


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THE TURKISH TRANSFORMATION

A Study in Social and Religious Development

BY

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To
MY MOTHER AND FATHER

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THE TURKISH TRANSFORMATION

PREFATORY NOTE

Religious systems and religious thought in every section of the world are today undergoing severe periods of questioning and readjustment as men learn to control the forces of nature and lose their sense of dependence upon supernatural agencies. Islam is no exception. The last thirty-five years have seen it struck unmercifully by all the forces of scientific thought, machinery, and nationalism which developed in Christendom over a period of centuries and to which Christianity had to learn to adapt itself.

To make an exhaustive study of Islam's reaction to the influences which have been loosed upon it in recent years would require several volumes and many years of careful study and travel. For Islam cannot be treated as a unit. It includes within its ranks diversified sects with beliefs as varied as those of Christendom, which includes nominally the worshipers of Abyssinia and Concord, Massachusetts. In Islam may be found the puritanical Wahhabis of the Arabian Desert and the broad-minded followers of Baha'ullah. Their reactions to innovations will be as different as are those of Abyssinians and Unitarians. "Islam" is a term which must be used very guardedly when generalizing.

Of the composite mass which goes to make up Islam, no unit today presents a more interesting or amazing picture than Turkey in its eager rush to escape from the toils of ignorance and superstition which have for so many years retarded her progress. When one remembers the centuries of bitterness and bloodshed, of jealousy and misunderstanding,

in the relations of Islam and Christianity, and when one realizes that Turkey, long the champion of Moslem orthodoxy and most redoubtable aggressor for the faith of Mohammed, is now making herself into a Western nation according to the very pattern of those European states which for so many years she despised and feared, he cannot deny that he is witnessing one of history's most significant phenomena. Here before our very eyes is occurring a transition of civilizations, the abandonment of practices which originated in Arabia, based upon union of religion and politics, the adoption of patterns which developed in Europe, based upon separation of religion and politics. Far-reaching consequences of this transition may be observed in government, law, education, and social structure. Religion, which but little more than a half-century ago was the test of citizenship, has been severed from the constitution. Islam, shorn of its prestige, strives to adapt itself to a new situation wherein it must confine itself to the domain of conscience.

These alterations which are going on in Anatolia are important not only as the Westernization of an oriental people but also as providing a crucial experiment for all Islam. If the religion of Mohammed is able to function effectively in a state which does not regard the Koran as the ultimate source of all legislation, then certainly we shall have visible evidence of its adaptability and enduring vitality. Other Moslem countries, however much they may berate the Turks as backsliders, must needs observe developments carefully. Sir Mohammed Iqbal points out that "among the Muslim nations of to-day, Turkey alone has shaken off its dogmatic slumber, and attained to self-consciousness." He goes on to say that "most Muslim countries to-day are mechanically repeating old values, whereas the Turk is on the way to creating new values."¹

¹ *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 154.

This book has been written to aid in the understanding of those new values. It is not propaganda. The writer has not been associated with any foreign institution in Turkey, and has been motivated solely by an interest awakened ten years ago during studies in the religious sciences at the University of Chicago. In collecting data for the work two trips were made to Turkey to study the situation at first hand. It is, of course, inevitable in writing a descriptive interpretation of a transition process not yet completed that the chronicle of change stop somewhere, and accurate information on the "latest" reforms is not always easy to obtain when one is not on the spot. Thus, for example, the book must go to press with some proper names as they were before the 1935 law requiring surnames was put into effect. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this volume may prove of more than transitory value for those who seek a fuller comprehension of the roots and the characteristic patterns of this extraordinary social and religious transformation.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

Seven hundred years ago there appeared in Anatolia a small tribe of warrior nomads from the little-known fastnesses of Central Asia. Led by the dashing hero, Ertoghrol, the little band set out, as had their relatives the Magyars, to win themselves land of their own. Not many years after their arrival these newcomers from Turkestan became converted to the faith of Islam, and from their leader of the time, whose name, Osman, was the same as that of Mohammed's companion, the third caliph, the tribe became known as Ottomans. Into the disrupted society of the time, suffering as it was from the decadence and corruption of Byzantine rule and frequent strife with the Seljuks, the entrance of the Ottoman Turks, flushed with successful conquest and inspired with religious enthusiasm by their recent conversion, proved a unifying, if somewhat fearsome, force. In 1453, after two centuries of warfare and assimilation of the motley and diversified peoples who dwelt in the Balkan Peninsula and Western Asia Minor, the Ottomans captured Constantinople and became undisputed masters of the regions which had once been the nucleus of the proud Eastern Roman Empire. Conquest followed on conquest in brilliant succession until the climax was reached in the sixteenth century, when Selim's crushing campaigns and Suleiman's genius in palace and on battlefield exalted the Turkish Empire to a position of unparalleled magnificence, making Constantinople the fear of Christendom and the hope of Islam.

Despite the splendid organization set up by Suleiman for the organization and administration of his vast Empire, the seventeenth century found the Turkish conquerors softening under the insidious influence of Byzantium's luxurious vices, and for nearly two hundred years, with hardly a flicker of the old-time dashing brilliance to relieve the sordid gloom of a decaying dynasty, the light of the Empire waned to a point where genuine alarm was felt. The vitality which had been the heritage of the Turks from their wild nomadic life was gone. Creativity had been crushed by the weight of Islamic formalism, whose deadening hand had left religion a matter of ritual and precedent, had left law with its sanctions so deeply grounded in the past that progress was well-nigh impossible, and had made literature something Arabicized, foreign to the Turkish spirit, and limited to an exclusive, highly educated circle.

Things had reached such a pass by the latter part of the eighteenth century that even a well-intentioned sultan like Selim III, who saw that radical reforms must be instituted if Turkey's prestige was to be saved from further humiliation at the hands of her newly Westernized foes, the Russians, was unable to realize his wishes. Control of the Empire was wholly in the hands of fanatical religious leaders and the famous band of fierce and uncontrollable warriors known as the Janissaries (*Veni Cheri*). These professional troops, originally recruited in large part from children of the Christian subject populations, had become so powerful as to control even the commercial life of the capital and so reactionary as to balk at any attempt to lessen their influence or modernize their methods of fighting.

It took the accession of a bold and strong-handed reformer like Mahmud II to the throne to achieve the formation of a modernized regular army which should be able to destroy the Janissaries and clear the way for the introduction of pro-

gressive innovations. After some years of failure, Mahmud, who came to the throne in 1808, succeeded in 1826 in utterly destroying the power of the Janissaries, his new regular army massacring hundreds of them through the use of modern artillery. Mahmud, who is often called the *ghiaour* sultan because of his tendency to adopt the customs and habits of the Western *ghiaours*, and his successor, Abdul-Medjid, who followed him in 1839, brought about numerous social and administrative reforms, including adoption of the fez as the national headdress to replace the turban, which symbolized conservatism, and a proclamation of new rights and equal treatment for the subject Christian populations. The Christian rights were proclaimed twice, once in 1839 and again in 1856, and were in large part attributable to the influence of Britain's great ambassador, Stratford Canning. The difficulty with the new reforms, however, lay in the fact that they were too much imposed from above and met with little co-operation from the people of Turkey. The reactionary demonstrations which greeted each attempt at Westernization at this early period showed how far the country was from being ready to throw off its oriental ways. Nevertheless the Western sympathies of the ruling house and the aristocracy of the period immediately following the 1856 proclamation, a time known as the "Tanzimat period," opened the way for a new interest in European, particularly French, literature and history, and sowed the seeds of liberal ideas which eventually produced the Young Turk movement and such reformers as Midhat Pasha of 1876, and the constitutional movement of 1908.

Reaction seemed to be again in the saddle in the reign of Abdul-Aziz. Nevertheless a group of progressive Young Turks were able to remove him and in 1876 to bring to the throne Abdul-Hamid II with promises of a constitutional rule and a new liberal regime. Despite the hopes of Midhat Pasha, who was grand vizier, Abdul-Hamid proved to be

just the opposite kind of ruler from what the progressive leaders had expected and hoped for. Before many months he had suspended the Constitution and sent the Young Turk leaders into exile. Midhat was eventually done to death in his place of exile at Taif, near Mecca.

The explanation of Abdul-Hamid's behavior seems to lie in his fear of the growing influence and rapacity of the European Powers who were at that time engaged in a deadly rivalry of imperialist expansion, in which possession of Constantinople loomed as one of the greatest prizes for Russia, Britain, or whoever else was fortunate enough to fall heir to it when the long-desired demise of the Turkish Empire should take place. Abdul-Hamid, apparently motivated by fear of these Western gluttons, who were watching and seizing every opportunity to increase their influence in Turkey and be ready to bite off delectable portions, and by disgust for everything which had any connection with the hated infidels, adopted a new and desperate policy. Instead of seeking to strengthen his Empire by the adoption of new efficient methods, he turned his back definitely on the West and sought to build bulwarks against his European foes by facing toward the Orient and calling on the Moslems of the world to unite in fighting off every approach of the hated infidel. Importation of Western literature and novelties was prohibited, and a pan-Islamic movement was commenced with emphasis being placed on Abdul-Hamid's position as caliph of Islam—a position which was asserted to give him spiritual authority over all Moslems in the world. He also proved himself adroit in playing European rivalries off against each other and thus preventing any one nation from attaining too much influence in Turkish affairs.

With such a reversion to old practices, and with all liberally inclined Turks either in exile or closely watched by palace spies, the era of progress in Turkey seemed definitely

to have come to an end. But there was an Achilles' heel in the form of Turkey's young army officers. Abdul-Hamid had not been so fanatical as to restore medieval methods in his army; on the contrary, he had had his military leaders trained in Western methods and had sometimes sent them to Europe for instruction in order that he might be able to fight his adversaries with their own weapons. But these young officers who had had a glimpse of the progress and ways of the West were determined that their own country should no longer remain so far behind. Secret committees were formed, of which the one at Salonika was the most important and effective, and contact was made with the exiles in Paris and elsewhere, who furnished intellectual and moral support. In 1908 the Constitutional Revolution forced Abdul-Hamid to restore the Constitution he had set aside in 1876 and to declare a new era of liberality. An attempted reactionary counter-revolution a few months later, led by fanatical Moslems and suspected to be sponsored by Abdul-Hamid's money, was promptly subdued by the army of the Young Turks and resulted only in proving the strength and popularity of the reform and in bringing about the deposition of Abdul-Hamid in favor of Mohammed V, who was a mere puppet in the hands of the new leaders.

Division of counsels among the new leaders and consequent disputes brought constitutional rule to a virtual conclusion once again in the years immediately following 1909, and power became concentrated in the hands of three strong men—Enver, Talaat, and Djemal Pashas. Seizure of outlying Turkish possessions in North Africa and Eastern Europe by enemy Powers, and the revolt and attacks of the Balkan Christian states seeking to throw off Turkish rule, caused the government to undertake a policy of Ottomanization, or Turkification, of the Empire in an effort to solidify it and prevent further defections. The chief consequence of this

policy was further to embitter the remaining subject peoples whose national individualities had begun to develop, thereby bringing about further restiveness, which the World War succeeded in precipitating into successful revolutions and attainment of independence, particularly by the Arab states. Although the men in control of Turkey's destinies at this time were sympathetic toward modernization, they found their hands too full with international matters and the task of maintaining their own hold on the controls of government to achieve anything notable in the social and internal reformation of the country. Though they were not sympathetic at heart to the Moslem religion, they were not above using it where it might serve their own ends, as in the case of the proclamation of *Djihad*, or Holy War, against the Allied Powers in 1915. No strong measures were taken to curb the influence of superstitious and unenlightened religion over the people, though secular schools were opened here and there, and a legal code was drawn up which modified the extent of Koranic influence over the Turkish society. The close of the Young Turk or Unionist regime with Turkey's collapse after the World War found Turkey physically shattered, but Socially little changed from the days of unquestioned religious supremacy under Abdul-Hamid.

After this brief historical summary which may serve as a background, we must proceed to our study of the movements and forces which in the last seventeen years have achieved infinitely more in the transformation of Turkey from a medieval, superstition-ridden country to a twentieth-century, westward-looking nation than the efforts of well-meaning reformers of the past hundred years.

III

PENETRATION OF THE WEST

Many writers of Christendom who hold a narrow view of Islam would agree with Andre Servier when he writes, "The Musulman, bound by his religion, cannot accept Western progress. The two civilizations are too different, too much opposed, ever to admit mutual interpenetration."^x While some justification might have been found for such a statement by an observation of remote Moslem countries where primitive conditions keep alive the traditional and Koranic practices, Turkey would certainly furnish contradictory evidence, for that country, long redoubtable as a pillar of Moslem strength, is today in process of taking over many features from the West and adapting them to her own peculiar needs. Servier might insist that Turkey in so doing is no longer a part of Islamic civilization, yet Turkey has not, up to the present time, renounced Islam in favor of the alternative Christendom, and gives little evidence of an inclination to do so. It cannot be denied that penetration has taken place, at least from the civilization of the West into that of Islamic Turkey. Whether the process will later become mutual, with Turkey furnishing features to the West in return, remains to be seen. The historic contribution of Islamic Spain to Christian Europe of five hundred years ago indicates that Western Christendom has not *ipso facto* a monopoly on perfection.

¹ *Islam and the Psychology of the Musulman* (Moss-Blundell trans.), p. 252.

It will be our task in the pages which follow to examine the channels which have served to import Western notions into Turkey and the Western sources from which the notions came. After that, we may in greater detail note the effects of the Western injection on Turkish life and thought.

From the events of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries presented in the historical introduction it is evident that interplay was taking place between Turkey and the European nations. Outside forces were pressing in on Turkey with stringent diplomatic demands and strange new practices. Here the process seems to be that of an external insistent force battering with its novelties against a surly resisting mass. But the process had another aspect, for individuals within that resisting mass were at the same time reaching out to master for themselves certain features of the alien civilization, thereby acting as conductors in the transmission of Western ways into the Turkish East. Both factors, the battering and the conducting, are important.

Of the factors which introduced Western civilization with a battering force into Turkey, it is necessary to mention only a few of the most important ones, appreciating at the same time the fact that Turkey's geographical position as the westernmost country of Asia and in a direct line between Europe and important regions of the Near and Middle East made it inevitable that she should be struck early and severely by Europe's eastward-looking imperialist expansion. Aggressive warfare carried on by nations that sought to appropriate Turkish territory caused Turkey to realize the superiority of Western war materials and methods. Diplomatic interference in the governmental affairs of the Sublime Porte kept officials unpleasantly conscious of the assertive West. Industrialists and engineers exploiting railways and natural resources impressed the Turks with the value of Western technical skill. The system of capitulations, which per-

mitted foreigners to live in the country subject to their own laws, kept constantly under Turkey's eyes communities with customs differing from those of the Turks, daily reminders of the West. Partly as a result of the capitulations, missionary and philanthropic enterprises were given considerable freedom in the country. Manned by devoted and able workers, foreign schools, hospitals, and publication societies were powerful agencies in carrying Western ideas into Turkey.

The mere impact of Western forces, however powerful, might not have succeeded in breaking through the protective crust of Turko-Moslem civilization. Had the ranks of Turkish society held firm, a stubborn and fanatical resistance might have been offered to Western aggression; the traditional organization might have maintained itself as an intact but constantly dwindling body, ever more compressed by the pressure of outside forces. But this was not to be, for certain individuals and groups within the Turkish society showed receptive inclinations toward Western ways, and the way was opened, as through cracks in the crust, for the infiltration of new notions. The members of Turkish society who thus opened the way to Westernization were of two main types: (1) those who stayed in the country and became acquainted with new customs by reading European books and observing Westerners in their midst, and (2) those who left home to visit Europe voluntarily as travelers or involuntarily as exiles.

Included in the first type were military and naval officers, who, as we have already noticed,² had been trained along strictly Western lines since the time of Sultan Mahmud I I ; members of the governing class in Istanbul who came in contact with the European diplomatic life in the capital; and certain of the well-to-do intelligentsia. These three groups,

² See Historical Introduction,

corresponding to the aristocracy of other countries, filled the role described by E. A. Ross as that of the "social stand-pipe"³ for the diffusion of advanced ideas in Turkey. The novels of Pierre Loti vividly depict the Europeanization of high Turkish society with its developing interest in French literature and European governesses. The memoirs of Halide Edib, with their picture of Turkish intellectual life in the early years of the present century, reveal Turkey's leaders as well versed in European literature, particularly French.

Turks who made up the second type of conductors of Western ideas, individuals who lived in Europe for considerable periods, may again be divided into two classes: (1) those who were out of favor with the government and had to live outside the Empire for their own safety, and (2) those who sallied forth voluntarily, some supported by their own resources, others, chiefly after the Revolution of 1908, sent under government auspices. The exile group, though living abroad in cities like Paris, London, and Geneva, were able by publications and secret organizations considerably to agitate Turkish society. The work of the Turkish committee in Paris was notable for its assistance to the young Turks of Salonika who were responsible for the overthrow of Abdul-Hamid's tyranny in 1908. Similar fermentation had been caused by the writers of the 1860's, whose publications, suppressed in Istanbul, were smuggled into the country from London. After 1908, when more enlightened forces were directing Turkey's destiny, the government hastened the adoption of Western ideas by sending students to study in Europe. An outstanding result of this foreign study was achieved in 1924, when Turks who had carried on legal studies in Switzerland, particularly Mahmud Essad, Kemal's youthful minister of justice, reshaped the Swiss Civil Code

³ Cf. *Social Psychology*, p. 160,

for use in Turkey, supplanting the semioriental code previously in force.⁴

In describing the interaction between Turkey and the forces of alien civilization, no distinction has hitherto been made between the various divisions of Western civilization. Our attention has been centered on the channels through which Western influences were brought to play upon the Turko-Islamic society; little has been said as yet regarding the quality and strength of these influences themselves. Obviously there are wide differences between the national cultures which go to make up Western civilization, and it is only natural that some of them should have acted more strongly than others in corrosion or stimulation of the Turko-Islamic mass.

It is a simple matter for the traveler in Turkey to observe that French civilization has been of paramount importance in the Western impact upon the Turks. A large majority of the educated classes speak French as a second language, and the outsider may with reasonable facility travel through the country on the main arteries of transportation if he has a speaking knowledge of French. Certain newspapers of Istanbul publish reduced editions in French, notably *Akcham*, *Le milliett*, and *La republique*. Examples could easily be multiplied. The explanation of this predominating French influence is traceable in Turkey's political, educational, and literary history. In politics one may point out the alliance of A.D. 1535 between Suleiman the Magnificent and Francis I against the Hapsburgs. The treaty consecrating this alliance paved the way for French predominance in commercial relations. Another event which served to increase the strength of French influence was Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and the eastern end of the Mediterranean in the years 1798-

* See below, p. 79.

1801.⁵ This occurrence made a great impression upon the imagination of the Turks. Educationally one need but call attention to the large number of schools carried on in the Empire by French Catholic missionaries⁶ and the great lycee of Istanbul, the Galata Serai, founded early in the latter half of the nineteenth century. This institution, controlled by the Turkish government but manned by French teachers, some of whom received their salaries from the French government, has played a leading role in Turkey's intellectual Westernization. As a result, too, of French influence in the country, Jesuit missionaries were able to restrain the influx of American and other Protestant literature, particularly vernacular translations of the Bible, by urging the Turks to strict censorship after the authorities had shown a tendency toward freedom of the press. In these repressive tactics the French were aided by Russia, acting in defense of the Orthodox communities for which she posed as protector.⁷

Turkish literature in its style and philosophy presents a leading example of the effect of French influence. The man chiefly responsible for bringing French influences to bear on his own literature was Shinasi Effendi, who in 1859 published a Turkish translation of French poets after a period of study in France. In 1860 he founded the first unofficial Turkish newspaper with the title, *Interpreter of Circumstances*. It was the movement begun by Shinasi which served to change Turkish literary style from something formal and artificial to one which was popular and readily understandable by any reader. Halide Edib, discussing the new tendency in her *Memoirs*, writes:

Modern Europe was furnishing a new current of thought and was creating a new spirit in Turkish writing. The European culture

⁵ Cf. Toynbee and Kirkwood, *Turkey*, p. 128.

⁶ Cf. Ross et al., *The Near East and American Philanthropy*, p. 163.

⁷ Cf. Barton, *Daybreak in Turkey*, p. 201.

which was most influential in Turkey was decidedly French, the *pontes philosophes*. The nightingale and the eternal rose, the spring, and nature themes of literature were giving way to a wider range of subjects and a new way of looking at man and nature, while the inward change in all directions was leading writers to search for directer and clearer expression in language. Translations from the French were introducing models of French art and thought.⁸

As Shinasi Effendi published in his paper articles on modern Europe and scientific discovery, Turks were given an idea of what was occurring in the West and a standard with which to compare in a critical spirit their own customs. Shinasi's lead was followed enthusiastically by a younger generation of writers, Namik Kemal, Abdul Hak Hamid, and Zia Pasha, whose poems, dramas, stories, and satires are regarded today as classics of the new Turkish literature. Thus it came about, as H. Kohn has written, that "in Turkey as elsewhere modern nationalist sentiment arose simultaneously with the creation of a new, unaffected, and natural literary language akin to the vernacular."⁹ It is then apparent what a debt Turkey owes to French culture for the rescue of her own literary individuality.

Another group of writers, including Halid Zia, Jenab Shehabbeddine, and Hussein Jahid, carried the spirit on into the twentieth century. Halide Edib writes:

The school was fiercely attacked by the old writers for its imitation of European culture, and had been equally criticized ... for lack of personality. But it must have succeeded in transmitting a new message and a new life in its work, for the new age looked up to it as the intellectual representative of the day.¹⁰

⁸ *Memoirs of Halidi Edib*, pp. 243 f.

⁹ *A History of Nationalism in the East*, p. 225.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 262.

No less is modern Turkish drama indebted to France for much of its present tone. When the Guedik Pasha Theater was founded in 1867 by Namik Kemal, Noury, and Ahmed Midhat Beys, French plays were translated or adapted for use on its stage. Says Halide Edib:

Ahmed Vefik Pasha's adaptation of Moliere and the translations of Dumas *films* furnished the Turkish stage with comedy and romantic drama to begin with; and Kemal himself wrote some patriotic plays which became very popular. This Europeanized school continues to the present time and has formed the origin and the basis of the Turkish stage of to-day.¹¹

In the Istanbul newspaper, *Le milliett*, a dramatic critic has discussed the intimacy of the relations existing between the French and Turkish theaters. He writes:

There are few peoples who are acquainted so closely with the French stage as the Turks. When, after the Reform, the artistic movement soared anew, it was pre-eminently the French stage which attracted it. From the time of Vefik Pasha to Rechad Noury Bey, that is to say over a long period of 80 years, it is the theatrical art of France which has been, the inspiration of our stage, although the English and German theater had no less merit. But a natural penchant has always pushed us toward the French. One must search for the cause of this inclination in the points of resemblance which exist in the habits of the two nations.

Even until yesterday, in speaking of the Occident, our people understood France, and for them Europe is Paris. During the years it has been from there that we have had our new painters and new economists come. France has represented in our eyes the country from which our art should imbibe its ultimate progress, so that those who went there from here thoroughly perfected themselves.

Stamboul has many times admired Sarah Bernhardt and has appreciated that artist with as much enjoyment as if her tongue were our own. Even actors and actresses who have never set foot in Turkey are well known to us by name.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

As for those who come to visit us, in no other country are they so enjoyed and applauded as in ours, so much do their sentiments, their passions and their joys resemble ours. In a word, the French and we have traits of moral resemblance as though we grew from the same stem.¹²

The significance of this influence of France over the Turkish theater may further be emphasized when one considers the importance of the stage in the Turkish program of modernization today. Speaking at a banquet in Ankara, a former minister of public instruction, Djemal Husni, is quoted as follows:

The different events which have happened in the recent history of young nations show us the important role played by the theatre in the formation and realization of national ideals and in the changes desired in the social life.

This moving form of literature and art, which displays itself in real life and living action, has since ancient times been a powerful element to lead men in the path of certain ideas. The theatrical representation, which gathers together before the stage individuals working in different occupations, is the most important means of extending the ideas and collective sentiments of nations, which constitute their strongest ties. The theatre fixes the state of societies at different epochs, and encourages and strengthens especially the courses which men are wished to follow and the forms which are sought to be given to the future.¹³

France has also made important contributions to recent Turkish philosophical and political thought, as one would be led to expect from the popularity of French writings. Auguste Comte had many admirers among the leaders of Turkish thought in the nineteenth century, and his influence appears strongly in the writings of Ahmed Riza, a leader of the young Turk movement long resident in Paris. In the speeches of Republican leaders today references to the French Revolution are often met with. To list all the French writers and

¹² *Le milliett*, April 6, 1930.

¹³ *Ibid.*, April 13, 1930.

philosophers who are read and admired in Turkey would be a longer task than we can here enter upon. Mention ought specially to be made, however, of Emile Durkheim, whose sociological ideas find a following among members of the university circle.

Although France has contributed bountifully to the Westernization of Turkey, this does not mean that other Western cultures have not had their share in the alteration of Turkey's society. Of the others, the Anglo-Saxon represented by Britain and America requires special mention. It is still impossible accurately to measure the relative sizes of cultural contributions in a cross-fertilization process of such complexity. For the present, therefore, it must suffice to point out the presence of certain transferred ideas and practices, leaving it to a later time to determine how deeply ingrained they prove to be in the Turkish matrix.

In the middle of the nineteenth century British ideas of political reform had achieved influence among the Turkish ruling class. This was in part due to the presence and personal prestige of the great British ambassador, Stratford Canning, to whom history gives credit for certain reforms, particularly those making for extension of equal rights to Christian subject populations of Turkey. Another source of Anglo-Saxon influence was a young Turkish diplomat who had been a member of the first Ottoman diplomatic mission to the Court of St. James early in the nineteenth century, one Raif Mahmud Effendi. According to Halil Halid:

This young secretary remained in England many years and devoted himself to the study of scientific subjects, more especially geography, and afterwards published a translation of an English atlas into Turkish, the first ever prepared in that language. While in England, Mahmud Effendi used to send reports to the Sublime Porte on the forms of administration and system of government in this country [England]. When Sultan

Mahmud II came to the throne, the young diplomatist was invited to Constantinople to assist in the work of reorganising the administration; but during one of the fanatical outbursts which preceded the extermination of the Janissary corps, this first modernised statesman of Turkey was accused of being a man of "broad views," and killed in a *meUe*. The seeds of reform sown by him, however, were not entirely destroyed; and it was chiefly owing to the work of the later Turkish statesmen, who followed his example in reorganising the system of their country, that the famous *Hatti-Sherij*, or first reform charter of the Ottoman empire, was drawn up, and, with the assistance of the friendly Powers, proclaimed.¹⁴

Thus through these two individuals, one representing the "battering," the other the "conducting" method, British political notions were introduced into Turkey. Despite periods of disfavor when British diplomacy was eclipsed by that of other Powers, Anglo-Saxon political ideals were radiated from the palatial embassy with its commanding position on the hill of Pera, and continued to be influential as long as Istanbul was capital of the Empire. After the war, because Istanbul was too exposed to British sea-power, the Kemalists made their decision to shift the national capital inland to Ankara.

One further channel for the introduction of British notions into Turkey was the Turkish navy, whose personnel was trained according to British regimen, corresponding to the German of the army.

Although British policy in the East is still distrusted, Anglo-Saxon culture in a broader sense seems to be attaining a position of considerable importance in the new civilization which Turkey is building. Whether this means a corresponding diminution in French influence is difficult to ascertain, for statements on the subject are very frequently biased by the individual preference of the one who speaks.

¹⁴ *The Diary of a Turk*, pp. 192 f.

Turks who themselves are acquainted with any one of the national cultures of Europe are likely to overemphasize the value and position of that culture in their own national life. Another difficulty arises on account of the great politeness of the Turk, who in talking to the foreigner still clings to the habit of saying what he thinks will please his listener. Thus a Frenchman will be told that France is closest to the Turkish heart, while an American may be told that Turkey seeks only to emulate the United States. Another element which makes judgment difficult is a geographical one, for outside cultural influence will vary from city to city according to the presence and strength of the various foreign enterprises scattered throughout the country. In Istanbul, French may be strongest because of the vogue of French schools there. In Izmir, the presence of a colony of English business folk may put Anglo-Saxon culture in the ascendance. In Adana, Teutonic culture has made a strong impression because there happen to be German factories there.

One finds today, however, unmistakable signs that Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic culture, which Turks feel to be quite similar, are making greater and greater contributions to contemporary Turkey. The new strength is partly attributable to the removal of Arabic and Persian studies from school curriculums, leaving a vacuum which was bound to be filled by English and German studies.¹⁵ And there are indications that French popularity is giving way to other Western cultures. At the Lycee Stamboul, a government school for boys in Istanbul, I was told by a member of the faculty that the teaching of French had been discontinued by order from Ankara. He did not venture to explain the reason for the order. At Galata Serai, stronghold of French

¹⁵ French had already won a position alongside the classical Arabic and Persian in most Turkish higher schools.

culture in Istanbul, I was told of an attempt to secure an American athletic director. From a high Turkish official in the Galata Serai, as well as from the distinguished writer, editor, and philosopher, Dr. Abdullah Djevdet Bey, whose command of French was such that he published original poems in that tongue, I heard arguments advanced in favor of English as Turkey's second language. One reason is that a study of English opens the door to the literature and culture of two great peoples, the British and the American, whereas any other language opens to only one people's civilization. Dr. Djevdet remarked that he had been influenced in favor of English through talking with a Japanese, who reported that his nation had profited tremendously as a result of having English as its second language. In Ankara, increasing interest in English was reported to me by a number of people, including three language teachers. At the language school maintained by the Society for Public Instruction the director reported an enrolment of thirty-five for English, thirty for German, and twenty for French. In the Ministry of Public Instruction, three of the high officials speak English and follow closely, through magazines and journals, American educational developments. A member of the Grand National Assembly, high in the nation's educational circles, whose only language besides his own is French, expressed himself to me as follows:

Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic cultures seem to us the most masculine in the West and best able to furnish Turkey strength in her rebuilding. French influence has long existed in Stamboul but has been of little practical value to Turkey. French culture and French literature tend to be dainty and refined. The language is pretty, and French influence can lend a people considerable charm and a polished veneer. But Turkey realizes now that it is not grace that she needs. It is science and work. As she studies the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic cultures, she

notices that they emphasize scientific method and energetic endeavor. It is strength and creative activity, rather than appreciation of the beautiful, that Turkey needs now and expects to learn from America, England, and Germany.

