruled from Kapilavastu over a small kingdom in the N.E. part of the United Provinces and the neighbouring District of southern Nepāl; and his mother, Māyā or Mahāmāyā, is said to have conceived him after a dream in which she beheld the future Buddha descending from the heaven, and entering her womb in the form of a white elephant. Hence the elephant is sacred to all Buddhists. Māyā herself, according to the tradition, died within seven days after the birth of her son, and was carried to the *Trayastriṁśa* heaven of Indra, whither the Buddha himself ascended later, to give her instruction in the Law.*

In the *Jātaka* (*q.v.*) the story of the life and experiences of the Buddha in his earlier existences is narrated, and how the characteristics and perfections of a Buddha were exhibited by him in patience, self-sacrifice, and the other virtues. As the time drew nigh for him to enter the world in this the final birth, the gods themselves prepared the way before him with celestial portents and signs. 'Earthquakes and miracles of healing took place; flowers bloomed and gentle rains fell, although out of season; heavenly music was heard, delicious scents filled the air, and the very water of the ocean lost its saltness and became sweet and refreshing.' Before his birth also the prophecy was uttered concerning him, that he would become either a Universal Monarch (*chakravartin*), or, abandoning house and home, would assume the robe of a monk, and become a Buddha, perfectly enlightened, for the salvation of mankind; and he himself, in the *Tuṣita* heaven, before consenting to undertake the office, makes the 'five great observations,' in order to determine the right family in which to be born, the right continent,† the appropriate district,‡ the proper time, and the predestined mother of the Buddha. He is accordingly conceived in the womb of Queen Mahāmāyā, and she is delivered of a son in the Lumbini Grove, under the shade of a Śāl-tree, a branch of which bends down to her, that she may grasp it with her hand. The body of the child bore at birth the thirty-two auspicious marks (*mahāvyañjana*) which indicated his future greatness, besides secondary marks (*anuvyañjana*) in large numbers. The chief of the divinities, including Indra, were in attendance, and the boy was received by four Brahma angels. Immediately also he uttered the 'shout of victory,'§ taking seven steps forward, and finding in none of the ten directions a being equal to himself. At the same moment his future wife was born, and also the sacred Bo-tree, under which he was destined to attain Buddhahood.

In many of the legends the young Gautama performs marvellous feats of strength. His father also, mindful of the prophecy that he would retire from the world, surrounded him with all manner of luxury and indulgence, in order to retain his affections, and prevent him from undertaking a vow of solitariness and poverty. In particular, he endeavoured to keep from him the 'four signs,' the sight of which, it had been announced, would move him to enter upon the ascetic life.

'Then said the king, "What shall my son see to make him retire from the world?"
"The four signs."
"What four?"

* The translation is that of J. F. Fleet in *JRAS*, 1908, p. 486; cf. p. 823, and *ib.* 1909, p. 760 ff.; V. A. Smith, in *IA* xxxiv. [1905], p. 4, gives a rendering that differs only in details. For a facsimile and transcription see G. Bühler, *Epigr. Ind.* v.; V. A. Smith, *Aśoka* (1901), p. 145, etc. Earlier articles and discussions will be found in *JRAS*, 1897, *et al.*, and in the references in V. A. Smith, *op. cit.* Not far from the Lumbini (Rummindei) pillar there was found, near the village of Nigliva, a second pillar of Aśoka, with an imperfect inscription recording his visit to the *stūpa* of Koṇāgamana (Skr. *Kanakamuni*), one of the four Buddhas of the present age (Kakusandha, Koṇāgamana, Kassapa, and Gautama himself; Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 32 *et al.*; V. A. Smith, *op. cit.* p. 145). Other pillar-inscriptions are known; see art. AŚOKA.

* Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, p. 80 f.; Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 42 ff. The story of the virginity of Māyā, the mother of the Buddha, is late, and owes its inspiration, it can hardly be doubted, to Christian sources. According to L. de la Vallée Poussin, the doctrine is asserted in the *Mahāvastu* (*q.v.*) but not elsewhere (cf. above, p. 741[b] and note ‡).

† 'In three of the continents the Buddhas are never born; only in the continent of India are they born.'

‡ *Madyadeśa*, the Middle Country.

§ In two of his previous existences the Buddha is said to have spoken at birth—the *Mahosadha* and *Vessantara* existences (see *Jātaka*, i. 53, quoted in Warren, p. 47). The ten directions are the zenith and nadir, with the four cardinal and the four intermediate points.

"A decrepit old man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk."

"From this time forth," said the king, "let no such persons be allowed to come near my son. It will never do for my son to become a Buddha. What I would wish to see is my son exercising sovereign rule and authority over the four great continents and the two thousand attendant isles, and walking through the heavens surrounded by a retinue thirty-six leagues in circumference" And when he had so spoken he placed guards for a distance of a quarter of a league in each of the four directions, in order that none of these four kinds of men might come within sight of his son.'*

On successive occasions, however, issuing from the palace, he is confronted by the four signs the sight of which fills him with amazement and distress; and, realizing the impermanence of all earthly things, he determines to forsake his home and take refuge in the forest for solitary meditation, and 'to obtain the highest immortality.' His resolution is strengthened by the appearance of the attendant women of the palace, whom he finds asleep in all manner of uncomely attitudes;† and he pays a final visit to his wife and child in the inner chamber, checking himself in his desire to waken and bid them farewell, lest their entreaties and caresses should avail to turn him from his fixed purpose. He is said to have been twenty-nine years old when he thus made the 'Great Renunciation.' On his horse Kaṇṭhaka he left the city by night, and miraculous signs accompanied his departure, in the same manner as when he had been born. The gods themselves silenced the neighing of his steed, lest the city and its warders should be aroused; and bore up the horse's hoofs, preventing them from touching the ground; while the city gates, heavy with bolts and bars, opened noiselessly to him of their own accord.‡ And Māra, the prince of evil, sought to win him back by the promise of universal dominion, which he should immediately obtain.

On the further side of a broad stream Gautama dismissed his horse and attendant, the latter seeking permission, which was refused, to remain with him;§ and the two returned to the city, to announce that their master had finally and for ever renounced the world. The prince himself proceeded alone and on foot to Rājagriha (Rājgir), whose king greeted him as the future Buddha, and obtained from him a promise that, after gaining enlightenment, he would re-visit his kingdom and give him instruction in the right knowledge. Thence he made his way to Uruvelā (Skr. *Urubilvā*, the great or wide-spreading Bel-tree, the wood-apple), a village or grove near Gayā, and there in the company of five ascetics entered upon a course of extreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length that his body became utterly emaciated and lost all its brightness and grace; finally, he fell down senseless and was believed to be dead. For six years the 'Great Struggle' continued, at the close of which, becoming convinced that the truth was not to be won by the way of asceticism, he resumed an ordinary course of life as a beggar living on alms. These six years are said to be 'like time spent in endeavouring to tie the air into knots.' His companions, however, the five ascetics, now deserted him, because they regarded his action as a proof of faithlessness to his principles, and departed to the Deer-Park at Benares.

There followed the assaults of Māra, who with his hosts endeavoured by every means, first by violence and then by varied allurements, to distract his attention and turn him from his purpose. Seated under the Bo-tree on a couch or platform of grass, on its eastern side and facing the east, Gautama remained steadfast and immovable, taking no notice of the showers of rocks and darts which, as soon as they reached him, turned into flowers. Here he resolved to remain — 'Never from this seat will I stir, until I have attained the supreme and absolute wisdom.' The period of the temptation closed with sunset, when the army of Māra was finally driven off in utter defeat. During the following night, in deepest meditation, the desired knowledge and the perfect state were attained, and Gautama became *Buddha*, 'the enlightened one,' to whom all the secrets of the universe were laid open—omniscient.

'A legend relates that in the first night-watch he gained a knowledge of all his previous existences; in the second, of all present states of being; in the third, of the chain of causes and effects; and at the dawn of day he knew all things.'*

During the seven weeks spent under the Bo-tree, he is said to have been miraculously sustained on an offering of milk-rice, brought to him by a woman of Uruvelā, named Sujātā, and neither to have moved from his place nor to have taken any further nourishment. Until this time he had been merely a *Bodhisattva* (*q.v.*), one who is destined to gain supreme wisdom, on the way to Buddhahood but not yet perfectly enlightened.

For a discussion of the doctrine or truth which the Buddha thus believed himself to have grasped, and which he made it his business henceforth to preach, see art HĪNAYĀNA. 'All existence involves suffering; suffering is caused by desire, especially the desire for continuance of existence; the suppression of desire therefore will lead to the extinction of suffering; this deliverance can only be effected by the Noble Eight-fold Path.' These are the *āryasatyāni*, or Noble Truths, the four terms of which are *duḥkha*, 'pain'; *samudaya*, 'cause'; *nirodha*, 'suppression'; *mārga*, 'way' or 'path.' The same four truths or axioms are propounded in the Sāṅkhya philosophy (*Mahāvagga*, I. vi. 19; *SBE* xiii. 95 f., etc.; see also R. Garbe, *Sāṅkhya und Yoga*, Strassburg, 1896, p. 18, and art. SĀṄKHYA).

With regard to the events immediately succeeding the Buddha's attainment of omniscience, the traditions are more than usually divergent. That which is perhaps the best attested, and most generally finds expression in Buddhist art, represents him as spending in succession seven days under the Bo-tree, in deep meditation, 'enjoying the bliss of emancipation'; the same period under the 'Goat-herd's Banyan' (*ajapāla*), where a Brāhman is said to have approached him with the request that he would define the characteristics of a true Brāhman; the Buddha replied that he only could justly claim the name who was 'free from pride, free from impurity, self-restrained, wise, and who has fulfilled the requirements of holiness.' A third week was spent under the *Muchalinda*-tree, from beneath which Muchalinda, the serpent-king, came forth, and spread his hood as a canopy over the Buddha to protect him from the wind and heat, the storm-cloud and the rain; and, finally, a fourth period of equal duration was spent under the *Rājāyatana*-tree, whence he returned to the Banyan. Thus were completed four periods of seven days. During the last week, two merchants, moved by a divine suggestion, approached the Buddha, and with respectful salutations offered him food, rice-cakes, and honey. The gift was accepted, and received in a bowl (or four bowls of stone), presented to him at the moment by the four divinities that guard the four quarters of the globe.† The merchants declared their faith in the Buddha and his Law,‡ and begged to be received as disciples. Their request was granted, and they thus became the earliest lay-disciples in Buddhism.

After his return the Buddha is represented as

* *Jātaka*, i. 56, in Warren, p. 53. The story of the four signs recurs in all the narratives of the Buddha's early years (cf. *e.g. Buddha-Charita*, bk. III.). It would seem to be one of the best-attested of the early traditions, as it is most characteristic.

† Cf. the description of Hanuman's visit by night to the palace of Rāvaṇa in Ceylon, finding his wives asleep (*Rāmāyaṇa*, v. 10); and the similar story of the noble Yasa (*Mahāvagga* i. 7).

‡ *Buddha-Charita*, v. 80 ff., etc.

§ According to one form of the tradition, the horse died of grief on the spot, and was re-born as a god in the *trayastriṁśa* heaven.

* Monier-Williams, *Buddhism*, p. 34; cf. Warren, p. 82.

† *Mahāvagga*, i. 2-4; cf. Warren, p. 83 ff.

‡ Employing the 'two-refuge' formula, because the *saṅgha*, the order of monks, was not yet instituted.

debating in his mind whether he should undertake the wearisome and thankless task of communicating to men the profound truths which he had thus perceived. Brahmā appeared to him, and with reverential obeisance recalled him to high office and duty, reminding him of the misery and ignorance of mankind, who, if they do not hear the doctrine preached, cannot attain to salvation. The Buddha assented; but a further doubt arose to whom he should first proclaim his doctrine with the assurance that they would understand. He decided that the five ascetics with whom he had previously lived in the practice of austerities should be the first to receive the new teaching. He therefore sought them out in the Deer-Park, *Isipatana*, at Benares, and to them delivered his first sermon, or brief exposition of doctrine, 'setting in motion the wheel of the Law,'* and founding 'the highest kingdom of truth.' The *bhikṣus* accepted the truth, and at their own request were duly ordained, becoming the first members of the Buddhist Order (*saṅgha*) of monks.

The number of the disciples rapidly increased; and Gautama sent forth his monks on missionary tours hither and thither, bidding them wander everywhere, preaching the doctrine (*dharma*), and teaching men to order their lives with self-restraint, simplicity, and chastity. Of these, his earliest converts, two of the most renowned were Sāriputta and Moggallāna (*Maudgalyāyana*), members of an ascetic community resident at that time at Rājagṛiha, who received the truth from the lips of the monk Assaji, one of the five original disciples; he taught them the substance of Buddhist doctrine, explaining that he himself, being only a novice, was unable to expound it at length.

'Of laws or principles that originate from a cause, the cause of these the Buddha hath declared, and also the destruction of them. Thus the great Teacher (Monk) hath spoken.†

The recitation of these words by the venerable monk Assaji is said to have aroused in the mind of the hearers a clear understanding of the fact that 'whatever is subject to origination is subject also to cessation or destruction.'‡ They were thereupon admitted into the Order by the Buddha himself. Both are recorded to have died before their Master. Other disciples, whose names and actions fill a large place in the early chronicles, were Upāli, who recited the text of the *Vinaya* at the first Council after the Buddha's death; Kāśyapa (Kassapa) or Mahā-Kāśyapa, the president of the Council, for whose coming the cremation of the body of the Buddha was delayed; and Ānanda (*q.v.*), his cousin and favourite attendant, who seems to have watched over him during life with closest care, and to have been nearest to him at death. Others of high birth became lay-disciples. And there were also female followers, who, later, were permitted to form themselves into an Order of Buddhist nuns (see art. MONASTICISM [Buddhist]).

Thereafter the Buddha spent a life prolonged, according to the tradition, over forty-five years, in itinerating from place to place, and preaching the doctrine to all who would listen. The details of his journeyings, as recorded in the chronicles, are not of much interest; they seem to have been confined mainly to the kingdom of Magadha,* and especially the country around Rājagṛiha and Śrāvastī;† but are traditionally said to have extended also far into the north-west of India and the Panjāb. During the whole of this period he appears to have had no settled dwelling-place, although gifts of land and buildings were made to him by wealthy disciples; the most extensive and important of these apparently were the Jetavana park and monastery at Śrāvastī—the gift of Sudatta or Anāthapiṇḍika, who bought it from Jeta, the king's son, at the cost of covering the ground with gold pieces. Jeta retained a portion, and built thereon a *vihāra* for the monks; whence the whole estate was known as *Jetavana*, the grove or park of Jeta. In the rainy season (*Vassa* [*q.v.*]) it was his wont to abstain from travelling, ostensibly lest the animal and insect life which then abounded should be inadvertently injured or destroyed; but partly also, no doubt, because of the physical difficulty which the heavy rains placed in the way of much movement.‡ The doctrines which he taught seem generally to have been received with approval, often with enthusiasm, although opposition was at times aroused. His chief rival was Devadatta, a cousin of the Buddha, who is represented as being jealous of his influence and popularity, and as repeatedly seeking to compass his death. Devadatta had been received into the Order at the time of a visit which Gautama paid to Kapilavastu in the sixth year of his ministry, but had never been a sincere believer. The final attempt which he made to poison the Buddha was frustrated, and he himself, for making a false profession of faith, fell down into hell, where he was condemned to remain for an entire world-cycle.

At the age of over eighty years, according to the tradition, at the close of a long life devoted to teaching and preaching, Gautama Buddha realized that the time drew near for him to die, to leave his disciples and his work, and to attain *parinirvāṇa*,§ final or perfect *nirvāṇa*.

The authoritative account of the death of the Buddha, as related by the Southern School of Buddhism, is contained in the *Mahā-Parinibbāna Sutta* of the *Dīgha-Nikāya*, the 'Book of the Great Decease,' translated by T. W. Rhys Davids in *SBE*, vol. xi.; Warren, pp. 95–110. See art. LITERATURE (Buddhist). The narrative from Tibetan sources is given by W. W. Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, pp. 132–147. The date of his death has been discussed at great length, and by many scholars. The Sinhalese reckoning, representing the tradition of the South, places the event in the year 544 or 543 B.C.; but it seems certain that this is too early. More than fifty years ago, Sir A. Cunningham (*Bhilsa Topes*, London, 1854), from a full consideration of all the available data, gave his decision for the year 477 B.C. Prof. Max Muller arrived at the same conclusion (*SBE* x.[2] p. xliii ff.; *History of Sanskrit Literature*[2], pp. 262 ff., 299), which was endorsed by Dr. Buhler. Others, as Westergaard and Kern, bring the time of his death down to a considerably later period, *c.* 370 B.C. The most recent essay in favour of a yet earlier date is by the Indian scholar P. C. Mukherji, who argues for the early part of the 6th century (see review in *JRAS*, 1900, p. 568 ff.). There can be little doubt that Sir A. Cunningham's date is very near to the truth. Dr. Fleet re-examines the whole question with great care in *JRAS*, 1909, pp. 1–34, endeavouring to determine the precise day of the year on which the Buddha died, which he concludes to have been Oct. 13th, 483 B.C. Cf. also M. de Zilva Wickremasinghe in *Epigr. Zeylanica*, i. 142 n. 7, 156 f.

