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
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Radha Kamal Mukerjee

THE
Frontiers of Social Science

IN HONOUR OF

RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE

Vice-Chancellor, University of Lucknow, India.

FOREWORD BY

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FOREWORD

I have known Sri Radhakamal Mukerjee, who is now the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Lucknow, for over thirty years, have read some of his works and have learnt to admire his prodigious learning, acute sociological thinking and deep devotion to the fundamentals of Indian culture. His poignant sympathy for the suffering humanity of India set the tone to his life work, which includes teaching in the night schools in the early years, study of economics, work for the co-operative movement, adult education.

I am not competent to speak of his vast work on sociology. What interests me is his attempt to base his sociological thinking on Indian mysticism, his perception that human life is a whole and cannot be studied in fragments. Sociology or the science of man in society cannot ignore the question of values. Social sciences give us knowledge and if this knowledge is to be employed for the good of man, we must develop a sense of values. Radhakamal Mukerjee is aware of this great truth.

Spiritual values and social behaviour are not antithetical. The individual expresses and develops his personality only through relations with others. Society is the network of relations among individuals. There is a fundamental harmony between our relations with the Unseen Reality which inspires nature and history and our relations with our fellowmen. *Mānava sevā is mādhava sevā.*[1] If we are to become more god-like, we have to undertake redemptive work for the world. The basic element in religion is not the intellectual acceptance of dogmatic principles or historical events. These are but the preparation for the experience which affects our entire being, which ends our disquiet, our anguish, which removes the sense of the aimlessness of our fragile and fugitive existence and which confers dignity on our life, individual and social.

The true aim of man is to integrate his nature which results in an integration with society. Self-integration is possible only by self-control, which is the basic principle of morality. The *Mahābhārata* says that the rules of dharma prescribed by great seers, each depending on his wisdom, are many. The highest among them all is self-control.[2] Those who have disciplined their natures are the enfranchised souls who are responsible for the great discoveries of science and art.[3]

Mukerjee's great ambition is to work for a better social order. The world has fought its way through centuries by methods of violence

[1] See also *Matthew* XXII, 37-40.
[2] Santi-parva, CLX, 6
[3] See Sorokin's paper on *The Supraconscious in Man's Mental Structure*, 81 ff.

and one civilisation after another has been dashed to the ground. Thanks to the development of new and devastating atomic weapons, we have come to realise that war in the new context will not pay and may involve even the extinction of civilisation. Compelled by necessity we are eager to get on with our neighbours and settle our problems by peaceful methods of negotiation, arbitration and agreement. There is nothing inevitable where human beings are concerned. We are not the unconscious tools of an unkind fate. We can, by a determined effort, change the course of history, stop the process of decay and lead our civilisation to new greatness. God helps those who help themselves by using fully and freely the minds and hearts he gave us. We all know that in future there can be only one civilisation. The saints of the past who looked upon the whole world as their sacred place, *vārāṇasī medinī*, are a pledge to the future of spiritual recovery and human solidarity.

An accomplished writer with wide intellectual interests, Radhakamal Mukerjee has devoted his life to reading and learning. He has written over thirty books and has plans for a few more. It is the earnest wish of his many friends and admirers here and abroad that he may continue to do the great work to which he has dedicated his life.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

NEW DELHI,
22 *September* 1955.

PREFACE

This volume is compiled both as a tribute to the scientific work of Prof. Radhakamal Mukerjee, and an integrated statement of the logical-epistemological unity of the social sciences. In its various chapters written by his colleagues or students, who admire and have learnt from him, one merges in the other, underlining the need for fresh and comprehensive integration as Professor Mukerjee has stressed for more than four decades. The volume has the advantage of including an intellectual autobiography of Professor Mukerjee, and his most recent review of a General Theory of Personality-Value- and Society, based on the philosophical notions of the multi-dimensionality, continuity and openness of the social environment and the triangular pattern of human relations and behaviour. The interchange of Man, Status and Institution in the social "field" provides in Mukerjee's General Theory the common conceptual frame-work of all the social sciences focussing its attention towards a totality of interrelated values, actual and potential, belonging to various levels or dimensions and achieving a wholeness and integrity in self, society and environment. This original and weighty contribution deserves careful attention of all social scientists and philosophers, and should be compared and contrasted with the Parsons-Shiels' General Theory of Social Action.

Brightman, whose, brilliant opening chapter is one of the last of his writings, devotes himself to Mukerjee's major contributions to the crossing of the various frontiers between the social sciences and Psychology, Philosophy and Ethics, restoring the real unity between the social and the individual in both social and moral theory and practice. Manuel Gottlieb compares the methodology and theoretical systems of Parsons and Mukerjee whom he regards as two of the most creative figures in the contemporary social sciences. The cross fertilization of Mukerjee's and Parsons' methods and theoretical elaborations with proper emphasis of the role of the region and ecological complex, as in Mukerjee, and of the blending of abstraction and rigorous analysis of theoretical properties with application to reality, as in Parsons, can bear a rich harvest in an integrated social science theory of the future. Parsons' own chapter on The Theory of Social Stratification is worked out as a general sociological theory with reference to a certain universal aspect of social systems. Hart analyses Mukerjee's objective ethical theory developed in his "Dynamics of Morals" based on the situational imperative of four basic types of groupings found in all human communities in which individuals are aware of their social bonds, and wish to maintain and perpetuate them as essential phases of adjustment and achievement of unity and wholeness through practical organisation. Unless Ethics becomes empirical, in this manner grounded in the whole social process and experience, it

has little possibility of surviving as an independent discipline. This line of thinking is certainly much more important than the current connotative definition of the moral life. Four important papers by Owen, Hart, Murphy and Bhattacharya deal with the role of value theory in social science. Mukerjee's basic contribution to the analysis and elaboration of value theory as the nexus of the social sciences is supplemented by Gardner Murphy's psychological theory presented in terms of concrete steps through which the growing individual passes. Owen stresses that the new sociology of values, as in the hands of Mukerjee, can make a distinct contribution both to intercultural understanding, and to knowledge of the cultural conditions under which a world faith might become an actuality. Samuel L. Hart elaborates Mukerjee's thesis of the interdependence of the quality of man's social and moral life without which the social sciences only sharpen the knife without having the bread to cut. A consensus in values and valuations, Hart insists, remains a heuristic principle, and he accepts Mukerjee's four basic types of human groupings related to the depth of the individual self as well as status and values as basic to empirical ethics and as essential for resolving many current dichotomies in social science.

Dodd, Bogardus and Chapin have elaborated their significant findings in the fields of social physics that they have tilled for many years. Here Mukerjee's modification of Bogardus' social distance scale as worked out in his UNESCO investigation of caste tensions is noteworthy. Mukerjee's Regional Sociology has introduced a new systematic division in sociological science based on the recognition that the region should be studied as a dynamic sociological unit. This is stressed by the contributions of Elizabeth Green, Craighill Handy and Leela Joseph. Hertzler shows the necessity of studying socio-psychological behaviour within the region that is stressed by Mukerjee. Carle C. Zimmerman and Richard E. Du Wors elaborate the theme with vivid American examples that the next step in Regional Sociology is to appraise the region as to its group or sociological characteristics with types of personalities and social attitudes of a regional nature. In an age of planning both on a national and international scale, Mukerjee's basic notion of the region has far-reaching applications for scientific utilization and conservation of natural resources and reorientation of local folk regional society and culture.

James A. Quinn credits Mukerjee with having produced the first systematic theoretical work in Human Ecology, including the factor of human culture in his conception of ecological relations, emphasising status and mobility as both ecological as well as socio-moral concepts, and using socio-ecological indices that are functionally related to social behaviour. Here he departs fundamentally from the theory of Robert E. Park, the leading American pioneer in human ecology. Leopold V. Wiese, the don among the German sociologists, analyses the physical, cultural and spiritual attributes of the "Heimat" in the light of ecology and shows that even in the emerging world community man for his security and stimulus has to find his anchorage in one fragment of the world which he may call his own. Ernest W. Burgess and

Rupert V. Vance, leading American human ecologists, have contributed on the subjects of the ecology of the urban growth and of the aged people in the population.

Tracing the development of the theory of optimum population from the general ideas implicit in such thinkers from Sisomondi to Mukerjee, Chenault, like Ferenczi, emphasises the significance of the synthetic optimum that may form a basis for peace and prosperity throughout the world. In contrast to the concepts of Cannan, Robbins and Beveridge, Mukerjee's integral optimum synthesizing bio-ecological, economic, social and ethical approaches sets out an inclusive and stable standard and criterion of national and international planning. J. Sinha also dwells on the supremacy of the integral optimum that takes into account the ecological, economic and institutional factors as well as the entire cultural set-up and their interaction on the demographic process.

Institutional economics takes into account such reciprocal interaction and the mutual conditioning of the non-economic and economic ways and means in the social process of which the economic change forms an essential ingredient. Manuel Gottlieb in his theory of an economic system emphasises the role of the concept of region in social-economic analysis that has been developed by Mukerjee. Mukerjee's functional approach gives him an advantage over Pareto and Schumpeter in looking at the subtle and organic balance resting on institutions in a Gestalt. He rightly draws attention to the multi-dimensionality of the economic system and to the radical difference in the institutionalised configurations in the middle of the 20th century as compared to those of a century earlier. Gruchy arrives at the same conclusion and examines the limitations of the Keynesian approach. Institutional economics presents a theory of economic order in transition and has therefore a high relevancy to the present times. Baljit Singh develops the policy implications of the premises of institutional economics, and stresses that mixed economy or a socialistic pattern, as in India, is the only alternative in a world where individual countries are being deluded and deflected by pure systems leading to many tensions and conflicts.

The distinguished savant Pitrim A. Sorokin classifies the various forms and manifestations of the supra-conscious, and illustrates its role in man's creativity and adventure as well as in the formulation of his universal and eternal ethical norms and imperatives in society. W. E. Hocking, Dayamoy Mitra and Jaideva Singh deal with Mukerjee's treatment of the role of mysticism in both the maturation of the individual mind and the evolution of social norms. Mysticism, according to Mukerjee, embodies and enhances the faith in the participation and permanence of the values of man, and thus leads sociology to the shrine of metaphysics. Raymond F. Piper discusses the significance of Mukerjee's comprehensive treatment of the significant and indispensable functions of art in society in what he calls his amazing book, "The Social Function of Art". He elucidates Mukerjee's metaphysics of art rooted in the mighty and ubiquitous principle of rhythm

that unifies nature, man, art and God, and analyses his stress of the role of the arts in promoting man's peaceful and happy adjustment in multifarious social relations. Herbert Read draws attention to the importance of Mukerjee's comparative study of art and its integrative role in civilization with the kind of universal insight which he shows.

In India the development of economic thought and sociological thinking have, unlike those in Europe, been saved from a divorce between theory and the actual facts. This is largely due to the dominating influence of Mukerjee, as has been well brought out in several papers in the last section including those of Baljit Singh, Mrs. Garg, Chauhan and Chandra. Mukerjee's central idea that "the attempt to force systems and methods of industrial organisation, economic arrangements, and institutions, which had admirably suited a different geographical environment will always be futile" has not only resulted in the establishment of a new Indian school of Economics resting on a functional analysis of Indian institutions and their changing pattern, but has deeply influenced economic policy and planning in independent India.

Here the "Region" as the focus of social-ecological investigation is a dynamic "field" or pattern, a "configuration" like the Gestalt of Wertheimer, Koehler and Koffka, produced by vast ecological processes, has provided a practical approach to planning. Mukerjee's emphasis on regional balance has resulted in river valley planning, 'rurbanisation', development of agro-industrial colonies and industrial dispersal.

The Partition of India created new problems for the country, and this has given an opportunity to Mrs. Anstey to examine the arguments for a customs union in the context of complementary and competitive economics. She concludes that complementarity seems to make a customs union unnecessary, whilst competitiveness provides a reason for it. These findings are significant not only for newly partitioned countries such as India, Pakistan and Burma but even more for Western and Eastern Europe. Mrs. Garg illustrates from Mukerjee's treatment of the wages problem in India the efficacy of his methodology of broadening economic enquiry into the whole of the social process, and of integrating analytical and normative studies for making social science concrete, both as knowledge and as application.

Mukerjee's contributions to the development of an Indian School of Sociology through linking up ecological and earth-bound with social values, and social with asthetic, moral and mystical values have been discussed in a separate paper. Sushil Chandra discusses Mukerjee's concept of "Disvalues" as basic to his analytical and normative theory of social disorganisation, which has stimulated a large number of field studies in Social Pathology at the J. K. Institute of Sociology and Human Relations, of which Mukerjee is the Director.

The various contributors have not only presented stimulating discussions on different social theories and issues developed by Mukerjee,

but have also collaborated in the rewarding venture of envisaging a new methodology that may bring about a closer integration of the social sciences. Some of them have developed their own conceptual tools and models, and these are presented here with an autonomy and seminal character without being titled by Mukerjee's frames of reference. On the whole, therefore, the volume is expected to aid powerfully the trend of unity in the social sciences.

EDITOR

I–AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND GENERAL THEORY

Radhakamal Mukerjee

1

FAITHS AND INFLUENCES

By RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE

Early Memories of Home and People

It is not easy to comply with the Editor's request to furnish him with an intellectual autobiography. Every man wishes to present himself and his situation attractively with an eye more towards his gains and achievements than towards his deficiencies and failures. Besides, human life is woven out of chance and purpose, destiny and effort. In a long view of life which is only of interest to fellowmen, the complex of forces and circumstances that shapes one's career is apt to be missed. Besides, if he happens to be an author, it is his writings that best reveal his strivings and experiences, invested as these may be with general import. Ideas and events that have a general significance for our common humanity are of far greater interest to others than the specific incidents of personal life.

I passed the first sixteen years of my life in a large family in Berhampur, a small country-town in Western Bengal. My father, who was the leader of the Bar in his time, was an accomplished scholar with a great interest in history. He used to have long discussions with Judge Beveridge, author of "Nun Coomer and Impey" and father of the distinguished London economist. Our house was full of books on History, Literature, Law and Sanskrit. In fact I grew up in an atmosphere where the elder brothers were constantly humming over books, and I was kept at a respectable distance from them, and my father had long meetings with his clients throughout the day interpersed with intellectual and religious discussions in the evenings. In the interior of the house there were ritual, ceremony and devotional story-telling. Animals abounded in the household, including a golden-hued cow which yielded milk without calving throughout the year, had free entry into all our rooms and when fondled offered us milk directly from her teats. There were no Oedipus complexes that I could remember in my early life although I recollect that I was given over now and then to phantasies. These were of a mild, gentle and fraternal kind. The peaceful tenor of life with its play and schooling, piety and devotion was punctuated by the periodic celebration of fasts and feasts, rituals and sacraments, story-telling from the Epics and Puranas and visits of ascetics and saints as guests of the household. When I was 13 years old a distinguished mystic Ramanuji saint from Vrindavan stayed in our house for more than a fortnight, and our entire house-hold obtained a glimpse of the invisible and the incomprehensible as the Real and Eternal. As a somewhat precocious boy I could soon imbibe from the family traditions and atmosphere the futility of the Chase of Life, "glisten-

ing like a motile dew-drop on the lotus leaf", blunting the edge of budding wishes and strivings. A premature but deep religiousity was fanned by deaths and sorrows in the household. I came to possess or was possessed by certain elegant slokas from the well-known Purana legends in Sanskrit that I repeated day in and day out. Their smooth flow and cadence still capture my heart.

Early memories include the sorrow and misery of a large population devastated by famine in Madras and Orissa in the early years of this century. The pictures of gaunt, human skeletons published in all the newspapers of the time still tenaciously cling to my imagination far out-stripping in their vividness the greater suffering, mortality and horror of the Bengal famine of 1942-1943 witnessed by me in the streets of Calcutta. There are several other vivid remembrances of the past that float across my mind like time-worn, torn letters of intimate friends no longer in the land of the living: never-ending Muhurram processions regularly stopping for a few minutes in front of our house where warriors of opposite camps fought vigorously and vociferously with their swords and lathis; sleek horses ridden by jockeys in shining colours running swiftly and outstripping one another on the race-ground where assembled thousands; nocturnal pageants of illuminated river-boats and rafts floating on the Bhagirathi; the Durgapuja celebration with its worshipful throngs by day and folk-plays by night; and the concourse and argumentation of Pandits engaged in wordy, excited duels on ceremonial occasions. I have always experienced throughout my life a strong desire to feel the pulse of the multitude and often ran away from home and school to listen to the mighty throb and commotion of enormous crowds and gatherings. They became vast reflections of myself as I apparently melted in them. My life used to fuse chaotically with the manifold impulses, thoughts and activities of the immense mass. But there were also vivid, contrary emotions and experiences. Alone on the boundless meadow with no trees anywhere to titilate the senses, on the terrace in a silvery moon-lit night, on the bank of the mighty river, with its rushing, eddying torrents, and during the rainy season when the rain and mist completely obliterated the landscape or the drip, drip, drip at midnight overcame all sense of existence. I felt the loss of self, the bubbling up of strong, confused but pleasant emotions due to the abolition of all boundaries between self and the world. There was left behind only a feeling of intense enjoyment, poise and peace. The cycle of the seasons, the rhythm of moon-light and darkness, the alternation of incessant dripping rain and bright sunshine or the play of light and shade on the flow of the vast river in the Bengal scene excited profound but vague delights and concords. Later on these were defined and recognised as mystical experiences that were deliberately cultivated and educed for inner harmony and organisation.

The Renaissance in Bengal

1905 saw a big intellectual and political ferment in every city in Bengal that was partitioned by Lord Curzon. Public meetings, street processions and singing parties, boycott of British goods, Swadeshi and prohibition first acquainted me with a mass upheaval. The

contact with the common man in the course of picketing in cloth and liquor shops was both new and invigorating. Next year found me with an academic scholarship in the leading educational institution in India, the Presidency College in Calcutta. I took the Honours Courses in English and History and among the teachers whom I admired most were H. M. Percival, M. Ghosh, brother of Sri Aurobindo Ghosh, Harinath De, the linguist, and Benoyendra Nath Sen. Not many books in Economics and Sociology were to be found in India, although the Calcutta Presidency College Library was then the best equipped in the whole country. I was a voracious reader and studied most of the volumes available. Comte, Herbert Spencer, Lester Ward, Bagehot, Hobhouse and Giddings I read from cover to cover. Aristotle and Plato and the medieval classics were also read assiduously. I went through Aristotle with a distinguished and genial scholar from Oxford, W. C. Wordsworth who became later on the Editor of the Statesman. Although I paid attention to the social sciences, my main interest was in History at this time. Buckle, Taine, Lecky, Stubbs, Acton and, Bury appealed to me most. Benoyendra Nath Sen was not only an accomplished and popular teacher but also a pious man, and his regular classes on the Bhagvad Gita first introduced me into Indian Philosophy.

But the influences outside the College were more significant, even over-powering. The country was passing through a political and cultural upheaval that completely changed the scale of values. The revaluation was however seen outside the Governmental institutions, and took the form of a literary and artistic renaissance that gradually expanded into a mass movement. In the slums of Mechuabazar in Calcutta an Adult Evening School was started by me in 1906. I wrote an easy text for adult education (Siksha Prachar) that was distributed in thousands, and also used to teach in the school every evening. This school became some kind of a Community Centre and local physicians took interest in this movement of social education and amelioration and treated the adults and children free.

History was prized by me at the beginning of my educational career as a systematic study for the recovery of "the glory that was Ind", but the face-to-face contact with misery, squalor and degradation in the slums of Calcutta decided my future interest in Economics and Sociology. There was no vacillation about the choice of my subjects at all. Ricardo, Mill, Marshall, Walker, Carver and Flux were not concerned with the problems of poverty at all, but did not these current text books of Economics formulate certain basic principles that required understanding and interpretation in order to analyse and alleviate Indian poverty? The broad march of social evolution that I came across in the writings of Giddings, Lester Ward, Hobhouse and Ross was invaluable in understanding the development of Indian institutions. But these were at that time mere glimpses and intimations. There was a definite call in the country for the tasks and responsibilities of education of the masses, and that call could be answered by an Indian student best through the knowledge of the social sciences then taught together at the M. A. stage in the Calcutta University viz. Economics, Politics and Sociology.

For a thorough equipment for the task of mass education and propaganda I began to read books in Physics, Chemistry, Geology, Botany and Zoology and write articles in Bengali in such sciences.

I lived in close association and sometimes in the same flat during these years with Benoy Kumar Sarkar, then a Professor at the Bengal National College, an institution that obtained the support of the leading thinkers of Bengal, including Tagore and Aurobindo Ghosh, for disseminating education on national lines free from British control and patronage. Sarkar was a man of great sacrifice and idealism and his influence on the younger generation of his time, especially in the districts of Malda and Rungpur, where national educational institutions cropped up as foci of a mass movement, was tremendous. We dreamed together many dreams of social education and rehabilitation and reorganization of the countryside for a mass awakening. Bepin Chandra Pal's political speeches and writings then electrified the imagination of young Bengal that turned over more and more to extremist and under-ground resistance. But our programme for the country at that time was entirely educational, for we understood from the experience of political repression and persecution that were going on that only educational and social work among the masses could be silently and unostentatiously pursued without being nipped in the bud by political oppression. In fact the surrounding atmosphere of suspicion and surveillance drove some of us to an extreme step that we smile at as a youthful prank as we now look back. We called ourselves "Ministers of the Poor" and dressed poorly, giving up shirts, coats and shoes!

Field Researches in Social Science

1910 saw me back as teacher in Economics in the same College where I had been educated viz. Krishnath College, Berhampur. Here I worked for the next five years. This was one of the busiest periods in my life. The study and teaching of Economics were from the very beginning enlivened and stimulated by field-researches into the standard of living and credit-worthiness of a large number of farmers, members of Cooperative Credit Societies in the District whose supervision I undertook. I had to scrutinise regularly the conditions of the harvests and the causes of accumulation of arrears, the economic and social incidents of indebtedness, the position of small tenants and agricultural workers who could not be given any loans or the decline of village and cottage industries. Such was the routine of investigation that provided the materials for my first book, "The Foundations of Indian Economics". The College was then developing its science departments and establishing a new laboratory for Botany. The Principal was a very learned and energetic man, the Rev. E. M. Wheeler, who was vitally interested in the Sciences especially Botany. We went out to the meadows, gardens and forests for collecting specimens of plants and insects of all kinds, studying the patterns of flowers, the habits of insects and the methods of pollination. It is these ecological reconaissances that first gave me a glimpse of what was later on interpreted as the Web of Life, binding plant and insect, insect and animal and animal and human communities. For several years I used to read a great deal of Haeckel,

the founder of bionomics or ecology, and Drummond among the biologists of the earlier generation.

But I also kept myself busy in different kinds of activity, mostly educational, social and humanitarian, for the small town and the many villages where the Co-operative Societies multiplied. I established a net-work of Adult Evening Schools for mass education and spent considerable time and money for this work. A trained body of social workers grew out of this movement and acted as a bridge between the intelligentia and the masses. I became the Honorary Organiser of Co-operative Societies for the District and started a net work of village banks with an agricultural demonstration plot and an evening school at the headquarters of the Co-operative Union. These were financed by Maharaja Manindra Chandra Nundy of Kasimbazar than whom a more liberal-minded and charitable friend of the poor and patron of learning could not be found at the time in Bengal. I made certain experiments with co-operatives for village rehabilitation, starting agricultural supply and cattle improvement societies for which new bye-laws were drafted for approval and sanction by Government.

A Proletariat Literature

I also took up the editorship of the renowned Bengali monthly "Upasana" from the hands of the well-known literateur of the past generation, Chandra Shekhar Mukerjee. I used to write in this Bengali magazine regularly for several years. I pleaded for a new mass consciousness in Bengali literature that might abandon the sophistication and drawing-room atmosphere of the artificial urban product, but extend its broad understanding and sympathy to the proletariat mass. I wrote a few articles on the Russian Slavophile movement and on Russian literature stressing "the religion of human suffering", characteristic of Dostoievesky and Tolstoy. I translated a portion of Tolstoy's "What Then Must We Do For The Poor". I wrote a Bengali novel at this time "The Eternal Beggar" (Sasvata Bhikhari) that echoed Tolstoy's advice to Russia: "Back to the people. Go and live as peasants with the peasants". "God Asleep" (Nidrita Narayana) is a short Bengali play of mine in which the theme of the children of the slums was perhaps first introduced into Bengali literature. "The Temple-girl of Kanya Kumarika" (Manimekhala) is the Bengali restoration of a South Indian legend about the goddess Parvati personating a temple girl and accepting her misery, agony and disease. The seriousness of purpose, that was sought to be introduced into provincial literature through its assimilation with the joys and sorrows, hopes and fears of the common man, was underlined in an interesting literary controversy in which Rabindra Nath Tagore, Dwijendra Lal Roy, Pramatha Nath Choudhury and others joined with me for a re-examination of art-forms and ideals. In my preface to my Bengali book 'Modern Bengali Literature" (Vartaman Bangala Sahitya) I wrote: "Literature will have to solve the social and ethical problems and conflicts of the age. A deep humanism in poetry, a profound sympathy with pain and suffering,—the spirit of a Dostoievesky in fiction falling prostrate at the feet of Sonia as before all suffering humanity—these must come and rescue art from the emptiness and artificiality of a Western drawing room atmosphere,

expand and deepen it so that it can renew and be renewed by the sympathetic resonance of the multitude". I also observed: "The sturdy peasant who tills the field under the scorching sun with the sweat flowing down his body and the entire burden of the world on his bowed shoulders, who toils and moils from morn till eve, day after day and year after year—is he alone in his stupendous, back-breaking labour on the earth ? There surround him innumerable human shadows, visions and aspirations. The sweat and tears, the calamities and hopes of entire mankind are in front and behind him. That Eternal Toiler holds in his hands the sweet and bitter fruits of labour of many ages and generations. Literature must reveal the joys and sorrows of the eternal man on the perennial earth."

A whole host of new writers in Bengal in the post-Rabindra Nath period have shown a poignant sympathy for the have-nots, a profound sense of social justice and compassion as well as a capacity to deal with the new social scenes and situations from the under-world. A proletariat literature is now emerging in Bengal. As the Editor for many years of the North Indian Bengali monthly "Uttara", I welcomed this development in many articles. Later on as the President of the Bengali Literary Conference held at Kanpur I had an opportunity to discuss some of the contemporary trends in fiction in a symposium in which such well-known writers as Bibhuti Bhushan Banerjee and Tara Sankar Banerjee participated.

The Co-operative Movement

(The routine of work for the Co-operative Banks and the Evening Schools in the villages and the town provided excellent opportunities for a first-hand study of the changing rural environment and the cottage and village industries of the country.) All through the practical bias, the realisation of the danger of a blind adoption of Western industrial methods and the reaction against the doctrinaire economic teaching then current in the Colleges came from the constant contact with the realities of poverty and low morale associated with the break down of the existing economic system.

(But the smooth tenor of teaching and silent social work in the fields of co-operation and adult education were disturbed by political tension and turmoil.) 1915 saw a marked increase of political persecution in Bengal as the result of which even social work was suppressed in as much as it bridged the gulf between the classes and the masses and could be utilised for strengthening the wide-spread underground resistance movement. All my Adult Schools were liquidated, a few of my pupils and workers interned or sent to jail and I was myself detained for a day in the house of the District Superintendent of Police on the ground that I was a "terrorist" or had sympathy with terrorism and that the adult education movement in the District, then covered with a net work of schools, was a mere cloak of "dangerous" activity. The Police Chief could not satisfactorily answer my lawyer brother's arguments and ultimately pleaded that his hands were tied by orders from Calcutta. But I was freed. Within a week I obtained the offer of the Principalship of a Lahore College and went to the Punjab. It was just an accident that I did not find myself in politics after a detention or internment, and found my life's work in the academy. But perhaps it is a

part of my destiny. "The moving finger writes and having writ, moves on."

The Rural Communalism of India

In the Punjab, the Vice-chancellor C. J. Maynard, who was also Financial Commissioner and who later on wrote a fine book on "The Russian Peasant" made an excellent arrangement for me to investigate village communities and customs in that State. I made a tour of villages almost following the foot-steps of Vinogradoff who visited the Punjab for his researches. Village custom in the Punjab is a living organism and had free scope to develop on wholesome lines without interference from the British administration and formal rule of procedure. In November 1917 I offered a course of ten lectures at the University of the Punjab on the "Principles of Indian Economics", in which I developed the concept of the relativity of property and social stratification that comprise the universal basis of economic life and stressed that the postulates of Western economics were entirely different from those which could be deduced from a realistic study of the Indian economic pattern. This was characterised by me as Rural Communalism that I differentiated from Capitalism or Socialism of the West. My lectures dealt also with the misapplication of English ideas to the landed property and village community in India and its effects upon the rural unsettlement and decline of agriculture.

From Lahore I came to the University of Calcutta where Asutosh Mookerji established the Post-Graduate Councils of Arts and Science and reorganised University teaching and research. I taught there for five years, (1917-21). (Economics, Sociology and Political Philosophy were the subjects on which I lectured) In December 1918 I went out on a tour for three months to the South Indian cities and villages, visiting Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Madura, Ramnad, Cochin and Travancore, speaking everywhere before large audiences on the social effects of industrialisation and the unsettlement of the village communities, studied on the spot. South India is still the home of the self-governing village, with its common grazing lands and irrigation channels; its complement of artisans and servants, its employment of communal labour and its common temples, sabhas, and panchayats. It was here that the conceptions of Regionalism in Sociology and the distinctive regional pattern of Rural Communalism in Economics were clearly defined in my mind. "Communalism", I spoke in a Madras lecture, "represents a world-wide movement towards a new economic order in which the individual and the state will be linked up with the vital primary groups and intermediate bodies and sums up more or less the organic tendencies and ideals of the coming era". At Madura, speaking on the "Foundations of Indian Sociology" I observed (1919), "The twin products of Western industrialism in India are the disintegrated village and the sordid, over-crowded city. The unsettlement of our villages, and the congestion, intemperance and vice of many of our towns demand a line of economic reform which will build the future economic superstructure on the bedrock of our characteristic economic habits and institutions, our village system and agrarian economy, and

the means and methods of our traditional city-planning and organisation".

The Regional and Comparative Method

While building up economic principles that might interpret the economic life and institutions better than the Western doctrines, I was groping after a more comprehensive methodology. Speaking on the "First Principles in Economics" in September 1918 at a Calcutta University meeting presided over by Asutosh Mookerji, I observed: "Comparative economics will not only take upon itself the task of directing the Indian economic evolution through the present unsettlement and disintegration, but will also correct the bewilderment and confusion of a three-fold disparity and divorce: between theory and practice without a perception of limiting conditions, between one region or type of culture and another without a perception of specific variations amidst a fundamental unity of plan and purpose, and, lastly, between biology as the fundamental science of life on the one hand and the humanistic and sociological sciences on the other without a perception of their organic unity and interdependence".

Social work was also expanded and variegated at this time. I became Vice-President of the Calcutta Working-man's Institute that conducted a large number of Night Schools in the slums. The slum school at Mechuabazar ultimately gave place to one of the biggest working-men's institutions in the whole country under the management of the Calcutta Corporation. I was also one of the Secretaries of the Bengal Social Service League. A Social Service Exhibition was organised in April, 1918 and attracted large crowds. Charts, pictures and lantern-shows drew attention of the Calcutta public to the dangers of slum-life, the high maternal and infantile mortality and the prevalence of vice in the background of the spread of malaria, desertion of villages and proletarisation of the peasantry. We called Calcutta "the matricidal city". The metropolis is typical of the bee-hive city of nineteenth century industrialism that has flourished at the expense of the health and well-being of the malaria-stricken, agriculturally decadent hinterland and has become symbolic of the ecologic, economic and institutional disbalance in the country associated with the indiscriminate borrowing of Western systems and doctrines. The Exhibition, the first of its kind in India to focus public attention towards far-reaching economic and social disintegration, was inaugurated by Mahatma Gandhi, and Sarojini Naidu also spoke most vividly and poetically on social service. Such memories and contacts are still treasured and enliven the work and thought for the impoverished and the under-privileged through the decades.

The Integrative Approach

1921 brought me to the University of Lucknow as Professor and Head of the Department of Economics and Sociology on the very day that the University started work. It was here that I introduced an integrated approach in Economics, Sociology and Anthropology in both research and teaching. Many subjects that had hitherto little

or no recognition in the Indian University courses and studies were given prominence: Rural Economics, Labour Economics, Social Economics, and Demography in the field of Economics, and Social Ecology, Social Psychology and Social Philosophy in the field of Sociology. The collaboration of the sciences of life, mind and society was focussed towards regional survey and research for the primitive-rural-urban continuum. The entire continuum was diligently explored under me by many doctorate students for more than three decades. (The basic frameworks of both "continuum" and "region" overspread the frontiers of the social sciences.) "In regional studies", I wrote in the Foreword to the Indian Sociological Review (August 1923)," the walls which keep the different social sciences in water-tight compartments crumble down. For the "region" is a reality and cannot be made to fit in with abstract theories. In a regional and concrete study, the first truth that emerges is that there is an agreement between stages and types of economic and political evolution with those of social development. Economic, religious and social norms and standards do indeed, conform. In the study of the social sciences in India we should aim at a more scientific study of race and culture origins, based on comparative methods. This will rescue them from the obsession with concepts and catagories, derived from the partial and inadequate social analyses in the West, which still dominate the teaching of these subjects in most of the Universities and colleges of India. Secondly, we should work definitely towards regional programmes and policies based on definite surveys whose techniques will have to be adapted to regional peculiarities". (Gradually a new orientation for an Indian School of Economics and Sociology was built up.) The contact of teachers and students with the common people was maintained through adult education, famine relief and social welfare as well as through systematic rural and urban surveys. I often wonder whether the social scientist or the social worker is more effective in bringing about the rapport between the intellect and the dynamic social material that is the basis of understanding and interpretation. Perhaps the interiorisation of the social scientist-cum-worker in every teacher and student is indispensable.

Social Education

The first Adult Evening School was set up by me in the winter of 1906. 1953 still finds me connected with the Night School and Adult Education movement as Vice-President of the Provincial Conference of Social Work, Uttar Pradesh, and the Council of Social Work, Lucknow University. In 1912 I published a book in Bengali, "The Cry of the Poor" (Daridrer Krandan), in which I dwelt on the permanent values of rural civilization and which went into several editions; and also a plan of rural reconstruction (Palli-Sevak, Palli-Charya) which was distributed in thousands. More than three decades later I wrote the comprehensive "Planning the Countryside" as Economic Advisor of the Gwalior State and implemented parts of the economic plan in a new social context. By this time I have seen the achievements of the Farm Security Administration and the T.V.A. in the U.S.A., Mussolini's planning in the region of the Pontine Marshes, Hitler's agricultural reorganisation in Southern

Germany and, above all, the far-reaching social experiments of the U.S.S.R. These have strengthened certain faiths and values that operate as time-binding anchors of both mind and heart, intellect and aspiration.

Mysticism, Personality and Society

In my case these have obtained their real validity and significance from Upanishadic thought and contemplation. Several great masters have guided me through the decades in the Way of Silence—"the ancient Aryan Way"—strewn with flowers of joy, love and beauty even in the midst of misfortune and darkness. For I have had more than the usual share of the burdens and anxieties of life that are the lot of our common humanity. It is however no escapism that has strengthened my habitudes in contemplation and silence dovetailed into the restlessness and suffering of the work-a-day world.

To see the mystical life as an escape, as a mere distortion or regression phenomenon, as many Western psychologists do from Freud to Leuba, is to miss its full and real value as a step forward for inner coherence, pattern and organisation. To counteract the profane attacks of psycho-analysis and psychiatry that ground mysticism in repression, conflict and anxiety, I have ventured to give certain extracts from my unpublished diary in the "Theory and Art of Mysticism (pp. 194-195)" that indicate some scaling and orderliness in man's mystical consciousness. The development and grading may be represented by the following phases that are universal whatever may be his religion or cultural context; (I) the quieting of the mind that comes to participate in the expanse and depth of the sea and the silence of the stars; (2) the revision of the assumptions of time and space, and the intimations of unfathomable duration and void; (3) the dissociation of the sensations, feelings and attitudes from objects and persons; (4) the sublimation and transformation of desires, conscious and unconscious into perennial and universal values embodied in the symbols of myriad gods, angels and wise men in the social tradition; (5) the development of an ethical neutrality and an indifference of mind; (6) the identification of reality with Pure Thought, Beauty and Bliss; (7) the unity of consciousness and the world in the natural luminous Self, freed from the distinctions of duality and non-duality, of the part and the whole, and yet interpenetrating with love and compassion with the imperfections and sufferings of the finite creature; and finally, (8) the Silence about which no further questions can be asked.

Silence is at once the Supreme and the Natural, beyond word, thought and vibration; it is the One and the Indivisible behind the many, the formless behind the form. Silence is freedom from all contingencies and references, even from the accidents of Life and Death, Being and Non-being. It lies inert in the womb of the rock, rains in sunshine, sprouts within the plant, pulsates in life and takes the form of mind and thought. Thus the universe is mere thought. How close is such a conception with that of Jeans, that "the universe consists of pure thought in the mind of God" and of Eddington that "the stuff of the world is mind-stuff"! The East and the West can fruitfully meet in rescuing metaphysics from the crippling

effects of the older mechanistic view of science and save the knowledge of self from the laws governing the motion of electrons and protons or the ceaseless flux of the evolutionary process.

(Mysticism finds pragmatic validation in terms of individual sanity and elevated social values.) The advance of life towards fulfilment and serenity is intimately related with the apprehension of ever wider organic wholes which is the core of the mystical consciousness. While for the individual personality mysticism is a vital self-actualisation and growth establishing order and unity in self, society and the universe, its significance for social evolution is no less. For as it seizes and moulds for its own aims the familiar primary-group sentiments and relationships, it strengthens the varied loyalties in society and opens out a more-than-human channel to the strivings after Love, Goodness and Beauty. Mysticism begins in inhibition and discipline but never ends there. (The core of mysticism is a searching self-analysis, a strenuous and patient self-discipline and an ultimate self-transcendence.) Mysticism posits the truth that Man is Universal. To respect the majesty and dignity of the Real, Universal, Common Man, absolutely every common man, is the supreme truth. The Man Universal is the true, eternal expression for human freedom and equality, for justice and goodness in all human relations and institutions, and for sharing, service and solidarity of all groups and classes. (The human mind in its deep joys and vast concords eternally renews goodness, justice and love in social life and experience. Between mysticism and society there is a reciprocity which has no end.)

The Value-Character of the Absolute

The question is often posed by critics of self-transcendence from Dean Inge and Clement Webb to Hartshorne and Edgar S. Brightman: What is the status of values when the Supreme is viewed not as the Person but as the relationless, transcendent Absolute? "Are there any values which are not in, of and for persons?," as Brightman puts it to me. In other words, can we posit values and realization of values as we reach an impersonal, cosmic mysticism? Such a question is exceedingly relevant for sociology which is intimately concerned with both the realisation of values and truths about universal, infinite and imperative norms. Metaphysical speculation in ancient India and China used the dialectic method for understanding the ultimate nature of reality. The dialectic method of Vedanta metaphysics that rules Indian thought is markedly different from Hegelian dialectic with its triad—thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The Indian dialectic gradually widens and deepens the mind through greater inclusiveness of ideas, and of their truth and value and finally culminates through intuition in the Absolute. The polarity of opposites based on contrasted assumptions and experiences of subject-predicate is used by the mind here as the leaping stone for rising to a higher dimension of thought and experience that transcends the formal laws of discursive reasoning pertaining to the finite world. Often does Indian religion, therefore, talk in terms of opposites and paradoxes. The dialectic in Indian religion introduces the paradox not easily accessible to the modern analytical mind that God is at once the activity of the omnipotent Person and the silence of an eternal Idea, at once static and ever-new, perennially

fascinating yet internally neutral. God loves through a non-relational dimension. The Infinite shares the imperfection and sorrow of finite man, and participates in his adventure in a dimension beyond cause-and-effect, beyond motivation-and-behaviour. In other religions this is called "miracle," but in Indian thought this is the Divine "maya" that implies God's interaction with the processes of nature, giving meaning to these and saturating these with the Divine will and purpose. The conceptions of primal Matter and Spirit are not alternative but complementary in India. The Absolute through "maya" becomes simultaneously the Person of Persons, the source and substance of Truth, Goodness and Beauty, and also enters as a fragment in the world in all finite creatures that however, due to "maya" cannot distinguish themselves from the world process. The antinomy between value-experience and non-relational religious consciousness arises in the West because of the notion, largely the outcome of Christian dogma, that the worship of the personal Godhead and the absorption in the Absolute, theism and monism completely eschew, even contradict each other. True mysticism, whether in the Oriental or in the Occidental tradition, effects a fusion between personalism and super-personal monism, viewing them as rhythms of the human spirit between silence and creation, abstraction and love, nirvana and the world process, Being and Becoming. It abolishes the distinction between the self as the knower, knowledge and the known in profound silence; but at the same time discovers a configuration of the self, expanding its circumference indefinitely, establishing itself as the centre of the world of values. Thus the world of values, of Love, Goodness, Beauty and Compassion, becomes as real and eternal as the world of facts.

The Indian Metaphysic of Compassion

The Supreme in the Indian religious tradition has three simultaneous accents of Being: (1) the transcendent but indwelling Absolute, Brahman, Paramatman or the Supreme Self; (2) the creative impulsion, freedom and power, Bhagavan, Narayana or Godhead; and (3) the wisdom, goodness and compassion irradiated in finite man through the Divine incarnation, Krishna or Avatara. God is all the three categories harmoniously blended. He incarnates himself in all finite beings, and unaffected by the world of change (samsara) leads them to universal salvation (Sarva-mukti) when his Divine integrity or infinity is revealed. Through voluntary acceptance of human limitations and sufferings He brings man, a fragment of Himself, nearer to His gracious purpose. In India the impersonal mysticism of the Advaita Vedanta, the Mahayana and the Bhagavata equally stresses the ideal of universal salvation (sarva-mukti) as the goal of the cosmic process. As mysticism reaches out to God's universal manifestation (sarva-rupa) and universal incarnation (sarva-avatara) and takes over the historical and the finite into the Absolute and the Infinite it merges in Universal compassion (sarva-daya) and universal salvation (sarva-mukti) The all-too-human values and norms of goodness, benevolence and compassion are nourished in the lap of the Absolute or the Cosmic mind and define objectively the true teleological structure of the world process including man and society. Thus does impersonal mysticism sup-

ply the inspiration for the sense of the universal validity and imperativeness of the Just, the Good and the Beautiful.

The blood, sweat and tears of man in the work-a-day world are involved in the suffering of God, human imperfection in the Divine self-limitation. The infinite goodness and grace of the Divine life shine in the tribulations, aspirations and sacrifices of man. God dwells in the heart of every finite creature and leads mankind steadily and steadfastly to universal freedom and perfection. Man touches complete freedom and perfection as he builds up the unlimited community or commonalty of the universe. Society becomes God's partnership in achieving the highest corporate freedom and perfection of man. Through universal incarnation God participates in all social relations, goals and values; social functions are transformed into ceremonies and sacraments. The metaphysic of the indwelling of God in all finite beings engenders an intense love, sharing and compassion of the humble, sensitive and worshipful spirit, nurtures a buoyant and equalitarian ethos and leads to the identity of the ends of society, religion and metaphysics. Such are the ingredients of a dynamic, evaluative social science.

Intellectual Currents and Influences: Inter-regional Comparisons

After all that is said and done, those influences, whether of gifted seers or sacred books that penetrate into the deepest recesses of being are the most potent in one's life. For these are no longer "influences" but constitute faith and intuition. Faith leads the exploring spirit with far greater ease, delicacy and certitude than intellect. As Eddington observes: "Human spirit as something that knows" is not quite so narrow a description as 'the observer'. Consciousness has other functions besides those of a rather inefficient measuring machine and knowledge may attain to other truths besides those which correlate sensory impressions. Deeper than any "forms of thought" is a faith. In the age of reason, faith yet remains supreme; for reason is one of the articles of faith". In the realm of reason in the usual, limited sense three major intellectual influences stimulated me at the early stage of my academic career. The most significant was that of the great polymath of India, Brajendra Nath Seal, whom I consulted at every step during the preparation of my earlier works. His stress on the comparative method in the cultural sciences and his accurate and comprehensive knowledge of various sciences and disciplines from mathematics to Vedanta and from Western philosophy to linguistics stimulated my sojourns in many fields of study, especially those that lie in the "borderlands of economics". Michael Sadler once compared Seal with Aristotle and called himself his pupil of the new Stoa Pœcile in the Darjeeling hills. Looking back to the early regional frameworks and tentative comparative theories in my "Foundations of Indian Economics", "Principles of Comparative Economics" and "Democracies of the East", I offer reverentially my tribute of homage to Brajendra Nath Seal who was far greater as a man than as a scholar and as a friend and guide than as a philosopher.

The Development of the Synecological Method

Professor Patrick Geddes, the well-known biologist, sociologist and

educator came to Calcutta and lived here off and on between 1914 and 1915. Geddes asked me to assist him in his Town-planning Exhibition held in Calcutta and I gladly took up the work arranging his maps, charts and plans relating to town-planning, zoning and suburban development of the "neo-technic" industrial towns in Europe and America. I soon became greatly interested in the Le Pley-Geddes analysis of "the valley section" and his concrete treatment of the inter-relations between Place, Work and Folk, or Environment, Function and Organism. His advocacy of a new bio-sociological method, which is at once practical and illuminative, seemed to supplement the comparative theoretical frame of reference that I derived from Brajendra Nath Seal. The Geddesian bio-sociological point of view is presented in a joint treatise "Life: Outlines of General Biology" by Geddes and J. A. Thomson. But a very important paper of his, "Essentials of Sociology" that appeared in the Indian Journal of Economics, 1922, has hardly reached economists and sociologists. His disciple Lewis Mumford introduced Geddes' sociological method to the U.S.A. I used to meet Geddes in the houses of the poet Tagore and the scientist J. C. Bose. Geddes used to lecture on such diverse topics as the 'Universities of Europe' and the 'Myths of Ancient Hellas'. According to Mumford Geddes was the first to apply the modern concept of energy to sociology. Hence the terms man-power and man-day stem from him. I have a chapter on the physical basis of economics in my "Principles of Comparative Economics" and another on Physics and Economics in my "Borderlands of Economics". Here I have developed further some of the principles that were enunciated in Geddes' long-forgotten, seminal paper on "Analysis of Economic Principles" at Glasgow.

While accepting fully Geddes' bio-geographical approach and his concept of the natural region, I have stressed that regions or "little wholes of humanity" cannot be fully understood without the consideration of social habits, values and traditions that were neglected in Geddes's scheme of analysis. Thus from the very beginning social psychology merged in my Regionalism. In my bio-ecological method the region serves as a selective agency for the mental traits of the individuals which as well as the bodily characters are moulded into characteristic patterns. Individuals possessing the same mental pattern become *solidaire*. Accordingly, the region as a common and coordinate set of stimuli evokes a similarity of responses, habits and feelings which are reinforced by gregariousness, developing the characteristic social heritage of a particular people, not less important as a formative factor in social evolution than the geographic environment. The social-psychological factors are today rightly stressed by Odum and his school in their Folk Regionalism. But on the whole the American ecologists deriving their methods from Park, McKenzie, Burgess and others do not give adequate consideration to the unity of region built up by social habits, traditions and values. A mere regional-ecological approach without the synthesis of the physical, biological and cultural environments must be inadequate and unsatisfactory. American human ecology still persists in distinguishing between the "external" and the "super-organic", the "ecological" and the "cultural" nature of human relations, and excludes from the conception of man's spatial and temporal relations the entire range of his

symbols, goals and values. The latter are as much realities as the hills, rivers and valleys that mould his occupations as well as his social habits and culture. In the new methodology that we have to build up, social, cultural and ecological patterns will have to be analysed in their mutual inter-dependence, in the total ecological situation, class or caste, village or city. Thus human ecology or synecology has to work hand in hand with human biology, geography and psychology as well as with economics and technics in order that man may attain his social equilibrium in the various levels and dimensions.

A fresh drawback in American ecology arises from the American pre-occupation with urban settlements and communities. There is a wide gap between the ecological approach to wild nature in the U.S.A. which has led to the recognition of the natural vegetative succession and climax and the social role of man in a man-made community-through-cultivation. Forbes and Adams among the plant ecologists have made it clear that in a managed (man-dominated) environment, man is a dominant influence in the ecological social community. Similarly Ritchie in Great Britain and Shelford in the U.S.A. were the pioneers in the study of the relations of wild animal life to grazing and the complexities of rodent and predator control, and finally the relation of the insects, gnawing mammals and birds to human welfare. The effects of over-grazing and browsing on the vegetative succession were studied by me in cooperation with the plant ecologists Dudgeon and S. K. Mukerji in the Ganges plain.[1] The effects of human interference on animal economy were also studied. With increasingly heavy grazing, vegetation is frequently reduced to one or a few species that are avoided by cattle. Sheep and goats then come in to do havoc with the thorn and shrub. Finally, camels eat almost any kind of thorny plant. They are able to live on food that does not support other animals liable to die off in great numbers in times of scarcity. A vicious circle has been established today in parts of the Middle Ganges basin due to the multiplication of animals and severe "biotic interference" causing impoverishment of grass land, fodder shortage, soil erosion and decline of rainfall and fertility, all contributing towards an agricultural crisis and thinning out of human density. Similarly due to man's upsetting of nature's biotic balance, or his curious discrimination, the multiplication of rabbits and squirrels, rats and mice, apes and monkeys has meant a heavy drain on man's food-supply, while ticks and mites, mosquitoes and flies, voles, bugs and beetles all now seriously threaten his health, security and prosperity. On the other hand, in the eastern parts of the Ganges valley, the expansion of marsh, water hyacinth and mosquito is an example of the ecologic disbalance of the region.

Such stories are world-wide and the harmful consequences are so remarkable that these can no longer be neglected at the cost of the stability of civilization itself. But social science hardly comprehends that human life and welfare in a long vista are interlocked in a subtle, ramifying web of relations with earth and organic nature or that man himself is part and parcel of the process by which the balance of the region is maintained and shifted, and the process is

[1] The Regional Balance of Man.

ever continued in see-saw fashion, now in favour of man, now definitely against him. Ecology guides and warns human culture in the long perspective of its prosperity and ruin, its exploitative outburst and recurrent defeat. Often has mankind's unwise, short-sighted and exploitative land-water culture led to disaster and extermination in the hands of revengeful nature. Civilization even in a scientific age is heedless in its ignorance, selfishness and improvidence. In an era of world-wide food shortage, increase of population and exhaustion of soil, forest and mineral resources, mankind needs to apply the synthetic ecological principles for building up a new social economy based on a more scientific, practical and humane utilization of the environmental and human resources, if civilization is not to be weighed down by perpetual want and the recurrence of natural and agricultural calamities. H. G. Wells once observed: "We need a type of scientific worker who does not yet exist. We need—what shall I call them? Professors of human ecology, or if you want a less precise and pompous name, of foresight".

The Gestalt Theory of the Group

A third significant influence on my methods and materials came from an old, intimate and now deceased friend and colleague, Narendra Nath Sen Gupta, who was educated under Munsterburg at Harvard University, U.S.A., and was first to introduce the study and teaching of Experimental Psychology into Indian Universities. He collaborated with me for the work "Introduction to Social Psychology: Mind in Society" (1928) and for several chapters in another volume as yet unpublished "The Civilizing of Sex." Sen Gupta was teaching formerly at the Calcutta University, but joined Lucknow in 1929. We discussed together for several years many hypotheses and interpretations in fields where Psychology, Sociology and Cultural Anthropology meet. My whole attitude towards an integrated treatment of society, mind and culture was much strengthened by what I saw and learnt in his Psychological Laboratory. Gradually the viewpoint emerged in my writings that the Gestalt theory of the group as a branch of scientific psychology is the sure basis of empirical sociology and ethics, the most significant discipline that constitutes the nexus of all the social sciences. I wrote in 1928 in the chapter on "The Group as a Value" contributed by me to the volume "Social Psychology": "It is group life which, acting on countless generations, determines the organisation of impulses and hence the components of personality. The group environment determines what impulses compose the foreground, how the mass of impulses and interests is harmonised, and what combinations produce that enduring harmony which we call character. The stability and complex evolution of group life, on the other hand, are possible because of the fusion, harmony, or unity in the world of consciousness".

My indebtedness, direct and indirect, to Western thinkers and scientific workers is manifold. This is abundantly evident from my writings. A person who has largely worked in the "borderlands" and often stepped across the frontier-barriers of several social sciences is expected to encounter much opposition. But on the whole I have

received much encouragement and indeed sometimes indulgent appreciation from them. Edward Allsworth Ross generously took away from my desk a manuscript on which I was still working. This was published under the title "Regional Sociology" in his well-known Century Social Science Series. About a dozen years later I was lecturing at Madison on his invitation, and visiting on his famous, slow-moving car middle-west American farms and little towns and enjoying the pageantry of Little Sweden. The encouragement I received from Commons, gray-haired and affectionate, when I reformulated the scope and theory of Institutional economics in the Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, is still treasured. Robert Ezra Park of Chicago honoured me with a visit at Lucknow and discussed Human Ecology. At Chicago I occupied Park's Departmental room in his leave of absence from the University; at his desk, which was a disordered lumber of books and scraps of paper, I prepared the courses of lectures on Institutional Economics, Social Ecology and Population offered at the Seminars of Knight, Faris, Burgess and Ogburn. At Ann Arbour I enjoyed the hospitality of Mckenzie, read each other's manuscripts and worked out a plan of a joint volume on Human Ecology that was, alas, foiled by his sad, untimely death. The cherished friendships of Ross, Sorokin, Broad, Robert Ulich and Murphy have stimulated my efforts to broaden the methods and materials of social science, and made me realise the truth of Thorburn's pregnant observation: "All the genuine, deep delight of life is in showing people the mud-pies you have made; and life is at its best when we confidingly recommend our mud-pies to each other's sympathetic consideration".

The Integration of the Social Sciences

With the recent advances in human ecology, sociology, psychology, and cultural anthropology, time no doubt has come for a close integration of the social sciences and the formulation of a general theory of society. On the other hand, prejudices and fixed habits of thinking in the specialized social studies play not a small role in combating any rapprochment.

A true general theory of society is the corpus of theories, laws and explanations of social relations and structures derived from all the social sciences; it is a body of integrated and coordinated knowledge relating to society as a whole. For society is not divisible. Only the social sciences for the sake of analysis and specialisation are fractionalised. Yet these must seek the true meaning and interpretation of these theories from the habits, values and symbols of society as a totality. The different patterns of social relations, roles and institutions, though these have to be dealt within special "frames of reference" by the different social sciences, are ordered and integrated into a unity by social ethos, eidos and standards. It is these that are objectified in institutions, statuses, and roles in different contexts and dimensions of social living. The frontiers of the social sciences have to be crossed immediately as we seek to understand, scrutinise and restate statuses, personalities and values; and without knowing values and the possibilities of their realisation what social science can offer a full and complete description, far less guide social pre-

vision and control? It is, therefore, round the central conceptions of values and symbols that the unity of the social sciences has to be achieved. The essence of values is adaptation, and the essence of human adaptation is the rise from dimension to dimension of function and experience. For man has a multi-dimensional existence. Biological Adaptation, Psychological Integration and Cosmic Transaction or At-homeness constitute the triple orders or dimensions of human living. Man's life within these three dimensions is a function of the metaphysical order; it reveals itself in the maturation of his statuses and personality, and his harmony with society and cosmos. As he orients himself to his total multi-dimensional universe through his status, standard of living, rights and duties and character he creates values and symbols within one or the other of these dimensions. Values and symbols lead his desires and social relations to the Rational as distinct from the impulsive, to the Whole as distinct from the partial, to the Real as distinct from the phenomenal.

No society can dare to forget the Rational, the Whole and the Real. The social is the metaphysical. Metaphysics is the law of man's social living. Man's true and ultimate status and values are cosmic. The human order is continuous with the cosmic order. Social relations obtain their true meaning, zest and direction from the sense of worth of humanity and of the cosmos. Thus do metaphysical notions and values govern normal social life moving to and fro between the phenomenal and the real, the immediate and transcendental levels of experience. Metaphysics brings the social to an ever higher level of communion or commonalty which is the highest value and meaning in itself. Yet how strong and deep is the conviction of modern social sciences that the happiness and competence of individuals are matters of the compounding of their interests, and that the accommodation of conflicting interests and values of groups and individuals is a matter of institutional arrangement, of laws, procedures and freedoms that automatically evolve the "goodness" and "justness" of social relations through the compromise of interest with interest and of right with right. How often is it forgotten that man's inner growth consists in sharing and communion—the perfection of social living, and that the perfect social living involves identity rather than adjustment, conscience and love rather than rights and liberties, ideals and norms rather than works and institutions! Metaphysics derives its clues to values and symbols from the social sciences, and at the same time directs the reintegration of the social sciences on the basis of an adequate conception of man's social nature and values, building up a wholeness and integrity in self, society and cosmos.

2

A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

By RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE

I THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL, HIERARCHICAL FRAME WORK

1. *The Concept of Man's Multi-dimensional Environment*

The requirements of a general theory of society demand a logical routine according to which the generality of social facts, relations and experiences may be presented in an abstract, formal pattern. Modern research finds untenable a rigid distinction between qualities and quantities in the analysis and interpretation of social facts or dichotomy of cultural *versus* non-cultural and of sociological *versus* psychological and moral in the methodological system. Man is a creature and agent in different dimensions or levels of human adaptation and experience. Such dimensions are not mutually exclusive but impinge upon one another. Consequently an exclusive natural science approach, resting on geography, ecology and biology or a mere socio-psychological or anthropological approach or, again, a mere telic, normative and philosophical approach completely misses the integrated "field" or situational view-point. Social facts and relations not only occur and stabilise themselves in myths, values and symbols, but these fuse in a system defining, ordering and manipulating different dimensions of human experience. McDougall aptly observes: "The prevalence of a system of accepted values is the main ground of the unity of the social group, of such harmony and coherence and stability as it enjoys, and of the effectiveness of its collective activities. The community of values is the basic fact for all the social sciences, a fact which must be psychologically understood and explained before the social sciences can be firmly grounded." In any social system men appreciate common values and symbols, comprehend common themes and beliefs, and feel common emotions and sentiments. These comprise golden chains that they continuously forge and have to wear as unconscious embellishments and extensions of life and mind.

It is the generic notions, values and symbols—synthetic products of the human mind that enhance, elevate and refine social relations and processes and bind men together in ever-expanding, ever-deepening participation and communication. This constitutes the telic nature of social relations and experiences rooted as these are in biological dispositions and immediate preferences. In social life there are no raw biologic desires and emotions, but these are assimilated, integrated and transformed into meanings, values and symbols. Yet it is in terms of the basic human desires and emotions that all social relations and institutions including those attaining ideal dimensions

and qualities are to be judged. A satisfactory general theory of society depends therefore on, first, a clear recognition of the multi-dimensional character of social facts and experiences that have to be dealt with somewhat in relative abstraction by the natural science methods for discovering constants, variables, patterns and syntheses in their specific levels of adaptation; and, second, on the use of insights, values and symbols for an integrated, artistic approach to the synthetic and telic nature of social data.

In a general theory of society there is an indispensable place for both the empirical, scientific and nomothetic and the artistic, philosophical, and ideographic viewpoints. Social reality may be abstracted by the dual method from man's logical and non-logical behaviour through the study of social functions and structures that may be described qualitatively but measured quantitatively; while meanings, symbols and values without which social functions can neither be understood in their true significance nor subjected to methodical observation, comparison and experiment, can be controlled by the relative constancies revealed by symbols and symbolic devices.

2. *The Nature of Social Reality: Social Ontology*

A general theory of society should define the nature of social reality, and thereby delimit the proper "universe of discourse" within which the hypotheses, concepts and explanations of the social sciences derive their proper meaning.[1] This is Social Ontology. *Social reality* may be defined as value in action, made up of both personal and idiomatic and communicable and shared interpersonal goals, values and responses. It is an ongoing cycle of three-fold transformation of (a) Persons into (a^1) Institutions and/or Groups, (b) Environment into (b^1) Region and of (c) their reciprocal relations i.e., Social Functions and Structures into (c^1) Goals and Values. In social reality valuation is the central process, the essence of man's adaptation to the environment and to fellowmen. Only by defining the concepts and procedures of the social sciences in this broad context can we obtain their real meaning. The "naturalness" of a unique social nature that is posited by philosophic naturalism for the true interpretation as well as the conscious moulding of human relations and development is denoted by (a) a set of values understood, sought and shared in common by human individuals; (b) social attitudes, relations and behaviour patterns that are symbolic-purposive, expressing themselves in the forms of goals and values; and (c) social structures oriented towards the creation, fulfilment and augmentation of these goals and values. The differentiation of the social from the physical and the biological is the creation and development of values by a "community" that emerges as an episode in man's adaptation to the environment but due to his mental development is quite distinct from the bio-social "aggregate" of plants, animals and social insects.

3. *The Sociological Vocabulary*

Society, then, is an organisation and accumulation of values. *Values* may be defined as socially approved desires and goals that are

[1] Cohen: A Preface to Logic, p. 93.

internalised through the process of conditioning, learning or socialisation and that become subjective preferences, standards and aspirations. The result is that man orients himself to his desires and goals in a set pattern solving inner tensions or conflicts of imperious biological drives on the one hand and achieving harmonious social roles and orderly relations with fellowmen, on the other. Simultaneously the approval and restraint, reward and punishment of society develop compatible attitudes and dispositions. Thus values operate below as well as above the conscious level. Goals, values and norms are different stages and levels of value insight and experience gained in the social milieu. The concept 'value' cuts across desires, goals, ideals and norms. Desires in social action are *goals*. The *ideal* is constructed in a hypothetical social situation characterised by the conflict of goals. *Norms* are arbiters of opposing or contradicting ideals and carry a connotation of a beyond-human, teleological order of the universe. *Social relationships* may be defined as attitudes and behaviours of men towards one another as presented and governed by their common goals and values. *Groups* may be defined as orderly social relationships and behaviours of associated persons that emerge out of the integration and fulfilment of their common goals and values. *Institutions* may be defined as more organised, formal and enduring social relationships and behaviours that fulfil certain common and stable goals and values of persons. All social functions and structures are seats of values that keep society as a going concern. All social relations and behaviour are symbolic-evaluative, expressing overtly the fulfilment of certain goals, values and satisfactions, or these latter remain *incipient* in the form of meanings, attitudes and *dispositions*. Region, Institution, State, Class and Community—the frameworks of society—are stable social structures within which values live, thrive and are disseminated. *Society* is the sum of social structures and functions that establishes, safeguards and transmits an ordered and systematised pattern of ethos, beliefs, relations and behaviour.

4. *Social Sciences and Value-hierarchy*

From level to level of human adaptation the trend of valuation is from immediate, specific and instrumental to ideal, universal and intrinsic values. The system of values presents itself to man's valuational consciousness as a hierarchy that remains in some measure absolute and inviolable, and that is definable as the moral order. This is basic to the development of character and the maintenance of status-prestige system in a particular culture. Viewing the broad march of social development of mankind we come across more similarities than divergences in valuation. It is these similarities that are particularly important in the evolution of mankind, unify societies and peoples in different regions, and embody the deeper meaning of the social process. The relativity of values indicates the necessity of a thorough analysis and sifting of environmental and social facts and conditions. The absolutism of values is on the other hand an embodiment of the universal human craving for order and harmony. With his values man actualizes his desires and goals with zest and persistence, makes social relations into the material of the full

realisation of his potentialities. By participation in values the individual toils and sacrifices for society, and at the same time achieves peace, security and dignity within himself. It is characteristic of all societies to create, safeguard and enhance certain perennial values rooted in the give-and-take of life itself. All social systems seek in the successive levels or dimensions of adaptation the fundamental values of *Sustenance, Status, Standard of living, Protection and Character,* establish a gradation or preference among these values and prevent the perversion of these values. Man cannot exist without fulfilling these basic values in the net-work of social relations. Not merely his own preferences and aspirations, but also the values of society can be inferred from the manner in which his time, income, and energies are spent.[1] The economist's schedule of family budgets, the distribution of skill, capital and equipment between various productive and cultural enterprises and services, the forms of social capital as well as the programmes of public expenditure and social services provide the basis for an objective appraisal of values in a given society. The development of civilization implies a *qualitative* improvement of wants and activities, values and expenditures and the improvement and proper utilization of leisure. The individual himself seeks a qualitative refinement and enrichment of his value insight and experience, setting up, conserving and maximising ideal relations and values without which he cannot find harmony with himself and with society. Society similarly cannot exist without the creation, conservation and maximisation of values and also a scaling or gradation of values, i.e. a perfect, symbolic moral order that constantly transforms the present order. The reciprocity between the person and environment *via* community keeps values ever changing, lapsing or augmenting. It also constantly provides a revision of the principles of precedence or scaling according to individual preference and the manifoldness of the moral order. Values and value-hierarchy in their turn define and govern the structure of personality and the ordering of social relations and ideal values—facets of the same movement. On the personality side, the lapse, denial and perversion of values are associated with a sense of guilt, shame and loss of self-esteem or self-status. On the side of society, these lead to disharmonious haphazard, inequitous and exploitative social relations and anti-social group formations. In all dimensions of behaviour there are accordingly specific *values* and *disvalues,* adaptive and mal-adapted inter-personal relations with their profound reactions upon the entire tenour of institutional life and experience. It is with reference to both differentiation and hierarchy of normal value experience that there emerge specific patterns of social life, relations and institutions coming under the sphere of the various social sciences.

5. *The Social Science Coordinates: Personality, Value, Social Structure.*

Social reality can be empirically discovered and logically interpreted by the various social sciences on lines like the mathematical

[1] Compare Lundberg: Human Values—a Research Programme.


coordinates of Descartes, in terms of a triangular relationship, each coordinate of which represents a basic aspect of the reality—the symbolic Man-in-Community, the set of Values, and the Region, Institution or Group, corresponding to the Geddes-Thomson coordinates in biology,—Organism, Function and Environment. The triangle is of course an abstract and selective relationship derived from mathematics. It is neither concrete nor substantial.[1] On the other hand, the conceptual frame-work of the triangle is appropriate for the understanding and interpretation of the complex phases of the social reality in terms of three-fold coordinates in mathematics. Modern thinking is largely in terms of "transaction" in Dewey's sense, viz: Organism-in-the Environment, and Man-in-the Community. The interchange or "transaction" of these basic elements comprises the entire data of the diverse social sciences, dealing with the specific attributes and peculiar forms of the social reality (i. e. Persons-Values-Institutions). The master notions for revealing the essential nature of the social reality as well as its particular expressions are ceaseless adaptation, adjustment or interpenetration between the basic elements as in Life itself. Out of the reciprocal interaction emerge different values, personalities and institutions as well as the *orders or dimensions* of interaction or value-experience. Ecologically, society is *Region*—a physical, spatial aggregation of population for the biologic values of sustenance and continuity. Economically, society is *Class*—a pattern of resources, technology and standard of living for the choice and satisfaction of divisible, limited values. Sociologically, society is *Institution* for the satisfaction of social goals and values of communication, control and status. Ethically, society is *Communion* for the creation and maintenance of ideal values, i.e. character. Different peoples in different regions and nurtured by different institutions or groups show different patterns, social relations, values and ethos—divergent expressions of social reality. In the same society through logical division we investigate different species of social life and reality within the inclusive genus. A particular pattern of social reality or form of participation and set of goals, values and institutions is dealt with by a particular social science. It is in this manner that the triadic formula used by Sorokin, Parsons and many others viz. Personality, Society and Culture is broadened and enriched through empirically covering different aspects or phases of inter-personal relationships and sets of value in the "social system".

6. *The Reconciliation of Values in a General Theory of Society*

Each social science has therefore its own frame of reference within its specific triadic relationship in terms of its own coordinates. It is concerned with some distinctive sets of values and social relations that constitute particular expressions of social life. The division of the social sciences arises out of the need of understanding man in his various levels of goals, values and behaviour-patterns that he shares in common with all members of society. But the essential character of man and the true nature of social reality cannot be understood unless we regard man—creature, creator and worshipper of the totality

[1] Vide Floyd Allport: Institutional Behaviour, p. 13.

of values,—as a unity, and the human relations and behaviour patterns, whether ecologic, economic or moral, conceived as one single process. Society as an ecological, economic and ethical *gestalt* is a self-sufficient, self-directed system in which are balanced and epitomised in their operation all the formative factors of social life, rising from level to level in their mutual adaptation, interdependence and interpenetration. Man, Value and Region, institution or group are not three separate independent entities. They mutually influence and "transact" with one another and form a concomitance which is the social reality, and which has to be seen not merely in its three-fold facets but also in its several levels and dimensions. The separation of the social and humanistic studies, the former dealing with man's struggle for sustenance, survival, wealth and power and the latter dealing with his beliefs, values, symbols, morals and culture is the legacy of the over-simple 19th century materialism and mechanical outlook. These have impregnated the social sciences with the notion that man's desires and needs or impelling economic and political interests represent something apart from his social values and traditions, institutional roles and moral values, and enter into his mind from outside. We cannot study the individual and the social, the egoistic and the altruistic, the impulsive and the evaluational, the subjective and the normative separately. Such dichotomies do not exist. Man-in-society through his different forms of social interaction and in different levels of adaptation evolves values, expectancies and standards whose nature and development are initiated and have to be discovered and explained from within an integral and composite social process.



Social Reality can be empirically discovered and interpreted by the different social sciences on lines like the coordinates in Geometry. The social science coordinates are represented by Person-Value-Social Structure. The reciprocity or "transaction" of the three basic aspects of social reality is the essence of a logically socio-meaningful analysis. *The general theory of society* is built within this triangular frame-work. The triadic relationships indicated by the grouping of the numerals 1 to 6 on the coordinates comprise respectively the data of (1) Human Ecology, (2) Sociology, (3) Economics, (4) Politics (5) Law, (6) and Ethics.

7. *Social Isomorphy*

A general theory of society, as we have seen, is a comprehensive theory of social relations, values and behaviour which constitute the frame of reference of all the social sciences. Sociology is that aspect of the general theory which is connected with the social relationships of communication and status within the frame-work institutions. The unity of a general theory of society cannot be achieved by *reducing* social principles to ecological, psychological and economic principles. What we should seek is to make "social" principles *congruent* with ecological, psychological, economic and moral ones, to establish a formal *correspondence or isomorphy* between the laws characterising the social processes and relations and those found in psychology, economics, geography and ecology.

The different *dimensions* or orders of man's social environment should form the subject matter of specialised analytic studies such as human biology, ecology, geography, economics, sociology and ethics pursued within the unified frame of reference of a general theory of society. The different social studies are, however, tied together by the isomorphy between the laws and explanations underlying the basic social functions and structures.

8. *The Field Concept*

There is another master notion which is extremely helpful in evolving a sound methodological system in social science. This is the so called "field" concept in modern sciences. Clerk-Maxwell in physics, Spemann and Weiss in embryology, the present writer in sociology and ethics, the Gestalt school in experimental psychology and Anygal and Sullivan in psychiatry have in different sciences, exploited and developed the general implications of the field theory. John Dewey, who considers all scientific enquiry as problem-solving in situations, compares situations to physical "fields". He observes: "There is always a *field* in which observations of *this* or *that* object or event occur. Observation of the latter is made for the sake of finding out what that *field* is with reference to some active adaptive response to be made in carrying forward a *course* of behaviour".[1] In the process of a wider application the *field* concept has undergone significant changes. Robert S. Hartman observes:—"It is used today not only in the sense in which it was originally proposed, as descriptive of concretely observable bi-polar phenomena occurring in space and time, such as magnetic and gravitational fields in physics or, in a

[1] Logic: The Theory of Enquiry p. 67.

later extension, "situations" in sociology, but also in a more abstract methodological sense, as denoting an ordering concept applied to any manifold of phenomena, whether actually observable or not. In the latter sense the term "field" is, if not synonymous with, at least closely related to, the terms "geometry", "frame of reference" and science. Field may thus exist either in space-time or in the dimension of thought or in both".[1] In sociology the notions of the "ecological area", "region", group and institution "field" points to a highly organised Gestalt in which values and meanings are subtly and inextricately interwoven with the process by which the equilibrium at the human level is maintained or shifted. The social situation is a "bi-polar field" subjected to the tension between certain group expectancies and imperatives and the uniqueness of individual choice, experience and behaviour. The appropriateness of social relations and behaviour in a specified "field" is abstracted, intellectualized and symbolised into aspirations, norms and sanctions. The "field", "pattern" or "frame of reference" is invaluable for the classification, ordering and the interpretation of social science data. The "field' 'of sociology constantly becomes richer and more complex through logical introspection, valuation and symbolization. Man's higher and more complex integrations of self, his social insights, sacrifices and morale articulate and stereotype themselves in the "group" existential fields. Social attitudes, norms and moral principles as well as means of control are selected and ordered with reference to actualisation of the values or the potentialities of the group "field" as can be anticipated i.e., of what the group "ought to be" with the individual as an aspiring, creative, moral agent transforming the group "field" into the "ideal" future of his mental prediction.

9. *The Field and Frame of Reference of the Social Sciences*

Utilising the theories of the dimensions or levels or the social environment and of the social "field" or "situation as a whole", we envisage the following frame of reference of the social sciences, corresponding to the three major dimensions of social adaptation.

The "Field" and Frame of Reference of the Social Sciences

Social Sciences	*Status of Man*	*Function*	*Structure*
I. Human Ecology	Man-in-the Ecological Community	Dominance, Sustenance and Continuity.	Region
II. Sociology	Man-in-the Psychosocial Community	Communication and Status	Institution.
A Economics	Man-in-the Economic Community	Choice and Satisfaction of Values limited by Region and Institution.	Class or Income-group.
B Politics	Man-in-the Political Community	Ordering of Freedom and Authority.	State
C Jurisprudence	Man-in-the Juridical Community	Protection of Social Relationships and Values.	Legal Society
III. Personality Studies including Ethics	Man-in-the Spiritual Community	Enhancement of moral and spiritual Values.	Communion

[1] The Moral Situation, *The Journal of Philosophy* Vol, XLV. p. 293.

In the past sociology was considered as a broad "encyclopaedic" science which sought a synthesis of all knowledge relating to human relations and behaviour. Today we should evolve a methodology which defines an independent field for sociology along with other social sciences that have equal status with it as parts of the same broader theoretical scheme. In our general theory of society it is the give-and-take between Man-Status-and Institution which provides the theoretical focus of sociology as a science. Sociological theory should as far as possible be framed in terms of Structure and Function which is in vogue in the biological sciences. *Institutions* which are stable patterns of social relationships and role behaviours must be analysed in terms of the fundamental, collective bio-social functions and patterns of communication and stratification. Just as the Region studied by the Human Ecology is a typical resource pattern for population and a typical Class System is a pattern of distribution and satisfaction of scarce values, goods and services and inter-related occupations and jobs, so Institution is a configuration of complementary social relationships (Statuses) and expected ways of behaviour (Roles) as well as patterns of communication and control. Sociology is concerned with the fundamental complementary status relationships between persons, such as kinship, reciprocity, dominance, deference, distance, proximity, competition and co-operation within the communicative structure of the Institutions. *Status* may be defined as a certain institutionally prescribed and relatively fixed framework of relationships between different categories of persons. *Status* represents the definite, socially expected relationship, *role* the socially expected behaviour, *prestige* the subjective attitude and *power* the formal legal relation in an institution. The roles and positions of individuals should be distinguished from each other. *Role* may be defined as a pattern of ordered and socially expected behaviour, associated with status, of different categories of individuals in a group or institution. *Position* refers to the individual's capacity and achievement (mobility) in the specific status within the institutional set-up.

Fundamentally, the level and degree of communication (group identification or communion) and control, the nature of status relations and the quality of institutions are linked with one another. Every institution develops an appropriate functional pattern of communication and status which is defined by the roles of individuals as they communicate with, participate in, and are coordinated and controlled by it. The institution is the matrix, and status-and-mobility the function or process in which the multitudinous complementary roles with their specific expectancies and imperatives evolve in the course of fulfilment and integration of the goals and values of society and personality. The net work of institutions evolves an overall hierarchy of status-power roles and means of control that define, integrate and order the major goals and values of society. The crucial function of the institutional set-up is to maintain the dominance and segregation of that stratum, class or caste (the elite), whose structural roles or ordered participation best represent the cultural aims and values of the community as a whole without at the same time blocking social communication or thwarting the upward social move-

ment of individuals and groups who belong to it. On the one hand, status assignment and role performance give harmony, security and stability to society by accommodating individuals and groups to the necessities of a working social pyramidal pattern fashioned by ecology and economics in man's limited space-time world. On the other hand, resting as it does on a community of interests, meanings and values that obtain social acceptance and cultural definition and impulsion, it assures *mobility* or freedom of communication to the individual or group for appropriating *all* the interests and values which society emulates. Institutions are the primary data of sociology. The foci of interest in sociology are the structure and development of institutions and the forces, mechanisms and modes of communication, and status-prestige-power.

The ecologic aggregation of human population, governed by climate, topography and resources, provides the basic bio-physical framework within which a full description of social relations and processes should be sought. But the ecologic picture must be dovetailed into the picture of conscious human adaptations, diversified, ever-shifting and symbolic-purposive. Aggregation becomes "community" at the human level. Spatial and temporal relations, determined by the selective and distributive forces of the region, become the traditions of division of labour, cooperation, competition, specialisation and stratification. Man's specific goals, values and symbols enter into the ecological distribution of people, services, occupations and institutions, into the meanings given to the resources of region and into the skills, aptitudes, implements and tools used in ecologic adjustment.

Communication is the response of one human mind to another in society. Status is the response of society to physical aggregation i.e., population. Communication and stratification, though rooted in ecology and economics, are saturated with specific human goals and values, and defined and articulated by institution. These promote and consolidate the specific coordinated unity of structure and activity of the population fashioned by the ecologic factors and forces. The pattern of society attains a greater complexity and wholeness as human evolution is lifted from the ecological to the sociological dimension.

As in the life-community in a region there develops a complex interrelationship among the various organisms and a balance and rhythm of growth for all, so in the culture of a human community which is woven within the frame work of the ecological area there are found a correspondence and convergence among the social, economic and other institutions and traditions, establishing some kind of equilibrium for the whole community of culture. Thus like the ecological community, society or culture develops as a whole maintaining a balance for different institutions, statuses and roles, all interrelated with one another, as culture progresses, in finer and finer patterns of correlation and solidarity. Man, the creature and creator of a multi-dimensional environment, lives in the ecological area, in the institution, in the class, in the state and in communion, and at the same time internalises the region, the institution, the class, the state and communion. His functions like those of any other orga-

nism maintain an organised and articulated "whole" or pattern, a part of which is internal and another part external. The give-and-take or the ongoing circular reciprocal process, sometimes called a "feed-back", sometimes interiorisation between the parts, comprise the dynamics of personality-value-society.

The integration of personality, the creation of values and the maintenance of the social order are different facets of the growth of human life itself. The "whole" or pattern determines and directs the activities of the part, and the part is projected and remarks the 'whole' or pattern. Both the part and the whole, the individual and society or culture are in ceaseless interaction in the spheres of ecology, institution and culture, and the 'transaction' constitutes the key note of our new understanding of human nature and society. Social equilibrium, like evolution and adaptation, rises from dimension to dimension. Both the scene and the actors become ever-new, and there is a slow succession of ever new life-forms and balances, ever-improved communities and balances of social structures and institutions towards an unrealised pattern that the ideals and norms of culture embody. Culture is the guardian that assures not merely a true equilibrium between different parts of institutional life but also between the divergent statuses, expectancies and values of man in the region, in the institution, in the class, in the state and in communion.[1] Several human ecologists characterise the adjustments man makes to his region as biotic, physical, sub-social or non-cultural, the dichotomy between the non-cultural and the cultural causing no little confusion and dilemma in ecological method.

Values and symbols give meanings not only to man's communication and status, group and institution but also to his locale and the frictions of space, use of land and water, sustenance activity and standard of living, occupation and income. Ecological, economic, social, political and moral relations and processes accordingly silently and subtly interweave, extend and ramify in the texture of human culture. To treat the patterns of man's ecological continuity, status and wealth-seeking, ethical code, values and symbols in isolation is to miss the coordinated wholeness of the social process. Like an organic system the unifying human culture maintains its specific overall normal pattern and activity through integral and symbolic-purposive responses, although for the purpose of analysis the difference of the order or level of the basic and universal social habits and patterns has to be recognised. This structural-dynamic *macroscopic* view of the social system with its various orders or levels of adaptation and its integralness, progressive differentiation and purposiveness and the organismic or *holistic* conception are essential for building up of a well integrated general theory of society. These furnish the fundamental starting points for the unification of the various social sciences.

10. *The Confusion between Society and Culture*:

Culture may be defined as the aggregate of beliefs, values and behaviours of the members of a society and the aggregate of symbols

[1] Compare my *Social Ecology*, Ch. XV.

which express and communicate such beliefs, values and behaviours. Culture in so far as it comprises those beliefs, values and symbols that facilitate communication and status assignment among the members of a society comes under the treatment of sociology as a science. Where it remains as an archaic, fossilised pattern that fails to elicit similar goals and responses it comes under the domain of anthropology. The sociological usage of the concept "culture" lies in our interest in the strategic role played by those elements in the cultural heritage of the community which establish and maintain communication, control and status. While all institutional patterns are cultural, some cultural traditions that have become lifeless, formal and outgrown have no significance for the society that institutions have. This distinction is one of functional relationship in society. The identification of the concepts of "society" and "culture" has a two-fold effect: first, it blurs the shifting, dynamic processes of inter-change between man and the social heritage that underlie the formal structure of institutions, means of control and the status and distance pattern at any given time, and hence gives inadequate attention to the dynamics of human values, symbols and behaviours, normal and deviant, that is reflected in that formal structure; second, it treats man as plastic clay, a kind of passive creature, moulded by the natural environment and institutions, and underestimates man as the creator of statuses, values and symbols through which he constantly modifies, manipulates and changes his social environment.

11. *The Structuring of the Social System at Different Dimensions*

The social system can be conveniently classified for the purpose of analysis into three dimensions or levels of environment:

A. Ecological
B. Psycho-social
C. Telic-moral.

For each dimension or level the analysis of the relation of parts or conditions which results in the selected observable effects or events must include the *structuring* and *function* of the social system as a whole. The structure implies a stable patterning of relationship of the parts or conditions. The function implies similarly a stable patterning of the bio-social needs of organisms. In any organic systems, however, the structure is merely a persistent function and the function a series of changing structures.[1] Both structure and function express the maintenance of a specific normal pattern of life and activity. In plant, animal or human life community, we never get away from a specific *normal* pattern of life, and its maintenance and continuity. Such a biological outlook is helpful for a proper appreciation and explanation of changes in the social system and for prediction of its future. In man's multi-dimensional environment, Region or Natural Area, Institution and Communion represent at successive levels the foci of theoretical interests so far as *structure* is concerned.

[1] L. K. Frank: Structure, Function and Growth, *Philosophy of Science*, 1953, p 213.

In human ecology the problem is to discover the principles underlying spatial structure, distribution and movements of population, groups and institutions.[1] Sustenance, selection and permanence in relation to the region or ecological area that the human community (considered as population) inhabits comprise the functional prerequisites of the social-ecological system, giving it a distinct articulation and determining its limits and possibilities. (In the next higher dimension the structure and function of institutions with their specific governing patterns of communication and stratification comprise the focus of interest in sociological theory.) Most social structures, relationships and behaviours are institutionalised i.e. become stable, uniform and formal. As a matter of fact (the unity and integrity of a society are based on an integrated pattern of institutions) while the institution in its turn is based on an integrated system of status-occupation and role-behaviour. To institutions are attached a certain formal stratificatory status and ordered role, a system of values, a set of signs and symbols of communication or the self-other feeling, rights and duties and finally expectations and imperatives of status and role-performances.

All these are partly or completely "interiorised" by individuals, the interiorisation being measured by their sense of "moral responsibility" for the specific, institutionally defined status-and role-performances. Just as the organismic conception of human ecology provides a complete explanation of the spatial structure and distribution of human groups, institutions and services, so the integrative, synthetic conception of sociology provides a complete explanation of those enduring repetitive regularities in the attitudes, values and role-behaviours of men that are called *institutions,* and that depend on the universal processes of reciprocal communication, status-assignment and control.

Finally, in the highest dimension of social environment and behaviour, the logical focus of the studies of personality and morality is Personality-Value-Communion interchange that gives the meaning, coherence and guidance to the ecological and institutional set-up. All human relations and behaviour are by their very nature *values.* These are sought, cared for, preferred or avoided "in, of and for persons." Society, properly conceived, is the sum of the structures and functions through which man orients himself to the three dimensions or levels of his environment, ecologic, psycho-social and telic-moral, and fulfils his basic requirements of Sustenance, Status and Value-fulfilment.

II THE HOLISTIC–DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY–VALUES-SOCIETY

12. *A General Theory of Values*

A satisfactory theory of values and statuses can be founded only on the notion of the orders or dimensions of social life and adaptation.

[1] See Holingshead: Community Research and discussions of Quinn, Kaufman, Swanson, Firey and Hawley in the *American Sociological Review,* April 1948; also the present writer's *Social Ecology,* Preface.

Like sustenance in the *interaction*, Man-Sustenance-Region, and like status in the *interdependence*, Man-Status-Institution, value in the *transaction*—Personality-Value-Communion, is an objective, datum in any theory of society. "The Social Structure of Values" argues for a renovation of sociological theory on the basis of the universality, stability and objectivity of values. In modern thought the fierce contradiction between value-subjectivism and value-objectivity, between value-preference and value coercion, characteristic of current value theory, has stood against its assimilation into the corpus of social science. First, the older metaphysical individualism fitted well with the deductive procedure of the social sciences, isolating man and his atomic desires and preferences from his total group and institutional situation. Thus metaphysical individualism has become a doctrine of value subjectivism and preference. Subjective choice and enjoyment, taste and preference rather than standard, ideal and duty have constituted the essence of value-consideration. Secondly, the atomism and rationalism of the social sciences have ignored the vast sector of human values that are shareable rather than competitive, integral rather than partial, and that mark both the maturation of personality and the improvement of the quality of social culture. Such shareable and communicative values are as much rooted in man's nature as are the divisible and fragmentary values. In fact the aim of the social process is to augment the fund of these type-values. Thirdly, when the starting-point for both social science and ethics still continues to be the rational, atomised individual, there is a compartmentalization of treatment of social relations, functions and values. Social structures and functions, are dealt with by natural science methods; while goals, ideals and norms have become the exclusive concerns of ethics, aesthetics and metaphysics. The inevitable consequence is a complete divorce between empirical sociology and value theory resulting in a sort of antithesis, in the words of Niebuhr, between "moral man and immoral society", in which are rooted individual and collective frustration and aggression in modern society. There is marked dissatisfaction with modern value theory that is full of tenuous distinctions and sematic discussions, and does not grip with values as real and universal occurrences in society and imperative demands from life and mind. Only an adequate theory that can enable the analysis of values to move easily from level to level of man's adjustment, assuming continuities that hold between the different levels in his multidimensional living, can be of aid to a general theory of society and to an integration of the different social sciences.

That values and valuations can be verified and validated in the social process rests on three basic socio-psychological assumptions. First, values play an important role in man's evolution and selection through the integration and fulfilment of man's basic impulses and desires in a stable and consistent manner appropriate for his social living. This is the transformation of his ego-centric, immediate and fluctuating needs into enduring mental sets and values without which man's life would have been "nasty, brutish and short". From the Hobbesian view of human nature that man acts on his immediate inclinations and preferences in the pursuit of his ego-centric

goals to modern instinct psychology, there has been an inadequate, appreciation of the social modification of man's nature, of his rational intelligence and judgment intervening with his impulsive life, and of the role of custom, moral code and folk-way as the reservoirs of social experience shaping his feelings of self-satisfaction and self-censure. Secondly, values are generic experiences in social action made up of both individual and social responses and attitudes. Both the universality of human impulses and desires and their social mode of ordering, assimilation and satisfaction lead to common value experiences embodied and reinforced by common symbolic expressions in society. Thus values are conformities in social relations and show a "requiredness" or "imperativeness", to use Kohler's terms, that is analogous to that of natural laws in the physical world.

Both values and their condensed epitomised expressions—symbols comprise a part of man's social inheritance inseparable from his social evolution and survival. The system of values provides the vital incentive and effective guidance in man's adjustment in different levels or dimensions of existence; it brings about inner coherence and consistency through solving man's mental stresses and conflicts, on the one hand and directs the improvement of both individual and group life towards ideal dimensions, on the other. Thirdly, in spite of the divergence of values and moral standards among different peoples and cultures there is discoverable a relatively absolute hierarchy of norms or moral order in the history of civilization. Values and value-hierarchy build up societies and cultures, integrate and order social relations, statuses and roles, that become themselves seats of values and mould the ideal dimensions of personality and the range and depth of culture. Given a knowledge of values, of their order and hierarchy in a particular society, it is possible to predict with a high degree of certainty the conduct of average men and groups in most situations. Sociology should accept man's commitment to, and consensus in a set of fundamental and integral values as "heuristic principles". A Gestalt theory of society should see the personality-value-communion in their dynamic "transaction", and abolish the false divisions between desires and social goals, between facts and values, between preferences and imperatives, and between the actual and the ideal. It should accept the value system of a society as central to its analysis and interpretation of the various social relations and processes in the different levels or order of adaptation.

Society builds up a pool of values, meanings, symbols, expectancies and norms—"a frame of reference" which provides an individual with rules, principles and standards that guide and critically evaluate his ecologic and institutional adaptations and the divergent processes and relations. Such a "frame of reference" is required for any individual to feel satisfaction for himself with certain objects, relations and ways of behaviour. Although these values and standards may not be entirely rigidly fixed, these add a new meaning, depth and richness to his immediate preferences and behaviour and lift these to the level of conscious reflective choice and "requiredness" in the relations and situations themselves.

Status allocation, the judgment whether the social roles are appropriate and good, and the assignment of beauty, goodness and holiness accordingly depend upon the generic normative frame of reference by which man's attitudes, behaviour and experiences become "cumulative" and are integrated and ordered as a familiar pattern. It is the hierarchy of values, norms and symbols that invest his status-seeking and role-performance within the institutional frame with a moral importance. Institutional status-gaining or status-losing that constitutes the *sine qua non* of the social process comprises a wished-for pattern and expectancy of social role-behaviour and a moral striving, achievement and imperative of the personality. Status is more rigidly institutionalized than role. The role-expectations, imperatives and sanctions are flexible within the limits of tolerated deviance; the self's sense of moral responsibility for different statuses and roles as well as its attitudes and standards of adjustment at different levels of living and behaviour exhibit the largest divergences. The key to institutional change and revision of the status structure and role system is held by the redefinition of values, norms and symbols of the community. The starting point of the process of change is both in the living traditions of culture and in the undefiled, incorruptible recesses of the human personality.

13. *The Reciprocity of Region, Institution, and Personality*

In the reciprocity of the structuring of Region, Institution and Personality that the general theory of society stresses we can define neither region nor personality nor culture nor again the bio-social functions of sustenance, status and values in the successive dimensions of man's collective adjustment without referring to the other terms or categories. For instance, man's meanings and values, eidos and ethos are assimilated to his physical environment through art, myth and symbol. This is what Meade meant when he remarked, "The community as such creates its own environment by being sensitive to it".[1] Man's ecological grade or position, his role or occupation in the division of labour and in the class system, his status or rank in society, his power in the political hierarchy and his moral imperative reflect the common heritage of values, themes, means and ends, skills and tools of the culture. What is more significant is that the ecological niche, economic role, social status, political prestige and moral responsibility are aspects of the same human adventure or achievement.

14. *The Blending of Social Relations and Values in Man's Multi-dimensional Living*

The social process is an integral whole, a bundle of problems of human relations, behaviour and values set for the different social sciences. In a given social situation, the social relation reveals the *totality* of interrelated values, actual and potential. Value is expressed in the total social-vital-ideal situation, and is neither purely or primarily bio-social, psychic or spiritual.

[1] *Mind, Self and Society,* p. 290.

A	B	C	D	E
Social Science	Pattern of Social Relation	Institution-alised Value	Dimension of Behaviour and Morals	Index of Social Adaptation
I Ecology	Symbiosis	Sustenance	Bio-social control: Prudence	Average Expectation of Life
II Sociology	Communi-cation	Status		Social Distance
Economics	Exchange	Standard of Living		Income Distribution
Politics	Law-enfor-cement	Order	Psychic Integration: Loyalty	Public Opinion
Jurisprudence	Coercive Reciprocity	Protection of Social Relationships and Values		Rights and Liberties
III Personality studies including Ethics.	Communion	Character	Spiritual "At-home-ness" : Reverence	Altruism

In the above table the different social sciences (A) introduce different *terms* for the same social *relationship* (B) that becomes the seat and focus of the entire range of values (C), existent or potential seen from different viewpoints, and experienced by man in different levels of his multi-dimensional existence (I, II, III). Social relationship and behaviour involve three levels or dimensions: Bio-social Control, Psychic Integration and Spiritual Transaction or At-homeness (D). The personality through these modes of existence rises from communication and reciprocity to real communion (B). Character is the end-product of the development of the individual, as spontaneous altruism of that of society. Character is developed out of meeting and overcoming the objective conditions and resistances of the world. Says an eminent philosopher: "Character comes out chiefly in dealing with nature. Nature and character are not two separable facts. There is no such thing as character in men apart from nature in objects, for character forms itself on the reliabilities of the world; is nothing else than my way of response to the world's way of approach."

Man is a bio-social-spiritual organism whose relations to the milieu are simultaneously conditioned by, and trained to Bio-social Control, Psychic Integration and Spiritual At-homeness. The three successive dimensions and stages of social experience, Bio-social Control, Psychic Integration and Spiritual At-homeness, in which man is equally and simultaneously involved harmonise and give direction to the entire range of human relations, values and roles in society and to the maturation of his personality and character.

15. *The Levels of Morality*

Man inevitably passes from one dimension of behaviour to another, and this finds expression in the improvement of his social relations, the enrichment of values and personality as well as of the moral life. Morals, rightly understood, is the total process through which he rises from one dimension of behaviour to another, fulfils his values and carries on his roles and duties properly within these dimensions. The structure and stages of his moral life reflect his progression from one dimension of the process to the next higher. Prudence, Loyalty (in the sense of Royce) and Reverence constitute the successive normative stages by which he intensifies and enriches his moral consciousness, the content of his moral decisions and adventures. Man as a psycho-biological creature prepares himself for living in society by learning to obey coercive rules and regulations that arise out of the constant threat and pressure of the external environment and the inadequacy of his nature (Bio-social Control). He is also a social creature, who for his inner growth and fulfilment must live in harmony and intimacy with fellow-men and finds certain loyalties to fellow-men, groups and institutions as the most propitious patterns of his life (Psychic Integration). Finally, he is a spiritual person who cannot achieve self-poise and competence unless he achieves some rapport with the cosmic order (Spiritual At-homeness).

Corresponding to the above dimensions of man's interaction with the world, we have three moral levels symbolised by the ethical terms, Prudence, Loyalty and Reverence that define, mould, and direct his actual dispositions, values and behaviour. In the course of maturation of his moral life, he experiences a transition from Prudence through Loyalty to Reverence. Prudence, Loyalty and Reverence are all required to regulate and impel his course of behaviour through life. As a moral principle Loyalty stands above Prudence, but does not supersede it. For in Loyalty he recognizes goals and values that both reflect the demands of life and society and express what he seeks to fulfil, strive and create within the means-end situation. It is because Loyalty often demands too much from the self without adequate recompense that in this level of choices and behaviour there is the sharpest antagonism between man and the environment. Yet man cannot live in harmony with himself without solving the ambivalence of enjoyment and duty, prudence and love. Such a solution ultimately rests on his realisation of the continuity between the human order and the cosmic order, rooted in a sense of Reverence, a feeling of a total, unlimited, cosmic meaning and purpose of life, man and society. Society cannot command unswerv-

ing loyalty and perpetual sacrifice unless it stands for the mystery of the cosmic law and purpose into which man may be initiated. Prudence and Loyalty exhaust values after actualising and fulfilling them in human relations and social experiences. Reverence intensifies, expands and creates values where these did not exist. It makes values inexhaustible through the infinite outpour into these of man's spiritual resources. In fact all values are entirely transformed through Reverence, reaching out to new possibilities beyond him. Reverence saturates morality with a super-human import. It implies the transcendence of man, the fusion of his choices and action with cosmic necessity and enterprise, and the abolition of his means-end and prudence-loyalty relations. It is the essence of Reverence that he makes himself an ardent participant in the life-process and the cosmic order. Reverence, to be sure, lends substance to goals and values that are beyond man and society, and yet the intimacy with the larger concerns of life and the cosmos that it gives imports ideal possibilities into all social acts and situations, breaking down the limited boundaries of prudence and loyalty through identity with the metaphysical order.

Prudence, Loyalty and Reverence continually operate in man's social relations, and the final outcome in the moral life is a synthesis that reveals the multi-dimensional character of his choices and behaviour. Thus moral progress builds up and consummates itself in Reverence. There are no social relations that are not moral. The norms of social adjustment and the principles of morality are congruent, fitting into the particular context and level of behaviour. At the highest level of social integration and behaviour, Reverence constitutes the norm. Proclaiming the majesty and dignity of the common man, Reverence places human relationships on a satisfactory footing beyond the recurrent menace of injury, warping or exploitation. Reverence no doubt guards, integrates and orders the varied social relations and goals. It provides the true meaning of man's social nature and values and the staying-power for a wholeness and integrity in self, society and cosmos.

16. *Value-hierarchy and Value-realisation*

Man simultaneously acts in different dimensions through different aspects of his nature; the texture of every relationship of his in society is woven by the triple norms of his adjustment in three dimensions of living as a creature, an agent and a creator of his world. Society is the functional instrument of his experience of the continuities that hold between the ecologic, the social and the cosmic modes and norms of existence. Morality attests the objectivity of such continuities as expressions of his life itself. But often his conscious reflective life is confined only to the biological and economic level; and in the pursuit of sustenance, status, wealth and power the normative ideals of life and the organised value-hierarchy that make up his principles and standards of behaviour are lost sight of or blurred in moral routine or blind mechanical conformity to folk-ways, conventions, manners and laws. Thus he lives a "value-free," "unworthy" life even though society injects values into the framework of the status-power system, moral codes, con-

ventions, laws and professional standards. It is the "interiorisation" of values that alone can establish positive relation between a value and what Kurt Lewin calls "the aspiration level." Only when the value demanded is appreciated, felt and recreated in the mind as such that there can be a positive relation between the intensity of action towards the attainment of a value and an optimistic expectancy regarding that value.

The adequacy of man's value experience depends upon the depth and creativeness of man's social participation that furnishes the background of the range of possibilities by which he can criticise and adjust current values and norms. Value insight and value-realisation are intimately related to his scaling of values and subordination of the immediate and instrumental to the ultimate and intrinsic values. The distinction between the "instrumental" values of survival, status, class and power, with which the social sciences are at present largely concerned, and the "intrinsic," universal and ultimate values of truth, beauty and goodness and of personality, has become crucial to-day. Only by a recognition of the basic superiority and destiny of the intrinsic values and the enlargement and enhancement of their sphere in the moral order can the general theory of society give a progressive direction to society, to human relations and behaviour.

17. *The Total Advance of Values*

Social relations and intrinsic, ultimate or ideal values impinge upon one another, and are reciprocally interdependent. But the degree of such impingement or interpenetration differs in different societies and individuals and in different social situations. For the individual who slavishly obeys society's codes, restraints and conventions society exists only without; he merely records and reflects, and does not create nor express values. Dewey observes: "The business of reflection in determining the true good cannot be done once for all, as, for instance, by making out a table of values arranged in a hierarchical order of higher and lower. The business of reflection needs to be done, and done over and over again, in terms of the conditions of the concrete situations as they arise. In short, the need for reflection and insight is perpetually recurring." A poet seer, hero or prophet with his vision of nobler intrinsic or ultimate values than are socially current can remake society through new evaluations of social roles and behaviour, new moral relations. His lively and intimate communion with the larger society, with his fellow-men of the present and the past, of his culture and outside provides the basis and impulsion of his creation of new values or renovation of old ones. Values conjugate, blend and interpenetrate and have a highly social function as they march together in dynamic discovery and achievement of harmony. Samuel L. Hart observes: "Each push forward is a push forward of *all* values. No beauty will thrive in a sphere of moral chaos, no morality will develop where no sense of beauty exists and where economic needs burden us and absorb most of our time. Religious values can only expand in harmony with others. Knowledge is the

vital source of all values. A better known subject-matter always calls for more appropriate expressive forms".[1]

There is complete agreement between modern psychoanalysis, psychiatry and social psychology that the socialized self is free, balanced and creative, that in psycho-social integration and expansion lie man's inner growth and fulfilment, and that the appreciation of values and norms means a better understanding of the social reality in all its dimensions and complexities and an overcoming of the egoism, inertia and prejudice that bind men to vested interests, obsolete statuses and roles and outgrown goals of society. From another viewpoint the pursuit of the intrinsic and ultimate values of life begets social justice and harmony, while untruth, ugliness and egoism are devastating to both self and society and reveal frustration and chaos. Truth, beauty and goodness coalesce with "wholeness" or holiness, and the perennial symbol of this unity is God. Thus religion finds God in man's unceasing struggle and sacrifice for the realisation of a more perfect humanity.

18. *Value-scaling in the Social Sciences*

The "wholeness" and compositeness of values, the hierarchy of intrinsic and instrumental values implied in the treatment of the various social sciences as well as the integral character of personality equally call for a unity of the social sciences if they can authentically speak for the reality of the manifold human relations as life expressions as discoveries of, and strivings towards greater fullness and richness of value experience and clarity of meaning in man's ever-expanding life. Changes in environment and the arts and technologies and social and economic transformations constantly engender new conflicts and frustrations and demand new values, statuses and social relations that can be clarified only by the disciplines that dwell in the truths, beauties and intrinsicalities of life.

The various social sciences obviously deal with instrumental and proximate, and not intrinsic and ultimate values, although the latter are implicit in the system of status and power, in rights-and-duties and in laws and morals of a society. The intrinsic and ultimate values are dealt with only by personality studies including ethics. It is necessary that the general theory of society should now define a coherent and common system of ultimate ends and norms that indeed defines the integrity and determines the continuity of culture and the full poise, growth and maturation of personality. Otherwise the goals of status assignment in sociology, of the standard of living in economics, of order in politics, and of equality in jurisprudence cannot serve as safeguards for practical social control and direction, especially in an age marked by a chronic conflict between different types of institutions and goals in different fields and chaos of individual valuations. For such ends of the different social sciences represent the intermediate, empirical goals that break down at each time of crisis for individuals, classes and societies. The general theory of society will consider objectively the system and hierarchy of instrumental and

[1] *Treatise on Values*, p. 82.

intrinsic values reigning in a particular society as the starting point, classify the various type-values postulated by the different social sciences, determine their genetic relationships and also analyse the changes that the various type-values undergo with accompanying significant social and institutional consequences and *vice versa*. In the present phase of world-wide lapse and disintegration of values it will focus the attention of the social sciences towards the problem how far the type-values that man holds dear lead to the full development and expression of human *individuality* on one hand and the generality of harmony, order and *solidarity* on the other. These are, according to Whitehead, the epitomised key-values that mankind has created and consolidated through its chequered process of development. The general theory of society will measure values and also social relations and institutions, regarded as shelters and nurturers of values according to these dual basic criteria, and the triple dimensions of man's social adjustment that show different phases with corresponding value-levels.

Accepting the notion of the "requiredness" of values as ideological regularities and necessities in the social universe on a par with the notions of gravitation, heat and light in the physical universe, the general theory of society with its knowledge of their order, integration and hierarchy in a particular social relation and institution would in large measure contribute towards the control and prediction of human relations and behaviour. Thus the notion of values becomes a most efficient tool not merely for the unification of the social sciences, but also for their approximation to the objectivity and prevision of the positive sciences.

No particular scale of values need be accepted or championed, nor a particular philosophy of life expounded by the general theory of society. The proper method of a general social science would be to study the uniformity of social relations and behaviour and in the process to treat social values as *hypotheses* for purposes of scientific observation and description, or successively treat alternate or conflicting norms as data or hypotheses without considering their ethical implications and values. It is only an analysis of social experience that can tell us what social norms are involved in an objective social situation, and which norms and values we want to follow and why.[1] To what extent the social norms of a particular culture actually meet the felt needs of the era or milieu and are thus validated involves a clear grasp of the institutional situation and possibilities and of the current ethic of a people in which the co-operation of ecology, economics, sociology, politics, law and ethics is essential.

Ideal values or norms are expressed in, and communicated by commonly understood symbols, myths, art motifs and religious and metaphysical metaphors. Society operates, experiences, tests and validates values, and in the process is profoundly stirred and renewed by ideal values or norms. The general theory of society should develop techniques and methods for the objective study of symbols and symbol-devices, verbal and non-verbal, in various fields, with

[1] Compare G. R. Geiger: *Philosophy and the Social Order.*

their associated meanings, attitudes and values) just as it investigates social relations, behaviour and institutions. The present writer has discussed the subject in his forthcoming volume entitled "The Symbolic Life of Man". Though the operational plan of values is represented by man's manifold social relations and institutions, values, tested and validated as they are only in these, are not exhausted by, but over-reach these. (It is from the trans-social and trans-personal aspect of values (i.e. norms that are the special themes of symbolic, mythopoeic treatment) that these derive their impulsion in transforming the relations and behaviour of man, eradicating all what is dysteleological, ugly, untrue and unrighteous in human relations and interactions. It is not values but norms that indeed symbolize the final mystery and destiny of man. On this dual functional relationship of values and norms to life, mind and society the basic valuational analysis of the general theory of society should be grounded.

19. *The Bio-social Functions of the Social System*

(The social system provides the minimum biological, psychosocial and spiritual needs of its component members.) Sustenance, communication and stratificatory status, ordering of power and the limited values of life and the sharing of values and symbols comprise at successive levels of social adjustment the points of reference which must be considered in order to analyse the functional prerequisites of the social system. These are ends and values of the society, whose activities in different sectors are so geared in with one another as to bring about the subordination of the lower to the higher ends and values and their smooth integration and coordination. Thus (the system of functions as a whole shows a pattern and regularity which depend on the needs, goals and values of a substantial proportion of men.)

20. *The Theory of Convergence of Social Functions*

(*Social functions* may be defined as activities in which persons associate themselves for the fulfilment of certain common basic goals and values.) The major functions of a society as a going concern with its unity and continuity may be conveniently classified as below, a major social science dealing with each category of functions.

Social Sciences and the Major Functions of Society

Social Sciences	*Social Functions*
I. Human Ecology	Sustenance, Dominance and Continuity.
II. Sociology	Communication and Status-assignment.
III. Economics	Choice and Satisfaction of divisible and competitive values limited by Region and Institution.
IV. Politics	Ordering of Authority and Freedom.

V.	Jurisprudence	Protection of Values and Value-hierarchy.
VI.	Personality Studies (including Ethics)	Creation, Integration and Sharing of Values.

In any social system the various functions or activities in different sectors converge, and are smoothly dovetailed into one another so that a normal pattern of life can be maintained and continued from one generation to another. Plant and animal communities of different species but living in the same habitat show ecological *convergence* or *homoplasty* i.e. agreement in structure and functions to factors of prime importance in the community habitat. By convergence plants and animals are similarly fitted for similar habits and surroundings. The social insects, ants, bees, wasps and termites, centipedes and millipedes as well as different families of rodents and marsupials illustrate convergence at different levels of animal evolution. From different origins there have arisen similar adaptations to similar conditions of life. In the human community experiments in trial and error in social adaptation similarly bring about a convergence of habits, functions and attitudes in different sectors.

Every society for its very existence must fulfil regularly the following functions:

I. It must maintain an adequate population at an adequate level of subsistence and sustenance, and with an adequate survival rate. Human Ecology merges in Demography as these investigate the basic forms of vital adjustment and level of functioning and the birth, marriage and death rates, the age and sex composition, migration, acclimatisation and survival. A society suffers ecological calamity or extinction due to ecologic disbalance in the region. Every society needs ecologic harmony and demographic stability. The trend of population, the pattern of occupations, the property rights, the routine of toil, technology, and the arts of production, all fit themselves into the fundamental ecological technique of land-and-water-culture, which is man's method of maintaining dominance in the ecological-social community and which even increases the social relation. The varying conditions of social living, marked at different stages of the population movement, engender divergent social attitudes such as individualism and freedom of enterprise or state planning, control and strict organisation as well as different ideals of family, and scales of personal values. The contrasts of cultural outlooks and social relations between the age of open space and the age of population pressure have been discerned in many countries.[1] Agricultural decay arising out of the ecologic dis-balance of vegetation, soil and population leads to continuous cityward drift that speeds up urbanisation. Large cities "devour" populations, and are characterised by such demographic features as heterogeniety, excess of adults and paucity of females, low birth-rate and high mortality, mobility and tempo of life. All these have significant effects upon the disintegration of primary-group bonds and the development of abstract, im-

[1] *The Political Economy of Population,* p. 241-243.

personal and contractual relations associated with new ways of living in mass society.[1] From the point of view of human society the ecological inter-relationships, the birth, reproduction, death and migration cycle and the economic and institutional set-up converge.

II. (Every society must maintain a shared, learned symbolic system of communication and control, stratified status and system of complementary roles and occupations which is necessary for the maintenance of the appropriate ecologic and demographic balance, on the one hand, and of the status-power and value-structure on the other) No society can persist without institutional stability as well as effective differentiation and functioning of statuses and roles all integrated within a specific pattern of social control and legal and moral order. Social disorganisation is a function of lapse or decay of means of control and the current system of status, prestige, privilege and power. (The decay of the institutional values and symbols) and deviation from the normal code of rights and duties (are symptoms of both social disruption and personality disintegration) From the view point of a social system the frame-work of institutions, the structure of personality and the moral life are parts of the total behaviour-culture interwoven into the social-ecological system.

III. (Every society must appropriately choose, order, divide and enjoy the limited values of life, "goods and services" and maintain an appropriate standard of living of its members ordered into "classes". The classes are aggregates of persons that can be distinguished in respect of the creation, distribution and satisfaction of the limited economic values of the community) (i.e. their share of material goods and services). But often class, role or occupation, status and privilege merge. Thus the class as a grouping is governed by unequal production and distribution (and enjoyment) of the dominant total values of life and not merely wealth. Economic efficiency underlies the stability of a society and economic disintegration is the prelude to social disorganisation. From the viewpoint of the social system the framework of economic relations and institutions, classes and occupations, mobility and competition are governed by the basic ecological man-land balance and interdependence. These converge with the institutional set-up, the distribution of freedom and authority and the values of living. The role and authority of the family, the village community, the primary groups and secondary groups, the elite-mass and the state are all determined to a greater or less extent in every social organisation by the economic pattern and the alignment of social and economic classes.

IV. (Similarly the unity and self-sufficiency of a society rest on the distribution of formal and effective power and freedom among the elite and the mass, that maintains the status-prestige scheme and role assignment through the legitimatised allocation of income and property rights, authority and privilege and control over the production and distribution of scarce goods and values) The distribution of political power, security and freedom determines the aims and techniques of economic planning, democratic or totalitarian, regio-

[1] *Man and His Habitation.*

nal or centralised, and is intimately connected with the pattern of values, liberties and restraints that the community prizes.

V. Every society for its identity and self-sufficiency prevents and regulates conflicts of individuals and groups pursuing various instrumental values by scarce and competitive means. It uses physical restraint or coercion to safeguard the status-power-prestige system, its hierarchy corresponding to the society's scale of values, intrinsic or instrumental, absolute or specialised. A legalised power structure with its rules and regulations in respect of property and economic power and privilege is an essential element in orderly social functioning and progress. Law is the chief means by which human values are protected and shared and at the same time scaled and ordered, the instrumental values being made subordinate to the intrinsic values, the ecological and the socio-economic values to the ideal values. No society can carry on unless the ecological and the economic values are guaranteed, and at the same time an absolute hierarchy of values safeguarded. Thus the legal society aims at the enforcement of the moral order by the legal order, the defence of the supreme values of the personality. Modern law seeks to work out in theory the conceptions of social justice and solidarity through a harmonious coordination of property and social-economic and political rights-and-duties. The transformation of collective moral norms into laws, such as the principle of conservation of resources and the continuity of the race in the realm of ecological adaptation, the principle of minimum sacrifice in economic adaptation, and the principle of social equality and solidarity in the field of social adaptation, represents a phase that modern law is passing through in the advanced countries of the world. The problems of law, of freedom, of work, of industry, of culture and of education are all co-implicated in their ethical bearing.

VI. A society in order to persist must regularly fulfil the supreme values of the personality. It must judge the social, economic and political institutions, the scheme of status-prestige-privilege, the assignment of roles, liberties and restraints of law and rights-and-duties from the viewpoint of personality development. From the point of view of a social system the ultimate values and symbols of the personality as well as institutions, laws and rights-and-duties interpenetrate and are mutually inter-dependent. The good society promotes and perfects this interpenetration.

A general theory of society stresses the interaction and interpenetration of the functions of sustenance and continuity. communication and control, choice and satisfaction of limited and competitive values, ordering of freedom and power, regulation of rights-and-duties and appraisal and sharing of values and symbols. Society exhibits jerks and pulls, misfits and maladjustments between its different sectors. Bad or obsolete law blocks the trend of the institutional set-up towards the subordination of the material and instrumental by the ideal and intrinsic values, of the legal order by the moral order. The distribution of political power and the legitimatized status-system may be such as to hinder economic progress and a proper sharing of the scarce goods and values by all. The pattern of economic system and the vested interests of classes may work towards

the dissipation of scarce, natural resources or promote a hectic effort towards the improvement of the level of living and comfort in such manner as to jeopardize child-raising for the *continuity* of race and culture. A total and synoptic analysis of the various social functions and institutions provides the key to an adequate understanding of the complex social reality and the prediction and experimental control of social processes. The current atomism and rationalism of methods dissect and distort the social reality that can only be interpreted and evaluated by the interpenetration of a cluster of disciplines.

21. *The Theories of Social Lag and Social Equilibrium*

The theories of social lag and social equilibrium are valuable in understanding and interpreting the disharmonious and ineffective or the smooth and efficient functioning of the different sectors of society. Bio-ecological stability and continuity, technological efficiency, social harmony and pursuit of the ultimate values are facets of the same movement. On the other hand, bio-ecological disbalance, characterised by destruction of scarce natural resources and increase of sickness and mortality, technological inefficiency, social injustice and conflict and increase of aggressiveness, cunning and deceit are functions of the rate of social dissolution.

Man consciously seeks harmonious relationships between his economic toil and the fateful resources of the region, between his efforts and technology and his material wants and satisfactions, between the income distribution and status-arrangement and between the status-scheme and his pursuit of the ultimate values. Any mal-adjustments between parts of his inner nature and society not only disturb the coordinated wholeness of the society but also cause strains and stresses in the personality. Now the ultimate values represent the very substance of coordinated wholeness that man can apprehend. It is these which man tries to objectify in the patterns and functions of groups and institutions that largely seek and achieve the balance between instrumental values which are divisible and partial and the intrinsic or ultimate values which are ideal, non-competitive and shareable with fellow-men. It is these again which represent norms for the solution of all unbalances, conflicts and misfits in various levels of social adaptation. These indeed embody man's creative initiatives and experiences in diverse fields, transforming relationships that are fractional, limited and impersonal into unlimited, universal and ideal relationships. The social equilibrium thus enlarges with the configuration of life itself, presenting a dynamic equilibrium of the lesser and simpler with the greater and more complex co-ordinated wholes until these cross the boundaries of time and space, and become identified with the totality of experience of the personality, which is essentially of an organic or 'holistic' character.

22. *The Theory of Social Optima*

The concept of the optimum has come from the physical and biological sciences to Demography and Economics. But it has not been adopted by the other social sciences. The optimum is a measur-

able criterion while the social sciences are concerned not only with correlations and averages but also with the qualitative aspect of the social situation. Yet as Max Weber observes, "all qualitative differences can be expressed in the last analysis in some form of quantitative difference of the way in which elements appear in various combinations". Thus the concept of the optimum in spite of the limitation of its quantitative expression will be helpful in the social sciences, certainly more than the categories of social progress laid down by such writers as Willcox, Nicefero, Dellepiane, Clarence Case and Hertzler. The social optimum stands for the intrinsically rational element in social development, the enlightened and harmonious realisation of mankind's desire for optimum luring in its various orders or dimensions. The criteria of optimum for society as envisaged by the various social sciences may now be briefly reviewed. What for Human Ecology is no more than the optimal bio-physical vitality and continuity of man in his generations in relation to the organisation of life as a whole, what for Economics is no more than the optimal pattern of satisfactions, resources and efficiency, what for Sociology is the maximum social integration or group participation, what for Politics is the maximum political and social security are from the view point of Personality Studies and Ethics, the maximum appreciation and sharing of the ultimate values. The social optimum is no mere ecologic, economic, sociological or political optimum, but an integral optimum in which the totality of social values and optima and the range and the depth of the personality are implied. There is an "ought" here in this integral social optimum grounded in mankind's universal striving after total optimum living. The social optima as envisaged by the different social sciences comprise therefore a complex of imperatives for optimum living in the different levels or dimensions as judged by the experience and insights of different societies and cultures.

	1 Human Ecology	2 Economics	3 Politics	4 Sociology	5 Jurisprudence	6 Personality Studies, including Ethics
Social Inheritance	Maximum population and continuation of society and culture (Measurable)	Maximum employment of resources and raw materials and maximum accumulation of social capital (Measurable)	Maximum social and political security on the basis of unison of public opinion (Measurable)	Maximum group participation and social integration	Maximum recognition of civil, economic and social rights	Syncretic myth, art, religion and philosophy of life.
Individual Acquisition.	Maximum longevity, intelligence, mobility and sociality (Measurable)	Maximum efficiency, income and leisure (Measurable)	Maximum freedom and equality on the basis of one man, one vote (Measurable)	Justice, love and sharing in social relations	Minimum encroachment on the values of personality	Maximum appreciation and sharing of the ultimate values

The above optima are broad and comprehensive, and based on the evolutionary conceptions of the levels or dimensions of man and culture and the movement of both individuals and society as a whole. Clarence Case's categories of social progress, viz., Utilisation, Equalization and Appreciation are included in the above scheme.

All societies struggle with the problem of achieving a harmony between the different ecologic, economic, political, sociological, legal and ethical optima. Such optima as often strengthen or support as these conflict with one another in concrete social situations. (A successful, realistic social planning must integrate the different optima.) The social optimum at its lower dimensions can be quantitatively studied, and all the criteria viz. size and continuity of population, average longevity, income and employment, unison of public opinion and recognition of rights have the merit of measurability that is denied to the sociological or ethical optima. Thus the combination of statistical analysis and deductive reasoning is necessary for indicating the trend of society both away from and towards the optimum. If there be revealed synchronous trends towards the reduction of average longevity, income, employment and limited resources and of leisure, freedom, equality and social cohesion in comparison with the standards of the country at an earlier date or with those in other societies belonging to the same order of civilization, the presumption is very strong that the society has diverged from the optimum. The integral social optimum concept furnishes an adequate "frame of reference" as well as classification of criteria that govern the total progress of any society, and that must be considered in envisaging the essentials of scientific social planning. The process of social development is essentially integral and synoptic. The movement in the realm of myth, art and religion and values of personality guides, democratizes and hence deepens and accelerates all social functions and processes, and enlarges the human community that ultimately oversteps the boundaries of time and space. Different societies reveal difference of judgment in respect of their relative stress of the different social optima. But on the whole the scheme we have proposed may carry a general approval.

23. *Social Meliorism*

(It is only a general theory of society that can envisage an integral or synthetic social optimum providing the basis of scientific social planning.) An integral theory of social optimum cannot be built up on the basis of either naturalistic philosophy or dialectical materialism,) both of which lead to the gradual neglect and impairment of value experience and the dissociation of the latter from human relations and institutions that come to shelter and nurture only instrumental and proximate values. The intrinsic and ultimate values are "in, of and for persons", and the pursuit, creation and sharing of values by persons and in myth, religion and art are not merely of the very essence of self-actualisation and growth of the individual, but also of the integration and development of society. Modern civilization needs a true social optimum theory that recog-

nises fully the richness, variety and dignity of the individual and its infinite possibilities, on the one hand, and the significance of the symbolic synthesis of art, myth and religion for solidarity and harmony of the social environment on the other.

The modern age is one of individual conflict and disillusionment and social pessimism and cynicism. Due to the impact of naturalistic philosophy and historical materialism in combination with the lag or disbalance between the technical and the moral or spiritual forces in progress, the social sciences have abandoned both the optimism of the 18th century French philosophers and the confident intellectualism of teleological social progress advanced by the founders of sociology, Comte, Spencer, Lester Ward, Giddings and Hobhouse. Marxism postulates the inevitability of the progress of techniques and modes of production and subsumes progress in other spheres within the dialectic of the economic movement. Today we have to revive the idea of harmonious, integrated development of Comte and Spencer and of the wholeness and compositness of values of Max Scheler, Bougle and Whitehead. (The integral or synthetic social optimum we have envisaged is based on the normal progress of all values and on the normal relationship between the optimum within the individual pattern and that within the environmental or cosmic pattern.) Here the optima in the individual pattern promote as well as rest on the optima in the cosmic pattern. The optima by which the progress of the individual is measured are also the optima for macrocosmic progress. Modern biology and psychology have contributed to destroy the old optimism in respect of the change of human nature, the quick and deliberate improvement of traditions, institutions and culture and the consequence of individual efforts and acquisitions. But this all the more encourages us with our feeble powers of foresight and full knowledge of the limits of education and social action to discover new values and symbols and contrive new social arrangements and methods of levelling up collective human nature as best as we can. Thus (the postulation of the various social optima applying to both society and the individual will be helpful towards integral and synoptic progress.) There should also be faith in progress, not a blind or illusory conviction nor again a belief in an unexorable socio-historical necessity, but what H. Kallen calls "the melioristic posture of the will of man" i.e. the conscious drive of individuals and societies to realise their optima at different levels of living and value-experience through concrete means and procedures. (The essence of the concept of the integral social optimum is the identification of the way to individual perfection with the general progress of society and humanity in terms of values and ideals exercised in rational direction and control.)

III. THE MACROSCOPIC BIO-SOCIAL ORIENTATION

24. *The Psycho-dynamic Theory of Social Conformity or Deviation*

There seem to be three fundamental categories into which the theory of social conformity or deviation falls.

A. The Theory of the Adaptation of Social Institutions to Human Nature, and of Human Nature to Social Institutions

This is the major point of articulation between sociology, social psychology and psychiatry. The cross fertilization of the methods and data of sociology, abnormal psychology and psychiatry strengthens the conviction that social deviations as these evolve in the institutional set-up range all the way from mild peculiarities of behaviour to the extreme forms of psychosis implying the complete disruption of communication and confusion and chaos of self-and-other statuses and roles, and that the same kind of personal, social and environmental factors are operative in preparing the ground for and in precipitating the functional psychoses as in the case of the neuroses—forms of aggressive, substitutive or "irreal" behaviour of the personality. These however fit into one another into a system of personal disorganisation and social deviation during great crises disorders or revolutions. Such is the recent emphasis of the different forms of abnormal behaviour as forming one continuum that psychiatry, hitherto concerned with the pathological phases of human behaviour, is today broadly defined by Masserman as "the science of human behaviour"[1] and presses its claims *vis a vis* those of sociology as the great synthesising science of all the sciences dealing in the human behaviour.

Such claims are however illegitimate since psychiatry is limited by the medical notions of health and disease, therapy and cure, and has not adopted any scientific criteria of mental normality or efficiency, nor assimilated to itself any system of goals and values that must assume the central and essential role in any discipline relating to human relations and behaviour. The insufficiency of modern psychiatry and personality theory is no doubt, underlined by the absence of an adequate value system without which the plans or techniques of psycho-therapy lean excessively on prevalent or conventional behaviour standards. It is a general theory of society that alone can yield a usable value system and value hierarchy together with a "homeostatic" frame of reference in terms of which the discrimination of the mentally abnormal from the normal or mental illness or disorder from health may proceed.

B. The Theory of the Dynamic Interrelations of Institutions and Values

This is the major point of articulation between sociology, social psychology and ethics. It is within this field that the sociology of values and the social psychology of ethics should be placed. Institutions owe their origin, stability and development to the imperative, universal and persistent character of human goals and values that inhere in them. Their instability and disintegration are the results of the lapse of goals and values or their re-scaling and reorientation. The multiple institutional structuring of society embodies on the psychological level its motivation-value-symbol pattern, and on the sociological level its system of inter-related statuses, roles, expectations

[1] *Principles of Dynamic Psychiatry*, p. 1.

and imperatives. The dynamics of society cannot be understood at all without a knowledge of the shifting social statuses and roles at the institutional base and an analysis of the motivational changes and expectancies. Man's neurosis, psychosis as well as deviant way of living are social through and through; these evolve within the legitimate status scheme, often deriving spurious support from legitimising cultural roles. (The shifting microscopic balance of institutions, statuses and values links sociology with ethics and personality studies on one side, and social pathology and psychiatry on the other.) Already through the clinical work of Sullivan, Masserman, Burrow, Cameron and others, psychiatry is breaking away from the traditional biological and physiological orientation, embracing the data and techniques of sociology and studying the dynamics of the social field for therapeutic purposes. Thus Social Psychiatry is developing as a special branch of sociology focussed round status-gaining and role-seeking behaviour and their normal contradictions and discrepancies in culture.[1] The psycho-therapist no longer regards his patient in isolation from his social field, but rather discovers what part social field conditions play in producing normal personalities and creating and aggravating personality disorders, and how he can best manipulate social forces to produce changes in the personality in the direction of better mental health.[2]

C. The Theory of Symbols

A symbol may be defined as a vehicle of communication and regulation of human relations, a pregnant, epitomised expression of meanings and values shared in social life. Man's relations, behaviour and status in society are largely symbolic. He competes and struggles with fellowmen even for sex, food and living space *symbolically*. The struggle for standard of living, for rank, prestige and power, is symbolic. All human goals and aspirations are future-oriented, symbolic; while institutions and the meanings and values these embody are conserved, maintained and fostered by a complex set of signs and symbols. If institutions comprise the structural skeleton of society, symbols comprise its vital, pervasive system of blood circulation. Thus symbols occupy a key place in sociological theory. The history of civilization is governed by the struggle of myths and values—worlds of symbols that sunder or bind together individuals, classes and nations. (The theory of symbols is the crux of the sociological analysis of human behaviour, culture and personality. It is central for a comprehensive, holistic interpretation of Behaviour-Value-and Personality.[3]

More than values symbols not only bring us nearer to the subjective experiences of the personality but as vehicles of social communication, stratification and control are also more amenable to scientific, objective analysis. The depth-levels of self-consciousness and of forms of social control are reflected in the forms of symbolism integrated together in a consistent framework for guiding common

[1] See, for instance, Cameron: *The Psychology of Behaviour Disorders.*

[2] Luchins: Towards an Experimental Clinical Psychology, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XX, p. 448.

[3] See *The Symbolic Life of Man.*

understanding, motivation and orientation of people in the society. Some of these social symbols and patterns are adapted to unique social situations and disappear as their immediate tasks of communication and regulation of human behaviour are over. Others are generalised and standardised and have continuous evocative, admonishing and regulative functions in society. Others, again, express and consolidate idiosyncratic and aberrant human goals and satisfactions and underlie neurosis, psychosis and criminosis. From the psychological viewpoint there is a fundamental distinction between "symbols" that are general and common and that lead to conforming self-and social roles and behaviour, and "symptoms" that are private and idiomatic and underlie social disorders, deviations or maladjustments. Recent studies of the nature and effects of social interaction among a group of schizophrenics indicate that the processes of communication and status break down in their case due to their building up of a unique, bizarre symbolic world not shared by other persons. This supports the conclusion reached from another angle in respect of the social character and role of the symbolic process. Since symbolic interaction is largely absent among schizophrenics because of the private character of the symbolism, their normal symbolic interaction is basic to the development of society and culture.[1]

25. *Typological Approach*

A general theory of society is to be built up out of the integration of the various working theories applicable to limited ranges of data in the three major dimensions of social adjustment, ecological, institutional, and moral. Thus we may reach a broad, single general theory adequate to derive all these and other theories. "The theoretical system which is basic to sociology", Talcott Parsons observes, "must be broader than the science of sociology itself. It must be a theory of social system. . . . . We must somehow work out a theoretical scheme which articulates our field with others which are equally part of the same broader fundamental system."[2] Such a general conceptional scheme will be somewhat different from the formal sociology of Simmel and Von Wiese in its emphasis of the coordination of the various current working theories and hypotheses, clarifying the mutual relations of structure and functions in the social system in both their static and dynamic aspects. In the various dimensions of group adjustment, the structure-function patterns

A. Natural Region—Sustenance, Dominance and Continuity
B. Institution—Communication and Status

AND

C. Voluntary Association—Value and Symbol

can be studied effectively according to "ideal-types" or models. This method of approach, introduced by Max Weber, selects certain features of the social situation as a whole, eliminating the mass of fea-

[1] Slotkin: The Nature and Effects of Social Interaction in Schizophrenia, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, June 1942.

[2] The Position of Sociological Theory, *American Sociological Review*, April 1948.

tures and trends that are considered irrelevant to the study for the purposes of simplification, appraisal and prediction. The Natural Region (that stable patterning of ecological relationships of the population subserving substance, dominance and continuity) can be usefully "typed" into Forest, Grassland, River-valley and Industrial Region with "model" resources-population ratios that subserve the functions of communication and status assignment in a social system. Besides the macroscopic ecological study of Regions, classified into broad cultural geographical areas or zones according to topography, climate and resources, such as Forest, Grassland, River-valley and Industrial Region with their different "man-land ratio", "social density" (Durkheim) or frequency of social contact and pattern of communication and participation, we have the microscopic ecological study of rural, urban and metropolitan communities, based on their structual differentiation into "ideal-typical" nodal centres, metropolises, cities, little towns, villages, hamlets and neighbourhood and time-cost distances of transporting men, goods and services. Thus the typological approach in human ecology varies according to the environmental locus defined with ecological limits as underlying community spatial structure. Institutions can be similarly "typed" into Tribal, Folk-rural and Urban-industrial. Voluntary Associations that create and maintain a stable pattern of motivations, values and symbols in the social system can be "typed" into Interest-groups, Communities and Commonalties. These meaningful types and clusters that can be identified with ease by the laymen and are concise, internally consistent and predictable have been utilised by social anthropology and rural and urban sociology for the meticulous observation of data and derivation of empirical laws. Maine's status *versus* contract in Law, Durkheim's sacred *versus* secular institutions in Religion, Tonnies' Gemeinschaft *versus* Gosselschaft relations in Ethics, Cooley's primary *versus* secondary groups in Sociology, the human ecologist's ecological or fractional *versus* cultural or integral phases of human relationships and groups pattern in Culture and Zimmerman's regionalism *versus* centralisation in Politics illustrate the formal, polarised patterning of attitudes, ways and norms of living based on simplified generalisations or "models" about salient features that point to the direction in which change in the total social system occurs.

The typological approach to the study of institutional functions and changes is obviously older than Max Weber, but still remains somewhat impressionistic in the fields of both sociology and anthropology. An adequate and satisfactory typology must be "real" not "nominal", and clearly define the significant structural-functional variables in the various levels of social adjustment. The concepts of Demographic Gradient, Tribal-rural-urban Continuum and Interest group-Community—(abstract) Commonalty progression have proved of great promise for the development of an empirical quantitative sociology with its feet firmly planted on the structure and processes of society on the specific everyday community level. The maturity of sociology now demands, first, the precise definition of the ideal types and constructs; second, the articulation of these with the empirical observations of the actual society so that these might not

serve as Procustean moulds into which the typologists fit their data ignoring many salient features and trends; third, the typology should be integrative and comprehensive, aiming at relatively complete explanation of institutions at different levels in terms of (a) *ecological* spatial structure and distribution; (b) group participation or intimacy of communication and self- and social-status in the *psychological* level; and (c) attitudes, values and symbols of the personality in the *moral* level; and, fourth, the hypothesis of the *continuum,* related to the ideal type, should be one of general convergence or correspondence of the dominant characters of the ideal type and of their dynamic transformation in the same direction. Thus a synthesising typology will aid the development of a coherent, systematic general social theory in both its nomothetic and ideographic aspects.

26. *The Articulation of Sociological with Ecological and Valuational Theories*

We thus find that the central core of a general theory of society is focussed round the structural-functional relationships of Institutions with their governing patterns of communication and status, defined according to the prevalent scheme of values and symbolised habit-pattern of the society. This is articulated on one side with ecological theory organised about the structural-functional relationships of Natural Regions or Ecological areas that comprise the physical basis of the social system, and on the other with the theory of Values and Symbols that constitute its superstructure, defining the complex of personality types and culture configurations. The human ecological theory, the sociological theory and the theory of values and symbols, each stands on its own footing in its separate field, but each borrows from and lends to the other. Together they form what may be called a macroscopic "general" theory of society, a broadly orienting conceptual frame-work that facilitates communication between the several social sciences and also fills the gaps between the existing "islands" of theoretical knowledge.[1]

27. *Major Components of a General Theory of Society*

Such a "general" theory of society can be enormously aided in its development by focussing attention to the three following integrative lines of approach—what one may call after J. S. Mill the "middle principles" whose refinement seems to be essential for theoretical advance. Mannheim following Mill has analysed these "middle principles" defined as "special relationships of a certain historical phase in a particular social setting".[2] Specialization in any branch of social science demands that it shall be concerned with a limited aspect of the "social reality", and that the data of the other social sciences are treated as "dependent variables" in regular and continuous interchange with its own data for constituting a concrete social system that is in a process of continuous transformation.[2]

[1] Vide Talcott Parsons: The Prospects of Sociological Theory, *American Sociological Review,* February 1950.

[2] See Mannheim's *Man in an Age of Reconstruction,* pp. 173-190, and also Lowe's *Economics and Sociology,* pp. 146-147.

A. The Theory of the Bio-Social Dimensions and Structuring of Self and Social Status in Culture

Man's multi-dimensional status has not received adequate recognition in the social sciences. First, self-status and community status are phases of the same human achievement. Man measures self-status and self-esteem in terms of social status and recognition and introjects his value situation and experience connected with his diverse social roles and other-roles into his own personality in imagination and fact. Secondly, status, individual and social, is a composite of the person's *statuses* in the various social structures and groupings in which he is involved at different levels or dimensions of his adaptation. Among the factors governing a person's over-all community status are his ecologic position, economic role, standard of living, group participation, social prestige, political power and morals. Obviously the definition of model or ideal type status groupings or structure involves the use of criteria covering man's over-all multi-dimensional adjustment. Thirdly, status is assigned by society not merely to individuals, groups, roles and occupations but also to concepts, beliefs, morals and values.[1] Fourthly, status is ecological, bio-social and moral. It embodies the basic organising feeling, value and symbol for making human life secure, reasonable and meaningful and ensuring the perpetuation of that pattern of life. The consideration of man's overall, multidimensional status arising out of his various social roles and structures at the various orders or levels of his living provides a common language for interrelating and systematising working biological, social and cultural hypotheses explaining social relations and processes. A bio-social analysis of man's community status associated with the "greater" value or prestige of his behaviour at different levels of living than has the behaviour of others is a real step forward in merging separate "islands" of theoretical implication into a consistent general theory of society, free from the sharp antinomies between biological, social and moral aspects of personality and culture. Such antinomies today divide the mansion of human knowledge into two separate parts: one part in which we have values, symbols, morals and culture, and the other part in which we have social relations and processes whence human values and meanings are arbitrarily eschewed unexplored and unanalysed. As long as this deep-seated division of our knowledge of man, society and behaviour persists neither can social theories be fitted to the operational procedures of research nor can there be any effective application of these in the actual world. A general theory of society moving to and fro between ecology and civilization and vice versa will eliminate the inconsistency of many current concepts and theorems and provide the frame of reference for a synoptic definition of social relations. Values, meanings and symbols, the entire socio-ecological frame-work of status groupings and processes and the structure of personality are inseparable and continuous. The incorporation of the theory of multi-dimensional human values, personality and behaviour into the corpus of a general theory of

[1] See my *Social Ecology*, p. ix.

society will be maximally fruitful in the advance towards a general and consistent system.

B. *The Psychodynamic Theory of Values, Symbols and Behaviour in Personality*

Another major step towards the development of a broadly orienting conceptual scheme involves, as we have seen, the connection of the theory of motivation-value-and symbol with the concepts of the basic structure of the human personality, on one side and the multiple group structuring of society or the dialectic of human communication or intimacy on the other. The group and institutional pattern and the behaviour, normal and abnormal, of the personality, and the values and "dis-values" it affects are to be theoretically envisaged as different phases of the same intimately interacting system. The dynamics of the overall symbolic modes of communication, communion and control and of group norms and personality adjustments shows a theoretical continuity. The more this theoretical continuity is brought out by the coordination of the theories of psychology, social psychology and psychiatry, the closer will be the linking of the analysis of social structure to psychological levels of the understanding of motivation-value-and symbol and of personality and behaviour, normal and abnormal. From this a general theory of society with a firmer integration of diverse working theories that now deal with the special and limited range of personality and behaviour problems would emerge.

C. *The Theory of Group and Institutional Membership*

This is that aspect of the *field* theory of the social system which is of the closest relevance to the sociologist. Status, individual and social, personality and communication or group intimacy are phases of the same fundamental system of human interaction. There is a dynamic connection between the basic categories of groups (Crowds, Interest-groups, Communities and Commonalties), the forms of social control and the levels of personality and values. Group memberships determine statuses and roles which determine goals, symbols, and forms of social control. These in turn regulate "vast segments of human behaviour". Newcomb boldly asserts: "There is not a single item in the above which cannot be defined in terms of observational procedures, not a singly independent variable which cannot be systematically varied, either experimentally or by field procedures."[1] We give on page 57 a table showing the "ideal-types" of groups together with their membership characteristics that could be studied by the psychologists through socio-metric techniques, group observations, interview methods and other techniques.