Important in making America's contribution to Turkey's Westernization have been colleges, schools, playgrounds, hospitals, and publication enterprises sponsored by American philanthropic and missionary organizations. The educational institutions will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter, but it should be brought out here that all such institutions have two characters in Turkish eyes. On the one hand they are means for Turkey to learn about and absorb that knowledge of Western civilization which she is so eager to acquire. On the other hand they are dangerous and insidious representatives of a spirit alien to Turkey's national self-interest. In the former guise they are most welcome to Turkey, but when they act against the national spirit, as Turks feel they do when Christian teaching is given, the institutions are looked upon with bitter hostility. American philanthropy before the war was directed in large measure toward minority Christian populations in Turkey, and while most of the American workers who continue their enterprises under the Republic are honestly seeking to give Turkey their best services, there still exists a suspicion, based on the old prejudice against Christians, that foreign institutions are designed to undermine the national foundations. American teachers, doctors, social workers, and publicists have made and can continue to make great contributions to Turkey's mentality, health, and character, but only as long as they are able to make it clear to Turkey that they are without ulterior motive and willing to play the game according to Turkish specifications.

Anglo-Saxon literature, usually in translation, has had a

rather wide following among educated Turks. Among the most influential have been the writings of William James, whose pragmatic philosophy I have heard praised by leading Turks as expressing the point of view needed by Turkey today. Much interest is displayed in H. G. Wells's *Outline of History*, points of which have been discussed by Kemal Atatürk¹⁶ in his six-day speech. The American Bible Society and the Publication Committee of the American Board Mission in Turkey have done notable work in making available to Turks and other Near Easterners translations not only of the Old and New Testaments, but of other volumes with ethical and religious value, such as Booker T. Washington's *Up from Slavery*, a biography of Abraham Lincoln, and certain of Ralph Connor's books. The mission group also sponsored for a number of years a reading-room and library in Istanbul, where the best literature was made available. This room, directed by a Moslem Turk, and making no pretense of religious propagandizing, was closed for financial reasons in 1933. A notable monthly magazine, *Muhit*, published jointly by American missionaries and Moslem Turks, has been able to supply the country with high-quality periodical reading, much of which is translated from American magazines.

One might multiply examples of other Anglo-Saxon contributions to Turkey in education, home life, and commercial activity. Perhaps none has greater potentiality, however, than the moving picture, for American films, with their portrayal of American life and customs, seem to dominate the Turkish market, and are well patronized by an eager and impressionable public.

¹⁶ The name newly adopted by Turkey's president at the beginning of 1935. Atatürk means Father of the Turks. His name, Mustapha Kemal, long familiar to Western readers, has officially been abandoned.

The contributions of Teutonic civilization in the process we are describing do not differ greatly from those of Anglo-Saxon except for some which have a militaristic flavor. Germany's imperialistic schemes which began toward the close of the nineteenth century had made Turkish friendship and co-operation an important part of the "Berlin to Bagdad" venture. The friendship bore fruit in a reorganization of the Turkish army along German lines and in concessions for various enterprises, chief of which was the railroad from Istanbul destined for Bagdad. Germany's influence with Turkey's military class both before and during the World War naturally caused many officers who were important in the government to look at the West through German eyes, a fact which was advantageous for the development of Turkish industry, construction, and even agriculture according to German specifications. One of Germany's most important contributions to Turkey is noticeable in medical work. Turkish hospitals are managed along German lines, frequently with German trained nurses in charge, and many of Turkey's leading doctors have taken courses in German medical centers.

A word should be said in regard to other nations which have made smaller but important contributions to the ferment. It is noticeable that Turkey is calling much upon smaller powers such as the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, and Switzerland to help her build railroads, develop industries, and master techniques. This is due, no doubt, to previous unfortunate experiences with the larger nations, whose supposedly private corporations have been mere masks of imperialistic governments. Turkey is calling, too, upon Hungary, for the Magyars are regarded by the Turks as a brother-race, and since the Magyars, once nomadic Turanians like the Turks, have learned the intricacies of Western civilization, it may be assumed that they will make good in-

structors for the Turks who wish to follow the same path. Hungarians are most numerous apparently in two fields in Turkey: one, that of skilled artisans; the other, that of entertainment and music. It is as yet too soon to judge the effect on Turkey's laboring class of these Magyars, men who have close racial connection with the Turks, and who have mastered the technique to which Turkey aspires. One is led to surmise that these talented brothers from Europe will serve as far better teachers and stimulators to the supposedly clumsy and lethargic Turk than the hated Greeks and Armenians with all their ability ever could have.

Turkey is eying Japan very carefully, as one would naturally expect, noting carefully the way in which Japan is handling her problems which arise from Westernization. The example of Japan's great success in mastering European ways has no doubt been a great encouragement to the reforming leaders of Turkey.

Of Russia little need be said in this connection, though it was probably the sting of defeat by a Westernized Russian army in 1774 that first led Turkey to realize the strength of the West and seriously to consider the need of remodeling her own forces along Western lines. Czarist Russia of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries played the role of Turkey's deadly foe too constantly to permit of friendly cultural interchange, though there seems to have been a sympathetic connection between the Russian revolutionary agitators of 1905 and the Young Turks, both of whom were eager to temper the power of their respective extreme autocracies. As for Bolshevik Russia, her contribution of large sums of money to assist the Nationalist movement in its early days undoubtedly insured the success of the movement, though the lines of its eventual reform program were vastly different from what the Bolsheviks had hoped for. The influx of vast numbers of refugees, fleeing from the Red armies after the

Revolution, added to Turkey's difficulties, overfilled as she already was with starving populations, and the refugees themselves, partisans of the Russian autocratic element so long hostile to Turkey, were not the sort either to awaken Turkey's friendly sympathy or to be invited to remain as members of Turkish society. Turkey today manifests a wholesome respect for her powerful neighbor on the north, and would do nothing knowingly to offend her. Political relationships are cordial, and there is a disposition to observe Soviet methods in education, art, and planned industrialization. Collectivism, however, seems repugnant to the Turkish mentality, and Marxist teachings are definitely unwelcome in the Kemalist state, as is witnessed by the swift punishment which is meted out to those who spread communist propaganda in the country.

IV

TURKEY'S RESENTMENT AGAINST THE RELIGIOUS INCUBUS

In the preceding chapter it appeared that Turkey's Islamic civilization was being acted upon in various ways by forces representing strong features of the West. The process of clash and penetration was described, and the individual sources of the Western injections were set forth. The next thing, then, to engage our attention will be the effect of the Western impact upon Turkish society. It has already been pointed out in an earlier chapter how the reactionary Sultan Abdul-Hamid II made an ineffective and panic-stricken attempt to protect his Islamic domain against the alien European aggression of the nineteenth century by rallying Islam to present a united front against the *ghiaours* and to exclude Western ideas and materials. The inevitable failure of this pan-Islamic movement, whose tactics call to mind the defensive methods of the ostrich burying its head in the sand, served to intensify Turkey's distress when she awoke to the inadequacy of her oriental ways in contrast to the skill and technique of the West. The comparison of her antiquated and incrustured culture with the vital and progressive features of Western civilization which had forced their way into the very heart of her society meant a violent criticism of the outworn forms which had resisted evolution and persisted so far beyond their period of usefulness. Attacks were leveled against Islam and those who had made it a stagnant and retarding influence for Turkey.

A large share of the blame and indignant vituperation has been handed to the Moslem theologians and doctors, whose ignorance and laziness, even dishonesty, are said to have changed Islam from a progressive and vital religion to one which emphasizes tradition, form, and superstition. Writers have pointed out that while Europe was busy during the Reformation in loosening the hold of a decadent clergy, the Ulema, Mollahs, and other religious leaders of Islam were hardening Islam into a set of formal practices and closing the gate on any possibility of interpretation which might lead to progressive adaptation. A writer in the *Review of Religions*, discussing the religious situation in Turkey, declares:

Even the slightest divergence from the established church was considered the highest crime; and the faithful wandered in and out of the four water-tight compartments of schools of theology completely dazed by the priest-made dogma that neither would reconcile with the early teachings of Islam nor ring true to the advancing humanity of the present age. The clergy made every effort to circumscribe the view of every Moslim and placed the right of interpretation beyond the reach of even the intelligent seeker after truth.¹

Another writer points out:

In the first epoch of the Islamic history, both in Bagdad and Spain, there was a great tolerance of free discussion, but afterwards our scholasticism prevented thinking with reason. Since then we have slept, and it is only in these last years that we have begun to awaken.²

A Russian Tatar, Mohammed Fatih, was one of the first Moslems of this century to call attention to Islam's

¹ Sirdar Ikbāl Ali Shah, "The Religious Revolt of Turkey," *op. cit.*, XXVII, No. 7 (July, 1928), 23-26; see p. 24.

² Djelal Noury, *The Turkish Revolution*, quoted in Levonian, *Moslem Mentality*, p. 69.

great incubus of ignorant religious leaders. Writing in 1904, he said:

In my humble opinion the precepts of the Koran can easily be brought to conform with culture and civilisation. But unhappily there are no Ulemas living in our day capable of inspiring Islam and reconciling it with civilisation. The Ulemas of to-day occupy themselves with outward forms alone; they do not understand the philosophic spirit of Islam, and cannot therefore apply their religion advantageously in practice. Our ignorant clergy expound Islam according to their own ideas, and instead of benefiting they injure us. You Europeans have strained every nerve and rescued your religion from the guidance of ignorant popes and priests, and have spread the light in your midst. Your faith is in your own hands, your conscience is free, and your minds are enlightened, whilst our religion is still dominated by priests. Until we follow your example and escape by our own efforts from the grip of the mollahs, abandoning empty formalities, our decadence is inevitable.³

A scathing denunciation of the corruption, worldliness, and ignorance of the theological teachers and students who posed as leaders of the Moslem religion is contained in a recent novel by Rechad Nuri. The book, entitled *Yesil Gece* ("Green Night"), and centered around the sacrificial devotion of a young teacher to the cause of his nation and his people, describes the early life of the young man, Shahin Effendi, his earnest enthusiasm upon entering a *medresseh*, or theological school, and the disillusionment he feels after he has seen what sort of knaves they are who are posing as holy men, leaders of the Islamic faith. The same resentfully critical spirit appeared in Turkey's first ambitious moving-picture production, *Ankara Postasi* ("The Ankara Courier"), in which two *hojas* (religious teachers) were portrayed as scoundrels whose drunkenness and attempted rape of the

³ Quoted in H. Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East*, p. 115.

heroine led to her death and that of the young hero, her lover and dispatch carrier for the patriotic nationalists.

No less than the religious leaders of the Turks are blamed their rulers, who misused their powers and kept the people in ignorance and poverty instead of helping enlighten them. The unholy alliance of secular despotism and religious obscurantism is frequently and bitterly criticized. Things might have gone better, it is felt, if religious and secular affairs had been kept separate.

Professor Abdalbaki takes this position in one of the books he has written for the religious instruction of children of the Republic:

You understand, don't you, that religious work is one thing, while secular work is another thing. But before, those who handled religious work tried to handle the secular affairs of the world also. The Sultans took the title of Caliph, the replacer of the Prophet, and began to rule as they wished to. And the Hodjas used to say "all right" to whatever the Sultans said, and they were also in the habit of saying to the nation* "There is the power of seven prophets in one Sultan. . . ." Such foolish things they said! In short the affairs of the world and the affairs of religion were not separate.

About even the smallest thing, the hodjas were asked, "Is it in harmony with religion or not?" and only after consultation was it done. For instance, as we have studied in history, printing was invented in Europe. They printed their books in the printing houses, and since everybody was able to buy books cheaply, ignorance diminished. On the other hand, in our country printing was introduced very late, because permission had to be asked of the hodjas, for they had to be satisfied, and on account of that we suffered much.

During the time of which we are speaking war and peace were all made by the decisions of the hodjas. There was no one to ask concerning the desire of the nation, nor any one to think about its interests. Once the Sultan had agreed with the head

Hodja and the other hodjas, the most impossible things **were** done. . . . Heads flew off, and hearths were extinguished.⁴

The sultans, or padishahs as they are frequently called, are similarly berated by the author of a book on civics, also used in the schools:

The Padishahs were ruling in Turkey for many years. These men would think only of their own amusement and would consider the nation as a group of slaves.

In Europe there had been founded well-organized states according to new principles. On the other hand, when a movement toward modern ideas started in Turkey, the conservatives, the fanatical people would step in and say, "This modernization is un-religious, and it is sinful." With such trifling talk they would prevent modernization. And already all the laws of the Government of the Padishah were based on the principles of religion.

So it was impossible to separate worldly and religious problems. As you know, religion teaches man more about heavenly things, although it teaches at the same time truth and goodness. One must not confound heavenly things with problems of the world. As if it were not enough to crush the people under the title of Padishah, the old Padishahs took the title of Caliph also, in order to give themselves importance in the public eye. These men who used to live in palaces with all kinds of amusements and pleasures were supposed to be the representatives of the Prophet. They never thought that religion is a concept of the conscience and that nobody has the right to interfere with people's religious problems. The reason why men have organized states is not to deal with heavenly problems, but it is only to assure the living of a comfortable and joyous life in the world.⁵

The resentful attitude against the old regime is well summed up in the statement of a Turkish small-town official:

We Turks are not really responsible for our backwardness. We have never been taught how to live; we have only been

⁴ *Religious Lessons for the Children of the Republic of Turkey: Fifth Grade*, chap. IV.

⁵ Mitat Sadullah, *Yeni Yurt Bilgisi: Fifth Grade*, pp. 38 f.

taught resignation. The Sultan's officials exploited us; the Caliph's emissaries stupefied us. We lived under the yoke of a government without morality and a religious organization without ideals.⁶

A large number of Turks, upset by the challenge of the West, would probably agree with Djelal Noury when he says, "The fault was not with religion, but with the rulers who have made it an instrument of their despotism through their servants, the clergy."⁷

However much blame and indignation may have been loosed upon the selfishness, despotism, extravagance, inefficiency, and corruption of the rulers and the clergy, there was plenty of criticism to be leveled at the governmental system which permitted the dominance of religious laws and at the quality of the religion which permitted itself to become degenerated.

In an explanatory introduction to the new civil code which Turkey adapted from that of Switzerland in 1924, the minister of justice, Mahmud Essad, laid the blame for Turkey's backwardness directly on the deadening influence of the Islamic laws which for so many years formed the basis of Turkey's government and society. He declares:

States whose laws are based on religion become incapable after a short lapse of time of satisfying the exigencies of the country and the nation. For religions express unchanging precepts. Life goes ahead, needs change rapidly. Religious laws, in the presence of life which constantly progresses, are no more than words void of sense and forms without value. Changelessness is a dogmatic religious necessity. Also the need for religions to be nothing more than a simple affair of the conscience has become one of the principles of modern civilization and one of the characteristic differences between the old civilization and the new.

⁶ Quoted in A. Colrat, "Turkey To-Day," *Living Age*, July 15, 1927.

⁷ Quoted in Levonian, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

Laws which derive their inspiration from religions fetter the societies in which they are applied to the primitive epochs in which they arose, and they constitute invincible factors which prevent progress. It is indubitable that our laws, which came out of the changeless precepts of religion and which ensured a permanent place to divine elements, have been the most powerful and the most effective factor which, in modern times, has enslaved the destinies of the Turkish nation to the mentalities and institutions of the Middle Ages. . . .

In the march of our evolution one notices that all progressive steps which have been attempted in the interest of the masses have been thwarted by a class of men whose interests were compromised by the projected innovations. These men have always sought to turn people aside from the path of progress in preserving among them, in the name of religion, obscure superstitions and false beliefs. Let us not forget that the Turkish people have resolved to accept without any reservation all the principles of modern civilization. The most striking proof of this appears in the Revolution itself. If in certain quarters the civilization of to-day appears irreconcilable with the needs of Turkish society, that does not indicate an aptitude lacking in the people, but in the superannuated traditions and religious institutions which have hindered their development. . . .

The conservative spirit which aspires to chain society irrevocably to the old customs and irrational empiricism is dangerous and does not make humanity advance an inch. . . .

The purpose of laws is not to maintain old customs or beliefs which have their source in religion, but rather to assure the economic and social unity of the nation.

When religion has sought to rule human societies, it has been the arbitrary instrument of sovereigns, despots, and strong men. In separating the temporal and the spiritual, modern civilization has saved the world from numerous calamities and has given to religion an imperishable throne in the consciences of believers.⁸

Of the attacks which were directed against religion itself as displayed in Turkey, it will be sufficient to quote but one example. This is a poem written some twenty-five years ago by the writer Tewfik Fikret and has had an immense in-

⁸ Editions Rizzo, *Code civil turc*, pp. xii-xvi.

fluence on the thought of the Turkish youth. My Turkish friend who rendered a translation of it into English for me declared that he, as well as many other men of his acquaintance, knew it by heart, and was frequently asked to speak it to small gatherings. The poem, he declared, was never formally published until 1927, being passed along from individual to individual. Before quoting the poem it will help to understand it as well as the author if we read what Halide Edib has to say about Tewfik Fikret. He had a passionate belief in humanity and international understanding.

[He] attacked above all else these two things: tyranny and religion. Being a man *sans peur et sans reproche*, he did not realize the social and individual value of religion, its importance in human morals and culture, its historic necessity to complete the social evolution in the early stages of human society. He saw only how men in general suffered from the tyranny and the narrow rule of the churches, how men rent each other in the name of religion all over the world, and what political use they made of creeds and of their gods. His famous attack on religion called "History" aroused a tremendous storm in religious circles, and he was mercilessly attacked by the clericals, both during his life and after his death. . . . He was as narrow and as merciless as they [the Unionists and the reactionaries] were to those who deviated from his own line in politics and in principles of every kind, and he fought them down as ferociously as did his opponents. The inflexibility and the rocky resistance of the man constituted both his force and his weakness.⁹

The poem, which is entitled *Tarihi Kadim* ("Ancient History"), represents the poet as seeing history in the form of a skeleton, who unfolds the past as a series of bloody, vicious, and tyrannical events, illustrating the rule of might. The sections of the poem which are pertinent to our purpose are quoted with no attempt at versification to correspond with the difficult Turkish.

⁹ *Memoirs of Kalide Edib*, p. 264.

Heroism is fundamentally savagery. Treading on cities and destroying armies, killing and untying, breaking, dragging, pounding, burning, devastating pitilessly, wherever you pass, your heroes fill the land with death and pain, and after you there remains no sign of crops, grass, or moss. Homes are obliterated, families suffer, no place remains unshaken.

Every *ojak* [hearth] looks like a gravestone, and roofs fall on the heads of orphans. What sights to arouse the conscience! O Leader! Down with your victories! Each victory is a vision of ruins and resembles a cemetery. O you men who conquered the world, be ashamed of this victory! Down with the old throne of independence—under your reign, people are suffering. Throngs of needy men are caused by you. You are like rooks which eat blood. Every dark place is filled with you. It is enough that you have run rough-shod over opinions, and men can live comfortably without you.

History can protect you because dark nights provide shelter for brigands. Be strangled in the darkness of history! These are the best tidings for the future. Here is true liberty. No fight, no invasion, no attack, no sultanate, no brigandage, no complaint, no despotism, no cruelty. I am myself, and you are yourself, and we need no lord or creature. If we don't need God or creatures, then the pages of the old book will be torn out. Those pages are the graves of opinions. But who can tear out your opinions? Who is going to undertake this great revolution?

VOICE: The Master of the world will do it!

But *He* [God] is the cause of all these fightings.

O heaven, which sometimes hears the sounds of pleasure, sometimes a dry voice, sometimes a painful sighing or sound of comfort, sometimes an "alas," sometimes a prayer, and sometimes quiet, and sometimes rebellious winds, sometimes grievances, sometimes blasphemy, and sometimes trembling, and sometimes tinkling of bells, sometimes you hear the quiet grievances of weakness and sometimes the thanks of cruelty, sometimes laughing, sometimes sobbing, and sometimes crying.

You tell us, O heaven, if these voices are echoed to heaven and if any prayer is accepted. O God of heaven, I have listened to your name from the fathers of religion as being matchless, having power of animating, giving food, and accepting desires, being just, and knowing everything, and being present everywhere. Though **your** most significant quality is that of being

matchless, yet see how many partners you have in this slough. They all have the quality of being matchless. They all have their commands and sovereignty. They all have their suns, moons, and stars; they all have a promised heaven; they all have a world here and one to come; they all have angels in their heaven, but they all look to swallow humanity. From the creatures they all wish submission.

I doubt everything, and I ask everyone, and all tell me that they do not know.

Who knows? Perhaps everything is imaginary, or being deceived is a necessity. Perhaps everything is true, yet I am not aware of my mistake and wish to believe that things which do not exist do exist; but my fault is in doubting. So is it harmful, because to doubt is to run toward the light, and to make truth shine is the right of wisdom. Who knows? Perhaps there is vanity, and perhaps there is heaven. But why should this body become the slave of a thousand pains because it is made by an eternal creator? Why create man from nothing and give him the quality of decadence? Who knows? Perhaps our origin is earth, yet why should we be made of mud whose pores are full of blood and tears? Is it the result of chance? This cannot be the work of a creator. The one who creates does not destroy. O Creator, doubt is your worst enemy. It has dropped from you. This is your own error.

Today stratagems, evil, and deviltry remove you from your throne and blow out the torches in your temples, and break your statues—and you fall with all your powers.

But nothing is heard of this fall. You make no stirrings in your hell. We hear no sounds of pain. But if an atom of a creature is lost, we at least hear a cry. You fall with your heaven and sky, but from nature we hear not a sigh. On the contrary, everywhere is laughing; for only dissimulation and stupidity weep after falsity.

It was inevitable that violent things should happen to Turkey's social and religious structure when its traditional stays were being so shaken by the floods of indignant criticism which broke forth when men awoke to their own helplessness, the heritage of corrupt despotism and ignorant bigotry. Islam's attempt to weather the storm and keep alive

in the midst of radically changed conditions will be the subject of a later chapter, but now we must notice what positive and constructive steps were taken by a desperate Turkish society under effective leadership to restore order out of a despondent and chaotic condition and build a social structure which would restore Turkey to a stable position in a world which was being shaped according to the specifications of Western civilization. The new spirit of impatience with sentimentality and demand for actuality and material improvement is brought out in a poem by Nazim Hikmet entitled *Eski Anadolu* ("Old Anatolia"). After describing the poverty, filth, and immorality of peasant life, he writes:

That village which smells like a rotten pickle-pot is not longing for romantic life. That which its soul cries for is two bare words: steam and electricity. If you are not blind, you will see that the farmer with earth-colored face and sieve-like breast, his vermin-filled head scratched with the nails of the Mutezim [tax farmer], wants to die and be buried with his daughter, wife, and oxen. O messieurs, with your pencils in hand and reins in your mouth, who sigh like Pierre Loti when looking at the blind, noseless, and decrepit peasants whose glasslike bellies bubble like yellow narghiles in their three-horsed carts—we are sick of listening to your nonsense! Now this truth must be pounded into our heads: that the peasant needs soil, and the soil needs machinery!

V

THE RUSH TO WESTERNIZE UNDER KEMAL ATATURK

Turkey's subjection to the impact of the West was, as has been seen, a process which had been going on for more than a century. Yet in the years which had elapsed up to 1918 very little had actually been done to incorporate Western notions into the life of the Turkish mass. Europeans had brought their new techniques into Turkey and a relatively small number of Turkish individuals had taken over Western customs, but either to a degree so slight as to be merely superficial or to a degree so extreme that the individual was severed from the society of his Turkish compatriots. Turkey had begun to sense more and more the strength and vitality of the alien forces and had begun to find fault with certain of her own weaknesses, but, by and large, her Orient-sprung social forms had undergone but slight changes, and whatever innovations had been introduced were more in the nature of modifications of existing forms than radical alterations or substitutions of Western practices in place of the venerable customs of the Orient.

During the World War, however, and particularly in the years which immediately followed it, there came a sudden change. The spark of indignation, which had been sputtering along like a fuse, all at once seemed to touch off the explosive material; Turkish society seemed to hurl off the burden of oriental traditions and to replace it with a miscel-

laneous assortment of ideas and customs borrowed from the West.

In the preceding chapter there was presented a picture of Turkish society in a distraught and dissatisfied state, on the verge of undergoing a severe readjustment. The transformation was brought about under the guidance of Mustapha Kemal Pasha (now known as Kemal Ataturk) and his comrades, who established Turkey as an independent nation and set up a constitutional representative government in a new capital.

It would obviously be foolish to assert that the modernization along Western lines which proceeded at high speed with the establishment of the Ankara government was solely the result of one man's or one group's wishes. The case of Afghanistan, where reform programs were attempted and had to be much modified, indicates that the condition of the society to be reformed is fully as important as the leader who sponsors the changes.

In the Turkey over which Kemal Ataturk assumed the leadership there had grown up a dissatisfaction with the Islamic heritage, as we have already seen. Yet even with this restlessness to work on, it is doubtful whether Kemal could have accomplished his Westernization program in such short order without the concurrent action of certain other exceptional circumstances which acted as catalytic agents in speeding up the social reaction. The effect of these circumstances was to agitate still more sharply the Turkish mass, make the Turkish people realize their individuality and unity, and place them in a grateful mood so that they were malleable in the shaping hand of their new leader.

One factor of importance was the series of wars in which Turkey became engaged, in which her Empire broke more and more away from her. Of these, the one which probably embittered the Turks more than any other was the Arab

revolt which broke out in the later years of the World War and opened up the Empire to attack from the hostile Allies. Turkey no doubt took as a matter of course the rebellions of subject Christian groups, but it was disillusioning for her to have her co-religionists, different though they were racially, thus betray her. Djemal Pasha, one of Turkey's leaders during the World War, wrote in his memoirs:

Although I had never believed in the honesty of the Sherif of Mecca, I could never have conceived that in a war, upon which the fate of the Khalifate depended, he would ally himself with the states which desired to thrust the Slav yoke upon the whole Mohammedan world, and, indeed, would go so far as to sow the seeds of discord in the whole country to gratify his personal ambitions.¹

The fact that Moslem Arabs should thus have turned against them made the Turks more than ever hostile to the Islamic features of their civilization which they associated with Arabia. It also increased the feeling among the Turks that they must face the world virtually alone, standing on their own resources.

With the close of the World War, Turkey was subjected to a series of humiliations by the countries which had been her victorious foes. The Allies, apparently believing that Turkey had come to the end of her rope and had no more strength or spirit left to offer further resistance, proceeded to partition up the country, forcing disgraceful terms on the tottering government of Sultan Vahid-ud-Din with the Treaty of Sevres and causing the defeated Turkish armies to surrender their arms. Working hand in glove with the various Christian minorities who inhabited Anatolia, the Allies showed their apparent intention of leaving Turkey only a small section of territory in Anatolia. Agents of the British government were working in the country seeking to create

¹ *Memoires of a Turkish Statesman*, p. 211.

favorable sentiment toward England and to discourage any show of resistance on the part of patriotic Turks.

It is possible that Turkey would have suffered her defeat and not raised a hand to protest against the partitioning of her homeland had it not been for one act which cut Turkey's wounded pride to the quick and stirred the nation to a heroic struggle for independence. This was the occupation of Izmir by Greek troops in 1919. This invasion of Turkey's own homelands by the nation's deadliest foe was enough to restore a heroic spirit of resistance and to unite the people in the accomplishment of a great patriotic endeavor. The thought of their territories being violated, their homes invaded, and their religion insulted by the hated infidels was enough to awaken a tremendous burst of hidden energy, and the upheaval caused a favorable condition for the dissociation and reintegration of Turkish social patterns.

Even with the aggravation of these hostile acts, however, the traditional government and Islamic customs might have held on to their positions in Turkish life had it not been for the apparent collusion of the sultan's government with Turkey's foes, and declarations by both the civil and the religious branches of that government that patriotic defensive movements were treasonable and contrary to religious law. This was enough to convince many Turks that there was something radically wrong with their government and religious organization. One can judge the Turkish feeling from a statement taken from one of the school civics or *Yurt Bilgisi* ("Knowledge of the Home") books.

The co-operation of the Caliph with the enemies during the War of Independence proved very clearly the uselessness of those authorities. As you know, when the Greek army began to march into the interior of Anatolia by attacking beautiful Izmir, all the Turks had sworn not to have their country trampled by the enemy and had begun arming themselves in

order to drive out the Greeks. The enemy marched, burning the places through which he passed. While the Turkish heroes were struggling to crush the enemy's soldiers, they saw that the real great enemy, who bore the name of Padishah and Caliph, had co-operated with the Greeks. Yes, Vahid-ud-Din, who is the most treacherous king in the world, had gathered a band named "the Army of the Caliphate" in Istanbul and unleashed it upon the heroes who were trying to save the country. However, the brave Turk defeated both enemies, and the treacherous Vahid-ud-Din fled away on an enemy boat. The Turkish nation, which had groaned for hundreds of years under the tyranny of the Padishahs, would not, after seeing this, keep those men at its head. There remained no more place for the Padishahs and their families, who had drawn their weapons against the nation at its most sorrowful hour, and who had thought only of their own ease in the midst of the most horrible calamities. The Grand National Assembly, which realized this, abolished the reign of the Sultans, and proclaimed the Turkish Republic; it saved our nation from the tyranny of the treacherous Padishahs. Children, there is no doubt that we began to live from that day on, in an atmosphere of freedom and independence which hasn't been seen in Turkish history until now.²

It must not be forgotten that the Turks who were fighting in defense of their homeland in defiance of the Istanbul government were given valuable and much-needed financial assistance by Bolshevik Russia, who saw thus a chance to strike at her capitalist foes, England, France, and Italy. Furthermore, the divided councils among the Allies, with France disapproving a policy which seemed sure to give Britain a commanding position in the Near East and finally making a separate peace with the Nationalist leaders at Ankara, helped the favorable outcome of the patriotic struggle. And the French and British war spirit, which had backed Allied ventures through 1918, had dwindled at home so that peoples and governments were no longer enthusiastic over the continuance of military ventures.

² Mitat Sadullah, *Yeni Yurt Bilgisi: Fifth Grade*, pp. 40 ff.

It was, however, due in largest part to the full blossoming of a national consciousness which had sprouted from a long-standing rivalry with the Greeks and had budded after the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 with the foundation of the Turk "Ojak" and other societies for the advancement of Turkish lore and patriotism that men and women from every stratum of Turkish society were able to band together to preserve their country and prepare it for a great metamorphosis. The devoted and heroic spirit which inspired the Turks in their struggle during the years after 1918 is powerfully expressed by the writer Rushen Echref in his tribute to the soldiers and flag of the Nationalists, written at Ankara in January, 1921. The piece is called *Bayragimiz* ("Our Flag").