Accompanied by Ānanda, the Buddha then came

* *Dharmachakrapravartana* (Pāli *Dhammachakkappavattana*); see *SBE* xiii. 94 ff., and the references there given; Kern, *Indian Buddhism*, p. 23. The wheel is a continually recurring symbol in Buddhist art; the original intention probably was to represent as well the perfection of the doctrine, the circle denoting all-rounded completeness, as its unceasing, unresting progression. The sermon itself, as given in the texts, is a manifesto of Buddhist doctrine, inculcating the avoidance of the two extremes of a life of sensual pleasure or of ascetic self-mortification, and urging the pursuit of the 'Middle Path' which leads to insight, supreme wisdom, and nirvāna.

† *Ye dharmā hetu-prabhavā hetum teṣām Tathāgataḥ hy avadat teṣāñcha yo nirodha evaṁ-vādī Mahāśramanaḥ*—the Buddhist creed or confession of faith. (*Cf. SBE* xiii. 144 ff.; Kern, p. 25; Warren, pp. 87-91.)

‡ *Mahāv.* i. 23; cf. Warren, p. 87 ff.

* Beal, *Siyuki*, ii. 82 ff.; cf art MAGADHA

† Legge, *Fā-Hien*, p. 55 ff.; Beal, *op. cit.* ii. 1 ff. The site of Śrāvastī was identified by Cunningham with Sahet Mahet, in the Gonda District of the United Provinces, and this identification has been confirmed by recent discoveries (see *JRAS*, 1908, pp. 971 ff., 1098 f., 1909, p. 1061 ff.; *IGI*, *s.v.*). There is a description of Śrāvastī from Sinhalese sources in W. Geiger, *Liter. u. Sprache d. Singhalesen*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 14 f.

‡ Vassa was also observed by the Jainas, and in this respect apparently both sects followed the earlier practice of the Hindu monastic orders.

§ Pāli *parinibbāna*, see art. NIRVĀṆA; *nirvāṇa* is a state attainable and attained during life, and was enjoyed by the Buddha himself and by many Buddhist saints; *parinirvāna* is reached only at death, with the dissolution of the bodily frame.

to the *Śāla*-tree grove *Upavartana* at Kuśanagara,* in the country of the Mallas. There, by his direction, a couch was spread between two *Śāla*-trees, with its head to the north, on which he lay down 'on the right side after the manner of a lion, and placing foot on foot remained mindful and conscious.'† The trees bloomed out of season, and scattered their flowers on him as he lay. His last hours were spent in giving counsels and directions to Ānanda and the assembled monks. Subhadra also, a wandering ascetic, was admitted to his presence, listened to his teaching, and was converted, thus becoming 'the last disciple made by the Blessed One himself.' Finally, he invited his disciples to state any doubt or difficulty felt by them with regard to the teaching of the Buddha or the rules of the Order, that he might remove it; and bade them regard his Doctrine and Discipline as their teacher after he was gone. Three times the question was repeated:

'"It may be, brethren, that some brother has a doubt or perplexity respecting either the Buddha or the Doctrine or the Order or the Path or the course of conduct. Ask any question, brethren, and do not have to reproach yourselves afterwards with the thought, Our Teacher was present with us, but we failed to ask him all our questions."

And when he had thus spoken the brethren were silent.

. . . . . .

"It may be, brethren, that it is out of respect to the Teacher that ye ask no questions. Then let each one speak to his friend."

And when he had thus spoken the brethren were silent.

Then the venerable Ānanda spake to the Blessed One:

"How wonderful a thing it is, Reverend Sir, and how marvellous! Verily, I believe that in this whole assembly of the brethren there is not one brother who has any doubt or perplexity respecting the Buddha or the Doctrine or the Order or the Path or the course of conduct."

"With you, Ānanda, it is a matter of faith, when you say that; but with the Tathāgata, Ānanda, it is a matter of knowledge that in this whole assembly of the brethren there is not one brother who has any doubt or perplexity respecting either the Buddha or the Doctrine or the Order or the Path or the course of conduct. For of all these five hundred brethren, Ānanda, even the most backward has become converted, and is no longer liable to be born in a state of suffering, but is assured of final salvation."

Then the Blessed One addressed the brethren:

"And now, brethren, I take my leave of you; all the constituents of being are transitory; work out your salvation with diligence."

This was the last word of the Tathāgata.

Thereupon the Blessed One entered the first trance (*dhyāna*); and rising from the first trance, he entered the second trance; and rising from the second trance, he entered the third trance; and rising from the third trance, he entered the fourth trance; and rising from the fourth trance, he entered the realm of the infinity of space; and rising from the realm of the infinity of space, he entered the realm of the infinity of consciousness; and rising from the realm of the infinity of consciousness, he entered the realm of nothingness; and rising from the realm of nothingness, he entered the realm of neither perception nor non-perception; and rising from the realm of neither perception nor non-perception, he arrived at the cessation of perception and sensation.'‡

The same process is then repeated in reverse order until the first trance is again reached. Thence he passes successively to the second, third, and fourth. And at the close it is said:

'And rising from the fourth trance, immediately the Blessed One passed into Nirvāṇa.'

In the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism a mystical doctrine of three bodies (*kāya*) of the Tathāgata is taught—the *dharmakāya*, or body of the Law, *sambhogakāya*, or body of perfect bliss, *nirmāṇakāya*, the illusory or apparitional body. The first is said to be discernible in the whole air of the Tathāgata, the second in the whole air of a Bodhisattva, the third in the air of different pious men. The underlying idea would seem to be that of completing the connexion, or chain of evolution, between the living earthly Buddha and his spiritual or mystical counterpart, invisible in the heaven.*

A curious tradition, the origin of which it is not easy to trace, represents the death of the Buddha as due to over-indulgence in 'dried boar's flesh,'† at a feast which Chunda, the blacksmith, had prepared for him and his disciples. Recognizing the danger of the dish, Gautama refused to allow the others to partake lest they should suffer injury, and gave orders that what was left over should be buried in the ground. In view of the Hindu aversion to a meat diet, or the taking of life in any form, it is hardly likely that the tradition is a mere invention of later times. It is more probable that the preparation consisted of some vegetable or root, perhaps truffles; a 'boar's delicacy,' or favourite food; or the name of some dish prepared for the feast may have been confused in course of time with 'boar's flesh' or 'pork.' The refusal to permit his disciples to share was then invented to exalt his magnanimity, and to account for the fact that he alone suffered after the meal. If this were really the case, his great age would itself be a sufficient explanation. It should be noticed also that in the Tibetan books no reference is made to the pork, although the last feast in the Buddha's honour is described as in the Pāli narratives.‡

The death of the Buddha, like his birth, was accompanied by signs and portents from heaven; and the spirits of the earth and sky united in lamentation with his disciples and the men of Kuśanagara. The Mallas of the town paid due honour to the corpse, with processions and garlands and music, for a space of six days. On the seventh the body was carried by eight of their chieftains to a shrine outside the city, on the east, where a funeral pyre was raised of sweet-scented woods. The Malla chiefs, however, were unable to set fire to the pile; and it was explained to them that the final ceremony of cremation must await the arrival of Kāśyapa, who with five hundred brethren was at that moment approaching Kuśanagara. When Kāśyapa reached the shrine, he saluted with reverence the Buddha's corpse, and with his companions passed thrice round the funeral pile, bowing down in homage. The pyre then spontaneously began to burn; and, after the flames had done their work, they were again miraculously extinguished.

The bones and relics that remained from the fire were claimed by the Mallas of Kuśanagara (Kusinārā), on the ground that the Buddha had died in their territory. Others, however, advanced claims to a portion; and the danger of strife was allayed only by the remonstrances of a Brāhman, Droṇa (Dona) by name, who, at the instance of the Mallas themselves, undertook to distribute the relics. An eightfold division was made, as follows: (1) Ajātaśatru, king of Magadha; (2) the Lichchhavis of Vaiśālī; (3) the Śākyas of Kapilavastu; (4) the Bulis of Allakappa; (5) the Koliyas of Rāmagrāma; (6) a Brāhman of Vethadīpa,§ whose name is not recorded; (7) the Mallas of Pāvā; (8) the Mallas of Kuśanagara. Further, the earthenware vessel (*kumbha*), in which the relics had been gathered together after cremation, was given to Droṇa himself; and to the Mauryas (Moriyas) of Pipphalīvana, who, after all the relics had been distributed, sent a message demanding a share, were granted the

* The scene of the Buddha's death has not been certainly dentified; according to Fa-Hien, chs. xxiii., xxiv., it lay 25 *yojanas* east of Kapilavastu (cf. Beal, *Siyuki*, ii. 31 ff.). Sir A. Cunningham identified the site with the village of Kasiā, about 40 miles east of Gorakhpur, in the United Provinces, where there are extensive Buddhist ruins; but doubt is thrown on the correctness of his conclusions by recent discoveries and investigations. See V. A. Smith in *JRAS*, 1902, p. 139 ff.; J. F. Fleet, *ib.* 1906, p. 907 and note; J. H. Marshall, *ib.* 1907, p. 993 ff., with plate showing excavations at the great monastery; *IGI*, *s.v.* 'Kasiā.'

† The attitude and scene are represented from sculptures, *e.g.* in A. Grünwedel, *Buddhist Art in India*, 1901, p. 119 ff.

‡ *Mahā-Parinibbāna Sutta*, vi. 1. 6-11; *SBE* xi. 112 ff.; Warren, p. 108 f.; Kern, p. 44 f.

* See Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, p. 200 ff.; L. de la V. Poussin in *JRAS*, 1906, p. 948 ff., and art. ĀDIBUDDHA in vol. i. p. 97 ff.

† *Śūkara* (*śūkara*) *maddava*, *Parinibb. S.* iv. 16 ff., *SBE* xi. 71 ff. J. F. Fleet (*JRAS*, 1906, pp. 658, 881 f.) suggests 'the succulent parts, tit-bits, of a young wild boar' (*maddava*, Skr. *mārdava*, 'softness,' 'delicacy' [*mṛdu*]).

‡ Rockhill, p. 133 f.

§ Probably represented, according to Dr. Vogel, by the ruins at Kasiā; see *JRAS*, 1907, p. 993 ff.

embers of the fire. Thus there were altogether ten portions, and over each a cairn (*stūpa*) was erected and homage paid. These buildings remained for many years centres of pilgrimage, and were visited not only by Buddhists of India, but by pilgrims from distant lands.* In one form of the narrative the Emperor Aśoka is said to have undertaken a re-distribution of the relics among 84,000 *stūpas*, which he built. One of the original *stūpas*, however, that at Rāmagrāma (5), he was unable to violate, being prevented by the spirits (*nāgas*) that watched over the cairn.

At Piprāwā (Piprāhavā, Piprāhwā), in the United Provinces, excavations were made some years ago in an ancient mound and relic chamber; and among the objects discovered was a large stone box, containing steatite vases (one of which bore a short inscription), pieces of bone, gold leaf, jewels, beads, etc. The inscription when read was understood to describe the relics enclosed in the vase as those of the Buddha himself; and it was inferred that these fragments of bone were the actual portions of the body of Gautama, preserved after cremation, over which was erected the *stūpa* which had now been re-discovered. Dr. Fleet, however, interprets the inscription differently; and understands it to refer, not to the founder himself, but to the Śākyas, his kinsmen, many of whom, according to the tradition, were massacred, and their city wholly or partially destroyed, in revenge for a slight put upon the neighbouring king of Kosala.† In either case the inscription would seem to carry with it the identification of Piprāwā with Kapilavastu, the capital of the Śākyas.

The discovery is also reported of the ancient *stūpa* built near Peshāwar, according to the reports of the Chinese pilgrims, by Kanishka,‡ which they describe as the finest in India. Buddha himself, when travelling in the country, is said to have prophesied to Ānanda that on that spot, four hundred years after his death, a king named Kanishka would raise a great *stūpa* in his honour, 'which will contain many various relics of my bones and flesh.'§ Many marvels are related concerning the fulfilment of the prophecy, and both Fa-Hien and Hiuen-Tsiang record the presence in former times of the almsbowl (*pātra*) of Buddha in that country. Two large mounds lying east of the city have been identified as the site of the great building erected by Kanishka, and excavations have been carried on for the last two years, under the direction of the Archæological Survey of India. Under one of the mounds were found 'remains of an enormous monument, which proves to be the lost pagoda, so minutely described by the Chinese travellers.'‖ In a relic-chamber was discovered a casket containing small fragments of bone, which may therefore be portions of the remains of Gautama himself. The magnificence of the monument indicates the importance attached to the sacred relics which it was intended to enshrine. And the tradition recorded by Hiuen-Tsiang proves that in his day they were believed to be actual relics of the Founder of Buddhism.

* *Parinibbāna Sutta*, vi. 51-62.

† *JRAS*, 1906, p. 150. Dr Fleet reads the text, and translates as follows: *Sukiti-bhatinaṁ sa-bhagiṇikanaṁ sa-puta-dalanam iyaṁ salila-nidhane Budhasa bhagavate sakiyanam*, 'Of the brethren of the Well-famed One, together with (their) little sisters (and) together with (their) children and wives, this (is) a deposit of relics; (namely) of the kinsmen of Buddha, the Blessed One.' Earlier interpretations understood the reference to be to a relic-shrine of the Buddha himself, set up by his Śākya brethren. See Fleet's article, *loc. cit.*, in which he discusses the inscription; and for a description of the original discoveries, *ib.* 1898, p. 574, etc.; Mukherji, *Antiquities in the Nepalese Tarai*, 1897; cf. Fleet in *JRAS*, 1905, p. 679 ff.; and on the identification of Kapilavastu, W. Vost, *ib.* 1906, p. 553 ff.

‡ Legge, *Fā-Hien*, ch. xii.; Beal, *Siyuki*, i. 97 ff.

§ Beal, *l.c.*, p. 99.

‖ *Times*, 17th Aug. 1909; see *JRAS*, 1909, p. 1056 ff.

Among the prophecies uttered by the Buddha was one concerning the future of the religion which he established, and its ultimate decline and disappearance from the earth. The declaration is contained in the *Anāgata-Vaṁśa* ('Narrative of Coming Events'), and was given at Kapilavastu in response to a question by Sāriputta. The history of the future Buddha, Maitreya (Pāli *Metteyya*), is described; then at long intervals after his own death will occur the 'five disappearances': of the attainments, when his disciples will rise to ever higher degrees of sanctity; of the method, when the knowledge of the precepts and the way of salvation shall be lost; of learning, when the sacred texts themselves shall be forgotten; of the symbols, the monastic robe, bowl, etc.; and at the close of five thousand years 'the relics will begin to fail of honour and worship, and will go wherever they can receive honour and worship. But as time goes on they will not receive honour and worship in any place. Then . . . the relics will come from every place . . . and having congregated together at the throne under the great Bo-tree . . . will teach the Doctrine. Not a single human being will be found at that place; but all the gods from ten thousand worlds will come together and listen to the Doctrine, and many thousands of them will attain to the Doctrine. . . . Then they will weep, saying, "From henceforth we shall be in darkness." Then the relics will put forth flames of fire and burn up . . . without remainder.'*

[The subject of Barlaam and Josaphat, which was referred to this article by a cross-reference at BARLAAM, it has been found more convenient to treat in a separate article under the title JOSAPHAT.]

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BUDDHAGHOṢA.—This was the name of several members of the Buddhist Order. It will be sufficient here to deal with the best known among them, the celebrated author and scholar who flourished early in the 5th century A.D.

1. Life.—The authorities regarding the life of Buddhaghoṣa the Great are as follows. In the first place, certain important portions of his works have already been published. The few details they contain as to the life of the author are the only contemporary records of it that have survived. Secondly, Dhammakitti, in the middle of the 13th cent. A.D., wrote a continuation of the *Great Chronicle* (tr. in Turnour's *Mahāvaṁśa*, p. 250 ff.) of Ceylon. In it he inserted an account, in thirty-three couplets, of the life and work of Buddhaghoṣa. It is not exactly known from what sources this account was drawn; but it probably gives

* Warren, pp. 482-485.

the tradition as preserved at the Great Minster in Anurādhapura (*q.v.*) in written documents now no longer extant. Thirdly, we have a life of Buddhaghoṣa, written in Pāli, in the middle of the 16th cent., by a Burmese *bhikṣu* named Mahā Maṅgala. It is of a legendary and edifying character, and of little independent value. The title is, *Buddhaghos-uppatti* ('Advent of Buddhaghoṣa'); and the text has been edited and translated by James Gray. The results to be obtained from these sources will best be stated chronologically.