In the study of social relations and behaviour it is of major importance to know whether the individual belongs primarily to one or other of the broad categories of human associations found in all cultures, to the Crowd, the Interest-group, to the Community as a whole or to the abstract Commonalty. In studying Crowds and Interest-groups advances are being made towards the analysis and

[1] Discussion, *American Sociological Review*, April 1948, p. 171.

even measurement of group tension and cohesiveness, the degree of egoism and fairness of both the individuals and the social group, and of the norm and imperative of the group and their effects upon the specific personality of its members. Kurt Lewin thinks that if the pattern of the total social "field" is generally more important than for instance, size, it becomes possible to study fundamental social constellations experimentally by "transposing" them into an appropriate group size.[1] The Community such as the nation and the church is a very large and enduring association. Here the meanings of social behaviour are unfolded over a long period of time and through a large variety of individual roles, statuses and value-fulfilments. Thus the dynamic properties of large social groups, not to speak of the abstract and unlimited Commonalties, have not so far yielded to the present tools and techniques of the psychological laboratory. Yet in a society there are many relatively small, homogeneous, face to face groups, interest-groups, factories, trade-unions, political parties, religious sects, neighbourhoods and community centres that in spite of fluctuations of the roles of individuals maintain a stability of goals, symbols, statuses and patterns of behaviour. On the other hand, social change is produced by altering the constellation of forces—economic, political or ideological—within the group system or institution. The latter with its norms, expectancies and sanctions "canalise" the needs of the individual members and their fulfilment through certain channels, isolating them within the social boundaries and blocking communication and free "locomotion" of individuals.

28. *Group Dynamics*

Group dynamics, both theoretical and practical, could supply the most appropriate methods and techniques for bringing about social integration, changes of personality and improvement of morale. More than any other field of psychology and sociology it precisely defines how certain "objective" social relations and situations intersect with "subjective" psychological and ethical processes. Gestalt ethics reacting against the individualistic theories of morals finds moral principles as functions of structure of the group situation. As the quality of group life improves from Crowd and Interest-group to Society and Commonalty, man improves his symbolic and moral experiences. A Gestalt theory of group co-ordinates the methods and conclusions of ethics and the social sciences and abolishes the false antitheses between individual and social ethics, on the one hand, and between the scientific and moral approaches to human relations on the other.

[1] See *Field Theory in Social Science*, p. 164.

THE FIELD OF GROUP PARTICIPATION AND CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PERSONALITY, VALUES AND BEHAVIOUR

Type of Group	*Nature of Personality*	*Nature of Group Behaviour*	*Ethical Norm*	*Symbolic means of* Social Control	*Function*
I. Crowd	Primal gregarious personality, imitative, suggestible, emotional, with complete inhibition of thoughts and ideas.	Group solidarity based on primitive emotions, irrational group behaviour based on suggestion.	Nil	Law	Physical Restraint.
II. Interest-association.	Fractionalised occupational personality, egoistic and aggressive with strong class consciousness and feeling.	Individual assertion and reciprocal impersonal service; individual conduct based on accommodation of interest to interest.	Reciprocity or "Rules of the game", Fairplay and Consideration.	Law and Honour	Physical Restraint and Social Expectancy.

III. Community.	Fractionalised personality of status, rank and power with less exclusive ideas and feelings.	Group solidarity based on integration of desires, emotions and interests; group and individual conduct based on the adjustment of personality to personality as well as of interest to interest.	Equity and justice.	Honour, Positive Morality and Law.	Physical Restraint, Social Expectancy and Self Status.
IV. Commonalty.	Most profound integrated personality of contemplation and ecstasy, corresponding to the most intense collective consciousness and feeling.	Impersonal and universal good will, altruism and devotion to one's social roles and duties in complete detachment.	Love, equality and solidarity.	Honour, Positive and Personal Morality, Conscience and Law.	Conscience (sense of self-hood, self-censure and self-praise) and Treative Moral Freedom of the Individual.

There is discernible a further correspondence between intellectual abstraction and generalisation in goal orientation and choice and universalism in group behaviour values, relations and symbols. The rationality, universality and affective neutrality of norms and ideals are essentially the same as the substitution of the primitive, unstable and immediate by learned, remote and enduring goals and satisfactions. The latter, while stabilising human relationships and behaviour, obtain a relative permanence and impersonality through the instrumentality of groups. Man's rationality is the achievement of integration of his competing and conflicting impulses and goals under the impulsion and guidance of groups and institutions that determine their expressions and outlets as well as inhibitions and repressions. Through intellectual abstraction, rational foresight and disciplined symbolisation he ceases to respond to the casual, fluctuating needs of the situation but brings about order and coherence in his goals, attitudes and behaviour and integration of his personality. The cognitive, appreciative and moral ordering and organisation of values and symbols is fundamentally a group insight and experience. It appears that the work in the general theory of society in this field awaits the fuller development of group psychology grounded in observational and experimental procedures and effectively articulated with sociology, psychology and psychiatry. Its essential ingredient will be provided by a theory of symbol, which takes account of both the physiological drives and emotions and the learned strivings and values of man, institutional as well as deviant, which links symbols with the stable, rational and ideal values of the personality on one side and with groups and inter-related social statuses and roles of the other, and which, finally, envisages a harmonious and universal symbolic system applicable to all individuals, groups and civilizations. An integration of symbol theory is much to be desired in the interest of a general, comprehensive sociological theory that will articulate the field of sociology with other sister and daughter disciplines. The development of a general theory of society will take some time. But with each advance certain gaps in theoretical knowledge will be closed, the reciprocal inter-relations of the current working theories properly understood, and certain broad theoretical principles reached whence many of the working theories and hypotheses will be directly derived.

IV. THE THEORY OF OPEN SYSTEMS

29. *Society as an "Open System"*

The fundamental general theory of society rests on the consideration of society as an "open system" i. e. an essentially self-directed and active organisation that tends towards increased heterogeneity, wholeness and macroscopic orderliness. Schrödinger has recently stressed that the organism continually extracts "orderliness" or "negative entropy" from outside to counterbalance the increasing chaos or entropy towards which it would degrade as a closed system. In this view the organism cannot be compared with a closed system with its tendency towards a static equilibrium, and the principle that is opera-

tive is not alive to physical science.[1] Together with the so-called molar or organismic as contrasted with the older molecular or analytical outlook, the principle of open system has important consequences in the social sciences. So far all leading schools of sociology and psychology are based upon theories of the "closed-system" type, treating man's inter-personal behaviour as approximating to a pattern of action and reaction of equal, simple and homogeneous forces as in classical physics. A theory of open systems requires new principles of social equilibrium, integration and control in different levels of social adaptation. Social interaction is "transaction" in Dewey's sense, characterised no doubt by conformity to the prescribed norms, meanings and practices of the social order. But such conformity holds in its bosom the uniqueness of the individual's feelings, emotions and learned trends. In the complex phases and dimensions of social adjustment, man unconsciously, meaningfully and idiomatically modifies, bends and tilts group-sanctioned mores and relations according to his private desires, goals and symbols. It is the individuality of his action, reaction and interaction that continually renews culture and the personality process as ongoing, reciprocally interdependent human adventures and aspirations. The dynamic equilibrium here is far different from that brought about by the interplay of simple and large forces acting from a distance in the "closed-system" of the Newtonian physics.

According to Dewey and Bentley, we find in modern science a transition from self-actional to interactional and transactional concepts. Classical sociology and psychology are self-actional, i.e. take into account only linear, causal trains acting in isolation from one another. The "field" theory is interactional, emphasising dynamics within a unified system and self-direction towards a specific coordinated unity of structure and activities comparable with man's functional capacity for "homeostasis" he owes to his mammalian origin. The general trend of modern science is directed towards transactional conceptions, viz., the organism in its environs. First, as Bentley observes, human behaviour and the relation between knowing and known can be considered as a special case of the wider conception of the organism as an "open system" that Bertalanffy defines as a system "not in thermo-dynamic equilibrium but kept at a distance from equilibrium."[2] Secondly, both the human organism and the environment assume new characteristics,—statuses, values, ideals and symbols—in the progressive levels of social integration characterised by symbolic, meaningful purposive behaviour. *Homo symbolicus* is different from all other animals. Man's evolution and progress are guided not by trial and error but by his meanings, values and symbols that reshape his environment. Social structure and functions comprise an expanding universe of symbols, eidos and ethos. Region, Institution and Group—the bases of structure of the social system are understood and operated symbolically; while bio-

[1] *What is Life?* See his *Science and Humanism* and Bertalanffy: *Problems of Life.*

[2] Dewey and Bentley: *Knowing and Known,* quoted in Bertalanffy: Theoretical Models in Biology and Psychology, *Journal of Personality,* September 1951, p. 34.

logical needs, status-strivings and moral values in the successive levels of social adjustment are based upon the intelligent ordering and disciplined integration of the complex of conceptual symbols. Man's symbolic process, ever-active and replete with new insights and understandings of nature, society and himself, persistently produces, transforms and protects the personality as a highly idiomatic way of living and behaviour, and by so doing not only maintains culture and perpetuates social order, but makes these appear reasonable, orderly and good to the extent that he views his own deviation and maladjustment with acute feelings of guilt and anxiety.

We should work out the theory of "open systems" in the general science of society in such manner as to stress the dynamics of sustenance, status, standard of living, order and character within the unified "field" in terms of "interactions" and "transactions" that carry *forward* social functions and relations, emergent and purposeful, and capable of changing their pattern in the successive dimensions of adaptation, manifesting wider and richer wholes of communication and participation.

30. *The Open Ecological System of Region-and-Sustenance*

(1) As Man-in-the Community faces the regional complex, he achieves the intricate balance of land and water, plants and animals not only with his skills, aptitudes, science and technology but also with his goals, values and designs for his collective living. The ecological laws of the unity and balance of life are orderly, permanent and universal. But the ways in which man shifts the ecologic balance now in his favour, now against him, are unique for the building of his sustenance and maintenance of his culture. It is the same universal chemical, physical and ecological processes of the nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus and other cycles and rhythms of nature, small and large, that binding human culture with climate, land and water, and with plants, animals and insects create a highly distinctive genus of life in a given region. The balance and oscillation of life in the region that constitute man's environment are created and consolidated by subtle, manifold and ever-ramifying web of relations between community and organic and inorganic nature. Into this genus of life with its specific coordinated unity of structure and activity, whether we consider the inter-relations of the great harmonic, vegetable or animal aggregations that arrive at a more or less stable equilibrium or the interlinkages of ecologic, economic and social arrangements, man also imports his meanings, symbols and values. The pattern of life and the pattern of culture, interacting and "transacting" with each other create and perpetuate many different designs for living of the human community in the world. These remain open systems so long as man imposes his goals, values and symbols between himself and the region. There is constant progress towards greater solidarity, complexity and organisation of the pattern of life through intimate, educative and purposive bio-ecological cooperation or symbiosis. In the older sociological speculation, man was treated as a part of nature, but in a frankly deterministic fashion: his plans and endeavours were conceived more as extraneous forces than as phases of the ecologic complex interwoven with

the rest of the region. Man is part and pracel of the process by which the balance of the region is maintained or shifted, refined or broken. In subtle ways his meanings, values and sensibilities mix with rain and sunshine, land and stream, plants and animals. The pattern of life continually grows and evolves as a whole, bringing about a harmony of the lesser and simpler with a greater and more complex whole of nature. Such are the "transactions" between Man-Sustenance-and Region.

The inter-relations of a fig tree, an earthworm, a rat and a bird are many but the threads make much more intricate and complex patterns when we reach the social economy of man. It is the knowledge of, and respect for the intricacy of the web of life which guides man to his highest destiny. Man is at once a microcosm and a macrocosm. This he has to realise in both imagination and fact. His wholeness of life or integralness with cosmos is not merely a matter of aesthetic intuition and spiritual ecstasy, but also of scientific understanding and planning of the pattern of his life and bio-physical relationship in intimate and subtle harmony with the rest of the universe. Thus does he contemplate and act out a wholeness that constitutes "the grand Ecology of the Universe."

31. *The Open Sociological System of Institution-and Status*

(2) In the next higher dimension of adaptation, the transactions between Man-Status-and Institution similarly comprise an open system. Institutions impose a regularity and orderliness on the patterns of communication, control and status and a rationality and predictability on individual goals and values, status-seeking and status-gaining. These garner the accumulated memory and judgment on individual and social relationships and behaviours for generations. But institutions, though these fulfil the essential and universal desires, interests and values of man, show a most remarkable diversity among different peoples. Man who is essentially similar in his goals, interests and values creates and maintains many different types of institutions and status-schemes. In the same culture, institutions define statuses and mould and direct desires and strivings in a broad and general manner, leaving ample scope for variety of status-achievement, for flexibility of individual behaviours. Each institution, each pattern of control, each status-scheme lays down practices and careers only in a general manner permitting a large amount of divergence of social relationships, behaviours and modes of fulfilment of values. Man's institutional complex may be thus viewed as an essentially created human value which he has selectively evolved from the limits and possibilities of the region and of his own nature. The human enterprise of institution-making or status-assignment is as creative and as continually renewed as his goals and values, and his knowledge and understanding of himself and of region are ceaselessly revised and renovated meaningfully.

32. *The Open Ethical System of Group-and-Value*

(3) Finally, the interactions and transactions between Man-Values-and Voluntary Association, though highly organised and pat-

terned, comprise essentially an open system. Personality reacts in and with the group in terms of its idiosyncratic emotions, goals and symbols which it persistently seeks to impose upon every group, every relationship, every situation. It is the individual's unique private, symbolic world that gives status and dignity to the human personality, and thereby produces, maintains and transforms universal and enduring values through moral participation in, and renewal of groups and institutions.

Value systems show a marked divergence according to the various types of social participation, relations and groups as represented by the qualitative "deal-types" of Interest-group, Community and abstract Commonalty. The dominance a particular type of social grouping in a culture governs the inter-relationships and scaling of values, the complexion of culture and the facets of personality. Group identification or communication is the medium of moral development. On the one hand, ethics is a function of the communicative structure of the group or institution. On the other hand, the personality through its moral initiative and ideal creativeness constantly modifies the group structured value scheme. Conflict, integration, enhancement and lapse of values are the ingredients of the social process. Sociology should cultivate a dispassionate, objective attitude towards these, without viewing the existing scheme of values as sacrosanct explore and analyse emerging values and validate all values, new and old, with reference to the total social situation, need and experience.

Society's chronic conflict and struggle of the major values in society are adjudged and resolved by reference to normative ideals or norms. Norms introduce stability and harmony into the value experience, sensitiveness and depth into the personality and integration and universalism into society. The distinction between goals, ideals, values and norms is fundamental for social science theory. Man first defines and selects *goals* with reference to his fundamental needs and tensions. As goals become competitive, divergent and conflictful he clarifies, criticises and classifies the value situation in terms of the *ideal.* Amidst the conflict and tension of empirical goals and incomplete ideals stability, harmony and coherence are provided by normative ideals or *norms* that are characterised by universality and imperativeness.[1] Norms are related to the heart of the self and of the world process, to Being and Becoming. These dwell in the Platonic heaven "where the gods may inspect them on a morning chariot ride".[2] These are Forms and Ideas of the Just, the Good and the Beautiful, and dwell so to speak in God's mind. But the meaning of norms is found in human emotions and purposes. Norms incarnate man's strivings and aspirations for self-actualisation and growth that his life and his society present. They are concretely realised and created through the demands and possibilities of the environment on one side, and man's unique responses to them on the other. They can become true values

[1] See *The Social Structure of Values,* pp. 105-111.

[2] E. S. Brightman: Value and Existence, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* December, 1943.

only when they are internalised as his conscience and faith and projected in his concrete social relations and institutions, in his freedoms, laws and rights and duties. The infinity, universality and imperativeness of norms constitute the basis of the pressure and compulsive character of values in society and the impulsion of human culture itself.

33. *The Cosmic Status of Values.*

Modern value theory in the West is beset by the harsh dichotomies between subjectivism and objectivity, relativity and absoluteness, preference and imperativeness of values.[1] Such dichotomies are to be attributed to the Western mode of definition in incisive outlines of the self and its relations to cosmos. Due to the peculiar development of social history and pattern of industrial culture in the West in the 19th century, selfhood, status and values have been rooted in an acute self-awareness, an intense self-assertion, a vivid subjective, individualistic enjoyment or caring and an atomism of man's separate and independent reality from the cosmos. In Oriental culture man by the untramelled play of his intellect and sentiment, his profound insight and ecstasy finds values and norms as constituting both his deepest self and the essence of an eternal, spiritual, teleological order of the cosmos. He participates in the unity of the Commonalty or the Cosmic Mind, infinite and universal, at once social and trans-social, human and beyond-human. This unity indeed defines the context within which he has to select, assimilate and order the goals and values of his life. The realization of cosmic values or norms implies at once the profoundest depth of the personality and the most intense temporal equality and solidarity of mankind. The individual's roles and aspirations, social relations and ideals must approximate to the value character and orderliness of the Reality—the Commonalty of the Universe that beacons both individual and society to reach out to goodness, justice and love greater than are yet realized, and to build up a Commonalty more extensive than is yet lived in. Due to the "continuity" between the human order and the cosmic order, man's moral life acquires a cosmic meaning, and his self-expansion and self-transcendence become supreme obligations. Values, accordingly, are transcendent in so far as these embody the order of the cosmos and the purpose of the Cosmic Mind and Deity. But these also reveal the full potentialities of the human creature. These are therefore immanent, embodying as these do what belongs to his real self, the harmony and integralness by which he seeks to supersede the chaos, immediacy and irrationality of his nature. The universal is the real self. True status and values are cosmic. The crisis in value doctrines cannot be resolved without relating it to a new metaphysic of Being and Becoming that is less man-centred and more universalist or cosmic. As long, however, as the present impasse continues, the divergence and uncertainty of value theories, relegated largely to psychology and cultural anthropology, works against the assimilation of the normative viewpoint into the sociological theories.

[1] Compare Ray Lepley (Ed.): *Value: A Cooperative Enquiry*

Iredell Jenkins has also recently suggested that the fierce dualisms that are characteristic of contemporary value theory in the West have arisen "because modern philosophical thought has treated man as an isolated creature; it has over-looked and neglected the continuities that bind man to his surroundings; it has studied the human system with insufficient reference to its context in nature and reality". Charles Hartshorne proposes to solve the dilemma in the value theory by positing the metaphysical experience of the cosmic mind. He observes, "The only way to avoid a certainly false, purely self-interest theory of motivation, and at the same time do justice to the principle that value lies in concrete individual satis faction, not in mere collection, is to recognise a super-human mind. If this includes the sum of being, if it be the cosmic mind, then the problem is solved, since such a mind would indeed find satisfaction in the satisfaction of all, for all would be integral parts of its own body, whose health would be inseparable from the prevailing health of its own parts".[1] Once the boundaries of the human order and cosmic order coalesce, the harsh dualisms of objective-subjective, absolute-relative, coercive-individualistic and obligation-preference in value-system will disappear. "The exploration of the continuities that hold between man and the world—between the human order and the cosmic order—is a task that outreaches value theory. But it is only through pursuing it that value theory can solve its own problems".[2] A general normative theory of sociology takes its stand on the reality of values that is at once transcendental and preferential and grounded in the affinity between the human and the cosmic order so often overlooked in modern thought. Man has obligations to self, to his group, institution and region, to humanity and to cosmos. But each man defines his obligations, wills his values and norms and creates his own social roles and patterns of integration and participation. Thus the "transaction" between man and society in which values become creative and are proved in his life is an "open" system.

34. *The Theoretical Models of Sociology*

The orthodox conceptual models of psychology cannot do justice to the dynamic interchange of personality, values and culture that is being revealed by modern experimental social psychology, anthropology, psychiatry and the arts. These latter disciplines should now furnish the theoretical models of social science analysis replacing the older assumptions of action-reaction, force-counter-force, stimulus-response in a static and closed system with linear causal chains. Simultaneously the science of society should, like the modern experimental sciences, constantly scrutinise its assumptions and postulates and choose from them to guide scientific enquiries. The presuppositions of social relations and processes—the subject matter of the social sciences—are the social myths, ideologies, symbols

[1] Elements of Truth in the Group Mind Concept, *Social Research*, May, 1942.

[2] Jenkins: The Present Status of the Value Problem. *The Review of Metaphysics*, Sept. 1950.

and values. These have to be continually tested and validated in social experiment and in social living, implying the progressive enlargement and deepening of both social relations and social theories. Neither stereotyped institutions and groups defined once for all in terms of certain established relations and ways of living, nor the fixed beliefs, values and symbols associated with the former in our intellectual tradition are the foci of a science of society, but rather the on-going processes of human living in regions, institutions and groups, and man's ceaseless adventure to make his region, group and institution ever more diversified, meaningful and satisfying, to orient these to the full realisation of his potentialities in his manifold statuses, relations and situations. Dewey remarks; "Associated or conjoint endeavour is a universal characteristic of all existences. Qualities of associated things are displayed only in association, since in interaction alone are potentialities released and actualised. The manifestation of potentialities varies with the manner and range of association. The social, in its human sense, is the richest, fullest and most delicately subtle of any mode actually experienced".[1] In other words, the physical, the vital and the mental reveal their full force and meaning only where association is manifested in the form of participation and communication. It would therefore, appear legitimate, according to Dewey, to adopt as a hypothesis the idea that the social is the whole and the proper point of departure for any more imaginative construeings of the whole that empirical philosophy may undertake.[2] It is because the highest possibilities of culture and personality depend upon the range and intimacy of human participation that a general science of society is the master-discipline unfolding the conditions and means for the promotion of the good of social relations and institutions and the depth and richness of the personality in on-going social discovery and reconstruction.

35. *Modern Trends against Scientific and Cultural Ethno-Centrism*

The development of a master science of society is delayed today, and the great unanswered questions of mankind that are "the great unanswered questions of the social sciences", according to Louis Wirth, are left unclarified,largely because of the "atomistic", lop-sided developments of the systems of psychology and psychiatry and of theories of personality, and values and valuations, all of which are central to the social science theory. There are unmistakeable signs today of new productive orientations and integrations. The "holistic" or "organismic" theory of psychology or of personality is having its full and increasing impact upon the entire field of analysis of human behaviour, personal and interpersonal. The holistic-dynamic concepts of "growth" and "self-actualization" are correcting the exclusive preoccupation of pathology and psycho-therapy with "crippled people and desperate rats", and a new motivation-and-value theory, freed from the older Freudian pessimism and be-

[1] Dewey: Social as a Category, *The Monist*, V. 38: 2.
[2] Dewey: *Philosophy and Civilization*, p. 77-92.

haviouristic relativism is on the way. This helps towards a clarification of the psychological theory of status, class, power, interpersonal relations and institutions. A richer and more integrated personality theory is now being woven into the theories of social psychology, education, social work and cross-cultural comparison. It will not be before long a scientific system of values will also emerge, freed from the dualisms of objective-subjective and coercive-individualistic, and unrestrictedly move to and fro between the personal, the social and the cosmic qualities and dimensions of human existence. All these advances, no doubt, enhance the possibility of articulation of a general master science of society. In the field of sociology itself five areas of enquiry viz. *the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of values, the sociology of symbols, the sociology of arts and the sociology of religion* have just begun to be assiduously tilled. Their results derived from social and intellectual climates in more than one region and culture will not only powerfully contribute to remove the artificial barriers between the different social sciences but also bring about interracial understanding through an appreciation of the multiplicity of values and their expressions in art, religion, morality and institutions in different regions and peoples. Integrative in its techniques and methods, the master science of society will combat the current scientific orthodoxy and fractionalism. Global in its outlook, it will resist the current cultural ethno-centrism. The problems of world community in the coming decades can only be solved by social science in the measure as it respects the divergence of cultures and cultural values on the one hand and removes the ideological conflict in respect of the realisation or furtherance of values and the preservation of freedom and diversity, on the other.

The future world organisation rests ultimately on an appreciation of the common values of mankind, even when revealed and embodied in diverse schemes of life in particular countries and epochs, and on a cooperative endeavour for the achievement of these values, derived as these may be from different or conflicting social and philosophic postulates and presuppositions. Different cultures, past and present, show on the whole a broad unity in respect of valuations. This unity is strengthened today by the commingling of the philosophy of history from Vico, Hegel and Comte to Rickert, Sorokin and Toynbee and the philosophy of values from Kant and Nietzche to Green, Dewey and Croce. Both historiography and philosophy of values now stress that it is the universal values of a particular society or culture that are positively significant in the broad march of civilization, that these are shared by all mankind and that their enhancement is conducive towards global unity and elimination of racial and cultural antagonisms and conflicts. From a different angle modern psychology, psycho-analysis and psychiatry have come to the conclusion that the inner growth and maturation of personality rest on the creation of more and more new values that can be shared by larger sections of society and humanity. Social science gives today the real clue to the disruptive and devastating forces of personality and society as well to the integrative and creative forces in the social process and moral experience that represent the functioning and substance of values. It can indeed

materially contribute towards the discernment of basic common values constituting the heritage of the species, of true values and their distortions and the understanding of the means by which to enhance the genuine and eliminate the false goals. Its differentiation of goals and ends that embody ephemeral and parochial economic and political affiliations from genuine values that fulfil the enduring and universal needs of man and its clarification of the confusions and ambiguities of divergent value systems now exploited in ideological oppositions can engender broad understanding, confidence and tolerance among the peoples in the place of the current, widespread but vague fears, suspicions and resentments. These will be the first, indispensable steps towards the development of an effective universalist morality basic for world security, cooperation and citizenship. Imperialism, whether political, economic or cultural, racialism whether open or in the disguised form of economic and political exploitation of backward groups, and the communist doctrine of the universal supremacy of the proletariat that liquidates elite groups everywhere are alike great enemies of the moral process by which individuals, groups and values transform themselves and their mutual relations, accepting the economic imperative of "One world, One wealth", the political imperative of the "United Nations", and the moral imperative of the Universal Man and the Universal Community—applying the one irrefragable law of universal truth, justice and love on a global scale.

The theoretical frame-work of the two dominant social sciences, viz. economics and politics, has been on the whole unhelpful towards social harmony and justice and the interdependence of mankind. The traditional individualistic approach in both economics and politics and the conception of economics as a theory of natural wealth and prosperity and of politics as a theory of national power and sovereignty have not been conducive at all towards the development of institutions that increasingly influence international relations either for war or peace in the modern world. Rather economics and politics have assisted and rationalised the disintegration of world economy and security. Only the philosophy of society can redefine economic and political goals for the changed conditions of the twentieth century "one world", and correct the narrow methodological viewpoint and fractionalism in both economics and political science, concerned with only one dimension of social relations and experience and that also in a more or less isolated national setting.

36. *Social Science and the Crisis in Civilization*

The status of a master science of society is high. It is both science and philosophy. As philosophy, it first examines and reconstructs the pre-suppositions underlying the various social sciences in the context of changing social-environmental relations and values, and sustains selfcorrecting, experimental methods, promoting a marriage between ethical idealism and free social enquiry. It prevents "fixation" of the social sciences to given schemes of status and power and scales of values which is largely responsible for ethical relativism and ideological conflict of the modern age; secondly, it intergrates the conclusions of the various social sciences into a

whole by the nexus of its treatment of values, status and personality. The convergence and interdependence of economic, political, legal and moral values and statuses that it stresses offer the major key to the harmony and integration of society, personality and its spiritual values. The value-analysis of society, with its frustrations, conflicts and distortions of myths, values and symbols that it lays bare also reveals that the widespread "disvalues" and symptoms of neurosis in modern culture invade the economic, political, moral and religious fields all together.[1]

The problems how to obtain solidarity, security, freedom, poise and sharing can no longer be left to a particular social science. These can be examined comprehensively and productively only by the philosophy of society. Fundamentally, the notions of the nature and destiny of man and the meaning of society that underlie the logic of all the social sciences are brought to light only by the philosophy of society.[2] Hoffding long ago observed, the ethically ideal must be sociologically possible. The philosophy of society clarifies the relations between the social and ethical spheres of human relations, and defines the moral issues involved in complicated economic and political policies and also the processes by which the ideal values of a particular culture are reshaped or destroyed by technology and diffused widely or circumscribed narrowly by the class system and status-power structure. It enquires into all kinds of institutions, statuses and social relations in order to appraise them and the meanings, beliefs, values and symbols these stand for. It scrutinises, refines and rectifies the current scale of status, power and values as well as the instruments and techniques of social intelligence, communication and control so that man's struggle for values, status and power becomes orderly, rational and wholesome. It appeals to the universal and rationally human elements in all institutions and value-systems and is an impartial instrument by which all social systems and cultures may be criticised and appraised. It clarifies and integrates the essential truths and values of all social systems and cultures, without bias or prejudice and sets up criteria, techniques and instruments for the fulfilment of certain invariant goals, values and norms of mankind. The struggle between status-power and value system has deteriorated into a global cold war with the result that the basic reality and destiny of personality, status and values have been seriously undermined in the modern epoch. The crisis in civilization accompanies the wide-spread distrust and crisis in the social sciences due to the discredit of their existing frames of reference, principles and methods that fail to offer any guidance in social planning, prediction and control. The present chasm between the conceptual structure of the social sciences and the social data in a changing cultural matrix is, indeed, associated with "a profound dissatisfaction with the result of social enquiry."[3] This has to be effectively bridged. The general theory of society can undoubtedly lead towards prevision, determination and control of the factors

[1] See the forthcoming volume, *The Symbolic Life of Man.*
[2] See *The Social Structure of Values,* p. 16-19.
[3] Kaufmann: *The Methodology of the Social Sciences,* p. 141.

operating in the divergent social fields with greater certainty, and plan values, social relations and statuses, using appropriate techniques of communication and sharing of values in planned mass society. Only as it accepts the challenge and opportunity of revising the methods of analysing and validating persons, values and statuses and translating them into new and more appropriate institutions and social processes that we can successfully tide over the present crisis in human civilization. Simultaneously both society and personality can find their full realization in the unity of the social sciences and of the philosophies of society, and values. Civilization urgently needs today a social science theory of full and integrated personality and of free and universal society. Its assumptions and postulates will be grounded in our new appreciation of the role of values and symbols in social processes and institutions, our new insight into human status and personality in both their normal and abnormal trends. Thus can social science make human living ever more meaningful through the adjustments of group, institution and culture to the fulfilment of the highest demands and possibilities of man. And in the unending creative process of making his living ever more significant in the total universe, the self-conscious, full and balanced personality is bound to seek an identity of the goals of social science, ethics and metaphysics as embodied in the symbolic synthesis of art, myth and religion.

37. *Philosophy and Society*

This broad humanistic trend of unification of social sciences and humanities is however opposed by dominant philosophical theories in Western civilization. Naturalistic philosophy deploys scientific methods in fields where human values and meanings are more significant for insight than empirical social facts; while dialectical materialism eschews the higher spiritual values altogether and uses dogmatically its lop-sided theory of human motivation and class struggle in the deterministic movement towards power and happiness without calling in the aid of either human understanding or morality. These contrasted "frames of reference" that govern and divide mankind today have this in common that they both seek to achieve "rightness" and "goodness" in social relations merely through institutions and economic and political techniques and procedures instead of through art, religion and metaphyics that create and defend values, ideals and norms. Thus they contribute to thwart and defeat man's modes of adjustment in different dimensions to self, society and universe and produce world-wide neuroses, anxieties and conflicts. The crisis in social sciences obviously is grounded in the *malaise* in philosophy and metaphysics.

Man's search for higher spiritual values of beauty, goodness and love, his creation and re-creation of social relations and institutions in accordance with these norms is the essence of his nature. It is this unity of human nature which transcends ethical and cultural relativity and binds mankind in a teleological world order. The ideal social unity of mankind stressed by a "general theory of relativity" for the human world can alone furnish the ideological foundation of a real and enduring universal community. Not before psychology,

axiology and philosophy root themselves, however, in the continuity and solidarity between man and universe, between the social order and the cosmic order is there any possibility of uniting mankind and saving goodness, charity and peace for the world.

II–THE REINTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Boston University
Manuel Gottlieb, University of Kansas
Talcott Parsons, Harvard University
Samuel L. Hart, State University of New York, Champlain College

3

FRONTIERS BETWEEN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

By EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

I. *Radhakamal Mukerjee As Frontiersman*

At the present stage of world history, frontiers assume increasing significance. Politically, the growth of nationalism is creating new frontiers, and with new frontiers, new problems. At the same time, the United Nations Organization is seeking to transcend frontiers, and to take into account the necessary interrelations of all human beings of every race, creed, nationality, and economic order. The goal of nationalism is independence, freedom, and responsibility. The goal of the United Nations is interdependence, co-operation, and world peace. In political relations the problem of frontiers is obviously acute.

A like situation obtains in the intellectual and spiritual life of man. Each human being is an individual, with individual duties, responsibilities and opportunities. Each human being is a member of society, molded by his society. His society indeed, imposes restrictions; his society also gives him education and opportunity. Every intellectual undertaking of man has its limits. The mind of man cannot grasp every thing at once. It must specialize. *Divide et impera* is its rule. But the mind of man is not itself divided as its "fields" or "specialties" are. The mind is a unity, and requires a unitary view of its experience and knowledge in order to act intelligently or to decide the simplest choice. In fact, no choices are very simple in this complexly interrelated world, to which the past has bequeathed a heritage of mingled glory and shame, that can never be ignored: this world, in which the present is always more subtle than we can see or know; this world in which future developments may be more exalted or more debased than we of today can dream. In such a world, there is equal need for the mind of the specialist in each separate field and for the mind that can grasp human problems as an interrelated whole. Frontiers are necessary; and frontiers must be crossed.

It is a great honour to be asked to contribute to a volume devoted to "The Frontiers of Social Science" and dedicated to a genuine frontiersman, Radhakamal Mukerjee. Although a social scientist, he is more than a social scientist. Although aware of the frontiers that must be drawn as a result of the division of labour in the great fields of science and philosophy, he is always at work on the task of crossing the frontiers and enriching every province of thought in the interest of every other. Such conquests are victories of peace and triumphs of the universal human spirit in which only ignorance is the enemy, and only ignorance suffers defeat.

Specifically, Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee crossed the frontiers of many sciences to make his creative contributions to social ecology. He explores "the borderlands of economics." He enters the

"theory and art of mysticism." He investigates "the social function of art." Interrelations, borderlands, frontiers, are, so to speak, his native habitat.

If we were to generalize, we might say that there are three great areas in which Professor Mukerjee exemplifies his work as frontiersman. These are the frontiers between the Orient and the Occident, between the religious and the secular, and between social science and philosophy.[1]

A reader who had only Mukerjee's books to go by could not judge whether the author was an Occidental, learned in Oriental matters, or an Oriental, learned in Occidental matters. A casual list of authorities cited by Mukerjee will illustrate the frontiersman at work. Here they are: Socrates, Sorokin, Herbert Spencer, Ramanuja, Sankara, Ortegar Y Gasset, Ruth Benedict, Pareto, B. Russell, J. Dewey, Whitehead, H. G. Wells, W. I. Thomas, Justice Cardozo, W. E. Hocking, Dean Pound, Floyd Allport, Gordon Allport, Max Weber, Gurvitch, Charles Bread, Max Eastman, Gardner Murphy, Josiah Royce, William James, Lin Yutang, Malinowski, Reinhold Niebuhr, J. Maritain, Berdyaev, Max Scheler, Karl Mannheim, G. H. Mead, Bergson and many others. He also covers the literature of psychoanalysis and that of laughter and of countless other fields. Yet with this immense range, of which the names given are but a sample, Mukerjee never gives the impression of eclecticism. His magnificent style—lucid, concrete, coherent—always masters his material, and every idea which he uses is touched by the vigorous originality of his creative mind. That he is at work on frontiers between Orient and Occident is self-evident.

His broad view of the human problem is further evidenced by his insight into the interrelations of the secular and the religious. By the secular is meant the whole of social life not specifically religious, of which the objective researches of science and philosophy are examples. His two recent works (SSV and DM) reveal repeatedly a point of view which not only recognizes religious institutions as social facts, but also acknowledges the importance of the norms revealed in religious experience for social guidance, social integrity and social progress in the highest sense.

But it is on the frontier between social science and philosophy that Mukerjee has done much of his most characteristic work. There are scholars whose fundamental aim is to be sure that the work they are doing is scientific, in the strict sense of the definition of the special science in which they are working. If they are sociologists, for example, they are nervously eager to stay within the bounds of sociology and to remain strictly descriptive, statistical, and "objective" in their reports of observation. Such sociologists will report on crime, without passing

[1] The range of the productive work of Radhakamal Mukerjee has only been hinted at above. The volume in which this Chapter appears will doubtless cover the manifold aspects of his activity.—In the present Chapter, the direct quotations will be confined to the two works which more clearly exemplify his conception of the borderland between social science and philosophy. These are: *The Social Structure of Values* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1950), referred to as SSV, and *The Dynamics of Morals* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1951), DM. All references thereafter are to works of Mukerjee, unless otherwise stated.

any moral judgments; on communistic and capitalistic groups without any hint of praise or blame; on art and religion as social facts without reference to their social value, much less to their metaphysical validity. This purely scientific or positivistic attitude is quite foreign to Mukerjee. He fully recognizes, of course, the basic importance of the knowledge of social facts. But he is far more concerned to arrive at an adequate understanding of human society and its values than he is to maintain the airtight separation between sociology, economics, political science, social philosophy, and metaphysics. His work freely crosses the boundaries of all these fields. Like Socrates he follows "wherever the argument blows."

Such a disregard of frontiers is very painful to those systematizers for whom neatness and abstract separations are more important than adequate truth. But Mukerjee is a philosopher as well as a scientist; he is both in one. He is guided by the Platonic principle that the philosopher is a synoptic man, as well as by Hegel's insight that the true is the whole. He would doubtless appreciate the quip of Warner Fite at a gathering of philosophers when he defined "an academic distinction" as a distinction which rendered it possible to maintain two distinct chairs in a university and thus guarantee jobs to two men. In reading Professor Mukerjee, one is at a loss to know whether he is a sociologist or a philosopher. The fact is, he is neither separately; he is both conjointly. As a seeker for the full social truth, he cannot be restrained by departmental lines any more than he can be guided by party lines. His only line is the line that leads to truth, impartial and comprehensive. That is why he is found on and across all frontiers.

It must, of course, be recognized, and I am certain that Professor Mukerjee does recognize, that division of labour is necessary, and that the immense task of social fact-gathering is itself greater than any one person can carry out. It is a group-project for those called social scientists in the technical sense. The further task of interpreting and evaluating the facts thus gathered is commonly thought of as the duty of the philosopher—the ethicist, the philosopher of religion or of art, the axiologist, the social philosopher, the metaphysician. As long as the subdivisions of social science and the subdivisions of philosophy are divided among different groups of individuals, progress will undoubtedly be made. But the progress may consist, as we say in the United States, in each specialist's knowing more and more about less and less; and consequently in the increase of a scientific temper strongly resembling that of the Tower of Babel. It is a rare thinker who can create a common language and unifying ideas in the strife of separate jargons. Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee, like Professor Lester F. Ward (whose work he knows), is one of that small band of thinkers—working in an age when philosophy is weaker and less popular and the accumulated facts unspeakably more numerous and complicated than in Ward's day.

II. *The Division of Knowledge*

The relations between social science and philosophy need to be seen in historical perspective, a perspective which will be here chief-

ly confined to the Western development.[1] Going back as far as we can go to the dim origins of civilization, we seem to find an organic unity of society in which all social activities are interrelated in a practical-emotional scheme of living and feeling and believing which was a kind of animistic religion—a totalitarian religious culture, it may be called, without imputing to it the invidious aspects of modern totalitarianism. Out of some such primitive and prehistoric religious social situation, the various arts and sciences and philosophies have been developed. This is what William Ernest Hocking in his great work, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* (1912), meant when he called religion "the mother of the Arts" (p. 14), and remarked that "there is little in what we call culture which has not at some time been a purely religious function" (p. 13). The division of knowledge into specialties has been a process of secularization.

The process moved slowly. Philosophy broke off but gradually from religion. For Thales all things were full of gods; and Pythagoras and Empedocles were as much religious as philosophical in their whole bent and aim. Plato was quite capable of isolating problems, as he did in dialogues so utterly different as the *Euthyphro* and the *Parmenides*. But when he considered social issues, as in the *Crito,* the *Republic,* the *Politicus,* the *Laws,* and the incomplete *Critias,* he did not behave like a modern social scientist. His interest was not in social facts as such (much as the facts of Sparta impressed him), but in social norms as seen by the philosopher who is a spectator "of all time and all existence."[2] Aristotle moved in the direction of a greater division of knowledge into fields such as logic, rhetoric, poetics, ethics, politics, and metaphysics; but he was also concerned with the philosophical integration of knowledge as truly as was Plato, an integration which in both cases was oriented toward ideal goals of social significance. Such integration is rare in the twentieth century.[3]

The development of Christian theology and philosophy continued the reign of integration. Philosophy itself was *ancilla theologiae,* and other branches of learning were organized into the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, logic) and the more advanced quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music). This was a very carefully guarded step toward specialization within unity.

But when Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) introduced his interpretation of inductive method, a turning point in science was reached. On the one hand, Bacon "banished" final causes from nature and thus instituted a separation between theology-philosophy and

[1] For the good and sufficient reason that the writer lacks the knowledge necessary to trace analogous relations in the development of Eastern thought prior to its close contact with the West.

[2] Plato, Rep. 486A.

[3] Professor Mukerjee is, at one point, more optimistic than the facts of British and American philosophy would seem to indicate. In these days of positivism and analytic philosophy, it seems odd for him to say: "Just as in previous ages philosophy has been primarily oriented to theology or to art or to history or to mathematics or to natural science, so in our day it should be primarily oriented to the social sciences" (SSV, 20). This is, indeed, the view of personalists and of some naturalists, but it is far from predominant. The primary stress today is on methodology, semantics, and analysis—on form rather than on content. It *should,* indeed, be social.

science. Let theology study final causes; science will be concerned only with efficient causes! On the other hand, Bacon opened the door to experimental method. With experimental method, the division of scientific labour into many special fields—physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, geology, and finally the social sciences—was a natural consequence. From the seventeenth century on, the proliferation of experimental science has been amazing. For many reasons, the physical sciences have led in this development, the result being, for the most part, an increased application of mathematics, and the reign of mechanical law. Instead of viewing science as a branch of philosophy, "the cult of science"[1] came to regard sciences as being philosophy. In the nineteenth century, natural philosophy was a synonym for the physical sciences; and in the twentieth, the term "naturalism" was used in America to describe a philosophy that identifies philosophy with scientific method.

In Auguste Comte (1798-1857) the triumph of the sciences seems to be complete. The division of the sciences, neatly classified by Comte, was capped by the new science of sociology which he founded. But his positivism and the Baconian aversion to final causes, were muddied by Comte's religion of humanity. His ethical idealism of order, progress, and love was a reinstatement of values and final causes. It was inconsistent with pure positivism. It has been repudiated by the modern positivists who find values to be "nonsense."

In the work of Plato, the "science" of society was not an experimental or statistical positivism. His *Republic* and *Laws* had been a blending of psychology, government, sociology, ethics, axiology, religion, and metaphysics. By Comte's time, sociology had eradicated metaphysics and had taken the place of religion, ethics, and axiology, as the queen of the sciences, based only on "positive" sensory knowledge. But how can sensory knowledge give man light on his highest needs and ideals? The result of this problem is a cleavage in the modern mind that is well described by Mukerjee:

> Man is a unity, but the knowledge of man and his behaviour is now dispersed between two separate compartments of research with their own conceptual mirrors and logical equipment and no doors and windows for communication with each other—one assigned to the sciences and their various applications, and the other to ethics, aesthetics, philosophy, metaphysics and religion.[2]

He rightly adds that "man is an integral whole as the carrier of values of different dimensions", and that to ignore this unity—as our specialized knowledge so often does—"would be a travesty of human nature and conduct."[3] He sees already where the trouble lies!

From Plato to the end of the Middle Ages, there was an excess of integration. In modern times, specialization has produced an excess of disintegration. What is needed for the understanding of man

[1] A phrase used by Ralph Barton Perry.
[2] DM, ix.
[3] DM, xxiv.

and his social experience is, as Mukerjee sees, an enriched reintegration of knowledge.

III. *The Reintegration of Knowledge*

The classical and medieval synthesis was followed by the scientific analysis. But the disintegrating analytic specialization was never final; especially in the social sciences it could not be final. In view of the unity of the human mind, of the interpersonal relations on which society is founded, and the values for which humanity strives (which are at once social and more than social), the specialized sciences could not remain forever divided. History does not flow in sealed canals, but all its streams join in a confluence. Sometimes the united stream flows steadily and peacefully; sometimes the torrent becomes black and wild, flooding areas far beyond its normal banks. Man tries as he can to exercise the art of flood control. So in the modern age through which we are passing, mankind is seeking social reintegration.

Intellectually[1] that reintegration has assumed two main forms. Let us call them the scientific and the philosophical. This division is, to a degree, arbitrary. No broad scientific thinking can avoid consideration of essentially philosophical problems, and no modern philosophy can possibly disregard the achievements of science. Yet it remains true that one movement is dominated by scientific interests and the other by philosophical.

The scientific movement is far from homogeneous. As we have seen, it found its systematic theoretical inception in the work of Comte, although it had an uneasy birth in David Hume's mind, where there was uncertainty about science itself. As it developed in the thought of Herbert Spencer, Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and others who called themselves materialists or, later, naturalists, it was marked roughly by a few common traits: (1) Reliance on science and scientific method.—The science made central was now physics, now biology, now economics, now psychology, now sociology. (2) Rejection of metaphysics and of metaphysical religion.—Dialectical materialists have been particularly fearful of metaphysics (although their own system is a kind of metaphysics), since they have identified it with idealism in a peculiar left-handed compliment. (3) Commitment to radical social reforms.—Comte (whose followers supported the Diaz regime in Mexico), Marx, and Dewey (an outstanding exponent of democracy) are examples of this commitment—although the reforms desired by these men vary widely. This raises the question whether an antimetaphysical science is a better guide to social truth than is an antiscientific metaphysics. It is true that idealistic metaphysicians have often supported unjust social orders; it is equally true that scientists, even in the twentieth century, have been dumb and servile slaves of unethical societies. It is also true that men like Albert Einstein have seen this peril and have appealed to religious believers and philosophers for a pooling of resources for the guidance of a bewildered society.

[1] The influence of religious movements is not under discussion at this point.

A scientific integration—a "unity of science" as it is being called—is an amazing step forward in social progress provided it does not mean at the same time a retrogression in humanity's devotion to the highest spiritual values. It is certain that science contributes immensely to man's knowledge of means for attaining social ends. The crucial intellectual problem for social thinking, is, however, the deeper question: Does science give light about social ends? It surely casts a blinding light on the fact that every social group, large or small, seeks for values, is a "fighter for ends" (as James said of the self). But does the positivistic, or statistical, method of such social science shed light on what ends ought to be sought? Can a purely descriptive social scientist do more than say: Here are the facts, here are the causal laws, here are the possibilities? Can he say: Here is what ought to be done?

It is largely because of the search for the "ought" that the movement toward a scientific integration has been supplemented by a movement toward a philosophical integration of knowledge—an integration which includes the scientific, but also the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious experiences of man; which takes cognizance of sensory experience, but also of man's total personal-social experience. It is at this point that certain words of Professor Mukerjee are especially relevant:

> It is too often forgotten that a higher sociality involves integration rather than accommodation, interpenetration rather than interdependence, equality and solidarity rather than equity and justice, and an appreciation of common meanings and values and of commonness or commonalty as a value in itself, rather than a rational weighing of interests and values.[1]

This beautiful statement of social integration needs only one critical comment. It is to be regretted that, even in appearance, and contrary, I am sure, to his own deeper intent, Mukerjee ranges himself with the enemies of the "rational" especially in these days when irrationalism is undermining the foundations of social justice and religious faith. What he meant by his last phrase, I venture to hope, was something like this: "rather than a purely analytic weighing of separate interests and values viewed without regard to their personal-social content—a method that has falsely arrogated to itself the name of rational."

The truly rational, philosophical reintegration of knowledge in modern times began with Immanuel Kant, and centres about his doctrine of "the primacy of the pure practical reason." Although Kant was profoundly concerned to validate science as against Hume, and to discover the presuppositions of Newton's physics, which he assumed to be true, he was even more concerned not merely to validate man's moral and religious convictions, but also to show their "primacy" over the principles of theoretical or speculative reason. In a sense, his great defence of democracy in his *Eternal Peace* is the climax of his thought. But while his aim was a reintegration of modern science with man's deepest social needs, his analytic tendencies left

[1] SSV, 4.

his three critiques and their applications, if not mere *disjecta membra,* then certainly less than an integrated organic whole.

It was Hegel who brought into modern philosophy the principle of organic unity. Hegel's interest, like Kant's, was fundamentally social. But Hegel brought out principles that had previously been only implicit in most thinkers since Plato and Aristotle — the principles of the integration of all knowledge and experience. He saw all the universe as a process of evolutionary development, but he saw that no stage of the development was the whole. The true, he insisted, is the whole. The whole includes all of logic and of science; all of individual life, and all social institutions; and higher than all states, —morality, religion, and philosophy.

There is much in Hegel that may and should be criticized in detail, but many have made the mistake of throwing the baby out with the bath. In a hasty eagerness to disavow Hegel's claims of logical necessity for his method, or his ill-considered defense of war or his apparent glorification of the state, or his particular view of the Absolute, many moderns have thrown away his sound dialectical method, his defense of reason, his appeal to organic wholeness, and his integration of social institutions with the whole development of thought and with the highest values revealed in experience. Fortunately, even in those who differ from him in many points, Hegel's yearning for the whole truth, his desire for a full interpenetration of science and values, and his social concern, has survived. This may be illustrated by the British neo-Hegelians, and by men like Hastings Rashdall and James Ward, as well as by American thinkers like Josiah Royce, Borden P. Bowne, and A. N. Whitehead. Some of Hegel's best tendencies are strong even in men who are in revolt against him, such as William James, Bertrand Russell, Ralph Barton Perry, and John Dewey. And they are very conspicuous in the thought of Indians like Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee.

There is then a world-wide movement toward reintegration on an inclusive basis — a genuine search for a profounder conception of man's social nature and social aspirations, as grounded not merely in immediate biological needs or the immediate environment, but in a more adequate[1] view of man's total being and his total environment. Mukerjee speaks in the spirit of this movement when he judges "not by ideological clichés . . . . . ., but by the basic dimensions and quality of human relations and group participation these connote."[2] In these dimensions and this quality he includes "the transcendence of the absolute," "building up a wholeness and integrity in social life."[3]

The thinker naturally inquires why there is so much difference of opinion about the nature of social science — whether it is to be

[1] It is significant that in Hegel the words "true" and "false" do not mean merely "correct" and "incorrect" (as atomistic propositions); but rather "true" and "false" mean "adequate" or "inadequate," that is, inclusive of all the relevant experience or incomplete and abstract. So too "concrete" means organically whole.

[2] SSV, xv.

[3] SSV, xvi.

positivistic or metaphysical, descriptive or normative. However this problem is solved, it is clear that the frontier between social science and philosophy is no absolute one. In order to keep philosophy out of social science, a new philosophy of positivism has to be set up. In order to keep social science out of philosophy, a new definition of social science has to be set up — by a philosopher — and barriers have to be erected which do not exist in nature and are not the work of God. Let us now turn to a consideration of the reasons underlying the specialized division of knowledge, and the reasons which make it necessary to overcome it. Specially: Can social science be social truth if it does not cross the frontier into philosophy ?

IV. *The Persistent Problems*

We have already surveyed briefly the rise of the division of know ledge in the Western world out of an original unity. This history is a duplication of what happens in the mind of every individual and in the development of every society.

When any situation is confronted, the first impression that it makes is that of an unclear unity. It is like what William James ascribes to the mind of the infant, who views his world as a "blooming, buzzing confusion" — yet, one must add, all one confusion. Using more technical language,[1] the original phase of the mind of the individual, both as regards his private experience and his social relations is that of a preanalytic synopsis. Such distinctions as psychical-physical, individual-social, or private-public, factual-normative, scientific-religious, are not only foreign to the infant mind; they are also foreign to all early societies, and are not self-evident to all individuals in the modern world.

In so far as any individual or society lives on the level of preanalytic synopsis, the synopsis experienced is inadequately grasped. It is a sheer "confusion," very vivid, perhaps, but governed by no laws or principles save those of immediate feeling or the imposed authority of social custom. When rival synopses appear within the same mind or society, or in alien minds or societies, there is no way of choosing between the rivals other than an appeal to immediate feeling or social custom — and unless feeling and custom are immensely strong against violence, the outcome is bound to be an appeal to physical force in order to compel behaviour in accordance with one set of feelings and customs as against another. All wars down to the present are the result of the refusal of at least one side to subject its own feelings and customs to a higher court of appeal.

The individual or the group which continues on the preanalytic level either perishes eventually in the struggle for survival or is preserved by the action of others who have risen above that level. Those who do not understand economics are preserved by those who understand economic institutions and laws. Those who understand neither physiology nor medicine are preserved by those who do. Infants who understand nothing are preserved by understanding parents.

Some sort of analysis, some consequent sort of specialization is, therefore, a social as well as a logical-epistemological necessity. Let

[1] Following the cue of Professor J. Loewenberg.

us summarize the grounds for this assertion. In so doing, we shall at the same time be adducing evidence for the interrelations between social process, social science, and philosophy.

First of all, there is (a) the manifest inadequacy of unanalyzed, unspecialized experience to guide either the individual or society to survival. The complexity both of the inner life and of the outer world is at first an unexplored jungle without pathway or guide.

Secondly, it is clear that (b) the isolated individual (who is manifestly not to be found), guided by instinct alone, is incapable of mastering these complicated jungles. Only shared experiences of exploration, mutual aid, remembered social endeavours, and gradual intellectual growth can serve as sources of man's survival and, on a higher level, of his evaluation of the goals of survival — of the difference between living and living well.

It becomes clear, then, after centuries of experience and experiment, that man cannot be satisfied with the unanalyzed acceptance of any experience, even the revered mores of his group. In addition to the need for survival and the evaluation of life, man is endowed with (c) an insatiable curiosity. Every child as soon as it learns to talk asks incessantly "Why? Why? Why?" Plato ascribes to Socrates the true words: "This feeling of wondering [which Theaetetus had said sometimes leads him to "whirl in darkness"] is the very essence of a philosopher; for there is no other beginning of philosophy than wonder."[2] And Aristotle, at the very start of Book A of his *Metaphysics,* went further and declared that "all men by nature desire to know." Aristotle did not mean that all men have the gifts or the patience to become sociologists or metaphysicians. But he certainly meant, and meant rightly, that inquiry is native to man. Particularly is this curiosity active in social affairs. Gossip existed long before newspapers and radio. It is a fundamental social fact that men desire to know about each other, to penetrate their motives, to love or hate them, to co-operate with them or to oppose them. Before wonder lures men to the heights of philosophy, it leads them to specialized knowledge about their neighbours and ancestors, their friends and their enemies, and then to even more specialized knowledge about the world of nature. It is true that curiosity in social matters led to a refinement of the mores long before it generated in Socrates the love of truth, regardless of custom, and tradition. But it is clear that wonder or curiosity was a potent force in making necessary the division of knowledge and the specialization of both social and intellectual functions.

As soon as the intellectual powers of man came to their maturity, (d) analysis become a logical as well as a practical necessity. The first man who counted, analyzed. The first astronomers had to analyze the heavenly scene. The first Western philosopher, Thales, analyzed all the apparently different objects and processes that constitute the physical world into forms of water. Once analysis began, curiosity drove it on to find what cannot be analyzed, if there be anything such. Atoms were found by Democritus — uncuttables, the word means. But modern science reveals in each atom a complex

[2] Plato, *Theaetetus,* 155D.

universe of powers. Not only is the atom analyzed, but some philosophers (especially the American neo-realists) analyze every possible object until all physical or mental characteristics are analyzed away, and only neutral entities remain. Yet to speak in terms of nonphysical and nonmental neutral entities does not seem to be very useful to physical or social scientists or to most philosophers, for many reasons, one of which is especially fundamental.

The fundamental reason why a complete analysis is insufficiently illuminating to the scientist, the philosopher, and the practical man is not that analysis is harmful or false. It is simply that analysis is inadequate to the facts. The facts are synoptic or organic. We experience wholes, as the Gestalt psychology has also pointed out. Our own self is a whole; every organism is a whole; society is a whole; the universe is a whole. It remains, of course, for endless inquiry to discover in each instance what kind of whole it is. Part of that inquiry consists in analysis; but analysis without action, analysis without appreciation of the unique properties of each whole, is incomplete inquiry. Not only is it incomplete, but it is peril of becoming meaningless. Any analysis is always relative to what has been analyzed. If, for example, a spatial whole has been analyzed into points and a temporal whole into instants, it would seem that the unanalyzable spatial points and the unanalyzable temporal instants could be distinguished from each other only by referring the points and instants to the spatial or temporal wholes from which they were derived. What I have called "the arrow of intelligibility" must fly back and forth between the whole and the part. The aim of the flight is not merely to hit the parts, but to enrich the whole. Mere analysis is never sufficient, especially in the social sciences. The aim of all social knowledge is to reinterpret the whole of life, to increase understanding and control. Without analysis, enriched knowledge of the whole is impossible. With analysis alone, it is equally impossible. Analysis and specialization are necessary, but they are not sufficient.

The complexity of (e) causal laws that have been discovered is another source of specialization. Inquiry into physical, chemical, geological, astronomical, biological, psychological, economic, political and social laws is sufficient of itself to generate specialization in the physicochemical and social sciences. Without a multiplicity of specialists no fruitful unity can be achieved.

In addition to being a survival-seeker and an animal-endowed-with-curiosity, man is, as has so often been said, "a fighter for ends." The complexity and conflict among these ends, as manifested in man's social behaviour, has produced specialization, both in inquiry and in social function. We must, then, speak of (f) normative principles as a source of the division of labour both in knowledge and in social organizations. If goodness, truth, beauty, and holiness are norms of what ought to be, there will arise specialists in ethics, in logic, science, and philosophy, in all the arts and religions, and there will arise social classes that aspire to authority in each of these realms.

A further, and very legitimate source of specialization, lies in the

dignity and autonomy of (g) the individual. Individualism may, it is true, become an antisocial force. Any view of the individual as a monad, "with no windows" and with absolute privacy and absolute right for himself without regard to others, is socially false. It is also a caricature of the true nature of the individual. Professor Mukerjee is greatly and rightly concerned to oppose such individualism. For example, he says:

> Philosophical idealism, metaphysical individualism, and social biologism of the nineteenth century, all have contributed separately and collectively to break up the real unity between the social and the individual in both social and moral theory and practice.[3]

He devotes a whole chapter to showing that "ethical individualism is one great foe of the great community."[4]

But Mukerjee also warns against regarding the individual "as a mere organ of society or of the cosmic process,"[5] and it is this reverence for the individual (embodied especially in Christian and Kantian ethics and modern personalism) which contributes to specialization and justifies it. Each individual has special endowments and gifts which may become his unique contribution to society. When a Raphael can become a painter, a Royce a metaphysician, a Radhakrishnan a philosopher-statesman, an Einstein a physicist, a Gandhi a saintly social leader, then society is far better served than if some bureaucracy had assigned quite unsuitable tasks to these men of genius. Specialization may be a symbol of the right of the individual to be true to the best in him.

The need for specialization could doubtless be defended on many other counts. Enough has been said to make clear sufficient grounds for the setting up of frontiers between the various disciplines, and specifically between the social sciences and the other branches of learning, especially philosophy.

But it must at once be added, the greater the need for specialization, just so much the greater is the need for reintegration. If science is atomized and disintegrated, civilization will be atomized and disintegrated. Knowledge of facts must come before adequate knowledge of relations and of wholes; immediacy must precede mediation. Analysis-synthesis, a knowledge of parts and their relations must be attained before we can have any enlightened synoptic understanding of the whole as a whole. Further, the facts must be available before they can be evaluated. True as all this is, it should not be forgotten that an analytic and specialized knowledge of all the parts of a human mind is far from guaranteeing that the analyst will understand the total person in question, even when complete analytic

[3] DM, 149-150. The enemy of this passage is clearly a real enemy. Yet the wording is obscure and inaccurate. In what sense has philosophical idealism in the nineteenth century tended to break up social unity? Hegelianism, on the contrary, exaggerated the organic wholeness of society, and all nineteenth and twentieth century idealism and personalism have laid great stress on the social. Mukerjee may have the dubious idealist Nietzsche in mind.

[4] DM, 524, under "Individualism."

[5] DM, xx.

knowledge is available.[6] Even more certain is it that the analytic or specialized procedure is not adequate for an understanding of social process. Mukerjee states a fundamental social truth when he declares that "no set of values and institutions can live and thrive in isolation."[7] All national sovereignty bows before the decisions of the United Nations — or the nation ceases to "thrive in isolation." So it is with individuals, values, and social groups.

Let us now consider some of the specific reasons why specialization is bound to be inadequate and why its boundary lines must be crossed.

First of all, (a) the division of experience and knowledge into specialties is artificial, not natural. There are no compartments in nature that are purely physical, set off from the chemical. There are no experiences that are purely social without including individual experience and experiences of the natural environment. Nature is not divided; God is not divided. All our specialties are analyzed out from the living whole of real experience. We need eventually to see them in the context of that whole.

As reality is a whole, so (b) the sciences are a whole. No science can stand alone. There would be no physics if the data for all the other sciences were not there, and physics depends on the existence of biological and psychological beings, as well as of physical nature. Chemistry and the other sciences presuppose physical objects and the science of physics. All sciences use common methods of observation, hypothesis, verification, and further exploration, in addition to the special methods which differences in subject matter require. The goal of science is not merely a perfect physics, a perfect biology, or a perfect sociology; but its goal is rather a growing body of interrelated knowledge. The social sciences draw upon all the others, and would be barren abstractions without them. Imagine an ecology without the co-operative work of many other sciences!

It is necessary, (c) to move beyond the separation between descriptive and normative sciences. That these traditional labels point to distinct tasks cannot well be denied. Description is an account of the facts and their causal relations. The social scientist rightly insists that you have not described all the facts of experience if you have omitted social groups, their behaviour, their laws, and their goals. A complete description of a society would necessarily include a description of the values approved and disvalues disapproved by that society. Description includes description of values. But a complete description of all values prized by Indians and Greeks, Patagonians and Alaskans, Indonesians and Scandinavians, would not have touched Plato's cross-cultural query: What is the true Good ? It must be granted that when any definition of the true Good or the true Beauty is undertaken, this norm must be described. Further, the materials for this description must be derived from clues, or hints, that are found in the "purely" descriptive sciences. A normative science could not be justified if created by some pure

[6] It should be added that psychoanalysts use the word analysis in a much less rigorous sense than do philosophers like the neorealists or more recent analysts.

[7] SSV, 73.

intuition of ideal value having no roots in actual experience beyond that institution. Kant's pure practical reason could not be imagined unless some actual human beings had willed to respect reason and the persons in whom alone reason is possible as an actuality.

The inadequacy of divisive specialization, with frontiers that can be crossed only on pain of intellectual death, is further illustrated by (d) the relations between the normative sciences and metaphysics. There is, it is true, a level on which ethics, for example, can be and should be developed independent of metaphysical considerations; and it is a pure cheat to drag in a metaphysic merely to support a preconceived ethical or economic or nationalistic or even a scientific program. But two or three basic considerations will show that there is a very close relation between the normative sciences and metaphysics.

First, it plainly requires no metaphysics in order to observe and state: This group practises cannibalism. But one cannot say: This group ought (or ought not) to practise cannibalism, without a knowledge of more than the brute facts of the case. One needs to know what Whitehead calls eternal objects; that is, one needs to know alternative possibilities. One needs also to know something of the true goal of human life ("the chief end of man"). In order to know these things he needs, of course, the science of ecology; but also, as far as in him lies, he needs to envision a cosmic ecology. Now cosmic ecology is simply a name for metaphysics. Horace said that nothing human is foreign to him. Let us go further and say that nothing real is foreign to man. It is self-evident that prayer and worship are not true values unless the devotee can believe in the metaphysical reality of a divine being. Or, to be more homely, yet equally metaphysical, there can be no true friendship unless there are truly two existing persons who are related as friends. There might, it is true, be a valid norm: There ought to be friendship, even after all persons were destroyed. But in a universe where, metaphysically, no persons existed, the norm itself could not exist as knowledge, nor could it be applied. It would be empty. To deny a relation between norms and metaphysics is therefore almost fantastic. Further, to know norms and the possibility of their realization is to know data which no metaphysics worthy of the name can ignore.

In a further, and very fundamental sense, specialization is inadequate. All science rests, in some sense, on the assumption, or at least on the hope, that Hegel was right when he said that (e) the real is the rational. A physicist will typically work out an hypothesis which takes a mathematical form. If observations do not conform to the hypothesis, a new (mathematical-rational) hypothesis is framed until one is hit on that is confirmed by observation. In short, the physicist will not admit that an idea of his is true unless it is rational. If no observations conformed to any rational hypothesis, then science, philosophy, religion, and civilized society would be impossible. This of course, does not mean that every fact of experience is an instance of reasoning; nor does it mean that the content of experience could be deduced from any formula if experience were not given. In this sense, the data of experience are nonrational; and it is rational to admit and include the nonrational. "Pure" reason is empty without

content. But all content can be, and must be, included under the inspection of reason.

What bearing does this have on specialization ? A very important one. Specialization appeals to reason for its very life. To reason it shall go. And reason is far more than deductive mathematics—logical necessity. Reason is the demand to include all the data of experience and to view them in their interrelations. "The true is the whole". To refuse specialization is to refuse reason. But to refuse to go beyond the boundaries of specialization is also to refuse reason. Reason supports the separate sciences; reason denies that their separation is final. Just as each nation makes its unique contribution to humanity, yet nationalism becomes a decisive peril without United Nations, so each science makes its unique contribution to knowledge, yet science becomes a peril to unified knowledge without a rational philosophy. There is no field of which this is truer than that of the social sciences. Abstract knowledge is necessary but it is not sufficient. Permanent abstraction becomes a foe both to concrete knowledge and to concrete application. The great life work of Radhakamal Mukerjee has been to make the social sciences concrete, both as knowledge and as application.[8]

V. *Specific Frontiers*

It has, I hope, been sufficiently established that each science, including the social sciences, can exist only by setting up and observing frontiers of separation; and also that every science, and especially the social sciences, must cross the frontiers for exchange of goods with other areas. In the remainder of this chapter my aim is briefly to illustrate this cross-fertilization by reference to certain sample concepts which are important in the social sciences.

First of all let us mention behavior and motivation. Only ignorance would deny the importance of the contribution made by behaviorists to the social sciences; and motivation has been fruitfully studied in terms of the stimuli of certain types of behavior. The social sciences have taken these concepts and methods over from psychology. Here is not only a frontier crossed between psychology and sociology, but philosophy is also near by. The philosopher must inquire into the presuppositions (or postulates) of any science. Such inquiry reveals that any science of behavior presupposes conscious observation of behavior; and that conscious observation precludes the truth of behaviorism as a complete account either of hu-

[8] A few quotations will suffice to support the statement in the text. "It will be the task of sociology to check social values and norms against social consequences, as well as check social consequences against values and norms" (SSV, 35). "Man's reason and judgment and society's experience build up the scale of values....." (SSV, 99). "Love, marriage, gambling and war throw to the winds the values systematised by religion and science through the centuries and encumber modern youths with the obscure superstitious scruples and regulations of magical lore" (SSV, 59). He demands a "higher sociality," that requires "integration, ... interpenetration,. . . . . common meanings and values" (SSV, 4). When he opposes "a rational weighing of interests and values" (SSV, 4) he is not opposing reason as defined in the text. Speaking of man's conscience and love, he says flatly that "metaphysics is the law of his social living" (DM, 426). Cf. SSV, 39 and 21.

man experience or of its motivation. Social science is quite incomplete unless it includes in its data and its explanations all the facts of human consciousness, including man's "spiritual life," as it has been called. This compels sociologists to break down the artificial barriers which would restrict their science to an investigation of observable behavior.

Another frontier, which is a by-product of scientific method and specialization, is that between part and whole. In the social sciences, this may take the form of substituting processes or events for persons, or of exaggerating either the atomistic privacy of the individual or the organic nature of the social whole in which the individual person vanishes like "the dew-drop in the shining sea."

The concept of part and whole must figure in the social sciences, but it is so plainly a frontier-concept that it is misleading to consider it in one context alone. The social scientist thinking of "the individual" and "the group" should take account of associational psychology and Gestalt; and he should bear in mind the debates among philosophers about analytic and synoptic methods. Today, "analytic philosophy" is popular, and the truth that wholes have properties that their parts do not have is in peril of being suppressed. If ever there was a borderline problem in the social sciences, it is this problem of the individual and his society — an example of the part whole problem with which Indian philosophy has always been concerned.

Professor Mukerjee's solution of this problem may well be called personalistic. In combating the error of social and metaphysical individualism (SSV, 4-5; DM, 16) he does not fall into the opposite error of social or metaphysical totalitarianism, but rather, by use of the concept person, reveals the social nature of the supposed "individual" (SSV, 16-17). His philosophical sociology substitutes for "the concept of the abstract individual . . . . . that of the social self or person." The person, then, is not a mere fact; socially and metaphysically he is a microcosm, as Lotze knew and as Swami Vivekananda showed in his *Jnana yoga.* These concepts, related to "the symbols and norms of the Universal Person in the Oriental world add a new dimension to human relationships and experience, and no small role in building up a wholeness and integrity in social life" (SSV, xvi).

Related to these frontier insights (sociology-philosophy-religion) is the concept that only he who now loves his neighbor can fully understand himself and his potentialities (SSV, 121). Mukerjee's work makes very clear that genuine understanding in the social sciences is promoted and enriched by crossing frontiers. There may be some debate about whether he goes too far in seeking "to break down the barriers between self and not-self" (SSV, 122). If all he means is the breakdown of antagonisms and the promotion of a sense of community and "commonalty," then he is stating both a basic principle of the social sciences and an ideal goal for all humanity. If he means the dissipation of personal identity, such an alternative would seem to imperil the very meaning of love, co-operation, and commonalty. Society requires members.[1]

[1] This aspect of truth is emphasized by Mukerjee in another context. "Goodness or moral value," he says, "is a matter of right relations between individuals"

A third frontier may be denoted by the expression causes-goals. This is closely related to the supposed separation of descriptive and normative sciences, already discussed. The frontier dawned in European consciousness when Socrates "heard someone reading from a book which he said was by Anaxagoras, and saying that it is the mind that sets in order all things and causes them." Socrates supposed that he was to have light on normative principles, setting forth "how to order and place each item in the way that is best". But instead, Socrates was cheated of his "wonderous hope", and found only descriptions of air, ether, and water. Bones and sinews were offered as explanations of human behaviour, whereas Socrates and his friends knew that the true cause of his being in prison and about to be executed, was no mere bone and sinew complex, but that "the Athenians deemed it better to vote me guilty, and therefore I have deemed it right to sit here and wait to suffer the penalty which they order."[2]

Since the insight of Socrates, Aristotle distinguished four "causes" —the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final. If the efficient (reduced to phenomenal by Hume and Kant) is the sole method of the sciences, then social science can shed no light on social goals. But if final causes — values — are taken into account by social sciences, then there is hope of a marriage of means and ends, of causes and values. Yet such marriage can be achieved only by adventurers who, like Mukerjee, cross the frontier between pure sociology (the realm of causes) and philosophy (the realm of ends), and fructify both fields to the benefit of humanity. In sharp contrast with this procedure is the method of those who would reduce sociology to bare objective statistical reports of social phenomena, leaving to someone else the vital task of evaluating these facts for their human importance.

A fourth example of frontier work is exemplified in the distinction between values and norms.[3] It is often supposed that values are the property of psychology, history, anthropology, and sociology; they are thought to be the mores of culture at a special time. Norms, however, if such "cross-cultural" notions are acknowledged, are supposed to dwell in the Platonic heaven, where the gods may inspect them on a morning chariot ride,[4] but in a realm remote from earth. Such frontiers are deadly. We needed no John Dewey to tell us that. Pofessor Mukerjee has made a valiant contribution to the crossing of these frontiers.[5] As he sees, a norm is a definition of what ought to be, but a norm is not a true value, even if located in Plato's World of Ideas or in God's mind. A true value is a personal-social experience in which the norm is exemplified.

Unless there are well-defined norms, there are no standards. But

(SSV, 36). The context shows that here "individuals" mean "persons. . . . . as free and equal beings."

2 Plato, *Phaedo,* 97B.....98E.

3 I am deeply indebted to Professor Mukerjee for his reference (SSV, 110, n. 1) to my article on "Value and Existence" in which I developed the distinction between values as experienced preferences and norms as rational standards of true value. It is a pleasure to report complete agreement between Professor Mukerjee and myself in the use of these concepts. His contribution is most detailed and valuable.

4 See Plato's *Phaedrus.*

5 See especially SSV, 107-111.

the most perfect norm is an ideal, and, as Mukerjee says (SSV, 107) "all ideas are also instrumental values." Unless the ideal norm is actually instrumental to the generation of values which conform to it, it is not even an instrumental value, save in potentiality. This emphasis on the concrete realization of norms, as well as on "the supremacy of higher values . . . . . [is] the *sine qua non* of culture, of civilisation, of the evolution of man from animality to humanity"[6] is a product of frontier thinking.

In short, "the sociological whole situation cannot be separated from ethical norms and value judgments.[7] Mukerjee's whole thinking rests on "the infinity and universality of values, ideals, and norms . . . . . as stable realities.[8]

The last frontier to be mentioned is that between persons and values.[9] There are those who regard persons as relegated entirely to psychology, individual and social; while values, they think, are impersonal Platonic Forms, or else mere mores of interest only to anthropologists.[10] It is true that persons and values may be investigated by many different sciences and from many different points of view. All the more necessary is it, if persons and values are to be adequately understood, to follow Mukerjee's example and fertilize understanding by a crossing of frontiers.

Suffice it to mention some of the frontier problems which must be faced and solved if we are to reach a significant social understanding of the relations of persons (groups), and values.

Are there any values which are not "in, of, and for persons," as T. H. Green put it, Is there a social mind, over and beyond persons, which is the bearer of social values? Is there a personal or a superpersonal divine mind, in possession of eternal truth about norms and concerned about the realization of values? What is the relation between random desires and values?

It is not clear that Mukerjee, or anyone, has an unambiguous answer to all these questions. On the one hand, as a good personalistic empiricist (like Green), he says that "all values, including moral values, are derived from human creatures." He also says that "the affirmation of personality provides the clue to the hierarchy of values." But, on the other hand, he also says on the same page that "an impersonal type of mysticism, such as is familiar in the East, is more appropriate for the integration of human relationships.[11] There is apparent contradiction between a basic personalism and a basic impersonalism or superpersonalism. This conflict is akin to

[6] SSV, 55-56.

[7] SSV, 42; see also SSV, 15.

[8] SSV, 1, xviii.

[9] See E. S. Brightman, *Persons and Values* (Boston: Boston University Press, 1952).

[10] It does not seem to occur to those who deny true cross-cultural norms that, if all values are deprived of truth and possess interest and meaning only for the culture where they are acknowledged, then it follows as the night the day that anthropology, as a scientific value of "our" culture, is a quaint localism without truth.

[11] DM, 195; SSV, 160. See also DM, 510, top of page. It seems possible that there is in these different emphases a conflict between head and heart or between tradition and critical thought.

that between Sankara and Ramanuja, and within the thought of Ramanuja himself, for that matter. Reconciliation may be found in a new definition of "impersonal" as meaning equally loving toward all persons.

Whatever the interpretation of this problem may be, all sociologists and all philosophers are profoundly indebted to Professor Mukerjee for his rich and inspiring insights into human society which transcend the frontiers of all sciences in the interest of the richest possible understanding of society and values in their broadest religious and philosophical significance.

4

PARSONS AND MUKERJEE: AN ESSAY ON ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS IN SOCIAL THOUGHT

By MANUEL GOTTLIEB

It is of course accidental that at approximately the same time two of the most creative figures in the contemporary social sciences should have attempted systematic expositions of their theoretical systems. In the case of Professor Parsons this attempt was given embodiment in two notable works which have only recently appeared and in a series of short papers which bear witness to a highly effervescent theoretical development.[1]

Professor Mukerjee, whose scientific work is honored in this memorial volume, sought to gather together and give an integrated restatement and further development in a series of volumes of his diverse contributions in the social sciences.[2]

What is significant about the parallelism in time is that it overlaps with so much congruence in viewpoint and specific doctrine. A common stress on "value-orientations" as the guiding thread to the analysis of cultural phenomena and social action and a common methodological insistence on the role of motivation and effort have resulted in much broad area of congruent doctrine.[3] Both authors

[1] Cf. Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe III., 1951). The analysis of the first five chapters of this work is carried to a much higher degree of refinement in the monograph which Parsons co-authored with E. A. Shils, "Values, Motives, and Systems of Action", included in the collection *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Parsons, Shils, eds., Cambridge, 1951) 47-278. With the specific authorship of Parsons much more diluted the introductory statement to this volume provides a very succinct and cogently argued summary of the general Parsonian position. Of the unpublished (but generally multilithed) papers which in rapid succession have been circulated in seminars and classrooms at Harvard University, the most illuminating for purposes of classification and further theoretical development are probably *A Note on the Theory of Symbolism in Relation to Action, with Special Reference to Generalization; Some Further Steps Toward a General Theory of Action* (co-authored with Robert F. Bales); *Memorandum II: Further Theoretical Considerations for A Study of Social Mobility.* In varying ways these papers carry the analysis and use of the "pattern-variable" approach much farther than in the two major works cited above.

[2] Since these works will be elsewhere cited and discussed in this volume no exact reference is needed. The two central works for our purposes are *Social Ecology* and *The Social Structure of Values.* Though running earlier in time his *The Institutional Theory of Economics* and the *Political Economy of Population* —two solid works published at the close of the decade of the Thirties—are of major importance.

[3] The common stress on value-orientations and on social man as a valuing creature was already prominent in the writings of the two men in the Thirties. Both authors employ a tripartite breakdown of value-orientations. But Mukerjee's breakdown — into values, ideals and norms — is both very persuasively argued and appears to weave a richer fabric of meaning. See Mukerjee, *The Social Structure of Values* (London 1950) xiii, 53f, 101ff "Values, ideals and norms form a coherent and harmonious hierarchy comprising the basic common knowledge of

believe that through religious beliefs and practises the value system of a society achieves its highest and most lasting integration. But doctrinal convergence is reached with highly varying methods of work and thought. Professor Parsons is the more systematic craftsman in the art of theoretic elaboration. He has aimed to build a theoretical system that can be readily communicated and whose components can be broken down and recombined freely. In such a system raw facts are never approached in their own light but only selectively and by means of specially designed concepts. These concepts at the start are laid down in the form of *ad hoc* premises which embody certain fundamental discriminations. The crucial task of theory is so artfully to select and to combine a minimum set of initial premises that a live and fructifying theoretical development can ensue of its own accord. The essence of such development consists of a widening range of empirical reference which is made possible by the unfolding of thought and the unravelling of new implications which enrich and replace but do not invalidate earlier conclusions. In this mode of analysis an unnecessary abstraction which evades or obscures some essential aspect of social reality is as costly and faulty as the mode of treatment which jumps to conclusions or telescopes the analysis before the theoretical properties of the material have been fully eluci-

the human situation and the right principles of behavior of individuals and groups." (xiii). Values are more or less defined as the sought-after goals or desires deriving from the more elemental drives (96ff). The ideal in turn "integrates into a larger mental system many competing impulses, interests and values. . . . . and builds up that enduring fusion and harmony of mental patterns which is called character" (100-101). Ideals "sometimes widen their range and become more comprehensive in their content and so performing a coherent and harmonious structure among themselves. These thus give rise to norms." (*ibid.*) Parsons' analysis of value-orientations is both more systematic and more carefully wrought. But possibly because it crystalizes so definitely, it has taken on a suspect form. In this form these orientations are reducible to five pairs of dichotomous sets of pattern-variables as they are termed. And while in *Social System* it is only vaguely implied that these sets are exhaustive (*Social System,* multilithed edn, p. 82) in the Parsons-Shils essay and the successor papers the thesis is argued at some length. Much of the cogency of the entire body of analysis will tend to turn on the issue. "We hold", write Parsons-Shils, "that the five pattern variables constitute a system covering all the fundamental alternatives which can arise directly out of the frame of reference for the theory of action" ("Values, Motives and Systems", *loc. cit.,* 88). In this essay the only argumentation adduced in support of this perilous proposition essentially was question-begging, for it specified that pattern variables must derive in just those ways in which the pattern variables selected may most easily be justified or deduced. The simplest and most authoritative method of sustaining the case would have been a canvass of possible alternative pairs drawn from the history of social thought. Thus to cite only a single thinker, there is Veblen's habitual bellicose frame of mind—"a prevalent habit of judging facts and events from the point of view of the fight"—or a discrimination between events and persons in terms of a dichotomy between animate and nonanimate phenomena. One thinks of a traditionalistic versus an innovationary frame of mind or a worshipful and a profane attitude. The Parsons-Shils variables can with some strain be used to derive some of these paired attitudes but not all without some impairment of meaning. Evidence of strain is also felt in the unsymmetrical patterning of the five pattern-variables one of which stands out bleak and almost wholly neglected (collective-self-seeking orientations). This indicates that the Parsonian discussion of value-orientations still has not struck bedrock.

dated.[4] By confining his analysis to the level of discourse which he has brought into being and has under control, the theoretician provides the cauterized intellectual tools by which the results of thought can be most powerfully developed, communicated and divested of a purely private character and assimilated into the organon of a science.[5]

Professor Mukerjee's characteristic mode of thought is almost the contrary of Parsons'. His work is encyclopedic in range, brilliant in generalization, ever recurring to the same problems in a new light and always giving them renewed or revivified expression. In this approach analysis does not unfold by approximations. Analysis is concerned from the start with the multi-colored social reality which is examined along dividing lines which are either conventionally prescribed or topically coherent. The material is constantly probed for insights and ultimate answers. Hence his work embodies an exceptionally rich range of generalization, fertilized by an almost universal scholarship and a rare combination of first-hand observation of social reality and behavior and skilful use of theoretic literature. But in the nature of the case much of this generalization is imprisoned in the webwork of syntheses which cannot easily be broken down into the organon of a science.

It will be the theme of this paper that the two methods and bodies of writings need to be cross-fertilized. Specifically it will be suggested that Professor Parson's theoretical system is impoverished

[4] Leonard Nelson has been noteworthy among methodologists of social thought for his insistence on rigorously carrying through a given theoretical scheme on both a "high enough level of abstraction" and one in which the "transition to application to reality is not made too early before the pure consequences of the theory have been worked through". L. Nelson, *System der Philosophischen Rechtslehre und politik* (1924, Munich).

[5] This is of course the Hegelian method which was elucidated in the preface to the *Phanomenologie des Geistes* and given embodiment in the *Philosophy of Right*. The parallels which might be found in methodological approach between this latter book and the new Parsonian work are striking. Both start with an analysis of the simplest forms of human action; both aim at achieving a theoretical development with some logical autonomy; both bring under successive survey new and enriched levels of analysis covering the fields of human action, basic institutions, economic exchange (instrumental complex in Parsons, division of labor on the basis of Recht in Hegel) and the formation of ethical life which becomes an institutionalized morality (Hegel) with mind (Parsonian value-orientations) or spirit (ethos) shining through. With the idealizing emphasis reversed, this method has been given a well known embodiment in the work of Marx. See my paper, "Marx's Mehrwert Concept and Theory of Pure Capitalism", *Review of Economic Studies* XVIII, (1951) 164-178. It may also be noted in passing that Rousseau's *Social Contract* embodies another attempt to apply the theoretical method of analysis on the basis of precise concepts through approximations. Failure to realize this accounts for much misunderstanding of Rousseau's great classic. As C. E. Vaughan pointed out in an authoritative analysis the *Social Contract* combined both "speculative originality" and "wide range" of enquiry with a clear "practical object". "Originally presented" in an "abstract form" it "ultimately assumes....the more qualified and concrete form". See C. E. Vaughan, "Introduction and Notes" to the *Political writings of J. J. Rousseau* (Cambridge, 1951) I, vii, 21, 69. While neither Marx nor Rousseau could achieve the smooth analytical flow which Hegel's genius could improvise so readily, much of the Hegelian flow is spurious or turns on tricks of interpretation or word-juggling.

by failure adequately to incorporate the range of rich insights and mediating generalizations which runs through Professor Mukerjee's work. Conversely, it will be assumed, though it will not be explicitly argued, in this paper that the kind of theoretical exposition developed by Professor Parsons provides the most fruitful framework in which to develop the implications and to project the work of Professor Mukerjee.

II

That Professor Parsons' theoretical system harbors serious elements of strain is indicated by the fate of the conceptual scheme which is given a detailed statement in the first four chapters of the work, *The Social System.* These chapters contain a noteworthy presentation of the elementary components of social systems, their functional prerequisites and their main governing conditions. The classifications are worked out with an almost pedantic exactitude while the interrelationships at the relevant levels are exhaustively canvassed. The analysis is theoretic in the special sense that throughout it bears reference only to very fundamental properties or features of social systems which are approached not empirically as going entities but selectively through certain basic discriminations. By implication and express assertion the analysis pretends to completeness and logical closure in the special sense that all the relevant discriminations and concepts and relationships are worked out which are needed to project the analysis into closer approximation to reality.[6]

It is precisely in this sense that the theoretical scheme while self-consistent and reflective of many basic processes of social reality and structural components of social system was found inadequate. The scheme spelled out a framework of analysis which disclosed an immense variation in social systems covering an absurdly wide range. In this sense the system had no ballast. As the author recognized, logical continuation of the analysis would involve "spinning out the logical possibilities of the permutations and combinations of certain more or less arbitrarily defined structural components." We do not find "that empirically observable structures cover anything like the range of theoretically possible variability; possible, i.e. according

[6] The claim to completeness is inherent in the method but was also given express assertion in the work. Thus the analysis was brought to the point where it would "approach the level of concreteness with which the empirical sociologist is concerned". Or again it was stated: "We have now reached the point where an attempt must be made to work out a basis for the structural description of a social system as a whole, showing the basis of the differentiation of its units from each other, the ranges of that differentiation and the structural relations of the units which constitute the system." It was expressly asserted that merely "filling in" the analysis "with the requisite detail of properly conceptualized statements of empirical fact" would constitute an "adequate description of a concrete social system". Hence it was concluded that there had been "coherently worked out" a "system of points of reference within which to locate any more specialized study and to begin to establish connections between the different parts,"—in other words a "basis from which the comparative analysis of different social structures must start". See *Theory of Social System,* chap. IV (multilithed ed., 160, 191f, 209).

to purely logical permutations and combinations of structural components".[7]

To correct this deficiency the analysis was turned to the examination of the main "empirical clusterings" and of the structural imperatives which underlie them. But for this purpose the theoretical scheme already elaborated was dropped. Instead of providing the requisite theoretical ballast by reworking the earlier foundations of the theory, there was thrown on to the scales as in the poetical contest in Aristophanes' famous drama, *the Frogs*, heavily weighted materials of fact.[8]

Extracted by direct observation or impression on the basis of conventional criteria, these materials were not exhaustive or comprehensive. They have an *ad hoc* character not because they are inadvisable or irrelevant but because the criteria by which they are selected and the standards by which their appropriateness is governed are not implicated into the earlier body of analysis or tallied with it for consistency or comprehensiveness.

The difficulties and awkwardness growing out of the use of *ad hoc* categories in a theoretical analysis have been noted in the earlier work of Professor Parsons. As he said, " . . . . any system of sound empirical generalizations implies a generalized theoretical system." The introduction of *ad hoc* features thus essentially signifies that a logical gap in one course of thought is patched up with the empirical derivatives of another unrelated and possibly incongruous course of thought. These derivatives are "defined theoretically by their failure to fit into the positively defined categories of the system." It was in these terms that Professor Parsons once caustically condemned the introduction of "arbitrary *ad hoc* constructions and classifications or the introduction of structural categories which are merely tolerated, not systematically developed." For these reasons also Professor Parsons once noted that theoretical advance consists chiefly in the assimilation of "residual categories" into the main theoretical organon.[10] Hence Parsons correctly observed that "even though any number of facts may be 'known' outside this center, they are not scientifically important until they can be brought into relation with a theoretical system."[11]

[7] *Ibid*, 211, 231.

[8] We will remember that Aeschylus, impatient with the controversy between himself and Euripides, declared that "I've enough of them; For my part I shall bring him to the balance, as a true test of our poetic merit, to prove the weight of our respective verses." And a scale is forthwith brought on the stage on which the authors throw their lines resonant with weighty meanings and imagery.

[9] In the *Theory of Social System* the relevant empirical features were characterized as "illustrative". See chapt. V, p. 211.

[10] Cf. Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied* (Glencoe, iii., 1949) 24, 30; *The Structure of Social Action* (2nd Glencoe iii. ed., 1949) 17.

[11] *Ibid.*, 16 "It is possible", noted Parsons earlier, "to have scattered and unintegrated bits of knowledge, and to assent to the 'truth' of further scattered bits as they are called to one's attention. This type of knowledge does not, however, constitute 'science'....." (*idem.*). It might also be worthwhile citing Parsons' own definition of "residual categories". "If as is almost always the case, not all the actually observable facts of the field, or those which have been

Our quest then points to a resurvey of the main theoretical scheme to ascertain the most appropriate mode in which it may be modified to accommodate a wider range of empirical reference and to display sufficient structural congruence with the real world. This resurvey will focus on weaknesses in the initial theoretical scheme which led to structural diffuseness of the scheme. These weaknesses, in our judgment, are related to lines of emphasis and theoretical elaboration which with great distinctiveness have been presented in the writings of Professor Mukerjee.

III

It is convenient to commence our critical review of the formative stages of Professor Parsons' theoretical system with a question of the adequacy of the triadic formula around which his work—and much contemporary social theory—has been written: personality, culture and social system (society).[12] Now in many ways it is questionable whether the distinctions implicit in the triadic formula are adequate. Inadequacy is indicated by the diversity of social types covered by the term "social system". It may be used to define very small collectivities or interacting groups. In its broadest signification, for which the term "society" was suggested, it covers a network of social systems linked together with stable interactive patterns and presumably operating on a roughly self-sufficient basis.[13] Though no systematic survey of the "societies" covered by the concept was made, there is clear implication that it includes such distinctive social sys-

observed, fit into the sharply, positively defined categories, they tend to be given one or more blanket names ["empirical clusterings"] which refer to categories negatively defined, that is, of facts known to exist, which are even more or less adequately described, but are defined theoretically by their failure to fit into the positively defined categories of the system." (*ibid.*, 17).

12 See *Social System*, chap. I, "The Action Frame of Reference and the General Theory of Action Systems: Culture, Personality and the Place of Social System". Though one cannot speak of so commonly found a classification as being borrowed from any one source, the distinctiveness with which this classification was presented in P. Sorokin's *Society, Culture and Personality* (NY 1947) 63f warrants the suggestion that special reference to Sorokin's work might have been advisable.

13 Formally (and actually as elaborated in usage) the term "social system" in the newer Parsonian writings means any "system of interaction of a plurality of persons....composed of relationships....[of such persons] drawing for its central unity on the 'role". Hence "Any system of interactive relationships of a plurality of actors is a social system". Parsons-Shils, "Toward a General Theory", *loc. cit.*, 23, 26. In *Social System* the concept "social system" is formally defined as "systems of interaction of a plurality of individual actors oriented to a situation and where the system includes a commonly understood system of cultural symbols" (p. 4.). Thus a club, a local community, a church or any plurality of actors organized around a structured set of roles, fulfilling some function and operating on the basis of shared values becomes a "social system". A society in turn is defined as an "empirically self-subsistent social system..... which meets all the essential functional prerequisites of long term persistence from within its own resources" (*ibid.*, 23). Elsewhere the term "self-subsistent" was elaborated as signifying the containing "within approximately the boundaries defined by membership all the functional mechanisms required for its maintenance as a system" (Parsons-Shils, *ibid.*, 196).

tems as classical China, South America, the United States and Germany.[14]

Apparently it was not noted that only one of the societies noted as such could be considered fully independent and self-subsistent. At least three of the above-noted societies (United States, South America and Germany) are parts of a larger organically integrated society which has its own distinctive developmental history, its own interactive processes, its far-flung division of labor, its codes and laws and its own regulative institutions and shared culture. Though overt institutionalization has only taken very tangible form and developed at a rapid rate in the most recent period for the Western world society, close integration and cultural and functional interweaving has always existed at a relatively high pitch in the Western world. Other societies also can be best interpreted and understood as component parts of a larger civilizational complex which embraces a number of interacting and coexisting societies more or less closely associated and sharing a common culture, a specific region and frequently a given ethnic basis. At least since the work of Toynbee a strong case can be made that significant social investigation must focus on a system of widest ambit and largest independence if the true filiation of cause and effect and the governing conditions of social process and development are to be perceived in their clearest form.[15]

[14] See *Social System*, p. 253f.

[15] Strictly speaking, the work of Toynbee in this connection should be linked together with that of Spengler and Danilevsky on the one hand and that of Max Weber on the other. P. Sorokin has steadfastly denied the integrity of the concept of "civilization" as a significant historical unity. He rather envisages loosely integrated and mobile culture areas through which constant fluctuations in varying rhythms pulsate. He envisages an "ocean of social life" which is in "incessant motion" and which consists of an enormous number of various social organizations in an incessant process of appearing and disappearing". His groups are "bonded" together only to varying degrees and their cultural traits tend to become diffused, to travel and to "fluctuate". These ideas run through all of Sorokin's works and were given distinctive impress already in his *Social Mobility* (NY 1927). Major documentation was provided in *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (4v. 1937-1941). For short exposition see Sorokin, *Society, Culture and Personality* where his concept of "society" melts away into an aggregate unstructured aggregate or "population" of "groups which are 'differentiated', 'stratified' and 'bonded' (See chap. 4, 9, 10, 16 and pages 296ff, 531ff). The entire analysis of the dynamics of recurrent social processes is in terms of virtually unrelated "groups" or "relationships" whose "fluctuations" are independently studied. (see Part VI.) For a brief criticism of "civilizational" theorists see chap. 43. It is naturally impossible to attempt here to defend against Sorokin's powerful critique the validity of the civilizational concept as used by Toynbee and Max Weber. But on the basis of legitimate facts it seems that Sorokin has drawn some illicit conclusions. Because the culture of major civilizational areas in very imperfectly integrated and to a greater or lesser degree is influenced by contact or interaction with other civilizations does not mean that the cultural development and life of a civilization is not sufficiently bonded together and interdependent to be treated as an integral unit. Likewise the quality of the social life and institutions and modes of production of different civilizations may be so distinctively different (which Max Weber for one argued was the case with modern "Western" society) that conclusions and reasoning derived from one civilization may be totally inapplicable to another or applicable only with marked limitations. In this sense civilizations are sufficiently distinctive on the one hand and self-subsistent and all-embracing on the other to make up the

But between the civilizational area and a society proper or some kind of all-inclusive social system there is yet another social form with properties sufficiently distinctive to warrant segregated treatment. This social form is that which R. Mukerjee in a series of brilliant works has championed for almost four decades: the region. "The fundamental unit of study for sociology is the region".[16] The region "is at once an ecological aggregate of persons, an economic frame-work and a cultural order. . . ., a faithful expression of the distribution of population, resources and occupations". The region is a "common and co-ordinate set of stimuli, eliciting a similarity of responses, habits and feelings which are reinforced by gregariousness, and which are moulded and stabilised into a characteristic mental type and pattern of living. . . .the legacy of occupations, traditions and culture." A society is not merely a plurality of persons or collectivities inhabiting a given territory or with a territorial integrative focus. Its territory is a region, a man-made habitat to which the society becomes adapted in an ever-changing ecologic balance. Region and man are in continuous interaction, and out of their give and take are born the major types of rural economy and settlement and standards of culture. The region thus is a "synthetical, reverberating whole with hamlets, villages and towns, weaving a characteristic pattern of human circulations and interrelations functionally integrated in the region and in the regional ways of living".[17]

It is not contended here that the analysis of social system conceived as extending to more or less autonomous societies functioning within some larger civilizational complex and composed of one or more regional complexes must involve detailed analysis of the civilization and the region as distinctive entities. But it is considered that any conceptual scheme which dissolves the region and civilization within the same amorphous concept that is used to distinguish concrete social systems is submerging a series of vital distinctions which need separate articulation. Failure to work out this articulation naturally left its impress on the theory and helps to account for its failure to contain within itself or permit to be developed those structural imperatives of social systems which are actually found in empirical reality. In Parson's classification of the social sciences and of sociological no recognizable place was accorded either the study of all-inclusive civilizations or of regional complexes. Failure to place societies as functioning within a more all-inclusive civilization helped to structure the artificial image of a social system as functioning in an isolated society without neighbors or systematic inter-

most satisfactory unit of study for a sociological analysis of society and social systems generally. For this reason, too, Sorokin's argument in v. I of his *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, pp. 161-84, about the homogeneity of cultural life intercivilizationally is of critical importance.

[16] *Mukerjee, Social Ecology* (Longman & Green, nd), viii

[17] See Mukerjee, *Social Ecology*, viii and chaps. XIII and XIV; Mukerjee, *Man and his Habitation, A Study in Social Ecology* (Longman & Green, 1940, Lucknow, India) 168-178. Mukerjee's basic work in this field was his 1926 classic, Regional Sociology.

meshing with other societies. Hence no recognition was taken of the pressures and mechanisms which have grown out of the participation of societies in larger civilizational complexes. It is sufficient to mention here those outside pressures which culminate in war and lead to militarism. A theory of social system worked out by Parsons to fit the hypothetical case of an isolated society is about as unreal and distorted as the utilitarian vision of a society composed of atomized individuals.

It was overlooked that the bounds of any society are not rigidly drawn but are marked by zones of interaction of lesser density between societies. If a state can be defined in John Dewey's terms as lying "somewhere between the associations that are narrow, close and intimate and those which are so remote as to have only infrequent and casual contact", the bounds of a society must be similarly indistinct. And just as the theory of state sovereignty — which is the counterpart in political theory to the image of the isolated social system adumbrated by Parsons — has a validity only for the limiting case of an isolated political society, so there is no actual boundary line which can be drawn between societies which in their complex relationships "may pass through federations and alliances into a larger whole which has some of the marks of statehood."[18] It is because the projection of an isolated society blunts or obscures the lines and pressures growing out of federated societies that this projection may be so harmful in the elucidation of social theory.

Since the significance of both regional and civilizational complexes is so vital for the understanding of social systems, it might be asked how a theorist with the extended empirical knowledge and theoretical subtlety of Professor Parsons could leave them out of account in his formative analysis of social system.[19] Partially of course Parsons has followed the footsteps of many famous theorists. It is sufficient to mention that the analysis of both Rousseau and Marx was developed in the form of a more or less isolated society, a

[18] J. Dewey. *The Public and its Problems* (NY 1927). W. Y. Elliott in his *The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics* (NY 1928) paid his tribute to the pluralist insight that "federalism based upon a working division of powers to fit areas of community is the key to a workable means of political association in international as well as in national society" (p. 478). Laski has quite wisely said that "a theory of the state.....must be from one angle a philosophy of international law." Laski *The State in Theory and Practice* (NY 1935). 193.

[19] On the empirical side there is no doubt that Professor Parsons is aware of the fluid and vagrant nature of the boundary lines between the larger societies and of the reflex action on social system which arises from varied civilizational contexts. The Weberian study of the great civilizations and emphasis on the distinctive characteristics of Western society would alone suffice for this. See *Structure of Social Action,* chaps. XIV, XV; *Essays in Sociological Theory,* 139-151 and 251-274. The latter essay, entitled "Certain Primary Sources and Patterns of Aggression in the Social Structure of the Western World" is distinctive both for its illuminating analysis and the understanding manifested of the constraining force of the multinational process which has made the Western world a single cosmos and not simply a mere aggregate of similar or even interdependent societies. Western society, he asserted, "is a very complex entity with many different variations on national, regional, cultural, class and other bases." (255).

fact which was the more significant since both were aware of the federalized nature of the bourgeois cosmos whose development and inner mechanisms they were trying to elucidate.[20] The weight of tradition, in this case, was reinforced by certain basic features of Professor Parsons' analysis. First, Parsons' procedure involved elaboration of a theory of social system by commencing with the most elemental units and relationships of social system which could be grasped within the context of a concrete situation (however idealized) and be stated in terms which would elucidate a set of roles and motivational processes within personalities. All social behavior is, as Parsons has emphasized, "ultimately the behavior of human beings, understandable in terms of the motivation of individuals, perhaps millions of them, *in the situations* in which they are placed."[21] Considering the sins of omission and distortion which have characterized that larger body of social theory which has only very imperfectly taken full account of motivational processes within personalities, the emphasis of the Parsonian work is understandable and serves to bring out basic features of social reality in their full prominence. But the presentation of elementary components of social action as the mode to build up to analysis of complex collectivities can readily tend to minimization of what in an earlier work Parsons aptly titled "emergent properties". Social systems, Parsons emphasized "have properties that are emergent only on a certain level of complexity in the relations of unit acts to each other.....which cannot be derived by a process of direct generalization of the properties of the unit act."[22] Unless unit analysis is carried beyond a certain point the emergent properties "evaporate and are no longer observable."[23]

It is not unlikely that due to concern that analysis of social systems must proceed by exhaustive analysis of their elementary components, it was not possible to take cognizance of inter-relationships of an intersocietal (civilizational) character or to anticipate these in the basic "structural" analysis. The effects of this analytical procedure may frequently be noted in the tendency of the work to generalize too quickly in areas of complex social reality on the basis

[20] As is well known Rousseau's analysis of a bourgeois society (in the *Social Contract*) did not extend to the analysis of such a society in a federalized cosmos though in the Emile and in his article on St. Pierre's project for a European order Rousseau brought out his full awareness of this fact and of its transformative effect on political life. The same was essentially true of Marx who was fully aware that the bourgeois cosmos of the Western world was essentially an international order embracing of necessity the more advanced European powers and a variety of supporting regions and climates which were tied into a tightly bound network of trade and production. Marx indicated many times that the international and expansive and colonial character of the bourgeois cosmos was not accidental or necessary only to explain genesis but was essential. (See *Capital*, I, Mod Lib ed. 824). Yet Marx's own theory of capitalism was adumbrated within a national framework and presupposed the existence of an isolated capitalist society. Among the Marxists the talented Rosa Luxemberg was among the first to stress the world-wide nature of the capitalist economy while N. Bukharin's book on this theme is still one of the best. See Luxemberg, *Einfuhrung in die Nationalokonomie* (Berlin 1925) chap I; Bukharin, *Imperialism and World Economy* (NY, 1926).

[21] Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory*, 252.

[22] *Structure of Social Action*, 739, 748.

[23] *Ibid.* 749.

of an analysis of behavior which takes place under very simple conditions. This it may be believed was notably true of certain phases of the discussion of social control and deviance.[24] A similar element of strain emerges from the assumption of the analysis that social systems are maintained in a kind of timeless "equilibrium" without any immanent tendency toward development.[25]

Two other contributing factors helped to submerge the role of civilization and region in Parsons' theory of social system. One of these concerns the system of economic theory which Professor Parsons has incorporated by reference into his analysis. This system reduces chiefly to modern (market) price theory which has customarily been elaborated either in a completely unhistorical setting or with reference to a more or less isolated national economic organism which is only

[24] See *Social System,* chap. VII. The analysis of deviance and mechanisms of social control is one of the remarkable contributions of Parsons' system which shows its ability to facilitate wide coordination of analysis on many different levels. But the analysis was derived from very simple modes of interaction depicted in a schematicized manner and occurring in any random social situation. It may be doubted whether the resulting analysis exhausts the "focus of the well known vicious circle in the genesis of deviant behavior patterns whether they be neurotic or psycho-somatic illness, criminality or others". (*ibid.,* 362) This may be illustrated with the case of hoboism which is defined as a tendency toward which "the passively oriented anti-conformist" is oriented in order to achieve a "maximal avoidance of implication in the positive expectation system of the society." (*ibid.,* 406). But though it draws on these personality inclinations, hoboism cannot be located except in a specific social universe which involved a system of migratory labor on the unskilled level and severe strains in the effort to cope with socially accepted goals under adverse circumstances. There are social systems in which hoboism was unknown. Hoboism must then be considered an institutionalized form of a general potential which yields different results in varied settings.

[25] This "bias" of the Parsonian system is strikingly brought out in his concept of a social system (by definition) as "boundary-maintaining" rather than as inherently developing and in a rather meager treatment given the phenomena of social change (see the weak chapter on this subject in *Social System,* chap. XI.) As Parsons there stated "one of the central strategic elements of the present conceptual scheme" was the fundamental tendency towards "stabilization of the processes of mutual orientation within complementary roles" (p. 685). Certainly any social system must function as a "stabilized interaction process" and be boundary-maintaining in the special sense of maintaining "relative to its environment . . . . . certain constancies of pattern whether this constancy be static or moving" (686). Stated in this way the theorem is not objectionable. Some degree of constancy of pattern will be preserved through the most disorderly periods of change. And as Sorokin has argued the malintegration of culture will ensure inconsistencies of pattern as a by-product of change. Beyond this, little progress is made in the chapter and Parsons had to make the statement — which is a tribute to his theoretical candor — that "a general theory of the processes of change of social systems is not possible in the present state of knowledge". (692). Certainly it is not possible unless social systems (of a societal scope) are related to the regional complexes out of which they are born and of whose life they partake and are further related to the larger civilizational complexes out of which the governing or controlling conditions of development may be traced. Over and against this general approach to "social change," Sorokin's critique of the equilibrium concept in social theory and his advocacy of the principle of "immanent" change within a principle of "limits" together with an indication of certain "prime movers" and of the nature of the "rythms" involved would appear to offer a better starting point for analysis. See *Cultural and Social Dynamics,* IV, chaps. V, VII, VIII, XII, XIII, XIV,

sporadically linked with like organisms through "foreign trade".[26] Parsons' commitment to this brand of economic theory is of old standing and made up a major issue in the body of writing which culminated in the *Structure of Social Action*.[27] In this respect a very clear contrast can be drawn between the work of Parsons and Mukerjee

[26] That conventional economic theory, as best represented in the work of Walras, Pareto and Wicksell, revolved around the analysis of an unhistorical and generally "imaginary" society conceived of as existing in a social void and having only sporadic outside contacts is well known and is brought to the fore by one of the names which conventional economic theory obtained in Germany, *Nationalökonomie*. "In economics", Mukerjee has stated, "the traditional individualistic approach and the conception of economics as a theory of national wealth and prosperity .. . . . . present economic problems as national issues disregarding the growing interdependence of nations". R. Mukerjee, *Political Economy of Population* (London 1943) 403. For this purpose, of course, conventional economic thought was supplemented — but not integrated with—a special literature dealing with "foreign trade". "It seems to me", complained A. W. Smithies in a recent paper, "that the drift . . . . . of modern theory has aided, abetted and rationalized the disintegration of the world economy and has failed to point the way to a workable world system." Smithies, "Modern International Trade Theory and International Policy", *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings* XLII (1952) 169.

[27] See particularly "Some Reflections on 'The Nature and Significance of Economics' ", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* XLVIII (1934) 511-545; and the *Structure of Social Action*, 95-102, 121ff, 129-177, 264ff, 728ff. Substantially Parsons was concerned in this work—which curiously enough has passed this generation of economists almost unread—with restating the conditions in which and the mode of reformulation with which conventional neo-classical economic theory (of price economics and marginal utility) could be given validity within a system of sciences of social action. Though the critique of utilitarianism was a powerful one and of that form of "modern" economic thought (such as L. Robbins) which is destructive of other social sciences, the critique was limited essentially to rendering economics "assimilable" with social theory. Substantially also the Paretoan type of restatement of economic theory was endorsed. See specifically on this *ibid.*, 264f, 766. The keynote of this economic theory was the analysis of processes of "exchange" and "allocation". Indeed, economics as a science was formally defined as being concerned with one sector of "intermediate" means-ends action involving choice between a plurality of ends and the utilization of limited means which are rationally employed to achieve the selected goals. For the formal definition see "Some Reflections. . . .", *loc cit.*, 526. The note of universalism inherent in the definition which is formally applicable to all social systems is lifted, however, by the caution that the theory is applicable only to societies in which a specific "economic" sector of action has been differentiated to a prominent degree. Although this was countered by repudiation of the Sombartian view "that there can be no such thing as a generally applicable economic theory but only a plurality of theories each applying to a particular historical, economic system." (*ibid.*, 531). Robbins' version of economics is not decried; it is only that he "puts the case for a logically independent science of economics badly" (*ibid.*, 544). Within its own limitations, Parsons has long construed the science of economics as the most advanced of the social sciences (See *Structure of Social Action*, 101, 125, 766f). This was also indicated in the recent writings with which we are chiefly concerned in this paper. Thus the Parsonian-authored statement endorsed by all the contributors to the Parsons-Shils volume characterized economics in its present-day conventional form as "probably the most highly elaborated sophisticated and refined of the disciplines dealing with action in our sense". (See Appendix to "Some Fundamental Categories of the Theory of Action: A General Statement", Parsons-Shils, *Toward A General Theory of Action*). See also *Social System*, chap. XII. Thus again this dominated the treatment of economic aspects of social system which in *universal terms* were reduced to processes of allocation and exchange—the pivotal concepts of modern neo-classical economics. See *Social System*, chaps. III and IV.

who also as a social scientist has attempted to work out the problems of a sociologically valid statement of economics. While much of Mukerjee's powerful critique of conventional economic thought would be acceptable to Parsons, the distinctive note sounded by Mukerjee was his effort to work out an enlarged body of analysis—roughly covering the sectors of "ecological" and "institutional" economics—into which conventional (price) theory figures not as an all-dominating doctrinal absolute (as with Parsons) but as a level of analysis which must be both deepened and transcended in order fully to encompass reality.[28]

Just as the Parsonian addiction to conventional economic theory helps to account for the structuring of his analysis of social systems, his partiality toward the "power" approaches to political thought conduced to the same end. Just as "allocation" becomes the dominating concept of economic activity with Parsons, so maximization of power-holding is the dominating criteria of political aspects of social systems.[29] Though modified by recognition of the claimed diffuseness of the subject-matter of politics which hampers the formation of any systematic body of analysis, the role of power-struggle and monopolization is paramount in Parsons' treatment of the political aspects of social system. This on the one hand reflects a broad current of thought among political theorists for whom political action was reducible to a dimension of power-maximization.[30] On the other hand, the emphasis on power would appear to derive from the influence of Pareto and Weber. In any case the reduction of political processes to a power dimension and the conception of a society as having a territorially integrated and centered power focus where power was monopolized in effect restated the classical view of the state as a body possessing sovereignty over a given territory. But the sovereign national state is in turn conceivable only in the form of a political society which as in classical political theory was either isolated or which was limited in its inter societal contacts

[28] See R. Mukerjee, *The Institutional Theory of Economics* (1940, Macmillan & Co., Delhi, India) see particularly chapters I and II. In this amazing book, which along with Commons' *Institutional Economics*, has been virtually boycotted by economists, conventional economics is both given a powerful critique and a magnificent amplification. The work is an amalgam which combines criticism with restatement of a body of theory much of which overlaps with what Parsons has chosen to call the *Theory of Social System*. But time and again Mukerjee insists that conventional economics with its 'fictions' and its pseudo-mathematical exactness shows a "fundamental inadequacy for interpreting phenomena" (351). The old "conceptual constructions" which Parsons would keep as a doctrinal absolute (science) "which formed the basic premises for the systems of economic theories of the past" are in Mukerjee's belief "now giving way to the observation and quantitative survey of economic processes and activities of groups" (352). The doctrine of marginal utility which Parsons accepts is spurned by Mukerjee (125ff).

[29] See *Social System*, chap. IV, 177ff. Politics is here treated in terms of a hierarchy of power and of a "functional need to organize the power system relative to force and territory. . . ." In chap. V, "Territoriality, Force and the Integration of the Power System" were treated as one of the "empirical clusterings" of social systems. For earlier adumbrations on this theme, see *Structure of Social Action*, 89f, 240, 768, and "Some Reflections. . . .", *loc. cit.*, 528.

[30] For an interesting statement and critique of these views, see L. Freund, "Power and the Democratic Process" *Social Research, XV*, 327-344,

to warlike moves of an essentially sporadic kind. Thus we see that the methodological procedure of Parsons' analysis of a social system has a definite kinship with the substantive analysis of that system.

It may also be claimed that this substantive analysis gives a very one-sided version of the working of political processes so far as they are relevant to social system theory. Of course the state must command a monopoly of force over a given territory though the state must doubtless be viewed as a subdivision of a larger federalized polity. But the power monopolized by the state must rather be conceived as being exerted through the state on terms and through channels and in directions that generate consent and which are institutionally sanctioned. No more fundamental thesis in political thought can be laid down than the essential futility of state power conceived or characterized as some undisciplined force available for freehanded use at the summit of society through command of the integrative institutions of society. Precisely because state power is centralized its authority is rendered dependent upon the goodwill and assent of strata and groups who support it, who work through it and who lean upon it.[31]

Goodwill and assent are generated by fulfilment of interest and conformance with stabilized expectation. But in addition there is also the positive element of the performance of socially required functions of a roughly serviceable nature. One of the reasons why the state did not emerge as an institution from the basic conceptual scheme of Parsons' theory but had to be added on as an "empirical clustering" is because the carryover of a primarily laissez-faire allocative kind of economics obscured the role of those functions which even in very rudimentary forms of social life can only or best be carried on by some kind of essentially cooperative undertaking with methods of authority and distributed or utilized on the basis of essentially non-market or exchange criteria. These functions cannot be left to the voluntary acquisitive activities of the members of the society but must be discharged on some socially organized basis. But utilization of a body of economic thought whose central concern is with allocative processes of choice and exchange led to the submergence of the problem of production or reproduction of collective wants and needs.[32] And unwillingness to probe the concrete nature of wants which underlay economic activity together with neglect of the process of production account for the failure of the state to emerge from the formative level of Parsons' conceptual scheme. For if the mass of human wants had been probed on the most elementary level, they would have been found to involve some form of effortful activity in man's native or produced habitat to utilize natural forces or

[31] See the critique of the power concept in political theory which is to be found in Marx, T. H. Green (in his Lectures on the *Principles of Political Obligation*, lectures I, H; and H. Hiller, *Staatslehre (Leiden* 1934) 203ff. On the Marxian side, see the powerful critique of "force" theory in F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring (Inter. pub., NY nd)* 200-300.

[32] For discussion of the extent of the submergence of the concept of production in modern economic thought, see my paper, "Marx's Mehrwert Concept and Theory of Pure Capitalism", *Review of Economic Studies,* XVIII (1951) 165

materials and the vegetative and animal life which surrounds him and which he adapts to his needs. The basic fact was not brought out that human communities are landworking and develop their life as an integral part of an ecological process which involves soil and watershed, proto-plasmic exchange and climatic adjustments. For as landworking communities all social systems face the need to devise specific methods to discharge a variety of working functions that must be discharged by cooperative or authoritative methods. Chief among these is the provision of channels of communication and access and of such common resources as hunting preserves and water supplies. Once social systems are placed in the context of a federalized polity, the need arises to guard the frontiers of what is in effect a cooperative preserve. Finally, even undeveloped forms of economic life soon were forced to carry out large-scale public works. Discharge of these service functions affords a much more solid basis for understanding the role of the state in social systems than mere preoccupation with avoidance of "fraud and theft" or regularization of the use of coercion.[33] Moreover, this derivation of the state authority would logically unfold a series of important questions which are not explicitly dealt with in the Parsonian work. What is the relationship between political statehood and social system at the societal level? Must every society be coterminous with a political state? Or may there be a plurality of states coexisting within a single society? Here we verge on those problems of federalistic affiliations (politics) or civilizational context (sociology) which are thus indicated to be not peripheral to the theory of social system but integral to it.

IV

It is important also to see that a fuller statement of the concrete ecological imperatives which condition social systems would have brought out in the work of Parsons that phase of social life which Mukerjee has prominently placed in the foreground, namely population. As Mukerjee has demonstrated, the ecological mechanisms which througout the animal world preserve within the biotic community of a region a shifting balance at optimal levels function with greater effectiveness among many species of social insects, birds and higher mammals but have become comparatively blunted in human life. In the main this is due to the increased stimulation of sexuality and the increased role of cultural inheritance which were by-products of social development and of sedentary life.[34] Hence a problem of population exists and "without a well-defined and systematic population theory there is.....left a big void in the heart of the social sciences....[35]

[33] In the main it is interesting to note that Mukerjee has tended to stress this kind of approach to political process. See e. g. *Social Ecology*, chap. XIV; *The Social Structure of Values*, chap. XII; *Democracies of the East*.

[34] See Mukerjee, *Political Economy of Population* (Longmans Green & Co., Lucknow Univ., Studies 1943) chap. VI, "The Optimum of Population: Ecologic", 160-98, 199ff, 229f

[35] *Ibid.*, 3. As is well known it was Marx's contention that while every social system has its distinct "law" of population, the capitalist social order

At least since the work of Malthus the general nature of population theory and the way in which it must be fitted into the explanation of social systems has been made increasingly clear. On the aggregative side the course of population development has been shown to be the outcome of an intricate network of practices and customs relative to age of marriage and nuptiality rates, attitudes toward control over family size and toward children and practices which limit conception, infertility and sterility, and of course all the forces that govern specific fertility and mortality rates. These practices and customs are institutionalized both to fit into cultural patterns and into social structure to a degree that makes it highly likely that each specific social system will entail a given set of tendencies toward population change.

It has also been made clear that population change cannot vary at random over any very extended period or to any very considerable degree. For the effects of population change on the society—on its internal makeup and its external position—are both fundamental and crucial. Out of the early Malthusian generalization regarding the relationship between economic levels of welfare and population size has developed the analysis of ecologic and economic optimum as the net outcome of changing pressures of resource use, margins of land cultivation and water use, scope for industrialization and division of labor and ability to interweave into a larger economic polity through "foreign trade".[36] The interrelationship between

generated a surplus population out of its inherent functioning. In the main this view appears to have been generated by revulsion from the class-ideological garb in which in its Malthusian form the theory of population was first cast (cf. the emotionally tinged and sardonic comments of Marx on Malthus in V. III of the *Theorien über den Mehrwert*). But also there was involved Marx's overestimation of the process of technological unemployment and renovation which in Marx's eyes dominated population requirements. Thus in an illuminating article in the *N. Y. Tribune* (22 March 1853) on the subject of migration, Marx stated that for earlier modes of society migration was needed to guard the integrity of the social order which could be reproduced only with relatively limited numbers. The same pressure of population working on a kindred type of social organism explains the barbarian migrations from the Asiatic plateaus. "Avec des phénomènes différents, la cause fut la même." But the present-day migrations, Marx noted, were a different charter. "It is not the lack of productive forces which creates the excess of population, it is the increase of productive forces which causes a diminution of population. . . . ." It is not the "population which weighs on productive forces but the productive forces which weigh on the population". See collection of articles translated into French, *Oeuvres complètes Karl Marx*, Oeuvres politiques, tome II, "Lettres sur l'Angleterre" (Paris 1929) 187-197. Writing while the process of population swelling and industrialization was in its high tide, Marx simply was not able—like most of his contemporaries—to measure the true nature of the process.

[36] Mukerjee's own work in this area, chiefly reproduced in his *Political Economy of Population*, has a distinctive place in the literature of the subject. For a general survey of the literature and an attempted concise statement of an acceptable residue of theory, see my two papers, "The Theory of Optimum Population for a Closed Economy", *Journal of Political Economy* LII (1945) 289-316; "Optimum Population, Foreign Trade and World Economy", *Population Studies* III (1949) 151-169. See also J. J. Spengler, "Aspects of the Eco-

population level and directions of change and economic welfare and organization are intimate and controlling over large areas and to varying degrees within all social systems.

The political or military inter-relationships are hardly less vital than the economic since differential population change among societies plays a crucial role in governing their relative position within the inter-societal polity or their capacity to maintain an independent existence.[37] But possibly of even greater importance for its constraining and shaping role on social system are not the aggregative effects of population but the shiftings and mobilities implicit in the differential makeup of population flow along socially significant lines of distinction. Within a larger civilizational polity one of the basic differentiating factors among the component societies will be migratory movements which shift rural-urban balances, drain away energetic elements which become concentrated in new lands or newly developing areas and which constitute a major source for the breaking down of old ethnic and national dividing lines by helping to create new multi-national "melting-pot" nations or congeries of nations. From this point of view one of the most significant features of the amazing growth of population of the Western world during the 19th century was that it was accompanied—and perhaps in part generated—by massive migratory shifts.[38] This unevenness of growth accompanied by migration helps to explain certain lines of differentiation between component national cultures within the Western world and the accentuation of certain national features which regarded in isolation can only appear anomalous or disturbing.

Unevenness of makeup and flow exerts an even more potent influence in shaping the social system of a society. The social effects of differential rates of reproduction are lasting and profound. These have not been given any definitive study and data on earlier societies and civilizations is fragmentary. But it appears highly likely that among the more differentiated and developed societies the tendency of rural and lower class sectors to reproduce at faster rates than urban and upper class sectors has had profound significance both in sustaining the flow of vertical class circulation and in making possible under extremely difficult conditions enduring forms of urban life. It has not been without a certain influence on overall capacities of the racial stock.[39] Of these three possible effects of differential rates of

nomics of Population Growth", *Southern Economic Journal*, XIV (1947) 123-147, 233-265.

[37] See Mukerjee, *Political Economy of Population*, 252-279, 291-295, 323f, 339-359, 429-458.

[38] See *Ibid.*, 30-62, 339-402. See also a more recent trenchant little book by Mukerjee, *Races, Lands and Food* (NY 1946).

[39] After an exhaustive study of relevant data P. Sorokin concluded that in most developed societies a "'social vacuum' is incessantly created through the inability of the upper strata to perpetuate themselves sufficiently to fill the vacancies and that these must be filled through promotions from the lower strata". For a brief survey, see P. Sorokin, *Society, Culture and Personality*, 435f; P. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (NY 1927) 347-360. W. Thompson stated it was "not unlikely that the powerful and privileged of all ages have had a tendency to die out quite rapidly, owing to greater exposure to violent death on one hand and to greater debauchery on the other". W. Thompson, *Popu-*

population change, perhaps the most significant relates to the stimulation of vertical class circulation which is naturally intensified to the degree to which upper class groups do not biologically maintain themselves but must assimilate lower-class individuals to replace losses.[40] The fact that urban populations exert a never-ceasing source of drainage on their rural habitat which sustains them biologically as well as nutritively is a structural fact with profound implications for the development of a generalized theory of social systems.[41]

Since the effects of population flow and makeup on social system are so profound and manysided, it is hardly likely that the processes of the institutionalization within social systems can be unaffected by the need to maintain or develop certain overall population requirements. Stated in these terms it then follows that one of the most important functions of a generalized theory of social system would be to explain the reciprocal network of relationships and the governing conditions which are to be found between social systems generally and the complex of customs and beliefs which control population size and makeup. Some mechanism of adjustment there must be by which some kind of reciprocity on a more or less conscious or planned level can develop between population and social systems. It is precisely in this area of social ecology—an area in which Mukerjee has helped to bring into prominence as a special branch of sociology—that Parsons' work is most deficient.

The ecological weakness of Parsons' theory of social system ties in with obscuring the role of the region and civilizational complex and helps to explain the diffuseness of the conceptual scheme which

lation Problems (NY 1935 2nd ed.) 155 (see entire chapter, X "The Differential Birth Rate" for a systematic presentation of available facts. A rural-urban differential seems well-established (see on this the exhaustive collection of facts in Sorokin and Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* (NY 1930). For the specific case of France, see the cautious survey with similar results in J J. Spengler, *France Faces Depopulation* (Durham, N.C. 1938) 66-102.

[40] For this of course our leading guide is V. Pareto and particularly in his *Manual d' economie politique* (Paris 1927 ed.), chapter on "population" for a full development of his theory of the hierarchical makeup of society, the need for promoting vertical "circulation of elites" and the tensional consequences of the inability to maintain vertical mobility at the necessary rates. See for general survey, P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (NY 1928) 219-308; J. J. Spengler, "Pareto on Population", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* II, November 1944, 116-129. For a general analysis of the role and scope of vertical mobility in social systems, see the above cited work of Sorokin and his more recent treatment in *Society, Culture and Personality*, 423-444. It appears to be an absolute constant of social system—which strangely enough was neglected in Parsons' analysis — that "any organized group, being stratified, has a strong or weak current of vertical mobility" (423) and that in no known society is vertical mobility completely unhampered or completely blocked. The need for vertical mobility is derived from general *functional* causes (recruitment of high abilities wherever found) and apparently tends to satisfy the need for stability in the social order by providing avenues of escape for able lower-class men and women.

[41] See in this connection the illuminating and vivid analysis by Mukerjee of the mesh and contrast of rural-urban world in his *Man and his Habitation, A Study in Social Ecology* (Longmans Green & Co., Lucknow Univ. Studies, 193) 118-275.

lacked sufficient structuring power to serve as a basis for further theoretical elaboration. This ecological weakness came to a head in the complete bypassing in the Parsonian work of the theory of population as an integral part of the analysis of social systems. It is in this ecological groundwork that Mukerjee's performance can help in the necessary redirection of thought.

But ecological processes in human society become transformed in their functioning as they work themselves through man's cultural world. "Social equilibrium rises from level to level". "What for ecologic interpretation are no more than blind trials and errors of experiments trying out various relationships to the organization of life as a whole, what for economics are no more than patterns of satisfactions, resources and efforts are, from the sociological standpoint, the search for the ultimate values. The social equilibrium.... is no mere organic or economic equilibrium but an equilibrium in which the harmony of institutions and man's varied impulses and interests, values and virtues and the range and depth of personality are implicated".[42] But since this constant theme of Mukerjee is also one of the doctrinal tenets of Parsons' new work and one which this work treats in the most distinguished manner, we have reached a note of solidarity between these two great contemporary thinkers of our time upon which we may close.

[42] *Mukerjee, Social Ecology* 335, 336ff. Within the somewhat narrower field of institutional economics the same transformative process was noted. "The three respective norms or standards viz., biological survival, technological efficiency and aggregate social welfare, solidarity and progress are implicated in one another ..... Ecological equilibrium is attained in and through economic equilibrium and when the maximum social welfare, solidarity and justice are attained economic equilibrium is attained". Mukerjee, *The Institutional Theory of Economics*, 84f.

5

A REVISED ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION[1]

By TALCOTT PARSONS

It has come to be rather widely recognized in the sociological field that social stratification is a generalized aspect of the structure of all social systems, and that the system of stratification is intimately linked to the level and type of integration of the system as a system.

The major point of reference both for the judgment of the generality of the importance of stratification, and for its analysis as a phenomenon, is to be found in the nature of frame of reference in terms of which we analyze social action. We conceive action to be

[1] Note: This paper, written especially for the present volume, may be regarded as a revision of the author's earlier paper, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification", first published in the *American Journal of Sociology*, May 1940, and reprinted in the collection of the author's *Essay in Sociological Theory*, Free Press, 1949. However, so much work had intervened in the meantime, both in the field of general theory and more specifically on social stratification, that it seemed much better to attempt a new statement of a general approach to the field. The more recent phases of the work in general theory on which the present paper relies most heavily will be found discussed in three publications in which the author has had a major part: Parsons and Shils, Editors, *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Harvard University Press, 1951); Parsons, *The Social System* (Free Press, 1951) and Parsons, Bales, and Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (Free Press, 1953). In addition Bales' *Interaction Process Analysis* (Addison-Wesley Press, 1950) has played a very important part in the background.

On the empirical side the author has, over a considerable period, been engaged in a study of social mobility among high school boys in collaboration with Samuel A. Stouffer, Florence Kluckhohn, and a research staff. Though results of this study are not yet ready for publication, the work on it has exerted a major influence on my theoretical thinking about the general field. In addition, in collaboration with Dr. Bales and two assistants, an attempt is being made to link together the study of stratification in the large-scale society and in small groups, using in a broad way the conceptual scheme outlined in this paper. Both projects have been carried out under the auspices of the Harvard Laboratory of Social Relations. Besides the general funds of the Laboratory, the study of mobility has received financial support in the first instance from the Russell Sage Foundation, but also from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Harvard Graduate School of Education. I would like herewith to express gratitude to all these agencies for their assistance.

The paper is, therefore, by no means a product of individual work, but is essentially collaborative in nature. In the work in general theory I am particularly indebted to my collaborators, Shils and Bales, and to the co-authors of *Toward a General Theory of Action*. With reference to the field of stratification there is a special debt to Samuel Stouffer and Florence Kluckhohn, and to staff members who have worked intimately with me on relevant aspects of the two empirical projects, especially most recently Frank E. Jones, Bengt G. Rundblad, and Joseph Berger. I am, however, solely responsible for the specific formulations which are here set forth. I am greatly indebted to Professor Stouffer, Dr. Bales and Messrs. Jones, Rundblad and Berger for criticism of the first draft of this paper.

oriented to the attainment of goals, and hence to involve selective processes relative to goals. Seen in their relations to goals, then, all the components of systems of action and of the situations in which action takes place, are subject to the process of evaluation, as desirable or undesirable, as useful or useless, as gratifying or noxious. Evaluation in turn has, when it operates in the setting of *social* systems of action, two fundamental implications. First, the units of systems, whether they be elementary unit acts or roles, collectivities, or personalities, must in the nature of the case be subject to evaluation. To say that all acts were valued equally, that it did not "matter" what a person did or how he did it,would simply be to say that the category of evaluation was irrelevant to the analysis of action. But given the process of evaluation, the probability is that it will serve to differentiate entities in a rank order of some kind. Exactly equal evaluation of two or more entities may of course occur, but it is a special case of evaluative judgment, not a demonstration of its irrelevance. Just how great the differentiations may be, how permanent or generalized they are, and by what criteria they are made is of course the focus of a whole series of analytical and empirical problems, but *that they should be* imputed to actors in a system is inherent in the frame of reference we employ for the analysis of social interaction.[2]

The second implication is the well-known one that it is a condition of the stability of social systems that there should be an integration of the value-standards of the component units to constitute a "common value-system". Again the content of such a common value system and the degree and modes of its integration with the actual action of the units in a social system vary empirically. But the existence of such a pattern system as a point of reference for the analysis of social phenomena is a central assumption which follows directly from the frame of reference of actions as applied to the analysis of social systems.

Stratification *in its valuational aspect,* then, is the ranking of units in a social system in accordance with the standards of the common value system. This ranking may be equal but obviously from a logical point of view this is a limiting case, and there are good reasons to believe that from an empirical point of view it should also be so regarded, the more so the larger and more complex the system. The valuational aspect must be analytically distinguished from the others entering into the total "power" system of a society.

[2] It should be clear that this process of differentiation, with respect to ranking as in other respects, is a process *internal* to the social system. In its development using extra-system phenomena, such as sex, age, individual differences serve as points of reference. These may determine what concrete units will occupy what place and in part sometimes affect the range of differentiation, but they never determine the basic pattern itself which derives from the exigencies of process in the system as such.

Furthermore, differentiation and integration are, in social as in biological systems, correlative phenomena. The differentiation of units in a system *from* each other in rank as in other respects, involves ipso facto the integration of the components of the units. In the stratification aspect this means that by the same process by which collectivities are differentially ranked the *members* of any one come to be treated as equals—thus the equality of members of a family unit is a corollary of the differentiation in class status of the family from other families.

In the above statement care has been taken to use the very general term "unit" as the "that which" to which ranking evaluation is applied. One of the most important ranges of problems in the field of stratification is the discrimination of the different kinds of units to which the categories of stratification can be applied, and the order of relations of these different kinds of units to each other.

It will simplify our analysis if in a strict sense we focus attention on social systems, and hence confine the technical discussion of the bases of social stratification to the ranking of the units of a *given* system of specific reference in terms of scope and time-span. We may then maintain that for a given social system, in the theoretical sense, there can be only one kind of unit, which is the "membership" role, or status-role complex. The "actor" of whom this is a role may, however, be either an individual human being or a collectivity, and it is particularly important to keep in mind that these two cross-cut each other, a collectivity by definition is composed of a plurality of roles in different collectivities. Strictly speaking we will not refer to a personality as having a place in a scale or system of social stratification, because even in the case of the total society an individual's membership does not exhaust his personality as a system.

This focus on the specific social system is, we believe, exceedingly important. But the familiar sociological fact that a given actor has a plurality of roles, calls our attention to the fact that the particular system which is isolated for analysis never stands alone but is always articulated with a plurality of other systems, specifically though not exclusively, the systems in which the same actors have other roles, such for example as kinship units and occupational organizations in our society. We have found by experience that a great many of the problems of empirical sociological analysis can most effectively be handled by treating more than one system at a time. We shall have occasion below to consider a number of problems in these terms, but in the meantime it is most important to define our terms and the basic relationships with which we are concerned in terms of a single system of reference, and then to introduce the further complications involved in the articulations of more than one system with each other.

Specific judgments of evaluation are not applied to the system unit as such—except in a limiting case—but to particular properties of that unit—always by comparison with others in the system. These properties may be classificatory, in the sense of characterizing the unit independently of its relations to other objects in a system as in the case of sex, age or specific abilities, or they may be relational characterizing the way in which it is related to other entities as in the case of membership in a kinship unit.[3]

Looked at on another basis the properties to which a judgment may be applied may be classified as qualities, performances (including their reward significance as sanctions) and possessions.[4]

[3] This distinction will be recognized as an application of the pattern variable, universalism-particularism.

[4] More accurately qualities and performances are attributable to the system unit as such, whereas possessions are situational objects in some sense independent of such a unit. Qualities (including performance-capacities) may be modified by learning processes, but they are not transferable. Possession, however,

Qualities are those properties of a unit which can be evaluated independently of any change in its relations to objects in its situation, but may be ascribed to the unit as such. Thus when we say a man "has an I. Q. of 120" we describe a quality usually called "intelligence." When, however, we, say, "he gave the right answer to the question", we describe a performance, which is thus a process of change in his relation to a situational object, the questioner, which can be ascribed to his "agency". Qualities may be interpreted, of course, in whole or in part, as consequences of previous processes of performance, on the part of the system-unit in question and|or of others in the system, and performances are never understandable without reference to an ascriptive or quality point of reference which describes "that which" is the starting point of the performance and that which brings it about. Thus to give the right answer the man had to be "intelligent". Or to say a man is now a member of the American Sociological Society is to describe a quality, but he got there by a variety of performances including (if an "active" member) getting a Ph. D., applying for membership and paying his dues. Hereditary status is the limiting case where only qualities and no prior performances are the requisites, the "ascriptive base", of a social status.[5]

Possessions are situational objects which are intrinsically transferable and to which an actor (individual or collective) in a social system has a specific relationship of "control" such that he has in the institutionalized case rights to their use, control or disposal differentiated from those held by other units in the system. In the nature of the case possessions are valued objects, valued directly by their possessor and either actually or potentially by others in the system. Possession is thus a category not of the "intrinsic" nature of the object, but of its *relation* to a unit in a system as distinguished from its relation to other units in the same system. Possessions in turn may be of two primary orders of significance in social systems, either of which may have primacy. On the one hand, they may be "facilities", i. e. means-objects relative to instrumental goal-attainment processes; on the other hand, "rewards", i.e. objects which either are objects of direct gratification or are symbolically associated with such objects.[6]

It is quite clear that the concrete hierarchical "position" of a system-unit in a social system cannot be only a function of its place in the scale of valuation relative to an integrated common value-system, because no social system is ever perfectly integrated in this sense. It is convenient to conceptualize this element of discrepancy between the normatively defined "ideal" ranking order and the actual state of affairs, in terms of the relation between ranking in value terms

is a relation to an object which can be transferred from one actor to another. Qualities (or performances) may be instrumentally or expressive-symbolically significant. This distinction is parallel to that between facilities and rewards, as categories of the meaning of possessions.

[5] The reader who is interested in more technical developments of the theory of action, may think of qualities in this sense as describing a given location of a system unit in action-space, whereas performances describe a change of location from one point to another. Cf. Parsons, Bales and Shils, *Working Papers*, Chaps. 3 & 5.

[6] Cf. Parsons, *The Social System*, Chaps. III and IV for an extensive discussion of these categories.

and power". Power we may define as the realistic capacity of a system-unit to actualize its "interests" (attain goals, prevent undesired interference, command respect, control possessions, etc.) within the context of system-interaction and in this sense to exert influence on processes in the system.[7]

Power in this sense we may conceive to be the resultant of three sets of factors which are cognate with the above aspects of institutionalized ranking but are treated differently in order to permit the analysis of discrepancies between institutionalized standards and the empirical state of affairs. The first of these is the valuation of the unit in the system according to value standards, whether completely common throughout the system or not, and including both the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of judgment in relation to the standards. The second is the degree to which and the manner in which actors in the system permit deviance from these standards in performance. The most obvious way in which this factor can be seen to operate is the permission of other actors to allow any one (ego) to do things which are more or less out of line with the common value standards. The third set of factors is the control of possessions, which is a source of differential advantage in bringing about a desired result (including preventing one not desired). The assumption is that these three sets of factors are interdependent and hence that "position" with respect to any one of them will be correlated with position with respect to each of the others, but they will also be to some degree independent.