. . . These were our soldiers. They still had the assurance and bearing which their comrades in Istanbul were forced to relinquish.³ They were not standing like those in Istanbul with their hands in their pockets and their heads bowed. They had lifted their bayonets up to heaven like fingers made of steel. They were standing as a symbol of respect made of flesh and metal for a certain object. They remembered the beginning of a small but healthy future rather than the relics of a great but decadent past. Our flag rose gradually before them, and it started to spread into heaven like a streaming red mane. Now this red object had more than the significance of a flag; it was a leader. My soul with the miracle of it regained its warmth, stirred, and straightened up. I was face to face with new hopefulness.

The flag which had received its color from the hearts of our ancestors nearly became black in our days. It seemed about to fall like a black mourning cloth after having run from victory to victory and gracing the kavuk⁴ like a red rose. But in a crowd of Turkish soldiers its old significance returned, and it seemed to be gay and no longer sorrowing. The day after Inonu⁵

³ By the Allied occupation.

⁴ Headdress of the famous corps of Janissaries, destroyed in 1826.

⁵ Battle in the Graeco-Turkish War.

it seemed to me more fresh and glorious than at the May of the battle of Mohac. It was perhaps more courageous when it flew in the winds of conquest while fighting in Europe. But then it was less substantial. It flies now with more life in the gale of independence rising from the rebellion of a band of oppressed souls.

The moment which it passed at Mohac was the end of the road leading to conquest. But at Inonu it marked the beginning of a new road when the world thought all was ended. . . .

O God! A generation of Turks condemned to hide in their trunks flags which we have carried gloriously on our heads like drops of blood would be the most unfortunate children in the world. But cannot the drop of blood which has come out of our body re-enter it again? We are not of those who keep their flags under their heads! Ever will our heads remain under our flags!

O flag,—the God of Lionlike gazis⁶ and the sacred trust of our brave sehits [martyrs]. . . . You are not created of artificial imaginations. You have sprung directly from our hearts. You are the color of the life-stream which is the most sacred thing in the human body, and on you there appear traces of heaven [the white star and crescent which stand on the red field]. That is why you will not fade nor wither. You will live as free and as red above the heads of the new generation as you have lived above the heads of our ancestors! Never shall you see the last generation of Turks!

Such, then, was the highly reactive state of Turkish society, enraged at its foes and at the impedimenta of outworn Islamic incumbrances, inspired to exert itself heroically in the accomplishment of feats undreamed of. Seething as it was, there was needed only the introduction of an element of strong leadership to precipitate a new compound of social forms and attitudes. This element of leadership was furnished in the person of Kemal Ataturk. It is not possible to give here an extensive biography of this great soldier who

⁶ Those who have fought in holy wars and not been killed.

has meant so much to Turkey during the last twelve years. Suffice it to say that he was of Macedonian origin, coming from a poor family, that he received a military education in Istanbul, that he served his country with distinction during the World War, especially in the Dardanelles defense, that he was always strongly critical of the Young Turk policy which governed the country from 1908 to 1918, and that he was the chief initiator of the movement for the defense of Anatolia contrary to the wishes of the sultan's government in 1918-19. The force of his personality, his determination, his endurance, his executive ability, but, above all, his inspiring generalship, which led Turkey's small but brave Nationalist army to victory against the invading Greeks in 1922, raised him to the highest pinnacle in the hearts of his fellow-countrymen. In the space of a few months he became the idol of Turkey, and stories of his exploits were quick to spread, painting him as a veritable superman. The country was his to do with it what he willed, and his will was sweeping reform.

Numerous are the admiring tributes paid to the Gazi ("The Victorious One"—a title bestowed on him by the Grand National Assembly), indicating the esteem in which he is held by his grateful compatriots. The fervency of some of these show that popular imagination has raised him almost to the position of a divinity, and this partially explains the willingness of the country to carry out his wishes. Hamdullah Subhi, former president of the Turk "Ojak," and generally recognized as one of Turkey's greatest orators, rendered a classic eulogy of Turkey's heroic leader when an equestrian statue of Ataturk was unveiled in Ankara in the fall of 1927. After speaking in glowing terms of Ataturk's ability, his invincibility in battle, and his unique endowment of perspicacity, Hamdullah Subhi goes on:

He is a reformer. He discovered the spiritual chains which tie the whole Moslem world in various ways to slavery. If it is necessary for the Eastern oppressed nations to find a way which leads to a strong and happy future, it is necessary to follow the road which is pointed out by this great patriot who now overlooks the city of Ankara. At one time the application of reforms which we now witness was considered madness; to speak of such reforms was considered over-optimism; and to try to carry them out was regarded as foolishness. It was the courage of this revolutionary leader which overcame all obstacles, accomplished the impossible, and overshadowed all previous reformers.

He is a leader. He applied principles which astonished us, and he showed us the best forms in military organizations, administration, politics, sociology, and art.

He is a head. He is a head that gives courage to hopeless hearts, gathers lost intellects under a common will like a flag which shows the rallying place on a battle-field, makes others confess his superiority, and helps those who are loyal to the principles which he has applied.

He is a reviving force. The ideas upon which the new era is based have been given new life by him. He is a reviving force which has been appointed by Truth to create a new world with his deep spirit and thoughts. . . .⁷

Another Turkish writer, Ahmed Rustem, less eulogistic in his characterization, has described Ataturk as a combination of Machiavelli, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck.

Of sentimentality no trace. He is a realist of the first order. In his case the soldier, the statesman, and the reformer have been carved with great strokes of the chisel in the hardest granite . . . It is this which was precisely what he had to have in order to succeed in the formidable task which he had to accomplish.⁸

Kemal Ataturk lost no time after he had reached the position of greatest influence in the new government in

⁷ In *Segme Yazilar* ("Selected Writings"), pp. 145 ff.

⁸ "Moustapha Kemal Pacha," *Bibliothèque universelle et revue de Genève*, November, 1929, pp. 618-27; see p. 624.

making it plain that he intended to make Turkey a modern Western state, and so adroitly and forcefully did he manage governmental affairs and the promulgation of new laws that he drove from the country those who differed with him either in his radical Westernization program or in his dictatorial and high-handed methods of putting the program into effect.

Kemal's chief strength lies, of course, with the people who gratefully remember his services in saving Turkey from the Greek and Allied armies. As a soldier himself he enjoys great popularity among the military men of Turkey. Army officers seem notably well dressed, and are said to be well paid. Private soldiers, too, though paid practically nothing for their compulsory service, are said by people long acquainted with Turkish life to be for the most part warmly favorable to the Gazi. With the army, then, strongly back of him, and with Turkey accustomed for centuries to leadership and control by the military class, Kemal is seen to be virtually immune from the menace of any serious armed uprising. Politically Ataturk exerts great control over his nation through the People's party which he founded and which is the only party nominating candidates for election to the Grand National Assembly.⁹

Whatever one may say against Kemal's tendency to maintain himself in control of the country, it must be borne in mind that he has shared a great deal of his glory as well as his responsibilities with his present prime minister, Ismet luonii, a tremendously able executive, a likeable warrior and family man, whose moral character is unimpeachable. The

⁹ The attempt in 1930 to set up a recognized opposition, Fethi Bey's Liberal party, was short-lived. Apparently Ataturk will not permit the nation's progress to be slowed down by bickering and needless discussion. When the country has become sufficiently enlightened to understand democracy, we may look for a relaxation of the present system of rigid, one-party control.

co-operation between these two great leaders is a most fortunate circumstance for Turkey's well-being and progress. While Kemal's inner circle of cronies has been described as a fast and hard-drinking clique whose reputation leaves room for the circulation of many spicy rumors, he has at the same time chosen for positions of responsibility many of the best brains of the country. Such departments as those of Public Instruction and of Public Hygiene and Social Assistance, of those with which I personally have come in contact, are in the hands of men who do the government credit. While naturally the supply of qualified experts in various lines is still limited, nevertheless the improvement of Turkish schools and the large number of students who are sent to Europe annually to perfect themselves in special fields indicates an early cure for the situation. Ataturk has also cut down to a minimum the number of breeding places for unprogressive ideas, having shut down the old *medressehs*, or theological schools, and outlawed the dervish and other secret orders.

In his masterful speech delivered over a period of six days to the People's party at Ankara in 1927, Kemal said many things regarding his policies past, present, and future. Among other things he declared his intention "to raise the nation to that position to which she is entitled to aspire in the civilized world and to establish the Turkish Republic forever on firm foundations."¹⁰ By "civilized world" he of course referred to the nations which go to make up Western civilization as contrasted to backward nations of the Orient.

It may be wondered whether Turkey does not feel that she is making a great concession amounting nearly to surrender in admitting the superiority of the Western ways which originated in countries whose religion was that of the long-despised Christianity. The answer is contained in a

¹⁰ In the German edition of the speech, *Die nationale Revolution*, II, 387.

statement by Djelal Noury, quoted in Levonian's *Moslem Mentality*:

It is a mistake to call the modern European and American civilization a Christian civilization; that is, a civilization brought about by Christianity. The Christian religion adjusted itself to the movements in Europe, and was saved out of the old static condition, so much so that to-day there is little resemblance between the religion taught by Jesus and modern Christianity. It may even be asserted that the present Christianity differs fundamentally from the original Christianity. The Europeans have built an altogether new religion during the course of the past nineteen centuries, although they have begun with the story of Jesus. Christianity in Europe, in spite of the opposition of the clergy, has assimilated the ideas and thoughts of every age. When Europe was struggling with ignorance during the Middle Ages, Christianity also was in a pitiful condition. But about four centuries later a radical purification took place in the Christian religion. A number of nations separated themselves from the Catholic Church and formed a new organization. Even the Roman Catholic Church began to change within itself. Thus we see that Christianity could not oblige its followers to be content with the old forms. Ultimately it was the new ideas that gave to Christianity a new colour. To-day, if Christ were to come to the world, he would remain a stranger among the Christians.¹¹

From the foregoing quotation it is evident that Turkey disregards any religious rivalry in the steps she is taking. Since Christianity is regarded as more influenced by than influencing Western civilization, Turkey, in accepting ideas from the West, is merely profiting from a set of secular circumstances to which the Christian religion is itself indebted.

The Turks in accepting the science of the West show no parallel intention of supplanting their allegiance to Mohammed by allegiance to Jesus Christ. It is recalled by one Moslem Turkish writer that Islam was the original sponsor

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 57 ff.

of science, but, having forgotten it, must relearn it from Europe. He declares:

They were our learned men who made methods of calculations and published books on heavenly phenomena. In those great days some of our sages measured the heavens, while others gave methods of minute calculations to the world. Still others had gone into the field of medicine, established hospitals, and discovered remedies for thousands of diseases. Then we were the sole authorities. We were recognized, and our names were mentioned throughout the whole world. But when we left aside those sciences, gradually we lost our reputation, and our names were forgotten, and at last we became poor and ignorant. The sciences that we started have been perfected and advanced in the hands of others. Not only did we not learn the new sciences, but we also forgot the old ones. We lost our skill in craftsmanship which we inherited from our fathers and grandfathers. We are now in a state of needing help from Europe "from thread to needle."

The Europeans who were once our apprentices and knelt before us now have become our masters. They sell us things which we don't know about, measuring them in drachms and hitting us over the head. We must ourselves adopt the European science and craftsmanship as rapidly as possible.¹²

Turkey's determination to master the ways of the West is further encouraged by a spirit of self-confidence—sometimes carried almost to a fault—and a keen realization from first-hand experience that the Europeans are no supermen with any inherent essential superiority. The prominent Turkish journalist, Yunus Nadi, after a trip to Europe, wrote back to his newspaper in Istanbul, *La republique*, an article entitled "The Great School"—referring to Europe. In his concluding paragraphs he wrote as follows:

What is the distance which separates us from Europe? No one can find that distance very long, very wide, and very great.

¹²Ourianzade Ali Vahit, *First Sermon—from the Pulpit of Hadji Bairam Mosque*, pp. 15 f.

It is a question of disposition. In any event it is certain that the Europeans are neither stronger nor more intelligent than we. We could declare without fear of error that there exists between them and us no difference with respect to organic constitution. Why then is it necessary that they should succeed and that we others should not be able to? Still more so when we have before our eyes an excellent model in Europe herself. Those Europeans have only been able to achieve their actual progress with short steps, slow and difficult. We have then nothing to discover in the materials. What we must do is simply to learn their methods, something not at all difficult. The fact is simply that we have to learn many things from these gentlemen and that we must proceed most methodically to be able to succeed in a space of time relatively limited and settled in advance.

Method! Method! That is the greatest mystery of occidental civilization.

We may for to-day recapitulate as follows:

We must learn in Europe, work like Europe and with Europe. And the torch which we shall hold in our hand to advance on the way of civilization can be nothing else than the method applied in Europe.¹³

The climax to Turkey's adoption of Western techniques seems to have been reached with the embarkation upon an ambitious five-year industrialization plan, calling for the erection of fifteen factories in various sections of the country. Accepted on January 9, 1934, this plan, if successfully carried out in a land pre-eminently agricultural, will be an accomplishment to which the Turks may well point with pride.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, October 3, 1929.

VI

TURKEY'S CHANGED STATUS IN THE FAMILY OF NATIONS AND IN THE MOSLEM WORLD

Turkey under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk had thrown her lot wholly on the side of Westernization. The manifestations and consequences of this decision will occupy our full attention from this point on, for the transformed Turkish nation had opened herself to a host of new influences which could not help affecting every phase of her existence. To the outside world there was probably no change so far reaching in its effect on international relations as Turkey's complete allegiance to the Western doctrine of nationalism. In the present chapter we shall notice how Turkey's status as leader of Islam was affected, and in the chapter which follows we shall see how nationalism altered the entire structure of Turkey's internal social life.

In the preceding chapter mention was made of Turkey's desertion not only by her Christian populations but by her Arab co-religionists. This fact, together with her growing impatience against the antiquated Islamic system still clung to by most of the other Moslem countries, caused Turkey more and more to center her attention on her own needs and to shun any responsibility such as she had formerly assumed for the defense and leadership of the rest of the Moslem world.

National needs and national development came to occupy Turkey's thoughts and activities, and she sought to develop into a strong, unified, and self-sufficient state similar to her

European neighbors whom she was taking for a model. A Turkish journalist and member of the Grand National Assembly, Mahmut, wrote in his newspaper, *Le milliett*, an editorial entitled "The Rule of Our Time." He begins:

The rule of our century is nationalism, the care of nationality. This rule constitutes for every people a truth and an obligation. This truth, which history confirms more each day, is vaster and fuller of meaning for Turkey. Indeed, the events which we have gone through up till now, the bitter experiences which we have known, the special situation of our country, command us to hold to this rule more firmly than any other nation. In spite of the efforts for solidarity and peace which are being established in the political world, the only truth which has value in all countries is nationalism. . . . The first condition for occupying a choice position among the civilized countries is to have a national conscience. Better than any other nation are we able to appreciate the force of the national ideal, of the national conscience, which have led Turkey in the fight for independence to liberty and safety.¹

Turkey made up her mind that no longer should any other purpose than the wishes and welfare of the Turkish people guide her policies. No longer were Turkish lives to be sacrificed for the selfish ambitions of a ruling family, and Turkey was through with bearing the burdens of fellow-Turanians or fellow-Moslems who dwelt outside her borders. According to Kemal himself in a talk given at Eski-Shehir during the latter part of the struggle for independence:

The policy which will be followed by the New Turkey . . . will be absolutely proportioned to the capacities and needs of the country. Neither Islamic union nor Turanianism can form a doctrine, a logical policy for us. Henceforth the governmental policy of the new Turkey is to consist in living independent, relying on her sovereignty within her national frontiers.²

¹ Issue of May 5, 1930.

² Mahmut Bey, "Le Ghazi et la revolution," *Le milliett*, November 26, 1929, to February 8, 1930, instalment No. 11.

Speaking to a group of journalists from Istanbul who had come to interview him during those same days, the Gazi spoke in similar vein:

If we are to say, "Let's please the hodjas, let's please the Moslem world, let's please everybody," it will be easy to make them all happy, but it is we who will not have attained our purpose. Men inclined to compromise cannot accomplish a revolution, and besides, in the present state of misery and disorder, it is impossible to satisfy any one whatever. When the country becomes flourishing, when the nation becomes prosperous, everybody will be happy.⁸

With Turkish feeling running strongly as it was toward concentration on national ends, it is not surprising that the position of the sultan-caliphs in Istanbul, rulers whose position as heads of the Moslem world had given them an international significance, should have been subjected to great alteration in status. Since the accession of Abdul-Hamid II, the padishahs had been losing their popularity with their Turkisfe subjects, but the behavior of the unfortunate Mohammed VI, Vahid-ud-Din, who came to the throne in 1918, sealed the doom of the dynasty, and brought to an end Turkey's role as an empire, which she had played for five centuries under the leadership of scions of the house of Osman. Vahid-ud-Din had to take the blame for the Treaty of Sevres, the abortive document which the Allies sought to force on Turkey after the World War, and which Nationalist Turkey refused to accept. Helpless in the hands of Britain and the other Allies who had occupied Istanbul on March 16, 1920, Vahid-ud-Din appeared to be playing into the hands of Turkey's enemies, and his dispatch of troops called the "Army of the Caliphate" against the budding Nationalist movement, together with a proclamation of that movement

³ *Ibid.*, instalment No. 24.

as contrary to government and religion, was a hostile act which the Nationalists never forgot.

When, after Kemal's army had defeated the Greeks, it became necessary to draw up terms of peace, the Allies invited both the Istanbul government and that at Ankara, which had been set up following the Allied occupation of Istanbul, late in October, 1922, to a conference at Lausanne. This caused the Ankara Nationalists to decide that the time had come to end the government of the sultans once and for all. On November 1, 1922, the Ankara Parliament passed a law declaring that the government of the sultans had ceased on March 16, 1920, the date on which the Allied occupation of Istanbul had taken place. On November 4, 1922, Refet Pasha took over the administration of Istanbul in the name of the Ankara government, and on November 17 Sultan Mohammed VI, Vahid-ud-Din, fled to Malta on board the British battleship "Malaya."

Ankara was not ready yet, however, to terminate the existence of the caliphate, although they did not propose to have any member of the house of Osman exert temporal power over them. There was still too much feeling both among Moslem Turks and among Moslems outside Turkey to permit an abrupt abolition of Turkey's symbolic leadership of the religion of Islam. An Indian Caliphate Committee had been organized to express the sentiments of the seventy million Moslems of India that the caliphate should be safeguarded. Other Moslem countries had sent representatives or gifts to the triumphant Kemal to express their admiration of the way in which he had defeated the infidels, and to state their willingness to follow the Ankara government as the rightful defenders of the faith. Many among the Nationalist Turks also felt that it would be unwise to do away with an office of international significance, thereby losing a possible asset in their international dealings and at the same time

antagonizing a large number of friendly Moslems throughout the world who had become used to regarding Turkey as Islam's rightful protagonist. Ankara decided, accordingly, to elect another member of the house of Osman, Abdul-Medjid, as caliph, with powers solely spiritual and dependent on the government of the Grand National Assembly. The office presented a curious confused mixture of functions corresponding to those of a British king and a Roman pope. This election took place on November 18, 1922.

George Young, who was in Istanbul at the time, has written an effective and colorful description of the ceremonies accompanying the investiture of this new caliph who was to attempt to perform the impossible task of maintaining a glamorous international office without offending the jealously nationalistic government on which he depended, and upholding the dignity of a religion which that government cared nothing for. He writes:

Let us pay a last visit to the Old Serai [the residential palace of the sultans until last century] to attend the ceremony. As we cross the bridge there passes us at a trot an escort of lancers, mounted lackeys in red, and a carriage and four with postillions. In it sits a portly person in a fez, frock-coat and green ribbon. It is Abdul-Medjid, son of that Abdul-Aziz who cut the tangled knot of his fortunes with a pair of scissors.⁴ Abdul-Medjid is on his way to be invested as Caliph. The carriage whirls into the inner court of the Old Serai. On the one side are the mediaeval kitchens with their conical chimneys, on the other, the cupolas of the harem, at the end of a Byzantine portico of marbles and coloured tiles, still delightful in its dilapidation. On the pavement in front of the portico stands the Golden Throne studded with jewels, looted from Egypt by Selim, the first Ottoman Caliph.⁵ In a circle round it stand a few reporters, some sight-

⁴ Sultan Abdul-Aziz, who reigned from 1861 to 1876, died under mysterious circumstances after being deposed, apparently having committed suicide with a pair of scissors.

⁵ Historians now assert that Selim's supposed acquisition of the caliphate in 1517 was an invention of later historians.

seeing French and Italian officers, and some American ladies. No Britisher is there but myself. I venture to slip past the chamberlains through to the Bagdad Kiosk and so get a glimpse of that most sacred of ceremonies, the Investiture of a Caliph.

But what a travesty it is! Instead of the solemn ritual in the Mosque of Eyoub and a Sultan girded with the Sword of Osman⁶ receiving from the Sheikh of Islam the emblems of his spiritual power, here is a delegation of Angora deputies notifying an elderly dilettante that he has been elected by a majority vote like any Labour leader. There are the sacred relics, but the Sword of Osman remains at Eyoub⁷ to show that, though Abdul-Medjid is Caliph, he is not Sultan.

It was a further notable fact at this ceremony that the prayers were said in Turkish instead of Arabic,⁸ indicating still further how Turkey's national individuality was supplanting the wider allegiance to an imported religious system.

Theologians argued one way or another to prove or disprove the validity of an Islamic potentate with spiritual but no temporal power. Abdul-Medjid was in a precarious position, the center of heated controversy. It seemed impossible that he could hold on to his position in the face of nationalism and practical logic. More and more did it become apparent that Turkey must follow a path which led her away from her fellow-Moslems, and the Turks did not propose to make further exertions for Islamic countries with whom she had little in common, nor to keep alive an institution which could be of no practical benefit to themselves. Djelal Noury has said in his book, *The Turkish Revolution*: "To be faithful to the past in order to be united in fate with a body of 300 millions who never make progress is to rebel against the present and the future. . . . It means to lose national existence."⁹

⁶ The hereditary symbol of the temporal power of the sons of Osman, or Othman, founder of the Ottoman dynasty.

⁷ *Constantinople*, pp. 294 f.

⁸ Toynbee and Kirkwood, *Turkey*, p. 152.

⁹ Quoted in Levonian, *Moslem Mentality*, p. 62.

Kemal Ataturk has discussed the question at length both in his Six-Day Speech and in his informal talks quoted by Mahmut in "Le Ghazi et la revolution." In his words he shows repeatedly his conviction that the caliphate is in every way a liability to Turkey, that a Moslem union is a historic unreality, and that all attempts to bring Moslems together will only deflect Turkey from her supreme obligation toward her own interests. Some characteristic statements on the caliphate reveal his attitude:

Let us say, Gentlemen, that there is a Caliphate extending over the Moslem world. This responsibility is held by a personage whose title is "Caliph of the Moslems." I ask what is, according to those who speak of the duties and powers of the Caliphate, the duty of this Caliph of the Moslems. Is it not to deliver the Moslem world? There exist, in the domain over which the jurisdiction of the Caliph extends, a State of Turkey, a Persia, an Afghanistan; there is the Moslem mass of seventy million Indians, Egypt, Morocco, etc. If we admit the duties of the Caliph as they are defined in the recognized treatises, we are obligated to save all these countries. And to save them it is necessary to have energy, power, money, and men. Who can say that for this purpose the Turkish state and the population of Turkey are under the orders of the Caliphate? Who can say, "Go, Gentlemen, inflict a defeat on the entire world and save the Moslem world!" I ask the nation: Does it consent to that? Can this poor nation assume such a great responsibility? . . .

Gentlemen, it is this point of view which has moved our nation for centuries. But what has come of it? She has left millions of men in all the places where she had gone. Finally she has been driven out. And to-day she has fallen into this situation. Do you know the number of children of Anatolia exterminated in the deserts of Yemen? Can you count the number of men whom we have lost to be able to preserve Syria and Irak, to keep our hold in Egypt and Africa, and to carry conquest to the very gates of Vienna? And what all this has finally resulted in, you see. . . .

Suppose for an instant that Turkey should take seriously the

duty in question, that she should aim at and have good success in freeing the Moslems, uniting them on one point and governing them. Very good! But what if, after we had for example freed Egypt, the Egyptians should say to us: "We thank you very much. But we are not willing to be governed by you. Egypt is for the Egyptians. We shall allow no one to interfere with our independence and our national sovereignty. We shall remain independent. . . .

Gentlemen, you see that it is proposed to destroy this poor nation for a whim, for an illusion, in a word, for nothing. . . .

Enough of these misfortunes into which our nation has been drawn by obstinacy in not seeing real situations and following those who are mistaken! We cannot, knowing the cause, permit the same drama to be played on!¹⁰

Abdul-Medjid, the unhappy last caliph of Islam, was allowed to hold his anomalous office for a little more than a year. But it was clearly impossible that the Moslem world should accept enthusiastically in the midst of all its doctrinal diversity a spiritual and dogmatic chief, particularly from Turkey, a land which had never had a reputation for theological brilliance or regularity. It was plainly brought out that a caliphate was essentially based on temporal power, and when shorn of that, a caliph could have no real authority or respect. Turkey's grasp of this fact, her unwillingness to tolerate a caliph with temporal power, and her eagerness to break away from too close a connection with the rest of Islam made it inevitable that a caliph who was not sultan could not long exist. Of the theoretical tests for a caliph set up by Moslem legists—such as descent from the Koreish, the Prophet's tribe; election by a conclave of notables; nomination by a predecessor; guardianship of the holy cities, Mecca and Medina; acceptance by all Moslems unanimously; and qualifications mental and physical—it was evident that Abdul-Medjid could satisfy at best only the second and last.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, instalment No. 36; cf. also Gazi Mustapha Kemal Pascha, *Die neue Türkei*, Vol. I I : *Die nationale Revolution*, pp. 244 f.

It was logical, then, for the Grand National Assembly at Ankara on March 3, 1924, to adopt a law abolishing the caliphate and banishing members of the Ottoman imperial family from Turkish territories. Turkey served notice that she was through once and for all with any responsibility for leadership of the Moslem world. In his famous speech at Ankara in 1927 Atatürk said:

Gentlemen, I must frankly and categorically declare that those who busy themselves any more with the chimaera of the Caliphate and thereby lead the Moslem world astray are nothing but enemies of the world of Islam and especially of Turkey. Hopes to set up such an imposture can only be the affairs of ignoramuses and dummies.¹¹

Few tears were shed for the demise of the caliphate. Congresses assembled in Mecca and Cairo to discuss what steps Moslems should take, but no unanimity of opinion manifested itself. The virus of nationalism had apparently penetrated so far into the East that most Moslems were content to let their religious affairs be guided by local conditions and decisions. There was no Moslem ruler of sufficient prestige to be regarded by all as a defender of the faithful.

To progressive Moslem opinion the end of the caliphate was regarded as beneficial to the best interests of the religion. It is felt that emphasis will be taken from the superficial and worldly features of the religion and placed on the more vital realm of ethics and conscience. A writer in the *Review of Religions* declares that "the abolition of the Khilafat, considering its nature and the depths to which it had sunk, has put an end to a terrible evil. . . . The Muslim world can be confidently expected to fare better without it." ¹²

Turkey's abolition of the caliphate does not mean, how-

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, II, 346 f.

¹² S. Niaz, "Changes in the Muslim East," *op. cit.*, XXVIII, No. 3 (March, 1929), 81.

ever, that her influence in the Moslem world and in the Orient is ended or even diminished. Evidence, on the other hand, indicates that as a progressive example to the less advanced nations her leadership will count for more than it has ever before. Turkey's consciousness of her new role is frequently met with. Yacoub Kadri has discussed the subject in *Le milliett*. He says:

We have not only proved our inexhaustible vitality in destroying, after a long series of wars, the invaders; we have not only given proof of our intellectual youth and vigor in achieving revolutions of democracy and civilization in life; but we have at the same time—and what is perhaps more important than the rest—proved that we were the only vanguard of occidental civilization in the Orient so enveloped in darkness, and in the vastness of Asia. To-day from Syria to Egypt, from Egypt to China, all peoples have their eyes fixed on us and strive to follow in our footsteps. . . .

For nearly four hundred years the Europeans have tried to introduce European civilization into the heart of Asia. But from the first Venetian voyager to the latest convoys of colonization, all attempts made in this vein by Europeans have served only to lead the nations, Oriental and Asiatic, to hate that civilization. One may even say that it was after these contacts that the abyss opened between the Orient and the Occident.

Thus it is that to-day we others constitute a bridge of steel over this abyss.¹³

When I asked Dr. Abdullah Djevdet Bey what he felt about Turkey's present relationship with the rest of the Moslem world, he smilingly referred me to an interview which he had given twelve years before on the subject of pan-Islam in Diamontopoulo's book, *Le reveil de la Turquie*. He is quoted as saying:

The word Pan-Islamism ought . . . to express a sympathy exclusively intellectual and literary among Moslems. To attain that ideal we must have a Turkey advanced and modernized. Constan-

¹³ Issue of March 10, 1930.

tinople ought then to be a center of enlightenment to which Moslems might come without prejudice to imbibe ideas of science and civilization.¹⁴

In Yusuf Ziya's book of religious lessons, written for use in Turkey's middle and normal schools, the author writes: "As we are the most progressive and the most civilized of all these Moslem countries, we should try to progress more and become good examples."¹⁵

Of the Moslem nations which have sought to preserve close friendship with the new Turkey, none has shown more enthusiasm in following Turkey's lead than Afghanistan under the rules of Amanullah, Nadir, and Mohammed Zahir. Turkish officers have been invited to assist the Afghan army. Afghan cadets have been sent to Turkish military schools. Amanullah's government also sent boys and girls to Turkey's civil schools: six boys to the primary boarding schools, ninety-eight boys and fifteen girls to lycees. The girl students were recalled subsequently by Nadir Khan when he came into office as a concession to the public opinion which had revolted against the extreme steps taken by Amanullah.