In the introductory verses to his commentary on the *Dīgha* (ed. Rhys Davids and Carpenter), Buddhaghoṣa says that he compiled it in accordance with the opinions of the Elders at the Great Minster; and that since he had already, in his *Visuddhi Magga* ('Path of Purity'), dealt with certain points, he would omit these in his commentary. Lastly, he says that the authorities on which he relied were in the Sinhalese language, and that he reproduces the contents of them in Pāli. In his commentary on the *Vinaya* (quoted *JRAS*, 1871, p. 295) he gives the names of some of these Sinhalese works. They are the Great Commentary, the Raft Commentary (*i.e.* written on a raft), and the Kurundī Commentary (*i.e.* the one written at Kurunda Veḷu). In his commentary on the *Parivāra*, Buddhaghoṣa states (*teste* Gray, p. 12) that he studied these three under Buddhamitta. In his *Attha-sālinī* (ed. Muller), Buddhaghoṣa also quotes as his authorities these and other commentaries written in Sinhalese; refers frequently to his own *Visuddhi Magga*, and twice at least to his commentary on the *Vinaya*; and mentions otherwise (apart from the canonical works) only the *Milinda* and the *Peṭakopadesa*.*

These meagre but important details show conclusively that Buddhaghoṣa worked at a date subsequent to that of the two books last mentioned, under the auspices of the scholars at the Great Minster in Ceylon, and on the basis of materials written in Sinhalese.

The authority next in point of date explains how this was supposed to have occurred. It tells us that, during the reign in Ceylon of Mahā-Nāma (who ascended the throne A.D. 413), there was a young Brāhman born in India who wandered over the continent maintaining theses against all the world. In consequence of a discussion that took place between him and Revata, a Buddhist *bhikṣu*, he became interested in Buddhist doctrine, and entered the Order that he might learn more about it. It was not long before he became converted, and wrote a treatise entitled *Jñāṇodaya* ('Uprising of Knowledge'); and also an essay entitled *Atthasālinī* ('Full of Meaning'), on the *Abhidhamma* manual included in the Canon under the title *Dhamma-saṅgaṇī*. On Revata observing that he contemplated a larger work, he urged him to go to Anurādhapura, where there were better materials and greater opportunities for study, and make himself acquainted there with the commentaries that had been preserved in Sinhalese at the Great Minster, with a view to re-casting them in Pāli. Buddhaghoṣa agreed to this, went to the Great Minster, studied there under Saṅghapāli, and when he had mastered all the subjects taught, asked permission to translate the commentaries. The authorities of the School gave him two verses as the subject of a thesis, to test his ability. What he submitted as this thesis was the work afterwards to become so famous under the title of *Visuddhi Magga*. This proved, with the assistance of good fairies, so satisfactory that his request was granted. Then, according to the chronicler, 'he translated the whole of the Sinhalese commentaries into Pāli.'

* See the references given in Mrs. Rhys Davids' *Buddhist Psychology*, pp. xx-xxv.

We need not take every word of this edifying story *au pied de la lettre*. We know, for instance, that it was not the whole, but only a part, though a very important part, of the Sinhalese commentaries that he reproduced in Pāli. Other scholars, some of whose names we know, while some are not yet known, reproduced other parts of it. The work was by no means a translation in the modern sense. It was a new work based on the older ones. And the intervention of the fairies (*devatā*) is only evidence of the curious literary taste of the time of the poet. But, in the main, the story bears the impress of probability.

The *Buddhaghos-uppatti* takes over this story, telling it with many flowers of speech and at greater length. It adds a few details not found in Dhammakitti's couplets, giving, for instance, the names of Buddhaghoṣa's father and mother as Kesī and Kesinī, and the name of the village they dwelt in as Ghosa. Both the authorities locate it at Gayā in Magadha, near the Bo-tree. The *Gandhavaṁśa* (*JPTS*, 1896, p. 66) adds that Kesī was the family chaplain (*purohita*) of King Saṅgāma. The *Saddhamma Saṅgaha* (*JPTS*, 1890, p. 55) gives the additional detail that Buddhaghoṣa worked at his translations in the Padhānaghara, an apartment to the right of the Great Minster. The Sinhalese chronicler concludes his account with the simple statement that Buddhaghoṣa, when his task was accomplished, returned home to India, to worship at the Wisdom tree. The Burmese authorities (quoted by Gray in his introduction) all agree that he went to Burma. This is merely a confusion between our Buddhaghoṣa and another *bhikṣu* of the same name (called more accurately Buddhaghoṣa the Less), who went from Ceylon to Burma towards the end of the 15th cent. (Forchhammer, p. 65).

2. **Works.**—The extant books written by Buddhaghoṣa would fill many volumes. Of these only one, and that one of the shortest, has so far been edited in Europe. The most important is probably the *Visuddhi Magga*, a compendium of all Buddhism, in three books: on Conduct, Concentration (or mental training), and Wisdom respectively. Henry C. Warren has published an abstract of this work (*JPTS*, 1891); and a complete edition, with translation, introductions, and notes, is in preparation for the Harvard Oriental Series. The rest are all commentaries. Those on the four great *Nikāyas*, on the *Abhidhamma*, and on the *Vinaya*, would each fill three or four volumes. A late authority, the *Saddhamma Saṅgaha* (*JPTS*, 1890, p. 56), gives 137,000 lines as the extent of these six works. Another late authority, the *Gandha-vaṁśa* (*JPTS*, 1896, p. 59), in giving a complete list of Buddhaghoṣa's works, mentions in addition commentaries on the *Pātimokkha*, *Dhammapada*, *Jātaka*, *Khuddaka Pāṭha*, and *Apadāna*, adding on p. 68 the *Sutta Nipāta*. This list probably errs both by excess and by defect. It does not include the *Attha-sālinī*, which we now know, from the edition published by the Pāli Text Society, to have been written by him, and it does include the commentaries on the *Dhammapada* and the *Jātakas*. Now we have before us the text of the introductory verses to each of these works. In each case the author describes the circumstances under which, and names the scholars at whose instigation, he undertook and carried out the work. In neither case is any reference made to Buddhaghoṣa. In both style and matter each of these books differs from the other, and from such portions of the works of Buddhaghoṣa as are accessible to us. In the similar cases of Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara, works not written by them have been ascribed to famous writers. The tradition of Buddhaghoṣa's authorship of either of

the books above named has not as yet been traced back earlier than the 10th cent.; and, for the above reasons, it is at present very doubtful. A large number of short quotations from Buddhaghoṣa's commentaries have been printed by the editors of the various texts with which he deals; and sixty consecutive pages from the historical introduction to his commentary on the *Vinaya* have been edited by H. Oldenberg (*Vinaya*, vol. iii.). Rhys Davids and Carpenter have published one volume, out of three, of the *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*, his commentary on the *Dīgha*. And one complete work by him, the *Attha-sālinī* above referred to, has been edited by E. Müller. This turns out to be, not the essay under that title said by Dhammakitti to have been composed in India, but another work written in Ceylon subsequently to the *Visuddhi Magga* and the six great commentaries. It is doubtless an enlarged edition of the essay, and the latter has therefore not been preserved. Manuscripts of the undoubted works of Buddhaghoṣa, containing the texts, sufficient to fill some twenty-five volumes more, are extant in European libraries; and the Pāli Text Society, having completed its edition of the canonical works, is now engaged on the publication of these.

3. **General conclusions.**—Buddhaghoṣa's greatest value to the modern historian is due largely to the limitations of his mental powers. Of his talent there can be no doubt; it was equalled only by his extraordinary industry. But of originality, of independent thought, there is at present no evidence. He had mastered so thoroughly and accepted so completely the Buddhist view of life, that there was no need for him to occupy time with any discussions on ultimate questions. In his 'Path of Purity' he gives, with admirable judgment as to the general arrangement of his matter, and in lucid style, a summary of the Buddhism of his time. There is no argument or discussion. In his six great commentaries—those on each of the four *Nikāyas*, containing the Doctrine; on the *Vinaya*, containing the Canon Law; and on the *Abhidhamma*, containing the advanced Psychology—he adheres to one simple plan. He first gives a general introduction—dealing mainly with literary history—to the work itself. To each of the more important Dialogues, or *Suttas*, he gives a special introduction on the circumstances under which it was supposed, when he wrote, to have been originally spoken, and on the places and the persons mentioned in it. He quotes in the comment on the *Sutta* every word or phrase he considers doubtful or deserving of notice from a philological, exegetical, philosophical, or religious point of view. His philology is far in advance of the philology of the same date in Europe, and his notes on rare words are constantly of real value, and not seldom conclusive. He gives and discusses various readings he found in the texts before him; and these notes, together with his numerous quotations, go far to settle the text as it lay before him, and are of great service for the textual criticism of the originals. Of the higher criticism Buddhaghoṣa is entirely guiltless. To him there had been no development in doctrine, and all the texts were the words of the Master. He is fond of a story, and often relieves the earnestness of his commentary with anecdote, parable, or legend. In this way, without in the least intending it, he has preserved no little material for the history of social customs, commercial values, folk-lore, and belief in supra-normal powers. His influence on the development of the literary faculty among Buddhists throughout the world has been very considerable. It is true, no doubt, that the method adopted in his commentaries follows very closely the method of those much older ones preserved in the Canon; but the literary skill with which he uses it is a great advance, more especially in lucidity, over the older documents.

LITERATURE.—*Atthasālinī*, ed. E. Muller (*PTS*, 1897), *Sumaṅgala Vilasinī*, ed. Rhys Davids and Carpenter (*PTS*, 1886); *Mahāvaṁśa*, ed. G. Turnour (Colombo, 1837); *Buddhaghosuppatti* (ed. J. Gray, London, 1892); *Dīgha*, ed. Rhys Davids and Carpenter (*PTS*, 1899, 1903); E. Forchhammer, *Jardine Prize Essay* (Rangoon, 1885); Mrs. Rhys Davids, 'Buddhist Psychology' (*RAS*, 1900).

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

BUDDHISM.—The character of Buddhism varies according to the country in which it prevails, so that a general sketch would be of very little value. The origin of Buddhism has been given in the article BUDDHA; its early developments will be described in two articles, one on the HĪNAYĀNA, or Little Vehicle, the other on the MAHĀYĀNA, or Great Vehicle. Then the Buddhism of each country will be separately treated under the name of the country. See BHUTĀN, BURMA, CENTRAL ASIA, CEYLON, CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN, JAVA, KOREA, SIAM, TIBET. See also SECTS (Buddhist).

BULGARIANS.—See BOGOMILS.

BULL.

Egyptian.—See ANIMALS, EGYPTIAN RELIGION.
Greek and Roman.—See ANIMALS, TAUROBOLIUM.
Hindu.—See ANIMALS, VEDIC RELIGION.
Semitic (A. H. SAYCE), p. 887.
Teutonic (C. J. GASKELL), p. 889.

BULL (Semitic).—The wild bull (Assyr. *rîmu*, Heb. *rê'êm*) was found in Mesopotamia, whence it wandered into Babylonia and the level parts of Palestine, while the domesticated short-horned ox seems to have been indigenous in Western Asia before the rise of Bab. civilization. Further south, in Arabia and the Sinaitic Peninsula, the country was unsuitable for cattle, and sheep took the place of oxen. This fact is important in view of the general opinion of anthropologists that the original home of the Semitic race was Arabia.

In Babylonia, figures of bulls guarded the approach to a temple, house, or garden. They were believed to protect the building from the entrance of evil spirits, and were often represented with wings, to which, in the Assyrian period, a human face was added. Colossal figures of them in stone or metal, called *lamassi* (from the Sumerian *lammu*), were placed on either side of the entrance. At times they were represented on the gates or walls as goring the enemy. The Semitic Babylonians included them among the *sêdi* (Heb. *shêdîm*), or 'spirits,' partly beneficent, partly evil, with which the air was filled. Among the Sumerians, however, they had the specific name of *alad*. Ashurbanipal, in describing his destruction of Susa, states that he 'broke in pieces the *sêdi* (written *alad*), the colossal bulls (*lamassi*) which guarded the temple,' and 'removed the raging wild bulls that adorned the gates'; and in the legend of Chedorlaomer (?) we read that, when Bel determined to bring evil upon his temple at Babylon, 'its *šêdu*,' or guardian-bull, departed from it, and so allowed the Elamite to enter and destroy the sanctuary. The guardian-bulls were also known as *kirubi*, and corresponded with the cherubim which stood at the entrance to the Garden of Eden, protecting 'the way of the tree of life' (Gn 3^{24}). In a list of Bab. deities, the

names of 'the two divine bulls' of Ea of Eridu are given (*WAI* ii. 56, 59–60).

A bilingual hymn in Sumerian and Semitic (*ib.* iv. 23), addressed to 'the bull' who is 'the offspring of Zu,' the storm-god, describes it as 'the great bull, the supreme bull which treads the holy pasturage . . . planting the corn and making the field luxuriant.' 'Between his ears,' it is added, 'is the mouth of the deep,' or 'sea,' a great basin of water which stood in the court of a Bab. temple. As there is also a reference in the same hymn to 'the twelve gods of copper,' we are reminded of the 'sea' of Solomon's temple which 'stood upon twelve oxen' (1 K 7^{25}).

Among the Babylonians the bull symbolized strength, and hence was a synonym for 'hero'; it was probably on this account that the spirit which protected the gate was supposed to have a bull-like form. For the same reason Jahweh of Israel was compared to a wild bull (Nu 23^{22} 24^{8} etc.), and it is possible that the *abbîr* of the OT should be rendered 'bull' rather than 'mighty one.'

According to the Epic of Gilgamesh, Anu, the god of heaven, created a bull to avenge the insults offered by Gilgamesh to his daughter Ishtar, and to punish the hero by devastating his country and destroying his countrymen. The bull is called an *alû* (a word of Sumerian origin), and its horns are described as being of lapis lazuli, and of enormous size. The bull, however, was killed by Gilgamesh and his companion, in consequence of which, it would seem, Gilgamesh was afflicted with disease, while his companion suffered a premature death. The bull was really the constellation Taurus or the star Gud-ana, 'the bull of heaven'—a name which goes back to the age when the vernal equinox coincided with the entrance of the sun into Taurus. Jensen believes that it was a storm-god before being thus transplanted to the sky, and that a connexion was assumed between *alû*, 'the bull' and *alû* (Sumer. *alâ*), 'a storm-demon' (*Assyr.-bab. Mythen und Epen*, 1900, p. 452). The suggestion is supported by the fact that the bull is called the son of the storm-god (see above), and that it was a symbol of Hadad-Rimmon, the god of the air and the thunderbolt. Hadad is often depicted standing on the back of a bull. Hadad, however, was known in Babylonia as *Amurrû*, 'the Amorite god,' and it is therefore possible that his association with the bull was derived from Northern Syria. A recollection of the bull as a malevolent storm-deity may survive in the Mithraic representation of the sun-god slaying a bull.

In Northern Syria, where Hadad, the Cilician *Sandes*, was specially worshipped, the bull was his sacred animal. When the worship of the god under the name of *Juppiter Dolichenus* ('Juppiter of Dolichê') was transplanted to Rome, monuments were erected to him on which he is figured standing on a bull, with a double-headed battle-axe in one hand and a thunderbolt in the other. At Hierapolis (*Membij*), the successor of Carchemish, he was throned upon bulls as his consort was upon lions (Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 31), and bulls were among the sacred animals kept in the court of the temple. On the stele of Esarhaddon found at Zinjerli he also stands upon a bull, and the same is the case in the rock-sculpture of Maltaiya (Place, Pl. 45) to the N.W. of Mosul. The earliest known representation of the god in a similar position is upon Babylonian seal-cylinders of the age of Hammurabi.

Further south the association of the bull with the supreme Baal can also be traced. Europa was carried from Phœnicia by Zeus, *i.e.* Baal, under the form of a bull; and the Cretan Minotaur was termed 'Asterius,' pointing to a belief in a connexion between the bull and the Phœnician *Ashtoreth*. Bulls of iron existed in the sanctuary of Zeus Atabyrius in Rhodes which may have owed their origin to Phœnician influence; and Silius Italicus (*Punica*, iii. 104 ff.) refers to the 'cornigera frons' of Milichus or Melkarth. The name (Ashtoreth-) *Karnaim* seems to imply the existence of a cow-headed Ashtoreth; and a cow is found on an early Bab. seal-cylinder as a symbol of Ishtar. A cow-goddess naturally presupposes a bull-god. On a Nabatæan monument a bull represents a god whom Sachau identifies with Kaẓiu or Kasios (*PSBA*, 1896, p. 1056).

According to Ex 32, a golden 'calf,' or more correctly a bull, was made by Aaron during the absence of Moses on Mount Sinai, and was worshipped by the Israelites as a visible representation of the God who had brought them out of Egypt. At a later date, Jeroboam set up images of bulls in the sanctuaries of the Northern Kingdom, where they were adored as likenesses or symbols of Jahweh. This Israelitish worship of bulls has been thought to have been derived from Egypt. But against this it is urged that the Egyptians worshipped the living animal, and not the image of it. The objection, however, is not convincing, since votive images of the Egyptian bulls Apis and Mnevis are numerous, and the Semitic equivalent of Egyptian beast-worship would have been image-worship. But the bull-worship of the Northern Kingdom was unknown in Judah, and it is therefore probable that it was derived from Northern Syria, Jahweh being identified with Hadad.