From this point of view one type of measure of the integration of a social system (that in terms of pattern consistency) should be the degree to which ranking in terms of paramount common value standards does in fact correlate with all three of the above sets of factors. Any such correlation would, however, be a complex resultant of a variety of considerations. Thus there is no reason to believe that all of the units in the system conform or are expected to conform equally with the common value-standards. If ego—the unit of reference—conforms relatively more fully than the others this may diminish ego's power relative to that of the others because he is less willing to exploit opportunities forbidden by the norms. On the other hand his own deviance, if it happens to mesh with that of others, may increase his power, because he is allowed to "get away with it". The effect of deviance on power naturally depends on just what the nature of the deviance in question on both sides is. Similarly, access to possessions is always to some degree a function of factors which are "adventitious" from the point of view of the value-standards of the system; these discrepancies may or may not be corrected by the equilibrating mechanisms of the system.[8]

[7] It will be noted that this definition confines the relevant "interests" to those *within* the system of reference. The use of one system-membership to promote interest in influencing events in another system in which the same concrete entity, e. g. personality, is involved, presents further complications, which need to be handled independently and not in this elementary set of definitions.

[8] It will be remembered that in the earlier paper of which the present one is considered to be a revision, six criteria of differential evaluation were distinguished, namely, membership in a kinship unit, personal qualities, achievements, possessions, authority and power. Three of these, membership, authority and

The problems of the place of power in social systems shade directly over into those of authority. Both root in the most elementary fundamentals of social interaction on the one hand, its normative control on the other. Interaction, as we will discuss further below, is a continual interplay of what we call "performance" and "sanctions". What people do has an influence on the state of the system as a system, and on each other as members; the latter is the sanction aspect. In so far as influence on the action of others in the system becomes an institutionalized expectation of a role, we have the roots of authority. Authority, finally, is full blown when this institutionalized expectation comes to include the legitimation of "coercive" sanctions, that is the right to impose consequences deprivational to alter in case he fails to act as ego has an institutionalized right to expect he will, and of course to use the "threat" of such consequences to motivate alter to "conform".

Authority in this sense is an aspect of power in a system of social interaction; it is institutionalized power over others. In the nature of the case it must be evaluated, and therefore like other evaluated aspects, be stratified. In the strictest sense we probably ought to say that every member of a social system has some authority at the very least he would be felt to be justified in passively resisting "unreasonable" demands upon him by others, in effect saying negatively "if you do this, I won't—" do something expected. This is certainly a coercive sanction. In common usage however we tend to restrict the term authority to the higher ranges of the stratification of institutionalized power; thus we speak of parental authority over children but seldom of children's authority over their parents.

It should also be noted that authority, as legitimizing the use of power involving coercive sanctions, is not an isolated phenomenon. It is part of a much larger family of mechanisms of social control each of which may involve an element of authority, but also other elements as well. Thus patterns of religious ritual, of therapy, and of facilitation of ecological adjustment through intervention in the distribution of possessions or communication may serve this type of function. We will comment briefly on some of these problems below.

Empirically the imperfections of integration of social systems formulated by the two non-valuational components of the power of a unit may be extremely important. However, the point of view from which we approach the analysis of stratification prescribes that analysis should focus on the common value-pattern aspect. Only through this can we gain stable points of reference for a technical theoretical analysis of the empirical influence of the other components of the system-process. This is essentially because on general theoretical grounds we can state that the "focus" of the *structure* of

qualities have now all been consolidated under the one general category of qualities, but this is defined more broadly than before to include any qualities of a unit of a social system, not only "personal" qualities. It was not seen at that time that what we here call "relational" qualities, e. g. memberships, could be treated as qualities of the unit. Furthermore, authority, as will be discussed below, is a quality of the "status" of a unit. Finally, power is redefined as a resultant rather than as a residual factor.

a system of action lies in the common value-pattern aspect of its culture.

We have throughout treated the stratification of a social system as an aspect of its fundamental structure. It may be regarded as one of the most important conclusions of sociological theory that the distinction between the normative and the factual aspects of a social system must be regarded as relative. The basic categories in terms of which we describe a system as a structure, i. e. as a set of objects seen from the point of view of an observer, are *the same* as those in terms of which we describe the norms which regulate behavior or performance. This does not in any way imply that deviance from normative expectations is not to be treated as important, but concerns only the nature of the categories in terms of which social phenomena are to be described and analyzed.

Every unit in a system of action, e. g. the actor in a social role, is treated both as an object having ascertainable qualities, and as an entity performing the functions of a role. In the quality aspect we may, so far as his position in the system is concerned, speak of an actor's *status;* in the performance aspect we may speak of his *role* in the narrower technical sense. The value-standards of the common value system then will on the one hand categorize the units of the system as objects in status terms, and the units will be stratified in this respect so far as application of these status categories leads to differences of evaluation according to the common standards. At the same time, for objects having the qualities in question there will also be expected performances. These in turn will be evaluated in terms of norms, and the actual performances will be differentially evaluated.

The distinction of performance and quality is, it must be recognized, relative. Every performance implies what may be called an ascriptive or a "quality-base", a description of "that which" acts. The evaluation of performances is always relative to that base; we never literally mean that a performance is to be judged with no reference to *who* is responsible for it. Thus we say "pretty good, considering he is only twelve years old" or "Somebody will all his experience ought to have done better". Naturally we very often think or speak eliptically, and just say "well done" or the reverse; but the quality-base may always be regarded as implicit if it is not explicit.

At the same time performances have consequences. If these concern only the situation of action, they may be ignored, not from the point of view of evaluation of the performance, but in the quality context. If, however, these consequences involve change in the properties of the actor (through learning), then we may speak of a change in his own quality-patterns. A child, as actor in a social system, does not remain unchanged, but his qualities develop as a function of the socialization process itself.

On the basis of recent theoretical work it seems possible to treat the standards on the basis of which both object-qualities and performances are evaluated as reducible to four fundamental types which correspond to what we believe to be the four dimensions of action systems.[9] Any concrete system, including a single role-status unit

[9] For the theoretical basis of these statements and the derivation of the four

considered as a sub-system, will be subjected to all four types of standard, but they will stand in different orders of precedence in different kinds of systems. We will first take up the four types of standard in their relation to the normative control of performances, and then speak of their application to the evaluation of status-qualities.

The first type of standard we wish to consider, in relation to the evaluation of objects and performances, involves in its cognitive aspect, what we call universalism. In relation to performance its dominance defines what we call "technical" norms which maximize universalistic values in the adaptation of action to the intrinsic properties of the situational object-system in the service of a specific goal. This is what in common sense terms we ordinarily mean by "efficiency". The only reference is to the effectiveness with which objects in the situation are utilized (including adaptation to its uncontrollable features) in the interest of attainment of the goal. There is no consideration of the justification of usefulness of this particular goal-state itself nor to the consequences of the performances taken for other units in the system, i. e. in an integrative context, or to change in qualities of the system. Cognitive knowledge of the situation is at a premium in defining a technical norm, but a certain level of effort or commitment to the goal is presumed as well.

The second basic type of standard is that having to do with the definition of goals of an action process themselves,what in pattern-variable terms we have called performance or achievement. As a system-norm, it will either specify the system-goal or goals to which the unit is expected to contribute, (this we may call the prescriptive case) or it will define the limits of permissible "private" goals of the unit (the permissive case). As such, an achievement norm does not define the instrumental or technical means-acts which are expected but only the goal itself, and of course it is not concerned with other kinds of consequences either relative to system-integration or to changes in the qualities of the system or its units.

The third type of standard *does* concern integration and may be called the system-integrative. It defines expectations with respect to a unit's contribution to the maintenance of solidarity with other units in the system. The focus is on the quality of attitude, on positive action expected to be taken in the interest of inter-unit solidarity. The standards are particularistic, not universalistic, in that it is the status of both units in their relation of common membership in the same system which constitutes the basis of the expectations of showing solidarity. It focuses on the integrative or particularistic dimension.

Finally, the fourth type of standard concerns the maintenance and|or regulation of changes in the ascriptive-qualitative "base" from which other performances take their departure. There are two primary types of expressive action concerned. The first comprises those which are expressive of, or implement the value-patterns ascribed to the unit in its status in the system independent of specific adaptive problems, specific goals or the inter-unit integration of the system

standard types see the *Working Papers,* op. cit. See especially Chapter V, figure 2, p. 179 and Sec. V of that chapter,

in the particularistic solidarity sense. The second type is that oriented to bringing about changes in the qualities of the unit itself through learning processes. In system terms, that is, socialization is governed by qualitative-ascriptive norms.

From the dynamic or performance point of view social interaction is a continual back-and-forth alternation between performances and "sanctions". Sanctions may be thought of as actions which express attitudes toward the action or performance of others through reward and punishment. The distinction, it should be made clear, is an analytical one. Every (concrete) act has potential consequences for the maintenance or change of system state, and is in some degree oriented to these consequences — this is the aspect we have just been discussing under the heading of performances. At the same time every act is in some degree a reaction to the acts of others, and involves at least an implicit evaluation of the acts of other actors in the system. It thereby exerts an influence on their subsequent actions; this is the sanction aspect.

For every type of norm for evaluating performance there is a norm which defines the corresponding "appropriate" type of sanction. The formulae for the performance norms look from the dimension of primary focus "forward" to the next stage of the action process, i. e. a technical norm is defined in relation to the specific goal. The sanction norm on the other hand looks "backward" to the phase from which the process is emerging and thus "rewards"—in the positive case—successful transition to a new phase. Thus in the first type of sanction which corresponds to technical norms, we may speak of "approval" as referring both to universalistic standards, and to the quality base from which the performance takes its departure; the attitude of "neutrality" protects this quality base and universalistic orientation from being "diverted" into premature enjoyment of the goal in question or of other available goal-states.[10]

The sanction norms corresponding to the four performance norms outlined above are, in the same order, first "approval" which is characterized by attitudes of "specificity", i. e. relativity to the specific goal to which the action-process in question is committed, and "neutrality" which is relativized to the initial quality-base and inhibits consummatory gratification or diversion prior to attainment of the goal-state. The second is "response" characterized by attitudes of specificity and effectivity which is appropriate to the consummatory goal-state itself, and directly rewards the actor with access to goal-objects. It should therefore be conditional on the attainment of an approval goal. The third, appropriate to the system-integrative performance norm is "acceptance" in the form of reciprocation of the showing of solidarity and characterized by attitudes of affectivity and diffuseness and the fourth, finally, we have called "esteem", the evaluation of the unit as a unit in terms of the whole complex of its qualities, i. e. its total status in the system and characterized by attitudes of diffuseness and neutrality.

The standards governing the evaluation of the qualities of system

[10] The relations between performance-norms and sanction-norms will be found discussed in *Working Papers*, Chap. V, Sec. IV. Cf. especially Figure 5, p. 203.

units as objects are exactly the same as those governing performances. In this context, corresponding to technical norms we would speak of standards evaluating the adaptive or technical performance-capacities or "competence" of the actor as object, corresponding to the goal-defining norm simply of his goal-orientations, corresponding to the system-integrative, to his quality of system-loyalty, and finally corresponding to the qualitative-ascriptive standard, we would speak of his residual status-qualities. What binds the performance norms and the quality-standards together is simply the fact that we think of both as defining the stable state of system-process. When the system and its units are looked at "statically", i. e. as objects in abstraction from the processes going on within the system, then these norms define the qualities of the object and the sub-objects or "parts" of which it is composed.

In the light of these considerations the formal composition of the stratification of a social system may be summed up as follows. The categories in terms of which social objects (actors) and systems of them in roles are analyzed, are categories which in one aspect are value-standards. Value-standards, then are classified in terms of the same dimensions or variables which differentiate units in the social system in a structural sense *and* which define the types of sanctioned performance of those units and hence the appropriate sanctions relative to those performances. The evaluation of qualities and performances has inherently a hierarchical aspect because according to any value-standard some will rank higher than others. The next crucial problem we have to face, then, is that of how the different standards are *organized* relative to each other in a given social system; how, that is to say, they constitute a *system* of standards.

From this point of view any given social system will have a "paramount" value pattern which, in ideal type terms, we may classify as belonging to one of the four major types we have outlined. Thus the paramount values may emphasize efficiency of technical achievement as such without primary reference to the specification of goals; they may emphasize a paramount system-goal as the focus of valuation, they may emphasize the integration of the system, the relations of solidarity of the units with each other, or finally, they may emphasize the implementation and preservation of ascribed system-qualities[11] This is an ideal type classification and hence it can be taken as a point of departure in order to deal with mixed types. However, the problem we are now dealing with is quite sufficiently complex with-

[11] It is fully realized that this classification of types of basic value-patterns is highly "formal" and thus by no means concretely adequate for empirical purposes. It must be filled in by the concrete content of the cultural categories under consideration, which are given in the concrete belief systems and the concrete system of expressive symbolism. The reason why this classification is crucial for our present purposes and why its formality is not a handicap but a great advantage, is that it expresses the fundamental categories of the structure of the social system. If stratification is to be treated as a generalized aspect of social structure it must be analyzed in terms which are general to all instances and sub-classes of the type of system we are considering. In terms of the logical structure of our conceptual scheme, what we are dealing with here is analogous to the "primary qualities" of Locke's picture of the physical world, whereas, specific cultural content is analogous to "secondary" qualities.

out just now complicating it further by taking these explicitly into account.

Given the paramount value system, there will be a specification of the primary aspects of the system as a total object in relation to each of the four types of standard. As such the system will have ascriptive "base-qualities" it will exist in a situation with concrete specification of the adaptive problem and hence norms for dealing with them—or level of competence to do so; there will be a definition of paramount system-goals and limits of commitment to them; there will be definitions of the appropriate modes and levels of solidarity of the units with each other.

After specifying these aspects of the system, which means "spelling out" the paramount value system in each of the primary functional contexts of system process, we can then approach the problem of analyzing the structural differentiation of rules in the system. It should be remembered that we are dealing with this on a purely descriptive structural level. We are aware that the number of units belonging to a system, for example, is itself a function of system-process over time, and from a dynamic point of view should not be assumed as given, but for present purposes we will ignore this.

The first level of structural analysis is, we may say, the distinction of "primary" sub-systems, i. e. those which may be interpreted to constitute direct differentiations of the major system itself. There will, then, be one of these primary sub-systems which is the one given most stress by the common value system, the one in which the paramount values are most directly embodied. Since we interpret the American value system to be very closely described in terms of the universalism-achievement (or performance) pattern, we may say the strategic sub-system is the "occupational" i. e. the sub-system organized about the adaptive problems of the total system. There should then be a sub-system oriented to system-goal attainment, one to system-integration and one to expression and maintenance (including socialization) of the institutionalized ascriptive-qualitative pattern-complex, i.e. a sub-system with primarily "cultural" functions.

At this point, however, two very important sets of analytical, to say nothing of empirical, difficulties, arise. The first concerns the fact that concrete structures do not follow the lines of differentiation of system-function exactly. The functional or dimensional classification is a frame of reference in terms of which this differentiation may be analyzed, but because of the empirical inter-relations between the units, the segregation of their properties from each other does not neatly follow the lines of such a classification. The situation is closely analogous to that in the biological sciences. Without the categories of metabolism, respiration, locomotion, coordination and the like, it would be impossible to analyze the structure and functioning of complex organisms, but speaking of any one concrete organ-system as serving only one organic function is seldom legitimate. Exactly what the "blurrings" of the analytical lines we have drawn will be in any concrete case will vary with the type both of value system and of level of its differentiation as a social system. Rather than attempting to get into these problems here, it will be better to touch them briefly in relation to concrete illustration of this analysis.

The second set of difficulties concerns the complexities of system-sub-system relationships in a full scale social system. At one extreme we have the type of differentiation found in small groups which Bales has so ably analyzed.[12] In a five-member group for example the possibilities of such differentiation are very strictly limited, but even here the question must be raised of whether each member's role should be treated by itself, or whether it is not better to think of sub-collectivities as already present. It would be appropriate, for example, to speak of these as "coalitions" or "cliques". Similar considerations are important in the analysis of family units as systems.

At the other extreme we have the problem of treating such a complex entity as American Society. For purposes of empirical analysis the problems seem to center on the relations between three principal different levels of unit. The one we speak of most commonly is the role of the individual actor, not in his total societal membership but in specific interaction sub-systems such as his conjugal family or the particular occupational organization, etc. The second is that of the interactive system of which such a role is itself a unit, e. g. his conjugal family, or the particular occupational organization in which he works. The third level then concerns sub-systems of the society which are aggregates of such units grouped in relation to common paramount function, such as the occupational function type or the governmental function and the like. Again, it seems best merely to call attention at this point to this immensely difficult field, and to reserve any further treatment of it for the illustrative analysis of the American stratification system.

Let us return to the problem of the relationships of different types of evaluative standards to each other. It was stated above that the type of paramount value-system will establish the primacy of the norm-type which directly "embodies" these values, in our American case, universalistic-performance values. "Commitment" of the system to such a set of values we may interpret to mean a tendency to maximize their implementation in action and thus in concrete system-structure. This tendency is, however, subject to certain exigencies, those of adaptation to the conditions of the extra-system situation which of course includes other *social* systems — the integrative exigencies involved in the maintenance of solidary relations in a system consisting of the kind and number of units in question and those concerned with maintenance of the institutionalization of these patterns and management of the attendant motivational tensions. Thus we would class "size" of the society as defined by its population as constituting an integrative exigency, as would its composition for example in terms of the ethnic origins of the population.

Whatever the type of value system, it is this which defines the primary ascriptive-qualitative base in terms of which the other aspects of its structure must be analyzed. Thus the general dimensional scheme we have outlined must be applied on *two* different levels, first to define the type of system with which we are dealing in terms of its type of paramount value-system, and second, to analyze the internal

[12] Cf. *Interaction Process Analysis* and *Working Papers*, op. cit. Ch. IV.

differentiation of the system using this paramount value-pattern type as the ascriptive base from which to carry out the analysis.

Then we must ask what are the implications of the value-system for the definition of goals. First this must be asked on the level of a goal or goals for the system as such, and then for the units on whatever level is being considered. Implications for unit goals in turn may be either prescriptive – both relatively continuous as with reference to a governmental unit or a university, and in special circumstances, as in relation to a national emergency–or permissive. Further more, it must be noted that it is fundamental to the nature of differentiation of a system, that the goals of units should also be differentiated. Differentiated unit-goals then must be defined either as "contributions" to system function, or permissively as falling within limits allowed.

Clearly, what differentiated unit goals will be prescribed or permitted will be a function, in turn, of the three sets of exigencies we have noted in their relation to the paramount value-system. Even in very simple systems there is reason to believe that some differentiation on the axis of the distinction between adaptive and integrative functions will take place, i.e. of units whose paramount function and therefore sub-system goals are more adaptive than anything else, and of units whose paramount functions are more integrative than anything else. Both these may however be combined in subtle ways with system-goal-oriented and pattern-maintenance or ascriptive functions and hence sub-system goals.

In general we may say that the criteria of relative priority of these functions and hence sub-system goals will be defined in terms of the *consequences* of performance, in the expected way, of the system-functions for the maintenance of the system and its institutionalized value-patterns; it will, that is to say, be a matter of the *strategic* significance of the unit-functions in the system process. It is evident that this significance will vary as a function both of the type of value-system and its cultural content and of the concrete adaptive integrative and regulatory exigencies to which it is subject. We cannot therefore lay down any general priority scales independent of these factors. In general, however, we can say that the function most directly institutionalizing the paramount value will have first place; the problems for analysis concern the ranking of the other principal functions. In other words what we have developed here is not an empirical generalization about rank-ordering, but only a set of categories in terms of which the empirical problem may be approached.

There remain two further general analytical problems before we can attempt to illustrate through the analysis of certain aspects of the American stratification system. The first of these is that of the way in which the analysis of the place of possessions is to be fitted into the scheme outlined above. The second is the problem of the modes and degrees of integration of the different criteria of differential ranking to form a single "general prestige continuum".

The key to the analysis of possessions lies in the distinction between facilities and rewards objects. Facilities are to be categorized according to performance-norms, rewards according to sanction norms. It should, of course, be kept in mind, as noted above, that a concrete object may be–indeed in principle always is–both a facility and a

reward, but one or the other aspect of its significance may be of primary importance in a given context. Facilities and rewards are, strictly speaking, categories of the *meaning* or significance of objects, they are not *classes* of concrete objects.

In the facility or performance aspect the basic classification of types of possession is that relative to the system-functions in relation to which they serve as facilities, i. e. relative to the role of the possessing unit, and its various sub-differentiations. Thus for the unit all facilities have instrumental functions, but for the system the functions of the facilities will be relative to those of the unit in the system. A blast furnace has instrumental functions for a steel-manufacturing concern, but pews and priestly robes have instrumental functions as facilities for a church. This duality of reference must always be kept in mind in judging the categorization of an object of possession. Of course the same distinction may be repeated if the unit itself is treated as a system. Then there will be facilities for its adaptive functions, for its goal-consummation phase, for its own integrative functions and for its pattern-maintenance and tension-release function.

The allocation of roles and that of facilities in a system must, as a condition of integration of the system, have some kind of ordered correspondence. This is to say that this is a condition of the stable state of the system, that is of conformity with or integration in terms of, its value-system. The basic principle of optimum allocation would seem to be "the facilities to those who need them most to promote whatever goals or values are relevant to the systems as defined in its specific culture." The standard of effectiveness of course is contribution to system-function. It therefore includes both a component of "technical" efficiency and one of commitment to an institutionalized role, with its various functions in the system. The relevant questions therefore are first to what end are the facilities used and second, how effectively are they used? The first question includes adherence to "regulative" rules which protect the interests of other system-units and functions. The most important general inference from these considerations seems to be that in so far as a social system is stratified on the basis of the differential strategic contributions of its units to system-function, there will tend to be a corresponding differentiation in the facilities allocated to those units. This becomes particularly important in the situations where there are mechanisms of generalization of the control of facilities, of which money is an outstanding example. Then we would say that the rank order of control of facilities should tend to correspond to the rank order of the evaluation of unit-function in the system; any lack of such correspondence may be regarded as a disturbing factor in the situation. Furthermore this broad generalization should with better knowledge, be subject to progressively more minute specification.

The case of rewards is very closely parallel. However a certain setting of the more concrete problems needs to be kept in mind. There is a partial lack of symmetry in the two categories of possession because of the fact that adaptive functions require control of objects which are inherently independent of the interaction process itself, whereas it seems to be one of the crucial features of human action systems that this is not so much the case with the functions of rewards.

What we mean to say is that the most basic rewards are the *attitudes* of actors and therefore that possession of reward-objects which are not themselves social objects, is primarily significant through the fact that this possession can be treated as the symbolic manifestation of the attitudes of one or more actors. This can be brought out most clearly in the case of social interaction, but even in empirical independence of this, it can be said that a person's valuation of self-acquired reward-objects is a function of *his* attitude toward the object in essentially the same sense; its possession symbolizes his "success" in achieving a valued goal in the same way as if it had been "given" to him by another.

Rewards then are to be classified in terms of their appropriateness as sanctions to the corresponding categories of performances. A duality of system-reference is as essential in this field as in that of the analysis of facilities. The overall, superordinate classification of types of reward must be made from the point of view of system-function. Then we would speak of approval and its symbols in relation to adaptive performances, of response and its symbols with reference to system-goal attainment, acceptance with reference to system-integration, etc. But the unit is itself a sub-system and the same logical pattern of differentiation applies to it in turn but with different specific content. Then for a unit with primarily adaptive functions, approval and its symbols are rewards for technical operations effectively performed, but not for "success" in goal-attainment. The right to the "proceeds" as available for "consumption" is essential in the latter context and this is to be classified as a response-reward. Acceptance in turn implies recognition of "contribution" to the system, which goes beyond either of the above types of reward for unit-success alone.

There is an essentially parallel relation between the integration of possession of reward-objects and the rank-ordering of units by direct evaluation as prevails in relation to facilities. The principle here is the very simple one of reward in proportion to "desert", interpreted in the broad sense which includes rewarding of desirable qualities as well as of performances; it is not to be interpreted in terms of our value system alone. Generally speaking, then, we may say that it is a condition of the stable state of a system that the reward system should tend to follow the same rank order as the direct evaluation of units in terms of their qualities and performances.[13]

[13] It should be clear that we are here speaking directly only of *objects* of possession, whether significant as facilities or as rewards. Objects of possession separable from the possessor shade, however, in their analytical significance, into qualities and performances of the actor. Thus membership in a collectivity may from one point of view be treated as a possession which can be acquired by active effort, or used as a facility in attaining a goal. It may also be regarded as a quality of the actor. These two points of view must be distinguished as involving different system-references, in some and different stages of the process through time. Thus membership in a collectivity cannot be used as a facility for attaining goals ascribed by the membership-status itself; it can however be used as a facility toward goals in other systems. Similarly the same actor may be rewarded by membership in a collectivity which he has been striving to attain, and this membership may be treated as one of his qualities. These considerations are of course of great significance in the analysis of social mobility, and will be touched upon below in that connection.

Before leaving the subject of possessions a word should be said about symbolism in relation to stratification, though it is too big a subject to do more than mention here. We have said above that possession is a category of the *meaning* of objects (also the distinction of their facility and reward aspects) not of their "intrinsic" properties. This is essentially to say that the situational object is always treated symbolically. Thus instrumental utility of facilities is a category of meaning of objects, and must be analyzed in the same basic terms of symbolic meaning as other types of meaning are.

Without attempting to carry the analysis farther we may distinguish here roughly cognitive-instrumental meanings of objects of possession and expressive-integrative meanings. It is the latter broad category which presents most of the analytical problems. A fundamental part is played in stratification systems by the expressive "style of life" symbolism which is integrated with the various status-categories, and this is one of the most important fields of the function of possessions. It is implicit in the whole theory of action that objects of consummatory gratification shade into symbols of status. Thus obviously hunger-gratification is essential to maintain life, and food-objects must have the necessary minimum nutritional properties. But in *what* human beings eat, and how and under what circumstances they eat it—as distinguished from *the fact that* they eat—an enormous part is played by the — often unconscious — symbolic significance of the choice. Thus to have steak for dinner is on one level an assertion that "I can afford something especially good", or of the special occasion which it is meant to symbolize. Essentially then we may say that expressively symbolic objects of possession form a continuum with status-qualities themselves, a kind of "extension" of the status-qualities of the possessor, and a reinforcer of their evaluation, positive or negative. They can thus, among other things, serve as an instrument of power.

Our final broad analytical problem is that of the value-integration of a social system in its bearing on the problem of stratification. We have classified the standards of evaluation in terms of functions of the social system. Since any going system must meet all of the fundamental functional prerequisites there must be positive evaluation of conformity with each of the four types of norm somewhere. This is true in a functionally integrated (as distinguished from pattern-integrated) system. This is to say that there may be "romantic" or "utopian" values which make it a positive virtue to act in violation of necessary conditions of system-function. In full self-consciousness this of course would be rare; there is generally a veil of rationalization drawn over such situations.

Then, as we have said, the broad rank-order of precedence will be, below the paramount value-pattern, the order of relative strategic importance of the exigencies relating to the other three major functional problem-contexts of the system. Thus in our system the primary value-focus is universalism-achievement. It may be suggested that the second order precedence goes to the cultural-latent area (universalism-quality) in the maintenance of the strategic cultural patterns on the one hand (e. g. science, education) and the regulation of personal motivation in relation to the basic value-system (family, health, etc.)

Probably the system-integrative comes next, and except for situations of national emergency, system-goal attainment last; this last is primarily what we mean by our "individualism". Or, to take a contrasting case, in a society where a transcendental religious orientation occupies the paramount position, the first order priority of values will rest in the ascriptive-qualitative norms. Then according to whether it is an actively "proselyting" religion or a more static-traditionalistic type, the next order would tend to be the system-goal attainment or the system-integrative type, with, presumably the adaptive in the last place. In the case of Calvinism, however, system-goal came second (the "kingdom of God on Earth") and because of the nature of this goal, the remaking of secular society in the image of God, adaptive considerations apparently outranked the system-integrative.

This broad rank-ordering of value-standard types, however, still leaves two vital problems unsolved. The first of these concerns what may be called the "spread" of the evaluative system, i. e. the relative independence of different sub-system hierarchies, while the second concerns the patterning of the "interlarding" of high rank on one scale with lower rank on another; thus in our system how would a rather high-ranking politician rank compared with a middle ranking business executive ?

Systems of stratification undoubtedly differ greatly with respect to the first problem, that of the relative importance of a tightly integrated "general prestige continuum". Thus in the European Middle Ages there seems to have been great importance attached to maintaining the unequivocal superiority of the nobility-gentry over any "bourgeois" classes, and of these in turn over any peasantry. In our system on the other hand it is much less easy to say that there is any specific elite group which ranks unequivocally at the top—is it the business elite, or the "best families", or the top professionals, or the top ranges in government? The most significant thing to be said in answer to the question apparently is that there are no unequivocal standards by which one or the other could be given first place, as there were in the Middle Ages, and still more in the case of Brahman supremacy in India.

Broadly it may be said that the amount of "looseness" or spread is a function of the relative ascendancy of universalistic-performance values, of the paramountcy of adaptive functions from the system point of view. A departure from this pattern in the direction of any of the other three seems to increase pressure toward tightening up the scale. If it is the system-goal direction then the standard of contribution to the goal becomes paramount; a hierarchy of which the instrumental organization is the prototype gains dominance. The Soviet system, dominated by the goal of Communism, is close to this type. If it is the "cultural" ascriptive-qualitative focus then the tendency is to measure all groups in terms of this quality-standard, i. e. to integrate the system in terms of a diffuse hierarchy of general esteem. Pre-Nazi Germany was not very far from this type. Finally, if it is a system-integrative emphasis, the tendency is to assign each unit a stably accepted place in the system, so that potentialities of disturbance of the system-equilibrium will be minimized. The

"traditionalism" of the classical Chinese system fits into this type[14].

These considerations lead over into two problem areas which need to be briefly dealt with, namely those of ascription and of authority. We have tried to make clear throughout that every system-unit must have an ascriptive quality-base from which its performances are to be evaluated. Certain of these qualities, however, may be the consequences of past performances, such as achieved collectivity membership. Others on the other hand are beyond control in various respects and hence the only problem is how they are to be evaluated, not whether or not they are to be acquired or renounced. The type cases at the latter extreme of course are the biological characteristics of individuals such as age, sex, and biological relatedness through descent. The hereditary principle is the extreme of using such an unalterable ascriptive point of reference as a basis for status-allocation in a social system. In general, I think it may be said that the adaptive and system-goal emphasis will lay least stress on ascription in this sense, while the system-integrative will lay most stress on it. The case of quality-emphasis will vary, depending on the specific content of the value qualities. Since a very important class of such cases are those institutionalizing a transcendental religious value system, there seems to be a strong likelihood that this will also favor ascriptive bases; the extreme case is India, but our own Middle Ages went quite far in that direction.

There are important relations of interdependence between these radically ascriptive foci and other more contingent bases of ascription. An excellent example is territorial location. Since all action involves human organism one potentially relevant basis for analyzing an action is always *where* the actor is located at the time, including of course, changes in his location in the course of an action. One prominent case is that of location of residence and its connection with the family as a solidary unit; in all known kinship systems the two aspects are inherently interdependent, since the basic functions of the family imply sharing of residence in most cases. Another example is the relation between territorial location and political jurisdiction; political units are always organized relative to territorial areas of jurisdiction. To be sure an individual may change his residence or other location of activity under certain conditions from one political jurisdiction to another; but the consequences of such change and the constraints on it may be so formidable that it is for many purposes almost as inescapable as one's sex or parentage.

The case of authority is quite different. Authority is one particularly important type of superiority, that which involves the legitimized right (and/or obligation) to control the actions of others in a social relationship system. It thus belongs, as we noted above, among the mechanisms of social control. The factor of legitimation means that authority is always an aspect of a status in a collectivity;

[14] This problem of looseness is being considered at present *only* with reference to the total stratification "profile" and thus involving the mode and degree of integration of ranking according to all four types of standard. On a more microscopic level a further problem of the mode of differentiation with respect to any one type of standard arises. We cannot take space to go into this problem here.

in so far as this is not the case but there is only realistic ability to control others, we speak of power.

The primary point is that authority *over* someone must mean in *some* sense and in some respect *superiority to* him. It is a status-quality involved in hierarchical evaluations. The legitimation of the authority is ipso facto that of the superiority. But the nature and bases of this superiority may of course vary widely. If it is specific rather than diffuse it need not imply any *generalized* superiority and may be compatible with the reverse; thus a traffic policeman has authority to stop the car of a prominent citizen who in general prestige terms is greatly his superior.

As Weber made clear, types of authority are to be classified in terms of the bases of their legitimation, i.e. in terms of the value-patterns which define the particular mode of superiority which the authority involves. This may of course be relative to any one of the functions of a system-process.

There are two kinds of inferences which may be drawn from this set of references. First, authority will tend to be relatively more prominent as a function of the priority of either goal-attainment or system-integrative values. In the one case the focus of the need for authority is the need to coordinate the contributions of the various units of the system to the goal. Authority will tend to be a function of the urgency of "getting things done". The system-integrative case presumably gives a somewhat lesser emphasis on authority based mainly on the negative need to *prevent* units from disturbing the integration of the system, the need to keep them "in line". The first is more "prescriptive" authority, the second more "regulative". The primacy of adaptive functions tends to transfer the problem of authority to the next level down. The unit is evaluated in terms of its achievement, but authority may be exceedingly important as one of the conditions of bringing about this achievement. Thus in our society the authority of the business executive is not a direct but a "derived" authority, it is legitimized in terms of its contribution to the efficiency of the firm. If ascriptive-qualitative values have primacy, the situation will tend to resemble that in the system-integrative case, but with perhaps a somewhat greater emphasis on authority. It would seem safe to infer that the adaptive emphasis would lead to the least emphasis on authority unless it were a case of ascriptive values with a strictly anti-authoritarian cast.

Secondly, the problem of authority is very much involved in the complexities of system-sub-system relationships. It has been emphasized that authority is an aspect of a status in a collectivity. The position of authority, therefore, is very much a function not only of the unit's status in the specific collectivity, but of the position of this collectivity in any larger system of which it is a part. The question of competing loyalties involved in the different collectivity memberships of the same persons necessarily limit authority in any one.

This leads us over to the problem mentioned above, that of the "interlarding" of the hierarchical scales set forth in terms of each of the major types of values-standard. In a complex system, there must be mechanisms which establish levels of relative equivalence, as

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This leads us over to the problem mentioned above, that of the "interlarding" of the hierarchical scales set forth in terms of each of the major types of values-standard. In a complex system, there must be mechanisms which establish levels of relative equivalence, as

well as mechanisms which insulate against too rigid and specific comparisons of status. Part of this function is carried out by what may be called direct evaluation of qualities and performances. Thus there is no doubt that any occupational role which can be adequately filled by almost any normal adult will not be considered the equal of one which is both highly valued and requires qualifications which only a few can fulfil, whatever the combination of training and native ability which may be involved. But there are serious limitations on the adequacy of the mechanisms of direct evaluation. One is the level of competence necessary for an adequate judgment, and hence the problem of how the judgment of the competent few is to be brought to bear, and to become generalized through the system. A second problem concerns the inherent element of indeterminacy of many of the standards of relative evaluation even within a class of cases, while a third concerns the comparability of different *kinds* of qualities and performances, even if the standards are relatively clear and definite with reference to each kind.

This gap tends to be filled, in part, by the processes of "ecological" distribution of possessions and of evaluative judgments, both as facilities and as reward-objects, but particularly the latter, and in part through the allocation of attitudinal rewards. In our type of society these mechanisms function through two main types of channels, the monetary market system and the fluid public communication system. In the first context it is above all financial resources as *generalized* access to possessions which come to be distributed; in the latter context, in the evaluative context, it is especially "reputation" which is allocated. In both cases we may speak of an ideal type of "free" competitive market process as a kind of base line. But equally in both cases, this fails to operate fully automatically even under what are empirically the best conditions. Hence various kinds of modifying "intervention" tend to take place which "even" the balances. Thus government of private philanthropy channels funds into uses to which, under competitive conditions they would not be put, such as health care or higher education, thereby increasing both the facilities and the rewards available to those working in those fields and the beneficiaries of their work. Similarly a person prominent in a field goes out of the way to praise the work of a younger less known person. By enhancing his reputation he also shifts the balance of facilities and rewards in the latter's favor. Essentially what seems to be going on is a kind of continual series of comparative judgments which say in effect, class A of roles is receiving too little, class B too much, and then a shift from A to B takes place.

It is obvious that it is particularly in processes such as these that the relation between the three components of power which we discussed above comes to be particularly crucial in the integrative functions of a system of stratification. It is essentially a question of the effectiveness of operation of the mechanisms of social control. Control of possessions is inevitably correlated with high status, hence there is a source of power independent of the direct evaluative legitimation of the status. Similarly potential deviance on either ego's or alter's part may enhance these possibilities of power. The func-

tion of the mechanisms of social control is to keep the *independent* i.e. the illegitimate, use of this power at a minimum.[15]

It may prove helpful to the reader in following the rather involved theoretical analysis of this paper if he is given a schematic outline of the principal conceptual elements used and some of their most important relations.

The most important point of reference is the accompanying figure (Fig. 2, Chap. V, p. 182 of *Working Papers.*) This is necessarily a highly schematic and hence in certain respects arbitrary representation, but it does show certain fundamental components and relations.

The four dimensions of our action space or directions of process are represented at the four corners of the figure—the adaptive (A), the goal-attainment or gratification (G), the integrative (I), and the latent-expressive (L). The *order* of the four is not arbitrary but is fundamental, e. g. that G is between A and I.

The four types of standards defining object-qualities and performance and sanction norms are described by the combinations of pattern variables clustering at each of the corners of the figures. These are respectively:

A. Qualities of "technical competence"
Performance norms: "technical efficiency"
(Pattern variables: universalism-performance)
Sanction norms: "approval-disapproval"
(Pattern variables: specificity-neutrality)

G. Qualities of a) "system-goal-commitment" or
b) "legitimation of unit-goal-commitment"
Performance Norms: a) system or "relational" responsibility
b) regulative "rules of the game"
(Pattern-variables: performance-particularism)
Sanction norms: conditional response-reward
(Pattern-variables: affectivity-specificity)

I. Qualities of "loyalty"
Performance norms: showing solidarity
(Pattern variables: particularism-quality)
Sanction norms: Diffuse acceptance
(Pattern variables: diffuseness-affectivity)

[15] The ecological allocation of possessions and of communication may as mechanisms of social systems, be treated as analogous to the "internal environment" of which physiologists have made so much. The stability of expectations with respect to the kind of evaluative judgments to be expected from qualities and performances, and with respect to their relation to control of facilities and reward-objects, is a condition of the integration of the system as a system. Thus there is functional significance in the constancy of this internal environment of the social system, an environment which is non-situational for the system as a whole, but situational for the action of the units taken as sub-systems. We shall attempt to analyze this somewhat further in connection with our own system of stratification presently.

L. Qualities of "cultural value-commitment"
Performance norms: "cultural responsibility"
(Pattern variables: quality-universalism)
Sanction norms: showing esteem
(Pattern-variables: neutrality-diffuseness)

The *organization* of value-standards relative to each other is analyzed as follows:

1. Characterization of *paramount* value pattern (in ideal type terms *one* of the above four types. This defines the content of the Latency cell of the figure, when applied to the system as a whole.
2. The system will then be differentiated into "primary" sub-systems:
   a) One of these will most directly institutionalize the paramount value system (the one whose norm type defines *this* latent cell, e. g. the occupational system in the United States)
   b) Others will be differentiated from it in relation to exigencies of (1) situational adaptation, (2) system and unit goal attainment, (3) system integration, (4) cultural pattern-maintenance and tension-management. Structural lines need not correspond *directly* to this classification, i. e. structures may be "multifunctional".

The paradigm must be used *at least twice* to analyze a differentiated system.

The principal criterion of priority of evaluation of functions, hence differentiated sub-systems, is *strategic significance for system-process.*

Units are rank-ordered

1) By direct evaluation in terms of
   a) Each of four types of standard
   b) Ordering of the four by the scale of strategic significance
2) Ecological "interlarding" through
   a) Allocation of facilities
   b) Allocation of reward-objects and reputation

To analyze the concrete system we should distinguish

1) A hierarchy of evaluative ranking which is a function of
   a) A "general prestige continuum"—more or less "tight or loose".
   b) Four major sub-hierarchies of direct evaluation in rough interlarded rank-order.
2) A hierarchy of power as a function of
   a) The above direct evaluations
   b) Conformity-deviance balances
   c) Allocation of possessions

We may now attempt to illustrate the abstract conceptual scheme just outlined by a brief sketch of certain highlights of the American system of social stratification, and the problems of analyzing the processes of mobility within it. On particular points contrasts with other systems will be discussed, but there will be no attempt to present a systematic comparative analysis.

As has been several times noted, we treat American society as having a value-system very close to the universalistic-achievement or performance ideal type. This gives first place to unit qualities and performances which have adaptive functions for the system. Furthermore, and very important, the lack of stress on a specific system-goal means that the valuation of adaptive functions is not relativized to such a specific goal, but goals are mainly permissively defined. In general then we may speak of contribution to the production of valued facilities for unit-goals, whatever, within the permissible limits, these may be, as the *primary* basis of positive evaluation of unit qualities and performances.

This puts the primary emphasis on productive activity in the economy, and also it is the source of what in a certain sense is an "individualistic" slant in the value system. This latter must, however, be very carefully interpreted. It definitely does not mean that only achievements of individuals in which they have not cooperated with others are valued or even that these are given priority. The achievements of collectivities such as business firms loom very large indeed. The major point is rather what may be called a "pluralism of goals" so that there is no overriding system-goal to which all activity in the system must be conceived to be oriented.

We might put it a little differently by saying that the primary system goal is the maximization of the production of valued possessions and cultural accomplishments which can facilitate the attainment of legitimate unit goals — whether the units be individual persons or various types of collectivities. This orientation places a particularly strong emphasis on the generalization of control of possessions through the money and market mechanisms, and on the generalization of evaluative communication through the allocation of direct attitudinal rewards, i.e. through "reputation". The first-order presumption is that the money value of a "product", i.e. as an exchangeable possession, is a measure of its value relative to others in the total productive process and similarly that money remuneration can serve as a workable index of the "reputation" of a unit in the system, individual or collective. This is of course only a first order orienting point of reference, and certain of its inadequacies will have to be taken up below.

If this general orientation is correctly designated as the central one, then the most directly valued achievement is what may be called in a special American sense a "practical" one, one which visibly eventuates in "production" in this sense. Next in order of evaluation then would seem to be the functions which are most important in insuring the conditions on which effective productive activities in this sense are dependent. In terms of our functional paradigm these involve as we have noted above, three main types or directions. The one next in order to the adaptive is probably the ascriptive-qualitative in

a special content sense, then the integrative aspect and finally the system-goal. We may take up each of these in turn.

The significance of values in the ascriptive-qualitative sphere is perhaps best brought out in terms of its relation to the universalistic component of the basic value-orientation type. There seem to be two main contexts of its application. One of these concerns the standards by which productive activities themselves are to be judged, and of course is generalized to cover other functions so far as such standards can be implemented in such a field. The place of science in our cultural system is the most important single example of this generalization. It is true that there is a sense in which its valuation is derivative rather than primary; the order runs from technology to science rather than vice versa. But once technology has attained a certain level of development the connection between it and science becomes exceedingly close. The most important single manifestation of this in the role structure of our present society is the place of the professions which require scientific training, notably of course engineering and medicine. The universities as the primary location of "pure" scientific investigation are also the places for training of professional personnel who then practice throughout the occupational system. Very broadly, then, contribution to the maintenance and development of a cultural tradition which can feed into the productive processes is one of the main classes of functions fitting into the ascriptive-qualitative value category. These functions rank high, but one may suspect it would take a real shift of the major value system to displace the "applied" functions from their position of priority.

The second context of application of universalism concerns the allocation of performance-capacities and opportunities for productive achievement. The focus of it is the universalistic definition of "equality of opportunity" as applied both to individuals and to collectivities. The differences of hereditary capacity must of course be accepted as "facts of nature". But within this framework there is a strong predilection to universalize opportunity. This seems to be the primary source of our high valuation of health and of education. Without good health and without as much training as a person has capacity to utilize, he cannot realize his potentialities for productive achievement. It is notable that these are two fields where there is the strongest consensus that "competitive" forces should not be permitted to operate unmodified, especially that access to health and to education should not be a simple function of ability to pay for them.

Two other particularly important fields of activity also fit into this context. One is the whole field of the regulation of the subtler balances of personality, both in respect to socialization and to maintaining emotional balance. This is above all the field in which our modern type of family, as distinguished from other kinship systems, has come to be specialized; hence perhaps it is not too far fetched to suggest that this is a main focus of evaluation of the feminine role. Formally professionalized handling of similar problems is, it may be noted, assimilated to the same basic context, and treated for the adult mainly as a problem of health through psychiatry, for the child as formal education. The other field concerns the regulation of the ecological processes of the distribution of possessions and of commu-

nication, especially reputation. It is here for example that a large part at least of the functions of the legal profession should be placed, but also certain of the regulatory functions of government, and of course, of informal "public opinion".

Integration of the system as a whole may be regarded as next in order in the scale of function-priorities. Generally speaking we expect this to work out to a large extent through spontaneous consensus and through a process of relatively free adjustment of interest groups to each other, through legislative negotiation, lobbying, etc. In general of course this set of functions merges over into the regulative aspects of the ascriptive-qualitative functions; the basic standard is that of "fair" opportunity for all legitimate interests. The doctrine of the separation of powers institutionalizes both our suspicion of commitment to overlay specific national system-goals and of overlay definite measures of system-integration. With changing conditions it would also seem that certain of the most severe strains in the functioning of the system were likely to appear at these points.

Finally, we have noted that functions of promoting system-goals directly are low in the priority scale because of the lack of a specific positive system-goal. Hence the positive position of government is relatively weak, and also dependent on its articulation with other functions. This also has to do with the wide variation between our attitudes toward government in ordinary circumstances, and in emergency conditions, where the goal of protecting the system from disruption from without becomes urgent. It would seem that the present position of high responsibility of the United States in the world would imply the necessity for a shift in the direction of a higher valuation of governmental function in this aspect; and, given our background this involves difficult processes of adjustment. The shading off of the ascriptive-qualitative into the system-goal aspects should be kept clearly in mind. Thus a primary occasion for relatively recent expansion in the functions of government was severe economic depression, which may be regarded as an emergency situation from the ascriptive-qualitative point of view, whereas the other most important occasion has been the problem of national defense and other closely related aspects of our position of international responsibility, i. e. a system-goal problem.

It should be kept clearly in mind that the same order of problems of valuation-priority appear again when we shift from consideration of the overall system as a whole to that of specific sub-systems. But the incidence of these judgments must be changed as a function of the place of the sub-system, especially if it is a collectivity, in the structure of the superordinate system. The paradigm must, that is, be applied at least twice in order to place a specific role of an individual in any kind of hierarchical order.

Thus the focus of the executive role as we ordinarily understand it, is on responsibility for system goal-attainment, i.e. of the organization in which the executive is placed. Because this is a highly strategic role for maximizing the contributions of the organization, while we do not necessarily give top priority to responsibility for overall societal goal-attainment, except in emergency, we do give high status to the executive role in productive organizations, other things

equal probably higher than to that of technical roles. Furthermore, while in the general value system instrumental functions tend to be ranked higher than expressive, from the point of view of functioning of the unit in the system in relation to the "internal environment" of the superordinate system, capacity to influence the action of others through expressive communication may be a highly strategic factor. Therefore the good negotiator, or the good "salesman" may have a highly strategic position because of the importance of his functions for the unit, even though *its* function in the larger system is of a totally different order. Because of this discrepancy in the two orders relative to the two levels of system reference, however, we might expect a good deal of ambivalence in the evaluation of such capacities and their resultant performances. In the extreme case the fact that they are practiced in the requisite occupational groups may be treated as almost sub-rosa. Thus the symbolic focus of competence in the legal profession centers on knowledge of the law. But the actual functions of practicing lawyers often involve a very large component of capacity to negotiate and persuade which is only loosely connected with intellectual mastery of the law.

We may now turn to a different order of analysis, looking at certain key features of our actual social structure in their bearing on the problems of stratification. Very roughly, and for our specific purposes, we may think of a society as composed of three major types of collectivities. First the "specific function" collectivity or organization of which the business firm, the school, the hospital may be treated as prototypes. Here, except for the recipients of service or the consumers of products, roles are organized in the occupational form, the collectivity is composed of executives, technicians, workers, teachers, physicians, nurses, etc. The second type, of which political units and churches are prototypes, are diffuse-function "associations" which represent their constituencies but which in proportion to their size and extensiveness of interests also tend to become organized in occupational-type roles for the more responsible and specialized functions, but with many limitations on how far this mode of organization, i.e. their "bureaucratization" can be carried. (There are of course innumerable specific-function associations like labor unions, professional associations, trade associations, etc., but these will be neglected here.) Finally, there are what may be called the "diffuse solidarities" in which individuals are embedded, of which local community, kinship and ethnic group are the most important for our purposes.

The relations of these three types of collectivities to each other are critically important to the system of stratification because the normal individual is a member of at least two of them, and if he is an adult male almost necessarily of a third, i.e. in the occupational system. He may within limits, of course, be a member of more than one such collectivity in a type which poses further problems of relationship and integration.

We have seen above that the field of most direct institutionalization of our paramount value system is that of occupational roles. It is true that some of what are defined as occupational roles are not primarily in the adaptive sub-system, but in the cultural ascriptive-qualitative sub-system as in the case of the scientist, the teacher or the

minister of religion, or in the system-goal-integrative systems as in the case of officials of government. However, even though the collectivities in these different sub-systems may have different characters related to their differences of function, they have what in the narrower sense are occupational sub-systems within which the roles are of the same fundamental type as those in the primarily adaptive sub-system. Furthermore of course a significant, though decreasing class of occupational roles, like the completely independent "private practitioner" of a profession, or completely independent craftsman, are not imbedded in the context of organization at all. There is one further type of role of which that of farmer is the type case where the otherwise normal segregation between kinship unit and productive function does not obtain; similar situations exist for small stores and in some other fields.

Nevertheless the massive fact is that the normal adult male is the incumbent of a "full-time" occupational role and that in the increasingly typical case this is part of an organization and is rather strictly segregated in physical premises, property control and "management" from his kinship unit. Furthermore the great majority of the unmarried female population have such roles, beyond the educational ages, and an increasing proportion of the married women. Broadly we may say that in the occupational system thus defined status is a function of the individual's productive "contribution" to the functions of the organizations concerned, hence of his performance capacities and his achievements on behalf of the organization.

We have said that this is "broadly" true. Of course there are innumerable ways in which it fails to work out, for the kinds of reasons mentioned above such as difficulty of implementing standards of judgment, indefiniteness of such standards, and difficulty of comparison between qualitatively different performances and qualities. Differences of power as a result of command of possessions, of blocks in communication and the like can serve to protect and increase such discrepancies. These factors are of the greatest importance for detailed empirical analysis, but are secondary from the point of view of the broad characterization of our stratification system.

The same individuals who are the incumbents of occupational roles are of course members of kinship units. The most important thing about the American kinship system from the present point of view is how far the process of "isolation" of the conjugal family has gone. In the first place this means of course that the standard or "expected" unit is the "family" household consisting of the married couple and their still dependent children. Though other relatives do often live in the household it can pretty definitely be said that this is structurally anomalous, particularly under urban middle class conditions. Furthermore there is a very close approach to symmetry in the relations between this family and the families of orientation of the spouses, though one may perhaps speak of a slight "matrilineal" trend through a tendency to special solidarity of mother and married daughter. Beyond this the conjugal family has, as is well recognized, been very largely stripped of functions in the larger society other than those in the ascriptive-qualitative sphere, above all those in "production" which otherwise are so fundamental to our type of

society. This means essentially that its primary function significance is as a maintainer of certain "style patterns" of life which are integral to the general cultural tradition, as a regulator of the personality equilibria of its members, and as a socializer of children into this cultural tradition.

This "whittling down" of the American kinship unit as compared with those in other societies, both with regard to membership and to function, is obviously intimately connected with the functional requirements of our type of occupational system. But there is a limit beyond which this process cannot go if the remaining functions are to be effectively performed. There seems to be little doubt first that these functions are vital to the society and second that there is, in a broad sense, no alternative way of taking care of them in sight.

The family is essentially a unit of diffuse solidarity. Its members must, therefore, to a fundamental degree share a common status in the larger system; which means that they must, in spite of their differentiation by sex and age, be evaluated in certain respects as equals. The family as a unit has a certain order of "reputation" in the community. Its members share a common household and therefore the evaluation of this in terms of location, character, furnishings, etc., in the system of prestige symbolism. They have a common style of life. If the position of the parents in the community is relatively high, its advantages must to some extent be shared by the children, whether they "deserve" it or not; similarly of course the sharing of the disadvantages of low parental status. From these considerations it follows that the preservation of a functioning family system even of our type is incompatible with complete "equality of opportunity". It is a basic limitation on the full implementation of our paramount value system, which is attributable to its conflict with the functional exigencies of personality and cultural stabilization and socialization.

Another aspect of the consequences of our family system concerns its impact on sex role differentiation. Even though its typical membership is so small, a conjugal family is an internally differentiated system. The adaptive exigencies of its maintenance as a system in our society focus above all on the reputation and income to be earned through the husband-father's occupational role. This is strategically so fundamental that by virtue of it alone he must be accorded the "instrumental leadership" role. But we know that groups of such size strongly tend to develop a differentiation between instrumental and expressive leadership. At the same time the exigencies of the socialization process demand a certain type of relation to children which it is exceedingly difficult for the father to combine with his occupational responsibilities. Hence the mother role in specific personal relation to the child, and the "expressive leadership" role in the family, combined with primary *internal* instrumental responsibilities in the family (as "homemaker") tend to form the center of gravity of the feminine role.

Inherent in this situation is a whole set of forces making for relative segregation of the sex roles, and in general to "shunt" the feminine role out of primary status in the occupational system or competition for occupational success or status. Probably the main

positive functional basis of this is the crucial functional significance to the society of the mother role *within* the context of the family. From this follows the importance of equality of status of husband and wife, but occupational competition tends to disperse in status rather than to equalize. Broadly married women in our society are not in direct competition for occupational status and its primary reward symbols with men of their own class. On the other hand it may also be said that the segregation of sex roles serves to keep men integrated in the family so that the extremely important socialization functions of the father role are preserved. Obviously the whole situation, however, produces another fundamental limitation on full "equality of opportunity", in that women, regardless of their performance capacities, tend to be relegated to a narrower range of functions than men, and excluded, at least relatively, from some of the highest prestige statuses.[16]

A striking manifestation of this segregation of the sex roles is to be found in the style-symbolism of dress and personal appearance generally. Masculine dress in our society is virtually a uniform, except for certain types of sports clothes. Feminine dress on the other hand emphasizes considerable elaboration and individuality of taste, supplemented by relatively elaborate embellishment of the hair, the face, etc., which is strongly taboo for men. That this order of differentiation is not to be regarded as "human nature" may be brought out by two contrasting examples. Anyone familiar with conservative farm communities knows that there tends there to be a much closer parallelism between the clothes of the two sexes, work clothes for every day, and "Sunday best" with about the same order of relative elaborateness for both sexes. At the other extreme we may mention the aristocratic society of the European eighteenth century where masculine dress approached feminine in its elaborateness and scope for taste. Powdered wigs, lace ruffles and cuffs, varicolored coats and waistcoats, satin breaches and silver buckles were not deemed in the least "effeminate" for a gentleman whereas they would be unthinkable for a man in our society.

Very broadly, again, the main lines of our system of stratification seem to be understandable as a resultant of the tendencies of institutionalization on the one hand of the occupational system—including of course roles in the ascriptive-qualitative and governmental systems and on the other hand of the kinship system. Local community might be an independent basis and to some extent is with respect to rural-urban and regional differentiations. But compared with other societies the notable thing about our patterns of residence is their high mobility, so that above all community of residence tends to be a function of occupational role rather than vice versa. Similarly within a community, neighborhood of residence tends, within the limits of access to occupational premises, to be a function of income and family taste rather than an independent determinant.

[16] The relevant aspects of the American kinship system and its relation to occupation and Stratification are more fully discussed in Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory, Chaps.* X-XII. See also on the whole American system, Robin M. Williams, Jr., *American Society*, especially Chap. 5.

Ethnic belongingness is another possible basis in diffuse solidarity for differentiation of status. It is probably, along with certain aspects of religion, the most important basis which is independent of occupation and kinship in the narrower senses, except perhaps for the rural-urban and the regional aspects of community. The case of the negro, even in the North, is the most conspicuous one. But in spite of the dispersion of the members of given ethnic groups through the different levels of the main class structure, ethnicity to some degree tends to preserve relatively independent "pyramids" in the more general system. Its importance would, in the normal course of development of our type of society, be expected to decrease. How far this is actually happening is exceedingly difficult to judge. On the one hand our system is, as noted, the kind which allows a much greater degree of looseness than most others, and this permits the preservation of ethnic distinctiveness. These tendencies are reinforced by ethnic traditionalism as a defense against insecurity. On the other hand there are very powerful forces of acculturation at work which tend to break down distinctive ethnic traditions. Broadly we may regard the ethnic factor as a secondary basis of modification of the stratification pattern but as by no means unimportant.

The ethnic problem seems to modify the system of stratification through two principal types of process. In the first place the value-system of an ethnic group may vary from that paramount in the dominant society. Then within certain limits of tolerance it may tend to form a variant sub-society within the larger society, more closely approximating implementation of its own values. In these respects the actions of an ethnic group should be interpreted in terms of its own distinctive culture, including its own internal stratification and the ways in which it can, according to its values, appropriately articulate with the main class system.[17]

The second mode of modification derives from the fact that the ethnic group, with regard both to its value-patterns and to any other aspects of its status in the larger society, constitutes an entity somewhat apart, to which non-members react in patterned ways which in turn help to determine the reactions of the members of the group. Discrimination, as in the non-acceptance of ethnic members in certain statuses for which they are otherwise qualified, is a type example. A reaction to discrimination is not understandable *only* in terms of the value-patterns of the ethnic group, but the source and character of the discrimination must also be taken into account.

In general it should be said that until fairly recently perhaps the major modifying influence of ethnic groups in American society has been in the lower reaches of the stratification scale. With upward mobility on a large scale, however, this has come to be modified and the place of Jews or of Catholic Irish in the upper middle classes, for instance, present problem areas of considerable empirical importance.

Of the two major types of what above were called diffuse-function associations, the political may be treated as a relatively minor

[17] The case of the Negro in American society would be that where an independent ethnic culture was of minimal importance; those of Italians or East European Jews would be cases where this culture was of considerable significance.

factor except for the groups actively participating in political function. The high level of horizontal mobility means that membership in the local political unit is of secondary significance and easily changed. Similarly party affiliation is for most of the "public" loose and easily changed except at the numerically small extremes involved in political activism of the protofascist or communist variety. The question of where those actively engaged in political careers belong presents another order of problem. Perhaps the most important point to note is that in sharp contrast to many societies, a "political elite" or "ruling class" does not have a paramount position in American society, but at best those most successful in making a political career are only *among* the elite elements, not the distinctively paramount one. Moreover, there is little continuity from generation to generation in this type of affiliation.

The case of religious organization and affiliation is different and is of great sociological interest. The main structure is, we may say, that of Protestant denominational pluralism with a great deal of congregational autonomy of the local units, even in the Episcopal and Methodist churches. This has tended to work out, in close correlation with residential neighbourhoods, in terms of an assimilation of religious affiliation in a broad and rather loose way with social stratification. Thus the main membership of certain churches is drawn from the upper class groups, and there is from here down a rough gradation of denominations corresponding to the class structure. If differentiation of parishes within the same denominations is taken into account the relationship is even closer. The main exception to the pattern is the Roman Catholic Church with its close relationship to the ethnic origins of its constituents. Again by contrast with other societies it is notable that a clergy does not occupy any very distinctive position in the class structure. Though in many respects a very special kind of occupational role, with the exception of the celibate Catholic clergy, it tends to be assimilated to the general occupational role system. The status of a clergyman is roughly a function of the prestige of his parishoners.

If we treat "politics" as at least partially an occupational role, (as indeed civil service and careers in the armed services certainly can be) then we need broadly abstract only from the ethnic problem, from the type of local community, and from the special position of the Catholic Church, to justify the broad generalization that our system of stratification revolves mainly about the integration between kinship and the occupational system. Obviously the most important direct links between the two concern the fact that what from the point of view of family status is the primary occupational role, that of husband-father, is occupied by the same person who is "instrumental leader" of the family, and that his occupational earnings constitute the main — though decreasingly often perhaps the only — source of family income, i.e. of facilities and symbolically significant reward-objects.

Hence there *has to be* a broad correlation between direct evaluation of occupational roles, income derived from those roles, and status of the families of the incumbents as collectivities in the scale of stratification. It is essentially this broad correlation to which we

would like to apply the term "class-status", so far as it describes American conditions. Somewhat more broadly we may repeat the definition of class status given in the earlier paper as that component of status shared by the members of the most effective kinship unit. In this respect the distinctive features of the American system are the constitution of the typical kinship unit, the isolated conjugal family, and the fact that one of its members occupies a status-determining occupational role. In classical China, for example, the distinction between peasantry and gentry families – which as kinship units were also differently constituted – rested on a quite different basis; essentially whether or not they owned sufficient land to make the "scholarly" pattern of life possible, without the family members themselves engaging in manual labour.

As thus defined, class status is, it should be clear, not a rigid entity, but a fairly loosely correlated complex. Family status relative to specific occupation and to income may be enhanced (or depressed) by canons of taste in the fields of expressive symbolism, by connections with other families of certain orders of prestige, through kinship or for example through memberships in voluntary associations or purely informal mutual entertainment relations. It may also be enhanced or depressed through choice of residential location, through prestige of educational institutions which members have attended or children are currently attending, and through various other channels. To a considerable degree it is arbitrary where the "constitutive" elements of class status are held to end, and their "symbolic" penumbra to begin. All that is here contended is that the family-occupation-income complex is by and large the core of the wider complex. We have deliberately abstracted from ethnic status which might be brought in. In a sense it is taken account of by way of the family. Perhaps the best single case for another element would be education. The most important reason for not including it in the core, but placing it on the "periphery" here is that in *our* society the primary meaning of education seems to be that it serves as a path to future occupational status. This differentiates American society from that of most European countries where the "quality" status of the educated man as compared with "what he does" is relatively much more important. This is, however, a difference of degree; thus attendance at an "ivy league" college does indeed stamp a man to some extent independently of his future occupational status.

However this question may be treated, it is of the greatest importance that it is only in the broadest sense that this class complex can in American society be made to yield a single unequivocal scale of classes. Some such broad classification as "upper" – carefully defined –"middle" and "lower" makes sense. Furthermore it is often useful to sub-divide these for specific purposes – as is done at a number of points in this paper. But care should be taken not to imply that the finer differentiations are even nearly uniform "across the board" or that the lines between adjacent classes are very clear-cut.

The main bases for such caution are three. First, as we have seen, from the point of view of direct evaluation of occupational roles themselves there has to be a complex process of "interlarding" of the different qualitative role types, not only in terms of *one* applica-

tion of our qualitative classification, but of *at least two.* Thus high business executives, people highly placed in government, and people highly placed in the ascriptive-qualitative functions such as scientists, writers, etc., are extremely difficult to rank relative to each other in any unequivocal way. Certain "situses" as Hatt[18] calls them, are easier to arrange in a relatively clear-cut rank order — broadly within the same qualitative types. Secondly, the relation between occupational and family status is relatively loose. It is true that there is a *tendency* through the consolidation of advantage, for the families of the successful to consolidate their position and perpetuate it as an hereditary "upper class", but this has not been notably effective on a nationwide basis. It is most conspicuous in smaller communities, not least because the occupationally more ambitious tend to be drained off from these communities. Even here there seems to be considerable change over time. In general any expressive-symbolic scale of ranking of family — such as the Chapin living room scale — will correlate, but only loosely, with one of occupational status of father, the more narrow the range relative to the total scale, the more loosely.

The third reason for looseness is the relative independence relative to the other components, of the factors involved in the processes of allocation of possessions. Inherited wealth plays some part, but compared to other systems a relatively minor one. (Its place in the upper reaches of the system, including what is ordinarily called the upper middle class is, however, undoubtedly worthy of more careful study than it has yet received). Earnings of members of the family other than the husband-father are also by no means negligible, but probably by far the most important factor is that of difference in the mechanisms through which income is allocated to occupational remuneration in different fields. Three main types of such mechanisms may be distinguished. The first is the "classical" distribution by free competition, whereby income of the individual is a direct function of his own "entrepreneurial" activity, through selling services or products on a free market. Formally this should include the independent craftsman, professional, etc., as well as the proprietor of a business in the usual sense. This has led to the greatest inequality, and is of course the source of the fortunes which are so much less prominent now than in our past. The second is payment by the firm on the basis of its earning in a competitive — though not necessarily unregulated — market, e.g. salaries, wages, bonuses, commissions, etc., (dividends on securities belong in another category). The third is the class of occupations which have to be "subsidized" in the sense that funds have to be "raised" through some mechanisms other than those of the free market, e.g. through taxation or philanthropic contribution.) Government employees and those of "non-profit" organizations like hospitals, universities, etc., are the most important cases. The most important broad generalization seems to be that the first two mechanisms lead to a considerably wider range of differentiation, and thus a considerably higher "top" than does the third.

[18] Hatt, Paul K., "Occupation and Stratification", *American Journal of Sociology,* 55, May 1950.

It is very much an open question how far these discrepancies of occupational income and hence of course of family standard of living correspond to clear-cut differentiations of direct evaluation of function.[19] It is easy to cite cases where discrepancy is clear — as for instance that between the salary of a high Federal Judge and what the incumbent could usually earn in the private practice of law.

The point of this relative "looseness" need not be laboured. But these kinds of discrepancies necessitate mechanisms of adjustment so that they do not disturb the integration of the social system too greatly. Two sets of such mechanisms may be briefly mentioned. One, which is very conspicuous by comparison with European societies, especially a generation or more ago, is the relatively wide range of facilities open to the "public" without specific status-implications; thus travel facilities, hotels, restaurants, etc. Such small things as the fact that "almost everybody" smokes standard brands of cigarettes of about the same price, and even that many very high status people drive Fords and Chevrolets, (and some not-so-high drive Cadillacs) are undoubtedly significant. Related to this broad "band" of objects with relatively little "invidious" significance, is the degree of insulation which exists between these different groups so that they do not come into much direct contact in spheres where the comparison would lead to acute strain. Thus the families of civil servants, officers, professors whose incomes are lower than those of comparable occupational statuses in business, have little to do with the families of the latter, so that strain is minimized. There are of course standards below which serious strain would be felt — a very important field is the education of children. But the existence of these mechanisms is a very important fact in a society where "keeping up with the Joneses" figures so prominently in the folklore. It illustrates the importance of assaying particular facts in the context of the social system as a whole, not one isolated context.

In brief, particularly as seen in comparative perspective, one of the most notable features of the American system of stratification is its relative looseness, the absence of a clear-cut hierarchy of prestige except in a very broad sense, the absence of an unequivocal top elite or ruling class; the fluidity of the shadings as well as mobility between groups and, in spite of the prestige-implications of the generalized goal of success, the relative tolerance for many different paths to success. It is by no means a "classless society", but among class societies, it is a distinctive type.

Another notable fact, the broader significance of which will have to be assessed in the light of the very long run trends of the development of the society, is the amount of "compression" of the scale, so

[18-a] The "sliding scale" which is a prominent feature of the market for professional services, is intermediate between these.

[19] The evidence of the North-Hatt study which places scientists and certain professional groups above even rather high business personnel would indicate that money income did not reflect relative evaluation *across* these types very accurately. Cf. North, Cecil C., and Hatt, Paul K., "Jobs and Occupations: A popular Evaluation" *Opinion News,* Sept. 1, 1947, pp. 3-13; reprinted in *Sociological Analysis,* Logan Wilson and William L. Kolb, eds., New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1949, pp. 464-473.

far as the income aspect is concerned, which has occurred in about the last generation. This has come from pressures on both "ends". On the one hand, related of course very largely to the development of the labour movement, with very considerable political support, but also involving the slowing up of immigration, there has been a very great rise in the relative incomes of most of the lower groups, though it has been uneven, and the "White collar" groups have not risen comparably. On the other hand high progressive taxation, both of incomes and of estates, and changes in the structure of the economy, have "lopped off" the previous top stratum, where the symbols of conspicuous consumption were, in an earlier generation most lavishly displayed. A notable symbol of this is the recent fate of the Long Island estate of the J. P. Morgan family, which had to be sold at auction in default of payment of taxes. One wonders what Veblen would say were he writing today instead of at the height of the "gilded age".

We may sum up the main pattern from top to bottom very broadly as follows: the "top" is a broad and diffuse one with several loosely integrated components. Undoubtedly its main focus is now on occupational status and occupational earnings. Seen in historical as well as comparative perspective this is a notable fact, for the entrepreneurial fortunes of the period of economic development of the 19th century, especially after the Civil War, notably failed to produce a set of ruling families on a national scale who as family entities on a Japanese or even a French pattern have tended to keep control of the basic corporate entities in the economy. Members of these families have retained elite position but broadly through their own occupational or occupation-like achievements rather than on a purely ascriptive basis of family membership. This is true in spite of the fact that mechanisms of safe investment have made it possible to keep inheritances intact more effectively (not of course allowing for voluntary dissipation through distribution to heirs and through philanthropic gifts and bequests) than in most other societies. The basic phenomenon seems to have been the shift in *control* of enterprise from the property interests of founding families to managerial and technical personnel who as such have not had a comparable vested interest in ownership. This critical fact underlies the interpretation that what we may call the "family elite" elements of the class structure (the Warnerian "upper-uppers") hold a secondary rather than a primary position in the overall stratification system. On the whole their position is far stronger locally than nationally, and on the whole in smaller than in larger communities – least so in metropolitan centers—and in economically less rather than more progressive communities. The burden of proof certainly rests upon him who would allege that we were well on the way to the development of a hereditary top class in the precapitalistic European sense. The development of our taxation system in the last generation would clearly not be understandable on the hypothesis of the increasing predominance of such a group.

Only in a rather loose and insecure way can one speak of the business managerial elite as the unequivocal top class in an occupational sense. There is strong competition from the professional elite groups, greatly reinforced by the increasing importance of scientifi-

cally based technology, both in industry and in the military field. Some groups of professionals are of course very close to business, notably lawyers and engineers, but they shade off into other groups, notable in the universities. With the kinds of qualifications already suggested we may speak of a rather open shifting elite.

The next point to note is that there is no clear break between elite groups in this sense and a broad band of what is usually called the "upper middle class", of business and professional people and, increasingly with the expansion of the functions of government, of civil servants and professional military officers.

The lack of distinctness of this line, and the next one down, is strongly accentuated by another circumstance. This is an implication of the independence of the conjugal family which in turn means that young married couples who are destined by ability or even birth for elite status often start off their married lives with a standard of living which might well be characterized as "lower middle class". The fact that on the whole we have so much less presumption than in European tradition that a son will follow in his father's footsteps, in status if not exact occupation, and that he will only marry when he can support his wife in "the style to which she has been accustomed", means that the lines are much more blurred by the circumstances of stages of career than is the case in other types of stratification system.

Probably the best single index of the line between "upper middle" class and the rest of the middle class is the expectation that children will have a college education, as a matter that is of status-right not of the exceptional ability of the individual. This also is blurred above all by the wide qualitative and other variation of institutions of higher education, but it seems to be a fairly clear-cut line.[20] It is important to be clear about the meaning of this expectation. It is, primarily, that the son of such a family will thereby be able to qualify for an acceptably high-level occupational role rather than that he should become a sufficiently educated man to have the manners and humanistic interests appropriate to the cultural status of the family.

Traditionally the line between "middle" and "lower" class status in the Western world has of course been drawn in terms of the distinction between "white collar" and "labor" occupations. Development in this country has gone far to blur the distinctness of this line. A major contribution to this blurring has been the high income of the elite labor groups, largely though not wholly enforced by strong union pressure, so that there is a very considerable overlap in income. But along with that has gone the assimilation of styles of life so that it is difficult to draw clear differentiations. A most important point, documented by Centers[21] is that expectation of advancement in status for children runs throughout these groups. We have

[20] As shown in the study of mobility referred to above, this expectation operates relatively clearly in the top two of six occupation status-groups we have distinguished.

[21] Centers, Richard, *The Psychology of Social Classes*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949, pp. 147 and 216.

relatively little of the traditional "labouring class" of the European background.

Another major aspect of this problem is the failure (contrary to Marxian predictions) for the industrial labour force to grow in proportion to the growth in productivity of the economy, and the corresponding relative increase in numbers in white-collar and "service" occupations, many of which have many of the characteristics of semi-independent small business, as in the case of the gas-station proprietor.

In any case the changing structure of the lower reaches of the occupational system is of the greatest importance for the future. The occupations consisting of almost sheer drudgery — "pick and shovel work" — have of course been enormously diminished. Now automatic machinery is eliminating whole ranges of the so-called "semi-skilled" occupations. It looks very much as though the traditional "bottom" of the occupational pyramid was in course of almost disappearing. If anything this will tend to make our class structure even more predominantly "middle-class" than it already is.

In the lower reaches of the structure there are tendencies to deviation from this "middle class" pattern which are in some respects complementary to the tendencies near the top to form family as distinguished from occupational elites. Essentially we might say this consists in a shift from predominance of the "success" goal to that of the "security" goal. More concretely it is a loss of interest in achievement, whether for its own sake and for opportunity to do more important things, or for advancement of family status through more income and enhanced reputation. Occupational role then becomes not the main "field" for achievement, but a means for securing the necessities of a tolerable standard of living, a necessary evil. The basic focus of interest is diverted from the occupational field into the family, avocations, friendship relations and the like. Undoubtedly this type of shift, found to some extent at all class levels, increases toward the bottom of the scale in what some have called the "common man" class.[22] It is probably most marked in what Warner and his associates call the "lower-lower" group. The exact extent and distribution of these tendencies are uncertain, but again perhaps the most important point to be made, one of which we have direct evidence, — is the lack of definiteness of the line. Evidence from the study of mobility shows clearly that we find considerable "ambition" at all class levels; there is no sharp break.

A word also needs to be said about the place of the farm population in the system of stratification. The first and notable fact is the enormous decrease in the relative proportion of farmers among the gainfully employed; it is now down to not much more than 15% — the contrast with most other societies is striking. Secondly it is important that there is a very wide range in size of farm, income, etc., so really we can say that farmers go all the way from equivalents of "upper middle" (excluding "gentleman farmers" to whom it is not really an occupational commitment) to the bottom of the scale in the proverbial poverty-striken share-croppers of certain areas. Finally

[22] The term is used by Warner, but also by Dr. Joseph A. Khal in unpublished material.

it may be suggested that the mechanization of agriculture is contributing to assimilation of farming to the "small business" category of occupations, indeed in a good many cases not very small. Furthermore the phenomena of "rurbanization" have tended to assimilate the style of life of the farming groups greatly to that of the urban population.

The kinds of considerations discussed in the last few pages suggest that while in American politics the great "interest groups" are above all business, labor and agriculture, they are not as blocks nearly as tightly integrated as much ideological stereotyping suggests; each contains a great range of types and status-levels (especially if we include labour-leaders, who often have business-level incomes). These groups are not as loose coalitions as the Democratic and Republican parties, but are very far from being groups whose members have interests which are identical on almost all issues. Above all they interlard in the system of stratification with each other and with other groups; they do not constitute clear cut "strata" in the literal sense, one above another.

Finally, this sketch would not be complete without a brief discussion of the problem of mobility within our stratification system. Though the interest of sociologists in this problem has tended to be focussed on so-called "vertical" mobility, perhaps the first important thing to emphasize is the great importance of "horizontal" mobility. Of this in turn two interrelated types are both crucial, namely residential mobility and shift from one occupational status to another, whether within the same occupational type but from one organization to another, or between occupational types. The volume of residential mobility is very great indeed, and this is a most important condition of vertical mobility, since it makes it possible to escape "tight" situations and try again where opportunity seems more promising. The study of small, economically stagnant communities without systematic accounting for what has happened to persons moving out of the community, has contributed to the impression given by the Warner-group studies of the low level of vertical mobility in the society.

Another extremely important fact about the American occupational system is the large amount of "lateral" movement within the occupational system. For example in Continental Europe, below the highest political levels, it has been much less common than here for people to move in and out of government service; there civil service has had to be a life career. Similarly we "hire away" from other organizations in the same or closely related fields a great deal. There is of course even less continuity of specific occupational status from generation to generation, even on similar levels, and much less than there has been in Europe. Both these types of horizontal mobility have been most important in making it possible to "make end runs" on an upward course rather than having to "break through the line" in the same situation in which one is placed by origin or at a given career stage.

Though it is perhaps less commonly said now than a few years ago, there have recently been a good many flat statements to the effect that opportunities for upward mobility have been drastically declining

in American society in the last generation or so. These statements should be regarded with great scepticism. There are to be sure two factors in our past which are not likely to be repeated. The settlement of a continent opens up opportunities for status, particularly in new local communities, which cannot be repeated in a fully settled country. Secondly, the opportunity for whole strata of recent immigrants, coming in at the bottom of the scale, to rise in status relative to their initial status in this country, naturally will not be repeated unless immigration is resumed on a grand scale, which seems unlikely. On the other side of course is the enormous increase in productivity of the American economy which is the big positive opportunity-producing factor. These factors are difficult to balance against each other. The general question is very open and the evidence fragmentary.

Undoubtedly there has been a shift by which mobility through the education-system has been greatly increasing in importance. The "self-made man" is less likely than before to have only a grade-school education, and less likely to have established his own organization rather than to have risen through existing organizations. Evidence from the Boston metropolitan area, and taking going to college as a prognosis of probable "high" status in the future, shows that both relative to occupational status of father and education of both parents there is considerable mobility.[23] If this is true of the Boston area, which is perhaps economically the most "stagnant" of the larger metropolitan areas of the country, the presumption is that it is more rather than less true of metropolitan America as a whole, though smaller towns are another matter.

On the question of how far sheer economic problems, the access to facilities, play a part in the aspect of mobility we have studied, the evidence is less definite, but an impression is fairly clear. This is that, in a metropolitan area where it is possible to attend college and live at home, the economic difficulties of going to college are not the principal barriers even for those from relatively low income families. Exactly how important this factor is we do not know – it is presumably much more so in communities which do not have a local college – but we feel that the available evidence suggests that it is less important than is generally supposed. If this is correct, then an unexpectedly heavy emphasis falls on the factor of *motivation* to mobility, on the part both of a boy himself, and of his parents on his behalf, as distinguished from objective opportunity for mobility. This is a conclusion which runs contrary to much "liberal" opinion, but is at least well enough validated by evidence to warrant further sociological investigation.[24]

This raises certain problems about the type of sociological analysis which is needed in order to understand the processes of mobility under such conditions. Essentially we may say that, within this

[23] The study of mobility in collaboration with S. A. Stouffer and Florence Kluckhohn referred to in Note 1, p. 1 above.

[24] There is, of course, no reason why this lack of motivation to mobility may not be a function of continuing low family status and hence opportunity over generations.

framework, the focus is on the determinants of the "free choice" of the individual. Therefore his motivation to "get ahead" and the qualitative direction in which he wishes to do so, must be treated as qualities of his personality, rather than placing the problem primarily in the understanding of the exigencies of the situation in which he must act.

If the problem focuses on qualities of the personality, then the question is, how do these qualities develop? One factor of course is constitutionally given ability, but this is outside the range of the sociologist's competence to analyze. Within the range of variation left open by constitutional abilities, however, qualities are acquired through the processes of socialization. These processes, we feel, operate first in the family as a sub-system of the society, then secondarily in the school and peer group. Essentially, then, we must be concerned with those features of families as social systems, the roles played by the parents and siblings and their impact on the personality of the child, which are significant for socialization in general and in particular for determining the difference between "ambitious" and "unambitious" boys and within the ambitious category, different qualitative types of ambition. (Similarly of course for schools and peer groups.)

From the point of view of American society as a social system this problem leads us into the areas of "microscopic" variability of the social structure, since we have good evidence that the differences in which we are interested are only partly a function of the broad differences of class status of families. But in no way does this circumstance make it any less a sociological problem area than if we were attempting to explain only the broadest differences between mobility (or its lack) in the American system of stratification and in the caste system of India.

In no sense is the above sketch a technically "operational" study of the American system of social stratification. In the context of the present paper its purpose is mainly illustrative; it is meant to give the reader some sense of the empirical relevance of the abstract analytical categories which were developed in the first part of the paper. Essentially its purpose will have been served if it helps to do three things: first to give concrete empirical content to most of the theoretical categories dealt with, second to show that by approaching even so complex and baffling an empirical area as the analysis of the stratification of a very complex society in terms of an articulated conceptual scheme, a firm "base of operations" for such analysis can be gained and, third, to show that by use of such a scheme specific insights about the dynamics of the system may be gained which would either not be possible at all, or would be far more vacillating and uncertain if the same empirical problems were approached in a more ad hoc or common-sense way.

One final note may be sounded about the paper as a whole. It is common by implication, if not quite explicitly, to suggest that it is possible and fruitful to develop "theories" of certain types of social phenomena which are essentially independent of each other and of general sociological theory; thus we might speak of a "theory of juvenile delinquency", a "theory of the family", or a "theory of

political behaviour" and of course a "theory of social stratification". That any one of these constitutes a legitimate field of specialization is beyond doubt. But unless the theoretical approach taken in this paper is grossly mistaken, the theory of stratification is not an independent body of concepts and generalizations which are only loosely connected with other parts of general sociological theory; it *is* general sociological theory pulled together with reference to a certain fundamental aspect of social systems. Such merits as the present analysis may possess are therefore overwhelmingly the product of advances in general theory which have made it possible to state and treat the problems of stratification in such a way as to bring to bear the major tools of general analysis upon them. It is above all the fact that we have much better general theory than a generation ago which makes a better understanding of stratification on a theoretical level possible, though of course in turn study of the problems of stratification has made a major contribution to the development of general theory.

6

BRIDGING SOCIOLOGY AND ETHICS

By SAMUEL L. HART

Mukerjee's reputation as an economist and sociologist is world-wide. His latest work, *The Dynamics of Morals,* written in the full maturity of his rich intellectual life, shows great learning in the total field of social studies. Mukerjee's knowledge is stupendous. He is equally at home in sociology, psychology, economics, psychiatry, anthropology, and Eastern and Western philosophies of morality. Erudition and an exceptional gift of integration are the most striking features of his writings. Mukerjee's unique blend of scientific competence with an untiring, daring quest for a better society is the most appealing virtue.

The viewpoint elucidated in *The Dynamics of Morals* evades any single term by which it could be adequately described. Mukerjee is too much engrossed in the vast material bearing upon the moral values to be content with one "ism" — individualism, collectivism, hedonism, utilitarianism, perfectionism, or idealism. He is not fond of any generalisation which distorts data of experience for the sake of logical simplicity or some preconceived epistemic scheme. His socio-psychological ethics studies moral norms and values as emergents in the dynamic interrelationship between the individual, the group, and the institution. These three must be examined in their togetherness if we aspire to an analysis of ethical concepts, norms and goals which could do full justice to the whole gamut of man's social life. A logical or linguistic scrutiny of values must be preceded by an investigation of what in actual social relations are posited and recognized as values. "Such abstract values as love, justice, goodness and truth can be understood only in the context of the whole social situation. In other words, in order to appreciate that a man is loving, just, good and truthful, we have to understand the group, the institution, the laws, rights and duties and the systems of economy and social culture in which he evaluates, plans and acts." (p. 212). Mukerjee knows well that man's actions speak louder than his words. Hence his justified scepticism about the prolific but fruitless linguistic analyses of the contemporary ethical inquiries. He devotes no more than 28 pages to the symbolic nature of morals. In addition, he rejects any logic of ethical terms which keeps itself aloof from consideration of the many social and cultural factors which frame our moral notions. Mukerjee talks about the inner world of symbolic living and experience whose external observable properties comprise only a fragment of its rich domain of meanings. Ethical terms encompass more than perceptive referents. They mark and fix past and present experiences, individual as well as collective, conscious as well as unconscious elements which account for our habits, attitudes and sentiments. Ethical terms describe and direct actual behaviour.

Their regulating role is intimately bound up with their informative character manifested in the anticipated consequences of behaviour they invoke. The plural significance of ethical terms, their richness in meanings, is not something we have reason to regret. "Culture consists, in its psychological aspect, largely of the finer filiations of dispositions, attitudes, values and modes of thinking. A person belonging to an advanced social culture lives more symbolically and enjoys a wider range of the higher subjective processes so that subtle alterations in the patterns of course of events in the external world come to him laden with fuller meanings and values. In such a plane of variegated subjective experience, life is raised from the level of 'all or none response' to one of discriminative and nicely graded reactions and enjoyments" (pp. 459 ff.). We do not talk past another in ethical issues because of the ambiguity of moral terms. We do so for other reasons, for reasons of social frustrations, social blocks in our actions. An elimination of such impediments is a more adequate means to a successful adjustment and communication than mere linguistic scrutinies, which in order to satisfy our inveterate urge for neat classification very often make us blind to the very data of experience we attempt to articulate. The existing class antagonisms, the real deprivations of economic and social nature, the narrowness of group participation and the innumerable barriers which stand in the way of a full realization of our actual needs and ideal aspirations — these are the crucial elements behind our poor ethical communication. The present writer agrees fully with Mukerjee that knowledge of the conditions of good life is more important than a connotative definition of the good life.

The Dynamics of Morals has three distinctive aims: a genetic and functional account of moral norms, goals, and values; an evaluation of moral codes on the basis of the descriptive findings bearing upon a man's social behaviour; and a projection of an ideal of universalistic ethos. Mukerjee fulfills the first aim very adequately. No matter what topic he discusses — origin and development of conscience, conscience and culture, bridging individual and social ethics, a bio-social approach to morals, etc. the richness of literary and factual evidence is very apparent. Mukerjee synthetizes the findings of the diverse social studies, and thus helps us toward an integrated picture of man's moral behaviour. His exposition is not an eclecticism. The various social and psychological theories are not compiled, rather critically appraised. Mukerjee accepts only statements and hypotheses which can claim sufficient evidence in the variability and complexity of human actions and can do justice to the diverse factors which determine our moral decisions. So, for instance, he makes a clear distinction between the two kinds of super-ego:the tyrannical and coercive, and the liberal, voluntary. Freud's contribution concerning the first cannot be disputed, his blindness to the latter is conspicuous. That social factors determine our ideas, beliefs, and values, Mukerjee is more than willing to admit, but he warns us against the excessive claims of those thinkers for whom social forces are the sole determinants of man's total mental life. The latter has additional factors: physiologic-psychological, and immanent-ideational. In his chapter "Morals Beyond Society", Mukerjee dwells on man's bonds with the universe,

whose symbolic rendering shows too many similarities among different nations and cultures to be accounted for by particular societal forces. Mukerjee's inclusive genetic account of man's moral and social behaviour disproves in a very convincing way the still prevalent divisions and dichotomies—biological and cultural sciences, individualism and collectivism, egoism and altruism, and the many one-sided interpretations of man : political animal, social being, economic creature, and spiritual entity. Man is a unity, the creature and creator of many values, groups and institutions which must be studied in their total configuration.

The vast majority of contemporary social scientists will find Mukerjee guilty of evaluations, of commingling facts and values, and of violating their "myth" of ethical neutrality. The present writer finds himself in accord with the author that a mere description of social phenomena is utterly incomplete. If the social sciences cannot do more than depict what people value, what customs and mores they live by, and what goals they strive for, their status as science is questionable. Values and valuations are not static phenomena. They undergo steady modifications due to many factors. Among them, the growing knowledge related to man's behaviour is of great importance. This and the cumulative effect of experience make a constant re-appraisal imperative. By refusing to evaluate, sciences leave values unexplored. "The consequence is that certain established values are often tacitly accepted though concealed in the methods of analysis of social relations and institutions. Indifference or neutrality in the matter of valuations stands for traditionalism or opportunism. Or there is indifference to the sweat, blood and tears of the work-a-day world, values being regarded as belonging to a remote spiritual realm. In any case the desire to abjure altogether the realm of values stands in the way of full understanding and scrutiny of the social relations and institutions themselves, shaped, moulded and impelled as these are by human valuations." (p. 121).

An objective ethics stands or falls with the possibility of a critical appraisal of the different moral codes. Mukerjee's bio-social approach, which focuses the dynamics of man's physiological and psychological needs in their reciprocal relation to the shifting social exigencies, prepares the groundwork for such an appraisal. His scaling principles (related to the moral agents "participating through group actions in the creation, criticism and realization of values in concrete situations of life" (p. 258)) are: How far do these moral norms freely express or stifle human nature and the potentialities of personality (p. x) ; to what extent do they promote full group participation or social inclusion (p. 259) ? We need not indulge in scientific quibblings as to what constitutes man's nature with all its dimensions. The empirical sciences themselves provide us with normative notion. The normative distinctions which abound in *The Dynamics of Morals* are taken from the same sciences for which moral concepts became taboo—It is psychology which furnishes him with the empirical evidence for the normalcy of man's social relations "based on love and goodness instead of authority and power" (p. 257) ; it is psychology in conjunction with psychiatry which tells him that most forms of aggresion, sadism, crime, and anxiety are products of excessive inhibi-

tions and repressions, that the "good" personality "exhibits relatively integrated, free and reality-adapted behaviour," and that the "bad" personality 'reverts to infantilism, automatism, megalomania, unadapted to reality." (p. 110) It is modern ecology which reveals mutualism as "the key to higher levels of adaptation and fuller exploitation of the limited sources of the environment by different interlocked parts of the living world" (p. 3). It is sociology which gives us insights into the cohesive and destructive forces, into values which express transient social and political affiliations, and values which answer to the universal needs of man.

On the basis of the normative implications of the descriptive, empirical findings, Mukerjee attempts to construct a framework of moral norms and goals which could do full justice to the transient and permanent, parochial and universal values in man's social behaviour. Viewing moral norms as "situational imperatives of groups in which individuals are aware of their social bonds and wish to maintain and perpetuate them as essential phases of adjustment and achievement of unity and wholeness through practical organisation" (p. 268), he distinguishes four basic types of human groupings which are to be found among all human communities. These are Crowd, Interest-group, Society, and Commonalty (pp. 256 ff.) Mukerjee's normative distinctions are highly interesting, informing and thought-provoking. Crowd and Commonalty represent two extremes of social fusion. The cohesion effected within the Crowd is transitory, irrational and highly destructive. The fusion effected within the Commonalty is enduring, rational, mystical-mystical, and constructive. In the Crowd only a part of man's total self is involved, in the Commonalty the whole personality is engaged. The ego-consciousness in the Crowd is attenuated or negated; in the Commonalty the ego-consciousness is most intense and at the same time of a most pervasive sociality. There is no moral norm or moral responsibility for the Crowd, whose members act on primal impulses and emotions; members of the Commonalty show the greatest personal responsibility, flowing from a sensitive and universal conscience nurtured by ideal values and rational goals. Between the Crowd and Commonalty stand the Interest-group and Society. These two groups are necessary organisations for the highest forms of social cohesion of the Commonalty. Both are rational types of grouping, as the latter is to a larger extent; but their values are fractional and divisible, and not all individuals can participate in them. By furthering communication, discussion and individual judgment, they counteract the lawless, impulsive behaviour of the Crowd. Each rational type of association has its own set of values. These are: reciprocity in the Interest-group; equity and justice in the Society; and love, equality and solidarity in the Commonalty. The four basic types of group relations are for Mukerjee "qualitatively different, embodying different social bonds and valuations and eliciting divergent social behaviour, experience and moral principles. It is not the external form of association but its basic relation and attitude which give the real clue to the whole social process and moral experience" (p. 260).

The Dynamics of Morals contains much more than empirical findings, sound generalizations and hypotheses. The book is also

full of "prophetic elements", acknowledged as such by the author himself, who, like his great predecessors in the ethical field, tries to reshape the imperfect social world. Mukerjee's aspirations for a world community of brotherhood flow from his deep belief in the dignity of each single individual. His myth of the Universal Man (Visvatman), like any other myth, is an ideal projection. But it is a more inclusive and more inspiring doctrine of man than some of those built up through the centuries: the Sagacious Political Man of the Graeco-Roman society, the Saintly Man of the medieval period; the Aesthetic-Intellectual Man of the Renaissance; the Economic Man of the nineteenth century; and the Mass-Man of our own industrial society. The values of the Universal Man do greater justice to the multi-dimensional nature of man in its biological, social, and spiritual planes of action.

Mukerjee is not a dreamer who confuses figments with reality. He never loses sight of the abstract and ideal character of the Commonalty of brotherhood. But his ideal is more than an illusion. It has great potential educational values by helping us to complement the global, physical world of technology, science and economics with a global ethics, which is imperative if humanity is to survive and advance. "If ethics cannot recover from its pusillanimity in this atomic age, the world that is one technically but racially and politically divided will be, in the words of Kant, "the graveyard of the human race" (p. xxvi).

III—SOCIAL SCIENCE AND VALUATION

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7

THE ROLE OF VALUATION IN SOCIOLOGY

By JOHN E. OWEN

It is an ironic commentary upon an age which has witnessed a conflict of values as bitter and extensive as any in human history that sociology, the science of man and his society, should have ignored problems of values and that only very recently has any serious attempt been made to point to the need for the analysis and study of values in all their sociological ramifications.

As a new area of enquiry sociology has shown an unfortunate one-sidedness of viewpoint both in its indifference to the concept of man and in its range of what is popularly considered to be sound scientific method. There has, indeed, been a widespread failure in sociology, particularly in the West, to recognise the importance of the conception of man that underlies social investigation and research. Few sociologists have paused to consider the fundamental issue, "What is man?" This question has been ignored and the answer to it merely assumed. The thought-patterns of modern social science, with their disdain for theoretical enquiry, have involved the view that such topics are best left to the philosophers and that if sociology is to be a true science it must avoid all concern for philosophical issues and value-problems and concentrate on the all-important task of gathering facts and formulating laws regarding social phenomena.

The natural sciences, it is thought, have made great advances by divorcing themselves from philosophical procedure. Their substitution of empirical investigation for the older metaphysical disputations has been regarded, and rightly so, as a determinant factor in their impressive achievements. Thus it has become fashionable to look upon philosophy as rather useless theorising that possesses little value or relevance for modern social research. The achievements of the natural sciences and the consequent prestige attaching to their methods have been, paradoxically, an indirect cause of the backwardness of the social sciences. For the view became widely prevalent that social science could reap comparable benefits by adopting similar methods and techniques. As a result, the ideology of the humanistic disciplines, certainly in America, has not been radically indistinguishable from that of the natural sciences. And it is this ideology which is in large measure responsible for the neglect of value-questions among social scientists in recent years. Science, supposedly, had no concern for values or value-judgments. Hence it was necessary for the social scientist to avoid all reference to the value-aspects of his data and to examine carefully his own scientific outlook for any hidden valuations that might be present. From one point of view, the history of sociology has been a drive towards objectivity, a progressive attempt to become more *wertfrei*.

And, yet, granting the need for objectivity in sociology as in any

science, and the desirability of having theory well-grounded in empirical fact, is there not evidence that the concept of objectivity has been surrounded with much loose thinking as to its nature and meaning for social study? Apart from the highly questionable tendency to exclude judgments of value from the scientific outlook, there is room for doubt as to the actual possibility of such a separation. Further, the influence of natural science thought-ways upon Western sociology has been so marked that the concept of objectivity has become associated with an exclusive concern for observable phenomena, and since values are patently considered to be in the realm of the intangible they have been judged as not belonging to the legitimate province of scientific research.

It is the present writer's contention that the attempt of the social sciences to found themselves so largely on the pattern of the natural sciences has been unfortunate, and is a principal basis for the more immature and extreme tendencies which sociology in particular has manifested. It is from the background of physical science ideology that the concept of objectivity has become erroneously associated with the range of the observable, and the field of values relegated to non-scientific pursuits. Yet sociology can never be a natural science in the same sense that physics and chemistry are considered, on account of the concrete differentiation in the nature of its data and the altered relationship which the sociologist bears to this data. The difference between human beings and physical objects would appear to be so elementary as to preclude comment, were it not for the fact that newer tendencies in sociology and psychology would well nigh eliminate the distinction. The behaviouristic and mechanistic views of man would regard the human individual as a mere physical bundle of reflexes and neuro-muscular responses. In these approaches to society all reference to the psychic or supersensory is to be avoided, on the ground that only the physical has real existence. One need not devote much space to the philosophical and methodological deficiencies of behaviourism. It is sufficient to point out that behaviourism assumes without warrant the metaphysical theory of materialism, that its technical jargon renders sociology and psychology inaccessible to the intelligent layman, and, in short, that it affords no adequate interpretation of human experience. As distinguished from natural science phenomena, every social act has an internal as well as an external aspect, and for this reason if for no other, a purely physicalistic view of man is incapable of treating one whole area of human interaction. If the inner world of thought and feeling lacks all functional significance in the explanation of social behaviour, then the entire world of values is irrelevant to sociology, and it is a regrettable fact, but an undeniable one, that for large numbers of Western sociologists this has hitherto been the case. Sociology, viewed as a natural science, becomes little more than an organisation of objectively observed and quantitatively tested knowledge regarding social interaction. It lacks all human significance for its concern is with measurement rather than meaning and with verification rather than value.

What are the reasons for the sociological disdain for values and value-judgments? They are partly historical, going back to the Comtean

intellectual heritage and the consequent notion that even the analysis of values as data is a relic of the theological and metaphysical stages of human thought. The naturalistic trend of thought that sprang from the scientific activity of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the philosophy that was then current can also be cited, while the modern vogue of logical positivism probably plays a part in defining the accepted bounds of intellectual respectability in social science. There is in addition the false doctrine that values are mere objects that satisfy human desire, and since individual desires do not coincide values are seen as irrational elements in experience and science can therefore give no guidance on them. But this view simply reiterates the mistake of Hobbes, as Professor Jensen has noted, for it is an error to presuppose that men act on the basis of their immediate inclinations in the pursuit of particular ends. If this were actually so, there could be no judgments of value. But man is capable of rational behaviour and his reflective intelligence operates upon the raw material of sensation and desire.[1]

The historical explanation for the exclusion of values from sociological enquiry can be augmented by psychological factors. Are there not, for example, subtle psychological compulsions behind the measurement-obsession? The psychological reasons for the adoption of mechanism and the attempt to exclude ethical questions have seldom, if ever, been subject to critical scrutiny, yet their influence in creating the recent ethos of sociology is probably greater than has been generally recognised. It is perhaps not mere coincidence that American sociology was in its formation during the period of religious decline preceding the first world war and the disillusioned two decades that followed. The fact that the value-free approach of the natural sciences was welcomed so widely would suggest an attitude of mind that was psychologically ready for it. In recent decades there has been a widespread disavowal of concern for ethics and a denial of meaningfulness in existence, and this mood may have left its mark on social science. Rather than showing concern for the basic problems of socio-cultural life and their deeper significance, how much easier it is simply to profess to observe and describe society. Any connection with the "ought" of existence and any sense of moral responsibility can thereby be disclaimed. The rise of behaviourism and logical positivism, as mentioned, also furnished a means of repudiating the significance of human values and ideals. A methodological approach may thus be one expression of an outlook on human experience itself, an outlook that has rejected any interest in values on account of psychological factors in the personal background of the social scientist and in the temper of the age. It would be unfair to attribute the disdain for values wholly to psychological causes, but the writer suggests that this little-discussed factor has played its part in the making of the modern sociological *weltanschauung*. The dehumanising tendency of mechanistic science, the rise of impersonal social and economic forces following the Industrial Revolution, bureaucratic manipulation of large groups, the pragmatic quality of

[1] Howard E. Jensen, "Social Methodology and the Teaching of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XLII, January, 1937, pp. 545-546.

American philosophy, and the loss of what Albert Schweitzer has called "reverence for life," are other related elements making for a preferential concern with facts and techniques rather than values.

The psychological foundations for social science ideology and the interplay of this ideology with larger currents in the environing culture might well be examined with profit. For no matter how "objective" a social scientist tries to be, his mind-set and implicit assumptions are coloured by the general climate of opinion in which he lives and works. The vehemence with which opposing methodological viewpoints are attacked and defended would suggest that they are not unrelated to a life-philosophy mingled with emotional compulsions whose psychological roots have become lost to view.

Most individuals in any society are emotionally bound to the current expectations and mores of their culture. As Dr. Mukerjee has noted, these are the source of their customary satisfactions and moral guidance. They defend the culture with its entrenched injustice and limited vision together with its various achievements. A mature social science might enable men to transcend this slavish allegiance to their own culture. Yet social scientists themselves, on a higher level, to be sure, may nevertheless fall prey to the "crowd mentality" that Professor Mukerjee has described, in their uncritical acceptance of the current ethos of their science itself. To be a true science, sociology should rise above any orthodoxy of mind or method. Orthodoxies exist in science as in theology and to transcend them necessitates an awareness of the historical antecedents of contemporary thought-fashions and the psychological forces that have moulded these fashions. The current taboo on values is a pertinent example of a scientific folkway which is adhered to almost as rigorously as the taboos prescribed by the social mores. It is all too frequently accepted and followed as part of the scientific climate of opinion. The diffusion of a more critical attitude towards the ethos of social science on the part of its exponents might lead to a more enlightened objectivity than the slavish devotion to "scientific method" which, in its frequent ignorance of the forces which have produced the scientific movement, is actually unscientific in its lack of perspective. In studying the ethos and value-system of a culture, sociology has an equal need to recognise the intellectual forces which have worked to constitute its own ethos and value-system, to clarify its own assumptions, and to bring to light its hidden valuations. Examination of the value-system of sociology as a science, with its apex of objectivity, fact-gathering, freedom from value-premises, and concern for the observable and the calculable, has seldom been undertaken, though true scientific objectivity would appear to presuppose an understanding of the valuational structure of science itself. "Objectivity" does not mean or assure neutrality on values. It is rather a condition that is replete with subtle valuations, a value-charged stand. Even the claim that sociology as a science should exclude value-judgments is itself a value-judgment.

The use of mathematical terms and symbols in sociology is one attempt to avoid subjective interpretations of human interaction. Yet the justifiable flight from unfounded speculation has reached an opposite extreme at which the social reality in certain of its facets is

equally misrepresented. Mathematics at best gives but one interpretation of even physical phenomena and in dealing with the more subtle and complex aspects of human affairs its impotence and limitations are very evident. The equating of science with mathematical computation and the view that the range of the measurable is the range of the meaningful can similarly be charged with part of the responsibility for sociology's taboo on values.

Yet social values are the empirical element in any mature sociology, just as moral values are the empirical element in religion. They each relate the other to the problems of human experience. A sociology that is concerned primarily with measurement and description is a pseudo-sociology, for it ignores and deprecates, by implication, those aspects of experience that are non-measurable. If sociology is to play any effective role in influencing human affairs, it must of necessity be concerned with values. Fear to take sides on value-questions by social scientists may hasten the advent of a time in which they will no longer enjoy the freedom to take sides on any question. It is the attitude of anathema to values and judgments of value that is chargeable with sociology's being relatively ineffectual in influencing the world of ideas, and even more, the world of action.

Is it universally the case that a melioristic concern for values is incompatible with scientific advance? Does the mood and method of science necessarily involve the exclusion of value-judgments? Many philosophers of science, as distinguished from scientific technicians, would hesitate to answer in the affirmative. They would point out, for example, that science itself is a value, that values lie behind the scientific quest or it would not, presumably, be made at all, and that even the physical sciences involve value-judgments regarding the utility of physical adjustments.

It is interesting to note that since the discovery of atomic energy even physical scientists themselves have urged that greater attention be paid to the social and ethical implications of their work. It is indeed difficult to see how the social sciences can be completely severed from philosophy and ethics, on account of the very nature of their subject-matter. Human motives, purposes, and socio-cultural values are the heart of sociology and ethics alike. Just as the cleavage between science and philosophy has been in some important respects deleterious for both, so the attempt to separate sociology completely from ethics has been undesirable. The more mature development of social science may ensure their eventual cooperation. Apart from the common ground of subject-matter which sociology and ethics now approach from divergent viewpoints, sociologists bring implicit valuations to their work and ethicists require a knowledge of social conditions and problems and of the influence of cultural conditioning upon the development of moral attitudes. The socio-cultural source of the emotions of shame, repulsion, blame, and approval, the relation of social attitudes to economic structure, the psychological factors entering into the rise of customs and codes, the diffusion of moral expectations, and the role of institutions in patterning ethical concepts are but a few of the topics on which sociology has had and still has a contribution to make to ethical theory. In American experience, how-

ever, a sociology of morals worthy of the name does not exist. The early works of Sumner, Hobhouse, and Westermarck have not inspired any later American efforts of similar scope. Professor Mukerjee's recent fine contributions in this field should exert a constructive influence.

It is not merely the absence of a sociology of morals that has resulted from the distaste for values. More important, the divorce between facts and values impoverishes from the outset the ability of social science to render a comprehensive interpretation of human experience. The distribution between the two approaches, the scientific-empirical and the philosophical-normative, should be kept in mind, but the necessity of differentiating between them should not involve any complete separation of one from the other. It may be that the difficulties inherent in clarifying the relations between the two are in part responsible for their present mutual isolation. It is an isolation which is untenable for several reasons. As Hoffding reminded us, the ethically ideal must be sociologically possible. But there is little evidence that students of the humanistic sciences have hitherto received training in defining the nature of social ideals or in analysing the value-problems involved in complicated political and economic issues. Nor have students of ethics been led to consider the empirical data required to define the boundaries of sociological possibility.

Individualistic ethical theory was based on a misconception of the nature of man. It has also become irrelevant to the changed conditions of modern society. A comparable misconception of the nature of man and society underlay the earlier spatially-oriented efforts at an ecological interpretation of society in which man's total life-setting was ignored. A concentration on organismic-geographic relations could hardly be expected to yield anything other than physicalistic conclusions reflecting the behaviouristic premises from which they arose. Dr. Mukerjee has played an important role in the salutary transformation of ecology from the narrow sociological behaviourism to the newer "gestalt sociology" described by Clarence M. Case. A gestalt sociology is based on a concept of man much broader than that of behaviourism. It takes into account the analysis of man's total situation, the interrelated wholeness of the human setting, and in this setting the value-system of a culture is central to an understanding of its configurating elements. Similarly, a gestalt ethics would rise above the individualistic theories of the past and pay more attention to man's effort towards Commonalty. The ignoring of the socio-cultural context by moral philosophy has too frequently reduced ethics to a dialectical discipline lacking human relevance, while its use of a single concept such as pleasure, utility, or efficiency, as a key, makes impossible that breadth and comprehensiveness required to handle the whole range of moral experience. Ethical relativism in particular has shown itself inadequate in coping with modern problems. A gestalt normative sociology would unite the scientific and the moral approaches to human relations, overcoming their separate deficiencies and eventuating in a meaningful synthesis. Dr. Mukerjee in his *Dynamics of Morals* has made a significant attack on this problem.

If ethics is to be more than a remote and abstract pursuit, it cannot

remain indifferent to social processes and organisation. Without a knowledge of the conditions underlying moral relations and the social framework in which they take place it is indeed devoid of foundations. If ethical theory were rooted in man's group life and social-psychological nature instead of metaphysical principles, its human relevance would be the more enhanced. An ethic that is not grounded in empirical social relations, upon an awareness of status-systems and roles, human bonds, and group structure, becomes a mere academic exercise. The false dichotomy between individual and social ethics, the erroneous conception of the individual as a being independent of the tissue of group life, and the disregard in moral theory for the values, ideals, and norms that arise in social situations could be ended by a normative sociology.

The social sciences can point to the political conditions under which moral advance is made possible and to the underlying causes of those forces which create anti-social and amoral attitudes — the organised ignorance in a society, racial myths and stereotypes, misconceptions regarding other cultures, mass movements, selfish ideologies and resistance to change, and the different levels of value-consciousness and ethical awareness in a population. But the current taboo on valuation tends to imply, in effect, that sociology treats the social organisation as sacred if not unchangeable. This Sumnerian ethos renders sociology less likely to exert any conscious influence that might alter the social value-system. Sociology up to the present has been apt to make empirical techniques and scientific orthodoxy almost ends in themselves. Academic values thus become more important than the human values in whose service they should be instrumental and of which they are but specialised aspects. The more mellow development of sociology may see the cooperation of science and ethics in that a progressive refinement of scientific method will be accompanied by an intelligent concern for the melioristic ends to which social enquiry is to be devoted. The ethical interest of the founders of sociology may return in a newer and changed perspective. Recent research into intergroup tensions, crime and delinquency, and the various UNESCO studies appear to point to this possibility. But it is necessary to show the masses of men that social science can be applied for their advantage, if it is to receive greater acceptance in the public mind.

Human experience is essentially qualitative. Any science of man that ignores that qualitative character can hardly fail to do justice to the nature of its subject-matter. It is a mistake to extricate the ethical from the wholeness of experience on the supposition that the remainder can be treated as though it were unimpaired by that operation. To study man from narrow methodological viewpoints cannot lead to anything but fractionalism in sociology and elsewhere. A valid interpretation of human experience cannot be made solely in terms of a value-free science, for only one dimension is thereby accounted for. Social facts have a moral aspect, while moral valuations are social facts. Values as data, we now see, can be objectively studied. But even in the most rigidly scientific quest, implicit valuations underlie the attitude to methodology, they help decide

the choice and definition of research problems and the selection of those facts regarded as significant.

Any isolation between the philosophy of social ends desired and the scientific means of attaining them is in several respects regrettable. If social scientists are reluctant to express themselves on political, economic, and social policies, leadership on controversial issues will come from less informed sources. The scientist who absolves himself from all questions of values and social applications may become the instrument of anti-social forces, as occurred in Nazi Germany. Any science that claims to be value-free nevertheless arises and is pursued as part of a cultural setting which is charged with valuations. Further, the redefinition of moral norms for the changed conditions of twentieth-century culture will obviously require the aid of social scientists. It is naive to pretend that sociology has no concern for values. Any datum of experience is distinguished as a social fact precisely by its nature as a value, as a thing to be used, desired, or avoided by human beings. Even Leopold von Wiese insisted that in this sense values represent the main data of sociology. Mechanistic descriptions of society are never adequate because they preclude the value-aspect of human association. But social actions and processes are to be understood not just as observed phenomena but also as felt experience. Hence sympathic insight, imaginative vitality and rational sympathy are as important in mature research as they are in enlightened citizenship.[3]

The content of the social process is psychological and cultural. Non-material culture constitutes a realm of intellectual and spiritual values, a world of appreciation. Sociology is indeed the study of culture but it degenerates into a travesty of any satisfactory treatment of man and society if it overlooks the valuations of a culture in all their manifold influence. How can any culture be understood without the recognition that the role of its value-system deserves?

As Professor Mukerjee has graphically shown, the sociological study of values could open a whole new field of investigation. The importance of values as data is becoming more and more apparent. Sociologists are less inclined to regard values as mere behaviouristic "speech-reactions." There is a wider awareness of the role of values in organising behaviour, institutions, groups and cultural patterns. Every revolt, every war, every human conflict and cooperative situation, indeed, every shared social relationship is shot through with values and it is in the light of these that human action acquires whatever significance it has. Sociology and psychology lead to an understanding of the values that motivate the behaviour of individuals and groups, and can also seek to find ways of constructively guiding this behaviour, such as the attempt to turn mass emotions in peaceful directions. Following Professor Mukerjee's lead, sociology might analyse values in relation to social organisation and power structures, and the processes whereby valuations are diffused and undergo change. Cultures and nations could be compared regarding the extent to which human beings actually realise the values acclaimed

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 545-547.

by the surrounding ethos and the extent to which there is a "discrepancy-myth" between the alleged possibilities and opportunities for individuals and the actual probability of a large share in creative social experience for the majority of them. Studies could be made of the degree of active participation in the ideal values of a culture as contrasted with those experiences to which persons are merely led to look forward. The value-analysis of a cultural ethos, with its human "expectancy-pattern," unrealised dreams, and repressed complexes, carries new possibilities for research, as does the needed study of symbols in terms of the values they represent.

With the recognition of the powerlessness of individuals to cope with complex social problems, the declining prestige of *laissez-faire,* and the rise of centralised government bodies of international scope, more significance is being attached to the concept of intelligent planning. Any type of planned progress revolves around values; social progress itself is a value-conception and largely for this reason the term has fallen into disrepute among social scientists. But world-conditions today are such that the attitude of disdain for values and for intelligent applications of social science is too expensive a pose to maintain. The Comtean and Wardian view of societal self-direction, revised in terms of changed conditions and newer knowledge of social processes, would afford a more meaningful rationale for social science than the sterile "objectivism" of the past. But in its newer setting it would require a closer cooperation between sociology and ethics. Since values are inseparable from all social problems and relations, the sociology of values should provide the integrating link between social science and ethical theory.

Despite the attempt to evade the value-aspect of social problems by the use of such terms as "social disorganisation," valuations are central to the very recognition of problem conditions. Valuation is indeed the heart of life itself. Man's experience is distinctively human by virtue of the values that arise in the course of his evolution, and as Cooley insisted, sociology is nothing if it is not human. "We have done very little.....in making studies of the value systems of our society," declared Dr. Louis Wirth,[3] yet as Dr. Mukerjee rightly observes, "the problem of social values is the core of social theory."[4] Social theory lacks status among professional sociologists today and the neglect of values is a part of this larger disregard for theoretical issues. But if social facts are to be given meaning, social philosophy will have to be allied more closely with social science. Similarly, if the concept of man underlying social science is to be brought to light and examined, the aid of social philosophy will be required. Philosophy is always implicit in every science, even though the assumptions and first principles of the science may not be admitted or recognised. The progenitors of scientific thought-patterns are intertwined with past currents in the history of philosophy, though this relationship is often lost to view, under the influence of the idea that science has no connection with philosophy.

[3] Cited by Stuart Chase, *The Proper Study of Mankind* (New York, 1948), p. 298.

[4] *The Social Structure of Values,* p. 6.

Yet every science is charged with philosophical problems, just as every knowledge-quest is charged with values. The analysis of epistemological presuppositions in the sciences, the claims of different approaches and methods, the validity of scientific postulates, and the deeper questions concerning the meaning of science for man's life can not be dealt with by scientific techniques alone. Is it not intellectually dishonest to disdain philosophy and at the same time to leave to philosophy the responsibility for the theoretical analysis that has played so large a role in scientific advance? Relativity theory should be a perpetual reminder of the importance of analysis and logic in science, and should dispel the false notion that philosophy is necessarily the same as unfounded speculation.

Philosophy is involved, also, in the evaluation of the place of science in human experience and in the larger problems and implications which the scientific quest raises. This applies to both the natural and the humanistic sciences. ". . . . . the general questions which are continuously in the background of every social inquiry cannot be dismissed. They can be ignored only at the risk of leaving the data rootless and, therefore, without issue."[5] The desirability of a coherent rationale in social science becomes more marked during the present crisis-situation with its lack of consensus on social values. The value theory surrounding social science, the *raison d'etre* of its research, the validity of its presuppositions, and the relevance of its aims are topics to which philosophical scrutiny might profitably devote itself. Social science investigation has too frequently been entered into with little attention given to these questions, because the research form and methodology employed were currently fashionable and ranked high in the academic ethos and value-system. But if creative synthesis is the final task of science, small research monographs, though useful, should not become an end in themselves. A more erudite sociology than that represented by contemporary methodological extremes would seek common cause with philosophers in the effort to examine basic postulates and to achieve a clearly-defined rationale and value theory.

Is it unreasonable to expect that normative sociology should provide a comprehensive formulation of the goal of human effort and aspiration? This would call for large studies of the human past, of man's evolving value-consciousnss, that have seldom been made since the first generation sociologists gave us their classic works. It would also require the assessment of the human past in terms of ideal levels and a restatement of the theory of humanity's conscious self-direction.

The large type of sociological study, embracing historical and philosophical learning combined with creative synthesis, generalisation, and originality, is rarely found in this age of fact-gathering.[6] But as Professor Sorokin has noted, the fact-gathering eras of academic

[5] Theodore Abel, "The Present Status of Social Theory," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XVII, April, 1952, p. 160.

[6] Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Improvement of Scholarship in the Social Sciences," Journal of Social Philosophy, April, 1937.

history are marked by a smaller acquisition of relevant new facts than are the periods of synthesis. Philosophical synthesis calls for a rarer quality of mind than that of the scientific technician. It is very possible that the research ethos of Western sociology in the last generation has repelled from this new science some superior and creative minds that could have raised its prestige in the world of thought. In contrast with the sociological giants of the past, do we have many great developers of social-philosophical ideas, not merely system-builders, but great synthesisers capable of taking the results of research and giving a comprehensive and rational interpretation of social facts? If such exponents of sociology are seldom found, the stigma on philosophy is partly responsible. It is an unwarranted stigma, for the great scientists have been philosophers of science who thought in wide terms. Similarly, to become a mature science of man, sociology should embrace the big issues of human experience—the nature of man, the meaning and destiny of his culture, the validity of the antithesis in "moral man and immoral society," sociological relativism in relation to religion and morals, and the evaluation of cultural epochs. There are the unsolved problems of what is sociologically possible, for example, the extent to which cultural values can be diffused throughout large segments of mankind and still endure, the possibility of value-planning, the extent to which a society can grow before its members lose touch with each other, and the regaining in a technological civilisation of a personal sense of value in work.

As Dr. Wirth reminded us, the great unanswered questions of sociology are the great unanswered questions of mankind – peace, freedom, security, welfare, prosperity, progress.[7] How can cultural conflict be reconciled to the end that divergent ways of life may each contribute to the fulfilment of those universal values on the level of Commonalty? Can techniques be devised for transcending the tribal ethics of the past? Has there been a genuine moral advance in history, or is what we have been witnessing simply the replacement of the ethics of the tribe by the ethics of the nation-state?

The twentieth century lays insistent demands upon both sociology and ethics to think in world terms. Its problems require that the artificial barriers between the social scientist and the moral philosopher be terminated. For the problems they face are problems of values that transcend the boundaries erected both by scientific orthodoxy and cultural ethnocentrism, and hence their solution requires an understanding of the climate of opinion in more than one culture. In analysing the presuppositions and mind-set of different ways of life, the sociology of values unites, among others, two rewarding areas of enquiry, the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of religion. In studying the value-premises inherent in, for example, the philosophical mysticism of the East and the scientific rationalism of the West, the sociology of values could make a contribution both to intercultural understanding and to knowledge of the cultural conditions under which a world faith might become an actuality. This is only one

[7] Cited by Stuart Chase, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

instance of the intriguing possibilities that stem from the analysis of the rise, diffusion, conflict, and reconciliation of values. And of the thinkers who have enlarged our conception of the vistas opened by this many-faceted field, none has done so with greater clarity or erudition than Dr. Radhakamal Mukerjee.

8

THE SOCIOLOGY OF VALUES

By SAMUEL L. HART

Mukerjee does not write as a cool spectator of human values and disvalues. He shares with all great men the noble, creative vision of a better and more dignified humanity. Contrary to the false notion that such an ideal directness blinds us to facts, the opposite is true. No comprehensive study of facts has ever been made because of a disinterested curiosity. An objective, all-inclusive analysis of facts requires more than skill of observation. It calls for concentrated efforts and many sacrifices. The latter are contingent upon a fine sensitivity to human strength and frailty, upon a daring quest for truth that is free from explicit and implicit rationalizations, and upon high aspirations to bring the actual nearer to the ideal, which, although rooted in man's natural dimensions, needs renewed articulation in each generation. Any advance is intimately bound up with ideal projections. In man's existence the actual and the ideal are not independent entities.

The reader of Mukerjee's books is impressed by two things: the stupendous amount of knowledge related to man's behavior, and the idealistic directness which pervades all of his writings, no matter what their topics may be—economics, sociology, psychology, and ethics. He builds upon decades of studies by himself and by others, integrates ascertained facts, and rejects sweeping generalities. The author's synoptic approach to the intricate problem of social values and valuations is second to none.[1] Mukerjee's ideal directness is the searching quest for the moral significance of social phenomena, for the changing and invariant ethical values which are common to mankind. The possibility of a scientific foundation of the latter rests with the undeniable fact that men "are basically similar in all regions and races in their bodily construction and instinctive equipment, in their emotional problems of youth and love, activity and renunciation, frustration and enjoyment, sin and purity, triumph and death".[2]

His idealistic directness notwithstanding or because of it, Mukerjee offers us a wealth of empirical data, so utterly neglected by those scientists who look upon values and value judgments as taboos. Mukerjee does not hesitate to make value judgments. In this respect he is in accord with all great theorists of social phenomena who never resign to a mere description of facts. Social phenomena are

[1] In a pre-publication comment on Mukerjee's *The Social Structure of Values* K. Mannheim remarks correctly that prior to this book there is no systematic work on the sociology of values "although there are various articles and a great interest in the subject."

[2] Radhakamal Mukerjee, *The Social Function of Art*, 1948, p. 3.

moral or immoral. They further or cripple man's actual or potential qualities, they fulfill or frustrate his basic and derivative needs. To treat them as amoral events means to distort them in order to satisfy a dogmatic, preconceived epistemic scheme, borrowed from the natural sciences.' (The social scientist is here to help us toward rational valuations, to guide us towards those values which answer to our needs in accordance with social requirements,) to direct us in the process of implementing of that kind of life which will sustain and promote our "self-status" and "self-enhancement" in harmony with our fellowmen. (To do that social sciences must complement the mere descriptive and empirical approach with a normative methodology.) "Sociology should now see the individual, society and values—the wick, the oil and the flame—apiece, the indivisible unity of the inner and outer, of the microcosm and the macrocosm. The perception of this unity would also accompany a reorientation of methods of study that should combine scientific and empirical with normative and philosophical approaches integrated together for the adequate interpretation of Man and Society, that comprise both empirical facts as well as social uniformities and normative judgments directing Man and Society to determinate goals. Neither the interpersonal roles and group relationships and institutions in society nor the human values, ideals and norms can be understood without a simultaneous dual reference: an empirical theory of social relationships, values and institutions that takes recognition of the widest range of knowledge concerning the bio-psychological nature of Man and Society, and permits of verification by the methods of natural science; and a normative theory defining an "ought" for society, which introduces preferences and moral values and ideals, resolves the ideological and ethical conflicts of Man and Society, and obtains its verification by taking care of the most extensive range of ethos and eidos of the world, together with their basic postulates and premises in respect of the nature of man, society and universe. (Thus would social philosophy bridge the gulf between biological and moral man and society, between the philosophy of science and the science of values.")

The fusion of the empirical and normative sociology will lead to a better social engineering which will have at its disposal reliable knowledge concerning human behavior, means and techniques of analysis, and feasible devices for social control. The workability of such a social engineering is conditional upon a commitment to fundamental values of a high ethos. It will rest "on the proper scaling of values and the recognition of man's dignity, creativeness and freedom of participation in the major values of life, and resist the use of fellowmen as pawns or objects whose loyalty and credulity are exploited for selfish ends."[4] It will employ techniques "that are less dependent upon coercion and fear of sanctions, and more upon understanding, sympathy and goodwill for the elimination of all kinds of evil and deviant behavior, and education and participation of larger and larger sections of the community in the higher values of life."[5]

[3] Radhakamal Mukerjee, *The Social Structure of Values*, (*Macmillan Co., London*) p. XIX.
[4] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. XIV.
[5] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. XIV.

These values are neither absolute, metaphysical entities, nor mere conventional norms and ideals. They have their roots in the "basic dimensions and quality of human relations and group participation these connote."[6]

The Fallacy of the Ethical Neutrality.

Most contemporary social scientists adhere to the ideal of ethical neutrality. They stress scientific objectivity, the quest for an impartial truth, the analysis of facts, and avoid value judgments. The emphasis is put on the various fields of human activities, on the classification of social phenomena as they arise from group-inclusion or group-exclusion, and manifest themselves in institutions, customs and mores. These phenomena are studied in their genetic sequence, causal nexus and quantitative statistical aggregates. Ethical norms, goals and values are treated as if they were of the same importance and of the same validity. The social scientist takes pride in describing them with the similar detachment as the physicist shows in observing and interpreting spatio-temporal events. No attempt is being made to evaluate them. An evaluation would imply an objective yardstick, independent of individual preferences and idiosyncrasies of particular societies, and since each culture is supposed to have its unique set of values, science cannot and ought not indulge in value judgments. This ethical neutrality is the biggest travesty of facts, and the most dangerous myth of our time. It is a travesty of facts because there are objective standards of a culture we cannot fail acknowledging if we have the guts and courage to make the vast amount of facts related to man's natural and social endowment and development of any avail. Men everywhere have common needs which crave for satisfaction. Goals and values can be checked against these needs and beliefs which do justice to the real, true nature of man, in opposition to beliefs which, as mere ideological cliches, distort the basic dimensions and qualities of human social relations. Men everywhere have needs for food, shelter, drink, air, sex, free movement, companionship, artistic expression, warmth, belonging, cooperation and sharing of experiences. Men everywhere prefer life to death, health to sickness, fulfillment to frustration, satisfaction to deprivation, acceptance to rejection. The reasons for the ethical neutrality are not of scientific nature; they are rather highly unscientific. It is not true that valuations are subjective preferences, devoid of any objective constituents. Our preferences are environmentally conditioned, and differ from one individual to another more in degree than in kind. Neither is it true that they are solely determined by societal forces of a parochial culture. There are values which are objective because they answer to the common needs of mankind. We could hardly make any value claims if our needs were not fulfilled, and if we could not encounter a value-affinity on the part of our fellowmen. In addition, there are cosmic exigencies which make for permanent values. A universe completely neutral to man's actual and ideal demands could never aspire him to values, goals and norms which are a part and parcel of his existence.

[6] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. XV.

It is not value aloofness which we expect from the social sciences, but value enlightenment; not ethical neutrality, but an ethos of gratifying nature; not a commingling of true and false values, but a clear distinction between values based on ascertained beliefs, and values which are mere rationalizations devoid of any empirical evidence; not an acquiescence in the distortion of human wants and interests, but an articulate expression of man's real needs; not a fatalistic interpretation of human frailties, but a daring projection of a better mankind which does justice to our ideal dimensions. If social sciences cannot do more than tell us that there is no scientific vindication or validation of the immoral doctrines and acts of the innumerable Hitlerites all over the world, and the high ethos of those pioneers of humanity who became martyrs because of their true teaching that men everywhere have sacred rights to life, so much the worse for them. It is not true science which can claim ethical neutrality, rather corrupt, pseudo-science "loaded with static and fatalistic valuations in its hidden ethos."[7]

We are served up with the recurrent refrain "that the moral "ought" cannot be derived from the "is" ". This refrain is a semantic play with symbols. In man's life values and facts are not two separate domains. His behavior attests to the dynamic interrelationship of both. Man's tremendous asset rests with his ability to find continuously a bridge from facts to values, a way from the mere "is" to the "ought". Because of this asset man has tradition which preserves, epitomizes and transmits experiences of his ancestors which direct and guide his own experiences. These relived values are ought-experiences. Man has the ability to learn from his own experiences and those of his fellowmen. These experiences become cumulative, habitual, and take the form of an ought. Without such ought-experiences we could hardly survive, expand and enhance our life. The conscious ought reflects the process of deliberation, the imaginative rehearsal of the possible courses of action from the point of view of individual and social gratification. As such it belongs to the "is", as Dewey rightly observes.[8] Acts which lead to satisfaction have a tendency to perpetuate. We experience them as ought contents. Acts which enrich our life become engrained and operate as ought commands concerning future acts. The ought-proof is not of syllogistic nature. The ought-reality is a shareable and communicative experience. Its validity is conditional upon our will to live. Whenever we argue about the moral ought we check its rationality or irrationality, its conducive or detrimental character, its social or antisocial import, and its sanitary or morbid aspect. The quality of the ought is the real problem, and not as most social scientists wrongly assume, its syllogistic proof, or what amounts to the same, the proof of an imperative sentence from declarative statements. We do not live up to any ought because of its syllogistic validity, rather because of its practical exigency.[9] Rational commands need no other validity

[7] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. VII.

[8] John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics,* (New York, H. Holt & Co. 1442,) p. 371ff.

[9] Samuel L. Hart, *Treatise on Values,* (New York Philosophical Library, 1949,) p. 12ff.

than their social and moral import. There are good and bad commands, good and bad oughts. The decisive factor is whether they answer to universal or parochial needs, whether they further or stifle social life.

Reflecting upon the vast number of sociological studies one cannot help feeling disappointed. Either they deal with trivial matters which lend themselves only to approximate generalizations of a very poor predictive character, or they argue methodological issues on a very abstract level. The reader is reminded of the pungent saying by Lotze: "What's the use of sharpening the knife if we do not have the bread to cut." Values and valuations are for Mukerjee the bread of the social sciences. He rejects the "logic-tight dichotomy of the world of facts and the world of values", and traces it to "the philosophical and ethical atomism and the constricting biological naturalism of the nineteenth century."[10] His *Social Structure of Values* is a systematic attempt to present sociology from the viewpoint of valuation as the primum mobile in the social universe, the nexus of all human relations, groups and institutions."[11] Mukerjee rejects the widespread notion that societal, irrational forces alone determine the nature of values and that all goals and norms of behaviour have the same ethical validity. Mukerjee never loses sight of the basic human needs which play an important role in the emergent values, social groups and institutions. "Human urge, behavior and value comprise a unity."[12] Between the single individual and his group and institution there is a dynamic interrelationship. Social groups and institutions shape the individual, and the individual frames his groups and institutions. The resulting values and goals are not sacrosanct, immutable entities. They change in accordance with the growing knowledge related to nature and man and the widening, richer ethos which manifests itself in the reciprocal interplay between the individual and society. There is no sharp division between the moral or immoral individual and the moral or immoral society. The capacity for moral conduct is the same in both.[13] The single, creative individual plays the major role in projecting and articulating new values. "While society and its major institutions and roles play the leading part in the definition, ordering, conservation and sharing of the major values through its arrangements, traditions, laws and freedoms, it is the knowledge, love and creative imagination of individuals that constantly create new sensibilities and values, bring these into the ever-expanding common pool, and compel society to make these a part of social living and experience of all."[14] Morality emerges out of man's active connections with fellowmen, out of intertwined human desires, values and activities in society. The social is the moral. But man is not merely social and gregarious. He builds up also an ideal morality, often in seclusion and detachment from fellowmen, and then gives his own definition of what is good and right in human relationships and interaction through an enhanced sense of conscious-

[10] R. Mukerjee, *The Social Structure of Values*, p. 6.
[11] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. VII.
[12] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. VIII.
[13] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. 5.
[14] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. XV.

ness of the whole or the totality. Thus the moral brings the social to an ever higher level of communion. The right, the good and the just are neither subjective whims nor rigid social controls, nor, again, timeless absolute categories, but constitute those goals that are continuous with the ends of social relations, behavior and institutions, and what man's rational intelligence, conscience and faith find as the true meaning and destiny of the latter.[15] In the face of the overwhelming empirical evidence for the dynamic interrelationship of the individual and society the still prevalent either-or philosophies in social sciences—individualism-collectivism—appear outdated. With the rejection of *these artificial theories* goes hand in hand the discarding of the division of the moral and social, which has inspired the myth of ethical neutrality. Once we realize "the interdependence of the quality of man's social and moral life", the social sciences cannot afford to exclude human behavior and human relations from ethical evaluations. By refusing to do it they are responsible, to a no small degree, that "in practical life moral values are regarded as entirely out of place, and dominant interests and pursuits are left to be regulated by opportunism and mass passion, often passing for a moral ideal, or by outworn custom and rigid tradition."[16]

The False and True Relativism of Values

The ethical neutrality of social sciences is an outcome of many factors. Among these, physicalism plays the major role. The latter subscribes to the belief that only observable spatio-temporal events are proper subjects of scientific investigation which aims at measurable quantitative relations. Values and goals, being qualitative conscious phenomena, are brushed aside as mere subjective preferences or idiosyncrasies of dominant social groups. Social scientists in their blind imitation of physics forget that social phenomena cannot be explained except with reference to goals, values and norms. Only a thorough knowledge of the latter gives us an understanding of man's activities. "Man's needs, aspirations and values are in dynamic interplay with the milieu, physical and institutional. Social and economic conditions and ethical attitudes constantly intermingle."[17] The second factor behind the ethical neutrality is the false metaphysical individualism in the social sciences. The latter depicts the individual either as an economic creature "isolated from his social and institutional milieu, motivated by single atomic drives, and feverishly engaged in the production of "goods" that bears little relation to his social impulses or moral aspiration"; or as a political animal "wresting certain abstract, unconditional and costless "rights of man" from the state that becomes the focus of class struggles for dominance both in reality and in the theory."[18] This metaphysical individualism accounts for the false value subjectivism which treats particular fields of human desire in isolation, uninfluenced by the total social and physical situation. Value subjectivism disregards the vast field of shareable and communicative values, rooted in man's common biologi-

[15] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* pp. 21ff.
[16] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. 22.
[17] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. 41.
[18] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* pp. 16ff.

cal constitution and similar cultural exigencies.

Contemporary social scientists take pride in a discovery which is very old, indeed. I mean the cultural relativism or the belief that customs and norms of a given culture are the sole criteria of good and bad. This discovery of cultural relativism is a revival of the doctrine that might makes right, which was set forth by the Sophists. This theory would make given customs, norms and values sacrosanct which only a recalcitrant relativist can maintain and defend. A cultural relativist cannot analyse a single culture, for such a survey implies some value premises, some criteria for the significant and insignificant. Even the notion of progress could not be employed. "For progress assumes that, after a culture pattern has changed, the new is somehow superior to the old. But to admit this is to make a moral judgment in terms of standards outside the process of change."[19] Mukerjee traces the false value relativism to the untenable divisions which still abound in social sciences: the individual and society, lower biological needs and higher motives, facts and values, the actual and the ideal. These divisions overlook completely the "blending, integration and transformation of desires into values."[20] To apply an objective ethical standard to mores, customs, social groups and institutions means to evaluate them in terms of the basic human needs as they emerge into value phenomena. There are customs and norms which further or cripple human value dimensions, which include or exclude men from a participation in the abiding values, and which make for growth or extirpation. Only a science which separates the moral life from the biological can pride itself in preserving a "dignified value neutrality". Such an attitude is callousness at its worse, and in addition a travesty of facts. There are basic physiological and psychological needs which crave for satisfaction. To refuse to evaluate social norms and institutions is to deny these needs and encourage all kinds of rationalization and pseudo-beliefs about the human nature. Ethical judgments are not whims which we can afford to ignore. They are imperative for every science which deals with social phenomena. "Since it is human beings that build culture and make it go, the social scientist's criteria of the significant cannot stop short of these human beings' criteria of the significant . . . . . no protestations of scientific objectivity and ethical neutrality can excuse the social scientist from coming down into the arena and accepting as his guiding values, in selecting and defining his problems, these deep, more widely based, cravings which living personalities seek to realize. The day has passed when ethics could be regarded as a comfortable thing apart, given at the hands of God as an inscrutable moral law implanted in the hearts of man, a thing to which social sciences could hand over all its problems of values. The old, aloof ethics has evaporated and ethics today is a component of the cravings of persons going about the daily round of living with each other."[21]

[19] See Martin Gardner, "Beyond Cultural Relativism." *Ethics*, October 1950, p. 39.

[20] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. 26.

[21] Robert Lynd, *Knowledge For What*, (Princeton University Press, 1946.) pp. 189ff.

The cultural relativist depicts a chaotic moral universe where different people have diverse customs and mores, exclusively contingent upon various regional, climatic, political, social and economic factors. It escapes his attention that there are invariant moral standards regulating human relations and behavior. "Although there is no rigidity or absoluteness about them, social evolution does show the existence and survival of general moral standards, guiding and controlling man's evolutionary advance".[22] The common standards center on the cognizance of similar human needs, common fulfillments and frustrations. The false value relativism becomes apparent once we stop to look upon values as mere artificial additions to a value-free existence and treat them as rooted in, and emerging from, man's natural dimensions. (By rejecting value relativism, Mukerjee does not fall in with the belief in absolute, immutable values. He is fully aware that values do change in accordance with a better knowledge related to nature and man, and with many environmental conditions,) "social and economic circumstances as well as "accidental" variations and mutations in isolated human communities."[22] In addition there is a relativity of human values and moral standards which is due "to different degrees of social and intellectual development and difference of man's interests, beliefs and faiths."[23]

The diversity of social institutions, social norms and social values is not a case for value relativism in the sense of equal validity and of equal truth. If values were nothing more than idiosyncrasies of single individuals or groups, nothing more than ideologies resulting from arbitrary rationalizations, a scientific evaluation of social norms and goals would be impossible. The fact that we distinguish between rationalizations and rational validation of values and valuations, between narrow and rich mores, between clinging to obsolete and advanced mores, between (what Bergson so eloquently describes) a closed and an open society, on the basis of the commitment to change, proves beyond any doubt that the belief that social values and goals are of equal truth has no empirical evidence. Ascertained value judgments cannot be made if values are looked upon as independent of, and not derived from, human needs and environmental exigencies which satisfy these needs. Value relativism is guilty of doing it. Its claim that men confer values to value-free data has no justification at all . Values do not come into being out of the blue sky. They answer to human needs which are common to all. Objective value judgments can be made on the basis of such universal needs and satisfaction of these demands.[24] (To claim that science cannot tell whether satisfaction of hunger is better than starvation is to discredit medicine; to say that psychology cannot tell whether a life of fear and anxiety is worse than a life of security and assurance is to talk non-

[22] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. 27.

[23] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. 26.

[24] J. Dewey speaks of needs "for food and drink and for moving about..... the need for some kind of companionship; the need for exhibiting energy, for bringing one's powers to bear upon surrounding conditions; the need for both cooperation with and emulation of one's fellows for some mutual aid and combat alike; the need for some sort of aesthetic expression and satisfaction; the need to lead and to follow, etc.," *Problems of Men*, (New York, Philosophical Library, 1946,) p. 184.

sense; to point out that sociology cannot maintain that social cohesion is more desirable that social disorganization is to deny its proper aim.