When the Afghan ambassador, Gulam Nebi Khan, presented his credentials on April 6, 1930, he addressed the following words to the Gazi:

Your Excellency! . . . Historical and social reasons have so strengthened the fraternal relations existing between the two countries that no force and no hand could break them. I could even say that the two powers represent an organism of two bodies with one soul. The history of the world in general and that of the Orient in particular will not fail to record the success obtained in the Revolution and the path of progress by the noble and industrious Turkish nation, coming again to life under the guidance of Your Excellency, whose generous and courageous protection in delivering that active and valiant nation

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 259 f.

¹⁵ *Islam Dint* ("The Religion of Islam"), I, 32.

from its moral and material shackles has directed it on the path of progress. The noble Afghan nation, in joyously assisting the advances realized by her Turkish brothers, appreciates them with sincerity.¹⁶

Turkey's abandonment of the caliphate and an assumption of solely secular relations with the rest of the world paved the way for a closer entente with Persia, whose differences with Turkey had frequently waxed bitter during the more than four hundred years that Turkey stood firm for the orthodoxy of Sunni beliefs while Persia upheld the Shiite doctrines. The sentiment is growing that Turkey and Persia should forget their religious differences and co-operate more closely in their endeavors to replace ignorant fanaticism with enlightenment. Instead of going to war, or at least having strained relations, because Turkey recognizes the first three caliphs, Abu-Bakr, Omar, and Othman, who are regarded by the Persian Shiites as impostors, or because the sons of Ali, so venerated by the Shiites, were killed by Sunnis some thirteen hundred years ago, Turkey and Persia are seeing that they have much more to gain by standing together politically and economically.¹⁷ A Persian member of Parliament in the course of a visit to Istanbul gave an interview to *Le milliett* in which he voiced the following sentiments:

I visited Turkey for the first time in 1913. Since then there has been great change and immense advances. The Persians love the Turks with a fraternal affection and follow their activity with great interest. We all know that the savior of Turkey, the great Gazi, Mustapha Kemal Pasha, who is a man of genius,

¹⁶ In *Le milliett*, April 8, 1930.

¹⁷ Occasional incidents arise to disturb the peace, such as the Kurdish raids of 1930, but the friendly interchange of visits by important officials, particularly Riza Shah's visit to Ankara in June, 1934, gives evidence of the real cordiality existing between the governments. It is also of interest to note that in the fall of 1934 a commission of Turks was selected to settle a border dispute between Persia and Afghanistan.

is a guide and an example for the Orient. All Persia speaks affectionately the name of your great President.¹⁸

Although Turkey's leaders at the present time are in large part men of military training or experience, and although many of Turkey's past heroes have been glorious warriors, there is probably no nation in the world more sincerely eager for the preservation of peace than is the Turkish Republic. The National Pact of 1920 disavowed all ideas of "irredentism," and the government today has been doing its best to establish friendly relations with all nations. For Turkey has been totally disillusioned by her war experiences and realizes that she must have peace in order to cure the vast number of ills which have come to her as a result of war. After visiting an obscure village near Merzifun where a young man apologized for its small size, remarking that 120 men had gone away to the recent wars and never returned, I was able, though the number must have been exaggerated, to form some idea of the tremendous losses in man-power which Turkey must have suffered. Yusuf Kemal, who was the first minister of foreign affairs of the Ankara government and is still an important figure in national affairs, remarked feelingly in the course of a conversation that "untilled fields, unworked mines, disease, poverty—all have their fundamental roots in Turkey's more than ten years of constant war." Such seems to be the almost unanimous feeling of Turkish public opinion.

Ataturk himself has left no doubt as to his own feelings on the subject of war and peace. Addressing the population of Ismidt at the close of the victorious campaign against the Greeks, he said:

The wars which have continued up to to-day have brought it about, unfortunately, that our agriculture has remained back-

¹⁸ Issue of March 30, 1930.

ward. Henceforth we shall avoid inopportune acts of this kind. We shall render our farmers more active. The nation henceforth will take up arms for only one cause: to defend from within her national frontiers, her life, her independence, her sovereignty. We shall have no more an aggressive military policy. No more shall we run after conquests. . . . We shall reduce as much as possible the duration of military service. We shall not limit military art to the handling of a gun; but we shall strive to teach our soldiers things which could allow them to be useful to their surroundings when they return to their homes and resume their work in the fields.¹⁹

Discoursing later on the contrast between his new policies and those of the Empire, he referred bitterly to the drain of wars of conquest on Turkey's own condition: "What happened to those armies of conquest which went into Asia, Europe, and Africa? They remained there; they died and disappeared there where they had gone. And as a result, the mother country remained empty and in ruins."²⁰

One of the most notable declarations of Turkey's desire for peace in her foreign relations is contained in a speech made to the Grand National Assembly by the foreign minister, Tewfik Ruchdi Aras, at the time of the ratification of the Turco-Hellenic Treaty:

You are aware that your Minister of Foreign Affairs has never ceased to proceed along the path traced for him by your High Assembly and to work for peace with great ardor and tireless activity, and even, I may say, with love. We owe to our efforts, guided by these principles, the majority of the pacts of friendship and arbitration concluded with neighboring states as well as with other countries.

The very necessities of our great national revolution and of

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, instalment No. 43.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, instalment No. 69. In this connection it is of interest to note that the Ministry of National Defense customarily receives the largest appropriation of any department in Turkey's general budget. Yet where this amount in 1926 was 64,004,925 Turkish liras, in 1933 it was only 33,326,640.

the special geographic position of our country have always obliged us to maintain an extreme interest in the cause of peace, as much for ourselves as for the entire world. Every time that we have been invited to a meeting in any country whatever for the purpose of peace, each time that a formula of peace had to be found for participation in the meeting, to subscribe to the formula we have laid down two conditions: equal treatment for all, and exclusion of every hostile intention against any one. We were not ignorant of the fact that every peace based on an equilibrium of forces set up by groupings of powers working together by a special agreement has never been an absolute and permanent peace. . . . We knew furthermore that means of violence and compulsion do not constitute a foundation for peace, but lead definitely to war. . . .

Believing that every separate alliance brings about others, Turkey has abstained from participation in such initiatives. But she hastened to subscribe to the Kellogg Pact which required a universal entente among all the nations. . . .

The Turkish nation, solidly supporting her great President, forms a unity, and certain of her power to defend and conserve her existence, looks for her development in peace.²¹

Further evidence of Turkey's interest in world-peace is found in her entrance into the League of Nations in July, 1932. With her assumption of a seat on the League Council in the fall of 1934, a strong influence for world-stability has been added to that important body.

There are some thinkers among the Turks who see in nationalism no hindrance to a broad and humanitarian world-outlook, saying, as does Halide Edib, that "it is after I have loved my own people and tried to understand their virtues and their faults with open-minded humility that I begin to have a better understanding of other people's sufferings and joys, and of their personality expressed in their national life."²² There are others who have told me that they feel nationalism a cramping force and prefer to extend their

²¹ *Le milliett*, June 19, 1930.

²² *Memoirs of Halidi Edib*, p. 326.

loyalties and affections to all humanity irrespective of nationality. But the largest part of vocal public opinion reveals a nationalism strongly self-centered, one which manifests no ulterior designs on any other people but which recognizes that this is a world where each nation must guard its own rights and does not propose to be victimized by the greed of any other nationality. Therefore Turkey's eagerness for peace does not, much as it might like to, express itself in disarmament, but in the maintenance of efficient defensive forces.

The Turkish writer and deputy, Falih Rifki, has said:

While those who hold the world under their law arm themselves more strongly each day and give their children a warlike education, it would be senseless to lead the Turkish nation to fix its gaze on the mirage of peace and to conduct it toward a dangerous optimism.²³

In no uncertain terms Abel Adam discusses the question in his *Book of Mustafa Kemal*:

To-day we are living in the era of nationalism; we have not yet reached the era of humanism. European civilization acts on the principle of nationalism; we must also do likewise. No nation recognizes the rights of other nations, or shows mercy or runs to help others. The terrible wars in Europe show this principle plainly. . . . Europe acts on the principle of nationalism. We see an English type which is willing to kindle the whole world in order to light his pipe. All European Powers are like that. We, the Turks, also shall be so. This is an exigency of the present-day humanity; therefore it is useless to criticize it or speak against it. Movements contrary to this principle are simply ridiculous. The League of Nations is a pitiful example of this sarcasm. To-day there is no humanitarian mentality in Europe, and therefore we also cannot act on humanitarian logic. We have nationalism and nationalistic logic only. This is the struggle for existence, and it is the foundation of life everywhere. This is an axiom; it is self-evident.^{24*}

²³ *Le milliett*, September 30, 1929.

²⁴ Quoted in Levonian, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

VII

THE CONSTRUCTION OF A LOYAL, UNIFIED POPULATION

Turkey's decision to make of herself a nation like the states of Western Europe brought changes not only in her attitude toward the rest of the world as described in the preceding chapter but in the whole internal structure of the country. Probably no alteration was as shattering to the old order as the steps taken to concentrate and unify the population within Turkey's new frontiers.

The Turkish Empire ever since its inception had been one of the most loosely knitted conglomerations of peoples and religions ever to owe ostensible allegiance to one sovereign. Its territorial extent alone in its days of widest expanse, when it reached from the very gates of Persia as far west as Hungary and took in Arabia, North Africa, and regions north of the Black Sea, was enough to prevent the development of unity among the diverse peoples included. Differences in race, in language, and in religion all contributed elements of disharmony which made it a virtually impossible task to build up a common *esprit de corps* in the old Ottoman Empire. Comprising units, many of which had been conquered and brought into subjection against their will, the imperial government had to devote a large part of its attention to the suppression of uprisings, and as long as the various units proved subservient and prompt in fulfilling financial obligations, the sultan-caliphs were content to let each preserve its own cultural individuality. Even though the religion of Islam lent to

the whole an outward appearance of integration, since the ruler was chief sponsor of the religion, and the official law was based on the Koran, there were various Christian and Jewish communities which had not been compelled to adopt the religion and culture of their conquerors. As a matter of fact each distinctive religious group was allowed to organize into an autonomous, self-governing body or *millet*, whose highest governing official was an ecclesiastical dignitary who was appointed by and responsible to the sultan. This arrangement had been worked out in the fifteenth century when Mohammed II, the Conqueror, had captured Constantinople and in accordance with Islamic practice legitimized the presence within the state of bodies immune from the laws of the state and with no sense of loyalty to the sovereign power. Even though it was possible for members of these independent *millets* to reach positions of responsibility, dignity, and honor in the sultanic government, there were very few compulsory obligations imposed on the semi-independent communities. Military service was not required, being handled by Moslems, and even freedom to have independent schools was permitted by Turkish insouciance.

Still a third disruptive influence, in addition to territorial ungainliness and the *millets*, was that of the capitulations. These special privileges, enjoyed by European governments, and permitting citizens of those countries to be exempt from Turkish law and subject to the laws of their own country when in Turkish territory, seem to have been continuations extended by the Turks of trading privileges originally granted to Genoese and Venetian traders by emperors of Byzantium before the Turkish conquest.¹ While these concessions were greatly widened in the sixteenth and later centuries, they seem at first apparently to have been merely a courteous

¹ See George Young, *Constantinople*, pp. 93, 107 f., etc.

continuation of an international agreement. As years wore on, however, and the Turkish government became weaker and more corrupt and the European Powers became more insistent and grasping, the capitulatory privileges more and more offered footholds for imperialistic intrigue and struck deeply into the vitals of the Empire, obstructing as much as possible any unifying Turkification.

Under such circumstances as have been described the Turkish Empire could expect nothing but added unrest, heightening rivalries among her component groups, and secession of the unassimilated racial and religious elements as soon as they developed sufficient national consciousness and military strength. The obstructions to Turkey's unification began naturally to be eliminated in this way through the revolt and establishment of separate governments of various Christian provinces, principally in the Balkans. Russia, Austria, France, England, and Italy helped the process along by appropriating contiguous territories, or seizing lands which seemed strategically or economically important. Thus by the outbreak of the World War Turkey's territories had shrunk until she had lost most of her Christian-inhabited territories in Europe, and all of North Africa. The World War and the revolt of the Arabs severed from her dominion the rest of her lands which were not primarily Turk inhabited. Turkey's acceptance of this situation, and repudiation of any desire to maintain dominion over the territories which had revolted from her rule, were contained in the Turkish National Pact, set forth at Istanbul on January 28, 1920, by the Nationalists who were shortly to set up their government at Ankara. Article 1 states:

The fate of the territories of the Ottoman Empire² exclusively populated by Arab majorities and finding themselves, since the

² On the abandoned use of the term "Ottoman," see note on p. 113 below.

conclusion of the armistice of October 30, 1918, under the occupation of enemy armies, must be regulated according to the freely expressed will of the local populations.

The parts of the Ottoman Empire situated this side of and beyond the line of occupation and inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority whose constituent elements, united by religious and cultural ties and by the same ideal, are animated by a reciprocal respect for their ethnic rights and their social conditions, form a whole which permits, under any pretext whatever, no dissociation whether by fact or by right.³

Thus did the new leaders of Turkey make it clear that they would not interfere with peoples who objected to their rule, at the same time insisting that they intended to have no one interfere with their own independent national existence.

One step, then, in Turkish national integration—that of eliminating appendant regions with discordant aspirations—was brought about by force of circumstances and was finally accepted by the Turks without remorse. But there were other disharmonizing factors in Turkey's own Anatolia as we have seen: the capitulations and the *milletts*. These presented problems immensely more difficult to solve.

The capitulations, it was noticed, had been a source of increasing irritation to the Turks who had set their minds on establishing an efficient and respected government. After the outbreak of war in 1914 the Young Turks in power thought they saw an opportunity to end the system which was such a source of embarrassment. Accordingly, on September 9, 1914, some weeks before Turkey actually entered the hostilities, the government, in a unilateral declaration, announced the termination of the capitulatory privileges, accompanied by great rejoicing and celebration in Turkey.⁴ The abolition of the capitulations in such a fashion was not, however, recognized by the foreign governments who had enjoyed them, and

³ Schlicklin, *Angora*, p. 14.

⁴ Cf. Wilson, *Modern Movements among Moslems*, pp. 278 ff.

when at the conclusion of hostilities in 1918 the Allied Powers proceeded to avail themselves of the rights as if they had never been withdrawn, the Turks realized that the West intended to play the old game of interference. The Nationalists, in their Pact of January 28, 1920, voiced their opposition to any such resumption of the dangerous privileges. In article 6 they affirmed:

It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to-date regular administration. For this reason we are opposed to restrictions, inimical to our development, in political, judicial, financial and other matters.⁵

It was not until 1923, however, when the Treaty of Lausanne finally terminated the war waged by Turkey in defense of her national life, that the nations of the West gave up their capitulatory privileges and granted to Turkey the right to manage her own affairs as they did themselves. Thus was brought about another step in the attainment of national unification.

The abandonment of the *millett* system, however, was a major operation on Turkey's body politic which occasioned a tremendous internal readjustment. It had become increasingly clear to the Turks that the presence within their own boundaries of groups not amenable to the laws of the government was a constant source of friction and intrigue. Although the large Jewish community had proved themselves valuable subjects, had not been involved in treasonable affairs, and had consequently been rewarded with an existence unmolested and respected on the whole, the Christian communi-

⁵ Toynbee and Kirkwood, *Turkey*, p. 141.

ties, Greek and Armenian, were quite a different proposition. Unlike the Jews, who had no "protecting" governments to interfere on their behalf, the Christian populations were, with the flourishing of European imperialism, constantly ministered to by foreign Christian governments, whose anxiety over the welfare of their oppressed Christian brethren in Turkey was generally tinged with the less altruistic motive of using the minority populations as a means to attain a foothold in the territories of the Turkish Empire, whose demise these Western Powers were ghoulishly awaiting.

The menace to Turkey of these Christian *milletts*, whose consciousness of national individuality was being encouraged by the European Powers, became threatening in the nineteenth century. Reactionary protests against the measures adopted about the middle of the century to give Christian populations more rights had brought out spasmodic outbreaks, but apparently the first Turk to recognize the danger for Turkey in a powerful Armenian population whose young bloods were excited with revolutionary notions by Russian agents was the sinister sultan Abdul-Hamid II. His answer to the threat was a crude one and brought on himself and his country the reputation of being cold-blooded assassins. He sought to cure the trouble by massacring the Armenian populations, the worst slaughters occurring about the year 1895.

He was unsuccessful in accomplishing his purpose, faced as he was by the opposition of public opinion in Europe and his own country. In 1915, however, when most of the world was wrapped up in thoughts of war, the governing clique decided to rid their country once and for all of the unassimilated Armenians. Again deportations and massacres, which this time accomplished the desired result.

At the time that these harsh measures were being taken, one of the triumvirate which was controlling Turkish affairs explained the point of view of the Turks in an interview

quoted by the American ambassador, Mr. Morgenthau. The speaker was Talaat Pasha:

We base our objections to the Armenians on three distinct grounds. In the first place, they have enriched themselves at the expense of the Turks. In the second place, they are determined to domineer over us and to establish a separate state. In the third place, they have openly encouraged our enemies. They have assisted the Russians in the Caucasus and our failure there is largely explained by their actions. We have therefore come to the irrevocable decision that we shall make them powerless before this war is ended.⁶

Ambassador Morgenthau, who was strongly critical of Turkish wartime policies and used every means at his disposal to protest against the Armenian deportations, quotes another statement from a government official showing the fear with which the Turks regarded the Armenians in their midst:

There are twenty-eight million people in Turkey and one million Armenians, and we do not propose to have one million disturb the peace of the rest of the population. The great trouble with the Armenians is that they are separatists. They are determined to have a kingdom of their own, and they have allowed themselves to be fooled by the Russians. Because they have relied upon the friendship of the Russians, they have helped them in this war. We are determined that they shall behave just as Turks do. . . . It is our own experience with revolutions which makes us fear the Armenians. If two hundred Turks could overturn the Government, then a few hundred bright, educated Armenians could do the same thing. We have therefore deliberately adopted the plan of scattering them so that they can do us no harm. As I told you once before, I warned the Armenian Patriarch that if the Armenians attacked us while we were engaged in a foreign war, that we Turks would hit back and that we would hit back indiscriminately.⁷

⁶ *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, p. 337.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 347 f.

As a result of the deportations and bloody treatment of the Armenians, spurred on by a jealous fear for their own national well-being, the Turks had by the end of the war reduced the Armenian population within their borders to a negligible quantity. Many, of course, escaped from the country alive and were assisted in their distress by philanthropic organizations, among which the American Near East Relief performed outstanding service.

There remains to be considered what was perhaps the greatest danger of all to Turkey's successful attainment of solid and strong nationhood—the Greeks. Although they were not scattered as widely over Anatolia as were the Armenians, their location at important points along Turkey's seacoast, particularly in the neighborhoods of Istanbul, Izmir, Samsun, and Trebizond, as well as their skill in commerce and crafts, gave them a very important position in the life of Turkey. Ever since Greece had attained her independence as a separate kingdom in 1830, true Greeks had cherished the dream of restoring the old Byzantine Empire, joining Anatolia with the lands already comprising Greece to form a state whose power and glory should be reminiscent of the days when Constantinople was the queen city of the world. Thanks to the vitality of their *millet* and their wealth successfully accumulated in commercial and other enterprises, the Greek population of Turkey seemed to be in a strong position to bring their aspirations to an actuality in the parlous days which followed the World War. With Allied consent Greek troops landed in Izmir in 1919, much to the delight of the Greek residents of Turkey. The story of how the fresh and well-equipped Greek army invaded Anatolia only to be crushingly repulsed and routed by the Turks, who had been aroused to the point of desperation by this violation of their homeland, is vividly portrayed by A. J. Toynbee in his book, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*. So violently

had the primitive hatreds and passions on both sides been aroused in the years from 1919 to 1922 that it was plainly impossible for the two peoples to continue living side by side. Since Turkey had emerged victorious, it was obvious that something would have to be done to remove the Greeks. Treatment such as that accorded the Armenians was out of the question since the Greeks were connected with a recognized nation with whom Turkey was avowedly at war. The only possible way out of the situation seemed to be an exchange of populations which would uproot all the Greek families in Turkey, many of whom had dwelt on the land for centuries, and send them to Greece, and perform a corresponding transfer of the Turkish families who had been left in Greek territory after the wave of Turkish dominion had been swept back in the various wars of the preceding hundred years. It was an extreme measure, fruitful of tremendous suffering and one not flattering to human nature which could permit hatreds to attain such a degree of bestiality. Yet to the framers of the Treaty of Lausanne it seemed the only safeguard against an outbreak of further troubles which might produce even worse sufferings. Thus by an official migration of hundreds of thousands of refugees, most of whom were forced to leave cherished homes and property to return to a strange fatherland, the national security of Turkey was assured. Nationhood, one of the novelties learned from the West, had been bought with a great price.

By the severe extirpating tactics just described Turkey had rid herself of the dangers from large disloyal populations in her midst and consequent threats against her own sovereignty in Anatolia. Yet she was not entirely freed from population worries, for in her largest city, Istanbul, thousands of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews continued to dwell: the Greeks by special exemptions from the general exchange of populations,

the Armenians by good fortune in having escaped the policy of extermination elsewhere accorded their race, the Jews because their lot had not been much affected in the general unpleasantness. There were also in Istanbul and elsewhere numbers of citizens of other nations engaged in business and other enterprises. These various peoples, although they represented but a small fraction of Turkey's total population, had nevertheless to be taken into consideration in shaping Turkey's future course. According to official figures compiled in Turkey's first census in 1927. the country divides itself religiously as follows: Moslems 13,269,606; Catholics (presumably Roman), 39,511; Protestants, 6,658; Orthodox (presumably Greek), 109,905; Armenians (presumably Gregorians), 77,433; Christians (presumably Nestorians), 24,307; Jews, 81 ;872; other religions, 17,494; those whose religion is not known or who have none, 2,702.⁸ It thus appears that only 2.64 per cent of the total population is non-Moslem. Of the 63 *vilayets* or states into which Turkey is divided there are only two in which the percentage of Moslems is lower than 94, six in which it is lower than 98, and 16 in which it is lower than 99. The *vilayet* of Istanbul, which has a total population of 794,444, contains 547,126 Moslems or 68.86 per cent.

Figures for residents of foreign nationalities in Turkey for the same year (1927) show that only 0.64 per cent of the entire population are not Turkish citizens, most of whom are from European countries.⁹ In the same connection it is interesting to note that 3.23 per cent of the population were born in foreign countries, while 13.58 per cent have a mother-tongue other than Turkish. Of those who speak foreign languages the largest number, some 8.69 per cent of the population, are Kurds, the only minority group of any size

⁸ *Annuaire statistique*, II (1929), 42.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

left within the Turkish frontiers, and the only one, despite its ostensible Turkish nationality, to express open dissatisfaction with the conduct of the government.¹⁰

With Turkey's population so thoroughly Moslem as a result of the wartime developments, one might be led to expect that she would try to make observance of her traditional law code compulsory for all within her borders. But the young leaders of the Ankara government had no interest in retaining a code based on religious sanctions, and it was found impracticable to alter the old code, or *Mejelleh*, to make it usable in a twentieth-century secular state. The new determination to eliminate religion from its place of control in the government and the desire to have one modern law code which should be uniformly applicable to everyone in Turkey caused the decision on the part of the Ankara leaders to adopt a totally new set of statutes based on Western models. With a civil code modeled almost exactly on that of Switzerland, any reservations felt by the Christian and Jewish populations who remained in Turkey about relinquishing their long-standing exemption privileges faded away. Most of them upon being promised equal treatment in the country accepted Turkish citizenship on the same basis as the Moslems, whose feelings in regard to their new laws will be discussed later. Thus the year 1926 saw all legal distinctions between Turkish subjects on grounds of religion officially removed. Though a clause in the Organic Law stated that the religion of Turkey was Islam, following the Gazi's interpretation that this was not incompatible with freedom of thought, it was decided in the spring of 1928 to remove this clause from the law along with one which required members of the Grand National Assembly to take their oath upon the Koran.

¹⁰ A rebellion in 1925 was suppressed with considerable bloodshed.

Freedom of religious thought was insured by the insertion of article 75 into the Organic Law. This provided that "no one can be disturbed on account of the religion, rite, or sect to which He belongs, nor for the philosophic opinions which he professes. All ritualistic ceremonies which are not contrary to the public order or morale, or inconsistent with the law, are authorized." This constitutional provision was backed by articles 175-78 of the Penal Code,¹¹ which prescribed stringent punishments for those who transgressed this statute. Thus did Turkey seek to place all religions on a basis of equality in the eyes of the law, while the government maintained a neutral position, independent of and superior to the demands of any one sect.

In the law of citizenship, promulgated June 4, 1928, religion is not mentioned in any way as a qualification or handicap in the attainment of Turkish citizenship. This is all the more remarkable when one remembers the traditional Islamic practice that citizenship went automatically with religious allegiance. Until the year 1869, when a law was promulgated providing that citizenship should be determined by considerations of descent and residence, the only recognized method of becoming an Ottoman subject was by becoming a Moslem.¹² But even after the Nationality Law of 1869 was instituted, the protests of various European Powers which were unwilling to grant to an infidel government the right to determine its own citizenship laws won the continued exemption from Ottoman citizenship of Christian residents in Turkey. The Ankara government, however, by abandoning its official connection with Islam and patterning its laws after those of European countries, has been able to lay down

¹¹ Adopted in 1926 and based on the Penal Code of Italy.

¹² The question of citizenship in Moslem lands is excellently treated by Dr. Jean S. Saba in *L'Islam et la nationalite*". Note particularly Part I, chap. iv.

citizenship regulations comparable to those of Western nations.

Turkey has followed the lead of certain European countries which adhere to the *jus sanguinis* and a modified *jus soli*. The *jus sanguinis* is stated clearly in article 1, which says, "A child born from Turkish father and mother in Turkey or in a foreign country is a Turk." This applies even in illegitimate births if the father or mother or both are Turks.¹⁸ The *jus soli* comes into the third and fourth articles. Article 3 provides that a child born in Turkey of foreign parents living in Turkey (diplomats, of course, excepted) may claim Turkish citizenship within three years after reaching the age of maturity, and, according to article 4, if the foreign parents were themselves born in Turkey after January 1, 1929, the children are considered Turkish unless within six months after attaining the age of maturity they apply for the nationality of their parents. Turkish citizenship may be obtained through naturalization if the foreigner has lived in Turkey continuously for five years, and is recognized by the laws of his own country as having reached the age of maturity.¹⁴ In this case, as with other cases where doubt or change enters in, the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers is vested with considerable discriminatory power in granting or withholding privileges.

Turkey's intentions, as manifested in her laws and published declarations, are unquestionably for the best. She is evidently anxious to abolish all religious discriminations among her subjects and to move as far away as possible from the old system which split her country up into rival and unsympathetic divisions toward a whole-hearted unification along national lines. But it takes more than the mere passage of laws to change attitudes and hatreds which have been long

¹⁸ Art. 2c.

¹⁴ Art. 5.

in growing. It is apparent to anyone who spends any time in Turkey that equality among Turkish subjects has not yet been actualized, and cannot be expected to be for another generation at least. The discerning French journalist, Paul Gentizon, who served as the correspondent of *Le temps* during the Turkish struggle for independence, points out in his book, *Mustapha Kemal*:

There still exist in the country two categories of citizens with unequal rights, the Moslems and the non-Moslems.

This discrimination made between citizens of the same state is not, however, dictated by the difference of religion. Its causes are, on the one hand, of a moral nature; on the other hand, of an economic nature. Let us examine first the former set of causes. The Moslem Turks, who alone fought for the independence of the country, remain still very much under the influence of the tragic struggle which took place in Anatolia. No more have they forgotten the attitude taken at that time by various sections of the non-Moslem communities. Certain betrayals rendered them suspicious. And in this state of mind they no longer consider the oral manifestations of civic loyalty on the part of the minorities as being of indisputable sincerity. They wish proofs more tangible showing that the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews have become heart and soul true citizens of Turkey.

The economic causes of discrimination, Gentizon goes on to say, are those which have arisen by virtue of the old Ottoman system which placed commercial affairs in the hands of the non-Turks, giving the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews a tremendous head-start in the attainment of business acumen, now so earnestly sought by the Turks.¹⁵

The issue in regard to the loyalty of the remaining non-Moslem peoples is indeed a very real one to the enthusiastically patriotic Turks. Newspaper men, government officials, and other Turks with whom I talked constantly stressed to

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 261 ff.

me their belief that Armenian and Greek propagandists were spreading false and derogatory reports about the Turkish Republic at every opportunity. Despite, too, the outward manifestations of friendship between Turkey and Greece, flurries of suspicion are aroused by the publication of such news as appeared in *Le milliett* of December 11, 1929, that in four years a total of fifteen thousand Greeks, supposedly citizens of Turkey, had fled the country to serve terms in the Greek army. Among Greeks and Armenians in the country there may be found a smoldering resentment over being forced to become Turkish citizens, indicating that they felt it somehow improper to be classified as Turks. The situation is one full of hard feeling and constant provocation on both sides, for the non-Moslems, who represent a defeated cause, seek to retain whatever they can of their old traditions and individuality, and resent the restrictions placed on them by the government, which sees in the continuance of those features a future danger to the internal welfare and peace of the state. The government, seeing the resentment on the part of the minorities, has reason still further to doubt their loyalty and restricts their traveling and citizenship rights.

In the economic sphere Turkey is especially anxious to have her subjects thrive commercially. She has set up laws requiring foreign business concerns to employ a certain percentage of Turkish citizens as employees, while certain occupations are entirely closed to non-Turks. But in the reckoning it appears that only Moslem Turks are regarded as citizens in this connection. It has sometimes been difficult for Christian Turks to secure or hold positions on this account. Naturally, because of the required employment of Turks, individuals who have frequently had little or no experience, efficiency sometimes suffers until the "green" employees become accustomed to their new work. In certain parts of the interior of Anatolia, where Turks are attempting to carry on

the various agricultural and industrial enterprises left by the refugee Greeks or Armenians, or to learn the skill in craftsmanship possessed by their departed neighbors, the let-down is very noticeable. It is no doubt true that necessity will spur the Turks on to learn the new techniques more rapidly than might otherwise be the case, but it cannot be expected under the circumstances that efficiency and skill will reach a high level until more time has been allowed for the development of experts.

Until Turkey has had enough time, then, to develop her nation to the point where the Moslem citizens are able to hold their own without fear or favor in the ways of the West, a certain amount of favoritism cannot but be expected in their treatment. The sooner this condition is reached, the sooner will Turkey become a full-fledged, strong nation, ready to forget past blows and insults, and able to take her place as a progressive nation in which citizenship might be considered a privilege by anyone. It is difficult to find fault with any of Turkey's intentions. When she does not act exactly as equitably as might be hoped for, observers must be patient, take into account the difficulties which she has had to face, and be ready to give credit for the advances which have actually been achieved.