The bull-worship even of the Semites in Northern Syria was probably of foreign origin. The divine bulls of Babylonia were originally Sumerian, and the names applied to them by the Semitic Babylonians were borrowed from the Sumerian language. On the other hand, Hittite influence was strong in Northern Syria, and 'the bull-god' was one of the chief Hittite deities in whose honour images of bulls were dedicated. At Eyuk, near Boghaz Keui, a bull, mounted on a pedestal, is represented as being worshipped; and among the Phrygians the stealing of an ox was punished with death (Nic. Damascenus, 148, ed. Orelli). Asia Minor, in fact, was a land of cattle-breeding and agriculture, where the ox which drew the plough was held in special veneration. When an anthropomorphic conception of the deity was introduced from Babylonia, the human god accompanied by the animal took the place of the animal alone as an object of worship. The cuneiform tablets from the Assyro-Babylonian colonies near Kaisariyeh show that this must be dated at latest in the Hammurabi age.

It would thus appear probable that Northern Syria was the meeting-place of a twofold Sumerian conception of the bull: as a beneficent guardian of the homestead, and a malevolent storm-demon—derived in the one instance from the character of the domesticated animal, and in the other from that of the wild bull—and the Hittite worship of the bull-god as the protector of the cultivated land. Sumerian beliefs in regard to the bull were adopted by the Semitic Babylonians, and the association of the bull with the Syrian Hadad would have been the result of foreign influences. Bull-worship, in short, would seem to have been unknown to the early Semites, as indeed must necessarily have been the case if their primitive home was Arabia. It is significant that the Heb. word for 'wild bull' is borrowed from Babylonian, and is not found, at all events in that sense, in Arabic. The custom of hanging up *bucrania*, or ox-heads, above the doors of houses, moreover, was not Semitic. It was derived from the belief in the protecting powers of the divine bull, and, like the Bab. *lamassi*, of

which they were a survival, the *bucrania* prevented the entrance of evil spirits into a house, as a horse-shoe is still supposed to do in certain parts of England. The custom was naturally prevalent throughout Asia Minor, and the bull's head frequently makes its appearance on Cyprian seal-cylinders of the early Copper Age. The custom was also known to the Nubian settlers in Egypt in the time of the XIIth and following dynasties, from whom the usage, described by Herodotus (ii. 39), of making an ox-head a scapegoat, may have been derived (see also Dt 21^{4-6}). In Arabia and Palestine the apotropæic use of the *bucranium* was practically unknown.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities cited above, see Baudissin, *Studien zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, Leipzig, 1876, i.; Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, London, 1891, pp. 289–93.

A. H. SAYCE.

BULL (Teutonic).—Plutarch in his life of Marius (cap. 23) states that the Cimbri took with them on their expedition into Italy a brazen bull, on which they were accustomed to swear solemn oaths. Apart from this, there is little evidence for the sacred character of cattle among the Teutonic races, beyond the fact that they were used for sacrifice. A primitive cult of the cow would appear to be reflected in the Edda account of the creation of the world, where the cow Audhumbla exists before either gods or men, and plays an important part in their origin. There is, moreover, in the saga of Olaf Trygvason, a curious legend, which relates that a certain Ogwald worshipped a cow, which he took everywhere with him, and which at his death was buried beside him in a second cairn. The only addition to these vague indications is the statement of Tacitus (*Germania*, 40), that the sacred car of the goddess Herthus was drawn by yoked cows; and it may be noted that in the Middle Ages oxen drew the chariots of the Merovingian kings.

C. J. GASKELL.

BULL-ROARER.—'Bull-roarer' is the English name (Germ. *Schwirrholz*) of a common toy in the country districts of Great Britain and the Continent. It is merely a thin slat of wood, with a hole for the insertion of a string, and is usually either oval or oblong in shape and pointed at the extremities; sometimes the edges are serrated. Tied to a string, and the string firmly held, the bull-roarer is swung round, and produces a kind of muffled roar. The mystic or magical connexions of the bull-roarer in Europe will be noticed later; we must first consider its very important part in the religion of the most backward races. It has been most carefully studied among the aborigines of Australia, and its uses are analyzed by Père P. W. Schmidt in his paper 'Die Stellung der Aranda' (Arunta), in *ZE*, 1908, Heft 6.

Beginning with the Arunta, in the exact centre of Australia, we find a people who, in one region described by Spencer and Gillen, have no conception of a sky-dwelling superior being, or 'All-Father'; while in the area studied by Strehlow the sky is understood to be tenanted by a magnified man, Altjira, called *mara* ('good'), but as indifferent to mankind as they are to him. In this tribe, as in most others where initiations of the boys exist, the bull-roarer is swung by the men at the secret ceremonies; the noise warns the women to keep at a distance, and they are told that the roar is the voice of a being named Twanyirika. The long absence of the boys while their wounds are healing is explained by the circumstance that Twanyirika 'enters the body of the boy after the operation and takes him away into the bush until he is better.'* The operation over, the boy is shown the bull-roarers (always carefully concealed from women), and his elder brother comes to him with a bundle of Churinga, saying, 'Here is Twanyirika, of whom you have heard so much, they are Churinga [sacred things] and will help to heal you quickly.' The boy is told that women of his tribal kin will be slain if he lets them see the bull-roarers.*

So far, Twanyirika seems to be a mere bogle, in whom the initiated do not believe. Among the tribe next to the north of the Arunta, the Unmatjera, the boy is told, before being circumcised, that Twanyirika will carry him away if he reveals any of the secrets of initiation.† After the process of sub-incision he is told to swing the bull-roarer, while in the bush, or else another *arakurta* (youth circumcised, but not yet sub-incised), '*who lives up in the sky*, will come down and carry him away. If this *arakurta* hears the *luringa*—that is, the noise of the bull-roarer—he says, "That is all right," and will not harm him.'‡

This idea of a sky-dwelling being, concerned with the initiations, is not found among Spencer's branch of the Arunta; the being of the Unmatjera is not an All-Father; nor are the Unmatjera known to have any belief in an All-Father. This notion of a sky-dweller, however, forms a link with the belief of the Loritja or Luritcha tribe, whose lands march with those of the Arunta on the east. They believe in a celestial and powerful being, Tukura, who has no concern with ethics or any interest in men, but does perform ceremonies like those of the tribe, involving the use of the bull-roarer, and the initiation of celestial young men. Tukura is known to the women, as is Altjira, the sky-dweller of Strehlow's Arunta, or Aranda; but Altjira does nothing but hunt, eat, and amuse himself. Among the Loritja, beings named Maiutu play the part of Twanyirika; one cuts off the heads of the boys, sticks them on again, and is slain; another receives food from the boys. He has a sharp-pointed leg-bone, like Daramulun among the Wiradjuri of the south-east, and Daramulun is, with them, the being of the bull-roarer, but subordinate to the sky-dweller, or All-Father, the ethical Baiame.§

North of the Arunta are the Kaitish tribe, who are but half-converts to Arunta ideas. They believe in an All-Father, Atnatu, who 'arose up in the sky in the very far back past, . . . made himself, and gave himself his name.' Before the Alcheringa (*q.v.*) he drove some disobedient sons out of heaven to earth, whence he dropped down 'everything which the black-fellow has,' including bull-roarers. These sons are the ancestors of half the tribe. Two *churinga* (bull-roarers), dropped by Atnatu, became men, who, making wooden bull-roarers, imitated the sound of Atnatu's bull-roarer in the heavens, that is, obviously, thunder. They were named Tumana; they died an ill death; but now the women (who know not Atnatu) believe that Tumana plays the part of Twanyirika among the Arunta. Atnatu himself is an All-Father, insisting on ceremonies and bull-roarers, but unconnected with morals.‖

The Warramunga have no Atnatu, as far as is known; their bull-roaring being is Murtu. Murtu, like the Tumana, was killed by a dog, which could not destroy the bull-roarer, *murtu-murtu*. The spirit of *murtu-murtu* instantly sprang up in certain trees, of whose wood bull-roarers are made.¶

The N. by E. Binbinga and Anula have, or teach to the women, similar beliefs; the bull-roarer is *watamura* or *mura-mura*; the beings connected with it are Katajalina and Gnabaia. The women are told that these beings swallow the boys, and disgorge them, re-born, as initiated men. This

* Spencer-Gillen[a], 246, note 1.

* Spencer-Gillen[b], 497. † *Ib.* 338. ‡ *Ib.* 343.
§ Strehlow, *Die Aranda und Loritja Stämme*, pt. i. (1907) p. 1 f.; pt. ii. (1908) pp. 1, 2, 48, 49.
‖ Spencer-Gillen[b], 498 ff. ¶ *Ib.* 279–352.

form of the exoteric myth is very common, occurring even among the tribes of the south-east.*

The S.E. tribes had not the spiritual philosophy of the central and northern communities. In that philosophy primal souls are perpetually re-incarnated, or in some regions spirits, *ratapa*, emanating from the primal totemic beings, are incarnated, and, after one earthly life, retire to the isle of the dead, and are finally annihilated.† There is thus no place of rewards and punishments for souls, while the evolutionary theory (see ALCHERINGA) makes a creative being superfluous, though, as Atnatu, he survives among the Kaitish.

The S.E. tribes in parts of Queensland, and in Victoria and New South Wales, had not the spiritual and evolutionary philosophy of the northern tribes, or among them it was not dominant, and they believed in a great sky-dwelling anthropomorphic being, the maker of most things, ethical, and the source of customary laws, who gives his sanction to morals, and is invoked at the initiatory rites, where a temporary image of him is made. Like Atnatu, he is unknown to the women and children. The thunder is his voice, and the bull-roarer, imitating the thunder, is sacred. Like the central and northern tribes, those of the south-east inculcate the belief in a being closely connected with the bull-roarer, but this being is taken more seriously than in the north and centre. He is the son, or 'boy,' practically the deputy, of the superior being, the All-Father. Among the Kurnai he is Tundun (which is also the name of the bull-roarer); among the Euahlayi and Kamilaroi he is Gayandi, under Baiame; among the Wiradjuri he is Daramulun, under Baiame; but among the Yuin, Daramulun is himself the All-Father.

The functions of the bull-roarer being, with the exoteric myth that he swallows the boys and disgorges them, are practically identical with the functions of Twanyirika and Tumana and the rest in the centre and north. The Wiradjuri Daramulun, like the Maiutu of the Loritja, has a leg which ends in a sharp bone.‡ Among seven of these tribes a larger (male) and a smaller (female) bull-roarer are used: among the Kurnai the larger represents Tundun, father of the race, the smaller represents his wife; but the distinction of sex is not said to exist among the Chepara and Turbal;§ with the Chepara the small bull-roarers given to the initiates are only tokens of initiation. Mr. Howitt thinks, 'but could not be sure,' that the female bull-roarer among the Kurnai indicates ceremonies in which the women take a certain part;‖ the Parnkalla also use a larger and a smaller bull-roarer; nothing is said of their sex.¶ Among the Wiradjuri the bull-roarer (*mudjigang* or *bobu*) does not, as among the Kurnai, bear the name of the bull-roarer being, *Daramulun*. 'There is an absence in the western tribes of a belief in an anthropomorphic Being by whom the ceremonies were first instituted.'** These western tribes conform to the ideas of the Dieri, who have no known All-Father, but believe in a multitude of *Muramura*—fabulous primal beings like those of the Arunta Alcheringa. Among them only bull-roarers marked with notches indicating their use at ceremonies are sacred; others are made a joke of. †† Practically they have not been consecrated. 'Changes in custom,' according to Howitt and Spencer-Gillen, 'have been slowly passing down from north to south,' from the Arunta and Dieri to the sea at Port Lincoln, among the western tribes. The ideas of Alcheringa and evolution appear to be northern and western; the All-Father belief is southern and eastern.

Père Schmidt, who finds the bull-roarers of sex in the reports of R. H. Matthews* among the Wiradjuri and other tribes (where Howitt found nothing about sex), and of Strehlow, in connexion with the maternal totem, has a theory that the large bull-roarer represents Twanyirika, Maiutu, etc., as fathers of the race, the small their wives as the mothers of the race,† and connects this with the sun and moon myths, and a period of so-called 'matriarchate' among tribes now reckoning descent in the male line, also with the 'sex totems' (animal friends of either sex) of the Kurnai and many other Australian tribes. There is also a theory of Papuan invasions, but the whole hypothesis cannot here be criticized.‡

The bull-roarer is in general use, among the central tribes, for magical purposes, and the spiritual element of their philosophy, as regards conception, is involved, especially in connexion with the stone *churinga nanja* of the Arunta nation, which are often, but not always, shaped like bull-roarers. Elsewhere these stone *churinga*, with totemic markings, are not found in use among the Australians.

Marett has advanced the opinion that 'the prototype' of the All-Fathers 'is nothing more or less than' the bull-roarer. 'Its thunderous booming must have been eminently awe-inspiring to the first inventors, or rather discoverers, of the instrument, and would not unnaturally provoke the "animatistic" attribution of life and power to it . . . a genuine Religion . . . has sprung up out of the Awe inspired by the bull-roarer.'§

But, as we have seen, there are, even in Australia, plenty of bull-roarers where there is no All-Father. Among the Arunta, Altjira has nothing to do with the bull-roarer, nor has Ulthaana, another sky-dwelling being of the Arunta.‖ It is usually not the All Father, but his 'boy,' as Tundun, who manages the bull-roarer. Moreover, it is thunder, not the bull-roarer, which very naturally inspires awe; it is the voice of the All-Father; the bull-roarer only represents that voice. Finally, the All-Father is found all over the world, in places where the bull-roarer is unknown.

The bull-roarer is of more importance in Australian religion, myth, and ritual than elsewhere. Its use at the Greek mysteries of Dionysus was explained by the story that it was a toy of the child-god.¶ Two or three bone bull-roarers of palæolithic times have been discovered and published. Like those of the north and central Australian tribes, they are decorated with incised concentric circles or half-circles. Thus palæolithic man may have had a religion akin to that of the Australians.

Bull-roarers in connexion with religion or magic are found in South and West Africa; among the Apache and Navaho Indians of North America, and the Koskimo of British Columbia,** where the

* Spencer-Gillen b, 501.
† Spencer-Gillen, and Strehlow, *ut supra*.
‡ Howitt, 585. § *Ib.* pp. 578, 582, 596.
‖ *Ib.* 628. ¶ *Ib.* 668–670. ** *Ib.* 677. †† *Ib.* 660.

* *Ethnological Notes of the Tribes of N.S. Wales and Victoria*, p 153 *f.*
† Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 893, 901.
‡ Schmidt, 'L'Origine de l'idée de Dieu,' in *Anthropos*, 1909, pt. i.
§ *Threshold of Religion*, 1909, pp. 17–19.
‖ Strehlow, i. 1 f.; Gillen, *Horn Expedition*, iv. 183.
¶ Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, i. 700.
** To these tribes may be added the Eskimo, Kwakiutl, Arapaho, Ute, Central Californians, Pueblo, and the ancient cliff-dwellers. 'The Hopi, who regard the bull-roarer as a prayer-stick of the thunder, and its whizzing noise as representing the wind that accompanies thunderstorms, make the tablet portion from a piece of lightning-riven wood. . . . The Navaho make the bull-roarer of the same material, but regard it as representing the voice of the thunder-bird, whose figure they often paint upon it. . . . Apache, Hopi, and Zuñi bull-roarers bear lightning symbols; and while in the semi-arid region the implement is used to invoke clouds, lightning, and rain, and to warn the initiated that rites are being performed, in the humid

bull-roarer being, as in Australia, is said to carry away the young initiate. This fable is, of course, intended merely for the women and children; the boys, when initiated, discover the absurdity of the figment. Central Brazil, New Guinea, the Torres Islands, Florida in the Melanesian group, the North-West Solomon Islands, and Sumatra are all familiar with the bull-roarer.* For modern Europe, as well as for the lower culture, see A. C. Haddon, *The Study of Man*, pp. 277–327, and *GB*[2] iii. 424. In Aberdeenshire the cow-herd boys used to swing the bull-roarer as a charm against thunder.

The most astonishing parallel to the Kaitish story of a bull-roarer dropped from heaven to earth by Atnatu occurs in the following note of the present writer, which, fortunately, is dated: 'Bull-roarer in Cantyre' (Argyll) "*Srannan*, pronounced *Strantham*, the first in this quarter fell from Juppiter." Macalister, October 20, 1885.' Mr. Macalister was a Gaelic-speaking schoolmaster at St. Mary's Loch, in the parish of Yarrow, Selkirkshire, and was an aged man in 1885, full of vigour and intelligence. The parallel myth of the Kaitish was not published till 1904. For a drawing of a Maori bull-roarer, in the Christy Museum, and for an early study of the subject, see 'The Bull-Roarer' in Lang's *Custom and Myth*, pp. 29–44 (1884 and later editions). For the use of *jurapari* pipes in Brazil, to scare away the women from the rites of the men, see A. R. Wallace, *Travels on the Amazon*, 1853, p. 349.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the article. A. LANG.