Mukerjee studies values as complex phenomena as they are determined by biological, psychological, physical and societal forces. His synoptic, integrated approach prevents him from a dogmatic adherence to any one-sided theory of social behavior. He is not fond of the many either-or philosophies and reductionist doctrines which abound in contemporary social studies. Just to mention a few: culture is a result of repressions of human drives; the social super-ego is the restricting and crippling agent of man's nature; mores and customs are the final arbiters in moral judgments; values are mere emotional expressions or motor-affective responses, devoid of any cognitive content; might makes right, etc. These diverse theories of social life are wrong in their exclusive claim to truth, but taken as complementary interpretations of the intricate social facts may lead to a scientific sociology of values. The latter stands or falls with the commitment to fundamental human goals which men manifest everywhere. Men want to live, they want to grow and expand; they have a need for sharing experiences and transmit them by the way of a symbolic rendering; they crave for reshaping the environment to fit the changing needs, and look for some cosmic anchorage of their discovered and created values. A commitment to these goals is imperative for any social science which aspires to bring order into the chaos of irrational valuations.

The Social Origin and the Social Character of Values.

"Society has both its visible and invisible aspects. The patterns of social behavior and institutions are visible. It can be seen and even measured to some extent how men interact towards one another or play their roles in society, and how institutions that have always a visible focus, work in the direction of orienting the behavior of groups of men towards certain definite ends and values. . . . . .But there is another more significant aspect of society—the subjective and invisible one, which is usually taken for granted, and which underlies all human relationships, viz. values, ideals and norms that define, maintain and regulate the visible social structure and interaction, give them cohesion and stability so that they cross the boundaries of time and space. The infinity and universality of values, ideals and norms can never be visible; but the social structure and institutional life render a part of these visible by patternising and stereotyping these through symbols, and by so doing make it possible for man to understand and experience these, and live and act in society."[25]

Man has been differently defined: as a rational being, as a social and political animal, as an image of God, and as speech creating and speech using creature. Mukerjee defines man as the value seeking and value creating being. Man not only vegetates, but knows the quality of his existence; he not only satisfies his needs, but knows the degrees of satisfaction; he not only lives in groups, but enjoys the worth of social ties; he not only adapts himself to his environment, but endeavors to change it according to his goals and ideals. In

[25] R. Mukerjee, *The Social Structure of Values*, p. 1.

man's life the actual and the ideal are linked together. In the ongoing process of interaction with his physical and social environment man learns to treasure objects, events, ways of behavior which are conducive to his self-preservation and self-enhancement. In this process he is tremendously helped by tradition which epitomizes, crystallizes and transmits values of the past.

Values and disvalues, although rooted in facts, are more than mere spatio-temporal occurrences. They are facts which please or displease, gratify or frustrate, phenomena we approve or disapprove, experiences we would like to abide by or experiences we would like to see ceased, occurrences which elevate us or make us despondent. Man's whole life moves in the realm of values and disvalues. The good and the evil, the beauty and the ugliness, the holiness, the justice and injustice are part and parcel of man's existence. The value experience is probably as old as any observation of facts. The value aspect is behind our sensations, emotions, volitions, and cognitions.[26] No wonder that every serious thinker has been occupied with the problem of values and valuations. Out of their daring quests many theories of values were set forth. Plato assigns values to a noumenal realm of eternal, immutable essences. Man, according to him, does not create values, rather discovers them in a process of contemplating, thinking directed to perfect, intelligible entities whose imperfect images comprise the changing reality. Other philosophers taking cognizance of the mutability of values, equate them either with customs and mores of a people or with individual desires and satisfactions, and shifting preferences. Most contemporary social scientists adhere to value subjectivism and relativism. Among modern philosophers Dewey and his followers reject both value subjectivism and value absolutism, and by applying the instrumental and causative theory of the meanings of terms veer toward objectivity of values whose cognitive contents can be tested by experience. According to them, value propositions and factual propositions differ only in their subject matter; both convey information, both occur in situations indicative of calling for intervention by reason and play an important part in bringing about consequences. Value judgments show a closer relationship between attitudes, interests, emotions, decisions and cognitions than factual statements. In the latter the cognitive elements are more apparent.

The writer finds himself in accord with Mukerjee that given a commitment to the fundamental human goals which are inherent in man's biological and social nature, values and valuations can be verified and validated. Their objectivity rests with their functional role in fulfilling vital needs, with their shareability and common symbolic rendering. Value objectivity does not mean independence of man's physiological and psychological make-up. Such an independence is given in no field of human knowledge. Objectivity of values stands for the similarity of experiences. That values cannot have the same epistemic status as physical events is too obvious to elaborate on. To experience the quality of a color one needs an intact vision; to enjoy a symphony or friendship one needs much more. It requires culti-

[26] See S. L. Hart, *Treatise on Values*, Ch. I,

vated senses, humanized emotions, and developed intellectual faculties. To verify a physical fact senses may suffice (as a rule they do not); to verify a value sensations alone are not enough; they must be accompanied by an insight in social cohesion living together entails, a fine sensitivity to human strength and frailty, and an expanding consciousness of a retrospective and prospective nature.

The still widespread dichotomy between facts and values, between factual and value propositions is the result of false interpretations of values as eternal essences of a noumenal nature or as irrational experiences of a non-cognitive ought. The first theory is a metaphysical speculation, and as such, needs no reputation. The second theory fails entirely in grasping the indissoluble unity of the "is" and the "ought" in the value phenomenon. To restrict values only to what ought to be is contrary to value experiences. That values do not belong to the realm of the "is" is a travesty of facts. Events and objects have properties which are pleasing or displeasing, fulfilling or frustrating. Men would not preserve and crave for values if the latter were not grounded in the realm of facts, physical and social. No ought, be it a practical, ethical or aesthetical, could come into being if it were not for its "actual is" which we would like to preserve, augment and transmit. Out of value realities come value ideals. "A value is a complex Gestalt, a conscious vital-social-ideal situation. Value is experienced in the total situation; and is neither purely or primarily biological, social or mental. There are levels of all value experience; at each level the primary values are associated with major urges, goals and ideals as well as ethical norms. The first step in value experience is the specification or preference of goals rooted in the primary urges and interests of man. The second step is the determination of formulation of the ideal or idea. All goals are instrumental values, i.e., means for the fulfilment of intrinsic personal values. Without the control and experience of goals from level to level of social adaptation, the experience of the intrinsic values of life becomes haphazard and accidental. All ideals are also instrumental values. Man's knowledge of the ideal is a means to the production and experience of values."[27] "Neither human goals and interests conceived biologically or economically grovel on the earth; nor ideals or norms live in paradise. All cooperate and interpenetrate in real life, in concrete human relations achieving the eternal, the rational and the universal on the earth here and now."[28]

Values and valuations "rest upon a social background that moulds man's psychic life and are a part and parcel of the creative adjustment inseparable from his social evolution and survival."[29] "Values may be rooted in man's organic dispositions, instincts and desires, interests, but their real nature can be understood only when these are seen as products of man's social nature and selection. Expressed in forms of common language and of common thought, these are the chief instruments of society for ordering and regulating man's instincts and desires, and for lifting him up to an ideal that he alone

[27] R. Mukerjee, *The Social Structure of Values*, p. 107.
[28] *Ibid.* p. 108.
[29] *Ibid.* p. 50.

can conceive and adore. Without the creation and recreation of values, virtues and ideals, societies cannot exist."[30] All human values are derived social values. Social life accounts for the transformation of wants into values which emerge, thrive and expand in a socially derived environment. Desires and values fuse or compete with one another. Their accord and discord reflect the kind of ethos pervading a social group or culture. The ethos is at its highest in a society open to ideal universal values—intellectual, moral, artistic and religious—which "deepen the communion between man and fellowman, brooking no boundaries."[31] The articulation of such ideals has been the task of all great men in science, religion, and art. Their creative genius is a product of two forces, individual and social: an imaginative sympathy coupled with an unusual gift of observation and interpretation, and a social expansion of a truly humane spirit.

A consensus in values and valuations will remain a heuristic principle. To deny that is to close our eyes to reality. Men everywhere have inveterate prejudices, false beliefs, and are prone to be told rather than to employ their own reasoning power. Their rationalizations *make* out of a conflict of interests a conflict of values. But there is reason to hope that a better knowledge of values, a more comprehensive study of man's common needs will discard the myth of the ethical neutrality of human cultures, and make a universal ethos a binding reality.

Levels of Morality: From Crowd to Commonalty.

Following the findings of modern social psychology Mukerjee rejects the still prevailing dichotomies in social sciences—the individual versus society, or society versus the individual; natural needs versus cultural requirements, or cultural requirements versus natural needs; egoism versus altruism, or altruism versus egoism; individual desires versus social utility, or social utility versus individual desires; freedom versus authority, or authority versus freedom; and individualism versus collectivism, or collectivism versus individualism. "It is erroneous to isolate the attitude and experience of the individual from the social and cultural background: such isolation—a relic of the older metaphysical individualism—supports the orthodox conceptions that individual motivation is the real source of values, and that folkways, laws, morals and institutions are chains and fetters, external hindrances to the expression and fulfilment of values. Social psychology insists, on the contrary, that man's consciousness of self emerges out of his social relations, as the self plays the roles of others in society, moves out of its own biological boundaries for the resolution of conflict and the relief of tension, seeks goals and values common to others successfully or unsuccessfully with opposite effects upon self-status, and becomes itself a part of the genuine give-and-take in social intercourse."[32] The individual's self develops with the social self. Between these two there is a dynamic interpenetration and interrelationship. Social relations frame the individual which in turn in-

[30] *Ibid.* p. 53.
[31] R. Mukerjee, *ibid.* p. 102.
[32] R. Mukerjee, *The Dynamics of Morals.* (Macmillan Co., London), p. 256.

fluences society through his own ideal scale of values. Thus social and individual morality complete one another. "Conscience is as much sustained by laws, folkways and institutions, as they are nourished by conscience."[33] Collectivism and individualism are oversimplified, erroneous theories of social life. Man is not a mere product of social forces, he is their part and parcel. Neither is he "an organization in which things are merely given. Man projects what he completely and insistently is upon his environment, his society."[34] Social values are not abstract entities, nor arbitrary conventions. They emerge in social relations, in concrete situations of life which may further or frustrate our potentialities. "Value experience is always within the social community."[35] Mukerjee distinguishes four types of social communities: Crowd, Interest-group, Society, and Com monalty. They indicate "different levels of social integration and depth of the individual self as well as the status of values. The organized realization of the highest values implies at once the profoundest depth of the personality and the most intense temporal equality and solidarity of mankind."[36] The four types of human groupings intermingle in reality. In order to comprehend the moral quality and levels of communion, a separation of the types appears necessary. The four basic types of social integration are to be found in all cultures.

Crowd.

"The Crowd is the most unstable group exhibiting primitive types of relation and behavior and is not constructive at all. On the contrary its action, dominated by primal instincts and emotions, is often destructive. In the history of social development the Crowd is the mechanism by which individuals seek by direct action immediately and spontaneously to remove lapses, offences or evils that law, custom, folkway or tradition would do slowly. Thus crowd behavior is lawless behavior. In modern communities the crowd is the device universally used to develop a revolutionary situation for asserting, attacking or wresting economic or political power. The Crowd operating violently on primal motives is an enemy not only of law and order, but also of private interest and judgment of the individual. For the crowd or mass-man, ego-consciousness and hence the sense of individual responsibility completely disappear."[37] Most men may become members of the crowd on occasions of natural cataclysms, civil and international strifes, economic and political insecurity, excessive regimentation on the part of the ruling class, and the many morbid forces which account for a sudden lapse of those habits and values which make for social integration. The latter is at its minimum in the crowd, and it is contingent "on external coercion and pressure, fear and insecurity. There is no morality of the Crowd. But when morals come into the cognizance of the Crowd, it reacts most violently, as in mob lynching, pogrom, religious or racial riot,

[33] *Ibid.* p. 257.
[34] *Ibid.* p. 257.
[35] R. Mukerjee, *The Social Structure of Values*, p. 110.
[36] *Ibid.* p. 110.
[37] *Ibid* p. 120.

where men collectively experience an outburst of moral feeling and indignation that seeks to right a wrong, however brutally. That the Crowd enforces an ethic in its own haphazard, savage manner represents obviously a distinctive failure of the state or the community to maintain laws or community mores, whether in the frontiers or in the heart of civilization."[38]

Interest-group.

While the Crowd hardly displays any ethical norms, the Interest-group develops the moral principles of reciprocity, integrity, consideration, fairness and proportion. Since the reciprocity is predominantly of an economic nature, the social cohesion of the Interest-group, although less ephemeral than that of the Crowd, is very fluctuating, and at times highly disruptive. Individuals associated within an Interest-group are not deeply involved in group life and group activity. They show a "fractionalized, occupational self, egoistic and aggressive with strong class consciousness and feeling."[39] The nature of their group reaction is of two kinds: "individual assertion and reciprocal impersonal service; individual conduct based on accommodation of interest to interest" . . . . . .or "impersonal conflict and retaliation without abrogating economic reciprocity."[40]

Society.

Interest-groups undergo a transition into Societies or Communities through common understanding, feeling, "friendly co-operation and participation in work, management and recreational interests."[41] The moral norms or values of Society or Community are equity and justice. The latter imply "an enterprise in common" while the reciprocity of the interest-group implies the equivalence of enterprises. The focus of equity and justice is "upon duties and obligations that nurture the commonness of the enterprise, its shared satisfactions and values." The focus of reciprocity is "upon the specific, limited satisfactions and values apportioned for each private enterprise."[42] The nature of group participation in Society is emotional-rational and moral. Here man rises "from the immediate and irrational to the stable, calculable and rational self that can integrate and order his casual, immediate contacts and responses with fellowmen into a system of configuration without which group living cannot be maintained."[43]

Commonalty.

Commonalty is the highest ethical social grouping. Here the social communion is most profound and most universal. In Commonalty, the ethos is autonomous, creative; its norms and values are love, equality and solidarity. Here "the morality gradually becomes more explicitly deliberative, involving the activity of the stable, evaluative, rational self that protects both against the immediacy and

[38] R. Mukerjee, *The Dynamics of Morals,* p. 261.
[39] R. Mukerjee, *The Social Structure of Values,* p. 118.
[40] *Ibid.* p. 119.
[41] R. Mukerjee, *The Dynamics of Morals,* p. 266.
[42] *Ibid.* p. 267.

irrationality of self and the constraint and coercion of existing laws, codes and folkways. Thus it may lift itself to its highest potentialities and disregard every social connection except and the most extensive."[44] "Commonalty represents the stage of profoundest unition, and is therefore the least dependent on external constraint and social pressure and most on conscience and spontaneous love."[45] Commonalty cannot thrive in a sphere of deprivation. Man must conquer hunger, still his thirst and find shelter in order to cultivate spiritual values of brotherhood. But these values, although rooted in satisfaction of fundamental needs, may in return contribute to their better fulfilment. A better social understanding, a life of freedom and goodness may lead to a wiser distribution of economic resources, eliminate hunger, counteract religious and political strife and eradicate ignorance which are the major forces behind evils men commit against men. "A world view of progress and ethics, in which the fundamentals are social responsibility, solidarity and co-operativeness, can alone supply the sure moral foundation of world reconstruction of the future."[46]

[44] R. Mukerjee, *The Dynamics of Morals*, p. 269.
[45] *Ibid.* p. 272.
[46] R. Mukerjee, *The Social Structure of Values*, p. 407.

9

THE GENESIS OF THE INDIVIDUAL VALUE SYSTEM

By GARDNER MURPHY

Among the many stimulating contributions to theoretical and empirical social science to which Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee has given his life, none is more provocative to the social psychologist than the theory of value. In so large and basic a region of analytic thinking, there is place for many approaches, from the vantage-point of many disciplines. It will be my aim in the present chapter to provide a psychological theory of value, defined in terms of a series of concrete steps through which the growing individual is conceived to pass. The empirical data for such an effort are already considerable, yet far from sufficient to establish a well documented case; and since they are presented in terms of the growth of the individual, they are inevitably lacking in that third dimension, the group process, to which the sociologist devotes his attention. It is hoped, however, that some clarification may result from a more intensive view of the psychology of the problem, and that the speculative aspects of the enterprise may be forgiven in so far as they may suggest better research procedures for the establishment of a sounder factual foundation for the value theory of tomorrow.

I

We shall begin with the theory of "motives", of "drives", or of "impulses to action"; for our purposes these terms will be equivalent. It is characteristic of living things to be restless. Even in the infant's deep sleep there is the instability, the shifting tension of postural change, of varying pulse and breathing. Even in the man under deep ether anesthesia there is spontaneous discharge or "firing" of nerve cells in the brain. The body cannot come to full quiescence if it is to live. When the infant or the man awakes, it is to a renewal of activity; activity of sense-organs of brain, of muscles, of vital organs, of the chemical processes of more active metabolism. The whole living system presents us at all times with the picture of tensions, or energy concentrations, which are more evident in some regions of the body than in others, but shift fluidly and dynamically from moment to moment, and present from moment to moment new integrations. Every tissue, every organ, expresses such patterns of relative energy concentration, and of intercommunication, or energy exchange, with other tissues and organs.

The early evolutionists of the Darwinian era appear to have grasped all this vaguely, but those of a later period appear to have forgotten it almost completely. For they began to posit lists of instincts or dynamic impulsive units, embedded in an otherwise passive system. A man's behaviour, from the point of view of such

"instinct theory," is reduced to one or more instinctive units, which supply the driving power. We might thus compare a man with a watch, in which the main spring, under tension, drives forward the inert machinery of the hands. The role of McDougall's "instincts" in refuting the crudities of a naive pleasure-pain calculation as the basis of social life was very great; but one of the by-products, the conception of a limited list of impulsive units in an otherwise inert human nature, was unfortunate. But it was not just McDougall who approached the problem in this way. The animal psychologists, studying the effect upon animals of depriving them of food, water, mates, etc., created the illusion that animals are driven to action only by gross frustration of their visceral needs. One would have thought that to watch a monkey, or a puppy, at play, would have been enough to cause some doubts about this approach; but this was apparently not the case. Finally, and most seriously of all, it was the ill fortune of Freud, at the time of the founding of psychoanalysis, to encounter in his earliest patients such gross psychological pathology related to sexual frustrations, and later, to the manifestations of aggression and of the impulse to destroy, that the other vital impulses such as hunger and the maternal impulses were treated as quasi-sexual. And (more seriously) no sustained attention was ever given to the infinitely subtle and complex mainsprings of human activity related to the dynamics of sensory and muscular activity, and to what we call (for lack of a better term) the "spontaneous" activity (as noted above) of the nervous system. If Freud encounters a love of color or of tone, he must perforce treat this under the head of "sublimation", an indirect sexual expression; and if there is active thinking for the intrinsic joy of thinking, this must, if the systematic theory is to be maintained, represent the "erotisation of thought." Many modern trends have thus conspired to give us an extraordinarily naive conception of human impulses to replace the pleasure-pain calculations of an earlier era; for all our impulses must, according to this view, be traced to the viscera (and indeed often traced somehow to the sexual). There is not the slightest doubt that people in a state of grave frustration of vital needs do often behave just as these instinct theories suggest; but we need also a balanced conception of the myriad phases of human motivation, at the level of the child and at the level of the adult, which enter into the complexities of civilized living.

All classifications of human motivation, Eastern or Western, have their own inadequacies and their tantalizing oversimplifications; but we have to have some kind of classification as a loose cord to hold together what modern observation has emphasized, and we shall offer our own very inadequate and over-simplified scheme.

We suggest a four-fold classification of human motives: The first is the visceral: the system of needs arising from tensions in the vital organs. Most of these are due to chemical scarcities: lack of food in general, or of specific foods (e.g. salt craving, calcium craving); lack of water; lack of oxygen. Some of them, notably the sexual and maternal, vary directly with biochemical conditions, but undergo great social elaboration, and remain strong even when the biochemical state is grossly altered.

The second group of motives is more closely related to the volun-

tary musculature: the striped muscles of trunk, head, and extremities. The infant's ceaseless activity and delight in rolling, pushing-up, pat-a-cake games, etc., and his corresponding intense misery when forced to keep absolutely still ("Daddy has a headache, so be quiet") and the barbarous nineteenth century European habit of standing a child in a corner as punishment, bear witness to the need for activity. The fatigued or listless adult may remain for a while very still but with endless little shifts such as go on all the time in sleep; and the healthy adult, far from seeking solely repose, is constantly inventing activities: ways to exercise large muscles in sports or small muscles in tasks of precision, broadly conceived ways to use the muscle-tissues which grow stale and wither when inactive Sometimes all the musculature is used, as in many sports; sometimes, as in the cultivation of a skill or in mental concentration or contemplation, some muscle groups are deliberately kept in a state of disciplined tension while others are relaxed. But the conception of visceral tension is in all these cases inadequate to describe the urge of the whole man to use his whole body.

The third group of motives is related to the manner in which the senses and their connections with the brain are used. The six-months-old infant constantly scans and studies the faces, the movements of the people about him; his grasping and groping movements combine with his watchful eyes in the effort to make contact with this interesting world. At times he may be seeking food; but he uses his senses even when satiated, and it is in fact in the child who is *not* in a state of visceral need that we seek most clearly and actively this endless looking, listening, touching, exploring. That which passes out of his range of vision may be pursued as long as possible by craning his neck to see, or a little later, by creeping after what has disappeared; and we may begin to label this behaviour by the term "curiosity". Or what has been heard or seen may "haunt" us a while, as a melody "runs in the head", and we may use the language of psychology to call this "perseveration." But here again we are dealing with activators in human conduct which are not primarily of visceral origin. These "sensory" motivations include of course in a very prominent way the responses to color, to line, to tone, to rhythm, which we assign to the realm of esthetics; the color is satisfying, the rhythm stirring or moving, and at a level of somewhat greater sophistication we have the development of the "arts" to give greater and more articulate place to the "beautiful". It is out of these sensory gratifications that the material of the arts is slowly evolved — giving large place of course to the role of the symbolic and the imaginative, but clinging ultimately to the deep joys which sensory contact with the world can provide.

Fourth and last, we must name a group of motives which are not primarily definable as forms of gratification of needs; not primarily modes of positive exploitation of the good things in the environment, but rooted in the need to escape from threatening things in the environment. A violent sound causes the infant to cry, to cringe, or at a later age to crawl away; here we speak of fear. An interference with his breathing or his free movements leads to kicking or slashing, or at a later age to a temper tantrum; here we speak of rage. Some tastes or odors may lead to disgust. The social rejection of his

needs for acceptance and approval may lead to shame. All these states of turmoil when the individual is confronted with a situation with which he cannot cope in a simple muscular fashion are sometimes called "emergency reactions." They differ from the three fore-going classes of responses in that the drive is not *towards* but *away from* the situation; or (in the case of rage) that it is directed to the removal of the disturbing situation.

It is characteristically human to combine two or more of these responses. Even foods must do more than fill the stomach; they may appeal to several of the senses. Poetry satisfies through its rhythms the activity needs, and through its melody the sensory needs. Stirring music may, along with its rhythm and its appeal to the ear, arouse the impulse to struggle or to join in a great effort or overthrow a powerful enemy. Mature love of man and woman involves response to beauty of form and of voice, and many subtle personal appreciations stemming from the sensory complexities which we define as grace or charm, as well as from the sexual need as such; and the protective or maternal need which at times (especially times of sorrow or loneliness) makes the husband seem like a son, or the wife like a daughter.

II

It is my thesis that a theory of value must begin with the needs of human beings. But it cannot end there. It must provide an orderly and intelligible account of the way in which the needs are developed, through individual growth and through the process of socially directed learning into stable and crystallised form, so that they are not mere momentary impulses but abiding expressions of personality and of the culture in which it develops. It must moreover provide for the understanding of the processes by which the needs are symbolised and communicated from person to person, and ultimately built into an organised and continuing value system. With the latter phases of this total process Professor Mukerjee has extensively dealt; but it is possible that there may be a place for somewhat more consideration of the process by which the individual, starting with these needs, *acquires values,* by virtue of the interaction of personal idiosyncracies, family pressures, and group norms. This involves the psychology of the learning process.

Two elementary types of learning will concern us here. The first is ordinarily designated by the term "conditioning." Let any situation S arouse a response R; any other situation S 1 concurrent with or immediately preceding S comes to acquire the capacity to evoke R. In the celebrated experiments of Pavlov, the meat powder in the mouth of the dog elicits salivary response; during or immediately before such administration of the meat powder a tuning fork is sounded. On later occasions the tuning fork alone, without the meat powder, elicits the salivary flow. Sometimes a single presentation of S 1 along with, or just preceding R, will suffice to establish the response to a specified level; sometimes a number of these joint-stimulations is required before the response is evident; sometimes the development of the new response appears gradual and we have an excellent method of studying the process of learning. When

thoroughly ingrained, the response may be dependable for a while, with no additional use of the original stimulus, e. g., the meat powder. Sooner or later, however, the presentation of S 1 alone, without S, will begin to fail to evoke the response R., and if not "reinforced" by fresh presentation of S along with S1, the response will die out or become "extinguished." It is obvious at a glance that infants learn in this fashion: e. g., at first the mother's ministrations put an end to crying; soon her footsteps or her approaching form can put an end to the crying before she actually reaches the child. We may regard all this kind of learning as essentially a form of "anticipatory response"; the individual acts as if that which meets his need, or satisfies his drive, were already present, even though in fact the only thing present is a *signal* which in past experience has been a dependable prelude to the desired drive-satisfier. When the signal, in the case of "extinction" has failed to give valid information as to what may be anticipated, the response fails.

It is, I think, obvious, that we have here a rudimentary beginning of a theory of value. It is not only clear that signals which in themselves can satisfy no need may come to stand for the satisfiers and hence to be valuable in themselves. A rupee note as a piece of paper has practically no drive-satisfying value at all. But it stands for the commodities for which it may be exchanged. By gradations we come to the man who "loves money" and even in some cases to the miser. Let inflation destroy the dependable relation between the piece of paper and the commodities, and the value of the paper shrinks. There is nothing new about any of this except the reminder that in their rudimentary form human values are rooted in an elementary learning process which appears not only in infants but likewise in animals.

There is however a secondary form of rudimentary learning which appears to be even more important for a theory of value. This is noted by the French with their exquisite linguistic finesse in the word "canaliser", for which we may use the less elegant and less frequently heard canalisation; and a very similar process is extensively described by Freud in the term "Besatzung", literally translated "investment," and more freely "cathexis." The basic idea is that a drive which at first may be satisfied by a wide variety of satisfiers comes to be much more easily satisfied with *one specific satisfier* which has frequently been the means of satisfying it, and much less easily satisfied by other satisfiers which originally were just as good. The drive is "invested in" or "attached to" a specific satisfier. Thus at this moment there are, all over the face of the globe, hundreds or thousands of two-year old children who are hungry. Those in the Arctic who have at times been fed upon blubber will eagerly accept and ravenously swallow a piece of blubber. Those in the great rice areas of the world will be satisfied with rice; those in the metropolitan areas of the West will be satisfied with strained carrots or orange juice. We have often noted, however, the facial expression and the behaviour of the child who is given an unfamiliar food — how the candle grease acceptable by the Eskimo child is spewed out by the Western child. In the same way the lullabies and the little games which satisfy the need for tone and rhythm give endlessly recurring satis-

fying; we say the child is "used to them." But there is an actual jolt when an unaccustomed song or game is presented to the same child. Things which to the newborn are practically equivalent have become differentiated through experience. As the French would say, the broad and diffuse stream of human motivation now flows through a more narrow channel, is canalised. The Freudian says that the energies of the individual have been invested in a specific form of satisfier, and one cannot at will shift it easily to other forms.

The reader will immediately inquire whether canalisation, like conditioning, is subject to extinction. But no one knows. It is easy to demonstrate the acquisition of canalised responses, but hard to observe their disappearance. To be sure, we find the child at a later age giving up the special tastes, games, enthusiasms of earlier years, but this may be because new activities are absorbing all his immediately available energies. He may continue to play at the old games if no one derides him as babyish for doing so; he may dream of his erstwhile less mature activities; and under stress he may "regress" or fall back to earlier pursuits. The adult too often slips back into the ways of earlier years, may dream of his golden childhood. In our American Christmas celebrations there is no taboo, no feeling of lack of dignity, if the father lies on the floor with his child playing with the Christmas toys. Many American adults read the "comic strips" with a delight which may well mean, as has often been said, that we are an immature people. Behind such facts is the basic phenomenon that canalisation may be hidden, interrupted, or screened from observation, but probably not obliterated. Human beings everywhere cling throughout life, in one way or another, to that which in childhood was near and dear. The satisfactions not only of food, but of rhythm, of vocal or musical melody, of line and color, or human relationships in the family, are sought ever afterwards. Even the wanderer to another clime dreams of his earlier home. The "signals" which impinge upon him when he meets another man from his home village do not act upon a nervous system which has undergone the effects of "extinction", as in the case of the conditioned response; the old response is for ever ready for fresh excitation. This is in fact a necessary derivative or corollary from the theory of conditioning and canalisation which has been sketched. The only reason why the rupee note or the tuning fork ever shows the effects of extinction is the fact that its value is extrinsic, depending not on what it is in itself, but on what it stands for; and if it no longer stands for a satisfier, it is useless. The canalised or cathected object or person, on the other hand, is *intrinsically* satisfying, and even though there may be long periods during which we do not encounter it, it may nevertheless freshly affect us (if we ourselves have not fundamentally changed) just as it did long ago.

In practice, canalisation and conditioning are usually combined. A word is uttered which refers to a person, a song, a custom which is precious to our hearts. The word acts upon us by conditioning; let social conditions change the meaning of the word, as has often been the case in the recent history of the United States, and the word no longer touches off the old dependable response. Usually some new conditioning to words is acquired each year. The word-signal also

initiates in us the impulse to move towards the cherished person or thing, or (by a process too complex to describe here) to relive in imagination the earlier experiences which still retain their vital meaning for us. But there is much more here than conditioning. If we have been conditioned by means of words to approach, or in imagination to dwell upon many different persons or things which we love, there is still the fact that through canalisation we have developed strong *preferences;* canalisation flows strong and deep at one point, in weak or shallow form at another point. The dream process may bring back to us not only the symbol of that which has been good in our lives; it may make possible an actual reliving of a deeply canalised experience, as the old man may awaken from sleep with deep gratitude and peace through having dreamt of the precious friends "now sunk in death's dateless night."

The value world then is maintained both by the system of symbols (especially words) which renew each day the reminders of good things—and appropriately reinforce by bringing us into renewed contact with these things — and also by the system of canalisations which provides some measure of continuity through the life span, making us continue as essentially loyal members of the cultural group which has shared essentially the same canalised experiences which we have shared. In new situations, e.g., the choice among new books or new people, we choose in accordance with the system of canalisations ingrained within us. Not only individual but cultural continuity is rooted largely in this phenomenon of the non-extinguishability of canalisations; and the phenomenon of "cultural lag" is at least in large part traceable to the preservation of great inertia at the level of values despite great and rapid changes in geographic, scientific, or technological conditions. The American worker who turns nut number 2911 in the assembly line is still deeply devoted to individualism as a precious system of values.

Value systems are of course maintained by the actual exposure of the child to things and persons who satisfy his needs; by standardising these satisfying experiences through the use of symbols which are shared by the members of the group and freshly exercised day by day, so as to maintain continuity; and by including in the value system of the child the conception of the good parent and of his own personal worth in such fashion that when he grows up his conception of desirable behaviour on his own part as a parent maintains the value system to which he himself was exposed.

The more complex value systems of society are conceived, from this viewpoint, in terms of structured wholes which it takes the child a long time to develop, through the acquisition of symbols (i.e. by conditioning) and of associations between the symbols and the world of canalised satisfactions. The world of beauty begins with simple enjoyment of sunshine, or lullaby, or green parrots on the wing; but as the treasure house of culture is opened to the child, rich meanings are added by exposing him to fresh satisfiers and interweaving them all with a symbolic (usually verbal) strand of connections. The world of philosophy carries the symbolic texture of the imagination still further, till it becomes hard to trace the role of those images which derive from the sensory world, and the symbolic imagi-

nation is taxed to the uttermost to portray that which (like "infinity") is by definition incapable of such direct portrayal. The world of religion and of morals richly combines the demand for action (the use of imperatives) with the imaginal and symbolic portrayal of realities which compel such action. How far we shall succeed in extending the present simple genetic theory of the individual values in the direction of explaining the actual content of the more complex value systems is I think an empirical question, in which the experience of sociologists, of child psychologists, of artists, of philosophers, or mystics, are all to be taken without prejudice sympathetically into account.

III

Since each human want can be satisfied in many ways — there are many kinds of foods, melodies, mates, philosophies to satisfy our curiosity or creative needs or our need to find a home in the great inscrutable universe—it would appear on the surface that there is no necessary tendency for values to *conflict*. Indeed, we may have many children, each uniquely constituted and different from the rest, and we may deeply love them all. There is room in the human constitution for an almost unlimited range and variety of value satisfactions. In practice, too, there is not much inevitable restriction of values or necessary conflict of values until the problem of the *self* or of "ego dynamics" is confronted. While logical opposition of ideas may make it impossible to entertain mutually exclusive philosophies, a man may still at the same time be a classicist and a romanticist (cf. Milton or Mozart) or be emotionally at home in pantheism, monotheism, polytheism. But as soon as we inquire into the development of the self, the awareness of one's own individuality, we find that self-love is organized around a picture of oneself which contains certain salient features such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, dependability, dignity, or whatever may have been emphasized by the family in response to the individual's actual capacities or the adult's perception of what these attributes ought to be. The picture soon becomes well formed or even rigid. Now let the ten-year old child begin to be naively playful in relation to a new game or pet; it is likely that some one will think this playfulness "babyish", "immature", or "undignified". Or let him pursue habits of reading at all hours irrespective of tasks to be done; this will certainly bring upon him the accusation that he is "irresponsible", or "inconsiderate" of others who count upon his assistance at the time. He cannot have both his fun and his good reputation. Moreover, whatever value he pursues subtracts from the time and energy available for other values. This would not in itself make any necessary trouble; but if there is a picture of himself, organised around a picture of salient characteristics which he must show if he is to be truly himself, there will be a constant cause for anxiety. He must choose between various kinds of selves, which one he wishes to be.

In psychiatric practice by far the commonest form of personal stress is the need to choose between two or more kinds of self, under the pressure to be as laudable or as worthy as possible. In a period of Puritanism in European civilisation, for example, one must choose

between a relatively simple and honest approach to sex and an approach in terms of the essential denial of one's sexuality; or in a period of Christian efforts to inculcate a deep rejection of all aggressive impulses, one must choose between a self capable of vigorous defense against calumny and abuse, and on the other hand a saintly aggressionless self which invariably "turns the other cheek". A gamut of impulses and value trends which in themselves, and at a level of direct comparison of the good things in life, would lead to little or no conflict, becomes, under the tutelage of a society which impresses upon each person the reality and consistency of his own selfhood, an unending source of deep conflict and misery.

In the case of culture interaction and culture conflict, I believe the same principle holds. The values of different cultures are seldom in actual conflict. Wise and strong men may have in their homes the paintings of India, of China, of France, and of Brazil; the scientific and philosophical works of men of every era; the minor amenities and courtesies of every tradition and every clime. But let the question of the self be brought into the situation, under conditions in which the self must be vindicated, defended or matched against another self. "Which do you like better, Professor X., Ming or Sung Dynasty paintings?" The question is likely to be construed to mean: "With whom do you side?" and in answering one must prove that in preferring the Ming period one has greater depth, sensitivity or perceptiveness. "We Ming-ites can readily prove the superficiality of the Sung-ites". In the midst of the profundities of the second part of *Faust,* Goethe allows himself to be drawn into the controversy among the geologists as to the history of the earth, and the breath of the polemics shrouds the beauty of the poetic lines. Most value conflict which is serious appears to be really a conflict centered in the ego.

This theoretical question takes on very great practical importance when we ask about the commingling of cultures and the alienation and strife which arise from the contact between cultures which represent deep differences in values, such as French and German, or Hindu and Islamic cultures. There can be no doubt that men of integrity and conviction feel that in giving up or compromising on social values they are selling out what is the most precious thing in life. From the present outlook it is suggested that actual devotion to a cultural standard has in this way become confused with a veiled effort at competitive ego enhancement. From the present viewpoint a Frenchman deeply devoted to French culture as such does not become in the least degree less loyal to his culture when he begins to understand and appreciate German music or philosophy; and a Hindu or Muslim who is deeply and happily at home in his own culture can respond just as warmly to the culture of the other group as if he were less completely at home in it, indeed more so, because competitiveness so often springs from a half-conscious insecurity. The "superpatriots" of America today are often the men who suspect their fellow-country and the liberal trends of American life. I should like then to conclude this point on this practical note: values seldom give rise, in themselves, to conflict; cultural values are likely to strengthen rather than weaken cultural tolerance and inter-cultural cooperation. It

is the preoccupation with one's own ego needs, especially status needs, which gives rise to the illusion that men of different cultures need inevitably become strangers to one another. In terms of intercultural understanding, then, the primary problem would appear to be not the preaching of intercultural tolerance—a virtue which will arise whenever it has an opportunity to grow—but the development of a cooperative society in which the restless ego need not forever struggle for its own status. This leads of course into problems of economics, politics, and education, beyond the scope of this paper.

IV–SOCIAL PHYSICS

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10

DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS IN SOCIAL PHYSICS

A Semantic Theory with Application to Demographic Gravitation

By STUART C. DODD

ABSTRACT

The thesis here is: Analysis of social data into generalized statistical moments of a minimum set of dimensions will help develop social laws of mass human action. These moments are sums of products of powers, ($\Sigma\pi X^x$) irrespective of the size of the units, which physicists call "dimensional formulas." The minimum set of dimensions used here are the factors of "time," "length," "people," which can define Social Physics and further factors on trial, namely "desiring," and the complement class of "indices of anything else," (i.e., X = T, L, P, D, I). (The minimum set in Physics is time, length, mass, temperature, and charge (X = T,L,M,O,Q).) Their powers range mostly over integral exponents of 0, 1, 2, or 3, either positive or negative. These five factors and their powers provide a comprehensive and exact classification system for the situations, S, (i.e., the symbolized phenomena) of the social sciences. $S = \Sigma T^t L^l P^p D^d I$

The thesis is summarized in an experimentally testable theory of dimensional analysis which expects that dimensional formulas, properly used, will improve man's predicting of human phenomena.

When applied to the interacting of human groups the dimensional formula becomes the hypothesis of interactance, or candidate law of demographic gravitation. For testing this, twenty-seven sets of evidence from the Washington Public Opinion Laboratory are reported. They confirm the hypothesis by showing correlations between expectation and observation that range from .5 to .98 with a median correlation of .86.

I. *Intentions of this Paper*

This paper intends to develop a semantic theory of dimensional analysis which can be experimentally tested in Social Physics (or for that matter in any science) and which helps to develop the social sciences as exact sciences. It intends to present experimental evidence testing the theory in the case of the formula for gravitation when applied to human groups.

II. *A Semantic Theory of Dimensional Analysis*

Our methodological theory of dimensional analysis can be very simply stated. It is roughly: *Dimensional formulas help to predict social phenomena.* As the terms in this statement are explained below, it will be seen that the theory could about as well be restated

as: Statistical moments of five or six classes of variables can help to develop laws in the social sciences. For we shall see that statistical moments are dimensional formulas and that laws are the scientist's device for predicting phenomena – which we see as the central function of science.[1]

To test this theory, an experiment might compare 100 studies using dimensional analysis as described below with 100 studies using its antithesis such as literary prose descriptions of the phenomena. In each study, predictions about the social behavior of large numbers of people should be made and compared with their later behavior.

The theory claims that the studies using dimensional analysis will predict future mass behavior of people more closely than studies not involving any dimensional analysis.[2]

III. *Dimensional Analysis in Physics*

To understand what dimensional formulas in our theory mean, let us review the physicist's concept of dimensions[3] briefly for the non-physicist readers.

Dimensional formulas in physical mechanics mean rewriting any formula as a product of powers of length, mass, and time. He may substitute an equivalent trio such as length, momentum, and energy. For special fields of thermodynamics or electricity, temperature and charge are convenient additional dimensions. He seeks a minimum set of variables which can re-express and systematically interrelate all other variables. He wants to have his dimensional formulas show the relations between dimensions regardless of the absolute size of the units. Bridgman (Ref. 1) has shown that the mathematical function that does this is a *product of powers,* such as:

[1] The function of science is often stated in such terms as "to understand phenomena," "to systematize knowledge," "to predict and control," etc. But accurate predicting is the final test of whether we really understand how phenomena work and do not merely have a warm glow in our "innards" from using familiar words about phenomena. Systematizing can be idle building of a neat pantheon of gods or scientific ordering of knowledge depending on the degree of predictability it yields of how specified classes of things will behave under specified conditions. Similarly control is that sub-case of predicting where men desire the predicted variables and know how to manipulate the predicter variables. Therefor prediction is the central function of science and is taken as the criterion of what is good scientific method in our dimensional theory.

[2] More exactly, the theory expects high correlation (in the statistical population of the 200 studies) between the degree to which dimensional analysis is used as specified for example in the author's "Dimensions of Society" (See the 100 "Rules for Writing S-formulas," Appendix II, Ref. 4) and the degree to which the 200 predictions come true. (Of course, this correlation coefficient is itself a bit of dimensional analysis!) Still more exactly the theory is composed of a large set of hypotheses, each hypothesis expecting that improved predicting is likely to result when one item of dimensional procedure or symbolism is properly used.

[3] "Dimensions" has other meanings. In mathematics one speaks of n-dimensional space or of the equation $ax^3 + bx^2 + cx + d = 0$ as having three dimensions. In popular usage it means a measured continuum or quantity of some thing. The author has used it in this broad sense in his previous writings (Refs. 4-8 especially) but is here limiting it to the physicist's concept of a minimum basic set of variables such as time and length in terms of which all other variables and formulas can be re-expressed in a specified field of science. (Such as the fields of mechanics, MTL; thermodynamics, MTLO; electro-physics, MLTQ; demography, PTI; human ecology, LPTI; economics, DVLPTI; etc.

$M^m \cdot L^l \cdot T^t$ (1) The dimensional formula for physical mechanics.

Therefore he defines a dimensional formula in Physics as *a sum of products of powers of the basic dimensions.* This may be symbolized by :

$\Sigma\pi X^x$ (2) The generalized dimensional formula.

Here X is a basic dimension such as mass, M; length, L; time, T; etc.

Physicists use dimensional analysis to systematize all their formulas and laws. They also use them to assure equal dimensionality on both sides of an equation formulating a problem so that a mass is not equated to time, etc.

IV. *Dimensional Analysis in the Social Sciences*

A. Statistical Moments as Dimensional Formulas

This dimensional formula turns out in the social sciences to be a generalized statistical moment. Dimensional formulas neglect the size of the units which are always 1|N, the unit of observation, in every statistical moment.[4]

Now the importance of identifying statistical moments with dimensional formulas is very great. For it can be shown that the elementary formulas of statistics can be reduced to a special case of this generalized moment, which we call the Z_3 statistic, or to a function of it.[5] We have taken the 434 statistical formulas in Dunlap and Kurtz's *Handbook of Statistical Formulas* (Ref. 16) and re-expressed every one of them as a special case or function of this generalized moment (5). It thus seems that the entire field of statistics can be

[4] Thus in the simple case of one variable (where the symbol for a product of variables vanishes) the dimensional formula per unit of observation becomes the familiar

$$\frac{\Sigma X^x}{N} \qquad (3)$$ A univariate statistical moment.

According as the exponent is 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 this moment becomes the unit population, the mean, the variance, a skewness, or a kurtosis respectively. Again in the case of a product of two variables with exponents of unity this dimensional formula in units of 1|N becomes the cross-product moment familiar in all correlation theory:

$$\frac{\Sigma X_1 X_2}{N} \qquad (4)$$ A bivariate statistical moment.

These moments can be generalized to be the sum (of N addends) of products (of n factors) of powers (of degree |x) of the n basic dimensions when expressed per unit of observation as:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{i=N} \prod_{j=i}^{j=n} X^x{}_{ij}/N \qquad (5)$$ The generalized statistical moment.

Where the post subscript, ij, denotes each of the N values in turn of each of the n variables in turn, each variable having its own exponent, |x. (The four scripts at the corners of a base letter have standardized meaning in our dimensional "S-notation" which can unify the meaning of scripts in symbolic logic, mathematics, statistics, semantics and in the empirical sciences. (See Ref. 4, p. 899-902; Ref. 5, p. 697 and Chapter 11.)

[5] An unpublished manuscript which may be copied on request, entitled "A Generalization of Statistical and Logistic Formulas," Ref. 5, p. 679 and Chapter 11 expand the summarizing statements here.

ordered or systematized as the four S–scripts, $\begin{matrix} x & x \\ x & x \end{matrix}$ which specify the properties of moments, range over their possible values.

This may be coupled with the working hypothesis that every concept in the social sciences can be redefined operationally in a statistical formula.[6] For a statistic is but an operational definition, an observed instance of something, or class of such. Any concept in science that is unobservable, that cannot be recorded as a qualitative or quantitative statistic, will eventually be discarded, we believe, along with such historic unobservables as phlogiston, either the soul, the will, and human instincts.

All this implies that social scientists may be able progressively to analyze social phenomena into the form of dimensional formulas, i.e., as a sum of products of powers of a few basic dimensions. (5). This statement calls for some description of the few basic dimensions and of their commonly occurring powers.

B. The Basic Social Dimensions.

What are the basic dimensions in the social sciences? Is there a minimum set of variables that are necessary and sufficient to re-express most, if not all, observable variables? What may be the social equivalents of time, length, mass, temperature, and electric charge in Physics ?

Our experience has been that the social sciences require a set of at least five dimensions, or, more exactly, four dimensions and one residual class "to grow on." These basic social dimensions are time (T), length (L), people (P), desire (D), and the complement class definable as "indices of anything else" (I). Time, space, and people are fundamental and practically define the field of Social Physics just as time, space and mass define physical Mechanics. The analogy is well supported experimentally in yielding high prediction of social phenomena (which is the final test of all analogy in science or of good and bad scientific methodology of any kind). When the number of people, P, is substituted for mass, M, in the formulas of mechanics we get such concepts as demographic momentum, force, energy, gravitation, etc., as evidenced below.

The fourth dimensions which we called human "desire" has two aspects—(a) the act of desiring and (b) the desideratum or thing desired. The first aspect, the intensity of desiring, which we symbolize by the letter D, is demand in the special case of Economics. It is usually measured in Economics in dollars but can be more generally measured in non-economic fields by an index of what a person will *give or do* to get a desideratum.[7]

[6] Evidence for this operational hypothesis is marshalled in Refs. 4 and 5. To appreciate the implications of this hypothesis better requires realizing that when N=1 the moment represents any particular case, or even any constant, and when the exponent is zero all qualitative elements, classes and sentences even, are denoted, as explained a bit further below. Thus any statistic, any word, and even any symbol can be rewritten as a primitive or simplified moment with $N = n = 1$ and $x_i = O$, i.e., (5) becomes X^0 which is a symbol for *any kind* of entity as may be named by the post-subscript. This limiting qualitative case of moments occurs more than all the other quantitative cases in popular usage of course.

[7] Colloquially one measures desiring when he states the worth or the cost to

The other aspect of desire is the desired object, or desideratum, or object of value (which we symbolize by V). This is supply in economics. The ratio of the intensity of desiring over the desideratum has as one subcase the demand|supply ratio determining price (when other factors are constant). More generally it is a *give|get ratio* of exchange, or a valuation, in any field of human desire.[8]

This desire dimension with its two opposite aspects of the desiring and the desired (D and V) seems comparable in some respects to electric charge with its positive and negative subclasses. A promising research problem is to seek experimental ways of testing this analogy. Will formulas involving the quantity of electricity fit social data and improve our predicting of human desires and the consequent behavior of people? Thus Mr. Sutherland's paper based on curves of economic production in the U.S. since the 1860's shows a parallel between electric current (or quantity of electricity per period) and economic production, Ref. 25. Since production is our desideratum per period (V|T), this tends to parallel the desire dimension in social science with electric charge in Physics.

The fifth class of social dimensions is the complementary class in Logic comprising any variables other than time, length, people and desire. It therefore includes physical mass, social temperature, or any other variables which now occur occasionally in social data or may be invented in the future. It thus provides room for research and growth. This enormous class of residual variables has to be subclassified in many levels and as finely as needed in a given study to become identical with any variable which may be studied and which cannot be analyzed fully into T, L, P or D.[9]

This complementary class of indices (which we symbolize by the letter I) is not a mere catch all. It is a standard concept of Logic applied to science. It generalizes certain properties of all its members in a very useful way. One of its uses is to make the social sciences a closed system within which theorems, laws, experiments, etc., can all be more exactly developed. With this complement class it is possible to write formulas for every concept and principle; for all data, actual or conceivable.[10] Without this complement class our

him of a desideratum or object of value. We know of at least nine ways of measuring the intensity of a person's desiring in terms of time, effort, money, or sacrifice of material, psychic or social sorts of things. We have a research program going on in our Laboratory on interconverting these indices of desiring, partly by means of indifference curves, in order to develop standards of *worth* whether political worth, or educational worth, or religious worth, or any other worth of whatever people value in life. Refs. 11 and 16.

[8] It can be measured wherever a person can make a choice between alternatives, as everyone is doing all the time. Every act we make is a choice, valuing that act more than whatever alternative acts were possible. Thus by offering people alternative choices in polls we can measure (with a determinate degree of reliability) their valuations and their desire dimension (D or V) under specified conditions. See further Refs. 11 and 16.

[9] This complement class may be usefully applicable in Physics. It may deal with the physicist's "dimensionless" quantities and make dimensional analysis thereby include all physical quantities in a more rigorously closed semantic system.

[10] For systematic evidence of over one thousand sets of data, concepts, etc., throughout the social sciences dimensionally analyzed, in detail and without residue, with the aid of these five dimensions (T, L, P, D, I), see Refs. 4 and

dimensional system covers only one part of the social sciences leaving out much of the phenomena which most concerns the various social scientists.[11]

A second unifying property of this complement class of dimensions, I, is their uniform behavior when operated on by the exponents 0, 1, 2, 3. Briefly, these exponents subclassify them in a fundamental set of categories (stemming back to Kant's categories of the understanding). These are:

I^0, denoting a quality, a kind—the field of Logic largely;
I^1, denoting a quantity, an amount—the field of Math. largely;
I^2, denoting a relation, a correlation of quantified qualities;
I^{3+}, denoting a system, a compoundering of the above.

A warning, however, is needed. As long as these complementary dimensions are a *class* of differing variables and not a single dimension they must be used with more care when checking the dimensional homogeneity of equations (or the principle of similitude, as the British call it).[12]

C. The basic Powers of the Social Dimensions

The integral powers of the basic dimensions serve to define higher order concepts and to classify systematically the lower orders of symbols of phenomena.

Thus in Physical Mechanics some examples of products of powers are:

Table 1

Dimensions	÷ T, Time	÷ T, Time
. Distance, L	LT^{-1} = Velocity	LT^{-2} = Acceleration
multiplied by:		
Mass, M	MLT^{-1} = Momentum	MLT^{-2} = Force
multiplied by:		
Distance, L	ML^2T^{-1} = Action	ML^2T^{-2} = Energy

5. The reliability of these analyses was found in controlled experiments to range from 92% to 99%.

[11] This complement class may operate in the realm of symbols (through which we have to deal with most phenomena) much as the principle of conservation of mass and energy operates in the realm of physical phenomena. With its aid all recorded, i.e., symbolized, phenomena can be conserved, equations that follow the appropriate rules can be expected to balance, no recorded phenomena need be lost while being processed in research.

[12] Other candidates for the basic set of social dimensions are being explored. J. Q. Stewart is investigating "social temperature." W. F. Sutherland suggests further an organizational factor, O. Stewart and we have speculated whether formulas for radiant energy would fit human *communicating* in symbols and mass media. This would need a polling agency on a large scale to test. In general, we believe the field of mass human activity is most likely to show basic uniformities paralleling the mass activity of the particles of various kinds that are studied in Physics and Chemistry.

Similarly in Social Physics a few examples of the meaning of the powers of the basic dimensions are:

Table 2

$X^x{}_x$ Powers ($|^x$) of the Social Dimensions

Classes ($|_x$) of Dimensions	X^0	X^1	X^2	X^3
Length, L	L^0 a point	L^1 a line	L^2 an area	L^3 a volume
Time, T	T^0 a date	T^1 a period a speed if T^{-1}	T^{-2} an acceleration	T^{-3} an accelerating acceleration (a factor in power)
People, P	P^0 a person	P^1 a plural	P^2 a group	P^3 an organization
Desiring, D	D^0 the attribute of desiring	D^1 a degree of desiring	D^2 2 positively or negatively correlated desirings	D^3 a complex of at least three desirings as factors
Desiderata, V	V^0 one kind of human value	V^1 an amount of a value	V^2 a correlation of 2 values	V^3 three values as factors, e.g., social control, etc.
Complementary I	I^0 a class (in Logic)	I^1 a variable (in Math.)	I^2 a correlation (in Statistics)	I^3 a system (in Social Physics)
Averaged as statistical moments, $\Sigma X^x/P$, in human distributions	$\Sigma X^0/P = 1$, the unit population, zeroth moment	$\Sigma X^1/P$ = a mean, first moment	$\Sigma X^2/P$ = a variance, or a correlation, a second moment	$\Sigma X^3/P$ = a skewness, third moment
A sample compound of rows TPI above	$T^0P^0I^0$ an attribute of a person at a date	$T^{-1}P^1I^1$ social momentum	$T^{-2}P^2I^2$ social energy (as in demographic gravitation)	$T^{-3}P^3I^3$ (unmeasured as yet) an example may be: an organization's power of social control

Further cross-classifying yields higher order products of powers which can define dimensionally the concepts of the social sciences. In the author's "Dimensions of Society" and "Systematic Social Science" volumes more detailed analysis is presented of several hundred of the most used concepts of Sociology and Anthropology, of Economics and Political Science, of Ethics and Statistics. Thus, for example, we have redefined in an S-formula (which is usually a dimensional formula as here limited) every concept of Sociology recommended as basic by a Committee of the American Sociological Society along with several hundred other much used concepts (Refs. 3, 4, 5). We have converted all the formulas of elementary statistics to dimensional formulas as noted above.

With the aid of our twin dimensions of the valuing (D) and the valued (V), economic data, concepts and principles seem to be rewritable in terms of our dimensions.

The value concepts of ethics seem similarly reducible to dimensional analysis (Refs. 11, 16). We have even, for example, translated the Ten Commandments and the Lord's Prayer via Basic English and Boolean Algebra into dimensional formulas, using zero exponents.[13]

We believe that our two volumes (Refs. 4, 5) show that this dimensional system can be a comprehensive and adequate one for all the social sciences.[14]

The basic dimensions and their powers serve to systematize as well as to define. The resulting comprehensive system for any

[13] These dimensions should be noted in Linguistics: An unexpected and creative by-product of this analysis of social dimensions has been the discovery that language itself can be analyzed into a small number of dimensions (Ref. 14). Thus, if the words and syllables of any language are divided into either connective or substantive classes, each class comprises about one half. The connective half has been reduced by us into a dozen dimensions. These include the six dimensions above (L, T, P, V, D, I) plus four numbers (0, 1, 2, 3,) plus two relators ("more—less" and "to—from"). They comprise an alphabet of a dozen elements of meaning. This seems capable of re-expressing, in a few standard dimensions, at least one half of all that human beings say to each other or think in verbal terms. How much of the substantive half of language may be similarly analyzed to a few dimensions awaits creative exploration with our dimensional tools.

The importance of this dimensional analysis of language and so of all verbal thinking may prove very great. It may open up new realms for mental and spiritual evolution comparable to our present realm of printed communication that was opened up by the analysis of speech to the few letters of the alphabet during the last few thousand years. Or, for a further speculation, the reduction of all language to a few dimensions (with enormous possibilities of their definite and meaningful combinations and permutations) may prove comparable to the analysis in chemistry of the myriad substances in the universe to ninety-six classes of atoms whose synthesis is giving man increasing control over his material environment. The author personally believes that this creative analysis of language, and so of knowledge and of communication, may prove one of science's revolutionizing discoveries in remaking human life. Perhaps the next big acceleration of scientific progress will come from semantics via improved symbolic tools, in what we think *with* more than what we think *about*.

[14] The S-system of notation developed in Refs. 4 and 5 goes beyond the dimensional formulas discussed here. They involve more scripts and more operators in more sequences than the exponent script and multiplying operator and the sequence implied in (5). The S-system is a comprehensive attempt to apply the notation and rules of Logic, Mathematics, Statistics, Matrix Algebra and Semantics in a standardized and integrated way to the social sciences.

science is expressible in code numbers. Every set of data, concept, principle, formula, map, diagram, sentence, paragraph or other set of recorded symbols can have its classificatory or code number in this system. We call this the "quantic number" of an S-situation (where an S-situation is defined as any recorded set of symbols). We symbolize the quantic number by "|s" meaning the set of exponents on the basic dimensions of that situation. (Refs. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). In forming this quantic number for any S-situation we do not limit the combining operation to multiplication as in dimensional formulas in Physics. Thus consider our dimensional formula:

$$\Sigma X^{s}_{TLFDI} = \Sigma T^{t}\, L^{l}\, P^{p}\, D^{d}\, I^{i} \quad (6)$$ The dimensional formula for the social sciences.

The quantic number (tlpdi) of a physical velocity would be 91000 (using complements from ten for negative exponents somewhat as in logarithms). The quantic number for the speed of population growth would be 90100; for the acceleration of some desire it would be 80010; for a social force ($T^{-2}\, L^{0}\, P^{1}\, D^{0}\, I^{1}$) it would be 80101; etc.

The quantic number from the five basic classes of social dimensions can be cross-tabulated in a matrix of five axes, or as a rectangular solid in a 5-dimensional space. Each axis would have four sections for the four common powers or integral logs of its dimensions, namely, 0, 1, 2 and 3. This yields a matrix of $4\times4\times4\times4\times4$ order, or 4^5, which means 1024 cells for classifying social phenomena —though in practice less than a hundred are in common use. Four compounded cells are shown, for example, in the last row of Table 3.

This dimensional classification table has interesting analogies with the more developed Mendelyeev periodic table of the atomic elements. They both order their phenomena in regular cycles, families, or recurring sequences. They both specify many properties by cells even to predicting properties of cell occupants before they had been observed. They thus challenge research to fill in the gaps, such as the last cell in Table 3. They both grow with research in finding many phenomena correlated with this classification system. Although one is well along the road, while the other is just starting out, they both aid, we believe, in that understanding, predicting and controlling of phenomena in their field which is the function of science.

D. The Zero Exponent

In our dimensional formulas and quantic numbers the zero exponent is very important. The invention of this bit of symbolism is believed by the author to out-rank any other symbol in S-formulas. For it can integrate qualitative and quantitative analysis in the same expression and with equal rigor. It may prove very useful in further unifying Symbolic Logic with Mathematics and both with the data of the sciences and with ordinary language.

The zero exponent on any base letter X° is defined as some *kind* of thing in folk language, or as a class in Logic, or as an attribute

in Statistics, or as a quality in Kant's epistemology.[15] The zero exponent notation lets logical classes (or sentences or relations or other qualitative symbols) be combined with mathematical and statistical expressions and handled by a more united set of rules.[16]

This permits mixed qualifying of quantities in great complexity. Thus any equation can have the assumptions, the conditions, the definition of terms, or any other information explicitly incorporated with it from formulation to solution. A chemical equation can specify explicitly what operations and equipment are needed to make the reaction convert the molecules on the left side of the equation to those on the right. A social engineer can specify any limiting conditions or instructions in the formulas he develops for dealing with human affairs (provided, of course, he obeys the semantic rules of the Boolean or other algebra he uses).

In sum, it is conceivable that just as the zero digit enlarged man's ability to handle quantities, so the zero exponent may enlarge his ability to handle qualities for scientific purposes.

V. Application to Demographic Gravitation

A. Dimensional Derivation of the Gravitation Formula

A frequent comment on dimensional analysis is: "Granted that it systematizes a field, can it be used creatively to help solve research problems?" We see many possibilities in creative dimensional analysis. Let us illustrate such analysis on the known principle of demographic gravitation.

The problem of demographic gravitation, or human interactance, is to predict within some area and period and population, the number of interacts of one kind between groups of people. The unit is an act of one person with another person across unit distance in unit

[15] A-capital letter as post-subscript names one class (while a lower case letter denotes a set of classes), so that "X^0_A" may be the symbol for "European" while "X^0_B" = "female", "X^0_C" = "normally distributed," i.e., "$(y = N_{,\sigma^0} \sqrt{2\pi}\, e^{x^2/2\sigma^2})$ and "X^1_D" = "intelligence scores." The logical product of such classes is the class of their common members or whatever is jointly qualified by all the factor qualities. Thus $X^0_A\ X^0_B\ X^0_C\ X^0_D$ (or X^1_{ABCD} in brief) would here denote the normally distributed intelligence scores of European females. An X-to-the-zero power, or attribute, can modify any symbol it is written next to as adjectives modify nouns or adverbs modify verbs. Next to a number, e.g., 6, or algebraic variable, e.g., Y as $6X^0_A$ or YX^0_A it qualifies them to mean 6 or Y units of the X^0_A kind of thing. In short, any quality, X°, or quantity, X^1, or relation, X^2, or other symbol, may be qualified by "multiplying" it by any specified quality X^0_A, without changing its quantity (since every $X^\circ = 1$ and $1 . Y = Y$ in quantitative algebras).

[16] Thus, for example, in Logic a class multiplied by itself is unchanged, i.e., $A \cap A \cap A \cap \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots A = A$ by the law of tautology; while in algebra a variable multiplied by itself n times is changed to the nth power by the rule of adding exponents when multiplying, i.e., $A^1 . A^1 . A^1 . \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots A^1 = A^n$. Different universes of discourse had different rules and apparently different results. But the zero exponent harmonizes them since adding zero exponents gives a zero exponent:

$A^\circ \cdot A^\circ \cdot A^\circ \cdot \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots \cdot A^\circ = A^\circ$ · This permits one to "multiply" qualities with the same rule as for multiplying quantities in this case.

time. (See (5) and (6).) Interacts studied to date include telephone calls, telegrams, money orders, purchases, cheques cleared, trips by plane, bus or train, marrying, going to college, rumor telling and many others. Our 100 rules[17] for dimensional analysis tell us to begin by cross-tabulating interacts in a matrix, or contingency table, with each group studied leading a row and a column. Each cell entry compares the observed number of interacts of its row and column pair of groups A and B with the dimensionally expected number of interacts. A contingency coefficient of zero (or a correlation coefficient of unity here) then verifies the expectation from the dimensional formula. If at first we know only the frequencies of interacts of each group, then the most probable absolute number to expect in each cell by the law of joint probability would be the product of the row and column absolute frequencies divided by the total number of interacts of all groups ($\Sigma I_A \cdot \Sigma I_B / \Sigma I$). We shall call this inverse total the "interaction type parameter", k, as it is constant for any one type of action $\left(\frac{I}{\Sigma I} = k\right)$. (This k turns out to be somewhat analogous to g in physical gravitation.)

We now can write the beginnings of a formula for the expected interactance between any two groups, A and B, as:

$$I_{AB} = k \Sigma I_A \cdot \Sigma I_B \qquad (7)$$

We try including in this formula each basic dimension in turn, finding its best fitting power. Then we test their combinations as in (8). Geometric considerations (sketched below) lead us to hypothesize that the distance dimension is a factor with an exponent of minus one, (L^{-1}). We can take the period of interating that is observed as the unit of time for simplicity so that $T=1$. The population dimension can be made explicit by splitting the number of interacts into the population factor (P) and the per capita interacts. We call this per capita interacting in one group the "group level parameter" ($= I_A = \Sigma I_A / P$). This group level parameter (I_A) (I) is the analogue of specific molecular mass in physical gravity (where the "population" is the number of molecules). We now can write the dimensional formula for the expected interacting as:

$$I_{AB} = k\, I_A P_A\, I_B P_B\, T/L \qquad (8)$$

Human interactance or demographic gravitation[18].

[17] See Rules 32 and 65, Appendix II, Ref. 4.

[18] Fuller dimensional analysis might substitute D for I and insert the dimensions here of the dimensional constants, k and I_A, I_B (k seems to have the dimensions PL/T^2 here, a demographic force; and $I_A = \Sigma I_A / P$, a per capita index). This gives the interacting per period in (8) as:

$$\frac{D}{T} = \frac{PL}{T^2}\frac{D}{P}P\frac{D}{P}P\frac{I}{L} = PD^2T^{-2} \qquad (9)$$

This is a "social energy" as it is a "population-mass" times a velocity (of acting) squared. It parallels physical energy both as dimensionally analyzed in (9) and as empirically observed in the gravitation formula (8). (In this analysis, however, the dimensional parameter, k, has the dimensions of a force rather than of an acceleration.)

This says that the interacting (of one kind in a given culture and period) between two human groups is predicted as the product of a "type of activity parameter," k, times the two populations, times their two indices of per capita level of activity, divided by their intervening distance.

B. 27 Tests of the Formula

Now the sixty-four dollar question becomes: Does this theoretically derived dimensional formula fit the facts? Will the correlation coefficient between the expectation by (8) and the observed interacting approach perfect correlation?

This question is being affirmatively answered in impressively cumulative studies by a number of scientists (Refs. 2, 12, 13, 19-24, 26, 27). Recently in our Laboratory Joseph Cavanaugh has made 27 tests of the interactance theory or set of seven interactance hypotheses—one hypothesis for the effect of each factor in (8) when every other factor is constant. As shown in Table 3, these tests include 10 types of interacting, between 30 sets of groups and places such as cities, counties, states, national parks, hotels, a university, etc., in a dozen periods, with and without weighting by the specific indices of group activity level, etc.

All these tests tend to confirm the interactance hypothesis. All the correlations between expectation and observation are above .5 and they run up to .98—an unusual degree of confirmation of an hypothesis in the social sciences. Over three-quarters of the correlations exceed .71 which is the midway point above which the determiners of interacting are more known than unknown (i.e., $r^2 > .5$ and $k^2 < .5$ since $r^2 + k^2 = 1$). The median of the 27 confirmatory correlations between the expectation and the observation is .86.

Twenty-six of the 27 correlations were statistically significant at the one percent level.

The D for I substitution is justified by our behavioristic definition of intensity of desiring, D, as being measured by what a person will *give or do* to get what he wants. Here the interacts, I, (such as telephoning) are what a person *does*, a D, in order to get whatever he hopes to get thereby. D thus can subsume any human behavior as a special case whenever one is studying the desiring which that behavior expresses.

CORRELATIONS OF EXPECTED WITH OBSERVED INTERACTING

Showing high confirmation of the interactance hypothesis, $I_{AB} = k\, I_A\, P_A I_B\, P_B\, L^{-1}\, T$

Unit interact, I	r, correlation	P_A = "row" groups	P_B = "column" groups	I_A or I_B weights
				* *
1 Phone call (1940) ..	93	26 U.S. cities	26 U.S. cities	1 1
2 Phone call (1948) ..	.86	27 U.S. cities	27 U.S. cities	1 1
3 Phone call (1948) ..	.90	27 U.S. cities	27 U.S. cities	Calls cap.
4 Postal Money order sent	.90	1 (Seattle)	51 cities ..	1 1
5 Going to college (1948)	.85	1 (Univ. of Wash) ..	48 states ..	1 1
6 Going to college (1949)	.73	1 (Univ. of Wash) ..	45 states ..	1 1
7 Hotel visiting ..	.82	1 (Savoy in Seattle) ..	47 states ..	1 1
8 Hotel visiting ..	.64	1 (Olympic in „) ..	79 cities ..	1 1
9 Travelor by RR, bus, auto	.86	1 (Seattle)	24 states ..	1 1
10 Travelor by air ..	.58	1 (Seattle)	46 cities ..	1 1
11 Household moving by van	.68	1 (2 van companies in Seattle)	49 cities ..	1 1
12 Household moving by van	.50	1 (Another van company in Seattle)	15 cities ..	1 1
13 Tourist visiting ..	.86	1 (Washington state) ..	40 states ..	1 1
14 Auto entering ..	.69	1 (Seattle)	22 states ..	1 1
15 Auto entering ..	96	1 (Seattle)	37 countries..	1 1
16 „ „	.87	1 (Seattle)	37 countries..	Reg. cars per cap.
17 „ „	.88	1 (Yosemite Nat'l Park)	48 states ..	1 1
18 „ „	.75	1 (Yellowstone „ Pk.)..	48 states ..	1 1
19 „ „	.62	1 (Glacier „ Pk.)..	48 s ates ..	1 1
20 „ „	.86	1 (Rainier „ Pk.)..	48 states ..	1 8
21 „ „	.94	1 („ „ Pk.)..	48 states ..	Reg. cars per cap.
22 „ „	.97	1 („ „ „)..	48 states ..	West-South = 2 = .8
23 „ „	.98	1 („ „ „)..	6 West-states	1 1
24 „ „	.83	1 („ „ „)..	12 South-state	1 1
25 „ „	.82	1 („ „ „)..	30 other states	1 1
26 Persons entering (1947)	.85	1 („ „ „)..	48 states ..	1 1
27 „ „ (1948)	.83	1 („ „ „)..	48 states ..	1 1

*Where $I_A = 1 = I_B$ the indices of group activity level are ignored for lack of data and the expectation formula simplifies to $I_{AB} = k\, P_A\, P_B / L$.

Where P_A is one group, only one row of the interaction matrix is studied (e.g., No. 4-27). This simplifies the formula to $I_{AB} = k\, P_B / L$, the population potential at A. All r's except 12 are significant at the one percent level.

Conditions for the hypothesis holding best seem to be whenever :

1 Large samples are observed, e.g., No. 1 with 1,618,704 telephone calls;

2 Mature culture traits are observed, e.g., No. 10, r = .58 is less mature than No. 9, r = .86;

3 Group level constants can be observed, e.g., No. 2 vs 3, No. 20 vs 21 and 22;

4 Special factors are absent, e.g., No. 16, r = .87 lowered (cf. No. 15, r = .96) by a big naval base in a rural county, etc.;

5 In addition, there are the basic conditions of even distribution of the interacts (i.e., $\sigma_1 = 0$ among the persons, the subareas, and the subperiods.

(Data from Ph.D., thesis of Joseph A. Cavanaugh, Washington Public Opinion Laboratory).

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11

SOCIAL DISTANCE AND SOCIAL VALENCE

By EMORY S. BOGARDUS

Social distance is the degree of sympathetic understanding that functions between person and person, person and group, group and group. This degree of sympathetic understanding is due to the relation between positive and negative social valences.

Social valence may be thought of in terms of the forces that attract people to or repel them from one another. These forces consist of likes or dislikes, of cooperating or antagonistic drives. They come into evidence through helpful or harmful behavior, and through overtly or even subtly expressed agreements or disagreements.[1]

A person who attracts another person to him may be illustrating positive social valence. If the other person is also drawn to the first, the positive social valence may be said to be mutual. A person who repels another exerts negative social valence, and if the other also repels the first, the negative social valence is mutual.

Personality is here viewed not as a static entity and not as a machine, but as "a system of energy."[2] Personality is more, it is an integration of energy operating within a field of social forces, which consists of all the other personalities which exert any kind of influence upon personality, or is exerted by it in any way upon any other human personality.[3] The social field is all-important in understanding the reactions of a person toward another person, for it includes "a totality of co-existing social entities, such as groups, subgroups, members, barriers, channels of communication, etc."[4]

It may be assumed that one person arouses both attracting and repelling power on the part of another, and that in the main the stronger is expressed at any given moment. A person is drawn to another by the expression of some of the latter's personality dimensions and is repelled by some of the other dimensions of the latter's personality.[5]

[1] The original meaning of valence comes from the Latin, valere, and signifies to have power. As used in chemistry and physics today it means combining power, for example, of two elements.

[2] Lewis H. Rohrbaugh, *Vectors in Group Change*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1940, p. 52.

[3] J. F. Brown, *Psychology and the Social Order*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1936, pp. 43ff.

[4] Kurt Lewin, *Field Theory in Social Sciences*. Edited by Dorwin Cartwright. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951.

[5] The term, dimensions of personality, is used here in somewhat the sense that Shartle describes leadership dimensions. See Carrol L. Shartle in *Groups, Leadership and Men*. Harold Guetzkow, Editor. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press, 1951, p. 124.

One man says of another: "I would like to get better acquainted with X. He is a likeable person and he has been kind to me, but something holds me back. I know what it is. He and I have different economic-political outlooks. I am not a New Dealer, but I don't like to have a serious attempt to improve human relations made fun of repeatedly and I cannot stand his insinuating jokes about honest men."[6] This report illustrates how a person may be both drawn to and repelled from another person at the same time.

The recognition of social nearness or social farness may itself constitute positive social valence or negative social valence. The discovery that another person has a friendly feeling toward one tends to stimulate, other forces being equal, a nearness reaction on the part of the one toward the other person. By the same token the discovery that another person dislikes one tends to arouse a farness feeling by the one toward the other. A girl discovers that a boy acquaintance, with whom she has "dated" a few times is seriously in love with her and at once comes to a quick decision that she cannot marry him, and so severs relationships with him. A business man learns that a rather reticent employee has been working overtime without asking for overtime pay out of enjoyment in the work and loyalty to his employer. The latter after the employee's record with the firm not only promotes him to an assistant managership but invites him to dinner occasionally and shows his personal friendship.

Sometimes a person is attracted greatly and repelled scarcely at all by another person. Sometimes the opposite situation occurs, and the reaction is almost wholly one of repulsion. Sometimes a person is strongly attracted to another and the latter similarly attracted to the first; or again the opposite result follows from mutually strong repelling reactions.

Social valences include expression of personal and social forces, such as sympathy, understanding, the integration of these in sympathetic understanding, love, and on the other hand, such personal and social forces as dislike, hate, envy, jealousy, the integration of these in prolonged enmity. In between come mild expressions of respect on one hand and of tolerance on the other.

The positive social valence or negative social valence reactions of persons toward each other involves more than just two persons reacting toward each other; it involves what Gardner Murphy calls "a structured organism-environment field, each aspect of which stands in dynamic relation to each other aspect."[7]

The attracting power or repelling power that functions between persons is not viewed here as being a separate personality characteristic or dimension. It is the whole personality being expressed in one direction at the same time, that is, X may move closer to Y (social nearness) and away from Z (social farness). In other words, there is not only X's personality organization and Y's personality organization being expressed, but there is an inter-organizational system that is important.

[6] From social distance interview with S. B.

[7] *Personality.* New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947, p. 8.

Social valence functions as a balance of the positive and negative tendencies to act by each of the persons involved. X's balance toward Y may be positive. Y's balance toward X may also be positive but not nearly so strong as expressed by X toward Y. The difference in these two positive valences has been measured by the writer in terms of differential social distance.[8]

In the aforementioned case the social relationships between X and Y will be determined by Y, because Y expresses the greater negative social valence. If X's total valence toward Y is positive and Y's toward X is negative, Y's reactions will hold X at a distance determined by Y's negative valence toward X. If Y's total valence toward X is deadlocked at zero then X will probably try to swing Y's reactions toward the positive side. If X's and Y's balances toward each other are zero, or if they are both negative, then both will probably continue each on his own course unmindful of the other.

There seems to be no such thing as a neutral social valence. When a person's positive and negative social valences toward another person are about equal, they are deadlocked, but they pull in opposite directions and result in no action, which is different from pure neutrality. Or, a person's positive and negative valences may both be weak, due to lack of information and give the impression of neutrality.

The attracting and repelling forces of one person toward another tend to be balanced tentatively at some point along a continum ranging from little social distance to unlimited distance, that is, in terms either of a nearness or a farness relationship. However, this equilibrium or balance may be upset at any time by some experience that either party may have involving the other in any way. Such an experience may arouse more positive or more negative valence on the part of either party toward the other.

In the light of what has been said about social valence, its relation to social distance becomes evident. The social distance scale registers the point at which a tentative equilibrium of positive and negative social valences function at a given time. It denotes the resultant of opposing reactions, for example, of one person toward another. The point of equilibrium which is thus indicated between these opposing forces may be relatively stable or one very unstable, depending upon the degree of organization of attitudes of each person toward the other.

Three questions for further research may be posited here. One question is: What arouses social valences, positive and negative, in any given human relationship? A second question that logically arises is: How strong is the positive valence, and how strong is the negative valence in such a human relationship? It is important to know the relative intensity of each component in the social valence equilibrium. The hypothesis may be suggested that if the positive and the negative valences in any given case are about even, the equilibrium may possess relative instability. A third question is: To what degree and in what cases can positive and negative valences be

[8] "The Social Distance Differential", *Sociology and Social Research*, XXXII; 882 87,

predicted? Another hypothesis may be stated, namely, where the equilibrium is relatively stable the predictability of change will be easier than where the equilibrium is unstable. Predictability may be expected to bear a relation also to the importance for instance that an individual attaches to the person or persons toward whom social distance is recorded.

12

TIME PERSPECTIVES AND ADJUSTMENT TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

By F. STUART CHAPIN

Technological change has become a world-wide phenomenon in the twentieth century, as the machine culture of so-called "Western civilization" of Europe and America has spread to many areas where hand-work has hitherto been the chief mode of doing work. This trend seems likely to cause profound adjustments in areas far removed from the centers where machine production originated. It may, therefore, be interesting to examine some of the neglected facts of technological change in areas of origin, as a possible indication of changes that may come to cultures in which mechanization is a relatively new development.

Human adjustment is the focus of much practice of the art of social work as well as of the thought of sociologists. We have arrived at the stage of defining adjustment as a functional process rather than as a fixed state of being that may be attained. Since this concept of adjustment is that of a continuing functional process, the time factor becomes of great importance. The role of the individual comes to have a forward reference as well as a past reference.[1] A perspective of future time events includes individual roles of abstinance, thrift, and planning and attitudes toward post mortem rewards. The retrospective time perspective draws upon myths, nostalgia, and legends, as well as upon historical fact. Now our expectations of the future are often frustrated because the anticipated situation, when it arrives, differs from these expectations. The result is a threat to our self-esteem or our sense of ego security. And so today, we tend to think more in terms of security than in terms of freedom.While some find adjustment through nostalgia, others search for a basis of greater confidence in one's capacity to adjust to *new* situations. Time marches on, and with it there is an increasing need for some group basis for this confidence in our capacity to adjust. Our role requirements come to have a predominantly forward reference and we hope that the group, the nation, the United Nations, will supply reasonably accurate predictions of the future requirements of individual roles in a changing world.

We are confronted on all sides by paradoxes of adjustment. The higher the standard of living goes, the more ways there are of being poor. Without a radio, a telephone or a "jalopy", many Americans

[1] Hulett, J. E. Jr. "The Person's Time Perspective and the Social Role", *Social Forces*, 23: 2: 155-159, December 1944.
Frank, L. K. "Time Perspectives", *Journ, Social Philosophy*, 4: 293-312, July '39.

feel deprived despite the fact that there may be clothing, food and shelter, in greater abundance than was true one hundred years ago. The rights of the four freedoms do not eradicate social tensions; they only bring them to the surface. This is, of course, an improvement on the social situation of one hundred years ago in the United States when these freedoms were thought of as achievements which would *ipso facto* eradicate inequalities and lead to a permanent state of satisfaction. It is far better to have the underlying disagreements and frustrations brought out into the open, where they can be dealt with, than to remain a hidden and festering source of dissatisfaction. The United Nations Assembly has become a world forum. But the widespread evidence of expressed dissatisfactions is a source of dismay to many persons whose expectations were unrealistic. Thus for every part of culture that arouses expectations of security, there is usually another part of culture which denies them; hence we have social problems on all sides. Evidence of tangible improvement in culture, such as in mechanical invention which saves labor, is that each such invention decreases the number of productive workers, who before the invention had learned to rely upon their individual skills, who had confidence in their resourcefulness to adapt, and who possessed therewith self-confidence in their capacity to adjust.

In any effort to forecast the turn of future events, one must stay close to existing trends in order to note their direction. When one considers the trend toward increasing mechanization in Western society, some startling ideas are forthcoming which deserve our sober attention since they may suggest the form of future situations to which human adjustment must be made.

We know that machine energy is the secret of production and the source of power in the world economy of today. What is not so evident, are the by-products, the unintended and unplanned effects. The basic facts are summarized in a recent book of the Twentieth Century Foundation, *U.S.A.: Measure of a Nation.* Here it is shown that since 1850, the production of goods per hour has increased in value over fourfold. Meanwhile the contribution of power from man and his domestic animals has decreased from 94% to 4% and the contribution of the machine has increased from 6% to 96% (in 1960). This trend is not unrelated to the paradox stated a minute ago: every machine that saves labor, decreases the number of productive workers who had previously relied upon their individual skills and individual resourcefulness. Not only has manufacturing industry felt the impetus of machine production, agriculture also is becoming mechanized and a recent study of this trend concludes with the statement, ". . . . with mechanization has come a capacity to produce more food and fiber than can be consumed under effective peacetime demand, potential unemployment of agricultural workers, concentration of farm ownership among fewer landholders, increased social stratification of tenure classes, and depopulation of farms and villages, which are service centers for farmers. As yet, the full impact of farm mechanization has not been felt because of World War II".[2]

[2] Robert T. McMillan, "Effects of Mechanization on American Agriculture", *Scientific Monthly*, 60: 1: 28, July, 1949.

In a certain sense we may regard machines as artificial adjustment mechanisms which human beings have invented to do the heavy work previously performed by muscles. Thus regarded, the machine is a substitute adjustment mechanism *which stands between* one's self and the environment. If this point of view is taken then it becomes evident that although human energy is saved, the adjustment process is made even more complex, for we have not only to adjust to the ultimate and now somewhat remote physical environment of natural forces, but we have also to adjust to the machine. For the rhythm of human work is one thing, and the artificial rhythm of the machine is quite another matter. The reaction of labor in highly mechanized industry to the "speed-up" system is an example; there is also the time clock to be punched; and punctuality has to be learned by school children. Georg Juenger[3] claims that machines have become an end in themselves rather than a means to the end of liberating man from incessant and routine toil. He claims that the machine does not save labor; it increases it. Since the machine functions best under organization of masses of workers, it creates vast bureaucracies of business and government, thus increasing the number of unproductive workers. He claims that not the "class struggle", but the machine, may destroy capitalism, since its technology possesses a dynamism that obliterates all concepts of ownership. Because the machine drives men into perpetual motion, it does not bring more leisure into human life. According to another writer, Siegfried Giedion,[4] this motion is an aimless motion, continuous and unsatisfying; busy executives rush by auto to an awaiting plane, swiftly move to a distant city, and then rush back again to additional hectic conferences. The time saved is not used for leisure but is used for *more motion.*

Let it not be concluded that the machine terminates its influence at the purely physical level of mechanical power in production, communication and transportation; oh no, it has penetrated into the realm of human thinking, and this penetration is by no means an indirect implication, but a real substitute for thinking. Penn State College[5] reports a robot professor with an electronic brain and four faces. This robot confronts a classroom seating forty persons. The students never speak. The robot gets their answers by electricity. The machine has a memory, called memory relays. It marks forty examinations in one minute. The real professor can see at a glance how many students are answering a particular question. If the live professor forgets to do something that is part of the teaching program, the robot never forgets this, but flashes a red light on the console board. In Pittsburgh,[6] Elektro, the robot that amazed visitors at the New York World's Fair 10 years ago, can smoke cigarettes, count up to ten on his fingers, and recite a speech in his 77 word vocabulary. His brain consists of 82 electrical relays that operate his nervous system of motors, levers, gears and chains, to make him walk, talk, count,

[3] *The Failure of Technology,* 1948.
[4] *Mechanization Takes Command,* 1948.
[5] *New York Times,* August 7, 1949.
[6] Newspaper item, August 22, 1949.

smoke and distinguish colors and to salute. At Cambridge,[7] the robot Mark III, has a memory system capable of storing 64,000 digits and leading the computing part of the machine through a complex mathematical problem of 4,000 steps. In Philadelphia the giant brain of the robot Binac, performed in two hours 500,000 additions and 20,000 multiplications. A man working with an adding machine would have taken years to do the same computing. Now a new robot, Univac, betters the record of Binac, but even Binac, using electrical impulses, can pick out the numbers to be computed from a long list of numbers and addresses. These electrical impulses are called messengers. The instructions fed into the machine on magnetic tape, may tell the messengers to get the number living in location 322. They pick him up and carry him to the computing machine. Then they get the number in location 164 and take him also, to the computing machine. The two operations take less than one-thousand of a second. In fact, 1,000 multiplications or divisions can be made in a second.

These mechanical brains are becoming so complex that one psychiatrist has already suggested that one of them may someday become neurotic. Since they already have memory banks, special circuits could give them electrical impulses of curiosity and self-preservation. Just what the type of escape mechanism would be in which a neurotic machine[8] would refuge, to escape from a too painful human reality, I do not know, but I recommend the study of Cybernetics.[9]

Thus the machine not only relieves men of physical labor, but it relieves them as well of mental labor. Step by step we are becoming more and more dependent upon the machine. What is going to become of hand skills of adjustment ? What happens in this machine age to the well-rounded confidence of the efficient artisan? Have machines, as a culture screen between ourselves and natural forces, robbed us of some human values? If catastrophe comes, how many unborn Americans could till a field, raise our own food, build us a house, or for that matter, even harness a horse?

But the machine is only one aspect of this culture screen which modern man has raised between himself and natural forces in his struggle to adjust. Two other examples can be mentioned, I refer to synthetic products of chemistry and the artificial immunities to disease produced by medical science.

Synthetic drugs have replaced some which were previously obtained from herbs and natural barks. The supply has thereby been increased and yet what has become of the whole network of field exploration to find natural supplies, and have the earlier skills of preparation been lost? This question could become important if catastrophe destroyed the centers of chemical industry, and the distribution system which collects and supplies raw materials to the laboratories. The same observations apply to synthetic rubber, and to fabrics made of glass, rayon, nylon, orlon, and dacron, as substi-

[7] Newspaper item, September 11, 1949.
[8] Newspaper item, September 22, 1948.
[9] Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics*, 1948: and *The Human Use of Human Beings*, 1950.

tutes for natural fibers obtained from animal and vegetable sources, such as silk, wool, cotton and linen. One thinks also of the synthetic production of one commodity – *oil* – so extremely strategic to our machine culture. It has been sometimes said that oil as a lubricating fluid is more important to Western civilization than oil as a fuel or as a source of power. There are unused resources of power still available, also sources of heat, but where find a natural substitute for oil, if catastrophe comes? How soon could natural products, now more and more replaced by synthetic substitutes, and distributed by mechanized transport, be re-discovered and used after the atomic destruction of cities. For such a catastrophe would be the destruction not merely of the machine, the city laboratories and the network of distributing systems themselves, but also of all the instrumentalities which create them. What will become of the housewife's skills in cooking, when large flour milling concerns place in the hands of women perfected recipes of pre-mixed preparations that are prescriptions for a perfect biscuit or a perfect cake?

When one looks over an inventory of human progress, the most unequivocal gain of all seems to be that of medical science and technology. Here we seem to find no penalties attached to progress. And yet this gain is not entirely a net gain, because many thousands of those now living, *exist on the borrowed time* of artificial props and culture screens, and epidemics of contagious disease could again roll up a frightful toll of death, which would carry with it the loss of many irreplaceable men of genius, not to mention the deaths of thousands of the masses. The knowledge basic to these advances and the technologies of laboratory work, *assume* a continued peaceful social order, wherein persons with special gifts may devote their talents to therapeutic and constructive efforts, freed from the ordinary duties of the menial production of foods, textile fabrics and building materials.

In Western cultures the continued high standard of living depends upon the maintenance of a balanced economy. Once this "balance of nature" is dislocated and destroyed, *it could take hundreds of years to re-create it from the "grass roots" knowledge and skills which are now being so undermined and weakened by technologies of the machine.* It is weakened by the chemical synthesis of essential products, which were once the achievement of individual skills, and enfeebled by the borrowed time which results from artificial immunities to contagious diseases. The analogy of a stable social system to the stable atom is not entirely without meaning. In the ordinary inert atom the composing forces are in equilibrium; but when atomic fission releases these boundless forces an explosion of energy occurs in which the balance of nature is destroyed, with the devastating effects that we have recently witnessed. Similarly our social system is an equilibrium of equal and opposite forces locked together in a tension structure. *This balance or equilibrium of the social order is not so much an observable trait, a positive characteristic, as it is the absence of violent change in the total situation.* When we try to

[10] Sol Tax, M. Tumin and E. Vivas, *American Sociological Review*, 10: 2: April 1945.

look at the overall pattern of this system we see only stability, a sort of moving equilibrium, and by social change we mean only time differences in its parts. Primitive people seldom are able to get outside of their social order and view it as an over-all unit; in fact there is plenty of evidence[10] to show that most primitive peoples have no conception of a unity apart from the local tribe or community in which they live. The Mexican Indian has no idea of a larger national unity of which he is part. More sophisticated individuals find in the study of history, archaeology and anthropology, a detachment from space and time, which gives them a glimmer of this larger gestalt. But even with us, the average individual is merely part of a going system whose total direction he can seldom see.

Various devices have been invented by man to gain control over his social system. Recently we have learned anew from our experience with totalitarian fascism and totalitarian communism, the real nature of alternative controls over this system. A considerable part of the human family places a high value upon democratic government as a better control system than totalitarianism. We regard a political structure in which the people participate as a desirable social mechanism for the transmission and operation of a system of human relations. In the late League of Nations we tried out one experiment in world-wide control, and now we are committed to the United Nations as a second experiment. Unfortunately for the prompt success of such systems, *the span of individual human life is relatively short.* In fact the span of life, that is, the extreme age to which people are apt to live, *has not changed* from the Biblical three score years and ten.[11] This span of life should not be confused with the expectation of life, which has increased in marked degree. The expectation of life is merely the average age at death, and since the number of deaths in infancy has been reduced by the achievements of medical science, the average age of those who die in any given year is higher than it used to be,—*but man does not live longer!* The consequences are that human lives are too short an interval in which to repair damage to the equilibrium of the social system which a catastrophe would effect. The going social order is too complex a system for continuity of human control of the factors that would need to be controlled for re-establishment of the balance. When one adds to these considerations the facts that each new generation of humans comes into this complex world with no inborn skills or learning, but must painfully acquire anew each essential efficiency of behavior, and that the political structure for long-time control is a fickle instrument at best, one begins to appreciate the difficulties that would surround any efforts to re-establish a balanced social order, if this order should be destroyed by some world war or other catastrophe. *The social mechanism for the transmission and operation of our learned skills is itself in precarious balance.* One need only to look at the record of history to appreciate the truth of this principle. There are mute evidences of once high, but now extinct civilizations, in Cambodia, Peru and

[10] Sol Tax, M. Tumin and E. Vivas, *American Sociological Review,* 10: 2: April 1945.

[11] Thompson, W. S., *Population Problems,* 1935, p. 176.

Yucatan, cultures which left no lineal descendants, and even in the main stream of earlier European history, there is the record of the rise and fall of Egypt, Greece, and Rome, and more recently of Spain and even of the British empire.

Time seems to be running short. Toynbee has recently warned us of these trends. He says, "Modern man often flatters himself that the gimmicks and gadgets of the industrial world are proofs of his superiority to his forebears. But technical proficiency is not, in itself, a guarantee of wisdom or survival. . . . . Civilization that became fascinated by their own mechanical skill proved to have taken a step toward suicide. They reversed this trend only if they abandoned their narrow concentration on tools as ends in themselves. . . . . This lesson runs through history: nothing fails like worldly success. Cultures are healthy only if they are creative. . . . . Today we are endangered by our mastery of the machine. We are so bewitched by our own progress in technology that we may neglect the broader creative acts which alone will enable us to survive . . . . . Idolatry is one of man's strongest temptations; there is no surer way of drying up the sources of creativity than this worshipping of our own achievements of yesterday".[12] With these words of Toynbee, I return to my original question: have our achievements in the technologies of machine production and of chemical synthesis, deprived us of our heritage of individual skills and efficiences, which are so basic to individual satisfactions, to confidence in our capacity to adjust, and so essential to the human resources which could some day be needed to re-establish a civilization ?

Since these somewhat sombre forebodings suggest that our difficulties are spreading, our ideas tend to converge more and more upon the United Nations as the most immediate social device to show us the way out. The chief optimistic note for which the United Nations stands as an example, is its function as a world forum of opinion. Splendid as have been the efforts to implement the United Nation's activities with a permanent organization, *its chief contribution to date is regarded by many observers to be its service as an open meeting place for world opinion.* In this respect the Assembly, wherein the official representatives of member nations meet and publicly express their opinions, serves for world society, much the same purpose as that which is performed locally wherever the rights of freedom of assemblage, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press are protected. The general Assembly of the United Nations does not eradicate tensions between nations; it brings them to the surface where world opinion may become cognizant of them. Perhaps the United Nations organization will provide the social mechanism that, remaining in balance for a time interval beyond the short span of human life, will provide the group basis for continuity in adjustment.

[12] Toynbee, A. J. quoted in newspaper item, September 22, 1948.

V–REGIONAL SOCIOLOGY

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13

NEXT STEPS IN REGIONAL SOCIOLOGY:

An Essay in Honour of Radhakamal Mukerjee, Pioneer on Regional Sociology

By CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN AND RICHARD E. DU WORS

Regional sociology in one form or another has been talked about by scientists for some centuries.[1] However most of this analysis has been done rather mechanically. The geographic distribution of human beings and their cultural objects and values have been described without much reference to group sociology.[2] Underlying all this regional sociology and human geography work has been a basic postulate that regions should be studied as sociological groups.[3] In spite of this accepted view of presupposition, very little progress toward its achievement has been made. Modern regional sociology is

[1] For instance see Montesquieu, *Spirit of the Laws.* In one sense the Odyssey by Homer was a device for explaining regional sociology to the Greeks. Edgar Kant in the *Swedish Geographical Yearbook* 1948 (24) gives a bibliography of the hundred most important modern theoretical works in the field. Many of the conclusions of this essay are to be developed in a series of three monographs about American social organization planned by the present author and Richard E. Du Wors of Bucknell University. They cover *American Regional Sociology, American Community Systems* and *American Family Systems.* These three monographs seek to move out into the frontiers of social science and to uncover the organizational or sociological aspects and developments in American uniqueness. This particular work is also a development of earlier studies of regionalism by F. Le Play, Edmond Demolins, Radhakamal Mukerjee, and Patrick Geddes.

[2] The latest work of this type is Merril Jensen (Editor), *Regionalism in America,* University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1951. The work by R. J. Russell and F. B. Kniffen, *Culture Worlds,* New York, 1951, illustrates the nature of the mechanical approach. Here the world is divided into seven geographic regions and each is analyzed as a "culture world". This is a valuable method for teaching about the spatial distribution of societies and the influence of climate upon this but it uses little group theory.

[3] Montesquieu uses this idea in his attribution of definite sociological traits to climatic, soil and other geographic groupings. In a large sense the F. C. S. Northorp book, *The Meeting of East and West,* New York, 1946 is a regional sociology with a little group theory. Thus Northorp finds the basic postulates of regional groups different and inquires how a "world understanding" can come about with this in mind. Some of the social geographers such as the Dutch A. C. De Vooys deny any relation between research into territorial groupings and group sociology. Another school, the sociographers, hold somewhat the opposite view. The social geographers tend to limit their contentions about human life to statements about the relation between man and his environment as opposed to the sociographers of whom S. R. Steinmetz is representative. Nevertheless, the outstanding figures in the field from the beginning have been mostly of the Le Play and Demolins type. They feel a relation between the geographical environment and group life but as yet have not been able to prove this in a systematic form. In America Ellsworth Huntington has stressed the group forming influences of geographical factors and P. A. Sorokin has been most sceptical. In Europe, Edgar Kant is stressing the group influences of geography in his researches in the University of Lund and elsewhere.

still mechanical, descriptive, too broadly generalized and integrated very little with any clear, Sociological theory of groups.[4]

If we accept the view that sociology is a body of knowledge which in the ideas of Herbert Spencer and others, should move constantly from the known into the unknown, then it is axiomatic that next steps in regional sociology should enlarge the group theory aspects of regionalism. This leads us to ask a number of questions. What are the characteristics of group life which determine regions? What general attributes of groups are most influential in regions? What effects do regional groups have on the total culture of a society? These three questions enlarge the horizon of regional sociology from description towards theory. They furnish a higher basis of generalization and classification of groups founded upon large landscapes. Finally they raise issues of the relations between social organization and human character which have not been settled heretofore for this kind of a group.

The Region as a Sociological Group

The region is a group geographically based. That is inherent in the nature of its character. Consequently all analyses which apply to regional sociology have been influenced more by geographic studies than by any other. All studies have sought to find some broad universalism in landscapes which would enable the delimitation of what could be called regional groups. Rainfall, temperature, topography, soil, ocean barriers, ground cover, elevation and all geographic traits have been searched unceasingly to find if they have given a natural grouping or ecology to human communities. That such studies have failed to find complete geographic determinants is perfectly evident. Under the same geographic conditions many different kinds of human groupings of a large area sort have always existed and still do so.[5]

The reason for this failure of the pure geographic approach to regionalism ought to be obvious. Groups are human products and as such adapt to geography only insofar as human ingenuity is lacking for more favorable kinds of organization. To illustrate by an obvious example, we may take the occupation of the territory of the U.S.A. by the peoples before and after Columbus. All climatic and geographic aspects of the area are largely constant but the variables of social space have been changed. We can see this same difference in a less marked sense between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries in the present United States.

The American Wheatbelt, and the Arid West, which seem regions in the United States of today, are faced now, at least temporarily, with thinning and declining populations. The Cornbelt is losing

[4] For instance Odum and Moore, *American Regionalism* cuts up America into sections as mechanically as if one would take a map of the country and cut it into six pieces with scissors. The different authors, Merril Jensen (Editor), *Regionalism in America* do not even include our Cornbelt or the Urban Northeast. Two thirds of the Americans live in the Urban Northeast and the Cornbelt is the chief source of American calories and proteins.

[5] Russell and Kniffen, *Culture Worlds,* illustrates this on a large scale.

rural population and watching it increase slowly in the cities. The Appalachian Ozarkian region is losing farm population in favor of small industrial city growth. In our Urban Northeast the big city centers seem to be reaching a stalemate or a decline in favor of fringe and back country growth. The South is industrializing and that rapidly. Our Pacific-Mediterranean region increased fifty percent or from ten to fifteen millions between 1940 and 1950. In a marked sense these changes are due to alternations of regional variables of a group and human kind not yet taken into full consideration in geo-sociology.

Any full and complete theory of group life as an influence upon regionalism must add to the geographic conception those of *social time* and *social space.* At any particular time when a culture has changed its knowledge and capacity to form groups of a regional nature, the new uses of geography will tend to adapt to the new ideas. Thus in North America it has been discovered that maize, which grows extremely well in a limited region in the interior of the continent, is a more efficient producer of calories and units of protein, than most other crops or products which can be raised in the region. This gives us a large unique region called the American Cornbelt. The main product of this region is a cultural synthesis about maize production. It starts with corn, adds pigs and cattle for fattening, adds legumes like the soyabean to replace some nitrogen and to be used for supplementary ration for the livestock, and then adds a village, town and city population which services the major producers.

Social Time

These urban dwellers in the Cornbelt have subsidiary forms of production, mostly manufacturing, industrial and service, which they carry on. In spite of this diverse secondary production which complements and supplements the main product, the maize complex, this region is still the American Cornbelt. It appeared only as such during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, showing one aspect of the variable *social time* in the determination of a region.

A second aspect of social time may be illustrated by our Southern region in the United States. This was once developed almost solely as a producer of tobacco and a few other cash export crops in British colonial trade. Later it became a cotton culture (with tobacco secondary) using negro slave labor. Up to the American Civil War (1861-1885) this combination continued. After the war it continued as a cotton-tobacco culture using a mixture of whites and blacks in a system of almost economic peonage—the sharecropper tenancy. Lately the whole system is changing towards a very diverse industrialized region based upon petroleum products, tree cellulose, and newly developed forage plants—grasses and legumes. California, a part of our Pacific region, has now become a leading cotton producer in the relatively diminishing markets for this fiber.

The significance of social time in this aspect of regionalism arises in the continuance of the region, where possible, through a number of different and changing economics. In this case the

presence of the Negro almost predominantly in the region up until very recently, has given the South a sort of unique social organization developed about what is almost a bi-racial caste system. This social system has maintained the region throughout several aspects of economic time in the same sense that pan-Germanism, pan-Slavism, and pan-Indianism often appear to surmount numerous vicissitudes in the political field. Thus one single great unique catalyzer of regionalism in the American South to this time has been the presence there of the Negro and that is not due to geography so much as to social time. A colonial system had to transplant Negroes to a relatively unoccupied white-owned region where intensive hand-produced commercial crops could be grown.

The continuance of the South as a geographic entity, which must be called a psycho-social region, is attested to by a number of evidences, only one of which can be pointed out. At the present time in the United States we have what is known as a Dixiecrat movement. It is a revolt in the prevailing Democratic political party against the domination of northern elements in the party.

The Sociological Character of Regional Groups

Two broad concepts—social time and social space—include group forces which influence geographical areas. Factors denoted by these two concepts show this capacity to take an area of similar geographic and climatic factors and to change it from its past or from what its counterparts are in other regions of the earth. These conceptions of social time and social space are benchmarks in cultural change. We now live in a world which has departed drastically in all basic lines from the historical past. This new time has called for a new conception of space and new forms of areal organization. We may speak of it as moving from historical *Provincialism* to a new *regionalism.*

Regional Social Solidarity Forms

For the past century sociologists have tried to find general formulas which type the social relations marking the solidarity of groups. The most generally accepted dichotomy is that of mechanical *vs* organic social forms, Durkheim, Toennies, Sorokin and others have used different words, (such as *gemeinschaft vs gesellschaft* for instance) but they have been dealing with the same conceptions. Mechanical solidarity implies a similarity in experience from person to person which is readily observable by each and leads to rapid formation of value agreements. Men mechanically similar have many common experiences and about the same general psychological orientations. Organic men are parts of a larger impersonal system. Their mutuality comes not in all doing the same type of work, but rather by a division of labor in a common enterprise in which they unite to achieve a given end more efficiently. A small community is supposed to have more mechanical solidarity and a large urban one to be more organic.

Now the question of social solidarity within region is involved in the type or types of expression of its most common social relations.

If mechanical solidarity is general, then regional characters are easily capable of substitution for each other within the same region. Would a bourbon plantation owner from the coastal plain of North Carolina find himself at home if transposed to the Mississippi delta? Would an Irish Catholic policeman or politician from Chicago or New York in our Urban Northeast fit well into the Boston situation? Within the past decade almost five millions of middle class American citizens have moved to our Pacific region. Would it have made any great material difference if a hundred thousand of those, which moved to the Portland-Seattle area had been exchanged for a hundred thousand which went to the San Francisco-Oakland sub-region?

The mechanical exchangability of persons within a region is only one aspect. Another is that of organic involvement of the social systems. Notwithstanding the universal prevalence of many of the same types of characters, within a region, is there also a partial diversity or division of labor as in a social system? And is that diversity more or less region wide? Does each state in the South have its same struggle among the bourbons, the poor whites and the negroes? Does each state in the Urban Northeast have the rise of "regional catalyzers" or persons who can deal with both groups—Catholic and Protestant—and seek some common aims. And are these diversities as expressed more or less symptomatic of only that region?

The thesis or result of our analysis is that the American region is again "bi-focal" in that it has a strong development of both mechanical and organic solidarity. Each part of the region has about the same types of characters and each smaller area about the same organic social system.

The different type characters in each sub-area of a region could be transposed readily from one sub-area to the other. On the other hand they could not be transferred easily out of the region. An Irish policeman could move from Boston to New York but he could be in strange surroundings if he found himself on the police force of a Southern, a Wheatbelt or a Pacific city. A bourbon planter or business man could move from eastern North Carolina to a similar part of any southern state but he would find himself decidedly out of place in any other region.

Furthermore the combined system of characters within each region make a sort of organic unity. This unity is region wide and seldom, if ever, extends into another region in a realistic fashion. We note this in the troubles which arise when two conflicting character types from one region, such as the South, move into another region, such as the Urban Northeast, with its different system of controls. Small race antagonisms are perennial in the South. But the large race riot is a product of the Urban Northeast where the social system only slowly learns to handle the problem of the conflict between the lower class white and the Negro. America's lynchings are primarily southern. America's race riots of the past quarter of a century have been in St. Louis, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit and other Urban Northeastern cities.

Within each region an organic synthesis of an elementary type

encompasses the whole social system. It is not the only, or the paramount, system of social organization of this type involving the region Nevertheless it exists and must be considered a sociological phenomenon.

Group Personality Types

The final sociological analysis of the nature of the regional group seeks to find if there are types of personalities of a regional nature. Admitting infinite variety within groups, we often speak of model types both temporal and areal. The industrial man is thought to be a type differentiated from the feudal one and the American, a type different from the European. Is there a differentiated type of man within the seven American regions?

The outstandingness of the regional personality depends to some extent upon the age and nature of the region. Our very old and undisturbed regions have such systems of definite characters, each of which holds its social place because the members incarnate within themselves something important of the basic ideals of the representative folk of the region. Although the area personality in the newer regions are not so plainly marked they still show the same folk impression.

These above statements on findings do not deny either diversity within a region or the overriding commonness of other trans-regional personalities such as national or other group types. In America the radio and television are available to everyone and are supported by public advertising revenue. Consequently there is always a drive for a one-type American because the most common denominator kind of man gets the most listeners and reaps the highest rewards for his attention value in advertising. This does not conflict with regionalism of personality because all of us are capable of playing a number of social roles.

Diversity of personality within a region is due in part to the general fact of variation in nature and to the different roles in the regional social system played by various groupings.

The main problem left for discussion in the group personality section is whether the regional personality is a conscious or unconscious matter. Do people in a given American region recognize this "difference" between them and others based upon regional impressions within their total personality?

The answer to this is both yes and no, again showing the bi-focality of modern regionalism. The older regions, such as the South, have been challenged so often in their struggles with other regions, that they have become conscious of their differences. "I am a Southerner" is an identification statement for them, understood more deeply by some, but a little by all. Other regions are not so deeply aware of differences, except where these are challenged. An example of this is the Protestant-Catholic struggle in the Urban Northeast. In public this region denies the existence of such a struggle, although recently it has come to the conscious mind in the political quarrel within the United States over state department representatives to the Vatican. Until that time, regions outside of the Urban Northeast were

scarcely aware of the deep seated immensity of the argument and psychological clash.

Resume and Implications

The region is a relatively new sociological group. To date it has been studied largely as an ecological incident, with little attention being paid to the internal organization of the region. It is suggested that a needed next step in Regional Sociology is to appraise the region as to its group or sociological characteristics.

The region is a definite "real group" but different from most sociological groups in that it is grossly bi-focal—it expands both inwardly and outwardly. This leads to the consideration of the sociological consequences in the greater system or systems of regional organization. What difference in this world exists because of the development of the regional man? Of what importance in the world at large is the rise of a new group which can bridge the gap between parochialism and a civilization-wide outlook? The analysis of these questions is possible only when we advance from the older ecological approach to the pure sociological.

Elaboration of these matters has demonstrated that this new group, the region, as developed in the United States, has had distinct influence of a creative nature upon the other social groups. These influences range from the family structure at the bottom up through economic organization and national spirit at the top. In a large sense it shows a certain creativity in social organization, *per se,* although functional causes are necessary at inception. However, this is one cause in a complex of others, and all must be understood together. Nevertheless, the formal cause, in the Aristotelian sense, of much that is uniquely American seems to be related closely to the influences of regional social organization.

Then what are the next steps in Regional Sociology? The first is to examine regions from the standpoint of group theory. The second is to seek an understanding of the total social impact of this new group. Our older nominal approach to regional sociology, as well as our simple geographical and ecological analyses, must give way to a maturer sociology.[1]

[1] The article had to be considerably abridged.

14

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF REGIONALISM

By J. O. HERTZLER

There is an occasional reference to certain vague "social psychological" aspects of regionalism in the rapidly growing literature on this subject, but almost nothing in the way of data or treatment of this aspect of the region. Mukerjee's *Regional Sociology* is about the only exception.[1] A perusal of the eight most recent textbooks in social psychology, at the same time, shows that only one of them[2] even makes mention of the region or any other geographic-economic setting for the culture group. So it may be said quite truthfully that the regionalists have not explored the social psychological aspects of their subject, and the social psychologists have not discovered the region as that areal unit which is so rapidly becoming a matter of general interest in social investigation, planning and administration.

This brief paper claims to be only the most superficial reconnaissance of this new field. It will examine a few basic concepts and principles, try to determine what some of the chief social psychological aspects of the region may be, and, incidentally, suggest fields for further study.

The Region as a Social Psychological Phenomenon

The elemental fact underlying the concept of region is the natural landscape, with its fairly uniform and distinctive topography, climate and natural resources. Determined more or less by these assets and liabilities for social life, the culture group fashions on it a configuration of social life which Carl O. Sauer has appropriately called the "cultural landscape."[3] This latter landscape consists first and fundamentally of the economic structure which rests upon the natural resources as they determine agriculture, industry, technology, wealth, mobility, income, and occupation. Secondly, it involves the varied composition of the population occupying the area. Third, it includes the effects of historical social processes — ecological, political, economic, racial — which have occurred within the area. Finally, it includes the combination of cultures each successive population increment brought into the area and adapted more or less well to the geographic-economic setting, and also the cultural materials that have

[1] See *Regional Sociology*, pp. vii, 183, 216–218, 221–222, 233–238.

[2] R. La Piere and P. R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), pp. 267–269.

[3] *The Morphology of Landscape* (Berkeley: *Uni. of Cal. Pubs. in Geography*), Vol. II, No. 2, 1925, p. 46.

been and are continually coming into the region by the multiple processes of communication and transportation.

Out of these factors is compounded the culture of a region, and this culture comes to have a relative internal homogeneity and uniformity, as judged by a variety of indices, and an obvious external uniqueness.[4] The region with its distinctive social pattern seems to identify its inhabitants as types, as, for example, those of the South, New England, the Middle West, the Plains Area, or the Pacific North-West, in spite of the many nation-wide and even hemispherical behavior uniformities which they show.

Undeniably such a combination of determining factors would produce a large array of social psychological, as well as socio-biological, economic, political, and sociological phenomena. Or, to view it from another angle, the social interaction which is the basis of socio-psychological behavior takes place within a social *milieu,* and this in turn rests fundamentally and unavoidably upon the regional base.

Personality Patterning and the Region

Individual personality may be looked upon as being largely a product of the cumulative power of regional conditioning, both in its physical and cultural phases.[5] The region is a social system, existing prior to its present constituent persons. It supplies the plan for personality patterning; it is both content and organization to the developing ego.

Each culture, that of a region for example, carries certain dominant motifs which serve as selective norms and as centers with reference to which conduct is directed. Each culture, of course, as Hiller points out, also has lesser constellations of culture complexes which do not reflect the dominant motif to an equal extent. Many of the elements of these are universals that are part of the larger surrounding culture; others are new insertions or accretions by borrowing or invention, some of which are likely to have discordant elements that lack congruity with the indigenous and better adapted traits. But there is the general tendency for the regionally unique, the universal, and the incongruous elements of culture to harmonize and cohere in an area. It is this complex regional culture, however, which produces the personality patterns of its inhabitants through the stimuli which it radiates, the preferences and choices which it offers, and the distinctive placement of persons or groups of persons, which constitutes its structure. Naturally regions do not have an equal effect in producing typical personalities, though, as has been noted above, no one who has traveled this country over, North and South, East and West, is at a loss in distinguishing and delineating regional types.

[4] J. O. Hertzler, "American Regionalism and the Regional Sociological Society," *Am. Sociological Rev.,* 3 (Oct., 1938): 739.

[5] For most of the thought of this section the writer is indebted to the penetrating analysis of E. T. Hiller, "The Social Structure in Relation to the Person," *Social Forces,* 16 (Oct. 1937): 34–44. The ideas that are not his were suggested by his treatment. The adaptations are mine.

The Collective Behavior of the Region

The social psychologist keeps the behaving person in the foreground, but this behaving person only has significance when we see him as part of a *collectivity* of behavior. Conversely, this collective behavior is but a complex form of the behavior of human beings.[6] This collective behavior is a product of the interaction of the human beings of a society under a given set of conditions. It manifests itself in a variety of related forms. If now the region can be viewed as such a collectivity of individuals, it will show many distinctive collective behavior traits,[7] along lines determined, influenced, or affected by the whole regional *milieu.*

Mukerjee alone, though quite incidentally, as far back as fourteen years ago, touched upon some of these features of collective behavior which show a regional pattern.[8] He emphasized the material factors which definitely enter into the pattern. Basically the physical environment of the region evokes the kind of labor or economic behavior which, under the given cultural conditions, can best utilize the natural resources. He states, ". . . . . a common occupation and mode of life are dictated by the common environment, and these mold and assimilate people into a distinctive life group" (p. 222). Again, "social customs and institutions may be regarded as social tropisms and reflexes due to external stimuli" (p. 183). Regional segregation, through its selective power, stabilizes these reactions, and the gregarious contacts of the people reinforce and integrate them. "Even the valuable responses developed through trial and error stereotype themselves into rigid habits and modes of behavior common to all who share the environment" (p. 221). Through "the legacy of occupation, tradition, and culture" the behavior of the group acquires "a unitary character." To these occupational and economic features as selective factors in the social interaction of the region, specifically referred to by Mukerjee, must be mentioned also the inorganic and biological features on the plane below them, and the complex of political, communicative, educational, and the narrowly cultural features on the plane above. These are all subject to a variety of ecological processes. By means of all of these, the inhabitants, at any given time, are in *rapport* with their region, and this takes the form of "collective behavior."[9]

What are some of the component elements in this environmentally mediated pattern of interaction that we will refer to as the regional plane of collective behavior?

The region gives rise to *sentiments, wishes, interests,* and

[6] See R. La Piere, *Collective Behavior* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938), pp. 6–7.

[7] It has been abundantly demonstrated that it does. See, e.g., H. W. Odum, *Southern Regions in the United States* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1936), in which more than 700 indices are presented in comparing the six regions, the Northeast, the Southeast, the Middle States, the Northwest, the Southwest, and the Far West, into which he divides the country.

[8] *Op. cit.*

[9] L. Wirth also refers to the "almost stereotyped patterns" of "collective behavior" which the study of regions seems to follow. "The Prospects of Regional Research in Relation to Social Planning," *Pubs. Am. Sociological Soc.* 29 (1935): 110.

loyalties.[10] The people are physically dependent upon it, since all of their material wants are satisfied in it. It is their greater home, the immediate world that sustains their spirit and embodies all that is familiar.[11] Food is determined to some extent by geography, and it is notorious that strong sentiments grow up around food and the social customs attaching to it. The typical landscape and climate also enter in, as do the past and contemporary vicissitudes and conquests in contending with it. The common economic activities, especially occupations, the forms of landholding, and the special functions of the region in the national division of labor produce a variety of interests and wishes. Historic tribulations and struggles, experiences, heroic and otherwise, during frontier days, sacred memories, oft-repeated myths, and deep-seated traditions, a pride of place and events, common aspirations and hopes, often accentuated by partial isolation, beget common loyalties that cannot be over-ridden without damage to the human spirit.

Closely related to the above and engendered by the same contributory factors are the common *attitudes* and *thought patterns.* Each region has unique clusters of these. The New Englanders react differently to many situations from the people of the Great Lakes region, or of the Deep South, or the Prairie States, or the Mountain States, or of the Pacific Coast. The reactions to such situations as class configurations and distinctions, racial relations, political mugwumpery, support of popular education for different population levels, religious interpretations, family relations, labor dissent, social legislation, aid to agriculture, individual self-maintenance are almost stereotyped, region by region. William Allen White exclaims, "Justice for one region is not justice for the other."

The *habit systems,* particularly as they become incorporated and integrated in the institutional patterns of the region, are also significant expressions of collective behavior. The regional environment, physical and cultural, establishes various kinds of life conditions and situations to which compliant adjustment must be made if men are to live and prosper. Borrowed as well as indigenous institutional behavior must be compatible with regional requirements. Among individuals in the larger uniformity of the region-wide constellation of communities, as well as locally, the training in the daily discipline of life produces repeated activity that shows a considerable degree of unity. Habits relating to occupation, congregation, leisure, recreation, consumption, and transportation necessarily show direct influence of the physical region.[12] In others, regional variations in historical and cultural factors are more influential, as for example, language, religious, political and aesthetic habits, though generalizations are dangerous.

Finally the region is a social psychological climate in which certain types of *public opinion* germinate and flourish. These grow

[10] See H. A. Mess, "Geography in Relation to National and Social Sentiment," *Sociological Rev.,* 30 (April, 1938): 186–200.

[11] Cf. R. M. MacIver, *Society* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1937), p. 152.

[12] Cf. J. O. Hertzler, *Social Institutions* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1929), pp. 128–139.

mainly out of major problems as they appear region by region. Regional economic matters produce special opinions, such as the cotton opinion of the South, the manufacturing opinion of the Great Lakes area, or the wheat and corn opinion of the Middlewest and Northwest. Racial or nationality minorities in a region color the opinion on all matters in which these are involved, notably the Negro in the South and increasingly in the North and Northeast, the Mexican in the Southwest or Orientals on the Pacific Coast. Ancient sectional controversies still bob up in the opinion of the regions which have largely replaced the old sections. In fact, almost all public opinion shows regional variations, reflecting regional economic, social, political, historical or cultural points of view.

The best evidence of the reality of these regionally uniform behavior patterns is to note the degree to which persons migrating from one region to another find many of their interests, attitudes, habits and opinions at variance with those of the people resident for some time in the new habitat. The migrant into a region finds himself confronted by a different climate, new occupations, different industrial activities, different current usages, different class, nationality and racial arrangements and attitudes, different dialects, different social and economic objectives, different political conditions, different living conditions, a different social philosophy, and so on. He feels himself to be, and for a while is, very definitely an "outlander." For example, when a Southerner of middle or upper class migrates northward he does not easily change his attitudes towards the Negro or the sharecropper; the New Englander is surprised by the democratic ways of the prairie country; the Dust Bowl farmer finds himself a rudderless ship in the Puget Sound area, or in the California valleys; the sharecropper in Detroit must adjust himself to a new climate, new occupations, new living conditions, new class attitudes; in several regions an "outsider" is still conspicuous because of the peculiarities of his speech — the idioms, the peculiarities of pronunciation, special words and uses of words.

Occasionally there is an actual difficulty of adjusting their behavior along many lines to that prevailing in the new region, resulting not only in occupational or economic disorganization, but also in frequent embarrassment, a feeling of "being out of things," and sometimes in some disorganization of personality.

It is of course equally true that economic, technological, and physiographic changes, or, for that matter, anything which disturbs the established regional culture, may also have a disturbing effect upon the personality organization of many of the long-time inhabitants of the region. Observers have reported to the writer the disorganization of personality of many of the people of the West Virginia and Kentucky hills when highways were cut through and brought with them various dislocations of the settled ways of life of the adjoining region. Increases in delinquency and crime, for example, were particularly noticeable. Similar effects have been observed among the Carolina lower classes when the textile mills were established, and among the drought area inhabitants as a result of the physical and economic changes there occurring during recent years. In these and similar cases the regional culture, by which the people

had been conditioned, changed so much that the personalities simply could not "stand the shock."

It would be fatal for a social scientist, or for a politician or administrator to ignore the existence of these differences in the collective behavior of the regions.

Partly by way of qualification, the social psychological effects of different kinds of isolation as they appear within different regions must be mentioned. Physical isolation resulting from such features of the physical setting as mountains, sparsely settled arid and semi-arid areas, or swamps, and cultural isolation due to great variations in wealth, income, standard of living, and therefore of class, to privilege hierarchies, to occupational structure, to religious distinctions, or to racial or nationality stratification tend to produce *regional subtypes of behavior.* As examples one might mention the Negro and white sharecroppers of the South, the die-hard "quality" of the South, the Cajuns, the mountain whites or "hill-billies," the "desert rats," the "pocketed" nationality communities of the Plans and the Northwest, the people on the Western "ranges," the "Mexicans" of the Southwest, the "Canucks" of New England, the "cow men" and "sheep men" of the "wide open spaces," the Orientals of the Pacific Coast, the tenant farmers of the Middle West and Northwest, the Mormons of the Mountain States, and the Hutterites and Mennonites of the Northwest. Each of these have whole blocks of distinguishing behavior traits within the greater mass of those generally characteristic of the region.

The Regional Level of Consciousness

An aspect of regionalism which bears a very close relationship to the social psychology of the region is the regional level of consciousness which is definitely perceptible in this country. There has always been a local consciousness — that of the village, city, or country— growing from face-to-face contiguity and communication, from common activities, and from pride in local possessions and achievements; there has long been a state level of consciousness, mainly of a political nature; in the past there has been at times a sharp sectional consciousness; for most people and areas there has long been a national level, partly political and patriotic, partly cultural, partly economic, partly due to the development of nation-wide uniformities as developed by newspapers and journals, telegraph, radio, and easy transportation. But in the last decade and a half there has been noticeable the appearance of a new regional level of social consciousness. This undoubtedly has its roots in the old political and economic sectionalism, but it has grown to be a finer and more diversified phenomenon.

We have not been levelled into uniformity even by the powerful agencies of machine production, modern communication and transportation, or the great expansion of Federal organizations and functions. In fact, there seems to be a spiritual resistance to the very processes which make for "giantism" and nation-wide uniformity and regimentation. At the same time the larger contacts and interactions have developed interests and loyalties which extend beyond the local community to the natural-cultural region. We Americans are settling down and stabilizing as highly self-conscious intermediate regional

areas of differentiation, which are, however, acknowledgedly interdependent, interrelated and cooperative.

Drought and flood, erosion, the exhaustion of resources, the new emphasis upon and consciousness of scenery and climate as induced by auto-borne vacationists, the vicissitudes of agriculture and similar factors have developed a new consciousness of the significance of the geographical characteristics and uniformities of the region. As our world markets have tended to disappear and as internal economic competition has become keener, we are reverting more and more to a nation-wide division of labor and interdependence resting upon more effectively utilized and conserved regional resources, both material and human. Economic problems of all kinds—industrial, commercial, consumer — are being examined regionally by informal and formally organized bodies. In the search for differentiation from the giant whole, regional historical events, traditions, customs, and artifacts ("antiques") are cherished with a new fevor. The expressional impulses of the people seem to be coalescing along the lines of regional "folk stuffs"—folk-regional music, drama, painting, and literature. Notable is the large crop of regional literary journals of recent years.[13] A consciousness of regional diversities of thought along social and economic lines is noted in the editorial columns of newspapers and in the rapid growth of regional journals covering agriculture, trade, social and scientific problems.

Even the learned and professional groups are organizing along regional lines, first, because within the region the members are more accessible to each other, and the regional meetings produce more spontaneous, congenial, and intimate contacts over against the formalism, impersonalism, and anonymity of the national organizations; second, because the regional organization makes possible a more direct, comprehensive, and cooperative attack upon the problems of their craft and their subject and object matter;[14] third, because there is a closer appreciation of their individual and common achievements, and the competition is tempered by friendship and regional pride and morale.

The disappearance of the frontier, the halting of immigration, and cessation of great western movements of population into unsettled country, have given us, even in the more recently settled areas, a more stable and less restless population which, while mobile, yet increasingly feels a more permanent tie to a given region. Finally, while our political feelings are getting away from the particularism and centralization by states, they cannot go over easily to a complete Federal centralization as an alternative; the region more and more becomes an area of political consciousness as well as of administration.

The matter can be summarized by saying that a regional "sense of community" is developing. We are thinking of our relationships with others in terms of the regions which we inhabit; here are elicited our basic interests; here is the ideal tangible areal unit to which we

[13] A. E. DuBois, "Among the Quarterlies: This Question of Regionalism," *Sewanee Rev.* 45, (April, 1937): 216–227.

[14] J. O. Hertzler, "American Regionalism and the Regional Sociological Society." *Am. Sociological Rev.*, 3 (October, 1938): 738–784.

can attach our loyalties.[15] The psychic overtones of this intermediate areal unit are increasingly distinct and must be considered by all who are concerned with attitudes and opinion.

[15] H. E. Moore, *What is Regionalism?* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1937), p. 13.

15

REGIONAL DEMOCRACY SUPPLANTS EMPIRE, WEST—THEN EAST

By ELIZABETH GREEN AND CRAIGHILL HANDY

I

The basic conception in this article is not purely scientific, although we believe we are working with a true ecological scheme, and in doing so are attempting to make our demonstration scientific. At least the sources and materials we use are authentic and our approach is entirely objective.[1] If the demonstration is not scientific, the fault lies with our knowledge, insight and logic.

The ecological approach,[2] applied to the natural realms and their regional sub-divisions on a continental scale, comparable to that applied sociologically to the South-eastern States in particular and to the United States in general by Howard W. Odum and his colleagues, and applied to China, U.S.S.R., and to Asia as a whole and the Pacific by George B. Cressey[3]—when applied in terms of human ecology on a global scale, we are convinced, constitutes the only scientific basis for permanent sound international, inter-racial and inter-cultural relations, unchangeable except with the geologic and climatic changes of Mother Earth. Migrations and wars, human inventions and scheming may modify temporarily Earth's patterning. But the heavens and the earth determine the patterns by which and within which the differing breeds of men in all places and all

[1] See also "Regionally Planning the Far East." *Social Forces*, 23 (March 1945), pp. 394-404.

[2] Patrick Geddes, trained in Botany and General Biology, brought from biology into sociology the ecological approach. Geddes influenced thinkers in India. Radhakamal Mukerjee incorporated the concept in part in his *Regional Sociology* (1926) as a philosophy and a technique in social science. Lewis Mumford was also directly influenced by Geddes, and made important contributions. Regionalism as a sociological technique and philosophy has grown to imposing scientific and practical significance primarily in the work of Howard W. Odum and his colleagues, Rupert B. Vance, Katharine Jocher, Guy B. Johnson and others, of the Institute for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina. Administrative and cultural regionalism have been strengthened by the notable success of T. V. A. and its staff, as well as by its sponsors and by such engineers as Morris Llewellen Cooke. A different though closely related growth upon the stem of biological ecology is economic geographic regionalism, exemplified in the works of J. Russell Smith and M. Ogden Phillips (North America, 1940). Geographers work primarily with physiographic patterns of regionalism: and it is this basic earth patterning that we take to be fundamental to sound regional study or planning, whatever the discipline that utilizes this point of view. As old as the ecology of the biologists is another form of regional study long practised by anthropologists and ethnographers, the division of continents into Culture Areas.

[3] George B. Cressey, *China's Geographic Foundations*, (1934); *Asia's Lands and Peoples* (1944); *The Basis of Soviet Strength* (1945).

times shall work out their respective and inter-related destinies, and not the earnest and hard-thinking men and women in the diplomatic and economic corps of the nations, nor the tough military minds nor the equally tough commercial and financial cohorts.

We believe that the U.S.A., albeit unconsciously, as a result of working out a set of principles governing international rights and destinies, in the course of the mastery of, and being moulded by, a virgin continent, has established in the world a new political philosophy to which global regionalism is the corollary.[4] We, therefore, take it to be of paramount importance that human ecology on a global scale be studied: and, for Americans, that our part and place in the picture and drama be clearly defined.

The Indian Realm Regionally Viewed

If any Indian scholar finds food for thought in what follows, interpreting India's and America's relationship from the point of view of regional science and philosophy, it will surely exemplify the truth of the Scriptural verse, "Cast thy bread upon the waters and it shall return unto thee after many days"; for it was the mind of an Indian scientist and scholar, Radhakamal Mukerjee, endowed with the complementary aptitudes for combined analytic and synthetic thinking so highly developed in intellectual Indians, which threw vivid contours of regional interpretation upon American sociological science twenty years ago. In his preface to *Regional Sociology,* Dr. Mukerjee wrote:

"Already we are glimpsing a Human Ecology which seeks to provide us with the keys to the origin of diverse social types, correlated with the plant and animal communities of a natural, easily distinguished region. . . . . Thus, combining the regional and historical methods, sociology can direct the use of comparison on a somewhat large scale, which is indispensable for its forming concepts and generalizations applicable to all social types and regions."[5]

The basis of Professor Mukerjee's regional sociological conspectus was biological and human ecology. "The scientific classification of social, like that of biological types must now be related to ecology, which traces the relations of the activities of organisms to their environments".[6] The ecological factors indicated by Mukerjee as quoted in the paragraph above, in their geographic setting, obviously underlie the whole system of comparative interpretation that is the basis of this study.

Regions in India, according to Mukerjee, may be delineated in terms of climate, vegetation, the distribution of domesticated animals, zones of irrigation, types of social organization. Today the science of regional sociology recognizes the fact that many types of regional

[4] This new political philosophy we attempted to define in a recent article, "Regionalism and the New Political Philosophy of the U.S.A. and U.N.O." *Social Forces*, 24 (March 1946), pp. 267-73.

[5] Radhakamal Mukerjee, *Regional Sociology* (1926), pp. vii-viii. In the introduction Dr. E. A. Ross speaks of this work as "The first book that has ever appeared under the title Regional Sociology", and says of "this felicitous phrase" that it was "suggested to our author by the world-famous Rabindranath Tagore".

[6] Ibid., p. 259.

division or demarcation may be valid from the point of view of various types of study or for different purposes. Thus Odum and Moore[7] discuss the primary types of regional study as having to do with Natural Regions (Soil, Topography, Climate), River Valley Regions; Metropolitan, Rural and Literary and Aesthetic Culture Regions; and Service Regions (Governmental and non-Governmental).

India has been and is divided and studied, administered, etc., in accordance with all these kinds of regionalism, and is capable of being studied in terms of other classifications, almost without limit. It is the basic geographic regionalism to which we must adhere, however; for this, as we have said above, determines the fundamental regional character of the continental natural realms we seek to compare in terms of their inter-relations, their resemblances and their contrasts.

Following Mukerjee's stimulating contribution to regional thinking in 1936, there were several studies of geographic regionalism in India.[8] These followed the old conventional patterning of the Indian sub-continent in terms of its superficial geographic features and contrasts.

In 1939, Professor M. B. Pithawalla published two articles on physiographic regions in India. The first paper,[9] read at the 1939 Indian Science Congress at Lahore, follows the principles adopted by the Association of American Geographers for defining the physiographic divisions or provinces of the U.S.A., which base physiographic definition primarily on geological factors. Physiographic divisions, so defined, do not accord with the so-called "Natural" Regions (in terms of area of superficial topography) of the English geographers. Pithawalla's proposed geographic divisions are three: Extra-Peninsular Mountains, The Indo-Gangetic Plain, and the Peninsular Area. Each of these is sub-divided into regions and sections. A second subsequent article[10] follows the same scheme, with certain modifications or alterations in accord with criticism and discussion of the original classification.

In Part III, we shall make a further mention of Pithawalla's original study of India from the point of view of geography, after describing the interweaving of the threads of the historical connection between America and India out of and by way of London in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The point of interest and significance to note here is that in 1939, before World War II and the very recent realization of independence had brought India and the U.S.A. to a new awareness of each other's existence and problems, the leading Indian geographic regionalist was turning to American geographic science and applying to India the principles perfected therein through the study of North America.

[7] Howard W. Odum and Harry Estill Moore, *American Regionalism* (1938)..

[8] J. N. L. Baker, "Notes on the Natural Regions of India", *Geography*, XIV (1928), 447-456; Daniel R. Bergsmark, "The Geographic Regions of India", *Journal of Geography*, XXVIII (1929), 108-122; F. J. Richard, "Cultural Regions in India", *Geography*, Vol. XV (1929), pp. 20-29.

[9] M. P. Pithawalla, "The Need of Uniformity in Geographic Divisions of India," *Journal of the Madras Geographic Association*, XIV (1939), 213-228.

[10] M. B. Pithawalla, "Physiographic Divisions of India", *Journal of the Madras Geographic Association*, XIV (1939), 423-434.

II

Madras and Jamestown were coincidental bridgeheads of England's seventeenth century global "pincers movement". Madras was her earliest fortified proprietary holding in India and her trading company's depot for a large share of the East Indian trade; Jamestown her first stronghold, stockaded against the savage "Indians", on the unexplored continent north of the "West Indies". Established coincidentally at the outset of the century that first saw the founding of world empire, these bridgeheads became the foci for campaigns and strategy—commercial, colonial, political and military—which have led Anglo-Saxons, in the New World and the Old, down roads of destiny consistently divergent. Yet these paths, separated by the world's diameter geographically and antipodal socially may in our time turn out to be merely the two legs of a triangle whose base is now in process of drawing.

In South Asia imperial England, by wile, guile, a little force and a lot of guts, took unto herself an ancient sub-continental Realm —vast, humanly prolific and wealthy, geographically rich and, for Empire, strategic. In the West, democratic Anglo-Saxondom, wrested from the wilderness, fought and bargained for a new virgin Continental Realm, vaster, as yet barely populated, incomparably endowed with potential wealth, and in terms of geo-strategy, economic and military, beyond compare on this our globe.

Descendants of those colonists at Jamestown, and the other early settlers from Plymouth to Charleston, spreading in ever widening segments westward, wrought a self-contained continental empire and made wholly their own this great virgin land in the democratic pioneering way—one country, one people. Behind Madras—and the other commercial cities like it—the ancient land of India still to-day, as ever throughout its history, harbours diverse, divided peoples. It is a country in which many native petty potentates still hold sway, and where, until 1947, there ruled the alien conquerors for whom it never became, and never could become, a colonial home.

Both to India and to America went the two types of persons embodying the two points of view that then made and now still make Anglo-Saxondom: the love of individual liberty and commonalty—the Athenian spirit of democracy; and its opposite, regnant dynasty—a Roman lust for wealth and power. India, which through all time has been the scene of successive dynastic glories, converted this English dynasticism into Viceregal Imperialism. In the soil of virgin America, regalism was dissolved, liberty and commonalty took deep root and flourished.

The East India Company Infiltrates a Sub-Continental Realm

For all their subsequent divergence, the two prongs of this seventeenth century thrust had their common origin, not only geographically in the royal mercantile city of London, but psychologically and economically in the restless pressure of the times and the expanding search for wealth. In either instance a company of substantial nobles and merchants, chartered under the royal seal, undertook to follow upon the explorations of intrepid voyagers West and

East: of Sir Richard Granville (1585), captaining Raleigh's first expedition across the Atlantic to Roanoke Island; of Captain James Lancaster (1591) into those East Indian waters whose charted secrets had been so long and jealously guarded by the Portuguese discoverers.

Impatient for a share in the fabulous riches of India, such as Dutch foresight and sea-power were already beginning to nibble at along the fringes of Portugal's century-old Eastern monopoly, British merchants in 1600 had at length prodded their cautious Queen Bess into granting a charter for "trading into the East Indies".[11] By 1607 three separate expeditions had set forth, coming home with such lucrative cargoes as to return from 100 to 200 per cent to investors and send non-investors' fever up by as many degrees. And by that same year Captain John Smith, "Adventurer", was leading the first expedition for the new London Company to Virginia.[12]

In the first year both the motives and the history of the two companies were inextricably inter-twined.[13] The Virginia Company was charged first and foremost with the search for a new and direct sea route to India to supersede the long, dangerous, and costly route around the tip of Africa; secondly, with the exploration of the fabled gold mines which were expected to produce new wealth to finance these ventures; and lastly, with opening a prosperous trade in the new world—primarily in the timber so greatly needed in England for the fast-expanding shipping enterprise to East and West. Settlement on the coastal margin of Virginia was at first but incidental to such exploring and trading operations.

There was also, as in motive, a close link in personnel in those earliest adventurous years. London was not then vast in population or in wealth. Those merchants and knights with the imagination to be stirred by the expanding world over-seas, the means to risk, and the acumen to regulate these new ventures wisely, were inevitably the ones drawn upon to underwrite and to manage both Eastern and Western enterprises. Such a one was Sir Thomas Smythe—a name important in East Indian annals as the Company's first London Governor of Council. He was a member also of the first Virginia Company's Council in 1606; and by 1618, as its President and Treasurer, he had become the King's foremost Conservative counsellor in the developing controversy between Crown and Parliament over control of these fast-growing monopolies. Sir Thomas Dale, whose administration in Virginia had established his reputation for firm and able leadership, was another. It was he who was chosen to command the East India Company's fleet in the crucial year 1618 when a test of the Dutch temper over interference with her East Indian monopoly seemed imminent. Sir Edwin Sandys, a name es-

[11] Sir William Foster, *In Quest of Far Eastern Trade*, pp. 90-99, 127-135, 144-172; *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 14th Edition, Vol. VII, pp. 869-70, "East India Company"; *Encyclopedia Americana*, Vol. IX, 1944, pp. 503-5, "The East India Companies" (Portugal, Dutch, English, etc., of the 17th centuries).

[12] J. T. Ellyson, *The London Company of Virginia* (1908); W. C. Armstrong, *Life and Adventures of Captain John Smith. . . . . .Principally compiled from his own Works* (1885).