VIII

THE NEW SPIRIT IN TURKEY'S SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Profound changes were introduced into Turkey, as we have noticed, by the compelling force of Nationalism. But it must not be thought that the Western infiltration was limited to the realms of international policy and internal political structure. It is difficult to find any aspect of Turkey's life which has not been affected by the flood of new ideals which so suddenly broke through the Islamic dikes. In fact, the Turkish Revolution gives every indication of being one of the most, if not the most, far-reaching revolutions ever accomplished by so large a society in a corresponding length of time. As P. Gentizon has said:

The French Revolution was limited to the domain of political institutions; the Russian Revolution has brought about disorder in social relations; but only the Turkish Revolution has concerned itself all at one time with political institutions, social relations, religion, the family, economic life, the customs and even the moral bases of society. One transformation invites another. One reform conditions the following one. For a while hold on to the life of the people.¹

The Swedish observer, Rutger Essen, one of the most notable political writers of Scandinavia, has declared in the *Svenska Dagbladet*:

In this remarkable development there is only one country comparable, and that is Japan during the last three decades of

¹ *Mustapha Kemal*, p. 198.

the 19th century. The differences also are very important. At first sight Japan did not go so far in her occidental reform as Turkey has now done. Japan adopted only occidental technique. Mentality and reforms in the social life have preserved an indifference. This indifference, after 1900 or 1910, tends rather to grow than to diminish. But Turkey's point of departure was quite different, and besides she found herself much nearer the common civilization in the Occident. In that which concerns mentality, the Turks are not so far from the common European type as one might imagine, much nearer than the Russians, for example.²

In the pages which follow, we shall see what these far-reaching changes have been, spending some time on the more important ones and noticing the way in which the government has introduced them, often with the co-operation of private or semiofficial organizations.

An alteration which may at first glance appear superficial but which in reality is of almost fundamental significance in the country's changing mentality was the adoption of the European hat in place of the brimless fez, which, though it had been adopted in Turkey a hundred years ago as a reform itself supplanting the turban, had grown to symbolize the mentality of conservatism and opposition to change. One day in January, 1930, when I was walking through a street of the old bazaar of Istanbul near the Bayezid Library with an American friend who had been for some years in Turkey publishing Bibles, he remarked that ten or fifteen years ago it would have been impossible for a person in a European hat to walk down that street without being spit on. The hat indicated the European *ghiaour* so earnestly hated by the religious conservatives. The same person in a fez would not be molested. Nowadays Turks and Western *ghiaours* all wear the same headdress; the visible mark of distinction has been removed; and by the psychological influence of wearing identi-

² Translated in *Le milliett*, June 21, 1930.

cal clothes the cause of friendly co-operation is greatly enhanced. To enforce such a prescription by law may seem to have been a somewhat extreme measure, but it was a tangible Westernizing measure and one which would affect every man in Turkey. To put a Western hat on the head of every Turk would serve as an ever present reminder to the country that new customs were the vogue. It betokened, too, the power of the new government, and at the same time was a blow against religious fanaticism, for the hat with its brim meant awkwardness in touching one's forehead to the ground as required in the Moslem prostration for prayer.

When Kemal Atatürk and his fellow-legislators had decided in 1925 that the fez must go, the Gazi, with characteristic directness, propounded his reform in one of conservatism's strongholds, Kastamuni, a somewhat isolated section between Ankara and the Black Sea. His feeling on the matter is well expressed in his own words in his Six-Day Speech of 1927:

Gentlemen, it was important to remove the fez, which sat on our heads like a symbol of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred against progress and civilization, and in its place to put the customary hat, headdress of the entire civilized world, and to show thereby, among other things, that no difference in manner of thought existed between the Turkish nation and the great family civilization.⁸

In an earlier chapter we saw that one of the traditional restrictions which brought out great discontent and resentment was the application of religious principles to the laws of the country. It did not take the Ankara reformers long to see that their progress could not be achieved as they wished, if their country was kept under the handicap of an antiquated system based on the *sharia* law of Islam. True it is that attempts had been made in previous administrations to modify the force and the scope of religious applications in Turkey's

³ *Die neue Türkei*, II, 386.

laws, for example, the introduction of rational Western principles in the Hatti Humayun of 1856 and in Midhat Pasha's Constitution twenty years later, and under the "Young Turk" wartime administration in 1917 the transfer of the *sharia* or religious courts under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. In 1920 the newly organized Grand National Assembly made an attempt to shape the old religious institutions to conform to the exigencies of the new state. On May 2 a law was passed substituting in place of the old offices of *Sheikh-ul-Islam* and minister of *Evkaf* ("Pious Foundations") a single commissary. At the same time in its law of organization the Assembly expressly asserted its powers to make laws which had previously been determined by Islamic treatises. In the Law of Fundamental Organization, No. 85, according to article 1:

The Government belongs unconditionally and without restriction to the nation. The system of administration is based on the fact that the people govern strictly and effectively, in fact and in person, their destinies.

And article 7 stated:

The promulgation and application of all laws, even religious prescriptions, the modifications to be made to them, and their abolition, the conclusion of treaties, the signature of peace, the declarations of defense of the country, etc., as well as all analogous prerogatives belong to the Grand National Assembly. In the elaboration of the laws the needs of the times, the interests of the people, legislative and juridical data, and manners and customs will be taken into account.⁴

On March 3, 1924, a new law abolished the Commissary for the *Evkaf* and *Sheikh-ul-Islamate*, and religious affairs were placed under a departmental head in the office of the prime minister.⁵

⁴ Schlicklin, *Angora*, pp. 40 f.

⁵ Cf. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs* (1925), Part I: "The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement," pp. 71, 572 f.

The new leaders were giving more and more evidence of impatience with inadequate and compromising measures, and showed that they would be glad to get rid of all Islamic incumbrances as soon as possible. The next question naturally to be faced was what to put in place of the antiquated *Mejelleh* (Turkey's adaptation of Islamic law). On this question the minister of justice, Mahmud Essad, is quoted as declaring:

We are badly in want of a good scientific Code. Why waste our time trying to produce something new when quite good codes are to be found ready made? Moreover, what is the use of a Code without good commentaries to guide in the application of it? Are we in a position to write such commentaries for a new Code? We dispose neither of the necessary time nor of the necessary precedents in practice. The only thing to do is to take a good ready-made Code to which good commentaries exist, and translate them wholesale. The Swiss Code is a good Code; I am going to have it adopted, and I shall ask the Assembly to proceed to a vote *en bloc*, as Napoleon had his Code voted. If it had to be discussed article by article, we should never get through.⁶

In accordance with this attitude, the Assembly in 1926 adopted from Switzerland a Civil Code and a Code of Obligations, from Italy a new Penal Code, and from Germany a new Commercial Code. These were put into force after Turkey's legists and common people had had six months to study them. The responsibility on the judges and lawyers who had to lay aside most of their funds of learning and experience in the intricacies of the oriental *Mejelleh* Code and switch in less than a year to practicing according to an occidental law which laid on the magistrate's judgment much more responsibility than the hoary and petrified religious system ever thought of was tremendous. Yet the change in law was but one of the radical reforms to which the citizens of Turkey

⁶ Quoted in Ostrorog, *The Angora Reform*, pp. 87 f.

had to accustom themselves during the first decade of the Republic.

In the brief treatment which we are able to give to these reforms, any one of which could be made the subject of a long and deep study, it must not be thought that because small space is devoted to them that they are of minor significance. The fact is, in the case of the law codes, as Gentizon has pointed out:

The adoption of a European civil code by a Moslem nation, accustomed for centuries to obey only a religious law considered as revealed, is one of the most important dates and events in the history of the world. For the first time a people of Mohammedan religion applies with respect to personal and family law a legislation completely free from theocratic dispositions and able to rule indiscriminately all the inhabitants of the country, whatever their race or their religion. . . . [Turkey] no longer admits any difference between men according to their faith or their belief. And in doing this, in accepting that legally in her midst there are no more any but citizens equal in rights and in duties, Turkey, first among the Moslem countries, admits a rationalistic conception of the universe and of humanity.⁷

The benefits which Turkey believes will be safeguarded by her new legal system are numerous. While it is true that repressive measures have been taken and high-handed methods used in the introduction of reforms, the end in view has usually been to insure the success of Westernization and to root out reactionary and dissenting forces which might have set up fatal obstacles to the attainment of the new goals. The worst thing to be said of this type of superimposed advance is the criticism made of all beneficent dictatorships, that the progress is not the result of popular mass initiative and that too much depends on the continuance in power of the strong dictator. In the case of Turkey, however, the handicaps of illiteracy, fanaticism, fatalism, and lack of means of commu-

⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 219 f.

nication might so seriously have retarded progress that Turkey without strong leadership might have been unable to hold off Western imperialists and the country might have been forced to undergo the tribulations of India, Egypt, or even China. If the present government, it may be added, were solely interested in maintaining itself in power, it would not be sponsoring so thoroughgoing a system of education and so determined a war on illiteracy along with its introduction of liberal laws. For with schools and the ability to read, the seeds of democracy are being sown which must sooner or later produce a nation which will not countenance any rule which does not make for the ultimate welfare of the nation.

I have not been able to find, and so far as I know there has not yet been published in any language, a complete history of education in Turkey. For the historical data on educational developments during the past century I am indebted to Hilmi Malik Adnan, who holds the degree of Master of Arts from Columbia University, and who prepared a study chiefly dealing with preschool education for presentation to a conference of former Columbia students in Geneva. Of education under the regime of the sultans the report has the following to say:

In the old regime, the religious side of education was the most important thing, and everything was based on it. The world to come was more important for the living creatures of God than the present world. The religious influence was supreme with the old regime in the educational system, so much so that physical and natural courses were religiously interpreted. The subject of evolution was discarded and ignored. The aim in education was to train the pupils to become faithful subjects and officials of the Sultans and their government. The school discipline was a model of the life of that period. Mechanical obedience was the soul of discipline.

For centuries whatever schooling a Turk could receive was in or near the mosque, where one of the chief functionaries was named the *hodja*, or teacher. Whatever training these ecclesiastics had had was obtained in a *medresseh* or theological school, and the bulk of what they taught was the memorization of the Koran in Arabic—a language which was not understood by most Turks. Elementary education was limited to this sort of teaching unless the student sought to become a member of the Ulema and make himself an authority on Islamic law.

Better things might be said of Turkey's scholastic system in the early heyday of the Empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. When the religious ideal was flourishing with the enthusiastic energy of the newly converted Turks, the great sultans, notably Mohammed the Conqueror and Suleiman the Magnificent, were lavish in their endowments for schools, and the best minds were attracted into religious, legal, and administrative service, and the curriculums of Turkish institutions measured up with the best in Europe. But with decadence in the house of Osman followed decadence in the religious and educational realms, and little disposition toward revitalization was met with until the reign of Mahmud II, who laid his reforming hand on these as well as other spheres. From his time dates the first compulsory education law in Turkey, which, however, was probably little more than a statute on paper. In the late sixties elementary education for the second time was pronounced compulsory, and parents were obligated to send their children to school at the age of six. In 1870 a set of rules and regulations for elementary education was issued by the Department of Education, from which the following program is quoted by Hilmi Malik Adnan: "There will be an Elementary School in every quarter of a city and in every village; its scholastic years will be four, and the teaching of Alphabet, Koran,

Courses on Morals, Writing, Arithmetic, Turkish History, Geography, and others, will be done according to modern methods." Apparently as part of the same movement which in literature was producing a Europeanized school of writers and politically was bringing to birth the Young Turk party and the Constitution of 1876, educational enterprise opened an experimental elementary school at Noury Osmanieh Mosque, studied the elementary-school system of Europe, appointed a commission to organize and improve methods of teaching, opened more elementary schools in Istanbul, and started to spread enlightenment into the provinces. About 1885 the first elementary normal school in the interior was established at Sivas. Further progress was then checked for some years by the growing reactionary conservatism led by Abdul-Hamid II.

After 1908 when the forces of progress came to power, education came back into favor. The government schools were expanded, students were encouraged to go abroad for study, and Turkish Moslems even began attending in large numbers the European and American schools long maintained in the country as missionary agencies. Most remarkable of all, perhaps, was the advance made in the religious schools maintained by the *Evkaf* or "Pious Foundations." Through the influence of Hairi Effendi, *Sheikh-ul-Islam* and a very broad man, serious reforms were undertaken. Halide Edib, who played a part in the modernization scheme, has given an intimate and interesting picture of the movement in her *Memoirs*. She says:

The *medresses* for the first time were to have modern science taught by modern teachers instead of the old scholastic curriculum and the old teachers. The mosque schools, which so far taught only the Koran and which were housed in little holes, were to be modernized, and a dozen schools were amalgamated in one big and up-to-date building in an important center. Each

was to have a modern staff with a modern curriculum. The boys' schools were organized by Ali Bey, a very capable and progressive section chief in *evkaff*. The girls' schools as well as the small mixed ones⁸ were to be organized by Nakie Hanum as the general director.

Halide Edib herself became inspector-general and adviser of the girls' schools and remarks that "the curriculum of the *evkaff* schools at the time was more secular than obtained in the schools of the public instruction." °

However creditable might be the innovations which were introduced into the various schools of Turkey, one thing which became clear to the Ankara leaders as they came into control of Turkey's destinies was that too much of Turkey's education was unsystematized and left to chance whims of individuals who happened to be in control. Little continuity existed between administrations, and Turkey's schools never really quite knew what their true end was or should be. The programs, too, had little connection with the practical facts of life. These weaknesses were sensed and criticized by the Gazi in his important pronouncements to the population at Ismidt following the Greek defeat. Turkey's future program of public instruction, he declared,

will be of such a sort that those who will have followed it will become good agriculturists, good manufacturers, good merchants, good shoe-makers—they will become practical and profitable men. Public instruction constitutes the ensemble of institutions and programs which will teach all that.

Gentlemen, a director of public instruction with whom I conversed in the course of this trip has lived during his career of between twenty and thirty years in different parts of the country. According to the information which he gave me, he has received many contradictory programs which he applied or caused to be applied. For each minister who came to power elaborated a pro-

⁸ *Memoirs of Halidi Edib*, p. 351.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 352.

gram according to his own views, distributed it, and worked for its application. Another minister would come some time after, who was not pleased with this program and would apply another. What did all these programs produce? Men who had learned a great many things. But what did they know? A certain number of theories. And what had they not learned? To understand themselves, life, and their needs. They had learned nothing that it is necessary to know to live, and they were hungry.¹⁰

... I do not wish, Gentlemen, to trace a program of public instruction. But I emphasize that it is absolutely necessary that primary and secondary instruction give science and the knowledge which civilization and reality demand of men. But they must be given in a practical fashion in order that the child leaving the school may be certain that he will find work.¹¹

As a keynote not only of educational matters but of the whole governmental attitude on public enlightenment the Gazi's plea for disillusionment and eagerness to face facts is one of the most significant pronouncements of that new spirit which seeks to arouse the Orient from its dreamy existence. He insisted:

No, Gentlemen! It is necessary to be very honest! The greatest of the errors committed up till now, the greatest sin of our men of action, of our enlightened men, above all of our men of science, has been in not being straightforward. It is essential to be honest, it is necessary to carry on honestly in the sight of the nation.¹²

In education as in the other phases of Turkish life which have been considered the Western point of view brought sweeping changes. The goal now was to have an educational system which would be scientific, realistic, and practical. It was to produce Turks who should be equipped mentally and bodily to serve the nation. It was to compete successfully with the foreign institutions which Turks feared were edu-

¹⁰ "Le Ghazi et la revolution," instalment No. 44.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, instalment No. 45.

¹² *Ibid.*, instalment No. 48.

eating their children away from their national environment.¹³ It was to be a unified system, scientifically planned, and this meant that religious influences, feared as enemies of progress, were to be eliminated or at least brought under control. In order, then, that such a system might be realized, there was passed on March 3, 1924, at the same time as the law previously mentioned which made religious affairs a subdepartment under the prime minister, the Law for the Unification of Educational Systems.¹⁴ By this piece of legislation all the religious schools connected with the *Evkaf* or other pious institutions, as well as educational enterprises connected with other ministries, such as military high schools which had been run by the Ministry of National Defense, were transferred directly under the control of the Ministry of Public Instruction. To the same Ministry was also diverted the income provided by the *Evkaf* ("Pious Endowments") for Islamic schools. Religious instruction, which had been the original *raison d'être* of education in Turkey, now played a distinctly minor role and was retained for a time by the secular ministry only in so far as it could be made to contribute in some way toward the building-up of the nation and the national spirit. Headed by a permanent commission of educational experts who retain their offices whatever political wind might blow, public instruction in Turkey entered upon a period of unprecedented activity in the war on ignorance and fanaticism and the building-up of a modern system of universal education.

The Ministry of Public Instruction is one of the most important departments of the Ankara government, leading and controlling as it does the agencies by which Turkey hopes to achieve that which is infinitely more difficult than any change in dress or legal system, a change in the nation's entire mentality. The Department of Public Instruction is intrusted

¹³ The place of foreign schools in Turkey is discussed in chap. ix.

¹⁴ Text in Toynbee, *op. cit.*, Part I, Appen. II, p. 574.

with the responsibility of producing a new generation which is literate, practical, versed in the ways of the West, and, above all, enthusiastically useful to Turkey's national society. For 1933 its budget was £T6,528,327 (about \$3,000,000).¹⁵ The post of minister of public instruction has often been held by men who are among the country's ablest.

Of central significance in the Department, however, is the permanent commission known as the National Bureau of Education and Instruction. According to Professor Ismail Hakki of Istanbul University, in his article on Turkish education for the *Educational Year Book of 1928*, the duties of this Bureau include the following:

To make decisions as to what educational aims, systems, and methods are to be accepted and applied; to examine books written for Primary and Secondary schools and to accept and authorize those which conform to the curriculum and which suit the educational conditions of the country; further to arrange and have printed school books for the various subjects of the curriculum; and to follow educational magazines and books written in foreign languages and to publish in whole or in summary those which will be useful for the teachers of Turkey.¹⁶

Compulsory education, which is still far from being universally enforced due to the lack of trained teachers and adequate equipment, begins at the age of seven and extends through the primary years, supposedly five in number. According to statistics given out by the Ministry of Public Instruction, there were in the year 1932-33 a total of 6,733

¹⁵ According to the *Annuaire statistique*, Vol. VI, for 1932-33, certain other departments received the following appropriations for 1933: National Defense: £T33,326,640; Public Works: £T14,296,993; Finance: £T12,387,287; Gendarmerie: £T8,679,379; Justice: £T8,013,478; Hygiene and Social Assistance: £T4,196,884; Agriculture: £T4,487,611; Religious Affairs: £T619,586. Payment of public debts took £T146,210,355 in that same year.

¹⁶ "Present-Day Education in Turkey," *op. cit.*

primary schools with 15,064 teachers, and attended by 567,963 pupils throughout the country. The progress already made is evident when compared with the years 1923-24 and 1913-14. In 1923-24 the figures are 4,470 primary schools, 9,760 teachers, and 330,740 pupils, while in 1913-14, in the same area as modern Turkey, there were but 3,623 primary schools, 5,963 teachers, and 215,130 pupils. Encouraging though the progress be, however, it is estimated that the number of children who have reached school age but who do not attend school is more than 1,000,000.

Government education provides, besides the five-year primary course, a three-year middle school and a three-year lycee course, as well as special courses in professional schools and the University at Istanbul. More will be said about these higher schools in subsequent pages. Supervision of the educational system is maintained by the division of the country into thirteen sections, each administered by a regional superintendent who is directly responsible to the Ankara Ministry. The thirteen sections are in turn divided into smaller districts, each with a superintendent, and some districts are even subdivided. Close watch is kept on the schools through three types of inspectors: (1) primary inspectors who are responsible to the district superintendents; (2) regional inspectors, responsible to one of the thirteen regional superintendents and authorized to inspect all educational institutions within the specified region; (3) central inspectors, operating under the Ankara Ministry and having broad responsibilities in the examination of conditions, administrative and educational, throughout the whole system of public instruction. Financial support for the system comes as much as possible from the cities and *vilayets* of Turkey, while the government budget takes care of whatever else is necessary. The training of teachers will be discussed later in connection with the higher

education, and the recently opened adult schools will be described in connection with the promulgation of the new alphabet.

Since it is upon primary education that Turkey is laying great emphasis in the development of the type of citizens which she hopes will strengthen the nation, it will be of interest to examine the curriculum which has been laid out for primary schools and to note some of the objectives of the system as they appear in the instructions issued to primary-school teachers and in other publications.

The following curriculum for primary schools, which was adopted in 1926, exemplifies the extent to which Western educational ideas have penetrated the country. It is a far cry from the educational methods of the *hodjas* in the mosque schools which centered about the Koran and Islamic lore. It is a constant source of amazement to the outsider traveling in Turkey to see such things as school children dressed in neat European uniforms walking hand in hand with mothers who still wear the veil and *charshaj*; or to hear from a school-room window the strains of children's voices joyously singing a song to the tune of the "Barcarolle" from *The Tales of Hoffmann* while from a nearby minaret may be issuing the plaintive and distinctly oriental call to prayer; or to talk with a highly cultured Ankara official who follows American educational journals, including those of the University of Chicago, and who knows the history of American education more thoroughly than 999 out of 1,000 Americans. In the following curriculum it will be noted that the five years are divided into two stages, the first of three years and the second of two. The figures in Table I represent lesson periods per week. The table is taken from the previously quoted article by Ismail Hakki written for the *Educational Year Book for 1928*.

TABLE I

LESSONS	FIRST STAGE			SECOND STAGE	
	1st Year	2d Year	3d Year	4th Year	5th Year
A.B.C.	12				
Reading		*4	4	2	
Writing		2	2	1	
Composition		2	2	2	
Grammar				1	
Penmanship ...		2	2	1	
Religious training *		2	2	1	
Orientation	4	4	4		
Arithmetic-geometry ...	2	2	2	3	3
History				2	2
Geography				2	2
Nature study ..					3
Object lesson ..					
Civics				2	2
Drawing-handicraft	4	4	4	3	3
Music	2	2	2	2	2
Physical training	2	2	2	2	1
Domestic science (extra)					(2)
Total	26	26	26	26	26

* Religion has subsequently been eliminated from the school curriculums.

After reading this program, which of course has gone through modifications from year to year, one can appreciate the message issued by the minister of public instruction to his teachers throughout Turkey at the opening of the school year in September, 1929:

Teachers, in your instruction, turning your eyes away from everything that has any vestige of the past, you will have as a sacred ideal the future of the new Turkey, prosperous and civilized. The ideas which you will inculcate will be the reflections of the ideals of the great Gazi, the creator of the new Turkish world, and the one who has turned a new page of our history.¹⁷

¹⁷ Djemal Husni in *Le milliett*, September 18, 1929.

One of the vestiges of the past on which Turkey had most resolutely turned her back was the continuance of Islamic instruction in its old supernaturalistic and ritualistic form. Education no longer worked to produce good and faithful Moslems, but good and faithful Turks. Islam in so far as it could contribute to the new end was retained, but the religious instruction was not given by turbaned *hodjas* but by the regular secular teachers and was so presented, as will be seen in a later chapter, as to produce devoted Turks. As a matter of fact, recent developments have produced a new type of course called *Yurt Bilgisi* ("Knowledge of the Home"), which seems to play a part of more and more importance in the production of intelligent and patriotic citizens. A study of the educational objectives as they are presented in a popular *Yurt Bilgisi* series of textbooks and in the published instructions to the primary teachers will give an idea of what the Turks wish their educational system to accomplish and some of the means by which the students are imbued with the new ideals.

The four aims which seem to stand out most prominently in the writings mentioned are: (1) the attainment of knowledge for practical uses; (2) the development of a spirit of social co-operation; (3) the kindling of a devoted flame of patriotism; and (4) the promotion of good health. A fifth desideratum, which at present is frankly given but little emphasis due to the all-important need of gaining equipment for the struggle to keep alive, is aesthetic appreciation of nature and the arts. As years go by the finer and gentler sensibilities will no doubt bulk larger among the aims which Turkey wishes to attain in her education, but at the present time when every effort is being bent to bring Turkey back on her feet economically, and resentment is still rife against the leaders of the past whose dalliances and dreamy lack of practicality are blamed for Turkey's present plight, it is not to be won-

dered at that things dainty or delicate are considered of secondary consequence. And while it is recognized that music and the other arts are important parts of the civilization to which Turkey aspires, one must not be surprised to see painting take its greatest advances in the lines of commercial art, and music and sculpture find their expression in martial and patriotic subjects.

Turkey's desire that knowledge shall have a *practical application in life* is manifested frequently in the instructions issued by the Ministry of Public Instruction to the primary teachers in the little handbook entitled *Ilkmektepler Talimatnamesi*. Section 51 of this booklet has the following to say:

It is necessary that training should be practical, and it should be based upon the principles of observation of the objects with which the lesson is connected. If the object can not be brought to the classroom, then students must be taken to the place where they can see these objects; if this is not possible, then some equipment of the school such as maps or pictures must be used to make the lesson more interesting for the child.

Carrying this idea still farther, the minister of public instruction added in a special leaflet of instructions to the teachers which he inclosed with the booklet:

Children should be acquainted with the economic activities of their vicinity and the agricultural production and work of the place in which they live. Where vegetables and fruit grow, the lessons should have a close relation with the activity of the locality. If the village or city is near the shore of the sea, it is amusing and interesting for the children to have a knowledge of fishing and canning and the important part played by these in the economic life of the nation.

The same principle, says this educator, can be applied to mathematics, geometry, civics, geography, handwork, etc.:

The instructor should develop the tendency of the student, and the instructor who understands his work perfectly creates this type of interest in the child. Primary education does not help to realize a future career, but it creates and must create an interest. It should never be forgotten that primary education increases the productive energies, and this can only be obtained by having a close relation between the lessons and the economic activities of the environment.

Strong objection to any sort of teaching which is so abstract as to have no influence on the child's ability to face life more adequately is contained in sections 40 and 41 of the "Instructions":

It is necessary that teaching should have an educative nature. The lesson which does not have any influence upon the character and the spirit of the child is not an educative lesson. Students must be able to put into practice what they have learned. They must be able to apply their knowledge to overcome the difficulties of life.

Teaching must have a relation with the intellectual training of the child. It must also have a close contact with the feelings and will power of the child. So it is necessary to study the relations of the lesson to the points which are mentioned above [feelings and will power].

The lesson which is taught under the title of "Knowledge of Life" concentrates on the relations of the child with his environment. Therefore this lesson is the centre and the axle of the activities of the students.

Patriotic feelings are increased in teaching Turkish history, geography and civics. Arithmetic must be taught so as to increase the reasoning ability of the child. Drawing and handwork should serve to give a taste and appreciation of the fine arts; they also give a sense of pleasure derived from being able to accomplish something. Physical instructions should develop the body of the student and also strengthen the quality of daring. Games and excursions are to increase the power of observation.

One of the worst faults with the instruction in the old mosque schools was its emphasis on memorizing and repetition—features which **made the students tend to be purely**

imitative and lacking in mental initiative. This meant that their education did nothing to help them think for themselves and apply their learning to constructive living. This error is specially warned against in the Ministry's "Instructions," again in section 41:

Students often fall into carelessness. They interpret the things which they see in accordance with their own feelings and imagination in a way often vague, sometimes wrong, and sometimes exaggerated. So teachers should correct them in games and in experimental activities. If a student is asked to repeat aloud what he has read in class, it will be found that he has read only with his eyes but not with his mind. The habit of playing on words must be avoided. One of the greatest duties of a teacher is to prevent his students from getting such bad habits and to strengthen the relations between the intellect and the talents of the child.

The second objective of education which we shall consider is that which aims to develop a *spirit of social co-operation* among the students. Sections of the "Instructions" which deal with this phase of the program are the following:

20. From the first day the younger generation starts school it should develop social powers and abilities so as to adapt itself physically and spiritually in the most useful way to the national community and to the Turkish Republic.

21. The first and the last aim of training in Primary Schools is the full adaptation of children to the national life. So there must be close harmony and relations between the schools and the national communities.

22. The social principles of the national communities must form the basis of school life and of the administration and discipline of the school and of the relations of teachers with the students.

23. In the schools of the Republic, discipline cannot be based on methods of compelling and restraining. Love and respect must be the axle of the relations between the pupils and between pupil and teacher.

24. The discipline of the school must be the result of work

done in the proper way. It must grow out of healthy and educative games, close social relations, mutual help and understanding. It must be a democratic, free, habitual discipline, inspired from the above-mentioned virtues.

25. Serious attention should be given that students in their characters and their words should be truthful and should behave properly in their relations with one another and should play games fairly.

26. Teachers should work hard to cultivate the sense of punctuality and regularity and to realize the value of time.

27. It is necessary that special attention should be paid to the fact that students should be persistent and faithful to the work which they have undertaken. They should not neglect the details of a duty and should be invested with civilized virtues so as to sacrifice their personal interests for the benefit of the community.

28. Care must be taken that competition either in lessons or in games, in the same school or between different schools, should be reasonable and moderate and that it should not create hatred in individual or in group games.

29. Students should know thoroughly and believe firmly that the school building, equipment, and furniture are to be kept in good condition and that they have no right to use public property more than any one else.

30. Students should be careful in their dress, behavior, and talk. It is important that they should avoid dressing and behaving carelessly. Especially should students avoid using bad language which shows a social defect.

31. Students from an early age should learn to discuss politely, to defend their own point of view without hurting others, to listen to the opinions of others, and to correct themselves without being hurt.

32. It should always be remembered that all social virtues may be obtained by experience in life and that habits can only be formed in this way. In order to lead the students to form good habits they should be given opportunity for activities so as to form these desired habits. This method is preferable to giving lectures and making speeches. Students must find themselves in an environment where the affairs of daily life are treated with honesty and purity and are closely related with physical and intellectual activities, and where there is no possibility of dishon-

esty and impurity, nor of a lazy life. Therefore teachers should concern themselves more with the environment than with the behavior of the individual student. The spiritual atmosphere of the school must be as pure as the material atmosphere.

33. Students must be saturated with the spirit of social service. For example, students ought to feel uneasy when they see window panes dirty. And where there are no servants, students should remedy the situation themselves. Students should not be indifferent to having the school garden ruined. Teachers should never forget that they will always be examples to their students.