BULLS AND BRIEFS.—Under this heading may be conveniently considered not only those documents of the Papal chancery which are technically so designated, but also the various other classes of 'apostolic letters' which in comparatively modern times have been increasingly employed by the Roman Pontiffs in their most important utterances. For this wider interpretation of the name 'bulls' there is excellent authority. Both bulls and briefs are in their essence Papal letters, and the *quasi*-official collection known as the *Bullarium Romanum* includes Encyclicals, Motu Proprios, and other similar constitutions which possess just the same force, as sources of the Canon Law, as the bulls, briefs, and decretals which we should primarily expect to find there (see the prefatory letter prefixed to vol. i. of the *Bullarium* of Benedict XIV.). For the same reason any calendar of Papal *Urkunden*, such as the important *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* (from the beginning to 1198) of Jaffé-Löwenfeld (continued to 1304 by Potthast), might be correctly described as an abstract of the letter-books of the Holy See; and in point of fact the first authentic document which Jaffé has summarized, or in other words the first Papal bull, in the wider sense, of which the text is preserved to us, is the famous letter addressed by Pope Clement I. (Clemens Romanus) to the Church of Corinth. This, and two other letters of the time of Pope Cornelius, form the only complete specimens we possess of the official correspondence of the Popes down to the middle of the 4th century.

1. Early Papal letters.—Beginning, however, with the time of Pope Julius I. (337–352), a much larger collection of documents becomes available. This fact alone lends a certain probability to the conjecture based upon the language of the *Liber Pontificalis* (i. 205, ed. Duchesne), that a reorganization of the Papal archives took place under this pontificate. We hear of a body of officials (*schola notariorum*) and of a responsible director (*primicerius*), while only a few years later an inscription of Pope Damasus seems to speak of the construction of a special *archivium*, later called the *scrinium* (see de Rossi, 'La Bibliotheca della Sede Apostolica,' in *Studi di Storia e Diritto*, v. 340).

The natural result of the official registration of documents which all this organization seems to imply must have been to create by degrees a recognized Pontifical chancery, and to establish the use of traditional forms and customs with regard to the drafting, dating, and expediting of Papal letters, which we find fully developed at a later period. Down to the time of Hadrian I. (772–795) our knowledge of these forms is somewhat vague, and in no case founded upon the original documents themselves. For the most part the texts of which we have copies are of an epistolary or hortatory character, often mere extracts, in which addresses, salutations, and subscriptions are naturally little regarded. The earliest Papal writings known to us which have any claim to be regarded as legal instruments date from the beginning of the 5th cent., and were addressed by Pope Zosimus to the Bishops of Arles (see Mansi, *Concilia*, iv. 359; and H. J. Schmitz in *Histor. Jarhb.* xii. [1891] 1 ff.; but cf. Nostiz-Rieneck, *ZKT* xxi. [1897] 6 ff.). Still, the number of Papal letters of earlier date than the year 772, preserved to us in whole or in part, amounts in round numbers to nearly 2400, and in some cases, notably in that of Pope Gregory the Great, we can argue back to the arrangement of these letters in the *Regesta*, or letter-books, from which they have ultimately been copied. Even from an early period it seems that the Papal chancery was carefully organized, for already in the time of Gelasius I. (492–496) we find traces of the numbering of the letters in the *Regesta*, and we know that the *primicerius notariorum*, or head of the chancery, was one of the most important officials in the Roman Church. He was the Pope's counsellor (*consiliarius*), by which name he is sometimes designated, and during the vacancy of the See he exercised for the time being a supreme authority in conjunction with the archpriest and the archdeacon. We have also reason to believe that the *secundicerius*, or second in command, was regarded as holding an important post of trust.

As regards the drafting of the documents of this early period, it seems clear that they were all modelled on the type of an ordinary Roman letter. Like a Roman letter, the missive is preceded by an *intitulatio*, or formal naming of the writer, and an *inscriptio*, or naming of the addressee, this last being often coupled with a form of salutation. Thus: 'Leo Episcopus, Presbyteris et Diaconibus Ecclesiae Alexandrinae, dilectissimis filiis, in Domino Salutem.' In many cases, however, the *inscriptio* precedes the *intitulatio*, as, for example, 'Gloriosissimo et clementissimo Filio Justiniano Augusto, Vigilius Episcopus.' Gregory the Great seems to have been the first to employ habitually the formula 'servus servorum Dei' in the *intitulatio* of his letters, but this style was not at once adopted by his successors. It seems, however, to have gradually won its way back into favour, and in the Papal letters of the 8th cent. it is rarely omitted. The salutation, which was by no means always appended to the *inscriptio*, takes different forms. In the earlier letters we find simply

area it is used to implore the wind to bring fair weather. The bull-roarer is a sacred implement, associated with rain, wind, and lightning, and among the Kwakiutl, according to Boas, with ghosts' (Hough in *Handbook of Amer. Indians*, i. [=*Bulletin 30 BE*] 170 f., where further literature is given). From these American examples it appears that the bull-roarer is rather a magical instrument than a thing associated with the religious idea of a Lord of Thunder, as among certain Australian tribes.

* Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 424. Note 1 contains a list of authorities.

'salutem'; under Julius I. (337–352), 'in Domino salutem,' and, later on, other amplifications. Pope Adeodatus (672–676) adopted the form 'salutem a Deo et benedictionem nostram,' and this perhaps paved the way for the existing usage 'salutem et apostolicam benedictionem.' At the close of the Papal letter was appended, first, the *subscriptio papae*, and, secondly, the date. The *subscriptio papae* did not take the form of what we should now call a signature, *i.e.* the writing of the Pope's own name, but consisted simply of a word of blessing and farewell. For example, 'Deus te incolumem custodiat, frater carissime,' or, more commonly, 'Bene vale, frater carissime'; but from the 7th cent. onwards the Papal missives of a more formal and legal character rarely had any other subscription than the simple 'Bene vale,' or 'Bene valete.' As for the date, which comes last of all, it was probably never omitted in the originals, though it is so often lacking in the copies which have been preserved to us. Down to the end of the 5th cent. we usually find only the day of the month and the names of the consuls, *e.g.* 'Data tertio idus Februarias, Arcadio et Bautone consulibus'; but from about 490 onwards the year of the indiction is, at first sometimes, and later on invariably, added. With regard to the body of the document, it is easy, especially with the aid of the numerous extant letters of St. Gregory the Great, to recognize the gradual introduction of certain traditional forms and phrases. The occurrence in our copies of such abbreviations as 'secundum morem,' or 'de more solito,' implies the same, and in the so-called *Liber Diurnus* a collection of Papal formularies is preserved to us, the earliest portion of which is believed to have been compiled shortly after St. Gregory's time. We meet also in these early letters, particularly from the time of Leo I. (440–461), a certain rhythmical cadence known as the *cursus*, which, after falling into abeyance for a long period, re-appears at the end of the 11th cent. (see Duchesne, 'Note sur l'Origine du *Cursus*,' in the *Bib. de l'École des Chartes*, vol. l. p. 162), and was then maintained until near the close of the Middle Ages. Finally, the document was probably written on papyrus, and had attached to it a cord, with a leaden seal, the *bulla*. As already stated, no original deeds of this period remain to us, but we have the leaden seals which must once have been attached to letters of Pope John III. (560–573), of Deusdedit (615–618), and others. These *bullae* are about an inch in diameter, and bear on one side the Pope's name in the genitive, and on the other the word PAPAE. It is, of course, from this feature that the Papal letters themselves have come to be called 'bulls'; but this designation is not used officially in any early document. The Popes speak of their own letters, or of those of their predecessors, as *litterae*, *epistola*, *pagina*, *scriptum*, or, less generally, as *privilegium*, *praeceptum*, or *auctoritas*.

2. From 772 to 1048.—With the accession of Hadrian I. it is convenient to begin a new period in the history of the Papal chancery, and this for two reasons: first, because the earliest specimen of an original bull—even then a mere fragment, seemingly of a letter on papyrus addressed to Charlemagne — belongs to this pontificate; secondly, because some re-organization of the chancery must have occurred at this time, the result probably of the improved political status of the Holy See, now strong in the support of Pepin and his son. Already we may begin to trace that broad division of Papal documents into two categories (see Schmitz-Kallenberg, 'Papsturkunden,' in Meister's *Grundriss*, i. 198), which is practically perpetuated in the popular locution of 'bulls and briefs,' though, perhaps, for these earlier periods it is better to retain the terminology of Bresslau, Diekamp, and Léopold Delisle, and to speak of 'privileges' and 'letters.' The latter class were, as the name imports, simply letters. They were written on sheets of papyrus of smaller size, and elaborate formulas of dating were dispensed with. Their purpose was ephemeral, and as a result the originals have almost completely disappeared, only one entire specimen (of the time of Clement II. [1046–1047]) being preserved to us. Of 'privileges,' however, though these must have been far more rarely issued, a comparatively large number of originals remain, their preservation being the natural result of the fact that they commonly conferred or confirmed a title in matters either of property or of jurisdiction. A catalogue of these early Papal documents on papyrus, twenty-three in number, has been given by H. Omont in the *Bib. de l'École des Chartes*, 1904 (cf. also Melampo in *Miscellanea di Storia e Cultura Ecclesiastica*, 1905–1907). Concerning these more formal 'privileges,' therefore, to which it is usual to give the names of bulls, we are fully informed, and their peculiarities have often been described. They are made of broad strips of papyrus, and the whole document is sometimes as much as 10 ft. long and from 18 to 24 in. broad. A wide margin is left at the top; then follows in large writing the *intitulatio* and *inscriptio*, with the formula 'in perpetuum.' The body of the document comes next in a smaller hand, and beneath it the so-called 'double date.' This consists of two distinct entries, of which the one seemingly has reference to the engrossing of the instrument, for it begins with the words 'scriptum per manus N.N.,' with the day of the month and the indiction, the other concerned with its final expedition or delivery, and expressed in the words 'Data' or 'Datum,' with month and day and fuller details of the year, 'per manum N.N.' Between these comes the *subscriptio papae*, which takes the form of the words †BENE VALETE† generally written in two lines in uncial letters with a cross preceding and another cross or SS (*subscripsi*) following. That this was at first written by the Pope's own hand is rendered probable by the fact, first, that the hand of the BENE VALETE always differs from that of the body of the document and of the dates; and, secondly, that in the cases in which we possess more than one original bull of the same Pontiff, the identity of the characters of the BENE VALETE seems well established. Further, in certain 'privileges' of Pope Silvester II. (999–1003) we find invariably added to the BENE VALETE a few words in the so-called 'Tironian notes' or short-hand, for example, 'Silvester Gerbertus Romanus episcopus subscripsi,' or 'Gerbertus qui et Silvester episcopus' (see Ewald in *Neues Archiv*, ix. 321 ff.). Still it would seem that already in the time of Clement II. (1046–1047) the practice was being given up, and that the Pope henceforth was usually content with marking a cross or other private signs beside the BENE VALETE already written there by the engrosser. Finally, the *bulla*, or leaden seal, was attached to the document, strings of hemp or silk being passed through the lower margin of the papyrus, which was folded once or twice to give greater strength, while the seal was impressed upon these strings. Down to the end of the 11th cent. the *bullae* bore nothing more than the name of the Pope on one side and the word 'papae' on the other, though the arrangement of the letters, complicated with certain crosses and dots, varied considerably. At this period also, as we may often learn from the details given in the second (or 'delivery') date of the 'privileges' just described, the chief position

in the Papal chancery was taken by an official known as the *bibliothecarius sanctae apostolicae sedis*, who no doubt was originally no more than the custodian of the archives. By degrees, however, he seems to have taken over the functions of the *primicerius notariorum*. He was generally a bishop, and soon we find him commonly invested with the title *cancellarius*. As an illustration of the kind of details given in the second dating clause, the following specimen taken from a bull of Silvester II. of the year 999 may be worth quoting:

'Data VIIII Kl. decemb. per manum Johannis, episcopi sancte Albanensis ecclesie et bibliothecarii sancte apostolice sedis, anno pontificatus domini nostri Silvestri secundi pape primo, imperante domino nostro tertio Ottone, a Deo coronato, magno et pacifico imperatore, anno quarto, in mense et indictione suprascriptis.'

Although the year of the Incarnation is not here mentioned, it is to be met with occasionally in Papal documents somewhat earlier than this. Details of this kind, which are often of great critical importance, will be found noted at the head of each pontificate in Jaffé-Löwenfeld's *Regesta* and in Mas Latrie's *Trésor de Chronologie*, 1889, pp. 1035–1148.

3. **From 1048 to 1198.**—After the accession of Leo IX. in 1048, the more stable traditions of the Papal chancery seem to have given place to a period of very rapid development. There was at first a good deal of chopping and changing in the forms observed, but after the lapse of about a century we find a pretty general uniformity of usage in documents of the same nature. In any case the broad distinction between 'privileges' and 'letters' still held good, though these great groups themselves have now to be divided into classes, each with characteristics of its own. To begin with the more formal and elaborate documents (the 'privileges'), the era of Leo IX. seems to have introduced the general use of parchment in place of papyrus, and possibly as a consequence of this, the employment of minuscule instead of 'Lombardic' writing; but there were also other changes which may be said to have transformed the external features of the great bulls and to have lasted down to the present day. The *subscriptio papae* ceases to consist in the writing of the words BENE VALETE, this being now represented by a monogram followed by three dots and a huge comma (see, upon this, Pflugk-Harttung in *Mittheil. Inst. Oest. Gesch.* v. [1884] 434 ff.). The comma and dots, which appear but for a short period, probably stood for 'subscripsi.' In place of the BENE VALETE, the Pope's sign manual now took the form of a 'rota' drawn in the blank space below the centre of the document, but a little to the left. The 'rota,' or wheel, derives its name from the two concentric circles, from 2 to 5 in. in diameter, inside which a cross was drawn, with the words 'scs petrus scs paulus' and the Pope's name arranged thus:

SCS	SCS
PETRVS	PAVLVS
PASCHA	LIS
PP	II

Between the concentric circles was written the Pope's motto—usually a brief text from the Psalms. That of Paschal II., for example, was 'Verbo Domini coeli firmati sunt.' Before the first word a rude cross is marked, and this at least is believed to have been done by the Pope's own hand. Between the 'rota' thus drawn to the left and the BENE VALETE monogram standing parallel to it a little to the right, the Pope's name was engrossed in the following or some similar form: 'Ego Paschalis Catholicae Ecclesiae Episcopus subscripsi.' At a somewhat later time the attestations of a certain number of Cardinals present were also written below the name of the Pope in three columns, consisting respectively of Cardinal Bishops, Cardinal Priests, and Cardinal Deacons. We may say that the 'rota' and B.V. monogram, which appear first in the time of Leo IX. and which with slight variations have lasted down to the present day, still constitute the most striking external feature of the most solemn kinds of bulls. Of the other changes connected with this period it is only needful to notice that the *Scriptum* clause, *i.e.* the date of the engrossing, disappears from all Papal documents, and that the leaden *bulla*, which was, as a rule, appended alike to 'privileges' and 'letters,' assumed under Pope Paschal II. (1099–1107) the type which it has retained ever since; that is to say, the obverse of the seal shows the busts of St. Peter and St. Paul facing each other—St. Peter to the spectator's right, St. Paul to the left, with a rude cross between them, while above their heads appear the letters S. PA. and S. PE. On the reverse we find the name of the reigning Pope in the nominative, *e.g.* 'Urbanus PP. III.' On both sides of the *bulla* are circles of dots, and there is some reason to believe that the exact number of these dots for any given pontificate was a point carefully attended to, and was meant to be used as a test of authenticity. There can be no doubt that, like the documents themselves, the leaden *bullae* appended to them were freely fabricated at a later date. Even in the British Museum *Catalogue of Seals* a number of these early *bullae* are entered (vol. vi., Nos. 21681–21698), without any indication of the fact that the examples so described are forgeries.

The tendency to reserve the more elaborate forms of authentication with 'rota,' monogram, and signatures, as above explained, for certain very solemn 'privileges' became accentuated even during this early period; and Schmitz-Kallenberg already distinguishes from them a class of 'simple privileges,' which, while of substantially the same nature as regards their inscription and contents, lack these and some other formalities. In the case of the 'letters' also, we may note two kinds, viz. the *litterae cum filo serico* (*i.e.* in which the *bulla* hangs by silken cords) and *litterae cum filo canapis* (in which hemp was employed). The authority just named also attributes to this period the first appearance of *litterae clausae*. This does not mean to say that ordinary Papal 'privileges' and 'letters' were sent to the recipient open, so that all men could read them, but only that their fastening, which seems to have been effected by the strings to which the *bulla* was attached, could be undone without mutilating the document. In the case, however, of the *litterae clausae* the parchment was so folded and the *bulla* so attached that nothing of the contents could be read without destroying the *bulla* as an authentication (see Diekamp in *Mittheil. Inst. Oest. Gesch.* iii. [1882] 865 ff.). It is possible that the use of waxen seals with the 'Fisherman's ring' may also date from this time (cf. Jaffé, *Regesta*, Nos. 5225 and 5242), but no specimen is now in existence.