[13] Susan M. Kingsbury, "A Comparison of the Virginia Company with the other English Trading Companies of the 16th and 17th centuries," *American Historical Association Reports*, Vol. 1, 1906.

pecially prominent in Virginia records, was still another: a charter member of the East India Company, he had drafted also the Virginia Company's second enlarged charter in 1609, and as leader of the growing Liberal faction in the Company's membership it was he who was elected in 1619 to succeed the conservative Sir Thomas Smythe as President and Treasurer, thus inaugurating the popular regime of Governor George Yardley in Jamestown in that historic year which witnessed the establishment of the first representative assembly in America.[14]

King James' proudly denominated "Royal Colony of Virginia", proclaimed in 1624, was not even dimly visible on the horizon of events when Jamestown Island became the landfall-by-error of Captain John Smith's sea-weary company of adventurers in 1607.[15]

Meantime, from 1601 onward , persistently through calm and tempest and piracy at sea and untried ways and unknown risks ashore, the ships of the East India Company had begun methodically moving, outward bound with cargoes of metals and woolen cloth, to return laden with spices, indigo, calico, carpets and skein-silk, porcelain, tea, curios, furniture to provide exotic sensations for London folk in the "merrie Englande" that followed Good Queen Bess. Here and there on these voyages there was left behind a lone "factor" (merchant) whose trading, if he survived disease and sudden death by poisoning or assault, became the foundation of those stockaded "factories" or trading posts in the East out of which have grown the modern ports and centres of trade and Western urbanism.[16]

No thought there of colonization; but rather of finding crannies in a crowded island or coastal population where a seed of English trade might lodge. No question either of new lands to open up, of plantations to be hewn out of a wilderness, but rather of old-established imperial cities, and marts of trade to penetrate, of ancient practices, prejudices, and suspicions to comprehend and circumvent as best could be.

Not until 1611, however, did Master Hippon in the Globe[17] passing up the "Spice Islands" and their lucrative cargoes for the time, sail directly to the East Coast of India proper and set down at Masulipatam the handful of men who were to constitute the Company's first established seat of trade upon the great sub-continent of India proper. The next year, on the opposite side of India, divided from Masulipatam's tiny English agency by all the unknown breadth of the hot and populous land, Captain Thomas Best, commanding the Dragon and the Hosiander, planted a second "factory" at Surat, on the Bay of Cambay. But first he had journeyed far inland to Agra to secure the privilege from the Mogul Court, and then had

[14] Mathew Page Andrews, *The Soul of a Nation: the Founding of Virginia and the Projection of New England* (1943); Chapter X, "The Great Charter"; Chapter XI, "The Cornerstone of Representative Government". For additional detailed treatment of this period see the interesting volume *'Before the Mayflower'* by Captain J. H. R. Yardley, (1931).

[15] *Encyclopedia Britannica,* 14th Edition, Vol. XXIII, "Virginia", History, p. 187

[16] Sir William Foster, *The English Factories in India,* 1618-1669 (Oxford Press, 1927).

[17] E. K. Chatterton, *The Old East Indiamen* (1914).

been obliged to fight off the fleet of Portuguese vessels waiting to oppose him in the Bay.

Thus was the career of the greatest trading company of all time precariously launched, to be sedulously fostered by men of probity and ability, frequently of outstanding distinction in the ruling as well as the merchant world. For in the words of Sir Thomas Symthe,[18] each man selected must be "Partlie a navigatour, partlie a merchannt (to have knowledge to lade a ship), and partlie a man of fashion and good respect". It was to be a career culminating in empire, after an earlier epoch of vast enterprise and profit, of vicissitudes and complexities such as only Englishmen of the kind described seem especially endowed by nature to muddle through to wealthy and sometimes happy endings.

III

A Conjunction of Opposites

While royal stupidity in London was compelling independent American colonists by force of arms to break away and create a free United States, shrewd business sense and tactics backed by just enough military force and regal pageantry were coercing into unconscious Empire-partnership an alien conglomeration of ancient kingdoms on the other side of the world, in a rich sub-continental realm two-thirds the size of the present U.S.A. Since then there has evolved slowly, through diplomatic manoeuvers, that complicated jig-saw puzzle of "Presidencies", "Provinces", "Dependencies", "Protectorates", and "Native States" which has made up the Map of India until to-day; along with the tangled interweaving of racial, social, religious, and political strands of antipathy and ambition that still constitute the Problem—and Stalemate?—of India. But along with the commercial opportunism that made of this realm, in some ways, a cultural and social nightmare equivalent to the nineteenth century "insensate industrial town"—to use Lewis Mumford's phrase[19]—there came also into the country and its people's minds those seeds of liberty implicit in the mores and mentality of freedom-loving Anglo-Saxons. Even in that ancient soil, where the dynastic will has most sharply focussed, those seeds which so quickly flourished in virgin America, by slower growth took root and spread throughout the land and have now rendered their harvest. Independence has been won politically. It is not claimed even by ardent patriots that it has been established; but it has been granted.

The grant of independence has released India from artificial geographic, economic, and cultural bondage to England. At last students, scientists, scholars, and equally engineers, men of affairs and professional men and women will be flocking to this country. This rising tide has already assumed imposing dimensions. Whereas in 1926—when Mukerjee pioneered his trail into American sociology

[18] Sir William Foster, *Voyage of Thomas Best to the Indies*, 1612-14, Introduction, xiii.

[19] This characterization by no means implies that we do not fully appreciate how the partnership has also benefited India: in law and order, communications, transport; agriculturally, industrially, educationally, culturally.

—there were in Universities in the U.S.A. less than two score Indian students, there are today over 600.

In no branch of learning or research have we more to give than in that which Mukerjee has enriched: Sociology, and in particular, regional sociology and geography, for these sciences have much to contribute to the solution of both the internal and external problems of India, whose complexities are only matched by her potentialities. It is significant that Pithawalla turned to American physiographic science in 1939 in delineating a new geographic regional pattern for Indian geographers and teachers, as Mukerjee was earlier drawn to American social science. In the same category may be mentioned another American-trained pioneer in a closely related discipline, Dr. B. S. Guha whose ethnographic volume in the last Census of India series marks the opening of a new era in anthropology in India.

Space does not allow of any detailed discussion in this article of India's internal regional set-up. Pithawalla's classification should be compared with that of Cressey.[20] These geographers' patterns may be counted on as being more in accord with the slowly maturing outlines Mother Earth lays down than any political plans conceived and executed in London or New Delhi, or diplomatic or economic adjustments achieved by the United States or United Nations. It is as geographic Realms that the U.S.A. and India have peculiar mutual relations, and this by reason of contrasts within a frame of historical and geographic parallelism, rather than by reason of equivalence and long historical co-operation as in the case of China. Although a case might be argued in favour of certain geographic regional equivalences within the realms,[21] these are relatively superficial and secondary compared with the contrasts. In the case of China, the interest centres on resemblances, realm to realm, and on striking regional equivalences within the major realms as between China and the U.S.A., and the potentialities of regional co-operation arise out of the logical necessity of collaboration, realm to realm and region to region. With India, on the other hand, the equivalence (if it may be so called) is that of antithesis over all, within a frame of actual historical relationships as delineated in section II of this article, and of potential mutual destiny and collaborative relationship in the years to come.

With respect to India as a distinct, self-contained, and isolated natural realm we find the following cogent summary of its unique geographic position written by Cressey.[22]


"In many ways it (India) is an island by itself . So far as effective intercourse is concerned, the Himalaya might also as well be the frozen Arctic Ocean. . . . . India is as big and as populous as all of western Europe, and its claim to continentality is better than that of Europe. Devoid of good harbours or important near neighbours,

[20] *Asia's Lands and Peoples,* Chap. 31 and Map on p. 458.

[21] Broad resemblances exist, such as: U.S.A. midland River Area and Ganges-Brahmaputra; U.S.A. arid south-west, and north-west India; U.S.A. western Great Mountain Area and Himalaya System; U.S.A. south-west (and Mexican) Plateaus and the Deccan. These are outweighed by the contrasts: geologic, climatic, biological (flora, fauna, wild and domesticated), ethnic and cultural.

[22] *Asia's Lands and Peoples,* p. 414.

India remained isolated until modern times. Even today no railway crosses its borders."



Though it is actually vast peninsula, this geographic sub-continent is bounded by two coasts and an Arctic, as we are. What may be termed the potential geo-strategy of social-cultural-economic-political world relationships, as affecting India and the U.S.A., is summarised on Figure 1. It is interesting to note that the principle of antithetical counterbalance, which prevails throughout the history relations with England, and internally in almost every way as between the U.S.A. and India, is clearly shown in the Figure. The same arrows are all there: but all pointing in opposite directions! The currents of history have flowed in opposite directions—though never in opposition—and now they meet, and the union of destinies may be counted on to produce a fruitful and happy marriage.

It is the responsibility of scientists concerned with social geo-strategy to bring home to politico-economic planners the fact that this is a marriage not of nations but of *Natural Realms* in the patterning of Earth. As a philosopher-geographer has recently written,[23] "Man may artificially erect regionalisms, but their test of

[23] Roderick Peattie, *Geography in Human Destiny* (New York, 1940), pp. 211, 292, 294.

endurance is environmental. The earth has time on its side, and conquers in the long run.....The continuity in the long story of man is the environmental scene.....if the next peace is to last more than ten years it must make sound geographic sense".




fig 1. the italic letters refer to footnote **21** *in the text.*

16

THE SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT OF THE REGION

By LEELA JOSEPH

A region is a typical resource pattern for population. Region and population are interconnected in the sense that one cannot exist without the other. It is a typical system of inter-related roles or occupations of individual inhabitants. In other words there is a balance and mutual pressure of human along with other living and non-living communities in the region. On this bio-ecological foundation Mukerjee has for the first time introduced and amplified the scientific notion of the region, which he used effectively as a methodological tool for sociological analysis and classification. In his hands the concept is also important for social planning in so far as he shows that social progress or deterioration is intimately connected with man's symbiotic balance or unbalance with the region. Man's dominance or permanence on the scene of the earth rests on his harmony or disharmony with the rest of the living and the non-living realm.

Let us first appreciate the sociological significance of Mukerjee's definition of region. According to him, "the "region" as the focus of social-ecological investigation is a dynamic "field" or pattern, a "configuration" . . . . . produced by vast ecological processes shifting the life-balance now in favour of man, now against him".[1] The mutuality of adaptations, which are endless and ever-changing, gives us the picture of the total situation as a configuration. If any changes take place in the environment, automatically there comes about a complete change in the milieu in which plants, animals and humans find a new equilibrium through natural biological processes. Supposing there is a change in drainage and texture of soil or there is a spell of drought, then there is an entire transformation of the situation in which man with the rest of nature undergoes a change in biological status. Similarly man remakes the region whenever he introduces new cultivated plants, animals or insects into the region, changes from shepherding to agriculture and from agriculture to industry etc. In other words when man brings about any transformations in the region, side by side with that he revises the organic constitution of the region as well. Without the regional balance it will be impossible for the human beings to thrive in their habitat. As Mukerjee observes, man is part and parcel of the process by which the balance of the region is maintained or shifted.[2] In this process

[1] R. K. Mukerjee *The Regional Balance of Man,* University of Madras (1938), Introduction.

[2] *Ibid,* p. 2.

his entire socio-cultural heritage and development are implicated. According to him the ecological frame and the cultural pattern are facets of the same movement of a folk or people. In Lundberg's conception of a region as well, "all of man's "mind", "thoughts", "soul", "spirit", "culture" and "ideas", usually observed in the form of signs and symbols, are regarded as inextricably interwoven with all the other components of a region and are to be studied in the same way".[3] Not only is the balance of the region maintained or shifted but also the process is ever continued in the see-saw fashion now in favour of man, now definitely against him. In this process the whole life of inorganic nature is involved, though human beings take the initiative which sets in motion a series of processes which may upset or stabilise the order of nature. Social culture is very much dependent on this regional balance or unbalance. Unlike American ecology, Mukerjee emphasises concepts such as balance, organisation and regression deriving these from plant and animal ecology and has undertaken meticulous studies of the pressure of human and cattle population on the total socio-ecological complex in the crowded Ganges Valley.

A region is a particular type of field of force or situation viz. one in which it is desired to emphasise influence of the geographic factor. Mukerjee has made the following excellent statement as to the nature of the ecological region. "Perhaps the most important contribution of ecology is the idea of the region as an intricate network of inter-relations. The region exhibits a complex pattern of adaptations between the environmental factors and the plant and animal communities including human societies".[4]

Man's adjustment to his region has been dictated mainly by his instincts and by the traditions of his race. According to the ecologists, the animals and plants of a region form a vast complex in which every organism affects every other directly or indirectly and is in turn affected by all the others. Besides this all the organisms are influenced by their environment and in turn affect the character of the environment. It is true that man as well as animal respond to environmental conditions, but man's responses differ in kind from those of the animal. Man with his intelligence and organisation can devise tools and implements of self-preservation and mastery, which animals cannot. There must have been a time when man like animal had been forced to fit himself to a particular set of conditions. He could get out of the iron grips of the environment only when his intellectual capacity and social organisation started growing. Yet the old mechanisms of ecologic adaptation did not cease to work. On the other hand human initiatives and social adjustments established a balance of the human community, however viable, with the entire range of ecologic forces of the region. This was the only effective human way to establish the permanence of human civilisation.

[3] Lundberg, *Foundations of Sociology*, (Macmillan Co., New York, 1939), pp. 473-474.

[4] R. K. Mukerjee, *The Regional Balance of Man*, Introduction, p. 1.

Mukerjee's *Regional Sociology,* which he has followed up by many articles on distribution and succession and on the concepts of balance and organisation, is of great importance in the sociologists' study of the region, which he defines as "an area where many dissimilar species of inhabitants adapt themselves to a common existence so that the ecological community as a whole keeps on".[5] He warns repeatedly that man and his social organisation as an integral part of the region prosper or are doomed as the region as a whole prospers or is doomed. The elemental fact underlying the concept of region is the natural landscape with its fairly uniform and distinctive topography, climate and natural resources. Carl O Sauer has appropriately called this the "cultural landscape".[6] This landscape consists of the economic structure which rests upon the natural resources as they determine agriculture, industry, technology, wealth, nobility, income and occupation, the composition of the population, the effects of the ecological, economic, political and racial processes and the combination of cultures, each successive population increment brought into the area. Strictly speaking, the culture of a region arises out of these above factors and thus this culture comes to possess an obvious external uniqueness.

The role of regionalism in social problems may perhaps best be epitomised in the concept of the regional balance of man and nature and of culture and technology. It seems clear that a great deal of perhaps most of the tragic situations of maladjustment, disorganisation and pathology in the world is due to imbalance whether in terms of the lack of natural ecological balance between soil, plant and animal resources or between man and nature or whether in terms of the "haves" and "have-nots" in advanced civilisation. The heart of the regional balance is found in the search for equal opportunity for all the people through the conservation, development and use of their resources in the places where they live adequately adjusted to the inter-regional culture and economy of the other regions of the world or of the nation.

The wealth of nations is conditioned by the nature and use of resources, by the factors of situation and exchange, by general balance between men and resources and a real distribution as well as by the degree to which the regional quality and balance may be integrated and implemented through communication and transportation. The nature and the amount of wealth are also conditioned by the kinds of resources and the nature of technology and skill, which have developed those resources in the area where they are. In many ways the problem of race and caste in their genesis and development is essentially a problem of regional culture. The problem of peoples and regions and the concept of regionalism also appear as a thread running throughout the fabric of the whole of societal development. In regionalism the student of sociology will find an expanded ecology, in which he may study not only the history of

[5] *The American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 38, Nov. 1932, p. 349.

[6] Quoted by J. O. Hertzler in "Some Notes on the Social Psychology of Regionalism", *Social Forces,* Vol. 18.

the relation between an organism and its environment but also the optimum development of society in relation to various regional settings. The essence of the folk and of the folk society is found in the close relationship between the people, their culture and the lands upon which they live. Agriculture, industry, composition and distribution of population, social stratification and many of the major institutions are all conditioned by the folk-regional society, so that, if we can understand the folk in relation to their total regional environment, we have a framework for the understanding of how societies grow. The region and its culture as reflected in the folk-regional society, provides the best possible laboratory for social research in the sense that it is probably the smallest unit of society in which all phases of the evolution, development and behaviour of the people can be studied adequately. It provides an areal laboratory large enough to comprehend all of the activities and factors involved and small enough for an all-inclusive inquiry.

The region greatly influences the individual personality. The individual personality may be looked upon as being largely a product of the cumulative power of regional conditioning. It is the region which supplies the plan for personality patterning. If the region can be viewed as a collectivity of individuals, it will show many distinctive collective behaviour traits along lines determined, influenced or affected by the whole regional milieu. Mukerjee alone has dealt with some of these features of collective behaviour, which have a strong tendency to show a regional pattern. He states, "a common occupation and mode of life are dictated by the common environment and these mould and assimilate people into a distinctive life group". Basically the physical environment of the region evokes the kind of labour or economic behaviour, which, under the given cultural conditions can best utilise the natural resources. Regional segregation through its selective power stabilises these reactions, and the gregarious contacts of the people reinforce and integrate them. Through the legacy of occupation, tradition and culture, the behaviour of the group acquires a unitary character. Not only these occupational, economic and psychological features but also the inorganic and biological features are selective factors in the social interaction of the region. These are all subject to a variety of ecological processes. By means of all these, the inhabitants at any given time are in rapport with their region and this undoubtedly takes the form of collective behaviour and habits of living.

Today the science of regional sociology recognises the fact that many types of regional division or demarcation may be valid from the point of view of various types of study or for different purposes. Thus Odum and Moore discuss the primary types of regional study as having to do with National Regions in connection with soil, topography, and climate, River Valley Regions, Metropolitan, Rural, Literary and Aesthetic culture Regions and Service Regions. According to Mukerjee, regions in India may be delineated in terms of climate, vegetation, the distribution of domesticated animals, irrigation types, modes of land utilisation etc. India has been and is divided and administered in accordance with all these kinds of

regionalism. About twenty five years ago Mukerjee's new methodology of regional interpretation had its vivid impact on American sociological science. In his preface to his *Regional Sociology* he wrote: "Already we are glimpsing a Human Ecology which seeks to provide us with the keys to the origin of diverse social types correlated with the plant and animal communities of a natural easily distinguished region . . . . . thus combining the regional and historical methods, sociology can direct the use of comparison on a somewhat large scale which is indispensable for its forming concepts and generalisations applicable to all social types and regions".[7] The basis of Mukerjee's regional sociological conspectus was human ecology. The scientific classification of social like that of biological types must be related to ecology, which traces the relations of the activities of organism to their environments. Regionalism indeed plays an important role in our sociological studies. It is the basic geographic regionalism to which we must adhere, for this determines the fundamental regional character of the continental natural realms we seek to compare in terms of their inter-relations, their resemblances and their contrasts.

The social psychological aspects of regionalism are not yet quite explored by the regionalists. Neither have the social psychologists discovered the region as that areal unit, which is so rapidly becoming a matter of general interest in social investigation, planning and administration. The region is the elemental constituent unit of the total larger society everywhere and is the smallest unit for study that combines all the factors of time, geography and folk behaviour essential to complete analysis. As the unit of all folk-regional society, the region is the creator of culture.

Now we will consider whether regionalism as a framework for study and planning may be characterised as a science. Research into areal situations, phenomena in the fields of geography, biology, ecology, history, economics, anthropology and sociology—this body of knowledge is represented by regionalism scientifically. Secondly, regionalism can be rightly called a science in so far as it represents a basic inquiry into the organic character of the relation between men and resources, areas and culture and physical and cultural environments. Besides this, regionalism lies at the basis of world ecology and helps to interpret sociology as a science; it measures the capacity of social organisms to function within the framework of their natural environment. Regionalism may also be interpreted as a science in the sense that it comprehends what can be called the folk-regional society, which is the smallest unit through which all society can be studied. Odum on whose regional interpretations the impress of Mukerjee's writings is obvious, observes: "For the purposes of understanding the scientific nature and the comprehensive background of regionalism it is important to note the universality of its application to all societies. Regionalism not only helps to understand the organic nature of culture but also helps to explain the modern world and

[7] R. K. Mukerjee, *Regional Sociology*, (Century Co., New York and London, 1926), Preface, pp. 6-8.

aids in finding direction for the new post-war world. Perhaps one of the best ways to understand the generic meaning of regionalism is to survey the world regions in which people and resources have found their setting, but often in situations of imbalance and unevenness. Such world regions . . . . include climate regions, regions of natural resources and regions of situations bounded by rivers, mountains and oceans".[8]

How far has regional sociology affected American thought? A clear and complete insight into American regionalism will help us to answer this question. An understanding of the world culture of the present and of the future which is conducive to the planning of any realistic post-war world reconstruction has to be preceded by a thorough understanding of the American regionalism, which can be divided into two viz. that of North and South America and that of the United States alone. In France, regionalism has meant a protest against excessive centralisation in politics and culture; it has led to the reconstitution of the provincial universities and to the active economic development of regions like the French Alps. In Denmark regionalism has meant the adaptation of Danish agriculture to dairying and export trade and the achievement of a democratic culture. In England however, regionalism has worked out a characteristic theory of civilisation enriched by a harmony of local cultures. Regional planning councils have come into existence and thus a movement has been created whose purpose is to colonise the country with new cities fully equipped for industry and culture, thus reducing the pressure of the existing centres. The regional approach proves to be a very sound theoretical approach, which enables the sociologists to have a clear idea of the society and also of the growth of cultures, beginning with the folk in the region and expanding into bigger communities which combine other regions and gradually empires and nations. The study of regionalism emphasises the total society as made up of regional parts rather than focusing as an end on the local region. Regionalism does not however result in competition and conflict because, the very essence of regionalism lies in matching resources and people in each region—a strategy which seeks mostly those arrangements, which compete least with those of other regions. In other words, the main objective is enrichment of the region and the people in relation to the total nation.

The greatest evidence of the regional quality of a big country like India or the U. S. A. is found in the cultural quality and loyalties within each great region. Region and culture are interconnected in the sense that the way of each region is the way of its culture and each culture is always identified with its region. This is not only nothing new but has always been recognised as a definitive part of understanding peoples and their institutions and ways of living. This fact has always been recognised by anthropologists and sociologists in their study of cultures. It has always been appreciated by the common people in their loyalties and devotion to their own and

[8] Odum, *Understanding Society*, (Macmillan Co., New York. 1947), p. 99

their criticism of other customs and institutions. Regional attitudes and mores are so powerful that they indeed constitute rights and wrongs and they sometimes seem inevitable since the type of culture differ so radically.

Regionalism can be said to be a tool for democratic world reconstruction as well as for social planning. The society of tomorrow can be best organised for human welfare through cooperative regionalism rather than economic nationalism. Hence it is a tool for democratic world reconstruction. It is a tool for social planning because of two main reasons: (1) it takes into consideration the rights and privileges and resources of the people and areas and stresses self-government as opposed to "coercive centralized power"; (2) it offers scientific technical ways of developing and conserving resources for human-use ends. Thus when we come to understand the most important problems of democracy, social control, urbanisation etc., we find that it is through region alone that a permanent balance between man and the land and between urban and rural life can be worked out. In regionalism may be found an exact scientific and practical medium for proper representation of minorities as well as majorities and of peoples in all regions and sub-regions of the central nation. It is only through the utilisation of regional adaptation that the best use of resources can be had and the best adaptation of the people to their environment can be made.

For any given area, several elements like position, area, climate, soil, minerals, waters of the land, oceans, coast lines, native vegetation, native animal life etc. may be found to make up the geographic background. Position exists in reference to other regions; it determines the accessibility or isolation of cultural groups. Area sets limits to the quantity of population that may be supported and thus aids in determining national strength. The valley, plateau, mountain range or plain affects climate by means of altitude and influences communication. Climate itself is composed of many factors: temperature, humidity, cloudiness and prevailing winds. Together with soil and minerals, climate furnishes the basis of the greater part of what we call natural resources. Growing out of the inorganic environment are the biological factors like native vegetation and animal life. Surface features, types of soil, the annual range of temperature, the mean annual rainfall etc. furnish nature's conditions for vegetation. Not only is the plant complex conditioned by these physical factors, but plants themselves exist in what may be called communities. As the ecologists have shown, in every area there exists a delicate equilibrium of plant contending with plant for a place in the sun and the soil. Animals subsist on plant life and on each other, so that we may think of man's organic milieu as an equilibrium of plants, animals, insects, parasites, all in contact and all interacting through natural biological processes. In passing to the realm of the organic, man's milieu has become increasingly complex. The change of any factor in a region as variation in rainfall or the introduction of a new plant or insect is sufficient to establish a new equilibrium. In so far as animals prey upon vegetation and upon each other they may be regarded as the superstructure of this complex,

but when man arrives on the scene he becomes the new superstructure. Man's so called conquest of nature accordingly has consisted in disturbing nature's equilibrium of flora and fauna. From native plants growing in a region, man has developed the few at the expense of the many, outlawing them as weeds and attempting their extermination. He has introduced exotic vegetation. Cotton, corn, wheat, rye, oats, cane and fruits are "pampered monstrosities" created and kept alive by man. To the fauna offered by nature he has been no less arbitary. Wild animals of the forest have been exterminated. Agricultural ecology has recently stressed that a complete replacement of native by exotic plants and destruction of the fauna of the region or their replacement by domesticated stocks lead to agricultural havoc. Mukerjee has illustrated this by his meticulous survey of some parts of the middle Ganges plain where "biotic interferences" in the form of introduction of new crops and enormous multiplication of cattle population together with the extermination of small herbivorous mammals has led to deterioration in human standards of living and even the thinning out of population due to the unbalance of land, flora and fauna.[9] All this further strengthens the significance of the scientific concept of the region and the role of regionalism in agricultural and economic rehabilitation and social planning in general. In both *Migrant Asia* and *Races, Lands and Food* Mukerjee utilises the concept of a cooperative regionalism for the proper development and conservation of resources in pioneer lands, and for sane and equitable adjustment of the resources, claims and goals of old inhabitants and new colonists. The notion of the region is utilised as a tool for scientific, planned colonisation and settlement and inter-regional cooperation that might wipe out the global food shortage and at the same time evolve the local folk-regional society and culture. The key to the removal of the present unbalance and injustice in many undeveloped territories of the world is offered by regionalism rather than by racialism and nationalism. It is obvious that the basic notion of the region as the unit of sociological study which Mukerjee first introduced in his *Regional Sociology* is a flexible and efficacious methodological tool that will have wider and variegated applications for both the understanding of peoples, societies and institutions and for social reconstruction on a nation-wide and world basis rooted in the development and conservation of resources for stable human-use goals and values.

[9] R. K. Mukerjee, *The Regional Balance of Man.*

VI–SOCIAL ECOLOGY

James A. Quinn, University of Cincinati

Leopold V. Wiese, University of Cologne

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17

MUKERJEE, A PIONEER IN SOCIAL ECOLOGY

JAMES A. QUINN

It is gratifying to be invited to contribute to a book that has the purpose of honouring a scholar of the stature of Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee. I am happy to be able to express, even though inadequately, my appreciation of this distinguished person's pioneering efforts in one field of human knowledge, that of social ecology.

Anyone who has scanned the imposing bibliography of books and articles produced by Dr. Mukerjee has, no doubt, been impressed by the range and versatility of his knowledge. These diverse materials do not, however, stand as separate areas of information that have little meaning for one another. On the contrary, with few exceptions, each of his books and articles deals with one or more interrelated aspects of a single totality—namely, the inter-relations between culturally organized human groups and their regional environments. Thus, Dr. Mukerjee's varied writings on economic institutions, occupations, government, population balance, migrations, and environment all find a place within a unified theory of social ecology.

Professor Mukerjee may be credited with having published the first constructive, systematic, theoretical book on social ecology.[1] This accomplishment was preceded by more than two decades of theoretical development during which both he and other scholars contributed constructive ideas and negative criticisms to this emerging discipline. Because one cannot otherwise fully appreciate the worth of Dr. Mukerjee's contributions, I shall refer, briefly, to a few of these earlier publications, first by other pioneers, then by Dr. Mukerjee himself.

In their introductory text in sociology, published in 1921[2], Professors Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess laid one important basis for later differentiation of social ecology as a separate discipline, by distinguishing between the sub-social process of "competition," by which men influence one another through the medium of limited quantities of environmental products, as contrasted with those human social processes of inter-action that take place through language communication. Two years later, in 1923, Professor H. H. Barrows, in his presidential address before the Association of American Geographers, defined human ecology as synonymous with human geography, thus placing further emphasis on the need for an integrated study of relations between man and environment.[3] In 1924, Professor Roderick D. McKenzie, then working closely with Professor Park, read a paper before the American Sociological Society in which he formulated his early conception of the nature of the field of human

[1] *Social Ecology*. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1945.

[2] Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1921.

[3] H. H. Barrows, "Geography as Human Ecology," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 1923, Vol. XIII, Pages 1-14.

ecology.[4] During the next decade, both Park and McKenzie published several articles in which they attempted either to describe the scope and nature of human ecology, or to give greater precision to one or more of its major concepts, such as dominance and succession.[5] In one of these publications, in 1929, Professor Park discussed the *ecological index* as a device for quantifying elusive aspects of human social relations and, thus, of making sociology more exact.[6] In 1934, McKenzie issued a large mimeographed volume of readings in human ecology, organized chiefly around the concepts of "social aggregation", "mobility", "ecological organization", "dominance", and "succession".[7] In this same year, the author of the present article attempted to give clarity and precision to the delimitation of differences between ecological and social processes, as previously suggested by Park and Burgess.[8] In 1935, Professor C. C. Adams, a biologist, published an article declaring that human ecology forms only one of several branches of the biological science of general ecology.[9] He listed a number of concepts and principles that had already proved valuable in studying the relations of plants and animals to their respective environments, and recommended their use by human ecologists. During this same year, Professor J. W. Bews, a botanist from South Africa, published the first book entitled *Human Ecology*, in which he pictured the field as an inclusive synthesis that embraces the study of all aspects of man as a living organism, all aspects of physical and social environments *per se*, and all aspects of reciprocal relations between man and environment.[10] Meanwhile, Professor Ernest W. Burgess, together with Professor Park and a number of graduate students at the University of Chicago, had focussed attention on the internal spatial structure of the city and on the distribution of various kinds of data as related to this "spatial ecological organization."[11] In 1939, Miss Milla A. Alihan brought forth a highly

[4] Roderick D. McKenzie, "The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community", *The American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1924. Vol. XXX, pages 287-301.

[5] Robert E. Park: (a) "The Urban Community as a Spacial Pattern and a Moral Order," in Ernest W. Burgess (ed.) *The Urban Community*, pages 3-18. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1926; (b) "The Concept of Position in Sociology", *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1926. Vol. XX, pages 1-14; (c) "Dominance: The Concept, Its Origin and Development," in R. D. McKenzie (ed.), *Readings in Human Ecology*, pages 381-385. Roderick D. McKenzie: (a), "The Scope of Human Ecology," *The American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1926. Vol. XXXII, pages 141-154; (b), "The Concept of Dominance and World Organization," *The American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1927. Vol. XXXIII, Pages 28-42; (c) "Human Ecology," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1931. Vol. V, pages 314-315.

[6] Robert E. Park, "Sociology," in Wilson Gee (ed.), *Research in the Social Sciences*, pages 3-33. New York; The Macmillan Company, 1929.

[7] Roderick D. McKenzie, *Readings in Human Ecology*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: George Wahr, 1934.

[8] James A. Quinn, "Ecological Versus Social Interaction," *Sociology and Social Research*, July-August, 1934. Vol. XVIII, pages 565-570.

[9] Charles C. Adams, "The Relation of General Ecology to Human Ecology," *Ecology*, July, 1935. Vol. XVI, pages 316-335.

[10] J. W. Bews, *Human Ecology*. London: Oxford University Press, 1935.

[11] Ernest W. Burgess: (a). "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project," *Publications of The American Sociological Society*, 1927.

critical volume, entitled *Social Ecology,* in which she attacked much of the theoretical framework of human ecology, especially as represented by Park, McKenzie, Burgess, and their associates.[12] Also, in 1939, Professor A. B. Hollingshead under the editorship of Professor Park published six chapters on "Human Ecology" in a student handbook entitled *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology.*[13] These chapters, with title headings "human ecology and the social sciences," "aggregation", "ecological organization", "dominance", "migration and mobility", and "succession", presumably summarized the conception of the field that had emerged from the joint efforts of Park and McKenzie.

During this period of early development of social ecology and its emergence as a somewhat distinct discipline, Professor Mukerjee either preceded or paralleled other pioneer human ecologists in his development of ecological concepts and their application to regional research. In his *Borderlands of Economics,* published in 1925, he pleaded for incorporating the materials and methods of plants and animal ecology into economics and in the treatment of economic and social evolution stressed the reciprocal adaptation and mutual helpfulness of plants, animals and men in a common environment.[14] In addition to his other publications dealing with migrations, land planning, food problems, and economic and political institutions, especially as related to India, he produced several articles and books dealing specifically with the field of social ecology. His earlier works in this field were devoted to the thesis that the human region forms the proper unit for studying human relations, because only within the regional area can one best understand the complex inter-relations between culture-bearing human groups and the plant, animal, and non-living environments with which they interact. Presumably, human social behaviour, social institutions, and human problems of adjustment cannot be fully understood apart from the regional complex. More specifically, his *Regional Sociology*[15], published in 1926, defined human ecology as "a synoptic study of the balance of plant, animal, and human communities, which are systems of correlated working parts in the organization of the region."[16] In 1928, he published an article on the "Social Ecology of a River Valley" in which he applied his thesis to a specific type of regional area.[17] During the years, 1931-1933, Professor Mukerjee published six

Vol. XXI, pages 178-184; (c) "Urban Areas", in T. V. Smith and L. D. White (eds.), *Chicago: An Experiment in Social Science Research,* pages 113-138. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1929.

[12] Milla A. Alihan, *Social Ecology; A Critical Analysis.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1938.

[13] A. B. Hollingshead, "Human Ecology", in Robert E. Park (ed.), *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology,* pages 63-168. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1930.

[14] *Borderlands of Economics.* London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1925, page 288; preface to *The Regional Balance of Man,* page III.

[15] *Regional Sociology.* New York: The Century Co., 1926.

[16] In prefaces to *Regional Sociology,* page VI and to *Man and His Habitation,* page VII.

[17] "Social Ecology of a River Valley." *Sociology and Social Research,* March 1928. Vol. XII, pages 341-347.

articles in British and American sociological journals, each devoted to some aspect of ecological analysis of regions, and ordinarily with specific use of revelant ecological concepts.[18] In 1937 Professor Mukerjee was invited to lecture on human ecology at several outstanding European and American Universities. On this tour, various American ecologists had the opportunity of exchanging ideas with him. After his return to India, Professor Mukerjee published *The Regional Balance of Man: An Ecological Theory of Population* in 1938 bringing together the materials presented in the courses of lectures delivered in Europe and the U.S.A. and also his earlier Meyer Foundation Lectures at the University of Madras (1935-36).[19] In 1938-39 he delivered a series of lectures before his colleagues at the University of Lucknow, which were published under the title, *Man and His Habitation: A Study in Social Ecology*.[20] This volume, although presenting several aspects of a systematic theoretical approach, was organized primarily around the analysis of types of habitation—primitive, rural, urban—and of man's typical adjustments within each type. In 1945, he produced the first volume organized deliberately as a constructive, systematic, theoretical treatise on *Social Ecology*.[21]

Possibly a brief explanation should be inserted as to why I credit Professor Mukerjee with having produced the first constructive, systematic, theoretical book in this field when other authors had previously published books or sections of books under the specific titles of *human ecology* and *social ecology*[22]: (1) I feel that short articles, or books, that deal with only a special part or aspect of the field do not qualify for the honour. Neither do concrete research studies, that omit systematic discussion of theory, meet the test. (2) Professor McKenzie's volume (1934) consisted almost wholly of selected readings written by many authors. Although he may be credited with developing a theoretical frame of reference for selecting and

[18] (a) "The Processes of Regional Balance," *The Sociological Review*, October, 1931. Vol. XXIII, pages 173-181; (b) "The Concepts of Balance and Organization in Social Ecology", *Sociology and Social Research*, July-August, 1932. Vol. XVI, pages 503-516; (c) "The Concepts of Distribution and Succession in Social Ecology", *Social Forces*, October, 1932. Vol. XI, pages 1-11; (d) "The Ecological Outlook in Sociology", *The American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1932. Vol. XXXVIII, pages 349-355; (e) "The Broken Balance of Man and Region", *Sociology and Social Research*, May, 1933. Vol. XVII, pages 403-408; (f) "The Ecological Unbalance of Man", *The Sociological Review, October*, 1933, Vol. XXV, pages 233-243.

[19] *The Regional Balance of Man: An Ecological Theory of Population*, University of Madras, 1938.

[20] *Man and His Habitation: A Study in Social Ecology*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1940.

[21] *Social Ecology*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1945.

[22] Professor Mukerjee utilized the designation *social ecology* rather than *human ecology* because he wanted to exclude consideration of the relations between the individual organism and its environment. Botanists generally had included in human ecology both (a) group relations to environment (synecology) and (b) individual relations to environment (autecology). Professor Mukerjee regarded social ecology as synonymous with human synecology. American sociologists generally ignore autecology completely, and use both designations, *human ecology* and *social ecology*, to refer to the narrower field of *human synecology*.

organizing these readings, McKenzie himself did not produce an integrated text. (3) Professor Bews (1935) included much more than has become accepted as falling within the realm of social ecology. His point of view comprehends in their entirety all sciences that deal with man, with environment, and with relations between man and environment—including, for example, human anatomy, physiology, psychology, anthropology, ethnology, climatology, geology, and sociology. His volume summarizes materials from several such fields, but does not analyze them in terms of a systematic framework of ecological concepts and principles. He spends his effort almost exclusively on emphasizing the general wholistic thesis that no part of a complex whole can adequately be understood except in relation to every other part. (4) Miss Alihan (1938) remained negatively critical in approach. She did not attempt to formulate a systematic theory of human ecology. (5) Professor Hollingshead (1939), although systematic and theoretical, presented only a bare outline of the field, as one of five parts of a larger outline of "principles" of sociology. (6) Therefore, credit for having produced the first entire book, written by a single author, which attempts to systematize constructively the theoretical concepts and principles of social ecology, belongs to Professor Mukerjee.

In his various publications cited above, Professor Mukerjee has made use of most, if not all, of the concepts of social ecology—such as aggregation, balance, competition, competitive-co-operation, concentration, distance, distribution, dominance, equilibrium, invasion, mobility, organization, pyramid, status, stratification, and succession. Some of these concepts aid especially in interpreting regional structure (organization); others in analyzing changes in this structure. For example: Within a given environmental setting, different types of organisms continually compete and co-operate with one another. The complex web of competitive-cooperative relations brings about both (a) the distribution of organisms and activities in space, and (b) the distribution of specialized types of individuals and groups within stratified ecological pyramids. Dominant units, either individually or in concentrated clusters, typically obtain favoured positions both in space and in the stratified pyramids. At the optimum, both organisms and specialized activities distribute themselves in space and in dominant-subordinate strata so that all achieve on the average, maximum adjustment to the environment and to one another. Although, in one sense, the regional complex generally tends toward a condition of balance, such an equilibrium does not remain stable. Changes in the physical environment itself, the introduction of new varieties of competitors or the extermination of old ones, the spatial mobility of competitors, the greater success of some classes of competitors, the development of new forms of transportation or production, or changes in the cultural-moral standards of the population, all tend to alter an existing regional complex. A migratory population for example, may invade a formerly segregated area and ultimately bring about a population succession which, in turn, affects all other aspects of the integrated web of regional relations. Of course, some of these changes may be introduced from outside the region itself, thus requiring analysis of the relations of the region to the larger

economy and society within which it operates, Regional structure, or organization, is not to be conceived, therefore, as characterized by a condition of stable equilibrium. Instead, it is constantly subject to change. Also, within a regional structure, the spatial position and the status of an individual participant may be subject to violent change, particularly in a society characterized by extreme competition, individualism, and emphasis on pecuniary values.

Professor Mukerjee should be complimented for escaping a major theoretical error made by one of the most illustrious of American pioneers in social ecology, Professor Robert E. Park. The error by Professor Park lay in his attempt to exclude the factor of culture from his conception of ecological relations. He conceived such relations among men as similar to those taking place among plants and lower animals—entirely devoid of the cultural factor, and occurring solely at a sub-cultural level. This error has resulted in considerable confusion and controversy among American sociologists, somewhat to the detriment of the field of human ecology. Professor Mukerjee, in contrast with Professor Park, recognized clearly that even though ecological relations among men are similar in several fundamental ways to those among lower organisms, they cannot fruitfully be separated from culture, not even for purposes of scientific abstraction. Cultural norms necessarily affect both the values for which men strive and the specific ways in which they compete and cooperate with one another. Contemporary human ecologists, almost without exception, now accept the point of view expressed by Professor Mukerjee rather than that utilized by Professor Park.

Both Professors Mukerjee and Park maintained that social ecology gives promise of making the field of sociology more quantitative and exact than it had been previously. They agreed that by turning attention to measurable data such as size, density, and movement of population, number and types of specialized occupations, spatial and time-cost distances, and pecuniary values, sociologists might be able to quantify some of the more elusive aspects of social-cultural relations which previously they had been unable to measure. To this end, these scholars would make use of *ecological indexes* which, being both measurable and functionally related to social-cultural items, would presumably permit exact scientific study of the latter.[23] Although the actual use of ecological indexes to date has not fulfilled the high hopes of these pioneers, and possibly will not do so in the future, the emphasis on studying only quantifiable, measurable aspects of human relations has greatly influenced the course of sociological research.

I shall mention, in passing, one point about Professor Mukerjee's position on which I remain somewhat uncertain and confused. I have been unable to obtain from his books and articles any clear-cut, consistent picture of his conception of the relation between social ecology and sociology. Possibly the confusion results from my own

[23] Robert E. Park, "Sociology", in Wilson Gee (ed.), *Research in the Social Sciences*, pages 3-33. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929; (b) Radhakamal Mukerjee, *Social Ecology*, pages 221-223. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1945.

failure to understand exactly what he has written, but the fact remains that I have not obtained the precise answer I should like to have. I seem to find a considerable amount of support, in different parts of his writings, for each of the following points of view: (1) That social ecology studies the entire regional complex which includes not only relations between regional environment, spatially distributed population, and ecological pyramids, but, also, the social-cultural milieu. Sociology is primarily concerned with the latter. Therefore, social ecology, as the more inclusive field, embraces sociology as one of its sub-divisions. (2) That social ecology studies only the measurable aspects of regional environment, population, occupations, and economic relations, and it omits consideration of non-measurable social-cultural phenomena. Therefore, it stands as an essential basis for sociology; but the two disciplines remain distinct. (3) That sociology includes the study of all aspects of the regional complex that affect man's social behaviour. Therefore, if social ecology is limited to the study of directly measurable influences, it constitutes one narrower, specialized sub-division of sociology. (4) That sociology and social ecology may be regarded as identical if both are conceived as including complete, systematic analysis of all aspects of the relations between cultured human groups and their regional environments. Fortunately, the lack of a clear-cut statement of differences between these fields and of their relations to one another does not lessen the value of other contributions that Professor Mukerjee has made.

Regardless of how he may have delimited the fields of social ecology and sociology, Professor Mukerjee properly stresses the two-fold character of integrated group relations. In this matter he seems to reflect the influence of Emile Durkheim. He emphasizes the fact that cultured men create and maintain many specialized sustenance activities in their competitive-cooperative group adjustments to environment. This specialization-integration, division-of-labour aspect of group relations may be best analyzed by beginning with the basic concepts of mobility and position (status), in relation to both spatial distribution and stratified ecological pyramids. The specific forms of regional division-of-labour structures unquestionably influence the forms of social-cultural relations that accompany them. At the same time, however, culture-bearing human groups exhibit moral codes and values which, once they have become established, add new dimensions to social behaviour. These social-moral ties of *consensus*, themselves, affect the integrated division-of-labour aspect of the regional complex as well as being influenced by it. Complete understanding of human social behaviour within a region requires analysis of both the division-of-labour and the consensus aspects of group relations. To the extent that Professor Mukerjee has clarified the differences between these two aspects of group structure, has analyzed the reciprocal relations between them, and has encouraged greater objectivity of observation and wider use of quantitative measurement, other social scientists—whether known as sociologists or social ecologists—are greatly in his debt.

18

THE "HEIMAT"[1], IN THE LIGHT OF ECOLOGY

By LEOPOLD V. WIESE

I

A sociologist who sets himself the task of tabulating, of classifying, such relationships as exist between one human being and another finds himself immediately up against a problem. How exactly is he to assess that significant feature of life summed up by the word: "Heimat"? The difficulty seems to lie in the fact that this term embraces not only a link between the individual and the actual *Lares* and *Penates* of his home: but it suggests, likewise, that subtle connection between himself, his native soil, and the people by whom he is surrounded. Speaking scientifically, this is a matter of ecology, a question of regionalism. But also, and no less significantly, it is a question of the whole vast study of inter-personal relations. Indeed it would scarcely be wide of the mark to describe the material soil of the "Heimat" as nothing more vital than that physical medium fostering the growth of inter-human behaviour; that is to say such behaviour as exists within the framework of the family circle; the framework of the community; that of the race itself, and its very traditions. Added to which there remains that special link with environment—be it country or town—which causes the individual to regard it in the light of a fragment of the natural world peculiarly essential to himself. You love—or you may scorn—the venerable skyline of your Cathedral town on the bank of the river; those picturesque houses; the village green, or perhaps the horse-pond in the meadow. Nature's work and the work of man: you see them blended in a perfect whole. The storied past, those colourful scenes now playing themselves out on the stage of the market-square, the hush of the churchyard, all these belong, at one and the same moment, to the realm of humanity, as to the natural world. Values aesthetic and ethical are inextricably interwoven so that, to the tiller of the soil, it is by no means easy to determine whether he rejoices in the thought of his wheatfield because of the harvest it holds in store, or delights in the sheer beauty of its rippling ears, or the plough-team in its furrow—a sight dear to him since the days of his childhood.

This deep-seated attachment to the "Heimat" plays a leading part in the temperament of those who long for security; who enjoy fellowship with kindred spirits; and for whom the words "perversity" and "resentment" hold no meaning whatever. Those, however, who

[1] The word "Heimat" in its truest fullest sense, cannot be translated into English (or French). As well as the mere domestic features of the home, it expresses the idea of that locality in which one was born and brought up. In an abstract sense it can be said to imply all that is suggested by the term "atmosphere".

are made of sterner stuff are likely to dismiss this passion for the "Heimat" as nothing more vital than sentimental twaddle. At any rate, they steel their heart against such weakness, lest it turn to their own disadvantage. Then there are the victims of incurable wanderthirst. Everyday life, with its humdrum routine, the stifling horizon of parish politics, is to them the cause of acute suffering. Theirs the urge to go forth to the ends of the world: to grapple with adventure: to feast their eyes on all things new. Take the dream of the lad standing by the water-front, longing to join those who "go down to the sea in ships": the case of the explorer, who will know no rest till he seizes the chance to study the customs of strange lands. *Anything* rather than the same old boring faces; the dreary round of gossips; those monotonous streets.....

Ask these birds of passage a few years later on exactly what they have to show for their travels, and you will learn of different reactions. To begin with there are those who at last were able to "find themselves": to discover, and to make use of, their own particular gifts. Had these remained at home they would, assuredly, have gone under. They just *could* not have stood up to the pin-pricks of routine, in the midst of people considered by them incapable of seeing an inch beyond the length of their own noses. Perhaps they come back for a temporary visit. With the smile that conceals both embarassment and emotion not without patronage, it is true, but also not without genuine warmth, they greet the provincial town of their schooldays, the scene of the years of their apprenticehood, those relatives—old "stick-in-the-muds" though they be, those associates from an earlier chapter in their lives: yes, even the enchantress of that pristine love-affair, now changed into a plain and buxom housewife. And then, yet once more, they experience the urge to be off on their travels again: not without the unspoken reflection, "The Lord be thanked I need not stop to vegetate in this hole!"

More numerous, unfortunately, are the disillusioned. "If *only* I had had the sense to stay at home in the Old Country! What had the world of foreign lands to offer to such as me? Where was I to turn for support, for sympathy? Oh the strain, the hopelessness of the attempt to make oneself even so much as understood through the medium of a language not your own! While as for the *loneliness* of it all: the homesickness, the longing to re-trace one's footsteps—does Life indeed hold anything much worse?"

But cases such as this are by no means the most serious. Consider the plight of such unfortunates who have been actually driven from their homes. This, to-day, constitutes the fate of people by the rate of the hundreds of thousands. It is rightly the subject of much talk and literature all of which however can do little to help. But here, instead of covering old ground, I will merely point out that this horde of persons falls, yet once again, into certain specific types. There are those who have no hope; whose emotional fare consists but of melancholy and longing. Their retrospective glance sees nothing of the past other than those glories now departed for ever. Beauty, freedom, solace: these are not to be found beyond the frontier of a land now far away, in the desecrating hands of the foe. For them the tree of life has been torn out of its soil; it can there-

fore do nothing but wither. Oh could they but make sure they would be *buried* in native ground! They have managed to salvage just a sackful of their earth. This they carry with them as they go their stony way. To them it is a holy relic.

By their side stand those less sensitive souls, able more or less to acclimatize themselves to one atmosphere as to another. If they find they are up against it, why they curse the foreign soil. If all goes well they jostle shoulders with the natives and instinctively go native themselves.

Between them are the many, who drift this way and that, driven by the conflict of these conflicting forces. Under the influence of ever changing impulse, they bear their lot with courage: or—alternatively—despair.

Those persons for whom the love of "Heimat" holds no meaning —and homesickness, conversely, no terrors at all—may consist of the class of people aforementioned who, suffering from the harshness or narrow outlook of home life, have been forced to travel in order to find conditions sympathetic to their development. This is a type not to be under-estimated. Usually however individuals of this kind prove themselves either defective in character, or they may even be psycho-neurotic. They find no entrance to that inner world of psychic emotions.

But to return to devotees of the "Heimat", we may possibly find amongst these a set of extremists, unable to respond to any form of stimulus which the outer world has to offer for their delight. It is with nothing less than a sigh of relief that they return from the most extended, the most representative of foreign tours. "Oh the joy and comfort of being home once more! Here at least we need not cudgel our brains in order to get wind of what's going on around us! Home .....:when all's said and done, there's no place like it!" Well—and what's the objection to this? It is only in excess that the love of one's own four walls is a matter to be deplored. One may love one's home, the scene of one's daily work, one's town, one's country more than anything else on earth. But if this should lead to lack of spiritual response to anything worthwhile that one may come upon abroad, why then it is no more than the unattractive hallmark of an impoverished mind.

II

Between that tie which binds us to the "Heimat", and the consciousness of belonging to a group, there exists an obvious difference. To the back of the purely man-made group, we discover the typical social force. Loyalty to the "Heimat" however is bound up, as a rule, with the very heart itself. The Church, the State, the various professions: great institutions such as these possess, to a greater or lesser degree a power, which they tend to impose on such action and thought as may come within their orbit. But it is not only these vast national bodies which have to be guarded against on this account. Society has its own methods of compulsion. It wields, to a varying extent, power to which the Man in the Street is virtually forced to conform: unless of course he is content to be regarded either in the light of a revolutionary, or—at best—an eccentric.

Indeed the greater part of his subjective life is under the control of influences such as these. In general, however, he responds, not unwillingly, to dictates of a type he does not recognize as such, but considers purely as a matter of free will. Nevertheless, the more some people grow conscious of their own restricted initiative, the more an element of dissatisfaction comes to permeate the social herd. It becomes aware that its burdens are heavy. It begins to feel a certain lack of independence; sees itself thwarted at every turn. It starts to understand, in short, the nature of that discipline to which, unwillingly, it has succumbed.

How different from all of which the sweet surrender to the "Heimat"! This does not stultify, it rather liberates the soul: provided of course the groups of people here involved—the family, the profession, the social circle—do not exploit such willing allegiance to the point of wearing down personality. It may be a matter of the purest expediency to enter a partnership, to join a society, to play one's merely formal role in the intercourse of family life. But that which is poured out upon the altar of the "Heimat" is, as a rule, a freewill offering of the heart. Often it has not been so much as asked for, even. Devotion of this kind may occasionally, it is true, be assumed from motives of sheer self-interest. To the genuine lover of the "Heimat" however, it appears as something which is quite inevitable: something inextricably, and closely, interwoven with the very texture of his body and his soul.

III

Hitherto we have confined our attention to that aspect of the "Heimat" to be found in the realm of the physical. The "Heimat" however has its place, no less, on the more spiritual side of life. You may be told: "My 'Heimat' lies within the world of my books . . . . " "It lies within the singing strings of my fiddle. . . . . " "Within the sanctuary of my old-world parish church . . . . " Granted, in these cases, that the "Heimat" referred to embodies itself in some subtle form of matter: matter which, under certain circumstances, is able, virtually, to recreate that atmosphere which the word "Heimat" conveys to the mind. But there are no limits to those heights where we may soar. How about the student who declares that his "Heimat" is the sphere of Plato, Augustins or Goethe? "Heimat" to a temperament such as this, suggests a means of escape—no less—right out beyond the plane of this material life, into a dream-world of reason and fantasy.

But be it town or country, or Elysium itself, always predominant we find the idea that, somewhere in this concrete world or in this world of thought, there is a place of sanctuary where the spirit may know itself secure: where it may lay aside the horrid consciousness of having continuously to stand on its guard in order to avoid being wronged, misunderstood, or to suffer the misery of the unloved. To be continually on the alert, prepared at any moment to defend oneself what place has this in the atmosphere of the "Heimat"? At home, it matters not at all what you may be. The thing that counts is the fact that you are—YOU!

To be without a "Heimat"—even in the world of thoughts—can

only lead to a wild misdirected search for this feeling of security, whatever the form, and at whatever the cost. To the utter restlessness of present-day life, to the accelerated tempo of its rhythms, is to be attributed the fact that genuine feeling for the "Heimat"—demanding leisure to ponder and reflect—has become much less universal. Or on occasions it may possibly break out, either in some form of acute distress, or in a state of nostalgia for some condition assumed to be ideal. That brutal practice of political forces to remove whole populations from their home without so much as a consideration for their wishes forges the chain of a whole cycle of human woe. But even where, after generations of exile, a race may migrate back to the land of its forebears, there to form a community (as for example in Israel the Jews) those returning are likely to find themselves sundered from the past by the very fact of their having spent so many generations in a foreign environment. This may of course be mitigated by an unchanged religion which fuses together past and present, or by such persecution as may be inflicted by countries purporting to offer the blessings of hospitality to these victims of time and circumstance.

IV

This crying need at the heart of the individual, as of the nation itself, to hold unbroken the link with the "Heimat" is a matter devolving grave responsibility upon the shoulders of politicians, both of to-day and of to-morrow. It is a not to be disputed fact that only the creation of vast "culture spheres" extending right over such boundaries as normally separate nation from nation—and forming unassailable reservoirs of power—can be the one and only conceivable answer to the riddle of the safeguarding of our humanity. The wielding of such force as is not to be resisted—force acquired by some particular country to be used for the winning of its own peculiar ends—this is a tool in the shaping of world history which must be regarded as inadmissible. We may however discover some method of evolving a form of Continental control, of national conformity: the spirit of which must oppose itself directly to the conservative outlook of those smaller communities, that, in the cultivation of their "Heimat", are only too ready to separate themselves from the recourses of those lands surrounding it. Suffering untold could in this manner be swept away. But, with the expanding of such national horizons, new dangers come into the picture. At the most recent anthropological-sociological conference, the problem of Europe and the European formed the subject of our discussion. The following point was then made by myself: "Those social groups which have been handed down to us through the medium of history and tradition are utterly dependent for their power upon a force both vitalizing and essential to mankind. This force is none other than this love of the "Heimat"; none other than this love of the family, complete with all its ramifications; the love of the community surrounding the family; the ultimate love of that nation itself into which a man has the fortune to find himself born. Or, where the term "love" may be too strong to apply, there is still to be found a certain gratitude, a respect, towards a State, the function of which is nothing

more or less than the protection of its subjects. Within the framework of a scheme of culture on a scale that is international, this same love of the "Heimat", this identical pride of race, this fellowship of language and historical background, all such local and picturesque customs as may be retained for the general good: these—all these—must be encouraged to live on, to play out their part to the heights and deeps of their power. But the continued, the independent, existence of the force of an element even so vitalizing as this, must by no means omit to contribute its quota— must seek to render no form of injury—to the greater abundance of life to be found in the new international circle. It must not prove itself in the nature of an obstacle in the path of understanding between the nations: in the path of international co-operation; the achievement of aims on an international—yes, on an inter-continental scale. More and more, by division and with pooling of labour, the concentrated life-force of that innermost circle must radiate its strength for the happy evolution of that broader Federation in which it has its being."

It is no part of the natural law that, with the formation of new national groups, features from the life of the smaller communities such as might with advantage be retained should, of necessity, fade out of the picture. Indeed—to turn for a moment to that dream of an, alas, far distant future—in a brotherhood of peoples embracing no less than the entire surface of the very globe itself, there may very well still exist one indispensable plot of earth, one fragment of the world which a man may call his own: that sanctuary of the heart to which his spirit may belong, as to no other spot in all a far-flung Commonwealth. This must however pre-suppose some form of policy, both beneficent and wise, able to appraise at its true worth the value of the minor community within the scope of the vast cosmos of nations. Here, as in everything, the basic law for the ruling of mankind with justice and with wisdom consists in determining the relative merits of a state of independence and self-realization and in striking the balance between these two extremes. Love for the "Heimat" must not, in short, be allowed to stay on in the role of an honourable pretext for the tending of no more than one's own national cabbage-patch. Rather, it should sublimate—it should redirect the full strength of its emotion to form the vital source of such world-collaboration as is capable of changing the whole story of mankind: the fount of that humanity, which draws us to our fellow-men —and our prolific mother, the Earth.

19

PREDICTING HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

By ERNEST W. BURGESS

The outstanding fact about the city, the characteristic that makes it a city, is growth. And growth for American cities almost without exception has been unplanned growth. This growth, then, can be conceived as a natural process—one susceptible of description and analysis in terms of location and movement in space and time.

The growth of the city considered in its simplest aspects and in terms of its most evident characteristic is radial extension outward from its center to its periphery. If population units be abstractly conceived in time as a process of being poured in at the center of the city (where as a matter of fact the majority of newcomers arrive) and expanding outward, the shape of the city would take the form of a circle, and the growth of the city could be stated in terms of rings of growth such as exhibited by the tree.

If, as is typically the case with American cities, the center of the city is occupied by retail and wholesale trade and its periphery is selected for the more desirable residential districts then "the rings of growth" offer an ideal construction of the process of urban expansion. Thus the spatial pattern of the city may be represented as a series of concentric circles.

The inner circle is "The Loop" or the central business district. Its center is the retail trade area of department stores with its adjoining theater streets, transient hotels, office buildings, financial district and railroad stations. Around the retail district is the wholesale trade area. Teeming with workers during the day and with theater-goers at night, almost its only residents are transients in hotels and casual workers of the flop houses and cheap hotels.

The second circular area is the Zone in Transition where the inner factory district tends to encroach upon residence. Here are located the neighborhoods of lowest residential desirability, the so-called "slums", marked by physical deterioration and neighborhood disorganization. With low capacity for residential resistance they are the ports of first immigrant settlement. In the slums Negroes, Mexicans, and Orientals find a foothold. As will be seen later these neighborhoods exhibit high rates of social problems and of mental disorder.

The third circular area is the Zone of Workingmen's Homes within which reside skilled and semi-skilled laborers wishing to live near but not too near their place of employment. The neighborhoods in this zone are typically areas of second immigrant settlement inhabited by those who have escaped from Zone II.

Beyond this zone is the fourth circular area of better residence with high-class apartment house buildings and restricted residential

districts of single homes. This zone is inhabited by the white-collar office and professional workers.

Still further, out beyond the city limits, is the fifth or commuters' zone of suburban areas and satellite cities within a thirty-to-sixty minute ride of the Central business district. The suburb is a favored residential area for those who work, shop, and belong to clubs and attend theaters in the central business district but wish to avoid the disadvantages of urban residence. The satellite city is a community industrially dependent upon the metropolis but which maintains independence in its other functions.

This conception of the form of the city as a logical resultant of its growth is the chief ideal construction in the study of the urban community. Other important ideal constructions must be taken into account if we are to explain the vast discrepancy between the ideal type of the city which would exist if radial expansion outward from the center alone determined its pattern of growth and the city as it actually appears to our senses in its almost infinite concrete variety.

What then are the other ideal constructions which distort the concentric pattern of growth and give the city a form varying widely from that of the circle?

1. The location of a city on a water front, particularly upon the shore of the ocean or a lake, at once changes the series of circles into semi-circular zones. Along the Great Lakes this is notably the case with Chicago, Toronto, and Cleveland. A river front has a somewhat similar effect, although in this case there is a marked tendency toward the growth of a dwarfed twin city upon the other shore. St. Louis has its East St. Louis; Kansas City, Missouri its Kansas City, Kansas; and Detroit has its miniature double, Windsor, Ontario.

2. Favored residential position also distorts the simplicity of the ideal form of concentric circular zones. If the favored residential position is a lake or a river front situation in what would otherwise be Zones II and III, then that desirable section is added to Zones IV and V as is pre-eminently the position of the North Side lake front in Chicago. To a lesser degree this is the case with the South Side lake front up to the point at which the South Chicago steel mills have claimed it for industry.

Another favored residential position is elevation in the form of ridges, hills, mountains, and last but not least residential skyscrapers. In Montreal, Canada, the concentric circles are vertical. The central business district and its adjoining area of deterioration are at the foot of the zones of residential desirability which rise along the slopes up to the crown of Mount Royal. Similarly, in Seattle with its seven hills, social status corresponds with physical elevation. In Los Angeles the tops of mountains, especially those with ocean view, are pre-emptied by millionaires; with the economic status of residents declining with descent down the mountainside. In skyscraper apartments the rise in rents indicates the higher residential desirability of each succeeding story from the first to the nth floor.

3. The street pattern as a factor influencing the shape and directions of city growth may also be considered as an ideal construction. If the city grew according to the conventional pattern of the

real estate dealer its form would be a square. Actually, however, the shape of the city tends to be a diamond. This outcome is due to the fact that the first settled areas are those equidistant from the center of the city. The result is that the north-west, north-east, south-east, and south-west diagonal halves of the quadrants of the square tend to remain uninhabited. Thus, the populated area approaches the form of a diamond.

4. In addition, the pattern of street car lines and the more rapid forms of transportation such as elevated lines, subways, and railroad suburban transit will still further modify the shape of the city. Typically in American cities the main street car lines and rapid transit lines run north and south and east and west. Accordingly, the emphasis on distance in terms of time instead of spatial units pushes the points of the diamond further out. The city in its contiguously settled territory tends to take the form of a cross patee popularly but erroneously called the Maltese cross, the form of which we are familiar in the case of Indianapolis and Columbus. Cleveland has this same form with the omission of the northern point of the cross. Chicago follows this pattern with the eastern section of the cross absent because of Lake Michigan, and with its north-western section settled rather than uninhabited. This exception to the pattern is the result of transportation along the diagonal radial lines of Milwaukee Avenue which runs north-west.

5. Barriers constitute still another ideal construction. No matter what the barriers—rivers, elevated railroads with abutting industry, boulevards with their fleet traffic of speedily driven cars—they all have the generic characteristics of obstructing movement, whether it be residential, commercial, or recreational. The restriction of residential movement by these barriers gives a temporary stability to cities as shown by the local communities separated from each other by barriers of rivers, elevated railroads with adjacent industries, by parks and by boulevards. The industrial residential community may be defined as one that is typically entirely surrounded by railroad and industrial property. The residential community by contrast is bounded by parks and boulevards. These natural barriers hold back the forces of radial expansion in city growth. By reason of the protection of barriers local communities when they change tend to change slowly at first and then rapidly, but almost always as units.

All of these ideal constructions should be used in elaborating a theoretical model of human behavior in the urban environment in terms of points of location, lines of movement and the circular, quadrilateral, and other patterns of population distribution and movement.

But it is necessary in this paper to limit our predictions of location and movements of individuals, groups, and institutions within the city to the operations of one factor, namely, that of the ideal construction of the radial tendency of expansion and movement from the center of the city to its periphery.

This ideal construction of urban zones is susceptible to statistical formulation and verification, and it lends itself to the prediction of the growth of the city.

It is of interest first to point out three generalizations inherent in this typology of the natural process of city growth. The predictive significance of these generalizations will be presented.

1. Just as all the four inner zones of the city were once contained in the present Zone I (the central business district) it can be confidently predicted that with the continued growth of the city Zone I will encroach upon Zone II (the area in transition), and this zone of the slums will run into Zone III (the district of workingmen's homes), which in turn will invade the better residential district. This process of residential succession can of course be reduced to quantitative terms. Slum areas, for example, can be defined as areas of housing demolition and of decreasing population and the outward movement of indices can be charted.

2. The movement of races and nationalities can be charted and analyzed in terms of radial movement outward from the center to the periphery. Each incoming group in turn—the native stock, the first immigrant, the Irish and the German, the Scandinavian and the German Jew; later the Polish, the Italian, and the Lithunian; still later the Negro and the Mexican—have all entered at the center of the city at points of low residential resistance and have followed some main radial line in their progress across urban zones toward the promised land of Suburbia. The native-born of native stock rapidly moved along the lake front north, Madison Street west, and the lake front south. Today they are a minority of the adult population within the city limits but have taken refuge in the exclusive suburbs of Lake Forest, Hubbard Woods, Winnetka, La Grange, and River Forest. The Germans and Scandinavians moved north along Lincoln Avenue, followed in turn by the Hungarians and Italians, with Negros occupying one of the neighborhoods of early Swedish settlement in the Near North Side.

On the west side Germans and Scandinavians followed the Milwaukee Avenue radial north-west to the city limits, with the Poles now crowding hard upon their heels.

The Italians in the nineties pushed out Scandinavians west along Grant Avenue and have followed it as it twisted north-west beyond the city limits into Melrose Park. An early Negro settlement was upon Lake Street. After forty years Negroes have progressed westward several miles along a front of less than one-half mile. Taylor Street has been the radial of Italian movement west following upon the retreating Irish. Russian Jews settled along Twelfth Street, now Roosevelt Road, and have marched west upon it across Douglas Park, occupied North Lawndale and have penetrated into Cicero and Berwyn. Negroes now occupy the old Ghetto district and now traversing the same line of westward movement. In solid phalanx the Czechs have followed Twenty-second and Twenty-sixth Streets west from the Pilsen neighborhood into South Lawndale and across the municipal boundaries into Cicero and Berwyn.

On the South Side, the Irish went south along Halsted Street followed now by Lithuanians. Poles are now going south along Ashland Avenue. The Negroes who early found an asylum on South State Street have penetrated several miles south to 67th Street and even beyond into Lilydale, although their progress east has been

seldom over a mile and westward but one-half mile.

This uniformity of movement along radial lines affords the basis for the prediction of the direction of future movement. The past and thereby indicated future course of succession of races and nationalities has been statistically studied[1] by Paul F. Cressey for the census periods 1910-30, and continued by Richard G. Ford through 1940.

3. The placing of individuals, groups, and institutions is indicated by the concentric zonal construction of city growth and the survival or failure of a given case of location predicted. A hobo finds a habitat in and around the central business district: no other zone will accommodate him. P. G. Cressey[2] discovered that taxi dance halls quickly folded up outside their natural habitat of the non-family man areas of the city. Protestant churches, stranded in immigrant neighborhoods in Zone II, die or survive only by secular transformation. Boy scout troups flourish in the residential districts but languish in settlement neighborhoods where boys' gangs are prevalent. Chain stores succeed in apartment house neighborhoods but have difficulty in surviving in immigrant areas where trade is still largely bound up with friendly contacts.

The foregoing generalizations and predictions are largely qualitative even though they are susceptible to statistical procedure. Other generalizations with associated predictions may, however, be shown graphically upon maps and can be reduced to definite statistical formulation.

Since 1910 Chicago has been divided into census tracts. These tracts, now numbering 935, make possible the tabulation of census and other data, the calculation of rates according to population, and the graphic presentation of these rates upon maps. These rates for small areas of Chicago when depicted upon a map of the city indicate the tendency of any given social phenomenon to be distributed in a regular order according to the ideal construction of concentric zones.

Density of population exhibits the characteristic zonal pattern with high density around the central business district and declining density outward to the periphery of the city. The effect of another factor—the apartment-house area—is to be noted in extending high density rates along the lake front.

Increase and decrease of population for 1920-50 exhibits the zonal pattern in an interesting way. The greatest decrease is in Zones I and II, the central business district and the so-called slum areas of rooming houses and first immigrant settlement. The areas of stationary population fall in Zone III, the district of workingmen's homes. The big increases in population are in Zone IV, the better residential region and in Zone V, the suburbs where commuters reside.

The percentage of homes owned rises regularly from the center to the periphery of the city.

[1] Paul F. Cressey, "Population Succession in Chicago", *American Journal of Sociology*, 44, 1938, pp. 59-69; and Richard G. Ford, "Population Succession in Chicago", *American Journal of Sociology*, 56, 1950, pp. 156-60.

[2] The Taxi-dance Hall, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1932.

The economic status of families as measured by capacity to pay rents and by rental value of homes owned increased along radial lines from immigrant areas outward to suburban districts. Here again is to be noted the association of apartment house areas along the lake front with higher capacity to pay rent as well as the connection between the South Chicago industrial district and lower rent paying capacity.

Educational status, as measured by median grade completed school, follows much the same zonal pattern of distribution as economic status.

Marital status, in terms of the increasing per cent of the population married, increases as one proceeds from the loop towards the suburbs.

The 1931 census of the unemployed during the depression also exhibited the familiar pattern of the concentration of the unemployed in Zones I and II and their scattering toward the periphery. To be noted, however, are the exceptions of heavy incidence of unemployment in certain outlying industrial communities such as Hegewisch, Pullman, West Pullman, and Brighon Park.

The highest percentages of the population on relief in 1933 were to be found in and around the loop with the South Chicago industrial district as usual showing relatively high rates.

The map prepared by C. R. Shaw giving the residences of male juvenile delinquents 1917-23[3] again indicates high concentrations in the zone of first immigrant settlement, much lower numbers in the area of workingmen's homes and very low incidence of cases in the better residential districts.

The distribution of venereal disease as reported by a special survey showed the clustering of cases at the center of the city and their progressive decline towards the periphery.

Significant also is the fact that rates of mental disorder as determined by the distribution of cases in both public and private hospitals[4] show the same zonal pattern of rates with highest proportions at the center and lowest percentages at the outskrits of the city.

From this series of distributions the evidence appears quite convincing that different series of social data at least roughly approximate the ideal construction of the five concentric zones. What are the possibilities of more accurate measurement of these apparent progressive increases or decreases in rates from the center to the periphery?

This notion of measuring an assumed regular progression taking place in space introduces the concept of gradient.[5] By gradient is meant the rate of change of a variable condition like poverty, or home

[3] *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1942.

[4] R. E. L. Faris and H. Warren Dunham, *Mental Disorder in Urban Areas,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1939, p. 36.

[5] See E. W. Burgess, "The Determination of Gradients in the Growth of the City", *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* 21, 1927, 178-84; and J. A. Quinn, *Human Ecology,* New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950, pp. 275-76; 438-40; 457-69.

ownership, or births, from the standpoint of its distribution over a given area.

A first requisite for the determination of gradients in urban growth was the securing of a suitable unit area for comparative statistical data. The census tracts proved serviceable for this purpose because, while they are not often identical in size, they are almost always some division of a mile, often one-eigth of a square mile, a size entirely satisfactory for a unit district.

It next was necessary to select a series of tracts to measure the effect upon the urban community of radial expansion. It seemed highly desirable to choose a line of unit districts which had experienced the full force of radial expansion, uncomplicated so far as possible by the presence of other factors. The choice, therefore, fell upon the line of tracts running westward from the central business district and lying just south of Madison Street, since this thoroughfare is by far the clearest illustration of the effect of radial extension from the dominating business center, uninfluenced by the lake front and other complicating conditions.

The line of tracts running west along Madison Street starts in the central business district with the intersection at State Street, which 200,000 people pass daily, and extends through the zone in transition, the zone of second immigrant settlement, and the middle-class residential zone, and ends in the higher-class residential district of Oak Park.

The unit districts, if one-quarter of a mile wide, would give theoretically 36 unit districts in a nine mile line from State Street to Harlem Avenue, the west boundary of Oak Park. Actually, these 36 districts units are represented by 20 census tracts.

The figures on home ownership indicate the method used in the determination of gradients. In the first census tract (unit districts A1 and 2) the percentage of families owning homes is less than 1; in the second district tract (unit districts A3 and 4) it is 1 per cent; in unit districts B5 and 6, comprising one census tract, it is 4, rising to 7, then 12, then 15 and 18, falling to 17 and 16, and then rising to 23, 29, 30, 31, 40, and finally to its highest point 62 per cent, in Oak Park. These $\frac{1}{4}$ mile unit districts were combined into one-mile unit districts (as represented by the letters, A, B, etc.) by giving each unit district equal weight. Using this procedure a quite regular upward gradation of percentage of families owning homes is obtained. The gradients of home ownership are particularly significant, since home ownership is both one of the most important negative indices of mobility and one of the positive indications of stability not only of the family but of community life.

The data obtained from the census made it possible to tabulate in the same way the percentage of the total population in these unit districts of males, of persons twenty-one years and over, and the percentage of foreign-born. In all these cases the differences are most marked in the unit districts in the first four or five miles, although in all cases the difference is very great from the loop to Oak Park; percentage of males from 85.5 per cent to 47.0 per cent; persons twenty-one years of age and over, from 88.2 to 66.4; and percentage of foreign-born, from 39.0 to 14.

In a similar way the incidence of poverty, divorce, and juvenile delinquency rates were calculated for these tracts. It is significant to note that the highest rate of poverty occurs in the zone of first immigrant settlement, while the two high points of the divorce rate appear in the outer half of the zone of first immigrant settlement and the inner half of the zone of second immigrant settlement. The objection may well be made that the incidence of both poverty and divorce is figured on total population, whereas poverty should be calculated upon the number of families and divorce on the number of married persons.

Not only along the West Madison Street radial, but along nearly every other radial selected, the rate of juvenile delinquency declines from the center to the periphery of the city.[6] Certain variations do appear as, for example, the rise in rates of delinquency where a radial extends into an industrial district, as in the South Chicago area. In the boy-delinquency rates where the boy population of 11-17 years is taken as the base, the most striking differences are obtained as from 443 per 1,000 in the first mile unit, 58 in the second mile, 27 in the third mile, 15 in the fourth mile, 4 in the fifth mile, and none in either the sixth or seventh mile. In the first two one-quarter mile units of the central business district, over half the boys were brought into the juvenile court in an 18 months' period.

A quantitative analysis of the actual course of change in these unit districts was made by a comparison of the rates of increase or decrease of population. In the central business district and in the greater part of the zone in transition, land values have risen due to present or prospective business use, although population has declined. The point of low land values, however, marks the movement westward of the zone of deterioration. Interestingly enough, the high points in land values at business intersections appear to forecast residential deterioration of the neighborhood. The area of stationary or slight increase in population is marked by drops in residential land values, while the areas of rapid increase in population give the highest gains in residential land values.

The rates of distribution of juvenile delinquency and insanity may be calculated not only by radial lines but by zones. Zonal rates of juvenile delinquency as prepared by Shaw show that for the zones as a whole and as arbitrarily defined by two mile units, delinquency rates decline from the center to the edge of the city.[7] The same is also the case with rates of mental disorder when measured by sectors within the zones of the city.[8]

A question may now be raised: Are these findings true for Chicago but not for other cities? Has the assumption that Chicago is a specimen of other American cities been put to the test? Fortunately, Shaw[9] has extended his studies of the zonal pattern of the distribution of juvenile delinquency to other cities. In the following table findings are presented for Chicago and eleven other Ameri-

[6] Clifford Shaw, *op. cit.*

[7] *Op. cit.*

[8] R. E. L. Faris and H. W. Dunham, *op. cit.*

[9] *Op. cit.*

can cities where zones were arbitrarily laid out by one to two mile units. From a study of the table it is evident that the pattern for Chicago applies also to all but two of these other cities.

TABLE I

Zone Rates of Male Delinquents for Twelve Cities in the United States

Cities	Width in Miles	Per Cent Delinquent Males of Males of Juvenile Court Age					
		Zone I	Zone II	Zone III	Zone IV	Zone V	Zone VI
Birmingham ..	1	14.7	6.9	6.4			
Boston	1½	11.7	8.0	3 6	2 7	3.1	4.3
Chicago	2	9.8	6.7	4 5	2.5	1.8	
Cincinati ..	1½	18.3	9.4	4.8	4.4	3.0	
Cleveland	2	19.5	11.0	5.7	4.5		
Columbia	1	18.4	10.5	8.4	5.0	3.5	
Denver	..	9.4	7.1	4.2	3.7	3.2	
Evansville ..	..	18.6	12.0	7.2			
Little Rock ..	1	8.5	5.7	3.8			
Omaha	1	10.2	5.2	2.9	2.7	3.3	
Philadelphia ..	1½	11.6	6.8	4.4	3.5	3.4	1.7
Richmond.. ..	1	19.7	12.2	6.4			

The ideal construction of urban zones then may be accepted as a valid conceptual scheme applicable to city life both in qualitative analyses and in quantitative measurement. It must be used with due recognition of the other ideal constructions available for research, any one of which might have been used for generalization and prediction.

This ideal construction of concentric urban zones is, as shown by the distribution of urban problems, indicative of community organization and disorganization. This zonal pattern is a convenient instrument for measuring the gradations between the extreme of residential mobility at the center of the city to the opposite extreme of residential stability in the suburbs, between the emancipation of the individual in the anonymity of the moral regions in the downtown and roominghouse areas to the maximum of community control of the person in the residential, single-home neighborhoods, from the heterogeneity of the loop crowds to the homogeneity of population in the specialized suburbs. The zonal pattern is a research tool fashioned for the qualitative analysis and quantitative measurement of community organization and disorganization.

As such, and to the extent that the zonal pattern permits generalization, it also makes possible prediction. The zone which had

the highest rates of bad housing and poverty thirty years ago is, somewhat expanded, the belt of bad housing and poverty today and will be still further expanded to constitute the region of bad housing and poverty ten years hence. The delinquency area of five decades ago is, with a contracted inner area and an enlarged marginal area, the delinquency area of the present year, and will constitute the largest part of the enlarged delinquency area of 1960.

What is the meaning of these generalizations and predictions from the standpoint of social control? Do they mean that no control is possible? Not at all. They *do* mean that much well-intentioned social and political efforts are futile and even harmful when they are instituted without regard to the powerful forces inherent in the natural growth of the city. They *do* mean that effort which is constructive must take account of these forces and deal with them. They *do* mean that zoning, public or private housing projects, delinquency prevention programs, etc., to be successful, must be oriented with reference to these trends in the very patterns and processes of urban growth.

Furthermore, this conceptual system of urban growth makes feasible measurement of the effect of welfare programs when these are thought of as social experiments.

It then becomes possible to develop the measurement of the success or failure of programs such as zoning, slum clearance, and delinquency prevention. In other words, under these circumstances it is feasible first to predict the future incidence, let us say, of juvenile delinquency in a particular neighborhood, to institute a program of treatment and prevention of juvenile delinquency, and then to introduce an accounting procedure to find out whether or not it has been possible to make the original prediction false. When this takes place, the city may be regarded as a social laboratory in which experiments may be undertaken under conditions which the social scientist will attempt to take into account and calculate.

This conceptual scheme of urban zones should not be regarded as in any sense dogmatic or sacred. It is a working tool of research, an instrument of understanding, of measurement, and of prediction. Its value consists in the fact that it is an index of the natural tendencies of city growth and that it reduces to some order and precision what might otherwise be regarded as too complex and complicated for generalization, prediction, and control.

20

THE ECOLOGY OF THE AGED

By RUPERT B. VANCE

The distribution of the aged population offers a neat problem for ecology. From the theoretical point of view a study of this phenomenon should offer a chance to confine the techniques of population analysis with the approaches used in human ecology. In a society as much given to mobility as the United States the distribution of older people should have much to say about the mode of life.

The United States as an organized society stands committed to the values of longevity—a long life and plenty of it. Since we have been able to implement these values—and our demographic situation is favourable—we would expect to find aged people everywhere. An analysis of the ecology of our old people accordingly must be devoted to the explanation of differentials: that is, the question is why larger proportions of aged people are found in certain areas and types of communities? Two answers are possible. The aged will be found in greater proportions in (1) areas to which they have migrated and in (2) areas in which larger proportions of the mature population have remained to grow old together. The whole content of this paper will of necessity be devoted to the interplay of these two themes.

I

Retirement from the labor market might well be accepted as the crucial act in determining the ecology of our aged population. Here possibly for the first time in their mature lives, individuals find themselves in the position where the place they reside is not determined by the requirements of the job. From now on they can be oriented to their own needs as consumers rather than to the demands the economy has placed upon them as producers. This is a situation which cuts both ways. If ever they wanted leisure to spend, they have it now. If ever they lacked money with which to enjoy leisure, it is probable they will lack it now.

Our first effort accordingly is to answer the question: what effect does retirement have upon the location of old people? If we had asked this question of an older generation we might have received in answer the refrain of a sad old song: "Over the hills to the poor house." If we had looked for stereotypes in the roaring twenties, we would have been told that "the retired farmers of Iowa are going to California to spend their declining days in the sunshine." If there is a rationale connecting retirement with location, it behoves us to examine it.

No doubt when old people retire some will follow the impulse to go "where the livin' is easy," in Porgy's immortal song. These are the ones we should expect to find in certain California commu-

nities and in St. Petersburg, Florida. Such special communities are worthy of detailed study in the ecology of the aged. Those who retire to these sunshine cities are also the ones we may expect to find in the well-known higher income brackets and among those whose employers have set up fairly generous pension schemes. What we have come to here is the hypothesis that migration of the aged is a function of economic position with the suggestion that the most likely migrants at older ages will be those with retirement incomes.

There is another approach to the set of hypotheses which seem to be emerging from our statement of the problem: old people may have to move, if they lack means to support themselves as independent households in the locality of current residence. Here we would expect the aged, especially women over 65, to go where relatives are located. Since these relatives are usually their children, we would expect this stream of migration to follow the paths followed by the mature population twenty to forty years ago. We also have some reason to expect single oldsters to be more important than couples in this movement. If their children have not migrated, neither will this group of old people.

To develop an ecology of old people it is necessary then that we know something about their retirement status and their family characteristics.

Examination of labour force data indicates that at age 60 years about four-fifths of the men in 1940 were still in the labor force of the nation. From age 65 to 74 almost half the men were still in the labor force. After 75 the proportion dwindled to less than one in five. A decade ago it seems that old men were more likely to stay at home with a job than to retire. If they migrated it would be as a member of the labor force. Aged women in the labor force, on the other hand, never rose higher than 13.6 per cent for those aged 60 to 64 years. It fell to 2 per cent for those 75 and over. Rural-farm males continued longer in the labor force, rural-non-farm males dropped out sooner.

We may secure a partial answer to this question: "Where do the old folks live?" by an examination of the statistics on marital status and family composition. They indicate in 1940 that 68.8 per cent of those 65 and over lived in their own households; 16.4 per cent in households with sons or daughters; 10 per cent with other relatives or as lodgers; 2.5 per cent in institutions and 1.6 per cent with other relatives or as lodgers; 2.5 per cent in quasi-households, apartment hotels, boarding homes and the like. Men tend to live in their own houses more than women, 75.5 per cent compared to 62.5 per cent. Women more often lived with sons or daughters, 22.2 per cent to 10.4 per cent. Older males maintain their own households longer if they live on farms (78.6 per cent); women, in rural-non-farm areas 68.8 per cent. Larger proportions of older women (27.0 per cent) also live with their children on farms. From such facts Marion B. Smith drew the following conclusions: (1) a large part of the aged men in 1940 were living in their own homes with their wives, and were wholly or in part self-supporting through their labor. (2) A large portion of the elderly women were not living in their own domiciles but in establishments with their sons

or daughters and they received their support wholly or in part from their offspring or from the state in the form of old age relief.

Moreover there are more older women than men and a higher proportion are widowed. In the middle classes and above consistent efforts are made to leave "an estate" or insurance for the widowed. Therefore we have every right to assume in 1940 that the impact of older men on the ecology of the aged was in terms of orientation to the productive economy while that of women was in terms of "retirement" in quotes, and affected for many by the decision to reside with their children. We would thus have to assume that older women are more migratory than men. No assumption about aged couples is justified from these data.

II

In our search for hypotheses about the ecology of the aged, we must focus our range finder on areas as well as on families. In terms of our theoretical model, we have said that two areas should emerge: areas to which the aged go and areas in which the aged are left. Where then do the oldsters stay and where do they go? On farms, in villages, or in the cities? On the West Coast, in New England, Florida and California, or the Middle West? Where do older men predominate and in what type of communities and areas is the excess of older women to be found?

In twenty years from 1930 to 1950 the sex ratio of all the elders fell from 101.3 men per 100 women to 84.4. There are now 900,000 more women than men over 65. In urban territory older women exceed older men by more than a million, in rural-non-farm territory by 80,000. The account is balanced on farms where there is a surplus of 209,000 men among the older group. In every census period older women were found more often in urban and less often in rural farm areas. Aged men as would be expected, show greater predominance in rural farm territory. Analysis by five year age groups in 1950 shows that on farms older men come to exceed older women around age 55. In other residence groups women invariably predominate in all ages over fifty except for age 60-64. This offers some indication that our surplus of aged women may be transferred from the 60-64 year old group.

More and more the population old and young has shifted from countryside to city. From 1910 to 1950 the change went on with the aged showing consistent partiality only for the rural-non-farm residence. Of the people over 65 in 1940, well over half (56.2 per cent) were found in urban places, 21.8 per cent in rural-non-farm territory, and 22.0 per cent on farms. This followed very closely the distribution of the total population, with the aged found to be over-represented only in rural-non-farm territory. Preliminary sample figures from the 1950 census show large decreases in farm residence with over-representation of the aged in both urban and rural-non-farm territory.

Our 12,321,000 old people in 1950 were divided among the country's major regions with a majority in the northern regions: 28.2 per cent in the North East, 33.1 per cent in the North Central states and the minority in the South, 25.9 per cent and West, 12.8 per cent.

Highest proportions of the population are aged in the North Central States, 9.2 per cent, and the North East, 8.8 per cent. The South West has only 6.8 per cent 65 and over. Only 5.8 per cent of the South's Negroe population are 65 and over.

By region the residence of old people tends to follow that of the total population with exceptions. In 1940 only two of the nine Census divisions conformed to the United States pattern—relatively most persons 65 years old and over in the rural-non-farm population and least in the rural farm. By 1950 only the South out of four main regions failed to follow the national pattern. Here rural-farm residence was preferred to rural-non-farm residence. In the North Central States, however, elders disproportionately prefer rural-non-farm communities; in the West they avoid farms and seek the cities to a greater extent than do the total population.

The picture can be narrowed to the state level only for 1940. Examination of the extremes shows that New Hampshire then had the highest proportion of its residents aged 65 and over, 9.7 per cent, and the highest proportion on rural farms, 13.2 per cent. Minnesota and Iowa were both high, 9.8 and 8.9 per cents, but Iowa was the most unusual in having 13.3 per cent of its rural-non-farm people over 65. Colorado had the highest proportion of elders in its urban areas, 9.6 per cent. South Carolina and New Mexico had the least, 4.2 and 4.4 per cent. Neither Florida nor California were unusual.

While the internal structure of the city has not been adequately studied from this point of view, we would expect to find old people in settled residential areas 30 and 40 years old and other older areas invaded by industry and business. Following McKenzie's model, James A. Quinn in his Cincinnati studies found elders in goodly proportions in (1) an old residential area which had not deteriorated greatly, (2) in an old village encompassed by the city, (3) around the central business district (men) and (4) in certain apartment hotels. Calvin F. Schmid found that in large cities older people show a tendency to live in the higher income areas, T. Lynn Smith presents data showing that the *village* rural-non-farm populations have a higher proportions of aged than the *suburban* rural-non-farm peoples, the latter being in general a later settlement. Many institutions for the care of the aged are located in the open country and this fact may increase the importance of rural-non-farm residence for this group.

In any model pattern of population dispersal which we are able to visualize, the present location of people over 65 reflects of necessity the concentration and dispersal of the mature population of some 30-40 years ago. This consideration led us to expect large proportions of the aged in areas of economic maturity. These we can assume will be Eastern and Midwestern rather than Pacific States. They will show a preponderance of old people in rural rather than in urban areas. That this ecological pattern will be pronounced when accompanied by out-migration of youth is shown by the age and residence patterns of New England. It is not found in the South, another area of large out-migration. Here high fertility has operated as a counter-acting force.

III

As usual, the sixty-four dollar question is not asked until the last: What is the probability that the aged will migrate? Have their movements served to set up the predominance of older people in certain regions?

Studies of the main streams of in-migration—those to the Pacific coast, to the industrial North East and to Florida, from 1910 to 1950 —show these areas had net gains of both aged and young migrants. The pattern of aged migration follows that of the nation, but the stream is proportionately less than that of the younger population.

Studies of the population movements for the periods 1935-40 by Warren S. Thompson show that migration was less significant in accounting for the location of people over 55 than for the total population. An unpublished study of migration in Tennessee, for the same period, by James J. Maslowski, confirms this conclusion. In no case did the proportions of migrants 65 years old and over equal the percentage of migrants from the total population. In no sub-region and no city did those aged 65 and over equal as large a proportion among the total migrants as they did in the total population. In the main, rural areas had proportionately more old people, and the immigrant rates of old people were usually higher than out-migration rates for the metropolitan counties the oldsters consistently showed higher out-migration rates.

Accordingly we come back to the basic explanations which account for the ecology of the aged. A high proportion of aged in the population may be due to (1) a high rate of in-migration of old persons. This is the most reasonable of all the assumptions, but it proves on examination to be the least important. A predominance of elders may be due to (2) the aging of a mature population of a generation ago. If accompanied by little in-migration and a declining birth rate, this is shown to have a most important effect. Finally, it may be increased by (3) a high rate of out-migration of young persons from the area. A high proportion of oldsters in a rural-area will probably represent both processes, that is, the economic maturation of an area with accompanying loss of the younger people. That outward migration does not of itself furnish this pattern is shown by the case of the South. Finally the point to be made about important areas of in-migration is that they attract young populations in even greater proportions than they attract oldsters.

By this time we are prepared to say that the probability that the aged will not migrate is very large. Warren Thompson has shown that only 3.9 per cent of all 1935-40 migrants were 65 and over. All persons of this age, however, composed 6.8 per cent of the total population. One reason why non-migrants constitute so great a proportion of those above 65 is that it includes the large numbers who do not retire at this definite age break. This large group who are not ready to go to lands of sunshine and are not forced to seek shelter with their children undoubtedly offers the main key to the ecology of the aged. Those who do not retire by glancing at the calendar are likely to be found among the owners of small business, operators of small farms, small proprietors and many

professional men. It also includes the large number of wage earners who stay on after 65. For this group, Jacob Fisher points out:

> ....economic motive, while of diminished significance among the aged, does not cease to operate at age 65. After all, six out of ten men between the ages of 65 and 70 were still in the labour force in 1940; some of them are no doubt attracted to the same States that annually draw millions of young people. Part of the answer then is that the economic considerations influencing younger migrants also affect some of the aged.

The net conclusion of this analysis is to diminish greatly the importance of migration in determining the ecology of old people. Oldsters migrate in proportionately smaller numbers than the total population. Moreover, the areas like California and Florida which have proved attractive to old people are even more attractive to mature and young populations. On every statistical exhibit accordingly these areas turn out to have small proportions of the aged in their populations than long settled areas like rural New England and the Middle West. In rural areas we expect to find more oldsters in settled farming areas where the general patterns of agriculture have not changed much in recent years.

Thus, it can be shown that an ecological patterning of the aged would be established if old people did not migrate at all. This pattern is a projection of the mature population of 20-30 years before. This pattern will be further accented if there is a migration of youth from these mature areas.

The evidence would suggest that new patterns of the ecology of the aged had not been worked out a decade ago and 1940 is not the best guide to their future distribution. The full effect of Old-Age and Survivor Insurance on retirement had not been felt by that time. Even the 1950 census has not come at a time to measure the effect of pension and retirement schemes now being put into effect by major corporations.

Retirement has not yet become a definite break with the previous life and location of older people. In the main, our elders go on living in their familiar haunts; when they do move in numbers they follow the paths of the total population to such an extent that they do not appear as an outstanding segment in the new region. In fact we may say that out movements of youth may be more important in giving areas a predominance of old people than movements of the aged. The maximum effect of the migration of oldsters is to be found in those specialized communities which like St. Petersburg, Florida, cater to their needs.

IV

Our last consideration will serve to relate our topic to the realm of public policy. Here the importance of the ecology of the aged has been sought in terms of the unequal burden of dependent populations on states and communities. Calculated in terms of the ratio of producing and consuming units in the population, it can be shown that regions with predominantly young populations carry the greater dependency burden.

This contradicts the dramatic emphasis given to the unequal tax burdens of old age. States with mild climates are thought to pay for their good fortune by having to support an excess of the nation's elders. Moreover, states have hesitated to adopt liberal old age measures for fear of the torrents of senescence they would attract from their more niggardly neighbors.

In a survey of the field, Jacob Fisher found that:

> States with an in-migration of aged persons tend to have fewer aged old-age and survivors insurance beneficiaries than might be expected from the number of aged insured workers, and States with an out-migration to have more beneficiaries. These relationships reflect differences in employment opportunities for the aged in covered industry. In-migrant states tend to be high-income States and to have relatively more covered employment than out-migrant States. In such States the benefit has relatively less attraction than in out-migrant low-income agricultural States, the volume of retirement is relatively lower, and the "deficit" of beneficiaries therefore is relatively larger.

Oklahoma offers a good example of the impact of ecology on policy in the field of old age assistance. Throughout the 1930's Oklahoma had the largest proportions of its people on old age relief of any state. Sometimes explained by lax standards, this phenomenon was closely geared to the trends we have just been discussing. Oklahoma was settled by a land rush just before its admission as a state in 1909. The large cohort of "Boomers" and "Sooners" who sought security in homesteading were of the same general age composition. They came thirty years later to demand the security of relief, a security which many failed to find in the rush for free land. Similarly, the importance of the Okies who trecked Westward in the 1930's will again be apparent when they reappear among the aging cohorts who should make California a predominant home of old people less than a generation hence. For this prediction to be realized there is one proviso—migration to California must slacken.

Special communities of old people need not wait a generation to develop problems of policy. Any city which becomes a resort for the retirement of the aged faces definite hazards. The local community lacks the broad basis of tax support enjoyed by state and nation. By attracting aged residents it decreases its normal demographic basis of a supporting, productive population. To carry the services needed by these old people, such communities are dependent for proportionate support on the properties and retirement incomes of the aged. How taxable and how stable are these sources of support? This question will become increasingly important to every sunshine city which has attracted large proportions of elders. Here the ecology of the aged already has meaning for public policy.

VII–POPULATION THEORY

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21

EXPANDING CONCEPTS OF THE OPTIMUM THEORY AND POPULATION POLICY

By LAWRENCE R. CHENAULT

It is possible that population may become the most important field in all social science. One prominent writer has said that no issue, not even that of war, is as important as the factor of population, for democracy must either solve this problem or perish.[1] In recent years "the devil of Malthus" has again been set loose; clearer and definite population policies have come into existence; and an approach to the whole question has begun on what may turn out to be a world policy. Breaking away from Malthus and the idea of a natural law, economists have made an attempt to develop a new ideal of a population of the "best" or "optimum" size. This concept of an optimum population may well be reviewed in the light of what possible effect it has had on policy and what remains of it, if anything, today.

Population policies began very early in the history of man. It was Carr-Saunders, perhaps, more than any other individual writer, who has shown that primitive or preliterate man, contrary to what is often supposed, did not find an easy or abundant life because of small numbers and unlimited resources.[2] Often population growth was held in check by such measures as infanticide, taboo periods, abortion, and the killing of the aged and defective. Some scholars have found something of the idea of the "best" number of people in Plato's ideal state, and have shown that in the writings of both Plato and Aristotle the concept of a desirable number of people for a certain purpose is found. Excess population was to be removed by colonization or other means, and an increase in numbers could be secured by rewards for parenthood.[3] As with the Greeks, policies with the Romans were both quantitative and qualitative in aims. Rome needed to replace her citizens lost in wars of conquest, and in her later years her well-known writers lamented the fact that her important citizens no longer married and had children. Penalties were placed on the unwedded; Caesar had said that no unmarried woman could wear jewels. The Church, while providing a reaction to decay and the low state of family life found in the later days of the Roman Empire, appears to have little of what might be called a population policy except the general idea that it was good to have larger numbers in order that they might give praise to a benevolent deity who would

[1] G. Myrdal, *Population.* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1940) p. 33.

[2] *The Population Problem.* (Oxford, 1922).

[3] Barnes and Becker, *Contemporary Social Theory.* (Appleton-Century, 1940) p. 284. Centuries later we find Sir Thomas Moore drawing on Plato's *Republic* for the idea of the model society of *Utopia.* For his opinion about population numbers in *Utopia* see Harvard Classics edition, vol. 36, pp. 194-5.

provide subsistence. Marriage was a concession to human frailty. With the Mercantilists, there is clearly a policy of expansion of numbers. In their desire to build up the military and financial powers of the state, they saw a need for numerous, efficient, and cheap workers. After Adam Smith, who wrote of population as limited by the food supply and regulated by the demand for labor, the stage was now set for the contribution of many writers to the famous Malthus-Godwin controversy which has continued down to this day. It was due to the ideas of Malthus and Bentham that William Pitt dropped his bill to reform the poor laws. Although the vast amount of data about people and customs and the idea of Malthus' *Essay*, itself, did influence legislation and policy to some extent, there is in Malthus' work no idea of the optimum population. Interest in this concept was to reach its height about a century later.

Many writers have made statements which suggested the beginings of an optimum population before it was actually studied. The general idea (of the optimum) is implicit in the writings of Sismondi, not often cited in connection with the theory, who believed that prosperity depended, not upon either wealth or population, but upon the relation between these two factors which would secure the highest well-being. Wolfe and Myrdal both cited J. S. Mill as one of the founders of the optimum but their idea about this was denied by Robbins.[4] Mill, following Ricardo and others, clearly made the law of diminishing returns one of the pillars of his theory; at the same time he pointed out that in manufacturing an opposite tendency would prevail. He says that after a certain point has been reached to allow for the benefits of combination of the factors, if we assume that the tendency is not offset by improvements, with an increase in numbers there will be a decline in the average condition of the people.[5] It seems that while there exists a clear basis for an optimum theory, yet, as Robbins states, there is no development of the concept of a return per head as set out in modern theory. A recent writer on the development of economic thought has given Henry Sidgwick credit for laying the foundations of the optimum theory, and points out that he made clear that there was a point of maximum return per head due to density, stage of the arts, and the accumulation of capital, and that the position of the optimum was subject to change.[6] Although many other references could be cited, it is perhaps in the work of Cannan, followed by Julius Wolf in Germany who used the term "optimum output", that we find the first clear statement of the theory in modern form. Wicksell, after the turn of the century, clearly stated the theory in modern form; and Carr-Saunders has probably done more than anyone else to popularize the idea.

A great variety of definitions have been given to the theory of the optimum. Some of the first definitions, which came after the first World War in which there was the greatest interest in the optimum concept, dealt with the problem on a rather restricted or economic

[4] Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 26, and L. Robbins in his article "The Optimum Theory of Population" in *London Essays in Economics*, (London, 1927).

[5] J. S. Mill, *Principles of Political Economy* (Ashley ed.) p. 185 and 191-2.

[6] E. Whitaker, *A History of Economic Ideas.* (Longmans Green, 1940) p. 348.

base. As the idea is definitely utilitarian, earlier writers probably had good Benthamic ideas of human happiness as goals. Dalton, in perhaps as good a statement as can be found, used maximum real income per head as an index of economic welfare. Fairchild excluded all but economic considerations and set forth his analysis in term of a "standard of living" resulting from varying population, the stage of the arts, and resources. Wolfe, while making some allowance for non-economic goals, attempted a statement based on per capita of consumers' goods. The essence of this older statement of the optimum concept is relatively simple. At any one time with no change in methods or techniques, it is not difficult to conceive of overpopulation which is a condition in which there would be an increase in per capita income if the number of people in relation to natural resources were reduced. Also, there is certainly a possibility of underpopulation where returns per head would increase with a large number of people. Somewhere in between these two extremes, there must be a good or a "best" return per head based upon the relation of resources, the stage of the arts, and the number of people.

It soon became apparent that there could be no general agreement on a definition of an optimum, as attacks came in strength and from all sides. Thompson in vigorous terms denounced the whole idea of an economic optimum which was, in his opinion, in complete subordination to all spiritual and personal values. There was, to his way of thinking, no "single optimum" but one of "optima". It was also contended that the concept of the optimum involved so many factors for its determination that it became vague and indeterminate.[7] Others viewed the theory as a static concept where all other important facts such as improvements in technology were impounded *in ceteris paribus*. These factors might be even more important than the actual relationship of numbers and resources.[8] Gini and Penrose thought that instead of one point of best return there might be instead an optimum zone or plateau. Penrose tried to show that any income concept used in the optimum theory would coincide with the per capita welfare concept only if the income was spent on goods which would afford the greatest welfare.[9] Others wrote that Cannan, in outlining the theory, had not made a proper distinction between the diminishing returns found in agriculture and the conditions found in manufacturing. Beveridge and others brought out the criticism that the optimum was a moving and changing concept—a concept toward which we might be said to move, but one which we could never reach.[10] It also became apparent that the former simple ideas of overpopulation were not absolute but relative. Overpopulation must depend on the criterion. It follows from this that the term "optimum" must also be regarded as relative. A good example of this confusion and difficulty is shown by the well-known controversy between Keynes and Beveridge as to whether England was overpopulated or not. During this period population policy,

[7] *Population Problems.* (McGraw-Hill, 1935) pp. 429-32.
[8] G. Myrdal, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-3.
[9] E. F. Penrose, *Population Theories and Their Application.* (Stanford Univ., 1934) pp. 57 and 83.
[10] W. H. Beveridge, *Unemployment.* (London, 1930) p. 376.

entirely unmindful of any such theory, was one of drift; pressure continued to be "felt" in countries soon to become expansive in policy and militaristic; and Northern Europe and America woke up to the fact that what faced them in the future was not a stationary population, but a declining one. There followed a sharp decline of interest in the entire optimum concept. In 1927 Robbins concluded his essay with a certain air of futility when he wrote:

> "These problems today are but clouds the sign of a man's hand in the heavens, but in the future may come to dominate our horizon; and it is a melancholy reflection that the tremendous conflicts they may well engender will be waged around issues upon which, in the present state of knowledge, there seems least hope of the cold light of Economic Science being able to afford any very precise and practical guidance."[11]

A decade later, Myrdal was to declare that he considered the optimum theory one of the most sterile ideas which had ever grown out of our science.[12] Thompson, when his standard textbook was revised, left out entirely his former chapter on the theory.[13] It may be at about this time that the subject of population, the grand tradition of the economists, was finally passed to those in other fields. In the minds of sociologists and economists interested in welfare "optima", the theory had failed.

As I see it, these facts afford an excellent illustration that Economics, perhaps more than any other social science, has suffered from an unwillingness to broaden its base of analysis and to expand its concepts, and to integrate its theories with the findings of the other social sciences. Keynes must have realized this when he wrote in the perface to the *General Theory*: "The composition of this book has been for the author a long struggle of escape.....a struggle of escape from habitual modes of thought and expression. The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones."[14]

This narrowness of the base of analysis could be illustrated from almost any aspect of economic theory.[15] In America, except for

[11] Robbins, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
[12] Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[13] In 1942 edition.
[14] J. M. Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.* (Harcourt Brace, New York, 1936) Preface p. VIII.
[15] No resort to the complications of the indifference curve analysis can alter the fact that in consumer economics there is no one goal or motive. Katona in his recent book on economic behavior (*Psychological Analysis of Economic Behavior*, McGraw-Hill, 1951) shows from his study that multiple and conflicting motivations are the rule. These motives need not be selfish ones and change with circumstances and experiences. In his study it was brought out that economic analysis which rests on *the* motive or a single goal is meaningless. (Prof. R. A. Lester called my attention to this book in his talk before the Metropolitan Economic Conference in November 1951. Excellent articles will be found by the student dealing with the inadequacy of traditional economic analysis by Lester in the American Economic Review and other journals during the last few years. See "Shortcomings of Marginal Analysis," *American Economic Review*, March 1946.)

In the management field, especially subject to criticism is the portrayal of a two-dimensional analysis where, with the aid of a few numerical devices and mathematical concepts, business decisions are made on a cost-revenue basis. Al-

what remains of the Institutional School and a few writers here and there, year after year economics seems to become more mechanistic and mathematical and to depend on solutions and conclusions made from the imputation of quantitative data to single motives and narrow and limited concepts.

Although previously abandoned by economists, who were now completely engaged with problems of the great depression, monopolistic competition, and the "Keynesian Revolution," the optimum theory was now to be expanded far beyond the borders of anything known to classical theory. Using a total and complete sociological approach, Ferenczi developed his synthetic or proportional optimum, which would state and coordinate an analysis of the problem on economic, social, and political levels. With this attempt at a new synthesis, there also came proposals for an international program which in time would provide the basis of some kind of a world policy.[16] At about the same time, Mukerjee began to work out his *integral* optimum — a combined bio-ecological, economic, and social and ethical approach which set out tests of performance and welfare with each level of analysis. These optima, when harmonized and coordinated, would become the basis of a planned population policy which would become both national and international. Such an attempt not only to set out the complete problem at one time on these different levels of analysis, but also to arrange and integrate each level with the others is an approach seldom found and will be recognized as a permanent and significant contribution.[17]

A generalized science of man which would provide a new synthesis of all of the social sciences has long been considered a great hope. In America, as in other countries, there appears to be a definite renewal of this interest among sociologists and anthropologists.[18] They hope to bring together the generalizations of cultural anthropology, social psychology and sociology. Through this synthesis man could be better understood in the light of his bio-psychological nature, the culture in which he is found, and his success in adapting himself to this culture. There will be, instead of a single or "grand" theory, a

though it is true that marginal calculations do form the basis of certain types of business decisions, there is no "unit dosing method" as described in elementary economic theory. Even the slightest examination of empirical data will be sufficient to show that there are many other factors which may influence cost other than volume. In cases where firms make hundreds of products, which many of them do, and there are other factors such as selling costs, any description of business decisions as resting on the balancing of marginal revenue and marginal cost of a single product is not only unrealistic but becomes a complete distortion. (Students interested in this criticism may see *Research Study on Variation of Costs with Volume,* published by the National Association of Cost Accountants, in 1949 and 1951 and my review in the *American Economic Review* for June 1951.)

[16] I. Ferenczi, *The Synthetic Optimum.* (League of Nations, Paris, 1938).

[17] See *Political Economy of Population.* (Longmans Green Ltd. 1943) and *The Regional Balance of Man: An Ecological theory of population* (University of Madras, 1938). Mukerjee has many other books and articles.

[18] R. Linton, *The Science of Man in the World Crisis.* (Columbia Univ. Press, 1944), is a good example of this interest. W. C. Mitchell should be cited as an economist who was interested in the integration of all of the social sciences. He urged his students to study psychology and other subjects as well as economics if they really wished to explain human behavior.

slow and tedious step by step process with an avowed goal of social welfare. This development, although not placed in the field of population and without a defined level of analysis, is in essence the same as the integral and synthetic analysis. In actual fact, this generalized science, strangely enough, may not prove to be any more difficult to achieve than the optimum concept as defined in its original terms. Whatever may be accomplished in the future by this total sociological approach is unpredictable and uncertain. In spite of this, however, a few short-run observations can be made.

1. There should result from these efforts a complete reappraisal and better understanding of what is meant by the scientific method and its application to social and human problems.[19] Without any scheme of how men should act, scientists will study with notebooks and pencil how they do act. Never at any time has the social interest and the amount of reliable statistical data available for study and research assumed such proportions. As population has probably profited more than almost any other field by quantitative studies and statistical methods, prospects for accomplishments in population policy seem bright.[20]

2. In any scientific inquiry which is to be used as a basis for population policy, it is necessary to define certain goals and values and the normative problem, so often disclaimed by the social scientist, cannot be avoided. It is my opinion that regardless of what may be affirmed about "pure" science, most social scientists do in fact deal with this problem and make value judgments. If this does not lead to actual bias and a disregard of method, there is no objection. The goals of medicine are not obscure. Economics, it seems to me, if it must stand mute at all mention of political policy or welfare is pointless. We can and do find there is some area and certain objectives about which there is rather definite agreement. Literacy, full employment, avoidance of severe business fluctuations, the degree of personal freedom are good examples of these objectives.

3. All population planning and policy must, as Mukerjee says, spread upward from a national to an international basis. Standards of living and all other vital statistics must take on more and more international meanings. Whatever may be considered the best or the welfare optima of one country must be considered in view of its effect on other nations.[21]

[19] Mukerjee The Criterion of Optimum Population, Amer. Jl of Socio., 1934. An interesting example of how social sciences were used to solve a difficult problem is given by S. Chase, *The Proper Study of Mankind* (Harper, 1938) Chapter III.

[20] Thompson agrees to the value of these quantitative studies but statistical techniques are not to be carried too far. "Population Studies, *"American Journal of Sociology,* (Vol. L, no. 6, May, 1945).

[21] Mukerjee, *Political Economy of Population,* pp. 19-22, 323-338; See also his *Races, Lands and Food* (The Dryden Press). N. Y. 1946.

There is clear evidence that the second of these conclusions, that population policies must take into consideration normative problems, is supported by some recent statements of population policies. Alva Myrdal, for example, in her book on Swedish population policy, often referred to a field laboratory for western nations, begins her book by stating: "A population policy can be nothing less than a social policy at large . . . . . The population problem concerns the very foundations of social structure and calls for nothing less than complete social redirection."[22] In the Swedish policy, it is clear that value judgments were necessary to define the goals on which a positive program could rest. At the same time, there was a clear recognition of the importance of the quantitative aspects and a general agreement that a rapidly declining population was not desirable. As in other programs, there were provisions for better housing, nutrition, health, and infant care. On a higher level, there is throughout the study a recognition that personal freedom and free choice of parenthood must be maintained regardless of its possible effect on numbers. Another recent important report on population policy was that of the Royal Commission of Great Britain which was appointed to study trends of population, the causes of these trends and their consequences, and to make recommendation in light of national interest. Here we find an excellent example of demographic analysis in which future numbers are projected. As in the case of Swedish policy, there is a hope, even in spite of the acceptance of the principle of voluntary parenthood, that something like a stationary population can be maintained. On the whole, the British program contained many welfare features and was clearly purposive. Up to this time, interest in the United States on population policy has been less than in many of the European countries. A recent attempt to outline an acceptable policy contained many of the common elements contained in the policies of other countries facing a possible decline in numbers.[23] In contrast to a country such as Sweden, India has adopted a rather drastic program aimed at limitation of the size of her families. Whether this restrictive policy will form a permanent part of her program to improve the economic and social conditions of her people remains to be seen.[24]

The mere fact that there does exist at this time a Population Commission of the United Nations is of profound significance to all students of population. This commission has already made contributions to demographic analysis, studies of the relation of demographic and economic factors, migration and the problem of stateless people, and general standards for registration and vital statistics. Out

[22] Quoted from *Population Index,* (Population Association of America, Princeton, January, 1942), p. 11.

[23] Lorimer aet al, *Foundations of American Population Policy,* (Harper, New York, 1940)

[24] Mukerjee, Political Economy of Population, pp. 333-334; also *Food Planning for Four Hundred Millions* (Macmillan and Co.) Notestein writes about this policy in *Population Index,* (Office of Population Research, Princeton, October, 1951). References cited include such publications as K. Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan,* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1951), and *India Famine Inquiry Commission—Final Report,* (Madras Govt. Press 1954.)

of this organization could emerge something which we might call a world population policy which eventually could work out a more equitable distribution of resources and increase world living and social standards.

But what has become of the theory of the optimum population with which we started? If we think of it as it was originally conceived, in an economic sense, the conclusion that interest in this concept has practically disappeared is inescapable. It was merely a construct of the human mind, entirely man-made, and it has grown into something else. In light of this greater task and finer ideal, may we expect that the social scientist of the future, in keeping with his country and his time, will work with the ever-growing techniques of the scientific method towards the integration of the social sciences so as to provide a higher standard of welfare for his people.[25]

[25] See Mukerjee, *Social Ecology* (Longmans Green Ltd.), 336ff and *The Institutional Theory of Economics* (Macmillan and Co.), 84f.

22

THE INTEGRAL APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF POPULATION

By J. N. SINHA

Ever since Malthus wrote his essay on the Principle of Population in 1798, much interest in the theory of population grew as a reaction to his supposed pessimistic conclusions. Subsequent advances in the field of transport and production weakened the force of 'means of subsistence' as a factor in equilibrium density, while the concept of equilibrium at the minimum level of subsistence itself became incompatible with the new ideology of the welfare state. Interest naturally centered upon discovering the optimum of population adjustment, the number that can live best and not the maximum number which can live at all.

The change from the Malthusian hypothesis of a simple relation between the independently moving variables of population and resources into that of a fundamental interaction between the two marked a basic turn in the theory of population. This was manifest in the exposition of the tendency of diminishing returns by J. S. Mill. It provided the main clue to the concept of 'optimum' in the population theory. Mill observed that beyond a certain stage, an increase of numbers, unless counteracted by technical or economic improvements, was bound to result in a decline in the average condition of the people. It could be easily inferred from this that at a certain stage the numbers were just proper to the best conditions of life and before this stage, an increase of numbers would result in an improvement and a decrease, in the deterioration of their condition.

To Prof. Cannan[1] we owe the first clear definition of the concept of optimum. He postulates the economic optimum based on maximum per capita income, and the same view is elaborated further by Robbins[2] in his London Essays in Economics and Dalton[3] in his well-known Economica article of March, 1928. The genesis of the theory may be stated as follows:

Under given conditions of the arts of production and the progress of science, there must be an optimum point at which real income per head is likely to be maximum owing to the free interplay of natural resources on the one hand and facilities for economic co-operation on the other.

The practical and pertinent question for the optimum theorists is: Is it possible to increase per capita income by increasing or reducing the size of population? If it is so, there exists the state

[1] *Cannan, Theories of Production and Distribution.*

[2] Robbins, The Optimum Theory of Population, *London Essays in Economics.*

[3] Dalton, The Theory of Population, *Economica,* 1928.

of either under- or over-population. If not, the optimum has been attained. The test of rising or falling income as proposed by Sir William Beveridge[4] is, however, different from this question, and often misleading too, since rising income can co-exist with the tendencies both towards under- and over-population. Growing emphasis on welfare aspect led Prof. Fairchild[5] to substitute the criterion of standard of living for per capita income since welfare is presumed to depend only on that proportion of income which goes towards actual consumption.

The theory of economic optimum assumes static conditions and techniques of production. That this assumption is purely hypothetical has been admitted almost universally. In real life optimum will rest not at any single point but will be constantly shifting with changes in technology and production function. From a practical standpoint, therefore, optimum population will have to be defined as that process or movement of population which strikes an ideal equilibrium with the changing forces and materials of production. This involves many variables and imponderables that defy quantitative measurement. As such the concept of optimum may fail to provide any quantitative guidance; but its value for its directional guidance remains unquestionable.

The true dynamics of optimum has, however, not been always fully appreciated. Inventions, new techniques, discovery of new lands or expansion of foreign trade that affect the optimum may not be merely adventitious; these may directly follow population growth which is likely to provide stimuli in the form of higher propensity to consume, rising level of effective demand, wider markets etc. Recently Prof. Colin Clark has observed that for several progressive nations (like the Greeks, the Dutch, the English and the Japanese) "the period of rapid population growth, though it undoubtedly meant economic hardships in the early stages, proved in the end to be not a disaster but a glorious national opportunity. Each country made the effort — and a very strenuous effort it had to be — to convert itself from an agrarian to a commercial society, emigrating, manufacturing and exporting, buying food from the less densely populated regions of the world. These periods of population expansion were also periods of great scientific, cultural and artistic achievement as well as of economic advancement."[6] Much, however, depends on the native genius of a nation. A torpid nation may fail to react even to the most intense population pressure; for such a nation the increase of population may, instead of being a spur to progress, become a source of permanent economic crisis.

Another limitation of the traditional theory of optimum arises out of the neglect of interaction between man's numbers and his natural environment. Natural resources were assumed to be fixed in a given period and independent of population movement so that the simple effect of an increase of numbers was the diminution of land-man ratio. That human society is bound up with the plant and

[4] Beveridge, Over-population and Unemployment, *Economic Journal*, 1923.
[5] Fairchild, Optimum Population, *World Population Conference*, 1927.
[6] Colin Clark, New Light on Population, *The Listener* March 26, 1953.

animal aggregations, and with the ecologic complex in an intricate system of economic and other relationships was to be revealed by later developments in the field of ecology. In old agricultural communities the economic or social order is inextricably woven with the skeleton of the ecological order, and the rate of population growth profoundly affects man's subtle and intimate inter-relations with the environment. Where man has carried the plough and the axe to the mountain slopes, or indulged in the lavish use of soil and waters through exploitative, commercial types of farming or allowed the green mantle on the banks of rivers to be indiscriminately destroyed by his cattle, he has upset the physiographic and hydro-graphic balance of the region. This threatens the stability of his agriculture and food supply and limits the numbers that can be adequately maintained. If man's disregard of the ecologic balance thus restricts the size of optimum population, he can by afforestation and controlled use of forests, adoption of balanced agriculture and soil conservation practices and economy of subsoil water supply and river training and management not only restore the balance but even extend the ecologic base, thus permitting an increase of human numbers without that diminution of natural resources per head which constitutes one of the basic features of the theory of economic optimum.

The importance of the maximum stability and balance of the region which constitutes the ecologic base of the continuing human association and economic toil was first discussed with great originality and insight by Prof. Radhakamal Mukerjee in his *Regional Balance of Man* and later adopted as one of the criteria of population optimum at the ecological level in his *Political Economy of Population.*

Finally, the concept of economic optimum has also been criticized by the welfare theorists on the ground that human welfare is determined by a great many values in life other than the enjoyment of material comfort. This point was emphatically brought out by Dr. Warren Thomson in his discussion at the World Population Conference, Geneva, 1927. "An optimum population in the purely economic sense might easily dictate that people should not have children under certain conditions; but it is quite possible that an optimum population from the standpoint of the development of human character and of the broader spiritual values in human life might require that we should keep up the population beyond the point where it could be supported at the maximum standard of living".[7] In reply to this A. B. Wolfe[8] has pointed out that although the economic optimum does not cover many important elements which enter into human welfare, it still remains quite significant since the maximum enjoyment of the material comforts of life on which it is based is regarded as an important means to higher spiritual and moral culture and has the advantage of practicability since other criteria are too complicated for measurement. Prof. Mukerjee, however, adduced the criterion of maximum average expectation of life which combines the advantage of measurability with compre-

[7] World Population Conference, 1927.

[8] A. B. Wolfe, On the Criterion of Optimum Population *Amer. Jl. of Socio* March, 1934.

hensiveness. He observes, "From the dynamic standpoint an improvement of average income, standard of living, employment, political security and individual happiness coincides with an increase of the average span of life. While both longevity and the economic optimum have the merit of measurability not possessed by the other optima of population adduced, the advantage of the former is that certain social, moral and aesthetic factors in well-being which cannot be scientifically measured are also implicated in it".[9]

A more realistic approach to the population theory was, however, presented by Dr. Mukerjee in his concept of the integral optimum. According to this view population adjustment cannot have one optimum but different kinds of optima at the successive levels of environment, both from the standpoint of the individual and that of society. "The true optimum of population is the integral optimum which is based on a harmonious co-ordination of the optima in the successive levels of ecology, economy and state in respect of (a) the expectation of life, (b) real income, and (c) personal happiness and self-expression,—all these from the individual standpoint, and of (a) the stability of the economic base and occupational balance, (b) the regularity and continuity of employment, and (c) national security and power,—all of the latter from the collective standpoint."[10]

Dynamically considered, the criteria derived from the different levels of demographic equilibrium are partial, and often conflicting. Maximum economic productivity per capita may lead to a quick exhaustion of irreplacable resources and consequent shrinkage of the ecologic base for posterity. Or it may be associated with certain incidents in the system of production and with habits of consumption which may have unfavourable effects on the physical and mental condition of individuals. Or again, the pursuit of an artificially high standard of living or personal enjoyment may so affect the family building habits as to threaten a decline of numbers with consequent loss of national morale and political stability. On the other hand, an exclusive stress on national objectives like preparation for war and conquest as observed in the demographic autarchy of Germany or Japan may encourage population increase even at the sacrifice of present living standards. Similarly, the attainment of the collective norm of maximum employment may sometimes mean a fall in the per capita income of the working classes, especially in times of depression when the demand for labour is relatively inelastic. As observes Dr. Dalton, "It is a paradox of our modern industrial system that the income per head of the relatively poor majority may be higher with much unemployment than with little."[11] The relative stress on the different criteria will, therefore, be determined in the light of the particular socio-economic system in which a population is to seek its adjustments. But this is certain that any concept of optimum which is to form the basis of a sound population policy must represent the reconciliation of the individual and the social optimum as well as a working compromise between the

[9] Mukerjee, *Political Economy of Population*, p. 11. See also Population Balance and Optimum, *International Congress of Population, Rome.*

[10] Ibid., p. 17.

[11] Dalton, *op. cit,*

ecologic, the economic and the ethical ends.

Also the integral optimum population cannot be implemented by an exclusively national ideal and policy. Planned population, like the economy of the national state, has to be harmonised with, and dovetailed into, a world economic policy. Many of the seeds of economic struggles and wars lie embedded in differential population pressures, resources and standards of living of different peoples of the earth. World peace can be effectively guaranteed in the future only by an international population policy. Without the acceptance of certain universal minimum living and wage standards by all peoples, which will be safeguarded by national population, labour and social welfare policies, inferior types of humanity will expand and sabotage international living standards, or they will explode. But with such acceptance, there can come both systematic population restriction in overcrowded countries and freedom of immigration and the Open Door Policy in the empty and inadequately used territories with consequent release of tensions in international economics and politics.[12]

No doubt the integral optimum which subsumes complex population adjustments at the national and international levels is incapable of quantitative expression and measurement. But economic and sociological analysis as well as statistical reasoning can help us to discover whether the trend of population is towards the optimum or away from it. Max Weber observes: "All qualitative differences (such as involved in social situations) can be expressed in the last analysis in some form of quantitative differences of the way in which elements appear in different combinations."[13]

Any theory of population will be incomplete and sterile without the scientific study and forecast of trend in numbers. Statistics which provides us with tools of measurement is obviously the handmaid of demography. But statistical reasoning alone may not be adequate for this purpose; it needs to be reinforced by sociological analysis and forecast of population increase. For example, the study of differential reproductive trends in different regions, occupations, communities and classes should prove much more helpful in forecasting trends and adjusting population policies than the measurement of a single rate of growth for the whole country based upon the study of overall fertility and mortality trends and the analysis of age and sex composition.[14] A country may show its net reproduction rate above unity and yet bear the possibility of stationariness or even decline of numbers if certain groups numerically small but culturally dominant take to new patterns of family limitation. This will be particularly true of a society which is characterised by a high degree of what Dumont calls 'social capillarity'. In respect of demographic planning, countries faced with stationary or declining population require not merely the revision of social mores and attitudes favour-

[12] Mukerjee, *Political Economy of Population*, pp. 323-338, and *Races, Lands and Food*, chapter I.

[13] Quoted in Mukerjee, *Political Economy of Population*.

[14] See Mukerjee: *Food Planning for Four Hundred Millions* and The Sociological Analysis and Forecast of Indian Population, *Proceedings of the Second Conference of Marriage, Hygiene and Population, Bombay.*

ing large family but also the organisation of a vast network of medical and welfare services especially for the backward regions and classes from whom the future population is being largely recruited in order that the quality is not sacrificed to quantity. Similarly, the family planning and birth limitation movement recently initiated by some nations of the overcrowded East cannot thrive without that change of economic and social climate which brings new hope and life to the relatively more prolific depressed castes and classes. In its concrete shape, the problem before the population planner is to discover and regulate the reproductive trends in each region and each socio-economic group without which any attempt at aggregative adjustment of numbers and resources will be mere groping in the dark.

With recent advances in contraceptive techniques it is possible for parents to restrict their family to any size that they choose to have. Their choices and conscience in this matter are governed by family traditions, social attitudes, institutions and values and above all, in the case of cultural groups dominated by the pursuit of material enjoyment, by the relation between the expected income and the desired standard of living. The population history of England and France illustrates how partial and direct steps like family allowances fail to alter demographic trends. On the other hand, a substantial rise in birth rate could be achieved by the Fascist nations where marriage loans, family allowances, differential taxation of bachelors and parents of small families were supported by systematic efforts at land settlement and colonisation as well as guarantee of economic security by war time production and employment.

A full appraisal of the population problem is possible only in the background of the whole cultural set-up. The ecological factors of land and resources, the economic factors of productivity and standard of living, and the institutional factors of sex and philoprogenitive habits and cultural traditions and personal and social attitudes concerning marriage and child-bearing—all these interact with the demographic process. A comprehensive approach to demography, therefore, requires an integration of research in the diverse fields of ecology, biology, genetics, economics, politics and sociology which ought to focus their separate and collective attention on the regional, the economic, the political and the institutional complex within which the population movement occurs. The significance of Dr. Mukerjee's demographic analysis lies in this synthetic approach; here ecological, economic and institutional and ethical factors comprise in their reciprocal inter-action the essential ingredients of both the population process and the population optimum. In this pioneer broad-based theory that is in refreshing contrast with many current treatments, the pattern of institutions and social attitudes corresponds to the basic ecologic man-land or numbers-resources ratio, to the conditions of economic pressure and the phase of demographic process itself. Thus does the study of population merge into dynamic institutional economics which provides the meeting ground of the various sciences concerning man, region and social patterns.[15]

[15] Mukerjee, *The Institutional Theory of Economics*, 84ff

VIII–INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

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THEORY OF AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM*

By MANUEL GOTTLIEB

I

The movement in sociology which Talcott Parsons is leading is inspired by the idea that the central focus for sociology as a discipline is the study of the social system as a whole, i.e. of the entire social order of a distinct and more or less self-maintaining society. In this social order—in its bounds, its structural components, its limits, its major processes—sociology finds its raw material, its problems and, most important of all, its drive for synthesis.

A social order of course is not a society; rather, it is the complex of cultural and institutional patterns through which the individual persons who make up the society function. Individual persons conform to these patterns by acting as they prescribe in the varied situations of life, by filling the roles and occupying the status-positions, by respecting the norms and holding the beliefs institutionalized in the social order. But not all roles can be filled by all persons; nor can all ideals or ideas be accepted by individuals nor can all the cultural patterns of a society obtain conformity. Individuals, that is to say, are not mere creatures of culture. The only undeniable fact about them is that they are born helpless of woman and are to some degree plastic. Barring handicaps, they are capable of reaching adulthood and of complying with the patterns of a social order if it satisfies their requirements on at least a minimum level. Their requirements are complex and interrelated but chiefly involve want-fulfillment, affection, self-expression. The study of human personality in these respects has become a segregated discipline whose findings must be mobilized in order to disclose the constraints on social order which grow out of the native characteristics and potentialities of the personality.

This linkage of sociology with social psychology is complemented by an analogous linkage with cultural anthropology. The beliefs held by individuals, the knowledge at their disposal, the technology they practise, the art they appreciate, the games they play, the rites they perform, the attitudes they hold—all these make up the totality of culture which prevails within a society. Now culture like personality has special characteristics. It must be embodied in things; its meanings are transmitted from generation to generation or diffused

* This paper is a greatly expanded version of one with the same title presented at the meeting, December 26-9-1952, of the American Economics Association and printed in the *American Economic Review Proceedings* for May 1953. The editor very kindly permitted that portion of this paper first published in the Review, to appear here. The entire first section of this paper is new while the argument of the second section has been recast here and there.

over cultural space through a process of individual appreciation or learning; it is subject to certain dynamics of change and stereotyping; its inconsistencies may be bridged to some degree by rationalization and compartmentalization. The study of culture in all its aspects is the special concern of the newly developed discipline of cultural anthropology or culturology, as it has been called.[1] The findings in this discipline are mobilized by sociologists in their study of social order. The roles and statuses which make up the social order are articulated in terms of a dominant culture which must be shared by enough individuals of the society to maintain motivation at adequate levels.

Not all workers in the three social science disciplines thus linked together would accept this interpretation of their mutual relations.[2] There is always a tendency for interrelated disciplines to go off on tangents. But this interpretation is close enough to the facts to be tentatively accepted by us.

If we accept this interpretation of sociology as a discipline whose central field of interest is that of the social order, where, then, is its relationship to economics? It will be the thesis of this paper that the relationship of economics to sociology should parallel that of the two disciplines just mentioned. If psychology deals with the cosmos of personality and its imperatives, if culturology deals with the cosmos of culture and its imperatives, economics would deal with the cosmos of economic behavior and its imperatives. This latter cosmos like the other two is not isolated but is meshed in with the social order. This involvement is in every sense of the word thorough. This entails, firstly, recognition that the economic system cannot be regarded as an empirically self-contained or closed set of interconnections but only as a phase or focal center of a larger whole. Thus some of the functional requirements of the economic system will be discharged through agencies arising elsewhere in the social order; and certain strains which originate in economic activity will find their ultimate issue elsewhere. From this it follows that the tangled mesh of socio-cultural reality can be cut through to form the bounds of a determinate system only with some arbitrariness though with not the less validity.[3] Finally, the involvement of the economic with the social order implies that the economic system like the social order must be

[1] See the monumental attempt by P. Sorokin, *Cultural and Social Dynamics* (4v., 1937-41, NY) and the works of Kroeber, L. White and R. Benedict.

[2] See particularly, T. Parsons, *Structure of Social Action* (2nd. ed., Ill., 1949) 757-775; Parsons, *The Social System* (Ill., 1951) Chap. XII. There is a core of tradition in sociological thought which Parsons has endeavoured to bring to a single focus. This traditional core revolved around the study of society as a distinct phenomenon. But of course it was easy to go off on tangents like that of historical development (historical sociology), the purely formal relationships which a society involves (formalistic or sociologistic school), concrete social problems, and so forth. See P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (NY, 1928).

[3] This point was very distinctively argued by Max Weber, "Die Objektivitat sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis", *Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tubingen 1922) 166, 170. T. Parsons for his part has left room for more or less articulated sub-systems, of which the economic would be one, which make up the overall social order (called "social system"). See Parsons, *The Social System,* chaps. III, IV, XII; *Structure of Social Action,* 757ff. Even an

regarded as a complex of cultural and institutional patterns. The individual persons who make up the society give reality to these patterns by conforming with them in the relevant situations of life. They do this by filling the roles, occupying the status-positions, respecting the norms and holding the beliefs involved.

This definition of the economic system as the cluster of cultural and institutional patterns which guide economic behavior may be valid. But we need to bring its implicit empirical reference into closer focus. This empirical reference in conventional economic thought is regarded as consisting of rational processes of exchange and allocation by which ultimate wants, organised into scales of preference, are brought into adjustment with technical conditions and ultimate resources available for want-satisfaction.[4] An economic system may be described as consisting of the totality of exchange relationships themselves regarded in their capacity for harboring an infinite number of concrete constellations. Everything outside the system then becomes so much "data" which are determined by forces operating outside the system and at random to it. Hence economics is defined as a discipline which studies the working of this system, i.e. processes of rational and instrumental action by which scarce means with alternative uses are brought into adjustment with ultimate ends. When analysis is traced back to some item of ultimate data, analysis terminates. Within this frame of reference, analysis can only be refined or made more elegant.

Broader approaches are of course numerous. Perhaps the most well-known is the Marxian in which the concept of a more all-inclusive economic system plays a central role. This system is defined to comprise the totality of social relations arising out of, and institutionalized within the process of production and distribution. These relations are then specified in terms of class status, historical succession, technology, culture and institutions. The totality of the relations are adjusted to the way in which authority is exerted over the actual producers or the working force and their prerogatives relative to the facilities of production and to their product. Thus adjusted these total relations are resolved into a historic succession of fundamental types of "economic systems" or to use Marx's own terms, "economic structures" or "social forms of production" which denote "a particular stage of development in the history of mankind".[5] Though these main structures subdivide almost at will into intermediary and transitional forms, they have generally

organicist like Cooley who believed that life in society is a single whole also emphasised that within it and part of it "are innumerable special systems of interaction, more or less distinct, more or less enduring, more or less conscious and intelligent.....so that each part of the whole belongs to more than one organic system". *Social Process* (NY 1918) 27f.

[4] For examples of this usage, see J. Schumpeter, "The Instability of Capitalism", *The Economic Journal,* XXXVIII (1928) 364; O. Lange, 'The Scope and Method of Economics", *Review of Economic Studies* XIII (1945|6) 20 f; G. Cassel, *On Quantitative Thinking in Economics* (Oxford 1935) 10ff.

[5] See *Marx, Wage-Labor and Capital,* chap. V; the famous "Preface" to the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (originally published 1859); Capital, I (Mod. Lib. Ed.,), I, Chapter I, section 4, "The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof", also pp. 559, 567, 836, 963.

followed a five-fold breakdown which has delineated primitive-communal, ancient-slavery, medieval-serf, modern-capitalist and future-socialist systems.[6]

The Marxian analysis was illuminating, considering both its setting and its logical distinctness. But its limitations for use in contemporary thought stand out as obvious. It assumed in the first place that economic systems with identical modes of production would be identical in other structurally significant attributes. It assumed that the social relations involved in the mode of production would directly determine or provide the basis for the entire social order. Finally, it assumed a linearity of historic evolution so complete that economic systems could be explicitly defined in terms of historic succession. None of these assumptions can be regarded as fully acceptable; hence the question of an economic system may be regarded as open; and we can turn to other viewpoints for possible answers.

These possible answers run a broad range. Most economic and cultural historians and students of various historic periods and most institutional economists tend to order their materials in terms which suggest or imply the existence of institutionally structured and historically located economic systems. An entire literature has grown up around the issues involved in the genesis of one alleged system, namely capitalism. American institutionalism has revolved around this theme. But at least to my limited knowledge of this literature, the attempts made at system classification and identification have been overlapping, incomplete and inconsistent with one another. There has been a minimum of effort at critical comparison of viewpoint and outcome. No very full effort has been made to justify an approach to the problem of economic systems which recognized the real difficulties of the concept and which attempted to cope with these on a reasonably high level of logical articulation and analytical depth.[7] Perhaps this conclusion can be given some support if we canvass the contributions to the theory of an economic system made by four leading writers in our field: Veblen, Weber, Sombart and Röpke.

Veblen's insight into and knowledge of economic institutions and their cultural conditioning was sweeping; and he was among the

[6] This classification was worked out by Marx. It is followed in most Marxian manuals, e.g. Bogdanov, *A Short Course in Economic Science,* a work which was characteristically praised by Lenin for presentation of material "in the form of a description of the successive periods of economic development," thus strengthening the conception of "separate, historically specific modes of social economy". See *Political Economy in the Soviet Union* (trans. from Russian, International Publishers, NY, 1944) 17. See also Rosa Luxemberg, *Einfuhrung in die Nationalokonomie* (Berlin, 1925) with her separate analysis of distinct economic "structures". For an example of "intermediary" and transition forms, see M. Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (NY, 1947). On the basis of scattered comments in Marx's correspondence and a few articles, there has been added to the basic types of economic systems a sixth category, the "Asiatic". On this see K. A. Wittfogel, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas* (Leipzig 1931), 3ff, 65ff, 77ff, 173ff, 189. The distinctive characteristics which Marxists like Wittfogel adumbrated for an "Asiatic" form of economy were isolated and analysed from another viewpoint and with more breadth by Mukerjee as an ideal-type of "communalism". See his *The Institutional Theory of Economics* (London 1940), Chap. IX.

[7] See the negative appraisal reached by A. G. Gruchy in his *Modern Economic Thought* (NY, 1947) 615f.

first to disclose the institutional enmeshment of behavior through telling selective examples and at a high level of generalized analysis. He was among the first systematically to question the assumptions about human personality and rational instrumental action which were incorporated into the preconceptions of conventional thought. Veblen pointed out that the pattern of wants is moulded by the system through the institutionalization within individuals of approved values and goal-aspirations. Veblen also perceived that the institutional form in which economic behavior was organised would bear a definite relationship to other interrelated sectors all of which would fit together into some kind of all-inclusive social order. On the methodological level Veblen was distinctive for presenting conventional theory as a limiting case of idealised behavior and for insisting on the need for a larger kind of social-economics. In all these respects we have much to learn from Veblen.

But though Veblen thus contributed to shaping a concept of an institutionally structured economic system, he did not develop such a concept himself or give it any central focus in his work. Economic institutions existed for him in some kind of interrelated order; but his major interest was in their capacity of becoming "adjusted" in processes of change. Hence the element of order was played down, the element of cumulative or genetic change was played up.[8] Moreover, Veblen always left his "economic institutions" in a kind of a haze without rigorous distinction from the cultural and socio-psychological level. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that such a classification of "systems" as can be distilled from his writings was not logically well-articulated and fell into the trap of prescribing exact historic succession. This succession was formulated in vaguer terms than the Marxian one. It pictured a modern contract or "pecuniary" order as being separated from some ancient barbarian preliterate society by a vaguely outlined feudal society founded on prescriptive status and land ownership. The institutional and cultural elements of these "orders" were subject to an erosive process of cumulative change which would tend to rub out the distinct boundary lines of any system. The only case in which interest was focussed on the emergent properties of the system or order itself was his interesting, if unsuccessful, effort to work out an interpretation of a "new order" which had allegedly grown out of an older form of capitalist enterprise.[9]

[8] Cf. T. Veblen, *The place of Science in Modern Civilization* (NY, 1919), 378, 72, 74f, 173, 177, 241ff. In all these contexts the emphasis is on genetic change. Interestingly enough a formal definition of an economic system called this a "mechanism the structure of which is made up of what are called its economic institutions". And characteristically enough Veblen went on to define these institutions as "habitual methods of carrying on the life process of the community in contact with the material environment in which it lives." *Theory of the Leisure Class* (Mod. Lib. ed.), 193.