A word of further advice to the teachers on this subject of building up habits which are desirable in modern Turkish society is added by the minister in his previously mentioned leaflet of suggestions to the teachers. He advises the teacher to study student activity, urging that he should study the influence of the work upon the child and the results of the work, and discover what sort of habits are formed; and the instructor should ask himself whether Turkish citizens have need of these habits. He goes on:

If you study the activities from this point of view, you will find what is to be avoided and what is to be allowed. Children should be trained to express their opinions freely. Insincerity and any tendency toward charlatanism and deceitfulness should be cut out at once. The student should understand that he is a human being and he should be treated as such.

Section 125 of the "Instructions" goes still farther into the subject of developing the right sort of members of society by establishing the right sort of life in the school.

It is necessary that the school should have the nature of a small society. It is not necessary that the student should only learn lessons and play games which are approved, but he must also use his own will and create some activities himself.

These activities may be put down as follows:

- 1) The students should feel responsible for the cleanness of the classroom, and for this they should have a committee for

cleanness and orderliness. Students elect the members of this committee.

2) A sense of responsibility may be given the students for keeping the school equipment in order.

3) The members of the fourth and fifth classes may be advised to form an honor committee. The committee is composed of four members, two from each class. Each member is to act in turn as chairman. . . . The members of the committee may give their opinions about cases connected with school discipline, if approved by the head teacher. Another important duty of the Honor Committee is this: that they should lead the students to obey the rules of the school and rules of friendship and health. Another duty is to pay special attention that vulgar language shall not prevail among the students.

4) With the help of the teachers the committee should try to form hobby clubs and savings societies, to help the Red Crescent and the Children's Protective Society [Himayei Etfal], to protect useful animals, and to take care of trees and gardens. (Besides these activities which are mentioned above, no other imitative activities are permitted in the schools.)

5) With schools in the same or in different cities the students may exchange postcards and give information about their own city. For this purpose the members of the higher classes may form a club.

6) Members of the fourth and fifth classes may be encouraged to put up a wall newspaper to give a record of activities in the school and of outside news which may interest the students. These wall newspapers may also have colored pictures. In order to obtain the best results, one of the teachers should take an interest in this activity.

7) The following points are important in the games and play program of the primary school: students should be encouraged to play, but football (soccer) is strictly forbidden. Basketball and volleyball¹⁸ and other easy games may be allowed. In order to prevent competition and jealousy in collective games members of the teams should be exchanged. Sport activities, especially

¹⁸ It is interesting to note that these two words have been taken over directly into the new Turkish and are spelt phonetically, as is all Turkish; thus *basketbol* and *volibol*.

group excursions, camping and mountain-climbing, should be encouraged.

8) Regarding the relations of boys and girls,¹⁹ special attention should be paid to politeness, but the boys should not be allowed to pay too many compliments to the girls. While having games of any sort or any other activities, it is not necessary that boys and girls should mix with each other. When it is noticed that boys wish to be alone on one side and girls on the other, it is not right to prevent such a division.

9) When it is possible, the children may form a club to help poor students, but in helping the poorer students extreme care should be taken lest the poor students' feelings be hurt. To help one group, the other group should not try to collect money openly. Public charitable organizations must be formed outside the schools, and students may receive help from them. These organizations may be the regular charity organizations of the city, or the teachers may form special organizations for this purpose.

10) Celebration of the National Holidays mentioned in the program is a source of love for the school, and later it develops into love for the community.

11) Schools should have a close relation with the environment and especially with the parents and guardians of the students. This relation may be established by communication with the parents and the holding of social exercises. It is useful to have these social exercises twice a year if the building is suitable. No obligation should be levied on the parents, and the program should be fixed by the students. If it is a play, it should have not more than two acts; national dances, monologues, and the recitation of poems may compose the program. Either the head teacher or another of the teachers must explain the nature of these exercises.

12) Besides these annual social exercises, class social activities may take place, provided that too much time is not taken

¹⁹ Coeducation was introduced into the entire Turkish school system, the lycees temporarily excepted, in 1928. This radical change was regarded apprehensively by many parents. But as Pere Ludovic of the French legation remarked, it has long been a custom in Turkish families to bring up small children in close proximity to each other and to their parents so that a child of six frequently has a rather complete sex knowledge.

for preparation. One or two of the activities which are mentioned in the above articles may be performed by the class, and the teacher may give a short lecture. Special care should be taken that the lecture be interesting and brief. Some educational authorities or government officials may be invited to these exercises. These social exercises should not last more than two hours and must be over at nine o'clock in the evening.

One last section of the "Instructions" may be quoted in connection with this objective of producing children who will be useful and co-operative citizens. This deals with the subject of thrifty economy. Section 35 states:

Another important phase of primary education is thrift. At every opportunity students should be informed and trained for national thrift. They must learn to economize their pencils, papers, etc. This idea of saving and thrift may be communicated to students in arithmetic classes by giving them special problems to solve.

One of the chief agencies used by the schools in developing the sense of social co-operation is the course mentioned earlier, known as *Yurt Bilgisi* ("Knowledge of the Home"). In the series of three books written by Mitat Sadullah for use in the third, fourth, and fifth grades of the primary schools, the child is given an introduction to all the institutions and activities with which the Republic wishes him to become acquainted, while backward customs are in various ways made to look either repulsive or ridiculous. Frequent use is made of letters or conversations between village worthies to explain new laws and to stress the importance of civilized living. Health activities are explained, the use of tax money is outlined, and the importance of willing military service is set forth. Particular emphasis is placed on the value of co-operative enterprises in purchase of agricultural machinery, etc. Turkey is shown to be made up of individuals and groups

who must co-operate in order to make the most of their country.

In the book for the third grade is printed a letter purporting to have been written by a village lad to his uncle in Istanbul. The writer tells his uncle about the changes which have occurred in his village since the uncle's last visit. Among the improvements are mentioned the following: an extra teacher has come for the village school; the village guesthouse has been refurnished; the old coffee-house is now clean and well lighted with a *Lux* lamp where men come to read the Istanbul newspapers and listen to the gramophone; new homes have been built, with the chicken coops and stables located at a distance from the family dwelling; roads have been repaired and swamps drained—in fact, the village has raised itself to the standard of European civilization.²⁰

In the volume for the fourth grade appears a set of "Civilized Rules Which Everybody Should Respect in Town and City Life." In regard to appearance in the street the writer has the following to say:

The problem of appearance in the street is very important. Civilized people can go out in the street only with a civilized appearance.

The Republican Government which has changed everything bad in the country has also taken appearance under some regulation and has adopted the hat for the headdress. There is no possibility hereafter of walking in the streets with a gown and *ketchekula* [bowl-shaped cap].²¹

Further advice is offered in regard to "behavior in public places like the cinema and theater":

One must be cleanly dressed when he goes to public places like the theater and cinema. You cannot go to a public place with dirty and dusty looking clothes. In such places one must not be

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 104 f.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 178.

in a condition which will disgust others. It is not allowed to smoke or speak loudly in the theaters and cinema halls, and especially while the film is being shown or while the play is being acted, talking is not a thing befitting a gentleman; and while listening to music, even if the piece is not to our taste, things like grimacing and laughing we must avoid.

In covered places one must take off his hat. . . .

It is not a thing befitting children who have gone to school and who have been taught politeness *to attempt to get* into the cinema or theater without a ticket, or to sit in the front rows with a ticket for the rear.²²

In the third-grade book is printed the government's "Law of the Village,"⁷ which contains twelve articles:

1) To pave the roads of the village with stone from one end to the other.

2) To build a laundry, a bath, and a marketplace in the village.

3) To grow forests at proper places in the borders of the village and on the hills.

4) To buy co-operatively agricultural machinery such as tractors, reapers, and threshers.

5) To bring in artificial fertilizer in order to get greater production.

6) To bring in books that will increase the knowledge of the peasant.

7) To kill insects which harm vineyards, fruitful or fruitless trees, and crops.

8) To keep the sown and planted crops and trees of the village people safe from every kind of damage and loss.

9) To irrigate co-operatively all the village land in order to water the village fields and orchards.

10) To make, to build, or to bring co-operatively a mill for the village.

11) To bring a sanitation officer in order to take care of the health of the village people. Otherwise to employ a man who will be sent by the village to the kaza [county] capital in order to attend and get instruction from the health courses opened in the city.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 178 ff.

12) To keep the medicines given by the Government in order to use them at the time required.²⁸

Third in the list of objectives which we have mentioned as being striven for in Turkey's primary education is that of *inculcating patriotic devotion to the Turkish Republic* in the hearts of the children. Illustrations as to the methods used may again be found in the "Instructions" for the teachers and in the *Yurt Bilgisi* books. Patriotism may, of course, be regarded as one phase of the second objective, that of producing children who will be useful, devoted, and co-operative members of the Turkish society. Yet its importance in the eyes of the government and its contrast to the former religious loyalty stressed by the mosque schools warrant its being given separate treatment.

According to section 36 of the "Instructions":

The Turkish cause and Turkey will be the fundamental axle of training. The national feelings of the students should be strengthened at every chance. The significance and bountiful gifts of this Revolution must be explained thoroughly. Ceremonies and other exercises carried out on the anniversary of the Proclamation of the Republic [October 29] and the Bayram of April 22²⁴, give a chance to increase the national feelings of the children.

Section 37 states:

Students should love and respect their flag, which represents the country and the nation. Thereafter in every primary school it is necessary that a flag ceremony should take place on the first and the last days of the week. The school building must have a flagpole, and this must be nearly as high as the school building. During official holidays and the days of Bayram there must be a flag on the mast. This flag must be prepared according to the flag instructions. The flag is raised one hour before sunrise and is

²³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 39 ff.

²⁴ National holiday in honor of children, anniversary of the first meeting of the National Assembly at Ankara, April 23, 1920.

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lowered at sunset. It is not permissible for the flag to stay up during the night. Children must learn to salute the flag. . . .

Pictures as an aid toward the awakening of patriotic ideals are recommended in article 144:

It is desirable that the following items should decorate the walls of the assembly halls and public rooms:

1) A large picture of His Excellency the President, Gazi Mustafa Kemal.

2) Pictures of the Turkish leaders (a special list is prepared).

3) Pictures of great events in Turkish history and important places in Turkey, pictures of Turkish monuments and valuable paintings (a special list will be prepared).²⁵

In addition to these symbolic and ceremonial methods of arousing a patriotic spirit, two other methods appear in the instruction given in the *Yurt Bilgisi* courses. These are: (1) the historical presentation of Turkish history as something proud and noble and worthy of admiration and (2) the appeal to youthful idealism to devote its energies to carrying on the progressive work commenced by the Republican leaders.

An example of the *historical-greatness presentation* is found in the third-grade volume of Mi tat Sadullah's *Yurt Bilgisi*:

The Turks²⁶ are the oldest independent nation of history. Our nation is called the Turkish nation. The Turkish nation is one of the oldest and greatest nations. The masses of people who talk with the same language and who have been born of the same stock and whose feelings are the same are called a *nation*. There are many nations in the world, Turkish, French, Japanese, etc.

The Turks are of a very old nation. While the other nations

²⁵ The liberal use of pictures in Turkey, notably the ever present likenesses of the Gazi, indicates the strong trend against Islam's longstanding objection to any sort of artificial reproduction of the human face or figure.

²⁶ The term "Turk," because of its association with the rougher but more virile civilization of the Central Asiatic Plateau, has now supplanted the term "Ottoman" or "Osmanli," which connotes the refined but effeminate era of the sultans.

were in a state near barbarism, the Turks had a strong government and good laws. The Turks who lived in Central Asia some thousand years ago have left many traces of their civilization.

The Turks are the bravest and best-hearted nation in the world. To be brave, to be hospitable, and to pity those who have fallen are some of the most beautiful qualities of the Turk.

Turks have formed great and independent states since very old times and from time to time have taken many nations under their domination.

There are millions of Turks in Europe and in Asia, but the greatest Turkish state in the world is the Turkish Republic.²⁷

This tendency to dwell on the historic achievements of the Turks and to claim as ancestors many of the great conquering peoples of Asia characterizes all history teaching in Turkey today. A four-volume work entitled *Universal History* was published in August, 1931, for use in the schools of the country. Much emphasis is laid upon the relationship of the Turks and the ancient Hittites. Non-Turkish historians may disagree with certain assumptions and interpretations which play fast and loose with the previously accepted concepts of Asiatic history, but when one considers the nationalistic bias which pervades the history texts of every other nation in the world, he would hardly be justified in singling out Turkey for criticism.

Similarly motivated by a desire to build up national pride is the current tendency to make the language more purely Turkish and to purge it of foreign words, especially those of Arabic and Persian derivation. So many names and titles are being changed and the national vocabulary undergoing such constant modification that those who write about Turkey are under a severe handicap in their effort to find the proper designation for the subject under discussion. Such alterations in the national speech must be accepted, however, as inevitable in a nationalistic program such as that sponsored by

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 93 f.

Ankara. Kemal Ataturk himself, in an Introduction written in 1930 for an important linguistic work, *For the Turkish Language*, by Sadri Maksudi, points out:

The tie between national sentiment and language is very strong. A rich national language has great influence on the development of national feeling. The Turkish tongue is one of the richest of all; it only needs to be wisely used. The Turkish nation, which has known how to establish its government and its high independence, must free its tongue from the yoke of foreign words.²⁸

An example of the *appeal to youthful idealism* in the inculcation of Turkish patriotism is contained in the *Yurt Bilgisi* for the fifth grade. In the concluding pages, the chapter called "Duties of the Young People," appears the following:

When the word *youth* is pronounced, you remember strength, valiance, agility, and newness. Our young Republic is waiting for every kind of progress and uplift from the youth. Our Grand Gazi was not satisfied with saving our country from the enemies; he brought about in our country a great national, mental, and social revolution also; he removed oldness and rotten organizations.

Are not all these things the removal of oldness from the country and its rejuvenation?

It is the greatest service to our country to save our beloved Republic, which we established as a result of great sacrifices, from every kind of danger, and, if necessary, to die for it. Because the country of the Turks will be lifted up only through the help of the Republic. The Turkish nation will attain the benefits and the advancements which she lacked for centuries by working in the way the Republican Government has shown. If we think of the many benefits that the very young Republic has procured for us, we understand what additional benefits we shall get from this fine Government.

We will not avoid any kind of sacrifice for the uplift of our

²⁸ Quoted by Sir Telford Waugh in "A Far Reaching Turkish Plan," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XX, Part IV (October, 1933), 581.

beloved country. We will break every hand stretching out to damage the Turkish Republic even though that may result in our death. We will always work for the maintenance of the rule of our new and modern ideas in every corner of our beautiful country.

Young people, everything is yours hereafter; country, flag, and Republic are yours hereafter! Lift higher than all else our beloved Republic and our independence which we won for the price of the blood of hundreds of thousands of martyrs. Work always; work harder than any body and any nation. There are people ahead of us who have started much earlier than we. You must run in order that our victorious flag which has been waving in the skies may wave eternally.

Never expect anything from the past; take only advice from the past. Expect everything from the future. Let your eye and soul always face forward. Let your life be filled with joys and happiness.²⁹

One of the most famous patriotic pleas is that addressed by the Gazi to his young fellow-countrymen and appearing in his Six-Day Speech:

Turkish youth! Your first duty is to guard and defend forever the national independence, the Turkish Republic. That is the sole basis of your existence and your future. This basis contains your most costly treasure. In the future too there will be both at home and abroad ill-will which will want to snatch away this treasure from you. If you are forced to defend your independence and the Republic, then, in order to perform your duty, you will have to watch out for the possibilities and conditions of the situation in which you may find yourself. It might be that these conditions and possibilities were absolutely unfavorable. It is possible that the enemies who sought to destroy your independence and your Republic represented the most victorious power that the earth had ever seen; that through intrigue or force of arms every fort and every arsenal in the fatherland was seized; that all your armies were dispersed and the land actually and completely occupied.

Assume in order to put before your eyes a still gloomier possi-

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 204 ff.

bility, that those who possess the governmental authority in the land have fallen into error, that they are fools or traitors, yea, that these ruling people have let their personal interests fall in with the political aims of the enemies. It might come about that the nation had fallen into complete want and extreme privation; that she found herself in a state of collapse and complete exhaustion.

Even under such circumstances and conditions like these, O Turkish child of the future centuries, is it your duty to save your independence, the Turkish Republic. The strength you need for this end surges in the noble blood which flows in your veins.⁸⁰

The fourth thing which Turkey seems most eager to accomplish in her primary-education program is the *spreading of health knowledge and sanitation*. The articles in the "Instructions" for the primary teachers in this regard are indicative of a determination to stamp out the lazy fatalism which frequently prompted peasants to accept disease and squalor as a divine prescription, and to equip the new generation with knowledge which would permit them to fight infection and build up strong and healthy physiques. Following are the sections which deal with "Health Activities and Services in the School":

151. Special attention should be paid to the formation of health habits among the students. These should be encouraged on every occasion. Teachers must be watchful of the positions of the students in classroom and workshop, and specially while reading, writing, or drawing, the position of the book and paper is very important. In this case the normal standard is 30 centimeters. Some pupils may have eye trouble and be unable to see at that distance. Such students must be examined by specialists.

152. The air in the classrooms and in other rooms must be changed frequently. It is useful to have the upper part of the window open. During the winter it must be arranged to have the upper part of the window open.

153. Students should be assigned by turns to open the windows between classes.

⁸⁰ *Op. cit.*, II, 38\$.

154. It is necessary that the classrooms should be at a temperature between 16° and 18° Centigrade. It is harmful to have it less or more. In games, teachers should be watchful of the positions of the students.

155. If the heat in the morning is 25° Centigrade in the shade, classes are dismissed in the afternoon. It depends on local conditions of the environment whether the students should remain at the school or go to their homes.

156. Special attention should be given to care of the teeth. Frequent advice should be given for care of the teeth and students should be especially advised to use toothbrushes.³¹ If possible, toothbrush exercises should be given in the class. At least four times a year, examinations of the teeth should take place, and if any student is found negligent, he should be advised, and if necessary, his parents should be informed.

157. Care of the hair should not be neglected. Once every week hair examination should take place, and students should be advised to wash their hair at least once a week, and also to have their hair cut every week.

Every morning examinations for cleanliness should take place. If any wounds or scratches are seen on the body or head, the student should be sent to a doctor.

158. If a student is ill with a contagious disease, he cannot be accepted in the school until he brings a certificate from a doctor that his illness is over. If there are no doctors in the town, twenty days must pass after the time of the child's recovery.

159. A small pharmacy must be established in the school, and the following medicines are required:

- 1) Iodine in a colored, corded bottle. . . .
- 2) Ammonia (liquid). . . .
- 3) Ether. . . .
- 4) A small quantity of pure alcohol.
- 5) Absorbent cotton.
- 6) A few packages of gauze.

Besides these above medicines there must be a good fever thermometer and pincers, and for examination of the throat, spatulas

³¹ Here again an irrational religious prejudice is attacked. Because of the use of hog bristles in toothbrushes, Moslems have always regarded them with abhorrence and have preferred to use the primitive *misvak*, a bristly root grown in Yemen.

and medical scissors. All these articles must be kept in clean boxes in the head-teacher's room.

160. If a child falls and is hurt while playing, iodine must be applied at once.

161. The head-teachers who do not have the articles mentioned in No. 159 will be held responsible. In addition to the medicines above mentioned no other medical treatment may be applied to the students. Quinine may only be used for fever with the advice of a specialist.

162. It is desirable that a health club be formed among the students. The members of the club should be weighed every month and their height measured, and the results put down in the weight and height records. Members of the club should undertake and continue faithfully to take care of their health and teeth.

163. It is required that each student should have a general medical examination every year, and the result should be recorded in his health certificate.

164. Lectures should be given to cause the students to avoid and despise the use of alcohol and tobacco. In this connection teachers should be extremely careful not to arouse a sense of curiosity in the students. Pictures must be shown to depict the evil effects of drunkenness, and teachers should have conversations with their students on this subject.

It must not be assumed that the program and objectives which have just been set forth are being completely realized. Mentality does not change like a hat, nor is it possible in a few years' time to produce trained teachers capable of bringing into being a program conceived along lines so totally different from that of Turkey's traditional educational system. Furthermore, Turkey is faced with the problem of attracting her ablest young men and women to the all-important profession of teaching, for in the commercial world which the nation is just beginning to enter with such enthusiasm there is a need and an attraction of financial return. The teacher not only must go through a long period of training to receive a minimum salary of perhaps twenty-five dollars a month, but must also be willing to take a teaching assignment

for a period of years at whatever place the government sees fit to indicate. There is still considerable reluctance on the part of young men and women born in the cities to run the risk of assignment to villages and communities in the far interior where conditions and intellects are still quite primitive. Objections of this kind are of course growing less year by year as the government develops its system of railroads and communication which makes life in Anatolia much less unattractive to the type of teachers, doctors, and administrators who are needed for the campaign against ignorance. Yet even at the time of my visit to Anatolia in October, 1929, I could not help being impressed with the high average of devotion and skill apparent among the young teachers and officials in the schools visited. Crowded conditions were everywhere encountered, and inefficiency and poor judgment were by no means absent, but from the way in which educators seemed to be buckling to their tasks and teachers were constantly receiving instruction from inspectors, publications, and vacation study courses, one is led to expect a rather successful realization of modern educational methods before the lapse of many more years. Whatever else may be said, it is an unquestioned fact that in Turkey's public instruction system a desire to propagate progressive ideas has completely supplanted any wish to preserve the institutions and practices of a religious system which lacked vitality.

It must not, of course, be presumed that the devout Moslems among the Turks—and there are still many of them—view with equanimity the changed point of view in education. As one learned *hodja* told me in Istanbul, "There is little probability of the new education succeeding in teaching morality. It is all experimental and has cast loose from the sure foundations on which education used to be grounded." Certain it is that in attempting to make responsibility to one's fellow-members of society the prime basis for moral

and religious behavior Turkey is not only cutting loose from an inherited system in which everything depended ultimately on Allah, but is making a humanist experiment whose success or failure the world must watch with close attention and interest. The task placed upon Turkey's new young teachers of inspiring children to be moral and loving because of social responsibility instead of reasons based on fear of eternal punishment and hell fire is a tremendous one and requires the devotion of Turkey's finest young men and women. It

TABLE II

TYPE or SCHOOL	No. OF SCHOOLS	TEACHERS		PUPILS	
		Men	Women	Boys	Girls
<i>University of Istanbul:</i>					
Faculty of Theology		18		20	
Faculty of Sciences .		40		580	146
Faculty of Medicine		96		654	18
Faculty of Law		28		1,241	200
Faculty of Letters		25		133	186
Higher School of Pharmacy		45		65	22
Higher Dental School .				208	75
School for Midwives ..					50
<i>Schools under the Ministry of Public Instruction</i>					
Ordinary schools:					
Achievement schools	2	8		229	29
Middle schools	83	750	241	22,590	5,929
Lycees	30	634	118	4,199	1,156
Special higher schools:					
School for Civil Service		24		130	4
Academy of the Fine Arts		33		136	20
School for High-School Teachers		4		41	49
School for Secondary-School Teachers ...		25		155	26
Professional schools:					
Boys' normal schools .		135	2	976	
Girls' normal schools .		73	80		974

TABLE II—(Continued)

TYPE OF SCHOOL	No. OF SCHOOLS	TEACHERS		PUPILS	
		Men	Women	Boys	Girls
Normal School for Vil- lage Teachers		10		76	10
Normal School for Mu- sic Teachers	1	22	7	21	19
Trade schools	17	206	78	1,780	801
Commercial schools ..	9	193	19	1,244	253
<i>Schools under other min- istries:</i>					
Special higher schools:					
School of Commerce		28		223	36
Forestry School		8		55	
Veterinary School		28		84	
Engineering School		30		328	5
Ankara Law School		17		435	33
Ankara Agriculture School		37		65	
School for Marine En- gineers and Captains		20		68	
Professional schools:					
Agriculture and me- chanical schools ...		34		231	
Schools for silk work-		7		73	9
Schools for sanitary agents		5		104	12
School for Finance Ministry Employees		12		65	
Istanbul Cadaster School		13		54	1
Istanbul School of Pub- lic Works		17		142	2
Istanbul School for Veterinary Health Agents		13		31	3
Izmir School for the Deaf, Dumb, and Blind	1			56	23

•The faculty of the Dental School is included with that of the School of Pharmacy.

† Instruction in the School for Midwives is carried on by the Faculty of Medicine.

might be expected that at this point missionary enterprises would be able to furnish some real advice and help, and it is true that some missionaries are anxious to do that very thing. The difficulties attendant upon missionary contributions are very real too, however; this problem is discussed in a succeeding chapter.

The advanced schools sponsored by the state are playing a more and more significant role at the present time. An idea of their extent and importance may be gained from Table I I . The figures are for the year 1932-33, and are taken from the official *Annuaire statistique* (1932-33).

Although the question of non-Turkish schools is taken up in detail later, it may be well for purposes of comparison to note here the numbers of schools which, though their programs are subject to rigorous inspection by the Department of Public Instruction, are supported from sources other than that of the government. For the years 1932-33 the statistics are as shown in Table III.³²

TABLE III

TYPE OF SCHOOL	No. OF SCHOOLS	TEACHERS		PUPILS	
		Men	Women	Boys	Girls
Foreign primary schools ..	44	113	178	3,050	3,978
Foreign middle schools ...	15	92	165	1,512	924
Foreign lycees	13	268	143	457	251
Minority primary schools .	104	343	563	9,567	7,975
Minority middle schools ..	2	22	14	649	398
Minority lycees	10	238	112	334	218
Turkish private primary schools	17	38	40	1,515	919
Turkish private middle schools	6	60	28	990	329
Turkish private lycées	9	264	50	999	229

From what has already been written it is apparent that Turkey is on the way toward the establishment of an educa-

³² *Annuaire statistique* (1932-33), 183-85.

tional system capable of giving her citizens a thorough training in almost any branch of arts or science. More and more is she decreasing the numbers of schools supported by non-Turkish sources and increasing her own educational resources by inviting foreign experts to help in her own schools and by giving promising Turkish students an opportunity to study abroad and bring back technical knowledge to Turkey. A special law, No. 1416, provides specifically for the selection of students for foreign study, and so arranges matters that selection, inspection of studies, and payment of stipend are all supervised by the Ministry of Public Instruction, no matter what the field or what department is sponsoring the education. In the year 1932-33, according to the *Annuaire statistique*, there were 267 Turkish students, 44 of whom were girls, pursuing courses of study in European countries under government guidance. This compares with 31 in the year 1923-24. The countries of study in 1932-33 were as follows, with the number of students in each: France, 99; Germany, 97; Belgium, 29; Switzerland, 16; England, 9; Italy, 5; Czecho-Slovakia, 5; America, 4; Sweden, 2; and Austria, 1.

The subjects which these students are pursuing are especially interesting to examine since their character graphically reveals the absorbing desire of the Turks to master the technical craftsmanship of the West. The 267 government-supported students in 1932-33 were specializing as shown in Table IV.

Let it be again pointed out that these figures refer only to students officially sponsored by the government and does not include many others studying abroad on private means.

It might seem to the casual observer that the new Turkey would have her hands full carrying out the educational program which has been described thus far. Not so, however. Displaying a veritable mania for education and a determination to stamp out illiteracy, the new government in 1928 de-

TABLE IV

Subject	Boys	Girls	Subject	Boys	Girls
History and geography	24		Civil engineering .		
Foreign language.	17		Agriculture		
Physics and chemistry	20		Electricity		
Mathematics	19		Manual training .		
Commerce	16		Political economy		
Law	12		Hydrodynamics .		
Natural history .	7		Technical science		
Tailoring	1		Pottery-making .		
Mechanics	9		Lycee work		
Philosophy.	7		Industrial and mining engineering		
Geology	7		Blacksmith trade.		
Carpentry and cabinetwork . .	7		Pedagogy		
Motors and fitting	6		Medicine		
Veterinary surgeon	5		Home economics .		
Embroidery and needlework . .			Canning		
Flower-making . .			Automobile repairing		

One boy in each of the following: archaeology, wine-growing, pisciculture, cartography, shipbuilding, foundry-work, construction and engineering, creamery work, architecture, music and fine arts, dye and textile trade, forestry, drawing and decorative arts, psychology, factory head.

One girl in each of the following: gymnastics, dress-designing, drawing, child care.

cided to scrap the Arabic alphabet in which Turkish has been awkwardly written for centuries, and replace it with a Latinized alphabet which not only would suit the language better but which would also be much easier for the ordinary person to learn. It was contemplated in the amazingly short period of two years completely to eliminate the Arabic script from use in the country. But for government departments, periodicals, advertisements, and moving-picture captions, the time was much shorter. For these, the new letters had to be adopted December 1, 1928. The final deadline for changing all printed documents and discontinuing the use of Arabic

script as shorthand for stenographers was June 1, 1930. Naturally the government had to spend hundreds of thousands of liras to subsidize newspapers and other periodicals, for with the suddenness of the change, most publications were deprived of virtually their entire reading public.³³ Moreover, in order that the change might be engineered with all possible dispatch, the Department of Public Instruction undertook the most comprehensive system of compulsory adult education that the world has yet witnessed. Every adult between the ages of sixteen and forty was to procure a certificate that he could read and write the new letters. If he was unable to do so, he had to attend school until he could pass the requisite examination. Classes were established in regular primary-school buildings, twice a week in the afternoons for women and twice a week in the evenings for men. At Samsun, where I discussed the matter with various Turks and the superintendent of public instruction, I was impressed with the thoroughness of the new law's application in a typical Turkish city somewhat removed from the capital. My friends told me with considerable glee of enforcement measures taken by police who visited cafes and backgammon dens, removing to school any culprits who could not produce certificates of their reading and writing ability. In the office of the educational superintendent I was shown the files of certificates and photographs which recorded the names and faces of all those who had successfully completed their tests. Penalties are prescribed both for those who neglect to attend the schools and for those who attend but are lazy. According to statistics in *Le milliett* for June 1, 1930, 12,902 schools were opened in 1928 and were attended by 589,858 persons. I was

³³ Critics of the government point out that this measure gave the government a tremendous leverage over the press, since newspapers which disagreed with the government could be deprived of the vital subsidy.

interested to learn in Ankara that these adult schools do not necessarily consider their work completed with the imparting of ability to read and write. Voluntary courses are provided for the second year providing instruction in geography, mathematics, and various other subjects of a somewhat elementary nature. It must be pointed out that distinctions have to be made in instruction for those who already know how to use the Arabic alphabet and those who have been completely illiterate. Some idea of the problem involved may be obtained from literacy figures obtained in the census of 1927. These show that out of Turkey's total population of over 13,600,000 only 8.16 per cent were able to read. The percentage of literate men was 12.99; of women, 3.67.³⁴

Besides these popular schools literacy is being forwarded by the construction of reading-rooms in various cities, the publication of magazines on pedagogy by official and private sources, and the assistance of an important private organization known as the Association for Public Instruction. Alphabet classes have also been sponsored by private industrial enterprises for their employees. The task of providing a new dictionary has been undertaken by an official commission working in Ankara. After two years of labor it was announced in June, 1930, that this commission had completed the letter A. The whole country has embarked on a drive to bring about the day when, according to the Ankara *Hakimieti-Millie*, "an illiterate Turk will attract everybody's attention like a monstrous phenomenon of nature."³⁵

It is obvious that Turkey's reform program will be vastly speeded up and strengthened by the attainment of a high degree of literacy, yet one's breath is almost taken away by the speed and comprehensiveness of the reform which Kemal undertook to this end. He fired the popular imagination by

³⁴ *Annuaire statistique* (1929), II, 18-37.