4. **From 1198 to modern times.**—The pontificate of Innocent III. (1198–1216) marks an epoch of the highest importance in the history of the Papal chancery. From this time forward not only do the original documents exist in abundance, but the official *Regesta*, or letter-books, of which only a few fragments are known before this date, are preserved to us in an almost uninterrupted series. Furthermore, Innocent III., like the great organizer that he was, devoted special attention to this most important matter (*Nouveau Traité de Diplomatique*, vi. 168 ff.). He built new premises for the chancery, and it was no doubt due to his per-

sonal influence that a strict uniformity and an adherence to certain recognized rules are henceforth observable in all its instruments. With the greatly extended authority of the Holy See and its more frequent intervention in matters other than purely religious, the scope of the many Papal pronouncements seems to be widened. The distinguished canonist Alexander III. (1159–1181) by his *litterae decretales* (letters containing decisions of points of law submitted to him) had already built up a vast edifice of Case Law, which was soon to be published to the world by Pope Gregory IX. in the Book of the Decretals compiled under Pontifical direction by St. Raymond de Pennaforte (1234). The great mass of this material was furnished by the replies of Alexander III., Innocent III., and his two successors, Honorius III. and Gregory IX. himself; and the tone of the law-giver seems insensibly to become emphasized in all subsequent Papal utterances. Moreover, we now touch upon a period when such documents often seem to be addressed to all Christendom, and no longer consistently observe the form of letters directed to an individual or group of individuals. From this date the 'great privileges' with their 'rota' and B.V. monogram and their elaborate attestations of Cardinals become less numerous; while, on the other hand, only a few years later, under Innocent IV., we are for the first time confronted with that form of Papal document, technically and strictly known as a 'bull,' which is something intermediate between the formal 'privilege' and the simple 'letter.' In this, as in a 'privilege,' the first line is written in tall letters, but it ends not with the abbreviation IN PP. (*in perpetuum*), but with the phrase 'ad perpetuam rei memoriam,' or something equivalent, *e.g.* 'ad certitudinem perpetuam et memoriam futurorum.' There is often no mention of the person addressed; but the document concludes with certain minatory clauses, 'Nulli ergo,' etc., and 'Si quis,' etc., directed against all who may contravene what is therein laid down, ending, without any other subscription, in a simple date mentioning the place, the year of the Incarnation (but this was a later addition), and the year of the pontificate. To this document the ordinary leaden *bulla* was attached by silken cords. It was in this form that many important pronouncements were given to the world during the 13th and 14th cents., more particularly the manifestos of Boniface VIII., *e.g.* the *Ausculta fili* and the *Unam sanctam* which provoked so much resistance from their appeal to the authority of 'the two swords' and the consequent claim to far-reaching authority in temporal matters. As the initial words themselves of the bull *Ausculta fili*, directed to Philip IV. of France, would suffice to show, many of these utterances were still letters in form and addressed to individuals, but in their scope they appealed to Christendom at large.

In Innocent III.'s days some of these *quasi*-political documents took the form of 'privileges.' This was the case with the bull in which Innocent accepted and ratified the surrender by which king John made England a fief of the Holy See. But after the 14th cent. this more elaborate form of instrument—'consistorial bulls,' as they were called, from the fact that the attestations of the Cardinal Bishops, Cardinal Priests, and Cardinal Deacons were given in one of those assemblies of Cardinals in council with the Pope, known as 'Consistories'—became very unusual. It was confined, in fact, to concessions which called for special solemnity, to bulls of canonization, and to a few important constitutions such as the bull of Julius II. (18th July 1511), convoking the Fifth Lateran Council, or the confirmation of the Council of Trent by Pius IV. (26th Jan. 1564). By exception the bull conferring on Henry VIII. the title of 'Defender of the Faith' was made out in consistorial form and sealed with a golden *bulla*; but even such a document as the condemnation of the Pragmatic Sanction on 19th Dec. 1516, though decided upon in the Lateran Council itself, was executed in an ordinary bull; and it may in general be assumed that from the 14th cent. onwards, when the term 'bull' is used (as, for example, the 'bull of demarcation of Alexander VI.' determining the respective limits of the Portuguese and Spanish possessions in the Indies; the 'dispensation bull' for the marriage of Henry VIII. with his brother's widow; or the bull of Pius V. deposing Queen Elizabeth, etc.), the instrument so designated observed the following forms which for clearness' sake it will be well to recapitulate:

(1) The document begins with the Pope's name and 'servus servorum Dei' followed by a perpetuity clause or, less commonly in the case of a bull addressed to an individual, by the name of the addressee and salutation. Thus in the former case we have: 'Leo episcopus, servus servorum Dei, ad perpetuam rei memoriam'; or, in the latter: 'Leo episcopus, servus servorum Dei, dilecto filio suo N. salutem et apostolicam benedictionem.'—(2) The dating clause, which comes at the end of the whole, takes the following form and order: 'Datum Romae apud S. Petrum (or elsewhere) anno Incarnationis Dominicae MDCXX, quinto Kal. Maii, pontificatus nostri anno quinto.'—(3) To this was appended, by strings of silk or hemp, the *bulla* bearing the heads of SS. Peter and Paul, and on the other side the name of the reigning Pope.—(4) The document was engrossed upon thick parchment, in an archaic hand, which, after the modern Roman style of writing came into use, became very artificial and ungraceful, and was known as *scrittura bollatica*. During the 17th cent. this writing and its contractions became so unfamiliar that it was customary to issue a *transsumptum*, or copy in ordinary handwriting, along with the official document.—(5) After the substance of the bull, and before the dating clause, we commonly find inserted certain imprecatory clauses: 'Nulli ergo,' etc., and 'Si quis autem, etc., though this rule was not invariable. It may be well to set down the precise form which these clauses ordinarily take: 'Nulli ergo omnino hominum liceat hanc paginam nostrae concessionis infringere vel ei ausu temerario contraire. Si quis autem hoc attemptare presumpserit, indignationem omnipotentis Dei et beatorum Petri et Pauli, apostolorum ejus, se noverit incursurum.' Sometimes these imprecatory clauses are further followed by directions as to the execution and publication of the bull, or again by clauses of derogation, beginning: 'Non obstantibus constitutionibus et ordinationibus apostolicis, privilegiis quoque et indultis,' etc.

Some of the distinctions here indicated, notably the presence or omission of the imprecatory clauses, correspond with a distinction in the bulls themselves, which in the 13th and subsequent centuries are commonly classified as either *tituli* or *mandamenta*. The *tituli* were for the most part acts of grace (*indulgentiae*), concessions of privileges, confirmations, decisions of points of doctrine or law, etc. On the other hand, the *mandamenta* represented the ordinary correspondence of the Holy See. They were orders of the Pope, commissions to conduct an inquiry or to reform abuses, letters written to communicate some important intelligence, or to invite the co-operation of temporal sovereigns, or to prescribe a line of conduct for clergy or laity. Their tenor nearly always includes the formula 'per apostolica scripta mandamus,' or 'precipiendo mandamus'—a phrase for which the words 'rogamus,' 'exhortamur,' 'monemus' are sometimes substituted. Of these two classes the *tituli*, though of less interest to the student of history, were the more solemn in form, the imprecatory clauses being rarely omitted. The writing was elegant, and carefully executed according to certain strict rules, while the *bulla* was attached with cords of red and yellow silk. On the other hand, the *mandamenta* showed both in substance and form that they were intended to serve a more temporary purpose. The writing was in a more flowing hand, less ornate and less carefully executed, the imprecatory clauses were generally omitted, and the *bulla* was attached with cords of hemp. Throughout we recognize the tendency to simplify and to make the issue of bulls, especially

those of an administrative nature, more expeditious. But though the formalities observed in the preparation of a *mandamentum* of the 14th cent. fell far short of what was needed for a consistorial bull, still even in the former the endorsements of the various officials of the chancery, mostly entered upon the *plica*, or fold of the parchment, show that it must have passed through a large number of different hands—*abbreviatores*, *scriptores*, *registratores*, and finally the department of the *bullatores*, who affixed the seal (see Baumgarten, *Aus Kanzlei und Kammer*, Freiburg, 1907). No wonder we find that under the pontificate of Eugenius IV. (1431) a new form of Papal letter of a more summary kind was instituted by the Holy See, and that henceforth this was commonly employed in all matters requiring despatch.

This was known as a 'brief,' and it soon almost entirely took the place of the earlier *mandamentum*. A brief was a document written upon fine vellum, and sealed, not with a leaden *bulla*, but with a wax seal bearing the imprint of the 'Fisherman's ring.' It was written in a fine cursive Roman hand, and at the head occurs simply the Pope's name standing by itself thus:

EUGENIUS PP. IIII.

Immediately below this, the Pope greets the addressee in the vocative, according to his rank and condition, *e.g.* 'Dilecte fili,' or 'Carissime in Christo fili,' or 'Venerabilis pater in Domino,' etc., with the salutation 'salutem et apostolicam benedictionem.' In constitutions of a more solemn and permanent character we often find, instead of this greeting, the formula, also already long familiar in bulls, 'ad perpetuam rei memoriam.' Another distinctive feature of briefs is the final clause expressing the date. It almost invariably takes this form: 'Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, sub annulo Piscatoris, die IX Novembris MDXCII pont. nri. anno primo.' In contradistinction to the dating of bulls, which generally, though not invariably, at any rate down to the pontificate of Innocent XII., is to be referred to the years of the Incarnation, beginning 25th March, the years are here to be understood as those of the Nativity. Beneath the date the name of the Cardinal Secretary of Briefs is usually written as an attestation of authenticity.

With regard to the form of instrument chosen, let us note that this has little to do with the importance or binding force of any Papal pronouncement. The decretals, upon which the fabric of Canon Law was largely built up, almost invariably took the form of lesser bulls, *i.e.* simple letters or *mandamenta*. The first known *Bulla in Coena Domini*, containing the 'Reserved Cases' of the Holy See, issued by Urban V. in 1364, was a *mandamentum*. No doubt there was at times a very natural wish to impart some extraneous solemnity to document of dogmatic importance. For example, the constitution of Benedict XII., beginning 'Benedictus Deus' (29th Jan. 1336)—which decides a controversy regarding the Beatific Vision, and contains the notable formula, 'Hac in perpetuum valitura constitutione auctoritate apostolica definimus'—was issued as a *titulus* with imprecatory clauses. The dispensation for the marriage of Henry VIII. with his brother's widow was drawn up first in great haste, and secretly transmitted to Spain as a brief, while it was afterwards more publicly expedited as a bull; but the brief, its authenticity once admitted, was of just the same force as the bull. So again, Benedict XIV., when compiling the first volume of his own pontifical acts, and sending it officially to the University of Bologna as a collection of authoritative rulings in the Canon Law, declares that it contains 'nostras Constitutiones, videlicet Bullas, et aliqua Brevia, Litteras Encyclicas et alia huiusmodi,' making no distinction between the authority attaching to these different instruments. So, in more modern times, the Society of Jesus, suppressed by Clement XIV. with a brief, was restored by Pius VII. in a bull; while Leo XIII. used a bull to re-establish the Catholic hierarchy in Scotland, though Pius IX., twenty-eight years before, had issued only a brief to effect the same purpose in England. The seal with the 'Fisherman's ring,' which is the distinctive mark of the brief, was formerly always impressed upon red wax within a loop formed by a twisted strip of parchment, and arranged in such a way that the seal served at the same time to close and secure the folded sheet of vellum to which it was affixed. The 'Fisherman's ring' is mentioned in 1265 as used by the Pope to authenticate his private correspondence, and is probably much older. The earliest existing impression is said to have been discovered in the treasury of the Sancta Sanctorum at the Lateran. It belongs to the time of Nicholas III. (1277–1280), and represents St. Peter fishing with a rod and line; but the identification seems somewhat doubtful. In the later examples St. Peter is represented in a boat drawing in the net.

In quite modern times some notable modifications have taken place in the rules of the Papal chancery regarding the issue of bulls and briefs. Since 1842 the impression of the 'Fisherman's ring' upon red wax attached to briefs has given way to a stamp in red ink bearing the same device. In the case of bulls, the *scrittura bollatica* engrossed upon great sheets of parchment has for ordinary purposes been discarded—this took place at the beginning of the pontificate of Leo XIII. in 1878—and the document is now written in the same legible Roman hand which is used for briefs, while the leaden *bulla* has given way in most cases to a stamp in red ink that can more conveniently be sent by post. It is likely also that the complicated formalities, which till quite lately attended the ordinary expedition of bulls by the *via di cancelleria*, will be much simplified in consequence of the recent re-organization of the Roman Curia.

Other Apostolic Letters.—As a further consequence of the delays and complications attending the issue of bulls, another new kind of instrument came into use at the end of the 15th cent. under Innocent VIII. It was a species of brief known as a *motu proprio*, and it was without any authenticating seal. As its name imports, it professed to be a document issued by the Pontiff of his own initiative, without any instance being made to him by interested parties. The documents of this class, which continued to be very common during the 16th cent., closely resembled briefs in their general features, but there are differences in the manner of dating, and, of course, there is no mention of the 'Fisherman's ring.' On the other hand, the words 'motu proprio' are always introduced, and occur not uncommonly as the initial words of the document. For the most part these *motu proprios* were concerned with the administration, ecclesiastical or civil, of the city of Rome and the government of the Papal States, and, in contrast to the more formal bulls and briefs, were frequently couched in Italian. From the insistence which their form seemed to lay upon the Papal initiative, they were regarded by foreign governments, notably by that of France, with disfavour, and treated as an encroachment upon the liberties of the Gallican Church.

In more modern times, the Roman Pontiffs, when wishing to impart instruction to the clergy and laity of the Church over which they rule, especially in matters which require somewhat elaborate treatment, have most commonly had recourse to an

'**encyclical.**' As the term imports, this is in form a circular letter intended to be passed on from one to another of a group of persons, but in practice it is a letter addressed to all the bishops in communion with the Holy See, or at least to all the bishops of a single district or province. The term 'encyclical letter' has been in use from an early date, but it was not commonly adopted for Papal documents before the 18th century. Since then it has come increasingly into favour, and Pius IX., Leo XIII., and Pius X. have issued numerous and very lengthy encyclicals, dealing not only with dogmatic questions, but also with problems that are primarily social and ethical in their scope. One of the most famous of these encyclicals was that of Pius IX., *Quanta cura* (8th Dec. 1864), of which the main purport was to condemn the principles of Naturalism (*i.e.* the exclusion of religion from the government of human society), to denounce Socialism and Communism, and to vindicate the sacred rights of family life; but it is perhaps principally remembered on account of the 'Syllabus' of condemned errors which was published along with it. Leo XIII., again, published a long and very remarkable series of encyclicals, dealing with a number of modern questions, *e.g.* the encyclical *Immutabilis* (21st Apr. 1878), on the evils of the times; *Arcanum divinae sapientiae* (10th Feb. 1880), on Christian marriage and family life; *Diuturnum illud* (29th June 1881), on the origin of civil authority; *Immortale Dei* (1st Nov. 1885), on the Christian constitution of States; *Libertas praestantissimum* (20th June 1881), on true liberty; *Rerum novarum* (16th May 1891), on the Labour question; and *Satis cognitum* (29th June 1896), on religious unity. Most of these utterances have been collected and translated, *e.g.* by J. Wynne in *The Great Encyclical Letters of Leo XIII.* (New York, 1903), and by W. Eyre, *The Pope and the People* (London, 1897).

The present Pope, Pius X., has also shown special favour for this form of manifesto, and many of his instructions have taken this shape: *e.g.* his first letter to the clergy and faithful of France, *Vehementer nos* (11th Feb. 1906); and the condemnation of Modernism, *Pascendi dominici gregis* (8th Sept. 1907), with very many others. In form an encyclical is simply a letter, which in its *inscriptio* mentions the 'Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and other local Ordinaries,' and concludes with the Apostolic blessing and a simple date including the year of the pontificate. The Pope's name 'Pius PP. X.' appears at the foot. It is generally held by Catholic theologians that the mere fact of an encyclical being addressed to the whole of Christendom does not constitute it an *ex cathedra* pronouncement, even if it deals with dogmatic matters. The degree in which the infallible *magisterium* of the Papacy is involved must be judged from the terms used in the document itself, and from attendant circumstances. This question is discussed with some fullness in Choupin, *Valeur et décisions doctrinales et disciplinaires du Saint-Siège* (Paris, 1908).

Another form of Papal utterance which calls for notice is the '**allocution,**' which is an address delivered by the Pontiff to the Cardinals assembled in secret consistory. This address is sometimes printed and published by order of the Pope, who chooses this way of making known his judgment or wishes with regard to questions, often semi-political, which are of pressing importance. But, of course, this pronouncement is not a Papal letter, and cannot even in a wider sense be classed as a bull.

The remaining words, which are used to describe documents emanating from the Papal chancery, are of a general character, and for the most part rather loosely used. For example, almost any kind of instrument may be described as a '**rescript,**' but strictly the term should be limited to some form of answer to an application addressed to the Holy See. Such answers in early times often began with the words, 'Significavit nobis dilectus filius,' and ended with the formula, 'Deus te incolumem servet.' Another very general word is '**constitution,**' and this may be correctly applied to any written act which determines some question submitted, or lays down a rule to be followed.