[9] For this "new order" and the somewhat eccentric form of movement and life-process with which he endowed it as well as the many basic discriminations which he worked out about it, see his *Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times* (NY, 1923) 205-445. The "new order" was identified in terms of an interesting discrimination between key industries, manufacturing industries and agriculture; it was further identified in terms of institutions (big corporation and

Something similar is to be said of that even greater figure in the history of sociological economics, namely Max Weber. In many ways he was ideally suited to develop a typology and generalized analysis of institutionally structured economic systems. He was a trained student of economic development both in the modern and ancient worlds; he had a rare talent for abstract thought; and he had a rare knowledge about the social process in which economic life is cast. One of his analytic starting points is the concept of an institutionally structured capitalist system. Though selectively friendly in this and other respects to the Marxian position he was also sympathetic to the main teachings of modern economic theory.[10] At an intellectual turning point in his career Weber explicitly explored the major methodological requirements of a systematic theory of economic systems defined in broader terms than the price approach and in some close relationship to the thought of Roscher and Marx. Even now this illuminating essay, which has been translated, constitutes the major methodological treatment of our subject matter.[11] His major concern was to justify a concentration of disciplinary interest — the discipline of "social-economics" — on the entire complex of institutionally organized and culturally-shaped behavior involved in the processes of work and struggle with nature by which every society fulfilled its developed needs for material goods and services.[12] It was legitimate to cut through the cultural world in a "onesided" manner partly because of the advantage which scientific division of labor brings with it, partly because the boundaries of a discipline are determined by the conceptual relatedness of its problems and not by the homogeneity of its empirical subject matter.[13] Hence Weber urged that

combine), emphasis on salesmanship and advertising, and a specific kind of finance situation and industrial outcome. It should be noted that in the earlier *The Theory of Business Enterprise* (NY, 1904) the pecuniary system was defined by implication in terms of the national state, the ideology of natural rights, the machine process and the business enterprise. But the book lapses readily into other themes or into description or ironic commentary and no coherent structural account of the system as a system stands out.

[10] His positively favourable attitude toward modern price theory, which he treated only as an ideal-type of a limiting case, is brought out in his methodological essays, in his interesting article on marginal utility thought, and his analysis of a planned versus a market economy. See Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (trans., Oxford, 1947) chap. II; *Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tubingen, 1922) 372, 185f, 189ff, 367-373.

[11] See "Die Objektivitat sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis", *ibid.*, 146-214.

[12] Thus the main object of research is: ".....der allgemeinen Kulturbedeutung der sozialokonomischen Struktur des menschlichen Gemeinschaftslebens und seiner historischen Organisationsformen bezeichnen" (*ibid.*, 165); and "social-economics" was formally defined to refer to all action processes which objectively—and not in subjective motivation or cultural prescription—are adapted for or are utilized in economic purposes. These are defined as broadly speaking arising out of the need to assure want fulfillment through work and struggle with nature on a socially organised basis (*ibid.*, 161). This definition of economic behavior narrowed and the "system" concept dropped in Weber's later work. See the *General Economic History* (German Ed.) Chap. I; *Social and Economic Organization*, Chap. II.

[13] See "Die Objektivitat.....", *loc. cit.*, 166, 170. See the use made of one of these passages by L. Robbins in his *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (2nd ed., London, 1935) 2.

such an economic system would not determine or describe the social order or provide the only independent sub-system within it.[14] But for the same reason any picture or version of the shifting, complex, protean-like socio-cultural reality which is interpreted to make up some distinct economic system could be valid only as a conceptual scheme or "ideal-type". And in this connection Weber exhaustively probed into the validity of such a conceptual scheme and the logical status of the ideas that would be used in its derivation or construction. He showed that these ideas would involve some element of cultural understanding of motivated behavior interpreted on grounds of "adequacy". He emerged with the judgment that any such generalized picture or collective synthesis though indispensable would be highly idealised in its nature and hence would only have relative validity as a means of ordering insights and comparison.[15]

Weber thus helped to launch the methodological groundwork for a social-science discipline whose major focus would be the economic system. Indeed a large part of his own analytical and empirical research may be thought of as prolegomena to this discipline. For this purpose he engaged in his monumental study of the economic ethics of the great religions and his more generalized typological studies of various types of social, political and economic relationships and gestalts. But he did not attempt to develop any systematic analysis of any given economic system so conceived, not even of capitalism[16]. This failure to reach the "system" level of analysis is due partly to Weber's reluctance to carry synthetic generalization very far, partly to a developing interest in sociology as a science, partly to a kind of fascination with the uniqueness of the specifically cultural element in various civilizations, and partly to the possibilities yielded by an analysis of individual gestalts of socio-cultural reality divorced from their system context and traced in a cross-cultural setting.[17]

Further generalized work on the system level of analysis has been contributed to mainly by two other German socio-economists, one a contemporary of Weber's, Werner Sombart, the other a contemporary of ours, Wilhelm Röpke. The take off for Röpke's work in this field was concern over the way in which the concept of an economic system and that of capitalism in particular was being abused. This led Röpke to develop a schema of five basic types of economic systems distinguished on the basis of the essential ordering principle by which the economic plan—the determination of what would be produced with what and given to whom—would be fixed. To each of these five ordering principles there would correspond in quite Marxian fashion some distinct legal-political order. Three of the five resulting types of economic systems were primary: namely, an *Eigenwirtschaft* with

[14] "Die Objektivitat.....", *Loc. cit.*, 168ff.

[15] See *ibid.* 170-208.

[16] This was apparent in his immense *Wirtschaft und Gesellachaft* and still more in his *General Economic History*. It is to be noted that the chapters on capitalism in this latter work are primarily concerned with "genesis" and that the order of components and essential characteristics of capitalism as such are not handled with very great care.

[17] See Parson's appreciative and balanced judgments on this theme in his *Structure of Social Action* 601ff, Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory, Pure and Applied (Ill.* 1949) 74-92.

its imposed economic plan on a household or a village-community level; a market society with division of labor and a plan arising through the market mechanism; and a planned economy where the plan was laid down by central authority. The socio-political orders corresponding to these three types were village-community, the liberal polity and the collectivist state. Two of these primary types were then cast in a "distorted" form. Thus the village community could become feudalized while the competitive order could become monopolistic or trustified. The nature of these distorted systems would depend upon the total historical setting of the society in which the particular principle was embodied.[18]

The advantage of the Röpkian approach is that it penetrates to a level of essential principle which is distinguished from the historical form in which it may become manifested. But the difficulties of the approach also stand out prominently. It is unhistorical; *i. e.* it contains no element of historical specificity. It borrows from the Marxian view point the assumption of rigid determinism between the economic order and the socio-political order.[19] It classifies economic systems according to one characteristic and thus assumes that these systems are invariant with respect to other significant characteristics. Finally, there is an obvious vagueness and diffuseness about the class of 'distorted systems. They bear all the earmarks of what Parsons once called 'residual categories'. As is almost always the case, noted Parsons, "not all the actually observable facts of the field, or those which have been observed, fit into the sharply positively defined categories, they tend to be given one or more blanket names which refer to categories negatively defined, that is of facts known to exist, which are more or less adequately described, but are defined theoretically by their failure to fit into the positively defined categories of the system". Parsons then went on to argue that "one kind of progress of theoretical work consists precisely in carving out from residual categories, definite positively defined concepts and their verification in empirical investigation".[20] This I take it to be obviously called for here with such an omnibus category as "distortions" containing many diverse elements which can hardly vary at random and which hence must be structured in significant ways. In all likelihood this structuring would revolve around cultural and historical configurations. Röpke's main failure probably thus boils down to failure to define his economic systems with reference to these configurations.

With Sombart, the other German propounder of a theory of economic systems, the emphasis was thrown on precisely those configurations which Röpke threw into an omnibus category, namely the cultural, the social, the historical. Thus one of the primary components of an economic system with Sombart is its *Geist,* those generalized attitudes and orientations from which derive the characteristic motives

[18] See W. Ropke, *Die Gesellschaftskrisis Der Gegenwart* (4th ed., Zurich, 1942) 162-241, *Civitas Humana* (Zurich, 1944) introduction (31-46). With some modifications a similar analysis is to be found in Erich Schneider, *Einfuhrung in die Wirtschaftstheorie* (Tubingen, 1947) 11-20.

[19] See particularly, *Gesellschaftskrisis,* 143ff. This kind of inverted Marxism is commonly found among the adherents of neo-liberalism.

[20] Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action,* 16ff.

of economic behavior. In the specific case of capitalism this included the unlimited drive for money acquisition, idealising of competition, rationality in handling means. *Geist* also includes generalized qualities of "style" about a system. The second primary component of an economic system is its *Ordnung* or key institutional structure. In the case of capitalism this revolved around the capitalist enterprise, but under modified conditions it included a complex of institutions including the trade union, the cartel, the stock exchange, and regulatory bodies. The last component of the economic system concerned crucial mechanisms of economic process (*Hergang der Wirtschaft*), which in the case of pure capitalism chiefly consisted of the price mechanism.[21]

From this account one can see that Sombart's concept of an economic system had the necessary breadth. This expanded perspective was in turn given a most interesting elaboration in detail. Grouped under the three main categories of *Geist, Ordnung* and *Process* were twelve detailed polarities along which every concrete economic system could be specified. Thus in the realm of *Geist* there was motivation ranging from mere earning a livelihood through satisfaction of given "wants" (*Bedarfdeckungsprinzip*) to aims for unlimited pecuniary acquisition (*Erwerbsprinzip*). Then again motivation is characterized by class of means regarded as appropriate. In the one case the animus is traditionalistic in selection of means; in the other, rationalistic. Finally, motivation is characterized by attitudes toward other participating egos with the polarity stretching from solidaristic orientations as against the more narrow kinds of individualism.

This threefold specification of motivations (by way of orientation to goals, object means and other participating persons) was complemented by a sixfold specification of *Ordnung*, also running in terms of polarities on a spectrum. Economic activity can be more or less bound in direction and object thus varying along a dimension of freedom-direction. Economic organization can be private or collective; and again it can be democratic or aristocratic in the role of leaders and the scope of authority which they exercise. It can be open or closed with reference to selection of occupation. It will vary in the degree of activity whose consummation is reached in the producing unit as against the method of division of labor. Finally, it will vary by mode of organization of the enterprise: individual or social.

With reference to process, the polarities are threefold. In range of knowledge, systems may be empirical or scientific; with reference to their course through time they may be stationary or progressive; and with reference to the controlling conditions and materials with which they cope they will be more or less organic or inorganic.

This framework of analysis was very suggestively filled in for earlier economic systems, for a hypothetical socialism and above all for capitalism. But if Sombart's thought had the necessary breadth and

[21] Cf. W. Sombart, *Die Dreie Nationalokonomien* (Munich, 1929) 178-191, "Nationalokonomie", *Wirtschaftliches Archiv* XXX (1931) 1-18, "Die Wandlungen des Kapitalismus", ibid., XXVIII (1929) 243–256: "Capitalism", *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (NY, 1930, v. III). See also *Der Moderne Kapitalismus.* His concept of an economic system was most systematically set forth in *Die Ordnung des Wirtschaftslebens* (1927) 1-33.

range of historical perspective, there is question as to the adequacy of its analytical depth and of the soundness of its classifications. His polarities refer to so many external features of an economic system and these features are not traced back or resolved at some more fundamental analytical level. Thus it was that the crucial concept of function was not explicitly mobilized nor were varieties of system traced back to the unformulated polarities of function. Only a start was made in developing a systematic typology of systems with an indication of the range of structural variation which they could follow. What Sombart did do was to carry the analysis of system farther than anyone else. He explicitly proclaimed it the central ordering framework for the science of economics.[22] Around his own analysis of system he developed his monumental empirical studies of capitalism. But he did not leave us a generalized way of thinking about economic systems which links up the best levels of modern sociological and economic thought and which penetrates down to the level of fundamental forces.

II

This account ot our doctrinal position is sketchy and incomplete. But it indicates that the idea of an economic system is protean in form. In its narrowest scope as a purely price system—a system of determinate exchange relationships occurring within a given universe of data—the concept achieves precision only by being emptied of sociocultural and historical reference. Equipped with this broader reference, the concept takes on wider meaning. But as scope has widened content has become more diffuse and questionable.

The composite effect of inadequate discrimination of basic ideas on personality, sociological and historical levels has tended to convert the concept of an economic system from a useful source of insight into a smudge which tends to hamper research, promote sloganizing and disturb clear thinking. This confusion and lack of consensus dwells mostly, I hasten to add, on the surface level. There has been a broadening course of thought which through this surface confusion has prepared elements or strands of synthesis on a relatively high level of logical articulation and empirical reference. It is this course of thought which, restated in terms of the more active currents of contemporary sociological thought, can take on new significance and achieve wider generality of form. I will attempt in this paper to work out the salient points of such a restatement to the ex-

[22] With the idea of an economic system, wrote Sombart, "economic theory as a science stands or falls" (*Die Dreie Nationalokonomen*, 185). This idea has been distinctively presented in Gruchy's valuable book, *Modern Economic Thought*, 541, 550f, 554ff. See also R. Mukerjee, *The Institutional Theory of Economics*, 5, 44f, 200ff, 213ff. By contrast Marxian thought contends that economic theory only involves the study of capitalism and that no generalized theory has yet been developed for cross-cultural study or should be. Partly this position involves semantic issues but partly a real difference of opinion. See Luxemberg, *Einfuhrung*, 45-63, 71ff. But F. Engels in his *Anti-Duehring* (trans., Inter. pub., n. d.) 167-71 develops the theme that political economy endeavours to establish the "laws", both "special" for each historical epoch and "general", which govern the "conditions and forms under which the various human societies have produced, exchanged and on this basis have distributed their products." But he stated that this "wider" political economy had not yet come into existence.

tent permitted by my own appreciation of the literature and ability to think the issues through. In the main the paper will dwell on the level of analysis where basic discriminations and their mutual implications are worked out. We will lapse from this austere level only to provide occasional illustration to bring some point home. To save time this attempt at restatement is cast in relatively dogmatic form and not in the more fruitful context of doctrinal discussion.[23]

In seeking a starting point we may mobilize for our purposes the ancient Weberian truth that a main ordering principle of an economic system will be the "ideal type".[24] In the main, ideal-types consist of a selective ordering of things or relationships defined in statical terms: they delineate a constellation, a Gestalt, a schemata. They should, however, have some counterpart in the world of action processes. We are not, of course, interested in the processes themselves or in their concrete forms but in the potentialities for action which they contain. Now in economic theory we deal with these potentialities for action chiefly as they relate to the conditions of demand or supply as embodied in functional relationships between two or more variables. There is a counterpart to these functional relationships of pure economic theory in the field of sociological theory. This counterpart has been brought out by Karl Mannheim who, on the basis of a suggestion of John Stuart Mill has developed an analysis of what he called the *principia media* of a social order. These are, broadly speaking, "special relationships of a certain historical phase in a particular social setting". Examples relevant to the functioning of an economic system are: that liberal capitalism generated a highly formal system of law; that enforced unemployment under specified conditions fosters rebellious attitudes; that a large public debt makes possible a wider range of democratic process. This type of generalization embodies empirical and quantitative as well as qualitative research on those "hybrid" or "synthetic" problems, as they have been called, which lie on the borderland of the various disciplines. When properly formulated these generalizations can describe the functional relations which tie together structural components of the economic system or which connect the economic system with the larger social order into which it is intermeshed. These functional relations are "mutually related" and hence "form a structure" or "configuration".[25] It is this configuration which we want to incorporate into our version of an economic system conceived in socio-cultural terms.

But still more realism—*i.e.*, specification on a more concrete level—is required. This can be provided by specifying regional characteristics. We speak of river valley societies and coast cultures.

[23] As my teacher, A. W. Marget has emphasized, fruitful analysis on an *ex parte* basis may occasionally bring new insights but at the cost of scattering effort, disrupting tradition and hampering the growth of the impersonal organon of a discipline. See his *The Thory of Prices* (2v., NY, 1938-42), "prefaces" and in a sense the whole of v. II.

[24] Cf. Mukerjee, *The Institutional Theory of Economics*, 213ff.

[25] See K. Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (NY 1949) 173-190; also A. Lowe, *Economics and Sociology* (London 1935) 98ff., 115f., 145f., on "middle principles". See also Mukerjee, *The Institutional Theory of Economics*, 1-4.

The plantation economy as we all know is not accidentally connected with tropical climates. Capitalism arose in a fringe or frontier area with a coastline sufficiently broken to foster extensive maritime skills. As a functioning system capitalism required the collaboration of different continents and the free run of the oceans. There are many crucial differences between Eastern and Western societies which turn upon the fact that one area cultivates and eats rice and the other bread grains and roots. These examples which of course could be multiplied suggest that an economic system must be specified on some level by its regional characteristics. Fortunately, the concept of the region in social-economic analysis has been developed in a series of remarkable works by the great Indian sociologist-economist. Radhakamal Mukerjee.[26]

We have endowed our economic system with typical features, process potentials and a regional situs. But in what terms can it be regarded as an organized pattern of action? In terms, I would submit, of what in sociological theory is called the functional approach.[27] Now economic analysis is not alien to the way of thinking embodied in the functional approach. It is in fact common to describe economic theory as a generalized description of the way certain functions are carried out through economic organization.[28] In traditional theory these functions relate primarily to the determination of an economic plan which selects the productive tasks, allocates resources for their fulfilment and distributes the product among claimants. The determination of such a plan *is* a crucial function of *all* economic systems; and it is a function which has been under-rated by most institutionalist economists of the past.[29] But it is not the exclusive or the only important function. The brunt of the institutionalist criticism of conventional economics is reducible to the charge that there are other essential functions which are relevant to the make-up of an economic system and which must find some kind of response in that system. These other functions may perhaps be grouped on the *ecologic, economic and institutional levels.*[30] On the *ecologic*

[26] See R. Mukerjee, *Man and his Habitation, A Study in Social Ecology* (London 1940) 170; *Social Ecology* (London 1944) viii. See also his *Regional Sociology* (1926); his *The Political Economy of Population* (London, 1910) Chaps. III, IV, V, VI. Mukerjee has developed the analysis of the region in a way that takes due account of and enables us to mobilize the findings of what Sorokin has called the "Geographical School" of sociological thought. See Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* chap. III. On the Marxian side, N. Bukharin has duly emphasized the role of the natural environment in which society must function and the constant metabolic process which goes on between society and its regional environment. See N. Bukharin, *Historical Materialism* (trans., NY, 1925) Chap. V.

[27] Cf. On the "functional" approach. Cf. R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (1949) 46-79; B. Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and other Essays* (Chapel Hill 1944) 67-74, 145-176; Mukerjee, *The Institutional Theory of Economics,* 36ff.

[28] See G. J. Stigler, *The Theory of Competitive Price* (NY, 1942) 32ff; Luxemberg, *Einfuhrung,* 60-2.

[29] Derogation of this function was implied in characterising conventional economics as inherently "bourgeois", or a "historical category", or as "taxonomic". Marx, Schmoller, Veblen all sinned grievously in this regard.

[30] This mode of classifying functions, I draw from Mukerjee, *The Institutional Theory of Economics,* Chapter II, "Relativity of Economic Environments".

level there is the function of making provision for the economically disabled members of the society, of ensuring support for reproduction, and of conserving or developing the resources of the region. On the more immediate *economic level* there is the function of satisfaction of the desire for self-expression or creativity in work, provision of appropriate mechanisms for ordering economic relations with the outside world, provision for stimulating technological progress and wealth accumulation, satisfaction of the desire for stability and security of livelihood, and development of mechanisms whereby diffuse benefits and unallocatable costs can receive their appropriate consideration. On the *institutional level* there is the function of providing for an adequate circulation of persons within the occupational system, of making available goods and services required to meet collective needs and to provide collective facilities, of devising ways for resolving disputes over working rules between members of the economy engaged in associated activity, of mobilizing incentives for engaging in effortful activity and for compliance with authority through provision of positive inducements or negative sanctions.

This list of functions as formulated is incomplete, overlapping and not reduced to the simplest possible form and fewest number. But it does, I believe, give more adequate expression to current levels of awareness of the actual scope for economic organization than does current methodological doctrine. A generation of economists that has been schooled by Marx, Veblen, Schmoller, Marshall, Pigou, Wicksell, Schumpeter and Keynes necessarily has moved a long way from the Euclidean economics of the utilitarian man with his naked interests, his calculus of desires, his random ends and his simple society.[31]

As soon as it is realized that there is not a single order or family of functional objectives which economic systems must subserve but a variety of them operating on different levels and becoming effective in different ways, the way is opened to the realization that in any concrete economic system these functional objectives must be arranged in priorities which lay out their relative value or claim on a limited stock of economic and social resources. It is possible for an economic system to lay weight on creativity in work and to neglect the function of innovation; or again emphasis may be laid on that trinity of functions which determine the economic plan to the relative neglect of the function of resource conservation or of providing for collective wants. It is not possible to carry out any given function with perfect satisfaction without rubbing up against some other. In shaping these boundary lines—by law, by institutional arrangement, by custom or by main force of resource layout—relative functional priorities will be determined. The pattern of functional priorities will be a crucial feature of the larger social order and will be closely integrated with it.

We pass on to the next issue what are the admissible ways and means by which economic functions are carried out? Conventional

[31] For the illuminating analysis of "Euclidean economics" in these terms, see J. M. Clark, *Preface to Social Economics* (NY, 1936) 40f.

theory holds that the only ways and means relevant for economic analysis are economic aspects of behavior. This mode of behavior is purely instrumental in form. As such it is carried on only for the sake of the realized end-product and involves the adaptation of scarce means with alternative uses to multiple and competing ends. This is the common idea which runs through the modern definition of economics as a discipline concerned only with the economic *aspects* of behavior. It is not presupposed that the concrete behavior involved in carrying out economic functions can be purely economic as thus defined. That all concrete behavior is to varying degrees impure was conceded by the founders of modern economics.[32] It is claimed, however, that the economic aspects of concrete behavior can be detached from their context and separately studied to good effect by a distinct discipline.[33]

In making this claim conventional economics was obviously influenced by its relatively simple view of functions. This made it easier to see in the non-economic only so many distracting or random influences to be studied separately. Institutional economics took a broader view of functions and it took a correspondingly broader view of ways and means. It saw that the non-economic influence over economic behavior was not random but organic and crucial. The non-economic actually constitutes modes through which economic functions become discharged. There is probably a tendency in every society to de-economize purely economic relationships, to infuse into them or to give increasing scope in them to affective and expressive aspects of behavior, to organize them into going concerns with a code of working rules to which some form of loyalty can be given and which can take on some deeper meaning for the individuals concerned. At the very least the bare repetition of instrumental economic behavior over a long enough time will change the nature of the action. As such it will induce the formation of habits and customs which when institutionalized can provide their own forms of motivation and proximate goals. It might even be said that any particular economic relationship incapable of mobilizing the support of effective non-economic elements probably tends to be inherently dysfunctional. As such it becomes the source of personality maladjustment and social strain.

[32] On Marshall, see Parsons, *Structure of Social Action*, 129-177. C. Menger, *Untersuchungen u.d. Methode der Socialwissenschaften.....* (Leipzig, 1883), BKI Chaps. 6-8. Walras was so convinced that inter-personal behavior — where some community of purpose would be required and sharing of ends—was so intrinsically social-moral that he confined to the sphere of pure economics only the study of "social riches" per. se, i.e. the relationships of persons with *things* and not of *persons* with *persons*. See his *Etudes D'Economie Sociale* (Paris, 1936) the 3rd and 4th lectures of his "Theorie Generale De La Societe"; and in more summary form see his *Abrege des Elements D'Economie Politique Pure* (Paris, 1938 ed.) 1st and 2nd lessons. Pareto made it very plain that in the real world logical and non-logical actions were mixed. See *Manuel D'Economie Politique* (2nd, Paris, 1927) 41. Perhaps F. Knight in some of his early essays went as far as it was possible to go in playing down the scope for application of modern theory. See his *The Ethics of Competition* (NY, 1935) 76-147.

[33] In about these terms did J. Schumpeter defend modern economics in his great methodological work, *Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der Theoretischen Nationalokonomie* (Leipzig, 1908) 76ff, 88ff, 523ff, 554ff, 581ff.

The role of the non-econmic in economic behavior emerges clearly in the study of wants, for it is only through culture that the wants of individuals can become coherently organized. Culture gets its grip at those points in the individual scale of preference where incommensurable magnitudes must be mutually related. These points appear chiefly when radically different kinds of satisfaction are equated, when quick decisions must be made, when present and future are scaled, when response thresholds are defined and when the element of the symbolic emerges. In making these decisions individuals in all societies must apply conventions and norms which are acquired from the culture by learning and which when internalized in personalities, become a part of working behavior.[34] In this way a culturally organized scale of preference emerges in the society. This involves a certain range for idiosyncratic orientation which permits discretion in individual taste as against prescriptive orientation through social norms. The objects wanted will be patterned as they are particular to the individual, common to many individuals or universal among all. Modes of want satisfaction will be patterned by holding individual or optional group consumption in balance with group consumption compulsively organized through the state.[35]

But if the non-economic is a crucial agency in carrying out economic functions, it in turn will be moulded partly to meet economic requirements. It must, to a degree, since the survival of the society involves a minimum level of economic performance and adaptability. Even hardened custom bends under sufficiently strong economic pressure, the rigid Indian caste system makes way for newly emerging occupational groups, and wants are moulded by new activities. But this adaptability is not automatic; it takes time; it involves a reshuffling of priorities in functions; and it takes effect through a process of cultural growth. Thus the functional priorities and the economic and non-economic ways and means mutually condition each other as aspects of a shifting cultural process.[36] In this process "the equilibrium of forces and relations is lifted from the plane of environmental selection through that of prices and costs by the action

[34] The role of these norms and conventions, which Thomas and Znaniecki noted were so distinctly to be seen in the scale of preference of the Polish peasant (with his high degree of income and use-compartmentalization and the distinctive character of his "norms"), and which Veblen satirized so richly for a pecuniary society, were recognized by P. Wicksteed only in the form of "crudities", "errors", "wastes" and other abnormalities involved in the process of income administration. See W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and* America (NY, 1927) 157ff, 164ff, 166f, 181f, 202ff; P. Wicksteed, *The Commonsense of Political Economy* (London 1933) I, chap. III, "Economical Administration and its Difficulties". The role of culture in shaping time-preference patterns has only been obliquely noticed in the literature though the discussion on this subject by Bohm-Bawerk and Keynes is valuable. See E. Bohm-Bawerk, *The Positive Theory of Capital* (trans., NY, 1891) 249-59; J. M. Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (NY, 1936) chap. XII, "The State of Long Term Expectation"; A. Marshall, *Principles of Economics* (London 8th ed., 1920) 224ff.

[35] See Mukerjee, *The Institutional Theory of Economics*, 151-169; Suranyi-Unger, *Comparative Economic Systems* (NY, 1952), Chap. XIV, "Wants and Satisfactions".

[36] See Veblen and Marshall on the mutual give-and-take or "contamination" of this process. Veblen, *Instinct of Workmanship* (NY, 1914) 84ff; Marshall, *op. cit.*, 86-91, 218ff, 725f; cf. also A. G. Gruchy, *Modern Economic Thought* (NY, 1947) 544f.

of demand and supply to that of the final level of the synthesis of all values by the framework of culture".[37]

This process of mutual conditioning on the cultural level takes on a specifically institutional dimension as the element of organization and regularity in culturally shaped interactive behavior rises to the fore. At rudimentary levels of division of labor, this element exists only in inchoate form. But as division of labor, becomes finer and is carried on over a wider range, the regulative ties arising out of the primary group become weakened while regulating mechanisms and processes having their origin in larger relationships become more prominent. Explicitly defined law emerges out of custom and morality; economic life becomes more settled and productive. At the same time interactive behavior patterns will now display formations which constantly reappear, which involve vital interests and facilities, which have a continuity of their own and which play some role in the discharge of the major functions. These nuclear formations of interactive behavior patterns constitute what are generally called the basic economic institutions. Despite the consideration given to "economic institutions", it is surprising how little systematic attention has been given to the criteria by which institutions are defined and to the designation of the fundamental ones, *i.e.,* to those which occur in every social system though in different forms and combinations. Here it can only be noted that the concept of institution in sociological theory is not yet settled.

Institutions will here be taken to refer to those complexes of behavior which, running through a society, are found concurrently to be organized in accord with some subjectively manifested realm of purposes and codes or rules, to revolve round the satisfaction of some vital interest and the working of some basic facility or "vehicle", and to involve the formation of one or more distinct groups and sets of role and status positions. This is a common ground of meaning which various institutional approaches share.[38] Using this criteria of institution, it then appears that five basic economic institutions stand out clearly. These five necessarily emerge in any society with an advanced stage of division of labor embracing a sufficiently wide

[37] Mukerjee, *The Institutional Theory of Economics,* 65f.

[38] Veblen quite consistently dealt with institutions as if they turned essentially around the habits of mind which ran through them. So also Talcott Parsons defined institutions as systems of "patterned expectations defining the proper behavior of persons playing certain roles". See Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied* (Glencoe 1949) 35. In his chapter on "The Theory of Social Institutions", Sorokin with many others virtually identifies an institution with the group which is or may be involved in its functioning and he lays an equally prominent stress on the element of law-norms. See his *Society, Culture and Personality* (NY, 1947) 70ff, 85ff. Others more loosely think of institutions as a reference to the more concrete phases of social organization. Mukerjee in his chapter "The Theory of Social Institutions" (*The Institutional Theory of Economics,* chap. VIII) is eclectic and lays stress on all these elements but emphasizes the tieup between each economic system and a "given set of institutions" (193) which are reduced to "different types of economic organization" (201) but this in turn grows out of underlying social norms and values. See also his *The Social Structure of Values,* 303ff, for an analysis of the roots of economic values and institutions. He refers here to the "tertiary values" represented by the system of industry and business organisation, property and the class.

range of groups and localities. These five institutions in fact may be regarded only as modes through which a finely organized division of labor can be carried out once social organization extends very far beyond the primary group held together through ethnic ties, face-to-face relationships and morality. The five institutions are property, money, industry, agriculture and leisure class.

The role of property as a basic economic institution is undisputed. As division of labor becomes more advanced, appropriation becomes universal and it becomes more necessary to define property relationships more clearly, to assemble these into some kind of distinct system and to render them more complex and flexible. Hence the institution of property is an ensemble of rights, immunities and forbearances which can be combined in different ways even within the same type of social and cultural order. Yet property and division of labor are intimately related. What in terms of overall process appears as division of labor must appear as property to the individuals concerned in defining their relations to the flow of products and the facilities of production.[39]

So it is with money, another basic economic institution. Some form of money emerges whenever indirect exchange achieves a certain degree of complexity and stability. Once the stamp of money is placed on a commodity, it tends to become conventionalized in character. As such its monetary function can become refined and an object of social control which it increasingly becomes as the division of labor becomes more complex and its monetary needs, accordingly, more prominent. Thus institutionalized money takes on a wide variety of concrete forms in the more complex and developed economic systems. If an economic system cannot rise higher than its form of money, it is also true that any given and historically evolved form of money will itself mirror a given system, its requirements and characteristics, and that modified forms of money and changes in the monetary institution may frequently be a transformative agency within the economic system and social order.[40]

But the role of money, as a basic economic institution, is perhaps overshadowed by two important institutions, industry and agriculture. These together with the city must emerge and take on an institutionalized form as the division of labor becomes more complexly organized. This can only occur if raw materials are drawn away from their scattered primary producers and consigned for processing and fabrication to specialists who by functioning in teams and with specialized facilities can develop new levels of efficiency. Industry which thus appears becomes essentially urban in form since fulfillment of its functions require location at some concentrated spot

[39] See K. Marx, *German Ideology* (trans., NY, 1939), 22; J. R. Commons, *Institutional Economics* (NY, 1934) 74 ff; Suranyi-Unger, *Comparative Economic Systems*, Chap. X; Mukerjee: *Principles of Comparative Economics*, Vol. I, Chap. VII; *"The Polities of Economic Systems"*, above all see J. S. mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, B.K. II, Chaps. 1-5.

[40] J. M. Keynes' *Treatise on Money* (NY, 1930) Chaps. I, XXXV; M. Weber's *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (trans., NY, 1947) chap. II; Suranyi-Unger, *op. cit.*, chap. XXI; Mukerjee, *Social Ecology*, Chap. IX; F. von Wieser, *Social Economics* (trans., NY, 1927) chaps. 29, 49.

where the physical circulation of matter is most easily arranged, where market access is convenient and where the economies of further specialization and community may be realized. Both industry, agriculture and the city which thus become differentiated are capable of assuming a wide variety of institutional forms. For industry, this variety ranges from the home workshop, the more organized craft guild, the capitalist enterprise, the modern corporation. For agriculture, this variety turns chiefly around modes of land tenure, settlement, husbandry, and takes on such concrete embodiments as the manor, the village community, the plantation, the extensive family farm, the peasant household, the capitalist farm rented from landlords and employing wage labor.[41] For the city, institutional variation has chiefly turned around patterns of nucleation, self-sufficiency or dependency, degree of self-organization, monopoly and regulatory control, collectivised want consumption and religious sharing. The city thus emerges in a specific cluster of institutional types running a range between the small dependent community, the industrial city, the modern metropolis, the fortress city, the exploitive warrior city, the plebian city and the like.[42]

The institution of the leisure class has been treated so thoroughly and subtly by Marx, Veblen, Pareto and Schumpeter that it suffices here only to refer to their work. Some kind of leisure class or economic elite with exemption from the industrial employments and with a relative monopoly of the higher status employments necessarily emerges as economic life becomes organized above the rudimentary level. The functions of the leisure class are varied but they will include that of giving general direction to the productive process, of organizing access to facilities of production and of controlling the distribution of the product. It is unnecessary to add that the leisure class can take on a variety of institutional forms.[43]

These economic institutions may vary in given settings. Their range of variation widens at the more advanced economic levels. To reach these levels institutions go through a process of more or less autonomous development which may be traced as it cuts through social orders and cultural contexts. Only to a limited extent are

[41] On the city as an economic institution, cf. A. Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (Mod. Lib. ed.) 17ff, 373ff; Marx, *Capital,* I, 387f; Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tubingen 1922) chap. VIII, "Die Stadt" and particularly 522ff; also Weber, *General Economic History,* 317ff; Mukerjee, *Man and His Habitation,* chaps. IV-VI. Werner Sombart's treatment is most illuminating. See his *Der Moderne Kapitalismus* (Leipzig 1902 ed.) II, 191ff.

[42] See particularly Weber's monumental study, "Die Stadt" (cited above) and its summarized account in *General Economic History,* 315-337; Hawley, *Human Ecology,* chaps. XIII-XV; Mukerjee, *Social Ecology,* Chap. V; and Sombart's *Moderne Kapitalismus,* II, chaps. X-XII for a study of the general nature of the "capitalist city" and its major variations and adulterated forms.

[43] That the leisure class or the directive elite may be fruitfully regarded as an institution whose functions and development may be traced on a broad canvass was, of course, classically argued by Veblen in his classic, *Theory of the Leisure Class,* but was in many respects better set forth by Pareto and Schumpeter (see particularly by the latter his essay on social classes published in *Imperialism and Social Classes* (NY, 1951).

these institutions adaptable or subject to deliberate social control and for the most part they are prescriptive in their working.

In these ways we realize that economic institutions have a certain historic and functional individuality. We also realize that they cannot vary at random in a given society. They make up a Gestalt which must be mutually consistent in terms of requirements and adaptability. Thus any very complex form of economic life requires, among other things, a more highly conventionalized kind of money, a more elastic kind of property, a less self-contained kind of city, a more productive form of agriculture and a more energetic leisure class. Any given institutional Gestalt, in turn, will tend to induce an adaptive pattern of functional priorities and ways and means. Functions previously submerged may call for specialized handling while old ways and means may be out of tune with changed institutions. Commons expressed these adaptive patterns by noting that when "efficiency increases then scarcity diminishes, a variation in the working rules occurs as well as of expectations of the future, and perhaps of the use of sovereignty."[44] There will in these respects be a mutual give-and-take which as Mukerjee pointed out will rise from level to level, from the ecologic through the economic to the institutional.[45] This give-and-take may only express inter-dependence but it may also rise to the higher forms of equilibrium or moving balance.[46] These relationships are illustrated by the case of capitalism which may for present purposes be defined as a Gestalt fused of the following elements: a commodity money conventionalized at a high level, a highly absolute form of private property, a want-structure with primacy on individualized modes of consumption and stress on emulative pecuniary norms, a specifically Western type city with minimum social control, individualized capitalist farms, functional primacy on the economic plan and relative neglect of ecologic and institutional functions, primacy on utilitarian ways and means, an energetic and productive leisure class, and capitalist industry.

These examples only bring out that all institutions are implicated in any given economic situation and social order and that the balance between the functional priorities, ways and means and institutional forms will be subtle and organic. This of course raises questions about the degrees of mutual implication or integration and the kinds of emergent properties which economic systems manifest. Integration can vary with respect to system-integrity or the capacity to resist change or direct it in certain ways. Likewise systems can vary in their capacity to maintain equilibrium. It is because of this trait of system-integrity and of the need for mutual adaptation among the elements which contribute to the system that systems cannot assume

[44] See J. R. Commons, *Institutional Economics*, 738.

[45] Mukerjee, *The Institutional Theory of Economics*, 65, 84, and chapter II and XV. "Social equilibrium like evolution and adaptation rises from level to level. Both the scene and the actors become ever new, and there is a slow succession of ever new life-forms, ever-improved communities and balances of life towards an unrealised climax". *Social Ecology*, 335 (see also the whole of this chapter, "Social Equilibrium").

[46] See Marget, *Theory of Prices*, II, 406-449; on "going concerns", see Commons, *Institutional Economics* 69ff.

an indefinite number of forms. Though there are many major components which within degrees are variable and which enter into the system, the need for adaptation reigns in these limits. Thus, there will emerge a limited number of system-patterns which are determined by fundamental properties of system-structure. These properties or structural-constraints have not been systematically studied or collected though most of them have been noted by our better analysts and given a generalized expression. Perhaps the tendency has been to assume either too relaxed a tendency toward system-integrity or, as in the case of Marx, to exaggerate the force of system-integrity and to under-estimate the scope for independent variation in the system-components.

It is precisely this question of system-integrity which leads to the question of historic specification. For the range of variability of systems is greatly narrowed by the fact that every empirical economic system must be located in a historical environment which is malleable only to a limited degree. Thus the modern capitalist economy presupposed and went hand in hand with a relatively high level of scientific achievement. The two cannot be divorced from each other, nor can either be assumed to function in a society equipped with the industrial technology of the early Egyptians. There *has* been a pattern of historical development which has involved specific relationships between certain levels of culture, scientific knowledge, social technology, industrial arts, religion. The fact that the historical development has not been rigidly linear or everywhere uniform should not be permitted to blot out the fact that it did occur though within limits that vary considerably from area to area and period to period. It is within such limits that it would seem to make sense to affix a historical specification on types of economic systems.

But there are reasons why this historical specification should be complex in character. The reasons for complexity can perhaps best be brought out through illustrations of which I have picked four: Protestantism, colonialism, population increase and the national state. A case can be made to support the assertion that the rise of capitalism was structurally connected with the protestant Reformation. In a broad way this assertion spells out the implications of the general connection traced by most cultural historians between the Reformation and the emergence of the "modern" world and its characteristic attitudes.[47] We all know the subtlety of analysis and large body of proof which Weber, Troeltsch and Tawney mobilized in support of their stand on this question. Assume for the moment that we can accept their conclusion. This does not entail that the Protestant ethic be deemed a structural ingredient of capitalism. Weber was the first to point out that with the development of capitalism the specifically religious expression of its outlook vanished, and that its outlook became wholly secularized and shifted in orientation.[48] Hence capitalism was able to spread into areas where it

[47] It is worth noting that this was a cardinal thesis of St. Simon, Comte and Hegel as well as of modern cultural historians.

[48] See *General Economic History*, 369; it was emphasised in his *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.*

could never have originated and to adapt itself to forms of belief which originally would have been incompatible with it.

Colonialism was associated with the discovery and utilization on a large scale of tropical lands and peoples and with such crucial products and materials as tobacco, sugar, cotton, tea. In these respects colonialism accelerated maritime activity and commerce, fostered new wants as inducement to new forms of activity, and formed new sources of riches. These all were so many means of dislocating the old society. In these respects historical research indicates that colonialism was necessary to the rise of capitalism. Was this role still involved in the 19th century when capitalism had achieved its own foundations? Was colonialism then a structural ingredient of capitalism which reflected its essential unevenness of make-up? Was it a structural hang-over from the period of genesis? Was it essentially a by-product of the presence of feudalized ruling classes and feudal attitudes? Or should colonialism be considered a phase of the expansion of Western civilization and its rise to world power, a phase which ran its course concurrently with capitalism but is not fully identified with it?[49]

Similarly disturbing questions are encountered in the field of population. Much of the surface history of the 19th century ordinarily categorised as capitalist is traceable to the amazing population increase which in that century almost tripled Europe's population. This population increase rendered the society more mutable; it accelerated the proletarianisation of the labor force; it pushed ahead the geographical spread of capitalism through overseas migration: it stimulated the speedier rise of unplanned urban areas peopled by uprooted rural migrants; it made Europe increasingly dependent upon overseas imports of raw materials and food; finally, it helped to upset the balance of power upon which the peace of Europe was founded.[50] To what extent, now, should this population increase be considered a structural ingredient of capitalism? Assertion of structural relationship is on its face a tenable position. It was upheld not only by the classical economists and Marx but as strictly by Schumpeter and to a degree by Sombart and many population specialists.[51] This position is supported by the obvious relationship that existed between capitalism, industrial expansion, rationalisation of life generally, the improvement in conditions of public health

[49] We have no intention of references here to the immense literature which has developed on this subject, which overlaps with that of imperialism. It is merely worth while noting to illustrate the confusion which shrouds the discussion that whereas Marx distinctly characterised colonialism as essential to capitalist genesis (see Capital, I 823ff.), he also in a cryptic statement characterised it as essential to an evolved capitalism. "..... the veiled slavery of the wage earners in Europe needed for its pedestal slavery, pure and simple, in the new world" (833). See also Marx, *Poverty of Philosophy* (trans., Chicago 1920) 121f. Yet Lenin makes of colonialism a specific trait of "imperialism", a more advanced "phase" of capitalism.

[50] Mukerjee, *Political Economy of Population*, 247ff, 338ff; Ropke, *Gesellschaftskrisis*, 180ff; W. Thompson, *Population Problems* (NY, 1935, 2nd ed.) chap. XXIII; P. Mombert, *Bevolkerungslehre* (Jena 1929) 170-194; J. M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (NY, 1920) 9-26.

[51] Cf. J. Schumpeter *Theorieder wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung* (Leipzing 1912) 476ff.

and of medical practice and the marked fall in death rates. Yet the case of France shows that capitalism sometimes could call for people and obtain a muted response.[52] The French experience was proved later to be not the exception but the forerunner of the universal rule that under capitalism population sooner or later began to fail to reproduce itself. And a very persuasive case has been made that this outcome was inherently attributable to the rationalisation of life produced by capitalism, its insecure mode of existence for large masses, its dissolution of traditional ideas, the cult of personality and spirit of ambition which it fostered, the expense of raising children under its conditions.[53] If this is true, then the population increase was not a primary attribute of capitalism but was a lagged response upon which is writ large the impress of the historically accidental.

Difficulties no less perplexing are encountered in coping with the problem of the national state which has been defined as an essential ingredient of capitalism considered as a system.[54] On a sufficiently concrete level of reference, this specification makes sense. The habitat of capitalism at its birth was a broken up peninsula whose population was bound together by a common culture but was differentiated into emerging national groups which differed in position, self-organisation and power. Under these conditions it was understandable that capitalism would develop unevenly and that the most developed capitalist country was able to build up a world empire. She was also able through fostering the balance of power to prevent her European neighbors from becoming consolidated into a single polity which she herself was unfitted to organize. These were the general conditions under which the national state became a distinct characteristic of capitalism. But if the national state is thus specified as an ingredient of capitalism, there must also be included the balance of power system of international politics and the hegemony of England over Europe and in world politics generally. Perhaps capitalism should be specified down to this level of concrete description. But at this level of specification it includes a temporary population increase, the rise of an American republic, the maintenance of a colonial system, and a whole series of forces which were a part of the historical setting in which it became embodied.

I think these illustrations bring out three distinct issues. In the first place, they imply that historical specification can probably dwell on many analytical levels according to the purpose on hand. But specification must be consistently applied on whatever level it chooses to dwell. Failure to observe this canon has tended to vitiate many important generalizations found in Marxian writings. Secondly, these illustrations suggest that a distinction should be drawn between an economic system defined in a stage of genesis and in a more fully developed stage. Finally, on this basis we can take

[52] Cf. J. J. Spengler, *France Faces Depopulation* (Durham, 1938), chap. I.

[53] *Ibid.*, chap. VII; G. Myrdal, *Population* (Cambridge, 1940) 98ff; Mukerjee *Political Economy of Population*, 247ff.; Thompson, *Population Problems*, chap. XI.

[54] See Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution* (NY, 1941), 18ff., 172ff.; K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (NY, 1944) 3f; also M. Weber, *General Economic History*, XXIX.

cognisance of the important process of cultural diffusion by which advanced social forms and traits may be taken over by simpler societies and adapted to their needs through amalgamation or selective borrowing. A given socio-economic form once evolved will thus tend by a process of cultural diffusion to produce a variety of hybrid types which of course will make up an environment which will react upon the originating society. Thus no historically existent economic system can be regarded as a single type with distinct stages but must in its essential nature be regarded as a family of hybrid types arising out of an interacting process of diffusion and development.[55] But it is also true that the common form and principles which run through all the hybrid types and stages may be regarded as an idealized form of which they are varying embodiments. Probably this is as far as we can go with Ropke in stripping an economic system of the impress of its historical setting. But this idealized form must always be regarded in close connection with the family of hybrid types and stages whose common features it expresses. In any case it makes no sense to contrapose one to the other, or to argue that the acceptance of one renders the other unnecessary or that the relationship between the two is one of mystic infusion.

This discussion of cultural diffusion leads into the general issue of the role and nature of boundary lines which by implication have been incorporated into the concept of an economic system. The simple fact is that boundary lines between societies have been rigidly drawn only in exceptional cases and mostly for some preliterate or specially isolated peoples. Most societies and all highly developed ones have been more or less solidary with neighbouring societies and they have, as Toynbee recently has pointed out, grouped themselves into complexes which may be called civilizations.[56] Within these civilizational complexes there will generally prevail a relatively high degree of multi-national integration with some overt institutionalisation; a common culture including a faith or the elements of a common language; extensive interaction, cultural diffusion, and a kind of moral solidarity; and, where techniques permit, a large amount of mutual trade and division of labor.

The implications of this overlapping of social orders into larger civilizational complexes have not been as carefully considered in the social sciences as they deserve. There has been all too much tendency to theorise about and for a nonexistent distinct or isolated society whether in its economic, social or political aspects.[57] Yet we

[55] On cultural diffusion and its role in social process, see Sorokin, *Cultural and Social Dynamics,* IV, 197-288; L. D. Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution* (NY, 1931) I, chap. I, where the "law of combined development" was applied to the Russian case. Marx in his published writings sustained the general viewpoint of the integrity of social systems which had to be taken en bloc. See his first "preface" to the German edition of *Capital,* I. See also Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* (NY, 1915), chap. II and Mukerjee: *Principles of Comparative Economics,* Vol. I, chap. XI.

[56] See A. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (6v, Oxford 1936-9) I, Chaps. I, II.

[57] See for criticism of the unitary society theorists P. Sorokin, *Society, Culture and Personality* (NY, 1947) 306ff; R. Luxemberg, *Einfuhrung,* 13-44 (arguing that the capitalist economy had to be considered a world economy); and see my

are presented here with a very real dilemma. Federalization and civilizational solidarity have almost everywhere gone far enough to affect significantly the internal systems of the component societies and to constitute some form of overlapping order with its own functional requirements and emergent properties. This was true of the 19th century Western world as it was of medieval Christendom, classical China, the Moslem world or pre-British India. Yet federalization has only in a few cases been carried to the point where the boundary lines of a distinct society with its separate economy and state have been rubbed out. I merely present this dilemma with the rather obvious suggestion that, since it is real and not spurious, it be respected. Societies and economic systems are both distinct and overlapping, and they are neither fully isolated and self-maintaining nor fully consolidated and federalized.[58] We should thus recognize that an economic system is a highly complex concept. It should denote an historically evolved ideal-type form resolvable into a family of hybrid stages and types of systems united more or less loosely in a civilizational complex and identified individually in terms of a more or less integrated pattern of functional priorities, ways and means for their discharge, and an institutional Gestalt.

In conclusion I believe it is worthwhile to attempt to indicate the value of carrying theory forward over so difficult a terrain as that which I have marked out. I at least need to say something against the attitude of letting sleeping dogs lie. Our first motivation is curiosity. How has the problem of economic organization in fact been solved and what are the structural imperatives to which it must conform? Not all of us are curious, but the incurious also will have an image of an economic system; these images should be verified. Yet another motive for action is that in this way we make effective contact with the other social sciences and bring to an end our self-imposed isolation from them. There is a fourth and even more urgent motive and on this I will rest my case.

This concerns the need to clear up the issue of capitalism which has hung around our science for many years now without having had its precise status clarified. In reaching a concensus on this question our orientation of course will be different from that of the great figures who were concerned with it, in the past two generations. They were preoccupied with the genesis of capitalism, its mode of operation in its heydey, or the need for reforming it. The primary focus of our interest should be neither genesis, operation nor reform but rather its demise or speaking more precisely its degree of transformation. Assuredly the process of change in virtually all dimensions of the system has gone a long way. The totality of ways and means and of their institutionalised configurations by which the functions of the economy are discharged in the middle of

comments on T. Parsons in my "Parsons and Mukerjee" *loc. cit.* Alert historians have criticised the writing of history from an exclusively national framework.

[58] We must, that is to say, learn to think in Hegelian terms; for the union of something which *is* and *is not* is *becoming.* See *Wissenschaft der Logik,* I, Chap. I. In the classical work of W. I. Thomas and Znaniecki. *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* I, 36, social theory was said to revolve around "the analysis of the totality of social becoming."

the 20th century differs radically from its counterpart of a century earlier. The question of an economic system is thus with us not an academic but a practical question. As Gruchy has pointed out, this question, though central to institutionalist work in America, has been left without careful answer. In India, as it has been adequately stressed by Mukerjee's institutional approach, it is equally a vital, practical issue.[59] Until an effort at synthesis is made on a reasonably high level of logical articulation and empirical breadth, the intellectual atmosphere will be clouded by the hold-over of unfit doctrines and preconceptions.

[59] Gruchy, *Modern Economic Thought*. 554ff., 615ff. For an essay of my own along these lines, see my paper "Meek on Marx", *Review of Economic Studies* (1953, forthcoming issue). See Mukerjee: *The Institutional Theory of Economics*, IX.

INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

By ALLAN G. GRUCHY

National economic policy making and government intervention have become common aspects of economic activity in many countries in recent years. The depression of the 1930's and the development of John M. Keynes' economics dealt severe, if not fatal, blows to the non-interventionism of the traditional or orthodox economics of the first quarter of the current century. The interventionist position, however, had become well known in academic circles long before the Great Depression of 1929. Interventionism has been associated with institutional economics ever since it was given shape by Thorstein Veblen, John A. Hobson and other institutionalists in the closing years of the nineteenth century.

Among the many features that distinguish institutional economics from other less heterodox types of economics none has been more important than the interest of the institutional economist in the problem of collective economic control. An examination of the work of Hobson, Tawney, and the Webbs in England, of Veblen and his followers in the United States, and of the Indian institutionalist Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee shows that these members of the institutional school are in agreement that the uncontrolled economic system does not automatically provide, on a lasting basis, that high degree of national economic coordination required for a satisfactory level of general economic welfare. The position of the institutionalists with respect to this important economic problem was well stated by Professor Mukerjee in 1925 in his *Borderlands of Economics* in which he observes that in the future economics "will not be concerned with remote and abstract generalities, but with the scrutiny in detail of concrete situations and with intelligent attention and deliberate control for improvement". It has been understood by institutional economists in both the East and the West that the maturing capitalism of Western Europe and North America and the agricultural communalism of Asiatic countries have one thing in common. This is that neither type of economic system can rely upon the free working of the market place for those levels of output and employment that result in an adequate national standard of living.

Institutional economics is essentially an economics of collective action. It recognizes that new forms of collective economic action are now making their appearance, while the inherited system of nineteenth century individualism becomes increasingly unable to cope with the large economic problems of our times. The basic problem of the current century is to see to it that the new patterns of collective economic action leave ample room for the full expression of individual freedom. What is now needed, with variations according to the

special conditions of different geographical regions, is a pattern of collective-individualistic economic activity which will constitute the foundation of society in which the twin goals of *security* and *freedom* are achieved. "The problem alike for the East and the West", Professor Mukerjee has explained in *The Institutional Theory of Economics,* "is the planning of resources, scientific skills and techniques and economic institutions, so that these may fit with one another and direct man's impulses, interests and habits as well as his tools of production and exchange for the sharing of a fuller and more abundant life for all. It is the realization of this practical object in the actual social situation which will furnish the judgment of the different plans of action treated as hypotheses and not as established dogmas."

It is the aim of this essay to inquire into the interconnections between institutional economic thought and the problem of national economic planning which has today moved to the front of economic questions of world-wide importance. Since so much attention has of late been given to the economics of John M. Keynes, it has been thought appropriate to bring out the national economic policy implications of institutional economics by first making a comparison of Keynesian and institutionalist economics, both of which have given much attention to the issue of intervention in national economic affairs. It is important to note, however, that the economic planning recommended by Professor Mukerjee and other institutionalists is in many important respects quite different from the economic intervention suggested by Keynes and his followers.

I

It is clear at this mid-century point that a new type of economic system is emerging in democratic countries throughout the world. This new system exemplifies the principles of neither laissez-faire capitalism nor full socialism; it is, instead, what may be best described as a "public-private enterprise" economy. The essence of this emerging economic system is found in a combination of public and private enterprise, with the government, however, assuming final responsibility for the guidance of the nation's economic activities. The public-private enterprise type of economic system has made its appearance in the last half-century in many areas of the world. It is found in the Scandinavian countries, in the United Kingdom, in Australia and other Dominions, and in such newer countries as India and Israel. In all these countries and elsewhere the basic economic pattern is the same. The key industries in the core of the economy are either publically owned and operated or subject to extensive government regulation; the smaller-scale and more competitive industries are left in private hands and are subject to less rigorous regulation, while the government accepts responsibility not only for a high level of output and employment but also for the general growth or development of the economy.[1] The ratio of public to private enterprise varies from

[1] In the United States this pattern of economic organization is making its appearance. All that remains is to develop a scheme of controls that will be applied to the core of large-scale, key industries. The work of the National Resources Committee and the President's Council of Economic Advisers points in this direction.

country to country, and reflects the special historico-cultural circumstances of each nation. But beneath all such special national features or emphases lies the basic pattern of the democratic, public-private enterprise economy. With the present stage of world development and cultural attainment democratic nations may for a long time to come continue to accept this public-private system as the norm of economic enterprise. As long as this is the case, any body of economic thought which is based on the assumptions of pure capitalism or pure socialism will necessarily fall far short of explaining the economic realities of the twentieth century. What is needed today for a full understanding of economic activity in all the major democratic nations of the East and the West is an economics of public-private enterprise. This is precisely the economics of the institutional school of economists which has been primarily concerned with an investigation and interpretation of the mixed or dual economy, ever since Thorstein Veblen penned his brilliant economic essays at the end of the last century.

What has brought the public-private enterprise economy into great prominence in recent years has been the problem of economic growth as it relates to both developed and underdeveloped areas. It is now widely conceded that economic growth is a problem which far transcends the purview of private enterprise. What is called for, if stabilized economic development is to be achieved, is a partnership of public and private enterprise in which the government remains the senior partner. The main reason for this dominant role of the government is that economic growth requires types of investment which have no appeal for private enterprise. Private investment proceeds on the basis of the usual marginal considerations which result in the selection of those investments that pay the highest net return. Long-term economic growth, however, cannot be limited by private financial considerations. In the final analysis economic growth depends very much upon the successful building up of an adequate supply of social capital in the form of a protected soil, a healthy public, widespread industrial skills, advanced scientific understanding, and devices for the best use of natural resources such as flood-control systems, hydro-electrical installations, irrigation projects, and the like. Public investment along these lines cannot be divorced from the problems of private investment and consumption. In any given circumstance more public investment usually means less private investment or less private consumption. The distribution of the gross national product is a matter to be settled, not by the forces of the market place, but by a consensus of public opinion based on the estimated relative social net worth of additional public or private consumption or investment. It is in answering these problems that democratic nations have in recent decades found the public-private enterprise type of economy most suitable for the tasks at hand.

The spread of the public-private enterprise system in democratic nations in recent decades has brought about highly important changes in national economic policy. One has but to call to mind the Middle Way of Sweden, the Laborism of Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and the Fair Deal of the United States to realize how extensive have been recent changes in national economic policy. These

fundamental economic-policy changes have not been without important effects in the realm of economic science. Two schools of economists have risen in answer to the challenges of the Great Depression era and later times. These are the institutional and the Keynesian schools, the former school including the neo-Veblenians and their counterparts outside the United States, and the latter school including Keynes and his many followers in the United Kingdom and abroad. These two schools of economic thought have pushed into comparative oblivion the school of non-interventionists led by, among others, Lionel Robbins and Friedrich von Hayek in England and Frank Knight and Henry Simons in the United States.

Both institutional and Keynesian economists have come forth with national policy recommendations for the good working of the public-private enterprise economic system. These recommendations, however, fall into two basically different categories. The institutionalist policy recommendations lead to comprehensive or over-all national planning, while the Keynesian recommendations look to partial or piecemeal national planning. These substantial differences in policy recommendations stem from the fundamental differences in scientific interpretation which are found in institutional and Keynesian economics. Every body of economic thought has within it a logic of interpretation which derives from the underlying assumptions of that economic thought. This logic of interpretation becomes the basic for a related logic of reform. This is true because the economist's logic of interpretation becomes the basis for a related logic of reform. This is true because the economist's logic of interpretation is a kind of framework which limits and gives direction to his suggestions for economic reform. The economic variables which the economist chooses to analyze, and about which he makes his economic generalizations, determine in a general way the paths which his views on economic reform are to follow. For example, the public policy implications of institutional economics point in the direction of comprehensive national economic planning, because the institutional economist makes a comprehensive interpretation of the evolving economic system which covers a wide range of economic variables. The public policy implications of Keynes' economics are much more limited because his economic analysis includes fewer variables than does institutional economics, and so falls far short of being a broad interpretation of the developing economic process. It remains to be shown that the public policy implications of institutional economics are today much more significant for economic policy-making than are those of Keynesian economics. An examination of the different public policy implications of both types of economics will not only indicate more precisely the nature of these implications, but will also show why, in the opinion of the institutional economists, their public policy suggestions are more helpful in coping with the major economic problems of the second half of the twentieth century.

II

Before analyzing the policy implications of Keynes' economics it is necessary to lay bare the general features of his economic

thought. Keynes' primary interest is in what he calls the "monetary economy."[2] He describes the English economy of his time as a monetary economy, because he feels that it is the monetary and not the industrial features of modern capitalism that are of strategic importance in explaining twentieth-century economic problems. As Keynes sees the matter, it is not the basic industrial structure or the supply side of the capitalistic system that is at fault. Rather, it is the monetary features of capitalistic enterprise that are the source of current economic troubles. Keynes does not find the roots of present-day economic problems in the organization of industry, as do the institutional economists. Instead, he finds these roots in various matters relating to money which he describes as "that subtle device for linking the present to the future." To put the matter differently, Keynes' economic analysis runs primarily in terms of "demand" rather than "supply." As he himself has expressed it, "the more significant change, of which we have to take account, is the effect of changes in *demand* both on costs and on volume. It is on the side of demand that we have to introduce quite new ideas . . . ."[3] If Keynes had probed more deeply into the supply side of economic activities he would have had to take account of technological innovation, economic development, the changing structure of industry, the emergence of large-scale enterprise, and all those problems that stem from a consideration of the impact of a changing technology on economic life. As it is, he largely ignores these matters which are of so much concern to the institutional economists, and instead concentrates his attention on profit expectations, money supplies, interest rates, propensities to consume and save, and all those other matters which constitute merely the monetary epiphenomena of the capitalistic system.

What are the consequences of Keynes' all-absorbing and rather exclusive interest in the demand or monetary side of economic activity? First, he incorrectly assumes that, in general, the modern highly-industrialized economy operates in an efficient, balanced manner. Keynes asserts that there is nothing radically wrong with the organization of industry, the allocation of the factors of production, or the internal functioning of the industrial system. In the concluding chapter of the *General Theory* he declares that "I see no reason to suppose that the existing system seriously misemploys the factors of production which we use. . . . . It is in determining the *volume,* not the *direction,* of actual employment that the existing system has broken down."[4] This is a statement which no institutional economist would accept on the ground that, in his opinion, the modern industrialized economy very seriously misemploys the factors of production because of the presence of a high degree of monopolization in economic affairs. To be sure, Keynes is not unaware of the monopoly problem, but he dismisses it by taking for granted that there exists a tendency for big enterprises to socialize themselves, and so to behave in a quasi-competitive manner.[5] It is only by making this unwar-

[2] The *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,* pp. vii and 293
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 294.
[4] *Ibid.,* p. 379. Italics supplied.
[5] For Keynes' views in this connection see his *Laissez-Faire and Communism.*

ranted assumption (even as applied to the United Kingdom of the 1930's) that Keynes is able to ignore the major defects in the organization of the modern industrial system. The consequences with respect to public policy of Keynes' failure to probe into the industrial sub-structure of his monetary economy are not difficult to uncover, as we shall shortly see.

The second major consequence of Keynes' deep interest in the demand aspect rather than the supply aspect of present-day economic activity shows up in his failure to combine his theory of employment with a theory of economic development. Since Keynes ignores the problem of technological change and its impact on the industrial structure of the modern economy, it is not surprising to find that he is more interested in "equilibrium" than in "process." There is throughout his economic analysis a superficial interest in the evolving economic system.[6] What distinguishes Keynes from the institutional economists is not that the latter are interested in the economic process while he is not. The difference is that the economic process in Keynes' analysis comes to an end when an equilibrium between saving and investment is established within the framework of his predominantly private-enterprise monetary economy. With the institutional economists the economic process has no predetermined end, since there will be a continuous reshaping of the economic system as long as technological change occurs.

Keynes' interest in equilibrium economics, inherited from his predecessors in the Cambridge school, leads him to develop what may be described as the "compensatory" rather than the 'growth" approach to economic problems. Keynes is concerned, as he himself explains, with compensating for deficiencies in the *volume* but not the *direction* of investment. In Keynes' economics the direction aspect of the growth problem is taken care of automatically because, as he puts it, there is no misemployment of economic resources. Hence his deep concern with only the volume aspect of the problem of economic growth. From an historical standpoint it is not difficult to explain this special interest of Keynes in compensatory rather than growth economics. The *General Theory* was written in the depressed 1930's when the most pressing problem was the volume and not the direction of investment. No matter what one may say about the long-run significance of Keynes' economics, it is clear that it came into being as a kind of compensatory, depression economics which was not primarily concerned with the growth problem. It is only when full employment is achieved that the problem of economic growth becomes important. The economist's interest then comes to include both the volume and the direction of investment. Such a shift is observable in the economics of Alvin H. Hansen, the outstanding American expo-

1926, pp. 61-63. Keynes here states that "one of the most interesting developments of recent decades has been the tendency of big enterprise to socialize itself . . . . big institutions are, as time goes, socializing themselves." An analysis of the price, wage, and investment policies of large corporations hardly supports this optimistic outlook with regard to the future of big business. We have here the fundamental weakness of the whole Keynesian analysis, that is to say, a failure to understand the nature of modern industrial organization.

[6] *Essays in Persuasion*, p. 355.

nent of Keynesianism.[7] Although the basic emphasis of Hansen's work is still largely of the compensatory type, he nevertheless combines his compensatory economics with a limited type of developmental or growth economics. One notes in Hansen's work a tendency to emphasize much more than does Keynes the possibility of influencing the direction as well as the volume of investment. Hansen calls for a strong natural and human resource development program which, while compensating for the investment deficiencies of the modern economic system, would also significantly alter the direction of the investment process. If Hansen would give more attention to the role of technological change in the modern economy, and if he would broaden his investment control program to include private as well as public enterprise, he would find himself in the institutionalist rather than the Keynesian camp. As it is, he appears to be located somewhere between the two schools of economic thought.

III

In view of the nature of Keynes' compensatory economics it is not surprising that his public policy pronouncements should point in the direction of partial or piecemeal planning. This limited type of economic planning consists of a number of fiscal and monetary measures combined with a limited amount of public investment which call for no direct governmental intervention in private business affairs. Keynes' public policy recommendations are made with a view to influencing the private enterprise sector of the economy only from an external stand-point. The partial or limited economic planning of the Keynesian variety has two distinguishing characteristics: (1) this planning program does not involve public control of the price, production, and investment policies of large-scale private enterprises, and (2) there is no suggestion of the need for any over-all national planning agency to coordinate the activities of the private and public sectors of the economy. Since Keynes believes that the private enterprise system allocates resources fairly efficiently, he sees no need for over-all economic planning. All that is necessary, in his view, is fiscal and monetary planning which will shore up an otherwise sound economic structure. There is no necessity for any significant modification of the organization of private industry.

A recent example of how Keynesian economics creates a framework for, and thus limits, public policy suggestions is found in Alvin H. Hansen's appraisal of the work of Wesley C. Mitchell.[8] When he analyzes Mitchell's views on national economic planning, Hansen criticizes these views because they suggest that what is required is a somewhat drastic reorganization of industry along the lines of over-all national planning. Hansen asserts that Mitchell would have done better to have looked for a solution to current economic problems not along the lines of the organization of industry but in monetary and fiscal policies. One sees here quite clearly the close relations between economic analysis and economic reform. Mitchell had, after 1929, come around to the view that technological change was so alter-

[7] See, for example, Hansen's *Economic Policy and Full Employment*, 1947, and his more recent contribution, *Business Cycles and National Income*, 1951.

[8] A. H. Hansen, "Wesley Mitchell, Social Scientist and Social Counselor," in *Wosley Clair Mitshell, The Economic Scientist*, 1952, edited by A. F. Burns.

ing the structure of the modern economy, that some central body, some "general staff" as Mitchell would say, was necessary to give adequate over-all coordination to economic activities. What Mitchell was suggesting was a centripetal type of national economic policy. Hansen, under the Keynesian influence, prefers a more centrifugal type of national economic policy—a scattered piecemeal planning program which moves in many directions at once, and so fails, from the Mitchellian standpoint, to pierce to the core of the current economic malaise.

A very good example of Keynesian economics in action is found in the British White Paper on Employment Policy issued in 1944.[9] In this White Paper the government accepts the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment as one of its primary aims and responsibilities. In its list of "guiding principles" for the maintenance of aggregate demand the government makes no reference to over-all economic planning. It concludes that little can be done about controlling the investment decisions of the private business system. Main reliance for securing stability must therefore be placed on compensatory or counter-cyclical measures involving changes in public investment and personal consumption expenditures. The economic philosophy underlying this Keynesian approach is well stated by the White Paper which observes that "The ideal to be aimed at is some corrective influence which would come into play automatically—on the analogy of a thermostatic control—in accordance with rules determined in advance and well understood by the public."[10] The development of any condition adverse to full employment would soon result in a "feed back" of the necessary information to an appropriate government authority, which would then initiate some compensatory measures in order to remove or neutralize the disturbing condition.

There is no need for any type of over-all or general economic planning in the opinion of those who accept this thermostatic approach to economic problems. It can even be argued with considerable support that the Keynesian approach is essentially anti-planning, in the sense that limited or partial planning is advocated on the ground that it will make over-all national economic planning unnecessary. The Keynesians appear to pursue a patch-work economic policy because they believe that the capitalistic system is in need of no substantial structural change.[11] The salvation of the capitalistic system, as the Keynesians see it, is to be largely an external affair directed by a few governmental authorities who always keep their thermostatic controls ready for immediate application.

IV

So much for the logic of reform inherent in Keynes' economics.

[9] *Employment Policy*, Cmd. 6527, presented by the Minister of Reconstruction to Parliament in May, 1944. For similar examples of economic thinking with a strong Keynesian bias see *Full Employment in Australia*, 1945, and the Canadian Government document, *Employment and Income*, 1945.

[10] *Employment Policy*, p. 18.

[11] The fact that Keynesian economics proposes to take care of major economic ills with minor readjustments of the economy undoubtedly explains the great popularity in academic circles of this type of economics. See J. S. Cambs, *Beyond Supply and Demand*, 1946, p. 3.

When one turns to institutional economics he finds a fundamentally different logic of economic reform. Institutional economics lays a foundation for national economic policies of a much more comprehensive nature than those emanating from Keynesian economics. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the institutional economists broaden the scope of their science to include many more variables than does the Keynesian version of economics. The institutional economists go far beyond the equilibrium of savings and investment which is the central consideration in the Keynesian analysis. In doing so these heterodox economists broaden the theory of output until it becomes a theory of the evolving economic order. They substitute an economics of process for the Keynesian economics of comparative statics, and thus lay the foundation for a public policy which goes far beyond the Keynesian partial or piecemeal planning.

The fundamental differences between institutional and Keynesian economics are brought to light by a consideration of the three aspects or levels of economic activity, namely, the industrial, the business, and the financial aspects. The industrial aspect or level relates to the actual production system where the main considerations are technological or a matter of goods making. The business aspect relates to the organizational superstructure which rests on the industrial basis of the economic system. This business superstructure is concerned with the ways in which business enterprises are organized and operated. Here the emphasis is not technological but instead managerial, with a view to profit making. Over and above the industrial and business strata of the economy lies the third or financial stratum which is at some distance from the industrial or technological basis of the economic system. The objectives of this financial stratum of economic activity are pecuniary (Veblen) or monetary (Keynes), in the sense that the end in view is the speculative maximizing of asset values or what Kenneth Boulding has called balance-sheet items.[12]

The industrial, business, and financial aspects of economic activity are taken into account in both the Keynesian and the institutionalist analysis, but the treatment accorded to them in the two different types of economic analysis follows quite different lines. In Keynes' economics the industrial and business strata of economic activity are combined under the single heading of "enterprise" as against the third level of finance or "speculation," as Keynes labels it.[13] It is important to note that in combining the industrial and business levels of economic activity Keynes subordinates the industrial level to the business level. Since, as Keynes believes, the economic system allocates resources quite efficiently, there is no basic conflict between the workers and the business men who direct the production system.

[12] K. E. Boulding, *A Reconstruction of Economics*, 1950.

[13] *The General Theory*, p. 158. In his *Monetary Reform* (1924) Keynes draws a distinction between "enterprise" and "accumulation." What he means is that any financial activity which plays no productive or creative role, but instead inhibits the work of the productive classes (those concerned with enterprise), should be subjected to appropriate governmental control. Financial activity which plays an essential role and thus aids production would be regarded by Keynes as a part of "enterprise."

These productive groups are allied against certain financial or speculative interests which would sacrifice the national interest to the chance of making a quick profit. This approach permits Keynes to give little attention to the key element or factor in the industrial stratum of the economic system, namely, technology or what Veblen called the "state of the industrial arts." This treatment of the three levels of economic activity also permits Keynes to carry out his economic analysis on the basis of an assumed harmony of interests between labor and business. It is this treatment of the three aspects of economic activity which explains why the analysis of labor problems plays such a minor role in Keynesian economics. Keynes and his followers in both the United Kingdom and the United States do not seem to be aware of the many great issues arising from the problem of establishing an industrial democracy. Full employment is only one goal approved by the working population. The workers are also interested in fair and democratic or just employment. Keynes' partial or piecemeal planning, although aimed at full employment, leaves untouched the problem of the worker's role in industry. As long as Keynesian economics substitutes harmony for conflict at the industrial-business level, many large economic problems will continue to be solved by the simple expedient of ignoring them.

As already indicated, the analysis of the three different aspects of economic activity by the institutional economists is substantially different from the Keynesian analysis. Like the Keynesians, the institutional economists make use of a basic dichotomy in economic activity. But the Keynesian and institutionalist dichotomies are essentially different. Whereas the Keynesian dichotomy is between enterprise (industry and business) and finance (speculation), the institutionalist dichotomy is between industry and business (including finance). Whereas Keynes subordinates industry to business, the institutional economists emphasize the greater importance of industry in comparison with both business and finance. Keynes in effect elevates business over both industry and finance, while the institutional economists elevate industry over both business and finance. The basic significance of the industrial aspects of economic activity has been the central theme of institutional economics for the past half-century. Wesley C. Mitchell erected his business cycle theory on the foundation of the distinction between industry and business, or between goods making and profit making. The primacy of the industrial aspect of economic activity is thrown into high relief in John R. Commons' distinction between efficiency profits and scarcity profits, and in John M. Clark's analysis of the role of overhead costs and his distinction between private and social values. It is characteristic of institutional economics that the industrial aspect or stratum of economic activity becomes the point of departure for economic investigation. This difference in the handling of the three aspects of economic activity is the source of the fundamental difference between the institutionalist and the Keynesian interpretations of twentieth-century economic enterprise. Furthermore, it is out of this basic difference in economic interpretation that the different public policy implications of the two types of economic thought arise.

To put the matter somewhat differently, Keynes' approach to

economic problems is through the demand side of economic affairs, as has already been explained, while the institutional economists' approach is through the supply side. This is not to say that Keynes ignores supply, or that the institutional economists pay no attention to the role of demand in economic activities. The point is that Keynes lays special emphasis upon the demand factors, in his economic analysis, while the institutional economists give special attention to the supply elements. As long as Keynes was dominated by considerations of demand, it was quite inevitable that he should make no place in his economics for a changing technology and its impact on the structure and functioning of the economic system. In emphasizing demand or market conditions, marginal profitability of capital, interest rates, and all the other features of a monetary economy Keynes reveals his close intellectual kinship with David Ricardo. It was Ricardo who converted economics from a study of the basic factors controlling production to a study of the operations of the market place, and their influence upon the shares of national income. The Physiocrats and Adam Smith had earlier approached economics not from the demand side, as did Ricardo, but from the supply or production side. They had emphasized productivity and serviceability, while Ricardo stressed vendability and profitability. The institutional economists draw their inspiration from the Physiocrats and Adam Smith who were interested in the "wealth of nations" and not merely that of private individuals. In essence, the institutional economists are productionists who, while not ignoring the role of the price mechanism, nevertheless make economics a study of an *industrial* and not a *monetary* economy.

The essential features of the institutionalist interpretation of twentieth-century economic activity may be summarized as follows. The underlying industrial stratum or fabric of the modern economy is potentially very fruitful. Modern industrial technology has created an industrial system which is, as Veblen has said, "inordinately productive."[14] However, the potential fruitfulness of this improved industrial technology has not been fully realized, because a conflict has developed between the industrial substratum of the economic system and the restrictive super-structure of large-scale business and financial enterprise. As the result of the uneven effects of technological change there has developed a hybrid superstructure with a core of large-scale key monopolistic and oligopolistic industries surrounded by areas of competitive activity of various degrees of imperfection. This economic development has reached its highest level in the United States where the hybrid economic system, although highly productive, has failed by a long distance to achieve that maximum production of socially desirable goods of which it is potentially capable. According to the institutional economists, the shackling of the modern industrial technology is being gradually eliminated. The current age is one of transition from the restrictionism of monopoly capitalism to the expansionism of the new public-private enterprise

[14] T. Veblen, *The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts*, 1919, p. 63.

system, such as we see emerging in Western Europe and other industrialized areas.

It is the position of the institutional economists that the economic system has now matured to the point where its continued growth at the rate, and in the direction, approved by the majority of peoples in democratic nations is no longer the automatic outcome of the operations of uncontrolled economic forces. The mature private enterprise economy fails to provide that stabilized growth which is fast becoming the goal of all nations. The basic problem, as the institutional economists see it, is to release the productive potentialities of the modern large-scale economy not merely by regulating private enterprise, but also by extending the area of public enterprise. This release of technological potentialities requires changes in the price, wage, and investment policies of the large-scale private business enterprises to the end that a more satisfactory profit-wage ratio may be established, and the restrictionist practices of both labor and capital may be eliminated. In addition to these modifications of private business enterprise the investment process should be directed more to the creation of social values rather than merely private values. "Economic progress is, therefore, interpreted to mean much more than the building up of an efficient apparatus for the production of material goods; it means also the provision of social services, the widening of opportunities for the common man and social equality and justice."[15] The state should take a more positive role in directing the investment process. Consumer preferences are not all satisfied through the operations of the market place. Preferences for such important social values as a high level of public health, an adequately maintained soil, a protected flora and fauna, an effectively educated population, a vigorous state of scientific activity—all these important social values require for their creation a new type of public-private enterprise system such as one sees developing out of the Fair Deal of the United States, the Middle Way of Sweden, and the Laborism of Great Britain. These manifestations of the new public-private enterprise economy call attention to the need for a system of "collaborative guidance" by the State and by private business of the nation's economic enterprise, which goes far beyond the shored-up "individualistic capitalism" envisioned by Keynes and his disciples.[16]

V

The logic of economic reform inherent in institutional economics leads to the consideration of a kind of national economic planning which pays special attention to the industrial basis of economic society. Whereas, as we have seen, the economic reform based on Keynesian economics centers attention on the financial aspect of economic activity, the economic reform emanating from the investigations of the institutional economists directs attention to the large-scale industrial core of the modern economy. Large-scale enterprise has always been

[15] Planning Commission of the Government of India. *The First Five Year Plan*, July, 1951, p. 7.

[16] See the concluding paragraph of the *First Annual Report to the President* of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, 1946, Washington, D. C., and *The General Theory*, pp. 317, and 380-381.

the main interest of the economists of the institutional school. This is apparent in the work of the Veblenians in the United States and their British counterpart, the Fabians, in the United Kingdom. As Veblenian and Fabian thought developed after 1885 it came more and more to run in terms of technological change, the evolving industrial system, and the growth of large-scale enterprise. It was not long before the institutional economists had substituted an economics of collective action for the inherited economics of individual action. It is this economics of collective action which is the basis of the program for comprehensive national economic planning proposed by institutional economists.

It was Thorstein Veblen who laid the foundations for institutionalist economic reform in the United States. In *The Engineers and the Price System* (1921) and elsewhere he explained that the releasing of the productive capacities of the industrial system required more than a change in fiscal and monetary policy. Veblen's specific economic reform program recommended the public ownership and operation of not only the large-scale core but also the outlying competitive portions of the industrial sub-stratum of the economy. The American institutional economists who have come after Veblen have not recommended the public ownership and operation of industry. They have nevertheless made suggestions for economic reform which, like those of Veblen, take the control of the large-scale core of the economy as their central consideration. This is well illustrated in the planning proposals of Wesley C. Mitchell, John M. Clark, Gardiner C. Means, Rexford G. Tugwell, Mordecai Ezekiel, and other institutional economists.[17] These institutionalist planning suggestions proceed along the following lines. The government assumes responsibility not only for full employment but also for the general coordination and direction of economic activity. It makes annual and longer-term projections of the gross national product on the basis of a national economic budget showing the nation's production-consumption patterns. An apparatus of economic controls is set up in order to achieve the goal of an increased gross national product. These controls may be classed as internal and external. The external controls are the fiscal and monetary regulations which do not directly interfere with the operations of the private sector of the economy. The internal controls are those which involve changes in the functioning of private business enterprise. The planning programs of Clark, Tugwell, Means, Mitchell, and others call for a reorganization of large-scale business enterprise. The key industries are not to be nationalized but their price, production, and investment policies are to be controlled by industry boards representing labor, business, and consumer interests. Industry of a more competitive nature surrounding the core of large-scale enterprise is to be subjected to less

[17] See W. C. Mitchell, "The Social Sciences and National Planning," in *The Backward Art of Spending Money*, 1937; John M. Clark, "Long-Range Planning for the Regularization of Industry," in *Preface to Social Economics*, 1936; C. Ware and G. C. Means, *The Modern Economy in Action*, 1933; and M. Ezekiel, *Jobs for All Through Industrial Expansion*, 1939. For a general discussion of this topic see A. G. Gruchy, "The Concept of Planning in Industrial Economics," *The Southern Economic Journal*, Vol. VI, Oct. 1939.

comprehensive controls. It is felt that there would be a limited need for the planning of competitive industries after the industrial core of the economy was stabilized and adjusted to a program of stabilized growth. A central government agency would be responsible for the general supervision of the over-all national economic plan.

The approach of the English representatives of the institutional school to the problems of national economic planning has been along lines similar to the approach of the American institutional economists. The planning proposals of the Webbs, John A. Hobson, R. G. Tawney, G. D. H. Cole and economists associated with the trade union movement in the United Kingdom take the form of over-all national economic planning. These proposals were given concrete expression in the 1944 report of the Trades Union Congress on *Post-War Reconstruction* which may be regarded as organized labor's reply to the Coalition Government's White Paper on *Employment Policy*. We see in these two reports the sharp contrast between institutionalist and Keynesian planning. In reply to the Coalition Government's recommendation of partial or piecemeal planning the British trade union movement proposed over-all general economic planning which takes as its point of departure the regulation of the economy's key industries. The trade union movement's planning proposals include the Keynesian fiscal and monetary measures, but they move far beyond these control devices. These proposals as seen in the British Labour Party's declarations of policy, *Let us Face the Future* (1945) and *Let us Win Through Together* (1950), and also in the Labour Government's *Economic Survey for* 1947 proceed in terms of a national economic budget, a projected gross national product, predetermined investment and consumption components of this product, the control of the price, production, and investment policies of the key industries, and various external fiscal and monetary controls.

Although the American and British institutional economists have substantially similar views with respect to national economic planning, there is one major difference. The American institutional economists do not accept the socialist program of the state ownership and operation of industry. Although both the American and British members of the institutional school accept as the central part of their planning program the regulation or control of the economy's core of large-scale enterprises, the American institutional economists propose to leave these enterprises in private hands. This difference in policy with respect to the ownership of the economy's key industries does not arise because of any basic theoretical differences in the interpretation of economic activity in highly industrialized nations. The difference in planning policy stems from a difference in historico-cultural experience. The extent to which recourse is had to public ownership and operation depends upon the special economic circumstances in each country. The historical experiences and cultural conditions of such countries as Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and India necessarily give rise to different combinations of public and private enterprise. Each country must find that admixture of public and private enterprise which best meets its needs. Thus far the American people have preferred to limit the area of pub-

lic ownership and operation quite severely. In Western Europe public ownership has been more widely accepted. The logic of reform deriving from institutional economics is not altered by this secondary question of public versus private ownership of industry. The national economic planning proposals of institutional economists in all democratic countries follow the same general pattern no matter how this question (industrial ownership) is settled.

VI

This analysis of the public policy implications of institutional economics brings to light the fact that economists of the institutional school carry on their analyses in terms of a new type of economic system. This is the public-private enterprise system which has been taking shape in the first half of the current century. In all major industrialized nations there has been a movement away from the unregulated capitalism of the nineteenth century. But the shift has not been towards a system of full socialism such as was envisioned by economic reformers in the second half of the last century. The current step in the evolution of democratic economic societies appears to be the development of a public-private enterprise system in which the general direction of economic life is provided by public enterprise but in which private enterprise continues to play an important role. In the modern state governments have a fourth function besides the usual legislative, executive, and judicial functions. This is the directive function, the aim of which is to provide over-all direction for the nation's economic activities in order to assure adequate economic development. As the public-private enterprise economic system has evolved, the negative government of nineteenth century capitalism has been replaced by a positive type of government. The horizon of governmental responsibility has been broadened to include matters not even contemplated in the last century. This concept of a positive government goes far beyond the Keynesian view of the role of government. In the concluding chapter of the *General Theory* Keynes explains that his system of economic controls would necessitate a "large extension of the traditional functions of government." However, he very quickly waters down his concept of a positive government by observing that the wide field for the exercise of private enterprise would still remain. As an advocate of partial, piecemeal planning Keynes only somewhat grudgingly broadens the scope of public enterprise. Keynes is essentially an individualist who, however, recognizes the desirability of altering his individualism along certain collective lines, if present-day economic problems are to be handled successfully.[18] The institutional economists are essentially collective in out-

[18] The origins of Keynes' individualistic outlook are revealed in his posthumous essay on "My Early Beliefs" in *Two Memories,* 1949. There is a strange contrast between Keynes' deep interest in the scholasticism of Professor Gele. Moore's *Principia Ethica* and the politico-economic developments at the turn of the century which were laying the foundation for the hectic half-century to follow. It is interesting to speculate how different Keynes' economics might have been had he been as familiar with the sordid atmosphere of the East end of London as he was with the intellectually impeccable atmosphere of early twentieth century Cambridge.

look, but recognize the need to modify this outlook with certain concessions to inherited individualistic tendencies. This difference between the institutionalist and Keynesian outlooks is a difference of kind and not of degree. Between the two schools of economic thought there is a difference in politico-economic Gestalt which creates an impassable gulf between Keynesian and institutional economics.

We may conclude our discussion of the policy implications of institutional economics by noting the major characteristics of the end product of their thinking, namely, the public-private enterprise economic system. This new type of economy has four major features. In the first place it has a democratic basis. The direction of this new type of economy, its admixture of public and private enterprise, and the division of national output among personal, business, and government expenditures are all determined in the final analysis in accordance with the preferences of the majority of the population. In the second place the government plays the dominant role in the public-private enterprise economy. Although there is, as the Council of Economic Advisers in the United States explains, "a complementary relationship between mutually interested partners," the ultimate responsibility for the execution of democratically-determined national economic policies lies with the government and not with private enterprise.[19] It is the government's responsibility to see that the popular will is translated into concrete national economic programs. The government must make sure that provision is made for economic growth, that adequate social-economic capital is built up, and that scientific progress is carefully nurtured.

The third main feature of the public-private enterprise economy relates to the role of private enterprise. In all democratically-planned economies the private sector has continued to account for a major share of the nation's gross product. Although public enterprise has continued to expand, it is widely conceded that it is desirable from the standpoint of industrial efficiency to leave a considerable portion of the economy in private hands. There are today in most democracies obvious limitations to the spread of state management of industry. As long as these limitations continue to exist, private management will doubtlessly continue to operate over a wide area of the economy. This was clearly recognized by the British Labour Party in its 1950 statement on national economic policy, *Labour and the New Society*, where it explains that "Private enterprise has a proper place in the economy. Indeed, we shall aid and encourage its efficiency and enterprise. But the community has the right to see that it works in the interests of the nation." The institution of private property, while remaining quite vigorous in the public-private enterprise economy, is nevertheless undergoing a great change. A new trustee concept of private property is making its appearance. According to this new property concept private owners function as trustees who see to it that their property is used in the national as well as in their own interest. Private profits are regarded as a legitimate reward as long as they continue to serve both national and private welfare. We see

[19] Council of Economic Advisers, *First Annual Report to the President*, 1946, p. 21.

here the old Roman concept of private property involving more or less exclusive control giving way to a property concept more in keeping with the needs of the new collective age. Under this trustee principle private property has continued to maintain its hold in the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in spite of the growth of public enterprise. This is because it has made the necessary adjustments to an era in which national interests have come to occupy a place of major importance along with both sectional and private interests.

The fourth major feature of the public-private enterprise economy is its over-all national planning program. This type of economy grew up in the past half-century because of the failure of the market system to provide that coordination of economic activities which maximizes the supply of social and private values. Social values, unlike private values, do not appear in the market place. They do not result from private-enterprise production, nor do they have a price placed upon them. These social values are described by John M. Clark as "service values," and by the President's Council of Economic Advisers as "priority values." The private market mechanism does not have these values as its primary concern, and if left to its own resources the market mechanism fails to produce an ample supply of social values. It is the primary purpose of the over-all national planning of the institutional economists to coordinate economic activities in such a way as to enlarge the supply of social values. It is not the purpose of institutionalist planning to do away with the private market system as a coordinating factor in economic life. The aim is, instead, to supplement the pricing mechanism with an over-all planning program which will ensure an adequate supply of both social and private values. In the long run the increase in social values results in an increase in private values, since improvements in health, education, recreation, natural resource use, and scientific progress provide a firmer and wider basis for the expansion of the supply of private market values.

The major problem in any national economic planning program is investment rather than prices.[20] Orthodox economists tend to carry over into their studies of the planned economy an exaggerated interest in the problems of pricing. It is now well understood that the pricing process works in a democratically planned economy very much as it does in an unplanned economy. Whether the economy is planned or unplanned the price system, where full democracy prevails, operates in such a fashion as to satisfy consumer preferences. What is unique about the planned public-private enterprise economy is the special treatment accorded to the problem of investment. Under private enterprise investment has been carried on with the special aim of enlarging the output of salable private values. Re-

[20] The post-war Swedish planning commission explains that in securing "such a distribution of the country's resources as will make for the best development of the economy, the main emphasis must lie in the amount and disposition of investments—which have the greatest effect on the development." See the commission's report, *The Outlook in Sweden, Long-Term Economic Survey* 1951-1955, published by the Swedish Institute and the Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research, 1952, p. 21.

latively less investment has gone in directions which lead to an increase in the output of social values. What is now needed is a vast investment in public health, housing, educational and recreational facilities, natural resource preservation, and the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Under a national economic planning program the public must decide what proportion of the gross national product shall be reserved for investment in those lines that favor the creation of social values. A new priority of values should be established on the basis of the relative social utilities of various types of investment and consumption.[21] The public is the ultimate determinant of the relative contributions to human satisfaction of further expenditures on public or private investment projects. Since social values are not priced, free market prices are not a guide in this connection. The public, strengthened by a consensus of scientific opinion and its own intuitive grasp of things, must make the final determination with respect to the division of the gross national product between public and private investment and between public and private consumption. It is the purpose of the national planning program proposed by the institutional economists to provide the public with the institutional means of making this fundamental decision.

Institutional economics is highly relevant to the economic problems of our mid-century period because it presents a theory of the economic order in transition. Public policy in many countries today places special emphasis upon the control of the business cycle. There is, however, a still larger problem which academic economists are not always willing to recognize, and which political parties sometimes fail to state clearly. This is the mid-century problem of shifting from a largely unregulated private enterprise system to a planned public-private enterprise system. This transition has been the most abiding concern of institutional economists since the final quarter of the nineteenth century. In all major democratic countries the issue, as Wesley C. Mitchell has expressed it, is not planning versus no planning, but instead what kind of national planning should be established. It has already been explained that the Keynesian and institutionalist answers to this problem are quite different. Thus far the verdict of history appears to be favoring the institutional rather than the Keynesian economists.[22] In nation after nation comprehensive democratic national planning is being accepted as the desirable way of meeting the large economic problems of the times. In the opinion of the institutional economists this is no accidental historical development. The trend toward national economic planning is the inevitable outcome of the second industrial revolution, which began late in the nineteenth century with the application of modern science to industry.

[21] For a discussion of the problem of national priorities as applied to the agricultural communalism of Asiatic countries see Professor Mukerjee's analysis of the economic plan of India in *Planning the Countryside*, 1946.

[22] This is not to be little Keynes' contributions to pure theory. He has won for himself an enviable place among the great economists. However, it is clear that Keynes' work reveals the limitations that are common to all members of the Cambridge school. They fail to penetrate the "veil of money" sufficient to see the more fundamental characteristics of the industrial system.

INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO PLANNING

By BALJIT SINGH

Economic Systems

There is not one economic system but there are economic systems. These are sometimes believed to follow each other in a historical sequence; e.g. the Marxians broadly arrange them in the following order : primitive-communal, ancient-slavery, medieval-serf, modern-capitalist and future-socialist. According to Marx each system has a unique structure and represents "a particular stage of development in the history of mankind", and rigidly determines the prevalent socio-political order. There are others who do not attribute any "historic" dimension to various systems. For instance Wilhelm Ropke has so classified them into five basic types, three of which are primary i. e. an Eigenwirtschaft (communal), a market society and a planned economy. The first two of these may also assume a "distorted" form as feudalistic and monopolistic respectively.

The historical approach however, is not altogether without a truth. At the same time its limitation should be admitted in so far as historical development has not been rigidly linear and uniform. Similarly, the Marxian theory of economic determinism overemphasises the role of configurations of economic institutions in the social process and altogether ignores the *mutual* conditioning of the non-economic and economic ways and means in the Gestalt. Institutional economics is sounder in judgment in this connection. Thus Dr. Mukerjee maintains that the economic system of a country is related to the man-land ratio, the peculiar configuration of class and the pattern of the state reciprocally determining one another. Capitalistic industrial society was built up by the regional resources, the strong individualism of a new industrial and commercial class and the spirit of compromise of nineteenth century democracy in Western Europe. Neither the incentives of production nor technology, neither the class structures nor private property, competition and credit, Dr. Mukerjee insists, are true of other economic systems in the forms in which these have governed capitalistic industrial society for a whole generation. The institutional theory of economics, more than any other economic theory, does adequate justice to the social-economic Gestalt.

One thing that is more or less definitely known about economic systems is that each one of them provides an economic plan for what would be produced, how and given to whom. The ordering principle for determination of the plan is different in each case. Yet, no economic system is planless in the sense of having no arrangement for dealing with the eonomic problem of the allocation of scarce means having alternative uses to satisfy as fully as possible multiple and competing wants. In its functioning each economic organisation is finding solution to the following issues: What goods and services are to be produced and in what quantities? How to allocate

resources, which are scarce, among the selected productive tasks? How to adjust consumption to rates of supply of goods and services? How is the product to be distributed among various claimants; or, whose wants are to be satisfied and to what extent? How to provide for maintenance and expansion of economy? In solving these each economic system gives an economic plan. Hence, for *all* economic systems determination of a plan is a fundamental function.

But each system discharges this function in its own way, which is quite distinct from that of all others. This makes each system unique; and when it is a question of conscious selection and adoption which is what *planning* tends to do we arrange them in scale of preferences. The task appears to be simple as for practical purposes the choice is confined only to two primary types viz. free market economy functioning through pricing process and planned economy with a central authority to determine the plan. But the tests of selection are not yet clearly formulated and universally accepted while in real life each system is "hybrid". A perfect market is as much non-existent as a planned economy and throughout we find a combination of private and public enterprise with greater or less emphasis on collectivisation. Planners in each country are engaged, not in making a choice between two alternatives, but in deciding how much to have of both—in synthesizing. Their emphasis differs according to their subjective valuation of the ideal type.

The Keynesian Solution

Keynes and his followers recognised the instability inherent in a market economy with its free enterprise, where entrepreneurs purchase for money productive resources which are owned by labourers, capitalists and landowners. These owners spend the money they obtain by selling their resources for the products of the entrepreneurs. Apparently there are two markets, one for consumers' goods and the other for resources and in both, equilibrium is obtained through the pricing process. The same process integrates the two markets and on balance the entrepreneurs tend to purchase all resources available in the market. Viewed as such there is no antagonism in the interests of the entrepreneurs on the one hand and owners of resources including labourers on the other; and nor the interests of workers, capitalists and land-owners conflict with each other. Each is free to sell in the dearest market and purchase in the cheapest market and on balance all resources have been sold to such entrepreneurs who can make their best use and they have paid the maximum price corresponding to the marginal productivity of a factor. All this of course implies free competition but granted this there is no misallocation of resources, underemployment and unemployment, or exploitation. Output is at its maximum, each gets according to his contribution and producers produce what consumers want.

Actually it may not be so, and an economy seldom works so smoothly since certain faults tend to arise in "monetary economy" that "veils" and is superimposed over it. All transactions take place in terms of money, and entrepreneurs may have more or less of it than what is necessary to lift off all the productive resources from

the market. On the obverse side of a market economy we may find that consumers have more or less of purchasing power than required to purchase all supplies. Keynes focussed his attention on the monetary aspect of economy only, as according to his analysis nothing was wrong with allocation of resources, direction of production or distribution under the market process. The tendency of the market to be imperfect did not present any serious difficulty to him as it was presumed to be neutralised by a counter-tendency—'the tendency of big enterprise to socialize itself.'

Having found nothing fundamentally wrong with the economic organisation of private enterprise either with regard to allocation of resources or distribution, the only task left for Keynesians is finding measures for economic stabilisation. These they readily find in monetary-fiscal policy which can be used very effectively to control aggregate demand and the total volume of investment since free competition is supposed to bring about the best allocation and hence it cannot be improved upon. Beginning with an emphasis on monetary policy to regulate the volume of investment and aggregate demand Keynes finally advocated a compensatory fiscal policy to make up for humps and gaps in private investment by public investments. The main tenets of Keynesians are still the same and their apparent advocacy of public enterprise and limited socialization of investment is not based on any defects that they find in private enterprise economic organisation. They do not go beyond monetary-fiscal measures to recommend any institutional changes or controls for a reorganisation of the private sector.

Even if the Keynesian analysis be correct it can provide little practical guidance in the planning of an underdeveloped country. This is so because (a) the monetary aspect of its economy is not yet ubiquitous, (b) market economy is only gradually emerging and coexists with feudal and communal structures, and (c) the "process" of growth rather than "equilibrium" in which Keynesians are primarily interested, dominates its problems.

Planned Economy

The 'process' has been of primary interest to Marx and his followers. Their approach should naturally attract serious attention in backward countries, planning for rapid growth. The Marxians believe that the private-enterprise system is wasteful, unstable and antagonistic to the interests of workers. These defects can be eliminated only when productive resources are allocated according to a 'plan' and to each a share is given according to his needs. This does not mean that there will be no money or markets for exchange; but in spite of these the market process will not determine what and how much would be produced, with what and given to whom. All this will be determined beforehand for specified periods by a planning authority and embodied in a 'plan'. There will be no independent producers competing for productive resources or private individuals owning them. There will be a single organisation for production although there may be as many production units, or even more, as in any other system. Under such a system of planned economy it is claimed that any required rate of economic growth

commensurate with total resources can be obtained while distribution is just. The distributive supremacy does not, however, inhere in the system since it follows from the policy that is adopted. In fact any type of distribution may be obtained so much so that theoretically a system where there is only one master and all others are slaves also fits in with the model of planned economy!

Here lies the great danger of the system for the masses, particularly when they are poor and ignorant as in backward countries. The distributional aspect is the weakest point of a planned economy since it provides a free hand to those few who may happen to control and usurp the entire production machine. To each according to needs must ever remain an ideal; and to each according to labour in the absence of independent producers competing for their services must be based on arbitrary judgements.

A single organisation for production and distribution is established through a continuous expansion of socialist production and constant curtailment of private sector. Large-scale enterprise and industrial sector may admit such change without any major difficulties. But the agricultural sector with peasant holdings, small trades and handicrafts appears to be less amenable to socialisation. China after an unsuccessful attempt towards socialisation of agriculture has been forced to revert to peasant economy, and the U.S.S.R., in spite of collectivisation of farming has not yet succeeded in bringing farm production within the ambit of the single production organisation of the state. Discussing "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," in a new article last year, Stalin admitted that even the whole-sale collectivisation of peasant holding in Russia implies an independent group of producers that restrict the scope of state planning and is responsible for the operation of the law of value, although in a limited sphere. This is incongruous with a system of planned economy or a socialist state. But transition is not easy or simply a technical question of the organisation of productive forces rationally. Planned economy cannot be fully established without a complete revolution in the very nature of farming, both physical and biological, and its assimilation in the culture of the people. Its conditions are not satisfied simply by collectivisation because, to quote Stalin again, the collective farm carries in Marxist terminology a "contradiction" between the 'relations of production' and the 'forces of production', the characteristic feature of capitalism. Stalin believed that the collective farm sector in the U.S.S.R. was "already beginning to hamper the powerful development" of its productive forces. From the Russian experience we can see how distant must be the goal of planned economy or socialisation for countries with a heavy concentration of population in agriculture and a strong tradition of peasant holdings.

Above all, it is simply doctrinaire that there is no waste or misallocation of resources in such a system. Broadly speaking, in the absence of the market process there may be no way of finding out the defects and maladjustments. In particular the contrary will be true if business executives and planners lack close acquaintance with economic laws governing production or are not men of integrity and foresight. It will be equally naive to assert that this system

assures a higher rate of economic growth than any other system. Colin Clark in "The Economics of 1960" finds in the Russian rate of growth an exception to the tendency towards convergence. He states, "Countries which at present have a low income per head show the most rapid rates of increase.....Russia is an exception to this generalisation, as its expansion, whether under Czarism or Bolshevism, has been very slow". The Russian case cannot rebut the claims of planned economy or socialist production but it does certainly prove that wholesale socialisation of the industrial sector and collectivisation of agriculture are no remedies for the handicap with regard to rate of growth.

Institutional Approach

Institutional economics analyses the 'process' from a functional viewpoint—the impact of changing technology on the structure and functioning both of the economic system and the state. As the result of the mutual conditioning of technology and the functions of property, exchange and distribution on the one hand and the role of the government on the other we have, according to Dr. Mukerjee, the following "spectrum" of economic systems:

(1) Laissez-faire; small-scale competitive industries; relatively little state intervention; little monopoly.
Early nineteenth century Europe and America.

(2) Agricultural communalism; customs; small-scale village and cottage industries; control by guilds, castes and village communities which cohere in a loose type of federal structure and exercise to a limited extent the economic functions of government.
India, China and Japan in the past and still largely today in the rural sector.

(3) Much state intervention; large industries; monopolistic tendencies; some collective ownership.
Western Europe and America to-day.

(4) Considerable regulation of private enterprise; direction and limitation of investments; regimentation under "war economy" but private profit and ownership upheld.
Germany, Italy and Japan during World War II.

(5) State management of most economic sectors but free enterprise permitted as a matter of expediency, especially in the sector of agriculture.
U.S.S.R. under New Economic Policy and modern China.

(6) State management of the whole economic system with controlled distribution.
U.S.S.R. to-day.

Dr. Mukerjee stresses that as one moves along this "spectrum" from the pole of free-market co-ordination towards the pole of central planning and control one seems to move also from private property rights in productive instruments towards collective ownership; from governmental functions confined to law and order and the maintenance of

industrial peace within the frame-work of the market system towards the welfare state and the control and management of the whole industrial and distributive system by government.

The institutional economists of America speak of the modern industrial system as "inordinately productive" whose potentiality is not fully realised on account of "the restrictive superstructure of large-scale business and financial enterprise" that shackles and controls the key industries through monopolistic and oligopolistic organisation. The industrial, business and financial aspects of economic activity are not in complete harmony under a private enterprise system and there arises a conflict between industry and business including finance. The latter operates for 'profit making' while the former is concerned with "goods making". In the ensuing conflict a misallocation of resources takes place as the business men who direct the production system subordinate 'goods making' to 'profit making'. This restricts output to the detriment of economy as a whole while workers find themselves at a disadvantage since the opposite interests of those who control production are given a primacy. Workers at best may get full employment but employment is seldom fair or just.

To establish an industrial democracy that will give a fair deal to workers and will provide for economic growth at the rate and in the direction approved by the majority of people institutional economists suggest comprehensive economic planning. They advocate public ownership and|or control of the large-scale key industries forming the core of an economy with less vigorous regulation for smaller-scale and more competitive industries. Without such public-private enterprise it is their contention sufficient provision cannot be made for economic growth.

Private investment proceeds along marginal considerations of the highest net return while long term economic growth requires building up of social capital, that needs investment which private capital seldom finds financially paying. Public investment is necessary for the formation of social capital and is therefore prima facie, a necessary condition of economic growth. But public investment either for accumulation of social capital or for owning the large-scale industrial core of economy has bearings on private investment and consumption, which cannot obviously utilise the portion of national income used for the former. Hence arises the need of planning (1) to determine the allocation of national product for consumption, private investment and public outlay; (2) to enlarge the sector of public enterprise to correct the misallocation of resources arising under private enterprise system; (3) to protect workers against all forms of exploitation; and (4) to provide for economic stability and development at a pre-determined rate. This requires the state to assume an overall responsibility for the general direction of economy.

This is feasible only when with the establishment and enlargement of public sector controls are applied to regulate the private sector which is confined to a more or less competitive segment. These controls are to be comprehensive so as to include fiscal and monetary regulation on the one hand and internal controls on prices, wages, profits, production and investment on the other. Economic policy should be directed towards establishment of a satisfactory

profit-wage ratio, regulation of not only the volume but also the *direction* of private investment, and maximisation of output of socially desirable goods. In contrast to Keynesian, this programme covers a wide range of economic variables and substitutes the economy of collective action in place of that of individual action. Prof. Gruchy, a foremost contemporary among institutional economists, points out that such comprehensive economic planning is more significant for the present day world than the Keynesian piece-meal planning based on thermostatic control in so far as the emerging economic system throughout the world 'exemplifies the principles of neither laissez-faire capitalism nor full socialism; it is, instead, what may be best described as "public-private enterprise" economy.

India's Choice of a Mixed Economy

The evolving pattern of mixed economy differs in detail according to economic circumstances of each country. Consequently the features of comprehensive planning will also differ. Planning must be suited to meet best the needs of a country rather than proceed on any doctrinaire sanctity of public or private sector. For instance, institutional economists in U.S.A. do not accept state ownership and operation of industry as essential while those in Western Europe regard it as the kernel of economic planning. The essence in both cases lies in public control and central direction of the large-scale industrial core of economy, projection of national product and its predetermined allocation into investment and consumption components, besides comprehensive internal and external controls.

In formulating our approach to planning we must consider fully the distinguishing features of our economy and its basic needs. In contrast to the industrial countries we find that—firstly, the large-scale industrial core of our economy exercises a restrictive influence, not due to its being 'inordinately productive' but on account of its very incipient development. Industrialisation has hardly taken place and in particular the key industries are sadly lacking. Secondly, the superstructure of business and finance covers a very limited field and the 'monetary economy' which occupies a strategical position in modern capitalism has not yet become important. Over a wide field absence of money transactions, modern credit facilities and banking institutions shackles the Indian economy. As an example of the degree of absence of monetization in our economy the National Income Committee points out that 72 per cent of the total outturn of rice, the principal crop of the country, remains in the non-monetized sector. Hence the range of disharmony between the interests of production on the one hand and business and finance on the other is comparatively limited. The same may be true about the conflict between the interests of workers and employers as the former are often agricultural labourers partially dependent on the land. Finally, agriculture is stifled and provides a precarious living to the bulk of the population due to the paucity of investment in such strategical production functions as irrigation, power, soil conservation, transport, marketing and communication. This in its own turn restricts the process of capital formation and development throughout. Here, rather than

in the business organisation of large-scale industry and finance lies our main handicap.

The country, therefore, needs a large public sector to push investment in strategical directions that have been neglected by, and are unsuitable for, private enterprise either on account of marginal considerations pertaining to net return or due to their magnitude and risks involved. Little will be gained by pursuing a programme of nationalisation of a few large-scale industries that are mostly for consumption goods. We cannot draw much in our planning from the analogy of highly industrialised countries. Similarly, in formulating any programme of economic controls either of prices, profits production or investment in the private sector, the limitations of a usually ill-equipped administrative machinery have to be given full consideration.

Comprehensive Planning under the First Five Year Plan

Our first five-year Plan accepts mixed economy as a norm with the state as a senior partner responsible for over-all economic development. 'In promoting capital formation of the required scale, in facilitating and in encouraging the introduction of new techniques, and in the over-all realignment of the productive forces and class relationships within society, the state will have to play a crucial role' (p. 9). In accordance with the logic of institutional economics this role is to be fulfilled by (a) 'a progressive widening of the public sector' and (b) 'a reorientation of the private sector to the needs of a planned economy'. The former does not involve, broadly speaking, any programme of nationalisation of private enterprise either in business, industry or agriculture. In fact the issue of public and private ownership has been given a secondary treatment and it is pointed out that the two sectors function as a single organism, the distinction being one of relative emphasis only. Private enterprise will not be completely unregulated and free. It will have a free scope to earn legitimate profits within the system of economic controls both internal and external. The internal controls include price control and regulation of investment, wages and production of factory industries. External controls will consist of monetary and fiscal measures. Over a large field, particularly agricultural, extension of cooperative form of organisation has been laid down as an objective.

Allocation of National Product

The national income is estimated to increase over the Plan period by Rs. 1,000 crores to Rs. 10,000 crores or by a little more than 2 per cent per year. Out of the additional income each year 80 per cent will be available for consumption in contrast to 95 per cent of the current income. The rate of saving will gradually increase from 5 per cent in 1950-51 to 6.75 per cent in 1955-56. A detailed estimate has been prepared for the planned outlay of public sector while that for the private sector remains for obvious reasons only tentative and rough. The aggregate outlay of Rs. 2,069 crores under the Plan refers to the investment and development expenditure of public sector only.

It is envisaged that the Plan will be followed by further plans resulting in a doubling of the per capita income by 1977. The main emphasis in these five years is on agricultural development rather than on industrialisation but this covers extensive development of irrigation and power facilities and expenditure on these together with agriculture accounts for less than 50 per cent of the total public outlay.

Institutional Changes—(a) Land Rights

The British left a large part of the country in a state of feudalism which was the result of their land revenue policy. Insecurity of tenure and rack renting by intermediaries reduced peasants to forms of serfdom. Little incentives and means were left for proper cultivation. Immediately after Independence, therefore, many states adopted measures of land reforms and in particular for the abolition of *zamindari*. These have however not yet been completed in all states.

During the Plan period all forms of feudal organisation are proposed to be eliminated by abolishing *zamindari* and *jagirdari* land tenures. A fair measure of progress has also been made in protecting the peasantry against money lenders and traders and in securing for it fixity of tenure and fair rents. But land still does not always belong to the tiller and there is a vast section of the agricultural population without any land rights. It is however not easy in an overcrowded country to give a strip of land to each tiller or agricultural worker without undermining national organisation of production.

The imperative need of raising agricultural output and productivity is pressing hard for the enlargement of the unit of cultivation to admit improved technology while the growing land hunger is strengthening the claims for land redistribution. Further agrarian reforms to reconcile these conflicting claims have been suggested in the Plan for which the primary responsibility rests with the states. Progress in this direction cannot obviously be uniform whereas certain differences are inevitable due to local variations.

The underlying objective of agrarian reforms viz., the establishment of a rich peasant economy based on individual family holdings organised in free cooperatives may not lead to as spectacular results and satisfaction of land hunger in the immediate future as might be claimed for socialisation and collectivisation of farming. But then, there is a danger of violent agrarian revolution in the latter course, besides immediate dislocation of production and consequent starvation of millions. Moreover, peasant economy is more in accord with the aspirations of the rural masses in the country and that assures an era of stable progress along a line that is most acceptable to the rural masses.

Institutional Changes—(b) Distributive System

Accumulation of large private profits is inconsistent not only with the broad social objectives but is also likely to divert resources to speculative trading in preference to production on account of higher marginal returns in the former. This might seriously impede

the process of capital formation at strategical points. It has therefore been suggested that while fiscal policy should constantly aim at reducing inequalities of income and wealth, opening for speculative investment in trade should as far as practical be narrowed down. This envisages control of the distributive system and establishment of state trading at the wholesale level in respect of selected commodities. In this manner surpluses arising in the distributive trades can be diverted for public outlay and secondly a more effective check can be maintained on prices and cost of living. This suggestion seems to be rather premature and if carried out might cause a great disillusionment. If the experience gained by various states in controlled distribution of food-grains in connection with their rationing commitments during the last several years is not to be lost the government will be well advised not to proceed with any scheme of state trading in near future. The beckoning lights of state trading are colourful and for that very reason we should be cautious. No decision has been taken on the issue and before taking any step in this direction there will be a thorough investigation including a Census of Distribution to throw light on certain crucial aspects of finance and organisation of trade in selected commodities.

Institutional Changes—(c) Banking System

An increase in national income as envisaged in the Plan will obviously be associated with an increased economic activity. This would certainly need (a) larger flow of savings, (b) smooth supply of credit at strategical points, and (c) an adequate supply of money particularly as the ambit of monetary economy will widen. At present over large areas specially in the countryside there are no organised institutions for tapping savings and supplying credit for agriculture and cottage industries. The small scale industries too are very much handicapped by paucity of credit facilities.

The central bank of the country viz., the Reserve Bank is already nationalised and has wide powers of controlling the monetary and credit system not only through bank rate policy and open market operations but by regulating more directly the credit and investments of the many joint stock banks in the country. But it is a limited money market over which the Reserve Bank can exercise control as the indigenous system which finances agriculture is not yet integrated with it. Institutional credit in the countryside is to some extent provided by the co-operative banks but these cover a very small percentage of farmers. The joint stock banks make advances largely for commerce (about 40% of the total advances) and also meet partly the short term credit needs of industry. The recently state established Industrial Finance Corporations both at the Centre and in certain States now provide limited long-term capital to industry. But the present arrangements are far from adequate either for mobilising savings or for providing production credit particularly, in the countryside.

The Plan envisages a more direct and active role for the Reserve Bank "in creating or helping to create the machinery needed for financing developmental activities all over the country and in ensuring that the finance available flows in the direction intended". This

does not necessarily imply any replacement of the existing agencies of institutional credit by state agencies or nationalisation of banking or insurance. There is first a great leeway to be made by supplementing the work of existing agencies with new ones and in particular by extension of savings and credit facilities to rural areas. Nothing will be gained by using limited public resources for indiscriminate nationalisation of banking and insurance that cannot be achieved by administrative measures. Our primary problem is that of filling in the yawning gaps in the credit structure of the country. Wholesale nationalisation of credit and insurance may have some meaning only after a high stage of monetization of economy is reached.

Economic Controls

On the whole the Plan is based on minimum institutional changes except in the sphere of land rights and there will be little shifts in the organisation or entrepreneurial structure of industry, trade and finance. The public outlay is primarily intended for development and capital formation in selected key sectors of national economy.

For a projected allocation of resources in the total economy, both with regard to direction and volume, as well as to secure a balance between the claims of different sections of the community economic controls will be applied. Controls form an essential part of the Plan; but these will not supplant the market. On the contrary these will be applied to fulfil the targets of the Plan through the market process. Since the state will have no absolute control over the vast private sector of production these targets are essentially notional.

Price policy is stated to be the most potent instrument of economic control to bring about a given resource allocation or distribution. Our experience of price control however since the last war has not been very healthy. Generally in the agricultural sector output is less responsive to price adjustments throughout the world and it is all the more true under a system of subsistence farming. Price elasticity of demand of agricultural commodities is also relatively low. Hence it can seldom be worked out as to at what absolute or relative price of any farm commodity say wheat or rice its output will tend to increase. Whether the cultivator will grow more or less at a favourable or adverse price parity than obtaining at present is any body's guess, and is at present not subject to a scientific forecast. To tinker with the market process through price control with our present state of knowledge will be extremely risky. Price planning is very delicate and has not been easy even in U.S.S.R. Stalin in his previously quoted article reminds of the confusion in the sphere of price-fixing policy. He recalls as to how some time ago the planners in U.S.S.R. submitted price proposals in the interest of cotton growing. In his words the adoption of these proposals would have meant that "we should have ruined the cotton growers and found ourselves without cotton". Economic conditions in India seldom justify price control at the present stage. In fact apart from the shortage of personnel of the proper calibre needed for price administration another limiting factor is the avail-

ability of sufficient finance for the purpose.

It appears that for executing the Plan the government will have to depend mostly on external controls consisting of monetary and fiscal measures. Fiscal policy will be applied to enlarge the resources of government for investment and to reduce inequalities of income and wealth. Death duties and progressive income tax rates are expected to secure the latter objective in the long run. But here, too, it would be rather difficult to reconcile redistributive taxation with the necessity of fresh incentives and larger savings in the private sector essential for the process of development.

Centralised Planning and Coordinated Approach

Finally, national planning in India is based on a coordinated approach to economic and social problems. 'The problem is not merely one of developing resources in a narrow technical sense but of improving the quality of human life and of building up an institutional framework adequate to the wider ends in view' (p. 7). A concerted, purposive endeavour is required for the purpose and yet this has to be mobilised in a democratic way and within the limitations imposed by a federal constitution which transfers to the States the major responsibility for developmental activities and outlay.

The Planning Commission has no statutory authority to enforce the Plan which has to be executed by the Central and State governments through policies and measures approved by independent legislatures. The Central government and parliament have no other powers than those of persuation and financial grants-in-aid to the States. It is true that all States are cooperating but there is nothing to prevent additions to and modification of the Plan at State level. This in fact is already going on and various States have formulated their own plans which include besides a break down of the Plan several regional and local projects. If this goes on to any large extent, State projects outside the Plan might strain national resources to a point, where smooth execution of the national Plan itself might be endangered.

Finally, the first Five Year Plan is not an end in itself but the beginning of an era of planned development and progress. In that sense it is only a preparatory plan or a plan for planning, a programme that will not raise living standards immediately but one that will make this practicable in future by accelerating the process of increasing productivity and productive capacity. There is no precedent in the history of mankind of democratic planning on such an enormous scale as is represented by the Indian scheme of planning. Essentially it is a new experiment whose results may be momentous not only for our country but for many other countries, in so far as planning may after all be reconciled with freedom and may be undertaken without class-war, blood-shed and reduction of the living standards of the masses. Its success may open a new chapter in human civilization.

IX–MYSTICISM, ART AND SOCIETY

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THE SUPRACONSCIOUS IN MAN'S MENTAL STRUCTURE, CREATIVITY, AND COGNITION

By PITRIM A. SOROKIN

1. *The Supraconscious: Its Characteristics*

The prevalent theories of the mental structure of human personality are grossly defective. The first of the big blunders consists of merging into one class (by E. von Hartmann, P. Janet, S. Freud and others), two radically different energies of man: the biologically *unconscious* that lies below the level of the conscious energies and the *supraconscious* ("genius," "creative elan," "the divine inspiration," etc.) that lies above the level of any conscious, rational, logical thought or energy. The "depth psychology" of the prevalent theories of personality that merge these different energies into one class of "the unconscious" or "the subconscious" is in fact quite shallow. It either flattens the mental structure almost exclusively to the level of the unconscious or subconscious, with a sort of epiphenomenal and vague "ego" and "superego", or just depicts it as a "two-storey building"—unconscious (subconscious) and conscious (rational).

This utterly inadequate theory must be replaced by a more scientific one. It distinguishes four different forms of energies and four mental levels and activities in our total personality and behaviour: 1. biologically unconscious (subconscious); 2. biologically conscious; 3. socioculturally conscious; and 4. supraconscious. Figuratively speaking, man appears to be a sort of four-storey building, instead of two or one-storey structure depicted by the prevalent theories.

While the existence of the above three levels of personality structure is hardly questioned, the existence and reality of the supraconscious mentality, energy, and activities is either denied or seriously questioned by many social science and humanistic scholars. Its admission goes against the dominant materialistic and mechanistic metaphysics, still prevalent in contemporary psychology and social disciplines. For this reason, and also for that of an exceptional importance of the supraconscious for creative altruization, it is advisable to stop at this problem somewhat longer than at an elucidation of the unconscious, bioconscious, and the sociocultural consciousness in man. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the very minimum of the evidence for the reality of the supraconscious and some of its properties.

The supraconscious is known very little. What is known of it can be summed up as follows:

1. The supraconscious seems to be the fountainhead of the greatest achievements and discoveries in all fields of human creative activity: science, religion, philosophy, technology, ethics, law, the

fine arts, economics and politics. Without its genius and operation through merely rational conscious and unconscious activities, only mediocre achievements are possible; never the greatest. A professor of English or of musical composition may excellently know all the rational rules and techniques of composition of a literary or musical masterpiece; and yet, if he is devoid of the supraconscious genius, he never can become even a remote relative of the Shakespeares and Chaucers, Bachs and Beethovens. The same is true of a professor of scientific method: if he is not graced by the supraconscious, he has no chance to become Galileo or Newton, Plato and Kant. In this sense, the supraconscious is the highest creative energy known.

2. The supraconscious creates and discovers through supraconscious *intuition*. It is different from all sensory intuitions, perception-observation, and from logical-mathematical and syllogistic-reasoning. 1. In contrast to senses and reason, intuitional creative inspiration or cognition comes as a momentary flash, different from a patient sensory observation or mathematico-logical analysis and calculation; 2. The time-moment and the circumstances of this flash can hardly be foreseen, predicted, or voluntarily produced; 3. The flash often occurs in the least expected moment and conditions. This is true of the individuals as well as nations and other organized groups. The stream of their creativity, measured by either the number of creative geniuses or by that of scientific discoveries, great philosophical, religious, and ethical systems, by fine art's creations, technological inventions, this stream in each and all fields of creativity swells and dries, rises and falls, shifts from one group to another in a little predictable and fairly erratic manner;[1] 4. The intuitional flash intuits adequately the central, or the most essential nature of the intuited phenomenon, noumenon, relationship or a new creative value; 5. During the process of supraconscious intuition the person (creator or cognizer) and the intuited object tend to become united into one whole in which there is no separation between the subject (person) and the object; they become an identity; 6. For this reason, the supraconscious intuition delivers to us unmediated, adequate, idea or knowledge or experience of the intuited phenomenon or noumenon instead of the mediated, inadequate, and always uncertain cognition or idea derived through sense-organs and logical reasoning; 7. This means that the supraconscious intuition deals with the essence and not with the appearance of its object; 8. As such the supraconscious intuition lies at the basis of the whole sensory and logical knowledge or value-experience. The ultimate bases of our cognition and the ultimate standards of our moral, aesthetic and other values are intuitional. For the same reason, in the functioning of the supraconscious intuition, a person's ego entirely disappears; the individual becomes one with his object; loses any awareness of ego or I. *The supraconscious is egoless*: it transcends ego entirely and unconditionally. The field of any ego

[1] Cf. the data and evidence in P. Sorokin, *Society, Culture and Personality*, chs. 35-44; *Dynamics*, vols. 1, 2, 3, 4 (passim); for the saints as geniuses in goodness, *Altruistic Love*, chs. 37, 38.

or its constellations is strictly limited to the bio- and socio-cultural *conscious level of personality.* Ego disappears below this level and above it; there is no experience of "ego" or "I" in the unconscious-subconscious fields of an individual. Dominated by the supraconscious an individual becomes an egoless instrument of the supraconscious, lifted far above the limitations of an ego; 9. The supraconscious with its creative intuition and other characteristics was noted long ago and given different terms. "The Self," (vs. "ego"), "atman," "purusha" of the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita, the Yoga system of Patanjali with the state of "samadhi" when an individual and the supraconscious become one, are the Hindu names given to the supraconscious and its cognitive and creative intuition. "The Self," "The Enlightenment" and the state of "Satori" in Buddhism and the Zen-Buddhism are the Buddhist names for it.[2] "The Eternal Reason," "Sublime Stupidity," "intuition" vs. sensory and intellectual knowledge are the names for it in Taoism.[3] Suprasensory and suprarational "divine madness" is Plato's name for it. "Divine Wisdom" (vs. "Foolishness of the World"), "Grace of God", "Divine or Mystic Revelation," *docta ignorantia* of Nicolas of Cusa, up to the "Inner Light" of Quakers are other terms for it used by many thinkers and groups. "Genius", "Inspiration," "Creative Elan," "Sovereign intelligence which sees in a twinkle of an eye the truth of all things in contrast to vain knowledge," (J. J. Rousseau), "celestial inspiration", "supramental wisdom that goeth beyond all knowledge" (Ibn-Khaldun), "Oversoul" (Emerson), up to "intuition" and "creativity" and "unconscious" (E. von Hartmann) are other names for it. Under different names almost all eminent Oriental and Occidental thinkers assert its reality and characteristics.[4]

[2] Cf. *The Yoga System of Patanjali,* tr. by E. E. Woods, (Cambridge, 1927) book I et passim; D. T. Suzuki, *Essays in Zen-Buddhism* (New York, 1949), pp. 30-35, 227ff, 261ff.

[3] Lao Tzu, *Canon of Reason and Virtue,* i, ii, iii et passim. In W. S. A. Pott. *Chinese Political Philosophy* (New York, 1925), pp. 103ff; Lin Tung-Chi, "The Chinese Mind; Its Taoist Substratum," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* June, 1947.

[4] Cf. K. W. Wild, *Intuition* (Cambridge University Press, 1938); N. Losskv, *Sensory, Intellectual, and Mystical Intuition* (Paris, 1938). After surveying and analyzing the meaning of intuition in the works of many philosophers and thinkers (B. Spinoza, H. Bergson, J. S. Mill, C. Jung, By Croce and others), K. W. Wild finds the following common elements in the intuitions of all these thinkers: "An intuition is an immediate awareness by a subject ot some particular entity, without such aid from the senses or from reason as would account for that awareness." "Reason and all other forms of knowing are dependent" upon this intuitive awareness. "Intuition is not alternative to reason (or to senses); its minimum function is to form a basis for reason, and its wider function is to deal with what is unaccessible to reason. . . It gives a peculiar feeling of unity between subject and object. . . Intuition gives us insight into reality as opposed to, or supplementing, appearance." The supraconscious "intuition is an endowment of specially gifted people." Wild, *op. cit.,* pp. 226ff.

For a survey and analysis of "the supraconscious" or "genius" in the recent biological, psychological and philosophical theories. cf. N. D. M. Hirsh, *Genius and Creative Intelligence,* (Cambridge, 1931), pp. 323 ff. et passim. Charles Nicolle, *Biologic de l'Invention* (Paris, 1932), ch. 1 et passim. P. A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York, 1941), Vol. 4, pp. 746 ff. J. Hadamard, *The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field* (Princeton, 1945) S. Voronoff, *Du cretin au Genie* (New York, 1941), pp. 35 ff. Cf. other literature in P. A. Sorokin's *Dynamics.*

Having outlined the essentials of the supraconscious, let us glance at the concrete evidence of its existence and operation. We can begin with mathematics.

2. *The Role of the Supraconscious in Mathematical and Natural Sciences*

The so-called "calculating boys" or "arithmetical prodigies" give an example of an instantaneous operation of the supraconscious, quite different from ordinary conscious mathematical calculation. These persons, often of a low intelligence and incapable consciously of an elementary mathematical reasoning or understanding, have been able to make instantaneously a complex mathematical calculation like a determination of the logarithm of any number of 7 or 8 places, or finding intuitively "what factors would divide any large number, not a prime; thus given the number 17,861, they can say instantly that it is 337×53. "He [Mr. Bidder] could not explain how he did this; it seemed a natural instinct to him."[5]

Another prodigy, Benjamen Hall Blyth, at the age of six years was instantly able to calculate how many seconds he lived, including two days for the leap-years (1820 and 1824), omitted by his father in his calculations with pen and paper (172,000 seconds). When Arago in the presence of the French Academy asked Vito Mangiamele (10 years old and otherwise uneducated), what is the cubic root of 3,796,416, in a space of about half a minute the child responded 156. Asked "What satisfies the condition that its cube plus five times its square is equal to 42 times itself increased by 40?", in less than a minute Vito responded that 5 satisfies the condition. Asked to extract the 10th root of 282,475,249, Vito found in a short time that the root is 7.[6] And so on.

The subsequent list taken from F. W. H. Meyers' work concisely sums up the age when the calculating gift was observed, duration of the gift (which lasted only for some time with most of the prodigies), and finally their conscious general intelligence:

TABLE OF PRINCIPAL ARITHMETICAL PRODIGIES

Name (alphabetically)	Age when gift was observed	Duration of gift	Intelligence
Ampere	4	?	eminent
Bidder	10	through life	good
Buxton	?	?	low
Colburn	6	few years	average
Dase (or Dahse)	boyhood	through life	very low
Fuller	boyhood	?	low
Gauss	3	?	eminent
Mangiamele	10	few years	average
Mondeux	10	few years	low
Prolongeau	6	few years	low
Safford	6	few years	good
"Mr. Van R., of Utica" ..	6	few years	average
Whately	3	few years	good

[5] Frederic W. H. Meyers, *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death* (New York, 1903), v. 1, pp. 78 ff. Meyers summed up the data given by Prof. Scrupture (in *American Journal of Psychology*, April 1891), by Binet (in *Revue Philosophique*, 1895), and by others.

[6] *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 80 ff.

Now, among these thirteen names we have two men (Ampere and Gauss) of transcendent, and three of high ability. The rest are of a low or average intelligence. Some of these, like Dase, were devoid of mathematical grasp and could not understand an elementary mathematical proposition or Euclidian theorem. It is also to be noted that the gift lasted only for some time with most of them, mainly in their young years. Later on, after a few years, it disappeared.[7] Whatever is the nature of this gift, one thing is certain: it is something quite different from ordinary arithmetical calculation and cognition. Since it is done neither in an unconscious nor subconscious state of the prodigies (they were wide awake and conscious of what they were doing), and since their operations radically differ from an ordinary conscious mathematical calculation (with pen, paper, slow and gradual, requiring a conscious knowledge of arithmetic or algebra or geometry), these operations are of the supraconscious kind, inexplicable and impossible otherwise.

As to the main *mathematical discoveries,* the role of the supraconscious intuition has been enormous and indispensable. Henri Poincare's own experience is typical here. "During fifteen days I tried to demonstrate that no functions analogous to what later on I called *les fonctions fuchsiennes* could exist. All these days I sat down at my working table, and attempted a great number of combinations and arrived at no result. One evening I took black coffee and could not fall asleep; ideas appeared in crowds; I felt as though they were pushing one another until two of them hooked each other and made a stable combination. In the morning I established the existence of the class of the *fonctions fuchsiennes.* All that I had to do was to repeat the results, which took only a few hours from me." Another time the solution of a mathematical problem over which he had fruitlessly worked came to him instantaneously and unexpectedly when he was stepping into a bus, "with the same traits of brevity, suddenness and immediate certitude."[8]

Poincare shows that a great many mathematical discoveries have been achieved in a similar intuitive way.[9] Other eminent mathematicians corroborate this on their part.

Poincare, G. Birkhoff, Arago, and the whole Intuitional School in mathematics all assert further that "intuition and faith" serve as "the foundations for the rational superstructure erected by means of deductive and inductive reasoning," that they are "heuristically valuable," "of supreme importance," and are "beyond reason."[10] Other eminent mathematicians like J. Hadamard, Kronecker, A. Fraenkel, P. Boutroux, F. Gonseth, H. Weil, and eminent physicists like N. Bohr, W. Heisenberg, L. de Broglie, F. Klein, and so on, reiterate these ideas, stating that the notion of number is an inherent or intuitive property of our mind, without which no thought is possible and which lies at the foundation of any mathematical or logical proof, and

[7] See details in Meyers' work.
[8] H. Poincare, *Science et Methode* (Paris, 1908), pp. 52 55.
[9] H. Poincare, *Inventions Mathematiques* (Paris, 1908).
[10] G. Birkhoff, "Intuition, Reason and Faith in Science," *Science,* December 30, 1938, p. 603
30, 1938, p. 603.

explicitly point out the intuitional foundations of their theories.[11]

Jacques Hadamard, himself an eminent mathematician, recently made a special study of the psychology of mathematical inventions. Among other sources he used the answers of the eminent living mathematicians to his questionnaire. The main results well corroborate all the above characteristics of the supraconscious (which Hadamard calls the "unconscious," following the prevalent mixing of these different orders).

All eminent mathematicians state that their discoveries were "sudden and spontaneous," "without any time for thought, however brief." They all resemble Gauss's experience. Gauss for many years fruitlessly struggled with a mathematical theorem. Finally, he reports:

"I succeeded, not on account of my painful efforts, but by the grace of God. Like a sudden flash of lightening the riddle happened to be solved. I myself cannot say what was the conducting thread which connected what I previously knew with what made my success possible."

In the opinion of several of the mathematicians the supraconscious does not originate in the mathematicians, but comes from the cosmos and connects the inventor with the supraconscious cosmic energy. Aristotle, Leibnitz, Schelling, Fichte called it "participation in Divinity." Myers, W. James, O. Spengler, W. Schubart and others expressed a similar idea.

Further on, many of the inventor-mathematicians, among them A. Einstein, think not in words, notions, concepts, but in various symbols, signs, syllables, visual forms, and so on.

Almost all discoveries are started intuitionally. "There is hardly any completely logical discovery. Some interaction of intuition (from the supraconscious region) is necessary at least to initiate the logical work."

Finally, among the motives of discoveries, "the sense of scientific beauty" is stressed by many mathematicians.[11a]

What is said of the role of the supraconscious intuition in mathematics, still more certainly can be said of other natural sciences. The supraconscious intuition has been the starter of most of the important discoveries in these sciences; intuitional verities lie at the very foundation of all the valid scientific propositions; and the intuitional flashes have occurred there unexpectedly, often in surprising conditions, and flashed like lightning "eye-openers."

Sir Isaac Newton's discoveries of the mathematical method of fluxion, of the law of gravitation and of the composition of light are classical examples of great discoveries that were started intuitionally. His biographers rightly call these discoveries as "nothing short of miraculous" on the part of a youth who did not distinguish himself in college, who retired after graduation into a lonely village, worked

[11] Cf. about this E. Meyerson, *Du Cheminement de la Pensee* (Paris, 1931), v. I., ch. 1., v. III, pp. 719-754. F. Conseth, *Fondements de Mathematiques* (Paris, 1924); G. Hardy, "Mathematical Proof," *Mind*, v. 38, New Series, No. 149.

[11a] J. Hadamard, *The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field* (Princeton, 1945), pp. 41 ff., 60 ff., 97, 112 et passim. Cf. also S. Voronoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 53ff.

there unaided, and made the discoveries in two years. An apple falls with a thud . . . . and starts a chain of creative thought ending in the discovery of the law of gravitation.[12]

Similarly, Galileo sees a swinging lamp in a church and through a "short circuit of intuition," discovers the law of oscillation of the pendulum. From two chance occurrences during a voyage, Robert Meyer "with a sudden leap of thought . . . . derived the law of the mechanical equivalence of heat."[13] The same is true of discoveries of Haller, Black, Gauss, Ampere, Liebig, Humphrey, Faraday, E. H. Moore, M. Planck, Davy, Berthelot, B. Russel, and others. In Biology, the role of intuition was well stressed by C. Bernard.[14]

It is not surprising, therefore, that a large number of the great scientists—like Pascal, Kepler, Newton, partly Galileo and others—were not only intuitionists, but mystics in a narrow sense of this term. 83 per cent of 232 natural scientists querried by the American Chemical Society admitted an unpredictable flash of an insight illuminating the essentials of a solution of their problems with a trait of adequacy and finality.[15]

As to the intuitional bases of the valid—logical and sensory—proportions of these sciences, these bases have been explicitly recognized by the leading empirical and positive methodologists of these sciences and of their logic, such as August Comte, John S. Mill, and subsequent empirical and inductive logicians. "The truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others are inferred"—such is the formula of J. S. Mill. The foundation of all conclusions from experience and of our belief into uniformity of nature necessary for validity of any inductive knowledge is "instinctive law of belief" (Reid and others), "custom and habit" (Hume), "belief and intuition" (J. S. Mill), "intuitive insight" (A. Comte).[16] Similar are the statements of hundreds of contemporary scientists and scholars.[17]

[12] See L. T. More, *Isaac Newton* (New York, 1934), pp. 41 ff., 56, 288 et passim. "As a mathematician he seemed to grasp the solution of a problem immediately."

[13] F. Kretschmer, *The Psychology of Men of Genius* (London, 1931), p. 141.

[14] C. Bernard, Lecon d'Ouverture (Paris, 1857), pp. 7, 36, 82.

[15] See D. Hutchinson, *How to Think Creatively* (New York), pp. 18-19. See many other facts in J. Liebig, *Reden und Abhandlungen* (Leipzig, 1897), pp. 249 ff; E. Meyerson, *De l'Explication dans les Sciences* (Paris, 2nd Edition), pp. 597 ff; E. von Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (London, 1931), vol. I, pp. 243-372, vol. II, pp. 1-44.

[16] Cf. for details J. Venn. *The Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic* (London, 1907), pp. 129-133; A. Comte, *Positive Philosophy*, tr. by Martineau (New York, 1885), vol. I, pp. 40-41, *Positive Policy* (London, 1875), vol. I, pp. 97, 257, 321, vol. II, pp. 7 ff.

[17] Cf. for instance, A. Eddington, *Philosophy of Physical Sciences* (New York, 1939); T. Langmuire, "Science, Common Sense and Decency," *New York Times*, Dec. 27, 1942; I. Lapshin, *Philosophy of Invention and Invention in Philosophy* (in Russian, Prague, 1924); F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West* (New York, 1946), chs. XII, XIII et passim; L. Dechesne, "La Pensee inconsciente dans la Recherche Scientifique," *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres, Academic Royal de Belgique*, tome xxxiii, 1947, pp. 169-174; R. Ulrich, *Man and Reality* (New Haven, 1948, The Hazen Pamphlets, No. 21); Sinnot, E. W., "Science and the Whole Man," *American Scientist*, vol. 36, 1948, pp. 127-138; H. O. Taylor, Fact: *The Romance of Mind* (New York, 1932); H. Dingle, *Through Science to Philosophy* (Oxford, 1937); J.H. Leuba, "Intuition," *Forum*, May, 1928; H. Margenau, *The Nature of Physical Reality* (New York, 1950).