³⁵ Quoted in *La republique* (Istanbul), October 26, 1929.

appearing himself in various towns and holding public examinations in the open squares to see whether citizens have acquired the desired reading ability. To the Western traveler like myself who had an opportunity to travel in Turkey both before and after the introduction of the new letters, the difference is especially noticeable in the new ease with which it is possible to read signs, etc. Today an English-speaking traveler feels no less at home linguistically than he may in Hungary or Czecho-Slovakia and probably more at home than in Bulgaria or Greece, where different alphabets persist. This very improvement illustrates one of the Gazi's great aims, to place Turkey on a level with other civilized countries of the West.

Before closing this treatment of Turkey's educational and anti-illiteracy program, those sections of Ismet Inonu's masterly speech to his constituents at Malatya in 1928 in which he deals with the importance of literacy in the Republican program must be quoted:

The Republic is not the name of a time which is quiet and stagnant. On the contrary it is a symbol of life which constructs and creates every day. To-day nations are obliged to be mobilized with high qualities in order to be able to fight and compete in their economic and social lives and in international relations. This age and the future require Turkish society to be invested with various qualities such as activity, hard work, knowledge and creativity. Or we may express these qualities in one single word, civilization.

We cannot close our ears to the things which this age and the future will require of the Turkish nation. And this is natural because we believe that we are the generation which has witnessed the complete and total decadence of the past periods.

I want to explain the reason why we are in favor of a radical reform to create a strong Turkish society to correspond with the requirements of civilization and science.

But, Gentlemen, we must know clearly that the first characteristic of the first living man was language. So the characteristic

of human society is reading and writing. I want to point out particularly that reading and writing are not considered to be characteristics of education and civilization. They are the first signs of a community which is capable of assimilating education and civilization.

The ignorance of communities which lack reading and writing is a hindrance and obstacle to life and development.

To-day the Turkish nation has attacked this great trouble by the help of its great Gazi. The great Turkish nation with the leadership of its great and triumphant son, the Gazi, has decided to adopt Latin characters and to lift itself from among the nations which do not know how to read and write.

We have undertaken a great enterprise which will give glory to the coming generation. This enterprise is to teach reading and writing to every member of the Turkish nation.

It will not be easy to reply to the criticism of the future generation as to why such a promising reform has been so long delayed, but I shall tell them it was necessary for the Turkish nation to have a leader like the Gazi, who goes from one village to another and teaches the new Turkish alphabet like a village teacher and leads them away from their old habits.

Do you not see the rush of the people in Istanbul, Ankara, and other places to be lifted up from the state of ignorance? Our old women and mothers are glad to see that the black lines on white paper which meant nothing before start to talk to them like illumined figures.

To fight against ignorance is the leading point of our program. This program is the program of the Government and of the People's Party, and it is the program of the Turkish idealists.

To-day the whole country looks like a classroom, and the head teacher and the main treasure of this nation is its great son, the Gazi.

The Turkish nation will work hard to have full satisfaction from this classroom.⁸⁶

In discussing the objectives of primary education it was noted that one of the chief ends striven for was health education. It is noteworthy, as we pursue our study of the mani-

⁸⁶Quoted in *Segme Yazilar* ("Selected Writings"), pp. 24f.

festations of the new Western ideals in Turkish society, that health and sanitation activity stands out most significantly as a symbol of Turkey's drive toward modernization. One finds the government again taking the lead through its Ministry of Hygiene and Social Assistance, aided by a number of private but subsidized associations, in teaching Turks how to take care of their bodies and in supplanting the old fatalistic or superstitious mentality with an alert attitude which seeks to destroy disease.

The medical profession has furnished Turkey with many of its outstanding liberal leaders for many years. The faculty of medicine of the University of Istanbul has a distinguished reputation, and the various Turkish hospitals which I took special pains to visit in Istanbul, Ankara, and Sivas seemed well ordered and manned by a personnel of exceptionally high caliber. Although equipment was not always plentiful and modern, owing to lack of funds, in every case what equipment there was seemed to my lay eyes to be clean and well taken care of. Except for a shortage in well-trained nurses, owing to the fact that trained nurses are something new in Turkey and the social patterns have not shaped themselves as yet either to train a sufficient number or to employ in homes those who are trained, the medical profession in Turkey seems the best equipped of any professional group in the country, excepting only the military class. Thus the Ministry of Hygiene and Social Assistance in its attempts to carry out health and sanitation programs has had a reasonable number of trained men to call on.

Some notion of the accomplishments of this Ministry may be gathered from data in the *Annuaire statistique* (1932-33), VI, 137-49.

In 1932 there were 3,827 persons employed in public health work in Turkey, of whom 2,146 were paid by the state. Of the total number of workers we find 1,188 doctors, 116

pharmacists, 1,246 sanitary agents, 421 midwives, 216 nurses, and 640 listed in various other categories.

Hospitals in Turkey under the general direction of the Ministry of Hygiene show a remarkable development in usefulness over the years from 1926 to 1932 for which statistics are available (see Table V).

TABLE V

Year	Bed Patients	Dispensary Patients	Laboratory Analyses
1926	7,620	38,838	13,440
1932	16,971	109,032	40,603

The task of transforming Turkey into a healthy "nation is making headway despite the inertia of the population, which for centuries has been taught that sickness and health are divinely dispensed and not to be questioned or interfered with by meddling mortals. Epidemic diseases such as smallpox, when they break out, are promptly and effectively dealt with by quarantine and vaccination. But particularly noteworthy is the aggressive program planned to check the ravages of four perennial scourges: malaria, trachoma, syphilis, and tuberculosis.

The figures shown in Table VI indicate the extent of the antimalarial activity.

TABLE VI

Year	Dispensary Centers	Expenditures (in Turkish Liras)	Persons Examined	Blood Tests	Treated for Malaria
1925 ...	3	£T576,000	67,000	30,000	36,000
1932 ...	11	£T623,000	1,677,000	557,000	432,000

In connection with the antimalarial work it is important to note that twenty-eight marshes were drained between 1925

and 1932, and thirty-two drainage-canal projects were completed between 1929 and 1932.

The progress of the campaign to control the spread of syphilis may be visualized from the statistics shown in Table VII.

TABLE VII

YEAR	DISPENSARY CENTERS	EXPENDITURES (IN TURKISH LIRAS)	PATIENTS REGISTERED		CURED
			Men	Women	
1926 .	4	£T12 7,000	40,380	44,282	629
1932 .	9	£T168,000	Total both sexes 157,412		4,621

While complete figures for the early years of the campaign against trachoma are not given in the *Annuaire statistique* for 1932-33, the extent of activities for 1932 may be judged as shown in Table VIII.

TABLE VIII

Dispensary Centers	Expenditures (in Turkish Liras)	Bed Patients	Dispensary Patients	Operations
6	£T123,000	1,535	1,042,917	15,189

Smaller amounts have been expended in the fight against tuberculosis, the total for the three years 1930-32 being only £T78,000. This figure, however, apparently does not include the upkeep of the tuberculosis sanitarium on the island of Halki, which alone in the year 1932 required £T32,000.

Further study of the expenditures of the Hygiene Ministry reveals more regarding the comprehensiveness and diversity of its activity. In 1932 the items shown in Table IX are listed.

TABLE IX

Bacteriological work ...	£T8,000	Schools for sanitary	
Vaccination work.	7,000	agents.	£T13,000
Health Museum.	1,000	Aid to <i>vilayets</i> in corn-	
Hydrophobia treatment	16,000	bating contagious dis-	
		eases.	.66,000

The Ministry has also been active in sponsoring research, in drawing up laws for the protection of women and children, and in bringing about the sane distribution of pharmacies among the population. Health education along modern lines has been undertaken by posters and health exhibits, and especially through the medium of moving pictures. Among the health films imported from America for free exhibition in cinema theaters throughout Turkey³⁷ are such titles as the following: "Your mouth," "Tommy Tucker's Tooth," "Fly Danger," "The Error of Omission," "How To Live Long and Well," "Drinking of Health," "Confessions of a Cold," "Many Happy Returns," "Malaria," and "Child Welfare"; also a French film, "II etait une fois trois amis" (about syphilis).

Besides the official activities for maintenance of health which have been mentioned, a number of private organizations, some of them partly subsidized by the state, have been established to deal with specific physical and social problems. There is, for example, the Red Crescent Society which performs relief work in time of famine and distress in a manner exactly analogous to that of the Red Cross among Western nations. The problems of alcoholism, which have assumed a new form with the weakening of the Koranic injunction against liquor and the establishment of a government monopoly for the manufacture and sale of spirits, are dealt with by an organization known as the Green Crescent Society. There

³⁷ At the end of the year 1931 there were 144 moving-picture theaters in Turkey (*Annuaire statistique* [1932-33], VI, 482).

exist also two societies known as the Association for the War against Tuberculosis and the Association for Mental Hygiene. There is even a small Society of the Enemies of Tobacco.⁸⁸

Noteworthy work is being done for children through the Turkish Himayei Etfal (Children's Protective Society) which was founded by Dr. Fuad in 1910 in his home city of Kasaba, and has grown to a place of nation-wide importance with a Central Committee of twenty members of the Turkish Parliament, and a headquarters in Ankara which is one of the most modern and best equipped in the city. An idea of the work being done by this organization for the benefit of children and mothers may be gained from the following excerpt from the report of its annual congress, May 8, 1927:

Our society desires to fight against infant mortality and occupies itself chiefly with children who need wet-nursing. Valuable results have been obtained from the wet-nurseries which we have established in Istanbul, Izmir [Smyrna], Ankara, and Tokat. We will try to establish other wet-nurseries in other suitable places.

3697 kilograms of milk have been distributed since the first of January [1927] at the milk dispensary in the Children's Palace [Ankara]. There is a great demand for the milk which is sterilized and pasteurized at our milk distributing plants. Doctors receive visits of patients in the afternoons for internal, external, ear, nose, throat, skin, eye, nerve and gynecological diseases, and in the mornings our specialized doctors take care of children. Since the first of January [1927] 7677 children and mothers have been examined and 3257 children and mothers have taken baths in our bath houses. Our bath houses are also used by mothers just before the time of childbirth, and by mothers who have nervous diseases.

Children who have been examined in our dispensaries and who are treated at their homes are visited by nurses, and the condition of their health is closely followed. Doubtless the ignorance of child treatment plays a great part in infant mortality. The nurses who visit the families give information about child treatment.

The love and interest which have been shown to our institution

³⁸ *Le milliett*, December 12, 1929.

increase every day. Last year we had 318 main branches. This year the number has been increased to 405, which are located in the districts where our organization is strongest, and 38 in other places.

It is worthy of note that Turkey celebrates a national holiday on April 23 in honor of her children. At the same time an entire week is devoted to special festivities for children, with important civic and other offices held by children.

Of special interest to Americans is the health and welfare work inspired by the late Asa K. Jennings and carried on since his death in January, 1933, under the leadership of his son, Asa W. Jennings, as executive vice-president of the American Friends of Turkey. Associated after the World War with the Young Men's Christian Association in the Near East, the elder Mr. Jennings was one of the first foreigners to recognize the new nationalistic self-reliance of the Turks. He saw that foreign philanthropy, if it was to be effectively administered in Turkey, could not be dictatorially manipulated by outsiders but must conform to the wishes and sensibilities of the Turks themselves. Between 1924 and 1928 in the city of Izmir (Smyrna) with the active co-operation of the great Turkish humanitarian, Aziz, who was governor and then mayor of Izmir, Mr. Jennings was instrumental in establishing a home for orphan babies, a playground with modern equipment (the first of its kind in Turkey), and a community sport field. Interest was also aroused in prison reform and a clinic for babies and mothers.

A wider field was opened to Mr. Jennings when in 1928 he was invited to carry on his projects in the capital city of Ankara. Aziz, who had become a deputy in the Grand National Assembly, continued to be an invaluable ally in winning the co-operation of Turks. At first the new enterprise functioned as an adjunct of the Children's Protective Society (Himayei Etfal), co-operating in the development of clinics,

but, above all, playgrounds under the guidance of two American experts, W. T. Gannoway and Barent Burhans. Subsequently, in order to give wider scope to the American group, permitting them to aid other social service organizations besides the Children's Protective Society, a new arrangement was worked out. In 1930 the Turkish group organized a new Society for the Promotion and Support of Good Works (Hayir Islerine Yardim Cemiyeti), while the interested Americans became incorporated as the American Friends of Turkey; a mixed commission made up of representatives of each organization took over supervision of all projects. With money furnished by both American and Turkish participants, the arrangement has become a model in international co-operation and is exerting its influences in many other fields than those in which the experiment was first begun, notably in education. That, however, is another story.

An admirable summary of the sense of responsibility which the Turkish leaders feel for the health and physical welfare of their nation is fluently expressed in Ismet Inonii's speech to his constituents at Malatya:

Whatever others may say, the health struggle comes first for the economic plans as well as for duties of citizenship and humanity. The sick man is not only the emblem of a destroyed home; he is at the same time in the same position as the man who consumes his savings which some day may form the capital of some other man. When I say struggle against disease, I mean the fever which influences the general life and the social activities of the nation. This struggle has been started by the Republic. A scientific struggle has taken place in vast areas with limited means, but has ended with great success. The citizens who were once suffering from fever have become as a result of this struggle lively and active earning machines.³⁹

In few spheres of Turkish life have the changed viewpoints had greater effect than on the position and status of

³⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 22 f.

women in family and public life. Contemporaneously with the weakening of traditional prescriptions in every walk of life, the seclusion and inequality of women, so long considered as characteristic of Islam, have lost their popularity, and one finds women forging to the front most rapidly in the last twenty years. In cities particularly came an abandonment of the veil. Schools for girls became more numerous. During the World War women received their opportunity to enter positions in industry and commerce which had been left vacant by men at the front. The story of woman's emancipation in Turkey would alone furnish material for many books.

The first great advance in the improvement of woman's legal status came in 1917, when the law of October 25 introduced certain innovations in the marriage provisions. This law is clearly analyzed and explained by Mahmud Essad in his Introduction to the new Civil Code of 1926. His explanations are worth noting in detail:

From the Islamic point of view, the Moslem marriage was analogous to that which one calls in Europe to-day civil marriage. The consent of the two to be united given before two witnesses was sufficient for the contraction of the marriage. Such was the custom, it is true, at first, but the union was then pronounced by the "imams." The new law had extended this principle; it had sought to give to the act a character more official. It declared the presence of two witnesses insufficient and rendered obligatory the presence of the magistrate or his deputy.

If the fact of contracting the marriage in the presence of the judge already had regularization and consolidation in view, there was added yet another thing: the registry of the union. Henceforth every act of marriage and divorce had to be entered on the registers of the tribunal.

The third measure envisaged for the regularization of this question was the preliminary publication of the banns.

As for divorce, there was admitted a system in conformance with the words of the Imam Maliki: if a difference arises between

the husband and wife which prompts the latter to demand divorce, the tribunals will designate two members of each family to attempt to reconcile the couple; in case it is impossible for these arbiters to attain a reconciliation of the parties, recourse will be had to the judge, who will pronounce the divorce. If a disagreement arises among the arbiters, a new superior arbitral council will be appointed outside the members of the couple's families, and action will be taken according to its decision. It can be seen that while safeguarding the rights of the wife, freedom is not allowed her lightly to break one of the most powerful social ties.

In order to put an end to forced marriage, the commission referred to the words of the Imam Shan, and it wrote in the law that forced marriage was not valid.

As for polygamy, here is what the commission adopted: at the time of contracting the union, the wife may set the condition that in case the husband should wish to conclude a new marriage, the first or the second would be *ipso facto* annulled, a procedure which would prevent the husband from having several wives contrary to the wish of the first.

Another question still had been settled: that is the sum which the husband must pay the wife in case of divorce. The commission, to settle the case, referred to the Imam Yusuf: at the time of marriage, the husband must propose to his wife an adequate dowry.

The law also took into consideration matrimonial capacity. Young girls could not marry before the age of nine years, and men, before twelve; the former were free to contract marriage according to their desire and with whoever they might wish after the age of seventeen years, and the latter, after eighteen. Between these two age limits it was necessary to have the assent of the judge for men, and that of the parents or guardian for girls.⁴⁰

Mahmud Essad goes on to point out the special arrangements made for marriage among non-Moslems. But when the new code of 1926 came into force,

the new project established no difference between Moslems and non-Moslems. From the very moment when there was found the

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. ix f.

word "Moslem" in no article, it was necessary to conclude that after its promulgation the law must be applicable to all subjects of the Republic. The chief principle adopted was monogamy. Nevertheless, as it did not seem possible altogether to prevent polygamy, because in Anatolia, said the President, men were less numerous than women, it was believed necessary to retain polygamy, but imposing on it such severe conditions that it was only possible in cases of absolute necessity.

In the case of divorce there was set the principle of reciprocity.⁴¹

In the spring of 1930 the Grand National Assembly passed a law granting women the right to vote in municipal elections, and at nearly the same time a woman, Beyhan Hanum, was appointed to be a judge.⁴² But the climax in the struggle for equal rights was not reached until the end of 1934 when women were granted full rights to vote and to hold office in the National Assembly itself. Turkey had come a long way since the days twenty years ago or less when a Turkish woman who appeared on the streets without a veil was an object of police attention.

In almost no phase of activity in Turkey today is it possible to find anything but new energy and new methods. Small villages are being linked to the rest of the world by gendarmerie telephones; dirty and tumbled-down cities are being cleaned up and improved with paved streets and parks. Particularly is this true of Ankara, which is being reconstructed according to the plans of a famous German specialist. Trees are being planted, and reforestation is one of the country's watchwords. Elaborate irrigation schemes are under way, and an unprecedented activity in railroad-building is taking place. These lines, built by foreign engineers for the most part but financed almost wholly by government revenue, are expected to play one of the most important parts in de-

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

⁴² *Le milliett*, April 30, 1930.

veloping both the commerce and the mentality of the remote regions which were formerly notable chiefly as places of exile. Model villages are being set up to lead the peasants toward a cleaner and more comfortable life. On model farms, particularly that of the Gazi near Ankara, experiments are constantly being carried on to develop the most satisfactory agricultural methods and products. Automobiles are becoming less and less a novelty, and with the influx of light American cars, especially the Ford, which is assembled in a plant at Istanbul, the day cannot be far distant when good roads will insure passage all the year round. Great interest is being manifested in Western music and in Western art. With the change in alphabet, the old school of calligraphy which used to develop such fascinating designs and mottoes from the Arabic characters has turned its attention to developing beautiful monograms and designs from the new Latinized alphabet. Safety razors now form a stock in trade alongside the traditional blue beads which are supposed to ward off the evil eye and which in many places are twined around the radiator caps of modern automobiles. A new desire for efficiency and exactness is manifested by the establishment of a national Bureau of Statistics in Ankara and by the spread of civil service methods in the selection of government personnel. To attend the opening of Parliament in Ankara on November 1, to note the dress and manners of the guests at the presidential ball on October 29, the anniversary of the Proclamation of the Republic, and to witness the cosmopolitan appearance of the city and citizens of the new Ankara would cause anyone to ask himself most dubiously whether this were an Oriental land he was visiting.

True it is that the Turks are far from used to their new habits and surroundings and frequently produce strange interpretations of Western clothes and customs which might be

amusing if they were not so dead in earnest. It is even difficult to reckon historical dates now, for on January 1, 1926, the old Hegira calendar was definitely abandoned after several years of a clumsy combination of lunar and solar calendars. Aeronautics is constantly kept in the public eye by means of a national Airplane Society which raises money for Turkey's air force through the medium of frequent nationwide lotteries. The metric system has been adopted for all official measurements, and the set price is even beginning to displace the hallowed custom of bargaining in the larger centers. A law taking effect January 1, 1935, compels every Turk to take a family name in accordance with the practice in Western countries. At the same time all titles such as Pasha, Bey, Effendi, and Hanum, customarily added after a name and indicating something of the social status of the individual, were outlawed, their place being taken by simple Turkish titles, Bay and Bayin, placed before the name. The need for this revolutionary departure from traditional Moslem avoidance of family names is apparent to anyone who has glanced through a long list of Turkish names, such as a telephone directory, and been puzzled by the appalling duplication therein. Efficiency is clearly enhanced by this innovation, and one more custom which made Turks different from westerners is eliminated. For the sake of conforming to European commercial standards and to place its banks on a plane of equality with those of its Western neighbors, the Turkish government might consider the abandonment of Friday as its distinctive day of worship and rest in favor of Sunday so that valuable business time might not be lost.⁴³

Turkey's aim, now that she has gained her political independence, is to adopt the ways of the West so that Western ways and methods may strengthen her own national and eco-

⁴³ Since this statement was written, the Turkish Parliament has actually enacted this change by a law passed May 28, 1935.

conomic life in order that she will be able to take her place on a par with any other nation and be compelled to ask favors from no one. In the words of a writer in *Le milliett*:

Our movement can not be compared to the Hindu movement which aims to return to the spinning wheel. Our movement is no more negative than reactionary. It is a movement forward, a positive movement. We do not say to the people "Return to the industry of the fireside; boycott foreign merchandise; become positive again." On the contrary we say to them, "Let us industrialize; let us perfect technique; accord importance to those branches of industry whose development is possible among us, and assure their success." Our doors are open to the merchandise which is not or cannot be produced in our country. To be able to buy more of them we wish to augment our national revenues.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ February 1, 1930.

IX

MISSIONARY EDUCATION IN THE LIGHT OF NATIONALISM

It was only natural that Turkey's determined attempt to rule her own destiny and to master the technique of Western civilization should have an effect on the foreign philanthropic work which had been established within her borders. These enterprises, evangelical, educational, and medical, had been carried on for decades by mission groups representing the important nations of Europe and by Americans. Under the governments of the Ottoman Empire the missions had enjoyed much freedom to carry on their work, for the Sublime Porte was everywhere being forced to accede to requests from nations of the West. Furthermore, since a large proportion of the mission work was directed toward the various Christian minority groups within the Empire, and since the Moslem Turks were nearly immune from the Christian virus due to their fancied superiority and the solidity of Islamic society, there was for a long time little reason for agitation on the part of the Moslems. When, however, the Empire dwindled away and the Turkish population concentrated and solidified into a nation, eliminating by violent means the disloyal Christian groups from its midst, the situation went through a radical change. Turkish territories were now populated almost solely by Moslem Turks; the Christian missions were left in the country with these Moslem Turks as the only object of their activity; and those Turks, due to the sudden disorganization and readjustment of their society, were no

longer immune to disturbing influences. It became essential, then, in the eyes of the strongly nationalist government, to make profound alterations in the status of these foreign enterprises and to subject them to more rigid governmental control than ever before lest they offer an obstruction to the attainment of strong, united nationhood.

It is true that the number of foreign schools in Turkey is smaller than before the war, though accurate comparison cannot be made because of the tremendous alteration which took place in Turkey's territory between 1914 and 1923. As we have already pointed out,¹ there still functioned 72 foreign schools in Turkey in 1932-33, attended by 10,172 pupils, not counting the minority schools operated by the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish populations. While the *Annuaire statistique* for 1932-33 does not separate the foreign schools by nationality, it will give an idea of the comparative extent of the enterprises of various nations to cite figures released by the Ministry of Public Instruction for 1927-28, when there were 36 French schools, 17 Italian, 8 American, 5 Bulgarian, 3 English, 2 Austrian, 1 German, and 1 Yugoslav.

It is a noteworthy fact that the foreign schools are thought of primarily in connection with their nationality rather than with their denomination, although the large majority of them are supported by religious groups. This is explainable largely because secular governments frequently interfered on behalf of the schools from their own country and because the language used for instruction in a foreign school was always that of the country from which the teachers came. Certain of the European schools have even received subsidies from the governments of the countries of their origin. The Turks are no doubt justified from past experience in suspecting that other motives than religious and philan-

¹ *Ci. chap, viii, Table I I I.*

thropic ones have entered into the establishment of foreign schools on their territory.

The Turks' connection of religious belief with nationality is explicable not only by their observance of the behavior of European governments but by their own history in Anatolia. In the days of conquest, he who became a Moslem became an Ottoman citizen and participated in the privileges of the dominant group. The Christian remained apart as a member of a semiautonomous inferior body known as a *millet* and was not an Ottoman citizen in full standing.² In the grim days between 1914 and 1923 the budding Turkish nation was seriously threatened by those Greek and Armenian *millets*, people who dwelt in the same land but whose religious differences, among others, led them to revolt and seek to set up new states at the expense of the Moslem Turks. It is not to be wondered at that a Turk instinctively thinks of a change from Islam to Christianity as an indication of treason to the nation. It will take Turkey many years to forget her enmity to Christianity, and, meanwhile, no matter how many declarations she may make about separating church and state, sacred and secular, one must regard it as only natural that Turkish citizens whose religion is other than Islam or agnosticism should be accepted into Turkish society with distinct reservations.

Turkey's present attitude toward the foreign schools in her midst may be brought out more clearly by a careful study of the position of one group of such institutions, the American schools. While their influence may be smaller—as are their numbers—than the French schools, they are by virtue of the quality of their instruction highly regarded in the country and hold a place of prominence in its educational life. Furthermore, data concerning them are more readily available, and it may be presumed that what is true for the schools of

² Cf. p. 80 above.

one nation will be true in general for the schools of all foreign states represented in Turkey.

The American educational work in Turkey comes under two main categories: one consisting of schools administered by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the other consisting of two colleges, Robert College and Constantinople Woman's College, which co-operate for purposes of finance and appointment of American teachers with the Near East College Association.

The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, an agency of the Congregational church, which in 1933 operated five schools with a total attendance of 582 students, has been carrying on work in Turkey for more than a century. In fact, Turkey as the Asiatic country most accessible to the United States has served as the center of American mission work to Moslem countries since the time when Levi Parsons and Pliny Fisk were sent out in 1819 as the first two missionaries.³ Oddly enough, these men were expected to minister not specially to Moslems but to the Jews of Palestine, and this same policy of working with non-Moslem peoples in the Turkish Empire prevailed until recent years. It was not the Jews, however, but the Christian Armenians who received the bulk of attention from the American missionaries. It was not a deliberate plan on the Americans' part to specialize on the Armenians to the exclusion of Moslem Turks and others. It was largely due to the coincidence that the Armenian Gregorian church was going through a disruptive experience brought about by a conflict between the reactionary, unintelligent clergy in control and a progressive, reforming element which was seeking to end the obscurantist tendency of their church—a struggle which was becoming bitter at the period when American missionaries began to appear on the scene. Here the newcomers

³ Barton, *Daybreak in Turkey*, p. 87.

found a definite opportunity for service open to them, and they immediately embarked on the venture of aiding the reforming Armenians in their attempt to liberalize their church.⁴ The Armenians were responsive to American work, and when schools were later opened in connection with the missions, they made up by far the largest racial group in attendance. Figures for 1913-14 for the twenty secondary schools operated by the Americans show that the registration included 4,385 Armenians, 339 Greeks, and 122 Turks.⁸

Robert College and the Constantinople Woman's College, founded in 1863 and 1871 respectively, pursued a similar policy, and though not carrying on Christian propaganda as intensively as the mission schools, catered to a clientele predominantly non-Turkish. Prior to the Young Turk revolution of 1908 the number of Turks in their student bodies was negligible, and even in 1913-14 there were registered in Robert College but 90 Turks in a total of 644, and in the Woman's College only 55 Turks in a total of 277.⁶

The outbreak of the World War and its consequent upheavals brought tremendous readjustments both in Turkey's internal affairs and in the status of the missions. Most notable was the elimination from the territory of Turkey of virtually the entire Armenian and Greek population. This meant that the people with whom the missions had spent the greater part of their effort were no longer in the country and that the missionaries must now shape their work to deal with Moslems. But some of the institutions which were regarded by the nationalists as having been so active in their assistance of Christian populations as to be anti-Turkish were asked to withdraw from the country, thus leaving for the new work only those Turkish-speaking missionaries and other edu-

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 108, 144 f.

⁵ C. A. Reed, *Problems of American Education in the Near East*, **Ibid.*

cators who were sympathetic toward the new national ideals. The Ankara government showed that it intended to run things as it saw fit, and the missionaries of every nationality came to realize that they were no longer to enjoy the free hand they had had under the sultans. Facing the new situation courageously, however, the Americans determined to continue their educational enterprises to the best of their ability, even though they were to be seriously restricted in any religious work they chose to undertake.

The years immediately following the Graeco-Turkish War and the Allied occupation of Constantinople were fraught with uncertainty and painful readjustments. The new nationalistic government, suspicious of all things foreign, kept a most careful eye on every move made by the foreign schools, while the directors and teachers of those schools, determined to spread the message of unselfish devotion to which they had dedicated their lives, shaped their plans to conform to the demands of the new regime. Courses were laid out with their chief purpose to meet the needs of Moslem Turks. Turkish teachers were added to the faculties of the schools; courses in Turkish language, literature, and history were added; in fact, all possible steps were taken to shape their curriculums so as to attract the younger generation of Turks, who were for the first time as a result of political circumstances exposed in large numbers to such Western influences.