With reference to the collection of Papal bulls and letters, it is to be noted that all the extant editions of the *Bullarium Romanum*, so far as regards mediæval documents, are of a very unsatisfactory character. The *Bullarium Romanum* was originally nothing but a private compilation, first formed by one Laertius Cherubini at the end of the 16th century. Its purpose was to print certain Papal constitutions which had been issued since the formation of the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, and which, though of great importance to students of law, were not accessible in any collected form. Naturally such a work did not concern itself much with the Papal letters of remote ages. It was the recent utterances which were important for the compiler's purpose. The various editions which followed greatly enlarged the collection and brought it up to date; but even in the scholarly work of Cocquelines, who edited the great *Bullarium Romanum* (printed in Rome in 32 volumes, between 1739 and 1762), nothing but the most meagre gleanings are presented of the Papal letters issued during the first 1500 years of the Church's history. For these early letters the reader must be referred to Coustant, *Epistolae Pontificum Romanorum* (extending to the year 440), and to Thiele's continuation (which brought the collection down to 553), but, most conveniently, to the already mentioned *Regesta* of Jaffe-Lowenfeld with the continuation by Potthast (which covers the whole period from the beginning to the 14th century). Special attention has, of course, been paid to certain isolated pontificates of importance. For example, the letters of St. Gregory the Great have been edited with great care in the quarto series of the *MGH*, by P. Ewald and L. Hartmann, while the Papal letters to Charlemagne and Louis the Pious have been studied by Carl Hampe, also in the *MGH*. Again, under the title of *Italia Pontificia*, a most thorough piece of work has been undertaken by P. F. Kehr in calendaring the 'privileges' and other Papal documents connected with the churches of Italy. Further, we must note that the pontificate of Innocent III., from which time onward, as stated above, the Papal *Regesta* are preserved, marks a period of much fuller knowledge. The *Regesta* of Innocent III. and of Honorius III., in part, have been published in the *Patrology* of Migne, while that of Honorius III. has subsequently been re-edited. None, however, of these Papal *Regesta* seems to contain copies of all the bulls issued during any pontificate, and consequently the fact that any document is lacking in the official register is no sufficient proof of its spuriousness. It is probable that for such registration, constituting, as it did, an additional safeguard of authenticity in case of dispute, a fee was demanded, and that registration was denied to those who were unwilling to pay the fee. During recent years a great effort has been made to publish the *Regesta* of the remaining Popes of the 13th and following centuries. The chief work has been done by the École Française de Rome with results which may be thus summarized:

Regesta completely edited.

Benedict XI. (1303–1304), ed. C. Grandjean; 1 vol.
Nicholas IV. (1288–1292), ed. E. Langlois; 2 vols.
Honorius IV. (1285–1287), ed. M. Prou; 1 vol.

Regesta in progress.

Gregory IX. (1227–1241), ed. L. Auvray; 3 vols. (two completed).
Innocent IV. (1243–1254), ed. E. Berger; 4 vols. (three completed).
Alexander IV. (1254–1261), ed. Bourel de la Roncière and others; 2 vols. (one nearly complete).
Urban IV. (1261–1264), ed. J. Guiraud; 4 vols. (three completed).
Clement IV. (1265–1268), ed. E. Jordan; 1 vol. (nearly complete).
Gregory X. and John XXI. (1271–1277), ed. J. Guiraud and L. Cadier; 1 vol. (nearly complete).
Nicholas III. (1277–1280), ed. J. Gay; 1 vol. (begun).
Martin IV. (1281–1285), ed. ?; 1 vol. (begun).
Boniface VIII. (1294–1303), ed. G. Digard, M. Faucon, A. Thomas; 3 vols. (1 vol. complete).

Besides these, the École Française de Rome has undertaken the publication of the letters of the Avignon Popes which have reference to French affairs. Amongst these considerable progress has been made with the letters of John XXII. (1316–1334) and Benedict XII. (1334–1342). Further, the École Belge de Rome has recently begun the publication of the *Regesta* of Clement VI. under the editorship of Dom U. Berlière.

As regards England in particular, an important undertaking has been for some time in progress under the general title of *A Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland.* This work, begun by the late W. H. Bliss and continued by J. A. Twemlow, has now extended to nine volumes, bringing the record down to the middle of the 15th cent., and it provides short summaries in English of all documents in the Roman *Regesta* which have any reference to the British Isles.

Amongst other isolated efforts may be mentioned the Benedictine edition of the *Regesta* of Clement v. (1305–1314), and Cardinal Hergenrother's incomplete calendar of the bulls and other documents of Leo x. At a much earlier period, A. Theiner, librarian of the Vatican, published, chiefly from the *Regesta*, large numbers of Papal bulls, etc., dealing with various countries of Europe—the British Isles, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, etc., among the number. Special *Bullaria*, chiefly collections of 'privileges,' to which formerly the name *Mare Magnum* was often applied, have also been published for most of the great Religious Orders and for some of the Roman Congregations.

LITERATURE.—Regarded as a branch of the science of 'Diplomatics,' the subject of Papal bulls and briefs possesses an abundant literature. A very large number of spurious documents of this kind have always been in existence, and the detection of these has exercised the acumen of scholars from quite an early period. Naturally the Popes themselves have at various times prohibited the fabrication of Papal letters and 'privileges,' under the severest spiritual penalties; and many references to the subject will be found among the bulls of such Pontiffs as Alexander III. and Innocent III. The foundations of the true science of diplomatic criticism were laid in Mabillon's great work, *De Re Diplomatica* (1681–1704), and this was further developed and systematized a little later by his fellow Benedictines, Dom Toustain and Dom Tassin, in their *Nouveau Traité de Diplomatique*, in six volumes quarto. For a compendious modern introduction to the subject, the reader may most conveniently be referred to A. Giry, *Manuel de Diplomatique* (Paris, 1894), and to the section on Papal diplomatics contributed by Schmitz-Kallenberg to H. Meister's *Grundriss der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1906, vol. i. pp. 172–230), both of which works contain ample bibliographies. Besides the treatises mentioned in the course of the foregoing article, special reference should be made to H. Bresslau's *Handbuch der Urkundenlehre*, still, unfortunately, incomplete; to Pflugk-Harttung's great collection of facsimiles, *Specimina Selecta Chartarum Pontificum Romanorum* (3 vols., Stuttgart, 1887); and to books and papers by P. Kehr, Tangl, Diekamp, Mühlbacher, and others. Many of these contributions have appeared in the *Mittheil. des Instituts f. Österreichs Geschichtsforschung*, or in the Gottingen *Nachrichten* (Phil.-hist. Classe). The newly founded *Archiv für Urkundenforschung*, edited by Brandi, also contains some most valuable work of this kind. For the practical working of the Papal chancery, the *Practica Cancellariae Apostolicae*, edited by Schmitz-Kallenberg (Munich, 1904), the work of Baumgarten, *Aus Kanzlei und Kammer* (Freiburg, 1907); and that of E. von Ottenthal, *Regulae Cancellariae Apostolicae* (Innsbruck, 1888), are of great importance. Good work of the same kind has also been done by French scholars, notably M. Léopold Delisle and the Comte de Mas Latrie.

From the legal point of view, all the larger treatises which touch on the sources of the Canon Law devote a certain amount of space to the question of Papal bulls and letters. It will be sufficient to mention here (besides the great works of Phillips, Hinschius, von Scherer, and Wernz): Maassen, *Gesch. der Quellen und Lit. d. can. Rechts*, i. (1870); J. F. von Schulte, *Gesch. der Quellen u. Lit. des can. Rechts*, 3 vols. (1875–80); A. Tardif, *Histoire des sources du droit canonique* (1887); C. Mirbt, *Quellen zur Gesch. des Papsttums und des röm. Katholizismus* (1901). Much useful information about the building up of Roman Case Law will be found in F. W. Maitland's *Roman Canon Law in the Church of England* (1898). The Catholic standpoint regarding the pronouncements of such mediæval Popes as Gregory VII., Innocent III., and Boniface VIII. may be gathered from Hergenröther's *Catholic Church and Christian State* (Eng. tr., Lond. 1876)—a work which grew out of the 'Janus' controversy; or, better, from the various articles in the *Staatslexikon* (Herder, Freiburg), edited by Bruder and Bachem, the 3rd ed. of which is now in course of publication.

HERBERT THURSTON.

BUNYAN.—1. Life.—John Bunyan, the greatest of allegorists, and also the greatest exponent of the Puritan doctrine in popular form, was born at Elstow near Bedford in 1628, and died in London in 1688. His life thus covered the troubled period of the Civil War, the Commonwealth, and the Restoration, and ended on the eve of the Revolution. His origin was humble,—'low and inconsiderable,' he calls it,—his father being a tinker or itinerant brazier. He himself adopted the same trade. He learned to read and write, 'according to the rate of other poor men's children,' but his small stock of education was quickly lost. He seems to have had a somewhat nervous and morbid childhood, disturbed by dreams and fears. About 1645, when he was still but a lad, he served as a soldier. He himself does not say on which side he was enrolled, and his biographers have either followed their own fancy in the matter or have been content to regard the point as undecided. But probably Dr. Brown's carefully considered verdict would not now be disputed, based as it is upon a survey of the local circumstances and the 'strong set of the stream in the Parliamentary direction': 'It seems scarcely likely that he would think his way to independent conclusions so wide apart from those of his neighbours, break through all the carefully kept lines of the Parliamentary forces . . . and join the Royalist army with the king' (*Life*, p. 49). Bunyan owed much to his first wife. She restored to him the simple education he had lost by disuse; and she brought to him his first impressions of practical religion. They were very poor,—'not having so much household stuff as a dish or a spoon betwixt us both,'—but she brought with her two little books. The titles of these are noteworthy. They are seeds of a harvest. One was *The Plaine Man's Path-way to Heaven, Wherein every man may clearly see, whether he shall be saved or damned*, by Arthur Dent. The other was Lewis Bayly's well-known book, *The Practice of Pietie, directing a Christian how to walke that he may please God*. These little books must have left a deep mark upon the young man's mind. The former is written entirely in dialogue form. The latter, though somewhat heavy and common-place as a whole, has near its close a long 'colloquie' between Christ and the soul, so simple, tender, and beautiful that Bunyan himself might almost have written it.* We have possibly here the germ of his love for dialogue, both in allegory and in preaching.

After his marriage there came a period of spiritual upheaval lasting about four years, and recorded with wonderful power and skill in his *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners* (1666). This book is the key to all his other writings: it is his experience compressed; the other books are his experience writ large, for in his case, as in that of St. Paul, doctrine and experience are in continual contact. No summary can do justice to the vividness of this great little autobiography; and this period of his life, when his soul was in the throes of birth, can be suitably described only in his own words. It was a period of many difficulties about such matters as election, the day of grace, the sin against the Holy Ghost; of many sacrifices—one game and pleasure after another being given up in the hope of finding peace; of many unsatisfied yearnings and aspirations,—'Oh! how I now loved those words that spake of a Christian's calling! as when the Lord said to one, Follow me; and to another, Come after me: and oh, thought I, that he would say so to me too: how gladly would I run after him!' It was a period of swift alternations of feeling, ranging from moments of an ecstatic joy—which lasted all too short a time, and was quickly caught up again, like Peter's sheet, to heaven—to moods of morbid self-torture, as when voices seemed to tempt him to sell Christ and he persuaded himself that he had sold his Saviour.† He himself admits that there was something distraught and unbalanced in his condition at this time: 'This is the man that hath his dwelling among the tombs with the dead; that

* '. . . *Soule*: Lord, wherefore wouldest thou be lift up upon a Crosse? *Christ*: That I might lift thee up with me to heaven. *S.*: Lord, why wouldest thou have thine armes nayled abroad? *C.*: That I might embrace thee more lovingly, my sweet soule. *S.*: Lord, wherefore was thy side opened with a Speare? *C.*: That thou mightest have a way to come nearer my heart. *S.*: Lord, wherefore wouldst thou be buried? *C*: That thy sinnes might never rise up in Iudgement against thee. . .'

† Cf. the 'Meditation upon Peep of Day' from *A Book for Boys and Girls*

'I oft, though it be peep of day, don't know
Whether 'tis Night, whether 'tis Day or no
I fancy that I see a little light;
But cannot yet distinguish day from night.
I hope, I doubt, but steady yet I be not,
I am not at a point, the Sun I see not.
Thus 'tis with such, who Grace but now possest.
They know not yet, if they are curst or blest'

is always crying out and cutting himself with stones.' But the essence of his case did not lie in its morbid extremes, but in a genuine conviction of sin which was the Divine preparation for the comfort of the Cross. Gradually he found his way to peace, the two chief influences being Luther's commentary upon *Galatians*,—'most fit for a wounded conscience,'—and the ministry of John Gifford. This man had formerly been a loose liver and an officer in the Royalist army, then a physician in Bedford; finally from 1650, being now a changed man, he became the pastor of the newly formed Nonconformist congregation in Bedford. He was doubtless the prototype of 'Evangelist'; he helped Bunyan the pilgrim towards the wicket gate and the shining light, and received him into the fellowship of the congregation in 1653. From that year until 1660 the congregation met in St. John's Church at Bedford, for the experiment of a comprehensive national Church was being tried under Cromwell, and Gifford had been presented to the living of St. John's.

In 1655, Bunyan removed from Elstow to Bedford. In the same year he lost his first wife, and was also called by his brethren to open his lips as a preacher: 'They desired me, and that with much earnestness, that I would be willing at sometimes to take in hand, in one of the meetings, to speak a word of exhortation unto them.' His message proved immediately acceptable: people came by hundreds to hear him; during the period of tolerance he preached more than once even in parish churches. But the Restoration brought the Act of Uniformity. Even as early as March 1658 there had been trouble. The minutes of the Bedford church mention a meeting 'for counsaile what to doe with respect to the indictment against bro: Bunyan at ye Assizes for preaching at Eaton.' Nothing seems to have come of that, but 1660 brought his arrest and the beginning of his imprisonment. There has been much uncertainty as to the number and places of his incarcerations, but once more Dr. Brown's careful weighing of evidence must decide the matter, reinforced as it has been by the discovery of the actual warrant of arrest for his second and shorter imprisonment in the end of 1675. The first imprisonment was in the County Gaol at Bedford, and lasted for twelve years, with a break in the middle, and with a considerable amount of liberty at times, varied with periods of greater strictness. He made tagged laces for his own support; wrote *Grace Abounding* and several other books; and preached in the gaol, and occasionally outside it. The second was in the Town Gaol on Bedford Bridge: it lasted six months, and produced the first part of *The Pilgrim's Progress*. When the first imprisonment drew to a close, the prisoner found new and enlarged service waiting for him. The following appears in the records of the Bedford church for 21st Jan. 1672

'After much seeking God by prayer and sober conference formerly had, the Congregation did at this meeting with joynt consent (signifyed by solemne lifting up of their hands) call forth and appoint our brother John Bunyan to the pastorall office or eldership And he, accepting thereof, gave up himself to serve Christ and his Church in that charge; and received of the Elders the right hand of fellowship'

An orchard was purchased, and a barn that stood upon it was converted into a meeting-place, which was the home of the congregation until long after Bunyan's death.

From this point onwards his fame as a preacher, aided by his growing popularity as a writer, spread far and wide. He became known as 'Bishop Bunyan,' and travelled in many directions through England. He was often in London, where crowds would gather to hear him even at 7 o'clock in the morning. Some of the secrets of his success as a preacher may be guessed from his printed sermons, even though these in their revised and enlarged form may differ somewhat from the spoken word. He used strong and simple language,—his whole mind being saturated with the English Bible. He spoke with intense conviction, especially at first, upon the guilt and power of sin: 'I preached what I felt, what I smartingly did feel. . . . I went myself in chains to preach to them in chains, and carried that fire in my own conscience that I persuaded them to be aware of.' Later he gave more emphasis to 'Jesus Christ in all His offices, relations, and benefits,' and 'the mystery of the union of Christ'; but still, he says, 'I preached what I saw and felt.' There must have been a strongly dramatic element in his preaching, as in his enlargement of St. Peter's words, 'Repent every one of you,' in *The Jerusalem Sinner Saved*:

'*Objector*: But I was one of them that plotted to take away his life. May I be saved by him? *Peter*: Every one of you. *Obj.*: But I was one of them that bare false witness against him. Is there grace for me? *Peter*: For every one of you. *Obj.*: But I was one of them that cried out, Crucify him, crucify him; and desired that Barabbas the murderer might live, rather than him. What will become of me, think you? *Peter*: I am to preach repentance and remission of sins to every one of you, says Peter. . . Oh! what a blessed *Every one of you* is here!'