As to philosophers, beginning with the Upanishads in India, with Taoism in China, passing through all mystic philosophies of the East and the West; through Plato, Aristotle, the Neo-Platonists (Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus), Neo-Pythagorians, and Gnostics; St. Augustine and the Church Fathers; Pseudo-Dionysius, J. S. Erigena, Nicolaus Cusanus; most of the great scholastics of the late Middle Ages (including St. Thomas Aquinas, especially in the latest period of his life); up to more modern philosophers, even such apparent rationalists as Descartes and Spinoza; even such sceptical-critical philosophers as Hume and Kant, not to mention Schopenhauer, Fichte, Schelling; even such objective idealists as Hegel; up to V. Solovyev, L. Tolstoi, H. Bergson, N. Lossky, W. James (of later period), A. Whitehead, E. Husserl and other "Phenomenologists"; N. Berdyaeff, followers of Soren Kierkegaard, J. Maritain and the Neo-Thomists; M. Scheler; Heidegger and some of the other "Existentialists"; these and many other philosophical currents—practically an overwhelming majority of these—all recognize some sort of intuitional axioms, "forms of mind," or verities as the basis of all the mathematical, logical and sensory-observational verities and valid propositions in all fields of human cognition and creativity.[18]

3. *The Supraconscious in Technological Inventions*

The supraconscious intuition plays perhaps a still more important role in initiation of *technological inventions* than in the scientific discoveries. A detailed study of how inventors happen to conceive their inventions shows unmistakably the indispensable role of intuition; in most of the cases the first idea of the invention comes like a flash, unexpected, often in peculiar conditions, with all the other traits of the intuitional insight.

"In my own experience, many decisions were made on the basis of intuition," says I. I. Sikorsky,[19] inventor of clippers, heliocopters, and so on. J. Rossman collected by questionnaire many details of how technological inventions have been made by a large number of American inventors. The answers of the inventors corroborate Sikorsky's experience. One of the inventors says that when a need for a certain invention comes, "I cease to labor over it, and consign it to the 'subjective department of my mind." There it spontancously ripens until it "comes out." Another states: "Ideas come when I least expect them, often when I am half asleep, or day dreaming." Others say that the first idea cames "in a flash," "quite unexpectedly," "suddenly," when the inventor is engaged in a different kind of work, in "the period of relaxation," "in a bathtub," "at the moment of waking," and so on.[20]

"The veritable man of genius is he who acts by impulse. . . And

[18] Cf. literature and details in my *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, vol. IV, pp. 746 ff. E. von Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (London, 1931).

[19] Cf. I. I. Sikorsky, *The Story of the Winged-S* (New York, 1942), p. 227; see the whole chapter 22, where intuition as "as sixth-sense" is well analyzed.

[20] J. Rossman, *The Psychology of Inventors* (Washington, 1931), pp. 101-106. See also E. D. Hutchinson, *How to Think Creatively* (New York,), where a large number of similar facts are given, pp. 18-30 et passim. S. Voronoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 64 ff.

genius is a grace," succinctly sums up the situation J. de Maistre in his excellent criticism of F. Bacon's *Novum Organum*.[21]

Practically all historians of technological inventions assert the startling and indispensable role of supraconscious intuition.[22]

4. *The Supraconscious in the Fine Arts, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences* .

Still more decisive is the role of supraconscious intuition in the discoveries and creativity in *language, the fine arts, philosophies, humanities, and social sciences.* All great creators in these fields have been persons graced by a generous magnitude of the supraconscious and this supraconscious—in co-operation with the consciously learned skill and technique—has been responsible for their achievements.

Language is an absolute condition for human thought and creativity in many fields. Its invention and creation is one of the greatest marvels of humanity. Since it is a condition of rational thought, it could not be invented consciously and rationally. Creation of all natural languages was largely supraconscious. (None of them, except artificial languages—Esperanto, etc.—was created "rationally"; Esperanto and other rationally created languages have not had any success.)[23]

The main philosophies, the main ethical systems, the main codes of law, the basic humanistic and social science theories were discovered long ago and were formulated in the sublimest form when neither laboratories, nor statistics, nor the rational techniques nor the enormous body of observed facts existed. Any rationally conscious generalization can be achieved only when these sources and data exist. Since the greatest philosophies, theories, and generalizations were made long ago, when these sources and data did not exist, the great philosophies and theories were evidently discovered and created intuitively, through the operation of the supraconscious.

Only through the supraconscious could Plato have created his great philosophical system to which, according to A. H. Whitehead, the subsequent history of philosophy has been but a foot-note. The same may be said of any other great philosophical system of the past as well as of any great social science theory or ethical and partly juridical code. The sublimest ethical systems of the great religions were formulated and discovered long ago. All the subsequent ethical-intellectual theories have not created anything equal to the norms of the Sermon on the Mount, or to the similar norms of Taoism, Confucianism, the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita, the Yoga, of Buddhism, of Jainism, Judaism, and Mohammedanism. All the subsequent ethical theories and codes are but mere foot-notes

[21] J. de Maistre, *Examen de la Philosophie de Bacon* (Paris, 1836), v. I, pp. 67 ff. Nor without reason de Maistre claims that inventions and discoveries are hardly ever made according to the rational rules of Bacon.

[22] A. P. Usher, *A History of Mechanical Inventions* (New York, 1929), pp. 28 ff; H. S. Hatfield, *The Inventor and His World* (London, New York, 1931); J. M. Montmasson, *Invention and the Unconscious* (London, 1932); J. Venn, *op. cit.*, pp. 352 ff; L. Dechesne, *op. cit.*; *cf.* other literature in my *Dynamics*, vol. IV, pp. 754 ff. Voronoff, *Du Cretin au Genius* (New York, 1941), pp. 35 ff., 64 ff., 129 ff.

[23] Cf. E. von Hartmann, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 293 ff.; R. A. Wilson, *The Miraculous Birth of Language* (New York, 1949).

to these great ethical systems. The other purely utilitarian, "rational" and "empirical" ethical theories have often been either a questionable "discovery," or a sort of an instruction book for Chevrolet drivers, or a cook book for a housewife. Even in these "pedestrian" theories the supraconscious intuition often has been slightly participant in their birth and formulation.

Nietzsche well describes this role of intuition or "inspiration." In the state of creative inspiration, "one becomes nothing but a medium for supermighty influences. That which happens can only be termed revelation; that is to say, that suddenly, with unutterable certainty and delicacy, something becomes visible and audible and shakes and rends one to the depth of one's being. One hears, one does not seek; one takes, one does not ask who it is that gives; like lightning a thought flashes out, of necessity, complete in form... It is a rapture... a state of being entirely outside oneself. . . . Everything happens in the highest degree involuntarily, as in a storm of feeling, freedom, of power, of divinity."[24]

Many a great poet similarly described the basic transmutation they experienced when "inspired" or possessed by the supraconscious. "Until Apollo calls a poet to his sacred sacrifice he is vulgarly silent; his soul is asleep; and among the insignificant children of the world he is perhaps the most trifling. But as soon as the Divine word touches his sensitive ear, the poet's soul rouses as an awakened eagle. He is bored amidst amusements of the world; he is a stranger to the gossips of the mob; he does not bend his proud head to the feet of the popular idol." In this way Pushkin, the greatest poet of Russia, describes this transmutation; and similarly it is described by other poets (Horace, Schiller, Goethe, Wordsworth, Browning, Shelley, Spenser, Gogol, and others).

"What, you ask, is my method in writing and elaborating my large and lumbering things?" Writes Mozart answering the question. "I can, in fact, say nothing more about it than this: I do not know myself and can never find out. When I am in a particularly good condition... then the thoughts come to me in a rush, and best of all. Whence and how that is I do not know and cannot learn." Further on he describes how "the crumbs" spontaneously combine with one another until they assume a finished form in his head. "All the finding and making goes on in me as in a very vivid dream." Finally, he puts the work on paper and since it is ready in his mind "it goes pretty quickly on to paper."[25]

[24] F. Nietzsche, *Werke* (Taschenausgabe) v. VII, pp. xxiv ff.

[25] O. Jahn, *W. A. Mozart* (Leipzig, 1856-59), v. III, pp. 423-25. It is to be noted in passing that the creativity of a genius graced by the supraconscious proceeds fast and results in a large quantitative output compared with that of the mediocrities working within much longer time. While an average output of a mediocre professor is about two or three volumes for life, most of the eminent scholars and thinkers whose works make a history of a social or humanistic or philosophical science have been much more prolific and most of their works they wrote in a comparatively short time. Ibn-Khaldun wrote his *Prolegomena* (three large volumes in quarto) within one year; G. Vico wrote his New Science within some four months. Mozart, Pergolesi, Purcell, Mendelsohn, Schubert and other great composers died in their thirtieth year about, or a few years later. And yet, the total output of their works is something exceeding many times the total output of mediocre composers who died in their seventies. The real masters

Quite similar are the descriptions of the process of creativity by other creators in the fine arts field. Beethoven states: "You will ask me where I get my ideas. I am not able to answer that question positively. They come directly, indirectly; I can grasp them with my hands. Out amidst the freedom of nature, in the woods, on walks. . . called forth by . . . moods. I carry my thoughts about with me long before I write them down. . . Then begins the mental working out of this stuff. . . [Finally] it is put on paper", which goes quickly.

wrote a suite or concerto or symphony sometimes within a short period of a few hours, a few days, or a few weeks. Handel's twelve *Concertos Grossos* were composed within one month, his *Messiah* in 24 days; Telemann, Mozart, Bach, and Haydn composed a suite sometimes within the time necessary to write a long letter to a friend. This explains why the total output of eminent composers was enormous: hundreds of operas, suites, concertos, symphonies, masses, etc. The same applies to the creative geniuses in other fields.

The superaconscious is possibly responsible also for a frequent precocity of genius. The conscious ability requires long-time training while the superaconscious seems to be able to manifest itself in a comparatively short period. Here are typical examples of the precocity of genius.

Mozart: played piano at age 3; wrote a concerto for the clavicord at age 4; at that age also he was able to play a piece on the violin without ever having been taught how. He completed his first opera at age 12. . . He would suddenly stop walking, take out his note book, and start writing notes feverishly, saying to his comrade: "Don't speak to me or interrupt me; they are singing in my ears, I must note it down." . . . .

Franz Lizst: Began playing piano at age 6; gave concerts from age of 8; gave his first opera "Don Sancho" at age 14.

Schubert: Wrote sonatas, symphonies, and operas at age 11 and 12; wrote the famous song "Hajars Klaze" at age 13, and when 15 and 16, his musical production was already prodigious.

K. M. Weber: Wrote six symphonies, three sonatas, and an opera at age 12; at 13, he wrote a two-act opera, "Das stumme Waldmadchen"; and at age 14, he wrote the opera "Peter Schmol and his Neighbor."

Mendelssohn: Wrote a psalm at age 12, the overture "Sommernachtstraum" at age 14, and had written four operas by the age of 15.

Groteh: Began playing piano at age of 2, and in 1779, at the age of 3½, he played his compositions on the organ at Piccadilly.

Frederic Gauss: Worked arithmetical problems and traced geometrical figures in the dust at the age of three.

Blaise Pascal: His father, a mathematician, encouraged his son to study Latin and Greek; he was told only that geometry consisted in the proper drawing of figures and the arranging and determination of their parts in their relations to one another. On the basis of this information, and with no other guidance whatsoever, Pascal proceeded to cover the walls and floor of his recreation room with geometrical figures, axioms, and theorems, all the way to Euclid's 32nd. proposition in his first book on geometry; he had invented a mathematical system at the age of 12, thereby, entirely independent of outside guidance. At 16, he had composed a treatise on conic sections; at 18, he had invented a mathematical machine, for making complicated calculations.

Ampere: Performed mathematical calculations with pebbles before he could read or write, and by the age of four, performed mental calculations as well.

Alexis Claude Clairaud: In 1726, at the age of 12, read a paper on four curves of his own invention before the Academy of Sciences. At 18, he was admitted to that Academy after publication of his researches on curvilear relationships.

Jose Comas Sola: A Spanish astronomer who, in 1877, at age 10, wrote first work on astronomy. He produced a second work at age 12, and observed sun spots at age 13 through a small telescope.

Brunswick: In 1780, at age 3, he solved mathematical problems and also (like Pascal and Gauss) traced geometrical figures in the dust.

"What we conquer for ourselves through art is from God, divine inspiration. . . Every genuine creation of art is independent, mightier than the artist himself, and through its manifestation, returns to the Divine. With man it has only this in common: that it bears testimony to the mediation of the Divine in him." Beethoven clearly stresses the insufficiency of the rational mind for creativity. "Kings and Princes may be able to create professors and privy councillors,. . . but they cannot create great men. . . ." "I sit and [rationally] think, and get it all settled, but it won't come on paper." "The new and original is born of itself without one's thinking of it."[26]

Similarly R. Wagner in his letter, July 20, 1856, says that ideas of his musical compositions "came to me like a flash of light in the greatest clarity and definiteness, but not altogether in complete detail."

J. Brahms states about his early years: "I was always composing. . . My finest songs would come to me early in the morning while I was cleaning my boots."[27]

In still greater detail Peter Tchaikovsky describes this process. "Usually the seed of a future musical creation germinates instantaneously and most unexpectedly. If the soil is eager, if there is a disposition to work, that seed takes root with an amazing power and speed, appears above ground as a little stalk which puts forth leaves and branches and finally flowers. This simile is as near as I can come to a description of a creative process. If the seed appears at a favourable moment, the main difficulty is passed. The rest grows

Leaving mathematics and entering the art of painting, precocity is just as evident, although the ability to manipulate the tools of artistic production does not appear at quite as early an age. . . .

Raphael: Began drawing at age of 8, had some drawings accepted at the Academy in Venice at age 12, and was already famous at 19.

Claude Joseph Vernet: At age 4, used crayons well; was famous by age of 20 years.

Greuze made his first work (public appearance) at age 8; *Giotto* started at 10; *Durer* at 15; *Titian, Rubens, Jordaens,* were also very precocious.

Bernini: Completed his first sculpture at age 10; *Grasser* was sculpturing statues at the age of 13.

Dantes Composed a sonnet to Beatrice at age 9; *Le Tasse,* and *Byron* began writing at age 10 to 12.

Victor Hugo: Had written over 3000 verses by age 14; also, he had begun two tragedies by that time.

Goethe: Wrote dialogues and other pieces between age 6 and 8; wrote his first theatrical play at age 10; wrote "Thoughts on the Descent of Jesus Christ into Hell" at age 15.

Pushkin: Wrote his first poem "La Tolgade" and his comedy "L'Escamoteur" at the age of 10.

Picode Mirandola: Was familiar with Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, and Chaldean while still a child.

Ralph W. Emerson: Wrote the poem "Fortus" at age 12.

Goldoni: Produced a comedy at age of 8.

Ovide: Spoke in verse from the time of childhood.

Shakespeare: Wrote all his historic plays before the age of 34.

Ellius Quirine Visconti. Gave sermons at age of 6.

Bossuet: Gave sermons at age of 12.

Fenelon: Gave sermons at age of 15.

[26] R. H. Schauffler, *Beethoven* (New York, 1934), pp. 553, 279, 63-64.

[27] W. Niemann, *J. Brahms* (New York, 1929), p. 11. E. D. Hutchinson, *How To Think Creatively,* quoted, p. 30.

of itself." A new idea gives to Tchaikovsky a boundless joy. . . . "One forgets everything; one is a madman. . . Sometimes inspiration takes flight, one has to seek it again—often in vain. Frequently one must rely here upon a quite cold, deliberate technical process of work. Perhaps such moments are responsible, in the works of the Great Masters, for those places where the organic coherence fails and where one can trace artificial coherence, seams and patches. But this is unavoidable. If that spiritual condition of the artist called inspiration. . . should continue uninterrupted, the artist could not survive a single day. . . The strings would snap and the instrument would fly to pieces. One thing, however, is indispensable: the main idea of the piece, together with a general outline of the separate parts, must not be found through searching, but must simply appear as a result of that supernatural, incomprehensible and never-analyzed power called inspiration."

In another place he says that in his musical creativity the idea comes usually in a fully orchestrated form. "I never compose in the abstract. . . So I find the musical thought simultaneously with the orchestration."

"Only the music moved by inspiration can touch and take possession of the hearer. There is no doubt that even the greatest musical genius has sometimes worked unwarmed by inspiration. *It is a guest that does not come on first invitation.* In the meantime one must work. . . If one waits for inclination (to compose) instead of advancing to meet it, one easily drifts into laziness and apathy. One must hold fast and have faith, and inspiration will come."

Further on he insists at the necessity of acquiring all the technical skill for any great artist: without it his genius may be wasted and may give only a half-baked product. Nevertheless, without a genius or inspiration no technical skill can produce anything great and valuable.[28]

M. Proust reiterates: "Every artist seems thus the citizen of an unknown fatherland, forgotten by himself. Each of them remains forever unconsciously [rather supraconsciously P.A.S.] tuned in a certain unison with it; he is delicious with joy when he sings in accordance with his fatherland."[29]

Paul Chabaneix, T. Ribot, and E. von Hartmann collected (by questionnaire and interview) a number of answers of eminent poets, writers, artists, and scholars about the process of their creativity. All answers were similar in the emphasis on the supraconscious, which like many others they call "subconscious."[30]

Here are a few of many examples given in these works:

"Corneille composed the scene between Horatius and Curiatus just as the bird builds its nest." (Voltaire's testimony.)

Sully Prudhomme states: "In writing these dramas I seemed

[28] C. D. Bowen and Barbara von Meck, "Beloved Friend," *The Story of Tchaikovsky and N. von Meck* (New York, 1937), pp. 206 216-18.

[29] M. Proust, *La Prisonniere*, v. II, p. 73.

[30] P. Chabaneix, *Le Subconscient Chez les Artists, les Savants et les Ecrivains* (Paris, 1897); T. Ribot, *Creative Imagination* (New York, 1906); E. von Hartmann, *op. cit.*; also F. W. H. Meyers, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 89 ff.

to be a spectator at the play; I gazed at what was passing on the scene in an eager passionate expectation of what was to follow."

"With Chopin, creation was spontaneous, miraculous; he wrought without foreseeing. It would come complete, sudden, sublime." (Testimony of Georges Sand.)

"In the course of my life I have had some happy thoughts, and I often noted that they would come to me involuntarily, and when I was not thinking of the subject." (Du Bois Reymond.)

"You feel a little electric shock striking you in the head, seizing your heart at the same time—that is the moment of genius." (Buffon.)

De Musset writes, "On ne travaille pas, on ecoute, c'est comme un inconnu qui vous parle a l'oreille."

Lamartine says, "Ce n'est pas moi qui pense; ce sont mes idees qui pensent pour moi."

Remy de Gourmont: "My conceptions rise into the field of consciousness like a flash of lightning or like the flight of a bird."

Saint-Saens had only to listen, as Socrates to his Daemon: and M. Ribot, summing up a number of similar cases, says: "It is the unconscious [the supraconscious, P.A.S.] which produces what is vulgarly called inspiration. This condition is a positive fact, accompanied with physical and psychical characteristics peculiar to itself. Above all, it is impersonal and involuntary, it acts like an instinct, when and how it chooses; it may be wooed, but cannot be compelled. Neither reflection nor will can supply its place in original creation". . .

Testimony of Schiller (Cf. his "Happiness"), Goethe (Cf. his *Autobiography* and how he created *Egmont, Iphigenia, Werther*), R. Wagner, Wordsworth, Browning, Shelley, Spenser, L. Tolstoi, Carlyle, Descartes, Walter Scott, Schopenhauer, Michelet, Voltaire, N. Gogol, Condorcet, Coleridge, Tartini, Rosny, Schumann, Diogene, Laerce, Balzac, and of many others, depicts the creative process "as something that passes in ourselves, without us and sometimes against us. Artistic inspiration is not devoid of any of the aspects of religious inspiration because it has the same psychological characteristics." In the words of Schelling: "Just as the man of destiny does not execute what he wills or intends, but what he is obliged to execute through an incomprehensible fate under whose influence he stands, so the artist. . . seems to stand under the influence of a power which. . . compels him to declare or represent things which he himself does not completely see through, and whose import is infinite."[31]

5. *The Supraconscious in Religion and Ethics*

Finally, the role of the supraconscious is overwhelmingly decisive in *religious and moral creativity*. The greatest religious creators, —the founders of great religions, the great prophets, apostles, and charismatic religious leaders—they all explicitly state that either they themselves are an incarnation of the supraconscious (God, Brahma, and their equivalents), or they are revealing the suprarational, supraconscious, suprasensory Truth or Gospel. Lao-Tze, Zoroaster,

[31] H. Delacroix, *Psychologie de l'Art* (Paris, 1927), pp. 189-98. Cf. also K. W. Wild's *op. cit.*, ch. VIII. S. Voronoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 64 ff.

Buddha, Moses, and the Hebrew prophets, Mahavira, Christ, Mohammed, all the great teachers up to the more recent charismatic religious leaders explicitly profess this role. Even when ordinary persons become religiously and morally inspired, they consider themselves emptied of their egos and turned into the instrumentality of the supraconscious or God. This is implied by the term of a complete surrender to God or His equivalent or by the term of complete transcendence of our little egos. "When we are emptied of ourself, God takes possession of us."[32] All such religious and moral creators state:

"I and the Father are one," says Jesus (John x, 30).

"Thou [God] art the doer thereof," (Jayminiya Upanishads).

"I live, yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me." (St. Paul, Gal. ii, 20.)

"The works of a man who is led by the Holy Ghost are the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own." (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.* II, i, 96, 6 and 1).

"If any man is to come to God, he must be empty of all works and let God work alone." (Tauler, *Following of Christ,* 16,17.)

"Not me, but God working through me," (St. Teresa).

"It is Thou who wanted my debut and who took my essence in order to serve Thou as a symbol among men." (Al Hallaj).

"To be like wax before the fire ready to receive every impression of the divine will" (Thomas Schillitoe and other Quakers). For Quakers, the enemy is ego or self-centeredness. It is at war with the divine "inner light." In spiritual growth, man completely surrenders to God and becomes His instrument.[33]

We see here the same transmutation of man into an instrument of the supraconscious which we saw in all fields of creativity. In religious and ethical fields this "becoming obsessed by the supraconscious" is especially conspicuous.

Since the great religions have been as great as any creations of man, since their basic verities seem to be immortal and eternal, and since the great religions were created long ago (when rationally scientific and sensory knowledge was meagre), this testifies that they could be created only through the supraconscious and not through an undeveloped empirical and logical rational mind. This conclusion is reinforced by an invariable failure of all the attempts to create "rational and scientific" religion, "reasonable, sensible, verifiable empirically." Such "religions" never have gotten anywhere and at the best remained a third class vulgarized philosophy and pseudoscience, spread among a mere handful of "rational intellectuals" devoid of the grace of the supraconscious.

Finally, as in the field of Truth, the ultimate bases upon which the whole sensory and rational building of the Beautiful and the Good are built, are again supraconscious intuitions.

The very division of all the phenomena into: "beautiful and ugly," "right and wrong" is intuitive. Their concrete forms (erected by reason and senses) are diverse and varying; but the very difference

[32] *The Bhagavadgita,* tr. by S. Radhakrishnan (New York, 1948), p. 62.
[33] Cf. H. Brinton, *The Children of Light* (New York, 1938), p. 406.

of the beautiful and ugly, of the right and wrong, of the good and bad, is eternal, universal, and constant. As such it can be only supraconsciously intuitional.

Many other basic traits of the Good and Beautiful are likewise intuitional. With a full reason, B. Croce says that "art is perfectly defined when simply defined as intuition."[34]

"Aesthetic associations are intuitive in type. . . Aesthetic judgment acts intuitively and rapidly," says our eminent mathematician on the basis of his study of aesthetic proportions and mathematical relationships in art-phenomena.[35]

Even more, as is the case with ethical values, the very relativity of the concrete aesthetic phenomena is greatly exaggerated by many sociologists, anthropologists and historians. It is true that the concrete forms of the beautiful are conditioned by subconscious and conscious custom, mores, habit and rational-sensory considerations of pain and pleasure. But all this diversity concerns the concrete "superstructure" of the beautiful, erected upon its eternal intuitional bases by senses and reason. However, even in regard to this superstructure, there is more similarity than discord in the aesthetic evaluations of various groups and persons. Admiration of Gothic architecture does not hinder an admiration of the Pantheon, or of the great architectural achievements of the Hindu, the Chinese, the Arabic and other cultures. Their diversity is not an evidence of a relativity and oppositeness of aesthetic phenomena, as it has been interpreted by sociocultural "relativists," but that of many-folded manifestation of the Beautiful. An admiration of different sorts of rose, of azalea, of a blue sky or a stormy ocean, of Beethoven and Bach is not an evidence of the relativity and contrariety of the aesthetic perception, evaluation and phenomena, but of a rich diversity of the Beautiful. Its diversity and manifold richness is not its relativity and contrariety. Our "relativists" confused two different orders: manifoldness of manifestation of the Beautiful (in which there is no antagonism, no contradiction, no conflict between their diverse but equally beautiful forms) and nihilistic and mutually exclusive contrariness. Bach is different from Beethoven, Homer from Shakespeare or Mahabharata, a rose from an azalea, but this difference is mutually supplementary, is free from "either-or" mutual contrariness; all are beautiful in their own way. To sum up: diversity is not relativity; the fullness and richness of manifestations of the Beautiful are not evidences of its relativity, conventionality or non-existence. The diversity of the sounds (words) used for designation of the object called in English by "the sun," in French by "le soleil," in Russian by "solntze," the object now shining, now clouded, now seemingly cold, does not make the object (the sun) relative or conventional or non-existent or not universally and almost perenially (for an indefinitely long time) given and existing in its solid reality Even in its concrete manifestations the aesthetic phenomena are much

[34] B. Croce, *The Essence of Aesthetics* (London, 1921), pp. 33 et passim.

[35] G. Birkhoff, *Aesthetic Measure* (Harvard University Press, 1933), p. 6, 216 et passim. Cf. further K. W. Wild, *Intuition*, ch. viii; E. von Hartmann, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 269-293.

less relative and contradictory than our "nihilistic relativists" try to convince us.

Still more true is this in regard to ethical values and manifestations. Their ultimate bases are intuitional. All the main moral commandments of practically all religious-ethical codes are essentially similar to the Ten Commandments, and especially to those of the Sermon on the Mount. On supraconscious intuition is based also what is called "natural law" (as *aeternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret imperandi prohibendique sapientia*), the Golden Rule, the *categoric imperative.* Kant, denying that the "pure reason" of our conscious, rational mind can know the true reality as it is in itself and for itself, affirmed that we can and do know it through the supraconscious moral intuition or "practical reason." Even more, in practically all even pre-literate groups, the ethical norms assert Altruistic *Love* and its derivatives as good and right in regard to the members of the in-group, and hate and harming as bad or wrong. The basic norms of the good and right and of the bad and wrong are truly universal and perennial. The main difference is not in the norms and commandments, but in the extensity of the universe to which they have been applied.

Not only the basic ethical norms, but even most of the main concrete law-norms of various groups, persons and periods, beginning with the pre-literate and ending with contemporary ones, are essentially similar in what they prohibit and punish when done to a member of an in-group and in what they recommend and demand. They all prohibit murder of an in-group member, infliction of various physical and other harms upon him, violation of his basic values, health, etc. Here again, our superficial cultural relativists enormously exaggerated the contrariety, nihilistic relativity and changeableness of ethical value and evaluations.[36]

In many of their empirical details, built by sensory-rational experience, they have to be different; now and then even contradictory; but in their foundations and basic traits, up to many details, they have been universal, eternal, unchangeable. Even in many changeable details, they have shown mainly manifold diversity rather than contradictory relativity.

To sum up: The supraconscious "furthers the conscious process of thought by its inspiration in small as in great matters."[37]

"New directions of thought arise from the flashes of intuition."[38]

"Human spirit as 'something that knows' is not quite so narrow a description as 'the observer'. Consciousness has other functions besides those of a rather inefficient measuring machine; and know-

[36] See the detailed study of all the prohibited and punishable actions in various law-codes, beginning with pre-literate groups, especially with the Graeco-Roman and early Barbarian codes of the West, and ending with the most recent Criminal Codes of Soviet Russia, Hitlerite Germany, Fascist Italy. The study shows that the main crimes in all these codes remain essentially the same. Changes concern either secondary misdemeanors or details, or less essential elements of the criminal actions. Cf. my *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* vol. II, chs. 13, 14, 15.

[37] E. von Hartmann, *op. cit.,* vol. II p. 39.

[38] A. H. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York, 1933), p. 138.

ledge may attain to other truths besides those which correlate sensory impressions. . . Deeper than any 'forms of thought' is a faith. . . In the age of reason, faith yet remains supreme; for reason is one of the articles of faith."[39]

6. *The Supraconscious in Extra-Sensory Perception, Psychokinetics, etc.*

A specific aspect of the supraconscious appears in the extra-sensory perception, psychokinetics, and related phenomena.[40] At the present time the reality of these extra-sensory and supra-rational processes is well demonstrated. Their nature apparently differs basically from sensory and purely rational processes. They open to us one of many aspects of the little known supraconscious.

7. *Uneven Distribution of the Supraconscious*

The supraconscious or the creative genius seems to be of different magnitude and of different kinds with different individuals and groups. It is distributed unevenly among different persons and groups; and this distribution greatly varies in time. Some individuals—the greatest geniuses—have it in its maximal magnitude and of the highest quality; others, common mortals, have only its minimum and of an inferior quality. Some, like Plato or Aristotle had the philosophical form of genius; Buddha, Lao Tze, Confucius, and Jesus manifested its religious form; Pheidias, Homer, Beethoven, Michelangelo, its artistic form; Galileo, Newton, Darwin, its scientific form; Archemedes, Stephenson, Fulton, Edison, its technological creativity; Hammurabi, Moses, Manu or the jurisconsuls of the *Corpus Juris Civilis,* its juridical form; and so on.

A supraconscious of a smaller magnitude and of possibly inferior quality seems to be present in every normal individual. If it is not stifled by the individual's unconscious, bioconscious, and conscious forces, as happens in some cultures and periods, every individual has his moments of domination by the supraconscious. When the individual's ego and drives are forgotten in the purest religious ecstasy, in the sublimest altruistic sacrifice, in the ineffable experience of beauty (of nature, the fine arts, the loved one); in the complete immersion into cognized phenomenon, however elementary; in the flare-up of creativity in any field, however simple; all these and similar moments occurring in the life of practically every normal individual are the moments of pulsation of the supraconscious in the rank and file. Mrs. D. Roberts correctly suggests that the "moments" which T. S. Eliot describes are further concrete illustrations of these moments of the supraconscious in daily life. Eliot's "moments in the rose-garden," "the moment in the draughty church at smokefall," "lost in a shaft of sunlight," in the "whisper of running streams and

[39] A. Eddington, *op. cit.,* pp. 221-23.

[40] Cf. J. B. Rhine, *The Reach of Mind* (New York, 1947); *New Frontiers of the Mind* (New York, 1937); J. B. Rhine, J. G. Pratt, B. M. Smith, C. E. Stuart, and J. A. Greenwood, *Extra-Sensory Perception After Sixty Years* (New York, 19); W. W. Carington, *Thought Transference* (New York, 1946); then the volumes of the *Journal of Parapsychology* and *Proceedings of Society for Psychical Research;* A. Smith, *The Psychic Source Book* (New York, 1951),

winter lightning," or the moments when "music [is] heard so deeply that it is not heard at all, but you are the music while the music lasts," or the moments "I can only say, *there* we have been: but I cannot say where. . . beyond any meaning we can assign to happiness"; these and similar supraconscious moments occur in the life of almost all individuals. They are the highest peaks of creativity reached by an individual in his whole life.

Exactly this presence of supraconscious energy makes every human being an inestimably great value—the end value—in the whole world, one that should not be used as a mere means for anything and anybody except the supraconscious itself. But when a person becomes an instrumentality of the supraconscious he is rising above any means and any other ends; he increasingly becomes the ultimate end-value. This pulsation of the supraconscious can notably be increased in the life-activity of all of us, if proper care and effort are taken for that purpose.

8. *Manifoldedness of the Supraconscious*

The above aspects of the supraconscious show its manifold character. It seems to have many forms and manifests itself in all the infinite richness of supreme creativity. Theoretically it can be defined as the Manifold Infinity, the *coincidentia oppositorum* transcending the contradictions of rational thought; ever creative and inexhaustible in its creativity. It possibly connects man with the World's Supraconscious, as man's unconscious connects him with the bio-physical universe and its forces.

9. *The Problem of the Ultimate Self*

In some of the Hindu and other conceptions, beyond our supraconscious there is still higher, ultimate self, always equal to itself, free from any change and modification. This Self is strictly the Divine in man, the God in man. Being unchangeable it does not participate in all the transformations and incessant changes of the empirical man and his unconscious, conscious and supraconscious states. This Self looks with equanimity at these states, weighs and evaluates them and finds them wanting or satisfactory. This "Self" speaks when we say: "*My* mind is restless," "my" in the sense of a temporary connection of the Self with its mind or with "my body."

Whether this Self is identical with the supraconscious or is different from it, as the fifth and the highest energy in man, cannot be decided now; the existing knowledge of the supraconscious is too meagre for making a definite decision in this point.

SYMBOL AND RHYTHM IN COSMIC ART

By RAYMOND F. PIPER

1. *The Cosmos Generates and Sustains Beauty*

"The question of beauty," declares Emerson, "takes us out of surfaces into thinking of the foundation of things." Beauty, a compact name for the totality of aesthetic delights, must be cosmic in genesis and maintenance since it exists extensively and multiplies endlessly, and the rhythms which constitute it permeate the universe. A. N. Whitehead affirms, "All order is aesthetic order. . . . The actual order is the outcome of the aesthetic order, and the aesthetic order is derived from the immanence of God."[1]

Nature provides multifarious constructing materials and rhythmic forms for aesthetic enjoyment, and crowns evolution with selves of versatile sensitivity to the charms of color and sound, of rhythms and patterns. Man exhibits a primodial joy in spontaneous, rhythmic, playful, constructive, adventurous behaviour. He also lives by the magic of symbols as much as by bread, because symbols provide the necessary means for his becoming human through communication and for exploiting his endless urge toward an expanding value consciousness.

Since man is a beauty-loving creature, we infer that the cosmic soul-maker is or loves beauty. "Nature is that being which has poetry in her brain," declares poet William Yerington. *Beauty is rooted in reality.* Therefore, growth in the appreciation of the beauties of nature and great art, especially of the cosmic kinds, should be one of the highways of ascent or return to Brahma. Sri Aurobindo affirms, "It is the soul in us which turns always towards Truth, Good and Beauty, because it is by these things that it itself grows in stature. . . . To reveal, to embody, to create as we say, highest beauty is to bring out of our souls the living image and power of God. . . . This is the first necessity, that . . . each individual shall discover the spirit, the divine reality within him and express that in all his being and living."[2] Beauty, therefore, is necessary for man's self-realization because it is necessary for his divinity. Our author holds that psychological theories fail to account for the more elevated varieties of aesthetic contemplation. He says, "We are here in the realm of metaphysics, which alone can give us the clue to the essence of beauty and the art process."[3]

[1] *Religion in the Making,* New York, 1926, pp. 104-5.
[2] *The Life Divine,* New York, 1949, p. 543; *The Human Cycle,* New York, 1950, p. 160; *The Life Divine,* p. 907.
[3] Mukerjee: *The Social Function of Art* (SFA), p. 121.

2. *How a Sociologist Reaches the Shrine of Metaphysics*

It is an astonishing and delightful experience for a philosopher, excursioning in some of the twenty-nine volumes on the social sciences by Radhakamal Mukerjee, to discover a deep and satisfying metaphysics of art and religion. This achievement represents a triple tribute to our versatile author: first, to his profound assimilation of the rich and powerful perspectives of Hindu metaphysics; second, to his comprehensive insight into the nature and human worth of the fine arts; and, third, to his far ranging vision of the proper and necessary contribution of artistic symbols to the peaceful and happy life of nations and of the world community that is in the making.

This essay is limited to a discussion of two basic aspects, symbolism and rhythm, of that kind of fine art which he rightly regards as most significant for the total well-being of mankind. Cosmic art is a convenient name for this kind of art, which includes all artistic creations which are intended to embody and enhance the most inclusive and enduring values of man, notably love, wisdom, social solidarity, beauty, reverence for the divine, eternal life, and wholiness. Cosmic art is essentially religious art because, as our author declares, "Religion is the faith in the participation and permanence of values. . . . Thus great art is religious; the fine arts are divine."[4] For the preservation of man's highest values, the fine arts are the most important vehicles.

The path of an idealistic sociologist from the observation of social phenomena to the shrine of metaphysics is a straight and short route of inevitable logic passing through four stages.

(*a*) Every community must have artistic symbols both for the communication and the preservation of those basic ideals which consolidate its members. "Great art," he affirms, "expresses the universal social symbols and archetypes . . . in the history of civilization."[5]

(*b*) Such symbols become significant, of course, so far as they are suitable to human persons, so far as they speak through forms which are eloquent and meaningful to them. In other words, the difficult artistic problem of creating effective symbols for embodying abstract ideals and the Invisible Spirit can be solved only by reshaping those processes and patterns which are most familiar and most vital to the bearers and makers of values; namely, human selves, possessing complicated ancestral endowments and acting through living bodies.

(*c*) The fundamental activities of the human body are rhythmic, such as the alternations of muscular movement and of attention. Our author strongly emphasizes that there is one property which characterizes and unifies man, nature, art, and God, and that is rhythm, an inclusive name for every kind of ordered succession of actions or accents which unfold in endless variety in the universe.

(*d*) But rhythm permeates reality. It is probably an ontological category, that is, a principle which is necessary both for the existence and the understanding of everything that exists from atoms

[4] *The Social Structure of Values* (SSV), p. 398; SFA, p. 131.
[5] SFA, p. 2.

to deity. But reality is the subject-matter of metaphysics. As soon as we investigate its nature we have arrived at the portal of metaphysics.

From the preceding dialectic spring a practical climax, a rule of action which is of immense importance in carrying on self-realization, the goal of life: since rhythm is integral to our nature because of our divine and organic descent, self-realization requires the widest possible assimilation of the significant values which are embodied in the greatest arts of mankind.

3. *Art Symbols are the Binders of a Community*

The practical goal of the social sciences is the "conscious improvement of society by society." The social scientist strives to push out the frontiers of knowledge concerning the essentials of happy living together so that the social engineer may enlarge the domain of human goods. But the applier of social wisdom has not yet won a satisfactory name nor adequate professional recognition. Since his function is the skillful guidance of men rather the operation of machines, a title borrowed from art, religion, or education would be more appropriate than one borrowed from engineering.

For a savant with such a comprehensive view of life as Radhakamal Mukerjee a new official title is needed. Social architect, prophet of the good society, or social seer suggest possibilities, but all of these are too narrow. Actually I know of no word which holds together the sociological, aesthetic, religious, philosophical, and technical faculties of our author. No matter how specific the problem he wrestles with, he is ever aware of its cosmic bearings. He realizes two virtues which are far rare among sociologists: a knowledge of the metaphysical foundations of social institutions and of the immense importance of the fine arts in consolidating and enriching enlightened communities. He declares, "Thus do the great arts of the world immortalize the collective visions and values of historical cultures and illustrate the essential oneness of mankind."[6]

There is no need of restating here the author's successful proof of the significant and indispensable functions of art in society. The two concepts which most clearly and richly reveal this theory of art are symbol and rhythm. What needs reiteration is his insistent and illuminating emphasis upon the importance, indeed the necessity, of artistic symbols for the very existence as well as for the progress of a good society. He adumbrates and illustrates copiously the power of art to objectify, establish, enhance, unify, and perpetuate those spiritual values which condition a community. He says, "Art in Asia became the torch-bearer of social and spiritual universals for millions. .... Art is the great binder, the ubiquitous seal of community life and action..... Oriental art is most intensely charged with community feeling, and is thus chiefly responsible for the historic continuity of Oriental cultures."[7]

[6] SEA, Preface, p. iii.
[7] SEA, Introduction, pp. v, xvii; 176.

4. *The Nature of Symbols*

A symbol is essentially a material object or process which stands for a meaning beyond bare sensation. It represents man's supplement to animal response, and signalizes his entrance into the spaceless, transcendental world of meanings. Our author declares, "The identification of the human with the universal, of the sensory with the spiritual, is the function of such permanent symbols as art creates."[8] Thus symbols are the mysterious vehicles by which man lives and moves freely in that ideal world where his principal treasures unfold. Bernard Bosanquet affirms, "Symbolism is the embodiment of invisible realities in sensuous form."[9]

Our author divides symbols into two classes. (*a*) Representational or realistic symbols or signs, for practical life, such as signal flags, whistles, traffic lights, telegraphic codes, and so forth. (b) Expressionist or abstract symbols which signify generic, universal, or abstract meanings, values and attitudes, and which possess deep and experiential affective color. "Expressional symbols are the chief means of communion in groups." They are instruments for unifying a culture by providing a frame of reference for human values and attitudes. They have great power to create social cohesion and continuity. He declares, "Symbols are means of either communication or communion, comprising signs and devices by which men become oriented not only to men as objects, but also to the thoughts, values, and experiences of other men, facilitating their reciprocal exchange and interpenetration."[10]

5. *The Modern Quest for New Abstract Value Symbols*

Modern man desperately needs the power of new symbols, myths, parables and heroes to focalize and summarize his values, both old and new. The once potent symbols of medieval Christianity have lost their appeal to contemporary man. Naturalistic signs and arts are prosaic, unattractive, ineffective in a photographic age. Our author affirms, "Due to the secularisation of life and its interests and modern scientific and materialistic outlook, cultures throughout the world are losing their appreciation of the ultimate values and sentiments and the 'paradigmatic' experiences. Thus the meaning and function of these expressional archetypes and symbols for the stability of society and for the perfection of the individual are being missed. Such lapse of moral significance and purpose is even more true of the religious-metaphysical sign and symbol-patterns in a social culture."[11]

Further, "European science and metaphysics have not been able to create the universal human realities, archetypes and symbols that can restore the individual to his harmonious relationship with his social milieu and the universe."[12] A basic reason for this failure is the bewildering confusion of contemporary men concerning the ideals

[8] SFA, Preface, p. vi.
[9] *A History of Aesthetic*, London, 1892, p. 47.
[10] *The Dynamics of Morals* (DM), pp. 475, 471.
[11] DM, p. 481.
[12] SFA, p. 176.

of an abundant life to which they can safely commit their destinies. Because of this loss of "many ancient symbols, myths, and models," our author concludes that "their restoration or the creation of new ones will be an integral part of the new ethical dynamic."[13]

Contemporary philosophical artists, therefore, may find their most exciting and significant endeavor to be the creation of fresh universal forms to embody, focalize, and accent the new human values that are gradually emerging in contemporary life. The problem is to discover "new symbolic devices that may appropriately express and focus the new morality and philosophy of life. Could not aesthetic and metaphysical symbols and myths elicit an unfailing allegiance to the world community, a sensitive sentiment of the brotherhood of mankind? On an answer to this largely depends the future of mankind."[14]

Our author expresses the hope that effective non-figurative artistic forms may be found to express the more abstract and universal values which modern knowledge and communication have made possible. Examples of such values are justice, economic well-being, cooperation, world-wide brotherhood, and the religious value of cosmic security : the sense of safety rooted in harmony with the universal presence of the Supreme Spirit.

One need not be an artist to appreciate the exceeding difficulty of inventing a satisfying artistic form to express any one of these values. What pigmental design, for instance, could reveal a Cosmic Intelligence which is manifested in everything and identical with nothing in particular? How make the observer see and feel the invisible Universal Activator? What plastic means will express this ceaseless undifferentiated power without concealing it in concrete terms? That artists around the world are seriously devoted to solving these problems is proved by the fact that my collection of photographs contains seventeen hundred reproductions of art works on ethical, religious, and mataphysical subjects, done by six hundred sixty artists in fifty three countries of the world.

In recent years a new symbol of far reaching and almost hypnotic influence has been invented: a red flag marked with intersecting hammer and sickle. While this sign is realistic and literal rather than expressional and functional, and while its original ideal meaning of fruitful labor and decent living has become yoked with demoniac designs and methods, yet it suggests three obvious problems involved in establishing an appealing moral symbol in a modern community: (*a*) the clear formulation of an ideal which the masses of men understand and esteem; (*b*) the creation of an appropriate visible or audible pattern to stand for this ideal; and (*c*) winning the allegiance of human hearts to the values for which the symbol stands.

During a sojourn in a Buddhist temple on Koyasan in Japan, I was told that a brass ceremonial water cup symbolized benevolence because, just as water seeks its own level, so the good man shares whatever goods he has with his neighbors until they enjoy as much as he

[13] DM, p. 28.
[14] DM, p. 28.

has. A cup for drinking water might be designed to stand for brotherhood among all races, colors, and creeds because water, like light and bread, is linked with the most urgent daily needs of all men. A hemispherical bowl might suggest the earth, and other structural elements could signify some of the most universal values in the faiths of the world. The stem might be a conventionalized lotus bud (purity, wisdom), the supporting base a cross (service, fortitude), and a bowl decoration an encircling crescent band (monotheistic religion). All of the rich imagery derived from water in the scriptures and poetry of the world would re-inforce the basic ideas for which such a cup would stand. The development and dissemination of a great symbol in the world community is a complicated cooperative product to which many kinds of persons must bring their aid: religious prophet, philosopher, artist, statesman, and social architect.

6. *Three Varieties of Abstract Artistic Mediums*

Our author points out that modern man is experiencing an increasing range of universal values and of significant emotional variations. For the establishment, dissemination, and perpetuation of these values new symbols need to be invented. Naturalistic forms for expressing one of these values may be difficult or impossible; conventionalized anthropomorphic symbols may be lacking; and perhaps no exact word exists for the sentiment. While poetry offers tremendous possibilities for expressing universal values in the patterning of known words, this art falls outside of the nonfigurative arts we are here considering. Further, even the most widely spoken existing languages are foreign to more than four-fifths of the world's peoples. Yet the adoption by all countries and schools of the world of a common written or literary symbolism is a primary and compelling condition for building a peaceful world order. Although about three hundred twenty five universal languages have been proposed, the wonderful Interlingua seems to be the finest of all. It is the product of many years of research by a large international group of scholars under the sponsorship of the International Auxiliary Language Association of New York City.

For the artistic expression of universal values and moods, three non-literary mediums offer endless possibilities of new rhythmic forms: nonfigurative or abstract painting, lumia, and music. The abstract forms of modern science and technology have impelled many artists to try purely geometrical patterns of expression. Multitudes of artists in recent years have experimented with more or less abstract or non-representational constructions. Many resolutely believe that such art forms have the greatest promise of effectively expressing the univeral values of modern mankind. Our author seems to share in this view. He declares, "In contemporary abstract and non-figurative art, freed from the limitations of given forms of natural objects, we now notice a profound sense of spatial relationship and contrasted values that carry painting to unfamiliar revelations of proportion and rhythm . . . . According to the British sculptor Henry Moore, there are universal shapes to which everybody is subconsciously conditioned and to which they can respond if their conscious control does not shut

them off."[15] "The constructivists have elicited the rhythm and intrinsic qualities of shapes and objects of the mechanical world that mould machines into men."[16]

Up to the present time, however, the percentage of nonrepresentative creations other than architecture which succeed in communicating significant universal values to the ordinary man is exceedingly small. Few persons have access to the best works of this kind, and too many of these works present a private symbolism which is known only to the artist himself, and perhaps not even to him.

Lumia, the silent art of light, the art of mobile color or "color music," likewise is not yet accessible to the masses of men. It has the promise, however, of becoming one of the major arts of the future because it has its own direct, independent, self-sufficient, impressive, and endless medium; namely, light with all of its included colors. Lumia compositions are produced on an instrument called the clavilux, which is a complicated assembly of lenses, motors, levers, and other parts, operated from a console. On this instrument the creative artist moulds white light into form, color, and motion on a projection screen. This flat white screen becomes a window opening into infinite space in which structural or nebulous forms endlessly interweave, contract and expand. The effect resembles a nonfigurative painting that springs into dancing motion, or a musical composition that is silenced as it dissolves into color symphonies. Thomas Wilfred of West Nyack, New York, has been for many years tirelessly carrying on constructive experiments on this great but little-known art. Professor William Ernest Hocking of Harvard University wrote as follows after witnessing an amateur lumia performance in my home: "I shall never forget that initiation into the marvels of color-and-shape play in that new projection-apparatus, and all the speculations it gives rise to about the human mind—either in its efforts to find points of rest in a pure flux or in its resignation of effort and acceptance of complete detachment from purposeful action."

At the present time music is the only abstract art of universal emotional appeal, the only operating international language in the world. It possesses, therefore, unique potentialities for building the living bonds of brotherhood among all men. "Music is the culmination of the arts,"[17] declares our author, but space forbids elaboration. He presents detailed reasons why "music can express and suggest the deepest, subtlest and unutterable human feelings and moods."[18] Music at once portrays the endless fluxes of nature's rhythms and transports the mind into a transcendental untroubled realm of universalized emotions and meanings. "Music is the only adequate, final and impeccable utterance of mortal man's emotion of Being, of his unutterable ecstasy of concord of Being and Becoming.[19]"

The development of the three preceding forms of purely nonfigurative arts requires special opportunities and long training which

[15] SFA, p. 64.
[16] SFA, p. 69.
[17] SFA, p. 328
[18] SFA, p. 332.
[19] SFA, p. 333.

the masses of man cannot realize for a long time to come with the exception of certain popular aspects of music. Music may increasingly become the universal language of mankind, even while a universal auxiliary literary language is being established. Social architects, statesmen, and philosophers are under strong obligation immensely to expand their effective concern for creating powerful music which will express and stir universal human values and thus contribute to building the peaceful world community. Our age needs a new kind of creative musician who possesses, besides his professional expertness, something of the skills of the poet and the statesman.

Music and the other arts, as Plato and Confucius long ago proved, need a significant, integral, practical place in social planning, and every government should have a well supported department of fine arts. The inclusion of a secretary of fine arts in a government cabinet is no new idea: in the oldest of the Chinese classics, the *Book of History,* we read that one of the primary duties of the ideal emperor is to appoint a director of music and poetry for the purpose of teaching the people the highest virtues.

7. *The Perennial Expressiveness of the Human Body*

The multitudes of mankind who have no opportunity to practise or enjoy the pure abstract arts and who do not possess telepathic power to transmit meanings without sensory media, must continue to communicate through that physical instrument which is evidently the most expressive of all known material entities; namely, the human body. The idealized human form possesses perennial symbolic power. There is no prospect that there ever can be an adequate substitute on this planet for the marvellous human organism as a medium of effective artistic expression and as a vehicle for the communication of values from person to person. Artists will, of course, utilize for special purposes simplification, abstraction and other modifications of the human figure. Our author declares, "The most potent social symbols of communion are in fact represented by images of 'charismatic,' mythical and ideal personality types, which are the foci of values, sentiments and attitudes and are supremely prized by society and which mould the motivations and behavior of men."[20] But why dwell on the utterly obvious importance of the human body for artistic communication? Because a multitude of promoters of nonfigurative art exist who either neglect or condemn anthropomorphic forms in art.

There are good reasons why anthropomorphic forms have prevailed in the past for the artistic, functional expression of ethical and religious ideals. (*a*) The human self, a union of mind and body, is the center and condition of all values that men know on this planet. Our author affirms, "The social and biological value of art rests on the symbols or ideal transfigurations of human relations . . . . . that art gives."[21]

(*b*) Each of us knows intuitively the bodily activities which for

[20] DM, p. 478.
[21] SFA, Introduction, p. xviii.

us express certain values or ideas. The human body, with its wide variety of possible gestures and other movements, is the most expressive artistic instrument known to us.

(*c*) If value symbols are to appeal to us, they must be expressed in patterns which can be brought, sooner or later, into the apprehending range of our selfic experience. If they are not already familiar to us, we must expand our experience, we must acquire new familiars. But a host of bodily behaviors are familiar to us as revealing certain inner motives or values. A notable modification of the human figure in Indian sculpture is the idealized human being with many arms which is designed to suggest the omnipresent dynamism of the Supreme Mind. Our author writes, "Since the Deity is not a human individual but the embodiment of the supernatural or metaphysical abstraction, there is often a striking departure from the human form or symmetry in the multiplication of heads, hands and feet so as to suit the cosmic vision. Thus . . . . . realism becomes in sculpture the vehicle of the cosmic and the transcendental."[22] Again he says, "The idea of God, as the Supreme Person, whether as the Eternal Lover or the Beloved, the Universal Father, Madonna, Friend or Master, is the outcome of the universalising of man's actual intimate loves, tenderness and loyalties in the family and kindred."[23]

(*d*) Since the dance is the most highly expressive of all bodily movements, it is likely to provide in all civilizations the most effective symbols for spiritual conceptions, with the exception of poetic symbols. Thus our author declares, "The dance is very certainly the quintessence of the eternal and universal meaning of motion and rest in the universe."[24]

(*e*) The history of religious symbolism provides an abundant and extending evidence of the power of the idealized human figure to communicate and perpetuate the great ideals of the good life.

We must, therefore, repudiate the hypothesis of those artists who ridicule anthropomorphic art, because that hypothesis involves a dreadful impoverishment of artistic creations in respect to human values. Just as an idea or concept, while it must exist in some particular mind, is nevertheless universal in its meaning, so a work of art can be both personal or selfic in its forms and yet universal in its meaning. The artists of India have employed the human form with utmost seriousness and effectiveness, as a means of expressing their great conceptions, not only because of its expressive power but also because of their philosophical conception of the divinity of man, of the identity between the human self and the Divine Atman.

The two arts which especially exploit the human form are the dance and sculpture. The dance can reveal the ceaseless activity of the immanent Cosmic Spirit while sculpture catches and preserves for centuries the crucial instants of that activity. Yet the dance is too transitory for the Eternal and sculpture by itself is too static for the dynamic Creator. Hence, the perfect and consummate expression of the Cosmic Mind is the *Dancing Siva* in sculptured pattern. In

[22] SFA, p. 193.
[23] SSV, p. 112.
[24] SFA, p. 346.

this supreme creation of Indian art the sculptured form forever expresses the idea of the ceaseless indwelling activation of Brahman. Our author regards the archetype of Dancing Siva as the most brilliant sculptural expression of ever changing Reality. "In Indian iconography the entire cosmic pageant of rhythmic creation and destruction . . . . . is epitomised by the divine dance images that translate eternal movement in the universe, whether represented by the larger, more pervasive rhythms of the phenomena of nature or the lesser pulsations of human moods and sentiments. The palpitating patterns of human figures thus incarnate in unsurpassed fashion the physical, biological and metaphysical rhythms with their profound spiritual meanings and values for man."[25]

The power of anthropomorphic symbols to win love and devotion of multitudes is readily demonstrated at length in the profound and sustained historical effects of such artistic images as the Buddha seated in meditation, the Bodhisattva contemplating and relieving human miseries, the incomparable and colossal *Trimurti* of the Elephanta Caves, the Madonna in endless variety, Christ crucified and the master Christ. "The luminous beauty of Buddha, Bodhisattva, Vishnu and Siva is in subtle unison with the supernatural aims of the body as the receptacle of the soul. The serenity, majesty and poise of these gods in Indian sculpture represent the apotheosis of man's beauty."[26]

The author points out how religious history, popular tales, myths, legends, children's and fairy stories provide images which "may embody the perfections of individual personality of different categories, such as the hero, the saint and the genius." These provide the basis for the projection of multitudes of "religious and ethical values."[27] Our author emphasizes with stirring eloquence the perennial civilizing influence of the two greatest Oriental archetypes, of two personalities idealized in Hindu and Buddhist art, the Great Yogi in meditation and Buddha attaining enlightenment.

"No one in the modern age," he asserts, "needs to be a Buddhist, a Hindu or a pessimist in his outlook on life to recognise the beauty of the icons of Buddha and Siva, embodying a profound stillness of the human spirit that has conquered all struggles and passions."[28] "The Mahayana image of the Bodhisattva with his serene and compassionate face, bending down with the gesture of infinite pity and sacrifice for suffering fellow creatures, keeps alive among the masses in Asia the ideals of non-violence, goodwill and selfforgetting service."[29]

But always in Oriental cosmic art it is not the exactness of natural likeness but the expressive power of the human form which is the artist's central concern. In the man-derived symbols of deity, our author declares "the abstract, formal or geometrical quality transcends the naturalistic, for the copying of nature is the real enemy of

[25] SFA, p. 346.
[26] SFA, pp. 188-189.
[27] SSV, p. 316.
[28] SFA, p. 4.
[29] SFA, p. 176.

symbolism."[30] "Supernaturalism rather than anthropomorphism, symbolism rather than naturalism represent the keynotes of artistic representation of the deity in the East."[31] When a devotee contemplates the image of his master or deity, its historical likeness is utterly foreign to his consciousness; rather, he aspires to realise within himself the divine virtues exemplified in the image. Thus "In Asia human emotions and social feelings were fashioned and moulded in supernatural cast, expressed in a transcendental context from which the social feelings derive their profoundest significance. Thus the archetypes and symbols are at once metaphysical and ethical in their content, adapted at once to the intellect of the elite, and the feelings and aspirations of the common people."[32]

8. *The Link that Unifies Nature, Man, Art and God is Rhythm*

In his amazing book, *The Social Function of Art,* Radhakamal Mukerjee unfolds in versatile eloquence the thesis that beauty in nature and art expresses rhythmic "metaphysical relations between Being and Becoming."[33] He affirms, "Throughout the Orient the conviction has indeed been fundamental through the epochs that art is a revelation of pulsation of the immanent metaphysical reality in natural forms, and thus the dominant note has been not the imitation of nature but the expression of rhythms that embody this reality."[34] "In the metaphysical harmonies of Being and Becoming which man realises also as cosmic rhythms of matter and motion, life and mind, we have in the ultimate analysis the genesis of art. Thus great art is religious; the fine arts are divine."[35] "Psychological theories of art fail here. We are here in the realm of metaphysics, which alone can give us the clue to the essence of Beauty and the art process."[36]

Now the ubiquitous and mighty principle that unifies nature, man, art and God is rhythm. Rhythm, the most indispensable mark of fine art, is also the governing order of all other phases of reality.[37] Since it is the mode of expression which characterizes the cosmic, it also characterizes human nature and man's creations. In Indian thought rhythm is the synthetic name for the essence of all beautiful forms and processes. "This universe is not a mere mechanism," says C. Jinarajadasa, "but a Rhythmic Life which is revealing the soul of the good and the heart of beauty."[38]

Man's simpler experiences of rhythm consist of such alternations as muscular movement, breathing and heart beat, bilateral bodily behavior, anabolism and katabolism, hunger and satiety, waking and sleeping, male and female, birth and death, love and hate, and other varied emotional antitheses. Economic and social rhythms also profoundly affect human life: toil and relaxation, buying and selling,

[30] SFA, p. 192.
[31] SFA, p. 202.
[32] SFA, p. 137.
[33] SFA, p. 149
[34] SFA, pp. 132-33.
[35] SFA, p. 134.
[36] SFA, p. 121.
[37] SFA, p. 125f.
[38] *Art as Will and Idea,* Adyar, 1927, p. 90.

income and outgo, frustration and fulfilment, war and festival. "As his consciousness deepens and widens, his sense of rhythm embraces deeper levels of his being."[39] "Man's integrations or equilibrium with the environment are thus rhythms, rhythms of need and satisfaction in the biological level, rhythms of resistance and mastery in the psychological and social level, rhythms of achievement and withdrawal in the metaphysical level. From level to level the resolutions of tension or rhythms give a delight that increases in depth, range and intensity."[39] "Wherever man encounters rhythms and harmonies, he is in fact transported to a strange world of rest and silence; he finds Being."[40]

"It is the larger rhythms of nature that predetermine rhythm as the significant form in all the fine arts of man. . . . Such forms and rhythms may be called 'sensuous universals' because of their appeal to men of all races and regions. [They are] rooted in the basic character of man as the living creature."[41] "All art, then, originates in the ultimate analysis in the physical and metaphysical rhythm that alone can explain those patterns of colour, significant forms and melodious rhythms from which the mind derives profound delight without asking why."[42] "The basic rhythms that underlie the scheme of the universe and constitute the substance of reality are expressed in the fine arts by the polarity or opposition of their fundamental sensory materials, light, shadow and colour in painting, mass and emptiness in sculpture, tension and ethereality in architecture, repetition and novelty of sounds in music."[43]

"Man's highest freedom, deepest poise, and fullest experience are recorded and celebrated by rhythms in his poetry, painting, sculpture and architecture, music and dance."[44] The author emphasises in Chapter XV the extraordinary power and fitness of music and the dance to express and communicate cosmic rhythms and to reveal the depths of being.

"The function of art is to bridge the gulf between the Being and the Becoming by imitating the rhythm of the soul that in its most intense moments identifies itself with the world around."[45] "Man's profound joys are stirred by the metaphysical rhythms when his soul overcomes all kinds of contrasts of lack and fullness, of opposition and achievement, of concreteness and universality."[46] These profound joys presuppose a self which abides through the stream of consciousness, which is endowed with capacities for endless delights, and which preserves its unity amid countless and multifarious interactions with the rest of the universe. Great works of art continue to be incomparable instigations to self-realization because the human

[39] Chapter VI. The Function of Rhythm in Man and Art; especially pp. 123, 125.
[40] SFA, p. 126.
[41] SFA, p. 118.
[42] SFA, pp. 130-131.
[43] SFA, p. 133.
[44] SFA, p. 126.
[45] SFA, pp. 122-23.
[46] SFA,p. 125.

self and beautiful things are alike expressions of the cosmic rhythms which forever manifest the Primordial and Universal Spirit. "The rhythm or concord of Being and Becoming is the summit of artistic and mystical experience."[47] Beauty is rooted in cosmic rhythms and a beauty-loving God.

9. *The Necessity of Art in the Perfecting of Man and the World Community*

After assimilating the theme of Mukerjee's metaphysics of art, one would feel astonishment and profound pain toward any suggestion that art is a luxury, appendage, or surplusage of life, a veneer, frillery, or escape. On the contrary, it has become evident that the enjoyment of great art is necessary to possess reality, especially in its dynamic, value, and selfic aspects—and what other aspects are there? As man embraces through aesthetic experiences more and more levels and variations of reality, he awakens to himself, expands his native potentialities, becomes more fully man, because his own nature is an image and fruit of cosmic rhythms and Spirit. The author develops with massive detail the efficacy of the arts in promoting man's peaceful and happy adjustment in multifarious social relations. "True art is the autobiography of society,"[48] he observes.

Hindu psychologists, unlike Western psychologists, are fairly agreed on what master urge dominates human behavior: "The real motive behind man's activities . . . is the search after abiding bliss" through union with the Divine, asserts Swami Akhilananda.[49] We advance such a union by realizing the divine potentialities in our nature. Our author declares, "Man's life gains in fullness, richness and zest to the extent that well-defined, integrated and harmonious myths, symbols, models, signs and figures, human and trans-human, dominate his imagination and interpolate with their poetic and transcendent meanings and purposes in his daily orientation of values and goals and routine of conduct.[50]

Men need and enjoy art, therefore, because it fulfills both aspects of their double nature, the earthly and the celestial, the sensuous and the spiritual, for a truly great work of art blends in a unique and wonderful way the concrete and the universal, the personal and the impersonal. In its contemplation we lose all feeling of contrast or opposition between mind and matter. Matter is infused with spirit and spirit enjoys matter as an instrument for the amplification and expansion of its values. As a result the qualities of aesthetic and religious experiences display extensive similarities and few differences. Our author declares, "The realisation of ideal beauty or aesthetic experience cannot be distinguished in Hindu metaphysics from the gnosis of Brahman, the realisation of Being."[51]

If now the preceding account is correct concerning the nature of

[47] SFA, p. 122.
[48] SFA, p. 75.
[49] *Hindu Psychology*, N. Y., 1946, pp. 8, 51-52. Read references in footnote 2 above.
[50] DM, p. 481.
[51] SFA, p. 129.

fine art and of its incomparable power to perpetuate human ideals and to unite peoples through common feelings, then mankind today urgently needs a new kind of engineering statesmanship for mobilising and directing the artistic resources of the world for peace. Consider a negative supposition: Drop out of Christianity the charm of Jesus' sayings, its psalms and ceremonies, Gothic cathedrals and other temples, all its countless paintings, sculptures, and musical creations, and surely Christianity would not have won a third of mankind. It is through the triple appeal of personality, truth and beauty that goodwill has grown in the hearts of Christian men, but without aesthetic support both truth and goodwill become pale, unattractive, and neglected by the multitudes.

In positive terms, we must say that leaders who wish to reach the masses of men must translate their conceptions so far as possible into appealing art forms. Declares Mukerjee, "It is the pattern of myths and symbols which most effectively aid towards perfect Communion and group indentification in religion and the fine arts at the highest level—the level of abstract Commonalty or Community of the earth or cosmos."[52]

And the fine arts in all lands possess common basic principles, such as rhythm and harmony, the appeal of colour, sound, and dance movements, and these may exist without verbal language. Thus the fine arts, expressing human sufferings, aspirations, and values, constitute a natural basis for that unity of spirit, that reciprocal appreciation of human interests, which is the foundation of world peace. A beautiful and fitting place of worship like the Altar of Heaven in Peking belongs to all men; it is an artistic miracle which all religious peoples can appreciate as a perfect setting for worshipping the Supreme.

Our author affirms, "Art reveals not only the perfectibility of man, but also the enduring essence of society that transcends the barriers of class, race or epoch. Art speaks in a tongue that overreaches and silences the discordant notes of economics and politics. It is the authentic language of human community and continuity that refuses to accept any barriers of complete communication between man and man, between culture and culture, over-riding distances of space and time."[53]

Further, science has added powerful new art mediums to the classical seven arts, notably the cinema, radio, television, and lumia, as well as new architectural, sculptural, graphic, and musical materials. And Western scholarship is gradually discovering the immense artistic resources of the Orient as means of realising feelings of world-wide brotherhood. Our author asserts, "The Brahmanical and Buddhist conception of the universal brotherhood of all beings and the continuity of life in man and nature served as an enduring inspiration to artistic effort that sought through the centuries to express the full participation of all beings and things in the cosmic

[52] DM, p. 483.
[53] SFA, Introduction, p. xviii.

life."[54] Thus we are unexpectedly confronted with important new resources and opportunities for spreading ideals of goodwill and peace in the world by artistic means.

I make, therefore, a strong appeal for a new kind of aesthetic statesmanship which will discover, organize, and direct the art resources of our time in the interest of world peace, brotherhood, and unity. In the improved society of the future "the artist will rehabilitate the principle of harmony in all things, in both human nature and in the society in which he lives and moves, and when under extraneous pressure society disturbs or challenges that harmony, the artist will realise and transmit newer harmonies and concords, guiding the multitude with the faith and vision with which he is endowed in greater measure than his fellowmen."[55]

We need a revolution in the training of our leaders, religious and civic, so that they may know as much of the power of art and beauty as of truth and technology. It is probable that in winning men's hearts to practical sentiments of world brotherhood and order, the fine arts will be as strong an influence as any, if not the strongest. But the success of the government director of fine arts and other aesthetic statesmen requires a fundamentally new and basic kind of art education: learning to live by the conviction that artistic symbols are as necessary for good daily living as bread is, and that they are the indispensable uniting bonds in the coming community of world peace.

Our author concludes, "Such a consummation rests obviously on his trained contemplation, his capacity to live and move in a new plane of universal feeling and experience through the medium of moral and metaphysical myths and symbols that dramatise and perpetuate his fulfilment of the supreme values, at once concrete and speculative, unquestioned and poetic. Man's fulfilment of the highest values of knowledge, goodness and beauty—his perfection, can be realised indeed only symbolically, not actually. Yet it is the symbols which give him the certitude of such realisation in everyday life and experience and make the latter an endless adventure, throwing off ever new meanings and values through the mingling of the finite and the infinite, the concrete and the universal."[56]

[54] SFA, p. 27.
[55] SFA, p. 77.
[56] DM, p. 483.

ART AND CIVILIZATION

By HERBERT READ

Sociology and psychology are the typical sciences of our time, but until quite recently both have shown an almost complete neglect of one of the most comprehensive spheres of human activity—art. From the earliest dawn of human civilization, the most complete and accurate evidence of man's social and spiritual development is to be found, not in his political institutions, which are often the imposition of a minority, and not in the incomplete and distorted records of historical events, but in the still visible and still vital work of his hands. Art is a living voice from the past, sometime the only voice, and no history of human evolution can be complete or valid that has not listened to this voice.

It is quite obvious why science should have neglected this evidence. As Professor Mukerjee points out in his *"Social Function of Art,"* it was hardly to be expected that the intellectual or rational approach which has hitherto distinguished science should take into account material which required, for its appreciation, not the intellect, but the sensibility. The intellect can classify art into styles and periods, and relate these to other manifestations of social activity; but the significance of art must be determined by other faculties, which science has been content to ignore.

But these are points which Professor Mukerjee himself makes. My purpose here is to draw attention to the remarkable success with which he has developed this new approach to an understanding of human civilization. He has taken into consideration an unusual amount of material, and from his actual point of view, which is midway between the East and the West, he has been able to give equal weight to the evidence from both hemispheres. This has given him a great advantage over most of our Occidental scholars, who have generally been compelled to make some excuse for ignoring the Oriental evidence. This has been a great limitation, for in certain respects the East has shown a deeper feeling for the function of art in society. From our Western point of view it has shown excesses, the sensible reality of art disappearing under a load of transcendental symbolism; but how inadequately individualistic our Western art must sometimes seem to Eastern eyes. In any case, the truth about art, with a full realization of its social significance, is only to be obtained from the kind of universal oversight which Professor Mukerjee possesses. I have been enormously impressed by his eclecticism, by the completeness of his knowledge, and by the modernity of his outlook. His scope goes all the way from the Upanishads to James Joyce! And the author never loses his way, never leaves the reader confused with a mass of unrelated detail. I

think the secret probably lies in Professor Mukerjee's clear realization of the integrative role of art. Art is the projection, from that spiritual depth which Jung has called the collective unconscious, of a series of viable symbols, infinitely transformed, round which, in which, the emotions and aspirations of mankind find an objective unity. We cannot conceive civilization without these rallying-points, and the path that mankind has followed, through thousands of years, can only be traced from one such point to another. Radhakamal Mukerjee guides us with his illuminating intelligence from stage to stage of this immortal journey.

THE ART OF MYSTICISM

By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING

Philosophy in the Orient has never been a detached speculation: it has been an adjunct of a way of life. The sage utters his Four-fold Truth; but it is to merge at once into an Eight-fold Path. On the other hand, the Path debouches in a state of Salvation which is Enlightenment. It is not always possible to say whether the Enlightenment is the immediate condition of release into beatitude or is itself Salvation. In any case, practice culminates in a higher cognition. While the West sometimes prides itself upon the fact that its metaphysics and theology tend to express themselves in ethical codes and social efforts, these outflows of theory appear for the most part in the guise of corollaries or applications, whereas for the East the speculative truth is the immediate garb or framework for the religiously directed action. And the goal of that action is an experience in which the "good" of action and the "true" of thought are inseparably fused.

We are prone to describe this quest of an immediate experience of the Real as mysticism, and its achievement as mystical experience. Mukerjee's significant book on mysticism, *The Theory and Art of Mysticism,* drives straight to the centre of the spiritual sources of Asia; and he has happily maintained throughout his work the characteristic Oriental union of speculation and practice, of theory and art. He writes of a current of life whose essence he knows. Yet he adds to this primary and indispensable sympathy a threefold objectivity, that of the scholar scientifically trained, that of the reader widely familiar with Western literature of his subject, and that of the sociologist concerned with the bearng of religion upon the health of human institutions.

It is of high importance for the rapidly changing East that a light so adequate should be thrown upon its ancient and perennial sources of strength. In the shock of social upheaval it is these sources that are likely to be discounted and jettisoned on the supposition that a modern society based on technology has no place for them, and on the kindred supposition that they have no interest nor function in such world. It is seldom that our students of society appreciate that principle of alternation in the hygiene of the mind whereby a mystical discipline remains an essential condition of the vigour and value of realistic enterprise, even of scientific fertility. Instinctively, the conservative impulses of Hindu piety, as seen in various plans of education, such as the Rishikuls, the Gurukuls, the schools of the Ramakrishna movement, and various others, have attempted to maintain a liaison between these elements. The instinct is sound: the new social streams will run shallow if they abandon the

ancient springs, on the assumption that economy and its guides are competent to furnish all the vital equipment of a new order. But the validities of these spiritual arts need to be subjected to a deeper and more objective analysis, capable of severely critical separation between irrelevant and essential factors. It is in this direction that Mukerjee's work renders a definite service to the actual situation not alone in India, but throughout the Orient.

And not alone in the Orient. For mysticism is one of the common elements in world religion; and a study which, like this one joins hands with the work of western scholars, Rhys Davids, Poussin, James Woods, Rudolf Otto, J. B. Pratt, von Hugel, ... adds to the self-understanding of the race in its religious experience, and in so far to the moral unity of mankind. Mysticism has aspects which are local; it has other aspects which repel; it is capable of making common cause with our depravities and all manner of subjective conceits. Where it is largely cultivated there will be abundant danger of abuse somewhat in proportion to its promise of power, and there will be those who, with an honest zeal, desire to cleanse the temple by a radical excision. But it is not by impatience that we come to the things which are difficult and rare. We cannot forget that with the true mystic, wherever he is, the local disappears and we are at home in what is universal. And with him also, the body, the physical world, the social order, far from being abandoned, seem lifted into a new level of meaning—their normal meaning, presumably, which we habitually surrender and allow to become hidden. We must recur, unflagging, to the great enterprise of discerning the true mystic.

MYSTICISM AND SOCIETY

By DAYAMOY MITRA

Religious mysticism is still regarded in a doubtful light in the West. The scholars there have weighed it in the balance and found it wanting. They emphasise what they call its 'other-worldly' aspect. The late Victor Branford, a British sociologist of great repute, had begun to think and write on the effects on society of mystical thought. His book on "St. Columba: a study of social inheritance" was one of the earliest ones of its own kind. But excluding such stray writings the idea that mysticism can be an active agency for good, a definite power that can help us in the solution of the problems of life, capable of meeting the requirements of "human nature's daily food" is still regarded as utopian or at least visionary in the extreme. The present writer remembers the remonstrance and disparagement expressed by the late Professor Patrick Geddes when some one tried to make him understand our Eastern point of view of social progress in relation to mysticism. In spite of the fact that the professor was a man of most liberal outlook he characterised philosophy, religion and mysticism in a rather eleemosynary spirit as mere individual problems—to use his own expression, "auto-drama". In this he illustrated only the typical Western outlook in such matters. Catholic Europe in the Middle Ages instituted a dualism of thought in the realm of matter and spirit which modern European speculation in spite of its liberalism has not yet been able to shake off altogether. The idea that that which is a matter of inner growth—ordinarily called 'mystical'—can guide our external activities even in the common spheres of life is being only slowly understood and assimilated by the West. In the East it has a long tradition at its back, and our life as we live it every day is easily and popularly regarded as the shadow of a greater life that is beyond. Apart from any theological conception of heaven, with which it is but remotely associated, there is a living belief that even our material social life with all its institutions and conception of duty, has no significance whatsoever when it is seen detached from the greater life of the Soul, towards which all our aspiration and progress should be mainly directed.

Comte and following him many others, the pioneers of sociological thought in Europe, considered religion to be so much dead lumber, or at least a mere cumbrous relic of the past that clogged the onward march of the wheels of social progress. Mukerjee has very ably refuted the mistakes of such theorists. He has pointed out that at every stage of life, in every form of it there has been a strain of mysticism, however crude and primitive some of its earlier forms may have been—and that it is this which forms the bed-rock of

human society. Even the primitive savage who worships stock or stone does not worship it as such but as something higher in essence, something to which the group-mind of his type of tribal organisation pays reverence as a mysterious power making for social integration and as a helpful medium, therefore, in the organisation of all his thought and activities. Mysticism in its highest aspect is no doubt a matter of individual growth from within but at the same time it is an integrating force helping social growth and social development. This cannot be denied now, after all the able exposition we have in his writings in this particular field.[1] The mystic's eager search for Reality and his attainment of it have a beneficent radiation that is never lost on the society at large. As a matter of fact it is round such personalities only that society in India still revolves and social institutions are shaped and moulded by the light of their intuition. The mendicant Sadhu in the East is not considered as a parasite but a great social asset in spite of the fact that there has been much abuse of religious life here in the past as well as in the present time.

Religious mysticism, therefore, does not necessarily imply exclusiveness or isolation in any form. It has a dynamic quality of its own implying a widening and expansion of the heart that embraces all creatures and all forms of life and incorporates that which is diffused and scattered into one. A broad humanism is, if not always the basis, the apex of such mysticism and its true test. In Mukerjee's own words: "It is a paradox that the most intense state of collective insight and ecstasy comes to man in his isolation and detachment from society that provides the condition of the greatest autonomy and creative freedom of the individual."[2]

The story told of Hanuman (Mahavira) has been aptly quoted by Mukerjee:— "A wretched scavenger in the grip of a loathsome disease, lay in foul filth crying: 'Ah God! God!' Hanuman, flying by, angrily kicked the sufferer on the breast. That night as he shampooed the God's body, he was horrified to find a dreadful wound on the same place. How had it happened? 'You kicked a poor man on the breast,' explained God, 'as he called upon my name, and what you did to the vilest of my children you did to me.' "[3]

Analyzing this story from the point of view of a sociologist the author points out that 'Hanuman might have been a totemic deity worshipped by the aboriginal inhabitants of India, but as the apotheosis of moral purity, energy and self-surrender, as he is described to be by Valmiki and Tulsidas, he is at once a bridge between Aryanism and Dravidian culture, and a symbol of a most ethical type of theistic worship among millions of people in Northern India.' The worship of Sri Ramachandra stresses a great many social virtues which he possessed—virtues that are still regarded in India as the most covetable ones in spite of much of the disintegrating influence

[1] See especially, *The Theory and Art of Mysticism, The Social Structure of Values* and *The Dynamics of Morals.*

[2] *The Social Structure of Values,* p. 144.

[3] *The Theory and Art of Mysticism,* p. 132.

of modern civilization. Sri Ramachandra is not merely worshipped as divinity but as the perfect specimen of humanity.

In the first chapter of his *'Theory and Art of Mysticism'* Mukerjee writes on the 'Forms and Functions of Mysticism.' Here he establishes the normality of religion and provides us with a psycho-physical study of the phenomenon of mysticism. In the chapter on "The Roots of Religion,' he has some very deeply reflective remarks on imagination as the co-ordinator. He distinguishes very clearly between the symbols of religion and art. He writes: "In art the symbols are mere symbols while in religion these are real as well as figurative. Unlike the artist, the religious mystics does not live in the realm of his imagination, he lives in the realm of essence." Here we find a study of the orderly growth of the mind of a mystic. "The mystic's attitude-adjustment," he says, "is the most plastic: neither a set emotion nor an intellectual formula can damage the wholeness and integrity of his experience. His mind responds more freely, more fully, more finely to all possible situations than does the ordinary mind. Hence the supreme place and function of religion in human life; for it is from religion that the ordinary person obtains his modes and patterns of response."

The conviction that gradually grows in one's mind in reading Mukerjee's works is that the speculative thought of the Eastern sages possesses the only key that can change the complexion of what the West regards as mere 'auto-drama' of individual life into the 'cosmo-drama' that comprehends all life. The last war has taught Western humanity not only the many ways how the individual 'under any dispensation' can be moulded by the society in which he lives, but it has also laid bare the fact that if the structure of society is based on wrong insistences and wrong emphases the whole of the social outlook will go out of focus and lead to perversions of the totalitarian type. The question therefore reduces itself to knowing what the right kind of individualism can do for society. In his powerfully written chapter on the social mechanisms of revaluation in *"The Social Structure of Values"* Mukerjee has envisaged the problem in a bold analytical manner. The tables affixed to this chapter are of great value in determining the trend of social norm. The search for true individuality in its highest and best form will prove to be the true evangel of a new human society in which the spiritual personality of man and the collectivity of common-wealth of the universe work together to their consummation. But this means a return to the pursuit of an ancient secret, the exact nature of which has also been presented in an excellent philosophical manner in the last chapter of his latest volume, *'The Dynamics of Morals'*. The ideal of the 'Visvatman' or 'Homo Universus' is the apex of this realisation. In its essence mystical, it comprehends society and the individual alike. The only destiny of the individual is service of humanity. To lead and determine scientifically the progress of society in the creation of individuals of the right type social and sensitive the new friars', who, according to the late Patrick Geddes are the 'sociological Friars' of our day—but they will surely miss their vocation if they cut out from it the spirit and vision of the friars that used to be. In thus

welding together the true genius of the East and West alike in sociological studies lies the most original contribution of Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee.

We cannot but mention one great merit of his '*Theory and Art of Mysticism*'. It is written in a charming literary style. This makes the book to be of absorbing interest even to a lay-reader. There is many a scattered passage in it where the balanced clauses, the gracefulness, the lyric charm and suavity of expressions employed make one feel that these can vie in their feeling-tone with the best emotional writers in modern literature. Here is one: "For the ignorant God is fetish, image or ritual; for the wise God is mysterious and bears a thousand names. For the child God is a playmate; for the youth God is the sweet coy maiden of love and beauty. For the worldly God is the consecration of the flesh, and the art and ritual of the satisfaction of desires. For the leaders of men, God is the supreme embodiment of renunciation and self-sacrifice. For the aged God is the All and the Alone.

"God's body is made up of man's deepest and most fervent desires and aspirations. In the depth of passion, in the serenity of knowledge, in the tensest moments of activity God is with man. And when passion is frustrated, and activity is baffled by cruel fate and death and man finds himself a castaway on the sands of time, he still worships God as the All-Good. When his knowledge quails before the thought that this universe, the scene of his many triumphs and sufferings, must share the inevitable extinction of the solar system, God is still the All-true. God is the eternal dancer in all-engulfing Space and Time. Life and Death, Creation and Destruction are rhythmically pulsating patterns in His ever-supple, ever-flowing dance. Whilst He sweeps majestically over dark unfathomable space, a thousand worlds and beings spring up like lotuses and God lingers amongst them in a kiss and His kiss is the hope and beauty of creation. When He swiftly turns back in the grandeur of sheer aimlessness a thousand worlds and beings return after their little day to His all-devouring mouth and God is left alone and unpartnered. Then there is neither universe nor man, and God neither feels, nor thinks, nor dreams."

It is quite possible that passages like these may seem to be conundrums to some matter-of-fact intellects but read in their context these will unfold a depth of thought and vision which even physical science cannot now altogether ignore. Professor William Ernest Hocking of the Harvard University rightly observes in his highly appreciative foreword to the "*Theory and Art of Mysticism*". "It is of high importance for the rapidly changing East that a light so adequate should be thrown upon its ancient and perennial sources of strength." Mukerjee speaks in these books not only as an eminent scholar in his own rights as a sociologist but also as a psychologist of great insight into the minute working of the mystical mind and its relations with the world of sense bound reality. Western scholars like James, Rudolf Otto, J. B. Pratt and Von Hugel have studied such problems from their own angles of vision. Mukerjee's substantial contributions in the field not only bridge the gulf between

the intellectual outlook on mysticism among Western and Eastern scholars but also serve towards inter-cultural understanding and appreciation and the rediscovery of a world faith, universal in its appeal, and sensitive to the modern demands alike of human equality and infinite worth of the individual. Only a syncretic world faith can successfully combat the sterile secularism and humanism of the present epoch.

MYSTICISM IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

By JAIDEVA SINGH

Introductory

Radhakamal Mukerjee is a rare combination of a mystic and a scientific sociologist. In his various works on sociology, he has laid under contribution the most up-to-date researches of anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists, but he feels that we cannot get a complete view of social philosophy till we take into account the spiritual nature of man as revealed by *yoga* and the mystics of various countries. In this brief paper, we can study only some of his important contributions towards a reorientation of social philosophy.

The Individual and Society

The relationship of the individual to society is unique. A society without individuals is an abstraction; equally so is an individual without a society. Even a Robinson Crusoe required a Friday. Society consists in the mental relationships of individuals. A bare and lone individual in only a figment of imagination. As a matter of fact, an individual has a bi-polar existence; he is not a mere individual, but a *socius*. Social institutions like the family, language, church, state etc. are the various media through which his personality develops, and through which he comes to be what he is. The individual gradually learns 'to transfer his value-situation and experience, connected with the existence of "alter-egos" into his own "self". "His relation to the alter-ego becomes at the same time a relation within the self. The group, interest-association, society or commonalty represents the more or less complete fusion of the selves and this establishes itself in each self, where indeed society is felt and lived, where society is always present".[1]

This does not mean, however, that the individual does not count, and is lost in the mass. As Mukerjee puts it, the human personality is at once unique and social. "It is in and through his uniqueness and freedom that the human person can, and should contribute his best to society. Society, ideally speaking, is communion of human persons; while values give it its true meaning, worth and purpose. In so far as it is a communicating, conserving and transmitting medium of the values of life, it has its own claims on the individual; but such claims proceed only from those values which the human person alone has the power to create and to achieve, and should not invade the self-determining and unique part of personal consciousness and experience that is the basis of all valuation".[2]

[1] *The Dynamics of Morals*, p. 160.
[2] *The Dynamics of Morals*, p. 402.

From the point of view of the mystics of all ages, the ideal self is alone the real Self, and the real Self is social or universal in its very nature. The more does an individual realize his real Self, the more truly is he a person. The world is not a cruel joke. It is only in and through society that the main characteristics of a human personality are developed. Society is the training ground of the spirit. Mukerjee has rightly said, "More than *quid pro quo,* more than equity and justice, communion and sharing mark the deepening and moralising of the social processes, and represent the patterns of the truly social community. The social life, truly understood, is a life shared and *solidare.* Such sharing can easily transcend the bonds of classes, states and races, and embody the process of evolution of interest-group and society to abstract Commonalty, which also implies the ascent of the human person from the superficial, egoistic and evanescent self to the deep, altruistic, and universal self. Such is the law of both personality development and of social living."[3]

Mystical consciousness alone gives the rationale of a complete social philosophy. "Love thy neighbour as thyself", says the commandment. "Love thy neighbour as thyself, because in essence thou art thy neighbour", declare the mystics. Mukerjee says very rightly, "Starting with the practice of self-hypnosis and removal of all sources of inner conflict, the mystic integrates all the forces of the mind into a unity and reconciles himself with the community, and with the totality of experience as a spiritual system".[4] Since the mystic is a truly integrated personality, he understands the significance of life in society and inspires it with a new meaning, a higher value. "In the religious person, social values reincarnate themselves; in him the conflict of social ideals is completely resolved. It is he who leads society towards that full harmony and perfect concord which he obtains from his experience of God".[5]

Mukerjee draws the pointed attention of thinkers to the importance of mysticism in the reconstruction of a social philosophy in the following words:

"The relation between mysticism and social values is, therefore, a vital subject of social thinking, especially in an age when the process of valuation is still chaotic..... When the consciousness of the social sciences is fully impregnated with the consciousness of the highest values, the differences between the mechanical and the ideal, between the evolutionary and the spiritual, may be composed. No adequate and comprehensive theory of social progress, which it is the task of social philosophy to envisage, can afford to neglect the considerations of religion; and sociology, which regards all phenomena of human society as its province, should no longer relegate to the philosophy of religion alone the task of attempting a comprehensive formulation of the goal of man's collective effort and aspiration."[6]

[3] *The Dynamics of Morals,* pp. 407-408.
[4] *Theory and Art of Mysticism,* p. 3.
[5] *Theory and Art of Mysticism,* p. 3.
[6] Ibid, p. 8.

Value-formation and Mysticism

Value is being recognized more and more as the *primum mobile* in the social universe, the bond of all human relations. Values determine the behaviour of individuals and groups. Society has two aspects—visible and invisible. The patterns of social behaviour and institutions are the visible aspects of society. Values and ideals form the invisible aspects of society, but it is these that inspire and regulate social behaviour. Mukerjee compares the individual to a wick, society to oil and value to flame. It is the flame of the value that sheds light on a dark universe and gives it meaning and purpose. As Mukerjee says, "Between man and society, the floating wick and the deep oil, there is a never-ending give-and-take, producing the bright, steady flame of value experience that eternally radiates light and warmth on our bleak, dreary universe".[7]

All social life or planning is only a translation of some ideal, norm or value. Values and social institutions may be mentally distinguished but cannot be actually separated. A bare 'world of facts', and a bare 'realm of values' are equally abstractions. The sundering of the harmonious whole of life into such water-tight compartments is simply the outcome of an atomistic, mechanistic sociology.

Mukerjee tells us that the supreme values of life are—love, sharing and solidarity. He sums up these qualities under the general head Commonalty. He vigorously controverts the idea of some sociologists that social life is simply the accommodation of conflicting interests by institutional arrangement of laws and procedures. "It is too often forgotten that a higher sociality involves integration rather than accommodation, interpenetration rather than interdependence, equality and solidarity rather than equity and justice, and an appreciation of common meanings and values and of commonness or commonalty as a value in itself rather than a rational weighing of interests and values."[8]

But even Commonalty is not the last word of a value-philosophy. Mysticism points to an environment larger than mere man or society and Commonalty is thus a part of a larger environment into which man may consciously enter. "Social experience, even if it be that of Commonalty or earth-community, cannot be regarded as ultimate. For the personality transcends society. Society itself is an object of moral valuation by the personality who by this means imports spiritual meaning and ultimate value into moral and social experience. The Commonalty of the human species, of which the personality is a functional part, it itself part of a still larger environment that he can hope to understand, appreciate and control only through his religious insight, ecstasy and inspiration".[9] The sense of Commonalty finds its explanation and fulfilment only in a Divine frame of reference. The Divine surrounds us, but we know it not. It is like the air without which we cannot live but which we hardly care to notice.

[7] *The Social Structure of Values*, XVIII.
[8] Ibid, p. 4.
[9] *'The Dynamics of Morals'*, pp. 413-414.

"A mere 'social' or 'moral' meaning attached to the brotherhood of the nations or commonalty of fellow-creatures remains an illicit fancy, so long as it is unleavened by a real and profound affirmation and appreciation of the infinite worth of both self and non-self," which is an introduction of metaphysics into society. The notions of the organic perfectibility of man and of brotherhood of a free and unlimited society—the goals of scientific humanism cannot provide the impulsion of flagging human enthusiasms without these latter being oriented and channelled in an infinite, superhuman, super-social frame of reference".[10]

The Place of Mysticism in the Evolution of Man

It is generally thought that man achieves the highest end of his life by improving his physical and social environment and cultivating social and ethical virtues. Positivism and humanism maintain that the highest object of worship for man is society and service to man is the highest religion. Mukerjee joins issue with the thinkers of these schools. Perfect service to man can be possible only with the elimination of the ego. Service that is rendered without self-denial generally ends in exploitation. The *malaise* of the world may be summed up in one word 'exploitation'—economic, political and that of religious organization. In his 'Perennial Philosophy', Aldous Huxley classifies higher idolatries into three: technological, political, and moral. The devotees of technology believe that society can be salvaged only by the improvement of gadgets. The political idolators believe that mankind can be redeemed only by an improvement of social and economic organizations. But because man believes in nothing beyond the gain of the paltry self, his selfishness wrecks all the planning of the technological and political idolators. The moralist sees a little far ahead and discovers the truth that in malicious hands all the instruments of organization may prove to be only means to evil. Unless the individuals who compose societies and use the machines are morally good, all schemes of reconstruction are bound to fail. But the moralist also becomes an idolator when he treats virtue as an end in itself, and not as a necessary condition of the knowledge and love of the Divine without which virtue itself cannot be made perfect. Mysticism which is the core of all religions can alone arrest the rapid decline of the human race. Mere institutional morality will not help. In his "*Two Sources of Morality and Religion*", Bergson observes beautifully, "The mystic love of humanity is not an extension of any instinct or sympathy, nor does it originate in an idea. It belongs neither to the sensitive nor to the rational. It is implicitly both and effectively much more. For such a love lies at the very root of feeling and reason as of all other things. It is more metaphysical than moral in its essence." And Mukerjee adds, "The recognition that higher morality, like higher religion, is supra-rational and supra-social and that man's obligation is to make himself a detached instrument of the forces of growth inherent in the cosmos is essential for reuniting personal and social ethics as well as

[10] Ibid, p. 428.

axiology and sociology without which the present crisis in moral theory and practice cannot be dealt with successfully."[11]

Humanism alone will not be able to remedy the ills of society. "The fellow-man is too full of defects of character, and society too full of imperfections, injustices and cruelties to elicit man's unbounded love and service. It is the infinitely vast universe or whole, of which all beings, nature and society are inseparable, organic parts, that can be the ultimate source of man's love and sharing, which must in the last resort be grounded on convictions regarding the nature of self, non-self, and the universe or whole. Thus do human allegiances and enthusiasms towards fellow-individuals and society imply and involve initiation into the deeper mystery of the beyond-human and beyond-social".[12]

It is the destiny of man to become a co-worker with God in the evolution of the social ideal. He is not simply driven along helplessly by the tide of evolutionary forces, but by self-denial and surrender to the Divine also contributes to the realisation of the highest value and thus to the fulfilment of the goal of evolution. "It is the prerogative of man to criticise, evaluate, and direct both organic and human evolution; he imports into evolution both control and direction by his own scale of values. Now, man derives values and norms not from the world-stuff nor from the cosmic process, but from within his self and its relation to other selves and to the cosmos. Thus it is metaphysical notions and values that conserve and elevate his dignity in a fathomless universe, and inspire and energize him for his tasks of control of the evolutionary forces and of intellectual and moral adventure in spite of his natural finitude and limited span of life. Metaphysics and religion both import beyond-human meanings into the evolutionary process and encourage mankind to evaluate, order, and direct it as frequently as it suffers defeat at the hands of nature. Such meanings and values make man indeed a creator and a participator in the immortal life, and evolution in the universe no longer holds any terrors for him".[13]

We are men only in the making. The lives of moral heroes, sages and mystics remind us that we have still to climb up the ladder of evolution. Man is not born only to eat, drink, work, beget and die. "Man reaches his highest moral nature when his identity-feeling, joy, and reverence reflect themselves in his relations to the external world through a more sensitive, universalized conscience in terms of complete acceptance, peace, and transcending compassion or love. . . . . His enlarged knowledge and intensified love lead to expanded sharing and service, strengthen his fight against misfortune, disease, ignorance, and poverty—both the handicaps of nature and the defects of his social organization—and, indeed, invest ethics with an indescribable purity and mystery, an overwhelming numinous significance. Widely practised, mysticism is the impulsion of any

[11] *The Dynamics of Morals*, p. 436.

[12] 'The Philosophy of Mysticism' p. 449 (a paper of Dr. Mukerjee incorporated in the *Cultural Heritage of India*).

[13] Ibid, pp. 449-450.

future evolutionary advance of man".[14]

Stages of Mystic Progress

Mysticism is not vague and confused nor enigmatic. It is an immediate awareness of reality. The mystics constantly speak of 'the undemonstrable but irrefragable certainty of God'. The experience may be ineffable but it is a profound sense of reality. "It seems that the essence of the mystical consciousness consists in the intense experience of an ineffable reality."[15]

On the basis of the Bhagavadgītā, Mukerjee speaks of the following stages of the mystic progress: the all-pervasiveness of knowledge or of Self; the sense of equality of life rooted in the pervasiveness of self-knowledge; the life of detached and passionless altruistic devotion and service to all creatures; the realisation of the absolute and the transcendental Divine that is immanent in the self and in all existence, sentient and non-sentient; and, finally, the consecration of life with all its activity as service to the Divine immanent in all creatures, and at the same time the identification of a life of profound silence with the non-dual, undifferentiated, unconditional and peaceful Absolute.[16]

From an invincible faith in the Divine, one slowly develops unitive consciousness when everything becomes suffused with the attributes of God. The sense of egoism, of possessiveness disappears and man sees his good only in the good of all. The slogan of equality and fraternity becomes meaningful only when one lives *sub specie aeternitatis,* and makes no distinction between the high and low, rich and poor. Democracy has not been as great a success as it should be, because we insist only on equality and liberty, and fail to practise fraternity. And yet it is fraternity which is the key-word of democracy. Equality and liberty are not possible without a keen sense of fraternity, and fraternity will remain an idle dream until we have developed an invincible faith in God and a sense of responsibility towards His creatures. "The only heresy", said the great Buddha, "is Sakkāya-diṭṭhi—the sense of separateness". This sense of separateness can be mitigated only by humility, alertness and prayer. Egotism and fraternity cannot go together, and we can get rid of egotism only when we surrender ourselves to God. The unitive consciousness cannot be developed by mere understanding or intellect. Truly has the great mystic Eckhart said, "When is a man in mere understanding? I answer, 'When a man sees one thing separated from another'. And when is a man above mere understanding? That I can tell you: "When a man sees All in all, then a man stands beyond mere understanding."

The Social Values of Mysticism

Mysticism is not an abnormal experience. It is wholly normal and necessary to man. It may begin in some cases in world-flight, but is bound to end in a heightened consciousness in which man

[14] Ibid, p. 457.
[15] *Theory and Art of Mysticism,* p. 192.
[16] 'The Philosophy of Mysticism', p. 451.

sees life apparelled in celestial light, and the world acquires a new significance.

"Mysticism deliberately bases Reality on value, and makes God enter into natural and social experience. Thus mysticism involves a dual movement, first, the development of personality by the integration of the finalities of life and the forces of the universe into a unitary whole, and, second, the descent of these finalities of life into the expansive valleys of human values and practice. In true religious experimentation such as that of the mystic, the two processes are recurrent, forming phases of a profound unity and harmony of experience. The course of the mystic's life, indeed, falls into a normal alternation between what Hocking calls a 'world-flight', in which, by way of his negations, the mystic reaches the absolute real and good and an activism in which he seeks these in human and social intercourse".[17]

In mystic consciousness, life becomes a consecration, work, worship, and the world a *dharma-kṣhetra*—a field for the growth and development of the moral and spiritual life. "The mystic's complete living here becomes an episode in the establishment of permanent condition of union with the Divine in every man, nay, in every sentient being. All human and social experiences thus are seized and transformed into seats of the eternal and the beautiful."[18]

Means to Mystic Consciousness

In his Philosophy of Mysticism, Mukerjee mentions the following means to mystic consciousness:

(1) The way of action with non-attachment grounded on the realisation of the presence of the universal Self or God in every sentient creature (Karma-yoga); (2) the way of metaphysical knowledge or understanding of this unity (Jñāna-yoga); (3) the way of elevated contemplation for direct and intuitive apprehension of this unity (Rāja-yoga); and (4) the way of devotion to and feeling of the immanence of the universal Self or God through prayer and worship (Bhakti-yoga). One may adopt any of these means for the development of mystic consciousness. While the other means may be difficult for many, the way of prayer and worship is open to all. St. François de Sales puts it beautifully: "God did not deprive thee of the operation of His love, but thou didst deprive Him of thy cooperation. God would never have rejected thee, if thou hadst not rejected His love. O all-good God, thou didst not forsake unless forsaken, thou never takest away thy gifts until we take away our hearts". God is always with us, but by our indifference and waywardness we deny Him every moment.

Prayer and conduct are both essential. By our prayer, we gather the necessary inspiration, by our conduct we express it. Truly did Archbishop Temple say, "The right relation between prayer and conduct is not that conduct is supremely important and prayer may help it, but that prayer is supremely important and conduct tests it".

[17] *Theory and Art of Mysticism*, p. 260.
[18] *Theory and Art of Mysticism*, p. 238.

Conclusion

The modern man is suffering from an exaggerated individualism. The insecurity and dread that he experiences are simply the outcome of his extreme ego-consciousness. The outer chaos in the world is only a reflex of an inward bankruptcy. The ills of life cannot be remedied simply by reconstructing the outer organizations of society. Man needs to reconstruct himself. "More than the biological and economic demands of social solidarity, man's reverence for God supplies the true and stable ground and intense zest for the ultimate values of Goodness and Love, rooted as these are in the Divine nature".[19] Again, "the modern problem today is the challenge to man's creativeness by a world-imprisoning standardization with its shibboleth of mechanical as opposed to vital and purposive efficiency. The problems arising from the disintegration of free elastic groups and the lapse of individual initiative and spontaneity in every field of social life can only be met by a modern religious world-view. Indeed, such a view is forced upon all religions in order that the life of the spirit may be saved".[20]

Man will be at peace with others only when he is at peace with himself, only when the conflicts of his ego are dissolved. For this purpose religion or mysticism which is the core of all religions is the best help available to man. "Religion is the expression of normal human impulses and hence cannot be regarded as an affair of a few chosen or gifted individuals. In fact the vital need of human nature which religious objects satisfy, the sanity and equipoise which these import to the individual suffering from psychic conflicts or strains, the consciousness of a transcendent joy or sublimity, and the knowledge of higher values with which all higher religious experiences are associated, all go to show that a man without religion is weak and deficient. He has not developed an effective tool of adaptation, lacking which he suffers in wholesomeness and vitality. Man is much greater than society or nature, and his superiority is shown by the world of values which his philosophy creates and his religion makes dynamic in his heart. Religion, therefore, involves the very summit of man's personality".[21]

It is, of course, not expected that every man will become a full-fledged mystic. What is required is the mystic temper, a spiritual outlook on life. It is this which will bring about a harmonious relationship between man and man.

"Mysticism is the art of finding a harmonious relationship to the whole of Reality which man envisages. Humanly speaking, man seeks to find peace with self and his universe. Mystical intuition establishes a perfect harmony of being and certainty of the universe. It deepens man's sense of order in the self and expands it into the universe. Thus even in intense action, a calm aloofness becomes possible. Mysticism combines a strenuous moral life with a profound peace of mind and a delicate sense of beauty or order. An intel-

[19] *Theory and Art of Mysticism*, XV.
[20] Ibid, p. 247.
[21] Ibid, p. 224.

lectual detachment and aesthetic refinement thus become expressions of the poise and balance which the self derives from the heart of the universe. The gulf between man's intrinsic and instrumental ends disappears, and neither the ordinary routine of individual life nor social effort exhibits any longer contradictory motives facing each other in segregated worlds of experience".[22]

Mysticism is not a pathological condition of the mind, but the proper vocation of man. The hard facts of conflict, disintegration, failure of technology and mechanical means of social organization compel man to turn to something deeper than the mere surface of life can show.

He encounters today misery in the midst of plenty. He faces virtual extinction during war and cold war during peace, and in times of both peace and war suppression of freedom of thought and expression and regimentation of life. Society can be no better than its members. All honour to those thinkers who are drawing the attention of man to the supreme need of his own reconstruction, to a spiritual outlook on life. Mukerjee has pleaded with new insight and integration for a reconstruction of society on a spiritual basis, for a proper place for the mystic temper in life. He deserves the congratulations of all for the re-orientation that he has given to sociology.

[22] *Theory and Art of Mysticism*, p. 260.

THE SOCIAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF VALUE

By HARIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

The primary purpose at the root of value discrimination is joyful living. Whatever furthers that objective becomes good and anything that hinders it becomes evil. Truth is good, and falschood or error is evil; so also is beauty good, and ugliness evil. We seek truth and beauty and shun falschood and ugliness. "Evil, be Thou my good," is a Satanic choice, and it is men like Richard III of England, who because of their ugly bodily features, cannot 'court an amorous looking-glass', that deliberately 'turn a villain' to take vengeance upon society for the unkindness of nature. The negative values—error, ugliness and moral evil—bring us somewhere up against an obstacle and cause a failure of understanding and adjustment. Our system, when properly constituted, feels at ease in the presence of beauty, which in some unascertainable way satisfies the condition of repose by ceasing to pull the mind in unequal degrees in different directions because of the symmetry and rhythm that it possesses. Similarly, truth quells contradiction and brings about an adjustment between the internal and the external, between the differnt elements of cognitive experience, and between the revelations to the mind and the reactions made thereto. Where doubt holds up decision, resistance arrests action, and unpleasantness upsets pre-existent composure, we are forcibly led furiously to think about the conflict in some sphere of consciousness responsible for indecision, inactivity and disagreeable feeling. Good is what brings about coherence and concord, expanded knowledge and extended activity and enriched feeling. Evil is what circumscribes the limits of cognition, affection and conation because of its tendency to contract the personality in the presence of opposing factors. Good alone finds an echo in other minds and is therefore conducive to self-expansion and openness of expression. Evil, conversely, is associated with contraction and secretiveness. Truth is a good because it tends to be universal and is shareable as an attitude to the world of objects, howsoever conceived or constituted. Beauty is a good because it tends to bring about an agreement in enjoyment and, when supplemented by desirability is coveted by all similarly constituted beings. Goodness is valuable because it increases sociality and spirit of cooperation. If truth helps us to live and beauty to enjoy, goodness enables the social instinct to function without constraint. Far down in the animal scale we meet with groups that function more or less as a whole in obedience to the needs of collecting food, rearing progeny, warding off danger and attacking enemies. The beginnings of aggregation in multicellular bodies of colonial existence in plants and animals and of cooperation in symbiosis found

gradual perfection in termites, ants, wasps and bees, in flocks of birds, shoals of fishes and heards of mammals loosely organised, until finally the rearing of the young demanded prolonged association of parents, and the evolution of a rudimentary social organisation for protection of the young, safety of the group and cooperative procurement of food did not lag far behind. As an inheritor of these biological traditions man possesses all these features but he has added to them new associations and made them the objects of conscious pursuit through a sense of their value. The development of intelligence has enabled him to compare means of adjustment to things and other men, to look before and after, to postpone reaction to situations by a process of self-control, and to extend the field of activity so as to embrace distant and future societies. Dissociation between representation and action, distinction between the immediate and the remote in space and time, importation of transcendental factors such as God and future life into empirical life and recognition of common urges and interests among all men have infinitely expanded his horizon. He dares, now, with his expanded vision, to be the spectator of all times and places and, with his diversified interests, to join selective groups in furtherance of common aims and ideals and to evolve a scale of social values. Improved and intelligent modes of communication have made possible the development of a socially acceptable standard of morality that ensures peaceful cooperation in furtherance of the interests of corporate life.

With great learning and much concentrated thought Dr. Radhakamal Mukerjee has marshalled in his two books, *The Social Structure of Values* and the *Dynamics of Morals* materials culled from wide fields of study into an integrated system of morals, bringing out forcibly and clearly the interrelations of the individual, the group and the social institutions in which traditions incorporate and conserve themselves. The complicated social structure that has to function in the interest of political and economic stability and justice, of moral harmony and progress and of freedom and equality in self-expression and thereby to advance culture, promote concord and leave enough leisure for developing and expressing the finer sides of life in literature and artistic production, has been so ably analysed that a reference to them is enough to show the protean from that the moral sense of mankind has to assume to adjust itself to the growing consciousness of human solidarity that the distinctions of race, sex, culture and creed are apt to hide. Once it is recognised that moral progress is not orthogenetic but depends upon the active endeavour of men themselves, the responsibility of directing and quickening it falls upon mankind itself. Even if it be true that in a universe indifferent or hostile to the evolution and conservation of values human effort in the direction of creation of values will ultimately fail of its purpose, Mukerjee scents no danger in human initiation but rather fears that inhibitions and repressions will tend to breed by way of reaction an aggressive attitude towards established institutions and an anti-social tendency which is inimical to mutual understanding, peace and progress. With his dynamic life

man ever presses forward towards higher goals, and values emerge as a result of man's strivings towards establishing a state of society in which maximum freedom compatible with utmost social accord can express itself to establish a social organisation that touches human life at all points and yet leaves scope for effecting improvement to the wise and the good, who discover the necessity of further social progress in keeping with the needs of higher life as disclosed by their refined insight and developed conscience.

Basing man's moral attitudes and obligations on the degree of cohesion and unitive feeling represented by four ideal types of group life and relations, Dr. Mukerjee has given an elaborate and fascinating account of the formation, function and interrelation of Crowd, Interest-group, Society or Community and abstract Commonalty which show in a progressive manner the manifestation of the social instinct and the evolution of social bonds that alone ensures social integration and stability, enlightened social intercourse for general and specific purposes and social acceptance of common goals. Such progress leads to the establishment of common traditions, of uniform moral standards and ultimately of international understanding, amity and benevolence and of active effort to remove suffering, ignorance and want and accept a common humanity underlying the diversity of races, cultures and habitations based on the discovery of universal values. This broad march fulfils rather than denies the variety and richness of the individual. Contributions, as those of mystics, moralists and reformers, in different cultures, enrich and order the evolution of the dynamic equilibrium called moral progress and march of civilisation which depends upon a right orientation of genetic values of life and their mutual interpenetration. From the casual and momentary fusion of interests and loss of personal responsibility as exhibited in the Crowd men pass on to a feeling of responsive cooperation and reciprocity in Interest-groups, private and public, and pass on to a sense of equity and justice in Society and ultimately reach out to the ideals of love, equality and solidarity in Commonalty, creating in course of their spiritual journey codes of honour, appropriate to each type of grouping, that replace the sense of compulsion and restraint and usher in that sharing of weal and woe which is expressed in the triple forms of 'each for all', 'all for each' and 'all with all'. To the above groups must be added, as Mukerjee points out, the primary groups into which a man is born—the most familiar of these being the family, the clan, the caste, the kindred, the neighbourhood and the small rural community which serve as so many concentric circles that expand into larger circles of social or communal life with greater knowledge and larger contract. These provide the primary training ground for the abiding virtues of devotion, love, justice, fidelity and sacrifice. From these emancipation can be achieved with considerable effort because of the deep impressions produced in the innermost depths of the individual in the most susceptible period of his life. The introduction of flexibility in the social structure, the new alignment of statuses and the admission of new values are difficult processes as innate conservativeness, inability or unwillingness to face risks of social disapproval or oppression and lack of ideas, drive or moral courage all cons-

pire to keep intact ancient social stratifications with their attendant duties and privileges, through tacit general assent. Repression and frustration due to such social hierarchy, when reinforced by the growth of education and moral sense, inevitably lead to social revolution if the cause of social tension is not lessened in proper time and the progressive integration of the biological, social and ideal values, that ensures comfortable living, sharing of social privileges and opportunities of self-expression, is not achieved. Thus, as Mukerjee points out, between an individual's conscience and moral sensibility and group values and institutional norms there is constant interpenetration in the total pattern of culture, the ultimate objective being the establishment of "a universalist morality, appropriate for world security, co-operation and citizenship," achieving ever-improved individual and group adaptations through a sense of solidarity and oneness that characterises every mystical thought. It is in Love alone that this sense of equality and identity finds practical expression; this must therefore represent the highest moral value for man, and its dynamic character is revealed by the readiness to serve all without motive of getting benefit in return.

Mukerjee has well brought out the complicated nature of the interaction of social and individual values, which results in a moving equilibrium of social forces swayed on the one side by the conscious pursuit of higher levels of culture and ethical standards and on the other by the tendency to relax effort and to follow uncritically existing social traditions, conventions and manners. The mimetic impulse follows the line of least resistance and establishes identification with the group at a lower level, sharing in its joys and sorrows, enjoying its rustic art and simple amusement, and shirking the isolation of independent thought and rebellious conduct. It is reserved for pioneers of higher culture, nobler conduct and more intimate and enlightened association to inject more and more reason into collective thought and action, and to evolve symbols of a significant type in keeping with the deliberate intention of establishing social solidarity through common loyalty to ideals consciously conceived. Individual expansion and social arrest work somewhat antagonistically to each other, but their conjoint operation saves a community from the scylla of individualism and the charybdis of mass-society or totalitarianism, and helps in the evolution of personalism in which the uniqueness of the individual is reconciled with its acceptance of society as "a communicating, conserving and transmitting medium of the values of life."

It is not our object to summarise the massive materials that Mukerjee has brought together to re-inforce his major conclusions. But his earnestness in preaching the gospel of the Universal Man with his precept and practice of all-embracing love and service is inspiring and almost contagious. We are more interested in the philosophic basis of this standpoint and in its psychological foundation, for, like Hartmann, Mukerjee is not satisfied with the mere sensing of values but thinks that a knowledge of their content, order, system and unity is essential for a proper guidance of social life and pursuit of ideals.

Man's innate gregariousness has been responsible for evolving social order ruled by prohibitions and promptings, by reciprocity,

justice and love. It has set the norm for morality through the necessity of social understanding and mutual adjustment. *A modus vivendi,* a policy of live and let live, is evolved only when certain broad and fundamental agreements are reached about common interests. If truth is tested by its adequacy for life in the world of facts, morality is established by social coherence. In both cases social confirmation is needed but in different ways. Individual judgment on the nature of a fact assumes certainty when accepted by the social group; but even in the absence of such confirmation successful reactions to physical situations will indicate the conformity of internal relations to external. In the case of morality, however, social acceptance is the essence of correct action, which has no meaning, in fact, without social bearing. Action even with the least repercussion upon society have a moral character—that is why the renunciation of household life by a man having social relations is an object of moral judgment, while his subsequent disappearance from the worldly stage, solitary and unseen, is not a subject of moral enquiry though its truth value can be enquired into. As moral valuation leads back to social judgment, either directly delivered or conveyed through the dictates of an inner substitute, conscience or the super-ego or the impartial spectator, its character will depend upon the society which is accepted as relevant for the judgment in question. Membership of an ideal society or a theocratic organisation, howsoever conceived, will bring in new social components with whom coherence in conduct has to be effected. So also as we project ourselves into future societies our conduct gets patterned after our picture of the society-to-be. The attempt to formulate an objective scale of moral values implies that the abiding social relations can be detected and graded without reference to ever-expanding space and never-ending time and the growing imaginational capacities of the human mind, as if an over-personal will has decreed that certain eternal values shall retain their status and gradation under all conditions of space, time and situation, and man has the privilege of omniscience in divining the unalterable moral relations of the human race. We abstract the formal features of certain abiding social relations based upon the pursuit of common interests and ideals and discover the laws of harmony that govern those relations. The opinions we value are those of men with whom we have the largest number of social contacts. Hence crowds form and dissolve, interest-groups change their interdependencies and alliances, and even commonalty has a dim, shadowy existence; but community or society has the greatest pull on personality and only a moral hero can, without any deep scar on his personality, severe the many ties with which society holds him morally fast. The intrusion of consciousness into the formation of interest-groups and the cultivation of cosmic sympathy is adverse to that unconscious sense of solidarity which is the strength of communal or social grouping. How to grow humanity and internationality at the expense of society and nationality has been the headache of God's good men on earth.

Values have a compulsiveness about them in different degrees and to that extent each value represents the 'ought to be' in some fashion. A moral action one feels obliged to perform, a true situation one feels

inclined to support; a beautiful environment one feels obliged to create. And yet each is imperfect in its insistence, for while it has a pursuasive force, it has no compulsive capacity. We may know the better and yet do the worse, we may deliberately hug an illusion or speak the untruth; and we may continue to live in squalid surroundings. We may even deaden our sense of values to such an extent that evil becomes our good, as in wanton mischief and unjustified slander and backbiting, that falsehood becomes a habit as in deliberately misleading others, and that indulgence in ugliness creates a morbid taste as in acts of vandalism of all kinds that disfigure scenes and sights and even men and materials. The corrective to the ignoring of truth is provided by maladjustment to our physical surroundings and the consequent danger to our life. The corrective to vicious aesthetic taste is more recondite and is supplied by the failure to attract others as also by the active ridicule and hostility of our fellowmen who have a better sense of proportion and harmony. The corrective to moral delinquency is social approbrium and oppression which check antinomianism and thereby maintain social balance. Social control is most effective within a limited range and a homogeneous population; it loses its strength as the area is widened till at international levels its binding force almost disappears and moral considerations cease to influence national acts and attitudes. Without considerable powers of imagination and sympathy it is not possible to widen the catchment area of social approval and cultivate sensitiveness to the moral opinion of a wide world. The instinct of gregariousness makes us thirst-after an ever-widening company and this makes us hunger after righteousness in the absence of which social cohesion will dissolve and disappear. Without social reference and in abstraction from social endeavour, morality has no legitimate meaning. Nature is morally indifferent; to think of it as conserving values or as favouring the righteous or as providing the training ground of virtue is to endow it with the qualities of moral men. Alexander and Taylor hover between two theories of value, namely, that it is somehow a feature of reality and so not an imposition of the human mind and that it is not a "transcendental" (to use Taylor's expression) but is due to the compresence of the subject with other things (Alexander). In the particular case of morality the validity or objectivity is supplied by other souls with whom an understanding and agreement must be reached about common interests. The overpersonal will is represented by the general will of the community at large determined to evolve a conflictless existence for its members. Morality is socially coherent action and shares in the vicissitudes of the social pattern on which it is dependent. Moral idealism is the positing of new moral values that would hold together the society-to-be with its ever-expanding orbit that aspires to include the totality of beings within itself at any given moment of time—what Mukerjee calls the "Commonalty of the Universe". But inasmuch as time is inexhaustible, no final moral planning is possible unless it is believed that in an absolutistic scheme moral progress has no meaning, and moral idealism means the discovery of the unalterable verities of social ethics as constituting an objective scale of values that is not subject to vicissitudes of any kind

and therefore puts an end to the exhausting Sisyphian task of creating new harmonies and concords that would provide a moving equilibrium of social interests in a changing universe. This will make eternal values dependent not on abiding interests of human societies but upon certain unvarying relations of social components which mankind in its march through space and time is trying to discover.

Personally we prefer the first view and hold that life, pleasure and gregariousness are the ultimate bases of all valuation, and not any empirical qualities of the real. It may even be doubted whether something objective in reality quickens the value-reaction in the subject so that value acts as a form imposed upon the materials of experience as the Kantian forms of intuition and categories of the understanding are supposed to do. For while these Kantian *a priori* corrective activities are the same in all apprehending minds, as if they are imposed by a consciousness-in-general, valuations have no such uniform character regarding identical contents, showing that individual and fleeting interests often determine valuation and thereby conflicting valuations of the same situation are made possible. It is also to be noted that not only existents but also assumptions may be subjected to valuation. A reshuffling of the materials of existence would not change their value unless the new grouping subserves some interests—a causative explanation through intellect would only solve a cosmic equation, while a teleological explanation through satisfaction of will would need the postulation of progress or regress. We, therefore, hold against Urban that values are not adjectival to reality but attributive thereto, either as a necessity of our volitional life or as a creation of our temporary interests. We have to accept, however, as an ultimate fact that the human constitution is subject to certain constant and recurrent needs and that therefore certain interests are common to the human race. It is on these that the so-called objective and eternal values are based though in reality they owe their origin to the basic common needs of the human kind—life, love and longing for company. To one apathetic to any of these, the corresponding value disappears or, rather the opposite becomes valuable; a suicide, a misogynist and recluse prize death, single blessedness and complete violation from society respectively. Some of these symptoms appear in abnormal minds and so the possibility of their development in normal minds cannot be denied altogether. Fortunately the overwhelming majority are governed by normal impulses; otherwise the human race would have long ceased to exist. Truth, beauty and morality, therefore, continue to be values for mankind and spur men ever to create, conserve and refine them in life and society.

X–INDIAN ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY

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MUKERJEE AS A PIONEER IN INDIAN ECONOMICS

By BALJIT SINGH

A School of Indian Economics

It is not easy to appraise the contributions of Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee to the development of economic thought in this country since his books are numerous comprising more than a dozen volumes devoted to various sectors of Indian economy and written over four decades. His earliest work, *"The Foundations of Indian Economics"* (1916) has become a classic, and provided the theoretical basis of a new school of Indian Economics that obtained recognition in the West. Mukerjee's treatment of the social environment and of the history and social functions of the joint family, caste and rural community and economico-ethical ideas that underlie these institutions for the first time revealed the background on which a sound economic structure is to be raised in India. Not merely does Mukerjee stress here the dangers of a wholesale subsitution of institutions as revealed in the desertion of the village and disintegration of rural economy, but he also provides a systematic first-hand survey of cottage and village industries and the elements of stability and progress in rural India. In Europe the development of economic science has suffered considerably by diverting theory from the facts of actual life. But the danger has been far greater and more real under the conditions in India.

Mukerjee observes that "the attempt to force systems and methods of industrial organization, economic arrangements, and institutions, which have admirably suited a different geographical environment will always be futile".[1] He also lays down a practical programme of economic development grounded on the co-operative rehabilitation of the village and agriculture and a careful integration and co-ordination of the small crafts, middle-sized workshops and large-scale industries in various industrial sectors. He urges that the case of the small industries is not as bad as often depicted. Even in the industrialised countries of Western Europe the rural industries are quite important and have received a great impetus from cooperative organization and methods. The small scale industry embraces 90 per cent of the industrial establishments in Germany, 80 per cent in Denmark and 93 per cent in Belgium. He advances various social as well as technical arguments for a complete decentralisation and regionalisation of industry promoted by the greater use of electricity and small motors and the development of rural transport in the country.

The significance of Mukerjee's pioneer work lay not only in res-

1 *The Foundations of Indian Economics, Preface* (Longmans Green, 1916).

cuing economic study and teaching in India from the incubus of Western deductive theorising and formulating the theoretical pattern of development of Indian Economics based on first-hand studies and surveys, which he first systematically began in the country, but also in providing a sound economic programme and policy. At the Dasehra Industrial Exhibition in Mysore on 12th October 1913, the Dewan Mr. A. R. Bannerji speaking on industrial policy in the State accepted the conclusion of Mukerjee and made these the foundation for the building of economic structure. Especially did he endorse the view of Mukerjee "that mere imitation of Western methods and ideals will go for nothing unless the social condition which affects mostly the submerged majority amongst the population is somewhat altered to suit those ideals." The Dewan fully accepted Mukerjee's warning that India should not imitate the "standardised semi-slums of Western progress" but work out her own economic salvation on lines specially suited to her conditions viz. conditions for her village and rural population who form the vast majority in the country. In Mrs. Annie Basant's remarkable presidential address before the Indian National Congress in Calcutta, (1918) Mukerjee's views in respect of the restoration of village and of small industries and his caveat against a slavish imitation of Western ideas and methods were also approvingly quoted and utilized.

In November 1917, Mukerjee delivered a course of eight lectures at the University of the Punjab on the "Principles of Indian Economics" in which he clarified certain special economic concepts of India in relation to Property, Ethical competition and Communalism. He laid stress on the sociological view of industry and emphasised that the economic situation could be saved only by conserving and developing the "communal"sense, habits and institutions in adaptation to the complex economic needs of today. He discussed in these Lectures the postulates of Indian Economics as distinguished from those of Western Europe analysed by Bagehot and derived from quite different conditions and circumstances. At one of his lectures delivered on Agriculture and Industrialism in St. Stephen's College, Delhi, on November 27, 1917, Mahatma Gandhi presided and it would be interesting to quote Gandhiji's concluding remarks. Gandhiji emphasised the importance of investigation into Indian poverty, the deserted village and the unhealthy factory conditions delineated in Mukerjee's address. The principles of Western Economics could not, he observed, be applied as they were to the Indian conditions in the same way as the rules of grammar and syntax of one language would not be applicable to another. The evil effects of such application were patent in our disintegrated agriculture, the wretched condition of our factory labourers and the high rates of infant mortality in the principal industrial cities of India. The importance of the question, whether our infants would live and grow in strength and vitality or they would continue to die as soon as they are born, which the Lecturer clearly explained by his interesting diagram, could hardly be exaggerated from the point of view of our national efficiency. In conclusion, Gandhiji eloquently appealed to the students to read Economics out of doors, in the fields,

cottages and workshops in its relation to the actual facts and conditions instead of cramming Western Economics heedless and forgetful of the phenomena around them. The fruitful series of lectures on the social effects of industrialism in India that Mukerjee initiated in Delhi under the Chairmanship of Mahatma Gandhi were continued by him next year in all the chief cities of Southern India.

The Social Effects of Industrialism

No doubt Mukerjee's pioneer first-hand surveys of villages, cottage industries, cooperatives, industrial and labour conditions and the people's ways of living in general as well as his realistic teaching undertaken for more than forty years, have been a major influence in India in directing economic studies and researches outside the class rooms and Western text-books which Gandhiji pleaded for. His series of lectures delivered in Banglore, Madras, Madura and Cochin were enlivened by his vivid surveys of over-crowding and physical and social deterioration derived from his first-hand investigations from city to city. He also vigorously advocated methods of town planning, industrial zoning and social welfare adapted to the social conditions and habits of the workers. This was the first time that a University teacher had left his desk and class-room to carry on a propaganda in the country before vast gatherings in favour of a more adaptive, clean and wholesome pattern of industrialism and economic and social justice to the working class. In his Madras lecture on The City Industrial and the City Communal on December 1, 1918 Mukerjee observed: "Industrialism has always involved this curse that it has identified the interests of manufacture and business with those of residential arrangement, building up the homes and tenements in the same plan and as appendages to the mills and factories. Modern town-planning demands that the interests of domesticity can only be maintained and developed when the home settlements are organised independently in accordance with the special ends and ideals of domestic and civic life". He strongly pleaded for slum clearance and planning of the industrial city in more harmonious relation to its hinter-land with its cheap means of transport and garden settlements for the workers away from the dust and smoke of the factories.

Since 1917 Mukerjee's interest in labour problems has been continuous and he has served as a member of the Bihar Labour Enquiry Committee, the Government of India Committees on the cost of living of industrial workers, on profit sharing and on the Textile Industry and also on I.L.O. Committees in Geneva and Montreal. His *"Indian Working Class,"* (Hind Kitabs 1945) covers the principal aspects and conditions of labour in India and provides a mass of first-hand knowledge and information while combining his usual scholarship, clarity and objectivity with broad sympathy and understanding. The sociological background of a migrant labour population, uprooted from the villages and inadequately adjusted to the fluctuating employment, unwholesome housing and hard continuous toil in factories is nowhere treated with such acumen and breadth of outlook and in its full bearings upon absenteeism, efficiency and

industrial relations. It is a book which today assists the employers in dealing out fair play and justice to the working class in improving the conditions of their employment, living and working conditions and also the Indian labour movement in canalising its demands for minimum wages, collective bargaining and security in fruitful constructive channels. In Labour Tribunals Mukerjee's norms of the determination of the living wage and distribution of the gains of rationalisation between labour and capital are cited by both management and trade union with equal pertinacity.

The Cultural Theory Underlying Comparative Economics

Mukerjee's *"Principles of Comparative Economics"* (P.S. King, 1921) with an introduction from Senator Raphael Levi of the French Institute is a comprehensive treatment of the bio-social; psychological and regional principles of Economics and anticipated the works of Eddie, Tugwell and Dickenson. His methodology is indicated in the following: "The imperative need of today is a twofold movement in economic thought, a movement of descent in the analysis of economic principles down to their originating and limiting physical and physiological conditions, and, secondly, a movement of ascent which, starting from these physical and biological conditions and factors, works up by the synthesis of life and history, to the various social and economic laws, categories and values, that govern different economic regions and environments." The position of Mukerjee's *"Comparative Economics"* in this regard is well explained by A. B. Wolfe and A. G. Gruchy. The former observes: "The point to be emphasized is that just as economic institutions of a given time must be treated in close correlation with the other contemporary aspects of culture so the stream of economic change is a sub-stream of the total cultural movement and is constantly influencing, and being influenced by, its other elements. Each cultural stream may be investigated by its own specialists, but not adequately unless they have reasonably wide and fresh knowledge of the main features of the collateral culture movements".[2] Gruchy remarks that "holistic" or institutional economists not only make good use of the recent contributions of other social scientists but they also look forward to a further inter-mingling of the social sciences. He quotes Mukerjee in this connection: "Radhakamal Mukerjee has explained in his study of modern economic theory that since the individual is not a discrete and separate atom, as the social sciences taking their cue from the older psychology and biology would have it, but rather like the atom of the new physics, dependent on the cosmos and at the same time a cosmos in itself, economics must adopt a different method of analysis. Economics must base itself on a kind of social psychology which reveals the vital unity of the individual and the society, a unity which is more fully revealed in the individual's conduct and in social institutions than in his set instincts and overt desire. In working out the full significance of this statement the

[2] Sociology and Economics in Ogburn (Ed): *The Social Sciences and Their Inter-relations*, p. 308.

holistic economists have drawn attention to the influence of the cultural setting upon human conduct, to the collective nature of much economic behaviour, and to the importance of habit as a factor controlling this behaviour. All these matters are of special interest for these economists when they come to fashion their theory of the economic order". Gruchy rightly stresses that while the institutional economists take note of the contributions of other social scientists toward a more realistic interpretation of the structure and functioning of the human culture, of which the sphere of economic relations forms but one segment, the cultural theory underlying their theory of the economic order serves as a common bond between their work and that of the sociologists.[3]

The Scientific Argument for Regional Economics

In his *Principles of Comparative Economics* and *Borderlands of Economics* Mukerjee has not only succeeded in achieving a very remarkable synthesis of biology, geography and psychology in providing the basis of a scientific treatment of labour, utility, value and consumption in economics but also applied for the first time the sociological method in the analysis of the causation and evolution of economic types and regions; while his reduction of economic principles to those of the basic physical sciences has its modern adherents. His presentation of the new idea of Regional Economics is brilliant and productive. Differences in wants and scale of consumption and in habits, standards of living and patterns of toil due to geographic and other causes must change economic organization and our treatment of the economic principles underlying it. Regional economics stresses the environmental adjustment which evolves the labour, occupation and economic type that can best utilise the resources and possibilities of the region. Social gradation is also different in diffrent economic regions. The pattern of economic class, group organisation and occupation has reference not only to regional resources or the man-land ratio, but also to the culture of the community. All these bring about a differentiation of economic systems, types and zones that have to be studied afresh without accepting one universally valid economic system, described by the Anglo-French school in its conceptional purity, neglecting both regional and social historical processes. It must be noted that Mukerjee's Regional Economics is a division of an entire system of sociology that he calls Regional Sociology. This is a highly synthetic viewpoint for clearly on this basis the complete understanding of society involves the knowledge of the geographer, the biologist, the economist, the ethnologist and the sociologist. The various basal sciences integrate together in the synthetic nature of Mukerjee's human ecological approach. While Mukerjee has been hailed as a pioneer of the new science of Human Ecology—a significant division of sociology, the classification of economic types which his Regional Economics proposes to characterise and investigate has been neglected so far. Thus the provincialism against which Mukerjee combats has persisted in economics. The

[3] Gruchy: *Modern Economic Thought*, pp. 619-620.

American Journal of Sociology, reviewing *"Regional Sociology"* (Century Co, 1926) thus comments on Mukerjee's programme for systematic studies in the field of the social science based on the ecological approach: "Mukherjee's *"Regional Sociology"* outlines, in fact, a programme of scientific studies more comprehensive than anything else that has yet been attempted in this field. The title suggests that the volume is an extension of recent studies in human geography. On the contrary, the point of departure is not geography, but ecology. It is a study, in other words, not of man and society as parts of the changing landscape, but rather of the whole complex physical environment in which human aggregations develop a cultural life. In other words, the geographical region and the web of life within the region has been made the subject of a new division of the social sciences. The region which nurtures man—his habitat—as a result of "the cumulative effects of environment and ecological succession" becomes at once a natural and a cultural entity. It is the inter-relation of all these factors—physiographic, economic, and cultural—which reduce themselves eventually to specific types that the new regional sociology proposes to describe, classify and explain". Regional Economics not merely presents the principles of the classification of economic types in the broad regions of the world's distribution of natural resources, but also throws light on the problems of conflict between the different economic regions and types, and between immigrants and indigenous peoples in colonies and pioneer zones. In this field of economic analysis, Mukerjee's methods forestall the regional comparisons of Tugwell, Clive Day, Barker and others. Of special interest to Inter-national Economics is his examination of different standards of living and economic efficiency, migration and restriction and the resulting disturbances and antagonisms. While his discussions of relativity in property theory and institution, the contrasted Indian and Western schemes of caste and class, competition and communalism provide the basis of scientific examination of undeveloped economies his scientific argument for Regional Economics and for comparison and collation of economic types and specific variations, without which Universal Economics cannot be formulated, is yet to be developed and matured in both theory and practice in India.

The Theory of an Indian Economic order: Rural Communalism

The traditional economic pattern of India which Mukerjee delineates on the basis of his first-hand surveys of villages, guilds and co-operatives from the Punjab to the Bengal delta and from Orissa to Travancore is designated as Communalism (with none of the sinister political significance attached to the term later on). "The Regional Economics of India, comprising the descriptive part of the *"Principles of Comparative Economics"* (Vol. 2), unfolds Communalism as a specific type for India. In Communalism the typical features are these: the rural community; collective management of pastures, meadows and irrigation channels; scattered field distribution; co-operation in agricutural methods and practices; customs; ethical competition; small scale village and cottage industries, panchayat manage-

ment; multiplicity of functional groups, castes, guilds and brotherhood which cohere in a loose type of federal structure and exercise to a limited extent the economic functions of government. Mukerjee in his "Land Problems of India," has shown that natural associations and alliances of village communities, guilds and brotherhood grew into a system in India, instead of the grouping for mutual protection of men and large estates, which has supplied the framework of the European economic and social organization. Gruchy commenting on the study of the organization of economic life and activity in particular cultural areas of the past and present by the holistics or institutional economists observes, "Russian economists concern themselves with the theory of a socialistic economic order, while Indian economists are interested in developing a theory of an economic order which is neither socialistic nor capitalistic but "rural-communal" as Radhakamal Mukerjee has described it".[4] The connections between the economic activity and the entire cultural order are established in institutional economics, according to Gruchy, by "a technological interpretation, a concept of cultural unbalance or lag, a crisis theory, and a concept of cultural equlibrium", and he refers in this connection to Mukerjee's "theory of social institutions" formulated in *"The Institutional Theory of Economics."* Ch. VIII.[5] Each economic system in its cultural historical setting, in Mukerjee's analysis, is associated with a particular man-land ratio, a specific frame-work of institutions, of property, freedom and competition and an appropriate mechanism of Governmental control and group organisation. In the agricultural Communism of India which contrasts with the capitalistic economy of Europe and America, the fundamental adjustment of population to resources and the type of mechanical technology and social relations are different. The body of economic interpretation for India, defined as Communalism by Mukerjee, is thus a theory of a particular economic order, what is called a theory of a "total or connected economic system" by Werner Sombart who differentiates between a number of historically extant economic systems, each having its own economic disposition or completion. Economic progress in India consists not in imitation nor in substitution, but in adaptive development of communalism, fully recognising the accumulated force of social history, economic tradition and mental outlook of the people.[6]

Mukerjee's small treatise, *"Groundwork of Economics"* (1925) is concrete, vivid and human, stressing institutions and customs rather than theory and giving new materials on rural communalism incentives to work, regional patterns, and distribution of land and income. Here we have economics dealing with men and their ways of living in the concrete regional and institutional setting rather than with the mutilated economic man of orthodox theory.

In India the establishment and spread of village communities with their equalising measures in agriculture and irrigation, bring

[4] Gruchy: *Modern Economic Thought*, p. 553.
[5] Ibid, p. 455.
[6] ***The Institutional Theory of Economics*** (Macmillan, 1942), Ch. IX.

together different castes and communities in close functional interdependence. Guilds which often unite artisans of different castes and the village communities, which encourage a good deal of co-operation in agriculture, community-services, festivals and recreations, prevent the crystallisation of class feelings and interests. Group organisation in India has taken a form of functionalism and regionalism and a class-cleavage, which is not in its origin economic. The Indian social process has encouraged an effective local group organisation and traditions of voluntary co-operation of various kinds of neighbourhood and functional groups. Both Classical and Marxist theories not only do grave injustice to the variety and many-sideness of human culture which has a history of its own not rooted in economics, but also picture the individual as a creature, self interested, rational and independent who owes no obligations to other individuals and to society at large or irrational, dependent and aggressive who cannot achieve anything without the support of the interests of the class and with whom all other individuals are means not ends.

More than twenty-five years before the Planning Commission Mukerjee pointed out in this work that for the agricultural progress of India the co-operative and collective farm would constitute better foundations than the undersized peasant farm[7]. It is to the regional and co-operative spirit in groups of villages and districts that he looked for a solution of the problem of industrialisation and the evolution of a new society aided by the distribution of hydel power and motor transport.

The Interdependence between Ecological, Economic and Social Factors

In *"The Rural Economy of India"* (1926) Mukerjee is again in the realm of field economic research. As a matter of fact he has been the pioneer in agricultural economic survey and research in the country. Economic and sociological surveys undertaken by the students of the Lucknow University were brought together in a volume entitled *"Fields and Farmers in Oudh"* (1929). These have dealt with the distribution of holdings, farmer's cost and profit, agricultural indebtedness, agricultural labour conditions and rural unemployment. For the first time sociological materials were also assembled. The relation between caste and occupation in the villages; the disparity of the proportion of sexes in different castes and its effects upon the economic status of women; the recreations and diversions of the cultivating classes, folk culture and the system of village and caste government are all vividly studied. The aim has been to "link economics up with much else to give a picture not so much of abstract economic forces at work but of men and women in homes and fields, at work and in leisure". Mukerjee's Introduction here as well as that contributed to S. Nehru's *"Caste and Credit in Rural Area"* plead for combined ecological, agricultural economic and sociological surveys. Such surveys, he observes: "must be informed by the primary consideration of social and human values,

[7] Groundwork of Economics, pp. 161, 167. (Longmans Green, 1925).

which alone can raise economics to the plane of a truly liberal culture."[8] His studies of agricultural economics show the essential interdependence between the pattern of land utilisation and distribution and the adjustment of population to resources and regional conditions on the one hand and between ecological, economic and social factors and forces, on the other.

Especially penetrating in analysis and comprehensive in sweep is the discussion of the ecologic balance and disbalance of land, water and vegetation, a subject which he has treated with illuminative details later on in *"The Regional Balance of Man"* (University of Madras, 1938). The agricultural and economic consequences of excessive browsing and grazing on the vegetative succession and of wholesale destruction of bird and animal life on agriculture and the standard of living of the peasantry have nowhere been treated which such acumen and breadth of vision based on the inter-disciplinary research. "The problem of constructive economics is to follow the methods of ecology in restoring the balance", Mukerjee observes.[9] He pleads for regional planning for restoring the balance between the rural and urban economy of India.