To patronize the American schools was for the Turks something new. More than the French Jesuit schools, which had succeeded in the past in maintaining work definitely for Turkish Moslems,⁷ the American institutions had held a repu-

⁷ French has long been the accepted second language in Turkey, and today among the younger officialdom one meets many loyal Turks who have attended schools under French influence or control. A young army medical officer who had attended such a school told me he would never have thought of attending an American school, though there was one as conveniently located for him as the French.

tation for being interested chiefly in the minority Christian populations, and the impression clung tenaciously in the Turkish mind that a treasonable taint attached to American schools. Nevertheless the proportional number of Turks began to increase in the registration so that in 1923 seven American Mission schools had 257 Turkish students out of a total of 836, and in 1927 the proportion had become 919 Turks out of a total of 1,257, two additional schools having been reopened to make nine altogether.

The reasons for this growth in popularity of the American schools among the Turks after the World War are not hard to find. First of all, one should recall the background of Turkey's condition in the years which followed the cessation of hostilities. The country had passed through years of war, suffering, and deprivation. She had bled herself of men and money nearly to death, had passed through a period when all seemed utterly lost, and then by a titanic effort had re-established her right to exist as a nation. Disillusioned with the oriental way of life, to which she attributed her decadence, she turned eagerly toward the West to learn from it the skill and technique which she believed necessary for the maintenance and improvement of her existence. Two conflicting attitudes were discernible in the young nation: one a debasing sense of the inadequacy of her tools and material equipment inherited from the past; the other an exalting sense of confident determination to master the new civilization, born of the victory over Western foes. It is not surprising, then, that the Turks individually should turn eagerly to the American schools, for their equipment seemed in general vastly superior to the Turkish schools, which had suffered as a result of war-depleted treasuries, and they offered to teach the Turks that very knowledge of the West which the new nation was so eager to learn.

In an analysis of the causes which prompted individuals

to send their children to the American schools, there appear manifestations of the fundamental life urges⁸ which one would normally expect to find. With the entire nation busy in learning the new civilization, the *explorative* and *investigative urge* naturally played an important role. There was much that Turkey did not know about Western ways, and so the foreign institutions attracted a certain patronage from those who were curious to find out more about this novelty. Of importance, too, was the *acquisitive urge*, for Turkey had made up her mind to take care of her own finance and commerce. Believing that acquisition of wealth was of importance for comfort and stability, having reduced the Greek and Armenian populations which formerly carried on the bulk of her commerce, and having cast aside her old prejudice against participating in trade, Turkey sought how best to make money. Since America is looked upon as the nation most adept at amassing fortunes, it followed that her schools should be able somehow to impart this ability to Turkish students. A young official of Robert College reported to me that it was almost impossible nowadays to interest Turkish seniors in staying on at the college to teach, since all were inclined to enter commercial positions as soon as possible after graduation. A young graduate of an American College, in speaking of the attractions of American education, admitted that he felt he should be enabled to make a better living as a result of knowing the English language, and that this language attraction had first drawn him to consider attending the American college.

The *urge to mastery* gives indications of being one of the most important factors in the popularity of American schools among the Turks. Mention has been made of the impoverished and inadequate condition of Turkey's schools as a re-

⁸ Cf. M. Price, *Christian Missions and Oriental Civilizations*, pp. 537 ff.

suit of years of warfare. In contrast to them stood the American schools, which were in at least good if not flourishing condition and manned by staffs of teachers who carried themselves with assurance. In Turkey's anxiety to grasp and control the new techniques which she deemed essential for her well-being, is it to be wondered at that her citizens saw in the American and other foreign schools the surest means of achieving their ends? Better equipped than most Turkish schools, with able teachers, and providing a curriculum in the very fields which Turkey felt she must master, schools of the West must have seemed to many Turkish parents, eager that their children should be provided with an up-to-date education, a veritable answer to prayer.

In close alliance to the urge for mastery as it expressed itself in the selection of a foreign school to learn the new technique must be recognized the *urge toward recognition* or self-regard. Would not the parent who sent his child to one of the supposedly "superior" foreign schools feel that he had elevated his own status by educating his child in the best possible manner, enjoying the reflected glory which would come to him as the parent of a child who felt at home in the new Western ways, and who could converse in a European language with foreigners?

Both the mastery and the recognition urges as we have described them are revealed in an article by an anonymous parent which appeared in a magazine of Istanbul. The article is titled "How I Gave My Daughter to the American Girls' College." The writer begins:

Five years ago, while seeking a school for my daughter, I had recommended to me the American Girls' College, and to convince me they made me visit the school one day.

As soon as I saw the modern and elegant building situated on a beautiful and commanding site on the Bosphorus and the students inside who like flowers were flitting here and there, did

I not give my decision? It would not be possible to find in Turkey a better or more perfect school than this. After inspecting under the guidance of a student the classrooms, the laboratories, the library, the dining room and the dormitory this conviction took on new strength. This without any doubt was a place the like of which could not be found in the country. This most important matter was settled, and I decided in a satisfactory way the question of education for my daughter, which had bothered me so long. When that evening I took the good news to my daughter, her joy was unbounded. . . .

We went to a good deal of expense. We had new clothes made as if we were preparing a trousseau for our daughter, and finally we sent her to school.⁹

In an article which appeared in *Hayat*, an Ankara magazine, the writer in discussing the attractiveness of foreign schools makes mention of the element of recognition and self-regard. He remarks:

The idea of education which the heads of families have, especially and quite generally in the high classes, is narrow and mistaken. The educational ideals of some of those who belong to the high class can be turned exactly to these three points: a foreign language, piano, social manners. . . .

Snobbery also is another important element which insures full attendance at foreign schools. It is the desire to appear refined and aristocratic.¹⁰

This same writer suggests that a further motive, that of *self-protection*, enters into consideration in that parents, eager to escape from the nuisance and responsibilities of educating their children, choose to send them to boarding schools, especially foreign ones. He writes:

A large number of heads of families on giving their children to a school are happy, counting themselves henceforth free from all educational responsibility. For such as these, boarding schools

⁹*Resitnli Ay*, May, 1929, p. 18.

¹⁰"The Christianizing Incident," editorial in *Hayat* (Ankara), February 2, 1928.

are attractive; as for foreign boarding schools, they are ideal, for in a great degree they save the families from educational responsibilities and inconveniences.¹¹

Turkish parents who sent their children to foreign schools under the impulsion of the various urges described above no doubt felt that their position was fully justified by the circumstances. It was not to be expected, however, that the path of the foreign schools was to continue smooth despite the respect with which they were regarded in certain quarters. Republican Turkey was jealously insistent on maintaining and developing her national genius, in which, as we have seen, there was a liberal sprinkling of religious feeling inherited from the past. She was furthermore extremely anxious to attain a position of complete independence and self-reliance in every realm, including the educational. Schools under foreign Christian auspices, no matter how wholeheartedly they sought to play the game as the Turks wanted them to, could not hope to escape friction with the authorities since they stood for cultures and religious ideas which were alien to those of Turkey, and since their very presence was a constant unpleasant reminder to ardent Turks that their own educational system was regarded as inadequate.

Early in the year 1928 the Americans and others who maintained foreign-supported schools were brought to realize that their position was extremely precarious. This came about through a chain of unfortunate circumstances which resulted in the closing of a school at Bursa which had been supported by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, and the imprisonment in the school buildings of the teachers judged guilty of breaking the laws of the Ministry of Public Instruction. Personal spite on the part of one of the Turkish teachers in the school who had been discharged as the result of discontinuance of her course

¹¹ *Ibid.*

at orders of the government was no doubt responsible for the securing of evidence on which to prosecute, but, be that as it may, the prosecution occurred, and whatever the sense of injustice felt by the missionaries, the case must be regarded as an important one, symbolic of the trend of the times.

The charge brought against the Bursa school-teachers was that they had converted four young Turkish girls in their school to Christianity, and they were prosecuted in accordance with article 526 of the Turkish Penal Code, which provides punishment for those who disobey the regulations of a competent authority. The regulation deemed broken was that of the Ministry of Public Instruction, No. 37, originally adopted on August 20, 1915, and passed again by the Ankara government July 30, 1922. This paragraph reads as follows:

It is not allowed to encourage or force students to take part in the instruction or the services of a religion or denomination other than the religion or denomination to which they belong or to prevent students from attending the school because of non-participation or to permit the participation of students who attend by their own consent.

To understand the issues and sentiments involved in the case it will help to study the twelve charges and the defense arguments as presented by the lawyer for the mission, Ali Haydar, at the fifth session of the trial held April 25, 1928:

The charges against us can be analyzed under twelve heads, and we will treat each in turn:

1. "Kameron and her sister Nemika and two other girls have become Christians." It is easy to become a Moslem; one simply repeats the "word of witnessing." But Christianity is different; it is necessary to be baptized and partake of the communion before one is considered a Christian. We can say categorically that these girls did not become Christians. It is more true to say that they felt a love for Protestantism and for Jesus. Are we to suppose that Kameron came to love Protestantism because she had made a careful study and found it better? She is not

able to make such a study. The reason for her love for Protestantism is rather to be found in the early influences of her mother, who was an Armenian, and her grandmother, who to this day remains a Christian. Without the least desire to cast any disrespect upon the family, or to blame them in any way for such influences, we must see that it is not the school but home influences which are largely responsible for her love for Jesus. She herself has said that she is a Mohammedan and a Turk, and in the secular republic of to-day none of us has any right to question or criticize her.

2. "The diaries of Madelet Hanum are before us." In these diaries are found a number of references, including the fact that Miss Day told her the resurrection story. This story, as you know, is to the effect that Jesus was buried and later when some women went to his tomb, they were met by angels who told them Jesus had ascended into Heaven. In our own religion the story is only slightly different, relating that before being put on the cross he ascended into Heaven. In any case, the diary of an emotional young girl, filled with her imagination, is not sufficient to convict any one of a penal offense without further proof.

3. "Miss Day was guilty of religious propaganda during walks with the children." We shall explain later whether she did this or not and the degree of responsibility involved.

4. "Religious records were played as a means of religious propaganda." The "Ave Maria" record is particularly referred to. On my way down here on the S.S. "Marmora" I heard this "Ave Maria" played on the gramophone. Are we to accuse the stewards of the boat with trying to make us Christians? Religion is not propagated by piano and violin pieces which have no words. Many of the pupils testified that they did not even imagine this record was religious until they were recently told so. How can it be regarded as religious propaganda?

5. "Religious songs were taught to the children as a means of religious propaganda." "I would be true" has been cited as an example of this, but the translation submitted to the court shows it to be not religious. It advocates virtues which belong to our religion also. Is it only Jesus that teaches truthfulness, purity, courage, etc.? The government is encouraging the teaching of morals without religious teaching in the schools. This song is just such as should be approved.

6. "Miss Day gave a New Testament to **Kameron Hanum.**"

7. "Miss Sanderson gave Madelet Hanum the *Girls' Year Book*" Is the giving of a book a penal offense? In Pera there is a shop devoted exclusively to selling Bibles. This is not stopped by the police because the government grants freedom in this respect. By what law is it a penal offense to give some one such a book? Just in these last weeks Ismet Pasha and his associates have made a proposal for revision of the constitution which has been adopted. This leaves every one free to do as he likes in matters of religion. The government does not interfere in such matters.

8. "Distinctions were made between Friday and Sunday." No distinctions were made by the school. The forbidding of tennis on Sundays is a perfectly natural thing, as the teachers have a right to have that day quiet for rest. They did not scorn or slight our Friday in any way. It is our humane and religious duty to respect their Sunday also. Four points are clear: 1. The school gave the same permissions to pupils on Fridays and Sundays. 2. The teachers have a right to have quiet on Sundays. 3. The Department of Education has accepted the principle of Sunday observance in foreign schools. 4. Clothing worn on Sundays can have no relation to religious propaganda.

9. "Greater privileges were accorded to the four girls who are said to have been converted." Although it had been charged that they received better food when sick, Shahide Hanum herself, who worked in the hospital, testified that all received the same food. If some were introduced to American guests, it was because they spoke English better or made a better impression. The fruit garden was forbidden to all the pupils. Is it supposed that there was a church in this fruit garden?

10. "There were religious pictures in the school." All witnesses, including those against us, have testified that there were no religious pictures in the school. If there were some in the private rooms of the teachers, which the pupils were not supposed to enter, no complaint can be made. In one's own room one can hang any pictures one likes and perform any kind of worship one chooses.

11. "Before meals, the pupils were made to stand a moment and participate in a prayer said secretly by the teachers." It is very natural that the pupils be made to stand a moment and all sit down together for purposes of discipline, as is done in the Naval Academy and other Turkish schools also. Even if the

American teachers did say a prayer to themselves, it is not a crime to thank God for one's food, but it is taught by all religions. It is a Turkish custom to say "Bismillah" at this time. All the witnesses agree that no prayer was said aloud and that the pupils were not forced to pray.

12. "Prohibited books such as Longman's *Grammar* and *Silas Marner* were taught in the school." This point was not raised at first but only brought out later. What sort of religious propaganda can be made by scattered references or religious phrases in a grammar? Moreover, this book has been shown to be included in the lists submitted every year to the Department of Education and approved by them. *Silas Marner* has been declared by a translator appointed under order of the court to be a novel, not religious in nature, and not referring to Christ. We can thus declare that these two books are not forbidden by law.

From the foregoing presentation it is plainly apparent what sort of atmosphere was being maintained in a typical American school. The missionaries no doubt were sincere in their protestations that they were doing nothing not strictly permissible in the eyes of the law, and although each point of accusation when taken by itself seems to be only of trifling consequence, when presented *en masse* the effect is one over which the Turks can hardly be blamed for becoming worried. The missionaries may have felt impelled to present their message of Christian love by whatever means were open to them, but the Turks would have been blind, indeed, if they had failed to see that under the surface forces were stirring which would be bound to have a profound influence on their religious, social, and national life.

Before proceeding to a further study of protests which have been raised by Turks against the alleged proselyting and denationalizing activities of the foreign schools, a brief glance may be taken at representative pronouncements by American missionary educators concerning their religious position.

In 1908 at the period of the constitutional revolution in

Turkey, an American institution, the Central Turkey College, stated its aims and purposes, three of which are worthy of note in our present problem. The religious aim is stated as follows:

The college is a Christian college. It makes Christian character the basis of educated manhood, and believes education without character building to be worse than folly and more harmful than ignorance. Consequently, it guards itself against all influences which are antagonistic to religion in general and to the Christian religion in particular. It can tolerate nothing, however popular or plausible it may be, at the risk or expense of the religious welfare of its students. It seeks to develop the spiritual life of every student, under the conviction that Jesus Christ alone can supply the needs of the human soul.

Another paragraph deals with the college's denominational aims:

The college is not a denominational college. It is based upon evangelical Christianity, but its object is not to propagate any particular form of Christianity among its students. It is first and foremost an educational institution, which promotes religious education so far as it believes religious life to be as natural as physical and intellectual life. Consequently, the college is open to young men of all religions on exactly the same terms. Formal distinctions with reference to religious sects and ideas cannot be made by the Faculty, and will not be tolerated among the students.¹²

The statement of a prominent American educator in Turkey written after the war again stresses the vital importance of religion in the missionary educational work:

So long as American colleges are loyal to the religious convictions that have made them possible, and broadly tolerant while absolutely loyal to their best convictions, they may expect the respect even of those who differ from them. If through fear or favor, they seek to withhold their witness to the essential

¹² Quoted from Reed, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

truth of their religion, they will not only lose the respect of those who differ from them, but also the possibility of broadening and liberalizing the young people who do not know in their own countries any forms of religion which are largely not corrupted by superstition and meaningless forms. If education means enlightenment, certainly the American colleges owe it to their students to exhibit religion in its highest and purest forms. We should condemn them if in art they exhibited only inferior forms, if in music they allowed no one to play Beethoven or Chopin because these were not Orientals. And they would be equally blameworthy if, with their high ideals of religion, they did not present to every student the truths which have made possible their own service to the world.¹³

A representative Turkish reaction to the type of religious living and character-building carried on at Bursa and defended by the viewpoints expressed above is set forth in an editorial which appeared in *Hayat* magazine, an Ankara journal, at the time of the excitement over the Bursa trial. However high the ideals which missionary educators profess to exemplify, it must not be forgotten that they may not wear a halo in the eyes of the people in whose land they are working. The editor writes:

It is reported that several of the Turkish girls in the Bursa American School have become Christian. If the event is taken by itself, it is a simple, ordinary event: a few individuals of the Mohammedan mass which numbers several hundred millions of people have come out from the mass and joined the Christian mass, which also numbers several hundred million persons. But if we think of the reactions to which the event has given birth, the publications of the newspapers, the emotion experienced by the parents whose children were studying in this school in Bursa, and the taking of their children from the school by these families at once after the event, then we realize that we are not face to face with an ordinary question. The affair has made a deep impression upon the Turkish mass, to such a degree that the educational administration of the secular Republican government felt

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 510 ff.

the necessity of entering into the affair. In this respect the problem is not simple; it is worthy of discussion and analysis in a comprehensive manner and taking full account of the meaning of the word "social."

It is fitting to begin our analysis first of all by asking why an "American" school is situated in Bursa, which is our most Turkish city. Yes, why is there an American school in Bursa when there is not even one American family there? Why are there in Constantinople American, French, Italian, English, German, Austrian, etc. schools for boys and girls? It is well known that the duty of the school is to give education; the function of education is to inoculate the younger generation with the thoughts, feelings, desires, and ideals of the society *to which it belongs*. The thoughts, feelings, etc. common to a society, however, can only be firmly established in the spirits of conscious and cultivated mature members of that society. And only these can inoculate the younger generation with these things. If this idea of ours is correct, then American and other foreign schools in general in Turkey are meaningless, and therefore functionless, empty institutions. We are sure of the truth of our ideas about education because these are not merely a matter of personal opinion; in every civilized country they are current and respected ideas. From another point of view, the foreign schools in Turkey are not meaningless, functionless, and "empty."

The object of the foreign school is foreign culture; foreign language, foreign national ideals and foreign religion are the chief bases of this culture.

The purpose of the foreign school then is to inoculate native youth with this culture. . . .

The writer goes on to speak of the professed intentions of the directors of foreign schools to help Turkey and their care to obey the demands of educational laws. He goes on:

Now let us also pass on to the educational activities of the school. Here we are first of all face to face with moral training. They constantly mention character building to you. This character building duty is always taken in charge by the American teachers. And all the activities of the school are directed toward this center. Let us not forget that the most attractive of the activities of the school is sport. The one directing this is sure to

be a teacher brought up with care and under strong religious suggestion in the special schools of the Y.M.C.A. This teacher is on intimate terms with the pupil. The directors of American schools have learned by experience that indirect religious suggestions are more influential upon young people; especially the influence of a good sports teacher upon the spiritual nature of the youth is deep and continuing. . . .

An important activity of the schools is also student discussions. These discussions are conducted with great skill and always drive the student toward a definite idea. This idea is a virtue such as faithfulness, cleanheartedness, etc. Only, the roads which, always secretly in the beginning and on the condition of remaining nameless, lead to this virtue, all lead through Christianity. . . .

He goes on to mention points which were brought out in the Bursa charges such as the importance placed on Christian holidays. He asserts:

The result is that there is Christianity and Protestantism in the school. But the influences upon the pupil are all indirect, all without name. . . .

Perhaps there are also those who will say, "Very well, what of this? In a secular Republic is a religious question to be discussed?" Indeed every Turk who has reached the age of majority can choose the religion he wishes. . . . But we must not forget that every religion is an ideal, and every ideal is an intense love that needs to be satisfied. The longings of soul of a young Turk who is a Protestant cannot be satisfied in Turkey within a Turkish society; he will turn his eyes to the great Protestant nations. However, it is necessary that the glance of a young Turk be directed to his own society, and education is charged with assuring this. . . .

In a word these schools are institutions which by their lessons, by their training, turn Turkish youth away from the society to which they belong to another society and carry them toward a foreign ideal. The conversions which occasionally take place openly are the high points of the indirect influences which are at work every day and every hour upon the Turkish students who fill the schools, and the most harmful influences of the foreign school are especially the indirect influences. . . .

Character is very much a matter of nationality. It takes shape only in a national environment, and only with the good and bad actions and reactions of that environment. I stress the phrase "both the good and the bad." Character cannot be brought in from outside, for it is not an external, a corporeal thing. The foreign school moulds a character only according to foreign ideals; as for this character, be it in a religious form or in a political form, it is harmful for the national Turkish ideals. . . .

The continuance in Turkey in an enterprise harmful for Turkish nationality under the name of educational activity of some countrymen of those Americans who do not look with pleasure upon institutions harmful to the Americanization movement and to American national activity in America, can be harmonized neither with the humanitarian purpose which they advocate on every occasion nor with the principle, "Do not to another that which thou dost not desire to be done to thee," which they attribute to Christianity. . . .¹⁴

Numerous examples could be cited of Turkish writers who have protested against the presence of foreign schools because of their indirect religious influences which are regarded as distinctly dangerous to the development of Turkish nationality. Mehmet Emin, one of the most influential educators in Turkey, writing in the same magazine, *Hayat*, two weeks later makes the declaration:

The worst schools are those institutions which do not create capacities useful for the social and national environment. The foreign school not only fails to create these capacities, it produces young people who gradually get out of harmony with the spiritual life of their environment, due to the religious and national influence which the institution makes its object.¹⁵

In a novel entitled *Pervaneler* ("Moths"), the woman novelist, Mufidie Ferid, has written a strong criticism of the effect of American college education on Turkish girls, from which certain passages are worthy of attention. Describ-

¹⁴ "The Christianizing Incident," *op. cit.*

¹⁵ "Is the Conversion to Christianity Incident a Result of a Culture Crisis?" *ibid.*, February 16, 1928.

ing the emotional conflict undergone by one of the characters in her novel, she writes:

Nesime's trouble was like that of all Turkish children who study in this school [Byzantium College] . . . American life and the desire to live in America!

This was their last year, and as it was the time to leave the school, this desire was more acute. To return home at the end of the year—God spare them from it! Every day pulling her head together with Leman [a fellow-student], the two of them were seeking an escape from this fate. But they were not bad girls. Perhaps they loved their families, but the training which they had received from this college in their early years¹⁶ had caused them to dislike their environments.

Because they were changed and transformed.

The trip to America was a psychological need for Nesime. Nesime was the daughter of a well-known Mevlevi sheikh, Amir Tchelebi. Her mother died when she was born. She grew up in a *tekke* [dervish monastery] without any love and kindness among the armies of dervishes and *badjis* [negro nurses], and in a continual flood of visitors. When she entered the cold stage of the school, which resembles the world of struggle, she thought there were two sorts of women on the face of the earth: one, the women whom she had seen in the *tekke*", silent, aimless, and filling their lives with menial tasks; the other, women whom she met in the college, able to earn their livelihood, fight against men, and rely on their own strength without the help of relatives.

Perhaps there might be a third sort of women who are loved and married . . . heroines of love. But they were beautiful women, and Nesime knew that she was not beautiful.

Therefore there remained for her two alternatives of life: either to thrust herself into the struggle as she did when she was in school, or, as her father wished her to do, go back to the *tekke* and marry and thrust herself into a monotonous desert of life and do small and menial tasks.

But was this life possible for her now? Was it possible for her to leave the college and go back to the *tekke* and mend clothes before a *mongal* [charcoal stove] in low-roofed rooms,

¹⁶ The college, like its real prototype, the Constantinople Woman's College, included preparatory courses in its curriculum.

obey her husband without love, and live among the *badjis* a life in which one day is just like another? Was it possible after this?

Now it was too late. In her empty heart the worship of America was sown as a seed. The vision of being master of her own life was shining before her like a great happiness. To earn her livelihood! Perhaps to be famous! Of course these were mere wishes, but that sort of desire may lead to happiness. So who would go back home?¹⁷

Another notable passage describes the impression made on relatives of one of the students who have come to the school to protest against having the girl sent to America on a scholarship; they are being shown around the school by one of the teachers, an Armenian.

Andree [a French girl married to a Turk, brother of the student] was looking at the pictures hanging in the classrooms and corridors. There were masterpieces of the world's art. They were chosen to be shown to the children. They had photographs and lithographs, starting from the Apollo Belvedere, up to Memnon the Giant, including the Statue of Liberty in New York, the Acropolis, the Capitol, stones from Karnak, the palaces of Westminster, and the Gothic castles of feudal times; small or large, they had all these pieces, but they did not have a single thing which concerned Turkey.

The only thing that was Turkish was the air and sunshine which came through the large windows. Andree, as she looked out from the window, saw the crimson line of minarets and mosques which forms the unique Turkish picture, looking like a winged and imaginary painting.

Then they went to the Ethnographic Museum. There they had everything from Armenia, Greece, Russia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia—but not a single thing from Turkey. Better to say they had a few Turkish kerchiefs and towels from Aintab, but they all came under the name of Armenian work. They did not find a single thing, neither a Turkish carpet, nor an antique faience, nor a gilded book cover, nor a silken headdress that looks like a flower, not a thing made by Fatma [a name representing

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 47 f.

Turkish women in general]. They had forgotten the Seljuk bridges and castles, the Blue Mosque of Bursa, the Mosque of Selim in Adrianople, and the Suleimaniyeh of Stamboul. As they had forgotten Turkey among their art works, so they denied her in the Ethnographic Museum.

Andree wondered at this treacherous frame of mind toward the country whose hospitality they had accepted. Now she, and all three, understood why the Turkish girls like her sister-in-law did not remember their nationality. . . .¹⁸

Sami said, "They live apart like a different state in our country, without recognizing us or our laws, under their own rules, organization, environment, civilization, even in their own streets and lighting. And by so living they think they can exert the influence and power of their country more effectively. You are right. It is a lantern which attracts moths."¹⁹

Enough evidence has been presented to show that the position of missionary and foreign education in Turkey is in a precarious position as a result of Turkey's evangel of nationalism. The work of all institutions which are not regularly administered by the Ministry of Public Instruction is bound constantly to be subjected to a rigid scrutiny by patriotic Turks, and any denationalizing influences, direct or indirect, especially any which have Christian religious significance, will be certain, if found, to meet with a punishment similar to that accorded to the teachers at Bursa. Turkey at the present time is not a place for a missionary who is not willing to forego all ideas of proselyting and to devote himself whole-heartedly to the task of helping Turkey develop according to her own genius, supplying only such Western or Christian viewpoints as the Turks themselves call upon him to suggest. Pragmatic as Turkey now is, and ready to accept from the West whatever she feels will contribute to the strengthening of her national society, philanthropists may assume that any essential features of their culture and re-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 112 f.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

ligion will be eventually requested by a nation so avowedly eclectic as Turkey now is. It would be a great tactical blunder on the part of those who wish to share Christianity with the Turks to make an effort to force their ideals down Turkish throats. The antagonism which would be aroused by such activity would delay indefinitely the achievement of those very ends so earnestly desired by Turkey's well-wishing foreign friends.

Now that the new Turkish government and American mission workers have had more than a decade to become acquainted with each other, there should be a constantly diminishing number of causes for friction. The missionaries remaining in Turkey understand the definite limitations placed upon religious teaching and are altruistically committed to the service of the Turkish people in whatever manner is possible. Turkey's responsible officials, for their part, are co-operative and ready to extend a cordial welcome to American enterprises which have shown themselves ready to conform to the policies of the republican government.²⁰ Turkey's enthusiastic appreciation of the work of the Messrs. Jennings and the American Friends of Turkey has already been cited.²¹ And there seems no reason to suppose that other American activities will be treated with hostility so long as they continue to be genuinely helpful in Turkey's transition and development.

An example of the intelligent work of the American mission group was its initiation of a wholesome magazine, *Muhit*, with the co-operation of Turkish publicists, when the change in alphabet and reading habits of the nation made it ex-

²⁰ Curtailment of American educational activity since 1931 has not been due to Turkish unfriendliness. The closing of three American Board school and the college at Izmir was necessitated by financial and administrative difficulties and was carried out voluntarily by the responsible American executives.

²¹ See pp. 135 f. above.

tremely difficult for any except crude pictorial journals to secure enough circulation to survive. In many other practical ways these missionaries of the new day have sought to lend a hand where the need was greatest. In addition to the schools already referred to, five medical centers have been established, playground and social service work have been set up in Adana, and an experimental farm placed in service at Gaziantep.

A paragraph from the *Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions for 1932* summarizes the practical work being attempted in Turkey:

A survey of the whole Near East Mission reveals how much there is of great promise in the work being done, both in city and in rural areas. The definite rural activities center around Merzifon, Talas, and Gaziantep where during the past year experimental work in village education by means of "movies" and village visitation has been carried on. Suspicion and mistrust have been replaced by confidence and friendship as a result of this quiet, intensive work. The Village Boys' Hostel in connection with the Talas School has been a worth-while experiment. Fifteen village boys who brought their own beds and food were provided quarters and a cook, so that with a minimum of expense they might have some educational opportunity which would otherwise be beyond their reach. The Gaziantep Farm is the outstanding rural project in the Mission. The village boys who serve as apprentices on the farm are being trained in better methods of agriculture and in turn will become demonstrators of these methods in their villages. There are results in character building which are quite as real though less tangible.²²

From the Turkish viewpoint it is clear, despite hostile hysterical flurries, that Turkey will welcome American philanthropy when it is given without ulterior motives. A statement in this regard has been made by Mehmet Emin in his previously quoted article in *Hay at*:

²² *Op. cit.*, pp. 15 f.

Those of philanthropic temper who wish to help us must do this exclusively with Turkish hands and for the needs of Turkey. The Americans have given vast assistance to the University of Brussels, but in return for this assistance they did not seek to open an American University in Brussels. Humanitarian assistance which can be given to Turkey can only be of this kind.²³

From the missionary viewpoint the tendency is more and more to respect the wishes of the Turks with a growing realization that missionary educational work is a co-operative enterprise. It is clear that students must be educated as loyal Turkish citizens to be of maximum service to their community. Recognizing the prevailing Turkish attitude on religion, this precludes any attempt to make these students professing Christians. Patience and forbearance must be manifested until the wounds caused by Christian-Moslem rivalry have healed and until Turkey as a whole outgrows her suspicion of religion as a benighted superstition and an enemy of progress. When Turkey, along with the rest of the world, comes to understand real religion as a great dynamic, liberating force, designed to serve the needs of humanity, and when she realizes the close identification between the aims of her own leaders and the humanitarian purposes of vital religion, there will be an end to inhibitions and the mutual distrust existing between Moslem and Christian. Leaders of each faith may then work in harmony, releasing their full energies to seek together the ideal society wherein man may live at his best, thus fulfilling the fondest hopes of Jesus and Mohammed. But how long it will take to reach this ideal era, who can say?

²³ "Is the Conversion to Christianity Incident a Result of a Culture Crisis?" *op. cit.*

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