And his message must have been full of a limitless pity and tenderness, the true spirit of an evangelist, the spirit of the Christ whose mercy he had tasted for himself. John Owen is said to have remarked to Charles II. that he would gladly give up all his learning for the tinker's power of reaching the heart, and it is very evident that one of Bunyan's secrets of reaching the heart was just his intense compassion. 'Mark Rutherford,' himself no mean stylist, selects the following passage from *The Heavenly Footman* as unmatched in its simple eloquence:

'To encourage thee a little farther, set to the work, and when thou hast run thyself down weary, then the Lord Jesus will take thee up and carry thee. Is not this enough to make any poor soul begin his race? Thou perhaps cryest, O but I am feeble, I am lame, etc.; well, but Christ hath a bosom; consider, therefore, when thou hast run thyself down weary, he will put thee in his bosom. He shall gather the lambs with his arms, and carry them in his bosom, and shall gently lead those that are with young. This is the way that fathers take to encourage their children, saying: Run, sweet babe, while thou art weary, and then I will take thee up and carry thee. He will gather his lambs with his arms and carry them in his bosom; when they are weary, they shall ride.'

There is more than eloquence in such a passage: there is the tenderness of a true shepherd of souls.

In addition to his wide-spread work as preacher and evangelist, Bunyan played a not unimportant part in the earlier history of the Baptist denomination, as an advocate of open communion. The church of which he was pastor had been founded upon a broad basis:

'The principle upon which they thus entered into fellowship one with another, and upon which they did afterwards receive those that were added to their body and fellowship, was *faith in Christ and holiness of life* without respect to this or that circumstance or opinion in outward and circumstantiall things.'

So runs the old church record, and both Gifford and Bunyan seem to have been in sympathy with the basis. Dr. Brown says that, though Gifford is often called a Baptist, there is no evidence to prove him such; and though Bunyan was himself baptized by immersion in the Ouse, he was drawn into controversy with some of the stricter Baptists who found fault with him for his principle of open communion. The substance of his treatise, *Differences in Judgment about Water Baptism no bar to Communion* (1673), and of various other pamphlets and passages, amounts to this—that the point is one for the judgment of the individual, and that the Church dare not reject those who are true believers, whatever their opinion on this point. 'Christ, not baptism, is the way to the sheepfold. . . . Baptism also may be abused, and is, when more is laid upon it by us than is commanded by God.' He gives us his own preference and practice

in a phrase in *The Heavenly Footman*, when, after bidding his readers beware of Quakers, Ranters, Freewillers, he adds, 'Also do not have too much company with some Anabaptists, though I go under that name myself.' It is a little surprising to find that one who bore the name 'Anabaptist' should have two of his children christened after his own immersion—one at Elstow in 1654 and one at St. Cuthbert's, Bedford, in 1672. Can it mean that neither Bunyan's first wife, nor his second, whom he married in 1660 and who proved herself during his tribulation to be a woman of some courage and character, shared his personal view, and that he did not care enough about the matter to insist upon his own preference?

2. **Works.** — According to the list given by Dr. Brown, based upon that of Bunyan's friend, Charles Doe, Bunyan produced in all 60 works, one for each year of his life. But this includes such items as *A Map of Salvation*, and various tracts and poetical pieces of small bulk, as well as the longer controversial, evangelistic, and allegorical works. *Grace Abounding* is referred to above. Of the others, apart from the three greatest, the most noteworthy are: *Some Gospel-Truths opened*, interesting now chiefly as Bunyan's first book, published in 1656, a fiery protest against Quaker Mysticism, clear in its style and orderly in its arrangement, but giving a hint only in an occasional phrase of the greater riches that were to come; the various books, such as *Come and Welcome to Jesus Christ*, *The Jerusalem Sinner Saved*, and *The Heavenly Footman*, which preserve for us the style and substance of Bunyan's actual preaching; his Catechism, *Instructions for the Ignorant*; and *A Book for Boys and Girls, or Country Rhimes for Children*. This last is quaint and valuable in itself, and is perhaps the *fons et origo* of a slender but sparkling literary stream which has flowed intermittently through the generations, and has not yet spent itself—witness *The Child's Garden of Verses*. Probably the modern child, accustomed to the skilful and dainty catering of R. L. Stevenson and others, would count Bunyan's verses, except in one or two cases, somewhat heavy and didactic. Yet to the boys and girls of the 17th cent. these 'rhimes' may have been almost as much of a relief and joy as R. L. S. and Edward Lear to the happier children of the later 19th century.

Bunyan's poetry has been severely criticized. It may be admitted that in verse he seldom found his liberty, and that his more extended poems are doggerel. Yet in this region Bunyan is better worth knowing than the critics would have us believe. Many of his verses are at least melodious, pithy, and memorable. And something is to be said for the poetic quality of the man who wrote the song of the Shepherd Boy, and these lines *Upon the Swallow*:

'This pretty Bird, Oh! how she flies and sings!
But could she do so if she had not Wings?
Her Wings bespeak my Faith, her Songs my Peace,
When I believe and sing, my Doubtings cease.'

The first part of *The Pilgrim's Progress* was published in 1678, the second part about seven years later. The book was an immediate and amazing success. Three editions of the first part were sold in a year, and in the second and third of these the original scheme was wisely added to — Worldly Wiseman, Mr. By-end's relations, and Giant Despair's wife being among these happy afterthoughts. In Bunyan's lifetime 100,000 copies were sold. It is the greatest of allegories. It is the fine flower of Puritan theology and experience. It may be called the first great English novel. 'John Bunyan may pass for the father of our novelists,' says Hallam. Into it, with a pen that had found freedom and mastery, he put all his marvellous powers of observation: the man who has given us Mr. Talkative and Mr. Fearing went about the world with his eyes and ears open. Into it he also put all his own experience, so rich in sorrows and in joys. The temptation is strong to suggest originals for the allegorical scenes and personages. Was Elstow Abbey the House Beautiful, and was the Slough of Despond suggested by the miry fields near Bunyan's birthplace? Was Judge Jeffreys or Sir John Kelynge the original of Judge Hate-good? Was Faithful's voice, overheard in the valley, the voice of Martin Luther? And was Christiana Bunyan's second wife and Mercy his first? These things are better left vague. But we touch the real source of the whole matter when we study Bunyan's own experience. Here, *e.g.*, is the original of the Slough of Despond in *Grace Abounding*: 'I would in these days, often in my greatest agonies, even flounce towards the promise, as the horses do towards sound ground, that yet stick in the mire.' There have been very varying judgments as to the value of the second part of *The Pilgrim's Progress*. Its geographical interest is, of course, less than that of the first, because the story leads the reader along a familiar path; and the dialogue is in places weaker. But Mr. Froude's severe disparagement is entirely misleading, if only because of the extraordinary richness of the second part as a book of character. Mr. Brisk, Mr. Honest, Greatheart, Mercy, Mr. Fearing, Madam Bubble, and the rest are inimitable and immortal. But, indeed, criticism of *The Pilgrim's Progress*, if it be based on sympathy, soon loses itself in affection. Sir Walter Scott speaks for the multitude of Bunyan's readers when he says:

'John Bunyan's parable must be dear to many, as to us, from the recollection that in youth they were endued with permission to peruse it at times when all studies of a nature merely entertaining were prohibited' (*Quart. Rev.*, Oct. 1830).*

No other book except the Bible so unites the hearts of young and old, learned and simple, the lover of beauty and the lover of sanctity.

In *The Life and Death of Mr. Badman*, published in 1680, Bunyan made an attempt to tell the opposite story, and describe a pilgrimage from bad to worse. The attempt is not very successful. It is retarded by being cast in dialogue form throughout; it is weighted with amazing anecdotes, which, however interesting from their mere incredibility, distract attention from the main story; it loses itself in tedious discussions, *e.g.*, on the difference between cursing and swearing. But the pen that created the Pilgrim had not lost all its cunning. There are many passages acute in observation and happy in expression, like the phrase about Mr. Badman's 'mournful, sugared letters' to his creditors; and the book is full of Bunyan's keen observation and knowledge of life: 'I think I may truly say that, to the best of my remembrance, all the things that I here discourse of, I mean as to matters of fact, have been acted upon the stage of this world, even many times before mine eyes.' And the book has value still as a picture of the rougher and uglier side of English life in Bunyan's time. Perhaps the author's artistic restraint is never more finely exhibited than in giving Mr. Badman a quiet and peaceable deathbed.

In *The Holy War* (1682) Bunyan rose again almost to his own loftiest level, and created another allegory second only to *The Pilgrim's Progress*. The task in this case was more difficult. Though there is more Biblical foundation for the figure of a war than for that of a pilgrimage, the former is less easy to draw out into a connected story. Defects and inconsistencies are easily observable, *e.g.*, Mansoul seems now the soul of a man, now the soul of humanity. It is dangerous also to bring

* Cf. Macaulay in his Essay on 'John Bunyan': 'That wonderful book, while it obtains admiration from the most fastidious critics, is loved by those who are too simple to admire it.'

the Persons of the Trinity into action and dialogue. But if there be defects in construction, there is not a weak page in the actual writing, and the style throughout seems mysteriously to take on a quality kindred to its theme—something of the strength of a rampart, something of the sound of a trumpet. Once more observation and experience are manifest continually. Bunyan's soldiering serves him well in his battle scenes. His heart remembers how this sort of thing is done: the evolutions of Emmanuel's army, 'the handling of their arms and managing of their weapons of war, were marvellously taking to Mansoul and me.' The new modelling of Mansoul is a reflexion of the changes that were compulsorily brought about in the civic arrangements of towns like Bedford as Commonwealth or Monarchy got the upper hand. The setting up of a ministry in Mansoul is also full of echoes of times when the ecclesiastical foundations were unsettled, and contending ideals enjoyed alternate periods of supremacy. Bunyan handles all this with exhaustless skill and ingenuity: *e.g.*, there is a whole analysis of persecution, clear and complete, packed into one corner of the plot. When the Bloodmen were taken, they were had before the Prince, and

'he found them to be of three several counties, though they all came out of one land. One sort of them came out of Blindmanshire, and they were such as did ignorantly what they did. Another sort of them came out of Blindzealshire, and they did superstitiously what they did. The third sort of them came out of the town of Malice, in the county of Envy, and they did what they did out of spite and implacableness.'

In the scheme of this allegory, there is naturally less room for character-drawing than in the other, yet who can forget that deaf and angry man, old Mr. Prejudice, or the darling of Diabolus, Captain Anything? Moreover, in the dealings between Emmanuel and Mansoul there appears, as in all Bunyan ever wrote, his passionate love for his Lord, and the Lord's love and pity for his sinful but aspiring servants.

3. Place and influence.—Bunyan's influence was immediate and enormous, not in his own denomination only, not in his own country only. *The Pilgrim's Progress* was translated into Welsh in 1688, into Dutch in 1682, into German in 1703, into French in 1685. Bunyan's empire has grown steadily with the passing generations, mainly through this his best known book: perhaps the best criterion of its extent to-day is the fact that in the summer of 1909 the Religious Tract Society announces versions in 112 different languages and dialects. Even such an edition as that produced by J. M. Neale in 1853, with insertions and alterations in the worst possible taste, designed to make the book teach a different scheme of doctrine from that of its author, is a proof of Bunyan's wide sovereignty and of the appeal he makes to minds of many different types. In addition to the qualities alluded to incidentally above—his pictorial style, uniting the young and the old; his strong, simple, Biblical English, uniting the educated and the unlearned; his knowledge of life; his faithfulness to his own deep experience; his historical position as our great exponent of Puritanism at its best—the following may be mentioned as among the secrets of an influence so wide and enduring:

(*a*) Bunyan's real *originality.** This quality may be claimed for him even apart from the question of borrowed materials. Shakespeare can be original even when he is working over the story of some old chronicler: resurrection can be so managed as to be equivalent to creation. Much ingenuity, however, has been expended on the attempt to find a source for the Pilgrim-story. Guillaume de Guileville's *Le Pèlerinage de l'Homme* in Lydgate's version; Bernard's *The Isle of Man, or the Legal Proceedings in Manshire against Sin*; and other existing allegories or romances have been suggested as the source of Bunyan's inspiration; or it is alleged that he found his seed-thought, say, in *The Plaine Man's Path-way*, or in the letter of an Italian martyr in Foxe's *Booke of Martyrs*, which says, 'I will travel up to the New Jerusalem. . . . Behold, I have entered already on my journey.' Probably Bunyan gathered seed-thoughts everywhere, and plagiarized prodigiously from the open book of life. But the question of his literary originality is very carefully examined in the preface to Furnivall's edition of Lydgate's *de Guileville*, and the wise conclusion reached is this: 'In one Book alone, the Bible, supplemented by Bunyan's own experience, we may trace all the influences necessary for the production of *The Pilgrim's Progress.*'

(*b*) His *practical sagacity and ethical force.* Bunyan the evangelist does not altogether hide Bunyan the moralist: the two are one. 'He was securely weighted with unshifting ballast, the ballast of common sense.' The story of Mr. Badman's fraudulent bankruptcy shows how Bunyan had an eye for the insincerities and corruptions of the commercial world. Some of his counsels are startlingly close to modern problems of commercial morality: 'Art thou a seller and do things grow cheap? Set not thy hand to help or hold them up higher. Art thou a buyer and do things grow dear? Use no cunning or deceitful language to pull them down.' There is no thought more characteristic of Bunyan, in spite of his lurid pictures of the agonies of the lost, than this—that sin is hell; sin is the worm; sin is the fire; it would be better to be sinless in hell than to be a sinner in heaven.

(*c*) His *broad and genial humanity.* This shows itself in many ways,—not least in his kindly and hearty humour,—his portraits, such as those of Mr. Brisk, Talkative, Sir Having Greedy, Christiana and her comrades dancing over the fate of Giant Despair, his skill in inventing amusing and delightful names, and his way of poking fun at those whom he would gently rebuke. Still more strikingly does his breadth of humanity come out in his whole management of the Pilgrim's story. There are so few ecclesiastical waymarks that one would never guess the author's own position, and when Giant Pope is omitted the book can be used with profit and pleasure by Catholic readers. He avoids the temptation to which religious teachers of strongly marked experience often yield—the temptation to think that all others must walk in their footprints in order to be safe. This is finely brought out in the contrast between the experiences of Christian and Faithful in the first part, and in the room that is found in the second part for a rich variety of character and experience.

(*d*) *The note of the Evangel.* The most intimate and enduring secret of the hold that Bunyan has over multitudes of men is this, that he was so great a lover of men, and so passionately loyal to the supreme Lover of men. His friend Doe calls him 'a great convert'; and, because he was so great and so thorough a convert, he is a great exponent of the motives that have supreme converting power. Hence *The Pilgrim's Progress* is, as Coleridge calls

* Hallam, 'that niggard of applause,' has this: 'His success in a line of composition like the spiritual romance or allegory, which seems to have been frigid and unreadable in the few instances where it had been attempted, is doubtless enhanced by his want of all learning and his low station in life. He was therefore rarely, if ever, an imitator; he was never enchained by rules. Bunyan possessed in a remarkable degree the power of representation; his inventive faculty was considerable, but the other is his distinguishing excellence. He saw, and makes us see, what he describes; he is circumstantial without prolixity, and, in the variety and frequent change of his incidents, never loses sight of the unity of his allegorical fable' (*Lit. History*, iv. 331)

it, '*Summa Theologiae Evangelicae*.' And, in spite of the many changes of standpoint and vocabulary since Bunyan's day, he will still be for many generations to come the teacher and the friend of those who have no other explanation of their own deliverance than this: 'He hath given me rest by his sorrow and life by his death.'

LITERATURE.—The literature of this subject is now enormous. Among the biographies, that by **John Brown** (London, 1885; new ed. 1902) stands alone in its completeness, and in its wealth of extracts from historical sources such as the minutes of Bunyan's church. Among smaller biographies and critical studies there may be mentioned: **Macaulay**, *Essays*, 'John Bunyan' (1831); **J. A Froude** in the 'English Men of Letters' series (1887); 'Mark Rutherford' in the 'Literary Lives' series (1905); lives by **Southey** (1831) and **Canon Venables** (1888); lectures by **Dean Howson** in 'Companions for the Devout Life' (1877), and by **W Robertson Nicoll** in the 'Evangelical Succession' series (1884). There is also a large literature of exposition, devoted mainly to *The Pilgrim's Progress*. In addition to the older books, such as **Cheever** (1844), there are **Kerr Bain's** two volumes on *The People of the Pilgrimage* (1887)—unique in their thoroughness and in the almost too great weight of learning they bring to their task. The lecture-sermons of **A. Whyte** (two volumes on *The Pilgrim* [1893, 1894], one on *The Holy War* [1895], one on *Grace Abounding* [1908]), are also the product of deep knowledge, sympathy, and enthusiasm, and have done much to create a new public for Bunyan. A series of papers on *The Pilgrim* has recently been contributed by **J. Kelman** to *The Expository Times* (xvi. [1905] ff.). Among earlier fugitive pieces, **Sir Walter Scott's** review of Southey's *Life* in the *Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1830, is interesting, especially for its comparison and contrast between Bunyan and Spenser. The best vindication of Bunyan's originality is that alluded to above, in 10 pp. of the introduction to Furnivall's *de Guileville*. Bunyan's *Complete Works* have been edited by G. Offor and R. Philip, 3 vols., London, 1853 (new ed. 1862), and there are critical texts with notes and glossaries issued by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, and (the text alone) by the Cambridge University Press.

J. M. E. ROSS.

THE END OF VOL. II.

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