The Balance of Hamlets, Villages and Cities

This theme is taken up again in a later work *"Man and His Habitation", a Study in Social Ecology* (1940). This volume investigates the ecological, economic and social factors that account for the distribution of the scattered and nucleated types of rural habitation in India with their characteristic patterning of fields, distribution of population and ways of living and applies in this sphere the methods of the great French geographers, Vidal de la Blache and Demangeon, enlivened and renovated by new social-psychological principles and techniques. Density, circulation and distance are examined by Mukerjee with special reference to their social and institutional implications, and the contrasted trends of ruralisation and urbanisation treated in the setting of a universal social-ecological process with the data from India supplemented by those pertaining to Europe and U. S. A. to old and new zones of settlement. Hamlet and village, country, town and city are all links in ecological circulation, and it is only their organic reciprocity that can maintain the orderliness and balance of the region. Mukerjee's conception of a region as a synthetical, reverberating whole with hamlets, villages and cities, weaving a characteristic pattern of human circulations and interrelations that are functionally integrated in the regional patterns of living and culture, is a major contribution in agricultural economics.[10] It emerges from the cross fertilisation of the methods and materials of human ecology and social psychology and lifts agricultural economics altogether to a new plane as a division of cultural sociology. There is today confusion and disorder in man's technology and his spatial, occupational and power relations. Mukerjee's view that

[8] *Fields and Farmers in Oudh,* Preface viii. (Longmans Green, 1929).
[9] *The Rural Economy of India,* p. 215. (Longmans Green, 1926).
[10] *Man and His Habitation,* p. 170-179. (Longmans Green, 1940).

ecological planning, bio-technic economy and a new social evaluation form inseparable parts of a programme of recovery, region by region, habitation by habitation, oriented and co-ordinated together in the context of a national and inter-regional scheme is more forward looking and suggestive than American regionalism. In India's present phase of ecological, industrial and cultural disequilibrium, Mukerjee's comprehensive method and technique will certainly arouse more interest in the coming decades.

The Ecologic Approach to Rural Economics

With a wealth of first-hand information derived from the various states of India, Mukerjee in his *"Rural Economy of India"* deals with the interdependence of agriculture, population and the conservation and exhaustion of the land. The favourable influences of climate, rainfall and irrigation are nullified in the crowded plains by excessive human and bovine population. Through his ecologic treatment of the limiting factors in agriculture, he materially contributes towards making Rural Economics an independent science, "not an adjunct of a set of doctrines derived from the city and industrial conditions". The volume deals comparatively with the patterns of human subsistence and uses of land and water under different regional conditions and looks upon social evolution as a vast process, where massive ecologic forces engage in an endless inter-weaving of region agriculture and population, and social deterioration carries the idea of an unravelling of the complex web so woven.[11] In his brilliant chapter on Crime against Tree and Water in this volume, Mukerjee was the first to draw the attention of the country to the menace of soil erosion and the phenomenon of the man-made desert. For the U.P. he attributed the increasing irregularity of rainfall and the fall of the Jamuna water-level since the middle of the last century to local deforestation and abuse of vegetation. Before the Royal Commission of Agriculture on 7th February, 1927, Mukerjee urged "There cannot be any doubt that the destruction of forests within the last two centuries has affected to some extent the volume of water supplied by both canal and well irrigation. In the districts in the southwest, U.P. the sandy plains are making considerable advances so that the Indian desert is extending towards the north-east. The loose sands set free by the disappearance of scrub jungle and grass which bound them together now have resumed their march under the action of the westerly wind and already have extended a considerable distance in many districts of the U.P. Nothing but a chain of forest reserves can hinder further progress. Deforestation has reached the point of destroying the equilibrium between the factors determining the climate and hydrographical condition of the tract thus imperilling its agricultural future".

The Ecologic Unbalance in India: Problems and Remedies

Mukerjee's advocacy of a policy of rural afforestation, the construction of field embankments and storage *bundhs* wherever the sand-

[11] *The Rural Economy of India,* p. 105.

dune or ravine is encroaching upon the cultivated area and the maintenance of a permanent well-boring staff anticipated the U. P. State Planning Committee's action by more than quarter of a century. His grim warning about the agricultural crisis in Uttar Pradesh where the dry, protruding tongue of the Rajputana desert sucks up the moisture and vegetation of an ancient area once far-famed for plenty and prosperity ought not to go unheeded in modern schemes of planning. "The great densely populated Gangetic Plain is now practically bare of forest growth. Probably with the disappearance of the forests, the meteorological conditions of the Gangetic valley will gradually change. Once there was smiling plenty in the Indus valley. The debris and mounds, vestiges of a forgotten civilisation recently excavated in the sandy deserts of Harappa, whisper a tragedy of famine, despair and abandonment. Deforestation has no doubt cumulative ill effects which tend to the capture of smaller streams and wells and the diminution of fertility. That the forests in the Uttar Pradesh have disappeared during the last four or five centuries is not open to doubt. In the 13th century the river Hokra dried up in Rajputana, and only traces of this once mighty stream are now to be found in Gurgaon, Bhatinda and Bahawalpur. The abuse of vegetation and over-drainage help the eastward march of the Rajputana desert. Progressive desiccation is accelerated by denudation, erosion and run-off in the Chambal-Jamuna region where the spring level has already fallen to 150-200 feet. Another ominous sign is the appearance of desert plants in districts like Agra, Muttra, Morena and Bhind which are far from the desert. Ravine fissures and gullies keep on protruding dry tongues into a cultivated stretch that was once the rich and prosperous Vrajabhumi in the Uttar Pradesh. The Chambal alone has swallowed up in this manner 416 square miles of once fertile territory in Gwalior State. The ravine area, about 800 square miles, now represents 15% of the three northern districts of Gwalior. Gullied lands in the U.P. cover at least 500 sq. miles in this tract and are not merely useless but constitute a serious danger to the adjoining good lands. About 20 per cent of the tracts along the flanks of the Jamuna and Chambal are new intersected and denuded by ravines comprising a vast waving Sea of aching desolation and waste fringing and attacking one of the most prosperous parts of India. In the Moghal period this region produced such wet crops as indigo, cotton and sugarcane. Old stone-presses for crushing sugarcane are frequently found buried in the ravines in the U.P. Soil erosion is therefore the greatest single menace to the agriculture of the State and skilful as well as comprehensive methods have to be adopted to combat it".

It is, therefore, no wonder that one of Mukerjee's first economic plans as Economic Adviser in Gwalior was concerned with soil stabilisation in the district of Bhind that was sanctioned by the Gwalior Government for implementation. The scheme of ravine control here departs materially from the Etawah project in that it starts in the uppermost reaches of the Chambal where the gully finger is first discerned and threatens to suck the moisture and fertility of the arable land instead of down below in the river slope where the cut-

ting of land has gone too far. In his *"Planning the Countryside"* which constitutes his first Report on Economic planning in Gwalior the plan for soil stabilization is given in detail. It is based on the coordination of agricultural, sylvicultural and veterinary measures carried on in different levels of the ravine-stricken territory. Considered in many respects as more appropriate than some of the U.P. projects both by the Inspector General of Forests, Government of India and by the U.S.A. Soil Erosion Expert who inspected it, this coordinated plan of erosion control deserves careful attention in our present community projects.

The Economics and Politics of the Land

"The Land Problems of India" (Longmans Green, 1033) brings together Mukerjee's Readership lectures at the Patna and Calcutta Universities and Extension lectures at the Nagpur University in 1925 and 1926. The book has remained the most authoritative work on land tenures after Baden-Powell's *"Land Systems of British India"* and the fertile source of inspiration of agrarian reforms in different States. It is written from a broad sociological viewpoint and utilises comparisons and analogies from other countries and times with excellent effect. Mukerjee's analysis of the history and present position of Zamindari, the conversion of the upper peasantry into rent-receiving middleman and the transformation of peasant proprietors and tenants into the rural proletariat has been profitably utilised by several Land Reform Committees in the country. His realistic description of agrestic serfdom based on field researches in the U. P., Bihar, Bengal, Chota Nagpur, Orissa and the C.P., has been an eye-opener. "Real democracy in India," Mukerjee rightly contends, "is incompatible with the increase of a class of landless proletariat. The way towards Swaraj is a devious path, but this difficutly has not hitherto attracted the attention it deserves viz: that there cannot be any true Swaraj, unless we have a proper utilization and equitable distribution of land resources".

Mukerjee's view that agrarian problems have been neglected in India because politics is largely an urban monopoly cannot be gainsaid and he wisely directs us to look to the small agricultural countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are not yet completely industrialized and urbanized for the solution of many of our problems of agrarian reform and readjustment.

Before the Todhunter Taxation Enquiry Committee (1924) Mukerjee made out certain points that have important current relevance. He held that the system of land revenue was such that it encouraged the continuous increase of the class of rent-receivers and intermediaries. He recommended the imposition of heavy duties on estates, probates, legacies and succession duties and the exemption of uneconomic holdings from taxation. Arguing that the tax on uneconomic holdings leads to the loss of physical efficiency of the cultivator and his family and the transfer of his holding into the hands of money-lending or middle classes, he suggested the supersession of the present system of land revenue by a system of taxation of agricultural profits, as it is in vogue in France, based on a

careful definition of economic small holdings on the basis of detailed farm surveys. His warning that whether the Government or the landlord encroaches upon the standard wages of cultivation by exacting an undue share of produce the result of the transgression is the same and that the Indian land revenue system has to be reviewed and revised from a new angle of vision is of fresh import in all States that have abolished or are going to abolish Zamindari. Sooner or later the problems of the exemption of undersized holdings from taxation and the redistribution of the burden of land revenue among the various grades of peasantry have to be squarely faced.

On the issue of the relation of the size of holdings to indebtedness Mukerjee wrote a note of dissent in the U.P. Banking Enquiry Report, showing that the cumulatively increasing burden of agricultural debt is largely due to the undersized holdings and cannot be relieved much either by intensive cultivation or even by the promotion of subsidiary occupations. Under-employment or unemployment of 50 lakhs of agricultural labourers and of 118 lakhs of agricultural labourers-cum-small tenants of holdings of less than 2 acres, each comprising in the aggregate about two thirds of the total population dependent on the land, dominate the present rural picture of the Uttar Pradesh, and whether we endeavour to remove rural indebtedness, or effect agricultural improvement and land reform this picture ought to be in the forefront before the State Planning Board.

Population and Migration from a National and a Global Viewpoint

In 1929 Mukerjee was invited by Professor Corrado Gini to contribute a volume on the problems of population and migration in Asia to his well-known World Population Monographs. Mukerjee's *"Migrant Asia"* (Tipografia Failli, Rome, 1036) will remain for decades one of the fundamental sources for all discussions on Asiatic population problems in relation to World population trend and distribution. Corrado Gini's brilliant and comprehensive Foreword, dealing especially with the unequal distribution of raw materials in the globe, has underlined the importance of this most significant Asian contribution to world demography. The same subject is treated by Mukerjee as a problem of social justice and world peace in another treatise *"Races, Lands and Food: a programme for world subsistence"* with an introduction by Harold L. Ickes, former Secretary of the Interior, U.S.A. Mukerjee stresses that the issues of population growth and expansion are eventually economic. Race animosity and conflict are merely adventitious. One thousand millions of Asiatics to-day are confined to territories of inadequate resources, representing in all about one-sixth the size occupied by only two-thirds as many whites. As air flows to regions of low density the excessive pressure of the Asiatic population seeks release through its overflow into all the thinly inhabited regions of the Indo-Pacific area. In this area we have the seeds of a momentous issue, which may involve the civilised races in a world conflict of which the dim outlines are already visible in such danger spots as Korea, the Pacific Coast of the Americas, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. In Burma, Indo-China, Ceylon and the East Indies, where Asiatic im-

migrants, now 13½ millions strong, are struggling for food and wages, race friction is sowing the seeds of future conflict among the Orientals. Pointed attention was given to the significance of Mukerjee's analysis of the trends of Asian migration in C. B. Fawcett's Presidential address before the Geography section at the annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

In his courageous and skillful stand for the claims of Indian, Chinese and Japanese migration founded on global security and improvement of standards of living of all peoples, Mukerjee is the distinguished spokesman of Asian economists. Mankind has now fallen short of cultivated area to the extent of atleast 20 per cent. The unoccupied arable lands of the earth lie mostly in the hot climates where only the Asian groups can toil in the fields. Freedom of Asian emigration may not only remedy the present severe global food-shortage but also improve the purchasing power of a billion Asiatic, thus preventing an industrial slump in the post-war world.[12] Given planned agricultural colonization and development in the Pacific World, the increase of population will lead to the development of intensive and diversified farming and of secondary industries. Neither plantation economy nor a sudden mushroom industrial growth fostered by tariffs and exclusion of migrants, but a balanced development of agriculture and simple manufactures, or agricultural industry for home consumption, he points out, holds the key to the economic development of backward and pioneer regions. The end of economic imperialism in the colonies of the Great Powers will go hand in hand with the supersession of the European system by intensive agriculture, development of local industries, and diversification of tropical economies. These will be greatly facilitated by Asian emigration. Mukerjee contends that in Asia and the Pacific, freedom from want implies both the planning of Asian migration and the orderly abolition of the colonial system; and in many dependencies, the one will aid the other. Only an international authority, or a regional authority subordinate to it, in whose favour the Great Powers have to sacrifice some of their independent rights in the interests of a cooperative world plan of reconstruction, can cope with these delicate and difficult tasks and build a better future for the world. He observes, "A revitalized and expanded democratic humanist-liberal tradition of the modern world, which involves the equalization of human rights and scale of living everywhere, even with some losses to hitherto privileged groups, must be married to that equally modern and significant tradition of science, which implies an integrated world community on the basis of the economic collaboration of different peoples and regions; thus and thus alone, the peace of the world may be kept and an adequate system of international economic cooperation successfully elaborated in the future".

At the second session of the F.A.O. Conference held at Copenhagen (1946) where Mukerjee was nominated Chairman of the Commission on Economics and Statistics he carried the Conference

[12] *Races, Land and Food.* Preface p. 6 (The Dryden Press, 1946).

with him in respect of his proposals for the exploration of the possibilities of extension of the world rice production in the pioneer tropical belts through planned policy of land reclamation, irrigation development and agricultural colonization under the F.A.O. aided by international loans.

Global Food Surpluses and Regional Prices

Mukerjee stresses that the modern economically unified world has to build up global economic policies and institutions in agriculture, industry, labour, migration and finance in order that the poverty and low purchasing power of the under-developed regions may not jettison the economic stability and prosperity of the developed countries. Assessing the economic legacy of the 19th century he observes that the economic imperialism of the past is responsible not only for the ruthless dissipation of natural and human resources of large parts of the globe but also for the ban against Asian emigration to Australia, Africa and the Americas. In his opinion there cannot be lasting world peace unless opportunities of migration and settlement are opened for the Eastern Asians—half of humanity now confined to only 13.6 per cent of the globe surface. The creation of an international famine reserve and the offer by surplus countries such as the U.S.A., Canada and Australia of their burdensome agricultural surpluses to the needy countries at low "regional" prices through the World Food Council will also, according to him, benefit the economy of Asian peoples far beyond the sphere of food and agriculture. Mukerjee remarks: "It is a paradox that the economic health and well-being of the U.S.A., the mightiest nation of the world, will depend in this epoch on the assistance it gives to backward countries to improve their working efficiency and purchasing power through supplies of food, capital and scientific machinery and personnel. The reason lies in the realization that the world can enjoy security and prosperity only through a levelling up of the present inequalities in the standards of living, purchasing power and technology. Only by granting special prices to needy countries will the United States be able to dispose of her persistent surpluses. These result from an agricultural and industrial output that has increased since 1940 by 36 and 50 per cent, respectively."[13]

At the F.A.O. Preparatory Commission on World Food Proposals in 1947 Mukerjee pleaded for the differential fixation of export prices of the major foodstuffs on the world markets according to the purchasing power of different regions with a view to stimulate world consumption for food. The two price systems might be worked in such manner that could increase supplies adequate to meet the current aggregate requirement of world consumers of different grades of purchasing power. In a region of cyclical or short-term fluctuations that are symptoms of chronic disequilibrium and an intractable surplus problem, it is the World Food Council alone that by laying down price differentials, and regional export prices, could in his view maintain a working balance between adequate security to the pro-

[13] Interview, New York Times, January 1947.

ducers and a progressive general cheapening of food for all consumers through greater and more efficient production. The idea of "regional" prices for countries of low purchasing power and inadequate nutrition with one thousand million people was considered a strikingly original contribution to the F.A.O. Commission. The F.A.O. Commission has suggested sale of food-stuffs at "special" prices for countries in which a large section of population suffers chronically from malnutrition with certain safeguards.[14] Mukerjee has also urged the need of setting up a Regional Council for the countries arcund the Pacific including India, China and Japan for securing a common economic policy for South and East Asia in respect of procurement of foreign loans for internal development, the reclamation of vast open spaces, the planning of migration movements and the formulation of trade agreements.

River Control and Management

Mukerjee's intensive ecological and agricultural surveys were confined to the U.P., Bihar and Bengal. His *"Changing Face of Bengal: a Study in Riverine Economy"* (Longmans Green, 1938) is a pioneer study of the river development and drainage system in the Bengal delta as a nicely adjusted balance, albeit, a shifting one, established among the various feeders, distributaries and channels of the river system. With many maps dealing with the river changes since the 16th century, he dwells on the menace to the prosperity of the State due to the river decay, agricultural depression and malaria. The swing of the Ganges south-eastwards, which is discernible since the sixteenth century, has brought about the decay of the Bhagirathi and the other Nadia rivers and later the Jessore rivers. Its causes are attributed by Mukerjee to the westerly detour of the Kosi which has caused the north-eastward pressure of the Padma, the interruption of the Bhagirathi flow due to the decline of the western tributaries caused by the destruction of forests in the Chota Nagpur plateau and western uplands of Bengal, and subsidence in the south-eastern quadrant of the joint delta. The river Damodar left its old channel in 1770. When that channel which had formerly joined the Bhagirathi at Katwa swerved to the south-west, the doom of Western Bengal was sealed. Half a century later, the rapid decline of the Bhagirathi and the other Nadia rivers was strikingly evident. In 1870, the "Burdwan Fever", starting from Jessore, the heart of the dead river area, spread through Central and Western Bengal and claimed many millions as its victims. In 1930 an expert Irrigation Department Committee apprehended that "deterioration had already proceeded so far in Central Bengal that it could not be checked and that Central Bengal was doomed to revert to swamp and jungle". By 1970, Mukerjee grimly forecasts, the extension of swamp and jungle in the hinterland of Calcutta and the contamination caused by the setting up of the local deltaic channels used for the removal of the sewerage might seal the doom of the city of Palaces. Upon a region which represents about two-fifths of the total area of undivided Ben-

[14] *Report of the FAO Preparatory Commission on World Food Proposals.*

gal, the mosquito has descended and conquered, with the result that the decline of agriculture, spread of the jungle and malaria and enfeeblement of the population by the recurrent attacks of the disease easily defeat the agricultural officer, the economist and the sanitarian. In those parts of Bengal, where free river spill has been restricted by river, road and railway embankments, the cultivated area as well as harvests have diminished, malaria has increased and the rivers and "khals" have silted up. As regards remedial measures, Mukerjee's suggestions demand the most careful consideration: first, the survey of the problems of obstructed drainage and food and river control in different districts in West Bengal. The extent and the prevention of erosion in the catchment areas of the important rivers and the related questions of afforestation and swampy land reclamation as well as the effects of canal irrigation in the Uttar Pradesh and Bihar on the river flow should also be investigated. Secondly, a complete hydraulic survey of the decadent areas should be undertaken; thirdly, the Government or a Waterways Trust should raise an initial loan of a few crores of rupees to combat the menace of obstructed drainage, agricultural depression and malaria affecting about two-thirds of the total area of Bengal. Fourthly, the Irrigation, Co-operative, Health and Agriculture Departments, as well as Municipalities, District and Union Boards should co-ordinate their activities in certain selected areas for the flushing of dead rivers, pools and ponds, and prevention of anopheles breeding. Mukerjee pleaded about two decades back for the establishment of a set-up like the present D.V.C. But his recommendation that there should be an Inland Waterways and Irrigation Board or a Ganges River Commission, constituted by the Federal Government on the lines of Mississippi River Commission in the U.S.A., which should adjust inter-provincial claims and interests, has not yet found Governmental support. There is no doubt, however, that the postponement of a co-ordinated programme of river control implies greater national losses due to denudation, flood and spread of swamp and jungle. It is only a Ganges River Commission, acting on behalf of the federal government, which can co-ordinate the divergent interests of the Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Assam and Bengal as regards schemes of canalisation and river control. The recognition that the Ganges and her tributaries form an integral system, and that no project of irrigation, flood prevention or afforestation should be considered provincially is overdue. What the Mississippi is for the different states in America, and the Rhine for France, Germany and the Netherlands collectively, the Ganges is for the Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Bengal, and river physics demands that the up-river and down-river areas should no longer pursue schemes in piecemeal and independent fashion, jeopardising the interests of each other.[15] For the conservation and management of the waters that are crucial in the decadent south-western region of the U. P. Mukerjee has recently urged the establishment of a Jamuna-Chambal Valley Corporation on the lines of the D.V.C.

[15] *The Changing Face of Bengal.* p. 109.

The Balance of Regions and Industries in India

In his Presidential Address before the Indian Economic Conference in January 1933 Mukerjee developed in his original fashion the concept of the regional pattern of life as contrasted with the isolated processes on which contemporary economic analysis is concentrated. The theory which he developed is "one of factors of complex action and interaction of non-uniform forces working themselves out into a specific pattern whether of the arts of industry and consumption or of groups and values". He pleaded for large scale quantitative surveys of institutional and ecological economics. Thus in India policies must be worked out in relation to the requirements and balancing of the interests of regions and industries and the whole must be correlated in the economic planning so as to obtain the optimum benefit to the country.

Dr. Mukerjee stresses that scientific agriculture in the fertile plains, forests on the mountain slopes and pasture-farming in poor and cheap land help one another. On the other hand, the ascent of agriculture to the hill-sides and depletion of forests, excessive or indiscriminate grazing in pasture-lands, and continuous encroachment on marsh and meadow spell agricultural decline in India.

The conflicting interests of different zones, sections and groups of producers in India must be brought into some kind of balance in the economic structure of India. Especially is this necessary in a democratic federal State, as the United States and India. Federalism as a political experiment is bound to fail in the absence of economic inter-penetration and right balancing of the interests of different regions and sections. If the cotton industry of Western India, for example, demands sacrifices from the whole country through protected higher prices, it cannot remain wholly indifferent to the interests of other sections and regions such as the coal mines of Bengal and Bihar or hand-loom weaving in all States, whose depression will ultimately recoil upon itself. A policy of economic protectionism in federal India must be based on a consideration of conditions which envisages mutual utilization of products of different economic regions and groups of producers and not the exclusive benefits to a particular region or section.

Population and Food Planning

Mukerjee was the first economist in India to deal scientifically and systematically with problems of India's population in relation to food supply and is considered today an internationally recognised authority on population questions. In this field he has made significant theoretical and practical contributions in his *"Food Planning for Four Hundred Millions"* (Macmillan, 1939), *"Migrant Asia"*, *"The Political Economy of Population"* and *"Races, Lands and Food"*. As early as 1936, he convened the first Indian Population Conference at Lucknow, estimated India's then food shortage at a deficiency for 48 million of "average" men or 13% of the population and predicted an increase of population to 400 millions by 1941—a forecast that proved true. He pleaded for systematic crop and food planning adjusted to the conditions of agriculture, cattle-keeping and population pres-

sure. He also advocated birth-control especially among the rural population. His observations in this connection show his foresight. "A rational family planning and education of the masses in birth-control must be accepted as one of the important means, though not the only means of cambating population increase". "As there is a desire for better food and higher standard of living, and for giving the children better opportunity for advancement, as women gain enlightenment and self-conciousness and as men rid themselves of the over-awing authority of religious injunctions which were the outcome of remote specious times and which have now become obvious misfits, the prejudice against "interference with nature" will yield to economic necessity. Modern education, medicine and public hygiene have reached the Indian village, and as these spread more birth control will shock people less and an "adaptive fertility" will relieve the present heavy population pressure."

Mukerjee's major contributions to the analysis of Indian population problems are the following:—

1. His analysis of the mutual adaptation of climate, dietary and body size and activity of peoples of different States, and division of India into three distinct food regions with respect to the consumption of cereals and intake of calories per capita. Marked differences in climate and in the size, weight and activity of the body, and the greater prevalence of short rations in the regions of population pressure in the east and south easily explain the contrasts between the intake of the Pathans, Punjabis, Rajputs and Mahrattas, stalwart and strong peoples of the north and west, and that of the Bengalees, Uriyas, and Madrassis of the east and south, puny, weak and supine.[16] The smaller percentage of cropped area per capita, larger burden of superfluous cattle population, and smaller percentage of land area available for reclamation and settlement would make agricultural and nutritional improvement more and more difficult, should population further multiply in the rice regions of India.

2. His estimate of the dietetic needs and population capacity of India following the methods adopted by Taylor in the U.S.A. These methods should now be followed up State by State for estimating food surplus or deficit using the common dietary and the present level of farming technique and method of the people. This alone can furnish the basis of a scientific food policy, based on "a marriage between agriculture and nutrition", with targets of food production and consumption in agricultural planning.

3. His examination of the climatic, agricultural and social factors in over-population in his address on The Sociological Analysis and Forecast of Population Increase in the Second Session of Indian Population Conference covers the entire field of Indian demography both with reference to existing situation and future trend.

4. His forecast of the future population in India based on analysis of the trends of age and sex composition of the population and the calculation of net reproduction rate of India viz, 1.454 based on

[16] *See Races, Lands and Food*, pp. 52 to 56.

the life-table for Indian females and interpolation of the Japanese fertility rate to India age by age.

5. His examination of the ecological consequences of over-population with special reference to the correspondence between bad harvest and increase in death-rate and fall in birth-rate. The diminution of birth-rate in certain congested districts is not due, in his view, to deliberate family limitation at all but to a combined effect of several biological factors that are hardly operative in European demography. This aspect of the consequence of over-population attracted much interest of Kuczynski and Harris in the U.K. In India in over-crowded States, he also finds not merely an alteration of the age and sex composition of the population and a diminution of the average expectation of life, especially of females, but also a trend of paucity of females, which collectively reduces natality.[17] Mukerjee's detailed study of the desparity of sex proportions region by region and caste by caste in India is of great demographic significance. In the famine zones and areas of precarious rainfall where economic pressure is more severe, and women more exposed to the hardships of struggle with the soil and climate the continuing deficiency of women is especially marked. On the whole as we proceed from east to west in Northern India arid conditions increase and sex ratio becomes lower. In Sindh the average proportion of females is only between 780 to 787 per 1000 males. Climate and the absence of certain essential elements in food-stuffs appear, according to him, to have an enormous influence on both fertility and sex ratio in India which is maintained in the various castes and communities by strict endogamy. The effects of the paucity of females at birth on the decline of the fertility are aggravated by relatively heavier mortality of females than males, especially in the child-bearing period. The diminution of the sex ratio which is aggravated in years of drought resembles in Mukerjee's view the subordination or elimination of the useless males which brings about population adjustment among the pond Cladocera, bees and gall-inhabiting wasps.[18]

6. On the basis of his analysis of the dysgenic trend in Indian population, due to the lower caste Hindus and Moslems showing a greater natural increase than the high-caste Hindus in the Northern India, Mukerjee as early as 1935 in his Meyer Foundation Lectures in the Madras University forestalled the economic and political crisis in Bengal culminating in the partition of the State. The Muslims as well as the lower caste Hindus have for decades tended to swamp the upper caste Hindus which show striking paucity of females, adopt rigid exogamous and hypergamous restrictions and strictly prohibit widow-remarriage.—These social customs the former do not favour. The Muslims not only have discarded the prohibition of widow remarriage but have adopted polygamy throughout Northern India. The Muslim custom of adopting more than one and as many as four wives, who serve as field labourers in new reclamations, contributes towards the success of agricultural colonization in virgin wilder-

[17] See *Food Planning for Four Hundred Millions.* (Macmillan, 1338).
[18] *Political Economy of Population,* p. 195. (Longmans Green, 1942).

nesses, islands and swamps, where the delta-building rivers meet the sea in East Bengal. In the shifting settlements in the sand dunes and jungles, Muslim colonists living far away from the parent villages employ women as agricultural labourers and establish new homes by marrying them. Mukerjee predicted: "Fifty years hence out of ten persons in the fields or city lanes in Eastern Bengal eight would be Muhammadens, one would be a Namasudra and another person a Brahmin, Vaidya or any other caste". The demographic unbalance of Hindus and Moslems grounded in contrasted marital customs, Mukerjee stressed, could not but have profound social and political repercussions.[19] Here therefore has demographic and sociological insight aided political prediction.

7. Mukerjee has been the first Indian economist who has advocated birth-control since the convention of the first Indian Population Conference in 1936. His argument may be given briefly. Man's conquest of the soil is in vain if he fails to exercise his own volition or the socio-religious restraints of the past, nor uses scientific techniques for the control of his reproduction, but leaves nature to control indirectly, through the rates of mortality and fecundity.[20] In his eyes the programme of birth control should be brought home to the Indian peasant and his wife as a programme of mortality-control. Recently he and the present writer have undertaken a pilot research project on family planning in the rural U.P. for analysing and interpreting the attitudes of the rural population towards family limitation in general and the effectiveness of different methods of birth-control in particular.

The Economic and The Social Structure

With his deep and abiding sociological interest Mukerjee in the midst of his pre-occupations with theoretical work in gradually enlarged fields in economics has again and again turned to the basic problems of the Indian Social Structure—the village, the land system, the richer and the poorer peasantry, and the transformation of the peasantry to the landless proletariat. Before the Royal Commission on Agriculture in 1927 he pleaded for adequate rural employment, legislation to compel villages to accept restripment of holdings, rehabilitation of the landless class and abolition of land-lordism, stressing that the village unsettlement and the political unsettlement have a direct bearing on each other. Before the Royal Commission on Industrial Labour in 1929 he pointed out the dangers from congestion, insanitation, inadequate nutrition and fatigue of an essentially agricultural class living as migrants in modern industrial cities. He pleaded for the improvement of nutrition and readjustment of industrial working hours, at least, in summer. As a member of the Provincial Banking Inquiry Committee U.P. his Minority Note appended to the Report (in 1930) emphasised the uneconomic character of the majority of holdings in the State leading to chronic indebtedness that can neither be studied nor solved without reference to the entire social setting

[19] Meyer Lectures, Madras University—July 1935.

[20] Presidential Address before the Sociology Section, *2nd All India Population and 1st Family Hygiene Conference, Bombay,* 1938.

of the agricultural debtor. As the President of the Provincial Co-operative Conference in Madras and again in Bihar, he pleaded for the "nationalization" of the co-operative movement and the rehabilitation of indegenous habits of agricultural co-operation and irrigation as well as economic self-management, so that what is today an exotic and artificial movement may be assimilated to the Indian social structure. In his evidence before the Congress Agrarian Committee he urged the imposition of an upper limit of 14 acres for an agricultural holding that could be owned by a cultivator without the normal importation of hired farm hands along with the lower limit of 10 acres for a subsistence holding that should not be permitted to be further fractionalised. Mere liquidation of landlordism cannot, in his opinion, improve agriculture or elicit rural initiative in the Uttar Pradesh where 50 lakhs of agricultural labourers, representing one-fifth of the number of people living on the land are completely ignored in the scheme of land reform, and another 118 lakhs of small tenants-cum-agricultural labourers cannot eke out their subsistence. As long as the basis of rural class relations is not altered the community projects cannot arouse enthusiasm among the people. Mukerjee advocates mechanized farming that can come only if some kind of choice be left to the majority in a village to compel the minority towards co-operative farming, and the Government be more liberal in providing various aids and services towards the establishment of such modern mechanised farms. He recommends that every State Government should insist upon all cultivators forming themselves into co-operative farms as the prior condition of the distribution of short and long term credit by the Government. And he warns that mere rehabilitation of peasant farming on the basis of 2 to 3 acres per family will delay agricultural recovery in the country, apart from starting a fresh bitter struggle between the upper and lower peasantry that may vitiate the scheme of community development of the Planning Commission. For the landless class he suggets collective farming especially in virgin areas reclaimed by the State. But no land reform can succeed in the long run unless it is associated with programmes of rural industrialisation and family restriction.

The Aims of Economic Planning

Mukerjee had been the pioneer in supporting the theory and practice of economic planning in the country when the *Laissez faire* tradition had been ascendent in both administration and the academic circles. As early as 1935, his fifth William Meyer Foundation Lecture at the Madras University was devoted to economic planning for India. In 1937, he went out on a six months' sojourn in Europe and America which he utilized for studying the new agricultural policy in Great Britain, the economic planning in Hitler's Germany, the vast public works and integral "bonification" carried on in Mussolini's Italy, the comprehensive measures of soil conservation, flood control and rural rehabilitation of the New Deal in the U.S.A. and the far-reaching collectivist experiments in Soviet Russia, where he stayed for a month. His earlier views on economic planning were

embodied in his Meyer Lectures later on published under the title of "The Regional Balance of Man", in his Preface to Economic Planning appearing in his Second Volume of "Economic Problems of Modern India" (Editor) and in the Report he prepared as Chairman of the Committee of Aims and Purposes of National Planning appended to the National Planning Committee's Report. Later on his Reports on Population and Social Welfare and on Land System and Agricultural Labour that he prepared as Chairman and Secretary respectively of the sub-committees on population and the land system of the National Planning Committee of which he had been a member, were published. "Planning The Countryside" which comprises the economic plan for Gwalior and deals with rural planning is also a notable work precisely calculating and fixing targets for agriculture, nutrition, standard of living, health and literacy that are reached by necessary developmental plans in various fields. Mukerjee brought his fundamental ecological outlook into his discussion of problems of economic planning from a fresh angle. This emphasis is lacking in the Planning Commission's schemes. Right economic planning for India, according to Mukerjee, must see the different sections of the region as belonging to a single whole and conserve natural resources in India's denuded mountain slopes, in her impoverished fields, in her depopulated villages and in her industrial cities. On the Indian hill sides, Mukerjee stresses, the preservation and plantation of forests will be indispensable for stabilising the mountain stream flow, preventing erosion of the hill slopes, defending the irrigation system and probably also for increasing humidity of the air and local rainfall. In the mountain slopes the "tree crops" type of agriculture will save the hill sides from destruction and thus benefit the agriculture of the plains. In the meadows, scientific or rotational grazing, looking into the interest of the future, or an arranged succession of leguminous fodder crops with cereals will be the chief support of intensive farming. Thus the different levels or sections of the valley will develop each its appropriate type of land use in relation to the region-forestry on the mountains, tree cropping in the slopes and rocky places, forage cropping in the meadows and grasslands and intensive cereal growing in the level plains. All will be equally necessary in order that the Indian peasant may secure a stable basis for his life and civilization.[21]

Rurbanisation

In India we are now passing through an economic phase in which there are excessive ruralisation and deindustrialisation as in Bengal, Assam, Orissa and Madras, or there are excessive urbanisation and decline of the village. True economic planning, in Mukerjee's scheme, will industrialise the village and ruralise the city so that culture and civilization may no longer be confined to a few industrial centres but are brought home at every point in the region where the economic basis for a community life can be found. Mukerjee uses the graphic hybrid term "Rurbanisation" (first utilized in his

[21] Meyer Lecture, Madras University, July 1935.

"Man and His Habitation" in a broader sociological context) which has now been assimilated into the planning literature in the country. "Rurbanisation" or the development of technically efficient urbanised villages, disseminating their new standards of living and technical efficiency in the entire region, holds, according to Mukerjee, the major key to socially adaptive industrial planning for India. "Perhaps the world-wide menace of the contrasts of wealth and misery and of its repercussions in profoundly disturbed industrial relations may be mitigated, if not avoided, by a process of decentralisation of economic activity and the mass distribution of economy, ownership and power that a dispersed pattern of industrialism will tend to foster". In this connection Mukerjee stresses a point that has hardly drawn the attention of the Planning Commission it deserves, viz. the establishment of parity between agricultural and industrial prices so that the present gulf between rural and urban standards of living may be gradually reduced. "Planning in an agricultural country, must adopt the mechanism of price control, not only, for safeguarding fair prices for the major cereals but also for stabilising such ratio between the prices of agriculture and of industrial commodities so that gradually the rural standard of living approximates to the urban."[22] It is freedom from want as well as a modicum of purchasing power of the rural population, Mukerjee remarks, "which alone can support an increased pace of industrialization". The all-round improvement of agricultural production, the establishment of a favourable exchange between agricultural produce and cloth, salt, sugar, kerosene and other articles of common consumption and the intensive development of rural public works and social services like public health and education have to be looked at from the point of view of laying the solid and stable foundation of both industrialization and over-all balance between rural and urban standards of living. Above all, industrialization, Mukerjee stresses, should be of the dispersed and the decentralised type so that it might give impetus to rural improvement not only by providing employment for idle and semi-idle labour but also by supplying cheap fertilizers, tractors, pumps and hydel-power for agricultural country and village industry.[23] Mukerjee's discussion of the scale of priorities in planning in the concluding chapter of his *"Planning The Countryside"* deserves careful consideration. He makes it clear that the nature and tempo of progress in agriculture and the capacity for co-operative organization and socialized living rest on education in the widest sense of the term. He also stresses that agricultural and rural reconstruction cannot be assisted nor accelerated unless they are linked with the development of communications and industrialization that not merely reduce economic isolation, excessive dependence upon agriculture and chronic unemployment but also break down the mental and social inertia of the people. A solid development can be based only on diversified employment, improved com-

[22] *Planning the Countryside,* Preface.

[23] *Rural Economy of India,* pp. 239-243; *Economic Problems of Modern India,* Preface to Planning.

munication and regionalisation of industry, associated with a diversified and mechanized agriculture based on secondary crops and raw materials rather than on subsistence agriculture. A network of industries, large, medium-sized and small, established in the countryside through the facilities of cheap hydel-power and transport, will utilise the industrial crops and raw materials, from which the agriculturist's income will appreciably increase, abolish rural idleness and lead to a more equitable distribution of wealth and purchasing power among the urban and rural classes. More technical skill and science in the countryside will mean greater alertness and intelligence[24] with their favourable cumulative reactions upon the social and political life of the common people.

Peasant Democracy versus Parliamentarism

Real decentralization, Mukerjee urges, does not mean isolation nor is it confined only to politics. It means that the village in India, becomes once again the centre and the focus of all developmental activities, linked and integrated with one another and spreading out from the village to a group of villages in extending circles in the interest of efficiency and of coordination of such functions as banking, marketing, community movement and research for the whole region. The Constitution has given rural India the village panchayat, but the village panchayat is official-ridden, super-imposed and feeble. Nor is there any statutory recognition of unions of villages that may keep alive an active peasant citizenship free from control of the urban classes. "A middle and upper class democracy favours centralization and control. These trends will be intensified in the coming years with the increase of population and shortage of food, cloth and other necessities, leading to more complex and expensive bureaucratic organisation and loss of community initiative and reliance. It will not be easy for a genuine peasant democracy to assert itself in the present social context on the basis of real decentralization that alone can keep alive the essential values and freedom of an agricultural civilization so strikingly symbolized by Mahatma Gandhi's cults of spinning wheel and the Panchayat Raj."[25] Decentralization has been the pillar of a multi-national state like India built up by absorption and assimilation of stocks and cultures, and is incompatible with the parliamentary or party methods that we have recently imported from the West into the Indian Constitution. Mukerjee stresses that our modern parliamentarism and middle class supremacy, imposed upon an indifferent and despairing rural community, cause great social waste and friction and inhibit the development of a real, active, peasant democracy in India. Even the type of agrarian organization today comes to be determined by the city and the city middle class without reference to the social needs and habits of the peasantry. He rightly observes: "There is an inter-relation between the type of farm organization and the progressive ideology of urban-industrial culture; and just as the village community or co-operative farm-

[24] For a full discussion, see Preface and Ch. XV, *Planning the Countryside*.
[25] Convocation Address at the Bareilly College, Feby. 25, 1952.

ing favours a decentralized type of industrial structure, a State-controlled system of industry favours collectivization in agriculture. Such issues are yet to emerge in the economics and politics of the field in India".[26] There is no doubt, however, that on these basic issues that are yet in the offing depend largely not only the success of economic planning but also the achievement of a wider and deeper political synthesis in the country.

Economic Progress and Social Planning

Due to Mukerjee's sociological method, social planning is dovetailed into his economic planning from the very beginning. Social life, in Mukerjee's view, is an integral whole, and he shows that the patterns of economic, social and political institutions correspond and cohere together forming a harmonious, balanced whole. A lag or disbalance between the different sectors of life is associated with acute social friction and un-settlement.[27] He observes: "We cannot have feudalism and inequality in the village and freedom and democracy in the city. No people can be socialistic and progress-minded in economics and at the same time remain superstitious in religion, over-bearing and intolerant in social manners and behaviour and obscurantist, dogmatic and magical in their general outlook on life".

A most serious obstacle to economic progress in the country, according to him, is the spirit and tradition of caste that keep the village disorganised, disunited, incompetent to absorb the modern technology, science and collective method. Even the village panchayat on which much depends for the success of economic planning has become the seed-bed of caste tensions, hostilities and struggles. A rural survey of 29 high and low castes conducted under him in the UNESCO Social Tension Research Project shows that 25 castes in Uttar Pradesh would not touch a Pasi, Dusadh, Bhangi or Dom, 22 would not touch a Chamar, Dhanuk and Kori, and 19 would not touch a Dhobi. Social distance breeds fresh social distance and vitiates elections of Gram Panchayats and District Boards. He often stresses that in view of the fact that in another 25 years the so-called backward and depressed castes will constitute more than one-fifth of her population, half of whom will be no better than serfs or born-slaves, India should back up legal emancipation of the lower castes by their economic and social emancipation. Experimental techniques in modern social psychology show how attitude change can be brought about on the basis of social action research. The economic improvement of the inferior castes ensuring them access to better and more land and subsidiary income from crafts and industries is of course basic and decisive. The introduction of wheelbarrow for carrying night soil and carcass will be helpful in easing caste tension and fulfilling the ambitions of the scavenging castes to improve their manner of living and social status. Social prejudices can be combated by direct appeals to new attitudes and values

[26] *Planning the Countryside*, p. 174.

[27] *Democracies of the East*, pp. 4-5, 135-136; (P. S. King, 1923) Social Ecology, pp. 342-346. (Longmans Green, 1945)

through new types of symbolic behaviour, such as the abolition of caste titles and surnames; the introduction of new common greetings such as Jai Hind and Jai Bharat instead of discriminatory forms, such as Pailagi; and a uniform seating arrangement in all meetings. Especially is conditioning for social nearness efficacious for children through games, scout activities, dramatic performances and other forms of recreation. Such community activities as the co-operative farm, the village panchayat, the city workshop and the trade union can also be powerful social equalisers and become new instruments of social cohesion. Economic progress is fundamentally congruent with and dovetailed into social progress.[28]

Technology and Human Values

Thus does Mukerjee come by an altogether different path to Mahatma Gandhi's well-known programmes of cottage production, panchayat government and Harijan uplift. According to Mukerjee such social aims and objectives are basic to the future of Indian culture and scheme of life. India cherishes the human and social values and virtues of intimate contact with the land and the family in economic toil, whether agriculture or the rural arts and crafts. In the modern planned endeavour to relate the new technology and science to her ancient rural and agricultural civilization, it is not a few large octopus cities that drain the wealth, talent and population from the entire country but numerous small "rurban" centres with their small and medium-scale industries, and co-operatives that will be the appropriate nuclei of reconstruction, superseding the archaic methods of production and bringing the new science and technology into the village and agriculture.

At one of the Commission in the ECAFE Conference in Otacamund 1949 Mukerjee, moving a resolution on the pattern of industrialization in the Eastern countries, observed that the industrial planner must relate his overall design to the basic occupational picture of the region that cannot be changed quickly or considerably. Further, such co-ordination between large and small industries, between villages and towns, will in a properly conceived industrialisation prevent the repetition in the East of the social evils ot congestion and slum life, high mortality and vice, and unequal distribution of wealth and ownership, associated with the nineteenth century phase of Western capitalistic industrialism. Industrialism in the Eastern countries should be of a dispersed and not concentrated pattern, and instead of the beehive cities of Western industrialism, we should have clusters of urbanised villages with their new agricultural industries and new standards of living and technical efficiency, spread out in the entire region and radiating their influence throughout it. Such a trend is facilitated to-day by hydro-electric power development and distribution of cheap electricity in the countryside, as well as by the organisation of cheap motor transport on land and river. And indeed, the power and transport system should be so planned and controlled that these would stimulate not the over-concentration of

[28] *Inter-caste Tensions.*

industries in towns in a few areas, but their dispersal and decentralization throughout the region. Such is the over-all industrial pattern that Mukerjee envisages for India and the undeveloped economies in the Far East. The India of the cities and towns, with their appalling congestion and unwholesome slum life, rampant vice and chronic class strife is losing her spirit and soul. The India of the villages, because of poverty, insanitation, superstition, and divisiveness is playing a more and more negligible role in the development of Indian culture. The imperative problem in the coming years is to reconcile the technical efficiency of the West with the humaneness of Indian society. Thus would Mukerjee adapt and assimilate the science and organization of the industrial age to the social structure and values of an ancient civilization.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY IN INDIA

It was under the impact of British rule on her culture that sociological thinking on modern lines first emerged in India. The pioneer of comparative studies in this country is Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1833) who played a dominant role in the spread of Western education, promulgation of social reforms and recovery of ancient spiritual values amidst the various orthodoxies and superstitions of the 19th century. As the 19th century progressed, the social conquest of India by the British was challenged from various fields. Controversies with Christian missionaries as well as active programmes of social reform stimulated interest in the study of social life and institutions, especially caste, family and religion. Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Bhudev Chandra Mookerjee and Isvara Chandra Vidyasagar in Bengal and B. N. Malabari, M. G. Ranade and R. G. Bhandarker in Western India were among the influential writers, who studied Indian social institutions, opposed the imitation of Western ways and reinterpreted the social values and ideals of the past. A few liberal British administrators like Metcalfe and Maine, dealing with the village communities of India, Alfred Lyall concerned with tribal law and administration and Munro exploring the methods and agencies of education, stood against the substitution of ancient institutions and communal principles and critically commented on the British legal and administrative policy. At least four socio-religious movements of reform and service arose, each promulgating social adjustment to the civilisation of west in its own line: The Brahmo Samaj led by the Tagores and Keshab Chandra Sen, the Arya Samaj led by Dayananda Sarasvati, the Theosophical Society led by Annie Besant and the Rama Krishna Mission under Swami Vivekananda. In Bengal the political and revolutionary movements were saturated by a national idealism that expressed itself in a lively interest in folk culture and institutions, folk songs and arts and crafts. Sister Nivedita's *The Web of Indian Life,* Mukerjee's *Foundations of Indian Economics, Democracies of the East,* and *Principles of Comparative Economics,* Benoy Kumar Sarkar's *Folk Elements in Hindu Culture* and *Creative India,* and Ananda K. Coomarswamy's *The Arts and Crafts of India and Ceylon* and *Essays in National Idealism* represent realistic studies of Indian institutions or counsels of preservation of the spirit and genius of Indian culture.

Meanwhile inductive studies of specific institutions were forthcoming from various fields. The institution which attracted the major interest was caste, studied by such eminent foreign scholars as Senart, Nesfield, Risley, Ibbetson, Thurston, Crooke, Gait, O'Malley and Blunt. Ketkar in his *History of Hindu Castes,* Rama Prasad

Chandra in his *Indo-Aryan Races,* Ghurye in his *Caste and Race* and N. K. Dutta in his *Origin and Growth of Caste in India,* approached the origin and development of caste largely from the anthropological side. Mukerjee, in his *Comparative Economics,* Blunt in the *Caste System of Northern India,* Briggs in his *Chamars,* Wiser in *The Hindu Jajmani System* and Mukerjee's pupil, Mohendra Singh, in *The Depressed Castes of Northern India* approached caste from the economic side. A caste-distance scale in India was recently worked out on the lines of Bogardus' schedule by Mukerjee and Baljit Singh as the result of elaborate field survey of caste attitudes in the monograph, *Inter-caste Tensions.* Indigenous guilds were also studied by Mukerjee in the *Regional Economics of India.* Village panchayats or councils of the five were surveyed by Matthai in *Village Government in India,* and by Mukerjee who treated the economic origins of the panchayats from the early ethnographical formations of the Munda-Dravidian folks in *Democracies of the East.* Benoy Kumar Sarkar's *Villages and Towns as Social Patterns* is also a notable contribution towards an analysis of rural institutions. Marriage and the family were treated philosophically by Rabindra Nath Tagore and Hirendra Nath Dutta and socio-psychologically by Mukerjee and N. N. Sengupta in their joint writings on *Sex and Culture.* Patrick Geddes' Town-planning exhibitions in India, and teaching in the University of Bombay where he occupied the chair in Sociology focussed attention to problems of urban social deterioration. His reports on town-planning of Calcutta, Indore and various cities of Southern India are a mine of information and suggestions as regards present urban disorganisation and renewal. Mukerjee his associate in some of Geddes' town planning surveys discussed the social effects of industrialisation in India and advocated reorientation of rural and urban economy in *The Regional Economics of India* and *Man and His Habitation.* Mukerjee's pupils R. B. Gupta in his *Labour and Housing in India,* B. S. Haikerwal in his *Economic and Social Aspects of Crime in India,* Bogle in his *Town-planning in India,* and A. K. Misra in his *Urban Recreations* have later on dealt with particular phases of social disorganisation in Indian cities and towns under the impact of industrialism.

The Dawn Society under Satish Chandra Mukerjee and Dawn Society's magazine played an important role in the development of cultural sociology in Bengal. The National Council of Education which was established in 1906 as well as the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad (Bengali Literary Association) initiated researches in folkways and cultural institutions. The work of Ramendra Sunder Trivedi in the field of Aryan myths and ritual sacrifices and of Bepin Chandra Pal author of *The Soul of India* in the fields of Hindu morality and religion is especially significant. Brajendra Nath Seal, for a long time Professor of Philosophy at Calcutta, wrote *Comparative studies of Vaishnavism and Christianity* and a paper on *Race Origins* in *Interracial Problems* (Ed. Spiller) in which he contended that social development is multilinear and diversely ramifying, and that in most cases judgments of superiority or inferiority of social customs and institutions are wholly irrelevant. Seal emphasised that social insti-

tutions can only be fully and adequately studied in the context of race, religion and culture. Dr. Brajendra Nath Seal initiated studies in what he called comparative sociology.

Mukerjee's field investigations of the "rural communalism" of India, both in its political and economic aspects as a novel "ideal-type" of social organisation, and constrasted with Western capitalistic institutions which were disintegrating the traditional social pattern, might be regarded as an extended application of comparative methodology. Economics and Politics were broadened to take account of ethnic and national variations in differennt cultural regions and the boundaries between the different social sciences, such as, Cultural Anthropology, Economics, Politics, Law and Sociology crumbled down with the emphasis of the cultural region as a concrete study. Simultaneously the sociological Law of Correspondence was formulated, viz., that there is an agreement between stages and types of economic and political evolution with those of social development. Economic, religious and social norms and standards do indeed correspond. The school of Indian sociology focussed attention towards anthropological and sociopsychological field surveys, region by region, group by group. This was emphasised in the Foreword to the Indian Sociological Review (1934) edited from the Lucknow University. A more intimate coordination of the social sciences in the interpretation of the region is considered as prelude to a classification of social types, so essential for a comparative study of civilisation. A scientific study of the forces which govern social growth-formations in different regions, it is urged, will also be accompanied by a more improved purposive control and selection, the necessity of which is felt now more than ever in this age of the substitution of cultures in the East. "Not until we study the group life and formation of different communities in India with their regional peculiarities can we hope to establish democracy on the stable foundations of popular custom and usage, without which it will be a mechanical instrument of control, not the expression of a free, self-conscious group will, or, again, build an industrialism which will not thwart cherished national traits, nor bring about social unsettlement." The conflict between marriage and economic mores, in the family between communal rights in land and individualistic notions in property, between traditions of village government and the tendencies of centralisation, between education for social service and education as a means of livelihood, between communal recreation and the passion for individualistic enjoyment, between spiritual traditions and zeal for mass methods, all these exhibit unintended social metamorphoses in modern India, with corresponding deterioration of the character of the people. These have to be analysed and understood region by region, group by group. And for this social surveys must be initiated and introduced into new fields. Rural surveys and slum investigations are already bringing to light the weak spots in the economic organisation and suggesting their own remedies. "And similarly in alternative methods of apprenticeship, of employment, of factory management, of education or of the cooperative, collective and peasant types of farm organisation and finance, we shall realise the importance of

the regional and social survey which will furnish us with results that will be exactly measured for comparison and estimate in the conflicts between old and new."

Regional Sociology outlines a programme of scientific studies more comprehensive and socio-psychologically directed than the Geddes-Le Play methodology. The antiquated geographical determination is here avoided and *"Human Ecology"* was for the first time envisaged as providing the keys to the origin of diverse social types correlated with the plant and animal communities of a natural, easily distinguished region. First, the geographical region and the web of life within that region is here made the subject of a new division of the social sciences. Second, the synthetic nature of ecological approach is emphasised for here anthropo-geography, ethnology and economic history join forces to make a sociological interpretation. Thirdly, it is stressed that no sociology can be universally valid as long as it concerns itself largely with the Western world in its theorising, and fails to appreciate the remote regions whose life-histories are equally important in the formulation of universal social laws. Similar "provincialism" holds good in the system of political and economic theories established in the West. *Democracies of the East, Principles of Comparative Economics* and *The Institutional Theory of, Economics* have all sought to present a broad frame of reference without which the social sciences will be concerned with sectional social histories and limited generalisations.

The "Region" as the focus of social-ecological investigation is a dynamic "field" or pattern, a "configuration" like the Gestalt of Wertheimer, Koehler and Koffka, produced by vast ecological processes shifting the life-balance now in favour of man, now against him. The success or failure of social culture is rooted in this regional balance or unbalance. While American ecology is today largely concerned with problems of metropolitan, urban and rural distribution of population and services, the Indian school of ecology emphasises concepts, such as balance, organisation, disturbance and regression from plant and animal ecology and has undertaken meticulous studies of the pressure of human and cattle population on the total ecological complex in the crowded Ganges Valley. Studies of intensive population pressure have been made by Mathur and Misra in monographic surveys of two riverine districts, of distribution and migration of the Himalayan peoples by Pant in *The Social Economy of the Himalayaans,* by Baljit Singh in his *Population and Food Planning in India,* by Mukerjee in his *Food Planning for Four Hundred Millions,* and by Gyan Chand in his *India's Teeming Millions.* Mukerjee's *Regional Balance of Mans An Ecological Theory of Population* (1938) stresses the ecological notion of a natural demographic balance, albeit a shifting one, of the region which exhibits an increasing process of inter-linking of the living and the non-living world. The fundamental concepts of ecologic balance and vital interchange and solidarity of the region are here seen to underlie the laws and processes of population and sustained optimum economy. His *Migrant Asia* and *Races, Lands and Food* set forth a theory of human migration and settlement on the basis of ecological principles of

distribution and succession; while his more comprehensive work, *The Political Economy of Population* represents a psycho-sociological approach to population problems and policies and formulates an integral sociological theory of optimum population. *Man and His Habitation: A Study in Social Ecology* (1940) illustrates the operation of fundamental ecological processes such as mobility, segregation and dominance in the growth and structure of villages, towns and cities and their mutual relations. Social, mental and ecological patterns are here analysed in their mutual inter-dependence in a total ecological situation: hamlet, village or city.

While *Man and His Habitation* uses ecological indices for characterising the morphology and physiology of a whole region, for revealing the individuality and measuring the role of villages, little towns and cities and for ascertaining their respective orbits or boundaries as well as channels or routes of human circulation, it departs sharply from the traditional trail of Park, McKenzie and Burgess. Through human ecology use of the prevailing culture of an area in analysing its spatial pattern and its occupational base. While the ecological whole situation outlook may be a corrective of the neglective procedure of the specialised social sciences, it also supports a wide-minded co-ordination of mechanical-technic with regional and social planning, without which neither the evils of power-technology, nor the urbanised habits of the social group, both of which we seem to accept as the indispensable equipment of civilised existence, can be adequately counteracted. The ecology of human habitation thus has a deep theoretical as well as practical interest.

The concepts of psychological and social "field" and "life space" that have come recently into psychology and the social sciences from physics in the hands of Lewin, Brown, Murphy, Dodd, Lundberg and others are similar to the concepts of the "region" in *Regional Sociology* and of "ecological, social and moral space" in *Social Ecology*. The uniqueness of the individual personality is rooted in "personal-ecological space and time", from which he appropriates his quota of satisfactions and values. Man's "moral space" in which judgment of status and mobility takes place is defined and circumscribed as his mental, social and ecological and social space is limited. The "boundaries" of the latter help him in resisting the pressures of myriad groups with goals entirely different from his own, and chalking out his own "field" of goals and achievements from the distraction of disharmonious wishes and interests. Thus does he achieve his relative status and develop his distinctive personality in his limited ecological, social and moral space. In *Social Ecology* a systematic analysis has been made of social processes in terms of social status, mobility, distance and social and moral "boundaries". The drawbacks of the American ecological school who treat ecological and social interaction separately have been, as Lundberg points out, that the regional, structural and spatial relationships of groups and communities have been considered without their relevance to human meanings, values and symbolic behaviours. Thus a different and incompatible framework in super-organic and cultural terms had to be conceived. Suffice it here to indicate that in the conception of the Indian School ecological

relationships and cultural patterns are parts of one dynamic "region", "field", "social and moral space" or configuration.

Social Ecology, The Social Function of Art, The Social Structure of Values and *The Dynamics of Morals*: A Socio-Psychological Theory of Ethics form a systematic, quadripartite whole. Corresponding to the Organism-Function-Environment frame of reference in general biology (Patrick Geddes) and Man-Occupation-Region Scheme adopted in Social Ecology (*"Regional Sociology"* and *"Social Ecology"*), the frame of reference in sociology and ethics is Personality-Value-Group, the whole system being comprehended within the institutional set-up. Man, society and values cannot be understood separately. Each can be understood operationally only in terms of others in the personality-value-group, and man (organism) — culture (function) —environment "field". The social "field" and man's adjustment to it should both be considered as dynamic processes in which changes constantly take place, in which new social roles and statuses arise on the outer side, and social values, ideals and norms on the subjective side. The structuring of society, of values and of self is inseparable, with old articulations being superseded by new and apparently more adequate and satisfactory ones, these in turn constantly responding to external events, technological changes, cultural developments and chronic, subjective tensions. Values are the only stable realities that may constitute a frame for ordering of these complexes, intermeshed phenomena of the social "field".

Indian sociology is deeply rooted in religion. The strength of sociology in India lies precisely in its linking up ecological and earth-bound with social values, and social with aesthetic, moral and spiritual values. *The Social Function of Art* deals from a comparative viewpoint with the organic function and meaning of art in society as the vehicle of metaphysical ideas and moral ideals, and the broadcaster of mass social movements. The more vigorous and inflexible the framework of society and collective living under the logic of metaphysical or social fictions, myths and customs or regimentation under despotism, priestcraft or rigid caste system, the more do these social characteristics impose themselves upon the monumentality and immobility of both architecture and sculpture in a country. The development of individual consciousness, subjectivism, remanticism, idealism and mysticism, is translated directly into the subordination of architecture and sculpture to the pictorial, the decorative and the melodious sense. Thus does the change of accent of society from order and continuity to freedom and progress usher in the reign of painting and music, and introduce sinuous, sensitive and suggestive modelling and melodious play of light over form, of flat tone over space, into architecture and sculpture. The mystical attitude, that is the core of the personality consciousness, effects the transition from architecture to music and dance. The glory of painting and music pre-eminently rests on the genius of individuals as these arts reveal the complex and subtle nuances of the individual mood and the mystical sentiment set against the background of collective metaphysics, dogma and value. As we proceed from architecture through

sculpture to painting, music and dance, the individual releases himself at once from social myths and values and art styles and traditions of his environment to dive deep into the inexpressible mysteries of his own soul for the creation of new universal rythms and patterns that have an appeal to humanity much beyond their social context.

Finally, we come to religious and mystical values as reconciling the evolutionary and spiritual, the mechanical and the ideal, in Indian sociology. We find this emphasis in Tagore's *Religion of Man,* Vivekananda's *Modern India,* Aurobindo Ghosh's *The Life Divine,* Radhakrishnan's *The Hindu View of Life, East and West in Religion* and *Eastern Religions and Western Thought.* Coomaraswamy's *Hinduism and Buddhism* and Mukerjee's *Theory and Art of Mysticism, The Indian Scheme of Life* and *The Dynamics of Morals.* Dharma or Truth in Indian sociology is the fundamental law that sustains the Universe. It is also the metaphysical norm of individual maturation and perfection and of cohesion and solidarity of groups, classes and strata in society. Dharma's root principle is the identification of self and non-self. Social justice (samya) becomes thus an episode of the development and perfection of character in the individual through achievement of perfect serenity (sama) and identity of pleasure or pain or equality of fellowman with himself (samya, samadarsana, atmaupamya). Man's daily round of activity becomes a ritual, full of symbolic meaning and significance. The Indian myth of the Five Obligations and Sacrifices regards the whole cosmos as a circling chain of reciprocal duties and services binding together all its creatures. This is a basic metaphysical idea for the social order. Religion, metaphysics and morals alike proclaim in India communion, sharing and solidarity as the *leit motif* of individual and social culture. The rediscovery and elaboration of the principle of Dharma and of its relation to Deity, indeed, assimilate not only metaphysics into the core of sociological theory, but also the ancient humanism and socialism of Indian culture into the modern social equalitarian movement.

COMPLEMENTARY AND COMPETITIVE ECONOMIES, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN

By VERA ANSTEY

I. *The Problem. Scope of the Discussion*

There has been much confusion and controversy about what are the effects of various types of economic co-operation (in particular, customs union[1]) between two or more countries, and as to the influence of complementarity and competitiveness in determining the effectiveness and results of such co-operation. Both protectionists and free traders have advocated customs unions[2], whilst it is by no means clear even what is meant by "complementarity" and "competitiveness" in this context, let alone which is more conducive to the formation of an effective customs union.

The object of the following pages is to discuss certain aspects of these problems, to some extent in general terms, but with special reference to the case of India and Pakistan.

Questions of economic policy are inherently controversial not only because aims may differ, but because the ultimate results of pursuing a particular policy depend upon non-economic (political, social, psychological) factors as well as upon economic conditions. Even from the purely economic viewpoint the formation of a custom union, regional grouping, or of multilateral or bilateral monetary or trade agreements may result—according to the particular circumstances and terms of agreement—in either an extension, or a reduction, of specialisation and exchange. It cannot even be said, *a priori*, that an extension of specialisation and exchange will, in the long run, tend to maximise output and raise the standard of life either of the world as a whole, or even of the co-operating countries. This does not, however, render it impossible to make some useful, if limited, generalisations. What can be done is to denote types of circumstances that will tend to produce particular results if particular policies are pursued, and to distinguish certain factors that will render the relevant tendencies more or less strong.

For instance, Professor Viner enumerates seven factors which determine whether the formation of a customs union will result in freer or in more restricted trade.[3] His line of argument may be sum-

[1] A customs union is, of course, only one of the possible forms of economic co-operation (v. J. E. Meade: "Problems of Economic Union", three lectures delivered at the University of Chicago, Aug. 1952). It is, however, the main type aiming primarily at an extension of the market for the products of the co-operating countries, and I propose to concentrate mainly upon this aspect of the question in this article.

[2] V. J. Viner: "The Customs Union", New York, 1950, p. 41.

[3] op. cit., p. 51.

marised as follows: the economic effects of the institution of a customs union depend upon the circumstances prior to union and the tariff policies pursued before and after union. The result will be a net diversion of purchases either to lower-cost sources of supply--which will promote freer trade and increased specialisation of production for the countries which combine, and perhaps also for "outside" countries and the world as a whole—or to higher-cost sources of supply—which, contrariwise will tend to restrict trade and specialisation of production. The conditions which justify the presumption that a customs union will lead to freer (i.e. an expansion of) trade are (i) the larger the area of the customs union and therefore the greater the scope for internal division of labour; (ii) the lower the average tariff level imposed on imports from outside the customs union area, in comparison with what that level would have been in the absence of customs union; (iii) the greater the correspondence in kind of products (as between the different parts of the customs union) of the range of high-cost industries (in the broadest sense) which were protected by tariffs in both of the member countries before the establishment of a customs union; (iv) the greater the differences in unit-costs for protected industries of the same kind as between the different parts of the customs union, and therefore the greater the economies to be derived from free trade with respect to these industries within the customs union area; (v) the higher the tariff levels in potential export markets outside the customs union area with respect to commodities in whose production the member countries of the customs union would have a comparative advantage under free trade, and therefore the less the injury resulting from reducing the degree of specialization in production as between the customs union and the outside world; (vi) the greater the range of protected industries for which an enlarged market would lead to lower unit-costs in comparison with the products of "outside" areas; (vii) the smaller the range of protected industries for which an enlarged market would *not* lead to lower unit-costs in comparison with the products of "outside" areas, but which would nevertheless expand under a customs union.

Although "complementarity" and "competitiveness" are not mentioned in this list, there is clearly a relationship between them and some of Professor Viner's "conditions". Professor Viner points out that the usual assumption is that complementarity is an advantage in the formation of a customs union.[4] His condition (iii), however, shows that an expansion of trade will result from a customs union the more similar (and hence competitive) the uniting countries are with regard to industries which they wish to protect, whilst condition (vi) points out that an expansion of trade will result from a customs union the larger the range of the protected industries which would secure lower unit-costs from an enlarged market—it being clear from condition (iii) that the tendency towards trade expansion will be greater if these protected industries are similar in the combining

[4] op. cit., footnote 11, p. 51. See also F. V. Meyer: "Great Britain, the Sterling Area and Europe" (1952), p. 99.

countries. None of the "conditions" suggests that freer trade would be promoted by complementarity. Hence the inference, so far, is that an expansion of trade is more likely to be promoted if the two countries are predominantly competitive.

But let us enquire rather more closely how "complementarity" and "competitiveness" affect the ease of establishing a customs union, and the expectation that a customs union will be effective and advantageous (from the point of view of promoting trade expansion).

Although the terms "complementary" and "competitive" hardly need definition, it is not always easy to apply the distinction to particular countries. The distinction, however, becomes clearer if expressed in terms of cost advantage: the larger is the proportion of total trade between any two countries that is based on absolute cost differences, the more complementary are the two economies. Contrariwise, the larger is the proportion of total trade between the two countries that is based on comparative cost differences only, the more competitive are their economies.

It is clearly true that it is "easier" to abolish all trade barriers between countries whose mutual trade is based predominantly upon differences in absolute costs, because there will be less conflict of interests to overcome and more obvious gain from trade. If country A has deposits of iron ore, but not of tin ore (or is suited to the cultivation of pineapples, but not of apples), whereas country B is in the reverse position, there can be no opposition (on economic grounds) to the free exchange of iron ore for tin ore (or of pineapples for apples). But if this exchange were the only trade to ensue from the removal of customs barriers what advantage would be thereby derived? Neither country would in any case impose a "protective" tariff on iron ore or tin ore (or upon pineapples or apples); there could be no increase in specialisation; nor would the market for the product of each country be enlarged and thus afford an opportunity for a reduction in costs arising from larger-scale production. On the other hand if we consider the prospects for the adoption of a common tariff *vis a vis* all other countries, the difficulties confronting complementary economies are obvious: their interests would be diametrically opposed. Country A might wish to protect her iron-ore industry but to secure tin-ore as cheaply as possible, whereas the case would be reversed for country B.

At the other extreme, if both countries produced cotton and woollen textiles (and traded these commodities only), but country A had a comparative cost advantage in producing cotton textiles, whereas country B had a comparative cost advantage in producing wollens, there would be opposition in both countries to the removal of tariff barriers, although—if they were removed—both countries would be able to specialise more fully and might have the opportunity of reducing real costs by larger-scale production. Moreover it would be easy for these countries to conduct joint tariff negotiations with "outside" countries, and to agree upon a common tariff schedule.

If this were all, it might be concluded that a customs union would be more effective and advantageous for "competitive" than for "complementary" economies. In practice, however, this is far

from being "all". There is often nothing clear-cut, absolute or permanent about the classification of pairs (or groups) of economies as either "complementary" or "competitive", when the trade of other countries, and the existence of numerous traded commodities are taken into consideration. For the trade between any pair of countries is affected not only by conditions and costs of production within each of the two, but also by the trade of each with third parties, and the commercial policies pursued in relation to, and by, these third parties. For instance, in the second example given above, a customs union might divert (to B) A's purchases of woollens not from the home market, but from country C, which could produce at lower cost than B, but which could no longer compete in A's market when B's woollens entered free of duty (whereas C's products still had to pay a duty). Now if in the past only a low duty had been imposed by A on imported woollen goods, it is possible that A's market might have been supplied entirely by C's products, and that country A might have entirely ceased to produce woollens. For similar reasons B might have ceased to produce cotton goods. Under such circumstances countries A and B would appear to be complementary with regard to woollen and cotton textiles. Turning to the question of permanence, and taking the same example, it may be assumed for our purpose that country B was at a disadvantage compared with country A in the production of cotton textiles on account of the excessive (and relative) dryness of the atmosphere but that the introduction of artificial humidity overcame this difficulty, and indeed altered the balance of advantages between A and B, so that B came to have a comparative advantage in the production of cotton textiles. Hypothetical cases of this type could be multiplied, but it is hoped that enough has been said to illustrate the point that there is not necessarily anything either absolute or permanent about this classification. The conclusion is that complementarity seems to make customs union unnecessary, but mutual free trade most advantageous and, on economic grounds, easy to secure, whilst competitiveness provides a reason for customs union, but will engender opposition. In less extreme (i.e. less "pure") cases, there may be strong reasons to attempt to overcome the opposition from similar (i.e. competitive) industries, in order not only to secure the economies of specialisation in their case, but also to secure the free exchange of complementary goods (which might otherwise be subjected to a revenue or "general" tariff).

My object in the rest of this paper is to apply these concepts to the particular case of India and Pakistan[5], and to suggest how the initial opposition to freer trade between the two countries may be overcome by transitional measures. In so doing, I propose to start with a short historical retrospect (which is particularly illuminating because the unification under British Rule, followed by Partition, enables one to trace, within a relatively short period, the changes due to first an extension and then to a contraction of the market);

[5] This will have to be done in highly general terms, as a detailed analysis of the relevant data would be beyond the scope of this article.

then to analyse the economic factors affecting the prospects of economic union; next to enquire whether the freer trade criterion is appropriate for under-developed countries (such as India and Pakistan); and, finally, in the light of all these considerations, to draw conclusions as to the feasibility and probable effects of closer economic co-operation, and the best method of securing whatever end-policies emerge as most desirable under the given circumstances.

II. *Historical Retrospect*

It may be shortly said that the main effects of the substantial degree of economic unification of the whole Indian peninsula, under British Rule, upon the economic structure and internal trade of the sub-continent, were a somewhat extreme concentration in a small number of localities of modern forms of industrial, mineral and power production, together with the concentration of financial (e.g. banking) and commercial activities in the main ports and other large cities, and also a relatively high degree of localisation of the production of commercial crops (both foodstuffs and industrial raw materials) and of plantation products.

The outstanding factor favouring high concentration in most instances seems to have been the great economic advantages (or "external economies") derived from agglomeration at ports and railway centres, where transport facilities, public utilities of various types, and expert personnel were available, rather than the attractions arising out of the geographical distribution of resources and facilities. In the earlier stages of modern economic (including industrial) development the advantages of such agglomerations tended to outweigh those which may, in the longer run, be derived from a scattering of production and diversification of output in a much larger number of smaller centres, each of which can then take advantage of local supplies of raw materials (and foodstuffs) and serve neighbouring final consumers' markets. Outstanding examples are the concentration of jute mills in and near Calcutta, of cotton mills in Bombay (and in one or two other centres), of iron and steel production[6] and sugar-refining in Bihar and of hydro-electric installations near Bombay. During the inter-war period, and still more since 1939, industrial location has tended to change (e.g. for cotton mills, cement works and certain stages of the production of iron and steel goods) in the direction of the establishment of more up-country centres, supplying local consumer markets at lower transport costs for both raw materials and final products. In some cases (notably that of the Bombay Cotton Mill industry) this has entailed a decline in the former prosperity of the earlier industrial centres. The railway system, constructed to join the chief ports to inland commercial centres and to each other, and the railway rates policy (which favoured

[6] In the case of iron and steel production, of course, the availability of iron ore, other raw materials, and coal played a predominant part in determining the location of the Tata works, but the fact remains that until quite recently these were the only Indian works producing steel and many types of fabricated steel goods. They supplied over three-quarters of India's steel consumption by the end of the 'thirties' (the rest being supplied by imports).

long hauls to and from the major ports) also fostered industrial concentration.

The net result was an extension of the market for commercial crops and the products of modern industries to embrace practically the whole of the Indian peninsula—an extension of the market surprising and unusual for a region as economically backward as India. This involved, on the one hand, a great increase in total productivity and the transformation of the famine problem, whilst on the other hand—so long as a predominantly free trade policy was pursued—it also involved increased specialisation in the production and export of primary products and dependence upon imports of manufactured goods. After a policy of discriminating protection was adopted (in and after 1923) for the chief modern, large-scale industries, the Indian market for consumption goods came to be supplied mainly by the products of domestic industries instead of by imports from the West. Producers' goods, however, continued to be secured mainly through imports. The great economic achievements under British Rule—whatever may have been the incidental disadvantages—were thus a substantial increase in total productivity and the elimination of the worst results of the vagaries of the monsoon by means of the unification of the internal market. Unfortunately the increase in total productivity was prevented, by the contemporaneous increase in population growth (and rate of growth) from transforming itself into any appreciable increase in output per head or rise in the standard of life.

The Partition of 1947 abruptly reversed the tendencies towards economic unification and extension of the market characteristic of the period of British Rule. It led, on the one hand, to an artificial division of the whole country into three main parts (i.e. the Indian Union, West Pakistan and East Pakistan) but, on the other hand (as is often forgotten) it resulted in the absorption of the former Indian States into the Indian Union, or Pakistan, respectively, with—to that extent—unifying results.[7] Given economic co-operation on a broad front after Partition, this might have resulted in a further expansion of the whole Indian market, but in the event of the increasing estrangement of India and Pakistan—especially after the devaluation of sterling in 1949, which resulted in an equivalent devaluation of the Indian rupee but no devaluation of the Pakistan rupee, and thus initiated a prolonged and far-reaching trade war between the two countries, as well as the erection of a new monetary barrier—far outweighed the benefits reaped from the absorption of the former "Indian States" into what had been "British India".

It is unnecessary to detail here the story of the disastrous effects of the dislocations following Partition (including the sufferings, losses and economic burdens and problems resulting from the large-scale—and long-continued—migrations between the two countries). It should, however, be noted that the situation deteriorated, especially in 1949-50, so that the pattern of trade between the two countries

[7] This type of unification could not be secured under the British Rule owing to the treaties with the Princes.

changed substantially even between 1947-48 and 1951-52.[8] It was therefore not merely a matter of the erection of trade barriers between the two countries, but an almost complete cessation of legal trade,[9] from time to time, and an enduring determination, on both sides, to become economically independent of each other. Although the trade agreement of August 1952 has to some extent eased the situation and checked the deterioration of trade and of commercial relationships between India and Pakistan, it has not yet been fully implemented, but has been accompanied by administrative frictions and other difficulties which have so far prevented smooth operation even of the agreed exchanges of commodities.[10]

The division of economic resources and activities by Partition can be briefly summarised by saying that India retained the chief ports (except for Karachi) and large-scale mineral, power and manufacturing centres, whereas Pakistan secured (especially in Western Pakistan) the major food and raw material surplus areas. Thus (in the absence of facilities for mutual trade) Indian industries (such as the jute and cotton mill industries) were cut off from a large part both of their raw material supplies, and of their former markets. The Indian consumer could no longer secure West Pakistan's surplus foodstuffs, whilst Pakistan had to turn elsewhere for markets for its primary commodities and for sources of supply of manufactured consumers' goods.

This arose partly by geographical accident, in the sense that physical and economic features and resources were more favourable to industrial and commercial agglomeration in predominantly Hindu regions, and to the production of surplus agricultural crops in predominantly Moslem areas, but partly because—for various social reasons—in all parts of undivided India modern forms of financial, industrial and commercial organisation had been developed by Hindus rather than by Moslems, with the result that modern enterprises of all types had been more readily adopted in areas which were eventually assigned to the Indian Union. Moreover the banks and

[8] For instance, whereas raw cotton and raw jute used to be the two major exports from Pakistan to India and coal and cotton textiles were the principal items received in return, by 1952 raw cotton had almost disappeared from the picture, whilst India had progressed far towards self-sufficiency in jute. Pakistan plans to become self-sufficient in cotton textiles by 1953, and already supplies 40% of her own needs as compared with only 10% in 1947. Pakistan also plans to replace coal by oil for industrial purposes, and to manufacture her own jute. Many similar examples could be quoted. See, for instance: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, July 1952; (Asiatic Review, Oct. 1952; Supplement to the Indian Trade Journal, May 17, 1952 (Report on Economic & Commercial Conditions in Pakistan); Economic Weekly (Bombay) May 17, August 2 and August 23, 1952; Indian Trade and Industries, Sept. 19, 1952; Economics and Commerce (Karachi) August, 1952; Times Review of Industry, Sept. 1952 ("Pakistan's Trade Crisis"). The most recent Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement of August 1952 does not even mention jute and coal:

[9] Much smuggling occurred across the economically highly artificial boundaries.

[10] On the history of trade relations and agreements between these two countries see Economics and Commerce, Jan. 1952: "Indo-Pakistani Trade and Trade Relations" by A. A. Anwer. *Indian News*, Sept. 6, 1952 (Indian High Commissioner's Office, London), gives a summary of the current Trade Agreement.

other modern economic institutions in areas assigned to Pakistan were largely manned by Hindus, so that the post-partition migration of Hindus from Pakistan to India (and of Moslems from India to Pakistan) largely stripped Pakistan of the personnel necessary for the maintenance of modern forms of economic enterprise, whilst the Moslems who left India for Pakistan were mainly agriculturalists. The post-partition migrations, therefore, not only created an enormous and costly refugee problem, but also greatly aggravated the apparent complementarity of the two countries.

In addition partition strengthened in both countries the pre-existing determination to industrialize, and to become more economically independent (if not actually self-sufficing), whilst the pursuit of this policy by India and Pakistan, acting independently of each other, entailed not only restrictions on imports of each others' goods, but also the duplication of existing raw material and manufacturing capacity. Thus Pakistan quickly decided to expand her small existing cotton mill industry and to establish jute mills[11], whilst India attempted to increase her acreage under jute and cotton. This created a particularly difficult problem for India, as it was highly desirable that she should at the same time greatly increase her output of foodstuffs in order to reduce her dependence upon (very costly) imported foodstuffs. For whereas before 1939 the Indian subcontinent depended only to a minor extent on imports of foodstuffs (mainly Burmese rice) since then needs have increased whilst available supplies have declined. The Indian Union, in the absence of the pre-Partition free access to Pakistan's normal food surplus, has been left with a serious food deficiency, greatly aggravated by the rapid growth of population, a series of bad harvests and (until quite recently) the complete failure of the "grow more food campaign" which started during the war. Pakistan—again until quite recently—has been more favoured by world events as the overall shortage of world food supplies, the rearmament drive, the Korean war, and the U.S.A.'s stockpiling programme resulted in a relative rise in world demand and prices for Pakistan's main exports, and have enabled her to find new and profitable markets for her primary products which were diverted by the Indo-Pakistan trade war from the Indian market. This enabled her to purchase imported manufactured goods[12] on relatively easy terms and to benefit, rather than lose, from her decision not to devalue. It is true that quite recently world trends and prices have proved less favourable, and have given rise to a so-called "crisis", whilst poor harvests have even necessitated imports of food into East Pakistan.

It is undeniable that Partition (in the absence of economic co-operation) has reduced the free market for the products of both countries, has tended to reduce specialisation and the advantages to be derived therefrom, and has tended to encourage an uneconomic dupli-

[11] Leather, paper, sugar refining and chemical factories have been established, hydro-electric works are under construction, and match factory is planned.

[12] In some cases of course delivery was long delayed (especially of machinery and other capital equipment) owing to world shortage of such goods and the rearmament drive.

cation of productive capacity. The nature and direction of both countries' trade has notably changed even in the few years since Partition, whilst for India the future outlook is darkened by the fact that whereas she has become more and more dependent upon exports of manufactures, which up to the present have found ready markets especially in near-by overseas markets that before 1939 were largely served by Japan and Germany, the revival of exports from these latter countries will surely reduce her profits from such sales in the near future, even if these markets are not completely lost.[13]

III. *Economic Factors affecting the Prospects of an Indo-Pakistani Customs Union*

Having briefly reviewed the main effects of first, unification and, second, Partition, on the trend of economic development in the Indian sub-continent, it must now be asked how—given the present economic conditions, ideals and policies in India and Pakistan—a customs union would (if at all) fit into the picture.

Let us first consider to what extent Professor Viner's seven "conditions" favouring trade expansion (in the formation of a customs union) apply in this case.[14]

It is clear that—whether considered from the point of view of area or population—India and Pakistan are "large enough to provide scope for internal division of labour (and also that, under British Rule, such division of labour did occur). Next—taking "conditions" (ii) and (iii) together—it can be said that India and Pakistan produce, or aspire to produce, and *protect,* a number of the same industries (e.g. the Cotton Mill Industry, the Paper Industry, and the Sugar Refining Industry). Further, so far as agricultural commodities are concerned there is a similar desire to encourage certain crops, e.g. long-staple cotton. Where India possesses resources (for instance mineral resources) not present in Pakistan, Protection is normally unnecessary. Indeed the protective tariff schedules of both countries and their need for revenue duties are remarkably similar. It should not, therefore, prove difficult to secure co-operation in negotiating trade agreements with other countries, or in drawing up a common import tariff schedule, whilst there is no obvious reason why there should be any increase, after union, in the level of tariffs on imports from outside the customs union area.

With reference to condition (iv), it can be suggested that as Pakistan is behind India in industrialization, it is probable that she will at first do best in the simpler types of industry—e.g. in cotton spinning, as contrasted with weaving—which should provide scope for the emergence of substantial "differences in unit-costs for protected industries of the same kind as between the different parts of the customs union" and therefore for economies from free trade between the two areas. Fourthly (conditions vi and vii) there seems every reason to expect that an enlarged and secure market would lead to

[13] In 1951, already, Japan replaced India as the world's largest exporter of cotton goods (U.N. Special Release, November 23rd, 1952).

[14] See p. 471, above.

reduced unit costs for the many infant industries which India and Pakistan hope to develop. So far as these "conditions" go, therefore, there seems ample reason to suppose that a customs union would tend to expand production and trade.[15]

Should we, therefore, consider India and Pakistan to be complementary? or competitive? It seems that, in the past, the areas now known as India and Pakistan were largely complementary, exchanging predominantly foodstuffs and raw materials (from what is now Pakistan) for manufactures (from what is now the Indian Union). But since Partition the pattern of trade has tended to change; firstly due to the policies pursued; secondly because these policies tend to bring about a permanent change in production and productive capacity. The fact is that although in the past the two areas have been complementary, in reality they are potentially competitive. Once certain initial difficulties have been overcome, there is no reason why cotton or jute goods (for instance) should not be produced at as low a cost in Pakistan as in India. In other words, India and Pakistan, as a result of Partition—in the sense that Partition has created the desire and the power to duplicate in each area certain economic features formerly characteristic of the other area—are in the process of changing over from complementarity to competitiveness.

It may well, however, be argued that, in forming a customs union, India and Pakistan might secure some of the advantages of complementarity (such as the absence in a substantial sphere of clash of interests, and the obvious advantage of, for instance, free exchange of coal for wheat) as well as some of the advantages of competitiveness (e.g. similar interests in imposing protective import duties).

Nevertheless it is quite impracticable to suggest the formation of a customs union in the foreseeable future, or simply to assume that in the long run such a policy would prove advantageous to both countries.

It is impracticable to suggest a customs union apart altogether from political difficulties, because free trade between two countries would necessarily frustrate their "plans". Pakistan, in particular, has determined upon and has already taken its first steps in the direction of industrialization but certainly could not overcome its initial difficulties in this direction without some kind of protection against the already developed (or more developed) industries of India. Even if it could be demonstrated conclusively that such a policy would bring an immediate increase in the prosperity of both countries, the reply would be made that in the long run, at least for Pakistan, more would be gained by deliberate industrialization. Indeed it might well be argued that only by deliberate economic planning, involving some degree of industrialization, could output and hence income per head be raised permanently and substantially above its present miserably low level. What truth there is in this contention must now be examined.

But before doing so, one further problem must just be mentioned. This is that merely to form a customs union, without further, more

[15] It seems difficult to make any judgment under condition (vi).

fundamental co-operation, between two otherwise independent countries, would prove impracticable. Sooner or later balance of payments difficulties would be encountered, which could not be solved without the adoption either of common monetary and credit institutions and policies, or a fluctuating exchange policy (or some alternative device).[16] As, however, the formation of a customs union involving free trade between the co-operating countries is not here envisaged, the problem does not arise. So long as trade and monetary controls are maintained, balance of payments difficulties can be looked after by means of a trade agreement, re-inforced (if necessary) by currency reserves, and (or) tariff, currency and exchange quota systems.

IV. *Is the Free Trade Criterion acceptable for Under-Developed Countries?*

It has so far been argued that Indo-Pakistan possesses many features—some complementary, some competitive—which favour closer economic co-operation, but that the customs union solution, including the removal of tariff barriers between India and Pakistan, is impracticable, because incompatible with their accepted economic plans. It must now be examined whether—even if it were practicable—the free trade criterion would be in the long-run interest of under-developed countries, such as India and Pakistan.

Strong reasons to the contrary have recently been most convincingly expressed by Professor Nurske[17], and it is my opinion that even if we accept the superiority of private competitive enterprise, the price mechanism, and free trade in the international sphere, over national planning and control (which need not, however, deny important roles to private competitive enterprise and the price mechanism within the "plan") for economically advanced countries and even in the short run for densely populated under-developed countries, yet, in the long run, for many countries of the latter type, it will prove impossible by these means to achieve the desired results (i.e. increased per capita output and income, and an improvement in the standard of life).

This is because (a) the poverty of such countries is mainly attributable to a scarcity of capital in relation to resources and labour, resulting in low efficiency and output per head, uneconomic organisation, and under-employment of a large proportion of the population, with the inevitable result that demand is inelastic for most goods (except perhaps primary foodstuffs)—or, in other words, that there exists no large and profitable market for additional products: (b) As the value-productivity of capital is limited by the size of the market, although there is scarcity of capital in under-developed countries, the marginal productivity of capital is, in fact, extremely low: (c) Where the standard of life is very low and where population presses on the means of subsistence, any temporary easing of the situation, through an increased supply of foodstuffs and consum-

[16] v. J. E. Meade: op. cit., p. 19 et seq.

[17] Ragnar Nurske: "Some Aspects of Capital Accumulation in Under-developed Countries" (National Bank of Egypt, Cairo, 1952).

ers' goods—whether from good domestic harvests, or from outside "aid"—however desirable on humanitarian grounds, will result not in any permanent or cumulative increase in productivity per head, but in increased consumption, a fall in the death-rate and a higher rate of population growth, which means that the larger supplies will merely maintain a larger population at an unaltered standard of life: (d) Underemployment cannot be cured by monetary expansion, which will merely lead to inflation.[18] The deficiency is in real purchasing power, not in monetary demand, and hence cannot be cured merely by, for instance, raising wages and other monetary rewards. (e) Although to extend the market by removing the post-Partition barriers to trade between India and Pakistan might undo the harm resulting from Partition, it could do little more, and would obviously not suffice to break the vicious circle of poverty, inefficiency, and low output per head.[19] Moreover it would necessitate abandoning or reversing the economic programmes of the two countries, and would reduce the planning power of both. In particular Pakistan's campaign for the establishment and assistance (on "infant industry" grounds) of modern forms of industry would be frustrated.

From these propositions it follows that private enterprise and capital, whether from within the economy or from outside cannot provide a solution for the problem. The profits to be reaped are either nil, or low in comparison with those that can be secured elsewhere (i.e. in advanced countries) whilst the methods likely to be employed (e.g. the establishment of high capital intensity plant) may not be suitable to the needs and capacity of under-developed areas.

But this is not to say that there is no way of breaking the vicious circle, nor that economic co-operation cannot assist the process.

What is required is that there should be "a more or less synchronized application of capital to a wide range of different industries."[20] so that "people working with more and better tools in a number of complementary projects become each other's customers", leading to a "balanced growth" of production, especially in the first place, in public utilities and services (irrigation, drainage, roads, railways, housing, education and training schemes) and in "industries" (including agriculture) catering for mass consumption, leading later to the establishment of complementary and bye-industries of every description, together with carefully controlled provision for a contemporaneous and persistent increase in domestic saving, in order to assure cumulative and accelerated advance. "Balanced growth" (by securing so-called "external economies", which result in social benefits, but not in private profits) "appears in the present context as the basic means of enlarging the size of the market and as a prerequisite

[18] "Effective demand" in terms of Keynesian economics is not one of the main determinants of the size of the market in the sense in which we have discussed it.' Ragnar Nurske: op. cit., p. 9.

[19] Professor Nurske calls attention to the case of China in this connection, p. 10 (i.e. China became a single market after 1928, but remained one of the poorest countries in the world.)

[20] Ragnar Nurske, op. cit., p. 4.

for stimulating the private inducement to invest."[21] That is, in under-developed countries, "the forces that are to defeat the grip of economic stagnation have to be deliberately organized through some form, and some degree, of central direction and collective enterprise, at any rate initially."[22] Here the argument is that private enterprise will not suffice because it is unsuited to undertake at one and the same time investments of diverse types, on the necessary scale, chiefly because of the discrepancy between the private and social marginal productivity of capital, which means that the returns to such investment would not take the form of profits for the private investor, although they could eventually be secured by the State or other Public Authority in the form of increased taxable capacity.

It is impossible, and would be irrelevant, to pursue in detail here the whole subject of how to secure the initial stimulus, and capital, for balanced growth, and how to control consumption in the initial stages in order to achieve that persistent increase in domestic saving necessary for cumulative advance. It must suffice to say that Professor Nurske gives reasons for assuming that the task will not prove impossible, if the nature of the problem is fully understood. Clearly it will not be easy to limit consumption[23] whilst there will be need for some capital from abroad, if progress is to be at more than a snail's pace. But no one denies that a certain amount of foreign capital will be forthcoming. What is feared is that this foreign capital may run to waste by failing to initiate the requisite cumulative movement and balanced growth. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the capital invested can only be prevented from running to waste if provision is made to limit consumption during the initial stages and thus to secure an increase in productive capacity, not merely in production.

If, then, it is concluded that in under-developed countries some form and degree of central direction and collective enterprise is essential to break the vicious circle, it follows that India and Pakistan must be enabled to pursue their own ideals and policies, in order that they can plan a balanced advance over a broad front, but it remains true that it will benefit both countries if they pursue these ends in co-operation with each other, and co-ordinate their plans so as to minimise mutual clashes in interest, and maximise the mutual advantages to be obtained from an extension of markets and pooling of "know-how".

V. *The Potentialities of Closer Economic Co-operation between India and Pakistan*

Professor J. E. Meade[24] has distinguished six main objections of international and intra-national economic co-operation, and then pro-

[21] Ragnar Nurske, op. cit., p. 5.
[22] op. cit., p. 7.
[23] It is common knowledge that those countries which industrialized most quickly (i.e. U.S.S.R. and Japan) did, and had to, control consumption during the transition period.
[24] op. cit., p. 2 et seq.

ceeds to concentrate upon the case of two or more countries which come together to form an economic union with the hope of raising their efficiency and standard of living by creating a large free trade area (and perhaps also a large area "within which the factors of production can freely move to the most productive employments"). After deliberately setting aside two important aspects of the problem, he proceeds to enquire "what are the minimum economic powers which they must surrender to the supranational or union authority? What is the maximum range of economic functions that they can properly retain for their own national governments?"[25]

Although I wish to consider here that type of economic co-operation which aims at an integration and hence enlargement of the market for the products of the co-operating countries, it is unnecessary to proceed as deeply into the matter as Professor Meade has done, because our analysis of Indo-Pakistani data has already led to the conclusion that, for the time-being, it is impracticable even to contemplate the removal of trade barriers between the two countries. Nevertheless in suggesting the possibility of formulating a less ambitious programme, which does not require us to face immediately the central problem posed by Professor Meade, it is desirable to bear in mind from the start that if the policy advocated should work well it may prepare the way for the creation of a fully integrated and completely free Indo-Pakistani market. If so, it will then become necessary to decide whether the advantages to be thereby derived would make it worth while to surrender that degree of sovereignty to the supranational or union authority which would be necessary for the proper functioning of a full economic union.

Is it, then, possible to devise a policy which could secure some, at least, of the advantages to be gained from integration of the home markets for Indian and Pakistani goods, which could at the same time reconcile the interests and ideals of both countries (as expressed in their present economic plans), and for the time-being reduce to a minimum any necessity to surrender sovereignty and independence? And if so, is there any hope that such limited measures could eventually lead to a situation in which the present insuperable obstacles to free trade (and the free movement of the factors of production) between India and Pakistan, would become merely matters of mutual adjustment and compromise? My contention is that this could be done, if the nature of the long-term problem were realized from the start, so that the policies pursued from day to day should not raise unnecessary and artificial barriers and vested interests too strong and deep-rooted ever to be overcome, set aside, or ignored.

My point is that the very imperfect and not yet satisfactorily implemented and administered measures, which have already been adopted perforce (in the form of the Indo-Pakistani Trade Agreement of August 1952) in order to mitigate the intolerable effects of the disastrous trade and monetary wars arising from Partition and the devaluation of 1949, offer a by no means negligible, though still

[25] op. cit., p. 4.

severely limited, basis upon which—with luck and good sense—better things could be built.

Each country would have to begin by respecting—and accepting as "given"—the economic plans and aspirations of its neighbours. For instance, it must be recognized that Pakistan has the right to industrialize, and India to become more self-sufficient in food and raw materials, if they so wish.

The policy would then be—in the light of continuing negotiation and exchange of views—to amend and extend from time to time, the existing arrangements, whereby it is agreed to trade given quantities of particular goods at stated prices. Improved and extended trade operations could gradually be worked out, in combination with the development of the economic plans of both countries. Even consultation and a mutual knowledge of each others plans might suggest methods by which a co-ordination, or even an adjustment of plans could bring mutual economies and advantages. As, by hypothesis, tariff barriers would be retained, it might prove feasible to replace the present agreed exchange of goods by tariff quotas on competitive goods (such as cotton and jute textiles), so calculated as to preserve the home market for domestic products to the extent of the capacity of the domestic industry, plus duty-free imports (up to the estimated total domestic demand) from the partner country. Beyond this, prohibitive duties could be levied. In so far as India and Pakistan are complementary, trade could gradually be thrown open for the relevant commodities.

It would, of course, be necessary to watch and control the balance of payments, but this could be done by the mutual grant of short-term credit of agreed amounts, to cover fluctuations in such balances, whereas a long-term tendency to lack of balance in a particular direction could be corrected by the offer of an assured and preferred (or free) market for the products of specified industries, to which it would then be worth the while of the exporting country to give priority within the national "plan".[26]

By these and similar means trade could gradually be extended and, to a considerable degree, freed from duties. Similarly, by consultation and mutual agreement to supply each other with certain necessary goods, the tariff schedule of the two countries, applying to other countries, might gradually be co-ordinated and eventually unified.

If the "plans" of the two countries succeeded in increasing productivity and the standard of life, total demand would also rise, and it might prove possible progressively to raise, rather than to reduce, the tariff-free quotas for (at least some) competitive goods, in spite of the growth of protected domestic industries. Eventually, as infant industries matured, some—at least—would prove as efficient as the other country's longer-established industries of similar types, and

[26] Pakistan has normally had a surplus trade balance with India, although recently there has been a change in trend. If necessary, and given an assured market, it should not prove difficult to arrange for (e.g.) India to step-up production, and export to Pakistan a given quantity of manufactured goods of types needed by Pakistan.

might cease to require protection. Competing industries in each country would then each have an advantage (e.g. through lower transport costs) in certain localities, and compete elsewhere.

In this way expanded and integrated markets for Indian and Pakistani products could gradually be secured for an everwidening list of goods, until the ultimate goal of mutual free trade seemed but a small last step.

In conclusion let me admit my consciousness that some readers may think that a mouse has emerged from the travail of a mountain. Let it not, however, be forgotten that mice are prolific, and that a sufficient proliferation of mice might, in time, move—or undermine—the mountain.

MUKERJEE AND MINIMUM WAGES

By SARALA GARG

Social thought of our times has been profoundly influenced by Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee whose pioneer work in the social sciences has not only enlarged their specific frontiers but has brought about greater integration and unification among the various systems and disciplines that would have never been possible without his rich contributions. No other social scientist has been a pioneer of equal eminence in so many social sciences at the same time. Professor Mukerjee extended the frontiers of human knowledge both by his philosophy and methodology, the former resting on the oneness of life between man and nature and the integralness and compositeness of values and the latter bringing about a synthesis between field studies and analytical thinking. Life is one and the world we live in is both physical and metaphysical—a meeting point of matter and spirit, fact and value. Human problems, therefore, when studied from any partial viewpoint e.g., economic, political or ethical, fail to give that perspective which is essential for an adequate understanding. A scientific approach has to be human i.e. organic or integral and this cannot disregard the fundamental relationship between man and nature on the one hand and between matter and spirit, fact and value on the other. In Professor Mukerjee's system human values include, yet transcend and govern the economic forces of supply and demand. Social and economic values blend and interpenetrate for building up a wholeness and integrity in man's total being and his total environment. We have here not only a more adequate explanation of social behaviour and human relations, but the social processes and the functions and mechanisms of social control are also brought into closer interdependence. All this has proved invaluable for both theoretical treatment and practical social policy.

The methodology developed by him to achieve this remarkable extension of human knowledge rests on a widening of the scope and purpose of field studies beyond the merely statistical or collection of primary data for quantitative relations. Human behaviour can seldom be explained by simple correlations, much less by quantitative types confined to any individual field of values, impulses or desires. We have to look forward to multiple correlations that are interspersed in several directions and the motivating forces cannot always be measured quantitatively. Field studies bring to light these correlations only when social surveys are designed, for an intellectual sharing of the experiences of the common man on the point under investigation, to cover life as it is lived, as a composite whole. It is such experiences that aid fundamental research or give objectivity to universal truths.

An attempt is made in this paper to follow and not evaluate,

Mukerjee's treatment of the wage problem in India leading to his advocacy of minimum wages and thereby demonstrate as an example, the superiority of the methodology adopted by him.

Let us start by stating the purely economic view of wages. It can be deduced logically from economic laws that in a market economy the current level of money wages represents the equilibrium wage. If it is raised by action outside the market forces of demand and supply, the equilibrium is disturbed causing either a shrinkage of employment or inflation. In both cases, the workers as a class suffer. At this money rate all workers who are in search of employment are supposed to be employed; competition among them will force the level of wages till all have found employment. Ultimately, therefore, the current level of wages will be such at which there will be full employment representing equilibrium between the forces of demand and supply. Wages will tend to stabilise at this equilibrium point. Any increase in money wages, say, by administrative action or through collective bargaining, above this point, that raises real wages will tend to displace labour since the demand for labour at the higher level will be less. Pressure from the displaced workers will again lead to the equilibrium being restored at the original low rate. Alternatively, a rise in money wages may be associated with inflationary pressure and under these circumstances there will be no improvement in real wages. On the contrary, due to the time lag between the rise in cost of living and money wages the standard of living of the workers may actually be pulled down. Real wages tend to fall under inflationary conditions. In brief, an increase in money wages over the market rate will either cause unemployment or an inflationary rise in prices and cost of living reducing real wages.

The policy implication of the purely economic theory is that in a market economy wages should be left to the free play of the market forces and the state, even a welfare state, can do little to improve the standard of living of the workers. Field studies even with highly accurate statistical designs gave no more hope to the working class. These revealed conditions of sweating, desperately low wages, and sub-standard level of living of workers in many parts of the world especially in underdeveloped regions. An allround low wage scale is almost the rule in poor countries where economic life for the toiling masses is miserable and sub-human. But low wages and poor living conditions are not altogether unknown even in the high-income countries. Many areas of depressed wage industries were located in these otherwise fair wage countries. At the same time however, field studies revealed little surplus capacity with employers of low wage workers to pay higher wages. Under given conditions industry has seldom a capacity to pay more than what it does. Statistical surveys of consumer behaviour revealed equally no margin for increasing wage rates. Inevitably these studies confirmed the theory that a rise in money wages above the market rate would tend to restrict the market and consequently the employment opportunities.

Mukerjee brought to light the fallacies in this static conception of wages and succeeded in establishing a dynamic theory instead, that has since been the corner-stone of a progressive wage policy. These

fallacies were caused first, by applying analytical tools to static conditions whereas the world in which the worker lives and works is in fact dynamic; secondly, by ignoring the factor that a rise in money wages may itself lead to an expansion of the market; and thirdly, and this was a very serious desideratum, by disregarding altogether or substantially the social aspect of the wage problem. In brief, economic analysis proceeded on unrealistic assumptions and was not sufficiently broad-based. Mukerjee's methodology gave him a distinct advantage. It required analytical thinking to be related to the facts of life. He started by finding out the working and living conditions of the Indian workers. Soon it was clear that wages were extremely low even by standards applicable to a poor country and workers generally eked out a miserable living. But the more startling fact that his investigations revealed was that even at these low rates there was considerable unemployment while under-employment of the agriculturists was chronic. This exploded the myth that the current rate represents the equilibrium wage at which all workers in search of employment find jobs. There was no equation of demand and supply in the labour market under the free play of economic forces. Many workers seeking employment at the current rate found no employment. Nor were the workers reconciled to their poor living and sub-human existence. There was a clear indication not only of the absence of a stable equilibrium in a narrow sense but the sub-human living conditions for the workers threatened the very base of society and civilization.

Wages in the country are low every where and within this low range there are wage differentials that have no system. Mukerjee was the first to point out the chaotic character of the Indian wage structure, the wide disparity in wages in different industries, regions and jobs and the extreme disparity in the wage level in the country and that in the progressive countries outside. He drew attention to the social risks and dangers inherent in the situation. Extreme discontent leading to industrial breakdowns, strikes, riots, and "direct action" of all kinds are the most overt but by far not the most potent ones. Continuance of such conditions may release forces for a violent revolution in the country.

At the same time Mukerjee found that productivity per worker in the country was one of the lowest in the world and so was the per capita income. But his most revealing discovery that led to the formulation of a dynamic theory of wages was that both labour productivity and per capita income were restricted by the low wage rate in the country. That productivity governs wages was commonly accepted, but his new finding was that productivity was also governed by wages and the two were interdependent. This was the most significant discovery that brought fair wages within the reach of workers in each industry and economy howsoever underdeveloped it may be. An industry's capacity to pay is not absolutely limited but improves with an increase in wages. With this discovery of elasticity in an industry's capacity to pay and the inter-dependence of productivity and wages the theoretical limitations to the improvement of low wages to a fair level were found to be unrealistic.

Mukerjee proved that the notion 'that an improvement of wages leads to the workers' idleness or extravagance is a half-truth to which many employers still cling, and which is as economically perilous as socially disruptive.' This is so because the extra payment over the current rate necessary for minimum living needs is soon covered by increased productivity instead of causing any shrinkage of employment in the long run as was formerly believed. Hence, raising the wage level to satisfy the minimum living needs is a precondition of increased productivity and economic progress. As Mukerjee states: 'A living wage which secures not merely the full human needs of labour but also the conditions of efficiency and comfort in relation to the particular occupation or industry improves the output per worker and benefits industry in the long run'. It may be that during the transition an industry may be put to temporary difficulties but, if it is efficiently organised and well run, there can be no doubt that in the long run productivity will catch up with the increase in wages. The increase in productivity will lower costs resulting in an expansion of market and employment. If, however, there are industries which even in a dynamic situation cannot increase productivity to pay living wages, these are basically unsuitable for any economy. According to Mukerjee, 'sub-marginal industrial undertakings which cannot afford to pay living wages to the workers have no right to exist, and the sooner these are forced out of the field, the more surely the standards of decent living and working conditions establish themselves in the country'. Mukerjee puts forward the case for a living wage as a minimum not only on economic grounds but equally 'in order to stress the social responsibilities of industry'. Minimum wage takes the form of a social wage and is not simply an expression of economic relation in an industry at the minimum desirable level. The policy implication is obvious, that minimum wages should be guaranteed to all workers and in fixing such wages the criterion of living needs alone should be the determining factor. The alternative criterion of capacity to pay is extraneous in the determination of living wages. At the same time Mukerjee does not ignore that the standard of living needs is relative to the economic conditions, particularly the per capita income of a country.

Economic theory has now recognised the interdependence of productivity and wages and the claim of workers to a living wage. The capacity of industry to pay is now treated as a function of the wage rates. As pointed out by Pigou, the demand schedule for labour is not independent of the supply price of labour but is liable itself to be revised when that price is raised. This is so, primarily on account of the compensatory effect of a rise in real wages on productive efficiency. With an increase in wages, when workers are very poorly paid so as to be unable to meet their needs for living and efficiency, their capacity and willingness to work would obviously increase. "In this way the extra pay creates the extra efficiency which it rewards, and there is no cost to anybody" (Pigou). This is, however, not the only source of increased efficiency. At the other end, the pressure of high wages acts as a spur on industry which

seeks better organisation and methods to prevent costs from rising. Pigou recalls that when Trade Boards were first instituted in the sweated industries in England it was found that employers were stimulated to organise their work better and to use improved methods—thus securing a bigger output that compensated them for their higher wage payments. Moreover if the increase in money wages is not confined to a narrow field the consequent improvement in the general standard of living of workers tends to enlarge the market and employment generally. When sometimes back minimum wage in U.S.A. was raised from 40 cents to 75 cents per working hour it was argued that it would displace labour particularly in the Southern States. Actually there was no such displacement and the workers are now enjoying a higher standard of living and at the same time have more employment opportunities than before.

These salient ingredients of the modern theory of wages were first envisaged by Mukerjee who, while advocating the criterion of living needs for fixing minimum wages, brought about a synthesis between the alternative criterion of productivity and capacity to pay for the determination of actual wage rates. In the fixation of wages the prevailing conditions in any particular trade or industry are as germane as the level of national income in a country for determining norms of living needs. Mukerjee calculated the living needs of an average worker in India with reference to a dietetic norm of 3,000 calories per day, 45 yards of clothing per annum, and 100 sq. feet of living space per capita for a family of 3.4 adults or 4 persons with the ration expenses constituting no more than 50% of the wage to leave enough to meet other items of the household budget. In his actual calculation of the national minimum wage standard at Rs. 33 per month at pre-war prices or Rs. 165 per month at the current price level the expenditure on food, however, represents less than 45 per cent of the wage.

This, of course, cannot immediately be applied as a national minimum to cover the bulk of workers including those in agriculture, cottage industries and handicrafts in a country where the per capita income at current prices is placed at Rs. 265.2 for 1950-51 i.e. about Rs. 22 per month, and where the prevailing wages were less than Rs. 10 to Rs. 12 per month at the prewar prices or are Rs. 25 to 30 per month at the current price level for most of the unskilled workers. Hence Mukerjee pleads for gradualism and suggests that the gap between the minimum standard and the current wages be abridged by stages to prevent any sudden dislocation of economy. A beginning may be made with what he terms as the rock-bottom minimum at two-thirds of the minimum wage norm and the full standard may be reached within a period of ten years. To smooth the transition, different industries may be treated differently—a high standard being adopted from the very beginning in the organised industries and a lower minimum according to circumstances in case of others. Differentials should take into full account the higher capacity to pay in each case above the minimum for a group. In factory industries he suggests that the full minimum standard can be guaranteed from the beginning in components of the basic wage

constituting three-fifths of the minimum (Rs. 99), dearness comprising two-third of the remainder (Rs. 44) and production bonus for the balance (Rs. 22). To link it with the capacity to pay, Mukerjee has advocated a compulsory scheme of profit-sharing linked with industrial output. Likewise he has suggested the enforcement of the minimum wage gradually from the larger towns to the smaller ones and eventually in villages and adoption of regional differentials according to differences in the cost of living.

In his scheme, the principle of equal pay for equal work is basic, all the more as women workers in India, unlike many industrial countries, are often independent wage-earners. These are mostly widows who have to support their families. My investigations showed that in the building industry where most of the women workers in U. P. are employed as many as 40 per cent had to support their families by their independent earnings and in the total sample more than one-third were widows. But besides widows there are others also, such as those who are deserted or whose husbands are disabled, decrepit or chronically ill: they remain the chief bread-winners of the family. In my sample these latter constituted 26 per cent of the total women independent earners. At an average each one of them has to support 2.3 adult units or a family of 3 to 4 persons. Mukerjee, however, has suggested a lower minimum in the beginning for women, children, apprentices and handicapped workers in accordance with the prevailing practice.

Mukerjee has thus paved the way for abolishing sweating in all its forms and cleared our doubts and uncertainties in the wage theory that abstract reasoning along partial lines has created. The Minimum Wages Act and the progressive labour policy adopted in the country after Independence undoubtedly bear the distinct impress of a single work viz. The Indian Working Class by Mukerjee. Indian planning today needs more courage for bringing about both an improvement of national output and redistribution of national income in order to secure to the working class a fair deal at the minimum level advocated by him. His treatment of the whole problem is even more significant from the viewpoint of thought as it establishes the supremacy of the method of broadening our enquiries into the whole of social process even when the subject apparently pertains to economy in a narrow sense, and of integrating analytical and normative with practical and inductive studies for making social science concrete both as knowledge and as application. The social scientists in every field will always owe a debt to his methodology.

LAND UTILIZATION

By D. S. CHAUHAN

Approach to Planned Agricultural Production

The dominating idea in planning agriculture at present is that of enhancing the output in all the fields of agricultural enterprise. There is, however, a controversy regarding the desirable extent of increase over a specified period of time. These norms are usually based on different criteria such as 'self-sufficiency' or 'adequate desirable standard' or 'putting agricultural economy on sound footing so as to maintain a progressively rising standard', implying thereby to maintain the growing population on a gradually improving economic standard. There are bound to be wide variations in these estimates, particularly in view of the present unsatisfactory state of statistics in India. However, a workable analysis is always possible; and the Planning Commission, giving the top priority to agriculture (including irrigation), have fixed the following targets for the period 1951-56:—

Kind of produce		Total out put 1955-56	Additional out put over 1950-51	% of increase
Food grains (including grains and pulses).	(Mill. tons)	61.6	7.6	14
Cotton.	(Lakh Bales)	42.2	12.6	42
Jute.	(„)	53.9	20.9	63
Sugar.	(Mill. tons)	6.3	.7	12
Oil Seeds.	(„)	5.5	.4	8

(For food the figure for additional output is for 49-50, since in 50-51 the output was abnormally low.)

It works out roughly an average increase of 15% within a period of 5 years. Without entering into the question of the magnitude of effort contemplated in different fields of agriculture let us start with the assumption of an all-round increase about which there is unanimity of opinion.

In any attempt at an increase of such magnitude, the present man-land and cattle-land ratios have to be considered in all their biological and economic aspects, region by region. Both human and bovine population are pressing hard on the resources. Land is gradually becoming more scarce. The struggle for existence between man and beasts has reached a critical stage, and man has be-

gun to drive out cattle in certain regions.[1] There is a serious danger of indiscriminate land-use in these areas. Under the stress of the immediate problem of shortage of agricultural production which has crystallised in the form of land-hunger, the long-term view of balanced land-use is likely to be sacrificed. The fear is not unfounded since the history of mankind affords conclusive evidence that in the struggle for a more satisfying way of life man's handling of resources has been a failure, most of the damage wrought by him is permanent, and those malpractices still continue, implying thereby that man has not become wiser in matters of resource manipulation. In our country the history of misuse is writ large in deforested areas, wasteful cultivation on hills, increasing floods, widening and deepening gullies, increasing aridity, and declining faunal forms which are ultimately endangering the very basis of human life. Attention to this misuse was for the first time drawn in India by Dr. R. K. Mukerjee in his Rural Economy of India. "Not only does man dissipate or exhaust without replenishing the resources of nature, but he also upsets the natural equilibrium of the different levels of the region he inhabits, liberating destructive forces which ultimately engulf his carefully wrought handiwork—his civilization." He strongly pleaded for the protection of the heritage of nature from the rapacity of mankind, in the form of national policies for the development of fauna and flora; and he repeated the warning later on in "The Food Supply of India", 'The Regional Balance of Man' and 'Planning the Countryside'. More recently during the last war there was wide-spread and indiscriminate deforestation in many areas, and as a consequence of zamindari abolition there is now indiscriminate plouging up of village forests and pastures, and felling of trees for fuel. Our recent surveys reveal that in many villages the pasture lands are almost eliminated, and lovely spots in the countryside denuded and now present a barren and wasteful appearance. Another misuse of land, particularly of fertile land, is found on the rural-urban fringes where large and wide-spread brick kilns spoil not only the ground on which they are situated, but also a considerable part of the surrounding cultivated area. But the most alarming features in the land-use are presented by the accelerated erosion particularly in the Jamna-Chambal tract, and the growing aridity in the western portion of the Ganges Valley, popularly termed as the extension or invasion of the desert, about which Dr. Mukerjee warned the Government about 25 years back.[2] This sounds a note of warning against any further

[1] The study of human and cattle population and the food situation shows that there is a decrease in the total number of cattle, buffaloes, horses, ponies and sheep and goats, (the superior type) and an increase in pigs, poultry, and camels, whose maintenance is cheap and less competitive with that of man. A still more interesting fact is that the thickly populated parts which are deficit in food supply mostly coincide with parts of decreasing bovine population, and the cattle population is increasing mostly in parts which are surplus in food supply.

[2] In his evidence before the Royal Commission on Indian Agriculture he drew the attention of the Government about the Dust Bowl of India establishing itself over about a thousand sq. miles of land once smiling in plenty, and invad-

misuse of land resources and on the positive side it calls for a highly imaginative, far-sighted policy of resource conservation.

It is worthwhile to appreciate that there are limits to man's enchroachment on land for cultivation, and secondly, agriculture can prosper only as a part of the balanced resource system, what Mukerjee in his "Food Planning for Four Hundred Millions" describes as the triangular relationship between land, man and cattle. The unity, balance and harmony of the ecological complex, Mukerjee insists, must be understood and conserved in land-use. Any particular genus of life is created, consolidated and maintained through subtle, complex and manifold relationships between human community on the one hand and the regional complex on the other. Man is a part and parcel of those interwoven relationships by which regional balance is maintained, refined, shifted or broken. From various angles he shows that the pattern of life evolves as a complex whole; and he interprets social progress in terms of an over-all balance with the geographical milieu or symbiosis with the entire range of ecologic forces and factors. Life can be sustained and progress can be maintained only so long as the ecological balance is not disturbed. The central idea in planning agricultural production from this viewpoint, therefore is to reconcile the need of improvement of allround production with optimum land-use corresponding to the balance and harmony of the ecological complex.

Inelasticity of Production

To increase production in a poor but over-crowded country is by no means an easy task; and the crux of this is to give the initial impulse for an upward movement. In agriculture particularly the production structure is rather rigid. This rigidity reflects itself in that production on the whole lags far behind the population increase and that the responses of farmers and farms to price fluctuations are very slow, and in many cases nil. The more outstanding recent example is the failure of the Grow More Food Campaign to bring about the desired increase in production.

A study made by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture to determine trends in crop yields over the last 40 years indicates that in no State do all crops show a constant decline in yields. Commercial crops on the whole show an increase, but in food crops the yield trend is not uniform. Certain crops in certain States show a decline while others show an increase, and some others do not exhibit any perceptible change. Generally speaking an expansion in area under a crop has been associated with the lowering of yield (because of new lands being less fertile) while an increase in irrigation has an opposite effect. The study concludes that there is little ground for belief that there has been a deterioration in soil fertility or in the standard of husbandry in recent years. But the fact remains that the official estimates framed on the comparable basis show a decline

ing the Ganges Valley in a great convex arc at a rate of about half a mile per year. Recently while inaugurating the B. R. School of Economics and Sociology, Agra, he repeated his warning with greater emphasis that U.P. was committing a regional suicide in its south-west.

in yield per acre of cereals from 619 lbs. in the period immediately preceding the war to 565 lbs. as an average for 3 years ending 49-50, i.e., a decline of 8.7%. As a matter of fact on the basis of such data one hesitates to arrive at any definite conclusion regarding yield trends. But undoubtedly there is no evidence of an increase; and the data show stabilization at a low level of productivity. Besides, there are a few features, viz., lack of facilities in the newly opened areas, general decrease in the quantity of manure, over-irrigation in canal areas, development of alkalinity in certain parts, erosion in some other parts, and the adoption of agriculture as a subsidiary occupation by artisans and village menials who are inefficient farmers, lacking the necessary agricultural equipment and operating on a very small scale, which singly and collectively contribute towards decline. The cumulative effect is a general deterioration of the agricultural situation.

The land-use pattern

The total area of the Indian Union is 810.8 million acres. Since all the States do not collect statistics of land untilization and even in the States which collect some pockets are left out of account, the data for land classification is now available only for 615 mill. acres. or 75.8% of the total area. Even in this 3.5 mill. acres remain unclassified. On the basis of the available information we find the following land-use pattern:—

Land classes.	Area. (Mill. acres.)	%	% (3 yrs. average)
Net area sown.	266	43	42.4
Forests.	93	15	14.9
Not available for cultivation.	96	16	16.4
Other uncultivated lands (excluding Current fallows).	98	16	15.8
Current fallow.	58	9	10.5

The net cultivated area is 266 mill. acres. The gross cropped area, including the conventional estimates for non-reporting areas in respect of food grains and the double cropped area, which is 35.5 mill. acres or 13.3% of the net area sown, comes to 317 mill. acres. The study of the trends in land-use patterns over the last 40 years shows that except in U.P. the net area sown shows no appreciable increase. The increase under double cropping is responsible for a slight increase in gross cropped area. But even then it lags far behind the rapidly increasing population. Again the area under irrigation has increased by about 10% essentially through the extension of canals; and under minor irrigation works it has remained almost stationary. It means that new constructions have been neutralized by older ones going out of use for want of repairs. Thus we find that in spite of the increasing population pressure very little new area has been brought under cultivation, and consequently man-land

ratio has become adverse. This evil was first pointed out by Dr. Mukerjee and as a counter-measure he advocated a bold policy of population control.

It is generally believed that part of the cultivable waste can be utilized for extension of cultivation and afforestation. It is however doubtful whether there can be any significant increase in area under cultivation from this source without adoption of major development schemes for which the large capital required may not be available in the near future. There may of course be some scope for extending cultivation on a limited scale through minor works which can yield quick though not significant results.

Till the early forties the area under current fallow remained almost the same as in 1919-20. But thereafter it has shown a continuous increase. During the last decade it increased by about 25% i.e. from an average of 8.9 acres in 1936-39 to 10.9 mill. acres in 48-49. This increase is seen mostly in States like Hyderabad and Rajasthan, and falls mostly in cotton and millet growing tract. It is partly due to recent zamindari and jagirdari abolition and the decrease under cotton area. Whatever the reason, this is said to be an index of the potentialities of agricultural extension in the long run. There are really many difficulties in cultivating this land.

The study of the trends in crop patterns based on the data relating to the main growing areas shows that during the last 4 decades the area under oilseeds (mostly groundnut) increased by about 4 mill. acres and under jute and sugarcane by 1 mill. acre each. Under cotton there was a decrease in area between the two wars, and at that time food grains showed slight increase. But now cotton shows an increase and there is no significant expansion under foodgrains. The existing cropping pattern is given in the following table:—

	Mill. Acres.	%
A. Food Crops.		
Cereals.	193.04	60.88
Gram.	18.71	5.90
Pulses.	28.47	8.98
Fruits and Veg.	5.00	1.58
Other food crops.	1.65	.52
	246.87	77.86
B. Commercial crops.		
Major oil seeds.	26.68	8.41
Other oil seeds.	4.27	1.35
Cotton.	14.56	4.59
Jute.	1.45	.46
Other fibres.	1.05	.33
Sugarcane.	4.21	1.33
Tobacco.	.90	.28
	53.12	16.75

C. Plantations, condiments & spices.		
Plantation Crops.		
(Tea, coffee, rubber)	1.19	.37
Condiments & spices.	2.46	.78
	3.65	1.15
D. Other Crops.		
Fodder.	11.17	3.52
Other Crops.	2.27	.72
	13.44	4.24
	317.08	100.00

No uniform pattern of land utilization is possible in different regions of the country which are widely different from each other in topography, soil and climatic conditions, and population pressure. However, in the northern and coastal plains the extent of cultivation must be greater than in other parts. The present land use and distribution throughout the country reveal that limits of agricultural extension are reached to a considerable extent in the plains or mostly in rice lands which are also thickly populated and where the struggle for existence is more acute. The difficulties of Rice Zones were emphasized by Mukerjee in his various writings and also in his report as Chairman of the Economics and Statistics Commission of the F.A.O. Conference at Copenhagen. This brings out a very important conclusion regarding the land-use pattern and population adjustment. In the northern and the coastal plains, and particularly in the rice zones, extension of the area under cultivation has no vast potentialities, and hence reliance here has to be placed mainly on intensification: but in the central zone, or more particularly in the millet area there seems to be a fair scope for extension.

MUKERJEE: THE FRONTIERSMAN IN THE STUDY OF SOCIAL DISORGANISATION IN INDIA

By SUSHIL CHANDRA

Social Work and Sociology

Criminology, one of the newest disciplines in the hierarchy of the modern social sciences, is as a subject of post-graduate study in India merely a decade and a half old. The credit for organising teaching and research in the sphere of social disorganisation in this country goes to Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee, the father of Indian Sociology. It was in the twenties of the present century, when Social Work was hardly recognised as a serious subject of study at the Indian Universities, that he for the first time invited the attention of sociologists and social workers to the vast unexplored fields of personal and social disorganisation.

In 1917-18, Dr. Mukerjee in a series of lectures on Indian slum life in the general background of the effects of industrialisation on social structure delivered at the major Universities drew pointed attention to the factors underlying appalling congestion, vice, alcoholism, delinquency and destitution under modern urban-industrial conditions. Mahatma Gandhi who presided over one of these lectures in Delhi in November 1917 pointed out on the occasion that the importance of this question whether our infants would live and grow in strength and vitality in our industrial towns or they would continue to die as soon as they are born, which Professor Mukerjee clearly explained, could hardly be exaggerated from the point of view of national efficiency. These materials on social disorganisation were later on marshalled in Mukerjee's chapters on Indian Slum Environment and Public Health and Economic Conditions in Relation to the Social Evil in his *Principles of Comparative Economics.* Vol. 2.

A decade later, in 1938, when Dr. Mukerjee was requested to deliver the first Convocation Address of the Dorabji Tata Graduate School of Social Work, now the Tata School of Social Sciences, Bombay, the theme he chose was "Social Disorganisation in India". Dr. Mukerjee, the path-finder, pointed the way for a serious and scientific study of social problems which he considered were socio-psycho-genic in character.

Parallelisms in Origins

When John Howard, on his appointment as High Sheriff of Bedford, in 1773, started a deep probe into the conditions of the British places of detention, little did he realise that he was laying the foundations of a humanitarian movement which would, in the course of time, grip the attention of the entire civilised world.

Little did Dr. Mukerjee also realise three decades back that in course of time Social Work would develop as the pivotal subject in the Scientific Social Survey Movement which he had initiated in India at that time. There is a close and intimate relationship between sociology and the practice of social work. When Dr. Francis G. Peabody organised such a course for the first time at the Harvard University some of the academicians took a critical attitude and doubted its suitability for inclusion in a university curriculum.

Giddings was one of those who was sceptical about such inclusion. Mary Richmond too did not view a close affiliation of University teaching with social work and charity. If social work is a helping, ameliorative activity, how could this art benefit from one science merely? With Sociology emerging as the social science *par excellence,* drawing heavily from the allied fields of psychology and psychiatry, and with the latest development of an integral approach in contradistinction with the earlier deterministic theories and methods, its utility and importance to social work has almost come into its own. Similarly, the role of Social Science in furnishing improved social work techniques cannot be minimised by those who emphasise social work as a profession. As a profession it implies both education and training. Social science has to provide education while training has to be made available through practical field work. The cumulative result of social surveys, scientific deliberations and rational thinking spread over a long period had been that most of the Schools of Social Work in the West are now part and parcel of accredited universities.

If University education has to keep itself abreast of the changing conditions and needs in a community and is catholic enough to incorporate new academic trends in its body-curriculum, Social Work as a subject drawing heavily from the social sciences will have to obtain a place of honour and prestige in the University syllabus. If the goal of a social welfare state has to be achieved in India, a large number of social services and welfare organisations will have to be set up. Such agencies, whether governmental, municipal or voluntary, cannot attain any standard of work efficiency unless these are manned by social workers well trained in the field and well-educated in the various disciplines of the social sciences. It is through the medium of such an army that a successful struggle against the various social problems, that have crept in as a result of the processes of social disorganisation, is to be launched before a modicum of social justice could be meted out to the common man.

The Field of Social Disorganisation in India

In pointing out the field of Social Disorganisation in India, Professor Mukerjee has said, ". . . the transition from the rural to urban economy, from handicraft production to the machine industry, has been too disintegrative and the growth of railways, cities and towns too rapid to permit a slow and gradual adaptation of the habits and attitudes of the people. Such changes have accompanied a severe economic pressure, the disruption of the joint family and caste control

and the unsettlement of status and custom; the individual, so to speak, has been thrown out of doors to the fury of economic forces. . . . . The continuous city-ward drift due to unremunerative agriculture, indebtedness and multiplication of agricultural labourers, and the overcrowding in our industrial cities and towns, with inadequate opportunities of employment of woman labour, have introduced new problems of moral and social deterioration unknown before. Intemperance and prostitution in all our industrial cities are alike the results of a striking excess of males over females, over-crowding in slums, casual unemployment, physical mobility and mental restlessness."[1]

The specific problems on which Professor Mukerjee focussed the attention of social workers were over-crowding, vice and crime, juvenile delinquency, the incidence of venereal diseases, prostitution, crime and poverty, crime and caste, the reclamation of criminal tribes and castes, organised beggary, the control of pauperism and institutionalisation of social service.

In describing the extent of venereal disease, he has said, "syphilis is, relatively, speaking, a new infection first introduced into the Indian port-towns by the Portuguese, and it works greater havoc in the contact-zones where the hill and forest-dwellers come in contact with emigrants and probably among the rural, more than among the urban-dwellers in this country. In the villages venereal diseases are far more common than are usually supposed."[2] One of the probable reasons for such a situation according to him appears to be that "the periodical fairs, *melas* and festivals throughout India become occasions when villagers from far and near indulge in herd prostitution somewhat resembling the seasonal ribaldry and license of the primitive tribes of Chota Nagpur and Chittagong hill tracts, who give up all their sex taboos and regulations during the spring festival. In one fair in Bihar at Sonepur a census has shown the presence of as many as 276 prostitutes within the *mela* area and the situation by day and night is as revolting as it is dangerous to the hygiene of the country-side."[3]

In discussing the extent of prostitution in the urban areas he has said, "When labourers flock to the *bustis, dhowras*, and tenements honey-combed with rooms, in which there is little privacy, where there is no segregation between the sexes, prostitution becomes common . . . . .The disparity between the proportions of the sexes in all industrial cities and especially in the mining areas also indirectly encourages prostitution. In one of the mill towns of Hooghly district, Bengal, out of 300 women immigrant workers, one in three admitted being a prostitute; among the people born in Hooghly, one-third of the families worked in the mills, of whom one in every four professed to be a prostitute. As a matter of fact in many *bustis, dhowras* and tenements throughout India there is practically open prostitution especially on offdays and holidays. . . .But in the bigger cities she is often seen in the street by night and in some quarters fairly in herds. Along with the congested slums, taverns, tea and coffee shops, she seems

[1] Mukerjee: Man and His Habitation, p. 217.
[2] Mukerjee: Social Disorganisation in India, p. 12.
[3] Ibid, p. 13.

to be regarded as being as essential to existence as industrialism and the loneliness and coarse relaxation of an alien urban life."[4]

Analysing the field of Social Disorganisation in India Dr. Mukerjee has remarked. . . . . the entire trend of social and economic forces is bringing about both social and individual disorganisation, especially in our new cities and towns where the social crisis due to the spread of an unplanned industrialism, supported by rural decay and the disintegration of family, caste and community habits, attitudes and values, has made it more and more difficult for many individuals to construct a new life-organisation out of the remnants of the old. These become the unfortunate victims of social disorganisation: the thieves, the paupers, the vagabonds, the prostitutes, who have lost their vital contact with society."[5]

What Dr. Mukerjee suggested, nearly two decades ago, regarding the remedial measures for tackling these problems holds good even to this day. He said, "It requires little imagination to realise that social work will be a mere palliative in India and that vice, pauperism, intemperance, disease and crime cannot be prevented unless the unfavourable social situation caused by an unbalance between the decline of agriculture and urban-industrial concentration, between the decay of the village and the expansion of a few over-crowded and tentacular cities like Calcutta, Bombay and Cawnpore, rearing their heads over the debris of deserted fields and broken homesteads, be counter-acted. A wise social and economic planning like what is being adopted in Germany, Italy and the United States can alone prevent social inadequacy, maladjustment and suffering, and contribute towards the positive promotion of mass welfare in India."[6]

Mukerjee's concept of disvalues as clue to the understanding of socio-pathic behaviour

The beginnings of the study of Social Disorganisation are to be found in the valuational, social-problems approach. With the emergence of a socio-pathic problem, the nature of which is almost readily apparent and the characteristics easily recognisable, attention is focussed on how to formulate social action for the eradication of the social evil. Faced with such a situation attempts are made to restore the lost equilibrium in keeping with the prevalent ideologies and the state of existing knowledge. This is partly the reason why the social-problems approach, which arose as a result of the great humanitarian movement of the latter half of the nineteenth century is now regarded as a moralistic and a practical common sense approach. With greater development of the Social Sciences rapid strides were taken in understanding and tackling such problems on a more scientific basis. From the social-problems approach to the bio-psychological, geographical or an improved version of the same, viz., the ecological and psychocultural to the modern integral approach shows the tremendous advance made by social science in understanding MAN and his problems. The ex-

[4] Ibid, pp. 13-14.
[5] Ibid, p. 19.
[6] Ibid, p. 19.

planation of a problem of social-disorganisation today cannot be fur nished in terms of biology, psychology, psychiatry, ecology, or in relation to cultural entities and processes merely but is to be found in over lapping and inter-penetrating phases of the various disciplines. The present understanding of delinquency and criminal behaviour has, for instance, passed through various marked phases. From the many unorganised and ephemeral explanations of delinquency and crime, stated and accepted during the various stages of man's advance to the modern clinical conceptions in the understanding of sociopathic behaviour, is a long and tedious process which shows the tremendous advances made in the conceptions and treatment of delinquency and crime. For this development the methods and materials of social ecology and social psychology, the former dealing with ecologic causation and distribution of forms of social disorganisation and the latter clarifying both normal human values and disvalues and unvalues of diseased and disintegrated groups and minds have become crucial.

In discussing the ecology of social disorganisation Mukerjee stresses that contemporary social disorganisation cannot be understood without placing mobility in the centre of the perspective, nor can mobility, according to him, be adequately interpreted without adopting an integrated and synthetic viewpoint. The predominant heterogenous adult population with its excess of single persons, the abnormally rapid tempo of life, the fluidity of social relations and the freedom of competition and contract in the deliberate pecuniary standard that emerge in the successive levels of social accommodation—all these are reciprocally interdependent, and express the Gestalt of modern social disorganisation of which physical and social mobility is the fundamental process. Mukerjee observes, "The rate of mobility and tempo of life of the community are enhanced by the congregation of young adults and less females in the industrial town. This affects social life and relationships. Excessive mobility hinders the functioning of the joint family, caste and Panchayat organisation, which represent the traditional forms of social government, and disintegrates the family and the firmly integrated social and moral standards. The Panchayat or council of the five is the ubiquitous implement of social government in India, originating in the periodical redistribution of holdings and collective management of water, which prevailed among her rice-growing, aboriginal villagers. But the Panchayat hardly regulates the behaviour of mill-hands in the new industrial towns. Nor do neighbourhood relationships develop where homes are not owned and so frequently changed. In the Bengal mill-town the worker is neither a casteman, nor neighbour; often he is not even a family man, but is living an enforced single life and entering into casual sex alliances; he is dissociated in any case from the stable groups and controls which integrate society. Everywhere the breakdown of family, caste, panchayat and neighbourhood controls tends to promote pathological behaviour and social disorganisation.[7] The significance of Mukerjee's treatment of social disorganisation is its unified ap-

[7] Mukerjee: Man an His Habitation, pp. 215-216.

proach. Excessive mobility is biologically rooted in the peculiar age and sex composition of an urban community.[8] A dominant male sex ratio and a deficiency of children stimulate the brisk feverish tempo and the eat-drink-and-be-merry attitude and promote family breakdown and vice. Mobility has also its economic basis. A constant vertical movement of individuals and economic classes is the economic consequence of machine technology and presents a marked contrast with the rigid social stratification in a rural community. In urban society the greater the mobility, the greater are the economic contrasts of wealth and poverty, independence and destitution. Mobility also cannot be understood without reference to the characteristic formal, pecuniary standard that governs larger and larger spheres of interpersonal relations and corrodes moral and aesthetic values while fitting well into the machine technology, rapid tempo of life, interdependence of labour and freedom of mobility. In the social disorganisation of an urban community Dr. Mukerjee stresses the correspondence between ecological, economic and personal relations. This synoptic analysis of social deviation and pathological social relations in the different levels of ecology, economy and morality, so that every sector is seen in relation to the whole, is the crux of the modern treatment of social disorganisation.[9] Further, mobility is measurable. The correspondence between mobility and rates of social deviation or "gradients" has been discerned in recent investigations of social disorganisation. Professor Mukerjee has used the concept of mobility in its successive levels or phases both for the interpretation of social disorganisation as an integral self-perpetuating process and for exact and quantitative study of social deviation.

It is well known that Professor Mukerjee in his sociological writings has stressed the objective character of values either actually or in thought and independent of desires or emotions of man and claiming his allegiance in different social situations. This view-point has been of considerable significance for his development of the concept of disvalues or unvalues as a key notion in the study of social disorganisation.

Dis-values or un-values, according to Mukerjee, have their psychological origin in the lack of coherence or dissociation between the biological, the social and the ideal phases of human satisfaction. The pursuit of mere biological values to the exclusion of the social and ideal values spells, in his view, social unsettlement and disruption. Abnormal social conditions marked by the unstability of group and institutional life are associated with the persistence of pathological institutions that evade laws and social codes, such as the brothel, the saloon, the gambling den, the gang and the black-market. These foci of "disvalues" are fairly common in all societies.[10].

The pursuit of dis-values, according to Professor Mukerjee, is a function of the group situation, governed by expectancies and pressures that originate within the group and that determine the indivi-

[8] Ibid, Chapter VI.
[9] Mukerjee: Social Ecology, Chapter IX.
[10] Mukerjee: The Social Structure of Values, p. 300.

dual's mode of conduct and morally justifies it. Thus "social dis-values are institutional. In a sense, the aggressive or coercive anti-social action of a gang or mob is social."[11]

On the other hand, even in the gang the delinquent enjoys self-esteem and self-status. It is social expectancy which governs the individual's judgment of himself and even though the goals of the gang are socially disruptive, these are selected from the surrounding culture and as the individual identifies himself with these he retains respect for both himself and others. The insight that disvalues are emergents of the primary social process or inter-personal relationship is new and valuable. Dis-values and deviations from norms and standards, according to Dr. Mukerjee, enter into patterns of social disintegration and social degeneracy. The chaos, disintegration, falsification and perversion of values are illustrated in the process of disorganization that ranges from an increase of mobility and casual impersonal relationship, frustration and revolt of the individual to cultural lag, inflexibility of the status-power system, break-down of traditional controls and revolutionary economic and political upheaval. A society in chaos or disorganization exhibits a whole constellation of individual and social neuroses, crimes, immoralities, and other pathological features that fit into one another into a system, cumulatively aggravating the unadaptability of the individual, the inadequacy of social values and norms and the instability of society. Thus valuation phenomena are significant for the understanding of individual behaviour in both normal and pathological aspects.[12]

The recognition of the above principle is fundamental in Dr. Mukerjee's view for the combat against social dis-values. More and more social pathology and psycho-therapy should develop techniques and methods of reintegrating diseased individuals and groups by working upon the total sociological situation or the group-context rather than by isolating the individual and his deviation and its consequences from the social milieu. Professor Mukerjee puts less emphasis in the study of social disorganisation on the purely intellectual phases of development and more on matters like social adaptability and status within the group and inter-personal connections. The entire social-cultural complex is often actively involved in ego-conflict and disorganisation which utilise childhood traumas and insecurities as well as adult psychic tensions in the depressive social-cultural milieu for the development of neurosis as an established, accommodative pattern of life. Thus the whole problem of reorientation of groups, cultural values and aspirations in which the abnormal individuals can find a new adjustment that may break the vicious, pathological circles of causation, obtains a new significance.[13]

The new school of social work at the Lucknow university under Mukerjee's directorship has addressed itself to this important field. Various problems of social disorganisation have come under the purview of research. The results of such research are attracting the atten-

[11] Mukerjee: The Dynamics of Morals, p. 361.
[12] Ibid, pp. 139-140.
[13] Ibid, p. 368.

tion not only of specialists, but of legislators and social workers. A comprehensive plan for social welfare in India and its effective implementation, no doubt, rest on the results of objective, scientific researches in various fields of social disorganisation, where even now as is aptly remarked by Dr. Mukerjee, "it is not the scientifically trained social worker but the politician or the propagandist who still remains the central figure.[14]

[14] Address on the occasion of inauguration of the University course, August 14, 1952.

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